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-Project Gutenberg's History of Greece, Volume 10 (of 12), by George Grote
-
-This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most
-other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions
-whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of
-the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at
-www.gutenberg.org.  If you are not located in the United States, you'll have
-to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook.
-
-Title: History of Greece, Volume 10 (of 12)
-
-Author: George Grote
-
-Release Date: February 11, 2016 [EBook #51183]
-
-Language: English
-
-Character set encoding: UTF-8
-
-*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK HISTORY OF GREECE, VOLUME 10 OF 12 ***
-
-
-
-
-Produced by Adrian Mastronardi, Ramon Pajares Box and the
-Online Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net
-(This file was produced from images generously made
-available by The Internet Archive/American Libraries.)
-
-
-
-
-
-
-TRANSCRIBER'S NOTE
-
-  * Italics are denoted by underscores as in _italics_.
-  * Small caps are represented in upper case as in SMALL CAPS.
-  * Letter spaced Greek text is enclosed in tildes as in ~καὶ τὰ
-    λοιπά~.
-  * Obvious printer errors have been silently corrected, after
-    comparison with a later edition of this work. Greek text has
-    also been checked with this later edition and with Perseus,
-    when the reference was found.
-  * Original spelling, hyphenation and punctuation have been kept,
-    but variant spellings were made consistent when a predominant
-    usage was found.
-  * Some inconsistencies in the use of diæresis (like “reorganize”
-    and “reörganize”) and in the use of accents over proper nouns
-    (like “Autokles” and “Autoklês”) have been retained.
-  * Throughout the text, “Mövers” has been changed to “Movers”, when
-    referring to Franz Karl Movers, as it is the spelling used in the
-    title pages of his main works in German.
-  * The following changes were also made, after checking with other
-    editions:
-
-    page  27:   “Phokæn” → “Phokæan”    (that Phokæan lady).
-    page  94:     “from” → “at”         (arriving at Sparta)
-    page  96: “Kannônes” → “Kannônus”   (psephism of Kannônus).
-    page 374:    “troad” → “Troad”      (especially in the Troad).
-    note 711:  “vii, 39” → “vii, 4, 39” (“Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 39”)
-
-  * In note 965, the printed book version has been retained: “Μὴ
-    κινεῖ Καμάριναν, ἀκίνητόν περ ἐοῦσαν”, but the original English
-    edition has “Μὴ κινεῖ Καμάριναν, ἀκινητὸς γὰρ ἀμείνων”.
-
-
-
-
-  HISTORY OF GREECE.
-
-  BY
-  GEORGE GROTE, ESQ.
-
-  VOL. X.
-
-  REPRINTED FROM THE LONDON EDITION.
-
-  NEW YORK:
-  HARPER & BROTHERS, PUBLISHERS,
-  329 AND 331 PEARL STREET.
-
-
-
-
-PREFACE TO VOL. X.
-
-
-The present Volume is already extended to an unusual number of pages;
-yet I have been compelled to close it at an inconvenient moment,
-midway in the reign of the Syracusan despot Dionysius. To carry that
-reign to its close, one more chapter will be required, which must be
-reserved for the succeeding volume.
-
-The history of the Sicilian and Italian Greeks, forming as it does
-a stream essentially distinct from that of the Peloponnesians,
-Athenians, etc., is peculiarly interesting during the interval
-between 409 B.C. (the date of the second Carthaginian invasion) and
-the death of Timoleon in 336 B.C. It is, moreover, reported to us
-by authors (Diodorus and Plutarch), who, though not themselves very
-judicious as selectors, had before them good contemporary witnesses.
-And it includes some of the most prominent and impressive characters
-of the Hellenic world,—Dionysius I., Dion with Plato as instructor,
-and Timoleon.
-
-I thought it indispensable to give adequate development to this
-important period of Grecian history, even at the cost of that
-inconvenient break which terminates my tenth volume. At one time I
-had hoped to comprise in that volume not only the full history of
-Dionysius I., but also that of Dionysius II. and Dion—and that of
-Timoleon besides. Three new chapters, including all this additional
-matter, are already composed and ready. But the bulk of the present
-volume compels me to reserve them for the commencement of my next,
-which will carry Grecian history down to the battle of Chæroneia
-and the death of Philip of Macedon—and which will, I trust, appear
-without any long interval of time.
-
-  G. G.
-
-  LONDON, FEB. 15, 1852.
-
-
-
-
-CONTENTS.
-
-VOL. X.
-
-
-PART II.
-
-CONTINUATION OF HISTORICAL GREECE.
-
-
-  CHAPTER LXXVI.
-
-  FROM THE PEACE OF ANTALKIDAS DOWN TO THE SUBJUGATION OF OLYNTHUS
-  BY SPARTA.
-
-  Peace or convention of Antalkidas. Its import and character.
-  Separate partnership between Sparta and Persia.—Degradation
-  in the form of the convention—an edict drawn up, issued, and
-  enforced, by Persia upon Greece.—Gradual loss of Pan-hellenic
-  dignity, and increased submission towards Persia as a means
-  of purchasing Persian help—on the part of Sparta.—Her
-  first application before the Peloponnesian war; subsequent
-  applications.—Active partnership between Sparta and Persia
-  against Athens, after the Athenian catastrophe at Syracuse.
-  Athens is ready to follow her example.—The Persian force aids
-  Athens against Sparta, and breaks up her maritime empire.—No
-  excuse for the subservience of Sparta to the Persians. Evidence
-  that Hellenic independence was not destined to last much
-  longer.—Promise of universal autonomy—popular to the Grecian
-  ear—how carried out.—The Spartans never intended to grant,
-  nor ever really granted, general autonomy.—Immediate point
-  made against Corinth and Thebes—isolation of Athens.—Persian
-  affairs—unavailing efforts of the Great King to reconquer
-  Egypt.—Evagoras, despot of Salamis in Cyprus.—Descent of
-  Evagoras—condition of the island of Cyprus.—Greek princes of
-  Salamis are dispossessed by a Phœnician dynasty.—Evagoras
-  dethrones the Phœnician, and becomes despot of Salamis.—Able
-  and beneficent government of Evagoras.—His anxiety to revive
-  Hellenism in Cyprus—he looks to the aid of Athens.—Relations
-  of Evagoras with Athens during the closing years of the
-  Peloponnesian war.—Evagoras at war with the Persians—he receives
-  aid both from Athens and from Egypt—he is at first very
-  successful, so as even to capture Tyre.—Struggle of Evagoras
-  against the whole force of the Persian empire after the peace
-  of Antalkidas.—Evagoras, after a ten years’ war, is reduced,
-  but obtains an honorable peace, mainly owing to the dispute
-  between the two satraps jointly commanding.—Assassination of
-  Evagoras, as well as of his son Pnytagoras, by an eunuch slave
-  of Nikokreon.—Nikoklês, son of Evagoras, becomes despot of
-  Salamis. Great power gained by Sparta through the peace of
-  Antalkidas. She becomes practically mistress of Corinth, and the
-  Corinthian isthmus. Miso-Theban tendencies of Sparta—especially
-  of Agesilaus.—The Spartans restore Platæa. Former conduct of
-  Sparta towards Platæa.—Motives of Sparta in restoring Platæa.
-  A politic step, as likely to sever Thebes from Athens.—Platæa
-  becomes a dependency and outpost of Sparta. Main object of Sparta
-  to prevent the reconstitution of the Bœotiad federation—Spartan
-  policy at this time directed by the partisan spirit of
-  Agesilaus, opposed by his colleague Agesipolis.—Oppressive
-  behavior of the Spartans towards Mantinea. They require the
-  walls of the city to be demolished.—Agesipolis blockades the
-  city, and forces it to surrender, by damming up the river
-  Ophis. The Mantineans are forced to break up their city into
-  villages.—Democratical leaders of Mantinea—owed their lives
-  to the mediation of the exiled king Pausanias.—Mantinea is
-  pulled down and distributed into five villages.—High-handed
-  despotism of Sparta towards Mantinea—signal partiality of
-  Xenophon. Return of the philo-Laconian exiles in the various
-  cities, as partisans for the purposes of Sparta—case of
-  Phlius.—Competition of Athens with Sparta for ascendency at
-  sea. Athens gains ground, and gets together some rudiments of a
-  maritime confederacy.—Ideas entertained by some of the Spartan
-  leaders, of acting against the Persians for the rescue of the
-  Asiatic Greeks.—Panegyrical Discourse of Isokrates.—State of
-  Macedonia and Chalkidikê—growth of Macedonian power during
-  the last years of the Peloponnesian war.—Perdikkas and
-  Archelaus—energy and ability of the latter.—Contrast of Macedonia
-  and Athens.—Succeeding Macedonian kings—Orestes, Æropus,
-  Pausanias, Amyntas. Assassination frequent.—Amyntas is expelled
-  from Macedonia by the Illyrians.—Chalkidians of Olynthus—they
-  take into their protection the Macedonian cities on the coast,
-  when Amyntas runs away before the Illyrians. Commencement of the
-  Olynthian confederacy.—Equal and liberal principles on which the
-  confederacy was framed from the beginning. Accepted willingly
-  by the Macedonian and Greco-Macedonian cities.—The Olynthians
-  extend their confederacy among the Grecian cities in Chalkidic
-  Thrace—their liberal procedure—several cities join.—Akanthus
-  and Apollonia resist the proposition. Olynthus menaces. They
-  then solicit Spartan intervention against her.—Speech of
-  Kleigenes the Akanthian envoy at Sparta.—Envoys from Amyntas at
-  Sparta.—The Spartan Eudamidas is sent against Olynthus at once,
-  with such force as could be got ready. He checks the career
-  of the Olynthians.—Phœbidas, brother of Eudamidas, remains
-  behind to collect fresh force, and march to join his brother
-  in Thrace. He passes through the Theban territory and near
-  Thebes.—Conspiracy of Leontiades and the philo-Laconian party in
-  Thebes, to betray the town and citadel to Phœbidas.—The opposing
-  leaders—Leontiades and Ismenias—were both Polemarchs.—Leontiades
-  overawes the Senate, and arrests Ismenias: Pelopidas and
-  the leading friends of Ismenias go into exile.—Phœbidas in
-  the Kadmeia—terror and submission at Thebes.—Mixed feelings
-  at Sparta—great importance of the acquisition to Spartan
-  interests.—Displeasure at Sparta more pretended than real,
-  against Phœbidas; Agesilaus defends him.—Leontiades at Sparta—his
-  humble protestations and assurances—the ephors decide that they
-  will retain the Kadmeia, but at the same time fine Phœbidas.—The
-  Lacedæmonians cause Ismenias to be tried and put to death.
-  Iniquity of this proceeding.—Vigorous action of the Spartans
-  against Olynthus—Teleutias is sent there with a large force,
-  including a considerable Theban contingent. Derdas coöperates
-  with him.—Teleutias being at first successful, and having become
-  over-confident, sustains a terrible defeat from the Olynthians
-  under the walls of their city.—Agesipolis is sent to Olynthus
-  from Sparta with a reinforcement. He dies of a fever.—Polybiades
-  succeeds Agesipolis as commander—he reduces Olynthus to
-  submission—extinction of the Olynthian federation. Olynthus and
-  the other cities are enrolled as allies of Sparta.—Intervention
-  of Sparta with the government of Phlius.—Agesilaus marches an
-  army against Phlius—reduces the town by blockade, after a long
-  resistance. The Lacedæmonians occupy the acropolis, naming a
-  council of one hundred as governors.                            1-72
-
-
-  CHAPTER LXXVII.
-
-  FROM THE SUBJUGATION OF OLYNTHUS BY THE LACEDÆMONIANS DOWN TO THE
-  CONGRESS AT SPARTA, AND PARTIAL PEACE, IN 371 B.C.
-
-  Great ascendency of Sparta on land in 379 B.C.—Sparta is now
-  feared as the great despot of Greece.—Strong complaint of
-  the rhetor Lysias, expressed at the Olympic festival of 384
-  B.C.—Panegyrical oration of Isokrates.—Censure upon Sparta
-  pronounced by the philo-Laconian Xenophon.—His manner of marking
-  the point of transition in his history—from Spartan glory to
-  Spartan disgrace.—Thebes under Leontiades and the philo-Spartan
-  oligarchy, with the Spartan garrison in the Kadmeia—oppressive
-  and tyrannical government.—Discontent at Thebes, though under
-  compression. Theban exiles at Athens.—The Theban exiles at
-  Athens, after waiting some time in hopes of a rising at Thebes,
-  resolve to begin a movement themselves.—Pelopidas takes the
-  lead—he, with Mellon and five other exiles, undertakes the task
-  of destroying the rulers of Thebes. Coöperation of Phyllidas the
-  secretary, and Charon at Thebes.—Plans of Phyllidas for admitting
-  the conspirators into Thebes and the government-house—he
-  invites the polemarchs to a banquet.—The scheme very nearly
-  frustrated—accident which prevented Chlidon from delivering
-  his message.—Pelopidas and Mellon get secretly into Thebes,
-  and conceal themselves in the house of Charon.—Leontiades
-  and Hypates are slain in their houses.—Phyllidas opens the
-  prison, and sets free the prisoners. Epaminondas and many other
-  citizens appear in arms.—Universal joy among the citizens on
-  the ensuing morning, when the event was known. General assembly
-  in the market-place—Pelopidas, Mellon, and Charon are named
-  the first Bœotarchs.—Aid to the conspirators from private
-  sympathizers in Attica.—Pelopidas and the Thebans prepare to
-  storm the Kadmeia—the Lacedæmonian garrison capitulate and
-  are dismissed—several of the oligarchical Thebans are put to
-  death in trying to go away along with them. The harmost who
-  surrendered the Kadmeia is put to death by the Spartans.—Powerful
-  sensation produced by this incident throughout the Grecian
-  world.—Indignation in Sparta at the revolution of Thebes—a
-  Spartan army sent forth at once under king Kleombrotus. He
-  retires from Bœotia without achieving anything.—Kleombrotus
-  passes by the Athenian frontier—alarm at Athens—condemnation
-  of the two Athenian generals who had favored the enterprise of
-  Pelopidas.—Attempt of Sphodrias from Thespiæ to surprise the
-  Peiræus by a night-march. He fails.—Different constructions
-  put upon this attempt and upon the character of Sphodrias.—The
-  Lacedæmonian envoys at Athens seized, but dismissed.—Trial of
-  Sphodrias at Sparta; acquitted through the private favor and
-  sympathies of Agesilaus.—Comparison of Spartan with Athenian
-  procedure.—The Athenians declare war against Sparta, and contract
-  alliance with Thebes.—Exertions of Athens to form a new maritime
-  confederacy, like the Confederacy of Delos. Thebes enrolls
-  herself as a member.—Athens sends round envoys to the islands
-  in the Ægean. Liberal principles on which the new confederacy
-  is formed.—Envoys sent round by Athens—Chabrias, Timotheus,
-  Kallistratus.—Service of Iphikrates in Thrace after the peace of
-  Antalkidas. He marries the daughter of the Thracian prince Kotys,
-  and acquires possession of a Thracian seaport, Drys.—Timotheus
-  and Kallistratus.—Synod of the new confederates assembled at
-  Athens—votes for war on a large scale.—Members of the confederacy
-  were at first willing and harmonious—a fleet is equipped.—New
-  property-tax imposed at Athens. The Solonian census.—The
-  Solonian census retained in the main, though with modifications,
-  at the restoration under the archonship of Eukleides in 403
-  B.C.—Archonship of Nausinikus in 378 B.C.—New census and
-  schedule then introduced, of all citizens worth twenty minæ and
-  upwards, distributed into classes, and entered for a fraction of
-  their total property; each class for a different fraction.—All
-  metics, worth more than twenty-five minæ, were registered in
-  the schedule; all in one class, each man for one-sixth of his
-  property. Aggregate schedule.—The Symmories—containing the
-  twelve hundred wealthiest citizens—the three hundred wealthiest
-  leaders of the Symmories.—Citizens not wealthy enough to be
-  included in the Symmories, yet still entered in the schedule,
-  and liable to property-tax. Purpose of the Symmories—extension
-  of the principle to the trierarchy.—Enthusiasm at Thebes
-  in defence of the new government and against Sparta.
-  Military training—the Sacred Band.—Epaminondas.—His previous
-  character and training—musical and intellectual, as well as
-  gymnastic. Conversation with philosophers, Sokratic as well as
-  Pythagorean.—His eloquence—his unambitious disposition—gentleness
-  of his political resentments.—Conduct of Epaminondas at the
-  Theban revolution of 379 B.C.—he acquires influence, through
-  Pelopidas, in the military organization of the city.—Agesilaus
-  marches to attack Thebes with the full force of the Spartan
-  confederacy—good system of defence adopted by Thebes—aid from
-  Athens under Chabrias. Increase of the Theban strength in
-  Bœotia, against the philo-Spartan oligarchies in the Bœotian
-  cities.—Second expedition of Agesilaus into Bœotia—he gains no
-  decisive advantage. The Thebans acquire greater and greater
-  strength. Agesilaus retires—he is disabled by a hurt in the
-  leg.—Kleombrotus conducts the Spartan force to invade Bœotia.—He
-  retires without reaching Bœotia.—Resolution of Sparta to equip
-  a large fleet, under the admiral Pollis. The Athenians send
-  out a fleet under Chabrias—Victory of Chabrias at sea near
-  Naxos. Recollections of the battle of Arginusæ.—Extension
-  of the Athenian maritime confederacy, in consequence of the
-  victory at Naxos.—Circumnavigation of Peloponnesus by Timotheus
-  with an Athenian fleet—his victory over the Lacedæmonian
-  fleet—his success in extending the Athenian confederacy—his
-  just dealing.—Financial difficulties of Athens.—She becomes
-  jealous of the growing strength of Thebes—steady and victorious
-  progress of Thebes in Bœotia.—Victory of Pelopidas at Tegyra
-  over the Lacedæmonians.—The Thebans expel the Lacedæmonians out
-  of all Bœotia, except Orchomenus—they reorganize the Bœotian
-  federation.—They invade Phokis—Kleombrotus is sent thither
-  with an army for defence—Athens makes a separate peace with
-  the Lacedæmonians.—Jason of Pheræ—his energetic character and
-  formidable power.—His prudent dealing with Polydamas.—The
-  Lacedæmonians find themselves unable to spare any aid for
-  Thessaly—they dismiss Polydamas with a refusal. He comes to terms
-  with Jason, who becomes Tagus of Thessaly.—Peace between Athens
-  and Sparta—broken off almost immediately. The Lacedæmonians
-  declare war again, and resume their plans upon Zakynthus and
-  Korkyra.—Lacedæmonian armament under Mnasippus, collected from
-  all the confederates, invades Korkyra.—Mnasippus besieges the
-  city—high cultivation of the adjoining lands.—The Korkyræans
-  blocked up in the city—supplies intercepted—want begins—no hope
-  of safety except in aid from Athens. Reinforcement arrives from
-  Athens—large Athenian fleet preparing under Timotheus. Mnasippus
-  is defeated and slain—the city supplied with provisions.—Approach
-  of the Athenian reinforcement—Hypermenês, successor of Mnasippus,
-  conveys away the armament, leaving his sick and much property
-  behind.—Tardy arrival of the Athenian fleet—it is commanded not
-  by Timotheus, but by Iphikrates—causes of the delay—preliminary
-  voyage of Timotheus, very long protracted.—Discontent at Athens,
-  in consequence of the absence of Timotheus—distress of the
-  armament assembled at Kalauria—Iphikrates and Kallistratus
-  accuse Timotheus. Iphikrates named admiral in his place.—Return
-  of Timotheus—an accusation is entered against him, but trial is
-  postponed until the return of Iphikrates from Korkyra.—Rapid
-  and energetic movements of Iphikrates towards Korkyra—his
-  excellent management of the voyage. On reaching Kephallenia,
-  he learns the flight of the Lacedæmonians from Korkyra.—He
-  goes on to Korkyra, and captures by surprise the ten Syracusan
-  triremes sent by Dionysius to the aid of Sparta.—Iphikrates in
-  want of money—he sends home Kallistratus to Athens—he finds
-  work for his seamen at Korkyra—he obtains funds by service
-  in Akarnania.—Favorable tone of public opinion at Athens, in
-  consequence of the success at Korkyra—the trial of Timotheus
-  went off easily—Jason and Alketas come to support him—his
-  quæstor is condemned to death.—Timotheus had been guilty
-  of delay, not justifiable under the circumstances—though
-  acquitted, his reputation suffered—he accepts command under
-  Persia.—Discouragement of Sparta in consequence of her defeat at
-  Korkyra, and of the triumphant position of Iphikrates.—Helikê
-  and Bura are destroyed by an earthquake.—The Spartans again send
-  Antalkidas to Persia, to sue for a fresh intervention—the Persian
-  satraps send down an order that the Grecian belligerents shall
-  make up their differences.—Athens disposed towards peace.—Athens
-  had ceased to be afraid of Sparta, and had become again jealous
-  of Thebes.—Equivocal position of the restored Platæa, now that
-  the Lacedæmonians had been expelled from Bœotia.—The Thebans
-  forestall a negotiation by seizing Platæa, and expelling the
-  inhabitants, who again take refuge at Athens.—Strong feeling
-  excited in Athens against the Thebans, on account of their
-  dealings with Platæa and Thespiæ. The Plataic discourse of
-  Isokrates.—Increased tendency of the Athenians towards peace
-  with Sparta—Athens and the Athenian confederacy give notice to
-  Thebes. General congress for peace at Sparta.—Speeches of the
-  Athenian envoys Kallias, Autokles, Kallistratus.—Kallistratus
-  and his policy.—He proposes that Sparta and Athens shall divide
-  between them the headship of Greece—Sparta on land, Athens at
-  sea—recognizing general autonomy.—Peace is concluded. Autonomy of
-  each city to be recognized: Sparta to withdraw her harmosts and
-  garrisons.—Oaths exchanged. Sparta takes the oath for herself and
-  her allies. Athens takes it for herself: her allies take it after
-  her, successively.—The oath proposed to the Thebans. Epaminondas,
-  the Theban envoy, insists upon taking the oath in the name of
-  the Bœotian federation. Agesilaus and the Spartans require that
-  he shall take it for Thebes alone.—Daring and emphatic speeches
-  delivered by Epaminondas in the congress—protesting against the
-  overweening pretensions of Sparta. He claims recognition of the
-  ancient institutions of Bœotia, with Thebes as president of
-  the federation.—Indignation of the Spartans, and especially of
-  Agesilaus—brief questions exchanged—Thebes is excluded from the
-  treaty.—General peace sworn, including Athens, Sparta, and the
-  rest—Thebes alone is excluded.—Terms of peace—compulsory and
-  indefeasible confederacies are renounced—voluntary alliances
-  alone maintained.—Real point in debate between Agesilaus and
-  Epaminondas.                                                  72-174
-
-
-  CHAPTER LXXVIII.
-
-  BATTLE OF LEUKTRA AND ITS CONSEQUENCES.
-
-  Measures for executing the stipulations made at the congress of
-  Sparta.—Violent impulse of the Spartans against Thebes.—King
-  Kleombrotus is ordered to march into Bœotia, and encamps at
-  Leuktra.—New order of battle adopted by Epaminondas.—Confidence
-  of the Spartans and of Kleombrotus.—Battle of Leuktra.—Defeat
-  of the Spartans and death of Kleombrotus.—Faint adherence of
-  the Spartan allies.—Spartan camp after the defeat—confession of
-  defeat by sending to solicit the burial-truce.—Great surprise,
-  and immense alteration of feeling, produced throughout Greece
-  by the Theban victory.—Effect of the news at Sparta—heroic
-  self-command.—Reinforcements sent from Sparta.—Proceedings in
-  Bœotia after the battle of Leuktra. The Theban victory not
-  well received at Athens.—Jason of Pheræ arrives at Leuktra—the
-  Spartan army retires from Bœotia under capitulation.—Treatment
-  of the defeated citizens on reaching Sparta—suspension of
-  the law.—Lowered estimation of Sparta in Greece—prestige of
-  military superiority lost.—Extension of the power of Thebes.
-  Treatment of Orchomenus and Thespiæ.—Power and ambition of
-  Jason.—Plans of Jason—Pythian festival.—Assassination of Jason
-  at Pheræ.—Relief to Thebes by the death of Jason—satisfaction in
-  Greece.—Proceedings in Peloponnesus after the defeat of Leuktra.
-  Expulsion of the Spartan harmosts and dekarchies.—Skytalism at
-  Argos—violent intestine feud.—Discouragement and helplessness of
-  Sparta.—Athens places herself at the head of a new Peloponnesian
-  land-confederacy.—Accusation preferred in the Amphyctionic
-  assembly, by Thebes against Sparta.—The Spartans are condemned
-  to a fine—importance of this fact as an indication.—Proceedings
-  in Arcadia.—Reëstablishment of the city of Mantinea by its own
-  citizens.—Humiliating refusal experienced by Agesilaus from the
-  Mantineans—keenly painful to a Spartan.—Feeling against Agesilaus
-  at Sparta.—Impulse among the Arcadians towards Pan-Arcadian
-  union. Opposition from Orchomenus and Tegea.—Revolution at
-  Tegea—the philo-Spartan party are put down or expelled.—Tegea
-  becomes anti-Spartan, and favorable to the Pan-Arcadian
-  union.—Pan-Arcadian union is formed.—March of Agesilaus against
-  Mantinea. Evidence of lowered sentiment in Sparta.—Application by
-  the Arcadians to Athens for aid against Sparta; it is refused:
-  they then apply to the Thebans.—Proceedings and views of
-  Epaminondas since the battle of Leuktra.—Plans of Epaminondas for
-  restoring the Messenians in Peloponnesus.—Also, for consolidating
-  the Arcadians against Sparta.—Epaminondas and the Theban army
-  arrive in Arcadia. Great allied force assembled there. The
-  allies entreat him to invade Laconia.—Reluctance of Epaminondas
-  to invade Laconia—reasonable grounds for it.—He marches into
-  Laconia—four lines of invasion.—He crosses the Eurotas and
-  approaches close to Sparta.—Alarm at Sparta—arrival of various
-  allies to her aid by sea.—Discontent in Laconia among the Periœki
-  and Helots—danger to Sparta from that cause.—Vigilant defence of
-  Sparta by Agesilaus.—Violent emotion of the Spartans, especially
-  the women. Partial attack upon Sparta by Epaminondas.—He retires
-  without attempting to storm Sparta: ravages Laconia down to
-  Gythium. He returns into Arcadia.—Great effect of this invasion
-  upon Grecian opinion—Epaminondas is exalted, and Sparta farther
-  lowered.—Foundation of the Arcadian Megalopolis.—Foundation of
-  Messênê.—Abstraction of Western Laconia from Sparta.—Periœki
-  and Helots established as freemen along with the Messenians
-  on the Lacedæmonian border.—The details of this reorganizing
-  process unhappily unknown.—Megalopolis—the Pan-Arcadian Ten
-  Thousand.—Epaminondas and his army evacuate Peloponnesus.—The
-  Spartans solicit aid from Athens—language of their envoys, as
-  well as those from Corinth and Phlius, at Athens.—Reception of
-  the envoys—the Athenians grant the prayer.—Vote passed to aid
-  Sparta—Iphikrates is named general.—March of Iphikrates and his
-  army to the Isthmus.—Trial of Epaminondas at Thebes for retaining
-  his command beyond the legal time—his honorable and easy
-  acquittal.                                                   174-241
-
-
-  CHAPTER LXXIX.
-
-  FROM THE FOUNDATION OF MESSENE AND MEGALOPOLIS TO THE DEATH OF
-  PELOPIDAS.
-
-  Changes in Peloponnesus since the battle of Leuktra.—Changes
-  out of Peloponnesus.—Amyntas prince of Macedonia.—Ambitious
-  views of Athens after the battle of Leuktra.—Her aspirations to
-  maritime empire, and to the partial recovery of kleruchies.—She
-  wishes to recover Amphipolis—Amyntas recognizes her right to the
-  place.—Athens and Amphipolis.—Death of Jason and Amyntas—state
-  of Thessaly and Macedonia.—Alexander of Pheræ—he is opposed
-  by Pelopidas—influence of Thebes in Thessaly.—State of
-  Macedonia—Alexander son of Amyntas—Euridikê—Ptolemy.—Assistance
-  rendered by the Athenian Iphikrates to the family of
-  Amyntas.—Iphikrates and Timotheus.—The Spartan allied
-  army defends the line of Mount Oneium—Epaminondas breaks
-  through it, and marches into Peloponnesus.—Sikyon joins the
-  Thebans—Phlius remains faithful to Sparta.—Reinforcement from
-  Syracuse to Peloponnesus, in aid of Sparta.—Forbearance and
-  mildness of Epaminondas.—Energetic action and insolence of the
-  Arcadians—Lykomedes animates and leads them on.—Great influence
-  of Lykomedes.—Elis tries to recover her supremacy over the
-  Triphylian towns, which are admitted into the Arcadian union,
-  to the great offence of Elis.—Mission of Philiskus to Greece
-  by Ariobarzanes.—Political importance of the reconstitution
-  of Messênê, which now becomes the great subject of discord.
-  Messenian victor proclaimed at Olympia.—Expedition of Pelopidas
-  into Thessaly.—The Tearless Battle—victory of the Spartan
-  Archidamus over the Arcadians.—Third expedition of Epaminondas
-  into Peloponnesus—his treatment of the Achæan cities.—The Thebans
-  reverse the policy of Epaminondas, on complaint of the Arcadians
-  and others. They do not reëlect him Bœotarch.—Disturbed state of
-  Sikyon. Euphron makes himself despot—his rapacious and sanguinary
-  conduct.—Sufferings of the Phliasians—their steady adherence
-  to Sparta.—Assistance rendered to Phlius by the Athenian
-  Chares—surprise of the fort of Thyamia.—Euphron is expelled from
-  Sikyon by the Arcadians and Thebans—he retires to the harbor,
-  which he surrenders to the Spartans.—Euphron returns to Sikyon—he
-  goes to Thebes, and is there assassinated.—The assassins are put
-  upon their trial at Thebes—their defence.—They are acquitted by
-  the Theban Senate.—Sentiment among the Many of Sikyon, favorable
-  to Euphron—honors shown to his body and memory.—The Sikyonians
-  recapture their harbor from the Spartans.—Application of Thebes
-  for Persian countenance to her headship—mission of Pelopidas and
-  other envoys to Susa.—Pelopidas obtains from Persia a favorable
-  rescript.—Protest of the Athenians and Arcadians against the
-  rescript.—Pelopidas brings back the rescript. It is read publicly
-  before the Greek states convoked at Thebes.—The states convoked
-  at Thebes refuse to receive the rescript. The Arcadian deputies
-  protest against the headship of Thebes.—The Thebans send the
-  rescript to be received at Corinth; the Corinthians refuse:
-  failure of the Theban object.—Mission of Pelopidas to Thessaly.
-  He is seized and detained prisoner by Alexander of Pheræ.—The
-  Thebans despatch an army to rescue Pelopidas. The army, defeated
-  and retreating, is only saved by Epaminondas, then a private
-  man.—Triumph of Alexander in Thessaly and discredit of Thebes.
-  Harsh treatment of Pelopidas.—Second Theban army sent into
-  Thessaly, under Epaminondas, for the rescue of Pelopidas, who
-  is at length released by Alexander under a truce.—Oropus is
-  taken from Athens and placed in the hands of the Thebans. The
-  Athenians recall Chares from Corinth.—Athens discontented with
-  her Peloponnesian allies; she enters into alliance with Lykomedes
-  and the Arcadians. Death of Lykomedes.—Epaminondas is sent as
-  envoy into Arcadia; he speaks against Kallistratus.—Project of
-  the Athenians to seize Corinth; they are disappointed.—They
-  apply to Sparta.—Refusal of the Spartans to acknowledge the
-  independence of Messênê; they reproach their allies with
-  consenting.—Corinth, Epidaurus, Phlius, etc., conclude peace
-  with Thebes, but without Sparta—recognizing the independence of
-  Messênê.—Athens sends a fresh embassy to the Persian king—altered
-  rescript from him, pronouncing Amphipolis to be an Athenian
-  possession.—Timotheus sent with a fleet to Asia—Agesilaus—revolt
-  of Ariobarzanes.—Conquest of Samos by Timotheus.—Partial
-  readmission to the Chersonese obtained by Timotheus.—Athenian
-  kleruchs or settlers sent thither as proprietors.—Difficulties
-  of Athens in establishing kleruchs in the Chersonese.—Kotys
-  of Thrace.—Timotheus supersedes Iphikrates.—Timotheus acts
-  with success on the coast of Macedonia and Chalkidikê. He
-  fails at Amphipolis.—Timotheus acts against Kotys and near the
-  Chersonese.—Measures of the Thebans in Thessaly—Pelopidas is sent
-  with an army against Alexander of Pheræ.—Epaminondas exhorts the
-  Thebans to equip a fleet against Athens.—Discussion between him
-  and Menekleidas in the Theban assembly.—Menekleidas seemingly
-  right in dissuading naval preparations.—Epaminondas in command
-  of a Theban fleet in the Hellespont and Bosphorus. Pelopidas
-  attacks Alexander of Pheræ—his success in battle—his rashness—he
-  is slain.—Excessive grief of the Thebans and Thessalians for his
-  death.—The Thebans completely subdue Alexander of Pheræ.     242-310
-
-
-  CHAPTER LXXX.
-
-  FROM THE DEATH OF PELOPIDAS TO THE BATTLE OF MANTINEA.
-
-  Conspiracy of the knights of Orchomenus against
-  Thebes—destruction of Orchomenus by the Thebans.—Repugnance
-  excited against the Thebans—regret and displeasure of
-  Epaminondas.—Return of Epaminondas from his cruise—renewed
-  complications in Peloponnesus.—State of Peloponnesus—Eleians and
-  Achæans in alliance with Sparta.—The Eleians aim at recovering
-  Triphylia—the Spartans, at recovering Messênê.—War between
-  the Eleians and Arcadians; the latter occupy Olympia.—Second
-  invasion of Elis by the Arcadians. Distress of the Eleians.
-  Archidamus and the Spartans invade Arcadia.—Archidamus
-  establishes a Spartan garrison at Kromnus. The Arcadians gain
-  advantages over him—armistice.—The Arcadians blockade Kromnus,
-  and capture the Spartan garrison.—The Arcadians celebrate
-  the Olympic festival along with the Pisatans—excluding the
-  Eleians.—The Eleians invade the festival by arms—conflict
-  on the plain of Olympia—bravery of the Eleians.—Feelings of
-  the spectators at Olympia.—The Arcadians take the treasures
-  of Olympia to pay their militia.—Violent dissensions arising
-  among the members of the Arcadian communion, in consequence
-  of this appropriation. The Arcadian assembly pronounces
-  against it.—Farther dissensions in Arcadia—invitation sent to
-  the Thebans—peace concluded with Elis.—The peace generally
-  popular—celebrated at Tegea—seizure of many oligarchical
-  members at Tegea by the Theban harmost.—Conduct of the Theban
-  harmost.—View taken by Epaminondas.—His view is more consistent
-  with the facts recounted by Xenophon, than the view of Xenophon
-  himself.—Policy of Epaminondas and the Thebans.—Epaminondas
-  marches with a Theban army into Peloponnesus, to muster at
-  Tegea.—Agesilaus and the Spartans are sent for.—Night-march of
-  Epaminondas to surprise Sparta. Agesilaus is informed in time
-  to prevent surprise.—Epaminondas comes up to Sparta, but finds
-  it defended.—He marches back to Tegea—despatches his cavalry
-  from thence to surprise Mantinea.—The surprise is baffled,
-  by the accidental arrival of the Athenian cavalry—battle
-  of cavalry near Mantinea, in which the Athenians have the
-  advantage.—Epaminondas resolves to attack the enemy near
-  Mantinea.—View of Xenophon—that this resolution was forced upon
-  him by despair—examined.—Alacrity of the army of Epaminondas,
-  when the order for fighting is given.—Mantinico-Tegeatic
-  plain—position of the Lacedæmonians and Mantineans.—March of
-  Epaminondas from Tegea.—False impression produced upon the
-  enemy by his manœuvres.—Theban order of battle—plans of the
-  commander.—Disposition of the cavalry on both sides.—Unprepared
-  state of the Lacedæmonian army.—Battle of Mantinea—complete
-  success of the dispositions of Epaminondas.—Victory of the
-  Thebans—Epaminondas is mortally wounded.—Extreme discouragement
-  caused by his death among the troops, even when in full victory
-  and pursuit.—Victory claimed by both sides—nevertheless the
-  Lacedæmonians are obliged to solicit the burial-truce.—Dying
-  moments of Epaminondas.—The two other best Theban officers
-  are slain also in the battle.—Who slew Epaminondas? Different
-  persons honored for it.—Peace concluded—_statu quo_ recognized,
-  including the independence of Messênê—Sparta alone stands
-  out—the Thebans return home.—Results of the battle of Mantinea,
-  as appreciated by Xenophon—unfair to the Thebans.—Character of
-  Epaminondas.—Disputes among the inhabitants of Megalopolis. The
-  Thebans send thither a force under Pammenes, which maintains the
-  incorporation.—Agesilaus and Archidamus.—State of Persia—revolted
-  satraps and provinces—Datames.—Formidable revolt of the satraps
-  in Asia Minor—it is suppressed by the Persian court, through
-  treachery.—Agesilaus goes as commander to Egypt—Chabrias is
-  there also.—Death and character of Agesilaus.—State of Egypt
-  and Persia.—Death of Artaxerxes Mnemon. Murders in the royal
-  family.—Athenian maritime operations—Timotheus makes war
-  against Amphipolis and against Kotys.—Ergophilus succeeds
-  Timotheus at the Chersonese—Kallisthenes succeeds him against
-  Amphipolis—war at sea against Alexander of Pheræ.—Ergophilus
-  and Kallisthenes both unsuccessful—both tried.—Autokles in the
-  Hellespont and Bosphorus—convoy for the corn-ships out of the
-  Euxine.—Miltokythes revolts from Kotys in Thrace—ill-success of
-  the Athenians.—Menon—Timomachus—as commanders in the Chersonese.
-  The Athenians lose Sestos.—Kephisodotus in the Chersonese.
-  Charidemus crosses thither from Abydos.—Assassination of
-  Kotys.—Kersobleptes succeeds Kotys. Berisades and Amadokus, his
-  rivals—ill-success of Athens—Kephisodotus.—Improved prospects of
-  Athens in the Chersonese—Athenodorus—Charidemus.—Charidemus is
-  forced to accept the convention of Athenodorus—his evasions—the
-  Chersonese with Sestos is restored to Athens.—The transmarine
-  empire of Athens now at its maximum. Mischievous effects of her
-  conquests made against Olynthus.—Maximum of second Athenian
-  empire—accession of Philip of Macedon.                       311-383
-
-
-  CHAPTER LXXXI.
-
-  SICILIAN AFFAIRS AFTER THE DESTRUCTION OF THE ATHENIAN ARMAMENT
-  BEFORE SYRACUSE.
-
-  Syracuse after the destruction of the Athenian
-  armament.—Anticipation of the impending ruin of Athens—revolution
-  at Thurii.—Syracusan squadron under Hermokrates goes to
-  act against Athens in the Ægean.—Disappointed hopes—defeat
-  at Kynossema—second ruinous defeat at Kyzikus.—Sufferings
-  of the Syracusan seamen—disappointment and displeasure at
-  Syracuse.—Banishment of Hermokrates and his colleagues. Sentence
-  communicated by Hermokrates to the armament.—Internal state of
-  Syracuse—constitution of Diokles.—Difficulty of determining
-  what that constitution was.—Invasion from Carthage.—State of
-  the Carthaginians.—Extent of Carthaginian empire—power, and
-  population—Liby-Phœnicians.—Harsh dealing of Carthage towards
-  her subjects. Colonies sent out from Carthage.—Military force of
-  Carthage.—Political constitution of Carthage.—Oligarchical system
-  and sentiment at Carthage.—Powerful families at Carthage—Mago,
-  Hamilkar, Hasdrubal.—Quarrel between Egesta and Selinus in
-  Sicily.—Application of Egesta to Carthage for aid—application
-  granted—eagerness of Hannibal.—Carthaginian envoys sent to
-  Sicily.—Hannibal crosses over to Sicily with a very large
-  armament. He lays siege to Selinus.—Vigorous assault on
-  Selinus—gallant resistance—the town is at length stormed.—Selinus
-  is sacked and plundered—merciless slaughter.—Delay of the
-  Syracusans and others in sending aid. Answer of Hannibal to
-  their embassy.—Hannibal marches to Himera and besieges it.
-  Aid from Syracuse under Diokles—sally from Himera. Hannibal
-  destroys Himera, and slaughters three thousand prisoners, as an
-  expiation to the memory of his grandfather.—Alarm throughout
-  the Greeks of Sicily—Hannibal dismisses his army, and returns
-  to Carthage.—New intestine discord in Syracuse—Hermokrates
-  comes to Sicily.—He levies troops to effect his return by
-  force.—He is obliged to retire—he establishes himself in the
-  ruins of Selinus, and acts against the Carthaginians.—His
-  father attempts to reënter Syracuse, with the bones of the
-  Syracusans slain near Himera. Banishment of Diokles.—Hermokrates
-  tries again to penetrate into Syracuse with an armed force.—He
-  is defeated and slain.—First appearance of Dionysius at
-  Syracuse.—Weakness of Syracuse, arising out of this political
-  discord—party of Hermokrates. Danger from Carthage.—Fresh
-  invasion of Sicily, by the Carthaginians. Immense host under
-  Hannibal and Imilkon.—Great alarm in Sicily—active preparations
-  for defence at Agrigentum.—Grandeur, wealth, and population of
-  Agrigentum.—The Carthaginians attack Agrigentum. They demolish
-  the tombs near its walls. Distemper among their army. Religious
-  terrors—sacrifice.—Syracusan reinforcement to Agrigentum,
-  under Daphnæus. His victory over the Iberians. He declines to
-  pursue them.—Daphnæus enters Agrigentum. Discontent against
-  the Agrigentine generals, for having been backward in attack.
-  They are put to death.—Privations in both armies—Hamilkar
-  captures the provision-ships of the Syracusans—Agrigentum
-  is evacuated.—Agrigentum taken and plundered by the
-  Carthagians.—Terror throughout Sicily.—Bitter complaints against
-  the Syracusan generals.—The Hermokratean party at Syracuse comes
-  forward to subvert the government and elevate Dionysius.—Harangue
-  of Dionysius in the Syracusan assembly against the generals,
-  who are deposed by vote of the people, and Dionysius with others
-  appointed in their room.—Ambitious arts of Dionysius—he intrigues
-  against his colleagues, and frustrates all their proceedings. He
-  procures a vote for restoring the Hermokratean exiles.—Dionysius
-  is sent with a Syracusan reinforcement to Gela. He procures the
-  execution or banishment of the Geloan oligarchy.—He returns
-  to Syracuse with an increased force—he accuses his colleagues
-  of gross treason.—Dionysius is named general, single-handed,
-  with full powers.—Apparent repentance of the people after the
-  vote. Stratagem of Dionysius to obtain a vote ensuring to him a
-  body of paid guards.—March of Dionysius to Leontini.—Dionysius
-  establishes himself at Syracuse as despot.—Dionysius as
-  despot—the means whereby he attained the power.              383-446
-
-
-  CHAPTER LXXXII.
-
-  SICILY DURING THE DESPOTISM OF THE ELDER DIONYSIUS AT SYRACUSE.
-
-  Imilkon with the Carthaginian army marches from Agrigentum to
-  attack Gela.—Brave defence of the Geloans—Dionysius arrives
-  with an army to relieve them.—Plan of Dionysius for a general
-  attack on the Carthaginian army.—He is defeated and obliged
-  to retreat.—He evacuates Gela and Kamarina—flight of the
-  population of both places, which are taken and sacked by the
-  Carthaginians.—Indignation and charges of treachery against
-  Dionysius.—Mutiny of the Syracusan horsemen—they ride off to
-  Syracuse, and declare against Dionysius.—Their imprudence.
-  Dionysius master of Syracuse.—Propositions of peace come from
-  Imilkon. Terms of peace.—Collusion of Dionysius with the
-  Carthaginians, who confirm his dominion over Syracuse. Pestilence
-  in the Carthaginian army.—Near coincidence, in time, of this
-  peace, with the victory of Lysander at Ægospotami—sympathy
-  of Sparta with Dionysius.—Depressed condition of the towns
-  of Southern Sicily, from Cape Pachynus to Lilybæum.—Strong
-  position of Dionysius.—Strong fortifications and other
-  buildings erected by Dionysius, in and about Ortygia.—He
-  assigns houses in Ortygia to his soldiers and partisans—he
-  distributes the lands of Syracuse anew.—Exorbitant exactions
-  of Dionysius—discontent at Syracuse.—Dionysius marches out of
-  Syracuse against the Sikels—mutiny of the Syracusan soldiers
-  at Herbesa—Dorikus the commander is slain.—The Syracusan
-  insurgents, with assistance from Rhegium and Messênê, besiege
-  Dionysius in Ortygia.—Despair of Dionysius—he applies to a
-  body of Campanians in the Carthaginian service, for aid.—He
-  amuses the assailants with feigned submission—arrival of the
-  Campanians—victory of Dionysius.—Dionysius strengthens his
-  despotism more than before—assistance lent to him by the
-  Spartan Aristus—Nikoteles the Corinthian is put to death.—He
-  disarms the Syracusan citizens—strengthens the fortifications
-  of Ortygia—augments his mercenary force.—Dionysius conquers
-  Naxus, Katana, and Leontini.—Great power of Dionysius.
-  Foundation of Alæsa by Archonides.—Resolution of Dionysius to
-  make war upon Carthage.—Locality of Syracuse—danger to which
-  the town had been exposed, in the Athenian siege.—Additional
-  fortifications made by Dionysius along the northern ridge of
-  the cliffs of Epipolæ, up the Euryalus.—Popularity of the
-  work—efforts made by all the Syracusans as well as by Dionysius
-  himself.—Preparations of Dionysius for aggressive war against
-  the Carthaginians.—Improvement in the behavior of Dionysius
-  towards the Syracusans.—His conciliatory offers to other
-  Grecian cities in Sicily. Hostile sentiment of the Rhegines
-  towards him. Their application to Messênê.—He makes peace with
-  Messênê and Rhegium.—He desires to marry a Rhegine wife. His
-  proposition is declined by the city. He is greatly incensed.—He
-  makes a proposition to marry a wife from Lokri—his wish is
-  granted—he marries a Lokrian maiden named Doris.—Immense warlike
-  equipment of Dionysius at Syracuse—arms, engines, etc.—Naval
-  preparations in the harbor of Syracuse. Enlargement of the bulk
-  of ships of war—quadriremes and quinqueremes.—General sympathy
-  of the Syracusans in his projects against Carthage.—He hires
-  soldiers from all quarters.—He celebrates his nuptials with two
-  wives on the same day—Doris and Aristomachê. Temporary good
-  feeling at Syracuse towards him.—He convokes the Syracusan
-  assembly, and exhorts them to war against Carthage.—He desires
-  to arrest the emigration of those who were less afraid of the
-  Carthaginian dominion than of his.—He grants permission to
-  plunder the Carthaginian residents and ships at Syracuse. Alarm
-  at Carthage—suffering in Africa from the pestilence.—Dionysius
-  marches out from Syracuse with a prodigious army against
-  the Carthaginians in Sicily.—Insurrection against Carthage,
-  among the Sicilian Greeks subject to her. Terrible tortures
-  inflicted on the Carthaginians.—Dionysius besieges the
-  Carthaginian seaport Motyê.—Situation of Motyê—operations of
-  the siege—vigorous defence.—Dionysius overruns the neighboring
-  dependencies of Carthage—doubtful result of the siege of
-  Motyê—appearance of Imilkon with a Carthaginian fleet—he is
-  obliged to return.—Desperate defence of Motyê. It is at length
-  taken by a nocturnal attack.—Plunder of Motyê—the inhabitants
-  either slaughtered or sold for slaves.—Farther operations of
-  Dionysius.—Arrival of Imilkon with a Carthaginian armament—his
-  successful operations—he retakes Motyê.—Dionysius retires to
-  Syracuse.—Imilkon captures Messênê.—Revolt of the Sikels from
-  Dionysius. Commencement of Tauromenium.—Provisions of Dionysius
-  for the defence of Syracuse—he strengthens Leontini—he advances
-  to Katana with his land-army as well as his fleet.—Naval battle
-  off Katana—great victory of the Carthaginian fleet under
-  Magon.—Arrival of Imilkon to join the fleet of Magon near
-  Katana—fruitless invitation to the Campanians of Ætna.—Dionysius
-  retreats to Syracuse—discontent of his army.—Imilkon marches
-  close up to Syracuse—the Carthaginian fleet come up to occupy
-  the Great Harbor—their imposing entry. Fortified position
-  of Imilkon near the Harbor.—Imilkon plunders the suburb of
-  Achradina—blockades Syracuse by sea.—Naval victory gained by the
-  Syracusan fleet during the absence of Dionysius.—Effect of this
-  victory in exalting the spirits of the Syracusans.—Public meeting
-  convened by Dionysius—mutinous spirit against him—vehement
-  speech by Thedorus.—Sympathy excited by the speech in the
-  Syracusan assembly.—The Spartan Pharakidas upholds Dionysius—who
-  finally dismisses the assembly, and silences the adverse
-  movement.—Alliance of Sparta with Dionysius—suitable to her
-  general policy at the time. The emancipation of Syracuse depended
-  upon Pharakidas.—Dionysius tries to gain popularity.—Terrific
-  pestilence among the Carthaginian army before Syracuse.—Dionysius
-  attacks the Carthaginian camp. He deliberately sacrifices a
-  detachment of his mercenaries.—Success of Dionysius, both by sea
-  and by land, against the Syracusan position.—Conflagration of
-  the Carthaginian camp—exultation at Syracuse.—Imilkon concludes
-  a secret treaty with Dionysius, to be allowed to escape with the
-  Carthaginians, on condition of abandoning his remaining army.
-  Destruction of the remaining Carthaginian army, except Sikels and
-  Iberians.—Distress at Carthage—miserable end of Imilkon.—Danger
-  of Carthage—anger and revolt of her African subjects—at length
-  put down.                                                    446-512
-
-
-
-
-HISTORY OF GREECE.
-
-
-
-
-PART II.
-
-CONTINUATION OF HISTORICAL GREECE.
-
-
-
-
-CHAPTER LXXVI.
-
-FROM THE PEACE OF ANTALKIDAS DOWN TO THE SUBJUGATION OF OLYNTHUS BY
-SPARTA.
-
-
-The peace or convention[1] which bears the name of Antalkidas, was an
-incident of serious and mournful import in Grecian history. Its true
-character cannot be better described than in a brief remark and reply
-which we find cited in Plutarch. “Alas for Hellas (observed some one
-to Agesilaus) when we see our Laconians _medising_!”—“Nay (replied
-the Spartan king), say rather the Medes (Persians) _laconising_.”[2]
-
-  [1] It goes by both names; Xenophon more commonly speaks of ἡ
-  εἰρήνη—Isokrates, of αἱ συνθῆκαι.
-
-  Though we say, the peace _of_ Antalkidas, the Greek authors say ἡ
-  ἐπ’ Ἀνταλκίδου εἰρήνη; I do not observe that they ever phrase it
-  with the genitive case Ἀνταλκίδου simply, without a preposition.
-
-  [2] Plutarch, Artaxerxes, c. 22 (compare Plutarch, Agesil. c. 23;
-  and his Apophtheg. Lacon. p. 213 B). Ὁ μὲν γὰρ Ἀγησίλαος, πρὸς
-  τὸν εἰπόντα—Φεῦ τῆς Ἑλλάδος, ὅπου μηδίζουσιν ἡμῖν οἱ Λάκωνες!...
-  Μᾶλλον, εἶπεν, οἱ Μῆδοι λακωνίζουσι.
-
-These two propositions do not exclude each other. Both were perfectly
-true. The convention emanated from a separate partnership between
-Spartan and Persian interests. It was solicited by the Spartan
-Antalkidas, and propounded by him to Tiribazus on the express
-ground, that it was exactly calculated to meet the Persian king’s
-purposes and wishes,—as we learn even from the philo-Laconian
-Xenophon.[3] While Sparta and Persia were both great gainers, no
-other Grecian state gained anything, as the convention was originally
-framed. But after the first rejection, Antalkidas saw the necessity
-of conciliating Athens by the addition of a special article providing
-that Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros should be restored to her.[4] This
-addition seems to have been first made in the abortive negotiations
-which form the subject of the discourse already mentioned, pronounced
-by Andokides. It was continued afterwards and inserted in the final
-decree which Antalkidas and Tiribazus brought down in the king’s name
-from Susa; and it doubtless somewhat contributed to facilitate the
-adherence of Athens, though the united forces of Sparta and Persia
-had become so overwhelming, that she could hardly have had the means
-of standing out, even if the supplementary article had been omitted.
-Nevertheless, this condition undoubtedly did secure to Athens a
-certain share in the gain, conjointly with the far larger shares both
-of Sparta and Persia. It is, however, not less true, that Athens,
-as well as Thebes,[5] assented to the peace only under fear and
-compulsion. As to the other states of Greece, they were interested
-merely in the melancholy capacity of partners in the general loss and
-degradation.
-
-  [3] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 14.
-
-  [4] The restoration of these three islands forms the basis
-  of historical truth in the assertion of Isokrates, that the
-  Lacedæmonians were so subdued by the defeat of Knidus, as to come
-  and tender maritime empire to Athens—(ἐλθεῖν τὴν ἀρχὴν δώσοντας)
-  Orat. vii, (Areopagit.) s. 74; Or. ix, (Evagor.); s. 83. But the
-  assertion is true respecting a later time; for the Lacedæmonians
-  really did make this proposition to Athens after they had been
-  enfeebled and humiliated by the battle of Leuktra; but not before
-  (Xenoph. Hellen. vii. 1, 3).
-
-  [5] Diodor. xiv, 111.
-
-That degradation stood evidently marked in the form, origin, and
-transmission, of the convention, even apart from its substance.
-It was a fiat issued from the court of Susa; as such it was
-ostentatiously proclaimed and “sent down” from thence to Greece. Its
-authority was derived from the king’s seal, and its sanction from his
-concluding threat, that he would make war against all recusants. It
-was brought down by the satrap Tiribazus (along with Antalkidas),
-read by him aloud, and heard with submission by the assembled
-Grecian envoys, after he had called their special attention to the
-regal seal.[6] Such was the convention which Sparta, the ancient
-president of the Grecian world had been the first to solicit at
-the hands of the Persian king, and which she now not only set the
-example of sanctioning by her own spontaneous obedience, but even
-avouched as guarantee and champion against all opponents; preparing
-to enforce it at the point of the sword against any recusant state,
-whether party to it or not. Such was the convention which was now
-inscribed on stone, and placed as a permanent record in the temples
-of the Grecian cities;[7] nay, even in the common sanctuaries,—the
-Olympic, Pythian, and others,—the great _foci_ and rallying points of
-Pan-hellenic sentiment. Though called by the name of a convention,
-it was on the very face of it a peremptory mandate proceeding from
-the ancient enemy of Greece, an acceptance of which was nothing less
-than an act of obedience. While to him it was a glorious trophy, to
-all Pan-hellenic patriots it was the deepest disgrace and insult.[8]
-Effacing altogether the idea of an independent Hellenic world,
-bound together and regulated by the self-acting forces and common
-sympathies of its own members,—even the words of the convention
-proclaimed it as an act of intrusive foreign power, and erected the
-barbarian king into a dictatorial settler of Grecian differences; a
-guardian[9] who cared for the peace of Greece more than the Greeks
-themselves. And thus, looking to the form alone, it was tantamount to
-that symbol of submission—the cession of earth and water—which had
-been demanded a century before by the ancestor of Artaxerxes from the
-ancestors of the Spartans and Athenians; a demand, which both Sparta
-and Athens then not only repudiated, but resented so cruelly, as to
-put to death the heralds by whom it was brought,—stigmatizing the
-Æginetans and others as traitors to Hellas for complying with it.[10]
-Yet nothing more would have been implied in such cession than what
-stood embodied in the inscription on that “colonna infame,” which
-placed the peace of Antalkidas side by side with the Pan-hellenic
-glories and ornaments at Olympia.[11]
-
-  [6] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 30, 31. Ὥστ’ ἐπεὶ παρήγγειλεν ὁ Τιρίβαζος
-  παρεῖναι ~τοὺς βουλομένους ὑπακοῦσαι~, ἣν βασιλεὺς εἰρήνην
-  καταπέμποι, ταχέως πάντες παρεγένοντο. Ἐπεὶ δὲ ξυνῆλθον,
-  ~ἐπιδείξας ὁ Τιρίβαζος τὰ βασιλέως σημεῖα~, ἀνεγίνωσκε τὰ
-  γεγραμμένα, εἶχε δὲ ὧδε·
-
-  Ἀρταξέρξης βασιλεὺς ~νομίζει δίκαιον~, τὰς μὲν ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ πόλεις
-  ἑαυτοῦ εἶναι, καὶ τῶν νήσων Κλαζομένας καὶ Κύπρον· τὰς δὲ ἄλλας
-  Ἑλληνίδας πόλεις καὶ μικρὰς καὶ μεγάλας, αὐτονόμους εἶναι, πλὴν
-  Λήμνου, καὶ Ἴμβρου καὶ Σκύρου, ταύτας δὲ, ὥσπερ τὸ ἀρχαῖον, εἶναι
-  Ἀθηναίων. Ὁπότεροι δὲ ταύτην τὴν εἰρήνην μὴ δέχονται, ~τούτοις
-  ἐγὼ πολεμήσω~, μετὰ τῶν ταὐτα βουλομένων, καὶ πέζῇ καὶ κατὰ
-  θάλασσαν, καὶ ναυσὶ καὶ χρήμασιν.
-
-  [7] Isokrates, Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 211. Καὶ ταύτας ἡμᾶς
-  ἠνάγκασεν (the Persian king) ἐν στήλαις λιθίναις ἀναγράψαντας ἐν
-  τοῖς κοινοῖς τῶν ἱερῶν ἀναθεῖναι, πολὺ κάλλιον τρόπαιον τῶν ἐν
-  ταῖς μάχαις γιγνομένων.
-
-  The Oratio Panegyrica of Isokrates (published about 380
-  B.C., seven years afterwards) from which I here copy, is
-  the best evidence of the feelings with which an intelligent
-  and patriotic Greek looked upon this treaty at the time;
-  when it was yet recent, but when there had been full time
-  to see how the Lacedæmonians carried it out. His other
-  orations, though valuable and instructive, were published
-  later, and represent the feelings of after-time.
-
-  Another contemporary, Plato in his Menexenus (c. 17, p. 245
-  D), stigmatizes severely “the base and unholy act (αἰσχρὸν καὶ
-  ἀνόσιον ἔργον) of surrendering Greeks to the foreigner,” and
-  asserts that the Athenians resolutely refused to sanction it.
-  This is a sufficient mark of his opinion respecting the peace of
-  Antalkidas.
-
-  [8] Isokrat. Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 207. Ἃ χρῆν ἀναιρεῖν,
-  καὶ μηδεμίαν ἐᾷν ἡμέραν, νομίζοντες, ~προστάγματα καὶ οὐ
-  συνθήκας~ εἶναι, etc. (s. 213). Αἰσχρὸν ἡμᾶς ~ὅλης τῆς Ἑλλάδος
-  ὑβριζομένης~, μηδεμίαν ποιήσασθαι κοινὴν τιμωρίαν, etc.
-
-  The word προστάγματα exactly corresponds with an expression of
-  Xenophon (put in the mouth of Autokles the Athenian envoy at
-  Sparta), respecting the dictation of the peace of Antalkidas by
-  Artaxerxes—Καὶ ὅτε μὲν ~Βασιλεὺς προσέταττεν~ αὐτονόμους τὰς
-  πόλεις εἶναι, etc. (Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 9).
-
-  [9] Isokrat. Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 205. Καίτοι πῶς οὐ χρὴ
-  διαλύειν ταύτας τὰς ὁμολογίας, ἐξ ὧν τοιαύτη δόξα γέγονεν, ὥστε
-  ὁ μὲν Βάρβαρος κήδεται τῆς Ἑλλάδος καὶ φύλαξ τῆς εἰρήνης ἐστὶν,
-  ἡμῶν δέ τινές εἰσιν οἱ λυμαινόμενοι καὶ κακῶς ποιοῦντες αὐτήν;
-
-  The word employed by Photius in his abstract of Theopompus
-  (whether it be the expression of Theopompus himself, we cannot
-  be certain—see Fragm. 111, ed. Didot), to designate the position
-  taken by Artaxerxes in reference to this peace, is—τὴν εἰρήνην
-  ἣν τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἐβράβευσεν—which implies the peremptory decision
-  of an official judge, analogous to another passage (139) of the
-  Panegyr. Orat. of Isokrates—Νῦν δ’ ἐκεῖνός (Artaxerxes) ἐστιν, ὁ
-  διοικῶν τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ μόνον οὐκ ἐπιστάθμους ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι
-  καθιστάς. Πλὴν γὰρ τούτου τί τῶν ἄλλων ὑπόλοιπόν ἐστιν; Οὐ καὶ
-  τοῦ πολέμου κύριος ἐγένετο, καὶ ~τὴν εἰρήνην ἐπρυτάνευσε~, καὶ
-  τῶν παρόντων πραγμάτων ἐπιστάτης καθέστηκεν;
-
-  [10] Herodot. vi, 49. κατηγόρεον Αἰγινητέων τὰ πεποιήκοιεν,
-  προδόντες τὴν Ἑλλάδα.
-
-  [11] Isokrates, Orat. xii, (Panathen.) s. 112-114.
-
-  Plutarch (Agesil. c. 23; Artaxerxes, c. 21, 22) expresses
-  himself in terms of bitter and well-merited indignation of this
-  peace,—“if indeed (says he) we are to call this ignominy and
-  betrayal of Greece by the name of _peace_, which brought with it
-  as much infamy as the most disastrous war.” Sparta (he says) lost
-  her headship by her defeat at Leuktra, but her honor had been
-  lost before, by the convention of Antalkidas.
-
-  It is in vain, however, that Plutarch tries to exonerate
-  Agesilaus from any share in the peace. From the narrative
-  (in Xenophon’s Hellenica, v. i, 33) of his conduct at
-  the taking of the oaths, we see that he espoused it most
-  warmly. Xenophon (in the Encomium of Agesilaus, vii, 7)
-  takes credit to Agesilaus for being μισοπέρσης, which was
-  true, from the year B.C. 396 to B.C. 394. But in B.C. 387,
-  at the time of the peace of Antalkidas, he had become
-  μισοθηβαῖος; his hatred of Persia had given place to hatred
-  of Thebes.
-
-  See also a vigorous passage of Justin (viii, 4), denouncing
-  the disgraceful position of the Greek cities at a later time
-  in calling in Philip of Macedon as arbiter; a passage not less
-  applicable to the peace of Antalkidas; and perhaps borrowed from
-  Theopompus.
-
-Great must have been the change wrought by the intermediate
-events, when Sparta, the ostensible president of Greece,—in her
-own estimation even more than in that of others,[12]—had so lost
-all Pan-hellenic conscience and dignity, as to descend into an
-obsequious minister, procuring and enforcing a Persian mandate for
-political objects of her own. How insane would such an anticipation
-have appeared to Æschylus, or the audience who heard the Persæ! to
-Herodotus or Thucydides! to Perikles and Archidamus! nay, even to
-Kallikratidas or Lysander! It was the last consummation of a series
-of previous political sins, invoking more and more the intervention
-of Persia to aid her against her Grecian enemies.
-
-  [12] Compare the language in which the Ionians, on their revolt
-  from Darius king of Persia about 500 B.C., had implored the aid
-  of Sparta (Herodot. v, 49). Τὰ κατήκοντα γάρ ἐστι ταῦτα· Ἰώνων
-  παῖδας δούλους εἶναι ἀντ’ ἐλευθέρων—ὄνειδος καὶ ἄλγος μέγιστον
-  μὲν αὐτοῖσι ἡμῖν, ~ἔτι δὲ τῶν λοιπῶν ὑμῖν, ὅσῳ προεστέατε τῆς
-  Ἑλλάδος~.
-
-  How striking is the contrast between these words and the peace of
-  Antalkidas! and what would have been the feelings of Herodotus
-  himself if he could have heard of the latter event!
-
-Her first application to the Great King for this purpose dates from
-the commencement of the Peloponnesian war, and is prefaced by an
-apology, little less than humiliating, from king Archidamus; who, not
-unconscious of the sort of treason which he was meditating, pleads
-that Sparta, when the Athenians are conspiring against her, ought
-not to be blamed for asking from foreigners as well as from Greeks
-aid for her own preservation.[13] From the earliest commencement to
-the seventh year of the war, many separate and successive envoys
-were despatched by the Spartans to Susa; two of whom were seized in
-Thrace, brought to Athens, and there put to death. The rest reached
-their destination, but talked in so confused a way, and contradicted
-each other so much, that the Persian court, unable to understand
-what they meant,[14] sent Artaphernes with letters to Sparta (in the
-seventh year of the war) complaining of such stupidity, and asking
-for clearer information. Artaphernes fell into the hands of an
-Athenian squadron at Eion on the Strymon, and was conveyed to Athens;
-where he was treated with great politeness, and sent back (after the
-letters which he carried had been examined) to Ephesus. What is more
-important to note is, that Athenian envoys were sent along with him,
-with a view of bringing Athens into friendly communication with the
-Great King; which was only prevented by the fact that Artaxerxes
-Longimanus just then died. Here we see the fatal practice, generated
-by intestine war, of invoking Persian aid; begun by Sparta as an
-importunate solicitor,—and partially imitated by Athens, though we do
-not know what her envoys were instructed to say, had they been able
-to reach Susa.
-
-  [13] Thucyd. i, 82. Κἀν τούτῳ καὶ τὰ ἡμέτερα αὐτῶν ἐξαρτύεσθαι
-  ξυμμάχων τε προσαγωγῇ καὶ Ἑλλήνων ~καὶ βαρβάρων~, εἴ ποθέν τινα
-  ~ἢ ναυτικοῦ ἢ χρημάτων~ δύναμιν προσληψόμεθα, (~ἀνεπίφθονον~ δὲ,
-  ὅσοι ὥσπερ καὶ ἡμεῖς ὑπ’ Ἀθηναίων ἐπιβουλευόμεθα, μὴ Ἕλληνας
-  μόνον ~ἀλλὰ καὶ βαρβάρους~ προσλαβόντας διασωθῆναι), etc. Compare
-  also Plato, Menexenus, c. 14, p. 243 B.
-
-  [14] Thucyd. ii, 7, 67; iv, 50.
-
-Nothing more is heard about Persian intervention until the year of
-the great Athenian disasters before Syracuse. Elate with the hopes
-arising out of that event, the Persians required no solicitation, but
-were quite as eager to tender interference for their own purposes, as
-Sparta was to invite them for hers. How ready Sparta was to purchase
-their aid by the surrender of the Asiatic Greeks, and that too
-without any stipulations in their favor,—has been recounted in my
-last volume.[15] She had not now the excuse,—for it stands only as an
-excuse and not as a justification—of self-defence against aggression
-from Athens, which Archidamus had produced at the beginning of the
-war. Even then it was only a colorable excuse, not borne out by the
-reality of the case; but now, the avowed as well as the real object
-was something quite different,—not to repel, but to crush, Athens.
-Yet to accomplish that object, not even of pretended safety, but
-of pure ambition, Sparta sacrificed unconditionally the liberty of
-her Asiatic kinsmen; a price which Archidamus at the beginning of
-the war would certainly never have endured the thoughts of paying,
-notwithstanding the then formidable power of Athens. Here, too,
-we find Athens following the example; and consenting, in hopes of
-procuring Persian aid, to the like sacrifice, though the bargain was
-never consummated. It is true that she was then contending for her
-existence. Nevertheless, the facts afford melancholy proof how much
-the sentiment of Pan-hellenic independence became enfeebled in both
-the leaders, amidst the fierce intestine conflict terminated by the
-battle of Ægospotami.[16]
-
-  [15] See Vol. IX, Ch. LXXV, p. 360.
-
-  Compare the expressions of Demosthenes (cont. Aristokrat. c. 33,
-  p. 666) attesting the prevalent indignation among the Athenians
-  of his time, about this surrender of the Asiatic Greeks by
-  Sparta,—and his oration De Rhodior. Libertate, c. 13, p. 199,
-  where he sets the peace of Kallias, made by Athens with Persia in
-  449 B.C., in contrast with the peace of Antalkidas, contracted
-  under the auspices of Sparta.
-
-  [16] This is strikingly set forth by Isokrates, Or. xii,
-  (Panathen.) s. 167-173. In this passage, however, he distributes
-  his blame too equally between Sparta and Athens, whereas the
-  blame belongs of right to the former, in far greater proportion.
-  Sparta not only began the practice of invoking the Great King,
-  and invoking his aid by disgraceful concessions,—but she also
-  carried it, at the peace of Antalkidas, to a more extreme point
-  of selfishness and subservience. Athens is guilty of following
-  the bad example of her rival, but to a less extent, and under
-  greater excuse on the plea of necessity.
-
-  Isokrates says in another place of this discourse, respecting
-  the various acts of wrong-doing towards the general interest
-  of Hellas—ἐπιδεικτέον τοὺς μὲν ἡμετέρους ~ὀψιμαθεῖς~ αὐτῶν
-  γεγενημένους, Λακεδαιμονίους δὲ ~τὰ μὲν πρώτους, τὰ δὲ μόνους~,
-  ἐξαμαρτόντας (Panath. s. 103). Which is much nearer the truth
-  than the passage before referred to.
-
-After that battle, the bargain between Sparta and Persia would
-doubtless have been fulfilled, and the Asiatic Greeks would have
-passed at once under the dominion of the latter,—had not an entirely
-new train of circumstances arisen out of the very peculiar position
-and designs of Cyrus. That young prince did all in his power to
-gain the affections of the Greeks, as auxiliaries for his ambitious
-speculations; in which speculations both Sparta and the Asiatic
-Greeks took part, compromising themselves irrevocably against
-Artaxerxes, and still more against Tissaphernes. Sparta thus became
-unintentionally the enemy of Persia, and found herself compelled to
-protect the Asiatic Greeks against his hostility, with which they
-were threatened; a protection easy for her to confer, not merely
-from the unbounded empire which she then enjoyed over the Grecian
-world, but from the presence of the renowned Cyreian Ten Thousand,
-and the contempt for Persian military strength which they brought
-home from their retreat. She thus finds herself in the exercise of a
-Pan-hellenic protectorate or presidency, first through the ministry
-of Derkyllidas, next of Agesilaus, who even sacrifices at Aulis,
-takes up the sceptre of Agamemnon, and contemplates large schemes of
-aggression against the Great King. Here, however, the Persians play
-against her the same game which she had invoked them to assist in
-playing against Athens. Their fleet, which fifteen years before she
-had invited for her own purposes, is now brought in against herself,
-and with far more effect, since her empire was more odious as well as
-more oppressive than the Athenian. It is now Athens and her allies
-who call in Persian aid; without any direct engagement, indeed, to
-surrender the Asiatic Greeks, for we are told that after the battle
-of Knidus, Konon incurred the displeasure of the Persians by his
-supposed plans for reuniting them with Athens,[17] and Athenian aid
-was still continued to Evagoras,—yet, nevertheless, indirectly paving
-the way for that consummation. If Athens and her allies here render
-themselves culpable of an abnegation of Pan-hellenic sentiment, we
-may remark, as before, that they act under the pressure of stronger
-necessities than could ever be pleaded by Sparta; and that they might
-employ on their own behalf, with much greater truth, the excuse of
-self-preservation preferred by king Archidamus.
-
-  [17] Cornelius Nepos, Conon. c. 5.
-
-But never on any occasion did that excuse find less real place than
-in regard to the mission of Antalkidas. Sparta was at that time
-so powerful, even after the loss of her maritime empire, that the
-allies at the Isthmus of Corinth, jealous of each other and held
-together only by common terror, could hardly stand on the defensive
-against her, and would probably have been disunited by reasonable
-offers on her part; nor would she have needed even to recall
-Agesilaus from Asia. Nevertheless, the mission was probably dictated
-in great measure by a groundless panic, arising from the sight of
-the revived Long Walls and refortified Piræus, and springing at
-once to the fancy, that a new Athenian empire, such as had existed
-forty years before, was about to start into life; a fancy little
-likely to be realized, since the very peculiar circumstances which
-had created the first Athenian empire were now totally reversed.
-Debarred from maritime empire herself, the first object with Sparta
-was, to shut out Athens from the like; the next, to put down all
-partial federations or political combinations, and to enforce
-universal autonomy, or the maximum of political isolation; in
-order that there might nowhere exist a power capable of resisting
-herself, the strongest of all individual states. As a means to this
-end, which was no less in the interest of Persia than in hers, she
-outbid all prior subserviences to the Great King, betrayed to him
-not only one entire division of her Hellenic kinsmen, but also the
-general honor of the Hellenic name in the most flagrant manner,—and
-volunteered to _medise_ in order that the Persians might repay her by
-_laconising_.[18] To ensure fully the obedience of all the satraps,
-who had more than once manifested dissentient views of their own,
-Antalkidas procured and brought down a formal order signed and sealed
-at Susa; and Sparta undertook, without shame or scruple, to enforce
-the same order,—“the convention sent down by the king,”—upon all her
-countrymen; thus converting them into the subjects, and herself into
-a sort of viceroy or satrap, of Artaxerxes. Such an act of treason
-to the Pan-hellenic cause was far more flagrant and destructive than
-that alleged confederacy with the Persian king, for which the Theban
-Ismenias was afterwards put to death, and that, too, by the Spartans
-themselves.[19] Unhappily it formed a precedent for the future, and
-was closely copied afterwards by Thebes;[20] foreboding but too
-clearly the short career which Grecian political independence had to
-run.
-
-  [18] Isok. Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 145. Καὶ τῷ βαρβάρῳ τῷ τῆς Ἀσίας
-  κρατοῦντι συμπράττουσι (the Lacedæmonians) ὅπως ὡς μεγίστην ἀρχὴν
-  ἕξουσιν.
-
-  [19] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 35.
-
-  [20] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 33-39.
-
-That large patriotic sentiment, which dictated the magnanimous answer
-sent by the Athenians[21] to the offers of Mardonius in 479 B.C.,
-refusing in the midst of ruin present and prospective, all temptation
-to betray the sanctity of Pan-hellenic fellowship,—that sentiment
-which had been during the two following generations the predominant
-inspiration of Athens, and had also been powerful, though always
-less powerful, at Sparta,—was now, in the former, overlaid by more
-pressing apprehensions, and in the latter completely extinguished.
-Now it was to the leading states that Greece had to look, for holding
-up the great banner of Pan-hellenic independence; from the smaller
-states nothing more could be required than that they should adhere
-to and defend it, when upheld.[22] But so soon as Sparta was seen to
-solicit and enforce, and Athens to accept (even under constraint),
-the proclamation under the king’s hand and seal brought down by
-Antalkidas,—that banner was no longer a part of the public emblems
-of Grecian political life. The grand idea represented by it,—of
-collective self-determining Hellenism,—was left to dwell in the
-bosoms of individual patriots.
-
-  [21] Herodot. viii, 143.
-
-  The explanation which the Athenians give to the Spartan envoys,
-  of the reasons and feelings which dictated their answer of
-  refusal to Alexander (viii, 144), are not less impressive than
-  the answer itself.
-
-  But whoever would duly feel and appreciate the treason of the
-  Spartans in soliciting the convention of Antalkidas, should read
-  in contrast with it that speech which their envoys address to the
-  Athenians, in order to induce the latter to stand out against the
-  temptations of Mardonius (viii, 142).
-
-  [22] The sixth oration (called Archidamus) of Isokrates sets
-  forth emphatically the magnanimous sentiments, and comprehensive
-  principles, on which it becomes Sparta to model her public
-  conduct,—as altogether different from the simple considerations
-  of prudence and security which are suitable to humbler states
-  like Corinth, Epidaurus, or Phlius (Archidamus, s. 105, 106, 110).
-
-  Contrast these lofty pretensions with the dishonorable realities
-  of the convention of Antalkidas,—not thrust upon Sparta by
-  superior force, but both originally sued out, and finally
-  enforced by her, for her own political ends.
-
-  Compare also Isokrates, Or. xii. (Panathen.) s. 169-172, about
-  the dissension of the leading Grecian states, and its baneful
-  effects.
-
-If we look at the convention of Antalkidas apart from its form and
-warranty, and with reference to its substance, we shall find that
-though its first article was unequivocally disgraceful, its last was
-at least popular as a promise to the ear. Universal autonomy, to
-each city, small or great, was dear to Grecian political instinct.
-I have already remarked more than once that the exaggerated force
-of this desire was the chief cause of the short duration of Grecian
-freedom. Absorbing all the powers of life to the separate parts,
-it left no vital force or integrity to the whole; especially, it
-robbed both each and all of the power of self-defence against foreign
-assailants. Though indispensable up to a certain point and under
-certain modifications, yet beyond these modifications, which Grecian
-political instinct was far from recognizing, it produced a great
-preponderance of mischief. Although, therefore, this item of the
-convention was in its promise acceptable and popular,—and although
-we shall find it hereafter invoked as a protection in various
-individual cases of injustice,—we must inquire how it was carried
-into execution, before we can pronounce whether it was good or evil,
-the present of a friend or of an enemy.
-
-The succeeding pages will furnish an answer to this inquiry. The
-Lacedæmonians, as “presidents (guarantees or executors) of the peace,
-sent down by the king,”[23] undertook the duty of execution; and
-we shall see that from the beginning they meant nothing sincerely.
-They did not even attempt any sincere and steady compliance with the
-honest, though undistinguishing, political instinct of the Greek
-mind; much less did they seek to grant as much as was really good,
-and to withhold the remainder. They defined autonomy in such manner,
-and meted it out in such portions, as suited their own political
-interests and purposes. The promise made by the convention,
-except in so far as it enabled them to increase their own power by
-dismemberment or party intervention, proved altogether false and
-hollow. For if we look back to the beginning of the Peloponnesian
-war, when they sent to Athens to require general autonomy throughout
-Greece, we shall find that the word had then a distinct and serious
-import; demanding that the cities held in dependence by Athens should
-be left free, which freedom Sparta might have ensured for them
-herself at the close of the war, had she not preferred to convert
-it into a far harsher empire. But in 387 (the date of the peace of
-Antalkidas) there were no large body of subjects to be emancipated,
-except the allies of Sparta herself, to whom it was by no means
-intended to apply. So that in fact, what was promised, as well as
-what was realized, even by the most specious item of this disgraceful
-convention, was—“that cities should enjoy autonomy, not for their
-own comfort and in their own way, but for Lacedæmonian convenience;”
-a significant phrase (employed by Perikles,[24] in the debates
-preceding the Peloponnesian war) which forms a sort of running text
-for Grecian history during the sixteen years between the peace of
-Antalkidas and the battle of Leuktra.
-
-  [23] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 36.
-
-  Ἐν δὲ τῷ πολέμῳ μᾶλλον ἀντιῤῥόπως τοῖς ἐναντίοις πράττοντες
-  οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ~πολὺ ἐπικυδέστεροι ἐγένοντο~ ἐκ τῆς ἐπ’
-  Ἀνταλκίδου εἰρήνης καλουμένης· ~προστάται γὰρ γενόμενοι τῆς ὑπὸ
-  βασιλέως καταπεμφθείσης εἰρήνης~ καὶ τὴν αὐτονομίαν ταῖς πόλεσι
-  πράττοντες, etc.
-
-  [24] Thucyd. i, 144. Νῦν δὲ τούτοις (to the Lacedæmonian envoys)
-  ἀποκρινάμενοι ἀποπέμψωμεν ... τὰς δὲ πόλεις ὅτι αὐτονόμους
-  ἀφήσομεν, εἰ καὶ αὐτονόμους ἔχοντες ἐσπεισάμεθα, καὶ ὅταν
-  κἀκεῖνοι ταῖς αὐτῶν ἀποδῶσι πόλεσι ~μὴ σφίσι τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις
-  ἐπιτηδείως αὐτονομεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ αὐτοῖς ἑκάστοις, ὡς βούλονται~.
-
-I have already mentioned that the first two applications of
-the newly-proclaimed autonomy, made by the Lacedæmonians, were
-to extort from the Corinthian government the dismissal of its
-Argeian auxiliaries, and to compel Thebes to renounce her ancient
-presidency of the Bœotian federation. The latter especially was an
-object which they had long had at heart;[25] and by both, their
-ascendency in Greece was much increased. Athens, too, terrified by
-the new development of Persian force as well as partially bribed
-by the restoration of her three islands, into an acceptance of the
-peace,—was thus robbed of her Theban and Corinthian allies, and
-disabled from opposing the Spartan projects. But before we enter upon
-these projects, it will be convenient to turn for a short time to the
-proceedings of the Persians.
-
-  [25] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 36. οὗπερ πάλαι ἐπεθύμουν.
-
-Even before the death of Darius Nothus (father of Artaxerxes and
-Cyrus) Egypt had revolted from the Persians, under a native prince
-named Amyrtæus. To the Grecian leaders who accompanied Cyrus in his
-expedition against his brother, this revolt was well known to have
-much incensed the Persians; so that Klearchus, in the conversation
-which took place after the death of Cyrus about accommodation with
-Artaxerxes, intimated that the Ten Thousand could lend him effectual
-aid in reconquering Egypt.[26] It was not merely these Greeks who
-were exposed to danger by the death of Cyrus, but also the various
-Persians and other subjects who had lent assistance to him; all of
-whom made submission and tried to conciliate Artaxerxes, except
-Tamos, who had commanded the fleet of Cyrus on the coasts both of
-Ionia and Kilikia. Such was the alarm of Tamos when Tissaphernes
-came down in full power to the coast, that he fled with his fleet
-and treasures to Egypt, to seek protection from king Psammetichus,
-to whom he had rendered valuable service. This traitor, however,
-having so valuable a deposit brought to him, forgot every thing
-else in his avidity to make it sure, and put to death Tamos with
-all his children.[27] About 395 B.C., we find Nephereus king of
-Egypt lending aid to the Lacedæmonian fleet against Artaxerxes.[28]
-Two years afterwards (392-390 B.C.), during the years immediately
-succeeding the victory of Knidus, and the voyage of Pharnabazus
-across the Ægean to Peloponnesus,—we hear of that satrap as employed
-with Abrokomas and Tithraustes in strenuous but unavailing efforts
-to reconquer Egypt.[29] Having thus repulsed the Persians, the
-Egyptian king Akoras is found between 390-380 B.C.,[30] sending aid
-to Evagoras in Cyprus against the same enemy. And in spite of farther
-efforts made afterwards by Artaxerxes to reconquer Egypt, the native
-kings in that country maintained their independence for about sixty
-years in all, until the reign of his successor Ochus.
-
-  [26] Xen. Anab. ii, 5, 13.
-
-  It would appear that the revolt of Egypt from Persia must date
-  between 414-411 B.C.; but this point is obscure. See Boeckh,
-  Manetho und die Hundsstern-Periode, pp. 358, 363, Berlin 1845; and
-  Ley, Fata et Conditio Ægypti sub Imperio Persarum, p. 55.
-
-  M. Rehdautz, Vitæ Iphicratis, Timothei, et Chabriæ, p. 240, places
-  the revolt rather earlier, about 414 B.C.; and Mr. Fynes Clinton
-  (Fasti Hellen. Appendix, ch. 18, p. 317) countenances the same
-  date.
-
-  [27] Diodor. xiv, 35.
-
-  This Psammetichus is presumed by Ley (in his Dissertation above
-  cited, p. 20) to be the same person as Amyrtæus the Saite in the
-  list of Manetho, under a different name. It is also possible,
-  however, that he may have been king over a part of Egypt,
-  contemporaneous with Amyrtæus.
-
-  [28] Diodor. xiv, 79.
-
-  [29] This is the chronology laid down by M. Rehdautz (Vitæ
-  Iphicratis, Chabriæ, et Timothei, Epimetr. ii, pp. 241, 242) on
-  very probable grounds, principally from Isokrates, Orat. iv,
-  (Panegyr.) s. 161, 162.
-
-  [30] Diodor. xv, 2, 3.
-
-But it was a Grecian enemy,—of means inferior, yet of qualities much
-superior, to any of these Egyptians,—who occupied the chief attention
-of the Persians immediately after the peace of Antalkidas: Evagoras,
-despot of Salamis in Cyprus. Respecting that prince we possess a
-discourse of the most glowing and superabundant eulogy, composed
-after his death for the satisfaction (and probably paid for with
-the money) of his son and successor Nikoklês, by the contemporary
-Isokrates. Allowing as we must do for exaggeration and partiality,
-even the trustworthy features of the picture are sufficiently
-interesting.
-
-Evagoras belonged to a Salaminian stock or Gens called the Teukridæ,
-which numbered among its ancestors the splendid legendary names of
-Teukrus, Telamon, and Æakus; taking its departure, through them,
-from the divine name of Zeus. It was believed that the archer
-Teukrus, after returning from the siege of Troy to (the Athenian)
-Salamis, had emigrated under a harsh order from his father Telamon,
-and given commencement to the city of that name on the eastern
-coast of Cyprus.[31] As in Sicily, so in Cyprus, the Greek and
-Phœnician elements were found in near contact, though in very
-different proportions. Of the nine or ten separate city communities,
-which divided among them the whole sea-coast, the inferior towns
-being all dependent upon one or other of them,—seven pass for
-Hellenic, the two most considerable being Salamis and Soli; three
-for Phœnician,—Paphos, Amathus, and Kitium. Probably, however,
-there was in each a mixture of Greek and Phœnician population, in
-different proportions.[32] Each was ruled by its own separate prince
-or despot, Greek or Phœnician. The Greek immigrations (though their
-exact date cannot be assigned) appear to have been later in date
-than the Phœnician. At the time of the Ionic revolt (B.C. 496), the
-preponderance was on the side of Hellenism; yet with considerable
-intermixture of Oriental custom. Hellenism was, however, greatly
-crushed by the Persian reconquest of the revolters, accomplished
-through the aid of the Phœnicians[33] on the opposite continent. And
-though doubtless the victories of Kimon and the Athenians (470-450
-B.C.) partially revived it, yet Perikles, in his pacification with
-the Persians, had prudently relinquished Cyprus as well as Egypt;[34]
-so that the Grecian element in the former, receiving little
-extraneous encouragement, became more and more subordinate to the
-Phœnician.
-
-  [31] Isokrates, Or. iii, (Nikokl.) s. 50; Or. ix, (Evagoras) s.
-  21; Pausanias, ii, 29, 4; Diodor. xiv, 98.
-
-  The historian Theopompus, when entering upon the history of
-  Evagoras, seems to have related many legendary tales respecting
-  the Greek Gentes in Cyprus, and to have represented Agamemnon
-  himself as ultimately migrating to it (Theopompus, Frag. 111, ed.
-  Wichers; and ed. Didot. ap. Photium).
-
-  The tomb of the archer Teukrus was shown at Salamis in Cyprus.
-  See the Epigram of Aristotle, Antholog. i, 8, 112.
-
-  [32] Movers, in his very learned investigations respecting the
-  Phœnicians (vol. iii, ch. 5, p. 203-221 _seq._), attempts to
-  establish the existence of an ancient population in Cyprus,
-  called Kitians; once extended over the island, and of which the
-  town called Kitium was the remnant. He supposes them to have
-  been a portion of the Canaanitish population, anterior to the
-  Jewish occupation of Palestine. The Phœnician colonies in Cyprus
-  he reckons as of later date, superadded to, and depressing these
-  natives. He supposes the Kilikian population to have been in
-  early times Canaanitish also. Engel (Kypros, vol. i, p. 166)
-  inclines to admit the same hypothesis as highly probable.
-
-  The sixth century B.C. (from 600 downwards) appears to have been
-  very unfavorable to the Phœnicians, bringing upon Tyre severe
-  pressure from the Chaldeans, as it brought captivity upon the
-  Jews. During the same period, the Grecian commerce with Egypt was
-  greatly extended, especially by the reign of the Phil-hellenic
-  Amasis, who acquired possession of Cyprus. Much of the Grecian
-  immigration into Cyprus probably took place at this time; we know
-  of one body of settlers invited by Philokyprus to Soli, under the
-  assistance of the Athenian Solon (Movers, p. 244 _seq._).
-
-  [33] Herodot. v, 109.
-
-  Compare the description given by Herodotus of the costume and
-  arms of the Cypriots in the armament of Xerxes,—half Oriental
-  (vii, 90). The Salaminians used chariots of war in battle (v,
-  113); as the Carthaginians did, before they learnt the art of
-  training elephants (Diodor. xvi, 80; Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 27).
-
-  [34] See Vol. V. of this History, Ch. xlv, p. 335.
-
-It was somewhere about this time that the reigning princes of
-Salamis, who at the time of the Ionic revolt had been Greeks of
-the Teukrid Gens,[35] were supplanted and dethroned by a Phœnician
-exile who gained their confidence and made himself despot in their
-place.[36] To insure his own sceptre, this usurper did everything
-in his power to multiply and strengthen the Phœnician population,
-as well as to discourage and degrade the Hellenic. The same policy
-was not only continued by his successor at Salamis, but seems also
-to have been imitated in several of the other towns; insomuch that
-during most part of the Peloponnesian war, Cyprus became sensibly
-dis-hellenized. The Greeks in the island were harshly oppressed; new
-Greek visitors and merchants were kept off by the most repulsive
-treatment, as well as by threats of those cruel mutilations of the
-body which were habitually employed as penalties by the Orientals;
-while Grecian arts, education, music, poetry, and intelligence, were
-rapidly on the decline.[37]
-
-  [35] One of these princes, however, is mentioned as bearing the
-  Phœnician name of Siromus (Herod. v, 104).
-
-  [36] We may gather this by putting together Herodot. iv, 102; v,
-  104-114, with Isokrates, Or. ix, (Evagoras) s. 22.
-
-  [37] Isokrates, Or. ix, (Evag.) s. 23, 55, 58.
-
-  Παραλαβὼν γὰρ (Evagoras) ~τὴν πόλιν ἐκβεβαρβαρωμένην~, καὶ διὰ
-  τὴν τῶν Φοινίκων ἀρχὴν οὔτε τοὺς Ἕλληνας προσδεχομένην, οὔτε τέχνας
-  ἐπισταμένην, οὔτ’ ἐμπορίῳ χρωμένην, οὔτε λιμένα κεκτημένην, etc.
-
-  Πρὶν μὲν γὰρ λαβεῖν Εὐαγόραν τὴν ἀρχὴν, οὕτως ἀπροσοίστως καὶ
-  χαλεπῶς εἶχον, ὥστε καὶ τῶν ἀρχόντων τούτους ἐνόμιζον εἶναι
-  βελτίστους οἵ ~τινες ὠμότατα πρὸς τοὺς Ἕλληνας διακείμενοι~
-  τυγχάνοιεν, etc.
-
-  This last passage receives remarkable illustration from the
-  oration of Lysias against Andokides, in which he alludes to the
-  visit of the latter to Cyprus—μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ἔπλευσεν ὡς τὸν
-  Κιτιέων βασιλέα, καὶ προδιδοὺς ληφθεὶς ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ ἐδέθη, καὶ οὐ
-  μόνον τὸν θάνατον ἐφοβεῖτο ἀλλὰ τὰ καθ’ ἡμέραν αἰκίσματα,
-  ~οἰόμενος τὰ ἀκρωτήρια ζῶντος~ ἀποτμηθήσεσθαι (s. 26).
-
-  Engel (Kypros, vol. i, p. 286) impugns the general correctness of
-  this narrative of Isokrates. He produces no adequate reasons, nor
-  do I myself see any, for this contradiction.
-
-  Not only Konon, but also his friend Nikophemus, had a wife and
-  family at Cyprus, besides another family in Athens (Lysias, De
-  Bonis Aristophanis, Or. xix, s. 38).
-
-Notwithstanding such untoward circumstances, in which the youth of
-the Teukrid Evagoras at Salamis was passed, he manifested at an
-early age so much energy both of mind and body, and so much power of
-winning popularity, that he became at once a marked man both among
-Greeks and Phœnicians. It was about this time that the Phœnician
-despot was slain, through a conspiracy formed by a Kitian or Tyrian
-named Abdêmon, who got possession of his sceptre.[38] The usurper,
-mistrustful of his position, and anxious to lay hands upon all
-conspicuous persons who might be capable of doing him mischief,
-tried to seize Evagoras; but the latter escaped and passed over to
-Soli and Kilikia. Though thus to all appearance a helpless exile,
-he found means to strike a decisive blow, while the new usurpation,
-stained by its first violences and rapacity, was surrounded by
-enemies, doubters, or neutrals, without having yet established any
-firm footing. He crossed over from Soli in Kilikia, with a small but
-determined band of about fifty followers,—obtained secret admission
-by a postern gate of Salamis,—and assaulted Abdêmon by night in
-his palace. In spite of a vastly superior number of guards, this
-enterprise was conducted with such extraordinary daring and judgment,
-that Abdêmon perished, and Evagoras became despot in his place.[39]
-
-  [38] Theopompus (Fr. 111) calls Abdêmon a Kitian; Diodorus
-  (xiv, 98) calls him a Tyrian. Movers (p. 206) thinks that both
-  are correct, and that he was a Kitian living at Tyre, who had
-  migrated from Salamis during the Athenian preponderance there.
-  There were Kitians, not natives of the town of Kition, but
-  belonging to the ancient population of the island, living in the
-  various towns of Cyprus; and there were also Kitians mentioned as
-  resident at Sidon (Diogen. Laert. Vit. Zenon. s. 6).
-
-  [39] Isokrates, Or. ix, (Evagoras) s. 29-35; also Or. iii,
-  (Nikokl.) s. 33; Theopomp. Fragm. 111, ed. Wichers and ed. Didot.
-  Diodor. xiv, 98.
-
-  The two latter mention the name, Audymon or Abdêmon, which
-  Isokrates does not specify.
-
-The splendor of this exploit was quite sufficient to seat Evagoras
-unopposed on the throne, amidst a population always accustomed to
-princely government; while among the Salaminian Greeks he was still
-farther endeared by his Teukrid descent.[40] His conduct fully
-justified the expectations entertained. Not merely did he refrain
-from bloodshed, or spoliation, or violence for the gratification
-of personal appetite; abstinences remarkable enough in any Grecian
-despot to stamp his reign with letters of gold, and the more
-remarkable in Evagoras, since he had the susceptible temperament
-of a Greek, though his great mental force always kept it under due
-control.[41] But he was also careful in inquiring into, and strict in
-punishing crime, yet without those demonstrations of cruel infliction
-by which an Oriental prince displayed his energy.[42] His government
-was at the same time highly popular and conciliating, as well towards
-the multitude as towards individuals. Indefatigable in his own
-personal supervision, he examined everything for himself, shaped out
-his own line of policy, and kept watch over its execution.[43] He was
-foremost in all effort and in all danger. Maintaining undisturbed
-security, he gradually doubled the wealth, commerce, industry, and
-military force, of the city, while his own popularity and renown went
-on increasing.
-
-  [40] Isokrates, Or. iii, (Nikokles) s. 33.
-
-  [41] Isokrat. Or. ix, s. 53. ἡγούμενος τῶν ἡδονῶν, ἀλλ’ οὐκ
-  ἀγόμενος ὑπ’ αὐτῶν, etc.
-
-  [42] Isokr. Or. ix, 51. οὐδένα μὲν ἀδικῶν, τοὺς δὲ χρηστοὺς
-  τιμῶν, καὶ σφόδρα μὲν ἁπάντων ἄρχων, ~νομίμως δὲ τοὺς
-  ἐξαμαρτάνοντας~ κολάζων (s. 58)—ὃς οὐ μόνον τὴν ἑαυτοῦ πόλιν
-  πλείονος ἀξίαν ἐποίησεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν τόπον ὅλον, τὸν περιέχοντα
-  τὴν νῆσον, ~ἐπὶ πρᾳότητα καὶ μετριότητα~ προήγαγεν, etc.; compare
-  s. 81.
-
-  These epithets, _lawful_ punishment, _mild_ dealing, etc., cannot
-  be fully understood except in contrast with the mutilations
-  alluded to by Lysias, in the passage cited in a note on page
-  16, above; also with exactly similar mutilations, mentioned by
-  Xenophon as systematically inflicted upon offenders by Cyrus
-  the younger (Xenoph. Anabas. i, 9, 13). Οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἡμῶν (says
-  Isokrates about the Persians) οὕτως αἰκίζεται τοὺς οἰκέτας, ὡς
-  ἐκεῖνοι τοὺς ἐλευθέρους κολάζουσιν—Or. iv, (Paneg.) 142.
-
-  [43] Isokrates, Or. ix, (Evag.) s. 50-56.
-
-  The language of the encomiast, though exaggerated, must doubtless
-  be founded in truth, as the result shows.
-
-Above all, it was his first wish to renovate, both in Salamis and
-in Cyprus, that Hellenism which the Phœnician despots of the last
-fifty years had done so much to extinguish or corrupt. For aid in
-this scheme, he seems to have turned his thoughts to Athens, with
-which city he was connected as a Teukrid, by gentile and legendary
-sympathies,—and which was then only just ceasing to be the great
-naval power of the Ægean. For though we cannot exactly make out the
-date at which Evagoras began to reign, we may conclude it to have
-been about 411 or 410 B.C. It seems to have been shortly after that
-period that he was visited by Andokides the Athenian;[44] moreover,
-he must have been a prince not merely established, but powerful,
-when he ventured to harbor Konon in 405 B.C., after the battle of
-Ægospotami. He invited to Salamis fresh immigrants from Attica and
-other parts of Greece, as the prince Philokyprus of Soli had done
-under the auspices of Solon,[45] a century and a half before. He
-took especial pains to revive and improve Grecian letters, arts,
-teaching, music, and intellectual tendencies. Such encouragement was
-so successfully administered, that in a few years, without constraint
-or violence, the face of Salamis was changed. The gentleness and
-sociability, the fashions and pursuits, of Hellenism, became again
-predominant; with great influence of example over all the other towns
-of the island.
-
-  [44] Lysias cont. Andokid. s. 28.
-
-  [45] Plutarch, Solon, c. 26.
-
-Had the rise of Evagoras taken place a few years earlier, Athens
-might perhaps have availed herself of the opening to turn her
-ambition eastward, in preference to that disastrous impulse which
-led her westward to Sicily. But coming as he did only at that later
-moment when she was hard pressed to keep up even a defensive war, he
-profited rather by her weakness than by her strength. During those
-closing years of the war, when the Athenian empire was partially
-broken up, and when the Ægean, instead of the tranquillity which it
-had enjoyed for fifty years under Athens, became a scene of contest
-between two rival money-levying fleets,—many out-settlers from
-Athens, who had acquired property in the islands, the Chersonesus, or
-elsewhere, under her guarantee, found themselves insecure in every
-way, and were tempted to change their abodes. Finally, by the defeat
-of Ægospotami (B.C. 405), all such out-settlers as then remained
-were expelled, and forced to seek shelter either at Athens (at that
-moment the least attractive place in Greece), or in some other
-locality. To such persons, not less than to the Athenian admiral
-Konon with his small remnant of Athenian triremes saved out of the
-great defeat, the proclaimed invitations of Evagoras would present
-a harbor of refuge nowhere else to be found. Accordingly, we learn
-that numerous settlers of the best character, from different parts
-of Greece, crowded to Salamis.[46] Many Athenian women, during the
-years of destitution and suffering which preceded as well as followed
-the battle of Ægospotami, were well pleased to emigrate and find
-husbands in that city;[47] while throughout the wide range of the
-Lacedæmonian empire, the numerous victims exiled by the harmosts and
-dekarchies had no other retreat on the whole so safe and tempting.
-The extensive plain of Salamis afforded lands for many colonists. On
-what conditions, indeed, they were admitted, we do not know; but the
-conduct of Evagoras as a ruler, gave universal satisfaction.
-
-  [46] Isokrates, Or. ix, (Evag.) s. 59-61; compare Lysias, Or.
-  xix, (De Aristoph. Bon.) s. 38-46; and Diodor. xiv, 98.
-
-  [47] Isokrates, _l. c._ παιδοποιεῖσθαι δὲ τοὺς πλείστους αὐτῶν
-  γυναῖκας λαμβάνοντες παρ’ ἡμῶν, etc.
-
-  For the extreme distress of Athenian women during these trying
-  times consult the statement in Xenophon, Memorab. ii, 7, 2-4.
-
-  The Athenian Andokides is accused of having carried out a young
-  woman of citizen family,—his own cousin, and daughter of an
-  Athenian named Aristeides,—to Cyprus, and there to have sold
-  her to the despot of Kitium for a cargo of wheat. But being
-  threatened with prosecution for this act before the Athenian
-  Dikastery, he stole her away again and brought her back to
-  Athens; in which act, however, he was detected by the prince, and
-  punished with imprisonment from which he had the good fortune
-  to escape. (Plutarch, Vit. X, Orat. p. 834; Photius, Cod. 261;
-  Tzetzes, Chiliad. vi, 367).
-
-  How much there may be of truth in this accusation, we have no
-  means of determining. But it illustrates the way in which the
-  Athenian maidens, who had no dowry at home, were provided for by
-  their relatives elsewhere. Probably Andokides took this young
-  woman out, under the engagement to find a Grecian husband for her
-  in Cyprus. Instead of doing this, he sold her for his own profit
-  to the harem of the prince; or at least, is accused of having so
-  sold her.
-
-During the first years of his reign, Evagoras doubtless paid his
-tribute regularly, and took no steps calculated to offend the Persian
-king. But as his power increased, his ambition increased also. We
-find him towards the year 390 B.C., engaged in a struggle not merely
-with the Persian king, but with Amathus and Kitium in his own island,
-and with the great Phœnician cities on the mainland. By what steps,
-or at what precise period, this war began, we cannot determine. At
-the time of the battle of Knidus (394 B.C.) Evagoras had not only
-paid his tribute, but was mainly instrumental in getting the Persian
-fleet placed under Konon to act against the Lacedæmonians, himself
-serving aboard.[48] It was in fact (if we may believe Isokrates)
-to the extraordinary energy, ability, and power, displayed by him
-on that occasion in the service of Artaxerxes himself, that the
-jealousy and alarm of the latter against him are to be ascribed.
-Without any provocation, and at the very moment when he was profiting
-by the zealous services of Evagoras, the Great King treacherously
-began to manœuvre against him, and forced him into the war in
-self-defence.[49] Evagoras accepted the challenge, in spite of the
-disparity of strength, with such courage and efficiency, that he at
-first gained marked successes. Seconded by his son Pnytagoras, he not
-only worsted and humbled Amathus, Kitium, and Soli, which cities,
-under the prince Agyris, adhered to Artaxerxes,—but also equipped a
-large fleet, attacked the Phœnicians on the mainland with so much
-vigor as even to take the great city of Tyre; prevailing, moreover,
-upon some of the Kilikian towns to declare against the Persians.[50]
-He received powerful aid from Akoris, the native and independent
-king in Egypt, as well as from Chabrias and the force sent out by
-the Athenians.[51] Beginning apparently about 390 B.C., the war
-against Evagoras lasted something more than ten years, costing the
-Persians great efforts and an immense expenditure of money. Twice
-did Athens send a squadron to his assistance, from gratitude for his
-long protection to Konon and his energetic efforts before and in the
-battle of Knidus,—though she thereby ran every risk of making the
-Persians her enemies.
-
-  [48] This much appears even from the meagre abstract of Ktesias,
-  given by Photius (Ktesiæ Persica, c. 63, p. 80, ed. Bähr).
-
-  Both Ktesias and Theopompus (Fr. iii, ed. Wichers, and ed. Didot)
-  recounted the causes which brought about the war between the
-  Persian king and Evagoras.
-
-  [49] Isokrates, Or. ix, (Evag.) s. 71, 73, 74. πρὸς δὲ τοῦτον
-  (Evagoras) οὕτως ἐκ πολλοῦ περιδεῶς ἔσχε (Artaxerxes), ~ὥστε
-  μεταξὺ πάσχων εὖ~, πολεμεῖν πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐπεχείρησε, δίκαια μὲν οὐ
-  ποιῶν, etc.—ἐπειδὴ ~ἠναγκάσθη πολεμεῖν~ (_i. e._ Evagoras).
-
-  [50] Isokr. Or. ix, (Evag.) s. 75, 76; Diodor. xiv, 98; Ephorus,
-  Frag. 134, ed. Didot.
-
-  [51] Cornelius Nepos, Chabrias, c. 2; Demosthenes adv. Leptinem,
-  p. 479, s. 84.
-
-The satrap Tiribazus saw that so long as he had on his hands a
-war in Greece, it was impossible for him to concentrate his force
-against the prince of Salamis and the Egyptians. Hence, in part, the
-extraordinary effort made by the Persians to dictate, in conjunction
-with Sparta, the peace of Antalkidas, and to get together such a
-fleet in Ionia as should overawe Athens and Thebes into submission.
-It was one of the conditions of that peace that Evagoras should be
-abandoned;[52] the whole island of Cyprus being acknowledged as
-belonging to the Persian king. Though thus cut off from Athens, and
-reduced to no other Grecian aid than such mercenaries as he could
-pay, Evagoras was still assisted by Akoris of Egypt, and even by
-Hekatomnus prince of Karia with a secret present of money.[53] But
-the peace of Antalkidas being now executed in Asia, the Persian
-satraps were completely masters of the Grecian cities on the Asiatic
-sea-board, and were enabled to convey round to Kilikia and Cyprus not
-only their whole fleet from Ionia, but also additional contingents
-from these very Grecian cities. A large portion of the Persian
-force acting against Cyprus was thus Greek, yet seemingly acting by
-constraint, neither well paid nor well used,[54] and therefore not
-very efficient.
-
-  [52] Isokrat. Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 162. Εὐαγόραν—ὃς ἐν ταῖς
-  συνθήκαις ἔκδοτός ἐστιν, etc.
-
-  We must observe, however, that Cyprus had been secured to the
-  king of Persia, even under the former peace, so glorious to
-  Athens, concluded by Perikles about 449 B.C., and called the
-  peace of Kallias. It was, therefore, neither a new demand on
-  the part of Artaxerxes, nor a new concession on the part of the
-  Greeks, at the peace of Antalkidas.
-
-  [53] Diodor. xv, 2.
-
-  It appears that Artaxerxes had counted much upon the aid of
-  Hekatomnus for conquering Evagoras (Diodor. xiv, 98).
-
-  About 380 B.C., Isokrates reckons Hekatomnus as being merely
-  dependent in name on Persia; and ready to revolt openly on the
-  first opportunity (Isokrates, Or. iv, (Paneg.) s. 189).
-
-  [54] Isokrates, Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 153, 154, 179.
-
-The satraps Tiribazus and Orontes commanded the land force, a large
-portion of which was transported across to Cyprus; the admiral Gaos
-was at the head of the fleet, which held its station at Kitium in the
-south of the island. It was here that Evagoras, having previously
-gained a battle on land, attacked them. By extraordinary efforts he
-had got together a fleet of two hundred triremes, nearly equal in
-number to theirs; but after a hard-fought contest, in which he at
-first seemed likely to be victorious, he underwent a complete naval
-defeat, which disqualified him from keeping the sea, and enabled the
-Persians to block up Salamis as well by sea as by land.[55] Though
-thus reduced to his own single city, however, Evagoras defended
-himself with unshaken resolution, still sustained by aid from Akoris
-in Egypt; while Tyre and several towns in Kilikia also continued
-in revolt against Artaxerxes; so that the efforts of the Persians
-were distracted, and the war was not concluded until ten years
-after its commencement.[56] It cost them on the whole (if we may
-believe Isokrates)[57] fifteen thousand talents in money, and such
-severe losses in men, that Tiribazus acceded to the propositions
-of Evagoras for peace, consenting to leave him in full possession
-of Salamis, under payment of a stipulated tribute, “like a slave
-to his master.” These last words were required by the satrap to be
-literally inserted in the convention; but Evagoras peremptorily
-refused his consent, demanding that the tribute should be recognized
-as paid by “one king to another.” Rather than concede this point
-of honor, he even broke off the negotiation, and resolved again to
-defend himself to the uttermost. He was rescued, after the siege had
-been yet farther prolonged, by a dispute which broke out between
-the two commanders of the Persian army. Orontes, accusing Tiribazus
-of projected treason and rebellion against the king, in conjunction
-with Sparta, caused him to be sent for as prisoner to Susa, and thus
-became sole commander. But as the besieging army was already wearied
-out by the obstinate resistance of Salamis, he consented to grant
-the capitulation, stipulating only for the tribute, and exchanging
-the offensive phrase enforced by Tiribazus, for the amendment of the
-other side.[58]
-
-  [55] Diodor. xv, 4.
-
-  [56] Compare Isokrates, Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 187, 188—with
-  Isokrates, Or. ix, (Evag.) s. 77.
-
-  The war was not concluded,—and Tyre as well as much of
-  Kilikia was still in revolt,—when Isokrates published the
-  Panegyrical Oration. At that time, Evagoras had maintained
-  the contest six years, counting either from the peace of
-  Antalkidas (387 B.C.) or from his naval defeat about a year
-  or two afterwards; for Isokrates does not make it quite
-  clear from what point of commencement he reckons the six
-  years.
-
-  We know that the war between the king of Persia and
-  Evagoras had begun as early as 390 B.C., in which year
-  an Athenian fleet was sent to assist the latter (Xenoph.
-  Hellen. iv, 8, 24). Both Isokrates and Diodorus state
-  that it lasted ten years; and I therefore place the
-  conclusion of it in 380 or 379 B.C., soon after the date
-  of the Panegyrical Oration of Isokrates. I dissent on
-  this point from Mr. Clinton (see Fasti Hellenici, ad
-  annos 387-376 B.C., and his Appendix, No. 12—where the
-  point is discussed). He supposes the war to have begun
-  after the peace of Antalkidas, and to have ended in 376
-  B.C. I agree with him in making light of Diodorus, but he
-  appears to me on this occasion to contradict the authority
-  of Xenophon,—or at least only to evade the necessity
-  of contradicting him by resorting to an inconvenient
-  hypothesis, and by representing the two Athenian
-  expeditions sent to assist Evagoras in Cyprus, first in 390
-  B.C., next in 388 B.C., as relating to “_hostile measures
-  before the war began_” (p. 280). To me it appears more
-  natural and reasonable to include these as a part of the
-  war.
-
-  [57] Isokrates, Or. ix, s. 73-76.
-
-  [58] Diodor. xv. 8, 9.
-
-  This remarkable anecdote, of susceptible Grecian honor on the
-  part of Evagoras, is noway improbable, and seems safe to admit
-  on the authority of Diodorus. Nevertheless, it forms so choice
-  a morsel for a panegyrical discourse such as that of Isokrates,
-  that one cannot but think he would have inserted it had it come
-  to his knowledge. His silence causes great surprise—not without
-  some suspicion as to the truth of the story.
-
-It was thus that Evagoras was relieved from his besieging enemies,
-and continued for the remainder of his life as tributary prince
-of Salamis under the Persians. He was no farther engaged in war,
-nor was his general popularity among the Salaminians diminished
-by the hardships which they had gone through along with him.[59]
-His prudence calmed the rankling antipathy of the Great King, who
-would gladly have found a pretext for breaking the treaty. His
-children were numerous, and lived in harmony as well with him as
-with each other. Isokrates specially notices this fact, standing as
-it did in marked contrast with the family-relations of most of the
-Grecian despots, usually stained with jealousies, antipathies, and
-conflict, often with actual bloodshed.[60] But he omits to notice
-the incident whereby Evagoras perished; an incident not in keeping
-with that superhuman good fortune and favor from the gods, of which
-the Panegyrical Oration boasts as having been vouchsafed to the hero
-throughout his life.[61] It was seemingly not very long after the
-peace, that a Salaminian named Nikokreon formed a conspiracy against
-his life and dominion, but was detected, by a singular accident,
-before the moment of execution, and forced to seek safety in flight.
-He left behind him a youthful daughter in his harem, under the care
-of an eunuch (a Greek, born in Elis) named Thrasydæus; who, full of
-vindictive sympathy in his master’s cause, made known the beauty of
-the young lady both to Evagoras himself and to Pnytagoras, the most
-distinguished of his sons, partner in the gallant defence of Salamis
-against the Persians. Both of them were tempted, each unknown to
-the other, to make a secret assignation for being conducted to her
-chamber by the eunuch; both of them were there assassinated by his
-hand.[62]
-
-  [59] Isokrates, Or. iii, (Nikokles) s. 40,—a passage which must
-  be more true of Evagoras than of Nikokles.
-
-  [60] Isokrat. Or. ix, s. 88. Compare his Orat. viii, (De Pace) s.
-  138.
-
-  [61] Isokrates, ib. s. 85. εὐτυχέστερον καὶ θεοφιλέστερον, etc.
-
-  [62] I give this incident, in the main, as it is recounted in the
-  fragment of Theopompus, preserved as a portion of the abstract
-  of that author by Photius (Theopom. Fr. 111, ed. Wichers and ed.
-  Didot).
-
-  Both Aristotle (Polit. v, 8, 10) and Diodorus (xv, 47) allude
-  to the assassination of Evagoras by the eunuch; but both these
-  authors conceive the story differently from Theopompus. Thus
-  Diodorus says—Nikoklês, the eunuch, assassinated Evagoras, and
-  became “despot of Salamis.” This appears to be a confusion of
-  Nikoklês with Nikokreon. Nikoklês was the son of Evagoras, and
-  the manner in which Isokrates addresses him affords the surest
-  proof that _he_ had no hand in the death of his father.
-
-  The words of Aristotle are—ἡ (ἐπίθεσις) τοῦ εὐνούχου Εὐαγόρᾳ
-  τῷ Κυπρίῳ· διὰ γὰρ τὸ τὴν γυναῖκα παρελέσθαι τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ
-  ἀπέκτεινεν ὡς ὑβρισμένος. So perplexing is the passage in its
-  literal sense, that M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire, in the note to his
-  translation, conceives ὁ εὐνοῦχος to be a surname or _sobriquet_
-  given to the conspirator, whose real name was Nikoklês. But this
-  supposition is, in my judgment, contradicted by the fact, that
-  Theopompus marks the same fact, of the assassin being an eunuch,
-  by another word—Θρασυδαίου ~τοῦ ἡμιάῤῥενος~, ὃς ἦν Ἠλεῖος τὸ
-  γένος, etc.
-
-  It is evident that Aristotle had heard the story differently
-  from Theopompus, and we have to choose between the two. I
-  prefer the version of the latter; which is more marked as well
-  as more intelligible, and which furnishes the explanation why
-  Pnytagoras,—who seems to have been the most advanced of the sons,
-  being left in command of the besieged Salamis when Evagoras
-  quitted it to solicit aid in Egypt,—did not succeed his father,
-  but left the succession to Nikoklês, who was evidently (from the
-  representation even of an eulogist like Isokrates) not a man
-  of much energy. The position of this eunuch in the family of
-  Nikokreon seems to mark the partial prevalence of Oriental habits.
-
-Thus perished a Greek of preëminent vigor and intelligence,
-remarkably free from the vices usual in Grecian despots, and
-forming a strong contrast in this respect with his contemporary
-Dionysius, whose military energy is so deeply stained by crime and
-violence. Nikoklês, the son of Evagoras, reigned at Salamis after
-him, and showed much regard, accompanied by munificent presents,
-to the Athenian Isokrates; who compliments him as a pacific and
-well-disposed prince, attached to Greek pursuits and arts, conversant
-by personal study with Greek philosophy, and above all, copying his
-father in that just dealing and absence of wrong towards person or
-property, which had so much promoted the comfort as well as the
-prosperity of the city.[63]
-
-  [63] Isokrates, Or. iii, (Nikoklês) s. 38-48; Or. ix, (Evagoras)
-  s. 100; Or. xv, (Permut.) s. 43. Diodorus (xv, 47) places the
-  assassination of Evagoras in 374 B.C.
-
-We now revert from the episode respecting Evagoras,—interesting not
-less from the eminent qualities of that prince than from the glimpse
-of Hellenism struggling with the Phœnician element in Cyprus,—to the
-general consequences of the peace of Antalkidas in Central Greece.
-For the first time since the battle of Mykalê in 479 B.C., the
-Persians were now really masters of all the Greeks on the Asiatic
-coast. The satraps lost no time in confirming their dominion. In all
-the cities which they suspected, they built citadels and planted
-permanent garrisons. In some cases, their mistrust or displeasure was
-carried so far as to raze the town altogether.[64] And thus these
-cities, having already once changed their position greatly for the
-worse, by passing from easy subjection under Athens to the harsh rule
-of Lacedæmonian harmosts and native decemvirs,—were now transferred
-to masters yet more oppressive and more completely without the pale
-of Hellenic sympathy. Both in public extortion, and in wrong doing
-towards individuals, the commandant and his mercenaries, whom the
-satrap maintained, were probably more rapacious, and certainly more
-unrestrained, than even the harmosts of Sparta. Moreover, the Persian
-grandees required beautiful boys as eunuchs for their service, and
-beautiful women as inmates of their harems.[65] What was taken
-for their convenience admitted neither of recovery nor redress;
-and Grecian women, if not more beautiful than many of the native
-Asiatics, were at least more intelligent, lively, and seductive,—as
-we may read in the history of that Phokæan lady, the companion of
-Cyrus, who was taken captive at Kunaxa. Moreover, these Asiatic
-Greeks, when passing into the hands of Oriental masters, came under
-the maxims and sentiment of Orientals, respecting the infliction of
-pain or torture,—maxims not only more cruel than those of the Greeks,
-but also making little distinction between freemen and slaves.[66]
-The difference between the Greeks and Phœnicians in Cyprus, on this
-point, has been just noticed; and doubtless the difference between
-Greeks and Persians was still more marked. While the Asiatic Greeks
-were thus made over by Sparta and the Perso-Spartan convention of
-Antalkidas, to a condition in every respect worse, they were at the
-same time thrown in, as reluctant auxiliaries, to strengthen the
-hands of the Great King against other Greeks,—against Evagoras in
-Cyprus,—and above all, against the islands adjoining the coast of
-Asia,—Chios, Samos, Rhodes, etc.[67] These islands were now exposed
-to the same hazard, from their overwhelming Persian neighbors, as
-that from which they had been rescued nearly a century before by the
-Confederacy of Delos, and by the Athenian empire into which that
-Confederacy was transformed. All the tutelary combination that the
-genius, the energy, and the Pan-hellenic ardor, of Athens had first
-organized, and so long kept up,—was now broken up; while Sparta, to
-whom its extinction was owing, in surrendering the Asiatic Greeks,
-had destroyed the security even of the islanders.
-
-  [64] Isokrates. Or. iv, (Paneg.) s. 142, 156, 190. Τάς τε πόλεις
-  τὰς Ἑλληνίδας οὕτω κυρίως παρείληφεν, ὥστε τὰς μὲν κατασκάπτειν,
-  ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἀκροπόλεις ἐντειχίζειν.
-
-  [65] See Herodot. vi, 9; ix, 76.
-
-  [66] Isokrat. Or. iv, (Paneg.) s. 142.
-
-  Οἷς (to the Asiatic Greeks after the peace of Antalkidas) οὐκ
-  ἐξαρκεῖ δασμολογεῖσθαι καὶ τὰς ἀκροπόλεις ὁρᾷν ὑπὸ τῶν ἐχθρῶν
-  κατεχομένας, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ταῖς κοιναῖς συμφοραῖς δεινότερα πάσχουσι
-  τῶν παρ’ ἡμῖν ἀργυρωνήτων· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἡμῶν οὕτως αἰκίζεται τοὺς
-  οἰκέτας, ὡς ἐκεῖνοι τοὺς ἐλευθέρους κολάζουσιν.
-
-  [67] Isokrat. Or. iv, (Paneg.) s. 143, 154, 189, 190. How
-  immediately the inland kings, who had acquired possession of the
-  continental Grecian cities, aimed at acquiring the islands also,
-  is seen in Herodot. i, 27. Chios and Samos indeed, surrendered
-  without resisting, to the first Cyrus, when he was master of
-  the continental towns, though he had no naval force (Herod. i,
-  143-169). Even after the victory of Mykalê, the Spartans deemed
-  it impossible to protect these islanders against the Persian
-  masters of the continent (Herod. ix, 106). Nothing except the
-  energy and organization of the Athenians proved that it was
-  possible to do so.
-
-It soon appeared, however, how much Sparta herself had gained by
-this surrender in respect to dominion nearer home. The government
-of Corinth,—wrested from the party friendly to Argos, deprived of
-Argeian auxiliaries, and now in the hands of the restored Corinthian
-exiles who were the most devoted partisans of Sparta,—looked to her
-for support, and made her mistress of the Isthmus, either for offence
-or for defence. She thus gained the means of free action against
-Thebes, the enemy upon whom her attention was first directed. Thebes
-was now the object of Spartan antipathy, not less than Athens had
-formerly been; especially on the part of King Agesilaus, who had to
-avenge the insult offered to himself at the sacrifice near Aulis,
-as well as the strenuous resistance on the field of Koroneia. He
-was at the zenith of his political influence; so that his intense
-miso-Theban sentiment made Sparta, now becoming aggressive on all
-sides, doubly aggressive against Thebes. More prudent Spartans,
-like Antalkidas, warned him[68] that his persevering hostility
-would ultimately kindle in the Thebans a fatal energy of military
-resistance and organization. But the warning was despised until it
-was too fully realized in the development of the great military
-genius of Epaminondas, and in the defeat of Leuktra.
-
-  [68] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 26; Plutarch, Lykurg. c. 13.
-
-I have already mentioned that in the solemnity of exchanging oaths
-to the peace of Antalkidas, the Thebans had hesitated at first to
-recognize the autonomy of the other Bœotian cities; upon which
-Agesilaus had manifested a fierce impatience to exclude them from the
-treaty, and attack them single-handed.[69] Their timely accession
-balked him in this impulse; but it enabled him to enter upon a series
-of measures highly humiliating to the dignity as well as to the power
-of Thebes. All the Bœotian cities were now proclaimed autonomous
-under the convention. As solicitor, guarantee, and interpreter, of
-that convention, Sparta either had, or professed to have, the right
-of guarding their autonomy against dangers, actual or contingent,
-from their previous Vorort or presiding city. For this purpose she
-availed herself of this moment of change to organize in each of them
-a local oligarchy, composed of partisans adverse to Thebes as well as
-devoted to herself, and upheld in case of need by a Spartan harmost
-and garrison.[70] Such an internal revolution grew almost naturally
-out of the situation; since the previous leaders, and the predominant
-sentiment in most of the towns, seem to have been favorable to
-Bœotian unity, and to the continued presidency of Thebes. These
-leaders would therefore find themselves hampered, intimidated, and
-disqualified, under the new system, while those who had before been
-an opposition minority would come forward with a bold and decided
-policy, like Kritias and Theramenes at Athens after the surrender of
-the city to Lysander. The new leaders doubtless would rather invite
-than repel the establishment of a Spartan harmost in their town, as a
-security to themselves against resistance from their own citizens as
-well as against attacks from Thebes, and as a means of placing them
-under the assured conditions of a Lysandrian dekarchy. Though most of
-the Bœotian cities were thus, on the whole, favorable to Thebes,—and
-though Sparta thrust upon them the boon, which she called autonomy,
-from motives of her own, and not from their solicitation,—yet,
-Orchomenus and Thespiæ, over whom the presidency of Thebes appears to
-have been harshly exercised, were adverse to her, and favorable to
-the Spartan alliance.[71] These two cities were strongly garrisoned
-by Sparta, and formed her main stations in Bœotia.[72]
-
-  [69] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 33.
-
-  [70] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 46. Ἐν πάσαις γὰρ ταῖς πόλεσι δυναστεῖαι
-  καθειστήκεσαν, ὥσπερ ἐν Θήβαις. Respecting the Bœotian city
-  of Tanagra, he says—ἔτι γὰρ τότε καὶ τὴν Τανάγραν οἱ περὶ
-  Ὑπατόδωρον, φίλοι ὄντες τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων, εἶχον (v, 4, 49).
-
-  Schneider, in his note on the former of these two passages,
-  explains the word δυναστεῖαι as follows—“Sunt factiones
-  optimatium qui Lacedæmoniis favebant, cum præsidio et harmostâ
-  Laconico.” This is perfectly just; but the words ὥσπερ ἐν
-  Θήβαις seem also to require an explanation. These words allude
-  to the “factio optimatium” at Thebes, of whom Leontiades was
-  the chief; who betrayed the Kadmeia (the citadel of Thebes) to
-  the Lacedæmonian troops under Phœbidas in 382 B.C.; and who
-  remained masters of Thebes, subservient to Sparta and upheld by
-  a standing Lacedæmonian garrison in the Kadmeia, until they were
-  overthrown by the memorable conspiracy of Pelopidas and Mellon
-  in 379 B.C. It is to this oligarchy under Leontiades at Thebes,
-  devoted to Spartan interests and resting on Spartan support,—that
-  Xenophon compares the governments planted by Sparta, after the
-  peace of Antalkidas, in each of the Bœotian cities. What he says,
-  of the government of Leontiades and his colleagues at Thebes,
-  is—“that they deliberately introduced the Lacedæmonians into the
-  acropolis, and enslaved Thebes to them, in order that they might
-  themselves exercise a despotism”—τούς τε τῶν πολιτῶν εἰσαγαγόντας
-  εἰς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν αὐτοὺς, καὶ βουληθέντας Λακεδαιμονίοις τὴν
-  πόλιν δουλεύειν, ὥστε αὐτοὶ τυραννεῖν (v, 4, 1: compare v, 2,
-  36). This character—conveying a strong censure in the mouth
-  of the philo-Laconian Xenophon—belongs to all the governments
-  planted by Sparta in the Bœotian cities after the peace of
-  Antalkidas, and, indeed, to the Dekarchies generally which she
-  established throughout her empire.
-
-  [71] Xenoph. Memorab. iii, 5, 2; Thucyd. iv, 133; Diodor. xv, 79.
-
-  [72] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 15-20; Diodor. xv, 32-37; Isokrates, Or.
-  xiv, (Plataic.) s. 14. 15.
-
-The presence of such garrisons, one on each side of Thebes,—the
-discontinuance of the Bœotarchs, with the breaking up of all symbols
-and proceedings of the Bœotian federation,—and the establishment of
-oligarchies devoted to Sparta in the other cities,—was doubtless a
-deep wound to the pride of the Thebans. But there was another wound
-still deeper, and this the Lacedæmonians forthwith proceeded to
-inflict,—the restoration of Platæa.
-
-A melancholy interest attaches both to the locality of this town, as
-one of the brightest scenes of Grecian glory,—and to its brave and
-faithful population, victims of an exposed position combined with
-numerical feebleness. Especially, we follow with a sort of repugnance
-the capricious turns of policy which dictated the Spartan behavior
-towards them. One hundred and twenty years before, the Platæans had
-thrown themselves upon Sparta, to entreat her protection against
-Thebes. The Spartan king Kleomenes had then declined the obligation
-as too distant, and had recommended them to ally themselves with
-Athens.[73] This recommendation, though dictated chiefly by a wish
-to raise contention between Athens and Thebes, was complied with;
-and the alliance, severing Platæa altogether from the Bœotian
-confederacy, turned out both advantageous and honorable to her until
-the beginning of the Peloponnesian war. At that time, it suited
-the policy of the Spartans to uphold and strengthen in every way
-the supremacy of Thebes over the Bœotian cities; it was altogether
-by Spartan intervention, indeed, that the power of Thebes was
-reëstablished, after the great prostration as well as disgrace which
-she had undergone, as traitor to Hellas and zealous in the service
-of Mardonius.[74] Athens, on the other hand, was at that time doing
-her best to break up the Bœotian federation, and to enrol its various
-cities as her allies; in which project, though doubtless suggested
-by and conducive to her own ambition, she was at that time (460-445
-B.C.) perfectly justifiable on Pan-hellenic grounds; seeing that
-Thebes as their former chief had so recently enlisted them all in
-the service of Xerxes, and might be expected to do the same again
-if a second Persian invasion should be attempted. Though for a
-time successful, Athens was expelled from Bœotia by the defeat of
-Korôneia; and at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, the whole
-Bœotian federation (except Platæa), was united under Thebes, in bitter
-hostility against her. The first blow of the war, even prior to any
-declaration, was struck by Thebes in her abortive nocturnal attempt
-to surprise Platæa. In the third year of the war, king Archidamus,
-at the head of the full Lacedæmonian force, laid siege to the latter
-town; which, after an heroic defence and a long blockade, at length
-surrendered under the extreme pressure of famine; yet not before one
-half its brave defenders had forced their way out over the blockading
-wall, and escaped to Athens, where all the Platæan old men, women,
-and children, had been safely lodged before the siege. By a cruel
-act which stands among the capital iniquities of Grecian warfare,
-the Lacedæmonians had put to death all the Platæan captives, two
-hundred in number, who fell into their hands; the town of Platæa
-had been razed, and its whole territory, joined to Thebes, had
-remained ever since cultivated on Theban account.[75] The surviving
-Platæans had been dealt with kindly and hospitably by the Athenians.
-A qualified right of citizenship was conceded to them at Athens, and
-when Skionê was recaptured in 420 B.C., that town (vacant by the
-slaughter of its captive citizens) was handed over to the Platæans
-as a residence.[76] Compelled to evacuate Skionê, they were obliged
-at the close of the Peloponnesian war,[77] to return to Athens,
-where the remainder of them were residing at the time of the peace
-of Antalkidas; little dreaming that those who had destroyed their
-town and their fathers forty years before, would now turn round and
-restore it.[78]
-
-  [73] Herodot. vi, 108.
-
-  [74] See Vol. V. Ch. xlv, p. 327 of this History.
-
-  [75] Thucyd. iii, 68.
-
-  [76] Thucyd. v, 32; Isokrates, Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 126; Or.
-  xii, (Panathen.) s. 101.
-
-  [77] Plutarch, Lysand. c. 14.
-
-  [78] Pausanias, ix, 1, 3.
-
-Such restoration, whatever might be the ostensible grounds on which
-the Spartans pretended to rest it, was not really undertaken either
-to carry out the convention of Antalkidas, which guaranteed only the
-autonomy of _existing_ towns,—or to repair previous injustice, since
-the prior destruction had been the deliberate act of themselves, and
-of King Archidamus the father of Agesilaus,—but simply as a step
-conducive to the present political views of Sparta. And towards
-this object it was skilfully devised. It weakened the Thebans, not
-only by wresting from them what had been, for about forty years,
-a part of their territory and property; but also by establishing
-upon it a permanent stronghold in the occupation of their bitter
-enemies, assisted by a Spartan garrison. It furnished an additional
-station for such a garrison in Bœotia, with the full consent of the
-newly-established inhabitants. And more than all, it introduced
-a subject of contention between Athens and Thebes, calculated to
-prevent the two from hearty coöperation afterwards against Sparta.
-As the sympathy of the Platæans with Athens was no less ancient
-and cordial than their antipathy against Thebes, we may probably
-conclude that the restoration of the town was an act acceptable to
-the Athenians; at least, at first, until they saw the use made of
-it, and the position which Sparta came to occupy in reference to
-Greece generally. Many of the Platæans, during their residence at
-Athens, had intermarried with Athenian women,[79] who now, probably,
-accompanied their husbands to the restored little town on the north
-of Kithæron, near the southern bank of the river Asôpus.
-
-  [79] Isokrates, Or. xiv. (Plataic.) s. 54.
-
-Had the Platæans been restored to a real and honorable autonomy, such
-as they enjoyed in alliance with Athens before the Peloponnesian
-war, we should have cordially sympathized with the event. But the
-sequel will prove—and their own subsequent statement emphatically
-sets forth—that they were a mere dependency of Sparta, and an outpost
-of Spartan operations against Thebes.[80] They were a part of the
-great revolution which the Spartans now brought about in Bœotia;
-whereby Thebes was degraded from the president of a federation into
-an isolated autonomous city, while the other Bœotian cities, who had
-been before members of the federation, were elevated each for itself
-into the like autonomy; or rather (to substitute the real truth[81]
-in place of Spartan professions) they became enrolled and sworn in
-as dependent allies of Sparta, under oligarchical factions devoted
-to her purposes and resting upon her for support. That the Thebans
-should submit to such a revolution, and, above all, to the sight of
-Platæa as an independent neighbor with a territory abstracted from
-themselves,—proves how much they felt their own weakness, and how
-irresistible at this moment was the ascendency of their great enemy,
-in perverting to her own ambition the popular lure of universal
-autonomy held out by the peace of Antalkidas. Though compelled to
-acquiesce, the Thebans waited in hopes of some turn of fortune
-which would enable them to reörganize the Bœotian federation; while
-their hostile sentiment towards Sparta was not the less bitter for
-being suppressed. Sparta on her part kept constant watch to prevent
-the reunion of Bœotia;[82] an object in which she was for a time
-completely successful, and was even enabled, beyond her hopes, to
-become possessed of Thebes itself,[83] through a party of traitors
-within,—as will presently appear.
-
-  [80] See the Orat. xiv, (called Plataicus) of Isokrates; which
-  is a pleading probably delivered in the Athenian assembly by
-  the Platæans (after the second destruction of their city),
-  and, doubtless, founded upon their own statements. The painful
-  dependence and compulsion under which they were held by Sparta,
-  is proclaimed in the most unequivocal terms (s. 31, 33, 48);
-  together with the presence of a Spartan harmost and garrison in
-  their town (s. 14).
-
-  [81] Xenophon says, truly enough, that Sparta made the Bœotian
-  cities αὐτονόμους ἀπὸ τῶν Θηβαίων (v. 1, 36), which she had long
-  desired to do. Autonomy, in the sense of disconnection from
-  Thebes, was insured to them,—but in no other sense.
-
-  [82] To illustrate the relations of Thebes, the other Bœotian
-  cities, and Sparta, between the peace of Antalkidas and the
-  seizure of the Kadmeia by Sparta (387-382 B.C.)—compare
-  the speech of the Akanthian envoys, and that of the Theban
-  Leontiades, at Sparta (Xenoph. Hellen. v, 2, 16-34). Ὑμᾶς
-  (the Spartans) τῆς μὲν Βοιωτίας ἐπιμεληθῆναι, ὅπως μὴ καθ’
-  ἓν εἴη, etc. Καὶ ὑμεῖς γε τότε μὲν ἀεὶ προσείχετε τὸν νοῦν,
-  πότε ἀκούσεσθε βιαζομένους αὐτοὺς (the Thebans) τὴν Βοιωτίαν
-  ὑφ’ αὑτοῖς εἶναι· νῦν δὲ, ἐπεὶ τάδε πέπρακται, οὐδὲν ὑμᾶς δεῖ
-  Θηβαίους φοβεῖσθαι, etc. Compare Diodor. xv, 20.
-
-  [83] In the Orat. (14) Plataic. of Isokrates, s. 30—we find it
-  stated among the accusations against the Thebans, that during
-  this period (_i. e._ between the peace of Antalkidas and the
-  seizure of the Kadmeia) they became sworn in as members of the
-  Spartan alliance and as ready to act with Sparta conjointly
-  against Athens. If we could admit this as true, we might also
-  admit the story of Epaminondas and Pelopidas serving in the
-  Spartan army at Mantinea (Plutarch, Pelop. c. 3). But I do not
-  see how it can be even partially true. If it had been true, I
-  think Xenophon could not have failed to mention it: all that he
-  does say, tends to contradict it.
-
-In these measures regarding Bœotia, we recognize the vigorous hand,
-and the miso-Theban spirit, of Agesilaus. He was at this time the
-great director of Spartan foreign policy, though opposed by his more
-just and moderate colleague king Agesipolis,[84] as well as by a
-section of the leading Spartans, who reproached Agesilaus with his
-project of ruling Greece by means of subservient local despots or
-oligarchies in the various cities,[85] and who contended that the
-autonomy promised by the peace of Antalkidas ought to be left to
-develop itself freely, without any coërcive intervention on the part
-of Sparta.[86]
-
-  [84] Diodor. xv. 29.
-
-  [85] How currently this reproach was advanced against Agesilaus,
-  may be seen in more than one passage of the Hellenica
-  of Xenophon; whose narrative is both so partial, and so
-  ill-constructed, that the most instructive information is dropped
-  only in the way of unintentional side-wind, where we should
-  not naturally look for it. Xen. Hellen. v. 3, 16. πολλῶν δὲ
-  λεγόντων Λακεδαιμονίων ὡς ὀλίγων ἕνεκεν ἀνθρώπων πόλει (Phlius)
-  ἀπεχθάνοιτο (Agesilaus) πλέον πεντακισχιλίων ἀνδρῶν. Again,
-  v, 4, 13. (Ἀγησίλαος) εὖ εἰδὼς, ὅτι, εἰ στρατηγοίη, λέξειαν οἱ
-  πολῖται, ὡς Ἀγησίλαος, ὅπως βοηθήσειε τοῖς τυράννοις, πράγματα τῇ
-  πόλει παρέχοι, etc. Compare Plutarch, Agesil. c. 24-26.
-
-  [86] Diodorus indeed affirms, that this was really done, for
-  a short time; that the cities which had before been dependent
-  allies of Sparta were now emancipated and left to themselves;
-  that a reaction immediately ensued against those dekarchies
-  or oligarchies which had hitherto managed the cities in the
-  interests of Sparta; that this reaction was so furious, as
-  everywhere to kill, banish, or impoverish, the principal
-  partisans of Spartan supremacy; and that the accumulated
-  complaints and sufferings of these exiles drove the Spartans,
-  after having “endured the peace like a heavy burthen” (ὥσπερ
-  βαρὺ φόρτιον—xv, 5) for a few months, to shake it off, and
-  to reëstablish by force their own supremacy as well as the
-  government of their friends in all the various cities. In this
-  statement there is nothing intrinsically improbable. After what
-  we have heard of the dekarchies under Sparta, no extent of
-  violence in the reaction against them is incredible, nor can we
-  doubt that such reaction would carry with it some new injustice,
-  along with much well-merited retribution. Hardly any but Athenian
-  citizens were capable of the forbearance displayed by Athens both
-  after the Four Hundred and after the Thirty. Nevertheless, I
-  believe that Diodorus is here mistaken, and that he has assigned
-  to the period immediately succeeding the peace of Antalkidas,
-  those reactionary violences which took place in many cities
-  about sixteen years subsequently, _after the battle of Leuktra_.
-  For Xenophon, in recounting what happened after the peace of
-  Antalkidas, mentions nothing about any real autonomy granted by
-  Sparta to her various subject-allies, and subsequently revoked;
-  which he would never have omitted to tell us, had the fact been
-  so, because it would have supplied a plausible apology for the
-  high-handed injustice of the Spartans, and would have thus lent
-  aid to the current of partiality which manifests itself in his
-  history.
-
-Far from any wish thus to realize the terms of peace which they
-had themselves imposed, the Lacedæmonians took advantage of an
-early moment after becoming free from their enemies in Bœotia and
-Corinth, to strain their authority over their allies beyond its
-previous limits. Passing in review[87] the conduct of each during
-the war, they resolved to make an example of the city of Mantinea.
-Some acts, not of positive hostility, but of equivocal fidelity,
-were imputed to the Mantineans. They were accused of having been
-slack in performance of their military obligations, sometimes even
-to the length of withholding their contingent altogether, under
-pretence of a season of religious truce; of furnishing corn in
-time of war to the hostile Argeians; and of plainly manifesting
-their disaffected feeling towards Sparta,—chagrin at every success
-which she obtained,—satisfaction, when she chanced to experience
-a reverse.[88] The Spartan ephors now sent an envoy to Mantinea,
-denouncing all such past behavior, and peremptorily requiring that
-the walls of the city should be demolished, as the only security
-for future penitence and amendment. As compliance was refused, they
-despatched an army, summoning the allied contingents generally for
-the purpose of enforcing the sentence. They intrusted the command
-to king Agesipolis, since Agesilaus excused himself from the duty,
-on the ground that the Mantineans had rendered material service to
-his father Archidamus in the dangerous Messenian war which had beset
-Sparta during the early part of his reign.[89]
-
-  [87] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 1-8. Αἰσθόμενοι τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους
-  ἐπισκοποῦντας τοὺς ξυμμάχους, ὁποῖοί τινες ἕκαστοι ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ
-  αὐτοῖς ἐγεγένηντο, etc.
-
-  [88] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 2. He had before stated, that the
-  Mantineans had really shown themselves pleased, when the
-  Lacedæmonian Mora was destroyed near Corinth by Iphikrates (iv,
-  5, 18).
-
-  [89] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 3.
-
-Having first attempted to intimidate the Mantineans by ravaging
-their lands, Agesipolis commenced the work of blockade by digging
-a ditch around the town; half of his soldiers being kept on guard,
-while the rest worked with the spade. The ditch being completed, he
-prepared to erect a wall of circumvallation. But being apprised that
-the preceding harvest had been so good, as to leave a large stock
-of provision in the town, and to render the process of starving it
-out tedious both for Sparta and for her allies,—he tried a more
-rapid method of accomplishing his object. As the river Ophis, of
-considerable breadth for a Grecian stream, passed through the middle
-of the town, he dammed up its efflux on the lower side;[90] thus
-causing it to inundate the interior of the city and threaten the
-stability of the walls; which seem to have been of no great height,
-and built of sun-burnt bricks. Disappointed in their application to
-Athens for aid,[91] and unable to provide extraneous support for
-their tottering towers, the Mantineans were compelled to solicit a
-capitulation. But Agesipolis now refused to grant the request, except
-on condition that not only the fortifications of their city, but
-the city itself, should be in great part demolished; and that the
-inhabitants should be re-distributed into those five villages, which
-had been brought together, many years before, to form the aggregate
-city of Mantinea. To this also the Mantineans were obliged to submit,
-and the capitulation was ratified.
-
-  [90] In 1627, during the Thirty years’ War, the German town of
-  Wolfenbüttel was constrained to surrender in the same manner, by
-  damming up the river Ocker which flowed through it; a contrivance
-  of General Count Pappenheim, the Austrian besieging commander.
-  See Colonel Mitchell’s Life of Wallenstein, p. 107.
-
-  The description given by Xenophon of Mantinea as it stood in
-  385 B.C., with the river Ophis, a considerable stream, passing
-  through the middle of it, is perfectly clear. When the city,
-  after having been now broken up, was rebuilt in 370 B.C., the
-  site was so far changed that the river no longer ran through it.
-  But the present course of the river Ophis, as given by excellent
-  modern topographical examiners, Colonel Leake and Kiepert, is
-  at a very considerable distance from the Mantinea rebuilt in
-  370 B.C.; the situation of which is accurately known, since
-  the circuit of its walls still remains distinctly marked. The
-  Mantinea of 370 B.C., therefore, as compared with the Mantinea in
-  385 B.C., must have been removed to a considerable distance—or
-  else the river Ophis must have altered its course. Colonel
-  Leake supposes that the Ophis had been artificially diverted
-  from its course, in order that it might be brought through the
-  town of Mantinea; a supposition, which he founds on the words
-  of Xenophon,—σοφωτέρων γενομένων ταύτῃ γε τῶν ἀνθρώπων, τὸ μὴ
-  διὰ τειχῶν ποταμὸν ποιεῖσθαι (Hellen. v, 2, 7). But it is very
-  difficult to agree with him on this point, when we look at his
-  own map (annexed to the Peloponnesiaca) of the Mantinice and
-  Tegeatis, and observe the great distance between the river Ophis
-  and Mantinea; nor do the words of Xenophon seem necessarily to
-  imply any artificial diversion of the river. It appears easier to
-  believe that the river has changed its course. See Leake, Travels
-  in Morea, vol. iii, ch. xxiv, p. 71; and Peloponnesiaca, p. 380;
-  and Ernst Curtius, Peloponnesos, p. 239—who still, however,
-  leaves the point obscure.
-
-  [91] Diodor. xv, 5.
-
-Though nothing was said in the terms of it about the chiefs of the
-Mantinean democratical government, yet these latter, conscious that
-they were detested both by their own oligarchical opposition and
-by the Lacedæmonians, accounted themselves certain of being put
-to death. And such would assuredly have been their fate, had not
-Pausanias (the late king of Sparta, now in exile at Tegea), whose
-good opinion they had always enjoyed, obtained as a personal favor
-from his son Agesipolis the lives of the most obnoxious, sixty in
-number, on condition that they should depart into exile. Agesipolis
-had much difficulty in accomplishing the wishes of his father. His
-Lacedæmonian soldiers were ranged in arms on both sides of the
-gate by which the obnoxious men went out; and Xenophon notices it
-as a signal mark of Lacedæmonian discipline, that they could keep
-their spears unemployed when disarmed enemies were thus within
-their reach; especially as the oligarchical Mantineans manifested
-the most murderous propensities, and were exceedingly difficult to
-control.[92] As at Peiræus before, so here at Mantinea again,—the
-liberal, but unfortunate, king Pausanias is found interfering in the
-character of mediator to soften the ferocity of political antipathies.
-
-  [92] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 6. Οἰομένων δὲ ἀποθανεῖσθαι τῶν
-  ἀργολιζόντων, καὶ τῶν τοῦ δήμου προστατῶν, διεπράξατο ὁ πατὴρ
-  (see before, v, 2, 3) παρὰ τοῦ Ἀγησιπόλιδος, ἀσφάλειαν αὐτοῖς
-  ἔσεσθαι, ἀπαλλαττομένοις ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, ἑξήκοντα οὖσι. Καὶ
-  ἀμφοτέρωθεν μὲν τῆς ὁδοῦ, ἀρξάμενοι ἀπὸ τῶν πυλῶν ἔχοντες τὰ
-  δόρατα οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἔστησαν, θεώμενοι τοὺς ἐξιόντας· ~καὶ
-  μισοῦντες αὐτοὺς ὅμως ἀπείχοντο αὐτῶν ῥᾷον ἢ οἱ βέλτιστοι τῶν
-  Μαντινέων~· καὶ τοῦτο μὲν εἰρήσθω μέγα τεκμήριον πειθαρχίας.
-
-  I have remarked more than once, and the reader will here observe
-  a new example, how completely the word βέλτιστοι—which is applied
-  to the wealthy or aristocratical party in politics, as its
-  equivalent is in other languages, by writers who sympathize with
-  them—is divested of all genuine ethical import as to character.
-
-The city of Mantinea was now broken up, and the inhabitants were
-distributed again into the five constituent villages. Out of
-four-fifths of the population, each man pulled down his house in
-the city, and rebuilt it in the village near to which his property
-lay. The remaining fifth continued to occupy Mantinea as a village.
-Each village was placed under oligarchical government, and left
-unfortified. Though at first (says Xenophon) the change proved
-troublesome and odious, yet presently, when men found themselves
-resident upon their landed properties,—and still more, when they felt
-themselves delivered from the vexatious demagogues,—the new situation
-became more popular than the old. The Lacedæmonians were still better
-satisfied. Instead of one city of Mantinea, five distinct Arcadian
-villages now stood enrolled in their catalogue of allies. They
-assigned to each a separate xenâgus (Spartan officer destined to the
-command of each allied contingent), and the military service of all
-was henceforward performed with the utmost regularity.[93]
-
-  [93] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 7.
-
-  He says of this breaking up of the city of Mantinea, διῳκίσθη ἡ
-  Μαντίνεια τετραχῆ, καθάπερ τὸ ἀρχαῖον ᾤκουν. Ephorus (Fr. 138,
-  ed. Didot) states that it was distributed into the five original
-  villages; and Strabo affirms that there were _five_ original
-  constituent villages (viii, p. 337). Hence it is probable that
-  Mantinea the city was still left, after this διοίκισις, to
-  subsist as one of the five unfortified villages; so that Ephorus,
-  Strabo, and Xenophon may be thus made to agree, in substance.
-
-Such was the dissection or cutting into parts of the ancient city
-Mantinea; one of the most odious acts of high-handed Spartan
-despotism. Its true character is veiled by the partiality of the
-historian, who recounts it with a confident assurance, that after
-the trouble of moving was over, the population felt themselves
-decidedly bettered by the change. Such an assurance is only to be
-credited, on the ground that, being captives under the Grecian laws
-of war, they may have been thankful to escape the more terrible
-liabilities of death or personal slavery, at the price of forfeiting
-their civic community. That their feelings towards the change were
-those of genuine aversion, is shown by their subsequent conduct after
-the battle of Leuktra. As soon as the fear of Sparta was removed,
-they flocked together, with unanimous impulse, to reconstitute and
-refortify their dismantled city.[94] It would have been strange
-indeed had the fact been otherwise; for attachment to a civic
-community was the strongest political instinct of the Greek mind.
-The citizen of a town was averse—often most unhappily averse—to
-compromise the separate and autonomous working of his community
-by joining in any larger political combination, however equitably
-framed, and however it might promise on the whole an increase of
-Hellenic dignity. But still more vehemently did he shrink from the
-idea of breaking up his town into separate villages, and exchanging
-the character of a citizen for that of a villager, which was nothing
-less than great social degradation, in the eyes of Greeks generally,
-Spartans not excepted.[95]
-
-  [94] This is mentioned by Xenophon himself (Hellen. vi, 5,
-  3). The Lacedæmonians, though they remonstrated against it,
-  were at that time too much humiliated to interfere by force
-  and prevent it. The reason why they did not interfere by force
-  (according to Xenophon) was that a general peace had just then
-  been sworn, guaranteeing autonomy to every distinct town, so
-  that the Mantineans under this peace had a right to do what
-  they did—στρατεύειν γε μέντοι ἐπ’ αὐτοὺς οὐ δυνατὸν ἐδόκει
-  εἶναι, ἐπ’ αὐτονομίᾳ τῆς εἰρήνης γεγενημένης (vi, 5, 5). Of
-  this second peace, Athens was the originator and the voucher;
-  but the autonomy which it guaranteed was only the same as had
-  been professedly guaranteed by the peace of Antalkidas, of which
-  Sparta had been the voucher.
-
-  General autonomy, as interpreted by Athens, was a different thing
-  from general autonomy as it had been when interpreted by Sparta.
-  The Spartans, when they had in their own hands both the power
-  of interpretation and the power of enforcement, did not scruple
-  to falsify autonomy so completely as to lay siege to Mantinea
-  and break up the city by force; while, when interpretation and
-  enforcement had passed to Athens, they at once recognized that
-  the treaty precluded them from a much less violent measure of
-  interference.
-
-  We may see by this, how thoroughly partial and Laconian is
-  the account given by Xenophon of the διοίκισις of Mantinea;
-  how completely he keeps out of view the odious side of that
-  proceeding.
-
-  [95] See the remarkable sentence of the Spartans, in which they
-  reject the claim of the Pisatans to preside over and administer
-  the Olympic festival (which had been their ancient privilege)
-  because they were χωρίται and not fit for the task (Xen. Hellen.
-  iii, 2, 31): compare χωριτικῶς (Xen. Cyrop. iv. 5, 54).
-
-In truth the sentence executed by the Spartans against Mantinea was
-in point of dishonor, as well as of privation, one of the severest
-which could be inflicted on free Greeks. All the distinctive glory
-and superiority of Hellenism,—all the intellectual and artistic
-manifestations,—all that there was of literature and philosophy, or
-of refined and rational sociality,—depended upon the city-life of the
-people. And the influence of Sparta, during the period of her empire,
-was peculiarly mischievous and retrograde, as tending not only to
-decompose the federations such as Bœotia into isolated towns, but
-even to decompose suspected towns such as Mantinea into villages;
-all for the purpose of rendering each of them exclusively dependent
-upon herself. Athens, during her period of empire, had exercised no
-such disuniting influence; still less Thebes, whom we shall hereafter
-find coming forward actively to found the new and great cities of
-Megalopolis and Messênê. The imperial tendencies of Sparta are worse
-than those of either Athens or Thebes; including less of improving
-or Pan-hellenic sympathies, and leaning the most systematically upon
-subservient factions in each subordinate city. In the very treatment
-of Mantinea just recounted, it is clear that the attack of Sparta was
-welcomed at least, if not originally invited, by the oligarchical
-party of the place, who sought to grasp the power into their own
-hands and to massacre their political opponents. In the first object
-they completely succeeded, and their government probably was more
-assured in the five villages than it would have been in the entire
-town. In the second, nothing prevented them from succeeding except
-the accidental intervention of the exile Pausanias; an accident,
-which alone rescued the Spartan name from the additional disgrace
-of a political massacre, over and above the lasting odium incurred
-by the act itself; by breaking up an ancient autonomous city, which
-had shown no act of overt enmity, and which was so moderate in its
-democratical manifestations as to receive the favorable criticism
-of judges rather disinclined towards democracy generally.[96] Thirty
-years before, when Mantinea had conquered certain neighboring
-Arcadian districts, and had been at actual war with Sparta to
-preserve them, the victorious Spartans exacted nothing more than
-the reduction of the city to its original district;[97] now they
-are satisfied with nothing less than the partition of the city into
-unfortified villages, though there had been no actual war preceding.
-So much had Spartan power, as well as Spartan despotic propensity,
-progressed during this interval.
-
-  [96] Aristot. Polit. vi, 2, 2.
-
-  [97] Thucyd. v, 81.
-
-The general language of Isokrates, Xenophon, and Diodorus,[98]
-indicates that this severity towards Mantinea was only the most
-stringent among a series of severities, extended by the Lacedæmonians
-through their whole confederacy, and operating upon all such of
-its members as gave them ground for dissatisfaction or mistrust.
-During the ten years after the surrender of Athens, they had been
-lords of the Grecian world both by land and sea, with a power never
-before possessed by any Grecian state; until the battle of Knidus,
-and the combination of Athens, Thebes, Argos, and Corinth, seconded
-by Persia, had broken up their empire at sea, and much endangered
-it on land. At length the peace of Antalkidas, enlisting Persia on
-their side (at the price of the liberty of the Asiatic Greeks), had
-enabled them to dissolve the hostile combination against them. The
-general autonomy, of which they were the authorized interpreters,
-meant nothing more than a separation of the Bœotian cities from
-Thebes,[99] and of Corinth from Argos,—being noway intended to apply
-to the relation between Sparta and her allies. Having thus their
-hands free, the Lacedæmonians applied themselves to raise their
-ascendency on land to the point where it had stood before the battle
-of Knidus, and even to regain as much as possible of their empire at
-sea. To bring back a dominion such as that of the Lysandrian harmosts
-and dekarchies, and to reconstitute a local oligarchy of their most
-devoted partisans, in each of those cities where the government had
-been somewhat liberalized during the recent period of war,—was their
-systematic policy.
-
-  [98] Isokrates, Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 133, 134, 146, 206; Or.
-  viii, (De Pace) s. 123; Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 1-8; Diodor. xv, 5,
-  9-19.
-
-  [99] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 35.
-
-Those exiles who had incurred the condemnation of their
-fellow-citizens for subservience to Sparta, now found the season
-convenient for soliciting Spartan intervention to procure their
-return. It was in this manner that a body of exiled political
-leaders from Phlius,—whose great merit it was that the city when
-under their government had been zealous in service to Sparta, but
-had now become lukewarm or even disaffected in the hands of their
-opponents,—obtained from the ephors a message, polite in form but
-authoritative in substance, addressed to the Phliasians, requiring
-that the exiles should be restored, as friends of Sparta banished
-without just cause.[100]
-
-  [100] Xen. Hellen. v. 2, 8-10.
-
-  The consequences of this forced return are difficult to foresee;
-  they will appear in a subsequent page.
-
-While the Spartan power, for the few years succeeding the peace of
-Antalkidas, was thus decidedly in ascending movement on land, efforts
-were also made to reëstablish it at sea. Several of the Cyclades
-and other smaller islands were again rendered tributary. In this
-latter sphere, however, Athens became her competitor. Since the
-peace, and the restoration of Lemnos, Imbros and Skyros, combined
-with the refortified Peiræus and its Long Walls,—Athenian commerce
-and naval power had been reviving, though by slow and humble steps.
-Like the naval force of England compared with France, the warlike
-marine of Athens rested upon a considerable commercial marine, which
-latter hardly existed at all in Laconia. Sparta had no seamen except
-constrained Helots or paid foreigners;[101] while the commerce of
-Peiræus had both required and maintained a numerous population of
-this character. The harbor of Peiræus was convenient in respect of
-accommodation, and well-stocked with artisans,—while Laconia had few
-artisans, and was notoriously destitute of harbors.[102] Accordingly,
-in this maritime competition, Athens, though but the shadow of her
-former self, started at an advantage as compared with Sparta, and
-in spite of the superiority of the latter on land, was enabled to
-compete with her in acquiring tributary dependencies among the
-smaller islands of the Ægean. To these latter, who had no marine of
-their own, and who (like Athens herself) required habitual supplies
-of imported corn, it was important to obtain both access to Peiræus
-and protection from the Athenian triremes against that swarm of
-pirates, who showed themselves after the peace of Antalkidas, when
-there was no predominant maritime state; besides which, the market of
-Peiræus was often supplied with foreign corn from the Crimea, through
-the preference shown by the princes of Bosphorus to Athens, at a time
-when vessels from other places could obtain no cargo.[103] A moderate
-tribute paid to Athens would secure to the tributary island greater
-advantages than if paid to Sparta,—with at least equal protection.
-Probably, the influence of Athens over these islanders was farther
-aided by the fact, that she administered the festivals, and lent
-out the funds, of the holy temple at Delos. We know by inscriptions
-remaining, that large sums were borrowed at interest from the
-temple-treasure, not merely by individual islanders, but also by the
-island-cities collectively,—Naxos, Andros, Tenos, Siphnos, Seriphos.
-The Amphiktyonic council who dispensed these loans (or at least the
-presiding members) were Athenians named annually at Athens.[104]
-Moreover, these islanders rendered religious homage and attendance
-at the Delian festivals, and were thus brought within the range of a
-central Athenian influence, capable, under favorable circumstances,
-of being strengthened and rendered even politically important.
-
-  [101] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 3-12.
-
-  [102] Xen. Hell. iv, 8, 7.
-
-  [103] Isokrates, Orat. xvii, (Trapezit.) s. 71.
-
-  [104] See the valuable inscription called the Marmor Sandvicense,
-  which contains the accounts rendered by the annual Amphiktyons at
-  Delos, from 377-373 B.C.
-
-  Boeckh, Staats-haushaltung der Athener, vol. ii, p. 214, ed. 1;
-  vol. ii, p. 78 _seq._, ed. 2nd.
-
-  The list of cities and individuals who borrowed money from the
-  temple is given in these accounts, together with the amount of
-  interest either paid by them, or remaining in arrear.
-
-By such helps, Athens was slowly acquiring to herself a second
-maritime confederacy, which we shall presently find to be of
-considerable moment, though never approaching the grandeur of
-her former empire; so that in the year 380 B.C., when Isokrates
-published his Panegyrical Discourse (seven years after the peace of
-Antalkidas), though her general power was still slender compared with
-the overruling might of Sparta,[105] yet her navy had already made
-such progress, that he claims for her the right of taking the command
-by sea, in that crusade which he strenuously enforces, of Athens and
-Sparta in harmonious unity at the head of all Greece, against the
-Asiatic barbarians.[106]
-
-  [105] This is the description which Isokrates himself gives
-  (Orat. xv, (Permutat.) s. 61) of the state of the Grecian world
-  when he published his Panegyrical Discourse—ὅτε Λακεδαιμόνιοι μὲν
-  ἦρχον τῶν Ἑλλήνων, ἡμεῖς δὲ ταπεινῶς ἐπράττομεν, etc.
-
-  [106] The Panegyrical Discourse of Isokrates, the date of it
-  being pretty exactly known, is of great value for enabling us
-  to understand the period immediately succeeding the peace of
-  Antalkidas.
-
-  He particularly notices the multiplication of pirates, and the
-  competition between Athens and Sparta about tribute from the
-  islands in the Ægean (s. 133). Τίς γὰρ ἂν τοιαύτης καταστάσεως
-  ἐπιθυμήσειεν, ἐν ᾗ καταποντισταὶ μὲν τὴν θάλασσαν κατέχουσι,
-  πελτασταὶ δὲ τὰς πόλεις καταλαμβάνουσι, etc.
-
-  ... Καίτοι χρὴ τοὺς φύσει καὶ μὴ διὰ τύχην μέγα φρονοῦντας
-  τοιούτοις ἔργοις ἐπιχειρεῖν, πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ ~τοὺς νησιώτας
-  δασμολογεῖν~, οὓς ἄξιόν ἐστιν ἐλέειν, ὁρῶντας τούτους μὲν διὰ
-  σπανιότητα τῆς γῆς ὄρη γεωργεῖν ἀναγκαζομένους, τοὺς δ’ ἠπειρώτας
-  δι’ ἀφθονίαν τῆς χώρας τὴν μὲν πλείστην αὐτῆς ἀργὸν περιορῶντας,
-  etc. (s. 151).
-
-  ... Ὧν ἡμεῖς (Athenians and Spartans) οὐδεμίαν ποιούμεθα
-  πρόνοιαν, ἀλλὰ ~περὶ μὲν τῶν Κυκλάδων νήσων ἀμφισβητοῦμεν~,
-  τοσαύτας δὲ τὸ πλῆθος καὶ τηλικαύτας τὸ μέγεθος δυνάμεις οὕτως
-  εἰκῇ τῷ βαρβάρῳ παραδεδώκαμεν.
-
-  Compare Xenoph. Hellen. vi, 1, 12—μὴ εἰς νησύδρια ἀποβλέποντας,
-  etc.
-
-It would seem that a few years after the peace of Antalkidas, Sparta
-became somewhat ashamed of having surrendered the Asiatic Greeks
-to Persia; and that king Agesipolis and other leading Spartans
-encouraged the scheme of a fresh Grecian expedition against Asia,
-in compliance with propositions from some disaffected subjects of
-Artaxerxes.[107] Upon some such project, currently discussed though
-never realized, Isokrates probably built his Panegyrical Oration,
-composed in a lofty strain of patriotic eloquence (380 B.C.) to
-stimulate both Sparta and Athens in the cause, and calling on both,
-as joint chiefs of Greece, to suspend dissensions at home for a great
-Pan-hellenic manifestation against the common enemy abroad. But
-whatever ideas of this kind the Spartan leaders may have entertained,
-their attention was taken off, about 382 B.C. by movements in a
-more remote region of the Grecian world, which led to important
-consequences.
-
-  [107] Diodor. xv, 9, 19.
-
-Since the year 414 B.C. (when the Athenians were engaged in the
-siege of Syracuse), we have heard nothing either of the kings of
-Macedonia, or of the Chalkidic Grecian cities in the peninsula of
-Thrace adjoining Macedonia. Down to that year, Athens still retained
-a portion of her maritime empire in those regions. The Platæans
-were still in possession of Skiônê (on the isthmus of Pallênê)
-which she had assigned to them; while the Athenian admiral Euetion,
-seconded by many hired Thracians, and even by Perdikkas king of
-Macedonia, undertook a fruitless siege to reconquer Amphipolis on
-the Strymon.[108] But the fatal disaster at Syracuse having disabled
-Athens from maintaining such distant interests, they were lost to
-her along with her remaining empire,—perhaps earlier; though we
-do not know how. At the same time, during the last years of the
-Peloponnesian war, the kingdom of Macedonia greatly increased in
-power; partly, we may conceive, from the helpless condition of
-Athens,—but still more from the abilities and energy of Archelaus,
-son and successor of Perdikkas.
-
-  [108] Thucyd. vii, 9.
-
-The course of succession among the Macedonian princes seems not to
-have been settled, so that disputes and bloodshed took place at
-the death of several of them. Moreover, there were distinct tribes
-of Macedonians, who, though forming part, really or nominally, of
-the dominion of the Temenid princes, nevertheless were immediately
-subject to separate but subordinate princes of their own. The reign
-of Perdikkas had been troubled in this manner. In the first instance,
-he had stripped his own brother Alketas of the crown,[109] who
-appears (so far as we can make out) to have had the better right to
-it; next he had also expelled his younger brother Philippus from his
-subordinate principality. To restore Amyntas the son of Philippus,
-was one of the purposes of the Thrakian prince Sitalkês, in the
-expedition undertaken conjointly with Athens, during the second year
-of the Peloponnesian war.[110] On the death of Perdikkas (about
-413 B.C.), his eldest or only legitimate son was a child of seven
-years old; but his natural son[111] Archelaus was of mature age and
-unscrupulous ambition. The dethroned Alketas was yet alive, and had
-now considerable chance of reëstablishing himself on the throne;
-Archelaus, inviting him and his son under pretence that he would
-himself bring about their reëstablishment, slew them both amidst
-the intoxication of a banquet. He next despatched the boy, his
-legitimate brother, by suffocating him in a well; and through these
-crimes made himself king. His government, however, was so energetic
-and able, that Macedonia reached a degree of military power such as
-none of his predecessors had ever possessed. His troops, military
-equipments, and fortified places, were much increased in numbers;
-while he also cut straight roads of communication between the various
-portions of his territory,—a novelty seemingly everywhere, at that
-time.[112] Besides such improved organization (which unfortunately we
-are not permitted to know in detail), Archelaus founded a splendid
-periodical Olympic festival, in honor of the Olympian Zeus and
-the Muses,[113] and maintained correspondence with the poets and
-philosophers of Athens. He prevailed upon the tragic poets Euripides
-and Agathon, as well as the epic poet Chœrilus, to visit him in
-Macedonia, where Euripides especially was treated with distinguished
-favor and munificence,[114] remaining there until his death in
-406 or 405 B.C. Archelaus also invited Sokrates, who declined the
-invitation,—and appears to have shown some favor to Plato.[115] He
-perished in the same year as Sokrates (399 B.C.), by a violent
-death; two Thessalian youths, Krateuas and Hellanokrates, together
-with a Macedonian named Dekamnichus, being his assassins during a
-hunting-party. The first two were youths to whom he was strongly
-attached, but whose dignity he had wounded by insulting treatment and
-non-performance of promises; the third was a Macedonian, who, for
-having made an offensive remark upon the bad breath of Euripides, had
-been given up by the order of Archelaus to the poet, in order that
-he might be flogged for it. Euripides actually caused the sentence
-to be inflicted; but it was not till six years after his death that
-Dekamnichus, who had neither forgotten nor forgiven the affront,
-found the opportunity of taking revenge by instigating and aiding the
-assassins of Archelaus.[116]
-
-  [109] This is attested by Plato, Gorgias, c. 26. p. 471 A.
-
-  ... Ὅς γε (Archelaus son of Perdikkas) πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτον αὐτὸν
-  τὸν δεσπότην καὶ θεῖον (Alketas) μεταπεμψάμενος, ~ὡς ἀποδώσων τὴν
-  ἀρχὴν ἣν Περδίκκας αὐτὸν ἀφείλετο~, etc.
-
-  This statement of Plato, that Perdikkas expelled his brother
-  Alketas from the throne, appears not to be adverted to by the
-  commentators. Perhaps it may help to explain the chronological
-  embarrassments connected with the reign of Perdikkas, the years
-  of which are assigned by different authors, as 23, 28, 35, 40,
-  41. See Mr. Clinton, Fasti Hellen. ch. iv, p. 222—where he
-  discusses the chronology of the Macedonian kings: also Krebs,
-  Lection. Diodoreæ, p. 159.
-
-  There are no means of determining when the reign of Perdikkas
-  began—nor exactly, when it ended. We know from Thucydides that he
-  was king in 432, and in 414 B.C. But the fact of his acquiring
-  the crown by the expulsion of an elder brother, renders it less
-  wonderful that the beginning of his reign should be differently
-  stated by different authors; though these authors seem mostly
-  to conceive Perdikkas as the immediate successor of Alexander,
-  without any notice of Alketas.
-
-  [110] Thucyd. i, 57; ii, 97-100.
-
-  [111] The mother of Archelaus was a female slave belonging
-  to Alketas; it is for this reason that Plato calls Alketas
-  ~δεσπότην~ καὶ θεῖον of Archelaus (Plato, Gorgias, c. 26. p. 471
-  A.)
-
-  [112] Thucyd. ii, 100. ὁδοὺς εὐθείας ἔτεμε, etc. See the note in
-  Ch. lxix, p. 17 of Vol. ix.
-
-  [113] Arrian, i, 11; Diodor. xvii, 16.
-
-  [114] Plutarch, De Vitioso Pudore, c. 7, p. 531 E.
-
-  [115] Aristotel. Rhetoric, ii, 24; Seneca, de Beneficiis, v, 6;
-  Ælian, V. H. xiv, 17.
-
-  [116] See the statements, unfortunately very brief, of Aristotle
-  (Politic. v, 8, 10-13). Plato (Alkibiad. ii, c. 5, p. 141 D),
-  while mentioning the assassination of Archelaus by his παιδικὰ
-  represents the motive of the latter differently from Aristotle,
-  as having been an ambitious desire to possess himself of the
-  throne. Diodorus (xiv, 37) represents Krateuas as having killed
-  Archelaus unintentionally in a hunting-party.
-
-  Καὶ τῆς Ἀρχελάου δ’ ἐπιθέσεως Δεκάμνιχος ἡγεμὼν ἐγένετο,
-  παροξύνων τοὺς ἐπιθεμένους πρῶτος· αἴτιον δὲ τῆς ὀργῆς, ὅτι αὐτὸν
-  ἐξέδωκε μαστιγῶσαι Εὐριπίδῃ τῷ ποιητῇ· ὁ δὲ Εὐριπίδης ἐχαλέπαινεν
-  εἰπόντος τι αὐτοῦ εἰς δυσώδειαν τοῦ στόματος (Arist. Pol. _l.
-  c._).
-
-  Dekamnichus is cited by Aristotle as one among the examples of
-  persons actually scourged; which proves that Euripides availed
-  himself of the privilege accorded by Archelaus.
-
-These incidents, recounted on the authority of Aristotle, and
-relating as well to the Macedonian king Archelaus as to the Athenian
-citizen and poet Euripides, illustrate the political contrast
-between Macedonia and Athens. The government of the former is one
-wholly personal,—dependent on the passions, tastes, appetites, and
-capacities, of the king. The ambition of Archelaus leads both to his
-crimes for acquiring the throne, and to his improved organization of
-the military force of the state afterwards; his admiration for the
-poets and philosophers of Athens makes him sympathize warmly with
-Euripides, and ensure to the latter personal satisfaction for an
-offensive remark; his appetites, mingling license with insult, end by
-drawing upon him personal enemies of a formidable character. _L’Etat,
-c’est moi_—stands marked in the whole series of proceedings; the
-personality of the monarch is the determining element. Now at Athens,
-no such element exists. There is, on the one hand, no easy way of
-bringing to bear the ascendency of an energetic chief to improve the
-military organization,—as Athens found to her cost, when she was
-afterwards assailed by Philip, the successor after some interval, and
-in many respects the parallel, of Archelaus. But on the other hand,
-neither the personal tastes nor the appetites, of any individual
-Athenian, count as active causes in the march of public affairs,
-which is determined by the established law and by the pronounced
-sentiments of the body of citizens. However gross an insult might
-have been offered to Euripides at Athens, the dikasts would never
-have sentenced that the offender should be handed over to him to be
-flogged. They would have inflicted such measure of punishment as the
-nature of the wrong, and the preëxisting law appeared to them to
-require. Political measures, or judicial sentences, at Athens, might
-be well or ill-judged; but at any rate, they were always dictated
-by regard to a known law and to the public conceptions entertained
-of state-interests, state-dignity, and state-obligations, without
-the avowed intrusion of any man’s personality. To Euripides,—who
-had throughout his whole life been the butt of Aristophanes and
-other comic writers, and who had been compelled to hear, in the
-crowded theatre, taunts far more galling than what is ascribed to
-Dekamnichus,—the contrast must have been indeed striking, to have
-the offender made over to him, and the whip placed at his disposal,
-by order of his new patron. And it is little to his honor, that
-he should have availed himself of the privilege, by causing the
-punishment to be really administered; a punishment which he could
-never have seen inflicted, during the fifty years of his past life,
-upon any free Athenian citizen.
-
-Krateuas did not survive the deed more than three or four days, after
-which Orestes, son of Archelaus, a child, was placed on the throne,
-under the guardianship of Æropus. The latter, however, after about
-four years, made away with his ward, and reigned in his stead for
-two years. He then died of sickness, and was succeeded by his son
-Pausanias; who, after a reign of only one year, was assassinated and
-succeeded by Amyntas.[117] This Amyntas (chiefly celebrated as the
-father of Philip and the grandfather of Alexander the Great), though
-akin to the royal family, had been nothing more than an attendant
-of Æropus,[118] until he made himself king by putting to death
-Pausanias.[119] He reigned, though with interruptions, twenty-four
-years (393-369 B.C.); years, for the most part, of trouble and
-humiliation for Macedonia, and of occasional exile for himself. The
-vigorous military organization introduced by Archelaus appears to
-have declined; while the frequent dethronements and assassinations
-of kings, beginning even with Perdikkas the father of Archelaus,
-and continued down to Amyntas, unhinged the central authority
-and disunited the various portions of the Macedonian name; which
-naturally tended to separation, and could only be held together by a
-firm hand.
-
-  [117] Diodor. xiv. 84-89.
-
-  [118] Ælian, V. H. xii, 43; Dexippus ap. Syncell. p. 263; Justin,
-  vii, 4.
-
-  [119] Diodor. xiv, 89. Ἐτελεύτησε δὲ καὶ Παυσανίας ὁ τῶν
-  Μακεδόνων βασιλεὺς, ἀναιρεθεὶς ὑπὸ Ἀμύντου δόλῳ, ἄρξας ἐνιαυτόν·
-  τὴν δὲ βασιλείαν κατέσχεν Ἀμύντας, etc.
-
-The interior regions of Macedonia were bordered, to the north,
-north-east, and north-west, by warlike barbarian tribes, Thracian and
-Illyrian, whose invasions were not unfrequent and often formidable.
-Tempted, probably, by the unsettled position of the government,
-the Illyrians poured in upon Amyntas during the first year of his
-reign; perhaps they may have been invited by other princes of the
-interior,[120] and at all events their coming would operate as
-a signal for malcontents to declare themselves. Amyntas,—having
-only acquired the sceptre a few months before by assassinating his
-predecessor, and having little hold on the people,—was not only
-unable to repel them, but found himself obliged to evacuate Pella,
-and even to retire from Macedonia altogether. Despairing of his
-position, he made over to the Olynthians a large portion of the
-neighboring territory,—Lower Macedonia or the coast and cities round
-the Thermaic Gulf.[121] As this cession is represented to have been
-made at the moment of his distress and expatriation, we may fairly
-suspect that it was made for some reciprocal benefit or valuable
-equivalent; of which Amyntas might well stand in need, at a moment of
-so much exigency.
-
-  [120] See in Thucyd. iv, 112—the relations of Arrhibæus, prince
-  of the Macedonians called Lynkestæ in the interior country, with
-  the Illyrian invaders—B.C. 423.
-
-  Archelaus had been engaged at a more recent period in war with a
-  prince of the interior named Arrhibæus,—perhaps the same person
-  (Aristot. Polit. v, 8, 11).
-
-  [121] Diodor. xiv, 92; xv, 19. Ἀπογνοὺς δὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν, Ὀλυνθίοις
-  μὲν τὴν συνεγγὺς χώραν ἐδωρήσατο, etc. Τῷ δήμῳ τῶν Ὀλυνθίων
-  δωρησαμένου πολλὴν τῆς ὁμόρου χώρας, διὰ τὴν ἀπόγνωσιν τῆς ἑαυτοῦ
-  δυναστείας, etc.
-
-  The flight of Amyntas, after a year’s reign, is confirmed by
-  Dexippus ap. Syncell. p. 263.
-
-It is upon this occasion that we begin to hear again of the
-Chalkidians of Olynthus, and the confederacy which they gradually
-aggregated around their city as a centre. The confederacy seems to
-have taken its start from this cession of Amyntas,—or rather, to
-speak more properly, from his abdication; for the cession of what
-he could not keep was of comparatively little moment, and we shall
-see that he tried to resume it as soon as he acquired strength.
-The effect of his flight was, to break up the government of Lower
-or maritime Macedonia, and to leave the cities therein situated
-defenceless against the Illyrians or other invaders from the
-interior. To these cities, the only chance of security, was to throw
-themselves upon the Greek cities on the coast, and to organize in
-conjunction with the latter a confederacy for mutual support. Among
-all the Greeks on that coast, the most strenuous and persevering
-(so they had proved themselves in their former contentions against
-Athens when at the summit of her power) as well as the nearest, were
-the Chalkidians of Olynthus. These Olynthians now put themselves
-forward,—took into their alliance and under their protection the
-smaller towns of maritime Macedonia immediately near them,—and soon
-extended their confederacy so as to comprehend all the larger towns
-in this region,—including even Pella, the most considerable city
-of the country.[122] As they began this enterprise at a time when
-the Illyrians were masters of the country so as to drive Amyntas
-to despair and flight, we may be sure that it must have cost them
-serious efforts, not without great danger if they failed. We may
-also be sure that the cities themselves must have been willing, not
-to say eager, coadjutors; just as the islanders and Asiatic Greeks
-clung to Athens at the first formation of the confederacy of Delos.
-The Olynthians could have had no means of conquering even the less
-considerable Macedonian cities, much less Pella, by force and against
-the will of the inhabitants.
-
-  [122] Xenoph. Hellen. v, 2, 12. Ὅτι μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης
-  μεγίστη πόλις Ὄλυνθος σχεδὸν πάντες ἐπίστασθε. Οὗτοι τῶν πόλεων
-  προσηγάγοντο ἔστιν ἃς, ἐφ’ ᾧτε τοῖς αὐτοῖς χρῆσθαι νόμοις καὶ
-  συμπολιτεύειν· ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τῶν μειζόνων προσέλαβόν τινας. Ἐκ
-  δὲ τούτου ἐπεχείρησαν καὶ τὰς τῆς Μακεδονίας πόλεις ἐλευθεροῦν
-  ἀπὸ Ἀμύντου, τοῦ βασιλέως Μακεδόνων. Ἐπεὶ δὲ εἰσήκουσαν αἱ
-  ἐγγύτατα αὐτῶν, ταχὺ καὶ ἐπὶ τὰς πόῤῥω καὶ μείζους ἐπορεύοντο·
-  καὶ κατελίπομεν ἡμεῖς ἔχοντας ἤδη ἄλλας τε πολλὰς, καὶ Πέλλαν,
-  ἥπερ μεγίστη τῶν ἐν Μακεδονίᾳ πόλεων. Καὶ Ἀμύνταν δὲ αἰσθανόμεθα
-  ἀποχωροῦντά τε ἐκ τῶν πόλεων, καὶ ὅσον οὐκ ἐκπεπτωκότα ἤδη ἐκ
-  πάσης Μακεδονίας.
-
-  We know from Diodorus that Amyntas fled the country in despair,
-  and ceded a large proportion at least of Lower Macedonia to the
-  Olynthians. Accordingly, the struggle between the latter and
-  Amyntas (here alluded to), must have taken place when he came
-  back and tried to resume his dominion.
-
-How the Illyrians were compelled to retire, and by what steps the
-confederacy was got together, we are not permitted to know. Our
-information (unhappily very brief) comes from the Akanthian envoy
-Kleigenês, speaking at Sparta about ten years afterwards (B.C. 383),
-and describing in a few words the confederacy as it then stood.
-But there is one circumstance which this witness,—himself hostile
-to Olynthus and coming to solicit Spartan aid against her,—attests
-emphatically; the equal, generous, and brotherly principles, upon
-which the Olynthians framed their scheme from the beginning. They
-did not present themselves as an imperial city enrolling a body of
-dependent allies, but invited each separate city to adopt common
-laws and reciprocal citizenship with Olynthus, with full liberty
-of intermarriage, commercial dealing, and landed proprietorship.
-That the Macedonian cities near the sea should welcome so liberal a
-proposition as this, coming from the most powerful of their Grecian
-neighbors, cannot at all surprise us; especially at a time when they
-were exposed to the Illyrian invaders, and when Amyntas had fled the
-country. They had hitherto always been subjects;[123] their cities
-had not (like the Greek cities) enjoyed each its own separate
-autonomy within its own walls; the offer, now made to them by the
-Olynthians, was one of freedom in exchange for their past subjection
-under the Macedonian kings, combined with a force adequate to protect
-them against Illyrian and other invaders. Perhaps also these various
-cities,—Anthemus, Therma, Chalastra, Pella, Alôrus, Pydna, etc.,—may
-have contained, among the indigenous population, a certain proportion
-of domiciliated Grecian inhabitants, to whom the proposition of the
-Olynthians would be especially acceptable.
-
-  [123] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 12—τὰς τῆς Μακεδονίας πόλεις ἐλευθεροῦν
-  ἀπὸ Ἀμύντου, etc.; compare v, 2, 38.
-
-We may thus understand why the offer of Olynthus was gladly
-welcomed by the Macedonian maritime cities. They were the first who
-fraternized as voluntary partners in the confederacy; which the
-Olynthians, having established this basis, proceeded to enlarge
-farther, by making the like liberal propositions to the Greek cities
-in their neighborhood. Several of these latter joined voluntarily;
-others were afraid to refuse; insomuch that the confederacy came
-to include a considerable number of Greeks,—especially, Potidæa,
-situated on the Isthmus of Pallênê, and commanding the road of
-communication between the cities within Pallênê and the continent.
-The Olynthians carried out with scrupulous sincerity their professed
-principles of equal and intimate partnership, avoiding all
-encroachment or offensive preëminence in favor of their own city. But
-in spite of this liberal procedure, they found among their Grecian
-neighbors obstructions which they had not experienced from the
-Macedonian. Each of the Grecian cities had been accustomed to its own
-town-autonomy and separate citizenship, with its peculiar laws and
-customs. All of them were attached to this kind of distinct political
-life, by one of the most tenacious and universal instincts of the
-Greek mind; all of them would renounce it with reluctance, even on
-consenting to enter the Olynthian confederacy, with its generous
-promise, its enlarged security, and its manifest advantages; and
-there were even some who, disdaining every prospective consideration,
-refused to change their condition at all except at the point of the
-sword.
-
-Among these last were Akanthus and Apollonia, the largest cities
-(next to Olynthus) in the Chalkidic peninsula, and, therefore,
-the least unable to stand alone. To these the Olynthians did not
-make application, until they had already attracted within their
-confederacy a considerable number of other Grecian as well as
-Macedonian cities. They then invited Akanthus and Apollonia to come
-in, upon the same terms of equal union and fellow-citizenship. The
-proposition being declined, they sent a second message intimating
-that, unless it were accepted within a certain time, they would
-enforce it by compulsory measures. So powerful already was the
-military force of the Olynthian confederacy, that Akanthus and
-Apollonia, incompetent to resist without foreign aid, despatched
-envoys to Sparta to set forth the position of affairs in the
-Chalkidic peninsula, and to solicit intervention against Olynthus.
-
-Their embassy reached Sparta about B.C. 383, when the Spartans,
-having broken up the city of Mantinea into villages, and coërced
-Phlius, were in the full swing of power over Peloponnesus,—and when
-they had also dissolved the Bœotian federation, placing harmosts
-in Platæa and Thespiæ as checks upon any movement of Thebes. The
-Akanthian Kleigenês, addressing himself to the Assembly of Spartans
-and their allies, drew an alarming picture of the recent growth
-and prospective tendencies of Olynthus, invoking the interference
-of Sparta against that city. The Olynthian confederacy (he said)
-already comprised many cities, small and great, Greek as well as
-Macedonian,—Amyntas having lost his kingdom. Its military power,
-even at present great, was growing every day.[124] The territory,
-comprising a large breadth of fertile corn-land, could sustain a
-numerous population. Wood for ship-building was close at hand, while
-the numerous harbors of the confederate cities ensured a thriving
-trade as well as a steady revenue from custom-duties. The neighboring
-Thracian tribes would be easily kept in willing dependence, and would
-thus augment the military force of Olynthus; even the gold mines of
-Mount Pangæus would speedily come within her assured reach. “All
-that I now tell you (such was the substance of his speech) is matter
-of public talk among the Olynthian people, who are full of hope and
-confidence. How can you Spartans, who are taking anxious pains to
-prevent the union of the Bœotian cities,[125] permit the aggregation
-of so much more formidable a power, both by land and by sea, as this
-of Olynthus? Envoys have already been sent thither from Athens and
-Thebes,—and the Olynthians have decreed to send an embassy in return
-for contracting alliance with those cities; hence, your enemies will
-derive a large additional force. We of Akanthus and Apollonia, having
-declined the proposition to join the confederacy voluntarily, have
-received notice that, if we persist, they will constrain us. Now we
-are anxious to retain our paternal laws and customs, continuing as
-a city by ourselves.[126] But if we cannot obtain aid from you, we
-shall be under the necessity of joining them,—as several other cities
-have already done, from not daring to refuse; cities, who would have
-sent envoys along with us, had they not been afraid of offending
-the Olynthians. These cities, if you interfere forthwith, and with
-a powerful force, will now revolt from the new confederacy. But if
-you postpone your interference, and allow time for the confederacy
-to work, their sentiments will soon alter. They will come to be knit
-together in attached unity, by the co-burgership, the intermarriage,
-and the reciprocity of landed possessions, which have already been
-enacted prospectively. All of them will become convinced that they
-have a common interest both in belonging to, and in strengthening the
-confederacy,—just as the Arcadians, when they follow you, Spartans,
-as allies, are not only enabled to preserve their own property, but
-also to plunder others. If, by your delay, the attractive tendencies
-of the confederacy should come into real operation, you will
-presently find it not so much within your power to dissolve.[127]”
-
-  [124] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 14.
-
-  The number of Olynthian troops is given in Xenophon as eight
-  hundred hoplites—a far greater number of peltasts—and one
-  thousand horsemen, assuming that Akanthus and Apollonia joined
-  the confederacy. It has been remarked by Mr. Mitford and others,
-  that these numbers, as they here stand, must be decidedly smaller
-  than the reality. But we have no means of correction open to us.
-  Mr. Mitford’s suggestion of eight thousand hoplites in place of
-  eight hundred, rests upon no authority.
-
-  Demosthenes states that Olynthus by herself, and before she had
-  brought all the Chalkidians into confederacy (οὔπω Χαλκιδέων
-  πάντων εἰς ἓν συνῳκισμένων—De Fals. Leg. c. 75, p. 425) possessed
-  four hundred horsemen, and a citizen population of 5000; no more
-  than this (he says) at the time when the Lacedæmonians attacked
-  them. The historical statements of the great orator, for a time
-  which nearly coincides with his own birth, are to be received
-  with caution.
-
-  [125] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 16. Ἐννοήσατε δὲ καὶ τόδε, πῶς εἰκὸς,
-  ὑμᾶς τῆς μὲν Βοιωτίας ἐπιμεληθῆναι, ὅπως μὴ καθ’ ἓν εἴη, πολὺ δὲ
-  μείζονος ἀθροιζομένης δυνάμεως ἀμελῆσαι, etc.
-
-  I translate here the substance of the speech, not the exact words.
-
-  [126] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 14. Ἡμεῖς δὲ, ὦ ἄνδρες Λακεδαιμόνιοι,
-  βουλόμεθα μὲν τοῖς πατρίοις νόμοις χρῆσθαι, καὶ αὐτοπολῖται
-  εἶναι· εἰ μέντοι μὴ βοηθήσει τις, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἡμῖν μετ’ ἐκείνων
-  γίγνεσθαι.
-
-  [127] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 18. Δεῖ γε μὴν ὑμᾶς καὶ τόδε εἰδέναι,
-  ὡς, ἣν εἰρήκαμεν δύναμιν μεγάλην οὖσαν, οὔπω δυσπάλαιστός τις
-  ἐστίν· αἱ γὰρ ἄκουσαι τῶν πόλεων ~τῆς πολιτείας κοινωνοῦσαι~,
-  αὗται, ἄν τι ἴδωσιν ἀντίπαλον, ταχὺ ἀποστήσονται· ~εἰ μέντοι
-  συγκλεισθήσονται ταῖς τε ἐπιγαμίαις καὶ ἐγκτήσεσι παρ’ ἀλλήλαις,
-  ἃς ἐψηφισμένοι εἰσὶ—καὶ γνώσονται, ὅτι μετὰ τῶν κρατούντων
-  ἕπεσθαι κερδαλέον ἐστὶν~, ὥσπερ Ἄρκαδες, ὅταν μεθ’ ὑμῶν ἴωσι, τά
-  τε αὐτῶν σώζουσι καὶ τὰ ἀλλότρια ἁρπάζουσιν—~ἴσως οὔκεθ’ ὁμοίως
-  εὔλυτα ἔσται~.
-
-This speech of the Akanthian envoy is remarkable in more than one
-respect. Coming from the lips of an enemy, it is the best of all
-testimonies to the liberal and comprehensive spirit in which the
-Olynthians were acting. They are accused,—not of injustice, nor of
-selfish ambition, nor of degrading those around them,—but literally,
-of organizing a new partnership on principles too generous and too
-seductive; of gently superseding, instead of violently breaking
-down, the barriers between the various cities, by reciprocal ties
-of property and family among the citizens of each; of uniting them
-all into a new political aggregate, in which not only all would
-enjoy equal rights, but all without exception would be gainers. The
-advantage, both in security and in power, accruing prospectively to
-all, is not only admitted by the orator, but stands in the front of
-his argument. “Make haste and break up the confederacy (he impresses
-upon Sparta) before its fruit is ripe, so that the confederates may
-never taste it nor find out how good it is; for if they do, you
-will not prevail on them to forego it.” By implication, he also
-admits,—and he says nothing tending even to raise a doubt,—that the
-cities which he represents, Akanthus and Apollonia, would share
-along with the rest in this same benefit. But the Grecian political
-instinct was nevertheless predominant,—“We wish to preserve our
-paternal laws, and to be a city by ourselves.” Thus nakedly is
-the objection stated; when the question was, not whether Akanthus
-should lose its freedom and become subject to an imperial city like
-Athens,—but whether it should become a free and equal member of a
-larger political aggregate, cemented by every tie which could make
-union secure, profitable, and dignified. It is curious to observe
-how perfectly the orator is conscious that this repugnance, though
-at the moment preponderant, was nevertheless essentially transitory,
-and would give place to attachment when the union came to be felt as
-a reality; and how eagerly he appeals to Sparta to lose no time in
-clenching the repugnance, while it lasted. He appeals to her, not for
-any beneficial or Pan-hellenic objects, but in the interests of her
-own dominion, which required that the Grecian world should be as it
-were pulverized into minute, self-acting, atoms without cohesion,—so
-that each city, or each village, while protected against subjection
-to any other, should farther be prevented from equal political union
-or fusion with any other; being thus more completely helpless and
-dependent in reference to Sparta.
-
-It was not merely from Akanthus and Apollonia, but also from the
-dispossessed Macedonian king Amyntas, that envoys reached Sparta to
-ask for aid against Olynthus. It seems that Amyntas, after having
-abandoned the kingdom and made his cession to the Olynthians, had
-obtained some aid from Thessaly and tried to reinstate himself
-by force. In this scheme he had failed, being defeated by the
-Olynthians. Indeed we find another person named Argæus, mentioned
-as competitor for the Macedonian sceptre, and possessing it for two
-years.[128]
-
-  [128] Diodor. xiv, 92; xv, 19.
-
-  Demosthenes speaks of Amyntas as having been expelled from his
-  kingdom by the Thessalians (cont. Aristokrat. c. 29, p. 657).
-  If this be historically correct, it must be referred to some
-  subsequent war in which he was engaged with the Thessalians,
-  perhaps to the time when Jason of Pheræ acquired dominion over
-  Macedonia (Xenoph. Hellen. vi, 1, 11).
-
-After hearing these petitioners, the Lacedæmonians first declared
-their own readiness to comply with the prayer, and to put down
-Olynthus; next, they submitted the same point to the vote of the
-assembled allies.[129] Among these latter, there was no genuine
-antipathy against the Olynthians, such as that which had prevailed
-against Athens before the Peloponnesian war, in the synod then
-held at Sparta. But the power of Sparta over her allies was now
-far greater than it had been then. Most of their cities were under
-oligarchies, dependent upon her support for authority over their
-fellow-citizens; moreover, the recent events in Bœotia and at
-Mantinea had operated as a serious intimidation. Anxiety to keep
-the favor of Sparta was accordingly paramount, so that most of the
-speakers as well as most of the votes, declared for war,[130] and a
-combined army of ten thousand men was voted to be raised. To make
-up such total, a proportional contingent was assessed upon each
-confederate; combined with the proviso now added for the first
-time, that each might furnish money instead of men, at the rate of
-three Æginæan oboli (half an Æginæan drachma) for each hoplite. A
-cavalry-soldier, to those cities which furnished such, was reckoned
-as equivalent to four hoplites; a hoplite, as equivalent to two
-peltasts; or pecuniary contribution on the same scale. All cities in
-default were made liable to a forfeit of one stater (four drachmæ)
-per day, for every soldier not sent; the forfeit to be enforced by
-Sparta.[131] Such licensed substitution of pecuniary payment for
-personal service, is the same as I have already described to have
-taken place nearly a century before in the confederacy of Delos
-under the presidency of Athens.[132] It was a system not likely to
-be extensively acted upon among the Spartan allies, who were at once
-poorer and more warlike than those of Athens. But in both cases it
-was favorable to the ambition of the leading state; and the tendency
-becomes here manifest, to sanction, by the formality of a public
-resolution, that increased Lacedæmonian ascendency which had already
-grown up in practice.
-
-  [129] See above in this History, Vol. VI. Ch. xlviii. p. 79.
-
-  [130] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 20. Ἐκ τούτου μέντοι, πολλοὶ μὲν
-  ξυνηγόρευον στρατιὰν ποιεῖν, μάλιστα δὲ οἱ βουλόμενοι
-  Λακεδαιμονίοις χαρίζεσθαι, etc.
-
-  [131] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 21, 22.
-
-  Diodorus (xv, 31) mentions the fact that an hoplite was reckoned
-  equivalent to two peltasts, in reference to a Lacedæmonian
-  muster-roll of a few years afterwards; but it must have been
-  equally necessary to fix the proportion on the present occasion.
-
-  [132] See Vol. V. Ch. xlv, p. 302 of this History.
-
-The Akanthian envoys, while expressing their satisfaction with
-the vote just passed, intimated that the muster of these numerous
-contingents would occupy some time, and again insisted on the
-necessity of instant intervention, even with a small force; before
-the Olynthians could find time to get their plans actually in work or
-appreciated by the surrounding cities. A moderate Lacedæmonian force
-(they said), if despatched forthwith, would not only keep those
-who had refused to join Olynthus, steady to their refusal, but also
-induce others, who had joined reluctantly, to revolt. Accordingly the
-ephors appointed Eudamidas at once, assigning to him two thousand
-hoplites,—Neodamodes (or enfranchised Helots), Periœki, and Skiritæ
-or Arcadian borderers. Such was the anxiety of the Akanthians for
-haste, that they would not let him delay even to get together the
-whole of this moderate force. He was put in march immediately, with
-such as were ready; while his brother Phœbidas was left behind
-to collect the remainder and follow him. And it seems that the
-Akanthians judged correctly. For Eudamidas, arriving in Thrace after
-a rapid march, though he was unable to contend against the Olynthians
-in the field, yet induced Potidæa to revolt from them, and was
-able to defend those cities, such as Akanthus and Apollonia, which
-resolutely stood aloof.[133] Amyntas brought a force to coöperate
-with him.
-
-  [133] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 24; Diodor. xv, 21.
-
-The delay in the march of Phœbidas was productive of consequences no
-less momentous than unexpected. The direct line from Peloponnesus
-to Olynthus lay through the Theban territory; a passage which the
-Thebans, whatever might have been their wishes, were not powerful
-enough to refuse, though they had contracted an alliance with
-Olynthus,[134] and though proclamation was made that no Theban
-citizens should join the Lacedæmonian force. Eudamidas, having
-departed at a moment’s notice, passed through Bœotia without a halt,
-in his way to Thrace. But it was known that his brother Phœbidas was
-presently to follow; and upon this fact the philo-Laconian party in
-Thebes organized a conspiracy.
-
-  [134] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 27-34.
-
-They obtained from the ephors, and from the miso-Theban feelings
-of Agesilaus, secret orders to Phœbidas, that he should coöperate
-with them in any party movement which they might find opportunity
-of executing;[135] and when he halted with his detachment near the
-gymnasium a little way without the walls, they concerted matters as
-well with him as among themselves. Leontiades, Hypatês, and Archias,
-were the chiefs of the party in Thebes favorable to Sparta; a party
-decidedly in minority, yet still powerful, and at this moment so
-strengthened by the unbounded ascendency of the Spartan name, that
-Leontiades himself was one of the polemarchs of the city. Of the
-anti-Spartan, or predominant sentiment in Thebes,—which included most
-of the wealthy and active citizens, those who came successively into
-office as hipparchs or generals of the cavalry,[136]—the leaders were
-Ismenias and Androkleides. The former, especially, the foremost as
-well as ablest conductor of the late war against Sparta, was now in
-office as Polemarch, conjointly with his rival Leontiades.
-
-  [135] This is the statement of Diodorus (xv, 20), and
-  substantially that of Plutarch (Agesil. c. 24), who intimates
-  that it was the general belief of the time. And it appears to me
-  much more probable than the representation of Xenophon—that the
-  first idea arose when Phœbidas was under the walls of Thebes,
-  and that the Spartan leader was persuaded by Leontiades to act
-  on his own responsibility. The behavior of Agesilaus and of the
-  ephors after the fact is like that of persons who had previously
-  contemplated the possibility of it. But the original suggestion
-  must have come from the Theban faction themselves.
-
-  [136] Plutarch (De Genio Socratis, c. 5, p. 578 B.) states that
-  most of these generals of cavalry (τῶν ἱππαρχηκότων νομίμως) were
-  afterwards in exile with Pelopidas at Athens.
-
-  We have little or no information respecting the government of
-  Thebes. It would seem to have been at this moment a liberalized
-  oligarchy. There was a Senate, and two Polemarchs (perhaps the
-  Polemarchs may have been more than two in all, though the words
-  of Xenophon rather lead us to suppose _only_ two)—and there seems
-  also to have been a civil magistrate, chosen by lot (ὁ κυαμιστὸς
-  ἄρχων) and renewed annually, whose office was marked by his
-  constantly having in his possession the sacred spear of state (τὸ
-  ἱερὸν δόρυ) and the city-seal (Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. c. 31. p.
-  597—B.—C.).
-
-  At this moment, it must be recollected, there were no such
-  officers as Bœotarchs; since the Lacedæmonians, enforcing the
-  peace of Antalkidas, had put an end to the Bœotian federation.
-
-While Ismenias, detesting the Spartans, kept aloof from Phœbidas,
-Leontiades assiduously courted him and gained his confidence. On the
-day of the Thesmophoria,[137] a religious festival celebrated by
-the women apart from the men, during which the acropolis or Kadmeia
-was consecrated to their exclusive use,—Phœbidas, affecting to have
-concluded his halt, put himself in march to proceed as if towards
-Thrace; seemingly rounding the walls of Thebes, but not going into
-it. The Senate was actually assembled in the portico of the agora,
-and the heat of a summer’s noon had driven every one out of the
-streets, when Leontiades, stealing away from the Senate, hastened
-on horseback to overtake Phœbidas, caused him to face about, and
-conducted the Lacedæmonians straight up to the Kadmeia; the gates
-of which, as well as those of the town, were opened by his order as
-polemarch. There were not only no citizens in the streets, but none
-even in the Kadmeia; no male person being permitted to be present
-at the feminine Thesmophoria; so that Phœbidas and his army became
-possessed of the Kadmeia without the smallest opposition. At the
-same time they became possessed of an acquisition of hardly less
-importance,—the persons of all the assembled Theban women; who served
-as hostages for the quiet submission, however reluctant, of the
-citizens in the town below. Leontiades handed to Phœbidas the key of
-the gates, and then descended into the town, giving orders that no
-man should go up without his order.[138]
-
-  [137] The rhetor Aristeides (Or. xix, Eleusin. p. 452 Cant.;
-  p. 419 Dind.) states that the Kadmeia was seized during the
-  Pythian festival. This festival would take place, July or August
-  382 B.C.; near the beginning of the third year of the (99th)
-  Olympiad. See above in this History, Vol. VI. Ch. liv, p. 455,
-  note. Respecting the year and month in which the Pythian festival
-  was held, there is a difference of opinion among commentators.
-  I agree with those who assign it to the first quarter of the
-  third Olympic year. And the date of the march of Phœbidas would
-  perfectly harmonize with this supposition.
-
-  Xenophon mentions nothing about the Pythian festival as being in
-  course of celebration when Phœbidas was encamped near Thebes: for
-  it had no particular reference to Thebes.
-
-  [138] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 28, 29.
-
-The assembled Senate heard with consternation the occupation of the
-acropolis by Phœbidas. Before any deliberation could be taken among
-the senators, Leontiades came down to resume his seat. The lochages
-and armed citizens of his party, to whom he had previously given
-orders, stood close at hand. “Senators (said he), be not intimidated
-by the news that the Spartans are in the Kadmeia; for they assure
-us that they have no hostile purpose against any one who does not
-court war against them. But I, as polemarch, am empowered by law to
-seize any one whose behavior is manifestly and capitally criminal.
-Accordingly, I seize this man Ismenias, as the great inflamer of
-war. Come forward, captains and soldiers, lay hold of him, and carry
-him off where your orders direct.” Ismenias was accordingly seized
-and hurried off as a prisoner to the Kadmeia; while the senators,
-thunderstruck and overawed, offered no resistance. Such of them as
-were partisans of the arrested polemarch, and many even of the more
-neutral members, left the Senate and went home, thankful to escape
-with their lives. Three hundred of them, including Androkleidas,
-Pelopidas, Mellon, and others, sought safety by voluntary exile to
-Athens; after which, the remainder of the Senate, now composed of
-few or none except philo-Spartan partisans, passed a vote formally
-dismissing Ismenias, and appointing a new polemarch in his place.[139]
-
-  [139] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 30, 31.
-
-This blow of high-handed violence against Ismenias forms a
-worthy counterpart to the seizure of Theramenes by Kritias,[140]
-twenty-two years before, in the Senate of Athens under the Thirty.
-Terror-striking in itself, it was probably accompanied by similar
-deeds of force against others of the same party. The sudden explosion
-and complete success of the conspiracy, plotted by the Executive
-Chief himself, the most irresistible of all conspirators,—the
-presence of Phœbidas in the Kadmeia, and of a compliant Senate in
-the town,—the seizure or flight of Ismenias and all his leading
-partisans,—were more than sufficient to crush all spirit of
-resistance on the part of the citizens; whose first anxiety probably
-was, to extricate their wives and daughters from the custody of
-the Lacedæmonians in the Kadmeia. Having such a price to offer,
-Leontiades would extort submission the more easily, and would
-probably procure a vote of the people ratifying the new _régime_,
-the Spartan alliance, and the continued occupation of the acropolis.
-Having accomplished the first settlement of his authority, he
-proceeded without delay to Sparta, to make known the fact that “order
-reigned” at Thebes.
-
-  [140] Xen. Hellen. ii, 3. See above in this History, Vol. VIII.
-  Ch. lxv. p. 252.
-
-The news of the seizure of the Kadmeia and of the revolution at
-Thebes had been received at Sparta with the greatest surprise, as
-well as with a mixed feeling of shame and satisfaction. Everywhere
-throughout Greece, probably, it excited a greater sensation than any
-event since the battle of Ægospotami. Tried by the recognized public
-law of Greece, it was a flagitious iniquity, for which Sparta had not
-the shadow of a pretence. It was even worse than the surprise of
-Platæa by the Thebans before the Peloponnesian war, which admitted
-of the partial excuse that war was at any rate impending; whereas
-in this case, the Thebans had neither done nor threatened anything
-to violate the peace of Antalkidas. It stood condemned by the
-indignant sentiment of all Greece, unwillingly testified even by the
-philo-Laconian Xenophon[141] himself. But it was at the same time
-an immense accession to Spartan power. It had been achieved with
-preëminent skill and success; and Phœbidas might well claim to have
-struck for Sparta the most important blow since Ægospotami, relieving
-her from one of her two really formidable enemies.[142]
-
-  [141] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 1.
-
-  [142] It is curious that Xenophon, treating Phœbidas as a man
-  more warm-hearted than wise, speaks of him as if he had rendered
-  no real service to Sparta by the capture of the Kadmeia (v, 2,
-  28). The explanation of this is, that Xenophon wrote his history
-  at a later period, after the defeat at Leuktra and the downfall
-  of Sparta; which downfall was brought about by the reaction
-  against her overweening and oppressive dominion, especially after
-  the capture of the Kadmeia,—or (in the pious creed of Xenophon)
-  by the displeasure of the gods, which such iniquity drew down
-  upon her (v, 4, 1). In this way, therefore, it is made out that
-  Phœbidas had not acted with true wisdom, and that he had done
-  his country more harm than good; a criticism, which we may be
-  sure that no man advanced, at the time of the capture itself, or
-  during the three years after it.
-
-Nevertheless, far from receiving thanks at Sparta, he became the
-object of wrath and condemnation, both with the ephors and the
-citizens generally. Every one was glad to throw upon him the odium
-of the proceeding, and to denounce him as having acted without
-orders. Even the ephors, who had secretly authorized him beforehand
-to coöperate generally with the faction at Thebes, having doubtless
-never given any specific instructions, now indignantly disavowed
-him. Agesilaus alone stood forward in his defence, contending
-that the only question was, whether his proceeding at Thebes had
-been injurious or beneficial to Sparta. If the former, he merited
-punishment; if the latter, it was always lawful to render service,
-even _impromptu_ and without previous orders.
-
-Tried by this standard, the verdict was not doubtful. For every man
-at Sparta felt how advantageous the act was in itself; and felt it
-still more, when Leontiades reached the city, humble in solicitation
-as well as profuse in promise. In his speech addressed to the
-assembled ephors and Senate, he first reminded them how hostile
-Thebes had hitherto been to them, under Ismenias and the party just
-put down,—and how constantly they had been in jealous alarm, lest
-Thebes should reconstitute by force the Bœotian federation. “Now
-(added he) your fears may be at an end; only take as good care to
-uphold our government, as we shall take to obey your orders. For the
-future, you will have nothing to do but to send us a short despatch,
-to get every service which you require.[143]” It was resolved by the
-Lacedæmonians, at the instance of Agesilaus, to retain their garrison
-now in the Kadmeia, to uphold Leontiades with his colleagues in the
-government of Thebes, and to put Ismenias upon his trial. Yet they
-at the same time, as a sort of atonement to the opinion of Greece,
-passed a vote of censure on Phœbidas, dismissed him from his command,
-and even condemned him to a fine. The fine, however, most probably
-was never exacted; for we shall see by the conduct of Sphodrias
-afterwards that the displeasure against Phœbidas, if at first
-genuine, was certainly of no long continuance.
-
-  [143] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 34.
-
-  Καὶ ὑμεῖς γε (says Leontiades to the Lacedæmonian ephors) τότε
-  μὲν ἀεὶ προσείχετε τὸν νοῦν, πότε ἀκούσεσθε βιαζομένους αὐτοὺς
-  τὴν Βοιωτίαν ὑφ’ αὑτοῖς εἶναι· νῦν δ’, ἐπεὶ τάδε πέπρακται, οὐδὲν
-  ὑμᾶς δεῖ Θηβαίους φοβεῖσθαι· ἀλλ’ ἀρκέσει ὑμῖν μικρὰ σκυτάλη,
-  ὥστε ἐκεῖθεν πάντα πράττεσθαι, ὅσων ἂν δέησθε—ἐὰν, ὥσπερ ἡμεῖς
-  ὑμῶν, οὕτω καὶ ὑμεῖς ἡμῶν, ἐπιμελῆσθε.
-
-  Xenophon mentions the displeasure of the ephors and the Spartans
-  generally against Phœbidas (χαλεπῶς ἔχοντας τῷ Φοιβίδᾳ) but not
-  the fine, which is certified by Diodorus (xv, 20), by Plutarch
-  (Pelopidas, c. 6, and De Genio Socratis, p. 576 A), and Cornelius
-  Nepos (Pelopid. c. 1).
-
-That the Lacedæmonians should at the same time condemn Phœbidas
-and retain the Kadmeia—has been noted as a gross contradiction.
-Nevertheless, we ought not to forget, that had they evacuated the
-Kadmeia, the party of Leontiades at Thebes, which had compromised
-itself for Sparta as well as for its own aggrandizement, would have
-been irretrievably sacrificed. The like excuse, if excuse it be,
-cannot be urged in respect to their treatment of Ismenias; whom they
-put upon his trial at Thebes, before a court consisting of three
-Lacedæmonian commissioners, and one from each allied city. He was
-accused, probably by Leontiades and his other enemies, of having
-entered into friendship and conspiracy with the Persian king to the
-detriment of Greece,[144]—of having partaken in the Persian funds
-brought into Greece by Timokrates the Rhodian,—and of being the real
-author of that war which had disturbed Greece from 395 B.C. down
-to the peace of Antalkidas. After an unavailing defence, he was
-condemned and executed. Had this doom been inflicted upon him by his
-political antagonists as a consequence of their intestine victory,
-it would have been too much in the analogy of Grecian party-warfare
-to call for any special remark. But there is something peculiarly
-revolting in the prostitution of judicial solemnity and Pan-hellenic
-pretence, which the Lacedæmonians here committed. They could have no
-possible right to try Ismenias as a criminal at all; still less to
-try him as a criminal on the charge of confederacy with the Persian
-king,—when they had themselves, only five years before, acted not
-merely as allies, but even as instruments, of that monarch, in
-enforcing the peace of Antalkidas. If Ismenias had received money
-from one Persian satrap, the Spartan Antalkidas had profited in
-like manner by another,—and for the like purpose too of carrying on
-Grecian war. The real motive of the Spartans was doubtless to revenge
-themselves upon this distinguished Theban for having raised against
-them the war which began in 395 B.C. But the mockery of justice
-by which that revenge was masked, and the impudence of punishing
-in him as treason that same foreign alliance with which they had
-ostentatiously identified themselves, lends a deeper enormity to the
-whole proceeding.
-
-  [144] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 35; Plutarch, De Genio Socratis, p. 576
-  A. Plutarch in another place (Pelopid. c. 5) represents Ismenias
-  as having been conveyed to Sparta and tried there.
-
-Leontiades and his partisans were now established as rulers in
-Thebes, with a Lacedæmonian garrison in the Kadmeia to sustain them
-and execute their orders. The once-haughty Thebes was enrolled as
-a member of Lacedæmonian confederacy. Sparta was now enabled to
-prosecute her Olynthian expedition with redoubled vigor. Eudamidas
-and Amyntas, though they repressed the growth of the Olynthian
-confederacy, had not been strong enough to put it down; so that a
-larger force was necessary, and the aggregate of ten thousand men,
-which had been previously decreed, was put into instant requisition,
-to be commanded by Teleutias, brother of Agesilaus. The new general,
-a man of very popular manners, was soon on his march at the head of
-this large army, which comprised many Theban hoplites as well as
-horsemen, furnished by the new rulers in their unqualified devotion
-to Sparta. He sent forward envoys to Amyntas in Macedonia, urging
-upon him the most strenuous efforts for the purpose of recovering
-the Macedonian cities which had joined the Olynthians,—and also to
-Derdas, prince of the district of Upper Macedonia called Elimeia,
-inviting his coöperation against that insolent city, which would
-speedily extend her dominion (he contended) from the maritime region
-to the interior, unless she were put down.[145]
-
-  [145] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 38.
-
-Though the Lacedæmonians were masters everywhere and had their
-hands free,—though Teleutias was a competent officer with powerful
-forces,—and though Derdas joined with four hundred excellent
-Macedonian horse,—yet the conquest of Olynthus was found no easy
-enterprise.[146] The Olynthian cavalry, in particular, was numerous
-and efficient. Unable as they were to make head against Teleutias
-in the field or repress his advance, nevertheless in a desultory
-engagement which took place near the city gates, they defeated
-the Lacedæmonian and Theban cavalry, threw even the infantry into
-confusion, and were on the point of gaining a complete victory, had
-not Derdas with his cavalry on the other wing, made a diversion which
-forced them to come back for the protection of the city. Teleutias,
-remaining master of the field, continued to ravage the Olynthian
-territory during the summer, for which, however, the Olynthians
-retaliated by frequent marauding expeditions against the cities in
-alliance with him.[147]
-
-  [146] Demosthenes (De Fals. Leg. c. 75, p. 425) speaks with
-  proper commendation of the brave resistance made by the
-  Olynthians against the great force of Sparta. But his expressions
-  are altogether misleading as to the tenor and result of the
-  war. If we had no other information than his, we should be led
-  to imagine that the Olynthians had been victorious, and the
-  Lacedæmonians baffled.
-
-  [147] Xenoph. Hellen. v, 2, 40-43.
-
-In the ensuing spring, the Olynthians sustained various partial
-defeats, especially one near Apollonia, from Derdas. They were more
-and more confined to their walls; insomuch that Teleutias became
-confident and began to despise them. Under these dispositions on
-his part, a body of Olynthian cavalry showed themselves one morning,
-passed the river near their city, and advanced in calm array towards
-the Lacedæmonian camp. Indignant at such an appearance of daring,
-Teleutias directed Tlemonidas with the peltasts to disperse them;
-upon which the Olynthians slowly retreated, while the peltasts rushed
-impatiently to pursue them, even when they recrossed the river. No
-sooner did the Olynthians see that half the peltasts had crossed
-it, than they suddenly turned, charged them vigorously, and put
-them to flight with the loss of their commander Tlemonidas and a
-hundred others. All this passed in sight of Teleutias, who completely
-lost his temper. Seizing his arms, he hurried forward to cover the
-fugitives with the hoplites around him, sending orders to all his
-troops, hoplites, peltasts, and horsemen, to advance also. But the
-Olynthians, again retreating, drew him on towards the city, with
-such inconsiderate forwardness, that many of his soldiers ascending
-the eminence on which the city was situated, rushed close up to the
-walls.[148] Here, however, they were received by a shower of missiles
-which forced them to recede in disorder; upon which the Olynthians
-again sallied forth, probably, from more than one gate at once, and
-charged them first with cavalry and peltasts, next with hoplites.
-The Lacedæmonians and their allies, disturbed and distressed by the
-first, were unable to stand against the compact charge of the last;
-Teleutias himself, fighting in the foremost ranks, was slain, and his
-death was a signal for the flight of all around. The whole besieging
-force dispersed and fled in different directions,—to Akanthus, to
-Spartôlus, to Potidæa, to Apollonia. So vigorous and effective was
-the pursuit of the Olynthians, that the loss of the fugitives was
-immense. The whole army was in fact ruined;[149] for probably many of
-the allies who escaped became discouraged and went home.
-
-  [148] Thucyd. i, 63—with the Scholiast.
-
-  [149] Xen. Hellen. v, 3, 4-6. παμπλήθεις ἀπέκτειναν ἀνθρώπους καὶ
-  ὅτι περ ὄφελος ἦν τούτου τοῦ στρατεύματος.
-
-  Diodorus (xv, 21) states the loss at twelve hundred men.
-
-At another time, probably, a victory so decisive might have deterred
-the Lacedæmonians from farther proceedings, and saved Olynthus. But
-now, they were so completely masters everywhere else, that they
-thought only of repairing the dishonor by a still more imposing
-demonstration. Their king Agesipolis was placed at the head of an
-expedition on the largest scale; and his name called forth eager
-coöperation, both in men and money, from the allies. He marched
-with thirty Spartan counsellors, as Agesilaus had gone to Asia;
-besides a select body of energetic youth as volunteers, from the
-Periœki, from the illegitimate sons of Spartans, and from strangers
-or citizens who had lost their franchise through poverty, introduced
-as friends of richer Spartan citizens to go through the arduous
-Lykurgean training.[150] Amyntas and Derdas also were instigated to
-greater exertions than before, so that Agesipolis was enabled, after
-receiving their reinforcements in his march through Macedonia, to
-present himself before Olynthus with an overwhelming force, and to
-confine the citizens within their walls. He then completed the ravage
-of their territory, which had been begun by Teleutias; and even took
-Torônê by storm. But the extreme heat of the summer weather presently
-brought upon him a fever, which proved fatal in a week’s time;
-although he had caused himself to be carried for repose to the shady
-grove, and clear waters, near the temple of Dionysus at Aphytis. His
-body was immersed in honey and transported to Sparta, where it was
-buried with the customary solemnities.[151]
-
-  [150] Xen. Hellen. v, 3, 9. Πολλοὶ δὲ αὐτῷ καὶ τῶν περιοίκων
-  ἐθελονταὶ καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ ἠκολούθουν, καὶ ξένοι τῶν τροφίμων
-  καλουμένων, καὶ νόθοι τῶν Σπαρτιατῶν, μάλα εὐειδεῖς τε καὶ τῶν ἐν
-  τῇ πόλει καλῶν οὐκ ἄπειροι.
-
-  The phrase—ξένοι τῶν τροφίμων—is illustrated by a passage from
-  Phylarchus in Athenæus, vi, p. 271 (referred to by Schneider
-  in his note here). I have already stated that the political
-  franchise of a Spartan citizen depended upon his being able to
-  furnish constantly his quota to the public mess-table. Many of
-  the poor families became unable to do this, and thus lost their
-  qualification and their training; but rich citizens sometimes
-  paid their quota for them, and enabled them by such aid to
-  continue their training as ξύντροφοι, τρόφιμοι, μόθακες, etc.
-  as companions of their own sons. The two sons of Xenophon were
-  educated at Sparta (Diog. Laert. ii, 54), and would thus be ξένοι
-  τῶν τροφίμων καλουμένων. If either of them was now old enough, he
-  might probably have been one among the volunteers to accompany
-  Agesipolis.
-
-  [151] Xen. Hellen. v, 3, 18; Pausan. iii, 5, 9.
-
-Polybiades, who succeeded Agesipolis in the command, prosecuted the
-war with undiminished vigor; and the Olynthians, debarred from their
-home produce as well as from importation, were speedily reduced to
-such straits as to be compelled to solicit peace. They were obliged
-to break up their own federation, and to enrol themselves as sworn
-members of the Lacedæmonian confederacy, with its obligations of
-service to Sparta.[152] The Olynthian union being dissolved, the
-component Grecian cities were enrolled severally as allies of Sparta,
-while the maritime cities of Macedonia were deprived of their
-neighboring Grecian protector, and passed again under the dominion of
-Amyntas.
-
-  [152] Xen. Hellen. v, 3, 26; Diodor. xv, 22, 23.
-
-Both the dissolution of this growing confederacy, and the
-reconstitution of maritime Macedonia, were signal misfortunes to
-the Grecian world. Never were the arms of Sparta more mischievously
-or more unwarrantably employed. That a powerful Grecian confederacy
-should be formed in the Chalkidic peninsula, in the border region
-where Hellas joined the non-Hellenic tribes,—was an incident of
-signal benefit to the Hellenic world generally. It would have
-served as a bulwark to Greece against the neighboring Macedonians
-and Thracians, at whose expense its conquests, if it made any,
-would have been achieved. That Olynthus did not oppress her Grecian
-neighbors—that the principles of her confederacy were of the most
-equal, generous, and seducing character,—that she employed no greater
-compulsion than was requisite to surmount an unreflecting instinct
-of town-autonomy,—and that the very towns who obeyed this instinct
-would have become sensible themselves, in a very short time, of the
-benefits conferred by the confederacy on each and every one,—these
-are facts certified by the urgency of the reluctant Akanthians,
-when they entreat Sparta to leave no interval for the confederacy
-to make its workings felt. Nothing but the intervention of Sparta
-could have crushed this liberal and beneficent promise; nothing but
-the accident, that during the three years from 382 to 379 B.C., she
-was at the maximum of her power and had her hands quite free, with
-Thebes and its Kadmeia under her garrison. Such prosperity did not
-long continue unabated. Only a few months after the submission of
-Olynthus, the Kadmeia was retaken by the Theban exiles, who raised
-so vigorous a war against Sparta, that she would have been disabled
-from meddling with Olynthus,—as we shall find illustrated by the
-fact (hereafter to be recounted), that she declined interfering in
-Thessaly to protect the Thessalian cities against Jason of Pheræ.
-Had the Olynthian confederacy been left to its natural working,
-it might well have united all the Hellenic cities around it in
-harmonious action, so as to keep the sea coast in possession of a
-confederacy of free and self-determining communities, confining
-the Macedonian princes to the interior. But Sparta threw in her
-extraneous force, alike irresistible and inauspicious, to defeat
-these tendencies; and to frustrate that salutary change,—from
-fractional autonomy and isolated action into integral and equal
-autonomy with collective action,—which Olynthus was laboring to
-bring about. She gave the victory to Amyntas, and prepared the
-indispensable basis upon which his son Philip afterwards rose, to
-reduce not only Olynthus, but Akanthus, Apollonia, and the major part
-of the Grecian world, to one common level of subjection. Many of
-those Akanthians, who spurned the boon of equal partnership and free
-communion with Greeks and neighbors, lived to discover how impotent
-were their own separate walls as a bulwark against Macedonian
-neighbors; and to see themselves confounded in that common servitude
-which the imprudence of their fathers had entailed upon them. By
-the peace of Antalkidas, Sparta had surrendered the Asiatic Greeks
-to Persia; by crushing the Olynthian confederacy, she virtually
-surrendered the Thracian Greeks to the Macedonian princes. Never
-again did the opportunity occur of placing Hellenism on a firm,
-consolidated, and self-supporting basis, round the coast of the
-Thermaic Gulf.
-
-While the Olynthian expedition was going on, the Lacedæmonians
-were carrying on, under Agesilaus, another intervention within
-Peloponnesus, against the city of Phlius. It has already been
-mentioned that certain exiles of this city had recently been
-recalled, at the express command of Sparta. The ruling party in
-Phlius had at the same time passed a vote to restore the confiscated
-property of these exiles; reimbursing out of the public treasury,
-to those who had purchased it, the price which they had paid,—and
-reserving all disputed points for judicial decision.[153] The
-returned exiles now again came to Sparta, to prefer complaint that
-they could obtain no just restitution of their property; that the
-tribunals of the city were in the hands of their opponents, many of
-them directly interested as purchasers, who refused them the right
-of appealing to any extraneous and impartial authority; and that
-there were even in the city itself many who thought them wronged.
-Such allegations were, probably, more or less founded in truth. At
-the same time, the appeal to Sparta, abrogating the independence
-of Phlius, so incensed the ruling Phliasians that they passed a
-sentence of fine against all the appellants. The latter insisted on
-this sentence as a fresh count for strengthening their complaints
-at Sparta; and as a farther proof of anti-Spartan feeling, as well
-as of high-handed injustice, in the Phliasian rulers.[154] Their
-cause was warmly espoused by Agesilaus, who had personal relations
-of hospitality with some of the exiles; while it appears that his
-colleague, King Agesipolis, was on good terms with the ruling party
-at Phlius,—had received from them zealous aid, both in men and money,
-for his Olynthian expedition,—and had publicly thanked them for their
-devotion to Sparta.[155] The Phliasian government, emboldened by the
-proclaimed testimonial of Agesipolis, certifying their fidelity,
-had fancied that they stood upon firm ground, and that no Spartan
-coërcion would be enforced against them. But the marked favor of
-Agesipolis, now absent in Thrace, told rather against them in the
-mind of Agesilaus; pursuant to that jealousy which usually prevailed
-between the two Spartan kings. In spite of much remonstrance at
-Sparta, from many who deprecated hostilities against a city of five
-thousand citizens, for the profit of a handful of exiles,—he not only
-seconded the proclamation of war against Phlius by the ephors, but
-also took the command of the army.[156]
-
-  [153] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 10.
-
-  [154] Xen. Hellen. v, 3, 10, 11.
-
-  [155] Xen. Hellen. v, 3, 10. ἡ Φλιασίων πόλις, ἐπαινεθεῖσα μὲν
-  ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀγησιπόλιδος, ὅτι πολλὰ καὶ ταχέως αὐτῷ χρήματα ἐς τὴν
-  στρατιὰν ἔδοσαν, etc.
-
-  [156] Xen. Hellen. v, 3, 12, 13; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 24; Diodor.
-  xv, 20.
-
-The army being mustered, and the border sacrifices favorable,
-Agesilaus marched with his usual rapidity towards Phlius; dismissing
-those Phliasian envoys, who met him on the road and bribed or
-entreated him to desist, with the harsh reply that the government
-had already deceived Sparta once, and that he would be satisfied
-with nothing less than the surrender of the acropolis. This being
-refused, he marched to the city, and blocked it up by a wall of
-circumvallation. The besieged defended themselves with resolute
-bravery and endurance, under a citizen named Delphion; who, with a
-select troop of three hundred, maintained constant guard at every
-point, and even annoyed the besiegers by frequent sallies. By public
-decree, every citizen was put upon half-allowance of bread, so that
-the siege was prolonged to double the time which Agesilaus, from the
-information of the exiles as to the existing stock of provisions, had
-supposed to be possible. Gradually, however, famine made itself felt;
-desertions from within increased, among those who were favorable,
-or not decidedly averse, to the exiles; desertions, which Agesilaus
-took care to encourage by an ample supply of food, and by enrolment
-as Phliasian emigrants on the Spartan side. At length, after about a
-year’s blockade,[157] the provisions within were exhausted, so that
-the besieged were forced to entreat permission from Agesilaus to
-despatch envoys to Sparta and beg for terms. Agesilaus granted their
-request. But being at the same time indignant that they submitted
-to Sparta rather than to him, he sent to ask the ephors that the
-terms might be referred to his dictation. Meanwhile he redoubled his
-watch over the city; in spite of which, Delphion, with one of his
-most active subordinates, contrived to escape at this last hour.
-Phlius was now compelled to surrender at discretion to Agesilaus,
-who named a Council of One Hundred (half from the exiles, half from
-those within the city) vested with absolute powers of life and death
-over all the citizens, and authorized to frame a constitution for the
-future government of the city. Until this should be done, he left a
-garrison in the acropolis, with assured pay for six months.[158]
-
-  [157] Xen. Hellen. v, 3, 25.
-
-  Καὶ τὰ μὲν περὶ Φλιοῦντα οὕτως αὖ ἐπετετέλεστο ἐν ὀκτὼ μησὶ καὶ
-  ἐνιαυτῷ.
-
-  This general expression “the matters relative to Phlius,”
-  comprises not merely the blockade, but the preliminary treatment
-  and complaints of the Phliasian exiles. One year, therefore, will
-  be as much as we can allow for the blockade,—perhaps more than we
-  ought to allow.
-
-  [158] Xen. Hellen. v, 3, 17-26.
-
-Had Agesipolis been alive, perhaps the Phliasians might have obtained
-better terms. How the omnipotent Hekatontarchy named by the partisan
-feelings of Agesilaus,[159] conducted themselves, we do not know.
-But the presumptions are all unfavorable, seeing that their situation
-as well as their power was analogous to that of the Thirty at Athens
-and the Lysandrian Dekarchies elsewhere.
-
-  [159] The panegyrist of Agesilaus finds little to commend
-  in these Phliasian proceedings, except the φιλεταιρεία or
-  partisan-attachment of his hero (Xenoph. Agesil. ii, 21).
-
-The surrender of Olynthus to Polybiades, and of Phlius to Agesilaus,
-seem to have taken place nearly at the same time.
-
-
-
-
-CHAPTER LXXVII.
-
-FROM THE SUBJUGATION OF OLYNTHUS BY THE LACEDÆMONIANS DOWN TO THE
-CONGRESS AT SPARTA, AND PARTIAL PEACE, IN 371 B.C.
-
-
-At the beginning of 379 B.C., the empire of the Lacedæmonians on
-land had reached a pitch never before paralleled. On the sea, their
-fleet was but moderately powerful, and they seem to have held divided
-empire with Athens over the smaller islands; while the larger islands
-(so far as we can make out) were independent of both. But the whole
-of inland Greece, both within and without Peloponnesus,—except Argos,
-Attica, and perhaps the more powerful Thessalian cities,—was now
-enrolled in the confederacy dependent on Sparta. Her occupation of
-Thebes, by a Spartan garrison and an oligarchy of local partisans,
-appeared to place her empire beyond all chance of successful
-attack; while the victorious close of the war against Olynthus
-carried everywhere an intimidating sense of her far-reaching power.
-Her allies, too,—governed as they were in many cases by Spartan
-harmosts, and by oligarchies whose power rested on Sparta,—were much
-more dependent upon her than they had been during the time of the
-Peloponnesian war.
-
-Such a position of affairs rendered Sparta an object of the same
-mingled fear and hatred (the first preponderant) as had been felt
-towards imperial Athens fifty years before, when she was designated
-as the “despot city.[160]” And this sentiment was farther aggravated
-by the recent peace of Antalkidas, in every sense the work of
-Sparta; which she had first procured, and afterwards carried into
-execution. That peace was disgraceful enough, as being dictated by
-the king of Persia, enforced in his name, and surrendering to him
-all the Asiatic Greeks. But it became yet more disgraceful when the
-universal autonomy which it promised was seen to be so executed, as
-to mean nothing better than subjection to Sparta. Of all the acts
-yet committed by Sparta, not only in perversion of the autonomy
-promised to every city, but in violation of all the acknowledged
-canons of right dealing between city and city,—the most flagrant
-was, her recent seizure and occupation of the Kadmeia at Thebes. Her
-subversion (in alliance with, and partly for the benefit of, Amyntas
-king of Macedonia) of the free Olynthian confederacy was hardly
-less offensive to every Greek of large or Pan-hellenic patriotism.
-She appeared as the confederate of the Persian king on one side, of
-Amyntas the Macedonian, on another, of the Syracusan despot Dionysius
-on a third,—as betraying the independence of Greece to the foreigner,
-and seeking to put down, everywhere within it, that free spirit which
-stood in the way of her own harmosts and partisan oligarchies.
-
-  [160] Thucyd. i, 124. πόλιν τύραννον.
-
-Unpopular as Sparta was, however, she stood out incontestably as the
-head of Greece. No man dared to call into question her headship,
-or to provoke resistance against it. The tone of patriotic and
-free-spoken Greeks at this moment is manifested in two eminent
-residents at Athens,—Lysias and Isokrates. Of these two rhetors, the
-former composed an oration which he publicly read at Olympia during
-the celebration of the 99th Olympiad, B.C. 384, three years after
-the peace of Antalkidas. In this oration (of which unhappily only a
-fragment remains, preserved by Dionysius of Halikarnassus), Lysias
-raises the cry of danger to Greece, partly from the Persian king,
-partly from the despot Dionysius of Syracuse.[161] He calls upon all
-Greeks to lay aside hostility and jealousies one with the other,
-and to unite in making head against these two really formidable
-enemies, as their ancestors had previously done, with equal zeal for
-putting down despots and for repelling the foreigner. He notes the
-number of Greeks (in Asia) handed over to the Persian king, whose
-great wealth would enable him to hire an indefinite number of Grecian
-soldiers, and whose naval force was superior to anything which the
-Greeks could muster; while the strongest naval force in Greece was
-that of the Syracusan Dionysius. Recognizing the Lacedæmonians as
-chiefs of Greece, Lysias expresses his astonishment that they should
-quietly permit the fire to extend itself from one city to another.
-They ought to look upon the misfortunes of those cities which had
-been destroyed, both by the Persians and by Dionysius, as coming home
-to themselves; not to wait patiently, until the two hostile powers
-had united their forces to attack the centre of Greece, which yet
-remained independent.
-
-  [161] Lysias, Frag. Orat. xxxiii, (Olympic.) ed. Bekker ap.
-  Dionys. Hal. Judic. de Lysiâ, p. 520-525, Reisk.
-
-  ... Ὁρῶν οὕτως αἰσχρῶς διακειμένην τὴν Ἑλλάδα, καὶ πολλὰ μὲν
-  αὐτῆς ὄντα ὑπὸ τῷ βαρβάρῳ, πολλὰς δὲ πόλεις ὑπὸ τυράννων
-  ἀναστάτους γεγενημένας.
-
-  ... Ὁρῶμεν γὰρ τοὺς κινδύνους καὶ μεγάλους καὶ παντάχοθεν
-  περιεστηκότας. Ἐπίστασθε δὲ, ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἀρχὴ τῶν κρατούντων τῆς
-  θαλάσσης, τῶν δὲ χρημάτων βασιλεὺς ταμίας· ~τὰ δὲ τῶν Ἑλλήνων
-  σώματα, τῶν δαπανᾶσθαι δυναμένων~· ναῦς δὲ πολλὰς αὐτὸς κέκτηται,
-  πολλὰς δ’ ὁ τύραννος τῆς Σικελίας....
-
-  ... Ὥστε ἄξιον—τοὺς προγόνους μιμεῖσθαι, οἱ τοὺς μὲν βαρβάρους
-  ἐποίησαν, τῆς ἀλλοτρίας ἐπιθυμοῦντας, τῆς σφετέρας αὐτῶν
-  ἐστερῆσθαι· τοὺς δὲ τυράννους ἐξελάσαντες, κοινὴν ἅπασι τὴν
-  ἐλευθερίαν κατέστησαν. Θαυμάζω δὲ Λακεδαιμονίους πάντων μάλιστα,
-  τίνι ποτε γνώμῃ χρώμενοι, ~καιομένην τὴν Ἑλλάδα περιορῶσιν~,
-  ἡγεμόνες ὄντες τῶν Ἑλλήνων, etc.
-
-  ... Οὐ τοίνυν ὁ ἐπιὼν καιρὸς τοῦ παρόντος βελτίων· οὐ γὰρ
-  ἀλλοτρίας δεῖ τὰς τῶν ἀπολωλότων συμφορὰς νομίζειν, ἀλλ’ οἰκείας·
-  οὐδ’ ἀναμεῖναι, ἕως ἂν ἐπ’ αὐτοὺς ἡμᾶς αἱ δυνάμεις ~ἀμφοτέρων~
-  (of Artaxerxes and Dionysius) ἔλθωσιν, ἀλλ’ ἕως ἔτι ἔξεστι, τὴν
-  τούτων ὕβριν κωλῦσαι.
-
-  Ephorus appears to have affirmed that there was a plan concerted
-  between the Persian king and Dionysius, for attacking Greece in
-  concert and dividing it between them (see Ephori Fragm. 141,
-  ed. Didot). The assertion is made by the rhetor Aristeides,
-  and the allusion to Ephorus is here preserved by the Scholiast
-  on Aristeides (who, however, is mistaken, in referring it to
-  Dionysius _the younger_). Aristeides ascribes the frustration of
-  this attack to the valor of two Athenian generals, Iphikrates,
-  and Timotheus; the former of whom captured the fleet of
-  Dionysius, while the latter defeated the Lacedæmonian fleet at
-  Leukas. But these events happened in 373-372 B.C., when the
-  power of Dionysius was not so formidable or aggressive as it had
-  been between 387-382 B.C.: moreover, the ships of Dionysius
-  taken by Iphikrates were only ten in number, a small squadron.
-  Aristeides appears to me to have misconceived the date to which
-  the assertion of Ephorus really referred.
-
-Of the two common enemies,—Artaxerxes and Dionysius,—whom Lysias
-thus denounces, the latter had sent to this very Olympic festival
-a splendid Theôry, or legation to offer solemn sacrifice in his
-name; together with several chariots to contend in the race, and
-some excellent rhapsodes to recite poems composed by himself. The
-Syracusan legation, headed by Thearides, brother of Dionysius, were
-clothed with rich vestments, and lodged in a tent of extraordinary
-magnificence, decorated with gold and purple; such, probably, as had
-not been seen since the ostentatious display made by Alkibiades[162]
-in the ninetieth Olympiad (B.C. 420). While instigating the
-spectators present to exert themselves as Greeks for the liberation
-of their fellow-Greeks enslaved by Dionysius, Lysias exhorted them
-to begin forthwith their hostile demonstration against the latter,
-by plundering the splendid tent before them, which insulted the
-sacred plain of Olympia with the spectacle of wealth extorted from
-Grecian sufferers. It appears that this exhortation was partially,
-but only partially, acted upon.[163] Some persons assailed the
-tents, but were, probably, restrained by the Eleian superintendents
-without difficulty. Yet the incident, taken in conjunction with
-the speech of Lysias, helps us to understand the apprehensions and
-sympathies which agitated the Olympic crowd in B.C. 384. This was
-the first Olympic festival after the peace of Antalkidas; a festival
-memorable, not only because it again brought thither Athenians,
-Bœotians, Corinthians, and Argeians, who must have been prevented
-by the preceding war from coming either in B.C. 388 or in B.C.
-392,—but also as it exhibited the visitors and Theôries from the
-Asiatic Greeks, for the first time since they had been handed over
-by Sparta to the Persians,—and the like also from those numerous
-Italians and Sicilian Greeks whom Dionysius had enslaved. All these
-sufferers, especially the Asiatics, would doubtless be full of
-complaints respecting the hardships of their new lot, and against
-Sparta as having betrayed them; complaints, which would call forth
-genuine sympathy in the Athenians, Thebans, and all others who had
-submitted reluctantly to the peace of Antalkidas. There was thus a
-large body of sentiment prepared to respond to the declamations of
-Lysias. And many a Grecian patriot, who would be ashamed to lay hands
-on the Syracusan tents or envoys, would yet yield a mournful assent
-to the orator’s remark, that the free Grecian world was on fire[164]
-at both sides; that Asiatics, Italians, and Sicilians, had already
-passed into the hands of Artaxerxes and Dionysius; and that, if these
-two formidable enemies should coalesce, the liberties even of central
-Greece would be in great danger.
-
-  [162] See Pseudo-Andokides cont. Alkibiad. s. 30; and Vol. VII.
-  of this History, Ch. lv, p. 53.
-
-  [163] Dionys. Hal. Judic. de Lysiâ, p. 519; Diodor. xiv, 109.
-  ὥστε τινας τολμῆσαι διαρπάζειν τὰς σκηνάς.
-
-  Dionysius does not specify the date of this oration of Lysias;
-  but Diodorus places it at Olympiad 98—B.C. 388—the year before
-  the peace of Antalkidas. On this point I venture to depart from
-  him, and assign it to Olympiad 99, or 384 B.C., three years
-  after the peace; the rather as his Olympic chronology appears not
-  clear, as may be seen by comparing xv, 7 with xiv, 109.
-
-  1. The year 388 B.C. was a year of war, in which Sparta with
-  her allies on one side,—and Thebes, Athens, Corinth, and Argos
-  on the other,—were carrying on strenuous hostilities. The war
-  would hinder the four last-mentioned states from sending any
-  public legation to sacrifice at the Olympic festival. Lysias, as
-  an Athenian metic, could hardly have gone there at all; but he
-  certainly could not have gone there to make a public and bold
-  oratorical demonstration.
-
-  2. The language of Lysias implies that the speech was delivered
-  after the cession of the Asiatic Greeks to Persia,—ὁρῶν πολλὰ μὲν
-  αὐτῆς (Ἑλλάδος) ὄντα ὑπὸ τῷ Βαρβάρῳ, etc. This is quite pertinent
-  after the peace of Antalkidas; but not at all admissible before
-  that peace. The same may be said about the phrase,—οὐ γὰρ
-  ἀλλοτρίας δεῖ τὰς τῶν ἀπολωλότων συμφορὰς νομίζειν, ἀλλ’ οἰκείας;
-  which must be referred to the recent subjection of the Asiatic
-  Greeks by Persia, and of the Italian and Sicilian Greeks by
-  Dionysius.
-
-  3. In 388 B.C.—when Athens and so large a portion of the
-  greater cities of Greece were at war with Sparta, and therefore
-  contesting her headship,—Lysias would hardly have publicly
-  talked of the Spartans as ἡγεμόνες τῶν Ἑλλήνων, οὐκ ἀδίκως, καὶ
-  διὰ τὴν ἔμφυτον ἀρετὴν καὶ διὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ἐπιστήμην.
-  This remark is made also by Sievers (Geschich. Griech. bis zur
-  Schlacht von Mantinea, p. 138). Nor would he have declaimed so
-  ardently against the Persian king, at a time when Athens was
-  still not despairing of Persian aid against Sparta.
-
-  On these grounds (as well as on others which I shall state when
-  I recount the history of Dionysius), it appears to me that this
-  oration of Lysias is unsuitable to B.C. 388—but perfectly
-  suitable to 384 B.C.
-
-  [164] Lysias, Orat. Olymp. Frag. καιομένην τὴν Ἑλλάδα περιορῶσιν,
-  etc.
-
-It is easy to see how much such feeling of grief and shame would
-tend to raise antipathy against Sparta. Lysias, in that portion of
-his speech which we possess, disguises his censure against her under
-the forms of surprise. But Isokrates, who composed an analogous
-discourse four years afterwards (which may perhaps have been read at
-the next Olympic festival of B.C. 380), speaks out more plainly. He
-denounces the Lacedæmonians as traitors to the general security and
-freedom of Greece, and as seconding foreign kings as well as Grecian
-despots to aggrandize themselves at the cost of autonomous Grecian
-cities,—all in the interest of their own selfish ambition. No wonder
-(he says) that the free and self-acting Hellenic world was every day
-becoming contracted into a narrower space, when the presiding city
-Sparta assisted Artaxerxes, Amyntas, and Dionysius to absorb it,—and
-herself undertook unjust aggressions against Thebes, Olynthus,
-Phlius, and Mantinea.[165]
-
-  [165] Isokrates, Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 145, 146: compare his
-  Orat. viii, (De Pace) s. 122; and Diodor. xv, 23.
-
-  Dionysius of Syracuse had sent twenty triremes to join the
-  Lacedæmonians at the Hellespont, a few months before the peace of
-  Antalkidas (Xenophon, Hellen. v, 1, 26).
-
-The preceding citations, from Lysias and Isokrates, would be
-sufficient to show the measure which intelligent contemporaries
-took, both of the state of Greece and of the conduct of Sparta,
-during the eight years succeeding the peace of Antalkidas (387-379
-B.C.). But the philo-Laconian Xenophon is still more emphatic in his
-condemnation of Sparta. Having described her triumphant and seemingly
-unassailable position after the subjugation of Olynthus and Phlius,
-he proceeds to say,[166]—“I could produce numerous other incidents,
-both in and out of Greece, to prove that the gods take careful note
-of impious men and of evil-doers; but the events which I am now about
-to relate are quite sufficient. The Lacedæmonians, who had sworn to
-leave each city autonomous, having violated their oaths by seizing
-the citadel of Thebes, were punished by the very men whom they had
-wronged,—though no one on earth had ever before triumphed over them.
-And the Theban faction who had introduced them into the citadel, with
-the deliberate purpose that their city should be enslaved to Sparta
-in order that they might rule despotically themselves,—were put down
-by no more than seven assailants, among the exiles whom they had
-banished.”
-
-  [166] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 1. Πολλὰ μὲν οὖν ἄν τις ἔχοι καὶ
-  ἄλλα λέγειν, καὶ Ἑλληνικὰ καὶ βαρβαρικὰ, ὡς θεοὶ οὔτε τῶν
-  ἀσεβούντων οὔτε τῶν ἀνόσια ποιούντων ἀμελοῦσι· νῦν γε μὴν λέξω τὰ
-  προκείμενα. Λακεδαιμόνιοί τε γὰρ, οἱ ὀμόσαντες αὐτονόμους ἐάσειν
-  τὰς πόλεις, τὴν ἐν Θήβαις ἀκρόπολιν κατασχόντες, ὑπ’ αὐτῶν μόνων
-  τῶν ἀδικηθέντων ἐκολάσθησαν, πρῶτον οὐδ’ ὑφ’ ἑνὸς τῶν πώποτε
-  ἀνθρώπων κρατηθέντες. Τούς τε τῶν πολιτῶν εἰσαγαγόντας εἰς τὴν
-  ἀκρόπολιν αὐτοὺς, καὶ βουληθέντας Λακεδαιμονίοις τὴν πόλιν
-  δουλεύειν, ὥστε αὐτοὶ τυραννεῖν ... τὴν τούτων ἀρχὴν ἑπτὰ μόνον
-  τῶν φυγόντων ἤρκεσαν καταλῦσαι.
-
-  This passage is properly characterized by Dr. Peter (in his
-  Commentatio Critica in Xenophontis Hellenica, Hall. 1837, p. 82)
-  as the turning-point in the history:—
-
-  “Hoc igitur in loco quasi editiore operis sui Xenophon subsistit,
-  atque uno in conspectu Spartanos, et ad suæ felicitatis
-  fastigium ascendere videt, et rursus ab eo delabi: tantâ autem
-  divinæ justitiæ conscientiâ tangitur in hac Spartanorum fortunâ
-  conspicuæ, ut vix suum judicium, quanquam id solet facere,
-  suppresserit.”
-
-What must have been the hatred, and sense of abused ascendency,
-entertained towards Sparta by neutral or unfriendly Greeks, when
-Xenophon, alike conspicuous for his partiality to her and for his
-dislike of Thebes, could employ these decisive words in ushering
-in the coming phase of Spartan humiliation, representing it as a
-well-merited judgment from the gods? The sentence which I have just
-translated marks, in the commonplace manner of the Xenophontic
-Hellenica, the same moment of pointed contrast and transition,—past
-glory suddenly and unexpectedly darkened by supervening
-misfortune,—which is foreshadowed in the narrative of Thucydides by
-the dialogue between the Athenian envoys and the Melian[167] council;
-or in the Œdipus and Antigonê of Sophokles,[168] by the warnings of
-the prophet Teiresias.
-
-  [167] See Vol. VII. of this History,—the close of Chapter lvi.
-
-  [168] Soph. Œdip. Tyr. 450; Antigon. 1066.
-
-The government of Thebes had now been for three years (since the blow
-struck by Phœbidas) in the hands of Leontiades and his oligarchical
-partisans, upheld by the Spartan garrison in the Kadmeia. Respecting
-the details of its proceedings we have scarce any information. We can
-only (as above remarked) judge of it by the analogy of the Thirty
-tyrants at Athens, and of the Lysandrian Dekarchies, to which it was
-exactly similar in origin, position, and interests. That the general
-spirit of it must have been cruel, oppressive, and rapacious,—we
-cannot doubt; though in what degree we have no means of knowing.
-The appetites of uncontrolled rulers, as well as those of a large
-foreign garrison, would ensure such a result; besides which, those
-rulers must have been in constant fear of risings or conspiracies
-amidst a body of high-spirited citizens who saw their city degraded,
-from being the chief of the Bœotian federation, into nothing better
-than a captive dependency of Sparta. Such fear was aggravated by
-the vicinity of a numerous body of Theban exiles, belonging to the
-opposite or anti-Spartan party; three or four hundred of whom had
-fled to Athens at the first seizure of their leader Ismenias, and had
-been doubtless joined subsequently by others. So strongly did the
-Theban rulers apprehend mischief from these exiles, that they hired
-assassins to take them off by private murder at Athens; and actually
-succeeded in thus killing Androkleidas, chief of the band and chief
-successor of the deceased Ismenias,—though they missed their blows at
-the rest.[169] And we may be sure that they made the prison in Thebes
-subservient to multiplied enormities and executions, when we read not
-only that one hundred and fifty prisoners were found in it when the
-government was put down,[170] but also that in the fervor of that
-revolutionary movement, the slain gaoler was an object of such fierce
-antipathy, that his corpse was trodden and spit upon by a crowd
-of Theban women.[171] In Thebes, as in other Grecian cities, the
-women not only took no part in political disputes, but rarely even
-showed themselves in public;[172] so that this furious demonstration
-of vindictive sentiment must have been generated by the loss or
-maltreatment of sons, husbands, and brothers.
-
-  [169] Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 6: compare Plutarch, De Gen. Socr.
-  c. 29, p. 596 B.
-
-  [170] Xenoph. Hellen. v, 4, 14.
-
-  [171] Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. c. 33, p. 598 B, C. ᾧ καὶ μεθ’
-  ἡμέραν ἐπενέβησαν καὶ προσέπτυσαν οὐκ ὀλίγαι γυναῖκες.
-
-  Among the prisoners was a distinguished Theban of the democratic
-  party, named Amphitheus. He was about to be shortly executed,
-  and the conspirators, personally attached to him, seem to have
-  accelerated the hour of their plot partly to preserve his life
-  (Plutarch, De Gen. Socrat. p. 577 D, p. 586 F.).
-
-  [172] The language of Plutarch (De Gen. Socrat. c. 33, p. 598
-  C.) is illustrated by the description given in the harangue of
-  Lykurgus cont. Leokrat. (c. xi, s. 40)—of the universal alarm
-  prevalent in Athens after the battle of Chæroneia, such that
-  even the women could not stay in their houses—ἀναξίως αὐτῶν καὶ
-  τῆς πόλεως ὁρωμένας, etc. Compare also the words of Makaria, in
-  the Herakleidæ of Euripides, 475; and Diodor. xiii, 55, in his
-  description of the capture of Selinus in Sicily.
-
-The Theban exiles found at Athens not only secure shelter, but
-genuine sympathy with their complaints against Lacedæmonian
-injustice. The generous countenance which had been shown by the
-Thebans, twenty-four years before, to Thrasybulus and the other
-Athenian refugees, during the omnipotence of the Thirty, was
-now gratefully requited under this reversal of fortune to both
-cities;[173] and requited too in defiance of the menaces of Sparta,
-who demanded that the exiles should be expelled,—as she had in the
-earlier occasion demanded that the Athenian refugees should be
-dismissed from Thebes. To protect these Theban exiles, however, was
-all that Athens could do. Their restoration was a task beyond her
-power,—and seemingly yet more beyond their own. For the existing
-government of Thebes was firmly seated, and had the citizens
-completely under control. Administered by a small faction, Archias,
-Philippus, Hypatês, and Leontiades (among whom the first two were at
-this moment polemarchs, though the last was the most energetic and
-resolute)—it was at the same time sustained by the large garrison of
-fifteen hundred Lacedæmonians and allies,[174] under Lysanoridas and
-two other harmosts, in the Kadmeia,—as well as by the Lacedæmonian
-posts in the other Bœotian cities around,—Orchomenus, Thespiæ,
-Platæa, Tanagra, etc. Though the general body of Theban sentiment
-in the city was decidedly adverse to the government, and though the
-young men while exercising in the palæstra (gymnastic exercises being
-more strenuously prosecuted at Thebes than anywhere else except at
-Sparta) kept up by private communication the ardor of an earnest,
-but compressed, patriotism,—yet all manifestation or assemblage was
-forcibly kept down, and the commanding posts of the lower town, as
-well as the citadel, were held in vigilant occupation by the ruling
-minority.[175]
-
-  [173] Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 6.
-
-  See this sentiment of gratitude on the part of Athenian
-  democrats, towards those Thebans who had sheltered them at Thebes
-  during the exile along with Thrasybulus,—strikingly brought out
-  in an oration of Lysias, of which unfortunately only a fragment
-  remains (Lysias, Frag. 46, 47, Bekk.; Dionys. Hal. Judic. de
-  Isæo, p. 594). The speaker of this oration had been received at
-  Thebes by Kephisodotus the father of Pherenikus; the latter was
-  now in exile at Athens; and the speaker had not only welcomed
-  him (Pherenikus) to his house with brotherly affection, but
-  also delivered this oration on his behalf before the Dikastery;
-  Pherenikus having rightful claims on the property left behind by
-  the assassinated Androkleidas.
-
-  [174] Diodor. xv, 25; Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 12; Plutarch, De
-  Gen. Socr. c. 17, p. 586 E.
-
-  In another passage of this treatise (the last sentence but one)
-  he sets down the numbers in the Kadmeia at five thousand: but the
-  smaller number is most likely to be true.
-
-  [175] Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. c. 4, p. 577 B; c. 17, p. 587 B; c.
-  25, p. 594 C; c. 27, p. 595 A.
-
-For a certain time the Theban exiles at Athens waited in hopes of
-some rising at home, or some positive aid from the Athenians. At
-length, in the third winter after their flight, they began to despair
-of encouragement from either quarter, and resolved to take the
-initiative upon themselves. Among them were numbered several men of
-the richest and highest families at Thebes, proprietors of chariots,
-jockeys, and training establishments, for contending at the various
-festivals: Pelopidas, Mellon, Damokleidas, Theopompus, Pherenikus,
-and others.[176]
-
-  [176] Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 7, 8.
-
-  Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. c. 17, p. 587 D. Τῶν Μέλλωνος ἁρματηλατῶν
-  ἐπιστάτης.... Ἆρ’ οὐ Χλίδωνα λέγεις, τὸν κέλητι τὰ Ἡραῖα νικῶντα
-  πέρυσιν;
-
-Of these the most forward in originating aggressive measures, though
-almost the youngest, was Pelopidas; whose daring and self-devotion,
-in an enterprise which seemed utterly desperate, soon communicated
-itself to a handful of his comrades. The exiles, keeping up constant
-private correspondence with their friends in Thebes, felt assured of
-the sympathy of the citizens generally, if they could once strike a
-blow. Yet nothing less would be sufficient than the destruction of
-the four rulers, Leontiades and his colleagues,—nor would any one
-within the city devote himself to so hopeless a danger. It was this
-conspiracy which Pelopidas, Mellon, and five or ten other exiles (the
-entire band is differently numbered, by some as seven, by others,
-twelve[177]) undertook to execute. Many of their friends in Thebes
-came in as auxiliaries to them, who would not have embarked in the
-design as primary actors. Of all auxiliaries, the most effective and
-indispensable was Phyllidas, the secretary of the polemarchs; next
-to him, Charon, an eminent and earnest patriot. Phyllidas, having
-been despatched to Athens on official business, entered into secret
-conference with the conspirators, concerted with them the day for
-their coming to Thebes, and even engaged to provide for them access
-to the persons of the polemarchs. Charon not only promised them
-concealment in his house, from their first coming within the gates
-until the moment of striking their blow should have arrived,—but
-also entered his name to share in the armed attack. Nevertheless,
-in spite of such partial encouragements, the plan still appeared
-desperate to many who wished heartily for its success. Epaminondas,
-for example,—who now for the first time comes before us,—resident
-at Thebes, and not merely sympathizing with the political views of
-Pelopidas, but also bound to him by intimate friendship,—dissuaded
-others from the attempt, and declined participating in it. He
-announced distinctly that he would not become an accomplice in civil
-bloodshed. It appears that there were men among the exiles whose
-violence made him fear that they would not, like Pelopidas, draw the
-sword exclusively against Leontiades and his colleagues, but would
-avail themselves of success to perpetrate unmeasured violence against
-other political enemies.[178]
-
-  [177] Xenophon says _seven_ (Hellen. v, 4, 1, 2); Plutarch and
-  Cornelius Nepos say _twelve_ (Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. c. 2, p.
-  576 C.; Plutarch, Pelopidas c. 8-13; Cornel. Nepos, Pelopidas, c.
-  2).
-
-  It is remarkable that Xenophon never mentions the name of
-  Pelopidas in this conspiracy; nor indeed (with one exception)
-  throughout his Hellenica.
-
-  [178] Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. c. 3, p. 576 E.; p. 577 A.
-
-The day for the enterprise was determined by Phyllidas the secretary,
-who had prepared an evening banquet for Archias and Philippus, in
-celebration of the period when they were going out of office as
-polemarchs,—and who had promised on that occasion to bring into
-their company some women remarkable for beauty, as well as of the
-best families in Thebes.[179] In concert with the general body of
-Theban exiles at Athens, who held themselves ready on the borders
-of Attica, together with some Athenian sympathizers, to march to
-Thebes the instant that they should receive intimation,—and in
-concert also with two out of the ten Stratêgi of Athens, who took
-on themselves privately to countenance the enterprise, without any
-public vote,—Pelopidas and Mellon, and their five companions,[180]
-crossed Kithæron from Athens to Thebes. It was wet weather, about
-December B.C. 379; they were disguised as rustics or hunters, with
-no other arms than a concealed dagger; and they got within the gates
-of Thebes one by one at nightfall, just when the latest farming men
-were coming home from their fields. All of them arrived safe at the
-house of Charon, the appointed rendezvous.
-
-  [179] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 4. τὰς σεμνοτάτας καὶ καλλίστας τῶν
-  ἐν Θήβαις. Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. c. 4, p. 577 C.; Plutarch,
-  Pelopid. c. 9.
-
-  The Theban women were distinguished for majestic figure and
-  beauty (Dikæarchus, Vit. Græc. p. 144, ed Fuhr.).
-
-  [180] Plutarch, (Pelopid. c. 25; De Gen. Socr. c. 26, p. 594 D.)
-  mentions Menekleidês, Damokleidas, and Theopompus among them.
-  Compare Cornel. Nepos, Pelopid. c. 2.
-
-It was, however, by mere accident that they had not been turned back,
-and the whole scheme frustrated. For a Theban named Hipposthenidas,
-friendly to the conspiracy, but faint-hearted, who had been let into
-the secret against the will of Phyllidas,—became so frightened as the
-moment of execution approached, that he took upon himself, without
-the knowledge of the rest, to despatch Chlidon, a faithful slave of
-Mellon, ordering him to go forth on horseback from Thebes, to meet
-his master on the road, and to desire that he and his comrades would
-go back to Attica, since circumstances had happened to render the
-project for the moment impracticable. Chlidon, going home to fetch
-his bridle, but not finding it in its usual place, asked his wife
-where it was. The woman, at first pretending to look for it, at last
-confessed that she had lent it to a neighbor. Chlidon became so
-irritated with this delay, that he got into a loud altercation with
-his wife, who on her part wished him ill luck with his journey. He
-at last beat her, until neighbors ran in to interpose. His departure
-was thus accidentally frustrated, so that the intended message of
-countermand never reached the conspirators on their way.[181]
-
-  [181] Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 8; Plutarch, De Gen. Socrat. c. 17,
-  p. 586 B.; c. 18, p. 587 D-E.
-
-In the house of Charon they remained concealed all the ensuing day,
-on the evening of which the banquet of Archias and Philippus was to
-take place. Phyllidas had laid his plan for introducing them at that
-banquet, at the moment when the two polemarchs had become full of
-wine, in female attire, as being the women whose visit was expected.
-The hour had nearly arrived, and they were preparing to play their
-parts, when an unexpected messenger knocked at the door, summoning
-Charon instantly into the presence of the polemarchs. All within
-were thunderstruck with the summons, which seemed to imply that the
-plot had been divulged, perhaps by the timid Hipposthenidas. It was
-agreed among them that Charon must obey at once. Nevertheless, he
-himself, even in the perilous uncertainty which beset him, was most
-of all apprehensive lest the friends whom he had sheltered should
-suspect him of treachery towards themselves and their cause. Before
-departing, therefore, he sent for his only son, a youth of fifteen,
-and of conspicuous promise in every way. This youth he placed in the
-hands of Pelopidas, as a hostage for his own fidelity. But Pelopidas
-and the rest, vehemently disclaiming all suspicion, entreated Charon
-to put his son away, out of the reach of that danger in which all
-were now involved. Charon, however, could not be prevailed on to
-comply, and left his son among them to share the fate of the rest.
-He went into the presence of Archias and Philippus; whom he found
-already half-intoxicated, but informed, by intelligence from Athens,
-that some plot, they knew not by whom, was afloat. They had sent for
-him to question him, as a known friend of the exiles; but he had
-little difficulty, aided by the collusion of Phyllidas, in blinding
-the vague suspicions of drunken men, anxious only to resume their
-conviviality.[182] He was allowed to retire and rejoin his friends.
-Nevertheless, soon after his departure,—so many were the favorable
-chances which befel these improvident men,—a fresh message was
-delivered to Archias the polemarch, from his namesake Archias the
-Athenian Hierophant, giving an exact account of the names and scheme
-of the conspirators, which had become known to the philo-Laconian
-party at Athens. The messenger who bore this despatch delivered it to
-Archias with an intimation, that it related to very serious matters.
-“Serious matters for to-morrow,” said the polemarch, as he put the
-despatch, unopened and unread, under the pillow of the couch on which
-he was reclining.[183]
-
-  [182] Xenophon does not mention this separate summons and visit
-  of Charon to the polemarchs,—nor anything about the scene
-  with his son. He only notices Charon as having harbored the
-  conspirators in his house, and seems even to speak of him as a
-  person of little consequence—παρὰ Χαρωνί τινι, etc. (v, 4, 3).
-
-  The anecdote is mentioned in both the compositions of Plutarch
-  (De Gen. Socr. c. 28, p. 595; and Pelopidas, c. 9), and is too
-  interesting to be omitted, being perfectly consistent with
-  what we read in Xenophon; though it has perhaps somewhat of a
-  theatrical air.
-
-  [183] Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 10; Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. c. 30,
-  p. 596 F. Εἰς αὔριον τὰ σπουδαῖα.
-
-  This occurrence also finds no place in the narrative of Xenophon.
-  Cornelius Nepos, Pelopidas, c. 3. Æneas (Poliorcetic. c. 31)
-  makes a general reference to the omission of immediate opening
-  of letters arrived, as having caused the capture of the Kadmeia;
-  which was, however, only its remote consequence.
-
-Returning to their carousal, Archias and Philippus impatiently called
-upon Phyllidas to introduce the women according to his promise. Upon
-this the secretary retired, and brought the conspirators, clothed
-in female attire, into an adjoining chamber; then going back to
-the polemarchs, he informed them that the women would not come in
-unless all the domestics were first dismissed. An order was forthwith
-given that these latter should depart, while Phyllidas took care
-that they should be well provided with wine at the lodging of one
-among their number. The polemarchs were thus left only with one or
-two friends at table, half-intoxicated as well as themselves; among
-them Kabeirichus, the archon of the year, who always throughout his
-term kept the consecrated spear of office in actual possession,
-and had it at that moment close to his person. Phyllidas now
-conducted the pretended women into the banqueting-room; three of
-them attired as ladies of distinction, the four others following as
-female attendants. Their long veils, and ample folds of clothing,
-were quite sufficient as disguise,—even had the guests at table
-been sober,—until they sat down by the side of the polemarchs; and
-the instant of lifting their veils was the signal for using their
-daggers. Archias and Philippus were slain at once and with little
-resistance; but Kabeirichus with his spear tried to defend himself,
-and thus perished with the others, though the conspirators had not
-originally intended to take his life.[184]
-
-  [184] The description given by Xenophon, of this assassination
-  of the polemarchs at Thebes, differs materially from that of
-  Plutarch. I follow Xenophon in the main; introducing, however,
-  several of the details found in Plutarch, which are interesting,
-  and which have the air of being authentic.
-
-  Xenophon himself intimates (Hellen. v, 4, 7), that besides the
-  story given in the text, there was also another story told by
-  some,—that Mellon and his companions had got access to the
-  polemarchs in the guise of drunken revellers. It is this latter
-  story which Plutarch has adopted, and which carries him into
-  many details quite inconsistent with the narrative of Xenophon.
-  I think the story, of the conspirators having been introduced in
-  female attire, the more probable of the two. It is borne out by
-  the exact analogy of what Herodotus tells us respecting Alexander
-  son of Amyntas, prince of Macedonia (Herod. v, 20).
-
-  Compare Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 10, 11; Plutarch, De Gen. Socrat.
-  c. 31, p. 597. Polyænus (ii, 4, 3) gives a story with many
-  different circumstances, yet agreeing in the fact that Pelopidas
-  in female attire killed the Spartan general. The story alluded to
-  by Aristotle (Polit. v, 5, 10), though he names both Thebes and
-  Archias, can hardly refer to this event.
-
-  It is Plutarch, however, who mentions the presence of Kabeirichus
-  the archon at the banquet, and the curious Theban custom that
-  the archon during his year of office never left out of his hand
-  the consecrated spear. As a Bœotian born, Plutarch was doubtless
-  familiar with these old customs.
-
-  From what other authors Plutarch copied the abundant details of
-  this revolution at Thebes, which he interweaves in the life of
-  Pelopidas and in the treatise called De Genio Socratis—we do not
-  know. Some critics suppose him to have borrowed from Dionysodôrus
-  and Anaxis—Bœotian historians whose work comprised this period,
-  but of whom not a single fragment is preserved (see Fragm.
-  Histor. Græc. ed. Didot, vol. ii, p. 84).
-
-Having been thus far successful, Phyllidas conducted three of the
-conspirators,—Pelopidas, Kephisodôrus, and Damokleidas,—to the house
-of Leontiades, into which he obtained admittance by announcing
-himself as the bearer of an order from the polemarchs. Leontiades was
-reclining after supper, with his wife sitting spinning wool by his
-side, when they entered his chamber. Being a brave and powerful man,
-he started up, seized his sword, and mortally wounded Kephisodôrus
-in the throat; a desperate struggle then ensued between him and
-Pelopidas in the narrow doorway, where there was no room for a third
-to approach. At length, however, Pelopidas overthrew and killed him,
-after which they retired, enjoining the wife with threats to remain
-silent, and closing the door after them with peremptory commands
-that it should not be again opened. They then went to the house
-of Hypatês, whom they slew while he attempted to escape over the
-roof.[185]
-
-  [185] Xen. Hell. v, 4, 9; Plutarch, Pelop. c. 11, 12; and De Gen.
-  Socr. p. 597 D-F. Here again Xenophon and Plutarch differ; the
-  latter represents that Pelopidas got into the house of Leontiades
-  _without_ Phyllidas,—which appears to me altogether improbable.
-  On the other hand, Xenophon mentions nothing about the defence
-  of Leontiades and his personal conflict with Pelopidas, which
-  I copy from Plutarch. So brave a man as Leontiades, awake and
-  sober, would not let himself be slain without a defence dangerous
-  to assailants. Plutarch, in another place, singles out the death
-  of Leontiades as the marking circumstance of the whole glorious
-  enterprise, and the most impressive to Pelopidas (Plutarch—Non
-  posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum—p. 1099 A-E.).
-
-The four great rulers of the philo-Laconian party in Thebes having
-been now put to death, Phyllidas proceeded with the conspirators to
-the prison. Here the gaoler, a confidential agent in the oppressions
-of the deceased governors, hesitated to admit him; but was slain by a
-sudden thrust with his spear, so as to ensure free admission to all.
-To liberate the prisoners, probably, for the most part men of kindred
-politics with the conspirators,—to furnish them with arms taken
-from the battle-spoils hanging up in the neighboring porticos,—and
-to range them in battle order near the temple of Amphion,—were the
-next proceedings; after which they began to feel some assurance
-of safety and triumph.[186] Epaminondas and Gorgidas, apprised of
-what had occurred, were the first who appeared in arms with a few
-friends to sustain the cause; while proclamation was everywhere made
-aloud, through heralds, that the despots were slain,—that Thebes
-was free,—and that all Thebans who valued freedom should muster in
-arms in the market-place. There were at that moment in Thebes many
-trumpeters who had come to contend for the prize at the approaching
-festival of the Herakleia. Hipposthenidas engaged these men to blow
-their trumpets in different parts of the city, and thus everywhere to
-excite the citizens to arms.[187]
-
-  [186] Xenoph. Hell. v, 4, 8; Plutarch, Pelop. c. 12; De Gen.
-  Socr. p. 598 B.
-
-  [187] This is a curious piece of detail, which we learn from
-  Plutarch (De Gen. Socr. c. 34. p. 598 D.).
-
-  The Orchomenian Inscriptions in Boeckh’s Collection record the
-  prizes given to these Σαλπιγκταὶ or trumpeters (see Boeckh, Corp.
-  Inscr. No. 1584, 1585, etc.).
-
-Although during the darkness surprise was the prevalent feeling,
-and no one knew what to do,—yet so soon as day dawned, and the
-truth became known, there was but one feeling of joy and patriotic
-enthusiasm among the majority of the citizens.[188] Both horsemen
-and hoplites hastened in arms to the agora. Here for the first time
-since the seizure of the Kadmeia by Phœbidas, a formal assembly
-of the Theban people was convened, before which Pelopidas and his
-fellow-conspirators presented themselves. The priests of the city
-crowned them with wreaths, and thanked them in the name of the local
-gods; while the assembly hailed them with acclamations of delight and
-gratitude, nominating with one voice Pelopidas, Mellon, and Charon,
-as the first renewed Bœotarchs.[189] The revival of this title, which
-had been dropped since the peace of Antalkidas, was in itself an
-event of no mean significance; implying not merely that Thebes had
-waked up again into freedom, but that the Bœotian confederacy also
-had been, or would be, restored.
-
-  [188] The unanimous joy with which the consummation of the
-  revolution was welcomed in Thebes,—and the ardor with which the
-  citizens turned out to support it by armed force,—is attested by
-  Xenophon, no very willing witness,—Hellen. v, 4, 9. ἐπεὶ δ’ ἡμέρα
-  ἦν καὶ φανερὸν ἦν τὸ γεγενημένον, ταχὺ δὴ καὶ οἱ ὁπλῖται καὶ οἱ
-  ἱππεῖς σὺν τοῖς ὅπλοις ἐξεβοήθουν.
-
-  [189] Plutarch, Pelop. c. 12.
-
-Messengers had been forthwith despatched by the conspirators to
-Attica to communicate their success; upon which all the remaining
-exiles, with the two Athenian generals privy to the plot, and a body
-of Athenian volunteers, or _corps francs_, all of whom were ready on
-the borders awaiting the summons,—flocked to Thebes to complete the
-work. The Spartan generals, on their side also, sent to Platæa and
-Thespiæ for aid. During the whole night, they had been distracted and
-alarmed by the disturbance in the city; lights showing themselves
-here and there, with trumpets sounding and shouts for the recent
-success.[190] Apprised speedily of the slaughter of the polemarchs,
-from whom they had been accustomed to receive orders, they knew not
-whom to trust or to consult, while they were doubtless beset by
-affrighted fugitives of the now defeated party, who would hurry up
-the Kadmeia for safety. They reckoned at first on a diversion in
-their favor from the forces at Platæa and Thespiæ. But these forces
-were not permitted even to approach the city gate; being vigorously
-charged, as soon as they came in sight, by the newly-mustered Theban
-cavalry, and forced to retreat with loss. The Lacedæmonians in the
-citadel were thus not only left without support, but saw their
-enemies in the city reinforced by the other exiles, and by the
-auxiliary volunteers.[191]
-
-  [190] Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. p. 598 E.; Pelop. c. 12.
-
-  [191] Xenophon expressly mentions that the Athenians who were
-  invited to come, and who actually did come, to Thebes, were the
-  two generals and the volunteers; all of whom were before privy
-  to the plot, and were in readiness on the borders of Attica—τοὺς
-  ~πρὸς τοῖς ὁρίοις~ Ἀθηναίων καὶ τοὺς δύο τῶν στρατηγῶν—οἱ
-  Ἀθηναῖοι ~ἀπὸ τῶν ὁρίων~ ἤδη παρῆσαν (Hellen. v, 4, 9, 10).
-
-Meanwhile, Pelopidas and the other new Bœotarchs found themselves at
-the head of a body of armed citizens, full of devoted patriotism
-and unanimous in hailing the recent revolution. They availed
-themselves of this first burst of fervor to prepare for storming
-the Kadmeia without delay, knowing the importance of forestalling
-all aid from Sparta. And the citizens were already rushing up to
-the assault,—proclamation being made of large rewards to those who
-should first force their way in,—when the Lacedæmonian commander sent
-proposals for a capitulation.[192] Undisturbed egress from Thebes,
-with the honors of war, being readily guaranteed to him by oath,
-the Kadmeia was then surrendered. As the Spartans were marching out
-of the gates, many Thebans of the defeated party came forth also.
-But against these latter the exasperation of the victors was so
-ungovernable, that several of the most odious were seized as they
-passed, and put to death; in some cases, even their children along
-with them. And more of them would have been thus despatched, had not
-the Athenian auxiliaries, with generous anxiety, exerted every effort
-to get them out of sight and put them into safety.[193] We are not
-told,—nor is it certain,—that these Thebans were protected under the
-capitulation. Even had they been so, however, the wrathful impulse
-might still have prevailed against them. Of the three harmosts who
-thus evacuated the Kadmeia without a blow, two were put to death,
-the third was heavily fined and banished, by the authorities at
-Sparta.[194] We do not know what the fortifications of the Kadmeia
-were, nor how far it was provisioned. But we can hardly wonder that
-these officers were considered to have dishonored the Lacedæmonian
-arms, by making no attempt to defend it; when we recollect that
-hardly more than four or five days would be required to procure
-adequate relief from home,—and that forty-three years afterwards, the
-Macedonian garrison in the same place maintained itself against the
-Thebans in the city for more than fourteen days, until the return of
-Alexander from Illyria.[195] The first messenger who brought news to
-Sparta of the conspiracy and revolution at Thebes, appears to have
-communicated at the same time that the garrison had evacuated the
-Kadmeia and was in full retreat, with a train of Theban exiles from
-the defeated party.[196]
-
-  [192] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 10, 11. προσέβαλον πρὸς τὴν
-  ἀκρόπολιν—τὴν προθυμίαν τῶν προσιόντων ἁπάντων ἑώρων, etc.
-
-  Diodorus, xv, 25. ἔπειτα τοὺς πολίτας ἐπὶ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν
-  παρακαλέσαντες (the successful Theban conspirators, Pelopidas,
-  etc.) ~συνέργους ἔσχον ἅπαντας τοὺς Θηβαίους~.
-
-  [193] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 12.
-
-  [194] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 13; Diodor. xv, 27.
-
-  Plutarch (Pelopid. c. 13) augments the theatrical effect by
-  saying that the Lacedæmonian garrison on its retreat, actually
-  met at Megara the reinforcements under king Kleombrotus, which
-  had advanced thus far, on their march to relieve the Kadmeia.
-  But this is highly improbable. The account of Xenophon intimates
-  clearly that the Kadmeia was surrounded on the next morning after
-  the nocturnal movement. The commanders capitulated in the first
-  moment of distraction and despair, without even standing an
-  assault.
-
-  [195] Arrian, i, 6.
-
-  [196] In recounting this revolution at Thebes, and the
-  proceedings of the Athenians in regard to it, I have followed
-  Xenophon almost entirely.
-
-  Diodorus (xv, 25, 26) concurs with Xenophon in stating that the
-  Theban exiles got back from Attica to Thebes by night, partly
-  through the concurrence of the Athenians (συνεπιλαβομένων τῶν
-  Ἀθηναίων)—slew the rulers—called the citizens to freedom next
-  morning, finding all hearty in the cause—and then proceeded to
-  besiege the fifteen hundred Lacedæmonians and Peloponnesians in
-  the Kadmeia.
-
-  But after thus much of agreement, Diodorus states what followed,
-  in a manner quite inconsistent with Xenophon; thus (he tells us)—
-
-  The Lacedæmonian commander sent instant intelligence to Sparta
-  of what had happened, with request for a reinforcement. The
-  Thebans at once attempted to storm the Kadmeia, but were repulsed
-  with great loss, both of killed and wounded. Fearing that they
-  might not be able to take the fort before reinforcement should
-  come from Sparta, they sent envoys to Athens to ask for aid,
-  reminding the Athenians that they (the Thebans) had helped to
-  emancipate Athens from the Thirty, and to restore the democracy
-  (ὑπομιμνήσκοντες μὲν ὅτι καὶ αὐτοὶ ~συγκατήγαγον τὸν δῆμον~ τῶν
-  Ἀθηναίων καθ’ ὃν καιρὸν ὑπὸ τῶν τριάκοντα κατεδουλώθησαν). The
-  Athenians, partly from desire to requite this favor, partly from
-  a wish to secure the Thebans as allies against Sparta, passed a
-  public vote to assist them forthwith. Demophon the general got
-  together five thousand hoplites and five hundred horsemen, with
-  whom he hastened to Thebes on the next day; and all the remaining
-  population were prepared to follow, if necessary (πανδημεί).
-  All the other cities in Bœotia also sent aid to Thebes too,—so
-  that there was assembled there a large force of twelve thousand
-  hoplites and two thousand horsemen. This united force, the
-  Athenians being among them, assaulted the Kadmeia day and night,
-  relieving each other; but were repelled with great loss of killed
-  and wounded. At length the garrison found themselves without
-  provisions; the Spartans were tardy in sending reinforcement;
-  and sedition broke out among the Peloponnesian allies who formed
-  the far larger part of the garrison. These Peloponnesians,
-  refusing to fight longer, insisted upon capitulating; which the
-  Lacedæmonian governor was obliged perforce to do, though both he
-  and the Spartans along with him desired to hold out to the death.
-  The Kadmeia was accordingly surrendered, and the garrison went
-  back to Peloponnesus. The Lacedæmonian reinforcement from Sparta
-  arrived only a little too late.
-
-  All these circumstances stated by Diodorus are not only
-  completely different from Xenophon, but irreconcilable with his
-  conception of the event. We must reject either the one or the
-  other.
-
-  Now Xenophon is not merely the better witness of the two, but is
-  in this case sustained by all the collateral probabilities of the
-  case.
-
-  1. Diodorus represents the Athenians as having despatched by
-  public vote, assistance to Thebes, in order to requite the
-  assistance which the Thebans had before sent to restore the
-  Athenian democracy against the Thirty. Now this is incorrect
-  in point of fact. The Thebans had _never sent any assistance_,
-  positive or ostensible, to Thrasybulus and the Athenian democrats
-  against the Thirty. They had assisted Thrasybulus underhand,
-  and without any public government-act; and they had refused to
-  serve along with the Spartans against him. But they never sent
-  any force to help him against the Thirty. Consequently, the
-  Athenians _could not_ now have sent any public force to Thebes,
-  _in requital_ for a similar favor done before by the Thebans to
-  them.
-
-  2. Had the Athenians passed a formal vote, sent a large public
-  army, and taken vigorous part in several bloody assaults on
-  the Lacedæmonian garrison in the Kadmeia,—this would have been
-  the most flagrant and unequivocal commencement of hostilities
-  against Sparta. No Spartan envoys could, after that, have gone
-  to Athens, and stayed safely in the house of the Proxenus,—as we
-  know from Xenophon that they did. Besides,—the story of Sphodrias
-  (presently to be recounted) proves distinctly that Athens was at
-  peace with Sparta, and had committed no act of hostility against
-  her, for three or four months at least after the revolution at
-  Thebes. It therefore refutes the narrative of Diodorus about
-  the public vote of the Athenians, and the public Athenian force
-  under Demophon, aiding in the attack of the Kadmeia. Strange
-  to say,—Diodorus himself, three chapters afterwards (xv, 29),
-  relates this story about Sphodrias, just in the same manner
-  (with little difference) as Xenophon; ushering in the story with
-  a declaration, that _the Athenians were still at peace with
-  Sparta_, and forgetting that he had himself recounted a distinct
-  rupture of that peace on the part of the Athenians.
-
-  3. The news of the revolution at Thebes must necessarily have
-  taken the Athenian public completely by surprise (though some
-  few Athenians were privy to the scheme), because it was a scheme
-  which had no chance of succeeding except by profound secrecy.
-  Now, that the Athenian public, hearing the news for the first
-  time,—having no positive act to complain of on the part of
-  Sparta, and much reason to fear her power,—having had no previous
-  circumstances to work them up, or prepare them for any dangerous
-  resolve,—should identify themselves at once with Thebes,
-  and provoke war with Sparta in the impetuous manner stated
-  by Diodorus,—this is, in my judgment, eminently improbable,
-  requiring good evidence to induce us to believe it.
-
-  4. Assume the statement of Diodorus to be true,—what reasonable
-  explanation can be given of the erroneous version which we
-  read in Xenophon? The facts as he recounts them conflict most
-  pointedly with his philo-Laconian partialities; first, the
-  overthrow of the Lacedæmonian power at Thebes, by a handful
-  of exiles; still more, the whole story of Sphodrias and his
-  acquittal.
-
-  But assume the statement of Xenophon to be true,—and we can
-  give a very plausible explanation how the erroneous version
-  in Diodorus arose. A few months later, after the acquittal of
-  Sphodrias at Sparta, the Athenians did enter heartily into
-  the alliance of Thebes, and sent a large public force (indeed
-  five thousand hoplites, the same number as those of Demophon,
-  according to Diodorus, c. 32) to assist her in repelling
-  Agesilaus with the Spartan army. It is by no means unnatural
-  that their public vote and expedition undertaken about July 378
-  B.C.,—should have been erroneously thrown back to December 379
-  B.C. The Athenian orators were fond of boasting that Athens
-  had saved the Thebans from Sparta; and this might be said with
-  some truth, in reference to the aid which she really rendered
-  afterwards. Isokrates (Or. Plataic. s. 31) makes this boast in
-  general terms; but Deinarchus (cont. Demosthen. s. 40) is more
-  distinct, and gives in a few words a version the same as that
-  which we find in Diodorus; so also does Aristeides, in two very
-  brief allusions (Panathen. p. 172, and Or. xxxviii, Socialis, p.
-  486-498). Possibly Aristeides as well as Diodorus may have copied
-  from Ephorus; but however this may be, it is easy to understand
-  the mistake out of which their version grew.
-
-  5. Lastly, Plutarch mentions nothing about the public vote of
-  the Athenians, and the regular division of troops under Demophon
-  which Diodorus asserts to have aided in the storming of the
-  Kadmeia. See Plutarch (De Gen. Socrat. ad fin. Agesil. c. 23;
-  Pelopid. 12, 13). He intimates only, as Xenophon does, that there
-  were some Athenian volunteers who assisted the exiles.
-
-  M. Rehdantz (Vitæ Iphicratis, Chabriæ, etc. p. 38-43) discusses
-  this discrepancy at considerable length, and cites the opinion
-  of various German authors in respect to it, with none of whom I
-  altogether concur.
-
-  In my judgment, the proper solution is, to reject altogether (as
-  belonging to a later time) the statement of Diodorus, respecting
-  the public vote at Athens, and the army said to have been sent to
-  Thebes under Demophon; and to accept the more credible narrative
-  of Xenophon; which ascribes to Athens a reasonable prudence, and
-  great fear of Sparta,—qualities such as Athenian orators would
-  not be disposed to boast of. According to that narrative, the
-  question about sending Athenians to aid in storming the Kadmeia
-  could hardly have been submitted for public discussion, since
-  that citadel was surrendered at once by the intimidated garrison.
-
-This revolution at Thebes came like an electric shock upon the
-Grecian world. With a modern reader, the assassination of the four
-leaders, in their houses and at the banquet, raises a sentiment of
-repugnance which withdraws his attention from the other features
-of this memorable deed. Now an ancient Greek not only had no such
-repugnance, but sympathized with the complete revenge for the seizure
-of the Kadmeia and the death of Ismenias; while he admired, besides,
-the extraordinary personal daring of Pelopidas and Mellon,—the
-skilful forecast of the plot,—and the sudden overthrow, by a force
-so contemptibly small, of a government which the day before seemed
-unassailable.[197] It deserves note that we here see the richest
-men in Thebes undertaking a risk, single-handed and with their
-own persons, which must have appeared on a reasonable estimate
-little less than desperate. From the Homeric Odysseus and Achilles
-down to the end of free Hellenism, the rich Greek strips in the
-Palæstra,[198] and exposes his person in the ranks as a soldier like
-the poorest citizens; being generally superior to them in strength
-and bodily efficiency.
-
-  [197] The daring _coup de main_ of Pelopidas and Mellon, against
-  the government of Thebes, bears a remarkable analogy to that by
-  which Evagoras got into Salamis and overthrew the previous despot
-  (Isokrates, Or. ix, Evagor. s. 34).
-
-  [198] See, in illustration of Greek sentiment on this point,
-  Xenophon, Hellen. iii, 4, 19; and Xenophon, Enc. Ages. i, 28.
-
-As the revolution in Thebes acted forcibly on the Grecian mind from
-the manner in which it was accomplished, so by its positive effects
-it altered forthwith the balance of power in Greece. The empire of
-Sparta, far from being undisputed and nearly universal over Greece,
-is from henceforward only maintained by more or less effort, until at
-length it is completely overthrown.[199]
-
-  [199] If, indeed, we could believe Isokrates, speaking through
-  the mouth of a Platæan, it would seem that the Thebans,
-  immediately after their revolution, sent an humble embassy to
-  Sparta deprecating hostility, entreating to be admitted as
-  allies, and promising service, even against their benefactors
-  the Athenians, just as devoted as the deposed government had
-  rendered; an embassy which the Spartans haughtily answered by
-  desiring them to receive back their exiles, and to cast out the
-  assassins Pelopidas and his comrades. It is possible that the
-  Thebans may have sent to try the possibility of escaping Spartan
-  enmity; but it is highly improbable that they made any such
-  promises as those here mentioned; and it is certain that they
-  speedily began to prepare vigorously for that hostility which
-  they saw to be approaching.
-
-  See Isokrates, Or. xiv, (Plataic.) s. 31.
-
-  This oration is put into the mouth of a Platæan, and seems to be
-  an assemblage of nearly all the topics which could possibly be
-  enforced, truly or falsely, against Thebes.
-
-The exiles from Thebes, arriving at Sparta, inflamed both the ephors,
-and the miso-Theban Agesilaus, to the highest pitch. Though it was
-then the depth of winter,[200] an expedition was decreed forthwith
-against Thebes, and the allied contingents were summoned. Agesilaus
-declined to take the command of it, on the ground that he was above
-sixty years of age, and therefore no longer liable to compulsory
-foreign service. But this (says Xenophon[201]) was not his real
-reason. He was afraid that his enemies at Sparta would say,—“Here
-is Agesilaus again putting us to expense, in order that he may
-uphold despots in other cities,”—as he had just done, and had been
-reproached with doing, at Phlius; a second proof that the reproaches
-against Sparta (which I have cited a few pages above from Lysias and
-Isokrates) of allying herself with Greek despots as well as with
-foreigners to put down Grecian freedom, found an echo even in Sparta
-herself. Accordingly Kleombrotus, the other king of Sparta, took the
-command. He had recently succeeded his brother Agesipolis, and had
-never commanded before.
-
-  [200] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 14. μάλα χειμῶνος ὄντος.
-
-  [201] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 13. εὖ εἰδὼς ὅτι, εἰ στρατηγοίη, λέξειαν
-  οἱ πολῖται, ὡς Ἀγησίλαος, ὅπως βοηθήσειε τοῖς τυράννοις, πράγματα
-  τῇ πόλει παρέχοι. Plutarch, Agesil. c. 24.
-
-Kleombrotus conducted his army along the Isthmus of Corinth through
-Megara to Platæa, cutting to pieces an outpost of Thebans, composed
-chiefly of the prisoners set free by the recent revolution, who had
-been placed for the defence of the intervening mountain-pass. From
-Platæa he went forward to Thespiæ, and from thence to Kynoskephalæ in
-the Theban territory, where he lay encamped for sixteen days; after
-which he retreated to Thespiæ. It appears that he did nothing, and
-that his inaction was the subject of much wonder in his army, who
-are said to have even doubted whether he was really and earnestly
-hostile to Thebes. Perhaps the exiles, with customary exaggeration,
-may have led him to hope that they could provoke a rising in Thebes,
-if he would only come near. At any rate the bad weather must have
-been a serious impediment to action; since in his march back to
-Peloponnesus through Kreusis and Ægosthenæ the wind blew a hurricane,
-so that his soldiers could not proceed without leaving their shields
-and coming back afterwards to fetch them. Kleombrotus did not quit
-Bœotia, however, without leaving Sphodrias as harmost at Thespiæ,
-with one third of the entire army, and with a considerable sum of
-money to employ in hiring mercenaries and acting vigorously against
-the Thebans.[202]
-
-  [202] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 15-18.
-
-The army of Kleombrotus, in its march from Megara to Platæa, had
-passed by the skirts of Attica; causing so much alarm to the
-Athenians, that they placed Chabrias with a body of peltasts, to
-guard their frontier and the neighboring road through Eleutheræ
-into Bœotia. This was the first time that a Lacedæmonian army had
-touched Attica (now no longer guarded by the lines of Corinth, as
-in the war between 394 and 388 B.C.) since the retirement of king
-Pausanias in 404 B.C.; furnishing a proof of the exposure of the
-country, such as to revive in the Athenian mind all the terrible
-recollections of Dekeleia and the Peloponnesian war. It was during
-the first prevalence of this alarm,—and seemingly while Kleombrotus
-was still with his army at Thespiæ or Kynoskephalæ, close on the
-Athenian frontier,—that three Lacedæmonian envoys, Etymoklês and
-two others, arrived at Athens to demand satisfaction for the part
-taken by the two Athenian generals and the Athenian volunteers, in
-concerting and aiding the enterprise of Pelopidas and his comrades.
-So overpowering was the anxiety in the public mind to avoid giving
-offence to Sparta, that these two generals were both of them accused
-before the dikastery. The first of them was condemned and executed;
-the second, profiting by this warning (since, pursuant to the
-psephism of Kannônus,[203] the two would be put on trial separately),
-escaped, and a sentence of banishment was passed against him.[204]
-These two generals had been unquestionably guilty of a grave abuse
-of their official functions. They had brought the state into public
-hazard, not merely without consulting the senate or assembly, but
-even without taking the sense of their own board of Ten. Nevertheless
-the severity of the sentence pronounced indicates the alarm, as well
-as the displeasure, of the general body of Athenians; while it served
-as a disclaimer in fact, if not in form, of all political connection
-with Thebes.[205]
-
-  [203] See Vol. VIII. of this History, Ch. lxiv, p. 196—about the
-  psephism of Kannônus.
-
-  [204] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 19; Plutarch, Pelopid. c. 14.
-
-  Xenophon mentions the Lacedæmonian envoys at Athens, but does
-  not expressly say that they were sent to demand reparation for
-  the conduct of these two generals or of the volunteers. I cannot
-  doubt, however, that the fact was so; for in those times, there
-  were no resident envoys,—none but envoys sent on special missions.
-
-  [205] The trial and condemnation of these two generals has
-  served as the groundwork for harsh reproach against the Athenian
-  democracy. Wachsmuth (Hellen. Alterth. i, p. 654) denounces
-  it as “a judicial horror, or abomination—ein Greul-gericht.”
-  Rehdantz (Vitæ Iphicratis, Chabriæ, etc. p. 44, 45) says,—“Quid?
-  quia invasionem Lacedæmoniorum viderant in Bœotiam factam esse,
-  non puduit eos, damnare imperatores quorum facta suis decretis
-  comprobaverant?” ... “Igitur hanc _illius facinoris excusationem_
-  habebimus: Rebus quæ a Thebanis agebantur (_i. e._ by the
-  propositions of the Thebans seeking peace from Sparta, and trying
-  to get enrolled as her allies,—alleged by Isokrates, which I
-  have noticed above as being, in my judgment, very inaccurately
-  recorded) cognitis, Athenienses, quo _enixius subvenerant,
-  eo majore pœnitentiâ perculsi_ sunt.... Sed tantum abfuit ut
-  sibimet irascerentur, ut, _e more Atheniensium, punirentur qui
-  perfecerant id quod tum populus exoptaverat_.”
-
-  The censures of Wachsmuth, Rehdantz, etc. assume as matter of
-  fact,—1. That the Athenians had passed a formal vote in the
-  public assembly to send assistance to Thebes, under two generals,
-  who accordingly went out in command of the army and performed
-  their instructions. 2. That the Athenians, becoming afterwards
-  repentant or terrified, tried and condemned these two generals
-  for having executed the commission entrusted to them.
-
-  I have already shown grounds (in a previous note) for believing
-  that the first of these affirmations is incorrect; the second, as
-  dependent on it, will therefore be incorrect also.
-
-  These authors here appear to me to single out a portion of each
-  of the two _inconsistent_ narratives of Xenophon and Diodorus,
-  and blend them together in a way which contradicts both.
-
-  Thus, they take from Diodorus the allegation, that the Athenians
-  sent to Thebes by public vote a large army, which fought along
-  with the Thebans against the Kadmeia,—an allegation which, not
-  only is not to be found in Xenophon, but which his narrative
-  plainly, though indirectly, excludes.
-
-  Next, they take from Xenophon the allegation, that the Athenians
-  tried and condemned the two generals who were accomplices in the
-  conspiracy of Mellon against the Theban rulers,—τὼ δύω στρατηγὼ,
-  οἳ συνηπιστάσθην τὴν τοῦ Μέλλωνος ἐπὶ τοὺς περὶ Λεοντιάδην
-  ἐπανάστασιν (v, 4, 19). Now the mention of these two generals
-  follows naturally and consistently in _Xenophon_. He had before
-  told us that there were _two_ out of the Athenian generals, who
-  both assisted underhand in organizing the plot, and afterwards
-  went with the volunteers to Thebes. But it cannot be fitted
-  on to the narrative of _Diodorus, who never says a word about
-  this condemnation by the Athenians_—nor even mentions _any two
-  Athenian generals_, at all. He tells us that the Athenian army
-  which went to Thebes was commanded by Demophon; he notices
-  no colleague whatever. He says in general words, that the
-  conspiracy was organized “with the assistance of the Athenians”
-  (συνεπιλαβομένων Ἀθηναίων); not saying a word about any _two
-  generals_ as especially active.
-
-  Wachsmuth and Rehdantz take it for granted, most gratuitously,
-  that these two condemned generals (mentioned by Xenophon and not
-  by Diodorus) are identical with Demophon and another colleague,
-  commanders of an army which went out by public vote (mentioned by
-  Diodorus and not by Xenophon).
-
-  The narratives of Xenophon and Diodorus (as I have before
-  observed) are distinct and inconsistent with each other. We have
-  to make our option between them. I adhere to that of Xenophon,
-  for reasons previously given. But if any one prefers that of
-  Diodorus, he ought then to reject altogether the story of the
-  condemnation of the two Athenian generals (_who nowhere appear
-  in Diodorus_), and to suppose that Xenophon was misinformed upon
-  that point, as upon the other facts of the case.
-
-  That the two Athenian generals (assuming the Xenophontic
-  narrative as true) should be tried and punished, when the
-  consequences of their unauthorized proceeding were threatening to
-  come with severity upon Athens,—appears to me neither improbable
-  nor unreasonable. Those who are shocked by the very severity
-  of the sentence, will do well to read the remarks which the
-  Lacedæmonian envoys make (Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 23) on the conduct
-  of Sphodrias.
-
-  To turn from one severe sentence to another,—whoever believes the
-  narrative of Diodorus in preference to that of Xenophon, ought
-  to regard the execution of those two Lacedæmonian commanders
-  who surrendered the Kadmeia as exceedingly cruel. According to
-  Diodorus, these officers had done everything which brave men
-  could do; they had resisted a long time, repelled many attacks,
-  and were only prevented from farther holding out by a mutiny
-  among their garrison.
-
-  Here again, we see the superiority of the narrative of
-  Xenophon over that of Diodorus. According to the former, these
-  Lacedæmonian commanders surrendered the Kadmeia without any
-  resistance at all. Their condemnation, like that of the Athenian
-  two generals, becomes a matter easy to understand and explain.
-
-Even before the Lacedæmonian envoys had quitted Athens, however,
-an incident, alike sudden and memorable, completely altered the
-Athenian temper. The Lacedæmonian harmost Sphodrias (whom Kleombrotus
-had left at Thespiæ to prosecute the war against Thebes), being
-informed that Peiræus on its land side was without gates or night
-watch,—since there was no suspicion of attack,—conceived the idea of
-surprising it by a night-march from Thespiæ, and thus of mastering
-at one stroke the commerce, the wealth, and the naval resources of
-Athens. Putting his troops under march one evening after an early
-supper, he calculated on reaching the Peiræus the next morning before
-daylight. But his reckoning proved erroneous. Morning overtook
-him when he had advanced no farther than the Thriasian plain near
-Eleusis; from whence, as it was useless to proceed farther, he turned
-back and retreated to Thespiæ; not, however, without committing
-various acts of plunder against the neighboring Athenian residents.
-
-This plan against Peiræus appears to have been not ill conceived. Had
-Sphodrias been a man competent to organize and execute movements as
-rapid as those of Brasidas, there is no reason why it might not have
-succeeded; in which case the whole face of the war would have been
-changed, since the Lacedæmonians, if once masters of Peiræus, both
-could and would have maintained the place. But it was one of those
-injustices, which no one ever commends until it has been successfully
-consummated,—“consilium quod non potest laudari nisi peractum.[206]”
-As it failed, it has been considered, by critics as well as by
-contemporaries, not merely as a crime but as a fault, and its author
-Sphodrias as a brave man, but singularly weak and hot-headed.[207]
-Without admitting the full extent of this censure, we may see
-that his present aggression grew out of an untoward emulation of
-the glory which Phœbidas, in spite of the simulated or transient
-displeasure of his countrymen, had acquired by seizing the Kadmeia.
-That Sphodrias received private instructions from Kleombrotus (as
-Diodorus states) is not sufficiently proved; while the suspicion,
-intimated by Xenophon as being abroad, that he was wrought upon
-by secret emissaries and bribes from his enemies the Thebans, for
-the purpose of plunging Athens into war with Sparta, is altogether
-improbable;[208] and seems merely an hypothesis suggested by the
-consequences of the act,—which were such, that if his enemies had
-bribed him, he could not have served them better.
-
-  [206] Tacit. Histor. i, 38.
-
-  Compare (in Plutarch, Anton. c. 32) the remark of Sextus Pompey
-  to his captain Menas, when the latter asked his permission to
-  cut the cables of the ship, while Octavius and Antony were
-  dining on board, and to seize their persons,—“I cannot permit
-  any such thing; but you ought to have done it without asking my
-  permission.” A reply familiar to the readers of Shakspeare’s
-  Antony and Cleopatra.
-
-  [207] Kallisthenes, Frag. 2, ed. Didot, apud Harpokration, v.
-  Σφοδρίας; Diodor. xv, 29; Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 14; Plutarch,
-  Agesil. c. 24. The miscalculation of Sphodrias as to the time
-  necessary for his march to Peiræus is not worse than other
-  mistakes which Polybius (in a very instructive discourse, ix,
-  12, 20, seemingly extracted from his lost commentaries on
-  Tactics) recounts as having been committed by various other able
-  commanders.
-
-  [208] Πείθουσι τὸν ἐν ταῖς Θεσπιαῖς ἁρμοστὴν Σφοδρίαν, χρήματα
-  δόντες, ὡς ὑπωπτεύετο—Xenoph. Hellen. v, 4, 20; Diodor. xv, 29;
-  Plutarch, Pelopid. c. 14; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 24, 25.
-
-  Diodorus affirms private orders from Kleombrotus to Sphodrias.
-
-  In rejecting the suspicion mentioned by Xenophon,—that it was
-  the Theban leaders who instigated and bribed Sphodrias,—we may
-  remark—1. That the plan might very possibly have succeeded; and
-  its success would have been ruinous to the Thebans. Had they
-  been the instigators, they would not have failed to give notice
-  of it at Athens at the same time; which they certainly did not
-  do. 2. That if the Lacedæmonians had punished Sphodrias, no war
-  would have ensued. Now every man would have predicted, that
-  assuming the scheme to fail, they certainly would punish him.
-  3. The strong interest taken by Agesilaus afterwards in the
-  fate of Sphodrias, and the high encomium which he passed on the
-  general character of the latter,—are quite consistent with a
-  belief on his part that Sphodrias (like Phœbidas) may have done
-  wrong towards a foreign city from over-ambition in the service
-  of his country. But if Agesilaus (who detested the Thebans
-  beyond measure) had believed that Sphodrias was acting under the
-  influence of bribes from them, he would not merely have been
-  disposed to let justice take its course, but would have approved
-  and promoted the condemnation.
-
-  On a previous occasion (Hellen. iii, 5, 3) Xenophon had imputed
-  to the Thebans a similar refinement of stratagem; seemingly with
-  just as little cause.
-
-The presence of Sphodrias and his army in the Thriasian plain was
-communicated shortly after daybreak at Athens, where it excited
-no less terror than surprise. Every man instantly put himself
-under arms for defence; but news soon arrived that the invader had
-retired. When thus reassured, the Athenians passed from fear to
-indignation. The Lacedæmonian envoys, who were lodging at the house
-of Kallias the proxenus of Sparta, were immediately put under arrest
-and interrogated. But all three affirmed that they were not less
-astonished, and not less exasperated, by the march of Sphodrias, than
-the Athenians themselves; adding, by way of confirmation, that had
-they been really privy to any design of seizing the Peiræus, they
-would have taken care not to let themselves be found in the city,
-and in their ordinary lodging at the house of the proxenus, where
-of course their persons would be at once seized. They concluded by
-assuring the Athenians, that Sphodrias would not only be indignantly
-disavowed, but punished capitally, at Sparta. And their reply was
-deemed so satisfactory, that they were allowed to depart; while an
-Athenian embassy was sent to Sparta, to demand the punishment of the
-offending general.[209]
-
-  [209] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 22; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 24.
-
-The Ephors immediately summoned Sphodrias home to Sparta, to take
-his trial on a capital charge. So much did he himself despair of
-his case, that he durst not make his appearance; while the general
-impression was, both at Sparta and elsewhere, that he would certainly
-be condemned. Nevertheless, though thus absent and undefended, he was
-acquitted, purely through private favor and esteem for his general
-character. He was of the party of Kleombrotus, so that all the
-friends of that prince espoused his cause, as a matter of course.
-But as he was of the party opposed to Agesilaus, his friends dreaded
-that the latter would declare against him, and bring about his
-condemnation. Nothing saved Sphodrias except the peculiar intimacy
-between his son Kleonymus and Archidamus son of Agesilaus. The
-mournful importunity of Archidamus induced Agesilaus, when this
-important cause was brought before the Senate of Sparta, to put aside
-his judicial conviction, and give his vote in the following manner:
-“To be sure, Sphodrias is guilty; upon that there cannot be two
-opinions. Nevertheless, we cannot put to death a man like him, who,
-as boy, youth, and man, has stood unblemished in all Spartan honor.
-Sparta cannot part with soldiers like Sphodrias.[210]” The friends
-of Agesilaus, following this opinion and coinciding with those of
-Kleombrotus, ensured a favorable verdict. And it is remarkable,
-that Etymoklês himself, who as envoy at Athens had announced as a
-certainty that Sphodrias would be put to death,—as senator and friend
-of Agesilaus voted for his acquittal.[211]
-
-  [210] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 32. Ἐκεῖνός γε (Ἀγησίλαος) πρὸς πάντας
-  ὅσοις διείλεκται, ταῦτὰ λέγει· Μὴ ἀδικεῖν μὲν Σφοδρίαν ἀδύνατον
-  εἶναι· ὅστις μέντοι, παῖς τε ὢν καὶ παιδίσκος καὶ ἡβῶν, πάντα τὰ
-  καλὰ ποιῶν διετέλεσε, χαλεπὸν εἶναι τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα ἀποκτιννύναι·
-  τὴν γὰρ Σπάρτην τοιούτων δεῖσθαι στρατιωτῶν.
-
-  Xenophon explains at some length (v, 4, 25-33) and in a very
-  interesting manner, both the relations between Kleonymus and
-  Archidamus, and the appeal of Archidamus to his father. The
-  statement has all the air of being derived from personal
-  knowledge, and nothing but the fear of prolixity hinders me from
-  giving it in full.
-
-  Compare Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 25; Diodor. xv, 29.
-
-  [211] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 22-32.
-
-This remarkable incident (which comes to us from a witness not merely
-philo-Laconian, but also personally intimate with Agesilaus) shows
-how powerfully the course of justice at Sparta was overruled by
-private sympathy and interests,—especially, those of the two kings.
-It especially illustrates what has been stated in a former chapter
-respecting the oppressions exercised by the Spartan harmosts and the
-dekadarchies, for which no redress was attainable at Sparta. Here
-was a case where not only the guilt of Sphodrias stood confessed,
-but in which also his acquittal was sure to be followed by a war
-with Athens. If, under such circumstances, the Athenian demand for
-redress was overruled by the favor of the two kings, what chance
-was there of any justice to the complaint of a dependent city, or
-an injured individual, against the harmost? The contrast between
-Spartan and Athenian proceeding is also instructive. Only a few days
-before, the Athenians condemned, at the instance of Sparta, their two
-generals who had without authority lent aid to the Theban exiles.
-In so doing, the Athenian dikastery enforced the law against clear
-official misconduct,—and that, too, in a case where their sympathies
-went along with the act, though their fear of a war with Sparta was
-stronger. But the most important circumstance to note is, that at
-Athens there is neither private influence, nor kingly influence,
-capable of overruling the sincere judicial conscience of a numerous
-and independent dikastery.
-
-The result of the acquittal of Sphodrias must have been well known
-beforehand to all parties at Sparta. Even by the general voice
-of Greece, the sentence was denounced as iniquitous.[212] But
-the Athenians, who had so recently given strenuous effect to the
-remonstrances of Sparta against their own generals, were stung by
-it to the quick; and only the more stung, in consequence of the
-extraordinary compliments to Sphodrias on which the acquittal was
-made to turn. They immediately contracted hearty alliance with
-Thebes, and made vigorous preparations for war against Sparta both
-by land and sea. After completing the fortifications of Peiræus, so
-as to place it beyond the reach of any future attempt, they applied
-themselves to the building of new ships of war, and to the extension
-of their naval ascendency, at the expense of Sparta.[213]
-
-  [212] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 24.
-
-  [213] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 34-63.
-
-From this moment, a new combination began in Grecian politics. The
-Athenians thought the moment favorable to attempt the construction
-of a new confederacy, analogous to the Confederacy of Delos, formed
-a century before; the basis on which had been reared the formidable
-Athenian empire, lost at the close of the Peloponnesian war. Towards
-such construction there was so far a tendency, that Athens had
-already a small body of maritime allies; while rhetors like Isokrates
-(in his Panegyrical Discourse, published two years before) had been
-familiarizing the public mind with larger ideas. But the enterprise
-was now pressed with the determination and vehemence of men smarting
-under recent insult. The Athenians had good ground to build upon;
-since, while the discontent against the ascendency of Sparta was
-widely spread, the late revolution in Thebes had done much to lessen
-that sentiment of fear upon which such ascendency chiefly rested. To
-Thebes, the junction with Athens was preëminently welcome, and her
-leaders gladly enrolled their city as a constituent member of the
-new confederacy.[214] They cheerfully acknowledged the presidency of
-Athens,—reserving, however, tacitly or expressly, their own rights
-as presidents of the Bœotian federation, as soon as that could be
-reconstituted; which reconstitution was at this moment desirable even
-for Athens, seeing that the Bœotian towns were now dependent allies
-of Sparta under harmosts and oligarchies.
-
-  [214] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 34; Xen. de Vectigal. v, 7; Isokrates,
-  Or. xiv, (Plataic.) s. 20, 23, 37; Diodor. xv, 29.
-
-The Athenians next sent envoys round to the principal islands and
-maritime cities in the Ægean, inviting all of them to an alliance
-on equal and honorable terms. The principles were in the main the
-same as those upon which the confederacy of Delos had been formed
-against the Persians, almost a century before. It was proposed that
-a congress of deputies should meet at Athens, one from each city,
-small as well as great, each with one vote; that Athens should be
-president, yet each individual city autonomous; that a common fund
-should be raised, with a common naval force, through assessment
-imposed by this congress upon each, and applied as the same authority
-might prescribe; the general purpose being defined to be, maintenance
-of freedom and security from foreign aggression, to each confederate,
-by the common force of all. Care was taken to banish as much as
-possible those associations of tribute and subjection which rendered
-the recollection of the former Athenian empire unpopular.[215]
-And as there were many Athenian citizens, who, during those times
-of supremacy, had been planted out as kleruchs or out-settlers in
-various dependencies, but had been deprived of their properties at
-the close of the war,—it was thought necessary to pass a formal
-decree,[216] renouncing and barring all revival of these suspended
-rights. It was farther decreed that henceforward no Athenian should
-on any pretence hold property, either in house or land, in the
-territory of any one of the confederates; neither by purchase, nor
-as security for money lent, nor by any other mode of acquisition.
-Any Athenian infringing this law, was rendered liable to be informed
-against before the synod; who, on proof of the fact, were to deprive
-him of the property,—half of it going to the informer, half to the
-general purposes of the confederacy.
-
-  [215] The contribution was now called σύνταξις, not φόρος;
-  see Isokrates, De Pace, s. 37-46; Plutarch, Phokion, c. 7;
-  Harpokration, v. Σύνταξις.
-
-  Plutarch, De Fortunâ Athen. p. 351. ἰσόψηφον αὐτοῖς τὴν Ἑλλάδα
-  κατέστησαν.
-
-  [216] Isokrates, Or. xiv, (Plataic.) s. 47. Καὶ ~τῶν μὲν κτημάτων
-  τῶν ὑμετέρων αὐτῶν ἀπέστητε~, βουλόμενοι τὴν συμμαχίαν ὡς
-  μεγίστην ποιῆσαι, etc.
-
-  Diodor. xv, 28, 29. Ἐψηφίσαντο δὲ καὶ ~τὰς γενομένας κληρουχίας
-  ἀποκαταστῆσαι τοῖς πρότερον κυρίοις γεγονόσι~, καὶ νόμον ἔθεντο
-  μηδένα τῶν Ἀθηναίων γεωργεῖν ἐκτὸς τῆς Ἀττικῆς. Διὰ δὲ ταύτης
-  τῆς φιλανθρωπίας ἀνακτησάμενοι τὴν παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησιν εὔνοιαν,
-  ἰσχυροτέραν ἐποιήσαντο τὴν ἰδίαν ἡγεμονίαν.
-
-  Isokrates and Diodorus speak loosely of this vote, in language
-  which might make us imagine that it was one of distinct
-  restitution, giving back property _actually enjoyed_. But the
-  Athenians had never actually regained the outlying private
-  property lost at the close of the war, though they had much
-  desired it, and had cherished hopes that a favorable turn of
-  circumstances might enable them to effect the recovery. As the
-  recovery, if effected, would be at the cost of those whom they
-  were now soliciting as allies, the public and formal renunciation
-  of such rights was a measure of much policy, and contributed
-  greatly to appease uneasiness in the islands; though in point of
-  fact nothing was given up except rights to property not really
-  enjoyed.
-
-  An Inscription has recently been discovered at Athens, recording
-  the original Athenian decree, of which the main provisions
-  are mentioned in my text. It bears date in the archonship of
-  Nausinikus. It stands, with the restorations of M. Boeckh
-  (fortunately a portion of it has been found in tolerably good
-  preservation), in the Appendix to the new edition of his
-  work,—“Über die Staats-haushaltung der Athener—Verbesserungen und
-  Nachträge zu den drei Banden der Staats-haushaltung der Athener,”
-  p. xx.
-
-  Ἀπὸ δὲ Ναυσινίκου ἄρχοντος μὴ ἐξεῖναι μήτε ἰδίᾳ μήτε δημοσίᾳ
-  Ἀθηναίων μηδενὶ ἐγκτήσασθαι ἐν ταῖς τῶν συμμάχων χώραις μήτε
-  οἰκίαν μήτε χώριον, μήτε πριαμένῳ, μήτε ὑποθεμένῳ, μήτε ἄλλῳ
-  τρόπῳ μηδενί. Ἐὰν δέ τις ὠνῆται ἢ κτᾶται ἢ τίθηται τρόπῳ ὁτῳοῦν,
-  ἐξεῖναι τῷ βουλομένῳ τῶν συμμάχων φῆναι πρὸς τοὺς συνέδρους τῶν
-  συμμάχων. Οἱ δὲ σύνεδροι ἀπο- -μενοι ἀποδόντων [τὸ μὲν ἥ]μισυ
-  τῷ φῄναντι, τὸ δὲ ἄ[λλο κοιν]ὸν ἔστω τῶν συνμμάχων. Ἐὰν δέ τις
-  [ἴῃ] ἐπὶ πολέμῳ ἐπὶ τοὺς ποιησαμένους τὴν συμμαχίαν, ἢ κατὰ γῆν
-  ἢ κατὰ θάλασσαν, βοηθεῖν Ἀθηναίους καὶ τοὺς συμμάχους τούτοις καὶ
-  κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν παντὶ σθένει κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν. Ἐὰν δέ
-  τις εἴπῃ ἢ ἐπιψηφίσῃ, ἢ ἄρχων ἢ ἰδιώτης, παρὰ τόδε τὸ ψήφισμα,
-  ὡς λύειν τι δεῖ τῶν ἐν τῷδε τῷ ψηφίσματι εἰρημένων, ὑπαρχέτω μὲν
-  αὐτῷ ἀτίμῳ εἶναι, καὶ τὰ χρήματα αὐτοῦ δημόσια ἔστω καὶ τῆς θεοῦ
-  τὸ ἐπιδέκατον· καὶ κρινέσθω ἐν Ἀθηναίοις καὶ τοῖς συμμάχοις ὡς
-  διαλύων τὴν συμμαχίαν. Ζημιούντων δὲ αὐτὸν θανάτῳ ἢ φυγῇ ὅπου
-  Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ οἱ σύμμαχοι κρατοῦσι. Ἐὰν δὲ θανάτῳ τιμήθῃ, μὴ
-  ταφήτω ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ μηδὲ ἐν τῇ τῶν συμμάχων.
-
-  Then follows a direction, that the Secretary of the Senate of
-  Five Hundred shall inscribe the decree on a column of stone,
-  and place it by the side of the statue of Zeus Eleutherius;
-  with orders to the Treasurers of the goddess to disburse sixty
-  drachmas for the cost of so doing.
-
-  It appears that there is annexed to this Inscription a list of
-  such cities as had already joined the confederacy, together with
-  certain other names added afterwards, of cities which joined
-  subsequently. The Inscription itself directs such list to be
-  recorded,—εἰς δὲ τὴν στήλην ταύτην ἀναγράφειν τῶν τε οὐσῶν πόλεων
-  συμμαχίδων τὰ ὀνόματα, καὶ ἥτις ἂν ἄλλη σύμμαχος γίγνηται.
-
-  Unfortunately M. Boeckh has not annexed this list, which,
-  moreover, he states to have been preserved only in a very partial
-  and fragmentary condition. He notices only, as contained in it,
-  the towns of Poiessa and Korêsus in the island of Keos,—and
-  Antissa and Eresus in Lesbos; all four as autonomous communities.
-
-Such were the liberal principles of confederacy now proposed by
-Athens,—who, as a candidate for power, was straightforward and
-just, like the Herodotean Deiokês,[217]—and formally ratified, as
-well by the Athenians as by the general voice of the confederate
-deputies assembled within their walls. The formal decree and compact
-of alliance was inscribed on a stone column and placed by the side
-of the statue of Zeus Eleutherius or the Liberator; a symbol, of
-enfranchisement from Sparta accomplished, as well as of freedom to
-be maintained against Persia and other enemies.[218] Periodical
-meetings of the confederate deputies were provided to be held (how
-often, we do not know) at Athens, and the synod was recognized as
-competent judge of all persons, even Athenian citizens, charged with
-treason against the confederacy. To give fuller security to the
-confederates generally, it was provided in the original compact, that
-if any Athenian citizen should either speak, or put any question to
-the vote, in the Athenian assembly, contrary to the tenor of that
-document,—he should be tried before the synod for treason; and
-that, if found guilty, he might be condemned by them to the severest
-punishment.
-
-  [217] Herodot. i, 96. Ὁ δὲ, οἷα δὴ μνεώμενος ἀρχὴν, ἰθύς τε καὶ
-  δίκαιος ἦν.
-
-  [218] This is the sentiment connected with Ζεὺς
-  Ἐλευθέριος,—Pausanias the victor of Platæa, offers to Zeus
-  Eleutherius a solemn sacrifice and thanksgiving immediately
-  after the battle, in the agora of the town (Thucyd. ii, 71). So
-  the Syracusans immediately after the expulsion of the Gelonian
-  dynasty (Diodor. xi, 72)—and Mæandrius at Samos (Herodot. iii,
-  142).
-
-Three Athenian leaders stood prominent as commissioners in the
-first organization of the confederacy, and in the dealings with
-those numerous cities whose junction was to be won by amicable
-inducement,—Chabrias, Timotheus son of Konon, and Kallistratus.[219]
-
-  [219] Diodor. xv, 29.
-
-The first of the three is already known to the reader. He and
-Iphikrates were the most distinguished warriors whom Athens numbered
-among her citizens. But not having been engaged in any war, since
-the peace of Antalkidas in 387 B.C., she had had no need of their
-services; hence both of them had been absent from the city during
-much of the last nine years, and Iphikrates seems still to have
-been absent. At the time when that peace was concluded, Iphikrates
-was serving in the Hellespont and Thrace, Chabrias with Evagoras
-in Cyprus; each having been sent thither by Athens at the head of
-a body of mercenary peltasts. Instead of dismissing their troops,
-and returning to Athens as peaceful citizens, it was not less
-agreeable to the military tastes of these generals, than conducive
-to their importance and their profit, to keep together their bands,
-and to take foreign service. Accordingly, Chabrias had continued
-in service first in Cyprus, next with the native Egyptian king
-Akoris. The Persians, against whom he served, found his hostility so
-inconvenient, that Pharnabazus demanded of the Athenians to recall
-him, on pain of the Great King’s displeasure; and requested at the
-same time that Iphikrates might be sent to aid the Persian satraps
-in organizing a great expedition against Egypt. The Athenians, to
-whom the goodwill of Persia was now of peculiar importance, complied
-on both points; recalled Chabrias, who thus became disposable for
-the Athenian service,[220] and despatched Iphikrates to take command
-along with the Persians.
-
-  [220] Diodor. xv, 29.
-
-Iphikrates, since the peace of Antalkidas, had employed his peltasts
-in the service of the kings of Thrace: first of Seuthes, near the
-shores of the Propontis, whom he aided in the recovery of certain
-lost dominions,—next of Kotys, whose favor he acquired, and whose
-daughter he presently married.[221] Not only did he enjoy great
-scope for warlike operations and plunder, among the “butter-eating
-Thracians,”[222]—but he also acquired, as dowry, a large stock of
-such produce as Thracian princes had at their disposal, together
-with a boon even more important,—a seaport village not far from the
-mouth of the Hebrus, called Drys, where he established a fortified
-post, and got together a Grecian colony dependent on himself.[223]
-Miltiades, Alkibiades, and other eminent Athenians had done the same
-thing before him; though Xenophon had refused a similar proposition
-when made to him by the earlier Seuthes.[224] Iphikrates thus became
-a great man in Thrace, yet by no means abandoning his connection with
-Athens, but making his position in each subservient to his importance
-in the other. While he was in a situation to favor the projects of
-Athenian citizens for mercantile and territorial acquisitions in the
-Chersonese and other parts of Thrace,—he could also lend the aid of
-Athenian naval and military art, not merely to princes in Thrace,
-but to others even beyond those limits,—since we learn that Amyntas
-king of Macedonia became so attached or indebted to him as to adopt
-him for his son.[225] When sent by the Athenians to Persia, at the
-request of Pharnabazus (about 378 B.C. apparently), Iphikrates had
-fair ground for anticipating that a career yet more lucrative was
-opening before him.[226]
-
-  [221] Cornel. Nepos, Iphicrates, c. 2; Chabrias, c. 2, 3.
-
-  [222] See an interesting Fragment (preserved by Athenæus, iv,
-  p. 131) of the comedy called _Protesilaus_—by the Athenian poet
-  Anaxandrides (Meineke, Comic. Græc. Frag. iii, p. 182). It
-  contains a curious description of the wedding of Iphikrates with
-  the daughter of Kotys in Thrace; enlivened by an abundant banquet
-  and copious draughts of wine given to crowds of Thracians in the
-  market-place:—
-
-      δειπνεῖν δ’ ~ἄνδρας βουτυροφάγας~
-      αὐχμηροκόμας μυριοπληθεῖς, etc.,
-
-  brazen vessels as large as wine vats, full of broth,—Kotys
-  himself girt round, and serving the broth in a golden basin,
-  then going about to taste all the bowls of wine and water ready
-  mixed, until he was himself the first man intoxicated. Iphikrates
-  brought from Athens several of the best players on the harp and
-  flute.
-
-  The distinction between the _butter_ eaten, or rubbed on the
-  skin, by the Thracians, and the _olive-oil_ habitually consumed
-  in Greece, deserves notice. The word αὐχμηροκόμας seems to
-  indicate the absence of those scented unguents which, at the
-  banquet of Greeks, would have been applied to the hair of the
-  guests, giving to it a shining gloss and moisture. It appears
-  that the Lacedæmonian women, however, sometimes anointed
-  themselves with butter, and not with oil; see Plutarch, adv.
-  Koloten, p. 1109 B.
-
-  The number of warlike stratagems in Thrace, ascribed to
-  Iphikrates by Polyænus and other Tactic writers, indicates that
-  his exploits there were renowned as well as long-continued.
-
-  [223] Theopomp. Fragm. 175, ed. Didot; Demosth. cont. Aristokrat.
-  p. 664.
-
-  [224] Xenoph. Anab. vii, 2, 38; vii, 5, 8; vii, 6, 43. Xen.
-  Hellen. i, 5, 17; Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 36.
-
-  See also a striking passage (in Lysias Orat. xxviii, cont.
-  Ergokl. s. 5) about the advice given to Thrasybulus by a
-  discontented fellow-citizen, to seize Byzantium, marry the
-  daughter of Seuthes, and defy Athens.
-
-  [225] Æschines, Fals. Leg. c. 13. p. 249.
-
-  At what time this adoption took place, we cannot distinctly
-  make out; Amyntas died in 370 B.C., while from 378-371 B.C.,
-  Iphikrates seems to have been partly on service with the Persian
-  satraps, partly in command of the Athenian fleet in the Ionian
-  Sea (see Rehdantz, Vitæ Iphicratis, etc. ch. 4). Therefore, the
-  adoption took place at some time between 387-378 B.C.; perhaps
-  after the restoration of Amyntas to his maritime dominions by
-  the Lacedæmonian expedition against Olynthus—382-380 B.C.
-  Amyntas was so weak and insecure, from the Thessalians, and
-  other land-neighbors (see Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 657. s.
-  112), that it was much to his advantage to cultivate the favor
-  of a warlike Athenian established on the Thracian coast, like
-  Iphikrates.
-
-  [226] From these absences of men like Iphikrates and Chabrias,
-  a conclusion has been drawn severely condemning the Athenian
-  people. They were so envious and ill-tempered (it has been said),
-  that none of their generals could live with comfort at Athens;
-  all lived abroad as they could. Cornelius Nepos (Chabrias, c. 3)
-  makes the remark, borrowed originally from Theopompus (Fr. 117,
-  ed. Didot), and transcribed by many modern commentators as if
-  it were exact and literal truth—“Hoc Chabrias nuntio (i. e. on
-  being recalled from Egypt, in consequence of the remonstrance of
-  Pharnabazus) Athenas rediit neque ibi diutius est moratus quam
-  fuit necesse. Non enim libenter erat ante oculos civium suorum,
-  quod et vivebat laute, et indulgebat sibi liberalius, quam ut
-  invidiam vulgi posset effugere. Est enim hoc commune vitium in
-  magnis liberisque civitatibus, ut invidia gloriæ comes sit, et
-  libenter de his detrahant, quos eminere videant altius; neque
-  animo æquo pauperes alienam opulentium intuentur fortunam. Itaque
-  Chabrias, quoad ei licebat, plurimum aberat. Neque vero solus
-  ille aberat Athenis libenter, sed omnes fere principes fecerunt
-  idem, quod tantum se ab invidiâ putabant abfuturos, quantum a
-  conspectu suorum recessissent. Itaque Conon plurimum Cypri vixit,
-  Iphicrates in Thraciâ, Timotheus Lesbi, Chares in Sigeo.”
-
-  That the people of Athens, among other human frailties, had their
-  fair share of envy and jealousy, is not to be denied; but that
-  these attributes belonged to them in a marked or peculiar manner,
-  cannot (in my judgment) be shown by any evidence extant,—and most
-  assuredly is not shown by the evidence here alluded to.
-
-  “Chabrias was fond of a life of enjoyment and luxurious
-  indulgence.” If instead of being an Athenian, he had been a
-  Spartan, he would undoubtedly have been compelled to expatriate
-  in order to gratify this taste; for it was the express drift and
-  purpose of the Spartan discipline, not to equalize property,
-  but to equalize the habits, enjoyments, and personal toils,
-  of the rich and poor. This is a point which the admirers of
-  Lykurgus,—Xenophon and Plutarch,—attest not less clearly than
-  Thucydides, Plato, Aristotle, and others. If then it were
-  considered a proof of envy and ill-temper, to debar rich men
-  from spending their money in procuring enjoyments, we might
-  fairly consider the reproach as made out against Lykurgus and
-  Sparta. Not so against Athens. There was no city in Greece
-  where the means of luxurious and comfortable living were more
-  abundantly exhibited for sale, nor where a rich man was more
-  perfectly at liberty to purchase them. Of this the proofs are
-  everywhere to be found. Even the son of this very Chabrias,
-  Ktesippus, who inherited the appetite for enjoyment, without the
-  greater qualities of his father,—found the means of gratifying
-  his appetite so unfortunately easy at Athens, that he wasted
-  his whole substance in such expenses (Plutarch, Phokion, c. 7;
-  Athenæus, iv, p. 165). And Chares was even better liked at Athens
-  in consequence of his love of enjoyment and license,—if we are to
-  believe another Fragment (238) of the same Theopompus.
-
-  The allegation of Theopompus and Nepos, therefore, is neither
-  true as matter of fact, nor sufficient, if it had been true, to
-  sustain the hypothesis of a malignant Athenian public, with which
-  they connect it. Iphikrates and Chabrias did not stay away from
-  Athens because they loved enjoyments or feared the envy of their
-  countrymen; but because both of them were large gainers by doing
-  so, in importance, in profit, and in tastes. Both of them were
-  men πολεμικοὶ καὶ φιλοπόλεμοι ἐσχάτως (to use an expression of
-  Xenophon respecting the Lacedæmonian Klearchus—Anab. ii, 6, 1);
-  both of them loved war and had great abilities for war,—qualities
-  quite compatible with strong appetite for enjoyment; while
-  neither of them had either taste or talent for the civil routine
-  and debate of Athens when at peace. Besides, each of them was
-  commander of a body of peltasts, through whose means he could
-  obtain lucrative service as well as foreign distinction; so that
-  we can assign a sufficient reason why both of them preferred to
-  be absent from Athens during most part of the nine years that
-  the peace of Antalkidas continued. Afterwards, Iphikrates was
-  abroad three or four years, in service with the Persian satraps,
-  by order of the Athenians; Chabrias also went a long time
-  afterwards, again on foreign service, to Egypt, at the same time
-  when the Spartan king Agesilaus was there (yet without staying
-  long away, since we find him going out on command from Athens
-  to the Chersonese in 359-358 B.C.—Demosth. cont. Aristokr. p.
-  677, s. 204); but neither he nor Agesilaus, went there to escape
-  the mischief of envious countrymen. Demosthenes does not talk of
-  Iphikrates as being uncomfortable in Athens, or anxious to get
-  out of it; see Orat. cont. Meidiam, p. 535, s. 83.
-
-  Again, as to the case of Konon and his residence in Cyprus; it
-  is truly surprising to see this fact cited as an illustration of
-  Athenian jealousy or ill-temper. Konon went to Cyprus immediately
-  after the disaster of Ægospotami, and remained there, or remained
-  away from Athens, for eleven years (405-393 B.C.) until the
-  year after his victory at Knidus. It will be recollected that
-  he was one of the six Athenian generals who commanded the fleet
-  at Ægospotami. That disaster, while it brought irretrievable
-  ruin upon Athens, was at the same time such as to brand with
-  well-merited infamy the generals commanding. Konon was so far
-  less guilty than his colleagues, as he was in a condition to
-  escape with eight ships when the rest were captured. But he could
-  not expect, and plainly did not expect, to be able to show his
-  face again in Athens, unless he could redeem the disgrace by some
-  signal fresh service. He nobly paid this debt to his country,
-  by the victory of Knidus in 394 B.C.; and then came back the
-  year afterwards, to a grateful and honorable welcome at Athens.
-  About a year or more after this, he went out again as envoy to
-  Persia in the service of his country. He was there seized and
-  imprisoned by the satrap Tiribazus, but contrived to make his
-  escape, and died at Cyprus, as it would appear, about 390 B.C.
-  Nothing therefore can be more unfounded than the allegation of
-  Theopompus, “that Konon lived abroad at Cyprus, because he was
-  afraid of undeserved ill-temper from the public at Athens.” For
-  what time Timotheus may have lived at Lesbos, we have no means of
-  saying. But from the year 370 B.C. down to his death, we hear of
-  him so frequently elsewhere, in the service of his country, that
-  his residence cannot have been long.
-
-Iphikrates being thus abroad, the Athenians joined with Chabrias, in
-the mission and measures for organizing their new confederacy, two
-other colleagues, of whom we now hear for the first time—Timotheus
-son of Konon, and Kallistratus the most celebrated orator of
-his time.[227] The abilities of Kallistratus were not military
-at all; while Timotheus and Chabrias were men of distinguished
-military merit. But in acquiring new allies and attracting deputies
-to her proposed congress, Athens stood in need of persuasive
-appeal, conciliatory dealing, and substantial fairness in all
-her propositions, not less than of generalship. We are told that
-Timotheus, doubtless as son of the liberator Konon, from the
-recollections of the battle of Knidus—was especially successful in
-procuring new adhesions; and probably Kallistratus,[228] going round
-with him to the different islands, contributed by his eloquence
-not a little to the same result. On their invitation, many cities
-entered as confederates.[229] At this time (as in the earlier
-confederacy of Delos) all who joined must have been unconstrained
-members. And we may understand the motives of their junction, when
-we read the picture drawn by Isokrates (in 380 B.C.) of the tyranny
-of the Persians on the Asiatic mainland, threatening, to absorb the
-neighboring islands. Not only was there now a new basis of imposing
-force, presented by Athens and Thebes in union—but there was also
-a wide-spread hatred of imperial Sparta, aggravated since her
-perversion of the pretended boon of autonomy, promised by the peace
-of Antalkidas; and the conjunction of these sentiments caused the
-Athenian mission of invitation to be extremely successful. All the
-cities in Eubœa (except Histiæa, at the north of the island)—as well
-as Chios, Mitylênê, Byzantium, and Rhodes—the three former of whom
-had continued favorably inclined to Athens ever since the peace of
-Antalkidas,[230]—all entered into the confederacy. An Athenian fleet
-under Chabrias, sailing among the Cyclades and the other islands of
-the Ægean, aided in the expulsion of the Lacedæmonian harmosts,[231]
-together with their devoted local oligarchies, wherever they still
-subsisted; and all the cities thus liberated became equal members of
-the newly-constituted congress at Athens. After a certain interval,
-there came to be not less than seventy cities, many of them
-separately powerful, which sent deputies to it;[232] an aggregate
-sufficient to intimidate Sparta, and even to flatter Athens with the
-hope of restoration to something like her former lustre.
-
-  [227] Æschines, Fals. Leg. c. 40, p. 283.
-
-  [228] The employment of the new word συντάξεις, instead
-  of the unpopular term φόρους, is expressly ascribed to
-  Kallistratus,—Harpokration in Voce.
-
-  [229] Isokrates gives the number twenty-four cities (Or. xv,
-  Permut. s. 120). So also Deinarchus cont. Demosthen. s. 15;
-  cont. Philokl. s. 17. The statement of Æschines, that Timotheus
-  brought seventy-five cities into the confederacy, appears large,
-  and must probably include all that that general either acquired
-  or captured (Æsch. Fals. Leg. c. 24, p. 263). Though I think
-  the number twenty-four probable enough, yet it is difficult
-  to identify what towns they were. For Isokrates, so far as he
-  particularizes, includes Samos, Sestos, and Krithôtê, which were
-  not acquired until many years afterwards,—in 366-365 B.C.
-
-  Neither of these orators distinguish between those cities which
-  Timotheus brought or persuaded to come into the confederacy, when
-  it was first formed (among which we may reckon Eubœa, or most
-  part of it—Plutarch, De Glor. Athen. p. 351 A.)—from those others
-  which he afterwards took by siege, like Samos.
-
-  [230] Isokrates, Or. xiv, Plataic. s. 30.
-
-  [231] Isokrates, Or. xiv, (Plat.) s. 20. Οἱ μὲν γὰρ ὑφ’ ὑμῶν κατὰ
-  κράτος ἁλόντες εὐθὺς μὲν ἁρμοστοῦ καὶ δουλείας ἀπηλλάγησαν, νῦν
-  δὲ τοῦ συνεδρίου καὶ τῆς ἐλευθερίας μετέχουσιν, etc.
-
-  The adverb of time here used indicates about 372 B.C., about a
-  year before the battle of Leuktra.
-
-  [232] Diodor. xv, 30.
-
-The first votes both of Athens herself, and of the newly-assembled
-congress, threatened war upon the largest scale. A resolution was
-passed to equip twenty thousand hoplites, five hundred horsemen, and
-two hundred triremes.[233] Probably the insular and Ionic deputies
-promised each a certain contribution of money, but nothing beyond.
-We do not, however, know how much,—nor how far the engagements,
-large or small, were realized,—nor whether Athens was authorized to
-enforce execution against defaulters,—or was in circumstances to act
-upon such authority, if granted to her by the congress. It was in
-this way (as the reader will recollect from my fifth volume) that
-Athens had first rendered herself unpopular in the confederacy of
-Delos,—by enforcing the resolutions of the confederate synod against
-evasive or seceding members. It was in this way that what was at
-first a voluntary association had ultimately slid into an empire
-by constraint. Under the new circumstances of 378 B.C., we may
-presume that the confederates, though ardent and full of promises
-on first assembling at Athens, were even at the outset not exact,
-and became afterwards still less exact, in performance; yet that
-Athens was forced to be reserved in claiming, or in exercising,
-the right of enforcement. To obtain a vote of contribution by the
-majority of deputies present, was only the first step in the process;
-to obtain punctual payment, when the Athenian fleet was sent round
-for the purpose of collecting,—yet without incurring dangerous
-unpopularity,—was the second step, but by far the most doubtful and
-difficult.
-
-  [233] Diodor. xv, 29.
-
-  Polybius (ii, 62) states that the Athenians _sent out_ (not
-  merely, _voted_ to send out) ten thousand hoplites, and manned
-  one hundred triremes.
-
-  Both these authors treat the resolution as if it were taken by
-  the Athenians alone; but we must regard it in conjunction with
-  the newly-assembled synod of allies.
-
-It must, however, be borne in mind that at this moment, when the
-confederacy was first formed, both Athens and the other cities
-came together from a spontaneous impulse of hearty mutuality and
-coöperation. A few years afterwards, we shall find this changed;
-Athens selfish, and the confederates reluctant.[234] Inflamed, as
-well by their position of renovated headship, as by fresh animosity
-against Sparta, the Athenians made important efforts of their own,
-both financial and military. Equipping a fleet, which for the time
-was superior in the Ægean, they ravaged the hostile territory of
-Histiæa in Eubœa, and annexed to their confederacy the islands of
-Peparêthus and Skiathus. They imposed upon themselves also a direct
-property-tax; to what amount, however, we do not know.
-
-  [234] Xen. De Vectigal. v, 6. οὔκουν καὶ τότ’, ἐπεὶ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν
-  ἀπεσχόμεθα, πάλιν ~ὑπὸ τῶν νησιωτῶν ἑκόντων προστάται~ τοῦ
-  ναυτικοῦ ἐγενόμεθα;
-
-  In the early years of this confederacy, votive offerings of
-  wreaths or crowns, in token of gratitude to Athens, were decreed
-  by the Eubœans, as well as by the general body of allies. These
-  crowns were still to be seen thirty years afterwards at Athens,
-  with commemorative inscriptions (Demosthen. cont. Androtion. c.
-  21, p. 616; cont. Timokrat. c. 41, p. 756).
-
-It was on the occasion of this tax that they introduced a great
-change in the financial arrangements and constitution of the city;
-a change conferring note upon the archonship of Nausinikus, (B.C.
-378-377). The great body of substantial Athenian citizens as well as
-metics were now classified anew for purposes of taxation. It will
-be remembered that even from the time of Solon[235] the citizens of
-Athens had been distributed into four classes,—Pentakosiomedimni,
-Hippeis, Zeugitæ, Thêtes,—distinguished from each other by the
-amount of their respective properties. Of these Solonian classes,
-the fourth, or poorest, paid no direct taxes; while the three former
-were taxed according to assessments representing a certain proportion
-of their actual property. The taxable property of the richest (or
-Pentakosiomedimni, including all at or above the minimum income of
-five hundred medimni of corn per annum) was entered in the tax-book
-at a sum equal to twelve times their income; that of the Hippeis
-(comprising all who possessed between three hundred and five hundred
-medimni of annual income) at ten times their income; that of the
-Zeugitæ (or possessors of an annual income between two hundred and
-three hundred medimni) at five times their income. A medimnus of
-corn was counted as equivalent to a drachma; which permitted the
-application of this same class-system to movable property as well
-as to land. So that, when an actual property-tax (or _eisphora_)
-was imposed, it operated as an equal or proportional tax, so far as
-regarded all the members of the same class; but as a graduated or
-progressive tax, upon all the members of the richer class as compared
-with those of the poorer.
-
-  [235] For the description of the Solonian census, see Vol. III,
-  Ch. xi, p. 117, of this History.
-
-The three Solonian property-classes above named appear to have
-lasted, though probably not without modifications, down to the
-close of the Peloponnesian war; and to have been in great part
-preserved, after the renovation of the democracy in B.C. 403,
-during the archonship of Eukleides.[236] Though eligibility to the
-great offices of state had before that time ceased to be dependent
-on pecuniary qualification, it was still necessary to possess some
-means of distinguishing the wealthier citizens, not merely in case
-of direct taxation being imposed, but also because the liability to
-serve in liturgies or burdensome offices was consequent on a man’s
-enrolment as possessor of more than a given minimum of property. It
-seems, therefore, that the Solonian census, in its main principles
-of classification and graduation, was retained. Each man’s property
-being valued, he was ranged in one of three or more classes according
-to its amount. For each of the classes, a fixed proportion of taxable
-capital to each man’s property was assumed, and each was entered in
-the schedule, not for his whole property, but for the sum of taxable
-capital corresponding to his property, according to the proportion
-assumed. In the first or richest class, the taxable capital bore a
-greater ratio to the actual property than in the less rich; in the
-second, a greater ratio than in the third. The sum of all these items
-of taxable capital, in all the different classes, set opposite to
-each man’s name in the schedule, constituted the aggregate census
-of Attica; upon which all direct property-tax was imposed, in equal
-proportion upon every man.
-
-  [236] This is M. Boeckh’s opinion, seemingly correct, as far
-  as can be made out on a subject very imperfectly known (Public
-  Economy of Athens, B, iv, ch. 5).
-
-Respecting the previous modifications in the register of taxable
-property, or the particulars of its distribution into classes, which
-had been introduced in 403 B.C. at the archonship of Eukleides, we
-have no information. Nor can we make out how large or how numerous
-were the assessments of direct property-tax, imposed at Athens
-between that archonship and the archonship of Nausinikus in 378
-B.C. But at this latter epoch the register was again considerably
-modified, at the moment when Athens was bracing herself up for
-increased exertions. A new valuation was made of the property of
-every man possessing property to the amount of twenty-five minæ
-(or twenty-five hundred drachmæ) and upwards. Proceeding upon this
-valuation, every one was entered in the schedule for a sum of taxable
-capital equal to a given fraction of what he possessed. But this
-fraction was different in each of the different classes. How many
-classes there were, we do not certainly know; nor can we tell, except
-in reference to the lowest class taxed, what sum was taken as the
-minimum for any one of them. There could hardly have been less,
-however, than three classes, and there may probably have been four.
-But respecting the first or richest class, we know that each man was
-entered in the schedule for a taxable capital equal to one-fifth of
-his estimated property; and that possessors of fifteen talents were
-included in it. The father of Demosthenes died in this year, and the
-boy Demosthenes was returned by his guardians to the first class, as
-possessor of fifteen talents; upon which his name was entered on the
-schedule with a taxable capital of three talents set against him;
-being one-fifth of his actual property. The taxable capital of the
-second class was entered at a fraction less than one-fifth of their
-actual property (probably enough, one-sixth, the same as all the
-registered metics); that of the third, at a fraction still smaller;
-of the fourth (if there was a fourth), even smaller than the third.
-This last class descended down to the minimum of twenty-five minæ, or
-twenty-five hundred drachmæ; below which no account was taken.[237]
-
-  [237] Demosthen. cont. Aphob. i, p. 815, 816; cont. Aphob. ii, p.
-  836; cont. Aphob. de Perjur. p. 862. Compare Boeckh, Publ. Econ.
-  Ath. iv, 7.
-
-  In the exposition which M. Boeckh gives of the new
-  property-schedule introduced under the archonship of Nausinikus,
-  he inclines to the hypothesis of four distinct Classes, thus
-  distributed (p. 671 of the new edition of his Staats-haushaltung
-  der Athener):—
-
-  1. The first class included all persons who possessed property to
-  the value of twelve talents and upwards. They were entered on the
-  schedule, each for one-fifth, or twenty per cent. of his property.
-
-  2. The second class comprised all who possessed property to
-  the amount of six talents, but below twelve talents. Each was
-  enrolled in the schedule, for the amount of sixteen per cent.
-  upon his property.
-
-  3. The third class included all whose possessions amounted to the
-  value of two talents, but did not reach six talents. Each was
-  entered in the schedule at the figure of twelve per cent. upon
-  his property.
-
-  4. The fourth class comprised all, from the minimum of
-  twenty-five minæ, but below the maximum of two talents. Each was
-  entered in the schedule for the amount of eight per cent. upon
-  his property.
-
-  This detail rests upon no positive proof; but it serves to
-  illustrate the principle of distribution, and of graduation, then
-  adopted.
-
-Besides the taxable capitals of the citizens, thus graduated, the
-schedule also included those of the metics or resident aliens; who
-were each enrolled (without any difference of greater or smaller
-property, above twenty-five minæ) at a taxable capital equal to
-one-sixth of his actual property;[238] being a proportion less than
-the richest class of citizens, and probably equal to the second
-class in order of wealth. All these items summed up amounted to
-five thousand seven hundred and fifty or six thousand talents,[239]
-forming the aggregate schedule of taxable property; that is,
-something near about six thousand talents. A property-tax was no part
-of the regular ways and means of the state. It was imposed only on
-special occasions; and whenever it was imposed, it was assessed upon
-this schedule,—every man, rich or poor, being rated equally according
-to his taxable capital as there entered. A property-tax of one per
-cent. would thus produce sixty talents; two per cent., one hundred
-and twenty talents, etc. It is highly probable that the exertions of
-Athens during the archonship of Nausinikus, when this new schedule
-was first prepared, may have caused a property-tax to be then
-imposed, but we do not know to what amount.[240]
-
-  [238] Demosthen. cont. Androtion. p. 612, c. 17. τὸ ἑκτὸν μέρος
-  εἰσφέρειν μετὰ τῶν μετοίκων.
-
-  [239] Polybius states the former sum (ii, 62), Demosthenes the
-  latter (De Symmoriis, p. 183, c. 6). Boeckh however has shown,
-  that Polybius did not correctly conceive what the sum which he
-  stated really meant.
-
-  [240] I am obliged again, upon this point, to dissent from
-  M. Boeckh, who sets it down as positive matter of fact that
-  a property-tax of five per cent., amounting to three hundred
-  talents, was imposed and levied in the archonship of Nausinikus
-  (Publ. Econ. Ath. iv, 7, 8; p. 517-521, Eng. Transl.). The
-  evidence upon which this is asserted, is, a passage of
-  Demosthenes cont. Androtion. (p. 606. c. 14). Ὑμῖν ~παρὰ τὰς
-  εἰσφορὰς τὰς ἀπὸ Ναυσινίκου~, παρ’ ἴσως τάλαντα τριακόσια ἢ
-  μικρῷ πλείω, ἔλλειμμα τέτταρα καὶ δέκα ἐστὶ τάλαντα· ὧν ἑπτὰ
-  οὗτος (Androtion) εἰσέπραξεν. Now these words imply,—not that
-  a property-tax of about three hundred talents had been levied
-  or called for _during_ the archonship of Nausinikus, but—that
-  a total sum of three hundred talents, or thereabouts, had been
-  levied (or called for) by all the various property-taxes imposed
-  _from the archonship of Nausinikus down to the date of the
-  speech_. The oration was spoken about 355 B.C.; the archonship
-  of Nausinikus was in 378 B.C. What the speaker affirms,
-  therefore, is, that a sum of three hundred talents had been
-  levied or called for by all the various property-taxes imposed
-  between these two dates; and that the aggregate sum of arrears
-  due upon all of them, at the time when Androtion entered upon his
-  office, was fourteen talents.
-
-  Taylor, indeed, in his note, thinking that the sum of three
-  hundred talents is very small, as the aggregate of all
-  property-taxes imposed for twenty-three years, suggests that
-  it might be proper to read ~ἐπὶ~ Ναυσινίκου instead of ~ἀπὸ~
-  Ναυσινίκου; and I presume that M. Boeckh adopts that reading.
-  But it would be unsafe to found an historical assertion upon
-  such a change of text, even if the existing text were more
-  indefensible than it actually is. And surely the plural number
-  τὰς εἰσφορὰς proves that the orator has in view, not the single
-  property-tax imposed in the archonship of Nausinikus, but two
-  or more property-taxes, imposed at different times. Besides,
-  Androtion devoted himself to the collection of outstanding
-  arrears generally, in whatever year they might have accrued. He
-  would have no motive to single out those which had accrued in
-  the year 378 B.C.; moreover, those arrears would probably have
-  become confounded with others, long before 355 B.C. Demosthenes
-  selects the year of Nausinikus as his initial period, because it
-  was then that the new schedule and a new reckoning, began.
-
-Along with this new schedule of taxable capital, a new distribution
-of the citizens now took place into certain bodies called Symmories.
-As far as we can make out, on a very obscure subject, it seems that
-these Symmories were twenty in number, two to each tribe; that each
-contained sixty citizens, thus making one thousand two hundred in
-all; that these one thousand two hundred were the wealthiest citizens
-of the schedule,—containing, perhaps, the two first out of the four
-classes enrolled. Among these one thousand two hundred, however, the
-three hundred wealthiest stood out as a separate body; thirty from
-each tribe. These three hundred were the wealthiest men in the city,
-and were called “the leaders or chiefs of the Symmories.” The three
-hundred and the twelve hundred corresponded, speaking roughly, to
-the old Solonian classes of Pentakosiomedimni and Hippeis; of which
-latter class there had also been twelve hundred, at the beginning of
-the Peloponnesian war.[241] The liturgies, or burdensome and costly
-offices, were discharged principally by the Three Hundred, but partly
-also by the Twelve Hundred. It would seem that the former was a body
-essentially fluctuating, and that after a man had been in it for
-some time, discharging the burdens belonging to it, the Stratêgi
-or Generals suffered him to be mingled with the Twelve Hundred,
-and promoted one of the latter body to take his place in the Three
-Hundred. As between man and man, too, the Attic law always admitted
-the process called Antidosis, or Exchange of Property. Any citizen
-who believed himself to have been overcharged with costly liturgies,
-and that another citizen, as rich or richer than himself, had not
-borne his fair share,—might, if saddled with a new liturgy, require
-the other to undertake it in his place; and in case of refusal, might
-tender to him an exchange of properties, under an engagement that he
-would undertake the new charge, if the property of the other were
-made over to him.
-
-  [241] Respecting the Symmories, compare Boeckh,
-  Staats-haushaltung der Athener, iv, 9, 10; Schömann, Antiq. Jur.
-  Publ. Græcor. s. 78; Parreidt, De Symmoriis, p. 18 _seq._
-
-It is to be observed, that besides the twelve hundred wealthiest
-citizens who composed the Symmories, there were a more considerable
-number of less wealthy citizens not included in them, yet still
-liable to the property-tax; persons who possessed property from the
-minimum of twenty-five minæ, up to some maximum that we do not know,
-at which point the Symmories began,—and who corresponded, speaking
-loosely, to the third class or Zeugitæ of the Solonian census.
-The two Symmories of each tribe (comprising its one hundred and
-twenty richest members) superintended the property-register of each
-tribe, and collected the contributions due from its less wealthy
-registered members. Occasionally, when the state required immediate
-payment, the thirty richest men in each tribe (making up altogether
-the three hundred) advanced the whole sum of tax chargeable upon
-the tribe, having their legal remedy of enforcement against the
-other members for the recovery of the sum chargeable upon each. The
-richest citizens were thus both armed with rights and charged with
-duties, such as had not belonged to them before the archonship of
-Nausinikus. By their intervention (it was supposed) the schedule
-would be kept nearer to the truth as respects the assessment on each
-individual, while the sums actually imposed would be more immediately
-forthcoming, than if the state directly interfered by officers of
-its own. Soon after, the system of the Symmories was extended to the
-trierarchy; a change which had not at first been contemplated. Each
-Symmory had its chiefs, its curators, its assessors, acting under the
-general presidency of the Stratêgi. Twenty-five years afterwards, we
-also find Demosthenes (then about thirty years of age) recommending a
-still more comprehensive application of the same principle, so that
-men, money, ships, and all the means and forces of the state, might
-thus be parcelled into distinct fractions, and consigned to distinct
-Symmories, each with known duties of limited extent for the component
-persons to perform, and each exposed not merely to legal process,
-but also to loss of esteem, in the event of non-performance. It will
-rather appear, however, that, in practice, the system of Symmories
-came to be greatly abused, and to produce pernicious effects never
-anticipated.
-
-At present, however, I only notice this new financial and political
-classification introduced in 378 B.C., as one evidence of the ardor
-with which Athens embarked in her projected war against Sparta. The
-feeling among her allies, the Thebans, was no less determined. The
-government of Leontiades and the Spartan garrison had left behind
-it so strong an antipathy, that the large majority of citizens,
-embarking heartily in the revolution against them, lent themselves
-to all the orders of Pelopidas and his colleagues; who, on their
-part, had no other thought but to repel the common enemy. The Theban
-government now became probably democratical in form; and still more
-democratical in spirit, from the unanimous ardor pervading the
-whole mass. Its military force was put under the best training; the
-most fertile portion of the plain north of Thebes, from which the
-chief subsistence of the city came, was surrounded by a ditch and
-a palisade,[242] to repel the expected Spartan invasion; and the
-memorable Sacred Band was now for the first time organized. This was
-a brigade of three hundred hoplites, called the Lochus, or regiment
-of the city, as being consecrated to the defence of the Kadmeia, or
-acropolis.[243] It was put under constant arms and training, at the
-public expense, like the Thousand at Argos, of whom mention was made
-in my seventh volume.[244] It consisted of youthful citizens from the
-best families, distinguished for their strength and courage amidst
-the severe trials of the palæstra in Thebes, and was marshalled in
-such manner, that each pair of neighboring soldiers were at the same
-time intimate friends; so that the whole band were thus kept together
-by ties which no dangers could sever. At first its destination, under
-Gorgidas its commander (as we see by the select Three Hundred who
-fought in 424 B.C. at the battle of Delium),[245] was to serve as
-front rank men, for the general body of hoplites to follow. But from
-a circumstance to be mentioned presently, it came to be employed by
-Pelopidas and Epaminondas as a regiment by itself, and in a charge
-was then found irresistible.[246]
-
-  [242] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 38.
-
-  [243] Plutarch. Pelopid. c. 18, 19.
-
-  [244] Hist. of Greece. Vol. VII, ch. lv, p. 11.
-
-  [245] Diodor. xii, 70.
-
-  These pairs of neighbors who fought side by side at Delium, were
-  called Heniochi and Parabatæ,—Charioteers and Side Companions; a
-  name borrowed from the analogy of chariot-fighting, as described
-  in the Iliad and probably in many of the lost epic poems; the
-  charioteer being himself an excellent warrior, though occupied
-  for the moment with other duties,—Diomedes and Sthenelus,
-  Pandarus and Æneas, Patroklus and Automedon, etc.
-
-  [246] Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 18, 19.
-
-  Ὁ συνταχθεὶς ὑπὸ Ἐπαμινώνδου ἱερὸς λόχος (Hieronymus apud
-  Athenæum, xiii, p. 602 A.). There was a Carthaginian military
-  division which bore the same title, composed of chosen and
-  wealthy citizens, two thousand five hundred in number (Diodor.
-  xvi, 80).
-
-We must remark that the Thebans had always been good soldiers, both
-as hoplites and as cavalry. The existing enthusiasm, therefore, with
-the more sustained training, only raised good soldiers into much
-better. But Thebes was now blessed with another good fortune, such as
-had never yet befallen her. She found among her citizens a leader of
-the rarest excellence. It is now for the first time that Epaminondas,
-the son of Polymnis, begins to stand out in the public life of
-Greece. His family, poor rather than rich, was among the most ancient
-in Thebes, belonging to those Gentes called Sparti, whose heroic
-progenitors were said to have sprung from the dragon’s teeth sown
-by Kadmus.[247] He seems to have been now of middle age; Pelopidas
-was younger, and of a very rich family; yet the relations between
-the two were those of equal and intimate friendship, tested in a day
-of battle, wherein the two were ranged side by side as hoplites,
-and where Epaminondas had saved the life of his wounded friend, at
-the cost of several wounds, and the greatest possible danger, to
-himself.[248]
-
-  [247] Pausan. viii, 11, 5.
-
-  Dikæarchus, only one generation afterwards, complained that
-  he could not find out the name of the mother of Epaminondas
-  (Plutarch, Agesil. c. 19).
-
-  [248] Plutarch, Pelop. c. 4; Pausan. ix, 13, 1. According to
-  Plutarch, Epaminondas had attained the age of forty years, before
-  he became publicly known (De Occult. Vivendo, p. 1129 C.).
-
-  Plutarch affirms that the battle (in which Pelopidas was
-  desperately wounded, and saved by Epaminondas) took place
-  at Mantinea, when they were fighting on the side of the
-  Lacedæmonians, under king Agesipolis, against the Arcadians; the
-  Thebans being at that time friends of Sparta, and having sent a
-  contingent to her aid.
-
-  I do not understand what battle Plutarch can here mean. The
-  Thebans were never so united with Sparta as to send any
-  contingent to her aid, after the capture of Athens (in 404 B.C.).
-  Most critics think that the war referred to by Plutarch, is, the
-  expedition conducted by Agesipolis against Mantinea, whereby the
-  city was broken up into villages—in 385 B.C.; see Mr. Clinton’s
-  Fasti Hellenici ad 385 B.C. But, in the first place, there cannot
-  have been any Theban contingent then assisting Agesipolis; for
-  Thebes was on terms unfriendly with Sparta,—and certainly was not
-  her ally. In the next place, there does not seem to have been any
-  battle, according to Xenophon’s account.
-
-  I therefore am disposed to question Plutarch’s account, as to
-  this alleged battle of Mantinea; though I think it probable that
-  Epaminondas may have saved the life of Pelopidas at some earlier
-  conflict, before the peace of Antalkidas.
-
-Epaminondas had discharged, with punctuality, those military and
-gymnastic duties which were incumbent on every Theban citizen.
-But we are told that in the gymnasia he studied to acquire the
-maximum of activity rather than of strength; the nimble movements
-of a runner and wrestler,—not the heavy muscularity, purchased in
-part by excessive nutriment, of the Bœotian pugilist.[249] He also
-learned music, vocal and instrumental, and dancing; by which, in
-those days, was meant, not simply the power of striking the lyre or
-blowing the flute, but all that belonged to the graceful, expressive,
-and emphatic management, either of the voice or of the body;
-rhythmical pronunciation, exercised by repetition of the poets,—and
-disciplined movements, for taking part in a choric festival with
-becoming consonance amidst a crowd of citizen performers. Of such
-gymnastic and musical training, the combination of which constituted
-an accomplished Grecian citizen, the former predominated at Thebes,
-the latter at Athens. Moreover, at Thebes the musical training
-was based more upon the flute (for the construction of which,
-excellent reeds grew near the Lake Kopaïs); at Athens more upon
-the lyre, which admitted of vocal accompaniment by the player. The
-Athenian Alkibiades[250] was heard to remark, when he threw away
-his flute in disgust, that flute-playing was a fit occupation for
-the Thebans, since they did not know how to speak; and in regard
-to the countrymen of Pindar[251] generally, the remark was hardly
-less true than contemptuous. On this capital point, Epaminondas
-formed a splendid exception. Not only had he learnt the lyre[252]
-as well as the flute from the best masters, but also, dissenting
-from his brother Kapheisias and his friend Pelopidas, he manifested
-from his earliest years an ardent intellectual impulse, which would
-have been remarkable even in an Athenian. He sought with eagerness
-the conversation of the philosophers within his reach, among whom
-were the Theban Simmias and the Tarentine Spintharus, both of
-them once companions of Sokrates; so that the stirring influence
-of the Sokratic method would thus find its way, partially and at
-second-hand, to the bosom of Epaminondas. As the relations between
-Thebes and Athens, ever since the close of the Peloponnesian war, had
-become more and more friendly, growing at length into alliance and
-joint war against the Spartans,—we may reasonably presume that he
-profited by teachers at the latter city as well as at the former. But
-the person to whom he particularly devoted himself, and whom he not
-only heard as a pupil, but tended almost as a son, during the close
-of an aged life,—was a Tarentine exile, named Lysis; a member of the
-Pythagorean brotherhood, who, from causes which we cannot make out,
-had sought shelter at Thebes, and dwelt there until his death.[253]
-With him, as well as with other philosophers, Epaminondas discussed
-all the subjects of study and inquiry then afloat. By perseverance
-in this course for some years, he not only acquired considerable
-positive instruction, but also became practised in new and enlarged
-intellectual combinations; and was, like Perikles,[254] emancipated
-from that timorous interpretation of nature, which rendered so many
-Grecian commanders the slaves of signs and omens. His patience as a
-listener, and his indifference to showy talk on his own account, were
-so remarkable, that Spintharus (the father of Aristoxenus), after
-numerous conversations with him, affirmed that he had never met with
-any one who understood more, or talked less.[255]
-
-  [249] Cornel. Nepos, Epamin. c. 2; Plutarch, Apophth. Reg. p. 192
-  D.; Aristophan. Acharn. 872.
-
-  Compare the citations in Athenæus, x, p. 417. The perfection of
-  form required in the runner was also different from that required
-  in the wrestler (Xenoph. Memor. iii, 8, 4; iii, 10, 6).
-
-  [250] Plutarch, Alkib. c. 2.
-
-  [251] Pindar, Olymp. vi, 90.
-
-      ἀρχαῖον ὄνειδος—Βοιώτιον ὗν, etc.
-
-  [252] Aristoxenus mentions the flute, Cicero and Cornelius Nepos
-  the lyre (Aristoxen. Fr. 60, ed. Didot, ap. Athenæ. iv, p. 184;
-  Cicero, Tusc. Disp. i, 2, 4; Cornel. Nepos, Epamin. c. 2).
-
-  [253] Aristoxenus, Frag. 11, ed. Didot; Plutarch, De Gen. Socr.
-  p. 583, Cicero, De Offic. i, 44, 155; Pausan. ix, 13, 1; Ælian,
-  V. H. iii, 17.
-
-  The statement (said to have been given by Aristoxenus, and copied
-  by Plutarch as well as by Jamblichus) that Lysis, who taught
-  Epaminondas, had been one of the persons actually present in
-  the synod of Pythagoreans at Kroton when Kylon burnt down the
-  house, and that he with another had been the only persons who
-  escaped—cannot be reconciled with chronology.
-
-  [254] Compare Diodor. xv, 52 with Plutarch, Perikles, c. 6, and
-  Plutarch, Demosthenes, c. 20.
-
-  [255] Plutarch, De Gen. Sokrat. p. 576 D. μετείληφε παιδείας
-  διαφόρου καὶ περιττῆς—(p. 585 D.) τὴν ἀρίστην τροφὴν ἐν
-  φιλοσοφίᾳ—(p. 592 F.) Σπίνθαρος ὁ Ταραντῖνος οὐκ ὀλίγον αὐτῷ
-  (Epaminondas) συνδιατρίψας ἐνταῦθα χρόνον, ἀεὶ δήπου λέγει,
-  μηδενί που τῶν καθ’ ἑαυτὸν ἀνθρώπων ἐντετευχέναι, μήτε πλείονα
-  γιγνώσκοντι μήτε ἐλάττονα φθεγγομένῳ. Compare Cornel. Nepos,
-  Epamin. c. 3—and Plutarch, De Audiend. c. 3, p. 39 F.
-
-  We may fairly presume that this judgment of Spintharus was
-  communicated by him to his son Aristoxenus, from whom Plutarch
-  copied it; and we know that Aristoxenus in his writings mentioned
-  other particulars respecting Epaminondas (Athenæus, iv, p.
-  184). We see thus that Plutarch had access to good sources of
-  information respecting the latter. And as he had composed a life
-  of Epaminondas (Plutarch, Agesil. c. 28), though unfortunately
-  it has not reached us, we may be confident that he had taken
-  some pains to collect materials for the purpose, which materials
-  would naturally be employed in his dramatic dialogue, “De Genio
-  Socratis.” This strengthens our confidence in the interesting
-  statements which that dialogue furnishes respecting the
-  character of Epaminondas; as well as in the incidental allusions
-  interspersed among Plutarch’s other writings.
-
-Nor did such reserve proceed from any want of ready powers of
-expression. On the contrary, the eloquence of Epaminondas, when
-he entered upon his public career, was shown to be not merely
-preëminent among Thebans, but effective even against the best
-Athenian opponents.[256] But his disposition was essentially modest
-and unambitious, combined with a strong intellectual curiosity
-and a great capacity; a rare combination amidst a race usually
-erring on the side of forwardness and self-esteem. Little moved by
-personal ambition, and never cultivating popularity by unworthy
-means, Epaminondas was still more indifferent on the score of
-money. He remained in contented poverty to the end of his life,
-not leaving enough to pay his funeral expenses, yet repudiating
-not merely the corrupting propositions of foreigners, but also the
-solicitous tenders of personal friends;[257] though we are told
-that, when once serving the costly office of choregus, he permitted
-his friend Pelopidas to bear a portion of the expense.[258] As
-he thus stood exempt from two of the besetting infirmities which
-most frequently misguided eminent Greek statesmen, so there was a
-third characteristic not less estimable in his moral character;
-the gentleness of his political antipathies,—his repugnance to
-harsh treatment of conquered enemies,—and his refusal to mingle in
-intestine bloodshed. If ever there were men whose conduct seemed
-to justify unmeasured retaliation, it was Leontiades and his
-fellow-traitors. They had opened the doors of the Kadmeia to the
-Spartan Phœbidas, and had put to death the Theban leader Ismenias.
-Yet Epaminondas disapproved of the scheme of Pelopidas and the
-other exiles to assassinate them, and declined to take part in it;
-partly on prudential grounds, but partly, also, on conscientious
-scruples.[259] None of his virtues was found so difficult to imitate
-by his subsequent admirers, as this mastery over the resentful and
-vindictive passions.[260]
-
-  [256] Cornel. Nepos, Epaminond. c. 5; Plutarch, Præcept. Reip.
-  Gerend. p. 819 C. Cicero notices him as the only man with any
-  pretensions to oratorical talents, whom Thebes, Corinth, or Argos
-  had ever produced (Brutus, c. 13, 50).
-
-  [257] Plutarch (De Gen. Socr. p. 583, 584; Pelopid. c. 3; Fab.
-  Max. c. 27. Compar. Alcibiad. and Coriol. c. 4): Cornel. Nepos.
-  Epamin. c. 4.
-
-  [258] Plutarch, Aristeides, c. 1; Justin, vi, 8.
-
-  [259] Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. p. 576 F. Ἐπαμεινώνδας δὲ, μὴ
-  πείθων ὡς οἴεται βέλτιον εἶναι ταῦτα μὴ πράσσειν· εἰκότως
-  ἀντιτείνει πρὸς ἃ μὴ πέφυκε, μηδὲ δοκιμάζει, παρακαλούμενος.
-
-  ... Ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐ πείθει τοὺς πολλοὺς, ἀλλὰ ταύτην ὡρμήκαμεν τὴν
-  ὁδὸν, ἐᾷν αὐτὸν κελεύει φόνου καθαρὸν ὄντα καὶ ἀναίτιον ἐφεστᾶναι
-  τοῖς καιροῖς, μετὰ τοῦ δικαίου τῷ συμφέροντι προσοισόμενον.
-
-  Compare the same dialogue, p. 594 B.; and Cornelius Nepos,
-  Pelopidas, c. 4.
-
-  Isokrates makes a remark upon Evagoras of Salamis, which may
-  be well applied to Epaminondas; that the objectionable means,
-  without which the former could not have got possession of the
-  sceptre, were performed by others and not by him; while all the
-  meritorious and admirable functions of command were reserved for
-  Evagoras (Isokrates, Or. ix, (Evag.) s. 28).
-
-  [260] See the striking statements of Plutarch and Pausanias about
-  Philopœmen,—καίπερ Ἐπαμεινώνδου βουλόμενος εἶναι μάλιστα ζηλωτὴς,
-  τὸ δραστήριον καὶ συνετὸν αὐτοῦ καὶ ὑπὸ χρημάτων ἀπαθὲς ἰσχυρῶς
-  ἐμιμεῖτο, τῷ δὲ πράῳ καὶ βαθεῖ καὶ φιλανθρώπῳ παρὰ τὰς πολιτικὰς
-  διαφορὰς ἐμμένειν οὐ δυνάμενος, δι’ ὀργὴν καὶ φιλονεικίαν, μᾶλλον
-  ἐδόκει στρατιωτικῆς ἢ πολιτικῆς ἀρετῆς οἰκεῖος εἶναι. To the like
-  purpose, Pausanias, viii, 49, 2; Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 25:
-  Cornel. Nepos, Epamin. c. 3—“patiens admirandum in modum.”
-
-Before Epaminondas could have full credit for these virtues, however,
-it was necessary that he should give proof of the extraordinary
-capacities for action with which they were combined, and that he
-should achieve something to earn that exclamation of praise which
-we shall find his enemy Agesilaus afterwards pronouncing, on seeing
-him at the head of the invading Theban army near Sparta,—“Oh! thou
-man of great deeds!”[261] In the year B.C. 379, when the Kadmeia
-was emancipated, he was as yet undistinguished in public life,
-and known only to Pelopidas with his other friends; among whom,
-too, his unambitious and inquisitive disposition was a subject of
-complaint as keeping him unduly in the background.[262] But the
-unparalleled phenomena of that year supplied a spur which overruled
-all backwardness, and smothered all rival inclinations. The Thebans,
-having just recovered their city by an incredible turn of fortune,
-found themselves exposed single-handed to the full attack of Sparta
-and her extensive confederacy. Not even Athens had yet declared
-in their favor, nor had they a single other ally. Under such
-circumstances, Thebes could only be saved by the energy of all her
-citizens,—the unambitious and philosophical as well as the rest. As
-the necessities of the case required such simultaneous devotion, so
-the electric shock of the recent revolution was sufficient to awaken
-enthusiasm in minds much less patriotic than that of Epaminondas.
-He was among the first to join the victorious exiles in arms, after
-the contest had been transferred from the houses of Archias and
-Leontiades to the open market-place; and he would probably have been
-among the first to mount the walls of the Kadmeia, had the Spartan
-harmost awaited an assault. Pelopidas being named Bœotarch, his
-friend Epaminondas was naturally placed among the earliest and most
-forward organizers of the necessary military resistance against the
-common enemy; in which employment his capacities speedily became
-manifest. Though at this moment almost an unknown man, he had
-acquired, in B.C. 371, seven years afterwards, so much reputation
-both as speaker and as general, that he was chosen as the expositor
-of Theban policy at Sparta, and trusted with the conduct of the
-battle of Leuktra, upon which the fate of Thebes hinged. Hence we
-may fairly conclude, that the well-planned and successful system of
-defence, together with the steady advance of Thebes against Sparta,
-during the intermediate years, was felt to have been in the main his
-work.[263]
-
-  [261] Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 32. Ὦ τοῦ μεγαλοπράγμονος ἀνθρώπου!
-
-  [262] Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. p. 576 E. Ἐπαμεινώνδας δὲ, Βοιωτῶν
-  ἁπάντων τῷ πεπαιδεῦσθαι πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀξιῶν διαφέρειν, ἀμβλὺς ἐστι
-  καὶ ἀπρόθυμος.
-
-  [263] Bauch, in his instructive biography of Epaminondas
-  (Epaminondas, und Thebens Kampf um die Hegemonie: Breslau, 1834,
-  p. 26), seems to conceive that Epaminondas was never employed
-  in any public official post by his countrymen, until the period
-  immediately preceding the battle of Leuktra. I cannot concur in
-  this opinion. It appears to me that he must have been previously
-  employed in such posts as enabled him to show his military
-  worth. For all the proceedings of 371 B.C. prove that in that
-  year he actually possessed a great and established reputation,
-  which must have been acquired by previous acts in a conspicuous
-  position; and as he had no great family position to start from,
-  his reputation was probably acquired only by slow degrees.
-
-  The silence of Xenophon proves nothing in contradiction of this
-  supposition; for he does not mention Epaminondas even at Leuktra.
-
-The turn of politics at Athens which followed the acquittal of
-Sphodrias was an unspeakable benefit to the Thebans, in seconding as
-well as encouraging their defence; and the Spartans, not unmoved at
-the new enemies raised up by their treatment of Sphodrias, thought
-it necessary to make some efforts on their side. They organized on
-a more systematic scale the military force of their confederacy,
-and even took some conciliatory steps with the view of effacing
-the odium of their past misrule.[264] The full force of their
-confederacy,—including, as a striking mark of present Spartan power,
-even the distant Olynthians,[265]—was placed in motion against
-Thebes in the course of the summer under Agesilaus; who contrived,
-by putting in sudden requisition a body of mercenaries acting in
-the service of the Arcadian town Kleitor against its neighbor
-the Arcadian Orchomenus, to make himself master of the passes of
-Kithæron, before the Thebans and Athenians could have notice of his
-passing the Lacedæmonian border.[266] Then crossing Kithæron into
-Bœotia, he established his head-quarters at Thespiæ, a post already
-under Spartan occupation. From thence he commenced his attacks
-upon the Theban territory, which he found defended partly by a
-considerable length of ditch and palisade—partly by the main force of
-Thebes, assisted by a division of mixed Athenians and mercenaries,
-sent from Athens under Chabrias. Keeping on their own side of the
-palisade, the Thebans suddenly sent out their cavalry, and attacked
-Agesilaus by surprise, occasioning some loss. Such sallies were
-frequently repeated, until, by a rapid march at break of day, he
-forced his way through an opening in the breastwork into their
-inner country, which he laid waste nearly to the city walls.[267]
-The Thebans and Athenians, though not offering him battle on equal
-terms, nevertheless kept the field against him, taking care to hold
-positions advantageous for defence. Agesilaus on his side did not
-feel confident enough to attack them against such odds. Yet on one
-occasion he had made up his mind to do so; and was marching up to
-the charge, when he was daunted by the firm attitude and excellent
-array of the troops of Chabrias. They had received orders to await
-his approach, on a high and advantageous ground, without moving
-until signal should be given; with their shields resting on the
-knee, and their spears protended. So imposing was their appearance,
-that Agesilaus called off his troops without daring to complete the
-charge.[268] After a month or more of devastations on the lands of
-Thebes, and a string of desultory skirmishes in which he seems to
-have lost rather than gained, Agesilaus withdrew to Thespiæ; the
-fortifications of which he strengthened, leaving Phœbidas with a
-considerable force in occupation, and then leading back his army to
-Peloponnesus.
-
-  [264] Diodor. xv, 31.
-
-  [265] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 54; Diodor. xv, 31.
-
-  [266] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 36-38.
-
-  [267] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 41.
-
-  [268] Diodor. xv, 32; Polyæn. ii, 1, 2; Cornel. Nepos, Chabrias,
-  c. 1,—“obnixo genu scuto,”—Demosthen. cont. Leptinem, p. 479.
-
-  The Athenian public having afterwards voted a statue to the honor
-  of Chabrias, he made choice of this attitude for the design
-  (Diodor. xv, 33).
-
-Phœbidas,—the former captor of the Kadmeia,—thus stationed at
-Thespiæ, carried on vigorous warfare against Thebes; partly with his
-own Spartan division, partly with the Thespian hoplites, who promised
-him unshrinking support. His incursions soon brought on reprisals
-from the Thebans; who invaded Thespiæ, but were repulsed by Phœbidas
-with the loss of all their plunder. In the pursuit, however, hurrying
-incautiously forward, he was slain by a sudden turn of the Theban
-cavalry;[269] upon which all his troops fled, chased by the Thebans
-to the very gates of Thespiæ. Though the Spartans, in consequence of
-this misfortune, despatched by sea another general and division to
-replace Phœbidas, the cause of the Thebans was greatly strengthened
-by their recent victory. They pushed their success not only against
-Thespiæ, but against the other Bœotian cities, still held by local
-oligarchies in dependence on Sparta. At the same time, these
-oligarchies were threatened by the growing strength of their own
-popular or philo-Theban citizens, who crowded in considerable numbers
-as exiles to Thebes.[270]
-
-  [269] Xen. Hellen. v, 4. 42-45; Diodor. xv, 33.
-
-  [270] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 46. Ἐκ δὲ τούτου πάλιν αὖ τὰ τῶν Θηβαίων
-  ἀνεζωπυρεῖτο, καὶ ἐστρατεύοντο εἰς Θεσπιὰς, καὶ εἰς τὰς ἄλλας
-  τὰς περιοικίδας πόλεις. Ὁ μέντοι δῆμος ἐξ αὐτῶν εἰς τὰς Θήβας
-  ἀπεχώρει· ἐν πάσαις γὰρ ταῖς πόλεσι δυναστεῖαι καθειστήκεσαν,
-  ὥσπερ ἐν Θήβαις· ὥστε καὶ οἱ ἐν ταύταις ταῖς πόλεσι φίλοι τῶν
-  Λακεδαιμονίων βοηθείας ἐδέοντο.
-
-A second expedition against Thebes, undertaken by Agesilaus in the
-ensuing summer with the main army of the confederacy, was neither
-more decisive nor more profitable than the preceding. Though he
-contrived, by a well-planned stratagem, to surprize the Theban
-palisade, and lay waste the plain, he gained no serious victory;
-and even showed, more clearly than before, his reluctance to engage
-except upon perfectly equal terms.[271] It became evident that
-the Thebans were not only strengthening their position in Bœotia,
-but also acquiring practice in warfare and confidence against
-the Spartans; insomuch that Antalkidas and some other companions
-remonstrated with Agesilaus, against carrying on the war so as only
-to give improving lessons to his enemies in military practice,—and
-called upon him to strike some decisive blow. He quitted Bœotia,
-however, after the summer’s campaign, without any such step.[272] In
-his way he appeased an intestine conflict which was about to break
-out in Thespiæ. Afterwards, on passing to Megara, he experienced
-a strain or hurt, which grievously injured his sound leg, (it has
-been mentioned already that he was lame of one leg,) and induced his
-surgeon to open a vein in the limb for reducing the inflammation.
-When this was done, however, the blood could not be stopped until he
-swooned. Having been conveyed home to Sparta in great suffering, he
-was confined to his couch for several months; and he remained during
-a much longer time unfit for active command.[273]
-
-  [271] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 47, 51.
-
-  The anecdotes in Polyænus (ii, 1, 18-20), mentioning
-  faint-heartedness and alarm among the allies of Agesilaus, are
-  likely to apply (certainly in part) to this campaign.
-
-  [272] Diodor. xv, 33, 34; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 26.
-
-  [273] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 58.
-
-The functions of general now devolved upon the other king
-Kleombrotus, who in the next spring conducted the army of the
-confederacy to invade Bœotia anew. But on this occasion, the
-Athenians and Thebans had occupied the passes of Kithæron, so that he
-was unable even to enter the country, and was obliged to dismiss his
-troops without achieving anything.[274]
-
-  [274] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 59.
-
-His inglorious retreat excited such murmurs among the allies when
-they met at Sparta, that they resolved to fit out a large naval
-force, sufficient both to intercept the supplies of imported corn
-to Athens, and to forward an invading army by sea against Thebes,
-to the Bœotian port of Kreusis in the Krissæan Gulf. The former
-object was attempted first. Towards midsummer, a fleet of sixty
-triremes, fitted out under the Spartan admiral Pollis, was cruising
-in the Ægean; especially round the coast of Attica, near Ægina,
-Keos, and Andros. The Athenians, who, since their recently renewed
-confederacy, had been undisturbed by any enemies at sea, found
-themselves thus threatened, not merely with loss of power, but also
-with loss of trade and even famine; since their corn-ships from the
-Euxine, though safely reaching Geræstus (the southern extremity of
-Eubœa), were prevented from doubling Cape Sunium. Feeling severely
-this interruption, they fitted out at Peiræus a fleet of eighty
-triremes,[275] with crews mainly composed of citizens; who, under
-the admiral Chabrias, in a sharply contested action near Naxos,
-completely defeated the fleet of Pollis, and regained for Athens the
-mastery of the sea. Forty-nine Lacedæmonian triremes were disabled
-or captured, eight with their entire crews.[276] Moreover, Chabrias
-might have destroyed all or most of the rest, had he not suspended
-his attack, having eighteen of his own ships disabled, to pick up
-both the living men and the dead bodies on board, as well as all
-Athenians who were swimming for their lives. He did this (we are
-told[277]), from distinct recollection of the fierce displeasure
-of the people against the victorious generals after the battle of
-Arginusæ. And we may thus see, that though the proceedings on that
-memorable occasion were stained both by illegality and by violence,
-they produced a salutary effect upon the public conduct of subsequent
-commanders. Many a brave Athenian (the crews consisting principally
-of citizens) owed his life, after the battle of Naxos, to the
-terrible lesson administered by the people to their generals in 406
-B.C., thirty years before.
-
-  [275] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 61. ἐνέβησαν αὐτοὶ εἰς τὰς ναῦς, etc.
-  Boeckh (followed by Dr. Thirlwall, Hist. Gr. ch. 38, vol. v, p.
-  58) connects with this maritime expedition an Inscription (Corp.
-  Insc. No. 84, p. 124) recording a vote of gratitude, passed by
-  the Athenian assembly in favor of Phanokritus, a native of Parium
-  in the Propontis. But I think that the vote can hardly belong
-  to the present expedition. The Athenians could not need to be
-  informed by a native of Parium about the movements of a hostile
-  fleet near Ægina and Keos. The information given by Phanokritus
-  must have related more probably, I think, to some occasion of the
-  transit of hostile ships along the Hellespont, which a native
-  of Parium would be the likely person first to discover and
-  communicate.
-
-  [276] Diodor. xv, 35; Demosthen. cont. Leptin. c. 17, p. 480.
-
-  I give the number of prize-ships taken in this action, as stated
-  by Demosthenes; in preference to Diodorus, who mentions a smaller
-  number. The orator, in enumerating the exploits of Chabrias in
-  this oration, not only speaks from a written memorandum in his
-  hand, which he afterwards causes to be read by the clerk,—but
-  also seems exact and special as to numbers, so as to inspire
-  greater confidence than usual.
-
-  [277] Diodor. xv, 35. Chabrias ἀπέσχετο παντελῶς τοῦ διωγμοῦ,
-  ἀναμνησθεὶς τῆς ἐν Ἀργινούσαις ναυμαχίας, ἐν ᾗ τοὺς νικήσαντας
-  στρατηγοὺς ὁ δῆμος ἀντὶ μεγάλης εὐεργεσίας θανάτῳ περιέβαλεν,
-  ~αἰτιασάμενος ὅτι τοὺς τετελευτηκότας κατὰ τὴν ναυμαχίαν οὐκ
-  ἔθαψαν~· εὐλαβήθη οὖν (see Wesseling and Stephens’s note)
-  μή ποτε τῆς περιστάσεως ὁμοίας γενομένης κινδυνεύσῃ παθεῖν
-  παραπλήσια. Διόπερ ~ἀποστὰς τοῦ διώκειν, ἀνελέγετο τῶν πολιτῶν
-  τοὺς διανηχομένους, καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἔτι ζῶντας διέσωσε, τοὺς
-  δὲ τετελευτηκότας ἔθαψεν~. Εἰ δὲ μὴ περὶ ταύτην ἐγένετο τὴν
-  ἐπιμέλειαν, ῥᾳδίως ἂν ἅπαντα τὸν πολεμίων στόλον διέφθειρε.
-
-  This passage illustrates what I remarked in my preceding volume
-  (Vol. VIII, Ch. lxiv, p. 175), respecting the battle of Arginusæ
-  and the proceedings at Athens afterwards. I noticed that Diodorus
-  incorrectly represented the excitement at Athens against the
-  generals as arising from their having neglected to pick up the
-  bodies of the _slain_ warriors for burial,—and that he omitted
-  the more important fact, that they left many living and wounded
-  warriors to perish.
-
-  It is curious, that in the first of the two sentences above
-  cited, Diodorus repeats his erroneous affirmation about the
-  battle of Arginusæ; while in the second sentence he corrects the
-  error, telling us that Chabrias, profiting by the warning, took
-  care to pick up the _living_ men on the wrecks and in the water,
-  as well as the dead bodies.
-
-This was the first great victory (in September, 376 B.C.[278])
-which the Athenians had gained at sea since the Peloponnesian war;
-and while it thus filled them with joy and confidence, it led to
-a material enlargement of their maritime confederacy. The fleet
-of Chabrias,—of which a squadron was detached under the orders of
-Phokion, a young Athenian now distinguishing himself for the first
-time and often hereafter to be mentioned,—sailed victorious round
-the Ægean, made prize of twenty other triremes in single ships,
-brought in three thousand prisoners with one hundred and ten talents
-in money, and annexed seventeen new cities to the confederacy,
-as sending deputies to the synod and furnishing contributions.
-The discreet and conciliatory behavior of Phokion, especially
-obtained much favor among the islanders, and determined several
-new adhesions to Athens.[279] To the inhabitants of Abdêra in
-Thrace, Chabrias rendered an inestimable service, by aiding them to
-repulse a barbarous horde of Triballi, who quitting their abode from
-famine, had poured upon the sea-coast, defeating the Abderites and
-plundering their territory. The citizens, grateful for a force left
-to defend their town, willingly allied themselves with Athens, whose
-confederacy thus extended itself to the coast of Thrace.[280]
-
-  [278] Plutarch, Phokion, c. 6; Plutarch, Camillus, c. 19.
-
-  [279] Demosthen. cont. Leptin. p. 480; Plutarch, Phokion, c. 7.
-
-  [280] Diodor. xv, 36. He states by mistake, that Chabrias was
-  afterwards assassinated at Abdera.
-
-Having prosperously enlarged their confederacy to the east of
-Peloponnesus, the Athenians began to aim at the acquisition of new
-allies in the west. The fleet of sixty triremes, which had recently
-served under Chabrias, was sent, under the command of Timotheus, the
-son of Konon, to circumnavigate Peloponnesus and alarm the coast of
-Laconia; partly at the instance of the Thebans, who were eager to
-keep the naval force of Sparta occupied, so as to prevent her from
-conveying troops across the Krissæan Gulf from Corinth to the Bœotian
-port of Kreusis.[281] This Periplus of Peloponnesus,—the first
-which the fleet of Athens had attempted since her humiliation at
-Ægospotami,—coupled with the ensuing successes, was long remembered
-by the countrymen of Timotheus. His large force, just dealing,
-and conciliatory professions, won new and valuable allies. Not
-only Kephallenia, but the still more important island of Korkyra,
-voluntarily accepted his propositions; and as he took care to avoid
-all violence or interference with the political constitution, his
-popularity all around augmented every day. Alketas, prince of
-the Molossi,—the Chaonians with other Epirotic tribes,—and the
-Akarnanians on the coast,—all embraced his alliance.[282] While near
-Alyzia and Leukas on this coast, he was assailed by the Peloponnesian
-ships under Nikolochus, rather inferior in number to his fleet. He
-defeated them, and being shortly afterwards reinforced by other
-triremes from Korkyra, he became so superior in those waters, that
-the hostile fleet did not dare to show itself. Having received only
-thirteen talents on quitting Athens, we are told that he had great
-difficulty in paying his fleet; that he procured an advance of
-money, from each of the sixty trierarchs in his fleet, of seven minæ
-towards the pay of their respective ships; and that he also sent
-home requests for large remittances from the public treasury;[283]
-measures which go to bear out that honorable repugnance to the
-plunder of friends or neutrals, and care to avoid even the suspicion
-of plunder, which his panegyrist Isokrates ascribes to him.[284]
-This was a feature unhappily rare among the Grecian generals on
-both sides, and tending to become still rarer, from the increased
-employment of mercenary bands.
-
-  [281] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 62.
-
-  [282] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 64; Diodor. xv, 36.
-
-  [283] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 66; Isokrates, De Permutat. s. 116;
-  Cornelius Nepos, Timotheus, c. 2.
-
-  The advance of seven minæ respectively, obtained by Timotheus
-  from the sixty trierarchs under his command, is mentioned by
-  Demosthenes cont. Timotheum (c. 3, p. 1187). I agree with M.
-  Boeckh (Public Economy of Athens, ii, 24, p. 294) in referring
-  this advance to his expedition to Korkyra and other places in the
-  Ionian Sea in 375-374 B.C.; not to his subsequent expedition of
-  373 B.C., to which Rehdantz, Lachmann, Schlosser, and others
-  would refer it (Vitæ Iphicratis, etc. p. 89). In the second
-  expedition, it does not appear that he ever had really sixty
-  triremes, or sixty trierarchs, under him. Xenophon (Hellen. v,
-  4, 63) tells us that the fleet sent with Timotheus to Korkyra
-  consisted of sixty ships; which is the exact number of trierarchs
-  named by Demosthenes.
-
-  [284] Isokrates, Orat. De Permutat. s. 128, 131, 135.
-
-The demands of Timotheus on the treasury of Athens were not favorably
-received. Though her naval position was now more brilliant and
-commanding than it had been since the battle of Ægospotami,—though
-no Lacedæmonian fleet showed itself to disturb her in the
-Ægean,[285]—yet the cost of the war began to be seriously felt.
-Privateers from the neighboring island of Ægina annoyed her commerce,
-requiring a perpetual coast-guard; while the contributions from the
-deputies to the confederate synod were not sufficient to dispense
-with the necessity of a heavy direct property tax at home.[286]
-
-  [285] Isokrates, De Permutat. s. 117; Cornel. Nepos, Timoth. c. 2.
-
-  [286] Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 1.
-
-In this synod the Thebans, as members of the confederacy, were
-represented.[287] Application was made to them to contribute towards
-the cost of the naval war; the rather, as it was partly at their
-instance that the fleet had been sent round to the Ionian Sea. But
-the Thebans declined compliance,[288] nor were they probably in any
-condition to furnish pecuniary aid. Their refusal occasioned much
-displeasure at Athens, embittered by jealousy at the strides which
-they had been making during the two last years, partly through the
-indirect effect of the naval successes of Athens. At the end of the
-year 377 B.C., after the two successive invasions of Agesilaus, the
-ruin of two home crops had so straitened the Thebans, that they were
-forced to import corn from Pagasæ in Thessaly; in which enterprise
-their ships and seamen were at first captured by the Lacedæmonian
-harmost at Oreus in Eubœa, Alketas. His negligence, however, soon
-led not only to an outbreak of their seamen who had been taken
-prisoners, but also to the revolt of the town from Sparta, so that
-the communication of Thebes with Pagasæ became quite unimpeded.
-For the two succeeding years, there had been no Spartan invasion
-of Bœotia; since, in 376 B.C., Kleombrotus could not surmount the
-heights of Kithæron,—while in 375 B.C., the attention of Sparta had
-been occupied by the naval operations of Timotheus in the Ionian
-Sea. During these two years, the Thebans had exerted themselves
-vigorously against the neighboring cities of Bœotia, in most of which
-a strong party, if not the majority of the population, was favorable
-to them, though the government was in the hands of the philo-Spartan
-oligarchy, seconded by Spartan harmosts and garrison.[289] We hear of
-one victory gained by the Theban cavalry near Platæa, under Charon;
-and of another near Tanagra, in which Panthöides, the Lacedæmonian
-harmost in that town, was slain.[290]
-
-  [287] See Isokrates, Or. xiv, (Plataic.) s. 21, 23, 37.
-
-  [288] Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 1. Οἱ δ’ Ἀθηναῖοι, αὐξανομένους μὲν
-  ὁρῶντες διὰ σφᾶς τοὺς Θηβαίους, χρήματά δ’ οὐ συμβαλλομένους
-  εἰς τὸ ναυτικὸν, αὐτοὶ δ’ ἀποκναιόμενοι καὶ χρημάτων εἰσφοραῖς
-  καὶ λῃστείαις ἐξ Αἰγίνης, καὶ φυλακαῖς τῆς χώρας, ἐπεθύμησαν
-  παύσασθαι τοῦ πολέμου.
-
-  [289] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 46-55.
-
-  [290] Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 15-25.
-
-But the most important of all their successes was that of Pelopidas
-near Tegyra. That commander, hearing that the Spartan harmost, with
-his two (moræ or) divisions in garrison at Orchomenus, had gone
-away on an excursion into the Lokrian territory, made a dash from
-Thebes with the Sacred Band and a few cavalry, to surprise the place.
-It was the season in which the waters of the Lake Kopaïs were at
-the fullest, so that he was obliged to take a wide circuit to the
-north-west, and to pass by Tegyra, on the road between Orchomenus and
-the Opuntian Lokris. On arriving near Orchomenus, he ascertained
-that there were still some Lacedæmonians in the town, and that no
-surprise could be effected; upon which he retraced his steps. But
-on reaching Tegyra, he fell in with the Lacedæmonian commanders,
-Gorgoleon and Theopompus, returning with their troops from the
-Lokrian excursion. As his numbers were inferior to theirs by half,
-they rejoiced in the encounter; while the troops of Pelopidas were
-at first dismayed, and required all his encouragement to work them
-up. But in the fight that ensued, closely and obstinately contested
-in a narrow pass, the strength, valor, and compact charge of the
-Sacred Band proved irresistible. The two Lacedæmonian commanders were
-both slain; their troops opened, to allow the Thebans an undisturbed
-retreat; but Pelopidas, disdaining this opportunity, persisted in the
-combat until all his enemies dispersed and fled. The neighborhood of
-Orchomenus forbade any long pursuit, so that Pelopidas could only
-erect his trophy, and strip the dead, before returning to Thebes.[291]
-
-  [291] Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 17; Diodor. xv, 37.
-
-  Xenophon does not mention the combat at Tegyra. Diodorus
-  mentions, what is evidently this battle, near Orchomenus; but he
-  does not name Tegyra.
-
-  Kallisthenes seems to have described the battle of Tegyra, and to
-  have given various particulars respecting the religious legends
-  connected with that spot (Kallisthenes, Fragm. 3, ed. Didot, ap.
-  Stephan. Byz. v. Τεγύρα).
-
-This combat, in which the Lacedæmonians were for the first time
-beaten in fair field by numbers inferior to their own, produced a
-strong sensation in the minds of both the contending parties. The
-confidence of the Thebans, as well as their exertion, was redoubled;
-so that by the year 374 B.C., they had cleared Bœotia of the
-Lacedæmonians, as well as of the local oligarchies which sustained
-them; persuading or constraining the cities again to come into
-union with Thebes, and reviving the Bœotian confederacy. Haliartus,
-Korôneia, Lebadeia, Tanagra, Thespiæ, Platæa, and the rest, thus
-became again Bœotian;[292] leaving out Orchomenus alone, (with its
-dependency Chæroneia,) which was on the borders of Phokis, and still
-continued under Lacedæmonian occupation. In most of these cities, the
-party friendly to Thebes was numerous, and the change, on the whole,
-popular; though in some the prevailing sentiment was such, that
-adherence was only obtained by intimidation. The change here made by
-Thebes, was not to absorb these cities into herself, but to bring
-them back to the old federative system of Bœotia; a policy which she
-had publicly proclaimed on surprising Platæa in 431 B.C.[293] While
-resuming her own ancient rights and privileges as head of the Bœotian
-federation, she at the same time guaranteed to the other cities,—by
-convention, probably express, but certainly implied,—their ancient
-rights, their security, and their qualified autonomy, as members; the
-system which had existed down to the peace of Antalkidas.
-
-  [292] That the Thebans thus became again presidents of all
-  Bœotia, and revived the Bœotian confederacy,—is clearly stated by
-  Xenophon, Hellen. v, 4, 63; vi, 1, 1.
-
-  [293] Thucyd. ii, 2. Ἀνεῖπεν ὁ κήρυξ (the Theban herald after the
-  Theban troops had penetrated by night into the middle of Platæa)
-  εἴ τις βούλεται ~κατὰ τὰ πάτρια τῶν πάντων Βοιωτῶν~ ξυμμαχεῖν,
-  τίθεσθαι παρ’ αὐτοὺς τὰ ὅπλα, νομίζοντες σφίσι ῥᾳδίως τούτῳ τῷ
-  τρόπῳ προσχωρήσειν τὴν πόλιν.
-
-  Compare the language of the Thebans about τὰ πάτρια τῶν Βοιωτῶν
-  (iii, 61, 65, 66). The description which the Thebans give of
-  their own professions and views, when they attacked Platæa in 431
-  B.C., may be taken as fair analogy to judge of their professions
-  and views towards the recovered Bœotian towns in 376-375 B.C.
-
-The position of the Thebans was materially improved by this
-reconquest or reconfederation of Bœotia. Becoming masters of Kreusis,
-the port of Thespiæ,[294] they fortified it, and built some triremes
-to repel any invasion from Peloponnesus by sea across the Krissæan
-Gulf. Feeling thus secure against invasion, they began to retaliate
-upon their neighbors and enemies the Phokians, allies of Sparta, and
-auxiliaries in the recent attacks on Thebes,—yet also, from ancient
-times, on friendly terms with Athens.[295] So hard pressed were
-the Phokians,—especially as Jason of Pheræ in Thessaly was at the
-same time their bitter enemy,[296]—that unless assisted, they would
-have been compelled to submit to the Thebans, and along with them
-Orchomenus, including the Lacedæmonian garrison then occupying it;
-while the treasures of the Delphian Temple would also have been laid
-open, in case the Thebans should think fit to seize them. Intimation
-being sent by the Phokians to Sparta, King Kleombrotus was sent to
-their aid, by sea across the Gulf, with four Lacedæmonian divisions
-of troops, and an auxiliary body of allies.[297] This reinforcement,
-compelling the Thebans to retire, placed both Phokis and Orchomenus
-in safety. While Sparta thus sustained them, even Athens looked upon
-the Phokian cause with sympathy. When she saw that the Thebans had
-passed from the defensive to the offensive,—partly by her help, yet
-nevertheless refusing to contribute to the cost of her navy,—her
-ancient jealousy of them became again so powerful, that she sent
-envoys to Sparta, to propose terms of peace. What these terms were,
-we are not told; nor does it appear that the Thebans even received
-notice of the proceeding. But the peace was accepted at Sparta, and
-two of the Athenian envoys were despatched at once from thence,
-without even going home, to Korkyra, for the purpose of notifying the
-peace to Timotheus, and ordering him forthwith to conduct his fleet
-back to Athens.[298]
-
-  [294] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 3; Compare Diodor. xv, 53.
-
-  [295] Diodor. xv, 31; Xen. Hellen, vi, 3, 1; iii, 6, 21.
-
-  [296] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 21-27.
-
-  [297] Xen. Hellen. vi, 1, 1; vi, 21.
-
-  This expedition of Kleombrotus to Phokis is placed by Mr. Fynes
-  Clinton in 375 B.C. (Fast. Hel. ad 375 B.C.). To me it seems
-  to belong rather to 374 B.C. It was not undertaken until the
-  Thebans had reconquered all the Bœotian cities (Xen. Hell. vi, 1,
-  1); and this operation seems to have occupied them all the two
-  years,—376 and 375 B.C. See v, 4, 63, where the words οὔτ’ ἐν ᾧ
-  Τιμόθεος περιέπλευσε must be understood to include, not simply
-  the time which Timotheus took in _actually circumnavigating_
-  Peloponnesus, but the year which he spent afterwards in the
-  Ionian Sea, and the time which he occupied in performing his
-  exploits near Korkyra, Leukas, and the neighborhood generally.
-  The “Periplus” for which Timotheus was afterwards honored at
-  Athens (see Æschines cont. Ktesiphont. c. 90, p. 458) meant the
-  exploits performed by him during the year and with the fleet of
-  the “Periplus.”
-
-  It is worth notice that the Pythian games were celebrated in this
-  year 374 B.C.,—ἐπὶ Σωκρατίδου ἄρχοντος; that is, in the first
-  quarter of that archon, or the third Olympic year; about the
-  beginning of August, Chabrias won a prize at these games with a
-  chariot and four; in celebration of which, he afterwards gave a
-  splendid banquet at the point of sea-shore called Kôlias, near
-  Athens (Demosthen. cont. Neæram. c. 11, p. 1356).
-
-  [298] Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 1, 2.
-
-  Kallias seems to have been one of the Athenian envoys (Xen.
-  Hellen. vi, 3, 4).
-
-This proposition of the Athenians, made seemingly in a moment of
-impetuous dissatisfaction, was made to the advantage of Sparta, and
-served somewhat to countervail a mortifying revelation which had
-reached the Spartans a little before from a different quarter.
-
-Polydamas, an eminent citizen of Pharsalus in Thessaly, came to
-Sparta to ask for aid. He had long been on terms of hospitality
-with the Lacedæmonians; while Pharsalus had not merely been in
-alliance with them, but was for some time occupied by one of their
-garrisons.[299] In the usual state of Thessaly, the great cities
-Larissa, Pheræ, Pharsalus, and others, each holding some smaller
-cities in a state of dependent alliance, were in disagreement with
-each other,—often even in actual war. It was rare that they could
-be brought to concur in a common vote for the election of a supreme
-chief or Tagus. At his own city of Pharsalus, Polydamas was now
-in the ascendant, enjoying the confidence of all the great family
-factions who usually contended for predominance; to such a degree,
-indeed, that he was entrusted with the custody of the citadel and the
-entire management of the revenues, receipts as well as disbursements.
-Being a wealthy man, “hospitable and ostentatious in the Thessalian
-fashion,” he advanced money from his own purse to the treasury
-whenever it was low, and repaid himself when public funds came
-in.[300]
-
-  [299] Diodor. xiv, 82.
-
-  [300] Xen. Hellen. vi, 1, 3. Καὶ ὁπότε μὲν ἐνδεὴς εἴη,
-  παρ’ ἑαυτοῦ προσετίθει· ὁπότε δὲ περιγένοιτο τῆς προσόδου,
-  ἀπελάμβανεν· ἦν δὲ καὶ ἄλλως φιλόξενός τε καὶ μεγαλοπρεπὴς τὸν
-  Θετταλικὸν τρόπον.
-
-  Such loose dealing of the Thessalians with their public revenues
-  helps us to understand how Philip of Macedon afterwards got into
-  his hands the management of their harbors and customs-duties
-  (Demosthen. Olynth. i, p. 15; ii. p. 20). It forms a striking
-  contrast with the exactness of the Athenian people about
-  their public receipts and disbursements, as testified in the
-  inscriptions yet remaining.
-
-But a greater man than Polydamas had now arisen in Thessaly,—Jason,
-despot of Pheræ; whose formidable power, threatening the independence
-of Pharsalus, he now came to Sparta to denounce. Though the force of
-Jason can hardly have been very considerable when the Spartans passed
-through Thessaly, six years before, in their repeated expeditions
-against Olynthus, he was now not only despot of Pheræ, but master of
-nearly all the Thessalian cities (as Lykophron of Pheræ had partially
-succeeded in becoming thirty years before),[301] as well as of a
-large area of tributary circumjacent territory. The great instrument
-of his dominion was, a standing and well-appointed force of six
-thousand mercenary troops, from all parts of Greece. He possessed
-all the personal qualities requisite for conducting soldiers with
-the greatest effect. His bodily strength was great; his activity
-indefatigable; his self-command, both as to hardship and as to
-temptation, alike conspicuous. Always personally sharing both in the
-drill and in the gymnastics of the soldiers, and encouraging military
-merits with the utmost munificence, he had not only disciplined them,
-but inspired them with extreme warlike ardor and devotion to his
-person. Several of the neighboring tribes, together with Alketas,
-prince of the Molossi in Epirus, had been reduced to the footing
-of his dependent allies. Moreover, he had already defeated the
-Pharsalians, and stripped them of many of the towns which had once
-been connected with them, so that it only remained for him now to
-carry his arms against their city. But Jason was prudent, as well as
-daring. Though certain of success, he wished to avoid the odium of
-employing force, and the danger of having malcontents for subjects.
-He therefore proposed to Polydamas, in a private interview, that he
-(Polydamas) should bring Pharsalus under Jason’s dominion, accepting
-for himself the second place in Thessaly, under Jason installed as
-Tagus or president. The whole force of Thessaly thus united, with
-its array of tributary nations around, would be decidedly the first
-power in Greece, superior on land either to Sparta or Thebes, and
-at sea to Athens. And as to the Persian king, with his multitudes
-of unwarlike slaves, Jason regarded him as an enemy yet easier to
-overthrow; considering what had been achieved first by the Cyreians,
-and afterwards by Agesilaus.
-
-  [301] Xen. Hellen. ii, 3, 4.
-
-  The story (told in Plutarch, De Gen. Socrat. p. 583 F.) of Jason
-  sending a large sum of money to Thebes, at some period anterior
-  to the recapture of the Kadmeia, for the purpose of corrupting
-  Epaminondas,—appears not entitled to credit. Before that time,
-  Epaminondas was too little known to be worth corrupting;
-  moreover, Jason did not become _tagus_ of Thessaly until long
-  after the recapture of the Kadmeia (Xen. Hellen. vi, 1, 18, 19).
-
-Such were the propositions, and such the ambitious hopes, which the
-energetic despot of Pheræ had laid before Polydamas; who replied,
-that he himself had long been allied with Sparta, and that he could
-take no resolution hostile to her interests. “Go to Sparta, then
-(rejoined Jason), and give notice there, that I intend to attack
-Pharsalus, and that it is for them to afford you protection. If
-they cannot comply with the demand, you will be unfaithful to the
-interests of your city if you do not embrace my offers.” It was on
-this mission that Polydamas was now come to Sparta, to announce that
-unless aid could be sent to him, he should be compelled unwillingly
-to sever himself from her. “Recollect (he concluded) that the enemy
-against whom you will have to contend is formidable in every way,
-both from personal qualities and from power; so that nothing short of
-a first-rate force and commander will suffice. Consider, and tell me
-what you can do.”
-
-The Spartans, having deliberated on the point, returned a reply in
-the negative. Already a large force had been sent under Kleombrotus
-as essential to the defence of Phokis; moreover, the Athenians were
-now the stronger power at sea. Lastly, Jason had hitherto lent no
-active assistance to Thebes and Athens—which he would assuredly be
-provoked to do, if a Spartan army interfered against him in Thessaly.
-Accordingly the ephors told Polydamas plainly, that they were unable
-to satisfy his demands, recommending him to make the best terms that
-he could, both for Pharsalus and for himself. Returning to Thessaly,
-he resumed his negotiation with Jason, and promised substantial
-compliance with what was required. But he entreated to be spared the
-dishonor of admitting a foreign garrison into the citadel which had
-been confidentially entrusted to his care; engaging at the same time
-to bring his fellow-citizens into voluntary union with Jason, and
-tendering his two sons as hostages for faithful performance. All this
-was actually brought to pass. The politics of the Pharsalians were
-gently brought round, so that Jason, by their votes as well as the
-rest, was unanimously elected Tagus of Thessaly.[302]
-
-  [302] See the interesting account of this mission, and the speech
-  of Polydamas, which I have been compelled greatly to abridge (in
-  Xen. Hellen. vi, 1, 4-18).
-
-The dismissal of Polydamas implied a mortifying confession of
-weakness on the part of Sparta. It marks, too, an important stage in
-the real decline of her power. Eight years before, at the instance
-of the Akanthian envoys, backed by the Macedonian Amyntas, she had
-sent three powerful armies in succession to crush the liberal and
-promising confederacy of Olynthus, and to re-transfer the Grecian
-cities on the sea-coast to the Macedonian crown. The region to
-which her armies had been sent, was the extreme verge of Hellas.
-The parties in whose favor she acted, had scarcely the shadow of a
-claim, as friends or allies; while those _against_ whom she acted,
-had neither done nor threatened any wrong to her: moreover, the
-main ground on which her interference was invoked, was to hinder
-the free and equal confederation of Grecian cities. _Now_, a claim,
-and a strong claim, is made upon her by Polydamas of Pharsalus,
-an old friend and ally. It comes from a region much less distant;
-lastly, her political interest would naturally bid her arrest the
-menacing increase of an aggressive power already so formidable as
-that of Jason. Yet so seriously has the position of Sparta altered
-in the last eight years (382-374 B.C.), that she is now compelled
-to decline a demand which justice, sympathy, and political policy
-alike prompted her to grant. So unfortunate was it for the Olynthian
-confederacy, that their honorable and well-combined aspirations
-fell exactly during those few years in which Sparta was at her
-maximum of power! So unfortunate was such coincidence of time, not
-only for Olynthus, but for Greece generally:—since nothing but
-Spartan interference restored the Macedonian kings to the sea-coast,
-while the Olynthian confederacy, had it been allowed to expand,
-might probably have confined them to the interior, and averted the
-death-blow which came upon Grecian freedom in the next generation
-from their hands.
-
-The Lacedæmonians found some compensation for their reluctant
-abandonment of Polydamas, in the pacific propositions from Athens
-which liberated them from one of their chief enemies. But the peace
-thus concluded was scarcely even brought to execution. Timotheus,
-being ordered home from Korkyra, obeyed and set sail with his fleet.
-He had serving along with him some exiles from Zakynthus; and as
-he passed by that island in his homeward voyage, he disembarked
-these exiles upon it, aiding them in establishing a fortified post.
-Against this proceeding the Zakynthian government laid complaints
-at Sparta, where it was so deeply resented, that redress having
-been in vain demanded at Athens, the peace was at once broken off,
-and war again declared. A Lacedæmonian squadron of twenty-five sail
-was despatched to assist the Zakynthians,[303] while plans were
-formed for the acquisition of the more important island of Korkyra.
-The fleet of Timotheus having now been removed home, a malcontent
-Korkyræan party formed a conspiracy to introduce the Lacedæmonians
-as friends, and betray the island to them. A Lacedæmonian fleet of
-twenty-two triremes accordingly sailed thither, under color of a
-voyage to Sicily. But the Korkyræan government, having detected the
-plot, refused to receive them, took precautions for defence, and sent
-envoys to Athens to entreat assistance.
-
-  [303] Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 3; Diodor. xv, 45.
-
-  The statements of Diodorus are not clear in themselves; besides
-  that on some points, though not in the main, they contradict
-  Xenophon. Diodorus states that those exiles whom Timotheus
-  brought back to Zakynthus, were the philo-Spartan leaders, who
-  had been recently expelled for their misrule under the empire of
-  Sparta. This statement must doubtless be incorrect. The exiles
-  whom Timotheus restored must have belonged to the anti-Spartan
-  party in the island.
-
-  But Diodorus appears to me to have got into confusion by
-  representing that universal and turbulent reaction against the
-  philo-Spartan oligarchies, which really did not take place until
-  after the battle of Leuktra—as if it had taken place some three
-  years earlier. The events recounted in Diodor. xv, 40, seem to me
-  to belong to a period _after_ the battle of Leuktra.
-
-  Diodorus also seems to have made a mistake in saying that the
-  Athenians sent _Ktesikles_ as auxiliary commander to _Zakynthus_
-  (xv, 46); whereas this very commander is announced by himself
-  in the next chapter (as well as by Xenophon, who calls him
-  _Stesikles_) as sent to _Korkyra_ (Hellen. v, 2, 10).
-
-  I conceive Diodorus to have inadvertently mentioned this Athenian
-  expedition under Stesiklês or Ktesiklês, twice over; once as sent
-  to Zakynthus—then again, as sent to _Korkyra_. The latter is the
-  truth. No Athenian expedition at all appears on this occasion to
-  have gone to Zakynthus; for Xenophon enumerates the Zakynthians
-  among those who helped to fit out the fleet of Mnasippus (v, 2,
-  3).
-
-  On the other hand, I see no reason for calling in question the
-  reality of the two Lacedæmonian expeditions, in the last half of
-  374 B.C.—one under Aristokrates to Zakynthus, the other under
-  Alkidas to Korkyra—which Diodorus mentions (Diod. xv, 45, 46). It
-  is true that Xenophon does not notice either of them; but they
-  are noway inconsistent with the facts which he does state.
-
-The Lacedæmonians now resolved to attack Korkyra openly, with
-the full naval force of their confederacy. By the joint efforts
-of Sparta, Corinth, Leukas, Ambrakia, Elis, Zakynthus, Achaia,
-Epidaurus, Trœzen, Hermionê, and Halieis,—strengthened by pecuniary
-payments from other confederates, who preferred commuting their
-obligation to serve beyond sea,—a fleet of sixty triremes and a body
-of one thousand five hundred mercenary hoplites were assembled;
-besides some Lacedæmonians, probably Helots or Neodamodes.[304]
-At the same time, application was sent to Dionysius the Syracusan
-despot, for his coöperation against Korkyra, on the ground that the
-connection of that island with Athens had proved once, and might
-prove again, dangerous to his city.
-
-  [304] Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 3, 5, 16: compare v, 2, 21—about the
-  commutation of personal service for money.
-
-  Diodorus (xv, 47) agrees with Xenophon in the main about the
-  expedition of Mnasippus, though differing on several other
-  contemporary points.
-
-It was in the spring of 373 B.C. that this force proceeded against
-Korkyra, under the command of the Lacedæmonian Mnasippus; who, having
-driven in the Korkyræan fleet with the loss of four triremes, landed
-on the island, gained a victory, and confined the inhabitants within
-the walls of the city. He next carried his ravages round the adjacent
-lands, which were found in the highest state of cultivation, and
-full of the richest produce; fields admirably tilled,—vineyards in
-surpassing condition,—with splendid farm-buildings, well-appointed
-wine-cellars, and abundance of cattle as well as laboring-slaves.
-The invading soldiers, while enriching themselves by depredations
-on cattle and slaves, became so pampered with the plentiful stock
-around, that they refused to drink any wine that was not of the first
-quality.[305] Such is the picture given by Xenophon, an unfriendly
-witness, of the democratical Korkyra, in respect of its lauded
-economy, at the time when it was invaded by Mnasippus; a picture not
-less memorable than that presented by Thucydides (in the speech of
-Archidamus), of the flourishing agriculture surrounding democratical
-Athens, at the moment when the hand of the Peloponnesian devastator
-was first felt there in 431 B.C.[306]
-
-  [305] Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 6. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀπέβη (when Mnasippus
-  landed), ἐκράτει τε τῆς γῆς καὶ ἐδῄου ἐξειργασμένην μὲν παγκαλῶς
-  καὶ πεφυτευμένην τὴν χώραν, μεγαλοπρεπεῖς δὲ οἰκήσεις καὶ
-  οἰνῶνας κατεσκευασμένους ἔχουσαν ἐπὶ τῶν ἀγρῶν· ὥστ’ ἔφασαν τοὺς
-  στρατιώτας εἰς τοῦτο τρυφῆς ἐλθεῖν, ὥστ’ οὐκ ἐθέλειν πίνειν,
-  εἰ μὴ ἀνθοσμίας εἴη. Καὶ ἀνδράποδα δὲ καὶ βοσκήματα πάμπολλα
-  ἡλίσκετο ἐκ τῶν ἀγρῶν.
-
-  Οἶνον, implied in the antecedent word οἰνῶνας, is understood
-  after πίνειν.
-
-  [306] Thucyd. i, 82. (Speech of Archidamus) μὴ γὰρ ἄλλο τι
-  νομίσητε τὴν γῆν αὐτῶν (of the Athenians) ἢ ὅμηρον ἔχειν, καὶ οὐχ
-  ἧσσον ὅσῳ ἄμεινον ἐξείργασται.
-
-  Compare the earlier portion of the same speech (c. 80), and the
-  second speech of the same Archidamus (ii, 11).
-
-  To the same purpose Thucydides speaks, respecting the properties
-  of the wealthy men established throughout the area of
-  Attica,—οἱ δὲ δυνατοὶ καλὰ κτήματα κατὰ τὴν χώραν οἰκοδομίαις
-  τε καὶ πολυτελέσι κατασκευαῖς ἀπολωλεκότες (_i. e._ by the
-  invasion)—Thucyd. ii, 65.
-
-With such plentiful quarters for his soldiers, Mnasippus encamped
-on a hill near the city walls, cutting off those within from
-supplies out of the country, while he at the same time blocked
-up the harbor with his fleet. The Korkyræans soon began to be in
-want. Yet they seemed to have no chance of safety except through
-aid from the Athenians; to whom they had sent envoys with pressing
-entreaties,[307] and who had now reason to regret their hasty consent
-(in the preceding year) to summon home the fleet of Timotheus from
-the island. However, Timotheus was again appointed admiral of a new
-fleet to be sent thither; while a division of six hundred peltasts,
-under Stesiklês, was directed to be despatched by the quickest
-route, to meet the immediate necessities of the Korkyræans, during
-the delays unavoidable in the preparation of the main fleet and its
-circumnavigation of Peloponnesus. These peltasts were conveyed by
-land across Thessaly and Epirus, to the coast opposite Korkyra; upon
-which island they were enabled to land through the intervention of
-Alketas solicited by the Athenians. They were fortunate enough to
-get into the town; where they not only brought the news that a large
-Athenian fleet might be speedily expected, but also contributed much
-to the defence. Without such encouragement and aid, the Korkyræans
-would hardly have held out; for the famine within the walls increased
-daily; and at length became so severe, that many of the citizens
-deserted, and numbers of slaves were thrust out. Mnasippus refused to
-receive them, making public proclamation that every one who deserted
-should be sold into slavery; and since deserters nevertheless
-continued to come, he caused them to be scourged back to the
-city-gates. As for the unfortunate slaves, being neither received by
-him, nor re-admitted within, many perished outside of the gates from
-sheer hunger.[308]
-
-  [307] The envoys from Korkyra to Athens (mentioned by Xenophon,
-  v, 2, 9) would probably cross Epirus and Thessaly, through the
-  aid of Alketas. This would be a much quicker way for them than
-  the circumnavigation of Peloponnesus: and it would suggest
-  the same way for the detachment of Stesiklês presently to be
-  mentioned.
-
-  [308] Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 15.
-
-Such spectacles of misery portended so visibly the approaching hour
-of surrender, that the besieging army became careless, and the
-general insolent. Though his military chest was well-filled, through
-the numerous pecuniary payments which he had received from allies in
-commutation of personal service,—yet he had dismissed several of his
-mercenaries without pay, and had kept all of them unpaid for the last
-two months. His present temper made him not only more harsh towards
-his own soldiers,[309] but also less vigilant in the conduct of the
-siege. Accordingly the besieged, detecting from their watch-towers
-the negligence of the guards, chose a favorable opportunity and
-made a vigorous sally. Mnasippus, on seeing his outposts driven in,
-armed himself and hastened forward with the Lacedæmonians around him
-to sustain them; giving orders to the officers of the mercenaries
-to bring their men forward also. But these officers replied, that
-they could not answer for the obedience of soldiers without pay;
-upon which Mnasippus was so incensed, that he struck them with his
-stick and with the shaft of his spear. Such an insult inflamed still
-farther the existing discontent. Both officers and soldiers came to
-the combat discouraged and heartless, while the Athenian peltasts and
-the Korkyræan hoplites, rushing out of several gates at once, pressed
-their attack with desperate energy. Mnasippus, after displaying
-great personal valor, was at length slain, and all his troops, being
-completely routed, fled back to the fortified camp in which their
-stores were preserved. Even this too might have been taken, and the
-whole armament destroyed, had the besieged attacked it at once. But
-they were astonished at their own success. Mistaking the numerous
-camp-followers for soldiers in reserve, they retired back to the city.
-
-  [309] Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 16.
-
-  Ὁ δ’ αὖ Μνάσιππος ὁρῶν ταῦτα, ἐνόμιζέ τε ὅσον οὐκ ἤδη ἔχειν τὴν
-  πόλιν, καὶ περὶ τοὺς μισθοφόρους, ἐκαινούργει, καὶ τοὺς μέν τινας
-  αὐτῶν ἀπομίσθους ἐπεποιήκει, τοῖς δ’ οὖσι καὶ δυοῖν ἤδη μηνοῖν
-  ὤφειλε τὸν μισθὸν, οὐκ ἀπορῶν, ὡς ἐλέγετο, χρημάτων, etc.
-
-Their victory was however so complete, as to reopen easy
-communication with the country, to procure sufficient temporary
-supplies, and to afford a certainty of holding out until
-reinforcement from Athens should arrive. Such reinforcement, indeed,
-was already on its way, and had been announced as approaching to
-Hypermenês (second under the deceased Mnasippus), who had now
-succeeded to the command. Terrified at the news, he hastened to sail
-round from his station,—which he had occupied with the fleet to
-block up the harbor,—to the fortified camp. Here he first put the
-slaves, as well as the property, aboard of his transports, and sent
-them away; remaining himself to defend the camp with the soldiers
-and marines,—but remaining only a short time, and then taking these
-latter also aboard the triremes. He thus completely evacuated the
-island, making off for Leukas. But such had been the hurry,—and so
-great the terror lest the Athenian fleet should arrive,—that much
-corn and wine, many slaves, and even many sick and wounded soldiers,
-were left behind. To the victorious Korkyræans, these acquisitions
-were not needed to enhance the value of a triumph which rescued them
-from capture, slavery, or starvation.[310]
-
-  [310] Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 18-26; Diodor. xv, 47.
-
-The Athenian fleet had not only been tardy in arriving, so as to
-incur much risk of finding the island already taken,—but when it
-did come, it was commanded by Iphikrates, Chabrias, and the orator
-Kallistratus,[311]—not by Timotheus, whom the original vote of the
-people had nominated. It appears that Timotheus,—who (in April
-373 B.C.), when the Athenians first learned that the formidable
-Lacedæmonian fleet had begun to attack Korkyra, had been directed to
-proceed thither forthwith with a fleet of sixty triremes,—found a
-difficulty in manning his ships at Athens, and therefore undertook
-a preliminary cruise to procure both seamen and contributory funds,
-from the maritime allies. His first act was to transport the six
-hundred peltasts under Stesiklês to Thessaly, where he entered into
-relations with Jason of Pheræ. He persuaded the latter to become
-the ally of Athens, and to further the march of Stesiklês with
-his division by land across Thessaly over the passes of Pindus, to
-Epirus; where Alketas, who was at once the ally of Athens, and the
-dependent of Jason, conveyed them by night across the strait from
-Epirus to Korkyra. Having thus opened important connection with the
-powerful Thessalian despot, and obtained from him a very seasonable
-service, together (perhaps) with some seamen from Pagasæ to man his
-fleet,—Timotheus proceeded onward to the ports of Macedonia, where he
-also entered into relations with Amyntas, receiving from him signal
-marks of private favor,—and then to Thrace as well as the neighboring
-islands. His voyage procured for him valuable subsidies in money and
-supplies of seamen, besides some new adhesions and deputies to the
-Athenian confederacy.
-
-  [311] Xen. Hellen. vi. 2, 39.
-
-This preliminary cruise of Timotheus, undertaken with the general
-purpose of collecting means for the expedition to Korkyra, began
-in the month of April or commencement of May 373 B.C.[312] On
-departing, it appears, he had given orders to such of the allies
-as were intended to form part of the expedition, to assemble at
-Kalauria (an island off Trœzen, consecrated to Poseidon) where he
-would himself come and take them up to proceed onward. Pursuant to
-such order, several contingents mustered at this island,—among them
-the Bœotians, who sent several triremes, though in the preceding
-year it had been alleged against them that they contributed nothing
-to sustain the naval exertions of Athens. But Timotheus stayed out a
-long time. Reliance was placed upon him, and upon the money which he
-was to bring home, for the pay of the fleet; and the unpaid triremes
-accordingly fell into distress and disorganization at Kalauria,
-awaiting his return.[313] In the mean time fresh news reached Athens
-that Korkyra was much pressed; so that great indignation was felt
-against the absent admiral, for employing in his present cruise
-a precious interval essential to enable him to reach the island
-in time. Iphikrates (who had recently come back from serving with
-Pharnabazus, in an unavailing attempt to reconquer Egypt for the
-Persian king) and the orator Kallistratus, were especially loud in
-their accusations against him. And as the very salvation of Korkyra
-required pressing haste, the Athenians cancelled the appointment of
-Timotheus even during his absence,—naming Iphikrates, Kallistratus,
-and Chabrias, to equip a fleet and go round to Korkyra without
-delay.[314]
-
-  [312] The manner in which I have described the preliminary
-  cruise of Timotheus, will be found (I think) the only way of
-  uniting into one consistent narrative the scattered fragments of
-  information which we possess respecting his proceedings in this
-  year.
-
-  The date of his setting out from Athens is exactly determined by
-  Demosthenes, adv. Timoth. p. 1186—the month Munychion, in the
-  archonship of Sokratidês—April 373 B.C. Diodorus says that he
-  proceeded to Thrace, and that he acquired several new members for
-  the confederacy (xv, 47); Xenophon states that he sailed towards
-  the islands (Hellen. vi, 2, 12); two statements not directly the
-  same, yet not incompatible with each other. In his way to Thrace,
-  he would naturally pass up the Eubœan strait and along the coast
-  of Thessaly.
-
-  We know that Stesikles and his peltasts must have got to Korkyra,
-  not by sea circumnavigating Peloponnesus, but by land across
-  Thessaly and Epirus; a much quicker way. Xenophon tells us that
-  the Athenians “asked Alketas to help them to cross over from
-  the mainland of Epirus to the opposite island of Korkyra: and
-  that they were in consequence carried across by night,”—Ἀλκέτου
-  δὲ ἐδεήθησαν ~συνδιαβιβάσαι~ τούτους· καὶ οὗτοι μὲν ~νυκτὸς
-  διακομισθέντες~ που τῆς χώρας, εἰσῆλθον εἰς τὴν πόλιν.
-
-  Now these troops could not have got to Epirus without crossing
-  Thessaly; nor could they have crossed Thessaly without the
-  permission and escort of Jason. Moreover, Alketas himself was the
-  dependent of Jason, whose goodwill was therefore doubly necessary
-  (Xen. Hellen. vi, 1, 7).
-
-  We farther know that in the year preceding (374 B.C.), Jason
-  was not yet in alliance with Athens, nor even inclined to
-  become so, though the Athenians were very anxious for it (Xen.
-  Hellen. vi, 1, 10). But in November 373 B.C., Jason (as well as
-  Alketas) appears as the established ally of Athens; not as then
-  becoming her ally for the first time, but as so completely an
-  established ally, that he comes to Athens for the express purpose
-  of being present at the trial of Timotheus and of deposing in his
-  favor—Ἀφικομένου γὰρ Ἀλκέτου καὶ Ἰάσονος ὡς τοῦτον (Timotheus)
-  ἐν τῷ Μαιμακτηριῶνι μηνὶ τῷ ἐπ’ Ἀστείου ἄρχοντος, ~ἐπὶ τὸν
-  ἀγῶνα τὸν τούτου, βοηθησόντων αὐτῷ~ καὶ καταγομένων εἰς τὴν
-  οἰκίαν τὴν ἐν Πειραιεῖ, etc. (Demosthen. adv. Timoth. c. 5, p.
-  1190). Again,—Αὐτὸν δὲ τοῦτον (Timotheus) ~ἐξαιτουμένων μὲν~
-  τῶν ἐπιτηδείων καὶ οἰκείων αὐτῷ ἁπάντων, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ~Ἀλκέτου
-  καὶ Ἰάσονος, συμμάχων ὄντων ὑμῖν~, μόλις μὲν ἐπείσθητε ἀφεῖναι
-  (Demosthen. ib. c, 3, p. 1187.) We see from hence, therefore,
-  that the first alliance between Jason and Athens had been
-  contracted in the early part of 373 B.C.; we see farther that it
-  had been contracted by Timotheus in his preliminary cruise, which
-  is the only reasonable way of explaining the strong interest felt
-  by Jason as well as by Alketas in the fate of Timotheus, inducing
-  them to take the remarkable step of coming to Athens to promote
-  his acquittal. It was Timotheus who had first made the alliance
-  of Athens with Alketas (Diodor. xv, 36; Cornel. Nepos, Timoth. c.
-  2), a year or two before.
-
-  Combining all the circumstances here stated, I infer with
-  confidence, that Timotheus, in his preliminary cruise, visited
-  Jason, contracted alliance between him and Athens, and prevailed
-  upon him to forward the division of Stesikles across Thessaly to
-  Epirus and Korkyra.
-
-  In this oration of Demosthenes, there are three or four exact
-  dates mentioned, which are a great aid to the understanding of
-  the historical events of the time. That oration is spoken by
-  Apollodorus, claiming from Timotheus the repayment of money lent
-  to him by Pasion the banker, father of Apollodorus; and the dates
-  specified are copied from entries made by Pasion at the time in
-  his commercial books (c. 1. p. 1186; c. 9. p. 1197).
-
-  [313] Demosthen. adv. Timoth. c. 3, p. 1188. ἄμισθον μὲν τὸ
-  στράτευμα καταλελύσθαι ἐν Καλαυρίᾳ, etc.—ibid. c. 10, p. 1199.
-  προσῆκε γὰρ τῷ μὲν Βοιωτίῳ ἄρχοντι παρὰ τούτου (Timotheus) τὴν
-  τροφὴν τοῖς ἐν ταῖς ναυσὶ παραλαμβάνειν· ~ἐκ γὰρ τῶν κοινῶν
-  συντάξεων ἡ μισθοφορία ἦν τῷ στρατεύματι· τὰ δὲ χρήματα σὺ~
-  (Timotheus) ~ἅπαντα ἐξέλεξας ἐκ τῶν συμμάχων~· καὶ σὲ ἔδει αὐτῶν
-  λόγον ἀποδοῦναι.
-
-  [314] Xenoph. Hellen. vi, 2, 12, 13, 39; Demosthen. adv. Timoth.
-  c. 3. p. 1188.
-
-Before they could get ready, Timotheus returned; bringing several new
-adhesions to the confederacy, with a flourishing account of general
-success.[315] He went down to Kalauria to supply the deficiencies
-of funds, and make up for the embarrassments which his absence had
-occasioned. But he could not pay the Bœotian trierarchs without
-borrowing money for the purpose on his own credit; for though the sum
-brought home from his voyage was considerable, it would appear that
-the demands upon him had been greater still. At first an accusation,
-called for in consequence of the pronounced displeasure of the
-public, was entered against him by Iphikrates and Kallistratus. But
-as these two had been named joint admirals for the expedition to
-Korkyra, which admitted of no delay,—his trial was postponed until
-the autumn; a postponement advantageous to the accused, and doubtless
-seconded by his friends.[316]
-
-  [315] Diodor. xv, 47.
-
-  [316] I collect what is here stated from Demosthen. adv. Timoth.
-  c. 3. p. 1188; c. 10. p. 1199. It is there said that Timotheus
-  was about to sail home from Kalauria to take his trial; yet it
-  is certain that his trial did not take place until the month
-  Mæmakterion or November. Accordingly, the trial must have been
-  postponed, in consequence of the necessity for Iphikrates and
-  Kallistratus going away at once to preserve Korkyra.
-
-Meanwhile Iphikrates adopted the most strenuous measures for
-accelerating the equipment of his fleet. In the present temper of
-the public, and in the known danger of Korkyra, he was allowed
-(though perhaps Timotheus, a few weeks earlier, would not have
-been allowed) not only to impress seamen in the port, but even to
-coërce the trierarchs with severity,[317] and to employ all the
-triremes reserved for the coast-guard of Attica, as well as the two
-sacred triremes called Paralus and Salaminia. He thus completed a
-fleet of seventy sail, promising to send back a large portion of it
-directly, if matters took a favorable turn at Korkyra. Expecting to
-find on the watch for him a Lacedæmonian fleet fully equal to his
-own, he arranged his voyage so as to combine the maximum of speed
-with training to his seamen, and with preparation for naval combat.
-The larger sails of an ancient trireme were habitually taken out
-of the ship previous to a battle, as being inconvenient aboard:
-Iphikrates left such sails at Athens,—employed even the smaller sails
-sparingly,—and kept his seamen constantly at the oar; which greatly
-accelerated his progress, at the same time that it kept the men in
-excellent training. Every day he had to stop, for meals and rest, on
-an enemy’s shore; and these halts were conducted with such extreme
-dexterity as well as precision, that the least possible time was
-consumed, not enough for any local hostile force to get together. On
-reaching Sphakteria, Iphikrates learnt for the first time the defeat
-and death of Mnasippus. Yet not fully trusting the correctness of
-his information, he still persevered both in his celerity and his
-precautions, until he reached Kephallenia, where he first fully
-satisfied himself that the danger of Korkyra was past. The excellent
-management of Iphikrates throughout this expedition is spoken of in
-terms of admiration by Xenophon.[318]
-
-  [317] Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 14. Ὁ δὲ (Iphikrates) ἐπεὶ κατέστη
-  στρατηγὸς, μάλα ὀξέως τὰς ναῦς ἐπληροῦτο, καὶ τοὺς τριηράρχους
-  ἠνάγκαζε.
-
-  [318] Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 27, 32.
-
-Having no longer any fear of the Lacedæmonian fleet, the Athenian
-commander probably now sent back the home-squadron of Attica which
-he had been allowed to take, but which could ill be spared from
-the defence of the coast.[319] After making himself master of some
-of the Kephallenian cities, he then proceeded onward to Korkyra;
-where the squadron of ten triremes from Syracuse was now on the
-point of arriving; sent by Dionysius to aid the Lacedæmonians, but
-as yet uninformed of their flight. Iphikrates, posting scouts on the
-hills to give notice of their approach, set apart twenty triremes
-to be ready for moving at the first signal. So excellent was his
-discipline, (says Xenophon,) that “the moment the signal was made,
-the ardor of all the crews was a fine thing to see; there was not a
-man who did not hasten at a run to take his place aboard.”[320] The
-ten Syracusan triremes, after their voyage across from the Iapygian
-cape, had halted to rest their men on one of the northern points of
-Korkyra; where they were found by Iphikrates and captured, with all
-their crews and the admiral Anippus; one alone escaping, through the
-strenuous efforts of her captain, the Rhodian Melanôpus. Iphikrates
-returned in triumph, towing his nine prizes into the harbor of
-Korkyra. The crews, being sold or ransomed, yielded to him a sum
-of sixty talents; the admiral Anippus was retained in expectation
-of a higher ransom, but slew himself shortly afterwards from
-mortification.[321]
-
-  [319] Compare vi, 2, 14—with vi, 2, 39.
-
-  [320] Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 34.
-
-  [321] Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 35, 38; Diodor. xv, 47.
-
-  We find a story recounted by Diodorus (xvi, 57), that the
-  Athenians under Iphikrates captured, off Korkyra, some triremes
-  of Dionysius, carrying sacred ornaments to Delphi and Olympia.
-  They detained and appropriated the valuable cargo, of which
-  Dionysius afterwards loudly complained.
-
-  This story (if there be any truth in it) can hardly allude to
-  any other triremes than those under Anippus. Yet Xenophon would
-  probably have mentioned the story, if he had heard it; since
-  it presents the enemies of Sparta as committing sacrilege. And
-  whether the triremes were carrying sacred ornaments or not, it is
-  certain that they were coming to take part in the war, and were
-  therefore legitimate prizes.
-
-Though the sum thus realized enabled Iphikrates for the time to pay
-his men, yet the suicide of Anippus was a pecuniary disappointment
-to him, and he soon began to need money. This consideration induced
-him to consent to the return of his colleague Kallistratus; who,—an
-orator by profession, and not on friendly terms with Iphikrates,—had
-come out against his own consent. Iphikrates had himself singled
-out both Kallistratus and Chabrias as his colleagues. He was
-not indifferent to the value of their advice, nor did he fear
-the criticisms, even of rivals, on what they really saw in his
-proceedings. But he had accepted the command under hazardous
-circumstances; not only from the insulting displacement of Timotheus,
-and the provocation consequently given to a powerful party attached
-to the son of Konon,—but also in great doubts whether he could
-succeed in relieving Korkyra, in spite of the rigorous coërcion
-which he applied to man his fleet. Had the island been taken and had
-Iphikrates failed, he would have found himself exposed to severe
-crimination, and multiplied enemies, at Athens. Perhaps Kallistratus
-and Chabrias, if left at home, might in that case have been among
-his assailants,—so that it was important to him to identify both of
-them with his good or ill success, and to profit by the military
-ability of the latter, as well as by the oratorical talent of the
-former.[322] As the result of the expedition, however, was altogether
-favorable, all such anxieties were removed. Iphikrates could well
-afford to part with both his colleagues; and Kallistratus engaged,
-that if permitted to go home, he would employ all his efforts to
-keep the fleet well paid from the public treasury; or if this were
-impracticable, that he would labor to procure peace.[323] So terrible
-are the difficulties which the Grecian generals now experience in
-procuring money from Athens, (or from other cities in whose service
-they are acting,) for payment of their troops! Iphikrates suffered
-the same embarrassment which Timotheus had experienced the year
-before,—and which will be found yet more painfully felt as we advance
-forward in the history. For the present, he subsisted his seamen
-by finding work for them on the farms of the Korkyræans, where
-there must doubtless have been ample necessity for repairs after
-the devastations of Mnasippus, while he crossed over to Akarnania
-with his peltasts and hoplites, and there obtained service with the
-townships friendly to Athens against such others as were friendly to
-Sparta; especially against the warlike inhabitants of the strong town
-called Thyrieis.[324]
-
-  [322] Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 39. The meaning of Xenophon here is not
-  very clear, nor is even the text perfect.
-
-  Ἐγὼ μὲν δὴ ταύτην τὴν στρατηγίαν τῶν Ἰφικράτους οὐχ ἥκιστα
-  ἐπαινῶ· ἔπειτα καὶ τὸ ~προσελέσθαι κελεῦσαι ἑαυτῷ~ (this shows
-  that Iphikrates himself singled them out) Καλλίστρατόν τε τὸν
-  δημήγορον, οὐ μάλα ἐπιτήδειον ὄντα, καὶ Χαβρίαν, μάλα στρατηγικὸν
-  νομιζόμενον. Εἴτε γὰρ φρονίμους αὐτοὺς ἡγούμενος εἶναι,
-  συμβούλους λαβεῖν ἐβούλετο, σῶφρόν μοι δοκεῖ διαπράξασθαι· ~εἴτε
-  ἀντιπάλους νομίζων~, οὕτω θρασέως (some words in the text seem to
-  be wanting) ... μήτε καταῤῥᾳθυμῶν μήτε καταμελῶν φαίνεσθαι μηδὲν,
-  μεγαλοφρονοῦντος ἐφ’ ἑαυτῷ τοῦτό μοι δοκεῖ ἀνδρὸς εἶναι.
-
-  I follow Dr. Thirlwall’s translation of οὐ μάλα ἐπιτήδειον, which
-  appears to me decidedly preferable. The word ἠφίει (vi, 3, 3)
-  shows that Kallistratus was an unwilling colleague.
-
-  [323] Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 3. ὑποσχόμενος γὰρ Ἰφικράτει
-  (Kallistratus) ~εἰ αὐτὸν ἠφίει~, ἢ χρήματα πέμψειν τῷ ναυτικῷ, ἢ
-  εἰρήνην ποιήσειν, etc.
-
-  [324] Xen. Hellen. iv, 2, 37, 38.
-
-The happy result of the Korkyræan expedition, imparting universal
-satisfaction at Athens, was not less beneficial to Timotheus than
-to Iphikrates. It was in November, 373 B.C., that the former, as
-well as his quæstor or military treasurer Antimachus, underwent each
-his trial. Kallistratus, having returned home, pleaded against the
-quæstor, perhaps against Timotheus also, as one of the accusers;[325]
-though probably in a spirit of greater gentleness and moderation,
-in consequence of his recent joint success and of the general good
-temper prevalent in the city. And while the edge of the accusation
-against Timotheus was thus blunted, the defence was strengthened
-not merely by numerous citizen friends speaking in his favor with
-increased confidence, but also by the unusual phenomenon of two
-powerful foreign supporters. At the request of Timotheus, both
-Alketas of Epirus, and Jason of Pheræ, came to Athens a little
-before the trial, to appear as witnesses in his favor. They were
-received and lodged by him in his house in the Hippodamian Agora,
-the principal square of the Peiræus. And as he was then in some
-embarrassment for want of money, he found it necessary to borrow
-various articles of finery in order to do them honor,—clothes,
-bedding, and two silver drinking bowls,—from Pasion, a wealthy
-banker near at hand. These two important witnesses would depose to
-the zealous service and estimable qualities of Timotheus; who had
-inspired them with warm interest, and had been the means of bringing
-them into alliance with Athens; an alliance, which they had sealed
-at once by conveying Stesikles and his division across Thessaly and
-Epirus to Korkyra. The minds of the dikastery would be powerfully
-affected by seeing before them such a man as Jason of Pheræ, at
-that moment the most powerful individual in Greece; and we are
-not surprised to learn that Timotheus was acquitted. His treasurer
-Antimachus, not tried by the same dikastery, and doubtless not so
-powerfully befriended, was less fortunate. He was condemned to death,
-and his property confiscated; the dikastery doubtless believing (on
-what evidence we do not know) that he had been guilty of fraud in
-dealing with the public money, which had caused serious injury at a
-most important crisis. Under the circumstances of the case, he was
-held responsible as treasurer, for the pecuniary department of the
-money-levying command confided to Timotheus by the people.
-
-  [325] Demosthen. cont. Timoth. c. 9, p. 1197, 1198.
-
-As to the military conduct, for which Timotheus himself would be
-personally accountable, we can only remark that having been invested
-with the command for the special purpose of relieving the besieged
-Korkyra, he appears to have devoted an unreasonable length of time
-to his own self-originated cruise elsewhere; though such cruise was
-in itself beneficial to Athens; insomuch that if Korkyra had really
-been taken, the people would have had good reason for imputing the
-misfortune to his delay.[326] And although he was now acquitted, his
-reputation suffered so much by the whole affair, that in the ensuing
-spring he was glad to accept an invitation of the Persian satraps,
-who offered him the command of the Grecian mercenaries in their
-service for the Egyptian war; the same command from which Iphikrates
-had retired a little time before.[327]
-
-  [326] The narrative here given of the events of 373 B.C., so far
-  as they concern Timotheus and Iphikrates, appears to me the only
-  way of satisfying the exigencies of the case, and following the
-  statements of Xenophon and Demosthenes.
-
-  Schneider in his note, indeed, implies, and Rehdantz (Vitæ
-  Iphicratis, etc. p. 86) contends, that Iphikrates did not take
-  command of the fleet, nor depart from Athens, until _after_ the
-  trial of Timotheus. There are some expressions in the oration of
-  Demosthenes, which might seem to countenance this supposition;
-  but it will be found hardly admissible, if we attentively study
-  the series of facts.
-
-  1. Mnasippus arrived with his armament at Korkyra, and began the
-  siege, either before April, or at the first opening of April, 373
-  B.C. For his arrival there, and the good condition of his fleet,
-  was known at Athens _before_ Timotheus received his appointment
-  as admiral of the fleet for the relief of the island (Xen.
-  Hellen. vi, 2, 10, 11, 12).
-
-  2. Timotheus sailed from Peiræus on this appointed voyage, in
-  April 373 B.C.
-
-  3. Timotheus was tried at Athens in November 373 B.C.; Alketas
-  and Jason being then present, as allies of Athens and witnesses
-  in his favor.
-
-  Now, if the truth were, that Iphikrates did not depart from
-  Athens with his fleet until after the trial of Timotheus in
-  November, we must suppose that the siege of Korkyra by Mnasippus
-  lasted seven months, and the cruise of Timotheus nearly five
-  months. Both the one and the other are altogether improbable. The
-  Athenians would never have permitted Korkyra to incur so terrible
-  a chance of capture, simply in order to wait for the trial of
-  Timotheus. Xenophon does not expressly say how long the siege of
-  Korkyra lasted; but from his expressions about the mercenaries of
-  Mnasippus (that already pay was owing to them for _as much as two
-  months_,—καὶ δυοῖν ~ἤδη~ μηνοῖν—vi, 2, 16), we should infer that
-  it could hardly have lasted more than three months in all. Let
-  us say, that it lasted four months; the siege would then be over
-  in August, and we know that the fleet of Iphikrates arrived just
-  after the siege was concluded.
-
-  Besides, is it credible, that Timotheus—named as admiral for the
-  express purpose of relieving Korkyra, and knowing that Mnasippus
-  was already besieging the place with a formidable fleet—would
-  have spent so long a time as _five_ months in his preliminary
-  cruise?
-
-  I presume Timotheus to have stayed out in this cruise about _two_
-  months; and even this length of time would be quite sufficient to
-  raise strong displeasure against him at Athens, when the danger
-  and privations of Korkyra were made known as hourly increasing.
-  At the time when Timotheus came back to Athens, he found all
-  this displeasure actually afloat against him, excited in part
-  by the strong censures of Iphikrates and Kallistratus (Dem.
-  cont. Timoth. p. 1187. c. 3). The adverse orations in the public
-  assembly, besides inflaming the wrath of the Athenians against
-  him, caused a vote to be passed deposing him from his command to
-  Korkyra, and nominating in his place Iphikrates, with Chabrias
-  and Kallistratus. Probably those who proposed this vote would at
-  the same time give notice that they intended to prefer a judicial
-  accusation against Timotheus for breach or neglect of duty. But
-  it would be the interest of all parties to postpone _actual
-  trial_ until the fate of Korkyra should be determined, for which
-  purpose the saving of time would be precious. Already too much
-  time had been lost, and Iphikrates was well aware that his whole
-  chance of success depended on celerity; while Timotheus and his
-  friends would look upon postponement as an additional chance
-  of softening the public displeasure, besides enabling them to
-  obtain the attendance of Jason and Alketas. Still, though trial
-  was postponed, Timotheus was from this moment under impeachment.
-  The oration composed by Demosthenes therefore (delivered by
-  Apollodorus as plaintiff, several years afterwards),—though
-  speaking loosely, and not distinguishing the angry speeches
-  against Timotheus _in the public assembly_ (in June 373 B.C.,
-  or thereabouts, whereby his deposition was obtained), from the
-  accusing speeches against him at his actual trial in November
-  373 B.C., _before the dikastery_—is nevertheless not incorrect
-  in saying,—ἐπειδὴ δ’ ἀπεχειροτονήθη μὲν ὑφ’ ὑμῶν στρατηγὸς
-  διὰ τὸ μὴ περιπλεῦσαι Πελοπόννησον, ἐπὶ ~κρίσει δὲ παρεδέδοτο
-  εἰς τὸν δῆμον~, αἰτίας τῆς μεγίστης τυχὼν (c. 3, p. 1187)—and
-  again respecting his coming from Kalauria to Athens—μέλλων
-  τοίνυν καταπλεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν κρίσιν, ἐν Καλαυρίᾳ δανείζεται, etc.
-  (p. 1188, 1189.) That Timotheus had been handed over to the
-  people for trial—that he was sailing back from Kalauria _for
-  his trial_—might well be asserted respecting his position in
-  the month of June, though his trial did not actually take place
-  until November. I think it cannot be doubted that the triremes at
-  Kalauria would form a part of that fleet which actually went to
-  Korkyra under Iphikrates; not waiting to go thither until after
-  the trial of Timotheus in November, but departing as soon as
-  Iphikrates could get ready, probably about July 373 B.C.
-
-  Rehdantz argues that if Iphikrates departed with the fleet in
-  July, he must have returned to Athens in November to the trial
-  of Timotheus, which is contrary to Xenophon’s affirmation that
-  he remained in the Ionian sea until 371 B.C. But if we look
-  attentively at the oration of Demosthenes, we shall see that
-  there is no certain ground for affirming Iphikrates to have
-  been present in Athens in November, during the actual trial of
-  Timotheus. The phrases in p. 1187—ἐφειστήκει δ’ αὐτῷ Καλλίστρατος
-  καὶ Ἰφικράτης ... οὕτω δὲ διέθεσαν ὑμᾶς κατηγοροῦντες τούτου
-  αὐτοί τε καὶ οἱ συναγορεύοντες αὐτοῖς, etc., may be well
-  explained, so far as Iphikrates is concerned, by supposing them
-  to allude to those pronounced censures in the public assembly
-  whereby the vote of deposition against Timotheus was obtained,
-  and whereby the general indignation against him was first
-  excited. I therefore see no reason for affirming that Iphikrates
-  was actually present at the trial of Timotheus in November. But
-  Kallistratus was really present at the trial (see c. 9. p. 1197,
-  1198); which consists well enough with the statement of Xenophon,
-  that this orator obtained permission from Iphikrates to leave
-  him at Korkyra and come back to Athens (vi, 3, 3). Kallistratus
-  directed his accusation mainly against Antimachus, the treasurer
-  of Timotheus. And it appears to me that under the circumstances
-  of the case, Iphikrates, having carried his point of superseding
-  Timotheus in the command and gaining an important success at
-  Korkyra—might be well-pleased to be dispensed from the obligation
-  of formally accusing him before the dikastery, in opposition to
-  Jason and Alketas, as well as to a powerful body of Athenian
-  friends.
-
-  Diodorus (xv, 47) makes a statement quite different from
-  Xenophon. He says that Timotheus was at first deposed from
-  his command, but afterwards forgiven and re-appointed by the
-  people (jointly with Iphikrates) in consequence of the great
-  accession of force which he had procured in his preliminary
-  cruise. Accordingly the fleet, one hundred and thirty triremes
-  in number, was despatched to Korkyra under the joint command
-  of Iphikrates and Timotheus. Diodorus makes no mention of the
-  trial of Timotheus. This account is evidently quite distinct
-  from that of Xenophon, which latter is on all grounds to be
-  preferred, especially as its main points are in conformity with
-  the Demosthenic oration.
-
-  [327] Demosth. cont. Timoth. c. 6. p. 1191; c. 8. p. 1194.
-
-  We see from another passage of the same oration, that the
-  creditors of Timotheus reckoned upon his making a large sum
-  of money in the Persian service (c. 1, p. 1185). This farther
-  illustrates what I have said in a previous note, about the
-  motives of the distinguished Athenian officers to take service in
-  foreign parts away from Athens.
-
-That admiral, whose naval force had been reinforced by a large
-number of Korkyræan triremes, was committing without opposition
-incursions against Akarnania, and the western coast of Peloponnesus;
-insomuch that the expelled Messenians, in their distant exile at
-Hesperides in Libya, began to conceive hopes of being restored by
-Athens to Naupaktus, which they had occupied under her protection
-during the Peloponnesian war.[328] And while the Athenians were
-thus masters at sea both east and west of Peloponnesus,[329] Sparta
-and her confederates, discouraged by the ruinous failure of their
-expedition against Korkyra in the preceding year, appear to have
-remained inactive. With such mental predispositions, they were
-powerfully affected by religious alarm arising from certain frightful
-earthquakes and inundations with which Peloponnesus was visited
-during this year, and which were regarded as marks of the wrath of
-the god Poseidon. More of these formidable visitations occurred this
-year in Peloponnesus than had ever before been known; especially one,
-the worst of all, whereby the two towns of Helikê and Bura in Achaia
-were destroyed, together with a large portion of their population.
-Ten Lacedæmonian triremes, which happened to be moored on this shore
-on the night when the calamity occurred, were destroyed by the rush
-of the waters.[330]
-
-  [328] Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 38; Pausanias, iv, 26, 3.
-
-  [329] See a curious testimony to this fact in Demosthen. cont.
-  Neæram, c. 12, p. 1357.
-
-  [330] Diodor. xi, 48, 49; Pausan. vii, 25; Ælian. Hist. Animal.
-  xi, 19.
-
-  Kallisthenes seems to have described at large, with appropriate
-  religious comments, numerous physical portents which occurred
-  about this time (see Kallisthen. Fragm. 8, ed. Didot).
-
-Under these depressing circumstances, the Lacedæmonians had recourse
-to the same manœuvre which had so well served their purpose fifteen
-years before, in 388-387 B.C. They sent Antalkidas again as envoy
-to Persia, to entreat both pecuniary aid,[331] and a fresh Persian
-intervention enforcing anew the peace which bore his name; which
-peace had now been infringed (according to Lacedæmonian construction)
-by the reconstitution of the Bœotian confederacy under Thebes as
-president. And it appears that in the course of the autumn or
-winter, Persian envoys actually did come to Greece, requiring that
-the belligerents should all desist from war, and wind up their
-dissensions on the principles of the peace of Antalkidas.[332] The
-Persian satraps, at this time renewing their efforts against Egypt,
-were anxious for the cessation of hostilities in Greece, as a means
-of enlarging their numbers of Grecian mercenaries; of which troops
-Timotheus had left Athens a few months before to take the command.
-
-  [331] This second mission of Antalkidas is sufficiently verified
-  by an indirect allusion of Xenophon (vi, 3, 12). His known
-  philo-Laconian sentiments sufficiently explain why he avoids
-  directly mentioning it.
-
-  [332] Diodor. xv, 50.
-
-  Diodorus had stated (a few chapters before, xv, 38) that Persian
-  envoys had also come into Greece a little before the peace of 374
-  B.C., and had been the originators of that previous peace. But
-  this appears to me one of the cases (not a few altogether in his
-  history) in which he repeats himself, or gives the same event
-  twice over under analogous circumstances. The intervention of the
-  Persian envoys bears much more suitably on the period immediately
-  preceding the peace of 371 B.C., than upon that which preceded
-  the peace of 374 B.C., when, in point of fact, no peace was ever
-  fully executed.
-
-  Dionysius of Halikarnassus also (Judic. de Lysiâ, p. 479)
-  represents the king of Persia as a party to the peace sworn by
-  Athens and Sparta in 371 B.C.
-
-Apart, however, from this prospect of Persian intervention, which
-doubtless was not without effect,—Athens herself was becoming more
-and more disposed towards peace. That common fear and hatred of the
-Lacedæmonians, which had brought her into alliance with Thebes in 378
-B.C., was now no longer predominant. She was actually at the head
-of a considerable maritime confederacy; and this she could hardly
-hope to increase by continuing the war, since the Lacedæmonian naval
-power had already been humbled. Moreover, she found the expense of
-warlike operations very burdensome, nowise defrayed either by the
-contributions of her allies or by the results of victory. The orator
-Kallistratus,—who had promised either to procure remittances from
-Athens to Iphikrates, or to recommend the conclusion of peace,—was
-obliged to confine himself to the latter alternative, and contributed
-much to promote the pacific dispositions of his countrymen.[333]
-
-  [333] Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 3.
-
-Moreover, the Athenians had become more and more alienated from
-Thebes. The ancient antipathy between these two neighbors had for
-a time been overlaid by common fear of Sparta. But as soon as
-Thebes had reëstablished her authority in Bœotia, the jealousies
-of Athens again began to arise. In 374 B.C., she had concluded a
-peace with the Spartans, without the concurrence of Thebes; which
-peace was broken almost as soon as made, by the Spartans themselves,
-in consequence of the proceedings of Timotheus at Zakynthus. The
-Phokians,—against whom, as having been active allies of Sparta in her
-invasions of Bœotia, Thebes was now making war,—had also been ancient
-friends of Athens, who sympathized with their sufferings.[334]
-Moreover, the Thebans on their side probably resented the unpaid and
-destitute condition in which their seamen had been left by Timotheus
-at Kalauria, during the expedition for the relief of Korkyra in the
-preceding year;[335] an expedition of which Athens alone reaped
-both the glory and the advantage. Though they remained members of
-the confederacy, sending deputies to the congress at Athens, the
-unfriendly spirit on both sides continued on the increase, and was
-farther exasperated by their violent proceeding against Platæa in the
-first half of 372 B.C.
-
-  [334] Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 1.
-
-  [335] Demosthen. cont. Timoth. p. 1188, s. 17.
-
-During the last three or four years, Platæa, like the other towns of
-Bœotia, had been again brought into the confederacy under Thebes.
-Reëstablished by Sparta after the peace of Antalkidas as a so-called
-autonomous town, it had been garrisoned by her as a post against
-Thebes, and was no longer able to maintain a real autonomy after
-the Spartans had been excluded from Bœotia in 376 B.C. While other
-Bœotian cities were glad to find themselves emancipated from their
-philo-Laconian oligarchies and rejoined to the federation under
-Thebes, Platæa,—as well as Thespiæ,—submitted to the union only by
-constraint; awaiting any favorable opportunity for breaking off,
-either by means of Sparta or of Athens. Aware probably of the growing
-coldness between the Athenians and Thebans, the Platæans were
-secretly trying to persuade Athens to accept and occupy their town,
-annexing Platæa to Attica;[336] a project hazardous both to Thebes
-and Athens, since it would place them at open war with each other,
-while neither was yet at peace with Sparta.
-
-  [336] Diodor. xv, 46. I do not know from whom Diodorus copied
-  this statement; but it seems extremely reasonable.
-
-This intrigue, coming to the knowledge of the Thebans, determined
-them to strike a decisive blow. Their presidency, over more than one
-of the minor Bœotian cities, had always been ungentle, suitable to
-the roughness of their dispositions. Towards Platæa, especially, they
-not only bore an ancient antipathy, but regarded the reëstablished
-town as little better than a Lacedæmonian encroachment, abstracting
-from themselves a portion of territory which had become Theban, by
-prescriptive enjoyment lasting for forty years from the surrender
-of Platæa in 427 B.C. As it would have been to them a loss as
-well as embarrassment, if Athens should resolve to close with the
-tender of Platæa,—they forestalled the contingency by seizing the
-town for themselves. Since the reconquest of Bœotia by Thebes, the
-Platæans had come again, though reluctantly, under the ancient
-constitution of Bœotia; they were living at peace with Thebes,
-acknowledging her rights as president of the federation, and having
-their own rights as members guaranteed in return by her, probably
-under positive engagement,—that is, their security, their territory,
-and their qualified autonomy, subject to the federal restrictions
-and obligations. But though thus at peace with Thebes,[337] the
-Platæans knew well what was her real sentiment towards them,
-and their own towards her. If we are to believe, what seems very
-probable, that they were secretly negotiating with Athens to help
-them in breaking off from the federation,—the consciousness of
-such an intrigue tended still farther to keep them in anxiety and
-suspicion. Accordingly, being apprehensive of some aggression from
-Thebes, they kept themselves habitually on their guard. But their
-vigilance was somewhat relaxed and most of them went out of the city
-to their farms in the country, on the days, well known beforehand,
-when the public assemblies in Thebes were held. Of this relaxation
-the Bœotarch Neokles took advantage.[338] He conducted a Theban armed
-force, immediately from the assembly, by a circuitous route through
-Hysiæ to Platæa; which town he found deserted by most of its male
-adults, and unable to make resistance. The Platæans,—dispersed in the
-fields, finding their walls, their wives, and their families, all in
-possession of the victor,—were under the necessity of accepting the
-terms proposed to them. They were allowed to depart in safety, and to
-carry away all their movable property; but their town was destroyed,
-and its territory again annexed to Thebes. The unhappy fugitives
-were constrained for the second time to seek refuge at Athens, where
-they were again kindly received, and restored to the same qualified
-right of citizenship as they had enjoyed prior to the peace of
-Antalkidas.[339]
-
-  [337] This seems to me what is meant by the Platæan speaker in
-  Isokrates, when he complains more than once that Platæa had
-  been taken by the Thebans in time of peace,—εἰρήνης οὔσης. The
-  speaker, in protesting against the injustice of the Thebans,
-  appeals to two guarantees which they have violated; for the
-  purpose of his argument, however, the two are not clearly
-  distinguished, but run together into one. The first guarantee
-  was, the peace of Antalkidas, under which Platæa had been
-  restored, and to which Thebes, Sparta, and Athens, were all
-  parties. The second guarantee, was that given by Thebes when she
-  conquered the Bœotian cities in 377-370 B.C., and reconstituted
-  the federation; whereby she ensured to the Platæans existence
-  as a city, with so much of autonomy as was consistent with the
-  obligations of a member of the Bœotian federation. When the
-  Platæan speaker accuses the Thebans of having violated “the oaths
-  and the agreement” (ὅρκους καὶ ξυνθήκας), he means the terms of
-  the peace of Antalkidas, subject to the limits afterwards imposed
-  by the submission of Platæa to the federal system of Bœotia. He
-  calls for the tutelary interference of Athens, as a party to the
-  peace of Antalkidas.
-
-  Dr. Thirlwall thinks (Hist. Gr. vol. v, ch. 38. p. 70-72) that
-  the Thebans were parties to the peace of 374 B.C. between Sparta
-  and Athens; that they accepted it, intending deliberately to
-  break it; and that under that peace, the Lacedæmonian harmosts
-  and garrisons were withdrawn from Thespiæ and other places in
-  Bœotia. I am unable to acquiesce in this view; which appears to
-  me negatived by Xenophon, and neither affirmed nor implied in
-  the Plataic discourse of Isokrates. In my opinion, there were
-  no Lacedæmonian harmosts in Bœotia (except at Orchomenus in the
-  north) in 374 B.C. Xenophon tells (Hellen. v, 4, 63; vi, 1, 1)
-  that the Thebans “were recovering the Bœotian cities—had subdued
-  the Bœotian cities”—in or before 375 B.C., so that they were
-  able to march out of Bœotia and invade Phokis; which implies the
-  expulsion or retirement of all the Lacedæmonian forces from the
-  southern part of Bœotia.
-
-  The reasoning in the Plataic discourse of Isokrates is not very
-  clear or discriminating; nor have we any right to expect that it
-  should be, in the pleading of a suffering and passionate man.
-  But the expression εἰρήνης οὔσης and εἰρήνη may always (in my
-  judgment) be explained, without referring it, as Dr. Thirlwall
-  does, to the peace of 374 B.C., or supposing Thebes to have been
-  a party to that peace.
-
-  [338] Pausanias, ix, 1, 3.
-
-  [339] Diodor. xv, 47.
-
-  Pausanias (ix, 1, 3) places this capture of Platæa in the third
-  year (counting the years from midsummer to midsummer) before
-  the battle of Leuktra; or in the year of the archon Asteius at
-  Athens; which seems to me the true date, though Mr. Clinton
-  supposes it (without ground, I think) to be contradicted by
-  Xenophon. The year of the archon Asteius reaches from midsummer
-  373 to 372 B.C. It is in the latter half of the year that I
-  suppose Platæa to have been taken.
-
-It was not merely with Platæa, but also with Thespiæ, that Thebes
-was now meddling. Mistrusting the dispositions of the Thespians, she
-constrained them to demolish the fortifications of their town;[340]
-as she had caused to be done fifty-two years before, after the
-victory of Delium,[341] on suspicion of leanings favorable to Athens.
-
-  [340] I infer this from Isokrates, Or. xiv, (Plataic.) s. 21-38;
-  compare also sect. 10. The Platæan speaker accuses the Thebans
-  of having destroyed the walls of some Bœotian cities (over and
-  above what they had done to Platæa,) and I venture to apply this
-  to Thespiæ. Xenophon indeed states that the Thespians were at
-  this very period treated exactly like the Platæans; that is,
-  driven out of Bœotia, and their town destroyed; except that they
-  had not the same claim on Athens (Hellen. vi, 3, 1—ἀπόλιδας
-  γενομένους: compare also vi, 3, 5). Diodorus also (xv, 46)
-  speaks of the Thebans as having destroyed Thespiæ. But against
-  this, I gather, from the Plataic Oration of Isokrates, that the
-  Thespians were not in the same plight with the Platæans when
-  that oration was delivered; that is, they were not expelled
-  collectively out of Bœotia. Moreover, Pausanias also expressly
-  says that the Thespians were present in Bœotia at the time of
-  the battle of Leuktra, and that they were expelled shortly
-  afterwards. Pausanias at the same time gives a distinct story,
-  about the conduct of the Thespians, which it would not be
-  reasonable to reject (ix, 13, 3; ix, 14, 1). I believe therefore
-  that Xenophon has spoken inaccurately in saying that the
-  Thespians were ἀπόλιδες _before_ the battle of Leuktra. It is
-  quite possible that they might have sent supplications to Athens
-  (ἱκετεύοντας—Xen. Hell. vi, 3, 1) in consequence of the severe
-  mandate to demolish their walls.
-
-  [341] Thucyd. iv, 133.
-
-Such proceedings on the part of the Thebans in Bœotia excited
-strong emotion at Athens; where the Platæans not only appeared as
-suppliants, with the tokens of misery conspicuously displayed, but
-also laid their case pathetically before the assembly, and invoked
-aid to regain their town, of which they had been just bereft. On a
-question at once so touching and so full of political consequences,
-many speeches were doubtless composed and delivered, one of which has
-fortunately reached us; composed by Isokrates, and perhaps actually
-delivered by a Platæan speaker before the public assembly. The hard
-fate of this interesting little community is here impressively set
-forth; including the bitterest reproaches, stated with not a little
-of rhetorical exaggeration, against the multiplied wrongs done
-by Thebes, as well towards Athens as towards Platæa. Much of his
-invective is more vehement than conclusive. Thus when the orator
-repeatedly claims for Platæa her title to autonomous existence,
-under the guarantee of universal autonomy sworn at the peace of
-Antalkidas,[342]—the Thebans would doubtless reply, that at the
-time of that peace, Platæa was no longer in existence; but had
-been extinct for forty years, and was only renovated afterwards by
-the Lacedæmonians for their own political purposes. And the orator
-intimates plainly, that the Thebans were noway ashamed of their
-proceeding, but came to Athens to justify it, openly and avowedly;
-moreover, several of the most distinguished Athenian speakers
-espoused the same side.[343] That the Platæans had coöperated with
-Sparta in her recent operations in Bœotia against both Athens and
-Thebes, was an undeniable fact; which the orator himself can only
-extenuate by saying that they acted under constraint from a present
-Spartan force,—but which was cited on the opposite side as a proof
-of their philo-Spartan dispositions, and of their readiness again
-to join the common enemy as soon as he presented himself.[344]
-The Thebans would accuse Platæa of subsequent treason to the
-confederacy; and they even seem to have contended, that they had
-rendered a positive service to the general Athenian confederacy
-of which they were members,[345] by expelling the inhabitants of
-Platæa and dismantling Thespiæ; both towns being not merely devoted
-to Sparta, but also adjoining Kithæron, the frontier line whereby
-a Spartan army would invade Bœotia. Both in the public assembly of
-Athens, and in the general congress of the confederates at that
-city, animated discussions were raised upon the whole subject;[346]
-discussions, wherein, as it appears, Epaminondas, as the orator and
-representative of Thebes, was found a competent advocate against
-Kallistratus, the most distinguished speaker in Athens; sustaining
-the Theban cause with an ability which greatly enhanced his growing
-reputation.[347]
-
-  [342] Isokrates, Or. xiv, (Plataic.) s. 11, 13, 18, 42, 46, 47,
-  68.
-
-  [343] Isokrates, Or. xiv, (Plat.) s. 3. Εἰ μὲν οὖν μὴ Θηβαίους
-  ἑωρῶμεν ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου παρεσκευασμένους πείθειν ὑμᾶς ὡς οὐδὲν
-  εἰς ἡμᾶς ἐξημαρτήκασι, διὰ βραχέων ἂν ἐποιησάμεθα τοὺς λόγους·
-  ἐπειδὴ δ’ εἰς τοῦτ’ ἀτυχίας ἤλθομεν, ὥστε μὴ μόνον ἡμῖν εἶναι τὸν
-  ἀγῶνα πρὸς τούτους ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ῥητόρων τοὺς δυνατωτάτους, οὓς
-  ἀπὸ τῶν ἡμετέρων αὑτοῖς οὗτοι παρεσκευάσαντο συνηγόρους, etc.
-
-  Compare sect. 36.
-
-  [344] Isokr. Or. xiv, (Plat.) s. 12, 13, 14, 16, 28, 33, 48.
-
-  [345] Isokrat. Or. xiv, (Plat.) s. 23-27. λέγουσιν ὡς ὑπὲρ τοῦ
-  κοινοῦ τῶν συμμάχων ταῦτ’ ἔπραξαν—φασὶ τὸ Θηβαίους ἔχειν τὴν
-  ἡμετέραν, τοῦτο σύμφερον εἶναι τοῖς συμμάχοις, etc.
-
-  [346] Isokrat. Or. 14, (Plat.) s. 23, 24.
-
-  [347] Diodorus, (xv, 38) mentions the parliamentary conflict
-  between Epaminondas and _Kallistratus_, assigning it to the
-  period immediately antecedent to the abortive peace concluded
-  between Athens and Sparta three years before. I agree with
-  Wesseling (see his note _ad loc._) in thinking that these debates
-  more properly belong to the time immediately preceding the peace
-  of 371 B.C. Diodorus has made great confusion between the two;
-  sometimes repeating twice over the same antecedent phenomena,
-  as if they belonged to both,—sometimes assigning to one what
-  properly belongs to the other.
-
-  The altercation between Epaminondas and _Kallistratus_ (ἐν τῷ
-  κοινῷ συνεδρίῳ) seems to me more properly appertaining to debates
-  in the assembly of the confederacy at Athens,—rather than to
-  debates at Sparta, in the preliminary discussions for peace,
-  where the altercations between Epaminondas and _Agesilaus_
-  occurred.
-
-But though the Thebans and their Athenian supporters, having all the
-prudential arguments on their side, carried the point so that no step
-was taken to restore the Platæans, nor any hostile declaration made
-against those to whom they owed their expulsion,—yet the general
-result of the debates, animated by keen sympathy with the Platæan
-sufferers, tended decidedly to poison the good feeling, and loosen
-the ties, between Athens and Thebes. This change showed itself
-by an increased gravitation towards peace with Sparta; strongly
-advocated by the orator Kallistratus, and now promoted not merely by
-the announced Persian intervention, but by the heavy cost of war,
-and the absence of all prospective gain from its continuance. The
-resolution was at length taken,—first by Athens, and next, probably,
-by the majority of the confederates assembled at Athens,—to make
-propositions of peace to Sparta, where it was well known that similar
-dispositions prevailed towards peace. Notice of this intention was
-given to the Thebans, who were invited to send envoys thither also,
-if they chose to become parties. In the spring of 371 B.C., at the
-time when the members of the Lacedæmonian confederacy were assembled
-at Sparta, both the Athenian and Theban envoys, and those from the
-various members of the Athenian confederacy, arrived there. Among
-the Athenian envoys, two at least,—Kallias (the hereditary daduch or
-torchbearer of the Eleusinian ceremonies) and Autoklês,—were men of
-great family at Athens; and they were accompanied by Kallistratus the
-orator.[348] From the Thebans, the only man of note was Epaminondas,
-then one of the Bœotarchs.
-
-  [348] Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 3.
-
-  It seems doubtful, from the language of Xenophon, whether
-  Kallistratus was one of the envoys appointed, or only a companion.
-
-Of the debates which took place at this important congress, we
-have very imperfect knowledge; and of the more private diplomatic
-conversations, not less important than the debates, we have no
-knowledge at all. Xenophon gives us a speech from each of the three
-Athenians, and from no one else. That of Kallias, who announces
-himself as hereditary proxenus of Sparta at Athens, is boastful
-and empty, but eminently philo-Laconian in spirit;[349] that of
-Autoklês is in the opposite tone, full of severe censure on the past
-conduct of Sparta; that of Kallistratus, delivered after the other
-two,—while the enemies of Sparta were elate, her friends humiliated,
-and both parties silent from the fresh effect of the reproaches of
-Autoklês,[350]—is framed in a spirit of conciliation; admitting
-faults on both sides, but deprecating the continuance of war, as
-injurious to both, and showing how much the joint interests of both
-pointed towards peace.[351]
-
-  [349] Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 4-6.
-
-  [350] Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 7-10. Ταῦτ’ εἰπὼν, σιωπὴν μὲν παρὰ
-  πάντων ἐποίησεν (Autoklês), ἡδομένους δὲ τοὺς ἀχθομένους τοῖς
-  Λακεδαιμονίοις ἐποίησε.
-
-  [351] Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 10-17.
-
-This orator, representing the Athenian diplomacy of the time,
-recognizes distinctly the peace of Antalkidas as the basis upon which
-Athens was prepared to treat,—autonomy to each city, small as well
-as great; and in this way, coinciding with the views of the Persian
-king, he dismisses with indifference the menace that Antalkidas was
-on his way back from Persia with money to aid the Lacedæmonians in
-the war. It was not from fear of the Persian treasures (he urged),—as
-the enemies of peace asserted,—that Athens sought peace.[352] Her
-affairs were now so prosperous, both by sea and land, as to prove
-that she only did so on consideration of the general evils of
-prolonged war, and on a prudent abnegation of that rash confidence
-which was always ready to contend for extreme stakes,[353] like a
-gamester playing double or quits. The time had come for both Sparta
-and Athens now to desist from hostilities. The former had the
-strength on land, the latter was predominant at sea; so that each
-could guard the other; while the reconciliation of the two would
-produce peace throughout the Hellenic world, since in each separate
-city, one of the two opposing local parties rested on Athens, the
-other on Sparta.[354] But it was indispensably necessary that
-Sparta should renounce that system of aggression (already pointedly
-denounced by the Athenian, Autoklês) on which she had acted since
-the peace of Antalkidas; a system, from which she had at last reaped
-bitter fruits, since her unjust seizure of the Kadmeia had ended by
-throwing into the arms of the Thebans all those Bœotian cities, whose
-separate autonomy she had bent her whole policy to ensure.[355]
-
-  [352] Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 12, 13.
-
-  [353] Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 16.
-
-  [354] Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 14. Καὶ γὰρ δὴ κατὰ γῆν μὲν τις ἂν,
-  ὑμῶν φίλων ὄντων, ἱκανὸς γένοιτο ἡμᾶς λυπῆσαι; κατὰ θάλαττάν γε
-  μὴν τις ἂν ὑμᾶς βλάψαι τι, ἡμῶν ὑμῖν ἐπιτηδείων ὄντων;
-
-  [355] Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 11. Καὶ ὑμῖν δὲ ἔγωγε ὁρῶ διὰ τὰ
-  ἀγνωμόνως πραχθέντα ἔστιν ὅτε πολλὰ ἀντίτυπα γιγνόμενα· ὧν ἦν καὶ
-  ἡ καταληφθεῖσα ἐν Θήβαις Καδμεία· νῦν γοῦν, ὡς (?) ἐσπουδάσατε
-  αὐτονόμους τὰς πόλεις γίγνεσθαι, πᾶσαι πάλιν, ἐπεὶ ἠδικήθησαν οἱ
-  Θηβαῖοι, ἐπ’ ἐκείνοις γεγένηνται.
-
-Two points stand out in this remarkable speech, which takes a
-judicious measure of the actual position of affairs;—first, autonomy
-to every city; and autonomy in the genuine sense, not construed and
-enforced by the separate interests of Sparta, as it had been at the
-peace of Antalkidas; next, the distribution of such preëminence or
-headship, as was consistent with this universal autonomy, between
-Sparta and Athens; the former on land, the latter at sea,—as the
-means of ensuring tranquillity in Greece. That “autonomy perverted
-to Lacedæmonian purposes,”—which Perikles had denounced before
-the Peloponnesian war as the condition of Peloponnesus, and which
-had been made the political canon of Greece by the peace of
-Antalkidas,—was now at an end. On the other hand, Athens and Sparta
-were to become mutual partners and guarantees; dividing the headship
-of Greece by an ascertained line of demarcation, yet neither of them
-interfering with the principle of universal autonomy. Thebes, and
-her claim to the presidency of Bœotia, were thus to be set aside by
-mutual consent.
-
-It was upon this basis that the peace was concluded. The armaments
-on both sides were to be disbanded; the harmosts and garrisons
-everywhere withdrawn, in order that each city might enjoy full
-autonomy. If any city should fail in observance of these conditions,
-and continue in a career of force against any other, all were at
-liberty to take arms for the support of the injured party; but no
-one who did not feel disposed, was bound so to take arms. This last
-stipulation exonerated the Lacedæmonian allies from one of their most
-vexatious chains.
-
-To the conditions here mentioned, all parties agreed; and on the
-ensuing day the oaths were exchanged. Sparta took the oath for
-herself and her allies; Athens took the oath for herself only; her
-allies afterwards took it severally, each city for itself. Why such
-difference was made, we are not told; for it would seem that the
-principle of severance applied to both confederacies alike.
-
-Next came the turn of the Thebans to swear; and here the fatal hitch
-was disclosed. Epaminondas, the Theban envoy, insisted on taking the
-oath, not for Thebes separately, but for Thebes as president of the
-Bœotian federation, including all the Bœotian cities. The Spartan
-authorities on the other hand, and Agesilaus as the foremost of all,
-strenuously opposed him. They required that he should swear for
-Thebes alone, leaving the Bœotian cities to take the oath each for
-itself.
-
-Already in the course of the preliminary debates, Epaminondas
-had spoken out boldly against the ascendency of Sparta. While
-most of the deputies stood overawed by her dignity, represented
-by the energetic Agesilaus as spokesman,—he, like the Athenian
-Autoklês, and with strong sympathy from many of the deputies
-present, had proclaimed that nothing kept alive the war except her
-unjust pretensions, and that no peace could be durable unless such
-pretensions were put aside.[356] Accepting the conditions of peace
-as finally determined, he presented himself to swear to them in the
-name of the Bœotian federation. But Agesilaus, requiring that each
-of the Bœotian cities should take the oath for itself, appealed to
-those same principles of liberty which Epaminondas himself had just
-invoked, and asked him whether each of the Bœotian cities had not as
-good a title to autonomy as Thebes. Epaminondas might have replied
-by asking, why Sparta had just been permitted to take the oath for
-her allies as well as for herself. But he took a higher ground. He
-contended that the presidency of Bœotia was held by Thebes on as
-good a title as the sovereignty of Laconia by Sparta.[357] He would
-remind the assembly that when Bœotia was first conquered and settled
-by its present inhabitants, the other towns had all been planted out
-from Thebes as their chief and mother-city; that the federal union of
-all, administered by Bœotarchs chosen by and from all, with Thebes
-as president, was coeval with the first settlement of the country;
-that the separate autonomy of each was qualified by an established
-institution, devolving on the Bœotarchs and councils sitting at
-Thebes the management of the foreign relations of all jointly.
-All this had been already pleaded by the Theban orator fifty-six
-years earlier, before the five Spartan commissioners, assembled to
-determine the fate of the captives after the surrender of Platæa;
-when he required the condemnation of the Platæans as guilty of
-treason to the ancestral institutions of Bœotia;[358] and the Spartan
-commissioners had recognized the legitimacy of these institutions
-by a sweeping sentence of death against the transgressors. Moreover,
-at a time when the ascendency of Thebes over the Bœotian cities
-had been greatly impaired by her anti-Hellenic coöperation with
-the invading Persians, the Spartans themselves had assisted her
-with all their power to reëstablish it, as a countervailing force
-against Athens.[359] Epaminondas could show, that the presidency of
-Thebes over the Bœotian cities was the keystone of the federation;
-a right not only of immemorial antiquity, but pointedly recognized
-and strenuously vindicated by the Spartans themselves. He could show
-farther that it was as old, and as good, as their own right to govern
-the Laconian townships; which latter was acquired and held (as one of
-the best among their own warriors had boastfully proclaimed)[360] by
-nothing but Spartan valor and the sharpness of the Spartan sword.
-
-  [356] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 27.
-
-  [357] Plutarch. Agesil. c. 28.
-
-  [358] Thucyd. iii, 61. ἡμῶν (the Thebans) κτισάντων Πλάταιαν
-  ὕστερον τῆς ἄλλης Βοιωτίας καὶ ἄλλα χωρία μετ’ αὐτῆς, ἃ
-  ξυμμίκτους ἀνθρώπους ἐξελάσαντες ἔσχομεν, οὐκ ἠξίουν οὗτοι (the
-  Platæans), ~ὥσπερ ἐτάχθη τὸ πρῶτον~, ἡγεμονεύεσθαι ὑφ’ ἡμῶν,
-  ~ἔξω δὲ τῶν ἄλλων Βοιωτῶν παραβαίνοντες τὰ πάτρια~, ἐπειδὴ
-  προσηναγκάζοντο, προσεχώρησαν πρὸς Ἀθηναίους, etc.
-
-  Again (c. 65) he says respecting the oligarchical Platæans who
-  admitted the Theban detachment when it came by night to surprise
-  Platæa,—εἰ δὲ ἄνδρες ὑμῶν οἱ πρῶτοι καὶ χρήμασι καὶ γένει,
-  βουλόμενοι τῆς μὲν ἔξω ξυμμαχίας ὑμᾶς παῦσαι, ~ἐς δὲ τὰ κοινὰ τῶν
-  πάντων Βοιωτῶν πάτρια καταστῆσαι~, ἐπεκαλέσαντο ἕκοντες, etc.
-
-  Again (c. 66), κατὰ τὰ πάντων Βοιωτῶν πάτρια, etc. Compare ii, 2.
-
-  [359] Diodor. xi, 81.
-
-  [360] Thucyd. iv, 126.
-
-  Brasidas, addressing his soldiers when serving in Macedonia, on
-  the approach of the Illyrians:—
-
-  Ἀγαθοῖς γὰρ εἶναι προσήκει ὑμῖν τὰ πολέμια, οὐ διὰ ξυμμάχων
-  παρουσίαν ἑκάστοτε, ἀλλὰ δι’ οἰκείαν ἀρετὴν, καὶ μηδὲν πλῆθος
-  πεφοβῆσθαι ἑτέρων· οἵ γε μηδὲ ἀπὸ πολιτειῶν τοιούτων ἥκετε, ἐν
-  αἷς οὐ πολλοὶ ὀλίγων ἄρχουσιν, ἀλλὰ πλειόνων μᾶλλον ἐλάσσους·
-  ~οὐκ ἄλλῳ τινὶ κτησάμενοι τὴν δυναστείαν ἢ τῷ μαχόμενοι κρατεῖν~.
-
-An emphatic speech of this tenor, delivered amidst the deputies
-assembled at Sparta, and arraigning the Spartans not merely in their
-supremacy over Greece, but even in their dominion at home,—was as it
-were the shadow cast before, by coming events. It opened a question
-such as no Greek had ever ventured to raise. It was a novelty
-startling to all,—extravagant probably in the eyes of Kallistratus
-and the Athenians,—but to the Spartans themselves, intolerably
-poignant and insulting.[361] They had already a long account of
-antipathy to clear off with Thebes; their own wrong-doing in seizing
-the Kadmeia,—their subsequent humiliation in losing it and being
-unable to recover it,—their recent short-comings and failures, in
-the last seven years of war against Athens and Thebes jointly. To
-aggravate this deep-seated train of hostile associations, their
-pride was now wounded in an unforeseen point, the tenderest of all.
-Agesilaus, full to overflowing of the national sentiment, which in
-the mind of a Spartan passed for the first of virtues, was stung to
-the quick. Had he been an Athenian orator like Kallistratus, his
-wrath would have found vent in an animated harangue. But a king of
-Sparta was anxious only to close these offensive discussions with
-scornful abruptness, thus leaving to the presumptuous Theban no
-middle ground between humble retraction and acknowledged hostility.
-Indignantly starting from his seat, he said to Epaminondas,—“Speak
-plainly,—will you, or will you not, leave to each of the Bœotian
-cities its separate autonomy?” To which the other replied—“Will
-_you_ leave each of the Laconian towns autonomous?” Without saying
-another word, Agesilaus immediately caused the name of the Thebans
-to be struck out of the roll, and proclaimed them excluded from the
-treaty.[362]
-
-  [361] One may judge of the revolting effect produced by such
-  a proposition, before the battle of Leuktra,—by reading the
-  language which Isokrates puts into the mouth of the Spartan
-  prince Archidamus, five or six years after that battle,
-  protesting that all Spartan patriots ought to perish rather than
-  consent to the relinquishment of Messenia,—περὶ μὲν ἄλλων τινῶν
-  ἀμφισβητήσεις, ἐγίγνοντο, περὶ δὲ Μεσσήνης, οὔτε βασιλεὺς, οὐθ’
-  ἡ τῶν Ἀθηναίων πόλις, οὐδὲ πώποθ’ ἡμῖν ἐνεκάλεσεν ὡς ἀδίκως
-  κεκτημένοις αὐτήν (Isok. Arch. s. 32). In the spring of 371 B.C.,
-  what had once been Messenia, was only a portion of Laconia, which
-  no one thought of distinguishing from the other portions (see
-  Thucyd. iv, 3, 11).
-
-  [362] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 28; Pausanias, ix, 13, 1; compare
-  Diodor. xv, 51. Pausanias erroneously assigns the debate to the
-  congress preceding the peace of Antalkidas in 387 B.C.; at which
-  time Epaminondas was an unknown man.
-
-  Plutarch gives this interchange of brief questions, between
-  Agesilaus and Epaminondas, which is in substance the same as that
-  given by Pausanias, and has every appearance of being the truth.
-  But he introduces it in a very bold and abrupt way, such as
-  cannot be conformable to the reality. To raise a question about
-  the right of Sparta to govern Laconia, was a most daring novelty.
-  A courageous and patriotic Theban might venture upon it as a
-  retort against those Spartans who questioned the right of Thebes
-  to her presidency of Bœotia; but he would never do so without
-  assigning his reasons to justify an assertion so startling to a
-  large portion of his hearers. The reasons which I here ascribe to
-  Epaminondas are such as we know to have formed the Theban creed,
-  in reference to the Bœotian cities; such as were actually urged
-  by the Theban orator in 427 B.C., when the fate of the Platæan
-  captives was under discussion. After Epaminondas had once laid
-  out the reasons in support of his assertion, he might then, if
-  the same brief question were angrily put to him a second time,
-  meet it with another equally brief counter-question or retort. It
-  is this final interchange of thrusts which Plutarch has given,
-  omitting the arguments previously stated by Epaminondas, and
-  necessary to warrant the seeming paradox which he advances. We
-  must recollect that Epaminondas does not contend that Thebes was
-  entitled to _as much power_ in Bœotia as Sparta in Laconia. He
-  only contends that Bœotia, under the presidency of Thebes, was as
-  much an integral political aggregate, as Laconia under Sparta,—in
-  reference to the Grecian world.
-
-  Xenophon differs from Plutarch in his account of the conduct of
-  the Theban envoys. He does not mention Epaminondas at all, nor
-  any envoy by name; but he says that “the Thebans, having entered
-  their name among the cities which had taken the oaths, came on
-  the next day and requested, that the entry might be altered,
-  and that ‘_the Bœotians_’ might be substituted in place of _the
-  Thebans_, as having taken the oath. Agesilaus told them that he
-  could make no change; but he would strike their names out if they
-  chose, and he accordingly did strike them out” (vi, 3, 19). It
-  seems to me that this account is far less probable than that of
-  Plutarch, and bears every mark of being incorrect. Why should
-  such a man as Epaminondas (who doubtless was the envoy) consent
-  at first to waive the presidential pretensions of Thebes, and to
-  swear for her alone? If he did consent, why should he retract
-  the next day? Xenophon is anxious to make out Agesilaus to be as
-  much in the right as may be; since the fatal consequences of his
-  proceedings manifested themselves but too soon.
-
-Such was the close of this memorable congress at Sparta in June,
-371 B.C. Between the Spartans and Athenians, and their respective
-allies, peace was sworn. But the Thebans were excluded, and their
-deputies returned home (if we may believe Xenophon[363]) discouraged
-and mournful. Yet such a man as Epaminondas must have been well
-aware that neither his claims nor his arguments would be admitted by
-Sparta. If therefore he was disappointed with the result, this must
-be because he had counted upon, but did not obtain, support from the
-Athenians or others.
-
-  [363] Xenoph. Hellen. vi, 3, 20.
-
-The leaning of the Athenian deputies had been adverse rather than
-favorable to Thebes throughout the congress. They were disinclined,
-from their sympathies with the Platæans, to advocate the presidential
-claims of Thebes, though on the whole it was the political interest
-of Athens that the Bœotian federation should be maintained, as
-a bulwark to herself against Sparta. Yet the relations of Athens
-with Thebes, after the congress as before it, were still those of
-friendship, nominal rather than sincere. It was only with Sparta, and
-her allies, that Thebes was at war, without a single ally attached to
-her. On the whole, Kallistratus and his colleagues had managed the
-interests of Athens in this congress with great prudence and success.
-They had disengaged her from the alliance with Thebes, which had been
-dictated seven years before by common fear and dislike of Sparta,
-but which had no longer any adequate motive to countervail the cost
-of continuing the war; at the same time, the disengagement had been
-accomplished without bad faith. The gains of Athens, during the last
-seven years of war, had been considerable. She had acquired a great
-naval power, and a body of maritime confederates; while her enemies
-the Spartans had lost their naval power in the like proportion.
-Athens was now the ascendent leader of maritime and insular
-Greece,—while Sparta still continued to be the leading power on land,
-but only on land; and a tacit partnership was now established between
-the two, each recognizing the other in their respective halves of the
-Hellenic hegemony.[364] Moreover, Athens had the prudence to draw her
-stake, and quit the game, when at the maximum of her acquisitions,
-without taking the risk of future contingencies.
-
-  [364] Diodor. xv, 38-82.
-
-On both sides, the system of compulsory and indefeasable
-confederacies was renounced; a renunciation which had already been
-once sworn to, sixteen years before, at the peace of Antalkidas, but
-treacherously perverted by Sparta in the execution. Under this new
-engagement, the allies of Sparta or Athens ceased to constitute an
-organized permanent body, voting by its majority, passing resolutions
-permanently binding upon dissentients, arming the chief state with
-more or less power of enforcement against all, and forbidding
-voluntary secessions of individual members. They became a mere
-uncemented aggregate of individuals, each acting for himself; taking
-counsel together as long as they chose, and coöperating so far as
-all were in harmony; but no one being bound by any decision of the
-others, nor recognizing any right in the others to compel him even
-to performance of what he had specially promised, if it became
-irksome. By such change, therefore, both Athens and Sparta were
-losers in power; yet the latter to a much greater extent than the
-former, inasmuch as her reach of power over her allies had been more
-comprehensive and stringent.
-
-We here see the exact point upon which the requisition addressed
-by Sparta to Thebes, and the controversy between Epaminondas and
-Agesilaus, really turned. Agesilaus contended that the relation
-between Thebes and the other Bœotian cities was the same as what
-subsisted between Sparta and her allies; that accordingly, when
-Sparta renounced the indefeasible and compulsory character of
-her confederacy, and agreed to deal with each of its members as
-a self-acting and independent unit, she was entitled to demand
-that Thebes should do the same in reference to the Bœotian towns.
-Epaminondas, on the contrary, denied the justice of this parallel.
-He maintained that the proper subject of comparison to be taken, was
-the relation of Sparta, not to her extra-Laconian allies, but to
-the Laconian townships; that the federal union of the Bœotian towns
-under Thebes was coeval with the Bœotian settlement, and among the
-most ancient phenomena of Greece; that in reference to other states,
-Bœotia, like Laconia or Attica, was the compound and organized
-whole, of which each separate city was only a fraction; that other
-Greeks had no more right to meddle with the internal constitution
-of these fractions, and convert each of them into an integer,—than
-to insist on separate independence for each of the townships of
-Laconia. Epaminondas did not mean to contend that the power of Thebes
-over the Bœotian cities was as complete and absolute in degree, as
-that of Sparta over the Laconian townships; but merely that her
-presidential power, and the federal system of which it formed a part,
-were established, indefeasible, and beyond the interference of any
-Hellenic convention,—quite as much as the internal government of
-Sparta in Laconia.
-
-Once already this question had been disputed between Sparta and
-Thebes at the peace of Antalkidas; and already decided once by the
-superior power of the former, extorting submission from the latter.
-The last sixteen years had reversed the previous decision, and
-enabled the Thebans to reconquer those presidential rights of which
-the former peace had deprived them. Again, therefore, the question
-stood for decision, with keener antipathy on both sides,—with
-diminished power in Sparta,—but with increased force, increased
-confidence, and a new leader whose inestimable worth was even yet
-but half-known,—in Thebes. The Athenians,—friendly with both, yet
-allies of neither,—suffered the dispute to be fought out without
-interfering. How it was settled will appear in the next chapter.
-
-
-
-
-CHAPTER LXXVIII.
-
-BATTLE OF LEUKTRA AND ITS CONSEQUENCES.
-
-
-Immediately after the congress at Sparta in June 371 B.C., the
-Athenians and Lacedæmonians both took steps to perform the covenants
-sworn respectively to each other as well as to the allies generally.
-The Athenians despatched orders to Iphikrates, who was still at
-Korkyra or in the Ionian Sea, engaged in incursions against the
-Lacedæmonian or Peloponnesian coasts,—that he should forthwith
-conduct his fleet home, and that if he had made any captures
-subsequent to the exchange of oaths at Sparta, they should all be
-restored;[365] so as to prevent the misunderstanding which had
-occurred fifty-two years before with Brasidas,[366] in the peninsula
-of Pallênê. The Lacedæmonians on their side sent to withdraw their
-harmosts and their garrisons from every city still under occupation.
-Since they had already made such promise once before, at the peace
-of Antalkidas, but had never performed it,—commissioners,[367] not
-Spartans, were now named from the general congress, to enforce the
-execution of the agreement.
-
-  [365] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 1.
-
-  [366] Thucyd. iv.
-
-  [367] Diodorus, xv, 38. ἐξαγωγεῖς, Xen. Hellen. _l. c._
-
-  Diodorus refers the statements in this chapter to the peace
-  between Athens and Sparta in 374 B.C. I have already remarked
-  that they belong properly to the peace of 371 B.C.; as Wesseling
-  suspects in his note.
-
-No great haste, however, was probably shown in executing this part
-of the conditions; for the whole soul and sentiment of the Spartans
-were absorbed by their quarrel with Thebes. The miso-Theban impulse
-now drove them on with a fury which overcame all other thoughts;
-and which, though doubtless Agesilaus and others considered it at
-the time as legitimate patriotic resentment for the recent insult,
-appeared to the philo-Laconian Xenophon, when he looked back upon it
-from the subsequent season of Spartan humiliation, to be a misguiding
-inspiration sent by the gods,[368]—like that of the Homeric Atê. Now
-that Thebes stood isolated from Athens and all other allies out of
-Bœotia, Agesilaus had full confidence of being able to subdue her
-thoroughly. The same impression of the superiority of Spartan force
-was also entertained both by the Athenians and by other Greeks; to a
-great degree even by the Thebans themselves. It was anticipated that
-the Spartans would break up the city of Thebes into villages (as they
-had done at Mantinea) or perhaps retaliate upon her the fate which
-she had inflicted upon Platæa—or even decimate her citizens and her
-property to the profit of the Delphian god, pursuant to the vow that
-had been taken more than a century before, in consequence of the
-assistance lent by the Thebans to Xerxes.[369] Few persons out of
-Bœotia doubted of the success of Sparta.
-
-  [368] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 3. ἤδη γὰρ, ὡς ἔοικε, τὸ δαιμόνιον
-  ἦγεν, etc.
-
-  [369] Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 20; Plutarch, Pelopid. c. 20; Diodor.
-  xv, 51.
-
-To attack Thebes, however, an army was wanted; and as Sparta, by the
-peace just sworn, had renounced everything like imperial ascendency
-over her allies, leaving each of them free to send or withhold
-assistance as they chose,—to raise an army was no easy task; for
-the allies, generally speaking, being not at all inflamed with the
-Spartan antipathy against Thebes, desired only to be left to enjoy
-their newly-acquired liberty. But it so happened, that at the moment
-when peace was sworn, the Spartan king Kleombrotus was actually at
-the head of an army, of Lacedæmonians and allies, in Phokis, on the
-north-western frontier of Bœotia. Immediately on hearing of the
-peace, Kleombrotus sent home to ask for instructions as to his future
-proceedings. By the unanimous voice of the Spartan authorities and
-assembly, with Agesilaus as the most vehement of all,[370] he was
-directed to march against the Thebans, unless they should flinch
-at the last moment (as they had done at the peace of Antalkidas),
-and relinquish their presidency over the other Bœotian cities.
-One citizen alone, named Prothöus, interrupted this unanimity. He
-protested against the order, first, as a violation of their oaths,
-which required them to disband the army and reconstitute it on the
-voluntary principle,—next, as imprudent in regard to the allies, who
-now looked upon such liberty as their right, and would never serve
-with cordiality unless it were granted to them. But Prothöus was
-treated with disdain as a silly alarmist,[371] and the peremptory
-order was despatched to Kleombrotus; accompanied, probably, by a
-reinforcement of Spartans and Lacedæmonians, the number of whom, in
-the ensuing battle, seems to have been greater than can reasonably be
-imagined to have been before serving in Phokis.
-
-  [370] Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 28.
-
-  [371] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 2, 3. ἐκεῖνον μὲν φλυαρεῖν ἡγήσατο, etc.
-
-Meanwhile no symptoms of concession were manifested at Thebes.[372]
-Epaminondas, on his return, had found cordial sympathy with the
-resolute tone which he had adopted both in defence of the Bœotian
-federation and against Sparta. Though every one felt the magnitude
-of the danger, it was still hoped that the enemy might be prevented
-from penetrating out of Phokis into Bœotia. Epaminondas accordingly
-occupied with a strong force the narrow pass near Koroneia, lying
-between a spur of Mount Helikon on one side and the Lake Kopaïs on
-the other; the same position as had been taken by the Bœotians, and
-forced by the army returning from Asia under Agesilaus, twenty-three
-years before. Orchomenus lay northward (that is, on the Phokian side)
-of this position; and its citizens, as well as its Lacedæmonian
-garrison, now doubtless formed part of the invading army of
-Kleombrotus. That prince, with a degree of military skill rare in
-the Spartan commanders, baffled all the Theban calculations. Instead
-of marching by the regular road from Phokis into Bœotia, he turned
-southward by a mountain-road scarcely deemed practicable, defeated
-the Theban division under Chæreas which guarded it, and crossed the
-ridge of Helikon to the Bœotian port of Kreusis on the Crissæan Gulf.
-Coming upon this place by surprise, he stormed it, capturing twelve
-Theban triremes which lay in the harbor. He then left a garrison
-to occupy the port, and marched without delay over the mountainous
-ground into the territory of Thespiæ on the eastern declivity
-of Helikon; where he encamped on the high ground, at a place of
-ever-memorable name, called Leuktra.[373]
-
-  [372] It is stated that either the Lacedæmonians from Sparta,
-  or Kleombrotus from Phokis, sent a new formal requisition to
-  Thebes, that the Bœotian cities should be left autonomous; and
-  the requisition was repudiated (Diodor. xv, 51; Aristeides, Or.
-  (Leuktr.) ii, xxxiv, p. 644, ed. Dindorf). But such mission seems
-  very doubtful.
-
-  [373] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 3, 4; Diodor. xv, 53; Pausan. ix, 13, 2.
-
-Here was an important success, skilfully gained; not only placing
-Kleombrotus within an easy march of Thebes, but also opening a sure
-communication by sea with Sparta, through the port of Kreusis, and
-thus eluding the difficulties of Mount Kithæron. Both the king
-and the Lacedæmonians around him were full of joy and confidence;
-while the Thebans on their side were struck with dismay as well as
-surprise. It required all the ability of Epaminondas, and all the
-daring of Pelopidas, to uphold the resolution of their countrymen,
-and to explain away or neutralize the terrific signs and portents,
-which a dispirited Greek was sure to see in every accident of the
-road. At length, however, they succeeded in this, and the Thebans
-with their allied Bœotians were marched out from Thebes to Leuktra,
-where they were posted on a declivity opposite to the Spartan camp.
-They were commanded by the seven Bœotarchs, of whom Epaminondas
-was one. But such was the prevalent apprehension of joining battle
-with the Spartans on equal terms, that even when actually on the
-ground, three of these Bœotarchs refused to concur in the order for
-fighting, and proposed to shut themselves up in Thebes for a siege,
-sending their wives and families away to Athens. Epaminondas was
-vainly combatting their determination, when the seventh Bœotarch,
-Branchylides, arrived from the passes of Kithæron, where he had been
-on guard, and was prevailed upon to vote in favor of the bolder
-course. Though a majority was thus secured for fighting, yet the
-feeling throughout the Theban camp was more that of brave despair
-than of cheering hope; a conviction that it was better to perish in
-the field, than to live in exile with the Lacedæmonians masters
-of the Kadmeia. Some encouraging omens, however, were transmitted
-to the camp, from the temples in Thebes as well as from that of
-Trophonius at Lebadeia:[374] and a Spartan exile named Leandrias,
-serving in the Theban ranks, ventured to assure them that they were
-now on the very spot foredoomed for the overthrow of the Lacedæmonian
-empire. Here stood the tomb of two females (daughters of a Leuktrian
-named Skedasus) who had been violated by two Lacedæmonians and had
-afterwards slain themselves. Skedasus, after having in vain attempted
-to obtain justice from the Spartans for this outrage, came back,
-imprecating curses on them, and slew himself also. The vengeance of
-these departed sufferers would now be sure to pour itself out on
-Sparta, when her army was in their own district and near their own
-tomb. And the Theban leaders, to whom the tale was full of opportune
-encouragement, crowned the tomb with wreaths, invoking the aid of its
-inmates against the common enemy now present.[375]
-
-  [374] Kallisthenes, apud Cic. de Divinatione, i, 34, Fragm. 9,
-  ed. Didot.
-
-  [375] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 7; Diodor. xv, 54; Pausan. ix, 13, 3;
-  Plutarch, Pelopid. c. 20, 21; Polyænus, ii, 3, 8.
-
-  The latter relates that Pelopidas in a dream saw Skedasus,
-  who directed him to offer on this tomb “an auburn virgin” to
-  the deceased females. Pelopidas and his friends were greatly
-  perplexed about the fulfilment of this command; many urged
-  that it was necessary for some maiden to devote herself, or to
-  be devoted by her parents, as a victim for the safety of the
-  country, like Menœkeus and Makaria in the ancient legends; others
-  denounced the idea as cruel and inadmissible. In the midst of the
-  debate, a mare, with a chestnut filly, galloped up, and stopped
-  not far off; upon which the prophet Theokritus exclaimed,—“Here
-  comes the victim required, sent by the special providence of the
-  gods.” The chestnut filly was caught and offered as a sacrifice
-  on the tomb; every one being in high spirits from a conviction
-  that the mandate of the gods had been executed.
-
-  The prophet Theokritus figures in the treatise of Plutarch De
-  Genio Socratis (c. 3, p. 576 D.) as one of the companions of
-  Pelopidas in the conspiracy whereby the Theban oligarchy was put
-  down and the Lacedæmonians expelled from the Kadmeia.
-
-While others were thus comforted by the hope of superhuman aid,
-Epaminondas, to whom the order of the coming battle had been
-confided, took care that no human precautions should be wanting. His
-task was arduous; for not only were his troops dispirited, while
-those of the enemy were confident,—but their numbers were inferior,
-and some of the Bœotians present were hardly even trustworthy.
-What the exact numbers were on either side, we are not permitted
-to know. Diodorus assigns about six thousand men to the Thebans;
-Plutarch states the numbers of Kleombrotus at eleven thousand.[376]
-Without placing faith in these figures, we see good reason for
-believing that the Theban total was decidedly inferior. For such
-inferiority Epaminondas strove to make up by skilful tactics, and by
-a combination at that time novel as well as ingenious. In all former
-Grecian battles, the opposite armies had been drawn up in line,
-and had fought along the whole line; or at least such had been the
-intention of the generals,—and if it was not realized, the cause was
-to be sought in accidents of the ground, or backwardness or disorder
-on the part of some division of the soldiers. Departing from this
-habit, Epaminondas now arrayed his troops so as to bring his own left
-to bear with irresistible force upon the Spartan right, and to keep
-back the rest of his army comparatively out of action. Knowing that
-Kleombrotus, with the Spartans and all the official persons, would be
-on the right of their own line, he calculated that, if successful on
-this point against the best troops, he should find little resistance
-from the remainder. Accordingly he placed on his own left wing
-chosen Theban hoplites, to the prodigious depth of fifty shields,
-with Pelopidas and the Sacred Band in front. His order of advance
-was disposed obliquely or in echelon, so that the deep column on
-the left should join battle first, while the centre and right kept
-comparatively back and held themselves more in a defensive attitude.
-
-  [376] Diodor. xv, 52-56; Plutarch, Pelop. c. 20.
-
-In 371 B.C., such a combination was absolutely new, and betokened
-high military genius. It is therefore no disgrace to Kleombrotus
-that he was not prepared for it, and that he adhered to the ordinary
-Grecian tactics of joining battle at once along the whole line.
-But so unbounded was the confidence reigning among the Spartans,
-that there never was any occasion on which peculiar precautions
-were less thought of. When, from their entrenched camp on the
-Leuktrian eminence, they saw the Thebans encamped on an opposite
-eminence, separated from them by a small breadth of low ground and
-moderate declivities,—their only impatience was to hurry on the
-decisive moment, so as to prevent the enemy from escaping. Both the
-partisans and the opponents of Kleombrotus united in provoking
-the order for battle, each in their own language. The former urged
-him, since he had never yet done anything against the Thebans, to
-strike a blow, and clear himself from the disparaging comparisons
-which rumor instituted between him and Agesilaus; the latter gave
-it to be understood, that if Kleombrotus were now backward, their
-suspicions would be confirmed that he leaned in his heart towards
-the Thebans.[377] Probably the king was himself sufficiently eager
-to fight, and so would any other Spartan general have been, under
-the same circumstances, before the battle of Leuktra. But even had
-he been otherwise, the impatience, prevalent among the Lacedæmonian
-portion of his army, left him no option. Accordingly, the decided
-resolution to fight was taken. The last council was held, and the
-final orders issued by Kleombrotus, after his morning meal, where
-copious libations of wine both attested and increased the confident
-temper of every man. The army was marched out of the camp, and
-arrayed on the lower portion of the declivity; Kleombrotus with
-the Spartans and most of the Lacedæmonians being on the right, in
-an order of twelve deep. Some Lacedæmonians were also on the left,
-but respecting the order of the other parts of the line, we have no
-information. The cavalry was chiefly posted along the front.
-
-  [377] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 5.
-
-Meanwhile, Epaminondas also marched down his declivity, in his
-own chosen order of battle: his left wing being both forward, and
-strengthened into very deep order, for desperate attack. His cavalry
-too were posted in front of his line. But before he commenced his
-march, he sent away his baggage and attendants home to Thebes;
-while at the same time he made proclamation that any of his Bœotian
-hoplites, who were not hearty in the cause, might also retire, if
-they chose. Of such permission the Thespians immediately availed
-themselves;[378] so many were there, in the Theban camp, who
-estimated the chances to be all in favor of Lacedæmonian victory. But
-when these men, a large portion of them unarmed, were seen retiring,
-a considerable detachment from the army of Kleombrotus, either with
-or without orders, ran after to prevent their escape, and forced
-them to return for safety to the main Theban army. The most zealous
-among the allies of Sparta present,—the Phokians, the Phliasians, and
-the Herakleots, together with a body of mercenaries,—executed this
-movement; which seems to have weakened the Lacedæmonians in the main
-battle, without doing any mischief to the Thebans.
-
-  [378] Polyæn. ii, 2, 2; Pausanias, ix, 13, 3; ix, 14, 1.
-
-The cavalry first engaged, in front of both lines; and here the
-superiority of the Thebans soon became manifest. The Lacedæmonian
-cavalry,—at no time very good, but at this moment unusually bad,
-composed of raw and feeble novices, mounted on horses provided by
-the rich,—was soon broken and driven back upon the infantry, whose
-ranks were disturbed by the fugitives. To reëstablish the battle,
-Kleombrotus gave the word for the infantry to advance, himself
-personally leading the right. The victorious Theban cavalry probably
-hung upon the Lacedæmonian infantry of the centre and left, and
-prevented them from making much forward movement; while Epaminondas
-and Pelopidas with their left, advanced according to their intention
-to bear down Kleombrotus and his right wing. The shock here was
-terrible; on both sides victory was resolutely and desperately
-disputed, in a close hand-combat, with pushing of opposite shields
-and opposite masses. But such was the overwhelming force of the
-Theban charge,—with the sacred band or chosen warriors in front,
-composed of men highly trained in the palæstra,[379] and the deep
-column of fifty shields propelling behind,—that even the Spartans,
-with all their courage, obstinacy, and discipline, were unable to
-stand up against it. Kleombrotus, himself either in or near the
-front, was mortally wounded, apparently early in the battle; and
-it was only by heroic and unexampled efforts, on the part of his
-comrades around, that he was carried off yet alive, so as to preserve
-him from falling into the hands of the enemy. Around him also fell
-the most eminent members of the Spartan official staff; Deinon the
-polemarch, Sphodrias, with his son Kleonymus, and several others.
-After an obstinate resistance and a fearful slaughter, the right wing
-of the Spartans was completely beaten, and driven back to their camp
-on the higher ground.
-
-  [379] Plutarch, Symposiac. ii. 5, p. 639 F.
-
-It was upon this Spartan right wing, where the Theban left was
-irresistibly strong, that all the stress of the battle fell,—as
-Epaminondas had intended that it should. In no other part of the line
-does there appear to have been any serious fighting; partly through
-his deliberate scheme of not pushing forward either his centre or
-his right,—partly through the preliminary victory of the Theban
-cavalry, which probably checked a part of the forward march of the
-enemy’s line,—and partly also through the lukewarm adherence, or even
-suppressed hostility, of the allies marshalled under the command of
-Kleombrotus.[380] The Phokians and Herakleots,—zealous in the cause
-from hatred of Thebes,—had quitted the line to strike a blow at the
-retiring baggage and attendants; while the remaining allies, after
-mere nominal fighting and little or no loss, retired to the camp
-as soon as they saw the Spartan right defeated and driven back to
-it. Moreover, even some Lacedæmonians on the left wing, probably
-astounded by the lukewarmness of those around them, and by the
-unexpected calamity on their own right, fell back in the same manner.
-The whole Lacedæmonian force, with the dying king, was thus again
-assembled and formed behind the entrenchment on the higher ground,
-where the victorious Thebans did not attempt to molest them.[381]
-
-  [380] Pausanias (ix, 13, 4; compare viii, 6, 1) lays great stress
-  upon this indifference or even treachery of the allies. Xenophon
-  says quite enough to authenticate the reality of the fact (Hellen.
-  vi, 4, 15-24); see also Cicero De Offic. ii, 7, 26.
-
-  Polyænus has more than one anecdote respecting the dexterity of
-  Agesilaus in dealing with faint-hearted conduct or desertion on
-  the part of the allies of Sparta (Polyæn. ii, 1, 18-20).
-
-  [381] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 13, 14.
-
-But very different were their feelings as they now stood arrayed
-in the camp, from that exulting boastfulness with which they had
-quitted it an hour or two before; and fearful was the loss when
-it came to be verified. Of seven hundred Spartans who had marched
-forth from the camp, only three hundred returned to it.[382] One
-thousand Lacedæmonians, besides, had been left on the field, even
-by the admission of Xenophon; probably the real number was even
-larger. Apart from this, the death of Kleombrotus was of itself an
-event impressive to every one, the like of which had never occurred
-since the fatal day of Thermopylæ. But this was not all. The allies
-who stood alongside of them in arms were now altered men. All were
-sick of their cause, and averse to farther exertion; some scarcely
-concealed a positive satisfaction at the defeat. And when the
-surviving polemarchs, now commanders, took counsel with the principal
-officers as to the steps proper in the emergency, there were a few,
-but very few, Spartans who pressed for renewal of the battle, and for
-recovering by force their slain brethren in the field, or perishing
-in the attempt. All the rest felt like beaten men; so that the
-polemarchs, giving effect to the general sentiment, sent a herald to
-solicit the regular truce for burial of their dead. This the Thebans
-granted, after erecting their own trophy.[383] But Epaminondas,
-aware that the Spartans would practise every stratagem to conceal
-the magnitude of their losses, coupled the grant with a condition
-that the allies should bury their dead first. It was found that the
-allies had scarce any dead to pick up, and that nearly every slain
-warrior on the field was a Lacedæmonian.[384] And thus the Theban
-general, while he placed the loss beyond possibility of concealment,
-proclaimed at the same time such public evidence of Spartan courage,
-as to rescue the misfortune of Leuktra from all aggravation on the
-score of dishonor. What the Theban loss was, Xenophon does not tell
-us. Pausanias states it at forty-seven men,[385] Diodorus at three
-hundred. The former number is preposterously small, and even the
-latter is doubtless under the truth; for a victory in close fight,
-over soldiers like the Spartans, must have been dearly purchased.
-Though the bodies of the Spartans were given up to burial, their arms
-were retained; and the shields of the principal officers were seen by
-the traveller Pausanias at Thebes five hundred years afterwards.[386]
-
-  [382] Xen. Hellen. l. c. Plutarch (Agesil. c. 28) states a
-  thousand Lacedæmonians to have been slain; Pausanias (ix, 13, 4)
-  gives the number as more than a thousand; Diodorus mentions four
-  thousand (xv. 56), which is doubtless above the truth, though the
-  number given by Xenophon may be fairly presumed as somewhat below
-  it. Dionysius of Halikarnassus (Antiq. Roman. ii, 17) states that
-  seventeen hundred Spartans perished.
-
-  [383] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 15.
-
-  [384] Pausan. ix, 13, 4; Plutarch, Apotheg. Reg. p. 193 B.;
-  Cicero, de officiis, ii, 7.
-
-  [385] Pausan. ix, 13, 4; Diodor. xv, 55.
-
-  [386] Pausan. ix, 16, 3.
-
-Twenty days only had elapsed, from the time when Epaminondas quitted
-Sparta after Thebes had been excluded from the general peace, to
-the day when he stood victorious on the field of Leuktra.[387]
-The event came like a thunderclap upon every one in Greece, upon
-victors as well as vanquished,—upon allies and neutrals, near and
-distant, alike. The general expectation had been that Thebes would
-be speedily overthrown and dismantled; instead of which, not only
-she had escaped, but had inflicted a crushing blow on the military
-majesty of Sparta. It is in vain that Xenophon,—whose account of the
-battle is obscure, partial, and imprinted with that chagrin which
-the event occasioned to him,[388]—ascribes the defeat to untoward
-accidents,[389] or to the rashness and convivial carelessness of
-Kleombrotus; upon whose generalship Agesilaus and his party at Sparta
-did not scruple to cast ungenerous reproach,[390] while others
-faintly exculpated him by saying that he had fought contrary to
-his better judgment, under fear of unpopularity. Such criticisms,
-coming from men wise after the fact, and consoling themselves for
-the public calamity by censuring the unfortunate commander, will
-not stand examination. Kleombrotus represented on this occasion the
-feeling universal among his countrymen. He was ordered to march
-against Thebes with the full belief, entertained by Agesilaus and all
-the Spartan leaders, that her unassisted force could not resist him.
-To fight the Thebans on open ground was exactly what he and every
-other Spartan desired. While his manner of forcing the entrance of
-Bœotia, and his capture of Kreusis, was a creditable manœuvre, he
-seems to have arranged his order of battle in the manner usual with
-Grecian generals at the time. There appears no reason to censure
-his generalship, except in so far as he was unable to divine,—what
-no one else divined,—the superior combinations of his adversary,
-then for the first time applied to practice. To the discredit of
-Xenophon, Epaminondas is never named in his narrative of the battle,
-though he recognizes in substance that the battle was decided by
-the irresistible Theban force brought to bear upon one point of
-the enemy’s phalanx; a fact which both Plutarch and Diodorus[391]
-expressly refer to the genius of the general. All the calculations
-of Epaminondas turned out successful. The bravery of the Thebans,
-cavalry as well as infantry, seconded by the training which they had
-received during the last few years, was found sufficient to carry
-his plans into full execution. To this circumstance, principally,
-was owing the great revolution of opinion throughout Greece which
-followed the battle. Every one felt that a new military power had
-arisen, and that the Theban training, under the generalship of
-Epaminondas, had proved itself more than a match on a fair field,
-with shield and spear, and with numbers on the whole inferior,—for
-the ancient Lykurgean discipline; which last had hitherto stood
-without a parallel as turning out artists and craftsmen in war,
-against mere citizens in the opposite ranks, armed but without the
-like training.[392] Essentially stationary and old-fashioned, the
-Lykurgean discipline was now overborne by the progressive military
-improvement of other states, handled by a preëminent tactician; a
-misfortune predicted by the Corinthians[393] at Sparta sixty years
-before, and now realised, to the conviction of all Greece, on the
-field of Leuktra.
-
-  [387] This is an important date, preserved by Plutarch (Agesil.
-  c. 28). The congress was broken up at Sparta on the fourteenth of
-  the Attic month Skirrophorion (June), the last month of the year
-  of the Athenian archon Alkisthenes; the battle was fought on the
-  fifth of the Attic month of Hekatombæon, the first month of the
-  next Attic year, of the archon Phrasikleidês; about the beginning
-  of July.
-
-  [388] Diodorus differs from Xenophon on one important matter
-  connected with the battle; affirming that Archidamus son of
-  Agesilaus was present and fought, together with various other
-  circumstances, which I shall discuss presently, in a future note.
-  I follow Xenophon.
-
-  [389] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 8. Εἰς δ’ οὖν τὴν μάχην τοῖς μὲν
-  Λακεδαιμονίοις πάντα τἀναντία ἐγίγνετο, τοῖς δὲ (to the Thebans)
-  πάντα καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς τύχης κατωρθοῦτο.
-
-  [390] Isokrates, in the Oration vi, called _Archidamus_ (composed
-  about five years after the battle, as if to be spoken by
-  Archidamus son of Agesilaus), puts this statement distinctly
-  into the mouth of Archidamus—μέχρι μὲν ταυτησὶ τῆς ἡμέρας
-  δεδυστυχηκέναι δοκοῦμεν ἐν τῇ μάχῃ τῇ πρὸς Θηβαίους, καὶ τοῖς μὲν
-  σώμασι κρατηθῆναι ~διὰ τὸν οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἡγησάμενον~, etc. (s. 9).
-
-  I take his statement as good evidence of the real opinion
-  entertained both by Agesilaus and by Archidamus; an opinion the
-  more natural, since the two contemporary kings of Sparta were
-  almost always at variance, and at the head of opposing parties;
-  especially true about Agesilaus and Kleombrotus, during the life
-  of the latter.
-
-  Cicero (probably copying Kallisthenes or Ephorus) says, de
-  Officiis, i, 24, 84—“Illa plaga (Lacedæmoniis) pestifera,
-  quâ, quum Cleombrotus invidiam timens temere cum Epaminondâ
-  conflixisset, Lacedæmoniorum opes corruerunt.” Polybius remarks
-  (ix. 23, we know not from whom he borrowed) that all the
-  proceedings of Kleombrotus during the empire of Sparta, were
-  marked with a generous regard for the interests and feelings
-  of the allies; while the proceedings of Agesilaus were of the
-  opposite character.
-
-  [391] Diodor. xv, 55. Epaminondas, ἰδίᾳ τινι καὶ περιττῇ τάξει
-  χρησάμενος, διὰ τῆς ἰδίας στρατηγίας περιεποιήσατο τὴν περιβόητον
-  νίκην ... διὸ καὶ λοξὴν ποιήσας τὴν φάλαγγα, τῷ τοὺς ἐπιλέκτους
-  ἔχοντι κέρατι ἔγνω κρίνειν τὴν μάχην, etc. Compare Plutarch,
-  Pelop. c. 23.
-
-  [392] See Aristotel. Politic. viii, 3, 3, 5.
-
-  Compare Xenophon, De Repub. Laced. xiii, 5. τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους
-  αὐτοσχεδιαστὰς εἶναι τῶν στρατιωτικῶν, Λακεδαιμονίους δὲ μόνους
-  τῷ ὄντι τεχνίτας τῶν πολεμικῶν—and Xenoph. Memorab. iii, 5, 13,
-  14.
-
-  [393] Thucyd. i, 71. ἀρχαιότροπα ὑμῶν (of you Spartans) τὰ
-  ἐπιτηδεύματα πρὸς αὐτούς ἐστιν. ~Ἀνάγκη δ’ ὥσπερ τέχνης ἀεὶ τὰ
-  ἐπιγιγνόμενα κρατεῖν~· καὶ ἡσυχαζούσῃ μὲν πόλει τὰ ἀκίνητα νόμιμα
-  ἄριστα, πρὸς πολλὰ δὲ ἀναγκαζομένοις ἰέναι, ~πολλῆς καὶ τῆς
-  ἐπιτεχνήσεως δεῖ~, etc.
-
-But if the Spartan system was thus invaded and overpassed in its
-privilege of training soldiers, there was another species of teaching
-wherein it neither was nor could be overpassed,—the hard lesson of
-enduring pain and suppressing emotion. Memorable indeed was the
-manner in which the news of this fatal catastrophe was received at
-Sparta. To prepare the reader by an appropriate contrast, we may turn
-to the manifestation at Athens twenty-seven years before, when the
-trireme called Paralus arrived from Ægospotami, bearing tidings of
-the capture of the entire Athenian fleet. “The moan of distress (says
-the historian)[394] reached all up the Long Walls from Peiræus to
-Athens, as each man communicated the news to his neighbor: on that
-night, not a man slept, from bewailing for his lost fellow-citizens
-and for his own impending ruin.” Not such was the scene at Sparta,
-when the messenger arrived from the field of Leuktra, although there
-was everything calculated to render the shock violent. For not only
-was the defeat calamitous and humiliating beyond all former parallel,
-but it came at a moment when every man reckoned on victory. As soon
-as Kleombrotus, having forced his way into Bœotia, saw the unassisted
-Thebans on plain ground before him, no Spartan entertained any doubt
-of the result. Under this state of feeling, a messenger arrived
-with the astounding revelation, that the army was totally defeated,
-with the loss of the king, of four hundred Spartans, and more than
-a thousand Lacedæmonians; and that defeat stood confessed by having
-solicited the truce for interment of the slain. At the moment when
-he arrived, the festival called the Gymnopædia was actually being
-celebrated, on its last day; and the chorus of grown men was going
-through its usual solemnity in the theatre. In spite of all the
-poignancy of the intelligence, the ephors would not permit the
-solemnity to be either interrupted or abridged. “_Of necessity, I
-suppose, they were grieved_,—but they went through the whole as if
-nothing had happened, only communicating the names of the slain to
-their relations, and issuing a general order to the women, to make
-no noise or wailing, but to bear the misfortune in silence.” That
-such an order should be issued, is sufficiently remarkable; that it
-should be issued and obeyed, is what could not be expected; that it
-should not only be issued and obeyed, but overpassed, is what no man
-could believe, if it were not expressly attested by the contemporary
-historian. “On the morrow (says he) you might see those whose
-relations had been slain, walking about in public with bright and
-cheerful countenances; but of those whose relatives survived, scarce
-one showed himself; and the few who were abroad, looked mournful and
-humbled.”[395]
-
-  [394] Xen. Hellen. ii, 2, 3.
-
-  [395] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 16. Γενομένων δὲ τούτων, ὁ μὲν εἰς τὴν
-  Λακεδαίμονα ἀγγελῶν τὸ πάθος ἀφικνεῖται, Γυμνοπαιδιῶν τε οὐσῶν
-  τῆς τελευταίας, καὶ τοῦ ἀνδρικοῦ χόρου ἔνδον ὄντος· Οἱ δὲ ἔφοροι,
-  ἐπεὶ ἤκουσαν τὸ πάθος, ἐλυποῦντο μὲν, ὥσπερ οἶμαι, ἀνάγκῃ· τὸν
-  μέντοι χόρον οὐκ ἐξήγαγον, ἀλλὰ διαγωνίσασθαι εἴων. Καὶ τὰ μὲν
-  ὀνόματα πρὸς τοὺς οἰκείους ἑκάστου τῶν τεθνηκότων ἀπέδοσαν·
-  προεῖπον δὲ ταῖς γυναιξὶ, μὴ ποιεῖν κραυγὴν, ἀλλὰ σιγῇ τὸ πάθος
-  φέρειν. Τῇ δὲ ὑστεραίᾳ ἦν ὁρᾷν, ὧν μὲν ἐτέθνασαν οἱ προσήκοντες,
-  λιπαροὺς καὶ φαιδροὺς ἐν τῷ φανερῷ ἀναστρεφομένους· ὧν δὲ ζῶντες
-  ἠγγελμένοι ἦσαν, ὀλίγους ἂν εἶδες, τούτους δὲ σκυθρωποὺς καὶ
-  ταπεινοὺς περιϊόντας—and Plutarch, Agesil. c. 29.
-
-  See a similar statement of Xenophon, after he has recounted the
-  cutting in pieces of the Lacedæmonian mora near Lechæum, about
-  the satisfaction and even triumph of those of the Lacedæmonians
-  who had lost relations in the battle; while every one else was
-  mournful (Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 10). Compare also Justin, xxviii,
-  4—the behavior after the defeat of Sellasia.
-
-In comparing this extraordinary self-constraint and obedience to
-orders, at Sparta, under the most trying circumstances,—with the
-sensitive and demonstrative temper, and spontaneous outburst of
-feeling at Athens, so much more nearly approaching to the Homeric
-type of Greeks,—we must at the same time remark, that in reference
-to active and heroic efforts for the purpose of repairing past
-calamities and making head against preponderant odds, the Athenians
-were decidedly the better of the two. I have already recounted
-the prodigious and unexpected energy displayed by Athens, after
-the ruinous loss of her two armaments before Syracuse, when no one
-expected that she could have held out for six months: I am now
-about to recount the proceedings of Sparta, after the calamity at
-Leuktra,—a calamity great and serious indeed, yet in positive amount
-inferior to what had befallen the Athenians at Syracuse. The reader
-will find that, looking to the intensity of active effort in both
-cases, the comparison is all to the advantage of Athens; excusing at
-least, if not justifying, the boast of Perikles[396] in his memorable
-funeral harangue,—that his countrymen, without the rigorous drill
-of Spartans, were yet found noway inferior to Spartans in daring
-exertion, when the hour of actual trial arrived.
-
-  [396] Thucyd. ii, 39.
-
-It was the first obligation of the ephors to provide for the safety
-of their defeated army in Bœotia; for which purpose they put in march
-nearly the whole remaining force of Sparta. Of the Lacedæmonian
-moræ, or military divisions (seemingly six in the aggregate), two
-or three had been sent with Kleombrotus; all the remainder were now
-despatched, even including elderly citizens up to near sixty years of
-age, and all who had been left behind in consequence of other public
-offices. Archidamus took the command (Agesilaus still continuing
-to be disabled), and employed himself in getting together the aid
-promised from Tegea,—from the villages representing the disintegrated
-Mantinea,—from Corinth, Sikyon, Phlius, and Achaia; all these places
-being still under the same oligarchies which had held them under
-Lacedæmonian patronage, and still adhering to Sparta. Triremes were
-equipped at Corinth, as a means of transporting the new army across
-to Kreusis, and thus joining the defeated troops at Leuktra; the port
-of Kreusis, the recent acquisition of Kleombrotus, being now found
-inestimable, as the only means of access into Bœotia.[397]
-
-  [397] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 17-19.
-
-Meanwhile the defeated army still continued in its entrenched camp
-at Leuktra, where the Thebans were at first in no hurry to disturb
-it. Besides that this was a very arduous enterprise, even after the
-recent victory,—we must recollect the actual feeling of the Thebans
-themselves, upon whom their own victory had come by surprise, at a
-moment when they were animated more by despair than by hope. They
-were doubtless absorbed in the intoxicating triumph and exultation
-of the moment, with the embraces and felicitations of their families
-in Thebes, rescued from impending destruction by their valor. Like
-the Syracusans after their last great victory[398] over the Athenian
-fleet in the Great Harbor, they probably required an interval to give
-loose to their feelings of ecstasy, before they would resume action.
-Epaminondas and the other leaders, aware how much the value of Theban
-alliance was now enhanced, endeavored to obtain reinforcement from
-without, before they proceeded to follow up the blow. To Athens they
-sent a herald, crowned with wreaths of triumph, proclaiming their
-recent victory. They invited the Athenians to employ the present
-opportunity for taking full revenge on Sparta, by joining their hands
-with those of Thebes. But the sympathies of the Athenians were now
-rather hostile than friendly to Thebes, besides that they had sworn
-peace with Sparta, not a month before. The Senate, who were assembled
-in the acropolis when the herald arrived, heard his news with evident
-chagrin, and dismissed him without even a word of courtesy; while
-the unfortunate Platæans, who were doubtless waiting in the city in
-expectation of the victory of Kleombrotus, and of their own speedy
-reëstablishment, found themselves again struck down and doomed to
-indefinite exile.
-
-  [398] See Thucyd. vii, 73.
-
-To Jason of Pheræ in Thessaly, another Theban herald was sent for the
-same purpose, and very differently received. The despot sent back
-word that he would come forthwith by sea, and ordered triremes to be
-equipped for the purpose. But this was a mere deception; for at the
-same time, he collected the mercenaries and cavalry immediately near
-to him, and began his march by land. So rapid were his movements,
-that he forestalled all opposition,—though he had to traverse the
-territory of the Herakleots and Phokians, who were his bitter
-enemies,—and joined the Thebans safely in Bœotia.[399] But when the
-Theban leaders proposed that he should attack the Lacedæmonian camp
-in flank, from the high ground, while they would march straight
-up the hill and attack it in front,—Jason strongly dissuaded the
-enterprise as too perilous; recommending that they should permit the
-enemy’s departure under capitulation. “Be content (said he) with the
-great victory which you have already gained. Do not compromise it
-by attempting something yet more hazardous, against Lacedæmonians
-driven to despair in their camp. Recollect that a few days ago,
-_you_ yourselves were in despair, and that your recent victory is
-the fruit of that very feeling. Remember that the gods take pleasure
-in bringing about these sudden changes of fortune.”[400] Having by
-such representations convinced the Thebans, he addressed a friendly
-message to the Lacedæmonians, reminding them of their dangerous
-position, as well as of the little trust to be reposed in their
-allies,—and offering himself as mediator to negotiate for their safe
-retreat. Their acquiescence was readily given; and at his instance,
-a truce was agreed to by both parties, assuring to the Lacedæmonians
-the liberty of quitting Bœotia. In spite of the agreement, however,
-the Lacedæmonian commander placed little faith either in the Thebans
-or in Jason, apprehending a fraud for the purpose of inducing him
-to quit the camp and of attacking him on the march. Accordingly,
-he issued public orders in the camp for every man to be ready for
-departure after the evening meal, and to march in the night to
-Kithæron, with a view of passing that mountain on the next morning.
-Having put the enemy on this false scent, he directed his real
-night-march by a different and not very easy way, first to Kreusis,
-next to Ægosthena in the Megarian territory.[401] The Thebans offered
-no opposition; nor is it at all probable that they intended any
-fraud, considering that Jason was here the guarantee, and that he had
-at least no motive to break his word.
-
-  [399] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 20, 21.
-
-  However, since the Phokians formed part of the beaten army at
-  Leuktra, it must be confessed that Jason had less to fear from
-  them at this moment, than at any other.
-
-  [400] Pausanias states that immediately after the battle,
-  Epaminondas gave permission to the allies of Sparta to depart and
-  go home, by which permission they profited, so that the Spartans
-  now stood alone in the camp (Paus. ix, 14, 1). This however is
-  inconsistent with the account of Xenophon (vi, 4, 26), and I
-  think improbable.
-
-  Sievers (Geschichte, etc. p. 247) thinks that Jason preserved
-  the Spartans by outwitting and deluding Epaminondas. But it
-  appears to me that the storming of the Spartan camp was an
-  arduous enterprise, wherein more Thebans than Spartans would
-  have been slain: moreover, the Spartans were masters of the port
-  of Kreusis, so that there was little chance of starving out the
-  camp before reinforcements arrived. The capitulation granted by
-  Epaminondas seems to have been really the wisest proceeding.
-
-  [401] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 22-25.
-
-  The road from Kreusis to Leuktra, however, must have been that by
-  which Kleombrotus arrived.
-
-It was at Ægosthena that the retreating Lacedæmonians met Archidamus,
-who had advanced to that point with the Laconian forces, and was
-awaiting the junction of his Peloponnesian allies. The purpose of his
-march being now completed, he advanced no farther. The armament was
-disbanded, and Lacedæmonians as well as allies returned home.[402]
-
-  [402] This is the most convenient place for noticing the
-  discrepancy, as to the battle of Leuktra, between Diodorus and
-  Xenophon. I have followed Xenophon.
-
-  Diodorus (xv, 54) states both the arrival of Jason in Bœotia, and
-  the out-march of Archidamus from Sparta, to have taken place,
-  _not after_ the battle of Leuktra, but _before_ it. Jason (he
-  says) came with a considerable force to the aid of the Thebans.
-  He prevailed upon Kleombrotus, who doubted the sufficiency of
-  his own numbers, to agree to a truce and to evacuate Bœotia.
-  But as Kleombrotus was marching homeward, he met Archidamus
-  with a second Lacedæmonian army, on his way to Bœotia, by order
-  of the ephors, for the purpose of reinforcing him. Accordingly
-  Kleombrotus, finding himself thus unexpectedly strengthened,
-  openly broke the truce just concluded, and marched back with
-  Archidamus to Leuktra. Here they fought the battle, Kleombrotus
-  commanding the right wing, and Archidamus the left. They
-  sustained a complete defeat, in which Kleombrotus was slain; the
-  result being the same on both statements.
-
-  We must here make our election between the narrative of
-  Xenophon and that of Diodorus. That the authority of the
-  former is greater, speaking generally, I need hardly remark;
-  nevertheless his philo-Laconian partialities become so glaring
-  and preponderant, during these latter books of the Hellenica
-  (where he is discharging the mournful duty of recounting
-  the humiliation of Sparta), as to afford some color for the
-  suspicions of Palmerius, Morus, and Schneider, who think that
-  Xenophon has concealed the direct violation of truce on the part
-  of the Spartans, and that the facts really occurred as Diodorus
-  has described them. See Schneider ad Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 5, 6.
-
-  It will be found, however, on examining the facts, that such
-  suspicion ought not to be admitted, and that there are grounds
-  for preferring the narrative of Xenophon.
-
-  1. He explains to us how it happened that the remains of the
-  Spartan army, after the defeat of Leuktra, escaped out of Bœotia.
-  Jason arrives after the battle, and prevails upon the Thebans
-  to allow them to retreat under a truce; Archidamus also arrives
-  after the battle to take them up. If the defeat had taken place
-  under the circumstances mentioned by Diodorus,—Archidamus and the
-  survivors would have found it scarcely possible to escape out of
-  Bœotia.
-
-  2. If Diodorus relates correctly, there must have been
-  a violation of truce on the part of Kleombrotus and the
-  Lacedæmonians, as glaring as any that occurs in Grecian history.
-  But such violation is never afterwards alluded to by any one,
-  among the misdeeds of the Lacedæmonians.
-
-  3. A part, and an essential part, of the story of Diodorus,
-  is, that Archidamus was present and fought at Leuktra. But we
-  have independent evidence rendering it almost certain that
-  he was not there. Whoever reads the Discourse of Isokrates
-  called _Archidamus_ (Or. vi, sect. 9, 10, 129), will see that
-  such observations could not have been put into the mouth of
-  Archidamus, if he had been present there, and (of course) in
-  joint command with Kleombrotus.
-
-  4. If Diodorus be correct, Sparta must have levied a new army
-  from her allies, just after having sworn the peace, which peace
-  exonerated her allies from everything like obligation to follow
-  her headship; and a new army, not for the purpose of extricating
-  defeated comrades in Bœotia, but for pure aggression against
-  Thebes. This, to say the least, is eminently improbable.
-
-  On these grounds, I adhere to Xenophon and depart from Diodorus.
-
-In all communities, the return of so many defeated soldiers,
-liberated under a capitulation by the enemy, would have been a
-scene of mourning. But in Sparta it was pregnant with grave and
-dangerous consequences. So terrible was the scorn and ignominy
-heaped upon the Spartan citizen who survived a defeat, that life
-became utterly intolerable to him. The mere fact sufficed for his
-condemnation, without any inquiry into justifying or extenuating
-circumstances. No citizen at home would speak to him, or be seen
-consorting with him in tent, game, or chorus; no other family would
-intermarry with his; if he was seen walking about with an air of
-cheerfulness, he was struck and ill-used by the passers-by, until
-he assumed that visible humility which was supposed to become his
-degraded position. Such rigorous treatment (which we learn from
-the panegyrist Xenophon)[403] helps to explain the satisfaction of
-the Spartan father and mother, when they learned that their son
-was among the slain and not among the survivors. Defeat of Spartan
-troops had hitherto been rare. But in the case of the prisoners
-at Sphakteria, when released from captivity and brought back to a
-degraded existence at Sparta, some uneasiness had been felt, and some
-precautions deemed necessary to prevent them from becoming dangerous
-malcontents.[404] Here was another case yet more formidable. The
-vanquished returning from Leuktra were numerous, while the severe
-loss sustained in the battle amply attested their bravery. Aware of
-the danger of enforcing against them the established custom, the
-ephors referred the case to Agesilaus; who proposed that for that
-time and case the customary penalties should be allowed to sleep;
-but should be revived afterwards and come into force as before. Such
-was the step accordingly taken;[405] so that the survivors from
-this fatal battle-field were enabled to mingle with the remaining
-citizens without dishonor or degradation. The step was indeed doubly
-necessary, considering the small aggregate number of fully qualified
-citizens; which number always tended to decline,—from the nature
-of the Spartan political franchise combined with the exigencies of
-Spartan training,[406]—and could not bear even so great a diminution
-as that of the four hundred slain at Leuktra. “Sparta (says
-Aristotle) could not stand up against a single defeat, but was ruined
-through the small number of her citizens.”[407]
-
-  [403] Xenoph. Rep. Lac. c. ix; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 30.
-
-  [404] Thucyd. v, 34.
-
-  [405] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 30; Plutarch, Apophtheg. Lacon. p. 214
-  B.; Apophtheg. Reg. p. 191 C.; Polyænus, ii, 1, 13.
-
-  A similar suspension of penalties, for the special occasion, was
-  enacted after the great defeat of Agis and the Lacedæmonians by
-  Antipater, B.C. 330. Akrotatus, son of King Kleomenes, was the
-  only person at Sparta who opposed the suspension (Diodor. xix,
-  70). He incurred the strongest unpopularity for such opposition.
-  Compare also Justin, xxviii, 4—describing the public feeling at
-  Sparta after the defeat at Sellasia.
-
-  [406] The explanation of Spartan citizenship will be found in an
-  earlier part of this History, Vol. II, Ch. vi.
-
-  [407] Aristotel. Polit. ii, 6, 12. Μίαν γὰρ πληγὴν οὐχ ὑπήνεγκεν
-  ἡ πόλις, ἀλλ’ ἀπώλετο διὰ τὴν ὀλιγανθρωπίαν.
-
-The cause here adverted to by Aristotle, as explaining the utter
-loss of ascendency abroad, and the capital diminution both of power
-and of inviolability at home, which will now be found to come thick
-upon Sparta, was undoubtedly real and important. But a fact still
-more important was, the alteration of opinion produced everywhere
-in Greece with regard to Sparta, by the sudden shock of the battle
-of Leuktra. All the prestige and old associations connected with
-her long-established power vanished; while the hostility and
-fears, inspired both by herself and by her partisans, but hitherto
-reluctantly held back in silence,—now burst forth into open
-manifestation.
-
-The ascendency, exercised down to this time by Sparta north of the
-Corinthian Gulf, in Phokis and elsewhere, passed away from her,
-and became divided between the victorious Thebans and Jason of
-Pheræ. The Thebans, and the Bœotian confederates who were now in
-cordial sympathy with them, excited to enthusiasm by their recent
-success, were eager for fresh glories, and readily submitted to the
-full exigencies of military training; while under a leader like
-Epaminondas, their ardor was turned to such good account, that
-they became better soldiers every month.[408] The Phokians, unable
-to defend themselves single-handed, were glad to come under the
-protection of the Thebans, as less bitterly hostile to them than
-the Thessalian Jason,—and concluded with them obligations of mutual
-defence and alliance.[409] The cities of Eubœa, together with the
-Lokrians (both Epiknemidian and Opuntian,) the Malians and the
-town of Heraklea, followed the example. The latter town was now
-defenceless; for Jason, in returning from Bœotia to Thessaly, had
-assaulted it and destroyed its fortifications; since by its important
-site near the pass of Thermopylæ, it might easily be held as a
-position to bar his entrance into Southern Greece.[410] The Bœotian
-town of Orchomenus, which had held with the Lacedæmonians even until
-the late battle, was now quite defenceless; and the Thebans, highly
-exasperated against its inhabitants, were disposed to destroy the
-city, reducing the inhabitants to slavery. Severe as this proposition
-was, it would not have exceeded the customary rigors of war, nor
-even what might have befallen Thebes herself, had Kleombrotus been
-victorious at Leuktra. But the strenuous remonstrance of Epaminondas
-prevented it from being carried into execution. Alike distinguished
-for mild temper and for long-sighted views, he reminded his
-countrymen that in their present aspiring hopes towards ascendency in
-Greece, it was essential to establish a character for moderation of
-dealing[411] not inferior to their military courage, as attested by
-the recent victory. Accordingly, the Orchomenians were pardoned upon
-submission, and re-admitted as members of the Bœotian confederacy. To
-the Thespians, however, the same lenity was not extended. They were
-expelled from Bœotia, and their territory annexed to Thebes. It will
-be recollected, that immediately before the battle of Leuktra, when
-Epaminondas caused proclamation to be made that such of the Bœotians
-as were disaffected to the Theban cause might march away, the
-Thespians had availed themselves of the permission and departed.[412]
-The fugitive Thespians found shelter, like the Platæans, at
-Athens.[413]
-
-  [408] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 24. Καὶ γὰρ οἱ μὲν Βοιωτοὶ πάντες
-  ἐγυμνάζοντο περὶ τὰ ὅπλα, ἀγαλλόμενοι τῇ ἐν Λεύκτροις νίκῃ, etc.
-
-  These are remarkable words from the unwilling pen of Xenophon:
-  compare vii, 5, 12.
-
-  [409] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 23; vii, 5, 4; Diodor. xv, 57.
-
-  [410] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 27; vi, 5, 23.
-
-  [411] Diodor. xv, 57.
-
-  [412] Pausan. ix, 13, 3; ix, 14, 1.
-
-  [413] Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 1.
-
-  I have already given my reasons (in a note on the preceding
-  chapter) for believing that the Thespians were not ἀπόλιδες
-  _before_ the battle of Leuktra.
-
-While Thebes was commemorating her recent victory by the erection
-of a treasury chamber,[414] and the dedication of pious offerings
-at Delphi,—while the military organization of Bœotia was receiving
-such marked improvement, and the cluster of dependent states attached
-to Thebes was thus becoming larger, under the able management of
-Epaminondas,—Jason in Thessaly was also growing more powerful every
-day. He was tagus of all Thessaly; with its tributary neighbors under
-complete obedience,—with Macedonia partly dependent on him,—and with
-a mercenary force, well paid and trained, greater than had ever
-been assembled in Greece. By dismantling Heraklea, in his return
-home from Bœotia, he had laid open the strait of Thermopylæ, so
-as to be sure of access into southern Greece whenever he chose.
-His personal ability and ambition, combined with his great power,
-inspired universal alarm; for no man knew whither he would direct
-his arms; whether to Asia, against the Persian king, as he was fond
-of boasting,[415]—or northward against the cities in Chalkidikê—or
-southward against Greece.
-
-  [414] Pausanias, x, 11, 4.
-
-  [415] Isokrates, Or. v, (Philipp.) s. 141.
-
-The last-mentioned plan seemed the most probable, at the beginning
-of 370 B.C., half a year after the battle of Leuktra: for Jason
-proclaimed distinctly his intention of being present at the Pythian
-festival (the season for which was about August 1, 370 B.C.,
-near Delphi), not only with splendid presents and sacrifices to
-Apollo, but also at the head of a numerous army. Orders had been
-given that his troops should hold themselves ready for military
-service,[416]—about the time when the festival was to be celebrated;
-and requisitions had been sent round, demanding from all his
-tributaries victims for the Pythian sacrifice, to a total of not
-less than one thousand bulls, and ten thousand sheep, goats, and
-swine; besides a prize-bull to take the lead in the procession, for
-which a wreath of gold was to be given. Never before had such honor
-been done to the god; for those who came to offer sacrifice were
-usually content with one or more beasts bred on the neighboring
-plain of Kirrha.[417] We must recollect, however, that this Pythian
-festival of 370 B.C. occurred under peculiar circumstances; for the
-two previous festivals in 374 B.C. and 378 B.C. must have been
-comparatively unfrequented; in consequence of the war between Sparta
-and her allies on one side, and Athens and Thebes on the other,—and
-also of the occupation of Phokis by Kleombrotus. Hence the festival
-of 370 B.C., following immediately after the peace, appeared to
-justify an extraordinary burst of pious magnificence, to make up for
-the niggardly tributes to the god during the two former; while the
-hostile dispositions of the Phokians would be alleged as an excuse
-for the military force intended to accompany Jason.
-
-  [416] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 30. παρήγγειλε δὲ καὶ ὡς
-  στρατευσομένοις εἰς τὸν περὶ τὰ Πύθια χρόνον Θετταλοῖς
-  παρασκευάζεσθαι.
-
-  I agree with Dr. Arnold’s construction of this passage (see his
-  Appendix ad. Thucyd. v, 1, at the end of the second volume of his
-  edition of Thucydides) as opposed to that of Mr. Fynes Clinton.
-  At the same time, I do not think that the passage proves much
-  either in favor of his view, or against the view of Mr. Clinton,
-  about the month of the Pythian festival; which I incline to
-  conceive as celebrated about August 1; a little later than Dr.
-  Arnold, a little earlier than Mr. Clinton, supposes. Looking
-  to the lunar months of the Greeks, we must recollect that the
-  festival would not always coincide with the same month or week of
-  our year.
-
-  I cannot concur with Dr. Arnold in setting aside the statement of
-  Plutarch respecting the coincidence of the Pythian festival with
-  the battle of Koroneia.
-
-  [417] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 29, 30. βοῦν ἠγεμόνα, etc.
-
-But there were other intentions, generally believed though not
-formally announced, which no Greek could imagine without uneasiness.
-It was affirmed that Jason was about to arrogate to himself the
-presidency and celebration of the festival, which belonged of
-right to the Amphiktyonic assembly. It was feared, moreover, that
-he would lay hands on the rich treasures of the Delphian temple; a
-scheme said to have been conceived by the Syracusan despot Dionysius
-fifteen years before, in conjunction with the epirot Alketas, who
-was now dependent upon Jason.[418] As there were no visible means
-of warding off this blow, the Delphians consulted the god to know
-what they were to do if Jason approached the treasury; upon which
-the god replied, that he would himself take care of it,—and he kept
-his word. This enterprising despot, in the flower of his age and at
-the summit of his power, perished most unexpectedly before the day
-of the festival arrived.[419] He had been reviewing his cavalry near
-Pheræ, and was sitting to receive and answer petitioners, when seven
-young men approached, apparently in hot dispute with each other, and
-appealing to him for a settlement. As soon as they got near, they set
-upon him and slew him.[420] One was killed on the spot by the guards,
-and another also as he was mounting on horseback; but the remaining
-five contrived to reach horses ready prepared for them and to gallop
-away out of the reach of pursuit. In most of the Grecian cities which
-these fugitives visited, they were received with distinguished honor,
-as having relieved the Grecian world from one who inspired universal
-alarm,[421] now that Sparta was unable to resist him, while no other
-power had as yet taken her place.
-
-  [418] Diodor. xv, 13.
-
-  [419] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 30. ἀποκρίνασθαι τὸν θεὸν, ὅτι αὐτῷ
-  μελήσει. ~Ὁ δ’ οὖν ἀνὴρ, τηλικοῦτος ὢν, καὶ τοσαῦτα καὶ τοιαῦτα
-  διανοούμενος~, etc.
-
-  Xenophon evidently considers the sudden removal of Jason as a
-  consequence of the previous intention expressed by the god to
-  take care of his own treasure.
-
-  [420] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 31, 32.
-
-  The cause which provoked these young men is differently stated:
-  compare Diodor. xv, 60; Valer. Maxim. ix, 10, 2.
-
-  [421] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 32.
-
-  The death of Jason in the spring or early summer of 370 B.C.,
-  refutes the compliment which Cornelius Nepos (Timoth. c. 4) pays
-  to Timotheus; who can never have made war upon Jason after 373
-  B.C., when he received the latter at Athens in his house.
-
-Jason was succeeded in his dignity, but neither in his power, nor
-ability, by two brothers,—Polyphron and Polydorus. Had he lived
-longer, he would have influenced most seriously the subsequent
-destinies of Greece. What else he would have done, we cannot say; but
-he would have interfered materially with the development of Theban
-power. Thebes was a great gainer by his death, though perfectly
-innocent of it, and though in alliance with him to the last; insomuch
-that his widow went to reside there for security.[422] Epaminondas
-was relieved from a most formidable rival, while the body of Theban
-allies north of Bœotia became much more dependent than they would
-have remained, if there had been a competing power like that of Jason
-in Thessaly. The treasures of the god were preserved a few years
-longer, to be rifled by another hand.
-
-  [422] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 37.
-
-While these proceedings were going on in Northern Greece, during
-the months immediately succeeding the battle of Leuktra, events
-not less serious and stirring had occurred in Peloponnesus. The
-treaty sworn at Sparta twenty days before that battle, bound the
-Lacedæmonians to disband their forces, remove all their harmosts
-and garrisons, and leave every subordinate city to its own liberty
-of action. As they did not scruple to violate the treaty by the
-orders sent to Kleombrotus, so they probably were not zealous in
-executing the remaining conditions; though officers were named, for
-the express purpose of going round to see that the evacuation of the
-cities was really carried into effect.[423] But it probably was not
-accomplished in twenty days; nor would it perhaps have been ever more
-than nominally accomplished, if Kleombrotus had been successful in
-Bœotia. But after these twenty days came the portentous intelligence
-of the fate of that prince and his army. The invincible arm of
-Sparta was broken; she had not a man to spare for the maintenance
-of foreign ascendency. Her harmosts disappeared at once, (as they
-had disappeared from the Asiatic and insular cities twenty-three
-years before, immediately after the battle of Knidus,[424]) and
-returned home. Nor was this all. The Lacedæmonian ascendency had
-been maintained everywhere by local oligarchies or dekarchies,
-which had been for the most part violent and oppressive. Against
-these governments, now deprived of their foreign support, the
-long-accumulated flood of internal discontent burst with irresistible
-force, stimulated probably by returning exiles. Their past
-misgovernment was avenged by severe sentences and proscription, to
-the length of great reactionary injustice; and the parties banished
-by this anti-Spartan revolution became so numerous, as to harass and
-alarm seriously the newly-established governments. Such were the
-commotions which, during the latter half of 371 B.C., disturbed
-many of the Peloponnesian towns,—Phigaleia, Phlius, Corinth, Sikyon,
-Megara, etc., though with great local difference, both of detail and
-of result.[425]
-
-  [423] Diodor. xv, 38. ἐξαγωγεῖς.
-
-  [424] Xenoph. Hellen. iv, 8, 1-5.
-
-  [425] Diodor. xv, 39, 40.
-
-  Diodorus mentions these commotions as if they had taken place
-  after the peace concluded in 374 B.C., and not after the peace
-  of 371 B.C. But it is impossible that they can have taken place
-  after the former, which in point of fact, was broken off almost
-  as soon as sworn,—was never carried into effect,—and comprised no
-  one but Athens and Sparta. I have before remarked that Diodorus
-  seems to have confounded, both in his mind and in his history,
-  these two treaties of peace together, and has predicated of the
-  former what really belongs to the latter. The commotions which he
-  mentions come in, most naturally and properly, immediately after
-  the battle of Leuktra.
-
-  He affirms the like reaction against Lacedæmonian supremacy and
-  its local representatives in the various cities, to have taken
-  place even after the peace of Antalkidas in 387 B.C. (xv, 5).
-  But if such reaction began at that time, it must have been
-  promptly repressed by Sparta, then in undiminished and even
-  advancing power.
-
-  Another occurrence, alleged to have happened after the battle of
-  Leuktra, may be properly noticed here. Polybius (ii, 39), and
-  Strabo seemingly copying him (viii, p. 384), assert that both
-  Sparta and Thebes agreed to leave their disputed questions of
-  power to the arbitration of the Achæans, and to abide by their
-  decision. Though I greatly respect the authority of Polybius, I
-  am unable here to reconcile his assertion either with the facts
-  which unquestionably occurred, or with general probability. If
-  any such arbitration was ever consented to, it must have come to
-  nothing; for the war went on without interruption. But I cannot
-  bring myself to believe that it was even consented to, either by
-  Thebes or by Sparta. The exuberant confidence of the former, the
-  sense of dignity on the part of the latter, must have indisposed
-  both to such a proceeding; especially to the acknowledgment of
-  umpires like the Achæan cities, who enjoyed little estimation in
-  370 B.C., though they acquired a good deal a century and a half
-  afterwards.
-
-But the city where intestine commotion took place in its most violent
-form was Argos. We do not know how this fact was connected with
-the general state of Grecian politics at the time, for Argos had
-not been in any way subject to Sparta, nor a member of the Spartan
-confederacy, nor (so far as we know) concerned in the recent war,
-since the peace of Antalkidas in 387 B.C. The Argeian government
-was a democracy, and the popular leaders were vehement in their
-denunciations against the oligarchical opposition party—who were men
-of wealth and great family position. These last, thus denounced,
-formed a conspiracy for the forcible overthrow of the government.
-But the conspiracy was discovered prior to execution, and some of
-the suspected conspirators were interrogated under the torture, to
-make them reveal their accomplices; under which interrogation one of
-them deposed against thirty conspicuous citizens. The people, after
-a hasty trial, put these thirty men to death, and confiscated their
-property, while others slew themselves to escape the same fate. So
-furious did the fear and wrath of the people become, exasperated by
-the popular leaders, that they continued their executions until they
-had put to death twelve hundred (or, as some say, fifteen hundred)
-of the principal citizens. At length the popular leaders became
-themselves tired and afraid of what they had done; upon which the
-people were animated to fury against them, and put them to death
-also.[426]
-
-  [426] Diodor. xv, 57, 58.
-
-This gloomy series of events was termed the Skytalism, or Cudgelling,
-from the instrument (as we are told) by which these multiplied
-executions were consummated; though the name seems more to indicate
-an impetuous popular insurrection than deliberate executions. We know
-the facts too imperfectly to be able to infer anything more than
-the brutal working of angry political passion amidst a population
-like that of Argos or Korkyra, where there was not (as at Athens)
-either a taste for speech, or the habit of being guided by speech,
-and of hearing both sides of every question fully discussed. Cicero
-remarks that he had never heard of an Argeian orator. The acrimony
-of Demosthenes and Æschines was discharged by mutual eloquence of
-vituperation, while the assembly or the dikastery afterwards decided
-between them. We are told that the assembled Athenian people, when
-they heard the news of the Skytalism at Argos, were so shocked at it,
-that they caused the solemnity of purification to be performed round
-the assembly.[427]
-
-  [427] Plutarch, Reipubl. Gerend. Præcept. p. 814 B.; Isokrates.
-  Or. v, (Philip.) s. 58.; compare Dionys. Halic. Antiq. Rom. vii,
-  66.
-
-Though Sparta thus saw her confidential partisans deposed, expelled,
-or maltreated, throughout so many of the Peloponnesian cities,—and
-though as yet there was no Theban interference within the isthmus,
-either actual or prospective,—yet she was profoundly discouraged,
-and incapable of any effort either to afford protection or to uphold
-ascendency. One single defeat had driven her to the necessity of
-contending for home and family;[428] probably too the dispositions of
-her own Periœki and Helots in Laconia, were such as to require all
-her force as well as all her watchfulness. At any rate, her empire
-and her influence over the sentiments of Greeks out of Laconia,
-became suddenly extinct, to a degree which astonishes us, when
-we recollect that it had become a sort of tradition in the Greek
-mind, and that, only nine years before, it had reached as far as
-Olynthus. How completely her ascendency had passed away, is shown in
-a remarkable step taken by Athens, seemingly towards the close of
-371 B.C., about four months after the battle of Leuktra. Many of
-the Peloponnesian cities, though they had lost both their fear and
-their reverence for Sparta, were still anxious to continue members
-of a voluntary alliance under the presidency of some considerable
-city. Of this feeling the Athenians took advantage, to send envoys
-and invite them to enter into a common league at Athens, on the
-basis of the peace of Antalkidas, and of the peace recently sworn
-at Sparta.[429] Many of them, obeying the summons, entered into an
-engagement to the following effect: “I will adhere to the peace sent
-down by the Persian king, and to the resolutions of the Athenians and
-the allies generally. If any of the cities who have sworn this oath
-shall be attacked, I will assist her with all my might.” What cities,
-or how many, swore to this engagement, we are not told; we make out
-indirectly that Corinth was one;[430] but the Eleians refused it,
-on the ground that their right of sovereignty over the Marganeis,
-the Triphylians, and the Skilluntians, was not recognized. The
-formation of the league itself, however, with Athens as president, is
-a striking fact, as evidence of the sudden dethronement of Sparta,
-and as a warning that she would henceforward have to move in her
-own separate orbit, like Athens after the Peloponnesian war. Athens
-stepped into the place of Sparta, as president of the Peloponnesian
-confederacy, and guarantee of the sworn peace; though the cities
-which entered into this new compact were not for that reason
-understood to break with their ancient president.[431]
-
-  [428] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 10.
-
-  The discouragement of the Spartans is revealed by the unwilling,
-  though indirect, intimations of Xenophon,—not less than by
-  their actual conduct—Hellen. vi, 5, 21; vii, 1, 30-32; compare
-  Plutarch, Agesil. c. 30.
-
-  [429] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 1-3.
-
-  Ἐνθυμηθέντες οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ὅτι οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι ἔτι οἴονται, χρῆναι
-  ἀκολουθεῖν, καὶ οὔπω διακέοιντο οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ὥσπερ τοὺς
-  Ἀθηναίους διέθεσαν—μεταπέμπονται τὰς πόλεις, ὅσοι βούλονται τῆς
-  εἰρήνης μετέχειν, ἣν βασιλεὺς κατέπεμψεν.
-
-  In this passage, Morus and some other critics maintain that
-  we ought to read οὔπω (which seems not to be supported by any
-  MSS.), in place of οὕτω. Zeune and Schneider have admitted the
-  new reading into the text; yet they doubt the propriety of the
-  change, and I confess that I share their doubts. The word οὕτω
-  will construe, and gives a clear sense; a very different sense
-  from οὔπω, indeed,—yet more likely to have been intended by
-  Xenophon.
-
-  [430] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 37.
-
-  [431] Thus the Corinthians still continued allies of Sparta (Xen.
-  Hellen. vii, 4, 8).
-
-Another incident too, apparently occurring about the present time,
-though we cannot mark its exact date,—serves to mark the altered
-position of Sparta. The Thebans preferred in the assembly of
-Amphiktyons an accusation against her, for the unlawful capture of
-their citadel the Kadmeia by Phœbidas, while under a sworn peace; and
-for the sanction conferred by the Spartan authorities on this act, in
-detaining and occupying the place. The Amphiktyonic assembly found
-the Spartans guilty, and condemned them to a fine of five hundred
-talents. As the fine was not paid, the assembly, after a certain
-interval, doubled it; but the second sentence remained unexecuted as
-well as the first, since there were no means of enforcement.[432]
-Probably neither those who preferred the charge, nor those who
-passed the vote, expected that the Lacedæmonians would really submit
-to pay the fine. The utmost which could be done, by way of punishment
-for such contumacy, would be to exclude them from the Pythian games,
-which were celebrated under the presidency of the Amphiktyons; and we
-may perhaps presume that they really were thus excluded.
-
-  [432] Diodor. xvi, 23-29; Justin, viii, 1.
-
-  We may fairly suppose that both of them borrow from Theopompus,
-  who treated at large of the memorable Sacred War against the
-  Phokians, which began in 355 B.C., and in which the conduct of
-  Sparta was partly determined by this previous sentence of the
-  Amphiktyons. See Theopompi Fragm. 182-184, ed. Didot.
-
-The incident however deserves peculiar notice, in more than one
-point of view. First, as indicating the lessened dignity of Sparta.
-Since the victory of Leuktra and the death of Jason, Thebes had
-become preponderant, especially in Northern Greece, where the
-majority of the nations or races voting in the Amphiktyonic assembly
-were situated. It is plainly through the ascendency of Thebes,
-that this condemnatory vote was passed. Next, as indicating the
-incipient tendency, which we shall hereafter observe still farther
-developed, to extend the functions of the Amphiktyonic assembly
-beyond its special sphere of religious solemnities, and to make it
-the instrument of political coërcion or revenge in the hands of
-the predominant state. In the previous course of this history, an
-entire century has passed without giving occasion to mention the
-Amphiktyonic assembly as taking part in political affairs. Neither
-Thucydides nor Xenophon, though their united histories cover seventy
-years, chiefly of Hellenic conflict, ever speak of that assembly.
-The latter, indeed, does not even notice this fine imposed upon the
-Lacedæmonians, although it falls within the period of his history. We
-know the fact only from Diodorus and Justin; and unfortunately merely
-as a naked fact, without any collateral or preliminary details.
-During the sixty or seventy years preceding the battle of Leuktra,
-Sparta had always had her regular political confederacy and synod of
-allies convened by herself: her political ascendency was exercised
-over them, _eo nomine_, by a method more direct and easy than that of
-perverting the religious authority of the Amphiktyonic assembly, even
-if such a proceeding were open to her.[433] But when Thebes, after
-the battle of Leuktra, became the more powerful state individually,
-she had no such established confederacy and synod of allies, to
-sanction her propositions, and to share or abet her antipathies.
-The Amphiktyonic assembly, meeting alternately at Delphi and at
-Thermopylæ, and composed of twelve ancient races, principally
-belonging to Northern Greece, as well as most of them inconsiderable
-in power,—presented itself as a convenient instrument for her
-purposes. There was a certain show of reason for considering the
-seizure of the Kadmeia by Phœbidas as a religious offence; since it
-was not only executed during the Pythian festival, but was in itself
-a glaring violation of the public law and interpolitical obligations
-recognized between Grecian cities; which, like other obligations,
-were believed to be under the sanction of the gods; though probably,
-if the Athenians and Platæans had preferred a similar complaint to
-the Amphiktyons against Thebes for her equally unjust attempt to
-surprise Platæa under full peace in the spring of 431 B.C.,—both
-Spartans and Thebans would have resisted it. In the present case,
-however, the Thebans had a case against Sparta sufficiently
-plausible, when combined with their overruling ascendency, to carry a
-majority in the Amphiktyonic assembly, and to procure the imposition
-of this enormous fine. In itself the sentence produced no direct
-effect,—which will explain the silence of Xenophon. But it is the
-first of a series of proceedings, connected with the Amphiktyons,
-which will be found hereafter pregnant with serious results for
-Grecian stability and independence.
-
-  [433] See Tittmann, Ueber den Bund der Amphiktyonen, pp. 192-197
-  (Berlin, 1812).
-
-Among all the inhabitants of Peloponnesus, none were more powerfully
-affected, by the recent Spartan overthrow at Leuktra, than the
-Arcadians. Tegea, their most important city, situated on the border
-of Laconia, was governed by an oligarchy wholly in the interest of
-Sparta: Orchomenus was of like sentiment; and Mantinea had been
-broken up into separate villages (about fifteen years before) by the
-Lacedæmonians themselves—an act of high-handed injustice committed
-at the zenith of their power after the peace of Antalkidas. The
-remaining Arcadian population were in great proportion villagers;
-rude men, but excellent soldiers, and always ready to follow the
-Lacedæmonian banners, as well from old habit and military deference,
-as from the love of plunder.[434]
-
-  [434] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 19.
-
-The defeat of Leuktra effaced this ancient sentiment. The Arcadians
-not only ceased to count upon victory and plunder in the service of
-Sparta, but began to fancy that their own military prowess was not
-inferior to that of the Spartans; while the disappearance of the
-harmosts left them free to follow their own inclinations. It was by
-the Mantineans that the movement was first commenced. Divested of
-Grecian city-life, and condemned to live in separate villages, each
-under its own philo-Spartan oligarchy, they had nourished a profound
-animosity, which manifested itself on the first opportunity of
-deposing these oligarchies and coming again together. The resolution
-was unanimously adopted, to re-establish Mantinea with its walls, and
-resume their political consolidation; while the leaders banished by
-the Spartans at their former intervention, now doubtless returned to
-become foremost in the work.[435] As the breaking up of Mantinea had
-been one of the most obnoxious acts of Spartan omnipotence, so there
-was now a strong sympathy in favor of its re-establishment. Many
-Arcadians from other quarters came to lend auxiliary labor, while the
-Eleians sent three talents as a contribution towards the cost. Deeply
-mortified by this proceeding, yet too weak to prevent it by force,
-the Spartans sent Agesilaus with a friendly remonstrance. Having
-been connected with the city by paternal ties of hospitality, he had
-declined the command of the army of coërcion previously employed
-against it; nevertheless, on this occasion, the Mantinean leaders
-refused to convene their public assembly to hear his communication,
-desiring that he would make known his purpose to them. Accordingly,
-he intimated that he had come with no view of hindering the
-re-establishment of the city, but simply to request that they would
-defer it until the consent of Sparta could be formally given; which
-(he promised) should soon be forthcoming, together with a handsome
-subscription to lighten the cost. But the Mantinean leaders answered,
-that compliance was impossible, since a public resolution had already
-been taken to prosecute the work forthwith. Enraged at such a rebuff,
-yet without power to resent it, Agesilaus was compelled to return
-home.[436] The Mantineans persevered and completed the rebuilding of
-their city, on a level site, and in an elliptical form, surrounded
-with elaborate walls and towers.
-
-  [435] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 6; vi, 5, 3.
-
-  [436] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 4, 5.
-
-  Pausanias (viii, 8, 6: ix, 14, 2) states that the Thebans
-  reëstablished the city of Mantinea. The act emanated from the
-  spontaneous impulse of the Mantineans and other Arcadians, before
-  the Thebans had yet begun to interfere actively in Peloponnesus,
-  which we shall presently find them doing. But it was doubtless
-  done in reliance upon Theban support, and was in all probability
-  made known to, and encouraged by, Epaminondas. It formed the
-  first step to that series of anti-Spartan measures in Arcadia,
-  which I shall presently relate.
-
-  Either the city of Mantinea now built was not exactly in the
-  same situation as the one dismantled in 385 B.C., since the
-  river Ophis did not run through it, as it had run through the
-  former,—or else the course of the Ophis has altered. If the
-  former, there would be three successive sites, the oldest of
-  them being on the hill called Ptolis, somewhat north of Gurzuli.
-  Ptolis was perhaps the larger of the primary constituent
-  villages. Ernst Curtius (Peloponnesos, p. 242) makes the hill
-  Gurzuli to be the same as the hill called Ptolis; Colonel Leake
-  distinguishes the two, and places Ptolis on his map northward
-  of Gurzuli (Peloponnesiaca, p. 378-381). The summit of Gurzuli
-  is about one mile distant from the centre of Mantinea (Leake,
-  Peloponnes. p. 383).
-
-  The walls of Mantinea, as rebuilt in 370 B.C., form an ellipse
-  of about eighteen stadia, or a little more than two miles in
-  circumference. The greater axis of the ellipse points north and
-  south. It was surrounded with a wet ditch, whose waters join into
-  one course at the west of the town, and form a brook which Sir
-  William Gell calls the Ophis (Itinerary of the Morea, p. 142).
-  The face of the wall is composed of regularly cut square stones;
-  it is about ten feet thick in all,—four feet for an outer wall,
-  two feet for an inner wall, and an intermediate space of four
-  feet filled up with rubbish. There were eight principal double
-  gates, each with a narrow winding approach, defended by a round
-  tower on each side. There were quadrangular towers, eighty feet
-  apart, all around the circumference of the walls (Ernst Curtius,
-  Peloponnesos, p. 236, 237).
-
-  These are instructive remains, indicating the ideas of the Greeks
-  respecting fortification in the time of Epaminondas. It appears
-  that Mantinea was not so large as Tegea, to which last Curtius
-  assigns a circumference of more than three miles (p. 253).
-
-The affront here offered, probably studiously offered, by Mantinean
-leaders who had either been exiles themselves, or sympathized with
-the exiles,—was only the prelude to a series of others (presently
-to be recounted) yet more galling and intolerable. But it was
-doubtless felt to the quick both by the ephors and by Agesilaus,
-as a public symptom of that prostration into which they had so
-suddenly fallen. To appreciate fully such painful sentiment, we must
-recollect that an exaggerated pride and sense of dignity, individual
-as well as collective, founded upon military excellence and earned
-by incredible rigor of training,—was the chief mental result imbibed
-by every pupil of Lykurgus, and hitherto ratified as legitimate by
-the general testimony of Greece. This was his principal recompense
-for the severe fatigue, the intense self-suppression, the narrow,
-monotonous, and unlettered routine, wherein he was born and died.
-As an individual, the Spartan citizen was pointed out by the finger
-of admiration at the Olympic and other festivals;[437] while he
-saw his city supplicated from the most distant regions of Greece,
-and obeyed almost everywhere near her own border, as Pan-hellenic
-president. On a sudden, with scarce any preparatory series of events,
-he now felt this proud prerogative sentiment not only robbed of its
-former tribute, but stung in the most mortifying manner. Agesilaus,
-especially, was the more open to such humiliation, since he was not
-only a Spartan to the core, but loaded with the consciousness of
-having exercised more influence than any other king before him,—of
-having succeeded to the throne at a moment when Sparta was at the
-maximum of her power,—and of having now in his old age accompanied
-her, in part brought her by his misjudgments, into her present
-degradation.
-
-  [437] Isokrates, Or. vi, (Archidamus) s. 111.
-
-Agesilaus had, moreover, incurred unpopularity among the Spartans
-themselves, whose chagrin took the form of religious scruple and
-uneasiness. It has been already stated that he was, and had been
-from childhood, lame; which deformity had been vehemently insisted
-on by his opponents (during the dispute between him and Leotychides
-in 398 B.C. for the vacant throne) as disqualifying him for the
-regal dignity, and as being the precise calamity against which an
-ancient oracle—“Beware of a lame reign”—had given warning. Ingenious
-interpretation by Lysander, combined with superior personal merit
-in Agesilaus, and suspicions about the legitimacy of Leotychides,
-had caused the objection to be then overruled. But there had always
-been a party, even during the palmy days of Agesilaus, who thought
-that he had obtained the crown under no good auspices. And when
-the humiliation of Sparta arrived, every man’s religion suggested
-to him readily the cause of it,[438]—“See what comes of having set
-at nought the gracious warning of the gods, and put upon ourselves
-a lame reign!” In spite of such untoward impression, however, the
-real energy and bravery of Agesilaus, which had not deserted even
-an infirm body and an age of seventy years, was more than ever
-indispensable to his country. He was still the chief leader of
-her affairs, condemned to the sad necessity of submitting to this
-Mantinean affront, and much worse that followed it, without the least
-power of hindrance.
-
-  [438] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 30, 31, 34.
-
-The reëstablishment of Mantinea was probably completed during the
-autumn and winter of B.C. 371-370. Such coalescence of villages
-into a town, coupled with the predominance of feelings hostile to
-Sparta, appears to have suggested the idea of a larger political
-union among all who bore the Arcadian name. As yet, no such union
-had ever existed; the fractions of the Arcadian name had nothing in
-common, apart from other Greeks, except many legendary and religious
-sympathies, with a belief in the same heroic lineage and indigenous
-antiquity.[439] But now the idea and aspiration, espoused with
-peculiar ardor by a leading Mantinean named Lykomedes, spread itself
-rapidly over the country, to form a “commune Arcadum,” or central
-Arcadian authority, composed in certain proportions out of all the
-sections now autonomous,—and invested with peremptory power of
-determining by the vote of its majority. Such central power, however,
-was not intended to absorb or set aside the separate governments, but
-only to be exercised for certain definite purposes; in maintaining
-unanimity at home, together with concurrent, independent action, as
-to foreign states.[440] This plan of Pan-Arcadian federation was
-warmly promoted by the Mantineans, who looked to it as a protection
-to themselves in case the Spartan power should revive; as well as
-by the Thebans and Argeians, from whom aid was expected in case of
-need. It found great favor in most parts of Arcadia, especially in
-the small districts bordering on Laconia, which stood most in need
-of union to protect themselves against the Spartans,—the Mænalians,
-Parrhasians, Eutresians, Ægytes,[441] etc. But the jealousies among
-the more considerable cities made some of them adverse to any scheme
-emanating from Mantinea. Among these unfriendly opponents were
-Heræa, on the west of Arcadia bordering on Elis,—Orchomenus,[442]
-conterminous with Mantinea to the north—and Tegea, conterminous
-to the south. The hold of the Spartans on Arcadia had been always
-maintained chiefly through Orchomenus and Tegea. The former was the
-place where they deposited their hostages taken from other suspected
-towns; the latter was ruled by Stasippus and an oligarchy devoted to
-their interests.[443]
-
-  [439] It seems, however, doubtful whether there were not some
-  common Arcadian coins struck, even before the battle of Leuktra.
-
-  Some such are extant; but they are referred by K. O. Müller, as
-  well as by M. Boeckh (Metrologisch. Untersuchungen, p. 92) to a
-  later date subsequent to the foundation of Megalopolis.
-
-  On the other hand, Ernst Curtius (Beyträge zur Aeltern Münzkunde,
-  p. 85-90, Berlin, 1851) contends that there is a great difference
-  in the style and execution of these coins, and that several
-  in all probability belong to a date earlier than the battle
-  of Leuktra. He supposes that these older coins were struck in
-  connection with the Pan-Arcadian sanctuary and temple of Zeus
-  Lykæus, and probably out of a common treasury at the temple of
-  that god for religious purposes; perhaps also in connection
-  with the temple of Artemis Hymnia (Pausan. viii, 5, 11) between
-  Mantinea and Orchomenus.
-
-  [440] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 6. συνῆγον ἐπὶ τὸ συνιέναι πᾶν τὸ
-  Ἀρκαδικὸν, καὶ ὅ,τι νικῴη ἐν τῷ κοινῷ, τοῦτο κύριον εἶναι καὶ τῶν
-  πόλεων, etc.
-
-  Compare Diodor. xv, 59-62.
-
-  [441] See Pausanias, viii, 27, 2, 3.
-
-  [442] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 11.
-
-  [443] For the relations of these Arcadian cities, with Sparta and
-  with each other, see Thucyd. iv, 134; v, 61, 64, 77.
-
-Among the population of Tegea, however, a large proportion were
-ardent partisans of the new Pan-Arcadian movement, and desirous
-of breaking off their connection with Sparta. At the head of
-this party were Proxenus and Kallibius; while Stasippus and his
-friends, supported by a senate composed chiefly of their partisans,
-vehemently opposed any alteration of the existing system. Proxenus
-and his partisans resolved to appeal to the assembled people, whom
-accordingly they convoked in arms; pacific popular assemblies, with
-free discussion, forming seemingly no part of the constitution
-of the city. Stasippus and his friends appeared in armed numbers
-also; and a conflict ensued, in which each party charged the other
-with bad faith and with striking the first blow.[444] At first
-Stasippus had the advantage. Proxenus with a few of the opposite
-party were slain, while Kallibius with the remainder maintained
-himself near the town-wall, and in possession of the gate on the
-side towards Mantinea. To that city he had before despatched an
-express, entreating aid, while he opened a parley with the opponents.
-Presently the Mantinean force arrived, and was admitted within
-the gates; upon which Stasippus, seeing that he could no longer
-maintain himself, escaped by another gate towards Pallantium. He took
-sanctuary with a few friends in a neighboring temple of Artemis,
-whither he was pursued by his adversaries, who removed the roof,
-and began to cast the tiles down upon them. The unfortunate men
-were obliged to surrender. Fettered and placed on a cart, they were
-carried back to Tegea, and put on their trial before the united
-Tegeans and Mantineans, who condemned them and put them to death.
-Eight hundred Tegeans, of the defeated party, fled as exiles to
-Sparta.[445]
-
-  [444] Xenophon in his account represents Stasippus and his
-  friends as being quite in the right, and as having behaved
-  not only with justice but with clemency. But we learn from an
-  indirect admission, in another place, that there was also another
-  story, totally different, which represented Stasippus as having
-  begun unjust violence. Compare Hellenic. vi, 5, 7, 8 with vi, 5,
-  36.
-
-  The manifest partiality of Xenophon, in these latter books,
-  greatly diminishes the value of his own belief on such a matter.
-
-  [445] Xen. Hellen. vi. 5. 8, 9, 10.
-
-Such was the important revolution which now took place at Tegea; a
-struggle of force on both sides, and not of discussion,—as was in
-the nature of the Greek oligarchical governments, where scarce any
-serious change of policy in the state could be brought about without
-violence. It decided the success of the Pan-Arcadian movement, which
-now proceeded with redoubled enthusiasm. Both Mantinea and Tegea were
-cordially united in its favor; though Orchomenus, still strenuous in
-opposing it, hired for that purpose, as well as for her own defence,
-a body of mercenaries from Corinth under Polytropus. A full assembly
-of the Arcadian name was convoked at a small town called Asea, in
-the mountainous district west of Tegea. It appears to have been
-numerously attended; for we hear of one place, Eutæa (in the district
-of Mount Mænalus,[446] and near the borders of Laconia), from whence
-every single male adult went to the assembly. It was here that the
-consummation of the Pan-Arcadian confederacy was finally determined;
-though Orchomenus and Heræa still stood aloof.[447]
-
-  [446] Pausanias, viii, 27, 3.
-
-  [447] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 11, 12.
-
-There could hardly be a more fatal blow to Sparta than this loss
-to herself, and transfer to her enemies, of Tegea, the most
-powerful of her remaining allies.[448] To assist the exiles and
-avenge Stasippus, as well as to arrest the Arcadian movement,
-she resolved on a march into the country, in spite of her present
-dispirited condition; while Heræa and Lepreum, but no other places,
-sent contingents to her aid. From Elis and Argos, on the other
-hand, reinforcements came to Mantinea and Tegea. Proclaiming that
-the Mantineans had violated the recent peace by their entry into
-Tegea, Agesilaus marched across the border against them. The first
-Arcadian town which he reached was Eutæa,[449] where he found
-that all the male adults had gone to the great Arcadian assembly.
-Though the feebler population, remaining behind, were completely
-in his power, he took scrupulous care to respect both person and
-property, and even lent aid to rebuild a decayed portion of the
-wall. At Eutæa he halted a day or two, thinking it prudent to wait
-for the junction of the mercenary force and the Bœotian exiles under
-Polytropus, now at Orchomenus. Against the latter place, however,
-the Mantineans had marched under Lykomêdes, while Polytropus, coming
-forth from the walls to meet them, had been defeated with loss, and
-slain.[450] Hence Agesilaus was compelled to advance onward with
-his own unassisted forces, through the territory of Tegea up to the
-neighborhood of Mantinea. His onward march left the way from Asea
-to Tegea free, upon which the Arcadians assembled at Asea broke up,
-and marched by night to Tegea; from whence, on the next day, they
-proceeded to Mantinea, along the mountain range eastward of the
-Tegeatic plain; so that the whole Arcadian force thus became united.
-Agesilaus on his side, having ravaged the fields and encamped within
-little more than two miles from the walls of Mantinea, was agreeably
-surprised by the junction of his allies from Orchomenus, who had
-eluded by a night-march the vigilance of the enemy. Both on one side
-and on the other, the forces were thus concentrated. Agesilaus found
-himself on the first night, without intending it, embosomed in a
-recess of the mountains near Mantinea, where the Mantineans gathered
-on the high ground around, in order to attack him from above, the
-next morning. By a well-managed retreat, he extricated himself from
-this inconvenient position, and regained the plain; where he remained
-three days, prepared to give battle if the enemy came forth, in order
-that he might “not seem (says Xenophon) to hasten his departure
-through fear.”[451] As the enemy kept within their walls, he marched
-homeward, on the fourth day, to his former camp in the Tegean
-territory. The enemy did not pursue, and he then pushed on his march,
-though it was late in the evening, to Eutæa; “wishing (says Xenophon)
-to get his troops off before even the enemies’ fires could be seen,
-in order that no one might say that his return was a flight. He
-thought that he had raised the spirit of Sparta out of the previous
-discouragement, by invading Arcadia and ravaging the country without
-any enemy coming forth to fight him.”[452] The army was then brought
-back to Sparta and disbanded.
-
-  [448] Xen. Hellen. vii, 2, 2.
-
-  See the prodigious anxiety manifested by the Lacedæmonians
-  respecting the sure adhesion of Tegea (Thucyd. v, 64).
-
-  [449] I cannot but think that Eutæa stands marked upon the maps
-  of Kiepert at a point too far from the frontier of Laconia, and
-  so situated in reference to Asea, that Agesilaus must have passed
-  very near Asea in order to get to it; which is difficult to
-  suppose, seeing that the Arcadian convocation was assembled at
-  Asea. Xenophon calls Eutæa πόλιν ὅμορον with reference to Laconia
-  (Hellen. vi, 5, 12); this will hardly suit with the position
-  marked by Kiepert.
-
-  The district called Mænalia must have reached farther southward
-  than Kiepert indicates on his map. It included Oresteion, which
-  was on the straight road from Sparta to Tegea (Thucyd. v, 64;
-  Herodot. ix, 11). Kiepert has placed Oresteion in his map
-  agreeably to what seems the meaning of Pausanias, viii, 44, 3.
-  But it rather appears that the place mentioned by Pausanias must
-  have been _Oresthasion_, and that _Oresteion_ must have been a
-  different place, though Pausanias considers them the same. See
-  the geographical Appendix to K. O. Müller’s Dorians, vol. ii, p.
-  442—Germ. edit.
-
-  [450] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 13, 14; Diodor. xv, 62.
-
-  [451] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 20. ὅπως μὴ δοκοίη φοβούμενος σπεύδειν
-  τὴν ἔφοδον.
-
-  See Leake’s Travels in the Morea, vol. iii, c. xxiv, p. 74, 75.
-  The exact spot designated by the words τὸν ὄπισθεν κόλπον τῆς
-  Μαντινικῆς, seems hardly to be identified.
-
-  [452] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 21. βουλόμενος ἀπαγαγεῖν τοὺς ὁπλίτας,
-  πρὶν καὶ τὰ πυρὰ τῶν πολεμίων ἰδεῖν, ἵνα μή τις εἴπῃ, ὡς φεύγων
-  ἀπαγάγοι. Ἐκ γὰρ τῆς πρόσθεν ἀθυμίας ἐδόκει τε ἀνειληφέναι τὴν
-  πόλιν, ὅτι καὶ ἐμβεβλήκει εἰς τὴν Ἀρκαδίαν, καὶ δῃοῦντι τὴν χώραν
-  οὐδεὶς ἠθελήκει μάχεσθαι: compare Plutarch, Agesil. c. 30.
-
-It had now become a matter of boast for Agesilaus (according to his
-own friendly historian) to keep the field for three or four days,
-without showing fear of Arcadians and Eleians! So fatally had Spartan
-pride broken down, since the day (less than eighteen months before)
-when the peremptory order had been sent to Kleombrotus, to march out
-of Phokis straight against Thebes!
-
-Nevertheless it was not from fear of Agesilaus, but from a wise
-discretion, that the Arcadians and Eleians had kept within the
-walls of Mantinea. Epaminondas with the Theban army was approaching
-to their aid, and daily expected; a sum of ten talents having been
-lent by the Eleians to defray the cost.[453] He had been invited by
-them and by others of the smaller Peloponnesian states, who felt
-the necessity of some external protector against Sparta,—and who
-even before they applied to Thebes for aid, had solicited the like
-interference from Athens (probably under the general presidency
-accepted by Athens, and the oaths interchanged by her with various
-inferior cities, since the battle of Leuktra), but had experienced a
-refusal.[454]
-
-  [453] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 19.
-
-  [454] Diodor. xv, 62. Compare Demosthenes, Orat. pro Megalopolit.
-  pp. 205-207, s. 13-23.
-
-Epaminondas had been preparing for this contingency ever since the
-battle of Leuktra. The first use made of his victory had been to
-establish or confirm the ascendency of Thebes both over the recusant
-Bœotian cities and over the neighboring Phokians and Lokrians,
-etc. After this had been accomplished, he must have been occupied
-(during the early part of 370 B.C.) in anxiously watching the
-movements of Jason of Pheræ,—who had already announced his design
-of marching with an imposing force to Delphi for the celebration of
-the Pythian games (about August 1.) Though this despot was the ally
-of Thebes, yet as both his power, and his aspirations towards the
-headship of Greece,[455] were well known, no Theban general, even
-of prudence inferior to Epaminondas, could venture in the face of
-such liabilities to conduct away the Theban force into Peloponnesus,
-leaving Bœotia uncovered. The assassination of Jason relieved Thebes
-from such apprehensions, and a few weeks sufficed to show that his
-successors were far less formidable in power as well as in ability.
-Accordingly, in the autumn of 370 B.C. Epaminondas had his attention
-free to turn to Peloponnesus, for the purpose both of maintaining
-the anti-Spartan revolution which had taken place in Tegea, and
-of seconding the pronounced impulse among the Arcadians towards
-federative coalition.
-
-  [455] Diodor. xv, 60.
-
-But the purposes of this distinguished man went farther still;
-embracing long-sighted and permanent arrangements, such as should
-forever disable Sparta from recovering her prominent station in the
-Grecian world. While with one hand he organized Arcadia, with the
-other he took measures for replacing the exiled Messenians on their
-ancient territory. To achieve this, it was necessary to dispossess
-the Spartans of the region once known as independent Messenia, under
-its own line of kings, but now, for near three centuries, the best
-portion of Laconia, tilled by Helots for the profit of proprietors
-at Sparta. While converting these Helots into free Messenians, as
-their forefathers had once been, Epaminondas proposed to invite back
-all the wanderers of the same race who were dispersed in various
-portions of Greece; so as at once to impoverish Sparta by loss of
-territory, and to plant upon her flank a neighbor bitterly hostile.
-It has been already mentioned, that during the Peloponnesian war, the
-exiled Messenians had been among the most active allies of Athens
-and Sparta,—at Naupaktus, at Sphakteria, at Pylus, in Kephallenia,
-and elsewhere. Expelled at the close of that war by the triumphant
-Spartans,[456] not only from Peloponnesus, but also from Naupaktus
-and Kephallenia, these exiles had since been dispersed among various
-Hellenic colonies; at Rhegium in Italy, at Messênê in Sicily, at
-Hesperides in Libya. From 404 B.C. (the close of the war) to 373
-B.C., they had remained thus without a home. At length, about the
-latter year (when the Athenian confederate navy again became equal
-or superior to the Lacedæmonian on the west coast of Peloponnesus),
-they began to indulge the hope of being restored to Naupaktus.[457]
-Probably their request may have been preferred and discussed in the
-synod of Athenian allies, where the Thebans sat as members. Nothing
-however had been done towards it by the Athenians,—who soon became
-fatigued with the war, and at length made peace with Sparta,—when the
-momentous battle of Leuktra altered, both completely and suddenly,
-the balance of power in Greece. A chance of protection was now opened
-to the Messenians from Thebes, far more promising than they had
-ever had from Athens. Epaminondas, well aware of the loss as well
-as humiliation that he should inflict upon Sparta by restoring them
-to their ancient territory, entered into communication with them,
-and caused them to be invited to Peloponnesus from all their distant
-places of emigration.[458] By the time of his march into Arcadia, in
-the late autumn of 370 B.C., many of them had already joined him,
-burning with all their ancient hatred of Sparta, and contributing to
-aggravate the same sentiment among Thebans and allies.
-
-  [456] Diodor. xiv, 34.
-
-  [457] Pausanias. iv, 26, 3.
-
-  [458] Diodor. xv, 66; Pausanias, iv, 26, 3, 4.
-
-With the scheme of restoring the Messenians, was combined in the
-mind of Epaminondas another, for the political consolidation of
-the Arcadians; both being intended as parts of one strong and
-self-supporting organization against Sparta on her own border. Of
-course he could have accomplished nothing of the kind, if there had
-not been a powerful spontaneous movement towards consolidation among
-the Arcadians themselves. But without his guidance and protection,
-the movement would have proved abortive, through the force of local
-jealousies within the country, fomented and seconded by Spartan aid
-from without. Though the general vote for federative coalition had
-been passed with enthusiasm, yet to carry out such a vote to the
-satisfaction of all, without quarrelling on points of detail, would
-have required far more of public-minded sentiment, as well as of
-intelligence, than what could be reckoned upon among the Arcadians.
-It was necessary to establish a new city; since the standing jealousy
-between Mantinea and Tegea, now for the first time embarked in one
-common cause, would never have permitted that either should be
-preferred as the centre of the new consolidation.[459] Besides fixing
-upon the new site required, it was indispensable also to choose
-between conflicting exigencies, and to break up ancient habits, in a
-way such as could hardly have been enforced by any majority purely
-Arcadian. The authority here deficient was precisely supplied by
-Epaminondas; who brought with him a victorious army and a splendid
-personal name, combined with impartiality as to the local politics of
-Arcadia, and single-minded hostility to Sparta.
-
-  [459] To illustrate small things by great—At the first formation
-  of the Federal Constitution of the United States of America, the
-  rival pretensions of New York and Philadelphia were among the
-  principal motives for creating the new federal city of Washington.
-
-It was with a view to these two great foundations, as well as to
-expel Agesilaus, that Epaminondas now marched the Theban army
-into Arcadia; the command being voluntarily intrusted to him by
-Pelopidas and the other Bœotarchs present. He arrived shortly after
-the retirement of Agesilaus, while the Arcadians and Eleians
-were ravaging the lands of the recusant town of Heræa. As they
-speedily came back to greet his arrival, the aggregate confederate
-body,—Argeians, Arcadians, and Eleians, united with the Thebans
-and their accompanying allies,—is said to have amounted to forty
-thousand, or according to some, even to seventy thousand men.[460]
-Not merely had Epaminondas brought with him a choice body of
-auxiliaries,—Phokians, Lokrians, Eubœans, Akarnanians, Herakleots,
-Malians, and Thessalian cavalry and peltasts,—but the Bœotian bands
-themselves were so brilliant and imposing, as to excite universal
-admiration. The victory of Leuktra had awakened among them an
-enthusiastic military ardor, turned to account by the genius of
-Epaminondas, and made to produce a finished discipline which even the
-unwilling Xenophon cannot refuse to acknowledge.[461] Conscious of
-the might of their assembled force, within a day’s march of Laconia,
-the Arcadians, Argeians, and Eleians pressed Epaminondas to invade
-that country, now that no allies could approach the frontier to its
-aid. At first he was unwilling to comply. He had not come prepared
-for the enterprise; being well aware, from his own journey to Sparta
-(when the peace-congress was held there prior to the battle of
-Leuktra), of the impracticable nature of the intervening country, so
-easy to be defended, especially during the winter-season, by troops
-like the Lacedæmonians, whom he believed to be in occupation of all
-the passes. Nor was his reluctance overcome until the instances
-of his allies were backed by assurances from the Arcadians on the
-frontier, that the passes were not all guarded; as well as by
-invitations from some of the discontented Periœki, in Laconia. These
-Periœki engaged to revolt openly, if he would only show himself
-in the country. They told him that there was a general slackness
-throughout Laconia in obeying the military requisitions from Sparta;
-and tendered their lives as atonement if they should be found to
-speak falsely. By such encouragements, as well as by the general
-impatience of all around him to revenge upon Sparta her long career
-of pride and abused ascendency, Epaminondas was at length induced to
-give the order of invasion.[462]
-
-  [460] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 31; and compare Agesil. and Pomp. c.
-  4; Diodor. xv, 62. Compare Xenophon, Agesilaus, 2, 24.
-
-  [461] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 23. Οἱ δὲ Ἀρκάδες καὶ Ἀργεῖοι καὶ
-  Ἠλεῖοι ἔπειθον αὐτοὺς ἡγεῖσθαι ὡς τάχιστα εἰς τὴν Λακωνικήν,
-  ἐπιδείκνυντες μὲν τὸ ἑαυτῶν πλῆθος, ὑπερεπαινοῦντες δὲ τὸ τῶν
-  Θηβαίων στράτευμα. Καὶ γὰρ οἱ μὲν Βοιωτοὶ ἐγυμνάζοντο πάντες περὶ
-  τὰ ὅπλα, ἀγαλλόμενοι τῇ ἐν Λεύκτροις νίκῃ, etc.
-
-  [462] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 24, 25.
-
-That he should have hesitated in taking this responsibility, will
-not surprise us, if we recollect, that over and above the real
-difficulties of the country, invasion of Laconia by land was
-an unparalleled phenomenon,—that the force of Sparta was most
-imperfectly known,—that no such thought had been entertained when he
-left Thebes,—that the legal duration of command, for himself and his
-colleagues, would not permit it,—and that though his Peloponnesian
-allies were forward in the scheme, the rest of his troops and his
-countrymen might well censure him, if the unknown force of resistance
-turned out as formidable as their associations from old time led them
-to apprehend.
-
-The invading army was distributed into four portions, all penetrating
-by different passes. The Eleians had the westernmost and easiest
-road, the Argeians the easternmost;[463] while the Thebans themselves
-and the Arcadians formed the two central divisions. The latter
-alone experienced any serious resistance. More daring even than
-the Thebans, they encountered Ischolaus the Spartan at Ium or Oeum
-in the district called Skiritis, attacked him in the village, and
-overpowered him by vehemence of assault, by superior numbers, and
-seemingly also by some favor or collusion[464] on the part of the
-inhabitants. After a desperate resistance, this brave Spartan with
-nearly all his division perished. At Karyæ, the Thebans also found
-and surmounted some resistance; but the victory of the Arcadians
-over Ischolaus operated as an encouragement to all, so that the four
-divisions reached Sellasia[465] and were again united in safety.
-Undefended and deserted (seemingly) by the Spartans, Sellasia was
-now burnt and destroyed by the invaders, who, continuing their march
-along the plain or valley towards the Eurotas, encamped in the sacred
-grove of Apollo. On the next day they reached the Eurotas, at the
-foot of the bridge which crossed that river and led to the city of
-Sparta.
-
-  [463] Diodor. xv, 64.
-
-  See Colonel Leake’s Travels in the Morea, vol. iii, ch. 23, p. 29.
-
-  [464] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 26. When we read that the Arcadians got
-  on the roofs of the houses to attack Ischolaus, this fact seems
-  to imply that they were admitted into the houses by the villagers.
-
-  [465] Respecting the site of Sellasia, Colonel Leake thinks, and
-  advances various grounds for supposing, that Sellasia was on the
-  road from Sparta to the north-east, towards the Thyreatis; and
-  that Karyæ was on the road from Sparta northward, towards Tegea.
-  The French investigators of the Morea, as well as Professor Ross
-  and Kiepert, hold a different opinion, and place Sellasia on the
-  road from Sparta northward towards Tegea (Leake, Peloponnesiaca,
-  p. 342-352; Ross, Reisen im Peloponnes. p. 187; Berlin, 1841).
-
-  Upon such a point, the authority of Colonel Leake is very high;
-  yet the opposite opinion respecting the site of Sellasia seems to
-  me preferable.
-
-Epaminondas found the bridge too well-guarded to attempt forcing it;
-a strong body of Spartan hoplites being also discernible on the other
-side, in the sacred ground of Athênê Alea. He therefore marched down
-the left bank of the river, burning and plundering the houses in his
-way, as far as Amyklæ, between two and three miles below Sparta. Here
-he found a ford, though the river was full, from the winter season;
-and accomplished the passage, defeating, after a severe contest, a
-body of Spartans who tried to oppose it. He was now on the same side
-of the river as Sparta, to which city he slowly and cautiously made
-his approach; taking care to keep his Theban troops always in the
-best battle order, and protecting them, when encamped, by felled
-trees; while the Arcadians and other Peloponnesian allies dispersed
-around to plunder the neighboring houses and property.[466]
-
-Great was the consternation which reigned in the city; destitute
-of fortifications, yet hitherto inviolate in fact and unassailable
-even in idea. Besides their own native force, the Spartans had
-no auxiliaries except those mercenaries from Orchomenus who had
-come back with Agesilaus; nor was it certain beforehand that
-even these troops would remain with them, if the invasion became
-formidable.[467] On the first assemblage of the irresistible army
-on their frontier, they had despatched one of their commanders of
-foreign contingents (called Xenâgi) to press the instant coming of
-such Peloponnesian allies as remained faithful to them; and also
-envoys to Athens, entreating assistance from that city. Auxiliaries
-were obtained, and rapidly put under march, from Pellênê, Sikyon,
-Phlius, Corinth, Epidaurus, Trœzen, Hermionê, and Halieis.[468] But
-the ordinary line of march into Laconia was now impracticable to
-them; the whole frontier being barred by Argeians and Arcadians.
-Accordingly they were obliged to proceed first to the Argolic
-peninsula, and from thence to cross by sea (embarking probably at
-Halieis on the south-western coast of the peninsula) to Prasiæ on the
-eastern coast of Laconia; from whence they made their way over the
-Laconian mountains to Sparta. Being poorly provided with vessels,
-they were forced to cross in separate detachments, and to draw lots
-for priority.[469] By this chance the Phliasian contingent did not
-come over until the last; while the xenagus, eager to reach Sparta,
-left them behind, and conducted the rest thither, arriving only
-just before the confederate enemies debouched from Sellasia. The
-Phliasians, on crossing to Prasiæ, found neither their comrades nor
-the xenagus, but were obliged to hire a guide to Sparta. Fortunately
-they arrived there both safely and in time, eluding the vigilance of
-the enemy, who were then near Amyklæ.
-
-  [466] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 30; Diodor. xv, 65.
-
-  [467] This I apprehend to be the meaning of the phrase—ἐπεὶ
-  μέντοι ἔμενον μὲν οἱ ἐξ Ὀρχομένου μισθόφοροι, etc.
-
-  [468] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 29; vii, 2, 2.
-
-  [469] Xen. Hellen. vii, 2, 2. Καὶ ~διαβαίνειν τελευταῖοι
-  λαχόντες~ (the Phliasians) εἰς Πρασιὰς τῶν συμβοηθησάντων
-  ... οὐ γὰρ πώποτε ἀφέστασαν, ἀλλ’ οὐδ’, ἐπεὶ ὁ ξεναγὸς ~τοὺς
-  προδιαβεβῶτας~ λαβὼν ἀπολιπὼν αὐτοὺς ᾤχετο, οὐδ’ ὡς ἀπεστράφησαν,
-  ἀλλ’ ἡγεμόνα μισθωσάμενοι ἐκ Πρασιῶν, ὄντων τῶν πολεμίων περὶ
-  Ἀμύκλας, ὅπως ἐδύναντο διαδύντες ἐς Σπάρτην ἀφίκοντο.
-
-These reinforcements were no less seasonable to Sparta, than
-creditable to the fidelity of the allies. For the bad feeling which
-habitually reigned in Laconia, between the Spartan citizens on one
-side, and the Periœki and Helots on the other, produced in this hour
-of danger its natural fruits of desertion, alarm, and weakness.
-Not only were the Periœki and Helots in standing discontent, but
-even among the Spartan citizens themselves, a privileged fraction
-called Peers had come to monopolize political honors; while the
-remainder,—poorer men, yet ambitious and active, and known under
-the ordinary name of the Inferiors,—were subject to a degrading
-exclusion, and rendered bitterly hostile. The account given in a
-previous chapter of the conspiracy of Kinadon, will have disclosed
-the fearful insecurity of the Spartan citizen, surrounded by so many
-disaffected companions; Periœki and Helots in Laconia, inferior
-citizens at Sparta. On the appearance of the invading enemy,
-indeed, a certain feeling of common interest arose, since even the
-disaffected might reasonably imagine that a plundering soldiery, if
-not repelled at the point of the sword, would make their condition
-worse instead of better. And accordingly, when the ephors made public
-proclamation, that any Helot who would take heavy armor and serve
-in the ranks as an hoplite, should be manumitted,—not less than
-six thousand Helots gave in their names to serve. But a body thus
-numerous, when seen in arms, became itself the object of mistrust to
-the Spartans; so that the arrival of their new allies from Prasiæ
-was welcomed as a security, not less against the armed Helots within
-the city, than against the Thebans without.[470] Open enmity,
-however, was not wanting. A considerable number both of Periœki and
-Helots actually took arms on behalf of the Thebans; others remained
-inactive, disregarding the urgent summons from the ephors, which
-could not now be enforced.[471]
-
-  [470] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 28, 29. ὥστε φόβον αὖ οὗτοι παρεῖχον
-  συντεταγμένοι καὶ λίαν ἐδόκουν πολλοὶ εἶναι, etc.
-
-  [471] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 25; vi, 5, 32; vii, 2, 2.
-
-  It is evident from the last of these three passages, that the
-  number of Periœki and Helots who actually revolted, was very
-  considerable; and that the contrast between the second and third
-  passages evinces the different feelings with which the two seem
-  to have been composed by Xenophon.
-
-  In the second, he is recounting the invasion of Epaminondas,
-  with a wish to soften the magnitude of the Spartan disgrace and
-  calamity as much as he can. Accordingly, he tells us no more
-  than this,—“there were some among the Periœki, who even took
-  active service in the attack of Gythium, and fought along with
-  the Thebans,”—ἦσαν δέ τινες τῶν Περιοίκων, οἳ καὶ ἐπέθεντο καὶ
-  συνεστρατεύοντο τοῖς μετὰ Θηβαίων.
-
-  But in the third passage (vii, 2, 2: compare his biography called
-  Agesilaus, ii, 24) Xenophon is extolling the fidelity of the
-  Phliasians to Sparta under adverse circumstances of the latter.
-  Hence it then suits his argument, to magnify these adverse
-  circumstances, in order to enhance the merit of the Phliasians;
-  and he therefore tells us,—“_Many_ of the Periœki, all the
-  Helots, and all the allies except a few, had revolted from
-  Sparta,”—σφαλέντων δ’ αὐτῶν τῇ ἐν Λεύκτροις μάχῃ, καὶ ἀποστάντων
-  μὲν πολλῶν Περιοίκων, ἀποστάντων δὲ πάντων τῶν Εἱλώτων, ἔτι δὲ
-  τῶν συμμάχων πλὴν πάνυ ὀλίγων, ἐπιστρατευόντων δ’ αὐτοῖς, ὡς
-  εἰπεῖν, πάντων τῶν Ἑλλήνων, πιστοὶ διέμειναν (the Phliasians).
-
-  I apprehend that both statements depart from the reality, though
-  in opposite directions. I have adopted in the text something
-  between the two.
-
-Under such wide-spread feelings of disaffection the defence even of
-Sparta itself against the assailing enemy was a task requiring all
-the energy of Agesilaus. After having vainly tried to hinder the
-Thebans from crossing the Eurotas, he was forced to abandon Amyklæ
-and to throw himself back upon the city of Sparta, towards which they
-immediately advanced. More than one conspiracy was on the point of
-breaking out, had not his vigilance forestalled the projects. Two
-hundred young soldiers of doubtful fidelity were marching, without
-orders, to occupy a strong post (sacred to Artemis) called the
-Issorium. Those around him were about to attack them, but Agesilaus,
-repressing their zeal, went up alone to the band, addressed them in
-language betokening no suspicion, yet warning them that they had
-mistaken his orders: their services were needed, not at the Issorium,
-but in another part of the city. They obeyed his orders, and moved to
-the spot indicated; upon which he immediately occupied the Issorium
-with troops whom he could trust. In the ensuing night, he seized
-and put to death fifteen of the leaders of the two hundred. Another
-conspiracy, said to have been on the point of breaking out, was
-repressed by seizing the conspirators in the house where they were
-assembled, and putting them to death untried; the first occasion
-(observes Plutarch) on which any Spartan was ever put to death
-untried,[472]—a statement which I hesitate to believe without knowing
-from whom he borrowed it, but which, if true, proves that the Spartan
-kings and ephors did not apply to Spartan citizens the same measure
-as to Periœki and Helots.
-
-  [472] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 32; Polyænus, ii, 1, 14; Ælian, V. H.
-  xiv, 27.
-
-By such severe proceedings, disaffection was kept under; while the
-strong posts of the city were effectively occupied, and the wider
-approaches barricaded by heaps of stones and earth.[473] Though
-destitute of walls, Sparta was extremely defensible by position.
-Epaminondas marched slowly up to it from Amyklæ; the Arcadians and
-others in his army spreading themselves to burn and plunder the
-neighborhood. On the third or fourth day his cavalry occupied the
-Hippodrome (probably a space of level ground near the river, under
-the hilly site of the town), where the Spartan cavalry, though
-inferior both in number and in goodness, gained an advantage
-over them, through the help of three hundred chosen hoplites whom
-Agesilaus had planted in ambush hard by, in a precinct sacred to the
-Dioskuri. Though this action was probably of little consequence, yet
-Epaminondas did not dare to attempt the city by storm. Satisfied with
-having defied the Spartans and manifested his mastery of the field
-even to their own doors, he marched away southward down to Eurotas.
-To them, in their present depression, it was matter of consolation
-and even of boasting,[474] that he had not dared to assail them
-in their last stronghold. The agony of their feelings,—grief,
-resentment, and wounded honor,—was intolerable. Many wished to go out
-and fight, at all hazard; but Agesilaus resisted them with the same
-firmness as Perikles had shown at Athens, when the Peloponnesians
-first invaded Attica at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war.
-Especially the Spartan women, who had never before beheld an enemy,
-are said to have manifested emotions so furious and distressing, as
-to increase much the difficulty of defence.[475] We are even told
-that Antalkidas, at that time one of the ephors, sent his children
-for safety away from Sparta to the island of Kythêra. Epaminondas
-knew well how desperate the resistance of the Spartans would be if
-their city were attacked; while to himself, in the midst of a hostile
-and impracticable country, repulse would be absolute ruin.[476]
-
-  [473] Æneas, Poliorceticus, c. 2, p. 16.
-
-  [474] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 32. Καὶ τὸ μὲν μὴ πρὸς τὴν πόλιν
-  προσβαλεῖν ἂν ἔτι αὐτοὺς, ἤδη τι ἐδόκει θαῤῥαλεώτερον, εἶναι.
-
-  This passage is not very clear, nor are the commentators
-  unanimous either as to the words or as to the meaning. Some omit
-  μὴ, construe ἐδόκει as if it were ἐδόκει τοῖς Θηβαίοις, and
-  translate θαῤῥαλεώτερον “excessively rash.”
-
-  I agree with Schneider in dissenting from this alteration and
-  construction. I have given in the text what I believe to be the
-  meaning.
-
-  [475] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 28; Aristotel. Politic. ii, 6, 8;
-  Plutarch, Agesil. c. 32, 33; Plutarch, comp. Agesil. and Pomp. c.
-  4.
-
-  [476] Aristotle (in his Politica, iv, 10, 5), discussing the
-  opinion of those political philosophers who maintained that a
-  city ought to have no walls, but to be defended only by the
-  bravery of its inhabitants,—gives various reasons against such
-  opinion, and adds “that these are old-fashioned thinkers; that
-  the cities which made such ostentatious display of personal
-  courage, have been proved to be wrong by actual results”—λίαν
-  ἀρχαίως ὑπολαμβάνουσι, καὶ ταῦθ’ ὁρῶντες ἐλεγχομένας ἔργῳ τὰς
-  ἐκείνως καλλωπισαμένας.
-
-  The commentators say (see the note of M. Barth. St. Hilaire) that
-  Aristotle has in his view Sparta at the moment of this Theban
-  invasion. I do not see what else he can mean; yet at the same
-  time, if such be his meaning, the remark is surely difficult to
-  admit. Epaminondas came close up to Sparta, but did not dare
-  to attempt to carry it by assault. If the city had had walls
-  like those of Babylon, they could not have procured for her
-  any greater protection. To me the fact appears rather to show
-  (contrary to the assertion of Aristotle) that Sparta was so
-  strong by position, combined with the military character of her
-  citizens, that she could dispense with walls.
-
-  Polyænus (ii, 2, 5) has an anecdote, I know not from whom
-  borrowed, to the effect that Epaminondas might have taken
-  Sparta, but designedly refrained from doing so, on the ground
-  that the Arcadians and others would then no longer stand in need
-  of Thebes. Neither the alleged matter of fact, nor the reason,
-  appear to me worthy of any credit. Ælian (V. H. iv, 8) has the
-  same story, but with a different reason assigned.
-
-On leaving Sparta, Epaminondas carried his march as far as Helos
-and Gythium on the sea-coast; burning and plundering the country,
-and trying for three days to capture Gythium, which contained the
-Lacedæmonian arsenal and ships. Many of the Laconian Periœki joined
-and took service in his army; nevertheless his attempt on Gythium
-did not succeed; upon which he turned back and retraced his steps to
-the Arcadian frontier. It was the more necessary for him to think of
-quitting Laconia, since his Peloponnesian allies, the Arcadians and
-others, were daily stealing home with the rich plunder which they had
-acquired, while his supplies were also becoming deficient.[477]
-
-  [477] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 50; Diodor. xv, 67.
-
-Epaminondas had thus accomplished far more than he had projected
-when quitting Thebes; for the effect of the expedition on Grecian
-opinion was immense. The reputation of his army, as well as his
-own, was prodigiously exalted; and even the narrative of Xenophon,
-unfriendly as well as obscure, bears involuntary testimony both to
-the excellence of his generalship and to the good discipline of his
-troops. He made his Thebans keep in rank and hold front against the
-enemy, even while their Arcadian allies were dispersing around for
-plunder. Moreover, the insult and humiliation to Sparta were still
-greater than that inflicted by the battle of Leuktra; which had
-indeed shown that she was no longer invincible in the field, but
-had still left her with the admitted supposition of an inviolable
-territory and an unapproachable city.
-
-The resistance of the Spartans indeed (except in so far as regards
-their city) had been far less than either friends or enemies
-expected; the belief in their power was thus proportionally
-abridged. It now remained for Epaminondas to complete their
-humiliation by executing those two enterprises which had formed the
-special purpose of his expedition: the reëstablishment of Messênê,
-and the consolidation of the Arcadians.
-
-The recent invasion of Laconia, victorious as well as lucrative,
-had inspired the Arcadians with increased confidence and antipathy
-against Sparta, and increased disposition to listen to Epaminondas.
-When that eminent man proclaimed the necessity of establishing a
-strong frontier against Sparta on the side of Arcadia, and when
-he announced his intention of farther weakening Sparta by the
-restoration of the exiled Messenians,—the general feeling of the
-small Arcadian communities, already tending in the direction of
-coalescence, became strong enough to overbear all such impediments
-of detail as the breaking up of ancient abode and habit involves.
-Respecting early Athenian history, we are told by Thucydides,[478]
-that the legendary Theseus, “having become powerful, in addition
-to his great capacity,” had effected the discontinuance of those
-numerous independent governments which once divided Attica, and had
-consolidated them all into one common government at Athens. Just
-such was the revolution now operated by Epaminondas, through the
-like combination of intelligence and power. A Board of Œkists or
-Founders was named to carry out the resolution taken by the Arcadian
-assemblies at Asea and Tegea, for the establishment of a Pan-Arcadian
-city and centre. Of this Board, two were from Tegea, two from
-Mantinea, two from Kleitor, two from the district of Menalus, two
-from that of the Parrhasians. A convenient site being chosen upon
-the river Helisson (which flowed through and divided the town in
-two), about twenty miles west of Tegea, well-fitted to block up the
-marches of Sparta in a north-westerly direction,—the foundation of
-the new Great City (Megalopolis) was laid by the Œkists jointly with
-Epaminondas. Forty distinct Arcadian townships,[479] from all sides
-of this centre, were persuaded to join the new community. Ten were
-from the Mænalii, eight from the Parrhasii, six from the Eutresii,
-three great sections of the Arcadian name, each an aggregate of
-villages. Four little townships, occupying a portion of the area
-intended for the new territory, yet being averse to the scheme, were
-constrained to join; but in one of them, Trapezus, the aversion was
-so strong, that most of the inhabitants preferred to emigrate, and
-went to join the Trapezuntines in the Euxine Sea (Trebizond), who
-received them kindly. Some of the leading Trapezuntines were even
-slain by the violent temper of the Arcadian majority. The walls of
-the new city enclosed an area of fifty stadia in circumference (more
-than five miles and a half); while an ample rural territory was also
-gathered around it, extending northward as much as twenty-four miles
-from the city, and conterminous on the east with Tegea, Mantinea,
-Orchomenus, and Kaphyæ,—on the west with Messênê,[480] Phigalia, and
-Heræa.
-
-  [478] Thucyd. ii, 15. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ Θησεὺς ἐβασίλευσε, γενόμενος μετὰ
-  τοῦ ξυνετοῦ καὶ δυνατὸς, etc.
-
-  [479] Diodor. xv, 72.
-
-  [480] Pausan. viii, 27; viii, 35, 5. Diodor. xv, 63.
-
-  See Mr. Fynes Clinton, Fasti Hellenici, Appendix, p. 418, where
-  the facts respecting Megalopolis are brought together and
-  discussed.
-
-  It is remarkable that though Xenophon (Hellen. v, 2, 7) observes
-  that the capture of Mantinea by Agesipolis had made the
-  Mantineans see the folly of having a river run through their
-  town,—yet in choosing the site of Megalopolis, this same feature
-  was deliberately reproduced: and in this choice the Mantineans
-  were parties concerned.
-
-The other new city,—Messênê,—was founded under the joint auspices
-of the Thebans and their allies, Argeians and others; Epitelês
-being especially chosen by the Argeians for that purpose.[481]
-The Messenian exiles, though eager and joyful at the thought of
-regaining their name and nationality, were averse to fix their new
-city either at Œchalia or Andania, which had been the scenes of their
-calamities in the early wars with Sparta. Moreover the site of Mount
-Ithômê is said to have been pointed out by the hero Kaukon, in a
-dream, to the Ageian general Epitelês. The local circumstances of
-this mountain (on which the last gallant resistance of the revolted
-Messenians against Sparta had been carried on, between the Persian
-and Peloponnesian wars) were such, that the indications of dreams,
-prophets, and religious signs coincided fully with the deliberate
-choice of a judge like Epaminondas. In after days, this hill Ithômê
-(then bearing the town and citadel of Messênê), together with the
-Akrocorinthus, were marked out by Demetrius of Pharus as the two
-horns of Peloponnesus: whoever held these two horns, was master of
-the bull.[482] Ithômê was near two thousand five hundred feet above
-the level of the sea, having upon its summit an abundant spring of
-water, called Klepsydra. Upon this summit the citadel or acropolis
-of the new town of Messênê was built; while the town itself was
-situated lower down on the slope, though connected by a continuous
-wall with its acropolis. First, solemn sacrifices were offered,
-by Epaminondas, who was recognized as Œkist or Founder,[483] to
-Dionysius and Apollo Ismenius,—by the Argeians, to the Argeian Hêrê
-and Zeus Nemeius,—by the Messenians, to Zeus Ithomatês and the
-Dioskuri. Next, prayer was made to the ancient Heroes and Heroines
-of the Messenian nation, especially to the invincible warrior
-Aristomenes, that they would now come back and again take up their
-residence as inmates in enfranchised Messênê. After this, the ground
-was marked out and the building was begun, under the sound of Argeian
-and Bœotian flutes, playing the strains of Pronomus and Sakadas.
-The best masons and architects were invited from all Greece, to
-lay out the streets with regularity, as well as to ensure a proper
-distribution and construction of the sacred edifices.[484] In respect
-of the fortifications, too, Epaminondas was studiously provident.
-Such was their excellence and solidity, that they exhibited matter
-for admiration even in the after-days of the traveller Pausanias.[485]
-
-  [481] Pausan. iv, 26, 6.
-
-  [482] Strabo. viii, p. 361: Polybius, vii, 11.
-
-  [483] Pausan. ix, 14, 2: compare the inscription on the statue of
-  Epaminondas (ix, 15, 4).
-
-  [484] Pausan. iv, 27, 3.
-
-  [485] Pausan. iv, 31, 5.
-
-From their newly-established city on the hill of Ithômê, the
-Messenians enjoyed a territory extending fifteen miles southward
-down to the Messenian Gulf, across a plain, then as well as now, the
-richest and most fertile in Peloponnesus; while to the eastward,
-their territory was conterminous with that of Arcadia and the
-contemporary establishment of Megalopolis. All the newly-appropriated
-space was land cut off from the Spartan dominion. How much was cut
-off in the direction south-east of Ithômê (along the north-eastern
-coast of the Messenian Gulf), we cannot exactly say. But it would
-appear that the Periœki of Thuria, situated in that neighborhood,
-were converted into an independent community and protected by
-the vicinity of Messênê.[486] What is of more importance to
-notice, however, is,—that all the extensive district westward
-and south-westward of Ithômê,—all the south-western corner of
-Peloponnesus, from the river Neda southward to Cape Akritas,—was now
-also subtracted from Sparta. At the beginning of the Peloponnesian
-war, the Spartan Brasidas had been in garrison near Methônê[487] (not
-far from Cape Akritas); Pylus,—where the Athenian Demosthenes erected
-his hostile fort, near which the important capture at Sphakteria
-was effected,—had been a maritime point belonging to Sparta, about
-forty-six miles from the city;[488] Aulon (rather farther north, near
-the river Neda) had been at the time of the conspiracy of Kinadon a
-township of Spartan Periœki, of very doubtful fidelity.[489] Now all
-this wide area, from the north-eastern corner of the Messenian Gulf
-westward, the best half of the Spartan territory, was severed from
-Sparta to become the property of Periœki and Helots, converted into
-freemen; not only sending no rent or tribute to Sparta, as before,
-but bitterly hostile to her from the very nature of their tenure.
-It was in the ensuing year that the Arcadian army cut to pieces the
-Lacedæmonian garrison at Asinê,[490] killing the Spartan polemarch
-Geranor; and probably about the same time the other Lacedæmonian
-garrisons in the south-western peninsula must have been expelled.
-Thus liberated, the Periœki of the region welcomed the new Messênê as
-the guarantee of their independence. Epaminondas, besides confirming
-the independence of Methônê and Asinê, reconstituted some other
-towns,[491] which under Lacedæmonian dominion had probably been kept
-unfortified and had dwindled away.
-
-  [486] Pausan. iv, 31, 2.
-
-  [487] Thucyd. ii, 25.
-
-  [488] Thucyd. iv, 3.
-
-  [489] Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 8.
-
-  [490] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 25.
-
-  [491] Pausan. iv, 27, 4. ἀνῴκιζον δὲ καὶ ἄλλα πολίσματα, etc.
-  Pausanias, following the line of coast from the mouth of the
-  river Pamisus in the Messenian Gulf, round Cape Akritas to the
-  mouth of the Neda in the Western Sea,—enumerates the following
-  towns and places,—Kôronê, Kolônides, Asinê, the Cape Akritas,
-  the Harbor Phœnikus, Methônê, or Mothônê, Pylus, Aulon (Pausan.
-  iv, 34, 35, 36). The account given by Skylax (Periplus, c.
-  46, 47) of the coast of these regions, appears to me confused
-  and unintelligible. He reckons Asinê and Mothônê as cities of
-  Laconia; but he seems to have conceived these cities as being in
-  the _central southern_ projection of Peloponnesus (whereof Cape
-  Tænarus forms the extremity); and not to have conceived at all
-  the _south-western_ projection, whereof Cape Akritas forms the
-  extremity. He recognizes Messene, but he pursues the Paraplus of
-  the Messenian coast from the mouth of the river Neda to the coast
-  of the Messenian Gulf south of Ithômê without interruption. Then
-  after that, he mentions Asinê, Mothônê, Achilleios Limên, and
-  Psamathus, with Cape Tænarus between them. Besides, he introduces
-  in Messenia two different cities,—one called Messênê, the other
-  called Ithômê; whereas there was only one Messênê situated on
-  Mount Ithome.
-
-  I cannot agree with Niebuhr, who, resting mainly upon this
-  account of Skylax, considers that the south-western corner of
-  Peloponnesus remained a portion of Laconia and belonging to
-  Sparta, long after the establishment of the city of Messênê. See
-  the Dissertation of Niebuhr on the age of Skylax of Karyanda,—in
-  his Kleine Schriften, p. 119.
-
-In the spring of 425 B.C., when Demosthenes landed at Pylus,
-Thucydides considers it a valuable acquisition for Athens, and
-a serious injury to Sparta, to have lodged a small garrison of
-Messenians in that insignificant post, as plunderers of Spartan
-territory and instigators of Helots to desertion,[492]—especially as
-their dialect could not be distinguished from that of the Spartans
-themselves. How prodigious must have been the impression throughout
-Greece, when Epaminondas, by planting the Messenian exiles and others
-on the strong frontier city and position of Ithômê, deprived Sparta
-in a short time of all the wide space between that mountain and the
-western sea, enfranchising the Periœki and Helots contained in it!
-We must recollect that the name Messênê had been from old times
-applied generally to this region, and that it was never bestowed
-upon any city before the time of Epaminondas. When therefore the
-Spartans complained of “the liberation of Messênê,”—“the loss of
-Messênê,”—they included in the word, not simply the city on Mount
-Ithômê, but all this territory besides; though it was not all
-comprised in the domain of the new city.
-
-  [492] Thucyd. iv, 3, 42.
-
-They complained yet more indignantly, that along with the genuine
-Messenians, now brought back from exile,—a rabble of their own
-emancipated Periœki and Helots had been domiciled on their
-border.[493] Herein were included, not only such of these two
-classes as, having before dwelt in servitude throughout the
-territory westward of Ithômê, now remained there in a state of
-freedom—but also doubtless a number of others who deserted from
-other parts of Laconia. For as we know that such desertions had
-been not inconsiderable, even when there was no better shelter than
-the outlying posts of Pylus and Kythêra—so we may be sure that they
-became much more numerous, when the neighboring city of Messênê
-was founded under adequate protection, and when there was a chance
-of obtaining, westward of the Messenian Gulf, free lands with a
-new home. Moreover, such Periœki and Helots as had actually joined
-the invading army of Epaminondas in Laconia, would be forced from
-simple insecurity to quit the country when he retired, and would be
-supplied with fresh residences in the newly-enfranchised territory.
-All these men would pass at once, out of a state of peculiarly harsh
-servitude, into the dignity of free and equal Hellens,[494] sending
-again a solemn Messenian legation or Theôry to the Olympic festival,
-after an interval of more than three centuries,[495]—outdoing their
-former masters in the magnitude of their offerings from the same
-soil,—and requiting them for previous ill-usage by words of defiance
-and insult, instead of that universal deference and admiration which
-a Spartan had hitherto been accustomed to look upon as his due.
-
-  [493] The Oration (vi,) called Archidamus, by Isokrates. exhibits
-  powerfully the Spartan feeling of the time, respecting this
-  abstraction of territory, and emancipation of serfs, for the
-  purpose of restoring Messênê, s. 30. Καὶ εἰ μὲν τοὺς ὡς ἀληθῶς
-  Μεσσηνίους κατῆγον (the Thebans), ἠδίκουν μὲν ἂν, ὅμως δ’
-  εὐλογωτέρως ἂν εἰς ἡμᾶς ἐξημάρτανον· νῦν δὲ τοὺς Εἵλωτας ὁμόρους
-  ἡμῖν παρακατοικίζουσιν, ὥστε μὴ τοῦτ’ εἶναι χαλεπώτατον, εἰ τῆς
-  χώρας στερησόμεθα παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον, ἀλλ’ εἰ τοὺς δούλους ἡμετέρους
-  ἐποψόμεθα κυρίους αὐτῆς ὄντας.
-
-  Again—s. 101. ἢν γὰρ παρακατοικισώμεθα τοὺς Εἵλωτας, καὶ τὴν
-  πόλιν ταύτην περιΐδωμεν αὐξηθεῖσαν, τίς οὐκ οἶδεν ὅτι πάντα τὸν
-  βίον ἐν ταραχαῖς καὶ κινδύνοις διατελοῦμεν ὄντες; compare also
-  sections 8 and 102.
-
-  [494] Isokrates, Orat. vi, (Archidam.) s. 111. Ἄξιον δὲ καὶ τὴν
-  Ὀλυμπιάδα καὶ τὰς ἄλλας αἰσχυνθῆναι πανηγύρεις, ἐν αἷς ἕκαστος
-  ἡμῶν (Spartans) ζηλωτότερος ἦν καὶ θαυμαστότερος τῶν ἀθλητῶν
-  τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσι τὰς νίκας ἀναιρουμένων. Εἰς ἃς τίς ἂν ἐλθεῖν
-  τολμήσειεν, ἀντὶ μὲν τοῦ τιμᾶσθαι καταφρονηθησόμενος—ἔτι δὲ πρὸς
-  ~τούτοις ὀψόμενος μὲν τοὺς οἰκέτας ἀπὸ τῆς χώρας~ ἧς οἱ πατέρες
-  ἡμῖν κατέλιπον ἀπαρχὰς καὶ θυσίας μείζους ἡμῶν ποιουμένους,
-  ἀκουσόμενος δ’ ~αὐτῶν τοιαύταις βλασφημίαις χρωμένων, οἵαις περ
-  εἰκὸς τοὺς χαλεπώτερον τῶν ἄλλων δεδουλευκότας~, ἐξ ἴσου δὲ νῦν
-  τὰς συνθήκας τοῖς δεσπόταις πεποιημένους.
-
-  This oration, composed only five or six years after the battle of
-  Leuktra, is exceedingly valuable as a testimony of the Spartan
-  feeling under such severe humiliations.
-
-  [495] The freedom of the Messenians had been put down by the
-  first Messenian war, after which they became subjects of Sparta.
-  The second Messenian war arose from their revolt.
-
-  No free Messenian legation could therefore have visited Olympia
-  since the termination of the first war; which is placed by
-  Pausanias (iv, 13, 4) in 723 B.C.; though the date is not to be
-  trusted. Pausanias (iv, 27, 3) gives two hundred and eighty-seven
-  years between the end of the second Messenian war and the
-  foundation of Messênê by Epaminondas. See the note of Siebelis on
-  this passage. Exact dates of these early wars cannot be made out.
-
-The enfranchisement and reörganization of all Western Laconia, the
-renovation of the Messenian name, the foundation of the two new
-cities (Messênê and Megalopolis) in immediate neighborhood and
-sympathy,—while they completed the degradation of Sparta, constituted
-in all respects the most interesting political phenomena that Greece
-had witnessed for many years. To the profound mortification of the
-historian,—he is able to recount nothing more than the bare facts,
-with such inferences as these facts themselves warrant. Xenophon,
-under whose eyes all must have passed, designedly omits to notice
-them;[496] Pausanias, whom we have to thank for most of what we
-know, is prompted by his religious imagination to relate many divine
-signs and warnings, but little matter of actual occurrence. Details
-are altogether withheld from us. We know neither how long a time was
-occupied in the building of the two cities, nor who furnished the
-cost; though both the one and the other must have been considerable.
-Of the thousand new arrangements, incident to the winding up of many
-small townships, and the commencement of two large cities, we are
-unable to render any account. Yet there is no point of time wherein
-social phenomena are either so interesting or so instructive. In
-describing societies already established and ancient, we find the
-force of traditional routine almost omnipotent in its influence
-both on men’s actions and on their feelings; bad as well as good
-is preserved in one concrete, since the dead weight of the past
-stifles all constructive intelligence, and leaves little room even
-for improving aspirations. But the forty small communities which
-coalesced into Megalopolis, and the Messenians and other settlers
-who came for the first time together on the hill of Ithômê, were in
-a state in which new exigencies of every kind pressed for immediate
-satisfaction. There was no file to afford a precedent, nor any
-resource left except to submit all the problems to discussion by
-those whose character and judgment was most esteemed. Whether the
-problems were well- or ill-solved, there must have been now a genuine
-and earnest attempt to strike out as good a solution as the lights of
-the time and place permitted, with a certain latitude for conflicting
-views. Arrangements must have been made for the apportionment of
-houses and lands among the citizens, by purchase, or grant, or both
-together; for the political and judicial constitution; for religious
-and recreative ceremonies, for military defence, for markets, for
-the security and transmission of property, etc. All these and many
-other social wants of a nascent community must now have been provided
-for, and it would have been highly interesting to know how. Unhappily
-the means are denied to us. We can record little more than the bare
-fact that these two youngest members of the Hellenic brotherhood of
-cities were born at the same time, and under the auspices of the
-same presiding genius, Epaminondas; destined to sustain each other
-in neighborly sympathy and in repelling all common danger from the
-attacks of Sparta; a purpose, which, even two centuries afterwards,
-remained engraven on the mind of a Megalopolitan patriot like
-Polybius.[497]
-
-  [496] The partiality towards Sparta, visible even from the
-  beginning of Xenophon’s history, becomes more and more
-  exaggerated throughout the two latter books wherein he recounts
-  her misfortunes; it is moreover intensified by spite against the
-  Thebans and Epaminondas as her conquerors. But there is hardly
-  any instance of this feeling, so glaring or so discreditable,
-  as the case now before us. In describing the expedition of
-  Epaminondas into Peloponnesus in the winter of 370-369 B.C., he
-  totally omits the foundation both of Messênê and Megalopolis;
-  though in the after part of his history, he alludes (briefly)
-  both to one and to the other as facts accomplished. He represents
-  the Thebans to have come into Arcadia with their magnificent
-  army, for the simple purpose of repelling Agesilaus and the
-  Spartans, and to have been desirous of returning to Bœotia, as
-  soon as it was ascertained that the latter had already returned
-  to Sparta (vi, 5, 23). Nor does he once mention the name of
-  Epaminondas as general of the Thebans in the expedition, any more
-  than he mentions him at Leuktra.
-
-  Considering the momentous and striking character of these
-  facts, and the eminence of the Theban general by whom they were
-  achieved, such silence on the part of an historian, who professes
-  to recount the events of the time, is an inexcusable dereliction
-  of his duty to state the _whole truth_. It is plain that
-  Messênê and Megalopolis wounded to the quick the philo-Spartan
-  sentiment of Xenophon. They stood as permanent evidences of
-  the degradation of Sparta, even after the hostile armies had
-  withdrawn from Laconia. He prefers to ignore them altogether. Yet
-  he can find space to recount, with disproportionate prolixity,
-  the two applications of the Spartans to Athens for aid, with the
-  favorable reception which they obtained,—also the exploits of the
-  Phliasians in their devoted attachment to Sparta.
-
-  [497] See a striking passage in Polybius, iv, 32. Compare also
-  Pausan. v, 29, 3; and viii, 27, 2.
-
-Megalopolis was intended not merely as a great city in itself, but as
-the centre of the new confederacy; which appears to have comprised
-all Arcadia, except Orchomenus and Heræa. It was enacted that a synod
-or assembly, from all the separate members of the Arcadian name,
-and in which probably every Arcadian citizen from the constituent
-communities had the right of attending, should be periodically
-convoked there. This assembly was called the Ten Thousand, or the
-Great Number. A body of Arcadian troops, called the Epariti, destined
-to uphold the federation, and receiving pay when on service, was
-also provided. Assessments were levied upon each city for their
-support, and a Pan-Arcadian general (probably also other officers)
-was named. The Ten Thousand, on behalf of all Arcadia, received
-foreign envoys,—concluded war, or peace, or alliance,—and tried all
-officers or other Arcadians brought before them on accusations of
-public misconduct.[498] The great Athenian orators, Kallistratus,
-Demosthenes, Æschines, on various occasions pleaded before it.[499]
-What were its times of meeting, we are unable to say. It contributed
-seriously, for a certain time, to sustain a Pan-Arcadian communion
-of action and sentiment which had never before existed;[500] and to
-prevent, or soften, those dissensions which had always a tendency
-to break out among the separate Arcadian cities. The patriotic
-enthusiasm, however, out of which Megalopolis had first arisen,
-gradually became enfeebled. The city never attained that preëminence
-or power which its founders contemplated, and which had caused the
-city to be laid out on a scale too large for the population actually
-inhabiting it.[501]
-
-  [498] Xenoph. Hellen. vii, 1, 38; vii, 4, 2, 33, 34; vii, 3, 1.
-
-  [499] Demosthen. Fals. Legat. p. 344, s. 11, p. 403, s. 220,
-  Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 296, c. 49; Cornel. Nepos. Epamin. c. 6.
-
-  [500] Xenoph. Hellen. vii, 1, 38; vii, 4, 33; Diodor. xv, 59;
-  Aristotle—Ἀρκάδων Πολιτεία—ap. Harpokration, v. Μύριοι, p. 106,
-  ed. Neumann.
-
-  [501] Polybius, ii, 55.
-
-Not only was the portion of Laconia west of the Messenian Gulf now
-rendered independent of Sparta, but also much of the territory which
-lies north of Sparta, between that city and Arcadia. Thus the Skiritæ
-(hardy mountaineers of Arcadian race, heretofore dependent upon
-Sparta, and constituting a valuable contingent to her armies),[502]
-with their territory forming the northern frontier of Laconia
-towards Arcadia, became from this time independent of and hostile to
-Sparta.[503] The same is the case even with a place much nearer to
-Sparta,—Sellasia; though this latter was retaken by the Lacedæmonians
-four or five years afterwards.[504]
-
-  [502] Thucyd. v, 66.
-
-  [503] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 21.
-
-  [504] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 12; Diodor. xv, 64.
-
-Epaminondas remained about four months beyond the legal duration of
-his command in Arcadia and Laconia.[505] The sufferings of a severe
-mid-winter were greatly mitigated to his soldiers by the Arcadians,
-who, full of devoted friendship, pressed upon them an excess of
-hospitality which he could not permit consistently with his military
-duties.[506] He stayed long enough to settle all the preliminary
-debates and difficulties, and to put in train of serious execution
-the establishment of Messênê and Megalopolis. For the completion
-of a work thus comprehensive, which changed the face and character
-of Peloponnesus, much time was of course necessary. Accordingly, a
-Theban division under Pammenes was left to repel all obstruction from
-Sparta;[507] while Tegea also, from this time forward, for some
-years, was occupied as a post by a Theban harmost and garrison.[508]
-
-  [505] The exact number of eighty-five days, given by Diodorus
-  (xv. 67), seems to show that he had copied literally from Ephorus
-  or some other older author.
-
-  Plutarch, in one place (Agesil. c. 32), mentions “three entire
-  months,” which differs little from eighty-five days. He expresses
-  himself as if Epaminondas spent all this time in ravaging
-  Laconia. Yet again, in the Apophth. Reg. p. 194 B. (compare
-  Ælian, V. H. xiii, 42), and in the life of Pelopidas (c. 25),
-  Plutarch states, that Epaminondas and his colleagues held the
-  command four whole months over and above the legal time, being
-  engaged in their operations in Laconia and Messenia. This seems
-  to me the more probable interpretation of the case; for the
-  operations seem too large to have been accomplished in either
-  three or four months.
-
-  [506] See a remarkable passage in Plutarch—An Seni sit gerenda
-  Respublica (c. 8, p. 788 A.).
-
-  [507] Pausan. viii, 27, 2. Pammenes is said to have been an
-  earnest friend of Epaminondas, but of older political standing;
-  to whom Epaminondas partly owed his rise (Plutarch, Reip. Ger.
-  Præcep. p. 805 F.).
-
-  Pausanias places the foundation of Megalopolis in the same
-  Olympic year as the battle of Leuktra, and a few months after
-  that battle, during the archonship of Phrasikleides at Athens;
-  that is, between Midsummer 371 and Midsummer 370 B.C. (Pausan.
-  viii, 27, 6). He places the foundation of Messênê in the next
-  Olympic year, under the archonship of Dyskinêtus at Athens; that
-  is, between Midsummer 370 and Midsummer 369 B.C. (iv, 27, 5).
-
-  The foundation of Megalopolis would probably be understood to
-  date from the initial determination taken by the assembled
-  Arcadians, soon after the revolution at Tegea, to found a
-  Pan-Arcadian city and federative league. This was probably taken
-  before Midsummer 370 B.C., and the date of Pausanias would thus
-  be correct.
-
-  The foundation of Messênê would doubtless take its æra from the
-  expedition of Epaminondas,—between November and March 370-369
-  B.C. which would be during the archonship of Dyskinêtus at
-  Athens, as Pausanias affirms.
-
-  What length of time was required to complete the erection and
-  establishment of either city, we are not informed.
-
-  Diodorus places the foundation of Megalopolis in 368 B.C. (xv,
-  72).
-
-  [508] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 36.
-
-Meanwhile the Athenians were profoundly affected by these proceedings
-of Epaminondas in Peloponnesus. The accumulation of force against
-Sparta was so powerful, that under a chief like him, it seemed
-sufficient to crush her; and though the Athenians were now neutral in
-the contest, such a prospect was not at all agreeable to them,[509]
-involving the aggrandizement of Thebes to a point inconsistent with
-their security. It was in the midst of the successes of Epaminondas
-that envoys came to Athens from Sparta, Corinth, and Phlius, to
-entreat her aid. The message was one not merely humiliating to the
-Lacedæmonians, who had never previously sent the like request to any
-Grecian city,—but also difficult to handle in reference to Athens.
-History showed abundant acts of jealousy and hostility, little
-either of good feeling or consentient interest, on the part of the
-Lacedæmonians towards her. What little was to be found, the envoys
-dexterously brought forward; going back to the dethronement of the
-Peisistratids from Athens by Spartan help, the glorious expulsion
-of Xerxes from Greece by the joint efforts of both cities,—and the
-auxiliaries sent by Athens into Laconia in 465 B.C., to assist the
-Spartans against the revolted Messenians on Mount Ithômê. In these
-times (he reminded the Athenian assembly) Thebes had betrayed the
-Hellenic cause by joining Xerxes, and had been an object of common
-hatred to both. Moreover the maritime forces of Greece had been
-arrayed under Athens in the Confederacy of Delos, with full sanction
-and recommendation from Sparta; while the headship of the latter by
-land had in like manner been accepted by the Athenians. He called on
-the assembly, in the name of these former glories, to concur with
-Sparta in forgetting all the deplorable hostilities which had since
-intervened, and to afford to her a generous relief against the old
-common enemy. The Thebans might even now be decimated (according to
-the vow said to have been taken after the repulse of Xerxes), in
-spite of their present menacing ascendency,—if Athens and Sparta
-could be brought heartily to coöperate; and might be dealt with as
-Thebes herself had wished to deal with Athens after the Peloponnesian
-war, when Sparta refused to concur in pronouncing the sentence of
-utter ruin.[510]
-
-  [509] Isokrates (Archidamus), Or. vi, s. 129.
-
-  [510] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 34, 35.
-
-This appeal from Sparta was earnestly seconded by the envoys
-from Corinth and Phlius. The Corinthian speaker contended, that
-Epaminondas and his army, passing through the territory of Corinth
-and inflicting damage upon it in their passage into Peloponnesus,
-had committed a glaring violation of the general peace, sworn in
-371 B.C., first at Sparta and afterwards at Athens, guaranteeing
-universal autonomy to every Grecian city. The envoy from
-Phlius,—while complimenting Athens on the proud position which she
-now held, having the fate of Sparta in her hands,—dwelt on the meed
-of honor which she would earn in Greece, if she now generously
-interfered to rescue her ancient rival, forgetting past injuries and
-remembering only past benefits. In adopting such policy, too, she
-would act in accordance with her own true interests; since, should
-Sparta be crushed, the Thebans would become undisputed heads of
-Greece, and more formidable still to Athens.[511]
-
-  [511] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 38-48.
-
-It was not among the least marks of the prostration of Sparta, that
-she should be compelled to send such an embassy to Athens, and to
-entreat an amnesty for so many untoward realities during the past.
-The contrast is indeed striking, when we set her present language
-against that which she had held respecting Athens, before and through
-the Peloponnesian war.
-
-At first, her envoys were heard with doubtful favor; the sentiment
-of the assembly being apparently rather against than for them. “Such
-language from the Spartans (murmured the assembled citizens) is
-intelligible enough during their present distress; but so long as
-they were in good circumstances, we received nothing but ill-usage
-from them.”[512] Nor was the complaint of the Spartans, that the
-invasion of Laconia was contrary to the sworn peace guaranteeing
-universal autonomy, admitted without opposition. Some said that
-the Lacedæmonians had drawn the invasion upon themselves, by their
-previous interference with Tegea and in Arcadia; and that the
-intervention of the Mantineans at Tegea had been justifiable, since
-Stasippus and the philo-Laconian party in that city had been the
-first to begin unjust violence. On the other hand, the appeal made
-by the envoys to the congress of Peloponnesian allies held in 404
-B.C., after the surrender of Athens,—when the Theban deputy had
-proposed that Athens should be totally destroyed, while the Spartans
-had strenuously protested against so cruel a sentence—made a powerful
-impression on the assembly, and contributed more than anything else
-to determine them in favor of the proposition.[513] “As Athens was
-then, so Sparta is now, on the brink of ruin, from the fiat of the
-same enemy: Athens was then rescued by Sparta, and shall she now
-leave the rescue unrequited?” Such was the broad and simple issue
-which told upon the feelings of the assembled Athenians, disposing
-them to listen with increasing favor both to the envoys from Corinth
-and Phlius, and to their own speakers on the same side.
-
-  [512] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 35. Οἱ μέντοι Ἀθηναῖοι οὐ πάνυ
-  ἐδέξαντο, ἀλλὰ θροῦς τις τοιοῦτος διῆλθεν, ὡς νῦν μὲν ταῦτα
-  λέγοιεν· ὅτε δὲ εὖ ἔπραττον, ἐπέκειντο ἡμῖν.
-
-  [513] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 35. Μέγιστον δὲ τῶν λεχθέντων παρὰ
-  Λακεδαιμονίων ἐδόκει εἶναι, etc.
-
-To rescue Sparta, indeed, was prudent as well as generous. A
-counterpoise would thus be maintained against the excessive
-aggrandizement of Thebes, which at this moment doubtless caused
-serious alarm and jealousy to the Athenians. And thus, after the
-first ebullition of resentment against Sparta, naturally suggested
-by the history of the past, the philo-Spartan view of the situation
-gradually became more and more predominant in the assembly.
-Kallistratus[514] the orator spoke eloquently in support of the
-Lacedæmonians; while the adverse speakers were badly listened to,
-as pleading in favor of Thebes, whom no one wished to aggrandize
-farther. A vote, decisive and enthusiastic, was passed for assisting
-the Spartans with the full force of Athens; under the command of
-Iphikrates, then residing as a private citizen[515] at Athens, since
-the peace of the preceding year, which had caused him to be recalled
-from Korkyra.
-
-  [514] Demosthenes cont. Neær. p. 1353.
-
-  Xenokleides, a poet, spoke in opposition to the vote for
-  supporting Sparta (ib.).
-
-  [515] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 49; Dionys. Hal. Judic. de Lysiâ, p.
-  479.
-
-As soon as the sacrifices, offered in contemplation of this
-enterprise were announced to be favorable, Iphikrates made
-proclamation that the citizens destined for service should equip
-themselves and muster in arms in the grove of Akadêmus (outside the
-gates), there to take their evening meal, and to march the next
-morning at daybreak. Such was the general ardor, that many citizens
-went forth from the gates even in advance of Iphikrates himself;
-and the total force which followed him is said to have been twelve
-thousand men,—not named under conscription by the general, but
-volunteers.[516] He first marched to Corinth, where he halted some
-days; much to the discontent of his soldiers, who were impatient to
-accomplish their project of carrying rescue to Sparta. But Iphikrates
-was well aware that all beyond Corinth was hostile ground, and that
-he had formidable enemies to deal with. After having established his
-position at Corinth, and obtained information regarding the enemy,
-he marched into Arcadia, and there made war without any important
-result. Epaminondas and his army had quitted Laconia, while many of
-the Arcadians and Eleians had gone home with the plunder acquired;
-so that Sparta was, for the time, out of danger. Impelled in part
-by the recent manifestation of Athens,[517] the Theban general
-himself soon commenced his march of return into Bœotia, in which
-it was necessary for him to pass the line of Mount Oneium between
-Corinth and Kenchreæ. This line was composed of difficult ground,
-and afforded good means of resistance to the passage of an army;
-nevertheless Iphikrates, though he occupied its two extremities, did
-not attempt directly to bar the passage of the Thebans. He contented
-himself with sending out from Corinth all his cavalry, both Athenian
-and Corinthian, to harass them in their march. But Epaminondas beat
-them back with some loss, and pursued them to the gates of Corinth.
-Excited by this spectacle, the Athenian main body within the town
-were eager to march out and engage in general battle. Their ardor was
-however repressed by Iphikrates; who, refusing to go forth, suffered
-the Thebans to continue their retreat unmolested.[518]
-
-  [516] This number is stated by Diodorus (xv, 63).
-
-  [517] To this extent we may believe what is said by Cornelius
-  Nepos (Iphicrates, c. 2).
-
-  [518] The account here given in the text coincides as to the
-  matter of fact with Xenophon, as well as with Plutarch; and also
-  (in my belief) with Pausanias (Xen. Hell. vi, 5, 51; Plutarch,
-  Pelop. c. 24; Pausan. ix, 14, 3).
-
-  But though I accept the facts of Xenophon, I cannot accept either
-  his suppositions as to the purpose, or his criticisms on the
-  conduct, of Iphikrates. Other modern critics appear to me not
-  to have sufficiently distinguished Xenophon’s _facts_ from his
-  _suppositions_.
-
-  Iphikrates (says Xenophon), while attempting to guard the line
-  of Mount Oneium, in order that the Thebans might not be able
-  to reach Bœotia,—left the excellent road adjoining to Kenchreæ
-  unguarded. Then,—wishing to inform himself, whether the Thebans
-  had as yet passed the Mount Oneium, he sent out as scouts all the
-  Athenian and all the Corinthian cavalry. Now (observes Xenophon)
-  a few scouts can see and report as well as a great number; while
-  the great number find it more difficult to get back in safety.
-  By this foolish conduct of Iphikrates, in sending out so large a
-  body, several horsemen were lost in the retreat; which would not
-  have happened if he had only sent out a few.
-
-  The criticism here made by Xenophon appears unfounded. It is
-  plain, from the facts which he himself states, that Iphikrates
-  never intended to bar the passage of the Thebans; and that he
-  sent out his whole body of cavalry, not simply as scouts, but to
-  harass the enemy on ground which he thought advantageous for the
-  purpose. That so able a commander as Iphikrates should have been
-  guilty of the gross blunders with which Xenophon here reproaches
-  him, is in a high degree improbable; it seems to me more probable
-  that Xenophon has misconceived his real purpose. Why indeed
-  should Iphikrates wish to expose the whole Athenian army in a
-  murderous conflict for the purpose of preventing the homeward
-  march of the Thebans? His mission was, to rescue Sparta; but
-  Sparta was now no longer in danger; and it was for the advantage
-  of Athens that the Thebans should go back to Bœotia, rather than
-  remain in Peloponnesus. That he should content himself with
-  harassing the Thebans, instead of barring their retreat directly,
-  is a policy which we should expect from him.
-
-  There is another circumstance in this retreat which has excited
-  discussion among the commentators, and on which I dissent from
-  their views. It is connected with the statement of Pausanias, who
-  says,—Ὡς προϊὼν τῷ στρατῷ (Epaminondas) κατὰ Λέχαιον ἐγίνετο,
-  καὶ διεξιέναι τῆς ὁδοῦ τὰ στενὰ καὶ δύσβατα ἔμελλεν, Ἰφικράτης
-  ὁ Τιμοθέου πελταστὰς καὶ ἄλλην Ἀθηναίων ἔχων δύναμιν, ἐπιχειρεῖ
-  τοῖς Θηβαίοις. Ἐπαμινώνδας δὲ τοὺς ἐπιθεμένους τρέπεται, ~καὶ
-  πρὸς αὐτὸ ἀφικόμενος Ἀθηναίων τὸ ἄστυ~, ὡς ἐπεξιέναι μαχουμένους
-  τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐκώλυεν Ἰφικράτης, ὁ δὲ αὖθις ἐς τὰς Θήβας
-  ἀπήλαυνε.
-
-  In this statement there are some inaccuracies, as that of calling
-  Iphikrates “son of Timotheus;” and speaking of _Lechæum_, where
-  Pausanias ought to have named _Kenchreæ_. For Epaminondas could
-  not have passed Corinth on the side of Lechæum, since the Long
-  Walls, reaching from one to the other, would prevent him;
-  moreover, the “rugged ground” was between Corinth and Kenchreæ,
-  not between Corinth and Lechæum.
-
-  But the words which occasion most perplexity are those which
-  follow: “Epaminondas repulses the assailants, and _having come to
-  the city itself of the Athenians_, when Iphikrates forbade the
-  Athenians to come out and fight, he (Epaminondas) again marched
-  away to Thebes.”
-
-  What are we to understand _by the city of the Athenians_? The
-  natural sense of the word is certainly Athens; and so most of
-  the commentators relate. But when the battle was fought between
-  Corinth and Kenchreæ, can we reasonably believe that Epaminondas
-  pursued the fugitives to Athens—through the city of Megara, which
-  lay in the way, and which seems then (Diodor. xv, 68) to have
-  been allied with Athens? The station of Iphikrates was _Corinth_;
-  from thence he had marched out,—and thither his cavalry, when
-  repulsed, would go back, as the nearest shelter.
-
-  Dr. Thirlwall (Hist. Greece, vol. v, ch. 39, p. 141) understands
-  Pausanias to mean, that Iphikrates retired with his defeated
-  cavalry to Corinth,—that Epaminondas then marched straight on
-  to Athens,—and that Iphikrates followed him. “Possibly (he
-  says) the only mistake in this statement is, that it represents
-  the _presence_ of Iphikrates, instead of his _absence_, as the
-  cause which prevented the Athenians from fighting. According to
-  Xenophon, Iphikrates must have been in the rear of Epaminondas.”
-
-  I cannot think that we obtain this from the words of Xenophon.
-  Neither he nor Plutarch countenance the idea that Epaminondas
-  marched to the walls of Athens, which supposition is derived
-  solely from the words of Pausanias. Xenophon and Plutarch
-  intimate only that Iphikrates interposed some opposition, and not
-  very effective opposition, near Corinth, to the retreating march
-  of Epaminondas, from Peloponnesus into Bœotia.
-
-  That Epaminondas should have marched to Athens at all, under
-  the circumstances of the case, when he was returning to Bœotia,
-  appears to me in itself improbable, and to be rendered still more
-  improbable by the silence of Xenophon. Nor is it indispensable
-  to put this construction even upon Pausanias; who may surely
-  have meant by the words—πρὸς αὐτὸ Ἀθηναίων τὸ ἄστυ,—not Athens,
-  but _the city then occupied by the Athenians engaged_,—that is,
-  _Corinth_. _The city of the Athenians_, in reference to this
-  battle, was Corinth; it was the city out of which the troops of
-  Iphikrates had just marched, and to which, on being defeated,
-  they naturally retired for safety, pursued by Epaminondas to the
-  gates. The statement of Pausanias,—that Iphikrates would not let
-  the Athenians in the town (Corinth) go out to fight,—then follows
-  naturally. Epaminondas, finding that they would not come out,
-  drew back his troops, and resumed his march to Thebes.
-
-  The stratagem of Iphikrates noticed by Polyænus (iii, 9, 29),
-  can hardly be the same incident as this mentioned by Pausanias.
-  It purports to be a nocturnal surprise planned by the Thebans
-  against Athens; which certainly must be quite different (if it
-  be in itself a reality) from this march of Epaminondas. And the
-  stratagem ascribed by Polyænus to Iphikrates is of a strange and
-  highly improbable character.
-
-On returning to Thebes, Epaminondas with Pelopidas and the other
-Bœotarchs, resigned the command. They had already retained it for
-four months longer than the legal expiration of their term. Although,
-by the constitutional law of Thebes, any general who retained his
-functions longer than the period fixed by law was pronounced worthy
-of death, yet Epaminondas, while employed in his great projects
-for humiliating Sparta and founding the two hostile cities on her
-border, had taken upon himself to brave this illegality, persuading
-all his colleagues to concur with him. On resigning the command, all
-of them had to undergo that trial of accountability which awaited
-every retiring magistrate, as a matter of course,—but which, in the
-present case, was required on special ground, since all had committed
-an act notoriously punishable as well as of dangerous precedent.
-Epaminondas undertook the duty of defending his colleagues as well
-as himself. That he as well as Pelopidas had political enemies,
-likely to avail themselves of any fair pretext for accusing him,—is
-not to be doubted. But we may well doubt, whether on the present
-occasion any of these enemies actually came forward to propose that
-the penalty legally incurred should be inflicted; not merely because
-this proposition, in the face of a victorious army, returning elate
-with their achievements and proud of their commanders, was full of
-danger to the mover himself,—but also for another reason,—because
-Epaminondas would hardly be imprudent enough to wait for the case
-to be stated by his enemies. Knowing that the illegality committed
-was flagrant and of hazardous example,—having also the reputation
-of his colleagues as well as his own to protect,—he would forestall
-accusation by coming forward himself to explain and justify the
-proceeding. He set forth the glorious results of the expedition
-just finished; the invasion and devastation of Laconia, hitherto
-unvisited by any enemy,—the confinement of the Spartans within their
-walls,—the liberation of all Western Laconia, and the establishment
-of Messênê as a city,—the constitution of a strong new Arcadian city,
-forming, with Tegea on one flank and Messênê on the other, a line
-of defence on the Spartan frontier, so as to ensure the permanent
-depression of the great enemy of Thebes,—the emancipation of Greece
-generally, from Spartan ascendency, now consummated.
-
-Such justification,—whether delivered in reply to a substantive
-accuser, or (which is more probable) tendered spontaneously by
-Epaminondas himself,—was not merely satisfactory, but triumphant.
-He and the other generals were acquitted by acclamation; without
-even going through the formality of collecting the votes.[519] And
-it appears that both Epaminondas and Pelopidas were immediately
-re-appointed among the Bœotarchs of the year.[520]
-
-  [519] Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 25; Plutarch, Apophthegm. p. 194
-  B.; Pausan. ix, 14, 4; Cornelius Nepos, Epaminond. c. 7, 8;
-  Ælian, V. H. xiii, 42.
-
-  Pausanias states the fact plainly and clearly; the others,
-  especially Nepos and Ælian, though agreeing in the main fact,
-  surround it with colors exaggerated and false. They represent
-  Epaminondas as in danger of being put to death by ungrateful
-  and malignant fellow-citizens; Cornelius Nepos puts into his
-  mouth a justificatory speech of extreme insolence (compare
-  Arist. Or. xlvi, περὶ τοῦ παραφθέγματος—p. 385 Jebb.; p. 520
-  Dindorf.); which, had it been really made, would have tended more
-  than anything else to set the public against him,—and which is
-  moreover quite foreign to the character of Epaminondas. To carry
-  the exaggeration still farther, Plutarch (De Vitioso Pudore, p.
-  540 E.) describes Pelopidas as trembling and begging for his life.
-
-  Epaminondas had committed a grave illegality, which could not be
-  passed over without notice in his trial of accountability. But
-  he had a good justification. It was necessary that he should put
-  in the justification; when put in, it passed triumphantly. What
-  more could be required? The facts, when fairly stated, will not
-  serve as an illustration of the alleged ingratitude of the people
-  towards great men.
-
-  [520] Diodorus (xv, 81) states that Pelopidas was Bœotarch
-  without interruption, annually re-appointed, from the revolution
-  of Thebes down to his decease. Plutarch also (Pelopid. c. 34)
-  affirms that when Pelopidas died, he was in the thirteenth year
-  of his appointment; which may be understood as the same assertion
-  in other words. Whether Epaminondas was rechosen, does not appear.
-
-  Sievers denies the reappointment as well of Pelopidas as of
-  Epaminondas. But I do not see upon what grounds; for, in my
-  judgment, Epaminondas appears again as commander in Peloponnesus
-  during this same year (369 B.C.) Sievers holds Epaminondas to
-  have commanded without being Bœotarch; but no reason is produced
-  for this (Sievers, Geschicht. Griech. bis zur Schlacht von
-  Mantinea, p. 277).
-
-
-
-
-CHAPTER LXXIX.
-
-FROM THE FOUNDATION OF MESSENE AND MEGALOPOLIS TO THE DEATH OF
-PELOPIDAS.
-
-
-Prodigious was the change operated throughout the Grecian world
-during the eighteen months between June 371 B.C. (when the general
-peace, including all except Thebes, was sworn at Sparta, twenty days
-before the battle of Leuktra), and the spring of 369 B.C., when
-the Thebans, after a victorious expedition into Peloponnesus, were
-reconducted home by Epaminondas.
-
-How that change worked in Peloponnesus, amounting to a partial
-reconstitution of the peninsula, has been sketched in the preceding
-chapter. Among most of the cities and districts hitherto dependent
-allies of Sparta, the local oligarchies, whereby Spartan influence
-had been maintained, were overthrown, not without harsh and violent
-reaction. Laconia had been invaded and laid waste, while the Spartans
-were obliged to content themselves with guarding their central hearth
-and their families from assault. The western and best half of Laconia
-had been wrested from them; Messênê had been constituted as a free
-city on their frontier; a large proportion of their Periœki and
-Helots had been converted into independent Greeks bitterly hostile
-to them; moreover the Arcadian population had been emancipated from
-their dependence, and organized into self-acting jealous neighbors in
-the new city of Megalopolis, as well as in Tegea and Mantinea. The
-once philo-Laconian Tegea was now among the chief enemies of Sparta;
-and the Skiritæ, so long numbered as the bravest of the auxiliary
-troops of the latter, were now identified in sentiment with Arcadians
-and Thebans against her.
-
-Out of Peloponnesus, the change wrought had also been considerable;
-partly, in the circumstances of Thessaly and Macedonia, partly in the
-position and policy of Athens.
-
-At the moment of the battle of Leuktra (July, 371 B.C.) Jason was
-tagus of Thessaly, and Amyntas king of Macedonia. Amyntas was
-dependent on, if not tributary to, Jason, whose dominion, military
-force, and revenue, combined with extraordinary personal energy and
-ability, rendered him decidedly the first potentate in Greece, and
-whose aspirations were known to be unbounded; so that he inspired
-more or less alarm everywhere, especially to weaker neighbors like
-the Macedonian prince. Throughout a reign of twenty-three years, full
-of trouble and peril, Amyntas had cultivated the friendship both of
-Sparta and of Athens,[521] especially the former. It was by Spartan
-aid only that he had been enabled to prevail over the Olynthian
-confederacy, which would otherwise have proved an overmatch for
-him. At the time when Sparta aided him to crush that promising and
-liberal confederacy, she was at the maximum of her power (382-379
-B.C.), holding even Thebes under garrison among her subject allies.
-But the revolution of Thebes, and the war against Thebes and Athens
-(from 378 B.C. downward) had sensibly diminished her power on land;
-while the newly-organized naval force and maritime confederacy of
-the Athenians, had overthrown her empire at sea. Moreover, the
-great power of Jason in Thessaly had so grown up (combined with the
-resistance of the Thebans) as to cut off the communication of Sparta
-with Macedonia, and even to forbid her (in 374 B.C.) from assisting
-her faithful ally, the Pharsalian Polydamas, against him.[522]
-To Amyntas, accordingly, the friendship of Athens, now again the
-greatest maritime potentate in Greece, had become more important than
-that of Sparta. We know that he tried to conciliate the powerful
-Athenian generals, Iphikrates and Timotheus. He adopted the former as
-his son;[523] at what exact period, cannot be discovered; but I have
-already stated that Iphikrates had married the daughter of Kotys king
-of Thrace, and had acquired a maritime settlement called Drys, on the
-Thracian coast. In the years 373-372 B.C., we find Timotheus also in
-great favor with Amyntas, testified by a valuable present sent to him
-at Athens; a cargo of timber, the best produce of Macedonia.[524]
-Amyntas was at this period on the best footing with Athens, sent his
-deputies as a confederate to the regular synod there assembled, and
-was treated with considerable favor.[525]
-
-  [521] Æschines, De Fals. Leg. c. 13, p. 249; Isokrates, Or. v,
-  (Philipp.) s. 124. Ὁ γὰρ πατήρ σου (Isokrates to Philip) πρὸς
-  τὰς πόλεις ταύτας (Sparta, Athens, Argos, and Thebes), αἷς σοι
-  παραινῶ προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν, πρὸς ἁπάσας οἰκείως εἶχε.
-
-  The connection of Amyntas with Thebes could hardly have been
-  considerable; that with Argos, was based upon a strong legendary
-  and ancestral sentiment rather than on common political grounds;
-  with Athens, it was both political and serious; with Sparta, it
-  was attested by the most essential military aid and coöperation.
-
-  [522] Xen. Hellen. vi, 1, 17.
-
-  [523] Æschines, De Fals. Leg. c. 13, p. 249.
-
-  [524] Demosthen. cont. Timotheum. c. 8, p. 1194; Xenoph. Hellen.
-  vi, 1, 11.
-
-  [525] Æschines, De Fals. Leg. c. 13, p. 248. τὴν πατρικὴν
-  εὔνοιαν, καὶ τὰς εὐεργεσίας ἃς ὑμεῖς ὑπήρξατε Ἀμύντᾳ, τῷ Φιλίππου
-  πατρὶ, etc.
-
-  Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. c. 30, p. 660. τὴν πατρικὴν φιλίαν
-  ἀνανεοῦθαι (Philip to the Athenians): compare ibid. c. 29, p. 657.
-
-The battle of Leuktra (July 371 B.C.) tended to knit more closely
-the connection between Amyntas and the Athenians, who were now the
-auxiliaries most likely to sustain him against the ascendency of
-Jason. It produced at the same time the more important effect of
-stimulating the ambition of Athens in every direction. Not only
-her ancient rival, Sparta, beaten in the field and driven from
-one humiliation to another, was disabled from opposing her, and
-even compelled to solicit her aid,—but new rivals, the Thebans,
-were suddenly lifted into an ascendency inspiring her with mingled
-jealousy and apprehension. Hence fresh hopes as well as fresh
-jealousies conspired to push Athens in a career of aspiration such as
-had never appeared open to her since the disasters of 404 B.C. Such
-enlargement of her views was manifested conspicuously by the step
-taken two or three months after the battle of Leuktra (mentioned in
-my preceding chapter),—of causing the peace, which had already been
-sworn at Sparta in the preceding month of June, to be resworn under
-the presidency and guarantee of Athens, by cities binding themselves
-mutually to each other as defensive allies of Athens;[526] thus
-silently disenthroning Sparta and taking her place.
-
-On land, however, Athens had never held, and could hardly expect to
-hold, anything above the second rank, serving as a bulwark against
-Theban aggrandizement. At sea she already occupied the first place,
-at the head of an extensive confederacy; and it was to farther
-maritime aggrandizement that her present chances, as well as her past
-traditions, pointed. Such is the new path upon which we now find
-her entering. At the first formation of her new confederacy, in 378
-B.C., she had distinctly renounced all idea of resuming the large
-amount of possessions, public and private, which had been snatched
-from her along with her empire at the close of the Peloponnesian
-war; and had formally proclaimed that no Athenian citizen should
-for the future possess or cultivate land out of Attica—a guarantee
-against renovation of the previous kleruchies or out-possessions.
-This prudent self-restraint, which had contributed so much during
-the last seven years to raise her again into naval preëminence, is
-now gradually thrown aside, under the tempting circumstances of the
-moment. Henceforward, the Athenian maritime force becomes employed
-for the recovery of lost possessions as well as for protection or
-enlargement of the confederacy. The prohibition against kleruchies
-out of Attica will soon appear to be forgotten. Offence is given to
-the prominent members of the maritime confederacy; so that the force
-of Athens, misemployed and broken into fragments, is found twelve or
-thirteen years afterwards unable to repel a new aggressor, who starts
-up, alike able and unexpected, in the Macedonian prince Philip, son
-of Amyntas.
-
-  [526] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 2.
-
-Very different was the position of Amyntas himself towards Athens, in
-371 B.C. He was an unpretending ally, looking for help in case of
-need against Jason, and sending his envoy to the meeting at Athens
-about September or October 371 B.C., when the general peace was
-resworn under Athenian auspices. It was at this meeting that Athens
-seems to have first put forth her new maritime pretensions. While
-guaranteeing to every Grecian city, great and small, the enjoyment
-of autonomy, she made exception of some cities which she claimed as
-belonging to herself. Among these was certainly Amphipolis; probably
-also the towns in the Thracian Chersonesus and Potidæa; all which
-we find, a few years afterwards, occupied by Athenians.[527] How
-much of their lost possessions the Athenians thought it prudent now
-to reclaim, we cannot distinctly make out. But we know that their
-aspirations grasped much more than Amphipolis;[528] and the moment
-was probably thought propitious for making other demands besides.
-Amyntas through his envoy, together with the rest of the assembled
-envoys, recognized without opposition the right of the Athenians to
-Amphipolis.[529]
-
-  [527] Demosthen. (Philippic. ii, c. 4, p. 71; De Halonneso, c. 3,
-  p. 79; De Rebus Chersones. c. 2, p. 91); also Epistol. Philipp.
-  ap. Demosthen. c. 6, p. 163.
-
-  [528] Compare the aspirations of Athens, as stated in 391 B.C.,
-  when the propositions of peace recommended by Andokides were
-  under consideration, aspirations, which were then regarded as
-  beyond all hope of attainment, and imprudent even to talk about
-  (Andokides, De Pace, s. 15). φέρε, ἀλλὰ Χεῤῥόνησον καὶ τὰς
-  ἀποικίας καὶ τὰ ἐγκτήματα καὶ τὰ χρέα ἵνα ἀπολάβωμεν; Ἀλλ’ οὔτε
-  βασιλεὺς, οὔτε οἱ σύμμαχοι, συγχωροῦσιν ἡμῖν, μεθ’ ὧν αὐτὰ δεῖ
-  πολεμοῦντας κτήσασθαι.
-
-  [529] Æschines, De Fals. Leg. c. 14, p. 250.
-
-  Συμμαχίας γὰρ Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων συνελθούσης,
-  εἷς ὢν τούτων Ἀμύντας ὁ Φιλίππου πατὴρ, καὶ πέμπων σύνεδρον,
-  καὶ τῆς καθ’ ἐαυτὸν ψήφου κύριος ὢν, ~ἐψηφίσατο Ἀμφίπολιν τὴν
-  Ἀθηναίων συνεξαιρεῖν μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων Ἀθηναίοις~. Καὶ τοῦτο
-  τὸ κοινὸν δόγμα τῶν Ἑλλήνων, καὶ τοὺς ψηφισαμένους, ~ἐκ τῶν
-  δημοσίων γραμμάτων~ μάρτυρας παρεσχόμην.
-
-  The remarkable event to which Æschines here makes allusion, must
-  have taken place either in the congress held at Sparta, in the
-  month preceding the battle of Leuktra, where the general peace
-  was sworn, with universal autonomy guaranteed,—leaving out only
-  Thebes; or else, at the subsequent congress held three or four
-  months afterwards at Athens, where a peace, on similar conditions
-  generally, was again sworn under the auspices of Athens as
-  president.
-
-  My conviction is, that it took place on the latter occasion,—at
-  Athens. First, the reference of Æschines to the δημόσια γράμματα
-  leads us to conclude that the affair was transacted in that city;
-  secondly, I do not think that the Athenians would have been in
-  any situation to exact such a reserve in their favor, prior to
-  the battle of Leuktra; thirdly, the congress at Sparta was held,
-  not for the purpose of συμμαχία or alliance, but for that of
-  terminating the war and concluding peace; while the subsequent
-  congress at Athens formed the basis of a defensive alliance, to
-  which, either then or soon afterwards, Sparta acceded.
-
-Such recognition was not indeed in itself either any loss to
-Amyntas, or any gain to Athens; for Amphipolis, though bordering
-on his kingdom, had never belonged to him, nor had he any power of
-transferring it. Originally an Athenian colony,[530] next taken from
-Athens in 424-423 B.C. by Brasidas, through the improvidence of
-the Athenian officers Euklês and Thucydides, then recolonized under
-Lacedæmonian auspices,—it had ever since remained an independent
-city; though Sparta had covenanted to restore it by the peace of
-Nikias (421 B.C.), but had never performed her covenant. Its
-unparalleled situation, near to both the bridge and mouth of the
-Strymon, in the midst of a fertile territory, within reach of the
-mining district of Pangæus,—rendered it a tempting prize; and
-the right of Athens to it was indisputable; so far as original
-colonization before the capture by Brasidas, and formal treaty of
-cession by Sparta after the capture, could confer a right. But this
-treaty, not fulfilled at the time, was now fifty years old. The
-repugnance of the Amphipolitan population, which had originally
-prevented its fulfilment, was strengthened by all the sanction of
-a long prescription; while the tomb and chapel of Brasidas their
-second founder, consecrated in the agora, served as an imperishable
-admonition to repel all pretensions on the part of Athens. Such
-pretensions, whatever might be the right, were deplorably impolitic
-unless Athens was prepared to back them by strenuous efforts of men
-and money; from which we shall find her shrinking now as she had
-done (under the unwise advice of Nikias) in 421 B.C., and the years
-immediately succeeding. In fact, the large renovated pretensions of
-Athens both to Amphipolis and to other places on the Macedonian and
-Chalkidic coast, combined with her languor and inertness in military
-action,—will be found henceforward among the greatest mischiefs
-to the general cause of Hellenic independence, and among the most
-effective helps to the well-conducted aggressions of Philip of
-Macedon.
-
-  [530] The pretensions advanced by Philip of Macedon (in
-  his Epistola ad Athenienses, ap. Demosthen. p. 164), that
-  Amphipolis or its locality originally belonged to his ancestor
-  Alexander son of Amyntas, as having expelled the Persians from
-  it,—are unfounded, and contradicted by Thucydides. At least,
-  if (which is barely possible) Alexander ever did acquire the
-  spot, he must have lost it afterwards; for it was occupied by
-  the Edonian Thracians, both in 465 B.C., when Athens made her
-  first unsuccessful attempt to plant a colony there,—and in 437
-  B.C., when she tried again with better success under Agnon, and
-  established Amphipolis (Thucyd. iv, 102).
-
-  The expression of Æschines, that Amyntas in 371 B.C. “gave up or
-  receded from” Amphipolis (ὧν δ’ Ἀμύντας ἀπέστη—De Fals. Leg. 1
-  c.) can at most only be construed as referring to rights which he
-  may have claimed, since he was never in actual possession of it;
-  though we cannot wonder that the orator should use such language
-  in addressing Philip son of Amyntas, who was really master of the
-  town.
-
-Though the claim of Athens to the recovery of a portion of her lost
-transmarine possessions was thus advanced and recognized in the
-congress of autumn 371 B.C., she does not seem to have been able to
-take any immediate steps for prosecuting it. Six months afterwards,
-the state of northern Greece was again completely altered by the
-death, nearly at the same time, of Jason in Thessaly, and of Amyntas
-in Macedonia.[531] The former was cut off (as has been mentioned
-in the preceding chapter) by assassination, while in the plenitude
-of his vigor; and his great power could not be held together by an
-inferior hand. His two brothers, Polyphron and Polydorus, succeeded
-him in the post of tagus of Thessaly. Polyphron, having put to death
-his brother, enjoyed the dignity for a short time; after which he
-too was slain by a third brother, Alexander of Pheræ; but not before
-he had committed gross enormities by killing and banishing many of
-the most eminent citizens of Larissa and Pharsalus; among them the
-estimable Polydamas.[532] The Larissæan exiles, many belonging to
-the great family of the Aleuadæ, took refuge in Macedonia, where
-Amyntas (having died in 370 B.C.) had been succeeded in the throne
-by his youthful son Alexander. The latter, being persuaded to invade
-Thessaly for the purpose of restoring them, succeeded in getting
-possession of Larissa and Krannon; both which cities he kept under
-his own garrisons, in spite of unavailing resistance from Polyphron
-and Alexander of Pheræ.[533]
-
-  [531] Diodor. xv, 60.
-
-  [532] Xenoph. Hellen. vi, 4, 33, 34.
-
-  Diodorus (xv, 61) calls Alexander of Pheræ brother of Polydorus;
-  Plutarch (Pelopid. c. 29) calls him nephew. Xenophon does not
-  expressly say which; but his narrative seems to countenance the
-  statement of Diodorus rather than that of Plutarch.
-
-  [533] Diodor. xv, 61.
-
-This Alexander, who succeeded to Jason’s despotism in Pheræ, and
-to a considerable portion of his military power, was nevertheless
-unable to keep together the whole of it, or to retain Thessaly and
-its circumjacent tributaries in one united dominion. The Thessalian
-cities hostile to him invited assistance, not merely from Alexander
-of Macedon, but also from the Thebans; who despatched Pelopidas
-into the country, seemingly in 369 B.C., soon after the return of
-the army under Epaminondas from its victorious progress in Laconia
-and Arcadia. Pelopidas entered Thessaly at the head of an army,
-and took Larissa with various other cities into Theban protection;
-apparently under the acquiescence of Alexander of Macedon, with whom
-he contracted an alliance.[534] A large portion of Thessaly thus came
-under the protection of Thebes in hostility to the dynasty of Pheræ,
-and to the brutal tyrant Alexander who now ruled in that city.
-
-Alexander of Macedon found that he had difficulty enough in
-maintaining his own dominion at home, without holding Thessalian
-towns in garrison. He was harassed by intestine dissensions, and
-after a reign of scarcely two years, was assassinated (368 B.C.) by
-some conspirators of Alôrus and Pydna, two cities (half Macedonian,
-half Hellenic) near the western coast of the Thermaic Gulf. Ptolemæus
-(or Ptolemy) of Alôrus is mentioned as leader of the enterprise,
-and Apollophanês of Pydna as one of the agents.[535] But besides
-these conspirators, there was also another enemy, Pausanias,—a
-man of the royal lineage and a pretender to the throne;[536] who,
-having been hitherto in banishment, was now returning at the head
-of a considerable body of Greeks, supported by numerous partisans
-in Macedonia,—and was already master of Anthemus, Thermê, Strepsa,
-and other places in or near the Thermaic Gulf. He was making war
-both against Ptolemy and against the remaining family of Amyntas.
-Eurydikê, the widow of that prince, was now left with her two younger
-children, Perdikkas, a young man, and Philip, yet a youth. She was in
-the same interest with Ptolemy, the successful conspirator against
-her son Alexander, and there was even a tale which represented her
-as his accomplice in the deed. Ptolemy was regent, administering her
-affairs and those of her minor children, against Pausanias.[537]
-
-  [534] Diodor. xv, 67.
-
-  The transactions of Macedonia and Thessaly at this period are
-  difficult to make out clearly. What is stated in the text comes
-  from Diodorus; who affirms, however, farther,—that Pelopidas
-  marched into Macedonia, and brought back as a hostage to
-  Thebes the youthful Philip, brother of Alexander. This latter
-  affirmation is incorrect; we know that Philip was in Macedonia,
-  and free, _after_ the death of Alexander. And I believe that the
-  march of Pelopidas into Macedonia, with the bringing back of
-  Philip as a hostage, took place in the following year 368 B.C.
-
-  Justin also states (vii, 5) erroneously, that Alexander of
-  Macedon gave his brother Philip as a hostage, first to the
-  Illyrians, next to the Thebans.
-
-  [535] Demosthen. De Fals. Leg. c. 58, p. 402; Diodorus, xv, 71.
-
-  Diodorus makes the mistake of calling this Ptolemy son of Amyntas
-  and brother of Perdikkas; though he at the same time describes
-  him as Πτολεμαῖος Ἀλωρίτης, which description would hardly be
-  applied to one of the royal brothers. Moreover, the passage of
-  Æschines, Fals. Leg. c. 14, p. 250, shows that Ptolemy was not
-  son of Amyntas; and Dexippus (ap. Syncellum, p. 263) confirms the
-  fact.
-
-  See these points discussed in Mr. Fynes Clinton’s Fasti
-  Hellenici, Appendix, c. 4.
-
-  [536] Diodor. xvi, 2.
-
-  [537] Æschines, Fals. Legat. c. 13, 14, p. 249, 250; Justin, vii,
-  6.
-
-  Æschines mentions Ptolemy as regent, on behalf of Eurydikê and
-  her younger sons. Æschines also mentions Alexander as having
-  recently died, but says nothing about his assassination.
-  Nevertheless there is no reason to doubt that he was
-  assassinated, which we know both from Demosthenes and Diodorus;
-  and assassinated by Ptolemy, which we know from Plutarch (Pelop.
-  c. 27), Marsyas (ap. Athenæum, xiv. p. 629), and Diodorus.
-  Justin states that Eurydikê conspired both against her husband
-  Amyntas, and against her children, in concert with a paramour.
-  The statements of Æschines rather tend to disprove the charge of
-  her having been concerned in the death of Amyntas, but to support
-  that of her having been accomplice with Ptolemy in the murder of
-  Alexander.
-
-  Assassination was a fate which frequently befel the Macedonian
-  kings. When we come to the history of Olympias, mother of
-  Alexander the Great, it will be seen that Macedonian queens were
-  capable of greater crimes than those imputed to Eurydikê.
-
-Deserted by many of their most powerful friends, Eurydikê and Ptolemy
-would have been forced to yield the country to Pausanias, had they
-not found by accident a foreign auxiliary near at hand. The Athenian
-admiral Iphikrates, with a squadron of moderate force, was then on
-the coast of Macedonia. He had been sent thither by his countrymen
-(369 B.C.) (soon after his partial conflict near Corinth with the
-retreating army of Epaminondas, on its way from Peloponnesus to
-Bœotia), for the purpose of generally surveying the maritime region
-of Macedonia and Thrace, opening negotiations with parties in the
-country, and laying his plans for future military operations. At the
-period when Alexander was slain, and when Pausanias was carrying on
-his invasion, Iphikrates happened to be on the Macedonian coast.
-He was there visited by Eurydikê with her two sons Perdikkas and
-Philip; the latter seemingly about thirteen or fourteen years of age,
-the former somewhat older. She urgently implored him to assist the
-family in their present emergency, reminding him that Amyntas had
-not only throughout his life been a faithful ally of Athens, but had
-also adopted him (Iphikrates) as his son, and had thus constituted
-him brother to the two young princes. Placing Perdikkas in his hands,
-and causing Philip to embrace his knees, she appealed to his generous
-sympathies, and invoked his aid as the only chance of restoration,
-or even of personal safety, to the family. Iphikrates, moved by this
-affecting supplication, declared in her favor, acted so vigorously
-against Pausanias as to expel him from Macedonia, and secured the
-sceptre to the family of Amyntas; under Ptolemy of Alôrus as regent
-for the time.
-
-This striking incident is described by the orator Æschines[538] in
-an oration delivered many years afterwards at Athens. The boy, who
-then clasped the knees of Iphikrates, lived afterwards to overthrow
-the independence, not of Athens alone, but of Greece generally. The
-Athenian general had not been sent to meddle in the disputes of
-succession to the Macedonian crown. Nevertheless, looking at the
-circumstances of the time, his interference may really have promised
-beneficial consequences to Athens; so that we have no right to blame
-him for the unforeseen ruin which it was afterwards found to occasion.
-
-  [538] Æschines, Fals. Leg. c. 13, 14, p. 249, 250; Cornelius
-  Nepos, Iphicrates, c. 3.
-
-Though the interference of Iphikrates maintained the family of
-Amyntas, and established Ptolemy of Alôrus as regent, it did not
-procure to Athens the possession of Amphipolis; which was not in
-the power of the Macedonian kings to bestow. Amphipolis was at
-that time a free Greek city, inhabited by a population in the
-main seemingly Chalkidic, and in confederacy with Olynthus.[539]
-Iphikrates prosecuted his naval operations on the coast of Thrace
-and Macedonia for a period of three years (368-365 B.C.). We make
-out very imperfectly what he achieved. He took into his service a
-general named Charidemus, a native of Oreus in Eubœa; one of those
-Condottieri (to use an Italian word familiar in the fourteenth
-century), who, having a band of mercenaries under his command, hired
-himself to the best bidder and to the most promising cause. These
-mercenaries served under Iphikrates for three years,[540] until he
-was dismissed by the Athenians from his command and superseded by
-Timotheus. What successes they enabled him to obtain for Athens,
-is not clear; but it is certain that he did not succeed in taking
-Amphipolis. He seems to have directed one or two attempts against the
-town by other officers, which proved abortive; but he got possession
-of some Amphipolitan prisoners or hostages,[541] which opened a
-prospect of accomplishing the surrender of the town.
-
-  [539] Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 669, s. 150.
-
-  ... μισθοῖ πάλιν αὑτὸν (Charidemus) τοῖς Ὀλυνθίοις, τοῖς ὑμετέροις
-  ἐχθροῖς καὶ τοῖς ἔχουσιν Ἀμφίπολιν κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον.
-
-  Demosthenes is here speaking of the time when Timotheus
-  superseded Iphikrates in the command, that is, about 365-364 B.C.
-  But we are fairly entitled to presume that the same is true of
-  369 or 368 B.C.
-
-  [540] Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 669, s. 149, c. 37.
-
-  [541] Demosthen. cont. Aristokr. p. 669, s. 149, c. 37.
-
-  The passage in which the orator alludes to these _hostages_ of
-  the Amphipolitans in the hands of Iphikrates, is unfortunately
-  not fully intelligible without farther information.
-
-  (Charidemus) Πρῶτον μὲν τοὺς ~Ἀμφιπολιτῶν ὁμήρους, οὓς παρ’
-  Ἁρπάλου λαβὼν Ἰφικράτης ἔδωκε φυλάττειν αὐτῷ, ψηφισαμένων ὑμῶν~
-  ὡς ὑμᾶς κομίσαι, παρέδωκεν Ἀμφιπολίταις· καὶ τοῦ μὴ λαβεῖν
-  Ἀμφίπολιν, τοῦτ’ ἐμπόδιον κατέστη.
-
-  Who Harpalus was,—or what is meant by Iphikrates “obtaining
-  (or capturing) from him the Amphipolitan hostages”—we cannot
-  determine. Possibly Harpalus may have been commander of a
-  body of Macedonians or Thracians acting as auxiliaries to the
-  Amphipolitans, and in this character exacting hostages from them
-  as security. Charidemus, as we see afterwards when acting for
-  Kersobleptes, received hostages from the inhabitants of Sestos
-  (Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 679. c. 40 s. 177).
-
-It seems evident, however, in spite of our great dearth of
-information, that Iphikrates during his command between 369-365
-B.C. did not satisfy the expectations of his countrymen. At that
-time, those expectations were large, as testified by sending out not
-only Iphikrates to Macedonia and Thrace, but also Timotheus (who
-had returned from his service with the Persians in 372-371 B.C.)
-to Ionia and the Hellespont, in conjunction with Ariobarzanes the
-satrap of Phrygia.[542] That satrap was in possession of Sestos, as
-well as of various other towns in the Thracian Chersonesus, towards
-which Athenian ambition now tended, according to that new turn,
-towards more special and separate acquisitions for Athens, which it
-had taken since the battle of Leuktra. But before we advert to the
-achievements of Timotheus (366-365 B.C.) in these regions, we must
-notice the main course of political conflict in Greece Proper, down
-to the partial pacification of 366 B.C.
-
-  [542] Demosthen. De Rhodior. Libertat. c. 5, p. 193.
-
-Though the Athenians had sent Iphikrates (in the winter of 370-369
-B.C.) to rescue Sparta from the grasp of Epaminondas, the terms of
-a permanent alliance had not yet been settled between them; envoys
-from Sparta and her allies visited Athens shortly afterwards for
-that purpose.[543] All pretensions to exclusive headship on the
-part of Sparta were now at an end. Amidst abundant discussion in
-the public assembly, all the speakers, Lacedæmonian and others as
-well as Athenian, unanimously pronounced that the headship must be
-vested jointly and equally in Sparta and Athens; and the only point
-in debate was, how such an arrangement could be most suitably carried
-out. It was at first proposed that the former should command on
-land, the latter at sea; a distribution, which, on first hearing,
-found favor both as equitable and convenient, until an Athenian
-named Kephisodotus reminded his countrymen, that the Lacedæmonians
-had few ships of war, and those manned chiefly by Helots; while the
-land-force of Athens consisted of her horsemen and hoplites, the
-choice citizens of the state. Accordingly, on the distribution now
-pointed out, Athenians, in great numbers and of the best quality,
-would be placed under Spartan command; while few Lacedæmonians, and
-those of little dignity, would go under Athenian command; which would
-be, not equality, but the reverse. Kephisodotus proposed that both
-on land and at sea, the command should alternate between Athens and
-Sparta, in periods of five days; and his amendment was adopted.[544]
-
-  [543] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 1.
-
-  The words τῷ ὑστέρῳ ἔτει must denote the year beginning in the
-  spring of 369 B.C. On this point I agree with Dr. Thirlwall
-  (Hist. Gr. vol. v, ch. 40, p. 145 note); differing from him
-  however (p. 146 note), as well as from Mr. Clinton, in this,—that
-  I place the second expedition of Epaminondas into Peloponnesus
-  (as Sievers places it, p. 278) in 369 B.C.; not in 368 B.C.
-
-  The narrative of Xenophon carries to my mind conviction that this
-  is what he meant to affirm. In the beginning of Book VII, he
-  says, τῷ δ’ ὑστέρῳ ἔτει Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ τῶν συμμάχων πρέσβεις
-  ἦλθον αὐτοκράτορες Ἀθήναζε, βουλευσόμενοι καθ’ ὅ,τι ἡ συμμαχία
-  ἔσοιτο Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ Ἀθηναίοις.
-
-  Now the words τῷ δ’ ὑστέρῳ ἔτει denote the spring of 369 B.C.
-
-  Xenophon goes on to describe the assembly and the discussion
-  at Athens, respecting the terms of alliance. This description
-  occupies, from vii, 1, 1 to vii, 1, 14, where the final vote and
-  agreement is announced.
-
-  Immediately after this vote, Xenophon goes on to
-  say,—Στρατευομένων δ’ ἀμφοτέρων αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν συμμάχων
-  (Lacedæmonians, Athenians, and allies) εἰς Κόρινθον, ἔδοξε κοινῇ
-  φυλάττειν τὸ Ὄνειον. Καὶ ἐπεὶ ἐπορεύοντο οἱ Θηβαῖοι καὶ οἱ
-  σύμμαχοι, παραταξάμενοι ἐφύλαττον ἄλλος ἄλλοθεν τοῦ Ὀνείου.
-
-  I conceive that the decision of the Athenian assembly,—the
-  march of the Athenians and Lacedæmonians to guard the lines of
-  Oneion,—and the march of the Thebans to enter Peloponnesus,—are
-  here placed by Xenophon as events in immediate sequence, with no
-  long interval of time between them. I see no ground to admit the
-  interval of a year between the vote of the assembly and the march
-  of the Thebans; the more so, as Epaminondas might reasonably
-  presume that the building of Megalopolis and Messene, recently
-  begun, would need to be supported by another Theban army in
-  Peloponnesus during 369 B.C.
-
-  It is indeed contended (and admitted even by Sievers) that
-  Epaminondas could not have been reëlected Bœotarch in 369 B.C.
-  But in this point I do not concur. It appears to me that the
-  issue of the trial at Thebes was triumphant for him; thus making
-  it more probable,—not less probable,—that he and Pelopidas were
-  reëlected Bœotarchs immediately.
-
-  [544] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 10-14.
-
-Though such amendment had the merit of perfect equality between the
-two competitors for headship, it was by no means well-calculated for
-success in joint operations against a general like Epaminondas. The
-allies determined to occupy Corinth as a main station, and to guard
-the line of Mount Oneium between that city and Kenchreæ,[545] so as
-to prevent the Thebans from again penetrating into Peloponnesus.
-It is one mark of the depression in the fortunes of Sparta, that
-this very station, now selected for the purpose of keeping a Theban
-invader away from her frontier, had been held, during the war from
-394-387 B.C., by the Athenians and Thebans against herself, to
-prevent her from breaking out of Peloponnesus into Attica and Bœotia.
-Never since the invasion of Xerxes had there been any necessity for
-defending the Isthmus of Corinth against an extra-Peloponnesian
-assailant. But now, even to send a force from Sparta to Corinth,
-recourse must have been had to transport by sea, either across the
-Argolic Gulf from Prasiæ to Halieis, or round Cape Skyllæum to the
-Saronic Gulf and Kenchreæ; for no Spartan troops could march by land
-across Arcadia or Argos. This difficulty however was surmounted, and
-a large allied force (not less than twenty thousand men according
-to Diodorus),—consisting of Athenians with auxiliary mercenaries
-under Chabrias, Lacedæmonians, Pellenians, Epidaurians, Megarians,
-Corinthians, and all the other allies still adhering to Sparta,—was
-established in defensive position along the line of Oneium.
-
-  [545] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 15, 16; Diodor. xv, 68.
-
-It was essential for Thebes to reopen communication with her
-Peloponnesian allies. Accordingly Epaminondas, at the head of the
-Thebans and their northern allies, arrived during the same summer in
-front of this position, on his march into Peloponnesus. His numbers
-were inferior to those of his assembled enemies, whose position
-prevented him from joining his Arcadian, Argeian, and Eleian allies,
-already assembled in Peloponnesus. After having vainly challenged
-the enemy to come down and fight in the plain, Epaminondas laid
-his plan for attacking the position. Moving from his camp a little
-before daybreak, so as to reach the enemy just when the night-guards
-were retiring, but before the general body had yet risen and got
-under arms,[546]—he directed an assault along the whole line. But
-his principal effort, at the head of the chosen Theban troops, was
-made against the Lacedæmonians and Pellenians, who were posted in
-the most assailable part of the line.[547] So skilfully was his
-movement conducted, that he completely succeeded in surprising them.
-The Lacedæmonian polemarch, taken unprepared, was driven from his
-position, and forced to retire to another point of the hilly ground.
-He presently sent to solicit a truce for burying his dead; agreeing
-to abandon the line of Oneium, which had now become indefensible. The
-other parts of the Theban army made no impression by their attack,
-nor were they probably intended to do more than occupy attention,
-while Epaminondas himself vigorously assailed the weak point of
-the position. Yet Xenophon censures the Lacedæmonian polemarch as
-faint-hearted, for having evacuated the whole line as soon as his
-own position was forced; alleging, that he might easily have found
-another good position on one of the neighboring eminences, and might
-have summoned reinforcements from his allies,—and that the Thebans,
-in spite of their partial success, were so embarrassed how to descend
-on the Peloponnesian side of Oneium, that they were half disposed to
-retreat. The criticism of Xenophon indicates doubtless an unfavorable
-judgment pronounced by many persons in the army; the justice of which
-we are not in a condition to appreciate. But whether the Lacedæmonian
-commander was to blame or not, Epaminondas, by his skilful and
-victorious attack upon this strong position, enhanced his already
-high military renown.[548]
-
-  [546] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 16; Polyænus, ii, 2, 9.
-
-  This was an hour known to be favorable to sudden assailants,
-  affording a considerable chance that the enemy might be off their
-  guard. It was at the same hour that the Athenian Thrasybulus
-  surprised the troops of the Thirty, near Phylê in Attica (Xen.
-  Hellen. ii, 4, 6).
-
-  [547] Xen. Hellen. ib.; Pausanias, ix, 15, 2.
-
-  Pausanias describes the battle as having been fought περὶ
-  Λέχαιον; not very exact, topographically, since it was on the
-  other side of Corinth, between Corinth and Kenchreæ.
-
-  Diodorus (xv, 68) states that the whole space across, from
-  Kenchreæ on one sea to Lechæum on the other, was trenched and
-  palisaded by the Athenians and Spartans. But this cannot be true,
-  because the Long Walls were a sufficient defence between Corinth
-  and Lechæum; and even between Corinth and Kenchreæ, it is not
-  probable that any such continuous line of defence was drawn,
-  though the assailable points were probably thus guarded. Xenophon
-  does not mention either trench or palisade.
-
-  [548] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 14-17; Diodor. xv, 68.
-
-Having joined his Peloponnesian allies, Arcadians, Eleians, and
-Argeians, he was more than a match for the Spartan and Athenian
-force, which appears now to have confined itself to Corinth, Lechæum,
-and Kenchreæ. He ravaged the territories of Epidaurus, Trœzen, and
-Phlius; and obtained possession of Sikyon as well as of Pellênê.[549]
-At Sikyon, a vote of the people being taken, it was resolved to
-desert Sparta, to form alliance with Thebes, and to admit a Theban
-harmost and garrison into the acropolis; Euphron, a citizen hitherto
-preponderant in the city by means of Sparta and devoted to her
-interest, now altered his politics and went along with the stronger
-tide.[550] We cannot doubt also that Epaminondas went into Arcadia to
-encourage and regulate the progress of his two great enterprises,—the
-foundation of Messênê and Megalopolis; nor does the silence of
-Xenophon on such a matter amount to any disproof. These new towns
-having been commenced less than a year before, cannot have been yet
-finished, and may probably have required the reappearance of his
-victorious army. The little town of Phlius,—situated south of Sikyon
-and west of Corinth,—which was one of the most faithful allies of
-Sparta, was also in great hazard of being captured by the Phliasian
-exiles. When the Arcadians and Eleians were marching through Nemea to
-join Epaminondas at Oneium, these exiles entreated them only to show
-themselves near Phlius; with the assurance that such demonstration
-would suffice to bring about the capture of the town. The exiles then
-stole by night to the foot of the town walls with scaling-ladders,
-and there lay hid, until, as day began to break, the scouts from the
-neighboring hill Trikaranum announced that the allied enemies were in
-sight. While the attention of the citizens within was thus engaged
-on the other side, the concealed exiles planted their ladders,
-overpowered the few unprepared guards, and got possession of the
-acropolis. Instead of contenting themselves with this position until
-the allied force came up, they strove also to capture the town; but
-in this they were defeated by the citizens, who, by desperate efforts
-of bravery, repulsed both the intruders within and the enemy without;
-thus preserving their town.[551] The fidelity of the Phliasians to
-Sparta entailed upon them severe hardships through the superiority
-of their enemies in the field, and through perpetual ravage of their
-territory from multiplied hostile neighbors (Argos, Arcadia, and
-Sikyon), who had established fortified posts on their borders; for it
-was only on the side of Corinth that the Phliasians had a friendly
-neighbor to afford them the means of purchasing provisions.[552]
-
-  [549] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 18; vii, 2, 11; Diodor. xv, 69.
-
-  This march against Sikyon seems alluded to by Pausanias (vi, 3,
-  1); the Eleian horse were commanded by Stomius, who slew the
-  enemy’s commander with his own hand.
-
-  The stratagem of the Bœotian Pammenes in attacking the harbor
-  of Sikyon (Polyænus, v, 16, 4) may perhaps belong to this
-  undertaking.
-
-  [550] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 18, 22, 44; vii, 3, 2-8.
-
-  [551] Xen. Hellen. vii, 2, 5-9.
-
-  This incident may have happened in 369 B.C., just about the
-  time when Epaminondas surprised and broke through the defensive
-  lines of Mount Oneium. In the second chapter of the seventh Book,
-  Xenophon takes up the history of Phlius, and carries it on from
-  the winter of 370-369 B.C., when Epaminondas invaded Laconia,
-  through 369, 368, 367 B.C.
-
-  [552] Xen. Hellen. vii, 2, 17.
-
-Amidst general success, the Thebans experienced partial reverses.
-Their march carrying them near to Corinth, a party of them had the
-boldness to rush at the gates, and to attempt a surprise of the town.
-But the Athenian Chabrias, then commanding within it, disposed his
-troops so skilfully, and made so good a resistance, that he defeated
-them with loss and reduced them to the necessity of asking for the
-ordinary truce to bury their dead, which were lying very near to
-the walls.[553] This advantage over the victorious Thebans somewhat
-raised the spirits of the Spartan allies; who were still farther
-encouraged by the arrival in Lechæum of a squadron from Syracuse,
-bringing a body of two thousand mercenary Gauls and Iberians,
-with fifty horsemen, as a succor from the despot Dionysius. Such
-foreigners had never before been seen in Peloponnesus. Their bravery,
-and singular nimbleness of movement, gave them the advantage in
-several partial skirmishes, and disconcerted the Thebans. But the
-Spartans and Athenians were not bold enough to hazard a general
-battle, and the Syracusan detachment returned home after no very long
-stay,[554] while the Thebans also went back to Bœotia.
-
-  [553] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 19; Diodor. xv, 69.
-
-  [554] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 22; Diodor. xv, 70.
-
-  Diodorus states that these mercenaries had been furnished with
-  pay for five months; if this is correct, I presume that we must
-  understand it as comprehending the time of their voyage from
-  Sicily and back to Sicily. Nevertheless, the language of Xenophon
-  would not lead us to suppose that they remained in Peloponnesus
-  even so long as three months.
-
-  I think it certain however that much more must have passed in
-  this campaign than what Xenophon indicates. Epaminondas would
-  hardly have forced the passage of the Oneium for such small
-  objects as we find mentioned in the Hellenica.
-
-  An Athenian Inscription, extremely defective, yet partially
-  restored and published by M. Boeckh (Corp. Inscr. No. 85 a.
-  Addenda to vol. i, p. 897), records a vote of the Athenian people
-  and of the synod of Athenian confederates—praising Dionysius of
-  Syracuse,—and recording him with his two sons as benefactors of
-  Athens. It was probably passed somewhere near this time; and we
-  know from Demosthenes that the Athenians granted the freedom
-  of their city to Dionysius and his descendants (Demosthenes ad
-  Philipp. Epistol. p. 161, as well as the Epistle of Philip, on
-  which this is a comment). The Inscription is too defective to
-  warrant any other inferences.
-
-One proceeding of Epaminondas during this expedition merits especial
-notice. It was the general practice of the Thebans to put to death
-all the Bœotian exiles who fell into their hands as prisoners, while
-they released under ransom all other Greek prisoners. At the capture
-of a village named Phœbias in the Sikyonian territory, Epaminondas
-took captive a considerable body of Bœotian exiles. With the least
-possible delay, he let them depart under ransom, professing to regard
-them as belonging to other cities.[555] We find him always trying
-to mitigate the rigorous dealing then customary towards political
-opponents.
-
-  [555] Pausanias, ix, 15, 2.
-
-Throughout this campaign of 369 B.C., all the Peloponnesian allies
-had acted against Sparta cheerfully under Epaminondas and the
-Thebans. But in the ensuing year the spirit of the Arcadians had
-been so raised, by the formation of the new Pan-Arcadian communion,
-by the progress of Messênê and Megalopolis, and the conspicuous
-depression of Sparta,—that they fancied themselves not only capable
-of maintaining their independence by themselves, but also entitled
-to divide headship with Thebes, as Athens divided it with Sparta.
-Lykomedes the Mantinean, wealthy, energetic, and able, stood forward
-as the exponent of this new aspiration, and as the champion of
-Arcadian dignity. He reminded the Ten Thousand (the Pan-Arcadian
-synod),—that while all other residents in Peloponnesus were
-originally immigrants, they alone were the indigenous occupants of
-the peninsula; that they were the most numerous section, as well as
-the bravest and hardiest men, who bore the Hellenic name,—of which
-proof was afforded by the fact, that Arcadian mercenary soldiers were
-preferred to all others; that the Lacedæmonians had never ventured to
-invade Attica, nor the Thebans to invade Laconia, without Arcadian
-auxiliaries. “Let us follow no man’s lead (he concluded), but stand
-up for ourselves. In former days, we built up the power of Sparta by
-serving in her armies; and now, if we submit quietly to follow the
-Thebans, without demanding alternate headship for ourselves, we shall
-presently find them to be Spartans under another name.”[556]
-
-  [556] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 23.
-
-Such exhortations were heard with enthusiasm by the assembled
-Arcadians, to whom political discussion and the sentiment of
-collective dignity was a novelty. Impressed with admiration for
-Lykomedes, they chose as officers every man whom he recommended
-calling upon him to lead them into active service, so as to
-justify their new pretensions. He conducted them into the
-territory of Epidaurus, now under invasion by the Argeians; who
-were however in the greatest danger of being cut off, having
-their retreat intercepted by a body of troops from Corinth under
-Chabrias,—Athenians and Corinthians. Lykomêdês with his Arcadians,
-fighting his way through enemies as well as through a difficult
-country, repelled the division of Chabrias, and extricated the
-embarrassed Argeians. He next invaded the territory south of the
-new city of Messene and west of the Messenian Gulf, part of which
-was still held by Spartan garrisons. He penetrated as far as
-Asinê, where the Spartan commander, Geranor, drew out his garrison
-to resist them, but was defeated with loss, and slain, while the
-suburbs of Asinê were destroyed.[557] Probably the Spartan mastery
-of the south-western corner of the Peloponnesus was terminated by
-this expedition. The indefatigable activity which these Arcadians
-now displayed under their new commander, overpowering all enemies,
-and defying all hardships and difficulties of marching over the
-most rugged mountains, by night as well as by day, throughout the
-winter season,—excited everywhere astonishment and alarm; not
-without considerable jealousy even on the part of their allies the
-Thebans.[558]
-
-  [557] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 25.
-
-  Στρατευσάμενοι δὲ καὶ εἰς Ἀσίνην τῆς Λακωνικῆς, ἐνίκησάν τε τὴν
-  τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων φρουρὰν, καὶ τὸν Γεράνορα, τὸν πολέμαρχον
-  Σπαρτιάτην γεγενημένον, ἀπέκτειναν, καὶ τὸ προάστειον τῶν
-  Ἀσιναίων ἐπόρθησαν.
-
-  Diodorus states that Lykomedes and the Arcadians took Pellênê,
-  which is in a different situation, and can hardly refer to the
-  same expedition (xv, 67).
-
-  [558] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 26.
-
-While such jealousy tended to loosen the union between the Arcadians
-and Thebes, other causes tended at the same time to disunite them
-from Elis. The Eleians claimed rights of supremacy over Lepreon and
-the other towns of Triphylia, which rights they had been compelled
-by the Spartan arms to forego thirty years before.[559] Ever since
-that period, these towns had ranked as separate communities, each
-for itself as a dependent ally of Sparta. Now that the power of
-the latter was broken, the Eleians aimed at resumption of their
-lost supremacy. But the formation of the new “commune Arcadum” at
-Megalopolis, interposed an obstacle never before thought of. The
-Tryphilian towns, affirming themselves to be of Arcadian origin, and
-setting forth as their eponymous Hero Triphylus son of Arkas,[560]
-solicited to be admitted as fully qualified members of the incipient
-Pan-Arcadian communion. They were cordially welcomed by the general
-Arcadian body (with a degree of sympathy similar to that recently
-shown by the Germans towards Sleswick-Holstein), received as
-political brethren, and guaranteed as independent against Elis.[561]
-The Eleians, thus finding themselves disappointed of the benefits
-which they had anticipated from the humiliation of Sparta, became
-greatly alienated from the Arcadians.
-
-  [559] Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 30, 31.
-
-  [560] Polyb. iv, 77.
-
-  [561] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 26; vii, 4, 12.
-
-Ariobarzanes, the satrap of Phrygia, with whom the Athenians had
-just established a correspondence, now endeavored (perhaps at their
-instance) to mediate for peace in Greece, sending over a citizen
-of Abydus named Philiskus, furnished with a large sum of money.
-Choosing Delphi as a centre, Philiskus convoked thither, in the name
-of the Persian king, deputies from all the belligerent parties,
-Theban, Lacedæmonian, Athenian, etc., to meet him. These envoys
-never consulted the god as to the best means of attaining peace
-(says Xenophon), but merely took counsel among themselves; hence,
-he observes, little progress was made towards peace; since the
-Spartans[562] peremptorily insisted that Messênê should again be
-restored to them, while the Thebans were not less firm in resisting
-the proposition. It rather seems that the allies of Sparta were
-willing to concede the point, and even tried, though in vain, to
-overcome her reluctance. The congress accordingly broke up; while
-Philiskus, declaring himself in favor of Sparta and Athens, employed
-his money in levying mercenaries for the professed purpose of aiding
-them in the war.[563] We do not find, however, that he really lent
-them any aid. It would appear that his mercenaries were intended for
-the service of the satrap himself, who was then organizing his revolt
-from Artaxerxes; and that his probable purpose in trying to close
-the war was, that he might procure Grecian soldiers more easily and
-abundantly. Though the threats of Philiskus produced no immediate
-result, however, they so alarmed the Thebans as to determine them to
-send an embassy up to the Great King; the rather, as they learnt that
-the Lacedæmonian Euthykles had already gone up to the Persian court,
-to solicit on behalf of Sparta.[564]
-
-  [562] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 27. Ἐκεῖ δὲ ἐλθόντες, τῷ μὲν θεῷ οὐδὲν
-  ἐκοινώσαντο, ὅπως ἂν ἡ εἰρήνη γένοιτο, αὐτοὶ δὲ ἐβουλεύοντο.
-
-  [563] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 27; Diodor. xv, 70.
-
-  Diodorus states that Philiskus was sent by Artaxerxes; which
-  seems not exact; he was sent by Ariobarzanes in the name
-  of Artaxerxes. Diodorus also says that Philiskus left two
-  thousand mercenaries with pay provided, for the service of the
-  Lacedæmonians; which troops are never afterwards mentioned.
-
-  [564] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 33.
-
-How important had been the move made by Epaminondas in reconstituting
-the autonomous Messenians, was shown, among other evidences, by
-the recent abortive congress at Delphi. Already this formed the
-capital article in Grecian political discussion; an article, too,
-on which Sparta stood nearly alone. For not only the Thebans (whom
-Xenophon[565] specifies as if there were no others of the same
-sentiment), but all the allies of Thebes, felt hearty sympathy and
-identity of interest with the newly-enfranchised residents in Mount
-Ithômê and in Western Laconia; while the allies even of Sparta were,
-at most, only lukewarm against them, if not positively inclined in
-their favor.[566] A new phenomenon soon presented itself, which
-served as a sort of recognition of the new-born, or newly-revived,
-Messenian community, by the public voice of Greece. At the one
-hundred and third Olympic festival (Midsummer 368 B.C.),—which
-occurred within less than two years after Epaminondas laid the
-foundation-stone of Messênê,—a Messenian boy named Damiskus gained
-the wreath as victor in the foot-race of boys. Since the first
-Messenian war, whereby the nation became subject to Sparta,[567] no
-Messenian victor had ever been enrolled; though before that war, in
-the earliest half-century of recorded Olympiads, several Messenian
-victors are found on the register. No competitor was admitted to
-enter the lists, except as a free Greek from a free community;
-accordingly so long as these Messenians had been either enslaved,
-or in exile, they would never have been allowed to contend for the
-prize under that designation. So much the stronger was the impression
-produced, when, in 368 B.C., after an interval of more than three
-centuries, Damiscus the Messenian was proclaimed victor. No Theôry
-(or public legation for sacrifice) could have come to Olympia from
-Sparta, since she was then at war both with Eleians and Arcadians;
-probably few individual Lacedæmonians were present; so that the
-spectators, composed generally of Greeks unfriendly to Sparta,
-would hail the proclamation of the new name as being an evidence of
-her degradation, as well as from sympathy with the long and severe
-oppression of the Messenians.[568] This Olympic festival,—the first
-after the great revolution occasioned by the battle of Leuktra,—was
-doubtless a scene of earnest anti-Spartan emotion.
-
-  [565] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 27.
-
-  [566] See this fact indicated in Isokrates, Archidamus (Or. vi,)
-  s. 2-11.
-
-  [567] Pausanias, vi, 2, 5.
-
-  Two Messenian victors had been proclaimed during the interval;
-  but they were inhabitants of Messênê in Sicily. And these two
-  were ancient citizens of Zanklê, the name which the Sicilian
-  Messênê bore before Anaxilaus the despot chose to give to it this
-  last-mentioned name.
-
-  [568] See the contrary, or Spartan, feeling,—disgust at the idea
-  of persons who had just been their slaves, presenting themselves
-  as spectators and competitors in the plain of Olympia,—set forth
-  in Isokrates, Or. vi, (Archidamus) s. 111, 112.
-
-During this year 368 B.C., the Thebans undertook no march into
-Peloponnesus; the peace-congress at Delphi probably occupied their
-attention, while the Arcadians neither desired nor needed their aid.
-But Pelopidas conducted in this year a Theban force into Thessaly,
-in order to protect Larissa and the other cities against Alexander
-of Pheræ, and to counter-work the ambitious projects of that despot,
-who was soliciting reinforcement from Athens. In his first object
-he succeeded. Alexander was compelled to visit him at Larissa, and
-solicit peace. This despot, however, alarmed at the complaints which
-came from all sides against his cruelty,—and at the language, first,
-admonitory, afterwards, menacing, of Pelopidas—soon ceased to think
-himself in safety, and fled home to Pheræ. Pelopidas established a
-defensive union against him among the other Thessalian cities, and
-then marched onward into Macedonia, where the regent Ptolemy, not
-strong enough to resist, entered into alliance with the Thebans;
-surrendering to them thirty hostages from the most distinguished
-families in Macedonia, as a guarantee for his faithful adherence.
-Among the hostages was the youthful Philip, son of Amyntas, who
-remained in this character at Thebes for some years, under the
-care of Pammenês.[569] It was thus that Ptolemy and the family of
-Amyntas, though they had been maintained in Macedonia by the active
-intervention of Iphikrates and the Athenians not many months before,
-nevertheless now connected themselves by alliance with the Thebans,
-the enemies of Athens. Æschines the Athenian orator denounces them
-for ingratitude; but possibly the superior force of the Thebans left
-them no option. Both the Theban and Macedonian force became thus
-enlisted for the protection of the freedom of Amphipolis against
-Athens.[570] And Pelopidas returned to Thebes, having extended the
-ascendency of Thebes not only over Thessaly, but also over Macedonia,
-assured by the acquisition of the thirty hostages.
-
-  [569] Plutarch, Pelopid. c. 26.
-
-  [570] Æschines, De Fals. Leg. c. 14, p. 249.
-
-  ... διδάσκων, ὅτι πρῶτον μὲν ὑπὲρ Ἀμφιπόλεως ἀντέπραττε (Ptolemy)
-  τῇ πόλει (to Athens), καὶ πρὸς Θηβαίους διαφερομένων Ἀθηναίων,
-  συμμαχίαν ἐποιήσατο, etc.
-
-  Neither Plutarch nor Diodorus appear to me precise in specifying
-  and distinguishing the different expeditions of Pelopidas
-  into Thessaly. I cannot but think that he made four different
-  expeditions; two before his embassy to the Persian court (which
-  embassy took place in 367 B.C.; see Mr. Clinton, Fast. Hellen.
-  on that year, who rightly places the date of the embassy), and
-  two after it.
-
-  1. The first was, in 369 B.C., after the death of Amyntas, but
-  during the short reign, less than two years, of his son Alexander
-  of Macedon.
-
-  Diodorus mentions this fact (xv, 67), but he adds, what is
-  erroneous, that Pelopidas on this occasion brought back Philip as
-  a hostage.
-
-  2. The second was in 368 B.C.; also mentioned by Diodorus (xv,
-  71) and by Plutarch (Pelop. c. 26).
-
-  Diodorus (erroneously, as I think) connects this expedition with
-  the seizure and detention of Pelopidas by Alexander of Pheræ. But
-  it was really on this occasion that Pelopidas brought back the
-  hostages.
-
-  3. The third (which was rather a mission than an expedition) was
-  in 366 B.C., after the return of Pelopidas from the Persian
-  court, which happened seemingly in the beginning of 366 B.C.
-  In this third march, Pelopidas was seized and made prisoner
-  by Alexander of Pheræ, until he was released by Epaminondas.
-  Plutarch mentions this expedition, clearly distinguishing it
-  from the second (Pelopidas, c. 27—μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πάλιν, etc.);
-  but with this mistake, in my judgment, that he places it before
-  the journey of Pelopidas to the Persian court; whereas it really
-  occurred after and in consequence of that journey, which dates in
-  367 B.C.
-
-  4. The fourth and last, in 364-363 B.C.; wherein he was slain
-  (Diodor. xv. 80; Plutarch, Pelopid. c. 32).
-
-Such extension of the Theban power, in Northern Greece, disconcerted
-the maritime projects of Athens on the coast of Macedonia, at the
-same time that it laid the foundation of an alliance between her
-and Alexander of Pheræ. While she was thus opposing the Thebans in
-Thessaly, a second squadron and reinforcement arrived at Corinth
-from Syracuse, under Kissidas, despatched by the despot Dionysius.
-Among the synod of allies assembled at Corinth, debate being held
-as to the best manner of employing them, the Athenians strenuously
-urged that they should be sent to act in Thessaly. But the Spartans
-took an opposite view, and prevailed to have them sent round to the
-southern coast of Laconia, in order that they might coöperate in
-repelling or invading the Arcadians.[571] Reinforced by these Gauls
-and other mercenaries, Archidamus led out the Lacedæmonian forces
-against Arcadia. He took Karyæ by assault, putting to death every
-man whom he captured in the place; and he farther ravaged all the
-Arcadian territory, in the district named after the Parrhasii, until
-the joint Arcadian and Argeian forces arrived to oppose him; upon
-which he retreated to an eminence near Midea.[572] Here Kissidas, the
-Syracusan commander, gave notice that he must retire, as the period
-to which his orders reached had expired. He accordingly marched back
-to Sparta; but midway in the march, in a narrow pass, the Messenian
-troops arrested his advance, and so hampered him, that he was forced
-to send to Archidamus for aid. The latter soon appeared, while the
-main body of Arcadians and Argeians followed also; and Archidamus
-resolved to attack them in general battle near Midea. Imploring his
-soldiers, in an emphatic appeal, to rescue the great name of Sparta
-from the disgrace into which it had fallen, he found them full of
-responsive ardor. They rushed with such fierceness to the charge,
-that the Arcadians and Argeians were thoroughly daunted, and fled
-with scarce any resistance. The pursuit was vehement, especially by
-the Gallic mercenaries, and the slaughter frightful. Ten thousand
-men (if we are to believe Diodorus) were slain, without the loss
-of a single Lacedæmonian. Of this easy and important victory,—or,
-as it came to be called, “the tearless battle,”—news was forthwith
-transmitted by the herald Demotelês to Sparta. So powerful was the
-emotion produced by his tale, that all the Spartans who heard it
-burst into tears; Agesilaus, the Senators, and the ephors, setting
-the example;[573]—a striking proof how humbled, and disaccustomed
-to the idea of victory, their minds had recently become!—a striking
-proof also, when we compare it with the inflexible self-control which
-marked their reception of the disastrous tidings from Leuktra, how
-much more irresistible is unexpected joy than unexpected grief, in
-working on these minds of iron temper!
-
-  [571] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 28.
-
-  [572] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 28. The place here called Midea cannot
-  be identified. The only place of that name known, is in the
-  territory of Argos, quite different from what is here mentioned.
-  O. Müller proposes to substitute Malæa for Midea; a conjecture,
-  which there are no means of verifying.
-
-  [573] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 28-32; Diodor. xv, 72; Plutarch,
-  Agesil. c. 33.
-
-So offensive had been the insolence of the Arcadians, that the news
-of their defeat was not unwelcome even to their allies the Thebans
-and Eleians. It made them feel that they were not independent of
-Theban aid, and determined Epaminondas again to show himself in
-Peloponnesus, with the special view of enrolling the Achæans in his
-alliance. The defensive line of Oneium was still under occupation
-by the Lacedæmonians and Athenians, who had their head-quarters at
-Corinth. Yet having remained unattacked all the preceding year, it
-was now so negligently guarded, that Peisias, the general of Argos,
-instigated by a private request of Epaminondas, was enabled suddenly
-to seize the heights above Kenchreæ, with a force of two thousand
-men and seven days’ provision. The Theban commander, hastening his
-march, thus found the line of Oneium open near Kenchreæ, and entered
-Peloponnesus without resistance; after which he proceeded, joined by
-his Peloponnesian allies, against the cities in Achaia.[574] Until
-the battle of Leuktra, these cities had been among the dependent
-allies of Sparta, governed by local oligarchies in her interest.
-Since that event, they had broken off from her, but were still
-under oligarchical governments (though doubtless not the same men),
-and had remained neutral without placing themselves in connection
-either with Arcadians or Thebans.[575] Not being in a condition to
-resist so formidable an invading force, they opened negotiations
-with Epaminondas, and solicited to be enrolled as allies of Thebes;
-engaging to follow her lead whenever summoned, and to do their duty
-as members of her synod. They tendered securities which Epaminondas
-deemed sufficient for the fulfilment of their promise. Accordingly,
-by virtue of his own personal ascendency, he agreed to accept them
-as they stood, without requiring either the banishment of the
-existing rulers or substitution of democratical forms in place of
-the oligarchical.[576] Such a proceeding was not only suitable to
-the moderation of dealing so remarkable in Epaminondas, but also
-calculated to strengthen the interests of Thebes in Peloponnesus,
-in the present jealous and unsatisfactory temper of the Arcadians,
-by attaching to her on peculiar grounds Achæans as well as Eleians;
-the latter being themselves half-alienated from the Arcadians.
-Epaminondas farther liberated Naupaktus and Kalydon,[577] which were
-held by Achæan garrisons, and which he enrolled as separate allies of
-Thebes; whither he then returned, without any other achievements (so
-far as we are informed) in Peloponnesus.
-
-  [574] I think that this third expedition of Epaminondas into
-  Peloponnesus belongs to 367 B.C.; being simultaneous with the
-  embassy of Pelopidas to the Persian court. Many chronologers
-  place it in 366 B.C., after the conclusion of that embassy;
-  because the mention of it occurs in Xenophon after he has brought
-  the embassy to a close. But I do not conceive that this proves
-  the fact of subsequent date. For we must recollect that the
-  embassy lasted several months; moreover the expedition was made
-  while Epaminondas was Bœotarch; and he ceased to be so during the
-  year 366 B.C. Besides, if we place the expedition in 366 B.C.,
-  there will hardly be time left for the whole career of Euphron at
-  Sikyon, which intervened before the peace of 366 B.C. between
-  Thebes and Corinth (see Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 44 _seq._).
-
-  The relation of cotemporaneousness between the embassy of
-  Pelopidas to Persia, and the expedition of Epaminondas, seems
-  indicated when we compare vii, 1, 33 with vii, 1, 48—Συνεχῶς
-  δὲ βουλευόμενοι οἱ Θηβαῖοι, ὅπως ἂν τὴν ἡγεμονίαν λάβοιεν τῆς
-  Ἑλλάδος, ἐνόμισαν εἰ πέμψειαν πρὸς τὸν Περσῶν βασιλέα, etc. Then
-  Xenophon proceeds to recount the whole embassy, together with its
-  unfavorable reception on returning, which takes up the entire
-  space until vii, 2, 41, when he says—Αὖθις δ’ Ἐπαμεινώνδας,
-  βουληθεὶς τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς προσυπαγαγέσθαι, ὅπως μᾶλλον σφίσι καὶ
-  οἱ Ἀρκάδες καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι σύμμαχοι προσέχοιεν τὸν νοῦν, ἔγνωκε
-  στρατευτέον εἶναι ἐπὶ τὴν Ἀχαΐαν.
-
-  This fresh expedition of Epaminondas is one of the modes adopted
-  by the Thebans of manifesting their general purpose expressed in
-  the former words,—συνεχῶς βουλευόμενοι, etc.
-
-  [575] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 42-44.
-
-  The neutrality before observed, is implied in the phrase whereby
-  Xenophon describes their conduct afterwards; ἐπεὶ δὲ κατελθόντες
-  ~οὐκέτι ἐμέσευον~, etc.
-
-  [576] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 42.
-
-  His expression marks how completely these terms were granted
-  by the personal determination of Epaminondas, overruling
-  opposition,—~ἐνδυναστεύει~ ὁ Ἐπαμεινώνδας, ὥστε μὴ φυγαδεῦσαι
-  τοὺς κρατίστους, μηδὲ τὰς πολιτείας μεταστῆσαι, etc.
-
-  [577] Diodor. xv, 75.
-
-But the generous calculations of this eminent man found little favor
-with his countrymen. Both the Arcadians, and the opposition-party
-in the Achæan cities, preferred accusations against him, alleging
-that he had discouraged and humiliated all the real friends of
-Thebes; leaving power in the hands of men who would join Sparta
-on the first opportunity. The accusation was farther pressed
-by Menekleidas, a Theban speaker of ability, strongly adverse
-to Epaminondas, as well as to Pelopidas. So pronounced was the
-displeasure of the Thebans,—partly perhaps from reluctance to offend
-the Arcadians,—that they not only reversed the policy of Epaminondas
-in Achaia, but also refrained from reëlecting him as Bœotarch during
-the ensuing year.[578] They sent harmosts of their own to each of
-the Achæan cities,—put down the existing oligarchies,—sent the chief
-oligarchical members and partisans into exile,—and established
-democratical governments in each. Hence a great body of exiles soon
-became accumulated; who, watching for a favorable opportunity and
-combining their united forces against each city successively, were
-strong enough to overthrow the newly-created democracies, and to
-expel the Theban harmosts. Thus restored, the Achæan oligarchs took
-decided and active part with Sparta;[579] vigorously pressing the
-Arcadians on one side, while the Lacedæmonians, encouraged by the
-recent Tearless Battle, exerted themselves actively on the other.
-
-  [578] Xenoph. Hellen. vii, 1, 43; Plutarch, Pelopid. c. 25.
-
-  Diodorus (xv, 72) refers the displeasure of the Thebans against
-  Epaminondas to the events of the preceding year. They believed
-  (according to Diodorus) that Epaminondas had improperly spared
-  the Spartans, and not pushed his victory so far as might have
-  been done, when he forced the lines of Mount Oneium in 369 B.C.
-  But it is scarcely credible that the Thebans should have been
-  displeased on this account; for the forcing of the lines was a
-  capital exploit, and we may see from Xenophon that Epaminondas
-  achieved much more than the Spartans and their friends believed
-  to be possible.
-
-  Xenophon tells us that the Thebans were displeased with
-  Epaminondas, on complaint from the Arcadians and others, for his
-  conduct in Achaia two years after the action at Oneium; that
-  is, in 367 B.C. This is much more probable in itself, and much
-  more consistent with the general series of facts, than the cause
-  assigned by Diodorus.
-
-  [579] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 23.
-
-  For a similar case, in which exiles from many different cities,
-  congregating in a body, became strong enough to carry their
-  restoration in each city successively, see Thucyd. i, 113.
-
-The town of Sikyon, closely adjoining to Achaia, was at this time in
-alliance with Thebes, having a Theban harmost and garrison in its
-acropolis. But its government, which had always been oligarchical,
-still remained unaltered. The recent counter-revolution in the Achæan
-cities, followed closely by their junction with Sparta, alarmed
-the Arcadians and Argeians, lest Sikyon also should follow the
-example. Of this alarm a leading Sikyonian citizen named Euphron,
-took advantage. He warned them that if the oligarchy were left in
-power, they would certainly procure aid from the garrison at Corinth,
-and embrace the interests of Sparta. To prevent such defection (he
-said) it was indispensable that Sikyon should be democratized. He
-then offered himself, with their aid, to accomplish the revolution,
-seasoning his offer with strong protestations of disgust against the
-intolerable arrogance and oppression of Sparta: protestations not
-unnecessary, since he had himself, prior to the battle of Leuktra,
-carried on the government of his native city as local agent for her
-purposes and interest. The Arcadians and Argeians, entering into
-the views of Euphron, sent to Sikyon a large force, under whose
-presence and countenance he summoned a general assembly in the
-market-place, proclaimed the oligarchy to be deposed, and proposed
-an equal democracy for the future. His proposition being adopted, he
-next invited the people to choose generals; and the persons chosen
-were, as might naturally be expected, himself with five partisans.
-The prior oligarchy had not been without a previous mercenary force
-in their service, under the command of Lysimenês; but these men were
-overawed by the new foreign force introduced. Euphron now proceeded
-to reorganize them, to place them under the command of his son Adeas
-instead of Lysimenês, and to increase their numerical strength.
-Selecting from them a special body-guard for his own personal safety,
-and being thus master of the city under the ostensible color of chief
-of the new democracy, he commenced a career of the most rapacious
-and sanguinary tyranny.[580] He caused several of his colleagues to
-be assassinated, and banished others. He expelled also by wholesale
-the wealthiest and most eminent citizens, on suspicion of Laconism;
-confiscating their properties to supply himself with money, pillaging
-the public treasure, and even stripping the temples of all their rich
-stock of consecrated gold and silver ornaments. He farther procured
-for himself adherents by liberating numerous slaves, exalting them
-to the citizenship, and probably enrolling them among his paid
-force.[581] The power which he thus acquired became very great. The
-money seized enabled him not only to keep in regular pay his numerous
-mercenaries, but also to bribe the leading Arcadians and Argeians, so
-that they connived at his enormities; while he was farther ready and
-active in the field to lend them military support. The Theban harmost
-still held the acropolis with his garrison, though Euphron was master
-of the town and harbor.
-
-  [580] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 44-46; Diodor. xv, 70.
-
-  [581] Xen. Hellen, vii, 3, 8.
-
-During the height of Euphron’s power at Sikyon, the neighboring city
-of Phlius was severely pressed. The Phliasians had remained steadily
-attached to Sparta throughout all her misfortunes; notwithstanding
-incessant hostilities from Argos, Arcadia, Pellênê, and Sikyon, which
-destroyed their crops and inflicted upon them serious hardships. I
-have already recounted, that in the year 369 B.C., a little before
-the line of Oneium was forced by Epaminondas, the town of Phlius,
-having been surprised by its own exiles with the aid of Eleians
-and Arcadians, had only been saved by the desperate bravery and
-resistance of its citizens.[582] In the ensuing year, 368 B.C.,
-the Argeian and Arcadian force again ravaged the Phliasian plain,
-doing great damage; yet not without some loss to themselves in their
-departure, from the attack of the chosen Phliasian hoplites and of
-some Athenian horsemen from Corinth.[583] In the ensuing year 367
-B.C., a second invasion of the Phliasian territory was attempted by
-Euphron, with his own mercenaries to the number of two thousand,—the
-armed force of Sikyon and Pellênê,—and the Theban harmost and
-garrison from the acropolis of Sikyon. On arriving near Phlius, the
-Sikyonians and Pellenians were posted near the gate of the city which
-looked towards Corinth, in order to resist any sally from within;
-while the remaining invaders made a circuit round, over an elevated
-line of ground called the _Trikaranum_ (which had been fortified
-by the Argeians and was held by their garrison), to approach and
-ravage the Phliasian plain. But the Phliasian cavalry and hoplites
-so bravely resisted them, as to prevent them from spreading over the
-plain to do damage, until at the end of the day they retreated to
-rejoin the Sikyonians and Pellenians. From these last, however, they
-happened to be separated by a ravine which forced them to take a
-long circuit; while the Phliasians, passing by a shorter road close
-under their own walls, were beforehand in reaching the Sikyonians
-and Pellenians, whom they vigorously attacked and defeated with
-loss. Euphron with his mercenaries, and the Theban division, arrived
-too late to prevent the calamity, which they made no effort to
-repair.[584]
-
-  [582] Xen. Hellen. vii, 2, 6-9.
-
-  [583] Xen. Hellen. vii, 2, 10.
-
-  [584] Xen. Hellen. vii, 2, 11-15.
-
-An eminent Pellenian citizen, named Proxenus having been here made
-prisoner, the Phliasians, in spite of all their sufferings, released
-him without ransom. This act of generosity—coupled with the loss
-sustained by the Pellenians in the recent engagement, as well as
-with the recent oligarchical counter-revolutions which had disjoined
-the other Achæan cities from Thebes—altered the politics of Pellênê,
-bringing about a peace between that city and Phlius.[585] Such
-an accession afforded sensible relief,—it might almost be said,
-salvation,—to the Phliasians, in the midst of cruel impoverishment;
-since even their necessary subsistence, except what was obtained by
-marauding excursions from the enemy, being derived by purchase from
-Corinth, was found difficult to pay for, and still more difficult
-to bring home, in the face of an enemy. They were now enabled, by
-the aid of the Athenian general Charês and his mercenary troops from
-Corinth, to escort their families and their non-military population
-to Pellênê, where a kindly shelter was provided by the citizens. The
-military Phliasians, while escorting back a stock of supplies to
-Phlius, broke through and defeated an ambuscade of the enemy in their
-way; and afterwards, in conjunction with Charês, surprised the fort
-of Thyamia, which the Sikyonians were fortifying as an aggressive
-post on their borders. The fort became not only a defence for Phlius,
-but a means of aggression against the enemy, affording also great
-facility for the introduction of provisions from Corinth.[586]
-
-  [585] This change of politics at Pellênê is not mentioned by
-  Xenophon, at the time, though it is noticed afterwards (vii,
-  4, 17) as a fact accomplished; but we must suppose it to have
-  occurred now, in order to reconcile sections 11-14 with sections
-  18-20 of vii, 2.
-
-  The strong Laconian partialities of Xenophon induce him to allot
-  not only warm admiration, but a space disproportionate compared
-  with other parts of his history, to the exploits of the brave
-  little Phliasian community. Unfortunately, here, as elsewhere,
-  he is obscure in the description of particular events, and still
-  more perplexing when we try to draw from him a clear idea of the
-  general series.
-
-  With all the defects and partiality of Xenophon’s narrative,
-  however, we must recollect that it is a description of real
-  events by a contemporary author who had reasonable means of
-  information. This is a precious ingredient, which gives value to
-  all that he says; inasmuch as we are so constantly obliged to
-  borrow our knowledge of Grecian history either from authors who
-  write at second-hand and after the time,—or from orators whose
-  purposes are usually different from those of the historian. Hence
-  I have given a short abridgment of these Phliasian events as
-  described by Xenophon, though they were too slight to exercise
-  influence on the main course of the war.
-
-  [586] Xen. Hellen. vii, 2, 18-23.
-
-Another cause, both of these successes and of general relief to
-the Phliasians, arose out of the distracted state of affairs in
-Sikyon. So intolerable had the tyranny of Euphron become, that the
-Arcadians, who had helped to raise him up, became disgusted. Æneas of
-Stymphalus, general of the collective Arcadian force, marched with a
-body of troops to Sikyon, joined the Theban harmost in the Acropolis,
-and there summoned the Sikyonian _notables_ to an assembly. Under
-his protection, the intense sentiment against Euphron was freely
-manifested, and it was resolved to recall the numerous exiles, whom
-he had banished without either trial or public sentence. Dreading
-the wrath of these numerous and bitter enemies, Euphron thought
-it prudent to retire with his mercenaries to the harbor; where he
-invited Pasimêlus the Lacedæmonian to come, with a portion of the
-garrison of Corinth, and immediately declared himself an open
-partisan of Sparta. The harbor, a separate town and fortification at
-some little distance from the city (as Lechæum was from Corinth),
-was thus held by and for the Spartans; while Sikyon adhered to the
-Thebans and Arcadians. In Sikyon itself however, though evacuated
-by Euphron, there still remained violent dissensions. The returning
-exiles were probably bitter in reactionary measures; the humbler
-citizens were fearful of losing their newly-acquired political
-privileges; and the liberated slaves, yet more fearful of forfeiting
-that freedom, which the recent revolution had conferred upon them.
-
-Hence Euphron still retained so many partisans, that having procured
-from Athens a reinforcement of mercenary troops, he was enabled to
-return to Sikyon, and again to establish himself as master of the
-town in conjunction with the popular party. But as his opponents,
-the principal men in the place, found shelter along with the
-Theban garrison in the acropolis, which he vainly tried to take
-by assault,[587]—his possession even of the town was altogether
-precarious, until such formidable neighbors could be removed.
-Accordingly he resolved to visit Thebes, in hopes of obtaining from
-the authorities an order for expelling his opponents and handing over
-Sikyon a second time to his rule. On what grounds, after so recent
-a defection to the Spartans, he rested his hopes of success, we do
-not know; except that he took with him a large sum of money for the
-purpose of bribery.[588] His Sikyonian opponents, alarmed lest he
-should really carry his point, followed him to Thebes, where their
-alarm was still farther increased by seeing him in familiar converse
-with the magistrates. Under the first impulse of terror and despair,
-they assassinated Euphron in broad daylight,—on the Kadmeia, and even
-before the doors of the Theban Senate-house, wherein both magistrates
-and Senate were sitting.
-
-  [587] Xen. Hellen. vii, 3, 9.
-
-  [588] Xen. Hellen. vii, 3, 4-6.
-
-For an act of violence thus patent, they were of course seized
-forthwith, and put upon their trial, before the Senate. The
-magistrates invoked upon their heads the extreme penalty of death,
-insisting upon the enormity and even impudence of the outrage,
-committed almost under the eyes of the authorities,—as well as upon
-the sacred duty of vindicating not merely the majesty, but even the
-security of the city, by exemplary punishment upon offenders who had
-despised its laws. How many in number were the persons implicated,
-we do not know. All, except one, denied actual hand-participation;
-but that one avowed it frankly, and stood up to justify it before the
-Theban Senate. He spoke in substance nearly as follows,—taking up the
-language of the accusing magistrates:—
-
-“Despise you I cannot, men of Thebes; for you are masters of my
-person and life. It was on other grounds of confidence that I slew
-this man: first, I had the conviction of acting justly; next, I
-trusted in your righteous judgment. I knew that _you_ did not wait
-for trial and sentence to slay Archias and Hypatês,[589] whom you
-caught after a career similar to that of Euphron,—but punished them
-at the earliest practicable opportunity, under the conviction that
-men manifest in sacrilege, treason, and despotism, were already
-under sentence by all men. Well! and was not Euphron, too, guilty
-of all these crimes? Did not he find the temples full of gold and
-silver offerings, and strip them until they were empty? How can
-there be a traitor more palpable than the man, who, favored and
-upheld by Sparta, first betrayed her to you; and then again, after
-having received every mark of confidence from you, betrayed you to
-her,—handing over the harbor of Sikyon to your enemies? Was not he
-a despot without reserve, the man who exalted slaves, not only into
-freemen, but into citizens? the man who despoiled, banished, or slew,
-not criminals, but all whom he chose, and most of all, the chief
-citizens? And now, after having vainly attempted, in conjunction
-with your enemies the Athenians, to expel your harmost by force from
-Sikyon, he has collected a great stock of money, and come hither to
-turn it to account. Had he assembled arms and soldiers against you,
-you would have thanked me for killing him. How then can you punish me
-for giving him his due, when he has come with money to corrupt you,
-and to purchase from you again the mastery of Sikyon, to your own
-disgrace as well as mischief? Had he been my enemy and your friend,
-I should undoubtedly have done wrong to kill him in your city; but
-as he is a traitor, playing you false, how is he more my enemy
-than yours? I shall be told that he came hither of his own accord,
-confiding in the laws of the city. Well! you would have thanked me
-for killing him anywhere out of Thebes; why not _in_ Thebes also,
-when he has come hither only for the purpose of doing you new wrong
-in addition to the past? Where among Greeks has impunity ever been
-assured to traitors, deserters, or despots? Recollect, that you have
-passed a vote that exiles from any one of your allied cities might
-be seized as outlaws in any other. Now Euphron is a condemned exile,
-who has ventured to come back to Sikyon without any vote of the
-general body of allies. How can any one affirm that he has not justly
-incurred death? I tell you in conclusion, men of Thebes,—if you put
-me to death, you will have made yourselves the avengers of your very
-worst enemy,—if you adjudge me to have done right, you will manifest
-yourselves publicly as just avengers, both on your own behalf and on
-that of your whole body of allies.”[590]
-
-  [589] This refers to the secret expedition of Pelopidas and the
-  six other Theban conspirators from Athens to Thebes, at the time
-  when the Lacedæmonians were masters of that town and garrisoned
-  the Kadmeia. The conspirators, through the contrivance of the
-  secretary Phyllidas, got access in disguise to the oligarchical
-  leaders of Thebes, who were governing under Lacedæmonian
-  ascendency, and put them to death. This event is described in a
-  former chapter, Ch. lxxvii, p. 85 _seq._
-
-  [590] Xen. Hellen. vii, 3, 7-11.
-
-  To the killing of Euphron, followed by a defence so
-  characteristic and emphatic on the part of the agent,—Schneider
-  and others refer, with great probability, the allusion in
-  the Rhetoric of Aristotle (ii, 24, 2)—καὶ περὶ τοῦ Θήβῃσιν
-  ἀποθανόντος, περὶ οὗ ἐκέλευε κρῖναι, εἰ δίκαιος ἦν ἀποθανεῖν ὡς
-  οὐκ ἄδικον ὂν ἀποκτεῖναι τὸν δικαίως ἀποθανόντα.
-
-This impressive discourse induced the Theban Senate to pronounce
-that Euphron had met with his due. It probably came from one of the
-principal citizens of Sikyon, among whom were most of the enemies
-as well as the victims of the deceased despot. It appeals, in a
-characteristic manner, to that portion of Grecian morality which bore
-upon men, who by their very crimes procured for themselves the means
-of impunity; against whom there was no legal force to protect others,
-and who were therefore considered as not being entitled to protection
-themselves, if the daggers of others could ever be made to reach
-them. The tyrannicide appeals to this sentiment with confidence, as
-diffused throughout all the free Grecian cities. It found responsive
-assent in the Theban Senate, and would probably have found the like
-assent, if set forth with equal emphasis, in most Grecian senates or
-assemblies elsewhere.
-
-Very different, however, was the sentiment in Sikyon. The body
-of Euphron was carried thither, and enjoyed the distinguished
-preëminence of being buried in the market-place.[591] There, along
-with his tomb, a chapel was erected, in which he was worshipped
-as Archêgetês, or Patron-hero and Second Founder, of the city.
-He received the same honors as had been paid to Brasidas at
-Amphipolis. The humbler citizens and the slaves, upon whom he had
-conferred liberty and political franchise,—or at least the name of
-a political franchise,—remembered him with grateful admiration as
-their benefactor, forgetting or excusing the atrocities which he
-had wreaked upon their political opponents. Such is the retributive
-Nemesis which always menaces, and sometimes overtakes, an oligarchy
-who keep the mass of the citizens excluded from political privileges.
-A situation is thus created, enabling some ambitious and energetic
-citizen to confer favors and earn popularity among the many, and thus
-to acquire power, which, whether employed or not for the benefit
-of the many, goes along with their antipathies when it humbles or
-crushes the previously monopolizing few.
-
-  [591] Xen. Hellen. vii, 3, 12.
-
-We may presume from these statements that the government of Sikyon
-became democratical. But the provoking brevity of Xenophon does
-not inform us of the subsequent arrangements made with the Theban
-harmost in the acropolis,—nor how the intestine dissensions, between
-the democracy in the town and the refugees in the citadel, were
-composed,—nor what became of those citizens who slew Euphron. We
-learn only that not long afterwards, the harbor of Sikyon, which
-Euphron had held in conjunction with the Lacedæmonians and Athenians,
-was left imperfectly defended by the recall of the latter to Athens;
-and that it was accordingly retaken by the forces from the town,
-aided by the Arcadians.[592]
-
-  [592] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 1.
-
-It appears that these proceedings of Euphron (from his first
-proclamation of the democracy at Sikyon and real acquisition of
-despotism to himself, down to his death and the recovery of the
-harbor) took place throughout the year 367 B.C. and the earlier half
-of 366 B.C. No such enemy, probably, would have arisen to embarrass
-Thebes, unless the policy recommended by Epaminondas in Achaia had
-been reversed, and unless he himself had fallen under the displeasure
-of his countrymen. His influence too was probably impaired, and the
-policy of Thebes affected for the worse, by the accidental absence
-of his friend Pelopidas, who was then on his mission to the Persian
-court at Susa. Such a journey and return, with the transaction of the
-business in hand, must have occupied the greater part of the year 367
-B.C., being terminated probably by the return of the envoys in the
-beginning of 366 B.C.
-
-The leading Thebans had been alarmed by the language of
-Philiskus,—who had come over a few months before as envoy from the
-satrap Ariobarzanes and had threatened to employ Asiatic money in
-the interest of Athens and Sparta against Thebes, though his threats
-seem never to have been realized, as well as by the presence of the
-Lacedæmonian Euthyklês (after the failure of Antalkidas[593]) at the
-Persian court, soliciting aid. Moreover Thebes had now pretensions to
-the headship of Greece, at least as good as either of her two rivals;
-while since the fatal example set by Sparta at the peace called by
-the name of Antalkidas in 387 B.C., and copied by Athens after the
-battle of Leuktra in 371 B.C.,—it had become a sort of recognized
-fashion that the leading Grecian state should sue out its title
-from the terror-striking rescript of the Great King, and proclaim
-itself as enforcing terms which he had dictated. On this ground of
-borrowed elevation Thebes now sought to place herself. There was in
-her case a peculiar reason which might partly excuse the value set
-upon it by her leaders. It had been almost the capital act of her
-policy to establish the two new cities, Megalopolis and Messênê. The
-vitality and chance for duration, of both,—especially that of the
-latter, which had the inextinguishable hostility of Sparta to contend
-with,—would be materially improved, in the existing state of the
-Greek mind, if they were recognized as autonomous under a Persian
-rescript. To attain this object,[594] Pelopidas and Ismenias now
-proceeded as envoys to Susa; doubtless under a formal vote of the
-allied synod, since the Arcadian Antiochus, a celebrated pankratiast,
-the Eleian Archidamus, and a citizen from Argos, accompanied them.
-Informed of the proceeding, the Athenians also sent Timagoras and
-Leon to Susa; and we read with some surprise that these hostile
-envoys all went up thither in the same company.[595]
-
-  [593] Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 22.
-
-  [594] It is plain that Messênê was the great purpose with
-  Pelopidas in his mission to the Persian court; we see this not
-  only from Cornelius Nepos (Pelop. c. 4) and Diodorus (xv, 81),
-  but also even from Xenophon, Hellen. vii, 1, 36.
-
-  [595] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 33-38; Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 30;
-  Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 22.
-
-  The words of Xenophon ἠκολούθει δὲ καὶ Ἀργεῖος must allude to
-  some Argeian envoy; though the name is not mentioned, and must
-  probably have dropped out,—or perhaps the word τις, as Xenophon
-  may not have heard the name.
-
-  It would appear that in the mission which Pharnabazus conducted
-  up to the Persian court (or at least undertook to conduct) in 408
-  B.C., envoys from hostile Greek cities were included in the same
-  company (Xen. Hellen. i, 3, 13), as on the present occasion.
-
-Pelopidas, though he declined to perform the usual ceremony of
-prostration,[596] was favorably received by the Persian court.
-Xenophon,—who recounts the whole proceeding in a manner unfairly
-invidious towards the Thebans, forgetting that they were now only
-copying the example of Sparta in courting Persian aid,—affirms that
-his application was greatly furthered by the recollection of the
-ancient alliance of Thebes with Xerxes, against Athens and Sparta,
-at the time of the battle of Platæa; and by the fact that Thebes had
-not only refused to second, but had actually discountenanced, the
-expedition of Agesilaus against Asia. We may perhaps doubt, whether
-this plea counted for much; or the straightforward eloquence of
-Pelopidas, so much extolled by Plutarch,[597] which could only reach
-Persian ears through an interpreter. But the main fact for the Great
-King to know was, that the Thebans had been victorious at Leuktra;
-that they had subsequently trodden down still farther the glory
-of Sparta, by carrying their arms over Laconia, and emancipating
-the conquered half of the country; that when they were no longer
-in Peloponnesus, their allies the Arcadians and Argeians had been
-shamefully defeated by the Lacedæmonians (in the Tearless Battle).
-Such boasts on the part of Pelopidas,—confirmed as matters of fact
-even by the Athenian Timagoras,—would convince the Persian ministers
-that it was their interest to exercise ascendency over Greece through
-Thebes in preference to Sparta. Accordingly Pelopidas being asked
-by the Great King what sort of rescript he wished, obtained his own
-terms. Messênê was declared autonomous and independent of Sparta:
-Amphipolis also was pronounced to be a free and autonomous city: the
-Athenians were directed to order home and lay up their ships of war
-now in active service, on pain of Persian intervention against them,
-in case of disobedience. Moreover Thebes was declared the head city
-of Greece, and any city refusing to follow her headship was menaced
-with instant compulsion by Persian force.[598] In reference to the
-points in dispute between Elis and Arcadia (the former claiming
-sovereignty over Triphylia, which professed itself Arcadian and had
-been admitted into the Arcadian communion), the rescript pronounced
-in favor of the Eleians;[599] probably at the instance of Pelopidas,
-since there now subsisted much coldness between the Thebans and
-Arcadians.
-
-  [596] Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 22.
-
-  His colleague Ismenias, however, is said to have dropped his
-  ring, and then to have stooped to pick it up, immediately before
-  the king; thus going through the prostration.
-
-  [597] Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 30.
-
-  [598] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 36. Ἐκ δὲ τούτου ἐρωτώμενος ὑπὸ
-  βασιλέως ὁ Πελοπίδας τί βούλοιτο ἑαυτῷ γραφῆναι, εἶπεν ὅτι
-  Μεσσήνην τε αὐτόνομον εἶναι ἀπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων, καὶ Ἀθηναίους
-  ἀνέλκειν τὰς ναῦς: εἰ δὲ ταῦτα μὴ πείθοιντο, στρατεύειν ἐπ’
-  αὐτούς· ~εἴ τις δὲ πόλις μὴ ἐθέλοι ἀκολουθεῖν~, ἐπὶ ταύτην πρῶτον
-  ἰέναι.
-
-  It is clear that these are not the exact words of the rescript of
-  367 B.C., though in the former case of the peace of Antalkidas
-  (387 B.C.) Xenophon seems to have given the rescript in its
-  exact words (v, 1, 31).
-
-  What he states afterwards (vii, 1, 38) about Elis and Arcadia
-  proves that other matters were included. Accordingly I do not
-  hesitate to believe that Amphipolis also was recognized as
-  autonomous. This we read in Demosthenes, Fals. Leg. p. 383,
-  c. 42. Καὶ γάρ τοι πρῶτον μὲν Ἀμφίπολιν πόλιν ἡμετέραν δούλην
-  κατέστησεν (the king of Persia), ~ἣν τότε σύμμαχον αὐτῷ καὶ
-  φίλην~ ἔγραψεν. Demosthenes is here alluding to the effect
-  produced on the mind of the Great King, and to the alteration in
-  his proceedings, when he learnt that Timagoras had been put to
-  death on returning to Athens; the adverb of time τότε alludes to
-  the rescript given when Timagoras was present.
-
-  In the words of Xenophon,—εἴ τις δὲ πόλις μὴ ἐθέλοι
-  ~ἀκολουθεῖν~,—the headship of Thebes is declared or implied.
-  Compare the convention imposed by Sparta upon Olynthus, after the
-  latter was subdued (v, 3, 26.)
-
-  [599] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 38. Τῶν δὲ ἄλλων πρέσβεων ὁ μὲν Ἠλεῖος
-  Ἀρχίδαμος, ὅτι ~προὐτίμησε τὴν Ἦλιν πρὸ τῶν Ἀρκάδων~, ἐπήνει τὰ
-  τοῦ βασιλέως· ὁ δ’ Ἀντίοχος, ὅτι ~ἠλαττοῦτο τὸ Ἀρκαδικὸν~, οὔτε
-  τὰ δῶρα ἐδέξατο, etc.
-
-Leon the Athenian protested against the Persian rescript, observing
-aloud when he heard it read,—“By Zeus, Athenians, I think it is time
-for you to look out for some other friend than the Great King.”
-This remark, made in the King’s hearing and interpreted to him,
-produced the following addition to the rescript: “If the Athenians
-have anything juster to propose, let them come to the King and
-inform him.” So vague a modification, however, did little to appease
-the murmurs of the Athenians. On the return of their two envoys to
-Athens, Leon accused his colleague Timagoras of having not only
-declined to associate with him during the journey, but also of having
-lent himself to the purposes of Pelopidas, of being implicated in
-treasonable promises, and of receiving large bribes from the Persian
-King. On these charges Timagoras was condemned and executed.[600]
-The Arcadian envoy Antiochus was equally indignant at the rescript;
-refusing even to receive such presents of formal courtesy as were
-tendered to all, and accepted by Pelopidas himself, who however
-strictly declined everything beyond. The conduct of this eminent
-Theban thus exhibited a strong contrast with the large acquisitions
-of the Athenian Timagoras.[601] Antiochus, on returning to Arcadia,
-made report of his mission to the Pan-Arcadian synod, called the Ten
-Thousand, at Megalopolis. He spoke in the most contemptuous terms
-of all that he had seen at the Persian court. There were (he said)
-plenty of bakers, cooks, wine-pourers, porters, etc., but as for men
-competent to fight against Greeks, though he looked out for them with
-care, he could see none; and even the vaunted golden plane-tree was
-not large enough to furnish shade for a grasshopper.[602]
-
-  [600] Demosthen. Fals. Leg. c. 42, p. 383.
-
-  In another passage of the same oration (c. 57, p. 400),
-  Demosthenes says that Leon had been joint envoy with Timagoras
-  _for four years_. Certainly this mission of Pelopidas to the
-  Persian court cannot have lasted four years; and Xenophon states
-  that the Athenians sent the two envoys when they heard that
-  Pelopidas was going thither. I imagine that Leon and Timagoras
-  may have been sent up to the Persian court shortly after the
-  battle of Leuktra, at the time when the Athenians caused the
-  former rescript of the Persian king to be resworn, putting Athens
-  as head into the place of Sparta (Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 1, 2).
-  This was exactly four years before (371-367 B.C.). Leon and
-  Timagoras having jointly undertaken and perhaps recently returned
-  from their first embassy, were now sent _jointly_ on a second.
-  Demosthenes has summed up the time of the two as if it were one.
-
-  [601] Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 30.
-
-  Demosthenes speaks of the amount received, in money, by Timagoras
-  from the Persian king as having been forty talents, ὡς λέγεται
-  (Fals. Leg. p. 383), besides other presents and conveniences.
-  Compare also Plutarch, Artaxerxes, c. 22.
-
-  [602] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 38.
-
-On the other hand, the Eleian envoy returned with feelings of
-satisfaction, and the Thebans with triumph. Deputies from each of
-their allied cities were invited to Thebes, to hear the Persian
-rescript. It was produced by a native Persian, their official
-companion from Susa,—the first Persian probably ever seen in Thebes
-since the times immediately preceding the battle of Platæa,—who,
-after exhibiting publicly the regal seal, read the document aloud;
-as the satrap Tiribazus had done on the occasion of the peace of
-Antalkidas.[603]
-
-  [603] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 30.
-
-But though the Theban leaders thus closely copied the conduct of
-Sparta both as to means and as to end, they by no means found the
-like ready acquiescence, when they called on the deputies present
-to take an oath to the rescript, to the Great King, and to Thebes.
-All replied that they had come with instructions, authorizing them
-to hear and report, but no more; and that acceptance or rejection
-must be decided in their respective cities. Nor was this the worst.
-Lykomedes and the other deputies from Arcadia, already jealous of
-Thebes, and doubtless farther alienated by the angry report of their
-envoy Antiochus, went yet farther, and entered a general protest
-against the headship of Thebes; affirming that the synod ought not
-to be held constantly in that city, but in the seat of war, wherever
-that might be. Incensed at such language, the Thebans accused
-Lykomedes of violating the cardinal principle of the confederacy;
-upon which he and his Arcadian comrades forthwith retired and went
-home, declaring that they would no longer sit in the synod. The other
-deputies appear to have followed his example. Indeed, as they had
-refused to take the oath submitted to them, the special purpose of
-the synod was defeated.
-
-Having thus failed in carrying their point with the allies
-collectively, the Thebans resolved to try the efficacy of
-applications individually. They accordingly despatched envoys, with
-the Persian rescript in hand, to visit the cities successively,
-calling upon each for acceptance with an oath of adhesion. Each
-city separately (they thought) would be afraid to refuse, under
-peril of united hostility from the Great King and from Thebes. So
-confident were they in the terrors of the king’s name and seal, that
-they addressed this appeal not merely to the cities in alliance
-with them, but even to several among their enemies. Their envoys
-first set forth the proposition at Corinth; a city, not only at
-variance with them, but even serving as a centre of operation for
-the Athenian and Lacedæmonian forces to guard the line of Oneium,
-and prevent the entrance of a Theban army into Peloponnesus. But the
-Corinthians rejected the proposition altogether, declining formally
-to bind themselves by any common oaths towards the Persian king.
-The like refusal was experienced by the envoys as they passed on to
-Peloponnesus, if not from all the cities visited, at least from so
-large a proportion, that the mission was completely frustrated. And
-thus the rescript, which Thebes had been at such pains to procure,
-was found practically inoperative in confirming or enforcing her
-headship;[604] though doubtless the mere fact, that it comprised and
-recognized Messênê, contributed to strengthen the vitality, and exalt
-the dignity, of that new-born city.
-
-  [604] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 40. Καὶ αὐτὴ μὲν ἡ Πελοπίδου καὶ τῶν
-  Θηβαίων τῆς ἀρχῆς περιβολὴ οὕτω διελύθη.
-
-In their efforts to make the Persian rescript available towards
-the recognition of their headship throughout Greece, the Thebans
-would naturally visit Thessaly and the northern districts as well
-as Peloponnesus. It appears that Pelopidas and Ismenias themselves
-undertook this mission; and that in the execution of it they were
-seized and detained as prisoners by Alexander of Pheræ. That despot
-seems to have come to meet them, under pacific appearances, at
-Pharsalus. They indulged hopes of prevailing on him as well as the
-other Thessalians to accept the Persian rescript; for we see by the
-example of Corinth, that they had tried their powers of persuasion
-on enemies as well as friends. But the Corinthians, while refusing
-the application, had nevertheless respected the public morality held
-sacred even between enemies in Greece, and had dismissed the envoys
-(whether Pelopidas was among them, we cannot assert) inviolate. Not
-so the tyrant of Pheræ. Perceiving that Pelopidas and Ismenias were
-unaccompanied by any military force, he seized their persons, and
-carried them off to Pheræ as prisoners.
-
-Treacherous as this proceeding was, it proved highly profitable
-to Alexander. Such was the personal importance of Pelopidas, that
-his imprisonment struck terror among the partisans of Thebes in
-Thessaly, and induced several of them to submit to the despot of
-Pheræ; who moreover sent to apprise the Athenians of his capture,
-and to solicit their aid against the impending vengeance of Thebes.
-Greatly impressed with the news, the Athenians looked upon Alexander
-as a second Jason, likely to arrest the menacing ascendency of their
-neighbor and rival.[605] They immediately despatched to his aid
-thirty triremes and one thousand hoplites under Autoklês; who, unable
-to get through the Euripus, when Bœotia and Eubœa were both hostile
-to Athens, were forced to circumnavigate the latter island. He
-reached Pheræ just in time; for the Thebans, incensed beyond measure
-at the seizure of Pelopidas, had despatched without delay eight
-thousand hoplites and six hundred cavalry to recover or avenge him.
-Unfortunately for them, Epaminondas had not been rechosen commander
-since his last year’s proceedings in Achaia. He was now serving as an
-hoplite in the ranks, while Kleomenes with other Bœotarchs had the
-command. On entering Thessaly, they were joined by various allies
-in the country. But the army of Alexander, aided by the Athenians,
-and placed under the command of Autoklês, was found exceedingly
-formidable, especially in cavalry. The Thessalian allies of Thebes,
-acting with their habitual treachery, deserted in the hour of danger;
-and the enterprise, thus difficult and perilous, was rendered
-impracticable by the incompetence of the Bœotarchs. Unable to make
-head against Alexander and the Athenians, they were forced to retreat
-homeward. But their generalship was so unskilful, and the enemy’s
-cavalry so active, that the whole army was in imminent danger of
-being starved or destroyed. Nothing saved them now, but the presence
-of Epaminondas as a common soldier in the ranks. Indignant as well
-as dismayed, the whole army united to depose their generals, and
-with one voice called upon him to extricate them from their perils.
-Epaminondas accepted the duty,—marshalled the retreat in consummate
-order,—took for himself the command of the rear-guard, beating off
-all the attacks of the enemy,—and conducted the army safely back to
-Thebes.[606]
-
-  [605] The strong expressions of Demosthenes show what a
-  remarkable effect was produced by the news at Athens (cont.
-  Aristokrat. p. 660, s. 142).
-
-  Τί δ’; Ἀλέξανδρον ἐκεῖνον τὸν Θετταλὸν, ἡνίκ’ εἶχε μὲν αἰχμάλωτον
-  δήσας Πελοπίδαν, ἐχθρὸς δ’ ὡς οὐδεὶς ἦν Θηβαίοις, ὑμῖν δ’ οἰκείως
-  διέκειτο, οὕτως ὥστε παρ’ ὑμῶν στρατηγὸν αἰτεῖν, ἐβοηθεῖτε δ’
-  αὐτῷ καὶ πάντ’ ἦν Ἀλέξανδρος, etc.
-
-  Alexander is said to have promised to the Athenians so ample a
-  supply of cattle as should keep the price of meat very low at
-  Athens (Plutarch, Apophtheg. Reg. p. 193 E.)
-
-  [606] Diodor. xv, 71; Plutarch, Pelop. c. 28; Pausanias ix, 15, 1.
-
-This memorable exploit, while it disgraced the unsuccessful
-Bœotarchs, who were condemned to fine and deposition from their
-office, raised higher than ever the reputation of Epaminondas among
-his countrymen. But the failure of the expedition was for the time a
-fatal blow to the influence of Thebes in Thessaly; where Alexander
-now reigned victorious and irresistible, with Pelopidas still in
-his dungeon. The cruelties and oppressions, at all times habitual
-to the despot of Pheræ, were pushed to an excess beyond all former
-parallel. Besides other brutal deeds of which we read with horror, he
-is said to have surrounded by his military force the unarmed citizens
-of Melibœa and Skotussa, and slaughtered them all in mass. In such
-hands, the life of Pelopidas hung by a thread; yet he himself, with
-that personal courage which never forsook him, held the language of
-unsubdued defiance and provocation against the tyrant. Great sympathy
-was manifested by many Thessalians, and even by Thêbê the wife of
-Alexander, for so illustrious a prisoner; and Alexander, fearful
-of incurring the implacable enmity of Thebes, was induced to spare
-his life, though retaining him as a prisoner. His confinement, too,
-appears to have lasted some time before the Thebans, discouraged
-by their late ill-success, were prepared to undertake a second
-expedition.
-
-At length they sent a force for the purpose; which was placed, on
-this occasion, under the command of Epaminondas. The renown of his
-name rallied many adherents in the country; and his prudence, no less
-than his military skill, was conspicuously exhibited, in defeating
-and intimidating Alexander, yet without reducing him to such despair
-as might prove fatal to the prisoner. The despot was at length
-compelled to send an embassy excusing his recent violence, offering
-to restore Pelopidas, and soliciting to be admitted to peace and
-alliance with Thebes. But Epaminondas would grant nothing more than
-a temporary truce,[607] coupled with the engagement of evacuating
-Thessaly; while he required in exchange the release of Pelopidas
-and Ismenias. His terms were acceded to, so that he had the delight
-of conveying his liberated friend in safety to Thebes. Though this
-primary object was thus effected, however, it is plain that he did
-not restore Thebes to the same influence in Thessaly which she had
-enjoyed prior to the seizure of Pelopidas.[608] That event with
-its consequences still remained a blow to Thebes and a profit to
-Alexander; who again became master of all or most part of Thessaly,
-together with the Magnêtes, the Phthiot Achæans, and other tributary
-nations dependent on Thessaly—maintaining unimpaired his influence
-and connection at Athens.[609]
-
-  [607] Plutarch (Pelopidas, c. 29) says, a truce for thirty days;
-  but it is difficult to believe that Alexander would have been
-  satisfied with a term so very short.
-
-  [608] The account of the seizure of Pelopidas by Alexander,
-  with its consequences, is contained chiefly in Diodorus, xv,
-  71-75; Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 27-29; Cornel. Nep. Pelop. c. 5;
-  Pausanias, ix, 15, 1. Xenophon does not mention it.
-
-  I have placed the seizure in the year 366 B.C., after the return
-  of Pelopidas from his embassy in Persia; which embassy I agree
-  with Mr. Fynes Clinton in referring to the year 367 B.C. Plutarch
-  places the seizure before the embassy; Diodorus places it in the
-  year between Midsummer 368 and Midsummer 367 B.C.; but he does
-  not mention the embassy at all, in its regular chronological
-  order; he only alludes to it in summing up the exploits at the
-  close of the career of Pelopidas.
-
-  Assuming the embassy to the Persian court to have occurred in 367
-  B.C., the seizure cannot well have happened before that time.
-
-  The year 368 B.C. seems to have been that wherein Pelopidas
-  made his second expedition into Thessaly, from which he returned
-  victorious, bringing back the hostages. See above, p. 264, note.
-
-  The seizure of Pelopidas was accomplished at a time when
-  Epaminondas was not Bœotarch, nor in command of the Theban army.
-  Now it seems to have been not until the close of 367 B.C., after
-  the accusations arising out of his proceedings in Achaia, that
-  Epaminondas missed being rechosen as general.
-
-  Xenophon, in describing the embassy of Pelopidas to Persia,
-  mentions his grounds for expecting a favorable reception, and
-  the matters which he had to boast of (Hell. vii, 1, 35). Now if
-  Pelopidas, immediately before, had been seized and detained for
-  some months in prison by Alexander of Pheræ, surely Xenophon
-  would have alluded to it as an item on the other side. I know
-  that this inference from the silence of Xenophon is not always to
-  be trusted. But in this case, we must recollect that he dislikes
-  both the Theban leaders; and we may fairly conclude, that where
-  he is enumerating the trophies of Pelopidas, he would hardly
-  have failed to mention a signal disgrace, if there had been one,
-  immediately preceding.
-
-  Pelopidas was taken prisoner by Alexander, not in battle, but
-  when in pacific mission, and under circumstances in which
-  no man less infamous than Alexander would have seized him
-  (παρασπονδηθεὶς—Plutarch, Apoph. p. 194 D.; Pausan. ix, 15, 1;
-  “legationis jure satis tectum se arbitraretur” Corn. Nep.). His
-  imprudence in trusting himself under any circumstances to such
-  a man as Alexander, is blamed by Polybius (viii, 1) and others.
-  But we must suppose such imprudence to be partly justified or
-  explained by some plausible circumstances; and the proclamation
-  of the Persian rescript appears to me to present the most
-  reasonable explanation of his proceeding.
-
-  On these grounds, which, in my judgment, outweigh any
-  probabilities on the contrary side, I have placed the seizure of
-  Pelopidas in 366 B.C., after the embassy to Persia; not without
-  feeling, however, that the chronology of this period cannot be
-  rendered absolutely certain.
-
-  [609] Plutarch. Pelopid c. 31-35.
-
-While the Theban arms were thus losing ground in Thessaly, an
-important point was gained in their favor on the other side of
-Bœotia. Orôpus, on the north-eastern frontier of Attica adjoining
-Bœotia, was captured and wrested from Athens by a party of exiles
-who crossed over from Eretria in Eubœa, with the aid of Themison,
-despot of the last-mentioned town. It had been more than once
-lost and regained between Athens and Thebes; being seemingly in
-its origin Bœotian, and never incorporated as a Deme or equal
-constituent member of the Athenian commonwealth, but only recognized
-as a dependency of Athens; though, as it was close on the frontier,
-many of its inhabitants were also citizens of Athens, demots of
-the neighboring Deme Græa.[610] So recently before as the period
-immediately preceding the battle of Leuktra, angry remonstrances had
-been exchanged between Athens and Thebes respecting a portion of
-the Oropian territory. At that time, it appears, the Thebans were
-forced to yield, and their partisans in Oropus were banished.[611]
-It was these partisans who, through the aid of Themison and the
-Eretrians, now effected their return, so as to repossess themselves
-of Oropus, and doubtless to banish the principal citizens friendly to
-Athens.[612] So great was the sensation produced among the Athenians,
-that they not only marched with all their force to recover the place,
-but also recalled their general, Chares, with that mercenary force
-which he commanded in the territories of Corinth and Phlius. They
-farther requested aid from the Corinthians and their other allies in
-Peloponnesus. These allies did not obey the summons; but the Athenian
-force alone would have sufficed to retake Oropus, had not the Thebans
-occupied it so as to place it beyond their attack. Athens was obliged
-to acquiesce in their occupation of it; though under protest, and
-with the understanding that the disputed right should be referred to
-impartial arbitration.[613]
-
-  [610] See the instructive Inscription and comments published by
-  Professor Ross, in which the Deme Γραῆς, near Oropus, was first
-  distinctly made known (Ross, Die Demen von Attika, p. 6, 7—Halle,
-  1846).
-
-  [611] Isokrates, Orat. xiv, (Plataic.) s. 22-40.
-
-  [612] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 1; Diodor. xv, 76.
-
-  The previous capture of Oropus, when Athens lost it in 411 B.C.,
-  was accomplished under circumstances very analogous (Thucyd.
-  viii, 60).
-
-  [613] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 1; Diodor. xv, 76.
-
-  Compare Demosthen. De Coronâ, p. 259, s. 123; Æschines cont.
-  Ktesiphont. p. 397, s. 85.
-
-  It would seem that we are to refer to this loss of Oropus the
-  trial of Chabrias and Kallistratus in Athens, together with
-  the memorable harangue of the latter which Demosthenes heard
-  as a youth with such strong admiration. But our information is
-  so vague and scanty, that we can make out nothing certainly on
-  the point. Rehdantz (Vitæ Iphicratis, Chabriæ, et Timothei, p.
-  109-114) brings together all the scattered testimonies in an
-  instructive chapter.
-
-This seizure of Oropus produced more than one material consequence.
-Owing to the recall of Chares from Corinth, the harbor of Sikyon
-could no longer be maintained against the Sikyonians in the town;
-who, with the aid of the Arcadians, recaptured it, so that both
-town and harbor again came into the league of Thebans and Arcadians.
-Moreover, Athens became discontented with her Peloponnesian allies,
-for having neglected her summons on the emergency at Oropus,
-although Athenian troops had been constantly in service for the
-protection of Peloponnesus against the Thebans. The growth of such
-dispositions at Athens became known to the Mantinean Lykomedes;
-the ablest and most ambitious leader in Arcadia, who was not only
-jealous of the predominance of the Thebans, but had come to a formal
-rupture with them at the synod held for the reception of the Persian
-rescript.[614] Anxious to disengage the Arcadians from Thebes as well
-as from Sparta, Lykomedes now took advantage of the discontent of
-Athens to open negotiations with that city; persuading the majority
-of the Arcadian Ten Thousand to send him thither as ambassador. There
-was difficulty among the Athenians in entertaining his proposition,
-from the alliance subsisting between them and Sparta. But they were
-reminded, that to disengage the Arcadians from Thebes, was no less
-in the interest of Sparta than of Athens; and a favorable answer was
-then given to Lykomedes. The latter took ship at Peiræus for his
-return, but never reached Arcadia; for he happened to land at the
-spot where the Arcadian exiles of the opposite party were assembled,
-and these men put him to death at once.[615] In spite of his death,
-however, the alliance between Arcadia and Athens was still brought to
-pass, though not without opposition.
-
-  [614] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 39; vii, 4, 2.
-
-  [615] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 3.
-
-  Xenophon notices the singularity of the accident. There were
-  plenty of vessels in Peiræus; Lykomedes had only to make his
-  choice, and to determine where he would disembark. He fixed upon
-  the exact spot where the exiles were assembled, not knowing that
-  they were there—δαιμονιώτατα ἀποθνήσκει.
-
-Thebes was during this year engaged in her unsuccessful campaign in
-Thessaly (alluded to already) for the rescue of Pelopidas, which
-disabled her from effective efforts in Peloponnesus. But as soon as
-that rescue had been accomplished, Epaminondas, her greatest man, and
-her only conspicuous orator, was despatched into Arcadia to offer,
-in conjunction with an envoy from Argos, diplomatic obstruction to
-the proposed Athenian alliance. He had to speak against Kallistratus,
-the most distinguished orator at Athens, who had been sent by his
-countrymen to plead their cause amidst the Arcadian Ten Thousand, and
-who, among other arguments, denounced the enormities which darkened
-the heroic legends both of Thebes and Argos. “Were not Orestes and
-Alkmæon, both murderers of their mothers (asked Kallistratus),
-natives of Argos? Was not Œdipus, who slew his father and married his
-mother, a native of Thebes?”—“Yes (said Epaminondas, in his reply)
-they were. But Kallistratus has forgotten to tell you, that these
-persons, while they lived at home were innocent, or reputed to be so.
-As soon as their crimes became known, Argos and Thebes banished them;
-and then it was that Athens received them, stained with confessed
-guilt.”[616] This clever retort told much to the credit of the
-rhetorical skill of Epaminondas; but his speech as a whole, was not
-successful. The Arcadians concluded alliance with Athens; yet without
-formally renouncing friendship with Thebes.
-
-  [616] Cornelius Nepos, Epaminond. c. 6: Plutarch, Repub. Ger.
-  Præc. p. 810 F.; Plutarch, Apophtheg. Reg. p. 193 D.
-
-  Compare a similar reference, on the part of others, to the crimes
-  embodied in Theban legend (Justin, ix, 3).
-
-  Perhaps it may have been during this embassy into Peloponnesus,
-  that Kallistratus addressed the discourse to the public assembly
-  at Mêssenê, to which Aristotle makes allusion (Rhetoric, iii, 17,
-  3); possibly enough, against Epaminondas also.
-
-As soon as such new alliance had been ratified, it became important
-to Athens to secure a free and assured entrance into Peloponnesus;
-while at the same time the recent slackness of the Corinthians, in
-regard to the summons to Oropus, rendered her mistrustful of their
-fidelity. Accordingly it was resolved in the Athenian assembly, on
-the motion of a citizen named Demotion, to seize and occupy Corinth;
-there being already some scattered Athenian garrisons, on various
-points of the Corinthian territory, ready to be concentrated and
-rendered useful for such a purpose. A fleet and land-force under
-Chares was made ready and despatched. But on reaching the Corinthian
-port of Kenchreæ, Chares found himself shut out even from admittance.
-The proposition of Demotion, and the resolution of the Athenians
-had become known to the Corinthians; who forthwith stood upon their
-guard, sent soldiers of their own to relieve the various Athenian
-outposts on their territory, and called upon these latter to give
-in any complaints for which they might have ground, as their
-services were no longer needed. Chares pretended to have learnt that
-Corinth was in danger. But both he and the remaining Athenians were
-dismissed, though with every expression of thanks and politeness.[617]
-
-  [617] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 4-6.
-
-  The public debates of the Athenian assembly were not favorable to
-  the success of a scheme, like that proposed by Demotion, to which
-  secrecy was indispensable. Compare another scheme, divulged in
-  like manner, in Thucydides, iii, 3.
-
-The treacherous purpose of Athens was thus baffled, and the
-Corinthians were for the moment safe. Yet their position was
-precarious and uncomfortable; for their enemies, Thebes and Argos,
-were already their masters by land, and Athens had now been converted
-from an ally into an enemy. Hence they resolved to assemble a
-sufficient mercenary force in their own pay;[618] but while thus
-providing for military security, they sent envoys to Thebes to open
-negotiations for peace. Permission was granted to them by the Thebans
-to go and consult their allies, and to treat for peace in conjunction
-with as many as could be brought to share their views. Accordingly
-the Corinthians went to Sparta and laid their case before the full
-synod of allies, convoked for the occasion. “We are on the point
-of ruin (said the Corinthian envoy), and must make peace. We shall
-rejoice to make it in conjunction with you, if you will consent; but
-if you think proper to persevere in the war, be not displeased if we
-make peace without you.” The Epidaurians and Phliasians, reduced to
-the like distress, held the same language of weariness and impatience
-for peace.[619]
-
-  [618] It seems probable that these were the mercenaries placed by
-  the Corinthians under the command of Timophanes, and employed by
-  him afterwards as instruments for establishing a despotism.
-
-  Plutarch (Timoleon, c. 3, 4) alludes briefly to mercenaries
-  equipped about this time (as far as we can verify his chronology)
-  and to the Corinthian mercenaries now assembled, in connection
-  with Timoleon and Timophanes, of whom I shall have to say much in
-  a future chapter.
-
-  [619] Compare Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 8, 9 with Isokrates, Or. vi,
-  (Archidamus), s. 106.
-
-It had been ascertained at Thebes, that no propositions for peace
-could be entertained, which did not contain a formal recognition of
-the independence of Messênê. To this the Corinthians and other allies
-of Sparta had no difficulty in agreeing. But they vainly endeavored
-to prevail upon Sparta herself to submit to the same concession.
-The Spartans resolutely refused to relinquish a territory inherited
-from victorious forefathers, and held under so long a prescription.
-They repudiated yet more indignantly the idea of recognizing as
-free Greeks and equal neighbors, those who had so long been their
-slaves; and they proclaimed their determination of continuing the
-war, even single-handed and with all its hazards, to regain what they
-had lost;[620] and although they could not directly prohibit the
-Corinthians and other allies, whose sickness of the war had become
-intolerable, from negotiating a separate peace for themselves,—yet
-they gave only a reluctant consent. Archidamus son of Agesilaus even
-reproached the allies with timorous selfishness, partly in deserting
-their benefactress Sparta at her hour of need, partly in recommending
-her to submit to a sacrifice ruinous to her honor.[621] The Spartan
-prince conjured his countrymen, in the name of all their ancient
-dignity, to spurn the mandates of Thebes; to shrink neither from
-effort nor from peril for the reconquest of Messênê, even if they
-had to fight alone against all Greece; and to convert their military
-population into a permanent camp, sending away their women and
-children to an asylum in friendly foreign cities.
-
-  [620] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 9.
-
-  [621] This sentiment of dissatisfaction against the allies is
-  strongly and repeatedly set forth in the oration of Isokrates
-  called Archidamus, composed as if to be spoken in this
-  synod,—and good evidence (whether actually spoken or not) of
-  the feelings animating the prince and a large party at Sparta.
-  Archidamus treats those allies who recommended the Spartans to
-  surrender Messênê, as worse enemies even than those who had
-  broken off altogether. He specifies Corinthians, Phliasians,
-  and Epidaurians, sect. 11-13,—εἰς τοῦτο δ’ ἥκουσι πλεονεξίας,
-  καὶ τοσαύτην ἡμῶν κατεγνώκασιν ἀνανδρίαν, ὥστε πολλάκις ἡμᾶς
-  ἀξιώσαντες ὑπὲρ τῆς αὑτῶν πολεμεῖν, ὑπὲρ Μεσσήνης οὐκ οἴονται
-  δεῖν κινδυνεύειν· ἀλλ’ ἵν’ αὐτοὶ τὴν σφετέραν αὐτῶν ἀσφαλῶς
-  καρπῶνται, πειρῶνται διδάσκειν ἡμᾶς ὡς χρὴ τοῖς ἐχθροῖς τῆς
-  ἡμετέρας παραχωρῆσαι, καὶ πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐπαπειλοῦσιν, ὡς, εἰ
-  μὴ ταῦτα συγχωρήσομεν, ποιησόμενοι τὴν εἰρήνην κατὰ σφᾶς αὐτούς.
-  Compare sect. 67, 87, 99, 105, 106, 123.
-
-  We may infer from this discourse of Isokrates, that the
-  displeasure of the Spartans against their allies, because the
-  latter advised them to relinquish Messênê,—was much greater than
-  the narrative of Xenophon (Hellen. vii, 4, 8-11) would lead us to
-  believe.
-
-  In the argument prefixed to the discourse, it is asserted (among
-  various other inaccuracies), that the Spartans had sent to Thebes
-  to ask for peace, and that the Thebans had said in reply,—peace
-  would be granted, εἰ Μεσσήνην ἀνοικίσωσι καὶ αὐτόνομον ἐάσωσι.
-  Now the Spartans had never sent to Thebes for this purpose; the
-  Corinthians went to Thebes, and there learnt the peremptory
-  condition requiring that Messênê should be recognized. Next, the
-  Thebans would never require Sparta to recolonize or reconstitute
-  (ἀνοικίσαι) Messênê; that had been already done by the Thebans
-  themselves.
-
-Though the Spartans were not inclined to adopt the desperate
-suggestions of Archidamus, yet this important congress ended
-by a scission between them and their allies. The Corinthians,
-Phliasians, Epidaurians, and others, went to Thebes, and concluded
-peace; recognizing the independence of Messênê, and affirming the
-independence of each separate city within its own territory, without
-either obligatory alliance, or headship on the part of any city. Yet
-when the Thebans invited them to contract an alliance, they declined,
-saying that this would be only embarking in war on the other side;
-whereas that which they sighed for was peace. Peace was accordingly
-sworn, upon the terms indicated in the Persian rescript, so far as
-regarded the general autonomy of each separate town, and specially
-that of Messênê; but not including any sanction, direct or indirect,
-of Theban headship.[622]
-
-  [622] Diodorus (xv, 76) states that the Persian king sent envoys
-  to Greece who caused this peace to be concluded. But there seems
-  no ground for believing that any Persian envoys had visited
-  Greece since the return of Pelopidas, whose return with the
-  rescript did in fact constitute a Persian intervention. The peace
-  now concluded was upon the general basis of that rescript; so
-  far, but no farther (as I conceive), the assertion of Diodorus
-  about Persian intervention is exact.
-
-This treaty removed out of the war, and placed in a position of
-neutrality, a considerable number of Grecian states; chiefly those
-near the Isthmus,—Corinth, Phlius, Epidaurus; probably Trœzen and
-Hermionê, since we do not find them again mentioned among the
-contending parties. But it left the more powerful states, Thebes and
-Argos,—Sparta and Athens,[623]—still at war; as well as Arcadia,
-Achaia, and Elis. The relations between these states, however, were
-now somewhat complicated; for Thebes was at war with Sparta, and in
-alliance, though not altogether hearty alliance, with the Arcadians;
-while Athens was at war with Thebes, yet in alliance with Sparta
-as well as with Arcadia. The Argeians were in alliance with Thebes
-and Arcadia, and at war with Sparta; the Eleians were on unfriendly
-terms, though not yet at actual war, with Arcadia—yet still (it
-would appear) in alliance with Thebes. Lastly, the Arcadians
-themselves were losing their internal coöperation and harmony one
-with another, which had only so recently begun. Two parties were
-forming among them, under the old conflicting auspices of Mantinea
-and Tegea. Tegea, occupied by a Theban harmost and garrison, held
-strenuously with Megalopolis and Messênê as well as with Thebes, thus
-constituting a strong and united frontier against Sparta.
-
-  [623] Diodorus (xv, 76) is farther inaccurate in stating the
-  peace as universally accepted, and as being a conclusion of the
-  Bœotian and Lacedæmonian war, which had begun with the battle of
-  Leuktra.
-
-As the Spartans complained of their Peloponnesian allies, for urging
-the recognition of Messênê as an independent state,—so they were
-no less indignant with the Persian king; who, though still calling
-himself their ally, had inserted the same recognition in the rescript
-granted to Pelopidas.[624] The Athenians also were dissatisfied with
-this rescript. They had (as has been already stated) condemned to
-death Timagoras, one of their envoys who had accompanied Pelopidas,
-for having received bribes. They now availed themselves of the
-opening left for them in the very words of the rescript, to send a
-fresh embassy up to the Persian court, and solicit more favorable
-terms. Their new envoys, communicating the fact that Timagoras had
-betrayed his trust and had been punished for it, obtained from the
-Great King a fresh rescript, pronouncing Amphipolis to be an Athenian
-possession instead of a free city.[625] Whether that other article
-also in the former rescript, which commanded Athens to call in
-all her armed ships, was now revoked, we cannot say; but it seems
-probable.
-
-  [624] Xenophon, Enc. Agesil. ii, 30. ἐνόμιζε—τῷ Πέρσῃ δίκην
-  ἐπιθήσειν καὶ τῶν πρόσθεν, καὶ ὅτι νῦν, σύμμαχος εἶναι φάσκων,
-  ἐπέταττε Μεσσήνην ἀφιέναι.
-
-  [625] This second mission of the Athenians to the Persian court
-  (pursuant to the invitation contained in the rescript given to
-  Pelopidas, Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 37), appears to me implied in
-  Demosthenes, Fals. Leg. p. 384, s. 150, p. 420, s. 283; Or. De
-  Halonneso, p. 84, s. 30.
-
-  If the king of Persia was informed that Timagoras had been put
-  to death by his countrymen on returning to Athens,—and if he
-  sent down (κατέπεμψεν) a fresh rescript about Amphipolis,—this
-  information can only have been communicated, and the new rescript
-  only obtained, by a second embassy sent to him from Athens.
-
-  Perhaps the Lacedæmonian Kallias may have accompanied this second
-  Athenian mission to Susa; we hear of him as having come back with
-  a friendly letter from the Persian king to Agesilaus (Xenophon,
-  Enc. Ages. viii, 3; Plutarch, Apophth. Lacon. p. 1213 E.),
-  brought by a Persian messenger. But the statement is too vague to
-  enable us to verify this as the actual occasion.
-
-At the same time that the Athenians sent this second embassy, they
-also despatched an armament under Timotheus to the coast of Asia
-Minor, yet with express instructions not to violate the peace with
-the Persian king. Agesilaus, king of Sparta, went to the same
-scene, though without any public force; availing himself only of
-his long-established military reputation to promote the interests
-of his country as negotiator. Both Spartan and Athenian attention
-was now turned, directly and specially, towards Ariobarzanes the
-satrap of Phrygia; who (as has been already related) had sent over to
-Greece, two years before, Philiskus of Abydus, with the view either
-of obtaining from the Thebans peace on terms favorable to Sparta,
-or of aiding the latter against them.[626] Ariobarzanes was then
-preparing, and apparently had since openly consummated, his revolt
-from the Persian king, which Agesilaus employed all his influence in
-fomenting. The Athenians, however, still wishing to avoid a distinct
-breach with Persia, instructed Timotheus to assist Ariobarzanes,—yet
-with a formal proviso, that he should not break truce with the Great
-King. They also conferred both upon Ariobarzanes (with his three
-sons), and upon Philiskus, the gift of Athenian citizenship.[627]
-That satrap seems now to have had a large mercenary force, and to
-have been in possession of both sides of the Hellespont, as well as
-of Perinthus on the Propontis; while Philiskus, as his chief officer,
-exercised extensive ascendency, disgraced by much tyranny and
-brutality, over the Grecian cities in that region.
-
-  [626] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 27.
-
-  [627] Demosthen. De Rhodior. Libert. p. 193, s. 10, cont.
-  Aristokrat. p. 666, s. 165; p. 687, s. 242.
-
-Precluded by his instructions from openly aiding the revolted
-Ariobarzanes, Timotheus turned his force against the island of Samos;
-which was now held by Kyprothemis, a Grecian chief with a military
-force in the service of Tigranes, Persian satrap on the opposite
-mainland. How or when Tigranes had acquired it we do not know; but
-the Persians, when once left by the peace of Antalkidas in quiet
-possession of the continental Asiatic Greeks, naturally tended to
-push their dominion over the neighboring islands. After carrying on
-his military operations in Samos, with eight thousand peltasts and
-thirty triremes, for ten or eleven months, Timotheus became master
-of it. His success was the more gratifying, as he had found means
-to pay and maintain his troops during the whole time at the cost
-of enemies; without either drawing upon the Athenian treasury, or
-extorting contributions from allies.[628] An important possession
-was thus acquired for Athens, while a considerable number of Samians
-of the opposite party went into banishment, with the loss of their
-properties. Since Samos was not among the legitimate possessions
-of the king of Persia, this conquest was not understood to import
-war between him and Athens. Indeed it appears that the revolt of
-Ariobarzanes, and the uncertain fidelity of various neighboring
-satraps, shook for some time the king’s authority, and absorbed his
-revenues in these regions. Autophradates, the satrap of Lydia,—and
-Mausôlus, native prince of Karia under Persian supremacy,—attacked
-Ariobarzanes, with the view, real or pretended, of quelling his
-revolt; and laid siege to Assus and Adramyttium. But they are
-said to have been induced to desist by the personal influence
-of Agesilaus.[629] As the latter had no army, nor any means of
-allurement (except perhaps some money derived from Ariobarzanes),
-we may fairly presume that the two besiegers were not very earnest
-in the cause. Moreover, we shall find both of them, a few years
-afterwards, in joint revolt with Ariobarzanes himself against the
-Persian king.[630] Agesilaus obtained, from all three, pecuniary aid
-for Sparta.[631]
-
-  [628] Demosth. _ut sup._; Isokrates, Or. xv, (De Permut.) s. 118;
-  Cornel. Nepos, Timoth. c. 1.
-
-  The stratagems whereby Timotheus procured money for his troops
-  at Samos, are touched upon in the Pseudo-Aristoteles, Œconomic.
-  ii, 23; and in Polyæn. iii, 10, 9; so far as we can understand
-  them, they appear to be only contributions, levied under a thin
-  disguise, upon the inhabitants.
-
-  Since Ariobarzanes gave money to Agesilaus, he may perhaps have
-  given some to Timotheus during this siege.
-
-  [629] Xenoph. Enc. Ages. ii, 26; Polyænus, vii, 26.
-
-  I do not know whether it is to this period that we are to refer
-  the siege of Atarneus by Autophradates, which he was induced to
-  relinquish by an ingenious proposition of Eubulus, who held the
-  place (Aristot. Politic. ii, 4, 10).
-
-  [630] It is with the greatest difficulty that we make out
-  anything like a thread of events at this period; so miserably
-  scanty and indistinct are our authorities.
-
-  Rehdantz (Vitæ Iphicratis, Chabriæ, et Timothei, chap. v, p.
-  118-130) is an instructive auxiliary in putting together the
-  scraps of information; compare also Weissenborn, Hellen. p.
-  192-194 (Jena, 1844).
-
-  [631] Xen. Enc. Ages. ii, 26, 27.
-
-The acquisition of Samos, while it exalted the reputation of
-Timotheus, materially enlarged the maritime dominion of Athens.
-It seems also to have weakened the hold of the Great King on Asia
-Minor,—to have disposed the residents, both satraps and Grecian
-cities, to revolt,—and thus to have helped Ariobarzanes, who rewarded
-both Agesilaus and Timotheus. Agesilaus was enabled to carry home
-a sum of money to his embarrassed countrymen; but Timotheus,
-declining pecuniary aid, obtained for Athens the more valuable boon
-of readmission to the Thracian Chersonese. Ariobarzanes made over
-to him Sestus and Krithôtê in that peninsula; possessions doubly
-precious, as they secured to the Athenians a partial mastery of the
-passage of the Hellespont; with a large circumjacent territory for
-occupation.[632]
-
-  [632] Isokrates, Or. xv, (De Permut.) s. 115-119; Cornelius
-  Nepos, Timotheus, c. 1.
-
-  Isokrates particularly dwells upon the fact that the conquests
-  of Timotheus secured to Athens a large circumjacent territory—ὧν
-  ληφθεισῶν ἅπας ὁ τόπος περιέχων οἰκεῖος ἠναγκάσθη τῇ πόλει
-  γενέσθαι, etc. (s. 114).
-
-  From the value of the Hellespont to Athens as ensuring a regular
-  supply of corn imported from the Euxine, Sestus was sometimes
-  called “the flour-board of the Peiræus”—ἡ τηλία τοῦ Πειραιῶς
-  (Aristot. Rhetor. iii, 10, 3).
-
-Samos and the Chersonese were not simply new tributary confederates
-aggregated to the Athenian synod. They were, in large proportion,
-new territories acquired to Athens, open to be occupied by Athenian
-citizens as out-settlers or kleruchs. Much of the Chersonese had
-been possessed by Athenian citizens, even from the time of the first
-Miltiades and afterwards down to the destruction of the Athenian
-empire in 405 B.C. Though all these proprietors had been then driven
-home and expropriated, they had never lost the hope of a favorable
-turn of fortune and eventual reëntry.[633] That moment had now
-arrived. The formal renunciation of all private appropriations of
-land out of Attica, which Athens had proclaimed at the formation
-of her second confederacy in 378 B.C., as a means of conciliating
-maritime allies—was forgotten, now that she stood no longer in
-fear of Sparta. The same system of kleruchies, which had so much
-discredited her former empire, was again partially commenced. Many
-kleruchs, or lot-holders, were sent out to occupy lands both at Samos
-and in the Chersonese. These men were Athenian citizens, who still
-remained citizens of Athens even in their foreign domicile, and
-whose properties formed part of the taxable schedule of Athens. The
-particulars of this important measure are unknown to us. At Samos
-the emigrants must have been new men; for there had never been any
-kleruchs there before.[634] But in the Chersonese, the old Athenian
-proprietors, who had been expropriated forty years before (or their
-descendants), doubtless now went back, and tried, with more or less
-of success, to regain their previous lands; reinforced by bands of
-new emigrants. And Timotheus, having once got footing at Sestus and
-Krithôtê, soon extended his acquisitions to Elæus and other places;
-whereby Athens was emboldened publicly to claim the whole Chersonese,
-or at least most part of it, as her own ancient possession,—from its
-extreme northern boundary at a line drawn across the isthmus north of
-Kardia, down to Elæus at its southern extremity.[635]
-
-  [633] See Andokides de Pace, s. 15.
-
-  [634] That the Athenian occupation of Samos (doubtless only in
-  part) by kleruchs, _began_ in 366 or 365 B.C.,—is established
-  by Diodorus, xviii, 8-18, when he mentions the restoration of
-  the Samians forty-three years afterwards by the Macedonian
-  Perdikkas. This is not inconsistent with the fact that additional
-  detachments of kleruchs were sent out in 361 and in 352 B.C.,
-  as mentioned by the Scholiast on Æschines cont. Timarch. p. 31
-  c. 12; and by Philochorus, Fr. 131, ed. Didot. See the note of
-  Wesseling, who questions the accuracy of the date in Diodorus. I
-  dissent from his criticism, though he is supported both by Boeckh
-  (Public Econ. of Athens, b. iii, p. 428) and by Mr. Clinton (F.
-  H. ad ann. 352). I think it highly improbable that so long an
-  interval should have elapsed between the capture of the island
-  and the sending of the kleruchs, or that this latter measure,
-  offensive as it was in the eyes of Greece, should have been
-  _first_ resorted to by Athens in 352 B.C., when she had been
-  so much weakened both by the Social War, and by the Progress of
-  Philip. Strabo mentions two thousand kleruchs as having been
-  sent to Samos. But whether he means the first batch alone, or
-  altogether, we cannot say (Strabo xiv, p. 638). The father of the
-  philosopher Epikurus was among these kleruchs; compare Diogen.
-  Laert. x, 1.
-
-  Rehdantz (Vitæ Iphicratis, Chabriæ et Timothei, p. 127) seems to
-  me to take a just view of the very difficult chronology of this
-  period.
-
-  Demosthenes mentions the property of the kleruchs, in his general
-  review of the ways and means of Athens; in a speech delivered in
-  Olym. 106, before 352 B.C. (De Symmoriis, p. 182, s. 19).
-
-  [635] See Demosthenes, De Halonneso, p. 86, s. 40-42; Æschines, De
-  Fals. Legat. 264, s. 74.
-
-  This transfer of lands in Samos to Athenian proprietors, combined
-  with the resumption of the Chersonese, appears to have excited
-  a strong sensation throughout Greece, as a revival of ambitious
-  tendencies on the part of Athens, and a manifest departure from
-  those disinterested professions which she had set forth in 378
-  B.C. Even in the Athenian assembly, a citizen named Kydias
-  pronounced an emphatic protest against the emigration of the
-  kleruchs to Samos.[636] However, obnoxious as the measure was to
-  criticism, yet having been preceded by a conquering siege and the
-  expulsion of many native proprietors, it does not seem to have
-  involved Athens in so much real difficulty as the resumption of
-  her old rights in the Chersonese. Not only did she here come into
-  conflict with independent towns, like Kardia,[637] which resisted
-  her pretensions,—and with resident proprietors whom she was to
-  aid her citizens in dispossessing,—but also with a new enemy,
-  Kotys, king of Thrace. That prince, claiming the Chersonese as
-  Thracian territory, was himself on the point of seizing Sestus,
-  when Agesilaus or Ariobarzanes drove him away,[638] to make room
-  for Timotheus and the Athenians.
-
-  [636] Aristotel. Rhetoric. ii, 8, 4.
-
-  [637] Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 677, s. 201; p. 679, s. 209.
-
-  [638] Xenophon, Enc. Agesil. ii, 26.
-
-It has been already mentioned, that Kotys,[639]—the new Thracian
-enemy, but previously the friend and adopted citizen, of Athens,—was
-father-in-law of the Athenian general Iphikrates, whom he had enabled
-to establish and people the town and settlement called Drys, on
-the coast of Thrace. Iphikrates had been employed by the Athenians
-for the last three or four years on the coasts of Macedonia and
-Chalkidikê, and especially against Amphipolis; but he had neither
-taken the latter place, nor obtained (so far as we know) any other
-success; though he had incurred the expense for three years of
-a mercenary general named Charidemus with a body of troops. How
-so unprofitable a result, on the part of an energetic man like
-Iphikrates, is to be explained,—we cannot tell. But it naturally
-placed him before the eyes of his countrymen in disadvantageous
-contrast with Timotheus, who had just acquired Samos and the
-Chersonese. An additional reason for mistrusting Iphikrates, too,
-was presented by the fact, that Athens was now at war with his
-father-in-law Kotys. Hence it was now resolved by the Athenians to
-recall him, and appoint Timotheus[640] to an extensive command,
-including Thrace and Macedonia as well as the Chersonese. Perhaps
-party enmities between the two Athenian chiefs, with their respective
-friends, may have contributed to the change. As Iphikrates had been
-the accuser of Timotheus a few years before, so the latter may have
-seized this opportunity of retaliating.[641] At all events the
-dismissed general conducted himself in such a manner as to justify
-the mistrust of his countrymen; taking part with his father-in-law
-Kotys in the war, and actually fighting against Athens.[642] He had
-got into his possession some hostages of Amphipolis, surrendered to
-him by Harpalus; which gave great hopes of extorting the surrender
-of the town. These hostages he had consigned to the custody of the
-mercenary general Charidemus, though a vote had been passed in the
-Athenian assembly that they should be sent to Athens.[643] As soon
-as the appointment of Iphikrates was cancelled, Charidemus forthwith
-surrendered the hostages to the Amphipolitans themselves, thus
-depriving Athens of a material advantage. And this was not all.
-Though Charidemus had been three years with his band in the service
-of Athens under Iphikrates, yet when the new general Timotheus
-wished to reëngage him, he declined the proposition; conveying
-away his troops in Athenian transports, to enter into the pay of a
-decided enemy of Athens—Kotys; and in conjunction with Iphikrates
-himself.[644] He was subsequently coming by sea from Kardia to take
-service under her other enemies, Olynthus and Amphipolis, when he was
-captured by the Athenian fleet. Under these circumstances, he was
-again prevailed on to serve Athens.
-
-  [639] Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 660, s. 141.
-
-  [640] Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 669, s. 174. Ἐπειδὴ τὸν μὲν
-  Ἰφικράτην ἀποστράτηγον ἐποιήσατε, Τιμόθεον δ’ ἐπ’ Ἀμφίπολιν καὶ
-  Χεῤῥόνησον ἐξεπέμψατε στρατηγὸν, etc.
-
-  [641] See Demosthen. cont. Timoth. p. 1187, 1188, s. 10-15.
-
-  Timotheus swore and pledged himself publicly in the Athenian
-  assembly, on one occasion, to prefer against Iphikrates a γραφὴν
-  ξενίας; but he never realized this engagement, and he even
-  afterwards became so far reconciled with Iphikrates, as to give
-  his daughter in marriage to the son of the latter (ibid. p. 1204,
-  s. 78).
-
-  To what precise date, or circumstance, this sworn engagement is
-  to be referred, we cannot determine. Possibly the γραφὴ ξενίας
-  may refer to the connection of Iphikrates with Kotys, which
-  might entail in some manner the forfeiture of his right of
-  citizenship; for it is difficult to understand how γραφὴ ξενίας,
-  in its usual sense (implying the negation of any original right
-  of citizenship), could ever be preferred as a charge against
-  Iphikrates; who not only performed all the active duties of a
-  citizen, but served in the highest post, and received from the
-  people distinguished honors.
-
-  [642] Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 664, s. 153. ἐτόλμησεν ὑπὲρ
-  τῶν Κότυος πραγμάτων ἐναντία τοῖς ὑμετέροις στρατηγοῖς ναυμαχεῖν.
-
-  [643] Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 669. s. 174-177. Respecting
-  these hostages, I can do nothing more than repeat the brief
-  and obscure notice of Demosthenes. Of the various conjectures
-  proposed to illustrate it, none appear to me at all satisfactory.
-  Who Harpalus was, I cannot presume to say.
-
-  [644] Demosthen. cont. Aristocrat. p. 669. s. 175.
-
-  The orator refers to letters written by Iphikrates and Timotheus
-  to the Athenian people, in support of these allegations.
-  Unfortunately these letters are not cited in substance.
-
-It was against these two cities, and to the general coast of
-Macedonia and the Chalkidic Thrace, that Timotheus devoted his first
-attention, postponing for the moment Kotys and the Chersonese. In
-this enterprise he found means to obtain the alliance of Macedonia,
-which had been hostile to his predecessor Iphikrates. Ptolemy of
-Alôrus, regent of that country, who had assassinated the preceding
-king, Alexander son of Amyntas, was himself assassinated (365 B.C.)
-by Perdikkas, brother of Alexander.[645] Perdikkas, during the first
-year or two of his reign, seems to have been friendly and not hostile
-to Athens. He lent aid to Timotheus, who turned his force against
-Olynthus and other towns both in the Chalkidic Thrace and on the
-coast of Macedonia.[646] Probably the Olynthian confederacy may have
-been again acquiring strength during the years of recent Spartan
-humiliation; so that Perdikkas now found his account in assisting
-Athens to subdue or enfeeble it, just as his father Amyntas had
-invoked Sparta for the like purpose. Timotheus, with the assistance
-of Perdikkas, was very successful in these parts; making himself
-master of Torônê, Potidæa, Pydna, Methônê, and various other places.
-As he mastered many of the Chalkidic towns allied with Olynthus,
-the means and adherents still retained by that city became so much
-diminished, that Timotheus is spoken of loosely as having conquered
-it.[647] Here, as at Samos, he obtained his successes not only
-without cost to Athens, but also (as we are told) without severities
-upon the allies, simply from the regular contributions of the
-Thracian confederates of Athens, assisted by the employment of a
-temporary coinage of base metal.[648] Yet though Timotheus was thus
-victorious in and near the Thermaic Gulf, he was not more fortunate
-than his predecessor in his attempt to achieve that which Athens had
-most at heart,—the capture of Amphipolis; although, by the accidental
-capture of Charidemus at sea, he was enabled again to enlist that
-chief with his band, whose services seem to have been gratefully
-appreciated at Athens.[649] Timotheus first despatched Alkimachus,
-who was repulsed,—then landed himself and attacked the city. But the
-Amphipolitans, aided by the neighboring Thracians, in large numbers
-(and perhaps by the Thracian Kotys), made so strenuous a resistance,
-that he was forced to retire with loss; and even to burn some
-triremes, which, having been carried across to assail the city from
-the wide part of the river Strymon above, could not be brought off
-in the face of the enemy.[650]
-
-  [645] Diodorus, xv, 77; Æschines de Fals. Leg. p. 250. c. 14.
-
-  [646] Demosthenes (Olynth. 1, p. 21. s. 14) mentions the
-  assistance of the Macedonians to Timotheus against Olynthus.
-  Compare also his oration ad Philippi Epistolam (p. 154. s. 9).
-  This can hardly allude to anything else than the war carried on
-  by Timotheus on those coasts in 364 B.C. See also Polyæn. iii,
-  10, 14.
-
-  [647] Diodor. xv, 81; Cornelius Nepos, Timoth. 1; Isokrates, Or.
-  xv, (De Permut.) s. 115-119; Deinarchus cont. Demosth. s. 14.
-  cont. Philokl. s. 19.
-
-  I give in the text what I apprehend to be the real truth
-  contained in the large assertion of Isokrates,—Χαλκιδεῖς ἅπαντας
-  κατεπολέμησεν (s. 119). The orator states that Timotheus acquired
-  twenty-four cities in all; but this total probably comprises
-  his conquests in other times as well as in other places. The
-  expression of Nepos—“Olynthios bello subegit” is vague.
-
-  [648] Isokrates, _l. c._; Aristotel. Œconomic. ii, 22: Polyæn.
-  iii, 10, 14.
-
-  [649] Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 669. s. 177.
-
-  [650] Polyænus (iii, 10, 8) mentions this fact, which is
-  explained by comparing (in Thucydides, vii, 9) the description of
-  the attack made by the Athenian Euetion upon Amphipolis in 414
-  B.C.
-
-  These ill-successes of Timotheus stand enumerated, as I conceive,
-  in that catalogue of _nine_ defeats, which the Scholiast on
-  Æschines (De Fals. Leg. p. 755, Reiske) specifies as having been
-  undergone by Athens at the territory called _Nine Ways_ (Ἐννέα
-  Ὁδοὶ), the previous name of the spot where Amphipolis was built.
-  They form the eighth and ninth items of the catalogue.
-
-  The third item, is the capture of Amphipolis by Brasidas. The
-  fourth is, the defeat of Kleon by Brasidas. Then come,—
-
-  5. οἱ ἐνοικοῦντες ἐπ’ Ἠϊόνα Ἀθηναῖοι ἐξελάθησαν. The only way
-  in which I can make historical fact out of these words, is,
-  by supposing that they allude to the driving in of all the
-  out-resident Athenians to Athens, after the defeat of Ægospotami.
-  We know from Thucydides that when Amphipolis was taken by
-  Brasidas, many of the Athenians who were there settled retired
-  to Eion; where they probably remained until the close of the
-  Peloponnesian war, and were then forced back to Athens. We should
-  then have to construe οἱ ἐνοικοῦντες ἐπ’ Ἠϊόνα Ἀθηναῖοι—“the
-  Athenians residing at Eion;” which, though not a usual sense
-  of the preposition ἐπὶ with an accusative case, seems the only
-  definite meaning which can be made out here.
-
-  6. οἱ μετὰ Σιμμίχου στρατηγοῦντος διεφθάρησαν.
-
-  7. ὅτε Πρωτόμαχος ἀπέτυχεν (Ἀμφιπολιτῶν αὐτοὺς παραδόντων τοῖς
-  ὁμόροις Θρᾳξί, these last words are inserted by Bekker from
-  a MS.). These two last-mentioned occurrences are altogether
-  unknown. We may perhaps suppose them to refer to the period when
-  Iphikrates was commanding the forces of Athens in these regions,
-  from 368-365 B.C.
-
-  8. ἐκπεμφθεὶς ὑπὸ Τιμοθέου Ἀλκíμαχος ἀπέτυχεν αὐτοῦ, παραδόντων
-  αὑτοὺς Θρᾳξὶν ἐπὶ Τιμοκράτους Ἀθήνῃσιν ἄρχοντος.
-
-  The word Τιμοθέου is here inserted by Bekker from a MS., in place
-  of Τιμοσθένους, which appeared in Reiske’s edition.
-
-  9. Τιμόθεος ἐπιστρατεύσας ἡττήθη ἐπὶ Καλαμιώνος.
-
-  Here are two defeats of Timotheus specified, one in the
-  archonship of Timokrates, which exactly coincides with the
-  command of Timotheus in these regions (Midsummer 364 to Midsummer
-  363 B.C.). But the other archon Kalamion, is unknown in the Fasti
-  of Athens. Winiewski (Comment. in Demosth. de Corona, p. 39),
-  Böhnecke, and other commentators follow Corsini in representing
-  Kalamion to be a corruption of _Kallimedes_, who was archon
-  from Midsummer 360-359 B.C.; and Mr. Clinton even inserts the
-  fact in his tables for that year. But I agree with Rehdantz
-  (Vit. Iph. Chab. et Tim. p. 153) that such an occurrence after
-  Midsummer 360 B.C., can hardly be reconciled with the proceedings
-  in the Chersonese before and after that period, as reported by
-  Demosthenes in the Oration against Aristokrates. Without being
-  able to explain the mistake about the name of the archon, and
-  without determining whether the real mistake may not consist
-  in having placed ἐπὶ in place of ὑπὸ,—I cannot but think that
-  Timotheus underwent two repulses, one by his lieutenant, and
-  another by himself, near Amphipolis,—both of them occurring in
-  364 or the early part of 363 B.C. During great part of 363 B.C.,
-  the attention of Timotheus seems to have been turned to the
-  Chersonese, Byzantium, Kotys, etc.
-
-  My view of the chronology of this period agrees generally with
-  that of Dr. Thirlwall (Hist. Gr. vol. v, ch. 42, p. 244-257).
-
-Timotheus next turned his attention to the war against Kotys in
-Thrace, and to the defence of the newly-acquired Athenian possessions
-in the Chersonese, now menaced by the appearance of a new and
-unexpected enemy to Athens in the eastern waters of the Ægean,—a
-Theban fleet.
-
-I have already mentioned that in 366 B.C., Thebes had sustained
-great misfortunes in Thessaly. Pelopidas had been fraudulently seized
-and detained as prisoner by Alexander of Pheræ; a Theban army had
-been sent to rescue him, but had been dishonorably repulsed, and had
-only been enabled to effect its retreat by the genius of Epaminondas,
-then serving as a private, and called upon by the soldiers to take
-the command. Afterwards, Epaminondas himself had been sent at the
-head of a second army to extricate his captive friend, which he had
-accomplished, but not without relinquishing Thessaly and leaving
-Alexander more powerful than ever. For a certain time after this
-defeat, the Thebans remained comparatively humbled and quiet. At
-length, the aggravated oppressions of the tyrant Alexander occasioned
-such suffering, and provoked such missions of complaint on the part
-of the Thessalians to Thebes, that Pelopidas, burning with ardor
-to revenge both his city and himself, prevailed on the Thebans to
-place him at the head of a fresh army for the purpose of invading
-Thessaly.[651]
-
-  [651] Plutarch Pelopid. c. 31; Diodor. xv, 80.
-
-At the same time, probably, the remarkable successes of the Athenians
-under Timotheus, at Samos and the Chersonese, had excited uneasiness
-throughout Greece, and jealousy on the part of the Thebans.
-Epaminondas ventured to propose to his countrymen that they should
-grapple with Athens on her own element, and compete for the headship
-of Greece not only on land but at sea. In fact the rescript brought
-down by Pelopidas from the Persian court sanctioned this pretension,
-by commanding Athens to lay up her ships of war, on pain of incurring
-the chastisement of the Great King;[652] a mandate, which she had so
-completely defied as to push her maritime efforts more energetically
-than before. Epaminondas employed all his eloquence to impress upon
-his countrymen, that, Sparta being now humbled, Athens was their
-actual and prominent enemy. He reminded them,—in language such as had
-been used by Brasidas in the early years of the Peloponnesian war,
-and by Hermokrates at Syracuse,[653]—that men such as the Thebans,
-brave and trained soldiers on land, could soon acquire the like
-qualities on shipboard; and that the Athenians themselves had once
-been mere landsmen, until the exigencies of the Persian war forced
-them to take to the sea.[654] “We must put down this haughty rival
-(he exhorted his countrymen); we must transfer to our own citadel,
-the Kadmeia, those magnificent Propylæa which adorn the entrance of
-the acropolis at Athens.”[655]
-
-  [652] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 36.
-
-  [653] Thucyd ii, 87; vii, 21.
-
-  [654] Diodor. xv, 78.
-
-  [655] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 276, c. 32, s. 111. Ἐπαμινώνδας,
-  οὐχ ὑποπτήξας τὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀξίωμα, εἶπε διαῤῥήδην ἐν τῷ
-  πλήθει τῶν Θηβαίων, ὡς δεῖ τὰ τῆς Ἀθηναίων ἀκροπόλεως προπύλαια
-  μετενεγκεῖν εἰς τὴν προστασίαν τῆς Καδμείας.
-
-Such emphatic language, as it long lived in the hostile recollection
-of Athenian orators, so it excited at the moment extreme ardor on
-the part of the Theban hearers. They resolved to build and equip
-one hundred triremes, and to construct docks with ship-houses fit
-for the constant maintenance of such a number. Epaminondas himself
-was named commander, to sail with the first fleet, as soon as it
-should be ready, to the Hellespont and the islands near Ionia;
-while invitations were at the same time despatched to Rhodes,
-Chios, and Byzantium, encouraging them to prepare for breaking with
-Athens.[656] Some opposition however was made in the assembly to the
-new undertaking; especially by Menekleidas, an opposition speaker,
-who, being frequent and severe in his criticisms upon the leading men
-such as Pelopidas and Epaminondas, has been handed down by Nepos
-and Plutarch in odious colors. Demagogues like him, whose power
-resided in the public assembly, are commonly represented as if they
-had a natural interest in plunging their cities into war, in order
-that there might be more matter of accusation against the leading
-men. This representation is founded mainly on the picture which
-Thucydides gives of Kleon in the first half of the Peloponnesian war:
-I have endeavored in my sixth volume to show,[657] that it is not a
-fair estimate even of Kleon separately, much less of the demagogues
-generally, unwarlike men both in tastes and aptitudes. Menekleidas
-at Thebes, far from promoting warlike expeditions in order that
-he might denounce the generals when they came back, advocated the
-prudence of continued peace, and accused Epaminondas of involving his
-country in distant and dangerous schemes, with a view to emulate the
-glories of Agamemnon by sailing from Aulis in Bœotia, as commander
-of an imposing fleet to make conquests in the Hellespont. “By the
-help of Thebes (replied Epaminondas) I have already done more than
-Agamemnon. He, with the forces of Sparta and all Greece besides, was
-ten years in taking a single city; while _I_, with the single force
-of Thebes and at the single day of Leuktra, have crushed the power of
-the Agamemnonian Sparta.”[658] While repelling the charge of personal
-motives, Epaminondas contended that peace would be equivalent to an
-abnegation of the headship of Greece; and that, if Thebes wished
-to maintain that ascendant station, she must keep her citizens in
-constant warlike training and action.
-
-  [656] Diodor. xv, 78, 79.
-
-  [657] See Vol. VI. Ch. liv. p. 475.
-
-  [658] Cornelius Nepos, Epaminond. c. 5; Plutarch, Pelopidas, c.
-  25; Plutarch, De Sui Laude, p. 542 A.
-
-  Neither of these the authors appear to me to conceive rightly
-  either the attack, or the reply, in which the name of Agamemnon
-  is here brought forward. As I have given it in the text, there is
-  a real foundation for the attack, and a real point in the reply;
-  as it appears in Cornelius Nepos, there is neither one nor the
-  other.
-
-  That the Spartans regarded themselves as having inherited the
-  leadership of Greece from Agamemnon, may be seen by Herodotus,
-  vii, 159.
-
-To err with Epaminondas may be considered, by some readers, as
-better than being right with Menekleidas. But on the main point of
-this debate, Menekleidas appears to have been really right. For
-the general exhortations ascribed to Epaminondas resemble but too
-closely those feverish stimulants, which Alkibiades administered at
-Athens to wind up his countrymen for the fatal expedition against
-Syracuse.[659] If we should even grant his advice to be wise, in
-reference to land-warfare, we must recollect that he was here
-impelling Thebes into a new and untried maritime career, for which
-she had neither aptitude nor facilities. To maintain ascendency
-on land alone, would require all her force, and perhaps prove
-too hard for her; to maintain ascendency by land and sea at once
-would be still more impracticable. By grasping at both she would
-probably keep neither. Such considerations warrant us in suspecting,
-that the project of stretching across the Ægean for ultramarine
-dependencies was suggested to this great man not so much by a sound
-appreciation of the permanent interests of Thebes, as by jealousy of
-Athens,—especially since the recent conquests of Timotheus.[660]
-
-  [659] Thucyd. vi, 17, 18.
-
-  [660] Plutarch (Philopœmen, c. 14) mentions that some authors
-  represented Epaminondas as having consented unwillingly to this
-  maritime expedition. He explains such reluctance by reference
-  to the disparaging opinion expressed by Plato about maritime
-  service. But this opinion of Plato is founded upon reasons
-  foreign to the character of Epaminondas; and it seems to me
-  evident that the authors whom Plutarch here followed, introduced
-  the opinion only as an hypothesis to explain why so great a
-  general on land as Epaminondas had accomplished so little at sea,
-  when he took command of a fleet; putting himself in a function
-  for which he had little capacity, like Philopœmen (Plutarch,
-  Reipublic. Gerend. Præcep. p. 812 E.).
-
-  Bauch (in his tract, Epaminondas und Thebens Kampf um die
-  Hegemonie, Breslau, 1834, p. 70, 71) maintains that Epaminondas
-  was constrained against his own better judgment to undertake this
-  maritime enterprise. I cannot coincide in his opinion. The oracle
-  which Bauch cites from Pausanias (viii, 11, 6) proves as little
-  as the above extract from Plutarch.
-
-The project however was really executed, and a large Theban fleet
-under Epaminondas crossed the Ægean in 363 B.C. In the same year,
-apparently, Pelopidas marched into Thessaly, at the head of a Theban
-land-force, against Alexander of Pheræ. What the fleet achieved,
-we are scarcely permitted to know. It appears that Epaminondas
-visited Byzantium; and we are told that he drove off the Athenian
-guard-squadron under Laches, prevailing upon several of the allies
-of Athens to declare in his favor.[661] Both he and Timotheus
-appear to have been in these seas, if not at the same time, at least
-with no great interval of time between. Both were solicited by the
-oligarchy of the Pontic Herakleia against the people; and both
-declined to furnish aid.[662] Timotheus is said to have liberated
-the besieged town of Kyzikus: by whom it was besieged, we do not
-certainly know, but probably by the Theban fleet.[663] Epaminondas
-brought back his fleet at the end of the year, without having gained
-any splendid victory or acquired any tenable possession for Thebes;
-yet not without weakening Athens, unsettling her hold upon her
-dependencies, and seconding indirectly the hostilities carried on
-by Kotys; insomuch that the Athenian affairs in the Chersonese and
-Thrace were much less prosperous in 362 B.C. than they had been in
-364 B.C. Probably Epaminondas intended to return with his fleet in
-the next year (362 B.C.), and to push his maritime enterprises still
-farther;[664] but we shall find him imperatively called elsewhere, to
-another and a fatal battle-field. And thus the first naval expedition
-of Thebes was likewise the last.
-
-  [661] Isokrates. Or. v, (Philip.) s. 53; Diodor. xv, 78. ἰδίας
-  τὰς πόλεις τοῖς Θηβαίοις ἐποίησεν. I do not feel assured that
-  these general words apply to Chios, Rhodes, and Byzantium, which
-  had before been mentioned.
-
-  [662] Justin, xvi, 4.
-
-  [663] Diodor. xv, 81; Cornel. Nepos, Timotheus, c. 1.
-
-  [664] Diodor. xv, 79.
-
-Meanwhile his friend and colleague Pelopidas had marched into
-Thessaly against the despot Alexander; who was now at the height of
-his power, holding in dependence a large portion of Thessaly together
-with the Phthiot Achæans and the Magnetes, and having Athens as his
-ally. Nevertheless, so revolting had been his cruelties, and so
-numerous were the malcontents who had sent to invite aid from Thebes,
-that Pelopidas did not despair of overpowering him. Nor was he
-daunted even by an eclipse of the sun, which is said to have occurred
-just as he was commencing his march, nor by the gloomy warnings which
-the prophets founded upon it; though this event intimidated many of
-his fellow-citizens, so that his force was rendered less numerous
-as well as less confident. Arriving at Pharsalus, and strengthening
-himself by the junction of his Thessalian allies, he found Alexander
-approaching to meet him at the head of a well-appointed mercenary
-force, greatly superior in number. The two chiefs contended who
-should occupy first the hills called Kynos Kephalæ, or the Dog’s
-Heads. Pelopidas arrived there first with his cavalry, beat the
-cavalry of the enemy, and pursued them to some distance; but he thus
-left the hills open to be occupied by the numerous infantry of the
-enemy, while his own infantry, coming up later, were repulsed with
-loss in their attempt to carry the position. Thus unpromising did the
-battle appear, when Pelopidas returned from the pursuit. Ordering
-his victorious cavalry to charge the infantry on the hill in flank,
-he immediately dismounted, seized his shield, and put himself at
-the head of his own discouraged infantry, whom he again led up the
-hill to attack the position. His presence infused so much fresh
-ardor, that his troops, in spite of being twice repulsed, succeeded
-in a third attempt to drive the enemy from the summit of the hill.
-Thus master of the hill, Pelopidas saw before him the whole army
-of the enemy, retiring in some disorder, though not yet beaten;
-while Alexander in person was on the right wing, exerting himself
-to rally and encourage them. When Pelopidas beheld, as it were
-within his reach, this detested enemy,—whose treacherous arrest and
-dungeon he had himself experienced, and whose cruelties filled every
-one’s mouth,—he was seized with a transport of rage and madness,
-like Cyrus the younger on the field of Kunaxa at the sight of his
-brother Artaxerxes. Without thinking of his duties as a general, or
-even looking to see by whom he was followed, he rushed impetuously
-forward, with loud cries and challenges to Alexander to come forth
-and fight. The latter, declining the challenge, retired among his
-guards, into the midst of whom Pelopidas plunged, with the few who
-followed him; and there, while fighting with desperate bravery, met
-his death. So rapidly had this rash proceeding been consummated, that
-his army behind did not at first perceive it. But they presently
-hastened forward to rescue or avenge him, vigorously charged the
-troops of Alexander, and put them to flight with severe loss.[665]
-
-  [665] For the description of this memorable scene, see Plutarch,
-  Pelopidas, c. 31, 32; Diodor. xv, 80, 81; Cornel. Nepos. Pelopid.
-  c. 5.
-
-Yet this victory, though important to the Thebans, and still more
-important to the Thessalians, was to both of them robbed of all its
-sensible value by the death of Pelopidas. The demonstrations of grief
-throughout the army were unbounded and universal. The soldiers yet
-warm from their victory, the wounded men with wounds yet untended,
-flocked around the corpse, piling up near to it as a trophy the arms
-of the slain enemies. Many, refusing either to kindle fire, or to
-touch their evening meal, testified their affliction by cutting off
-their own hair as well as the manes of their horses. The Thessalian
-cities vied with each other in tokens of affectionate respect, and
-obtained from the Thebans permission to take the chief share in
-his funeral, as their lost guardian and protector. At Thebes, the
-emotion was no less strikingly manifested. Endeared to his countrymen
-first as the head of that devoted handful of exiles who braved
-every peril to rescue the city from the Lacedæmonians, Pelopidas
-had been reëlected without interruption to the annual office of
-Bœotarch during all the years that had since elapsed[666] (378-364
-B.C.). He had taken a leading part in all their struggles, and
-all their glories; he had been foremost to cheer them in the hour
-of despondency; he had lent himself, with the wisdom of a patriot
-and the generosity of a friend, to second the guiding ascendency
-of Epaminondas, and his moderation of dealing towards conquered
-enemies.[667]
-
-  [666] Diodor. xv, 81. Plutarch (Pelop. c. 34) states
-  substantially the same.
-
-  [667] Plutarch, Compar. Pelopid. and Marcell. c. 1.
-
-All that Thebes could do, was, to avenge the death of Pelopidas. The
-Theban generals, Malkitas and Diogeiton,[668] conducted a powerful
-force of seven thousand hoplites into Thessaly, and put themselves at
-the head of their partisans in that country. With this united army,
-they pressed Alexander hard, completely worsted him, and reduced him
-to submit to their own terms. He was compelled to relinquish all
-his dependencies in Thessaly; to confine himself to Pheræ, with its
-territory near the Gulf of Pagasæ; and to swear adherence to Thebes
-as a leader. All Thessaly, together with the Phthiot Achæans and the
-Magnêtes, became annexed to the headship of the Thebans, who thus
-acquired greater ascendency in Northern Greece than they had ever
-enjoyed before.[669] The power of Alexander was effectually put down
-on land; but he still continued both powerful and predatory at sea,
-as will be seen in the ensuing year.
-
-  [668] Diodor. (xv, 78) places in one and the same year both,—1.
-  The maritime project of Epaminondas, including his recommendation
-  of it, the equipment of the fleet, and the actual expedition. 2.
-  The expedition of Pelopidas into Thessaly, with its immediate
-  consequences.—He mentions the former of the two first, but he
-  places both in the first year of Olympiad 104, the year in which
-  Timokrates was archon at Athens; that is, from Midsummer 364
-  to Midsummer 363 B.C. He passes immediately from the maritime
-  expedition into an allusion to the battle of Mantinea, which (he
-  says) proved fatal to Epaminondas and hindered him from following
-  up his ideas of maritime activity.
-
-  The battle of Mantinea took place in June or July 362 B.C. The
-  maritime expedition, immediately preceding that battle, would
-  therefore naturally take place in the summer of 363 B.C.; the
-  year 364 B.C. having been occupied in the requisite naval
-  equipments.
-
-  I incline to think that the march of Pelopidas into Thessaly also
-  took place during 363 B.C., and that his death thus occurred
-  while Epaminondas was absent on shipboard. A probable reason is
-  thus supplied why the second Theban army which went to avenge
-  Pelopidas, was commanded, not by his friend and colleague
-  Epaminondas, but by other generals. Had Epaminondas been then at
-  home, this would hardly have been.
-
-  The eclipse of the sun, which both Plutarch and Diodorus mention
-  to have immediately preceded the out-march of Pelopidas, does
-  not seem to have been as yet certainly identified. Dodwell, on
-  the authority of an astronomical friend, places it on the 13th
-  of June, 364 B.C., at five o’clock in the morning. On the other
-  hand, Calvisius places it on the 13th of July in the same Julian
-  year, at a quarter before eleven o’clock in the day (see L’Art de
-  Vérifier les Dates, tom. i, p. 257). We may remark, that the day
-  named by Dodwell (as he himself admits) would not fall within the
-  Olympic year 364-363 B.C., but during the months preceding the
-  commencement of that year. Moreover Dodwell speaks as if there
-  were no other months in the year, except June, July, and August,
-  fit for military expeditions; an hypothesis not reasonable to
-  admit.
-
-  Sievers and Dr. Thirlwall both accept the eclipse mentioned by
-  Dodwell, as marking the time when the expedition of Pelopidas
-  commenced—June 364 B.C. But against this, Mr. Clinton takes
-  no notice of it in his tables; which seems to show that he was
-  not satisfied as to the exactness of Dodwell’s statement or
-  the chronological identity. If it should turn out, on farther
-  astronomical calculations, that there occurred no eclipse of
-  the sun in the year 363 B.C., visible at Thebes,—I should then
-  fix upon the eclipse mentioned by Calvisius (13 July 364 B.C.)
-  as identifying the time of the expedition of Pelopidas; which
-  would, on that supposition, precede by eight or nine months
-  the commencement of the transmarine cruise of Epaminondas. The
-  eclipse mentioned by Calvisius is preferable to that mentioned by
-  Dodwell, because it falls within the Olympic year indicated by
-  Diodorus.
-
-  But it appears to me that farther astronomical information is
-  here required.
-
-  [669] Plutarch, Pelopid. c. 35.
-
-
-
-
-CHAPTER LXXX.
-
-FROM THE DEATH OF PELOPIDAS TO THE BATTLE OF MANTINEA.
-
-
-It was during this period,—while Epaminondas was absent with the
-fleet, and while Pelopidas was engaged in that Thessalian campaign
-from whence he never returned,—that the Thebans destroyed Orchomenus.
-That city, the second in the Bœotian federation, had always been
-disaffected towards Thebes; and the absence of the two great leaders,
-as well as of a large Theban force in Thessaly, seems to have been
-regarded by the Orchomenian Knights or Horsemen (the first and
-richest among the citizens, three hundred in number) as a favorable
-moment for attack. Some Theban exiles took part in this scheme, with
-a view to overthrow the existing government; and a day, appointed
-for a military review near Thebes, was fixed for execution. A large
-number of conspirators joined, with apparent ardor. But before the
-day arrived, several of them repented and betrayed the plot to the
-Bœotarchs; upon which the Orchomenian horsemen were seized, brought
-before the Theban assembly, condemned to death, and executed.
-But besides this, the resolution was taken to destroy the town,
-to kill the male adults, and to sell the women and children into
-slavery.[670] This barbarous decree was executed, though probably a
-certain fraction found means to escape, forming the kernel of that
-population which was afterwards restored. The full measure of ancient
-Theban hatred was thus satiated; a hatred, tracing its origin even
-to those mythical times when Thebes was said to have paid tribute to
-Orchomenus. But the erasure of this venerable city from the list of
-autonomous units in Hellas, with the wholesale execution and sale of
-so many free kinsmen into slavery, excited strong sympathy throughout
-the neighbors, as well as repugnance against Theban cruelty;[671] a
-sentiment probably aggravated by the fact, which we must presume to
-have been concurrent,—that the Thebans appropriated the territory
-among their own citizens. It would seem that the neighboring town of
-Koroneia shared the same fate; at least the two are afterwards spoken
-of together in such manner as to make us suppose so.[672] Thebes thus
-absorbed into herself these two towns and territories to the north of
-her own city, as well as Platæa and Thespiæ to the south.
-
-  [670] Diodor. xv, 79.
-
-  [671] See the sentiment expressed by Demosthenes cont. Leptinem,
-  p. 489, s. 121,—an oration delivered in 355 B.C.; eight years
-  after the destruction of Orchomenus.
-
-  [672] Demosth. De Pace, p. 62, s. 21; Philippic. II, p. 69, s.
-  13; s. 15; Fals. Leg. p. 375, s. 122; p. 387, s. 162; p. 445, s.
-  373.
-
-We must recollect that during the supremacy of Sparta and the
-period of Theban struggle and humiliation, before the battle of
-Leuktra, Orchomenus had actively embraced the Spartan cause.
-Shortly after that victory, the Thebans had been anxious under
-their first impulse of resentment to destroy the city, but had been
-restrained by the lenient recommendations of Epaminondas.[673] All
-their half-suppressed wrath was revived by the conspiracy of the
-Orchomenian Knights; yet the extreme severity of the proceeding would
-never have been consummated, but for the absence of Epaminondas, who
-was deeply chagrined on his return.[674] He well knew the bitter
-censures which Thebes would draw upon herself by punishing the entire
-city for the conspiracy of the wealthy Knights, and in a manner even
-more rigorous than Platæa and Thespiæ; since the inhabitants of these
-two latter were expelled with their families out of Bœotia, while the
-Orchomenian male adults were slain, and the women and children sold
-into slavery.
-
-  [673] Diodor. xv, 57.
-
-  [674] Pausan. ix, 15, 2.
-
-  Diodorus places in the same year all the three facts:—1. The
-  maritime expedition of Epaminondas. 2. The expedition of
-  Pelopidas into Thessaly, his death, and the following Theban
-  victories over Alexander of Pheræ. 3. The conspiracy of the
-  Orchomenian Knights, and the destruction of Orchomenus.
-
-  The year in which he places them is, the archonship of
-  Timokrates,—from Midsummer 364 to Midsummer 363 B.C.
-
-  That the destruction of Orchomenus occurred during the absence
-  of Epaminondas, and that he was greatly distressed at it on
-  his return,—is distinctly stated by Pausanias; who however is
-  (in my judgment) so far mistaken, that he refers the absence
-  of Epaminondas to that previous occasion when he had gone into
-  Thessaly to rescue Pelopidas from the dungeon of Alexander, 366
-  B.C.
-
-  This date is not so probable as the date assigned by Diodorus;
-  nor do the chronological conceptions of Pausanias seem to me
-  exact.
-
-On returning from his maritime expedition at the end of 363 B.C.,
-Epaminondas was reëlected one of the Bœotarchs. He had probably
-intended to renew his cruise during the coming year. But his
-chagrin for the Orchomenian affair, and his grief for the death of
-Pelopidas,—an intimate friend, as well as a political colleague whom
-he could trust,—might deter him from a second absence; while the
-affairs of Peloponnesus also were now becoming so complicated, as to
-render the necessity of renewed Theban interference again probable.
-
-Since the peace concluded in 366 B.C. with Corinth, Phlius, etc.,
-Thebes had sent no army into that peninsula; though her harmost
-and garrison still continued at Tegea, perhaps at Megalopolis and
-Messênê also. The Arcadians, jealous of her as well as disunited
-among themselves, had even gone so far as to contract an alliance
-with her enemy Athens. The main conflict however now was, between the
-Arcadians and the Eleians, respecting the possession of Triphylia
-and the Pisatid. The Eleians about this time (365 B.C.) came into
-alliance again with Sparta,[675] relinquishing their alliance with
-Thebes; while the Achæans, having come into vigorous coöperation with
-Sparta[676] ever since 367 B.C. (by reaction against the Thebans,
-who, reserving the judicious and moderate policy of Epaminondas,
-violently changed the Achæan governments), allied themselves with
-Elis also, in or before 365 B.C.[677] And thus Sparta, though
-robbed by the pacification of 366 B.C. of the aid of Corinth,
-Phlius, Epidaurus, etc., had now acquired in exchange Elis and
-Achaia,—confederates not less valuable.
-
-  [675] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 19.
-
-  [676] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 43.
-
-  [677] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 17.
-
-Triphylia, the territory touching the western coast of Peloponnesus,
-immediately north of the river Neda,—and the Pisatid (including
-the lower course of the river Alpheius and the plain of Olympia),
-immediately north of Triphylia,—both of them between Messenia and
-Elis,—had been in former times conquered and long held by the
-Eleians, but always as discontented subjects. Sparta, in the days of
-her unquestioned supremacy, had found it politic to vindicate their
-independence, and had compelled the Eleians, after a war of two or
-three years, to renounce formally all dominion over them.[678] No
-sooner, however, had the battle of Leuktra disarmed Sparta, than
-the Eleians reclaimed their lost dominion;[679] while the subjects
-on their side found new protectors in the Arcadians, and were even
-admitted, under pretence of kindred race, into the Pan-Arcadian
-confederacy.[680] The Persian rescript brought down by Pelopidas
-(367-366 B.C.) seems to have reversed this arrangement, recognizing
-the imperial rights of the Eleians.[681] But as the Arcadians had
-repudiated the rescript, it remained for the Eleians to enforce their
-imperial rights by arms, if they could. They found Sparta in the same
-interest as themselves; not only equally hostile to the Arcadians,
-but also complaining that she had been robbed of Messênê, as they
-complained of the loss of Triphylia. Sparta had just gained a slight
-advantage over the Arcadians, in the recapture of Sellasia; chiefly
-through the aid of a Syracusan reinforcement of twelve triremes,
-sent to them by the younger Dionysius, but with orders speedily to
-return.[682]
-
-  [678] Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 30, 31.
-
-  [679] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 2.
-
-  [680] Xen. Hellen. vii, 2, 26.
-
-  [681] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 38.
-
-  [682] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 12.
-
-Besides the imperial claims over Triphylia and the Pisatid, which
-thus placed Elis in alliance with Sparta and in conflict with
-Arcadia,—there was also a territory lying north of the Alpheius
-(on the hilly ground forming the western or Eleian side of Mount
-Erymanthus, between Elis and the north-western portion of Arcadia),
-which included Lasion and the highland townships called Akroreii, and
-which was disputed between Elis and Arcadia. At this moment, it was
-included as a portion of the Pan-Arcadian aggregate;[683] but the
-Eleians, claiming it as their own and suddenly marching in along with
-a body of Arcadian exiles, seized and occupied Lasion as well as some
-of the neighboring Akroreii. The Arcadians were not slow in avenging
-the affront. A body of their Pan-Arcadian militia called the epariti,
-collected from the various cities and districts, marched to Lasion,
-defeated the Eleian hoplites with considerable loss both of men and
-arms, and drove them out of the district. The victors recovered
-both Lasion and all the Akroreii, except Thraustus; after which they
-proceeded to the sacred ground of Olympia, and took formal possession
-of it, planting a garrison, protected by a regular stockaded circle,
-on the hill called Kronion. Having made good this position, they
-marched on even to the city of Elis itself, which was unfortified
-(though it had a tenable acropolis), so that they were enabled to
-enter it, finding no resistance until they reached the agora. Here
-they found mustered the Eleian horsemen and the chosen hoplites, who
-repulsed them with some loss. But Elis was in great consternation;
-while a democratical opposition now manifested itself against the
-ruling oligarchy,—seizing the acropolis in hopes of admitting the
-Arcadians. The bravery of the horsemen and hoplites, however, put
-down this internal movement, recovered the acropolis, and forced the
-malcontents, to the number of four hundred, to evacuate the city.
-Thus expelled, the latter seized and established themselves at Pylus
-(in the Eleian territory, about nine miles from Elis towards the
-Arcadian border[684]), where they were reinforced not only by a body
-of Arcadians, but also by many of their partisans who came from the
-city to join them. From this fortified post, planted in the country
-like Dekeleia in Attica, they carried on harassing war against the
-Eleians in the city, and reduced them after some time to great
-straits. There were even hopes of compelling the city to surrender,
-and a fresh invasion of the Arcadians was invited to complete the
-enterprise. The Eleians were only rescued by a reinforcement from
-their allies in Achaia, who came in large force and placed the city
-in safety; so that the Arcadians could do nothing more than lay waste
-the territory around.[685]
-
-  [683] It had been taken from Elis by Agis, at the peace of 399
-  B.C. after his victorious war (Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 31).
-
-  [684] Pausanias, vi, 22, 3.
-
-  [685] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 13-18; Diodor. xv, 77.
-
-Retiring on this occasion, the Arcadians renewed their invasion not
-long afterwards; their garrison still occupying Olympia, and the
-exiles continuing at Pylus. They now marched all across the country,
-even approaching Kyllênê, the harbor of Elis on the western sea.
-Between the harbor and the city, the Eleians ventured to attack them,
-but were defeated with such loss, that their general Andromachus (who
-had prompted the attack) fell upon his sword in despair. The distress
-of the Eleians became greater than ever. In hopes of drawing off
-the Arcadian invaders, they sent an envoy to Sparta, entreating that
-the Lacedæmonians would make a diversion on their side of Arcadia.
-Accordingly, the Spartan prince Archidamus (son of king Agesilaus),
-invading the south-western portion of Arcadia, occupied a hill-town
-or post called Kromnus (seemingly in the territory of Megalopolis,
-and cutting off the communication between that city and Messênê),
-which he fortified and garrisoned with about two hundred Spartans and
-Periœki. The effect which the Eleians contemplated was produced. The
-Arcadian army (except the garrison of Olympia) being withdrawn home,
-they had leisure to act against Pylus. The Pylian exiles had recently
-made an abortive attempt upon Thalamæ, on their return from which
-they were overtaken and worsted by the Eleians, with severe loss in
-killed, and two hundred of their number ultimately made prisoners.
-Among these latter, all the Eleian exiles were at once put to death;
-all the remainder sold for slaves.[686]
-
-  [686] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 26.
-
-Meanwhile the main Arcadian force, which had returned from Elis,
-was joined by allies,—Thebans,[687] Argeians, and Messenians,—and
-marched at once to Kromnus. They there blocked up the Lacedæmonian
-garrison by a double palisade carried all around, which they kept
-a numerous force to occupy. In vain did Archidamus attempt to draw
-them off, by carrying his devastations into the Skiritis and other
-portions of Arcadia; for the Skiritæ, in former days dependents of
-Sparta and among the most valuable constituents of the Lacedæmonian
-armies,[688] had now become independent Arcadians. The blockade was
-still continued without interruption. Archidamus next tried to get
-possession of a hill-top which commanded the Arcadian position. But
-in marching along the road up, he encountered the enemy in great
-force, and was repulsed with some loss; himself being thrust through
-the thigh with a spear, and his relatives Polyænidas and Chilon
-slain.[689] The Lacedæmonian troops retreated for some space into
-a wider breadth of ground, where they were again formed in battle
-order, yet greatly discouraged both by the repulse and by the
-communication of the names of the slain, who were among the most
-distinguished soldiers of Sparta. The Arcadians on the contrary were
-advancing to the charge in high spirits, when an ancient Spartan,
-stepping forth from the ranks, shouted with a loud voice “What
-need to fight, gentlemen? Is it not better to conclude a truce and
-separate?” Both armies accepted the proposition joyfully. The truce
-was concluded; the Lacedæmonians took up their dead and retired: the
-Arcadians also retreated to the spot where they had gained their
-advantage, and there erected their trophy.[690]
-
-  [687] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 27.
-
-  The Thebans who are here mentioned must have been soldiers in
-  garrison at Tegea, Megalopolis, or Messênê. No fresh Theban
-  troops had come into Peloponnesus.
-
-  [688] Thucyd. v, 68; Xen. Rep. Laced, xii, 3; xiii, 6.
-
-  [689] The seizure of Kromnus by the Lacedæmonians, and the wound
-  received by Archidamus, are alluded to by Justin, vi, 6.
-
-  [690] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 20-25. Ὡς δὲ, πλησίον ὄντων, ἀναβοήσας
-  τις τῶν πρεσβυτέρων εἶπε—Τί δεῖ ἡμᾶς, ὦ ἄνδρες, μάχεσθαι, ἀλλ’
-  οὐ σπεισαμένους διαλυθῆναι; ἄσμενοι δὴ ἀμφότεροι ἀκούσαντες,
-  ἐσπείσαντο.
-
-Under the graphic description here given by Xenophon, seems to be
-concealed a defeat of the Lacedæmonians more serious than he likes to
-enunciate. The Arcadians completely gained their point, by continuing
-the blockade without interruption. One more attempt was made by the
-Lacedæmonians for the relief of their countrymen. Suddenly assailing
-the palisade at night, they succeeded in mastering the portion
-of it guarded by the Argeians.[691] They broke down an opening,
-and called to the besieged to hasten out. But the relief had come
-unexpected, so that only a few of those near at hand could profit by
-it to escape. The Arcadians, hurrying to the spot in large force,
-drove off the assailants and reënclosed the besieged, who were soon
-compelled to surrender for want of provisions. More than a hundred
-prisoners, Spartans and Periœki together, were distributed among the
-captors,—Argeians, Thebans, Arcadians, and Messenians,—one share to
-each.[692] Sixty years before, the capture of two hundred and twenty
-Spartans and Lacedæmonians in Sphakteria, by Kleon and Demosthenes,
-had excited the extreme of incredulous wonder throughout all Greece;
-emphatically noted by the impartial Thucydides.[693] Now, not a trace
-of such sentiment appears, even in the philo-Laconian Xenophon. So
-sadly had Spartan glory declined!
-
-  [691] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 27. The conjecture of Palmerius,—τοῦ
-  κατὰ τοὺς Ἀργείους,—seems here just and necessary.
-
-  [692] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 27.
-
-  [693] Thucyd. iv, 40.
-
-Having thus put an end to the Spartan attack, the Arcadians resumed
-their aggression against Elis, in conjunction with a new project of
-considerable moment. It was now the spring immediately preceding the
-celebration of the great quadrennial Olympic festival, which came
-about midsummer. The presidency over this sacred ceremony had long
-been the cherished privilege of the Eleians, who had acquired it when
-they conquered the Pisatans—the inhabitants of the region immediately
-around Olympia, and the first curators of the festival in its most
-primitive state. These Pisatans, always reluctant subjects of Elis,
-had never lost the conviction that the presidency of the festival
-belonged to them of right; and had entreated Sparta to restore to
-them their right, thirty-five years before, when Agis as conqueror
-imposed terms of peace upon the Eleians.[694] Their request had
-been then declined, on the ground that they were too poor and rude
-to do worthy honor to the ceremony. But on now renewing it, they
-found the Arcadians more compliant than the Spartans had been. The
-Arcadian garrison, which had occupied the sacred plain of Olympia
-for more than a year, being strongly reinforced, preparation was
-made for celebrating the festival by the Pisatans under Arcadian
-protection.[695] The Grecian states would receive with surprise, on
-this occasion, two distinct notices from official heralds, announcing
-to them the commencement of the hieromenia or sacred season, and
-the precise day when the ceremonies would begin: for doubtless the
-Eleians, though expelled by force from Olympia, still asserted their
-rights and sent round their notices as usual.
-
-  [694] Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 31.
-
-  [695] Xen. Hellen. vii, 2, 29. Compare Pausanias, vi, 22, 2.
-
-It was evident that this memorable plain, consecrated as it was to
-Hellenic brotherhood and communion, would on the present occasion be
-dishonored by dispute and perhaps by bloodshed: for the Arcadians
-summoned to the spot, besides their own military strength, a
-considerable body of allies: two thousand hoplites from Argos,
-and four hundred horsemen from Athens. So imposing a force being
-considered sufficient to deter the unwarlike Eleians from any idea of
-asserting their rights by arms, the Arcadians and Pisatans began the
-festival with its ordinary routine of sacrifice and matches. Having
-gone through the chariot-race, they entered upon the pentathlon, or
-quintuple contest, wherein the running match and the wrestling-match
-came first in order. The running-match had already been completed,
-and those who had been successful enough in it to go on contending
-for the prize in the other four points, had begun to wrestle in the
-space between the stadium and the great altar,[696]—when suddenly the
-Eleians were seen entering the sacred ground in arms, accompanied
-by their allies the Achæans, and marching up to the opposite bank
-of the little river Kladeus,—which flowed at a little distance to
-the westward of the Altis, or interior enclosed precinct of Zeus,
-falling afterwards into the Alpheius. Upon this the Arcadians drew
-up in armed order, on their own side of the Kladeus, to resist the
-farther approach of the Eleians.[697] The latter, with a boldness
-for which no one gave them credit, forded the rivulet, headed by
-Stratolas with his chosen band of three hundred, and vigorously
-charged first the Arcadians, next the Argeians; both of whom were
-defeated and driven back. The victorious Eleians forced their way
-into the Altis, and pressed forward to reach the great altar. But at
-every step of their advance the resistance became stronger, aided as
-it was by numerous buildings,—the senate-house, the temple of Zeus,
-and various porticos,—which both deranged their ranks, and furnished
-excellent positions of defence for darters and archers on the roofs.
-Stratolas was here slain; while his troops, driven out of the sacred
-ground, were compelled to recross the Kladeus. The festival was then
-resumed and prosecuted in its usual order. But the Arcadians were so
-afraid of a renewed attack on the following day, that they not only
-occupied the roofs of all the buildings more completely than before,
-but passed the night in erecting a palisade of defence; tearing down
-for that purpose the temporary booths which had been carefully put up
-to accommodate the crowd of visitors.[698] Such precautions rendered
-the place unassailable, so that the Eleians were obliged to return
-home on the next day; not without sympathy and admiration among many
-of the Greeks, for the unwonted boldness which they had displayed.
-They revenged themselves by pronouncing the 104th Olympiad to be no
-Olympiad at all, and by registering it as such in their catalogue,
-when they regained power; preserving however the names of those who
-had been proclaimed victors, which appeared in the lists like the
-rest.[699]
-
-  [696] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 29. Καὶ τὴν μὲν ἱπποδρομίαν ἤδη
-  ἐπεποιήκεσαν, καὶ τὰ δρομικὰ τοῦ πεντάθλου· οἱ δ’ εἰς πάλην
-  ἀφικόμενοι ~οὐκέτι ἐν τῷ δρόμῳ~, ἀλλὰ μεταξὺ τοῦ δρόμου καὶ τοῦ
-  βωμοῦ ἐπάλαιον. ~Οἱ γὰρ Ἠλεῖοι~ παρῆσαν ἤδη, etc.
-
-  Diodorus erroneously represents (xv, 78) the occurrence as if the
-  Eleians had been engaged in celebrating the festival, and as if
-  the Pisatans and Arcadians had marched up and attacked them while
-  doing so. The Eleians were really the assailants.
-
-  [697] Xen. Hellen. _l. c._ Οἱ γὰρ Ἠλεῖοι παρῆσαν σὺν τοῖς ὅπλοις
-  ~εἰς τὸ τέμενος~. Οἱ δὲ Ἀρκάδες ποῤῥωτέρω μὲν οὐκ ἀπήντησαν, ἐπὶ
-  δὲ τοῦ Κλαδάου ποτάμου παρετάξαντο, ὃς παρὰ τὴν Ἄλτιν καταῤῥέων
-  εἰς τὸν Ἄλφειον ἐμβάλλει. Καὶ μὴν ~οἱ Ἠλεῖοι τἀπὶ θάτερα τοῦ
-  ποτάμου παρετάξαντο~, σφαγιασάμενοι δὲ εὐθὺς ἐχώρουν.
-
-  The τέμενος must here be distinguished from the Altis; as meaning
-  the entire breadth of consecrated ground at Olympia, of which the
-  Altis formed a smaller interior portion enclosed with a wall. The
-  Eleians entered into the τέμενος before they crossed the river
-  Kladeus, which flowed _through_ the τέμενος, but _alongside_ of
-  the Altis. The tomb of Œnomaus, which was doubtless included in
-  the τέμενος, was on the right bank of the Kladeus (Pausan. vi,
-  21, 3); while the Altis was on the left bank of the river.
-
-  Colonel Leake (in his Peloponnesiaca, pp. 6, 107) has given a
-  copious and instructive exposition of the ground of Olympia,
-  as well as of the notices left by Pausanias respecting it.
-  Unfortunately, little can be made out certainly, except the
-  position of the great temple of Zeus in the Altis. Neither the
-  positions assigned to the various buildings, the Stadion, or
-  the Hippodrome, by Colonel Leake,—nor those proposed by Kiepert
-  in the plan comprised in his maps—nor by Ernst Curtius, in
-  the Plan annexed to his recent Dissertation called _Olympia_
-  (Berlin, 1852)—rest upon very sufficient evidence. Perhaps future
-  excavations may hereafter reveal much that is now unknown.
-
-  I cannot agree with Colonel Leake however in supposing that Pisa
-  was at any time a _city_, and afterwards deserted.
-
-  [698] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4. 32. ὥστε οὐδ’ ἀνεπαύσαντο τῆς νυκτὸς
-  ἐκκόπτοντες τὰ διαπεπονημένα σκηνώματα, etc.
-
-  [699] Diodor. xv, 78; Pausanias, vi, 8, 2.
-
-Such was the unholy combat which dishonored the sanctuary of
-Pan-hellenic brotherhood, and in which the great temple, with its
-enthroned inmate the majestic Zeus of Pheidias, was for the first
-time turned into a fortress against its habitual presidents the
-Eleians. It was a combat wherein, though both Thebes and Sparta, the
-competing leaders of Greece, stand clear, Athens as well as most of
-the Peloponnesian chief states were implicated. It had been brought
-on by the rapacious ambition of the Arcadians, and its result seemed
-to confirm them, under color of Pisatan presidency, in the permanent
-mastery of Olympia. But in spite of such apparent promise, it was
-an event which carried in itself the seeds of violent reaction. We
-cannot doubt that the crowd of Grecian spectators present were not
-merely annoyed by the interruption of the proceedings and by the
-demolition of their tents, but also deeply shocked by the outrage
-to the sacred ground,—“imminentium templorum religio.”[700] Most of
-them probably believed the Eleians to be the rightful presidents,
-having never either seen or heard of any one else in that capacity.
-And they could hardly help feeling strong sympathy for the unexpected
-courage of these dispossessed presidents; which appeared so striking
-to Xenophon (himself perhaps a spectator) that he ascribes it to a
-special inspiration of the gods.[701]
-
-  [700] Tacitus, Hist. i, 40. He is describing the murder of Galba
-  in the Forum at Rome, by the Othonian soldiers:—
-
-  “Igitur milites Romani, quasi Vologesen aut Pacorum avito
-  Arsacidarum solio depulsuri, ac non Imperatorem suum, inermem et
-  senem, trucidare pergerent—disjectâ plebe, proculcato Senatu,
-  truces armis, rapidis equis, forum irrumpunt: nec illos Capitolii
-  aspectus, et imminentium templorum religio, et priores et futuri
-  Principes, terruere, quominus facerent scelus, cujus ultor est
-  quisquis successit.”
-
-  [701] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 32.
-
-If they disapproved of the conduct of the Arcadians and Pisatans
-as an unjust intrusion, they would disapprove yet more of that
-spoliation of the rich temples at Olympia, whereby the intruders
-rewarded themselves. The Arcadians, always on the look-out for
-plunder and pay as mercenary soldiers, found themselves supplied with
-both, in abundant measure, from this war: the one from the farms, the
-stock, and the field-laborers, of the Eleian neighborhood generally,
-more plentiful than in any part of Peloponnesus;[702] the other from
-the ample accumulation, both of money and of precious offerings,
-distributed over the numerous temples at Olympia. The Pisatans, now
-installed as administrators, would readily consent to appropriate
-these treasures to the pay of their own defenders, whom they
-doubtless considered as acting in the service of the Olympian Zeus.
-Accordingly the Epariti, the militia of joint Arcadia, were better
-paid than ever they had been before so that the service attracted
-numerous volunteers of the poorer class.[703]
-
-  [702] Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 20; Polybius, iv, 73.
-
-  [703] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 33, 34.
-
-At the outset of the Peloponnesian war, the Corinthians and Spartans
-had talked of prosecuting it in part by borrowed money from the
-treasuries of Delphi and Olympia.[704] How far the project had
-ever been executed, we have no information. But at least, it had
-not been realized in any such way as to form a precedent for the
-large sums now appropriated by the Pisatans and Arcadians; which
-appropriation accordingly excited much outcry, as flagrant rapacity
-and sacrilege. This sentiment was felt with peculiar force among
-many even of the Arcadians themselves, the guilty parties. Moreover
-some of the leaders employed had made important private acquisitions
-for themselves, so as to provoke both resentment and jealousy among
-their rivals. The Pan-Arcadian communion, recently brought together
-and ill-cemented, was little calculated to resist the effect of any
-strong special cause of dissension. It was composed of cities which
-had before been accustomed to act apart and even in hostility to each
-other; especially Mantinea and Tegea. These two cities now resumed
-their ancient rivalry.[705] The Mantineans, jealous both of Tegea
-and Megalopolis, began to labor underhand against Arcadian unity
-and the Theban alliance,—with a view to renewed connection with
-Sparta; though only five years before, they had owed to Thebes the
-reëstablishment of their own city, after it had been broken up into
-villages by Spartan force. The appropriation of the sacred funds,
-offensive as it was to much of sincere sentiment, supplied them with
-a convenient ground for commencing opposition. In the Mantinean
-assembly, a resolution was passed, renouncing all participation in
-the Olympic treasures; while at the same time an adequate sum was
-raised among the citizens, to furnish pay for all members of the
-Epariti who came from their city. This sum was forwarded to the
-officers in command; who however not only refused to receive it;
-but even summoned the authors of the proceeding to take their trial
-before the Pan-Arcadian assembly,—the Ten Thousand at Megalopolis,—on
-the charge of breaking up the integrity of Arcadia.[706] The
-Mantinean leaders thus summoned, having refused to appear, and
-being condemned in their absence by the Ten Thousand,—a detachment
-of the epariti was sent to Mantinea to secure their persons. But the
-gates were found shut, and the order was set at defiance. So much
-sympathy was manifested in Arcadia towards the Mantineans, that many
-other towns copied their protest. Nay, even the majority of the Ten
-Thousand themselves, moved by repeated appeals made to them in the
-name of the offended gods, were gradually induced to adopt it also,
-publicly renouncing and interdicting all farther participation in the
-Olympian treasures.
-
-  [704] Thucyd. i, 121.
-
-  Perikles in his speech at Athens alludes to this understood
-  purpose of the Spartans and their confederacy (Thucyd. i, 143).
-
-  [705] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 33, 34; Diodor. xv, 82; Pausanias,
-  vii, 8, 6.
-
-  [706] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 33. φάσκοντες αὐτοὺς λυμαίνεσθαι τὸ
-  Ἀρκαδικὸν, ἀνεκαλοῦντο εἰς τοὺς μυρίους τοὺς προστάτας αὐτῶν, etc.
-
-Here was a just point carried, and an important advantage gained,
-in desisting from a scandalous misappropriation. The party which
-had gained it immediately sought to push it farther. Beginning as
-the advocates of justice and of the Olympian Zeus, the Mantineans
-speedily pronounced themselves more clearly as the champions of
-oligarchy; friendly to Sparta and adverse to Thebes. Supplies from
-Olympia being no longer obtained, the means presently failed, of
-paying the epariti or public militia. Accordingly, such members
-of that corps as were too poor to continue without pay, gradually
-relinquished the service; while on the other hand, the more wealthy
-and powerful citizens, by preconcerted understanding with each other,
-enrolled themselves in large numbers, for the purpose of getting
-the national force out of the hands of the opposite party and into
-their own.[707] The leaders of that opposite party saw plainly,
-that this oligarchical movement would not only bring them to severe
-account for the appropriation of the sacred treasure, but would also
-throw Arcadia again into alliance with Sparta. Accordingly they sent
-intimation to the Thebans of the impending change of policy, inviting
-them to prevent it by an immediate expedition into Arcadia. Informed
-of this proceeding,[708] the opposite leaders brought it before the
-Pan-Arcadian assembly; in which they obtained a resolution, that
-envoys should be despatched to Thebes, desiring that no Theban army
-might enter into Arcadia until formally summoned,—and cancelling the
-preceding invitation as unauthorized. At the same time, the assembly
-determined to conclude peace with the Eleians, and to restore to them
-the locality of Olympia with all their previous rights. The Eleians
-gladly consented, and peace was accordingly concluded.[709]
-
-  [707] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 34.
-
-  [708] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 34. ~Οἱ δὲ τὰ κράτιστα τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ
-  βουλευόμενοι~ ἔπεισαν τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Ἀρκάδων, πέμψαντας πρέσβεις
-  εἰπεῖν τοῖς Θηβαίοις, etc.
-
-  The phrase here used by Xenophon, to describe the oligarchical
-  party, marks his philo-Laconian sentiment. Compare vii, 5, 1. οἱ
-  κηδόμενοι τῆς Πελοποννήσου, etc.
-
-  [709] Xen. Hellen. _l. c._
-
-The transactions just recounted occupied about one year and nine
-or ten months, from Midsummer 364 B.C. (the time of the battle at
-Olympia) to about April 362 B.C. The peace was generally popular
-throughout Arcadia, seemingly even among the cities which adhered to
-Thebes, though it had been concluded without consulting the Thebans.
-Even at Tegea, the centre of Theban influence, satisfaction was felt
-at the abandonment of the mischievous aggression and spoliation of
-Olympia, wherein the Thebans had had no concern. Accordingly when the
-peace, having been first probably sworn in other Arcadian cities,
-came to be sworn also at Tegea,—not only the city authorities, but
-also the Theban harmost, who occupied the town with a garrison of
-three hundred Bœotians, were present and took part in the ceremony.
-After it had been finished, most of the Mantineans went home; their
-city being both unfriendly to Tegea and not far distant. But many
-other Arcadians passed the evening in the town, celebrating the
-peace by libations, pæans, and feasting. On a sudden the gates were
-shut by order, and the most prominent of the oligarchical party
-were arrested as they sat at the feast, by the Bœotian garrison and
-the Arcadian Epariti of the opposite party. The leaders seized were
-in such considerable number, as to fill both the prison and the
-government-house; though there were few Mantineans among them, since
-most of these last had gone home. Among the rest the consternation
-was extreme. Some let themselves down from the walls, others escaped
-surreptitiously by the gates. Great was the indignation excited at
-Mantinea on the following morning, when the news of this violent
-arrest was brought thither. The authorities,—while they sent
-round the intelligence to the remaining Arcadian cities, inviting
-them at once to arms,—despatched heralds to Tegea, demanding all
-the Mantinean prisoners there detained. They at the same time
-protested emphatically against the arrest or the execution of any
-Arcadian, without previous trial before the Pan-Arcadian community;
-and they pledged themselves in the name of Mantinea, to answer
-for the appearance of any Arcadian against whom charges might be
-preferred.[710]
-
-  [710] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 37, 38.
-
-Upon receiving this requisition, the Theban harmost forthwith
-released all his prisoners. He then called together an
-assembly,—seemingly attended by only a few persons, from feelings of
-mistrust,[711]—wherein he explained that he had been misled, and that
-he had ordered the arrest upon a false report that a Lacedæmonian
-force was on the borders, prepared to seize the city in concert with
-treacherous correspondents within. A vote was passed accepting the
-explanation, though (according to Xenophon) no one believed it. Yet
-envoys were immediately sent to Thebes probably from the Mantineans
-and other Arcadians, complaining loudly of his conduct, and insisting
-that he should be punished with death.
-
-  [711] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 39. συγκαλέσας τῶν Ἀρκάδων ὁπόσοι γε
-  δὴ συνελθεῖν ἠθέλησαν, ἀπελογεῖτο, ὡς ἐξαπατηθείη.
-
-On a review of the circumstances, there seems reason for believing
-that the Theban officer gave a true explanation of the motives
-under which he had acted. The fact of his releasing the prisoners
-at the first summons, is more consistent with this supposition than
-with any other. Xenophon indeed says that his main object was to
-get possession of the Mantineans, and that, when he found but few
-of the latter among the persons seized, he was indifferent to the
-detention of the rest. But if such had been his purpose, he would
-hardly have set about it in so blind and clumsy a manner. He would
-have done it while the Mantineans were still in the town, instead of
-waiting until after their departure. He would not have perpetrated
-an act offensive as well as iniquitous, without assuring himself
-that it was done at a time when the determining purpose was yet
-attainable. On the other hand, nothing can be more natural than the
-supposition that the more violent among the Arcadian epariti believed
-in the existence of a plot to betray Tegea to the Lacedæmonians, and
-impressed the Theban with a persuasion of the like impending danger.
-To cause a revolution in Tegea, would be a great point gained for the
-oligarchical party, and would be rendered comparatively practicable
-by the congregation of a miscellaneous body of Arcadians in the
-town. It is indeed not impossible, that the idea of such a plot may
-really have been conceived; but it is at least highly probable, that
-the likelihood of such an occurrence was sincerely believed in by
-opponents.[712]
-
-  [712] The representation of Diodorus (xv, 82), though very loose
-  and vague, gives us to understand that the two opposing parties
-  at Tegea came to an actual conflict of arms, on occasion of the
-  peace.
-
-The explanation of the Theban governor, affirming that his order for
-arrest had either really averted, or appeared to him indispensable
-to avert, a projected treacherous betrayal,—reached Thebes at the
-same time as the complaints against him. It was not only received
-as perfectly satisfactory, but Epaminondas even replied to the
-complainants by counter-complaints of his own,—“The arrest (he said)
-was an act more justifiable than the release of those arrested.
-You Arcadians have already committed treason against us. It was on
-your account, and at your request, that we carried the war into
-Peloponnesus,—and you now conclude peace without consulting us! Be
-assured that we shall presently come in arms into Arcadia, and make
-war to support our partisans in the country.”[713]
-
-  [713] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 40.
-
-Such was the peremptory reply which the Arcadian envoy brought
-back from Thebes, announcing to his countrymen that they must
-prepare for war forthwith. They accordingly concerted measures for
-resistance with the Eleians and Achæans. They sent an invitation to
-the Lacedæmonians to march into Arcadia, and assist in repelling
-any enemy who should approach for the purpose of subjugating
-Peloponnesus,—yet with the proviso, as to headship, that each state
-should take the lead when the war was in its own territory; and they
-farther sent to solicit aid from Athens. Such were the measures taken
-by the Mantineans and their partisans, now forming the majority in
-the Pan-Arcadian aggregate, who (to use the language of Xenophon)
-“were really solicitous for Peloponnesus.”[714] “Why do these Thebans
-(said they) march into our country when we desire them not to come?
-For what other purpose, except to do us mischief? to make us do
-mischief to each other, in order that both parties may stand in need
-of _them_? to enfeeble Peloponnesus as much as possible, in order
-that they may hold it the more easily in slavery?”[715] Such is the
-language which Xenophon repeats, with a sympathy plainly evincing
-his philo-Laconian bias. For when we follow the facts as he himself
-narrates them, we shall find them much more in harmony with the
-reproaches which he puts into the mouth of Epaminondas. Epaminondas
-had first marched into Peloponnesus (in 369 B.C.) at the request
-of both Arcadians and Eleians, for the purpose of protecting them
-against Sparta. He had been the first to give strength and dignity
-to the Arcadians, by organizing them into a political aggregate, and
-by forming a strong frontier for them against Sparta, in Messênê and
-Megalopolis. When thus organized, the Arcadians had manifested both
-jealousy of Thebes, and incompetence to act wisely for themselves.
-They had caused the reversal of the gentle and politic measures
-adopted by Epaminondas towards the Achæan cities, whom they had thus
-thrown again into the arms of Sparta. They had, of their own accord,
-taken up the war against Elis and the mischievous encroachment
-at Olympia. On the other hand, the Thebans had not marched into
-Peloponnesus since 367 B.C.—an interval now of nearly five years.
-They had tried to persuade the Arcadians to accept the Persian
-rescript, and to desist from the idea of alliance with Athens; but
-when refused, they had made no attempt to carry either of these
-points by force. Epaminondas had a fair right now to complain of them
-for having made peace with Elis and Achaia, the friends and allies of
-Sparta, without any consultation with Thebes. He probably believed
-that there had been a real plot to betray Tegea to the Lacedæmonians,
-as one fruit of this treacherous peace; and he saw plainly that the
-maintenance of the frontier line against Sparta,—Tegea, Megalopolis,
-and Messênê,—could no longer be assured without a new Theban invasion.
-
-  [714] Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 1. Οἱ κηδόμενοι τῆς Πελοποννήσου.
-
-  [715] Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 2, 3.
-
-This appears to me the reasonable estimate of the situation in
-Peloponnesus, in June 362 B.C.—immediately before the last invasion
-of Epaminondas. We cannot trust the unfavorable judgment of Xenophon
-with regard either to this great man or to the Thebans. It will not
-stand good, even if compared with the facts related by himself; still
-less probably would it stand, if we had the facts from an impartial
-witness.
-
-I have already recounted as much as can be made out of the
-proceedings of the Thebans, between the return of Pelopidas from
-Persia with the rescript (in the winter 367-366 B.C.) to the close
-of 363 B.C. In 366-365 B.C., they had experienced great loss and
-humiliation in Thessaly connected with the detention of Pelopidas,
-whom they had with difficulty rescued from the dungeon of Pheræ. In
-364-363 B.C., Pelopidas had been invested with a fresh command in
-Thessaly, and though he was slain, the Theban arms had been eminently
-successful, acquiring more complete mastery of the country than
-ever they possessed before; while Epaminondas, having persuaded his
-countrymen to aim at naval supremacy, had spent the summer of 363
-B.C. as admiral of a powerful Theban fleet on the coast of Asia.
-Returning to Thebes at the close of 363 B.C., he found his friend
-Pelopidas slain; while the relations of Thebes, both in Peloponnesus
-and in Thessaly, were becoming sufficiently complicated to absorb
-his whole attention on land, without admitting farther aspirations
-towards maritime empire. He had doubtless watched, as it went on,
-the gradual change of politics in Arcadia (in the winter and spring
-of 363-362 B.C.), whereby the Mantinean and oligarchical party,
-profiting by the reaction of sentiment against the proceedings at
-Olympia, had made itself a majority in the Pan-Arcadian assembly
-and militia, so as to conclude peace with Elis, and to present the
-prospect of probable alliance with Sparta, Elis, and Achaia. This
-political tendency was doubtless kept before Epaminondas by the
-Tegean party in Arcadia, opposed to the party of Mantinea; being
-communicated to him with partisan exaggerations even beyond the
-reality. The danger, actual or presumed, of Tegea, with the arrest
-which had been there operated, satisfied him that a powerful Theban
-intervention could be no longer deferred. As Bœotarch, he obtained
-the consent of his countrymen to assemble a Bœotian force, to summon
-the allied contingents, and to conduct this joint expedition into
-Peloponnesus.
-
-The army with which he began his march was numerous and imposing.
-It comprised all the Bœotians and Eubœans, with a large number
-of Thessalians (some even sent by Alexander of Pheræ, who had now
-become a dependent ally of Thebes), the Lokrians, Malians, Ænianes,
-and probably various other allies from Northern Greece; though the
-Phokians declined to join, alleging that their agreement with Thebes
-was for alliance purely defensive.[716] Having passed the line of
-Mount Oneium,—which was no longer defended, as it had been at his
-former entrance,—he reached Nemea, where he was probably joined
-by the Sikyonian contingent,[717] and where he halted, in hopes
-of intercepting the Athenian contingent in their way to join his
-enemies. He probably had information which induced him to expect
-them;[718] but the information turned out false. The Athenians never
-appeared, and it was understood that they were preparing to cross
-by sea to the eastern coast of Laconia. After a fruitless halt,
-he proceeded onward to Tegea, where his Peloponnesian allies all
-presently joined him: the Arcadians of Tegea, Pallantium, Asea, and
-Megalopolis, the Messenians—(all these forming the line of frontier
-against Laconia)—and the Argeians.
-
-  [716] Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 5; Diodor. xv, 85.
-
-  [717] Diodor. xv, 85.
-
-  [718] The explanation which Xenophon gives of this halt at
-  Nemea,—as if Epaminondas was determined to it by a peculiar
-  hatred of Athens (Hellen. vii, 5, 6)—seems alike fanciful and
-  ill-tempered.
-
-The halt at Nemea, since Epaminondas missed its direct purpose,
-was injurious in another way, as it enabled the main body of his
-Peloponnesian enemies to concentrate at Mantinea; which junction
-might probably have been prevented, had he entered Arcadia without
-delay. A powerful Peloponnesian army was there united, consisting
-of the Mantineans with the major part of the other Arcadians,—the
-Eleians,—and the Achæans. Invitation had been sent to the Spartans;
-and old Agesilaus, now in his eightieth year, was in full march with
-the Lacedæmonian forces to Mantinea. Besides this, the Athenian
-contingent was immediately expected; especially valuable from its
-cavalry, since the Peloponnesians were not strong in that description
-of force,—some of them indeed having none at all.
-
-Epaminondas established his camp and place of arms within the walls
-of Tegea; a precaution which Xenophon praises, as making his troops
-more secure and comfortable, and his motions less observable by the
-enemy.[719] He next marched to Mantinea, to provoke the enemy to
-an action before the Spartans and Athenians joined; but they kept
-carefully on their guard, close to Mantinea, too strongly posted to
-be forced.[720] On returning to his camp in Tegea, he was apprised
-that Agesilaus with the Spartan force, having quitted Sparta on
-the march to Mantinea, had already made some progress and reached
-Pellênê. Upon this he resolved to attempt the surprise of Sparta
-by a sudden night-march from Tegea, which lay in the direct road
-from Sparta to Mantinea, while Agesilaus in getting from Sparta to
-Mantinea had to pursue a more circuitous route to the westward.
-Moving shortly after the evening meal, Epaminondas led the Theban
-force with all speed towards Sparta; and he had well-nigh come upon
-that town, “like a nest of unprotected young birds,” at a moment
-when no resistance could have been made. Neither Agesilaus, nor any
-one else, expected so daring and well-aimed a blow, the success of
-which would have changed the face of Greece. Nothing saved Sparta
-except the providential interposition of the gods,[721] signified
-by the accident that a Kretan runner hurried to Agesilaus, with the
-news that the Thebans were in full march southward from Tegea, and
-happened to arrest in time his farther progress towards Mantinea.
-Agesilaus instantly returned back with the troops around him to
-Sparta, which was thus put in a sufficient posture of defence before
-the Thebans arrived. Though sufficient for the emergency, however,
-his troops were not numerous; for the Spartan cavalry and mercenary
-forces were still absent, having been sent forward to Mantinea.
-Orders were sent for the main army at that city to hasten immediately
-to the relief of Sparta.[722]
-
-  [719] Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 8.
-
-  [720] Plutarch, De Gloriâ Athen. p. 346 B.
-
-  [721] Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 10. Καὶ εἰ μὴ Κρὴς, θείᾳ τινὶ μοίρᾳ
-  προσελθὼν, ἐξήγγειλε τῷ Ἀγησιλάῳ προσιὸν τὸ στράτευμα, ἔλαβεν ἂν
-  τὴν πόλιν ὥσπερ νεοττιὰν, παντάπασιν ἔρημον τῶν ἀμυνουμένων.
-
-  Diodorus coincides in the main fact (xv, 82, 83), though with
-  many inaccuracies of detail. He gives a very imperfect idea
-  of this narrow escape of Sparta, which is fully attested by
-  Xenophon, even against his own partialities.
-
-  Kallisthenes asserted that the critical intelligence had been
-  conveyed to Agesilaus by a Thespian named Euthynus (Plutarch,
-  Agesilaus, c. 34).
-
-  [722] Xenophon (Hellen. vii, 5, 10, 11) describes these facts
-  in a manner different on several points from Polybius (ix, 8),
-  and from Diodorus (xv, 83). Xenophon’s authority appears to me
-  better in itself, while his narrative is also more probable. He
-  states distinctly that Agesilaus heard the news of the Theban
-  march while he was yet at Pellênê (on the road to Mantinea, to
-  which place a large portion of the Spartan troops had already
-  gone forward),—that he turned back forthwith, and reached Sparta
-  before Epaminondas, with a division not numerous, yet sufficient
-  to put the town in a state of defence. Whereas Polybius affirms,
-  that Agesilaus heard the news when he was at Mantinea,—that he
-  marched from thence with the whole army to Sparta, but that
-  Epaminondas reached Sparta before him, had already attacked the
-  town and penetrated into the market-place, when Agesilaus arrived
-  and drove him back. Diodorus relates that Agesilaus never left
-  Sparta, but that the other king Agis, who had been sent with the
-  army to Mantinea, divining the plans of Epaminondas, sent word by
-  some swift Kretan runners to Agesilaus and put him upon his guard.
-
-  Wesseling remarks justly, that the mention of Agis must be a
-  mistake; that the second king of Sparta at that time was named
-  Kleomenes.
-
-  Polyænus (ii, 3, 10) states correctly that Agesilaus reached
-  Sparta before Epaminondas; but he adds many other details which
-  are too uncertain to copy.
-
-The march of Epaminondas had been undertaken only on the probability,
-well-nigh realized, of finding Sparta undefended. He was in no
-condition to assault the city, if tolerably occupied,—still less
-to spend time before it; for he knew that the enemy from Mantinea
-would immediately follow him into Laconia, within which he did not
-choose to hazard a general action. He found it impracticable to take
-this unfortified, yet unassailable city, Sparta, even at his former
-invasion of 370-369 B.C.; when he had most part of Peloponnesus in
-active coöperation with him, and when the Lacedæmonians had no army
-in the field. Accordingly, though he crossed the Eurotas and actually
-entered into the city of Sparta[723] (which had no walls to keep him
-out), yet as soon as he perceived the roofs manned with soldiers and
-other preparations for resistance, he advanced with great caution,
-not adventuring into the streets and amidst the occupied houses.
-He only tried to get possession of various points of high ground
-commanding the city, from whence it might be possible to charge down
-upon the defenders with advantage. But even here, though inferior in
-number they prevented him from making any impression. And Archidamus
-son of Agesilaus, sallying forth unexpectedly beyond the line of
-defence, with a small company of one hundred hoplites, scrambled over
-some difficult ground in his front, and charged the Thebans even up
-the hill, with such gallantry, that he actually beat them back with
-some loss; pursuing them for a space, until he was himself repulsed
-and forced to retreat.[724] The bravery of the Spartan Isidas, too,
-son of Phœbidas the captor of the Theban Kadmeia, did signal honor
-to Sparta, in this day of her comparative decline. Distinguished for
-beauty and stature, this youth sallied forth naked and unshielded,
-with his body oiled as in the palæstra. Wielding in his right hand
-a spear and in his left a sword, he rushed among the enemy, dealing
-death and destruction; in spite of which he was suffered to come back
-unwounded: so great was the awe inspired by his singular appearance
-and desperate hardihood. The ephors decorated him afterwards with a
-wreath of honor, but at the same time fined him for exposing himself
-without defensive armor.[725]
-
-  [723] Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 11. Ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐγένετο Ἐπαμινώνδας ~ἐν τῇ
-  πόλει~ τῶν Σπαρτιατῶν, etc.
-
-  [724] Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 12, 13.
-
-  Justin (vi, 7) greatly exaggerates the magnitude and violence of
-  the contest. He erroneously represents that Agesilaus did not
-  reach Sparta till after Epaminondas.
-
-  [725] Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 34.
-
-Though the Spartans displayed here an honorable gallantry, yet these
-successes, in themselves trifling, are magnified into importance only
-by the partiality of Xenophon. The capital fact was, that Agesilaus
-had been accidentally forewarned so as to get back to Sparta and put
-it in defence before the Thebans arrived. As soon as Epaminondas
-ascertained this, he saw that his project was no longer practicable;
-nor did he do more than try the city round, to see if he could detect
-any vulnerable point, without involving himself in a hazardous
-assault. Baffled in his first scheme, he applied himself, with equal
-readiness of resource and celerity of motion, to the execution of
-a second. He knew that the hostile army from Mantinea would be
-immediately put in march for Sparta, to ward off all danger from that
-city. Now the straight road from Mantinea to Sparta (a course nearly
-due south all the way) lying through Tegea, was open to Epaminondas,
-but not to the enemy, who would be forced to take another and more
-circuitous route, probably by Asea and Pallantion; so that he was
-actually nearer to Mantinea than they. He determined to return to
-Tegea forthwith, while they were on their march towards Sparta, and
-before they could be apprised of his change of purpose. Breaking
-up accordingly, with scarce any interval of rest, he marched back
-to Tegea; where it became absolutely indispensable to give repose
-to his hoplites, after such severe fatigue. But he sent forward
-his cavalry without any delay, to surprise Mantinea, which would
-be now (he well knew) unprepared and undefended; with its military
-force absent on the march to Sparta, and its remaining population,
-free as well as slave, largely engaged in the fields upon the
-carrying of harvest. Nothing less than the extraordinary ascendency
-of Epaminondas,—coupled with his earnestness in setting forth the
-importance of the purpose, as well as the probable plunder,—could
-have prevailed upon the tired horsemen to submit to such additional
-toil, while their comrades were enjoying refreshment and repose at
-Tegea.[726]
-
-  [726] Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 14. Πάλιν δὲ πορευθεὶς ὡς ἐδύνατο
-  τάχιστα εἰς τὴν Τεγέαν, τοὺς μὲν ὁπλίτας ἀνέπαυσε, τοὺς δὲ ἱππέας
-  ἔπεμψεν εἰς τὴν Μαντίνειαν, δεηθεὶς αὐτῶν προσκαρτερῆσαι, καὶ
-  διδάσκων ὡς πάντα μὲν εἰκὸς ἔξω εἶναι τὰ τῶν Μαντινέων βοσκήματα,
-  πάντας δὲ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, ἄλλως τε καὶ σίτου συγκομιδῆς οὔσης.
-
-Everything near Mantinea was found in the state which Epaminondas
-anticipated. Yet the town was preserved, and his well-laid scheme
-defeated, by an unexpected contingency which the Mantineans doubtless
-ascribed to the providence of the gods,—as Xenophon regards the
-previous warning given to Agesilaus. The Athenian cavalry had
-arrived, not an hour before, and had just dismounted from their
-horses within the walls of Mantinea. Having departed from Eleusis
-(probably after ascertaining that Epaminondas no longer occupied
-Nemea), they took their evening meal and rested at the isthmus
-of Corinth, where they seem to have experienced some loss or
-annoyance.[727] They then passed forward through Kleonæ to Mantinea,
-arriving thither without having broken fast, either themselves or
-their horses, on that day. It was just after they reached Mantinea,
-and when they had yet taken no refreshment,—that the Theban and
-Thessalian cavalry suddenly made their appearance, having advanced
-even to the temple of Poseidon, within less than a mile of the
-gates.[728]
-
-  [727] Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 15, 16.
-
-  The words—δυστυχήματος γεγενημένου ἐν Κορίνθῳ τοῖς
-  ἱππεῦσιν—allude to something which we have no means of making
-  out. It is possible that the Corinthians, who were at peace with
-  Thebes and had been ill-used by Athens (vii, 4, 6-10), may have
-  seen with displeasure, and even molested, the Athenian horsemen
-  while resting on their territory.
-
-  [728] Polybius, ix, 8.
-
-The Mantineans were terror-struck at this event. Their military
-citizens were absent on the march to Sparta, while the remainder
-were dispersed about the fields. In this helpless condition, they
-implored aid from the newly-arrived Athenian cavalry; who, though
-hungry and tired, immediately went forth,—and indeed were obliged
-to do so, since their own safety depended upon it. The assailants
-were excellent cavalry, Thebans and Thessalians, and more numerous
-than the Athenians. Yet such was the gallantry with which the
-latter fought, in a close and bloody action, that on the whole they
-gained the advantage, forced the assailants to retire, and had
-the satisfaction to preserve Mantinea with all its citizens and
-property. Xenophon extols[729] (and doubtless with good reason) the
-generous energy of the Athenians, in going forth hungry and fatigued.
-But we must recollect that the Theban cavalry had undergone yet
-more severe hunger and fatigue,—that Epaminondas would never have
-sent them forward in such condition, had he expected any serious
-resistance; and that they probably dispersed to some extent, for
-the purpose of plundering and seizing subsistence in the fields
-through which they passed, so that they were found in disorder when
-the Athenians sallied out upon them. The Athenian cavalry-commander
-Kephisodôrus,[730] together with Gryllus (son of the historian
-Xenophon), then serving with his brother Diodorus among the Athenian
-horse, were both slain in the battle. A memorable picture at Athens
-by the contemporary painter Euphranor, commemorated both the battle
-and the personal gallantry of Gryllus, to whose memory the Mantineans
-also paid distinguished honors.
-
-  [729] Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 15, 16, 17.
-
-  Plutarch (De Gloriâ Athen. p. 346 D.—E.) recounts the general
-  fact of this battle and the rescue of Mantinea; yet with several
-  inaccuracies which we refute by means of Xenophon.
-
-  Diodor. (xv, 84) mentions the rescue of Mantinea by the
-  unexpected arrival of the Athenians; but he states them as being
-  six thousand soldiers, that is hoplites, under Hegelochus; and
-  he says nothing about the cavalry battle. Hegesilaus is named by
-  Ephorus (ap. Diog. Laert. ii, 54,—compare Xenoph. De Vectigal.
-  iii, 7) as the general of the entire force sent out by Athens on
-  this occasion, consisting of infantry as well as cavalry. The
-  infantry must have come up somewhat later.
-
-  Polybius also (ix, 8), though concurring in the main with
-  Xenophon, differs in several details. I follow the narrative of
-  Xenophon.
-
-  [730] Harpokration v, Κηφισόδωρος, Ephorus ap. Diogen. Laert. ii,
-  53; Pausan. 1, 3, 4; viii, 9, 8; viii, 11, 5.
-
-  There is a confusion, on several points, between this cavalry
-  battle near Mantinea,—and the great or general battle, which
-  speedily followed it, wherein Epaminondas was slain. Gryllus is
-  sometimes said to have been slain in the battle of Mantinea, and
-  even to have killed Epaminondas with his own hand. It would seem
-  as if the picture of Euphranor represented Gryllus in the act
-  of killing the Theban commander; and as if the latter tradition
-  of Athens as well as of Thebes, erroneously bestowed upon that
-  Theban commander the name of Epaminondas.
-
-  See this confusion discussed and cleared up, in a good article
-  on the Battle of Mantinea, by Arnold Schäfer, p. 58, 59, in the
-  Rheinisches Museum für Philologie (1846—Fünfter Jahrgang, Erstes
-  Heft).
-
-Here were two successive movements of Epaminondas, both
-well-conceived, yet both disappointed by accident, without any
-omission of his own. He had his forces concentrated at Tegea, while
-his enemies on their side, returning from Sparta, formed a united
-camp in the neighborhood of Mantinea. They comprised Lacedæmonians,
-Eleians, Arcadians, Achæans, and Athenians; to the number, in all, of
-twenty thousand foot and two thousand horse, if we could trust the
-assertion of Diodorus;[731] who also gives the numbers of Epaminondas
-as thirty thousand foot and three thousand horse. Little value can be
-assigned to either of these estimates; nor is it certain which of the
-two armies was the more numerous. But Epaminondas saw that he had now
-no chance left for striking a blow except through a pitched battle,
-nor did he at all despair of the result.[732] He had brought out his
-northern allies for a limited time; which time they were probably not
-disposed to prolong, as the season of harvest was now approaching.
-Moreover, his stock of provisions was barely sufficient;[733] the new
-crop being not yet gathered in, while the crop of the former year was
-probably almost exhausted. He took his resolution therefore to attack
-the enemy forthwith.
-
-  [731] Diodor. xv, 84.
-
-  [732] Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 8. καὶ μὴν οἰόμενος κρείττων τῶν
-  ἀντιπάλων εἶναι, etc.
-
-  [733] Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 19. σπάνια δὲ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ἔχοντας
-  ὅμως πείθεσθαι ἐθέλειν, etc.
-
-But I cannot adopt the view of Xenophon, that such resolution was
-forced upon Epaminondas, against his own will, by a desperate
-position, rendering it impossible for him to get away without
-fighting,—by the disappointment of finding so few allies on his
-own side, and so many assembled against him,—and by the necessity
-of wiping off the shame of his two recent failures (at Sparta and
-at Mantinea) or perishing in the attempt.[734] This is an estimate
-of the position of Epaminondas, not consistent with the facts
-narrated by Xenophon himself. It could have been no surprise to the
-Theban general that the time had arrived for ordering a battle.
-With what other view had he come into Peloponnesus? Or for what
-other purpose could he have brought so numerous an army? Granting
-that he expected greater support in Peloponnesus than he actually
-found, we cannot imagine him to have hoped that his mere presence,
-without fighting, would suffice to put down enemies courageous as
-well as powerful. Xenophon exaggerates the importance of the recent
-defeats (as he terms them) before Sparta and Mantinea. These were
-checks or disappointments rather than defeats. On arriving at Tegea,
-Epaminondas had found it practicable (which he could not have known
-beforehand) to attempt a _coup de main_, first against Sparta, next
-against Mantinea. Here were accidental opportunities which his
-genius discerned and turned to account. Their success, so near to
-actual attainment, would have been a prodigious point gained;[735]
-but their accidental failure left him not worse off than he was
-before. It remained for him then, having the enemy before him in the
-field, and no farther opportunities of striking at them unawares by
-side-blows, to fight them openly; which he and all around him must
-have contemplated, from their first entrance into Peloponnesus, as
-the only probable way of deciding the contest.
-
-  [734] Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 18. αὐτὸς δὲ λελυμασμένος παντάπασι
-  τῇ ἑαυτοῦ δόξῃ ἔσοιτο, ἡττημένος μὲν ἐν Λακεδαιμόνι σὺν πολλῷ
-  ὁπλιτικῷ ὑπ’ ὀλίγων, ἡττημένος δὲ ἐν Μαντινείᾳ ἱππομαχίᾳ, αἴτιος
-  δὲ γεγενημένος διὰ τὴν ἐς Πελοπόννησον στράτειαν τοῦ συνεστάναι
-  Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ Ἀρκάδας καὶ Ἠλείους καὶ Ἀθηναίους· ὥστε οὐκ
-  ἐδόκει δυνατὸν εἶναι ἀμαχεὶ παρελθεῖν, etc.
-
-  [735] Polybius, ix. 8, 2.
-
-The army of Epaminondas, far from feeling that sentiment of
-disappointed hope and stern necessity which Xenophon ascribes to
-their commander, were impatient to fight under his orders, and full
-of enthusiastic alacrity when he at last proclaimed his intention.
-He had kept them within the walls of Tegea, thus not only giving
-them better quarters and fuller repose, but also concealing his
-proceedings from the enemy; who on their side were encamped on the
-border of the Mantinean territory. Rejoicing in the prospect of
-going forth to battle, the horsemen and hoplites of Epaminondas all
-put themselves in their best equipment. The horsemen whitened their
-helmets,—the hoplites burnished up their shields, and sharpened
-their spears and swords. Even the rustic and half-armed Arcadian
-villagers, who had nothing but clubs in place of sword or spear, were
-eager to share the dangers of the Thebans, and inscribed upon their
-shields (probably nothing but miserable squares of wood) the Theban
-ensign.[736] The best spirit and confidence animated all the allies,
-as they quitted the gates of Tegea, and disposed themselves in the
-order of march commanded by Epaminondas.
-
-  [736] Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 20. Προθύμως μὲν ἐλευκοῦντο οἱ ἱππεῖς
-  τὰ κράνη, κελεύοντος ἐκείνου· ἐπεγράφοντο δὲ καὶ οἱ τῶν Ἀρκάδων
-  ὁπλῖται, ῥόπαλα ἔχοντες, ὡς Θηβαῖοι ὄντες· πάντες δὲ ἠκονῶντο καὶ
-  λόγχας καὶ μαχαίρας, καὶ ἐλαμπρύνοντο τὰς ἀσπίδας.
-
-  There seems a sort of sneer in these latter words, both at the
-  Arcadians and Thebans. The Arcadian club-men are called ὁπλῖται;
-  and are represented as passing themselves off to be as good as
-  Thebans.
-
-  Sievers (Geschicht. p. 342) and Dr. Thirlwall (Hist. Gr. c. 40,
-  p. 200) follow Eckhel in translating this passage to mean that
-  “the Arcadian hoplites inscribed upon their shields the figure
-  of a club, that being the ensign of the Thebans.” I cannot think
-  this interpretation is the best,—at least until some evidence
-  is produced, that the Theban symbol on the shield was a club.
-  Xenophon does not disdain on other occasions to speak sneeringly
-  of the Theban hoplites,—see vii, 5, 12. The mention of λόγχας καὶ
-  μαχαίρας, immediately afterwards, sustains the belief that ῥόπαλα
-  ἔχοντες, immediately before, means “men armed with clubs”; the
-  natural sense of the words.
-
-  The horsemen are said to have “whitened their helmets (or
-  head-pieces).” Hence I presume that these head-pieces were not
-  made of metal, but of wood or wicker-work. Compare Xen. Hellen.
-  ii, 4, 25.
-
-The lofty Mantinico-Tegeatic plain, two thousand feet above the level
-of the sea (now known as the plain of Tripolitza)—“is the greatest
-of that cluster of valleys in the centre of Peloponnesus, each of
-which is so closely shut in by the intersecting mountains that no
-outlet is afforded to the waters except through the mountains
-themselves.”[737] Its length stretches from north to south, bordered
-by the mountain range of Mænalus on the west, and of Artemisium and
-Parthenion on the east. It has a breadth of about eight miles in the
-broadest part, and of one mile in the narrowest. Mantinea is situated
-near its northern extremity, Tegea near its southern; the direct
-distance between the two cities, in a line not much different from
-north and south, being about ten English miles. The frontier line
-between their two domains was formed by a peculiarly narrow part of
-the valley, where a low ridge projecting from the range of Mænalus on
-the one side, and another from Artemisium on the opposite, contract
-the space and make a sort of defensible pass near four miles south
-of Mantinea;[738] thus about six miles distant from Tegea. It was at
-this position, covering the whole Mantinean territory, that the army
-opposed to Epaminondas was concentrated; the main Lacedæmonian force
-as well as the rest having now returned from Sparta.[739]
-
-  [737] See Colonel Leake’s Travels in the Morea, vol. iii, ch. 24,
-  p. 45.
-
-  [738] Three miles from Mantinea (Leake, ib. p. 51-94) “a low
-  ridge of rocks, which, advancing into the plain from a projecting
-  part of the Mænalium, formed a natural division between the
-  districts of Tegea and Mantineia.”
-
-  Compare the same work, vol. i, ch. 3, p. 100, 112, 114, and the
-  recent valuable work of Ernst Curtius, Peloponnesos (Gotha,
-  1851), pp. 232-247. Gell says that a wall has once been carried
-  across the plain at this boundary (Itinerary of the Morea, p.
-  141-143).
-
-  [739] See the indications of the locality of the battle in
-  Pausanias, viii, 11, 4, 5; and Colonel Leake—as above referred to.
-
-Epaminondas, having marched out from Tegea by the northern gate,
-arrayed his army in columns proper for advancing towards the enemy;
-himself with the Theban columns forming the van. His array being
-completed, he at first began his forward march in a direction
-straight towards the enemy. But presently he changed his course,
-turning to the left towards the Mænalian range of mountains which
-forms the western border of the plain, and which he probably reached
-somewhere near the site of the present Tripolitza. From thence he
-pursued his march northward, skirting the flank of the mountain on
-the side which lies over against or fronts towards Tegea;[740] until
-at length he neared the enemy’s position, upon their right flank.
-He here halted, and caused his columns to face to the right; thus
-forming a line, or phalanx of moderate depth, fronting towards the
-enemy. During the march, each lochus or company had marched in single
-file with the lochage or captain (usually the strongest and best
-soldier in it), at the head; though we do not know how many of these
-lochages marched abreast, or what was the breadth of the column. When
-the phalanx or front towards the enemy was formed, each lochage was
-of course in line with his company, and at its left hand; while the
-Thebans and Epaminondas himself were at the left of the whole line.
-In this position, Epaminondas gave the order to ground arms.[741]
-
-  [740] Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 21.
-
-  Tripolitza is reckoned by Colonel Leake as about three miles and
-  a half from the site of Tegea; Mr. Dodwell states it as about
-  four miles, and Gell’s Itinerary of the Morea much the same.
-
-  Colonel Leake reckons about eight miles from Tripolitza to
-  Mantinea. Gell states it as two hours and three minutes, Dodwell
-  as two hours and five minutes,—or seven miles.
-
-  Colonel Leake, Travels in Morea, vol. i, p. 88-100; Gell’s
-  Itinerary, p. 141; Dodwell’s Travels, vol. ii, p. 418-422.
-
-  It would seem that Epaminondas, in this latter half of his march,
-  must have followed nearly the road from Mantinea to Pallantium.
-  Pallantium was situated west by south from Tegea.
-
-  [741] Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 22.
-
-The enemy, having watched him ever since he had left Tegea and formed
-his marching array, had supposed at first that he was coming straight
-up to the front of their position, and thus expected speedy battle.
-But when he turned to the left towards the mountains, so that for
-some time he did not approach sensibly nearer to their position, they
-began to fancy that he had no intention of fighting on that day.
-Such belief, having been once raised, still continued, even though,
-by advancing along the skirts of the mountain, he gradually arrived
-very close upon their right flank. They were farther confirmed in the
-same supposition, when they saw his phalanx ground arms; which they
-construed as an indication that he was about to encamp on the spot
-where he stood. It is probable that Epaminondas may have designedly
-simulated some other preliminaries of encampment, since his march
-from Tegea seems to have been arranged for the purpose partly of
-raising such false impression in his enemies, partly of getting upon
-their right flank instead of their front. He completely succeeded
-in his object. The soldiers on the Lacedæmonian side, believing
-that there would be no battle until the next day, suffered their
-ranks to fall into disorder, and scattered about the field. Many
-of the horsemen even took off their breast-plates and unbridled
-their horses. And what was of hardly less consequence,—that mental
-preparation of the soldier, whereby he was wound up for the moment of
-action, and which provident commanders never omitted, if possible, to
-inflame by a special harangue at the moment,—was allowed to slacken
-and run down.[742] So strongly was the whole army persuaded of the
-intention of Epaminondas to encamp, that they suffered him not only
-without hindrance, but even without suspicion, to make all his
-movements and dispositions preparatory to immediate attack.
-
-  [742] Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 22. Καὶ γὰρ δὴ, ὡς πρὸς τῷ ὄρει
-  ἐγένετο, ἐπεὶ ἐξετάθη αὐτῷ ἡ φάλαγξ, ὑπὸ τοῖς ὑψηλοῖς ἔθετο τὰ
-  ὅπλα· ὥστε εἰκάσθη στρατοπεδευομένῳ. Τοῦτο δὲ ποιήσας, ἔλυσε μὲν
-  τῶν πλείστων πολεμίων τὴν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς πρὸς μάχην παρασκευήν,
-  ἔλυσε δὲ τὴν ἐν ταῖς συντάξεσιν.
-
-Such improvidence is surprising, when we recollect that the ablest
-commander and the best troops in Greece were so close upon the right
-of their position. It is to be in part explained, probably, by the
-fact that the Spartan headship was now at an end, and that there was
-no supreme chief to whom the whole body of Lacedæmonian allies paid
-deference. If either of the kings of Sparta was present,—a point
-not distinctly ascertainable,—he would have no command except over
-the Lacedæmonian troops. In the entire allied army, the Mantineans
-occupied the extreme right (as on a former occasion, because the
-battle was in their territory,[743] and because the Lacedæmonians
-had lost their once-recognized privilege), together with the other
-Arcadians. On the right-centre and centre were the Lacedæmonians,
-Eleians, and Achæans; on the extreme left, the Athenians.[744] There
-was cavalry on both the wings; Athenian on the left,—Eleian on the
-right; spread out with no more than the ordinary depth, and without
-any intermixture of light infantry along with the horsemen.[745]
-
-  [743] Thucyd. v, 67; Pausanias, viii, 9, 5; viii. 10, 4.
-
-  [744] Diodor. xv. 85.
-
-  That the Athenians were on the left, we also know from Xenophon
-  (Hell. vii, 5, 24), though he gives no complete description of
-  the arrangement of the allies on either side.
-
-  [745] Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 23.
-
-In the phalanx of Epaminondas, he himself with the Thebans and
-Bœotians was on the left; the Argeians on the right; the Arcadians,
-Messenians, Eubœans, Sikyonians and other allies in the centre.[746]
-It was his purpose to repeat the same general plan of attack
-which had succeeded so perfectly at Leuktra; to head the charge
-himself with his Bœotians on the left against the opposing right
-or right-centre, and to bear down the enemy on that side with
-irresistible force, both of infantry and cavalry; while he kept
-back his right and centre, composed of less trustworthy troops,
-until the battle should have been thus wholly or partially decided.
-Accordingly, he caused the Bœotian hoplites,—occupying the left of
-his line in lochi or companies, with the lochage or captain at the
-left extremity of each,—to wheel to the right and form in column
-fronting the enemy, in advance of his remaining line. The Theban
-lochages thus became placed immediately in face of the enemy, as
-the heads of a column of extraordinary depth; all the hoplites of
-each lochus, and perhaps of more than one lochus, being ranged in
-file behind them.[747] What the actual depth was, or what was the
-exact number of the lochus, we do not know. At Leuktra, Epaminondas
-had attacked with fifty shields of depth; at Mantinea, the depth of
-his column was probably not less. Himself, with the chosen Theban
-warriors, were at the head of it, and he relied upon breaking through
-the enemy’s phalanx at whatever point he charged; since their files
-would hardly be more than eight deep, and very inadequate to resist
-so overwhelming a shock. His column would cut through the phalanx of
-the enemy, like the prow of a trireme impelled in sea-fight against
-the midships of her antagonist.
-
-  [746] Here again, we know from Xenophon that the Thebans were on
-  the left; but the general arrangement of the other contingents we
-  obtain only from Diodorus (xv, 85).
-
-  The Tactica of Arrian, also (xi, 2) inform us that Epaminondas
-  formed his attacking column, at Leuktra, of the Thebans—at
-  Mantinea, of all the Bœotians.
-
-  About the practice of the Thebans, both at and after the battle
-  of Leuktra, to make their attack with the left, see Plutarch.
-  Quæst. Roman. p. 282 D.
-
-  [747] Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 22. Ἐπεί γε μὴν, παραγαγὼν τοὺς ἐπὶ
-  κέρως πορευομένους λόχους εἰς μέτωπον, ἰσχυρὸν ἐποιήσατο τὸ περὶ
-  ἑαυτὸν ἔμβολον, τότε δὴ ἀναλαβεῖν παραγγείλας τὰ ὅπλα, ἡγεῖτο·
-  οἱ δ’ ἠκολούθουν ... Ὁ δὲ τὸ στράτευμα ἀντίπρωρον ὥσπερ τριήρη
-  προσῆγε, νομίζων, ὅπη ἐμβαλὼν διακόψειε, διαφθερεῖν ὅλον τὸ τῶν
-  ἐναντίων στράτευμα, etc.
-
-It was apparently only the Bœotian hoplites who were thus formed in
-column, projecting forward in advance; while the remaining allies
-were still left in their ordinary phalanx or lines.[748] Epaminondas
-calculated, that when he should have once broken through the enemy’s
-phalanx at a single point, the rest would either take flight, or
-become so dispirited, that his allies coming up in phalanx could
-easily deal with them.
-
-  [748] I agree with Folard (Traité de la Colonne, p. lv-lxi,
-  prefixed to the translation of Polybius) in considering
-  ἔμβολον to be a column,—rather than a wedge tapering towards
-  the front. And I dissent from Schneider’s explanation, who
-  says,—“Epaminondas phalangem contrahit sensim et colligit in
-  frontem, ut cunei seu rostri navalis formam efficeret. Copiæ
-  igitur ex utroque latere explicatæ transeunt in frontem; hoc
-  est, παράγειν εἰς μέτωπον.” It appears to me that the troops
-  which Epaminondas caused to wheel into the front and to form the
-  advancing column, consisted only of the left or Theban division,
-  the best troops in the army,—τῷ μὲν ἰσχυροτάτῳ παρεσκευάζετο
-  ἀγωνίζεσθαι, τὸ δὲ ἀσθενέστατον πόῤῥω ἀπέστησεν. Moreover,
-  the whole account of Xenophon implies that Epaminondas made
-  the attack from his own left against the enemy’s right, or
-  right-centre. He was afraid that the Athenians would take him in
-  flank from their own left.
-
-Against the cavalry on the enemy’s right, which was marshaled only
-with the ordinary depth of a phalanx of hoplites (four, six, or
-perhaps eight deep),[749] and without any light infantry intermingled
-with the ranks—the Theban general opposed on his left his own
-excellent cavalry, Theban and Thessalian, but in strong and deep
-column, so as to ensure to them also a superior weight of attack.
-He farther mingled in their ranks some active footmen, darters and
-slingers, of whom he had many from Thessaly and the Maliac Gulf.[750]
-
-  [749] Compare a similar case in Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 13, where
-  the Grecian cavalry, in the Asiatic army of Agesilaus, is said to
-  be drawn up ὥσπερ φάλαγξ ἐπὶ τεσσάρων, etc.
-
-  [750] These πέζοι ἅμιπποι—light-armed footmen, intermingled with
-  the ranks of the cavalry,—are numbered as an important item
-  in the military establishment of the Syracusan despot Gelon
-  (Herodot. vii. 158).
-
-There remained one other precaution to take. His deep Theban and
-Bœotian column, in advancing to the charge, would be exposed on its
-right or unshielded side to the attack of the Athenians, especially
-the Athenian cavalry, from the enemy’s left. To guard against any
-such movement, he posted, upon some rising ground near his right, a
-special body of reserve, both horse and foot, in order to take the
-Athenians in the rear if they should attempt it.
-
-All these fresh dispositions for attack, made on the spot, must have
-occupied time, and caused much apparent movement. To constitute
-both the column of infantry, and the column of cavalry, for attack
-on his left—and to post the body of reserve on the rising ground at
-his right against the Athenians—were operations which the enemy from
-their neighboring position could not help seeing. Yet they either did
-not heed, or did not understand, what was going on.[751] Nor was it
-until Epaminondas, perceiving all to be completed, actually gave the
-word of command to “take up arms,” that they had any suspicion of
-the impending danger. As soon as they saw him in full march moving
-rapidly towards them, surprise and tumultuous movement pervaded
-their body. The scattered hoplites ran to their places; the officers
-exerted every effort to establish regular array; the horsemen
-hastened to bridle their horses and resume their breast-plates.[752]
-And though the space dividing the two armies was large enough to
-allow such mischief to be partially corrected,—yet soldiers thus
-taken unawares, hurried, and troubled, were not in condition to stand
-the terrific shock of chosen Theban hoplites in deep column.
-
-  [751] Perhaps Epaminondas may have contrived in part to conceal
-  what was going on by means of cavalry-movements in his front.
-  Something of the kind seems alluded to by Polyænus (ii, 3, 14).
-
-  [752] Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 22.
-
-The grand force of attack, both of cavalry and infantry, which
-Epaminondas organized on his left, was triumphant in both its
-portions. His cavalry, powerfully aided by the intermingled darters
-and light troops from Thessaly, broke and routed the enemy’s cavalry
-opposed to them, and then restraining themselves from pursuit,
-turned to fall upon the phalanx of infantry. Epaminondas, on his
-part, with his Theban column, came into close conflict with the
-Mantinean and Lacedæmonian line of infantry, whom, after a desperate
-struggle of shield, spear, and sword, he bore down by superior force
-and weight. He broke through the enemy’s line of infantry at this
-point, compelling the Lacedæmonians opposed to him, after a brave
-and murderous resistance, to turn their backs and take to flight.
-The remaining troops of the enemy’s line, seeing the best portion of
-their army defeated and in flight, turned and fled also. The centre
-and right of Epaminondas, being on a less advanced front, hardly came
-into conflict with the enemy until the impression of his charge had
-been felt, and therefore found the troops opposed to them already
-wavering and disheartened. The Achæan, Eleian, and other infantry on
-that side, gave way after a short resistance; chiefly as it would
-appear, from contagion and alarm, when they saw the Lacedæmonians
-broken. The Athenians however, especially the cavalry, on the
-left wing of their own army, seem to have been engaged in serious
-encounter with the cavalry opposite to them. Diodorus affirms them
-to have been beaten, after a gallant fight,[753] until the Eleian
-cavalry from the right came to their aid. Here, as on many other
-points, it is difficult to reconcile his narrative with Xenophon, who
-plainly intimates that the stress of the action fell on the Theban
-left and Lacedæmonian right and centre,—and from whose narrative we
-should rather have gathered, that the Eleian cavalry, beaten on their
-own right, may have been aided by the Athenian cavalry from the left;
-reversing the statement of Diodorus.
-
-  [753] Diodor. xv, 85.
-
-  The orator Æschines fought among the Athenian hoplites on this
-  occasion (Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 300. c. 53.)
-
-In regard to this important battle, however, we cannot grasp with
-confidence anything beyond the capital determining feature and
-the ultimate result.[754] The calculations of Epaminondas were
-completely realized. The irresistible charge, both of infantry and
-cavalry, made by himself with his left wing, not only defeated the
-troops immediately opposed, but caused the enemy’s whole army to
-take flight. It was under these victorious circumstances, and while
-he was pressing on the retiring enemy at the head of his Theban
-column of infantry, that he received a mortal wound with a spear in
-the breast. He was by habit and temper, always foremost in braving
-danger, and on this day probably exposed himself preëminently, as
-a means of encouraging those around him, and ensuring the success
-of his own charge, on which so much depended; moreover, a Grecian
-general fought on foot in the ranks, and carried the same arms
-(spear, shield, etc.) as a private soldier. Diodorus tells us that
-the Lacedæmonian infantry were making a prolonged resistance, when
-Epaminondas put himself at the head of the Thebans for a fresh and
-desperate effort; that he stepped forward, darted his javelin,
-and slew the Lacedæmonian commander; that having killed several
-warriors, and intimidated others, he forced them to give way; that
-the Lacedæmonians, seeing him in advance of his comrades, turned upon
-him and overwhelmed him with darts, some of which he avoided, others
-he turned off with his shield, while others, after they had actually
-entered his body and wounded him, he plucked out and employed them
-in repelling the enemy. At length he received a mortal wound in his
-breast with a spear.[755] I cannot altogether admit to notice these
-details; which once passed as a portion of Grecian history, though
-they seem rather the offspring of an imagination fresh from the
-perusal of the Iliad than a recital of an actual combat of Thebans
-and Lacedæmonians, both eminent for close-rank fighting, with long
-spear and heavy shield. The mortal wound of Epaminondas, with a
-spear in the breast, is the only part of the case which we really
-know. The handle of the spear broke, and the point was left sticking
-in his breast. He immediately fell, and as the enemy were at that
-moment in retreat, fell into the arms of his own comrades. There was
-no dispute for the possession of his body, as there had been for
-Kleombrotus at Leuktra.
-
-  [754] The remark made by Polybius upon this battle deserves
-  notice. He states that the description given of the battle
-  by Ephorus was extremely incorrect and absurd, arguing great
-  ignorance both of the ground where it was fought and of
-  the possible movements of the armies. He says that Ephorus
-  had displayed the like incompetence also in describing the
-  battle of Leuktra; in which case, however, his narrative was
-  less misleading, because that battle was simple and easily
-  intelligible, involving movements only of one wing of each
-  army. But in regard to the battle of Mantinea (he says), the
-  misdescription of Ephorus was of far more deplorable effect;
-  because that battle exhibited much complication and generalship,
-  which Ephorus did not at all comprehend, as might be seen by any
-  one who measured the ground and studied the movements reported in
-  his narrative (Polybius, xii, 25).
-
-  Polybius adds that Theopompus and Timæus were as little to be
-  trusted in the description of land-battles as Ephorus. Whether
-  this remark has special application to the battle of Mantinea,
-  I do not clearly make out. He gives credit however to Ephorus
-  for greater judgment and accuracy, in the description of naval
-  battles.
-
-  Unfortunately, Polybius has not given us his own description of
-  this battle of Mantinea. He only says enough to make us feel how
-  imperfectly we know its details. There is too much reason to fear
-  that the account which we now read in Diodorus may be borrowed in
-  large proportion from that very narrative of Ephorus here so much
-  disparaged.
-
-  [755] Diodor. xv, 87. Cornelius Nepos (Epam. c. 9) seems to copy
-  the same authority as Diodorus, though more sparing of details.
-  He does not seem to have read Xenophon.
-
-  I commend the reader again to an excellent note of Dr. Arnold, on
-  Thucydides, iv, 11; animadverting upon similar exaggerations and
-  embellishments of Diodorus, in the description of the conduct of
-  Brasidas at Pylus.
-
-The news of his mortal wound spread like wild-fire through his
-army; and the effect produced is among the most extraordinary
-phenomena in all Grecian military history. I give it in the words
-of the contemporary historian. “It was thus (says Xenophon) that
-Epaminondas arranged his order of attack; and he was not disappointed
-in his expectation. For having been victorious, on the point where
-he himself charged, he caused the whole army of the enemy to take
-flight. But so soon as he fell, those who remained had no longer
-any power even of rightly using the victory. Though the phalanx
-of the enemy’s infantry was in full flight, the Theban hoplites
-neither killed a single man more, nor advanced a step beyond the
-actual ground of conflict. Though the enemy’s cavalry was also in
-full flight, yet neither did the Theban horsemen continue their
-pursuit, nor kill any more either of horsemen or of hoplites, but
-fell back through the receding enemies with the timidity of beaten
-men. The light troops and peltasts, who had been mingled with the
-Theban cavalry and had aided in their victory, spread themselves over
-towards the enemy’s left with the security of conquerors; but there
-(being unsupported by their own horsemen) they were mostly cut to
-pieces by the Athenians.”[756]
-
-  [756] Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 25. Τὴν μὲν δὴ συμβολὴν οὕτως
-  ἐποιήσατο, καὶ οὐκ ἐψεύσθη τῆς ἐλπίδος· ~κρατήσας γὰρ ἧ
-  προσέβαλεν, ὅλον ἐποίησε~ φεύγειν τὸ τῶν ἐναντίων. Ἐπεί γε μὴν
-  ἐκεῖνος ἔπεσεν, οἱ λοιποὶ οὐδὲ τῇ νίκῃ ὀρθῶς ἔτι ἐδυνάσθησαν
-  χρήσασθαι, ἀλλὰ φυγούσης μὲν αὐτοῖς τῆς ἐναντίας φάλαγγος, οὐδένα
-  ἀπέκτειναν οἱ ὁπλῖται, οὐδὲ προῆλθον ἐκ τοῦ χωρίου ἔνθα ἡ συμβολὴ
-  ἐγένετο· φυγόντων δ’ αὐτοῖς καὶ τῶν ἱππέων, ἀπέκτειναν μὲν οὐδὲ
-  οἱ ἱππεῖς διώκοντες οὔτε ἱππέας οὔθ’ ὁπλίτας, ὥσπερ δὲ ἡττώμενοι
-  πεφοβημένως διὰ τῶν φευγόντων πολεμίων διέπεσον. Καὶ μὴν οἱ
-  ἅμιπποι καὶ οἱ πελτασταὶ, συννενικηκότες τοῖς ἱππεῦσιν, ἀφίκοντο
-  μὲν ἐπὶ τοῦ εὐωνύμου, ὡς κρατοῦντες· ἐκεῖ δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων οἱ
-  πλεῖστοι αὐτῶν ἀπέθανον.
-
-Astonishing as this recital is, we cannot doubt that it is
-literally true, since it contradicts the sympathies of the
-reciting witness. Nothing but the pressure of undeniable evidence
-could have constrained Xenophon to record a scene so painful to
-him as the Lacedæmonian army beaten, in full flight, and rescued
-from destruction only by the untimely wound of the Theban general.
-That Epaminondas would leave no successor either equal or second
-to himself, now that Pelopidas was no more,—that the army which
-he commanded should be incapable of executing new movements or of
-completing an unfinished campaign,—we can readily conceive. But that
-on the actual battle-field, when the moment of dangerous and doubtful
-struggle has been already gone through, and when the soldier’s
-blood is up, to reap his reward in pursuit of an enemy whom he sees
-fleeing before him—that at this crisis of exuberant impatience, when
-Epaminondas, had he been unwounded, would have found it difficult to
-restrain his soldiers from excessive forwardness, they should have
-become at once paralyzed and disarmed on hearing of his fall,—this
-is what we could not have believed, had we not found it attested by
-a witness at once contemporary and hostile. So striking a proof has
-hardly ever been rendered, on the part of soldiers towards their
-general, of devoted and absorbing sentiment. All the hopes of this
-army, composed of such diverse elements, were centred in Epaminondas;
-all their confidence of success, all their security against defeat,
-were derived from the idea of acting under his orders; all their
-power, even of striking down a defeated enemy, appeared to vanish
-when those orders were withdrawn. We are not indeed to speak of such
-a proceeding with commendation. Thebes and her allied cities had
-great reason to complain of their soldiers, for a grave dereliction
-of military duty, and a capital disappointment of well-earned
-triumph,—whatever may be our feelings about the motive. Assuredly the
-man who would be most chagrined of all, and whose dying moments must
-have been embittered if he lived to hear it,—was Epaminondas himself.
-But when we look at the fact simply as a mark and measure of the
-ascendency established by him over the minds of his soldiers, it will
-be found hardly paralleled in history. I have recounted, a few pages
-ago, the intense grief displayed by the Thebans and their allies
-in Thessaly over the dead body of Pelopidas[757] on the hill of
-Kynoskephalæ. But all direct and deliberate testimonies of attachment
-to a dead or dying chief (and doubtless these too were abundant on
-the field of Mantinea) fall short of the involuntary suspension of
-arms in the tempting hour of victory.
-
-  [757] Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 33, 34.
-
-That the real victory, the honors of the day, belonged to Epaminondas
-and the Thebans, we know from the conclusive evidence of Xenophon.
-But as the vanquished, being allowed to retire unpursued, were only
-separated by a short distance from the walls of Mantinea, and perhaps
-rallied even before reaching the town,—as the Athenian cavalry had
-cut to pieces some of the straggling light troops,—they too pretended
-to have gained a victory. Trophies were erected on both sides.
-Nevertheless the Thebans were masters of the field of battle; so
-that the Lacedæmonians, after some hesitation, were forced to send a
-herald to solicit truce for the burial of the slain, and to grant for
-burial such Theban bodies as they had in their possession.[758] This
-was the understood confession of defeat.
-
-  [758] The statement of Diodorus (xv, 87) on this point appears to
-  me more probable than that of Xenophon (vii, 5, 26).
-
-  The Athenians boasted much of this slight success with their
-  cavalry, enhancing its value by acknowledging that all their
-  allies had been defeated around them (Plutarch, De Gloriâ Athen.
-  p. 350 A.).
-
-The surgeons, on examining the wound of Epaminondas, with the
-spear-head yet sticking in it, pronounced that he must die as soon as
-that was withdrawn. He first inquired whether his shield was safe;
-and his shield-bearer, answering in the affirmative, produced it
-before his eyes. He next asked about the issue of the battle, and
-was informed that his own army was victorious.[759] He then desired
-to see Iolaidas and Daiphantus, whom he intended to succeed him
-as commanders; but received the mournful reply, that both of them
-had been slain.[760] “Then (said he) you must make peace with the
-enemy.” He ordered the spear-head to be withdrawn, when the efflux of
-blood speedily terminated his life.
-
-  [759] Diodor. xv, 88; Cicero, De Finibus, ii, 30, 97; Epistol. ad
-  Familiares, v, 12, 5.
-
-  [760] Plutarch, Apophthegm. Regum, p. 194 C.; Ælian, V. H. xii, 3.
-
-  Both Plutarch and Diodorus talk of Epaminondas being carried back
-  to the _camp_. But it seems that there could hardly have been any
-  camp. Epaminondas had marched out only a few hours before from
-  Tegea. A tent may have been erected on the field to receive him.
-  Five centuries afterwards, the Mantineans showed to the traveller
-  Pausanias a spot called Skiopê near the field of battle, to which
-  (they affirmed) the wounded Epaminondas had been carried off, in
-  great pain, and with his hand on his wound—from whence he had
-  looked with anxiety on the continuing battle (Pausan. viii, 11,
-  4).
-
-Of the three questions here ascribed to the dying chief, the third
-is the gravest and most significant. The death of these two other
-citizens, the only men in the camp whom Epaminondas could trust,
-shows how aggravated and irreparable was the Theban loss, not indeed
-as to number, but as to quality. Not merely Epaminondas himself, but
-the only two men qualified in some measure to replace him, perished
-in the same field; and Pelopidas had fallen in the preceding year.
-Such accumulation of individual losses must be borne in mind when
-we come to note the total suspension of Theban glory and dignity,
-after this dearly-bought victory. It affords emphatic evidence of the
-extreme forwardness with which their leaders exposed themselves, as
-well as of the gallant resistance which they experienced.
-
-The death of Epaminondas spread rejoicing in the Lacedæmonian camp
-proportioned to the sorrow of the Theban. To more than one warrior
-was assigned the honor of having struck the blow. The Mantineans
-gave it to their citizen Machærion; the Athenians, to Gryllus son
-of Xenophon; the Spartans, to their countryman Antikrates.[761] At
-Sparta, distinguished honor was shown, even in the days of Plutarch,
-to the posterity of Antikrates, who was believed to have rescued the
-city from her most formidable enemy. Such tokens afford precious
-testimony, from witnesses beyond all suspicion, to the memory of
-Epaminondas.
-
-  [761] Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 35; Pausanias, i, 3, 3; viii, 9,
-  2-5; viii, 11, 4; ix, 15, 3.
-
-  The reports however which Pausanias gives, and the name of
-  Machærion which he heard both at Mantinea and at Sparta, are
-  confused, and are hardly to be reconciled with the story of
-  Plutarch.
-
-  Moreover, it would seem that the subsequent Athenians did not
-  clearly distinguish between the first battle fought by the
-  Athenian cavalry, immediately after their arrival at Mantinea,
-  when they rescued that town from being surprised by the Thebans
-  and Thessalians—and the general action which followed a few days
-  afterwards wherein Epaminondas was slain.
-
-How the news of his death was received at Thebes, we have no
-positive account. But there can be no doubt that the sorrow, so
-paralysing to the victorious soldiers on the field of Mantinea, was
-felt with equal acuteness, and with an effect not less depressing,
-in the senate-house and market-place of Thebes. The city, the
-citizen-soldiers, and the allies, would be alike impressed with the
-mournful conviction, that the dying injunction of Epaminondas must
-be executed. Accordingly, negotiations were opened, and peace was
-concluded,—probably at once, before the army left Peloponnesus.
-The Thebans and their Arcadian allies exacted nothing more than
-the recognition of the _statu quo;_ to leave everything exactly as
-it was, without any change or reactionary measure, yet admitting
-Megalopolis, with the Pan-Arcadian constitution attached to it,—and
-admitting also Messênê as an independent city. Against this last
-article Sparta loudly and peremptorily protested. But not one of her
-allies sympathized with her feelings. Some, indeed, were decidedly
-against her; to such a degree, that we find the maintenance of
-independent Messênê against Sparta ranking shortly afterwards as
-an admitted principle in Athenian foreign politics.[762] Neither
-Athenians, nor Eleians, nor Arcadians, desired to see Sparta
-strengthened. None had any interest in prolonging the war, with
-prospects doubtful to every one; while all wished to see the large
-armies now in Arcadia dismissed. Accordingly, the peace was sworn to
-on these conditions, and the autonomy of Messênê guaranteed, by all,
-except the Spartans; who alone stood out, keeping themselves without
-friends or auxiliaries, in the hope for better times,—rather than
-submit to what they considered as an intolerable degradation.[763]
-
-  [762] See the oration of Demosthenes on behalf of the
-  Megalopolitans (Orat. xvi, s. 10, p. 204; s. 21, p. 206).
-
-  [763] Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 35; Diodor. xv, 89; Polybius, iv,
-  33.
-
-  Mr. Fynes Clinton (Fasti Hellen. B.C. 361) assigns the
-  conclusion of peace to the succeeding year. I do not know however
-  what ground there is for assuming such an interval between the
-  battle and the peace. Diodorus appears to place the latter
-  immediately after the former. This would not count for much,
-  indeed, against any considerable counter-probability; but the
-  probability here (in my judgment) is rather in favor of immediate
-  sequence between the two events.
-
-Under these conditions, the armies on both sides retired. Xenophon
-is right in saying, that neither party gained anything, either city,
-territory, or dominion; though before the battle, considering the
-magnitude of the two contending armies, every one had expected
-that the victors, whichever they were, would become masters, and
-the vanquished, subjects. But his assertion,—that “there was more
-disturbance, and more matter of dispute, in Greece, after the battle
-than before it,”—must be interpreted, partly as the inspiration of
-a philo-Laconian sentiment, which regards a peace not accepted by
-Sparta as no peace at all,—partly as based on the circumstance,
-that no definite headship was recognized as possessed by any state.
-Sparta had once enjoyed it, and had set the disgraceful example of
-suing out a confirmation of it from the Persian king at the peace of
-Antalkidas. Both Thebes and Athens had aspired to the same dignity,
-and both by the like means, since the battle of Leuktra; neither
-of them had succeeded. Greece was thus left without a head, and
-to this extent the affirmation of Xenophon is true. But it would
-not be correct to suppose that the last expedition of Epaminondas
-into Peloponnesus was unproductive of any results,—though it was
-disappointed of its great and brilliant fruits by his untimely
-death. Before he marched in, the Theban party in Arcadia, (Tegea,
-Megalopolis, etc.), was on the point of being crushed by the
-Mantineans and their allies. His expedition, though ending in an
-indecisive victory, nevertheless broke up the confederacy enlisted
-in support of Mantinea; enabling Tegea and Megalopolis to maintain
-themselves against their Arcadian opponents, and thus leaving the
-frontier against Sparta unimpaired. While therefore we admit the
-affirmation of Xenophon,—that Thebes did not gain by the battle
-either city, or territory, or dominion,—we must at the same time add,
-that she gained the preservation of her Arcadian allies, and of her
-anti-Spartan frontier, including Messênê.
-
-This was a gain of considerable importance. But dearly, indeed, was
-it purchased, by the blood of her first hero, shed on the field of
-Mantinea; not to mention his two seconds, whom we know only from his
-verdict,—Daiphantus and Iolaidas.[764] He was buried on the field of
-battle, and a monumental column was erected on his tomb.
-
-  [764] Pausanias, viii, 11, 4, 5.
-
-Scarcely any character in Grecian history has been judged with
-so much unanimity as Epaminondas. He has obtained a meed of
-admiration,—from all, sincere and hearty,—from some, enthusiastic.
-Cicero pronounces him to be the first man of Greece.[765] The
-judgment of Polybius, though not summed up so emphatically in a
-single epithet, is delivered in a manner hardly less significant
-and laudatory. Nor was it merely historians or critics who formed
-this judgment. The best men of action, combining the soldier and
-the patriot, such as Timoleon and Philopœmen,[766] set before them
-Epaminondas as their model to copy. The remark has been often made,
-and suggests itself whenever we speak of Epaminondas, though its
-full force will be felt only when we come to follow the subsequent
-history,—that with him the dignity and commanding influence of Thebes
-both began and ended. His period of active political life comprehends
-sixteen years, from the resurrection of Thebes into a free community,
-by the expulsion of the Lacedæmonian harmost and garrison, and the
-subversion of the ruling oligarchy,—to the fatal day of Mantinea
-(379-362 B.C.). His prominent and unparalleled ascendency belongs
-to the last eight years, from the victory of Leuktra (371 B.C.).
-Throughout this whole period, both all that we know and all that we
-can reasonably divine, fully bears out the judgment of Polybius and
-Cicero, who had the means of knowing much more. And this too,—let it
-be observed,—though Epaminondas is tried by a severe canon: for the
-chief contemporary witness remaining is one decidedly hostile. Even
-the philo-Laconian Xenophon finds neither misdeeds nor omissions to
-reveal in the capital enemy of Sparta,—mentions him only to record
-what is honorable,—and manifests the perverting bias mainly by
-suppressing or slurring over his triumphs. The man whose eloquence
-bearded Agesilaus at the congress immediately preceding the battle
-of Leuktra,[767]—who in that battle stripped Sparta of her glory,
-and transferred the wreath to Thebes,—who a few months afterwards,
-not only ravaged all the virgin territory of Laconia, but cut off
-the best half of it for the restitution of independent Messênê,
-and erected the hostile Arcadian community of Megalopolis on its
-frontier,—the author of these fatal disasters inspires to Xenophon
-such intolerable chagrin and antipathy, that in the two first he
-keeps back the name, and in the third, suppresses the thing done.
-But in the last campaign, preceding the battle of Mantinea (whereby
-Sparta incurred no positive loss, and where the death of Epaminondas
-softened every predisposition against him), there was no such
-violent pressure upon the fidelity of the historian. Accordingly,
-the concluding chapter of Xenophon’s ‘Hellenica’ contains a
-panegyric,[768] ample and unqualified, upon the military merits of
-the Theban general; upon his daring enterprise, his comprehensive
-foresight, his care to avoid unnecessary exposure of soldiers, his
-excellent discipline, his well-combined tactics, his fertility of
-aggressive resource in striking at the weak points of the enemy,
-who content themselves with following and parrying his blows (to
-use a simile of Demosthenes[769]) like an unskilful pugilist, and
-only succeed in doing so by signal aid from accident. The effort of
-strategic genius, then for the first time devised and applied, of
-bringing an irresistible force of attack to bear on one point of
-the hostile line, while the rest of his army was kept comparatively
-back until the action had been thus decided,—is clearly noted by
-Xenophon, together with its triumphant effect, at the battle of
-Mantinea; though the very same combination on the field of Leuktra is
-slurred over in his description, as if it were so commonplace as not
-to require any mention of the chief with whom it originated. Compare
-Epaminondas with Agesilaus,—how great is the superiority of the
-first,—even in the narrative of Xenophon, the earnest panegyrist of
-the other! How manifestly are we made to see that nothing except the
-fatal spear-wound at Mantinea, prevented him from reaping the fruit
-of a series of admirable arrangements, and from becoming arbiter of
-Peloponnesus, including Sparta herself!
-
-  [765] Cicero, Tusculan. i, 2, 4; De Orator. iii, 34, 139.
-  “Epaminondas, princeps, meo judicio, Græciæ,” etc.
-
-  [766] Plutarch, Philopœmen, c. 3; Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 36.
-
-  [767] See the inscription of four lines copied by Pausanias from
-  the statue of Epaminondas at Thebes (Paus. ix, 16, 3):—
-
-    Ἡμετέραις βουλαῖς Σπάρτη μὲν ἐκείρατο δόξαν, etc.
-
-  [768] Xenoph. Hellen. vii, 5, 8, 9.
-
-  [769] Demosthenes, Philipp. I, p. 51, s. 46.
-
-The military merits alone of Epaminondas, had they merely belonged to
-a general of mercenaries, combined with nothing praiseworthy in other
-ways,—would have stamped him as a man of high and original genius,
-above every other Greek, antecedent or contemporary. But it is the
-peculiar excellence of this great man that we are not compelled
-to borrow from one side of his character in order to compensate
-deficiencies in another.[770] His splendid military capacity was
-never prostituted to personal ends: neither to avarice, nor ambition,
-nor overweening vanity. Poor at the beginning of his life, he left at
-the end of it not enough to pay his funeral expenses; having despised
-the many opportunities for enrichment which his position afforded,
-as well as the richest offers from foreigners.[771] Of ambition he
-had so little, by natural temperament, that his friends accused him
-of torpor. But as soon as the perilous exposure of Thebes required
-it, he displayed as much energy in her defence as the most ambitious
-of her citizens, without any of that captious exigence, frequent
-in ambitious men, as to the amount of glorification or deference
-due to him from his countrymen. And his personal vanity was so
-faintly kindled, even after the prodigious success at Leuktra, that
-we find him serving in Thessaly as a private hoplite in the ranks,
-and in the city as an ædile or inferior street-magistrate, under
-the title of Telearchus. An illustrious specimen of that capacity
-and goodwill, both to command and to be commanded, which Aristotle
-pronounces to form in their combination the characteristic feature
-of the worthy citizen.[772] He once incurred the displeasure of his
-fellow-citizens, for his wise and moderate policy in Achaia, which
-they were ill-judged enough to reverse. We cannot doubt also that
-he was frequently attacked by political censors and enemies,—the
-condition of eminence in every free state; but neither of these
-causes ruffled the dignified calmness of his political course. As he
-never courted popularity by unworthy arts, so he bore unpopularity
-without murmurs, and without angry renunciation of patriotic
-duty.[773]
-
-  [770] The remark of Diodorus (xv, 88) upon Epaminondas is more
-  emphatic than we usually find in him,—Παρὰ μὲν γὰρ ἑκάστῳ τῶν
-  ἄλλων ἓν ἂν εὕροι προτέρημα τῆς δόξης, παρὰ δὲ τούτῳ πάσας τὰς
-  ἀρετὰς ἠθροισμένας.
-
-  [771] Polybius, xxxii, 8, 6. Cornelius Nepos (Epaminondas, c.
-  4) gives one anecdote, among several which he affirms to have
-  found on record, of large pecuniary presents tendered to, and
-  repudiated by, Epaminondas; an anecdote recounted with so much
-  precision of detail, that it appears to deserve credit, though we
-  cannot assign the exact time when the alleged briber Diomedon of
-  Kyzicus, came to Thebes.
-
-  Plutarch (De Genio Socratis, p. 583 F.) relates an incident about
-  Jason of Pheræ tendering money in vain to Epaminondas, which
-  cannot well have happened before the liberation of the Kadmeia
-  (the period to which Plutarch’s dialogue assigns it), but may
-  have happened afterwards.
-
-  Compare Plutarch, Apophthegm. Reg. p. 193 C.; and Plutarch’s Life
-  of Fabius Maximus, c. 27.
-
-  [772] Aristotel. Politic. iii, 2, 10.
-
-  [773] Plutarch, Compar. Alkibiad. and Coriolanus, c. 4. Ἐπεὶ τό
-  γε μὴ λιπαρῆ μηδὲ θεραπευτικὸν ὄχλων εἶναι, καὶ Μέτελλος εἶχε
-  καὶ Ἀριστείδης καὶ Ἐπαμεινώνδας· ἀλλὰ τῷ καταφρονεῖν ὡς ἀληθῶς
-  ὧν δῆμός ἐστι καὶ δοῦναι καὶ ἀφελέσθαι κύριος, ἐξοστρακιζόμενοι
-  καὶ ἀποχειροτονούμενοι καὶ καταδικαζόμενοι πολλάκις οὐκ ὠργίζοντο
-  τοῖς πολίταις ἀγνωμονοῦσιν, ἀλλ’ ἠγάπων αὖθις μεταμελομένους καὶ
-  διηλλάττοντο παρακαλούντων.
-
-The mildness of his antipathies against political opponents at home
-was undeviating; and, what is even more remarkable, amidst the
-precedence and practice of the Grecian world, his hostility against
-foreign enemies, Bœotian dissentients, and Theban exiles, was
-uniformly free from reactionary vengeance. Sufficient proofs have
-been adduced in the preceding pages of this rare union of attributes
-in the same individual; of lofty disinterestedness, not merely
-as to corrupt gains, but as to the more seductive irritabilities
-of ambition, combined with a just measure of attachment towards
-partisans, and unparalleled gentleness towards enemies. His
-friendship with Pelopidas was never disturbed during the fifteen
-years of their joint political career; an absence of jealousy signal
-and creditable to both, though most creditable to Pelopidas, the
-richer, as well as the inferior, man of the two. To both, and to
-the harmonious coöperation of both, Thebes owed her short-lived
-splendor and ascendency. Yet when we compare the one with the other,
-we not only miss in Pelopidas the transcendent strategic genius and
-conspicuous eloquence, but even the constant vigilance and prudence,
-which never deserted his friend. If Pelopidas had had Epaminondas as
-his companion in Thessaly, he would hardly have trusted himself to
-the good faith, nor tasted the dungeon, of the Pheræan Alexander; nor
-would he have rushed forward to certain destruction, in a transport
-of phrensy, at the view of that hated tyrant in the subsequent battle.
-
-In eloquence, Epaminondas would doubtless have found superiors at
-Athens; but at Thebes, he had neither equal, nor predecessor, nor
-successor. Under the new phase into which Thebes passed by the
-expulsion of the Lacedæmonians out of the Kadmeia, such a gift was
-second in importance only to the great strategic qualities; while
-the combination of both elevated their possessor into the envoy,
-the counsellor, the debater, of his country,[774] as well as her
-minister at war and commander-in-chief. The shame of acknowledging
-Thebes as leading state in Greece, embodied in the current phrases
-about Bœotian stupidity, would be sensibly mitigated, when her
-representative in an assembled congress spoke with the flowing
-abundance of the Homeric Odysseus, instead of the loud, brief, and
-hurried bluster of Menelaus.[775] The possession of such eloquence,
-amidst the uninspiring atmosphere of Thebes, implied far greater
-mental force than a similar accomplishment would have betokened at
-Athens. In Epaminondas, it was steadily associated with thought and
-action,—that triple combination of thinking, speaking, and acting,
-which Isokrates and other Athenian sophists[776] set before their
-hearers as the stock and qualification for meritorious civic life. To
-the bodily training and soldier-like practice, common to all Thebans,
-Epaminondas added an ardent intellectual impulse and a range of
-discussion with the philosophical men around, peculiar to himself.
-He was not floated into public life by the accident of birth or
-wealth,—nor hoisted and propped up by oligarchical clubs,—nor even
-determined to it originally by any spontaneous ambition of his own.
-But the great revolution of 379 B.C., which expelled from Thebes
-both the Lacedæmonian garrison and the local oligarchy who ruled
-by its aid, forced him forward by the strongest obligations both
-of duty and interest; since nothing but an energetic defence could
-rescue both him and every other free Theban from slavery. It was
-by the like necessity that the American revolution, and the first
-French revolution, thrust into the front rank the most instructed and
-capable men of the country, whether ambitious by temperament or not.
-As the pressure of the time impelled Epaminondas forward, so it also
-disposed his countrymen to look out for a competent leader wherever
-he was to be found; and in no other living man could they obtain the
-same union of the soldier, the general, the orator, and the patriot.
-Looking through all Grecian history, it is only in Perikles that we
-find the like many-sided excellence; for though much inferior to
-Epaminondas as a general, Perikles must be held superior to him as a
-statesman. But it is alike true of both,—and the remark tends much
-to illustrate the sources of Grecian excellence,—that neither sprang
-exclusively from the school of practice and experience. They both
-brought to that school minds exercised in the conversation of the
-most instructed philosophers and sophists accessible to them,—trained
-to varied intellectual combinations and to a larger range of subjects
-than those that came before the public assembly,—familiarized with
-reasonings which the scrupulous piety of Nikias forswore, and which
-the devoted military patriotism of Pelopidas disdained.
-
-  [774] See an anecdote about Epaminondas as the diplomatist and
-  negotiator on behalf of Thebes against Athens—δικαιολογούμενος,
-  etc. Athenæus, xiv, p. 650 E.
-
-  [775] Homer, Iliad, iii, 210-220 (Menelaus and Odysseus)—
-
-    Ἀλλ’ ὅτε δὴ Τρώεσσιν ἀγειρομένοισιν ἔμιχθεν,
-    Ἤτοι μὲν Μενέλαος ἐπιτροχάδην ἀγόρευε,
-    Παῦρα μὲν, ἀλλὰ μάλα λιγέως· ἐπεὶ οὐ πολύμυθος, etc.
-    ... Ἀλλ’ ὅτε δή ῥ’ ὄπα τε μεγάλην ἐκ στήθεος ἵει (Odysseus),
-    Καὶ ἔπεα νιφάδεσσιν ἐοικότα χειμερίῃσιν,
-    Οὐκέτ’ ἔπειτ’ Ὀδυσῆΐ γ’ ἐρίσσειε βροτὸς ἄλλος, etc.
-
-  [776] See Vol. VIII. of this History, Ch. lxvii, p.
-  357-397—φρονεῖν, λέγειν, καὶ πράττειν, etc.
-
-On one point, as I have already noticed, the policy recommended by
-Epaminondas to his countrymen appears of questionable wisdom,—his
-advice to compete with Athens for transmarine and naval power.
-One cannot recognize in this advice the same accurate estimate of
-permanent causes,—the same long-sighted view, of the conditions of
-strength to Thebes and of weakness to her enemies, which dictated the
-foundation of Messênê and Megalopolis. These two towns, when once
-founded, took such firm root, that Sparta could not persuade even
-her own allies to aid in effacing them; a clear proof of the sound
-reasoning on which their founder had proceeded. What Epaminondas
-would have done,—whether he would have followed out maxims equally
-prudent and penetrating,—if he had survived the victory of
-Mantinea,—is a point which we cannot pretend to divine. He would
-have found himself then on a pinnacle of glory, and invested with a
-plenitude of power, such as no Greek ever held without abusing. But
-all that we know of Epaminondas justifies the conjecture that he
-would have been found equal, more than any other Greek, even to this
-great trial; and that his untimely death shut him out from a future
-not less honorable to himself, than beneficial to Thebes and to
-Greece generally.
-
-Of the private life and habits of Epaminondas we know scarcely
-anything. We are told that he never married; and we find brief
-allusions, without any details, to attachments in which he is said
-to have indulged.[777] Among the countrymen of Pindar,[778] devoted
-attachment between mature men and beautiful youths was more frequent
-than in other parts of Greece. It was confirmed by interchange of
-mutual oaths at the tomb of Iolaus, and was reckoned upon as the
-firmest tie of military fidelity in the hour of battle. Asopichus
-and Kaphisodorus are named as youths to whom Epaminondas was much
-devoted. The first fought with desperate bravery at the battle of
-Leuktra, and after the victory caused an image of the Leuktrian
-trophy to be carved on his shield, which he dedicated at Delphi;[779]
-the second perished along with his illustrious friend and chief on
-the field of Mantinea, and was buried in a grave closely adjacent to
-him.[780]
-
-  [777] Plutarch, Apophtheg. Reg. p. 192 E. Athenæ. xiii, p. 590 C.
-
-  [778] Hieronymus ap. Athenæ. xiii, p. 602 A.; Plutarch,
-  Pelopidas, c. 18; Xen. Rep. Lacedæmon. ii, 12.
-
-  See the striking and impassioned fragment of Pindar, addressed by
-  him when old to the youth Theoxenus of Tenedos, Fragm. 2 of the
-  Skolia, in Dissen’s edition, and Boeckh’s edition of Pindar, vol.
-  iii, p. 611, ap. Athenæum, xiii, p. 605 C.
-
-  [779] See Theopompus, Frag. 182, ed. Didot, ap. Athenæ. xiii, p.
-  605 A.
-
-  [780] Plutarch, Pelopid. _ut sup._; Plutarch, Amatorius, p. 761
-  D.; compare Xenoph. Hellen. iv, 8, 39.
-
-It rather appears that the Spartans, deeply incensed against their
-allies for having abandoned them in reference to Messênê, began to
-turn their attention away from the affairs of Greece to those of Asia
-and Egypt. But the dissensions in Arcadia were not wholly appeased
-even by the recent peace. The city of Megalopolis had been founded
-only eight years before by the coalescence of many smaller townships,
-all previously enjoying a separate autonomy more or less perfect. The
-vehement anti-Spartan impulse, which marked the two years immediately
-succeeding the battle of Leuktra, had overruled to so great a degree
-the prior instincts of these townships, that they had lent themselves
-to the plans of Lykomedes and Epaminondas for an enlarged community
-in the new city. But since that period, reaction had taken place. The
-Mantineans had come to be at the head of an anti-Megalopolitan party
-in Arcadia; and several of the communities which had been merged
-in Megalopolis, counting upon aid from them and from the Eleians,
-insisted on seceding, and returning to their original autonomy. But
-for foreign aid, Megalopolis would now have been in great difficulty.
-A pressing request was sent to the Thebans, who despatched into
-Arcadia three thousand hoplites under Pammenes. This force enabled
-the Megalopolitans, though not without measures of considerable
-rigor, to uphold the integrity of their city, and keep the refractory
-members in communion.[781] And it appears that the interference thus
-obtained was permanently efficacious, so that the integrity of this
-recent Pan-Arcadian community was no farther disturbed.
-
-  [781] Diodor. xv, 94.
-
-  I venture here to depart from Diodorus, who states that these
-  three thousand men were _Athenians_, not _Thebans_; that the
-  Megalopolitans sent to ask aid from _Athens_, and that the
-  _Athenians_ sent these three thousand men under Pammenes.
-
-  That Diodorus (or the copyist) has here mistaken Thebans for
-  Athenians, appears to me, on the following grounds:—
-
-  1. Whoever reads attentively the oration delivered by Demosthenes
-  in the Athenian assembly (about ten years after this period)
-  respecting the propriety of sending an armed force to defend
-  Megalopolis against the threats of Sparta—will see, I think,
-  that Athens can never before have sent any military assistance
-  to Megalopolis. Both the arguments which Demosthenes urges, and
-  those which he combats as having been urged by opponents, exclude
-  the reality of any such previous proceeding.
-
-  2. Even at the time when the above-mentioned oration was
-  delivered, the Megalopolitans were still (compare Diodorus,
-  xvi, 39) under special alliance with, and guardianship of,
-  Thebes—though the latter had then been so much weakened by the
-  Sacred War and other causes, that it seemed doubtful whether
-  she could give them complete protection against Sparta. But
-  in the year next after the battle of Mantinea, the alliance
-  between Megalopolis and Thebes, as well as the hostility between
-  Megalopolis and Athens, was still fresher and more intimate. The
-  Thebans (then in unimpaired power), who had fought for them in
-  the preceding year,—not the Athenians, who had fought against
-  them,—would be the persons invoked for aid to Megalopolis; nor
-  had any positive reverses as yet occurred to disable the Thebans
-  from furnishing aid.
-
-  3. Lastly, Pammenes is a _Theban_ general, friend of Epaminondas.
-  He is mentioned as such not only by Diodorus himself in another
-  place (xvi, 34), but also by Pausanias (viii, 27, 2), as
-  the general who had been sent to watch over the building of
-  Megalopolis, by Plutarch (Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 26; Plutarch,
-  Reipub. Gerend. Præcept. p. 805 F.), and by Polyænus (v, 16, 3).
-  We find a private Athenian citizen named Pammenes, a goldsmith,
-  mentioned in the oration of Demosthenes against Meidias (s. 31.
-  p. 521); but no Athenian officer or public man of that time so
-  named.
-
-  Upon these grounds, I cannot but feel convinced that Pammenes and
-  his troops were Thebans, and not Athenians.
-
-  I am happy to find myself in concurrence with Dr. Thirlwall on
-  this point (Hist. Gr. vol. v, ch. xliii, p. 368 note).
-
-The old king Agesilaus was compelled, at the age of eighty, to see
-the dominion of Sparta thus irrevocably narrowed, her influence in
-Arcadia overthrown, and the loss of Messênê formally sanctioned even
-by her own allies. All his protests, and those of his son Archidamus,
-so strenuously set forth by Isokrates, had only ended by isolating
-Sparta more than ever from Grecian support and sympathy. Archidamus
-probably never seriously attempted to execute the desperate scheme
-which he had held out as a threat some two or three years before the
-battle of Mantinea; that the Lacedæmonians would send away their
-wives and families, and convert their military population into
-a perpetual camp, never to lay down arms until they should have
-reconquered Messênê or perished in the attempt.[782] Yet he and his
-father, though deserted by all Grecian allies, had not yet abandoned
-the hope that they might obtain aid, in the shape of money for
-levying mercenary troops, from the native princes in Egypt and the
-revolted Persian satraps in Asia, with whom they seem to have been
-for some time in a sort of correspondence.[783]
-
-  [782] See Isokrates, Orat. vi, (Archidamus) s. 85-93.
-
-  [783] Isokrates, Or. vi, (Archid.) s. 73.
-
-About the time of the battle of Mantinea,—and as it would seem,
-for some years before,—a large portion of the western dominions of
-the Great King were in a state partly of revolt, partly of dubious
-obedience. Egypt had been for some years in actual revolt, and
-under native princes, whom the Persians had vainly endeavored to
-subdue (employing for that purpose the aid of the Athenian generals
-Iphikrates and Timotheus) both in 374 and 371 B.C. Ariobarzanes,
-satrap of the region near the Propontis and the Hellespont, appears
-to have revolted about the year 367-366 B.C. In other parts of Asia
-Minor, too,—Paphlagonia, Pisidia, etc.,—the subordinate princes or
-governors became disaffected to Artaxerxes. But their disaffection
-was for a certain time kept down by the extraordinary ability and
-vigor of a Karian named Datames, commander for the king in a part
-of Kappadokia, who gained several important victories over them
-by rapidity of movement and well-combined stratagem. At length
-the services of Datames became so distinguished as to excite the
-jealousy of many of the Persian grandees; who poisoned the royal
-mind against him, and thus drove him to raise the standard of revolt
-in his own district of Kappadokia, under alliance and concert with
-Ariobarzanes. It was in vain that Autophradates, satrap of Lydia,
-was sent by Artaxerxes with a powerful force to subdue Datames. The
-latter resisted all the open force of Persia, and was at length
-overcome only by the treacherous conspiracy of Mithridates (son of
-Ariobarzanes), who, corrupted by the Persian court and becoming a
-traitor both to his father Ariobarzanes and to Datames, simulated
-zealous coöperation, tempted the latter to a confidential interview,
-and there assassinated him.[784]
-
-  [784] Cornelius Nepos has given a biography of Datames at some
-  length, recounting his military exploits and stratagems. He
-  places Datames, in point of military talent, above all _barbari_,
-  except Hamilcar Barca and Hannibal (c. 1). Polyænus also (vii,
-  29) recounts several memorable proceedings of the same chief.
-  Compare too Diodorus, xv, 91; and Xen. Cyropæd. viii, 8, 4.
-
-  We cannot make out with any certainty either the history, or the
-  chronology, of Datames. His exploits seem to belong to the last
-  ten years of Artaxerxes Mnemon, and his death seems to have taken
-  place a little before the death of that prince; which last event
-  is to be assigned to 359-358 B.C. See Mr. Fynes Clinton, Fast.
-  Hell. ch. 18. p. 316, Appendix.
-
-Still, however, there remained powerful princes and satraps in Asia
-Minor, disaffected to the court; Mausôlus, prince of Karia; Orontes,
-satrap of Mysia, and Autophradates, satrap of Lydia,—the last having
-now apparently joined the revolters, though he had before been
-active in upholding the authority of the king. It seems too that the
-revolt extended to Syria and Phœnicia, so that all the western coast
-with its large revenues, as well as Egypt, was at once subtracted
-from the empire. Tachos, native king of Egypt, was prepared to lend
-assistance to this formidable combination of disaffected commanders,
-who selected Orontes as their chief; confiding to him their united
-forces, and sending Rheomithres to Egypt to procure pecuniary
-aid. But the Persian court broke the force of this combination
-by corrupting both Orontes and Rheomithres, who betrayed their
-confederates, and caused the enterprise to fail. Of the particulars
-we know little or nothing.[785]
-
-  [785] Diodor. xv, 91, 92; Xenophon, Cyropæd. viii, 8, 4.
-
-  Our information about these disturbances in the interior of
-  the Persian empire is so scanty and confused, that few of the
-  facts can be said to be certainly known. Diodorus has evidently
-  introduced into the year 362-361 B.C. a series of events, many
-  of them belonging to years before and after. Rehdantz (Vit.
-  Iphicrat. Chabr. et. Timoth. p. 154-161) brings together all the
-  statements; but unfortunately with little result.
-
-Both the Spartan king Agesilaus, with a thousand Lacedæmonian or
-Peloponnesian hoplites,—and the Athenian general Chabrias, were
-invited to Egypt to command the forces of Tachos; the former on
-land, the latter at sea. Chabrias came simply as a volunteer,
-without any public sanction or order from Athens. But the service of
-Agesilaus was undertaken for the purposes and with the consent of the
-authorities at home, attested by the presence of thirty Spartans who
-came out as his counsellors. The Spartans were displeased with the
-Persian king for having sanctioned the independence of Messênê; and
-as the prospect of overthrowing or enfeebling his empire appeared
-at this moment considerable, they calculated on reaping a large
-reward for their services to the Egyptian prince, who would in return
-lend them assistance towards their views in Greece. But dissension
-and bad judgment marred all the combinations against the Persian
-king. Agesilaus, on reaching Egypt,[786] was received with little
-respect. The Egyptians saw with astonishment, that one, whom they
-had invited as a formidable warrior, was a little deformed old man,
-of mean attire, and sitting on the grass with his troops, careless
-of show or luxury. They not only vented their disappointment in
-sarcastic remarks, but also declined to invest him with the supreme
-command, as he had anticipated. He was only recognized as general
-of the mercenary land force, while Tachos himself commanded in
-chief, and Chabrias was at the head of the fleet. Great efforts
-were made to assemble a force competent to act against the Great
-King; and Chabrias is said to have suggested various stratagems
-for obtaining money from the Egyptians.[787] The army having been
-thus strengthened, Agesilaus, though discontented and indignant,
-nevertheless accompanied Tachos on an expedition against the Persian
-forces in Phœnicia; from whence they were forced to return by the
-revolt of Nektanebis, cousin of Tachos, who caused himself to be
-proclaimed king of Egypt. Tachos was now full of supplications to
-Agesilaus to sustain him against his competitor for the Egyptian
-throne; while Nektanebis, also on his side, began to bid high for
-the favor of the Spartans. With the sanction of the authorities at
-home, but in spite of the opposition of Chabrias, Agesilaus decided
-in favor of Nektanebis, withdrawing the mercenaries from the camp of
-Tachos,[788] who was accordingly obliged to take flight. Chabrias
-returned home to Athens; either not choosing to abandon Tachos, whom
-he had come to serve,—or recalled by special order of his countrymen,
-in consequence of the remonstrance of the Persian king. A competitor
-for the throne presently arose in the Mendesian division of Egypt.
-Agesilaus, vigorously maintaining the cause of Nektanebis, defeated
-all the efforts of his opponent. Yet his great schemes against
-the Persian empire were abandoned, and nothing was effected as
-the result of his Egyptian expedition except the establishment of
-Nektanebis; who, having in vain tried to prevail upon him to stay
-longer, dismissed him in the winter season with large presents, and
-with a public donation to Sparta of two hundred and thirty talents.
-Agesilaus marched from the Nile towards Kyrênê, in order to obtain
-from that town and its ports ships for the passage home. But he died
-on the march, without reaching Kyrênê. His body was conveyed home by
-his troops, for burial, in a preparation of wax, since honey was not
-to be obtained.[789]
-
-  [786] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 36; Athenæus, xiv, p. 616 D.;
-  Cornelius Nepos, Agesil. c. 8.
-
-  [787] See Pseudo-Aristotel. Œconomic. ii, 25.
-
-  [788] Diodorus (xv, 93) differs from Plutarch and others (whom
-  I follow) in respect to the relations of Tachos and Nektanebis
-  with Agesilaus; affirming that Agesilaus supported Tachos, and
-  supported him with success, against Nektanebis.
-
-  Compare Cornelius Nepos, Chabrias, c. 2, 3.
-
-  We find Chabrias serving Athens in the Chersonese—in 359-358 B.C.
-  (Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 677, s. 204).
-
-  [789] Diodor. xv, 93; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 38-40; Cornelius
-  Nepos, Agesil. 8.
-
-Thus expired, at an age somewhat above eighty, the ablest and most
-energetic of the Spartan kings. He has enjoyed the advantage,
-denied to every other eminent Grecian leader, that his character
-and exploits have been set out in the most favorable point of view
-by a friend and companion,—Xenophon. Making every allowance for
-partiality in this picture, there will still remain a really great
-and distinguished character. We find the virtues of a soldier, and
-the abilities of a commander, combined with strenuous personal will
-and decision, in such measure as to ensure for Agesilaus constant
-ascendency over the minds of others far beyond what was naturally
-incident to his station; and that, too, in spite of conspicuous
-bodily deformity, amidst a nation eminently sensitive on that point.
-Of the merits which Xenophon ascribes to him, some are the fair
-results of a Spartan education;—his courage, simplicity of life, and
-indifference to indulgences,—his cheerful endurance of hardship under
-every form. But his fidelity to engagements, his uniform superiority
-to pecuniary corruption, and those winning and hearty manners which
-attached to him all around—were virtues not Spartan but personal
-to himself. We find in him, however, more analogy to Lysander—a
-man equally above reproach on the score of pecuniary gain—than to
-Brasidas or Kallikratidas. Agesilaus succeeded to the throne, with
-a disputed title, under the auspices and through the intrigues of
-Lysander; whose influence, at that time predominant both at Sparta
-and in Greece, had planted everywhere dekarchies and harmosts as
-instruments of ascendency for imperial Sparta—and under the name of
-Sparta, for himself. Agesilaus, too high-spirited to comport himself
-as second to any one, speedily broke through so much of the system as
-had been constructed to promote the personal dominion of Lysander;
-yet without following out the same selfish aspirations, or seeking
-to build up the like individual dictatorship, on his own account.
-His ambition was indeed unbounded, but it was for Sparta in the
-first place, and for himself only in the second. The misfortune was,
-that in his measures for upholding and administering the imperial
-authority of Sparta, he still continued that mixture of domestic and
-foreign coërcion (represented by the dekarchy and the harmost) which
-had been introduced by Lysander; a sad contrast with the dignified
-equality, and emphatic repudiation of partisan interference,
-proclaimed by Brasidas, as the watchword of Sparta, at Akanthus and
-Torônê—and with the still nobler Pan-hellenic aims of Kallikratidas.
-
-The most glorious portion of the life of Agesilaus was that spent
-in his three Asiatic campaigns, when acting under the miso-Persian
-impulse for which his panegyrist gives him so much credit.[790]
-
-  [790] Xenoph. Encom. Ages. vii, 7. Εἰ δ’ αὖ καλὸν καὶ μισοπέρσην
-  εἶναι, etc.
-
-He was here employed in a Pan-hellenic purpose, to protect the
-Asiatic Greeks against that subjection to Persia which Sparta herself
-had imposed upon them a few years before, as the price of Persian aid
-against Athens.
-
-The Persians presently succeeded in applying the lessons of Sparta
-against herself, and in finding Grecian allies to make war upon her
-near home. Here was an end of the Pan-hellenic sentiment, and of the
-truly honorable ambition, in the bosom of Agesilaus. He was recalled
-to make war nearer home. His obedience to the order of recall is
-greatly praised by Plutarch and Xenophon—in my judgment, with little
-reason, since he had no choice but to come back. But he came back an
-altered man. His miso-Persian feeling had disappeared, and had been
-exchanged for a miso-Theban sentiment which gradually acquired the
-force of a passion. As principal conductor of the war between 394-387
-B.C., he displayed that vigor and ability which never forsook him
-in military operations. But when he found that the empire of Sparta
-near home could not be enforced except by making her the ally of
-Persia and the executor of a Persian rescript, he was content to
-purchase such aid, in itself dishonorable, by the still greater
-dishonor of sacrificing the Asiatic Greeks. For the time, his policy
-seemed to succeed. From 387-379 B.C. (that is, down to the time of
-the revolution at Thebes, effected by Pelopidas and his small band),
-the ascendency of Sparta on land, in Central Greece, was continually
-rising. But her injustice and oppression stand confessed even by her
-panegyrist Xenophon; and this is just the period when the influence
-of Agesilaus was at its maximum. Afterwards we find him personally
-forward in sheltering Sphodrias from punishment, and thus bringing
-upon his countrymen a war with Athens as well as with Thebes. In the
-conduct of that war his military operations were, as usual, strenuous
-and able, with a certain measure of success. But on the whole, the
-war turns out unfavorably for Sparta. In 371 B.C., she is obliged to
-accept peace on terms very humiliating, as compared with her position
-in 387 B.C.; and the only compensation which she receives, is, the
-opportunity of striking the Thebans out of the treaty, thus leaving
-them to contend single-handed against what seemed overwhelming odds.
-Of this intense miso-Theban impulse, which so speedily brought about
-the unexpected and crushing disaster at Leuktra, Agesilaus stands
-out as the prominent spokesman. In the days of Spartan misfortune
-which followed, we find his conduct creditable and energetic, so
-far as the defensive position, in which Sparta then found herself,
-allowed; and though Plutarch seems displeased with him[791] for
-obstinacy in refusing to acknowledge the autonomy of Messênê (at the
-peace concluded after the battle of Mantinea), when acknowledged
-by all the other Greeks,—yet it cannot be shown that this refusal
-brought any actual mischief to Sparta; and circumstances might well
-have so turned out, that it would have been a gain.
-
-  [791] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 35.
-
-On the whole, in spite of the many military and personal merits of
-Agesilaus, as an adviser and politician he deserves little esteem.
-We are compelled to remark the melancholy contrast between the state
-in which he found Sparta at his accession, and that wherein he left
-her at his death—“Marmoream invenit, lateritiam reliquit.” Nothing
-but the death of Epaminondas at Mantinea saved her from something
-yet worse; though it would be unfair to Agesilaus, while we are
-considering the misfortunes of Sparta during his reign, not to
-recollect that Epaminondas was an enemy more formidable than she had
-ever before encountered.
-
-The efficient service rendered by Agesilaus during his last
-expedition to Egypt, had the effect of establishing firmly the
-dominion of Nektanebis the native king, and of protecting that
-country for the time from being reconquered by the Persians; an event
-that did not happen until a few years afterwards, during the reign of
-the next Persian king. Of the extensive revolt, however, which at one
-time threatened to wrest from the Persian crown Asia Minor as well as
-Egypt, no permanent consequence remained. The treachery of Orontes
-and Rheomithres so completely broke up the schemes of the revolters,
-that Artaxerxes Mnemon still maintained the Persian empire (with the
-exception of Egypt), unimpaired.
-
-He died not long after the suppression of the revolt (apparently
-about a year after it, in 359-358 B.C.), having reigned forty-five
-or forty-six years.[792] His death was preceded by one of those
-bloody tragedies which so frequently stained the transmission of
-a Persian sceptre. Darius, the eldest son of Artaxerxes, had been
-declared by his father successor to the throne. According to Persian
-custom, the successor thus declared was entitled to prefer any
-petition which he pleased; the monarch being held bound to grant
-it. Darius availed himself of the privilege to ask for one of the
-favorite inmates of his father’s harem, for whom he had contracted a
-passion. The request so displeased Artaxerxes, that he seemed likely
-to make a new appointment as to the succession; discarding Darius
-and preferring his younger son Ochus, whose interests were warmly
-espoused by Atossa, wife as well as daughter of the monarch. Alarmed
-at this prospect, Darius was persuaded by a discontented courtier,
-named Teribazus, to lay a plot for assassinating Artaxerxes; but the
-plot was betrayed, and the king caused both Darius and Teribazus
-to be put to death. By this catastrophe the chance of Ochus was
-improved, and his ambition yet farther stimulated. But there still
-remained two princes, older than he—Arsames and Ariaspes. Both these
-brothers he contrived to put out of the way; the one by a treacherous
-deceit, entrapping him to take poison,—the other by assassination.
-Ochus thus stood next as successor to the crown, which was not long
-denied to him,—for Artaxerxes, now very old and already struck down
-by the fatal consummation respecting his eldest son, Darius, did not
-survive the additional sorrow of seeing his two other sons die so
-speedily afterwards.[793] He expired, and his son Ochus, taking the
-name of Artaxerxes, succeeded to him without opposition; manifesting
-as king the same sanguinary dispositions as those by which he had
-placed himself on the throne.
-
-  [792] Diodor. xv, 93.
-
-  There is a difference between Diodorus and the Astronomical
-  Canon, in the statements about the length of reign, and date of
-  death, of Artaxerxes Mnemon, of about two years—361 or 359 B.C.
-  See Mr. Clinton’s Fasti Hellenici, Appendix, ch. 18. p. 316—where
-  the statements are brought together and discussed. Plutarch
-  states the reign of Artaxerxes Mnemon to have lasted sixty-two
-  years (Plutarch, Artax. c. 33); which cannot be correct, though
-  in what manner the error is to be amended, we cannot determine.
-
-  An Inscription of Mylasa in Karia recognizes the forty-fifth year
-  of the reign of Artaxerxes, and thus supports the statement in
-  the Astronomical Canon, which assigns to him forty-six years of
-  reign. See Boeckh, Corp. Inscr. No. 2691, with his comments, p.
-  470.
-
-  This same inscription affords ground of inference respecting the
-  duration of the revolt; for it shows that the Karian Mausolus
-  recognized himself as satrap, and Artaxerxes as his sovereign, in
-  the year beginning November 359 B.C., which corresponds with the
-  forty-fifth year of Artaxerxes Mnemon. The revolt therefore must
-  have been suppressed before that period: see Sievers, Geschichte
-  von Griechenland bis zur Schlacht von Mantineia, p. 373, note.
-
-  [793] Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 29, 30; Justin, x, 1-3.
-
-  Plutarch states that the lady whom the prince Darius asked for,
-  was, Aspasia of Phokæa—the Greek mistress of Cyrus the younger,
-  who had fallen into the hands of Artaxerxes after the battle of
-  Kunaxa, and had acquired a high place in the monarch’s affections.
-
-  But if we look at the chronology of the case, it will appear
-  hardly possible that the lady who inspired so strong a passion
-  to Darius, in or about 361 B.C., as to induce him to risk the
-  displeasure of his father—and so decided a reluctance on the
-  part of Artaxerxes to give her up—can have been the person who
-  accompanied Cyrus to Kunaxa _forty years_ before; for the battle
-  of Kunaxa was fought in 401 B.C. The chronological improbability
-  would be still greater, if we adopted Plutarch’s statement that
-  Artaxerxes reigned sixty-two years; for it is certain that the
-  battle of Kunaxa occurred very near the beginning of his reign,
-  and the death of his son Darius near the end of it.
-
-  Justin states the circumstances which preceded the death of
-  Artaxerxes Mnemon in a manner yet more tragical. He affirms that
-  the plot against the life of Artaxerxes was concerted by Darius
-  in conjunction with several of his brothers; and that, on the
-  plot being discovered, all these brothers, together with their
-  wives and children, were put to death. Ochus, on coming to the
-  throne, put to death a great number of his kinsmen and of the
-  principal persons about the court, together with their wives and
-  children—fearing a like conspiracy against himself.
-
-During the two years following the battle of Mantinea, Athens, though
-relieved by the general peace from land-war, appears to have been
-entangled in serious maritime contests and difficulties. She had been
-considerably embarrassed by two events; by the Theban naval armament
-under Epaminondas, and by the submission of Alexander of Pheræ to
-Thebes,—both events belonging to 364-363 B.C. It was in 363-362 B.C.
-that the Athenian Timotheus,—having carried on war with eminent
-success against Olynthus and the neighboring cities in the Thermaic
-Gulf, but with very bad success against Amphipolis,—transferred his
-forces to the war against Kotys king of Thrace near the Thracian
-Chersonese. The arrival of the Theban fleet in the Hellespont
-greatly distracted the Athenian general, and served as a powerful
-assistance to Kotys; who was moreover aided by the Athenian general
-Iphikrates, on this occasion serving his father-in-law against his
-country.[794] Timotheus is said to have carried on war against Kotys
-with advantage, and to have acquired for Athens a large plunder.[795]
-It would appear that his operations were of an aggressive character,
-and that during his command in those regions the Athenian possessions
-in the Chersonese were safe from Kotys; for Iphikrates would only
-lend his aid to Kotys towards defensive warfare; retiring from his
-service when he began to attack the Athenian possessions in the
-Chersonese.[796]
-
-  [794] Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 664, s. 153.
-
-  [795] The affirmation of Cornelius Nepos (Timotheus, c. 1), that
-  Timotheus made war on Kotys with such success as to bring into
-  the Athenian treasury twelve hundred talents, appears extravagant
-  as to amount; even if we accept it as generally true.
-
-  [796] Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 664, s. 155.
-
-We do not know what circumstances brought about the dismissal or
-retirement of Timotheus from the command. But in the next year,
-we find Ergophilus as Athenian commander in the Chersonese,
-and Kallisthenes (seemingly) as Athenian commander against
-Amphipolis.[797] The transmarine affairs of Athens, however, were
-far from improving. Besides that under the new general she seems
-to have been losing strength near the Chersonese, she had now upon
-her hands a new maritime enemy—Alexander of Pheræ. A short time
-previously, he had been her ally against Thebes, but the victories
-of the Thebans during the preceding year had so completely humbled
-him, that he now identified his cause with theirs; sending troops
-to join the expedition of Epaminondas into Peloponnesus,[798] and
-equipping a fleet to attack the maritime allies of Athens. His fleet
-captured the island of Tenos, ravaged several of the other Cyclades,
-and laid siege to Peparethos. Great alarm prevailed in Athens, and
-about the end of August (362 B.C.),[799] two months after the battle
-of Mantinea, a fleet was equipped with the utmost activity, for the
-purpose of defending the insular allies, as well as of acting in the
-Hellespont. Vigorous efforts were required from all the trierarchs,
-and really exerted by some, to accelerate the departure of this
-fleet. But that portion of it, which, while the rest went to the
-Hellespont, was sent under Leosthenes to defend Peparethos,—met with
-a defeat from the ships of Alexander, with the loss of five triremes
-and six hundred prisoners.[800] We are even told that soon after this
-naval advantage, the victors were bold enough to make a dash into the
-Peiræus itself (as Teleutias had done twenty-seven years before),
-where they seized both property on shipboard and men on the quay,
-before there was any force ready to repel them.[801] The Thessalian
-marauders were ultimately driven back to their harbor of Pegasæ; yet
-not without much annoyance to the insular confederates, and some
-disgrace to Athens. The defeated admiral Leosthenes was condemned to
-death; while several trierarchs,—who, instead of serving in person,
-had performed the duties incumbent on them by deputy and by contract,
-were censured or put upon trial.[802]
-
-  [797] See Rehdantz, Vitæ Iphicratis, Chabriæ, et Timothei, p.
-  151, and the preceding page.
-
-  M. Rehdantz has put together, with great care and sagacity, all
-  the fragments of evidence respecting this obscure period; and
-  has elicited, as it seems to me, the most probable conclusions
-  deducible from such scanty premises.
-
-  [798] Xenoph. Hellen. vii, 5, 4.
-
-  [799] We are fortunate enough to get this date exactly,—the
-  twenty third of the month Metageitnion, in the archonship of
-  Molon,—mentioned by Demosthenes adv. Polyklem, p. 1207, s. 5, 6.
-
-  [800] Diodor xvi, 95; Polyænus, vi, 2, 1.
-
-  [801] Polyænus, vi, 2, 2.
-
-  It must have been about this time (362-361 B.C.) that Alexander
-  of Pheræ sent envoys into Asia to engage the service of
-  Charidemus and his mercenary band, then in or near the troad. His
-  application was not accepted (Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 675,
-  s. 192).
-
-  [802] Demosthenes, de Coronâ Trierarch. p. 1230, s. 9.
-
-  Diodorus farther states that the Athenians placed Chares in
-  command of a fleet for the protection of the Ægean; but that this
-  admiral took himself off to Korkyra, and did nothing but plunder
-  the allies (Diodor. xvi, 95).
-
-Not only had the affairs of Athens in the Hellespont become worse
-under Ergophilus than under Timotheus, but Kallisthenes also, who had
-succeeded Timotheus in the operations against Amphipolis, achieved no
-permanent result. It would appear that the Amphipolitans, to defend
-themselves against Athens, had invoked the aid of the Macedonian
-king Perdikkas; and placed their city in his hands. That prince had
-before acted in conjunction with the Athenian force under Timotheus
-against Olynthus; and their joint invasion had so much weakened
-the Olynthians as to disable them from affording aid to Amphipolis.
-At least, this hypothesis explains how Amphipolis came now, for the
-first time, to be no longer a free city; but to be disjoined from
-Olynthus, and joined with (probably garrisoned by) Perdikkas, as a
-possession of Macedonia.[803] Kallisthenes thus found himself at
-war under greater disadvantages than Timotheus; having Perdikkas
-as his enemy, together with Amphipolis. Nevertheless, it would
-appear, he gained at first great advantages, and reduced Perdikkas
-to the necessity of purchasing a truce by the promise to abandon
-the Amphipolitans. The Macedonian prince, however, having gained
-time during the truce to recover his strength, no longer thought of
-performing his promise, but held Amphipolis against the Athenians as
-obstinately as before. Kallisthenes had let slip an opportunity which
-never again returned. After having announced at Athens the victorious
-truce and the approaching surrender, he seems to have been compelled,
-on his return, to admit that he had been cheated into suspending
-operations, at a moment when (as it seemed) Amphipolis might have
-been conquered. For this misjudgment or misconduct he was put upon
-trial at Athens, on returning to his disappointed countrymen; and at
-the same time Ergophilus also, who had been summoned home from the
-Chersonesus for his ill-success or bad management of the war against
-Kotys.[804] The people were much incensed against both; but most
-against Ergophilus. Nevertheless it happened that Kallisthenes was
-tried first, and condemned to death. On the next day, Ergophilus was
-tried. But the verdict of the preceding day had discharged the wrath
-of the dikasts, and rendered them so much more indulgent, that they
-acquitted him.[805]
-
-  [803] Compare Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 669, s. 174-176;
-  and Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 250, c. 14.
-
-  [804] The facts as stated in the text are the most probable
-  result, as it seems to me, derivable from Æschines, Fals. Leg. p.
-  250, c. 14.
-
-  [805] Aristotel. Rhetoric. ii, 3, 3.
-
-  Ergophilus seems to have been fined (Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p.
-  398, s. 200).
-
-Autokles was sent in place of Ergophilus to carry on war for Athens
-in the Hellespont and Bosphorus. It was not merely against Kotys
-that his operations were necessary. The Prokonnesians, allies of
-Athens, required protection against the attacks of Kyzikus; besides
-which, there was another necessity yet more urgent. The stock of
-corn was becoming short, and the price rising, not merely at Athens,
-but at many of the islands in the Ægean, and at Byzantium and other
-places. There prevailed therefore unusual anxiety, coupled with keen
-competition, for the corn in course of importation from the Euxine.
-The Byzantines, Chalkedonians, and Kyzikenes, had already begun to
-detain the passing corn-ships, for the supply of their own markets;
-and nothing less than a powerful Athenian fleet could ensure the safe
-transit of such supplies to Athens herself.[806] The Athenian fleet,
-guarding the Bosphorus even from the Hieron inwards (the chapel near
-the junction of the Bosphorus with the Euxine), provided safe convoy
-for the autumnal exports of this essential article.
-
-  [806] Demosthen. adv. Polyklem. p. 1207. s. 6.
-
-In carrying on operations against Kotys, Autokles was favored with
-an unexpected advantage by the recent revolt of a powerful Thracian
-named Miltokythes against that prince. This revolt so alarmed Kotys,
-that he wrote a letter to Athens in a submissive tone, and sent
-envoys to purchase peace by various concessions. At the same time
-Miltokythes also first sent envoys—next, went in person—to Athens, to
-present his own case and solicit aid. He was however coldly received.
-The vote of the Athenian assembly, passed on hearing the case (and
-probably procured in part through the friends of Iphikrates), was so
-unfavorable,[807] as to send him away not merely in discouragement,
-but in alarm; while Kotys recovered all his power in Thrace, and
-even became master of the Sacred Mountain with its abundance of
-wealthy deposits. Nevertheless, in spite of this imprudent vote,
-the Athenians really intended to sustain Miltokythes against Kotys.
-Their general Autokles was recalled after a few months, and put
-upon his trial for having suffered Kotys to put down this enemy
-unassisted.[808] How the trial ended or how the justice of the
-case stood, we are unable to make out from the passing allusions of
-Demosthenes.
-
-  [807] Demosthenes cont. Aristokrat. p. 655, s. 122; cont.
-  Polyklem. p. 1207.
-
-  ὅτε Μιλτοκύθης ἀπέστη Κότυος ... ἐγράφη τι παρ’ ὑμῖν ψήφισμα
-  τοιοῦτον, δι’ οὗ Μιλτοκύθης μὲν ~ἀπῆλθε~ φοβηθεὶς καὶ νομίσας
-  ὑμᾶς οὐ προσέχειν αὐτῷ, Κότυς δὲ ἐγκρατὴς τοῦ τε ὄρους τοῦ ἱεροῦ
-  καὶ τῶν θησαυρῶν ἐγένετο.
-
-  The word ἀπῆλθε implies that Miltokythes was at Athens in person.
-
-  The humble letter written by Kotys, in his first alarm at the
-  revolt of Miltokythes, is referred to by the orator, p. 658, s.
-  136, 137.
-
-  [808] Demosthenes adv. Polykl. p. 1210, s. 16; Demosthenes cont.
-  Aristok. p. 655, s. 123.
-
-Menon was sent as commander to the Hellespont to supersede Autokles;
-and was himself again superseded after a few months, by Timomachus.
-Convoy for the corn-vessels out of the Euxine became necessary anew,
-as in the preceding year; and was furnished a second time during the
-autumn of 361 B.C. by the Athenian ships of war;[809] not merely for
-provisions under transport to Athens, but also for those going to
-Maroneia, Thasos, and other places in or near Thrace. But affairs in
-the Chersonese became yet more unfavorable to Athens. In the winter
-of 361-360 B.C., Kotys, with the coöperation of a body of Abydene
-citizens and Sestian exiles, who crossed the Hellespont from Abydos,
-contrived to surprise Sestos;[810] the most important place in the
-Chersonese, and the guard-post of the Hellespont on its European
-side, for all vessels passing in or out. The whole Chersonese was now
-thrown open to his aggressions. He made preparations for attacking
-Elæus and Krithôtê, the two other chief possessions of Athens, and
-endeavored to prevail on Iphikrates to take part in his projects. But
-that general, though he had assisted Kotys in defence against Athens,
-refused to commit the more patent treason involved in aggressive
-hostility against her. He even quitted Thrace, but not daring at once
-to visit Athens, retired to Lesbos.[811] In spite of his refusal,
-however, the settlers and possessions of Athens in the Chersonese
-were attacked and imperiled by Kotys, who claimed the whole peninsula
-as his own, and established toll-gatherers at Sestos to levy the dues
-both of strait and harbor.[812]
-
-  [809] Demosthen. adv. Polyklem, p. 1212, s. 24-26; p. 1213, s.
-  27; p. 1225, s. 71.
-
-  [810] Demosthenes cont. Aristokrat. p. 673, s. 187. Ἐκ γὰρ
-  Ἀβύδου, τῆς τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον ὑμῖν ἐχθρᾶς, καὶ ὅθεν ἦσαν οἱ
-  Σηστὸν καταλαβόντες, εἰς Σηστὸν διέβαινεν, ἣν εἶχε Κότυς. (He is
-  speaking of Charidemus.)
-
-  The other oration of Demosthenes (adv. Polykl. p. 1212) contains
-  distinct intimation that Sestos was not lost by the Athenians
-  _until after November 361_ B.C. Apollodorus the Athenian
-  trierarch was in the town at that time, as well as various
-  friends whom he mentions; so that Sestos must have been still an
-  Athenian possession in November 361 B.C.
-
-  It is lucky for some points of historical investigation, that
-  the purpose of this oration against Polykles (composed by
-  Demosthenes, but spoken by Apollodorus) requires great precision
-  and specification of dates, even to months and days. Apollodorus
-  complains that he has been constrained to bear the expense of
-  a trierarchy, for four months beyond the year in which it was
-  incumbent upon him jointly with a colleague. He sues the person
-  whose duty it was to have relieved him as successor at the end of
-  the year, but who had kept aloof and cheated him. The trierarchy
-  of Apollodorus began in August 362 B.C., and lasted (not merely
-  to Aug. 361 B.C., its legal term, but) to November 361 B.C.
-
-  Rehdantz (Vitæ Iphicratis, Chabriæ, etc. p. 144, note), in the
-  valuable chapters which he devotes to the obscure chronology of
-  the period, has overlooked this exact indication of the time
-  _after which_ the Athenians lost Sestos. He supposes the loss to
-  have taken place two or three years earlier.
-
-  [811] Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 664, s. 155.
-
-  [812] Demosthenes cont. Aristokrat. p. 658, s. 136; p. 679, s.
-  211.
-
-  What is said in the latter passage about the youthful
-  Kersobleptes, is doubtless not less true of his father Kotys.
-
-The fortune of Athens in these regions was still unpropitious. All
-her late commanders, Ergophilus, Autokles, Menon, Timomachus, had
-been successively deficient in means, in skill, or in fidelity, and
-had undergone accusation at home.[813] Timomachus was now superseded
-by Kephisodotus, a man of known enmity towards both Iphikrates and
-Kotys.[814] But Kephisodotus achieved no more than his predecessors,
-and had even to contend against a new enemy, who crossed over from
-Abydos to Sestos to reinforce Kotys—Charidemus with the mercenary
-division under his command. That officer, since his service three
-years before under Timotheus against Amphipolis, had been for some
-time in Asia, especially in the Troad. He hired himself to the
-satrap Artabazus; of whose embarrassments he took advantage to
-seize by fraud the towns of Skepsis, Kebren, and Ilium; intending
-to hold them as a little principality.[815] Finding his position,
-however, ultimately untenable against the probable force of the
-satrap, he sent a letter across to the Chersonese, to the Athenian
-commander Kephisodotus, asking for Athenian triremes to transport
-his division across to Europe; in return for which, if granted, he
-engaged to crush Kotys and reconquer the Chersonese for Athens.
-This proposition, whether accepted or not, was never realized; for
-Charidemus was enabled, through a truce unexpectedly granted to
-him by the satrap, to cross over from Abydos to Sestos without any
-Athenian ships. But as soon as he found himself in the Chersonese,
-far from aiding Athens to recover that peninsula, he actually took
-service with Kotys against her; so that Elæeus and Krithôtê, her
-chief remaining posts, were in greater peril than ever.[816]
-
-  [813] Demosthen. pro Phormione, p. 960, s. 64; Demosth. Fals.
-  Leg. p. 398, s. 200.
-
-  [814] Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 672, s. 184.
-
-  [815] Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 671, s. 183. Compare
-  Pseudo-Aristot. Œconomic. ii, 30.
-
-  [816] Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 672, 673.
-
-  The orator reads a letter (not cited however) from the governor
-  of Krithôtê, announcing the formidable increase of force which
-  threatened the place since the arrival of Charidemus.
-
-The victorious prospects of Kotys, however, were now unexpectedly
-arrested. After a reign of twenty-four years he was assassinated by
-two brothers, Python and Herakleides, Greeks from the city of Ænus in
-Thrace, and formerly students under Plato at Athens. They committed
-the act to avenge their father; upon whom, as it would appear, Kotys
-had inflicted some brutal insult, under the influence of that violent
-and licentious temper which was in him combined with an energetic
-military character.[817] Having made their escape, Python and his
-brother retired to Athens, where they were received with every
-demonstration of honor, and presented with the citizenship as well
-as with golden wreaths; partly as tyrannicides, partly as having
-relieved the Athenians from an odious and formidable enemy.[818]
-Disclaiming the warm eulogies heaped upon him by various speakers in
-the assembly, Python is said to have replied—“It was a god who did
-the deed; we only lent our hands:”[819] an anecdote, which, whether
-it be truth or fiction, illustrates powerfully the Greek admiration
-of tyrannicide.
-
-  [817] Aristotle (Politic. v, 8, 12) mentions the act and states
-  that the two young men did it to avenge their father. He does
-  not expressly say what Kotys had done to the father; but he
-  notices the event in illustration of the general category,—Πολλαὶ
-  δ’ ἐπιθέσεις γεγένηνται καὶ διὰ τὸ εἰς τὸ σῶμα αἰσχύνεσθαι
-  τῶν μονάρχων τινάς (compare what Tacitus says about _mos
-  regius_—Annal. vi, 1). Aristotle immediately adds another case of
-  cruel mutilation inflicted by Kotys,—Ἀδάμας δ’ ἀπέστη Κότυος διὰ
-  τὸ ἐκτμηθῆναι ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ παῖς ὢν, ὡς ὑβρισμένος.
-
-  Compare, about Kotys, Theopompus, Fragm. 33, ed. Didot, ap.
-  Athenæ. xii, p. 531, 532.
-
-  Böhnecke (Forschungen auf dem Gebiete der Geschichte, p. 725,
-  726) places the death of Kotys in 359 B.C.; and seems to infer
-  from Athenæus (vi, p. 248; xii, p. 531) that he had actual
-  communication with Philip of Macedon as king, whose accession
-  took place between Midsummer 360 and Midsummer 359 B.C. But the
-  evidence does not appear to me to bear out such a conclusion.
-
-  The story cited by Athenæus from Hegesander, about letters
-  reaching Philip from Kotys, cannot be true about this Kotys;
-  because it seems impossible that Philip, in the first year of
-  his reign, can have had any such flatterer as Kleisophus; Philip
-  being at that time in the greatest political embarrassments, out
-  of which he was only rescued by his indefatigable energy and
-  ability. And the journey of Philip to Onokarsis, also mentioned
-  by Athenæus out of Theopompus, does not imply any personal
-  communication with Kotys.
-
-  My opinion is, that the assassination of Kotys dates more
-  probably in 360 B.C.
-
-  [818] Demosthenes cont. Aristokrat. p. 660, s. 142; p. 662, s.
-  150; p. 675, s. 193. Plutarch, De Sui Laude, p. 542 E.; Plutarch,
-  adv. Koloten, p. 1126, B.
-
-  [819] Plutarch, De Sui Laude, _ut sup._
-
-The death of Kotys gave some relief to Athenian affairs in the
-Chersonese. Of his children, even the eldest, Kersobleptes, was only
-a youth:[820] moreover two other Thracian chiefs, Berisades and
-Amadokus, now started up as pretenders to shares in the kingdom of
-Thrace. Kersobleptes employed as his main support and minister the
-mercenary general Charidemus, who either had already married, or
-did now marry, his sister; a nuptial connection had been formed in
-like manner by Amadokus with two Greeks named Simon and Bianor—and
-by Berisades with an Athenian citizen named Athenodorus, who (like
-Iphikrates and others) had founded a city, and possessed a certain
-independent dominion, in or near the Chersonese.[821] These Grecian
-mercenary chiefs thus united themselves by nuptial ties to the
-princes whom they served, as Seuthes had proposed to Xenophon, and as
-the Italian Condottieri of the fifteenth century ennobled themselves
-by similar alliance with princely families—for example, Sforza
-with the Visconti of Milan. All these three Thracian competitors
-were now represented by Grecian agents. But at first, it seems,
-Charidemus on behalf of Kersobleptes was the strongest. He and his
-army were near Perinthus on the north coast of the Propontis, where
-the Athenian commander, Kephisodotus, visited him, with a small
-squadron of ten triremes, in order to ask for the fulfilment of those
-fair promises which Charidemus had made in his letter from Asia. But
-Charidemus treated the Athenians as enemies, attacked by surprise
-the seamen on shore, and inflicted upon them great damage. He then
-pressed the Chersonese severely for several months, and marched
-even into the midst of it, to protect a nest of pirates whom the
-Athenians were besieging at the neighboring islet on its western
-coast—Alopekonnesus. At length, after seven months of unprofitable
-warfare (dating from the death of Kotys), he forced Kephisodotus
-to conclude with him a convention so disastrous and dishonorable,
-that as soon as known at Athens, it was indignantly repudiated.[822]
-Kephisodotus, being recalled in disgrace, was put upon his trial, and
-fined; the orator Demosthenes (we are told), who had served as one of
-the trierarchs in the fleet, being among his accusers.[823]
-
-  [820] Demosthen. cont. Aristokr. p. 674, s. 193. μειρακύλλιον,
-  etc.
-
-  [821] Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 623, 624, s. 8-12; p. 664, s.
-  153 (in which passage κηδεστὴς may be fairly taken to mean any
-  near connection by marriage).
-
-  About Athenodorus compare Isokrates, Or. viii, (de Pace) s. 31.
-
-  [822] Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 674-676, s. 193-199.
-
-  In sect. 194, are the words, ~ἧκε δὲ Κηφισόδοτος στρατηγῶν~,
-  πρὸς ὃν αὐτὸς (Charidemus) ἔπεμψε τὴν ἐπιστολὴν ἐκείνην, καὶ
-  αἱ τριήρεις, αἳ, ὅτ’ ἦν ἄδηλα τὰ τῆς σωτηρίας αὐτῷ, καὶ μὴ
-  συγχωροῦντος Ἀρταβάζου σώζειν ἔμελλον αὐτόν.
-
-  The verb ἧκε, in my judgment—not to the _first coming out_ of
-  Kephisodotus from Athens to take the command, as Weber (Comment.
-  ad Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 460) and other commentators
-  think, but—to the coming of Kephisodotus with ten triremes _to
-  Perinthus_, near which place Charidemus was, for the purpose of
-  demanding fulfilment of what the latter had promised; see s.
-  196. When Kephisodotus came to him at Perinthus (παρόντος τοῦ
-  στρατηγοῦ—πρὸς ὃν τὴν ἐπιστολὴν ἐπεπόμφει—s. 195) to make this
-  demand, then Charidemus, instead of behaving honestly, acted like
-  a traitor and an enemy. The allusion to this antecedent letter
-  from Charidemus to Kephisodotus, shows that the latter must have
-  been on the spot for some time, and therefore that ἧκε cannot
-  refer to his first coming out.
-
-  The term ἑπτὰ μῆνας (s. 196) counts, I presume, from the death of
-  Kotys.
-
-  [823] Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 676, s. 199; Æschines cont.
-  Ktesiphont. p. 384, c. 20.
-
-  Demosthenes himself may probably have been among the trierarchs
-  called before the dikastery as witnesses to prove what took place
-  at Perinthus and Alopekonnesus (Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p.
-  676, s. 200); Euthykles, the speaker of the discourse against
-  Aristokrates, had been himself also among the officers serving
-  (p. 675, s. 196; p. 683, s. 223).
-
-Among the articles of this unfavorable convention, one was that
-the Greek city of Kardia should be specially reserved to Charidemus
-himself. That city—eminently convenient from its situation on
-the isthmus connecting the Chersonese with Thrace—claimed by the
-Athenians as within the Chersonese, yet at the same time intensely
-hostile to Athens—became his principal station.[824] He was fortunate
-enough to seize, through treachery, the person of the Thracian
-Miltokythes, who had been the pronounced enemy of Kotys, and had
-coöperated with Athens. But he did not choose to hand over this
-important prisoner to Kersobleptes, because the life of Miltokythes
-would thus have been saved: it not being the custom of Thracians,
-in their intestine disputes, to put each other to death.[825] We
-remark with surprise a practice milder than that of Greece, amidst a
-people decidedly more barbarous and blood-thirsty than the Greeks.
-Charidemus accordingly surrendered Miltokythes to the Kardians,
-who put the prisoner with his son into a boat, took them a little
-way out to sea, slew the son before the eyes of the father, and
-then drowned the father himself.[826] It is not improbable that
-there may have been some special antecedent causes, occasioning
-intense antipathy on the part of the Kardians towards Miltokythes,
-and inducing Charidemus to hand him over to them as an acceptable
-subject for revenge. However this may be, their savage deed kindled
-violent indignation among all the Thracians, and did much injury to
-the cause of Kersobleptes and Charidemus. Though Kephisodotus had
-been recalled, and though a considerable interval elapsed before any
-successor came from Athens, yet Berisades and Amadokus joined their
-forces in one common accord, and sent to the Athenians propositions
-of alliance, with request for pecuniary aid. Athenodorus, the general
-of Berisades, putting himself at the head of Thracians and Athenians
-together, found himself superior in the field to Kersobleptes and
-Charidemus; whom he constrained to accept a fresh convention dictated
-by himself. Herein it was provided, that the kingdom of Thrace should
-be divided in equal portions between the three competitors; that
-all three should concur in surrendering the Chersonese to Athens;
-and that the son of a leading man named Iphiades at Sestos, held
-by Charidemus as hostage for the adherence of that city, should be
-surrendered to Athens also.[827]
-
-  [824] Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 679, s. 209; p. 681, s.
-  216. Demosthen. de Halonneso, p. 87, s. 42.
-
-  [825] Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 676, s. 201. οὐκ ὄντος
-  νομίμου τοῖς Θρᾳξὶν ἀλλήλους ἀποκτιννύναι, etc.
-
-  [826] Demosthenes, cont. Aristokrat. p. 677, s. 201.
-
-  [827] Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 677, s. 202-204.
-
-  Aristotle (Politic. v. 5, 9) mentions the association or faction
-  of Iphiades as belonging to Abydos, not to Sestos. Perhaps there
-  may have been an Abydene association now exercising influence at
-  Sestos; at least we are told, that the revolution which deprived
-  the Athenians of Sestos, was accomplished in part by exiles who
-  crossed from Abydos; something like the relation between Argos
-  and Corinth in the years immediately preceding the peace of
-  Antalkidas.
-
-This new convention, sworn on both sides, promised to Athens the full
-acquisition which she desired. Considering the thing as done, the
-Athenians sent Chabrias as commander in one trireme to receive the
-surrender, but omitted to send the money requested by Athenodorus;
-who was accordingly constrained to disband his army for want of
-pay. Upon this Kersobleptes and Charidemus at once threw up their
-engagement, refused to execute the convention just sworn, and
-constrained Chabrias, who had come without any force, to revert to
-the former convention concluded with Kephisodotus. Disappointed and
-indignant, the Athenians disavowed the act of Chabrias, in spite
-of his high reputation. They sent ten envoys to the Chersonese,
-insisting that the convention of Athenodorus should be resworn by all
-the three Thracian competitors—Berisades, Amadokus, Kersobleptes;
-if the third declined, the envoys were instructed to take measures
-for making war upon him, while they received the engagements of
-the other two. But such a mission, without arms, obtained nothing
-from Charidemus and Kersobleptes, except delay or refusal; while
-Berisades and Amadokus sent to Athens bitter complaints respecting
-the breach of faith. At length, after some months—just after the
-triumphant conclusion of the expedition of Athens against Eubœa (358
-B.C.)—the Athenian Chares arrived in the Chersonese, at the head
-of a considerable mercenary force. Then at length the two recusants
-were compelled to swear anew to the convention of Athenodorus, in the
-presence of the latter as well as of Berisades and Amadokus.[828]
-And it would appear that before long, its conditions were realized.
-Charidemus surrendered the Chersonese, of course including its
-principal town Sestos, to Athens;[829] yet he retained for himself
-Kardia,[830] which was affirmed (though the Athenians denied it)
-not to be included in the boundaries of that peninsula. The kingdom
-of Thrace was also divided between Kersobleptes, Berisades, and
-Amadokus; which triple division, diminishing the strength of each,
-was regarded by Athens as a great additional guarantee for her secure
-possession of the Chersonese.[831]
-
-  [828] Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 678, p. 205, 206; p. 680.
-  s. 211, 212. The arrival of Chares in the Hellespont is marked by
-  Demosthenes as immediately following the expedition of Athens to
-  drive the Thebans out of Eubœa, which took place about the middle
-  of 358 B.C.
-
-  [829] We see that Sestos must have been surrendered on this
-  occasion, although Diodorus describes it as having been conquered
-  by Chares five years afterwards, in the year 353 B.C. (Diod.
-  xvi, 34). It is evident from the whole tenor of the oration
-  of Demosthenes, that Charidemus did actually surrender the
-  Chersonese at this time. Had he still refused to surrender
-  Sestos, the orator would not have failed to insist on the fact
-  emphatically against him. Besides, Demosthenes says, comparing
-  the conduct of Philip towards the Olynthians, with that of
-  Kersobleptes towards Athens—ἐκεῖνος ἐκείνοις Ποτίδαιαν οὐχὶ
-  τηνικαῦτ’ ἀπέδωκεν, ἥνικ’ ἀποστερεῖν οὐκέθ’ οἷός τ’ ἦν, ὥσπερ
-  ὑμῖν Κερσοβλέπτης Χεῤῥόνησον (p. 656. s. 128). This distinctly
-  announces that the Chersonese was _given back_ to Athens, though
-  reluctantly and tardily, by Kersobleptes. Sestos must have been
-  given up along with it, as the principal and most valuable post
-  upon all accounts. If it be true (as Diodorus states) that
-  Chares in 353 B.C. took Sestos by siege, slew the inhabitants
-  of military age and reduced the rest to slavery—we must suppose
-  the town again to have revolted between 358 and 353 B.C.; that
-  is, during the time of the Social War; which is highly probable.
-  But there is much in the statement of Diodorus which I cannot
-  distinctly make out; for he says that Kersobleptes in 353 B.C.,
-  on account of his hatred towards Philip, surrendered to Athens
-  all the cities in the Chersonese except Kardia. That had already
-  been done in 358 B.C., and without any reference to Philip; and
-  if after surrendering the Chersonese in 358 B.C., Kersobleptes
-  had afterwards reconquered it, so as to have it again in his
-  possession in the beginning of 353 B.C.—it seems unaccountable
-  that Demosthenes should say nothing about the reconquest in his
-  oration against Aristokrates, where he is trying to make all
-  points possible against Kersobleptes.
-
-  [830] Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 681, s. 216.
-
-  [831] Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 623, s. 8; p. 654, s. 121.
-  The chronology of these events as given by Rehdantz (Vitæ
-  Iphicratis, Chabriæ, etc. p. 147) appears to me nearly correct,
-  in spite of the strong objection expressed against it by Weber
-  (Prolegg. ad Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. lxxiii.)—and more
-  exact than the chronology of Böhnecke, Forschungen, p. 727,
-  who places the coming out of Kephisodotus as general to the
-  Chersonese in 358 B.C., which is, I think, a full year too late.
-  Rehdantz does not allow, as I think he ought to do, for a certain
-  interval between Kephisodotus and the Ten Envoys, during which
-  Athenodorus acted for Athens.
-
-It was thus that Athens at length made good her possession of the
-Chersonese against the neighboring Thracian potentates. And it
-would seem that her transmarine power, with its dependencies and
-confederates, now stood at a greater height than it had ever reached
-since the terrible reverses of 405 B.C. Among them were numbered not
-only a great number of the Ægean islands (even the largest, Eubœa,
-Chios, Samos, and Rhodes), but also the continental possessions of
-Byzantium—the Chersonese—Maroneia[832] with other places on the
-southern coast of Thrace—and Pydna, Methônê, and Potidæa, with most
-of the region surrounding the Thermaic Gulf.[833] This last portion
-of empire had been acquired at the cost of the Olynthian fraternal
-alliance of neighboring cities, against which Athens too, as well as
-Sparta, by an impulse most disastrous for the future independence of
-Greece, had made war with inauspicious success. The Macedonian king
-Perdikkas, with a just instinct towards the future aggrandizement of
-his dynasty, had assisted her in thus weakening Olynthus; feeling
-that the towns on the Thermaic Gulf, if they formed parts of a
-strong Olynthian confederacy of brothers and neighbors, reciprocally
-attached and self-sustaining, would resist Macedonia more
-effectively, than if they were half-reluctant dependencies of Athens,
-even with the chances of Athenian aid by sea. The aggressive hand of
-Athens against Olynthus, indeed, between 368-363 B.C., was hardly
-less mischievous, to Greece generally, than that of Sparta had been
-between 382-380 B.C. Sparta had crushed the Olynthian confederacy in
-its first brilliant promise—Athens prevented it from rearing its head
-anew. Both conspired to break down the most effective barrier against
-Macedonian aggrandizement; neither were found competent to provide
-any adequate protection to Greece in its room.
-
-  [832] Demosthen. cont. Polyklem, p. 1212, s. 26.
-
-  [833] Demosthen. Philippic. I, p. 41, s. 6. εἴχομέν ποτε ἡμεῖς, ὦ
-  ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, Πύδναν καὶ Ποτίδαιαν καὶ Μεθώνην ~καὶ πάντα τὸν
-  τόπον τοῦτον οἰκεῖον κύκλῳ~, etc.
-
-The maximum of her second empire, which I have remarked that Athens
-attained by the recovery of the Chersonese,[834] lasted but for a
-moment. During the very same year, there occurred that revolt among
-her principal allies, known by the name of the Social War, which gave
-to her power a fatal shock, and left the field comparatively clear
-for the early aggressions of her yet more formidable enemy—Philip
-of Macedon. That prince had already emerged from his obscurity as a
-hostage in Thebes, and had succeeded his brother Perdikkas, slain
-in a battle with the Illyrians, as king (360-359 B.C.). At first,
-his situation appeared not merely difficult, but almost hopeless.
-Not the most prescient eye in Greece could have recognized, in the
-inexperienced youth struggling at his first accession against rivals
-at home, enemies abroad, and embarrassments of every kind—the future
-conqueror of Chæroneia, and destroyer of Grecian independence. How,
-by his own genius, energy, and perseverance, assisted by the faults
-and dissensions of his Grecian enemies, he attained his inauspicious
-eminence—will be recounted in my subsequent volume.
-
-  [834] I have not made any mention of the expedition against Eubœa
-  (whereby Athens drove the Theban invaders out of that island),
-  though it occurred just about the same time as the recovery of
-  the Chersonese.
-
-  That expedition will more properly come to be spoken of in my
-  next volume. But the recovery of the Chersonese was the closing
-  event of a series of proceedings which had been going on for four
-  years; so that I could hardly leave that series unfinished.
-
-       *       *       *       *       *
-
-At the opening of my ninth volume, after the surrender of Athens,
-Greece was under the Spartan empire. Its numerous independent
-city-communities were more completely regimented under one chief than
-they had ever been before, Athens and Thebes being both numbered
-among the followers of Sparta.
-
-But the conflicts recounted in these two volumes (during an interval
-of forty-four years—404-403 B.C. to 360-359 B.C.) have wrought
-the melancholy change of leaving Greece more disunited, and more
-destitute of presiding Hellenic authority, than she had been at
-any time since the Persian invasion. Thebes, Sparta, and Athens,
-had all been engaged in weakening each other; in which, unhappily,
-each has been far more successful than in strengthening herself.
-The maritime power of Athens is now indeed considerable, and may be
-called very great, if compared with the state of degradation to which
-she had been brought in 403 B.C. But it will presently be seen how
-unsubstantial is the foundation of her authority, and how fearfully
-she has fallen off from that imperial feeling and energy which
-ennobled her ancestors under the advice of Perikles.
-
-It is under these circumstances, so untoward for defence, that the
-aggressor from Macedonia arises.
-
-
-
-
-CHAPTER LXXXI.
-
-SICILIAN AFFAIRS AFTER THE DESTRUCTION OF THE ATHENIAN ARMAMENT
-BEFORE SYRACUSE.
-
-
-In the sixtieth chapter of this work, I brought down the history
-of the Grecian communities in Sicily to the close of the Athenian
-siege of Syracuse, where Nikias and Demosthenes with nearly their
-entire armament perished by so lamentable a fate. I now resume from
-that point the thread of Sicilian events, which still continues so
-distinct from those of Peloponnesus and Eastern Greece, that it is
-inconvenient to include both in the same chapters.
-
-If the destruction of the great Athenian armament (in September 413
-B.C.) excited the strongest sensation throughout every part of the
-Grecian world, we may imagine the intoxication of triumph with which
-it must have been hailed in Sicily. It had been achieved (Gylippus
-and the Peloponnesian allies aiding) by the united efforts of nearly
-all the Grecian cities in the island,—for all of them had joined
-Syracuse as soon as her prospects became decidedly encouraging;
-except Naxos and Katana, which were allied with the Athenians,—and
-Agrigentum, which remained neutral.[835] Unfortunately we know
-little or nothing of the proceedings of the Syracusans, immediately
-following upon circumstances of so much excitement and interest. They
-appear to have carried on war against Katana, where some fugitives
-from the vanquished Athenian army contributed to the resistance
-against them.[836] But both this city and Naxos, though exposed to
-humiliation and danger as allies of the defeated Athenians, contrived
-to escape without the loss of their independence. The allies of
-Syracuse were probably not eager to attack them, and thereby to
-aggrandize that city farther; while the Syracusans themselves also
-would be sensible of great exhaustion, arising from the immense
-efforts through which alone their triumph had been achieved. The
-pecuniary burdens to which they had been obliged to submit—known
-to Nikias during the last months of the siege,[837] and fatally
-misleading his judgment,—were so heavy as to task severely their
-powers of endurance. After paying, and dismissing with appropriate
-gratitude, the numerous auxiliaries whom they had been obliged to
-hire,—after celebrating the recent triumph, and decorating the
-temples, in a manner satisfactory to the exuberant joy of the
-citizens[838]—there would probably be a general disposition to repose
-rather than to aggressive warfare. There would be much destruction to
-be repaired throughout their territory, poorly watched or cultivated
-during the year of the siege.
-
-  [835] Thucyd. vii, 50-58.
-
-  [836] Lysias, Orat. xx, (pro Polystrato) s. 26, 27.
-
-  [837] Thucyd. vii, 48, 49.
-
-  [838] Diodor. xiii, 34.
-
-In spite of such exhaustion, however, the sentiment of exasperation
-and vengeance against Athens, combined with gratitude towards the
-Lacedæmonians, was too powerful to be balked. A confident persuasion
-reigned throughout Greece that Athens[839] could not hold out for one
-single summer after her late terrific disaster; a persuasion, founded
-greatly on the hope of a large auxiliary squadron to act against her
-from Syracuse and her other enemies in Sicily and Italy. In this day
-of Athenian distress, such enemies of course became more numerous.
-Especially the city of Thurii in Italy,[840] which had been friendly
-to Athens and had furnished aid to Demosthenes in his expedition
-to Sicily, now underwent a change, banished three hundred of the
-leading philo-Athenian citizens (among them the rhetor Lysias), and
-espoused the Peloponnesian cause with ardor. The feeling of reaction
-at Thurii, and of vengeance at Syracuse, stimulated the citizens of
-both places to take active part in an effort promising to be easy
-and glorious, for the destruction of Athens and her empire. And
-volunteers were doubtless the more forward, as the Persian satraps of
-the sea-board were now competing with each other in invitations to
-the Greeks, with offers of abundant pay.
-
-  [839] Thucyd. viii, 2; compare vii, 55.
-
-  [840] Thucyd. vii, 33-57; Dionysius Halikarn. Judic. de Lysiâ, p.
-  453.
-
-Accordingly, in the summer of the year 412 B.C. (the year following
-the catastrophe of the Athenian armament,) a Sicilian squadron of
-twenty triremes from Syracuse and two from Selinus, under the command
-of Hermokrates, reached Peloponnesus and joined the Lacedæmonian
-fleet in its expedition across the Ægean to Miletus. Another
-squadron of ten triremes from Thurii, under the Rhodian Dorieus,
-and a farther reinforcement from Tarentum, and Lokri, followed soon
-after. It was Hermokrates who chiefly instigated his countrymen to
-this effort.[841] Throughout the trying months of the siege, he
-had taken a leading part in the defence of Syracuse, seconding the
-plans of Gylippus with equal valor and discretion. As commander of
-the Syracusan squadron in the main fleet now acting against Athens
-in the Ægean (events already described in my sixty-first chapter),
-his conduct was not less distinguished. He was energetic in action,
-and popular in his behavior towards those under his command; but
-what stood out most conspicuously as well as most honorably, was
-his personal incorruptibility. While the Peloponnesian admiral and
-trierarchs accepted the bribes of Tissaphernes, conniving at his
-betrayal of the common cause and breach of engagement towards the
-armament, with indifference to the privations of their own unpaid
-seamen,—Hermokrates and Dorieus were strenuous in remonstrance, even
-to the extent of drawing upon themselves the indignant displeasure
-of the Peloponnesian admiral Astyochus, as well as of the satrap
-himself.[842] They were the more earnest in performing this duty,
-because the Syracusan and Thurian triremes were manned by freemen in
-larger proportion than the remaining fleet.[843]
-
-  [841] Thucyd. viii, 26, 35, 91.
-
-  [842] Thucyd. viii, 29, 45, 78, 84.
-
-  [843] Thucyd. viii, 84.
-
-The sanguine expectation, however, entertained by Hermokrates and his
-companions in crossing the sea from Sicily,—that one single effort
-would gloriously close the war,—was far from being realized. Athens
-resisted with unexpected energy; the Lacedæmonians were so slack
-and faint-hearted, that they even let slip the golden opportunity
-presented to them by the usurpation of the Athenian Four Hundred.
-Tissaphernes was discovered to be studiously starving and protracting
-the war for purposes of his own, which Hermokrates vainly tried
-to counter-work by a personal visit and protest at Sparta.[844]
-Accordingly, the war trailed on with fluctuating success, and even
-renovated efficiency on the part of Athens; so that the Syracusans
-at home, far from hearing announced the accomplishment of those
-splendid anticipations under which their squadron had departed,
-received news generally unfavorable, and at length positively
-disastrous. They were informed that their seamen were ill-paid and
-distressed; while Athens, far from striking her colors, had found
-means to assemble a fleet at Samos competent still to dispute the
-mastery of the Ægean. They heard of two successive naval defeats,
-which the Peloponnesian and Syracusan fleets sustained in the
-Hellespont[845] (one at Kynossema,—411 B.C.,—a second between Abydos
-and Dardanus,—410 B.C.); and at length of a third, more decisive and
-calamitous than the preceding,—the battle of Kyzikus (409 B.C.),
-wherein the Lacedæmonian admiral Mindarus was slain, and the whole
-of his fleet captured or destroyed. In this defeat the Syracusan
-squadron were joint sufferers. Their seamen were compelled to burn
-all their triremes without exception, in order to prevent them from
-falling into the hands of the enemy; and were left destitute, without
-clothing or subsistence, on the shores of the Propontis amidst the
-satrapy of Pharnabazus.[846] That satrap, with generous forwardness,
-took them into his pay, advanced to them clothing and provision for
-two months, and furnished them with timber from the woods of Mount
-Ida to build fresh ships. At Antandrus (in the Gulf of Adramyttium,
-one great place of export for Idæan timber), where the reconstruction
-took place, the Syracusans made themselves so acceptable and useful
-to the citizens, that a vote of thanks and a grant of citizenship was
-passed to all of them who chose to accept it.[847]
-
-  [844] Thucyd. viii, 85.
-
-  [845] Thucyd. viii, 105; Xen. Hellen. i, 1, 7.
-
-  [846] Xen. Hellen. i, 1, 19.
-
-  [847] Xen. Hellen. i, 1, 23-26.
-
-In recounting this battle, I cited the brief and rude despatch,
-addressed to the Lacedæmonians by Hippokrates, surviving second
-officer of the slain Mindarus, describing the wretched condition of
-the defeated armament—“Our honor is gone. Mindarus is slain. The men
-are hungry. We know not what to do.”[848] This curious despatch has
-passed into history, because it was intercepted by the Athenians, and
-never reached its destination. But without doubt the calamitous state
-of facts, which it was intended to make known, flew rapidly, under
-many different forms of words, both to Peloponnesus and to Syracuse.
-Sad as the reality was, the first impression made by the news would
-probably be yet sadder; since the intervention of Pharnabazus,
-whereby the sufferers were so much relieved, would hardly be felt
-or authenticated until after some interval. At Syracuse, the event
-on being made known excited not only powerful sympathy with the
-sufferers, but also indignant displeasure against Hermokrates and
-his colleagues; who, having instigated their countrymen three years
-before, by sanguine hopes and assurances, to commence a foreign
-expedition for the purpose of finally putting down Athens, had not
-only achieved nothing, but had sustained a series of reverses, ending
-at length in utter ruin, from the very enemy whom they had pronounced
-to be incapable of farther resistance.
-
-  [848] Xen. Hellen. i, 1, 23. Ἔῤῥει τὰ καλά. Μίνδαρος ἀπεσσούα·
-  πεινῶντι τὤνδρες· ἀπορέομες τί χρὴ δρᾷν.
-
-It was under such sentiment of displeasure, shortly after the defeat
-of Kyzikus, that a sentence of banishment was passed at Syracuse
-against Hermokrates and his colleagues. The sentence was transmitted
-to Asia, and made known by Hermokrates himself to the armament,
-convoked in public meeting. While lamenting and protesting against
-its alleged injustice and illegality, he entreated the armament to
-maintain unabated good behavior for the future, and to choose new
-admirals for the time, until the successors nominated at Syracuse
-should arrive. The news was heard with deep regret by the trierarchs,
-the pilots, and the maritime soldiers or marines; who, attached
-to Hermokrates from his popular manner, his constant openness of
-communication with them, and his anxiety to collect their opinions,
-loudly proclaimed that they would neither choose, nor serve under,
-any other leaders.[849] But the admirals repressed this disposition,
-deprecating any resistance to the decree of the city. They laid down
-their command, inviting any man dissatisfied with them to prefer his
-complaint at once publicly, and reminding the soldiers of the many
-victories and glorious conflicts, both by land and sea, which had
-knit them together by the ties of honorable fellowship. No man stood
-forward to accuse them; and they consented, on the continued request
-of the armament, to remain in command, until their three successors
-arrived—Demarchus, Myskon, and Potamis. They then retired amidst
-universal regret; many of the trierarchs even binding themselves
-by oath, that on returning to Syracuse they would procure their
-restoration. The change of commanders took place at Miletus.[850]
-
-  [849] Xen. Hellen. i, 1, 27.
-
-  [850] Xen. Hellen. i, 1, 27-31.
-
-Though Hermokrates, in his address to the soldiers, would doubtless
-find response when he invoked the remembrance of past victories, yet
-he would hardly have found the like response in a Syracusan assembly.
-For if we review the proceedings of the armament since he conducted
-it from Syracuse to join the Peloponnesian fleet, we shall find that
-on the whole his expedition had been a complete failure, and that
-his assurances of success against Athens had ended in nothing but
-disappointment. There was therefore ample cause for the discontent
-of his countrymen. But on the other hand, as far as our limited
-means of information enable us to judge, the sentence of banishment
-against him appears to have been undeserved and unjust. For we
-cannot trace the ill-success of Hermokrates to any misconduct or
-omission on his part; while in regard to personal incorruptibility,
-and strenuous resistance to the duplicity of Tissaphernes, he stood
-out as an honorable exception among a body of venal colleagues. That
-satrap, indeed, as soon as Hermokrates had fallen into disgrace,
-circulated a version of his own, pretending that the latter, having
-asked money from him and been refused, had sought by calumnious
-means to revenge such refusal.[851] But this story, whether believed
-elsewhere or not, found no credit with the other satrap Pharnabazus;
-who warmly espoused the cause of the banished general, presenting
-him with a sum of money even unsolicited. This money Hermokrates
-immediately employed in getting together triremes and mercenary
-soldiers to accomplish his restoration to Syracuse by force.[852]
-We shall presently see how he fared in this attempt. Meanwhile we
-may remark that the sentence of banishment, though in itself unjust,
-would appear amply justified in the eyes of his countrymen by his own
-subsequent resort to hostile measures against them.
-
-  [851] Thucyd. viii, 85.
-
-  [852] Xen. Hellen. i, 1, 31; Diodor. xiii, 63.
-
-The party opposed to Hermokrates had now the preponderance in
-Syracuse, and by their influence probably the sentence against him
-was passed, under the grief and wrath occasioned by the defeat of
-Kyzikus. Unfortunately we have only the most scanty information as
-to the internal state of Syracuse during the period immediately
-succeeding the Athenian siege; a period of marked popular sentiment
-and peculiar interest. As at Athens under the pressure of the
-Xerxeian invasion—the energies of all the citizens, rich and poor,
-young and old, had been called forth for repulse of the common
-enemy, and had been not more than enough to achieve it. As at Athens
-after the battles of Salamis and Platæa, so at Syracuse after the
-destruction of the Athenian besiegers—the people, elate with the
-plenitude of recent effort, and conscious that the late successful
-defence had been the joint work of all, were in a state of animated
-democratical impulse, eager for the utmost extension and equality
-of political rights. Even before the Athenian siege, the government
-had been democratical; a fact, which Thucydides notices as among the
-causes of the successful defence, by rendering the citizens unanimous
-in resistance, and by preventing the besiegers from exciting
-intestine discontent.[853] But in the period immediately after the
-siege, it underwent changes which are said to have rendered it still
-more democratical. On the proposition of an influential citizen named
-Dioklês, a commission of Ten was named, of which he was president,
-for the purpose of revising both the constitution and the legislation
-of the city. Some organic alterations were adopted, one of which
-was, that the lot should be adopted, instead of the principle of
-election, in the nomination of magistrates. Furthermore, a new code,
-or collection of criminal and civil enactments, was drawn up and
-sanctioned. We know nothing of its details, but we are told that
-its penalties were extremely severe, its determination of offences
-minute and special, and its language often obscure as well as brief.
-It was known by the name of the Laws of Dioklês, the chief of the
-Committee who had prepared it. Though now adopted at Syracuse, it did
-not last long; for we shall find in five or six years the despotism
-of Dionysius extinguishing it, just as Peisistratus had put down
-the Solonian legislation at Athens. But it was again revived at the
-extinction of the Dionysian dynasty, after the lapse of more than
-sixty years; with comments and modifications by a committee, among
-whose members were the Corinthians Kephalus and Timoleon. It is also
-said to have been copied in various other Sicilian cities, and to
-have remained in force until the absorption of all Sicily under the
-dominion of the Romans.[854]
-
-  [853] Thucyd. vii, 55.
-
-  [854] Diodor. xiii, 33-35.
-
-We have the austere character of Dioklês illustrated by a story (of
-more than dubious credit,[855] and of which the like is recounted
-respecting other Grecian legislators), that having inadvertently
-violated one of his own enactments, he enforced the duty of obedience
-by falling on his own sword. But unfortunately we are not permitted
-to know the substance of his laws, which would have thrown so much
-light on the sentiments and position of the Sicilian Greeks. Nor can
-we distinctly make out to what extent the political constitution
-of Syracuse was now changed. For though Diodorus tells us that the
-lot was now applied to the nomination of magistrates, yet he does
-not state whether it was applied to all magistrates, or under what
-reserves and exceptions—such, for example, as those adopted at
-Athens. Aristotle too states that the Syracusan people, after the
-Athenian siege, changed their constitution from a partial democracy
-into an entire democracy. Yet he describes Dionysius, five or six
-years afterwards, as pushing himself up to the despotism, by the most
-violent demagogic opposition; and as having accused, disgraced, and
-overthrown certain rich leaders then in possession of the functions
-of government.[856] If the constitutional forms were rendered more
-democratical, it would seem that the practice cannot have materially
-changed, and that the persons actually in leading function still
-continued to be rich men.
-
-  [855] Compare Diodor. xiii, 75—about the banishment of Dioklês.
-
-  [856] Aristotel. Politic. v, 3, 6. Καὶ ἐν Συρακούσαις ὁ δῆμος,
-  αἴτιος γενόμενος τῆς νίκης τοῦ πολέμου τοῦ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους, ἐκ
-  πολιτείας εἰς δημοκρατίαν μετέβαλε.
-
-  v, 4, 4, 5. Καὶ Διονύσιος κατηγορῶν Δαφναίου καὶ τῶν πλουσίων
-  ἠξιώθη τῆς τυραννίδος, διὰ τὴν ἔχθραν πιστευθεὶς ὡς δημοτικὸς ὤν.
-
-The war carried on by the Syracusans against Naxos and Katana, after
-continuing more than three years,[857] was brought to a close by an
-enemy from without, even more formidable than Athens. This time, the
-invader was not Hellenic, but Phœnician—the ancient foe of Hellas,
-Carthage.
-
-  [857] Diodor. xiii, 56.
-
-It has been already recounted, how in the same eventful year (480
-B.C.) which transported Xerxes across the Hellespont to meet his
-defeat at Salamis, the Carthaginians had poured into Sicily a vast
-mercenary host under Hamilkar, for the purpose of reinstating in
-Himera the despot Terillus, who had been expelled by Theron of
-Agrigentum. On that occasion, Hamilkar had been slain, and his large
-army defeated, by the Syracusan despot Gelon, in the memorable battle
-of Himera. So deep had been the impression left by this defeat, that
-for the seventy years which intervened between 480-410 B.C., the
-Carthaginians had never again invaded the island. They resumed their
-aggressions shortly after the destruction of the Athenian power
-before Syracuse; which same event had also stimulated the Persians,
-who had been kept in restraint while the Athenian empire remained
-unimpaired, again to act offensively for the recovery of their
-dominion over the Asiatic Greeks. The great naval power of Athens,
-inspiring not merely reserve but even alarm to Carthage,[858] had
-been a safeguard to the Hellenic world both at its eastern and its
-western extremity. No sooner was that safeguard overthrown, than the
-hostile pressure of the foreigner began to be felt, as well upon
-Western Sicily as on the eastern coast of the Ægean.
-
-  [858] Thucyd. vi, 34. Speech of Hermokrates to his countrymen at
-  Syracuse—δοκεῖ δέ μοι καὶ ἐς Καρχηδόνα ἄμεινον εἶναι πέμψαι. Οὐ
-  γὰρ ἀνέλπιστον αὐτοῖς, ἀλλ’ ἀεὶ διὰ φόβου εἰσὶ μή ποτε Ἀθηναῖοι
-  αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τὴν πόλιν ἔλθωσιν, etc.
-
-From this time forward for two centuries, down to the conclusion of
-the second Punic war, the Carthaginians will be found frequent in
-their aggressive interventions in Sicily, and upon an extensive
-scale, so as to act powerfully on the destinies of the Sicilian
-Greeks. Whether any internal causes had occurred to make them
-abstain from intervention during the preceding generations, we are
-unable to say. The history of this powerful and wealthy city is very
-little known. We make out a few facts, which impart a general idea
-both of her oligarchical government and of her extensive colonial
-possessions, but which leave us in the dark as to her continuous
-history. Her possessions were most extensive, along the coast of
-Africa both eastward and westward from her city; comprehending also
-Sardinia and the Balearic isles, but (at this time, probably) few
-settlements in Spain. She had quite enough to occupy her attention
-elsewhere, without meddling in Sicilian affairs; the more so, as
-her province in Sicily was rather a dependent ally than a colonial
-possession. In the early treaties made with Rome, the Carthaginians
-restrict and even interdict the traffic of the Romans both with
-Sardinia and Africa (except Carthage itself), but they grant the
-amplest license of intercourse with the Carthaginian province of
-Sicily; which they consider as standing in the same relation to
-Carthage as the cities of Latium stood in to Rome.[859] While the
-connection of Carthage with Sicily was thus less close, it would
-appear that her other dependencies gave her much trouble, chiefly in
-consequence of her own harsh and extortionate dominion.
-
-  [859] Polybius, iii, 22, 23, 24.
-
-  He gives three separate treaties (either wholly or in part)
-  between the Carthaginians and Romans. The latest of the three
-  belongs to the days of Pyrrhus, about 278 B.C.; the earliest to
-  508 B.C. The intermediate treaty is not marked as to date by
-  any specific evidence, but I see no ground for supposing that
-  it is so late as 345 B.C., which is the date assigned to it by
-  Casaubon, identifying it with the treaty alluded to by Livy, vii,
-  27. I cannot but think that it is more likely to be of earlier
-  date, somewhere between 480-410 B.C. This second treaty is far
-  more restrictive than the first, against the Romans; for it
-  interdicts them from all traffic either with Sardinia or Africa,
-  except the city of Carthage itself; the first treaty permitted
-  such trade under certain limitations and conditions. The second
-  treaty argues a comparative superiority of Carthage to Rome,
-  which would rather seem to belong to the latter half of the fifth
-  century B.C., than to the latter half of the fourth.
-
-All our positive information, scanty as it is, about Carthage and
-her institutions, relates to the fourth, third, or second centuries
-B.C., yet it may be held to justify presumptive conclusions as to the
-fifth century B.C., especially in reference to the general system
-pursued. The maximum of her power was attained before her first war
-with Rome, which began in 264 B.C.; the first and second Punic wars
-both of them greatly reduced her strength and dominion. Yet in spite
-of such reduction we learn that about 150 B.C., shortly before the
-third Punic war, which ended in the capture and depopulation of the
-city, not less than seven hundred thousand souls[860] were computed
-in it, as occupants of a fortified circumference of above twenty
-miles, covering a peninsula with its isthmus. Upon this isthmus its
-citadel Byrsa was situated, surrounded by a triple wall of its own,
-and crowned at its summit by a magnificent temple of Æsculapius.
-The numerous population is the more remarkable, since Utica (a
-considerable city, colonized from Phœnicia more anciently than even
-Carthage itself, and always independent of the Carthaginians, though
-in the condition of an inferior and discontented ally), was within
-the distance of seven miles from Carthage[861] on the one side, and
-Tunis seemingly not much farther off on the other. Even at that time,
-too, the Carthaginians are said to have possessed three hundred
-tributary cities in Libya.[862] Yet this was but a small fraction of
-the prodigious empire which had belonged to them certainly in the
-fourth century B.C., and in all probability also between 480-410 B.C.
-That empire extended eastward as far as the Altars of the Philæni,
-near the Great Syrtis,—westward, all along the coast to the Pillars
-of Herakles and the western coast of Morocco. The line of coast
-south-east of Carthage, as far as the bay called the Lesser Syrtis,
-was proverbial (under the name of Byzacium and the Emporia) for its
-fertility. Along this extensive line were distributed indigenous
-Libyan tribes, living by agriculture; and a mixed population called
-Liby-Phœnicians, formed by intermarriage and coalition of some of
-these tribes either with colonists from Tyre and Sidon, or perhaps
-with a Canaanitish population akin in race to the Phœnicians, yet of
-still earlier settlement in the country.[863] These Liby-Phœnicians
-dwelt in towns, seemingly of moderate size and unfortified, but each
-surrounded by a territory ample and fertile, yielding large produce.
-They were assiduous cultivators, but generally unwarlike, which
-latter quality was ascribed by ancient theory to the extreme richness
-of their soil.[864] Of the Liby-Phœnician towns the number is not
-known to us, but it must have been prodigiously great, since we are
-told that both Agathokles and Regulus in their respective invasions
-captured no less than two hundred. A single district, called Tuska,
-is also spoken of as having fifty towns.[865]
-
-  [860] Strabo, xvii, p. 832, 833; Livy, Epitome, lib. 51.
-
-  Strabo gives the circumference as three hundred and sixty stadia,
-  and the breadth of the isthmus as sixty stadia. But this is
-  noticed by Barth as much exaggerated (Wanderungen auf der Küste
-  des Mittelmeers, p. 85).
-
-  [861] Appian. Reb. Punic, viii, 75.
-
-  [862] Strabo, _ut sup._
-
-  [863] This is the view of Movers, sustained with much
-  plausibility, in his learned and instructive work—Geschichte der
-  Phœnizier, vol. ii, part ii, p. 435-455. See Diodor. xx, 55.
-
-  [864] Livy, xxix, 25. Compare the last chapter of the history of
-  Herodotus.
-
-  [865] Diodor. xx, 17; Appian, viii, 3, 68.
-
-A few of the towns along the coast,—Hippo, Utica, Adrumetum, Thapsus,
-Leptis, etc.,—were colonies from Tyre, like Carthage herself.
-With respect to Carthage, therefore, they stood upon a different
-footing from the Liby-Phœnician towns, either maritime or in the
-interior. Yet the Carthaginians contrived in time to render every
-town tributary, with the exception of Utica. They thus derived
-revenue from all the inhabitants of this fertile region, Tyrian,
-Liby-Phœnician, and indigenous Libyan; and the amount which they
-imposed appears to have been exorbitant. At one time, immediately
-after the first Punic war, they took from the rural cultivators as
-much as one-half of their produce,[866] and doubled at one stroke
-the tribute levied upon the towns. The town and district of Leptis
-paid to them a tribute of one talent per day, or three hundred and
-sixty-five talents annually. Such exactions were not collected
-without extreme harshness of enforcement, sometimes stripping the
-tax-payer of all that he possessed, and even tearing him from his
-family to be sold in person for a slave.[867] Accordingly the general
-sentiment among the dependencies towards Carthage was one of mingled
-fear and hatred, which rendered them eager to revolt on the landing
-of any foreign invader. In some cases the Carthaginians seem to have
-guarded against such contingencies by paid garrisons; but they also
-provided a species of garrison from among their own citizens; by
-sending out from Carthage poor men, and assigning to them lots of
-land with the cultivators attached. This provision for poor citizens
-as emigrants (mainly analogous to the Roman colonies), was a standing
-feature in the Carthaginian political system, serving the double
-purpose of obviating discontent among their own town population at
-home, and of keeping watch over their dependencies abroad.[868]
-
-  [866] Colonel Leake observes, with respect to the modern Greeks,
-  who work on the plains of Turkey, upon the landed property of
-  Turkish proprietors—“The Helots seem to have resembled the
-  Greeks, who labor on the Turkish farms _in the plains_ of Turkey,
-  and who are bound to account to their masters for one-half of the
-  produce of the soil, as Tyrtæus says of the Messenians of his
-  time—
-
-      Ὥσπερ ὄνοι μεγάλοις ἄχθεσι τειρόμενοι
-    Δεσποσύνοισι φέροντες, ἀναγκαίης ὑπὸ λυγρῆς,
-      Ἥμισυ πᾶν, ὅσσον κάρπον ἄρουρα φέροι.
-                                    (Tyrtæus, Frag. 5, ed. Schneid.)
-
-  The condition of the Greeks in the mountainous regions is not so
-  hard” (Leake, Peloponnesiaca, p. 168).
-
-  [867] Polybius, i, 72; Livy, xxxiv, 62.
-
-  Movers (Geschichte der Phœnizier, ii, 2, p. 455) assigns this
-  large assessment to Leptis Magna; but the passage of Livy can
-  relate only to Leptis Parva, in the region called Emporia.
-
-  Leptis Magna was at a far greater distance from Carthage, near
-  the Great Syrtis.
-
-  Dr. Barth (Wanderungen durch die Küstenländer des
-  Mittelländischen Meers, p. 81-146) has given a recent and
-  valuable examination of the site of Carthage and of the
-  neighboring regions. On his map, however, the territory called
-  Emporia is marked near the Lesser Syrtis, two hundred miles from
-  Carthage (Pliny, H. N. v, 3). Yet it seems certain that the name
-  Emporia must have comprised the territory south of Carthage and
-  approaching very near to the city; for Scipio Africanus, in his
-  expedition from Sicily, directed his pilots to steer for Emporia.
-  He intended to land very near Carthage; and he actually did land
-  on the White Cape, near to that city, but on the north side, and
-  still nearer to Utica. This region north of Carthage was probably
-  not included in the name Emporia (Livy, xxix, 25-27).
-
-  [868] Aristotel. Politic. ii, 8, 9; vi, 3, 5.
-
-In the fifth century B.C., the Carthaginians had no apprehension
-of any foreign enemy invading them from seaward; an enterprise
-first attempted in 316 B.C., to the surprise of every one, by the
-boldness of the Syracusan Agathokles. Nor were their enemies on
-the land side formidable as conquerors, though they were extremely
-annoying as plunderers. The Numidians and other native tribes,
-half-naked and predatory horsemen, distinguished for speed as
-well as for indefatigable activity, so harassed the individual
-cultivators of the soil, that the Carthaginians dug a long line of
-ditch to keep them off.[869] But these barbarians did not acquire
-sufficient organization to act for permanent objects, until the
-reign of Masinissa and the second Punic war with Rome. During the
-fifth and fourth centuries B.C., therefore (prior to the invasion
-of Agathokles), the warfare carried on by the Carthaginians was
-constantly aggressive and in foreign parts. For these purposes they
-chiefly employed foreign mercenaries, hired for the occasion from
-Italy, Gaul, Spain, and the islands of the Western Mediterranean,
-together with conscripts from their Libyan dependencies. The native
-Carthaginians,[870] though encouraged by honorary marks to undertake
-this military service, were generally averse to it, and sparingly
-employed. But these citizens, though not often sent on foreign
-service, constituted a most formidable force when called upon. No
-less then forty thousand hoplites went forth from the gates of
-Carthage to resist Agathokles, together with one thousand cavalry,
-and two thousand war-chariots.[871] An immense public magazine,—of
-arms, muniments of war of all kinds, and provisions,—appears to have
-been kept in the walls of Byrsa, the citadel of Carthage.[872] A
-chosen division of two thousand five hundred citizens, men of wealth
-and family, formed what was called the Sacred Band of Carthage,[873]
-distinguished for their bravery in the field as well as for the
-splendor of their arms, and the gold and silver plate which
-formed part of their baggage. We shall find these citizen-troops
-occasionally employed on service in Sicily: but most part of the
-Carthaginian armies consists of Gauls, Iberians, Libyans, etc., a
-mingled host got together for the occasion, discordant in language as
-well as in customs. Such men had never any attachment to the cause
-in which they fought,—seldom, to the commanders under whom they
-served; while they were often treated by Carthage with bad faith,
-and recklessly abandoned to destruction.[874] A military system such
-as this was pregnant with danger, if ever the mercenary soldiers got
-footing in Africa; as happened after the first Punic war, when the
-city was brought to the brink of ruin. But on foreign service in
-Sicily, these mercenaries often enabled Carthage to make conquest at
-the cost only of her money, without any waste of the blood of her own
-citizens. The Carthaginian generals seem generally to have relied,
-like Persians, upon numbers,—manifesting little or no military skill;
-until we come to the Punic wars with Rome, conducted under Hamilkar
-Barca and his illustrious son Hannibal.
-
-  [869] Appian, viii, 32, 54, 59; Phlegon, Trall. de Mirabilibus,
-  c. 18. Εὔμαχος δέ φησιν ἐν Περιηγήσει, Καρχηδονίους
-  περιταφρεύοντας τὴν ἰδίαν ἐπαρχίαν, εὑρεῖν ὀρύσσοντας δύο
-  σκελετοὺς ἐν σόρῳ κειμένους, etc.
-
-  The line of trench however was dug apparently at an early stage
-  of the Carthaginian dominion; for the Carthaginians afterwards,
-  as they grew more powerful, extended their possessions beyond the
-  trench; as we see by the passages of Appian above referred to.
-
-  Movers (Gesch. der Phœniz. ii, 2, p. 457) identifies this trench
-  with the one which Pliny names near Thenæ on the Lesser Syrtis,
-  as having been dug by order of the second Africanus—to form a
-  boundary between the Roman province of Africa, and the dominion
-  of the native kings (Pliny, H. N. v, 3). But I greatly doubt such
-  identity. It appears to me that this last is distinct from the
-  Carthaginian trench.
-
-  [870] A Carthaginian citizen wore as many rings as he had served
-  campaigns (Aristotel. Politic. vii, 2, 6).
-
-  [871] Diodor. xx, 10.
-
-  [872] Appian, viii, 80. Twenty thousand panoplies, together with
-  an immense stock of weapons and engines of siege, were delivered
-  up to the perfidious manœuvres of the Romans, a little before the
-  last siege of Carthage.
-
-  See Bötticher, Geschichte der Carthager, p. 20-25.
-
-  [873] Diodor. xvi, 8.
-
-  [874] See the striking description in Livy, of the motley
-  composition of the Carthaginian mercenary armies, where he
-  bestows just admiration on the genius of Hannibal, for having
-  always maintained his ascendency over them, and kept them in
-  obedience and harmony (Livy, xxviii, 12). Compare Polybius, i,
-  65-67, and the manner in which Imilkon abandoned his mercenaries
-  to destruction at Syracuse (Diodor. xiv, 75-77).
-
-Respecting the political constitution of Carthage, the facts
-known are too few, and too indistinct, to enable us to comprehend
-its real working. The magistrates most conspicuous in rank and
-precedence were, the two kings or suffetes, who presided over the
-Senate.[875] They seem to have been renewed annually, though how
-far the same persons were reëligible, or actually rechosen, we do
-not know, but they were always selected out of some few principal
-families or Gentes. There is reason for believing that the genuine
-Carthaginian citizens were distributed into three tribes, thirty
-curiæ, and three hundred gentes—something in the manner of the Roman
-patricians. From these gentes emanated a Senate of three hundred,
-out of which again was formed a smaller council or committee of
-thirty _principes_ representing the curiæ;[876] sometimes a still
-smaller, of only ten _principes_. These little councils are both
-frequently mentioned in the political proceedings of Carthage; and
-perhaps the Thirty may coincide with what Polybius calls the Gerusia,
-or Council of Ancients,—the Three Hundred, with that which he calls
-the Senate.[877] Aristotle assimilates the two kings (suffetes) of
-Carthage to the two kings of Sparta—and the Gerusia of Carthage also
-to that of Sparta;[878] which latter consisted of thirty members,
-including the kings who sat in it. But Aristotle does not allude to
-any assembly at Carthage analogous to what Polybius calls the Senate.
-He mentions two Councils, one of one hundred members, the other of
-one hundred and four; and certain Boards of Five,—the pentarchies. He
-compares the Council of one hundred and four to the Spartan ephors;
-yet again he talks of the pentarchies as invested with extensive
-functions, and terms the Council of one hundred the greatest
-authority in the state. Perhaps this last Council was identical with
-the assembly of one hundred Judges (said to have been chosen from the
-Senate as a check upon the generals employed), or Ordo Judicum; of
-which Livy speaks after the second Punic war, as existing with its
-members perpetual and so powerful that it overruled all the other
-assemblies and magistracies of the state. Through the influence
-of Hannibal, a law was passed to lessen the overweening power of
-this Order of Judges; causing them to be elected only for one year,
-instead of being perpetual.[879]
-
-  [875] There were in like manner two suffetes in Gades and each
-  of the other Phœnician colonies (Livy, xxviii, 37). Cornelius
-  Nepos (Hannibal, c. 7) talks of Hannibal as having been made
-  _king_ (rex) when he was invested with his great foreign military
-  command, at twenty-two years of age. So Diodorus (xiv, 54) talks
-  about Imilkon, and Herodotus (vii, 166) about Hamilkar.
-
-  [876] See Movers, Die Phönizier, ii, 1, p. 483-499.
-
-  [877] Polybius, x, 18; Livy, xxx, 16.
-
-  Yet again Polybius in another place speaks of the Gerontion at
-  Carthage as representing the aristocratical force, and as opposed
-  to the πλῆθος or people (vi, 51). It would seem that by Γερόντιον
-  he must mean the same as the assembly called in another passage
-  (x, 18) Σύγκλητος.
-
-  [878] Aristotel. Politic. ii, 8, 2.
-
-  [879] Livy, xxxiii, 46. Justin (xix, 2) mentions the one hundred
-  select Senators set apart as judges.
-
-These statements, though coming from valuable authors, convey so
-little information and are withal so difficult to reconcile, that
-both the structure and working of the political machine at Carthage
-may be said to be unknown.[880] But it seems clear that the general
-spirit of the government was highly oligarchical; that a few rich,
-old, and powerful families, divided among themselves the great
-offices and influence of the state; that they maintained themselves
-in pointed and even insolent distinction from the multitude;[881]
-that they stood opposed to each other in bitter feuds, often stained
-by gross perfidy and bloodshed; and that the treatment with which,
-through these violent party-antipathies, unsuccessful generals were
-visited, was cruel in the extreme.[882] It appears that wealth was
-one indispensable qualification, and that magistrates and generals
-procured their appointments in a great measure by corrupt means. Of
-such corruption, one variety was, the habit of constantly regaling
-the citizens in collective banquets of the _curiæ_ or the political
-associations; a habit so continual, and embracing so wide a circle of
-citizens, that Aristotle compares these banquets to the _phiditia_
-or public mess of Sparta.[883] There was a demos or people at
-Carthage, who were consulted on particular occasions, and before whom
-propositions were publicly debated, in cases where the suffetes and
-the small Council were not all of one mind.[884] How numerous this
-demos was, or what proportion of the whole population it comprised,
-we have no means of knowing. But it is plain, that whether more or
-less considerable, its multitude was kept under dependence to the
-rich families by stratagems such as the banquets, the lucrative
-appointments with lots of land in foreign dependencies, etc. The
-purposes of government were determined, its powers wielded and the
-great offices held—suffetes, senators, generals, or judges,—by
-the members of a small number of wealthy families; and the chief
-opposition which they encountered, was from their feuds against
-each other. In the main, the government was conducted with skill
-and steadiness, as well for internal tranquillity as for systematic
-foreign and commercial aggrandizement. Within the knowledge of
-Aristotle, Carthage had never suffered either the successful
-usurpation of a despot, or any violent intestine commotion.[885]
-
-  [880] Heeren (Ideen über den Verkehr der Alten Welt, part ii, p.
-  138, 3rd edit.) and Kluge (in his Dissertation, Aristoteles de
-  Politiâ Carthaginiensium, Wratisl. 1824) have discussed all these
-  passages with ability. But their materials do not enable them to
-  reach any certainty.
-
-  [881] Valerius Max. ix, 5, 4. “Insolentiæ inter Carthaginiensem
-  et Campanum senatum quasi æmulatio fuit. Ille enim separato à
-  plebe balneo lavabatur, hic diverso foro utebatur.”
-
-  [882] Diodor. xx, 10; xxiii, 9; Valer. Max. ii, 7, 1.
-
-  [883] Aristotel Politic. iii, 5, 6.
-
-  These banquets must have been settled, daily proceedings,—as
-  well as multitudinous, in order to furnish even apparent warrant
-  for the comparison which Aristotle makes with the Spartan public
-  mess. But even granting the analogy on these external points,—the
-  intrinsic difference of character and purpose between the two
-  must have been so great, that the comparison seems not happy.
-
-  Livy (xxxiv, 61) talks of the _circuli et convivia_ at Carthage;
-  but this is probably a general expression, without particular
-  reference to the public banquets mentioned by Aristotle.
-
-  [884] Aristotel. Polit. ii, 8, 3.
-
-  [885] Aristot. Polit. ii, 8, 1. He briefly alludes to the
-  abortive conspiracy of Hanno (v, 6, 2), which is also mentioned
-  in Justin (xxi, 4). Hanno is said to have formed the plan of
-  putting to death the Senate, and making himself despot. But he
-  was detected, and executed under the severest tortures; all his
-  family being put to death along with him.
-
-  Not only is it very difficult to make out Aristotle’s statements
-  about the Carthaginian government,—but some of them are even
-  contradictory. One of these (v, 10, 3) has been pointed out by M.
-  Barthélemy St. Hilaire, who proposes to read ἐν Χαλκηδόνι instead
-  of ἐν Καρχηδόνι. In another place (v, 10, 4) Aristotle calls
-  Carthage (ἐν Καρχηδόνι δημοκρατουμένῃ) a state democratically
-  governed; which cannot be reconciled with what he says in ii, 8,
-  respecting its government.
-
-  Aristotle compares the Council of One Hundred and Four at
-  Carthage to the Spartan ephors. But it is not easy to see how so
-  numerous a body could have transacted the infinite diversity of
-  administrative and other business performed by the five ephors.
-
-The first eminent Carthaginian leader brought to our notice, is
-Mago (seemingly about 530-500 B.C.), who is said to have mainly
-contributed to organize the forces, and extend the dominion,
-of Carthage. Of his two sons, one, Hasdrubal, perished after a
-victorious career in Sardinia;[886] the other, Hamilkar, commanding
-at the battle of Himera in Sicily, was there defeated and slain by
-Gelon, as has been already recounted. After the death of Hamilkar,
-his son Giskon was condemned to perpetual exile, and passed his
-life in Sicily at the Greek city of Selinus.[887] But the sons of
-Hasdrubal still remained at Carthage, the most powerful citizens
-in the state; carrying on hostilities against the Moors and other
-indigenous Africans, whom they compelled to relinquish the tribute
-which Carthage had paid, down to that time, for the ground whereon
-the city was situated. This family are said indeed to have been so
-powerful, that a check upon their ascendency was supposed to be
-necessary; and for that purpose the select One Hundred Senators
-sitting as judges were now nominated for the first time.[888] Such
-wars in Africa doubtless tended to prevent the Carthaginians from
-farther interference in Sicily, during the interval between 480-410
-B.C. There were probably other causes also, not known to us,—and
-down to the year 413 B.C., the formidable naval power of Athens
-(as has been already remarked) kept them on the watch even for
-themselves. But now, after the great Athenian catastrophe before
-Syracuse, apprehensions from that quarter were dissipated; so that
-Carthage again found leisure, as well as inclination, to seek in
-Sicily both aggrandizement and revenge.
-
-  [886] Justin. xix, 1.
-
-  [887] Diodor. xiii.
-
-  [888] Justin, xix, 2.
-
-It is remarkable that the same persons, acting in the same quarrel,
-who furnished the pretext or the motive for the recent invasion by
-Athens, now served in the like capacity as prompters to Carthage.
-The inhabitants of Egesta, engaged in an unequal war with rival
-neighbors at Selinus, were in both cases the soliciting parties.
-They had applied to Carthage first, without success,[889] before
-they thought of sending to invoke aid from Athens. This war indeed
-had been for the time merged and forgotten in the larger Athenian
-enterprise against Syracuse; but it revived after that catastrophe,
-wherein Athens and her armament were shipwrecked. The Egestæans had
-not only lost their protectors, but had incurred aggravated hostility
-from their neighbors, for having brought upon Sicily so formidable an
-ultramarine enemy. Their original quarrel with Selinus had related
-to a disputed portion of border territory. This point they no longer
-felt competent to maintain, under their present disadvantageous
-circumstances. But the Selinuntines, confident as well as angry,
-were now not satisfied with success in their original claim. They
-proceeded to strip the Egestæans of other lands indisputably
-belonging to them, and seriously menaced the integrity as well as the
-independence of the city. To no other quarter could the Egestæans
-turn, with any chance of finding both will and power to protect them,
-except to Carthage.[890]
-
-  [889] Diodor. xii, 82.
-
-  It seems probable that the war which Diodorus mentions to have
-  taken place in 452 B.C., between the Egestæans and Lilybæans—was
-  really a war between Egesta and Selinus (see Diodor, xi, 86—with
-  Wesseling’s note). Lilybæum as a town attained no importance
-  until after the capture of Motyê by the older Dionysius in 393
-  B.C.
-
-  [890] Diodor. xiii, 43.
-
-The town of Egesta (non-Hellenic or at least only semi-Hellenic) was
-situated on or near the northern line of Sicilian coast, not far from
-the western cape of the island, and in the immediate neighborhood
-of the Carthaginian settlements,—Motyê, Panormus (now Palermo), and
-Soloeis or Soluntum. Selinus also was near the western cape, but on
-the southern coast of Sicily, with its territory conterminous to
-the southern portion of Egesta. When therefore the Egestæan envoys
-presented their urgent supplications at Carthage for aid, proclaiming
-that unless assisted they must be subjugated and become a dependency
-of Selinus,—the Carthaginians would not unreasonably conceive,
-that their own Sicilian settlements would be endangered, if their
-closest Hellenic neighbor were allowed thus to aggrandize herself.
-Accordingly they agreed to grant the aid solicited; yet not without
-much debate and hesitation. They were uneasy at the idea of resuming
-military operations in Sicily,—which had been laid aside for seventy
-years, and had moreover left such disastrous recollections[891]—at a
-moment when Syracusan courage stood in high renown, from the recent
-destruction of the Athenian armament. But the recollections of the
-Gelonian victory at Himera, while they suggested apprehension,
-also kindled the appetite of revenge; especially in the bosom of
-Hannibal, the grandson of that general Hamilkar who had there met his
-death. Hannibal was at this moment king, or rather first of the two
-suffetes, chief executive magistrates of Carthage, as his grandfather
-had been seventy years before. So violent had been the impression
-made upon the Carthaginians by the defeat of Himera, that they had
-banished Giskon, son of the slain general Hamilkar and father of
-Hannibal, and had condemned him to pass his whole life in exile. He
-had chosen the Greek city of Selinus; where probably Hannibal also
-had spent his youth, though restored since to his country and to
-his family consequence,—and from whence he brought back an intense
-antipathy to the Greek name, as well as an impatience to wipe off by
-a signal revenge the dishonor both of his country and of his family.
-Accordingly, espousing with warmth the request of the Egestæans, he
-obtained from the Senate authority to take effective measures for
-their protection.[892]
-
-  [891] Diodor. xiii, 43.
-
-  [892] Diodor. xiii, 43. Κατέστησαν στρατηγὸν τὸν Ἀννίβαν, κατὰ
-  νόμους τότε βασιλεύοντα. Οὗτος δὲ ἦν υἱωνὸς μὲν τοῦ πρὸς Γέλωνα
-  πολεμήσαντος Ἁμίλκου, καὶ πρὸς Ἱμέρᾳ τελευτήσαντος, υἱὸς δὲ
-  Γέσκωνος, ὃς διὰ τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς ἧτταν ἐφυγαδεύθη, καὶ κατεβίωσεν
-  ἐν τῇ Σελινοῦντι. Ὁ δ’ οὖν Ἀννίβας, ὢν μὲν καὶ ~φύσει μισέλλην~,
-  ὅμως δὲ τὰς τῶν προγόνων ἀτιμίας διορθώσασθαι βουλόμενος, etc.
-
-  The banishment of Giskon, and that too for the whole of his
-  life, deserves notice, as a point of comparison between the
-  Greek republics and Carthage. A defeated general in Greece, if
-  he survived his defeat, was not unfrequently banished, even
-  where there seems neither proof nor probability that he had
-  been guilty of misconduct, or misjudgment, or omission. But I
-  do not recollect any case in which, when a Grecian general thus
-  apparently innocent was not merely defeated but slain in the
-  battle, his son was banished for life, as Giskon was banished
-  by the Carthaginians. In appreciating the manner in which the
-  Grecian states, both democratical and oligarchical, dealt with
-  their officers, the contemporary republic of Carthage is one
-  important standard of comparison. Those who censure the Greeks,
-  will have to find stronger terms of condemnation when they review
-  the proceedings of the Carthaginians.
-
-His first proceeding was to send envoys to Egesta and Selinus, to
-remonstrate against the encroachments of the Selinuntines; with
-farther instructions, in case remonstrance proved ineffectual, to
-proceed with the Egestæans to Syracuse, and there submit the whole
-dispute to the arbitration of the Syracusans. He foresaw that the
-Selinuntines, having superiority of force on their side, would refuse
-to acknowledge any arbitration; and that the Syracusans, respectfully
-invoked by one party but rejected by the other, would stand aside
-from the quarrel altogether. It turned out as he had expected.
-The Selinuntines sent envoys to Syracuse, to protest against the
-representations from Egesta and Carthage; but declined to refer
-their case to arbitration. Accordingly, the Syracusans passed a vote
-that they would maintain their alliance with Selinus, yet without
-impeachment of their pacific relations with Carthage: thus leaving
-the latter free to act without obstruction. Hannibal immediately sent
-over a body of troops to the aid of Egesta: five thousand Libyans
-or Africans; and eight hundred Campanian mercenaries, who had been
-formerly in the pay and service of the Athenians before Syracuse, but
-had quitted that camp before the final catastrophe occurred.[893]
-
-  [893] Diodor. xiii, 43, 44.
-
-In spite of the reinforcement and the imposing countenance of
-Carthage, the Selinuntines, at this time in full power and
-prosperity, still believed themselves strong enough to subdue Egesta.
-Under such persuasion, they invaded the territory with their full
-force. They began to ravage the country, yet at first with order
-and precaution; but presently, finding no enemy in the field to
-oppose them, they became careless, and spread themselves about for
-disorderly plunder. This was the moment for which the Egestæans
-and Carthaginians were watching. They attacked the Selinuntines
-by surprise, defeated them with the loss of a thousand men, and
-recaptured the whole booty.[894]
-
-  [894] Diodor. xiii, 44.
-
-The war, as hitherto carried on, was one offensive on the part of
-the Selinuntines, for the purpose of punishing or despoiling their
-ancient enemy Egesta. Only so far as was necessary for the defence of
-the latter, had the Carthaginians yet interfered. But against such an
-interference the Selinuntines, if they had taken a prudent measure of
-their own force, would have seen that they were not likely to achieve
-any conquest. Moreover, they might perhaps have obtained peace now,
-had they sought it; as a considerable minority among them, headed
-by a citizen named Empedion,[895] urgently recommended: for Selinus
-appears always to have been on more friendly terms with Carthage
-than any other Grecian city in Sicily. Even at the great battle of
-Himera, the Selinuntine troops had not only not assisted Gelon, but
-had actually fought in the Carthaginian army under Hamilkar;[896]
-a plea, which, had it been pressed, might probably have had weight
-with Hannibal. But this claim upon the goodwill of Carthage appears
-only to have rendered them more confident and passionate in braving
-her force and in prosecuting the war. They sent to Syracuse to ask
-for aid, which the Syracusans, under present circumstances, promised
-to send them. But the promise was given with little cordiality,
-as appears by the manner in which they fulfilled it, as well as
-from the neutrality which they had professed so recently before;
-for the contest seemed to be aggressive on the part of Selinus, so
-that Syracuse had little interest in helping her to conquer Egesta.
-Neither Syracusans nor Selinuntines were prepared for the immense
-preparations, and energetic rapidity of movement by which Hannibal at
-once altered the character, and enlarged the purposes, of the war. He
-employed all the ensuing autumn and winter in collecting a numerous
-host of mercenary troops from Africa, Spain, and Campania, with
-various Greeks who were willing to take service.[897]
-
-  [895] Diodor. xiii, 59.
-
-  [896] Diodor. xiii, 55; xi, 21.
-
-  [897] Diodor. xiii, 54-58. οἱ τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις Ἕλληνες
-  ξυμμαχοῦντες, etc.
-
-  It cannot therefore be exact,—that which Plutarch affirms,
-  Timoleon, c. 30,—that the Carthaginians had never employed Greeks
-  in their service, at the time of the battle of the Krimêsus,—B.C.
-  340.
-
-In the spring of the memorable year 409 B.C., through the exuberant
-wealth of Carthage, he was in a condition to leave Africa with a
-great fleet of sixty triremes, and fifteen hundred transports or
-vessels of burthen;[898] conveying an army, which, according to
-the comparatively low estimate of Timæus, amounted to more than
-one hundred thousand men; while Ephorus extended the number to two
-hundred thousand infantry, and four thousand cavalry, together
-with muniments of war and battering machines for siege. With these
-he steered directly for the western Cape of Sicily, Lilybæum;
-taking care, however, to land his troops and to keep his fleet on
-the northern side of that cape, in the bay near Motyê,—and not to
-approach the southern shore, lest he should alarm the Syracusans with
-the idea that he was about to prosecute his voyage farther eastward
-along the southern coast towards their city. By this precaution, he
-took the best means for prolonging the period of Syracusan inaction.
-The Selinuntines, panic-struck at the advent of an enemy so much more
-overwhelming than they had expected, sent pressing messengers to
-Syracuse to accelerate the promised help. They had made no provision
-for standing on the defensive against a really formidable aggressor.
-Their walls, though strong enough to hold out against Sicilian
-neighbors, had been neglected during the long-continued absence of
-any foreign besieger, and were now in many places out of repair.
-Hannibal left them no time to make good past deficiencies. Instead
-of wasting his powerful armament (as the unfortunate Nikias had done
-five years before) by months of empty flourish and real inaction,
-he waited only until he was joined by the troops from Egesta and
-the neighboring Carthaginian dependencies, and then marched his
-whole force straight from Lilybæum to Selinus. Crossing the river
-Mazara in his way, and storming the fort which lay near its mouth,
-he soon found himself under the Selinuntine walls. He distributed
-his army into two parts, each provided with battering machines and
-movable wooden towers; and then assailed the walls on many points at
-once, choosing the points where they were most accessible or most
-dilapidated. Archers and slingers in great numbers were posted near
-the walls, to keep up a discharge of missiles and chase away the
-defenders from the battlements. Under cover of such discharge, six
-wooden towers were rolled up to the foot of the wall, to which they
-were equal or nearly equal in height, so that the armed men in their
-interior were prepared to contend with the defenders almost on a
-level. Against other portions of the wall, battering-rams with iron
-heads were driven by the combined strength of multitudes, shaking or
-breaking through its substance, especially where it showed symptoms
-of neglect or decay. Such were the methods of attack which Hannibal
-now brought to bear upon the unprepared Selinuntines. He was eager to
-forestal the arrival of auxiliaries, by the impetuous movements of
-his innumerable barbaric host, the largest seen in Sicily since his
-grandfather Hamilkar had been defeated before Himera. Collected from
-all the shores of the western Mediterranean, it presented soldiers
-heterogeneous in race, in arms, in language,—in everything, except
-bravery and common appetite for blood as well as plunder.[899]
-
-  [898] Thucyd. vi, 34. δυνατοὶ δέ εἰσι (the Carthaginians) μάλιστα
-  τῶν νῦν, βουληθέντες· χρυσὸν γὰρ καὶ ἄργυρον πλεῖστον κέκτηνται,
-  ὅθεν ὅ τε πόλεμος καὶ τἄλλα εὐπορεῖ.
-
-  [899] Diodor. xiii, 54, 55.
-
-The dismay of the Selinuntines, when they suddenly found themselves
-under the sweep of this destroying hurricane, is not to be described.
-It was no part of the scheme of Hannibal to impose conditions or
-grant capitulation; for he had promised the plunder of their town
-to his soldiers. The only chance of the besieged was, to hold out
-with the courage of desperation, until they could receive aid from
-their Hellenic brethren on the southern coast,—Agrigentum, Gela,
-and especially Syracuse,—all of whom they had sent to warn and to
-supplicate. Their armed population crowded to man the walls, with a
-resolution worthy of Greeks and citizens; while the old men and the
-females, though oppressed with agony from the fate which seemed to
-menace them, lent all the aid and encouragement in their power. Under
-the sound of trumpets, and every variety of war-cry, the assailants
-approached the walls, encountering everywhere a valiant resistance.
-They were repulsed again and again, with the severest loss. But fresh
-troops came up to relieve those who were slain or fatigued; and at
-length, after a murderous struggle, a body of Campanians forced their
-way over the walls into the town. Yet in spite of such temporary
-advantage, the heroic efforts of the besieged drove them out again
-or slew them, so that night arrived without the capture being
-accomplished. For nine successive days was the assault thus renewed
-with undiminished fury; for nine successive days did this heroic
-population maintain a successful resistance, though their enemies
-were numerous enough to relieve each other perpetually,—though their
-own strength was every day failing,—and though not a single friend
-arrived to their aid. At length, on the tenth day, and after terrible
-loss to the besiegers, a sufficient breach was made in the weak part
-of the wall, for the Iberians to force their way into the city.
-Still however the Selinuntines, even after their walls were carried,
-continued with unabated resolution to barricade and defend their
-narrow streets, in which their women also assisted, by throwing down
-stones and tiles upon the assailants from the house-tops. All these
-barriers were successively overthrown, by the unexhausted numbers,
-and increasing passion, of the barbaric host; so that the defenders
-were driven back from all sides into the agora, where most of them
-closed their gallant defence by an honorable death. A small minority,
-among whom was Empedion, escaped to Agrigentum, where they received
-the warmest sympathy and the most hospitable treatment.[900]
-
-  [900] Diodor. xiii, 56, 57.
-
-Resistance being thus at an end, the assailants spread themselves
-through the town in all the fury of insatiate appetites,—murderous,
-lustful, and rapacious. They slaughtered indiscriminately elders
-and children, preserving only the grown women as captives. The sad
-details of a town taken by storm are to a great degree the same
-in every age and nation; but the destroying barbarians at Selinus
-manifested one peculiarity, which marks them as lying without the
-pale of Hellenic sympathy and sentiment. They mutilated the bodies
-of the slain; some were seen with amputated hands strung together
-in a row and fastened round their girdles; while others brandished
-heads on the points of their spears and javelins.[901] The Greeks
-(seemingly not numerous) who served under Hannibal, far from sharing
-in these ferocious manifestations, contributed somewhat to mitigate
-the deplorable fate of the sufferers. Sixteen thousand Selinuntines
-are said to have been slain, five thousand to have been taken
-captive; while two thousand six hundred escaped to Agrigentum.[902]
-These figures are probably under, rather than above, the truth. Yet
-they do not seem entitled to any confidence; nor do they give us any
-account of the entire population in its different categories,—old and
-young,—men and women,—freemen and slaves,—citizens and metics. We
-can only pretend to appreciate this mournful event in the gross. All
-exact knowledge of its details is denied to us.
-
-  [901] Diodor. xiii, 57.
-
-  [902] Diodor. xiii, 57, 58.
-
-It does little honor either to the generosity or to the prudence
-of the Hellenic neighbors of Selinus, that this unfortunate city
-should have been left to its fate unassisted. In vain was messenger
-after messenger despatched, as the defence became more and more
-critical, to Agrigentum, Gela, and Syracuse. The military force
-of the two former was indeed made ready, but postponed its march
-until joined by that of the last; so formidable was the account
-given of the invading host. Meanwhile the Syracusans were not
-ready. They thought it requisite, first, to close the war which
-they were prosecuting against Katana and Naxos,—next, to muster a
-large and carefully-appointed force. Before these preliminaries
-were finished, the nine days of siege were past, and the death-hour
-of Selinus had sounded. Probably the Syracusans were misled by the
-Sicilian operations of Nikias, who, beginning with a long interval
-of inaction, had then approached their town by slow blockade, such
-as the circumstances of his case required. Expecting in the case
-of Selinus that Hannibal would enter upon the like elaborate
-siege,—and not reflecting that he was at the head of a vast host
-of miscellaneous foreigners hired for the occasion, of whose lives
-he could afford to be prodigal, while Nikias commanded citizens of
-Athens and other Grecian states, whom he could not expose to the
-murderous but thorough-going process of ever-renewed assault against
-strong walls recently erected,—they were thunderstruck on being
-informed that nine days of carnage had sufficed for the capture. The
-Syracusan soldiers, a select body of three thousand, who at length
-joined the Geloans and Agrigentines at Agrigentum, only arrived in
-time to partake in the general dismay everywhere diffused. A joint
-embassy was sent by three cities to Hannibal, entreating him to
-permit the ransom of the captives, and to spare the temples of the
-gods; while Empedion went at the same time to sue for compassion on
-behalf of his own fugitive fellow-citizens. To the former demand
-the victorious Carthaginian returned an answer at once haughty and
-characteristic,—“The Selinuntines have not been able to preserve
-their freedom, and must now submit to a trial of slavery. The gods
-have become offended with them, and have taken their departure
-from the town.”[903] To Empedion, an ancient friend and pronounced
-partisan of the Carthaginians, his reply was more indulgent. All
-the relatives of Empedion, found alive among the captives, were
-at once given up; moreover permission was granted to the fugitive
-Selinuntines to return, if they pleased, and reoccupy the town with
-its lands, as tributary subjects of Carthage. At the same time
-that he granted such permission, however, Hannibal at once caused
-the walls to be razed, and even the town with its temples to be
-destroyed.[904] What was done about the proposed ransom, we do not
-hear.
-
-  [903] Diodor. xiii, 59. Ὁ δὲ Ἀννίβας ἀπεκρίθη, τοὺς μὲν
-  Σελινουντίους μὴ δυναμένους τηρεῖν τὴν ἐλευθερίαν, πεῖραν τῆς
-  δουλείας λήψεσθαι· τοὺς δὲ θεοὺς ἐκτὸς Σελινοῦντος οἴχεσθαι,
-  προσκόψαντας τοῖς ἐνοικοῦσιν.
-
-  [904] Diodor. xiii, 59. The ruins, yet remaining, of the ancient
-  temples of Selinus, are vast and imposing; characteristic as
-  specimens of Doric art, during the fifth and sixth centuries
-  B.C. From the great magnitude of the fallen columns, it has been
-  supposed that they were overthrown by an earthquake. But the
-  ruins afford distinct evidence, that these columns have been
-  first undermined, and then overthrown by crow-bars.
-
-  This impressive fact, demonstrating the agency of the
-  Carthaginian destroyers, is stated by Niebuhr, Vorträge über alte
-  Geschichte, vol. iii. p. 207.
-
-Having satiated his troops with this rich plunder Hannibal now
-quitted the scene of bloodshed and desolation, and marched across
-the island to Himera on its northern coast. Though Selinus, as the
-enemy of Egesta, had received the first shock of his arms, yet it was
-against Himera that the grand purpose of his soul was directed. Here
-it was that Hamilkar had lost both his army and his life, entailing
-inexpiable disgrace upon the whole life of his son Giskon: here it
-was that his grandson intended to exact full vengeance and requital
-from the grandchildren of those who then occupied the fated spot.
-Not only was the Carthaginian army elate with the past success,
-but a number of fresh Sikels and Sikans, eager to share in plunder
-as well as to gratify the antipathies of their races against the
-Grecian intruders, flocked to join it; thus making up the losses
-sustained in the recent assault. Having reached Himera, and disposed
-his army in appropriate positions around, Hannibal proceeded to
-instant attack, as at Selinus; pushing up his battering machines and
-towers against the vulnerable portions of the walls, and trying at
-the same time to undermine them. The Himeræans defended themselves
-with desperate bravery; and on this occasion the defence was not
-unassisted; for four thousand allies, chiefly Syracusans, and headed
-by the Syracusan Dioklês, had come to the city as a reinforcement.
-For a whole day they repelled with slaughter repeated assaults.
-No impression being made upon the city, the besieged became so
-confident in their own valor, that they resolved not to copy the
-Selinuntines in confining themselves to defence, but to sally out
-at daybreak the next morning and attack the besiegers in the field.
-Ten thousand gallant men,—Himeræans, Syracusans, and other Grecian
-allies,—accordingly marched out with the dawn; while the battlements
-were lined with old men and women as anxious spectators of their
-exploits. The Carthaginians near the walls, who, preparing to renew
-the assault, looked for nothing less than for a sally, were taken
-by surprise. In spite of their great superiority of number, and in
-spite of great personal bravery, they fell into confusion, and were
-incapable of long resisting the gallant and orderly charge of the
-Greeks. At length they gave way and fled towards the neighboring
-hill, where Hannibal himself with his body of reserve was posted to
-cover the operations of assault. The Greeks pursued them fiercely
-and slaughtered great numbers (six thousand according to Timæus,
-but not less than twenty thousand, if we are to accept the broad
-statement of Ephorus), exhorting each other not to think of making
-prisoners. But in the haste and exultation of pursuit, they became
-out of breath, and their ranks fell into disorder. In this untoward
-condition, they found themselves face to face with the fresh body of
-reserve brought up by Hannibal, who marched down the hill to receive
-and succor his own defeated fugitives. The fortune of the battle
-was now so completely turned, that the Himeræans, after bravely
-contending for some time against these new enemies, found themselves
-overpowered and driven back to their own gates. Three thousand of
-their bravest warriors, however, despairing of their city and mindful
-of the fate of Selinus, disdained to turn their backs, and perished
-to a man in obstinate conflict with the overwhelming numbers of the
-Carthaginians.[905]
-
-  [905] Diodor. xiii, 60.
-
-Violent was the sorrow and dismay in Himera, when the flower of her
-troops were thus driven in as beaten men, with the loss of half
-their numbers. At this moment there chanced to arrive at the port
-a fleet of twenty-five triremes, belonging to Syracuse and other
-Grecian cities in Sicily; which triremes had been sent to aid the
-Peloponnesians in the Ægean, but had since come back, and were now
-got together for the special purpose of relieving the besieged city.
-So important a reinforcement ought to have revived the spirit of
-the Himeræans. It announced that the Syracusans were in full march
-across the island, with the main force of the city, to the relief
-of Himera. But this good news was more than countervailed by the
-statement, that Hannibal was ordering out the Carthaginian fleet in
-the bay of Motyê, in order that it might sail round cape Lilybæum and
-along the southern coast into the harbor of Syracuse, now defenceless
-through the absence of its main force. Apparently the Syracusan
-fleet, in sailing from Syracuse to Himera, had passed by the bay of
-Motyê, observed maritime movement among the Carthaginians there, and
-picked up these tidings in explanation. Here was intelligence more
-than sufficient to excite alarm for home, in the bosom of Dioklês
-and the Syracusans at Himera; especially under the despondency
-now reigning. Dioklês not only enjoined the captains of the fleet
-to sail back immediately to Syracuse, in order to guard against
-the apprehended surprise, but also insisted upon marching back
-thither himself by land with the Syracusan forces, and abandoning
-the farther defence of Himera. He would in his march home meet his
-fellow-citizens on their march outward, and conduct them back along
-with him. To the Himeræans, this was a sentence of death, or worse
-than death. It plunged them into an agony of fright and despair. But
-there was no safer counsel to suggest, nor could they prevail upon
-Dioklês to grant anything more than means of transport for carrying
-off the Himeræan population, when the city was relinquished to the
-besiegers. It was agreed that the fleet, instead of sailing straight
-to Syracuse, should employ itself in carrying off as much of the
-population as could be put on board, and in depositing them safely
-at Messênê; after which it would return to fetch the remainder, who
-would in the mean time defend the city with their utmost force.
-
-Such was the frail chance of refuge now alone open to these unhappy
-Greeks, against the devouring enemy without. Immediately the feebler
-part of the population,—elders, women, and children,—crowding on
-board until the triremes could hold no more, sailed away along the
-northern coast to Messênê. On the same night, Dioklês also marched
-out of the city with his Syracusan soldiers; in such haste to get
-home, that he could not even tarry to bury the numerous Syracusan
-soldiers who had been just slain in the recent disastrous sally.
-Many of the Himeræans, with their wives and children, took their
-departure along with Dioklês, as their only chance of escape; since
-it was but too plain that the triremes could not carry away all.
-The bravest and most devoted portion of the Himeræan warriors still
-remained, to defend their city until the triremes came back. After
-keeping armed watch on the walls all night, they were again assailed
-on the next morning by the Carthaginians, elate with their triumph
-of the preceding day and with the flight of so many defenders. Yet
-notwithstanding all the pressure of numbers, ferocity, and battering
-machines, the resistance was still successfully maintained; so
-that night found Himera still a Grecian city. On the next day, the
-triremes came back, having probably deposited their unfortunate cargo
-in some place of safety not so far off as Messênê. If the defenders
-could have maintained their walls until another sunset, many of them
-might yet have escaped. But the good fortune, and probably the
-physical force, of these brave men, was now at an end. The gods were
-quitting Himera, as they had before quitted Selinus. At the moment
-when the triremes were seen coming near to the port, the Iberian
-assailants broke down a wide space of the fortification with their
-battering-rams, poured in through the breach, and overcame all
-opposition. Encouraged by their shouts, the barbaric host now on all
-sides forced the walls, and spread themselves over the city, which
-became one scene of wholesale slaughter and plunder. It was no part
-of the scheme of Hannibal to interrupt the plunder, which he made
-over as a recompense to his soldiers. But he speedily checked the
-slaughter, being anxious to take as many prisoners as possible, and
-increasing the number by dragging away all who had taken sanctuary in
-the temples. A few among this wretched population may have contrived
-to reach the approaching triremes; all the rest either perished or
-fell into the hands of the victor.[906]
-
-  [906] Diodor. xiii, 61, 62.
-
-It was a proud day for the Carthaginian general when he stood as
-master on the ground of Himera; enabled to fulfil the duty, and
-satisfy the exigencies, of revenge for his slain grandfather.
-Tragical indeed was the consummation of this long-cherished purpose.
-Not merely the walls and temples (as at Selinus), but all the houses
-in Himera, were razed to the ground. Its temples, having been first
-stripped of their ornaments and valuables, were burnt. The women
-and children taken captive were distributed as prizes among the
-soldiers. But all the male captives, three thousand in number, were
-conveyed to the precise spot where Hamilkar had been slain, and there
-put to death with indignity,[907] as an expiatory satisfaction to
-his lost honor. Lastly, in order that even the hated name of Himera
-might pass into oblivion, a new town called Therma (so designated
-because of some warm springs) was shortly afterwards founded by the
-Carthaginians in the neighborhood.[908]
-
-  [907] Diodor. xiii, 62. Τῶν δ’ αἰχμαλώτων γυναικάς τε καὶ παῖδας
-  διαδοὺς εἰς τὸ στρατόπεδον παρεφύλαττε· τῶν δ’ ἀνδρῶν τοὺς
-  ἁλόντας, εἰς τρισχιλίους ὄντας, παρήγαγεν ἐπὶ τὸν τόπον, ἐν ᾧ
-  πρότερον Ἀμίλκας ὁ πάππος αὐτοῦ ὑπὸ Γέλωνος ἀνῃρέθη, καὶ πάντας
-  αἰκισάμενος κατέσφαξε.
-
-  The Carthaginians, after their victory over Agathokles in 307
-  B.C., sacrificed their finest prisoners as offerings of thanks to
-  the gods (Diodor. xx, 65.)
-
-  [908] Diodor. xiii, 79.
-
-No man can now read the account of this wholesale massacre without
-horror and repugnance. Yet we cannot doubt, that among all the acts
-of Hannibal’s life, this was the one in which he most gloried; that
-it realized, in the most complete and emphatic manner, his concurrent
-inspirations of filial sentiment, religious obligation, and honor
-as a patriot; that to show mercy would have been regarded as a mean
-dereliction of these esteemed impulses; and that if the prisoners had
-been even more numerous, all of them would have been equally slain,
-rendering the expiatory fulfilment only so much the more honorable
-and efficacious. In the Carthaginian religion, human sacrifices were
-not merely admitted, but passed for the strongest manifestation
-of devotional fervor, and were especially resorted to in times of
-distress, when the necessity for propitiating the gods was accounted
-most pressing. Doubtless the feelings of Hannibal were cordially
-shared, and the plenitude of his revenge envied, by the army around
-him. So different, sometimes so totally contrary, is the tone and
-direction of the moral sentiments, among different ages and nations.
-
-In the numerous wars of Greeks against Greeks, which we have been
-unfortunately called upon to study, we have found few or no examples
-of any considerable town taken by storm. So much the more terrible
-was the shock throughout the Grecian world, of the events just
-recounted; Selinus and Himera, two Grecian cities of ancient standing
-and uninterrupted prosperity,—had both of them been stormed, ruined,
-and depopulated, by a barbaric host, within the space of three
-months.[909] No event at all parallel had occurred since the sack
-of Miletus by the Persians after the Ionic revolt (495 B.C.),[910]
-which raised such powerful sympathy and mourning in Athens. The
-war now raging in the Ægean, between Athens and Sparta with their
-respective allies, doubtless contributed to deaden, throughout
-Central Greece, the impression of calamities sustained by Greeks at
-the western extremity of Sicily. But within that island, the sympathy
-with the sufferers was most acute, and aggravated by terror for the
-future. The Carthaginian general had displayed a degree of energy
-equal to any Grecian officer throughout the war, with a command of
-besieging and battering machinery surpassing even the best equipped
-Grecian cities.
-
-The mercenaries whom he had got together were alike terrible from
-their bravery and ferocity; encouraging Carthaginian ambition to
-follow up its late rapid successes by attacks against the other
-cities of the island. No such prospects indeed were at once realized.
-Hannibal, having completed his revenge at Himera, and extended the
-Carthaginian dominion all across the north-west corner of Sicily
-(from Selinus on the southern sea to the site of Himera or Therma
-on the northern), dismissed his mercenary troops and returned home.
-Most of them were satiated with plunder as well as pay, though the
-Campanians, who had been foremost at the capture of Selinus, thought
-themselves unfairly stinted, and retired in disgust.[911] Hannibal
-carried back a rich spoil, with glorious trophies, to Carthage, where
-he was greeted with enthusiastic welcome and admiration.[912]
-
-  [909] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 37.
-
-  [910] Herodot. vi, 28.
-
-  [911] Diodor. xiii, 62-80.
-
-  [912] Diodor. xiii, 62.
-
-Never was there a time when the Greek cities in Sicily,—and Syracuse
-especially, upon whom the others would greatly rest in the event of
-a second Carthaginian invasion,—had stronger motives for keeping
-themselves in a condition of efficacious defence. Unfortunately,
-it was just at this moment that a new cause of intestine discord
-burst upon Syracuse; fatally impairing her strength, and proving in
-its consequences destructive to her liberty. The banished Syracusan
-general Hermokrates had recently arrived at Messênê in Sicily;
-where he appears to have been, at the time when the fugitives
-came from Himera. It has already been mentioned that he, with two
-colleagues, had commanded the Syracusan contingent serving with the
-Peloponnesians under Mindarus in Asia. After the disastrous defeat
-of Kyzikus, in which Mindarus was slain and every ship in the fleet
-taken or destroyed, sentence of banishment was passed at Syracuse
-against the three admirals. Hermokrates was exceedingly popular
-among the trierarchs and the officers; he had stood conspicuous for
-incorruptibility, and had conducted himself (so far as we have means
-of judging) with energy and ability in his command. The sentence,
-unmerited by his behavior, was dictated by acute vexation for the
-loss of the fleet, and for the disappointment of those expectations
-which Hermokrates had held out; combined with the fact that Diokles
-and the opposite party were now in the ascendant at Syracuse. When
-the banished general, in making it known to the armament, complained
-of its injustice and illegality, he obtained warm sympathy, and even
-exhortations still to retain the command, in spite of orders from
-home. He forbade them earnestly to think of raising sedition against
-their common city and country;[913] upon which the trierarchs, when
-they took their last and affectionate leave of him, bound themselves
-by oath, as soon as they should return to Syracuse, to leave no means
-untried for procuring his restoration.
-
-  [913] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 28. Οἱ δ’ οὐκ ἔφασαν δεῖν στασιάζειν
-  πρὸς τὴν ἑαυτῶν πόλιν, etc.
-
-The admonitory words addressed by Hermokrates to the forwardness
-of the trierarchs, would have been honorable to his patriotism,
-had not his own conduct at the same time been worthy of the worst
-enemies of his country. For immediately on being superseded by the
-new admirals, he went to the satrap Pharnabazus, in whose favor he
-stood high; and obtained from him a considerable present of money,
-which he employed in collecting mercenary troops and building ships,
-to levy war against his opponents in Syracuse and procure his own
-restoration.[914] Thus strengthened, he returned from Asia to Sicily,
-and reached the Sicilian Messênê rather before the capture of Himera
-by the Carthaginians. At Messênê he caused five fresh triremes to
-be built, besides taking into his pay one thousand of the expelled
-Himeræans. At the head of these troops, he attempted to force his
-way into Syracuse, under concert with his friends in the city,
-who engaged to assist his admission by arms. Possibly some of the
-trierarchs of his armament, who had before sworn to lend him their
-aid, had now returned and were among this body of interior partisans.
-
-  [914] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 31; Diodor. xiii, 63.
-
-The moment was well chosen for such an enterprise. As the disaster
-at Kyzikus had exasperated the Syracusans against Hermokrates, so
-we cannot doubt that there must have been a strong reaction against
-Diokles and his partisans, in consequence of the fall of Selinus
-unaided, and the subsequent abandonment of Himera. What degree of
-blame may fairly attach to Diokles for these misfortunes, we are not
-in a condition to judge. But such reverses in themselves were sure
-to discredit him more or less, and to lend increased strength and
-stimulus to the partisans of the banished Hermokrates. Nevertheless
-that leader, though he came to the gates of Syracuse, failed in
-his attempt to obtain admission, and was compelled to retire; upon
-which he marched his little army across the interior of the island,
-and took possession of the dismantled Selinus. Here he established
-himself as the chief of a new settlement, got together as many as
-he could of the expelled inhabitants (among whom probably some had
-already come back along with Empedion), and invited many fresh
-colonists from other quarters. Reëstablishing a portion of the
-demolished fortifications, he found himself gradually strengthened
-by so many new-comers, as to place at his command a body of six
-thousand chosen hoplites,—probably independent of other soldiers of
-inferior merit. With these troops he began to invade the Carthaginian
-settlements in the neighborhood, Motyê and Panormus.[915] Having
-defeated the forces of both in the field, he carried his ravages
-successfully over their territories, with large acquisitions of
-plunder. The Carthaginians had now no army remaining in Sicily;
-for their immense host of the preceding year had consisted only of
-mercenaries levied for the occasion, and then disbanded.
-
-  [915] Diodor. xiii, 63.
-
-These events excited strong sensation throughout Sicily. The valor of
-Hermokrates, who had restored Selinus and conquered the Carthaginians
-on the very ground where they had stood so recently in terrific
-force, was contrasted with the inglorious proceeding of Diokles at
-Himera. In the public assemblies of Syracuse, this topic, coupled
-with the unjust sentence whereby Hermokrates had been banished, was
-emphatically set forth by his partisans; producing some reaction
-in his favor, and a still greater effect in disgracing his rival
-Diokles. Apprised that the tide of Syracusan opinion was turning
-towards him, Hermokrates made renewed preparations for his return,
-and resorted to a new stratagem for the purpose of smoothing the
-difficulty. He marched from Selinus to the ruined site of Himera,
-informed himself of the spot where the Syracusan troops had undergone
-their murderous defeat, and collected together the bones of his slain
-fellow-citizens; which (or rather the unburied bodies) must have
-lain upon the field unheeded for about two years. Having placed
-these bones on cars richly decorated, he marched with his forces and
-conveyed them across the island from Himera to the Syracusan border.
-Here as an exile he halted; thinking it suitable now to display
-respect for the law,—though in his previous attempt he had gone up
-to the very gates of the city, without any similar scruples. But he
-sent forward some friends with the cars and the bones, tendering
-them to the citizens for the purpose of being honored with due
-funeral solemnities. Their arrival was the signal for a violent
-party discussion, and for an outburst of aggravated displeasure
-against Diokles, who had left the bodies unburied on the field of
-battle. “It was to Hermokrates (so his partisans urged) and to his
-valiant efforts against the Carthaginians, that the recovery of
-these remnants of the slain, and the opportunity of administering
-to them the funeral solemnities, was now owing. Let the Syracusans,
-after duly performing such obsequies, testify their gratitude to
-Hermokrates by a vote of restoration, and their displeasure against
-Diokles by a sentence of banishment.”[916] Diokles with his partisans
-was thus placed at great disadvantage. In opposing the restoration of
-Hermokrates, he thought it necessary also to oppose the proposition
-for welcoming and burying the bones of the slain citizens. Here the
-feelings of the people went vehemently against him; the bones were
-received and interred, amidst the respectful attendance of all; and
-so strong was the reactionary sentiment generally, that the partisans
-of Hermokrates carried their proposition for sentencing Diokles to
-banishment. But on the other hand, they could not so far prevail as
-to obtain the restoration of Hermokrates himself. The purposes of the
-latter had been so palpably manifested, in trying a few months before
-to force his way into the city by surprise, and in now presenting
-himself at the frontier with an armed force under his command,—that
-his readmission would have been nothing less than a deliberate
-surrender of the freedom of the city to a despot.[917]
-
-  [916] Diodor. xiii, 63, 75.
-
-  [917] Diodor. xiii, 75. Καὶ ὁ μὲν Διοκλῆς ἐφυγαδεύθη, τὸν δὲ
-  Ἑρμοκράτην οὐδ’ ὡς προσεδέξαντο· ὑπώπτευον γὰρ τὴν τἀνδρὸς
-  τόλμαν, μή ποτε τυχὼν ἡγεμονίας, ἀναδείξῃ ἑαυτὸν τύραννον.
-
-Having failed in this well-laid stratagem for obtaining a vote
-of consent, Hermokrates saw that his return could not at that
-moment be consummated by open force. He therefore retired from the
-Syracusan frontier; yet only postponing his purposes of armed attack
-until his friends in the city could provide for him a convenient
-opportunity. We see plainly that his own party within had been much
-strengthened, and his opponents enfeebled, by the recent manœuvre.
-Of this a proof is to be found in the banishment of Diokles, who
-probably was not succeeded by any other leader of equal influence.
-After a certain interval, the partisans of Hermokrates contrived a
-plan which they thought practicable, for admitting him into the city
-by night. Forewarned by them, he marched from Selinus at the head
-of three thousand soldiers, crossed the territory of Gela,[918] and
-reached the concerted spot near the gate of Achradina during the
-night. From the rapidity of his advance, he had only a few troops
-along with him; the main body not having been able to keep up. With
-these few, however, he hastened to the gate, which he found already
-in possession of his friends, who had probably (like Pasimêlus at
-Corinth[919]) awaited a night on which they were posted to act as
-sentinels. Master of the gate, Hermokrates, though joined by his
-partisans within in arms, thought it prudent to postpone decisive
-attack until his own main force came up. But during this interval,
-the Syracusan authorities in the city, apprised of what had happened,
-mustered their full military strength in the agora, and lost no time
-in falling upon the band of aggressors. After a sharply contested
-combat, these aggressors were completely worsted, and Hermokrates
-himself slain with a considerable proportion of his followers. The
-remainder having fled, sentence of banishment was passed upon them.
-Several among the wounded, however, were reported by their relatives
-as slain, in order that they might escape being comprised in such a
-condemnation.[920]
-
-  [918] Diodor. xiii, 75. Ὁ μὲν οὖν Ἑρμοκράτης τότε τὸν καιρὸν οὐχ
-  ὁρῶν εὔθετον εἰς τὸ βιάσασθαι, πάλιν ἀνεχώρησεν εἰς Σελινοῦντα.
-  Μετὰ δέ τινα χρόνον, τῶν φίλων αὐτὸν μεταπεμπομένων, ὥρμησε μετὰ
-  τρισχιλίων στρατιωτῶν, καὶ πορευθεὶς διὰ τῆς Γελώας, ἧκε νυκτὸς
-  ἐπὶ τὸν συντεταγμένον τόπον.
-
-  [919] Xenoph. Hellen. iv, 4, 8.
-
-  [920] Diodor. xiii, 75.
-
-  Xenophon (Hellen. i, 3, 13) states that Hermokrates, ἤδη φεύγων
-  ἐκ Συρακουσῶν, was among those who accompanied Pharnabazus along
-  with the envoys intended to go to Susa, but who only went as far
-  as Gordium in Phrygia, and were detained by Pharnabazus (on the
-  requisition of Cyrus) for three years. This must have been in the
-  year 407 B.C. Now I cannot reconcile this with the proceedings
-  of Hermokrates as described by Diodorus; his coming to the
-  Sicilian Messênê,—his exploits near Selinus,—his various attempts
-  to procure restoration to Syracuse:—all of which must have
-  occurred in 408-407 B.C., ending with the death of Hermokrates.
-
-  It seems to me impossible that the person mentioned by Xenophon
-  as accompanying Pharnabazus into the interior can have been the
-  eminent Hermokrates. Whether it was another person of the same
-  name,—or whether Xenophon was altogether misinformed,—I will not
-  take upon me to determine. There were really two contemporary
-  Syracusans bearing that name, for the father of Dionysius the
-  despot was named Hermokrates.
-
-  Polybius (xii, 25) states that Hermokrates fought with the
-  Lacedæmonians at Ægospotami. He means the eminent general so
-  called; who however cannot have been at Ægospotami in the summer
-  or autumn of 405 B.C. There is some mistake in the assertion of
-  Polybius, but I do not know how to explain it.
-
-Thus perished one of the most energetic of the Syracusan citizens; a
-man not less effective as a defender of his country against foreign
-enemies, than himself dangerous as a formidable enemy to her internal
-liberties. It would seem, as far as we can make out, that his attempt
-to make himself master of his country was powerfully seconded, and
-might well have succeeded. But it lacked that adventitious support
-arising from present embarrassment and danger in the foreign
-relations of the city, which we shall find so efficacious two years
-afterwards in promoting the ambitious projects of Dionysius.
-
-Dionysius,—for the next coming generation the most formidable name
-in the Grecian world,—now appears for the first time in history. He
-was a young Syracusan of no consideration from family or position,
-described as even of low birth and low occupation; as a scribe or
-secretary, which was looked upon as a subordinate, though essential,
-function.[921] He was the son of Hermokrates,—not that eminent person
-whose death has been just described, but another person of the same
-name, whether related or not, we do not know.[922] It is highly
-probable that he was a man of literary ability and instruction, since
-we read of him in after-days as a composer of odes and tragedies;
-and it is certain that he stood distinguished in all the talents
-for military action,—bravery, force of will, and quickness of
-discernment. On the present occasion, he espoused strenuously the
-party of Hermokrates, and was one of those who took arms in the
-city on his behalf. Having distinguished himself in the battle,
-and received several wounds, he was among those given out for dead
-by his relations.[923] In this manner he escaped the sentence of
-banishment passed against the survivors. And when, in the course of
-a certain time, after recovering from his wounds, he was produced
-as unexpectedly living,—we may presume that his opponents and the
-leading men in the city left him unmolested, not thinking it worth
-while to reopen political inquisition in reference to matters already
-passed and finished. He thus remained in the city, marked out by his
-daring and address to the Hermokratæan party, as the person most fit
-to take up the mantle, and resume the anti-popular designs, of their
-late leader. It will presently be seen how the chiefs of this party
-lent their aid to exalt him.
-
-  [921] Diodor. xiii, 96; xiv, 66.
-
-  Isokrates, Or. v, Philipp. s. 73—Dionysius, πολλοστὸς ὢν
-  Συρακοσίων καὶ τῷ γένει καὶ τῇ δόξῃ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν, etc.
-
-  Demosthenes, adv. Leptinem, p. 506, s. 178. γραμματέως, ὥς φασι,
-  etc. Polybius (xv, 35), ἐκ δημοτικῆς καὶ ταπεινῆς ὑποθέσεως
-  ὁρμηθεὶς, etc. Compare Polyænus, v, 2, 2.
-
-  [922] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 2, 24. Διονύσιος ὁ Ἑρμοκράτους. Diodor.
-  xiii, 91.
-
-  [923] Diodor. xiii, 75.
-
-Meanwhile the internal condition of Syracuse was greatly enfeebled by
-this division. Though the three several attempts of Hermokrates to
-penetrate by force or fraud into the city had all failed, yet they
-had left a formidable body of malcontents behind; while the opponents
-also, the popular government and its leaders, had been materially
-reduced in power and consideration by the banishment of Diokles. This
-magistrate was succeeded by Daphnæus and others, of whom we know
-nothing, except that they are spoken of as rich men and representing
-the sentiments of the rich,—and that they seem to have manifested but
-little ability. Nothing could be more unfortunate than the weakness
-of Syracuse at this particular juncture: for the Carthaginians, elate
-with their successes at Selinus and Himera, and doubtless also piqued
-by the subsequent retaliation of Hermokrates upon their dependencies
-at Motyê and Panormus, were just now meditating a second invasion of
-Sicily on a still larger scale. Not uninformed of their projects,
-the Syracusan leaders sent envoys to Carthage to remonstrate against
-them, and to make propositions for peace. But no satisfactory answer
-could be obtained, nor were the preparations discontinued.[924]
-
-  [924] Diodor. xiii, 79.
-
-In the ensuing spring, the storm gathering from Africa burst with
-destructive violence upon this fated island. A mercenary force had
-been got together during the winter, greater than that which had
-sacked Selinus and Himera; three hundred thousand men, according to
-Ephorus,—one hundred and twenty thousand, according to Xenophon and
-Timæus. Hannibal was again placed in command; but his predominant
-impulses of family and religion having been satiated by the great
-sacrifice of Himera, he excused himself on the score of old age,
-and was only induced to accept the duty by having his relative
-Imilkon named as colleague. By their joint efforts, the immense
-host of Iberians, Mediterranean islanders, Campanians, Libyans, and
-Numidians, was united at Carthage, and made ready to be conveyed
-across, in a fleet of one hundred and twenty triremes, with no less
-than one thousand five hundred transports.[925] To protect the
-landing, forty Carthaginian triremes were previously sent over to
-the Bay of Motyê. The Syracusan leaders, with commendable energy and
-watchfulness, immediately despatched the like number of triremes
-to attack them, in hopes of thereby checking the farther arrival
-of the grand armament. They were victorious, destroying fifteen of
-the Carthaginian triremes, and driving the rest back to Africa; yet
-their object was not attained; for Hannibal himself, coming forth
-immediately with fifty fresh triremes, constrained the Syracusans
-to retire. Presently afterwards the grand armament appeared,
-disembarking its motley crowd of barbaric warriors near the western
-cape of Sicily.
-
-  [925] Diodor. xiii, 80; Xenoph. Hellen. i, 5, 21.
-
-Great was the alarm caused throughout Sicily by their arrival. All
-the Greek cities either now began to prepare for war, or pushed with
-a more vigorous hand equipments previously begun, since they seem
-to have had some previous knowledge of the purpose of the enemy.
-The Syracusans sent to entreat assistance both from the Italian
-Greeks and from Sparta. From the latter city, however, little was
-to be expected, since her whole efforts were now devoted to the
-prosecution of the war against Athens; this being the year wherein
-Kallikratidas commanded, and when the battle of Arginusæ was fought.
-
-Of all Sicilian Greeks, the Agrigentines were both the most
-frightened and the most busily employed. Conterminous as they were
-with Selinus on their western frontier, and foreseeing that the first
-shock of the invasion would fall upon them, they immediately began
-to carry in their outlying property within the walls, as well as
-to accumulate a stock of provisions for enduring blockade. Sending
-for Dexippus, a Lacedæmonian then in Gela as commander of a body of
-mercenaries for the defence of that town, they engaged him in their
-service, with one thousand five hundred hoplites; reinforced by eight
-hundred of those Campanians who had served with Hannibal at Himera,
-but had quitted him in disgust.[926]
-
-  [926] Diodor. xiii, 81-84.
-
-Agrigentum was at this time in the highest state of prosperity and
-magnificence; a tempting prize for any invader. Its population
-was very great; comprising, according to one account, twenty
-thousand citizens among an aggregate total of two hundred thousand
-males,—citizens, metics, and slaves; according to another account, an
-aggregate total of no less than eight hundred thousand persons;[927]
-numbers unauthenticated, and not to be trusted farther than as
-indicating a very populous city. Situated a little more than two
-miles from the sea, and possessing a spacious territory highly
-cultivated, especially with vines and olives, Agrigentum carried on a
-lucrative trade with the opposite coast of Africa, where at that time
-no such plantations flourished. Its temples and porticos, especially
-the spacious temple of Zeus Olympius,—its statues and pictures,—its
-abundance of chariots and horses,—its fortifications,—its sewers,—its
-artificial lake of near a mile in circumference, abundantly stocked
-with fish,—all these placed it on a par with the most splendid
-cities of the Hellenic world.[928] Of the numerous prisoners taken
-at the defeat of the Carthaginians near Himera seventy years before,
-a very large proportion had fallen to the lot of the Agrigentines,
-and had been employed by them in public works contributing to the
-advantage or ornament of the city.[929] The hospitality of the
-wealthy citizens,—Gellias, Antisthenes, and others,—was carried
-even to profusion. The surrounding territory was celebrated for its
-breed of horses,[930] which the rich Agrigentines vied with each
-other in training and equipping for the chariot-race. At the last
-Olympic games immediately preceding this fatal Carthaginian invasion
-(that is at the 93rd Olympiad,—408 B.C.), the Agrigentine Exænetus
-gained the prize in a chariot-race. On returning to Sicily after his
-victory, he was welcomed by many of his friends, who escorted him
-home in procession with three hundred chariots, each drawn by a pair
-of white horses, and all belonging to native Agrigentines. Of the
-festival by which the wealthy Antisthenes celebrated the nuptials of
-his daughter, we read an account almost fabulous. Amidst all this
-wealth and luxury, it is not surprising to hear that the rough duties
-of military exercise were imperfectly kept up, and that indulgences,
-not very consistent with soldier-like efficiency, were allowed to the
-citizens on guard.
-
-  [927] Diogen. Laert. viii, 63.
-
-  [928] Diodor. xiii, 81-84; Polyb. ix, 7.
-
-  [929] Diodor. xi, 25.
-
-  [930] Virgil, Æneid. iii, 704.
-
-Such was Agrigentum in May 406 B.C., when Hannibal and Imilkon
-approached it with their powerful army. Their first propositions,
-however, were not of a hostile character. They invited the
-Agrigentines to enter into alliance with Carthage; or if this were
-not acceptable, at any rate to remain neutral and at peace. Both
-propositions were declined.[931]
-
-  [931] Diodor. xiii, 85.
-
-Besides having taken engagements with Gela and Syracuse, the
-Agrigentines also felt a confidence, not unreasonable, in the
-strength of their own walls and situation. Agrigentum with its
-citadel was placed on an aggregate of limestone hills, immediately
-above the confluence of two rivers, both flowing from the north; the
-river Akragas on the eastern and southern sides of the city, and the
-Hypsas on its western side. Of this aggregate of hills, separated
-from each other by clefts and valleys, the northern half is the
-loftiest, being about eleven hundred feet above the level of the
-sea—the southern half is less lofty. But on all sides, except on the
-south-west, it rises by a precipitous ascent; on the side towards
-the sea, it springs immediately out of the plain, thus presenting a
-fine prospect to ships passing along the coast. The whole of this
-aggregate of hills was encompassed by a continuous wall, built round
-the declivity, and in some parts hewn out of the solid rock. The
-town of Agrigentum was situated in the southern half of the walled
-enclosure. The citadel, separated from it by a ravine, and accessible
-only by one narrow ascent, stood on the north-eastern hill; it was
-the most conspicuous feature in the place, called the Athenæum,
-and decorated by temples of Athênê and of Zeus Atabyrius. In the
-plain under the southern wall of the city stood the Agrigentine
-sepulchres.[932]—Reinforced by eight hundred Campanian mercenaries,
-with the fifteen hundred other mercenaries brought by Dexippus from
-Gela,—the Agrigentines awaited confidently the attack upon their
-walls, which were not only in far better condition than those of
-Selinus, but also unapproachable by battering-machines or movable
-towers, except on one part of the south-western side. It was here
-that Hannibal, after reconnoitering the town all round, began his
-attack. But after hard fighting without success for one day, he was
-forced to retire at nightfall; and even lost his battering train,
-which was burnt during the night by a sally of the besieged.[933]
-Desisting from farther attempts on that point, Hannibal now ordered
-his troops to pull down the tombs; which were numerous on the lower
-or southern side of the city, and many of which, especially that of
-the despot Theron, were of conspicuous grandeur. By this measure he
-calculated on providing materials adequate to the erection of immense
-mounds, equal in height to the southern wall, and sufficiently
-close to it for the purpose of assault. His numerous host had made
-considerable progress in demolishing these tombs, and were engaged
-in breaking down the monument of Theron, when their progress was
-arrested by a thunderbolt falling upon it. This event was followed
-by religious terrors, suddenly overspreading the camp. The prophets
-declared that the violation of the tombs was an act of criminal
-sacrilege. Every night the spectres of those whose tombs had been
-profaned manifested themselves, to the affright of the soldiers on
-guard; while the judgment of the gods was manifested in a violent
-pestilential distemper. Numbers of the army perished, Hannibal
-himself among them; and even of those who escaped death, many were
-disabled from active duty by distress and suffering. Imilkon was
-compelled to appease the gods, and to calm the agony of the troops,
-by a solemn supplication according to the Carthaginian rites. He
-sacrificed a child, considered as the most propitiatory of all
-offerings, to Kronus; and cast into the sea a number of animal
-victims as offerings to Poseidon.[934]
-
-  [932] See about the Topography of Agrigentum,—Seyfert, Akragas,
-  p. 21, 23, 40 (Hamburg, 1845).
-
-  The modern town of Girgenti stands on one of the hills of this
-  vast aggregate, which is overspread with masses of ruins, and
-  around which the traces of the old walls may be distinctly made
-  out, with considerable remains of them in some particular parts.
-
-  Compare Polybius, i, 18; ix, 27.
-
-  Pindar calls the town ποταμίᾳ τ’ Ἀκράγαντι—Pyth. vi, 6: ἱερὸν
-  οἴκημα ποταμοῦ—Olymp. ii, 10.
-
-  [933] Diodor. xiii, 85.
-
-  We read of a stratagem in Polyænus (v, 10, 4), whereby Imilkon is
-  said to have enticed the Agrigentines, in one of their sallies,
-  into incautious pursuit, by a simulated flight; and thus to have
-  inflicted upon them a serious defeat.
-
-  [934] Diodor. xiii, 86.
-
-These religious rites calmed the terrors of the army, and mitigated,
-or were supposed to have mitigated, the distemper; so that Imilkon,
-while desisting from all farther meddling with the tombs, was enabled
-to resume his batteries and assaults against the walls, though
-without any considerable success. He also dammed up the western river
-Hypsas, so as to turn the stream against the wall; but this manœuvre
-produced no effect. His operations were presently interrupted by
-the arrival of a powerful army which marched from Syracuse, under
-Daphnæus, to the relief of Agrigentum. Reinforced in its road by
-the military strength of Kamarina and Gela, it amounted to thirty
-thousand foot and five thousand horse, on reaching the river Himera,
-the eastern frontier of the Agrigentine territory; while a fleet
-of thirty Syracusan triremes sailed along the coast to second its
-efforts. As these troops neared the town, Imilkon despatched against
-them a body of Iberians and Campanians;[935] who however, after a
-strenuous combat, were completely defeated, and driven back to the
-Carthaginian camp near the city, where they found themselves under
-the protection of the main army. Daphnæus, having secured the victory
-and inflicted severe loss upon the enemy, was careful to prevent his
-troops from disordering their ranks in the ardor of pursuit, in the
-apprehension that Imilkon with the main body might take advantage
-of that disorder to turn the fortune of the day,—as had happened in
-the terrible defeat before Himera, three years before. The routed
-Iberians were thus allowed to get back to the camp. At the same time
-the Agrigentines, witnessing from the walls, with joyous excitement,
-the flight of their enemies, vehemently urged their generals to lead
-them forth for an immediate sally, in order that the destruction
-of the fugitives might thus be consummated. But the generals were
-inflexible in resisting such demand; conceiving that the city itself
-would thus be stripped of its defenders, and that Imilkon might seize
-the occasion for assaulting it with his main body, when there was not
-sufficient force to repel them. The defeated Iberians thus escaped
-to the main camp; neither pursued by the Syracusans, nor impeded, as
-they passed near the Agrigentine walls, by the population within.
-
-  [935] Diodor. xiii, 87.
-
-  It appears that an eminence a little way eastward from Agrigentum
-  still bears the name of _Il Campo Cartaginese_, raising some
-  presumption that it was once occupied by the Carthaginians.
-  Evidently, the troops sent out by Imilkon to meet and repel
-  Daphnæus, must have taken post to the eastward of Agrigentum,
-  from which side the Syracusan army of relief was approaching.
-  Seyfert (Akragas, p. 41) contests this point, and supposes that
-  they must have been on the western side; misled by the analogy
-  of the Roman siege in 262 B.C., when the Carthaginian relieving
-  army under Hanno were coming from the westward,—from Heraklei
-  (Polyb. i, 19).
-
-Presently Daphnæus with his victorious army reached Agrigentum,
-and joined the citizens; who flocked in crowds, along with the
-Lacedæmonian Dexippus, to meet and welcome them. But the joy of
-meeting, and the reciprocal congratulations on the recent victory,
-were fatally poisoned by general indignation for the unmolested
-escape of the defeated Iberians; occasioned by nothing less than
-remissness, cowardice, or corruption, (so it was contended), on the
-part of the generals,—first the Syracusan generals, and next the
-Agrigentine. Against the former, little was now said, though much
-was held in reserve, as we shall soon hear. But against the latter,
-the discontent of the Agrigentine population burst forth instantly
-and impetuously. A public assembly being held on the spot, the
-Agrigentine generals, five in number, were put under accusation.
-Among many speakers who denounced them as guilty of treason, the most
-violent of all was the Kamarinæan Menês,—himself one of the leaders,
-seemingly of the Kamarinæan contingent in the army of Daphnæus. The
-concurrence of Menês, carrying to the Agrigentines a full sanction of
-their sentiments, wrought them up to such a pitch of fury, that the
-generals, when they came to defend themselves, found neither sympathy
-nor even common fairness of hearing. Four out of the five were stoned
-and put to death on the spot; the fifth, Argeius, was spared only
-on the ground of his youth; and even the Lacedæmonian Dexippus was
-severely censured.[936]
-
-  [936] Diodor. xiii, 87.
-
-  The youth of Argeius, combined with the fact of his being in high
-  command, makes us rather imagine that he was of noble birth:
-  compare Thucydid. vi, 38,—the speech of Athenagoras.
-
-How far, in regard to these proceedings, the generals were really
-guilty, or how far their defence, had it been fairly heard, would
-have been valid,—is a point which our scanty information does not
-enable us to determine. But it is certain that the arrival of the
-victorious Syracusans at Agrigentum completely altered the relative
-position of affairs. Instead of farther assaulting the walls, Imilkon
-was attacked in his camp by Daphnæus. The camp, however, was so
-fortified as to repel all attempts, and the siege from this time
-forward became only a blockade; a contest of patience and privation
-between the city and the besiegers, lasting seven or eight months
-from the commencement of the siege. At first Daphnæus, with his own
-force united to the Agrigentines, was strong enough to harass the
-Carthaginians and intercept their supplies, so that the greatest
-distress began to prevail among their army. The Campanian mercenaries
-even broke out into mutiny, crowding, with clamorous demands for
-provision and with menace of deserting, around the tent of Imilkon;
-who barely pacified them by pledging to them the gold and silver
-drinking-cups of the chief Carthaginians around him,[937] coupled
-with entreaties that they would wait yet a few days. During that
-short interval, he meditated and executed a bold stroke of relief.
-The Syracusans and Agrigentines were mainly supplied by sea from
-Syracuse; from whence a large transport of provision-ships was now
-expected, under convoy of some Syracusan triremes. Apprised of
-their approach, Imilkon silently brought out forty Carthaginian
-triremes from Motyê and Panormus, with which he suddenly attacked the
-Syracusan convoy, no way expecting such a surprise. Eight Syracusan
-triremes were destroyed; the remainder were driven ashore, and the
-whole fleet of transports fell into the hands of Imilkon. Abundance
-and satisfaction now reigned in the camp of the Carthaginians,
-while the distress, and with it the discontent, was transferred to
-Agrigentum. The Campanian mercenaries in the service of Dexippus
-began the mutiny, complaining to him of their condition. Perhaps he
-had been alarmed and disgusted at the violent manifestation of the
-Agrigentines against their generals, extending partly to himself
-also. At any rate, he manifested no zeal in the defence, and was even
-suspected of having received a bribe of fifteen talents from the
-Carthaginians. He told the Campanians that Agrigentum was no longer
-tenable, for want of supplies; upon which they immediately retired,
-and marched away to Messênê, affirming that the time stipulated
-for their stay had expired. Such a secession struck every one with
-discouragement. The Agrigentine generals immediately instituted an
-examination, to ascertain the quantity of provision still remaining
-in the city. Having made the painful discovery that there remained
-but very little, they took the resolution of causing the city to be
-evacuated by its population during the coming night.[938]
-
-  [937] Mention is again made, sixty-five years afterwards, in the
-  description of the war of Timoleon against the Carthaginians,—of
-  the abundance of gold and silver drinking cups, and rich personal
-  ornaments, carried by the native Carthaginians on military
-  service (Diodor. xvi, 81; Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 28, 29).
-
-  There was a select body of Carthaginians,—a Sacred
-  Band,—mentioned in these later times, consisting of two thousand
-  five hundred men of distinguished bravery as well as of
-  conspicuous position in the city (Diodor. xvi, 80; xx, 10).
-
-  [938] Diodor. xiii, 88.
-
-A night followed, even more replete with woe and desolation than
-that which had witnessed the flight of Diokles with the inhabitants
-of Himera from their native city. Few scenes can be imagined more
-deplorable than the vast population of Agrigentum obliged to hurry
-out of their gates during a December night, as their only chance of
-escape from famine or the sword of a merciless enemy. The road to
-Gela was beset by a distracted crowd, of both sexes and of every age
-and condition, confounded in one indiscriminate lot of suffering.
-No thought could be bestowed on the preservation of property
-or cherished possessions. Happy were they who could save their
-lives; for not a few, through personal weakness or the immobility
-of despair, were left behind. Perhaps here and there a citizen,
-combining the personal strength with the filial piety of Æneas, might
-carry away his aged father with the household gods on his shoulders;
-but for the most part, the old, the sick, and the impotent, all
-whose years were either too tender or too decrepit to keep up with a
-hurried flight, were of necessity abandoned. Some remained and slew
-themselves, refusing even to survive the loss of their homes and
-the destruction of their city; others, among whom was the wealthy
-Gellias, consigned themselves to the protection of the temples, but
-with little hope that it would procure them safety. The morning’s
-dawn exhibited to Imilkon unguarded walls, a deserted city, and a
-miserable population of exiles huddled together in disorderly flight
-on the road to Gela.
-
-For these fugitives, however, the Syracusan and Agrigentine soldiers
-formed a rear-guard sufficient to keep off the aggravated torture of
-a pursuit. But the Carthaginian army found enough to occupy them in
-the undefended prey which was before their eyes. They rushed upon
-the town with the fury of men who had been struggling and suffering
-before it for eight months. They ransacked the houses, slew every
-living person that was left, and found plunder enough to satiate
-even a ravenous appetite. Temples as well as private dwellings were
-alike stripped, so that those who had taken sanctuary in them became
-victims like the rest: a fate which Gellius only avoided by setting
-fire to the temple in which he stood and perishing in its ruins.
-The great public ornaments and trophies of the city,—the bull of
-Phalaris, together with the most precious statues and pictures,—were
-preserved by Imilkon and sent home as decorations to Carthage.[939]
-While he gave up the houses of Agrigentum to be thus gutted, he still
-kept them standing, and caused them to serve as winter-quarters for
-the repose of his soldiers, after the hardships of an eight months’
-siege. The unhappy Agrigentine fugitives first found shelter and kind
-hospitality at Gela; from whence they were afterwards, by permission
-of the Syracusans, transferred to Leontini.
-
-  [939] Diodor. xiii, 89, 90.
-
-I have described, as far as the narrative of Diodorus permits us to
-know, this momentous and tragical portion of Sicilian history; a
-suitable preface to the long despotism of Dionysius. It is evident
-that the seven or eight months (the former of these numbers is
-authenticated by Xenophon, while the latter is given by Diodorus)
-of the siege or blockade must have contained matters of the
-greatest importance which are not mentioned, and that even of the
-main circumstances which brought about the capture, we are most
-imperfectly informed. But though we cannot fully comprehend its
-causes, its effects are easy to understand. They were terror-striking
-and harrowing in the extreme. When the storm which had beaten down
-Selinus and Himera was now perceived to have extended its desolation
-to a city so much more conspicuous, among the wealthiest and most
-populous in the Grecian world,—when the surviving Agrigentine
-population, including women and children, and the great proprietors
-of chariots whose names stood recorded as victors at Olympia, were
-seen all confounded in one common fate of homeless flight and
-nakedness—when the victorious host and its commanders took up their
-quarters in the deserted houses, ready to spread their conquests
-farther after a winter of repose,—there was hardly a Greek in Sicily
-who did not tremble for his life and property.[940] Several of them
-sought shelter at Syracuse, while others even quitted the island
-altogether, emigrating to Italy.
-
-  [940] Diodor. xiii, 91.
-
-Amidst so much anguish, humiliation, and terror, there were loud
-complaints against the conduct of the Syracusan generals under whose
-command the disaster had occurred. The censure which had been cast
-upon them before, for not having vigorously pursued the defeated
-Iberians, was now revived, and aggravated tenfold by the subsequent
-misfortune. To their inefficiency the capture of Agrigentum was
-ascribed, and apparently not without substantial cause; for the town
-was so strongly placed as to defy assault, and could only be taken
-by blockade; now we discern no impediments adequate to hinder the
-Syracusan generals from procuring supplies of provisions; and it
-seems clear that the surprise of the Syracusan store-ships might
-have been prevented by proper precautions; upon which surprise the
-whole question turned, between famine in the Carthaginian camp and
-famine in Agrigentum.[941] The efficiency of Dexippus and the other
-generals, in defending Agrigentum (as depicted by Diodorus), stands
-sadly inferior to the vigor and ability displayed by Gylippus before
-Syracuse, as described by Thucydides: and we can hardly wonder that
-by men in the depth of misery, like the Agrigentines,—or in extreme
-alarm, like the other Sicilian Greeks—these generals, incompetent or
-treasonable, should be regarded as the cause of the ruin.
-
-  [941] Diodor. xiii, 88.
-
-  Xenophon confirms the statement of Diodorus, that Agrigentum was
-  taken by famine (Hellen. i, 5, 21; ii, 2, 24).
-
-Such a state of sentiment, under ordinary circumstances, would have
-led to the condemnation of the generals and to the nomination of
-others, with little farther result. But it became of far graver
-import, when combined with the actual situation of parties in
-Syracuse. The Hermokratean opposition party,—repelled during the
-preceding year with the loss of its leader, yet nowise crushed,—now
-re-appeared more formidable than ever, under a new leader more
-aggressive even than Hermokrates himself. Throughout ancient as
-well as modern history, defeat and embarrassment in the foreign
-relations have proved fruitful causes of change in the internal
-government. Such auxiliaries had been wanting to the success of
-Hermokrates in the preceding year; but alarms of every kind now
-overhung the city in terrific magnitude, and when the first Syracusan
-assembly was convoked on returning from Agrigentum, a mournful
-silence reigned;[942] as in the memorable description given by
-Demosthenes of the Athenian assembly held immediately after the
-taking of Elateia.[943] The generals had lost the confidence of their
-fellow-citizens; yet no one else was forward, at a juncture so full
-of peril, to assume their duty, by proffering fit counsel for the
-future conduct of the war. Now was the time for the Hermokratean
-party to lay their train for putting down the government. Dionysius,
-though both young and of mean family, was adopted as leader in
-consequence of that audacity and bravery which even already he
-had displayed, both in the fight along with Hermokrates and in the
-battles against the Carthaginians. Hipparinus, a Syracusan of rich
-family, who had ruined himself by dissolute expenses, was eager to
-renovate his fortunes by seconding the elevation of Dionysius to the
-despotism;[944] Philistus (the subsequent historian of Syracuse),
-rich, young, and able, threw himself ardently into the same cause;
-and doubtless other leading persons, ancient Hermokrateans and
-others, stood forward as partisans in the conspiracy. But it either
-was, from the beginning, or speedily became, a movement organized
-for the purpose of putting the sceptre into the hands of Dionysius,
-to whom all the rest, though several among them were of far greater
-wealth and importance, served but as satellites and auxiliaries.
-
-  [942] Diodor. xiii, 91.
-
-  [943] Demosthenes de Coronâ, p. 286, s. 220.
-
-  This comparison is made by M. Brunet de Presle, in his valuable
-  historical work (Recherches sur les Establissemens des Grecs en
-  Sicile, Part ii, s. 39, p. 219).
-
-  [944] Aristotel. Politic. v, 5, 6. Γίνονται δὲ μεταβολαὶ τῆς
-  ὀλιγαρχίας, καὶ ὅταν ἀναλώσωσι τὰ ἴδια, ζῶντες ἀσελγῶς· καὶ γὰρ
-  οἱ τοιοῦτοι καινοτομεῖν ζητοῦσι, καὶ ἢ τυραννίδι ἐπιτίθενται
-  αὐτοὶ, ἢ κατασκευάζουσιν ἕτερον· ὥσπερ Ἱππαρῖνος Διονύσιον ἐν
-  Συρακούσαις.
-
-  Hipparinus was the father of Dion, respecting whom more hereafter.
-
-  Plato, in his warm sympathy for Dion, assigns to Hipparinus more
-  of an equality of rank and importance with the elder Dionysius,
-  than the subsequent facts justify (Plato, Epistol. viii. p. 353
-  A.; p. 355 F.).
-
-Amidst the silence and disquietude which reigned in the Syracusan
-assembly, Dionysius was the first who rose to address them. He
-enlarged upon a topic suitable alike to the temper of his auditors
-and to his own views. He vehemently denounced the generals as having
-betrayed the security of Syracuse to the Carthaginians,—and as the
-persons to whom the ruin of Agrigentum, together with the impending
-peril of every man around, was owing. He set forth their misdeeds,
-real or alleged, not merely with fulness and acrimony, but with a
-ferocious violence outstripping all the limits of admissible debate,
-and intended to bring upon them a lawless murder, like the death of
-the generals recently at Agrigentum. “There they sit, the traitors!
-Do not wait for legal trial or verdict; but lay hands upon them at
-once, and inflict upon them summary justice.”[945] Such a brutal
-exhortation, not unlike that of the Athenian Kritias, when he
-caused the execution of Theramenes in the oligarchical senate, was
-an offence against law as well as against parliamentary order. The
-presiding magistrates reproved Dionysius as a disturber of order,
-and fined him, as they were empowered by law.[946] But his partisans
-were loud in his support. Philistus not only paid down the fine for
-him on the spot, but publicly proclaimed that he would go on for
-the whole day paying all similar fines which might be imposed,—and
-incited Dionysius to persist in such language as he thought proper.
-That which had begun as illegality, was now aggravated into open
-defiance of the law. Yet so enfeebled was the authority of the
-magistrates, and so vehement the cry against them, in the actual
-position of the city, that they were unable either to punish or
-to repress the speaker. Dionysius pursued his harangue in a tone
-yet more inflammatory, not only accusing the generals of having
-corruptly betrayed Agrigentum, but also denouncing the conspicuous
-and wealthy citizens generally, as oligarchs who held tyrannical
-sway,—who treated the many with scorn, and made their own profit out
-of the misfortunes of the city. Syracuse (he contended) could never
-be saved, unless men of a totally different character were invested
-with authority; men, not chosen from wealth and station, but of
-humble birth, belonging to the people by position, and kind in their
-deportment from consciousness of their own weakness.[947] His bitter
-invective against generals already discredited, together with the
-impetuous warmth of his apparent sympathy for the people against
-the rich, were both alike favorably received. Plato states that the
-assembly became so furiously exasperated, as to follow literally
-the lawless and blood-thirsty inspirations of Dionysius, and to
-stone all these generals, ten in number, on the spot, without any
-form of trial. But Diodorus simply tells us, that a vote was passed
-to cashier the generals, and to name in their places Dionysius,
-Hipparinus, and others.[948] This latter statement is, in my opinion,
-the more probable.
-
-  [945] Diodor. xiii, 91. Ἀπορουμένων δὲ πάντων παρελθών Διονύσιος
-  ὁ Ἑρμοκράτους, τῶν μὲν στρατηγῶν κατηγόρησεν, ὡς προδιδόντων τὰ
-  πράγματα τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις· τὰ δὲ πλήθη παρώξυνε πρὸς τὴν αὐτῶν
-  τιμωρίαν, παρακαλῶν μὴ περιμεῖναι τὸν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους κλῆρον,
-  ἀλλ’ ἐκ χειρὸς εὐθέως ἐπιθεῖναι τὴν δίκην.
-
-  [946] Diodor. xiii, 91. Τῶν δ’ ἀρχόντων ζημιούντων τὸν Διονύσιον
-  κατὰ τοὺς νόμους, ὡς θορυβοῦντα, Φίλιστος, ὁ τὰς ἱστορίας ὕστερον
-  συγγράψας, οὐσίαν ἔχων μεγάλην, etc.
-
-  In the description given by Thucydides (vi, 32-39) of the debate
-  in the Syracusan assembly (prior to the arrival of the Athenian
-  expedition) in which Hermokrates and Athenagoras speak, we find
-  the magistrates interfering to prevent the continuance of a
-  debate which had become very personal and acrimonious; though
-  there was nothing in it at all brutal, nor any exhortation to
-  personal violence or infringement of the law.
-
-  [947] Diodor. xiii, 91.
-
-  [948] Plato, Epistol. viii, p. 354. Οἱ γὰρ πρὸ Διονυσίου καὶ
-  Ἱππαρίνου ἀρξάντων Σικελιῶται τότε ὡς ᾤοντο εὐδαιμόνως ἔζων,
-  τρυφῶντές τε καὶ ἅμα ἀρχόντων ἄρχοντες· οἱ καὶ τοῦς δέκα
-  στρατηγοὺς κατέλευσαν βάλλοντες τοὺς πρὸ Διονυσίου, κατὰ νόμον
-  οὐδένα κρίναντες, ἵνα δὴ δουλεύοιεν μηδένι μήτε σὺν δίκῃ μήτε
-  νόμῳ δεσπότῃ, ἐλεύθεροι δ’ εἶεν πάντῃ πάντως· ὅθεν αἱ τυραννίδες
-  ἐγένοντο αὐτοῖς.
-
-  Diodor. xiii, 92. παραυτίκα τοὺς μὲν ἔλυσε τῆς ἀρχῆς, ἑτέρους δὲ
-  εἵλετο στρατηγοὺς, ἐν οἷς καὶ τὸν Διονύσιον. Some little time
-  afterwards, Diodorus farther mentions that Dionysius accused
-  before the public assembly, and caused to be put to death,
-  Daphnæus and Demarchus (xiii, 96); now Daphnæus was one of the
-  generals (xiii, 86-88).
-
-  If we assume the fact to have occurred as Plato affirms it,
-  we cannot easily explain how something so impressive and
-  terror-striking came to be transformed into the more commonplace
-  statement of Diodorus, by Ephorus, Theopompus, Hermeias, Timæus,
-  or Philistus, from one of whom probably his narrative is borrowed.
-
-  But if we assume Diodorus to be correct, we can easily account
-  for the erroneous belief in the mind of Plato. A very short
-  time before this scene at Syracuse, an analogous circumstance
-  had really occurred at Agrigentum. The assembled Agrigentines,
-  being inflamed against their generals for what they believed
-  to be slackness or treachery in the recent fight with the
-  Carthaginians, had stoned four of them on the spot, and only
-  spared the fifth on the score of his youth (Diodor. xiii, 87).
-
-  I cannot but think that Plato confounded in his memory the scene
-  and proceedings at Syracuse with the other events, so recently
-  antecedent, at Agrigentum. His letter (from which the above
-  citation is made) was written in his old age,—fifty years after
-  the event.
-
-  This is one inaccuracy as to matter-of-fact, which might be
-  produced in support of the views of those who reject the
-  letters of Plato as spurious, though Ast does not notice it,
-  while going through the letters _seriatim_, and condemning
-  them not only as un-Platonic but as despicable compositions.
-  After attentively studying both the letters themselves, and his
-  reasoning, I dissent entirely from Ast’s conclusion. The first
-  letter, that which purports to come not from Plato, but from
-  Dion, is the only one against which he seems to me to have made
-  out a good case (see Ast, Ueber Platon’s Leben und Schriften,
-  p. 504-530). Against the others, I cannot think that he has
-  shown any sufficient ground for pronouncing them to be spurious
-  and I therefore continue to treat them as genuine, following
-  the opinion of Cicero and Plutarch. It is admitted by Ast that
-  their authenticity was not suspected in antiquity, as far as our
-  knowledge extends. Without considering the presumption hence
-  arising as conclusive, I think it requires to be countervailed by
-  stronger substantive grounds than those which Ast has urged.
-
-  Among the total number of thirteen letters, those relating
-  to Dion and Dionysius (always setting aside the first
-  letter)—that is the second, third, fourth, seventh, eighth, and
-  thirteenth,—are the most full of allusions to fact and details.
-  Some of them go very much into detail. Now had they been the
-  work of a forger, it is fair to contend that he could hardly
-  avoid laying himself more open to contradiction than he has done,
-  on the score of inaccuracy and inconsistency with the supposed
-  situation. I have already mentioned one inaccuracy which I take
-  to be a _fault_ of memory, both conceivable and pardonable. Ast
-  mentions another, to disprove the authenticity of the eighth
-  letter, respecting the son of Dion. Plato, in this eighth
-  letter, speaking in the name of the deceased Dion, recommends
-  the Syracusans to name Dion’s son as one of the members of a
-  tripartite kingship, along with Hipparinus (son of the elder
-  Dionysius) and the younger Dionysius. This (contends Ast, p. 523)
-  cannot be correct, because Dion’s son died before his father. To
-  make the argument of Ast complete, we ought to be sure that Dion
-  had only _one_ son; for which there is doubtless the evidence
-  of Plutarch, who after having stated that the son of Dion, a
-  youth nearly grown up, threw himself from the roof of the house
-  and was killed, goes on to say that Kallippus, the political
-  enemy of Dion, founded upon this misfortune a false rumor which
-  he circulated,—ὡς ὁ Δίων ~ἄπαις γεγονὼς~ ἔγνωκε τὸν Διονυσίου
-  καλεῖν Ἀπολλοκράτην καὶ ποιεῖσθαι διάδοχον (Plutarch, Dion. c.
-  55, 56: compare also c. 21,—τοῦ παιδίου). But since the rumor was
-  altogether false, we may surely imagine that Kallippus, taking
-  advantage of a notorious accident which had just proved fatal to
-  the eldest son of Dion, may have fabricated a false statement
-  about the family of Dion, though there might be a younger boy at
-  home. It is not certain that the number of Dion’s children was
-  familiarly known among the population of Syracuse; nor was Dion
-  himself in the situation of an assured king, able to transfer
-  his succession at once to a boy not yet adult. And when we find
-  in another chapter of Plutarch’s Life of Dion (c. 31), that the
-  son of Dion was called by Timæus, _Aretæus_,—and by Timonides,
-  _Hipparinus_,—this surely affords some presumption that there
-  were _two_ sons, and not one son called by two different names.
-
-  I cannot therefore admit that Ast has proved the eighth Platonic
-  letter to be inaccurate in respect to matter of fact. I will add
-  that the letter does not mention the _name_ of Dion’s son (though
-  Ast says that it calls him _Hipparinus_); and that it does
-  specify the _three_ partners in the tripartite kingship suggested
-  (though Ast says that it only mentioned _two_).
-
-  Most of Ast’s arguments against the authenticity of the letters,
-  however, are founded, not upon alleged inaccuracies of fact,
-  but upon what he maintains to be impropriety and meanness of
-  thought, childish intrusion of philosophy, unseasonable mysticism
-  and pedantry, etc. In some of his criticisms I coincide, though
-  by no means in all. But I cannot accept them as evidence to
-  prove the point for which he contends,—the spuriousness of the
-  letters. The proper conclusion from his premises appears to me
-  to be, that Plato wrote letters which, when tried by our canons
-  about letter-writing, seem awkward, pedantic, and in bad taste.
-  Dionysius of Halikarnassus (De adm. vi dicend. in Demosth.
-  p. 1025-1044), while emphatically extolling the admirable
-  composition of Plato’s dialogues, does not scruple to pass an
-  unfavorable criticism upon him as a speech-writer; referring to
-  the speeches in the Symposion as well as to the funeral harangue
-  in the Menexenus. Still less need we be afraid to admit, that
-  Plato was not a graceful letter-writer.
-
-  That Plato would feel intensely interested, and even personally
-  involved, in the quarrel between Dionysius II. and Dion, cannot
-  be doubted. That he would write letters to Dionysius on the
-  subject,—that he would anxiously seek to maintain influence over
-  him, on all grounds,—that he would manifest a lofty opinion
-  of himself and his own philosophy,—is perfectly natural and
-  credible. And when we consider both the character and the station
-  of Dionysius, it is difficult to lay down beforehand any assured
-  canon as to the epistolary tone which Plato would think most
-  suitable to address him.
-
-Such was the first stage of what we may term the despot’s progress,
-successfully consummated. The pseudo-demagogue Dionysius outdoes,
-in fierce professions of antipathy against the rich, anything that
-we read as coming from the real demagogues, Athenagoras at Syracuse,
-or Kleon at Athens. Behold him now sitting as a member of the new
-Board of generals, at a moment when the most assiduous care and
-energy, combined with the greatest unanimity, were required to put
-the Syracusan military force into an adequate state of efficiency. It
-suited the policy of Dionysius not only to bestow no care or energy
-himself, but to nullify all that was bestowed by his colleagues, and
-to frustrate deliberately all chance of unanimity. He immediately
-began a systematic opposition and warfare against his colleagues. He
-refused to attend at their Board, or to hold any communication with
-them. At the frequent assemblies held during this agitated state of
-the public mind, he openly denounced them as engaged in treasonable
-correspondence with the enemy. It is obvious that his colleagues, men
-newly chosen in the same spirit with himself, could not as yet have
-committed any such treason in favor of the Carthaginians. But among
-them was his accomplice Hipparinus;[949] while probably the rest
-also, nominated by a party devoted to him personally, were selected
-in a spirit of collusion, as either thorough-going partisans, or
-worthless and incompetent men, easy for him to set aside. At any
-rate, his calumnies, though received with great repugnance by the
-leading and more intelligent citizens, found favor with the bulk of
-the assembly, predisposed at that moment from the terrors of the
-situation to suspect every one. The new Board of generals being thus
-discredited, Dionysius alone was listened to as an adviser. His
-first and most strenuous recommendation was, that a vote should be
-passed for restoring the exiles; men (he affirmed) attached to their
-country, and burning to serve her, having already refused the offers
-of her enemies; men who had been thrown into banishment by previous
-political dispute, but who, if now generously recalled, would
-manifest their gratitude by devoted patriotism, and serve Syracuse
-far more warmly than the allies invoked from Italy and Peloponnesus.
-His discredited colleagues either could not, or would not, oppose the
-proposition; which, being warmly pressed by Dionysius and all his
-party, was at length adopted by the assembly. The exiles accordingly
-returned, comprising all the most violent men who had been in arms
-with Hermokrates when he was slain. They returned glowing with
-party-antipathy and revenge, prepared to retaliate upon others the
-confiscation under which themselves had suffered, and looking to the
-despotism of Dionysius as their only means of success.[950]
-
-  [949] Plutarch, Dion. c. 3.
-
-  [950] Diodor. xiii, 93.
-
-The second step of the despot’s progress was now accomplished.
-Dionysius had filled up the ranks of the Hermokratean party, and
-obtained an energetic band of satellites, whose hopes and interests
-were thoroughly identified with his own. Meanwhile letters arrived
-from Gela, entreating reinforcements, as Imilkon was understood to be
-about to march thither. Dionysius being empowered to march thither
-a body of two thousand hoplites, with four hundred horsemen, turned
-the occasion to profitable account. A regiment of mercenaries,
-under the Lacedæmonian Dexippus, was in garrison at Gela; while the
-government of the town is said to have been oligarchical, in the
-hands of the rich, though with a strong and discontented popular
-opposition. On reaching Gela, Dionysius immediately took part with
-the latter; originating the most violent propositions against the
-governing rich, as he had done at Syracuse. Accusing them of treason
-in the public assembly, he obtained a condemnatory vote under
-which they were put to death and their properties confiscated. With
-the funds so acquired, he paid the arrears due to the soldiers of
-Dexippus, and doubled the pay of his own Syracusan division. These
-measures procured for him immense popularity, not merely with all the
-soldiers, but also with the Geloan Demos, whom he had relieved from
-the dominion of their wealthy oligarchy. Accordingly, after passing a
-public vote testifying their gratitude, and bestowing upon him large
-rewards, they despatched envoys to carry the formal expression of
-their sentiments to Syracuse. Dionysius resolved to go back thither
-at the same time, with his Syracusan soldiers; and tried to prevail
-on Dexippus to accompany him with his own division. This being
-refused, he went thither with his Syracusans alone. To the Geloans,
-who earnestly entreated that they might not be forsaken when the
-enemy was daily expected, he contented himself with replying that he
-would presently return with a larger force.[951]
-
-  [951] Diodor. xiii, 93.
-
-A third step was thus obtained. Dionysius was going back to Syracuse
-with a testimonial of admiration and gratitude from Gela,—with
-increased attachment on the part of his own soldiers, on account of
-the double pay,—and with the means of coining and circulating a new
-delusion. It was on the day of a solemn festival that he reached
-the town, just as the citizens were coming in crowds out of the
-theatre. Amidst the bustle of such a scene as well as of the return
-of the soldiers, many citizens flocked around him to inquire, What
-news about the Carthaginians? “Do not ask about your foreign enemies
-(was the reply of Dionysius); you have much worse enemies within
-among you. Your magistrates,—these very men upon whose watch you
-rely during the indulgence of the festival,—they are the traitors
-who are pillaging the public money, leaving the soldiers unpaid, and
-neglecting all necessary preparation, at a moment when the enemy
-with an immense host is on the point of assailing you. I knew their
-treachery long ago, but I have now positive proof of it. For Imilkon
-sent to me an envoy, under pretence of treating about the prisoners,
-but in reality to purchase my silence and connivance; he tendered to
-me a larger bribe than he had given to them, if I would consent to
-refrain from hindering them, since I could not be induced to take
-part in their intrigues. This is too much. I am come home now to
-throw up my command. While my colleagues are corruptly bartering away
-their country, I am willing to take my share as a citizen in the
-common risk, but I cannot endure to incur shame as an accomplice in
-their treachery.”
-
-Such bold allegations, scattered by Dionysius among the crowd
-pressing round him,—renewed at length, with emphatic formality in
-the regular assembly held the next day,—and concluding with actual
-resignation,—struck deep terror into the Syracusan mind. He spoke
-with authority, not merely as one fresh from the frontier exposed,
-but also as bearing the grateful testimonial of the Geloans, echoed
-by the soldiers whose pay he had recently doubled. His assertion of
-the special message from Imilkon, probably an impudent falsehood,
-was confidently accepted and backed by all these men, as well as
-by his other partisans, the Hermokratean party, and most of all by
-the restored exiles. What defence the accused generals made, or
-tried to make, we are not told. It was not likely to prevail, nor
-did it prevail, against the positive deposition of a witness so
-powerfully seconded. The people, persuaded of their treason, were
-incensed against them, and trembled at the thought of being left, by
-the resignation of Dionysius, to the protection of such treacherous
-guardians against the impending invasion. Now was the time for his
-partisans to come forward with their main proposition: “Why not get
-rid of these traitors, and keep Dionysius alone? Leave them to be
-tried and punished at a more convenient season; but elect him at
-once general with full powers, to make head against the pressing
-emergency from without. Do not wait until the enemy is actually
-assaulting our walls. Dionysius is the man for our purpose, the only
-one with whom we have a chance of safety. Recollect that our glorious
-victory over the three hundred thousand Carthaginians at Himera was
-achieved by Gelon acting as general with full powers.” Such rhetoric
-was irresistible in the present temper of the assembly,—when the
-partisans of Dionysius were full of audacity and acclamation,—when
-his opponents were discomfited, suspicious of each other, and without
-any positive scheme to propose,—and when the storm, which had already
-overwhelmed Selinus, Himera, and Agrigentum, was about to burst on
-Gela and Syracuse. A vote of the assembly was passed, appointing
-Dionysius general of the city, alone, and with full powers;[952] by
-what majority we do not know.
-
-  [952] Diodor. xiii, 94.
-
-The first use which the new general-plenipotentiary made of his
-dignity was to propose, in the same assembly, that the pay of the
-soldiers should be doubled. Such liberality (he said) would be the
-best means of stimulating their zeal; while in regard to expense,
-there need be no hesitation; the money might easily be provided.
-
-Thus was consummated the fourth, and most important, act of the
-despot’s progress. A vote of the assembly had been obtained, passed
-in constitutional forms, vesting in Dionysius a single-handed power
-unknown to and above the laws,—unlimited and unresponsible. But he
-was well aware that the majority of those who thus voted had no
-intention of permanently abnegating their freedom,—that they meant
-only to create a temporary dictatorship, under the pressing danger
-of the moment, for the express purpose of preserving that freedom
-against a foreign enemy,—and that even thus much had been obtained
-by impudent delusion and calumny, which subsequent reflection would
-speedily dissipate. No sooner had the vote passed, than symptoms of
-regret and alarm became manifest among the people. What one assembly
-had conferred, a second repentant assembly might revoke.[953] It
-therefore now remained for Dionysius to ensure the perpetuity of his
-power by some organized means; so as to prevent the repentance, of
-which he already discerned the commencement, from realizing itself
-in any actual revocation. For this purpose he required a military
-force extra-popular and anti-popular; bound to himself and not to
-the city. He had indeed acquired popularity with the Syracusan as
-well as with the mercenary soldiers, by doubling and ensuring their
-pay. He had energetic adherents, prepared to go all lengths on his
-behalf, especially among the restored exiles. This was an important
-basis, but not sufficient for his objects without the presence of a
-special body of guards, constantly and immediately available, chosen
-as well as controlled by himself, yet acting in such vocation under
-the express mandate and sanction of the people. He required a farther
-vote of the people, legalizing for his use such a body of guards.
-
-  [953] Diodor. xiii, 95. Διαλυθείσης δὲ τῆς ἐκκλησίας, οὐκ ὀλίγοι
-  τῶν Συρακουσίων κατηγόρουν τῶν πραχθέντων, ὥσπερ οὐκ αὐτοὶ
-  ταῦτα κεκυρωκότες· τοῖς γὰρ λογισμοῖς εἰς ἑαυτοὺς ἐρχόμενοι,
-  τὴν ἐσομένην δυναστείαν ἀνεθεώρουν. Οὗτοι μὲν οὖν βεβαιῶσαι
-  βουλόμενοι τὴν ἐλευθερίαν, ἔλαθον ἑαυτοὺς δεσπότην τῆς πατρίδος
-  καθεστακότες. Ὁ δὲ Διονύσιος, ~τὴν μετάνοιαν τῶν ὄχλων φθάσαι
-  βουλόμενος~, ἐπεζήτει δι’ οὗ τρόπου δύναιτο φύλακας αἰτήσασθαι
-  τοῦ σώματος· τούτου γὰρ συγχωρηθέντος, ῥᾳδίως ἤμελλε κυριεύσειν
-  τῆς τυραννίδος.
-
-But with all his powers of delusion, and all the zeal of his
-partisans, he despaired of getting any such vote from an assembly
-held at Syracuse. Accordingly, he resorted to a manœuvre, proclaiming
-that he had resolved on a march to Leontini, and summoning the full
-military force of Syracuse (up to the age of forty) to march along
-with him, with orders for each man to bring with him thirty days’
-provision. Leontini had been, a few years before, an independent
-city; but was now an outlying fortified post, belonging to the
-Syracusans; wherein various foreign settlers, and exiles from the
-captured Sicilian cities, had obtained permission to reside. Such
-men, thrown out of their position and expectations as citizens, were
-likely to lend either their votes or their swords willingly to the
-purposes of Dionysius. While he thus found many new adherents there,
-besides those whom he brought with him, he foresaw that the general
-body of the Syracusans, and especially those most disaffected to him,
-would not be disposed to obey his summons or accompany him.[954]
-For nothing could be more preposterous, in a public point of view,
-than an out-march of the whole Syracusan force for thirty days to
-Leontini, where there was neither danger to be averted nor profit to
-be reaped; at a moment too when the danger on the side of Gela was
-most serious, from the formidable Carthaginian host at Agrigentum.
-
-  [954] Diodor. xiii, 95. Αὐτὴ δ’ ἡ πόλις (Leontini) τότε φρούριον
-  ἦν τοῖς Συρακουσίοις, πλῆρες ὕπαρχον φυγάδων καὶ ξένων ἀνθρώπων.
-  Ἤλπιζε γὰρ τούτους συναγωνιστὰς ἕξειν, ἀνθρώπους δεομένους
-  μεταβολῆς· τῶν δὲ Συρακουσίων τοὺς πλείστους οὐδ’ ἥξειν εἰς
-  Λεοντίνους.
-
-  Many of the expelled Agrigentines settled at Leontini, by
-  permission of the Syracusans (Diodor. xiii, 89).
-
-Dionysius accordingly set out with a force which purported,
-ostensibly and according to summons, to be the full military
-manifestation of Syracuse; but which, in reality, comprised mainly
-his own adherents. On encamping for the night near to Leontini, he
-caused a factitious clamor and disturbance to be raised during the
-darkness, around his own tent,—ordered fires to be kindled,—summoned
-on a sudden his most intimate friends,—and affected to retire under
-their escort to the citadel. On the morrow an assembly was convened,
-of the Syracusans and residents present, purporting to be a Syracusan
-assembly; Syracuse in military guise, or as it were in Comitia
-Centuriata,—to employ an ancient phrase belonging to the Roman
-republic. Before this assembly Dionysius appeared, and threw himself
-upon their protection; affirming that his life had been assailed
-during the preceding night,—calling upon them emphatically to stand
-by him against the incessant snares of his enemies,—and demanding
-for that purpose a permanent body of guards. His appeal, plausibly
-and pathetically turned, and doubtless warmly seconded by zealous
-partisans, met with complete success. The assembly,—Syracusan or
-quasi-Syracusan, though held at Leontini,—passed a formal decree,
-granting to Dionysius a body-guard of six hundred men, selected
-by himself and responsible to him alone.[955] One speaker indeed
-proposed to limit the guards to such a number as should be sufficient
-to protect him against any small number of personal enemies, but not
-to render him independent of, or formidable to, the many.[956] But
-such precautionary refinement was not likely to be much considered,
-when the assembly was dishonest or misguided enough to pass the
-destructive vote here solicited; and even if embodied in the words
-of the resolution, there were no means of securing its observance
-in practice. The regiment of guards being once formally sanctioned,
-Dionysius heeded little the limit of number prescribed to him. He
-immediately enrolled more than one thousand men, selected as well
-for their bravery as from their poverty and desperate position. He
-provided them with the choicest arms, and promised to them the most
-munificent pay. To this basis of a certain, permanent, legalized,
-regiment of household troops, he added farther a sort of standing
-army, composed of mercenaries hardly less at his devotion than the
-guards properly so called. In addition to the mercenaries already
-around him, he invited others from all quarters, by tempting offers;
-choosing by preference outlaws and profligates, and liberating
-slaves for the purpose.[957] Next, summoning from Gela Dexippus the
-Lacedæmonian, with the troops under his command, he sent this officer
-away to Peloponnesus,—as a man not trustworthy for his purpose and
-likely to stand forward on behalf of the freedom of Syracuse. He then
-consolidated all the mercenaries under one organization, officering
-them anew with men devoted to himself.
-
-  [955] Diodor. xiii, 95.
-
-  [956] Aristotel. Politic. iii, 10, 10. Καὶ Διονυσίῳ τις, ὅτ’ ᾔτει
-  τοὺς φύλακας, συνεβούλευε τοῖς Συρακουσίοις διδόναι τοσούτους
-  τοὺς φύλακας—i. e. τοσαύτην τὴν ἴσχυν, ὥσθ’ ἑκάστου μὲν καὶ ἑνὸς
-  καὶ συμπλειόνων κρείττω, τοῦ δὲ πλήθους ἥττω, εἶναι.
-
-  [957] Diodor. xiv, 7. τοὺς ἠλευθερωμένους δούλους, etc.
-
-This fresh military levy and organization was chiefly accomplished
-during his stay at Leontini, without the opposition which would
-probably have arisen if it had been done at Syracuse; to which latter
-place Dionysius marched back, in an attitude far more imposing than
-when he left it. He now entered the gates at the head not only of his
-chosen body-guard, but also of a regular army of mercenaries, hired
-by and dependent upon himself. He marched them at once into the islet
-of Ortygia (the interior and strongest part of the city, commanding
-the harbor), established his camp in that acropolis of Syracuse, and
-stood forth as despot conspicuously in the eyes of all. Though the
-general sentiment among the people was one of strong repugnance, yet
-his powerful military force and strong position rendered all hope
-of open resistance desperate. And the popular assembly,—convoked
-under the pressure of this force, and probably composed of none but
-his partisans,—was found so subservient, as to condemn and execute,
-upon his requisition, Daphnæus and Demarchus. These two men, both
-wealthy and powerful in Syracuse, had been his chief opponents,
-and were seemingly among the very generals whom he had incited the
-people to massacre on the spot without any form of trial, in one
-of the previous public assemblies.[958] One step alone remained to
-decorate the ignoble origin of Dionysius, and to mark the triumph of
-the Hermokratean party by whom its elevation had been mainly brought
-about. He immediately married the daughter of Hermokrates; giving his
-own sister in marriage to Polyxenus, the brother of that deceased
-chief.[959]
-
-  [958] Diodor. xiii, 96.
-
-  [959] Diodor. 1, c.; Plutarch, Dion. c. 3.
-
-Thus was consummated the fifth or closing act of the despot’s
-progress, rendering Dionysius master of the lives and fortunes of
-his fellow-countrymen. The successive stages of his rise I have
-detailed from Diodorus, who (excepting a hint or two from Aristotle)
-is our only informant. His authority is on this occasion better than
-usual, since he had before him not merely Ephorus and Timæus, but
-also Philistus. He is, moreover, throughout this whole narrative at
-least clear and consistent with himself. We understand enough of the
-political strategy pursued by Dionysius, to pronounce that it was
-adapted to his end with a degree of skill that would have greatly
-struck a critical eye like Machiavel; whose analytical appreciation
-of means, when he is canvassing men like Dionysius, has been often
-unfairly construed as if it implied sympathy with and approbation
-of their end. We see that Dionysius, in putting himself forward as
-the chief and representative of the Hermokratean party, acquired
-the means of employing a greater measure of fraud and delusion than
-an exile like Hermokrates, in prosecution of the same ambitious
-purposes. Favored by the dangers of the state and the agony of the
-public mind, he was enabled to simulate an ultra-democratical ardor
-both in defence of the people against the rich, and in denunciation
-of the unsuccessful or incompetent generals, as if they were corrupt
-traitors. Though it would seem that the government of Syracuse, in
-406 B.C., must have been strongly democratical, yet Dionysius in his
-ardor for popular rights, treats it as an anti-popular oligarchy;
-and tries to acquire the favor of the people by placing himself in
-the most open quarrel and antipathy to the rich. Nine years before,
-in the debate between Hermokrates and Athenagoras in the Syracusan
-assembly, the former stood forth, or at least was considered to
-stand forth, as champion of the rich; while the latter spoke as a
-conservative democrat, complaining of conspiracies on the part of
-the rich. In 406 B.C., the leader of the Hermokratean party has
-reversed this policy, assuming a pretended democratical fervor much
-more violent than that of Athenagoras. Dionysius, who took up the
-trade of what is called a demagogue on this one occasion, simply
-for the purpose of procuring one single vote in his own favor, and
-then shutting the door by force against all future voting and all
-correction,—might resort to grosser falsehood than Athenagoras; who,
-as an habitual speaker, was always before the people, and even if
-successful by fraud at one meeting, was nevertheless open to exposure
-at a second.
-
-In order that the voting of any public assembly shall be really
-available as a protection to the people, its votes must not only be
-preceded by full and free discussion, but must also be open from
-time to time to rediscussion and correction. That error will from
-time to time be committed, as well by the collective people as by
-particular fractions of the people, is certain; opportunity for
-amendment is essential. A vote which is understood to be final, and
-never afterwards to be corrigible, is one which can hardly turn to
-the benefit of the people themselves, though it may often, as in the
-case of Dionysius, promote the sinister purposes of some designing
-protector.
-
-
-
-
-CHAPTER LXXXII.
-
-SICILY DURING THE DESPOTISM OF THE ELDER DIONYSIUS AT SYRACUSE.
-
-
-The proceedings, recounted at the close of my last chapter, whereby
-Dionysius erected his despotism, can hardly have occupied less
-than three months; coinciding nearly with the first months of 405
-B.C., inasmuch as Agrigentum was taken about the winter solstice
-of 406 B.C.[960] He was not molested during this period by the
-Carthaginians, who were kept inactive in quarters at Agrigentum, to
-repose after the hardships of the blockade; employed in despoiling
-the city of its movable ornaments, for transmission to Carthage, and
-in burning or defacing, with barbarous antipathy, such as could not
-be carried away.[961] In the spring Imilkon moved forward towards
-Gela, having provided himself with fresh siege-machines, and ensured
-his supplies from the Carthaginian territory in his rear. Finding
-no army to oppose him, he spread his troops over the territory both
-of Gela and of Kamarina, where much plunder was collected and much
-property ruined. He then returned to attack Gela, and established
-a fortified camp by clearing some plantation-ground near the river
-of the same name, between the city and the sea. On this spot stood,
-without the walls, a colossal statue of Apollo, which Imilkon caused
-to be carried off and sent as a present to Tyre.
-
-  [960] Xen. Hellen. ii, 2, 24. Ὁ ἐνιαυτὸς ἔληγεν, ἐν ᾧ μεσοῦντι
-  Διονύσιος ἐτυράννησε, etc.
-
-  The year meant here is an Olympic year, from Midsummer to
-  Midsummer; so that the middle months of it would fall in the
-  first quarter of the Julian year.
-
-  If we compare however Xen. Hellen. i, 5, 21 with ii, 2, 24, we
-  shall see that the indications of time cannot both be correct;
-  for the acquisition of the despotism by Dionysius followed
-  immediately, and as a consequence directly brought about, upon
-  the capture of Agrigentum by the Carthaginians.
-
-  It seems to me that the mark of time is not quite accurate in
-  either one passage or the other. The capture of Agrigentum took
-  place at the close of B.C. 406; the acquisition of the despotism
-  by Dionysius, in the early months of 405 B.C., as Diodorus places
-  them. Both events are in the same Olympic year, between Midsummer
-  406 B.C. and Midsummer 405 B.C. But this year is exactly the
-  year which falls between the two passages above referred to in
-  Xenophon; not coinciding exactly with either one or the other.
-  Compare Dodwell, Chronolog. Xenoph. ad ann. 407 B.C.
-
-  [961] Diodor. xiii, 82, 96, 108. τὰς γλυφὰς καὶ τὰ περιττοτέρως
-  εἰργασμένα κατέσκαψεν, etc.
-
-Gela was at this moment defended only by its own citizens, for
-Dionysius had called away Dexippus with the mercenary troops. Alarmed
-at the approach of the formidable enemy who had already mastered
-Agrigentum, Himera, and Selinus,—the Geloans despatched pressing
-entreaties to Dionysius for aid; at the same time resolving to
-send away their women and children for safety to Syracuse. But the
-women, to whom the idea of separation was intolerable, supplicated
-so earnestly to be allowed to stay and share the fortunes of their
-fathers and husbands, that this resolution was abandoned. In
-expectation of speedy relief from Dionysius, the defence was brave
-and energetic. While parties of the Geloans, well-acquainted with the
-country, sallied out and acted with great partial success against
-the Carthaginian plunderers,—the mass of the citizens repelled the
-assaults of Imilkon against the walls. His battering-machines and
-storming-parties were brought to bear on several places at once; the
-walls themselves,—being neither in so good a condition, nor placed
-upon so unassailable an eminence, as those of Agrigentum,—gave
-way on more than one point. Yet still the besieged, with obstinate
-valor, frustrated every attempt to penetrate within; reëstablishing
-during the night the breaches which had been made during the day.
-The feebler part of their population aided, by every means in
-their power, the warriors on the battlements; so the defence was
-thus made good until Dionysius appeared with the long-expected
-reinforcement. It comprised his newly-levied mercenaries, with the
-Syracusan citizens, and succors from the Italian as well as from the
-Sicilian Greeks; amounting in all to fifty thousand men, according to
-Ephorus,—to thirty thousand foot, and one thousand horse, as Timæus
-represented. A fleet of fifty ships of war sailed round Cape Pachynus
-to coöperate with them off Gela.[962]
-
-  [962] Diodor. xiii, 109.
-
-Dionysius fixed his position between Gela and the sea, opposite to
-that of the Carthaginians, and in immediate communication with his
-fleet. His presence having suspended the assaults upon the town, he
-became in his turn the aggressor; employing both his cavalry and his
-fleet to harass the Carthaginians and intercept their supplies. The
-contest now assumed a character nearly the same as had taken place
-before Agrigentum, and which had ended so unfavorably to the Greeks.
-At length, after twenty days of such desultory warfare, Dionysius,
-finding that he had accomplished little, laid his plan for a direct
-attack upon the Carthaginian camp. On the side towards the sea, as no
-danger had been expected, that camp was unfortified; it was there,
-accordingly, that Dionysius resolved to make his principal attack
-with his left division, consisting principally of Italiot Greeks,
-sustained by the Syracusan ships, who were to attack simultaneously
-from seaward. He designed at the same time also to strike blows from
-two other points. His right division, consisting of Sicilian allies,
-was ordered to march on the right or western side of the town of
-Gela, and thus fall upon the left of the Carthaginian camp; while he
-himself, with the mercenary troops which he kept specially around
-him, intended to advance through the town itself, and assail the
-advanced or central portion of their position near the walls, where
-their battering-machinery was posted. His cavalry were directed to
-hold themselves in reserve for pursuit, in case the attack proved
-successful; or for protection to the retreating infantry, in case it
-failed.[963]
-
-  [963] Diodor. xiii, 109.
-
-Of this combined scheme, the attack upon the left or seaward side
-of the Carthaginian camp, by the Italiot division and the fleet
-in concert, was effectively executed, and promised at first to be
-successful. The assailants overthrew the bulwarks, forced their way
-into the camp, and were only driven out by extraordinary efforts
-on the part of the defenders; chiefly Iberians and Campanians, but
-reinforced from the other portions of the army, which were as yet
-unmolested. But of the two other divisions of Dionysius, the right
-did not attack until long after the moment intended, and the centre
-never attacked at all. The right had to make a circuitous march, over
-the Geloan plain round the city, which occupied longer time than had
-been calculated; while Dionysius with the mercenaries around him,
-intending to march through the city, found themselves so obstructed
-and embarrassed that they made very slow progress, and were yet
-longer before they could emerge on the Carthaginian side. Probably
-the streets, as in so many other ancient towns, were crooked, narrow,
-and irregular; perhaps also, farther blocked up by precautions
-recently taken for defence. And thus the Sicilians on the right,
-not coming up to the attack until the Italians on the left had been
-already repulsed, were compelled to retreat, after a brave struggle,
-by the concurrent force of the main Carthaginian army. Dionysius and
-his mercenaries, coming up later still, found that the moment for
-attack had passed altogether, and returned back into the city without
-fighting at all.
-
-Whether the plan or the execution was here at fault,—or both the
-one and the other,—we are unable certainly to determine. There will
-appear reasons for suspecting, that Dionysius was not displeased at a
-repulse which should discourage his army, and furnish an excuse for
-abandoning Gela. After retiring again within the walls, he called
-together his principal friends to consult what was best to be done.
-All were of opinion that it was imprudent to incur farther hazard for
-the preservation of the town. Dionysius now found himself in the same
-position as Diokles after the defeat near Himera, and as Daphnæus
-and the other Syracusan generals before Agrigentum, after the capture
-of their provision-fleet by the Carthaginians. He felt constrained
-to abandon Gela, taking the best means in his power for protecting
-the escape of the inhabitants. Accordingly, to keep the intention of
-flight secret, he sent a herald to Imilkon to solicit a burial-truce
-for the ensuing day; he also set apart a body of two thousand light
-troops, with orders to make noises in front of the enemy throughout
-the whole night, and to keep the lights and fires burning, so as to
-prevent any suspicion on the part of the Carthaginians.[964] Under
-cover of these precautions, he caused the Geloan population to
-evacuate their city in mass at the commencement of night, while he
-himself with his main army followed at midnight to protect them. All
-hurried forward on their march to Syracuse, turning to best account
-the hours of darkness. On their way thither lay Kamarina,—Kamarina
-the immovable,[965] as it was pronounced by an ancient oracle or
-legend, yet on that fatal night seeming to falsify the epithet. Not
-thinking himself competent to defend this city, Dionysius forced
-all the Kamarinæan population to become partners in the flight of
-the Geloans. The same heart-rending scene, which has already been
-recounted at Agrigentum and Himera, was now seen repeated on the road
-from Gela to Syracuse: a fugitive multitude, of all ages and of both
-sexes, free as well as slave, destitute and terror-stricken, hurrying
-they knew not whither, to get beyond the reach of a merciless enemy.
-The flight to Syracuse, however, was fortunately not molested by any
-pursuit. At daybreak the Carthaginians, discovering the abandonment
-of the city, immediately rushed in and took possession of it. As very
-little of the valuable property within it had been removed, a rich
-plunder fell into the hands of the conquering host, whose barbarous
-hands massacred indiscriminately the miserable remnant left behind:
-old men, sick, and children, unable to accompany a flight so sudden
-and so rapid. Some of the conquerors farther satiated their ferocious
-instincts by crucifying or mutilating these unhappy prisoners.[966]
-
-  [964] Diodor. xiii, 111.
-
-  [965] Μὴ κινεῖ Καμάριναν, ἀκίνητόν περ ἐοῦσαν—
-
-                  “fatis nunquam concessa moveri
-      Apparet Camarina procul.”—Virgil. Æneid, iii, 701.
-
-  [966] Diodor. xiii. 111. Οὐδεμία γὰρ ἦν παρ’ αὐτοῖς φειδὼ τῶν
-  ἁλισκομένων, ἀλλ’ ἀσυμπαθῶς τῶν ἠτυχηκότων οὓς μὲν ἀνεσταύρουν,
-  οἷς δ’ ἀφορήτους ἐπῆγον ὕβρεις.
-
-Amidst the sufferings of this distressed multitude, however, and
-the compassion of the protecting army, other feelings also were
-powerfully aroused. Dionysius, who had been so unmeasured and so
-effective in calumniating unsuccessful generals before, was now
-himself exposed to the same arrows. Fierce were the bursts of wrath
-and hatred against him, both among the fugitives and among the army.
-He was accused of having betrayed to the Carthaginians, not only
-the army, but also Gela and Kamarina, in order that the Syracusans,
-intimidated by these formidable neighbors so close to their borders,
-might remain in patient servitude under his dominion. It was remarked
-that his achievements for the relief of Gela had been unworthy of
-the large force which he brought with him; that the loss sustained
-in the recent battle had been nowise sufficient to compel, or even
-to excuse, a disgraceful flight; that the mercenaries, especially,
-the force upon which he most relied, had not only sustained no loss,
-but had never been brought into action; that while his measures
-taken against the enemy had thus been partial and inefficient, they
-on their side had manifested no disposition to pursue him in his
-flight,—thus affording a strong presumption of connivance between
-them. Dionysius was denounced as a traitor by all,—except his own
-mercenaries, whom he always kept near him for security. The Italiot
-allies, who had made the attack and sustained the main loss during
-the recent battle, were so incensed against him for having left them
-thus unsupported, that they retired in a body, and marched across the
-centre of the island home to Italy.
-
-But the Syracusans in the army, especially the horsemen, the
-principal persons in the city, had a double ground of anger against
-Dionysius; partly from his misconduct or supposed treachery in
-this recent enterprise, but still more from the despotism which he
-had just erected over his fellow-citizens. This despotism, having
-been commenced in gross fraud and consummated by violence, was now
-deprived of the only plausible color which it had ever worn, since
-Dionysius had been just as disgracefully unsuccessful against the
-Carthaginians as those other generals whom he had denounced and
-superseded. Determined to rid themselves of one whom they hated at
-once as a despot and as a traitor, the Syracusan horsemen watched
-for an opportunity of setting upon Dionysius during the retreat, and
-killing him. But finding him too carefully guarded by the mercenaries
-who always surrounded his person, they went off in a body, and
-rode at their best speed to Syracuse, with the full purpose of
-reëstablishing the freedom of the city, and keeping out Dionysius. As
-they arrived before any tidings had been received of the defeat and
-flight at Gela, they obtained admission without impediment into the
-islet of Ortygia; the primitive interior city, commanding the docks
-and harbor, set apart by the despot for his own residence and power.
-They immediately assaulted and plundered the house of Dionysius,
-which they found richly stocked with gold, silver, and valuables
-of every kind. He had been despot but a few weeks; so that he must
-have begun betimes to despoil others, since it seems ascertained
-that his own private property was by no means large. The assailants
-not only plundered his house with all its interior wealth, but also
-maltreated his wife so brutally that she afterwards died of the
-outrage.[967] Against this unfortunate woman they probably cherished
-a double antipathy, not only as the wife of Dionysius, but also as
-the daughter of Hermokrates. They at the same time spread abroad the
-news that Dionysius had fled never to return; for they fully confided
-in the disruption which they had witnessed among the retiring army,
-and in the fierce wrath which they had heard universally expressed
-against him.[968] After having betrayed his army, together with Gela
-and Kamarina, to the Carthaginians, by a flight without any real
-ground of necessity (they asserted),—he had been exposed, disgraced,
-and forced to flee in reality, before the just displeasure of his own
-awakened fellow-citizens. Syracuse was now free; and might, on the
-morrow, reconstitute formally her popular government.
-
-  [967] Diodor. xiii, 112; xiv, 44. Plutarch, Dion. c. 3.
-
-  [968] Diodor. xiii, 112.
-
-Had these Syracusans taken any reasonable precautions against adverse
-possibilities, their assurances would probably have proved correct.
-The career of Dionysius would here have ended. But while they
-abandoned themselves to the plunder of his house and brutal outrage
-against his wife, they were so rashly confident in his supposed
-irretrievable ruin, and in their own mastery of the insular portion
-of the city, that they neglected to guard the gate of Achradina
-(the outer city) against his reëntry. The energy and promptitude
-of Dionysius proved too much for them. Informed of their secession
-from the army, and well knowing their sentiments, he immediately
-divined their projects, and saw that he could only defeat them by
-audacity and suddenness of attack. Accordingly, putting himself
-at the head of his best and most devoted soldiers,—one hundred
-horsemen and six hundred foot,—he left his army and proceeded by a
-forced march to Syracuse; a distance of about four hundred stadia,
-or about forty-five English miles. He arrived there about midnight,
-and presented himself, not at the gate of Ortygia, which he had
-probably ascertained to be in possession of his enemies, but at that
-of Achradina; which latter (as has been already mentioned) formed
-a separate fortification from Ortygia, with the Nekropolis between
-them.[969] Though the gate was shut, he presently discovered it to be
-unguarded, and was enabled to apply to it some reeds gathered in the
-marshes on his road, so as to set it on fire and burn it. So eager
-had he been for celerity of progress, that at the moment when he
-reached the gate, a part only of his division were with him. But as
-the rest arrived while the flames were doing their work, he entered,
-with the whole body, into Achradina or the outer city. Marching
-rapidly through the streets, he became master, without resistance,
-of all this portion of the city, and of the agora, or market-place,
-which formed its chief open space. His principal enemies, astounded
-by this alarming news, hastened out of Ortygia into Achradina, and
-tried to occupy the agora. But they found it already in possession
-of Dionysius; and being themselves very few in number, having taken
-no time to get together any considerable armed body, they were
-overpowered and slain by his mercenaries. Dionysius was thus strong
-enough to vanquish all his enemies, who entered Achradina in small
-and successive parties, without any order, as they came out of
-Ortygia. He then proceeded to attack the houses of those whom he knew
-to be unfriendly to his dominion, slew such as he could find within,
-and forced the rest to seek shelter in exile. The great body of the
-Syracusan horsemen,—who but the evening before were masters of the
-city, and might with common prudence have maintained themselves in
-it, were thus either destroyed or driven into banishment. As exiles
-they established themselves in the town of Ætna.[970]
-
-  [969] Diodor. xiii, 113. παρῆν περὶ μέσας νύκτας πρὸς τὴν πύλην
-  τῆς Ἀχραδινῆς ... εἰσήλαυνε διὰ τῆς Ἀχραδινῆς, etc.
-
-  [970] Diodor. xiii, 113. Compare Xenoph. Hellen. i, 3, 5.
-
-Thus master of the city, Dionysius was joined on the ensuing day by
-the main body of his mercenaries, and also by the Sicilian allies,
-who had now completed their march. The miserable sufferers from
-Gela and Kamarina, who looked upon him with indignation as their
-betrayer,—went to reside at Leontini; seemingly as companions of the
-original Leontine citizens, who had been for some time domiciliated
-at Syracuse, but who no longer chose to remain there under Dionysius.
-Leontini thus became again an independent city.[971]
-
-  [971] Xenophon (Hellen. ii, 3, 5) states that “the Leontines,
-  co-residents at Syracuse, revolted to their own city from
-  Dionysius and the Syracusans.”
-
-  This migration to Leontini seems a part of the same transaction
-  as what Diodorus notices (xiii, 113). Leontini, recognized as
-  independent by the peace which speedily followed, is mentioned
-  again shortly afterwards as independent (xiv, 14). It had been
-  annexed to Syracuse before the Athenian siege.
-
-Though the disasters at Gela had threatened to ruin Dionysius, yet
-he was now, through his recent victory, more master of Syracuse
-than ever; and had more completely trodden down his opponents. The
-horsemen, whom he had just destroyed and chased away, were for the
-most part the rich and powerful citizens of Syracuse. To have put
-down such formidable enemies, almost indispensable as leaders to
-any party which sought to rise against him, was the strongest of
-all negative securities for the prolongation of his reign. There
-was no public assembly any longer at Syracuse, to which he had to
-render account of his proceedings at Gela and Kamarina, and before
-which he was liable to be arraigned,—as he himself had arraigned
-his predecessors who had commanded at Himera and Agrigentum. All
-such popular securities he had already overridden or subverted. The
-superiority of force, and intimidation of opponents, upon which his
-rule rested, were now more manifest and more decisive than ever.
-
-Notwithstanding such confirmed position, however, Dionysius might
-still have found defence difficult, if Imilkon had marched on with
-his victorious army, fresh from the plunder of Gela and Kamarina, and
-had laid energetic siege to Syracuse. From all hazard and alarm of
-this sort he was speedily relieved, by propositions for peace, which
-came spontaneously tendered by the Carthaginian general. Peace was
-concluded between them, on the following terms:—
-
-1. The Carthaginians shall retain all their previous possessions,
-and all their Sikanian dependencies, in Sicily. They shall keep,
-besides, Selinus, Himera, Agrigentum. The towns of Gela and Kamarina
-may be reoccupied by their present fugitive inhabitants; but on
-condition of paying tribute to Carthage, and destroying their walls
-and fortifications.
-
-2. The inhabitants of Leontini and Messênê, as well as all the Sikel
-inhabitants, shall be independent and autonomous.
-
-3. The Syracusans shall be subject to Dionysius.[972]
-
-  [972] Diodor. xiii, 114. καὶ Συρακουσίους μὲν ὑπὸ Διονύσιον
-  τετάχθαι, etc.
-
-4. All the captives, and all the ships, taken on both sides, shall be
-mutually restored.
-
-Such were the conditions upon which peace was now concluded. Though
-they were extremely advantageous to Carthage, assigning to her,
-either as subject or as tributary, the whole of the southern shore
-of Sicily,—yet as Syracuse was, after all, the great prize to be
-obtained, the conquest of which was essential to the security of
-all the remainder, we are astonished that Imilkon did not push
-forward to attack it, at a moment so obviously promising. It
-appears that immediately after the conquest of Gela and Kamarina,
-the Carthaginian army was visited by a pestilential distemper,
-which is said to have destroyed nearly the half of it, and to
-have forbidden future operations. The announcement of this event
-however, though doubtless substantially exact, comes to us in a way
-somewhat confused.[973] And when we read, as one of the articles in
-the treaty, the express and formal provision that “The Syracusans
-shall be subject to Dionysius,”—we discern plainly, that there was
-also an additional cause for this timely overture, so suitable to
-his interests. There was real ground for those bitter complaints
-against Dionysius, which charged him with having betrayed Gela and
-Kamarina to the Carthaginians in order to assure his own dominion
-at Syracuse. The Carthaginians, in renouncing all pretensions to
-Syracuse and recognizing its autonomy, could have no interest in
-dictating its internal government. If they determined to recognize by
-formal treaty the sovereignty as vested in Dionysius, we may fairly
-conclude that he had purchased the favor from them by some underhand
-service previously rendered. In like manner both Hiketas and
-Agathoklês,—the latter being the successor, and in so many points the
-parallel of Dionysius, ninety years afterwards,—availed themselves
-of Carthaginian support as one stepping-stone to the despotism of
-Syracuse.[974]
-
-  [973] Diodor. xiii, 114.
-
-  Diodorus begins this chapter with the words,—~Διόπερ ὑπὸ τῶν
-  πραγμάτων ἀναγκαζόμενος~ Ἰμίλκων, ἔπεμψεν εἰς Συρακούσας κήρυκα,
-  παρακαλῶν τοὺς ἡττημένους διαλύσασθαι. Ἀσμένως δ’ ὑπακούσαντος
-  τοῦ Διονυσίου, τὴν εἰρήνην ἐπὶ τοῖσδε ἔθεντο, etc.
-
-  Now there is not the smallest matter of fact either mentioned
-  or indicated before, to which the word διόπερ can have
-  reference. Nothing is mentioned but success on the part of the
-  Carthaginians, and disaster on the part of the Greeks; the
-  repulse of the attack made by Dionysius upon the Carthaginian
-  camp,—his retreat and evacuation of Gela and Kamarina,—the
-  occupation of Gela by the Carthaginians,—the disorder, mutiny,
-  and partial dispersion of the army of Dionysius in its
-  retreat,—the struggle within the walls of Syracuse. There is
-  nothing in all this to which διόπερ can refer. But a few lines
-  farther on, after the conditions of peace have been specified,
-  Diodorus alludes to _the_ terrible disease (ὑπὸ τῆς νόσου) which
-  laid waste the Carthaginian army, as if he had mentioned it
-  before.
-
-  I find in Niebuhr (Vorträge über alte Geschichte, vol. iii, p.
-  212, 213) the opinion expressed, that here is a gap in Diodorus
-  “intentionally disguised in the MSS., and not yet noticed by any
-  editor.” Some such conclusion seems to me unavoidable. Niebuhr
-  thinks, that in the lost portion of the text, it was stated that
-  Imilkon marched on to Syracuse, formed the siege of the place,
-  and was there visited with the terrific pestilence to which
-  allusion is made in the remaining portion of the text. This also
-  is nowise improbable; yet I do not venture to assert it,—since
-  the pestilence may possibly have broken out while Imilkon was
-  still at Gela.
-
-  Niebuhr farther considers, that Dionysius lost the battle of
-  Gela through miserable generalship,—that he lost it by design,
-  as suitable to his political projects,—and that by the terms of
-  the subsequent treaty, he held the territory around Syracuse only
-  under Carthaginian supremacy.
-
-  [974] Justin, xxii, 2; Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 2, 7, 9.
-
-The pestilence, however, among the Carthaginian army is said to have
-been so terrible as to destroy nearly the half of their numbers.
-The remaining half, on returning to Africa, either found it already
-there, or carried it with them; for the mortality at and around
-Carthage was not less deplorable than in Sicily.[975]
-
-  [975] Diodor. xiii, 114.
-
-It was in the summer of 405 B.C., that this treaty was concluded,
-which consigned all the Hellenic ground on the south of Sicily to
-the Carthaginian dominion, and Syracuse with its population to
-that of Dionysius. It was in September or October of the same year
-that Lysander effected his capture of the entire Athenian fleet at
-Ægospotami, destroyed the maritime ascendency and power of Athens,
-and gave commencement to the Lacedæmonian empire, completed by the
-actual surrender of Athens during the ensuing year. The dekarchies
-and harmosts, planted by Lysander in so many cities of the central
-Hellenic world, commenced their disastrous working nearly at the same
-time as the despotism of Dionysius in Syracuse. This is a point to be
-borne in mind, in reference to the coming period. The new position
-and policy wherein Sparta now became involved, imparted to her a
-sympathy with Dionysius such as in earlier times she probably would
-not have felt; and which contributed materially, in a secondary way,
-to the durability of his dominion, as well by positive intrigues
-of Lacedæmonian agents, as by depriving the oppressed Syracusans
-of effective aid or countenance from Corinth or other parts of
-Greece.[976]
-
-  [976] Diodor. xiv, 10.
-
-  The valuable support lent to Dionysius by the Spartans is
-  emphatically denounced by Isokrates, Orat. iv, (Panegyric.) s.
-  145; Orat. viii, (De Pace) s. 122.
-
-The period immediately succeeding this peace was one of distress,
-depression, and alarm, throughout all the south of Sicily. According
-to the terms of the treaty, Gela and Kamarina might be reoccupied by
-their fugitive population; yet with demolished walls,—with all traces
-of previous opulence and comfort effaced by the plunderers,—and
-under the necessity of paying tribute to Carthage. The condition
-of Agrigentum, Selinus, and Himera, now actually portions of
-Carthaginian territory, was worse; especially Agrigentum, hurled
-at one blow from the loftiest pinnacle of prosperous independence.
-No free Hellenic territory was any longer to be found between Cape
-Pachynus and Cape Lilybæum, beyond the Syracusan frontier.
-
-Amidst the profound discouragement of the Syracusan mind, the
-withdrawal from Sicily of the terror-striking Carthaginian
-army would be felt as a relief, and would procure credit for
-Dionysius.[977] It had been brought about under him, though not
-as a consequence of his exploits; for his military operations
-against Imilkon at Gela had been completely unsuccessful (and even
-worse); and the Carthaginians had suffered no harm except from the
-pestilence. While his partisans had thus a plea for extolling him
-as the savior of the city, he also gathered strength in other ways
-out of the recent events. He had obtained a formal recognition of
-his government from the Carthaginians; he had destroyed or banished
-the chief Syracusan citizens opposed to his dominion, and struck
-terror into the rest; he had brought back all his mercenary troops
-and guards, without loss or dissatisfaction. He now availed himself
-of his temporary strength to provide precautions for perpetuity,
-before the Syracusans should recover spirit, or obtain a favorable
-opportunity, to resist.
-
-  [977] Plato, while he speaks of Dionysius and Hipparinus on
-  this occasion as the saviors of Syracuse, does not insist upon
-  extraordinary valor and ability on their parts, but assigns
-  the result mainly to fortune and the favor of the gods (Plato,
-  Epistol. viii, p. 353 B.; p. 355 F.).
-
-  His letter is written with a view of recommending a compromise at
-  Syracuse, between the party of freedom, and the descendants of
-  Dionysius and Hipparinus; he thus tries to set up as good a case
-  as he can, in favor of the title of both the two latter to the
-  gratitude of the Syracusans.
-
-  He reluctantly admits how much Dionysius the elder afterwards
-  abused the confidence placed in him by the Syracusans (p. 353 C.).
-
-His first measure was to increase the fortifications of the islet
-called Ortygia, strengthening it as a position to be held separately
-from Achradina and the remaining city. He constructed a new wall,
-provided with lofty turrets and elaborate defences of every kind,
-immediately outside of the mole which connected this islet with
-Sicily. On the outside of this new wall, he provided convenient
-places for transacting business, porticos spacious enough to shelter
-a considerable multitude, and seemingly a distinct strong fort,
-destined for a public magazine of corn.[978] It suited his purpose
-that the trade of the town should be carried on, and the persons
-of the traders congregated, under or near the outer walls of his
-peculiar fortress. As a farther means of security, he also erected
-a distinct citadel or acropolis within the islet and behind the new
-wall. The citadel was close to the Lesser Harbor or Portus Lakkius.
-Its walls were so extended as to embrace the whole of this harbor,
-closing it up in such a way as to admit only one ship at a time,
-though there was room for sixty ships within. He was thus provided
-with an almost impregnable stronghold, not only securing him against
-attack from the more numerous population in the outer city, but
-enabling him to attack them whenever he chose,—and making him master,
-at the same time, of the grand means of war and defence against
-foreign enemies.
-
-  [978] That this was the situation of the fortified _horrea
-  publica_ at Syracuse, we see from Livy, xxiv, 21. I think we may
-  presume that they were begun at this time by Dionysius, as they
-  form a natural part of his scheme.
-
-To provide a fortress in the islet of Ortygia, was one step towards
-perpetual dominion at Syracuse; to fill it with devoted adherents,
-was another. For Dionysius, the instruments of dominion were his
-mercenary troops and body-guards; men chosen by himself from
-their aptitude to his views, identified with him in interest, and
-consisting in large proportion not merely of foreigners, but even of
-liberated slaves. To these men he now proceeded to assign a permanent
-support and residence. He distributed among them the houses in the
-islet or inferior stronghold, expelling the previous proprietors, and
-permitting no one to reside there except his own intimate partisans
-and soldiers. Their quarters were in the islet, while he dwelt in
-the citadel,—a fortress within a fortress, sheltering his own person
-against the very garrison or standing army, by means of which he kept
-Syracuse in subjection.[979] Having provided houses for his soldiers,
-by extruding the residents in Ortygia,—he proceeded to assign to them
-a comfortable maintenance, by the like wholesale dispossession of
-proprietors, and reappropriation of lands, without. He distributed
-anew the entire Syracusan territory; reserving the best lands, and
-the best shares, for his own friends and for the officers in command
-of his mercenaries,—and apportioning the remaining territory in equal
-shares to all the inhabitants, citizens as well as non-citizens. By
-this distribution the latter became henceforward citizens as well as
-the former; so far at least, as any man could be properly called a
-citizen under his despotism. Even the recently enfranchised slaves
-became new citizens and proprietors as well as the rest.[980]
-
-  [979] Diodor. xiv, 7.
-
-  The residence of Dionysius in the acropolis, and the quarters
-  of his mercenaries without the acropolis, but still within
-  Ortygia,—are noticed in Plato’s account of his visit to the
-  younger Dionysius (Plato, Epistol. vii, p. 350; Epist. iii, p.
-  315).
-
-  [980] Diodor. xiv, 7. Τῆς δὲ χώρας τὴν μὲν ἀρίστην ἐξελόμενος
-  ἐδωρήσατο τοῖς τε φίλοις καὶ τοῖς ἐφ’ ἡγεμονίας τεταγμένοις·
-  ~τὴν δ’ ἄλλην ἐμέρισεν ἐπίσης ξένῳ τε καὶ πολίτῃ~, συμπεριλαβὼν
-  τῷ τῶν πολιτῶν ὀνόματι τοὺς ἠλευθερωμένους δούλους, οὓς ἐκάλει
-  νεοπολίτας. Διέδωκε δὲ καὶ τὰς οἰκίας τοῖς ὄχλοις, πλὴν τῶν ἐν τῇ
-  Νήσῳ· ταύτας δὲ τοῖς φίλοις καὶ τοῖς μισθοφόροις ἐδωρήσατο. Ἐπεὶ
-  δὲ τὰ κατὰ τὴν τυραννίδα καλῶς ἐδόκει διῳκηκέναι, etc.
-
-Respecting this sweeping change of property, it is mortifying to
-have no farther information than is contained in two or three brief
-sentences of Diodorus. As a basis for entire redivision of lands,
-Dionysius would find himself already possessed of the property
-of those Syracusan Horsemen or Knights whom he had recently put
-down or banished. As a matter of course, their property would be
-confiscated, and would fall into his possession for reassignment. It
-would doubtless be considerable, inasmuch as these Horsemen were for
-the most part wealthy men. From this basis, Dionysius enlarged his
-scheme to the more comprehensive idea of a general spoliation and
-reappropriation, for the benefit of his partisans and his mercenary
-soldiers. The number of these last we do not know; but on an occasion
-not very long afterwards, the mercenaries under him are mentioned as
-amounting to about ten thousand.[981] To ensure landed properties
-to each of these men, together with the monopoly of residence in
-Ortygia, nothing less than a sweeping confiscation would suffice.
-How far the equality of share, set forth in principle, was or could
-be adhered to in practice, we cannot say. The maxim of allowing
-residence in Ortygia to none but friends and partisans, passed from
-Dionysius into a traditional observance for future anti-popular
-governments of Syracuse. The Roman consul Marcellus, when he subdued
-the city near two centuries afterwards, prescribed the rule of
-admitting into the islet none but Romans, and of excluding all native
-Syracusan residents.[982]
-
-  [981] Diodor. xiv, 78.
-
-  So also, after the death of the elder Dionysius, Plutarch speaks
-  of his military force as having been βαρβάρων μυρíανδρον φυλακήν
-  (Plutarch, Dion. c. 10). These expressions however have little
-  pretence to numerical accuracy.
-
-  [982] Cicero in Verrem, v. 32, 84; 38, 98.
-
-Such mighty works of fortification, combined with so extensive
-a revolution both in property and in domicile, cannot have been
-accomplished in less than a considerable time, nor without provoking
-considerable resistance in detail. Nor is it to be forgotten that
-the pecuniary cost of such fortifications must have been very
-heavy. How Dionysius contrived to levy the money, we do not know.
-Aristotle informs us that the contributions which he exacted from the
-Syracusans were so exorbitant, that within the space of five years,
-the citizens had paid into his hands their entire property; that is,
-twenty per cent. per annum upon their whole property.[983] To what
-years this statement refers, we do not know; nor what was the amount
-of contribution exacted on the special occasion now before us. But
-we may justly infer from it that Dionysius would not scruple to lay
-his hand heavily upon the Syracusans for the purpose of defraying
-the cost of his fortifications; and that the simultaneous burthen
-of large contributions would thus come to aggravate the painful
-spoliation and transfers of property, and the still more intolerable
-mischiefs of a numerous standing army domiciled as masters in the
-heart of the city. Under such circumstances, we are not surprised
-to learn that the discontent among the Syracusans was extreme, and
-that numbers of them were greatly mortified at having let slip the
-favorable opportunity of excluding Dionysius, when the Horsemen were
-actually for a moment masters of Syracuse, before he suddenly came
-back from Gela.[984]
-
-  [983] Aristotel. Politic. v, 9, 4. Καὶ ἡ εἰσφορὰ τῶν τελῶν
-  (τυραννικόν ἐστι) ἐν πέντε γὰρ ἔτεσιν ἐπὶ Διονυσίου τὴν οὐσίαν
-  ἅπασαν εἰσενηνοχέναι συνέβαινε.
-
-  [984] Diodorus, xiv, 7.
-
-Whatever might be the extent of indignation actually felt, there
-could be no concert or manifestation in Syracuse, under a watchful
-despot with the overwhelming force assembled in Ortygia. But a
-suitable moment speedily occurred. Having completed his fortress and
-new appropriation for the assured maintenance of the mercenaries,
-Dionysius resolved to attempt a conquest of the autonomous Sikel
-tribes in the interior of the island, some of whom had sided with
-Carthage in the recent war. He accordingly marched out with a
-military force, consisting partly of his mercenary troops, partly
-of armed Syracusan citizens under a commander named Dorikus.
-While he was laying siege to the town of Erbessus, the Syracusan
-troops, finding themselves assembled in arms and animated with one
-common sentiment, began to concert measures for open resistance
-to Dionysius. The commander Dorikus, in striving to repress these
-manifestations, lifted up his hand to chastise one of the most
-mutinous speakers;[985] upon which the soldiers rushed forward in
-a body to defend him. They slew Dorikus, and proclaimed themselves
-again, with loud shouts, free Syracusan citizens; calling upon all
-their comrades in the camp to unite against the despot. They also
-sent a message forthwith to the town of Ætna, inviting the immediate
-junction of the Syracusan Horsemen, who had sought shelter there in
-their exile from Dionysius. Their appeal found the warmest sympathy
-among the Syracusan soldiers in the camp, all of whom declared
-themselves decisively against the despot, and prepared for every
-effort to recover their liberty.
-
-  [985] Diodor. xiv, 7. Compare an occurrence very similar, at
-  Mendê in Thrace (Thucyd. iv, 130).
-
-So rapidly did this sentiment break out into vehement and unanimous
-action, that Dionysius was too much intimidated to attempt to put
-it down at once by means of his mercenaries. Profiting by the
-lesson which he had received, after the return march from Gela, he
-raised the siege of Erbessus forthwith, and returned to Syracuse to
-make sure of his position in Ortygia, before his Syracusan enemies
-could arrive there. Meanwhile the latter, thus left full of joy and
-confidence, as well as masters of the camp, chose for their leaders
-those soldiers who had slain Dorikus, and found themselves speedily
-reinforced by the Horsemen, or returning exiles from Ætna. Resolved
-to spare no effort for liberating Syracuse, they sent envoys to
-Messênê and Rhegium, as well as to Corinth, for aid; while they at
-the same time marched with all their force to Syracuse, and encamped
-on the heights of Epipolæ. It is not clear whether they remained in
-this position, or whether they were enabled, through the sympathy
-of the population, to possess themselves farther of the outer city
-Achradina, and with its appendages Tycha and Neapolis. Dionysius
-was certainly cut off from all communication with the country; but
-he maintained himself in his impregnable position in Ortygia, now
-exclusively occupied by his chosen partisans and mercenaries. If he
-even continued master of Achradina, he must have been prevented from
-easy communication with it. The assailants extended themselves under
-the walls of Ortygia, from Epipolæ to the Greater as well as the
-Lesser Harbor.[986] A considerable naval force was sent to their aid
-from Messênê and Rhegium, giving to them the means of blocking him
-up on the seaside; while the Corinthians, though they could grant no
-farther assistance, testified their sympathy by sending Nikoteles as
-adviser.[987] The leaders of the movement proclaimed Syracuse again
-a free city, offered large rewards for the head of Dionysius, and
-promised equal citizenship to all the mercenaries who should desert
-him.
-
-  [986] Diodor. xiv, 8.
-
-  [987] Diodor. xiv, 10.
-
-Several of the mercenaries, attracted by such offers, as well
-as intimidated by that appearance of irresistible force which
-characterizes the first burst of a popular movement, actually came
-over and were well received. Everything seemed to promise success to
-the insurgents, who, not content with the slow process of blockade,
-brought up battering-machines, and vehemently assaulted the walls
-of Ortygia. Nothing now saved Dionysius except those elaborate
-fortifications which he had so recently erected, defying all attack.
-And even though sheltered by them, his position appeared to be so
-desperate, that desertion from Ortygia every day increased. He
-himself began to abandon the hope of maintaining his dominion;
-discussing with his intimate friends the alternative, between death
-under a valiant but hopeless resistance, and safety purchased by
-a dishonorable flight. There remained but one means of rescue: to
-purchase the immediate aid of a body of twelve hundred mercenary
-Campanian cavalry, now in the Carthaginian service, and stationed
-probably at Gela or Agrigentum. His brother-in-law Polyxenus
-advised him to mount his swiftest horse, to visit in person the
-Campanians, and bring them to the relief of Ortygia. But this
-counsel was strenuously resisted by two intimate friends,—Helôris
-and Megaklês,—who both impressed upon him, that the royal robe was
-the only honorable funeral garment, and that, instead of quitting
-his post at full speed, he ought to cling to it until he was dragged
-away by the leg.[988] Accordingly, Dionysius determined to hold out,
-without quitting Ortygia; sending private envoys to the Campanians,
-with promises of large pay if they would march immediately to his
-defence. The Carthaginians were probably under obligation not to
-oppose this, having ensured to Dionysius by special article of treaty
-the possession of Syracuse.
-
-  [988] Diodor. xiv, 8; xx, 78. Isokrates, Or. vi, (Archidamus)
-  sect. 49.
-
-  It appears that Timæus the historian ascribed this last
-  observation to Philistus; and Diodorus copies Timæus in one of
-  the passages above referred to, though not in the other. But
-  Philistus himself in his history asserted that the observation
-  had been made by another person (Plutarch, Dion. c. 35).
-
-  The saying seems to have been remembered and cited long
-  afterwards in Syracuse; but cited as having been delivered by
-  Dionysius himself, not as addressed to him (Livy, xxiv, 22).
-
-  Isokrates, while recording the saying, represents it as having
-  been delivered when the Carthaginians were pressing Syracuse
-  hardly by siege; having in mind doubtless the siege or blockade
-  undertaken by Imilkon seven years afterwards. But I apprehend
-  this to be a misconception. The story seems to suit better to the
-  earlier occasion named by Diodorus.
-
-To gain time for their arrival, by deluding and disarming the
-assailants, Dionysius affected to abandon all hope of prolonged
-defence, and sent to request permission to quit the city, along with
-his private friends and effects. Permission was readily granted
-to him to depart with five triremes. But as soon as this evidence
-of success had been acquired, the assailants without abandoned
-themselves to extravagant joy and confidence, considering Dionysius
-as already subdued, and the siege as concluded. Not merely was all
-farther attack suspended, but the forces were in a great measure
-broken up. The Horsemen were disbanded, by a proceeding alike unjust
-and ungrateful, to be sent back to Ætna; while the hoplites dispersed
-about the country to their various lands and properties. The same
-difficulty of keeping a popular force long together for any military
-operation requiring time, which had been felt when the Athenians
-besieged their usurpers Kylon and Peisistratus in the acropolis,[989]
-was now experienced in regard to the siege of Ortygia. Tired with
-the length of the siege, the Syracusans blindly abandoned themselves
-to the delusive assurance held out by Dionysius; without taking
-heed to maintain their force and efficiency undiminished, until
-his promised departure should be converted into a reality. In this
-unprepared and disorderly condition, they were surprised by the
-sudden arrival of the Campanians,[990] who, attacking and defeating
-them with considerable loss, forced their way through to join
-Dionysius in Ortygia. At the same time, a reinforcement of three
-hundred fresh mercenaries reached him by sea. The face of affairs
-was now completely changed. The recent defeat produced among the
-assailants not only discouragement, but also mutual recrimination
-and quarrel. Some insisted upon still prosecuting the siege of
-Ortygia, while others, probably the friends of the recently dismissed
-Horsemen, declared in favor of throwing it up altogether and joining
-the Horsemen at Ætna; a resolution, which they seem at once to
-have executed. Observing his opponents thus enfeebled and torn by
-dissension, Dionysius sallied out and attacked them, near the suburb
-called Neapolis or Newtown, on the south-west of Achradina. He was
-victorious, and forced them to disperse. But he took great pains to
-prevent slaughter of the fugitives, riding up himself to restrain his
-own troops; and he subsequently buried the slain with due solemnity.
-He was anxious by these proceedings to conciliate the remainder;
-for the most warlike portion of his opponents had retired to Ætna,
-where no less than seven thousand hoplites were now assembled along
-with the Horsemen. Dionysius sent thither envoys to invite them to
-return to Syracuse, promising the largest amnesty for the past. But
-it was in vain that his envoys expatiated upon his recent forbearance
-towards the fugitives and decent interment of the slain. Few could
-be induced to come back, except such as had left their wives and
-families at Syracuse in his power. The larger proportion, refusing
-all trust in his word and all submission to his command, remained
-in exile at Ætna. Such as did return were well treated, in hopes of
-inducing the rest gradually to follow their example.[991]
-
-  [989] Herodotus, v, 71; Thucydides, i, 112.
-
-  [990] It is said that the Campanians, on their way to Syracuse,
-  passed by Agyrium, and deposited their baggage in the care of
-  Agyris the despot of that town (Diodor. xiv, 9). But if we
-  look at the position of Agyrium on the map, it seems difficult
-  to understand how mercenaries coming from the Carthaginian
-  territory, and in great haste to reach Syracuse, can have passed
-  anywhere near to it.
-
-  [991] Diodor. xiv, 9.
-
-Thus was Dionysius rescued from a situation apparently desperate, and
-reëstablished in his dominion; chiefly through the rash presumption
-(as on the former occasion after the retreat from Gela), the want of
-persevering union, and the absence of any commanding leader, on the
-part of his antagonists. His first proceeding was to dismiss the
-newly-arrived Campanians. For though he had to thank them mainly for
-his restoration, he was well aware that they were utterly faithless,
-and that on the first temptation they were likely to turn against
-him.[992] But he adopted more efficient means for strengthening
-his dominion in Syracuse, and for guarding against a repetition of
-that danger from which he had so recently escaped. He was assisted
-in his proceedings by a Lacedæmonian envoy named Aristus, recently
-despatched by the Spartans for the ostensible purpose of bringing
-about an amicable adjustment of parties at Syracuse. While Nikoteles,
-who had been sent from Corinth, espoused the cause of the Syracusan
-people, and put himself at their head to obtain for them more or
-less of free government,—Aristus, on the contrary, lent himself to
-the schemes of Dionysius. He seduced the people away from Nikoteles,
-whom he impeached and caused to be slain. Next, pretending himself
-to act along with the people, and to employ the great ascendency of
-Sparta in defence of their freedom,[993] he gained their confidence
-and then betrayed them. The despot was thus enabled to strengthen
-himself more decisively than before, and probably to take off the
-effective popular leaders thus made known to him; while the mass of
-the citizens were profoundly discouraged by finding Sparta enlisted
-in the conspiracy against their liberties.
-
-  [992] Diodor. xiv, 9. The subsequent proceedings of the
-  Campanians justified his wisdom in dismissing them. They went
-  to Entella (a town among the dependencies of Carthage, in the
-  south-western portion of Sicily,—Diod. xiv, 48), where they were
-  welcomed and hospitably treated by the inhabitants. In the night,
-  they set upon the Entellan citizens by surprise, put them all to
-  death, married their widows and daughters, and kept possession of
-  the town for themselves.
-
-  [993] Diodor. xiv, 10. Ἀπέστειλαν (οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι) Ἄριστον,
-  ἄνδρα τῶν ἐπιφανῶν, εἰς Συρακούσας, τῷ μὲν λόγῳ προσποιούμενοι
-  καταλιπεῖν τὴν δυναστείαν, τῇ δ’ ἀληθείᾳ σπεύδοντες αὐξῆσαι τὴν
-  τυραννίδα· ἤλπιζον γὰρ συγκατασκευάζοντες τὴν ἀρχὴν, ὑπήκοον
-  ἕξειν τὸν Διονύσιον διὰ τὰς εὐεργεσίας. Ὁ δ’ Ἄριστος καταπλεύσας
-  εἰς Συρακούσας, καὶ τῷ τυράννῳ λάθρα περὶ τούτων διαλεχθεὶς, τούς
-  τε Συρακοσίους ἀνασείων, Νικοτέλην τὸν Κορίνθιον ἀνεῖλεν,
-  ἀφηγούμενον τῶν Συρακοσίων· τοὺς δὲ πιστεύσαντας προδοὺς, τὸν μὲν
-  τύραννον ἰσχυρὸν κατέστησε, διὰ δὲ τῆς πράξεως ταύτης ἀσχημονεῖν
-  ἐποίησεν αὑτὸν ἅμα καὶ τὴν πατρίδα. Compare xiv, 70.
-
-Of this renovated tide of success Dionysius took advantage, to
-strike another important blow. During the season of harvest, while
-the citizens were busy in the fields, he caused the houses to be
-searched, and seized all the arms found therein. Not satisfied
-with thus robbing his opponents of the means of attack, he farther
-proceeded to construct additional fortifications around the islet of
-Ortygia, to augment his standing army of mercenaries, and to build
-fresh ships. Feeling more than ever that his dominion was repugnant
-to the Syracusans, and rested only on naked force, he thus surrounded
-himself with precautions probably stronger than any other Grecian
-despot had ever accumulated. He was yet farther strengthened by the
-pronounced and active support of Sparta, now at the maximum of her
-imperial ascendency;[994] and by the presence of the mighty Lysander
-at Syracuse as her ambassador to countenance and exalt him.[995]
-The Spartan alliance, however, did not prevent him from enrolling
-among his mercenaries a considerable fraction of the Messenians, the
-bitter enemies of Sparta; who were now driven out of Naupaktus and
-Kephallenia, with no other possession left except their arms[996]—and
-whose restoration to Peloponnesus by Epaminondas, about thirty years
-afterwards, has been described in a preceding chapter.
-
-  [994] Diodor. xiv, 10. Καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ παρεσκευάζετο πρὸς τὴν
-  ἀσφάλειαν τῆς τυραννίδος, ὡς ἂν ἔργοις ἤδη πεῖραν εἰληφὼς, ὅτι
-  πᾶν ὑπομένουσιν οἱ Συρακούσιοι χάριν τοῦ μὴ δουλεύειν.
-
-  [995] Plutarch, Lysander, c. 2.
-
-  [996] Diodor. xiv, 34.
-
-So large a mercenary force, while the people in Syracuse were
-prostrate and in no condition for resistance, naturally tempted
-Dionysius to seek conquest as well as plunder beyond the border. Not
-choosing as yet to provoke a war with Carthage, he turned his arms
-to the north and north-west of the Syracusan territory; the Grecian
-(Chalkidic or Ionic) cities, Naxus, Katana, and Leontini—and the
-Sikels, towards the centre of Sicily. The three Chalkidic cities
-were the old enemies of Syracuse, but Leontini had been conquered by
-the Syracusans even before the Athenian expedition, and remained as
-a Syracusan possession until the last peace with the Carthaginians,
-when it had been declared independent. Naxus and Katana had contrived
-to retain their independence against Syracuse, even after the ruin
-of the Athenian armament under Nikias. At the head of a powerful
-force, Dionysius marched out from Syracuse first against the town of
-Ætna, occupied by a considerable body of Syracusan exiles hostile
-to his dominion. Though the place was strong by situation,[997]
-yet these men, too feeble to resist, were obliged to evacuate it;
-upon which he proceeded to attack Leontini. But on summoning the
-inhabitants to surrender, he found his propositions rejected, and
-every preparation made for a strenuous defence; so that he could do
-nothing more than plunder the territory around, and then advanced
-onward into the interior Sikel territory, towards Enna and Erbita.
-But his march in this direction was little more than a feint, for the
-purpose of masking his real views upon Naxus and Katana, with both
-which cities he had already opened intrigues. Arkesilaus, general
-of Katana, and Prokles, general of Naxus, were both carrying on
-corrupt negotiations for the purpose of selling to him the liberty
-of their native cities. Until the negotiations were completed,
-Dionysius wished to appear as if turning his arms elsewhere, and
-therefore marched against Enna. Here he entered into conspiracy with
-an Ennæan citizen named Aeimnestus, whom he instigated to seize the
-sceptre of his native town,—by promises of assistance, on condition
-of being himself admitted afterwards. Aeimnestus made the attempt
-and succeeded, but did not fulfil his engagement to Dionysius; who
-resented this proceeding so vehemently, that he assisted the Ennæans
-in putting down Aeimnestus, delivered him as prisoner into their
-hands, and then retired, satisfied with such revenge, without farther
-meddling. He next marched against Erbita, before which he passed his
-time with little or no result, until the bribes promised at Naxus
-and Katana had taken effect. At length the terms were fully settled.
-Dionysius was admitted at night by Arkesilaus into Katana, seized
-the city, disarmed the inhabitants, and planted there a powerful
-garrison. Naxus was next put into his hands, by the like corruption
-on the part of Prokles; who was rewarded with a large bribe, and with
-the privilege of preserving his kinsmen. Both cities were given up
-to be plundered by his soldiers; after which the walls as well as
-the houses were demolished, and the inhabitants sold as slaves. The
-dismantled site of Katana was then assigned to a body of Campanian
-mercenaries in the service of Dionysius, who however retained in his
-possession hostages for their fidelity;[998] the site of Naxus to the
-indigenous Sikels in the neighborhood. These captures struck so much
-terror into the Leontines, that when Dionysius renewed his attack
-upon them, they no longer felt competent to resist. He required them
-to surrender their city, to remove to Syracuse, and there to reside
-for the future as citizens; which term meant, at the actual time, as
-subjects of his despotism. The Leontines obeyed the requisition, and
-their city thus again became an appendage of Syracuse.[999]
-
-  [997] Diodor. xiv, 58.
-
-  [998] Diodor. xiv, 61.
-
-  [999] Diodor. xiv, 15.
-
-These conquests of Dionysius, achieved mainly by corrupting the
-generals of Naxos and Katana, were of serious moment, and spread so
-much alarm among the Sikels of the interior, that Archonides, the
-Sikel prince of Erbita, thought it prudent to renounce his town and
-soil; withdrawing to a new site beyond the Nebrode mountains, on the
-northern coast of the island, more out of the reach of Syracusan
-attack. Here, with his mercenary soldiers and with a large portion of
-his people who voluntarily accompanied him, he founded the town of
-Alæsa.[1000]
-
-  [1000] Diodor. xiv, 16. This Archonides may probably have been
-  son of the Sikel prince Archonides, who, having taken active part
-  as an ally of Nikias and the Athenian invaders against Syracuse,
-  died just before Gylippus reached Sicily (Thucyd. vii, 1).
-
-Strengthened at home by these successes abroad, the sanguine despot
-of Syracuse was stimulated to still greater enterprises. He resolved
-to commence aggressive war with the Carthaginians. But against such
-formidable enemies, large preparations were indispensable, defensive
-as well as offensive, before his design could be proclaimed. First,
-he took measures to ensure the defensibility of Syracuse against all
-contingencies. Five Grecian cities on the south of the island, one
-of them the second in Sicily, had already undergone the deplorable
-fate of being sacked by a Carthaginian host; a calamity, which might
-possibly be in reserve for Syracuse also, especially if she herself
-provoked a war, unless the most elaborate precautions were taken to
-render a successful blockade impossible.
-
-Now the Athenian blockade under Nikias had impressed valuable lessons
-on the mind of every Syracusan. The city had then been well-nigh
-blocked up by a wall of circumvallation carried from sea to sea;
-which was actually more than half completed, and would have been
-entirely completed, had the original commander been Demosthenes
-instead of Nikias. The prodigious importance of the slope of
-Epipolæ to the safety of the city had been demonstrated by the most
-unequivocal evidence. In my seventh volume, I have already described
-the site of Syracuse and the relation of this slope to the outer city
-called Achradina. Epipolæ was a gentle ascent west of Achradina.
-It was bordered, along both the north side and the south side, by
-lines of descending cliff, cut down precipitously, about twenty feet
-deep in their lowest part. These lines of cliff nearly converged at
-the summit of the slope, called Euryalus; leaving a narrow pass or
-road between elevated banks, which communicated with the country
-both north and west of Syracuse. Epipolæ thus formed a triangle upon
-an inclined plane, sloping upward from its base, the outer wall of
-Achradina, to its apex at Euryalus; and having its two sides formed,
-the one by the northern, the other by the southern, line of cliffs.
-This apex formed a post of the highest importance, commanding the
-narrow road which approached Epipolæ from its western extremity or
-summit, and through which alone it was easy for an army to get on
-the declivity of Epipolæ, since the cliffs on each side were steep,
-though less steep on the northern side than on the southern.[1001]
-Unless an enemy acquired possession of this slope, Syracuse could
-never be blocked up from the northern sea at Trogilus to the Great
-Harbor; an enterprise, which Nikias and the Athenians were near
-accomplishing, because they first surprised from the northward the
-position of Euryalus, and from thence poured down upon the slope
-of Epipolæ. I have already described, in my seventh volume, how
-the arrival of Gylippus deprived them of superiority in the field,
-at a time when their line of circumvallation was already half
-finished,—having been carried from the centre of Epipolæ southward
-down to Great Harbor, and being partially completed from the same
-point across the northern half of Epipolæ to the sea at Trogilus; how
-he next intercepted their farther progress, by carrying out, from the
-outer wall of Achradina, a cross wall traversing their intended line
-of circumvallation and ending at the northern cliff; how he finally
-erected a fort or guard-post on the summit of Euryalus, which he
-connected with the cross-wall just mentioned by a single wall of
-junction carried down the slope of Epipolæ.[1002]
-
-  [1001] See the Dissertation of Saverio Cavallari,—Zur Topographie
-  von Syrakus (Göttingen, 1845), p. 22.
-
-  [1002] See, for a farther exposition of these points, my account
-  of the siege of Syracuse by the Athenians, Vol. VII, ch. lix, lx.
-
-Both the danger which Syracuse had then incurred, and the means
-whereby it had been obviated, were fresh in the recollection of
-Dionysius. Since the Athenian siege, the Syracusans may perhaps
-have preserved the fort erected by Gylippus near Euryalus; but
-they had pulled down the wall of junction, the cross-wall, and the
-outer wall of protection constructed between the arrival of Nikias
-in Sicily and his commencement of the siege, enclosing the sacred
-precinct of Apollo Temenites. The outer city of Syracuse was thus
-left with nothing but the wall of Achradina, with its two suburbs or
-excrescences, Tychê and Neapolis. Dionysius now resolved to provide
-for Syracuse a protection substantially similar to that contrived
-by Gylippus, yet more comprehensive, elaborate, and permanent.
-He carried out an outer line of defence, starting from the sea
-near the port called Trogilus, enclosing the suburb called Tychê
-(which adjoined Achradina to the north-west), and then ascending
-westward, along the brink of the northern cliff of Epipolæ, to the
-summit of that slope at Euryalus. The two extremities thus became
-connected together,—not as in the time of Gylippus,[1003] by a single
-cross-wall carried out from the city-wall to the northern cliff, and
-then joined at an angle by another single wall descending the slope
-of Epipolæ from Euryalus, but,—by one continuous new line bordering
-the northern cliff down to the sea. And the new line, instead of
-being a mere single wall, was now built under the advice of the best
-engineers, with lofty and frequent towers interspersed throughout its
-length, to serve both as means of defence and as permanent quarters
-for soldiers. Its length was thirty stadia (about three and a half
-English miles); it was constructed of large stones carefully hewn,
-some of them four feet in length.[1004] The quarries at hand supplied
-abundant materials, and for the labor necessary, Dionysius brought
-together all the population of the city and its neighborhood, out of
-whom he selected sixty thousand of the most effective hands, to work
-on the wall. Others were ordered to cut the stones in the quarry,
-while six thousand teams of oxen were put in harness to draw them to
-the spot. The work was set out by furlongs and by smaller spaces of
-one hundred feet each, to regiments of suitable number, each under
-the direction of an overseer.[1005]
-
-  [1003] Thucyd. vi, 75.
-
-  [1004] Diodor. xiv, 18. λίθων τετραπόδων. The stones may have
-  been cubes of four feet; but this does not certainly appear.
-
-  [1005] Diodor. xiv, 18.
-
-As yet, we have heard little about Dionysius except acts of fraud,
-violence, and spoliation, for the purpose of establishing his own
-dominion over Syracuse, and aggrandizing himself by new conquests
-on the borders. But this new fortification was a work of different
-import. Instead of being, like his forts and walls in Ortygia,
-a guardhouse both of defence and aggression merely for himself
-against the people of Syracuse,—it was a valuable protection to the
-people, and to himself along with them, against foreign besiegers.
-It tended much to guarantee Syracuse from those disasters which had
-so recently befallen Agrigentum and the other cities. Accordingly,
-it was exceeding popular among the Syracusans, and produced between
-them and Dionysius a sentiment of friendship and harmony such as had
-not before been seen. Every man labored at the work not merely with
-good will, but with enthusiasm; while the despot himself displayed
-unwearied zeal, passing whole days on the spot, and taking part in
-all the hardship and difficulty. He showed himself everywhere amidst
-the mass, as an unguarded citizen, without suspicion or reserve, in
-marked contrast with the harshness of his previous demeanor,[1006]
-proclaiming rewards for the best and most rapid workmen; he also
-provided attendance or relief for those whose strength gave way.
-Such was the emulation thus inspired, that the numbers assembled,
-often toiling by night as well as by day, completed the whole wall
-in the space of twenty days. The fort at Euryalus, which formed the
-termination of this newly-constructed line of wall, is probably not
-to be understood as comprised within so short a period of execution;
-at least in its complete consummation. For the defences provided
-at this fort (either now or at a later period) were prodigious
-in extent as well as elaborate in workmanship; and the remains of
-them exhibit, even to modern observers, the most complete specimen
-preserved to us of ancient fortification.[1007] To bring them into
-such a condition must have occupied a longer time than twenty days.
-Even as to the wall, perhaps, twenty days is rather to be understood
-as indicating the time required for the essential continuity of its
-line, leaving towers, gates, etc., to be added afterwards.
-
-  [1006] Diodor. xiv, 18. Καθόλου δὲ ἀποθέμενος τὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς βάρος,
-  ἰδιώτην αὑτὸν ἀπεδείκνυε, etc.
-
-  Compare cap. 45 and cap. 47—μισοῦντες τὸ βάρος τῆς τῶν Φοινίκων
-  ἐπικρατείας, etc.
-
-  [1007] According to the testimony of Saverio Cavallari, the
-  architect under whose directions the excavations were made in
-  1839, whereby these remains were first fully disclosed (Zur
-  Topographie von Syrakus, p. 21).
-
-To provide defence for Syracuse against a besieging army, however,
-was only a small part of the extensive schemes of Dionysius. What he
-meditated was aggressive war against the Carthaginians; for which
-purpose, he not only began to accumulate preparations of every kind
-on the most extensive scale, but also modified his policy both
-towards the Syracusans and towards the other Sicilian Greeks.
-
-Towards the Syracusans his conduct underwent a material change.
-The cruelty and oppression which had hitherto marked his dominion
-was discontinued; he no longer put men to death, or sent them into
-banishment, with the same merciless hand as before. In place of such
-tyranny, he now substituted comparative mildness, forbearance, and
-conciliation.[1008] Where the system had before been so fraught with
-positive maltreatment to many and alarm to all, the mitigation of
-it must have been sensibly as well as immediately felt. And when we
-make present to our minds the relative position of Dionysius and
-the Syracusans, we shall see that the evil inflicted by his express
-order by no means represented the whole amount of evil which they
-suffered. He occupied the impregnable fortress of Ortygia, with the
-entire harbor, docks, and maritime means of the city. The numerous
-garrison in his pay, and devoted to him, consisted in great part of
-barbaric or non-Hellenic soldiers and of liberated slaves, probably
-also non-Hellenic. The Syracusans resident in the outer city and
-around were not only destitute of the means of defensive concert
-and organization, but were also disarmed. For these mercenaries
-either pay was to be provided from the contributions of the citizens,
-or lands from their properties; for them, and for other partisans
-also, Dionysius had enforced spoliations and transfers of land and
-house-property by wholesale.[1009] Now, while the despot himself
-was inflicting tyrannical sentences for his own purposes, we may be
-sure that these men, the indispensable instruments of his tyranny,
-would neither of themselves be disposed to respect the tranquillity
-of the other citizens, nor be easily constrained to do so. It was
-not, therefore, merely from the systematic misrule of the chief that
-the Syracusans had to suffer, but also from the insolence and unruly
-appetites of the subordinates. And accordingly they would be doubly
-gainers, when Dionysius, from anxiety to attack the Carthaginians,
-thought it prudent to soften the rigor of his own proceedings; since
-his example, and in case of need his interference, would restrict the
-license of his own partisans. The desire for foreign conquest made
-it now his interest to conciliate some measure of goodwill from the
-Syracusans; or at least to silence antipathies which might become
-embarrassing if they broke out in the midst of a war. And he had in
-this case the advantage of resting on another antipathy, powerful
-and genuine in their minds. Hating as well as fearing Carthage,
-the Syracusans cordially sympathized in the aggressive schemes of
-Dionysius against her; which held out a prospect of relief from the
-tyranny under which they groaned, and some chance of procuring a
-restoration of the arms snatched from them.[1010]
-
-  [1008] Diodor. xiv, 45. Ἀπετίθετο γὰρ ἤδη τὸ πικρὸν τῆς
-  τυραννίδος, καὶ μεταβαλλόμενος εἰς ἐπιείκειαν, φιλανθρωπότερον
-  ἦρχε τῶν ὑποτεταγμένων, οὔτε φονεύων, οὔτε φυγάδας ποιῶν,
-  ~καθάπερ εἰώθει~.
-
-  [1009] Diodor. xiv, 7.
-
-  [1010] Diodor. xiv, 45.
-
-Towards the Sicilian Greeks, also, the conduct of Dionysius was
-mainly influenced by his anti-Carthaginian projects, which made him
-eager to put aside, or at least to defer, all possibilities of war
-in other quarters. The inhabitants of Rhegium, on the Italian side
-of the Strait of Messina, had recently manifested a disposition to
-attack him. They were of common Chalkidic origin with Naxos and
-Katana, the two cities which Dionysius had recently conquered and
-enslaved. Sixteen years before, when the powerful Athenian armament
-visited Sicily with the ostensible view of protecting the Chalkidic
-cities against Syracuse, the Rhegines in spite of their fellowship of
-race, had refused the invitation of Nikias[1011] to lend assistance,
-being then afraid of Athens. But subsequent painful experience had
-taught them, that to residents in or near Sicily, Syracuse was the
-more formidable enemy of the two. The ruin of Naxus and Katana, with
-the great extension of Syracusan dominion northward, had filled
-them with apprehension from Dionysius, similar to the fears of
-Carthage, inspired to the Syracusans themselves by the disasters
-of Agrigentum and Gela. Anxious to revenge their enslaved kinsmen,
-the Rhegines projected an attack upon Dionysius before his power
-should become yet more formidable; a resolution, in which they were
-greatly confirmed by the instigations of the Syracusan exiles (now
-driven from Ætna and the other neighboring cities to Rhegium),
-confident in their assurances that insurrection would break out
-against Dionysius at Syracuse, so soon as any foreign succor should
-be announced as approaching. Envoys were sent across the strait to
-Messênê, soliciting coöperation against Dionysius, upon the urgent
-plea that the ruin of Naxus and Katana could not be passed over,
-either in generosity or in prudence, by neighbors on either side of
-the strait. These representations made so much impression on the
-generals of Messênê, that without consulting the public assembly,
-they forthwith summoned the military force of the city, and marched
-along with the Rhegines towards the Syracusan frontier,—six thousand
-Rhegine and four thousand Messenian hoplites,—six hundred Rhegine and
-four hundred Messenian horsemen,—with fifty Rhegine triremes. But
-when they reached the frontiers of the Messenian territory, a large
-portion of the soldiers refused to follow their generals farther. A
-citizen named Laomedon headed the opposition, contending that the
-generals had no authority to declare war without a public vote of
-the city, and that it was imprudent to attack Dionysius unprovoked.
-Such was the effect of these remonstrances, that the Messenian
-soldiers returned back to their city; while the Rhegines, believing
-themselves to be inadequate to the enterprise single handed, went
-home also.[1012]
-
-  [1011] Thucyd. vi, 46.
-
-  [1012] Diodor. xiv, 40.
-
-Apprised of the attack meditated, Dionysius had already led his
-troops to defend the Syracusan frontier. But he now reconducted them
-back to Syracuse, and listened favorably to propositions for peace
-which speedily reached him, from Rhegium and Messênê.[1013] He was
-anxious to conciliate them for the present, at all price, in order
-that the Carthaginians, when he came to execute his plans, might
-find no Grecian allies to coöperate with them in Sicily. He acquired
-an influence in Messênê, by making to the city large concessions of
-conterminous territory; on which side of the border, or how acquired,
-we do not know. He farther endeavored to open an intimate connection
-with Rhegium by marrying a Rhegine wife; with which view he sent a
-formal message to the citizens, asking permission to contract such an
-alliance, accompanied with a promise to confer upon them important
-benefits, both in territorial aggrandizement and in other ways.
-After a public debate, the Rhegines declined his proposition. The
-feeling in their city was decidedly hostile to Dionysius, as the
-recent destroyer of Naxus and Katana; and it appears that some of the
-speakers expressed themselves with contemptuous asperity, remarking
-that the daughter of the public executioner was the only fit wife for
-him.[1014] Taken by itself, the refusal would be sufficiently galling
-to Dionysius. But when coupled with such insulting remarks (probably
-made in public debate in the presence of his own envoys, for it seems
-not credible that the words should have been embodied in the formal
-reply or resolution of the assembly[1015]), it left the bitterest
-animosity; a feeling, which we shall hereafter find in full operation.
-
-  [1013] Diodor. xiv, 40.
-
-  [1014] Diodor. xiv, 44, 106, 107.
-
-  [1015] Diodorus, when he first mentions the answer, does not give
-  this remark as comprised in it; though he afterwards alludes to
-  it as having been _said_ to be (φασὶ) so comprised (xix, 44-107).
-
-Refused at Rhegium, Dionysius sent to prefer a similar request,
-with similar offers, at the neighboring city of Lokri; where it was
-favorably entertained. It is remarkable that Aristotle comments upon
-this acquiescence of the Lokrians as an act of grave imprudence, and
-as dictated only by the anxiety of the principal citizens, in an
-oligarchical government, to seek for aggrandizement to themselves
-out of such an alliance. The request would not have been granted
-(Aristotle observes) either in a democracy or in a well-regulated
-aristocracy. The marital connection now contracted by Dionysius with
-a Lokrian female, Doris, the daughter of a citizen of distinction
-named Xenetus, produced as an ultimate consequence the overthrow
-of the oligarchy of Lokri.[1016] And even among the Lokrians,
-the request was not granted without opposition. A citizen named
-Aristeides (one of the companions of Plato), whose daughter Dionysius
-had solicited in marriage, returned for answer that he would
-rather see her dead than united to a despot. In revenge for this
-bitter reply, Dionysius caused the sons of Aristeides to be put to
-death.[1017]
-
-  [1016] Aristot. Politic. v, 6, 7. Ἔτι διὰ τὸ πάσας τὰς
-  ἀριστοκρατικὰς πολιτείας ὀλιγαρχικὰς εἶναι, μᾶλλον πλεονεκτοῦσιν
-  οἱ γνώριμοι· οἷον καὶ ἐν Λακεδαίμονι εἰς ὀλίγους αἱ οὐσίαι
-  ἔρχονται, καὶ ἔξεστι ποιεῖν ὅτι ἂν θέλωσι τοῖς γνωρίμοις μᾶλλον,
-  καὶ κηδεύειν ὅτῳ θέλουσι. Διὸ καὶ ἡ Λοκρῶν πολιτεία ἀπώλετο ἐκ
-  τῆς πρὸς Διονύσιον κηδείας· ὃ ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ οὐκ ἂν ἐγένετο, οὐδ’
-  ἂν ἐν ἀριστοκρατίᾳ εὖ μεμιγμένῃ.
-
-  [1017] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 6.
-
-But the amicable relations which Dionysius was at so much pains to
-establish with the Greek cities near the Strait of Messênê, were
-destined chiefly to leave him free for preparations against Carthage;
-which preparations he now commenced on a gigantic scale. Efforts so
-great and varied, combined not merely with forecast but with all
-the scientific appliances then available, have not hitherto come
-before us throughout this history. The terrible effect with which
-Hannibal had recently employed his battering-machines against Selinus
-and Himera, stimulated Dionysius to provide himself with the like
-implements in greater abundance than any Greek general had ever
-before possessed. He collected at Syracuse, partly by constraint,
-partly by allurement, all the best engineers, mechanists, armorers,
-artisans, etc., whom Sicily or Italy could furnish. He set them
-upon the construction of machines and other muniments of war, and
-upon the manufacture of arms offensive as well as defensive, with
-the greatest possible assiduity. The arms provided were of great
-variety; not merely such as were suitable for Grecian soldiers, heavy
-or light, but also such as were in use among the different barbaric
-tribes around the Mediterranean, Gauls, Iberians, Tyrrhenians, etc.,
-from whom Dionysius intended to hire mercenaries; so that every
-different soldier would be furnished, on arriving, with the sort
-of weapon which had become habitual to him. All Syracuse became a
-bustling military workshop,—not only the market-places, porticos,
-palæstræ, and large private houses, but also the fore-chambers and
-back-chambers of the various temples. Dionysius distributed the
-busy multitude into convenient divisions, each with some eminent
-citizen as superintendent. Visiting them in person frequently, and
-reviewing their progress, he recompensed largely, and invited to his
-table, those who produced the greatest amount of finished work. As
-he farther offered premiums for inventive skill, the competition of
-ingenious mechanists originated several valuable warlike novelties;
-especially the great projectile engine for stones and darts, called
-Catapulta, which was now for the first time devised. We are told that
-the shields fabricated during this season of assiduous preparation
-were not less than one hundred and forty thousand in number, and
-the breast-plates fourteen thousand, many of them unrivalled in
-workmanship, destined for the body-guard and the officers. Helmets,
-spears, daggers, etc., with other arms and weapons in indefinite
-variety, were multiplied in corresponding proportion.[1018] The
-magazines of arms, missiles, machines, and muniments of war in every
-variety, accumulated in Ortygia, continued stupendous in amount
-through the whole life of Dionysius, and even down to the downfall of
-his son.[1019]
-
-  [1018] Diodor. xiv, 42, 43.
-
-  The historian Philistus had described with much minuteness these
-  warlike preparations of Dionysius. Diodorus has probably abridged
-  from him (Philisti Fragment. xxxiv, ed. Marx and ed. Didot.)
-
-  [1019] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 13.
-
-If the preparations for land-warfare were thus stupendous, those
-for sea-warfare were fully equal, if not superior. The docks of
-Syracuse were filled with the best ship-builders, carpenters, and
-artisans; numerous wood-cutters were sent to cut ship-timber on
-the well-clothed slopes of Ætna and the Calabrian Apennines; teams
-of oxen were then provided to drag it to the coast, from whence it
-was towed in rafts to Syracuse. The existing naval establishment
-of Syracuse comprised one hundred and ten triremes; the existing
-docks contained one hundred and fifty ship-houses, or covered slips
-for the purpose either of building or housing a trireme. But this
-was very inadequate to the conceptions of Dionysius, who forthwith
-undertook the construction of one hundred and sixty new ship-houses,
-each competent to hold two vessels,—and then commenced the building
-of new ships of war to the number of two hundred; while he at the
-same time put all the existing vessels and docks into the best
-state of repair. Here too, as in the case of the catapulta, the
-ingenuity of his architects enabled him to stand forth as a maritime
-inventor. As yet, the largest ship of war which had ever moved on
-the Grecian or Mediterranean waters, was the trireme, which was
-rowed by three banks or tiers of oars. It was now three centuries
-since the first trireme had been constructed at Corinth and Samos by
-the inventive skill of the Corinthian Ameinokles:[1020] it was not
-until the period succeeding the Persian invasion that even triremes
-had become extensively employed; nor had any larger vessels ever
-been thought of. The Athenians, who during the interval between the
-Persian invasion and their great disaster at Syracuse had stood
-preëminent and set the fashion in all nautical matters, were under no
-inducement to build above the size of the trireme. As their style of
-manœuvring consisted of rapid evolutions and changes in the ship’s
-direction, for the purpose of striking the weak parts of an enemy’s
-ship with the beak of their own,—so, if the size of their ship had
-been increased, her capacity for such nimble turns and movements
-would have been diminished. But the Syracusans had made no attempt to
-copy the rapid evolutions of the Athenian navy. On the contrary, when
-fighting against the latter in the confined harbor of Syracuse,[1021]
-they had found every advantage in their massive build of ships, and
-straightforward impact of bow driven against bow. For them, the
-larger ships were the more suitable and efficient; so that Dionysius
-or his naval architects, full of ambitious aspirations, now struck
-out the plan of building ships of war with four or five banks of oars
-instead of three; that is, quadriremes, or quinqueremes, instead of
-triremes.[1022] Not only did the Syracusan despot thus equip a naval
-force equal in number of ships to Athens in her best days; but he
-also exhibited ships larger than Athens had ever possessed, or than
-Greece had ever conceived.
-
-  [1020] Thucyd. i, 13.
-
-  [1021] Thucyd. vii, 36-62.
-
-  [1022] Diodor. xiv, 42.
-
-In all these offensive preparations against Carthage, as in the
-previous defences on Epipolæ, the spontaneous impulse of the
-Syracusans generally went hand in hand with Dionysius.[1023] Their
-sympathy and concurrence greatly promoted the success of his efforts,
-for this immense equipment against the common enemy. Even with all
-this sympathy, indeed, we are at a loss to understand, nor are we at
-all informed, how he found money to meet so prodigious an outlay.
-
-  [1023] Diodor. xiv, 41. Συμπροθυμουμένων δὲ τῶν Συρακουσίων
-  τῇ τοῦ Διονυσίου προαιρέσει, πολλὴν συνέβαινε γενέσθαι τὴν
-  φιλοτιμίαν περὶ τὴν τῶν ὅπλων κατασκευήν.
-
-After the material means for war had thus been completed,—an
-operation which can hardly have occupied less than two or three
-years,—it remained to levy men. On this point, the ideas of Dionysius
-were not less aspiring. Besides his own numerous standing force,
-he enlisted all the most effective among the Syracusan citizens,
-as well as from the cities in his dependency. He sent friendly
-addresses, and tried to acquire popularity, among the general body
-of Greeks throughout the island. Of his large fleet, one-half was
-manned with Syracusan rowers, marines, and officers; the other half
-with seamen enlisted from abroad. He farther sent envoys both to
-Italy and to Peloponnesus to obtain auxiliaries, with offers of the
-most liberal pay. From Sparta, now at the height of her power, and
-courting his alliance as a means of perpetuity to her own empire,
-he received such warm encouragement, that he was enabled to enlist
-no inconsiderable numbers in Peloponnesus; while many barbaric or
-non-Hellenic soldiers from the western regions near the Mediterranean
-were hired also.[1024] He at length succeeded, to his satisfaction,
-in collecting an aggregate army, formidable not less from numbers and
-bravery, than from elaborate and diversified equipment. His large and
-well-stocked armory (already noticed) enabled him to furnish each
-newly-arrived soldier, from all the different nations, with native
-and appropriate weapons.[1025]
-
-  [1024] Diodor. xiv, 43, 44, 45.
-
-  [1025] Diodor. xiv, 41.
-
-When all his preparations were thus complete, his last step was
-to celebrate his nuptials, a few days previous to the active
-commencement of the war. He married, at one and the same time, two
-wives,—the Lokrian Doris (already mentioned), and a Syracusan woman
-named Aristomachê, daughter of his partisan Hipparinus (and sister
-of Dion, respecting whom much will occur hereafter). The first use
-made of one among his newly-invented quinquereme vessels, was to sail
-to Lokri, decked out in the richest ornaments of gold and silver,
-for the purpose of conveying Doris in state to Ortygia. Aristomachê
-was also brought to his house in a splendid chariot with four white
-horses.[1026] He celebrated his nuptials with both of them in his
-house on the same day; no one knew which bedchamber he visited first;
-and both of them continued constantly to live with him at the same
-table, with equal dignity, for many years. He had three children by
-Doris, the eldest of whom was Dionysius the Younger; and four by
-Aristomachê; but the latter was for a considerable time childless;
-which greatly chagrined Dionysius. Ascribing her barrenness to
-magical incantations, he put to death the mother of his other wife
-Doris, as the alleged worker of these mischievous influences.[1027]
-It was the rumor at Syracuse that Aristomachê was the most beloved
-of the two. But Dionysius treated both of them well, and both of
-them equally; moreover his son by Doris succeeded him, though he had
-two sons by the other. His nuptials were celebrated with banquets
-and festive recreations, wherein all the Syracusan citizens as well
-as the soldiers partook. The scene was probably the more grateful
-to Dionysius, as he seems at this moment, when every man’s mind was
-full of vindictive impulse and expected victory against Carthage, to
-have enjoyed a real short-lived popularity, and to have been able
-to move freely among the people; without that fear of assassination
-which habitually tormented his life even in his inmost privacy and
-bedchamber—and that extremity of suspicion which did not except
-either his wives or his daughters.[1028]
-
-  [1026] Diodor. xiv, 44; xvi, 6.
-
-  [1027] Plutarch, Dion. c. 3.
-
-  [1028] Cicero, Tusc. Disp. v, 20, 57-63; Valer. Maxim. ix, 13;
-  Diodor. xiv, 2.
-
-After a few days devoted to such fellowship and festivity, Dionysius
-convoked a public assembly, for the purpose of formally announcing
-the intended war. He reminded the Syracusans that the Carthaginians
-were common enemies to Greeks in general, but most of all to the
-Sicilian Greeks—as recent events but too plainly testified. He
-appealed to their generous sympathies on behalf of the five Hellenic
-cities, in the southern part of the island, which had lately
-undergone the miseries of capture by the generals of Carthage, and
-were still groaning under her yoke. Nothing prevented Carthage
-(he added) from attempting to extend her dominion over the rest
-of the island, except the pestilence under which she had herself
-been suffering in Africa. To the Syracusans this ought to be an
-imperative stimulus for attacking her at once, and rescuing their
-Hellenic brethren, before she had time to recover.[1029]
-
-  [1029] Diodor. xiv, 45.
-
-These motives were really popular and impressive. There was besides
-another inducement, which weighed with Dionysius to hasten the war,
-though he probably did not dwell upon it in his public address to the
-Syracusans. He perceived that various Sicilian Greeks were migrating
-voluntarily with their properties into the territory of Carthage;
-whose dominion, though hateful and oppressive, was, at least while
-untried, regarded by many with less terror than his dominion when
-actually suffered. By commencing hostilities at once, he expected
-not only to arrest such emigration, but to induce such Greeks as
-were actually subjects of Carthage to throw off her yoke and join
-him.[1030]
-
-  [1030] Diodor. xiv, 41.
-
-Loud acclamations from the Syracusan assembly hailed the proposition
-for war with Carthage; a proposition, which only converted into
-reality what had been long the familiar expectation of every man.
-And the war was rendered still more popular by the permission,
-which Dionysius granted forthwith, to plunder all the Carthaginian
-residents and mercantile property either in Syracuse or in any of
-his dependent cities. We are told that there were not only several
-domiciliated Carthaginians at Syracuse, but also many loaded vessels
-belonging to Carthage in the harbor, so that the plunder was
-lucrative.[1031] But though such may have been the case in ordinary
-times, it seems hardly credible, that under the actual circumstances,
-any Carthaginian (person or property) can have been at Syracuse
-except by accident; for war with Carthage had been long announced,
-not merely in current talk, but in the more unequivocal language
-of overwhelming preparation. Nor is it easy to understand how the
-prudent Carthaginian Senate (who probably were not less provided with
-spies at Syracuse than Dionysius was at Carthage)[1032] can have
-been so uninformed as to be taken by surprise at the last moment,
-when Dionysius sent thither a herald formally declaring war; which
-herald was not sent until after the license for private plunder had
-been previously granted. He peremptorily required the Carthaginians
-to relinquish their dominion over the Greek cities in Sicily,[1033]
-as the only means of avoiding war. To such a proposition no answer
-was returned, nor probably expected. But the Carthaginians were
-now so much prostrated (like Athens in the second or third years
-of the Peloponnesian war) by depopulation, suffering, terrors, and
-despondency, arising out of the pestilence which beset them in
-Africa, that they felt incompetent to any serious effort, and heard
-with alarm the letter read from Dionysius. There was, however,
-no alternative, so that they forthwith despatched some of their
-ablest citizens to levy troops for the defence of their Sicilian
-possessions.[1034]
-
-  [1031] Diodor. xiv, 46.
-
-  There were also Greeks, and seemingly Greeks of some
-  consideration, who resided at Carthage, and seemed to have
-  continued resident there throughout the war between the
-  Carthaginians and Dionysius (Diodor. xiv, 77). We should infer,
-  from their continuing to reside there, that the Carthaginians did
-  not retaliate upon them the plunder now authorized by Dionysius
-  against their countrymen resident at Syracuse; and farther, it
-  affords additional probability that the number of Carthaginians
-  actually plundered at Syracuse was not considerable.
-
-  For instances of intermarriage, and inter-residence, between
-  Carthage and Syracuse, see Herodot. vii, 166; Livy, xxiv, 6.
-
-  Phœnician coins have been found in Ortygia, bearing a Phœnician
-  inscription signifying _The Island_,—which was the usual
-  denomination of Ortygia (Movers, Die Phönizier, ii, 2, p. 327).
-
-  [1032] Diodor. xiv, 55. Τοῦτο δ’ ἐμηχανήσατο (Ἰμίλκων) πρὸς τὸ
-  μηδένα τῶν κατασκόπων ἀπαγγεῖλαι τὸν κατάπλουν τῷ Διονυσίῳ, etc.
-
-  [1033] Diodor. xiv, 46, 47.
-
-  [1034] Diodor. xiv, 47.
-
-The first news that reached them was indeed appalling. Dionysius had
-marched forth with his full power, Syracusan as well as foreign,
-accumulated by so long a preparation. It was a power, the like of
-which had never been beheld in Greece; greater even than that wielded
-by his predecessor Gelon eighty years before. If the contemporaries
-of Gelon had been struck with awe[1035] at the superiority of his
-force to anything that Hellas could show elsewhere, as much or more
-would the same sentiment be felt by those who surrounded Dionysius.
-More intimately still was a similar comparison, with the mighty
-victor of Himera, present to Dionysius himself. He exulted in setting
-out with an army yet more imposing, against the same enemy, and for
-the same purpose of liberating the maritime cities of Sicily subject
-to Carthage;[1036] cities, whose number and importance had since
-fearfully augmented.
-
-  [1035] Herodot. vii, 145. Τὰ δὲ Γέλωνος πρήγματα μεγάλα ἐλέγετο
-  εἶναι, οὐδαμῶν Ἑλληνικῶν τῶν οὐ πολλὸν μέζω. Compare c. 160-162.
-
-  [1036] Herodot. vii, 158. Gelon’s speech to the Lacedæmonians who
-  come to solicit his aid against Xerxes.
-
-  Αὐτοὶ δὲ, ἐμεῦ πρότερον δεηθέντος βαρβαρικοῦ στρατοῦ
-  συνεπάψασθαι, ὅτε μοι πρὸς Καρχηδονίους νεῖκος συνῆπτο ...
-  ~ὑποτείνοντός τε τὰ ἐμπόρια συνελευθεροῦν~, etc.
-
-These subject-cities, from Kamarina on one side of the island to
-Selinus and Himera on the other, though there were a certain number
-of Carthaginian residents established there, had no effective
-standing force to occupy or defend them on the part of Carthage;
-whose habit it was to levy large mercenary hosts for the special
-occasion and then to disband them afterwards. Accordingly, as soon
-as Dionysius with his powerful army passed the Syracusan border,
-and entered upon his march westward along the southern coast of
-the island, proclaiming himself as liberator—the most intense
-anti-Carthaginian manifestations burst forth at once, at Kamarina,
-Gela, Agrigentum, Selinus, and Himera. These Greeks did not merely
-copy the Syracusans in plundering the property of all Carthaginians
-found among them, but also seized their persons, and put them to
-death with every species of indignity and torture. A frightful
-retaliation now took place for the cruelties recently committed by
-the Carthaginian armies, in the sacking of Selinus, Agrigentum, and
-the other conquered cities.[1037] The Hellenic war-practice, in
-itself sufficiently rigorous, was aggravated into a merciless and
-studied barbarity, analogous to that which had disfigured the late
-proceedings of Carthage and her western mercenaries. These “Sicilian
-vespers,” which burst out throughout all the south of Sicily against
-the Carthaginian residents, surpassed even the memorable massacre
-known under that name in the thirteenth century, wherein the Angevine
-knights and soldiers were indeed assassinated, but not tortured.
-Diodorus tells us that the Carthaginians learnt from the retaliation
-thus suffered, a lesson of forbearance. It will not appear however,
-from their future conduct, that the lesson was much laid to heart;
-while it is unhappily certain, that such interchange of cruelties
-with less humanized neighbors, contributed to lower in the Sicilian
-Greeks that measure of comparative forbearance which characterized
-the Hellenic race in its own home.
-
-  [1037] Diodor. xiv, 46. Οὐ μόνον γὰρ αὐτῶν τὰς οὐσίας διήρπασαν,
-  ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτοὺς συλλαμβάνοντες, πᾶσαν αἰκίαν καὶ ὕβριν εἰς
-  τὰ σώματα αὐτῶν ἀπετίθεντο, μνημονεύοντες ὧν αὐτοὶ κατὰ τὴν
-  αἰχμαλωσίαν ἔπαθον. Ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον δὲ τῆς κατὰ τῶν Φοινίκων
-  τιμωρίας προέβησαν, καὶ τότε καὶ κατὰ τὸν ὕστερον χρόνον,
-  ὥστε τοὺς Καρχηδονίους διδαχθῆναι μηκέτι παρανομεῖν εἰς τοὺς
-  ὑποπεσόντας.
-
-Elate with this fury of revenge, the citizens of Kamarina, Gela,
-Agrigentum, and Selinus joined Dionysius on his march along the
-coast. He was enabled, from his abundant stock of recently fabricated
-arms, to furnish them with panoplies and weapons; for it is probable
-that as subjects of Carthage they had been disarmed. Strengthened
-by all these reinforcements, he mustered a force of eighty thousand
-men, besides more than three thousand cavalry; while the ships of war
-which accompanied him along the coast were nearly two hundred, and
-the transports, with stores and battering machines, not less than
-five hundred. With this prodigious army, the most powerful hitherto
-assembled under Grecian command, he appeared before the Carthaginian
-settlement of Motyê, a fortified seaport in a little bay immediately
-north of Cape Lilybæum.[1038]
-
-  [1038] Diodor. xiv, 47.
-
-Of the three principal establishments of Carthage in Sicily,—Motyê,
-Panormus (Palermo), and Soloeis,—Motyê was at once the nearest to the
-mother-city,[1039] the most important, and the most devoted. It was
-situated (like the original Syracuse in Ortygia) upon a little islet,
-separated from Sicily by a narrow strait about two-thirds of a mile
-in breadth, which its citizens had bridged over by means of a mole,
-so as to form a regular, though narrow, footpath. It was populous,
-wealthy, flourishing, and distinguished for the excellence both of
-its private houses and its fortifications. Perceiving the approach of
-Dionysius, and not intimidated by the surrender of their neighbors
-and allies, the Elymi at Eryx, who did not dare to resist so powerful
-a force,—the Motyênes put themselves in the best condition of
-defence. They broke up their mole, and again insulated themselves
-from Sicily, in the hope of holding out until relief should be
-sent from Carthage. Resolved to avenge upon Motyê the sufferings
-of Agrigentum and Selinus, Dionysius took a survey of the place in
-conjunction with his principal engineers. It deserves notice, that
-this is among the earliest sieges recorded in Grecian history wherein
-we read of a professed engineer as being directly and deliberately
-called on to advise the best mode of proceeding.[1040]
-
-  [1039] Thucyd. vi, 2; Pausan. v, 25, 3.
-
-  [1040] Diodor. xiv, 48. Διονύσιος δὲ μετὰ τῶν ἀρχιτεκτόνων
-  κατασκεψάμενος τοὺς τόπους, etc.
-
-  Artemon the engineer was consulted by Perikles at the siege of
-  Samos (Plutarch, Perikles, c. 27).
-
-Having formed his plans, he left his admiral Leptines with a portion
-of the army to begin the necessary works, while he himself with
-the remainder laid waste the neighboring territory dependent on or
-allied with Carthage. The Sikani and others submitted to him; but
-Ankyræ, Soloeis, Panormus, Egesta, and Entella, all held out, though
-the citizens were confined to their walls, and obliged to witness,
-without being able to prevent, the destruction of their lands.[1041]
-Returning from this march, Dionysius pressed the siege of Motyê with
-the utmost ardor, and with all the appliances which his engineers
-could devise. Having moored his transports along the beach, and
-hauled his ships of war ashore in the harbor, he undertook the
-laborious task of filling up the strait (probably of no great depth)
-which divided Motyê from the main island;[1042]—or at least as much
-of the length of the strait as was sufficient to march across both
-with soldiers and with battering engines, and to bring them up close
-against the walls of the city. The numbers under his command enabled
-him to achieve this enterprise, though not without a long period
-of effort, during which the Carthaginians tried more than once to
-interrupt his proceedings. Not having a fleet capable of contending
-in pitched battle against the besiegers, the Carthaginian general
-Imilkon tried two successive manœuvres. He first sent a squadron of
-ten ships of war to sail suddenly into the harbor of Syracuse, in
-hopes that the diversion thus operated would constrain Dionysius to
-detach a portion of his fleet from Motyê. Though the attack, however,
-was so far successful as to destroy many merchantmen in the harbor,
-yet the assailants were beaten off without making any more serious
-impression, or creating the diversion intended.[1043] Imilkon next
-made an attempt to surprise the armed ships of Dionysius, as they
-lay hauled ashore in the harbor near Motyê. Crossing over from
-Carthage by night, with one hundred ships of war, to the Selinuntine
-coast, he sailed round Cape Lilybæum, and appeared at daybreak off
-Motyê. His appearance took every man by surprise. He destroyed or put
-to flight the ships on guard, and sailed into the harbor prepared
-for attack while as yet only a few of the Syracusan ships had been
-got afloat. As the harbor was too confined to enable Dionysius to
-profit by his great superiority in number and size of ships, a great
-portion of his fleet would have been now destroyed, had it not been
-saved by his numerous land force and artillery on the beach. Showers
-of missiles, from this assembled crowd as well as from the decks of
-the Syracusan ships, prevented Imilkon from advancing far enough to
-attack with effect. The newly-invented engine called the catapulta,
-of which the Carthaginians had as yet had no experience, was
-especially effective; projecting large masses to a great distance,
-it filled them with astonishment and dismay. While their progress
-was thus arrested, Dionysius employed a new expedient to rescue his
-fleet from the dilemma in which it had been caught. His numerous
-soldiers were directed to haul the ships, not down to the harbor,
-but landward, across a level tongue of land, more than two miles in
-breadth, which separated the harbor of Motyê from the outer sea.
-Wooden planks were laid so as to form a pathway for the ships; and
-in spite of the great size of the newly-constructed quadriremes and
-quinqueremes, the strength and ardor of the army sufficed for this
-toilsome effort of transporting eighty ships across in one day. The
-entire fleet, double in number to that of the Carthaginians, being at
-length got afloat, Imilkon did not venture on a pitched battle, but
-returned at once back to Africa.[1044]
-
-  [1041] Diodor. xiv, 48, 49.
-
-  [1042] Diodor. xiv, 49. ἐχώννυε τὸν μεταξὺ πόρον, καὶ τὰς μηχανὰς
-  ἐκ τοῦ κατὰ λόγον ἅμα τῇ τοῦ χώματος αὐξήσει προσήγαγε τοῖς
-  τείχεσι.
-
-  [1043] Diodor. xiv, 50.
-
-  [1044] Diodor. xiv, 50; Polyænus, v, 2, 6.
-
-Though the citizens of Motyê saw from the walls the mournful
-spectacle of their friends retiring, their courage was nowise
-abated. They knew well that they had no mercy to expect; that the
-general ferocity of the Carthaginians in their hour of victory,
-and especially the cruel treatment of Greek captives even in Motyê
-itself, would now be retaliated; and that their only chance lay in
-a brave despair. The road across the strait having been at length
-completed, Dionysius brought up his engines and began his assault.
-While the catapulta with its missiles prevented defenders from
-showing themselves on the battlements, battering-rams were driven
-up to shake or overthrow the walls. At the same time large towers
-on wheels were rolled up, with six different stories in them one
-above the other, and in height equal to the houses. Against these
-means of attack the besieged on their side elevated lofty masts
-above the walls, with yards projecting outwards. Upon these yards
-stood men protected from the missiles by a sort of breastwork,
-and holding burning torches, pitch, and other combustibles, which
-they cast down upon the machines of the assailants. Many machines
-took fire in the woodwork, and it was not without difficulty that
-the conflagration was extinguished. After a long and obstinate
-resistance, however, the walls were at length overthrown or carried
-by assault, and the besiegers rushed in, imagining the town to be in
-their power. But the indefatigable energy of the besieged had already
-put the houses behind into a state of defence, and barricaded the
-streets, so that a fresh assault, more difficult than the first,
-remained to be undertaken. The towers on wheels were rolled near,
-but probably could not be pushed into immediate contact with the
-houses in consequence of the ruins of the overthrown wall which
-impeded their approach. Accordingly the assailants were compelled
-to throw out wooden platforms or bridges from the towers to the
-houses, and to march along these to the attack. But here they were
-at great disadvantage, and suffered severe loss. The Motyenes,
-resisting desperately, prevented them from setting firm foot on the
-houses, slew many of them in hand-combat, and precipitated whole
-companies to the ground, by severing or oversetting the platform.
-For several days this desperate combat was renewed. Not a step was
-gained by the besiegers, yet the unfortunate Motyenes became each
-day more exhausted, while portions of the foremost houses were
-also overthrown. Every evening Dionysius recalled his troops to
-their night’s repose, renewing the assault next morning. Having
-thus brought the enemy into an expectation that the night would be
-undisturbed, he on one fatal night took them by surprise, sending the
-Thurian Archylus with a chosen body of troops to attack the foremost
-defences. This detachment, planting ladders and climbing up by means
-of the half-demolished houses, established themselves firmly in a
-position within the town before resistance could be organized. In
-vain did the Motyenes, discovering the stratagem too late, endeavor
-to dislodge them. The main force of Dionysius was speedily brought
-up across the artificial earth-way to confirm their success, and the
-town was thus carried, in spite of the most gallant resistance, which
-continued even after it had become hopeless.[1045]
-
-  [1045] Diodor. xiv, 51, 52, 53.
-
-The victorious host who now poured into Motyê, incensed not merely
-by the length and obstinacy of the defence, but also by antecedent
-Carthaginian atrocities at Agrigentum and elsewhere, gave full
-loose to the sanguinary impulses of retaliation. They butchered
-indiscriminately men and women, the aged and the children, without
-mercy to any one. The streets were thus strewed with the slain,
-in spite of all efforts on the part of Dionysius, who desired
-to preserve the captives that they might be sold as slaves, and
-thus bring in a profitable return. But his orders to abstain from
-slaughter were not obeyed, nor could he do anything more than invite
-the sufferers by proclamation to take refuge in the temples; a step,
-which most of them would probably resort to uninvited. Restrained
-from farther slaughter by the sanctuary of the temples, the victors
-now turned to pillage. Abundance of gold, silver, precious vestments,
-and other marks of opulence, the accumulations of a long period of
-active prosperity, fell into their hands; and Dionysius allowed to
-them the full plunder of the town, as a recompense for the toils
-of the siege. He farther distributed special recompenses to those
-who had distinguished themselves; one hundred minæ being given to
-Archylus, the leader of the successful night-surprise. All the
-surviving Motyenes he sold into slavery; but he reserved for a more
-cruel fate Daimenês and various other Greeks who had been taken among
-them. These Greeks he caused to be crucified;[1046] a specimen of
-the Phœnician penalties transferred by example to their Hellenic
-neighbors and enemies.
-
-  [1046] Diodor. xiv, 53.
-
-The siege of Motyê having occupied nearly all the summer, Dionysius
-now reconducted his army homeward. He left at the place a Sikel
-garrison under the command of the Syracusan Biton, as well as a
-large portion of his fleet, one hundred and twenty ships, under the
-command of his brother Leptines; who was instructed to watch for
-the arrival of any force from Carthage, and to employ himself in
-besieging the neighboring towns of Egesta and Entella. The operations
-against these two towns however had little success. The inhabitants
-defended themselves bravely, and the Egestæans were even successful,
-through a well-planned nocturnal sally, in burning the enemy’s camp,
-with many horses, and stores of all kinds in the tents. Neither of
-the two towns was yet reduced, when, in the ensuing spring, Dionysius
-himself returned with his main force from Syracuse. He reduced the
-inhabitants of Halikyæ to submission, but effected no other permanent
-conquest, nor anything more than devastation of the neighboring
-territory dependent upon Carthage.[1047]
-
-  [1047] Diodor. xiv, 54.
-
-  Leptines was brother of Dionysius (xiv, 102; xv, 7), though he
-  afterwards married the daughter of Dionysius,—a marriage not
-  condemned by Grecian sentiment.
-
-Presently the face of the war was changed by the arrival of Imilkon
-from Carthage. Having been elevated to the chief magistracy of the
-city, he now brought with him an overwhelming force, collected as
-well from the subjects in Africa as from Iberia and the Western
-Mediterranean. It amounted, even in the low estimate of Timæus,
-to one hundred thousand men, reinforced afterwards in Sicily
-by thirty thousand more,—and in the more ample computations of
-Ephorus, to three hundred thousand foot, four thousand horse, four
-hundred chariots of war, four hundred ships of war, and six hundred
-transports carrying stores and engines. Dionysius had his spies at
-Carthage,[1048] even among men of rank and politicians, to apprise
-him of all movements or public orders. But Imilkon, to obviate
-knowledge of the precise point in Sicily where he intended to land,
-gave to the pilots sealed instructions, to be opened only when
-they were out at sea, indicating Panormus (Palermo) as the place
-of rendezvous.[1049] The transports made directly for that port,
-without nearing the land elsewhere; while Imilkon with the ships of
-war approached the harbor of Motyê and sailed from thence along the
-coast to Panormus. He probably entertained the hope of intercepting
-some portion of the Syracusan fleet. But nothing of the kind was
-found practicable; while Leptines on his side was even fortunate
-enough to be able to attack, with thirty triremes, the foremost
-vessels of the large transport-fleet on their voyage to Panormus. He
-destroyed no less than fifty of them, with five thousand men, and
-two hundred chariots of war; but the remaining fleet reached the
-port in safety, and were there joined by Imilkon with the ships of
-war. The land force being disembarked, the Carthaginian general led
-them to Motyê, ordering his ships of war to accompany him along the
-coast. In his way he regained Eryx, which was at heart Carthaginian,
-having only been intimidated into submission to Dionysius during the
-preceding year. He then attacked Motyê, which he retook, seemingly
-after very little resistance. It had held out obstinately against
-the Syracusans a few months before, while in the hands of its
-own Carthaginian inhabitants, with their families and properties
-around them; but the Sikel garrison had far less motive for stout
-defence.[1050]
-
-  [1048] Justin, xx, 5. One of these Carthaginians of rank, who,
-  from political enmity to Hanno, wrote letters in Greek to
-  communicate information to Dionysius, was detected and punished
-  as a traitor. On this occasion, the Carthaginian senate is
-  said to have enacted a law, forbidding all citizens to learn
-  Greek,—either to write it or to speak it.
-
-  [1049] Diodor. xiv, 54; Polyænus, v, 10, 1.
-
-  [1050] Diodor. xiv, 55.
-
-Thus was Dionysius deprived of the conquest which had cost him so
-much blood and toil during the preceding summer. We are surprised
-to learn that he made no effort to prevent its recapture, though he
-was then not far off, besieging Egesta,—and though his soldiers,
-elate with the successes of the preceding year were eager for a
-general battle. But Dionysius, deeming this measure too adventurous,
-resolved to retreat to Syracuse. His provisions were failing, and
-he was at a great distance from allies, so that defeat would have
-been ruinous. He therefore returned to Syracuse, carrying with him
-some of the Sikanians, whom he persuaded to evacuate their abode in
-the Carthaginian neighborhood, promising to provide them with better
-homes elsewhere. Most of them, however, declined his offers; some
-(among them, the Halikyæans) preferring to resume their alliance
-with Carthage. Of the recent acquisitions nothing now remained to
-Dionysius beyond the Selinuntine boundary; but Gela, Kamarina,
-Agrigentum, and Selinus had been emancipated from Carthage, and
-were still in a state of dependent alliance with him; a result
-of moment,—yet seemingly very inadequate to the immense warlike
-preparations whereby it had been attained. Whether he exercised a
-wise discretion in declining to fight the Carthaginians, we have not
-sufficient information to determine. But his army appear to have been
-dissatisfied with it, and it was among the causes of the outbreak
-against him shortly afterwards at Syracuse.[1051]
-
-  [1051] Diodor. xiv, 55.
-
-Thus left master of the country, Imilkon, instead of trying to
-reconquer Selinus and Himera, which had probably been impoverished
-by recent misfortunes,—resolved to turn his arms against Messênê in
-the north-east of the island; a city as yet fresh and untouched,—so
-little prepared for attack that its walls were not in good
-repair,—and moreover at the present moment yet farther enfeebled
-by the absence of its horsemen in the army of Dionysius.[1052]
-Accordingly, he marched along the northern coast of Sicily, with his
-fleet coasting in the same direction to coöperate with him. He made
-terms with Kephalœdium and Therma, captured the island of Lipara, and
-at length reached Cape Pelôrus, a few miles from Messênê. His rapid
-march and unexpected arrival struck the Messenians with dismay. Many
-of them, conceiving defence to be impossible against so numerous a
-host, sent away their families and their valuable property to Rhegium
-or elsewhere. On the whole, however, a spirit of greater confidence
-prevailed, arising in part from an ancient prophecy preserved among
-the traditions of the town, purporting that the Carthaginians should
-one day carry water in Messênê. The interpreters affirmed that “to
-carry water” meant, of course, “to be a slave,”—and the Messenians,
-persuading themselves that this portended defeat to Imilkon, sent out
-their chosen military force to meet him at Pelôrus, and oppose his
-disembarkation. The Carthaginian commander, seeing these troops on
-their march, ordered his fleet to sail forward into the harbor of the
-city, and attack it from seaward during the absence of the defenders.
-A north wind so favored the advance of the ships, that they entered
-the harbor full sail, and found the city on that side almost
-unguarded. The troops who had marched out towards Pelôrus hastened
-back, but were too late;[1053] while Imilkon himself also, pushing
-forward by land, forced his way into the town over the neglected
-parts of the wall. Messênê was taken; and its unhappy population
-fled in all directions for their lives. Some found refuge in the
-neighboring cities; others ran to the hill-forts of the Messenian
-territory, planted as a protection against the indigenous Sikels;
-while about two hundred of them near the harbor, cast themselves into
-the sea, and undertook the arduous task of swimming across to the
-Italian coast, in which fifty of them succeeded.[1054]
-
-  [1052] Diodor. xiv, 56, 57. τῶν ἰδίων ἱππέων ἐν Συρακούσαις
-  ὄντων, etc. διὰ τῶν πεπτωκότων τειχῶν εἰσβιασάμενοι, etc. τὰ
-  τείχη καταπεπτωκότα, etc.
-
-  Compare another example of inattention to the state of their
-  walls, on the part of the Messenians (xix, 65).
-
-  [1053] Kleon and the Athenians took Torônê by a similar manœuvre
-  (Thucyd. v, 2).
-
-  [1054] Diodor. xiv, 57.
-
-Though Imilkon tried in vain to carry by assault some of the
-Messenian hill-forts, which were both strongly placed and gallantly
-defended,—yet his capture of Messênê itself was an event both
-imposing and profitable. It deprived Dionysius of an important ally,
-and lessened his facilities for obtaining succor from Italy. But
-most of all, it gratified the anti-Hellenic sentiment of the Punic
-general and his army, counterbalancing the capture of Motyê in the
-preceding year. Having taken scarce any captives, Imilkon had nothing
-but unconscious stone and wood upon which to vent his antipathy. He
-ordered the town, the walls, and all the buildings, to be utterly
-burnt and demolished; a task which his numerous host are said to
-have executed so effectually, that there remained hardly anything
-but ruins, without a trace of human residence.[1055] He received
-adhesion and reinforcements from most of the Sikels[1056] of the
-interior, who had been forced to submit to Dionysius a year or two
-before, but detested his dominion. To some of these Sikels, the
-Syracusan despot had assigned the territory of the conquered Naxians,
-with their city probably unwalled. But anxious as they were to escape
-from him, many had migrated to a point somewhat north of Naxus,—to
-the hill of Taurus, immediately over the sea, unfavorably celebrated
-among the Sikel population as being the spot where the first Greek
-colonists had touched on arriving in the island. Their migration was
-encouraged, multiplied, and organized, under the auspices of Imilkon,
-who prevailed upon them to construct, upon the strong eminence of
-Taurus, a fortified post, which formed the beginning of the city
-afterwards known as Tauromenium.[1057] Magon was sent with the
-Carthaginian fleet to assist in the enterprise.
-
-  [1055] Diodor. xiv, 58. Ἰμίλκων δὲ τῆς Μεσσήνης τὰ τείχη
-  κατασκάψας, προσέταξε τοῖς στρατιώταις καταβαλεῖν τὰς οἰκίας
-  εἰς ἔδαφος, καὶ μήτε κέραμον, μήθ’ ὕλην, μήτ’ ἄλλο μηδὲν
-  ὑπολιπεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν κατακαῦσαι, τὰ δὲ συντρίψαι. Ταχὺ δὲ τῇ
-  τῶν στρατιωτῶν πολυχειρίᾳ λαβόντων τῶν ἔργων συντέλειαν, ἡ πόλις
-  ἄγνωστος ἦν, ὅπου πρότερον αὐτὴν οἰκεῖσθαι συνέβαινεν. Ὁρῶν γὰρ
-  τὸν τόπον πόῤῥω μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν συμμαχίδων πόλεων κεχωρισμένον,
-  εὐκαιρότατον δὲ τῶν περὶ Σικελίαν ὄντα, προῄρητο δυοῖν θάτερον, ἢ
-  τελέως ἀοίκητον διατηρεῖν, ἢ δυσχερῆ καὶ πολυχρόνιον τὴν κτίσιν
-  αὐτῆς γίνεσθαι.
-
-  Ἐναποδειξάμενος οὖν τὸ πρὸς τοὺς Ἕλληνας μῖσος ἐν τῇ τῶν
-  Μεσσηνίων ἀτυχίᾳ, etc.
-
-  It would appear, however, that the demolition of Messênê can
-  hardly have been carried so far in fact as Imilkon intended;
-  since the city reappears shortly afterwards in renewed dignity.
-
-  [1056] Diodor. xiv, 59-76.
-
-  [1057] Diodor. xiv, 59.
-
-Meanwhile Dionysius, greatly disquieted at the capture of Messênê,
-exerted himself to put Syracuse in an effective position of defence
-on her northern frontier. Naxus and Katana being both unfortified, he
-was forced to abandon them, and he induced the Campanians whom he had
-planted in Katana to change their quarters to the strong town called
-Ætna, on the skirt of the mountain so named. He made Leontini his
-chief position; strengthening as much as possible the fortifications
-of the city as well as those of the neighboring country forts,
-wherein he accumulated magazines of provisions from the fertile
-plains around. He had still a force of thirty thousand foot and more
-than three thousand horse; he had also a fleet of one hundred and
-eighty ships of war,—triremes and others. During the year preceding,
-he had brought out both a land force and a naval force much superior
-to this, even for purposes of aggression; how it happened that he
-could now command no more, even for defence and at home,—or what had
-become of the difference,—we are not told. Of the one hundred and
-eighty ships of war, sixty only were manned by the extraordinary
-proceeding of liberating slaves. Such sudden and serious changes
-in the amount of military force from year to year, are perceptible
-among Carthaginians as well as Greeks,—indeed throughout most part
-of Grecian history;—the armies being got together chiefly for
-special occasions, and then dismissed. Dionysius farther despatched
-envoys to Sparta, soliciting a reinforcement of a thousand mercenary
-auxiliaries. Having thus provided the best defence that he could
-through the territory, he advanced forward with his main land-force
-to Katana, having his fleet also moving in coöperation, immediately
-off shore.
-
-Towards this same point of Katana the Carthaginians were now moving,
-in their march against Syracuse. Magon was directed to coast along
-with the fleet from Taurus (Tauromenium) to Katana, while Imilkon
-intended himself to march with the land force on shore, keeping
-constantly near the fleet for the purpose of mutual support. But
-his scheme was defeated by a remarkable accident. A sudden eruption
-took place from Ætna; so that the stream of lava from the mountain
-to the sea forbade all possibility of marching along the shore to
-Katana, and constrained him to make a considerable circuit with
-his army on the land-side of the mountain. Though he accelerated
-his march as much as possible, yet for two days or more he was
-unavoidably cut off from the fleet; which under the command of Magon
-was sailing southward towards Katana. Dionysius availed himself of
-this circumstance to advance beyond Katana along the beach stretching
-northward, to meet Magon in his approach, and attack him separately.
-The Carthaginian fleet was much superior in number, consisting of
-five hundred sail in all; a portion of which, however, were not
-strictly ships of war, but armed merchantmen,—that is, furnished
-with brazen bows for impact against an enemy, and rowed with oars.
-But on the other hand, Dionysius had a land-force close at hand
-to coöperate with his fleet; an advantage which in ancient naval
-warfare counted for much, serving in case of defeat as a refuge to
-the ships, and in case of victory as intercepting or abridging the
-enemy’s means of escape. Magon, alarmed when he came in sight of
-the Grecian land-force mustered on the beach, and the Grecian fleet
-rowing up to attack him,—was nevertheless constrained unwillingly
-to accept the battle. Leptines, the Syracusan admiral,—though
-ordered by Dionysius to concentrate his ships as much as possible,
-in consequence of his inferior numbers,—attacked with boldness, and
-even with temerity; advancing himself with thirty ships greatly
-before the rest, and being apparently farther out to sea than the
-enemy. His bravery at first appeared successful, destroying or
-damaging the headmost ships of the enemy. But their superior numbers
-presently closed around him, and after a desperate combat, fought
-in the closest manner, ship to ship and hand to hand, he was forced
-to sheer off, and to seek escape seaward. His main fleet, coming
-up in disorder, and witnessing his defeat, were beaten also, after
-a strenuous contest. All of them fled, either landward or seaward
-as they could, under vigorous pursuit by the Carthaginian vessels;
-and in the end, no less than a hundred of the Syracusan ships, with
-twenty thousand men, were numbered as taken, or destroyed. Many of
-the crews, swimming or floating in the water on spars, strove to get
-to land to the protection of their comrades. But the Carthaginian
-small craft, sailing very near to the shore, slew or drowned these
-unfortunate men, even under the eyes of friends ashore who could
-render no assistance. The neighboring water became strewed, both
-with dead bodies and with fragments of broken ships. As victors, the
-Carthaginians were enabled to save many of their own seamen, either
-on board of damaged ships, or swimming for their lives. Yet their own
-loss too was severe; and their victory, complete as it proved, was
-dearly purchased.
-
-Though the land-force of Dionysius had not been at all engaged,
-yet the awful defeat of his fleet induced him to give immediate
-orders for retreating, first to Katana and afterwards yet farther to
-Syracuse. As soon as the Syracusan army had evacuated the adjoining
-shore, Magon towed all his prizes to land, and there hauled them up
-on the beach; partly for repair, wherever practicable,—partly as
-visible proofs of the magnitude of the triumph, for encouragement to
-his own armament. Stormy weather just then supervening, he was forced
-to haul his own ships ashore also for safety, and remained there for
-several days refreshing the crews. To keep the sea under such weather
-would have been scarcely practicable; so that if Dionysius, instead
-of retreating, had continued to occupy the shore with his unimpaired
-land-force, it appears that the Carthaginian ships would have been
-in the greatest danger; constrained either to face the storm, to run
-back a considerable distance northward, or to make good their landing
-against a formidable enemy, without being able to wait for the
-arrival of Imilkon.[1058] The latter, after no very long interval,
-came up, so that the land-force and the navy of the Carthaginians
-were now again in coöperation. While allowing his troops some
-days of repose and enjoyment of the victory, he sent envoys to the
-town of Ætna, inviting the Campanian mercenary soldiers to break
-with Dionysius and join him. Reminding them that their countrymen
-at Entella were living in satisfaction as a dependency of Carthage
-(which they had recently testified by resisting the Syracusan
-invasion), he promised to them an accession of territory, and a share
-in the spoils of the war, to be wrested from Greeks who were enemies
-of Campanians not less than of Carthaginians.[1059] The Campanians of
-Ætna would gladly have complied with his invitation, and were only
-restrained from joining him by the circumstance that they had given
-hostages to the despot of Syracuse, in whose army also their best
-soldiers were now serving.
-
-  [1058] Diodor. xiv, 60, 61. Compare the speech of Theodôrus at
-  Syracuse afterwards (c. 68), from which we gather a more complete
-  idea of what passed after the battle.
-
-  [1059] Diodor. xiv, 61. Καὶ καθόλου δὲ τῶν Ἑλλήνων γένος
-  ἀπεδείκνυε πολέμιον ὕπαρχον τῶν ἄλλων ἐθνῶν.
-
-  These manifestations of anti-Hellenic sentiment, among the
-  various neighbors of the Sicilian Greeks, are important to
-  notice, though they are not often brought before us.
-
-Meanwhile Dionysius, in marching back to Syracuse, found his army
-grievously discontented. Withdrawn from the scene of action without
-even using their arms, they looked forward to nothing better than a
-blockade at Syracuse, full of hardship and privation. Accordingly
-many of them protested against retreat, conjuring him to lead them
-again to the scene of action, that they might either assail the
-Carthaginian fleet in the confusion of landing, or join battle
-with the advancing land-force under Imilkon. At first, Dionysius
-consented to such change of scheme. But he was presently reminded
-that unless he hastened back to Syracuse, Magon with the victorious
-fleet might sail thither, enter the harbor, and possess himself of
-the city; in the same manner as Imilkon had recently succeeded at
-Messênê. Under these apprehensions he renewed his original order for
-retreat, in spite of the vehement protest of his Sicilian allies;
-who were indeed so incensed that most of them quitted him at once.
-Which of the two was the wiser plan, we have no sufficient means
-to determine. But the circumstances seem not to have been the same
-as those preceding the capture of Messênê; for Magon was not in a
-condition to move forward at once with the fleet, partly from his
-loss in the recent action, partly from the stormy weather; and
-might perhaps have been intercepted in the very act of landing,
-if Dionysius had moved rapidly back to the shore. As far as we can
-judge, it would appear that the complaints of the army against the
-hasty retreat of Dionysius rested on highly plausible grounds. He
-nevertheless persisted, and reached Syracuse with his army not only
-much discouraged, but greatly diminished by the desertion of allies.
-He lost no time in sending forth envoys to the Italian Greeks and
-to Peloponnesus, with ample funds for engaging soldiers, and urgent
-supplications to Sparta as well as to Corinth.[1060] Polyxenus, his
-brother-in-law, employed on this mission, discharged his duty with
-such diligence, that he came back in a comparatively short space
-of time, with thirty-two ships of war under the command of the
-Lacedæmonian Pharakidas.[1061]
-
-  [1060] Diodor. xiv, 61.
-
-  [1061] Diodor. xiv, 63.
-
-  Polyænus (v, 8, 2) recounts a manœuvre of _Leptines_, practised
-  in bringing back a Lacedæmonian reinforcement from Sparta to
-  Sicily on his voyage along the Tarentine coast. Perhaps this may
-  be the Lacedæmonian division intended.
-
-Meanwhile Imilkon, having sufficiently refreshed his troops after
-the naval victory off Katana, moved forward towards Syracuse both
-with the fleet and the land-force. The entry of his fleet into the
-Great Harbor was ostentatious and imposing; far above even that of
-the second Athenian armament, when Demosthenes first exhibited its
-brilliant but short-lived force.[1062] Two hundred and eight ships
-of war first rowed in, marshalled in the best order, and adorned
-with the spoils of the captured Syracusan ships. These were followed
-by transports, five hundred of them carrying soldiers, and one
-thousand others either empty or bringing stores and machines. The
-total number of vessels, we are told, reached almost two thousand,
-covering a large portion of the Great Harbor.[1063] The numerous
-land-force marched up about the same time; Imilkon establishing his
-head quarters in the temple of Zeus Olympius, nearly one English mile
-and a half from the city. He presently drew up his forces in order
-of battle, and advanced nearly to the city walls; while his ships of
-war also, being divided into two fleets of one hundred ships each,
-showed themselves in face of the two interior harbors or docks (on
-each side of the connecting strait between Ortygia and the main land)
-wherein the Syracusan ships were safely lodged. He thus challenged
-the Syracusans to combat on both elements; but neither challenge was
-accepted.
-
-  [1062] Thucyd. vii, 42; Plutarch, Nikias, c. 21; Diodor. xiii, 11.
-
-  [1063] Diodor. xiv, 62.
-
-  The text of Diodorus is here so perplexed as to require
-  conjectural alteration, which Rhodomannus has supplied; yet not
-  so as to remove all that is obscure. The word εἰσθεόμεναι still
-  remains to be explained or corrected.
-
-Having by such defiance farther raised the confidence of his own
-troops, he first spread them over the Syracusan territory, and
-allowed them for thirty days to enrich themselves by unlimited
-plunder. Next, he proceeded to establish fortified posts, as
-essential to the prosecution of a blockade which he foresaw would
-be tedious. Besides fortifying the temple of the Olympian Zeus, he
-constructed two other forts; one at Cape Plemmyrium (on the southern
-entrance of the harbor, immediately opposite to Ortygia, where
-Nikias had erected a post also), the other on the Great Harbor,
-midway between Plemmyrium and the temple of the Olympian Zeus, at
-the little bay called Daskon. He farther encircled his whole camp,
-near the last-mentioned temple, with a wall; the materials of which
-were derived in part from the demolition of the numerous tombs
-around; especially one tomb, spacious and magnificent, commemorating
-Gelon and his wife Damaretê. In these various fortified posts he was
-able to store up the bread, wine, and other provisions which his
-transports were employed in procuring from Africa and Sardinia, for
-the continuous subsistence of so mighty an host.
-
-It would appear as if Imilkon had first hoped to take the city by
-assault; for he pushed up his army as far as the very walls of
-Achradina (the outer city). He even occupied the open suburb of that
-city, afterwards separately fortified under the name of Neapolis,
-wherein were situated the temples of Demeter and Persephonê, which he
-stripped of their rich treasures.[1064] But if such was his plan,
-he soon abandoned it, and confined himself to the slower process
-of reducing the city by famine. His progress in this enterprise,
-however, was by no means encouraging. We must recollect that he was
-not, like Nikias, master of the centre of Epipolæ; able from thence
-to stretch his right arm southward to the Great Harbor, and his left
-arm northward to the sea at Trogilus. As far as we are able to make
-out, he never ascended the southern cliff, nor got upon the slope of
-Epipolæ; though it seems that at this time there was no line of wall
-along the southern cliff, as Dionysius had recently built along the
-northern. The position of Imilkon was confined to the Great Harbor
-and to the low lands adjoining, southward of the cliff of Epipolæ;
-so that the communications of Syracuse with the country around
-remained partially open on two sides,—westward, through the Euryalus
-at the upper extremity of Epipolæ,—and northward towards Thapsus
-and Megara, through the Hexapylon, or the principal gate in the new
-fortification constructed by Dionysius along the northern cliff of
-Epipolæ. The full value was now felt of that recent fortification,
-which, protecting Syracuse both to the north and west, and guarding
-the precious position of Euryalus, materially impeded the operations
-of Imilkon. The city was thus open, partially at least, on two
-sides, to receive supplies by land. And even by sea means were
-found to introduce provisions. Though Imilkon had a fleet so much
-stronger that the Syracusans did not dare to offer pitched battle,
-yet he found it difficult to keep such constant watch as to exclude
-their store-ships, and ensure the arrival of his own. Dionysius and
-Leptines went forth themselves from the harbor with armed squadrons
-to accelerate and protect the approach of their supplies; while
-several desultory encounters took place, both of land-force and of
-shipping, which proved advantageous to the Syracusans, and greatly
-raised their spirits.
-
-  [1064] Diodor. xiv, 63. Κατελάβετο δὲ καὶ τὸ τῆς Ἀχραδινῆς
-  προάστειον, καὶ τοὺς νέως τῆς τε Δήμητρος καὶ Κόρης ἐσύλησεν.
-
-  Cicero (in Verrem, iv, 52, 53) distinctly mentions the temples
-  of Demeter and Persephonê, and the statue of Apollo Temenites,
-  among the characteristic features of Neapolis; which proves the
-  identity of Neapolis with what Diodorus calls the suburb of
-  Achradina. This identity, recognized by Serra di Falco, Colonel
-  Leake, and other authors, is disputed by Saverio Cavallari, on
-  grounds which do not appear to me sufficient.
-
-  See Colonel Leake, notes on Syracuse, pp. 7-10; Cavallari, Zur
-  Topographie von Syrakus, p. 20.
-
-One naval conflict especially, which occurred while Dionysius was
-absent on his cruise, was of serious moment. A corn-ship belonging to
-Imilkon’s fleet being seen entering the Great Harbor, the Syracusans
-suddenly manned five ships of war, mastered it, and hauled it into
-their own dock. To prevent such capture, the Carthaginians from
-their station sent out forty ships of war; upon which the Syracusans
-equipped their whole naval force, bore down upon the forty with
-numbers decidedly superior, and completely defeated them. They
-captured the admiral’s ship, damaged twenty-four others, and pursued
-the rest to the naval station; in front of which they paraded,
-challenging the enemy to battle. As the challenge was not accepted,
-they returned to their own dock, towing in their prizes in triumph.
-
-This naval victory indicated, and contributed much to occasion, that
-turn in the fortune of the siege which each future day still farther
-accelerated. Its immediate effect was to fill the Syracusan public
-with unbounded exultation. “Without Dionysius we conquer our enemies;
-under his command we are beaten; why submit to slavery under him any
-longer?” Such was the burst of indignant sentiment which largely
-pervaded the groups and circles in the city; strengthened by the
-consciousness that they were now all armed and competent to extort
-freedom,—since Dionysius, when the besieging enemy actually appeared
-before the city, had been obliged, as the less of two hazards, to
-produce and redistribute the arms which he had previously taken from
-them. In the midst of this discontent, Dionysius himself returned
-from his cruise. To soothe the prevalent temper, he was forced to
-convene a public assembly; wherein he warmly extolled the recent
-exploit of the Syracusans, and exhorted them to strenuous confidence,
-promising that he would speedily bring the war to a close.
-
-It is possible that Dionysius, throughout his despotism, may have
-occasionally permitted what were called public assemblies; but we
-may be very sure, that, if ever convened, they were mere matters of
-form, and that no free discussion or opposition to his will was ever
-tolerated. On the present occasion, he anticipated the like passive
-acquiescence; and after having delivered a speech, doubtless much
-applauded by his own partisans, he was about to dismiss the assembly,
-when a citizen named Theodôrus unexpectedly rose. He was a Horseman
-or Knight,—a person of wealth and station in the city, of high
-character and established reputation for courage. Gathering boldness
-from the time and circumstances, he now stood forward to proclaim
-publicly that hatred of Dionysius, and anxiety for freedom, which so
-many of his fellow-citizens around had been heard to utter privately
-and were well known to feel.[1065]
-
-  [1065] Diodor. xiv, 64. Οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τοιούτων λόγων γινομένων,
-  Διονύσιος κατέπλευσε, καὶ συναγαγὼν ἐκκλησίαν, ἐπῄνει τοὺς
-  Συρακοσίους, καὶ παρεκάλει θαῤῥεῖν, ἐπαγγελλόμενος ταχέως
-  καταλύσειν τὸν πόλεμον. Ἤδη δ’ αὐτοῦ μέλλοντος διαλύειν τὴν
-  ἐκκλησίαν, ἀναστὰς Θεόδωρος ὁ Συρακούσιος, ἐν τοῖς ἱππεῦσιν
-  εὐδοκιμῶν καὶ δοκῶν εἶναι πρακτικὸς, ἀπετόλμησε περὶ τῆς
-  ἐλευθερίας τοιούτοις χρήσασθαι λόγοις.
-
-Diodorus in his history gives us a long harangue (whether composed
-by himself, or copied from others, we cannot tell) as pronounced by
-Theodôrus. The main topics of it are such as we should naturally
-expect, and are probably, on the whole, genuine. It is a full review,
-and an emphatic denunciation, of the past conduct of Dionysius,
-concluding with an appeal to the Syracusans to emancipate themselves
-from his dominion. “Dionysius (the speaker contends, in substance) is
-a worse enemy than the Carthaginians: who, if victorious, would be
-satisfied with a regular tribute, leaving us to enjoy our properties
-and our paternal polity. Dionysius has robbed us of both. He has
-pillaged our temples of their sacred deposits. He has slain or
-banished our wealthy citizens, and then seized their properties by
-wholesale, to be transferred to his own satellites. He has given
-the wives of these exiles in marriage to his barbarian soldiers. He
-has liberated our slaves, and taken them into his pay, in order to
-keep their masters in slavery. He has garrisoned our own citadel
-against us, by means of these slaves, together with a host of other
-mercenaries. He has put to death every citizen who ventured to raise
-his voice in defence of the laws and constitution. He has abused
-our confidence,—once, unfortunately, carried so far as to nominate
-him general,—by employing his powers to subvert our freedom, and
-rule us according to his own selfish rapacity in place of justice.
-He has farther stripped us of our arms; these, recent necessity has
-compelled him to restore,—and these, if we are men, we shall now
-employ for the recovery of our own freedom.”[1066]
-
-  [1066] Diodor. xiv, 65. Οὗτος δὲ, τὰ μὲν ἱερὰ συλήσας, τοὺς δὲ
-  τῶν ἰδιωτῶν πλούτους ἅμα ταῖς τῶν κεκτημένων ψυχαῖς ἀφελόμενος,
-  τοὺς οἰκέτας μισθοδοτεῖ ἐπὶ τῆς τῶν δεσποτῶν δουλείας....
-
-  c. 66. Ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀκρόπολις, δούλων ὅπλοις τηρουμένη, κατὰ τῆς
-  πόλεως ἐπιτετείχισται· τὸ δὲ τῶν μισθοφόρων πλῆθος ἐπὶ δουλείᾳ
-  τῶν Συρακοσίων ἤθροισται. Καὶ κρατεῖ τῆς πόλεως οὐκ ἐπίσης
-  βραβεύων τὸ δίκαιον, ἀλλὰ μόναρχος πλεονεξίᾳ κρίνων πράττειν
-  πάντα. Καὶ νῦν μὲν οἱ πολέμιοι βραχὺ μέρος ἔχουσι τῆς χώρας·
-  Διονύσιος δὲ, πᾶσαν ποιήσας ἀνάστατον, τοῖς τὴν τυραννίδα
-  συναύξουσιν ἐδωρήσατο....
-
-  ... Καὶ πρὸς μὲν Καρχηδονίους δύο μάχας ἐνστησάμενος ἐν ἑκατέραις
-  ἥττηται· παρὰ δὲ τοῖς πολίταις πιστευθεὶς ἅπαξ στρατηγίαν, εὐθέως
-  ἀφείλετο τὴν ἐλευθερίαν· φονεύων μὲν τοὺς παῤῥησίαν ἄγοντας ὑπὲρ
-  τῶν νόμων, φυγαδεύων δὲ τοὺς ταῖς οὐσίαις προέχοντας· καὶ τὰς μὲν
-  τῶν φυγάδων γυναῖκας οἰκέταις καὶ μιγάσιν ἀνθρώποις συνοικίζων,
-  τῶν δὲ πολιτικῶν ὅπλων βαρβάρους καὶ ξένους ποιῶν κυρίους....
-
-  c. 67. Οὐκ αἰσχυνόμεθα τὸν πολέμιον ἔχοντες ἡγεμόνα, τὸν τὰ κατὰ
-  τὴν πόλιν ἱερὰ σεσυληκότα;
-
-  c. 69. Διόπερ ἕτερον ἡγεμόνα ζητητέον, ὅπως μὴ τὸν σεσυληκότα
-  τοὺς τῶν θεῶν ναοὺς στρατηγὸν ἔχοντες ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ θεομαχῶμεν....
-
-“If the conduct of Dionysius towards Syracuse has been thus infamous,
-it has been no better towards the Sicilian Greeks generally.
-He betrayed Gela and Kamarina, for his own purposes, to the
-Carthaginians. He suffered Messênê to fall into their hands without
-the least help. He reduced to slavery, by gross treachery, our
-Grecian brethren and neighbors of Naxus and Katana; transferring the
-latter to the non-Hellenic Campanians, and destroying the former.
-He might have attacked the Carthaginians immediately after their
-landing from Africa at Panormus, before they had recovered from the
-fatigue of the voyage. He might have fought the recent naval combat
-near the port of Katana, instead of near the beach north of that
-town; so as to ensure to our fleet, if worsted, an easy and sure
-retreat. Had he chosen to keep his land-force on the spot, he might
-have prevented the victorious Carthaginian fleet from approaching
-land, when the storm came on shortly after the battle; or he might
-have attacked them, if they tried to land, at the greatest advantage.
-He has conducted the war, altogether, with disgraceful incompetence;
-not wishing sincerely, indeed, to get rid of them as enemies, but
-preserving the terrors of Carthage, as an indirect engine to keep
-Syracuse in subjection to himself. As long as we fought with him,
-we have been constantly unsuccessful; now that we have come to
-fight without him, recent experience tells us that we can beat the
-Carthaginians, even with inferior numbers.
-
-“Let us look out for another leader (concluded Theodôrus), in place
-of a sacrilegious temple-robber whom the gods have now abandoned. If
-Dionysius will consent to relinquish his dominion, let him retire
-from the city with his property unmolested; if he will not, we are
-here all assembled, we are possessed of our arms, and we have both
-Italian and Peloponnesian allies by our side. The assembly will
-determine whether it will choose leaders from our own citizens,—or
-from our metropolis Corinth,—or from the Spartans, the presidents of
-all Greece.”
-
-Such are the main points of the long harangue ascribed to Theodôrus;
-the first occasion, for many years, on which the voice of free speech
-had been heard publicly in Syracuse. Among the charges advanced
-against Dionysius, which go to impeach his manner of carrying on
-the war against the Carthaginians, there are several which we can
-neither admit nor reject, from our insufficient knowledge of the
-facts. But the enormities ascribed to him in his dealing with the
-Syracusans,—the fraud, violence, spoliation, and bloodshed, whereby
-he had first acquired, and afterwards upheld, his dominion over
-them,—these are assertions of matters of fact, which coincide in the
-main with the previous narrative of Diodorus, and which we have no
-ground for contesting.
-
-Hailed by the assembly with great sympathy and acclamation, this
-harangue seriously alarmed Dionysius. In his concluding words,
-Theodôrus had invoked the protection of Corinth as well as of Sparta,
-against the despot, whom with such signal courage he had thus
-ventured publicly to arraign. Corinthians as well as Spartans were
-now lending aid in the defence, under the command of Pharakidas.
-That Spartan officer came forward to speak next after Theodôrus.
-Among various other sentiments of traditional respect towards
-Sparta, there still prevailed a remnant of the belief that she was
-adverse to despots; as she really had once been, at an earlier
-period of her history.[1067] Hence the Syracusans hoped, and even
-expected, that Pharakidas would second the protest of Theodôrus, and
-stand forward as champion of freedom to the first Grecian city in
-Sicily.[1068] Bitterly indeed were they disappointed. Dionysius had
-established with Pharakidas relations as friendly as those of the
-Thirty tyrants at Athens with Kallibius the Lacedæmonian harmost in
-the acropolis.[1069] Accordingly Pharakidas in his speech not only
-discountenanced the proposition just made, but declared himself
-emphatically in favor of the despot; intimating that he had been sent
-to aid the Syracusans and Dionysius against the Carthaginians,—not
-to put down the dominion of Dionysius. To the Syracusans this
-declaration was a denial of all hope. They saw plainly that in
-any attempt to emancipate themselves, they would have against
-them not merely the mercenaries of Dionysius, but also the whole
-force of Sparta, then imperial and omnipotent; represented on the
-present occasion by Pharakidas, as it had been in a previous year
-by Aristus. They were condemned to bear their chains in silence,
-not without unavailing curses against Sparta. Meanwhile Dionysius,
-thus powerfully sustained, was enabled to ride over the perilous
-and critical juncture. His mercenaries crowded in haste around his
-person,—having probably been sent for, as soon as the voice of a
-free spokesman was heard.[1070] And he was thus enabled to dismiss
-an assembly, which had seemed for one short instant to threaten the
-perpetuity of his dominion, and to promise emancipation for Syracuse.
-
-  [1067] Thucyd. i, 18; Herodot. v, 92.
-
-  [1068] Diodor. xiv, 70. Τοιούτοις τοῦ Θεοδώρου χρησαμένου λόγοις,
-  οἱ μὲν Συρακούσιοι μετέωροι ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἐγένοντο, καὶ πρὸς τοὺς
-  συμμάχους ἀπέβλεπον. Φαρακίδου δὲ τοῦ Λακεδαιμονίου ναυαρχοῦντος
-  τῶν συμμάχων, καὶ παρελθόντος ἐπὶ τὸ βῆμα, πάντες προσεδόκων
-  ἀρχηγὸν ἔσεσθαι τῆς ἐλευθερίας.
-
-  [1069] Diodor. xiv, 70. Ὁ δὲ τὰ πρὸς τὸν τύραννον ἔχων οἰκείως,
-  etc.; compare Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 3, 14.
-
-  [1070] Diodor. xiv, 70. Παρὰ δὲ τὴν προσδοκίαν γενομένης τῆς
-  ἀποφάσεως, οἱ μὲν μισθόφοροι συνέδραμον πρὸς τὸν Διονύσιον,
-  οἱ δὲ Συρακούσιοι καταπλαγέντες τὴν ἡσυχίαν, εἶχον, πολλὰ
-  τοῖς Σπαρτιάταις καταρώμενοι. Καὶ γὰρ τὸ πρότερον Ἀρέτης ὁ
-  Λακεδαιμόνιος (he is called previously _Aristus_, xiv, 10),
-  ἀντιλαμβανομένων αὐτῶν τῆς ἐλευθερίας, ἐγένετο προδότης· καὶ τότε
-  Φαρακίδας ἐνέστη ταῖς ὁρμαῖς τῶν Συρακουσίων.
-
-During this interesting and momentous scene, the fate of Syracuse
-had hung upon the decision of Pharakidas: for Theodôrus, well aware
-that with a besieging enemy before the gates, the city could not be
-left without a supreme authority, had conjured the Spartan commander,
-with his Lacedæmonian and Corinthian allies, to take into his own
-hands the control and organization of the popular force. There can
-be little doubt that Pharakidas could have done this, if he had been
-so disposed, so as at once to make head against the Carthaginians
-without, and to restrain, if not to put down, the despotism within.
-Instead of undertaking the tutelary intervention solicited by the
-people, he threw himself into the opposite scale, and strengthened
-Dionysius more than ever, at the moment of his greatest peril.
-The proceeding of Pharakidas was doubtless conformable to his
-instructions from home, as well as to the oppressive and crushing
-policy which Sparta, in these days of her unresisted empire (between
-the victory of Ægospotami and the defeat of Knidus), pursued
-throughout the Grecian world.
-
-Dionysius was fully sensible of the danger which he had thus been
-assisted to escape. Under the first impressions of alarm, he strove
-to gain something like popularity; by a conciliatory language and
-demeanor, by presents adroitly distributed, and by invitations to
-his table. Whatever may have been the success of such artifices, the
-lucky turn, which the siege was now taking, was the most powerful of
-all aids for building up his full power anew.
-
-It was not the arms of the Syracusans, but the wrath of Demeter and
-Persephonê, whose temple (in the suburb of Achradina) Imilkon had
-pillaged, that ruined the besieging army before Syracuse. So the
-piety of the citizens interpreted that terrific pestilence which
-now began to rage among the multitude of their enemies without. The
-divine wrath was indeed seconded (as the historian informs us[1071])
-by physical causes of no ordinary severity. The vast numbers of
-the host were closely packed together; it was now the beginning
-of autumn, the most unhealthy period of the year; moreover this
-summer had been preternaturally hot, and the low marshy ground
-near the Great Harbor, under the chill of morning contrasted with
-the burning sun of noon, was the constant source of fever and
-pestilence. These unseen and irresistible enemies fell with appalling
-force upon the troops of Imilkon; especially upon the Libyans, or
-native Africans, who were found the most susceptible. The intense
-and varied bodily sufferings of this distemper,—the rapidity with
-which it spread from man to man,—and the countless victims which it
-speedily accumulated,—appear to have equalled, if not surpassed,
-the worst days of the pestilence of Athens in 429 B.C. Care and
-attendance upon the sick, or even interment of the dead, became
-impracticable; so that the whole camp presented a scene of deplorable
-agony, aggravated by the horrors and stench of one hundred and
-fifty thousand unburied bodies.[1072] The military strength of the
-Carthaginians was completely prostrated by such a visitation. Far
-from being able to make progress in the siege, they were not even
-able to defend themselves against moderate energy on the part of the
-Syracusans; who (like the Peloponnesians during the great plague of
-Athens) were themselves untouched by the distemper.[1073]
-
-  [1071] Diodor. xiv, 70. Συνεπελάβετο δὲ καὶ τῇ τοῦ δαιμονίου
-  συμφορᾷ τὸ μυριάδας εἰς ταὐτὸ συναθροισθῆναι, καὶ τὸ τῆς ὥρας
-  εἶναι πρὸς τὰς νόσους ἐνεργότατον, etc.
-
-  [1072] Diodor. xiv, 71-76. πεντεκαίδεκα μυριάδας ἐπεῖδον ἀτάφους
-  διὰ τὸν λοιμὸν σεσωρευμένους.
-
-  I give the figure as I find it, without pretending to trust it as
-  anything more than an indication of a great number.
-
-  [1073] Thucyd. ii, 54.
-
-  When the Roman general Marcellus was besieging Syracuse in 212
-  B.C., a terrific pestilence, generated by causes similar to
-  that of this year, broke out. All parties, Romans, Syracusans,
-  and Carthaginians, suffered from it considerably; but the
-  Carthaginians worst of all; they are said to have all perished
-  (Livy, xxv, 26).
-
-Such was the wretched spectacle of the Carthaginian army, clearly
-visible from the walls of Syracuse. To overthrow it by a vigorous
-attack, was an enterprise not difficult; indeed, so sure, in the
-opinion of Dionysius, that in organizing his plan of operation, he
-made it the means of deliberately getting rid of some troops in the
-city who had become inconvenient to him. Concerting measures for a
-simultaneous assault upon the Carthaginian station both by sea and
-land, he entrusted eighty ships of war to Pharakidas and Leptines,
-with orders to move at daybreak; while he himself conducted a body
-of troops out of the city, during the darkness of night; issuing
-forth by Epipolæ and Euryalus (as Gylippus had formerly done when he
-surprised Plemmyrium[1074]), and making a circuit until he came, on
-the other side of the Anapus, to the temple of Kyanê; thus getting on
-the land-side or south-west of the Carthaginian position. He first
-despatched his horsemen, together with a regiment of one thousand
-mercenary foot-soldiers, to commence the attack. These latter troops
-had become peculiarly obnoxious to him, having several times engaged
-in revolt and disturbance. Accordingly, while he now ordered them
-up to the assault in conjunction with the horse, he at the same
-time gave secret directions to the horse, to desert their comrades
-and take flight. Both his orders were obeyed. The onset having been
-made jointly, in the heat of combat the horsemen fled, leaving their
-comrades all to be cut to pieces by the Carthaginians.[1075] We have
-as yet heard nothing about difficulties arising to Dionysius from
-his mercenary troops, on whose arms his dominion rested; and what we
-are here told is enough merely to raise curiosity without satisfying
-it. These men are said to have been mutinous and disaffected; a
-fact, which explains, if it does not extenuate, the gross perfidy of
-deliberately inveigling them to destruction, while he still professed
-to keep them under his command.
-
-  [1074] Thucyd. vii, 22, 23.
-
-  [1075] Diodor. xiv, 72. Οὗτοι δ’ ἦσαν οἱ μισθόφοροι τῷ Διονυσίῳ
-  παρὰ πάντας ἀλλοτριώτατοι, καὶ πλεονάκις ἀποστάσεις καὶ ταραχὰς
-  ποιοῦντες. Διόπερ ὁ μὲν Διονύσιος τοῖς ἱππεῦσιν ἦν παρηγγελκὼς,
-  ὅταν ἐξάπτωνται τῶν πολεμίων, φεύγειν, καὶ τοὺς μισθοφόρους
-  ἐγκαταλιπεῖν· ὧν ποιησάντων τὸ προσταχθὲν, οὗτοι μὲν ἅπαντες
-  κατεκόπησαν.
-
-In the actual state of the Carthaginian army, Dionysius could afford
-to make them a present of this obnoxious division. His own attack,
-first upon the fort of Polichnê, next upon that near the naval
-station at Daskon, was conducted with spirit and success. While the
-defenders, thinned and enfeebled by the pestilence, were striving
-to repel him on the land-side, the Syracusan fleet came forth from
-its docks in excellent spirits and order to attack the ships at the
-station. These Carthaginian ships, though afloat and moored, were
-very imperfectly manned. Before the crews could get aboard to put
-them on their defence, the Syracusan triremes and quinqueremes,
-ably rowed and with their brazen beaks well directed, drove against
-them on the quarter or midships, and broke through the line of
-their timbers. The crash of such impact was heard afar off, and the
-best ships were thus speedily disabled.[1076] Following up their
-success, the Syracusans jumped aboard, overpowered the crews, or
-forced them to seek safety as they could in flight. The distracted
-Carthaginians being thus pressed at the same time by sea and by land,
-the soldiers of Dionysius from the land-side forced their way through
-the entrenchment to the shore, where forty pentekonters were hauled
-up, while immediately near them were moored both merchantmen and
-triremes. The assailants set fire to the pentekonters; upon which the
-flames, rapidly spreading under a strong wind, communicated presently
-to all the merchantmen and triremes adjacent. Unable to arrest this
-terrific conflagration, the crews were obliged to leap overboard;
-while the vessels, severed from their moorings by the burning of the
-cables, drifted against each other under the wind, until the naval
-station at Daskon became one scene of ruin.
-
-  [1076] Diodor. xiv, 72. Πάντη δὲ τῶν ἐξοχωτάτων νεῶν θραυομένων,
-  αἱ μὲν ἐκ τῶν ἐμβόλων ἀναῤῥηττόμεναι λακίδες ἐξαίσιον ἐποιοῦντο
-  ψόφον, etc.
-
-Such a volume of flame, though destroying the naval resources of the
-Carthaginians, must at the same time have driven off the assailing
-Syracusan ships of war, and probably also the assailants by land.
-But to those who contemplated it from the city of Syracuse, across
-the breadth of the Great Harbor, it presented a spectacle grand and
-stimulating in the highest degree; especially when the fire was seen
-towering aloft amidst the masts, yards, and sails of the merchantmen.
-The walls of the city were crowded with spectators, women, children,
-and aged men, testifying their exultation by loud shouts, and
-stretching their hands to heaven,—as on the memorable day, near
-twenty years before, when they gained their final victory in the
-same harbor, over the Athenian fleet. Many lads and elders, too much
-excited to remain stationary, rushed into such small craft as they
-could find, and rowed across the harbor to the scene of action, where
-they rendered much service by preserving part of the cargoes, and
-towing away some of the enemy’s vessels deserted but not yet on fire.
-The evening of this memorable day left Dionysius and the Syracusans
-victorious by land as well as by sea; encamped near the temple of
-Olympian Zeus which had so recently been occupied by Imilkon. Though
-they had succeeded in forcing the defences of the latter both at
-Polichnê and at Daskon, and in inflicting upon him a destructive
-defeat, yet they would not aim at occupying his camp, in its infected
-and deplorable condition.
-
-On two former occasions during the last few years, we have seen the
-Carthaginian armies decimated by pestilence,—near Agrigentum and near
-Gela,—previous to this last and worst calamity. Imilkon, copying the
-weakness of Nikias rather than the resolute prudence of Demosthenes,
-had clung to his insalubrious camp near the Great Harbor, long
-after all hope of reducing Syracuse had ceased, and while suffering
-and death to the most awful extent were daily accumulating around
-him. But the recent defeat satisfied even him that his position
-was no longer tenable. Retreat was indispensable; yet nowise
-impracticable,—with the brave men, Iberians and others, in his army,
-and with the Sikels of the interior on his side,—had he possessed the
-good qualities as well as the defects of Nikias, or been capable of
-anything like that unconquerable energy which ennobled the closing
-days of the latter. Instead of taking the best measures available for
-a retiring march, Imilkon despatched a secret envoy to Dionysius,
-unknown to the Syracusans generally; tendering to him the sum of
-three hundred talents which yet remained in the camp, on condition
-of the fleet and army being allowed to sail to Africa unmolested.
-Dionysius would not consent, nor would the Syracusans have confirmed
-any such consent, to let them all escape; but he engaged to permit
-the departure of Imilkon himself with the native Carthaginians. The
-sum of three hundred talents was accordingly sent across by night to
-Ortygia; and the fourth night ensuing was fixed for the departure of
-Imilkon and his Carthaginians, without opposition from Dionysius.
-During that night forty of their ships, filled with Carthaginians,
-put to sea and sailed in silence out of the harbor. Their stealthy
-flight, however, did not altogether escape the notice of the
-Corinthian seamen in Syracuse; who not only apprised Dionysius, but
-also manned some of their own ships and started in pursuit. They
-overtook and destroyed one or two of the slowest sailers; but all the
-rest with Imilkon himself, accomplished their flight to Carthage.
-
-Dionysius,—while he affected to obey the warning of the Corinthians,
-with movements intentionally tardy and unavailing,—applied himself
-with earnest activity to act against the forsaken army remaining.
-During the same night he led out his troops from the city to the
-vicinity of their camp. The flight of Imilkon speedily promulgated,
-had filled the whole army with astonishment and consternation. No
-command,—no common cause,—no bond of union,—now remained among this
-miscellaneous host, already prostrated by previous misfortune. The
-Sikels in the army, being near to their own territory and knowing the
-roads, retired at once, before daybreak, and reached their homes.
-Scarcely had they passed, when the Syracusan soldiers occupied the
-roads, and barred the like escape to others. Amidst the general
-dispersion of the abandoned soldiers, some perished in vain attempts
-to force the passes, others threw down their arms and solicited
-mercy. The Iberians alone, maintaining their arms and order with
-unshaken resolution, sent to Dionysius propositions to transfer to
-him their service; which he thought proper to accept, enrolling them
-among his mercenaries. All the remaining host, principally Libyans,
-being stripped and plundered by his soldiers, became his captives,
-and were probably sold as slaves.[1077]
-
-  [1077] Diodor. xiv, 75.
-
-The heroic efforts of Nikias, to open for his army a retreat in
-the face of desperate obstacles, had ended in a speedy death as
-prisoner at Syracuse,—yet without anything worse than the usual fate
-of prisoners of war. But the base treason of Imilkon, though he
-insured a safe retreat home by betraying the larger portion of his
-army, earned for him only a short prolongation of life amidst the
-extreme of ignominy and remorse. When he landed at Carthage with the
-fraction of his army preserved, the city was in the deepest distress.
-Countless family losses, inflicted by the pestilence, added a keener
-sting to the unexampled public loss and humiliation now fully made
-known. Universal mourning prevailed; all public and private business
-was suspended, all the temples were shut, while the authorities and
-the citizens met Imilkon in sad procession on the shore. The defeated
-commander strove to disarm their wrath, by every demonstration of
-a broken and prostrate spirit. Clothed in the sordid garment of a
-slave, he acknowledged himself as the cause of all the ruin, by his
-impiety towards the gods; for it was they, and not the Syracusans,
-who had been his real enemies and conquerors. He visited all the
-temples, with words of atonement and supplication,—replied to all the
-inquiries about relatives who had perished under the distemper,—and
-then retiring, blocked up the doors of his house, where he starved
-himself to death.
-
-But the season of misfortune to Carthage was not closed by his
-decease. Her dominion over her Libyan subjects was always harsh
-and unpopular, rendering them disposed to rise against her at any
-moment of calamity. Her recent disaster in Sicily would have been
-in itself perhaps sufficient to stimulate them into insurrection;
-but its effect was aggravated by their resentment for the deliberate
-betrayal of their troops serving under Imilkon, not one of whom lived
-to come back. All the various Libyan subject towns had on this matter
-one common feeling of indignation; all came together in congress,
-agreed to unite their forces, and formed an army which is said to
-have reached one hundred and twenty thousand men. They established
-their head-quarters at Tunês (Tunis), a town within a short distance
-of Carthage itself, and were for a certain time so much stronger in
-the field, that the Carthaginians were obliged to remain within their
-walls. For a moment it seemed as if the star of this great commercial
-city was about to set for ever. The Carthaginians themselves were
-in the depth of despondency, believing themselves to be under the
-wrath of the goddesses Demeter and her daughter Persephonê; who, not
-content with the terrible revenge already taken in Sicily, for the
-sacrilege committed by Imilkon, were still pursuing them into Africa.
-Under the extreme religious terror which beset the city, every means
-were tried to appease the offended goddesses. Had it been supposed
-that the Carthaginian gods had been insulted, expiation would have
-been offered by the sacrifice of human victims,—and those too the
-most precious, such as beautiful captives, or children of conspicuous
-citizens. But on this occasion, the insult had been offered to
-Grecian gods, and atonement was to be made according to the milder
-ceremonies of Greece. The Carthaginians had never yet instituted in
-their city any worship of Demeter or Persephonê; they now established
-temples in honor of these goddesses, appointed several of their most
-eminent citizens to be priests, and consulted the Greeks resident
-among them, as to the form of worship most suitable to be offered.
-After having done this, and cleared their own consciences, they
-devoted themselves to the preparation of ships and men for the
-purpose of carrying on the war. It was soon found that Demeter and
-Persephonê were not implacable, and that the fortune of Carthage was
-returning. The insurgents, though at first irresistible, presently
-fell into discord among themselves about the command. Having no
-fleet, they became straitened for want of provisions, while Carthage
-was well supplied by sea from Sardinia. From these and similar
-causes, their numerous host gradually melted away, and rescued the
-Carthaginians from alarm at the point where they were always weakest.
-The relations of command and submission, between Carthage and her
-Libyan subjects, were established as they had previously stood,
-leaving her to recover slowly from her disastrous reverses.[1078]
-
-  [1078] Diodor. xiv, 77.
-
-But though the power of Carthage in Africa was thus restored, in
-Sicily it was reduced to the lowest ebb. It was long before she
-could again make head with effect against Dionysius, who was left
-at liberty to push his conquests in another direction, against the
-Italiot Greeks. The remaining operations of his reign,—successful
-against the Italiots, unsuccessful against Carthage,—will come to be
-recounted in my next succeeding chapter and volume.
-
-
-
-
-
-End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of History of Greece, Volume 10 (of 12), by 
-George Grote
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