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-The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Officer's Manual, by Napoleon Bonaparte
-
-This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most
-other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions
-whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of
-the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at
-www.gutenberg.org.  If you are not located in the United States, you'll have
-to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook.
-
-Title: The Officer's Manual
-       Napoleon's Maxims of War
-
-Author: Napoleon Bonaparte
-
-Release Date: December 23, 2015 [EBook #50750]
-
-Language: English
-
-Character set encoding: UTF-8
-
-*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE OFFICER'S MANUAL ***
-
-
-
-
-Produced by Shaun Pinder, Charlie Howard, and the Online
-Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This
-file was produced from images generously made available
-by The Internet Archive)
-
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-
-
-  THE OFFICER’S MANUAL.
-
-  NAPOLEON’S
-  MAXIMS OF WAR.
-
-
-  RICHMOND, VA.:
-  WEST & JOHNSTON.
-  1862.
-
-
-
-
-  EVANS & COGSWELL, PRINTERS.
-  NO. 3 BROAD ST., CHARLESTON, S. C.
-
-
-
-
-RECOMMENDATION.
-
-
-“After refreshing my memory by looking over again ‘The Officer’s
-Manual,’ or ‘Maxims of Napoleon,’ I think I may safely recommend the
-republication, in America, of the work in English, as likely to be
-called for by many officers, regular and volunteer. It contains a
-circle of maxims, deduced from the highest source of military science
-and experience, with practical illustrations of the principles taken
-from the most celebrated campaigns of modern times. The study of the
-book cannot fail to set all young officers on a course of inquiry and
-reflection greatly to their improvement.
-
-            “WINFIELD SCOTT.”
-
-
-
-
-PREFACE.
-
-
-The publisher has reissued this little volume as a publication timely
-for the occasion. A collection of maxims which directed the military
-operations of the greatest captain of modern times, cannot fail to
-prove of great use to such young officers as really desire a knowledge
-of the art of war. The maxims are illustrated by instances drawn from
-the campaigns of Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, Frederick, and Napoleon.
-These great men were all governed by the same principles, and it is by
-applying these principles to the perusal of their respective campaigns,
-that every military man will recognize their wisdom, and make such use
-of them hereafter as his own particular genius shall point out.
-
-“And here, perhaps,” says the translator, Col. D’Aguilar, “my task
-might have been considered finished; but perceiving how incomplete
-the collection was alone, I have endeavored to supply the deficiency
-by having recourse for further illustration to the memoirs of
-Montécuculli, and the instructions of Frederick to his generals. The
-analogy of their principles with those of Napoleon, has convinced me
-that the art of war is susceptible of two points of view: one, which
-relates entirely to the acquirements and genius of the general; the
-other, which refers to matters of detail.
-
-“The first is the same in all ages, and with all nations, whatever be
-the arms with which they fight. Hence it follows that, in every age,
-great commanders have been governed by the same principles.
-
-“The business of detail, on the contrary, is controlled by existing
-circumstances. It varies with the character of a people, and the
-quality of their arms.
-
-“It is with a view to impress the justice of this remark, that I have
-sought for facts in different periods of history, to illustrate these
-maxims, and to prove that nothing is _problematical_ in war; but that
-failure and success in military operations depend almost always on the
-natural genius and science of the chief.”
-
-
-
-
-NAPOLEON’S
-
-MAXIMS OF WAR.
-
-
-
-
-MAXIM I.
-
-
-The frontiers of states are either large rivers, or chains of
-mountains, or deserts. Of all these obstacles to the march of an army,
-the most difficult to overcome is the desert; mountains come next, and
-broad rivers occupy the third place.
-
-
-NOTE.
-
-Napoleon, in his military career, appears to have been called upon to
-surmount every difficulty which can occur in wars of invasion.
-
-In Egypt he traversed deserts, and vanquished and destroyed the
-Mamelukes, so celebrated for their address and courage. His genius
-knew how to accommodate itself to all the dangers of this distant
-enterprise, in a country ill adapted to supply the wants of his troops.
-
-In the conquest of Italy, he twice crossed the Alps by the most
-difficult passes, and at a season, too, which rendered this undertaking
-still more formidable. In three months he passed the Pyrenees, defeated
-and dispersed four Spanish armies. In short, from the Rhine to the
-Borysthenes, no natural obstacle could be found to arrest the rapid
-march of his victorious army.
-
-
-
-
-MAXIM II.
-
-
-In forming the plan of a campaign, it is requisite to foresee
-everything the enemy may do, and to be prepared with the necessary
-means to counteract it.
-
-Plans of campaign may be modified _ad infinitum_ according to
-circumstances--the genius of the general, the character of the troops,
-and the topography of the theatre of action.
-
-
-NOTE.
-
-Sometimes we see a hazardous campaign succeed, the plan of which is
-directly at variance with the principles of the art of war. But this
-success depends generally on the caprice of fortune, or upon faults
-committed by the enemy--two things upon which a general must never
-count. Sometimes the plan of a campaign, although based on sound
-principles of war, runs the risk of failing at the outset if opposed
-by an adversary who acts at first on the defensive, and then, suddenly
-seizing the initiative, surprises by the skilfulness of his manœuvres.
-Such was the fate of the plan laid down by the Aulic council for the
-campaign of 1796, under the command of Marshal Wurmser. From his
-great numerical superiority, the marshal had calculated on the entire
-destruction of the French army, by cutting off its retreat. He founded
-his operations on the defensive attitude of his adversary, who was
-posted on the line of the Adige, and had to cover the siege of Mantua,
-as well as central and lower Italy.
-
-Wurmser, supposing the French army fixed in the neighborhood of
-Mantua, divided his forces into three corps, which marched separately,
-intending to unite at that place. Napoleon, having penetrated the
-design of the Austrian general, perceived the advantage to be derived
-from striking the first blow against an army divided into three corps,
-with no communication between them. He hastened, therefore, to raise
-the siege of Mantua, assembled the whole of his forces, and by this
-means became superior to the imperialists, whose divisions he attacked
-and beat in detail. Thus Wurmser, who fancied he had only to march
-to certain victory, saw himself compelled, after ten days campaign,
-to retire with the remains of his army into the Tyrol, after a loss
-of twenty-five thousand men in killed and wounded, fifteen thousand
-prisoners, nine stand of colors, and seventy pieces of cannon.
-
-Hence, nothing is so difficult as to prescribe beforehand to a general
-the line of conduct he shall pursue during the course of a campaign.
-Success must often depend on circumstances that cannot be foreseen;
-and it should be remembered, likewise, that nothing cramps so much the
-efforts of genius as compelling the head of an army to be governed by
-any will but his own.
-
-
-
-
-MAXIM III.
-
-
-An army which undertakes the conquest of a country, has its two
-wings resting either upon neutral territories, or upon great natural
-obstacles, such as rivers or chains of mountains. It happens in some
-cases that only one wing is so supported; and in others that both are
-exposed.
-
-In the first instance cited, viz., where both wings are protected,
-a general has only to protect his front from being penetrated. In
-the second, where one wing only is supported, he should rest upon
-the supported wing. In the third, where both wings are exposed, he
-should depend upon a central formation, and never allow the different
-corps under his command to depart from this: for if it be difficult
-to contend with the disadvantage of having _two_ flanks exposed,
-the inconvenience is doubled by having _four_, trebled if there be
-_six_--that is to say, if the army is divided into two or three
-different corps. In the first instance, then, as above quoted, the line
-of operation may rest indifferently on the right or on the left. In
-the second, it should be directed toward the wing in support. In the
-third, it should be perpendicular to the centre of the army’s line of
-march. But in all these cases it is necessary, at a distance of every
-five or six days march, to have a strong post or an entrenched position
-upon the line of operation, in order to collect military stores and
-provisions, to organize convoys, to form of it a centre of movement,
-and establish a point of defence to shorten the line of operation of
-the army.
-
-
-NOTE.
-
-These general principles in the art of war were entirely unknown, or
-lost sight of, in the middle ages. The crusaders in their incursions
-into Palestine appear to have had no object but to fight and to
-conquer, so little pains did they take to profit by their victories.
-Hence, innumerable armies perished in Syria, without any other
-advantage than that derived from the momentary success obtained by
-superior numbers.
-
-It was by the neglect of these principles, also, that Charles XII,
-abandoning his line of operation and all communication with Sweden,
-threw himself into the Ukraine, and lost the greater part of his army
-by the fatigue of a winter campaign in a barren country destitute of
-resources.
-
-Defeated at Pultawa, he was obliged to seek refuge in Turkey, after
-crossing the Nieper with the remains of his army, diminished to little
-more than one thousand men.
-
-Gustavus Adolphus was the first who brought back the art of war to its
-true principles. His operations in Germany were bold, rapid, and well
-executed. He made success at all times conducive to future security,
-and established his line of operation so as to prevent the possibility
-of any interruption in his communications with Sweden. His campaigns
-form a new era in the art of war.
-
-
-
-
-MAXIM IV.
-
-
-When the conquest of a country is undertaken by two or three armies,
-which have each their separate line of operation, until they arrive at
-a point fixed upon for their concentration, it should be laid down as a
-principle, that the union of these different corps should never take
-place near the enemy; because the enemy, in uniting his forces, may not
-only prevent this junction, but may beat the armies in detail.
-
-
-NOTE.
-
-In the campaign of 1757, Frederick, marching to the conquest of Bohemia
-with two armies, which had each their separate line of operation,
-succeeded, notwithstanding, in uniting them in sight of the Duke of
-Lorraine, who covered Prague with the imperial army; but his example
-should not be followed. The success of this march depended entirely on
-the inaction of the duke, who, at the head of seventy thousand men, did
-nothing to prevent the junction of the two Prussian armies.
-
-
-
-
-MAXIM V.
-
-
-All wars should be governed by certain principles, for every war should
-have a definite object, and be conducted according to the rules of
-art. (A war should only be undertaken with forces proportioned to the
-obstacles to be overcome.)
-
-
-NOTE.
-
-It was a saying of Marshal Villars, that when war is decided on, it is
-necessary to have exact information of the number of troops the enemy
-can bring into the field, since it is impossible to lay down any solid
-plan of offensive or defensive operation without an accurate knowledge
-of what you have to expect and fear. “When the first shot is fired,”
-observes Marshal Villars, “no one can calculate what will be the issue
-of the war. It is, therefore, of vast importance to reflect maturely
-before we begin it.” When once, however, this is decided, the marshal
-observes that the boldest and most extended plans are generally the
-wisest and the most successful. “When we are determined upon war,” he
-adds, “we should carry it on vigorously and without trifling.”
-
-
-
-
-MAXIM VI.
-
-
-At the commencement of a campaign, to _advance_ or _not to advance_,
-is a matter for grave consideration; but when once the offensive has
-been assumed, it must be sustained to the last extremity. However
-skilful the manœuvres in a retreat, it will always weaken the _morale_
-of an army, because, in losing the chances of success, these last are
-transferred to the enemy. Besides, retreats always cost more men and
-_materiel_ than the most bloody engagements; with this difference, that
-in a battle the enemy’s loss is nearly equal to your own--whereas in a
-retreat the loss is on your side only.
-
-
-NOTE.
-
-Marshal Saxe remarks, that no retreats are so favorable as those which
-are made before a languid and unenterprising enemy, for when he pursues
-with vigor, the retreat soon degenerates into a rout. “Upon this
-principle it is a great error,” says the marshal, “to adhere to the
-proverb which recommends us to build a bridge of gold for a retreating
-enemy. No; follow him up with spirit, and he is destroyed!”
-
-
-
-
-MAXIM VII.
-
-
-An army should be ready every day, every night, and at all times of the
-day and night, to oppose all the resistance of which it is capable.
-With this view, the soldier should always be furnished completely
-with arms and ammunition; the infantry should never be without its
-artillery, its cavalry, and its generals; and the different divisions
-of the army should be constantly in a state to support, to be
-supported, and to protect itself.
-
-The troops, whether halted, or encamped, or on the march, should be
-always in favorable positions, possessing the essentials required for
-a field of battle; for example, the flanks should be well covered, and
-all the artillery so placed as to have free range, and to play with the
-greatest advantage. When an army is in column of march, it should have
-advanced guards and flanking parties, to examine well the country in
-front, to the right, and to the left, and always at such distance as
-to enable the main body to deploy into position.
-
-
-NOTE.
-
-The following maxims, taken from the memoirs of Montécuculli, appear
-to me well suited to this place, and calculated to form a useful
-commentary on the general principles laid down in the preceding maxim:
-
-1. When war has been once decided on, the moment is past for doubts and
-scruples. On the contrary, we are bound to hope that all the evil which
-may ensue, will not; that Providence, or our own wisdom, may avert it;
-or that the want of talent on the part of the enemy may prevent him
-from benefiting by it. The first security for success is to confer the
-command on one individual. When the authority is divided, the opinions
-of the commanders often vary, and the operations are deprived of that
-_ensemble_ which is the first essential to victory. Besides, when an
-enterprise is common to many, and not confined to a single person, it
-is conducted without vigor, and less interest is attached to the result.
-
-After having strictly conformed to all the rules of war, and satisfied
-ourselves that nothing has been omitted to ensure eventual success,
-we must then leave the issue in the hands of Providence, and repose
-ourselves tranquilly in the decision of a higher power.
-
-Let what will arrive, it is the part of a general-in-chief to remain
-firm and constant in his purposes; he must not allow himself to be
-elated by prosperity, nor to be depressed by adversity: for in war good
-and bad and fortune succeed each other by turns, form the ebb and flow
-of military operations.
-
-2. When your own army is strong and inured to service, and that of the
-enemy is weak and consists of new levies, or of troops enervated by
-long inaction, then you should exert every means to bring him to battle.
-
-If, on the other hand, your adversary has the advantage in troops, a
-decisive combat is to be avoided, and you must be content to impede
-his progress, by encamping advantageously, and fortifying favorable
-passes. When armies are nearly equal in force, it is desirable _not_ to
-avoid a battle, but only to attempt to fight one to advantage. For this
-purpose, care should be taken to encamp always in front of the enemy;
-to move when he moves, and occupy the heights and advantageous grounds
-that lie upon his line of march; to seize upon all the buildings and
-roads adjoining to his camp, and post yourself advantageously in the
-places by which he must pass. It is always something gained to make
-_him_ lose time, to thwart his designs, or to retard their progress
-and execution. If, however, an army is altogether inferior to that
-of the enemy, and there is no possibility of manœuvring against him
-with success, then the campaign must be abandoned, and the troops must
-retire into the fortresses.
-
-3. The principal object of a general-in-chief, in the moment of battle,
-should be to secure the flanks of his army. It is true that natural
-positions may be found to effect this object, but these positions being
-fixed and immovable in themselves, they are only advantageous to a
-general who wishes to wait the shock of the enemy, and not to one who
-marches to the attack.
-
-A general can, therefore, rely only on the proper arrangement of his
-troops, to enable him to repel any attempt the adversary may make upon
-the front, or flanks, or rear of his army.
-
-If one flank of an army rests upon a river, or an impassable ravine,
-the whole of the cavalry may be posted with the other wing, in order to
-envelop the enemy more easily by its superiority in numbers.
-
-If the enemy has his flanks supported by woods, light cavalry or
-infantry should be despatched to attack him in flank or in rear during
-the heat of the battle. If practicable, also, an attack should be made
-upon the baggage, to add to his confusion.
-
-If you desire to beat the enemy’s left with your right wing, or his
-right with your left wing, the wing with which you attack should be
-reinforced by the _élite_ of your army. At the same moment, the other
-wing should avoid battle, and the attacking wing brought rapidly
-forward, so as to overwhelm the enemy. If the nature of the ground
-admits, he should be approached by stealth, and attacked before he
-is on his guard. If any signs of fear are discoverable in the enemy,
-and which are always to be detected by confusion or disorder in his
-movements, he should be pursued immediately, without allowing him
-time to recover himself. It is now the cavalry should be brought into
-action, and manœuvre so as to surprise and cut off his artillery and
-baggage.
-
-4. The order of march should always be subservient to the order of
-battle, which last should be arranged beforehand. The march of an army
-is always well regulated when it is governed by the distance to be
-accomplished, and by the time required for its performance. The front
-of the column of march should be diminished or increased according
-to the nature of the country, taking care that the artillery always
-proceeds by the main road.
-
-When a river is to be passed, the artillery should be placed in battery
-upon the bank opposite the point of crossing.
-
-It is a great advantage, when a river forms a sweep or angle, and
-when a ford is to be found near the place where you wish to effect a
-passage. As the construction of the bridge proceeds, infantry should
-be advanced to cover the workmen, by keeping up a fire on the opposite
-bank; but the moment it is finished, a corps of infantry and cavalry,
-and some field-pieces, should be pushed across. The infantry should
-entrench itself immediately at the head of the bridge, and it is
-prudent, moreover, to fortify on the same side of the river, in order
-to protect the bridge in case the enemy should venture an offensive
-movement.
-
-The advanced guard of an army should be always provided with trusty
-guides, and with a corps of pioneers: the first to point out the best
-roads, the second to render these roads more practicable.
-
-If the army marches in detachments, the commander of each detachment
-should be furnished with the name of the place in writing, where the
-whole are to be reassembled; the place should be sufficiently removed
-from the enemy to prevent him from occupying it before the junction of
-all the detachments. To this end, it is of importance to keep the name
-a secret.
-
-From the moment an army approaches the enemy, it should march in
-the order in which it is intended to fight. If anything is to be
-apprehended, precautions are necessary in proportion to the degree of
-the danger. When a defile is to be passed, the troops should be halted
-beyond the extremity, until the whole army has quitted the defile.
-
-In order to conceal the movements of an army, it is necessary to march
-by night through woods and valleys, by the most retired roads, and out
-of reach of all inhabited places. No fires should be allowed; and, to
-favor the design still more, the troops should move by verbal order.
-When the object of the march is to carry a post, or to relieve a place
-that is besieged, the advanced guard should march within musket shot of
-the main body, because then you are prepared for an immediate attack,
-and ready to overthrow all before you.
-
-When a march is made to force a pass guarded by the enemy, it is
-desirable to make a feint upon one point, while, by a rapid movement,
-you bring your real attack to bear upon another.
-
-Sometimes success is obtained by pretending to fall back upon the
-original line of march, and, by a sudden countermarch, seizing upon
-the pass, before the enemy is able to reoccupy it. Some generals have
-gained their point by manœuvring so as to deceive the enemy, while a
-detachment under the cover of high grounds has surprised the passage by
-a stolen march. The enemy being engaged in watching the movements of
-the main body, the detachment has an opportunity of entrenching itself
-in its new position.
-
-5. An army regulates its mode of encampment according to the greater or
-less degree of precaution, when circumstances require. In a friendly
-country the troops are divided, to afford better accommodation and
-supplies. But with the enemy in front, an army should always encamp in
-order of battle. With this view, it is of the highest importance to
-cover one part of the camp, as far as practicable, by natural defences,
-such as a river, a chain of rocks, or a ravine. Care should be taken
-also that the camp is not commanded, and that there is no obstacle to a
-free communication between the different corps, and which can prevent
-the troops from mutually succoring each other.
-
-When an army occupies a fixed camp, it is necessary to be well supplied
-with provisions and ammunition, or at least that these should be
-within certain reach and easily obtained. To insure this, the line of
-communication must be well established, and care taken not to leave an
-enemy’s fortress in your rear.
-
-When an army is established in winter quarters, its safety is best
-secured either by fortifying a camp (for which purpose a spot should be
-selected near a large commercial town, or a river affording facility
-of transport), or by distributing it in close cantonments, so that the
-troops should be near together, and capable of affording each other
-mutual support.
-
-The winter quarters of an army should be protected, likewise, by
-constructing small covered works on all the lines of approach to the
-cantonments, and by posting advanced guards of cavalry to observe the
-motions of the enemy.
-
-6. A battle is to be sought, when there is reason to hope for victory,
-or when an army runs the risk of being ruined without fighting; also
-when a besieged place is to be relieved, or when you desire to prevent
-a reinforcement from reaching the enemy. Battles are useful, likewise,
-when we wish to profit by a favorable opportunity which offers, to
-secure a certain advantage, such as seizing upon an undefended point or
-pass, attacking the enemy when he has committed a fault, or when some
-misunderstanding among his generals favors the undertaking.
-
-If an enemy declines an engagement, he may be compelled to it, either
-by besieging a place of importance, or by falling upon him unawares,
-and when he cannot easily effect his retreat. Or (after pretending to
-retire), by making a rapid countermarch, attacking him vigorously and
-forcing him to action.
-
-The different circumstances under which a battle should be avoided
-or declined, are, when there is greater danger to be apprehended
-from defeat than advantage to be derived from victory; when you
-are very inferior to your adversary in numbers, and are expecting
-reinforcements; above all, when the enemy is advantageously posted, or
-when he is contributing to his own ruin by some inherent defect in his
-position, or by the errors and divisions of his generals.
-
-To gain a battle, each arm must be advantageously posted, and have the
-means of engaging its front and in flank. The wings must be protected
-by natural obstacles, where these present themselves, or by having
-recourse when necessary to the aid of art.
-
-The troops must be able to assist each other without confusion, and
-care must be taken that the broken corps do not fall back upon, and
-throw the rest into disorder. Above all, the intervals between the
-different corps must be sufficiently small to prevent the enemy from
-penetrating between them, for in that case you would be obliged to
-employ your reserves, and run the risk of being entirely overwhelmed.
-Sometimes victory is obtained by creating a diversion in the middle of
-a battle, or even by depriving the soldier of all hope of retreat, and
-placing him in a situation where he is reduced to the necessity either
-to conquer or die.
-
-At the commencement of a battle, if the ground is level, you should
-advance to meet the enemy, in order to inspire the soldier with
-courage; but if you are well posted, and your artillery advantageously
-placed, then wait for him with determination: remembering always to
-fight resolutely, to succor opportunely those who require it, and never
-to bring your reserves into action except in the last extremity; and
-even then to preserve some support, behind which the broken corps may
-rally.
-
-When it is necessary to attack with your whole force, the battle
-should commence toward evening; because then, whatever be the issue,
-night will arrive to separate the combatants before your troops are
-exhausted. By this means, an opportunity is afforded of affecting an
-orderly retreat if the result of the battle requires it.
-
-During an action, the general-in-chief should occupy some spot whence
-he can, as far as possible, overlook his whole army. He should be
-informed, immediately, of everything that passes in the different
-divisions. He should be ready, in order to render success more
-complete, to operate with fresh troops upon those points where the
-enemy is giving way, and also to reinforce his own corps wherever they
-are inclined to yield. When the enemy is beaten, he must pursue him
-instantly, without giving him a moment to rally; on the other hand, if
-he is himself defeated, or despairs of victory, he must retreat in the
-best possible order.
-
-7. It shows great talent in a general to bring troops, who are prepared
-for action, into collision with those who are not: for example, fresh
-troops against those which are exhausted--brave and disciplined men
-against recruits. He must likewise be ready always to fall with his
-army upon a weak or detached corps, to follow the track of the enemy,
-and charge him among defiles before he can face about and get into
-position.
-
-8. A position is good when the different corps are so placed as to be
-engaged with advantage, and without any remaining unemployed. If you
-are superior in cavalry, positions are to be taken in plains and open
-ground; if in infantry, in an enclosed and covered country. If inferior
-in numbers, in confined and narrow places; if superior, in a spacious
-and extensive field. With a very inferior army, a difficult pass must
-be selected to occupy and fortify.
-
-9. In order to obtain every possible advantage from a diversion, we
-should ascertain first, that the country in which it is to be created
-is easily penetrated. A diversion should be made vigorously, and on
-those points where it is calculated to do the greatest mischief to the
-enemy.
-
-10. To make war with success, the following principles should never be
-departed from:
-
-To be superior to your enemy in numbers, as well as in _morale_; to
-fight battles in order to spread terror in the country; to divide your
-army into as many corps as may be effected without risk, in order to
-undertake several objects at the same time; to treat WELL those who
-yield, to ILL treat those who resist; to secure your rear, and occupy
-and strengthen yourself at the outset in some post which shall serve
-as a central point for the support of your future movements; to
-guard against desertion; to make yourself master of the great rivers
-and principal passes, and to establish your line of communication by
-getting possession of the fortresses, by laying siege to them, and
-of the open country, by giving battle; for it is vain to expect that
-conquests are to be achieved without combats; although when a victory
-is won, they will be best maintained by uniting mildness with valor.
-
-
-
-
-MAXIM VIII.
-
-
-A general-in-chief should ask himself frequently in the day: “What
-should I do if the enemy’s army appeared now in my front, or on my
-right, or my left?” If he have any difficulty in answering these
-questions, his position is bad, and he should seek to remedy it.
-
-
-NOTE.
-
-In the campaign of 1758, the position of the Prussian army at Hohen
-Kirk, being commanded by the batteries of the enemy, who occupied all
-the heights, was eminently defective; notwithstanding, Frederick,
-who saw his rear menaced by the corps of Laudon, remained six days
-in his camp without seeking to correct his position. It would seem,
-indeed, that he was ignorant of his real danger: for Marshal Daun,
-having manœuvred during the night in order to attack by daybreak,
-surprised the Prussians in their lines before they were able to defend
-themselves, and by this means surrounded them completely.
-
-Frederick succeeded, however, in effecting his retreat with regularity,
-but not without the loss of ten thousand men, many general officers,
-and almost all of his artillery. If Marshal Daun had followed up his
-victory with greater boldness, the king of Prussia would never have
-been able to rally his army. On this occasion, Frederick’s good fortune
-balanced his imprudence.
-
-Marshal Saxe remarks, that there is more talent than is dreamt of in
-bad dispositions, if we possess the art of converting them into good
-ones when the favorable moment arrives. Nothing astonishes the enemy
-so much as this manœuvre; he has counted upon _something_; all his
-arrangements have been founded upon it accordingly--and at the moment
-of attack it escapes him! “I must repeat,” says the marshal, “there
-is nothing that so completely disconcerts an enemy as this, or leads
-him to commit so many errors; for it follows, that if he does _not_
-change his arrangements, he is beaten; and if he _does_ change them, in
-presence of his adversary, he is equally undone.”
-
-It seems to me, however, that a general who should rest the success of
-a battle upon such a principle, would be more likely to lose than to
-gain by it; for if he had to deal with a skilful adversary and an alert
-tactician, the latter would find time to take advantage of the previous
-bad arrangements, before he would be able to remedy them.
-
-
-
-
-MAXIM IX.
-
-
-The strength of an army, like the power in mechanics, is estimated
-by multiplying the mass by the rapidity; a rapid march augments the
-_morale_ of an army, and increases its means of victory. Press on!
-
-
-NOTE.
-
-“Rapidity,” says Montécuculli, “is of importance in concealing the
-movements of an army, because it leaves no time to divulge the
-intention of its chief. It is, therefore, an advantage to attack the
-enemy unexpectedly, to take him off his guard, to surprise him, and
-let him feel the thunder before he sees the flash; but if too great
-celerity exhausts your troops, while, on the other hand, delay deprives
-you of the favorable moment, you must weigh the advantage against the
-disadvantage, and choose between.”
-
-Marshal Villars observes, that “in war everything depends upon being
-able to deceive the enemy; and having once gained this point, in never
-allowing him time to recover himself.” Villars has united practice to
-precept. His bold and rapid marches were almost always crowned with
-success.
-
-It was the opinion of Frederick that all wars should be short and
-rapid; because a long war insensibly relaxes discipline, depopulates
-the state, and exhausts its resources.
-
-
-
-
-MAXIM X.
-
-
-When an army is inferior in number, inferior in cavalry, and in
-artillery, it is essential to avoid a general action. The first
-deficiency should be supplied by rapidity of movement; the want of
-artillery, by the nature of the manœuvres; and the inferiority in
-cavalry, by the choice of positions. In such circumstances, the
-_morale_ of the soldier does much.
-
-
-NOTE.
-
-The campaign of 1814 in France was skilfully executed upon these
-principles. Napoleon, with an army inferior in number, an army
-discouraged by the disastrous retreats of Moscow and of Leipzig, and
-still more by the presence of the enemy in the French territory,
-contrived, notwithstanding, to supply his vast inequality of force by
-the rapidity and combination of his movements. By the success obtained
-at Champ-Aubert, Montmirail, Montereau, and Rheims, he began to restore
-the _morale_ of the French army. The numerous recruits of which it
-was composed, had already acquired that steadiness of which the old
-regiments afforded them an example, when the capture of Paris, and the
-astonishing revolution it produced, compelled Napoleon to lay down his
-arms.
-
-But this consequence resulted rather from the force of circumstances
-than from any absolute necessity; for Napoleon, by carrying his army to
-the other side of the Loire, might easily have formed a junction with
-the armies of the Alps and Pyrenees, and have reappeared on the field
-of battle at the head of a hundred thousand men. Such a force would
-have amply sufficed to re-establish the chances of war in his favor;
-more especially as the armies of the allied sovereigns were obliged to
-manœuvre upon the French territory with all the strong places of Italy
-and France in their rear.
-
-
-
-
-MAXIM XI.
-
-
-To direct operations with lines far removed from each other, and
-without communications, is to commit a fault which always gives birth
-to a second. The detached column has only its orders for the first
-day. Its operations on the following day depend upon what may have
-happened to the main body. Thus, this column either loses time upon
-emergency, in waiting for orders, or it will act without them, and at
-hazard. Let it therefore be held as a principle, that an army should
-always keep its columns so united as to prevent the enemy from passing
-between them with impunity. Whenever, for particular reasons, this
-principle is departed from, the detached corps should be independent in
-their operations. They should move toward a point fixed upon for their
-future junction. They should advance without hesitating, and without
-waiting for fresh orders; and every precaution should be taken to
-prevent an attack upon them in detail.
-
-
-NOTE.
-
-The Austrian army, commanded by Field-marshal Alvinzi, was divided into
-two corps, destined to act independently, until they should accomplish
-their junction before Mantua. The first of these corps, consisting
-of forty-five thousand men, was under the orders of Alvinzi. It was
-to debouch by Monte Baldo, upon the positions occupied by the French
-army on the Adige. The second corps, commanded by General Provéra,
-was destined to act upon the lower Adige, and to raise the blockade
-of Mantua. Napoleon, informed of the enemy’s movements, but not
-entirely comprehending his projects, confined himself to concentrating
-his masses, and giving orders to the troops to hold themselves in
-readiness to manœuvre. In the meantime, fresh information satisfied the
-general-in-chief of the French army that the corps which had debouched
-by La Coronna, over Monte Baldo, was endeavoring to form a junction
-with its cavalry and artillery--both which, having crossed the Adige at
-Dolce, were directing their march upon the plateau of Rivoli, by the
-great road leading by Incanole.
-
-Napoleon immediately foresaw that, by having possession of the plateau,
-he should be able to prevent this junction, and obtain all the
-advantages of the initiative. He accordingly put his troops in motion,
-and at two o’clock in the morning occupied that important position.
-Once master of the point fixed upon for the junction of the Austrian
-columns, success followed all his dispositions. He repulsed every
-attack, made seven thousand prisoners, and took several standards and
-twelve pieces of cannon. At two o’clock in the afternoon, the battle of
-Rivoli was already gained, when Napoleon, learning that General Provéra
-had passed the Adige at Anghiari, and was directing his march upon
-Mantua, left to his generals the charge of following up the retreat of
-Alvinzi, and placed himself at the head of a division for the purpose
-of defeating the designs of Provéra.
-
-By a rapid march, he again succeeded in the initiatory movement, and
-in preventing the garrison of Mantua from uniting its force with
-the relieving army. The corps intrusted with the blockade, eager to
-distinguish itself under the eyes of the conqueror of Rivoli, compelled
-the garrison to retire into the place, while the division of Victor,
-forgetting the fatigues of a forced march, rushed with impetuosity on
-the relieving army in front. At this moment a sortie from the lines
-of St. George took him in flank, while the corps of Augereau, which
-had followed the march of the Austrian general, attacked him in rear.
-Provéra, surrounded on all sides, capitulated. The result of these two
-battles cost the Austrians three thousand men in killed and wounded,
-twenty-two thousand prisoners, twenty-four standards, and forty-six
-pieces of cannon.
-
-
-
-
-MAXIM XII.
-
-
-An army ought to have only one line of operation. This should be
-preserved with care, and never abandoned but in the last extremity.
-
-
-NOTE.
-
-“The line of communication of an army,” says Montécuculli, “must be
-certain and well established, for every army that acts from a distant
-base, and is not careful to keep this line perfectly open, marches upon
-a precipice. It moves to certain ruin, as may be seen by an infinity
-of examples. In fact, if the road by which provisions, ammunition and
-reinforcements are to be brought up, is not entirely secured--if the
-magazines, the hospitals, the depôts of arms, and the places of supply
-are not fixed and commodiously situated--not only the army cannot keep
-the field, but it will be exposed to the greatest dangers.”
-
-
-
-
-MAXIM XIII.
-
-
-The distances permitted between corps of an army upon the march must be
-governed by the localities, by circumstances, and by the object in view.
-
-
-NOTE.
-
-When an army moves at a distance from the enemy, the columns may be
-disposed along the road so as to favor the artillery and baggage. But
-when it is marching into action, the different corps must be formed in
-close columns in order of battle. The generals must take care that the
-heads of the columns, which are to attack together, do not outstep each
-other, and that in approaching the field of action they preserve the
-relative intervals required for deployment.
-
-“The marches that are made preparatory to a battle require,” says
-Frederick, “the greatest precaution.” With this view, he recommends
-his generals to be particularly on their guard, and to reconnoitre
-the ground at successive distances, in order to secure the initiative
-by occupying those positions most calculated to favor an attack. On
-a retreat, it is the opinion of many generals that an army should
-concentrate its forces, and march in close columns if it is still
-strong enough to resume the offensive; for by this means it is easy
-to form the line when a favorable opportunity presents itself, either
-for holding the enemy in check or for attacking him if he is not in a
-situation to accept battle.
-
-Such was Moreau’s retreat after the passage of the Adda by the
-Austro-Russian army. The French general, after having covered the
-evacuation of Milan, took up a position between the Po and the Tanaro.
-
-His camp rested upon Alexandria and Valentia, two capital fortresses,
-and had the advantage of covering the roads to Turin and Savona, by
-which he could effect his retreat in case he was unable to accomplish a
-junction with the _corps d’armee_ of Macdonald, who had been ordered to
-quit the kingdom of Naples, and hasten his march into Tuscany.
-
-Forced to abandon his position in consequence of the insurrection in
-Piedmont and Tuscany, Moreau retired upon Asti, where he learned that
-his communication with the river of Genoa had just been cut off by the
-capture of Ceva. After several ineffectual attempts to retake this
-place, he saw that his only safety depended upon throwing himself into
-the mountains.
-
-To effect this object, he directed the whole of his battering train
-and heavy baggage by the Col de Fenestrelle upon France; then opening
-himself a way over the St. Bernard, he gained Loano with his light
-artillery and the small proportion of field equipment he had been able
-to preserve.
-
-By this skilful movement, he not only retained his communications with
-France, but was enabled to observe the motions of the army from Naples,
-and to facilitate his junction with it by directing the whole of his
-force upon the points necessary for that purpose.
-
-Macdonald, in the meantime, whose only chance of success depended on
-concentrating his little army, neglected this precaution, and was
-beaten in three successive actions at the Trebia.
-
-By this retardment of his march, he rendered all Moreau’s measures to
-unite the two armies in the plains of the Po useless, and his retreat,
-after his brilliant but fruitless efforts at the Trebia, defeated the
-other arrangements, also, which the former had made to come to his
-support. The inactivity of Marshal Suwarrow, however, finally enabled
-the French general to accomplish his junction with the remains of the
-army from Naples. Moreau then concentrated his whole force upon the
-Appenines, and placed himself in a situation to defend the important
-positions of Liguria, until the chances of war should afford him an
-opportunity of resuming the offensive.
-
-When, after a decisive battle, an army has lost its artillery and
-equipments, and is consequently no longer in a state to assume the
-offensive, or even to arrest the pursuit of the enemy, it would
-seem most desirable to divide what remains into several corps, and
-order them to march by separate and distant routes upon the base of
-operation, and throw themselves into the fortresses. This is the only
-means of safety: for the enemy, uncertain as to the precise direction
-taken by the vanquished army, is ignorant in the first instance which
-corps to pursue, and it is in this moment of indecision that a march is
-gained upon him. Besides, the movements of a small body being so much
-easier than those of a larger one, these separate lines of march are
-all in favor of a retreating army.
-
-
-
-
-MAXIM XIV.
-
-
-Among mountains, a great number of positions are always to be found
-very strong in themselves, and which it is dangerous to attack. The
-character of this mode of warfare consists in occupying camps on the
-flanks or in the rear of the enemy, leaving him only the alternative
-of abandoning his position without fighting, to take up another in
-the rear, or to descend from it in order to attack you. In mountain
-warfare, the assailant has always the disadvantage; even in offensive
-warfare in the open field, the great secret consists in defensive
-combats, and in obliging the enemy to attack.
-
-
-NOTE.
-
-During the campaign of 1793, in the Maritime Alps, the French army,
-under the orders of General Brunet, did all in its power to get
-possession of the camps at Raus and at Fourches, by an attack in front.
-But these useless efforts served only to increase the courage of the
-Piedmontese, and to destroy the _élite_ of the grenadiers of the
-republican army. The manœuvres by which Napoleon, without fighting,
-compelled the enemy to evacuate these positions in 1796, suffice to
-establish the truth of these principles, and to prove how much success
-in war depends upon the genius of the general as well as on the courage
-of the soldier.
-
-
-
-
-MAXIM XV.
-
-
-The first consideration with a general who offers battle, should be the
-glory and honor of his arms; the safety and preservation of his men is
-only the second; but it is in the enterprise and courage resulting
-from the former, that the latter will most assuredly be found. In a
-retreat, besides the honor of the army, the loss of life is often
-greater than in two battles. For this reason, we should never despair
-while brave men are to be found with their colors. It is by this means
-that we obtain victory, and deserve to obtain it.
-
-
-NOTE.
-
-In 1645, the French army, under the orders of the Prince of Condé, was
-on the march to lay siege to Nordlingen, when it was discovered that
-Count Merci, who commanded the Bavarians, had foreseen this intention,
-and had entrenched himself in a strong position which defended
-Nordlingen at the same time that it covered Donawerth.
-
-Notwithstanding the favorable position of the enemy, Condé ordered the
-attack. The combat was terrible. All the infantry in the centre and on
-the right, after being successively engaged, was routed and dispersed,
-in spite of the efforts of the cavalry and the reserve, which were
-likewise carried away with the fugitives. The battle was lost. Condé,
-in despair, having no longer either centre or right to depend upon,
-collected the remnants of his battalions, and directed his march to the
-left, where Turenne was still engaged. This perseverance reanimated
-the ardor of the troops. They broke the right wing of the enemy,
-and Turenne, by a change of front, returned to the attack upon his
-centre. Night, too, favored the boldness of Condé. An entire corps of
-Bavarians, fancying themselves cut off, laid down their arms; and the
-obstinacy of the French general in this struggle for victory was repaid
-by possession of the field of battle, together with a great number of
-prisoners, and almost all the enemy’s artillery. The Bavarian army beat
-a retreat, and the next day Nordlingen capitulated.
-
-
-
-
-MAXIM XVI.
-
-
-It is an approved maxim in war, never to do what the enemy wishes you
-to do, for this reason alone, that he desires it. A field of battle,
-therefore, which he has previously studied and reconnoitred, should
-be avoided, and double care should be taken where he has had time to
-fortify and entrench. One consequence deducible from this principle is,
-never to attack a position in front which you can gain by turning.
-
-
-NOTE.
-
-It was without due regard to this principle, that Marshal Villeroi, on
-assuming the command of the army of Italy, during the campaign of 1701,
-attacked, with unwarrantable presumption, Prince Eugene, of Savoy, in
-his entrenched position of Chiavi, on the Oglio. The French generals,
-Catinat among the rest, considered the post unassailable, but Villeroi
-insisted, and the result of this otherwise unimportant battle was the
-loss of the _élite_ of the French army. It would have been greater
-still, but for Catinat’s exertions.
-
-It was by neglecting the same principle, that the Prince of Condé, in
-the campaign of 1644, failed in all his attacks upon the entrenched
-position of the Bavarian army. The Count Merci, who commanded the
-latter, had drawn up his cavalry skilfully upon the plain, resting
-upon Freyberg, while his infantry occupied the mountain. After many
-fruitless attempts, the Prince of Condé, seeing the impossibility of
-dislodging the enemy, began to menace his communications--but the
-moment Merci perceived this, he broke up his camp and retired beyond
-the Black mountains.
-
-
-
-
-MAXIM XVII.
-
-
-In a war of march and manœuvre, if you would avoid a battle with a
-superior army, it is necessary to entrench every night, and occupy a
-good defensive position. Those natural positions which are ordinarily
-met with, are not sufficient to protect an army against superior
-numbers without recourse to art.
-
-
-NOTE.
-
-The campaign of the French and Spanish army, commanded by the Duke
-of Berwick, against the Portuguese, in the year 1706, affords a good
-lesson on this subject. The two armies made almost the tour of Spain.
-They began the campaign near Badajoz, and after manœuvring across both
-Castiles, finished it in the kingdoms of Valencia and Murcia. The
-Duke of Berwick encamped his army eighty-five times, and although the
-campaign passed without a general action, he took about ten thousand
-prisoners from the enemy. Marshal Turenne also made a fine campaign of
-manœuvre against the Count Montécuculli, in 1675.
-
-The imperial army having made its arrangements to pass the Rhine at
-Strasburg, Turenne used all diligence, and, throwing a bridge over the
-river near the village of Ottenheim, three leagues below Strasburg, he
-crossed with the French army, and encamped close to the little town
-of Vilstet, which he occupied. This position covered the bridge of
-Strasburg, so that, by this manœuvre, Turenne deprived the enemy of all
-approach to that city.
-
-Upon this, Montécuculli made a movement with his whole army,
-threatening the bridge at Ottenheim, by which the French received their
-provisions from upper Alsace.
-
-As soon as Turenne discovered the design of the enemy, he left a
-detachment at Vilstet, and made a rapid march with his whole force
-upon the village of Altenheim. This intermediate position between
-the two bridges, which he wished to preserve, gave him the advantage
-of being able to succor either of these posts before the enemy had
-time to carry them. Montécuculli seeing that any successful attack
-upon the bridges was not to be expected, resolved to pass the Rhine
-below Strasburg, and with this view returned to his first position
-at Offenburg. Marshal Turenne, who followed all the movements of the
-Austrian army, brought back his army also to Vilstet.
-
-In the meantime, this attempt of the enemy having convinced the French
-general of the danger to which his bridge had exposed him, removed it
-nearer to that of Strasburg, in order to diminish the extent of ground
-he had to defend.
-
-Montécuculli, having commanded the magistrates of Strasburg to collect
-materials for a bridge, moved to Scherzheim to receive them; but
-Turenne again defeated his projects by taking a position at Freistett,
-where he occupied the islands of the Rhine, and immediately constructed
-a stockade.
-
-Thus it was that, during the whole of this campaign, Turenne succeeded
-in gaining the initiative of the enemy, and obliging him to follow
-his movements. He succeeded, also, by a rapid march, in cutting off
-Montécuculli from the Town of Offenburg, whence he drew his supplies,
-and would no doubt have prevented the Austrian general from effecting
-his junction with the corps of Caprara, had not a cannon-shot
-terminated this great man’s life.
-
-
-
-
-MAXIM XVIII.
-
-
-A general of ordinary talent occupying a bad position, and surprised
-by a superior force, seeks his safety in retreat; but a great captain
-supplies all deficiencies by his courage, and marches boldly to meet
-the attack. By this means he disconcerts his adversary; and if the
-latter shows any irresolution in his movements, a skilful leader,
-profiting by his indecision, may even hope for victory, or at least
-employ the day in manœuvring--at night he entrenches himself, or falls
-back to a better position. By this determined conduct he maintains the
-honor of his arms, the first essential to all military superiority.
-
-
-NOTE.
-
-In 1653, Marshal Turenne was surprised by the Prince of Condé, in a
-position where his army was completely compromised. He had the power,
-indeed, by an immediate retreat, of covering himself by the Somme,
-which he possessed the means of crossing at Peronne, and whence he
-was distant only half a league; but, fearing the influence of this
-retrograde movement on the _morale_ of his army, Turenne balanced all
-disadvantages by his courage, and marched boldly to meet the enemy with
-very inferior forces. After marching a league, he found an advantageous
-position, where he made every disposition for a battle. It was three
-o’clock in the afternoon; but the Spaniards, exhausted with fatigue,
-hesitated to attack him, and Turenne having covered himself with
-entrenchments during the night, the enemy no longer dared to risk a
-general action, and broke up his camp.
-
-
-
-
-MAXIM XIX.
-
-
-The transition from the defensive to the offensive is one of the most
-delicate operations.
-
-
-NOTE.
-
-By studying the first campaign of Napoleon in Italy, we can learn
-what genius and boldness may effect in passing with an army from the
-_defensive_ to the _offensive_. The army of the allies, commanded by
-General Beaulieu, was provided with every means that could render it
-formidable. Its force amounted to eighty thousand men, and two hundred
-pieces of cannon. The French army, on the contrary, could number
-scarcely thirty thousand men under arms, and thirty pieces of cannon.
-For some time there had been no issue of meat, and even the bread
-was irregularly supplied. The infantry was ill clothed, the cavalry
-wretchedly mounted. All the draught-horses had perished from want, so
-that the service of the artillery was performed by mules. To remedy
-these evils, large disbursements were necessary; and such was the state
-of the finances, that the government had only been able to furnish two
-thousand louis in specie for the opening of the campaign. The French
-army could not possibly exist in this state. To advance or retreat was
-absolutely necessary. Aware of the advantage of surprising the enemy
-at the very outset of the campaign by some decisive blow, Napoleon
-prepared for it by recasting the _morale_ of his army.
-
-In a proclamation full of energy, he reminded them that an ignoble
-death alone remained for them, if they continued on the defensive;
-that they had nothing to expect from France, but everything to hope
-from victory. “Abundance courts you in the fertile plains of Italy,”
-said he; “are you deficient, soldiers, in constancy or in courage?”
-Profiting by the moment of enthusiasm which he had inspired, Napoleon
-concentrated his forces in order to fall with his whole weight on the
-different corps of the enemy. Immediately afterward, the battles of
-Montenotte, Milesimo, and Mondovi, added fresh confidence to the high
-opinion already entertained by the soldier for his chief; and that army
-which only a few days ago was encamped amid barren rocks, and consumed
-by famine, already aspired to the conquest of Italy. In one month
-after the opening of the campaign, Napoleon had terminated the war with
-the King of Sardinia, and conquered the Milanese. Rich cantonments soon
-dispelled from the recollection of the French soldier the misery and
-fatigue attendant on this rapid march, while a vigilant administration
-of the resources of the country reorganized the _materiel_ of the
-French army, and created the means necessary for the attainment of
-future success.
-
-
-
-
-MAXIM XX.
-
-
-It may be laid down as a principle, that the line of operation should
-not be abandoned; but it is one of the most skilful manœuvres in war,
-to know how to change it, when circumstances authorize or render this
-necessary. An army which changes skilfully its line of operation
-deceives the enemy, who becomes ignorant where to look for its rear, or
-upon what weak points it is assailable.
-
-
-NOTE.
-
-Frederick sometimes changed his line of operation in the middle of a
-campaign; but he was enabled to do this, because he was manœuvring at
-that time in the centre of Germany--an abundant country, capable of
-supplying all the wants of his army in case his communications with
-Prussia were intercepted.
-
-Marshal Turenne, in the campaign of 1746, gave up his line of
-communication to the allies in the same manner; but, like Frederick,
-he was carrying on the war at this time in the centre of Germany, and
-having fallen with his whole forces upon Rain, he took the precaution
-of securing to himself a depôt upon which to establish his base of
-operation.
-
-By a series of manœuvres, marked alike by audacity and genius, he
-subsequently compelled the imperial army to abandon its magazines, and
-retire into Austria for winter quarters.
-
-But these are examples which it appears to me should only be imitated
-when we have taken full measure of the capacity of our adversary, and
-above all, when we see no reason to apprehend an insurrection in the
-country to which we transfer the theatre of war.
-
-
-
-
-MAXIM XXI.
-
-
-When an army carries with it a battering train, or large convoys of
-sick and wounded, it cannot march by too short a line upon its depôts.
-
-
-NOTE.
-
-It is above all in mountainous countries, and in those interspersed
-with woods and marshes, that it is of importance to observe this maxim;
-for, the convoys and means of transport being frequently embarrassed
-in defiles, an enemy by manœuvring may easily disperse the escorts, or
-make even a successful attack upon the whole army, when it is obliged,
-from the nature of the country, to march in an extended column.
-
-
-
-
-MAXIM XXII.
-
-
-The art of encamping in position is the same as taking up the line in
-order of battle in this position. To this end, the artillery should be
-advantageously placed, ground should be selected which is not commanded
-or liable to be turned, and, as far as possible, the guns should cover
-and command the surrounding country.
-
-
-NOTE.
-
-Frederick has remarked that, in order to be assured that your camp is
-well placed, you should see if, by making a small movement, you can
-oblige the enemy to make a greater; or, if after having forced him to
-retrograde one march you can compel him to fall back another.
-
-In defensive war, all camps should be entrenched in the front and
-wings of the position they occupy, and care should be taken that the
-rear is left perfectly open. If you are threatened with being turned,
-arrangements should be made beforehand for taking up a more distant
-position; and you should profit by any disorder in the enemy’s line of
-march, to make an attempt upon his artillery or baggage.
-
-
-
-
-MAXIM XXIII.
-
-
-When you are occupying a position which the enemy threatens to
-surround, collect all your force immediately, and menace _him_ with
-an offensive movement. By this manœuvre, you will prevent him from
-detaching and annoying your flanks in case you should judge it
-necessary to retire.
-
-
-NOTE.
-
-This was the manœuvre practised by General Desaix, in 1798, near
-Radstadt. He made up for inferiority in numbers by audacity, and
-maintained himself the whole day in position in spite of the vigorous
-attacks of the Archduke Charles. At night he effected his retreat in
-good order, and took up a position in the rear.
-
-It was in accordance, also, with this principle, in the same campaign,
-that General Moreau gave battle at Biberach, to secure his retreat
-by the passes of the Black mountains. A few days after, he fought at
-Schliengen with the same object. Placed in a good defensive position,
-he menaced the Archduke Charles by a sudden return to the offensive,
-while his artillery and baggage were passing the Rhine by the bridge of
-Huningen, and he was making all the necessary arrangements for retiring
-behind that river himself.
-
-Here, however, I would observe, that the execution of such offensive
-demonstrations should be deferred always till toward the evening, in
-order that you may not be compromised by engaging too early in a combat
-which you cannot long maintain with success.
-
-Night, and the uncertainty of the enemy after an affair of this kind,
-will always favor your retreat, if it is judged necessary; but,
-with a view to mask the operation more effectually, fires should be
-lighted all along the lines, to deceive the enemy and prevent him from
-discovering this retrograde movement, for in a retreat it is a great
-advantage to gain a march upon your adversary.
-
-
-
-
-MAXIM XXIV.
-
-
-Never lose sight of this maxim: that you should establish your
-cantonments at the most distant and best-protected point from the
-enemy, especially where a surprise is possible. By this means you will
-have time to unite all your forces before he can attack you.
-
-
-NOTE.
-
-In the campaign of 1745, Marshal Turenne lost the battle of Marienthal,
-by neglecting this principle; for if, instead of reassembling his
-divisions at Erbsthausen, he had rallied his troops at Mergentheim,
-behind the Tauber, his army would have been much sooner reunited; and
-Count Merci, in place of finding only three thousand men to fight at
-Erbsthausen (of which he was well informed), would have had the whole
-French army to attack in a position covered by a river.
-
-Some one having indiscreetly asked Viscount Turenne how he had lost the
-battle of Marienthal: “By my own fault,” replied the marshal; “but,”
-added he, “when a man has committed no faults in war, he can only have
-been engaged in it but a short time.”
-
-
-
-
-MAXIM XXV.
-
-
-When two armies are in order of battle, and one has to retire over a
-bridge, while the other has the circumference of the circle open, all
-the advantages are in favor of the latter. It is then a general should
-show boldness, strike a decided blow, and manœuvre upon the flank of
-his enemy. The victory is in his hands.
-
-
-NOTE.
-
-This was the position of the French army at the famous battle of
-Leipzig, which terminated the campaign of 1813 so fatally for Napoleon;
-for the battle of Hanau was of no consequence, comparatively, in the
-desperate situation of that army.
-
-It strikes me that, in a situation like that of the French army
-previous to the battle of Leipzig, a general should never calculate
-upon any of those lucky chances which may arise out of a return to the
-offensive, but that he should rather adopt every possible means to
-secure his retreat. With this view, he should immediately cover himself
-with good entrenchments, to enable him to repel with inferior numbers
-the attack of the enemy, while his own equipments are crossing the
-river. As fast as the troops reach the other side, they should occupy
-positions to protect the passage of the rear guard, and this last
-should be covered by a _tête de pont_ as soon as the army breaks up its
-camp. During the wars of the Revolution, too little regard was paid
-to entrenchments; and it is for this reason we have seen large armies
-dispersed after a single reverse, and the fate of nations compromised
-by the issue of one battle.
-
-
-
-
-MAXIM XXVI.
-
-
-It is contrary to all true principle, to make corps, which have no
-communication with each other, act separately against a central force
-whose communications are cut off.
-
-
-NOTE.
-
-The Austrians lost the battle of Hohenlinden by neglecting this
-principle. The imperial army, under the orders of the archduke John,
-was divided into four columns, which had to march through an immense
-forest, previous to their junction in the plain of Anzing, where they
-intended to surprise the French. But these different corps, having no
-direct communication, found themselves compelled to engage separately
-with an enemy who had taken the precaution of concentrating his masses,
-and who could move them with facility in a country with which he had
-been long previously acquainted.
-
-Thus the Austrian army, enclosed in the defiles of the forest with its
-whole train of artillery and baggage, was attacked in its flanks and
-rear, and the archduke John was only enabled to rally his dispersed and
-shattered divisions under cover of the night.
-
-The trophies obtained by the French army on this day were immense. They
-consisted of eleven thousand prisoners, one hundred pieces of cannon,
-several stand of colors, and all the baggage of the enemy.
-
-The battle of Hohenlinden decided the fate of the campaign of 1800, and
-Moreau’s brilliant and well-merited success placed him in the rank of
-the first general of the age.
-
-
-
-
-MAXIM XXVII.
-
-
-When an army is driven from a first position, the retreating columns
-should rally always sufficiently in the rear, to prevent any
-interruption from the enemy. The greatest disaster that can happen, is
-when the columns are attacked in detail, and before their junction.
-
-
-NOTE.
-
-One great advantage which results from rallying your columns on a point
-far removed from the field of battle, or from the position previously
-occupied, is, that the enemy is uncertain as to the direction you mean
-to take.
-
-If he divides his force to pursue you, he exposes himself to see his
-detachments beaten in detail, especially if you have exerted all due
-diligence, and have effected the junction of your troops in sufficient
-time to get between his columns and disperse them one after the other.
-
-It was by a manœuvre of this kind in the campaign of Italy, in 1799,
-that General Melas gained the battle of Genola.
-
-General Championet commanded the French army, and endeavored to cut off
-the communication of the Austrians with Turin, by employing corps which
-manœuvred separately to get into their rear. Melas, who divined his
-project, made a retrograde march, by which he persuaded his adversary
-he was in full retreat, although the real object of his movement was
-to concentrate his forces at the point fixed for the junction of
-the different detachments of the French army, and which he beat and
-dispersed, one after another, by his great superiority in numbers. The
-result of this manœuvre, in which the Austrian general displayed vigor,
-decision, and foresight, secured to him the peaceable possession of
-Piedmont.
-
-It was also by the neglect of this principle that General Beaulieu, who
-commanded the Austro-Sardinian army in the campaign of 1796, lost the
-battle of Milesimo after that of Montenotte.
-
-His object, in endeavoring to rally his different corps upon Milesimo,
-was, to cover the high roads of Turin and Milan; but Napoleon, aware of
-the advantages arising from the ardor of troops emboldened by recent
-success, attacked him before he could assemble his divisions, and, by
-a series of skilful manœuvres, succeeded in separating the combined
-armies. They retired in the greatest disorder--the one by the road of
-Milan, the other by that of Turin.
-
-
-
-
-MAXIM XXVIII.
-
-
-No force should be detached on the eve of a battle, because affairs may
-change during the night, either by the retreat of the enemy, or by the
-arrival of large reinforcements to enable him to resume the offensive,
-and counteract your previous arrangements.
-
-
-NOTE.
-
-In 1796, the army of the Sambre and Meuse, commanded by General
-Jourdan, effected a retreat, which was rendered still more difficult
-by the loss of his line of communication. Seeing, however, that the
-forces of the archduke Charles were scattered, Jourdan, in order to
-accomplish his retreat upon Frankfort, resolved to open himself a way
-by Wurtzburg, where there were at that moment only two divisions of
-the Austrian army. This movement would have been attended with success,
-if the French general, believing he had simply these two divisions to
-contend with, had not committed the error of separating himself from
-the corps of Lefevre--which he left at Schweinfurt to cover the only
-direct communication of the army with its base of operation.
-
-The commission of this fault at the outset, added to some slowness in
-the march of the French general, secured the victory to the archduke,
-who hastened to concentrate his forces.
-
-The arrival of the two divisions, also, of Kray and Wartesleben, during
-the battle, enabled him to oppose fifty thousand men to the French
-army, which scarcely numbered thirty thousand combatants. This last
-was consequently beaten, and obliged to continue its retreat by the
-mountains of Fuldes, where the badness of the roads could be equalled
-only by the difficulty of the country.
-
-The division of Lefevre, amounting to fourteen thousand men, would,
-in all probability, have turned the scale in favor of Jourdan, had
-the latter not unfortunately conceived that two divisions only were
-opposing his passage to Wurtzburg.
-
-
-
-
-MAXIM XXIX.
-
-
-When you have resolved to fight a battle, collect your whole force.
-Dispense with nothing. A single battalion sometimes decides the day.
-
-
-NOTE.
-
-I think it here desirable to observe, that it is prudent before a
-battle to fix upon some point in rear of the reserve for the junction
-of the different detachments; for if, from unforeseen circumstances,
-these detachments should be prevented from joining before the action
-has commenced, they might be exposed, in case a retrograde movement
-should be found necessary, to the masses of the enemy. It is desirable
-also to keep the enemy in ignorance of these reinforcements, in order
-to employ them with greater effect. “A seasonable reinforcement,” says
-Frederick, “renders the success of a battle certain, because the enemy
-will always imagine it stronger than it really is, and lose courage
-accordingly.”
-
-
-
-
-MAXIM XXX.
-
-
-Nothing is so rash or so contrary to principle, as to make a flank
-march before an army in position, especially when this army occupies
-heights at the foot of which you are forced to defile.
-
-
-NOTE.
-
-It was by a neglect of this principle that Frederick was beaten at
-Kollin in the first campaign of 1757. Notwithstanding prodigies of
-valor, the Prussians lost fifteen thousand men and a great portion of
-their artillery, while the loss of the Austrians did not exceed five
-thousand men. The consequence of this battle was more unfortunate
-still, since it obliged the King of Prussia to raise the siege of
-Prague, and to evacuate Bohemia.
-
-It was also by making a flank march before the Prussian army, that the
-French lost the disgraceful battle of Rosbach.
-
-This imprudent movement was still more to be reprehended, because the
-Prince de Soubise, who commanded the French army, was so negligent as
-to manœuvre, without either advanced guards or flanking corps, in
-presence of the enemy. The result was, that his army, consisting of
-fifty thousand men, was beaten by six battalions and thirty squadrons.
-The French lost seven thousand men, twenty-seven standards, and a great
-number of cannon. The Prussians had only three hundred men disabled.
-
-Thus, by having forgotten this principle, _that a flank march is never
-to be made before an enemy in line of battle_, Frederick lost his army
-at Kollin; and Soubise, at Rosbach, lost both his army and his honor.
-
-
-
-
-MAXIM XXXI.
-
-
-When you determine to risk a battle, reserve to yourself every possible
-chance of success, more particularly if you have to deal with an
-adversary of superior talent; for if you are beaten, even in the midst
-of your magazines and your communications, wo to the vanquished!
-
-
-NOTE.
-
-“We should make war,” says Marshal Saxe, “without leaving anything
-to hazard, and in this especially consists the talent of a general.
-But when we have incurred the risk of a battle, we should know how to
-profit by the victory, and not merely content ourselves, according to
-custom, with possession of the field.”
-
-It was by neglecting to follow up the first success, that the Austrian
-army, after gaining the field of Marengo, saw itself compelled on the
-following day to evacuate the whole of Italy.
-
-General Melas, observing the French in retreat, left the direction
-of the movements of his army to the chief of his staff, and retired
-to Alexandria to repose from the fatigues of the day. Colonel Zach,
-equally convinced with his general that the French army was completely
-broken, and consisted only of fugitives, formed the divisions in column
-of route.
-
-By this arrangement, the imperial army prepared to enter upon its
-victorious march in a formation not less than three miles in depth.
-
-It was near four o’clock when General Desaix rejoined the French army
-with his division. His presence restored in some degree an equality
-between the contending forces; and yet Napoleon hesitated for a moment
-whether to resume the offensive, or to make use of this corps to secure
-his retreat. The ardor of the troops to return to the charge, decided
-his irresolution. He rode rapidly along the front of his divisions, and
-addressing the soldiers--“We have retired far enough for to-day,” said
-he; “you know I always sleep upon the field of battle!”
-
-The army, with unanimous shout, proclaimed to him a promise of
-victory. Napoleon resumed the offensive. The Austrian advance guard,
-panic-struck at the sight of a formidable and unbroken body presenting
-itself suddenly at a point where, a few moments before, only fugitives
-were to be seen, went to the right about, and carried disorder into the
-mass of its columns. Attacked immediately afterward, with impetuosity,
-in its front and flanks, the Austrian army was completely routed.
-
-Marshal Daun experienced nearly the same fate as General Melas, at the
-battle of Torgau, in the campaign of 1760.
-
-The position of the Austrian army was excellent. It had its left upon
-Torgau, its right on the plateau of Siptitz, and its front covered by a
-large sheet of water.
-
-Frederick proposed to turn its right in order to make an attack upon
-the rear. For this purpose he divided his army into two corps, the one
-under the orders of Ziethen, with instructions to attack in front,
-following the edge of the water; the other under his own immediate
-command, with which he set out to turn the right of the Austrians.
-But Marshal Daun having had intimation of the movements of the enemy,
-changed his front by countermarching, and was thus enabled to repel
-the attacks of Frederick, whom he obliged to retreat. The two corps
-of the Prussian army had been acting without communication. Ziethen,
-in the meantime, hearing the fire recede, concluded that the king had
-been beaten, and commenced a movement by his left in order to rejoin
-him; but falling in with two battalions of the reserve, the Prussian
-general profited by this reinforcement to resume the offensive.
-Accordingly he renewed the attack with vigor, got possession of the
-plateau of Siptitz, and soon after of the whole field of battle. The
-sun had already set when the King of Prussia received the news of this
-unexpected good fortune. He returned in all haste, took advantage of
-the night to restore order in his disorganized army, and the day after
-the battle occupied Torgau.
-
-Marshal Daun was receiving congratulations upon his victory, when he
-heard that the Prussians had resumed the offensive. He immediately
-commanded a retreat, and at daybreak the Austrians repassed the Elbe
-with the loss of twelve thousand men, eight thousand prisoners, and
-forty-five pieces of cannon.
-
-After the battle of Marengo, General Melas, although in the midst
-of his fortresses and magazines, saw himself compelled to abandon
-everything, in order to save the wreck of his army.
-
-General Mack capitulated after the battle of Ulm, although in the
-centre of his own country.
-
-The Prussians, in spite of their depôts and reserves, were obliged,
-after the battle of Jena, and the French after that of Waterloo, to lay
-down their arms.
-
-Hence, we may conclude that the misfortune that results from the loss
-of a battle, does not consist so much in the destruction of men and of
-_materiel_ as in the discouragement which follows this disaster. The
-courage and confidence of the victors augment in proportion as those
-of the vanquished diminish; and whatever may be the resources of an
-army, it will be found that a retreat will degenerate rapidly into a
-rout unless the general-in-chief shall succeed, by combining boldness
-with skill, and perseverance with firmness, in restoring the _morale_
-of his army.
-
-
-
-
-MAXIM XXXII.
-
-
-The duty of an advanced guard does not consist in advancing or
-retiring, but in manœuvring. An advanced guard should be composed
-of light cavalry, supported by a reserve of heavy cavalry, and by
-battalions of infantry, supported also by artillery. An advanced guard
-should consist of picked troops, and the general officers, officers
-and men, should be selected for their respective capabilities and
-knowledge. A corps deficient in instruction is only an embarrassment to
-an advanced guard.
-
-
-NOTE.
-
-It was the opinion of Frederick that an advanced guard should be
-composed of detachments of troops of all arms. The commander should
-possess skill in the choice of ground, and he should take care to be
-instantly informed, by means of numerous patrols, of everything passing
-in the enemy’s camp.
-
-In war, it is not the business of an advanced guard to fight, but to
-observe the enemy, in order to cover the movements of the army. When in
-pursuit, the advanced guard should charge with vigor, and cut off the
-baggage and insulated corps of the retiring enemy. For this purpose, it
-should be reinforced with all the disposable light cavalry of the army.
-
-
-
-
-MAXIM XXXIII.
-
-
-It is contrary to the usages of war to allow parks or batteries of
-artillery to enter a defile, unless you hold the other extremity. In
-case of retreat, the guns will embarrass your movements and be lost.
-They should be left in position, under a sufficient escort, until you
-are master of the opening.
-
-
-NOTE.
-
-Nothing encumbers the march of an army so much as a quantity of
-baggage. In the campaign of 1796, Napoleon abandoned his battering
-train under the walls of Mantua, after spiking the guns and destroying
-the carriages. By this sacrifice, he acquired a facility of manœuvring
-rapidly his little army, and obtained the initiative as well as a
-general superiority over the numerous but divided forces of Marshal
-Wurmser.
-
-In 1799, during his retreat in Italy, General Moreau being compelled
-to manœuvre among the mountains, preferred separating himself entirely
-from his reserve artillery, which he directed upon France by the Col
-de Fenestrelle, rather than embarrass his march with this part of his
-equipment.
-
-These are the examples we should follow; for if, by a rapidity of
-march, and a facility of concentration upon decisive points, the
-victory is gained, the _materiel_ of an army is soon re-established.
-But if, on the other hand, we are beaten and compelled to retreat, it
-will be difficult to save our equipments, and we may have reason to
-congratulate ourselves that we abandoned them in time to prevent them
-from augmenting the trophies of the enemy.
-
-
-
-
-MAXIM XXXIV.
-
-
-It should be laid down as a principle, never to leave intervals by
-which the enemy can penetrate between corps formed in order of battle,
-unless it be to draw him into a snare.
-
-
-NOTE.
-
-In the campaign of 1757, the Prince of Lorraine, who was covering
-Prague with the Austrian army, perceived the Prussians threatening, by
-a flank movement, to turn his right. He immediately ordered a partial
-change of front by throwing back the infantry of that wing, so as to
-form a right angle with the rest of the line. But this manœuvre being
-executed in presence of the enemy, was not effected without some
-disorder. The heads of the columns having marched too quick, caused
-the rear to lengthen out, and when the line was formed to the right,
-a large interval appeared at the salient angle. Frederick, observing
-this error, hastened to take advantage of it. He directed his centre
-corps, commanded by the Duke of Bevern, to throw itself into this
-opening, and by this manœuvre decided the fate of the battle.
-
-The Prince of Lorraine returned to Prague, beaten and pursued, with the
-loss of sixteen thousand men and two hundred pieces of cannon.
-
-It should be observed at the same time, that this operation of throwing
-a corps into the intervals made by an army in time of battle, should
-never be attempted unless you are at least equal in force, and have
-an opportunity of outflanking the enemy on the one side or the other;
-for it is then only you can hope to divide his army in the centre, and
-insulate the wings entirely. If you are inferior in number, you run the
-risk of being stopped by the reverses, and overpowered by the enemy’s
-wings, which may deploy upon your flanks and surround you.
-
-It was by this manœuvre that the Duke of Berwick gained the battle of
-Almanza, in the year 1707, in Spain.
-
-The Anglo-Portuguese army, under the command of Lord Galloway, came to
-invest Villena. Marshal Berwick, who commanded the French and Spanish
-army, quitted his camp at Montalegre, and moved upon this town to
-raise the siege. At his approach, the English general, eager to fight
-a battle, advanced to meet him in the plains of Almanza. The issue was
-long doubtful. The first line, commanded by the Duke of Popoli, having
-been broken, the Chevalier d’Asfeldt, who had charge of the second,
-drew up his masses with large intervals between them; and when the
-English, who were in pursuit of the first line, reached these reserves,
-he took advantage of their disorder to attack them in flank and
-defeated them entirely.
-
-Marshal Berwick, perceiving the success of this manœuvre, threw open
-his front, and deploying upon the enemy’s flanks, while the reserve
-sustained the attack in front, and the cavalry manœuvred in their rear,
-obtained a complete victory.
-
-Lord Galloway, wounded and pursued, collected with difficulty the
-remains of his army, and took shelter with them in Tortosa.
-
-
-
-
-MAXIM XXXV.
-
-
-Encampments of the same army should always be formed so as to protect
-each other.
-
-
-NOTE.
-
-At the battle of Dresden, in the campaign of 1813, the camp of the
-allies, although advantageously placed upon the heights on the left
-bank of the Elbe, was nevertheless extremely defective, from being
-traversed longitudinally by a deep ravine, which separated the left
-wing completely from the centre and the right. This vicious arrangement
-did not escape the penetrating eye of Napoleon. He instantly directed
-the whole of his cavalry and two corps of infantry against the
-insulated wing, attacked it with superior numbers, overthrew it, and
-took ten thousand prisoners, before it was possible to come to its
-support.
-
-
-
-
-MAXIM XXXVI.
-
-
-When the enemy’s army is covered by a river, upon which he holds
-several _têtes de pont_, do not attack in front. This would divide
-your force and expose you to be turned. Approach the river in echelon
-of columns, in such a manner that the leading column shall be the
-only one the enemy can attack, without offering you his flank. In
-the meantime, let your light troops occupy the bank, and when you
-have decided on the point of passage, rush upon it and fling across
-your bridge. Observe that the point of passage should be always at a
-distance from the leading echelon, in order to deceive the enemy.
-
-
-NOTE.
-
-If you occupy a town or a village on the bank of a river, opposite
-to that held by the enemy, it is an advantage to make this spot the
-crossing point, because it is easier to cover your carriages and
-reserve artillery, as well as to mask the construction of your bridge,
-in a town, than in the open country. It is also a great advantage
-to pass a river opposite a village, when the latter is only weakly
-occupied by the enemy; because as soon as the advanced guard reaches
-the other side, it carries this post, makes a lodgment, and by
-throwing up a few defensive works, converts it easily into a _tête de
-pont_. By this means, the rest of the army is enabled to effect the
-passage with facility.
-
-
-
-
-MAXIM XXXVII.
-
-
-From the moment you are master of a position which commands the
-opposite bank, facilities are acquired for effecting the passage of
-the river; above all, if this position is sufficiently extensive to
-place upon it artillery in force. This advantage is diminished, if
-the river is more than three hundred toises (or six hundred yards)
-in breadth, because the distance being out of the range of grape, it
-is easy for the troops which defend the passage to line the bank and
-get under cover. Hence it follows that if the grenadiers, ordered to
-pass the river for the protection of the bridge, should reach the
-other side, they would be destroyed by the fire of the enemy; because
-his batteries, placed at the distance of two hundred toises from the
-landing, are capable of a most destructive effect, although removed
-above five hundred toises from the batteries of the crossing force.
-Thus the advantage of the artillery would be exclusively his. For
-the same reason, the passage is impracticable, unless you succeed in
-surprising the enemy, and are protected by an intermediate island, or,
-unless you are able to take advantage of an angle in the river, to
-establish a crossfire upon his works. In this case, the island or angle
-forms a natural _tête de pont_, and gives the advantage in artillery to
-the attacking army.
-
-When a river is less than sixty toises (or one hundred and twenty
-yards) in breadth, and you have a post upon the other side, the troops
-which are thrown across derive such advantages from the protection of
-your artillery, that, however small the angle may be, it is impossible
-for the enemy to prevent the establishment of a bridge. In this case,
-the most skilful generals, when they have discovered the project of
-their adversary, and brought their own army to the point of crossing,
-usually content themselves with opposing the passage of the bridge, by
-forming a semicircle round its extremity, as round the opening of a
-defile, and removing to the distance of three or four hundred toises
-from the fire of the opposite side.
-
-
-NOTE.
-
-Frederick observes, that “the passage of great rivers in the presence
-of the enemy is one of the most delicate operations in war.” Success on
-these occasions depends on secrecy, on the rapidity of the manœuvres,
-and the punctual execution of the orders given for the movements of
-each division. To pass such an obstacle in presence of an enemy, and
-without his knowledge, it is necessary not only that the previous
-dispositions should be well conceived, but that they should be executed
-without confusion.
-
-In the campaign of 1705, Prince Eugene, of Savoy, wishing to come to
-the assistance of the Prince of Piedmont, sought for a favorable point
-at which to force the passage of the Adda, defended at that time by
-the French army, under the command of the Duke de Vendome.
-
-After having selected an advantageous situation, Prince Eugene erected
-a battery of twenty pieces of cannon on a position which commanded the
-entire of the opposite bank, and covered his infantry by a line of
-entrenched parallels constructed on the slope of the declivity.
-
-They were working vigorously at the bridge, when the Duke de Vendome
-appeared with his whole army. At first he seemed determined to oppose
-its construction, but after having examined the position of Prince
-Eugene, he judged this to be impracticable.
-
-He therefore placed his army out of reach of the prince’s batteries,
-resting both his wings upon the river, so as to form a bow, of which
-the Adda was the cord. He then covered himself with entrenchments and
-abattis, and was thus enabled to charge the enemy’s columns whenever
-they debouched from the bridge, and to beat them in detail.
-
-Eugene, having reconnoitred the position of the French, considered the
-passage impossible. He therefore withdrew the bridge, and broke up his
-camp during the night.
-
-It was by this manœuvre, also, that, in the campaign of 1809, the
-Archduke Charles compelled the French to reoccupy the isle of Lobau,
-after having debouched on the left bank of the Danube. The march of the
-Archduke Charles was wholly concentric. He menaced Grosaspern with his
-right, Esling with his centre, and Enzersdorf with his left.
-
-His army, with both wings resting on the Danube, formed a semicircle
-around Esling. Napoleon immediately attacked and broke the centre of
-the Austrians; but after having forced their first line, he found
-himself arrested by the reserves. In the meantime, the bridges upon
-the Danube had been destroyed, and several of his corps, with their
-parks of artillery, were still on the right bank. This disappointment,
-joined to the favorable position of the Austrians, decided Napoleon
-to re-enter the isle of Lobau, where he had previously constructed a
-line of field-works, so as to give it all the advantages of a well
-entrenched camp.
-
-
-
-
-MAXIM XXXVIII.
-
-
-It is difficult to prevent an enemy, supplied with pontoons, from
-crossing a river. When the object of an army, which defends the
-passage, is to cover a siege, the moment the general has ascertained
-his inability to oppose the passage, he should take measures to arrive
-before the enemy, at an intermediate position between the river he
-defends and the place he desires to cover.
-
-
-NOTE.
-
-Here we may observe, that this intermediate position should be
-reconnoitred, or rather, well entrenched beforehand; for the enemy will
-be unable to make an offensive movement against the corps employed in
-the siege, until he has beaten the army of observation; and the latter,
-under cover of its camp, may always await a favorable opportunity to
-attack him in flank or in rear.
-
-Besides, the army which is once entrenched in this manner, has the
-advantage of being concentrated; while that of the enemy must act in
-detachments, if he wishes to cover his bridge, and watch the movements
-of the army of observation, so as to enable him to attack the besieging
-corps in its lines, without being exposed to an attempt on his rear, or
-being menaced with the loss of his bridge.
-
-
-
-
-MAXIM XXXIX.
-
-
-In the campaign of 1645, Turenne was attacked with his army before
-Philipsburg by a very superior force. There was no bridge here over
-the Rhine, but he took advantage of the ground between the river and
-the place to establish his camp. This should serve as a lesson to
-engineer officers, not merely in the construction of fortresses, but
-of _têtes de pont_. A space should always be left between the fortress
-and the river, where an army may form and rally without being obliged
-to throw itself into the place, and thereby compromise its security.
-An army retiring upon Mayence before a pursuing enemy, is necessarily
-compromised; for this reason, because it requires more than a day to
-pass the bridge, and because the lines of Cassel are too confined to
-admit an army to remain there without being blocked up. Two hundred
-toises should have been left between that place and the Rhine. It
-is essential that all _têtes de pont_ before great rivers should be
-constructed upon this principle, otherwise they will prove a very
-inefficient assistance to protect the passage of a retreating army.
-_Têtes de pont_, as laid down in our schools, are of use only for small
-rivers, the passage of which is comparatively short.
-
-
-NOTE.
-
-Marshal Saxe, in the campaign of 1741, having passed the Moldau in
-quest of a detached corps of fourteen thousand men, which was about to
-throw itself into Prague, left a thousand infantry upon that river,
-with orders to entrench themselves upon a height directly opposite the
-_tête de pont_. By this precaution, the marshal secured his retreat,
-and also the facility of repassing the bridge without disorder, by
-rallying his divisions between the entrenched height and the _tête de
-pont_.
-
-Were these examples unknown to the generals of modern times, or are
-they disposed to think such precautions superfluous?
-
-
-
-
-MAXIM XL.
-
-
-Fortresses are equally useful in offensive and defensive warfare. It
-is true, they will not in themselves arrest an army, but they are an
-excellent means of retarding, embarrassing, weakening and annoying a
-victorious enemy.
-
-
-NOTE.
-
-The brilliant success of the allied armies in the campaign of 1814, has
-given to many military men a false idea of the real value of fortresses.
-
-The formidable bodies which crossed the Rhine and the Alps at this
-period, were enabled to spare large detachments to blockade the strong
-places that covered the frontiers of France, without materially
-affecting the numerical superiority of the army which marched upon the
-capital. This army was in a condition, therefore, to act, without the
-fear of being menaced in its line of retreat.
-
-But at no period of military history were the armies of Europe so
-combined before, or governed so entirely by one common mind in the
-attainment of a single object. Under these circumstances, the line of
-fortresses which surround France was rendered unavailable during the
-campaign; but it would be very imprudent, therefore, to conclude that
-a frontier guarded by numerous fortresses may be passed with impunity;
-or that battles may be fought with these places in your rear, without
-previously besieging, or at least investing them with sufficient forces.
-
-
-
-
-MAXIM XLI.
-
-
-There are only two ways of insuring the success of a siege. The first,
-to begin by beating the enemy’s army employed to cover the place,
-forcing it out of the field, and throwing its remains beyond some great
-natural obstacle, such as a chain of mountains, or large river. Having
-accomplished this object, an army of observation should be placed
-behind the natural obstacle, until the trenches are finished and the
-place taken.
-
-But if it be desired to take the place in presence of a relieving army,
-without risking a battle, then the whole _materiel_ and equipment for
-a siege are necessary to begin with, together with ammunition and
-provisions for the presumed period of its duration, and also lines of
-contravallation and circumvallation, aided by all the localities of
-heights, woods, marshes and inundations.
-
-Having no longer occasion to keep up communications with your depôts,
-it is now only requisite to hold in check the relieving army. For
-this purpose, an army of observation should be formed, whose business
-it is never to lose sight of that of the enemy, and which, while it
-effectually bars all access to the place, has always time enough to
-arrive upon his flanks or rear in case he should attempt to steal a
-march.
-
-It is to be remembered, too, that by profiting judiciously by the
-lines of contravallation, a portion of the besieging army will always
-be available in giving battle to the approaching enemy.
-
-Upon the same general principle, when a place is to be besieged in
-presence of an enemy’s army, it is necessary to cover the siege by
-lines of _circumvallation_.
-
-If the besieging force is of numerical strength enough (after leaving
-a corps before the place four times the amount of the garrison) to
-cope with the relieving army, it may remove more than one day’s march
-from the place; but if it be inferior in numbers after providing for
-the siege, as above stated, it should remain only a short day’s march
-from the spot, in order to fall back upon its lines, if necessary, or
-receive succor in case of attack.
-
-If the investing corps and army of observation are only equal when
-united to the relieving force, the besieging army should remain entire
-within, or near its lines, and push the works and the siege with the
-greatest activity.
-
-
-NOTE.
-
-“When we undertake a siege,” says Montécuculli, “we should not seek to
-place ourselves opposite the weakest part of the fortress, but at the
-point most favorable for establishing a camp and executing the designs
-we have in view.”
-
-This maxim was well understood by the Duke of Berwick. Sent to form
-the siege of Nice in 1706, he determined to attack on the side of
-Montalban, contrary to the advice of Vauban, and even to the orders
-of the king. Having a very small army at his disposal, he began by
-securing his camp. This he did by constructing redoubts upon the
-heights that shut in the space between the Var and the Paillon,
-two rivers which supported his flanks. By this means, he protected
-himself against a surprise; for the Duke of Savoy, having the power
-of debouching suddenly by the Col de Tende, it was necessary that
-the marshal should be enabled to assemble his forces, so as to move
-rapidly upon his adversary, and fight him before he got into position;
-otherwise his inferiority in numbers would have obliged him to raise
-the siege.
-
-When Marshal Saxe was besieging Brussels, with only twenty-eight
-thousand men, opposed to a garrison of twelve thousand, he received
-intelligence that the Prince of Waldeck was assembling his forces
-to raise the siege. Not being strong enough to form an army of
-observation, the marshal reconnoitred a field of battle on the little
-river Voluve, and made all the necessary dispositions for moving
-rapidly to the spot, in case of the approach of the enemy. By this
-means he was prepared to receive his adversary without discontinuing
-the operations of the siege.
-
-
-
-
-MAXIM XLII.
-
-
-Feuquière says that “we should never wait for the enemy in the lines
-of circumvallation, but we should go out and attack him.” He is in
-error. There is no authority in war without exception; and it would be
-dangerous to proscribe the principle of awaiting the enemy within the
-lines of circumvallation.
-
-
-NOTE.
-
-During the siege of Mons, in 1691, the Prince of Orange assembled
-his army, and advanced as far as Notre Dame de Halle, making a
-demonstration to succor the place. Louis XIV, who commanded the siege
-in person, called a council of war to deliberate on what was to be
-done in case the Prince of Orange approached. The opinion of Marshal
-Luxembourg was to remain within the lines of circumvallation, and that
-opinion prevailed.
-
-The marshal laid it down as a principle that, when the besieging army
-is not strong enough to defend the whole extent of circumvallation, it
-should quit the lines and advance to meet the enemy; but when it is
-strong enough to encamp in two lines around a place, that it is better
-to profit by a good entrenchment--more especially as by this means the
-siege is not interrupted.
-
-In 1658, Marshal Turenne was besieging Dunkirk. He had already opened
-the trenches, when the Spanish army, under the orders of the Prince Don
-Juan, Condé, and D’Hocquincourt, appeared in sight, and took post upon
-the Downs, at a distance of a league from his lines. Turenne had the
-superiority in numbers, and he determined to quit his entrenchments.
-He had other advantages also. The enemy was without artillery, and
-their superiority in cavalry was rendered useless by the unfavorable
-nature of the ground. It was, therefore, of great importance to beat
-the Spanish army before it had time to entrench itself and bring up its
-artillery. The victory gained by the French on this occasion justified
-all the combinations of Marshal Turenne.
-
-When Marshal Berwick was laying siege to Philipsburg, in 1733, he had
-reason to apprehend that the Prince of Savoy would attack him with
-all the forces of the empire before its termination. The marshal,
-therefore, after having made his disposition of the troops intended for
-the siege, formed, with the rest of his army, a corps of observation to
-make head against Prince Eugene, in case the latter should choose to
-attack him in his lines, or attempt a diversion on the Moselle or Upper
-Rhine. Prince Eugene, having arrived in front of the besieging army,
-some general officers were of opinion that it was better not to await
-the enemy in the lines, but to move forward and attack him. But Marshal
-Berwick, who agreed with the Duke of Luxembourg, that an army which
-can occupy, completely, good entrenchments is not liable to be forced,
-persisted in remaining within his works. The result proved that this
-was also the opinion of Prince Eugene, for he did not dare to attack
-the entrenchments, which he would not have failed to do if he had any
-hopes of success.
-
-
-
-
-MAXIM XLIII.
-
-
-Those who proscribe lines of circumvallation, and all the assistance
-which the science of the engineer can afford, deprive themselves
-gratuitously of an auxiliary which is never injurious, almost always
-useful, and often indispensable. It must be admitted, at the same time,
-that the principles of field-fortification require improvement. This
-important branch of the art of war has made no progress since the time
-of the ancients. It is even inferior at this day to what it was two
-thousand years ago. Engineer officers should be encouraged in bringing
-this branch of their art to perfection, and in placing it upon a level
-with the rest.
-
-
-NOTE.
-
-“If we are inferior in numbers,” says Marshal Saxe, “entrenchments
-are of no use, for the enemy will bring all his forces to bear upon
-particular points. If we are of equal strength they are unnecessary
-also. If we are superior, we do not want them. Then why give ourselves
-the trouble to entrench?” Notwithstanding this opinion of the inutility
-of entrenchments, Marshal Saxe often had recourse to them.
-
-In 1797, Generals Provéra and Hohenzollern having presented themselves
-before Mantua (where Marshal Wurmser was shut up), for the purpose of
-raising the siege, they were stopped by the lines of contravallation of
-St. George. This slight obstacle sufficed to afford Napoleon time to
-arrive from Rivoli and defeat their enterprise. It was in consequence
-of neglecting to entrench themselves that the French had been obliged
-to raise the siege in the preceding campaign.
-
-
-
-
-MAXIM XLIV.
-
-
-If circumstances prevent a sufficient garrison being left to defend
-a fortified town, which contains an hospital and magazines, at least
-every means should be employed to secure the citadel against a _coup
-de main_.
-
-
-NOTE.
-
-A few battalions dispersed about a town, inspire no terror; but shut
-up in the more narrow outline of a citadel, they assume an imposing
-attitude. For this reason it appears to me that such a precaution
-is always necessary, not only in fortresses, but wherever there are
-hospitals or depôts of any kind. Where there is no citadel, some
-quarter of the town should be fixed upon most favorable for defence,
-and entrenched in such a manner as to oppose the greatest resistance
-possible.
-
-
-
-
-MAXIM XLV.
-
-
-A fortified place can only protect the garrison and detain the enemy
-for a certain time. When this time has elapsed, and the defences of
-the place are destroyed, the garrison should lay down its arms. All
-civilized nations are agreed on this point, and there never has been
-an argument except with reference to the greater or less degree of
-defence which a governor is bound to make before he capitulates. At the
-same time, there are generals--Villars among the number--who are of
-opinion that a governor should never surrender, but that in the last
-extremity he should blow up the fortifications, and take advantage of
-the night to cut his way through the besieging army. Where he is unable
-to blow up the fortifications, he may always retire, they say, with his
-garrison, and save the men.
-
-Officers who have adopted this line of conduct, have often brought off
-three-fourths of their garrison.
-
-
-NOTE.
-
-In 1705, the French, who were besieged in Haguenau by Count Thungen,
-found themselves incapable of sustaining an assault. Péri, the
-governor, who had already distinguished himself by a vigorous defence,
-despairing of being allowed to capitulate on any terms short of
-becoming prisoner of war, resolved to abandon the place and cut his way
-through the besiegers.
-
-In order to conceal his intention more effectually, and while he
-deceived the enemy, to sound at the same time the disposition of his
-officers, he assembled a council of war and declared his resolution to
-die in the breach. Then, under pretext of the extremity to which he was
-reduced, he commanded the whole garrison under arms; and leaving only a
-few sharpshooters in the breach, gave the order to march, and set out
-in silence, under cover of the night, from Haguenau. This audacious
-enterprise was crowned with success, and Péri reached Saverne without
-having suffered the smallest loss.
-
-Two fine instances of defence in later times are those of Massena at
-Genoa, and of Palafox at Saragossa.
-
-The first marched out with arms and baggage, and all the honors of
-war, after rejecting every summons, and defending himself until hunger
-alone compelled him to capitulate. The second only yielded after having
-buried his garrison amid the ruins of the city, which he defended from
-house to house, until famine and death left him no alternative but to
-surrender. This siege, which was equally honorable to the French as
-to the Spaniards, is one of the most memorable in the history of war.
-In the course of it, Palafox displayed every possible resource which
-courage and obstinacy can supply in the defence of a fortress.
-
-All real strength is founded in the mind; and on this account I am of
-opinion that we should be directed in the choice of a governor, less by
-his genius than his personal character. His most essential qualities
-should be courage, perseverance, and soldierlike devotedness. Above
-all, he should possess the talent not only of infusing courage into
-the garrison, but of kindling a spirit of resistance in the whole
-population. Where the latter is wanting, however art may multiply the
-defences of a place, the garrison will be compelled to capitulate after
-having sustained the first, or at most, the second assault.
-
-
-
-
-MAXIM XLVI.
-
-
-The keys of a fortress are well worth the retirement of the garrison,
-when it is resolved to yield only on those conditions. On this
-principle it is always wiser to grant an honorable capitulation to a
-garrison which has made a vigorous resistance, than to risk an assault.
-
-
-NOTE.
-
-Marshal Villars has justly observed, that “no governor of a place
-should be permitted to excuse himself for surrendering, on the ground
-of wishing to preserve the king’s troops. Every garrison that displays
-courage will escape being prisoners of war. For there is no general
-who, however well assured of carrying a place by assault, will not
-prefer granting terms of capitulation rather than risk the loss of a
-thousand men in forcing determined troops to surrender.”
-
-
-
-
-MAXIM XLVII.
-
-
-Infantry, cavalry, and artillery, are nothing without each other;
-therefore, they should always be so disposed in cantonments as to
-assist each other in case of surprise.
-
-
-NOTE.
-
-“A general,” says Frederick, “should direct his whole attention to
-the tranquility of his cantonments, in order that the soldier may be
-relieved from all anxiety, and repose in security from his fatigues.
-With this view, care should be taken that the troops are able to form
-rapidly upon ground which has been previously reconnoitered; that the
-generals remain always with their divisions or brigades, and that the
-service is carried on throughout with exactness.”
-
-Marshal Saxe is of opinion that an army should not be in a hurry to
-quit its cantonments, but that it should wait till the enemy has
-exhausted himself with marching, and be ready to fall upon him with
-fresh troops when he is overcome with fatigue.
-
-I believe, however, that it would be dangerous to trust implicitly
-to this high authority, for there are many occasions where all the
-advantage lies in the initiative, more especially when the enemy has
-been compelled to extend his cantonments, from scarcity of subsistence,
-and can be attacked before he has time to concentrate his forces.
-
-
-
-
-MAXIM XLVIII.
-
-
-The formation of infantry in line should be always in two ranks,
-because the length of the musket only admits of an effective fire in
-this formation. The discharge of the third rank is not only uncertain,
-but frequently dangerous to the ranks in its front. In drawing up
-infantry in two ranks, there should be a supernumerary behind every
-fourth or fifth file. A reserve should likewise be placed twenty-five
-paces in rear of each flank.
-
-
-NOTE.
-
-I am of opinion, if circumstances require a line of infantry to resort
-to a square, that two-deep is too light a formation to resist the
-shock of cavalry. However useless the third rank may appear for the
-purpose of file-firing, it is, notwithstanding necessary, in order to
-replace the men who fall in the ranks in front; otherwise you would
-be obliged to close in the files, and by this means leave intervals
-between the companies, which the cavalry would not fail to penetrate.
-It appears to me, also, that when infantry is formed in two ranks, the
-columns will be found to open out in marching to a flank. If it should
-be considered advantageous behind entrenchments to keep the infantry
-in two ranks, the third rank should be placed in reserve, and brought
-forward to relieve the front rank when fatigued, or when the fire is
-observed to slacken. I am induced to make these remarks, because I have
-seen an excellent pamphlet which proposes the two-deep formation for
-infantry as the best. The author supports his opinion by a variety of
-plausible reasons, but not sufficient, as it appears to me, to answer
-all the objections that may be offered to this practice.
-
-
-
-
-MAXIM XLIX.
-
-
-The practice of mixing small bodies of infantry and cavalry together is
-a bad one, and attended with many inconveniences. The cavalry loses its
-power of action. It becomes fettered in all its movements. Its energy
-is destroyed; even the infantry itself is compromised, for on the
-first movement of the cavalry it is left without support. The best mode
-of protecting cavalry is to cover its flank.
-
-
-NOTE.
-
-This also was the opinion of Marshal Saxe. “The weakness of the above
-formation,” says he, “is sufficient in itself to intimidate the
-platoons of infantry, because they must be lost if the cavalry is
-beaten.”
-
-The cavalry, also, which depends on the infantry for succor, is
-disconcerted the moment a brisk forward movement carries them out of
-sight of their supports. Marshal Turenne, and the generals of his time,
-sometimes employed this order of formation; but that does not, in my
-opinion, justify a modern author for recommending it in an essay,
-entitled “_Considerations sur l’Art de la Guerre_.” In fact, this
-formation has long been abandoned; and, since the introduction of light
-artillery, it appears to me almost ridiculous to propose it.
-
-
-
-
-MAXIM L.
-
-
-Charges of cavalry are equally useful at the beginning, the middle, and
-the end of a battle. They should be made always, if possible, on the
-flanks of the infantry, especially when the latter is engaged in front.
-
-
-NOTE.
-
-The Archduke Charles, in speaking of cavalry, recommends that it should
-be brought in mass upon a decisive point, when the moment for employing
-it arrives; that is to say, when it can attack with a certainty of
-success. As the rapidity of its movement enables cavalry to act along
-the whole line in the same day, the general who commands it should
-keep it together as much as possible, and avoid dividing it into many
-detachments. When the nature of the ground admits of cavalry being
-employed on all points of the line, it is desirable to form it in
-column behind the infantry, and in a position whence it may be easily
-directed wherever it is required. If cavalry is intended to cover a
-position, it should be placed sufficiently in the rear to meet at full
-speed any advance of troops coming to attack that position. If it is
-destined to cover the flank of the infantry, it should, for the same
-reason, be placed directly behind it. As the object of cavalry is
-purely offensive, it should be a rule to form it at such a distance
-only from the point of collision as to enable it to acquire its utmost
-impulse, and arrive at the top of its speed into action. With respect
-to the cavalry reserve, this should only be employed at the end of a
-battle, either to render the success more decisive, or to cover the
-retreat. Napoleon remarks that, at the battle of Waterloo, the cavalry
-of the guard which composed the reserve, was engaged against his
-orders. He complains of having been deprived from five o’clock of the
-use of this reserve, which, when well employed, had so often insured
-him the victory.
-
-
-
-
-MAXIM LI.
-
-
-It is the business of cavalry to follow up the victory, and to prevent
-the beaten enemy from rallying.
-
-
-NOTE.
-
-Victor or vanquished, it is of the greatest importance to have a body
-of cavalry in reserve, either to take advantage of victory, or to
-secure a retreat. The most decisive battles lose half their value to
-the conqueror, when the want of cavalry prevents him from following up
-his success, and depriving the enemy of the power of rallying.
-
-When a retiring army is pursued, it is more especially upon the flanks
-that the weight of cavalry should fall, if you are strong enough in
-that arm to cut off his retreat.
-
-
-
-
-MAXIM LII.
-
-
-Artillery is more essential to cavalry than to infantry, because
-cavalry has no fire for its defence, but depends upon the sabre.
-It is to remedy this deficiency that recourse has been had to
-horse-artillery. Cavalry, therefore, should never be without cannon,
-whether when attacking, rallying, or in position.
-
-
-NOTE.
-
-Horse-artillery is an invention of Frederick. Austria lost no time in
-introducing it into her armies, although in an imperfect degree. It was
-only in 1792 that this arm was adopted in France, where it was brought
-rapidly to its present perfection.
-
-The services of this arm during the wars of the Revolution were
-immense. It may be said to have changed to a certain extent the
-character of tactics, because its facility of movement enables it to
-bear with rapidity on every point where artillery can be employed
-with success. Napoleon has remarked in his memoirs that a flanking
-battery which strikes and rakes the enemy obliquely, is capable of
-deciding a victory in itself. To this we may add that, independent of
-the advantages which cavalry derives from horse-artillery in securing
-its flanks, and in opening the way for a successful charge by the
-destructiveness of its fire, it is desirable that these two arms
-should never be separated, but ready at all times to seize upon points
-where it may be necessary to employ cannon. On these occasions, the
-cavalry masks the march of the artillery, protects its establishment in
-position, and covers it from the attack of the enemy, until it is ready
-to open its fire.
-
-
-
-
-MAXIM LIII.
-
-
-In march, or in position, the greater part of the artillery should
-be with the divisions of infantry and cavalry. The rest should be in
-reserve. Each gun should have with it three hundred rounds, without
-including the limber. This is about the complement for two battles.
-
-
-NOTE.
-
-The better infantry is, the more important it is to support it by
-artillery, with a view to its preservation.
-
-It is essential, also, that the batteries attached to divisions should
-march in the front, because this has a strong influence on the _morale_
-of the soldier. He attacks always with confidence when he sees the
-flanks of the column well covered with cannon.
-
-The artillery reserve should be kept for a decisive moment, and then
-employed in full force, for it will be difficult for the enemy at such
-a time to presume to attack it.
-
-There is scarcely an instance of a battery of sixty pieces of cannon
-having been carried by a charge of infantry or cavalry, unless where
-it was entirely without support, or in a position to be easily turned.
-
-
-
-
-MAXIM LIV.
-
-
-Artillery should always be placed in the most advantageous positions,
-and as far in front of the line of cavalry and infantry as possible,
-without compromising the safety of the guns.
-
-Field batteries should command the whole country round from the level
-of the platform. They should on no account be masked on the right and
-left, but have free range in every direction.
-
-
-NOTE.
-
-The battery of eighteen pieces of cannon, which covered the centre of
-the Russian army at the battle of La Moskwa (Borodino), may be cited as
-an example.
-
-Its position, upon a circular height which commanded the field in every
-direction, added so powerfully to its effect, that its fire alone
-sufficed, for a considerable time, to paralyze the vigorous attack
-made by the French with their right. Although twice broken, the left
-of the Russian army closed to this battery, as to a pivot, and twice
-recovered its former position. After repeated attacks, conducted with
-a rare intrepidity, the battery was at length carried by the French,
-but not till they had lost the _élite_ of their army, and with it the
-Generals Caulincourt and Montbrun. Its capture decided the retreat of
-the Russian left.
-
-I might advert likewise to another instance, in the campaign of 1809,
-and to the terrible effect produced by the hundred pieces of cannon of
-the Guard which General Lauriston directed, at the battle of Wagram,
-against the right of the Austrian army.
-
-
-
-
-MAXIM LV.
-
-
-A General should never put his army into cantonments, when he has the
-means of collecting supplies of forage and provisions, and of thus
-providing for the wants of the soldier in the field.
-
-
-NOTE.
-
-One great advantage which results from having an army in camp is,
-that it is easier to direct its spirit and maintain its discipline
-there. The soldier in cantonments abandons himself to repose; he ends
-by finding a pleasure in idleness, and in fearing to return to the
-field. The reverse takes place in a camp. There, a feeling of _ennui_,
-and a severer discipline, make him anxious for the opening of the
-campaign, to interrupt the monotony of the service and relieve it with
-the chances and variety of war. Besides, an army in camp is much more
-secure from a surprise than in cantonments--the defect of which usually
-consists in their occupying too great an extent of ground. When an army
-is obliged to go into quarters, the Marquis de Feuquière recommends
-a camp to be selected in front of the line, where the troops can be
-frequently assembled--sometimes suddenly, in order to exercise their
-vigilance, or for the sole purpose of bringing the different corps
-together.
-
-
-
-
-MAXIM LVI.
-
-
-A good general, a well-organized system, good instructions, and severe
-discipline, aided by effective establishments, will always make good
-troops, independently of the cause for which they fight.
-
-At the same time, a love of country, a spirit of enthusiasm, a sense of
-national honor, and fanaticism, will operate upon young soldiers with
-advantage.
-
-
-NOTE.
-
-This remark appears to me less applicable to officers than to soldiers,
-for as war is not a state of things natural to man, it follows
-that those who maintain its cause must be governed by some strong
-excitement. Much enthusiasm and devotedness are required on the part
-of the troops for the general who commands, to induce an army to
-perform great actions in a war in which it takes no interest. This is
-sufficiently proved by the apathy of auxiliaries, unless when inspired
-by the conduct of their chief.
-
-
-
-
-MAXIM LVII.
-
-
-When a nation is without establishments and a military system, it is
-very difficult to organize an army.
-
-
-NOTE.
-
-This is an unanswerable truth, more particularly with reference to an
-army intended to act upon the system of modern war, and in which order,
-precision, and rapidity of movement, are the principal essentials to
-success.
-
-
-
-
-MAXIM LVIII.
-
-
-The first qualification of a soldier is fortitude under fatigue and
-privation. Courage is only the second; hardship, poverty and want, are
-the best school for a soldier.
-
-
-NOTE.
-
-Valor belongs to the young soldier as well as to the veteran; but in
-the former it is more evanescent. It is only by habits of service, and
-after several campaigns, that the soldier acquires that moral courage
-which makes him support the fatigues and privations of war without a
-murmur. Experience by this time has instructed him to supply his own
-wants. He is satisfied with what he can procure, because he knows that
-success is only to be obtained by fortitude and perseverance. Well
-might Napoleon say that misery and want were the best school for a
-soldier; for as nothing could be compared with the total destitution
-of the army of the Alps, when he assumed the command, so nothing
-could equal the brilliant success which he obtained with this army
-in the first campaign in Italy. The conquerors of Montenotte, Lodi,
-Castiglione, Bassano, Arcole and Rivoli had beheld, only a few months
-before, whole battalions covered with rags, and deserting for the want
-of subsistence.
-
-
-
-
-MAXIM LIX.
-
-
-There are five things the soldier should never be without--his musket,
-his ammunition, his knapsack, his provisions (for at least four days),
-and his entrenching-tool. The knapsack may be reduced to the smallest
-size possible, if it be thought proper, but the soldier should always
-have it with him.
-
-
-NOTE.
-
-It is fortunate that Napoleon has recognized the advantage of giving
-to every soldier an entrenching-tool. His authority is the best answer
-to the ridicule which has been thrown upon those who proposed it. An
-axe will be found to inconvenience the foot-soldier as little as the
-sword he wears at his side, and it will be infinitely more useful. When
-axes are given out to companies, or are carried by fatigue-men during
-a campaign, they are soon lost; and it often happens, when a camp is
-to be formed, that a difficulty arises in cutting wood and building
-huts for the soldier; whereas, by making the axe a part of every man’s
-appointments, he is obliged to have it always with him; and whether
-the object be to entrench himself in a village, or to erect huts in a
-camp, the commander of a corps will speedily see the advantage of this
-innovation.
-
-When once the axe has been generally adopted, we shall, perhaps,
-see the desirability of issuing pickaxes and shovels to particular
-companies, and also the benefit of more frequent entrenchments. It is
-more particularly during retreats that it is important to entrench when
-the army has reached a good position; for an entrenched camp not only
-furnishes the means of rallying troops which are pursued, but if it be
-fortified in such a manner as to render the issue of an attack doubtful
-to the enemy, it will not only sustain the _morale_ of the soldier in
-the retreat, but afford the general-in-chief opportunities for resuming
-the offensive, and profiting by the first false movement on the part of
-his adversary. It will be recollected how Frederick, in the campaign of
-1761, when surrounded by two Russian and Austrian armies, whose united
-force was quadruple his own, saved his army by entrenching himself in
-the camp of Buntzalvitz.
-
-
-
-
-MAXIM LX.
-
-
-Every means should be taken to attach the soldier to his colors. This
-is best accomplished by showing consideration and respect to the old
-soldier. His pay likewise should increase with his length of service.
-It is the height of injustice not to pay a veteran more than a recruit.
-
-
-NOTE.
-
-Some modern writers have recommended, on the other hand, to limit the
-period of service, in order to bring the whole youth of a country
-successively under arms. By this means they purpose to have the levies,
-_en masse_, all ready trained and capable of resisting successfully
-a war of invasion. But however advantageous at first sight such a
-military system may appear, I believe it will be found to have many
-objections.
-
-In the first place, the soldier fatigued with the minutiæ of discipline
-in a garrison, will not feel much inclined to re-enlist after he has
-received his discharge, more especially since, having served the
-prescribed time, he will consider himself to have fulfilled all the
-duties of a citizen to his country. Returning to his friends, he will
-probably marry, or establish himself in a trade. From that moment his
-military spirit declines, and he soon becomes ill adapted to the
-business of war. On the contrary, the soldier who serves long, becomes
-attached to his regiment as to a new family. He submits to the yoke of
-discipline, accustoms himself to the privations his situation imposes,
-and ends by finding his condition agreeable. There are few officers
-that have seen service who have not discovered the difference between
-old and young soldiers, with reference to their power of supporting
-the fatigues of a long campaign, to the determined courage that
-characterizes the attack, or to the ease with which they rally after
-being broken.
-
-Montécuculli observes, that “it takes time to discipline an army; more
-to inure it to war; and still more to constitute veterans.” For this
-reason, he recommends that great consideration should be shown to old
-soldiers; that they should be carefully provided for, and a large
-body of them kept always on foot. It seems to me, also, that it is
-not enough to increase the pay of the soldier according to his period
-of service, but that it is highly essential to confer on him some
-mark of distinction that shall secure to him privileges calculated to
-encourage him to grow gray under arms, and, above all, to do so with
-honor.
-
-
-
-
-MAXIM LXI.
-
-
-It is not set speeches at the moment of battle that render soldiers
-brave. The veteran scarcely listens to them, and the recruit forgets
-them at the first discharge. If discourses and harangues are useful, it
-is during the campaign: to do away unfavorable impressions, to correct
-false reports, to keep alive a proper spirit in the camp, and to
-furnish materials and amusement for the bivouac. All printed orders of
-the day should keep in view these objects.
-
-
-NOTE.
-
-The opinion of the general-in-chief, energetically expressed, is,
-notwithstanding, productive of great effect on the _morale_ of the
-soldier.
-
-In 1703, at the attack of Hornbec, Marshal Villars, seeing the troops
-advancing without spirit, threw himself at their head: “What!” said
-he, “is it expected that I, a marshal of France, should be the first to
-escalade, when I order YOU to attack?”
-
-These few words rekindled their ardor; officers and soldiers rushed
-upon the works, and the town was taken almost without loss.
-
-“We have retired far enough for to-day; you know I always sleep upon
-the field of battle!” said Napoleon, as he flew through the ranks
-at the moment of resuming the offensive at Marengo. These few words
-sufficed to revive the courage of the soldiers, and to make them forget
-the fatigues of the day, during which almost every man had been engaged.
-
-
-
-
-MAXIM LXII.
-
-
-Tents are unfavorable to health. The soldier is best when he bivouacs,
-because he sleeps with his feet to the fire, which speedily dries the
-ground on which he lies. A few planks, or a little straw, shelter him
-from the wind.
-
-On the other hand, tents are necessary for the superior officers, who
-have to write and to consult their maps. Tents should, therefore,
-be issued to these, with directions to them never to sleep in a
-house. Tents are always objects of observation to the enemy’s staff.
-They afford information in regard to your numbers and the ground you
-occupy; while an army bivouacking in two or three lines, is only
-distinguishable from afar by the smoke which mingles with the clouds.
-It is impossible to count the number of the fires.
-
-
-NOTE.
-
-The acknowledged advantage of bivouacking is another reason for
-adding an entrenching-tool to the equipment of the soldier; for, with
-the assistance of the axe and shovel, he can hut himself without
-difficulty. I have seen huts erected with the branches of trees,
-covered with turf, where the soldier was perfectly sheltered from the
-cold and wet, even in the worst season.
-
-
-
-
-MAXIM LXIII.
-
-
-All information obtained from prisoners should be received with
-caution, and estimated at its real value. A soldier seldom sees
-anything beyond his company; and an officer can afford intelligence of
-little more than the position and movements of the division to which
-his regiment belongs. On this account, the general of an army should
-never depend upon the information derived from prisoners, unless it
-agrees with the reports received from the advanced guards, in reference
-to the position, etc., of the enemy.
-
-
-NOTE.
-
-Montécuculli wisely observes that “prisoners should be interrogated
-separately, in order to ascertain, by the agreement in their answers,
-how far they may be endeavoring to mislead you.” Generally speaking,
-the information required from officers who are prisoners, should have
-reference to the strength and resources of the enemy, and sometimes to
-his localities and position. Frederick recommends that prisoners should
-be menaced with instant death if they are found attempting to deceive
-by false reports.
-
-
-
-
-MAXIM LXIV.
-
-
-Nothing is so important in war as an undivided command; for this
-reason, when war is carried on against a single power, there should be
-only one army, acting upon one base, and conducted by one chief.
-
-
-NOTE.
-
-“Success,” says the Archduke Charles, “is only to be obtained by
-simultaneous efforts, directed upon a given point, sustained with
-constancy, and executed with decision.” It rarely happens that any
-number of men who desire the same object are perfectly agreed as to the
-means of attaining it; and if the will of one individual is not allowed
-to predominate, there can be no _ensemble_ in the execution of their
-operations; neither will they attain the end proposed. It is useless to
-confirm this maxim by examples. History abounds in them.
-
-Prince Eugene and Marlborough would never have been so successful in
-the campaigns which they directed in concert, if a spirit of intrigue
-and difference of opinion had not constantly disorganized the armies
-opposed to them.
-
-
-
-
-MAXIM LXV.
-
-
-The same consequences which have uniformly attended long discussions
-and councils of war, will follow at all times. They will terminate
-in the adoption of the worst course, which in war is always the most
-timid, or, if you will, the most prudent. The only true wisdom in a
-general is determined courage.
-
-
-NOTE.
-
-Prince Eugene used to say that councils of war “are only useful when
-you want an excuse for attempting _nothing_.” This was also the opinion
-of Villars. A general-in-chief should avoid, therefore, assembling
-a council on occasions of difficulty, and should confine himself to
-consulting separately his most experienced generals in order to benefit
-by their advice, while he is governed at the same time in his decision
-by his own judgment. By this means, he becomes responsible, it is true,
-for the measures he pursues; but he has the advantage also of acting
-upon his own conviction, and of being certain that the secret of his
-operations will not be divulged, as is usually the case where it is
-discussed by a council of war.
-
-
-
-
-MAXIM LXVI.
-
-
-In war, the general alone can judge of certain arrangements. It depends
-on him alone to conquer difficulties by his own superior talents and
-resolution.
-
-
-NOTE.
-
-The officer who obeys, whatever may be the nature or extent of his
-command, will always stand excused for executing implicitly the
-orders which have been given to him. This is not the case with the
-general-in-chief, on whom the safety of the army and the success of the
-campaign depend. Occupied, without intermission, in the whole process
-of observation and reflection, it is easy to conceive that he will
-acquire by degrees a solidity of judgment which will enable him to see
-things in a clearer and more enlarged point of view than his inferior
-generals.
-
-Marshal Villars, in his campaigns, acted almost always in opposition
-to the advice of his generals, and he was almost always fortunate.
-So true it is, that a general, who feels confident in his talent for
-command, must follow the dictates of his own genius if he wishes to
-achieve success.
-
-
-
-
-MAXIM LXVII.
-
-
-To authorize generals or other officers to lay down their arms in
-virtue of a particular capitulation, under any other circumstances
-than when they are composing the garrison of a fortress, affords a
-dangerous latitude. It is destructive of all military character in a
-nation to open such a door to the cowardly, the weak, or even to the
-misdirected brave. Great extremities require extraordinary resolution.
-The more obstinate the resistance of an army, the greater the chances
-of assistance or of success.
-
-How many seeming impossibilities have been accomplished by men whose
-only resource was death!
-
-
-NOTE.
-
-In the campaign of 1759, Frederick directed General Fink, with eighteen
-thousand men, upon Maxen, for the purpose of cutting off the Austrian
-army from the defiles of Bohemia. Surrounded by twice his numbers, Fink
-capitulated after a sharp action, and fourteen thousand men laid down
-their arms. This conduct was the more disgraceful, because General
-Winch, who commanded the cavalry, cut his way through the enemy. The
-whole blame of the surrender fell, therefore, upon Fink, who was
-tried afterward by a court-martial, and sentenced to be cashiered and
-imprisoned for two years.
-
-In the campaign of Italy in 1796, the Austrian General Provéra
-capitulated with two thousand men in the castle of Cossaria.
-Subsequently, at the battle of La Favorite, the same general
-capitulated with a corps of six thousand men. I scarcely dare to revert
-to the shameful defection of General Mack in the capitulation of Ulm
-in 1805, where thirty thousand Austrians laid down their arms--when we
-have seen, during the wars of the Revolution, so many generals open
-themselves a way by a vigorous effort through the enemy, supported only
-by a few battalions.
-
-
-
-
-MAXIM LXVIII.
-
-
-There is no security for any sovereign, for any nation, or for any
-general, if officers are permitted to capitulate in the open field,
-and to lay down their arms in virtue of conditions favorable to the
-contracting party, but contrary to the interests of the army at large.
-To withdraw from danger, and thereby to involve their comrades in
-greater peril, is the height of cowardice. Such conduct should be
-proscribed, declared infamous, and made punishable with death. All
-generals, officers and soldiers, who capitulate in battle to save their
-own lives, should be decimated.
-
-He who gives the order, and those who obey, are alike traitors, and
-deserve capital punishment.
-
-
-NOTE.
-
-Soldiers, who are almost always ignorant of the designs of their
-chief, cannot be responsible for his conduct. If he orders them to
-lay down their arms, they must do so; otherwise they fail in that law
-of discipline which is more essential to an army than thousands of
-men. It appears to me, therefore, under these circumstances, that the
-chiefs alone are responsible, and liable to the punishment due to their
-cowardice. We have no example of soldiers being wanting in their duty
-in the most desperate situations, where they are commanded by officers
-of approved resolution.
-
-
-
-
-MAXIM LXIX.
-
-
-There is but one honorable mode of becoming prisoner of war. That
-is, by being taken separately; by which is meant, by being cut off
-entirely, and when we can no longer make use of our arms. In this case,
-there can be no conditions, for honor can impose none. We yield to an
-irresistible necessity.
-
-
-NOTE.
-
-There is always time enough to surrender prisoner of war. This should
-be deferred, therefore, till the last extremity. And here I may be
-permitted to cite an example of rare obstinacy in defence, which has
-been related to me by ocular witnesses. The captain of grenadiers,
-Dubrenil, of the thirty-seventh regiment of the line, having been
-sent on detachment with his company, was stopped on the march by a
-large party of Cossacks, who surrounded him on every side. Dubrenil
-formed his little force into square, and endeavored to gain the skirts
-of a wood (within a few muskets’ shot of the spot where he had been
-attacked), and reached it with very little loss. But as soon as the
-grenadiers saw this refuge secured to them, they broke and fled,
-leaving their captain and a few brave men, who were resolved not to
-abandon him, at the mercy of the enemy. In the meantime, the fugitives,
-who had rallied in the depth of the wood, ashamed of having forsaken
-their leader, came to the resolution of rescuing him from the enemy,
-if a prisoner, or of carrying off his body if he had fallen. With this
-view, they formed once more upon the outskirts, and opening a passage
-with their bayonets through the cavalry, penetrated to their captain,
-who, notwithstanding seventeen wounds, was defending himself still.
-They immediately surrounded him, and regained the wood with little
-loss. Such examples are not rare in the wars of the Revolution, and
-it were desirable to see them collected by some contemporary, that
-soldiers might learn how much is to be achieved in war by determined
-energy and sustained resolution.
-
-
-
-
-MAXIM LXX.
-
-
-The conduct of a general in a conquered country is full of
-difficulties. If severe, he irritates and increases the number of his
-enemies. If lenient, he gives birth to expectations which only render
-the abuses and vexations, inseparable from war, the more intolerable.
-A victorious general must know how to employ severity, justice and
-mildness by turns, if he would allay sedition or prevent it.
-
-
-NOTE.
-
-Among the Romans, generals were only permitted to arrive at the command
-of armies after having exercised the different functions of the
-magistracy. Thus by a previous knowledge of administration, they were
-prepared to govern the conquered provinces with all that discretion
-which a newly-acquired power, supported by arbitrary force, demands.
-
-In the military institutions of modern times, the generals, instructed
-only in what concerns the operation of strategy and tactics, are
-obliged to intrust the civil departments of the war to inferior agents,
-who, without belonging to the army, render all those abuses and
-vexations, inseparable from its operations, still more intolerable.
-
-This observation, which I do little more than repeat, seems to me,
-notwithstanding, deserving of particular attention; for if the leisure
-of general officers was directed in time of peace to the study of
-diplomacy--if they were employed in the different embassies which
-sovereigns send to foreign courts--they would acquire a knowledge of
-the laws and of the government of these countries, in which they may
-be called hereafter to carry on the war. They would learn also to
-distinguish those points of interest on which all treaties must be
-based, which have for their object the advantageous termination of a
-campaign. By the aid of this information they would obtain certain
-and positive results, since all the springs of action, as well as the
-machinery of war, would be in their hands. We have seen Prince Eugene,
-and Marshal Villars, each fulfilling with equal ability the duties of a
-general and a negotiator.
-
-When an army which occupies a conquered province observes strict
-discipline, there are few examples of insurrection among the people,
-unless indeed resistance is provoked (as but too often happens), by the
-exactions of inferior agents employed in the civil administration.
-
-It is to this point, therefore, that the general-in-chief should
-principally direct his attention, in order that the contributions
-imposed by the wants of the army may be levied with impartiality; and
-above all, that they may be applied to their true object, instead of
-serving to enrich the collectors, as is ordinarily the case.
-
-
-
-
-MAXIM LXXI.
-
-
-Nothing can excuse a general who takes advantage of the knowledge
-acquired in the service of his country, to deliver up her frontier and
-her towns to foreigners. This is a crime reprobated by every principle
-of religion, morality and honor.
-
-
-NOTE.
-
-Ambitious men who, listening only to their passions, arm natives of
-the same land against each other (under the deceitful pretext of
-the public good), are still more criminal. For however arbitrary a
-government, the institutions which have been consolidated by time, are
-always preferable to civil war, and to that anarchy which the latter is
-obliged to create for the justification of its crimes.
-
-To be faithful to his sovereign, and to respect the established
-government, are the first principles which ought to distinguish a
-soldier and a man of honor.
-
-
-
-
-MAXIM LXXII.
-
-
-A general-in-chief has no right to shelter his mistakes in war under
-cover of his sovereign, or of a minister, when these are both distant
-from the scene of operation, and must consequently be either ill
-informed or wholly ignorant of the actual state of things.
-
-Hence, it follows, that every general is culpable who undertakes the
-execution of a plan which he considers faulty. It is his duty to
-represent his reasons, to insist upon a change of plan, in short, to
-give in his resignation, rather than allow himself to be made the
-instrument of his army’s ruin. Every general-in-chief who fights a
-battle in consequence of superior orders, with the certainty of losing
-it, is equally blamable.
-
-In this last-mentioned case, the general ought to refuse obedience;
-because a blind obedience is due only to a military command given
-by a superior present on the spot at the moment of action. Being in
-possession of the real state of things, the superior has it then in his
-power to afford the necessary explanations to the person who executes
-his orders.
-
-But supposing a general-in-chief to receive positive order from
-his sovereign, directing him to fight a battle, with the further
-injunction, to yield to his adversary, and allow himself to be
-defeated--ought he to obey it? No. If the general should be able to
-comprehend the meaning or utility of such an order, he should execute
-it; otherwise he should refuse to obey it.
-
-
-NOTE.
-
-In the campaign of 1697, Prince Eugene caused the courier to be
-intercepted, who was bringing him orders from the emperor forbidding
-him to hazard a battle, for which everything had been prepared, and
-which he foresaw would prove decisive. He considered, therefore,
-that he did his duty in evading the orders of his sovereign; and the
-victory of Zanta, in which the Turks lost about thirty thousand men,
-and four thousand prisoners, rewarded his audacity. In the meantime,
-notwithstanding the immense advantages which accrued from this victory
-to the imperial arms, Eugene was disgraced on his arrival at Vienna.
-
-In 1793, General Hoche, having received orders to move upon Treves with
-an army harassed by constant marches in a mountainous and difficult
-country, refused to obey. He observed, with reason, that in order to
-obtain possession of an unimportant fortress, they were exposing his
-army to inevitable ruin. He caused, therefore, his troops to return
-into winter quarters, and preferred the preservation of his army, upon
-which the success of the future campaign depended, to his own safety.
-Recalled to Paris, he was thrown into a dungeon, which he only quitted
-on the downfall of Robespierre.
-
-I dare not decide if such examples are to be imitated; but it seems to
-me highly desirable that a question so new and so important, should be
-discussed by men who are capable of determining its merits.
-
-
-
-
-MAXIM LXXIII.
-
-
-The first qualification in a general-in-chief is a cool head--that
-is, a head which receives just impressions, and estimates things and
-objects at their real value. He must not allow himself to be elated by
-good news, or depressed by bad.
-
-The impressions he receives either successively or simultaneously in
-the course of the day, should be so classed as to take up only the
-exact place in his mind which they deserve to occupy; since it is upon
-a just comparison and consideration of the weight due to different
-impressions, that the power of reasoning and of right judgment depends.
-
-Some men are so physically and morally constituted as to see everything
-through a highly-colored medium. They raise up a picture in the mind on
-every slight occasion, and give to every trivial occurrence a dramatic
-interest. But whatever knowledge, or talent, or courage, or other good
-qualities such men may possess, nature has not formed them for the
-command of armies, or the direction of great military operations.
-
-
-NOTE.
-
-“The first quality in a general-in-chief,” says Montécuculli, “is a
-great knowledge of the art of war. This is not intuitive, but the
-result of experience. A man is not born a commander. He must become
-one. Not to be anxious; to be always cool; to avoid confusion in his
-commands; never to change countenance; to give his orders in the midst
-of battle with as much composure as if he were perfectly at ease. These
-are the proofs of valor in a general.
-
-“To encourage the timid; to increase the number of the truly brave; to
-revive the drooping ardor of the troops in battle; to rally those who
-are broken; to bring back to the charge those who are repulsed; to find
-resources in difficulty, and success even amid disaster; to be ready at
-a moment to devote himself, if necessary, for the welfare of the state.
-These are the actions which acquire for a general distinction and
-renown.”
-
-To this enumeration may be added, the talent of discriminating
-character, and of employing every man in the particular post which
-nature has qualified him to fill. “My principal attention,” said
-Marshal Villars, “was always directed to the study of the younger
-generals. Such a one I found, by the boldness of his character, fit
-to lead a column of attack; another, from a disposition naturally
-cautious, but without being deficient in courage, more perfectly to
-be relied on for the defence of a country.” It is only by a just
-application of these personal qualities to their respective objects,
-that it is possible to command success in war.
-
-
-
-
-MAXIM LXXIV.
-
-
-The leading qualifications which should distinguish an officer selected
-for the head of the staff, are, to know the country thoroughly; to
-be able to conduct a _reconnoissance_ with skill; to superintend the
-transmission of orders promptly; to lay down the most complicated
-movements intelligibly, but in a few words, and with simplicity.
-
-
-NOTE.
-
-Formerly, the duties of the chiefs of the staff were confined to the
-necessary preparations for carrying the plan of the campaign, and
-the operations resolved on by the general-in-chief, into effect.
-In a battle, they were only employed in directing movements and
-superintending their execution. But in the late wars, the officers
-of the staff were frequently intrusted with the command of a column
-of attack, or of large detachments, when the general-in-chief feared
-to disclose the secret of his plans by the transmission of orders or
-instructions. Great advantages have resulted from this innovation,
-although it was long resisted. By this means, the staff have been
-enabled to perfect their theory by practice, and they have acquired,
-moreover, the esteem of the soldiers and junior officers of the
-line, who are easily led to think lightly of their superiors, whom
-they do not see fighting in the ranks. The generals who have held
-the arduous situation of chief of the staff during the wars of the
-Revolution, have almost always been employed in the different branches
-of the profession. Marshal Berthier, who filled so conspicuously this
-appointment to Napoleon, was distinguished by all the essentials of a
-general. He possessed calm, and at the same time brilliant courage,
-excellent judgment, and approved experience. He bore arms during half
-a century, made war in the four quarters of the globe, opened and
-terminated thirty-two campaigns. In his youth he acquired, under the
-eye of his father, who was an engineer officer, the talent of tracing
-plans and finishing them with exactness, as well as the preliminary
-qualifications necessary to form a staff-officer. Admitted by the
-Prince de Lambesq into his regiment of dragoons, he was taught the
-skilful management of his horse and his sword--accomplishments so
-important to a soldier. Attached afterward to the staff of Count
-Rochambeau, he made his first campaign in America, where he soon began
-to distinguish himself by his valor, activity and talents. Having at
-length attained superior rank in the staff-corps formed by Marshal de
-Segur, he visited the camps of the King of Prussia, and discharged the
-duties of chief of the staff under the Baron de Bezenval.
-
-During nineteen years, consumed in sixteen campaigns, the history
-of Marshal Berthier’s life was little else but that of the wars of
-Napoleon, all the details of which he directed, both in the cabinet
-and the field. A stranger to the intrigues of politics, he labored
-with indefatigable activity; seized with promptitude and sagacity
-upon general views, and gave the necessary orders for attaining them
-with prudence, perspicuity, and conciseness. Discreet, impenetrable,
-modest; he was just, exact, and even severe, in everything that
-regarded the service; but he always set an example of vigilance and
-zeal in his own person, and knew how to maintain discipline, and to
-cause his authority to be respected by every rank under his orders.
-
-
-
-
-MAXIM LXXV.
-
-
-A commandant of artillery should understand well the general principles
-of each branch of the service, since he is called upon to supply
-arms and ammunition to the different corps of which it is composed.
-His correspondence with the commanding officers of artillery at the
-advanced posts, should put him in possession of all the movements of
-the army, and the disposition and management of the great park of
-artillery should depend upon this information.
-
-
-NOTE.
-
-After having recognized the advantage of intrusting the supply of
-arms and ammunition for an army to a military body, it appears to
-me extraordinary that the same regulation does not extend to that of
-provisions and forage, instead of leaving it in the hands of a separate
-administration, as is the practice at present.
-
-The civil establishments attached to armies are formed almost always at
-the commencement of a war, and composed of persons strangers to those
-laws of discipline which they are but too much inclined to disregard.
-These men are little esteemed by the military, because they serve only
-to enrich themselves, without respect to the means. They consider only
-their private interest in a service whose glory they cannot share,
-although some portion of its success depends upon their zeal. The
-disorders and defalcations incident to these establishments would
-assuredly cease, if they were confided to men who had been employed
-in the army, and who, in return for their labors, were permitted to
-partake with their fellow-soldiers the triumph of their success.
-
-
-
-
-MAXIM LXXVI.
-
-
-The qualities which distinguish a good general of advanced posts, are,
-to reconnoitre accurately defiles and fords of every description; to
-provide guides that may be depended on; to interrogate the _curé_
-and postmaster; to establish rapidly a good understanding with the
-inhabitants; to send out spies; to intercept public and private
-letters; to translate and analyze their contents; in a word, to be able
-to answer every question of the general-in-chief, when he arrives with
-the whole army.
-
-
-NOTE.
-
-Foraging parties, composed of small detachments, and which were usually
-intrusted to young officers, served formerly to make good officers
-of advanced posts; but now the army is supplied with provisions by
-regular contributions: it is only in a course of partisan warfare that
-the necessary experience can be acquired to fill these situations with
-success.
-
-A chief of partisans is, to a certain extent, independent of the army.
-He receives neither pay nor provisions from it, and rarely succor, and
-is abandoned during the whole campaign to his own resources.
-
-An officer so circumstanced must unite address with courage, and
-boldness with discretion, if he wishes to collect plunder without
-measuring the strength of his little corps with superior forces. Always
-harassed, always surrounded by dangers, which it is his business to
-foresee and surmount, a leader of partisans acquires in a short time an
-experience in the details of war rarely to be obtained by an officer
-of the line; because the latter is almost always under the guidance of
-superior authority, which directs the whole of his movements, while
-the talent and genius of the partisan are developed and sustained by a
-dependence on his own resources.
-
-
-
-
-MAXIM LXXVII.
-
-
-Generals-in-chief must be guided by their own experience, or their
-genius. Tactics, evolutions, the duties and knowledge of an engineer
-or artillery officer, may be learned in treatises, but the science
-of strategy is only to be acquired by experience, and by studying the
-campaigns of all the great captains.
-
-Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, and Frederick, as well as Alexander,
-Hannibal, and Cæsar, have all acted upon the same principles. These
-have been: to keep their forces united; to leave no weak part
-unguarded; to seize with rapidity on important points.
-
-Such are the principles which lead to victory, and which, by inspiring
-terror at the reputation of your arms, will at once maintain fidelity
-and secure subjection.
-
-
-NOTE.
-
-“A great captain can only be formed,” says the Archduke Charles, “by
-long experience and intense study: neither is his own experience
-enough--for whose life is there sufficiently fruitful of events to
-render his knowledge universal?” It is, therefore, by augmenting his
-information from the stock of others, by appreciating justly the
-discoveries of his predecessors, and by taking for his standard of
-comparison those great military exploits, in connection with their
-political results, in which the history of war abounds, that he can
-alone become a great commander.
-
-
-
-
-MAXIM LXXVIII.
-
-
-Peruse again and again the campaigns of Alexander, Hannibal, Cæsar,
-Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, Eugene, and Frederick. Model yourself
-upon them. This is the only means of becoming a great captain, and
-of acquiring the secret of the art of war. Your own genius will be
-enlightened and improved by this study, and you will learn to reject
-all maxims foreign to the principles of these great commanders.
-
-
-NOTE.
-
-It is in order to facilitate this object that I have formed the present
-collection. It is after reading and meditating upon the history of
-modern war that I have endeavored to illustrate, by examples, how the
-maxims of a great captain may be most successfully applied to this
-study. May the end I have had in view be accomplished!
-
-
-
-
-Transcriber’s Notes
-
-
-Cover created by Transcriber and placed in the Public Domain.
-
-Punctuation, hyphenation, and spelling were made consistent when a
-predominant preference was found in this book; otherwise they were not
-changed, except as noted below.
-
-Unusual and archaic spellings were not changed.
-
-Simple typographical errors were corrected; occasional unbalanced
-quotation marks retained.
-
-Ambiguous hyphens at the ends of lines were retained.
-
-Page 32: “spacious and extensive” was printed as “entensive” but
-changed here.
-
-Page 60: “1746” is a misprint; the correct date must be in the 1600's,
-perhaps “1646”.
-
-Page 63: “1798” may be a misprint for “1796”.
-
-Page 65: “1745” is a misprint; the correct year is “1645”.
-
-Page 75: “wo to the vanquished” was printed that way.
-
-Page 100: “Vauban” was printed as “Vanban” but changed here.
-
-
-
-
-
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+*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 50750 ***
+
+  THE OFFICER’S MANUAL.
+
+  NAPOLEON’S
+  MAXIMS OF WAR.
+
+
+  RICHMOND, VA.:
+  WEST & JOHNSTON.
+  1862.
+
+
+
+
+  EVANS & COGSWELL, PRINTERS.
+  NO. 3 BROAD ST., CHARLESTON, S. C.
+
+
+
+
+RECOMMENDATION.
+
+
+“After refreshing my memory by looking over again ‘The Officer’s
+Manual,’ or ‘Maxims of Napoleon,’ I think I may safely recommend the
+republication, in America, of the work in English, as likely to be
+called for by many officers, regular and volunteer. It contains a
+circle of maxims, deduced from the highest source of military science
+and experience, with practical illustrations of the principles taken
+from the most celebrated campaigns of modern times. The study of the
+book cannot fail to set all young officers on a course of inquiry and
+reflection greatly to their improvement.
+
+            “WINFIELD SCOTT.”
+
+
+
+
+PREFACE.
+
+
+The publisher has reissued this little volume as a publication timely
+for the occasion. A collection of maxims which directed the military
+operations of the greatest captain of modern times, cannot fail to
+prove of great use to such young officers as really desire a knowledge
+of the art of war. The maxims are illustrated by instances drawn from
+the campaigns of Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, Frederick, and Napoleon.
+These great men were all governed by the same principles, and it is by
+applying these principles to the perusal of their respective campaigns,
+that every military man will recognize their wisdom, and make such use
+of them hereafter as his own particular genius shall point out.
+
+“And here, perhaps,” says the translator, Col. D’Aguilar, “my task
+might have been considered finished; but perceiving how incomplete
+the collection was alone, I have endeavored to supply the deficiency
+by having recourse for further illustration to the memoirs of
+Montécuculli, and the instructions of Frederick to his generals. The
+analogy of their principles with those of Napoleon, has convinced me
+that the art of war is susceptible of two points of view: one, which
+relates entirely to the acquirements and genius of the general; the
+other, which refers to matters of detail.
+
+“The first is the same in all ages, and with all nations, whatever be
+the arms with which they fight. Hence it follows that, in every age,
+great commanders have been governed by the same principles.
+
+“The business of detail, on the contrary, is controlled by existing
+circumstances. It varies with the character of a people, and the
+quality of their arms.
+
+“It is with a view to impress the justice of this remark, that I have
+sought for facts in different periods of history, to illustrate these
+maxims, and to prove that nothing is _problematical_ in war; but that
+failure and success in military operations depend almost always on the
+natural genius and science of the chief.”
+
+
+
+
+NAPOLEON’S
+
+MAXIMS OF WAR.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM I.
+
+
+The frontiers of states are either large rivers, or chains of
+mountains, or deserts. Of all these obstacles to the march of an army,
+the most difficult to overcome is the desert; mountains come next, and
+broad rivers occupy the third place.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+Napoleon, in his military career, appears to have been called upon to
+surmount every difficulty which can occur in wars of invasion.
+
+In Egypt he traversed deserts, and vanquished and destroyed the
+Mamelukes, so celebrated for their address and courage. His genius
+knew how to accommodate itself to all the dangers of this distant
+enterprise, in a country ill adapted to supply the wants of his troops.
+
+In the conquest of Italy, he twice crossed the Alps by the most
+difficult passes, and at a season, too, which rendered this undertaking
+still more formidable. In three months he passed the Pyrenees, defeated
+and dispersed four Spanish armies. In short, from the Rhine to the
+Borysthenes, no natural obstacle could be found to arrest the rapid
+march of his victorious army.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM II.
+
+
+In forming the plan of a campaign, it is requisite to foresee
+everything the enemy may do, and to be prepared with the necessary
+means to counteract it.
+
+Plans of campaign may be modified _ad infinitum_ according to
+circumstances--the genius of the general, the character of the troops,
+and the topography of the theatre of action.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+Sometimes we see a hazardous campaign succeed, the plan of which is
+directly at variance with the principles of the art of war. But this
+success depends generally on the caprice of fortune, or upon faults
+committed by the enemy--two things upon which a general must never
+count. Sometimes the plan of a campaign, although based on sound
+principles of war, runs the risk of failing at the outset if opposed
+by an adversary who acts at first on the defensive, and then, suddenly
+seizing the initiative, surprises by the skilfulness of his manœuvres.
+Such was the fate of the plan laid down by the Aulic council for the
+campaign of 1796, under the command of Marshal Wurmser. From his
+great numerical superiority, the marshal had calculated on the entire
+destruction of the French army, by cutting off its retreat. He founded
+his operations on the defensive attitude of his adversary, who was
+posted on the line of the Adige, and had to cover the siege of Mantua,
+as well as central and lower Italy.
+
+Wurmser, supposing the French army fixed in the neighborhood of
+Mantua, divided his forces into three corps, which marched separately,
+intending to unite at that place. Napoleon, having penetrated the
+design of the Austrian general, perceived the advantage to be derived
+from striking the first blow against an army divided into three corps,
+with no communication between them. He hastened, therefore, to raise
+the siege of Mantua, assembled the whole of his forces, and by this
+means became superior to the imperialists, whose divisions he attacked
+and beat in detail. Thus Wurmser, who fancied he had only to march
+to certain victory, saw himself compelled, after ten days campaign,
+to retire with the remains of his army into the Tyrol, after a loss
+of twenty-five thousand men in killed and wounded, fifteen thousand
+prisoners, nine stand of colors, and seventy pieces of cannon.
+
+Hence, nothing is so difficult as to prescribe beforehand to a general
+the line of conduct he shall pursue during the course of a campaign.
+Success must often depend on circumstances that cannot be foreseen;
+and it should be remembered, likewise, that nothing cramps so much the
+efforts of genius as compelling the head of an army to be governed by
+any will but his own.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM III.
+
+
+An army which undertakes the conquest of a country, has its two
+wings resting either upon neutral territories, or upon great natural
+obstacles, such as rivers or chains of mountains. It happens in some
+cases that only one wing is so supported; and in others that both are
+exposed.
+
+In the first instance cited, viz., where both wings are protected,
+a general has only to protect his front from being penetrated. In
+the second, where one wing only is supported, he should rest upon
+the supported wing. In the third, where both wings are exposed, he
+should depend upon a central formation, and never allow the different
+corps under his command to depart from this: for if it be difficult
+to contend with the disadvantage of having _two_ flanks exposed,
+the inconvenience is doubled by having _four_, trebled if there be
+_six_--that is to say, if the army is divided into two or three
+different corps. In the first instance, then, as above quoted, the line
+of operation may rest indifferently on the right or on the left. In
+the second, it should be directed toward the wing in support. In the
+third, it should be perpendicular to the centre of the army’s line of
+march. But in all these cases it is necessary, at a distance of every
+five or six days march, to have a strong post or an entrenched position
+upon the line of operation, in order to collect military stores and
+provisions, to organize convoys, to form of it a centre of movement,
+and establish a point of defence to shorten the line of operation of
+the army.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+These general principles in the art of war were entirely unknown, or
+lost sight of, in the middle ages. The crusaders in their incursions
+into Palestine appear to have had no object but to fight and to
+conquer, so little pains did they take to profit by their victories.
+Hence, innumerable armies perished in Syria, without any other
+advantage than that derived from the momentary success obtained by
+superior numbers.
+
+It was by the neglect of these principles, also, that Charles XII,
+abandoning his line of operation and all communication with Sweden,
+threw himself into the Ukraine, and lost the greater part of his army
+by the fatigue of a winter campaign in a barren country destitute of
+resources.
+
+Defeated at Pultawa, he was obliged to seek refuge in Turkey, after
+crossing the Nieper with the remains of his army, diminished to little
+more than one thousand men.
+
+Gustavus Adolphus was the first who brought back the art of war to its
+true principles. His operations in Germany were bold, rapid, and well
+executed. He made success at all times conducive to future security,
+and established his line of operation so as to prevent the possibility
+of any interruption in his communications with Sweden. His campaigns
+form a new era in the art of war.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM IV.
+
+
+When the conquest of a country is undertaken by two or three armies,
+which have each their separate line of operation, until they arrive at
+a point fixed upon for their concentration, it should be laid down as a
+principle, that the union of these different corps should never take
+place near the enemy; because the enemy, in uniting his forces, may not
+only prevent this junction, but may beat the armies in detail.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+In the campaign of 1757, Frederick, marching to the conquest of Bohemia
+with two armies, which had each their separate line of operation,
+succeeded, notwithstanding, in uniting them in sight of the Duke of
+Lorraine, who covered Prague with the imperial army; but his example
+should not be followed. The success of this march depended entirely on
+the inaction of the duke, who, at the head of seventy thousand men, did
+nothing to prevent the junction of the two Prussian armies.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM V.
+
+
+All wars should be governed by certain principles, for every war should
+have a definite object, and be conducted according to the rules of
+art. (A war should only be undertaken with forces proportioned to the
+obstacles to be overcome.)
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+It was a saying of Marshal Villars, that when war is decided on, it is
+necessary to have exact information of the number of troops the enemy
+can bring into the field, since it is impossible to lay down any solid
+plan of offensive or defensive operation without an accurate knowledge
+of what you have to expect and fear. “When the first shot is fired,”
+observes Marshal Villars, “no one can calculate what will be the issue
+of the war. It is, therefore, of vast importance to reflect maturely
+before we begin it.” When once, however, this is decided, the marshal
+observes that the boldest and most extended plans are generally the
+wisest and the most successful. “When we are determined upon war,” he
+adds, “we should carry it on vigorously and without trifling.”
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM VI.
+
+
+At the commencement of a campaign, to _advance_ or _not to advance_,
+is a matter for grave consideration; but when once the offensive has
+been assumed, it must be sustained to the last extremity. However
+skilful the manœuvres in a retreat, it will always weaken the _morale_
+of an army, because, in losing the chances of success, these last are
+transferred to the enemy. Besides, retreats always cost more men and
+_materiel_ than the most bloody engagements; with this difference, that
+in a battle the enemy’s loss is nearly equal to your own--whereas in a
+retreat the loss is on your side only.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+Marshal Saxe remarks, that no retreats are so favorable as those which
+are made before a languid and unenterprising enemy, for when he pursues
+with vigor, the retreat soon degenerates into a rout. “Upon this
+principle it is a great error,” says the marshal, “to adhere to the
+proverb which recommends us to build a bridge of gold for a retreating
+enemy. No; follow him up with spirit, and he is destroyed!”
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM VII.
+
+
+An army should be ready every day, every night, and at all times of the
+day and night, to oppose all the resistance of which it is capable.
+With this view, the soldier should always be furnished completely
+with arms and ammunition; the infantry should never be without its
+artillery, its cavalry, and its generals; and the different divisions
+of the army should be constantly in a state to support, to be
+supported, and to protect itself.
+
+The troops, whether halted, or encamped, or on the march, should be
+always in favorable positions, possessing the essentials required for
+a field of battle; for example, the flanks should be well covered, and
+all the artillery so placed as to have free range, and to play with the
+greatest advantage. When an army is in column of march, it should have
+advanced guards and flanking parties, to examine well the country in
+front, to the right, and to the left, and always at such distance as
+to enable the main body to deploy into position.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+The following maxims, taken from the memoirs of Montécuculli, appear
+to me well suited to this place, and calculated to form a useful
+commentary on the general principles laid down in the preceding maxim:
+
+1. When war has been once decided on, the moment is past for doubts and
+scruples. On the contrary, we are bound to hope that all the evil which
+may ensue, will not; that Providence, or our own wisdom, may avert it;
+or that the want of talent on the part of the enemy may prevent him
+from benefiting by it. The first security for success is to confer the
+command on one individual. When the authority is divided, the opinions
+of the commanders often vary, and the operations are deprived of that
+_ensemble_ which is the first essential to victory. Besides, when an
+enterprise is common to many, and not confined to a single person, it
+is conducted without vigor, and less interest is attached to the result.
+
+After having strictly conformed to all the rules of war, and satisfied
+ourselves that nothing has been omitted to ensure eventual success,
+we must then leave the issue in the hands of Providence, and repose
+ourselves tranquilly in the decision of a higher power.
+
+Let what will arrive, it is the part of a general-in-chief to remain
+firm and constant in his purposes; he must not allow himself to be
+elated by prosperity, nor to be depressed by adversity: for in war good
+and bad and fortune succeed each other by turns, form the ebb and flow
+of military operations.
+
+2. When your own army is strong and inured to service, and that of the
+enemy is weak and consists of new levies, or of troops enervated by
+long inaction, then you should exert every means to bring him to battle.
+
+If, on the other hand, your adversary has the advantage in troops, a
+decisive combat is to be avoided, and you must be content to impede
+his progress, by encamping advantageously, and fortifying favorable
+passes. When armies are nearly equal in force, it is desirable _not_ to
+avoid a battle, but only to attempt to fight one to advantage. For this
+purpose, care should be taken to encamp always in front of the enemy;
+to move when he moves, and occupy the heights and advantageous grounds
+that lie upon his line of march; to seize upon all the buildings and
+roads adjoining to his camp, and post yourself advantageously in the
+places by which he must pass. It is always something gained to make
+_him_ lose time, to thwart his designs, or to retard their progress
+and execution. If, however, an army is altogether inferior to that
+of the enemy, and there is no possibility of manœuvring against him
+with success, then the campaign must be abandoned, and the troops must
+retire into the fortresses.
+
+3. The principal object of a general-in-chief, in the moment of battle,
+should be to secure the flanks of his army. It is true that natural
+positions may be found to effect this object, but these positions being
+fixed and immovable in themselves, they are only advantageous to a
+general who wishes to wait the shock of the enemy, and not to one who
+marches to the attack.
+
+A general can, therefore, rely only on the proper arrangement of his
+troops, to enable him to repel any attempt the adversary may make upon
+the front, or flanks, or rear of his army.
+
+If one flank of an army rests upon a river, or an impassable ravine,
+the whole of the cavalry may be posted with the other wing, in order to
+envelop the enemy more easily by its superiority in numbers.
+
+If the enemy has his flanks supported by woods, light cavalry or
+infantry should be despatched to attack him in flank or in rear during
+the heat of the battle. If practicable, also, an attack should be made
+upon the baggage, to add to his confusion.
+
+If you desire to beat the enemy’s left with your right wing, or his
+right with your left wing, the wing with which you attack should be
+reinforced by the _élite_ of your army. At the same moment, the other
+wing should avoid battle, and the attacking wing brought rapidly
+forward, so as to overwhelm the enemy. If the nature of the ground
+admits, he should be approached by stealth, and attacked before he
+is on his guard. If any signs of fear are discoverable in the enemy,
+and which are always to be detected by confusion or disorder in his
+movements, he should be pursued immediately, without allowing him
+time to recover himself. It is now the cavalry should be brought into
+action, and manœuvre so as to surprise and cut off his artillery and
+baggage.
+
+4. The order of march should always be subservient to the order of
+battle, which last should be arranged beforehand. The march of an army
+is always well regulated when it is governed by the distance to be
+accomplished, and by the time required for its performance. The front
+of the column of march should be diminished or increased according
+to the nature of the country, taking care that the artillery always
+proceeds by the main road.
+
+When a river is to be passed, the artillery should be placed in battery
+upon the bank opposite the point of crossing.
+
+It is a great advantage, when a river forms a sweep or angle, and
+when a ford is to be found near the place where you wish to effect a
+passage. As the construction of the bridge proceeds, infantry should
+be advanced to cover the workmen, by keeping up a fire on the opposite
+bank; but the moment it is finished, a corps of infantry and cavalry,
+and some field-pieces, should be pushed across. The infantry should
+entrench itself immediately at the head of the bridge, and it is
+prudent, moreover, to fortify on the same side of the river, in order
+to protect the bridge in case the enemy should venture an offensive
+movement.
+
+The advanced guard of an army should be always provided with trusty
+guides, and with a corps of pioneers: the first to point out the best
+roads, the second to render these roads more practicable.
+
+If the army marches in detachments, the commander of each detachment
+should be furnished with the name of the place in writing, where the
+whole are to be reassembled; the place should be sufficiently removed
+from the enemy to prevent him from occupying it before the junction of
+all the detachments. To this end, it is of importance to keep the name
+a secret.
+
+From the moment an army approaches the enemy, it should march in
+the order in which it is intended to fight. If anything is to be
+apprehended, precautions are necessary in proportion to the degree of
+the danger. When a defile is to be passed, the troops should be halted
+beyond the extremity, until the whole army has quitted the defile.
+
+In order to conceal the movements of an army, it is necessary to march
+by night through woods and valleys, by the most retired roads, and out
+of reach of all inhabited places. No fires should be allowed; and, to
+favor the design still more, the troops should move by verbal order.
+When the object of the march is to carry a post, or to relieve a place
+that is besieged, the advanced guard should march within musket shot of
+the main body, because then you are prepared for an immediate attack,
+and ready to overthrow all before you.
+
+When a march is made to force a pass guarded by the enemy, it is
+desirable to make a feint upon one point, while, by a rapid movement,
+you bring your real attack to bear upon another.
+
+Sometimes success is obtained by pretending to fall back upon the
+original line of march, and, by a sudden countermarch, seizing upon
+the pass, before the enemy is able to reoccupy it. Some generals have
+gained their point by manœuvring so as to deceive the enemy, while a
+detachment under the cover of high grounds has surprised the passage by
+a stolen march. The enemy being engaged in watching the movements of
+the main body, the detachment has an opportunity of entrenching itself
+in its new position.
+
+5. An army regulates its mode of encampment according to the greater or
+less degree of precaution, when circumstances require. In a friendly
+country the troops are divided, to afford better accommodation and
+supplies. But with the enemy in front, an army should always encamp in
+order of battle. With this view, it is of the highest importance to
+cover one part of the camp, as far as practicable, by natural defences,
+such as a river, a chain of rocks, or a ravine. Care should be taken
+also that the camp is not commanded, and that there is no obstacle to a
+free communication between the different corps, and which can prevent
+the troops from mutually succoring each other.
+
+When an army occupies a fixed camp, it is necessary to be well supplied
+with provisions and ammunition, or at least that these should be
+within certain reach and easily obtained. To insure this, the line of
+communication must be well established, and care taken not to leave an
+enemy’s fortress in your rear.
+
+When an army is established in winter quarters, its safety is best
+secured either by fortifying a camp (for which purpose a spot should be
+selected near a large commercial town, or a river affording facility
+of transport), or by distributing it in close cantonments, so that the
+troops should be near together, and capable of affording each other
+mutual support.
+
+The winter quarters of an army should be protected, likewise, by
+constructing small covered works on all the lines of approach to the
+cantonments, and by posting advanced guards of cavalry to observe the
+motions of the enemy.
+
+6. A battle is to be sought, when there is reason to hope for victory,
+or when an army runs the risk of being ruined without fighting; also
+when a besieged place is to be relieved, or when you desire to prevent
+a reinforcement from reaching the enemy. Battles are useful, likewise,
+when we wish to profit by a favorable opportunity which offers, to
+secure a certain advantage, such as seizing upon an undefended point or
+pass, attacking the enemy when he has committed a fault, or when some
+misunderstanding among his generals favors the undertaking.
+
+If an enemy declines an engagement, he may be compelled to it, either
+by besieging a place of importance, or by falling upon him unawares,
+and when he cannot easily effect his retreat. Or (after pretending to
+retire), by making a rapid countermarch, attacking him vigorously and
+forcing him to action.
+
+The different circumstances under which a battle should be avoided
+or declined, are, when there is greater danger to be apprehended
+from defeat than advantage to be derived from victory; when you
+are very inferior to your adversary in numbers, and are expecting
+reinforcements; above all, when the enemy is advantageously posted, or
+when he is contributing to his own ruin by some inherent defect in his
+position, or by the errors and divisions of his generals.
+
+To gain a battle, each arm must be advantageously posted, and have the
+means of engaging its front and in flank. The wings must be protected
+by natural obstacles, where these present themselves, or by having
+recourse when necessary to the aid of art.
+
+The troops must be able to assist each other without confusion, and
+care must be taken that the broken corps do not fall back upon, and
+throw the rest into disorder. Above all, the intervals between the
+different corps must be sufficiently small to prevent the enemy from
+penetrating between them, for in that case you would be obliged to
+employ your reserves, and run the risk of being entirely overwhelmed.
+Sometimes victory is obtained by creating a diversion in the middle of
+a battle, or even by depriving the soldier of all hope of retreat, and
+placing him in a situation where he is reduced to the necessity either
+to conquer or die.
+
+At the commencement of a battle, if the ground is level, you should
+advance to meet the enemy, in order to inspire the soldier with
+courage; but if you are well posted, and your artillery advantageously
+placed, then wait for him with determination: remembering always to
+fight resolutely, to succor opportunely those who require it, and never
+to bring your reserves into action except in the last extremity; and
+even then to preserve some support, behind which the broken corps may
+rally.
+
+When it is necessary to attack with your whole force, the battle
+should commence toward evening; because then, whatever be the issue,
+night will arrive to separate the combatants before your troops are
+exhausted. By this means, an opportunity is afforded of affecting an
+orderly retreat if the result of the battle requires it.
+
+During an action, the general-in-chief should occupy some spot whence
+he can, as far as possible, overlook his whole army. He should be
+informed, immediately, of everything that passes in the different
+divisions. He should be ready, in order to render success more
+complete, to operate with fresh troops upon those points where the
+enemy is giving way, and also to reinforce his own corps wherever they
+are inclined to yield. When the enemy is beaten, he must pursue him
+instantly, without giving him a moment to rally; on the other hand, if
+he is himself defeated, or despairs of victory, he must retreat in the
+best possible order.
+
+7. It shows great talent in a general to bring troops, who are prepared
+for action, into collision with those who are not: for example, fresh
+troops against those which are exhausted--brave and disciplined men
+against recruits. He must likewise be ready always to fall with his
+army upon a weak or detached corps, to follow the track of the enemy,
+and charge him among defiles before he can face about and get into
+position.
+
+8. A position is good when the different corps are so placed as to be
+engaged with advantage, and without any remaining unemployed. If you
+are superior in cavalry, positions are to be taken in plains and open
+ground; if in infantry, in an enclosed and covered country. If inferior
+in numbers, in confined and narrow places; if superior, in a spacious
+and extensive field. With a very inferior army, a difficult pass must
+be selected to occupy and fortify.
+
+9. In order to obtain every possible advantage from a diversion, we
+should ascertain first, that the country in which it is to be created
+is easily penetrated. A diversion should be made vigorously, and on
+those points where it is calculated to do the greatest mischief to the
+enemy.
+
+10. To make war with success, the following principles should never be
+departed from:
+
+To be superior to your enemy in numbers, as well as in _morale_; to
+fight battles in order to spread terror in the country; to divide your
+army into as many corps as may be effected without risk, in order to
+undertake several objects at the same time; to treat WELL those who
+yield, to ILL treat those who resist; to secure your rear, and occupy
+and strengthen yourself at the outset in some post which shall serve
+as a central point for the support of your future movements; to
+guard against desertion; to make yourself master of the great rivers
+and principal passes, and to establish your line of communication by
+getting possession of the fortresses, by laying siege to them, and
+of the open country, by giving battle; for it is vain to expect that
+conquests are to be achieved without combats; although when a victory
+is won, they will be best maintained by uniting mildness with valor.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM VIII.
+
+
+A general-in-chief should ask himself frequently in the day: “What
+should I do if the enemy’s army appeared now in my front, or on my
+right, or my left?” If he have any difficulty in answering these
+questions, his position is bad, and he should seek to remedy it.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+In the campaign of 1758, the position of the Prussian army at Hohen
+Kirk, being commanded by the batteries of the enemy, who occupied all
+the heights, was eminently defective; notwithstanding, Frederick,
+who saw his rear menaced by the corps of Laudon, remained six days
+in his camp without seeking to correct his position. It would seem,
+indeed, that he was ignorant of his real danger: for Marshal Daun,
+having manœuvred during the night in order to attack by daybreak,
+surprised the Prussians in their lines before they were able to defend
+themselves, and by this means surrounded them completely.
+
+Frederick succeeded, however, in effecting his retreat with regularity,
+but not without the loss of ten thousand men, many general officers,
+and almost all of his artillery. If Marshal Daun had followed up his
+victory with greater boldness, the king of Prussia would never have
+been able to rally his army. On this occasion, Frederick’s good fortune
+balanced his imprudence.
+
+Marshal Saxe remarks, that there is more talent than is dreamt of in
+bad dispositions, if we possess the art of converting them into good
+ones when the favorable moment arrives. Nothing astonishes the enemy
+so much as this manœuvre; he has counted upon _something_; all his
+arrangements have been founded upon it accordingly--and at the moment
+of attack it escapes him! “I must repeat,” says the marshal, “there
+is nothing that so completely disconcerts an enemy as this, or leads
+him to commit so many errors; for it follows, that if he does _not_
+change his arrangements, he is beaten; and if he _does_ change them, in
+presence of his adversary, he is equally undone.”
+
+It seems to me, however, that a general who should rest the success of
+a battle upon such a principle, would be more likely to lose than to
+gain by it; for if he had to deal with a skilful adversary and an alert
+tactician, the latter would find time to take advantage of the previous
+bad arrangements, before he would be able to remedy them.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM IX.
+
+
+The strength of an army, like the power in mechanics, is estimated
+by multiplying the mass by the rapidity; a rapid march augments the
+_morale_ of an army, and increases its means of victory. Press on!
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+“Rapidity,” says Montécuculli, “is of importance in concealing the
+movements of an army, because it leaves no time to divulge the
+intention of its chief. It is, therefore, an advantage to attack the
+enemy unexpectedly, to take him off his guard, to surprise him, and
+let him feel the thunder before he sees the flash; but if too great
+celerity exhausts your troops, while, on the other hand, delay deprives
+you of the favorable moment, you must weigh the advantage against the
+disadvantage, and choose between.”
+
+Marshal Villars observes, that “in war everything depends upon being
+able to deceive the enemy; and having once gained this point, in never
+allowing him time to recover himself.” Villars has united practice to
+precept. His bold and rapid marches were almost always crowned with
+success.
+
+It was the opinion of Frederick that all wars should be short and
+rapid; because a long war insensibly relaxes discipline, depopulates
+the state, and exhausts its resources.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM X.
+
+
+When an army is inferior in number, inferior in cavalry, and in
+artillery, it is essential to avoid a general action. The first
+deficiency should be supplied by rapidity of movement; the want of
+artillery, by the nature of the manœuvres; and the inferiority in
+cavalry, by the choice of positions. In such circumstances, the
+_morale_ of the soldier does much.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+The campaign of 1814 in France was skilfully executed upon these
+principles. Napoleon, with an army inferior in number, an army
+discouraged by the disastrous retreats of Moscow and of Leipzig, and
+still more by the presence of the enemy in the French territory,
+contrived, notwithstanding, to supply his vast inequality of force by
+the rapidity and combination of his movements. By the success obtained
+at Champ-Aubert, Montmirail, Montereau, and Rheims, he began to restore
+the _morale_ of the French army. The numerous recruits of which it
+was composed, had already acquired that steadiness of which the old
+regiments afforded them an example, when the capture of Paris, and the
+astonishing revolution it produced, compelled Napoleon to lay down his
+arms.
+
+But this consequence resulted rather from the force of circumstances
+than from any absolute necessity; for Napoleon, by carrying his army to
+the other side of the Loire, might easily have formed a junction with
+the armies of the Alps and Pyrenees, and have reappeared on the field
+of battle at the head of a hundred thousand men. Such a force would
+have amply sufficed to re-establish the chances of war in his favor;
+more especially as the armies of the allied sovereigns were obliged to
+manœuvre upon the French territory with all the strong places of Italy
+and France in their rear.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM XI.
+
+
+To direct operations with lines far removed from each other, and
+without communications, is to commit a fault which always gives birth
+to a second. The detached column has only its orders for the first
+day. Its operations on the following day depend upon what may have
+happened to the main body. Thus, this column either loses time upon
+emergency, in waiting for orders, or it will act without them, and at
+hazard. Let it therefore be held as a principle, that an army should
+always keep its columns so united as to prevent the enemy from passing
+between them with impunity. Whenever, for particular reasons, this
+principle is departed from, the detached corps should be independent in
+their operations. They should move toward a point fixed upon for their
+future junction. They should advance without hesitating, and without
+waiting for fresh orders; and every precaution should be taken to
+prevent an attack upon them in detail.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+The Austrian army, commanded by Field-marshal Alvinzi, was divided into
+two corps, destined to act independently, until they should accomplish
+their junction before Mantua. The first of these corps, consisting
+of forty-five thousand men, was under the orders of Alvinzi. It was
+to debouch by Monte Baldo, upon the positions occupied by the French
+army on the Adige. The second corps, commanded by General Provéra,
+was destined to act upon the lower Adige, and to raise the blockade
+of Mantua. Napoleon, informed of the enemy’s movements, but not
+entirely comprehending his projects, confined himself to concentrating
+his masses, and giving orders to the troops to hold themselves in
+readiness to manœuvre. In the meantime, fresh information satisfied the
+general-in-chief of the French army that the corps which had debouched
+by La Coronna, over Monte Baldo, was endeavoring to form a junction
+with its cavalry and artillery--both which, having crossed the Adige at
+Dolce, were directing their march upon the plateau of Rivoli, by the
+great road leading by Incanole.
+
+Napoleon immediately foresaw that, by having possession of the plateau,
+he should be able to prevent this junction, and obtain all the
+advantages of the initiative. He accordingly put his troops in motion,
+and at two o’clock in the morning occupied that important position.
+Once master of the point fixed upon for the junction of the Austrian
+columns, success followed all his dispositions. He repulsed every
+attack, made seven thousand prisoners, and took several standards and
+twelve pieces of cannon. At two o’clock in the afternoon, the battle of
+Rivoli was already gained, when Napoleon, learning that General Provéra
+had passed the Adige at Anghiari, and was directing his march upon
+Mantua, left to his generals the charge of following up the retreat of
+Alvinzi, and placed himself at the head of a division for the purpose
+of defeating the designs of Provéra.
+
+By a rapid march, he again succeeded in the initiatory movement, and
+in preventing the garrison of Mantua from uniting its force with
+the relieving army. The corps intrusted with the blockade, eager to
+distinguish itself under the eyes of the conqueror of Rivoli, compelled
+the garrison to retire into the place, while the division of Victor,
+forgetting the fatigues of a forced march, rushed with impetuosity on
+the relieving army in front. At this moment a sortie from the lines
+of St. George took him in flank, while the corps of Augereau, which
+had followed the march of the Austrian general, attacked him in rear.
+Provéra, surrounded on all sides, capitulated. The result of these two
+battles cost the Austrians three thousand men in killed and wounded,
+twenty-two thousand prisoners, twenty-four standards, and forty-six
+pieces of cannon.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM XII.
+
+
+An army ought to have only one line of operation. This should be
+preserved with care, and never abandoned but in the last extremity.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+“The line of communication of an army,” says Montécuculli, “must be
+certain and well established, for every army that acts from a distant
+base, and is not careful to keep this line perfectly open, marches upon
+a precipice. It moves to certain ruin, as may be seen by an infinity
+of examples. In fact, if the road by which provisions, ammunition and
+reinforcements are to be brought up, is not entirely secured--if the
+magazines, the hospitals, the depôts of arms, and the places of supply
+are not fixed and commodiously situated--not only the army cannot keep
+the field, but it will be exposed to the greatest dangers.”
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM XIII.
+
+
+The distances permitted between corps of an army upon the march must be
+governed by the localities, by circumstances, and by the object in view.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+When an army moves at a distance from the enemy, the columns may be
+disposed along the road so as to favor the artillery and baggage. But
+when it is marching into action, the different corps must be formed in
+close columns in order of battle. The generals must take care that the
+heads of the columns, which are to attack together, do not outstep each
+other, and that in approaching the field of action they preserve the
+relative intervals required for deployment.
+
+“The marches that are made preparatory to a battle require,” says
+Frederick, “the greatest precaution.” With this view, he recommends
+his generals to be particularly on their guard, and to reconnoitre
+the ground at successive distances, in order to secure the initiative
+by occupying those positions most calculated to favor an attack. On
+a retreat, it is the opinion of many generals that an army should
+concentrate its forces, and march in close columns if it is still
+strong enough to resume the offensive; for by this means it is easy
+to form the line when a favorable opportunity presents itself, either
+for holding the enemy in check or for attacking him if he is not in a
+situation to accept battle.
+
+Such was Moreau’s retreat after the passage of the Adda by the
+Austro-Russian army. The French general, after having covered the
+evacuation of Milan, took up a position between the Po and the Tanaro.
+
+His camp rested upon Alexandria and Valentia, two capital fortresses,
+and had the advantage of covering the roads to Turin and Savona, by
+which he could effect his retreat in case he was unable to accomplish a
+junction with the _corps d’armee_ of Macdonald, who had been ordered to
+quit the kingdom of Naples, and hasten his march into Tuscany.
+
+Forced to abandon his position in consequence of the insurrection in
+Piedmont and Tuscany, Moreau retired upon Asti, where he learned that
+his communication with the river of Genoa had just been cut off by the
+capture of Ceva. After several ineffectual attempts to retake this
+place, he saw that his only safety depended upon throwing himself into
+the mountains.
+
+To effect this object, he directed the whole of his battering train
+and heavy baggage by the Col de Fenestrelle upon France; then opening
+himself a way over the St. Bernard, he gained Loano with his light
+artillery and the small proportion of field equipment he had been able
+to preserve.
+
+By this skilful movement, he not only retained his communications with
+France, but was enabled to observe the motions of the army from Naples,
+and to facilitate his junction with it by directing the whole of his
+force upon the points necessary for that purpose.
+
+Macdonald, in the meantime, whose only chance of success depended on
+concentrating his little army, neglected this precaution, and was
+beaten in three successive actions at the Trebia.
+
+By this retardment of his march, he rendered all Moreau’s measures to
+unite the two armies in the plains of the Po useless, and his retreat,
+after his brilliant but fruitless efforts at the Trebia, defeated the
+other arrangements, also, which the former had made to come to his
+support. The inactivity of Marshal Suwarrow, however, finally enabled
+the French general to accomplish his junction with the remains of the
+army from Naples. Moreau then concentrated his whole force upon the
+Appenines, and placed himself in a situation to defend the important
+positions of Liguria, until the chances of war should afford him an
+opportunity of resuming the offensive.
+
+When, after a decisive battle, an army has lost its artillery and
+equipments, and is consequently no longer in a state to assume the
+offensive, or even to arrest the pursuit of the enemy, it would
+seem most desirable to divide what remains into several corps, and
+order them to march by separate and distant routes upon the base of
+operation, and throw themselves into the fortresses. This is the only
+means of safety: for the enemy, uncertain as to the precise direction
+taken by the vanquished army, is ignorant in the first instance which
+corps to pursue, and it is in this moment of indecision that a march is
+gained upon him. Besides, the movements of a small body being so much
+easier than those of a larger one, these separate lines of march are
+all in favor of a retreating army.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM XIV.
+
+
+Among mountains, a great number of positions are always to be found
+very strong in themselves, and which it is dangerous to attack. The
+character of this mode of warfare consists in occupying camps on the
+flanks or in the rear of the enemy, leaving him only the alternative
+of abandoning his position without fighting, to take up another in
+the rear, or to descend from it in order to attack you. In mountain
+warfare, the assailant has always the disadvantage; even in offensive
+warfare in the open field, the great secret consists in defensive
+combats, and in obliging the enemy to attack.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+During the campaign of 1793, in the Maritime Alps, the French army,
+under the orders of General Brunet, did all in its power to get
+possession of the camps at Raus and at Fourches, by an attack in front.
+But these useless efforts served only to increase the courage of the
+Piedmontese, and to destroy the _élite_ of the grenadiers of the
+republican army. The manœuvres by which Napoleon, without fighting,
+compelled the enemy to evacuate these positions in 1796, suffice to
+establish the truth of these principles, and to prove how much success
+in war depends upon the genius of the general as well as on the courage
+of the soldier.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM XV.
+
+
+The first consideration with a general who offers battle, should be the
+glory and honor of his arms; the safety and preservation of his men is
+only the second; but it is in the enterprise and courage resulting
+from the former, that the latter will most assuredly be found. In a
+retreat, besides the honor of the army, the loss of life is often
+greater than in two battles. For this reason, we should never despair
+while brave men are to be found with their colors. It is by this means
+that we obtain victory, and deserve to obtain it.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+In 1645, the French army, under the orders of the Prince of Condé, was
+on the march to lay siege to Nordlingen, when it was discovered that
+Count Merci, who commanded the Bavarians, had foreseen this intention,
+and had entrenched himself in a strong position which defended
+Nordlingen at the same time that it covered Donawerth.
+
+Notwithstanding the favorable position of the enemy, Condé ordered the
+attack. The combat was terrible. All the infantry in the centre and on
+the right, after being successively engaged, was routed and dispersed,
+in spite of the efforts of the cavalry and the reserve, which were
+likewise carried away with the fugitives. The battle was lost. Condé,
+in despair, having no longer either centre or right to depend upon,
+collected the remnants of his battalions, and directed his march to the
+left, where Turenne was still engaged. This perseverance reanimated
+the ardor of the troops. They broke the right wing of the enemy,
+and Turenne, by a change of front, returned to the attack upon his
+centre. Night, too, favored the boldness of Condé. An entire corps of
+Bavarians, fancying themselves cut off, laid down their arms; and the
+obstinacy of the French general in this struggle for victory was repaid
+by possession of the field of battle, together with a great number of
+prisoners, and almost all the enemy’s artillery. The Bavarian army beat
+a retreat, and the next day Nordlingen capitulated.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM XVI.
+
+
+It is an approved maxim in war, never to do what the enemy wishes you
+to do, for this reason alone, that he desires it. A field of battle,
+therefore, which he has previously studied and reconnoitred, should
+be avoided, and double care should be taken where he has had time to
+fortify and entrench. One consequence deducible from this principle is,
+never to attack a position in front which you can gain by turning.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+It was without due regard to this principle, that Marshal Villeroi, on
+assuming the command of the army of Italy, during the campaign of 1701,
+attacked, with unwarrantable presumption, Prince Eugene, of Savoy, in
+his entrenched position of Chiavi, on the Oglio. The French generals,
+Catinat among the rest, considered the post unassailable, but Villeroi
+insisted, and the result of this otherwise unimportant battle was the
+loss of the _élite_ of the French army. It would have been greater
+still, but for Catinat’s exertions.
+
+It was by neglecting the same principle, that the Prince of Condé, in
+the campaign of 1644, failed in all his attacks upon the entrenched
+position of the Bavarian army. The Count Merci, who commanded the
+latter, had drawn up his cavalry skilfully upon the plain, resting
+upon Freyberg, while his infantry occupied the mountain. After many
+fruitless attempts, the Prince of Condé, seeing the impossibility of
+dislodging the enemy, began to menace his communications--but the
+moment Merci perceived this, he broke up his camp and retired beyond
+the Black mountains.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM XVII.
+
+
+In a war of march and manœuvre, if you would avoid a battle with a
+superior army, it is necessary to entrench every night, and occupy a
+good defensive position. Those natural positions which are ordinarily
+met with, are not sufficient to protect an army against superior
+numbers without recourse to art.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+The campaign of the French and Spanish army, commanded by the Duke
+of Berwick, against the Portuguese, in the year 1706, affords a good
+lesson on this subject. The two armies made almost the tour of Spain.
+They began the campaign near Badajoz, and after manœuvring across both
+Castiles, finished it in the kingdoms of Valencia and Murcia. The
+Duke of Berwick encamped his army eighty-five times, and although the
+campaign passed without a general action, he took about ten thousand
+prisoners from the enemy. Marshal Turenne also made a fine campaign of
+manœuvre against the Count Montécuculli, in 1675.
+
+The imperial army having made its arrangements to pass the Rhine at
+Strasburg, Turenne used all diligence, and, throwing a bridge over the
+river near the village of Ottenheim, three leagues below Strasburg, he
+crossed with the French army, and encamped close to the little town
+of Vilstet, which he occupied. This position covered the bridge of
+Strasburg, so that, by this manœuvre, Turenne deprived the enemy of all
+approach to that city.
+
+Upon this, Montécuculli made a movement with his whole army,
+threatening the bridge at Ottenheim, by which the French received their
+provisions from upper Alsace.
+
+As soon as Turenne discovered the design of the enemy, he left a
+detachment at Vilstet, and made a rapid march with his whole force
+upon the village of Altenheim. This intermediate position between
+the two bridges, which he wished to preserve, gave him the advantage
+of being able to succor either of these posts before the enemy had
+time to carry them. Montécuculli seeing that any successful attack
+upon the bridges was not to be expected, resolved to pass the Rhine
+below Strasburg, and with this view returned to his first position
+at Offenburg. Marshal Turenne, who followed all the movements of the
+Austrian army, brought back his army also to Vilstet.
+
+In the meantime, this attempt of the enemy having convinced the French
+general of the danger to which his bridge had exposed him, removed it
+nearer to that of Strasburg, in order to diminish the extent of ground
+he had to defend.
+
+Montécuculli, having commanded the magistrates of Strasburg to collect
+materials for a bridge, moved to Scherzheim to receive them; but
+Turenne again defeated his projects by taking a position at Freistett,
+where he occupied the islands of the Rhine, and immediately constructed
+a stockade.
+
+Thus it was that, during the whole of this campaign, Turenne succeeded
+in gaining the initiative of the enemy, and obliging him to follow
+his movements. He succeeded, also, by a rapid march, in cutting off
+Montécuculli from the Town of Offenburg, whence he drew his supplies,
+and would no doubt have prevented the Austrian general from effecting
+his junction with the corps of Caprara, had not a cannon-shot
+terminated this great man’s life.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM XVIII.
+
+
+A general of ordinary talent occupying a bad position, and surprised
+by a superior force, seeks his safety in retreat; but a great captain
+supplies all deficiencies by his courage, and marches boldly to meet
+the attack. By this means he disconcerts his adversary; and if the
+latter shows any irresolution in his movements, a skilful leader,
+profiting by his indecision, may even hope for victory, or at least
+employ the day in manœuvring--at night he entrenches himself, or falls
+back to a better position. By this determined conduct he maintains the
+honor of his arms, the first essential to all military superiority.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+In 1653, Marshal Turenne was surprised by the Prince of Condé, in a
+position where his army was completely compromised. He had the power,
+indeed, by an immediate retreat, of covering himself by the Somme,
+which he possessed the means of crossing at Peronne, and whence he
+was distant only half a league; but, fearing the influence of this
+retrograde movement on the _morale_ of his army, Turenne balanced all
+disadvantages by his courage, and marched boldly to meet the enemy with
+very inferior forces. After marching a league, he found an advantageous
+position, where he made every disposition for a battle. It was three
+o’clock in the afternoon; but the Spaniards, exhausted with fatigue,
+hesitated to attack him, and Turenne having covered himself with
+entrenchments during the night, the enemy no longer dared to risk a
+general action, and broke up his camp.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM XIX.
+
+
+The transition from the defensive to the offensive is one of the most
+delicate operations.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+By studying the first campaign of Napoleon in Italy, we can learn
+what genius and boldness may effect in passing with an army from the
+_defensive_ to the _offensive_. The army of the allies, commanded by
+General Beaulieu, was provided with every means that could render it
+formidable. Its force amounted to eighty thousand men, and two hundred
+pieces of cannon. The French army, on the contrary, could number
+scarcely thirty thousand men under arms, and thirty pieces of cannon.
+For some time there had been no issue of meat, and even the bread
+was irregularly supplied. The infantry was ill clothed, the cavalry
+wretchedly mounted. All the draught-horses had perished from want, so
+that the service of the artillery was performed by mules. To remedy
+these evils, large disbursements were necessary; and such was the state
+of the finances, that the government had only been able to furnish two
+thousand louis in specie for the opening of the campaign. The French
+army could not possibly exist in this state. To advance or retreat was
+absolutely necessary. Aware of the advantage of surprising the enemy
+at the very outset of the campaign by some decisive blow, Napoleon
+prepared for it by recasting the _morale_ of his army.
+
+In a proclamation full of energy, he reminded them that an ignoble
+death alone remained for them, if they continued on the defensive;
+that they had nothing to expect from France, but everything to hope
+from victory. “Abundance courts you in the fertile plains of Italy,”
+said he; “are you deficient, soldiers, in constancy or in courage?”
+Profiting by the moment of enthusiasm which he had inspired, Napoleon
+concentrated his forces in order to fall with his whole weight on the
+different corps of the enemy. Immediately afterward, the battles of
+Montenotte, Milesimo, and Mondovi, added fresh confidence to the high
+opinion already entertained by the soldier for his chief; and that army
+which only a few days ago was encamped amid barren rocks, and consumed
+by famine, already aspired to the conquest of Italy. In one month
+after the opening of the campaign, Napoleon had terminated the war with
+the King of Sardinia, and conquered the Milanese. Rich cantonments soon
+dispelled from the recollection of the French soldier the misery and
+fatigue attendant on this rapid march, while a vigilant administration
+of the resources of the country reorganized the _materiel_ of the
+French army, and created the means necessary for the attainment of
+future success.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM XX.
+
+
+It may be laid down as a principle, that the line of operation should
+not be abandoned; but it is one of the most skilful manœuvres in war,
+to know how to change it, when circumstances authorize or render this
+necessary. An army which changes skilfully its line of operation
+deceives the enemy, who becomes ignorant where to look for its rear, or
+upon what weak points it is assailable.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+Frederick sometimes changed his line of operation in the middle of a
+campaign; but he was enabled to do this, because he was manœuvring at
+that time in the centre of Germany--an abundant country, capable of
+supplying all the wants of his army in case his communications with
+Prussia were intercepted.
+
+Marshal Turenne, in the campaign of 1746, gave up his line of
+communication to the allies in the same manner; but, like Frederick,
+he was carrying on the war at this time in the centre of Germany, and
+having fallen with his whole forces upon Rain, he took the precaution
+of securing to himself a depôt upon which to establish his base of
+operation.
+
+By a series of manœuvres, marked alike by audacity and genius, he
+subsequently compelled the imperial army to abandon its magazines, and
+retire into Austria for winter quarters.
+
+But these are examples which it appears to me should only be imitated
+when we have taken full measure of the capacity of our adversary, and
+above all, when we see no reason to apprehend an insurrection in the
+country to which we transfer the theatre of war.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM XXI.
+
+
+When an army carries with it a battering train, or large convoys of
+sick and wounded, it cannot march by too short a line upon its depôts.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+It is above all in mountainous countries, and in those interspersed
+with woods and marshes, that it is of importance to observe this maxim;
+for, the convoys and means of transport being frequently embarrassed
+in defiles, an enemy by manœuvring may easily disperse the escorts, or
+make even a successful attack upon the whole army, when it is obliged,
+from the nature of the country, to march in an extended column.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM XXII.
+
+
+The art of encamping in position is the same as taking up the line in
+order of battle in this position. To this end, the artillery should be
+advantageously placed, ground should be selected which is not commanded
+or liable to be turned, and, as far as possible, the guns should cover
+and command the surrounding country.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+Frederick has remarked that, in order to be assured that your camp is
+well placed, you should see if, by making a small movement, you can
+oblige the enemy to make a greater; or, if after having forced him to
+retrograde one march you can compel him to fall back another.
+
+In defensive war, all camps should be entrenched in the front and
+wings of the position they occupy, and care should be taken that the
+rear is left perfectly open. If you are threatened with being turned,
+arrangements should be made beforehand for taking up a more distant
+position; and you should profit by any disorder in the enemy’s line of
+march, to make an attempt upon his artillery or baggage.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM XXIII.
+
+
+When you are occupying a position which the enemy threatens to
+surround, collect all your force immediately, and menace _him_ with
+an offensive movement. By this manœuvre, you will prevent him from
+detaching and annoying your flanks in case you should judge it
+necessary to retire.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+This was the manœuvre practised by General Desaix, in 1798, near
+Radstadt. He made up for inferiority in numbers by audacity, and
+maintained himself the whole day in position in spite of the vigorous
+attacks of the Archduke Charles. At night he effected his retreat in
+good order, and took up a position in the rear.
+
+It was in accordance, also, with this principle, in the same campaign,
+that General Moreau gave battle at Biberach, to secure his retreat
+by the passes of the Black mountains. A few days after, he fought at
+Schliengen with the same object. Placed in a good defensive position,
+he menaced the Archduke Charles by a sudden return to the offensive,
+while his artillery and baggage were passing the Rhine by the bridge of
+Huningen, and he was making all the necessary arrangements for retiring
+behind that river himself.
+
+Here, however, I would observe, that the execution of such offensive
+demonstrations should be deferred always till toward the evening, in
+order that you may not be compromised by engaging too early in a combat
+which you cannot long maintain with success.
+
+Night, and the uncertainty of the enemy after an affair of this kind,
+will always favor your retreat, if it is judged necessary; but,
+with a view to mask the operation more effectually, fires should be
+lighted all along the lines, to deceive the enemy and prevent him from
+discovering this retrograde movement, for in a retreat it is a great
+advantage to gain a march upon your adversary.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM XXIV.
+
+
+Never lose sight of this maxim: that you should establish your
+cantonments at the most distant and best-protected point from the
+enemy, especially where a surprise is possible. By this means you will
+have time to unite all your forces before he can attack you.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+In the campaign of 1745, Marshal Turenne lost the battle of Marienthal,
+by neglecting this principle; for if, instead of reassembling his
+divisions at Erbsthausen, he had rallied his troops at Mergentheim,
+behind the Tauber, his army would have been much sooner reunited; and
+Count Merci, in place of finding only three thousand men to fight at
+Erbsthausen (of which he was well informed), would have had the whole
+French army to attack in a position covered by a river.
+
+Some one having indiscreetly asked Viscount Turenne how he had lost the
+battle of Marienthal: “By my own fault,” replied the marshal; “but,”
+added he, “when a man has committed no faults in war, he can only have
+been engaged in it but a short time.”
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM XXV.
+
+
+When two armies are in order of battle, and one has to retire over a
+bridge, while the other has the circumference of the circle open, all
+the advantages are in favor of the latter. It is then a general should
+show boldness, strike a decided blow, and manœuvre upon the flank of
+his enemy. The victory is in his hands.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+This was the position of the French army at the famous battle of
+Leipzig, which terminated the campaign of 1813 so fatally for Napoleon;
+for the battle of Hanau was of no consequence, comparatively, in the
+desperate situation of that army.
+
+It strikes me that, in a situation like that of the French army
+previous to the battle of Leipzig, a general should never calculate
+upon any of those lucky chances which may arise out of a return to the
+offensive, but that he should rather adopt every possible means to
+secure his retreat. With this view, he should immediately cover himself
+with good entrenchments, to enable him to repel with inferior numbers
+the attack of the enemy, while his own equipments are crossing the
+river. As fast as the troops reach the other side, they should occupy
+positions to protect the passage of the rear guard, and this last
+should be covered by a _tête de pont_ as soon as the army breaks up its
+camp. During the wars of the Revolution, too little regard was paid
+to entrenchments; and it is for this reason we have seen large armies
+dispersed after a single reverse, and the fate of nations compromised
+by the issue of one battle.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM XXVI.
+
+
+It is contrary to all true principle, to make corps, which have no
+communication with each other, act separately against a central force
+whose communications are cut off.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+The Austrians lost the battle of Hohenlinden by neglecting this
+principle. The imperial army, under the orders of the archduke John,
+was divided into four columns, which had to march through an immense
+forest, previous to their junction in the plain of Anzing, where they
+intended to surprise the French. But these different corps, having no
+direct communication, found themselves compelled to engage separately
+with an enemy who had taken the precaution of concentrating his masses,
+and who could move them with facility in a country with which he had
+been long previously acquainted.
+
+Thus the Austrian army, enclosed in the defiles of the forest with its
+whole train of artillery and baggage, was attacked in its flanks and
+rear, and the archduke John was only enabled to rally his dispersed and
+shattered divisions under cover of the night.
+
+The trophies obtained by the French army on this day were immense. They
+consisted of eleven thousand prisoners, one hundred pieces of cannon,
+several stand of colors, and all the baggage of the enemy.
+
+The battle of Hohenlinden decided the fate of the campaign of 1800, and
+Moreau’s brilliant and well-merited success placed him in the rank of
+the first general of the age.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM XXVII.
+
+
+When an army is driven from a first position, the retreating columns
+should rally always sufficiently in the rear, to prevent any
+interruption from the enemy. The greatest disaster that can happen, is
+when the columns are attacked in detail, and before their junction.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+One great advantage which results from rallying your columns on a point
+far removed from the field of battle, or from the position previously
+occupied, is, that the enemy is uncertain as to the direction you mean
+to take.
+
+If he divides his force to pursue you, he exposes himself to see his
+detachments beaten in detail, especially if you have exerted all due
+diligence, and have effected the junction of your troops in sufficient
+time to get between his columns and disperse them one after the other.
+
+It was by a manœuvre of this kind in the campaign of Italy, in 1799,
+that General Melas gained the battle of Genola.
+
+General Championet commanded the French army, and endeavored to cut off
+the communication of the Austrians with Turin, by employing corps which
+manœuvred separately to get into their rear. Melas, who divined his
+project, made a retrograde march, by which he persuaded his adversary
+he was in full retreat, although the real object of his movement was
+to concentrate his forces at the point fixed for the junction of
+the different detachments of the French army, and which he beat and
+dispersed, one after another, by his great superiority in numbers. The
+result of this manœuvre, in which the Austrian general displayed vigor,
+decision, and foresight, secured to him the peaceable possession of
+Piedmont.
+
+It was also by the neglect of this principle that General Beaulieu, who
+commanded the Austro-Sardinian army in the campaign of 1796, lost the
+battle of Milesimo after that of Montenotte.
+
+His object, in endeavoring to rally his different corps upon Milesimo,
+was, to cover the high roads of Turin and Milan; but Napoleon, aware of
+the advantages arising from the ardor of troops emboldened by recent
+success, attacked him before he could assemble his divisions, and, by
+a series of skilful manœuvres, succeeded in separating the combined
+armies. They retired in the greatest disorder--the one by the road of
+Milan, the other by that of Turin.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM XXVIII.
+
+
+No force should be detached on the eve of a battle, because affairs may
+change during the night, either by the retreat of the enemy, or by the
+arrival of large reinforcements to enable him to resume the offensive,
+and counteract your previous arrangements.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+In 1796, the army of the Sambre and Meuse, commanded by General
+Jourdan, effected a retreat, which was rendered still more difficult
+by the loss of his line of communication. Seeing, however, that the
+forces of the archduke Charles were scattered, Jourdan, in order to
+accomplish his retreat upon Frankfort, resolved to open himself a way
+by Wurtzburg, where there were at that moment only two divisions of
+the Austrian army. This movement would have been attended with success,
+if the French general, believing he had simply these two divisions to
+contend with, had not committed the error of separating himself from
+the corps of Lefevre--which he left at Schweinfurt to cover the only
+direct communication of the army with its base of operation.
+
+The commission of this fault at the outset, added to some slowness in
+the march of the French general, secured the victory to the archduke,
+who hastened to concentrate his forces.
+
+The arrival of the two divisions, also, of Kray and Wartesleben, during
+the battle, enabled him to oppose fifty thousand men to the French
+army, which scarcely numbered thirty thousand combatants. This last
+was consequently beaten, and obliged to continue its retreat by the
+mountains of Fuldes, where the badness of the roads could be equalled
+only by the difficulty of the country.
+
+The division of Lefevre, amounting to fourteen thousand men, would,
+in all probability, have turned the scale in favor of Jourdan, had
+the latter not unfortunately conceived that two divisions only were
+opposing his passage to Wurtzburg.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM XXIX.
+
+
+When you have resolved to fight a battle, collect your whole force.
+Dispense with nothing. A single battalion sometimes decides the day.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+I think it here desirable to observe, that it is prudent before a
+battle to fix upon some point in rear of the reserve for the junction
+of the different detachments; for if, from unforeseen circumstances,
+these detachments should be prevented from joining before the action
+has commenced, they might be exposed, in case a retrograde movement
+should be found necessary, to the masses of the enemy. It is desirable
+also to keep the enemy in ignorance of these reinforcements, in order
+to employ them with greater effect. “A seasonable reinforcement,” says
+Frederick, “renders the success of a battle certain, because the enemy
+will always imagine it stronger than it really is, and lose courage
+accordingly.”
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM XXX.
+
+
+Nothing is so rash or so contrary to principle, as to make a flank
+march before an army in position, especially when this army occupies
+heights at the foot of which you are forced to defile.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+It was by a neglect of this principle that Frederick was beaten at
+Kollin in the first campaign of 1757. Notwithstanding prodigies of
+valor, the Prussians lost fifteen thousand men and a great portion of
+their artillery, while the loss of the Austrians did not exceed five
+thousand men. The consequence of this battle was more unfortunate
+still, since it obliged the King of Prussia to raise the siege of
+Prague, and to evacuate Bohemia.
+
+It was also by making a flank march before the Prussian army, that the
+French lost the disgraceful battle of Rosbach.
+
+This imprudent movement was still more to be reprehended, because the
+Prince de Soubise, who commanded the French army, was so negligent as
+to manœuvre, without either advanced guards or flanking corps, in
+presence of the enemy. The result was, that his army, consisting of
+fifty thousand men, was beaten by six battalions and thirty squadrons.
+The French lost seven thousand men, twenty-seven standards, and a great
+number of cannon. The Prussians had only three hundred men disabled.
+
+Thus, by having forgotten this principle, _that a flank march is never
+to be made before an enemy in line of battle_, Frederick lost his army
+at Kollin; and Soubise, at Rosbach, lost both his army and his honor.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM XXXI.
+
+
+When you determine to risk a battle, reserve to yourself every possible
+chance of success, more particularly if you have to deal with an
+adversary of superior talent; for if you are beaten, even in the midst
+of your magazines and your communications, wo to the vanquished!
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+“We should make war,” says Marshal Saxe, “without leaving anything
+to hazard, and in this especially consists the talent of a general.
+But when we have incurred the risk of a battle, we should know how to
+profit by the victory, and not merely content ourselves, according to
+custom, with possession of the field.”
+
+It was by neglecting to follow up the first success, that the Austrian
+army, after gaining the field of Marengo, saw itself compelled on the
+following day to evacuate the whole of Italy.
+
+General Melas, observing the French in retreat, left the direction
+of the movements of his army to the chief of his staff, and retired
+to Alexandria to repose from the fatigues of the day. Colonel Zach,
+equally convinced with his general that the French army was completely
+broken, and consisted only of fugitives, formed the divisions in column
+of route.
+
+By this arrangement, the imperial army prepared to enter upon its
+victorious march in a formation not less than three miles in depth.
+
+It was near four o’clock when General Desaix rejoined the French army
+with his division. His presence restored in some degree an equality
+between the contending forces; and yet Napoleon hesitated for a moment
+whether to resume the offensive, or to make use of this corps to secure
+his retreat. The ardor of the troops to return to the charge, decided
+his irresolution. He rode rapidly along the front of his divisions, and
+addressing the soldiers--“We have retired far enough for to-day,” said
+he; “you know I always sleep upon the field of battle!”
+
+The army, with unanimous shout, proclaimed to him a promise of
+victory. Napoleon resumed the offensive. The Austrian advance guard,
+panic-struck at the sight of a formidable and unbroken body presenting
+itself suddenly at a point where, a few moments before, only fugitives
+were to be seen, went to the right about, and carried disorder into the
+mass of its columns. Attacked immediately afterward, with impetuosity,
+in its front and flanks, the Austrian army was completely routed.
+
+Marshal Daun experienced nearly the same fate as General Melas, at the
+battle of Torgau, in the campaign of 1760.
+
+The position of the Austrian army was excellent. It had its left upon
+Torgau, its right on the plateau of Siptitz, and its front covered by a
+large sheet of water.
+
+Frederick proposed to turn its right in order to make an attack upon
+the rear. For this purpose he divided his army into two corps, the one
+under the orders of Ziethen, with instructions to attack in front,
+following the edge of the water; the other under his own immediate
+command, with which he set out to turn the right of the Austrians.
+But Marshal Daun having had intimation of the movements of the enemy,
+changed his front by countermarching, and was thus enabled to repel
+the attacks of Frederick, whom he obliged to retreat. The two corps
+of the Prussian army had been acting without communication. Ziethen,
+in the meantime, hearing the fire recede, concluded that the king had
+been beaten, and commenced a movement by his left in order to rejoin
+him; but falling in with two battalions of the reserve, the Prussian
+general profited by this reinforcement to resume the offensive.
+Accordingly he renewed the attack with vigor, got possession of the
+plateau of Siptitz, and soon after of the whole field of battle. The
+sun had already set when the King of Prussia received the news of this
+unexpected good fortune. He returned in all haste, took advantage of
+the night to restore order in his disorganized army, and the day after
+the battle occupied Torgau.
+
+Marshal Daun was receiving congratulations upon his victory, when he
+heard that the Prussians had resumed the offensive. He immediately
+commanded a retreat, and at daybreak the Austrians repassed the Elbe
+with the loss of twelve thousand men, eight thousand prisoners, and
+forty-five pieces of cannon.
+
+After the battle of Marengo, General Melas, although in the midst
+of his fortresses and magazines, saw himself compelled to abandon
+everything, in order to save the wreck of his army.
+
+General Mack capitulated after the battle of Ulm, although in the
+centre of his own country.
+
+The Prussians, in spite of their depôts and reserves, were obliged,
+after the battle of Jena, and the French after that of Waterloo, to lay
+down their arms.
+
+Hence, we may conclude that the misfortune that results from the loss
+of a battle, does not consist so much in the destruction of men and of
+_materiel_ as in the discouragement which follows this disaster. The
+courage and confidence of the victors augment in proportion as those
+of the vanquished diminish; and whatever may be the resources of an
+army, it will be found that a retreat will degenerate rapidly into a
+rout unless the general-in-chief shall succeed, by combining boldness
+with skill, and perseverance with firmness, in restoring the _morale_
+of his army.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM XXXII.
+
+
+The duty of an advanced guard does not consist in advancing or
+retiring, but in manœuvring. An advanced guard should be composed
+of light cavalry, supported by a reserve of heavy cavalry, and by
+battalions of infantry, supported also by artillery. An advanced guard
+should consist of picked troops, and the general officers, officers
+and men, should be selected for their respective capabilities and
+knowledge. A corps deficient in instruction is only an embarrassment to
+an advanced guard.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+It was the opinion of Frederick that an advanced guard should be
+composed of detachments of troops of all arms. The commander should
+possess skill in the choice of ground, and he should take care to be
+instantly informed, by means of numerous patrols, of everything passing
+in the enemy’s camp.
+
+In war, it is not the business of an advanced guard to fight, but to
+observe the enemy, in order to cover the movements of the army. When in
+pursuit, the advanced guard should charge with vigor, and cut off the
+baggage and insulated corps of the retiring enemy. For this purpose, it
+should be reinforced with all the disposable light cavalry of the army.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM XXXIII.
+
+
+It is contrary to the usages of war to allow parks or batteries of
+artillery to enter a defile, unless you hold the other extremity. In
+case of retreat, the guns will embarrass your movements and be lost.
+They should be left in position, under a sufficient escort, until you
+are master of the opening.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+Nothing encumbers the march of an army so much as a quantity of
+baggage. In the campaign of 1796, Napoleon abandoned his battering
+train under the walls of Mantua, after spiking the guns and destroying
+the carriages. By this sacrifice, he acquired a facility of manœuvring
+rapidly his little army, and obtained the initiative as well as a
+general superiority over the numerous but divided forces of Marshal
+Wurmser.
+
+In 1799, during his retreat in Italy, General Moreau being compelled
+to manœuvre among the mountains, preferred separating himself entirely
+from his reserve artillery, which he directed upon France by the Col
+de Fenestrelle, rather than embarrass his march with this part of his
+equipment.
+
+These are the examples we should follow; for if, by a rapidity of
+march, and a facility of concentration upon decisive points, the
+victory is gained, the _materiel_ of an army is soon re-established.
+But if, on the other hand, we are beaten and compelled to retreat, it
+will be difficult to save our equipments, and we may have reason to
+congratulate ourselves that we abandoned them in time to prevent them
+from augmenting the trophies of the enemy.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM XXXIV.
+
+
+It should be laid down as a principle, never to leave intervals by
+which the enemy can penetrate between corps formed in order of battle,
+unless it be to draw him into a snare.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+In the campaign of 1757, the Prince of Lorraine, who was covering
+Prague with the Austrian army, perceived the Prussians threatening, by
+a flank movement, to turn his right. He immediately ordered a partial
+change of front by throwing back the infantry of that wing, so as to
+form a right angle with the rest of the line. But this manœuvre being
+executed in presence of the enemy, was not effected without some
+disorder. The heads of the columns having marched too quick, caused
+the rear to lengthen out, and when the line was formed to the right,
+a large interval appeared at the salient angle. Frederick, observing
+this error, hastened to take advantage of it. He directed his centre
+corps, commanded by the Duke of Bevern, to throw itself into this
+opening, and by this manœuvre decided the fate of the battle.
+
+The Prince of Lorraine returned to Prague, beaten and pursued, with the
+loss of sixteen thousand men and two hundred pieces of cannon.
+
+It should be observed at the same time, that this operation of throwing
+a corps into the intervals made by an army in time of battle, should
+never be attempted unless you are at least equal in force, and have
+an opportunity of outflanking the enemy on the one side or the other;
+for it is then only you can hope to divide his army in the centre, and
+insulate the wings entirely. If you are inferior in number, you run the
+risk of being stopped by the reverses, and overpowered by the enemy’s
+wings, which may deploy upon your flanks and surround you.
+
+It was by this manœuvre that the Duke of Berwick gained the battle of
+Almanza, in the year 1707, in Spain.
+
+The Anglo-Portuguese army, under the command of Lord Galloway, came to
+invest Villena. Marshal Berwick, who commanded the French and Spanish
+army, quitted his camp at Montalegre, and moved upon this town to
+raise the siege. At his approach, the English general, eager to fight
+a battle, advanced to meet him in the plains of Almanza. The issue was
+long doubtful. The first line, commanded by the Duke of Popoli, having
+been broken, the Chevalier d’Asfeldt, who had charge of the second,
+drew up his masses with large intervals between them; and when the
+English, who were in pursuit of the first line, reached these reserves,
+he took advantage of their disorder to attack them in flank and
+defeated them entirely.
+
+Marshal Berwick, perceiving the success of this manœuvre, threw open
+his front, and deploying upon the enemy’s flanks, while the reserve
+sustained the attack in front, and the cavalry manœuvred in their rear,
+obtained a complete victory.
+
+Lord Galloway, wounded and pursued, collected with difficulty the
+remains of his army, and took shelter with them in Tortosa.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM XXXV.
+
+
+Encampments of the same army should always be formed so as to protect
+each other.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+At the battle of Dresden, in the campaign of 1813, the camp of the
+allies, although advantageously placed upon the heights on the left
+bank of the Elbe, was nevertheless extremely defective, from being
+traversed longitudinally by a deep ravine, which separated the left
+wing completely from the centre and the right. This vicious arrangement
+did not escape the penetrating eye of Napoleon. He instantly directed
+the whole of his cavalry and two corps of infantry against the
+insulated wing, attacked it with superior numbers, overthrew it, and
+took ten thousand prisoners, before it was possible to come to its
+support.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM XXXVI.
+
+
+When the enemy’s army is covered by a river, upon which he holds
+several _têtes de pont_, do not attack in front. This would divide
+your force and expose you to be turned. Approach the river in echelon
+of columns, in such a manner that the leading column shall be the
+only one the enemy can attack, without offering you his flank. In
+the meantime, let your light troops occupy the bank, and when you
+have decided on the point of passage, rush upon it and fling across
+your bridge. Observe that the point of passage should be always at a
+distance from the leading echelon, in order to deceive the enemy.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+If you occupy a town or a village on the bank of a river, opposite
+to that held by the enemy, it is an advantage to make this spot the
+crossing point, because it is easier to cover your carriages and
+reserve artillery, as well as to mask the construction of your bridge,
+in a town, than in the open country. It is also a great advantage
+to pass a river opposite a village, when the latter is only weakly
+occupied by the enemy; because as soon as the advanced guard reaches
+the other side, it carries this post, makes a lodgment, and by
+throwing up a few defensive works, converts it easily into a _tête de
+pont_. By this means, the rest of the army is enabled to effect the
+passage with facility.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM XXXVII.
+
+
+From the moment you are master of a position which commands the
+opposite bank, facilities are acquired for effecting the passage of
+the river; above all, if this position is sufficiently extensive to
+place upon it artillery in force. This advantage is diminished, if
+the river is more than three hundred toises (or six hundred yards)
+in breadth, because the distance being out of the range of grape, it
+is easy for the troops which defend the passage to line the bank and
+get under cover. Hence it follows that if the grenadiers, ordered to
+pass the river for the protection of the bridge, should reach the
+other side, they would be destroyed by the fire of the enemy; because
+his batteries, placed at the distance of two hundred toises from the
+landing, are capable of a most destructive effect, although removed
+above five hundred toises from the batteries of the crossing force.
+Thus the advantage of the artillery would be exclusively his. For
+the same reason, the passage is impracticable, unless you succeed in
+surprising the enemy, and are protected by an intermediate island, or,
+unless you are able to take advantage of an angle in the river, to
+establish a crossfire upon his works. In this case, the island or angle
+forms a natural _tête de pont_, and gives the advantage in artillery to
+the attacking army.
+
+When a river is less than sixty toises (or one hundred and twenty
+yards) in breadth, and you have a post upon the other side, the troops
+which are thrown across derive such advantages from the protection of
+your artillery, that, however small the angle may be, it is impossible
+for the enemy to prevent the establishment of a bridge. In this case,
+the most skilful generals, when they have discovered the project of
+their adversary, and brought their own army to the point of crossing,
+usually content themselves with opposing the passage of the bridge, by
+forming a semicircle round its extremity, as round the opening of a
+defile, and removing to the distance of three or four hundred toises
+from the fire of the opposite side.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+Frederick observes, that “the passage of great rivers in the presence
+of the enemy is one of the most delicate operations in war.” Success on
+these occasions depends on secrecy, on the rapidity of the manœuvres,
+and the punctual execution of the orders given for the movements of
+each division. To pass such an obstacle in presence of an enemy, and
+without his knowledge, it is necessary not only that the previous
+dispositions should be well conceived, but that they should be executed
+without confusion.
+
+In the campaign of 1705, Prince Eugene, of Savoy, wishing to come to
+the assistance of the Prince of Piedmont, sought for a favorable point
+at which to force the passage of the Adda, defended at that time by
+the French army, under the command of the Duke de Vendome.
+
+After having selected an advantageous situation, Prince Eugene erected
+a battery of twenty pieces of cannon on a position which commanded the
+entire of the opposite bank, and covered his infantry by a line of
+entrenched parallels constructed on the slope of the declivity.
+
+They were working vigorously at the bridge, when the Duke de Vendome
+appeared with his whole army. At first he seemed determined to oppose
+its construction, but after having examined the position of Prince
+Eugene, he judged this to be impracticable.
+
+He therefore placed his army out of reach of the prince’s batteries,
+resting both his wings upon the river, so as to form a bow, of which
+the Adda was the cord. He then covered himself with entrenchments and
+abattis, and was thus enabled to charge the enemy’s columns whenever
+they debouched from the bridge, and to beat them in detail.
+
+Eugene, having reconnoitred the position of the French, considered the
+passage impossible. He therefore withdrew the bridge, and broke up his
+camp during the night.
+
+It was by this manœuvre, also, that, in the campaign of 1809, the
+Archduke Charles compelled the French to reoccupy the isle of Lobau,
+after having debouched on the left bank of the Danube. The march of the
+Archduke Charles was wholly concentric. He menaced Grosaspern with his
+right, Esling with his centre, and Enzersdorf with his left.
+
+His army, with both wings resting on the Danube, formed a semicircle
+around Esling. Napoleon immediately attacked and broke the centre of
+the Austrians; but after having forced their first line, he found
+himself arrested by the reserves. In the meantime, the bridges upon
+the Danube had been destroyed, and several of his corps, with their
+parks of artillery, were still on the right bank. This disappointment,
+joined to the favorable position of the Austrians, decided Napoleon
+to re-enter the isle of Lobau, where he had previously constructed a
+line of field-works, so as to give it all the advantages of a well
+entrenched camp.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM XXXVIII.
+
+
+It is difficult to prevent an enemy, supplied with pontoons, from
+crossing a river. When the object of an army, which defends the
+passage, is to cover a siege, the moment the general has ascertained
+his inability to oppose the passage, he should take measures to arrive
+before the enemy, at an intermediate position between the river he
+defends and the place he desires to cover.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+Here we may observe, that this intermediate position should be
+reconnoitred, or rather, well entrenched beforehand; for the enemy will
+be unable to make an offensive movement against the corps employed in
+the siege, until he has beaten the army of observation; and the latter,
+under cover of its camp, may always await a favorable opportunity to
+attack him in flank or in rear.
+
+Besides, the army which is once entrenched in this manner, has the
+advantage of being concentrated; while that of the enemy must act in
+detachments, if he wishes to cover his bridge, and watch the movements
+of the army of observation, so as to enable him to attack the besieging
+corps in its lines, without being exposed to an attempt on his rear, or
+being menaced with the loss of his bridge.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM XXXIX.
+
+
+In the campaign of 1645, Turenne was attacked with his army before
+Philipsburg by a very superior force. There was no bridge here over
+the Rhine, but he took advantage of the ground between the river and
+the place to establish his camp. This should serve as a lesson to
+engineer officers, not merely in the construction of fortresses, but
+of _têtes de pont_. A space should always be left between the fortress
+and the river, where an army may form and rally without being obliged
+to throw itself into the place, and thereby compromise its security.
+An army retiring upon Mayence before a pursuing enemy, is necessarily
+compromised; for this reason, because it requires more than a day to
+pass the bridge, and because the lines of Cassel are too confined to
+admit an army to remain there without being blocked up. Two hundred
+toises should have been left between that place and the Rhine. It
+is essential that all _têtes de pont_ before great rivers should be
+constructed upon this principle, otherwise they will prove a very
+inefficient assistance to protect the passage of a retreating army.
+_Têtes de pont_, as laid down in our schools, are of use only for small
+rivers, the passage of which is comparatively short.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+Marshal Saxe, in the campaign of 1741, having passed the Moldau in
+quest of a detached corps of fourteen thousand men, which was about to
+throw itself into Prague, left a thousand infantry upon that river,
+with orders to entrench themselves upon a height directly opposite the
+_tête de pont_. By this precaution, the marshal secured his retreat,
+and also the facility of repassing the bridge without disorder, by
+rallying his divisions between the entrenched height and the _tête de
+pont_.
+
+Were these examples unknown to the generals of modern times, or are
+they disposed to think such precautions superfluous?
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM XL.
+
+
+Fortresses are equally useful in offensive and defensive warfare. It
+is true, they will not in themselves arrest an army, but they are an
+excellent means of retarding, embarrassing, weakening and annoying a
+victorious enemy.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+The brilliant success of the allied armies in the campaign of 1814, has
+given to many military men a false idea of the real value of fortresses.
+
+The formidable bodies which crossed the Rhine and the Alps at this
+period, were enabled to spare large detachments to blockade the strong
+places that covered the frontiers of France, without materially
+affecting the numerical superiority of the army which marched upon the
+capital. This army was in a condition, therefore, to act, without the
+fear of being menaced in its line of retreat.
+
+But at no period of military history were the armies of Europe so
+combined before, or governed so entirely by one common mind in the
+attainment of a single object. Under these circumstances, the line of
+fortresses which surround France was rendered unavailable during the
+campaign; but it would be very imprudent, therefore, to conclude that
+a frontier guarded by numerous fortresses may be passed with impunity;
+or that battles may be fought with these places in your rear, without
+previously besieging, or at least investing them with sufficient forces.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM XLI.
+
+
+There are only two ways of insuring the success of a siege. The first,
+to begin by beating the enemy’s army employed to cover the place,
+forcing it out of the field, and throwing its remains beyond some great
+natural obstacle, such as a chain of mountains, or large river. Having
+accomplished this object, an army of observation should be placed
+behind the natural obstacle, until the trenches are finished and the
+place taken.
+
+But if it be desired to take the place in presence of a relieving army,
+without risking a battle, then the whole _materiel_ and equipment for
+a siege are necessary to begin with, together with ammunition and
+provisions for the presumed period of its duration, and also lines of
+contravallation and circumvallation, aided by all the localities of
+heights, woods, marshes and inundations.
+
+Having no longer occasion to keep up communications with your depôts,
+it is now only requisite to hold in check the relieving army. For
+this purpose, an army of observation should be formed, whose business
+it is never to lose sight of that of the enemy, and which, while it
+effectually bars all access to the place, has always time enough to
+arrive upon his flanks or rear in case he should attempt to steal a
+march.
+
+It is to be remembered, too, that by profiting judiciously by the
+lines of contravallation, a portion of the besieging army will always
+be available in giving battle to the approaching enemy.
+
+Upon the same general principle, when a place is to be besieged in
+presence of an enemy’s army, it is necessary to cover the siege by
+lines of _circumvallation_.
+
+If the besieging force is of numerical strength enough (after leaving
+a corps before the place four times the amount of the garrison) to
+cope with the relieving army, it may remove more than one day’s march
+from the place; but if it be inferior in numbers after providing for
+the siege, as above stated, it should remain only a short day’s march
+from the spot, in order to fall back upon its lines, if necessary, or
+receive succor in case of attack.
+
+If the investing corps and army of observation are only equal when
+united to the relieving force, the besieging army should remain entire
+within, or near its lines, and push the works and the siege with the
+greatest activity.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+“When we undertake a siege,” says Montécuculli, “we should not seek to
+place ourselves opposite the weakest part of the fortress, but at the
+point most favorable for establishing a camp and executing the designs
+we have in view.”
+
+This maxim was well understood by the Duke of Berwick. Sent to form
+the siege of Nice in 1706, he determined to attack on the side of
+Montalban, contrary to the advice of Vauban, and even to the orders
+of the king. Having a very small army at his disposal, he began by
+securing his camp. This he did by constructing redoubts upon the
+heights that shut in the space between the Var and the Paillon,
+two rivers which supported his flanks. By this means, he protected
+himself against a surprise; for the Duke of Savoy, having the power
+of debouching suddenly by the Col de Tende, it was necessary that
+the marshal should be enabled to assemble his forces, so as to move
+rapidly upon his adversary, and fight him before he got into position;
+otherwise his inferiority in numbers would have obliged him to raise
+the siege.
+
+When Marshal Saxe was besieging Brussels, with only twenty-eight
+thousand men, opposed to a garrison of twelve thousand, he received
+intelligence that the Prince of Waldeck was assembling his forces
+to raise the siege. Not being strong enough to form an army of
+observation, the marshal reconnoitred a field of battle on the little
+river Voluve, and made all the necessary dispositions for moving
+rapidly to the spot, in case of the approach of the enemy. By this
+means he was prepared to receive his adversary without discontinuing
+the operations of the siege.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM XLII.
+
+
+Feuquière says that “we should never wait for the enemy in the lines
+of circumvallation, but we should go out and attack him.” He is in
+error. There is no authority in war without exception; and it would be
+dangerous to proscribe the principle of awaiting the enemy within the
+lines of circumvallation.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+During the siege of Mons, in 1691, the Prince of Orange assembled
+his army, and advanced as far as Notre Dame de Halle, making a
+demonstration to succor the place. Louis XIV, who commanded the siege
+in person, called a council of war to deliberate on what was to be
+done in case the Prince of Orange approached. The opinion of Marshal
+Luxembourg was to remain within the lines of circumvallation, and that
+opinion prevailed.
+
+The marshal laid it down as a principle that, when the besieging army
+is not strong enough to defend the whole extent of circumvallation, it
+should quit the lines and advance to meet the enemy; but when it is
+strong enough to encamp in two lines around a place, that it is better
+to profit by a good entrenchment--more especially as by this means the
+siege is not interrupted.
+
+In 1658, Marshal Turenne was besieging Dunkirk. He had already opened
+the trenches, when the Spanish army, under the orders of the Prince Don
+Juan, Condé, and D’Hocquincourt, appeared in sight, and took post upon
+the Downs, at a distance of a league from his lines. Turenne had the
+superiority in numbers, and he determined to quit his entrenchments.
+He had other advantages also. The enemy was without artillery, and
+their superiority in cavalry was rendered useless by the unfavorable
+nature of the ground. It was, therefore, of great importance to beat
+the Spanish army before it had time to entrench itself and bring up its
+artillery. The victory gained by the French on this occasion justified
+all the combinations of Marshal Turenne.
+
+When Marshal Berwick was laying siege to Philipsburg, in 1733, he had
+reason to apprehend that the Prince of Savoy would attack him with
+all the forces of the empire before its termination. The marshal,
+therefore, after having made his disposition of the troops intended for
+the siege, formed, with the rest of his army, a corps of observation to
+make head against Prince Eugene, in case the latter should choose to
+attack him in his lines, or attempt a diversion on the Moselle or Upper
+Rhine. Prince Eugene, having arrived in front of the besieging army,
+some general officers were of opinion that it was better not to await
+the enemy in the lines, but to move forward and attack him. But Marshal
+Berwick, who agreed with the Duke of Luxembourg, that an army which
+can occupy, completely, good entrenchments is not liable to be forced,
+persisted in remaining within his works. The result proved that this
+was also the opinion of Prince Eugene, for he did not dare to attack
+the entrenchments, which he would not have failed to do if he had any
+hopes of success.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM XLIII.
+
+
+Those who proscribe lines of circumvallation, and all the assistance
+which the science of the engineer can afford, deprive themselves
+gratuitously of an auxiliary which is never injurious, almost always
+useful, and often indispensable. It must be admitted, at the same time,
+that the principles of field-fortification require improvement. This
+important branch of the art of war has made no progress since the time
+of the ancients. It is even inferior at this day to what it was two
+thousand years ago. Engineer officers should be encouraged in bringing
+this branch of their art to perfection, and in placing it upon a level
+with the rest.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+“If we are inferior in numbers,” says Marshal Saxe, “entrenchments
+are of no use, for the enemy will bring all his forces to bear upon
+particular points. If we are of equal strength they are unnecessary
+also. If we are superior, we do not want them. Then why give ourselves
+the trouble to entrench?” Notwithstanding this opinion of the inutility
+of entrenchments, Marshal Saxe often had recourse to them.
+
+In 1797, Generals Provéra and Hohenzollern having presented themselves
+before Mantua (where Marshal Wurmser was shut up), for the purpose of
+raising the siege, they were stopped by the lines of contravallation of
+St. George. This slight obstacle sufficed to afford Napoleon time to
+arrive from Rivoli and defeat their enterprise. It was in consequence
+of neglecting to entrench themselves that the French had been obliged
+to raise the siege in the preceding campaign.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM XLIV.
+
+
+If circumstances prevent a sufficient garrison being left to defend
+a fortified town, which contains an hospital and magazines, at least
+every means should be employed to secure the citadel against a _coup
+de main_.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+A few battalions dispersed about a town, inspire no terror; but shut
+up in the more narrow outline of a citadel, they assume an imposing
+attitude. For this reason it appears to me that such a precaution
+is always necessary, not only in fortresses, but wherever there are
+hospitals or depôts of any kind. Where there is no citadel, some
+quarter of the town should be fixed upon most favorable for defence,
+and entrenched in such a manner as to oppose the greatest resistance
+possible.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM XLV.
+
+
+A fortified place can only protect the garrison and detain the enemy
+for a certain time. When this time has elapsed, and the defences of
+the place are destroyed, the garrison should lay down its arms. All
+civilized nations are agreed on this point, and there never has been
+an argument except with reference to the greater or less degree of
+defence which a governor is bound to make before he capitulates. At the
+same time, there are generals--Villars among the number--who are of
+opinion that a governor should never surrender, but that in the last
+extremity he should blow up the fortifications, and take advantage of
+the night to cut his way through the besieging army. Where he is unable
+to blow up the fortifications, he may always retire, they say, with his
+garrison, and save the men.
+
+Officers who have adopted this line of conduct, have often brought off
+three-fourths of their garrison.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+In 1705, the French, who were besieged in Haguenau by Count Thungen,
+found themselves incapable of sustaining an assault. Péri, the
+governor, who had already distinguished himself by a vigorous defence,
+despairing of being allowed to capitulate on any terms short of
+becoming prisoner of war, resolved to abandon the place and cut his way
+through the besiegers.
+
+In order to conceal his intention more effectually, and while he
+deceived the enemy, to sound at the same time the disposition of his
+officers, he assembled a council of war and declared his resolution to
+die in the breach. Then, under pretext of the extremity to which he was
+reduced, he commanded the whole garrison under arms; and leaving only a
+few sharpshooters in the breach, gave the order to march, and set out
+in silence, under cover of the night, from Haguenau. This audacious
+enterprise was crowned with success, and Péri reached Saverne without
+having suffered the smallest loss.
+
+Two fine instances of defence in later times are those of Massena at
+Genoa, and of Palafox at Saragossa.
+
+The first marched out with arms and baggage, and all the honors of
+war, after rejecting every summons, and defending himself until hunger
+alone compelled him to capitulate. The second only yielded after having
+buried his garrison amid the ruins of the city, which he defended from
+house to house, until famine and death left him no alternative but to
+surrender. This siege, which was equally honorable to the French as
+to the Spaniards, is one of the most memorable in the history of war.
+In the course of it, Palafox displayed every possible resource which
+courage and obstinacy can supply in the defence of a fortress.
+
+All real strength is founded in the mind; and on this account I am of
+opinion that we should be directed in the choice of a governor, less by
+his genius than his personal character. His most essential qualities
+should be courage, perseverance, and soldierlike devotedness. Above
+all, he should possess the talent not only of infusing courage into
+the garrison, but of kindling a spirit of resistance in the whole
+population. Where the latter is wanting, however art may multiply the
+defences of a place, the garrison will be compelled to capitulate after
+having sustained the first, or at most, the second assault.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM XLVI.
+
+
+The keys of a fortress are well worth the retirement of the garrison,
+when it is resolved to yield only on those conditions. On this
+principle it is always wiser to grant an honorable capitulation to a
+garrison which has made a vigorous resistance, than to risk an assault.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+Marshal Villars has justly observed, that “no governor of a place
+should be permitted to excuse himself for surrendering, on the ground
+of wishing to preserve the king’s troops. Every garrison that displays
+courage will escape being prisoners of war. For there is no general
+who, however well assured of carrying a place by assault, will not
+prefer granting terms of capitulation rather than risk the loss of a
+thousand men in forcing determined troops to surrender.”
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM XLVII.
+
+
+Infantry, cavalry, and artillery, are nothing without each other;
+therefore, they should always be so disposed in cantonments as to
+assist each other in case of surprise.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+“A general,” says Frederick, “should direct his whole attention to
+the tranquility of his cantonments, in order that the soldier may be
+relieved from all anxiety, and repose in security from his fatigues.
+With this view, care should be taken that the troops are able to form
+rapidly upon ground which has been previously reconnoitered; that the
+generals remain always with their divisions or brigades, and that the
+service is carried on throughout with exactness.”
+
+Marshal Saxe is of opinion that an army should not be in a hurry to
+quit its cantonments, but that it should wait till the enemy has
+exhausted himself with marching, and be ready to fall upon him with
+fresh troops when he is overcome with fatigue.
+
+I believe, however, that it would be dangerous to trust implicitly
+to this high authority, for there are many occasions where all the
+advantage lies in the initiative, more especially when the enemy has
+been compelled to extend his cantonments, from scarcity of subsistence,
+and can be attacked before he has time to concentrate his forces.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM XLVIII.
+
+
+The formation of infantry in line should be always in two ranks,
+because the length of the musket only admits of an effective fire in
+this formation. The discharge of the third rank is not only uncertain,
+but frequently dangerous to the ranks in its front. In drawing up
+infantry in two ranks, there should be a supernumerary behind every
+fourth or fifth file. A reserve should likewise be placed twenty-five
+paces in rear of each flank.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+I am of opinion, if circumstances require a line of infantry to resort
+to a square, that two-deep is too light a formation to resist the
+shock of cavalry. However useless the third rank may appear for the
+purpose of file-firing, it is, notwithstanding necessary, in order to
+replace the men who fall in the ranks in front; otherwise you would
+be obliged to close in the files, and by this means leave intervals
+between the companies, which the cavalry would not fail to penetrate.
+It appears to me, also, that when infantry is formed in two ranks, the
+columns will be found to open out in marching to a flank. If it should
+be considered advantageous behind entrenchments to keep the infantry
+in two ranks, the third rank should be placed in reserve, and brought
+forward to relieve the front rank when fatigued, or when the fire is
+observed to slacken. I am induced to make these remarks, because I have
+seen an excellent pamphlet which proposes the two-deep formation for
+infantry as the best. The author supports his opinion by a variety of
+plausible reasons, but not sufficient, as it appears to me, to answer
+all the objections that may be offered to this practice.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM XLIX.
+
+
+The practice of mixing small bodies of infantry and cavalry together is
+a bad one, and attended with many inconveniences. The cavalry loses its
+power of action. It becomes fettered in all its movements. Its energy
+is destroyed; even the infantry itself is compromised, for on the
+first movement of the cavalry it is left without support. The best mode
+of protecting cavalry is to cover its flank.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+This also was the opinion of Marshal Saxe. “The weakness of the above
+formation,” says he, “is sufficient in itself to intimidate the
+platoons of infantry, because they must be lost if the cavalry is
+beaten.”
+
+The cavalry, also, which depends on the infantry for succor, is
+disconcerted the moment a brisk forward movement carries them out of
+sight of their supports. Marshal Turenne, and the generals of his time,
+sometimes employed this order of formation; but that does not, in my
+opinion, justify a modern author for recommending it in an essay,
+entitled “_Considerations sur l’Art de la Guerre_.” In fact, this
+formation has long been abandoned; and, since the introduction of light
+artillery, it appears to me almost ridiculous to propose it.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM L.
+
+
+Charges of cavalry are equally useful at the beginning, the middle, and
+the end of a battle. They should be made always, if possible, on the
+flanks of the infantry, especially when the latter is engaged in front.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+The Archduke Charles, in speaking of cavalry, recommends that it should
+be brought in mass upon a decisive point, when the moment for employing
+it arrives; that is to say, when it can attack with a certainty of
+success. As the rapidity of its movement enables cavalry to act along
+the whole line in the same day, the general who commands it should
+keep it together as much as possible, and avoid dividing it into many
+detachments. When the nature of the ground admits of cavalry being
+employed on all points of the line, it is desirable to form it in
+column behind the infantry, and in a position whence it may be easily
+directed wherever it is required. If cavalry is intended to cover a
+position, it should be placed sufficiently in the rear to meet at full
+speed any advance of troops coming to attack that position. If it is
+destined to cover the flank of the infantry, it should, for the same
+reason, be placed directly behind it. As the object of cavalry is
+purely offensive, it should be a rule to form it at such a distance
+only from the point of collision as to enable it to acquire its utmost
+impulse, and arrive at the top of its speed into action. With respect
+to the cavalry reserve, this should only be employed at the end of a
+battle, either to render the success more decisive, or to cover the
+retreat. Napoleon remarks that, at the battle of Waterloo, the cavalry
+of the guard which composed the reserve, was engaged against his
+orders. He complains of having been deprived from five o’clock of the
+use of this reserve, which, when well employed, had so often insured
+him the victory.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM LI.
+
+
+It is the business of cavalry to follow up the victory, and to prevent
+the beaten enemy from rallying.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+Victor or vanquished, it is of the greatest importance to have a body
+of cavalry in reserve, either to take advantage of victory, or to
+secure a retreat. The most decisive battles lose half their value to
+the conqueror, when the want of cavalry prevents him from following up
+his success, and depriving the enemy of the power of rallying.
+
+When a retiring army is pursued, it is more especially upon the flanks
+that the weight of cavalry should fall, if you are strong enough in
+that arm to cut off his retreat.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM LII.
+
+
+Artillery is more essential to cavalry than to infantry, because
+cavalry has no fire for its defence, but depends upon the sabre.
+It is to remedy this deficiency that recourse has been had to
+horse-artillery. Cavalry, therefore, should never be without cannon,
+whether when attacking, rallying, or in position.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+Horse-artillery is an invention of Frederick. Austria lost no time in
+introducing it into her armies, although in an imperfect degree. It was
+only in 1792 that this arm was adopted in France, where it was brought
+rapidly to its present perfection.
+
+The services of this arm during the wars of the Revolution were
+immense. It may be said to have changed to a certain extent the
+character of tactics, because its facility of movement enables it to
+bear with rapidity on every point where artillery can be employed
+with success. Napoleon has remarked in his memoirs that a flanking
+battery which strikes and rakes the enemy obliquely, is capable of
+deciding a victory in itself. To this we may add that, independent of
+the advantages which cavalry derives from horse-artillery in securing
+its flanks, and in opening the way for a successful charge by the
+destructiveness of its fire, it is desirable that these two arms
+should never be separated, but ready at all times to seize upon points
+where it may be necessary to employ cannon. On these occasions, the
+cavalry masks the march of the artillery, protects its establishment in
+position, and covers it from the attack of the enemy, until it is ready
+to open its fire.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM LIII.
+
+
+In march, or in position, the greater part of the artillery should
+be with the divisions of infantry and cavalry. The rest should be in
+reserve. Each gun should have with it three hundred rounds, without
+including the limber. This is about the complement for two battles.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+The better infantry is, the more important it is to support it by
+artillery, with a view to its preservation.
+
+It is essential, also, that the batteries attached to divisions should
+march in the front, because this has a strong influence on the _morale_
+of the soldier. He attacks always with confidence when he sees the
+flanks of the column well covered with cannon.
+
+The artillery reserve should be kept for a decisive moment, and then
+employed in full force, for it will be difficult for the enemy at such
+a time to presume to attack it.
+
+There is scarcely an instance of a battery of sixty pieces of cannon
+having been carried by a charge of infantry or cavalry, unless where
+it was entirely without support, or in a position to be easily turned.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM LIV.
+
+
+Artillery should always be placed in the most advantageous positions,
+and as far in front of the line of cavalry and infantry as possible,
+without compromising the safety of the guns.
+
+Field batteries should command the whole country round from the level
+of the platform. They should on no account be masked on the right and
+left, but have free range in every direction.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+The battery of eighteen pieces of cannon, which covered the centre of
+the Russian army at the battle of La Moskwa (Borodino), may be cited as
+an example.
+
+Its position, upon a circular height which commanded the field in every
+direction, added so powerfully to its effect, that its fire alone
+sufficed, for a considerable time, to paralyze the vigorous attack
+made by the French with their right. Although twice broken, the left
+of the Russian army closed to this battery, as to a pivot, and twice
+recovered its former position. After repeated attacks, conducted with
+a rare intrepidity, the battery was at length carried by the French,
+but not till they had lost the _élite_ of their army, and with it the
+Generals Caulincourt and Montbrun. Its capture decided the retreat of
+the Russian left.
+
+I might advert likewise to another instance, in the campaign of 1809,
+and to the terrible effect produced by the hundred pieces of cannon of
+the Guard which General Lauriston directed, at the battle of Wagram,
+against the right of the Austrian army.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM LV.
+
+
+A General should never put his army into cantonments, when he has the
+means of collecting supplies of forage and provisions, and of thus
+providing for the wants of the soldier in the field.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+One great advantage which results from having an army in camp is,
+that it is easier to direct its spirit and maintain its discipline
+there. The soldier in cantonments abandons himself to repose; he ends
+by finding a pleasure in idleness, and in fearing to return to the
+field. The reverse takes place in a camp. There, a feeling of _ennui_,
+and a severer discipline, make him anxious for the opening of the
+campaign, to interrupt the monotony of the service and relieve it with
+the chances and variety of war. Besides, an army in camp is much more
+secure from a surprise than in cantonments--the defect of which usually
+consists in their occupying too great an extent of ground. When an army
+is obliged to go into quarters, the Marquis de Feuquière recommends
+a camp to be selected in front of the line, where the troops can be
+frequently assembled--sometimes suddenly, in order to exercise their
+vigilance, or for the sole purpose of bringing the different corps
+together.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM LVI.
+
+
+A good general, a well-organized system, good instructions, and severe
+discipline, aided by effective establishments, will always make good
+troops, independently of the cause for which they fight.
+
+At the same time, a love of country, a spirit of enthusiasm, a sense of
+national honor, and fanaticism, will operate upon young soldiers with
+advantage.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+This remark appears to me less applicable to officers than to soldiers,
+for as war is not a state of things natural to man, it follows
+that those who maintain its cause must be governed by some strong
+excitement. Much enthusiasm and devotedness are required on the part
+of the troops for the general who commands, to induce an army to
+perform great actions in a war in which it takes no interest. This is
+sufficiently proved by the apathy of auxiliaries, unless when inspired
+by the conduct of their chief.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM LVII.
+
+
+When a nation is without establishments and a military system, it is
+very difficult to organize an army.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+This is an unanswerable truth, more particularly with reference to an
+army intended to act upon the system of modern war, and in which order,
+precision, and rapidity of movement, are the principal essentials to
+success.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM LVIII.
+
+
+The first qualification of a soldier is fortitude under fatigue and
+privation. Courage is only the second; hardship, poverty and want, are
+the best school for a soldier.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+Valor belongs to the young soldier as well as to the veteran; but in
+the former it is more evanescent. It is only by habits of service, and
+after several campaigns, that the soldier acquires that moral courage
+which makes him support the fatigues and privations of war without a
+murmur. Experience by this time has instructed him to supply his own
+wants. He is satisfied with what he can procure, because he knows that
+success is only to be obtained by fortitude and perseverance. Well
+might Napoleon say that misery and want were the best school for a
+soldier; for as nothing could be compared with the total destitution
+of the army of the Alps, when he assumed the command, so nothing
+could equal the brilliant success which he obtained with this army
+in the first campaign in Italy. The conquerors of Montenotte, Lodi,
+Castiglione, Bassano, Arcole and Rivoli had beheld, only a few months
+before, whole battalions covered with rags, and deserting for the want
+of subsistence.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM LIX.
+
+
+There are five things the soldier should never be without--his musket,
+his ammunition, his knapsack, his provisions (for at least four days),
+and his entrenching-tool. The knapsack may be reduced to the smallest
+size possible, if it be thought proper, but the soldier should always
+have it with him.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+It is fortunate that Napoleon has recognized the advantage of giving
+to every soldier an entrenching-tool. His authority is the best answer
+to the ridicule which has been thrown upon those who proposed it. An
+axe will be found to inconvenience the foot-soldier as little as the
+sword he wears at his side, and it will be infinitely more useful. When
+axes are given out to companies, or are carried by fatigue-men during
+a campaign, they are soon lost; and it often happens, when a camp is
+to be formed, that a difficulty arises in cutting wood and building
+huts for the soldier; whereas, by making the axe a part of every man’s
+appointments, he is obliged to have it always with him; and whether
+the object be to entrench himself in a village, or to erect huts in a
+camp, the commander of a corps will speedily see the advantage of this
+innovation.
+
+When once the axe has been generally adopted, we shall, perhaps,
+see the desirability of issuing pickaxes and shovels to particular
+companies, and also the benefit of more frequent entrenchments. It is
+more particularly during retreats that it is important to entrench when
+the army has reached a good position; for an entrenched camp not only
+furnishes the means of rallying troops which are pursued, but if it be
+fortified in such a manner as to render the issue of an attack doubtful
+to the enemy, it will not only sustain the _morale_ of the soldier in
+the retreat, but afford the general-in-chief opportunities for resuming
+the offensive, and profiting by the first false movement on the part of
+his adversary. It will be recollected how Frederick, in the campaign of
+1761, when surrounded by two Russian and Austrian armies, whose united
+force was quadruple his own, saved his army by entrenching himself in
+the camp of Buntzalvitz.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM LX.
+
+
+Every means should be taken to attach the soldier to his colors. This
+is best accomplished by showing consideration and respect to the old
+soldier. His pay likewise should increase with his length of service.
+It is the height of injustice not to pay a veteran more than a recruit.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+Some modern writers have recommended, on the other hand, to limit the
+period of service, in order to bring the whole youth of a country
+successively under arms. By this means they purpose to have the levies,
+_en masse_, all ready trained and capable of resisting successfully
+a war of invasion. But however advantageous at first sight such a
+military system may appear, I believe it will be found to have many
+objections.
+
+In the first place, the soldier fatigued with the minutiæ of discipline
+in a garrison, will not feel much inclined to re-enlist after he has
+received his discharge, more especially since, having served the
+prescribed time, he will consider himself to have fulfilled all the
+duties of a citizen to his country. Returning to his friends, he will
+probably marry, or establish himself in a trade. From that moment his
+military spirit declines, and he soon becomes ill adapted to the
+business of war. On the contrary, the soldier who serves long, becomes
+attached to his regiment as to a new family. He submits to the yoke of
+discipline, accustoms himself to the privations his situation imposes,
+and ends by finding his condition agreeable. There are few officers
+that have seen service who have not discovered the difference between
+old and young soldiers, with reference to their power of supporting
+the fatigues of a long campaign, to the determined courage that
+characterizes the attack, or to the ease with which they rally after
+being broken.
+
+Montécuculli observes, that “it takes time to discipline an army; more
+to inure it to war; and still more to constitute veterans.” For this
+reason, he recommends that great consideration should be shown to old
+soldiers; that they should be carefully provided for, and a large
+body of them kept always on foot. It seems to me, also, that it is
+not enough to increase the pay of the soldier according to his period
+of service, but that it is highly essential to confer on him some
+mark of distinction that shall secure to him privileges calculated to
+encourage him to grow gray under arms, and, above all, to do so with
+honor.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM LXI.
+
+
+It is not set speeches at the moment of battle that render soldiers
+brave. The veteran scarcely listens to them, and the recruit forgets
+them at the first discharge. If discourses and harangues are useful, it
+is during the campaign: to do away unfavorable impressions, to correct
+false reports, to keep alive a proper spirit in the camp, and to
+furnish materials and amusement for the bivouac. All printed orders of
+the day should keep in view these objects.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+The opinion of the general-in-chief, energetically expressed, is,
+notwithstanding, productive of great effect on the _morale_ of the
+soldier.
+
+In 1703, at the attack of Hornbec, Marshal Villars, seeing the troops
+advancing without spirit, threw himself at their head: “What!” said
+he, “is it expected that I, a marshal of France, should be the first to
+escalade, when I order YOU to attack?”
+
+These few words rekindled their ardor; officers and soldiers rushed
+upon the works, and the town was taken almost without loss.
+
+“We have retired far enough for to-day; you know I always sleep upon
+the field of battle!” said Napoleon, as he flew through the ranks
+at the moment of resuming the offensive at Marengo. These few words
+sufficed to revive the courage of the soldiers, and to make them forget
+the fatigues of the day, during which almost every man had been engaged.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM LXII.
+
+
+Tents are unfavorable to health. The soldier is best when he bivouacs,
+because he sleeps with his feet to the fire, which speedily dries the
+ground on which he lies. A few planks, or a little straw, shelter him
+from the wind.
+
+On the other hand, tents are necessary for the superior officers, who
+have to write and to consult their maps. Tents should, therefore,
+be issued to these, with directions to them never to sleep in a
+house. Tents are always objects of observation to the enemy’s staff.
+They afford information in regard to your numbers and the ground you
+occupy; while an army bivouacking in two or three lines, is only
+distinguishable from afar by the smoke which mingles with the clouds.
+It is impossible to count the number of the fires.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+The acknowledged advantage of bivouacking is another reason for
+adding an entrenching-tool to the equipment of the soldier; for, with
+the assistance of the axe and shovel, he can hut himself without
+difficulty. I have seen huts erected with the branches of trees,
+covered with turf, where the soldier was perfectly sheltered from the
+cold and wet, even in the worst season.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM LXIII.
+
+
+All information obtained from prisoners should be received with
+caution, and estimated at its real value. A soldier seldom sees
+anything beyond his company; and an officer can afford intelligence of
+little more than the position and movements of the division to which
+his regiment belongs. On this account, the general of an army should
+never depend upon the information derived from prisoners, unless it
+agrees with the reports received from the advanced guards, in reference
+to the position, etc., of the enemy.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+Montécuculli wisely observes that “prisoners should be interrogated
+separately, in order to ascertain, by the agreement in their answers,
+how far they may be endeavoring to mislead you.” Generally speaking,
+the information required from officers who are prisoners, should have
+reference to the strength and resources of the enemy, and sometimes to
+his localities and position. Frederick recommends that prisoners should
+be menaced with instant death if they are found attempting to deceive
+by false reports.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM LXIV.
+
+
+Nothing is so important in war as an undivided command; for this
+reason, when war is carried on against a single power, there should be
+only one army, acting upon one base, and conducted by one chief.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+“Success,” says the Archduke Charles, “is only to be obtained by
+simultaneous efforts, directed upon a given point, sustained with
+constancy, and executed with decision.” It rarely happens that any
+number of men who desire the same object are perfectly agreed as to the
+means of attaining it; and if the will of one individual is not allowed
+to predominate, there can be no _ensemble_ in the execution of their
+operations; neither will they attain the end proposed. It is useless to
+confirm this maxim by examples. History abounds in them.
+
+Prince Eugene and Marlborough would never have been so successful in
+the campaigns which they directed in concert, if a spirit of intrigue
+and difference of opinion had not constantly disorganized the armies
+opposed to them.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM LXV.
+
+
+The same consequences which have uniformly attended long discussions
+and councils of war, will follow at all times. They will terminate
+in the adoption of the worst course, which in war is always the most
+timid, or, if you will, the most prudent. The only true wisdom in a
+general is determined courage.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+Prince Eugene used to say that councils of war “are only useful when
+you want an excuse for attempting _nothing_.” This was also the opinion
+of Villars. A general-in-chief should avoid, therefore, assembling
+a council on occasions of difficulty, and should confine himself to
+consulting separately his most experienced generals in order to benefit
+by their advice, while he is governed at the same time in his decision
+by his own judgment. By this means, he becomes responsible, it is true,
+for the measures he pursues; but he has the advantage also of acting
+upon his own conviction, and of being certain that the secret of his
+operations will not be divulged, as is usually the case where it is
+discussed by a council of war.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM LXVI.
+
+
+In war, the general alone can judge of certain arrangements. It depends
+on him alone to conquer difficulties by his own superior talents and
+resolution.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+The officer who obeys, whatever may be the nature or extent of his
+command, will always stand excused for executing implicitly the
+orders which have been given to him. This is not the case with the
+general-in-chief, on whom the safety of the army and the success of the
+campaign depend. Occupied, without intermission, in the whole process
+of observation and reflection, it is easy to conceive that he will
+acquire by degrees a solidity of judgment which will enable him to see
+things in a clearer and more enlarged point of view than his inferior
+generals.
+
+Marshal Villars, in his campaigns, acted almost always in opposition
+to the advice of his generals, and he was almost always fortunate.
+So true it is, that a general, who feels confident in his talent for
+command, must follow the dictates of his own genius if he wishes to
+achieve success.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM LXVII.
+
+
+To authorize generals or other officers to lay down their arms in
+virtue of a particular capitulation, under any other circumstances
+than when they are composing the garrison of a fortress, affords a
+dangerous latitude. It is destructive of all military character in a
+nation to open such a door to the cowardly, the weak, or even to the
+misdirected brave. Great extremities require extraordinary resolution.
+The more obstinate the resistance of an army, the greater the chances
+of assistance or of success.
+
+How many seeming impossibilities have been accomplished by men whose
+only resource was death!
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+In the campaign of 1759, Frederick directed General Fink, with eighteen
+thousand men, upon Maxen, for the purpose of cutting off the Austrian
+army from the defiles of Bohemia. Surrounded by twice his numbers, Fink
+capitulated after a sharp action, and fourteen thousand men laid down
+their arms. This conduct was the more disgraceful, because General
+Winch, who commanded the cavalry, cut his way through the enemy. The
+whole blame of the surrender fell, therefore, upon Fink, who was
+tried afterward by a court-martial, and sentenced to be cashiered and
+imprisoned for two years.
+
+In the campaign of Italy in 1796, the Austrian General Provéra
+capitulated with two thousand men in the castle of Cossaria.
+Subsequently, at the battle of La Favorite, the same general
+capitulated with a corps of six thousand men. I scarcely dare to revert
+to the shameful defection of General Mack in the capitulation of Ulm
+in 1805, where thirty thousand Austrians laid down their arms--when we
+have seen, during the wars of the Revolution, so many generals open
+themselves a way by a vigorous effort through the enemy, supported only
+by a few battalions.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM LXVIII.
+
+
+There is no security for any sovereign, for any nation, or for any
+general, if officers are permitted to capitulate in the open field,
+and to lay down their arms in virtue of conditions favorable to the
+contracting party, but contrary to the interests of the army at large.
+To withdraw from danger, and thereby to involve their comrades in
+greater peril, is the height of cowardice. Such conduct should be
+proscribed, declared infamous, and made punishable with death. All
+generals, officers and soldiers, who capitulate in battle to save their
+own lives, should be decimated.
+
+He who gives the order, and those who obey, are alike traitors, and
+deserve capital punishment.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+Soldiers, who are almost always ignorant of the designs of their
+chief, cannot be responsible for his conduct. If he orders them to
+lay down their arms, they must do so; otherwise they fail in that law
+of discipline which is more essential to an army than thousands of
+men. It appears to me, therefore, under these circumstances, that the
+chiefs alone are responsible, and liable to the punishment due to their
+cowardice. We have no example of soldiers being wanting in their duty
+in the most desperate situations, where they are commanded by officers
+of approved resolution.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM LXIX.
+
+
+There is but one honorable mode of becoming prisoner of war. That
+is, by being taken separately; by which is meant, by being cut off
+entirely, and when we can no longer make use of our arms. In this case,
+there can be no conditions, for honor can impose none. We yield to an
+irresistible necessity.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+There is always time enough to surrender prisoner of war. This should
+be deferred, therefore, till the last extremity. And here I may be
+permitted to cite an example of rare obstinacy in defence, which has
+been related to me by ocular witnesses. The captain of grenadiers,
+Dubrenil, of the thirty-seventh regiment of the line, having been
+sent on detachment with his company, was stopped on the march by a
+large party of Cossacks, who surrounded him on every side. Dubrenil
+formed his little force into square, and endeavored to gain the skirts
+of a wood (within a few muskets’ shot of the spot where he had been
+attacked), and reached it with very little loss. But as soon as the
+grenadiers saw this refuge secured to them, they broke and fled,
+leaving their captain and a few brave men, who were resolved not to
+abandon him, at the mercy of the enemy. In the meantime, the fugitives,
+who had rallied in the depth of the wood, ashamed of having forsaken
+their leader, came to the resolution of rescuing him from the enemy,
+if a prisoner, or of carrying off his body if he had fallen. With this
+view, they formed once more upon the outskirts, and opening a passage
+with their bayonets through the cavalry, penetrated to their captain,
+who, notwithstanding seventeen wounds, was defending himself still.
+They immediately surrounded him, and regained the wood with little
+loss. Such examples are not rare in the wars of the Revolution, and
+it were desirable to see them collected by some contemporary, that
+soldiers might learn how much is to be achieved in war by determined
+energy and sustained resolution.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM LXX.
+
+
+The conduct of a general in a conquered country is full of
+difficulties. If severe, he irritates and increases the number of his
+enemies. If lenient, he gives birth to expectations which only render
+the abuses and vexations, inseparable from war, the more intolerable.
+A victorious general must know how to employ severity, justice and
+mildness by turns, if he would allay sedition or prevent it.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+Among the Romans, generals were only permitted to arrive at the command
+of armies after having exercised the different functions of the
+magistracy. Thus by a previous knowledge of administration, they were
+prepared to govern the conquered provinces with all that discretion
+which a newly-acquired power, supported by arbitrary force, demands.
+
+In the military institutions of modern times, the generals, instructed
+only in what concerns the operation of strategy and tactics, are
+obliged to intrust the civil departments of the war to inferior agents,
+who, without belonging to the army, render all those abuses and
+vexations, inseparable from its operations, still more intolerable.
+
+This observation, which I do little more than repeat, seems to me,
+notwithstanding, deserving of particular attention; for if the leisure
+of general officers was directed in time of peace to the study of
+diplomacy--if they were employed in the different embassies which
+sovereigns send to foreign courts--they would acquire a knowledge of
+the laws and of the government of these countries, in which they may
+be called hereafter to carry on the war. They would learn also to
+distinguish those points of interest on which all treaties must be
+based, which have for their object the advantageous termination of a
+campaign. By the aid of this information they would obtain certain
+and positive results, since all the springs of action, as well as the
+machinery of war, would be in their hands. We have seen Prince Eugene,
+and Marshal Villars, each fulfilling with equal ability the duties of a
+general and a negotiator.
+
+When an army which occupies a conquered province observes strict
+discipline, there are few examples of insurrection among the people,
+unless indeed resistance is provoked (as but too often happens), by the
+exactions of inferior agents employed in the civil administration.
+
+It is to this point, therefore, that the general-in-chief should
+principally direct his attention, in order that the contributions
+imposed by the wants of the army may be levied with impartiality; and
+above all, that they may be applied to their true object, instead of
+serving to enrich the collectors, as is ordinarily the case.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM LXXI.
+
+
+Nothing can excuse a general who takes advantage of the knowledge
+acquired in the service of his country, to deliver up her frontier and
+her towns to foreigners. This is a crime reprobated by every principle
+of religion, morality and honor.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+Ambitious men who, listening only to their passions, arm natives of
+the same land against each other (under the deceitful pretext of
+the public good), are still more criminal. For however arbitrary a
+government, the institutions which have been consolidated by time, are
+always preferable to civil war, and to that anarchy which the latter is
+obliged to create for the justification of its crimes.
+
+To be faithful to his sovereign, and to respect the established
+government, are the first principles which ought to distinguish a
+soldier and a man of honor.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM LXXII.
+
+
+A general-in-chief has no right to shelter his mistakes in war under
+cover of his sovereign, or of a minister, when these are both distant
+from the scene of operation, and must consequently be either ill
+informed or wholly ignorant of the actual state of things.
+
+Hence, it follows, that every general is culpable who undertakes the
+execution of a plan which he considers faulty. It is his duty to
+represent his reasons, to insist upon a change of plan, in short, to
+give in his resignation, rather than allow himself to be made the
+instrument of his army’s ruin. Every general-in-chief who fights a
+battle in consequence of superior orders, with the certainty of losing
+it, is equally blamable.
+
+In this last-mentioned case, the general ought to refuse obedience;
+because a blind obedience is due only to a military command given
+by a superior present on the spot at the moment of action. Being in
+possession of the real state of things, the superior has it then in his
+power to afford the necessary explanations to the person who executes
+his orders.
+
+But supposing a general-in-chief to receive positive order from
+his sovereign, directing him to fight a battle, with the further
+injunction, to yield to his adversary, and allow himself to be
+defeated--ought he to obey it? No. If the general should be able to
+comprehend the meaning or utility of such an order, he should execute
+it; otherwise he should refuse to obey it.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+In the campaign of 1697, Prince Eugene caused the courier to be
+intercepted, who was bringing him orders from the emperor forbidding
+him to hazard a battle, for which everything had been prepared, and
+which he foresaw would prove decisive. He considered, therefore,
+that he did his duty in evading the orders of his sovereign; and the
+victory of Zanta, in which the Turks lost about thirty thousand men,
+and four thousand prisoners, rewarded his audacity. In the meantime,
+notwithstanding the immense advantages which accrued from this victory
+to the imperial arms, Eugene was disgraced on his arrival at Vienna.
+
+In 1793, General Hoche, having received orders to move upon Treves with
+an army harassed by constant marches in a mountainous and difficult
+country, refused to obey. He observed, with reason, that in order to
+obtain possession of an unimportant fortress, they were exposing his
+army to inevitable ruin. He caused, therefore, his troops to return
+into winter quarters, and preferred the preservation of his army, upon
+which the success of the future campaign depended, to his own safety.
+Recalled to Paris, he was thrown into a dungeon, which he only quitted
+on the downfall of Robespierre.
+
+I dare not decide if such examples are to be imitated; but it seems to
+me highly desirable that a question so new and so important, should be
+discussed by men who are capable of determining its merits.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM LXXIII.
+
+
+The first qualification in a general-in-chief is a cool head--that
+is, a head which receives just impressions, and estimates things and
+objects at their real value. He must not allow himself to be elated by
+good news, or depressed by bad.
+
+The impressions he receives either successively or simultaneously in
+the course of the day, should be so classed as to take up only the
+exact place in his mind which they deserve to occupy; since it is upon
+a just comparison and consideration of the weight due to different
+impressions, that the power of reasoning and of right judgment depends.
+
+Some men are so physically and morally constituted as to see everything
+through a highly-colored medium. They raise up a picture in the mind on
+every slight occasion, and give to every trivial occurrence a dramatic
+interest. But whatever knowledge, or talent, or courage, or other good
+qualities such men may possess, nature has not formed them for the
+command of armies, or the direction of great military operations.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+“The first quality in a general-in-chief,” says Montécuculli, “is a
+great knowledge of the art of war. This is not intuitive, but the
+result of experience. A man is not born a commander. He must become
+one. Not to be anxious; to be always cool; to avoid confusion in his
+commands; never to change countenance; to give his orders in the midst
+of battle with as much composure as if he were perfectly at ease. These
+are the proofs of valor in a general.
+
+“To encourage the timid; to increase the number of the truly brave; to
+revive the drooping ardor of the troops in battle; to rally those who
+are broken; to bring back to the charge those who are repulsed; to find
+resources in difficulty, and success even amid disaster; to be ready at
+a moment to devote himself, if necessary, for the welfare of the state.
+These are the actions which acquire for a general distinction and
+renown.”
+
+To this enumeration may be added, the talent of discriminating
+character, and of employing every man in the particular post which
+nature has qualified him to fill. “My principal attention,” said
+Marshal Villars, “was always directed to the study of the younger
+generals. Such a one I found, by the boldness of his character, fit
+to lead a column of attack; another, from a disposition naturally
+cautious, but without being deficient in courage, more perfectly to
+be relied on for the defence of a country.” It is only by a just
+application of these personal qualities to their respective objects,
+that it is possible to command success in war.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM LXXIV.
+
+
+The leading qualifications which should distinguish an officer selected
+for the head of the staff, are, to know the country thoroughly; to
+be able to conduct a _reconnoissance_ with skill; to superintend the
+transmission of orders promptly; to lay down the most complicated
+movements intelligibly, but in a few words, and with simplicity.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+Formerly, the duties of the chiefs of the staff were confined to the
+necessary preparations for carrying the plan of the campaign, and
+the operations resolved on by the general-in-chief, into effect.
+In a battle, they were only employed in directing movements and
+superintending their execution. But in the late wars, the officers
+of the staff were frequently intrusted with the command of a column
+of attack, or of large detachments, when the general-in-chief feared
+to disclose the secret of his plans by the transmission of orders or
+instructions. Great advantages have resulted from this innovation,
+although it was long resisted. By this means, the staff have been
+enabled to perfect their theory by practice, and they have acquired,
+moreover, the esteem of the soldiers and junior officers of the
+line, who are easily led to think lightly of their superiors, whom
+they do not see fighting in the ranks. The generals who have held
+the arduous situation of chief of the staff during the wars of the
+Revolution, have almost always been employed in the different branches
+of the profession. Marshal Berthier, who filled so conspicuously this
+appointment to Napoleon, was distinguished by all the essentials of a
+general. He possessed calm, and at the same time brilliant courage,
+excellent judgment, and approved experience. He bore arms during half
+a century, made war in the four quarters of the globe, opened and
+terminated thirty-two campaigns. In his youth he acquired, under the
+eye of his father, who was an engineer officer, the talent of tracing
+plans and finishing them with exactness, as well as the preliminary
+qualifications necessary to form a staff-officer. Admitted by the
+Prince de Lambesq into his regiment of dragoons, he was taught the
+skilful management of his horse and his sword--accomplishments so
+important to a soldier. Attached afterward to the staff of Count
+Rochambeau, he made his first campaign in America, where he soon began
+to distinguish himself by his valor, activity and talents. Having at
+length attained superior rank in the staff-corps formed by Marshal de
+Segur, he visited the camps of the King of Prussia, and discharged the
+duties of chief of the staff under the Baron de Bezenval.
+
+During nineteen years, consumed in sixteen campaigns, the history
+of Marshal Berthier’s life was little else but that of the wars of
+Napoleon, all the details of which he directed, both in the cabinet
+and the field. A stranger to the intrigues of politics, he labored
+with indefatigable activity; seized with promptitude and sagacity
+upon general views, and gave the necessary orders for attaining them
+with prudence, perspicuity, and conciseness. Discreet, impenetrable,
+modest; he was just, exact, and even severe, in everything that
+regarded the service; but he always set an example of vigilance and
+zeal in his own person, and knew how to maintain discipline, and to
+cause his authority to be respected by every rank under his orders.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM LXXV.
+
+
+A commandant of artillery should understand well the general principles
+of each branch of the service, since he is called upon to supply
+arms and ammunition to the different corps of which it is composed.
+His correspondence with the commanding officers of artillery at the
+advanced posts, should put him in possession of all the movements of
+the army, and the disposition and management of the great park of
+artillery should depend upon this information.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+After having recognized the advantage of intrusting the supply of
+arms and ammunition for an army to a military body, it appears to
+me extraordinary that the same regulation does not extend to that of
+provisions and forage, instead of leaving it in the hands of a separate
+administration, as is the practice at present.
+
+The civil establishments attached to armies are formed almost always at
+the commencement of a war, and composed of persons strangers to those
+laws of discipline which they are but too much inclined to disregard.
+These men are little esteemed by the military, because they serve only
+to enrich themselves, without respect to the means. They consider only
+their private interest in a service whose glory they cannot share,
+although some portion of its success depends upon their zeal. The
+disorders and defalcations incident to these establishments would
+assuredly cease, if they were confided to men who had been employed
+in the army, and who, in return for their labors, were permitted to
+partake with their fellow-soldiers the triumph of their success.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM LXXVI.
+
+
+The qualities which distinguish a good general of advanced posts, are,
+to reconnoitre accurately defiles and fords of every description; to
+provide guides that may be depended on; to interrogate the _curé_
+and postmaster; to establish rapidly a good understanding with the
+inhabitants; to send out spies; to intercept public and private
+letters; to translate and analyze their contents; in a word, to be able
+to answer every question of the general-in-chief, when he arrives with
+the whole army.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+Foraging parties, composed of small detachments, and which were usually
+intrusted to young officers, served formerly to make good officers
+of advanced posts; but now the army is supplied with provisions by
+regular contributions: it is only in a course of partisan warfare that
+the necessary experience can be acquired to fill these situations with
+success.
+
+A chief of partisans is, to a certain extent, independent of the army.
+He receives neither pay nor provisions from it, and rarely succor, and
+is abandoned during the whole campaign to his own resources.
+
+An officer so circumstanced must unite address with courage, and
+boldness with discretion, if he wishes to collect plunder without
+measuring the strength of his little corps with superior forces. Always
+harassed, always surrounded by dangers, which it is his business to
+foresee and surmount, a leader of partisans acquires in a short time an
+experience in the details of war rarely to be obtained by an officer
+of the line; because the latter is almost always under the guidance of
+superior authority, which directs the whole of his movements, while
+the talent and genius of the partisan are developed and sustained by a
+dependence on his own resources.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM LXXVII.
+
+
+Generals-in-chief must be guided by their own experience, or their
+genius. Tactics, evolutions, the duties and knowledge of an engineer
+or artillery officer, may be learned in treatises, but the science
+of strategy is only to be acquired by experience, and by studying the
+campaigns of all the great captains.
+
+Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, and Frederick, as well as Alexander,
+Hannibal, and Cæsar, have all acted upon the same principles. These
+have been: to keep their forces united; to leave no weak part
+unguarded; to seize with rapidity on important points.
+
+Such are the principles which lead to victory, and which, by inspiring
+terror at the reputation of your arms, will at once maintain fidelity
+and secure subjection.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+“A great captain can only be formed,” says the Archduke Charles, “by
+long experience and intense study: neither is his own experience
+enough--for whose life is there sufficiently fruitful of events to
+render his knowledge universal?” It is, therefore, by augmenting his
+information from the stock of others, by appreciating justly the
+discoveries of his predecessors, and by taking for his standard of
+comparison those great military exploits, in connection with their
+political results, in which the history of war abounds, that he can
+alone become a great commander.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM LXXVIII.
+
+
+Peruse again and again the campaigns of Alexander, Hannibal, Cæsar,
+Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, Eugene, and Frederick. Model yourself
+upon them. This is the only means of becoming a great captain, and
+of acquiring the secret of the art of war. Your own genius will be
+enlightened and improved by this study, and you will learn to reject
+all maxims foreign to the principles of these great commanders.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+It is in order to facilitate this object that I have formed the present
+collection. It is after reading and meditating upon the history of
+modern war that I have endeavored to illustrate, by examples, how the
+maxims of a great captain may be most successfully applied to this
+study. May the end I have had in view be accomplished!
+
+
+
+
+Transcriber’s Notes
+
+
+Cover created by Transcriber and placed in the Public Domain.
+
+Punctuation, hyphenation, and spelling were made consistent when a
+predominant preference was found in this book; otherwise they were not
+changed, except as noted below.
+
+Unusual and archaic spellings were not changed.
+
+Simple typographical errors were corrected; occasional unbalanced
+quotation marks retained.
+
+Ambiguous hyphens at the ends of lines were retained.
+
+Page 32: “spacious and extensive” was printed as “entensive” but
+changed here.
+
+Page 60: “1746” is a misprint; the correct date must be in the 1600's,
+perhaps “1646”.
+
+Page 63: “1798” may be a misprint for “1796”.
+
+Page 65: “1745” is a misprint; the correct year is “1645”.
+
+Page 75: “wo to the vanquished” was printed that way.
+
+Page 100: “Vauban” was printed as “Vanban” but changed here.
+
+
+
+
+
+End of Project Gutenberg's The Officer's Manual, by Napoleon Bonaparte
+
+*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 50750 ***
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-
-The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Officer's Manual, by Napoleon Bonaparte
-
-This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most
-other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions
-whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of
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-www.gutenberg.org.  If you are not located in the United States, you'll have
-to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook.
-
-Title: The Officer's Manual
-       Napoleon's Maxims of War
-
-Author: Napoleon Bonaparte
-
-Release Date: December 23, 2015 [EBook #50750]
-
-Language: English
-
-Character set encoding: UTF-8
-
-*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE OFFICER'S MANUAL ***
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-
-
-<div class="transnote center">
-<p class="center bold">Transcriber’s Note</p>
-<p class="covernote center">Cover created by Transcriber and placed into the Public Domain.</p>
-<p class="center">Table of Contents created by Transcriber and placed into the Public Domain.</p>
-</div>
-
-<h1 class="vspace">
-<span class="small">THE OFFICER’S MANUAL.</span><br /><br />
-NAPOLEON’S<br />
-<span class="larger gesperrt">MAXIMS OF WAR.</span></h1>
-
-<p class="p2 center vspace2"><span class="gesperrt">RICHMOND, VA.:<br />
-WEST &amp; JOHNSTON.</span><br />
-1862.
-</p>
-
-<p class="p2 center smaller vspace2">
-<span class="smcap">Evans &amp; Cogswell, Printers.<br />
-No. 3 Broad St., Charleston, S. C.</span>
-</p>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<h2 id="CONTENTS">CONTENTS</h2>
-
-<div class="center"><div class="center-block vspacetoc">
-<a href="#RECOMMENDATION">RECOMMENDATION.</a><br />
-<a href="#PREFACE">PREFACE.</a><br />
-<a href="#NAPOLEONS">NAPOLEON’S</a><br />
-<a href="#MAXIM_I">MAXIM  I.</a><br />
-<a href="#MAXIM_II">MAXIM  II.</a><br />
-<a href="#MAXIM_III">MAXIM  III.</a><br />
-<a href="#MAXIM_IV">MAXIM  IV.</a><br />
-<a href="#MAXIM_V">MAXIM  V.</a><br />
-<a href="#MAXIM_VI">MAXIM  VI.</a><br />
-<a href="#MAXIM_VII">MAXIM  VII.</a><br />
-<a href="#MAXIM_VIII">MAXIM  VIII.</a><br />
-<a href="#MAXIM_IX">MAXIM  IX.</a><br />
-<a href="#MAXIM_X">MAXIM  X.</a><br />
-<a href="#MAXIM_XI">MAXIM  XI.</a><br />
-<a href="#MAXIM_XII">MAXIM  XII.</a><br />
-<a href="#MAXIM_XIII">MAXIM  XIII.</a><br />
-<a href="#MAXIM_XIV">MAXIM  XIV.</a><br />
-<a href="#MAXIM_XV">MAXIM  XV.</a><br />
-<a href="#MAXIM_XVI">MAXIM  XVI.</a><br />
-<a href="#MAXIM_XVII">MAXIM  XVII.</a><br />
-<a href="#MAXIM_XVIII">MAXIM  XVIII.</a><br />
-<a href="#MAXIM_XIX">MAXIM  XIX.</a><br />
-<a href="#MAXIM_XX">MAXIM  XX.</a><br />
-<a href="#MAXIM_XXI">MAXIM  XXI.</a><br />
-<a href="#MAXIM_XXII">MAXIM  XXII.</a><br />
-<a href="#MAXIM_XXIII">MAXIM  XXIII.</a><br />
-<a href="#MAXIM_XXIV">MAXIM  XXIV.</a><br />
-<a href="#MAXIM_XXV">MAXIM  XXV.</a><br />
-<a href="#MAXIM_XXVI">MAXIM  XXVI.</a><br />
-<a href="#MAXIM_XXVII">MAXIM  XXVII.</a><br />
-<a href="#MAXIM_XXVIII">MAXIM  XXVIII.</a><br />
-<a href="#MAXIM_XXIX">MAXIM  XXIX.</a><br />
-<a href="#MAXIM_XXX">MAXIM  XXX.</a><br />
-<a href="#MAXIM_XXXI">MAXIM  XXXI.</a><br />
-<a href="#MAXIM_XXXII">MAXIM  XXXII.</a><br />
-<a href="#MAXIM_XXXIII">MAXIM  XXXIII.</a><br />
-<a href="#MAXIM_XXXIV">MAXIM  XXXIV.</a><br />
-<a href="#MAXIM_XXXV">MAXIM  XXXV.</a><br />
-<a href="#MAXIM_XXXVI">MAXIM  XXXVI.</a><br />
-<a href="#MAXIM_XXXVII">MAXIM  XXXVII.</a><br />
-<a href="#MAXIM_XXXVIII">MAXIM  XXXVIII.</a><br />
-<a href="#MAXIM_XXXIX">MAXIM  XXXIX.</a><br />
-<a href="#MAXIM_XL">MAXIM  XL.</a><br />
-<a href="#MAXIM_XLI">MAXIM  XLI.</a><br />
-<a href="#MAXIM_XLII">MAXIM  XLII.</a><br />
-<a href="#MAXIM_XLIII">MAXIM  XLIII.</a><br />
-<a href="#MAXIM_XLIV">MAXIM  XLIV.</a><br />
-<a href="#MAXIM_XLV">MAXIM  XLV.</a><br />
-<a href="#MAXIM_XLVI">MAXIM  XLVI.</a><br />
-<a href="#MAXIM_XLVII">MAXIM  XLVII.</a><br />
-<a href="#MAXIM_XLVIII">MAXIM  XLVIII.</a><br />
-<a href="#MAXIM_XLIX">MAXIM  XLIX.</a><br />
-<a href="#MAXIM_L">MAXIM  L.</a><br />
-<a href="#MAXIM_LI">MAXIM  LI.</a><br />
-<a href="#MAXIM_LII">MAXIM  LII.</a><br />
-<a href="#MAXIM_LIII">MAXIM  LIII.</a><br />
-<a href="#MAXIM_LIV">MAXIM  LIV.</a><br />
-<a href="#MAXIM_LV">MAXIM  LV.</a><br />
-<a href="#MAXIM_LVI">MAXIM  LVI.</a><br />
-<a href="#MAXIM_LVII">MAXIM  LVII.</a><br />
-<a href="#MAXIM_LVIII">MAXIM  LVIII.</a><br />
-<a href="#MAXIM_LIX">MAXIM  LIX.</a><br />
-<a href="#MAXIM_LX">MAXIM  LX.</a><br />
-<a href="#MAXIM_LXI">MAXIM  LXI.</a><br />
-<a href="#MAXIM_LXII">MAXIM  LXII.</a><br />
-<a href="#MAXIM_LXIII">MAXIM  LXIII.</a><br />
-<a href="#MAXIM_LXIV">MAXIM  LXIV.</a><br />
-<a href="#MAXIM_LXV">MAXIM  LXV.</a><br />
-<a href="#MAXIM_LXVI">MAXIM  LXVI.</a><br />
-<a href="#MAXIM_LXVII">MAXIM  LXVII.</a><br />
-<a href="#MAXIM_LXVIII">MAXIM  LXVIII.</a><br />
-<a href="#MAXIM_LXIX">MAXIM  LXIX.</a><br />
-<a href="#MAXIM_LXX">MAXIM  LXX.</a><br />
-<a href="#MAXIM_LXXI">MAXIM  LXXI.</a><br />
-<a href="#MAXIM_LXXII">MAXIM  LXXII.</a><br />
-<a href="#MAXIM_LXXIII">MAXIM  LXXIII.</a><br />
-<a href="#MAXIM_LXXIV">MAXIM  LXXIV.</a><br />
-<a href="#MAXIM_LXXV">MAXIM  LXXV.</a><br />
-<a href="#MAXIM_LXXVI">MAXIM  LXXVI.</a><br />
-<a href="#MAXIM_LXXVII">MAXIM  LXXVII.</a><br />
-<a href="#MAXIM_LXXVIII">MAXIM  LXXVIII.</a><br />
-<a href="#Transcribers_Notes">Transcriber’s Notes</a>
-</div></div>
-
-</div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<h2><a id="RECOMMENDATION"></a>RECOMMENDATION.</h2>
-
-<p>“After refreshing my memory by looking over
-again ‘The Officer’s Manual,’ or ‘Maxims of Napoleon,’
-I think I may safely recommend the republication,
-in America, of the work in English, as likely to
-be called for by many officers, regular and volunteer.
-It contains a circle of maxims, deduced from the
-highest source of military science and experience,
-with practical illustrations of the principles taken
-from the most celebrated campaigns of modern times.
-The study of the book cannot fail to set all young
-officers on a course of inquiry and reflection greatly
-to their improvement.</p>
-
-<p class="sigright">
-“WINFIELD SCOTT.”
-</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_5">5</a></span></p>
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<h2><a id="PREFACE"></a>PREFACE.</h2>
-
-<p>The publisher has reissued this little
-volume as a publication timely for the
-occasion. A collection of maxims which
-directed the military operations of the
-greatest captain of modern times, cannot
-fail to prove of great use to such young
-officers as really desire a knowledge of
-the art of war. The maxims are illustrated
-by instances drawn from the campaigns
-of Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne,
-Frederick, and Napoleon. These great
-men were all governed by the same
-principles, and it is by applying these
-principles to the perusal of their respective
-campaigns, that every military man
-will recognize their wisdom, and make<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_6">6</a></span>
-such use of them hereafter as his own
-particular genius shall point out.</p>
-
-<p>“And here, perhaps,” says the translator,
-Col. D’Aguilar, “my task might
-have been considered finished; but perceiving
-how incomplete the collection
-was alone, I have endeavored to supply
-the deficiency by having recourse for
-further illustration to the memoirs of
-Montécuculli, and the instructions of
-Frederick to his generals. The analogy
-of their principles with those of Napoleon,
-has convinced me that the art of
-war is susceptible of two points of view:
-one, which relates entirely to the acquirements
-and genius of the general; the
-other, which refers to matters of detail.</p>
-
-<p>“The first is the same in all ages, and
-with all nations, whatever be the arms
-with which they fight. Hence it follows
-that, in every age, great commanders
-have been governed by the same principles.</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_7">7</a></span></p>
-
-<p>“The business of detail, on the contrary,
-is controlled by existing circumstances.
-It varies with the character of
-a people, and the quality of their arms.</p>
-
-<p>“It is with a view to impress the justice
-of this remark, that I have sought
-for facts in different periods of history,
-to illustrate these maxims, and to prove
-that nothing is <em>problematical</em> in war; but
-that failure and success in military operations
-depend almost always on the natural
-genius and science of the chief.”</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_9">9</a></span></p>
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<h2 class="vspace"><a id="NAPOLEONS"></a>NAPOLEON’S<br />
-<span class="larger gesperrt wspace">MAXIMS OF WAR.</span></h2>
-
-</div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<h2 class="nobreak"><a id="MAXIM_I"></a>MAXIM I.</h2>
-
-<p>The frontiers of states are either large
-rivers, or chains of mountains, or deserts.
-Of all these obstacles to the march of an
-army, the most difficult to overcome is
-the desert; mountains come next, and
-broad rivers occupy the third place.</p>
-
-<div class="note">
-<h3>NOTE.</h3>
-
-<p>Napoleon, in his military career, appears
-to have been called upon to surmount every
-difficulty which can occur in wars of invasion.</p>
-
-<p>In Egypt he traversed deserts, and vanquished
-and destroyed the Mamelukes, so
-celebrated for their address and courage.
-His genius knew how to accommodate itself
-to all the dangers of this distant enterprise,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_10">10</a></span>
-in a country ill adapted to supply the wants
-of his troops.</p>
-
-<p>In the conquest of Italy, he twice crossed
-the Alps by the most difficult passes, and at
-a season, too, which rendered this undertaking
-still more formidable. In three months
-he passed the Pyrenees, defeated and dispersed
-four Spanish armies. In short, from
-the Rhine to the Borysthenes, no natural
-obstacle could be found to arrest the rapid
-march of his victorious army.</p>
-
-</div></div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<h2><a id="MAXIM_II"></a>MAXIM II.</h2>
-
-<p>In forming the plan of a campaign, it
-is requisite to foresee everything the enemy
-may do, and to be prepared with the
-necessary means to counteract it.</p>
-
-<p>Plans of campaign may be modified
-<i xml:lang="la" lang="la">ad infinitum</i> according to circumstances&mdash;the
-genius of the general, the character
-of the troops, and the topography of the
-theatre of action.</p>
-
-<div class="note">
-<h3>NOTE.</h3>
-
-<p>Sometimes we see a hazardous campaign
-succeed, the plan of which is directly at variance<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_11">11</a></span>
-with the principles of the art of war.
-But this success depends generally on the
-caprice of fortune, or upon faults committed
-by the enemy&mdash;two things upon which a general
-must never count. Sometimes the plan
-of a campaign, although based on sound
-principles of war, runs the risk of failing at
-the outset if opposed by an adversary who
-acts at first on the defensive, and then, suddenly
-seizing the initiative, surprises by the
-skilfulness of his manœuvres. Such was the
-fate of the plan laid down by the Aulic council
-for the campaign of 1796, under the command
-of Marshal Wurmser. From his great
-numerical superiority, the marshal had calculated
-on the entire destruction of the French
-army, by cutting off its retreat. He founded
-his operations on the defensive attitude of
-his adversary, who was posted on the line
-of the Adige, and had to cover the siege of
-Mantua, as well as central and lower Italy.</p>
-
-<p>Wurmser, supposing the French army fixed
-in the neighborhood of Mantua, divided
-his forces into three corps, which marched
-separately, intending to unite at that place.
-Napoleon, having penetrated the design of
-the Austrian general, perceived the advantage
-to be derived from striking the first<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_12">12</a></span>
-blow against an army divided into three
-corps, with no communication between them.
-He hastened, therefore, to raise the siege of
-Mantua, assembled the whole of his forces,
-and by this means became superior to the
-imperialists, whose divisions he attacked and
-beat in detail. Thus Wurmser, who fancied
-he had only to march to certain victory,
-saw himself compelled, after ten days campaign,
-to retire with the remains of his army
-into the Tyrol, after a loss of twenty-five
-thousand men in killed and wounded, fifteen
-thousand prisoners, nine stand of colors, and
-seventy pieces of cannon.</p>
-
-<p>Hence, nothing is so difficult as to prescribe
-beforehand to a general the line of
-conduct he shall pursue during the course
-of a campaign. Success must often depend
-on circumstances that cannot be foreseen;
-and it should be remembered, likewise, that
-nothing cramps so much the efforts of genius
-as compelling the head of an army to be
-governed by any will but his own.</p>
-
-</div></div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<h2><a id="MAXIM_III"></a>MAXIM III.</h2>
-
-<p>An army which undertakes the conquest
-of a country, has its two wings<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_13">13</a></span>
-resting either upon neutral territories, or
-upon great natural obstacles, such as rivers
-or chains of mountains. It happens
-in some cases that only one wing is so
-supported; and in others that both are
-exposed.</p>
-
-<p>In the first instance cited, viz., where
-both wings are protected, a general has
-only to protect his front from being penetrated.
-In the second, where one wing
-only is supported, he should rest upon
-the supported wing. In the third, where
-both wings are exposed, he should depend
-upon a central formation, and never allow
-the different corps under his command to
-depart from this: for if it be difficult to
-contend with the disadvantage of having
-<em>two</em> flanks exposed, the inconvenience is
-doubled by having <em>four</em>, trebled if there
-be <em>six</em>&mdash;that is to say, if the army is divided
-into two or three different corps.
-In the first instance, then, as above quoted,
-the line of operation may rest indifferently
-on the right or on the left. In
-the second, it should be directed toward
-the wing in support. In the third, it<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_14">14</a></span>
-should be perpendicular to the centre of
-the army’s line of march. But in all
-these cases it is necessary, at a distance
-of every five or six days march, to have
-a strong post or an entrenched position
-upon the line of operation, in order to
-collect military stores and provisions, to
-organize convoys, to form of it a centre
-of movement, and establish a point of
-defence to shorten the line of operation
-of the army.</p>
-
-<div class="note">
-<h3>NOTE.</h3>
-
-<p>These general principles in the art of war
-were entirely unknown, or lost sight of, in
-the middle ages. The crusaders in their incursions
-into Palestine appear to have had
-no object but to fight and to conquer, so little
-pains did they take to profit by their
-victories. Hence, innumerable armies perished
-in Syria, without any other advantage
-than that derived from the momentary
-success obtained by superior numbers.</p>
-
-<p>It was by the neglect of these principles,
-also, that Charles XII, abandoning his line
-of operation and all communication with
-Sweden, threw himself into the Ukraine,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_15">15</a></span>
-and lost the greater part of his army by the
-fatigue of a winter campaign in a barren
-country destitute of resources.</p>
-
-<p>Defeated at Pultawa, he was obliged to
-seek refuge in Turkey, after crossing the
-Nieper with the remains of his army, diminished
-to little more than one thousand men.</p>
-
-<p>Gustavus Adolphus was the first who
-brought back the art of war to its true principles.
-His operations in Germany were
-bold, rapid, and well executed. He made
-success at all times conducive to future
-security, and established his line of operation
-so as to prevent the possibility of any
-interruption in his communications with
-Sweden. His campaigns form a new era in
-the art of war.</p>
-
-</div></div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<h2><a id="MAXIM_IV"></a>MAXIM IV.</h2>
-
-<p>When the conquest of a country is
-undertaken by two or three armies,
-which have each their separate line of
-operation, until they arrive at a point
-fixed upon for their concentration, it
-should be laid down as a principle, that<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_16">16</a></span>
-the union of these different corps should
-never take place near the enemy; because
-the enemy, in uniting his forces,
-may not only prevent this junction, but
-may beat the armies in detail.</p>
-
-<div class="note">
-<h3>NOTE.</h3>
-
-<p>In the campaign of 1757, Frederick,
-marching to the conquest of Bohemia with
-two armies, which had each their separate
-line of operation, succeeded, notwithstanding,
-in uniting them in sight of the Duke
-of Lorraine, who covered Prague with the
-imperial army; but his example should not
-be followed. The success of this march
-depended entirely on the inaction of the
-duke, who, at the head of seventy thousand
-men, did nothing to prevent the junction of
-the two Prussian armies.</p>
-
-</div></div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<h2><a id="MAXIM_V"></a>MAXIM V.</h2>
-
-<p>All wars should be governed by certain
-principles, for every war should have a
-definite object, and be conducted according
-to the rules of art. (A war should<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_17">17</a></span>
-only be undertaken with forces proportioned
-to the obstacles to be overcome.)</p>
-
-<div class="note">
-<h3>NOTE.</h3>
-
-<p>It was a saying of Marshal Villars, that
-when war is decided on, it is necessary to
-have exact information of the number of
-troops the enemy can bring into the field,
-since it is impossible to lay down any solid
-plan of offensive or defensive operation
-without an accurate knowledge of what
-you have to expect and fear. “When the
-first shot is fired,” observes Marshal Villars,
-“no one can calculate what will be the issue
-of the war. It is, therefore, of vast
-importance to reflect maturely before we
-begin it.” When once, however, this is
-decided, the marshal observes that the boldest
-and most extended plans are generally
-the wisest and the most successful. “When
-we are determined upon war,” he adds, “we
-should carry it on vigorously and without
-trifling.”</p>
-
-</div></div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<h2><a id="MAXIM_VI"></a>MAXIM VI.</h2>
-
-<p>At the commencement of a campaign,
-to <em>advance</em> or <em>not to advance</em>, is a matter<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_18">18</a></span>
-for grave consideration; but when once
-the offensive has been assumed, it must
-be sustained to the last extremity. However
-skilful the manœuvres in a retreat,
-it will always weaken the <em>morale</em> of an
-army, because, in losing the chances of
-success, these last are transferred to the
-enemy. Besides, retreats always cost
-more men and <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">materiel</i> than the most
-bloody engagements; with this difference,
-that in a battle the enemy’s loss is
-nearly equal to your own&mdash;whereas in a
-retreat the loss is on your side only.</p>
-
-<div class="note">
-<h3>NOTE.</h3>
-
-<p>Marshal Saxe remarks, that no retreats
-are so favorable as those which are made
-before a languid and unenterprising enemy,
-for when he pursues with vigor, the retreat
-soon degenerates into a rout. “Upon this
-principle it is a great error,” says the
-marshal, “to adhere to the proverb which
-recommends us to build a bridge of gold for
-a retreating enemy. No; follow him up
-with spirit, and he is destroyed!”</p>
-
-</div></div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_19">19</a></span></p>
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<h2><a id="MAXIM_VII"></a>MAXIM VII.</h2>
-
-<p>An army should be ready every day,
-every night, and at all times of the day
-and night, to oppose all the resistance
-of which it is capable. With this view,
-the soldier should always be furnished
-completely with arms and ammunition;
-the infantry should never be without its
-artillery, its cavalry, and its generals;
-and the different divisions of the army
-should be constantly in a state to support,
-to be supported, and to protect
-itself.</p>
-
-<p>The troops, whether halted, or encamped,
-or on the march, should be
-always in favorable positions, possessing
-the essentials required for a field of battle;
-for example, the flanks should be
-well covered, and all the artillery so
-placed as to have free range, and to play
-with the greatest advantage. When an
-army is in column of march, it should
-have advanced guards and flanking parties,
-to examine well the country in front,
-to the right, and to the left, and always<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_20">20</a></span>
-at such distance as to enable the main
-body to deploy into position.</p>
-
-<div class="note">
-<h3>NOTE.</h3>
-
-<p>The following maxims, taken from the
-memoirs of Montécuculli, appear to me well
-suited to this place, and calculated to form a
-useful commentary on the general principles
-laid down in the preceding maxim:</p>
-
-<p>1. When war has been once decided on,
-the moment is past for doubts and scruples.
-On the contrary, we are bound to hope that
-all the evil which may ensue, will not; that
-Providence, or our own wisdom, may avert
-it; or that the want of talent on the part of
-the enemy may prevent him from benefiting
-by it. The first security for success is to
-confer the command on one individual.
-When the authority is divided, the opinions
-of the commanders often vary, and the operations
-are deprived of that <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">ensemble</i> which
-is the first essential to victory. Besides,
-when an enterprise is common to many, and
-not confined to a single person, it is conducted
-without vigor, and less interest is
-attached to the result.</p>
-
-<p>After having strictly conformed to all the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_21">21</a></span>
-rules of war, and satisfied ourselves that
-nothing has been omitted to ensure eventual
-success, we must then leave the issue in the
-hands of Providence, and repose ourselves
-tranquilly in the decision of a higher power.</p>
-
-<p>Let what will arrive, it is the part of a
-general-in-chief to remain firm and constant
-in his purposes; he must not allow himself
-to be elated by prosperity, nor to be depressed
-by adversity: for in war good and
-bad and fortune succeed each other by turns,
-form the ebb and flow of military operations.</p>
-
-<p>2. When your own army is strong and
-inured to service, and that of the enemy is
-weak and consists of new levies, or of troops
-enervated by long inaction, then you should
-exert every means to bring him to battle.</p>
-
-<p>If, on the other hand, your adversary has
-the advantage in troops, a decisive combat
-is to be avoided, and you must be content to
-impede his progress, by encamping advantageously,
-and fortifying favorable passes.
-When armies are nearly equal in force, it is
-desirable <em>not</em> to avoid a battle, but only to
-attempt to fight one to advantage. For this
-purpose, care should be taken to encamp always
-in front of the enemy; to move when
-he moves, and occupy the heights and advantageous<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_22">22</a></span>
-grounds that lie upon his line of
-march; to seize upon all the buildings and
-roads adjoining to his camp, and post yourself
-advantageously in the places by which
-he must pass. It is always something gained
-to make <em>him</em> lose time, to thwart his designs,
-or to retard their progress and execution.
-If, however, an army is altogether
-inferior to that of the enemy, and there is no
-possibility of manœuvring against him with
-success, then the campaign must be abandoned,
-and the troops must retire into the
-fortresses.</p>
-
-<p>3. The principal object of a general-in-chief,
-in the moment of battle, should be to
-secure the flanks of his army. It is true
-that natural positions may be found to effect
-this object, but these positions being fixed
-and immovable in themselves, they are only
-advantageous to a general who wishes to
-wait the shock of the enemy, and not to one
-who marches to the attack.</p>
-
-<p>A general can, therefore, rely only on the
-proper arrangement of his troops, to enable
-him to repel any attempt the adversary may
-make upon the front, or flanks, or rear of
-his army.</p>
-
-<p>If one flank of an army rests upon a river,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_23">23</a></span>
-or an impassable ravine, the whole of the
-cavalry may be posted with the other wing,
-in order to envelop the enemy more easily
-by its superiority in numbers.</p>
-
-<p>If the enemy has his flanks supported by
-woods, light cavalry or infantry should be
-despatched to attack him in flank or in rear
-during the heat of the battle. If practicable,
-also, an attack should be made upon the
-baggage, to add to his confusion.</p>
-
-<p>If you desire to beat the enemy’s left with
-your right wing, or his right with your
-left wing, the wing with which you attack
-should be reinforced by the <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">élite</i> of your
-army. At the same moment, the other wing
-should avoid battle, and the attacking wing
-brought rapidly forward, so as to overwhelm
-the enemy. If the nature of the ground
-admits, he should be approached by stealth,
-and attacked before he is on his guard. If
-any signs of fear are discoverable in the enemy,
-and which are always to be detected
-by confusion or disorder in his movements,
-he should be pursued immediately, without
-allowing him time to recover himself. It is
-now the cavalry should be brought into action,
-and manœuvre so as to surprise and
-cut off his artillery and baggage.</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_24">24</a></span></p>
-
-<p>4. The order of march should always be
-subservient to the order of battle, which last
-should be arranged beforehand. The march
-of an army is always well regulated when it
-is governed by the distance to be accomplished,
-and by the time required for its performance.
-The front of the column of march
-should be diminished or increased according
-to the nature of the country, taking care
-that the artillery always proceeds by the
-main road.</p>
-
-<p>When a river is to be passed, the artillery
-should be placed in battery upon the bank
-opposite the point of crossing.</p>
-
-<p>It is a great advantage, when a river
-forms a sweep or angle, and when a ford is
-to be found near the place where you wish
-to effect a passage. As the construction of
-the bridge proceeds, infantry should be advanced
-to cover the workmen, by keeping
-up a fire on the opposite bank; but the moment
-it is finished, a corps of infantry and
-cavalry, and some field-pieces, should be
-pushed across. The infantry should entrench
-itself immediately at the head of the bridge,
-and it is prudent, moreover, to fortify on the
-same side of the river, in order to protect
-the bridge in case the enemy should venture
-an offensive movement.</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_25">25</a></span></p>
-
-<p>The advanced guard of an army should
-be always provided with trusty guides, and
-with a corps of pioneers: the first to point
-out the best roads, the second to render
-these roads more practicable.</p>
-
-<p>If the army marches in detachments, the
-commander of each detachment should be
-furnished with the name of the place in
-writing, where the whole are to be reassembled;
-the place should be sufficiently removed
-from the enemy to prevent him from
-occupying it before the junction of all the
-detachments. To this end, it is of importance
-to keep the name a secret.</p>
-
-<p>From the moment an army approaches
-the enemy, it should march in the order in
-which it is intended to fight. If anything is
-to be apprehended, precautions are necessary
-in proportion to the degree of the danger.
-When a defile is to be passed, the troops
-should be halted beyond the extremity, until
-the whole army has quitted the defile.</p>
-
-<p>In order to conceal the movements of an
-army, it is necessary to march by night
-through woods and valleys, by the most retired
-roads, and out of reach of all inhabited
-places. No fires should be allowed; and, to
-favor the design still more, the troops should<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_26">26</a></span>
-move by verbal order. When the object of
-the march is to carry a post, or to relieve a
-place that is besieged, the advanced guard
-should march within musket shot of the
-main body, because then you are prepared
-for an immediate attack, and ready to overthrow
-all before you.</p>
-
-<p>When a march is made to force a pass
-guarded by the enemy, it is desirable to
-make a feint upon one point, while, by a
-rapid movement, you bring your real attack
-to bear upon another.</p>
-
-<p>Sometimes success is obtained by pretending
-to fall back upon the original line of
-march, and, by a sudden countermarch, seizing
-upon the pass, before the enemy is able
-to reoccupy it. Some generals have gained
-their point by manœuvring so as to deceive
-the enemy, while a detachment under the
-cover of high grounds has surprised the passage
-by a stolen march. The enemy being
-engaged in watching the movements of the
-main body, the detachment has an opportunity
-of entrenching itself in its new position.</p>
-
-<p>5. An army regulates its mode of encampment
-according to the greater or less degree
-of precaution, when circumstances require.
-In a friendly country the troops are divided,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_27">27</a></span>
-to afford better accommodation and supplies.
-But with the enemy in front, an army should
-always encamp in order of battle. With
-this view, it is of the highest importance to
-cover one part of the camp, as far as practicable,
-by natural defences, such as a river, a
-chain of rocks, or a ravine. Care should be
-taken also that the camp is not commanded,
-and that there is no obstacle to a free communication
-between the different corps, and
-which can prevent the troops from mutually
-succoring each other.</p>
-
-<p>When an army occupies a fixed camp, it is
-necessary to be well supplied with provisions
-and ammunition, or at least that these should
-be within certain reach and easily obtained.
-To insure this, the line of communication
-must be well established, and care taken not
-to leave an enemy’s fortress in your rear.</p>
-
-<p>When an army is established in winter
-quarters, its safety is best secured either by
-fortifying a camp (for which purpose a spot
-should be selected near a large commercial
-town, or a river affording facility of transport),
-or by distributing it in close cantonments,
-so that the troops should be near
-together, and capable of affording each other
-mutual support.</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_28">28</a></span></p>
-
-<p>The winter quarters of an army should be
-protected, likewise, by constructing small
-covered works on all the lines of approach
-to the cantonments, and by posting advanced
-guards of cavalry to observe the motions of
-the enemy.</p>
-
-<p>6. A battle is to be sought, when there is
-reason to hope for victory, or when an army
-runs the risk of being ruined without fighting;
-also when a besieged place is to be
-relieved, or when you desire to prevent
-a reinforcement from reaching the enemy.
-Battles are useful, likewise, when we wish
-to profit by a favorable opportunity which
-offers, to secure a certain advantage, such as
-seizing upon an undefended point or pass,
-attacking the enemy when he has committed
-a fault, or when some misunderstanding
-among his generals favors the undertaking.</p>
-
-<p>If an enemy declines an engagement, he
-may be compelled to it, either by besieging
-a place of importance, or by falling upon
-him unawares, and when he cannot easily
-effect his retreat. Or (after pretending to
-retire), by making a rapid countermarch,
-attacking him vigorously and forcing him to
-action.</p>
-
-<p>The different circumstances under which<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_29">29</a></span>
-a battle should be avoided or declined, are,
-when there is greater danger to be apprehended
-from defeat than advantage to be
-derived from victory; when you are very
-inferior to your adversary in numbers, and
-are expecting reinforcements; above all,
-when the enemy is advantageously posted,
-or when he is contributing to his own ruin
-by some inherent defect in his position, or
-by the errors and divisions of his generals.</p>
-
-<p>To gain a battle, each arm must be advantageously
-posted, and have the means
-of engaging its front and in flank. The
-wings must be protected by natural obstacles,
-where these present themselves, or by
-having recourse when necessary to the aid
-of art.</p>
-
-<p>The troops must be able to assist each
-other without confusion, and care must be
-taken that the broken corps do not fall
-back upon, and throw the rest into disorder.
-Above all, the intervals between
-the different corps must be sufficiently small
-to prevent the enemy from penetrating between
-them, for in that case you would be
-obliged to employ your reserves, and run
-the risk of being entirely overwhelmed.
-Sometimes victory is obtained by creating<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_30">30</a></span>
-a diversion in the middle of a battle, or
-even by depriving the soldier of all hope
-of retreat, and placing him in a situation
-where he is reduced to the necessity either
-to conquer or die.</p>
-
-<p>At the commencement of a battle, if the
-ground is level, you should advance to meet
-the enemy, in order to inspire the soldier
-with courage; but if you are well posted,
-and your artillery advantageously placed,
-then wait for him with determination: remembering
-always to fight resolutely, to
-succor opportunely those who require it,
-and never to bring your reserves into action
-except in the last extremity; and
-even then to preserve some support, behind
-which the broken corps may rally.</p>
-
-<p>When it is necessary to attack with your
-whole force, the battle should commence
-toward evening; because then, whatever
-be the issue, night will arrive to separate
-the combatants before your troops are exhausted.
-By this means, an opportunity
-is afforded of affecting an orderly retreat
-if the result of the battle requires it.</p>
-
-<p>During an action, the general-in-chief
-should occupy some spot whence he can,
-as far as possible, overlook his whole army.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_31">31</a></span>
-He should be informed, immediately, of
-everything that passes in the different
-divisions. He should be ready, in order to
-render success more complete, to operate
-with fresh troops upon those points where
-the enemy is giving way, and also to reinforce
-his own corps wherever they are inclined
-to yield. When the enemy is beaten,
-he must pursue him instantly, without
-giving him a moment to rally; on the
-other hand, if he is himself defeated, or
-despairs of victory, he must retreat in the
-best possible order.</p>
-
-<p>7. It shows great talent in a general
-to bring troops, who are prepared for action,
-into collision with those who are
-not: for example, fresh troops against those
-which are exhausted&mdash;brave and disciplined
-men against recruits. He must likewise be
-ready always to fall with his army upon
-a weak or detached corps, to follow the
-track of the enemy, and charge him among
-defiles before he can face about and get into
-position.</p>
-
-<p>8. A position is good when the different
-corps are so placed as to be engaged with
-advantage, and without any remaining unemployed.
-If you are superior in cavalry,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_32">32</a></span>
-positions are to be taken in plains and
-open ground; if in infantry, in an enclosed
-and covered country. If inferior in
-numbers, in confined and narrow places;
-if superior, in a spacious and extensive
-field. With a very inferior army, a difficult
-pass must be selected to occupy and
-fortify.</p>
-
-<p>9. In order to obtain every possible advantage
-from a diversion, we should ascertain
-first, that the country in which it is to
-be created is easily penetrated. A diversion
-should be made vigorously, and on those
-points where it is calculated to do the greatest
-mischief to the enemy.</p>
-
-<p>10. To make war with success, the following
-principles should never be departed
-from:</p>
-
-<p>To be superior to your enemy in numbers,
-as well as in <em>morale</em>; to fight battles in order
-to spread terror in the country; to divide
-your army into as many corps as may be
-effected without risk, in order to undertake
-several objects at the same time; to treat
-<span class="smcap smaller">WELL</span> those who yield, to <span class="smcap smaller">ILL</span> treat those who
-resist; to secure your rear, and occupy and
-strengthen yourself at the outset in some
-post which shall serve as a central point for<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_33">33</a></span>
-the support of your future movements; to
-guard against desertion; to make yourself
-master of the great rivers and principal
-passes, and to establish your line of communication
-by getting possession of the fortresses,
-by laying siege to them, and of the
-open country, by giving battle; for it is vain
-to expect that conquests are to be achieved
-without combats; although when a victory
-is won, they will be best maintained by
-uniting mildness with valor.</p>
-
-</div></div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<h2><a id="MAXIM_VIII"></a>MAXIM VIII.</h2>
-
-<p>A general-in-chief should ask himself
-frequently in the day: “What should I
-do if the enemy’s army appeared now in
-my front, or on my right, or my left?”
-If he have any difficulty in answering
-these questions, his position is bad, and
-he should seek to remedy it.</p>
-
-<div class="note">
-<h3>NOTE.</h3>
-
-<p>In the campaign of 1758, the position of
-the Prussian army at Hohen Kirk, being
-commanded by the batteries of the enemy,
-who occupied all the heights, was eminently<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_34">34</a></span>
-defective; notwithstanding, Frederick, who
-saw his rear menaced by the corps of Laudon,
-remained six days in his camp without seeking
-to correct his position. It would seem,
-indeed, that he was ignorant of his real danger:
-for Marshal Daun, having manœuvred
-during the night in order to attack by daybreak,
-surprised the Prussians in their lines
-before they were able to defend themselves,
-and by this means surrounded them completely.</p>
-
-<p>Frederick succeeded, however, in effecting
-his retreat with regularity, but not without
-the loss of ten thousand men, many general
-officers, and almost all of his artillery. If
-Marshal Daun had followed up his victory
-with greater boldness, the king of Prussia
-would never have been able to rally his
-army. On this occasion, Frederick’s good
-fortune balanced his imprudence.</p>
-
-<p>Marshal Saxe remarks, that there is more
-talent than is dreamt of in bad dispositions,
-if we possess the art of converting them into
-good ones when the favorable moment
-arrives. Nothing astonishes the enemy so
-much as this manœuvre; he has counted
-upon <em>something</em>; all his arrangements have
-been founded upon it accordingly&mdash;and at<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_35">35</a></span>
-the moment of attack it escapes him! “I
-must repeat,” says the marshal, “there is
-nothing that so completely disconcerts an
-enemy as this, or leads him to commit so
-many errors; for it follows, that if he does
-<em>not</em> change his arrangements, he is beaten;
-and if he <em>does</em> change them, in presence of
-his adversary, he is equally undone.”</p>
-
-<p>It seems to me, however, that a general
-who should rest the success of a battle upon
-such a principle, would be more likely to
-lose than to gain by it; for if he had to deal
-with a skilful adversary and an alert tactician,
-the latter would find time to take advantage
-of the previous bad arrangements,
-before he would be able to remedy them.</p>
-
-</div></div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<h2><a id="MAXIM_IX"></a>MAXIM IX.</h2>
-
-<p>The strength of an army, like the
-power in mechanics, is estimated by multiplying
-the mass by the rapidity; a rapid
-march augments the <em>morale</em> of an army,
-and increases its means of victory. Press
-on!</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_36">36</a></span></p>
-
-<div class="note">
-<h3>NOTE.</h3>
-
-<p>“Rapidity,” says Montécuculli, “is of importance
-in concealing the movements of an
-army, because it leaves no time to divulge
-the intention of its chief. It is, therefore,
-an advantage to attack the enemy unexpectedly,
-to take him off his guard, to surprise
-him, and let him feel the thunder before he
-sees the flash; but if too great celerity exhausts
-your troops, while, on the other hand,
-delay deprives you of the favorable moment,
-you must weigh the advantage against the
-disadvantage, and choose between.”</p>
-
-<p>Marshal Villars observes, that “in war
-everything depends upon being able to deceive
-the enemy; and having once gained
-this point, in never allowing him time to
-recover himself.” Villars has united practice
-to precept. His bold and rapid marches
-were almost always crowned with success.</p>
-
-<p>It was the opinion of Frederick that all
-wars should be short and rapid; because a
-long war insensibly relaxes discipline, depopulates
-the state, and exhausts its resources.</p>
-
-</div></div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_37">37</a></span></p>
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<h2><a id="MAXIM_X"></a>MAXIM X.</h2>
-
-<p>When an army is inferior in number,
-inferior in cavalry, and in artillery, it is
-essential to avoid a general action. The
-first deficiency should be supplied by rapidity
-of movement; the want of artillery,
-by the nature of the manœuvres;
-and the inferiority in cavalry, by the
-choice of positions. In such circumstances,
-the <em>morale</em> of the soldier does much.</p>
-
-<div class="note">
-<h3>NOTE.</h3>
-
-<p>The campaign of 1814 in France was skilfully
-executed upon these principles. Napoleon,
-with an army inferior in number, an
-army discouraged by the disastrous retreats
-of Moscow and of Leipzig, and still more by
-the presence of the enemy in the French
-territory, contrived, notwithstanding, to supply
-his vast inequality of force by the rapidity
-and combination of his movements. By
-the success obtained at Champ-Aubert, Montmirail,
-Montereau, and Rheims, he began to
-restore the <em>morale</em> of the French army. The
-numerous recruits of which it was composed,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_38">38</a></span>
-had already acquired that steadiness
-of which the old regiments afforded them
-an example, when the capture of Paris, and
-the astonishing revolution it produced, compelled
-Napoleon to lay down his arms.</p>
-
-<p>But this consequence resulted rather from
-the force of circumstances than from any absolute
-necessity; for Napoleon, by carrying
-his army to the other side of the Loire,
-might easily have formed a junction with
-the armies of the Alps and Pyrenees, and
-have reappeared on the field of battle at the
-head of a hundred thousand men. Such a
-force would have amply sufficed to re-establish
-the chances of war in his favor; more
-especially as the armies of the allied sovereigns
-were obliged to manœuvre upon the
-French territory with all the strong places
-of Italy and France in their rear.</p>
-
-</div></div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<h2><a id="MAXIM_XI"></a>MAXIM XI.</h2>
-
-<p>To direct operations with lines far removed
-from each other, and without communications,
-is to commit a fault which
-always gives birth to a second. The<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_39">39</a></span>
-detached column has only its orders for
-the first day. Its operations on the following
-day depend upon what may have
-happened to the main body. Thus, this
-column either loses time upon emergency,
-in waiting for orders, or it will act without
-them, and at hazard. Let it therefore
-be held as a principle, that an army
-should always keep its columns so united
-as to prevent the enemy from passing between
-them with impunity. Whenever,
-for particular reasons, this principle is
-departed from, the detached corps should
-be independent in their operations. They
-should move toward a point fixed upon
-for their future junction. They should
-advance without hesitating, and without
-waiting for fresh orders; and every precaution
-should be taken to prevent an
-attack upon them in detail.</p>
-
-<div class="note">
-<h3>NOTE.</h3>
-
-<p>The Austrian army, commanded by Field-marshal
-Alvinzi, was divided into two corps,
-destined to act independently, until they
-should accomplish their junction before Mantua.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_40">40</a></span>
-The first of these corps, consisting of
-forty-five thousand men, was under the orders
-of Alvinzi. It was to debouch by Monte
-Baldo, upon the positions occupied by the
-French army on the Adige. The second
-corps, commanded by General Provéra, was
-destined to act upon the lower Adige, and
-to raise the blockade of Mantua. Napoleon,
-informed of the enemy’s movements,
-but not entirely comprehending his projects,
-confined himself to concentrating his masses,
-and giving orders to the troops to hold
-themselves in readiness to manœuvre. In
-the meantime, fresh information satisfied the
-general-in-chief of the French army that the
-corps which had debouched by La Coronna,
-over Monte Baldo, was endeavoring to form
-a junction with its cavalry and artillery&mdash;both
-which, having crossed the Adige at
-Dolce, were directing their march upon the
-plateau of Rivoli, by the great road leading
-by Incanole.</p>
-
-<p>Napoleon immediately foresaw that, by
-having possession of the plateau, he should
-be able to prevent this junction, and obtain
-all the advantages of the initiative. He accordingly
-put his troops in motion, and at
-two o’clock in the morning occupied that<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_41">41</a></span>
-important position. Once master of the point
-fixed upon for the junction of the Austrian
-columns, success followed all his dispositions.
-He repulsed every attack, made seven thousand
-prisoners, and took several standards
-and twelve pieces of cannon. At two o’clock
-in the afternoon, the battle of Rivoli was
-already gained, when Napoleon, learning
-that General Provéra had passed the Adige
-at Anghiari, and was directing his march
-upon Mantua, left to his generals the charge
-of following up the retreat of Alvinzi, and
-placed himself at the head of a division for
-the purpose of defeating the designs of Provéra.</p>
-
-<p>By a rapid march, he again succeeded in
-the initiatory movement, and in preventing
-the garrison of Mantua from uniting its force
-with the relieving army. The corps intrusted
-with the blockade, eager to distinguish
-itself under the eyes of the conqueror of
-Rivoli, compelled the garrison to retire into
-the place, while the division of Victor, forgetting
-the fatigues of a forced march, rushed
-with impetuosity on the relieving army in
-front. At this moment a sortie from the lines
-of St. George took him in flank, while the
-corps of Augereau, which had followed the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_42">42</a></span>
-march of the Austrian general, attacked him
-in rear. Provéra, surrounded on all sides,
-capitulated. The result of these two battles
-cost the Austrians three thousand men in
-killed and wounded, twenty-two thousand
-prisoners, twenty-four standards, and forty-six
-pieces of cannon.</p>
-
-</div></div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<h2><a id="MAXIM_XII"></a>MAXIM XII.</h2>
-
-<p>An army ought to have only one line
-of operation. This should be preserved
-with care, and never abandoned but in
-the last extremity.</p>
-
-<div class="note">
-<h3>NOTE.</h3>
-
-<p>“The line of communication of an army,”
-says Montécuculli, “must be certain and
-well established, for every army that acts
-from a distant base, and is not careful to
-keep this line perfectly open, marches upon
-a precipice. It moves to certain ruin, as may
-be seen by an infinity of examples. In fact,
-if the road by which provisions, ammunition
-and reinforcements are to be brought up, is
-not entirely secured&mdash;if the magazines, the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_43">43</a></span>
-hospitals, the depôts of arms, and the places
-of supply are not fixed and commodiously
-situated&mdash;not only the army cannot keep the
-field, but it will be exposed to the greatest
-dangers.”</p>
-
-</div></div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<h2><a id="MAXIM_XIII"></a>MAXIM XIII.</h2>
-
-<p>The distances permitted between corps
-of an army upon the march must be governed
-by the localities, by circumstances,
-and by the object in view.</p>
-
-<div class="note">
-<h3>NOTE.</h3>
-
-<p>When an army moves at a distance from
-the enemy, the columns may be disposed
-along the road so as to favor the artillery
-and baggage. But when it is marching into
-action, the different corps must be formed in
-close columns in order of battle. The generals
-must take care that the heads of the
-columns, which are to attack together, do not
-outstep each other, and that in approaching
-the field of action they preserve the relative
-intervals required for deployment.</p>
-
-<p>“The marches that are made preparatory<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_44">44</a></span>
-to a battle require,” says Frederick, “the
-greatest precaution.” With this view, he
-recommends his generals to be particularly
-on their guard, and to reconnoitre the ground
-at successive distances, in order to secure the
-initiative by occupying those positions most
-calculated to favor an attack. On a retreat,
-it is the opinion of many generals that an
-army should concentrate its forces, and
-march in close columns if it is still strong
-enough to resume the offensive; for by this
-means it is easy to form the line when a
-favorable opportunity presents itself, either
-for holding the enemy in check or for attacking
-him if he is not in a situation to
-accept battle.</p>
-
-<p>Such was Moreau’s retreat after the passage
-of the Adda by the Austro-Russian
-army. The French general, after having
-covered the evacuation of Milan, took up a
-position between the Po and the Tanaro.</p>
-
-<p>His camp rested upon Alexandria and
-Valentia, two capital fortresses, and had the
-advantage of covering the roads to Turin
-and Savona, by which he could effect his
-retreat in case he was unable to accomplish a
-junction with the <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">corps d’armee</i> of Macdonald,
-who had been ordered to quit the kingdom<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_45">45</a></span>
-of Naples, and hasten his march into
-Tuscany.</p>
-
-<p>Forced to abandon his position in consequence
-of the insurrection in Piedmont and
-Tuscany, Moreau retired upon Asti, where
-he learned that his communication with the
-river of Genoa had just been cut off by the
-capture of Ceva. After several ineffectual
-attempts to retake this place, he saw that
-his only safety depended upon throwing himself
-into the mountains.</p>
-
-<p>To effect this object, he directed the whole
-of his battering train and heavy baggage by
-the Col de Fenestrelle upon France; then
-opening himself a way over the St. Bernard,
-he gained Loano with his light artillery and
-the small proportion of field equipment he
-had been able to preserve.</p>
-
-<p>By this skilful movement, he not only retained
-his communications with France, but
-was enabled to observe the motions of the
-army from Naples, and to facilitate his junction
-with it by directing the whole of his
-force upon the points necessary for that
-purpose.</p>
-
-<p>Macdonald, in the meantime, whose only
-chance of success depended on concentrating
-his little army, neglected this precaution,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_46">46</a></span>
-and was beaten in three successive actions
-at the Trebia.</p>
-
-<p>By this retardment of his march, he rendered
-all Moreau’s measures to unite the
-two armies in the plains of the Po useless,
-and his retreat, after his brilliant but fruitless
-efforts at the Trebia, defeated the other
-arrangements, also, which the former had
-made to come to his support. The inactivity
-of Marshal Suwarrow, however, finally enabled
-the French general to accomplish his
-junction with the remains of the army from
-Naples. Moreau then concentrated his whole
-force upon the Appenines, and placed himself
-in a situation to defend the important
-positions of Liguria, until the chances of
-war should afford him an opportunity of resuming
-the offensive.</p>
-
-<p>When, after a decisive battle, an army has
-lost its artillery and equipments, and is consequently
-no longer in a state to assume the
-offensive, or even to arrest the pursuit of
-the enemy, it would seem most desirable to
-divide what remains into several corps, and
-order them to march by separate and distant
-routes upon the base of operation, and
-throw themselves into the fortresses. This
-is the only means of safety: for the enemy,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_47">47</a></span>
-uncertain as to the precise direction taken
-by the vanquished army, is ignorant in the
-first instance which corps to pursue, and it
-is in this moment of indecision that a march
-is gained upon him. Besides, the movements
-of a small body being so much easier
-than those of a larger one, these separate
-lines of march are all in favor of a retreating
-army.</p>
-
-</div></div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<h2><a id="MAXIM_XIV"></a>MAXIM XIV.</h2>
-
-<p>Among mountains, a great number of
-positions are always to be found very
-strong in themselves, and which it is dangerous
-to attack. The character of this
-mode of warfare consists in occupying
-camps on the flanks or in the rear of the
-enemy, leaving him only the alternative
-of abandoning his position without fighting,
-to take up another in the rear, or to
-descend from it in order to attack you.
-In mountain warfare, the assailant has
-always the disadvantage; even in offensive
-warfare in the open field, the great<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_48">48</a></span>
-secret consists in defensive combats, and
-in obliging the enemy to attack.</p>
-
-<div class="note">
-<h3>NOTE.</h3>
-
-<p>During the campaign of 1793, in the Maritime
-Alps, the French army, under the orders
-of General Brunet, did all in its power
-to get possession of the camps at Raus and
-at Fourches, by an attack in front. But
-these useless efforts served only to increase
-the courage of the Piedmontese, and to destroy
-the <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">élite</i> of the grenadiers of the republican
-army. The manœuvres by which Napoleon,
-without fighting, compelled the enemy
-to evacuate these positions in 1796, suffice to
-establish the truth of these principles, and
-to prove how much success in war depends
-upon the genius of the general as well as on
-the courage of the soldier.</p>
-
-</div></div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<h2><a id="MAXIM_XV"></a>MAXIM XV.</h2>
-
-<p>The first consideration with a general
-who offers battle, should be the glory and
-honor of his arms; the safety and preservation
-of his men is only the second; but<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_49">49</a></span>
-it is in the enterprise and courage resulting
-from the former, that the latter will
-most assuredly be found. In a retreat,
-besides the honor of the army, the loss of
-life is often greater than in two battles.
-For this reason, we should never despair
-while brave men are to be found with
-their colors. It is by this means that we
-obtain victory, and deserve to obtain it.</p>
-
-<div class="note">
-<h3>NOTE.</h3>
-
-<p>In 1645, the French army, under the orders
-of the Prince of Condé, was on the
-march to lay siege to Nordlingen, when it
-was discovered that Count Merci, who commanded
-the Bavarians, had foreseen this
-intention, and had entrenched himself in a
-strong position which defended Nordlingen
-at the same time that it covered Donawerth.</p>
-
-<p>Notwithstanding the favorable position of
-the enemy, Condé ordered the attack. The
-combat was terrible. All the infantry in
-the centre and on the right, after being
-successively engaged, was routed and dispersed,
-in spite of the efforts of the cavalry
-and the reserve, which were likewise carried
-away with the fugitives. The battle was<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_50">50</a></span>
-lost. Condé, in despair, having no longer
-either centre or right to depend upon, collected
-the remnants of his battalions, and
-directed his march to the left, where Turenne
-was still engaged. This perseverance reanimated
-the ardor of the troops. They
-broke the right wing of the enemy, and
-Turenne, by a change of front, returned to
-the attack upon his centre. Night, too,
-favored the boldness of Condé. An entire
-corps of Bavarians, fancying themselves cut
-off, laid down their arms; and the obstinacy
-of the French general in this struggle for
-victory was repaid by possession of the field
-of battle, together with a great number of
-prisoners, and almost all the enemy’s artillery.
-The Bavarian army beat a retreat,
-and the next day Nordlingen capitulated.</p>
-
-</div></div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<h2><a id="MAXIM_XVI"></a>MAXIM XVI.</h2>
-
-<p>It is an approved maxim in war, never
-to do what the enemy wishes you to do,
-for this reason alone, that he desires it.
-A field of battle, therefore, which he
-has previously studied and reconnoitred,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_51">51</a></span>
-should be avoided, and double care should
-be taken where he has had time to fortify
-and entrench. One consequence deducible
-from this principle is, never to attack
-a position in front which you can gain by
-turning.</p>
-
-<div class="note">
-<h3>NOTE.</h3>
-
-<p>It was without due regard to this principle,
-that Marshal Villeroi, on assuming the
-command of the army of Italy, during the
-campaign of 1701, attacked, with unwarrantable
-presumption, Prince Eugene, of
-Savoy, in his entrenched position of Chiavi,
-on the Oglio. The French generals, Catinat
-among the rest, considered the post unassailable,
-but Villeroi insisted, and the result
-of this otherwise unimportant battle was
-the loss of the <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">élite</i> of the French army. It
-would have been greater still, but for Catinat’s
-exertions.</p>
-
-<p>It was by neglecting the same principle,
-that the Prince of Condé, in the campaign
-of 1644, failed in all his attacks upon the
-entrenched position of the Bavarian army.
-The Count Merci, who commanded the latter,
-had drawn up his cavalry skilfully upon the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_52">52</a></span>
-plain, resting upon Freyberg, while his infantry
-occupied the mountain. After many
-fruitless attempts, the Prince of Condé,
-seeing the impossibility of dislodging the
-enemy, began to menace his communications&mdash;but
-the moment Merci perceived this,
-he broke up his camp and retired beyond
-the Black mountains.</p>
-
-</div></div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<h2><a id="MAXIM_XVII"></a>MAXIM XVII.</h2>
-
-<p>In a war of march and manœuvre, if
-you would avoid a battle with a superior
-army, it is necessary to entrench every
-night, and occupy a good defensive position.
-Those natural positions which are
-ordinarily met with, are not sufficient to
-protect an army against superior numbers
-without recourse to art.</p>
-
-<div class="note">
-<h3>NOTE.</h3>
-
-<p>The campaign of the French and Spanish
-army, commanded by the Duke of Berwick,
-against the Portuguese, in the year 1706,
-affords a good lesson on this subject. The
-two armies made almost the tour of Spain.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_53">53</a></span>
-They began the campaign near Badajoz, and
-after manœuvring across both Castiles, finished
-it in the kingdoms of Valencia and
-Murcia. The Duke of Berwick encamped
-his army eighty-five times, and although the
-campaign passed without a general action,
-he took about ten thousand prisoners from
-the enemy. Marshal Turenne also made a
-fine campaign of manœuvre against the
-Count Montécuculli, in 1675.</p>
-
-<p>The imperial army having made its arrangements
-to pass the Rhine at Strasburg,
-Turenne used all diligence, and, throwing a
-bridge over the river near the village of
-Ottenheim, three leagues below Strasburg,
-he crossed with the French army, and encamped
-close to the little town of Vilstet,
-which he occupied. This position covered
-the bridge of Strasburg, so that, by this
-manœuvre, Turenne deprived the enemy of
-all approach to that city.</p>
-
-<p>Upon this, Montécuculli made a movement
-with his whole army, threatening the bridge
-at Ottenheim, by which the French received
-their provisions from upper Alsace.</p>
-
-<p>As soon as Turenne discovered the design
-of the enemy, he left a detachment at Vilstet,
-and made a rapid march with his whole<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_54">54</a></span>
-force upon the village of Altenheim. This
-intermediate position between the two
-bridges, which he wished to preserve, gave
-him the advantage of being able to succor
-either of these posts before the enemy had
-time to carry them. Montécuculli seeing
-that any successful attack upon the bridges
-was not to be expected, resolved to pass
-the Rhine below Strasburg, and with this
-view returned to his first position at Offenburg.
-Marshal Turenne, who followed all
-the movements of the Austrian army, brought
-back his army also to Vilstet.</p>
-
-<p>In the meantime, this attempt of the
-enemy having convinced the French general
-of the danger to which his bridge had exposed
-him, removed it nearer to that of
-Strasburg, in order to diminish the extent
-of ground he had to defend.</p>
-
-<p>Montécuculli, having commanded the magistrates
-of Strasburg to collect materials
-for a bridge, moved to Scherzheim to receive
-them; but Turenne again defeated his projects
-by taking a position at Freistett, where
-he occupied the islands of the Rhine, and
-immediately constructed a stockade.</p>
-
-<p>Thus it was that, during the whole of
-this campaign, Turenne succeeded in gaining<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_55">55</a></span>
-the initiative of the enemy, and obliging
-him to follow his movements. He succeeded,
-also, by a rapid march, in cutting off Montécuculli
-from the Town of Offenburg, whence
-he drew his supplies, and would no doubt
-have prevented the Austrian general from
-effecting his junction with the corps of Caprara,
-had not a cannon-shot terminated this
-great man’s life.</p>
-
-</div></div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<h2><a id="MAXIM_XVIII"></a>MAXIM XVIII.</h2>
-
-<p>A general of ordinary talent occupying
-a bad position, and surprised by a superior
-force, seeks his safety in retreat; but
-a great captain supplies all deficiencies
-by his courage, and marches boldly to
-meet the attack. By this means he disconcerts
-his adversary; and if the latter
-shows any irresolution in his movements,
-a skilful leader, profiting by his indecision,
-may even hope for victory, or at least
-employ the day in manœuvring&mdash;at night
-he entrenches himself, or falls back to a
-better position. By this determined conduct<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_56">56</a></span>
-he maintains the honor of his arms,
-the first essential to all military superiority.</p>
-
-<div class="note">
-<h3>NOTE.</h3>
-
-<p>In 1653, Marshal Turenne was surprised
-by the Prince of Condé, in a position where
-his army was completely compromised. He
-had the power, indeed, by an immediate
-retreat, of covering himself by the Somme,
-which he possessed the means of crossing at
-Peronne, and whence he was distant only
-half a league; but, fearing the influence of
-this retrograde movement on the <em>morale</em> of
-his army, Turenne balanced all disadvantages
-by his courage, and marched boldly to
-meet the enemy with very inferior forces.
-After marching a league, he found an advantageous
-position, where he made every disposition
-for a battle. It was three o’clock
-in the afternoon; but the Spaniards, exhausted
-with fatigue, hesitated to attack
-him, and Turenne having covered himself
-with entrenchments during the night, the
-enemy no longer dared to risk a general
-action, and broke up his camp.</p>
-
-</div></div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_57">57</a></span></p>
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<h2><a id="MAXIM_XIX"></a>MAXIM XIX.</h2>
-
-<p>The transition from the defensive to
-the offensive is one of the most delicate
-operations.</p>
-
-<div class="note">
-<h3>NOTE.</h3>
-
-<p>By studying the first campaign of Napoleon
-in Italy, we can learn what genius and
-boldness may effect in passing with an army
-from the <em>defensive</em> to the <em>offensive</em>. The army
-of the allies, commanded by General Beaulieu,
-was provided with every means that
-could render it formidable. Its force amounted
-to eighty thousand men, and two hundred
-pieces of cannon. The French army,
-on the contrary, could number scarcely thirty
-thousand men under arms, and thirty pieces
-of cannon. For some time there had been
-no issue of meat, and even the bread was
-irregularly supplied. The infantry was ill
-clothed, the cavalry wretchedly mounted.
-All the draught-horses had perished from
-want, so that the service of the artillery was
-performed by mules. To remedy these evils,
-large disbursements were necessary; and
-such was the state of the finances, that the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_58">58</a></span>
-government had only been able to furnish
-two thousand louis in specie for the opening
-of the campaign. The French army could
-not possibly exist in this state. To advance
-or retreat was absolutely necessary. Aware
-of the advantage of surprising the enemy at
-the very outset of the campaign by some
-decisive blow, Napoleon prepared for it by
-recasting the <em>morale</em> of his army.</p>
-
-<p>In a proclamation full of energy, he reminded
-them that an ignoble death alone
-remained for them, if they continued on the
-defensive; that they had nothing to expect
-from France, but everything to hope from
-victory. “Abundance courts you in the fertile
-plains of Italy,” said he; “are you deficient,
-soldiers, in constancy or in courage?”
-Profiting by the moment of enthusiasm
-which he had inspired, Napoleon concentrated
-his forces in order to fall with his
-whole weight on the different corps of the
-enemy. Immediately afterward, the battles
-of Montenotte, Milesimo, and Mondovi, added
-fresh confidence to the high opinion
-already entertained by the soldier for his
-chief; and that army which only a few days
-ago was encamped amid barren rocks, and
-consumed by famine, already aspired to the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_59">59</a></span>
-conquest of Italy. In one month after the
-opening of the campaign, Napoleon had terminated
-the war with the King of Sardinia,
-and conquered the Milanese. Rich cantonments
-soon dispelled from the recollection of
-the French soldier the misery and fatigue
-attendant on this rapid march, while a vigilant
-administration of the resources of the
-country reorganized the <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">materiel</i> of the
-French army, and created the means necessary
-for the attainment of future success.</p>
-
-</div></div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<h2><a id="MAXIM_XX"></a>MAXIM XX.</h2>
-
-<p>It may be laid down as a principle,
-that the line of operation should not be
-abandoned; but it is one of the most
-skilful manœuvres in war, to know how
-to change it, when circumstances authorize
-or render this necessary. An army
-which changes skilfully its line of operation
-deceives the enemy, who becomes
-ignorant where to look for its rear, or
-upon what weak points it is assailable.</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_60">60</a></span></p>
-
-<div class="note">
-<h3>NOTE.</h3>
-
-<p>Frederick sometimes changed his line of
-operation in the middle of a campaign; but
-he was enabled to do this, because he was
-manœuvring at that time in the centre of
-Germany&mdash;an abundant country, capable of
-supplying all the wants of his army in case
-his communications with Prussia were intercepted.</p>
-
-<p>Marshal Turenne, in the campaign of
-1746, gave up his line of communication to
-the allies in the same manner; but, like
-Frederick, he was carrying on the war at
-this time in the centre of Germany, and
-having fallen with his whole forces upon
-Rain, he took the precaution of securing
-to himself a depôt upon which to establish
-his base of operation.</p>
-
-<p>By a series of manœuvres, marked alike
-by audacity and genius, he subsequently
-compelled the imperial army to abandon
-its magazines, and retire into Austria for
-winter quarters.</p>
-
-<p>But these are examples which it appears to
-me should only be imitated when we have
-taken full measure of the capacity of our
-adversary, and above all, when we see no<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_61">61</a></span>
-reason to apprehend an insurrection in the
-country to which we transfer the theatre
-of war.</p>
-
-</div></div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<h2><a id="MAXIM_XXI"></a>MAXIM XXI.</h2>
-
-<p>When an army carries with it a battering
-train, or large convoys of sick and
-wounded, it cannot march by too short
-a line upon its depôts.</p>
-
-<div class="note">
-<h3>NOTE.</h3>
-
-<p>It is above all in mountainous countries,
-and in those interspersed with woods and
-marshes, that it is of importance to observe
-this maxim; for, the convoys and means of
-transport being frequently embarrassed in
-defiles, an enemy by manœuvring may easily
-disperse the escorts, or make even a successful
-attack upon the whole army, when it is
-obliged, from the nature of the country, to
-march in an extended column.</p>
-
-</div></div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<h2><a id="MAXIM_XXII"></a>MAXIM XXII.</h2>
-
-<p>The art of encamping in position is the
-same as taking up the line in order of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_62">62</a></span>
-battle in this position. To this end, the
-artillery should be advantageously placed,
-ground should be selected which is not
-commanded or liable to be turned, and,
-as far as possible, the guns should cover
-and command the surrounding country.</p>
-
-<div class="note">
-<h3>NOTE.</h3>
-
-<p>Frederick has remarked that, in order to
-be assured that your camp is well placed,
-you should see if, by making a small movement,
-you can oblige the enemy to make a
-greater; or, if after having forced him to
-retrograde one march you can compel him to
-fall back another.</p>
-
-<p>In defensive war, all camps should be entrenched
-in the front and wings of the position
-they occupy, and care should be taken
-that the rear is left perfectly open. If you
-are threatened with being turned, arrangements
-should be made beforehand for taking
-up a more distant position; and you should
-profit by any disorder in the enemy’s line of
-march, to make an attempt upon his artillery
-or baggage.</p>
-
-</div></div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_63">63</a></span></p>
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<h2><a id="MAXIM_XXIII"></a>MAXIM XXIII.</h2>
-
-<p>When you are occupying a position
-which the enemy threatens to surround,
-collect all your force immediately, and
-menace <em>him</em> with an offensive movement.
-By this manœuvre, you will prevent him
-from detaching and annoying your flanks
-in case you should judge it necessary to
-retire.</p>
-
-<div class="note">
-<h3>NOTE.</h3>
-
-<p>This was the manœuvre practised by General
-Desaix, in 1798, near Radstadt. He made
-up for inferiority in numbers by audacity,
-and maintained himself the whole day in
-position in spite of the vigorous attacks of
-the Archduke Charles. At night he effected
-his retreat in good order, and took up a position
-in the rear.</p>
-
-<p>It was in accordance, also, with this principle,
-in the same campaign, that General
-Moreau gave battle at Biberach, to secure
-his retreat by the passes of the Black mountains.
-A few days after, he fought at Schliengen
-with the same object. Placed in a
-good defensive position, he menaced the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_64">64</a></span>
-Archduke Charles by a sudden return to the
-offensive, while his artillery and baggage
-were passing the Rhine by the bridge of
-Huningen, and he was making all the necessary
-arrangements for retiring behind that
-river himself.</p>
-
-<p>Here, however, I would observe, that the
-execution of such offensive demonstrations
-should be deferred always till toward the
-evening, in order that you may not be compromised
-by engaging too early in a combat
-which you cannot long maintain with success.</p>
-
-<p>Night, and the uncertainty of the enemy
-after an affair of this kind, will always favor
-your retreat, if it is judged necessary; but,
-with a view to mask the operation more
-effectually, fires should be lighted all along
-the lines, to deceive the enemy and prevent
-him from discovering this retrograde movement,
-for in a retreat it is a great advantage
-to gain a march upon your adversary.</p>
-
-</div></div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<h2><a id="MAXIM_XXIV"></a>MAXIM XXIV.</h2>
-
-<p>Never lose sight of this maxim: that
-you should establish your cantonments at<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_65">65</a></span>
-the most distant and best-protected point
-from the enemy, especially where a surprise
-is possible. By this means you will
-have time to unite all your forces before
-he can attack you.</p>
-
-<div class="note">
-<h3>NOTE.</h3>
-
-<p>In the campaign of 1745, Marshal Turenne
-lost the battle of Marienthal, by neglecting
-this principle; for if, instead of
-reassembling his divisions at Erbsthausen,
-he had rallied his troops at Mergentheim,
-behind the Tauber, his army would have
-been much sooner reunited; and Count Merci,
-in place of finding only three thousand
-men to fight at Erbsthausen (of which he
-was well informed), would have had the
-whole French army to attack in a position
-covered by a river.</p>
-
-<p>Some one having indiscreetly asked Viscount
-Turenne how he had lost the battle of
-Marienthal: “By my own fault,” replied the
-marshal; “but,” added he, “when a man has
-committed no faults in war, he can only
-have been engaged in it but a short time.”</p>
-
-</div></div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_66">66</a></span></p>
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<h2><a id="MAXIM_XXV"></a>MAXIM XXV.</h2>
-
-<p>When two armies are in order of battle,
-and one has to retire over a bridge,
-while the other has the circumference of
-the circle open, all the advantages are in
-favor of the latter. It is then a general
-should show boldness, strike a decided
-blow, and manœuvre upon the flank of
-his enemy. The victory is in his hands.</p>
-
-<div class="note">
-<h3>NOTE.</h3>
-
-<p>This was the position of the French army
-at the famous battle of Leipzig, which terminated
-the campaign of 1813 so fatally for
-Napoleon; for the battle of Hanau was of
-no consequence, comparatively, in the desperate
-situation of that army.</p>
-
-<p>It strikes me that, in a situation like that
-of the French army previous to the battle
-of Leipzig, a general should never calculate
-upon any of those lucky chances which may
-arise out of a return to the offensive, but
-that he should rather adopt every possible
-means to secure his retreat. With this view,
-he should immediately cover himself with
-good entrenchments, to enable him to repel<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_67">67</a></span>
-with inferior numbers the attack of the enemy,
-while his own equipments are crossing
-the river. As fast as the troops reach the
-other side, they should occupy positions to
-protect the passage of the rear guard, and
-this last should be covered by a <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">tête de pont</i>
-as soon as the army breaks up its camp.
-During the wars of the Revolution, too little
-regard was paid to entrenchments; and it is
-for this reason we have seen large armies
-dispersed after a single reverse, and the fate
-of nations compromised by the issue of one
-battle.</p>
-
-</div></div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<h2><a id="MAXIM_XXVI"></a>MAXIM XXVI.</h2>
-
-<p>It is contrary to all true principle, to
-make corps, which have no communication
-with each other, act separately against
-a central force whose communications are
-cut off.</p>
-
-<div class="note">
-<h3>NOTE.</h3>
-
-<p>The Austrians lost the battle of Hohenlinden
-by neglecting this principle. The
-imperial army, under the orders of the archduke
-John, was divided into four columns,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_68">68</a></span>
-which had to march through an immense
-forest, previous to their junction in the plain
-of Anzing, where they intended to surprise
-the French. But these different corps, having
-no direct communication, found themselves
-compelled to engage separately with
-an enemy who had taken the precaution of
-concentrating his masses, and who could
-move them with facility in a country with
-which he had been long previously acquainted.</p>
-
-<p>Thus the Austrian army, enclosed in the
-defiles of the forest with its whole train of
-artillery and baggage, was attacked in its
-flanks and rear, and the archduke John was
-only enabled to rally his dispersed and shattered
-divisions under cover of the night.</p>
-
-<p>The trophies obtained by the French army
-on this day were immense. They consisted
-of eleven thousand prisoners, one hundred
-pieces of cannon, several stand of colors, and
-all the baggage of the enemy.</p>
-
-<p>The battle of Hohenlinden decided the fate
-of the campaign of 1800, and Moreau’s brilliant
-and well-merited success placed him in
-the rank of the first general of the age.</p>
-
-</div></div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_69">69</a></span></p>
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<h2><a id="MAXIM_XXVII"></a>MAXIM XXVII.</h2>
-
-<p>When an army is driven from a first
-position, the retreating columns should
-rally always sufficiently in the rear, to
-prevent any interruption from the enemy.
-The greatest disaster that can happen, is
-when the columns are attacked in detail,
-and before their junction.</p>
-
-<div class="note">
-<h3>NOTE.</h3>
-
-<p>One great advantage which results from
-rallying your columns on a point far removed
-from the field of battle, or from the position
-previously occupied, is, that the enemy is
-uncertain as to the direction you mean to
-take.</p>
-
-<p>If he divides his force to pursue you, he
-exposes himself to see his detachments beaten
-in detail, especially if you have exerted all
-due diligence, and have effected the junction
-of your troops in sufficient time to get between
-his columns and disperse them one
-after the other.</p>
-
-<p>It was by a manœuvre of this kind in the
-campaign of Italy, in 1799, that General
-Melas gained the battle of Genola.</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_70">70</a></span></p>
-
-<p>General Championet commanded the
-French army, and endeavored to cut off the
-communication of the Austrians with Turin,
-by employing corps which manœuvred separately
-to get into their rear. Melas, who
-divined his project, made a retrograde march,
-by which he persuaded his adversary he was
-in full retreat, although the real object of his
-movement was to concentrate his forces at
-the point fixed for the junction of the different
-detachments of the French army, and
-which he beat and dispersed, one after
-another, by his great superiority in numbers.
-The result of this manœuvre, in which the
-Austrian general displayed vigor, decision,
-and foresight, secured to him the peaceable
-possession of Piedmont.</p>
-
-<p>It was also by the neglect of this principle
-that General Beaulieu, who commanded the
-Austro-Sardinian army in the campaign of
-1796, lost the battle of Milesimo after that
-of Montenotte.</p>
-
-<p>His object, in endeavoring to rally his
-different corps upon Milesimo, was, to cover
-the high roads of Turin and Milan; but
-Napoleon, aware of the advantages arising
-from the ardor of troops emboldened by
-recent success, attacked him before he could<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_71">71</a></span>
-assemble his divisions, and, by a series of
-skilful manœuvres, succeeded in separating
-the combined armies. They retired in the
-greatest disorder&mdash;the one by the road of
-Milan, the other by that of Turin.</p>
-
-</div></div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<h2><a id="MAXIM_XXVIII"></a>MAXIM XXVIII.</h2>
-
-<p>No force should be detached on the eve
-of a battle, because affairs may change
-during the night, either by the retreat of
-the enemy, or by the arrival of large reinforcements
-to enable him to resume the
-offensive, and counteract your previous
-arrangements.</p>
-
-<div class="note">
-<h3>NOTE.</h3>
-
-<p>In 1796, the army of the Sambre and
-Meuse, commanded by General Jourdan,
-effected a retreat, which was rendered still
-more difficult by the loss of his line of communication.
-Seeing, however, that the forces
-of the archduke Charles were scattered,
-Jourdan, in order to accomplish his retreat
-upon Frankfort, resolved to open himself a
-way by Wurtzburg, where there were at that<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_72">72</a></span>
-moment only two divisions of the Austrian
-army. This movement would have been attended
-with success, if the French general,
-believing he had simply these two divisions
-to contend with, had not committed the error
-of separating himself from the corps of Lefevre&mdash;which
-he left at Schweinfurt to cover
-the only direct communication of the army
-with its base of operation.</p>
-
-<p>The commission of this fault at the outset,
-added to some slowness in the march of the
-French general, secured the victory to the
-archduke, who hastened to concentrate his
-forces.</p>
-
-<p>The arrival of the two divisions, also, of
-Kray and Wartesleben, during the battle,
-enabled him to oppose fifty thousand men to
-the French army, which scarcely numbered
-thirty thousand combatants. This last was
-consequently beaten, and obliged to continue
-its retreat by the mountains of Fuldes, where
-the badness of the roads could be equalled
-only by the difficulty of the country.</p>
-
-<p>The division of Lefevre, amounting to fourteen
-thousand men, would, in all probability,
-have turned the scale in favor of Jourdan,
-had the latter not unfortunately conceived
-that two divisions only were opposing his
-passage to Wurtzburg.</p>
-
-</div></div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_73">73</a></span></p>
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<h2><a id="MAXIM_XXIX"></a>MAXIM XXIX.</h2>
-
-<p>When you have resolved to fight a
-battle, collect your whole force. Dispense
-with nothing. A single battalion
-sometimes decides the day.</p>
-
-<div class="note">
-<h3>NOTE.</h3>
-
-<p>I think it here desirable to observe, that it
-is prudent before a battle to fix upon some
-point in rear of the reserve for the junction
-of the different detachments; for if, from
-unforeseen circumstances, these detachments
-should be prevented from joining before the
-action has commenced, they might be exposed,
-in case a retrograde movement should
-be found necessary, to the masses of the
-enemy. It is desirable also to keep the
-enemy in ignorance of these reinforcements,
-in order to employ them with greater effect.
-“A seasonable reinforcement,” says Frederick,
-“renders the success of a battle certain,
-because the enemy will always imagine
-it stronger than it really is, and lose courage
-accordingly.”</p>
-
-</div></div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_74">74</a></span></p>
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<h2><a id="MAXIM_XXX"></a>MAXIM XXX.</h2>
-
-<p>Nothing is so rash or so contrary to
-principle, as to make a flank march before
-an army in position, especially when
-this army occupies heights at the foot
-of which you are forced to defile.</p>
-
-<div class="note">
-<h3>NOTE.</h3>
-
-<p>It was by a neglect of this principle that
-Frederick was beaten at Kollin in the first
-campaign of 1757. Notwithstanding prodigies
-of valor, the Prussians lost fifteen
-thousand men and a great portion of their
-artillery, while the loss of the Austrians did
-not exceed five thousand men. The consequence
-of this battle was more unfortunate
-still, since it obliged the King of Prussia to
-raise the siege of Prague, and to evacuate
-Bohemia.</p>
-
-<p>It was also by making a flank march
-before the Prussian army, that the French
-lost the disgraceful battle of Rosbach.</p>
-
-<p>This imprudent movement was still more
-to be reprehended, because the Prince de
-Soubise, who commanded the French army,
-was so negligent as to manœuvre, without<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_75">75</a></span>
-either advanced guards or flanking corps, in
-presence of the enemy. The result was,
-that his army, consisting of fifty thousand
-men, was beaten by six battalions and thirty
-squadrons. The French lost seven thousand
-men, twenty-seven standards, and a great
-number of cannon. The Prussians had only
-three hundred men disabled.</p>
-
-<p>Thus, by having forgotten this principle,
-<em>that a flank march is never to be made before
-an enemy in line of battle</em>, Frederick lost his
-army at Kollin; and Soubise, at Rosbach,
-lost both his army and his honor.</p>
-
-</div></div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<h2><a id="MAXIM_XXXI"></a>MAXIM XXXI.</h2>
-
-<p>When you determine to risk a battle,
-reserve to yourself every possible chance
-of success, more particularly if you have
-to deal with an adversary of superior
-talent; for if you are beaten, even in the
-midst of your magazines and your communications,
-wo to the vanquished!</p>
-
-<div class="note">
-<h3>NOTE.</h3>
-
-<p>“We should make war,” says Marshal
-Saxe, “without leaving anything to hazard,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_76">76</a></span>
-and in this especially consists the talent of a
-general. But when we have incurred the
-risk of a battle, we should know how to
-profit by the victory, and not merely content
-ourselves, according to custom, with
-possession of the field.”</p>
-
-<p>It was by neglecting to follow up the first
-success, that the Austrian army, after gaining
-the field of Marengo, saw itself compelled
-on the following day to evacuate the whole
-of Italy.</p>
-
-<p>General Melas, observing the French in
-retreat, left the direction of the movements
-of his army to the chief of his staff, and
-retired to Alexandria to repose from the
-fatigues of the day. Colonel Zach, equally
-convinced with his general that the French
-army was completely broken, and consisted
-only of fugitives, formed the divisions in
-column of route.</p>
-
-<p>By this arrangement, the imperial army
-prepared to enter upon its victorious march
-in a formation not less than three miles in
-depth.</p>
-
-<p>It was near four o’clock when General
-Desaix rejoined the French army with his
-division. His presence restored in some
-degree an equality between the contending<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_77">77</a></span>
-forces; and yet Napoleon hesitated for a
-moment whether to resume the offensive,
-or to make use of this corps to secure his
-retreat. The ardor of the troops to return
-to the charge, decided his irresolution. He
-rode rapidly along the front of his divisions,
-and addressing the soldiers&mdash;“We have retired
-far enough for to-day,” said he; “you
-know I always sleep upon the field of
-battle!”</p>
-
-<p>The army, with unanimous shout, proclaimed
-to him a promise of victory. Napoleon
-resumed the offensive. The Austrian
-advance guard, panic-struck at the sight of
-a formidable and unbroken body presenting
-itself suddenly at a point where, a few moments
-before, only fugitives were to be seen,
-went to the right about, and carried disorder
-into the mass of its columns. Attacked immediately
-afterward, with impetuosity, in its
-front and flanks, the Austrian army was
-completely routed.</p>
-
-<p>Marshal Daun experienced nearly the
-same fate as General Melas, at the battle
-of Torgau, in the campaign of 1760.</p>
-
-<p>The position of the Austrian army was
-excellent. It had its left upon Torgau, its
-right on the plateau of Siptitz, and its front
-covered by a large sheet of water.</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_78">78</a></span></p>
-
-<p>Frederick proposed to turn its right in
-order to make an attack upon the rear. For
-this purpose he divided his army into two
-corps, the one under the orders of Ziethen,
-with instructions to attack in front, following
-the edge of the water; the other under
-his own immediate command, with which he
-set out to turn the right of the Austrians.
-But Marshal Daun having had intimation of
-the movements of the enemy, changed his
-front by countermarching, and was thus
-enabled to repel the attacks of Frederick,
-whom he obliged to retreat. The two corps
-of the Prussian army had been acting without
-communication. Ziethen, in the meantime,
-hearing the fire recede, concluded that
-the king had been beaten, and commenced a
-movement by his left in order to rejoin him;
-but falling in with two battalions of the
-reserve, the Prussian general profited by this
-reinforcement to resume the offensive. Accordingly
-he renewed the attack with vigor,
-got possession of the plateau of Siptitz, and
-soon after of the whole field of battle. The
-sun had already set when the King of Prussia
-received the news of this unexpected
-good fortune. He returned in all haste, took
-advantage of the night to restore order in<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_79">79</a></span>
-his disorganized army, and the day after the
-battle occupied Torgau.</p>
-
-<p>Marshal Daun was receiving congratulations
-upon his victory, when he heard that
-the Prussians had resumed the offensive.
-He immediately commanded a retreat, and
-at daybreak the Austrians repassed the Elbe
-with the loss of twelve thousand men, eight
-thousand prisoners, and forty-five pieces of
-cannon.</p>
-
-<p>After the battle of Marengo, General Melas,
-although in the midst of his fortresses
-and magazines, saw himself compelled to
-abandon everything, in order to save the
-wreck of his army.</p>
-
-<p>General Mack capitulated after the battle
-of Ulm, although in the centre of his own
-country.</p>
-
-<p>The Prussians, in spite of their depôts
-and reserves, were obliged, after the battle
-of Jena, and the French after that of Waterloo,
-to lay down their arms.</p>
-
-<p>Hence, we may conclude that the misfortune
-that results from the loss of a battle,
-does not consist so much in the destruction
-of men and of <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">materiel</i> as in the discouragement
-which follows this disaster. The courage
-and confidence of the victors augment<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_80">80</a></span>
-in proportion as those of the vanquished
-diminish; and whatever may be the resources
-of an army, it will be found that a retreat
-will degenerate rapidly into a rout unless
-the general-in-chief shall succeed, by combining
-boldness with skill, and perseverance
-with firmness, in restoring the <em>morale</em> of his
-army.</p>
-
-</div></div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<h2><a id="MAXIM_XXXII"></a>MAXIM XXXII.</h2>
-
-<p>The duty of an advanced guard does
-not consist in advancing or retiring, but
-in manœuvring. An advanced guard
-should be composed of light cavalry, supported
-by a reserve of heavy cavalry, and
-by battalions of infantry, supported also
-by artillery. An advanced guard should
-consist of picked troops, and the general
-officers, officers and men, should be selected
-for their respective capabilities and
-knowledge. A corps deficient in instruction
-is only an embarrassment to an advanced
-guard.</p>
-
-<div class="note">
-<h3>NOTE.</h3>
-
-<p>It was the opinion of Frederick that an
-advanced guard should be composed of detachments<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_81">81</a></span>
-of troops of all arms. The commander
-should possess skill in the choice of
-ground, and he should take care to be instantly
-informed, by means of numerous
-patrols, of everything passing in the enemy’s
-camp.</p>
-
-<p>In war, it is not the business of an advanced
-guard to fight, but to observe the
-enemy, in order to cover the movements of
-the army. When in pursuit, the advanced
-guard should charge with vigor, and cut off
-the baggage and insulated corps of the retiring
-enemy. For this purpose, it should be
-reinforced with all the disposable light cavalry
-of the army.</p>
-
-</div></div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<h2><a id="MAXIM_XXXIII"></a>MAXIM XXXIII.</h2>
-
-<p>It is contrary to the usages of war to
-allow parks or batteries of artillery to
-enter a defile, unless you hold the other
-extremity. In case of retreat, the guns
-will embarrass your movements and be
-lost. They should be left in position,
-under a sufficient escort, until you are
-master of the opening.</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_82">82</a></span></p>
-
-<div class="note">
-<h3>NOTE.</h3>
-
-<p>Nothing encumbers the march of an army
-so much as a quantity of baggage. In the
-campaign of 1796, Napoleon abandoned his
-battering train under the walls of Mantua,
-after spiking the guns and destroying the
-carriages. By this sacrifice, he acquired a
-facility of manœuvring rapidly his little
-army, and obtained the initiative as well as
-a general superiority over the numerous but
-divided forces of Marshal Wurmser.</p>
-
-<p>In 1799, during his retreat in Italy, General
-Moreau being compelled to manœuvre
-among the mountains, preferred separating
-himself entirely from his reserve artillery,
-which he directed upon France by the Col
-de Fenestrelle, rather than embarrass his
-march with this part of his equipment.</p>
-
-<p>These are the examples we should follow;
-for if, by a rapidity of march, and a facility
-of concentration upon decisive points, the
-victory is gained, the <em>materiel</em> of an army is
-soon re-established. But if, on the other
-hand, we are beaten and compelled to retreat,
-it will be difficult to save our equipments,
-and we may have reason to congratulate<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_83">83</a></span>
-ourselves that we abandoned them in time
-to prevent them from augmenting the trophies
-of the enemy.</p>
-
-</div></div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<h2><a id="MAXIM_XXXIV"></a>MAXIM XXXIV.</h2>
-
-<p>It should be laid down as a principle,
-never to leave intervals by which the enemy
-can penetrate between corps formed
-in order of battle, unless it be to draw
-him into a snare.</p>
-
-<div class="note">
-<h3>NOTE.</h3>
-
-<p>In the campaign of 1757, the Prince of
-Lorraine, who was covering Prague with
-the Austrian army, perceived the Prussians
-threatening, by a flank movement, to turn
-his right. He immediately ordered a partial
-change of front by throwing back the infantry
-of that wing, so as to form a right angle
-with the rest of the line. But this manœuvre
-being executed in presence of the enemy,
-was not effected without some disorder.
-The heads of the columns having marched
-too quick, caused the rear to lengthen out,
-and when the line was formed to the right,
-a large interval appeared at the salient angle.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_84">84</a></span>
-Frederick, observing this error, hastened
-to take advantage of it. He directed his
-centre corps, commanded by the Duke of
-Bevern, to throw itself into this opening,
-and by this manœuvre decided the fate of
-the battle.</p>
-
-<p>The Prince of Lorraine returned to Prague,
-beaten and pursued, with the loss of sixteen
-thousand men and two hundred pieces of
-cannon.</p>
-
-<p>It should be observed at the same time,
-that this operation of throwing a corps into
-the intervals made by an army in time of
-battle, should never be attempted unless you
-are at least equal in force, and have an opportunity
-of outflanking the enemy on the
-one side or the other; for it is then only you
-can hope to divide his army in the centre,
-and insulate the wings entirely. If you are
-inferior in number, you run the risk of being
-stopped by the reverses, and overpowered
-by the enemy’s wings, which may deploy
-upon your flanks and surround you.</p>
-
-<p>It was by this manœuvre that the Duke of
-Berwick gained the battle of Almanza, in
-the year 1707, in Spain.</p>
-
-<p>The Anglo-Portuguese army, under the
-command of Lord Galloway, came to invest<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_85">85</a></span>
-Villena. Marshal Berwick, who commanded
-the French and Spanish army, quitted his
-camp at Montalegre, and moved upon this
-town to raise the siege. At his approach,
-the English general, eager to fight a battle,
-advanced to meet him in the plains of Almanza.
-The issue was long doubtful. The
-first line, commanded by the Duke of Popoli,
-having been broken, the Chevalier d’Asfeldt,
-who had charge of the second, drew up his
-masses with large intervals between them;
-and when the English, who were in pursuit
-of the first line, reached these reserves, he
-took advantage of their disorder to attack
-them in flank and defeated them entirely.</p>
-
-<p>Marshal Berwick, perceiving the success
-of this manœuvre, threw open his front, and
-deploying upon the enemy’s flanks, while
-the reserve sustained the attack in front,
-and the cavalry manœuvred in their rear,
-obtained a complete victory.</p>
-
-<p>Lord Galloway, wounded and pursued,
-collected with difficulty the remains of his
-army, and took shelter with them in Tortosa.</p>
-
-</div></div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_86">86</a></span></p>
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<h2><a id="MAXIM_XXXV"></a>MAXIM XXXV.</h2>
-
-<p>Encampments of the same army should
-always be formed so as to protect each
-other.</p>
-
-<div class="note">
-<h3>NOTE.</h3>
-
-<p>At the battle of Dresden, in the campaign
-of 1813, the camp of the allies, although advantageously
-placed upon the heights on
-the left bank of the Elbe, was nevertheless
-extremely defective, from being traversed
-longitudinally by a deep ravine, which separated
-the left wing completely from the centre
-and the right. This vicious arrangement
-did not escape the penetrating eye of Napoleon.
-He instantly directed the whole of
-his cavalry and two corps of infantry against
-the insulated wing, attacked it with superior
-numbers, overthrew it, and took ten thousand
-prisoners, before it was possible to
-come to its support.</p>
-
-</div></div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<h2><a id="MAXIM_XXXVI"></a>MAXIM XXXVI.</h2>
-
-<p>When the enemy’s army is covered by
-a river, upon which he holds several <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">têtes de pont</i>, <span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_87">87</a></span>
-do not attack in front. This
-would divide your force and expose you
-to be turned. Approach the river in
-echelon of columns, in such a manner
-that the leading column shall be the only
-one the enemy can attack, without offering
-you his flank. In the meantime, let
-your light troops occupy the bank, and
-when you have decided on the point of
-passage, rush upon it and fling across
-your bridge. Observe that the point of
-passage should be always at a distance
-from the leading echelon, in order to deceive
-the enemy.</p>
-
-<div class="note">
-<h3>NOTE.</h3>
-
-<p>If you occupy a town or a village on the
-bank of a river, opposite to that held by the
-enemy, it is an advantage to make this spot
-the crossing point, because it is easier to
-cover your carriages and reserve artillery,
-as well as to mask the construction of your
-bridge, in a town, than in the open country.
-It is also a great advantage to pass a river
-opposite a village, when the latter is only
-weakly occupied by the enemy; because as
-soon as the advanced guard reaches the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_88">88</a></span>
-other side, it carries this post, makes a lodgment,
-and by throwing up a few defensive
-works, converts it easily into a <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">tête de pont</i>.
-By this means, the rest of the army is enabled
-to effect the passage with facility.</p>
-
-</div></div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<h2><a id="MAXIM_XXXVII"></a>MAXIM XXXVII.</h2>
-
-<p>From the moment you are master of a
-position which commands the opposite
-bank, facilities are acquired for effecting
-the passage of the river; above all, if this
-position is sufficiently extensive to place
-upon it artillery in force. This advantage
-is diminished, if the river is more than
-three hundred toises (or six hundred
-yards) in breadth, because the distance
-being out of the range of grape, it is easy
-for the troops which defend the passage
-to line the bank and get under cover.
-Hence it follows that if the grenadiers,
-ordered to pass the river for the protection
-of the bridge, should reach the other
-side, they would be destroyed by the
-fire of the enemy; because his batteries,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_89">89</a></span>
-placed at the distance of two hundred
-toises from the landing, are capable of a
-most destructive effect, although removed
-above five hundred toises from the batteries
-of the crossing force. Thus the
-advantage of the artillery would be exclusively
-his. For the same reason, the
-passage is impracticable, unless you succeed
-in surprising the enemy, and are
-protected by an intermediate island, or,
-unless you are able to take advantage of
-an angle in the river, to establish a crossfire
-upon his works. In this case, the
-island or angle forms a natural <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">tête de pont</i>,
-and gives the advantage in artillery to
-the attacking army.</p>
-
-<p>When a river is less than sixty toises
-(or one hundred and twenty yards) in
-breadth, and you have a post upon the
-other side, the troops which are thrown
-across derive such advantages from the
-protection of your artillery, that, however
-small the angle may be, it is impossible
-for the enemy to prevent the establishment
-of a bridge. In this case, the most
-skilful generals, when they have discovered<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_90">90</a></span>
-the project of their adversary, and
-brought their own army to the point of
-crossing, usually content themselves with
-opposing the passage of the bridge, by
-forming a semicircle round its extremity,
-as round the opening of a defile, and removing
-to the distance of three or four
-hundred toises from the fire of the opposite
-side.</p>
-
-<div class="note">
-<h3>NOTE.</h3>
-
-<p>Frederick observes, that “the passage of
-great rivers in the presence of the enemy is
-one of the most delicate operations in war.”
-Success on these occasions depends on secrecy,
-on the rapidity of the manœuvres,
-and the punctual execution of the orders
-given for the movements of each division.
-To pass such an obstacle in presence of an
-enemy, and without his knowledge, it is
-necessary not only that the previous dispositions
-should be well conceived, but that
-they should be executed without confusion.</p>
-
-<p>In the campaign of 1705, Prince Eugene,
-of Savoy, wishing to come to the assistance
-of the Prince of Piedmont, sought for a
-favorable point at which to force the passage<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_91">91</a></span>
-of the Adda, defended at that time by the
-French army, under the command of the
-Duke de Vendome.</p>
-
-<p>After having selected an advantageous
-situation, Prince Eugene erected a battery
-of twenty pieces of cannon on a position
-which commanded the entire of the opposite
-bank, and covered his infantry by a line of
-entrenched parallels constructed on the
-slope of the declivity.</p>
-
-<p>They were working vigorously at the
-bridge, when the Duke de Vendome appeared
-with his whole army. At first he seemed
-determined to oppose its construction, but
-after having examined the position of Prince
-Eugene, he judged this to be impracticable.</p>
-
-<p>He therefore placed his army out of reach
-of the prince’s batteries, resting both his
-wings upon the river, so as to form a bow,
-of which the Adda was the cord. He then
-covered himself with entrenchments and
-abattis, and was thus enabled to charge the
-enemy’s columns whenever they debouched
-from the bridge, and to beat them in detail.</p>
-
-<p>Eugene, having reconnoitred the position
-of the French, considered the passage impossible.
-He therefore withdrew the bridge,
-and broke up his camp during the night.</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_92">92</a></span></p>
-
-<p>It was by this manœuvre, also, that, in the
-campaign of 1809, the Archduke Charles
-compelled the French to reoccupy the isle
-of Lobau, after having debouched on the
-left bank of the Danube. The march of the
-Archduke Charles was wholly concentric.
-He menaced Grosaspern with his right, Esling
-with his centre, and Enzersdorf with
-his left.</p>
-
-<p>His army, with both wings resting on the
-Danube, formed a semicircle around Esling.
-Napoleon immediately attacked and broke
-the centre of the Austrians; but after having
-forced their first line, he found himself
-arrested by the reserves. In the meantime,
-the bridges upon the Danube had been destroyed,
-and several of his corps, with their
-parks of artillery, were still on the right
-bank. This disappointment, joined to the
-favorable position of the Austrians, decided
-Napoleon to re-enter the isle of Lobau, where
-he had previously constructed a line of field-works,
-so as to give it all the advantages of
-a well entrenched camp.</p>
-
-</div></div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_93">93</a></span></p>
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<h2><a id="MAXIM_XXXVIII"></a>MAXIM XXXVIII.</h2>
-
-<p>It is difficult to prevent an enemy,
-supplied with pontoons, from crossing
-a river. When the object of an army,
-which defends the passage, is to cover a
-siege, the moment the general has ascertained
-his inability to oppose the passage,
-he should take measures to arrive before
-the enemy, at an intermediate position
-between the river he defends and the
-place he desires to cover.</p>
-
-<div class="note">
-<h3>NOTE.</h3>
-
-<p>Here we may observe, that this intermediate
-position should be reconnoitred, or
-rather, well entrenched beforehand; for the
-enemy will be unable to make an offensive
-movement against the corps employed in
-the siege, until he has beaten the army of
-observation; and the latter, under cover of
-its camp, may always await a favorable
-opportunity to attack him in flank or in
-rear.</p>
-
-<p>Besides, the army which is once entrenched
-in this manner, has the advantage of being<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_94">94</a></span>
-concentrated; while that of the enemy must
-act in detachments, if he wishes to cover his
-bridge, and watch the movements of the
-army of observation, so as to enable him to
-attack the besieging corps in its lines, without
-being exposed to an attempt on his rear,
-or being menaced with the loss of his bridge.</p>
-
-</div></div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<h2><a id="MAXIM_XXXIX"></a>MAXIM XXXIX.</h2>
-
-<p>In the campaign of 1645, Turenne was
-attacked with his army before Philipsburg
-by a very superior force. There was no
-bridge here over the Rhine, but he took
-advantage of the ground between the river
-and the place to establish his camp. This
-should serve as a lesson to engineer officers,
-not merely in the construction of fortresses,
-but of <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">têtes de pont</i>. A space should
-always be left between the fortress and
-the river, where an army may form and
-rally without being obliged to throw itself
-into the place, and thereby compromise
-its security. An army retiring upon Mayence
-before a pursuing enemy, is necessarily
-compromised; for this reason, because<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_95">95</a></span>
-it requires more than a day to pass the
-bridge, and because the lines of Cassel are
-too confined to admit an army to remain
-there without being blocked up. Two
-hundred toises should have been left between
-that place and the Rhine. It is
-essential that all <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">têtes de pont</i> before
-great rivers should be constructed upon
-this principle, otherwise they will prove a
-very inefficient assistance to protect the
-passage of a retreating army. <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">Têtes de
-pont</i>, as laid down in our schools, are of
-use only for small rivers, the passage of
-which is comparatively short.</p>
-
-<div class="note">
-<h3>NOTE.</h3>
-
-<p>Marshal Saxe, in the campaign of 1741,
-having passed the Moldau in quest of a detached
-corps of fourteen thousand men, which
-was about to throw itself into Prague, left a
-thousand infantry upon that river, with orders
-to entrench themselves upon a height
-directly opposite the <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">tête de pont</i>. By this
-precaution, the marshal secured his retreat,
-and also the facility of repassing the bridge
-without disorder, by rallying his divisions
-between the entrenched height and the <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">tête
-de pont</i>.</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_96">96</a></span></p>
-
-<p>Were these examples unknown to the generals
-of modern times, or are they disposed
-to think such precautions superfluous?</p>
-
-</div></div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<h2><a id="MAXIM_XL"></a>MAXIM XL.</h2>
-
-<p>Fortresses are equally useful in offensive
-and defensive warfare. It is true,
-they will not in themselves arrest an
-army, but they are an excellent means of
-retarding, embarrassing, weakening and
-annoying a victorious enemy.</p>
-
-<div class="note">
-<h3>NOTE.</h3>
-
-<p>The brilliant success of the allied armies in
-the campaign of 1814, has given to many
-military men a false idea of the real value of
-fortresses.</p>
-
-<p>The formidable bodies which crossed the
-Rhine and the Alps at this period, were enabled
-to spare large detachments to blockade
-the strong places that covered the frontiers
-of France, without materially affecting the
-numerical superiority of the army which
-marched upon the capital. This army was<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_97">97</a></span>
-in a condition, therefore, to act, without the
-fear of being menaced in its line of retreat.</p>
-
-<p>But at no period of military history were
-the armies of Europe so combined before, or
-governed so entirely by one common mind in
-the attainment of a single object. Under
-these circumstances, the line of fortresses
-which surround France was rendered unavailable
-during the campaign; but it would
-be very imprudent, therefore, to conclude
-that a frontier guarded by numerous fortresses
-may be passed with impunity; or
-that battles may be fought with these places
-in your rear, without previously besieging,
-or at least investing them with sufficient
-forces.</p>
-
-</div></div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<h2><a id="MAXIM_XLI"></a>MAXIM XLI.</h2>
-
-<p>There are only two ways of insuring the
-success of a siege. The first, to begin by
-beating the enemy’s army employed to
-cover the place, forcing it out of the field,
-and throwing its remains beyond some
-great natural obstacle, such as a chain of
-mountains, or large river. Having accomplished<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_98">98</a></span>
-this object, an army of observation
-should be placed behind the natural
-obstacle, until the trenches are finished
-and the place taken.</p>
-
-<p>But if it be desired to take the place in
-presence of a relieving army, without risking
-a battle, then the whole <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">materiel</i> and
-equipment for a siege are necessary to
-begin with, together with ammunition and
-provisions for the presumed period of its
-duration, and also lines of contravallation
-and circumvallation, aided by all the localities
-of heights, woods, marshes and
-inundations.</p>
-
-<p>Having no longer occasion to keep up
-communications with your depôts, it is
-now only requisite to hold in check the
-relieving army. For this purpose, an army
-of observation should be formed, whose
-business it is never to lose sight of that of
-the enemy, and which, while it effectually
-bars all access to the place, has always
-time enough to arrive upon his flanks or
-rear in case he should attempt to steal a
-march.</p>
-
-<p>It is to be remembered, too, that by<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_99">99</a></span>
-profiting judiciously by the lines of contravallation,
-a portion of the besieging
-army will always be available in giving
-battle to the approaching enemy.</p>
-
-<p>Upon the same general principle, when
-a place is to be besieged in presence of an
-enemy’s army, it is necessary to cover the
-siege by lines of <em>circumvallation</em>.</p>
-
-<p>If the besieging force is of numerical
-strength enough (after leaving a corps
-before the place four times the amount
-of the garrison) to cope with the relieving
-army, it may remove more than one
-day’s march from the place; but if it be
-inferior in numbers after providing for
-the siege, as above stated, it should remain
-only a short day’s march from the
-spot, in order to fall back upon its lines,
-if necessary, or receive succor in case of
-attack.</p>
-
-<p>If the investing corps and army of
-observation are only equal when united
-to the relieving force, the besieging army
-should remain entire within, or near its
-lines, and push the works and the siege
-with the greatest activity.</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_100">100</a></span></p>
-
-<div class="note">
-<h3>NOTE.</h3>
-
-<p>“When we undertake a siege,” says Montécuculli,
-“we should not seek to place ourselves
-opposite the weakest part of the fortress,
-but at the point most favorable for
-establishing a camp and executing the designs
-we have in view.”</p>
-
-<p>This maxim was well understood by the
-Duke of Berwick. Sent to form the siege of
-Nice in 1706, he determined to attack on the
-side of Montalban, contrary to the advice of
-Vauban, and even to the orders of the king.
-Having a very small army at his disposal,
-he began by securing his camp. This he did
-by constructing redoubts upon the heights
-that shut in the space between the Var and
-the Paillon, two rivers which supported his
-flanks. By this means, he protected himself
-against a surprise; for the Duke of Savoy,
-having the power of debouching suddenly
-by the Col de Tende, it was necessary that
-the marshal should be enabled to assemble
-his forces, so as to move rapidly upon his
-adversary, and fight him before he got into
-position; otherwise his inferiority in numbers
-would have obliged him to raise the
-siege.</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_101">101</a></span></p>
-
-<p>When Marshal Saxe was besieging Brussels,
-with only twenty-eight thousand men,
-opposed to a garrison of twelve thousand,
-he received intelligence that the Prince of
-Waldeck was assembling his forces to raise
-the siege. Not being strong enough to form
-an army of observation, the marshal reconnoitred
-a field of battle on the little river Voluve,
-and made all the necessary dispositions
-for moving rapidly to the spot, in case of
-the approach of the enemy. By this means
-he was prepared to receive his adversary
-without discontinuing the operations of the
-siege.</p>
-
-</div></div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<h2><a id="MAXIM_XLII"></a>MAXIM XLII.</h2>
-
-<p>Feuquière says that “we should never
-wait for the enemy in the lines of circumvallation,
-but we should go out and attack
-him.” He is in error. There is no authority
-in war without exception; and it
-would be dangerous to proscribe the principle
-of awaiting the enemy within the
-lines of circumvallation.</p>
-
-<div class="note">
-<h3>NOTE.</h3>
-
-<p>During the siege of Mons, in 1691, the
-Prince of Orange assembled his army, and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_102">102</a></span>
-advanced as far as Notre Dame de Halle,
-making a demonstration to succor the place.
-Louis XIV, who commanded the siege in
-person, called a council of war to deliberate
-on what was to be done in case the Prince
-of Orange approached. The opinion of
-Marshal Luxembourg was to remain within
-the lines of circumvallation, and that opinion
-prevailed.</p>
-
-<p>The marshal laid it down as a principle
-that, when the besieging army is not strong
-enough to defend the whole extent of circumvallation,
-it should quit the lines and
-advance to meet the enemy; but when it is
-strong enough to encamp in two lines around
-a place, that it is better to profit by a good
-entrenchment&mdash;more especially as by this
-means the siege is not interrupted.</p>
-
-<p>In 1658, Marshal Turenne was besieging
-Dunkirk. He had already opened the
-trenches, when the Spanish army, under
-the orders of the Prince Don Juan, Condé,
-and D’Hocquincourt, appeared in sight, and
-took post upon the Downs, at a distance of
-a league from his lines. Turenne had the
-superiority in numbers, and he determined
-to quit his entrenchments. He had other
-advantages also. The enemy was without<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_103">103</a></span>
-artillery, and their superiority in cavalry
-was rendered useless by the unfavorable
-nature of the ground. It was, therefore, of
-great importance to beat the Spanish army
-before it had time to entrench itself and
-bring up its artillery. The victory gained
-by the French on this occasion justified all
-the combinations of Marshal Turenne.</p>
-
-<p>When Marshal Berwick was laying siege
-to Philipsburg, in 1733, he had reason to
-apprehend that the Prince of Savoy would
-attack him with all the forces of the empire
-before its termination. The marshal, therefore,
-after having made his disposition of
-the troops intended for the siege, formed,
-with the rest of his army, a corps of observation
-to make head against Prince Eugene,
-in case the latter should choose to attack
-him in his lines, or attempt a diversion on
-the Moselle or Upper Rhine. Prince Eugene,
-having arrived in front of the besieging
-army, some general officers were of
-opinion that it was better not to await the
-enemy in the lines, but to move forward
-and attack him. But Marshal Berwick, who
-agreed with the Duke of Luxembourg, that
-an army which can occupy, completely, good
-entrenchments is not liable to be forced, persisted<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_104">104</a></span>
-in remaining within his works. The
-result proved that this was also the opinion of
-Prince Eugene, for he did not dare to attack
-the entrenchments, which he would not have
-failed to do if he had any hopes of success.</p>
-
-</div></div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<h2><a id="MAXIM_XLIII"></a>MAXIM XLIII.</h2>
-
-<p>Those who proscribe lines of circumvallation,
-and all the assistance which the
-science of the engineer can afford, deprive
-themselves gratuitously of an auxiliary
-which is never injurious, almost always
-useful, and often indispensable. It must
-be admitted, at the same time, that the
-principles of field-fortification require improvement.
-This important branch of
-the art of war has made no progress since
-the time of the ancients. It is even inferior
-at this day to what it was two thousand
-years ago. Engineer officers should
-be encouraged in bringing this branch of
-their art to perfection, and in placing it
-upon a level with the rest.</p>
-
-<div class="note">
-<h3>NOTE.</h3>
-
-<p>“If we are inferior in numbers,” says
-Marshal Saxe, “entrenchments are of no<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_105">105</a></span>
-use, for the enemy will bring all his forces
-to bear upon particular points. If we are
-of equal strength they are unnecessary also.
-If we are superior, we do not want them.
-Then why give ourselves the trouble to entrench?”
-Notwithstanding this opinion of
-the inutility of entrenchments, Marshal Saxe
-often had recourse to them.</p>
-
-<p>In 1797, Generals Provéra and Hohenzollern
-having presented themselves before
-Mantua (where Marshal Wurmser was shut
-up), for the purpose of raising the siege,
-they were stopped by the lines of contravallation
-of St. George. This slight obstacle
-sufficed to afford Napoleon time to arrive
-from Rivoli and defeat their enterprise. It
-was in consequence of neglecting to entrench
-themselves that the French had been
-obliged to raise the siege in the preceding
-campaign.</p>
-
-</div></div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<h2><a id="MAXIM_XLIV"></a>MAXIM XLIV.</h2>
-
-<p>If circumstances prevent a sufficient
-garrison being left to defend a fortified
-town, which contains an hospital and
-magazines, at least every means should<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_106">106</a></span>
-be employed to secure the citadel against
-a <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">coup de main</i>.</p>
-
-<div class="note">
-<h3>NOTE.</h3>
-
-<p>A few battalions dispersed about a town,
-inspire no terror; but shut up in the more
-narrow outline of a citadel, they assume an
-imposing attitude. For this reason it appears
-to me that such a precaution is always
-necessary, not only in fortresses, but
-wherever there are hospitals or depôts of any
-kind. Where there is no citadel, some quarter
-of the town should be fixed upon most
-favorable for defence, and entrenched in such
-a manner as to oppose the greatest resistance
-possible.</p>
-
-</div></div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<h2><a id="MAXIM_XLV"></a>MAXIM XLV.</h2>
-
-<p>A fortified place can only protect the
-garrison and detain the enemy for a certain
-time. When this time has elapsed,
-and the defences of the place are destroyed,
-the garrison should lay down its arms.
-All civilized nations are agreed on this
-point, and there never has been an argument<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_107">107</a></span>
-except with reference to the greater
-or less degree of defence which a governor
-is bound to make before he capitulates.
-At the same time, there are generals&mdash;Villars
-among the number&mdash;who are of
-opinion that a governor should never surrender,
-but that in the last extremity he
-should blow up the fortifications, and take
-advantage of the night to cut his way
-through the besieging army. Where he
-is unable to blow up the fortifications, he
-may always retire, they say, with his garrison,
-and save the men.</p>
-
-<p>Officers who have adopted this line of
-conduct, have often brought off three-fourths
-of their garrison.</p>
-
-<div class="note">
-<h3>NOTE.</h3>
-
-<p>In 1705, the French, who were besieged in
-Haguenau by Count Thungen, found themselves
-incapable of sustaining an assault.
-Péri, the governor, who had already distinguished
-himself by a vigorous defence,
-despairing of being allowed to capitulate on
-any terms short of becoming prisoner of
-war, resolved to abandon the place and cut
-his way through the besiegers.</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_108">108</a></span></p>
-
-<p>In order to conceal his intention more
-effectually, and while he deceived the enemy,
-to sound at the same time the disposition of
-his officers, he assembled a council of war
-and declared his resolution to die in the
-breach. Then, under pretext of the extremity
-to which he was reduced, he commanded
-the whole garrison under arms; and
-leaving only a few sharpshooters in the
-breach, gave the order to march, and set out
-in silence, under cover of the night, from
-Haguenau. This audacious enterprise was
-crowned with success, and Péri reached Saverne
-without having suffered the smallest
-loss.</p>
-
-<p>Two fine instances of defence in later times
-are those of Massena at Genoa, and of Palafox
-at Saragossa.</p>
-
-<p>The first marched out with arms and baggage,
-and all the honors of war, after rejecting
-every summons, and defending himself
-until hunger alone compelled him to capitulate.
-The second only yielded after having
-buried his garrison amid the ruins of the
-city, which he defended from house to house,
-until famine and death left him no alternative
-but to surrender. This siege, which
-was equally honorable to the French as to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_109">109</a></span>
-the Spaniards, is one of the most memorable
-in the history of war. In the course of it,
-Palafox displayed every possible resource
-which courage and obstinacy can supply in
-the defence of a fortress.</p>
-
-<p>All real strength is founded in the mind;
-and on this account I am of opinion that we
-should be directed in the choice of a governor,
-less by his genius than his personal
-character. His most essential qualities should
-be courage, perseverance, and soldierlike devotedness.
-Above all, he should possess the
-talent not only of infusing courage into the
-garrison, but of kindling a spirit of resistance
-in the whole population. Where the latter
-is wanting, however art may multiply the
-defences of a place, the garrison will be compelled
-to capitulate after having sustained
-the first, or at most, the second assault.</p>
-
-</div></div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<h2><a id="MAXIM_XLVI"></a>MAXIM XLVI.</h2>
-
-<p>The keys of a fortress are well worth
-the retirement of the garrison, when it is
-resolved to yield only on those conditions.
-On this principle it is always wiser to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_110">110</a></span>
-grant an honorable capitulation to a garrison
-which has made a vigorous resistance,
-than to risk an assault.</p>
-
-<div class="note">
-<h3>NOTE.</h3>
-
-<p>Marshal Villars has justly observed, that
-“no governor of a place should be permitted
-to excuse himself for surrendering, on the
-ground of wishing to preserve the king’s
-troops. Every garrison that displays courage
-will escape being prisoners of war. For there
-is no general who, however well assured of
-carrying a place by assault, will not prefer
-granting terms of capitulation rather than
-risk the loss of a thousand men in forcing
-determined troops to surrender.”</p>
-
-</div></div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<h2><a id="MAXIM_XLVII"></a>MAXIM XLVII.</h2>
-
-<p>Infantry, cavalry, and artillery, are nothing
-without each other; therefore, they
-should always be so disposed in cantonments
-as to assist each other in case of
-surprise.</p>
-
-<div class="note">
-<h3>NOTE.</h3>
-
-<p>“A general,” says Frederick, “should direct
-his whole attention to the tranquility of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_111">111</a></span>
-his cantonments, in order that the soldier
-may be relieved from all anxiety, and repose
-in security from his fatigues. With this
-view, care should be taken that the troops
-are able to form rapidly upon ground which
-has been previously reconnoitered; that the
-generals remain always with their divisions
-or brigades, and that the service is carried
-on throughout with exactness.”</p>
-
-<p>Marshal Saxe is of opinion that an army
-should not be in a hurry to quit its cantonments,
-but that it should wait till the
-enemy has exhausted himself with marching,
-and be ready to fall upon him with
-fresh troops when he is overcome with
-fatigue.</p>
-
-<p>I believe, however, that it would be dangerous
-to trust implicitly to this high authority,
-for there are many occasions where
-all the advantage lies in the initiative, more
-especially when the enemy has been compelled
-to extend his cantonments, from scarcity
-of subsistence, and can be attacked
-before he has time to concentrate his forces.</p>
-
-</div></div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_112">112</a></span></p>
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<h2><a id="MAXIM_XLVIII"></a>MAXIM XLVIII.</h2>
-
-<p>The formation of infantry in line should
-be always in two ranks, because the
-length of the musket only admits of an
-effective fire in this formation. The discharge
-of the third rank is not only uncertain,
-but frequently dangerous to the
-ranks in its front. In drawing up infantry
-in two ranks, there should be a supernumerary
-behind every fourth or fifth
-file. A reserve should likewise be placed
-twenty-five paces in rear of each flank.</p>
-
-<div class="note">
-<h3>NOTE.</h3>
-
-<p>I am of opinion, if circumstances require
-a line of infantry to resort to a square, that
-two-deep is too light a formation to resist
-the shock of cavalry. However useless the
-third rank may appear for the purpose of
-file-firing, it is, notwithstanding necessary,
-in order to replace the men who fall in the
-ranks in front; otherwise you would be
-obliged to close in the files, and by this
-means leave intervals between the companies,
-which the cavalry would not fail to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_113">113</a></span>
-penetrate. It appears to me, also, that when
-infantry is formed in two ranks, the columns
-will be found to open out in marching to a
-flank. If it should be considered advantageous
-behind entrenchments to keep the infantry
-in two ranks, the third rank should
-be placed in reserve, and brought forward
-to relieve the front rank when fatigued, or
-when the fire is observed to slacken. I am
-induced to make these remarks, because I
-have seen an excellent pamphlet which proposes
-the two-deep formation for infantry as
-the best. The author supports his opinion
-by a variety of plausible reasons, but not
-sufficient, as it appears to me, to answer all
-the objections that may be offered to this
-practice.</p>
-
-</div></div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<h2><a id="MAXIM_XLIX"></a>MAXIM XLIX.</h2>
-
-<p>The practice of mixing small bodies of
-infantry and cavalry together is a bad
-one, and attended with many inconveniences.
-The cavalry loses its power of action.
-It becomes fettered in all its movements.
-Its energy is destroyed; even
-the infantry itself is compromised, for on<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_114">114</a></span>
-the first movement of the cavalry it is
-left without support. The best mode of
-protecting cavalry is to cover its flank.</p>
-
-<div class="note">
-<h3>NOTE.</h3>
-
-<p>This also was the opinion of Marshal
-Saxe. “The weakness of the above formation,”
-says he, “is sufficient in itself to intimidate
-the platoons of infantry, because
-they must be lost if the cavalry is beaten.”</p>
-
-<p>The cavalry, also, which depends on the
-infantry for succor, is disconcerted the moment
-a brisk forward movement carries
-them out of sight of their supports. Marshal
-Turenne, and the generals of his time,
-sometimes employed this order of formation;
-but that does not, in my opinion,
-justify a modern author for recommending
-it in an essay, entitled “<cite>Considerations sur
-l’Art de la Guerre</cite>.” In fact, this formation
-has long been abandoned; and, since the introduction
-of light artillery, it appears to
-me almost ridiculous to propose it.</p>
-
-</div></div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<h2><a id="MAXIM_L"></a>MAXIM L.</h2>
-
-<p>Charges of cavalry are equally useful
-at the beginning, the middle, and the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_115">115</a></span>
-end of a battle. They should be made
-always, if possible, on the flanks of the
-infantry, especially when the latter is engaged
-in front.</p>
-
-<div class="note">
-<h3>NOTE.</h3>
-
-<p>The Archduke Charles, in speaking of cavalry,
-recommends that it should be brought
-in mass upon a decisive point, when the moment
-for employing it arrives; that is to
-say, when it can attack with a certainty of
-success. As the rapidity of its movement
-enables cavalry to act along the whole line
-in the same day, the general who commands
-it should keep it together as much as possible,
-and avoid dividing it into many detachments.
-When the nature of the ground
-admits of cavalry being employed on all
-points of the line, it is desirable to form it
-in column behind the infantry, and in a position
-whence it may be easily directed
-wherever it is required. If cavalry is intended
-to cover a position, it should be
-placed sufficiently in the rear to meet at full
-speed any advance of troops coming to
-attack that position. If it is destined to
-cover the flank of the infantry, it should, for
-the same reason, be placed directly behind<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_116">116</a></span>
-it. As the object of cavalry is purely offensive,
-it should be a rule to form it at such a
-distance only from the point of collision as
-to enable it to acquire its utmost impulse,
-and arrive at the top of its speed into action.
-With respect to the cavalry reserve,
-this should only be employed at the end of
-a battle, either to render the success more
-decisive, or to cover the retreat. Napoleon
-remarks that, at the battle of Waterloo, the
-cavalry of the guard which composed the
-reserve, was engaged against his orders.
-He complains of having been deprived from
-five o’clock of the use of this reserve, which,
-when well employed, had so often insured
-him the victory.</p>
-
-</div></div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<h2><a id="MAXIM_LI"></a>MAXIM LI.</h2>
-
-<p>It is the business of cavalry to follow
-up the victory, and to prevent the beaten
-enemy from rallying.</p>
-
-<div class="note">
-<h3>NOTE.</h3>
-
-<p>Victor or vanquished, it is of the greatest
-importance to have a body of cavalry in
-reserve, either to take advantage of victory,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_117">117</a></span>
-or to secure a retreat. The most decisive
-battles lose half their value to the conqueror,
-when the want of cavalry prevents him
-from following up his success, and depriving
-the enemy of the power of rallying.</p>
-
-<p>When a retiring army is pursued, it is
-more especially upon the flanks that the
-weight of cavalry should fall, if you are
-strong enough in that arm to cut off his
-retreat.</p>
-
-</div></div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<h2><a id="MAXIM_LII"></a>MAXIM LII.</h2>
-
-<p>Artillery is more essential to cavalry
-than to infantry, because cavalry has no
-fire for its defence, but depends upon the
-sabre. It is to remedy this deficiency
-that recourse has been had to horse-artillery.
-Cavalry, therefore, should never
-be without cannon, whether when attacking,
-rallying, or in position.</p>
-
-<div class="note">
-<h3>NOTE.</h3>
-
-<p>Horse-artillery is an invention of Frederick.
-Austria lost no time in introducing
-it into her armies, although in an imperfect
-degree. It was only in 1792 that this<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_118">118</a></span>
-arm was adopted in France, where it was
-brought rapidly to its present perfection.</p>
-
-<p>The services of this arm during the wars
-of the Revolution were immense. It may
-be said to have changed to a certain extent
-the character of tactics, because its facility
-of movement enables it to bear with rapidity
-on every point where artillery can be
-employed with success. Napoleon has remarked
-in his memoirs that a flanking battery
-which strikes and rakes the enemy
-obliquely, is capable of deciding a victory
-in itself. To this we may add that, independent
-of the advantages which cavalry
-derives from horse-artillery in securing its
-flanks, and in opening the way for a successful
-charge by the destructiveness of its
-fire, it is desirable that these two arms
-should never be separated, but ready at all
-times to seize upon points where it may
-be necessary to employ cannon. On these
-occasions, the cavalry masks the march of
-the artillery, protects its establishment in
-position, and covers it from the attack of
-the enemy, until it is ready to open its
-fire.</p>
-
-</div></div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_119">119</a></span></p>
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<h2><a id="MAXIM_LIII"></a>MAXIM LIII.</h2>
-
-<p>In march, or in position, the greater
-part of the artillery should be with the
-divisions of infantry and cavalry. The
-rest should be in reserve. Each gun
-should have with it three hundred rounds,
-without including the limber. This is
-about the complement for two battles.</p>
-
-<div class="note">
-<h3>NOTE.</h3>
-
-<p>The better infantry is, the more important
-it is to support it by artillery, with a view to
-its preservation.</p>
-
-<p>It is essential, also, that the batteries attached
-to divisions should march in the
-front, because this has a strong influence on
-the <em>morale</em> of the soldier. He attacks always
-with confidence when he sees the flanks of
-the column well covered with cannon.</p>
-
-<p>The artillery reserve should be kept for a
-decisive moment, and then employed in full
-force, for it will be difficult for the enemy at
-such a time to presume to attack it.</p>
-
-<p>There is scarcely an instance of a battery
-of sixty pieces of cannon having been carried<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_120">120</a></span>
-by a charge of infantry or cavalry,
-unless where it was entirely without support,
-or in a position to be easily turned.</p>
-
-</div></div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<h2><a id="MAXIM_LIV"></a>MAXIM LIV.</h2>
-
-<p>Artillery should always be placed in
-the most advantageous positions, and as
-far in front of the line of cavalry and
-infantry as possible, without compromising
-the safety of the guns.</p>
-
-<p>Field batteries should command the
-whole country round from the level of
-the platform. They should on no account
-be masked on the right and left,
-but have free range in every direction.</p>
-
-<div class="note">
-<h3>NOTE.</h3>
-
-<p>The battery of eighteen pieces of cannon,
-which covered the centre of the Russian
-army at the battle of La Moskwa (Borodino),
-may be cited as an example.</p>
-
-<p>Its position, upon a circular height which
-commanded the field in every direction, added
-so powerfully to its effect, that its fire alone
-sufficed, for a considerable time, to paralyze<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_121">121</a></span>
-the vigorous attack made by the French
-with their right. Although twice broken,
-the left of the Russian army closed to this
-battery, as to a pivot, and twice recovered
-its former position. After repeated attacks,
-conducted with a rare intrepidity, the battery
-was at length carried by the French,
-but not till they had lost the <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">élite</i> of their
-army, and with it the Generals Caulincourt
-and Montbrun. Its capture decided the retreat
-of the Russian left.</p>
-
-<p>I might advert likewise to another instance,
-in the campaign of 1809, and to the
-terrible effect produced by the hundred
-pieces of cannon of the Guard which General
-Lauriston directed, at the battle of
-Wagram, against the right of the Austrian
-army.</p>
-
-</div></div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<h2><a id="MAXIM_LV"></a>MAXIM LV.</h2>
-
-<p>A General should never put his army
-into cantonments, when he has the means
-of collecting supplies of forage and provisions,
-and of thus providing for the
-wants of the soldier in the field.</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_122">122</a></span></p>
-
-<div class="note">
-<h3>NOTE.</h3>
-
-<p>One great advantage which results from
-having an army in camp is, that it is easier
-to direct its spirit and maintain its discipline
-there. The soldier in cantonments abandons
-himself to repose; he ends by finding a
-pleasure in idleness, and in fearing to return
-to the field. The reverse takes place in a
-camp. There, a feeling of <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">ennui</i>, and a
-severer discipline, make him anxious for the
-opening of the campaign, to interrupt the
-monotony of the service and relieve it with
-the chances and variety of war. Besides, an
-army in camp is much more secure from a
-surprise than in cantonments&mdash;the defect of
-which usually consists in their occupying too
-great an extent of ground. When an army
-is obliged to go into quarters, the Marquis de
-Feuquière recommends a camp to be selected
-in front of the line, where the troops can be
-frequently assembled&mdash;sometimes suddenly,
-in order to exercise their vigilance, or for
-the sole purpose of bringing the different
-corps together.</p>
-
-</div></div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_123">123</a></span></p>
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<h2><a id="MAXIM_LVI"></a>MAXIM LVI.</h2>
-
-<p>A good general, a well-organized system,
-good instructions, and severe discipline,
-aided by effective establishments,
-will always make good troops, independently
-of the cause for which they fight.</p>
-
-<p>At the same time, a love of country, a
-spirit of enthusiasm, a sense of national
-honor, and fanaticism, will operate upon
-young soldiers with advantage.</p>
-
-<div class="note">
-<h3>NOTE.</h3>
-
-<p>This remark appears to me less applicable
-to officers than to soldiers, for as war is not
-a state of things natural to man, it follows
-that those who maintain its cause must be
-governed by some strong excitement. Much
-enthusiasm and devotedness are required on
-the part of the troops for the general who
-commands, to induce an army to perform
-great actions in a war in which it takes
-no interest. This is sufficiently proved by
-the apathy of auxiliaries, unless when inspired
-by the conduct of their chief.</p>
-
-</div></div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_124">124</a></span></p>
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<h2><a id="MAXIM_LVII"></a>MAXIM LVII.</h2>
-
-<p>When a nation is without establishments
-and a military system, it is very
-difficult to organize an army.</p>
-
-<div class="note">
-<h3>NOTE.</h3>
-
-<p>This is an unanswerable truth, more particularly
-with reference to an army intended
-to act upon the system of modern war, and
-in which order, precision, and rapidity of
-movement, are the principal essentials to
-success.</p>
-
-</div></div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<h2><a id="MAXIM_LVIII"></a>MAXIM LVIII.</h2>
-
-<p>The first qualification of a soldier is
-fortitude under fatigue and privation.
-Courage is only the second; hardship,
-poverty and want, are the best school
-for a soldier.</p>
-
-<div class="note">
-<h3>NOTE.</h3>
-
-<p>Valor belongs to the young soldier as
-well as to the veteran; but in the former
-it is more evanescent. It is only by habits<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_125">125</a></span>
-of service, and after several campaigns,
-that the soldier acquires that moral courage
-which makes him support the fatigues and
-privations of war without a murmur. Experience
-by this time has instructed him to
-supply his own wants. He is satisfied with
-what he can procure, because he knows that
-success is only to be obtained by fortitude
-and perseverance. Well might Napoleon
-say that misery and want were the best
-school for a soldier; for as nothing could be
-compared with the total destitution of the
-army of the Alps, when he assumed the
-command, so nothing could equal the brilliant
-success which he obtained with this
-army in the first campaign in Italy. The
-conquerors of Montenotte, Lodi, Castiglione,
-Bassano, Arcole and Rivoli had beheld, only
-a few months before, whole battalions covered
-with rags, and deserting for the want
-of subsistence.</p>
-
-</div></div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<h2><a id="MAXIM_LIX"></a>MAXIM LIX.</h2>
-
-<p>There are five things the soldier should
-never be without&mdash;his musket, his ammunition,
-his knapsack, his provisions<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_126">126</a></span>
-(for at least four days), and his entrenching-tool.
-The knapsack may be reduced
-to the smallest size possible, if it be
-thought proper, but the soldier should
-always have it with him.</p>
-
-<div class="note">
-<h3>NOTE.</h3>
-
-<p>It is fortunate that Napoleon has recognized
-the advantage of giving to every soldier
-an entrenching-tool. His authority is
-the best answer to the ridicule which has
-been thrown upon those who proposed it.
-An axe will be found to inconvenience the
-foot-soldier as little as the sword he wears
-at his side, and it will be infinitely more
-useful. When axes are given out to companies,
-or are carried by fatigue-men during
-a campaign, they are soon lost; and it
-often happens, when a camp is to be formed,
-that a difficulty arises in cutting wood and
-building huts for the soldier; whereas, by
-making the axe a part of every man’s appointments,
-he is obliged to have it always
-with him; and whether the object be to
-entrench himself in a village, or to erect huts
-in a camp, the commander of a corps will
-speedily see the advantage of this innovation.</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_127">127</a></span></p>
-
-<p>When once the axe has been generally
-adopted, we shall, perhaps, see the desirability
-of issuing pickaxes and shovels to
-particular companies, and also the benefit of
-more frequent entrenchments. It is more
-particularly during retreats that it is important
-to entrench when the army has reached
-a good position; for an entrenched camp
-not only furnishes the means of rallying
-troops which are pursued, but if it be fortified
-in such a manner as to render the issue
-of an attack doubtful to the enemy, it will
-not only sustain the <em>morale</em> of the soldier in
-the retreat, but afford the general-in-chief
-opportunities for resuming the offensive, and
-profiting by the first false movement on the
-part of his adversary. It will be recollected
-how Frederick, in the campaign of 1761,
-when surrounded by two Russian and Austrian
-armies, whose united force was quadruple
-his own, saved his army by entrenching
-himself in the camp of Buntzalvitz.</p>
-
-</div></div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<h2><a id="MAXIM_LX"></a>MAXIM LX.</h2>
-
-<p>Every means should be taken to attach
-the soldier to his colors. This is best<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_128">128</a></span>
-accomplished by showing consideration
-and respect to the old soldier. His pay
-likewise should increase with his length
-of service. It is the height of injustice
-not to pay a veteran more than a recruit.</p>
-
-<div class="note">
-<h3>NOTE.</h3>
-
-<p>Some modern writers have recommended,
-on the other hand, to limit the period of
-service, in order to bring the whole youth
-of a country successively under arms. By
-this means they purpose to have the levies,
-<i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">en masse</i>, all ready trained and capable of
-resisting successfully a war of invasion. But
-however advantageous at first sight such a
-military system may appear, I believe it
-will be found to have many objections.</p>
-
-<p>In the first place, the soldier fatigued with
-the minutiæ of discipline in a garrison, will
-not feel much inclined to re-enlist after he
-has received his discharge, more especially
-since, having served the prescribed time, he
-will consider himself to have fulfilled all the
-duties of a citizen to his country. Returning
-to his friends, he will probably marry,
-or establish himself in a trade. From that
-moment his military spirit declines, and he<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_129">129</a></span>
-soon becomes ill adapted to the business of
-war. On the contrary, the soldier who
-serves long, becomes attached to his regiment
-as to a new family. He submits to
-the yoke of discipline, accustoms himself to
-the privations his situation imposes, and
-ends by finding his condition agreeable.
-There are few officers that have seen service
-who have not discovered the difference
-between old and young soldiers, with reference
-to their power of supporting the
-fatigues of a long campaign, to the determined
-courage that characterizes the attack,
-or to the ease with which they rally after
-being broken.</p>
-
-<p>Montécuculli observes, that “it takes time
-to discipline an army; more to inure it to
-war; and still more to constitute veterans.”
-For this reason, he recommends that great
-consideration should be shown to old soldiers;
-that they should be carefully provided
-for, and a large body of them kept
-always on foot. It seems to me, also, that
-it is not enough to increase the pay of the
-soldier according to his period of service,
-but that it is highly essential to confer on
-him some mark of distinction that shall
-secure to him privileges calculated to encourage<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_130">130</a></span>
-him to grow gray under arms,
-and, above all, to do so with honor.</p>
-
-</div></div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<h2><a id="MAXIM_LXI"></a>MAXIM LXI.</h2>
-
-<p>It is not set speeches at the moment of
-battle that render soldiers brave. The
-veteran scarcely listens to them, and the
-recruit forgets them at the first discharge.
-If discourses and harangues are useful, it
-is during the campaign: to do away unfavorable
-impressions, to correct false
-reports, to keep alive a proper spirit in
-the camp, and to furnish materials and
-amusement for the bivouac. All printed
-orders of the day should keep in view
-these objects.</p>
-
-<div class="note">
-<h3>NOTE.</h3>
-
-<p>The opinion of the general-in-chief, energetically
-expressed, is, notwithstanding, productive
-of great effect on the <em>morale</em> of the
-soldier.</p>
-
-<p>In 1703, at the attack of Hornbec, Marshal
-Villars, seeing the troops advancing
-without spirit, threw himself at their head:<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_131">131</a></span>
-“What!” said he, “is it expected that I, a
-marshal of France, should be the first to
-escalade, when I order YOU to attack?”</p>
-
-<p>These few words rekindled their ardor;
-officers and soldiers rushed upon the works,
-and the town was taken almost without loss.</p>
-
-<p>“We have retired far enough for to-day;
-you know I always sleep upon the field of
-battle!” said Napoleon, as he flew through
-the ranks at the moment of resuming the
-offensive at Marengo. These few words sufficed
-to revive the courage of the soldiers,
-and to make them forget the fatigues of the
-day, during which almost every man had
-been engaged.</p>
-
-</div></div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<h2><a id="MAXIM_LXII"></a>MAXIM LXII.</h2>
-
-<p>Tents are unfavorable to health. The
-soldier is best when he bivouacs, because
-he sleeps with his feet to the fire, which
-speedily dries the ground on which he
-lies. A few planks, or a little straw, shelter
-him from the wind.</p>
-
-<p>On the other hand, tents are necessary
-for the superior officers, who have to write
-and to consult their maps. Tents should,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_132">132</a></span>
-therefore, be issued to these, with directions
-to them never to sleep in a house.
-Tents are always objects of observation
-to the enemy’s staff. They afford information
-in regard to your numbers and
-the ground you occupy; while an army
-bivouacking in two or three lines, is only
-distinguishable from afar by the smoke
-which mingles with the clouds. It is impossible
-to count the number of the fires.</p>
-
-<div class="note">
-<h3>NOTE.</h3>
-
-<p>The acknowledged advantage of bivouacking
-is another reason for adding an entrenching-tool
-to the equipment of the soldier; for,
-with the assistance of the axe and shovel,
-he can hut himself without difficulty. I have
-seen huts erected with the branches of trees,
-covered with turf, where the soldier was perfectly
-sheltered from the cold and wet, even
-in the worst season.</p>
-
-</div></div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<h2><a id="MAXIM_LXIII"></a>MAXIM LXIII.</h2>
-
-<p>All information obtained from prisoners
-should be received with caution, and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_133">133</a></span>
-estimated at its real value. A soldier
-seldom sees anything beyond his company;
-and an officer can afford intelligence
-of little more than the position and
-movements of the division to which his
-regiment belongs. On this account, the
-general of an army should never depend
-upon the information derived from prisoners,
-unless it agrees with the reports
-received from the advanced guards, in
-reference to the position, etc., of the
-enemy.</p>
-
-<div class="note">
-<h3>NOTE.</h3>
-
-<p>Montécuculli wisely observes that “prisoners
-should be interrogated separately, in
-order to ascertain, by the agreement in their
-answers, how far they may be endeavoring
-to mislead you.” Generally speaking, the information
-required from officers who are prisoners,
-should have reference to the strength
-and resources of the enemy, and sometimes
-to his localities and position. Frederick recommends
-that prisoners should be menaced
-with instant death if they are found attempting
-to deceive by false reports.</p>
-
-</div></div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_134">134</a></span></p>
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<h2><a id="MAXIM_LXIV"></a>MAXIM LXIV.</h2>
-
-<p>Nothing is so important in war as an
-undivided command; for this reason,
-when war is carried on against a single
-power, there should be only one army,
-acting upon one base, and conducted by
-one chief.</p>
-
-<div class="note">
-<h3>NOTE.</h3>
-
-<p>“Success,” says the Archduke Charles, “is
-only to be obtained by simultaneous efforts,
-directed upon a given point, sustained with
-constancy, and executed with decision.” It
-rarely happens that any number of men
-who desire the same object are perfectly
-agreed as to the means of attaining it; and
-if the will of one individual is not allowed to
-predominate, there can be no <em>ensemble</em> in the
-execution of their operations; neither will
-they attain the end proposed. It is useless
-to confirm this maxim by examples. History
-abounds in them.</p>
-
-<p>Prince Eugene and Marlborough would
-never have been so successful in the campaigns
-which they directed in concert, if a
-spirit of intrigue and difference of opinion
-had not constantly disorganized the armies
-opposed to them.</p>
-
-</div></div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_135">135</a></span></p>
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<h2><a id="MAXIM_LXV"></a>MAXIM LXV.</h2>
-
-<p>The same consequences which have
-uniformly attended long discussions and
-councils of war, will follow at all times.
-They will terminate in the adoption of the
-worst course, which in war is always the
-most timid, or, if you will, the most prudent.
-The only true wisdom in a general
-is determined courage.</p>
-
-<div class="note">
-<h3>NOTE.</h3>
-
-<p>Prince Eugene used to say that councils of
-war “are only useful when you want an
-excuse for attempting <em>nothing</em>.” This was
-also the opinion of Villars. A general-in-chief
-should avoid, therefore, assembling a
-council on occasions of difficulty, and should
-confine himself to consulting separately his
-most experienced generals in order to benefit
-by their advice, while he is governed at
-the same time in his decision by his own
-judgment. By this means, he becomes responsible,
-it is true, for the measures he
-pursues; but he has the advantage also of
-acting upon his own conviction, and of being<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_136">136</a></span>
-certain that the secret of his operations
-will not be divulged, as is usually the case
-where it is discussed by a council of war.</p>
-
-</div></div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<h2><a id="MAXIM_LXVI"></a>MAXIM LXVI.</h2>
-
-<p>In war, the general alone can judge of
-certain arrangements. It depends on him
-alone to conquer difficulties by his own
-superior talents and resolution.</p>
-
-<div class="note">
-<h3>NOTE.</h3>
-
-<p>The officer who obeys, whatever may be
-the nature or extent of his command, will
-always stand excused for executing implicitly
-the orders which have been given to him.
-This is not the case with the general-in-chief,
-on whom the safety of the army and the success
-of the campaign depend. Occupied, without
-intermission, in the whole process of
-observation and reflection, it is easy to conceive
-that he will acquire by degrees a
-solidity of judgment which will enable him
-to see things in a clearer and more enlarged
-point of view than his inferior generals.</p>
-
-<p>Marshal Villars, in his campaigns, acted<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_137">137</a></span>
-almost always in opposition to the advice of
-his generals, and he was almost always fortunate.
-So true it is, that a general, who feels
-confident in his talent for command, must
-follow the dictates of his own genius if he
-wishes to achieve success.</p>
-
-</div></div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<h2><a id="MAXIM_LXVII"></a>MAXIM LXVII.</h2>
-
-<p>To authorize generals or other officers
-to lay down their arms in virtue of a particular
-capitulation, under any other circumstances
-than when they are composing
-the garrison of a fortress, affords a dangerous
-latitude. It is destructive of all
-military character in a nation to open such
-a door to the cowardly, the weak, or even
-to the misdirected brave. Great extremities
-require extraordinary resolution. The
-more obstinate the resistance of an army,
-the greater the chances of assistance or of
-success.</p>
-
-<p>How many seeming impossibilities have
-been accomplished by men whose only
-resource was death!</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_138">138</a></span></p>
-
-<div class="note">
-<h3>NOTE.</h3>
-
-<p>In the campaign of 1759, Frederick directed
-General Fink, with eighteen thousand
-men, upon Maxen, for the purpose of cutting
-off the Austrian army from the defiles of Bohemia.
-Surrounded by twice his numbers,
-Fink capitulated after a sharp action, and
-fourteen thousand men laid down their arms.
-This conduct was the more disgraceful, because
-General Winch, who commanded the
-cavalry, cut his way through the enemy.
-The whole blame of the surrender fell, therefore,
-upon Fink, who was tried afterward by
-a court-martial, and sentenced to be cashiered
-and imprisoned for two years.</p>
-
-<p>In the campaign of Italy in 1796, the Austrian
-General Provéra capitulated with two
-thousand men in the castle of Cossaria. Subsequently,
-at the battle of La Favorite, the
-same general capitulated with a corps of six
-thousand men. I scarcely dare to revert to
-the shameful defection of General Mack in
-the capitulation of Ulm in 1805, where thirty
-thousand Austrians laid down their arms&mdash;when
-we have seen, during the wars of the
-Revolution, so many generals open themselves
-a way by a vigorous effort through
-the enemy, supported only by a few battalions.</p>
-
-</div></div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_139">139</a></span></p>
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<h2><a id="MAXIM_LXVIII"></a>MAXIM LXVIII.</h2>
-
-<p>There is no security for any sovereign,
-for any nation, or for any general, if officers
-are permitted to capitulate in the
-open field, and to lay down their arms in
-virtue of conditions favorable to the contracting
-party, but contrary to the interests
-of the army at large. To withdraw
-from danger, and thereby to involve their
-comrades in greater peril, is the height of
-cowardice. Such conduct should be proscribed,
-declared infamous, and made punishable
-with death. All generals, officers
-and soldiers, who capitulate in battle to
-save their own lives, should be decimated.</p>
-
-<p>He who gives the order, and those who
-obey, are alike traitors, and deserve capital
-punishment.</p>
-
-<div class="note">
-<h3>NOTE.</h3>
-
-<p>Soldiers, who are almost always ignorant
-of the designs of their chief, cannot be responsible
-for his conduct. If he orders them
-to lay down their arms, they must do so;
-otherwise they fail in that law of discipline<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_140">140</a></span>
-which is more essential to an army than
-thousands of men. It appears to me, therefore,
-under these circumstances, that the
-chiefs alone are responsible, and liable to the
-punishment due to their cowardice. We have
-no example of soldiers being wanting in their
-duty in the most desperate situations, where
-they are commanded by officers of approved
-resolution.</p>
-
-</div></div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<h2><a id="MAXIM_LXIX"></a>MAXIM LXIX.</h2>
-
-<p>There is but one honorable mode of
-becoming prisoner of war. That is, by
-being taken separately; by which is meant,
-by being cut off entirely, and when we
-can no longer make use of our arms. In
-this case, there can be no conditions, for
-honor can impose none. We yield to an
-irresistible necessity.</p>
-
-<div class="note">
-<h3>NOTE.</h3>
-
-<p>There is always time enough to surrender
-prisoner of war. This should be deferred,
-therefore, till the last extremity. And here
-I may be permitted to cite an example of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_141">141</a></span>
-rare obstinacy in defence, which has been
-related to me by ocular witnesses. The captain
-of grenadiers, Dubrenil, of the thirty-seventh
-regiment of the line, having been
-sent on detachment with his company, was
-stopped on the march by a large party of
-Cossacks, who surrounded him on every side.
-Dubrenil formed his little force into square,
-and endeavored to gain the skirts of a wood
-(within a few muskets’ shot of the spot
-where he had been attacked), and reached
-it with very little loss. But as soon as the
-grenadiers saw this refuge secured to them,
-they broke and fled, leaving their captain
-and a few brave men, who were resolved not
-to abandon him, at the mercy of the enemy.
-In the meantime, the fugitives, who had rallied
-in the depth of the wood, ashamed of
-having forsaken their leader, came to the
-resolution of rescuing him from the enemy,
-if a prisoner, or of carrying off his body if
-he had fallen. With this view, they formed
-once more upon the outskirts, and opening
-a passage with their bayonets through the
-cavalry, penetrated to their captain, who,
-notwithstanding seventeen wounds, was defending
-himself still. They immediately surrounded
-him, and regained the wood with<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_142">142</a></span>
-little loss. Such examples are not rare in
-the wars of the Revolution, and it were desirable
-to see them collected by some contemporary,
-that soldiers might learn how
-much is to be achieved in war by determined
-energy and sustained resolution.</p>
-
-</div></div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<h2><a id="MAXIM_LXX"></a>MAXIM LXX.</h2>
-
-<p>The conduct of a general in a conquered
-country is full of difficulties. If severe,
-he irritates and increases the number of
-his enemies. If lenient, he gives birth to
-expectations which only render the abuses
-and vexations, inseparable from war, the
-more intolerable. A victorious general
-must know how to employ severity, justice
-and mildness by turns, if he would allay
-sedition or prevent it.</p>
-
-<div class="note">
-<h3>NOTE.</h3>
-
-<p>Among the Romans, generals were only
-permitted to arrive at the command of armies
-after having exercised the different functions
-of the magistracy. Thus by a previous
-knowledge of administration, they were prepared<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_143">143</a></span>
-to govern the conquered provinces
-with all that discretion which a newly-acquired
-power, supported by arbitrary force,
-demands.</p>
-
-<p>In the military institutions of modern
-times, the generals, instructed only in what
-concerns the operation of strategy and tactics,
-are obliged to intrust the civil departments
-of the war to inferior agents, who,
-without belonging to the army, render all
-those abuses and vexations, inseparable from
-its operations, still more intolerable.</p>
-
-<p>This observation, which I do little more
-than repeat, seems to me, notwithstanding,
-deserving of particular attention; for if the
-leisure of general officers was directed in
-time of peace to the study of diplomacy&mdash;if
-they were employed in the different embassies
-which sovereigns send to foreign courts&mdash;they
-would acquire a knowledge of the
-laws and of the government of these countries,
-in which they may be called hereafter
-to carry on the war. They would learn also
-to distinguish those points of interest on
-which all treaties must be based, which have
-for their object the advantageous termination
-of a campaign. By the aid of this
-information they would obtain certain and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_144">144</a></span>
-positive results, since all the springs of action,
-as well as the machinery of war, would
-be in their hands. We have seen Prince
-Eugene, and Marshal Villars, each fulfilling
-with equal ability the duties of a general
-and a negotiator.</p>
-
-<p>When an army which occupies a conquered
-province observes strict discipline, there are
-few examples of insurrection among the people,
-unless indeed resistance is provoked (as
-but too often happens), by the exactions of
-inferior agents employed in the civil administration.</p>
-
-<p>It is to this point, therefore, that the general-in-chief
-should principally direct his
-attention, in order that the contributions
-imposed by the wants of the army may be
-levied with impartiality; and above all, that
-they may be applied to their true object, instead
-of serving to enrich the collectors, as
-is ordinarily the case.</p>
-
-</div></div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<h2><a id="MAXIM_LXXI"></a>MAXIM LXXI.</h2>
-
-<p>Nothing can excuse a general who
-takes advantage of the knowledge acquired
-in the service of his country, to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_145">145</a></span>
-deliver up her frontier and her towns to
-foreigners. This is a crime reprobated
-by every principle of religion, morality
-and honor.</p>
-
-<div class="note">
-<h3>NOTE.</h3>
-
-<p>Ambitious men who, listening only to
-their passions, arm natives of the same land
-against each other (under the deceitful pretext
-of the public good), are still more criminal.
-For however arbitrary a government,
-the institutions which have been consolidated
-by time, are always preferable to civil
-war, and to that anarchy which the latter is
-obliged to create for the justification of its
-crimes.</p>
-
-<p>To be faithful to his sovereign, and to
-respect the established government, are the
-first principles which ought to distinguish a
-soldier and a man of honor.</p>
-
-</div></div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<h2><a id="MAXIM_LXXII"></a>MAXIM LXXII.</h2>
-
-<p>A general-in-chief has no right to shelter
-his mistakes in war under cover of his
-sovereign, or of a minister, when these
-are both distant from the scene of operation,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_146">146</a></span>
-and must consequently be either ill
-informed or wholly ignorant of the actual
-state of things.</p>
-
-<p>Hence, it follows, that every general is
-culpable who undertakes the execution of
-a plan which he considers faulty. It is
-his duty to represent his reasons, to insist
-upon a change of plan, in short, to give
-in his resignation, rather than allow himself
-to be made the instrument of his
-army’s ruin. Every general-in-chief who
-fights a battle in consequence of superior
-orders, with the certainty of losing it, is
-equally blamable.</p>
-
-<p>In this last-mentioned case, the general
-ought to refuse obedience; because a
-blind obedience is due only to a military
-command given by a superior present on
-the spot at the moment of action. Being
-in possession of the real state of things,
-the superior has it then in his power to
-afford the necessary explanations to the
-person who executes his orders.</p>
-
-<p>But supposing a general-in-chief to receive
-positive order from his sovereign,
-directing him to fight a battle, with the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_147">147</a></span>
-further injunction, to yield to his adversary,
-and allow himself to be defeated&mdash;ought
-he to obey it? No. If the general
-should be able to comprehend the meaning
-or utility of such an order, he should
-execute it; otherwise he should refuse to
-obey it.</p>
-
-<div class="note">
-<h3>NOTE.</h3>
-
-<p>In the campaign of 1697, Prince Eugene
-caused the courier to be intercepted, who
-was bringing him orders from the emperor
-forbidding him to hazard a battle, for which
-everything had been prepared, and which
-he foresaw would prove decisive. He considered,
-therefore, that he did his duty in
-evading the orders of his sovereign; and the
-victory of Zanta, in which the Turks lost
-about thirty thousand men, and four thousand
-prisoners, rewarded his audacity. In
-the meantime, notwithstanding the immense
-advantages which accrued from this victory
-to the imperial arms, Eugene was disgraced
-on his arrival at Vienna.</p>
-
-<p>In 1793, General Hoche, having received
-orders to move upon Treves with an army
-harassed by constant marches in a mountainous
-and difficult country, refused to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_148">148</a></span>
-obey. He observed, with reason, that in order
-to obtain possession of an unimportant
-fortress, they were exposing his army to
-inevitable ruin. He caused, therefore, his
-troops to return into winter quarters, and
-preferred the preservation of his army, upon
-which the success of the future campaign
-depended, to his own safety. Recalled to
-Paris, he was thrown into a dungeon, which
-he only quitted on the downfall of Robespierre.</p>
-
-<p>I dare not decide if such examples are to
-be imitated; but it seems to me highly desirable
-that a question so new and so important,
-should be discussed by men who are
-capable of determining its merits.</p>
-
-</div></div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<h2><a id="MAXIM_LXXIII"></a>MAXIM LXXIII.</h2>
-
-<p>The first qualification in a general-in-chief
-is a cool head&mdash;that is, a head which
-receives just impressions, and estimates
-things and objects at their real value.
-He must not allow himself to be elated
-by good news, or depressed by bad.</p>
-
-<p>The impressions he receives either successively<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_149">149</a></span>
-or simultaneously in the course
-of the day, should be so classed as to
-take up only the exact place in his mind
-which they deserve to occupy; since it is
-upon a just comparison and consideration
-of the weight due to different impressions,
-that the power of reasoning and of
-right judgment depends.</p>
-
-<p>Some men are so physically and morally
-constituted as to see everything
-through a highly-colored medium. They
-raise up a picture in the mind on every
-slight occasion, and give to every trivial
-occurrence a dramatic interest. But
-whatever knowledge, or talent, or courage,
-or other good qualities such men
-may possess, nature has not formed them
-for the command of armies, or the direction
-of great military operations.</p>
-
-<div class="note">
-<h3>NOTE.</h3>
-
-<p>“The first quality in a general-in-chief,”
-says Montécuculli, “is a great knowledge
-of the art of war. This is not intuitive,
-but the result of experience. A man is not
-born a commander. He must become one.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_150">150</a></span>
-Not to be anxious; to be always cool; to
-avoid confusion in his commands; never to
-change countenance; to give his orders in
-the midst of battle with as much composure
-as if he were perfectly at ease. These are
-the proofs of valor in a general.</p>
-
-<p>“To encourage the timid; to increase the
-number of the truly brave; to revive the
-drooping ardor of the troops in battle; to
-rally those who are broken; to bring back
-to the charge those who are repulsed; to
-find resources in difficulty, and success even
-amid disaster; to be ready at a moment to
-devote himself, if necessary, for the welfare
-of the state. These are the actions which
-acquire for a general distinction and renown.”</p>
-
-<p>To this enumeration may be added, the
-talent of discriminating character, and of
-employing every man in the particular post
-which nature has qualified him to fill. “My
-principal attention,” said Marshal Villars,
-“was always directed to the study of the
-younger generals. Such a one I found, by
-the boldness of his character, fit to lead a
-column of attack; another, from a disposition
-naturally cautious, but without being
-deficient in courage, more perfectly to be<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_151">151</a></span>
-relied on for the defence of a country.” It
-is only by a just application of these personal
-qualities to their respective objects,
-that it is possible to command success in
-war.</p>
-
-</div></div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<h2><a id="MAXIM_LXXIV"></a>MAXIM LXXIV.</h2>
-
-<p>The leading qualifications which should
-distinguish an officer selected for the
-head of the staff, are, to know the country
-thoroughly; to be able to conduct a
-<em>reconnoissance</em> with skill; to superintend
-the transmission of orders promptly; to
-lay down the most complicated movements
-intelligibly, but in a few words,
-and with simplicity.</p>
-
-<div class="note">
-<h3>NOTE.</h3>
-
-<p>Formerly, the duties of the chiefs of the
-staff were confined to the necessary preparations
-for carrying the plan of the campaign,
-and the operations resolved on by
-the general-in-chief, into effect. In a battle,
-they were only employed in directing movements
-and superintending their execution.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_152">152</a></span>
-But in the late wars, the officers of the staff
-were frequently intrusted with the command
-of a column of attack, or of large detachments,
-when the general-in-chief feared to
-disclose the secret of his plans by the transmission
-of orders or instructions. Great
-advantages have resulted from this innovation,
-although it was long resisted. By this
-means, the staff have been enabled to perfect
-their theory by practice, and they have
-acquired, moreover, the esteem of the soldiers
-and junior officers of the line, who are
-easily led to think lightly of their superiors,
-whom they do not see fighting in the ranks.
-The generals who have held the arduous
-situation of chief of the staff during the
-wars of the Revolution, have almost always
-been employed in the different branches of
-the profession. Marshal Berthier, who filled
-so conspicuously this appointment to Napoleon,
-was distinguished by all the essentials
-of a general. He possessed calm, and at
-the same time brilliant courage, excellent
-judgment, and approved experience. He
-bore arms during half a century, made war
-in the four quarters of the globe, opened
-and terminated thirty-two campaigns. In
-his youth he acquired, under the eye of his<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_153">153</a></span>
-father, who was an engineer officer, the talent
-of tracing plans and finishing them with
-exactness, as well as the preliminary qualifications
-necessary to form a staff-officer.
-Admitted by the Prince de Lambesq into
-his regiment of dragoons, he was taught
-the skilful management of his horse and his
-sword&mdash;accomplishments so important to a
-soldier. Attached afterward to the staff of
-Count Rochambeau, he made his first campaign
-in America, where he soon began to
-distinguish himself by his valor, activity
-and talents. Having at length attained
-superior rank in the staff-corps formed by
-Marshal de Segur, he visited the camps of
-the King of Prussia, and discharged the duties
-of chief of the staff under the Baron
-de Bezenval.</p>
-
-<p>During nineteen years, consumed in sixteen
-campaigns, the history of Marshal Berthier’s
-life was little else but that of the
-wars of Napoleon, all the details of which he
-directed, both in the cabinet and the field.
-A stranger to the intrigues of politics, he
-labored with indefatigable activity; seized
-with promptitude and sagacity upon general
-views, and gave the necessary orders for
-attaining them with prudence, perspicuity,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_154">154</a></span>
-and conciseness. Discreet, impenetrable,
-modest; he was just, exact, and even severe,
-in everything that regarded the service;
-but he always set an example of
-vigilance and zeal in his own person, and
-knew how to maintain discipline, and to
-cause his authority to be respected by every
-rank under his orders.</p>
-
-</div></div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<h2><a id="MAXIM_LXXV"></a>MAXIM LXXV.</h2>
-
-<p>A commandant of artillery should understand
-well the general principles of
-each branch of the service, since he is
-called upon to supply arms and ammunition
-to the different corps of which it is
-composed. His correspondence with the
-commanding officers of artillery at the
-advanced posts, should put him in possession
-of all the movements of the army,
-and the disposition and management of
-the great park of artillery should depend
-upon this information.</p>
-
-<div class="note">
-<h3>NOTE.</h3>
-
-<p>After having recognized the advantage of
-intrusting the supply of arms and ammunition<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_155">155</a></span>
-for an army to a military body, it
-appears to me extraordinary that the same
-regulation does not extend to that of provisions
-and forage, instead of leaving it in
-the hands of a separate administration, as is
-the practice at present.</p>
-
-<p>The civil establishments attached to armies
-are formed almost always at the commencement
-of a war, and composed of persons
-strangers to those laws of discipline
-which they are but too much inclined to
-disregard. These men are little esteemed
-by the military, because they serve only to
-enrich themselves, without respect to the
-means. They consider only their private
-interest in a service whose glory they cannot
-share, although some portion of its success
-depends upon their zeal. The disorders
-and defalcations incident to these establishments
-would assuredly cease, if they were
-confided to men who had been employed in
-the army, and who, in return for their labors,
-were permitted to partake with their
-fellow-soldiers the triumph of their success.</p>
-
-</div></div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_156">156</a></span></p>
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<h2><a id="MAXIM_LXXVI"></a>MAXIM LXXVI.</h2>
-
-<p>The qualities which distinguish a good
-general of advanced posts, are, to reconnoitre
-accurately defiles and fords of every
-description; to provide guides that may
-be depended on; to interrogate the <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">curé</i>
-and postmaster; to establish rapidly a
-good understanding with the inhabitants;
-to send out spies; to intercept public and
-private letters; to translate and analyze
-their contents; in a word, to be able to
-answer every question of the general-in-chief,
-when he arrives with the whole
-army.</p>
-
-<div class="note">
-<h3>NOTE.</h3>
-
-<p>Foraging parties, composed of small detachments,
-and which were usually intrusted
-to young officers, served formerly to make
-good officers of advanced posts; but now the
-army is supplied with provisions by regular
-contributions: it is only in a course of partisan
-warfare that the necessary experience
-can be acquired to fill these situations with
-success.</p>
-
-<p>A chief of partisans is, to a certain extent,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_157">157</a></span>
-independent of the army. He receives
-neither pay nor provisions from it, and
-rarely succor, and is abandoned during the
-whole campaign to his own resources.</p>
-
-<p>An officer so circumstanced must unite
-address with courage, and boldness with
-discretion, if he wishes to collect plunder
-without measuring the strength of his little
-corps with superior forces. Always harassed,
-always surrounded by dangers, which
-it is his business to foresee and surmount, a
-leader of partisans acquires in a short time
-an experience in the details of war rarely to
-be obtained by an officer of the line; because
-the latter is almost always under the guidance
-of superior authority, which directs
-the whole of his movements, while the talent
-and genius of the partisan are developed
-and sustained by a dependence on his own
-resources.</p>
-
-</div></div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<h2><a id="MAXIM_LXXVII"></a>MAXIM LXXVII.</h2>
-
-<p>Generals-in-chief must be guided by
-their own experience, or their genius.
-Tactics, evolutions, the duties and knowledge
-of an engineer or artillery officer,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_158">158</a></span>
-may be learned in treatises, but the
-science of strategy is only to be acquired
-by experience, and by studying the campaigns
-of all the great captains.</p>
-
-<p>Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, and Frederick,
-as well as Alexander, Hannibal, and
-Cæsar, have all acted upon the same principles.
-These have been: to keep their
-forces united; to leave no weak part
-unguarded; to seize with rapidity on
-important points.</p>
-
-<p>Such are the principles which lead to
-victory, and which, by inspiring terror at
-the reputation of your arms, will at once
-maintain fidelity and secure subjection.</p>
-
-<div class="note">
-<h3>NOTE.</h3>
-
-<p>“A great captain can only be formed,”
-says the Archduke Charles, “by long experience
-and intense study: neither is his own
-experience enough&mdash;for whose life is there
-sufficiently fruitful of events to render his
-knowledge universal?” It is, therefore, by
-augmenting his information from the stock
-of others, by appreciating justly the discoveries
-of his predecessors, and by taking for
-his standard of comparison those great military<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_159">159</a></span>
-exploits, in connection with their political
-results, in which the history of war
-abounds, that he can alone become a great
-commander.</p>
-
-</div></div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<h2><a id="MAXIM_LXXVIII"></a>MAXIM LXXVIII.</h2>
-
-<p>Peruse again and again the campaigns
-of Alexander, Hannibal, Cæsar, Gustavus
-Adolphus, Turenne, Eugene, and Frederick.
-Model yourself upon them. This
-is the only means of becoming a great
-captain, and of acquiring the secret of the
-art of war. Your own genius will be
-enlightened and improved by this study,
-and you will learn to reject all maxims
-foreign to the principles of these great
-commanders.</p>
-
-<div class="note">
-<h3>NOTE.</h3>
-
-<p>It is in order to facilitate this object that
-I have formed the present collection. It is
-after reading and meditating upon the history
-of modern war that I have endeavored
-to illustrate, by examples, how the maxims
-of a great captain may be most successfully
-applied to this study. May the end I have
-had in view be accomplished!</p>
-
-</div></div>
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<div class="transnote">
-<h2 class="nobreak p1"><a id="Transcribers_Notes"></a>Transcriber’s Notes</h2>
-
-<p>Cover created by Transcriber and placed in the Public Domain.</p>
-
-<p>Punctuation, hyphenation, and spelling were made consistent when a predominant
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+<div>*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 50750 ***</div>
+
+<div class="transnote center">
+<p class="center bold">Transcriber’s Note</p>
+<p class="covernote center">Cover created by Transcriber and placed into the Public Domain.</p>
+<p class="center">Table of Contents created by Transcriber and placed into the Public Domain.</p>
+</div>
+
+<h1 class="vspace">
+<span class="small">THE OFFICER’S MANUAL.</span><br /><br />
+NAPOLEON’S<br />
+<span class="larger gesperrt">MAXIMS OF WAR.</span></h1>
+
+<p class="p2 center vspace2"><span class="gesperrt">RICHMOND, VA.:<br />
+WEST &amp; JOHNSTON.</span><br />
+1862.
+</p>
+
+<p class="p2 center smaller vspace2">
+<span class="smcap">Evans &amp; Cogswell, Printers.<br />
+No. 3 Broad St., Charleston, S. C.</span>
+</p>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2 id="CONTENTS">CONTENTS</h2>
+
+<div class="center"><div class="center-block vspacetoc">
+<a href="#RECOMMENDATION">RECOMMENDATION.</a><br />
+<a href="#PREFACE">PREFACE.</a><br />
+<a href="#NAPOLEONS">NAPOLEON’S</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_I">MAXIM  I.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_II">MAXIM  II.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_III">MAXIM  III.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_IV">MAXIM  IV.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_V">MAXIM  V.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_VI">MAXIM  VI.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_VII">MAXIM  VII.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_VIII">MAXIM  VIII.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_IX">MAXIM  IX.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_X">MAXIM  X.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_XI">MAXIM  XI.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_XII">MAXIM  XII.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_XIII">MAXIM  XIII.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_XIV">MAXIM  XIV.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_XV">MAXIM  XV.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_XVI">MAXIM  XVI.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_XVII">MAXIM  XVII.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_XVIII">MAXIM  XVIII.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_XIX">MAXIM  XIX.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_XX">MAXIM  XX.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_XXI">MAXIM  XXI.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_XXII">MAXIM  XXII.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_XXIII">MAXIM  XXIII.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_XXIV">MAXIM  XXIV.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_XXV">MAXIM  XXV.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_XXVI">MAXIM  XXVI.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_XXVII">MAXIM  XXVII.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_XXVIII">MAXIM  XXVIII.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_XXIX">MAXIM  XXIX.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_XXX">MAXIM  XXX.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_XXXI">MAXIM  XXXI.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_XXXII">MAXIM  XXXII.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_XXXIII">MAXIM  XXXIII.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_XXXIV">MAXIM  XXXIV.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_XXXV">MAXIM  XXXV.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_XXXVI">MAXIM  XXXVI.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_XXXVII">MAXIM  XXXVII.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_XXXVIII">MAXIM  XXXVIII.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_XXXIX">MAXIM  XXXIX.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_XL">MAXIM  XL.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_XLI">MAXIM  XLI.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_XLII">MAXIM  XLII.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_XLIII">MAXIM  XLIII.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_XLIV">MAXIM  XLIV.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_XLV">MAXIM  XLV.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_XLVI">MAXIM  XLVI.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_XLVII">MAXIM  XLVII.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_XLVIII">MAXIM  XLVIII.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_XLIX">MAXIM  XLIX.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_L">MAXIM  L.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_LI">MAXIM  LI.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_LII">MAXIM  LII.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_LIII">MAXIM  LIII.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_LIV">MAXIM  LIV.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_LV">MAXIM  LV.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_LVI">MAXIM  LVI.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_LVII">MAXIM  LVII.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_LVIII">MAXIM  LVIII.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_LIX">MAXIM  LIX.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_LX">MAXIM  LX.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_LXI">MAXIM  LXI.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_LXII">MAXIM  LXII.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_LXIII">MAXIM  LXIII.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_LXIV">MAXIM  LXIV.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_LXV">MAXIM  LXV.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_LXVI">MAXIM  LXVI.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_LXVII">MAXIM  LXVII.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_LXVIII">MAXIM  LXVIII.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_LXIX">MAXIM  LXIX.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_LXX">MAXIM  LXX.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_LXXI">MAXIM  LXXI.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_LXXII">MAXIM  LXXII.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_LXXIII">MAXIM  LXXIII.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_LXXIV">MAXIM  LXXIV.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_LXXV">MAXIM  LXXV.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_LXXVI">MAXIM  LXXVI.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_LXXVII">MAXIM  LXXVII.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_LXXVIII">MAXIM  LXXVIII.</a><br />
+<a href="#Transcribers_Notes">Transcriber’s Notes</a>
+</div></div>
+
+</div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="RECOMMENDATION"></a>RECOMMENDATION.</h2>
+
+<p>“After refreshing my memory by looking over
+again ‘The Officer’s Manual,’ or ‘Maxims of Napoleon,’
+I think I may safely recommend the republication,
+in America, of the work in English, as likely to
+be called for by many officers, regular and volunteer.
+It contains a circle of maxims, deduced from the
+highest source of military science and experience,
+with practical illustrations of the principles taken
+from the most celebrated campaigns of modern times.
+The study of the book cannot fail to set all young
+officers on a course of inquiry and reflection greatly
+to their improvement.</p>
+
+<p class="sigright">
+“WINFIELD SCOTT.”
+</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_5">5</a></span></p>
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="PREFACE"></a>PREFACE.</h2>
+
+<p>The publisher has reissued this little
+volume as a publication timely for the
+occasion. A collection of maxims which
+directed the military operations of the
+greatest captain of modern times, cannot
+fail to prove of great use to such young
+officers as really desire a knowledge of
+the art of war. The maxims are illustrated
+by instances drawn from the campaigns
+of Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne,
+Frederick, and Napoleon. These great
+men were all governed by the same
+principles, and it is by applying these
+principles to the perusal of their respective
+campaigns, that every military man
+will recognize their wisdom, and make<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_6">6</a></span>
+such use of them hereafter as his own
+particular genius shall point out.</p>
+
+<p>“And here, perhaps,” says the translator,
+Col. D’Aguilar, “my task might
+have been considered finished; but perceiving
+how incomplete the collection
+was alone, I have endeavored to supply
+the deficiency by having recourse for
+further illustration to the memoirs of
+Montécuculli, and the instructions of
+Frederick to his generals. The analogy
+of their principles with those of Napoleon,
+has convinced me that the art of
+war is susceptible of two points of view:
+one, which relates entirely to the acquirements
+and genius of the general; the
+other, which refers to matters of detail.</p>
+
+<p>“The first is the same in all ages, and
+with all nations, whatever be the arms
+with which they fight. Hence it follows
+that, in every age, great commanders
+have been governed by the same principles.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_7">7</a></span></p>
+
+<p>“The business of detail, on the contrary,
+is controlled by existing circumstances.
+It varies with the character of
+a people, and the quality of their arms.</p>
+
+<p>“It is with a view to impress the justice
+of this remark, that I have sought
+for facts in different periods of history,
+to illustrate these maxims, and to prove
+that nothing is <em>problematical</em> in war; but
+that failure and success in military operations
+depend almost always on the natural
+genius and science of the chief.”</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_9">9</a></span></p>
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2 class="vspace"><a id="NAPOLEONS"></a>NAPOLEON’S<br />
+<span class="larger gesperrt wspace">MAXIMS OF WAR.</span></h2>
+
+</div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2 class="nobreak"><a id="MAXIM_I"></a>MAXIM I.</h2>
+
+<p>The frontiers of states are either large
+rivers, or chains of mountains, or deserts.
+Of all these obstacles to the march of an
+army, the most difficult to overcome is
+the desert; mountains come next, and
+broad rivers occupy the third place.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>Napoleon, in his military career, appears
+to have been called upon to surmount every
+difficulty which can occur in wars of invasion.</p>
+
+<p>In Egypt he traversed deserts, and vanquished
+and destroyed the Mamelukes, so
+celebrated for their address and courage.
+His genius knew how to accommodate itself
+to all the dangers of this distant enterprise,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_10">10</a></span>
+in a country ill adapted to supply the wants
+of his troops.</p>
+
+<p>In the conquest of Italy, he twice crossed
+the Alps by the most difficult passes, and at
+a season, too, which rendered this undertaking
+still more formidable. In three months
+he passed the Pyrenees, defeated and dispersed
+four Spanish armies. In short, from
+the Rhine to the Borysthenes, no natural
+obstacle could be found to arrest the rapid
+march of his victorious army.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_II"></a>MAXIM II.</h2>
+
+<p>In forming the plan of a campaign, it
+is requisite to foresee everything the enemy
+may do, and to be prepared with the
+necessary means to counteract it.</p>
+
+<p>Plans of campaign may be modified
+<i xml:lang="la" lang="la">ad infinitum</i> according to circumstances&mdash;the
+genius of the general, the character
+of the troops, and the topography of the
+theatre of action.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>Sometimes we see a hazardous campaign
+succeed, the plan of which is directly at variance<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_11">11</a></span>
+with the principles of the art of war.
+But this success depends generally on the
+caprice of fortune, or upon faults committed
+by the enemy&mdash;two things upon which a general
+must never count. Sometimes the plan
+of a campaign, although based on sound
+principles of war, runs the risk of failing at
+the outset if opposed by an adversary who
+acts at first on the defensive, and then, suddenly
+seizing the initiative, surprises by the
+skilfulness of his manœuvres. Such was the
+fate of the plan laid down by the Aulic council
+for the campaign of 1796, under the command
+of Marshal Wurmser. From his great
+numerical superiority, the marshal had calculated
+on the entire destruction of the French
+army, by cutting off its retreat. He founded
+his operations on the defensive attitude of
+his adversary, who was posted on the line
+of the Adige, and had to cover the siege of
+Mantua, as well as central and lower Italy.</p>
+
+<p>Wurmser, supposing the French army fixed
+in the neighborhood of Mantua, divided
+his forces into three corps, which marched
+separately, intending to unite at that place.
+Napoleon, having penetrated the design of
+the Austrian general, perceived the advantage
+to be derived from striking the first<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_12">12</a></span>
+blow against an army divided into three
+corps, with no communication between them.
+He hastened, therefore, to raise the siege of
+Mantua, assembled the whole of his forces,
+and by this means became superior to the
+imperialists, whose divisions he attacked and
+beat in detail. Thus Wurmser, who fancied
+he had only to march to certain victory,
+saw himself compelled, after ten days campaign,
+to retire with the remains of his army
+into the Tyrol, after a loss of twenty-five
+thousand men in killed and wounded, fifteen
+thousand prisoners, nine stand of colors, and
+seventy pieces of cannon.</p>
+
+<p>Hence, nothing is so difficult as to prescribe
+beforehand to a general the line of
+conduct he shall pursue during the course
+of a campaign. Success must often depend
+on circumstances that cannot be foreseen;
+and it should be remembered, likewise, that
+nothing cramps so much the efforts of genius
+as compelling the head of an army to be
+governed by any will but his own.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_III"></a>MAXIM III.</h2>
+
+<p>An army which undertakes the conquest
+of a country, has its two wings<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_13">13</a></span>
+resting either upon neutral territories, or
+upon great natural obstacles, such as rivers
+or chains of mountains. It happens
+in some cases that only one wing is so
+supported; and in others that both are
+exposed.</p>
+
+<p>In the first instance cited, viz., where
+both wings are protected, a general has
+only to protect his front from being penetrated.
+In the second, where one wing
+only is supported, he should rest upon
+the supported wing. In the third, where
+both wings are exposed, he should depend
+upon a central formation, and never allow
+the different corps under his command to
+depart from this: for if it be difficult to
+contend with the disadvantage of having
+<em>two</em> flanks exposed, the inconvenience is
+doubled by having <em>four</em>, trebled if there
+be <em>six</em>&mdash;that is to say, if the army is divided
+into two or three different corps.
+In the first instance, then, as above quoted,
+the line of operation may rest indifferently
+on the right or on the left. In
+the second, it should be directed toward
+the wing in support. In the third, it<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_14">14</a></span>
+should be perpendicular to the centre of
+the army’s line of march. But in all
+these cases it is necessary, at a distance
+of every five or six days march, to have
+a strong post or an entrenched position
+upon the line of operation, in order to
+collect military stores and provisions, to
+organize convoys, to form of it a centre
+of movement, and establish a point of
+defence to shorten the line of operation
+of the army.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>These general principles in the art of war
+were entirely unknown, or lost sight of, in
+the middle ages. The crusaders in their incursions
+into Palestine appear to have had
+no object but to fight and to conquer, so little
+pains did they take to profit by their
+victories. Hence, innumerable armies perished
+in Syria, without any other advantage
+than that derived from the momentary
+success obtained by superior numbers.</p>
+
+<p>It was by the neglect of these principles,
+also, that Charles XII, abandoning his line
+of operation and all communication with
+Sweden, threw himself into the Ukraine,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_15">15</a></span>
+and lost the greater part of his army by the
+fatigue of a winter campaign in a barren
+country destitute of resources.</p>
+
+<p>Defeated at Pultawa, he was obliged to
+seek refuge in Turkey, after crossing the
+Nieper with the remains of his army, diminished
+to little more than one thousand men.</p>
+
+<p>Gustavus Adolphus was the first who
+brought back the art of war to its true principles.
+His operations in Germany were
+bold, rapid, and well executed. He made
+success at all times conducive to future
+security, and established his line of operation
+so as to prevent the possibility of any
+interruption in his communications with
+Sweden. His campaigns form a new era in
+the art of war.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_IV"></a>MAXIM IV.</h2>
+
+<p>When the conquest of a country is
+undertaken by two or three armies,
+which have each their separate line of
+operation, until they arrive at a point
+fixed upon for their concentration, it
+should be laid down as a principle, that<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_16">16</a></span>
+the union of these different corps should
+never take place near the enemy; because
+the enemy, in uniting his forces,
+may not only prevent this junction, but
+may beat the armies in detail.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>In the campaign of 1757, Frederick,
+marching to the conquest of Bohemia with
+two armies, which had each their separate
+line of operation, succeeded, notwithstanding,
+in uniting them in sight of the Duke
+of Lorraine, who covered Prague with the
+imperial army; but his example should not
+be followed. The success of this march
+depended entirely on the inaction of the
+duke, who, at the head of seventy thousand
+men, did nothing to prevent the junction of
+the two Prussian armies.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_V"></a>MAXIM V.</h2>
+
+<p>All wars should be governed by certain
+principles, for every war should have a
+definite object, and be conducted according
+to the rules of art. (A war should<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_17">17</a></span>
+only be undertaken with forces proportioned
+to the obstacles to be overcome.)</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>It was a saying of Marshal Villars, that
+when war is decided on, it is necessary to
+have exact information of the number of
+troops the enemy can bring into the field,
+since it is impossible to lay down any solid
+plan of offensive or defensive operation
+without an accurate knowledge of what
+you have to expect and fear. “When the
+first shot is fired,” observes Marshal Villars,
+“no one can calculate what will be the issue
+of the war. It is, therefore, of vast
+importance to reflect maturely before we
+begin it.” When once, however, this is
+decided, the marshal observes that the boldest
+and most extended plans are generally
+the wisest and the most successful. “When
+we are determined upon war,” he adds, “we
+should carry it on vigorously and without
+trifling.”</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_VI"></a>MAXIM VI.</h2>
+
+<p>At the commencement of a campaign,
+to <em>advance</em> or <em>not to advance</em>, is a matter<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_18">18</a></span>
+for grave consideration; but when once
+the offensive has been assumed, it must
+be sustained to the last extremity. However
+skilful the manœuvres in a retreat,
+it will always weaken the <em>morale</em> of an
+army, because, in losing the chances of
+success, these last are transferred to the
+enemy. Besides, retreats always cost
+more men and <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">materiel</i> than the most
+bloody engagements; with this difference,
+that in a battle the enemy’s loss is
+nearly equal to your own&mdash;whereas in a
+retreat the loss is on your side only.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>Marshal Saxe remarks, that no retreats
+are so favorable as those which are made
+before a languid and unenterprising enemy,
+for when he pursues with vigor, the retreat
+soon degenerates into a rout. “Upon this
+principle it is a great error,” says the
+marshal, “to adhere to the proverb which
+recommends us to build a bridge of gold for
+a retreating enemy. No; follow him up
+with spirit, and he is destroyed!”</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_19">19</a></span></p>
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_VII"></a>MAXIM VII.</h2>
+
+<p>An army should be ready every day,
+every night, and at all times of the day
+and night, to oppose all the resistance
+of which it is capable. With this view,
+the soldier should always be furnished
+completely with arms and ammunition;
+the infantry should never be without its
+artillery, its cavalry, and its generals;
+and the different divisions of the army
+should be constantly in a state to support,
+to be supported, and to protect
+itself.</p>
+
+<p>The troops, whether halted, or encamped,
+or on the march, should be
+always in favorable positions, possessing
+the essentials required for a field of battle;
+for example, the flanks should be
+well covered, and all the artillery so
+placed as to have free range, and to play
+with the greatest advantage. When an
+army is in column of march, it should
+have advanced guards and flanking parties,
+to examine well the country in front,
+to the right, and to the left, and always<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_20">20</a></span>
+at such distance as to enable the main
+body to deploy into position.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>The following maxims, taken from the
+memoirs of Montécuculli, appear to me well
+suited to this place, and calculated to form a
+useful commentary on the general principles
+laid down in the preceding maxim:</p>
+
+<p>1. When war has been once decided on,
+the moment is past for doubts and scruples.
+On the contrary, we are bound to hope that
+all the evil which may ensue, will not; that
+Providence, or our own wisdom, may avert
+it; or that the want of talent on the part of
+the enemy may prevent him from benefiting
+by it. The first security for success is to
+confer the command on one individual.
+When the authority is divided, the opinions
+of the commanders often vary, and the operations
+are deprived of that <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">ensemble</i> which
+is the first essential to victory. Besides,
+when an enterprise is common to many, and
+not confined to a single person, it is conducted
+without vigor, and less interest is
+attached to the result.</p>
+
+<p>After having strictly conformed to all the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_21">21</a></span>
+rules of war, and satisfied ourselves that
+nothing has been omitted to ensure eventual
+success, we must then leave the issue in the
+hands of Providence, and repose ourselves
+tranquilly in the decision of a higher power.</p>
+
+<p>Let what will arrive, it is the part of a
+general-in-chief to remain firm and constant
+in his purposes; he must not allow himself
+to be elated by prosperity, nor to be depressed
+by adversity: for in war good and
+bad and fortune succeed each other by turns,
+form the ebb and flow of military operations.</p>
+
+<p>2. When your own army is strong and
+inured to service, and that of the enemy is
+weak and consists of new levies, or of troops
+enervated by long inaction, then you should
+exert every means to bring him to battle.</p>
+
+<p>If, on the other hand, your adversary has
+the advantage in troops, a decisive combat
+is to be avoided, and you must be content to
+impede his progress, by encamping advantageously,
+and fortifying favorable passes.
+When armies are nearly equal in force, it is
+desirable <em>not</em> to avoid a battle, but only to
+attempt to fight one to advantage. For this
+purpose, care should be taken to encamp always
+in front of the enemy; to move when
+he moves, and occupy the heights and advantageous<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_22">22</a></span>
+grounds that lie upon his line of
+march; to seize upon all the buildings and
+roads adjoining to his camp, and post yourself
+advantageously in the places by which
+he must pass. It is always something gained
+to make <em>him</em> lose time, to thwart his designs,
+or to retard their progress and execution.
+If, however, an army is altogether
+inferior to that of the enemy, and there is no
+possibility of manœuvring against him with
+success, then the campaign must be abandoned,
+and the troops must retire into the
+fortresses.</p>
+
+<p>3. The principal object of a general-in-chief,
+in the moment of battle, should be to
+secure the flanks of his army. It is true
+that natural positions may be found to effect
+this object, but these positions being fixed
+and immovable in themselves, they are only
+advantageous to a general who wishes to
+wait the shock of the enemy, and not to one
+who marches to the attack.</p>
+
+<p>A general can, therefore, rely only on the
+proper arrangement of his troops, to enable
+him to repel any attempt the adversary may
+make upon the front, or flanks, or rear of
+his army.</p>
+
+<p>If one flank of an army rests upon a river,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_23">23</a></span>
+or an impassable ravine, the whole of the
+cavalry may be posted with the other wing,
+in order to envelop the enemy more easily
+by its superiority in numbers.</p>
+
+<p>If the enemy has his flanks supported by
+woods, light cavalry or infantry should be
+despatched to attack him in flank or in rear
+during the heat of the battle. If practicable,
+also, an attack should be made upon the
+baggage, to add to his confusion.</p>
+
+<p>If you desire to beat the enemy’s left with
+your right wing, or his right with your
+left wing, the wing with which you attack
+should be reinforced by the <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">élite</i> of your
+army. At the same moment, the other wing
+should avoid battle, and the attacking wing
+brought rapidly forward, so as to overwhelm
+the enemy. If the nature of the ground
+admits, he should be approached by stealth,
+and attacked before he is on his guard. If
+any signs of fear are discoverable in the enemy,
+and which are always to be detected
+by confusion or disorder in his movements,
+he should be pursued immediately, without
+allowing him time to recover himself. It is
+now the cavalry should be brought into action,
+and manœuvre so as to surprise and
+cut off his artillery and baggage.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_24">24</a></span></p>
+
+<p>4. The order of march should always be
+subservient to the order of battle, which last
+should be arranged beforehand. The march
+of an army is always well regulated when it
+is governed by the distance to be accomplished,
+and by the time required for its performance.
+The front of the column of march
+should be diminished or increased according
+to the nature of the country, taking care
+that the artillery always proceeds by the
+main road.</p>
+
+<p>When a river is to be passed, the artillery
+should be placed in battery upon the bank
+opposite the point of crossing.</p>
+
+<p>It is a great advantage, when a river
+forms a sweep or angle, and when a ford is
+to be found near the place where you wish
+to effect a passage. As the construction of
+the bridge proceeds, infantry should be advanced
+to cover the workmen, by keeping
+up a fire on the opposite bank; but the moment
+it is finished, a corps of infantry and
+cavalry, and some field-pieces, should be
+pushed across. The infantry should entrench
+itself immediately at the head of the bridge,
+and it is prudent, moreover, to fortify on the
+same side of the river, in order to protect
+the bridge in case the enemy should venture
+an offensive movement.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_25">25</a></span></p>
+
+<p>The advanced guard of an army should
+be always provided with trusty guides, and
+with a corps of pioneers: the first to point
+out the best roads, the second to render
+these roads more practicable.</p>
+
+<p>If the army marches in detachments, the
+commander of each detachment should be
+furnished with the name of the place in
+writing, where the whole are to be reassembled;
+the place should be sufficiently removed
+from the enemy to prevent him from
+occupying it before the junction of all the
+detachments. To this end, it is of importance
+to keep the name a secret.</p>
+
+<p>From the moment an army approaches
+the enemy, it should march in the order in
+which it is intended to fight. If anything is
+to be apprehended, precautions are necessary
+in proportion to the degree of the danger.
+When a defile is to be passed, the troops
+should be halted beyond the extremity, until
+the whole army has quitted the defile.</p>
+
+<p>In order to conceal the movements of an
+army, it is necessary to march by night
+through woods and valleys, by the most retired
+roads, and out of reach of all inhabited
+places. No fires should be allowed; and, to
+favor the design still more, the troops should<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_26">26</a></span>
+move by verbal order. When the object of
+the march is to carry a post, or to relieve a
+place that is besieged, the advanced guard
+should march within musket shot of the
+main body, because then you are prepared
+for an immediate attack, and ready to overthrow
+all before you.</p>
+
+<p>When a march is made to force a pass
+guarded by the enemy, it is desirable to
+make a feint upon one point, while, by a
+rapid movement, you bring your real attack
+to bear upon another.</p>
+
+<p>Sometimes success is obtained by pretending
+to fall back upon the original line of
+march, and, by a sudden countermarch, seizing
+upon the pass, before the enemy is able
+to reoccupy it. Some generals have gained
+their point by manœuvring so as to deceive
+the enemy, while a detachment under the
+cover of high grounds has surprised the passage
+by a stolen march. The enemy being
+engaged in watching the movements of the
+main body, the detachment has an opportunity
+of entrenching itself in its new position.</p>
+
+<p>5. An army regulates its mode of encampment
+according to the greater or less degree
+of precaution, when circumstances require.
+In a friendly country the troops are divided,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_27">27</a></span>
+to afford better accommodation and supplies.
+But with the enemy in front, an army should
+always encamp in order of battle. With
+this view, it is of the highest importance to
+cover one part of the camp, as far as practicable,
+by natural defences, such as a river, a
+chain of rocks, or a ravine. Care should be
+taken also that the camp is not commanded,
+and that there is no obstacle to a free communication
+between the different corps, and
+which can prevent the troops from mutually
+succoring each other.</p>
+
+<p>When an army occupies a fixed camp, it is
+necessary to be well supplied with provisions
+and ammunition, or at least that these should
+be within certain reach and easily obtained.
+To insure this, the line of communication
+must be well established, and care taken not
+to leave an enemy’s fortress in your rear.</p>
+
+<p>When an army is established in winter
+quarters, its safety is best secured either by
+fortifying a camp (for which purpose a spot
+should be selected near a large commercial
+town, or a river affording facility of transport),
+or by distributing it in close cantonments,
+so that the troops should be near
+together, and capable of affording each other
+mutual support.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_28">28</a></span></p>
+
+<p>The winter quarters of an army should be
+protected, likewise, by constructing small
+covered works on all the lines of approach
+to the cantonments, and by posting advanced
+guards of cavalry to observe the motions of
+the enemy.</p>
+
+<p>6. A battle is to be sought, when there is
+reason to hope for victory, or when an army
+runs the risk of being ruined without fighting;
+also when a besieged place is to be
+relieved, or when you desire to prevent
+a reinforcement from reaching the enemy.
+Battles are useful, likewise, when we wish
+to profit by a favorable opportunity which
+offers, to secure a certain advantage, such as
+seizing upon an undefended point or pass,
+attacking the enemy when he has committed
+a fault, or when some misunderstanding
+among his generals favors the undertaking.</p>
+
+<p>If an enemy declines an engagement, he
+may be compelled to it, either by besieging
+a place of importance, or by falling upon
+him unawares, and when he cannot easily
+effect his retreat. Or (after pretending to
+retire), by making a rapid countermarch,
+attacking him vigorously and forcing him to
+action.</p>
+
+<p>The different circumstances under which<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_29">29</a></span>
+a battle should be avoided or declined, are,
+when there is greater danger to be apprehended
+from defeat than advantage to be
+derived from victory; when you are very
+inferior to your adversary in numbers, and
+are expecting reinforcements; above all,
+when the enemy is advantageously posted,
+or when he is contributing to his own ruin
+by some inherent defect in his position, or
+by the errors and divisions of his generals.</p>
+
+<p>To gain a battle, each arm must be advantageously
+posted, and have the means
+of engaging its front and in flank. The
+wings must be protected by natural obstacles,
+where these present themselves, or by
+having recourse when necessary to the aid
+of art.</p>
+
+<p>The troops must be able to assist each
+other without confusion, and care must be
+taken that the broken corps do not fall
+back upon, and throw the rest into disorder.
+Above all, the intervals between
+the different corps must be sufficiently small
+to prevent the enemy from penetrating between
+them, for in that case you would be
+obliged to employ your reserves, and run
+the risk of being entirely overwhelmed.
+Sometimes victory is obtained by creating<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_30">30</a></span>
+a diversion in the middle of a battle, or
+even by depriving the soldier of all hope
+of retreat, and placing him in a situation
+where he is reduced to the necessity either
+to conquer or die.</p>
+
+<p>At the commencement of a battle, if the
+ground is level, you should advance to meet
+the enemy, in order to inspire the soldier
+with courage; but if you are well posted,
+and your artillery advantageously placed,
+then wait for him with determination: remembering
+always to fight resolutely, to
+succor opportunely those who require it,
+and never to bring your reserves into action
+except in the last extremity; and
+even then to preserve some support, behind
+which the broken corps may rally.</p>
+
+<p>When it is necessary to attack with your
+whole force, the battle should commence
+toward evening; because then, whatever
+be the issue, night will arrive to separate
+the combatants before your troops are exhausted.
+By this means, an opportunity
+is afforded of affecting an orderly retreat
+if the result of the battle requires it.</p>
+
+<p>During an action, the general-in-chief
+should occupy some spot whence he can,
+as far as possible, overlook his whole army.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_31">31</a></span>
+He should be informed, immediately, of
+everything that passes in the different
+divisions. He should be ready, in order to
+render success more complete, to operate
+with fresh troops upon those points where
+the enemy is giving way, and also to reinforce
+his own corps wherever they are inclined
+to yield. When the enemy is beaten,
+he must pursue him instantly, without
+giving him a moment to rally; on the
+other hand, if he is himself defeated, or
+despairs of victory, he must retreat in the
+best possible order.</p>
+
+<p>7. It shows great talent in a general
+to bring troops, who are prepared for action,
+into collision with those who are
+not: for example, fresh troops against those
+which are exhausted&mdash;brave and disciplined
+men against recruits. He must likewise be
+ready always to fall with his army upon
+a weak or detached corps, to follow the
+track of the enemy, and charge him among
+defiles before he can face about and get into
+position.</p>
+
+<p>8. A position is good when the different
+corps are so placed as to be engaged with
+advantage, and without any remaining unemployed.
+If you are superior in cavalry,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_32">32</a></span>
+positions are to be taken in plains and
+open ground; if in infantry, in an enclosed
+and covered country. If inferior in
+numbers, in confined and narrow places;
+if superior, in a spacious and extensive
+field. With a very inferior army, a difficult
+pass must be selected to occupy and
+fortify.</p>
+
+<p>9. In order to obtain every possible advantage
+from a diversion, we should ascertain
+first, that the country in which it is to
+be created is easily penetrated. A diversion
+should be made vigorously, and on those
+points where it is calculated to do the greatest
+mischief to the enemy.</p>
+
+<p>10. To make war with success, the following
+principles should never be departed
+from:</p>
+
+<p>To be superior to your enemy in numbers,
+as well as in <em>morale</em>; to fight battles in order
+to spread terror in the country; to divide
+your army into as many corps as may be
+effected without risk, in order to undertake
+several objects at the same time; to treat
+<span class="smcap smaller">WELL</span> those who yield, to <span class="smcap smaller">ILL</span> treat those who
+resist; to secure your rear, and occupy and
+strengthen yourself at the outset in some
+post which shall serve as a central point for<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_33">33</a></span>
+the support of your future movements; to
+guard against desertion; to make yourself
+master of the great rivers and principal
+passes, and to establish your line of communication
+by getting possession of the fortresses,
+by laying siege to them, and of the
+open country, by giving battle; for it is vain
+to expect that conquests are to be achieved
+without combats; although when a victory
+is won, they will be best maintained by
+uniting mildness with valor.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_VIII"></a>MAXIM VIII.</h2>
+
+<p>A general-in-chief should ask himself
+frequently in the day: “What should I
+do if the enemy’s army appeared now in
+my front, or on my right, or my left?”
+If he have any difficulty in answering
+these questions, his position is bad, and
+he should seek to remedy it.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>In the campaign of 1758, the position of
+the Prussian army at Hohen Kirk, being
+commanded by the batteries of the enemy,
+who occupied all the heights, was eminently<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_34">34</a></span>
+defective; notwithstanding, Frederick, who
+saw his rear menaced by the corps of Laudon,
+remained six days in his camp without seeking
+to correct his position. It would seem,
+indeed, that he was ignorant of his real danger:
+for Marshal Daun, having manœuvred
+during the night in order to attack by daybreak,
+surprised the Prussians in their lines
+before they were able to defend themselves,
+and by this means surrounded them completely.</p>
+
+<p>Frederick succeeded, however, in effecting
+his retreat with regularity, but not without
+the loss of ten thousand men, many general
+officers, and almost all of his artillery. If
+Marshal Daun had followed up his victory
+with greater boldness, the king of Prussia
+would never have been able to rally his
+army. On this occasion, Frederick’s good
+fortune balanced his imprudence.</p>
+
+<p>Marshal Saxe remarks, that there is more
+talent than is dreamt of in bad dispositions,
+if we possess the art of converting them into
+good ones when the favorable moment
+arrives. Nothing astonishes the enemy so
+much as this manœuvre; he has counted
+upon <em>something</em>; all his arrangements have
+been founded upon it accordingly&mdash;and at<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_35">35</a></span>
+the moment of attack it escapes him! “I
+must repeat,” says the marshal, “there is
+nothing that so completely disconcerts an
+enemy as this, or leads him to commit so
+many errors; for it follows, that if he does
+<em>not</em> change his arrangements, he is beaten;
+and if he <em>does</em> change them, in presence of
+his adversary, he is equally undone.”</p>
+
+<p>It seems to me, however, that a general
+who should rest the success of a battle upon
+such a principle, would be more likely to
+lose than to gain by it; for if he had to deal
+with a skilful adversary and an alert tactician,
+the latter would find time to take advantage
+of the previous bad arrangements,
+before he would be able to remedy them.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_IX"></a>MAXIM IX.</h2>
+
+<p>The strength of an army, like the
+power in mechanics, is estimated by multiplying
+the mass by the rapidity; a rapid
+march augments the <em>morale</em> of an army,
+and increases its means of victory. Press
+on!</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_36">36</a></span></p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>“Rapidity,” says Montécuculli, “is of importance
+in concealing the movements of an
+army, because it leaves no time to divulge
+the intention of its chief. It is, therefore,
+an advantage to attack the enemy unexpectedly,
+to take him off his guard, to surprise
+him, and let him feel the thunder before he
+sees the flash; but if too great celerity exhausts
+your troops, while, on the other hand,
+delay deprives you of the favorable moment,
+you must weigh the advantage against the
+disadvantage, and choose between.”</p>
+
+<p>Marshal Villars observes, that “in war
+everything depends upon being able to deceive
+the enemy; and having once gained
+this point, in never allowing him time to
+recover himself.” Villars has united practice
+to precept. His bold and rapid marches
+were almost always crowned with success.</p>
+
+<p>It was the opinion of Frederick that all
+wars should be short and rapid; because a
+long war insensibly relaxes discipline, depopulates
+the state, and exhausts its resources.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_37">37</a></span></p>
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_X"></a>MAXIM X.</h2>
+
+<p>When an army is inferior in number,
+inferior in cavalry, and in artillery, it is
+essential to avoid a general action. The
+first deficiency should be supplied by rapidity
+of movement; the want of artillery,
+by the nature of the manœuvres;
+and the inferiority in cavalry, by the
+choice of positions. In such circumstances,
+the <em>morale</em> of the soldier does much.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>The campaign of 1814 in France was skilfully
+executed upon these principles. Napoleon,
+with an army inferior in number, an
+army discouraged by the disastrous retreats
+of Moscow and of Leipzig, and still more by
+the presence of the enemy in the French
+territory, contrived, notwithstanding, to supply
+his vast inequality of force by the rapidity
+and combination of his movements. By
+the success obtained at Champ-Aubert, Montmirail,
+Montereau, and Rheims, he began to
+restore the <em>morale</em> of the French army. The
+numerous recruits of which it was composed,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_38">38</a></span>
+had already acquired that steadiness
+of which the old regiments afforded them
+an example, when the capture of Paris, and
+the astonishing revolution it produced, compelled
+Napoleon to lay down his arms.</p>
+
+<p>But this consequence resulted rather from
+the force of circumstances than from any absolute
+necessity; for Napoleon, by carrying
+his army to the other side of the Loire,
+might easily have formed a junction with
+the armies of the Alps and Pyrenees, and
+have reappeared on the field of battle at the
+head of a hundred thousand men. Such a
+force would have amply sufficed to re-establish
+the chances of war in his favor; more
+especially as the armies of the allied sovereigns
+were obliged to manœuvre upon the
+French territory with all the strong places
+of Italy and France in their rear.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XI"></a>MAXIM XI.</h2>
+
+<p>To direct operations with lines far removed
+from each other, and without communications,
+is to commit a fault which
+always gives birth to a second. The<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_39">39</a></span>
+detached column has only its orders for
+the first day. Its operations on the following
+day depend upon what may have
+happened to the main body. Thus, this
+column either loses time upon emergency,
+in waiting for orders, or it will act without
+them, and at hazard. Let it therefore
+be held as a principle, that an army
+should always keep its columns so united
+as to prevent the enemy from passing between
+them with impunity. Whenever,
+for particular reasons, this principle is
+departed from, the detached corps should
+be independent in their operations. They
+should move toward a point fixed upon
+for their future junction. They should
+advance without hesitating, and without
+waiting for fresh orders; and every precaution
+should be taken to prevent an
+attack upon them in detail.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>The Austrian army, commanded by Field-marshal
+Alvinzi, was divided into two corps,
+destined to act independently, until they
+should accomplish their junction before Mantua.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_40">40</a></span>
+The first of these corps, consisting of
+forty-five thousand men, was under the orders
+of Alvinzi. It was to debouch by Monte
+Baldo, upon the positions occupied by the
+French army on the Adige. The second
+corps, commanded by General Provéra, was
+destined to act upon the lower Adige, and
+to raise the blockade of Mantua. Napoleon,
+informed of the enemy’s movements,
+but not entirely comprehending his projects,
+confined himself to concentrating his masses,
+and giving orders to the troops to hold
+themselves in readiness to manœuvre. In
+the meantime, fresh information satisfied the
+general-in-chief of the French army that the
+corps which had debouched by La Coronna,
+over Monte Baldo, was endeavoring to form
+a junction with its cavalry and artillery&mdash;both
+which, having crossed the Adige at
+Dolce, were directing their march upon the
+plateau of Rivoli, by the great road leading
+by Incanole.</p>
+
+<p>Napoleon immediately foresaw that, by
+having possession of the plateau, he should
+be able to prevent this junction, and obtain
+all the advantages of the initiative. He accordingly
+put his troops in motion, and at
+two o’clock in the morning occupied that<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_41">41</a></span>
+important position. Once master of the point
+fixed upon for the junction of the Austrian
+columns, success followed all his dispositions.
+He repulsed every attack, made seven thousand
+prisoners, and took several standards
+and twelve pieces of cannon. At two o’clock
+in the afternoon, the battle of Rivoli was
+already gained, when Napoleon, learning
+that General Provéra had passed the Adige
+at Anghiari, and was directing his march
+upon Mantua, left to his generals the charge
+of following up the retreat of Alvinzi, and
+placed himself at the head of a division for
+the purpose of defeating the designs of Provéra.</p>
+
+<p>By a rapid march, he again succeeded in
+the initiatory movement, and in preventing
+the garrison of Mantua from uniting its force
+with the relieving army. The corps intrusted
+with the blockade, eager to distinguish
+itself under the eyes of the conqueror of
+Rivoli, compelled the garrison to retire into
+the place, while the division of Victor, forgetting
+the fatigues of a forced march, rushed
+with impetuosity on the relieving army in
+front. At this moment a sortie from the lines
+of St. George took him in flank, while the
+corps of Augereau, which had followed the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_42">42</a></span>
+march of the Austrian general, attacked him
+in rear. Provéra, surrounded on all sides,
+capitulated. The result of these two battles
+cost the Austrians three thousand men in
+killed and wounded, twenty-two thousand
+prisoners, twenty-four standards, and forty-six
+pieces of cannon.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XII"></a>MAXIM XII.</h2>
+
+<p>An army ought to have only one line
+of operation. This should be preserved
+with care, and never abandoned but in
+the last extremity.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>“The line of communication of an army,”
+says Montécuculli, “must be certain and
+well established, for every army that acts
+from a distant base, and is not careful to
+keep this line perfectly open, marches upon
+a precipice. It moves to certain ruin, as may
+be seen by an infinity of examples. In fact,
+if the road by which provisions, ammunition
+and reinforcements are to be brought up, is
+not entirely secured&mdash;if the magazines, the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_43">43</a></span>
+hospitals, the depôts of arms, and the places
+of supply are not fixed and commodiously
+situated&mdash;not only the army cannot keep the
+field, but it will be exposed to the greatest
+dangers.”</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XIII"></a>MAXIM XIII.</h2>
+
+<p>The distances permitted between corps
+of an army upon the march must be governed
+by the localities, by circumstances,
+and by the object in view.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>When an army moves at a distance from
+the enemy, the columns may be disposed
+along the road so as to favor the artillery
+and baggage. But when it is marching into
+action, the different corps must be formed in
+close columns in order of battle. The generals
+must take care that the heads of the
+columns, which are to attack together, do not
+outstep each other, and that in approaching
+the field of action they preserve the relative
+intervals required for deployment.</p>
+
+<p>“The marches that are made preparatory<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_44">44</a></span>
+to a battle require,” says Frederick, “the
+greatest precaution.” With this view, he
+recommends his generals to be particularly
+on their guard, and to reconnoitre the ground
+at successive distances, in order to secure the
+initiative by occupying those positions most
+calculated to favor an attack. On a retreat,
+it is the opinion of many generals that an
+army should concentrate its forces, and
+march in close columns if it is still strong
+enough to resume the offensive; for by this
+means it is easy to form the line when a
+favorable opportunity presents itself, either
+for holding the enemy in check or for attacking
+him if he is not in a situation to
+accept battle.</p>
+
+<p>Such was Moreau’s retreat after the passage
+of the Adda by the Austro-Russian
+army. The French general, after having
+covered the evacuation of Milan, took up a
+position between the Po and the Tanaro.</p>
+
+<p>His camp rested upon Alexandria and
+Valentia, two capital fortresses, and had the
+advantage of covering the roads to Turin
+and Savona, by which he could effect his
+retreat in case he was unable to accomplish a
+junction with the <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">corps d’armee</i> of Macdonald,
+who had been ordered to quit the kingdom<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_45">45</a></span>
+of Naples, and hasten his march into
+Tuscany.</p>
+
+<p>Forced to abandon his position in consequence
+of the insurrection in Piedmont and
+Tuscany, Moreau retired upon Asti, where
+he learned that his communication with the
+river of Genoa had just been cut off by the
+capture of Ceva. After several ineffectual
+attempts to retake this place, he saw that
+his only safety depended upon throwing himself
+into the mountains.</p>
+
+<p>To effect this object, he directed the whole
+of his battering train and heavy baggage by
+the Col de Fenestrelle upon France; then
+opening himself a way over the St. Bernard,
+he gained Loano with his light artillery and
+the small proportion of field equipment he
+had been able to preserve.</p>
+
+<p>By this skilful movement, he not only retained
+his communications with France, but
+was enabled to observe the motions of the
+army from Naples, and to facilitate his junction
+with it by directing the whole of his
+force upon the points necessary for that
+purpose.</p>
+
+<p>Macdonald, in the meantime, whose only
+chance of success depended on concentrating
+his little army, neglected this precaution,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_46">46</a></span>
+and was beaten in three successive actions
+at the Trebia.</p>
+
+<p>By this retardment of his march, he rendered
+all Moreau’s measures to unite the
+two armies in the plains of the Po useless,
+and his retreat, after his brilliant but fruitless
+efforts at the Trebia, defeated the other
+arrangements, also, which the former had
+made to come to his support. The inactivity
+of Marshal Suwarrow, however, finally enabled
+the French general to accomplish his
+junction with the remains of the army from
+Naples. Moreau then concentrated his whole
+force upon the Appenines, and placed himself
+in a situation to defend the important
+positions of Liguria, until the chances of
+war should afford him an opportunity of resuming
+the offensive.</p>
+
+<p>When, after a decisive battle, an army has
+lost its artillery and equipments, and is consequently
+no longer in a state to assume the
+offensive, or even to arrest the pursuit of
+the enemy, it would seem most desirable to
+divide what remains into several corps, and
+order them to march by separate and distant
+routes upon the base of operation, and
+throw themselves into the fortresses. This
+is the only means of safety: for the enemy,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_47">47</a></span>
+uncertain as to the precise direction taken
+by the vanquished army, is ignorant in the
+first instance which corps to pursue, and it
+is in this moment of indecision that a march
+is gained upon him. Besides, the movements
+of a small body being so much easier
+than those of a larger one, these separate
+lines of march are all in favor of a retreating
+army.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XIV"></a>MAXIM XIV.</h2>
+
+<p>Among mountains, a great number of
+positions are always to be found very
+strong in themselves, and which it is dangerous
+to attack. The character of this
+mode of warfare consists in occupying
+camps on the flanks or in the rear of the
+enemy, leaving him only the alternative
+of abandoning his position without fighting,
+to take up another in the rear, or to
+descend from it in order to attack you.
+In mountain warfare, the assailant has
+always the disadvantage; even in offensive
+warfare in the open field, the great<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_48">48</a></span>
+secret consists in defensive combats, and
+in obliging the enemy to attack.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>During the campaign of 1793, in the Maritime
+Alps, the French army, under the orders
+of General Brunet, did all in its power
+to get possession of the camps at Raus and
+at Fourches, by an attack in front. But
+these useless efforts served only to increase
+the courage of the Piedmontese, and to destroy
+the <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">élite</i> of the grenadiers of the republican
+army. The manœuvres by which Napoleon,
+without fighting, compelled the enemy
+to evacuate these positions in 1796, suffice to
+establish the truth of these principles, and
+to prove how much success in war depends
+upon the genius of the general as well as on
+the courage of the soldier.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XV"></a>MAXIM XV.</h2>
+
+<p>The first consideration with a general
+who offers battle, should be the glory and
+honor of his arms; the safety and preservation
+of his men is only the second; but<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_49">49</a></span>
+it is in the enterprise and courage resulting
+from the former, that the latter will
+most assuredly be found. In a retreat,
+besides the honor of the army, the loss of
+life is often greater than in two battles.
+For this reason, we should never despair
+while brave men are to be found with
+their colors. It is by this means that we
+obtain victory, and deserve to obtain it.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>In 1645, the French army, under the orders
+of the Prince of Condé, was on the
+march to lay siege to Nordlingen, when it
+was discovered that Count Merci, who commanded
+the Bavarians, had foreseen this
+intention, and had entrenched himself in a
+strong position which defended Nordlingen
+at the same time that it covered Donawerth.</p>
+
+<p>Notwithstanding the favorable position of
+the enemy, Condé ordered the attack. The
+combat was terrible. All the infantry in
+the centre and on the right, after being
+successively engaged, was routed and dispersed,
+in spite of the efforts of the cavalry
+and the reserve, which were likewise carried
+away with the fugitives. The battle was<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_50">50</a></span>
+lost. Condé, in despair, having no longer
+either centre or right to depend upon, collected
+the remnants of his battalions, and
+directed his march to the left, where Turenne
+was still engaged. This perseverance reanimated
+the ardor of the troops. They
+broke the right wing of the enemy, and
+Turenne, by a change of front, returned to
+the attack upon his centre. Night, too,
+favored the boldness of Condé. An entire
+corps of Bavarians, fancying themselves cut
+off, laid down their arms; and the obstinacy
+of the French general in this struggle for
+victory was repaid by possession of the field
+of battle, together with a great number of
+prisoners, and almost all the enemy’s artillery.
+The Bavarian army beat a retreat,
+and the next day Nordlingen capitulated.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XVI"></a>MAXIM XVI.</h2>
+
+<p>It is an approved maxim in war, never
+to do what the enemy wishes you to do,
+for this reason alone, that he desires it.
+A field of battle, therefore, which he
+has previously studied and reconnoitred,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_51">51</a></span>
+should be avoided, and double care should
+be taken where he has had time to fortify
+and entrench. One consequence deducible
+from this principle is, never to attack
+a position in front which you can gain by
+turning.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>It was without due regard to this principle,
+that Marshal Villeroi, on assuming the
+command of the army of Italy, during the
+campaign of 1701, attacked, with unwarrantable
+presumption, Prince Eugene, of
+Savoy, in his entrenched position of Chiavi,
+on the Oglio. The French generals, Catinat
+among the rest, considered the post unassailable,
+but Villeroi insisted, and the result
+of this otherwise unimportant battle was
+the loss of the <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">élite</i> of the French army. It
+would have been greater still, but for Catinat’s
+exertions.</p>
+
+<p>It was by neglecting the same principle,
+that the Prince of Condé, in the campaign
+of 1644, failed in all his attacks upon the
+entrenched position of the Bavarian army.
+The Count Merci, who commanded the latter,
+had drawn up his cavalry skilfully upon the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_52">52</a></span>
+plain, resting upon Freyberg, while his infantry
+occupied the mountain. After many
+fruitless attempts, the Prince of Condé,
+seeing the impossibility of dislodging the
+enemy, began to menace his communications&mdash;but
+the moment Merci perceived this,
+he broke up his camp and retired beyond
+the Black mountains.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XVII"></a>MAXIM XVII.</h2>
+
+<p>In a war of march and manœuvre, if
+you would avoid a battle with a superior
+army, it is necessary to entrench every
+night, and occupy a good defensive position.
+Those natural positions which are
+ordinarily met with, are not sufficient to
+protect an army against superior numbers
+without recourse to art.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>The campaign of the French and Spanish
+army, commanded by the Duke of Berwick,
+against the Portuguese, in the year 1706,
+affords a good lesson on this subject. The
+two armies made almost the tour of Spain.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_53">53</a></span>
+They began the campaign near Badajoz, and
+after manœuvring across both Castiles, finished
+it in the kingdoms of Valencia and
+Murcia. The Duke of Berwick encamped
+his army eighty-five times, and although the
+campaign passed without a general action,
+he took about ten thousand prisoners from
+the enemy. Marshal Turenne also made a
+fine campaign of manœuvre against the
+Count Montécuculli, in 1675.</p>
+
+<p>The imperial army having made its arrangements
+to pass the Rhine at Strasburg,
+Turenne used all diligence, and, throwing a
+bridge over the river near the village of
+Ottenheim, three leagues below Strasburg,
+he crossed with the French army, and encamped
+close to the little town of Vilstet,
+which he occupied. This position covered
+the bridge of Strasburg, so that, by this
+manœuvre, Turenne deprived the enemy of
+all approach to that city.</p>
+
+<p>Upon this, Montécuculli made a movement
+with his whole army, threatening the bridge
+at Ottenheim, by which the French received
+their provisions from upper Alsace.</p>
+
+<p>As soon as Turenne discovered the design
+of the enemy, he left a detachment at Vilstet,
+and made a rapid march with his whole<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_54">54</a></span>
+force upon the village of Altenheim. This
+intermediate position between the two
+bridges, which he wished to preserve, gave
+him the advantage of being able to succor
+either of these posts before the enemy had
+time to carry them. Montécuculli seeing
+that any successful attack upon the bridges
+was not to be expected, resolved to pass
+the Rhine below Strasburg, and with this
+view returned to his first position at Offenburg.
+Marshal Turenne, who followed all
+the movements of the Austrian army, brought
+back his army also to Vilstet.</p>
+
+<p>In the meantime, this attempt of the
+enemy having convinced the French general
+of the danger to which his bridge had exposed
+him, removed it nearer to that of
+Strasburg, in order to diminish the extent
+of ground he had to defend.</p>
+
+<p>Montécuculli, having commanded the magistrates
+of Strasburg to collect materials
+for a bridge, moved to Scherzheim to receive
+them; but Turenne again defeated his projects
+by taking a position at Freistett, where
+he occupied the islands of the Rhine, and
+immediately constructed a stockade.</p>
+
+<p>Thus it was that, during the whole of
+this campaign, Turenne succeeded in gaining<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_55">55</a></span>
+the initiative of the enemy, and obliging
+him to follow his movements. He succeeded,
+also, by a rapid march, in cutting off Montécuculli
+from the Town of Offenburg, whence
+he drew his supplies, and would no doubt
+have prevented the Austrian general from
+effecting his junction with the corps of Caprara,
+had not a cannon-shot terminated this
+great man’s life.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XVIII"></a>MAXIM XVIII.</h2>
+
+<p>A general of ordinary talent occupying
+a bad position, and surprised by a superior
+force, seeks his safety in retreat; but
+a great captain supplies all deficiencies
+by his courage, and marches boldly to
+meet the attack. By this means he disconcerts
+his adversary; and if the latter
+shows any irresolution in his movements,
+a skilful leader, profiting by his indecision,
+may even hope for victory, or at least
+employ the day in manœuvring&mdash;at night
+he entrenches himself, or falls back to a
+better position. By this determined conduct<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_56">56</a></span>
+he maintains the honor of his arms,
+the first essential to all military superiority.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>In 1653, Marshal Turenne was surprised
+by the Prince of Condé, in a position where
+his army was completely compromised. He
+had the power, indeed, by an immediate
+retreat, of covering himself by the Somme,
+which he possessed the means of crossing at
+Peronne, and whence he was distant only
+half a league; but, fearing the influence of
+this retrograde movement on the <em>morale</em> of
+his army, Turenne balanced all disadvantages
+by his courage, and marched boldly to
+meet the enemy with very inferior forces.
+After marching a league, he found an advantageous
+position, where he made every disposition
+for a battle. It was three o’clock
+in the afternoon; but the Spaniards, exhausted
+with fatigue, hesitated to attack
+him, and Turenne having covered himself
+with entrenchments during the night, the
+enemy no longer dared to risk a general
+action, and broke up his camp.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_57">57</a></span></p>
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XIX"></a>MAXIM XIX.</h2>
+
+<p>The transition from the defensive to
+the offensive is one of the most delicate
+operations.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>By studying the first campaign of Napoleon
+in Italy, we can learn what genius and
+boldness may effect in passing with an army
+from the <em>defensive</em> to the <em>offensive</em>. The army
+of the allies, commanded by General Beaulieu,
+was provided with every means that
+could render it formidable. Its force amounted
+to eighty thousand men, and two hundred
+pieces of cannon. The French army,
+on the contrary, could number scarcely thirty
+thousand men under arms, and thirty pieces
+of cannon. For some time there had been
+no issue of meat, and even the bread was
+irregularly supplied. The infantry was ill
+clothed, the cavalry wretchedly mounted.
+All the draught-horses had perished from
+want, so that the service of the artillery was
+performed by mules. To remedy these evils,
+large disbursements were necessary; and
+such was the state of the finances, that the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_58">58</a></span>
+government had only been able to furnish
+two thousand louis in specie for the opening
+of the campaign. The French army could
+not possibly exist in this state. To advance
+or retreat was absolutely necessary. Aware
+of the advantage of surprising the enemy at
+the very outset of the campaign by some
+decisive blow, Napoleon prepared for it by
+recasting the <em>morale</em> of his army.</p>
+
+<p>In a proclamation full of energy, he reminded
+them that an ignoble death alone
+remained for them, if they continued on the
+defensive; that they had nothing to expect
+from France, but everything to hope from
+victory. “Abundance courts you in the fertile
+plains of Italy,” said he; “are you deficient,
+soldiers, in constancy or in courage?”
+Profiting by the moment of enthusiasm
+which he had inspired, Napoleon concentrated
+his forces in order to fall with his
+whole weight on the different corps of the
+enemy. Immediately afterward, the battles
+of Montenotte, Milesimo, and Mondovi, added
+fresh confidence to the high opinion
+already entertained by the soldier for his
+chief; and that army which only a few days
+ago was encamped amid barren rocks, and
+consumed by famine, already aspired to the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_59">59</a></span>
+conquest of Italy. In one month after the
+opening of the campaign, Napoleon had terminated
+the war with the King of Sardinia,
+and conquered the Milanese. Rich cantonments
+soon dispelled from the recollection of
+the French soldier the misery and fatigue
+attendant on this rapid march, while a vigilant
+administration of the resources of the
+country reorganized the <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">materiel</i> of the
+French army, and created the means necessary
+for the attainment of future success.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XX"></a>MAXIM XX.</h2>
+
+<p>It may be laid down as a principle,
+that the line of operation should not be
+abandoned; but it is one of the most
+skilful manœuvres in war, to know how
+to change it, when circumstances authorize
+or render this necessary. An army
+which changes skilfully its line of operation
+deceives the enemy, who becomes
+ignorant where to look for its rear, or
+upon what weak points it is assailable.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_60">60</a></span></p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>Frederick sometimes changed his line of
+operation in the middle of a campaign; but
+he was enabled to do this, because he was
+manœuvring at that time in the centre of
+Germany&mdash;an abundant country, capable of
+supplying all the wants of his army in case
+his communications with Prussia were intercepted.</p>
+
+<p>Marshal Turenne, in the campaign of
+1746, gave up his line of communication to
+the allies in the same manner; but, like
+Frederick, he was carrying on the war at
+this time in the centre of Germany, and
+having fallen with his whole forces upon
+Rain, he took the precaution of securing
+to himself a depôt upon which to establish
+his base of operation.</p>
+
+<p>By a series of manœuvres, marked alike
+by audacity and genius, he subsequently
+compelled the imperial army to abandon
+its magazines, and retire into Austria for
+winter quarters.</p>
+
+<p>But these are examples which it appears to
+me should only be imitated when we have
+taken full measure of the capacity of our
+adversary, and above all, when we see no<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_61">61</a></span>
+reason to apprehend an insurrection in the
+country to which we transfer the theatre
+of war.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XXI"></a>MAXIM XXI.</h2>
+
+<p>When an army carries with it a battering
+train, or large convoys of sick and
+wounded, it cannot march by too short
+a line upon its depôts.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>It is above all in mountainous countries,
+and in those interspersed with woods and
+marshes, that it is of importance to observe
+this maxim; for, the convoys and means of
+transport being frequently embarrassed in
+defiles, an enemy by manœuvring may easily
+disperse the escorts, or make even a successful
+attack upon the whole army, when it is
+obliged, from the nature of the country, to
+march in an extended column.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XXII"></a>MAXIM XXII.</h2>
+
+<p>The art of encamping in position is the
+same as taking up the line in order of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_62">62</a></span>
+battle in this position. To this end, the
+artillery should be advantageously placed,
+ground should be selected which is not
+commanded or liable to be turned, and,
+as far as possible, the guns should cover
+and command the surrounding country.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>Frederick has remarked that, in order to
+be assured that your camp is well placed,
+you should see if, by making a small movement,
+you can oblige the enemy to make a
+greater; or, if after having forced him to
+retrograde one march you can compel him to
+fall back another.</p>
+
+<p>In defensive war, all camps should be entrenched
+in the front and wings of the position
+they occupy, and care should be taken
+that the rear is left perfectly open. If you
+are threatened with being turned, arrangements
+should be made beforehand for taking
+up a more distant position; and you should
+profit by any disorder in the enemy’s line of
+march, to make an attempt upon his artillery
+or baggage.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_63">63</a></span></p>
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XXIII"></a>MAXIM XXIII.</h2>
+
+<p>When you are occupying a position
+which the enemy threatens to surround,
+collect all your force immediately, and
+menace <em>him</em> with an offensive movement.
+By this manœuvre, you will prevent him
+from detaching and annoying your flanks
+in case you should judge it necessary to
+retire.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>This was the manœuvre practised by General
+Desaix, in 1798, near Radstadt. He made
+up for inferiority in numbers by audacity,
+and maintained himself the whole day in
+position in spite of the vigorous attacks of
+the Archduke Charles. At night he effected
+his retreat in good order, and took up a position
+in the rear.</p>
+
+<p>It was in accordance, also, with this principle,
+in the same campaign, that General
+Moreau gave battle at Biberach, to secure
+his retreat by the passes of the Black mountains.
+A few days after, he fought at Schliengen
+with the same object. Placed in a
+good defensive position, he menaced the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_64">64</a></span>
+Archduke Charles by a sudden return to the
+offensive, while his artillery and baggage
+were passing the Rhine by the bridge of
+Huningen, and he was making all the necessary
+arrangements for retiring behind that
+river himself.</p>
+
+<p>Here, however, I would observe, that the
+execution of such offensive demonstrations
+should be deferred always till toward the
+evening, in order that you may not be compromised
+by engaging too early in a combat
+which you cannot long maintain with success.</p>
+
+<p>Night, and the uncertainty of the enemy
+after an affair of this kind, will always favor
+your retreat, if it is judged necessary; but,
+with a view to mask the operation more
+effectually, fires should be lighted all along
+the lines, to deceive the enemy and prevent
+him from discovering this retrograde movement,
+for in a retreat it is a great advantage
+to gain a march upon your adversary.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XXIV"></a>MAXIM XXIV.</h2>
+
+<p>Never lose sight of this maxim: that
+you should establish your cantonments at<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_65">65</a></span>
+the most distant and best-protected point
+from the enemy, especially where a surprise
+is possible. By this means you will
+have time to unite all your forces before
+he can attack you.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>In the campaign of 1745, Marshal Turenne
+lost the battle of Marienthal, by neglecting
+this principle; for if, instead of
+reassembling his divisions at Erbsthausen,
+he had rallied his troops at Mergentheim,
+behind the Tauber, his army would have
+been much sooner reunited; and Count Merci,
+in place of finding only three thousand
+men to fight at Erbsthausen (of which he
+was well informed), would have had the
+whole French army to attack in a position
+covered by a river.</p>
+
+<p>Some one having indiscreetly asked Viscount
+Turenne how he had lost the battle of
+Marienthal: “By my own fault,” replied the
+marshal; “but,” added he, “when a man has
+committed no faults in war, he can only
+have been engaged in it but a short time.”</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_66">66</a></span></p>
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XXV"></a>MAXIM XXV.</h2>
+
+<p>When two armies are in order of battle,
+and one has to retire over a bridge,
+while the other has the circumference of
+the circle open, all the advantages are in
+favor of the latter. It is then a general
+should show boldness, strike a decided
+blow, and manœuvre upon the flank of
+his enemy. The victory is in his hands.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>This was the position of the French army
+at the famous battle of Leipzig, which terminated
+the campaign of 1813 so fatally for
+Napoleon; for the battle of Hanau was of
+no consequence, comparatively, in the desperate
+situation of that army.</p>
+
+<p>It strikes me that, in a situation like that
+of the French army previous to the battle
+of Leipzig, a general should never calculate
+upon any of those lucky chances which may
+arise out of a return to the offensive, but
+that he should rather adopt every possible
+means to secure his retreat. With this view,
+he should immediately cover himself with
+good entrenchments, to enable him to repel<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_67">67</a></span>
+with inferior numbers the attack of the enemy,
+while his own equipments are crossing
+the river. As fast as the troops reach the
+other side, they should occupy positions to
+protect the passage of the rear guard, and
+this last should be covered by a <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">tête de pont</i>
+as soon as the army breaks up its camp.
+During the wars of the Revolution, too little
+regard was paid to entrenchments; and it is
+for this reason we have seen large armies
+dispersed after a single reverse, and the fate
+of nations compromised by the issue of one
+battle.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XXVI"></a>MAXIM XXVI.</h2>
+
+<p>It is contrary to all true principle, to
+make corps, which have no communication
+with each other, act separately against
+a central force whose communications are
+cut off.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>The Austrians lost the battle of Hohenlinden
+by neglecting this principle. The
+imperial army, under the orders of the archduke
+John, was divided into four columns,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_68">68</a></span>
+which had to march through an immense
+forest, previous to their junction in the plain
+of Anzing, where they intended to surprise
+the French. But these different corps, having
+no direct communication, found themselves
+compelled to engage separately with
+an enemy who had taken the precaution of
+concentrating his masses, and who could
+move them with facility in a country with
+which he had been long previously acquainted.</p>
+
+<p>Thus the Austrian army, enclosed in the
+defiles of the forest with its whole train of
+artillery and baggage, was attacked in its
+flanks and rear, and the archduke John was
+only enabled to rally his dispersed and shattered
+divisions under cover of the night.</p>
+
+<p>The trophies obtained by the French army
+on this day were immense. They consisted
+of eleven thousand prisoners, one hundred
+pieces of cannon, several stand of colors, and
+all the baggage of the enemy.</p>
+
+<p>The battle of Hohenlinden decided the fate
+of the campaign of 1800, and Moreau’s brilliant
+and well-merited success placed him in
+the rank of the first general of the age.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_69">69</a></span></p>
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XXVII"></a>MAXIM XXVII.</h2>
+
+<p>When an army is driven from a first
+position, the retreating columns should
+rally always sufficiently in the rear, to
+prevent any interruption from the enemy.
+The greatest disaster that can happen, is
+when the columns are attacked in detail,
+and before their junction.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>One great advantage which results from
+rallying your columns on a point far removed
+from the field of battle, or from the position
+previously occupied, is, that the enemy is
+uncertain as to the direction you mean to
+take.</p>
+
+<p>If he divides his force to pursue you, he
+exposes himself to see his detachments beaten
+in detail, especially if you have exerted all
+due diligence, and have effected the junction
+of your troops in sufficient time to get between
+his columns and disperse them one
+after the other.</p>
+
+<p>It was by a manœuvre of this kind in the
+campaign of Italy, in 1799, that General
+Melas gained the battle of Genola.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_70">70</a></span></p>
+
+<p>General Championet commanded the
+French army, and endeavored to cut off the
+communication of the Austrians with Turin,
+by employing corps which manœuvred separately
+to get into their rear. Melas, who
+divined his project, made a retrograde march,
+by which he persuaded his adversary he was
+in full retreat, although the real object of his
+movement was to concentrate his forces at
+the point fixed for the junction of the different
+detachments of the French army, and
+which he beat and dispersed, one after
+another, by his great superiority in numbers.
+The result of this manœuvre, in which the
+Austrian general displayed vigor, decision,
+and foresight, secured to him the peaceable
+possession of Piedmont.</p>
+
+<p>It was also by the neglect of this principle
+that General Beaulieu, who commanded the
+Austro-Sardinian army in the campaign of
+1796, lost the battle of Milesimo after that
+of Montenotte.</p>
+
+<p>His object, in endeavoring to rally his
+different corps upon Milesimo, was, to cover
+the high roads of Turin and Milan; but
+Napoleon, aware of the advantages arising
+from the ardor of troops emboldened by
+recent success, attacked him before he could<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_71">71</a></span>
+assemble his divisions, and, by a series of
+skilful manœuvres, succeeded in separating
+the combined armies. They retired in the
+greatest disorder&mdash;the one by the road of
+Milan, the other by that of Turin.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XXVIII"></a>MAXIM XXVIII.</h2>
+
+<p>No force should be detached on the eve
+of a battle, because affairs may change
+during the night, either by the retreat of
+the enemy, or by the arrival of large reinforcements
+to enable him to resume the
+offensive, and counteract your previous
+arrangements.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>In 1796, the army of the Sambre and
+Meuse, commanded by General Jourdan,
+effected a retreat, which was rendered still
+more difficult by the loss of his line of communication.
+Seeing, however, that the forces
+of the archduke Charles were scattered,
+Jourdan, in order to accomplish his retreat
+upon Frankfort, resolved to open himself a
+way by Wurtzburg, where there were at that<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_72">72</a></span>
+moment only two divisions of the Austrian
+army. This movement would have been attended
+with success, if the French general,
+believing he had simply these two divisions
+to contend with, had not committed the error
+of separating himself from the corps of Lefevre&mdash;which
+he left at Schweinfurt to cover
+the only direct communication of the army
+with its base of operation.</p>
+
+<p>The commission of this fault at the outset,
+added to some slowness in the march of the
+French general, secured the victory to the
+archduke, who hastened to concentrate his
+forces.</p>
+
+<p>The arrival of the two divisions, also, of
+Kray and Wartesleben, during the battle,
+enabled him to oppose fifty thousand men to
+the French army, which scarcely numbered
+thirty thousand combatants. This last was
+consequently beaten, and obliged to continue
+its retreat by the mountains of Fuldes, where
+the badness of the roads could be equalled
+only by the difficulty of the country.</p>
+
+<p>The division of Lefevre, amounting to fourteen
+thousand men, would, in all probability,
+have turned the scale in favor of Jourdan,
+had the latter not unfortunately conceived
+that two divisions only were opposing his
+passage to Wurtzburg.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_73">73</a></span></p>
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XXIX"></a>MAXIM XXIX.</h2>
+
+<p>When you have resolved to fight a
+battle, collect your whole force. Dispense
+with nothing. A single battalion
+sometimes decides the day.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>I think it here desirable to observe, that it
+is prudent before a battle to fix upon some
+point in rear of the reserve for the junction
+of the different detachments; for if, from
+unforeseen circumstances, these detachments
+should be prevented from joining before the
+action has commenced, they might be exposed,
+in case a retrograde movement should
+be found necessary, to the masses of the
+enemy. It is desirable also to keep the
+enemy in ignorance of these reinforcements,
+in order to employ them with greater effect.
+“A seasonable reinforcement,” says Frederick,
+“renders the success of a battle certain,
+because the enemy will always imagine
+it stronger than it really is, and lose courage
+accordingly.”</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_74">74</a></span></p>
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XXX"></a>MAXIM XXX.</h2>
+
+<p>Nothing is so rash or so contrary to
+principle, as to make a flank march before
+an army in position, especially when
+this army occupies heights at the foot
+of which you are forced to defile.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>It was by a neglect of this principle that
+Frederick was beaten at Kollin in the first
+campaign of 1757. Notwithstanding prodigies
+of valor, the Prussians lost fifteen
+thousand men and a great portion of their
+artillery, while the loss of the Austrians did
+not exceed five thousand men. The consequence
+of this battle was more unfortunate
+still, since it obliged the King of Prussia to
+raise the siege of Prague, and to evacuate
+Bohemia.</p>
+
+<p>It was also by making a flank march
+before the Prussian army, that the French
+lost the disgraceful battle of Rosbach.</p>
+
+<p>This imprudent movement was still more
+to be reprehended, because the Prince de
+Soubise, who commanded the French army,
+was so negligent as to manœuvre, without<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_75">75</a></span>
+either advanced guards or flanking corps, in
+presence of the enemy. The result was,
+that his army, consisting of fifty thousand
+men, was beaten by six battalions and thirty
+squadrons. The French lost seven thousand
+men, twenty-seven standards, and a great
+number of cannon. The Prussians had only
+three hundred men disabled.</p>
+
+<p>Thus, by having forgotten this principle,
+<em>that a flank march is never to be made before
+an enemy in line of battle</em>, Frederick lost his
+army at Kollin; and Soubise, at Rosbach,
+lost both his army and his honor.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XXXI"></a>MAXIM XXXI.</h2>
+
+<p>When you determine to risk a battle,
+reserve to yourself every possible chance
+of success, more particularly if you have
+to deal with an adversary of superior
+talent; for if you are beaten, even in the
+midst of your magazines and your communications,
+wo to the vanquished!</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>“We should make war,” says Marshal
+Saxe, “without leaving anything to hazard,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_76">76</a></span>
+and in this especially consists the talent of a
+general. But when we have incurred the
+risk of a battle, we should know how to
+profit by the victory, and not merely content
+ourselves, according to custom, with
+possession of the field.”</p>
+
+<p>It was by neglecting to follow up the first
+success, that the Austrian army, after gaining
+the field of Marengo, saw itself compelled
+on the following day to evacuate the whole
+of Italy.</p>
+
+<p>General Melas, observing the French in
+retreat, left the direction of the movements
+of his army to the chief of his staff, and
+retired to Alexandria to repose from the
+fatigues of the day. Colonel Zach, equally
+convinced with his general that the French
+army was completely broken, and consisted
+only of fugitives, formed the divisions in
+column of route.</p>
+
+<p>By this arrangement, the imperial army
+prepared to enter upon its victorious march
+in a formation not less than three miles in
+depth.</p>
+
+<p>It was near four o’clock when General
+Desaix rejoined the French army with his
+division. His presence restored in some
+degree an equality between the contending<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_77">77</a></span>
+forces; and yet Napoleon hesitated for a
+moment whether to resume the offensive,
+or to make use of this corps to secure his
+retreat. The ardor of the troops to return
+to the charge, decided his irresolution. He
+rode rapidly along the front of his divisions,
+and addressing the soldiers&mdash;“We have retired
+far enough for to-day,” said he; “you
+know I always sleep upon the field of
+battle!”</p>
+
+<p>The army, with unanimous shout, proclaimed
+to him a promise of victory. Napoleon
+resumed the offensive. The Austrian
+advance guard, panic-struck at the sight of
+a formidable and unbroken body presenting
+itself suddenly at a point where, a few moments
+before, only fugitives were to be seen,
+went to the right about, and carried disorder
+into the mass of its columns. Attacked immediately
+afterward, with impetuosity, in its
+front and flanks, the Austrian army was
+completely routed.</p>
+
+<p>Marshal Daun experienced nearly the
+same fate as General Melas, at the battle
+of Torgau, in the campaign of 1760.</p>
+
+<p>The position of the Austrian army was
+excellent. It had its left upon Torgau, its
+right on the plateau of Siptitz, and its front
+covered by a large sheet of water.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_78">78</a></span></p>
+
+<p>Frederick proposed to turn its right in
+order to make an attack upon the rear. For
+this purpose he divided his army into two
+corps, the one under the orders of Ziethen,
+with instructions to attack in front, following
+the edge of the water; the other under
+his own immediate command, with which he
+set out to turn the right of the Austrians.
+But Marshal Daun having had intimation of
+the movements of the enemy, changed his
+front by countermarching, and was thus
+enabled to repel the attacks of Frederick,
+whom he obliged to retreat. The two corps
+of the Prussian army had been acting without
+communication. Ziethen, in the meantime,
+hearing the fire recede, concluded that
+the king had been beaten, and commenced a
+movement by his left in order to rejoin him;
+but falling in with two battalions of the
+reserve, the Prussian general profited by this
+reinforcement to resume the offensive. Accordingly
+he renewed the attack with vigor,
+got possession of the plateau of Siptitz, and
+soon after of the whole field of battle. The
+sun had already set when the King of Prussia
+received the news of this unexpected
+good fortune. He returned in all haste, took
+advantage of the night to restore order in<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_79">79</a></span>
+his disorganized army, and the day after the
+battle occupied Torgau.</p>
+
+<p>Marshal Daun was receiving congratulations
+upon his victory, when he heard that
+the Prussians had resumed the offensive.
+He immediately commanded a retreat, and
+at daybreak the Austrians repassed the Elbe
+with the loss of twelve thousand men, eight
+thousand prisoners, and forty-five pieces of
+cannon.</p>
+
+<p>After the battle of Marengo, General Melas,
+although in the midst of his fortresses
+and magazines, saw himself compelled to
+abandon everything, in order to save the
+wreck of his army.</p>
+
+<p>General Mack capitulated after the battle
+of Ulm, although in the centre of his own
+country.</p>
+
+<p>The Prussians, in spite of their depôts
+and reserves, were obliged, after the battle
+of Jena, and the French after that of Waterloo,
+to lay down their arms.</p>
+
+<p>Hence, we may conclude that the misfortune
+that results from the loss of a battle,
+does not consist so much in the destruction
+of men and of <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">materiel</i> as in the discouragement
+which follows this disaster. The courage
+and confidence of the victors augment<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_80">80</a></span>
+in proportion as those of the vanquished
+diminish; and whatever may be the resources
+of an army, it will be found that a retreat
+will degenerate rapidly into a rout unless
+the general-in-chief shall succeed, by combining
+boldness with skill, and perseverance
+with firmness, in restoring the <em>morale</em> of his
+army.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XXXII"></a>MAXIM XXXII.</h2>
+
+<p>The duty of an advanced guard does
+not consist in advancing or retiring, but
+in manœuvring. An advanced guard
+should be composed of light cavalry, supported
+by a reserve of heavy cavalry, and
+by battalions of infantry, supported also
+by artillery. An advanced guard should
+consist of picked troops, and the general
+officers, officers and men, should be selected
+for their respective capabilities and
+knowledge. A corps deficient in instruction
+is only an embarrassment to an advanced
+guard.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>It was the opinion of Frederick that an
+advanced guard should be composed of detachments<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_81">81</a></span>
+of troops of all arms. The commander
+should possess skill in the choice of
+ground, and he should take care to be instantly
+informed, by means of numerous
+patrols, of everything passing in the enemy’s
+camp.</p>
+
+<p>In war, it is not the business of an advanced
+guard to fight, but to observe the
+enemy, in order to cover the movements of
+the army. When in pursuit, the advanced
+guard should charge with vigor, and cut off
+the baggage and insulated corps of the retiring
+enemy. For this purpose, it should be
+reinforced with all the disposable light cavalry
+of the army.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XXXIII"></a>MAXIM XXXIII.</h2>
+
+<p>It is contrary to the usages of war to
+allow parks or batteries of artillery to
+enter a defile, unless you hold the other
+extremity. In case of retreat, the guns
+will embarrass your movements and be
+lost. They should be left in position,
+under a sufficient escort, until you are
+master of the opening.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_82">82</a></span></p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>Nothing encumbers the march of an army
+so much as a quantity of baggage. In the
+campaign of 1796, Napoleon abandoned his
+battering train under the walls of Mantua,
+after spiking the guns and destroying the
+carriages. By this sacrifice, he acquired a
+facility of manœuvring rapidly his little
+army, and obtained the initiative as well as
+a general superiority over the numerous but
+divided forces of Marshal Wurmser.</p>
+
+<p>In 1799, during his retreat in Italy, General
+Moreau being compelled to manœuvre
+among the mountains, preferred separating
+himself entirely from his reserve artillery,
+which he directed upon France by the Col
+de Fenestrelle, rather than embarrass his
+march with this part of his equipment.</p>
+
+<p>These are the examples we should follow;
+for if, by a rapidity of march, and a facility
+of concentration upon decisive points, the
+victory is gained, the <em>materiel</em> of an army is
+soon re-established. But if, on the other
+hand, we are beaten and compelled to retreat,
+it will be difficult to save our equipments,
+and we may have reason to congratulate<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_83">83</a></span>
+ourselves that we abandoned them in time
+to prevent them from augmenting the trophies
+of the enemy.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XXXIV"></a>MAXIM XXXIV.</h2>
+
+<p>It should be laid down as a principle,
+never to leave intervals by which the enemy
+can penetrate between corps formed
+in order of battle, unless it be to draw
+him into a snare.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>In the campaign of 1757, the Prince of
+Lorraine, who was covering Prague with
+the Austrian army, perceived the Prussians
+threatening, by a flank movement, to turn
+his right. He immediately ordered a partial
+change of front by throwing back the infantry
+of that wing, so as to form a right angle
+with the rest of the line. But this manœuvre
+being executed in presence of the enemy,
+was not effected without some disorder.
+The heads of the columns having marched
+too quick, caused the rear to lengthen out,
+and when the line was formed to the right,
+a large interval appeared at the salient angle.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_84">84</a></span>
+Frederick, observing this error, hastened
+to take advantage of it. He directed his
+centre corps, commanded by the Duke of
+Bevern, to throw itself into this opening,
+and by this manœuvre decided the fate of
+the battle.</p>
+
+<p>The Prince of Lorraine returned to Prague,
+beaten and pursued, with the loss of sixteen
+thousand men and two hundred pieces of
+cannon.</p>
+
+<p>It should be observed at the same time,
+that this operation of throwing a corps into
+the intervals made by an army in time of
+battle, should never be attempted unless you
+are at least equal in force, and have an opportunity
+of outflanking the enemy on the
+one side or the other; for it is then only you
+can hope to divide his army in the centre,
+and insulate the wings entirely. If you are
+inferior in number, you run the risk of being
+stopped by the reverses, and overpowered
+by the enemy’s wings, which may deploy
+upon your flanks and surround you.</p>
+
+<p>It was by this manœuvre that the Duke of
+Berwick gained the battle of Almanza, in
+the year 1707, in Spain.</p>
+
+<p>The Anglo-Portuguese army, under the
+command of Lord Galloway, came to invest<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_85">85</a></span>
+Villena. Marshal Berwick, who commanded
+the French and Spanish army, quitted his
+camp at Montalegre, and moved upon this
+town to raise the siege. At his approach,
+the English general, eager to fight a battle,
+advanced to meet him in the plains of Almanza.
+The issue was long doubtful. The
+first line, commanded by the Duke of Popoli,
+having been broken, the Chevalier d’Asfeldt,
+who had charge of the second, drew up his
+masses with large intervals between them;
+and when the English, who were in pursuit
+of the first line, reached these reserves, he
+took advantage of their disorder to attack
+them in flank and defeated them entirely.</p>
+
+<p>Marshal Berwick, perceiving the success
+of this manœuvre, threw open his front, and
+deploying upon the enemy’s flanks, while
+the reserve sustained the attack in front,
+and the cavalry manœuvred in their rear,
+obtained a complete victory.</p>
+
+<p>Lord Galloway, wounded and pursued,
+collected with difficulty the remains of his
+army, and took shelter with them in Tortosa.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_86">86</a></span></p>
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XXXV"></a>MAXIM XXXV.</h2>
+
+<p>Encampments of the same army should
+always be formed so as to protect each
+other.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>At the battle of Dresden, in the campaign
+of 1813, the camp of the allies, although advantageously
+placed upon the heights on
+the left bank of the Elbe, was nevertheless
+extremely defective, from being traversed
+longitudinally by a deep ravine, which separated
+the left wing completely from the centre
+and the right. This vicious arrangement
+did not escape the penetrating eye of Napoleon.
+He instantly directed the whole of
+his cavalry and two corps of infantry against
+the insulated wing, attacked it with superior
+numbers, overthrew it, and took ten thousand
+prisoners, before it was possible to
+come to its support.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XXXVI"></a>MAXIM XXXVI.</h2>
+
+<p>When the enemy’s army is covered by
+a river, upon which he holds several <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">têtes de pont</i>, <span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_87">87</a></span>
+do not attack in front. This
+would divide your force and expose you
+to be turned. Approach the river in
+echelon of columns, in such a manner
+that the leading column shall be the only
+one the enemy can attack, without offering
+you his flank. In the meantime, let
+your light troops occupy the bank, and
+when you have decided on the point of
+passage, rush upon it and fling across
+your bridge. Observe that the point of
+passage should be always at a distance
+from the leading echelon, in order to deceive
+the enemy.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>If you occupy a town or a village on the
+bank of a river, opposite to that held by the
+enemy, it is an advantage to make this spot
+the crossing point, because it is easier to
+cover your carriages and reserve artillery,
+as well as to mask the construction of your
+bridge, in a town, than in the open country.
+It is also a great advantage to pass a river
+opposite a village, when the latter is only
+weakly occupied by the enemy; because as
+soon as the advanced guard reaches the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_88">88</a></span>
+other side, it carries this post, makes a lodgment,
+and by throwing up a few defensive
+works, converts it easily into a <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">tête de pont</i>.
+By this means, the rest of the army is enabled
+to effect the passage with facility.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XXXVII"></a>MAXIM XXXVII.</h2>
+
+<p>From the moment you are master of a
+position which commands the opposite
+bank, facilities are acquired for effecting
+the passage of the river; above all, if this
+position is sufficiently extensive to place
+upon it artillery in force. This advantage
+is diminished, if the river is more than
+three hundred toises (or six hundred
+yards) in breadth, because the distance
+being out of the range of grape, it is easy
+for the troops which defend the passage
+to line the bank and get under cover.
+Hence it follows that if the grenadiers,
+ordered to pass the river for the protection
+of the bridge, should reach the other
+side, they would be destroyed by the
+fire of the enemy; because his batteries,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_89">89</a></span>
+placed at the distance of two hundred
+toises from the landing, are capable of a
+most destructive effect, although removed
+above five hundred toises from the batteries
+of the crossing force. Thus the
+advantage of the artillery would be exclusively
+his. For the same reason, the
+passage is impracticable, unless you succeed
+in surprising the enemy, and are
+protected by an intermediate island, or,
+unless you are able to take advantage of
+an angle in the river, to establish a crossfire
+upon his works. In this case, the
+island or angle forms a natural <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">tête de pont</i>,
+and gives the advantage in artillery to
+the attacking army.</p>
+
+<p>When a river is less than sixty toises
+(or one hundred and twenty yards) in
+breadth, and you have a post upon the
+other side, the troops which are thrown
+across derive such advantages from the
+protection of your artillery, that, however
+small the angle may be, it is impossible
+for the enemy to prevent the establishment
+of a bridge. In this case, the most
+skilful generals, when they have discovered<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_90">90</a></span>
+the project of their adversary, and
+brought their own army to the point of
+crossing, usually content themselves with
+opposing the passage of the bridge, by
+forming a semicircle round its extremity,
+as round the opening of a defile, and removing
+to the distance of three or four
+hundred toises from the fire of the opposite
+side.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>Frederick observes, that “the passage of
+great rivers in the presence of the enemy is
+one of the most delicate operations in war.”
+Success on these occasions depends on secrecy,
+on the rapidity of the manœuvres,
+and the punctual execution of the orders
+given for the movements of each division.
+To pass such an obstacle in presence of an
+enemy, and without his knowledge, it is
+necessary not only that the previous dispositions
+should be well conceived, but that
+they should be executed without confusion.</p>
+
+<p>In the campaign of 1705, Prince Eugene,
+of Savoy, wishing to come to the assistance
+of the Prince of Piedmont, sought for a
+favorable point at which to force the passage<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_91">91</a></span>
+of the Adda, defended at that time by the
+French army, under the command of the
+Duke de Vendome.</p>
+
+<p>After having selected an advantageous
+situation, Prince Eugene erected a battery
+of twenty pieces of cannon on a position
+which commanded the entire of the opposite
+bank, and covered his infantry by a line of
+entrenched parallels constructed on the
+slope of the declivity.</p>
+
+<p>They were working vigorously at the
+bridge, when the Duke de Vendome appeared
+with his whole army. At first he seemed
+determined to oppose its construction, but
+after having examined the position of Prince
+Eugene, he judged this to be impracticable.</p>
+
+<p>He therefore placed his army out of reach
+of the prince’s batteries, resting both his
+wings upon the river, so as to form a bow,
+of which the Adda was the cord. He then
+covered himself with entrenchments and
+abattis, and was thus enabled to charge the
+enemy’s columns whenever they debouched
+from the bridge, and to beat them in detail.</p>
+
+<p>Eugene, having reconnoitred the position
+of the French, considered the passage impossible.
+He therefore withdrew the bridge,
+and broke up his camp during the night.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_92">92</a></span></p>
+
+<p>It was by this manœuvre, also, that, in the
+campaign of 1809, the Archduke Charles
+compelled the French to reoccupy the isle
+of Lobau, after having debouched on the
+left bank of the Danube. The march of the
+Archduke Charles was wholly concentric.
+He menaced Grosaspern with his right, Esling
+with his centre, and Enzersdorf with
+his left.</p>
+
+<p>His army, with both wings resting on the
+Danube, formed a semicircle around Esling.
+Napoleon immediately attacked and broke
+the centre of the Austrians; but after having
+forced their first line, he found himself
+arrested by the reserves. In the meantime,
+the bridges upon the Danube had been destroyed,
+and several of his corps, with their
+parks of artillery, were still on the right
+bank. This disappointment, joined to the
+favorable position of the Austrians, decided
+Napoleon to re-enter the isle of Lobau, where
+he had previously constructed a line of field-works,
+so as to give it all the advantages of
+a well entrenched camp.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_93">93</a></span></p>
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XXXVIII"></a>MAXIM XXXVIII.</h2>
+
+<p>It is difficult to prevent an enemy,
+supplied with pontoons, from crossing
+a river. When the object of an army,
+which defends the passage, is to cover a
+siege, the moment the general has ascertained
+his inability to oppose the passage,
+he should take measures to arrive before
+the enemy, at an intermediate position
+between the river he defends and the
+place he desires to cover.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>Here we may observe, that this intermediate
+position should be reconnoitred, or
+rather, well entrenched beforehand; for the
+enemy will be unable to make an offensive
+movement against the corps employed in
+the siege, until he has beaten the army of
+observation; and the latter, under cover of
+its camp, may always await a favorable
+opportunity to attack him in flank or in
+rear.</p>
+
+<p>Besides, the army which is once entrenched
+in this manner, has the advantage of being<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_94">94</a></span>
+concentrated; while that of the enemy must
+act in detachments, if he wishes to cover his
+bridge, and watch the movements of the
+army of observation, so as to enable him to
+attack the besieging corps in its lines, without
+being exposed to an attempt on his rear,
+or being menaced with the loss of his bridge.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XXXIX"></a>MAXIM XXXIX.</h2>
+
+<p>In the campaign of 1645, Turenne was
+attacked with his army before Philipsburg
+by a very superior force. There was no
+bridge here over the Rhine, but he took
+advantage of the ground between the river
+and the place to establish his camp. This
+should serve as a lesson to engineer officers,
+not merely in the construction of fortresses,
+but of <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">têtes de pont</i>. A space should
+always be left between the fortress and
+the river, where an army may form and
+rally without being obliged to throw itself
+into the place, and thereby compromise
+its security. An army retiring upon Mayence
+before a pursuing enemy, is necessarily
+compromised; for this reason, because<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_95">95</a></span>
+it requires more than a day to pass the
+bridge, and because the lines of Cassel are
+too confined to admit an army to remain
+there without being blocked up. Two
+hundred toises should have been left between
+that place and the Rhine. It is
+essential that all <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">têtes de pont</i> before
+great rivers should be constructed upon
+this principle, otherwise they will prove a
+very inefficient assistance to protect the
+passage of a retreating army. <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">Têtes de
+pont</i>, as laid down in our schools, are of
+use only for small rivers, the passage of
+which is comparatively short.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>Marshal Saxe, in the campaign of 1741,
+having passed the Moldau in quest of a detached
+corps of fourteen thousand men, which
+was about to throw itself into Prague, left a
+thousand infantry upon that river, with orders
+to entrench themselves upon a height
+directly opposite the <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">tête de pont</i>. By this
+precaution, the marshal secured his retreat,
+and also the facility of repassing the bridge
+without disorder, by rallying his divisions
+between the entrenched height and the <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">tête
+de pont</i>.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_96">96</a></span></p>
+
+<p>Were these examples unknown to the generals
+of modern times, or are they disposed
+to think such precautions superfluous?</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XL"></a>MAXIM XL.</h2>
+
+<p>Fortresses are equally useful in offensive
+and defensive warfare. It is true,
+they will not in themselves arrest an
+army, but they are an excellent means of
+retarding, embarrassing, weakening and
+annoying a victorious enemy.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>The brilliant success of the allied armies in
+the campaign of 1814, has given to many
+military men a false idea of the real value of
+fortresses.</p>
+
+<p>The formidable bodies which crossed the
+Rhine and the Alps at this period, were enabled
+to spare large detachments to blockade
+the strong places that covered the frontiers
+of France, without materially affecting the
+numerical superiority of the army which
+marched upon the capital. This army was<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_97">97</a></span>
+in a condition, therefore, to act, without the
+fear of being menaced in its line of retreat.</p>
+
+<p>But at no period of military history were
+the armies of Europe so combined before, or
+governed so entirely by one common mind in
+the attainment of a single object. Under
+these circumstances, the line of fortresses
+which surround France was rendered unavailable
+during the campaign; but it would
+be very imprudent, therefore, to conclude
+that a frontier guarded by numerous fortresses
+may be passed with impunity; or
+that battles may be fought with these places
+in your rear, without previously besieging,
+or at least investing them with sufficient
+forces.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XLI"></a>MAXIM XLI.</h2>
+
+<p>There are only two ways of insuring the
+success of a siege. The first, to begin by
+beating the enemy’s army employed to
+cover the place, forcing it out of the field,
+and throwing its remains beyond some
+great natural obstacle, such as a chain of
+mountains, or large river. Having accomplished<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_98">98</a></span>
+this object, an army of observation
+should be placed behind the natural
+obstacle, until the trenches are finished
+and the place taken.</p>
+
+<p>But if it be desired to take the place in
+presence of a relieving army, without risking
+a battle, then the whole <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">materiel</i> and
+equipment for a siege are necessary to
+begin with, together with ammunition and
+provisions for the presumed period of its
+duration, and also lines of contravallation
+and circumvallation, aided by all the localities
+of heights, woods, marshes and
+inundations.</p>
+
+<p>Having no longer occasion to keep up
+communications with your depôts, it is
+now only requisite to hold in check the
+relieving army. For this purpose, an army
+of observation should be formed, whose
+business it is never to lose sight of that of
+the enemy, and which, while it effectually
+bars all access to the place, has always
+time enough to arrive upon his flanks or
+rear in case he should attempt to steal a
+march.</p>
+
+<p>It is to be remembered, too, that by<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_99">99</a></span>
+profiting judiciously by the lines of contravallation,
+a portion of the besieging
+army will always be available in giving
+battle to the approaching enemy.</p>
+
+<p>Upon the same general principle, when
+a place is to be besieged in presence of an
+enemy’s army, it is necessary to cover the
+siege by lines of <em>circumvallation</em>.</p>
+
+<p>If the besieging force is of numerical
+strength enough (after leaving a corps
+before the place four times the amount
+of the garrison) to cope with the relieving
+army, it may remove more than one
+day’s march from the place; but if it be
+inferior in numbers after providing for
+the siege, as above stated, it should remain
+only a short day’s march from the
+spot, in order to fall back upon its lines,
+if necessary, or receive succor in case of
+attack.</p>
+
+<p>If the investing corps and army of
+observation are only equal when united
+to the relieving force, the besieging army
+should remain entire within, or near its
+lines, and push the works and the siege
+with the greatest activity.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_100">100</a></span></p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>“When we undertake a siege,” says Montécuculli,
+“we should not seek to place ourselves
+opposite the weakest part of the fortress,
+but at the point most favorable for
+establishing a camp and executing the designs
+we have in view.”</p>
+
+<p>This maxim was well understood by the
+Duke of Berwick. Sent to form the siege of
+Nice in 1706, he determined to attack on the
+side of Montalban, contrary to the advice of
+Vauban, and even to the orders of the king.
+Having a very small army at his disposal,
+he began by securing his camp. This he did
+by constructing redoubts upon the heights
+that shut in the space between the Var and
+the Paillon, two rivers which supported his
+flanks. By this means, he protected himself
+against a surprise; for the Duke of Savoy,
+having the power of debouching suddenly
+by the Col de Tende, it was necessary that
+the marshal should be enabled to assemble
+his forces, so as to move rapidly upon his
+adversary, and fight him before he got into
+position; otherwise his inferiority in numbers
+would have obliged him to raise the
+siege.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_101">101</a></span></p>
+
+<p>When Marshal Saxe was besieging Brussels,
+with only twenty-eight thousand men,
+opposed to a garrison of twelve thousand,
+he received intelligence that the Prince of
+Waldeck was assembling his forces to raise
+the siege. Not being strong enough to form
+an army of observation, the marshal reconnoitred
+a field of battle on the little river Voluve,
+and made all the necessary dispositions
+for moving rapidly to the spot, in case of
+the approach of the enemy. By this means
+he was prepared to receive his adversary
+without discontinuing the operations of the
+siege.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XLII"></a>MAXIM XLII.</h2>
+
+<p>Feuquière says that “we should never
+wait for the enemy in the lines of circumvallation,
+but we should go out and attack
+him.” He is in error. There is no authority
+in war without exception; and it
+would be dangerous to proscribe the principle
+of awaiting the enemy within the
+lines of circumvallation.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>During the siege of Mons, in 1691, the
+Prince of Orange assembled his army, and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_102">102</a></span>
+advanced as far as Notre Dame de Halle,
+making a demonstration to succor the place.
+Louis XIV, who commanded the siege in
+person, called a council of war to deliberate
+on what was to be done in case the Prince
+of Orange approached. The opinion of
+Marshal Luxembourg was to remain within
+the lines of circumvallation, and that opinion
+prevailed.</p>
+
+<p>The marshal laid it down as a principle
+that, when the besieging army is not strong
+enough to defend the whole extent of circumvallation,
+it should quit the lines and
+advance to meet the enemy; but when it is
+strong enough to encamp in two lines around
+a place, that it is better to profit by a good
+entrenchment&mdash;more especially as by this
+means the siege is not interrupted.</p>
+
+<p>In 1658, Marshal Turenne was besieging
+Dunkirk. He had already opened the
+trenches, when the Spanish army, under
+the orders of the Prince Don Juan, Condé,
+and D’Hocquincourt, appeared in sight, and
+took post upon the Downs, at a distance of
+a league from his lines. Turenne had the
+superiority in numbers, and he determined
+to quit his entrenchments. He had other
+advantages also. The enemy was without<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_103">103</a></span>
+artillery, and their superiority in cavalry
+was rendered useless by the unfavorable
+nature of the ground. It was, therefore, of
+great importance to beat the Spanish army
+before it had time to entrench itself and
+bring up its artillery. The victory gained
+by the French on this occasion justified all
+the combinations of Marshal Turenne.</p>
+
+<p>When Marshal Berwick was laying siege
+to Philipsburg, in 1733, he had reason to
+apprehend that the Prince of Savoy would
+attack him with all the forces of the empire
+before its termination. The marshal, therefore,
+after having made his disposition of
+the troops intended for the siege, formed,
+with the rest of his army, a corps of observation
+to make head against Prince Eugene,
+in case the latter should choose to attack
+him in his lines, or attempt a diversion on
+the Moselle or Upper Rhine. Prince Eugene,
+having arrived in front of the besieging
+army, some general officers were of
+opinion that it was better not to await the
+enemy in the lines, but to move forward
+and attack him. But Marshal Berwick, who
+agreed with the Duke of Luxembourg, that
+an army which can occupy, completely, good
+entrenchments is not liable to be forced, persisted<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_104">104</a></span>
+in remaining within his works. The
+result proved that this was also the opinion of
+Prince Eugene, for he did not dare to attack
+the entrenchments, which he would not have
+failed to do if he had any hopes of success.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XLIII"></a>MAXIM XLIII.</h2>
+
+<p>Those who proscribe lines of circumvallation,
+and all the assistance which the
+science of the engineer can afford, deprive
+themselves gratuitously of an auxiliary
+which is never injurious, almost always
+useful, and often indispensable. It must
+be admitted, at the same time, that the
+principles of field-fortification require improvement.
+This important branch of
+the art of war has made no progress since
+the time of the ancients. It is even inferior
+at this day to what it was two thousand
+years ago. Engineer officers should
+be encouraged in bringing this branch of
+their art to perfection, and in placing it
+upon a level with the rest.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>“If we are inferior in numbers,” says
+Marshal Saxe, “entrenchments are of no<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_105">105</a></span>
+use, for the enemy will bring all his forces
+to bear upon particular points. If we are
+of equal strength they are unnecessary also.
+If we are superior, we do not want them.
+Then why give ourselves the trouble to entrench?”
+Notwithstanding this opinion of
+the inutility of entrenchments, Marshal Saxe
+often had recourse to them.</p>
+
+<p>In 1797, Generals Provéra and Hohenzollern
+having presented themselves before
+Mantua (where Marshal Wurmser was shut
+up), for the purpose of raising the siege,
+they were stopped by the lines of contravallation
+of St. George. This slight obstacle
+sufficed to afford Napoleon time to arrive
+from Rivoli and defeat their enterprise. It
+was in consequence of neglecting to entrench
+themselves that the French had been
+obliged to raise the siege in the preceding
+campaign.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XLIV"></a>MAXIM XLIV.</h2>
+
+<p>If circumstances prevent a sufficient
+garrison being left to defend a fortified
+town, which contains an hospital and
+magazines, at least every means should<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_106">106</a></span>
+be employed to secure the citadel against
+a <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">coup de main</i>.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>A few battalions dispersed about a town,
+inspire no terror; but shut up in the more
+narrow outline of a citadel, they assume an
+imposing attitude. For this reason it appears
+to me that such a precaution is always
+necessary, not only in fortresses, but
+wherever there are hospitals or depôts of any
+kind. Where there is no citadel, some quarter
+of the town should be fixed upon most
+favorable for defence, and entrenched in such
+a manner as to oppose the greatest resistance
+possible.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XLV"></a>MAXIM XLV.</h2>
+
+<p>A fortified place can only protect the
+garrison and detain the enemy for a certain
+time. When this time has elapsed,
+and the defences of the place are destroyed,
+the garrison should lay down its arms.
+All civilized nations are agreed on this
+point, and there never has been an argument<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_107">107</a></span>
+except with reference to the greater
+or less degree of defence which a governor
+is bound to make before he capitulates.
+At the same time, there are generals&mdash;Villars
+among the number&mdash;who are of
+opinion that a governor should never surrender,
+but that in the last extremity he
+should blow up the fortifications, and take
+advantage of the night to cut his way
+through the besieging army. Where he
+is unable to blow up the fortifications, he
+may always retire, they say, with his garrison,
+and save the men.</p>
+
+<p>Officers who have adopted this line of
+conduct, have often brought off three-fourths
+of their garrison.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>In 1705, the French, who were besieged in
+Haguenau by Count Thungen, found themselves
+incapable of sustaining an assault.
+Péri, the governor, who had already distinguished
+himself by a vigorous defence,
+despairing of being allowed to capitulate on
+any terms short of becoming prisoner of
+war, resolved to abandon the place and cut
+his way through the besiegers.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_108">108</a></span></p>
+
+<p>In order to conceal his intention more
+effectually, and while he deceived the enemy,
+to sound at the same time the disposition of
+his officers, he assembled a council of war
+and declared his resolution to die in the
+breach. Then, under pretext of the extremity
+to which he was reduced, he commanded
+the whole garrison under arms; and
+leaving only a few sharpshooters in the
+breach, gave the order to march, and set out
+in silence, under cover of the night, from
+Haguenau. This audacious enterprise was
+crowned with success, and Péri reached Saverne
+without having suffered the smallest
+loss.</p>
+
+<p>Two fine instances of defence in later times
+are those of Massena at Genoa, and of Palafox
+at Saragossa.</p>
+
+<p>The first marched out with arms and baggage,
+and all the honors of war, after rejecting
+every summons, and defending himself
+until hunger alone compelled him to capitulate.
+The second only yielded after having
+buried his garrison amid the ruins of the
+city, which he defended from house to house,
+until famine and death left him no alternative
+but to surrender. This siege, which
+was equally honorable to the French as to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_109">109</a></span>
+the Spaniards, is one of the most memorable
+in the history of war. In the course of it,
+Palafox displayed every possible resource
+which courage and obstinacy can supply in
+the defence of a fortress.</p>
+
+<p>All real strength is founded in the mind;
+and on this account I am of opinion that we
+should be directed in the choice of a governor,
+less by his genius than his personal
+character. His most essential qualities should
+be courage, perseverance, and soldierlike devotedness.
+Above all, he should possess the
+talent not only of infusing courage into the
+garrison, but of kindling a spirit of resistance
+in the whole population. Where the latter
+is wanting, however art may multiply the
+defences of a place, the garrison will be compelled
+to capitulate after having sustained
+the first, or at most, the second assault.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XLVI"></a>MAXIM XLVI.</h2>
+
+<p>The keys of a fortress are well worth
+the retirement of the garrison, when it is
+resolved to yield only on those conditions.
+On this principle it is always wiser to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_110">110</a></span>
+grant an honorable capitulation to a garrison
+which has made a vigorous resistance,
+than to risk an assault.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>Marshal Villars has justly observed, that
+“no governor of a place should be permitted
+to excuse himself for surrendering, on the
+ground of wishing to preserve the king’s
+troops. Every garrison that displays courage
+will escape being prisoners of war. For there
+is no general who, however well assured of
+carrying a place by assault, will not prefer
+granting terms of capitulation rather than
+risk the loss of a thousand men in forcing
+determined troops to surrender.”</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XLVII"></a>MAXIM XLVII.</h2>
+
+<p>Infantry, cavalry, and artillery, are nothing
+without each other; therefore, they
+should always be so disposed in cantonments
+as to assist each other in case of
+surprise.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>“A general,” says Frederick, “should direct
+his whole attention to the tranquility of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_111">111</a></span>
+his cantonments, in order that the soldier
+may be relieved from all anxiety, and repose
+in security from his fatigues. With this
+view, care should be taken that the troops
+are able to form rapidly upon ground which
+has been previously reconnoitered; that the
+generals remain always with their divisions
+or brigades, and that the service is carried
+on throughout with exactness.”</p>
+
+<p>Marshal Saxe is of opinion that an army
+should not be in a hurry to quit its cantonments,
+but that it should wait till the
+enemy has exhausted himself with marching,
+and be ready to fall upon him with
+fresh troops when he is overcome with
+fatigue.</p>
+
+<p>I believe, however, that it would be dangerous
+to trust implicitly to this high authority,
+for there are many occasions where
+all the advantage lies in the initiative, more
+especially when the enemy has been compelled
+to extend his cantonments, from scarcity
+of subsistence, and can be attacked
+before he has time to concentrate his forces.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_112">112</a></span></p>
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XLVIII"></a>MAXIM XLVIII.</h2>
+
+<p>The formation of infantry in line should
+be always in two ranks, because the
+length of the musket only admits of an
+effective fire in this formation. The discharge
+of the third rank is not only uncertain,
+but frequently dangerous to the
+ranks in its front. In drawing up infantry
+in two ranks, there should be a supernumerary
+behind every fourth or fifth
+file. A reserve should likewise be placed
+twenty-five paces in rear of each flank.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>I am of opinion, if circumstances require
+a line of infantry to resort to a square, that
+two-deep is too light a formation to resist
+the shock of cavalry. However useless the
+third rank may appear for the purpose of
+file-firing, it is, notwithstanding necessary,
+in order to replace the men who fall in the
+ranks in front; otherwise you would be
+obliged to close in the files, and by this
+means leave intervals between the companies,
+which the cavalry would not fail to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_113">113</a></span>
+penetrate. It appears to me, also, that when
+infantry is formed in two ranks, the columns
+will be found to open out in marching to a
+flank. If it should be considered advantageous
+behind entrenchments to keep the infantry
+in two ranks, the third rank should
+be placed in reserve, and brought forward
+to relieve the front rank when fatigued, or
+when the fire is observed to slacken. I am
+induced to make these remarks, because I
+have seen an excellent pamphlet which proposes
+the two-deep formation for infantry as
+the best. The author supports his opinion
+by a variety of plausible reasons, but not
+sufficient, as it appears to me, to answer all
+the objections that may be offered to this
+practice.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XLIX"></a>MAXIM XLIX.</h2>
+
+<p>The practice of mixing small bodies of
+infantry and cavalry together is a bad
+one, and attended with many inconveniences.
+The cavalry loses its power of action.
+It becomes fettered in all its movements.
+Its energy is destroyed; even
+the infantry itself is compromised, for on<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_114">114</a></span>
+the first movement of the cavalry it is
+left without support. The best mode of
+protecting cavalry is to cover its flank.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>This also was the opinion of Marshal
+Saxe. “The weakness of the above formation,”
+says he, “is sufficient in itself to intimidate
+the platoons of infantry, because
+they must be lost if the cavalry is beaten.”</p>
+
+<p>The cavalry, also, which depends on the
+infantry for succor, is disconcerted the moment
+a brisk forward movement carries
+them out of sight of their supports. Marshal
+Turenne, and the generals of his time,
+sometimes employed this order of formation;
+but that does not, in my opinion,
+justify a modern author for recommending
+it in an essay, entitled “<cite>Considerations sur
+l’Art de la Guerre</cite>.” In fact, this formation
+has long been abandoned; and, since the introduction
+of light artillery, it appears to
+me almost ridiculous to propose it.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_L"></a>MAXIM L.</h2>
+
+<p>Charges of cavalry are equally useful
+at the beginning, the middle, and the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_115">115</a></span>
+end of a battle. They should be made
+always, if possible, on the flanks of the
+infantry, especially when the latter is engaged
+in front.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>The Archduke Charles, in speaking of cavalry,
+recommends that it should be brought
+in mass upon a decisive point, when the moment
+for employing it arrives; that is to
+say, when it can attack with a certainty of
+success. As the rapidity of its movement
+enables cavalry to act along the whole line
+in the same day, the general who commands
+it should keep it together as much as possible,
+and avoid dividing it into many detachments.
+When the nature of the ground
+admits of cavalry being employed on all
+points of the line, it is desirable to form it
+in column behind the infantry, and in a position
+whence it may be easily directed
+wherever it is required. If cavalry is intended
+to cover a position, it should be
+placed sufficiently in the rear to meet at full
+speed any advance of troops coming to
+attack that position. If it is destined to
+cover the flank of the infantry, it should, for
+the same reason, be placed directly behind<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_116">116</a></span>
+it. As the object of cavalry is purely offensive,
+it should be a rule to form it at such a
+distance only from the point of collision as
+to enable it to acquire its utmost impulse,
+and arrive at the top of its speed into action.
+With respect to the cavalry reserve,
+this should only be employed at the end of
+a battle, either to render the success more
+decisive, or to cover the retreat. Napoleon
+remarks that, at the battle of Waterloo, the
+cavalry of the guard which composed the
+reserve, was engaged against his orders.
+He complains of having been deprived from
+five o’clock of the use of this reserve, which,
+when well employed, had so often insured
+him the victory.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_LI"></a>MAXIM LI.</h2>
+
+<p>It is the business of cavalry to follow
+up the victory, and to prevent the beaten
+enemy from rallying.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>Victor or vanquished, it is of the greatest
+importance to have a body of cavalry in
+reserve, either to take advantage of victory,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_117">117</a></span>
+or to secure a retreat. The most decisive
+battles lose half their value to the conqueror,
+when the want of cavalry prevents him
+from following up his success, and depriving
+the enemy of the power of rallying.</p>
+
+<p>When a retiring army is pursued, it is
+more especially upon the flanks that the
+weight of cavalry should fall, if you are
+strong enough in that arm to cut off his
+retreat.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_LII"></a>MAXIM LII.</h2>
+
+<p>Artillery is more essential to cavalry
+than to infantry, because cavalry has no
+fire for its defence, but depends upon the
+sabre. It is to remedy this deficiency
+that recourse has been had to horse-artillery.
+Cavalry, therefore, should never
+be without cannon, whether when attacking,
+rallying, or in position.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>Horse-artillery is an invention of Frederick.
+Austria lost no time in introducing
+it into her armies, although in an imperfect
+degree. It was only in 1792 that this<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_118">118</a></span>
+arm was adopted in France, where it was
+brought rapidly to its present perfection.</p>
+
+<p>The services of this arm during the wars
+of the Revolution were immense. It may
+be said to have changed to a certain extent
+the character of tactics, because its facility
+of movement enables it to bear with rapidity
+on every point where artillery can be
+employed with success. Napoleon has remarked
+in his memoirs that a flanking battery
+which strikes and rakes the enemy
+obliquely, is capable of deciding a victory
+in itself. To this we may add that, independent
+of the advantages which cavalry
+derives from horse-artillery in securing its
+flanks, and in opening the way for a successful
+charge by the destructiveness of its
+fire, it is desirable that these two arms
+should never be separated, but ready at all
+times to seize upon points where it may
+be necessary to employ cannon. On these
+occasions, the cavalry masks the march of
+the artillery, protects its establishment in
+position, and covers it from the attack of
+the enemy, until it is ready to open its
+fire.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_119">119</a></span></p>
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_LIII"></a>MAXIM LIII.</h2>
+
+<p>In march, or in position, the greater
+part of the artillery should be with the
+divisions of infantry and cavalry. The
+rest should be in reserve. Each gun
+should have with it three hundred rounds,
+without including the limber. This is
+about the complement for two battles.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>The better infantry is, the more important
+it is to support it by artillery, with a view to
+its preservation.</p>
+
+<p>It is essential, also, that the batteries attached
+to divisions should march in the
+front, because this has a strong influence on
+the <em>morale</em> of the soldier. He attacks always
+with confidence when he sees the flanks of
+the column well covered with cannon.</p>
+
+<p>The artillery reserve should be kept for a
+decisive moment, and then employed in full
+force, for it will be difficult for the enemy at
+such a time to presume to attack it.</p>
+
+<p>There is scarcely an instance of a battery
+of sixty pieces of cannon having been carried<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_120">120</a></span>
+by a charge of infantry or cavalry,
+unless where it was entirely without support,
+or in a position to be easily turned.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_LIV"></a>MAXIM LIV.</h2>
+
+<p>Artillery should always be placed in
+the most advantageous positions, and as
+far in front of the line of cavalry and
+infantry as possible, without compromising
+the safety of the guns.</p>
+
+<p>Field batteries should command the
+whole country round from the level of
+the platform. They should on no account
+be masked on the right and left,
+but have free range in every direction.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>The battery of eighteen pieces of cannon,
+which covered the centre of the Russian
+army at the battle of La Moskwa (Borodino),
+may be cited as an example.</p>
+
+<p>Its position, upon a circular height which
+commanded the field in every direction, added
+so powerfully to its effect, that its fire alone
+sufficed, for a considerable time, to paralyze<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_121">121</a></span>
+the vigorous attack made by the French
+with their right. Although twice broken,
+the left of the Russian army closed to this
+battery, as to a pivot, and twice recovered
+its former position. After repeated attacks,
+conducted with a rare intrepidity, the battery
+was at length carried by the French,
+but not till they had lost the <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">élite</i> of their
+army, and with it the Generals Caulincourt
+and Montbrun. Its capture decided the retreat
+of the Russian left.</p>
+
+<p>I might advert likewise to another instance,
+in the campaign of 1809, and to the
+terrible effect produced by the hundred
+pieces of cannon of the Guard which General
+Lauriston directed, at the battle of
+Wagram, against the right of the Austrian
+army.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_LV"></a>MAXIM LV.</h2>
+
+<p>A General should never put his army
+into cantonments, when he has the means
+of collecting supplies of forage and provisions,
+and of thus providing for the
+wants of the soldier in the field.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_122">122</a></span></p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>One great advantage which results from
+having an army in camp is, that it is easier
+to direct its spirit and maintain its discipline
+there. The soldier in cantonments abandons
+himself to repose; he ends by finding a
+pleasure in idleness, and in fearing to return
+to the field. The reverse takes place in a
+camp. There, a feeling of <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">ennui</i>, and a
+severer discipline, make him anxious for the
+opening of the campaign, to interrupt the
+monotony of the service and relieve it with
+the chances and variety of war. Besides, an
+army in camp is much more secure from a
+surprise than in cantonments&mdash;the defect of
+which usually consists in their occupying too
+great an extent of ground. When an army
+is obliged to go into quarters, the Marquis de
+Feuquière recommends a camp to be selected
+in front of the line, where the troops can be
+frequently assembled&mdash;sometimes suddenly,
+in order to exercise their vigilance, or for
+the sole purpose of bringing the different
+corps together.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_123">123</a></span></p>
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_LVI"></a>MAXIM LVI.</h2>
+
+<p>A good general, a well-organized system,
+good instructions, and severe discipline,
+aided by effective establishments,
+will always make good troops, independently
+of the cause for which they fight.</p>
+
+<p>At the same time, a love of country, a
+spirit of enthusiasm, a sense of national
+honor, and fanaticism, will operate upon
+young soldiers with advantage.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>This remark appears to me less applicable
+to officers than to soldiers, for as war is not
+a state of things natural to man, it follows
+that those who maintain its cause must be
+governed by some strong excitement. Much
+enthusiasm and devotedness are required on
+the part of the troops for the general who
+commands, to induce an army to perform
+great actions in a war in which it takes
+no interest. This is sufficiently proved by
+the apathy of auxiliaries, unless when inspired
+by the conduct of their chief.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_124">124</a></span></p>
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_LVII"></a>MAXIM LVII.</h2>
+
+<p>When a nation is without establishments
+and a military system, it is very
+difficult to organize an army.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>This is an unanswerable truth, more particularly
+with reference to an army intended
+to act upon the system of modern war, and
+in which order, precision, and rapidity of
+movement, are the principal essentials to
+success.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_LVIII"></a>MAXIM LVIII.</h2>
+
+<p>The first qualification of a soldier is
+fortitude under fatigue and privation.
+Courage is only the second; hardship,
+poverty and want, are the best school
+for a soldier.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>Valor belongs to the young soldier as
+well as to the veteran; but in the former
+it is more evanescent. It is only by habits<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_125">125</a></span>
+of service, and after several campaigns,
+that the soldier acquires that moral courage
+which makes him support the fatigues and
+privations of war without a murmur. Experience
+by this time has instructed him to
+supply his own wants. He is satisfied with
+what he can procure, because he knows that
+success is only to be obtained by fortitude
+and perseverance. Well might Napoleon
+say that misery and want were the best
+school for a soldier; for as nothing could be
+compared with the total destitution of the
+army of the Alps, when he assumed the
+command, so nothing could equal the brilliant
+success which he obtained with this
+army in the first campaign in Italy. The
+conquerors of Montenotte, Lodi, Castiglione,
+Bassano, Arcole and Rivoli had beheld, only
+a few months before, whole battalions covered
+with rags, and deserting for the want
+of subsistence.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_LIX"></a>MAXIM LIX.</h2>
+
+<p>There are five things the soldier should
+never be without&mdash;his musket, his ammunition,
+his knapsack, his provisions<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_126">126</a></span>
+(for at least four days), and his entrenching-tool.
+The knapsack may be reduced
+to the smallest size possible, if it be
+thought proper, but the soldier should
+always have it with him.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>It is fortunate that Napoleon has recognized
+the advantage of giving to every soldier
+an entrenching-tool. His authority is
+the best answer to the ridicule which has
+been thrown upon those who proposed it.
+An axe will be found to inconvenience the
+foot-soldier as little as the sword he wears
+at his side, and it will be infinitely more
+useful. When axes are given out to companies,
+or are carried by fatigue-men during
+a campaign, they are soon lost; and it
+often happens, when a camp is to be formed,
+that a difficulty arises in cutting wood and
+building huts for the soldier; whereas, by
+making the axe a part of every man’s appointments,
+he is obliged to have it always
+with him; and whether the object be to
+entrench himself in a village, or to erect huts
+in a camp, the commander of a corps will
+speedily see the advantage of this innovation.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_127">127</a></span></p>
+
+<p>When once the axe has been generally
+adopted, we shall, perhaps, see the desirability
+of issuing pickaxes and shovels to
+particular companies, and also the benefit of
+more frequent entrenchments. It is more
+particularly during retreats that it is important
+to entrench when the army has reached
+a good position; for an entrenched camp
+not only furnishes the means of rallying
+troops which are pursued, but if it be fortified
+in such a manner as to render the issue
+of an attack doubtful to the enemy, it will
+not only sustain the <em>morale</em> of the soldier in
+the retreat, but afford the general-in-chief
+opportunities for resuming the offensive, and
+profiting by the first false movement on the
+part of his adversary. It will be recollected
+how Frederick, in the campaign of 1761,
+when surrounded by two Russian and Austrian
+armies, whose united force was quadruple
+his own, saved his army by entrenching
+himself in the camp of Buntzalvitz.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_LX"></a>MAXIM LX.</h2>
+
+<p>Every means should be taken to attach
+the soldier to his colors. This is best<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_128">128</a></span>
+accomplished by showing consideration
+and respect to the old soldier. His pay
+likewise should increase with his length
+of service. It is the height of injustice
+not to pay a veteran more than a recruit.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>Some modern writers have recommended,
+on the other hand, to limit the period of
+service, in order to bring the whole youth
+of a country successively under arms. By
+this means they purpose to have the levies,
+<i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">en masse</i>, all ready trained and capable of
+resisting successfully a war of invasion. But
+however advantageous at first sight such a
+military system may appear, I believe it
+will be found to have many objections.</p>
+
+<p>In the first place, the soldier fatigued with
+the minutiæ of discipline in a garrison, will
+not feel much inclined to re-enlist after he
+has received his discharge, more especially
+since, having served the prescribed time, he
+will consider himself to have fulfilled all the
+duties of a citizen to his country. Returning
+to his friends, he will probably marry,
+or establish himself in a trade. From that
+moment his military spirit declines, and he<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_129">129</a></span>
+soon becomes ill adapted to the business of
+war. On the contrary, the soldier who
+serves long, becomes attached to his regiment
+as to a new family. He submits to
+the yoke of discipline, accustoms himself to
+the privations his situation imposes, and
+ends by finding his condition agreeable.
+There are few officers that have seen service
+who have not discovered the difference
+between old and young soldiers, with reference
+to their power of supporting the
+fatigues of a long campaign, to the determined
+courage that characterizes the attack,
+or to the ease with which they rally after
+being broken.</p>
+
+<p>Montécuculli observes, that “it takes time
+to discipline an army; more to inure it to
+war; and still more to constitute veterans.”
+For this reason, he recommends that great
+consideration should be shown to old soldiers;
+that they should be carefully provided
+for, and a large body of them kept
+always on foot. It seems to me, also, that
+it is not enough to increase the pay of the
+soldier according to his period of service,
+but that it is highly essential to confer on
+him some mark of distinction that shall
+secure to him privileges calculated to encourage<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_130">130</a></span>
+him to grow gray under arms,
+and, above all, to do so with honor.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_LXI"></a>MAXIM LXI.</h2>
+
+<p>It is not set speeches at the moment of
+battle that render soldiers brave. The
+veteran scarcely listens to them, and the
+recruit forgets them at the first discharge.
+If discourses and harangues are useful, it
+is during the campaign: to do away unfavorable
+impressions, to correct false
+reports, to keep alive a proper spirit in
+the camp, and to furnish materials and
+amusement for the bivouac. All printed
+orders of the day should keep in view
+these objects.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>The opinion of the general-in-chief, energetically
+expressed, is, notwithstanding, productive
+of great effect on the <em>morale</em> of the
+soldier.</p>
+
+<p>In 1703, at the attack of Hornbec, Marshal
+Villars, seeing the troops advancing
+without spirit, threw himself at their head:<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_131">131</a></span>
+“What!” said he, “is it expected that I, a
+marshal of France, should be the first to
+escalade, when I order YOU to attack?”</p>
+
+<p>These few words rekindled their ardor;
+officers and soldiers rushed upon the works,
+and the town was taken almost without loss.</p>
+
+<p>“We have retired far enough for to-day;
+you know I always sleep upon the field of
+battle!” said Napoleon, as he flew through
+the ranks at the moment of resuming the
+offensive at Marengo. These few words sufficed
+to revive the courage of the soldiers,
+and to make them forget the fatigues of the
+day, during which almost every man had
+been engaged.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_LXII"></a>MAXIM LXII.</h2>
+
+<p>Tents are unfavorable to health. The
+soldier is best when he bivouacs, because
+he sleeps with his feet to the fire, which
+speedily dries the ground on which he
+lies. A few planks, or a little straw, shelter
+him from the wind.</p>
+
+<p>On the other hand, tents are necessary
+for the superior officers, who have to write
+and to consult their maps. Tents should,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_132">132</a></span>
+therefore, be issued to these, with directions
+to them never to sleep in a house.
+Tents are always objects of observation
+to the enemy’s staff. They afford information
+in regard to your numbers and
+the ground you occupy; while an army
+bivouacking in two or three lines, is only
+distinguishable from afar by the smoke
+which mingles with the clouds. It is impossible
+to count the number of the fires.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>The acknowledged advantage of bivouacking
+is another reason for adding an entrenching-tool
+to the equipment of the soldier; for,
+with the assistance of the axe and shovel,
+he can hut himself without difficulty. I have
+seen huts erected with the branches of trees,
+covered with turf, where the soldier was perfectly
+sheltered from the cold and wet, even
+in the worst season.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_LXIII"></a>MAXIM LXIII.</h2>
+
+<p>All information obtained from prisoners
+should be received with caution, and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_133">133</a></span>
+estimated at its real value. A soldier
+seldom sees anything beyond his company;
+and an officer can afford intelligence
+of little more than the position and
+movements of the division to which his
+regiment belongs. On this account, the
+general of an army should never depend
+upon the information derived from prisoners,
+unless it agrees with the reports
+received from the advanced guards, in
+reference to the position, etc., of the
+enemy.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>Montécuculli wisely observes that “prisoners
+should be interrogated separately, in
+order to ascertain, by the agreement in their
+answers, how far they may be endeavoring
+to mislead you.” Generally speaking, the information
+required from officers who are prisoners,
+should have reference to the strength
+and resources of the enemy, and sometimes
+to his localities and position. Frederick recommends
+that prisoners should be menaced
+with instant death if they are found attempting
+to deceive by false reports.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_134">134</a></span></p>
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_LXIV"></a>MAXIM LXIV.</h2>
+
+<p>Nothing is so important in war as an
+undivided command; for this reason,
+when war is carried on against a single
+power, there should be only one army,
+acting upon one base, and conducted by
+one chief.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>“Success,” says the Archduke Charles, “is
+only to be obtained by simultaneous efforts,
+directed upon a given point, sustained with
+constancy, and executed with decision.” It
+rarely happens that any number of men
+who desire the same object are perfectly
+agreed as to the means of attaining it; and
+if the will of one individual is not allowed to
+predominate, there can be no <em>ensemble</em> in the
+execution of their operations; neither will
+they attain the end proposed. It is useless
+to confirm this maxim by examples. History
+abounds in them.</p>
+
+<p>Prince Eugene and Marlborough would
+never have been so successful in the campaigns
+which they directed in concert, if a
+spirit of intrigue and difference of opinion
+had not constantly disorganized the armies
+opposed to them.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_135">135</a></span></p>
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_LXV"></a>MAXIM LXV.</h2>
+
+<p>The same consequences which have
+uniformly attended long discussions and
+councils of war, will follow at all times.
+They will terminate in the adoption of the
+worst course, which in war is always the
+most timid, or, if you will, the most prudent.
+The only true wisdom in a general
+is determined courage.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>Prince Eugene used to say that councils of
+war “are only useful when you want an
+excuse for attempting <em>nothing</em>.” This was
+also the opinion of Villars. A general-in-chief
+should avoid, therefore, assembling a
+council on occasions of difficulty, and should
+confine himself to consulting separately his
+most experienced generals in order to benefit
+by their advice, while he is governed at
+the same time in his decision by his own
+judgment. By this means, he becomes responsible,
+it is true, for the measures he
+pursues; but he has the advantage also of
+acting upon his own conviction, and of being<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_136">136</a></span>
+certain that the secret of his operations
+will not be divulged, as is usually the case
+where it is discussed by a council of war.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_LXVI"></a>MAXIM LXVI.</h2>
+
+<p>In war, the general alone can judge of
+certain arrangements. It depends on him
+alone to conquer difficulties by his own
+superior talents and resolution.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>The officer who obeys, whatever may be
+the nature or extent of his command, will
+always stand excused for executing implicitly
+the orders which have been given to him.
+This is not the case with the general-in-chief,
+on whom the safety of the army and the success
+of the campaign depend. Occupied, without
+intermission, in the whole process of
+observation and reflection, it is easy to conceive
+that he will acquire by degrees a
+solidity of judgment which will enable him
+to see things in a clearer and more enlarged
+point of view than his inferior generals.</p>
+
+<p>Marshal Villars, in his campaigns, acted<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_137">137</a></span>
+almost always in opposition to the advice of
+his generals, and he was almost always fortunate.
+So true it is, that a general, who feels
+confident in his talent for command, must
+follow the dictates of his own genius if he
+wishes to achieve success.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_LXVII"></a>MAXIM LXVII.</h2>
+
+<p>To authorize generals or other officers
+to lay down their arms in virtue of a particular
+capitulation, under any other circumstances
+than when they are composing
+the garrison of a fortress, affords a dangerous
+latitude. It is destructive of all
+military character in a nation to open such
+a door to the cowardly, the weak, or even
+to the misdirected brave. Great extremities
+require extraordinary resolution. The
+more obstinate the resistance of an army,
+the greater the chances of assistance or of
+success.</p>
+
+<p>How many seeming impossibilities have
+been accomplished by men whose only
+resource was death!</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_138">138</a></span></p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>In the campaign of 1759, Frederick directed
+General Fink, with eighteen thousand
+men, upon Maxen, for the purpose of cutting
+off the Austrian army from the defiles of Bohemia.
+Surrounded by twice his numbers,
+Fink capitulated after a sharp action, and
+fourteen thousand men laid down their arms.
+This conduct was the more disgraceful, because
+General Winch, who commanded the
+cavalry, cut his way through the enemy.
+The whole blame of the surrender fell, therefore,
+upon Fink, who was tried afterward by
+a court-martial, and sentenced to be cashiered
+and imprisoned for two years.</p>
+
+<p>In the campaign of Italy in 1796, the Austrian
+General Provéra capitulated with two
+thousand men in the castle of Cossaria. Subsequently,
+at the battle of La Favorite, the
+same general capitulated with a corps of six
+thousand men. I scarcely dare to revert to
+the shameful defection of General Mack in
+the capitulation of Ulm in 1805, where thirty
+thousand Austrians laid down their arms&mdash;when
+we have seen, during the wars of the
+Revolution, so many generals open themselves
+a way by a vigorous effort through
+the enemy, supported only by a few battalions.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_139">139</a></span></p>
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_LXVIII"></a>MAXIM LXVIII.</h2>
+
+<p>There is no security for any sovereign,
+for any nation, or for any general, if officers
+are permitted to capitulate in the
+open field, and to lay down their arms in
+virtue of conditions favorable to the contracting
+party, but contrary to the interests
+of the army at large. To withdraw
+from danger, and thereby to involve their
+comrades in greater peril, is the height of
+cowardice. Such conduct should be proscribed,
+declared infamous, and made punishable
+with death. All generals, officers
+and soldiers, who capitulate in battle to
+save their own lives, should be decimated.</p>
+
+<p>He who gives the order, and those who
+obey, are alike traitors, and deserve capital
+punishment.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>Soldiers, who are almost always ignorant
+of the designs of their chief, cannot be responsible
+for his conduct. If he orders them
+to lay down their arms, they must do so;
+otherwise they fail in that law of discipline<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_140">140</a></span>
+which is more essential to an army than
+thousands of men. It appears to me, therefore,
+under these circumstances, that the
+chiefs alone are responsible, and liable to the
+punishment due to their cowardice. We have
+no example of soldiers being wanting in their
+duty in the most desperate situations, where
+they are commanded by officers of approved
+resolution.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_LXIX"></a>MAXIM LXIX.</h2>
+
+<p>There is but one honorable mode of
+becoming prisoner of war. That is, by
+being taken separately; by which is meant,
+by being cut off entirely, and when we
+can no longer make use of our arms. In
+this case, there can be no conditions, for
+honor can impose none. We yield to an
+irresistible necessity.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>There is always time enough to surrender
+prisoner of war. This should be deferred,
+therefore, till the last extremity. And here
+I may be permitted to cite an example of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_141">141</a></span>
+rare obstinacy in defence, which has been
+related to me by ocular witnesses. The captain
+of grenadiers, Dubrenil, of the thirty-seventh
+regiment of the line, having been
+sent on detachment with his company, was
+stopped on the march by a large party of
+Cossacks, who surrounded him on every side.
+Dubrenil formed his little force into square,
+and endeavored to gain the skirts of a wood
+(within a few muskets’ shot of the spot
+where he had been attacked), and reached
+it with very little loss. But as soon as the
+grenadiers saw this refuge secured to them,
+they broke and fled, leaving their captain
+and a few brave men, who were resolved not
+to abandon him, at the mercy of the enemy.
+In the meantime, the fugitives, who had rallied
+in the depth of the wood, ashamed of
+having forsaken their leader, came to the
+resolution of rescuing him from the enemy,
+if a prisoner, or of carrying off his body if
+he had fallen. With this view, they formed
+once more upon the outskirts, and opening
+a passage with their bayonets through the
+cavalry, penetrated to their captain, who,
+notwithstanding seventeen wounds, was defending
+himself still. They immediately surrounded
+him, and regained the wood with<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_142">142</a></span>
+little loss. Such examples are not rare in
+the wars of the Revolution, and it were desirable
+to see them collected by some contemporary,
+that soldiers might learn how
+much is to be achieved in war by determined
+energy and sustained resolution.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_LXX"></a>MAXIM LXX.</h2>
+
+<p>The conduct of a general in a conquered
+country is full of difficulties. If severe,
+he irritates and increases the number of
+his enemies. If lenient, he gives birth to
+expectations which only render the abuses
+and vexations, inseparable from war, the
+more intolerable. A victorious general
+must know how to employ severity, justice
+and mildness by turns, if he would allay
+sedition or prevent it.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>Among the Romans, generals were only
+permitted to arrive at the command of armies
+after having exercised the different functions
+of the magistracy. Thus by a previous
+knowledge of administration, they were prepared<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_143">143</a></span>
+to govern the conquered provinces
+with all that discretion which a newly-acquired
+power, supported by arbitrary force,
+demands.</p>
+
+<p>In the military institutions of modern
+times, the generals, instructed only in what
+concerns the operation of strategy and tactics,
+are obliged to intrust the civil departments
+of the war to inferior agents, who,
+without belonging to the army, render all
+those abuses and vexations, inseparable from
+its operations, still more intolerable.</p>
+
+<p>This observation, which I do little more
+than repeat, seems to me, notwithstanding,
+deserving of particular attention; for if the
+leisure of general officers was directed in
+time of peace to the study of diplomacy&mdash;if
+they were employed in the different embassies
+which sovereigns send to foreign courts&mdash;they
+would acquire a knowledge of the
+laws and of the government of these countries,
+in which they may be called hereafter
+to carry on the war. They would learn also
+to distinguish those points of interest on
+which all treaties must be based, which have
+for their object the advantageous termination
+of a campaign. By the aid of this
+information they would obtain certain and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_144">144</a></span>
+positive results, since all the springs of action,
+as well as the machinery of war, would
+be in their hands. We have seen Prince
+Eugene, and Marshal Villars, each fulfilling
+with equal ability the duties of a general
+and a negotiator.</p>
+
+<p>When an army which occupies a conquered
+province observes strict discipline, there are
+few examples of insurrection among the people,
+unless indeed resistance is provoked (as
+but too often happens), by the exactions of
+inferior agents employed in the civil administration.</p>
+
+<p>It is to this point, therefore, that the general-in-chief
+should principally direct his
+attention, in order that the contributions
+imposed by the wants of the army may be
+levied with impartiality; and above all, that
+they may be applied to their true object, instead
+of serving to enrich the collectors, as
+is ordinarily the case.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_LXXI"></a>MAXIM LXXI.</h2>
+
+<p>Nothing can excuse a general who
+takes advantage of the knowledge acquired
+in the service of his country, to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_145">145</a></span>
+deliver up her frontier and her towns to
+foreigners. This is a crime reprobated
+by every principle of religion, morality
+and honor.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>Ambitious men who, listening only to
+their passions, arm natives of the same land
+against each other (under the deceitful pretext
+of the public good), are still more criminal.
+For however arbitrary a government,
+the institutions which have been consolidated
+by time, are always preferable to civil
+war, and to that anarchy which the latter is
+obliged to create for the justification of its
+crimes.</p>
+
+<p>To be faithful to his sovereign, and to
+respect the established government, are the
+first principles which ought to distinguish a
+soldier and a man of honor.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_LXXII"></a>MAXIM LXXII.</h2>
+
+<p>A general-in-chief has no right to shelter
+his mistakes in war under cover of his
+sovereign, or of a minister, when these
+are both distant from the scene of operation,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_146">146</a></span>
+and must consequently be either ill
+informed or wholly ignorant of the actual
+state of things.</p>
+
+<p>Hence, it follows, that every general is
+culpable who undertakes the execution of
+a plan which he considers faulty. It is
+his duty to represent his reasons, to insist
+upon a change of plan, in short, to give
+in his resignation, rather than allow himself
+to be made the instrument of his
+army’s ruin. Every general-in-chief who
+fights a battle in consequence of superior
+orders, with the certainty of losing it, is
+equally blamable.</p>
+
+<p>In this last-mentioned case, the general
+ought to refuse obedience; because a
+blind obedience is due only to a military
+command given by a superior present on
+the spot at the moment of action. Being
+in possession of the real state of things,
+the superior has it then in his power to
+afford the necessary explanations to the
+person who executes his orders.</p>
+
+<p>But supposing a general-in-chief to receive
+positive order from his sovereign,
+directing him to fight a battle, with the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_147">147</a></span>
+further injunction, to yield to his adversary,
+and allow himself to be defeated&mdash;ought
+he to obey it? No. If the general
+should be able to comprehend the meaning
+or utility of such an order, he should
+execute it; otherwise he should refuse to
+obey it.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>In the campaign of 1697, Prince Eugene
+caused the courier to be intercepted, who
+was bringing him orders from the emperor
+forbidding him to hazard a battle, for which
+everything had been prepared, and which
+he foresaw would prove decisive. He considered,
+therefore, that he did his duty in
+evading the orders of his sovereign; and the
+victory of Zanta, in which the Turks lost
+about thirty thousand men, and four thousand
+prisoners, rewarded his audacity. In
+the meantime, notwithstanding the immense
+advantages which accrued from this victory
+to the imperial arms, Eugene was disgraced
+on his arrival at Vienna.</p>
+
+<p>In 1793, General Hoche, having received
+orders to move upon Treves with an army
+harassed by constant marches in a mountainous
+and difficult country, refused to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_148">148</a></span>
+obey. He observed, with reason, that in order
+to obtain possession of an unimportant
+fortress, they were exposing his army to
+inevitable ruin. He caused, therefore, his
+troops to return into winter quarters, and
+preferred the preservation of his army, upon
+which the success of the future campaign
+depended, to his own safety. Recalled to
+Paris, he was thrown into a dungeon, which
+he only quitted on the downfall of Robespierre.</p>
+
+<p>I dare not decide if such examples are to
+be imitated; but it seems to me highly desirable
+that a question so new and so important,
+should be discussed by men who are
+capable of determining its merits.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_LXXIII"></a>MAXIM LXXIII.</h2>
+
+<p>The first qualification in a general-in-chief
+is a cool head&mdash;that is, a head which
+receives just impressions, and estimates
+things and objects at their real value.
+He must not allow himself to be elated
+by good news, or depressed by bad.</p>
+
+<p>The impressions he receives either successively<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_149">149</a></span>
+or simultaneously in the course
+of the day, should be so classed as to
+take up only the exact place in his mind
+which they deserve to occupy; since it is
+upon a just comparison and consideration
+of the weight due to different impressions,
+that the power of reasoning and of
+right judgment depends.</p>
+
+<p>Some men are so physically and morally
+constituted as to see everything
+through a highly-colored medium. They
+raise up a picture in the mind on every
+slight occasion, and give to every trivial
+occurrence a dramatic interest. But
+whatever knowledge, or talent, or courage,
+or other good qualities such men
+may possess, nature has not formed them
+for the command of armies, or the direction
+of great military operations.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>“The first quality in a general-in-chief,”
+says Montécuculli, “is a great knowledge
+of the art of war. This is not intuitive,
+but the result of experience. A man is not
+born a commander. He must become one.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_150">150</a></span>
+Not to be anxious; to be always cool; to
+avoid confusion in his commands; never to
+change countenance; to give his orders in
+the midst of battle with as much composure
+as if he were perfectly at ease. These are
+the proofs of valor in a general.</p>
+
+<p>“To encourage the timid; to increase the
+number of the truly brave; to revive the
+drooping ardor of the troops in battle; to
+rally those who are broken; to bring back
+to the charge those who are repulsed; to
+find resources in difficulty, and success even
+amid disaster; to be ready at a moment to
+devote himself, if necessary, for the welfare
+of the state. These are the actions which
+acquire for a general distinction and renown.”</p>
+
+<p>To this enumeration may be added, the
+talent of discriminating character, and of
+employing every man in the particular post
+which nature has qualified him to fill. “My
+principal attention,” said Marshal Villars,
+“was always directed to the study of the
+younger generals. Such a one I found, by
+the boldness of his character, fit to lead a
+column of attack; another, from a disposition
+naturally cautious, but without being
+deficient in courage, more perfectly to be<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_151">151</a></span>
+relied on for the defence of a country.” It
+is only by a just application of these personal
+qualities to their respective objects,
+that it is possible to command success in
+war.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_LXXIV"></a>MAXIM LXXIV.</h2>
+
+<p>The leading qualifications which should
+distinguish an officer selected for the
+head of the staff, are, to know the country
+thoroughly; to be able to conduct a
+<em>reconnoissance</em> with skill; to superintend
+the transmission of orders promptly; to
+lay down the most complicated movements
+intelligibly, but in a few words,
+and with simplicity.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>Formerly, the duties of the chiefs of the
+staff were confined to the necessary preparations
+for carrying the plan of the campaign,
+and the operations resolved on by
+the general-in-chief, into effect. In a battle,
+they were only employed in directing movements
+and superintending their execution.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_152">152</a></span>
+But in the late wars, the officers of the staff
+were frequently intrusted with the command
+of a column of attack, or of large detachments,
+when the general-in-chief feared to
+disclose the secret of his plans by the transmission
+of orders or instructions. Great
+advantages have resulted from this innovation,
+although it was long resisted. By this
+means, the staff have been enabled to perfect
+their theory by practice, and they have
+acquired, moreover, the esteem of the soldiers
+and junior officers of the line, who are
+easily led to think lightly of their superiors,
+whom they do not see fighting in the ranks.
+The generals who have held the arduous
+situation of chief of the staff during the
+wars of the Revolution, have almost always
+been employed in the different branches of
+the profession. Marshal Berthier, who filled
+so conspicuously this appointment to Napoleon,
+was distinguished by all the essentials
+of a general. He possessed calm, and at
+the same time brilliant courage, excellent
+judgment, and approved experience. He
+bore arms during half a century, made war
+in the four quarters of the globe, opened
+and terminated thirty-two campaigns. In
+his youth he acquired, under the eye of his<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_153">153</a></span>
+father, who was an engineer officer, the talent
+of tracing plans and finishing them with
+exactness, as well as the preliminary qualifications
+necessary to form a staff-officer.
+Admitted by the Prince de Lambesq into
+his regiment of dragoons, he was taught
+the skilful management of his horse and his
+sword&mdash;accomplishments so important to a
+soldier. Attached afterward to the staff of
+Count Rochambeau, he made his first campaign
+in America, where he soon began to
+distinguish himself by his valor, activity
+and talents. Having at length attained
+superior rank in the staff-corps formed by
+Marshal de Segur, he visited the camps of
+the King of Prussia, and discharged the duties
+of chief of the staff under the Baron
+de Bezenval.</p>
+
+<p>During nineteen years, consumed in sixteen
+campaigns, the history of Marshal Berthier’s
+life was little else but that of the
+wars of Napoleon, all the details of which he
+directed, both in the cabinet and the field.
+A stranger to the intrigues of politics, he
+labored with indefatigable activity; seized
+with promptitude and sagacity upon general
+views, and gave the necessary orders for
+attaining them with prudence, perspicuity,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_154">154</a></span>
+and conciseness. Discreet, impenetrable,
+modest; he was just, exact, and even severe,
+in everything that regarded the service;
+but he always set an example of
+vigilance and zeal in his own person, and
+knew how to maintain discipline, and to
+cause his authority to be respected by every
+rank under his orders.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_LXXV"></a>MAXIM LXXV.</h2>
+
+<p>A commandant of artillery should understand
+well the general principles of
+each branch of the service, since he is
+called upon to supply arms and ammunition
+to the different corps of which it is
+composed. His correspondence with the
+commanding officers of artillery at the
+advanced posts, should put him in possession
+of all the movements of the army,
+and the disposition and management of
+the great park of artillery should depend
+upon this information.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>After having recognized the advantage of
+intrusting the supply of arms and ammunition<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_155">155</a></span>
+for an army to a military body, it
+appears to me extraordinary that the same
+regulation does not extend to that of provisions
+and forage, instead of leaving it in
+the hands of a separate administration, as is
+the practice at present.</p>
+
+<p>The civil establishments attached to armies
+are formed almost always at the commencement
+of a war, and composed of persons
+strangers to those laws of discipline
+which they are but too much inclined to
+disregard. These men are little esteemed
+by the military, because they serve only to
+enrich themselves, without respect to the
+means. They consider only their private
+interest in a service whose glory they cannot
+share, although some portion of its success
+depends upon their zeal. The disorders
+and defalcations incident to these establishments
+would assuredly cease, if they were
+confided to men who had been employed in
+the army, and who, in return for their labors,
+were permitted to partake with their
+fellow-soldiers the triumph of their success.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_156">156</a></span></p>
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_LXXVI"></a>MAXIM LXXVI.</h2>
+
+<p>The qualities which distinguish a good
+general of advanced posts, are, to reconnoitre
+accurately defiles and fords of every
+description; to provide guides that may
+be depended on; to interrogate the <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">curé</i>
+and postmaster; to establish rapidly a
+good understanding with the inhabitants;
+to send out spies; to intercept public and
+private letters; to translate and analyze
+their contents; in a word, to be able to
+answer every question of the general-in-chief,
+when he arrives with the whole
+army.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>Foraging parties, composed of small detachments,
+and which were usually intrusted
+to young officers, served formerly to make
+good officers of advanced posts; but now the
+army is supplied with provisions by regular
+contributions: it is only in a course of partisan
+warfare that the necessary experience
+can be acquired to fill these situations with
+success.</p>
+
+<p>A chief of partisans is, to a certain extent,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_157">157</a></span>
+independent of the army. He receives
+neither pay nor provisions from it, and
+rarely succor, and is abandoned during the
+whole campaign to his own resources.</p>
+
+<p>An officer so circumstanced must unite
+address with courage, and boldness with
+discretion, if he wishes to collect plunder
+without measuring the strength of his little
+corps with superior forces. Always harassed,
+always surrounded by dangers, which
+it is his business to foresee and surmount, a
+leader of partisans acquires in a short time
+an experience in the details of war rarely to
+be obtained by an officer of the line; because
+the latter is almost always under the guidance
+of superior authority, which directs
+the whole of his movements, while the talent
+and genius of the partisan are developed
+and sustained by a dependence on his own
+resources.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_LXXVII"></a>MAXIM LXXVII.</h2>
+
+<p>Generals-in-chief must be guided by
+their own experience, or their genius.
+Tactics, evolutions, the duties and knowledge
+of an engineer or artillery officer,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_158">158</a></span>
+may be learned in treatises, but the
+science of strategy is only to be acquired
+by experience, and by studying the campaigns
+of all the great captains.</p>
+
+<p>Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, and Frederick,
+as well as Alexander, Hannibal, and
+Cæsar, have all acted upon the same principles.
+These have been: to keep their
+forces united; to leave no weak part
+unguarded; to seize with rapidity on
+important points.</p>
+
+<p>Such are the principles which lead to
+victory, and which, by inspiring terror at
+the reputation of your arms, will at once
+maintain fidelity and secure subjection.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>“A great captain can only be formed,”
+says the Archduke Charles, “by long experience
+and intense study: neither is his own
+experience enough&mdash;for whose life is there
+sufficiently fruitful of events to render his
+knowledge universal?” It is, therefore, by
+augmenting his information from the stock
+of others, by appreciating justly the discoveries
+of his predecessors, and by taking for
+his standard of comparison those great military<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_159">159</a></span>
+exploits, in connection with their political
+results, in which the history of war
+abounds, that he can alone become a great
+commander.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_LXXVIII"></a>MAXIM LXXVIII.</h2>
+
+<p>Peruse again and again the campaigns
+of Alexander, Hannibal, Cæsar, Gustavus
+Adolphus, Turenne, Eugene, and Frederick.
+Model yourself upon them. This
+is the only means of becoming a great
+captain, and of acquiring the secret of the
+art of war. Your own genius will be
+enlightened and improved by this study,
+and you will learn to reject all maxims
+foreign to the principles of these great
+commanders.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>It is in order to facilitate this object that
+I have formed the present collection. It is
+after reading and meditating upon the history
+of modern war that I have endeavored
+to illustrate, by examples, how the maxims
+of a great captain may be most successfully
+applied to this study. May the end I have
+had in view be accomplished!</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<div class="transnote">
+<h2 class="nobreak p1"><a id="Transcribers_Notes"></a>Transcriber’s Notes</h2>
+
+<p>Cover created by Transcriber and placed in the Public Domain.</p>
+
+<p>Punctuation, hyphenation, and spelling were made consistent when a predominant
+preference was found in this book; otherwise they were not changed,
+except as noted below.</p>
+
+<p>Unusual and archaic spellings were not changed.</p>
+
+<p>Simple typographical errors were corrected; occasional unbalanced
+quotation marks retained.</p>
+
+<p>Ambiguous hyphens at the ends of lines were retained.</p>
+
+<p>Page <a href="#Page_32">32</a>: “spacious and extensive” was printed as “entensive”
+but changed here.</p>
+
+<p>Page <a href="#Page_60">60</a>: “1746” is a misprint; the correct date must be in the 1600's,
+perhaps “1646”.</p>
+
+<p>Page <a href="#Page_63">63</a>: “1798” may be a misprint for “1796”.</p>
+
+<p>Page <a href="#Page_65">65</a>: “1745” is a misprint; the correct year is “1645”.</p>
+
+<p>Page <a href="#Page_75">75</a>: “wo to the vanquished” was printed that way.</p>
+
+<p>Page <a href="#Page_100">100</a>: “Vauban” was printed as “Vanban” but changed here.</p>
+</div>
+</div>
+
+<div>*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 50750 ***</div>
+</body>
+</html>
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+The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Officer's Manual, by Napoleon Bonaparte
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most
+other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions
+whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of
+the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at
+www.gutenberg.org.  If you are not located in the United States, you'll have
+to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook.
+
+Title: The Officer's Manual
+       Napoleon's Maxims of War
+
+Author: Napoleon Bonaparte
+
+Release Date: December 23, 2015 [EBook #50750]
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: UTF-8
+
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE OFFICER'S MANUAL ***
+
+
+
+
+Produced by Shaun Pinder, Charlie Howard, and the Online
+Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This
+file was produced from images generously made available
+by The Internet Archive)
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+  THE OFFICER’S MANUAL.
+
+  NAPOLEON’S
+  MAXIMS OF WAR.
+
+
+  RICHMOND, VA.:
+  WEST & JOHNSTON.
+  1862.
+
+
+
+
+  EVANS & COGSWELL, PRINTERS.
+  NO. 3 BROAD ST., CHARLESTON, S. C.
+
+
+
+
+RECOMMENDATION.
+
+
+“After refreshing my memory by looking over again ‘The Officer’s
+Manual,’ or ‘Maxims of Napoleon,’ I think I may safely recommend the
+republication, in America, of the work in English, as likely to be
+called for by many officers, regular and volunteer. It contains a
+circle of maxims, deduced from the highest source of military science
+and experience, with practical illustrations of the principles taken
+from the most celebrated campaigns of modern times. The study of the
+book cannot fail to set all young officers on a course of inquiry and
+reflection greatly to their improvement.
+
+            “WINFIELD SCOTT.”
+
+
+
+
+PREFACE.
+
+
+The publisher has reissued this little volume as a publication timely
+for the occasion. A collection of maxims which directed the military
+operations of the greatest captain of modern times, cannot fail to
+prove of great use to such young officers as really desire a knowledge
+of the art of war. The maxims are illustrated by instances drawn from
+the campaigns of Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, Frederick, and Napoleon.
+These great men were all governed by the same principles, and it is by
+applying these principles to the perusal of their respective campaigns,
+that every military man will recognize their wisdom, and make such use
+of them hereafter as his own particular genius shall point out.
+
+“And here, perhaps,” says the translator, Col. D’Aguilar, “my task
+might have been considered finished; but perceiving how incomplete
+the collection was alone, I have endeavored to supply the deficiency
+by having recourse for further illustration to the memoirs of
+Montécuculli, and the instructions of Frederick to his generals. The
+analogy of their principles with those of Napoleon, has convinced me
+that the art of war is susceptible of two points of view: one, which
+relates entirely to the acquirements and genius of the general; the
+other, which refers to matters of detail.
+
+“The first is the same in all ages, and with all nations, whatever be
+the arms with which they fight. Hence it follows that, in every age,
+great commanders have been governed by the same principles.
+
+“The business of detail, on the contrary, is controlled by existing
+circumstances. It varies with the character of a people, and the
+quality of their arms.
+
+“It is with a view to impress the justice of this remark, that I have
+sought for facts in different periods of history, to illustrate these
+maxims, and to prove that nothing is _problematical_ in war; but that
+failure and success in military operations depend almost always on the
+natural genius and science of the chief.”
+
+
+
+
+NAPOLEON’S
+
+MAXIMS OF WAR.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM I.
+
+
+The frontiers of states are either large rivers, or chains of
+mountains, or deserts. Of all these obstacles to the march of an army,
+the most difficult to overcome is the desert; mountains come next, and
+broad rivers occupy the third place.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+Napoleon, in his military career, appears to have been called upon to
+surmount every difficulty which can occur in wars of invasion.
+
+In Egypt he traversed deserts, and vanquished and destroyed the
+Mamelukes, so celebrated for their address and courage. His genius
+knew how to accommodate itself to all the dangers of this distant
+enterprise, in a country ill adapted to supply the wants of his troops.
+
+In the conquest of Italy, he twice crossed the Alps by the most
+difficult passes, and at a season, too, which rendered this undertaking
+still more formidable. In three months he passed the Pyrenees, defeated
+and dispersed four Spanish armies. In short, from the Rhine to the
+Borysthenes, no natural obstacle could be found to arrest the rapid
+march of his victorious army.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM II.
+
+
+In forming the plan of a campaign, it is requisite to foresee
+everything the enemy may do, and to be prepared with the necessary
+means to counteract it.
+
+Plans of campaign may be modified _ad infinitum_ according to
+circumstances--the genius of the general, the character of the troops,
+and the topography of the theatre of action.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+Sometimes we see a hazardous campaign succeed, the plan of which is
+directly at variance with the principles of the art of war. But this
+success depends generally on the caprice of fortune, or upon faults
+committed by the enemy--two things upon which a general must never
+count. Sometimes the plan of a campaign, although based on sound
+principles of war, runs the risk of failing at the outset if opposed
+by an adversary who acts at first on the defensive, and then, suddenly
+seizing the initiative, surprises by the skilfulness of his manœuvres.
+Such was the fate of the plan laid down by the Aulic council for the
+campaign of 1796, under the command of Marshal Wurmser. From his
+great numerical superiority, the marshal had calculated on the entire
+destruction of the French army, by cutting off its retreat. He founded
+his operations on the defensive attitude of his adversary, who was
+posted on the line of the Adige, and had to cover the siege of Mantua,
+as well as central and lower Italy.
+
+Wurmser, supposing the French army fixed in the neighborhood of
+Mantua, divided his forces into three corps, which marched separately,
+intending to unite at that place. Napoleon, having penetrated the
+design of the Austrian general, perceived the advantage to be derived
+from striking the first blow against an army divided into three corps,
+with no communication between them. He hastened, therefore, to raise
+the siege of Mantua, assembled the whole of his forces, and by this
+means became superior to the imperialists, whose divisions he attacked
+and beat in detail. Thus Wurmser, who fancied he had only to march
+to certain victory, saw himself compelled, after ten days campaign,
+to retire with the remains of his army into the Tyrol, after a loss
+of twenty-five thousand men in killed and wounded, fifteen thousand
+prisoners, nine stand of colors, and seventy pieces of cannon.
+
+Hence, nothing is so difficult as to prescribe beforehand to a general
+the line of conduct he shall pursue during the course of a campaign.
+Success must often depend on circumstances that cannot be foreseen;
+and it should be remembered, likewise, that nothing cramps so much the
+efforts of genius as compelling the head of an army to be governed by
+any will but his own.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM III.
+
+
+An army which undertakes the conquest of a country, has its two
+wings resting either upon neutral territories, or upon great natural
+obstacles, such as rivers or chains of mountains. It happens in some
+cases that only one wing is so supported; and in others that both are
+exposed.
+
+In the first instance cited, viz., where both wings are protected,
+a general has only to protect his front from being penetrated. In
+the second, where one wing only is supported, he should rest upon
+the supported wing. In the third, where both wings are exposed, he
+should depend upon a central formation, and never allow the different
+corps under his command to depart from this: for if it be difficult
+to contend with the disadvantage of having _two_ flanks exposed,
+the inconvenience is doubled by having _four_, trebled if there be
+_six_--that is to say, if the army is divided into two or three
+different corps. In the first instance, then, as above quoted, the line
+of operation may rest indifferently on the right or on the left. In
+the second, it should be directed toward the wing in support. In the
+third, it should be perpendicular to the centre of the army’s line of
+march. But in all these cases it is necessary, at a distance of every
+five or six days march, to have a strong post or an entrenched position
+upon the line of operation, in order to collect military stores and
+provisions, to organize convoys, to form of it a centre of movement,
+and establish a point of defence to shorten the line of operation of
+the army.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+These general principles in the art of war were entirely unknown, or
+lost sight of, in the middle ages. The crusaders in their incursions
+into Palestine appear to have had no object but to fight and to
+conquer, so little pains did they take to profit by their victories.
+Hence, innumerable armies perished in Syria, without any other
+advantage than that derived from the momentary success obtained by
+superior numbers.
+
+It was by the neglect of these principles, also, that Charles XII,
+abandoning his line of operation and all communication with Sweden,
+threw himself into the Ukraine, and lost the greater part of his army
+by the fatigue of a winter campaign in a barren country destitute of
+resources.
+
+Defeated at Pultawa, he was obliged to seek refuge in Turkey, after
+crossing the Nieper with the remains of his army, diminished to little
+more than one thousand men.
+
+Gustavus Adolphus was the first who brought back the art of war to its
+true principles. His operations in Germany were bold, rapid, and well
+executed. He made success at all times conducive to future security,
+and established his line of operation so as to prevent the possibility
+of any interruption in his communications with Sweden. His campaigns
+form a new era in the art of war.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM IV.
+
+
+When the conquest of a country is undertaken by two or three armies,
+which have each their separate line of operation, until they arrive at
+a point fixed upon for their concentration, it should be laid down as a
+principle, that the union of these different corps should never take
+place near the enemy; because the enemy, in uniting his forces, may not
+only prevent this junction, but may beat the armies in detail.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+In the campaign of 1757, Frederick, marching to the conquest of Bohemia
+with two armies, which had each their separate line of operation,
+succeeded, notwithstanding, in uniting them in sight of the Duke of
+Lorraine, who covered Prague with the imperial army; but his example
+should not be followed. The success of this march depended entirely on
+the inaction of the duke, who, at the head of seventy thousand men, did
+nothing to prevent the junction of the two Prussian armies.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM V.
+
+
+All wars should be governed by certain principles, for every war should
+have a definite object, and be conducted according to the rules of
+art. (A war should only be undertaken with forces proportioned to the
+obstacles to be overcome.)
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+It was a saying of Marshal Villars, that when war is decided on, it is
+necessary to have exact information of the number of troops the enemy
+can bring into the field, since it is impossible to lay down any solid
+plan of offensive or defensive operation without an accurate knowledge
+of what you have to expect and fear. “When the first shot is fired,”
+observes Marshal Villars, “no one can calculate what will be the issue
+of the war. It is, therefore, of vast importance to reflect maturely
+before we begin it.” When once, however, this is decided, the marshal
+observes that the boldest and most extended plans are generally the
+wisest and the most successful. “When we are determined upon war,” he
+adds, “we should carry it on vigorously and without trifling.”
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM VI.
+
+
+At the commencement of a campaign, to _advance_ or _not to advance_,
+is a matter for grave consideration; but when once the offensive has
+been assumed, it must be sustained to the last extremity. However
+skilful the manœuvres in a retreat, it will always weaken the _morale_
+of an army, because, in losing the chances of success, these last are
+transferred to the enemy. Besides, retreats always cost more men and
+_materiel_ than the most bloody engagements; with this difference, that
+in a battle the enemy’s loss is nearly equal to your own--whereas in a
+retreat the loss is on your side only.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+Marshal Saxe remarks, that no retreats are so favorable as those which
+are made before a languid and unenterprising enemy, for when he pursues
+with vigor, the retreat soon degenerates into a rout. “Upon this
+principle it is a great error,” says the marshal, “to adhere to the
+proverb which recommends us to build a bridge of gold for a retreating
+enemy. No; follow him up with spirit, and he is destroyed!”
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM VII.
+
+
+An army should be ready every day, every night, and at all times of the
+day and night, to oppose all the resistance of which it is capable.
+With this view, the soldier should always be furnished completely
+with arms and ammunition; the infantry should never be without its
+artillery, its cavalry, and its generals; and the different divisions
+of the army should be constantly in a state to support, to be
+supported, and to protect itself.
+
+The troops, whether halted, or encamped, or on the march, should be
+always in favorable positions, possessing the essentials required for
+a field of battle; for example, the flanks should be well covered, and
+all the artillery so placed as to have free range, and to play with the
+greatest advantage. When an army is in column of march, it should have
+advanced guards and flanking parties, to examine well the country in
+front, to the right, and to the left, and always at such distance as
+to enable the main body to deploy into position.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+The following maxims, taken from the memoirs of Montécuculli, appear
+to me well suited to this place, and calculated to form a useful
+commentary on the general principles laid down in the preceding maxim:
+
+1. When war has been once decided on, the moment is past for doubts and
+scruples. On the contrary, we are bound to hope that all the evil which
+may ensue, will not; that Providence, or our own wisdom, may avert it;
+or that the want of talent on the part of the enemy may prevent him
+from benefiting by it. The first security for success is to confer the
+command on one individual. When the authority is divided, the opinions
+of the commanders often vary, and the operations are deprived of that
+_ensemble_ which is the first essential to victory. Besides, when an
+enterprise is common to many, and not confined to a single person, it
+is conducted without vigor, and less interest is attached to the result.
+
+After having strictly conformed to all the rules of war, and satisfied
+ourselves that nothing has been omitted to ensure eventual success,
+we must then leave the issue in the hands of Providence, and repose
+ourselves tranquilly in the decision of a higher power.
+
+Let what will arrive, it is the part of a general-in-chief to remain
+firm and constant in his purposes; he must not allow himself to be
+elated by prosperity, nor to be depressed by adversity: for in war good
+and bad and fortune succeed each other by turns, form the ebb and flow
+of military operations.
+
+2. When your own army is strong and inured to service, and that of the
+enemy is weak and consists of new levies, or of troops enervated by
+long inaction, then you should exert every means to bring him to battle.
+
+If, on the other hand, your adversary has the advantage in troops, a
+decisive combat is to be avoided, and you must be content to impede
+his progress, by encamping advantageously, and fortifying favorable
+passes. When armies are nearly equal in force, it is desirable _not_ to
+avoid a battle, but only to attempt to fight one to advantage. For this
+purpose, care should be taken to encamp always in front of the enemy;
+to move when he moves, and occupy the heights and advantageous grounds
+that lie upon his line of march; to seize upon all the buildings and
+roads adjoining to his camp, and post yourself advantageously in the
+places by which he must pass. It is always something gained to make
+_him_ lose time, to thwart his designs, or to retard their progress
+and execution. If, however, an army is altogether inferior to that
+of the enemy, and there is no possibility of manœuvring against him
+with success, then the campaign must be abandoned, and the troops must
+retire into the fortresses.
+
+3. The principal object of a general-in-chief, in the moment of battle,
+should be to secure the flanks of his army. It is true that natural
+positions may be found to effect this object, but these positions being
+fixed and immovable in themselves, they are only advantageous to a
+general who wishes to wait the shock of the enemy, and not to one who
+marches to the attack.
+
+A general can, therefore, rely only on the proper arrangement of his
+troops, to enable him to repel any attempt the adversary may make upon
+the front, or flanks, or rear of his army.
+
+If one flank of an army rests upon a river, or an impassable ravine,
+the whole of the cavalry may be posted with the other wing, in order to
+envelop the enemy more easily by its superiority in numbers.
+
+If the enemy has his flanks supported by woods, light cavalry or
+infantry should be despatched to attack him in flank or in rear during
+the heat of the battle. If practicable, also, an attack should be made
+upon the baggage, to add to his confusion.
+
+If you desire to beat the enemy’s left with your right wing, or his
+right with your left wing, the wing with which you attack should be
+reinforced by the _élite_ of your army. At the same moment, the other
+wing should avoid battle, and the attacking wing brought rapidly
+forward, so as to overwhelm the enemy. If the nature of the ground
+admits, he should be approached by stealth, and attacked before he
+is on his guard. If any signs of fear are discoverable in the enemy,
+and which are always to be detected by confusion or disorder in his
+movements, he should be pursued immediately, without allowing him
+time to recover himself. It is now the cavalry should be brought into
+action, and manœuvre so as to surprise and cut off his artillery and
+baggage.
+
+4. The order of march should always be subservient to the order of
+battle, which last should be arranged beforehand. The march of an army
+is always well regulated when it is governed by the distance to be
+accomplished, and by the time required for its performance. The front
+of the column of march should be diminished or increased according
+to the nature of the country, taking care that the artillery always
+proceeds by the main road.
+
+When a river is to be passed, the artillery should be placed in battery
+upon the bank opposite the point of crossing.
+
+It is a great advantage, when a river forms a sweep or angle, and
+when a ford is to be found near the place where you wish to effect a
+passage. As the construction of the bridge proceeds, infantry should
+be advanced to cover the workmen, by keeping up a fire on the opposite
+bank; but the moment it is finished, a corps of infantry and cavalry,
+and some field-pieces, should be pushed across. The infantry should
+entrench itself immediately at the head of the bridge, and it is
+prudent, moreover, to fortify on the same side of the river, in order
+to protect the bridge in case the enemy should venture an offensive
+movement.
+
+The advanced guard of an army should be always provided with trusty
+guides, and with a corps of pioneers: the first to point out the best
+roads, the second to render these roads more practicable.
+
+If the army marches in detachments, the commander of each detachment
+should be furnished with the name of the place in writing, where the
+whole are to be reassembled; the place should be sufficiently removed
+from the enemy to prevent him from occupying it before the junction of
+all the detachments. To this end, it is of importance to keep the name
+a secret.
+
+From the moment an army approaches the enemy, it should march in
+the order in which it is intended to fight. If anything is to be
+apprehended, precautions are necessary in proportion to the degree of
+the danger. When a defile is to be passed, the troops should be halted
+beyond the extremity, until the whole army has quitted the defile.
+
+In order to conceal the movements of an army, it is necessary to march
+by night through woods and valleys, by the most retired roads, and out
+of reach of all inhabited places. No fires should be allowed; and, to
+favor the design still more, the troops should move by verbal order.
+When the object of the march is to carry a post, or to relieve a place
+that is besieged, the advanced guard should march within musket shot of
+the main body, because then you are prepared for an immediate attack,
+and ready to overthrow all before you.
+
+When a march is made to force a pass guarded by the enemy, it is
+desirable to make a feint upon one point, while, by a rapid movement,
+you bring your real attack to bear upon another.
+
+Sometimes success is obtained by pretending to fall back upon the
+original line of march, and, by a sudden countermarch, seizing upon
+the pass, before the enemy is able to reoccupy it. Some generals have
+gained their point by manœuvring so as to deceive the enemy, while a
+detachment under the cover of high grounds has surprised the passage by
+a stolen march. The enemy being engaged in watching the movements of
+the main body, the detachment has an opportunity of entrenching itself
+in its new position.
+
+5. An army regulates its mode of encampment according to the greater or
+less degree of precaution, when circumstances require. In a friendly
+country the troops are divided, to afford better accommodation and
+supplies. But with the enemy in front, an army should always encamp in
+order of battle. With this view, it is of the highest importance to
+cover one part of the camp, as far as practicable, by natural defences,
+such as a river, a chain of rocks, or a ravine. Care should be taken
+also that the camp is not commanded, and that there is no obstacle to a
+free communication between the different corps, and which can prevent
+the troops from mutually succoring each other.
+
+When an army occupies a fixed camp, it is necessary to be well supplied
+with provisions and ammunition, or at least that these should be
+within certain reach and easily obtained. To insure this, the line of
+communication must be well established, and care taken not to leave an
+enemy’s fortress in your rear.
+
+When an army is established in winter quarters, its safety is best
+secured either by fortifying a camp (for which purpose a spot should be
+selected near a large commercial town, or a river affording facility
+of transport), or by distributing it in close cantonments, so that the
+troops should be near together, and capable of affording each other
+mutual support.
+
+The winter quarters of an army should be protected, likewise, by
+constructing small covered works on all the lines of approach to the
+cantonments, and by posting advanced guards of cavalry to observe the
+motions of the enemy.
+
+6. A battle is to be sought, when there is reason to hope for victory,
+or when an army runs the risk of being ruined without fighting; also
+when a besieged place is to be relieved, or when you desire to prevent
+a reinforcement from reaching the enemy. Battles are useful, likewise,
+when we wish to profit by a favorable opportunity which offers, to
+secure a certain advantage, such as seizing upon an undefended point or
+pass, attacking the enemy when he has committed a fault, or when some
+misunderstanding among his generals favors the undertaking.
+
+If an enemy declines an engagement, he may be compelled to it, either
+by besieging a place of importance, or by falling upon him unawares,
+and when he cannot easily effect his retreat. Or (after pretending to
+retire), by making a rapid countermarch, attacking him vigorously and
+forcing him to action.
+
+The different circumstances under which a battle should be avoided
+or declined, are, when there is greater danger to be apprehended
+from defeat than advantage to be derived from victory; when you
+are very inferior to your adversary in numbers, and are expecting
+reinforcements; above all, when the enemy is advantageously posted, or
+when he is contributing to his own ruin by some inherent defect in his
+position, or by the errors and divisions of his generals.
+
+To gain a battle, each arm must be advantageously posted, and have the
+means of engaging its front and in flank. The wings must be protected
+by natural obstacles, where these present themselves, or by having
+recourse when necessary to the aid of art.
+
+The troops must be able to assist each other without confusion, and
+care must be taken that the broken corps do not fall back upon, and
+throw the rest into disorder. Above all, the intervals between the
+different corps must be sufficiently small to prevent the enemy from
+penetrating between them, for in that case you would be obliged to
+employ your reserves, and run the risk of being entirely overwhelmed.
+Sometimes victory is obtained by creating a diversion in the middle of
+a battle, or even by depriving the soldier of all hope of retreat, and
+placing him in a situation where he is reduced to the necessity either
+to conquer or die.
+
+At the commencement of a battle, if the ground is level, you should
+advance to meet the enemy, in order to inspire the soldier with
+courage; but if you are well posted, and your artillery advantageously
+placed, then wait for him with determination: remembering always to
+fight resolutely, to succor opportunely those who require it, and never
+to bring your reserves into action except in the last extremity; and
+even then to preserve some support, behind which the broken corps may
+rally.
+
+When it is necessary to attack with your whole force, the battle
+should commence toward evening; because then, whatever be the issue,
+night will arrive to separate the combatants before your troops are
+exhausted. By this means, an opportunity is afforded of affecting an
+orderly retreat if the result of the battle requires it.
+
+During an action, the general-in-chief should occupy some spot whence
+he can, as far as possible, overlook his whole army. He should be
+informed, immediately, of everything that passes in the different
+divisions. He should be ready, in order to render success more
+complete, to operate with fresh troops upon those points where the
+enemy is giving way, and also to reinforce his own corps wherever they
+are inclined to yield. When the enemy is beaten, he must pursue him
+instantly, without giving him a moment to rally; on the other hand, if
+he is himself defeated, or despairs of victory, he must retreat in the
+best possible order.
+
+7. It shows great talent in a general to bring troops, who are prepared
+for action, into collision with those who are not: for example, fresh
+troops against those which are exhausted--brave and disciplined men
+against recruits. He must likewise be ready always to fall with his
+army upon a weak or detached corps, to follow the track of the enemy,
+and charge him among defiles before he can face about and get into
+position.
+
+8. A position is good when the different corps are so placed as to be
+engaged with advantage, and without any remaining unemployed. If you
+are superior in cavalry, positions are to be taken in plains and open
+ground; if in infantry, in an enclosed and covered country. If inferior
+in numbers, in confined and narrow places; if superior, in a spacious
+and extensive field. With a very inferior army, a difficult pass must
+be selected to occupy and fortify.
+
+9. In order to obtain every possible advantage from a diversion, we
+should ascertain first, that the country in which it is to be created
+is easily penetrated. A diversion should be made vigorously, and on
+those points where it is calculated to do the greatest mischief to the
+enemy.
+
+10. To make war with success, the following principles should never be
+departed from:
+
+To be superior to your enemy in numbers, as well as in _morale_; to
+fight battles in order to spread terror in the country; to divide your
+army into as many corps as may be effected without risk, in order to
+undertake several objects at the same time; to treat WELL those who
+yield, to ILL treat those who resist; to secure your rear, and occupy
+and strengthen yourself at the outset in some post which shall serve
+as a central point for the support of your future movements; to
+guard against desertion; to make yourself master of the great rivers
+and principal passes, and to establish your line of communication by
+getting possession of the fortresses, by laying siege to them, and
+of the open country, by giving battle; for it is vain to expect that
+conquests are to be achieved without combats; although when a victory
+is won, they will be best maintained by uniting mildness with valor.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM VIII.
+
+
+A general-in-chief should ask himself frequently in the day: “What
+should I do if the enemy’s army appeared now in my front, or on my
+right, or my left?” If he have any difficulty in answering these
+questions, his position is bad, and he should seek to remedy it.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+In the campaign of 1758, the position of the Prussian army at Hohen
+Kirk, being commanded by the batteries of the enemy, who occupied all
+the heights, was eminently defective; notwithstanding, Frederick,
+who saw his rear menaced by the corps of Laudon, remained six days
+in his camp without seeking to correct his position. It would seem,
+indeed, that he was ignorant of his real danger: for Marshal Daun,
+having manœuvred during the night in order to attack by daybreak,
+surprised the Prussians in their lines before they were able to defend
+themselves, and by this means surrounded them completely.
+
+Frederick succeeded, however, in effecting his retreat with regularity,
+but not without the loss of ten thousand men, many general officers,
+and almost all of his artillery. If Marshal Daun had followed up his
+victory with greater boldness, the king of Prussia would never have
+been able to rally his army. On this occasion, Frederick’s good fortune
+balanced his imprudence.
+
+Marshal Saxe remarks, that there is more talent than is dreamt of in
+bad dispositions, if we possess the art of converting them into good
+ones when the favorable moment arrives. Nothing astonishes the enemy
+so much as this manœuvre; he has counted upon _something_; all his
+arrangements have been founded upon it accordingly--and at the moment
+of attack it escapes him! “I must repeat,” says the marshal, “there
+is nothing that so completely disconcerts an enemy as this, or leads
+him to commit so many errors; for it follows, that if he does _not_
+change his arrangements, he is beaten; and if he _does_ change them, in
+presence of his adversary, he is equally undone.”
+
+It seems to me, however, that a general who should rest the success of
+a battle upon such a principle, would be more likely to lose than to
+gain by it; for if he had to deal with a skilful adversary and an alert
+tactician, the latter would find time to take advantage of the previous
+bad arrangements, before he would be able to remedy them.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM IX.
+
+
+The strength of an army, like the power in mechanics, is estimated
+by multiplying the mass by the rapidity; a rapid march augments the
+_morale_ of an army, and increases its means of victory. Press on!
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+“Rapidity,” says Montécuculli, “is of importance in concealing the
+movements of an army, because it leaves no time to divulge the
+intention of its chief. It is, therefore, an advantage to attack the
+enemy unexpectedly, to take him off his guard, to surprise him, and
+let him feel the thunder before he sees the flash; but if too great
+celerity exhausts your troops, while, on the other hand, delay deprives
+you of the favorable moment, you must weigh the advantage against the
+disadvantage, and choose between.”
+
+Marshal Villars observes, that “in war everything depends upon being
+able to deceive the enemy; and having once gained this point, in never
+allowing him time to recover himself.” Villars has united practice to
+precept. His bold and rapid marches were almost always crowned with
+success.
+
+It was the opinion of Frederick that all wars should be short and
+rapid; because a long war insensibly relaxes discipline, depopulates
+the state, and exhausts its resources.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM X.
+
+
+When an army is inferior in number, inferior in cavalry, and in
+artillery, it is essential to avoid a general action. The first
+deficiency should be supplied by rapidity of movement; the want of
+artillery, by the nature of the manœuvres; and the inferiority in
+cavalry, by the choice of positions. In such circumstances, the
+_morale_ of the soldier does much.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+The campaign of 1814 in France was skilfully executed upon these
+principles. Napoleon, with an army inferior in number, an army
+discouraged by the disastrous retreats of Moscow and of Leipzig, and
+still more by the presence of the enemy in the French territory,
+contrived, notwithstanding, to supply his vast inequality of force by
+the rapidity and combination of his movements. By the success obtained
+at Champ-Aubert, Montmirail, Montereau, and Rheims, he began to restore
+the _morale_ of the French army. The numerous recruits of which it
+was composed, had already acquired that steadiness of which the old
+regiments afforded them an example, when the capture of Paris, and the
+astonishing revolution it produced, compelled Napoleon to lay down his
+arms.
+
+But this consequence resulted rather from the force of circumstances
+than from any absolute necessity; for Napoleon, by carrying his army to
+the other side of the Loire, might easily have formed a junction with
+the armies of the Alps and Pyrenees, and have reappeared on the field
+of battle at the head of a hundred thousand men. Such a force would
+have amply sufficed to re-establish the chances of war in his favor;
+more especially as the armies of the allied sovereigns were obliged to
+manœuvre upon the French territory with all the strong places of Italy
+and France in their rear.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM XI.
+
+
+To direct operations with lines far removed from each other, and
+without communications, is to commit a fault which always gives birth
+to a second. The detached column has only its orders for the first
+day. Its operations on the following day depend upon what may have
+happened to the main body. Thus, this column either loses time upon
+emergency, in waiting for orders, or it will act without them, and at
+hazard. Let it therefore be held as a principle, that an army should
+always keep its columns so united as to prevent the enemy from passing
+between them with impunity. Whenever, for particular reasons, this
+principle is departed from, the detached corps should be independent in
+their operations. They should move toward a point fixed upon for their
+future junction. They should advance without hesitating, and without
+waiting for fresh orders; and every precaution should be taken to
+prevent an attack upon them in detail.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+The Austrian army, commanded by Field-marshal Alvinzi, was divided into
+two corps, destined to act independently, until they should accomplish
+their junction before Mantua. The first of these corps, consisting
+of forty-five thousand men, was under the orders of Alvinzi. It was
+to debouch by Monte Baldo, upon the positions occupied by the French
+army on the Adige. The second corps, commanded by General Provéra,
+was destined to act upon the lower Adige, and to raise the blockade
+of Mantua. Napoleon, informed of the enemy’s movements, but not
+entirely comprehending his projects, confined himself to concentrating
+his masses, and giving orders to the troops to hold themselves in
+readiness to manœuvre. In the meantime, fresh information satisfied the
+general-in-chief of the French army that the corps which had debouched
+by La Coronna, over Monte Baldo, was endeavoring to form a junction
+with its cavalry and artillery--both which, having crossed the Adige at
+Dolce, were directing their march upon the plateau of Rivoli, by the
+great road leading by Incanole.
+
+Napoleon immediately foresaw that, by having possession of the plateau,
+he should be able to prevent this junction, and obtain all the
+advantages of the initiative. He accordingly put his troops in motion,
+and at two o’clock in the morning occupied that important position.
+Once master of the point fixed upon for the junction of the Austrian
+columns, success followed all his dispositions. He repulsed every
+attack, made seven thousand prisoners, and took several standards and
+twelve pieces of cannon. At two o’clock in the afternoon, the battle of
+Rivoli was already gained, when Napoleon, learning that General Provéra
+had passed the Adige at Anghiari, and was directing his march upon
+Mantua, left to his generals the charge of following up the retreat of
+Alvinzi, and placed himself at the head of a division for the purpose
+of defeating the designs of Provéra.
+
+By a rapid march, he again succeeded in the initiatory movement, and
+in preventing the garrison of Mantua from uniting its force with
+the relieving army. The corps intrusted with the blockade, eager to
+distinguish itself under the eyes of the conqueror of Rivoli, compelled
+the garrison to retire into the place, while the division of Victor,
+forgetting the fatigues of a forced march, rushed with impetuosity on
+the relieving army in front. At this moment a sortie from the lines
+of St. George took him in flank, while the corps of Augereau, which
+had followed the march of the Austrian general, attacked him in rear.
+Provéra, surrounded on all sides, capitulated. The result of these two
+battles cost the Austrians three thousand men in killed and wounded,
+twenty-two thousand prisoners, twenty-four standards, and forty-six
+pieces of cannon.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM XII.
+
+
+An army ought to have only one line of operation. This should be
+preserved with care, and never abandoned but in the last extremity.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+“The line of communication of an army,” says Montécuculli, “must be
+certain and well established, for every army that acts from a distant
+base, and is not careful to keep this line perfectly open, marches upon
+a precipice. It moves to certain ruin, as may be seen by an infinity
+of examples. In fact, if the road by which provisions, ammunition and
+reinforcements are to be brought up, is not entirely secured--if the
+magazines, the hospitals, the depôts of arms, and the places of supply
+are not fixed and commodiously situated--not only the army cannot keep
+the field, but it will be exposed to the greatest dangers.”
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM XIII.
+
+
+The distances permitted between corps of an army upon the march must be
+governed by the localities, by circumstances, and by the object in view.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+When an army moves at a distance from the enemy, the columns may be
+disposed along the road so as to favor the artillery and baggage. But
+when it is marching into action, the different corps must be formed in
+close columns in order of battle. The generals must take care that the
+heads of the columns, which are to attack together, do not outstep each
+other, and that in approaching the field of action they preserve the
+relative intervals required for deployment.
+
+“The marches that are made preparatory to a battle require,” says
+Frederick, “the greatest precaution.” With this view, he recommends
+his generals to be particularly on their guard, and to reconnoitre
+the ground at successive distances, in order to secure the initiative
+by occupying those positions most calculated to favor an attack. On
+a retreat, it is the opinion of many generals that an army should
+concentrate its forces, and march in close columns if it is still
+strong enough to resume the offensive; for by this means it is easy
+to form the line when a favorable opportunity presents itself, either
+for holding the enemy in check or for attacking him if he is not in a
+situation to accept battle.
+
+Such was Moreau’s retreat after the passage of the Adda by the
+Austro-Russian army. The French general, after having covered the
+evacuation of Milan, took up a position between the Po and the Tanaro.
+
+His camp rested upon Alexandria and Valentia, two capital fortresses,
+and had the advantage of covering the roads to Turin and Savona, by
+which he could effect his retreat in case he was unable to accomplish a
+junction with the _corps d’armee_ of Macdonald, who had been ordered to
+quit the kingdom of Naples, and hasten his march into Tuscany.
+
+Forced to abandon his position in consequence of the insurrection in
+Piedmont and Tuscany, Moreau retired upon Asti, where he learned that
+his communication with the river of Genoa had just been cut off by the
+capture of Ceva. After several ineffectual attempts to retake this
+place, he saw that his only safety depended upon throwing himself into
+the mountains.
+
+To effect this object, he directed the whole of his battering train
+and heavy baggage by the Col de Fenestrelle upon France; then opening
+himself a way over the St. Bernard, he gained Loano with his light
+artillery and the small proportion of field equipment he had been able
+to preserve.
+
+By this skilful movement, he not only retained his communications with
+France, but was enabled to observe the motions of the army from Naples,
+and to facilitate his junction with it by directing the whole of his
+force upon the points necessary for that purpose.
+
+Macdonald, in the meantime, whose only chance of success depended on
+concentrating his little army, neglected this precaution, and was
+beaten in three successive actions at the Trebia.
+
+By this retardment of his march, he rendered all Moreau’s measures to
+unite the two armies in the plains of the Po useless, and his retreat,
+after his brilliant but fruitless efforts at the Trebia, defeated the
+other arrangements, also, which the former had made to come to his
+support. The inactivity of Marshal Suwarrow, however, finally enabled
+the French general to accomplish his junction with the remains of the
+army from Naples. Moreau then concentrated his whole force upon the
+Appenines, and placed himself in a situation to defend the important
+positions of Liguria, until the chances of war should afford him an
+opportunity of resuming the offensive.
+
+When, after a decisive battle, an army has lost its artillery and
+equipments, and is consequently no longer in a state to assume the
+offensive, or even to arrest the pursuit of the enemy, it would
+seem most desirable to divide what remains into several corps, and
+order them to march by separate and distant routes upon the base of
+operation, and throw themselves into the fortresses. This is the only
+means of safety: for the enemy, uncertain as to the precise direction
+taken by the vanquished army, is ignorant in the first instance which
+corps to pursue, and it is in this moment of indecision that a march is
+gained upon him. Besides, the movements of a small body being so much
+easier than those of a larger one, these separate lines of march are
+all in favor of a retreating army.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM XIV.
+
+
+Among mountains, a great number of positions are always to be found
+very strong in themselves, and which it is dangerous to attack. The
+character of this mode of warfare consists in occupying camps on the
+flanks or in the rear of the enemy, leaving him only the alternative
+of abandoning his position without fighting, to take up another in
+the rear, or to descend from it in order to attack you. In mountain
+warfare, the assailant has always the disadvantage; even in offensive
+warfare in the open field, the great secret consists in defensive
+combats, and in obliging the enemy to attack.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+During the campaign of 1793, in the Maritime Alps, the French army,
+under the orders of General Brunet, did all in its power to get
+possession of the camps at Raus and at Fourches, by an attack in front.
+But these useless efforts served only to increase the courage of the
+Piedmontese, and to destroy the _élite_ of the grenadiers of the
+republican army. The manœuvres by which Napoleon, without fighting,
+compelled the enemy to evacuate these positions in 1796, suffice to
+establish the truth of these principles, and to prove how much success
+in war depends upon the genius of the general as well as on the courage
+of the soldier.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM XV.
+
+
+The first consideration with a general who offers battle, should be the
+glory and honor of his arms; the safety and preservation of his men is
+only the second; but it is in the enterprise and courage resulting
+from the former, that the latter will most assuredly be found. In a
+retreat, besides the honor of the army, the loss of life is often
+greater than in two battles. For this reason, we should never despair
+while brave men are to be found with their colors. It is by this means
+that we obtain victory, and deserve to obtain it.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+In 1645, the French army, under the orders of the Prince of Condé, was
+on the march to lay siege to Nordlingen, when it was discovered that
+Count Merci, who commanded the Bavarians, had foreseen this intention,
+and had entrenched himself in a strong position which defended
+Nordlingen at the same time that it covered Donawerth.
+
+Notwithstanding the favorable position of the enemy, Condé ordered the
+attack. The combat was terrible. All the infantry in the centre and on
+the right, after being successively engaged, was routed and dispersed,
+in spite of the efforts of the cavalry and the reserve, which were
+likewise carried away with the fugitives. The battle was lost. Condé,
+in despair, having no longer either centre or right to depend upon,
+collected the remnants of his battalions, and directed his march to the
+left, where Turenne was still engaged. This perseverance reanimated
+the ardor of the troops. They broke the right wing of the enemy,
+and Turenne, by a change of front, returned to the attack upon his
+centre. Night, too, favored the boldness of Condé. An entire corps of
+Bavarians, fancying themselves cut off, laid down their arms; and the
+obstinacy of the French general in this struggle for victory was repaid
+by possession of the field of battle, together with a great number of
+prisoners, and almost all the enemy’s artillery. The Bavarian army beat
+a retreat, and the next day Nordlingen capitulated.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM XVI.
+
+
+It is an approved maxim in war, never to do what the enemy wishes you
+to do, for this reason alone, that he desires it. A field of battle,
+therefore, which he has previously studied and reconnoitred, should
+be avoided, and double care should be taken where he has had time to
+fortify and entrench. One consequence deducible from this principle is,
+never to attack a position in front which you can gain by turning.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+It was without due regard to this principle, that Marshal Villeroi, on
+assuming the command of the army of Italy, during the campaign of 1701,
+attacked, with unwarrantable presumption, Prince Eugene, of Savoy, in
+his entrenched position of Chiavi, on the Oglio. The French generals,
+Catinat among the rest, considered the post unassailable, but Villeroi
+insisted, and the result of this otherwise unimportant battle was the
+loss of the _élite_ of the French army. It would have been greater
+still, but for Catinat’s exertions.
+
+It was by neglecting the same principle, that the Prince of Condé, in
+the campaign of 1644, failed in all his attacks upon the entrenched
+position of the Bavarian army. The Count Merci, who commanded the
+latter, had drawn up his cavalry skilfully upon the plain, resting
+upon Freyberg, while his infantry occupied the mountain. After many
+fruitless attempts, the Prince of Condé, seeing the impossibility of
+dislodging the enemy, began to menace his communications--but the
+moment Merci perceived this, he broke up his camp and retired beyond
+the Black mountains.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM XVII.
+
+
+In a war of march and manœuvre, if you would avoid a battle with a
+superior army, it is necessary to entrench every night, and occupy a
+good defensive position. Those natural positions which are ordinarily
+met with, are not sufficient to protect an army against superior
+numbers without recourse to art.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+The campaign of the French and Spanish army, commanded by the Duke
+of Berwick, against the Portuguese, in the year 1706, affords a good
+lesson on this subject. The two armies made almost the tour of Spain.
+They began the campaign near Badajoz, and after manœuvring across both
+Castiles, finished it in the kingdoms of Valencia and Murcia. The
+Duke of Berwick encamped his army eighty-five times, and although the
+campaign passed without a general action, he took about ten thousand
+prisoners from the enemy. Marshal Turenne also made a fine campaign of
+manœuvre against the Count Montécuculli, in 1675.
+
+The imperial army having made its arrangements to pass the Rhine at
+Strasburg, Turenne used all diligence, and, throwing a bridge over the
+river near the village of Ottenheim, three leagues below Strasburg, he
+crossed with the French army, and encamped close to the little town
+of Vilstet, which he occupied. This position covered the bridge of
+Strasburg, so that, by this manœuvre, Turenne deprived the enemy of all
+approach to that city.
+
+Upon this, Montécuculli made a movement with his whole army,
+threatening the bridge at Ottenheim, by which the French received their
+provisions from upper Alsace.
+
+As soon as Turenne discovered the design of the enemy, he left a
+detachment at Vilstet, and made a rapid march with his whole force
+upon the village of Altenheim. This intermediate position between
+the two bridges, which he wished to preserve, gave him the advantage
+of being able to succor either of these posts before the enemy had
+time to carry them. Montécuculli seeing that any successful attack
+upon the bridges was not to be expected, resolved to pass the Rhine
+below Strasburg, and with this view returned to his first position
+at Offenburg. Marshal Turenne, who followed all the movements of the
+Austrian army, brought back his army also to Vilstet.
+
+In the meantime, this attempt of the enemy having convinced the French
+general of the danger to which his bridge had exposed him, removed it
+nearer to that of Strasburg, in order to diminish the extent of ground
+he had to defend.
+
+Montécuculli, having commanded the magistrates of Strasburg to collect
+materials for a bridge, moved to Scherzheim to receive them; but
+Turenne again defeated his projects by taking a position at Freistett,
+where he occupied the islands of the Rhine, and immediately constructed
+a stockade.
+
+Thus it was that, during the whole of this campaign, Turenne succeeded
+in gaining the initiative of the enemy, and obliging him to follow
+his movements. He succeeded, also, by a rapid march, in cutting off
+Montécuculli from the Town of Offenburg, whence he drew his supplies,
+and would no doubt have prevented the Austrian general from effecting
+his junction with the corps of Caprara, had not a cannon-shot
+terminated this great man’s life.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM XVIII.
+
+
+A general of ordinary talent occupying a bad position, and surprised
+by a superior force, seeks his safety in retreat; but a great captain
+supplies all deficiencies by his courage, and marches boldly to meet
+the attack. By this means he disconcerts his adversary; and if the
+latter shows any irresolution in his movements, a skilful leader,
+profiting by his indecision, may even hope for victory, or at least
+employ the day in manœuvring--at night he entrenches himself, or falls
+back to a better position. By this determined conduct he maintains the
+honor of his arms, the first essential to all military superiority.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+In 1653, Marshal Turenne was surprised by the Prince of Condé, in a
+position where his army was completely compromised. He had the power,
+indeed, by an immediate retreat, of covering himself by the Somme,
+which he possessed the means of crossing at Peronne, and whence he
+was distant only half a league; but, fearing the influence of this
+retrograde movement on the _morale_ of his army, Turenne balanced all
+disadvantages by his courage, and marched boldly to meet the enemy with
+very inferior forces. After marching a league, he found an advantageous
+position, where he made every disposition for a battle. It was three
+o’clock in the afternoon; but the Spaniards, exhausted with fatigue,
+hesitated to attack him, and Turenne having covered himself with
+entrenchments during the night, the enemy no longer dared to risk a
+general action, and broke up his camp.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM XIX.
+
+
+The transition from the defensive to the offensive is one of the most
+delicate operations.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+By studying the first campaign of Napoleon in Italy, we can learn
+what genius and boldness may effect in passing with an army from the
+_defensive_ to the _offensive_. The army of the allies, commanded by
+General Beaulieu, was provided with every means that could render it
+formidable. Its force amounted to eighty thousand men, and two hundred
+pieces of cannon. The French army, on the contrary, could number
+scarcely thirty thousand men under arms, and thirty pieces of cannon.
+For some time there had been no issue of meat, and even the bread
+was irregularly supplied. The infantry was ill clothed, the cavalry
+wretchedly mounted. All the draught-horses had perished from want, so
+that the service of the artillery was performed by mules. To remedy
+these evils, large disbursements were necessary; and such was the state
+of the finances, that the government had only been able to furnish two
+thousand louis in specie for the opening of the campaign. The French
+army could not possibly exist in this state. To advance or retreat was
+absolutely necessary. Aware of the advantage of surprising the enemy
+at the very outset of the campaign by some decisive blow, Napoleon
+prepared for it by recasting the _morale_ of his army.
+
+In a proclamation full of energy, he reminded them that an ignoble
+death alone remained for them, if they continued on the defensive;
+that they had nothing to expect from France, but everything to hope
+from victory. “Abundance courts you in the fertile plains of Italy,”
+said he; “are you deficient, soldiers, in constancy or in courage?”
+Profiting by the moment of enthusiasm which he had inspired, Napoleon
+concentrated his forces in order to fall with his whole weight on the
+different corps of the enemy. Immediately afterward, the battles of
+Montenotte, Milesimo, and Mondovi, added fresh confidence to the high
+opinion already entertained by the soldier for his chief; and that army
+which only a few days ago was encamped amid barren rocks, and consumed
+by famine, already aspired to the conquest of Italy. In one month
+after the opening of the campaign, Napoleon had terminated the war with
+the King of Sardinia, and conquered the Milanese. Rich cantonments soon
+dispelled from the recollection of the French soldier the misery and
+fatigue attendant on this rapid march, while a vigilant administration
+of the resources of the country reorganized the _materiel_ of the
+French army, and created the means necessary for the attainment of
+future success.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM XX.
+
+
+It may be laid down as a principle, that the line of operation should
+not be abandoned; but it is one of the most skilful manœuvres in war,
+to know how to change it, when circumstances authorize or render this
+necessary. An army which changes skilfully its line of operation
+deceives the enemy, who becomes ignorant where to look for its rear, or
+upon what weak points it is assailable.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+Frederick sometimes changed his line of operation in the middle of a
+campaign; but he was enabled to do this, because he was manœuvring at
+that time in the centre of Germany--an abundant country, capable of
+supplying all the wants of his army in case his communications with
+Prussia were intercepted.
+
+Marshal Turenne, in the campaign of 1746, gave up his line of
+communication to the allies in the same manner; but, like Frederick,
+he was carrying on the war at this time in the centre of Germany, and
+having fallen with his whole forces upon Rain, he took the precaution
+of securing to himself a depôt upon which to establish his base of
+operation.
+
+By a series of manœuvres, marked alike by audacity and genius, he
+subsequently compelled the imperial army to abandon its magazines, and
+retire into Austria for winter quarters.
+
+But these are examples which it appears to me should only be imitated
+when we have taken full measure of the capacity of our adversary, and
+above all, when we see no reason to apprehend an insurrection in the
+country to which we transfer the theatre of war.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM XXI.
+
+
+When an army carries with it a battering train, or large convoys of
+sick and wounded, it cannot march by too short a line upon its depôts.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+It is above all in mountainous countries, and in those interspersed
+with woods and marshes, that it is of importance to observe this maxim;
+for, the convoys and means of transport being frequently embarrassed
+in defiles, an enemy by manœuvring may easily disperse the escorts, or
+make even a successful attack upon the whole army, when it is obliged,
+from the nature of the country, to march in an extended column.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM XXII.
+
+
+The art of encamping in position is the same as taking up the line in
+order of battle in this position. To this end, the artillery should be
+advantageously placed, ground should be selected which is not commanded
+or liable to be turned, and, as far as possible, the guns should cover
+and command the surrounding country.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+Frederick has remarked that, in order to be assured that your camp is
+well placed, you should see if, by making a small movement, you can
+oblige the enemy to make a greater; or, if after having forced him to
+retrograde one march you can compel him to fall back another.
+
+In defensive war, all camps should be entrenched in the front and
+wings of the position they occupy, and care should be taken that the
+rear is left perfectly open. If you are threatened with being turned,
+arrangements should be made beforehand for taking up a more distant
+position; and you should profit by any disorder in the enemy’s line of
+march, to make an attempt upon his artillery or baggage.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM XXIII.
+
+
+When you are occupying a position which the enemy threatens to
+surround, collect all your force immediately, and menace _him_ with
+an offensive movement. By this manœuvre, you will prevent him from
+detaching and annoying your flanks in case you should judge it
+necessary to retire.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+This was the manœuvre practised by General Desaix, in 1798, near
+Radstadt. He made up for inferiority in numbers by audacity, and
+maintained himself the whole day in position in spite of the vigorous
+attacks of the Archduke Charles. At night he effected his retreat in
+good order, and took up a position in the rear.
+
+It was in accordance, also, with this principle, in the same campaign,
+that General Moreau gave battle at Biberach, to secure his retreat
+by the passes of the Black mountains. A few days after, he fought at
+Schliengen with the same object. Placed in a good defensive position,
+he menaced the Archduke Charles by a sudden return to the offensive,
+while his artillery and baggage were passing the Rhine by the bridge of
+Huningen, and he was making all the necessary arrangements for retiring
+behind that river himself.
+
+Here, however, I would observe, that the execution of such offensive
+demonstrations should be deferred always till toward the evening, in
+order that you may not be compromised by engaging too early in a combat
+which you cannot long maintain with success.
+
+Night, and the uncertainty of the enemy after an affair of this kind,
+will always favor your retreat, if it is judged necessary; but,
+with a view to mask the operation more effectually, fires should be
+lighted all along the lines, to deceive the enemy and prevent him from
+discovering this retrograde movement, for in a retreat it is a great
+advantage to gain a march upon your adversary.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM XXIV.
+
+
+Never lose sight of this maxim: that you should establish your
+cantonments at the most distant and best-protected point from the
+enemy, especially where a surprise is possible. By this means you will
+have time to unite all your forces before he can attack you.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+In the campaign of 1745, Marshal Turenne lost the battle of Marienthal,
+by neglecting this principle; for if, instead of reassembling his
+divisions at Erbsthausen, he had rallied his troops at Mergentheim,
+behind the Tauber, his army would have been much sooner reunited; and
+Count Merci, in place of finding only three thousand men to fight at
+Erbsthausen (of which he was well informed), would have had the whole
+French army to attack in a position covered by a river.
+
+Some one having indiscreetly asked Viscount Turenne how he had lost the
+battle of Marienthal: “By my own fault,” replied the marshal; “but,”
+added he, “when a man has committed no faults in war, he can only have
+been engaged in it but a short time.”
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM XXV.
+
+
+When two armies are in order of battle, and one has to retire over a
+bridge, while the other has the circumference of the circle open, all
+the advantages are in favor of the latter. It is then a general should
+show boldness, strike a decided blow, and manœuvre upon the flank of
+his enemy. The victory is in his hands.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+This was the position of the French army at the famous battle of
+Leipzig, which terminated the campaign of 1813 so fatally for Napoleon;
+for the battle of Hanau was of no consequence, comparatively, in the
+desperate situation of that army.
+
+It strikes me that, in a situation like that of the French army
+previous to the battle of Leipzig, a general should never calculate
+upon any of those lucky chances which may arise out of a return to the
+offensive, but that he should rather adopt every possible means to
+secure his retreat. With this view, he should immediately cover himself
+with good entrenchments, to enable him to repel with inferior numbers
+the attack of the enemy, while his own equipments are crossing the
+river. As fast as the troops reach the other side, they should occupy
+positions to protect the passage of the rear guard, and this last
+should be covered by a _tête de pont_ as soon as the army breaks up its
+camp. During the wars of the Revolution, too little regard was paid
+to entrenchments; and it is for this reason we have seen large armies
+dispersed after a single reverse, and the fate of nations compromised
+by the issue of one battle.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM XXVI.
+
+
+It is contrary to all true principle, to make corps, which have no
+communication with each other, act separately against a central force
+whose communications are cut off.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+The Austrians lost the battle of Hohenlinden by neglecting this
+principle. The imperial army, under the orders of the archduke John,
+was divided into four columns, which had to march through an immense
+forest, previous to their junction in the plain of Anzing, where they
+intended to surprise the French. But these different corps, having no
+direct communication, found themselves compelled to engage separately
+with an enemy who had taken the precaution of concentrating his masses,
+and who could move them with facility in a country with which he had
+been long previously acquainted.
+
+Thus the Austrian army, enclosed in the defiles of the forest with its
+whole train of artillery and baggage, was attacked in its flanks and
+rear, and the archduke John was only enabled to rally his dispersed and
+shattered divisions under cover of the night.
+
+The trophies obtained by the French army on this day were immense. They
+consisted of eleven thousand prisoners, one hundred pieces of cannon,
+several stand of colors, and all the baggage of the enemy.
+
+The battle of Hohenlinden decided the fate of the campaign of 1800, and
+Moreau’s brilliant and well-merited success placed him in the rank of
+the first general of the age.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM XXVII.
+
+
+When an army is driven from a first position, the retreating columns
+should rally always sufficiently in the rear, to prevent any
+interruption from the enemy. The greatest disaster that can happen, is
+when the columns are attacked in detail, and before their junction.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+One great advantage which results from rallying your columns on a point
+far removed from the field of battle, or from the position previously
+occupied, is, that the enemy is uncertain as to the direction you mean
+to take.
+
+If he divides his force to pursue you, he exposes himself to see his
+detachments beaten in detail, especially if you have exerted all due
+diligence, and have effected the junction of your troops in sufficient
+time to get between his columns and disperse them one after the other.
+
+It was by a manœuvre of this kind in the campaign of Italy, in 1799,
+that General Melas gained the battle of Genola.
+
+General Championet commanded the French army, and endeavored to cut off
+the communication of the Austrians with Turin, by employing corps which
+manœuvred separately to get into their rear. Melas, who divined his
+project, made a retrograde march, by which he persuaded his adversary
+he was in full retreat, although the real object of his movement was
+to concentrate his forces at the point fixed for the junction of
+the different detachments of the French army, and which he beat and
+dispersed, one after another, by his great superiority in numbers. The
+result of this manœuvre, in which the Austrian general displayed vigor,
+decision, and foresight, secured to him the peaceable possession of
+Piedmont.
+
+It was also by the neglect of this principle that General Beaulieu, who
+commanded the Austro-Sardinian army in the campaign of 1796, lost the
+battle of Milesimo after that of Montenotte.
+
+His object, in endeavoring to rally his different corps upon Milesimo,
+was, to cover the high roads of Turin and Milan; but Napoleon, aware of
+the advantages arising from the ardor of troops emboldened by recent
+success, attacked him before he could assemble his divisions, and, by
+a series of skilful manœuvres, succeeded in separating the combined
+armies. They retired in the greatest disorder--the one by the road of
+Milan, the other by that of Turin.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM XXVIII.
+
+
+No force should be detached on the eve of a battle, because affairs may
+change during the night, either by the retreat of the enemy, or by the
+arrival of large reinforcements to enable him to resume the offensive,
+and counteract your previous arrangements.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+In 1796, the army of the Sambre and Meuse, commanded by General
+Jourdan, effected a retreat, which was rendered still more difficult
+by the loss of his line of communication. Seeing, however, that the
+forces of the archduke Charles were scattered, Jourdan, in order to
+accomplish his retreat upon Frankfort, resolved to open himself a way
+by Wurtzburg, where there were at that moment only two divisions of
+the Austrian army. This movement would have been attended with success,
+if the French general, believing he had simply these two divisions to
+contend with, had not committed the error of separating himself from
+the corps of Lefevre--which he left at Schweinfurt to cover the only
+direct communication of the army with its base of operation.
+
+The commission of this fault at the outset, added to some slowness in
+the march of the French general, secured the victory to the archduke,
+who hastened to concentrate his forces.
+
+The arrival of the two divisions, also, of Kray and Wartesleben, during
+the battle, enabled him to oppose fifty thousand men to the French
+army, which scarcely numbered thirty thousand combatants. This last
+was consequently beaten, and obliged to continue its retreat by the
+mountains of Fuldes, where the badness of the roads could be equalled
+only by the difficulty of the country.
+
+The division of Lefevre, amounting to fourteen thousand men, would,
+in all probability, have turned the scale in favor of Jourdan, had
+the latter not unfortunately conceived that two divisions only were
+opposing his passage to Wurtzburg.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM XXIX.
+
+
+When you have resolved to fight a battle, collect your whole force.
+Dispense with nothing. A single battalion sometimes decides the day.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+I think it here desirable to observe, that it is prudent before a
+battle to fix upon some point in rear of the reserve for the junction
+of the different detachments; for if, from unforeseen circumstances,
+these detachments should be prevented from joining before the action
+has commenced, they might be exposed, in case a retrograde movement
+should be found necessary, to the masses of the enemy. It is desirable
+also to keep the enemy in ignorance of these reinforcements, in order
+to employ them with greater effect. “A seasonable reinforcement,” says
+Frederick, “renders the success of a battle certain, because the enemy
+will always imagine it stronger than it really is, and lose courage
+accordingly.”
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM XXX.
+
+
+Nothing is so rash or so contrary to principle, as to make a flank
+march before an army in position, especially when this army occupies
+heights at the foot of which you are forced to defile.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+It was by a neglect of this principle that Frederick was beaten at
+Kollin in the first campaign of 1757. Notwithstanding prodigies of
+valor, the Prussians lost fifteen thousand men and a great portion of
+their artillery, while the loss of the Austrians did not exceed five
+thousand men. The consequence of this battle was more unfortunate
+still, since it obliged the King of Prussia to raise the siege of
+Prague, and to evacuate Bohemia.
+
+It was also by making a flank march before the Prussian army, that the
+French lost the disgraceful battle of Rosbach.
+
+This imprudent movement was still more to be reprehended, because the
+Prince de Soubise, who commanded the French army, was so negligent as
+to manœuvre, without either advanced guards or flanking corps, in
+presence of the enemy. The result was, that his army, consisting of
+fifty thousand men, was beaten by six battalions and thirty squadrons.
+The French lost seven thousand men, twenty-seven standards, and a great
+number of cannon. The Prussians had only three hundred men disabled.
+
+Thus, by having forgotten this principle, _that a flank march is never
+to be made before an enemy in line of battle_, Frederick lost his army
+at Kollin; and Soubise, at Rosbach, lost both his army and his honor.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM XXXI.
+
+
+When you determine to risk a battle, reserve to yourself every possible
+chance of success, more particularly if you have to deal with an
+adversary of superior talent; for if you are beaten, even in the midst
+of your magazines and your communications, wo to the vanquished!
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+“We should make war,” says Marshal Saxe, “without leaving anything
+to hazard, and in this especially consists the talent of a general.
+But when we have incurred the risk of a battle, we should know how to
+profit by the victory, and not merely content ourselves, according to
+custom, with possession of the field.”
+
+It was by neglecting to follow up the first success, that the Austrian
+army, after gaining the field of Marengo, saw itself compelled on the
+following day to evacuate the whole of Italy.
+
+General Melas, observing the French in retreat, left the direction
+of the movements of his army to the chief of his staff, and retired
+to Alexandria to repose from the fatigues of the day. Colonel Zach,
+equally convinced with his general that the French army was completely
+broken, and consisted only of fugitives, formed the divisions in column
+of route.
+
+By this arrangement, the imperial army prepared to enter upon its
+victorious march in a formation not less than three miles in depth.
+
+It was near four o’clock when General Desaix rejoined the French army
+with his division. His presence restored in some degree an equality
+between the contending forces; and yet Napoleon hesitated for a moment
+whether to resume the offensive, or to make use of this corps to secure
+his retreat. The ardor of the troops to return to the charge, decided
+his irresolution. He rode rapidly along the front of his divisions, and
+addressing the soldiers--“We have retired far enough for to-day,” said
+he; “you know I always sleep upon the field of battle!”
+
+The army, with unanimous shout, proclaimed to him a promise of
+victory. Napoleon resumed the offensive. The Austrian advance guard,
+panic-struck at the sight of a formidable and unbroken body presenting
+itself suddenly at a point where, a few moments before, only fugitives
+were to be seen, went to the right about, and carried disorder into the
+mass of its columns. Attacked immediately afterward, with impetuosity,
+in its front and flanks, the Austrian army was completely routed.
+
+Marshal Daun experienced nearly the same fate as General Melas, at the
+battle of Torgau, in the campaign of 1760.
+
+The position of the Austrian army was excellent. It had its left upon
+Torgau, its right on the plateau of Siptitz, and its front covered by a
+large sheet of water.
+
+Frederick proposed to turn its right in order to make an attack upon
+the rear. For this purpose he divided his army into two corps, the one
+under the orders of Ziethen, with instructions to attack in front,
+following the edge of the water; the other under his own immediate
+command, with which he set out to turn the right of the Austrians.
+But Marshal Daun having had intimation of the movements of the enemy,
+changed his front by countermarching, and was thus enabled to repel
+the attacks of Frederick, whom he obliged to retreat. The two corps
+of the Prussian army had been acting without communication. Ziethen,
+in the meantime, hearing the fire recede, concluded that the king had
+been beaten, and commenced a movement by his left in order to rejoin
+him; but falling in with two battalions of the reserve, the Prussian
+general profited by this reinforcement to resume the offensive.
+Accordingly he renewed the attack with vigor, got possession of the
+plateau of Siptitz, and soon after of the whole field of battle. The
+sun had already set when the King of Prussia received the news of this
+unexpected good fortune. He returned in all haste, took advantage of
+the night to restore order in his disorganized army, and the day after
+the battle occupied Torgau.
+
+Marshal Daun was receiving congratulations upon his victory, when he
+heard that the Prussians had resumed the offensive. He immediately
+commanded a retreat, and at daybreak the Austrians repassed the Elbe
+with the loss of twelve thousand men, eight thousand prisoners, and
+forty-five pieces of cannon.
+
+After the battle of Marengo, General Melas, although in the midst
+of his fortresses and magazines, saw himself compelled to abandon
+everything, in order to save the wreck of his army.
+
+General Mack capitulated after the battle of Ulm, although in the
+centre of his own country.
+
+The Prussians, in spite of their depôts and reserves, were obliged,
+after the battle of Jena, and the French after that of Waterloo, to lay
+down their arms.
+
+Hence, we may conclude that the misfortune that results from the loss
+of a battle, does not consist so much in the destruction of men and of
+_materiel_ as in the discouragement which follows this disaster. The
+courage and confidence of the victors augment in proportion as those
+of the vanquished diminish; and whatever may be the resources of an
+army, it will be found that a retreat will degenerate rapidly into a
+rout unless the general-in-chief shall succeed, by combining boldness
+with skill, and perseverance with firmness, in restoring the _morale_
+of his army.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM XXXII.
+
+
+The duty of an advanced guard does not consist in advancing or
+retiring, but in manœuvring. An advanced guard should be composed
+of light cavalry, supported by a reserve of heavy cavalry, and by
+battalions of infantry, supported also by artillery. An advanced guard
+should consist of picked troops, and the general officers, officers
+and men, should be selected for their respective capabilities and
+knowledge. A corps deficient in instruction is only an embarrassment to
+an advanced guard.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+It was the opinion of Frederick that an advanced guard should be
+composed of detachments of troops of all arms. The commander should
+possess skill in the choice of ground, and he should take care to be
+instantly informed, by means of numerous patrols, of everything passing
+in the enemy’s camp.
+
+In war, it is not the business of an advanced guard to fight, but to
+observe the enemy, in order to cover the movements of the army. When in
+pursuit, the advanced guard should charge with vigor, and cut off the
+baggage and insulated corps of the retiring enemy. For this purpose, it
+should be reinforced with all the disposable light cavalry of the army.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM XXXIII.
+
+
+It is contrary to the usages of war to allow parks or batteries of
+artillery to enter a defile, unless you hold the other extremity. In
+case of retreat, the guns will embarrass your movements and be lost.
+They should be left in position, under a sufficient escort, until you
+are master of the opening.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+Nothing encumbers the march of an army so much as a quantity of
+baggage. In the campaign of 1796, Napoleon abandoned his battering
+train under the walls of Mantua, after spiking the guns and destroying
+the carriages. By this sacrifice, he acquired a facility of manœuvring
+rapidly his little army, and obtained the initiative as well as a
+general superiority over the numerous but divided forces of Marshal
+Wurmser.
+
+In 1799, during his retreat in Italy, General Moreau being compelled
+to manœuvre among the mountains, preferred separating himself entirely
+from his reserve artillery, which he directed upon France by the Col
+de Fenestrelle, rather than embarrass his march with this part of his
+equipment.
+
+These are the examples we should follow; for if, by a rapidity of
+march, and a facility of concentration upon decisive points, the
+victory is gained, the _materiel_ of an army is soon re-established.
+But if, on the other hand, we are beaten and compelled to retreat, it
+will be difficult to save our equipments, and we may have reason to
+congratulate ourselves that we abandoned them in time to prevent them
+from augmenting the trophies of the enemy.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM XXXIV.
+
+
+It should be laid down as a principle, never to leave intervals by
+which the enemy can penetrate between corps formed in order of battle,
+unless it be to draw him into a snare.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+In the campaign of 1757, the Prince of Lorraine, who was covering
+Prague with the Austrian army, perceived the Prussians threatening, by
+a flank movement, to turn his right. He immediately ordered a partial
+change of front by throwing back the infantry of that wing, so as to
+form a right angle with the rest of the line. But this manœuvre being
+executed in presence of the enemy, was not effected without some
+disorder. The heads of the columns having marched too quick, caused
+the rear to lengthen out, and when the line was formed to the right,
+a large interval appeared at the salient angle. Frederick, observing
+this error, hastened to take advantage of it. He directed his centre
+corps, commanded by the Duke of Bevern, to throw itself into this
+opening, and by this manœuvre decided the fate of the battle.
+
+The Prince of Lorraine returned to Prague, beaten and pursued, with the
+loss of sixteen thousand men and two hundred pieces of cannon.
+
+It should be observed at the same time, that this operation of throwing
+a corps into the intervals made by an army in time of battle, should
+never be attempted unless you are at least equal in force, and have
+an opportunity of outflanking the enemy on the one side or the other;
+for it is then only you can hope to divide his army in the centre, and
+insulate the wings entirely. If you are inferior in number, you run the
+risk of being stopped by the reverses, and overpowered by the enemy’s
+wings, which may deploy upon your flanks and surround you.
+
+It was by this manœuvre that the Duke of Berwick gained the battle of
+Almanza, in the year 1707, in Spain.
+
+The Anglo-Portuguese army, under the command of Lord Galloway, came to
+invest Villena. Marshal Berwick, who commanded the French and Spanish
+army, quitted his camp at Montalegre, and moved upon this town to
+raise the siege. At his approach, the English general, eager to fight
+a battle, advanced to meet him in the plains of Almanza. The issue was
+long doubtful. The first line, commanded by the Duke of Popoli, having
+been broken, the Chevalier d’Asfeldt, who had charge of the second,
+drew up his masses with large intervals between them; and when the
+English, who were in pursuit of the first line, reached these reserves,
+he took advantage of their disorder to attack them in flank and
+defeated them entirely.
+
+Marshal Berwick, perceiving the success of this manœuvre, threw open
+his front, and deploying upon the enemy’s flanks, while the reserve
+sustained the attack in front, and the cavalry manœuvred in their rear,
+obtained a complete victory.
+
+Lord Galloway, wounded and pursued, collected with difficulty the
+remains of his army, and took shelter with them in Tortosa.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM XXXV.
+
+
+Encampments of the same army should always be formed so as to protect
+each other.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+At the battle of Dresden, in the campaign of 1813, the camp of the
+allies, although advantageously placed upon the heights on the left
+bank of the Elbe, was nevertheless extremely defective, from being
+traversed longitudinally by a deep ravine, which separated the left
+wing completely from the centre and the right. This vicious arrangement
+did not escape the penetrating eye of Napoleon. He instantly directed
+the whole of his cavalry and two corps of infantry against the
+insulated wing, attacked it with superior numbers, overthrew it, and
+took ten thousand prisoners, before it was possible to come to its
+support.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM XXXVI.
+
+
+When the enemy’s army is covered by a river, upon which he holds
+several _têtes de pont_, do not attack in front. This would divide
+your force and expose you to be turned. Approach the river in echelon
+of columns, in such a manner that the leading column shall be the
+only one the enemy can attack, without offering you his flank. In
+the meantime, let your light troops occupy the bank, and when you
+have decided on the point of passage, rush upon it and fling across
+your bridge. Observe that the point of passage should be always at a
+distance from the leading echelon, in order to deceive the enemy.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+If you occupy a town or a village on the bank of a river, opposite
+to that held by the enemy, it is an advantage to make this spot the
+crossing point, because it is easier to cover your carriages and
+reserve artillery, as well as to mask the construction of your bridge,
+in a town, than in the open country. It is also a great advantage
+to pass a river opposite a village, when the latter is only weakly
+occupied by the enemy; because as soon as the advanced guard reaches
+the other side, it carries this post, makes a lodgment, and by
+throwing up a few defensive works, converts it easily into a _tête de
+pont_. By this means, the rest of the army is enabled to effect the
+passage with facility.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM XXXVII.
+
+
+From the moment you are master of a position which commands the
+opposite bank, facilities are acquired for effecting the passage of
+the river; above all, if this position is sufficiently extensive to
+place upon it artillery in force. This advantage is diminished, if
+the river is more than three hundred toises (or six hundred yards)
+in breadth, because the distance being out of the range of grape, it
+is easy for the troops which defend the passage to line the bank and
+get under cover. Hence it follows that if the grenadiers, ordered to
+pass the river for the protection of the bridge, should reach the
+other side, they would be destroyed by the fire of the enemy; because
+his batteries, placed at the distance of two hundred toises from the
+landing, are capable of a most destructive effect, although removed
+above five hundred toises from the batteries of the crossing force.
+Thus the advantage of the artillery would be exclusively his. For
+the same reason, the passage is impracticable, unless you succeed in
+surprising the enemy, and are protected by an intermediate island, or,
+unless you are able to take advantage of an angle in the river, to
+establish a crossfire upon his works. In this case, the island or angle
+forms a natural _tête de pont_, and gives the advantage in artillery to
+the attacking army.
+
+When a river is less than sixty toises (or one hundred and twenty
+yards) in breadth, and you have a post upon the other side, the troops
+which are thrown across derive such advantages from the protection of
+your artillery, that, however small the angle may be, it is impossible
+for the enemy to prevent the establishment of a bridge. In this case,
+the most skilful generals, when they have discovered the project of
+their adversary, and brought their own army to the point of crossing,
+usually content themselves with opposing the passage of the bridge, by
+forming a semicircle round its extremity, as round the opening of a
+defile, and removing to the distance of three or four hundred toises
+from the fire of the opposite side.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+Frederick observes, that “the passage of great rivers in the presence
+of the enemy is one of the most delicate operations in war.” Success on
+these occasions depends on secrecy, on the rapidity of the manœuvres,
+and the punctual execution of the orders given for the movements of
+each division. To pass such an obstacle in presence of an enemy, and
+without his knowledge, it is necessary not only that the previous
+dispositions should be well conceived, but that they should be executed
+without confusion.
+
+In the campaign of 1705, Prince Eugene, of Savoy, wishing to come to
+the assistance of the Prince of Piedmont, sought for a favorable point
+at which to force the passage of the Adda, defended at that time by
+the French army, under the command of the Duke de Vendome.
+
+After having selected an advantageous situation, Prince Eugene erected
+a battery of twenty pieces of cannon on a position which commanded the
+entire of the opposite bank, and covered his infantry by a line of
+entrenched parallels constructed on the slope of the declivity.
+
+They were working vigorously at the bridge, when the Duke de Vendome
+appeared with his whole army. At first he seemed determined to oppose
+its construction, but after having examined the position of Prince
+Eugene, he judged this to be impracticable.
+
+He therefore placed his army out of reach of the prince’s batteries,
+resting both his wings upon the river, so as to form a bow, of which
+the Adda was the cord. He then covered himself with entrenchments and
+abattis, and was thus enabled to charge the enemy’s columns whenever
+they debouched from the bridge, and to beat them in detail.
+
+Eugene, having reconnoitred the position of the French, considered the
+passage impossible. He therefore withdrew the bridge, and broke up his
+camp during the night.
+
+It was by this manœuvre, also, that, in the campaign of 1809, the
+Archduke Charles compelled the French to reoccupy the isle of Lobau,
+after having debouched on the left bank of the Danube. The march of the
+Archduke Charles was wholly concentric. He menaced Grosaspern with his
+right, Esling with his centre, and Enzersdorf with his left.
+
+His army, with both wings resting on the Danube, formed a semicircle
+around Esling. Napoleon immediately attacked and broke the centre of
+the Austrians; but after having forced their first line, he found
+himself arrested by the reserves. In the meantime, the bridges upon
+the Danube had been destroyed, and several of his corps, with their
+parks of artillery, were still on the right bank. This disappointment,
+joined to the favorable position of the Austrians, decided Napoleon
+to re-enter the isle of Lobau, where he had previously constructed a
+line of field-works, so as to give it all the advantages of a well
+entrenched camp.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM XXXVIII.
+
+
+It is difficult to prevent an enemy, supplied with pontoons, from
+crossing a river. When the object of an army, which defends the
+passage, is to cover a siege, the moment the general has ascertained
+his inability to oppose the passage, he should take measures to arrive
+before the enemy, at an intermediate position between the river he
+defends and the place he desires to cover.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+Here we may observe, that this intermediate position should be
+reconnoitred, or rather, well entrenched beforehand; for the enemy will
+be unable to make an offensive movement against the corps employed in
+the siege, until he has beaten the army of observation; and the latter,
+under cover of its camp, may always await a favorable opportunity to
+attack him in flank or in rear.
+
+Besides, the army which is once entrenched in this manner, has the
+advantage of being concentrated; while that of the enemy must act in
+detachments, if he wishes to cover his bridge, and watch the movements
+of the army of observation, so as to enable him to attack the besieging
+corps in its lines, without being exposed to an attempt on his rear, or
+being menaced with the loss of his bridge.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM XXXIX.
+
+
+In the campaign of 1645, Turenne was attacked with his army before
+Philipsburg by a very superior force. There was no bridge here over
+the Rhine, but he took advantage of the ground between the river and
+the place to establish his camp. This should serve as a lesson to
+engineer officers, not merely in the construction of fortresses, but
+of _têtes de pont_. A space should always be left between the fortress
+and the river, where an army may form and rally without being obliged
+to throw itself into the place, and thereby compromise its security.
+An army retiring upon Mayence before a pursuing enemy, is necessarily
+compromised; for this reason, because it requires more than a day to
+pass the bridge, and because the lines of Cassel are too confined to
+admit an army to remain there without being blocked up. Two hundred
+toises should have been left between that place and the Rhine. It
+is essential that all _têtes de pont_ before great rivers should be
+constructed upon this principle, otherwise they will prove a very
+inefficient assistance to protect the passage of a retreating army.
+_Têtes de pont_, as laid down in our schools, are of use only for small
+rivers, the passage of which is comparatively short.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+Marshal Saxe, in the campaign of 1741, having passed the Moldau in
+quest of a detached corps of fourteen thousand men, which was about to
+throw itself into Prague, left a thousand infantry upon that river,
+with orders to entrench themselves upon a height directly opposite the
+_tête de pont_. By this precaution, the marshal secured his retreat,
+and also the facility of repassing the bridge without disorder, by
+rallying his divisions between the entrenched height and the _tête de
+pont_.
+
+Were these examples unknown to the generals of modern times, or are
+they disposed to think such precautions superfluous?
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM XL.
+
+
+Fortresses are equally useful in offensive and defensive warfare. It
+is true, they will not in themselves arrest an army, but they are an
+excellent means of retarding, embarrassing, weakening and annoying a
+victorious enemy.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+The brilliant success of the allied armies in the campaign of 1814, has
+given to many military men a false idea of the real value of fortresses.
+
+The formidable bodies which crossed the Rhine and the Alps at this
+period, were enabled to spare large detachments to blockade the strong
+places that covered the frontiers of France, without materially
+affecting the numerical superiority of the army which marched upon the
+capital. This army was in a condition, therefore, to act, without the
+fear of being menaced in its line of retreat.
+
+But at no period of military history were the armies of Europe so
+combined before, or governed so entirely by one common mind in the
+attainment of a single object. Under these circumstances, the line of
+fortresses which surround France was rendered unavailable during the
+campaign; but it would be very imprudent, therefore, to conclude that
+a frontier guarded by numerous fortresses may be passed with impunity;
+or that battles may be fought with these places in your rear, without
+previously besieging, or at least investing them with sufficient forces.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM XLI.
+
+
+There are only two ways of insuring the success of a siege. The first,
+to begin by beating the enemy’s army employed to cover the place,
+forcing it out of the field, and throwing its remains beyond some great
+natural obstacle, such as a chain of mountains, or large river. Having
+accomplished this object, an army of observation should be placed
+behind the natural obstacle, until the trenches are finished and the
+place taken.
+
+But if it be desired to take the place in presence of a relieving army,
+without risking a battle, then the whole _materiel_ and equipment for
+a siege are necessary to begin with, together with ammunition and
+provisions for the presumed period of its duration, and also lines of
+contravallation and circumvallation, aided by all the localities of
+heights, woods, marshes and inundations.
+
+Having no longer occasion to keep up communications with your depôts,
+it is now only requisite to hold in check the relieving army. For
+this purpose, an army of observation should be formed, whose business
+it is never to lose sight of that of the enemy, and which, while it
+effectually bars all access to the place, has always time enough to
+arrive upon his flanks or rear in case he should attempt to steal a
+march.
+
+It is to be remembered, too, that by profiting judiciously by the
+lines of contravallation, a portion of the besieging army will always
+be available in giving battle to the approaching enemy.
+
+Upon the same general principle, when a place is to be besieged in
+presence of an enemy’s army, it is necessary to cover the siege by
+lines of _circumvallation_.
+
+If the besieging force is of numerical strength enough (after leaving
+a corps before the place four times the amount of the garrison) to
+cope with the relieving army, it may remove more than one day’s march
+from the place; but if it be inferior in numbers after providing for
+the siege, as above stated, it should remain only a short day’s march
+from the spot, in order to fall back upon its lines, if necessary, or
+receive succor in case of attack.
+
+If the investing corps and army of observation are only equal when
+united to the relieving force, the besieging army should remain entire
+within, or near its lines, and push the works and the siege with the
+greatest activity.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+“When we undertake a siege,” says Montécuculli, “we should not seek to
+place ourselves opposite the weakest part of the fortress, but at the
+point most favorable for establishing a camp and executing the designs
+we have in view.”
+
+This maxim was well understood by the Duke of Berwick. Sent to form
+the siege of Nice in 1706, he determined to attack on the side of
+Montalban, contrary to the advice of Vauban, and even to the orders
+of the king. Having a very small army at his disposal, he began by
+securing his camp. This he did by constructing redoubts upon the
+heights that shut in the space between the Var and the Paillon,
+two rivers which supported his flanks. By this means, he protected
+himself against a surprise; for the Duke of Savoy, having the power
+of debouching suddenly by the Col de Tende, it was necessary that
+the marshal should be enabled to assemble his forces, so as to move
+rapidly upon his adversary, and fight him before he got into position;
+otherwise his inferiority in numbers would have obliged him to raise
+the siege.
+
+When Marshal Saxe was besieging Brussels, with only twenty-eight
+thousand men, opposed to a garrison of twelve thousand, he received
+intelligence that the Prince of Waldeck was assembling his forces
+to raise the siege. Not being strong enough to form an army of
+observation, the marshal reconnoitred a field of battle on the little
+river Voluve, and made all the necessary dispositions for moving
+rapidly to the spot, in case of the approach of the enemy. By this
+means he was prepared to receive his adversary without discontinuing
+the operations of the siege.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM XLII.
+
+
+Feuquière says that “we should never wait for the enemy in the lines
+of circumvallation, but we should go out and attack him.” He is in
+error. There is no authority in war without exception; and it would be
+dangerous to proscribe the principle of awaiting the enemy within the
+lines of circumvallation.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+During the siege of Mons, in 1691, the Prince of Orange assembled
+his army, and advanced as far as Notre Dame de Halle, making a
+demonstration to succor the place. Louis XIV, who commanded the siege
+in person, called a council of war to deliberate on what was to be
+done in case the Prince of Orange approached. The opinion of Marshal
+Luxembourg was to remain within the lines of circumvallation, and that
+opinion prevailed.
+
+The marshal laid it down as a principle that, when the besieging army
+is not strong enough to defend the whole extent of circumvallation, it
+should quit the lines and advance to meet the enemy; but when it is
+strong enough to encamp in two lines around a place, that it is better
+to profit by a good entrenchment--more especially as by this means the
+siege is not interrupted.
+
+In 1658, Marshal Turenne was besieging Dunkirk. He had already opened
+the trenches, when the Spanish army, under the orders of the Prince Don
+Juan, Condé, and D’Hocquincourt, appeared in sight, and took post upon
+the Downs, at a distance of a league from his lines. Turenne had the
+superiority in numbers, and he determined to quit his entrenchments.
+He had other advantages also. The enemy was without artillery, and
+their superiority in cavalry was rendered useless by the unfavorable
+nature of the ground. It was, therefore, of great importance to beat
+the Spanish army before it had time to entrench itself and bring up its
+artillery. The victory gained by the French on this occasion justified
+all the combinations of Marshal Turenne.
+
+When Marshal Berwick was laying siege to Philipsburg, in 1733, he had
+reason to apprehend that the Prince of Savoy would attack him with
+all the forces of the empire before its termination. The marshal,
+therefore, after having made his disposition of the troops intended for
+the siege, formed, with the rest of his army, a corps of observation to
+make head against Prince Eugene, in case the latter should choose to
+attack him in his lines, or attempt a diversion on the Moselle or Upper
+Rhine. Prince Eugene, having arrived in front of the besieging army,
+some general officers were of opinion that it was better not to await
+the enemy in the lines, but to move forward and attack him. But Marshal
+Berwick, who agreed with the Duke of Luxembourg, that an army which
+can occupy, completely, good entrenchments is not liable to be forced,
+persisted in remaining within his works. The result proved that this
+was also the opinion of Prince Eugene, for he did not dare to attack
+the entrenchments, which he would not have failed to do if he had any
+hopes of success.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM XLIII.
+
+
+Those who proscribe lines of circumvallation, and all the assistance
+which the science of the engineer can afford, deprive themselves
+gratuitously of an auxiliary which is never injurious, almost always
+useful, and often indispensable. It must be admitted, at the same time,
+that the principles of field-fortification require improvement. This
+important branch of the art of war has made no progress since the time
+of the ancients. It is even inferior at this day to what it was two
+thousand years ago. Engineer officers should be encouraged in bringing
+this branch of their art to perfection, and in placing it upon a level
+with the rest.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+“If we are inferior in numbers,” says Marshal Saxe, “entrenchments
+are of no use, for the enemy will bring all his forces to bear upon
+particular points. If we are of equal strength they are unnecessary
+also. If we are superior, we do not want them. Then why give ourselves
+the trouble to entrench?” Notwithstanding this opinion of the inutility
+of entrenchments, Marshal Saxe often had recourse to them.
+
+In 1797, Generals Provéra and Hohenzollern having presented themselves
+before Mantua (where Marshal Wurmser was shut up), for the purpose of
+raising the siege, they were stopped by the lines of contravallation of
+St. George. This slight obstacle sufficed to afford Napoleon time to
+arrive from Rivoli and defeat their enterprise. It was in consequence
+of neglecting to entrench themselves that the French had been obliged
+to raise the siege in the preceding campaign.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM XLIV.
+
+
+If circumstances prevent a sufficient garrison being left to defend
+a fortified town, which contains an hospital and magazines, at least
+every means should be employed to secure the citadel against a _coup
+de main_.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+A few battalions dispersed about a town, inspire no terror; but shut
+up in the more narrow outline of a citadel, they assume an imposing
+attitude. For this reason it appears to me that such a precaution
+is always necessary, not only in fortresses, but wherever there are
+hospitals or depôts of any kind. Where there is no citadel, some
+quarter of the town should be fixed upon most favorable for defence,
+and entrenched in such a manner as to oppose the greatest resistance
+possible.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM XLV.
+
+
+A fortified place can only protect the garrison and detain the enemy
+for a certain time. When this time has elapsed, and the defences of
+the place are destroyed, the garrison should lay down its arms. All
+civilized nations are agreed on this point, and there never has been
+an argument except with reference to the greater or less degree of
+defence which a governor is bound to make before he capitulates. At the
+same time, there are generals--Villars among the number--who are of
+opinion that a governor should never surrender, but that in the last
+extremity he should blow up the fortifications, and take advantage of
+the night to cut his way through the besieging army. Where he is unable
+to blow up the fortifications, he may always retire, they say, with his
+garrison, and save the men.
+
+Officers who have adopted this line of conduct, have often brought off
+three-fourths of their garrison.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+In 1705, the French, who were besieged in Haguenau by Count Thungen,
+found themselves incapable of sustaining an assault. Péri, the
+governor, who had already distinguished himself by a vigorous defence,
+despairing of being allowed to capitulate on any terms short of
+becoming prisoner of war, resolved to abandon the place and cut his way
+through the besiegers.
+
+In order to conceal his intention more effectually, and while he
+deceived the enemy, to sound at the same time the disposition of his
+officers, he assembled a council of war and declared his resolution to
+die in the breach. Then, under pretext of the extremity to which he was
+reduced, he commanded the whole garrison under arms; and leaving only a
+few sharpshooters in the breach, gave the order to march, and set out
+in silence, under cover of the night, from Haguenau. This audacious
+enterprise was crowned with success, and Péri reached Saverne without
+having suffered the smallest loss.
+
+Two fine instances of defence in later times are those of Massena at
+Genoa, and of Palafox at Saragossa.
+
+The first marched out with arms and baggage, and all the honors of
+war, after rejecting every summons, and defending himself until hunger
+alone compelled him to capitulate. The second only yielded after having
+buried his garrison amid the ruins of the city, which he defended from
+house to house, until famine and death left him no alternative but to
+surrender. This siege, which was equally honorable to the French as
+to the Spaniards, is one of the most memorable in the history of war.
+In the course of it, Palafox displayed every possible resource which
+courage and obstinacy can supply in the defence of a fortress.
+
+All real strength is founded in the mind; and on this account I am of
+opinion that we should be directed in the choice of a governor, less by
+his genius than his personal character. His most essential qualities
+should be courage, perseverance, and soldierlike devotedness. Above
+all, he should possess the talent not only of infusing courage into
+the garrison, but of kindling a spirit of resistance in the whole
+population. Where the latter is wanting, however art may multiply the
+defences of a place, the garrison will be compelled to capitulate after
+having sustained the first, or at most, the second assault.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM XLVI.
+
+
+The keys of a fortress are well worth the retirement of the garrison,
+when it is resolved to yield only on those conditions. On this
+principle it is always wiser to grant an honorable capitulation to a
+garrison which has made a vigorous resistance, than to risk an assault.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+Marshal Villars has justly observed, that “no governor of a place
+should be permitted to excuse himself for surrendering, on the ground
+of wishing to preserve the king’s troops. Every garrison that displays
+courage will escape being prisoners of war. For there is no general
+who, however well assured of carrying a place by assault, will not
+prefer granting terms of capitulation rather than risk the loss of a
+thousand men in forcing determined troops to surrender.”
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM XLVII.
+
+
+Infantry, cavalry, and artillery, are nothing without each other;
+therefore, they should always be so disposed in cantonments as to
+assist each other in case of surprise.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+“A general,” says Frederick, “should direct his whole attention to
+the tranquility of his cantonments, in order that the soldier may be
+relieved from all anxiety, and repose in security from his fatigues.
+With this view, care should be taken that the troops are able to form
+rapidly upon ground which has been previously reconnoitered; that the
+generals remain always with their divisions or brigades, and that the
+service is carried on throughout with exactness.”
+
+Marshal Saxe is of opinion that an army should not be in a hurry to
+quit its cantonments, but that it should wait till the enemy has
+exhausted himself with marching, and be ready to fall upon him with
+fresh troops when he is overcome with fatigue.
+
+I believe, however, that it would be dangerous to trust implicitly
+to this high authority, for there are many occasions where all the
+advantage lies in the initiative, more especially when the enemy has
+been compelled to extend his cantonments, from scarcity of subsistence,
+and can be attacked before he has time to concentrate his forces.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM XLVIII.
+
+
+The formation of infantry in line should be always in two ranks,
+because the length of the musket only admits of an effective fire in
+this formation. The discharge of the third rank is not only uncertain,
+but frequently dangerous to the ranks in its front. In drawing up
+infantry in two ranks, there should be a supernumerary behind every
+fourth or fifth file. A reserve should likewise be placed twenty-five
+paces in rear of each flank.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+I am of opinion, if circumstances require a line of infantry to resort
+to a square, that two-deep is too light a formation to resist the
+shock of cavalry. However useless the third rank may appear for the
+purpose of file-firing, it is, notwithstanding necessary, in order to
+replace the men who fall in the ranks in front; otherwise you would
+be obliged to close in the files, and by this means leave intervals
+between the companies, which the cavalry would not fail to penetrate.
+It appears to me, also, that when infantry is formed in two ranks, the
+columns will be found to open out in marching to a flank. If it should
+be considered advantageous behind entrenchments to keep the infantry
+in two ranks, the third rank should be placed in reserve, and brought
+forward to relieve the front rank when fatigued, or when the fire is
+observed to slacken. I am induced to make these remarks, because I have
+seen an excellent pamphlet which proposes the two-deep formation for
+infantry as the best. The author supports his opinion by a variety of
+plausible reasons, but not sufficient, as it appears to me, to answer
+all the objections that may be offered to this practice.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM XLIX.
+
+
+The practice of mixing small bodies of infantry and cavalry together is
+a bad one, and attended with many inconveniences. The cavalry loses its
+power of action. It becomes fettered in all its movements. Its energy
+is destroyed; even the infantry itself is compromised, for on the
+first movement of the cavalry it is left without support. The best mode
+of protecting cavalry is to cover its flank.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+This also was the opinion of Marshal Saxe. “The weakness of the above
+formation,” says he, “is sufficient in itself to intimidate the
+platoons of infantry, because they must be lost if the cavalry is
+beaten.”
+
+The cavalry, also, which depends on the infantry for succor, is
+disconcerted the moment a brisk forward movement carries them out of
+sight of their supports. Marshal Turenne, and the generals of his time,
+sometimes employed this order of formation; but that does not, in my
+opinion, justify a modern author for recommending it in an essay,
+entitled “_Considerations sur l’Art de la Guerre_.” In fact, this
+formation has long been abandoned; and, since the introduction of light
+artillery, it appears to me almost ridiculous to propose it.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM L.
+
+
+Charges of cavalry are equally useful at the beginning, the middle, and
+the end of a battle. They should be made always, if possible, on the
+flanks of the infantry, especially when the latter is engaged in front.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+The Archduke Charles, in speaking of cavalry, recommends that it should
+be brought in mass upon a decisive point, when the moment for employing
+it arrives; that is to say, when it can attack with a certainty of
+success. As the rapidity of its movement enables cavalry to act along
+the whole line in the same day, the general who commands it should
+keep it together as much as possible, and avoid dividing it into many
+detachments. When the nature of the ground admits of cavalry being
+employed on all points of the line, it is desirable to form it in
+column behind the infantry, and in a position whence it may be easily
+directed wherever it is required. If cavalry is intended to cover a
+position, it should be placed sufficiently in the rear to meet at full
+speed any advance of troops coming to attack that position. If it is
+destined to cover the flank of the infantry, it should, for the same
+reason, be placed directly behind it. As the object of cavalry is
+purely offensive, it should be a rule to form it at such a distance
+only from the point of collision as to enable it to acquire its utmost
+impulse, and arrive at the top of its speed into action. With respect
+to the cavalry reserve, this should only be employed at the end of a
+battle, either to render the success more decisive, or to cover the
+retreat. Napoleon remarks that, at the battle of Waterloo, the cavalry
+of the guard which composed the reserve, was engaged against his
+orders. He complains of having been deprived from five o’clock of the
+use of this reserve, which, when well employed, had so often insured
+him the victory.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM LI.
+
+
+It is the business of cavalry to follow up the victory, and to prevent
+the beaten enemy from rallying.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+Victor or vanquished, it is of the greatest importance to have a body
+of cavalry in reserve, either to take advantage of victory, or to
+secure a retreat. The most decisive battles lose half their value to
+the conqueror, when the want of cavalry prevents him from following up
+his success, and depriving the enemy of the power of rallying.
+
+When a retiring army is pursued, it is more especially upon the flanks
+that the weight of cavalry should fall, if you are strong enough in
+that arm to cut off his retreat.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM LII.
+
+
+Artillery is more essential to cavalry than to infantry, because
+cavalry has no fire for its defence, but depends upon the sabre.
+It is to remedy this deficiency that recourse has been had to
+horse-artillery. Cavalry, therefore, should never be without cannon,
+whether when attacking, rallying, or in position.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+Horse-artillery is an invention of Frederick. Austria lost no time in
+introducing it into her armies, although in an imperfect degree. It was
+only in 1792 that this arm was adopted in France, where it was brought
+rapidly to its present perfection.
+
+The services of this arm during the wars of the Revolution were
+immense. It may be said to have changed to a certain extent the
+character of tactics, because its facility of movement enables it to
+bear with rapidity on every point where artillery can be employed
+with success. Napoleon has remarked in his memoirs that a flanking
+battery which strikes and rakes the enemy obliquely, is capable of
+deciding a victory in itself. To this we may add that, independent of
+the advantages which cavalry derives from horse-artillery in securing
+its flanks, and in opening the way for a successful charge by the
+destructiveness of its fire, it is desirable that these two arms
+should never be separated, but ready at all times to seize upon points
+where it may be necessary to employ cannon. On these occasions, the
+cavalry masks the march of the artillery, protects its establishment in
+position, and covers it from the attack of the enemy, until it is ready
+to open its fire.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM LIII.
+
+
+In march, or in position, the greater part of the artillery should
+be with the divisions of infantry and cavalry. The rest should be in
+reserve. Each gun should have with it three hundred rounds, without
+including the limber. This is about the complement for two battles.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+The better infantry is, the more important it is to support it by
+artillery, with a view to its preservation.
+
+It is essential, also, that the batteries attached to divisions should
+march in the front, because this has a strong influence on the _morale_
+of the soldier. He attacks always with confidence when he sees the
+flanks of the column well covered with cannon.
+
+The artillery reserve should be kept for a decisive moment, and then
+employed in full force, for it will be difficult for the enemy at such
+a time to presume to attack it.
+
+There is scarcely an instance of a battery of sixty pieces of cannon
+having been carried by a charge of infantry or cavalry, unless where
+it was entirely without support, or in a position to be easily turned.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM LIV.
+
+
+Artillery should always be placed in the most advantageous positions,
+and as far in front of the line of cavalry and infantry as possible,
+without compromising the safety of the guns.
+
+Field batteries should command the whole country round from the level
+of the platform. They should on no account be masked on the right and
+left, but have free range in every direction.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+The battery of eighteen pieces of cannon, which covered the centre of
+the Russian army at the battle of La Moskwa (Borodino), may be cited as
+an example.
+
+Its position, upon a circular height which commanded the field in every
+direction, added so powerfully to its effect, that its fire alone
+sufficed, for a considerable time, to paralyze the vigorous attack
+made by the French with their right. Although twice broken, the left
+of the Russian army closed to this battery, as to a pivot, and twice
+recovered its former position. After repeated attacks, conducted with
+a rare intrepidity, the battery was at length carried by the French,
+but not till they had lost the _élite_ of their army, and with it the
+Generals Caulincourt and Montbrun. Its capture decided the retreat of
+the Russian left.
+
+I might advert likewise to another instance, in the campaign of 1809,
+and to the terrible effect produced by the hundred pieces of cannon of
+the Guard which General Lauriston directed, at the battle of Wagram,
+against the right of the Austrian army.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM LV.
+
+
+A General should never put his army into cantonments, when he has the
+means of collecting supplies of forage and provisions, and of thus
+providing for the wants of the soldier in the field.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+One great advantage which results from having an army in camp is,
+that it is easier to direct its spirit and maintain its discipline
+there. The soldier in cantonments abandons himself to repose; he ends
+by finding a pleasure in idleness, and in fearing to return to the
+field. The reverse takes place in a camp. There, a feeling of _ennui_,
+and a severer discipline, make him anxious for the opening of the
+campaign, to interrupt the monotony of the service and relieve it with
+the chances and variety of war. Besides, an army in camp is much more
+secure from a surprise than in cantonments--the defect of which usually
+consists in their occupying too great an extent of ground. When an army
+is obliged to go into quarters, the Marquis de Feuquière recommends
+a camp to be selected in front of the line, where the troops can be
+frequently assembled--sometimes suddenly, in order to exercise their
+vigilance, or for the sole purpose of bringing the different corps
+together.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM LVI.
+
+
+A good general, a well-organized system, good instructions, and severe
+discipline, aided by effective establishments, will always make good
+troops, independently of the cause for which they fight.
+
+At the same time, a love of country, a spirit of enthusiasm, a sense of
+national honor, and fanaticism, will operate upon young soldiers with
+advantage.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+This remark appears to me less applicable to officers than to soldiers,
+for as war is not a state of things natural to man, it follows
+that those who maintain its cause must be governed by some strong
+excitement. Much enthusiasm and devotedness are required on the part
+of the troops for the general who commands, to induce an army to
+perform great actions in a war in which it takes no interest. This is
+sufficiently proved by the apathy of auxiliaries, unless when inspired
+by the conduct of their chief.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM LVII.
+
+
+When a nation is without establishments and a military system, it is
+very difficult to organize an army.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+This is an unanswerable truth, more particularly with reference to an
+army intended to act upon the system of modern war, and in which order,
+precision, and rapidity of movement, are the principal essentials to
+success.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM LVIII.
+
+
+The first qualification of a soldier is fortitude under fatigue and
+privation. Courage is only the second; hardship, poverty and want, are
+the best school for a soldier.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+Valor belongs to the young soldier as well as to the veteran; but in
+the former it is more evanescent. It is only by habits of service, and
+after several campaigns, that the soldier acquires that moral courage
+which makes him support the fatigues and privations of war without a
+murmur. Experience by this time has instructed him to supply his own
+wants. He is satisfied with what he can procure, because he knows that
+success is only to be obtained by fortitude and perseverance. Well
+might Napoleon say that misery and want were the best school for a
+soldier; for as nothing could be compared with the total destitution
+of the army of the Alps, when he assumed the command, so nothing
+could equal the brilliant success which he obtained with this army
+in the first campaign in Italy. The conquerors of Montenotte, Lodi,
+Castiglione, Bassano, Arcole and Rivoli had beheld, only a few months
+before, whole battalions covered with rags, and deserting for the want
+of subsistence.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM LIX.
+
+
+There are five things the soldier should never be without--his musket,
+his ammunition, his knapsack, his provisions (for at least four days),
+and his entrenching-tool. The knapsack may be reduced to the smallest
+size possible, if it be thought proper, but the soldier should always
+have it with him.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+It is fortunate that Napoleon has recognized the advantage of giving
+to every soldier an entrenching-tool. His authority is the best answer
+to the ridicule which has been thrown upon those who proposed it. An
+axe will be found to inconvenience the foot-soldier as little as the
+sword he wears at his side, and it will be infinitely more useful. When
+axes are given out to companies, or are carried by fatigue-men during
+a campaign, they are soon lost; and it often happens, when a camp is
+to be formed, that a difficulty arises in cutting wood and building
+huts for the soldier; whereas, by making the axe a part of every man’s
+appointments, he is obliged to have it always with him; and whether
+the object be to entrench himself in a village, or to erect huts in a
+camp, the commander of a corps will speedily see the advantage of this
+innovation.
+
+When once the axe has been generally adopted, we shall, perhaps,
+see the desirability of issuing pickaxes and shovels to particular
+companies, and also the benefit of more frequent entrenchments. It is
+more particularly during retreats that it is important to entrench when
+the army has reached a good position; for an entrenched camp not only
+furnishes the means of rallying troops which are pursued, but if it be
+fortified in such a manner as to render the issue of an attack doubtful
+to the enemy, it will not only sustain the _morale_ of the soldier in
+the retreat, but afford the general-in-chief opportunities for resuming
+the offensive, and profiting by the first false movement on the part of
+his adversary. It will be recollected how Frederick, in the campaign of
+1761, when surrounded by two Russian and Austrian armies, whose united
+force was quadruple his own, saved his army by entrenching himself in
+the camp of Buntzalvitz.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM LX.
+
+
+Every means should be taken to attach the soldier to his colors. This
+is best accomplished by showing consideration and respect to the old
+soldier. His pay likewise should increase with his length of service.
+It is the height of injustice not to pay a veteran more than a recruit.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+Some modern writers have recommended, on the other hand, to limit the
+period of service, in order to bring the whole youth of a country
+successively under arms. By this means they purpose to have the levies,
+_en masse_, all ready trained and capable of resisting successfully
+a war of invasion. But however advantageous at first sight such a
+military system may appear, I believe it will be found to have many
+objections.
+
+In the first place, the soldier fatigued with the minutiæ of discipline
+in a garrison, will not feel much inclined to re-enlist after he has
+received his discharge, more especially since, having served the
+prescribed time, he will consider himself to have fulfilled all the
+duties of a citizen to his country. Returning to his friends, he will
+probably marry, or establish himself in a trade. From that moment his
+military spirit declines, and he soon becomes ill adapted to the
+business of war. On the contrary, the soldier who serves long, becomes
+attached to his regiment as to a new family. He submits to the yoke of
+discipline, accustoms himself to the privations his situation imposes,
+and ends by finding his condition agreeable. There are few officers
+that have seen service who have not discovered the difference between
+old and young soldiers, with reference to their power of supporting
+the fatigues of a long campaign, to the determined courage that
+characterizes the attack, or to the ease with which they rally after
+being broken.
+
+Montécuculli observes, that “it takes time to discipline an army; more
+to inure it to war; and still more to constitute veterans.” For this
+reason, he recommends that great consideration should be shown to old
+soldiers; that they should be carefully provided for, and a large
+body of them kept always on foot. It seems to me, also, that it is
+not enough to increase the pay of the soldier according to his period
+of service, but that it is highly essential to confer on him some
+mark of distinction that shall secure to him privileges calculated to
+encourage him to grow gray under arms, and, above all, to do so with
+honor.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM LXI.
+
+
+It is not set speeches at the moment of battle that render soldiers
+brave. The veteran scarcely listens to them, and the recruit forgets
+them at the first discharge. If discourses and harangues are useful, it
+is during the campaign: to do away unfavorable impressions, to correct
+false reports, to keep alive a proper spirit in the camp, and to
+furnish materials and amusement for the bivouac. All printed orders of
+the day should keep in view these objects.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+The opinion of the general-in-chief, energetically expressed, is,
+notwithstanding, productive of great effect on the _morale_ of the
+soldier.
+
+In 1703, at the attack of Hornbec, Marshal Villars, seeing the troops
+advancing without spirit, threw himself at their head: “What!” said
+he, “is it expected that I, a marshal of France, should be the first to
+escalade, when I order YOU to attack?”
+
+These few words rekindled their ardor; officers and soldiers rushed
+upon the works, and the town was taken almost without loss.
+
+“We have retired far enough for to-day; you know I always sleep upon
+the field of battle!” said Napoleon, as he flew through the ranks
+at the moment of resuming the offensive at Marengo. These few words
+sufficed to revive the courage of the soldiers, and to make them forget
+the fatigues of the day, during which almost every man had been engaged.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM LXII.
+
+
+Tents are unfavorable to health. The soldier is best when he bivouacs,
+because he sleeps with his feet to the fire, which speedily dries the
+ground on which he lies. A few planks, or a little straw, shelter him
+from the wind.
+
+On the other hand, tents are necessary for the superior officers, who
+have to write and to consult their maps. Tents should, therefore,
+be issued to these, with directions to them never to sleep in a
+house. Tents are always objects of observation to the enemy’s staff.
+They afford information in regard to your numbers and the ground you
+occupy; while an army bivouacking in two or three lines, is only
+distinguishable from afar by the smoke which mingles with the clouds.
+It is impossible to count the number of the fires.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+The acknowledged advantage of bivouacking is another reason for
+adding an entrenching-tool to the equipment of the soldier; for, with
+the assistance of the axe and shovel, he can hut himself without
+difficulty. I have seen huts erected with the branches of trees,
+covered with turf, where the soldier was perfectly sheltered from the
+cold and wet, even in the worst season.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM LXIII.
+
+
+All information obtained from prisoners should be received with
+caution, and estimated at its real value. A soldier seldom sees
+anything beyond his company; and an officer can afford intelligence of
+little more than the position and movements of the division to which
+his regiment belongs. On this account, the general of an army should
+never depend upon the information derived from prisoners, unless it
+agrees with the reports received from the advanced guards, in reference
+to the position, etc., of the enemy.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+Montécuculli wisely observes that “prisoners should be interrogated
+separately, in order to ascertain, by the agreement in their answers,
+how far they may be endeavoring to mislead you.” Generally speaking,
+the information required from officers who are prisoners, should have
+reference to the strength and resources of the enemy, and sometimes to
+his localities and position. Frederick recommends that prisoners should
+be menaced with instant death if they are found attempting to deceive
+by false reports.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM LXIV.
+
+
+Nothing is so important in war as an undivided command; for this
+reason, when war is carried on against a single power, there should be
+only one army, acting upon one base, and conducted by one chief.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+“Success,” says the Archduke Charles, “is only to be obtained by
+simultaneous efforts, directed upon a given point, sustained with
+constancy, and executed with decision.” It rarely happens that any
+number of men who desire the same object are perfectly agreed as to the
+means of attaining it; and if the will of one individual is not allowed
+to predominate, there can be no _ensemble_ in the execution of their
+operations; neither will they attain the end proposed. It is useless to
+confirm this maxim by examples. History abounds in them.
+
+Prince Eugene and Marlborough would never have been so successful in
+the campaigns which they directed in concert, if a spirit of intrigue
+and difference of opinion had not constantly disorganized the armies
+opposed to them.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM LXV.
+
+
+The same consequences which have uniformly attended long discussions
+and councils of war, will follow at all times. They will terminate
+in the adoption of the worst course, which in war is always the most
+timid, or, if you will, the most prudent. The only true wisdom in a
+general is determined courage.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+Prince Eugene used to say that councils of war “are only useful when
+you want an excuse for attempting _nothing_.” This was also the opinion
+of Villars. A general-in-chief should avoid, therefore, assembling
+a council on occasions of difficulty, and should confine himself to
+consulting separately his most experienced generals in order to benefit
+by their advice, while he is governed at the same time in his decision
+by his own judgment. By this means, he becomes responsible, it is true,
+for the measures he pursues; but he has the advantage also of acting
+upon his own conviction, and of being certain that the secret of his
+operations will not be divulged, as is usually the case where it is
+discussed by a council of war.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM LXVI.
+
+
+In war, the general alone can judge of certain arrangements. It depends
+on him alone to conquer difficulties by his own superior talents and
+resolution.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+The officer who obeys, whatever may be the nature or extent of his
+command, will always stand excused for executing implicitly the
+orders which have been given to him. This is not the case with the
+general-in-chief, on whom the safety of the army and the success of the
+campaign depend. Occupied, without intermission, in the whole process
+of observation and reflection, it is easy to conceive that he will
+acquire by degrees a solidity of judgment which will enable him to see
+things in a clearer and more enlarged point of view than his inferior
+generals.
+
+Marshal Villars, in his campaigns, acted almost always in opposition
+to the advice of his generals, and he was almost always fortunate.
+So true it is, that a general, who feels confident in his talent for
+command, must follow the dictates of his own genius if he wishes to
+achieve success.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM LXVII.
+
+
+To authorize generals or other officers to lay down their arms in
+virtue of a particular capitulation, under any other circumstances
+than when they are composing the garrison of a fortress, affords a
+dangerous latitude. It is destructive of all military character in a
+nation to open such a door to the cowardly, the weak, or even to the
+misdirected brave. Great extremities require extraordinary resolution.
+The more obstinate the resistance of an army, the greater the chances
+of assistance or of success.
+
+How many seeming impossibilities have been accomplished by men whose
+only resource was death!
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+In the campaign of 1759, Frederick directed General Fink, with eighteen
+thousand men, upon Maxen, for the purpose of cutting off the Austrian
+army from the defiles of Bohemia. Surrounded by twice his numbers, Fink
+capitulated after a sharp action, and fourteen thousand men laid down
+their arms. This conduct was the more disgraceful, because General
+Winch, who commanded the cavalry, cut his way through the enemy. The
+whole blame of the surrender fell, therefore, upon Fink, who was
+tried afterward by a court-martial, and sentenced to be cashiered and
+imprisoned for two years.
+
+In the campaign of Italy in 1796, the Austrian General Provéra
+capitulated with two thousand men in the castle of Cossaria.
+Subsequently, at the battle of La Favorite, the same general
+capitulated with a corps of six thousand men. I scarcely dare to revert
+to the shameful defection of General Mack in the capitulation of Ulm
+in 1805, where thirty thousand Austrians laid down their arms--when we
+have seen, during the wars of the Revolution, so many generals open
+themselves a way by a vigorous effort through the enemy, supported only
+by a few battalions.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM LXVIII.
+
+
+There is no security for any sovereign, for any nation, or for any
+general, if officers are permitted to capitulate in the open field,
+and to lay down their arms in virtue of conditions favorable to the
+contracting party, but contrary to the interests of the army at large.
+To withdraw from danger, and thereby to involve their comrades in
+greater peril, is the height of cowardice. Such conduct should be
+proscribed, declared infamous, and made punishable with death. All
+generals, officers and soldiers, who capitulate in battle to save their
+own lives, should be decimated.
+
+He who gives the order, and those who obey, are alike traitors, and
+deserve capital punishment.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+Soldiers, who are almost always ignorant of the designs of their
+chief, cannot be responsible for his conduct. If he orders them to
+lay down their arms, they must do so; otherwise they fail in that law
+of discipline which is more essential to an army than thousands of
+men. It appears to me, therefore, under these circumstances, that the
+chiefs alone are responsible, and liable to the punishment due to their
+cowardice. We have no example of soldiers being wanting in their duty
+in the most desperate situations, where they are commanded by officers
+of approved resolution.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM LXIX.
+
+
+There is but one honorable mode of becoming prisoner of war. That
+is, by being taken separately; by which is meant, by being cut off
+entirely, and when we can no longer make use of our arms. In this case,
+there can be no conditions, for honor can impose none. We yield to an
+irresistible necessity.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+There is always time enough to surrender prisoner of war. This should
+be deferred, therefore, till the last extremity. And here I may be
+permitted to cite an example of rare obstinacy in defence, which has
+been related to me by ocular witnesses. The captain of grenadiers,
+Dubrenil, of the thirty-seventh regiment of the line, having been
+sent on detachment with his company, was stopped on the march by a
+large party of Cossacks, who surrounded him on every side. Dubrenil
+formed his little force into square, and endeavored to gain the skirts
+of a wood (within a few muskets’ shot of the spot where he had been
+attacked), and reached it with very little loss. But as soon as the
+grenadiers saw this refuge secured to them, they broke and fled,
+leaving their captain and a few brave men, who were resolved not to
+abandon him, at the mercy of the enemy. In the meantime, the fugitives,
+who had rallied in the depth of the wood, ashamed of having forsaken
+their leader, came to the resolution of rescuing him from the enemy,
+if a prisoner, or of carrying off his body if he had fallen. With this
+view, they formed once more upon the outskirts, and opening a passage
+with their bayonets through the cavalry, penetrated to their captain,
+who, notwithstanding seventeen wounds, was defending himself still.
+They immediately surrounded him, and regained the wood with little
+loss. Such examples are not rare in the wars of the Revolution, and
+it were desirable to see them collected by some contemporary, that
+soldiers might learn how much is to be achieved in war by determined
+energy and sustained resolution.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM LXX.
+
+
+The conduct of a general in a conquered country is full of
+difficulties. If severe, he irritates and increases the number of his
+enemies. If lenient, he gives birth to expectations which only render
+the abuses and vexations, inseparable from war, the more intolerable.
+A victorious general must know how to employ severity, justice and
+mildness by turns, if he would allay sedition or prevent it.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+Among the Romans, generals were only permitted to arrive at the command
+of armies after having exercised the different functions of the
+magistracy. Thus by a previous knowledge of administration, they were
+prepared to govern the conquered provinces with all that discretion
+which a newly-acquired power, supported by arbitrary force, demands.
+
+In the military institutions of modern times, the generals, instructed
+only in what concerns the operation of strategy and tactics, are
+obliged to intrust the civil departments of the war to inferior agents,
+who, without belonging to the army, render all those abuses and
+vexations, inseparable from its operations, still more intolerable.
+
+This observation, which I do little more than repeat, seems to me,
+notwithstanding, deserving of particular attention; for if the leisure
+of general officers was directed in time of peace to the study of
+diplomacy--if they were employed in the different embassies which
+sovereigns send to foreign courts--they would acquire a knowledge of
+the laws and of the government of these countries, in which they may
+be called hereafter to carry on the war. They would learn also to
+distinguish those points of interest on which all treaties must be
+based, which have for their object the advantageous termination of a
+campaign. By the aid of this information they would obtain certain
+and positive results, since all the springs of action, as well as the
+machinery of war, would be in their hands. We have seen Prince Eugene,
+and Marshal Villars, each fulfilling with equal ability the duties of a
+general and a negotiator.
+
+When an army which occupies a conquered province observes strict
+discipline, there are few examples of insurrection among the people,
+unless indeed resistance is provoked (as but too often happens), by the
+exactions of inferior agents employed in the civil administration.
+
+It is to this point, therefore, that the general-in-chief should
+principally direct his attention, in order that the contributions
+imposed by the wants of the army may be levied with impartiality; and
+above all, that they may be applied to their true object, instead of
+serving to enrich the collectors, as is ordinarily the case.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM LXXI.
+
+
+Nothing can excuse a general who takes advantage of the knowledge
+acquired in the service of his country, to deliver up her frontier and
+her towns to foreigners. This is a crime reprobated by every principle
+of religion, morality and honor.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+Ambitious men who, listening only to their passions, arm natives of
+the same land against each other (under the deceitful pretext of
+the public good), are still more criminal. For however arbitrary a
+government, the institutions which have been consolidated by time, are
+always preferable to civil war, and to that anarchy which the latter is
+obliged to create for the justification of its crimes.
+
+To be faithful to his sovereign, and to respect the established
+government, are the first principles which ought to distinguish a
+soldier and a man of honor.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM LXXII.
+
+
+A general-in-chief has no right to shelter his mistakes in war under
+cover of his sovereign, or of a minister, when these are both distant
+from the scene of operation, and must consequently be either ill
+informed or wholly ignorant of the actual state of things.
+
+Hence, it follows, that every general is culpable who undertakes the
+execution of a plan which he considers faulty. It is his duty to
+represent his reasons, to insist upon a change of plan, in short, to
+give in his resignation, rather than allow himself to be made the
+instrument of his army’s ruin. Every general-in-chief who fights a
+battle in consequence of superior orders, with the certainty of losing
+it, is equally blamable.
+
+In this last-mentioned case, the general ought to refuse obedience;
+because a blind obedience is due only to a military command given
+by a superior present on the spot at the moment of action. Being in
+possession of the real state of things, the superior has it then in his
+power to afford the necessary explanations to the person who executes
+his orders.
+
+But supposing a general-in-chief to receive positive order from
+his sovereign, directing him to fight a battle, with the further
+injunction, to yield to his adversary, and allow himself to be
+defeated--ought he to obey it? No. If the general should be able to
+comprehend the meaning or utility of such an order, he should execute
+it; otherwise he should refuse to obey it.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+In the campaign of 1697, Prince Eugene caused the courier to be
+intercepted, who was bringing him orders from the emperor forbidding
+him to hazard a battle, for which everything had been prepared, and
+which he foresaw would prove decisive. He considered, therefore,
+that he did his duty in evading the orders of his sovereign; and the
+victory of Zanta, in which the Turks lost about thirty thousand men,
+and four thousand prisoners, rewarded his audacity. In the meantime,
+notwithstanding the immense advantages which accrued from this victory
+to the imperial arms, Eugene was disgraced on his arrival at Vienna.
+
+In 1793, General Hoche, having received orders to move upon Treves with
+an army harassed by constant marches in a mountainous and difficult
+country, refused to obey. He observed, with reason, that in order to
+obtain possession of an unimportant fortress, they were exposing his
+army to inevitable ruin. He caused, therefore, his troops to return
+into winter quarters, and preferred the preservation of his army, upon
+which the success of the future campaign depended, to his own safety.
+Recalled to Paris, he was thrown into a dungeon, which he only quitted
+on the downfall of Robespierre.
+
+I dare not decide if such examples are to be imitated; but it seems to
+me highly desirable that a question so new and so important, should be
+discussed by men who are capable of determining its merits.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM LXXIII.
+
+
+The first qualification in a general-in-chief is a cool head--that
+is, a head which receives just impressions, and estimates things and
+objects at their real value. He must not allow himself to be elated by
+good news, or depressed by bad.
+
+The impressions he receives either successively or simultaneously in
+the course of the day, should be so classed as to take up only the
+exact place in his mind which they deserve to occupy; since it is upon
+a just comparison and consideration of the weight due to different
+impressions, that the power of reasoning and of right judgment depends.
+
+Some men are so physically and morally constituted as to see everything
+through a highly-colored medium. They raise up a picture in the mind on
+every slight occasion, and give to every trivial occurrence a dramatic
+interest. But whatever knowledge, or talent, or courage, or other good
+qualities such men may possess, nature has not formed them for the
+command of armies, or the direction of great military operations.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+“The first quality in a general-in-chief,” says Montécuculli, “is a
+great knowledge of the art of war. This is not intuitive, but the
+result of experience. A man is not born a commander. He must become
+one. Not to be anxious; to be always cool; to avoid confusion in his
+commands; never to change countenance; to give his orders in the midst
+of battle with as much composure as if he were perfectly at ease. These
+are the proofs of valor in a general.
+
+“To encourage the timid; to increase the number of the truly brave; to
+revive the drooping ardor of the troops in battle; to rally those who
+are broken; to bring back to the charge those who are repulsed; to find
+resources in difficulty, and success even amid disaster; to be ready at
+a moment to devote himself, if necessary, for the welfare of the state.
+These are the actions which acquire for a general distinction and
+renown.”
+
+To this enumeration may be added, the talent of discriminating
+character, and of employing every man in the particular post which
+nature has qualified him to fill. “My principal attention,” said
+Marshal Villars, “was always directed to the study of the younger
+generals. Such a one I found, by the boldness of his character, fit
+to lead a column of attack; another, from a disposition naturally
+cautious, but without being deficient in courage, more perfectly to
+be relied on for the defence of a country.” It is only by a just
+application of these personal qualities to their respective objects,
+that it is possible to command success in war.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM LXXIV.
+
+
+The leading qualifications which should distinguish an officer selected
+for the head of the staff, are, to know the country thoroughly; to
+be able to conduct a _reconnoissance_ with skill; to superintend the
+transmission of orders promptly; to lay down the most complicated
+movements intelligibly, but in a few words, and with simplicity.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+Formerly, the duties of the chiefs of the staff were confined to the
+necessary preparations for carrying the plan of the campaign, and
+the operations resolved on by the general-in-chief, into effect.
+In a battle, they were only employed in directing movements and
+superintending their execution. But in the late wars, the officers
+of the staff were frequently intrusted with the command of a column
+of attack, or of large detachments, when the general-in-chief feared
+to disclose the secret of his plans by the transmission of orders or
+instructions. Great advantages have resulted from this innovation,
+although it was long resisted. By this means, the staff have been
+enabled to perfect their theory by practice, and they have acquired,
+moreover, the esteem of the soldiers and junior officers of the
+line, who are easily led to think lightly of their superiors, whom
+they do not see fighting in the ranks. The generals who have held
+the arduous situation of chief of the staff during the wars of the
+Revolution, have almost always been employed in the different branches
+of the profession. Marshal Berthier, who filled so conspicuously this
+appointment to Napoleon, was distinguished by all the essentials of a
+general. He possessed calm, and at the same time brilliant courage,
+excellent judgment, and approved experience. He bore arms during half
+a century, made war in the four quarters of the globe, opened and
+terminated thirty-two campaigns. In his youth he acquired, under the
+eye of his father, who was an engineer officer, the talent of tracing
+plans and finishing them with exactness, as well as the preliminary
+qualifications necessary to form a staff-officer. Admitted by the
+Prince de Lambesq into his regiment of dragoons, he was taught the
+skilful management of his horse and his sword--accomplishments so
+important to a soldier. Attached afterward to the staff of Count
+Rochambeau, he made his first campaign in America, where he soon began
+to distinguish himself by his valor, activity and talents. Having at
+length attained superior rank in the staff-corps formed by Marshal de
+Segur, he visited the camps of the King of Prussia, and discharged the
+duties of chief of the staff under the Baron de Bezenval.
+
+During nineteen years, consumed in sixteen campaigns, the history
+of Marshal Berthier’s life was little else but that of the wars of
+Napoleon, all the details of which he directed, both in the cabinet
+and the field. A stranger to the intrigues of politics, he labored
+with indefatigable activity; seized with promptitude and sagacity
+upon general views, and gave the necessary orders for attaining them
+with prudence, perspicuity, and conciseness. Discreet, impenetrable,
+modest; he was just, exact, and even severe, in everything that
+regarded the service; but he always set an example of vigilance and
+zeal in his own person, and knew how to maintain discipline, and to
+cause his authority to be respected by every rank under his orders.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM LXXV.
+
+
+A commandant of artillery should understand well the general principles
+of each branch of the service, since he is called upon to supply
+arms and ammunition to the different corps of which it is composed.
+His correspondence with the commanding officers of artillery at the
+advanced posts, should put him in possession of all the movements of
+the army, and the disposition and management of the great park of
+artillery should depend upon this information.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+After having recognized the advantage of intrusting the supply of
+arms and ammunition for an army to a military body, it appears to
+me extraordinary that the same regulation does not extend to that of
+provisions and forage, instead of leaving it in the hands of a separate
+administration, as is the practice at present.
+
+The civil establishments attached to armies are formed almost always at
+the commencement of a war, and composed of persons strangers to those
+laws of discipline which they are but too much inclined to disregard.
+These men are little esteemed by the military, because they serve only
+to enrich themselves, without respect to the means. They consider only
+their private interest in a service whose glory they cannot share,
+although some portion of its success depends upon their zeal. The
+disorders and defalcations incident to these establishments would
+assuredly cease, if they were confided to men who had been employed
+in the army, and who, in return for their labors, were permitted to
+partake with their fellow-soldiers the triumph of their success.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM LXXVI.
+
+
+The qualities which distinguish a good general of advanced posts, are,
+to reconnoitre accurately defiles and fords of every description; to
+provide guides that may be depended on; to interrogate the _curé_
+and postmaster; to establish rapidly a good understanding with the
+inhabitants; to send out spies; to intercept public and private
+letters; to translate and analyze their contents; in a word, to be able
+to answer every question of the general-in-chief, when he arrives with
+the whole army.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+Foraging parties, composed of small detachments, and which were usually
+intrusted to young officers, served formerly to make good officers
+of advanced posts; but now the army is supplied with provisions by
+regular contributions: it is only in a course of partisan warfare that
+the necessary experience can be acquired to fill these situations with
+success.
+
+A chief of partisans is, to a certain extent, independent of the army.
+He receives neither pay nor provisions from it, and rarely succor, and
+is abandoned during the whole campaign to his own resources.
+
+An officer so circumstanced must unite address with courage, and
+boldness with discretion, if he wishes to collect plunder without
+measuring the strength of his little corps with superior forces. Always
+harassed, always surrounded by dangers, which it is his business to
+foresee and surmount, a leader of partisans acquires in a short time an
+experience in the details of war rarely to be obtained by an officer
+of the line; because the latter is almost always under the guidance of
+superior authority, which directs the whole of his movements, while
+the talent and genius of the partisan are developed and sustained by a
+dependence on his own resources.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM LXXVII.
+
+
+Generals-in-chief must be guided by their own experience, or their
+genius. Tactics, evolutions, the duties and knowledge of an engineer
+or artillery officer, may be learned in treatises, but the science
+of strategy is only to be acquired by experience, and by studying the
+campaigns of all the great captains.
+
+Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, and Frederick, as well as Alexander,
+Hannibal, and Cæsar, have all acted upon the same principles. These
+have been: to keep their forces united; to leave no weak part
+unguarded; to seize with rapidity on important points.
+
+Such are the principles which lead to victory, and which, by inspiring
+terror at the reputation of your arms, will at once maintain fidelity
+and secure subjection.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+“A great captain can only be formed,” says the Archduke Charles, “by
+long experience and intense study: neither is his own experience
+enough--for whose life is there sufficiently fruitful of events to
+render his knowledge universal?” It is, therefore, by augmenting his
+information from the stock of others, by appreciating justly the
+discoveries of his predecessors, and by taking for his standard of
+comparison those great military exploits, in connection with their
+political results, in which the history of war abounds, that he can
+alone become a great commander.
+
+
+
+
+MAXIM LXXVIII.
+
+
+Peruse again and again the campaigns of Alexander, Hannibal, Cæsar,
+Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, Eugene, and Frederick. Model yourself
+upon them. This is the only means of becoming a great captain, and
+of acquiring the secret of the art of war. Your own genius will be
+enlightened and improved by this study, and you will learn to reject
+all maxims foreign to the principles of these great commanders.
+
+
+NOTE.
+
+It is in order to facilitate this object that I have formed the present
+collection. It is after reading and meditating upon the history of
+modern war that I have endeavored to illustrate, by examples, how the
+maxims of a great captain may be most successfully applied to this
+study. May the end I have had in view be accomplished!
+
+
+
+
+Transcriber’s Notes
+
+
+Cover created by Transcriber and placed in the Public Domain.
+
+Punctuation, hyphenation, and spelling were made consistent when a
+predominant preference was found in this book; otherwise they were not
+changed, except as noted below.
+
+Unusual and archaic spellings were not changed.
+
+Simple typographical errors were corrected; occasional unbalanced
+quotation marks retained.
+
+Ambiguous hyphens at the ends of lines were retained.
+
+Page 32: “spacious and extensive” was printed as “entensive” but
+changed here.
+
+Page 60: “1746” is a misprint; the correct date must be in the 1600's,
+perhaps “1646”.
+
+Page 63: “1798” may be a misprint for “1796”.
+
+Page 65: “1745” is a misprint; the correct year is “1645”.
+
+Page 75: “wo to the vanquished” was printed that way.
+
+Page 100: “Vauban” was printed as “Vanban” but changed here.
+
+
+
+
+
+End of Project Gutenberg's The Officer's Manual, by Napoleon Bonaparte
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+
+The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Officer's Manual, by Napoleon Bonaparte
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most
+other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions
+whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of
+the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at
+www.gutenberg.org.  If you are not located in the United States, you'll have
+to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook.
+
+Title: The Officer's Manual
+       Napoleon's Maxims of War
+
+Author: Napoleon Bonaparte
+
+Release Date: December 23, 2015 [EBook #50750]
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: UTF-8
+
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE OFFICER'S MANUAL ***
+
+
+
+
+Produced by Shaun Pinder, Charlie Howard, and the Online
+Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This
+file was produced from images generously made available
+by The Internet Archive)
+
+
+
+
+
+
+</pre>
+
+
+<div class="transnote center">
+<p class="center bold">Transcriber’s Note</p>
+<p class="covernote center">Cover created by Transcriber and placed into the Public Domain.</p>
+<p class="center">Table of Contents created by Transcriber and placed into the Public Domain.</p>
+</div>
+
+<h1 class="vspace">
+<span class="small">THE OFFICER’S MANUAL.</span><br /><br />
+NAPOLEON’S<br />
+<span class="larger gesperrt">MAXIMS OF WAR.</span></h1>
+
+<p class="p2 center vspace2"><span class="gesperrt">RICHMOND, VA.:<br />
+WEST &amp; JOHNSTON.</span><br />
+1862.
+</p>
+
+<p class="p2 center smaller vspace2">
+<span class="smcap">Evans &amp; Cogswell, Printers.<br />
+No. 3 Broad St., Charleston, S. C.</span>
+</p>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2 id="CONTENTS">CONTENTS</h2>
+
+<div class="center"><div class="center-block vspacetoc">
+<a href="#RECOMMENDATION">RECOMMENDATION.</a><br />
+<a href="#PREFACE">PREFACE.</a><br />
+<a href="#NAPOLEONS">NAPOLEON’S</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_I">MAXIM  I.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_II">MAXIM  II.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_III">MAXIM  III.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_IV">MAXIM  IV.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_V">MAXIM  V.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_VI">MAXIM  VI.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_VII">MAXIM  VII.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_VIII">MAXIM  VIII.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_IX">MAXIM  IX.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_X">MAXIM  X.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_XI">MAXIM  XI.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_XII">MAXIM  XII.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_XIII">MAXIM  XIII.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_XIV">MAXIM  XIV.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_XV">MAXIM  XV.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_XVI">MAXIM  XVI.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_XVII">MAXIM  XVII.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_XVIII">MAXIM  XVIII.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_XIX">MAXIM  XIX.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_XX">MAXIM  XX.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_XXI">MAXIM  XXI.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_XXII">MAXIM  XXII.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_XXIII">MAXIM  XXIII.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_XXIV">MAXIM  XXIV.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_XXV">MAXIM  XXV.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_XXVI">MAXIM  XXVI.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_XXVII">MAXIM  XXVII.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_XXVIII">MAXIM  XXVIII.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_XXIX">MAXIM  XXIX.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_XXX">MAXIM  XXX.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_XXXI">MAXIM  XXXI.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_XXXII">MAXIM  XXXII.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_XXXIII">MAXIM  XXXIII.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_XXXIV">MAXIM  XXXIV.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_XXXV">MAXIM  XXXV.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_XXXVI">MAXIM  XXXVI.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_XXXVII">MAXIM  XXXVII.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_XXXVIII">MAXIM  XXXVIII.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_XXXIX">MAXIM  XXXIX.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_XL">MAXIM  XL.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_XLI">MAXIM  XLI.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_XLII">MAXIM  XLII.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_XLIII">MAXIM  XLIII.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_XLIV">MAXIM  XLIV.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_XLV">MAXIM  XLV.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_XLVI">MAXIM  XLVI.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_XLVII">MAXIM  XLVII.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_XLVIII">MAXIM  XLVIII.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_XLIX">MAXIM  XLIX.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_L">MAXIM  L.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_LI">MAXIM  LI.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_LII">MAXIM  LII.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_LIII">MAXIM  LIII.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_LIV">MAXIM  LIV.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_LV">MAXIM  LV.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_LVI">MAXIM  LVI.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_LVII">MAXIM  LVII.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_LVIII">MAXIM  LVIII.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_LIX">MAXIM  LIX.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_LX">MAXIM  LX.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_LXI">MAXIM  LXI.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_LXII">MAXIM  LXII.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_LXIII">MAXIM  LXIII.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_LXIV">MAXIM  LXIV.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_LXV">MAXIM  LXV.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_LXVI">MAXIM  LXVI.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_LXVII">MAXIM  LXVII.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_LXVIII">MAXIM  LXVIII.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_LXIX">MAXIM  LXIX.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_LXX">MAXIM  LXX.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_LXXI">MAXIM  LXXI.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_LXXII">MAXIM  LXXII.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_LXXIII">MAXIM  LXXIII.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_LXXIV">MAXIM  LXXIV.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_LXXV">MAXIM  LXXV.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_LXXVI">MAXIM  LXXVI.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_LXXVII">MAXIM  LXXVII.</a><br />
+<a href="#MAXIM_LXXVIII">MAXIM  LXXVIII.</a><br />
+<a href="#Transcribers_Notes">Transcriber’s Notes</a>
+</div></div>
+
+</div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="RECOMMENDATION"></a>RECOMMENDATION.</h2>
+
+<p>“After refreshing my memory by looking over
+again ‘The Officer’s Manual,’ or ‘Maxims of Napoleon,’
+I think I may safely recommend the republication,
+in America, of the work in English, as likely to
+be called for by many officers, regular and volunteer.
+It contains a circle of maxims, deduced from the
+highest source of military science and experience,
+with practical illustrations of the principles taken
+from the most celebrated campaigns of modern times.
+The study of the book cannot fail to set all young
+officers on a course of inquiry and reflection greatly
+to their improvement.</p>
+
+<p class="sigright">
+“WINFIELD SCOTT.”
+</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_5">5</a></span></p>
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="PREFACE"></a>PREFACE.</h2>
+
+<p>The publisher has reissued this little
+volume as a publication timely for the
+occasion. A collection of maxims which
+directed the military operations of the
+greatest captain of modern times, cannot
+fail to prove of great use to such young
+officers as really desire a knowledge of
+the art of war. The maxims are illustrated
+by instances drawn from the campaigns
+of Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne,
+Frederick, and Napoleon. These great
+men were all governed by the same
+principles, and it is by applying these
+principles to the perusal of their respective
+campaigns, that every military man
+will recognize their wisdom, and make<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_6">6</a></span>
+such use of them hereafter as his own
+particular genius shall point out.</p>
+
+<p>“And here, perhaps,” says the translator,
+Col. D’Aguilar, “my task might
+have been considered finished; but perceiving
+how incomplete the collection
+was alone, I have endeavored to supply
+the deficiency by having recourse for
+further illustration to the memoirs of
+Montécuculli, and the instructions of
+Frederick to his generals. The analogy
+of their principles with those of Napoleon,
+has convinced me that the art of
+war is susceptible of two points of view:
+one, which relates entirely to the acquirements
+and genius of the general; the
+other, which refers to matters of detail.</p>
+
+<p>“The first is the same in all ages, and
+with all nations, whatever be the arms
+with which they fight. Hence it follows
+that, in every age, great commanders
+have been governed by the same principles.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_7">7</a></span></p>
+
+<p>“The business of detail, on the contrary,
+is controlled by existing circumstances.
+It varies with the character of
+a people, and the quality of their arms.</p>
+
+<p>“It is with a view to impress the justice
+of this remark, that I have sought
+for facts in different periods of history,
+to illustrate these maxims, and to prove
+that nothing is <em>problematical</em> in war; but
+that failure and success in military operations
+depend almost always on the natural
+genius and science of the chief.”</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_9">9</a></span></p>
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2 class="vspace"><a id="NAPOLEONS"></a>NAPOLEON’S<br />
+<span class="larger gesperrt wspace">MAXIMS OF WAR.</span></h2>
+
+</div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2 class="nobreak"><a id="MAXIM_I"></a>MAXIM I.</h2>
+
+<p>The frontiers of states are either large
+rivers, or chains of mountains, or deserts.
+Of all these obstacles to the march of an
+army, the most difficult to overcome is
+the desert; mountains come next, and
+broad rivers occupy the third place.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>Napoleon, in his military career, appears
+to have been called upon to surmount every
+difficulty which can occur in wars of invasion.</p>
+
+<p>In Egypt he traversed deserts, and vanquished
+and destroyed the Mamelukes, so
+celebrated for their address and courage.
+His genius knew how to accommodate itself
+to all the dangers of this distant enterprise,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_10">10</a></span>
+in a country ill adapted to supply the wants
+of his troops.</p>
+
+<p>In the conquest of Italy, he twice crossed
+the Alps by the most difficult passes, and at
+a season, too, which rendered this undertaking
+still more formidable. In three months
+he passed the Pyrenees, defeated and dispersed
+four Spanish armies. In short, from
+the Rhine to the Borysthenes, no natural
+obstacle could be found to arrest the rapid
+march of his victorious army.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_II"></a>MAXIM II.</h2>
+
+<p>In forming the plan of a campaign, it
+is requisite to foresee everything the enemy
+may do, and to be prepared with the
+necessary means to counteract it.</p>
+
+<p>Plans of campaign may be modified
+<i xml:lang="la" lang="la">ad infinitum</i> according to circumstances&mdash;the
+genius of the general, the character
+of the troops, and the topography of the
+theatre of action.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>Sometimes we see a hazardous campaign
+succeed, the plan of which is directly at variance<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_11">11</a></span>
+with the principles of the art of war.
+But this success depends generally on the
+caprice of fortune, or upon faults committed
+by the enemy&mdash;two things upon which a general
+must never count. Sometimes the plan
+of a campaign, although based on sound
+principles of war, runs the risk of failing at
+the outset if opposed by an adversary who
+acts at first on the defensive, and then, suddenly
+seizing the initiative, surprises by the
+skilfulness of his manœuvres. Such was the
+fate of the plan laid down by the Aulic council
+for the campaign of 1796, under the command
+of Marshal Wurmser. From his great
+numerical superiority, the marshal had calculated
+on the entire destruction of the French
+army, by cutting off its retreat. He founded
+his operations on the defensive attitude of
+his adversary, who was posted on the line
+of the Adige, and had to cover the siege of
+Mantua, as well as central and lower Italy.</p>
+
+<p>Wurmser, supposing the French army fixed
+in the neighborhood of Mantua, divided
+his forces into three corps, which marched
+separately, intending to unite at that place.
+Napoleon, having penetrated the design of
+the Austrian general, perceived the advantage
+to be derived from striking the first<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_12">12</a></span>
+blow against an army divided into three
+corps, with no communication between them.
+He hastened, therefore, to raise the siege of
+Mantua, assembled the whole of his forces,
+and by this means became superior to the
+imperialists, whose divisions he attacked and
+beat in detail. Thus Wurmser, who fancied
+he had only to march to certain victory,
+saw himself compelled, after ten days campaign,
+to retire with the remains of his army
+into the Tyrol, after a loss of twenty-five
+thousand men in killed and wounded, fifteen
+thousand prisoners, nine stand of colors, and
+seventy pieces of cannon.</p>
+
+<p>Hence, nothing is so difficult as to prescribe
+beforehand to a general the line of
+conduct he shall pursue during the course
+of a campaign. Success must often depend
+on circumstances that cannot be foreseen;
+and it should be remembered, likewise, that
+nothing cramps so much the efforts of genius
+as compelling the head of an army to be
+governed by any will but his own.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_III"></a>MAXIM III.</h2>
+
+<p>An army which undertakes the conquest
+of a country, has its two wings<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_13">13</a></span>
+resting either upon neutral territories, or
+upon great natural obstacles, such as rivers
+or chains of mountains. It happens
+in some cases that only one wing is so
+supported; and in others that both are
+exposed.</p>
+
+<p>In the first instance cited, viz., where
+both wings are protected, a general has
+only to protect his front from being penetrated.
+In the second, where one wing
+only is supported, he should rest upon
+the supported wing. In the third, where
+both wings are exposed, he should depend
+upon a central formation, and never allow
+the different corps under his command to
+depart from this: for if it be difficult to
+contend with the disadvantage of having
+<em>two</em> flanks exposed, the inconvenience is
+doubled by having <em>four</em>, trebled if there
+be <em>six</em>&mdash;that is to say, if the army is divided
+into two or three different corps.
+In the first instance, then, as above quoted,
+the line of operation may rest indifferently
+on the right or on the left. In
+the second, it should be directed toward
+the wing in support. In the third, it<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_14">14</a></span>
+should be perpendicular to the centre of
+the army’s line of march. But in all
+these cases it is necessary, at a distance
+of every five or six days march, to have
+a strong post or an entrenched position
+upon the line of operation, in order to
+collect military stores and provisions, to
+organize convoys, to form of it a centre
+of movement, and establish a point of
+defence to shorten the line of operation
+of the army.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>These general principles in the art of war
+were entirely unknown, or lost sight of, in
+the middle ages. The crusaders in their incursions
+into Palestine appear to have had
+no object but to fight and to conquer, so little
+pains did they take to profit by their
+victories. Hence, innumerable armies perished
+in Syria, without any other advantage
+than that derived from the momentary
+success obtained by superior numbers.</p>
+
+<p>It was by the neglect of these principles,
+also, that Charles XII, abandoning his line
+of operation and all communication with
+Sweden, threw himself into the Ukraine,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_15">15</a></span>
+and lost the greater part of his army by the
+fatigue of a winter campaign in a barren
+country destitute of resources.</p>
+
+<p>Defeated at Pultawa, he was obliged to
+seek refuge in Turkey, after crossing the
+Nieper with the remains of his army, diminished
+to little more than one thousand men.</p>
+
+<p>Gustavus Adolphus was the first who
+brought back the art of war to its true principles.
+His operations in Germany were
+bold, rapid, and well executed. He made
+success at all times conducive to future
+security, and established his line of operation
+so as to prevent the possibility of any
+interruption in his communications with
+Sweden. His campaigns form a new era in
+the art of war.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_IV"></a>MAXIM IV.</h2>
+
+<p>When the conquest of a country is
+undertaken by two or three armies,
+which have each their separate line of
+operation, until they arrive at a point
+fixed upon for their concentration, it
+should be laid down as a principle, that<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_16">16</a></span>
+the union of these different corps should
+never take place near the enemy; because
+the enemy, in uniting his forces,
+may not only prevent this junction, but
+may beat the armies in detail.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>In the campaign of 1757, Frederick,
+marching to the conquest of Bohemia with
+two armies, which had each their separate
+line of operation, succeeded, notwithstanding,
+in uniting them in sight of the Duke
+of Lorraine, who covered Prague with the
+imperial army; but his example should not
+be followed. The success of this march
+depended entirely on the inaction of the
+duke, who, at the head of seventy thousand
+men, did nothing to prevent the junction of
+the two Prussian armies.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_V"></a>MAXIM V.</h2>
+
+<p>All wars should be governed by certain
+principles, for every war should have a
+definite object, and be conducted according
+to the rules of art. (A war should<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_17">17</a></span>
+only be undertaken with forces proportioned
+to the obstacles to be overcome.)</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>It was a saying of Marshal Villars, that
+when war is decided on, it is necessary to
+have exact information of the number of
+troops the enemy can bring into the field,
+since it is impossible to lay down any solid
+plan of offensive or defensive operation
+without an accurate knowledge of what
+you have to expect and fear. “When the
+first shot is fired,” observes Marshal Villars,
+“no one can calculate what will be the issue
+of the war. It is, therefore, of vast
+importance to reflect maturely before we
+begin it.” When once, however, this is
+decided, the marshal observes that the boldest
+and most extended plans are generally
+the wisest and the most successful. “When
+we are determined upon war,” he adds, “we
+should carry it on vigorously and without
+trifling.”</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_VI"></a>MAXIM VI.</h2>
+
+<p>At the commencement of a campaign,
+to <em>advance</em> or <em>not to advance</em>, is a matter<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_18">18</a></span>
+for grave consideration; but when once
+the offensive has been assumed, it must
+be sustained to the last extremity. However
+skilful the manœuvres in a retreat,
+it will always weaken the <em>morale</em> of an
+army, because, in losing the chances of
+success, these last are transferred to the
+enemy. Besides, retreats always cost
+more men and <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">materiel</i> than the most
+bloody engagements; with this difference,
+that in a battle the enemy’s loss is
+nearly equal to your own&mdash;whereas in a
+retreat the loss is on your side only.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>Marshal Saxe remarks, that no retreats
+are so favorable as those which are made
+before a languid and unenterprising enemy,
+for when he pursues with vigor, the retreat
+soon degenerates into a rout. “Upon this
+principle it is a great error,” says the
+marshal, “to adhere to the proverb which
+recommends us to build a bridge of gold for
+a retreating enemy. No; follow him up
+with spirit, and he is destroyed!”</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_19">19</a></span></p>
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_VII"></a>MAXIM VII.</h2>
+
+<p>An army should be ready every day,
+every night, and at all times of the day
+and night, to oppose all the resistance
+of which it is capable. With this view,
+the soldier should always be furnished
+completely with arms and ammunition;
+the infantry should never be without its
+artillery, its cavalry, and its generals;
+and the different divisions of the army
+should be constantly in a state to support,
+to be supported, and to protect
+itself.</p>
+
+<p>The troops, whether halted, or encamped,
+or on the march, should be
+always in favorable positions, possessing
+the essentials required for a field of battle;
+for example, the flanks should be
+well covered, and all the artillery so
+placed as to have free range, and to play
+with the greatest advantage. When an
+army is in column of march, it should
+have advanced guards and flanking parties,
+to examine well the country in front,
+to the right, and to the left, and always<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_20">20</a></span>
+at such distance as to enable the main
+body to deploy into position.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>The following maxims, taken from the
+memoirs of Montécuculli, appear to me well
+suited to this place, and calculated to form a
+useful commentary on the general principles
+laid down in the preceding maxim:</p>
+
+<p>1. When war has been once decided on,
+the moment is past for doubts and scruples.
+On the contrary, we are bound to hope that
+all the evil which may ensue, will not; that
+Providence, or our own wisdom, may avert
+it; or that the want of talent on the part of
+the enemy may prevent him from benefiting
+by it. The first security for success is to
+confer the command on one individual.
+When the authority is divided, the opinions
+of the commanders often vary, and the operations
+are deprived of that <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">ensemble</i> which
+is the first essential to victory. Besides,
+when an enterprise is common to many, and
+not confined to a single person, it is conducted
+without vigor, and less interest is
+attached to the result.</p>
+
+<p>After having strictly conformed to all the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_21">21</a></span>
+rules of war, and satisfied ourselves that
+nothing has been omitted to ensure eventual
+success, we must then leave the issue in the
+hands of Providence, and repose ourselves
+tranquilly in the decision of a higher power.</p>
+
+<p>Let what will arrive, it is the part of a
+general-in-chief to remain firm and constant
+in his purposes; he must not allow himself
+to be elated by prosperity, nor to be depressed
+by adversity: for in war good and
+bad and fortune succeed each other by turns,
+form the ebb and flow of military operations.</p>
+
+<p>2. When your own army is strong and
+inured to service, and that of the enemy is
+weak and consists of new levies, or of troops
+enervated by long inaction, then you should
+exert every means to bring him to battle.</p>
+
+<p>If, on the other hand, your adversary has
+the advantage in troops, a decisive combat
+is to be avoided, and you must be content to
+impede his progress, by encamping advantageously,
+and fortifying favorable passes.
+When armies are nearly equal in force, it is
+desirable <em>not</em> to avoid a battle, but only to
+attempt to fight one to advantage. For this
+purpose, care should be taken to encamp always
+in front of the enemy; to move when
+he moves, and occupy the heights and advantageous<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_22">22</a></span>
+grounds that lie upon his line of
+march; to seize upon all the buildings and
+roads adjoining to his camp, and post yourself
+advantageously in the places by which
+he must pass. It is always something gained
+to make <em>him</em> lose time, to thwart his designs,
+or to retard their progress and execution.
+If, however, an army is altogether
+inferior to that of the enemy, and there is no
+possibility of manœuvring against him with
+success, then the campaign must be abandoned,
+and the troops must retire into the
+fortresses.</p>
+
+<p>3. The principal object of a general-in-chief,
+in the moment of battle, should be to
+secure the flanks of his army. It is true
+that natural positions may be found to effect
+this object, but these positions being fixed
+and immovable in themselves, they are only
+advantageous to a general who wishes to
+wait the shock of the enemy, and not to one
+who marches to the attack.</p>
+
+<p>A general can, therefore, rely only on the
+proper arrangement of his troops, to enable
+him to repel any attempt the adversary may
+make upon the front, or flanks, or rear of
+his army.</p>
+
+<p>If one flank of an army rests upon a river,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_23">23</a></span>
+or an impassable ravine, the whole of the
+cavalry may be posted with the other wing,
+in order to envelop the enemy more easily
+by its superiority in numbers.</p>
+
+<p>If the enemy has his flanks supported by
+woods, light cavalry or infantry should be
+despatched to attack him in flank or in rear
+during the heat of the battle. If practicable,
+also, an attack should be made upon the
+baggage, to add to his confusion.</p>
+
+<p>If you desire to beat the enemy’s left with
+your right wing, or his right with your
+left wing, the wing with which you attack
+should be reinforced by the <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">élite</i> of your
+army. At the same moment, the other wing
+should avoid battle, and the attacking wing
+brought rapidly forward, so as to overwhelm
+the enemy. If the nature of the ground
+admits, he should be approached by stealth,
+and attacked before he is on his guard. If
+any signs of fear are discoverable in the enemy,
+and which are always to be detected
+by confusion or disorder in his movements,
+he should be pursued immediately, without
+allowing him time to recover himself. It is
+now the cavalry should be brought into action,
+and manœuvre so as to surprise and
+cut off his artillery and baggage.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_24">24</a></span></p>
+
+<p>4. The order of march should always be
+subservient to the order of battle, which last
+should be arranged beforehand. The march
+of an army is always well regulated when it
+is governed by the distance to be accomplished,
+and by the time required for its performance.
+The front of the column of march
+should be diminished or increased according
+to the nature of the country, taking care
+that the artillery always proceeds by the
+main road.</p>
+
+<p>When a river is to be passed, the artillery
+should be placed in battery upon the bank
+opposite the point of crossing.</p>
+
+<p>It is a great advantage, when a river
+forms a sweep or angle, and when a ford is
+to be found near the place where you wish
+to effect a passage. As the construction of
+the bridge proceeds, infantry should be advanced
+to cover the workmen, by keeping
+up a fire on the opposite bank; but the moment
+it is finished, a corps of infantry and
+cavalry, and some field-pieces, should be
+pushed across. The infantry should entrench
+itself immediately at the head of the bridge,
+and it is prudent, moreover, to fortify on the
+same side of the river, in order to protect
+the bridge in case the enemy should venture
+an offensive movement.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_25">25</a></span></p>
+
+<p>The advanced guard of an army should
+be always provided with trusty guides, and
+with a corps of pioneers: the first to point
+out the best roads, the second to render
+these roads more practicable.</p>
+
+<p>If the army marches in detachments, the
+commander of each detachment should be
+furnished with the name of the place in
+writing, where the whole are to be reassembled;
+the place should be sufficiently removed
+from the enemy to prevent him from
+occupying it before the junction of all the
+detachments. To this end, it is of importance
+to keep the name a secret.</p>
+
+<p>From the moment an army approaches
+the enemy, it should march in the order in
+which it is intended to fight. If anything is
+to be apprehended, precautions are necessary
+in proportion to the degree of the danger.
+When a defile is to be passed, the troops
+should be halted beyond the extremity, until
+the whole army has quitted the defile.</p>
+
+<p>In order to conceal the movements of an
+army, it is necessary to march by night
+through woods and valleys, by the most retired
+roads, and out of reach of all inhabited
+places. No fires should be allowed; and, to
+favor the design still more, the troops should<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_26">26</a></span>
+move by verbal order. When the object of
+the march is to carry a post, or to relieve a
+place that is besieged, the advanced guard
+should march within musket shot of the
+main body, because then you are prepared
+for an immediate attack, and ready to overthrow
+all before you.</p>
+
+<p>When a march is made to force a pass
+guarded by the enemy, it is desirable to
+make a feint upon one point, while, by a
+rapid movement, you bring your real attack
+to bear upon another.</p>
+
+<p>Sometimes success is obtained by pretending
+to fall back upon the original line of
+march, and, by a sudden countermarch, seizing
+upon the pass, before the enemy is able
+to reoccupy it. Some generals have gained
+their point by manœuvring so as to deceive
+the enemy, while a detachment under the
+cover of high grounds has surprised the passage
+by a stolen march. The enemy being
+engaged in watching the movements of the
+main body, the detachment has an opportunity
+of entrenching itself in its new position.</p>
+
+<p>5. An army regulates its mode of encampment
+according to the greater or less degree
+of precaution, when circumstances require.
+In a friendly country the troops are divided,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_27">27</a></span>
+to afford better accommodation and supplies.
+But with the enemy in front, an army should
+always encamp in order of battle. With
+this view, it is of the highest importance to
+cover one part of the camp, as far as practicable,
+by natural defences, such as a river, a
+chain of rocks, or a ravine. Care should be
+taken also that the camp is not commanded,
+and that there is no obstacle to a free communication
+between the different corps, and
+which can prevent the troops from mutually
+succoring each other.</p>
+
+<p>When an army occupies a fixed camp, it is
+necessary to be well supplied with provisions
+and ammunition, or at least that these should
+be within certain reach and easily obtained.
+To insure this, the line of communication
+must be well established, and care taken not
+to leave an enemy’s fortress in your rear.</p>
+
+<p>When an army is established in winter
+quarters, its safety is best secured either by
+fortifying a camp (for which purpose a spot
+should be selected near a large commercial
+town, or a river affording facility of transport),
+or by distributing it in close cantonments,
+so that the troops should be near
+together, and capable of affording each other
+mutual support.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_28">28</a></span></p>
+
+<p>The winter quarters of an army should be
+protected, likewise, by constructing small
+covered works on all the lines of approach
+to the cantonments, and by posting advanced
+guards of cavalry to observe the motions of
+the enemy.</p>
+
+<p>6. A battle is to be sought, when there is
+reason to hope for victory, or when an army
+runs the risk of being ruined without fighting;
+also when a besieged place is to be
+relieved, or when you desire to prevent
+a reinforcement from reaching the enemy.
+Battles are useful, likewise, when we wish
+to profit by a favorable opportunity which
+offers, to secure a certain advantage, such as
+seizing upon an undefended point or pass,
+attacking the enemy when he has committed
+a fault, or when some misunderstanding
+among his generals favors the undertaking.</p>
+
+<p>If an enemy declines an engagement, he
+may be compelled to it, either by besieging
+a place of importance, or by falling upon
+him unawares, and when he cannot easily
+effect his retreat. Or (after pretending to
+retire), by making a rapid countermarch,
+attacking him vigorously and forcing him to
+action.</p>
+
+<p>The different circumstances under which<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_29">29</a></span>
+a battle should be avoided or declined, are,
+when there is greater danger to be apprehended
+from defeat than advantage to be
+derived from victory; when you are very
+inferior to your adversary in numbers, and
+are expecting reinforcements; above all,
+when the enemy is advantageously posted,
+or when he is contributing to his own ruin
+by some inherent defect in his position, or
+by the errors and divisions of his generals.</p>
+
+<p>To gain a battle, each arm must be advantageously
+posted, and have the means
+of engaging its front and in flank. The
+wings must be protected by natural obstacles,
+where these present themselves, or by
+having recourse when necessary to the aid
+of art.</p>
+
+<p>The troops must be able to assist each
+other without confusion, and care must be
+taken that the broken corps do not fall
+back upon, and throw the rest into disorder.
+Above all, the intervals between
+the different corps must be sufficiently small
+to prevent the enemy from penetrating between
+them, for in that case you would be
+obliged to employ your reserves, and run
+the risk of being entirely overwhelmed.
+Sometimes victory is obtained by creating<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_30">30</a></span>
+a diversion in the middle of a battle, or
+even by depriving the soldier of all hope
+of retreat, and placing him in a situation
+where he is reduced to the necessity either
+to conquer or die.</p>
+
+<p>At the commencement of a battle, if the
+ground is level, you should advance to meet
+the enemy, in order to inspire the soldier
+with courage; but if you are well posted,
+and your artillery advantageously placed,
+then wait for him with determination: remembering
+always to fight resolutely, to
+succor opportunely those who require it,
+and never to bring your reserves into action
+except in the last extremity; and
+even then to preserve some support, behind
+which the broken corps may rally.</p>
+
+<p>When it is necessary to attack with your
+whole force, the battle should commence
+toward evening; because then, whatever
+be the issue, night will arrive to separate
+the combatants before your troops are exhausted.
+By this means, an opportunity
+is afforded of affecting an orderly retreat
+if the result of the battle requires it.</p>
+
+<p>During an action, the general-in-chief
+should occupy some spot whence he can,
+as far as possible, overlook his whole army.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_31">31</a></span>
+He should be informed, immediately, of
+everything that passes in the different
+divisions. He should be ready, in order to
+render success more complete, to operate
+with fresh troops upon those points where
+the enemy is giving way, and also to reinforce
+his own corps wherever they are inclined
+to yield. When the enemy is beaten,
+he must pursue him instantly, without
+giving him a moment to rally; on the
+other hand, if he is himself defeated, or
+despairs of victory, he must retreat in the
+best possible order.</p>
+
+<p>7. It shows great talent in a general
+to bring troops, who are prepared for action,
+into collision with those who are
+not: for example, fresh troops against those
+which are exhausted&mdash;brave and disciplined
+men against recruits. He must likewise be
+ready always to fall with his army upon
+a weak or detached corps, to follow the
+track of the enemy, and charge him among
+defiles before he can face about and get into
+position.</p>
+
+<p>8. A position is good when the different
+corps are so placed as to be engaged with
+advantage, and without any remaining unemployed.
+If you are superior in cavalry,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_32">32</a></span>
+positions are to be taken in plains and
+open ground; if in infantry, in an enclosed
+and covered country. If inferior in
+numbers, in confined and narrow places;
+if superior, in a spacious and extensive
+field. With a very inferior army, a difficult
+pass must be selected to occupy and
+fortify.</p>
+
+<p>9. In order to obtain every possible advantage
+from a diversion, we should ascertain
+first, that the country in which it is to
+be created is easily penetrated. A diversion
+should be made vigorously, and on those
+points where it is calculated to do the greatest
+mischief to the enemy.</p>
+
+<p>10. To make war with success, the following
+principles should never be departed
+from:</p>
+
+<p>To be superior to your enemy in numbers,
+as well as in <em>morale</em>; to fight battles in order
+to spread terror in the country; to divide
+your army into as many corps as may be
+effected without risk, in order to undertake
+several objects at the same time; to treat
+<span class="smcap smaller">WELL</span> those who yield, to <span class="smcap smaller">ILL</span> treat those who
+resist; to secure your rear, and occupy and
+strengthen yourself at the outset in some
+post which shall serve as a central point for<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_33">33</a></span>
+the support of your future movements; to
+guard against desertion; to make yourself
+master of the great rivers and principal
+passes, and to establish your line of communication
+by getting possession of the fortresses,
+by laying siege to them, and of the
+open country, by giving battle; for it is vain
+to expect that conquests are to be achieved
+without combats; although when a victory
+is won, they will be best maintained by
+uniting mildness with valor.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_VIII"></a>MAXIM VIII.</h2>
+
+<p>A general-in-chief should ask himself
+frequently in the day: “What should I
+do if the enemy’s army appeared now in
+my front, or on my right, or my left?”
+If he have any difficulty in answering
+these questions, his position is bad, and
+he should seek to remedy it.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>In the campaign of 1758, the position of
+the Prussian army at Hohen Kirk, being
+commanded by the batteries of the enemy,
+who occupied all the heights, was eminently<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_34">34</a></span>
+defective; notwithstanding, Frederick, who
+saw his rear menaced by the corps of Laudon,
+remained six days in his camp without seeking
+to correct his position. It would seem,
+indeed, that he was ignorant of his real danger:
+for Marshal Daun, having manœuvred
+during the night in order to attack by daybreak,
+surprised the Prussians in their lines
+before they were able to defend themselves,
+and by this means surrounded them completely.</p>
+
+<p>Frederick succeeded, however, in effecting
+his retreat with regularity, but not without
+the loss of ten thousand men, many general
+officers, and almost all of his artillery. If
+Marshal Daun had followed up his victory
+with greater boldness, the king of Prussia
+would never have been able to rally his
+army. On this occasion, Frederick’s good
+fortune balanced his imprudence.</p>
+
+<p>Marshal Saxe remarks, that there is more
+talent than is dreamt of in bad dispositions,
+if we possess the art of converting them into
+good ones when the favorable moment
+arrives. Nothing astonishes the enemy so
+much as this manœuvre; he has counted
+upon <em>something</em>; all his arrangements have
+been founded upon it accordingly&mdash;and at<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_35">35</a></span>
+the moment of attack it escapes him! “I
+must repeat,” says the marshal, “there is
+nothing that so completely disconcerts an
+enemy as this, or leads him to commit so
+many errors; for it follows, that if he does
+<em>not</em> change his arrangements, he is beaten;
+and if he <em>does</em> change them, in presence of
+his adversary, he is equally undone.”</p>
+
+<p>It seems to me, however, that a general
+who should rest the success of a battle upon
+such a principle, would be more likely to
+lose than to gain by it; for if he had to deal
+with a skilful adversary and an alert tactician,
+the latter would find time to take advantage
+of the previous bad arrangements,
+before he would be able to remedy them.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_IX"></a>MAXIM IX.</h2>
+
+<p>The strength of an army, like the
+power in mechanics, is estimated by multiplying
+the mass by the rapidity; a rapid
+march augments the <em>morale</em> of an army,
+and increases its means of victory. Press
+on!</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_36">36</a></span></p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>“Rapidity,” says Montécuculli, “is of importance
+in concealing the movements of an
+army, because it leaves no time to divulge
+the intention of its chief. It is, therefore,
+an advantage to attack the enemy unexpectedly,
+to take him off his guard, to surprise
+him, and let him feel the thunder before he
+sees the flash; but if too great celerity exhausts
+your troops, while, on the other hand,
+delay deprives you of the favorable moment,
+you must weigh the advantage against the
+disadvantage, and choose between.”</p>
+
+<p>Marshal Villars observes, that “in war
+everything depends upon being able to deceive
+the enemy; and having once gained
+this point, in never allowing him time to
+recover himself.” Villars has united practice
+to precept. His bold and rapid marches
+were almost always crowned with success.</p>
+
+<p>It was the opinion of Frederick that all
+wars should be short and rapid; because a
+long war insensibly relaxes discipline, depopulates
+the state, and exhausts its resources.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_37">37</a></span></p>
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_X"></a>MAXIM X.</h2>
+
+<p>When an army is inferior in number,
+inferior in cavalry, and in artillery, it is
+essential to avoid a general action. The
+first deficiency should be supplied by rapidity
+of movement; the want of artillery,
+by the nature of the manœuvres;
+and the inferiority in cavalry, by the
+choice of positions. In such circumstances,
+the <em>morale</em> of the soldier does much.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>The campaign of 1814 in France was skilfully
+executed upon these principles. Napoleon,
+with an army inferior in number, an
+army discouraged by the disastrous retreats
+of Moscow and of Leipzig, and still more by
+the presence of the enemy in the French
+territory, contrived, notwithstanding, to supply
+his vast inequality of force by the rapidity
+and combination of his movements. By
+the success obtained at Champ-Aubert, Montmirail,
+Montereau, and Rheims, he began to
+restore the <em>morale</em> of the French army. The
+numerous recruits of which it was composed,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_38">38</a></span>
+had already acquired that steadiness
+of which the old regiments afforded them
+an example, when the capture of Paris, and
+the astonishing revolution it produced, compelled
+Napoleon to lay down his arms.</p>
+
+<p>But this consequence resulted rather from
+the force of circumstances than from any absolute
+necessity; for Napoleon, by carrying
+his army to the other side of the Loire,
+might easily have formed a junction with
+the armies of the Alps and Pyrenees, and
+have reappeared on the field of battle at the
+head of a hundred thousand men. Such a
+force would have amply sufficed to re-establish
+the chances of war in his favor; more
+especially as the armies of the allied sovereigns
+were obliged to manœuvre upon the
+French territory with all the strong places
+of Italy and France in their rear.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XI"></a>MAXIM XI.</h2>
+
+<p>To direct operations with lines far removed
+from each other, and without communications,
+is to commit a fault which
+always gives birth to a second. The<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_39">39</a></span>
+detached column has only its orders for
+the first day. Its operations on the following
+day depend upon what may have
+happened to the main body. Thus, this
+column either loses time upon emergency,
+in waiting for orders, or it will act without
+them, and at hazard. Let it therefore
+be held as a principle, that an army
+should always keep its columns so united
+as to prevent the enemy from passing between
+them with impunity. Whenever,
+for particular reasons, this principle is
+departed from, the detached corps should
+be independent in their operations. They
+should move toward a point fixed upon
+for their future junction. They should
+advance without hesitating, and without
+waiting for fresh orders; and every precaution
+should be taken to prevent an
+attack upon them in detail.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>The Austrian army, commanded by Field-marshal
+Alvinzi, was divided into two corps,
+destined to act independently, until they
+should accomplish their junction before Mantua.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_40">40</a></span>
+The first of these corps, consisting of
+forty-five thousand men, was under the orders
+of Alvinzi. It was to debouch by Monte
+Baldo, upon the positions occupied by the
+French army on the Adige. The second
+corps, commanded by General Provéra, was
+destined to act upon the lower Adige, and
+to raise the blockade of Mantua. Napoleon,
+informed of the enemy’s movements,
+but not entirely comprehending his projects,
+confined himself to concentrating his masses,
+and giving orders to the troops to hold
+themselves in readiness to manœuvre. In
+the meantime, fresh information satisfied the
+general-in-chief of the French army that the
+corps which had debouched by La Coronna,
+over Monte Baldo, was endeavoring to form
+a junction with its cavalry and artillery&mdash;both
+which, having crossed the Adige at
+Dolce, were directing their march upon the
+plateau of Rivoli, by the great road leading
+by Incanole.</p>
+
+<p>Napoleon immediately foresaw that, by
+having possession of the plateau, he should
+be able to prevent this junction, and obtain
+all the advantages of the initiative. He accordingly
+put his troops in motion, and at
+two o’clock in the morning occupied that<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_41">41</a></span>
+important position. Once master of the point
+fixed upon for the junction of the Austrian
+columns, success followed all his dispositions.
+He repulsed every attack, made seven thousand
+prisoners, and took several standards
+and twelve pieces of cannon. At two o’clock
+in the afternoon, the battle of Rivoli was
+already gained, when Napoleon, learning
+that General Provéra had passed the Adige
+at Anghiari, and was directing his march
+upon Mantua, left to his generals the charge
+of following up the retreat of Alvinzi, and
+placed himself at the head of a division for
+the purpose of defeating the designs of Provéra.</p>
+
+<p>By a rapid march, he again succeeded in
+the initiatory movement, and in preventing
+the garrison of Mantua from uniting its force
+with the relieving army. The corps intrusted
+with the blockade, eager to distinguish
+itself under the eyes of the conqueror of
+Rivoli, compelled the garrison to retire into
+the place, while the division of Victor, forgetting
+the fatigues of a forced march, rushed
+with impetuosity on the relieving army in
+front. At this moment a sortie from the lines
+of St. George took him in flank, while the
+corps of Augereau, which had followed the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_42">42</a></span>
+march of the Austrian general, attacked him
+in rear. Provéra, surrounded on all sides,
+capitulated. The result of these two battles
+cost the Austrians three thousand men in
+killed and wounded, twenty-two thousand
+prisoners, twenty-four standards, and forty-six
+pieces of cannon.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XII"></a>MAXIM XII.</h2>
+
+<p>An army ought to have only one line
+of operation. This should be preserved
+with care, and never abandoned but in
+the last extremity.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>“The line of communication of an army,”
+says Montécuculli, “must be certain and
+well established, for every army that acts
+from a distant base, and is not careful to
+keep this line perfectly open, marches upon
+a precipice. It moves to certain ruin, as may
+be seen by an infinity of examples. In fact,
+if the road by which provisions, ammunition
+and reinforcements are to be brought up, is
+not entirely secured&mdash;if the magazines, the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_43">43</a></span>
+hospitals, the depôts of arms, and the places
+of supply are not fixed and commodiously
+situated&mdash;not only the army cannot keep the
+field, but it will be exposed to the greatest
+dangers.”</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XIII"></a>MAXIM XIII.</h2>
+
+<p>The distances permitted between corps
+of an army upon the march must be governed
+by the localities, by circumstances,
+and by the object in view.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>When an army moves at a distance from
+the enemy, the columns may be disposed
+along the road so as to favor the artillery
+and baggage. But when it is marching into
+action, the different corps must be formed in
+close columns in order of battle. The generals
+must take care that the heads of the
+columns, which are to attack together, do not
+outstep each other, and that in approaching
+the field of action they preserve the relative
+intervals required for deployment.</p>
+
+<p>“The marches that are made preparatory<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_44">44</a></span>
+to a battle require,” says Frederick, “the
+greatest precaution.” With this view, he
+recommends his generals to be particularly
+on their guard, and to reconnoitre the ground
+at successive distances, in order to secure the
+initiative by occupying those positions most
+calculated to favor an attack. On a retreat,
+it is the opinion of many generals that an
+army should concentrate its forces, and
+march in close columns if it is still strong
+enough to resume the offensive; for by this
+means it is easy to form the line when a
+favorable opportunity presents itself, either
+for holding the enemy in check or for attacking
+him if he is not in a situation to
+accept battle.</p>
+
+<p>Such was Moreau’s retreat after the passage
+of the Adda by the Austro-Russian
+army. The French general, after having
+covered the evacuation of Milan, took up a
+position between the Po and the Tanaro.</p>
+
+<p>His camp rested upon Alexandria and
+Valentia, two capital fortresses, and had the
+advantage of covering the roads to Turin
+and Savona, by which he could effect his
+retreat in case he was unable to accomplish a
+junction with the <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">corps d’armee</i> of Macdonald,
+who had been ordered to quit the kingdom<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_45">45</a></span>
+of Naples, and hasten his march into
+Tuscany.</p>
+
+<p>Forced to abandon his position in consequence
+of the insurrection in Piedmont and
+Tuscany, Moreau retired upon Asti, where
+he learned that his communication with the
+river of Genoa had just been cut off by the
+capture of Ceva. After several ineffectual
+attempts to retake this place, he saw that
+his only safety depended upon throwing himself
+into the mountains.</p>
+
+<p>To effect this object, he directed the whole
+of his battering train and heavy baggage by
+the Col de Fenestrelle upon France; then
+opening himself a way over the St. Bernard,
+he gained Loano with his light artillery and
+the small proportion of field equipment he
+had been able to preserve.</p>
+
+<p>By this skilful movement, he not only retained
+his communications with France, but
+was enabled to observe the motions of the
+army from Naples, and to facilitate his junction
+with it by directing the whole of his
+force upon the points necessary for that
+purpose.</p>
+
+<p>Macdonald, in the meantime, whose only
+chance of success depended on concentrating
+his little army, neglected this precaution,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_46">46</a></span>
+and was beaten in three successive actions
+at the Trebia.</p>
+
+<p>By this retardment of his march, he rendered
+all Moreau’s measures to unite the
+two armies in the plains of the Po useless,
+and his retreat, after his brilliant but fruitless
+efforts at the Trebia, defeated the other
+arrangements, also, which the former had
+made to come to his support. The inactivity
+of Marshal Suwarrow, however, finally enabled
+the French general to accomplish his
+junction with the remains of the army from
+Naples. Moreau then concentrated his whole
+force upon the Appenines, and placed himself
+in a situation to defend the important
+positions of Liguria, until the chances of
+war should afford him an opportunity of resuming
+the offensive.</p>
+
+<p>When, after a decisive battle, an army has
+lost its artillery and equipments, and is consequently
+no longer in a state to assume the
+offensive, or even to arrest the pursuit of
+the enemy, it would seem most desirable to
+divide what remains into several corps, and
+order them to march by separate and distant
+routes upon the base of operation, and
+throw themselves into the fortresses. This
+is the only means of safety: for the enemy,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_47">47</a></span>
+uncertain as to the precise direction taken
+by the vanquished army, is ignorant in the
+first instance which corps to pursue, and it
+is in this moment of indecision that a march
+is gained upon him. Besides, the movements
+of a small body being so much easier
+than those of a larger one, these separate
+lines of march are all in favor of a retreating
+army.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XIV"></a>MAXIM XIV.</h2>
+
+<p>Among mountains, a great number of
+positions are always to be found very
+strong in themselves, and which it is dangerous
+to attack. The character of this
+mode of warfare consists in occupying
+camps on the flanks or in the rear of the
+enemy, leaving him only the alternative
+of abandoning his position without fighting,
+to take up another in the rear, or to
+descend from it in order to attack you.
+In mountain warfare, the assailant has
+always the disadvantage; even in offensive
+warfare in the open field, the great<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_48">48</a></span>
+secret consists in defensive combats, and
+in obliging the enemy to attack.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>During the campaign of 1793, in the Maritime
+Alps, the French army, under the orders
+of General Brunet, did all in its power
+to get possession of the camps at Raus and
+at Fourches, by an attack in front. But
+these useless efforts served only to increase
+the courage of the Piedmontese, and to destroy
+the <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">élite</i> of the grenadiers of the republican
+army. The manœuvres by which Napoleon,
+without fighting, compelled the enemy
+to evacuate these positions in 1796, suffice to
+establish the truth of these principles, and
+to prove how much success in war depends
+upon the genius of the general as well as on
+the courage of the soldier.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XV"></a>MAXIM XV.</h2>
+
+<p>The first consideration with a general
+who offers battle, should be the glory and
+honor of his arms; the safety and preservation
+of his men is only the second; but<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_49">49</a></span>
+it is in the enterprise and courage resulting
+from the former, that the latter will
+most assuredly be found. In a retreat,
+besides the honor of the army, the loss of
+life is often greater than in two battles.
+For this reason, we should never despair
+while brave men are to be found with
+their colors. It is by this means that we
+obtain victory, and deserve to obtain it.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>In 1645, the French army, under the orders
+of the Prince of Condé, was on the
+march to lay siege to Nordlingen, when it
+was discovered that Count Merci, who commanded
+the Bavarians, had foreseen this
+intention, and had entrenched himself in a
+strong position which defended Nordlingen
+at the same time that it covered Donawerth.</p>
+
+<p>Notwithstanding the favorable position of
+the enemy, Condé ordered the attack. The
+combat was terrible. All the infantry in
+the centre and on the right, after being
+successively engaged, was routed and dispersed,
+in spite of the efforts of the cavalry
+and the reserve, which were likewise carried
+away with the fugitives. The battle was<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_50">50</a></span>
+lost. Condé, in despair, having no longer
+either centre or right to depend upon, collected
+the remnants of his battalions, and
+directed his march to the left, where Turenne
+was still engaged. This perseverance reanimated
+the ardor of the troops. They
+broke the right wing of the enemy, and
+Turenne, by a change of front, returned to
+the attack upon his centre. Night, too,
+favored the boldness of Condé. An entire
+corps of Bavarians, fancying themselves cut
+off, laid down their arms; and the obstinacy
+of the French general in this struggle for
+victory was repaid by possession of the field
+of battle, together with a great number of
+prisoners, and almost all the enemy’s artillery.
+The Bavarian army beat a retreat,
+and the next day Nordlingen capitulated.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XVI"></a>MAXIM XVI.</h2>
+
+<p>It is an approved maxim in war, never
+to do what the enemy wishes you to do,
+for this reason alone, that he desires it.
+A field of battle, therefore, which he
+has previously studied and reconnoitred,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_51">51</a></span>
+should be avoided, and double care should
+be taken where he has had time to fortify
+and entrench. One consequence deducible
+from this principle is, never to attack
+a position in front which you can gain by
+turning.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>It was without due regard to this principle,
+that Marshal Villeroi, on assuming the
+command of the army of Italy, during the
+campaign of 1701, attacked, with unwarrantable
+presumption, Prince Eugene, of
+Savoy, in his entrenched position of Chiavi,
+on the Oglio. The French generals, Catinat
+among the rest, considered the post unassailable,
+but Villeroi insisted, and the result
+of this otherwise unimportant battle was
+the loss of the <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">élite</i> of the French army. It
+would have been greater still, but for Catinat’s
+exertions.</p>
+
+<p>It was by neglecting the same principle,
+that the Prince of Condé, in the campaign
+of 1644, failed in all his attacks upon the
+entrenched position of the Bavarian army.
+The Count Merci, who commanded the latter,
+had drawn up his cavalry skilfully upon the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_52">52</a></span>
+plain, resting upon Freyberg, while his infantry
+occupied the mountain. After many
+fruitless attempts, the Prince of Condé,
+seeing the impossibility of dislodging the
+enemy, began to menace his communications&mdash;but
+the moment Merci perceived this,
+he broke up his camp and retired beyond
+the Black mountains.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XVII"></a>MAXIM XVII.</h2>
+
+<p>In a war of march and manœuvre, if
+you would avoid a battle with a superior
+army, it is necessary to entrench every
+night, and occupy a good defensive position.
+Those natural positions which are
+ordinarily met with, are not sufficient to
+protect an army against superior numbers
+without recourse to art.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>The campaign of the French and Spanish
+army, commanded by the Duke of Berwick,
+against the Portuguese, in the year 1706,
+affords a good lesson on this subject. The
+two armies made almost the tour of Spain.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_53">53</a></span>
+They began the campaign near Badajoz, and
+after manœuvring across both Castiles, finished
+it in the kingdoms of Valencia and
+Murcia. The Duke of Berwick encamped
+his army eighty-five times, and although the
+campaign passed without a general action,
+he took about ten thousand prisoners from
+the enemy. Marshal Turenne also made a
+fine campaign of manœuvre against the
+Count Montécuculli, in 1675.</p>
+
+<p>The imperial army having made its arrangements
+to pass the Rhine at Strasburg,
+Turenne used all diligence, and, throwing a
+bridge over the river near the village of
+Ottenheim, three leagues below Strasburg,
+he crossed with the French army, and encamped
+close to the little town of Vilstet,
+which he occupied. This position covered
+the bridge of Strasburg, so that, by this
+manœuvre, Turenne deprived the enemy of
+all approach to that city.</p>
+
+<p>Upon this, Montécuculli made a movement
+with his whole army, threatening the bridge
+at Ottenheim, by which the French received
+their provisions from upper Alsace.</p>
+
+<p>As soon as Turenne discovered the design
+of the enemy, he left a detachment at Vilstet,
+and made a rapid march with his whole<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_54">54</a></span>
+force upon the village of Altenheim. This
+intermediate position between the two
+bridges, which he wished to preserve, gave
+him the advantage of being able to succor
+either of these posts before the enemy had
+time to carry them. Montécuculli seeing
+that any successful attack upon the bridges
+was not to be expected, resolved to pass
+the Rhine below Strasburg, and with this
+view returned to his first position at Offenburg.
+Marshal Turenne, who followed all
+the movements of the Austrian army, brought
+back his army also to Vilstet.</p>
+
+<p>In the meantime, this attempt of the
+enemy having convinced the French general
+of the danger to which his bridge had exposed
+him, removed it nearer to that of
+Strasburg, in order to diminish the extent
+of ground he had to defend.</p>
+
+<p>Montécuculli, having commanded the magistrates
+of Strasburg to collect materials
+for a bridge, moved to Scherzheim to receive
+them; but Turenne again defeated his projects
+by taking a position at Freistett, where
+he occupied the islands of the Rhine, and
+immediately constructed a stockade.</p>
+
+<p>Thus it was that, during the whole of
+this campaign, Turenne succeeded in gaining<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_55">55</a></span>
+the initiative of the enemy, and obliging
+him to follow his movements. He succeeded,
+also, by a rapid march, in cutting off Montécuculli
+from the Town of Offenburg, whence
+he drew his supplies, and would no doubt
+have prevented the Austrian general from
+effecting his junction with the corps of Caprara,
+had not a cannon-shot terminated this
+great man’s life.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XVIII"></a>MAXIM XVIII.</h2>
+
+<p>A general of ordinary talent occupying
+a bad position, and surprised by a superior
+force, seeks his safety in retreat; but
+a great captain supplies all deficiencies
+by his courage, and marches boldly to
+meet the attack. By this means he disconcerts
+his adversary; and if the latter
+shows any irresolution in his movements,
+a skilful leader, profiting by his indecision,
+may even hope for victory, or at least
+employ the day in manœuvring&mdash;at night
+he entrenches himself, or falls back to a
+better position. By this determined conduct<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_56">56</a></span>
+he maintains the honor of his arms,
+the first essential to all military superiority.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>In 1653, Marshal Turenne was surprised
+by the Prince of Condé, in a position where
+his army was completely compromised. He
+had the power, indeed, by an immediate
+retreat, of covering himself by the Somme,
+which he possessed the means of crossing at
+Peronne, and whence he was distant only
+half a league; but, fearing the influence of
+this retrograde movement on the <em>morale</em> of
+his army, Turenne balanced all disadvantages
+by his courage, and marched boldly to
+meet the enemy with very inferior forces.
+After marching a league, he found an advantageous
+position, where he made every disposition
+for a battle. It was three o’clock
+in the afternoon; but the Spaniards, exhausted
+with fatigue, hesitated to attack
+him, and Turenne having covered himself
+with entrenchments during the night, the
+enemy no longer dared to risk a general
+action, and broke up his camp.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_57">57</a></span></p>
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XIX"></a>MAXIM XIX.</h2>
+
+<p>The transition from the defensive to
+the offensive is one of the most delicate
+operations.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>By studying the first campaign of Napoleon
+in Italy, we can learn what genius and
+boldness may effect in passing with an army
+from the <em>defensive</em> to the <em>offensive</em>. The army
+of the allies, commanded by General Beaulieu,
+was provided with every means that
+could render it formidable. Its force amounted
+to eighty thousand men, and two hundred
+pieces of cannon. The French army,
+on the contrary, could number scarcely thirty
+thousand men under arms, and thirty pieces
+of cannon. For some time there had been
+no issue of meat, and even the bread was
+irregularly supplied. The infantry was ill
+clothed, the cavalry wretchedly mounted.
+All the draught-horses had perished from
+want, so that the service of the artillery was
+performed by mules. To remedy these evils,
+large disbursements were necessary; and
+such was the state of the finances, that the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_58">58</a></span>
+government had only been able to furnish
+two thousand louis in specie for the opening
+of the campaign. The French army could
+not possibly exist in this state. To advance
+or retreat was absolutely necessary. Aware
+of the advantage of surprising the enemy at
+the very outset of the campaign by some
+decisive blow, Napoleon prepared for it by
+recasting the <em>morale</em> of his army.</p>
+
+<p>In a proclamation full of energy, he reminded
+them that an ignoble death alone
+remained for them, if they continued on the
+defensive; that they had nothing to expect
+from France, but everything to hope from
+victory. “Abundance courts you in the fertile
+plains of Italy,” said he; “are you deficient,
+soldiers, in constancy or in courage?”
+Profiting by the moment of enthusiasm
+which he had inspired, Napoleon concentrated
+his forces in order to fall with his
+whole weight on the different corps of the
+enemy. Immediately afterward, the battles
+of Montenotte, Milesimo, and Mondovi, added
+fresh confidence to the high opinion
+already entertained by the soldier for his
+chief; and that army which only a few days
+ago was encamped amid barren rocks, and
+consumed by famine, already aspired to the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_59">59</a></span>
+conquest of Italy. In one month after the
+opening of the campaign, Napoleon had terminated
+the war with the King of Sardinia,
+and conquered the Milanese. Rich cantonments
+soon dispelled from the recollection of
+the French soldier the misery and fatigue
+attendant on this rapid march, while a vigilant
+administration of the resources of the
+country reorganized the <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">materiel</i> of the
+French army, and created the means necessary
+for the attainment of future success.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XX"></a>MAXIM XX.</h2>
+
+<p>It may be laid down as a principle,
+that the line of operation should not be
+abandoned; but it is one of the most
+skilful manœuvres in war, to know how
+to change it, when circumstances authorize
+or render this necessary. An army
+which changes skilfully its line of operation
+deceives the enemy, who becomes
+ignorant where to look for its rear, or
+upon what weak points it is assailable.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_60">60</a></span></p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>Frederick sometimes changed his line of
+operation in the middle of a campaign; but
+he was enabled to do this, because he was
+manœuvring at that time in the centre of
+Germany&mdash;an abundant country, capable of
+supplying all the wants of his army in case
+his communications with Prussia were intercepted.</p>
+
+<p>Marshal Turenne, in the campaign of
+1746, gave up his line of communication to
+the allies in the same manner; but, like
+Frederick, he was carrying on the war at
+this time in the centre of Germany, and
+having fallen with his whole forces upon
+Rain, he took the precaution of securing
+to himself a depôt upon which to establish
+his base of operation.</p>
+
+<p>By a series of manœuvres, marked alike
+by audacity and genius, he subsequently
+compelled the imperial army to abandon
+its magazines, and retire into Austria for
+winter quarters.</p>
+
+<p>But these are examples which it appears to
+me should only be imitated when we have
+taken full measure of the capacity of our
+adversary, and above all, when we see no<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_61">61</a></span>
+reason to apprehend an insurrection in the
+country to which we transfer the theatre
+of war.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XXI"></a>MAXIM XXI.</h2>
+
+<p>When an army carries with it a battering
+train, or large convoys of sick and
+wounded, it cannot march by too short
+a line upon its depôts.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>It is above all in mountainous countries,
+and in those interspersed with woods and
+marshes, that it is of importance to observe
+this maxim; for, the convoys and means of
+transport being frequently embarrassed in
+defiles, an enemy by manœuvring may easily
+disperse the escorts, or make even a successful
+attack upon the whole army, when it is
+obliged, from the nature of the country, to
+march in an extended column.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XXII"></a>MAXIM XXII.</h2>
+
+<p>The art of encamping in position is the
+same as taking up the line in order of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_62">62</a></span>
+battle in this position. To this end, the
+artillery should be advantageously placed,
+ground should be selected which is not
+commanded or liable to be turned, and,
+as far as possible, the guns should cover
+and command the surrounding country.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>Frederick has remarked that, in order to
+be assured that your camp is well placed,
+you should see if, by making a small movement,
+you can oblige the enemy to make a
+greater; or, if after having forced him to
+retrograde one march you can compel him to
+fall back another.</p>
+
+<p>In defensive war, all camps should be entrenched
+in the front and wings of the position
+they occupy, and care should be taken
+that the rear is left perfectly open. If you
+are threatened with being turned, arrangements
+should be made beforehand for taking
+up a more distant position; and you should
+profit by any disorder in the enemy’s line of
+march, to make an attempt upon his artillery
+or baggage.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_63">63</a></span></p>
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XXIII"></a>MAXIM XXIII.</h2>
+
+<p>When you are occupying a position
+which the enemy threatens to surround,
+collect all your force immediately, and
+menace <em>him</em> with an offensive movement.
+By this manœuvre, you will prevent him
+from detaching and annoying your flanks
+in case you should judge it necessary to
+retire.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>This was the manœuvre practised by General
+Desaix, in 1798, near Radstadt. He made
+up for inferiority in numbers by audacity,
+and maintained himself the whole day in
+position in spite of the vigorous attacks of
+the Archduke Charles. At night he effected
+his retreat in good order, and took up a position
+in the rear.</p>
+
+<p>It was in accordance, also, with this principle,
+in the same campaign, that General
+Moreau gave battle at Biberach, to secure
+his retreat by the passes of the Black mountains.
+A few days after, he fought at Schliengen
+with the same object. Placed in a
+good defensive position, he menaced the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_64">64</a></span>
+Archduke Charles by a sudden return to the
+offensive, while his artillery and baggage
+were passing the Rhine by the bridge of
+Huningen, and he was making all the necessary
+arrangements for retiring behind that
+river himself.</p>
+
+<p>Here, however, I would observe, that the
+execution of such offensive demonstrations
+should be deferred always till toward the
+evening, in order that you may not be compromised
+by engaging too early in a combat
+which you cannot long maintain with success.</p>
+
+<p>Night, and the uncertainty of the enemy
+after an affair of this kind, will always favor
+your retreat, if it is judged necessary; but,
+with a view to mask the operation more
+effectually, fires should be lighted all along
+the lines, to deceive the enemy and prevent
+him from discovering this retrograde movement,
+for in a retreat it is a great advantage
+to gain a march upon your adversary.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XXIV"></a>MAXIM XXIV.</h2>
+
+<p>Never lose sight of this maxim: that
+you should establish your cantonments at<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_65">65</a></span>
+the most distant and best-protected point
+from the enemy, especially where a surprise
+is possible. By this means you will
+have time to unite all your forces before
+he can attack you.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>In the campaign of 1745, Marshal Turenne
+lost the battle of Marienthal, by neglecting
+this principle; for if, instead of
+reassembling his divisions at Erbsthausen,
+he had rallied his troops at Mergentheim,
+behind the Tauber, his army would have
+been much sooner reunited; and Count Merci,
+in place of finding only three thousand
+men to fight at Erbsthausen (of which he
+was well informed), would have had the
+whole French army to attack in a position
+covered by a river.</p>
+
+<p>Some one having indiscreetly asked Viscount
+Turenne how he had lost the battle of
+Marienthal: “By my own fault,” replied the
+marshal; “but,” added he, “when a man has
+committed no faults in war, he can only
+have been engaged in it but a short time.”</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_66">66</a></span></p>
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XXV"></a>MAXIM XXV.</h2>
+
+<p>When two armies are in order of battle,
+and one has to retire over a bridge,
+while the other has the circumference of
+the circle open, all the advantages are in
+favor of the latter. It is then a general
+should show boldness, strike a decided
+blow, and manœuvre upon the flank of
+his enemy. The victory is in his hands.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>This was the position of the French army
+at the famous battle of Leipzig, which terminated
+the campaign of 1813 so fatally for
+Napoleon; for the battle of Hanau was of
+no consequence, comparatively, in the desperate
+situation of that army.</p>
+
+<p>It strikes me that, in a situation like that
+of the French army previous to the battle
+of Leipzig, a general should never calculate
+upon any of those lucky chances which may
+arise out of a return to the offensive, but
+that he should rather adopt every possible
+means to secure his retreat. With this view,
+he should immediately cover himself with
+good entrenchments, to enable him to repel<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_67">67</a></span>
+with inferior numbers the attack of the enemy,
+while his own equipments are crossing
+the river. As fast as the troops reach the
+other side, they should occupy positions to
+protect the passage of the rear guard, and
+this last should be covered by a <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">tête de pont</i>
+as soon as the army breaks up its camp.
+During the wars of the Revolution, too little
+regard was paid to entrenchments; and it is
+for this reason we have seen large armies
+dispersed after a single reverse, and the fate
+of nations compromised by the issue of one
+battle.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XXVI"></a>MAXIM XXVI.</h2>
+
+<p>It is contrary to all true principle, to
+make corps, which have no communication
+with each other, act separately against
+a central force whose communications are
+cut off.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>The Austrians lost the battle of Hohenlinden
+by neglecting this principle. The
+imperial army, under the orders of the archduke
+John, was divided into four columns,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_68">68</a></span>
+which had to march through an immense
+forest, previous to their junction in the plain
+of Anzing, where they intended to surprise
+the French. But these different corps, having
+no direct communication, found themselves
+compelled to engage separately with
+an enemy who had taken the precaution of
+concentrating his masses, and who could
+move them with facility in a country with
+which he had been long previously acquainted.</p>
+
+<p>Thus the Austrian army, enclosed in the
+defiles of the forest with its whole train of
+artillery and baggage, was attacked in its
+flanks and rear, and the archduke John was
+only enabled to rally his dispersed and shattered
+divisions under cover of the night.</p>
+
+<p>The trophies obtained by the French army
+on this day were immense. They consisted
+of eleven thousand prisoners, one hundred
+pieces of cannon, several stand of colors, and
+all the baggage of the enemy.</p>
+
+<p>The battle of Hohenlinden decided the fate
+of the campaign of 1800, and Moreau’s brilliant
+and well-merited success placed him in
+the rank of the first general of the age.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_69">69</a></span></p>
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XXVII"></a>MAXIM XXVII.</h2>
+
+<p>When an army is driven from a first
+position, the retreating columns should
+rally always sufficiently in the rear, to
+prevent any interruption from the enemy.
+The greatest disaster that can happen, is
+when the columns are attacked in detail,
+and before their junction.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>One great advantage which results from
+rallying your columns on a point far removed
+from the field of battle, or from the position
+previously occupied, is, that the enemy is
+uncertain as to the direction you mean to
+take.</p>
+
+<p>If he divides his force to pursue you, he
+exposes himself to see his detachments beaten
+in detail, especially if you have exerted all
+due diligence, and have effected the junction
+of your troops in sufficient time to get between
+his columns and disperse them one
+after the other.</p>
+
+<p>It was by a manœuvre of this kind in the
+campaign of Italy, in 1799, that General
+Melas gained the battle of Genola.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_70">70</a></span></p>
+
+<p>General Championet commanded the
+French army, and endeavored to cut off the
+communication of the Austrians with Turin,
+by employing corps which manœuvred separately
+to get into their rear. Melas, who
+divined his project, made a retrograde march,
+by which he persuaded his adversary he was
+in full retreat, although the real object of his
+movement was to concentrate his forces at
+the point fixed for the junction of the different
+detachments of the French army, and
+which he beat and dispersed, one after
+another, by his great superiority in numbers.
+The result of this manœuvre, in which the
+Austrian general displayed vigor, decision,
+and foresight, secured to him the peaceable
+possession of Piedmont.</p>
+
+<p>It was also by the neglect of this principle
+that General Beaulieu, who commanded the
+Austro-Sardinian army in the campaign of
+1796, lost the battle of Milesimo after that
+of Montenotte.</p>
+
+<p>His object, in endeavoring to rally his
+different corps upon Milesimo, was, to cover
+the high roads of Turin and Milan; but
+Napoleon, aware of the advantages arising
+from the ardor of troops emboldened by
+recent success, attacked him before he could<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_71">71</a></span>
+assemble his divisions, and, by a series of
+skilful manœuvres, succeeded in separating
+the combined armies. They retired in the
+greatest disorder&mdash;the one by the road of
+Milan, the other by that of Turin.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XXVIII"></a>MAXIM XXVIII.</h2>
+
+<p>No force should be detached on the eve
+of a battle, because affairs may change
+during the night, either by the retreat of
+the enemy, or by the arrival of large reinforcements
+to enable him to resume the
+offensive, and counteract your previous
+arrangements.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>In 1796, the army of the Sambre and
+Meuse, commanded by General Jourdan,
+effected a retreat, which was rendered still
+more difficult by the loss of his line of communication.
+Seeing, however, that the forces
+of the archduke Charles were scattered,
+Jourdan, in order to accomplish his retreat
+upon Frankfort, resolved to open himself a
+way by Wurtzburg, where there were at that<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_72">72</a></span>
+moment only two divisions of the Austrian
+army. This movement would have been attended
+with success, if the French general,
+believing he had simply these two divisions
+to contend with, had not committed the error
+of separating himself from the corps of Lefevre&mdash;which
+he left at Schweinfurt to cover
+the only direct communication of the army
+with its base of operation.</p>
+
+<p>The commission of this fault at the outset,
+added to some slowness in the march of the
+French general, secured the victory to the
+archduke, who hastened to concentrate his
+forces.</p>
+
+<p>The arrival of the two divisions, also, of
+Kray and Wartesleben, during the battle,
+enabled him to oppose fifty thousand men to
+the French army, which scarcely numbered
+thirty thousand combatants. This last was
+consequently beaten, and obliged to continue
+its retreat by the mountains of Fuldes, where
+the badness of the roads could be equalled
+only by the difficulty of the country.</p>
+
+<p>The division of Lefevre, amounting to fourteen
+thousand men, would, in all probability,
+have turned the scale in favor of Jourdan,
+had the latter not unfortunately conceived
+that two divisions only were opposing his
+passage to Wurtzburg.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_73">73</a></span></p>
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XXIX"></a>MAXIM XXIX.</h2>
+
+<p>When you have resolved to fight a
+battle, collect your whole force. Dispense
+with nothing. A single battalion
+sometimes decides the day.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>I think it here desirable to observe, that it
+is prudent before a battle to fix upon some
+point in rear of the reserve for the junction
+of the different detachments; for if, from
+unforeseen circumstances, these detachments
+should be prevented from joining before the
+action has commenced, they might be exposed,
+in case a retrograde movement should
+be found necessary, to the masses of the
+enemy. It is desirable also to keep the
+enemy in ignorance of these reinforcements,
+in order to employ them with greater effect.
+“A seasonable reinforcement,” says Frederick,
+“renders the success of a battle certain,
+because the enemy will always imagine
+it stronger than it really is, and lose courage
+accordingly.”</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_74">74</a></span></p>
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XXX"></a>MAXIM XXX.</h2>
+
+<p>Nothing is so rash or so contrary to
+principle, as to make a flank march before
+an army in position, especially when
+this army occupies heights at the foot
+of which you are forced to defile.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>It was by a neglect of this principle that
+Frederick was beaten at Kollin in the first
+campaign of 1757. Notwithstanding prodigies
+of valor, the Prussians lost fifteen
+thousand men and a great portion of their
+artillery, while the loss of the Austrians did
+not exceed five thousand men. The consequence
+of this battle was more unfortunate
+still, since it obliged the King of Prussia to
+raise the siege of Prague, and to evacuate
+Bohemia.</p>
+
+<p>It was also by making a flank march
+before the Prussian army, that the French
+lost the disgraceful battle of Rosbach.</p>
+
+<p>This imprudent movement was still more
+to be reprehended, because the Prince de
+Soubise, who commanded the French army,
+was so negligent as to manœuvre, without<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_75">75</a></span>
+either advanced guards or flanking corps, in
+presence of the enemy. The result was,
+that his army, consisting of fifty thousand
+men, was beaten by six battalions and thirty
+squadrons. The French lost seven thousand
+men, twenty-seven standards, and a great
+number of cannon. The Prussians had only
+three hundred men disabled.</p>
+
+<p>Thus, by having forgotten this principle,
+<em>that a flank march is never to be made before
+an enemy in line of battle</em>, Frederick lost his
+army at Kollin; and Soubise, at Rosbach,
+lost both his army and his honor.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XXXI"></a>MAXIM XXXI.</h2>
+
+<p>When you determine to risk a battle,
+reserve to yourself every possible chance
+of success, more particularly if you have
+to deal with an adversary of superior
+talent; for if you are beaten, even in the
+midst of your magazines and your communications,
+wo to the vanquished!</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>“We should make war,” says Marshal
+Saxe, “without leaving anything to hazard,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_76">76</a></span>
+and in this especially consists the talent of a
+general. But when we have incurred the
+risk of a battle, we should know how to
+profit by the victory, and not merely content
+ourselves, according to custom, with
+possession of the field.”</p>
+
+<p>It was by neglecting to follow up the first
+success, that the Austrian army, after gaining
+the field of Marengo, saw itself compelled
+on the following day to evacuate the whole
+of Italy.</p>
+
+<p>General Melas, observing the French in
+retreat, left the direction of the movements
+of his army to the chief of his staff, and
+retired to Alexandria to repose from the
+fatigues of the day. Colonel Zach, equally
+convinced with his general that the French
+army was completely broken, and consisted
+only of fugitives, formed the divisions in
+column of route.</p>
+
+<p>By this arrangement, the imperial army
+prepared to enter upon its victorious march
+in a formation not less than three miles in
+depth.</p>
+
+<p>It was near four o’clock when General
+Desaix rejoined the French army with his
+division. His presence restored in some
+degree an equality between the contending<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_77">77</a></span>
+forces; and yet Napoleon hesitated for a
+moment whether to resume the offensive,
+or to make use of this corps to secure his
+retreat. The ardor of the troops to return
+to the charge, decided his irresolution. He
+rode rapidly along the front of his divisions,
+and addressing the soldiers&mdash;“We have retired
+far enough for to-day,” said he; “you
+know I always sleep upon the field of
+battle!”</p>
+
+<p>The army, with unanimous shout, proclaimed
+to him a promise of victory. Napoleon
+resumed the offensive. The Austrian
+advance guard, panic-struck at the sight of
+a formidable and unbroken body presenting
+itself suddenly at a point where, a few moments
+before, only fugitives were to be seen,
+went to the right about, and carried disorder
+into the mass of its columns. Attacked immediately
+afterward, with impetuosity, in its
+front and flanks, the Austrian army was
+completely routed.</p>
+
+<p>Marshal Daun experienced nearly the
+same fate as General Melas, at the battle
+of Torgau, in the campaign of 1760.</p>
+
+<p>The position of the Austrian army was
+excellent. It had its left upon Torgau, its
+right on the plateau of Siptitz, and its front
+covered by a large sheet of water.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_78">78</a></span></p>
+
+<p>Frederick proposed to turn its right in
+order to make an attack upon the rear. For
+this purpose he divided his army into two
+corps, the one under the orders of Ziethen,
+with instructions to attack in front, following
+the edge of the water; the other under
+his own immediate command, with which he
+set out to turn the right of the Austrians.
+But Marshal Daun having had intimation of
+the movements of the enemy, changed his
+front by countermarching, and was thus
+enabled to repel the attacks of Frederick,
+whom he obliged to retreat. The two corps
+of the Prussian army had been acting without
+communication. Ziethen, in the meantime,
+hearing the fire recede, concluded that
+the king had been beaten, and commenced a
+movement by his left in order to rejoin him;
+but falling in with two battalions of the
+reserve, the Prussian general profited by this
+reinforcement to resume the offensive. Accordingly
+he renewed the attack with vigor,
+got possession of the plateau of Siptitz, and
+soon after of the whole field of battle. The
+sun had already set when the King of Prussia
+received the news of this unexpected
+good fortune. He returned in all haste, took
+advantage of the night to restore order in<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_79">79</a></span>
+his disorganized army, and the day after the
+battle occupied Torgau.</p>
+
+<p>Marshal Daun was receiving congratulations
+upon his victory, when he heard that
+the Prussians had resumed the offensive.
+He immediately commanded a retreat, and
+at daybreak the Austrians repassed the Elbe
+with the loss of twelve thousand men, eight
+thousand prisoners, and forty-five pieces of
+cannon.</p>
+
+<p>After the battle of Marengo, General Melas,
+although in the midst of his fortresses
+and magazines, saw himself compelled to
+abandon everything, in order to save the
+wreck of his army.</p>
+
+<p>General Mack capitulated after the battle
+of Ulm, although in the centre of his own
+country.</p>
+
+<p>The Prussians, in spite of their depôts
+and reserves, were obliged, after the battle
+of Jena, and the French after that of Waterloo,
+to lay down their arms.</p>
+
+<p>Hence, we may conclude that the misfortune
+that results from the loss of a battle,
+does not consist so much in the destruction
+of men and of <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">materiel</i> as in the discouragement
+which follows this disaster. The courage
+and confidence of the victors augment<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_80">80</a></span>
+in proportion as those of the vanquished
+diminish; and whatever may be the resources
+of an army, it will be found that a retreat
+will degenerate rapidly into a rout unless
+the general-in-chief shall succeed, by combining
+boldness with skill, and perseverance
+with firmness, in restoring the <em>morale</em> of his
+army.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XXXII"></a>MAXIM XXXII.</h2>
+
+<p>The duty of an advanced guard does
+not consist in advancing or retiring, but
+in manœuvring. An advanced guard
+should be composed of light cavalry, supported
+by a reserve of heavy cavalry, and
+by battalions of infantry, supported also
+by artillery. An advanced guard should
+consist of picked troops, and the general
+officers, officers and men, should be selected
+for their respective capabilities and
+knowledge. A corps deficient in instruction
+is only an embarrassment to an advanced
+guard.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>It was the opinion of Frederick that an
+advanced guard should be composed of detachments<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_81">81</a></span>
+of troops of all arms. The commander
+should possess skill in the choice of
+ground, and he should take care to be instantly
+informed, by means of numerous
+patrols, of everything passing in the enemy’s
+camp.</p>
+
+<p>In war, it is not the business of an advanced
+guard to fight, but to observe the
+enemy, in order to cover the movements of
+the army. When in pursuit, the advanced
+guard should charge with vigor, and cut off
+the baggage and insulated corps of the retiring
+enemy. For this purpose, it should be
+reinforced with all the disposable light cavalry
+of the army.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XXXIII"></a>MAXIM XXXIII.</h2>
+
+<p>It is contrary to the usages of war to
+allow parks or batteries of artillery to
+enter a defile, unless you hold the other
+extremity. In case of retreat, the guns
+will embarrass your movements and be
+lost. They should be left in position,
+under a sufficient escort, until you are
+master of the opening.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_82">82</a></span></p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>Nothing encumbers the march of an army
+so much as a quantity of baggage. In the
+campaign of 1796, Napoleon abandoned his
+battering train under the walls of Mantua,
+after spiking the guns and destroying the
+carriages. By this sacrifice, he acquired a
+facility of manœuvring rapidly his little
+army, and obtained the initiative as well as
+a general superiority over the numerous but
+divided forces of Marshal Wurmser.</p>
+
+<p>In 1799, during his retreat in Italy, General
+Moreau being compelled to manœuvre
+among the mountains, preferred separating
+himself entirely from his reserve artillery,
+which he directed upon France by the Col
+de Fenestrelle, rather than embarrass his
+march with this part of his equipment.</p>
+
+<p>These are the examples we should follow;
+for if, by a rapidity of march, and a facility
+of concentration upon decisive points, the
+victory is gained, the <em>materiel</em> of an army is
+soon re-established. But if, on the other
+hand, we are beaten and compelled to retreat,
+it will be difficult to save our equipments,
+and we may have reason to congratulate<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_83">83</a></span>
+ourselves that we abandoned them in time
+to prevent them from augmenting the trophies
+of the enemy.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XXXIV"></a>MAXIM XXXIV.</h2>
+
+<p>It should be laid down as a principle,
+never to leave intervals by which the enemy
+can penetrate between corps formed
+in order of battle, unless it be to draw
+him into a snare.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>In the campaign of 1757, the Prince of
+Lorraine, who was covering Prague with
+the Austrian army, perceived the Prussians
+threatening, by a flank movement, to turn
+his right. He immediately ordered a partial
+change of front by throwing back the infantry
+of that wing, so as to form a right angle
+with the rest of the line. But this manœuvre
+being executed in presence of the enemy,
+was not effected without some disorder.
+The heads of the columns having marched
+too quick, caused the rear to lengthen out,
+and when the line was formed to the right,
+a large interval appeared at the salient angle.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_84">84</a></span>
+Frederick, observing this error, hastened
+to take advantage of it. He directed his
+centre corps, commanded by the Duke of
+Bevern, to throw itself into this opening,
+and by this manœuvre decided the fate of
+the battle.</p>
+
+<p>The Prince of Lorraine returned to Prague,
+beaten and pursued, with the loss of sixteen
+thousand men and two hundred pieces of
+cannon.</p>
+
+<p>It should be observed at the same time,
+that this operation of throwing a corps into
+the intervals made by an army in time of
+battle, should never be attempted unless you
+are at least equal in force, and have an opportunity
+of outflanking the enemy on the
+one side or the other; for it is then only you
+can hope to divide his army in the centre,
+and insulate the wings entirely. If you are
+inferior in number, you run the risk of being
+stopped by the reverses, and overpowered
+by the enemy’s wings, which may deploy
+upon your flanks and surround you.</p>
+
+<p>It was by this manœuvre that the Duke of
+Berwick gained the battle of Almanza, in
+the year 1707, in Spain.</p>
+
+<p>The Anglo-Portuguese army, under the
+command of Lord Galloway, came to invest<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_85">85</a></span>
+Villena. Marshal Berwick, who commanded
+the French and Spanish army, quitted his
+camp at Montalegre, and moved upon this
+town to raise the siege. At his approach,
+the English general, eager to fight a battle,
+advanced to meet him in the plains of Almanza.
+The issue was long doubtful. The
+first line, commanded by the Duke of Popoli,
+having been broken, the Chevalier d’Asfeldt,
+who had charge of the second, drew up his
+masses with large intervals between them;
+and when the English, who were in pursuit
+of the first line, reached these reserves, he
+took advantage of their disorder to attack
+them in flank and defeated them entirely.</p>
+
+<p>Marshal Berwick, perceiving the success
+of this manœuvre, threw open his front, and
+deploying upon the enemy’s flanks, while
+the reserve sustained the attack in front,
+and the cavalry manœuvred in their rear,
+obtained a complete victory.</p>
+
+<p>Lord Galloway, wounded and pursued,
+collected with difficulty the remains of his
+army, and took shelter with them in Tortosa.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_86">86</a></span></p>
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XXXV"></a>MAXIM XXXV.</h2>
+
+<p>Encampments of the same army should
+always be formed so as to protect each
+other.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>At the battle of Dresden, in the campaign
+of 1813, the camp of the allies, although advantageously
+placed upon the heights on
+the left bank of the Elbe, was nevertheless
+extremely defective, from being traversed
+longitudinally by a deep ravine, which separated
+the left wing completely from the centre
+and the right. This vicious arrangement
+did not escape the penetrating eye of Napoleon.
+He instantly directed the whole of
+his cavalry and two corps of infantry against
+the insulated wing, attacked it with superior
+numbers, overthrew it, and took ten thousand
+prisoners, before it was possible to
+come to its support.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XXXVI"></a>MAXIM XXXVI.</h2>
+
+<p>When the enemy’s army is covered by
+a river, upon which he holds several <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">têtes de pont</i>, <span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_87">87</a></span>
+do not attack in front. This
+would divide your force and expose you
+to be turned. Approach the river in
+echelon of columns, in such a manner
+that the leading column shall be the only
+one the enemy can attack, without offering
+you his flank. In the meantime, let
+your light troops occupy the bank, and
+when you have decided on the point of
+passage, rush upon it and fling across
+your bridge. Observe that the point of
+passage should be always at a distance
+from the leading echelon, in order to deceive
+the enemy.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>If you occupy a town or a village on the
+bank of a river, opposite to that held by the
+enemy, it is an advantage to make this spot
+the crossing point, because it is easier to
+cover your carriages and reserve artillery,
+as well as to mask the construction of your
+bridge, in a town, than in the open country.
+It is also a great advantage to pass a river
+opposite a village, when the latter is only
+weakly occupied by the enemy; because as
+soon as the advanced guard reaches the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_88">88</a></span>
+other side, it carries this post, makes a lodgment,
+and by throwing up a few defensive
+works, converts it easily into a <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">tête de pont</i>.
+By this means, the rest of the army is enabled
+to effect the passage with facility.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XXXVII"></a>MAXIM XXXVII.</h2>
+
+<p>From the moment you are master of a
+position which commands the opposite
+bank, facilities are acquired for effecting
+the passage of the river; above all, if this
+position is sufficiently extensive to place
+upon it artillery in force. This advantage
+is diminished, if the river is more than
+three hundred toises (or six hundred
+yards) in breadth, because the distance
+being out of the range of grape, it is easy
+for the troops which defend the passage
+to line the bank and get under cover.
+Hence it follows that if the grenadiers,
+ordered to pass the river for the protection
+of the bridge, should reach the other
+side, they would be destroyed by the
+fire of the enemy; because his batteries,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_89">89</a></span>
+placed at the distance of two hundred
+toises from the landing, are capable of a
+most destructive effect, although removed
+above five hundred toises from the batteries
+of the crossing force. Thus the
+advantage of the artillery would be exclusively
+his. For the same reason, the
+passage is impracticable, unless you succeed
+in surprising the enemy, and are
+protected by an intermediate island, or,
+unless you are able to take advantage of
+an angle in the river, to establish a crossfire
+upon his works. In this case, the
+island or angle forms a natural <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">tête de pont</i>,
+and gives the advantage in artillery to
+the attacking army.</p>
+
+<p>When a river is less than sixty toises
+(or one hundred and twenty yards) in
+breadth, and you have a post upon the
+other side, the troops which are thrown
+across derive such advantages from the
+protection of your artillery, that, however
+small the angle may be, it is impossible
+for the enemy to prevent the establishment
+of a bridge. In this case, the most
+skilful generals, when they have discovered<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_90">90</a></span>
+the project of their adversary, and
+brought their own army to the point of
+crossing, usually content themselves with
+opposing the passage of the bridge, by
+forming a semicircle round its extremity,
+as round the opening of a defile, and removing
+to the distance of three or four
+hundred toises from the fire of the opposite
+side.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>Frederick observes, that “the passage of
+great rivers in the presence of the enemy is
+one of the most delicate operations in war.”
+Success on these occasions depends on secrecy,
+on the rapidity of the manœuvres,
+and the punctual execution of the orders
+given for the movements of each division.
+To pass such an obstacle in presence of an
+enemy, and without his knowledge, it is
+necessary not only that the previous dispositions
+should be well conceived, but that
+they should be executed without confusion.</p>
+
+<p>In the campaign of 1705, Prince Eugene,
+of Savoy, wishing to come to the assistance
+of the Prince of Piedmont, sought for a
+favorable point at which to force the passage<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_91">91</a></span>
+of the Adda, defended at that time by the
+French army, under the command of the
+Duke de Vendome.</p>
+
+<p>After having selected an advantageous
+situation, Prince Eugene erected a battery
+of twenty pieces of cannon on a position
+which commanded the entire of the opposite
+bank, and covered his infantry by a line of
+entrenched parallels constructed on the
+slope of the declivity.</p>
+
+<p>They were working vigorously at the
+bridge, when the Duke de Vendome appeared
+with his whole army. At first he seemed
+determined to oppose its construction, but
+after having examined the position of Prince
+Eugene, he judged this to be impracticable.</p>
+
+<p>He therefore placed his army out of reach
+of the prince’s batteries, resting both his
+wings upon the river, so as to form a bow,
+of which the Adda was the cord. He then
+covered himself with entrenchments and
+abattis, and was thus enabled to charge the
+enemy’s columns whenever they debouched
+from the bridge, and to beat them in detail.</p>
+
+<p>Eugene, having reconnoitred the position
+of the French, considered the passage impossible.
+He therefore withdrew the bridge,
+and broke up his camp during the night.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_92">92</a></span></p>
+
+<p>It was by this manœuvre, also, that, in the
+campaign of 1809, the Archduke Charles
+compelled the French to reoccupy the isle
+of Lobau, after having debouched on the
+left bank of the Danube. The march of the
+Archduke Charles was wholly concentric.
+He menaced Grosaspern with his right, Esling
+with his centre, and Enzersdorf with
+his left.</p>
+
+<p>His army, with both wings resting on the
+Danube, formed a semicircle around Esling.
+Napoleon immediately attacked and broke
+the centre of the Austrians; but after having
+forced their first line, he found himself
+arrested by the reserves. In the meantime,
+the bridges upon the Danube had been destroyed,
+and several of his corps, with their
+parks of artillery, were still on the right
+bank. This disappointment, joined to the
+favorable position of the Austrians, decided
+Napoleon to re-enter the isle of Lobau, where
+he had previously constructed a line of field-works,
+so as to give it all the advantages of
+a well entrenched camp.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_93">93</a></span></p>
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XXXVIII"></a>MAXIM XXXVIII.</h2>
+
+<p>It is difficult to prevent an enemy,
+supplied with pontoons, from crossing
+a river. When the object of an army,
+which defends the passage, is to cover a
+siege, the moment the general has ascertained
+his inability to oppose the passage,
+he should take measures to arrive before
+the enemy, at an intermediate position
+between the river he defends and the
+place he desires to cover.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>Here we may observe, that this intermediate
+position should be reconnoitred, or
+rather, well entrenched beforehand; for the
+enemy will be unable to make an offensive
+movement against the corps employed in
+the siege, until he has beaten the army of
+observation; and the latter, under cover of
+its camp, may always await a favorable
+opportunity to attack him in flank or in
+rear.</p>
+
+<p>Besides, the army which is once entrenched
+in this manner, has the advantage of being<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_94">94</a></span>
+concentrated; while that of the enemy must
+act in detachments, if he wishes to cover his
+bridge, and watch the movements of the
+army of observation, so as to enable him to
+attack the besieging corps in its lines, without
+being exposed to an attempt on his rear,
+or being menaced with the loss of his bridge.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XXXIX"></a>MAXIM XXXIX.</h2>
+
+<p>In the campaign of 1645, Turenne was
+attacked with his army before Philipsburg
+by a very superior force. There was no
+bridge here over the Rhine, but he took
+advantage of the ground between the river
+and the place to establish his camp. This
+should serve as a lesson to engineer officers,
+not merely in the construction of fortresses,
+but of <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">têtes de pont</i>. A space should
+always be left between the fortress and
+the river, where an army may form and
+rally without being obliged to throw itself
+into the place, and thereby compromise
+its security. An army retiring upon Mayence
+before a pursuing enemy, is necessarily
+compromised; for this reason, because<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_95">95</a></span>
+it requires more than a day to pass the
+bridge, and because the lines of Cassel are
+too confined to admit an army to remain
+there without being blocked up. Two
+hundred toises should have been left between
+that place and the Rhine. It is
+essential that all <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">têtes de pont</i> before
+great rivers should be constructed upon
+this principle, otherwise they will prove a
+very inefficient assistance to protect the
+passage of a retreating army. <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">Têtes de
+pont</i>, as laid down in our schools, are of
+use only for small rivers, the passage of
+which is comparatively short.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>Marshal Saxe, in the campaign of 1741,
+having passed the Moldau in quest of a detached
+corps of fourteen thousand men, which
+was about to throw itself into Prague, left a
+thousand infantry upon that river, with orders
+to entrench themselves upon a height
+directly opposite the <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">tête de pont</i>. By this
+precaution, the marshal secured his retreat,
+and also the facility of repassing the bridge
+without disorder, by rallying his divisions
+between the entrenched height and the <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">tête
+de pont</i>.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_96">96</a></span></p>
+
+<p>Were these examples unknown to the generals
+of modern times, or are they disposed
+to think such precautions superfluous?</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XL"></a>MAXIM XL.</h2>
+
+<p>Fortresses are equally useful in offensive
+and defensive warfare. It is true,
+they will not in themselves arrest an
+army, but they are an excellent means of
+retarding, embarrassing, weakening and
+annoying a victorious enemy.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>The brilliant success of the allied armies in
+the campaign of 1814, has given to many
+military men a false idea of the real value of
+fortresses.</p>
+
+<p>The formidable bodies which crossed the
+Rhine and the Alps at this period, were enabled
+to spare large detachments to blockade
+the strong places that covered the frontiers
+of France, without materially affecting the
+numerical superiority of the army which
+marched upon the capital. This army was<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_97">97</a></span>
+in a condition, therefore, to act, without the
+fear of being menaced in its line of retreat.</p>
+
+<p>But at no period of military history were
+the armies of Europe so combined before, or
+governed so entirely by one common mind in
+the attainment of a single object. Under
+these circumstances, the line of fortresses
+which surround France was rendered unavailable
+during the campaign; but it would
+be very imprudent, therefore, to conclude
+that a frontier guarded by numerous fortresses
+may be passed with impunity; or
+that battles may be fought with these places
+in your rear, without previously besieging,
+or at least investing them with sufficient
+forces.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XLI"></a>MAXIM XLI.</h2>
+
+<p>There are only two ways of insuring the
+success of a siege. The first, to begin by
+beating the enemy’s army employed to
+cover the place, forcing it out of the field,
+and throwing its remains beyond some
+great natural obstacle, such as a chain of
+mountains, or large river. Having accomplished<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_98">98</a></span>
+this object, an army of observation
+should be placed behind the natural
+obstacle, until the trenches are finished
+and the place taken.</p>
+
+<p>But if it be desired to take the place in
+presence of a relieving army, without risking
+a battle, then the whole <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">materiel</i> and
+equipment for a siege are necessary to
+begin with, together with ammunition and
+provisions for the presumed period of its
+duration, and also lines of contravallation
+and circumvallation, aided by all the localities
+of heights, woods, marshes and
+inundations.</p>
+
+<p>Having no longer occasion to keep up
+communications with your depôts, it is
+now only requisite to hold in check the
+relieving army. For this purpose, an army
+of observation should be formed, whose
+business it is never to lose sight of that of
+the enemy, and which, while it effectually
+bars all access to the place, has always
+time enough to arrive upon his flanks or
+rear in case he should attempt to steal a
+march.</p>
+
+<p>It is to be remembered, too, that by<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_99">99</a></span>
+profiting judiciously by the lines of contravallation,
+a portion of the besieging
+army will always be available in giving
+battle to the approaching enemy.</p>
+
+<p>Upon the same general principle, when
+a place is to be besieged in presence of an
+enemy’s army, it is necessary to cover the
+siege by lines of <em>circumvallation</em>.</p>
+
+<p>If the besieging force is of numerical
+strength enough (after leaving a corps
+before the place four times the amount
+of the garrison) to cope with the relieving
+army, it may remove more than one
+day’s march from the place; but if it be
+inferior in numbers after providing for
+the siege, as above stated, it should remain
+only a short day’s march from the
+spot, in order to fall back upon its lines,
+if necessary, or receive succor in case of
+attack.</p>
+
+<p>If the investing corps and army of
+observation are only equal when united
+to the relieving force, the besieging army
+should remain entire within, or near its
+lines, and push the works and the siege
+with the greatest activity.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_100">100</a></span></p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>“When we undertake a siege,” says Montécuculli,
+“we should not seek to place ourselves
+opposite the weakest part of the fortress,
+but at the point most favorable for
+establishing a camp and executing the designs
+we have in view.”</p>
+
+<p>This maxim was well understood by the
+Duke of Berwick. Sent to form the siege of
+Nice in 1706, he determined to attack on the
+side of Montalban, contrary to the advice of
+Vauban, and even to the orders of the king.
+Having a very small army at his disposal,
+he began by securing his camp. This he did
+by constructing redoubts upon the heights
+that shut in the space between the Var and
+the Paillon, two rivers which supported his
+flanks. By this means, he protected himself
+against a surprise; for the Duke of Savoy,
+having the power of debouching suddenly
+by the Col de Tende, it was necessary that
+the marshal should be enabled to assemble
+his forces, so as to move rapidly upon his
+adversary, and fight him before he got into
+position; otherwise his inferiority in numbers
+would have obliged him to raise the
+siege.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_101">101</a></span></p>
+
+<p>When Marshal Saxe was besieging Brussels,
+with only twenty-eight thousand men,
+opposed to a garrison of twelve thousand,
+he received intelligence that the Prince of
+Waldeck was assembling his forces to raise
+the siege. Not being strong enough to form
+an army of observation, the marshal reconnoitred
+a field of battle on the little river Voluve,
+and made all the necessary dispositions
+for moving rapidly to the spot, in case of
+the approach of the enemy. By this means
+he was prepared to receive his adversary
+without discontinuing the operations of the
+siege.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XLII"></a>MAXIM XLII.</h2>
+
+<p>Feuquière says that “we should never
+wait for the enemy in the lines of circumvallation,
+but we should go out and attack
+him.” He is in error. There is no authority
+in war without exception; and it
+would be dangerous to proscribe the principle
+of awaiting the enemy within the
+lines of circumvallation.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>During the siege of Mons, in 1691, the
+Prince of Orange assembled his army, and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_102">102</a></span>
+advanced as far as Notre Dame de Halle,
+making a demonstration to succor the place.
+Louis XIV, who commanded the siege in
+person, called a council of war to deliberate
+on what was to be done in case the Prince
+of Orange approached. The opinion of
+Marshal Luxembourg was to remain within
+the lines of circumvallation, and that opinion
+prevailed.</p>
+
+<p>The marshal laid it down as a principle
+that, when the besieging army is not strong
+enough to defend the whole extent of circumvallation,
+it should quit the lines and
+advance to meet the enemy; but when it is
+strong enough to encamp in two lines around
+a place, that it is better to profit by a good
+entrenchment&mdash;more especially as by this
+means the siege is not interrupted.</p>
+
+<p>In 1658, Marshal Turenne was besieging
+Dunkirk. He had already opened the
+trenches, when the Spanish army, under
+the orders of the Prince Don Juan, Condé,
+and D’Hocquincourt, appeared in sight, and
+took post upon the Downs, at a distance of
+a league from his lines. Turenne had the
+superiority in numbers, and he determined
+to quit his entrenchments. He had other
+advantages also. The enemy was without<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_103">103</a></span>
+artillery, and their superiority in cavalry
+was rendered useless by the unfavorable
+nature of the ground. It was, therefore, of
+great importance to beat the Spanish army
+before it had time to entrench itself and
+bring up its artillery. The victory gained
+by the French on this occasion justified all
+the combinations of Marshal Turenne.</p>
+
+<p>When Marshal Berwick was laying siege
+to Philipsburg, in 1733, he had reason to
+apprehend that the Prince of Savoy would
+attack him with all the forces of the empire
+before its termination. The marshal, therefore,
+after having made his disposition of
+the troops intended for the siege, formed,
+with the rest of his army, a corps of observation
+to make head against Prince Eugene,
+in case the latter should choose to attack
+him in his lines, or attempt a diversion on
+the Moselle or Upper Rhine. Prince Eugene,
+having arrived in front of the besieging
+army, some general officers were of
+opinion that it was better not to await the
+enemy in the lines, but to move forward
+and attack him. But Marshal Berwick, who
+agreed with the Duke of Luxembourg, that
+an army which can occupy, completely, good
+entrenchments is not liable to be forced, persisted<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_104">104</a></span>
+in remaining within his works. The
+result proved that this was also the opinion of
+Prince Eugene, for he did not dare to attack
+the entrenchments, which he would not have
+failed to do if he had any hopes of success.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XLIII"></a>MAXIM XLIII.</h2>
+
+<p>Those who proscribe lines of circumvallation,
+and all the assistance which the
+science of the engineer can afford, deprive
+themselves gratuitously of an auxiliary
+which is never injurious, almost always
+useful, and often indispensable. It must
+be admitted, at the same time, that the
+principles of field-fortification require improvement.
+This important branch of
+the art of war has made no progress since
+the time of the ancients. It is even inferior
+at this day to what it was two thousand
+years ago. Engineer officers should
+be encouraged in bringing this branch of
+their art to perfection, and in placing it
+upon a level with the rest.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>“If we are inferior in numbers,” says
+Marshal Saxe, “entrenchments are of no<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_105">105</a></span>
+use, for the enemy will bring all his forces
+to bear upon particular points. If we are
+of equal strength they are unnecessary also.
+If we are superior, we do not want them.
+Then why give ourselves the trouble to entrench?”
+Notwithstanding this opinion of
+the inutility of entrenchments, Marshal Saxe
+often had recourse to them.</p>
+
+<p>In 1797, Generals Provéra and Hohenzollern
+having presented themselves before
+Mantua (where Marshal Wurmser was shut
+up), for the purpose of raising the siege,
+they were stopped by the lines of contravallation
+of St. George. This slight obstacle
+sufficed to afford Napoleon time to arrive
+from Rivoli and defeat their enterprise. It
+was in consequence of neglecting to entrench
+themselves that the French had been
+obliged to raise the siege in the preceding
+campaign.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XLIV"></a>MAXIM XLIV.</h2>
+
+<p>If circumstances prevent a sufficient
+garrison being left to defend a fortified
+town, which contains an hospital and
+magazines, at least every means should<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_106">106</a></span>
+be employed to secure the citadel against
+a <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">coup de main</i>.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>A few battalions dispersed about a town,
+inspire no terror; but shut up in the more
+narrow outline of a citadel, they assume an
+imposing attitude. For this reason it appears
+to me that such a precaution is always
+necessary, not only in fortresses, but
+wherever there are hospitals or depôts of any
+kind. Where there is no citadel, some quarter
+of the town should be fixed upon most
+favorable for defence, and entrenched in such
+a manner as to oppose the greatest resistance
+possible.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XLV"></a>MAXIM XLV.</h2>
+
+<p>A fortified place can only protect the
+garrison and detain the enemy for a certain
+time. When this time has elapsed,
+and the defences of the place are destroyed,
+the garrison should lay down its arms.
+All civilized nations are agreed on this
+point, and there never has been an argument<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_107">107</a></span>
+except with reference to the greater
+or less degree of defence which a governor
+is bound to make before he capitulates.
+At the same time, there are generals&mdash;Villars
+among the number&mdash;who are of
+opinion that a governor should never surrender,
+but that in the last extremity he
+should blow up the fortifications, and take
+advantage of the night to cut his way
+through the besieging army. Where he
+is unable to blow up the fortifications, he
+may always retire, they say, with his garrison,
+and save the men.</p>
+
+<p>Officers who have adopted this line of
+conduct, have often brought off three-fourths
+of their garrison.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>In 1705, the French, who were besieged in
+Haguenau by Count Thungen, found themselves
+incapable of sustaining an assault.
+Péri, the governor, who had already distinguished
+himself by a vigorous defence,
+despairing of being allowed to capitulate on
+any terms short of becoming prisoner of
+war, resolved to abandon the place and cut
+his way through the besiegers.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_108">108</a></span></p>
+
+<p>In order to conceal his intention more
+effectually, and while he deceived the enemy,
+to sound at the same time the disposition of
+his officers, he assembled a council of war
+and declared his resolution to die in the
+breach. Then, under pretext of the extremity
+to which he was reduced, he commanded
+the whole garrison under arms; and
+leaving only a few sharpshooters in the
+breach, gave the order to march, and set out
+in silence, under cover of the night, from
+Haguenau. This audacious enterprise was
+crowned with success, and Péri reached Saverne
+without having suffered the smallest
+loss.</p>
+
+<p>Two fine instances of defence in later times
+are those of Massena at Genoa, and of Palafox
+at Saragossa.</p>
+
+<p>The first marched out with arms and baggage,
+and all the honors of war, after rejecting
+every summons, and defending himself
+until hunger alone compelled him to capitulate.
+The second only yielded after having
+buried his garrison amid the ruins of the
+city, which he defended from house to house,
+until famine and death left him no alternative
+but to surrender. This siege, which
+was equally honorable to the French as to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_109">109</a></span>
+the Spaniards, is one of the most memorable
+in the history of war. In the course of it,
+Palafox displayed every possible resource
+which courage and obstinacy can supply in
+the defence of a fortress.</p>
+
+<p>All real strength is founded in the mind;
+and on this account I am of opinion that we
+should be directed in the choice of a governor,
+less by his genius than his personal
+character. His most essential qualities should
+be courage, perseverance, and soldierlike devotedness.
+Above all, he should possess the
+talent not only of infusing courage into the
+garrison, but of kindling a spirit of resistance
+in the whole population. Where the latter
+is wanting, however art may multiply the
+defences of a place, the garrison will be compelled
+to capitulate after having sustained
+the first, or at most, the second assault.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XLVI"></a>MAXIM XLVI.</h2>
+
+<p>The keys of a fortress are well worth
+the retirement of the garrison, when it is
+resolved to yield only on those conditions.
+On this principle it is always wiser to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_110">110</a></span>
+grant an honorable capitulation to a garrison
+which has made a vigorous resistance,
+than to risk an assault.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>Marshal Villars has justly observed, that
+“no governor of a place should be permitted
+to excuse himself for surrendering, on the
+ground of wishing to preserve the king’s
+troops. Every garrison that displays courage
+will escape being prisoners of war. For there
+is no general who, however well assured of
+carrying a place by assault, will not prefer
+granting terms of capitulation rather than
+risk the loss of a thousand men in forcing
+determined troops to surrender.”</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XLVII"></a>MAXIM XLVII.</h2>
+
+<p>Infantry, cavalry, and artillery, are nothing
+without each other; therefore, they
+should always be so disposed in cantonments
+as to assist each other in case of
+surprise.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>“A general,” says Frederick, “should direct
+his whole attention to the tranquility of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_111">111</a></span>
+his cantonments, in order that the soldier
+may be relieved from all anxiety, and repose
+in security from his fatigues. With this
+view, care should be taken that the troops
+are able to form rapidly upon ground which
+has been previously reconnoitered; that the
+generals remain always with their divisions
+or brigades, and that the service is carried
+on throughout with exactness.”</p>
+
+<p>Marshal Saxe is of opinion that an army
+should not be in a hurry to quit its cantonments,
+but that it should wait till the
+enemy has exhausted himself with marching,
+and be ready to fall upon him with
+fresh troops when he is overcome with
+fatigue.</p>
+
+<p>I believe, however, that it would be dangerous
+to trust implicitly to this high authority,
+for there are many occasions where
+all the advantage lies in the initiative, more
+especially when the enemy has been compelled
+to extend his cantonments, from scarcity
+of subsistence, and can be attacked
+before he has time to concentrate his forces.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_112">112</a></span></p>
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XLVIII"></a>MAXIM XLVIII.</h2>
+
+<p>The formation of infantry in line should
+be always in two ranks, because the
+length of the musket only admits of an
+effective fire in this formation. The discharge
+of the third rank is not only uncertain,
+but frequently dangerous to the
+ranks in its front. In drawing up infantry
+in two ranks, there should be a supernumerary
+behind every fourth or fifth
+file. A reserve should likewise be placed
+twenty-five paces in rear of each flank.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>I am of opinion, if circumstances require
+a line of infantry to resort to a square, that
+two-deep is too light a formation to resist
+the shock of cavalry. However useless the
+third rank may appear for the purpose of
+file-firing, it is, notwithstanding necessary,
+in order to replace the men who fall in the
+ranks in front; otherwise you would be
+obliged to close in the files, and by this
+means leave intervals between the companies,
+which the cavalry would not fail to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_113">113</a></span>
+penetrate. It appears to me, also, that when
+infantry is formed in two ranks, the columns
+will be found to open out in marching to a
+flank. If it should be considered advantageous
+behind entrenchments to keep the infantry
+in two ranks, the third rank should
+be placed in reserve, and brought forward
+to relieve the front rank when fatigued, or
+when the fire is observed to slacken. I am
+induced to make these remarks, because I
+have seen an excellent pamphlet which proposes
+the two-deep formation for infantry as
+the best. The author supports his opinion
+by a variety of plausible reasons, but not
+sufficient, as it appears to me, to answer all
+the objections that may be offered to this
+practice.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XLIX"></a>MAXIM XLIX.</h2>
+
+<p>The practice of mixing small bodies of
+infantry and cavalry together is a bad
+one, and attended with many inconveniences.
+The cavalry loses its power of action.
+It becomes fettered in all its movements.
+Its energy is destroyed; even
+the infantry itself is compromised, for on<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_114">114</a></span>
+the first movement of the cavalry it is
+left without support. The best mode of
+protecting cavalry is to cover its flank.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>This also was the opinion of Marshal
+Saxe. “The weakness of the above formation,”
+says he, “is sufficient in itself to intimidate
+the platoons of infantry, because
+they must be lost if the cavalry is beaten.”</p>
+
+<p>The cavalry, also, which depends on the
+infantry for succor, is disconcerted the moment
+a brisk forward movement carries
+them out of sight of their supports. Marshal
+Turenne, and the generals of his time,
+sometimes employed this order of formation;
+but that does not, in my opinion,
+justify a modern author for recommending
+it in an essay, entitled “<cite>Considerations sur
+l’Art de la Guerre</cite>.” In fact, this formation
+has long been abandoned; and, since the introduction
+of light artillery, it appears to
+me almost ridiculous to propose it.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_L"></a>MAXIM L.</h2>
+
+<p>Charges of cavalry are equally useful
+at the beginning, the middle, and the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_115">115</a></span>
+end of a battle. They should be made
+always, if possible, on the flanks of the
+infantry, especially when the latter is engaged
+in front.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>The Archduke Charles, in speaking of cavalry,
+recommends that it should be brought
+in mass upon a decisive point, when the moment
+for employing it arrives; that is to
+say, when it can attack with a certainty of
+success. As the rapidity of its movement
+enables cavalry to act along the whole line
+in the same day, the general who commands
+it should keep it together as much as possible,
+and avoid dividing it into many detachments.
+When the nature of the ground
+admits of cavalry being employed on all
+points of the line, it is desirable to form it
+in column behind the infantry, and in a position
+whence it may be easily directed
+wherever it is required. If cavalry is intended
+to cover a position, it should be
+placed sufficiently in the rear to meet at full
+speed any advance of troops coming to
+attack that position. If it is destined to
+cover the flank of the infantry, it should, for
+the same reason, be placed directly behind<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_116">116</a></span>
+it. As the object of cavalry is purely offensive,
+it should be a rule to form it at such a
+distance only from the point of collision as
+to enable it to acquire its utmost impulse,
+and arrive at the top of its speed into action.
+With respect to the cavalry reserve,
+this should only be employed at the end of
+a battle, either to render the success more
+decisive, or to cover the retreat. Napoleon
+remarks that, at the battle of Waterloo, the
+cavalry of the guard which composed the
+reserve, was engaged against his orders.
+He complains of having been deprived from
+five o’clock of the use of this reserve, which,
+when well employed, had so often insured
+him the victory.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_LI"></a>MAXIM LI.</h2>
+
+<p>It is the business of cavalry to follow
+up the victory, and to prevent the beaten
+enemy from rallying.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>Victor or vanquished, it is of the greatest
+importance to have a body of cavalry in
+reserve, either to take advantage of victory,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_117">117</a></span>
+or to secure a retreat. The most decisive
+battles lose half their value to the conqueror,
+when the want of cavalry prevents him
+from following up his success, and depriving
+the enemy of the power of rallying.</p>
+
+<p>When a retiring army is pursued, it is
+more especially upon the flanks that the
+weight of cavalry should fall, if you are
+strong enough in that arm to cut off his
+retreat.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_LII"></a>MAXIM LII.</h2>
+
+<p>Artillery is more essential to cavalry
+than to infantry, because cavalry has no
+fire for its defence, but depends upon the
+sabre. It is to remedy this deficiency
+that recourse has been had to horse-artillery.
+Cavalry, therefore, should never
+be without cannon, whether when attacking,
+rallying, or in position.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>Horse-artillery is an invention of Frederick.
+Austria lost no time in introducing
+it into her armies, although in an imperfect
+degree. It was only in 1792 that this<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_118">118</a></span>
+arm was adopted in France, where it was
+brought rapidly to its present perfection.</p>
+
+<p>The services of this arm during the wars
+of the Revolution were immense. It may
+be said to have changed to a certain extent
+the character of tactics, because its facility
+of movement enables it to bear with rapidity
+on every point where artillery can be
+employed with success. Napoleon has remarked
+in his memoirs that a flanking battery
+which strikes and rakes the enemy
+obliquely, is capable of deciding a victory
+in itself. To this we may add that, independent
+of the advantages which cavalry
+derives from horse-artillery in securing its
+flanks, and in opening the way for a successful
+charge by the destructiveness of its
+fire, it is desirable that these two arms
+should never be separated, but ready at all
+times to seize upon points where it may
+be necessary to employ cannon. On these
+occasions, the cavalry masks the march of
+the artillery, protects its establishment in
+position, and covers it from the attack of
+the enemy, until it is ready to open its
+fire.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_119">119</a></span></p>
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_LIII"></a>MAXIM LIII.</h2>
+
+<p>In march, or in position, the greater
+part of the artillery should be with the
+divisions of infantry and cavalry. The
+rest should be in reserve. Each gun
+should have with it three hundred rounds,
+without including the limber. This is
+about the complement for two battles.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>The better infantry is, the more important
+it is to support it by artillery, with a view to
+its preservation.</p>
+
+<p>It is essential, also, that the batteries attached
+to divisions should march in the
+front, because this has a strong influence on
+the <em>morale</em> of the soldier. He attacks always
+with confidence when he sees the flanks of
+the column well covered with cannon.</p>
+
+<p>The artillery reserve should be kept for a
+decisive moment, and then employed in full
+force, for it will be difficult for the enemy at
+such a time to presume to attack it.</p>
+
+<p>There is scarcely an instance of a battery
+of sixty pieces of cannon having been carried<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_120">120</a></span>
+by a charge of infantry or cavalry,
+unless where it was entirely without support,
+or in a position to be easily turned.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_LIV"></a>MAXIM LIV.</h2>
+
+<p>Artillery should always be placed in
+the most advantageous positions, and as
+far in front of the line of cavalry and
+infantry as possible, without compromising
+the safety of the guns.</p>
+
+<p>Field batteries should command the
+whole country round from the level of
+the platform. They should on no account
+be masked on the right and left,
+but have free range in every direction.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>The battery of eighteen pieces of cannon,
+which covered the centre of the Russian
+army at the battle of La Moskwa (Borodino),
+may be cited as an example.</p>
+
+<p>Its position, upon a circular height which
+commanded the field in every direction, added
+so powerfully to its effect, that its fire alone
+sufficed, for a considerable time, to paralyze<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_121">121</a></span>
+the vigorous attack made by the French
+with their right. Although twice broken,
+the left of the Russian army closed to this
+battery, as to a pivot, and twice recovered
+its former position. After repeated attacks,
+conducted with a rare intrepidity, the battery
+was at length carried by the French,
+but not till they had lost the <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">élite</i> of their
+army, and with it the Generals Caulincourt
+and Montbrun. Its capture decided the retreat
+of the Russian left.</p>
+
+<p>I might advert likewise to another instance,
+in the campaign of 1809, and to the
+terrible effect produced by the hundred
+pieces of cannon of the Guard which General
+Lauriston directed, at the battle of
+Wagram, against the right of the Austrian
+army.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_LV"></a>MAXIM LV.</h2>
+
+<p>A General should never put his army
+into cantonments, when he has the means
+of collecting supplies of forage and provisions,
+and of thus providing for the
+wants of the soldier in the field.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_122">122</a></span></p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>One great advantage which results from
+having an army in camp is, that it is easier
+to direct its spirit and maintain its discipline
+there. The soldier in cantonments abandons
+himself to repose; he ends by finding a
+pleasure in idleness, and in fearing to return
+to the field. The reverse takes place in a
+camp. There, a feeling of <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">ennui</i>, and a
+severer discipline, make him anxious for the
+opening of the campaign, to interrupt the
+monotony of the service and relieve it with
+the chances and variety of war. Besides, an
+army in camp is much more secure from a
+surprise than in cantonments&mdash;the defect of
+which usually consists in their occupying too
+great an extent of ground. When an army
+is obliged to go into quarters, the Marquis de
+Feuquière recommends a camp to be selected
+in front of the line, where the troops can be
+frequently assembled&mdash;sometimes suddenly,
+in order to exercise their vigilance, or for
+the sole purpose of bringing the different
+corps together.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_123">123</a></span></p>
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_LVI"></a>MAXIM LVI.</h2>
+
+<p>A good general, a well-organized system,
+good instructions, and severe discipline,
+aided by effective establishments,
+will always make good troops, independently
+of the cause for which they fight.</p>
+
+<p>At the same time, a love of country, a
+spirit of enthusiasm, a sense of national
+honor, and fanaticism, will operate upon
+young soldiers with advantage.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>This remark appears to me less applicable
+to officers than to soldiers, for as war is not
+a state of things natural to man, it follows
+that those who maintain its cause must be
+governed by some strong excitement. Much
+enthusiasm and devotedness are required on
+the part of the troops for the general who
+commands, to induce an army to perform
+great actions in a war in which it takes
+no interest. This is sufficiently proved by
+the apathy of auxiliaries, unless when inspired
+by the conduct of their chief.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_124">124</a></span></p>
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_LVII"></a>MAXIM LVII.</h2>
+
+<p>When a nation is without establishments
+and a military system, it is very
+difficult to organize an army.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>This is an unanswerable truth, more particularly
+with reference to an army intended
+to act upon the system of modern war, and
+in which order, precision, and rapidity of
+movement, are the principal essentials to
+success.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_LVIII"></a>MAXIM LVIII.</h2>
+
+<p>The first qualification of a soldier is
+fortitude under fatigue and privation.
+Courage is only the second; hardship,
+poverty and want, are the best school
+for a soldier.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>Valor belongs to the young soldier as
+well as to the veteran; but in the former
+it is more evanescent. It is only by habits<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_125">125</a></span>
+of service, and after several campaigns,
+that the soldier acquires that moral courage
+which makes him support the fatigues and
+privations of war without a murmur. Experience
+by this time has instructed him to
+supply his own wants. He is satisfied with
+what he can procure, because he knows that
+success is only to be obtained by fortitude
+and perseverance. Well might Napoleon
+say that misery and want were the best
+school for a soldier; for as nothing could be
+compared with the total destitution of the
+army of the Alps, when he assumed the
+command, so nothing could equal the brilliant
+success which he obtained with this
+army in the first campaign in Italy. The
+conquerors of Montenotte, Lodi, Castiglione,
+Bassano, Arcole and Rivoli had beheld, only
+a few months before, whole battalions covered
+with rags, and deserting for the want
+of subsistence.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_LIX"></a>MAXIM LIX.</h2>
+
+<p>There are five things the soldier should
+never be without&mdash;his musket, his ammunition,
+his knapsack, his provisions<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_126">126</a></span>
+(for at least four days), and his entrenching-tool.
+The knapsack may be reduced
+to the smallest size possible, if it be
+thought proper, but the soldier should
+always have it with him.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>It is fortunate that Napoleon has recognized
+the advantage of giving to every soldier
+an entrenching-tool. His authority is
+the best answer to the ridicule which has
+been thrown upon those who proposed it.
+An axe will be found to inconvenience the
+foot-soldier as little as the sword he wears
+at his side, and it will be infinitely more
+useful. When axes are given out to companies,
+or are carried by fatigue-men during
+a campaign, they are soon lost; and it
+often happens, when a camp is to be formed,
+that a difficulty arises in cutting wood and
+building huts for the soldier; whereas, by
+making the axe a part of every man’s appointments,
+he is obliged to have it always
+with him; and whether the object be to
+entrench himself in a village, or to erect huts
+in a camp, the commander of a corps will
+speedily see the advantage of this innovation.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_127">127</a></span></p>
+
+<p>When once the axe has been generally
+adopted, we shall, perhaps, see the desirability
+of issuing pickaxes and shovels to
+particular companies, and also the benefit of
+more frequent entrenchments. It is more
+particularly during retreats that it is important
+to entrench when the army has reached
+a good position; for an entrenched camp
+not only furnishes the means of rallying
+troops which are pursued, but if it be fortified
+in such a manner as to render the issue
+of an attack doubtful to the enemy, it will
+not only sustain the <em>morale</em> of the soldier in
+the retreat, but afford the general-in-chief
+opportunities for resuming the offensive, and
+profiting by the first false movement on the
+part of his adversary. It will be recollected
+how Frederick, in the campaign of 1761,
+when surrounded by two Russian and Austrian
+armies, whose united force was quadruple
+his own, saved his army by entrenching
+himself in the camp of Buntzalvitz.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_LX"></a>MAXIM LX.</h2>
+
+<p>Every means should be taken to attach
+the soldier to his colors. This is best<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_128">128</a></span>
+accomplished by showing consideration
+and respect to the old soldier. His pay
+likewise should increase with his length
+of service. It is the height of injustice
+not to pay a veteran more than a recruit.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>Some modern writers have recommended,
+on the other hand, to limit the period of
+service, in order to bring the whole youth
+of a country successively under arms. By
+this means they purpose to have the levies,
+<i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">en masse</i>, all ready trained and capable of
+resisting successfully a war of invasion. But
+however advantageous at first sight such a
+military system may appear, I believe it
+will be found to have many objections.</p>
+
+<p>In the first place, the soldier fatigued with
+the minutiæ of discipline in a garrison, will
+not feel much inclined to re-enlist after he
+has received his discharge, more especially
+since, having served the prescribed time, he
+will consider himself to have fulfilled all the
+duties of a citizen to his country. Returning
+to his friends, he will probably marry,
+or establish himself in a trade. From that
+moment his military spirit declines, and he<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_129">129</a></span>
+soon becomes ill adapted to the business of
+war. On the contrary, the soldier who
+serves long, becomes attached to his regiment
+as to a new family. He submits to
+the yoke of discipline, accustoms himself to
+the privations his situation imposes, and
+ends by finding his condition agreeable.
+There are few officers that have seen service
+who have not discovered the difference
+between old and young soldiers, with reference
+to their power of supporting the
+fatigues of a long campaign, to the determined
+courage that characterizes the attack,
+or to the ease with which they rally after
+being broken.</p>
+
+<p>Montécuculli observes, that “it takes time
+to discipline an army; more to inure it to
+war; and still more to constitute veterans.”
+For this reason, he recommends that great
+consideration should be shown to old soldiers;
+that they should be carefully provided
+for, and a large body of them kept
+always on foot. It seems to me, also, that
+it is not enough to increase the pay of the
+soldier according to his period of service,
+but that it is highly essential to confer on
+him some mark of distinction that shall
+secure to him privileges calculated to encourage<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_130">130</a></span>
+him to grow gray under arms,
+and, above all, to do so with honor.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_LXI"></a>MAXIM LXI.</h2>
+
+<p>It is not set speeches at the moment of
+battle that render soldiers brave. The
+veteran scarcely listens to them, and the
+recruit forgets them at the first discharge.
+If discourses and harangues are useful, it
+is during the campaign: to do away unfavorable
+impressions, to correct false
+reports, to keep alive a proper spirit in
+the camp, and to furnish materials and
+amusement for the bivouac. All printed
+orders of the day should keep in view
+these objects.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>The opinion of the general-in-chief, energetically
+expressed, is, notwithstanding, productive
+of great effect on the <em>morale</em> of the
+soldier.</p>
+
+<p>In 1703, at the attack of Hornbec, Marshal
+Villars, seeing the troops advancing
+without spirit, threw himself at their head:<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_131">131</a></span>
+“What!” said he, “is it expected that I, a
+marshal of France, should be the first to
+escalade, when I order YOU to attack?”</p>
+
+<p>These few words rekindled their ardor;
+officers and soldiers rushed upon the works,
+and the town was taken almost without loss.</p>
+
+<p>“We have retired far enough for to-day;
+you know I always sleep upon the field of
+battle!” said Napoleon, as he flew through
+the ranks at the moment of resuming the
+offensive at Marengo. These few words sufficed
+to revive the courage of the soldiers,
+and to make them forget the fatigues of the
+day, during which almost every man had
+been engaged.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_LXII"></a>MAXIM LXII.</h2>
+
+<p>Tents are unfavorable to health. The
+soldier is best when he bivouacs, because
+he sleeps with his feet to the fire, which
+speedily dries the ground on which he
+lies. A few planks, or a little straw, shelter
+him from the wind.</p>
+
+<p>On the other hand, tents are necessary
+for the superior officers, who have to write
+and to consult their maps. Tents should,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_132">132</a></span>
+therefore, be issued to these, with directions
+to them never to sleep in a house.
+Tents are always objects of observation
+to the enemy’s staff. They afford information
+in regard to your numbers and
+the ground you occupy; while an army
+bivouacking in two or three lines, is only
+distinguishable from afar by the smoke
+which mingles with the clouds. It is impossible
+to count the number of the fires.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>The acknowledged advantage of bivouacking
+is another reason for adding an entrenching-tool
+to the equipment of the soldier; for,
+with the assistance of the axe and shovel,
+he can hut himself without difficulty. I have
+seen huts erected with the branches of trees,
+covered with turf, where the soldier was perfectly
+sheltered from the cold and wet, even
+in the worst season.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_LXIII"></a>MAXIM LXIII.</h2>
+
+<p>All information obtained from prisoners
+should be received with caution, and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_133">133</a></span>
+estimated at its real value. A soldier
+seldom sees anything beyond his company;
+and an officer can afford intelligence
+of little more than the position and
+movements of the division to which his
+regiment belongs. On this account, the
+general of an army should never depend
+upon the information derived from prisoners,
+unless it agrees with the reports
+received from the advanced guards, in
+reference to the position, etc., of the
+enemy.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>Montécuculli wisely observes that “prisoners
+should be interrogated separately, in
+order to ascertain, by the agreement in their
+answers, how far they may be endeavoring
+to mislead you.” Generally speaking, the information
+required from officers who are prisoners,
+should have reference to the strength
+and resources of the enemy, and sometimes
+to his localities and position. Frederick recommends
+that prisoners should be menaced
+with instant death if they are found attempting
+to deceive by false reports.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_134">134</a></span></p>
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_LXIV"></a>MAXIM LXIV.</h2>
+
+<p>Nothing is so important in war as an
+undivided command; for this reason,
+when war is carried on against a single
+power, there should be only one army,
+acting upon one base, and conducted by
+one chief.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>“Success,” says the Archduke Charles, “is
+only to be obtained by simultaneous efforts,
+directed upon a given point, sustained with
+constancy, and executed with decision.” It
+rarely happens that any number of men
+who desire the same object are perfectly
+agreed as to the means of attaining it; and
+if the will of one individual is not allowed to
+predominate, there can be no <em>ensemble</em> in the
+execution of their operations; neither will
+they attain the end proposed. It is useless
+to confirm this maxim by examples. History
+abounds in them.</p>
+
+<p>Prince Eugene and Marlborough would
+never have been so successful in the campaigns
+which they directed in concert, if a
+spirit of intrigue and difference of opinion
+had not constantly disorganized the armies
+opposed to them.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_135">135</a></span></p>
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_LXV"></a>MAXIM LXV.</h2>
+
+<p>The same consequences which have
+uniformly attended long discussions and
+councils of war, will follow at all times.
+They will terminate in the adoption of the
+worst course, which in war is always the
+most timid, or, if you will, the most prudent.
+The only true wisdom in a general
+is determined courage.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>Prince Eugene used to say that councils of
+war “are only useful when you want an
+excuse for attempting <em>nothing</em>.” This was
+also the opinion of Villars. A general-in-chief
+should avoid, therefore, assembling a
+council on occasions of difficulty, and should
+confine himself to consulting separately his
+most experienced generals in order to benefit
+by their advice, while he is governed at
+the same time in his decision by his own
+judgment. By this means, he becomes responsible,
+it is true, for the measures he
+pursues; but he has the advantage also of
+acting upon his own conviction, and of being<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_136">136</a></span>
+certain that the secret of his operations
+will not be divulged, as is usually the case
+where it is discussed by a council of war.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_LXVI"></a>MAXIM LXVI.</h2>
+
+<p>In war, the general alone can judge of
+certain arrangements. It depends on him
+alone to conquer difficulties by his own
+superior talents and resolution.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>The officer who obeys, whatever may be
+the nature or extent of his command, will
+always stand excused for executing implicitly
+the orders which have been given to him.
+This is not the case with the general-in-chief,
+on whom the safety of the army and the success
+of the campaign depend. Occupied, without
+intermission, in the whole process of
+observation and reflection, it is easy to conceive
+that he will acquire by degrees a
+solidity of judgment which will enable him
+to see things in a clearer and more enlarged
+point of view than his inferior generals.</p>
+
+<p>Marshal Villars, in his campaigns, acted<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_137">137</a></span>
+almost always in opposition to the advice of
+his generals, and he was almost always fortunate.
+So true it is, that a general, who feels
+confident in his talent for command, must
+follow the dictates of his own genius if he
+wishes to achieve success.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_LXVII"></a>MAXIM LXVII.</h2>
+
+<p>To authorize generals or other officers
+to lay down their arms in virtue of a particular
+capitulation, under any other circumstances
+than when they are composing
+the garrison of a fortress, affords a dangerous
+latitude. It is destructive of all
+military character in a nation to open such
+a door to the cowardly, the weak, or even
+to the misdirected brave. Great extremities
+require extraordinary resolution. The
+more obstinate the resistance of an army,
+the greater the chances of assistance or of
+success.</p>
+
+<p>How many seeming impossibilities have
+been accomplished by men whose only
+resource was death!</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_138">138</a></span></p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>In the campaign of 1759, Frederick directed
+General Fink, with eighteen thousand
+men, upon Maxen, for the purpose of cutting
+off the Austrian army from the defiles of Bohemia.
+Surrounded by twice his numbers,
+Fink capitulated after a sharp action, and
+fourteen thousand men laid down their arms.
+This conduct was the more disgraceful, because
+General Winch, who commanded the
+cavalry, cut his way through the enemy.
+The whole blame of the surrender fell, therefore,
+upon Fink, who was tried afterward by
+a court-martial, and sentenced to be cashiered
+and imprisoned for two years.</p>
+
+<p>In the campaign of Italy in 1796, the Austrian
+General Provéra capitulated with two
+thousand men in the castle of Cossaria. Subsequently,
+at the battle of La Favorite, the
+same general capitulated with a corps of six
+thousand men. I scarcely dare to revert to
+the shameful defection of General Mack in
+the capitulation of Ulm in 1805, where thirty
+thousand Austrians laid down their arms&mdash;when
+we have seen, during the wars of the
+Revolution, so many generals open themselves
+a way by a vigorous effort through
+the enemy, supported only by a few battalions.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_139">139</a></span></p>
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_LXVIII"></a>MAXIM LXVIII.</h2>
+
+<p>There is no security for any sovereign,
+for any nation, or for any general, if officers
+are permitted to capitulate in the
+open field, and to lay down their arms in
+virtue of conditions favorable to the contracting
+party, but contrary to the interests
+of the army at large. To withdraw
+from danger, and thereby to involve their
+comrades in greater peril, is the height of
+cowardice. Such conduct should be proscribed,
+declared infamous, and made punishable
+with death. All generals, officers
+and soldiers, who capitulate in battle to
+save their own lives, should be decimated.</p>
+
+<p>He who gives the order, and those who
+obey, are alike traitors, and deserve capital
+punishment.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>Soldiers, who are almost always ignorant
+of the designs of their chief, cannot be responsible
+for his conduct. If he orders them
+to lay down their arms, they must do so;
+otherwise they fail in that law of discipline<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_140">140</a></span>
+which is more essential to an army than
+thousands of men. It appears to me, therefore,
+under these circumstances, that the
+chiefs alone are responsible, and liable to the
+punishment due to their cowardice. We have
+no example of soldiers being wanting in their
+duty in the most desperate situations, where
+they are commanded by officers of approved
+resolution.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_LXIX"></a>MAXIM LXIX.</h2>
+
+<p>There is but one honorable mode of
+becoming prisoner of war. That is, by
+being taken separately; by which is meant,
+by being cut off entirely, and when we
+can no longer make use of our arms. In
+this case, there can be no conditions, for
+honor can impose none. We yield to an
+irresistible necessity.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>There is always time enough to surrender
+prisoner of war. This should be deferred,
+therefore, till the last extremity. And here
+I may be permitted to cite an example of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_141">141</a></span>
+rare obstinacy in defence, which has been
+related to me by ocular witnesses. The captain
+of grenadiers, Dubrenil, of the thirty-seventh
+regiment of the line, having been
+sent on detachment with his company, was
+stopped on the march by a large party of
+Cossacks, who surrounded him on every side.
+Dubrenil formed his little force into square,
+and endeavored to gain the skirts of a wood
+(within a few muskets’ shot of the spot
+where he had been attacked), and reached
+it with very little loss. But as soon as the
+grenadiers saw this refuge secured to them,
+they broke and fled, leaving their captain
+and a few brave men, who were resolved not
+to abandon him, at the mercy of the enemy.
+In the meantime, the fugitives, who had rallied
+in the depth of the wood, ashamed of
+having forsaken their leader, came to the
+resolution of rescuing him from the enemy,
+if a prisoner, or of carrying off his body if
+he had fallen. With this view, they formed
+once more upon the outskirts, and opening
+a passage with their bayonets through the
+cavalry, penetrated to their captain, who,
+notwithstanding seventeen wounds, was defending
+himself still. They immediately surrounded
+him, and regained the wood with<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_142">142</a></span>
+little loss. Such examples are not rare in
+the wars of the Revolution, and it were desirable
+to see them collected by some contemporary,
+that soldiers might learn how
+much is to be achieved in war by determined
+energy and sustained resolution.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_LXX"></a>MAXIM LXX.</h2>
+
+<p>The conduct of a general in a conquered
+country is full of difficulties. If severe,
+he irritates and increases the number of
+his enemies. If lenient, he gives birth to
+expectations which only render the abuses
+and vexations, inseparable from war, the
+more intolerable. A victorious general
+must know how to employ severity, justice
+and mildness by turns, if he would allay
+sedition or prevent it.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>Among the Romans, generals were only
+permitted to arrive at the command of armies
+after having exercised the different functions
+of the magistracy. Thus by a previous
+knowledge of administration, they were prepared<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_143">143</a></span>
+to govern the conquered provinces
+with all that discretion which a newly-acquired
+power, supported by arbitrary force,
+demands.</p>
+
+<p>In the military institutions of modern
+times, the generals, instructed only in what
+concerns the operation of strategy and tactics,
+are obliged to intrust the civil departments
+of the war to inferior agents, who,
+without belonging to the army, render all
+those abuses and vexations, inseparable from
+its operations, still more intolerable.</p>
+
+<p>This observation, which I do little more
+than repeat, seems to me, notwithstanding,
+deserving of particular attention; for if the
+leisure of general officers was directed in
+time of peace to the study of diplomacy&mdash;if
+they were employed in the different embassies
+which sovereigns send to foreign courts&mdash;they
+would acquire a knowledge of the
+laws and of the government of these countries,
+in which they may be called hereafter
+to carry on the war. They would learn also
+to distinguish those points of interest on
+which all treaties must be based, which have
+for their object the advantageous termination
+of a campaign. By the aid of this
+information they would obtain certain and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_144">144</a></span>
+positive results, since all the springs of action,
+as well as the machinery of war, would
+be in their hands. We have seen Prince
+Eugene, and Marshal Villars, each fulfilling
+with equal ability the duties of a general
+and a negotiator.</p>
+
+<p>When an army which occupies a conquered
+province observes strict discipline, there are
+few examples of insurrection among the people,
+unless indeed resistance is provoked (as
+but too often happens), by the exactions of
+inferior agents employed in the civil administration.</p>
+
+<p>It is to this point, therefore, that the general-in-chief
+should principally direct his
+attention, in order that the contributions
+imposed by the wants of the army may be
+levied with impartiality; and above all, that
+they may be applied to their true object, instead
+of serving to enrich the collectors, as
+is ordinarily the case.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_LXXI"></a>MAXIM LXXI.</h2>
+
+<p>Nothing can excuse a general who
+takes advantage of the knowledge acquired
+in the service of his country, to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_145">145</a></span>
+deliver up her frontier and her towns to
+foreigners. This is a crime reprobated
+by every principle of religion, morality
+and honor.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>Ambitious men who, listening only to
+their passions, arm natives of the same land
+against each other (under the deceitful pretext
+of the public good), are still more criminal.
+For however arbitrary a government,
+the institutions which have been consolidated
+by time, are always preferable to civil
+war, and to that anarchy which the latter is
+obliged to create for the justification of its
+crimes.</p>
+
+<p>To be faithful to his sovereign, and to
+respect the established government, are the
+first principles which ought to distinguish a
+soldier and a man of honor.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_LXXII"></a>MAXIM LXXII.</h2>
+
+<p>A general-in-chief has no right to shelter
+his mistakes in war under cover of his
+sovereign, or of a minister, when these
+are both distant from the scene of operation,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_146">146</a></span>
+and must consequently be either ill
+informed or wholly ignorant of the actual
+state of things.</p>
+
+<p>Hence, it follows, that every general is
+culpable who undertakes the execution of
+a plan which he considers faulty. It is
+his duty to represent his reasons, to insist
+upon a change of plan, in short, to give
+in his resignation, rather than allow himself
+to be made the instrument of his
+army’s ruin. Every general-in-chief who
+fights a battle in consequence of superior
+orders, with the certainty of losing it, is
+equally blamable.</p>
+
+<p>In this last-mentioned case, the general
+ought to refuse obedience; because a
+blind obedience is due only to a military
+command given by a superior present on
+the spot at the moment of action. Being
+in possession of the real state of things,
+the superior has it then in his power to
+afford the necessary explanations to the
+person who executes his orders.</p>
+
+<p>But supposing a general-in-chief to receive
+positive order from his sovereign,
+directing him to fight a battle, with the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_147">147</a></span>
+further injunction, to yield to his adversary,
+and allow himself to be defeated&mdash;ought
+he to obey it? No. If the general
+should be able to comprehend the meaning
+or utility of such an order, he should
+execute it; otherwise he should refuse to
+obey it.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>In the campaign of 1697, Prince Eugene
+caused the courier to be intercepted, who
+was bringing him orders from the emperor
+forbidding him to hazard a battle, for which
+everything had been prepared, and which
+he foresaw would prove decisive. He considered,
+therefore, that he did his duty in
+evading the orders of his sovereign; and the
+victory of Zanta, in which the Turks lost
+about thirty thousand men, and four thousand
+prisoners, rewarded his audacity. In
+the meantime, notwithstanding the immense
+advantages which accrued from this victory
+to the imperial arms, Eugene was disgraced
+on his arrival at Vienna.</p>
+
+<p>In 1793, General Hoche, having received
+orders to move upon Treves with an army
+harassed by constant marches in a mountainous
+and difficult country, refused to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_148">148</a></span>
+obey. He observed, with reason, that in order
+to obtain possession of an unimportant
+fortress, they were exposing his army to
+inevitable ruin. He caused, therefore, his
+troops to return into winter quarters, and
+preferred the preservation of his army, upon
+which the success of the future campaign
+depended, to his own safety. Recalled to
+Paris, he was thrown into a dungeon, which
+he only quitted on the downfall of Robespierre.</p>
+
+<p>I dare not decide if such examples are to
+be imitated; but it seems to me highly desirable
+that a question so new and so important,
+should be discussed by men who are
+capable of determining its merits.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_LXXIII"></a>MAXIM LXXIII.</h2>
+
+<p>The first qualification in a general-in-chief
+is a cool head&mdash;that is, a head which
+receives just impressions, and estimates
+things and objects at their real value.
+He must not allow himself to be elated
+by good news, or depressed by bad.</p>
+
+<p>The impressions he receives either successively<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_149">149</a></span>
+or simultaneously in the course
+of the day, should be so classed as to
+take up only the exact place in his mind
+which they deserve to occupy; since it is
+upon a just comparison and consideration
+of the weight due to different impressions,
+that the power of reasoning and of
+right judgment depends.</p>
+
+<p>Some men are so physically and morally
+constituted as to see everything
+through a highly-colored medium. They
+raise up a picture in the mind on every
+slight occasion, and give to every trivial
+occurrence a dramatic interest. But
+whatever knowledge, or talent, or courage,
+or other good qualities such men
+may possess, nature has not formed them
+for the command of armies, or the direction
+of great military operations.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>“The first quality in a general-in-chief,”
+says Montécuculli, “is a great knowledge
+of the art of war. This is not intuitive,
+but the result of experience. A man is not
+born a commander. He must become one.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_150">150</a></span>
+Not to be anxious; to be always cool; to
+avoid confusion in his commands; never to
+change countenance; to give his orders in
+the midst of battle with as much composure
+as if he were perfectly at ease. These are
+the proofs of valor in a general.</p>
+
+<p>“To encourage the timid; to increase the
+number of the truly brave; to revive the
+drooping ardor of the troops in battle; to
+rally those who are broken; to bring back
+to the charge those who are repulsed; to
+find resources in difficulty, and success even
+amid disaster; to be ready at a moment to
+devote himself, if necessary, for the welfare
+of the state. These are the actions which
+acquire for a general distinction and renown.”</p>
+
+<p>To this enumeration may be added, the
+talent of discriminating character, and of
+employing every man in the particular post
+which nature has qualified him to fill. “My
+principal attention,” said Marshal Villars,
+“was always directed to the study of the
+younger generals. Such a one I found, by
+the boldness of his character, fit to lead a
+column of attack; another, from a disposition
+naturally cautious, but without being
+deficient in courage, more perfectly to be<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_151">151</a></span>
+relied on for the defence of a country.” It
+is only by a just application of these personal
+qualities to their respective objects,
+that it is possible to command success in
+war.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_LXXIV"></a>MAXIM LXXIV.</h2>
+
+<p>The leading qualifications which should
+distinguish an officer selected for the
+head of the staff, are, to know the country
+thoroughly; to be able to conduct a
+<em>reconnoissance</em> with skill; to superintend
+the transmission of orders promptly; to
+lay down the most complicated movements
+intelligibly, but in a few words,
+and with simplicity.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>Formerly, the duties of the chiefs of the
+staff were confined to the necessary preparations
+for carrying the plan of the campaign,
+and the operations resolved on by
+the general-in-chief, into effect. In a battle,
+they were only employed in directing movements
+and superintending their execution.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_152">152</a></span>
+But in the late wars, the officers of the staff
+were frequently intrusted with the command
+of a column of attack, or of large detachments,
+when the general-in-chief feared to
+disclose the secret of his plans by the transmission
+of orders or instructions. Great
+advantages have resulted from this innovation,
+although it was long resisted. By this
+means, the staff have been enabled to perfect
+their theory by practice, and they have
+acquired, moreover, the esteem of the soldiers
+and junior officers of the line, who are
+easily led to think lightly of their superiors,
+whom they do not see fighting in the ranks.
+The generals who have held the arduous
+situation of chief of the staff during the
+wars of the Revolution, have almost always
+been employed in the different branches of
+the profession. Marshal Berthier, who filled
+so conspicuously this appointment to Napoleon,
+was distinguished by all the essentials
+of a general. He possessed calm, and at
+the same time brilliant courage, excellent
+judgment, and approved experience. He
+bore arms during half a century, made war
+in the four quarters of the globe, opened
+and terminated thirty-two campaigns. In
+his youth he acquired, under the eye of his<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_153">153</a></span>
+father, who was an engineer officer, the talent
+of tracing plans and finishing them with
+exactness, as well as the preliminary qualifications
+necessary to form a staff-officer.
+Admitted by the Prince de Lambesq into
+his regiment of dragoons, he was taught
+the skilful management of his horse and his
+sword&mdash;accomplishments so important to a
+soldier. Attached afterward to the staff of
+Count Rochambeau, he made his first campaign
+in America, where he soon began to
+distinguish himself by his valor, activity
+and talents. Having at length attained
+superior rank in the staff-corps formed by
+Marshal de Segur, he visited the camps of
+the King of Prussia, and discharged the duties
+of chief of the staff under the Baron
+de Bezenval.</p>
+
+<p>During nineteen years, consumed in sixteen
+campaigns, the history of Marshal Berthier’s
+life was little else but that of the
+wars of Napoleon, all the details of which he
+directed, both in the cabinet and the field.
+A stranger to the intrigues of politics, he
+labored with indefatigable activity; seized
+with promptitude and sagacity upon general
+views, and gave the necessary orders for
+attaining them with prudence, perspicuity,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_154">154</a></span>
+and conciseness. Discreet, impenetrable,
+modest; he was just, exact, and even severe,
+in everything that regarded the service;
+but he always set an example of
+vigilance and zeal in his own person, and
+knew how to maintain discipline, and to
+cause his authority to be respected by every
+rank under his orders.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_LXXV"></a>MAXIM LXXV.</h2>
+
+<p>A commandant of artillery should understand
+well the general principles of
+each branch of the service, since he is
+called upon to supply arms and ammunition
+to the different corps of which it is
+composed. His correspondence with the
+commanding officers of artillery at the
+advanced posts, should put him in possession
+of all the movements of the army,
+and the disposition and management of
+the great park of artillery should depend
+upon this information.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>After having recognized the advantage of
+intrusting the supply of arms and ammunition<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_155">155</a></span>
+for an army to a military body, it
+appears to me extraordinary that the same
+regulation does not extend to that of provisions
+and forage, instead of leaving it in
+the hands of a separate administration, as is
+the practice at present.</p>
+
+<p>The civil establishments attached to armies
+are formed almost always at the commencement
+of a war, and composed of persons
+strangers to those laws of discipline
+which they are but too much inclined to
+disregard. These men are little esteemed
+by the military, because they serve only to
+enrich themselves, without respect to the
+means. They consider only their private
+interest in a service whose glory they cannot
+share, although some portion of its success
+depends upon their zeal. The disorders
+and defalcations incident to these establishments
+would assuredly cease, if they were
+confided to men who had been employed in
+the army, and who, in return for their labors,
+were permitted to partake with their
+fellow-soldiers the triumph of their success.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_156">156</a></span></p>
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_LXXVI"></a>MAXIM LXXVI.</h2>
+
+<p>The qualities which distinguish a good
+general of advanced posts, are, to reconnoitre
+accurately defiles and fords of every
+description; to provide guides that may
+be depended on; to interrogate the <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">curé</i>
+and postmaster; to establish rapidly a
+good understanding with the inhabitants;
+to send out spies; to intercept public and
+private letters; to translate and analyze
+their contents; in a word, to be able to
+answer every question of the general-in-chief,
+when he arrives with the whole
+army.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>Foraging parties, composed of small detachments,
+and which were usually intrusted
+to young officers, served formerly to make
+good officers of advanced posts; but now the
+army is supplied with provisions by regular
+contributions: it is only in a course of partisan
+warfare that the necessary experience
+can be acquired to fill these situations with
+success.</p>
+
+<p>A chief of partisans is, to a certain extent,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_157">157</a></span>
+independent of the army. He receives
+neither pay nor provisions from it, and
+rarely succor, and is abandoned during the
+whole campaign to his own resources.</p>
+
+<p>An officer so circumstanced must unite
+address with courage, and boldness with
+discretion, if he wishes to collect plunder
+without measuring the strength of his little
+corps with superior forces. Always harassed,
+always surrounded by dangers, which
+it is his business to foresee and surmount, a
+leader of partisans acquires in a short time
+an experience in the details of war rarely to
+be obtained by an officer of the line; because
+the latter is almost always under the guidance
+of superior authority, which directs
+the whole of his movements, while the talent
+and genius of the partisan are developed
+and sustained by a dependence on his own
+resources.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_LXXVII"></a>MAXIM LXXVII.</h2>
+
+<p>Generals-in-chief must be guided by
+their own experience, or their genius.
+Tactics, evolutions, the duties and knowledge
+of an engineer or artillery officer,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_158">158</a></span>
+may be learned in treatises, but the
+science of strategy is only to be acquired
+by experience, and by studying the campaigns
+of all the great captains.</p>
+
+<p>Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, and Frederick,
+as well as Alexander, Hannibal, and
+Cæsar, have all acted upon the same principles.
+These have been: to keep their
+forces united; to leave no weak part
+unguarded; to seize with rapidity on
+important points.</p>
+
+<p>Such are the principles which lead to
+victory, and which, by inspiring terror at
+the reputation of your arms, will at once
+maintain fidelity and secure subjection.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>“A great captain can only be formed,”
+says the Archduke Charles, “by long experience
+and intense study: neither is his own
+experience enough&mdash;for whose life is there
+sufficiently fruitful of events to render his
+knowledge universal?” It is, therefore, by
+augmenting his information from the stock
+of others, by appreciating justly the discoveries
+of his predecessors, and by taking for
+his standard of comparison those great military<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_159">159</a></span>
+exploits, in connection with their political
+results, in which the history of war
+abounds, that he can alone become a great
+commander.</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<h2><a id="MAXIM_LXXVIII"></a>MAXIM LXXVIII.</h2>
+
+<p>Peruse again and again the campaigns
+of Alexander, Hannibal, Cæsar, Gustavus
+Adolphus, Turenne, Eugene, and Frederick.
+Model yourself upon them. This
+is the only means of becoming a great
+captain, and of acquiring the secret of the
+art of war. Your own genius will be
+enlightened and improved by this study,
+and you will learn to reject all maxims
+foreign to the principles of these great
+commanders.</p>
+
+<div class="note">
+<h3>NOTE.</h3>
+
+<p>It is in order to facilitate this object that
+I have formed the present collection. It is
+after reading and meditating upon the history
+of modern war that I have endeavored
+to illustrate, by examples, how the maxims
+of a great captain may be most successfully
+applied to this study. May the end I have
+had in view be accomplished!</p>
+
+</div></div>
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<div class="transnote">
+<h2 class="nobreak p1"><a id="Transcribers_Notes"></a>Transcriber’s Notes</h2>
+
+<p>Cover created by Transcriber and placed in the Public Domain.</p>
+
+<p>Punctuation, hyphenation, and spelling were made consistent when a predominant
+preference was found in this book; otherwise they were not changed,
+except as noted below.</p>
+
+<p>Unusual and archaic spellings were not changed.</p>
+
+<p>Simple typographical errors were corrected; occasional unbalanced
+quotation marks retained.</p>
+
+<p>Ambiguous hyphens at the ends of lines were retained.</p>
+
+<p>Page <a href="#Page_32">32</a>: “spacious and extensive” was printed as “entensive”
+but changed here.</p>
+
+<p>Page <a href="#Page_60">60</a>: “1746” is a misprint; the correct date must be in the 1600's,
+perhaps “1646”.</p>
+
+<p>Page <a href="#Page_63">63</a>: “1798” may be a misprint for “1796”.</p>
+
+<p>Page <a href="#Page_65">65</a>: “1745” is a misprint; the correct year is “1645”.</p>
+
+<p>Page <a href="#Page_75">75</a>: “wo to the vanquished” was printed that way.</p>
+
+<p>Page <a href="#Page_100">100</a>: “Vauban” was printed as “Vanban” but changed here.</p>
+</div>
+</div>
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+<pre>
+
+
+
+
+
+End of Project Gutenberg's The Officer's Manual, by Napoleon Bonaparte
+
+*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE OFFICER'S MANUAL ***
+
+***** This file should be named 50750-h.htm or 50750-h.zip *****
+This and all associated files of various formats will be found in:
+        http://www.gutenberg.org/5/0/7/5/50750/
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+</pre>
+
+</body>
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