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+The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Officer's Manual, by Napoleon Bonaparte

+

+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most

+other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions

+whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of

+the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at

+www.gutenberg.org.  If you are not located in the United States, you'll have

+to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook.

+

+Title: The Officer's Manual

+       Napoleon's Maxims of War

+

+Author: Napoleon Bonaparte

+

+Release Date: December 23, 2015 [EBook #50750]

+

+Language: English

+

+Character set encoding: UTF-8

+

+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE OFFICER'S MANUAL ***

+

+

+

+

+Produced by Shaun Pinder, Charlie Howard, and the Online

+Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This

+file was produced from images generously made available

+by The Internet Archive)

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+  THE OFFICER’S MANUAL.

+

+  NAPOLEON’S

+  MAXIMS OF WAR.

+

+

+  RICHMOND, VA.:

+  WEST & JOHNSTON.

+  1862.

+

+

+

+

+  EVANS & COGSWELL, PRINTERS.

+  NO. 3 BROAD ST., CHARLESTON, S. C.

+

+

+

+

+RECOMMENDATION.

+

+

+“After refreshing my memory by looking over again ‘The Officer’s

+Manual,’ or ‘Maxims of Napoleon,’ I think I may safely recommend the

+republication, in America, of the work in English, as likely to be

+called for by many officers, regular and volunteer. It contains a

+circle of maxims, deduced from the highest source of military science

+and experience, with practical illustrations of the principles taken

+from the most celebrated campaigns of modern times. The study of the

+book cannot fail to set all young officers on a course of inquiry and

+reflection greatly to their improvement.

+

+            “WINFIELD SCOTT.”

+

+

+

+

+PREFACE.

+

+

+The publisher has reissued this little volume as a publication timely

+for the occasion. A collection of maxims which directed the military

+operations of the greatest captain of modern times, cannot fail to

+prove of great use to such young officers as really desire a knowledge

+of the art of war. The maxims are illustrated by instances drawn from

+the campaigns of Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, Frederick, and Napoleon.

+These great men were all governed by the same principles, and it is by

+applying these principles to the perusal of their respective campaigns,

+that every military man will recognize their wisdom, and make such use

+of them hereafter as his own particular genius shall point out.

+

+“And here, perhaps,” says the translator, Col. D’Aguilar, “my task

+might have been considered finished; but perceiving how incomplete

+the collection was alone, I have endeavored to supply the deficiency

+by having recourse for further illustration to the memoirs of

+Montécuculli, and the instructions of Frederick to his generals. The

+analogy of their principles with those of Napoleon, has convinced me

+that the art of war is susceptible of two points of view: one, which

+relates entirely to the acquirements and genius of the general; the

+other, which refers to matters of detail.

+

+“The first is the same in all ages, and with all nations, whatever be

+the arms with which they fight. Hence it follows that, in every age,

+great commanders have been governed by the same principles.

+

+“The business of detail, on the contrary, is controlled by existing

+circumstances. It varies with the character of a people, and the

+quality of their arms.

+

+“It is with a view to impress the justice of this remark, that I have

+sought for facts in different periods of history, to illustrate these

+maxims, and to prove that nothing is _problematical_ in war; but that

+failure and success in military operations depend almost always on the

+natural genius and science of the chief.”

+

+

+

+

+NAPOLEON’S

+

+MAXIMS OF WAR.

+

+

+

+

+MAXIM I.

+

+

+The frontiers of states are either large rivers, or chains of

+mountains, or deserts. Of all these obstacles to the march of an army,

+the most difficult to overcome is the desert; mountains come next, and

+broad rivers occupy the third place.

+

+

+NOTE.

+

+Napoleon, in his military career, appears to have been called upon to

+surmount every difficulty which can occur in wars of invasion.

+

+In Egypt he traversed deserts, and vanquished and destroyed the

+Mamelukes, so celebrated for their address and courage. His genius

+knew how to accommodate itself to all the dangers of this distant

+enterprise, in a country ill adapted to supply the wants of his troops.

+

+In the conquest of Italy, he twice crossed the Alps by the most

+difficult passes, and at a season, too, which rendered this undertaking

+still more formidable. In three months he passed the Pyrenees, defeated

+and dispersed four Spanish armies. In short, from the Rhine to the

+Borysthenes, no natural obstacle could be found to arrest the rapid

+march of his victorious army.

+

+

+

+

+MAXIM II.

+

+

+In forming the plan of a campaign, it is requisite to foresee

+everything the enemy may do, and to be prepared with the necessary

+means to counteract it.

+

+Plans of campaign may be modified _ad infinitum_ according to

+circumstances--the genius of the general, the character of the troops,

+and the topography of the theatre of action.

+

+

+NOTE.

+

+Sometimes we see a hazardous campaign succeed, the plan of which is

+directly at variance with the principles of the art of war. But this

+success depends generally on the caprice of fortune, or upon faults

+committed by the enemy--two things upon which a general must never

+count. Sometimes the plan of a campaign, although based on sound

+principles of war, runs the risk of failing at the outset if opposed

+by an adversary who acts at first on the defensive, and then, suddenly

+seizing the initiative, surprises by the skilfulness of his manœuvres.

+Such was the fate of the plan laid down by the Aulic council for the

+campaign of 1796, under the command of Marshal Wurmser. From his

+great numerical superiority, the marshal had calculated on the entire

+destruction of the French army, by cutting off its retreat. He founded

+his operations on the defensive attitude of his adversary, who was

+posted on the line of the Adige, and had to cover the siege of Mantua,

+as well as central and lower Italy.

+

+Wurmser, supposing the French army fixed in the neighborhood of

+Mantua, divided his forces into three corps, which marched separately,

+intending to unite at that place. Napoleon, having penetrated the

+design of the Austrian general, perceived the advantage to be derived

+from striking the first blow against an army divided into three corps,

+with no communication between them. He hastened, therefore, to raise

+the siege of Mantua, assembled the whole of his forces, and by this

+means became superior to the imperialists, whose divisions he attacked

+and beat in detail. Thus Wurmser, who fancied he had only to march

+to certain victory, saw himself compelled, after ten days campaign,

+to retire with the remains of his army into the Tyrol, after a loss

+of twenty-five thousand men in killed and wounded, fifteen thousand

+prisoners, nine stand of colors, and seventy pieces of cannon.

+

+Hence, nothing is so difficult as to prescribe beforehand to a general

+the line of conduct he shall pursue during the course of a campaign.

+Success must often depend on circumstances that cannot be foreseen;

+and it should be remembered, likewise, that nothing cramps so much the

+efforts of genius as compelling the head of an army to be governed by

+any will but his own.

+

+

+

+

+MAXIM III.

+

+

+An army which undertakes the conquest of a country, has its two

+wings resting either upon neutral territories, or upon great natural

+obstacles, such as rivers or chains of mountains. It happens in some

+cases that only one wing is so supported; and in others that both are

+exposed.

+

+In the first instance cited, viz., where both wings are protected,

+a general has only to protect his front from being penetrated. In

+the second, where one wing only is supported, he should rest upon

+the supported wing. In the third, where both wings are exposed, he

+should depend upon a central formation, and never allow the different

+corps under his command to depart from this: for if it be difficult

+to contend with the disadvantage of having _two_ flanks exposed,

+the inconvenience is doubled by having _four_, trebled if there be

+_six_--that is to say, if the army is divided into two or three

+different corps. In the first instance, then, as above quoted, the line

+of operation may rest indifferently on the right or on the left. In

+the second, it should be directed toward the wing in support. In the

+third, it should be perpendicular to the centre of the army’s line of

+march. But in all these cases it is necessary, at a distance of every

+five or six days march, to have a strong post or an entrenched position

+upon the line of operation, in order to collect military stores and

+provisions, to organize convoys, to form of it a centre of movement,

+and establish a point of defence to shorten the line of operation of

+the army.

+

+

+NOTE.

+

+These general principles in the art of war were entirely unknown, or

+lost sight of, in the middle ages. The crusaders in their incursions

+into Palestine appear to have had no object but to fight and to

+conquer, so little pains did they take to profit by their victories.

+Hence, innumerable armies perished in Syria, without any other

+advantage than that derived from the momentary success obtained by

+superior numbers.

+

+It was by the neglect of these principles, also, that Charles XII,

+abandoning his line of operation and all communication with Sweden,

+threw himself into the Ukraine, and lost the greater part of his army

+by the fatigue of a winter campaign in a barren country destitute of

+resources.

+

+Defeated at Pultawa, he was obliged to seek refuge in Turkey, after

+crossing the Nieper with the remains of his army, diminished to little

+more than one thousand men.

+

+Gustavus Adolphus was the first who brought back the art of war to its

+true principles. His operations in Germany were bold, rapid, and well

+executed. He made success at all times conducive to future security,

+and established his line of operation so as to prevent the possibility

+of any interruption in his communications with Sweden. His campaigns

+form a new era in the art of war.

+

+

+

+

+MAXIM IV.

+

+

+When the conquest of a country is undertaken by two or three armies,

+which have each their separate line of operation, until they arrive at

+a point fixed upon for their concentration, it should be laid down as a

+principle, that the union of these different corps should never take

+place near the enemy; because the enemy, in uniting his forces, may not

+only prevent this junction, but may beat the armies in detail.

+

+

+NOTE.

+

+In the campaign of 1757, Frederick, marching to the conquest of Bohemia

+with two armies, which had each their separate line of operation,

+succeeded, notwithstanding, in uniting them in sight of the Duke of

+Lorraine, who covered Prague with the imperial army; but his example

+should not be followed. The success of this march depended entirely on

+the inaction of the duke, who, at the head of seventy thousand men, did

+nothing to prevent the junction of the two Prussian armies.

+

+

+

+

+MAXIM V.

+

+

+All wars should be governed by certain principles, for every war should

+have a definite object, and be conducted according to the rules of

+art. (A war should only be undertaken with forces proportioned to the

+obstacles to be overcome.)

+

+

+NOTE.

+

+It was a saying of Marshal Villars, that when war is decided on, it is

+necessary to have exact information of the number of troops the enemy

+can bring into the field, since it is impossible to lay down any solid

+plan of offensive or defensive operation without an accurate knowledge

+of what you have to expect and fear. “When the first shot is fired,”

+observes Marshal Villars, “no one can calculate what will be the issue

+of the war. It is, therefore, of vast importance to reflect maturely

+before we begin it.” When once, however, this is decided, the marshal

+observes that the boldest and most extended plans are generally the

+wisest and the most successful. “When we are determined upon war,” he

+adds, “we should carry it on vigorously and without trifling.”

+

+

+

+

+MAXIM VI.

+

+

+At the commencement of a campaign, to _advance_ or _not to advance_,

+is a matter for grave consideration; but when once the offensive has

+been assumed, it must be sustained to the last extremity. However

+skilful the manœuvres in a retreat, it will always weaken the _morale_

+of an army, because, in losing the chances of success, these last are

+transferred to the enemy. Besides, retreats always cost more men and

+_materiel_ than the most bloody engagements; with this difference, that

+in a battle the enemy’s loss is nearly equal to your own--whereas in a

+retreat the loss is on your side only.

+

+

+NOTE.

+

+Marshal Saxe remarks, that no retreats are so favorable as those which

+are made before a languid and unenterprising enemy, for when he pursues

+with vigor, the retreat soon degenerates into a rout. “Upon this

+principle it is a great error,” says the marshal, “to adhere to the

+proverb which recommends us to build a bridge of gold for a retreating

+enemy. No; follow him up with spirit, and he is destroyed!”

+

+

+

+

+MAXIM VII.

+

+

+An army should be ready every day, every night, and at all times of the

+day and night, to oppose all the resistance of which it is capable.

+With this view, the soldier should always be furnished completely

+with arms and ammunition; the infantry should never be without its

+artillery, its cavalry, and its generals; and the different divisions

+of the army should be constantly in a state to support, to be

+supported, and to protect itself.

+

+The troops, whether halted, or encamped, or on the march, should be

+always in favorable positions, possessing the essentials required for

+a field of battle; for example, the flanks should be well covered, and

+all the artillery so placed as to have free range, and to play with the

+greatest advantage. When an army is in column of march, it should have

+advanced guards and flanking parties, to examine well the country in

+front, to the right, and to the left, and always at such distance as

+to enable the main body to deploy into position.

+

+

+NOTE.

+

+The following maxims, taken from the memoirs of Montécuculli, appear

+to me well suited to this place, and calculated to form a useful

+commentary on the general principles laid down in the preceding maxim:

+

+1. When war has been once decided on, the moment is past for doubts and

+scruples. On the contrary, we are bound to hope that all the evil which

+may ensue, will not; that Providence, or our own wisdom, may avert it;

+or that the want of talent on the part of the enemy may prevent him

+from benefiting by it. The first security for success is to confer the

+command on one individual. When the authority is divided, the opinions

+of the commanders often vary, and the operations are deprived of that

+_ensemble_ which is the first essential to victory. Besides, when an

+enterprise is common to many, and not confined to a single person, it

+is conducted without vigor, and less interest is attached to the result.

+

+After having strictly conformed to all the rules of war, and satisfied

+ourselves that nothing has been omitted to ensure eventual success,

+we must then leave the issue in the hands of Providence, and repose

+ourselves tranquilly in the decision of a higher power.

+

+Let what will arrive, it is the part of a general-in-chief to remain

+firm and constant in his purposes; he must not allow himself to be

+elated by prosperity, nor to be depressed by adversity: for in war good

+and bad and fortune succeed each other by turns, form the ebb and flow

+of military operations.

+

+2. When your own army is strong and inured to service, and that of the

+enemy is weak and consists of new levies, or of troops enervated by

+long inaction, then you should exert every means to bring him to battle.

+

+If, on the other hand, your adversary has the advantage in troops, a

+decisive combat is to be avoided, and you must be content to impede

+his progress, by encamping advantageously, and fortifying favorable

+passes. When armies are nearly equal in force, it is desirable _not_ to

+avoid a battle, but only to attempt to fight one to advantage. For this

+purpose, care should be taken to encamp always in front of the enemy;

+to move when he moves, and occupy the heights and advantageous grounds

+that lie upon his line of march; to seize upon all the buildings and

+roads adjoining to his camp, and post yourself advantageously in the

+places by which he must pass. It is always something gained to make

+_him_ lose time, to thwart his designs, or to retard their progress

+and execution. If, however, an army is altogether inferior to that

+of the enemy, and there is no possibility of manœuvring against him

+with success, then the campaign must be abandoned, and the troops must

+retire into the fortresses.

+

+3. The principal object of a general-in-chief, in the moment of battle,

+should be to secure the flanks of his army. It is true that natural

+positions may be found to effect this object, but these positions being

+fixed and immovable in themselves, they are only advantageous to a

+general who wishes to wait the shock of the enemy, and not to one who

+marches to the attack.

+

+A general can, therefore, rely only on the proper arrangement of his

+troops, to enable him to repel any attempt the adversary may make upon

+the front, or flanks, or rear of his army.

+

+If one flank of an army rests upon a river, or an impassable ravine,

+the whole of the cavalry may be posted with the other wing, in order to

+envelop the enemy more easily by its superiority in numbers.

+

+If the enemy has his flanks supported by woods, light cavalry or

+infantry should be despatched to attack him in flank or in rear during

+the heat of the battle. If practicable, also, an attack should be made

+upon the baggage, to add to his confusion.

+

+If you desire to beat the enemy’s left with your right wing, or his

+right with your left wing, the wing with which you attack should be

+reinforced by the _élite_ of your army. At the same moment, the other

+wing should avoid battle, and the attacking wing brought rapidly

+forward, so as to overwhelm the enemy. If the nature of the ground

+admits, he should be approached by stealth, and attacked before he

+is on his guard. If any signs of fear are discoverable in the enemy,

+and which are always to be detected by confusion or disorder in his

+movements, he should be pursued immediately, without allowing him

+time to recover himself. It is now the cavalry should be brought into

+action, and manœuvre so as to surprise and cut off his artillery and

+baggage.

+

+4. The order of march should always be subservient to the order of

+battle, which last should be arranged beforehand. The march of an army

+is always well regulated when it is governed by the distance to be

+accomplished, and by the time required for its performance. The front

+of the column of march should be diminished or increased according

+to the nature of the country, taking care that the artillery always

+proceeds by the main road.

+

+When a river is to be passed, the artillery should be placed in battery

+upon the bank opposite the point of crossing.

+

+It is a great advantage, when a river forms a sweep or angle, and

+when a ford is to be found near the place where you wish to effect a

+passage. As the construction of the bridge proceeds, infantry should

+be advanced to cover the workmen, by keeping up a fire on the opposite

+bank; but the moment it is finished, a corps of infantry and cavalry,

+and some field-pieces, should be pushed across. The infantry should

+entrench itself immediately at the head of the bridge, and it is

+prudent, moreover, to fortify on the same side of the river, in order

+to protect the bridge in case the enemy should venture an offensive

+movement.

+

+The advanced guard of an army should be always provided with trusty

+guides, and with a corps of pioneers: the first to point out the best

+roads, the second to render these roads more practicable.

+

+If the army marches in detachments, the commander of each detachment

+should be furnished with the name of the place in writing, where the

+whole are to be reassembled; the place should be sufficiently removed

+from the enemy to prevent him from occupying it before the junction of

+all the detachments. To this end, it is of importance to keep the name

+a secret.

+

+From the moment an army approaches the enemy, it should march in

+the order in which it is intended to fight. If anything is to be

+apprehended, precautions are necessary in proportion to the degree of

+the danger. When a defile is to be passed, the troops should be halted

+beyond the extremity, until the whole army has quitted the defile.

+

+In order to conceal the movements of an army, it is necessary to march

+by night through woods and valleys, by the most retired roads, and out

+of reach of all inhabited places. No fires should be allowed; and, to

+favor the design still more, the troops should move by verbal order.

+When the object of the march is to carry a post, or to relieve a place

+that is besieged, the advanced guard should march within musket shot of

+the main body, because then you are prepared for an immediate attack,

+and ready to overthrow all before you.

+

+When a march is made to force a pass guarded by the enemy, it is

+desirable to make a feint upon one point, while, by a rapid movement,

+you bring your real attack to bear upon another.

+

+Sometimes success is obtained by pretending to fall back upon the

+original line of march, and, by a sudden countermarch, seizing upon

+the pass, before the enemy is able to reoccupy it. Some generals have

+gained their point by manœuvring so as to deceive the enemy, while a

+detachment under the cover of high grounds has surprised the passage by

+a stolen march. The enemy being engaged in watching the movements of

+the main body, the detachment has an opportunity of entrenching itself

+in its new position.

+

+5. An army regulates its mode of encampment according to the greater or

+less degree of precaution, when circumstances require. In a friendly

+country the troops are divided, to afford better accommodation and

+supplies. But with the enemy in front, an army should always encamp in

+order of battle. With this view, it is of the highest importance to

+cover one part of the camp, as far as practicable, by natural defences,

+such as a river, a chain of rocks, or a ravine. Care should be taken

+also that the camp is not commanded, and that there is no obstacle to a

+free communication between the different corps, and which can prevent

+the troops from mutually succoring each other.

+

+When an army occupies a fixed camp, it is necessary to be well supplied

+with provisions and ammunition, or at least that these should be

+within certain reach and easily obtained. To insure this, the line of

+communication must be well established, and care taken not to leave an

+enemy’s fortress in your rear.

+

+When an army is established in winter quarters, its safety is best

+secured either by fortifying a camp (for which purpose a spot should be

+selected near a large commercial town, or a river affording facility

+of transport), or by distributing it in close cantonments, so that the

+troops should be near together, and capable of affording each other

+mutual support.

+

+The winter quarters of an army should be protected, likewise, by

+constructing small covered works on all the lines of approach to the

+cantonments, and by posting advanced guards of cavalry to observe the

+motions of the enemy.

+

+6. A battle is to be sought, when there is reason to hope for victory,

+or when an army runs the risk of being ruined without fighting; also

+when a besieged place is to be relieved, or when you desire to prevent

+a reinforcement from reaching the enemy. Battles are useful, likewise,

+when we wish to profit by a favorable opportunity which offers, to

+secure a certain advantage, such as seizing upon an undefended point or

+pass, attacking the enemy when he has committed a fault, or when some

+misunderstanding among his generals favors the undertaking.

+

+If an enemy declines an engagement, he may be compelled to it, either

+by besieging a place of importance, or by falling upon him unawares,

+and when he cannot easily effect his retreat. Or (after pretending to

+retire), by making a rapid countermarch, attacking him vigorously and

+forcing him to action.

+

+The different circumstances under which a battle should be avoided

+or declined, are, when there is greater danger to be apprehended

+from defeat than advantage to be derived from victory; when you

+are very inferior to your adversary in numbers, and are expecting

+reinforcements; above all, when the enemy is advantageously posted, or

+when he is contributing to his own ruin by some inherent defect in his

+position, or by the errors and divisions of his generals.

+

+To gain a battle, each arm must be advantageously posted, and have the

+means of engaging its front and in flank. The wings must be protected

+by natural obstacles, where these present themselves, or by having

+recourse when necessary to the aid of art.

+

+The troops must be able to assist each other without confusion, and

+care must be taken that the broken corps do not fall back upon, and

+throw the rest into disorder. Above all, the intervals between the

+different corps must be sufficiently small to prevent the enemy from

+penetrating between them, for in that case you would be obliged to

+employ your reserves, and run the risk of being entirely overwhelmed.

+Sometimes victory is obtained by creating a diversion in the middle of

+a battle, or even by depriving the soldier of all hope of retreat, and

+placing him in a situation where he is reduced to the necessity either

+to conquer or die.

+

+At the commencement of a battle, if the ground is level, you should

+advance to meet the enemy, in order to inspire the soldier with

+courage; but if you are well posted, and your artillery advantageously

+placed, then wait for him with determination: remembering always to

+fight resolutely, to succor opportunely those who require it, and never

+to bring your reserves into action except in the last extremity; and

+even then to preserve some support, behind which the broken corps may

+rally.

+

+When it is necessary to attack with your whole force, the battle

+should commence toward evening; because then, whatever be the issue,

+night will arrive to separate the combatants before your troops are

+exhausted. By this means, an opportunity is afforded of affecting an

+orderly retreat if the result of the battle requires it.

+

+During an action, the general-in-chief should occupy some spot whence

+he can, as far as possible, overlook his whole army. He should be

+informed, immediately, of everything that passes in the different

+divisions. He should be ready, in order to render success more

+complete, to operate with fresh troops upon those points where the

+enemy is giving way, and also to reinforce his own corps wherever they

+are inclined to yield. When the enemy is beaten, he must pursue him

+instantly, without giving him a moment to rally; on the other hand, if

+he is himself defeated, or despairs of victory, he must retreat in the

+best possible order.

+

+7. It shows great talent in a general to bring troops, who are prepared

+for action, into collision with those who are not: for example, fresh

+troops against those which are exhausted--brave and disciplined men

+against recruits. He must likewise be ready always to fall with his

+army upon a weak or detached corps, to follow the track of the enemy,

+and charge him among defiles before he can face about and get into

+position.

+

+8. A position is good when the different corps are so placed as to be

+engaged with advantage, and without any remaining unemployed. If you

+are superior in cavalry, positions are to be taken in plains and open

+ground; if in infantry, in an enclosed and covered country. If inferior

+in numbers, in confined and narrow places; if superior, in a spacious

+and extensive field. With a very inferior army, a difficult pass must

+be selected to occupy and fortify.

+

+9. In order to obtain every possible advantage from a diversion, we

+should ascertain first, that the country in which it is to be created

+is easily penetrated. A diversion should be made vigorously, and on

+those points where it is calculated to do the greatest mischief to the

+enemy.

+

+10. To make war with success, the following principles should never be

+departed from:

+

+To be superior to your enemy in numbers, as well as in _morale_; to

+fight battles in order to spread terror in the country; to divide your

+army into as many corps as may be effected without risk, in order to

+undertake several objects at the same time; to treat WELL those who

+yield, to ILL treat those who resist; to secure your rear, and occupy

+and strengthen yourself at the outset in some post which shall serve

+as a central point for the support of your future movements; to

+guard against desertion; to make yourself master of the great rivers

+and principal passes, and to establish your line of communication by

+getting possession of the fortresses, by laying siege to them, and

+of the open country, by giving battle; for it is vain to expect that

+conquests are to be achieved without combats; although when a victory

+is won, they will be best maintained by uniting mildness with valor.

+

+

+

+

+MAXIM VIII.

+

+

+A general-in-chief should ask himself frequently in the day: “What

+should I do if the enemy’s army appeared now in my front, or on my

+right, or my left?” If he have any difficulty in answering these

+questions, his position is bad, and he should seek to remedy it.

+

+

+NOTE.

+

+In the campaign of 1758, the position of the Prussian army at Hohen

+Kirk, being commanded by the batteries of the enemy, who occupied all

+the heights, was eminently defective; notwithstanding, Frederick,

+who saw his rear menaced by the corps of Laudon, remained six days

+in his camp without seeking to correct his position. It would seem,

+indeed, that he was ignorant of his real danger: for Marshal Daun,

+having manœuvred during the night in order to attack by daybreak,

+surprised the Prussians in their lines before they were able to defend

+themselves, and by this means surrounded them completely.

+

+Frederick succeeded, however, in effecting his retreat with regularity,

+but not without the loss of ten thousand men, many general officers,

+and almost all of his artillery. If Marshal Daun had followed up his

+victory with greater boldness, the king of Prussia would never have

+been able to rally his army. On this occasion, Frederick’s good fortune

+balanced his imprudence.

+

+Marshal Saxe remarks, that there is more talent than is dreamt of in

+bad dispositions, if we possess the art of converting them into good

+ones when the favorable moment arrives. Nothing astonishes the enemy

+so much as this manœuvre; he has counted upon _something_; all his

+arrangements have been founded upon it accordingly--and at the moment

+of attack it escapes him! “I must repeat,” says the marshal, “there

+is nothing that so completely disconcerts an enemy as this, or leads

+him to commit so many errors; for it follows, that if he does _not_

+change his arrangements, he is beaten; and if he _does_ change them, in

+presence of his adversary, he is equally undone.”

+

+It seems to me, however, that a general who should rest the success of

+a battle upon such a principle, would be more likely to lose than to

+gain by it; for if he had to deal with a skilful adversary and an alert

+tactician, the latter would find time to take advantage of the previous

+bad arrangements, before he would be able to remedy them.

+

+

+

+

+MAXIM IX.

+

+

+The strength of an army, like the power in mechanics, is estimated

+by multiplying the mass by the rapidity; a rapid march augments the

+_morale_ of an army, and increases its means of victory. Press on!

+

+

+NOTE.

+

+“Rapidity,” says Montécuculli, “is of importance in concealing the

+movements of an army, because it leaves no time to divulge the

+intention of its chief. It is, therefore, an advantage to attack the

+enemy unexpectedly, to take him off his guard, to surprise him, and

+let him feel the thunder before he sees the flash; but if too great

+celerity exhausts your troops, while, on the other hand, delay deprives

+you of the favorable moment, you must weigh the advantage against the

+disadvantage, and choose between.”

+

+Marshal Villars observes, that “in war everything depends upon being

+able to deceive the enemy; and having once gained this point, in never

+allowing him time to recover himself.” Villars has united practice to

+precept. His bold and rapid marches were almost always crowned with

+success.

+

+It was the opinion of Frederick that all wars should be short and

+rapid; because a long war insensibly relaxes discipline, depopulates

+the state, and exhausts its resources.

+

+

+

+

+MAXIM X.

+

+

+When an army is inferior in number, inferior in cavalry, and in

+artillery, it is essential to avoid a general action. The first

+deficiency should be supplied by rapidity of movement; the want of

+artillery, by the nature of the manœuvres; and the inferiority in

+cavalry, by the choice of positions. In such circumstances, the

+_morale_ of the soldier does much.

+

+

+NOTE.

+

+The campaign of 1814 in France was skilfully executed upon these

+principles. Napoleon, with an army inferior in number, an army

+discouraged by the disastrous retreats of Moscow and of Leipzig, and

+still more by the presence of the enemy in the French territory,

+contrived, notwithstanding, to supply his vast inequality of force by

+the rapidity and combination of his movements. By the success obtained

+at Champ-Aubert, Montmirail, Montereau, and Rheims, he began to restore

+the _morale_ of the French army. The numerous recruits of which it

+was composed, had already acquired that steadiness of which the old

+regiments afforded them an example, when the capture of Paris, and the

+astonishing revolution it produced, compelled Napoleon to lay down his

+arms.

+

+But this consequence resulted rather from the force of circumstances

+than from any absolute necessity; for Napoleon, by carrying his army to

+the other side of the Loire, might easily have formed a junction with

+the armies of the Alps and Pyrenees, and have reappeared on the field

+of battle at the head of a hundred thousand men. Such a force would

+have amply sufficed to re-establish the chances of war in his favor;

+more especially as the armies of the allied sovereigns were obliged to

+manœuvre upon the French territory with all the strong places of Italy

+and France in their rear.

+

+

+

+

+MAXIM XI.

+

+

+To direct operations with lines far removed from each other, and

+without communications, is to commit a fault which always gives birth

+to a second. The detached column has only its orders for the first

+day. Its operations on the following day depend upon what may have

+happened to the main body. Thus, this column either loses time upon

+emergency, in waiting for orders, or it will act without them, and at

+hazard. Let it therefore be held as a principle, that an army should

+always keep its columns so united as to prevent the enemy from passing

+between them with impunity. Whenever, for particular reasons, this

+principle is departed from, the detached corps should be independent in

+their operations. They should move toward a point fixed upon for their

+future junction. They should advance without hesitating, and without

+waiting for fresh orders; and every precaution should be taken to

+prevent an attack upon them in detail.

+

+

+NOTE.

+

+The Austrian army, commanded by Field-marshal Alvinzi, was divided into

+two corps, destined to act independently, until they should accomplish

+their junction before Mantua. The first of these corps, consisting

+of forty-five thousand men, was under the orders of Alvinzi. It was

+to debouch by Monte Baldo, upon the positions occupied by the French

+army on the Adige. The second corps, commanded by General Provéra,

+was destined to act upon the lower Adige, and to raise the blockade

+of Mantua. Napoleon, informed of the enemy’s movements, but not

+entirely comprehending his projects, confined himself to concentrating

+his masses, and giving orders to the troops to hold themselves in

+readiness to manœuvre. In the meantime, fresh information satisfied the

+general-in-chief of the French army that the corps which had debouched

+by La Coronna, over Monte Baldo, was endeavoring to form a junction

+with its cavalry and artillery--both which, having crossed the Adige at

+Dolce, were directing their march upon the plateau of Rivoli, by the

+great road leading by Incanole.

+

+Napoleon immediately foresaw that, by having possession of the plateau,

+he should be able to prevent this junction, and obtain all the

+advantages of the initiative. He accordingly put his troops in motion,

+and at two o’clock in the morning occupied that important position.

+Once master of the point fixed upon for the junction of the Austrian

+columns, success followed all his dispositions. He repulsed every

+attack, made seven thousand prisoners, and took several standards and

+twelve pieces of cannon. At two o’clock in the afternoon, the battle of

+Rivoli was already gained, when Napoleon, learning that General Provéra

+had passed the Adige at Anghiari, and was directing his march upon

+Mantua, left to his generals the charge of following up the retreat of

+Alvinzi, and placed himself at the head of a division for the purpose

+of defeating the designs of Provéra.

+

+By a rapid march, he again succeeded in the initiatory movement, and

+in preventing the garrison of Mantua from uniting its force with

+the relieving army. The corps intrusted with the blockade, eager to

+distinguish itself under the eyes of the conqueror of Rivoli, compelled

+the garrison to retire into the place, while the division of Victor,

+forgetting the fatigues of a forced march, rushed with impetuosity on

+the relieving army in front. At this moment a sortie from the lines

+of St. George took him in flank, while the corps of Augereau, which

+had followed the march of the Austrian general, attacked him in rear.

+Provéra, surrounded on all sides, capitulated. The result of these two

+battles cost the Austrians three thousand men in killed and wounded,

+twenty-two thousand prisoners, twenty-four standards, and forty-six

+pieces of cannon.

+

+

+

+

+MAXIM XII.

+

+

+An army ought to have only one line of operation. This should be

+preserved with care, and never abandoned but in the last extremity.

+

+

+NOTE.

+

+“The line of communication of an army,” says Montécuculli, “must be

+certain and well established, for every army that acts from a distant

+base, and is not careful to keep this line perfectly open, marches upon

+a precipice. It moves to certain ruin, as may be seen by an infinity

+of examples. In fact, if the road by which provisions, ammunition and

+reinforcements are to be brought up, is not entirely secured--if the

+magazines, the hospitals, the depôts of arms, and the places of supply

+are not fixed and commodiously situated--not only the army cannot keep

+the field, but it will be exposed to the greatest dangers.”

+

+

+

+

+MAXIM XIII.

+

+

+The distances permitted between corps of an army upon the march must be

+governed by the localities, by circumstances, and by the object in view.

+

+

+NOTE.

+

+When an army moves at a distance from the enemy, the columns may be

+disposed along the road so as to favor the artillery and baggage. But

+when it is marching into action, the different corps must be formed in

+close columns in order of battle. The generals must take care that the

+heads of the columns, which are to attack together, do not outstep each

+other, and that in approaching the field of action they preserve the

+relative intervals required for deployment.

+

+“The marches that are made preparatory to a battle require,” says

+Frederick, “the greatest precaution.” With this view, he recommends

+his generals to be particularly on their guard, and to reconnoitre

+the ground at successive distances, in order to secure the initiative

+by occupying those positions most calculated to favor an attack. On

+a retreat, it is the opinion of many generals that an army should

+concentrate its forces, and march in close columns if it is still

+strong enough to resume the offensive; for by this means it is easy

+to form the line when a favorable opportunity presents itself, either

+for holding the enemy in check or for attacking him if he is not in a

+situation to accept battle.

+

+Such was Moreau’s retreat after the passage of the Adda by the

+Austro-Russian army. The French general, after having covered the

+evacuation of Milan, took up a position between the Po and the Tanaro.

+

+His camp rested upon Alexandria and Valentia, two capital fortresses,

+and had the advantage of covering the roads to Turin and Savona, by

+which he could effect his retreat in case he was unable to accomplish a

+junction with the _corps d’armee_ of Macdonald, who had been ordered to

+quit the kingdom of Naples, and hasten his march into Tuscany.

+

+Forced to abandon his position in consequence of the insurrection in

+Piedmont and Tuscany, Moreau retired upon Asti, where he learned that

+his communication with the river of Genoa had just been cut off by the

+capture of Ceva. After several ineffectual attempts to retake this

+place, he saw that his only safety depended upon throwing himself into

+the mountains.

+

+To effect this object, he directed the whole of his battering train

+and heavy baggage by the Col de Fenestrelle upon France; then opening

+himself a way over the St. Bernard, he gained Loano with his light

+artillery and the small proportion of field equipment he had been able

+to preserve.

+

+By this skilful movement, he not only retained his communications with

+France, but was enabled to observe the motions of the army from Naples,

+and to facilitate his junction with it by directing the whole of his

+force upon the points necessary for that purpose.

+

+Macdonald, in the meantime, whose only chance of success depended on

+concentrating his little army, neglected this precaution, and was

+beaten in three successive actions at the Trebia.

+

+By this retardment of his march, he rendered all Moreau’s measures to

+unite the two armies in the plains of the Po useless, and his retreat,

+after his brilliant but fruitless efforts at the Trebia, defeated the

+other arrangements, also, which the former had made to come to his

+support. The inactivity of Marshal Suwarrow, however, finally enabled

+the French general to accomplish his junction with the remains of the

+army from Naples. Moreau then concentrated his whole force upon the

+Appenines, and placed himself in a situation to defend the important

+positions of Liguria, until the chances of war should afford him an

+opportunity of resuming the offensive.

+

+When, after a decisive battle, an army has lost its artillery and

+equipments, and is consequently no longer in a state to assume the

+offensive, or even to arrest the pursuit of the enemy, it would

+seem most desirable to divide what remains into several corps, and

+order them to march by separate and distant routes upon the base of

+operation, and throw themselves into the fortresses. This is the only

+means of safety: for the enemy, uncertain as to the precise direction

+taken by the vanquished army, is ignorant in the first instance which

+corps to pursue, and it is in this moment of indecision that a march is

+gained upon him. Besides, the movements of a small body being so much

+easier than those of a larger one, these separate lines of march are

+all in favor of a retreating army.

+

+

+

+

+MAXIM XIV.

+

+

+Among mountains, a great number of positions are always to be found

+very strong in themselves, and which it is dangerous to attack. The

+character of this mode of warfare consists in occupying camps on the

+flanks or in the rear of the enemy, leaving him only the alternative

+of abandoning his position without fighting, to take up another in

+the rear, or to descend from it in order to attack you. In mountain

+warfare, the assailant has always the disadvantage; even in offensive

+warfare in the open field, the great secret consists in defensive

+combats, and in obliging the enemy to attack.

+

+

+NOTE.

+

+During the campaign of 1793, in the Maritime Alps, the French army,

+under the orders of General Brunet, did all in its power to get

+possession of the camps at Raus and at Fourches, by an attack in front.

+But these useless efforts served only to increase the courage of the

+Piedmontese, and to destroy the _élite_ of the grenadiers of the

+republican army. The manœuvres by which Napoleon, without fighting,

+compelled the enemy to evacuate these positions in 1796, suffice to

+establish the truth of these principles, and to prove how much success

+in war depends upon the genius of the general as well as on the courage

+of the soldier.

+

+

+

+

+MAXIM XV.

+

+

+The first consideration with a general who offers battle, should be the

+glory and honor of his arms; the safety and preservation of his men is

+only the second; but it is in the enterprise and courage resulting

+from the former, that the latter will most assuredly be found. In a

+retreat, besides the honor of the army, the loss of life is often

+greater than in two battles. For this reason, we should never despair

+while brave men are to be found with their colors. It is by this means

+that we obtain victory, and deserve to obtain it.

+

+

+NOTE.

+

+In 1645, the French army, under the orders of the Prince of Condé, was

+on the march to lay siege to Nordlingen, when it was discovered that

+Count Merci, who commanded the Bavarians, had foreseen this intention,

+and had entrenched himself in a strong position which defended

+Nordlingen at the same time that it covered Donawerth.

+

+Notwithstanding the favorable position of the enemy, Condé ordered the

+attack. The combat was terrible. All the infantry in the centre and on

+the right, after being successively engaged, was routed and dispersed,

+in spite of the efforts of the cavalry and the reserve, which were

+likewise carried away with the fugitives. The battle was lost. Condé,

+in despair, having no longer either centre or right to depend upon,

+collected the remnants of his battalions, and directed his march to the

+left, where Turenne was still engaged. This perseverance reanimated

+the ardor of the troops. They broke the right wing of the enemy,

+and Turenne, by a change of front, returned to the attack upon his

+centre. Night, too, favored the boldness of Condé. An entire corps of

+Bavarians, fancying themselves cut off, laid down their arms; and the

+obstinacy of the French general in this struggle for victory was repaid

+by possession of the field of battle, together with a great number of

+prisoners, and almost all the enemy’s artillery. The Bavarian army beat

+a retreat, and the next day Nordlingen capitulated.

+

+

+

+

+MAXIM XVI.

+

+

+It is an approved maxim in war, never to do what the enemy wishes you

+to do, for this reason alone, that he desires it. A field of battle,

+therefore, which he has previously studied and reconnoitred, should

+be avoided, and double care should be taken where he has had time to

+fortify and entrench. One consequence deducible from this principle is,

+never to attack a position in front which you can gain by turning.

+

+

+NOTE.

+

+It was without due regard to this principle, that Marshal Villeroi, on

+assuming the command of the army of Italy, during the campaign of 1701,

+attacked, with unwarrantable presumption, Prince Eugene, of Savoy, in

+his entrenched position of Chiavi, on the Oglio. The French generals,

+Catinat among the rest, considered the post unassailable, but Villeroi

+insisted, and the result of this otherwise unimportant battle was the

+loss of the _élite_ of the French army. It would have been greater

+still, but for Catinat’s exertions.

+

+It was by neglecting the same principle, that the Prince of Condé, in

+the campaign of 1644, failed in all his attacks upon the entrenched

+position of the Bavarian army. The Count Merci, who commanded the

+latter, had drawn up his cavalry skilfully upon the plain, resting

+upon Freyberg, while his infantry occupied the mountain. After many

+fruitless attempts, the Prince of Condé, seeing the impossibility of

+dislodging the enemy, began to menace his communications--but the

+moment Merci perceived this, he broke up his camp and retired beyond

+the Black mountains.

+

+

+

+

+MAXIM XVII.

+

+

+In a war of march and manœuvre, if you would avoid a battle with a

+superior army, it is necessary to entrench every night, and occupy a

+good defensive position. Those natural positions which are ordinarily

+met with, are not sufficient to protect an army against superior

+numbers without recourse to art.

+

+

+NOTE.

+

+The campaign of the French and Spanish army, commanded by the Duke

+of Berwick, against the Portuguese, in the year 1706, affords a good

+lesson on this subject. The two armies made almost the tour of Spain.

+They began the campaign near Badajoz, and after manœuvring across both

+Castiles, finished it in the kingdoms of Valencia and Murcia. The

+Duke of Berwick encamped his army eighty-five times, and although the

+campaign passed without a general action, he took about ten thousand

+prisoners from the enemy. Marshal Turenne also made a fine campaign of

+manœuvre against the Count Montécuculli, in 1675.

+

+The imperial army having made its arrangements to pass the Rhine at

+Strasburg, Turenne used all diligence, and, throwing a bridge over the

+river near the village of Ottenheim, three leagues below Strasburg, he

+crossed with the French army, and encamped close to the little town

+of Vilstet, which he occupied. This position covered the bridge of

+Strasburg, so that, by this manœuvre, Turenne deprived the enemy of all

+approach to that city.

+

+Upon this, Montécuculli made a movement with his whole army,

+threatening the bridge at Ottenheim, by which the French received their

+provisions from upper Alsace.

+

+As soon as Turenne discovered the design of the enemy, he left a

+detachment at Vilstet, and made a rapid march with his whole force

+upon the village of Altenheim. This intermediate position between

+the two bridges, which he wished to preserve, gave him the advantage

+of being able to succor either of these posts before the enemy had

+time to carry them. Montécuculli seeing that any successful attack

+upon the bridges was not to be expected, resolved to pass the Rhine

+below Strasburg, and with this view returned to his first position

+at Offenburg. Marshal Turenne, who followed all the movements of the

+Austrian army, brought back his army also to Vilstet.

+

+In the meantime, this attempt of the enemy having convinced the French

+general of the danger to which his bridge had exposed him, removed it

+nearer to that of Strasburg, in order to diminish the extent of ground

+he had to defend.

+

+Montécuculli, having commanded the magistrates of Strasburg to collect

+materials for a bridge, moved to Scherzheim to receive them; but

+Turenne again defeated his projects by taking a position at Freistett,

+where he occupied the islands of the Rhine, and immediately constructed

+a stockade.

+

+Thus it was that, during the whole of this campaign, Turenne succeeded

+in gaining the initiative of the enemy, and obliging him to follow

+his movements. He succeeded, also, by a rapid march, in cutting off

+Montécuculli from the Town of Offenburg, whence he drew his supplies,

+and would no doubt have prevented the Austrian general from effecting

+his junction with the corps of Caprara, had not a cannon-shot

+terminated this great man’s life.

+

+

+

+

+MAXIM XVIII.

+

+

+A general of ordinary talent occupying a bad position, and surprised

+by a superior force, seeks his safety in retreat; but a great captain

+supplies all deficiencies by his courage, and marches boldly to meet

+the attack. By this means he disconcerts his adversary; and if the

+latter shows any irresolution in his movements, a skilful leader,

+profiting by his indecision, may even hope for victory, or at least

+employ the day in manœuvring--at night he entrenches himself, or falls

+back to a better position. By this determined conduct he maintains the

+honor of his arms, the first essential to all military superiority.

+

+

+NOTE.

+

+In 1653, Marshal Turenne was surprised by the Prince of Condé, in a

+position where his army was completely compromised. He had the power,

+indeed, by an immediate retreat, of covering himself by the Somme,

+which he possessed the means of crossing at Peronne, and whence he

+was distant only half a league; but, fearing the influence of this

+retrograde movement on the _morale_ of his army, Turenne balanced all

+disadvantages by his courage, and marched boldly to meet the enemy with

+very inferior forces. After marching a league, he found an advantageous

+position, where he made every disposition for a battle. It was three

+o’clock in the afternoon; but the Spaniards, exhausted with fatigue,

+hesitated to attack him, and Turenne having covered himself with

+entrenchments during the night, the enemy no longer dared to risk a

+general action, and broke up his camp.

+

+

+

+

+MAXIM XIX.

+

+

+The transition from the defensive to the offensive is one of the most

+delicate operations.

+

+

+NOTE.

+

+By studying the first campaign of Napoleon in Italy, we can learn

+what genius and boldness may effect in passing with an army from the

+_defensive_ to the _offensive_. The army of the allies, commanded by

+General Beaulieu, was provided with every means that could render it

+formidable. Its force amounted to eighty thousand men, and two hundred

+pieces of cannon. The French army, on the contrary, could number

+scarcely thirty thousand men under arms, and thirty pieces of cannon.

+For some time there had been no issue of meat, and even the bread

+was irregularly supplied. The infantry was ill clothed, the cavalry

+wretchedly mounted. All the draught-horses had perished from want, so

+that the service of the artillery was performed by mules. To remedy

+these evils, large disbursements were necessary; and such was the state

+of the finances, that the government had only been able to furnish two

+thousand louis in specie for the opening of the campaign. The French

+army could not possibly exist in this state. To advance or retreat was

+absolutely necessary. Aware of the advantage of surprising the enemy

+at the very outset of the campaign by some decisive blow, Napoleon

+prepared for it by recasting the _morale_ of his army.

+

+In a proclamation full of energy, he reminded them that an ignoble

+death alone remained for them, if they continued on the defensive;

+that they had nothing to expect from France, but everything to hope

+from victory. “Abundance courts you in the fertile plains of Italy,”

+said he; “are you deficient, soldiers, in constancy or in courage?”

+Profiting by the moment of enthusiasm which he had inspired, Napoleon

+concentrated his forces in order to fall with his whole weight on the

+different corps of the enemy. Immediately afterward, the battles of

+Montenotte, Milesimo, and Mondovi, added fresh confidence to the high

+opinion already entertained by the soldier for his chief; and that army

+which only a few days ago was encamped amid barren rocks, and consumed

+by famine, already aspired to the conquest of Italy. In one month

+after the opening of the campaign, Napoleon had terminated the war with

+the King of Sardinia, and conquered the Milanese. Rich cantonments soon

+dispelled from the recollection of the French soldier the misery and

+fatigue attendant on this rapid march, while a vigilant administration

+of the resources of the country reorganized the _materiel_ of the

+French army, and created the means necessary for the attainment of

+future success.

+

+

+

+

+MAXIM XX.

+

+

+It may be laid down as a principle, that the line of operation should

+not be abandoned; but it is one of the most skilful manœuvres in war,

+to know how to change it, when circumstances authorize or render this

+necessary. An army which changes skilfully its line of operation

+deceives the enemy, who becomes ignorant where to look for its rear, or

+upon what weak points it is assailable.

+

+

+NOTE.

+

+Frederick sometimes changed his line of operation in the middle of a

+campaign; but he was enabled to do this, because he was manœuvring at

+that time in the centre of Germany--an abundant country, capable of

+supplying all the wants of his army in case his communications with

+Prussia were intercepted.

+

+Marshal Turenne, in the campaign of 1746, gave up his line of

+communication to the allies in the same manner; but, like Frederick,

+he was carrying on the war at this time in the centre of Germany, and

+having fallen with his whole forces upon Rain, he took the precaution

+of securing to himself a depôt upon which to establish his base of

+operation.

+

+By a series of manœuvres, marked alike by audacity and genius, he

+subsequently compelled the imperial army to abandon its magazines, and

+retire into Austria for winter quarters.

+

+But these are examples which it appears to me should only be imitated

+when we have taken full measure of the capacity of our adversary, and

+above all, when we see no reason to apprehend an insurrection in the

+country to which we transfer the theatre of war.

+

+

+

+

+MAXIM XXI.

+

+

+When an army carries with it a battering train, or large convoys of

+sick and wounded, it cannot march by too short a line upon its depôts.

+

+

+NOTE.

+

+It is above all in mountainous countries, and in those interspersed

+with woods and marshes, that it is of importance to observe this maxim;

+for, the convoys and means of transport being frequently embarrassed

+in defiles, an enemy by manœuvring may easily disperse the escorts, or

+make even a successful attack upon the whole army, when it is obliged,

+from the nature of the country, to march in an extended column.

+

+

+

+

+MAXIM XXII.

+

+

+The art of encamping in position is the same as taking up the line in

+order of battle in this position. To this end, the artillery should be

+advantageously placed, ground should be selected which is not commanded

+or liable to be turned, and, as far as possible, the guns should cover

+and command the surrounding country.

+

+

+NOTE.

+

+Frederick has remarked that, in order to be assured that your camp is

+well placed, you should see if, by making a small movement, you can

+oblige the enemy to make a greater; or, if after having forced him to

+retrograde one march you can compel him to fall back another.

+

+In defensive war, all camps should be entrenched in the front and

+wings of the position they occupy, and care should be taken that the

+rear is left perfectly open. If you are threatened with being turned,

+arrangements should be made beforehand for taking up a more distant

+position; and you should profit by any disorder in the enemy’s line of

+march, to make an attempt upon his artillery or baggage.

+

+

+

+

+MAXIM XXIII.

+

+

+When you are occupying a position which the enemy threatens to

+surround, collect all your force immediately, and menace _him_ with

+an offensive movement. By this manœuvre, you will prevent him from

+detaching and annoying your flanks in case you should judge it

+necessary to retire.

+

+

+NOTE.

+

+This was the manœuvre practised by General Desaix, in 1798, near

+Radstadt. He made up for inferiority in numbers by audacity, and

+maintained himself the whole day in position in spite of the vigorous

+attacks of the Archduke Charles. At night he effected his retreat in

+good order, and took up a position in the rear.

+

+It was in accordance, also, with this principle, in the same campaign,

+that General Moreau gave battle at Biberach, to secure his retreat

+by the passes of the Black mountains. A few days after, he fought at

+Schliengen with the same object. Placed in a good defensive position,

+he menaced the Archduke Charles by a sudden return to the offensive,

+while his artillery and baggage were passing the Rhine by the bridge of

+Huningen, and he was making all the necessary arrangements for retiring

+behind that river himself.

+

+Here, however, I would observe, that the execution of such offensive

+demonstrations should be deferred always till toward the evening, in

+order that you may not be compromised by engaging too early in a combat

+which you cannot long maintain with success.

+

+Night, and the uncertainty of the enemy after an affair of this kind,

+will always favor your retreat, if it is judged necessary; but,

+with a view to mask the operation more effectually, fires should be

+lighted all along the lines, to deceive the enemy and prevent him from

+discovering this retrograde movement, for in a retreat it is a great

+advantage to gain a march upon your adversary.

+

+

+

+

+MAXIM XXIV.

+

+

+Never lose sight of this maxim: that you should establish your

+cantonments at the most distant and best-protected point from the

+enemy, especially where a surprise is possible. By this means you will

+have time to unite all your forces before he can attack you.

+

+

+NOTE.

+

+In the campaign of 1745, Marshal Turenne lost the battle of Marienthal,

+by neglecting this principle; for if, instead of reassembling his

+divisions at Erbsthausen, he had rallied his troops at Mergentheim,

+behind the Tauber, his army would have been much sooner reunited; and

+Count Merci, in place of finding only three thousand men to fight at

+Erbsthausen (of which he was well informed), would have had the whole

+French army to attack in a position covered by a river.

+

+Some one having indiscreetly asked Viscount Turenne how he had lost the

+battle of Marienthal: “By my own fault,” replied the marshal; “but,”

+added he, “when a man has committed no faults in war, he can only have

+been engaged in it but a short time.”

+

+

+

+

+MAXIM XXV.

+

+

+When two armies are in order of battle, and one has to retire over a

+bridge, while the other has the circumference of the circle open, all

+the advantages are in favor of the latter. It is then a general should

+show boldness, strike a decided blow, and manœuvre upon the flank of

+his enemy. The victory is in his hands.

+

+

+NOTE.

+

+This was the position of the French army at the famous battle of

+Leipzig, which terminated the campaign of 1813 so fatally for Napoleon;

+for the battle of Hanau was of no consequence, comparatively, in the

+desperate situation of that army.

+

+It strikes me that, in a situation like that of the French army

+previous to the battle of Leipzig, a general should never calculate

+upon any of those lucky chances which may arise out of a return to the

+offensive, but that he should rather adopt every possible means to

+secure his retreat. With this view, he should immediately cover himself

+with good entrenchments, to enable him to repel with inferior numbers

+the attack of the enemy, while his own equipments are crossing the

+river. As fast as the troops reach the other side, they should occupy

+positions to protect the passage of the rear guard, and this last

+should be covered by a _tête de pont_ as soon as the army breaks up its

+camp. During the wars of the Revolution, too little regard was paid

+to entrenchments; and it is for this reason we have seen large armies

+dispersed after a single reverse, and the fate of nations compromised

+by the issue of one battle.

+

+

+

+

+MAXIM XXVI.

+

+

+It is contrary to all true principle, to make corps, which have no

+communication with each other, act separately against a central force

+whose communications are cut off.

+

+

+NOTE.

+

+The Austrians lost the battle of Hohenlinden by neglecting this

+principle. The imperial army, under the orders of the archduke John,

+was divided into four columns, which had to march through an immense

+forest, previous to their junction in the plain of Anzing, where they

+intended to surprise the French. But these different corps, having no

+direct communication, found themselves compelled to engage separately

+with an enemy who had taken the precaution of concentrating his masses,

+and who could move them with facility in a country with which he had

+been long previously acquainted.

+

+Thus the Austrian army, enclosed in the defiles of the forest with its

+whole train of artillery and baggage, was attacked in its flanks and

+rear, and the archduke John was only enabled to rally his dispersed and

+shattered divisions under cover of the night.

+

+The trophies obtained by the French army on this day were immense. They

+consisted of eleven thousand prisoners, one hundred pieces of cannon,

+several stand of colors, and all the baggage of the enemy.

+

+The battle of Hohenlinden decided the fate of the campaign of 1800, and

+Moreau’s brilliant and well-merited success placed him in the rank of

+the first general of the age.

+

+

+

+

+MAXIM XXVII.

+

+

+When an army is driven from a first position, the retreating columns

+should rally always sufficiently in the rear, to prevent any

+interruption from the enemy. The greatest disaster that can happen, is

+when the columns are attacked in detail, and before their junction.

+

+

+NOTE.

+

+One great advantage which results from rallying your columns on a point

+far removed from the field of battle, or from the position previously

+occupied, is, that the enemy is uncertain as to the direction you mean

+to take.

+

+If he divides his force to pursue you, he exposes himself to see his

+detachments beaten in detail, especially if you have exerted all due

+diligence, and have effected the junction of your troops in sufficient

+time to get between his columns and disperse them one after the other.

+

+It was by a manœuvre of this kind in the campaign of Italy, in 1799,

+that General Melas gained the battle of Genola.

+

+General Championet commanded the French army, and endeavored to cut off

+the communication of the Austrians with Turin, by employing corps which

+manœuvred separately to get into their rear. Melas, who divined his

+project, made a retrograde march, by which he persuaded his adversary

+he was in full retreat, although the real object of his movement was

+to concentrate his forces at the point fixed for the junction of

+the different detachments of the French army, and which he beat and

+dispersed, one after another, by his great superiority in numbers. The

+result of this manœuvre, in which the Austrian general displayed vigor,

+decision, and foresight, secured to him the peaceable possession of

+Piedmont.

+

+It was also by the neglect of this principle that General Beaulieu, who

+commanded the Austro-Sardinian army in the campaign of 1796, lost the

+battle of Milesimo after that of Montenotte.

+

+His object, in endeavoring to rally his different corps upon Milesimo,

+was, to cover the high roads of Turin and Milan; but Napoleon, aware of

+the advantages arising from the ardor of troops emboldened by recent

+success, attacked him before he could assemble his divisions, and, by

+a series of skilful manœuvres, succeeded in separating the combined

+armies. They retired in the greatest disorder--the one by the road of

+Milan, the other by that of Turin.

+

+

+

+

+MAXIM XXVIII.

+

+

+No force should be detached on the eve of a battle, because affairs may

+change during the night, either by the retreat of the enemy, or by the

+arrival of large reinforcements to enable him to resume the offensive,

+and counteract your previous arrangements.

+

+

+NOTE.

+

+In 1796, the army of the Sambre and Meuse, commanded by General

+Jourdan, effected a retreat, which was rendered still more difficult

+by the loss of his line of communication. Seeing, however, that the

+forces of the archduke Charles were scattered, Jourdan, in order to

+accomplish his retreat upon Frankfort, resolved to open himself a way

+by Wurtzburg, where there were at that moment only two divisions of

+the Austrian army. This movement would have been attended with success,

+if the French general, believing he had simply these two divisions to

+contend with, had not committed the error of separating himself from

+the corps of Lefevre--which he left at Schweinfurt to cover the only

+direct communication of the army with its base of operation.

+

+The commission of this fault at the outset, added to some slowness in

+the march of the French general, secured the victory to the archduke,

+who hastened to concentrate his forces.

+

+The arrival of the two divisions, also, of Kray and Wartesleben, during

+the battle, enabled him to oppose fifty thousand men to the French

+army, which scarcely numbered thirty thousand combatants. This last

+was consequently beaten, and obliged to continue its retreat by the

+mountains of Fuldes, where the badness of the roads could be equalled

+only by the difficulty of the country.

+

+The division of Lefevre, amounting to fourteen thousand men, would,

+in all probability, have turned the scale in favor of Jourdan, had

+the latter not unfortunately conceived that two divisions only were

+opposing his passage to Wurtzburg.

+

+

+

+

+MAXIM XXIX.

+

+

+When you have resolved to fight a battle, collect your whole force.

+Dispense with nothing. A single battalion sometimes decides the day.

+

+

+NOTE.

+

+I think it here desirable to observe, that it is prudent before a

+battle to fix upon some point in rear of the reserve for the junction

+of the different detachments; for if, from unforeseen circumstances,

+these detachments should be prevented from joining before the action

+has commenced, they might be exposed, in case a retrograde movement

+should be found necessary, to the masses of the enemy. It is desirable

+also to keep the enemy in ignorance of these reinforcements, in order

+to employ them with greater effect. “A seasonable reinforcement,” says

+Frederick, “renders the success of a battle certain, because the enemy

+will always imagine it stronger than it really is, and lose courage

+accordingly.”

+

+

+

+

+MAXIM XXX.

+

+

+Nothing is so rash or so contrary to principle, as to make a flank

+march before an army in position, especially when this army occupies

+heights at the foot of which you are forced to defile.

+

+

+NOTE.

+

+It was by a neglect of this principle that Frederick was beaten at

+Kollin in the first campaign of 1757. Notwithstanding prodigies of

+valor, the Prussians lost fifteen thousand men and a great portion of

+their artillery, while the loss of the Austrians did not exceed five

+thousand men. The consequence of this battle was more unfortunate

+still, since it obliged the King of Prussia to raise the siege of

+Prague, and to evacuate Bohemia.

+

+It was also by making a flank march before the Prussian army, that the

+French lost the disgraceful battle of Rosbach.

+

+This imprudent movement was still more to be reprehended, because the

+Prince de Soubise, who commanded the French army, was so negligent as

+to manœuvre, without either advanced guards or flanking corps, in

+presence of the enemy. The result was, that his army, consisting of

+fifty thousand men, was beaten by six battalions and thirty squadrons.

+The French lost seven thousand men, twenty-seven standards, and a great

+number of cannon. The Prussians had only three hundred men disabled.

+

+Thus, by having forgotten this principle, _that a flank march is never

+to be made before an enemy in line of battle_, Frederick lost his army

+at Kollin; and Soubise, at Rosbach, lost both his army and his honor.

+

+

+

+

+MAXIM XXXI.

+

+

+When you determine to risk a battle, reserve to yourself every possible

+chance of success, more particularly if you have to deal with an

+adversary of superior talent; for if you are beaten, even in the midst

+of your magazines and your communications, wo to the vanquished!

+

+

+NOTE.

+

+“We should make war,” says Marshal Saxe, “without leaving anything

+to hazard, and in this especially consists the talent of a general.

+But when we have incurred the risk of a battle, we should know how to

+profit by the victory, and not merely content ourselves, according to

+custom, with possession of the field.”

+

+It was by neglecting to follow up the first success, that the Austrian

+army, after gaining the field of Marengo, saw itself compelled on the

+following day to evacuate the whole of Italy.

+

+General Melas, observing the French in retreat, left the direction

+of the movements of his army to the chief of his staff, and retired

+to Alexandria to repose from the fatigues of the day. Colonel Zach,

+equally convinced with his general that the French army was completely

+broken, and consisted only of fugitives, formed the divisions in column

+of route.

+

+By this arrangement, the imperial army prepared to enter upon its

+victorious march in a formation not less than three miles in depth.

+

+It was near four o’clock when General Desaix rejoined the French army

+with his division. His presence restored in some degree an equality

+between the contending forces; and yet Napoleon hesitated for a moment

+whether to resume the offensive, or to make use of this corps to secure

+his retreat. The ardor of the troops to return to the charge, decided

+his irresolution. He rode rapidly along the front of his divisions, and

+addressing the soldiers--“We have retired far enough for to-day,” said

+he; “you know I always sleep upon the field of battle!”

+

+The army, with unanimous shout, proclaimed to him a promise of

+victory. Napoleon resumed the offensive. The Austrian advance guard,

+panic-struck at the sight of a formidable and unbroken body presenting

+itself suddenly at a point where, a few moments before, only fugitives

+were to be seen, went to the right about, and carried disorder into the

+mass of its columns. Attacked immediately afterward, with impetuosity,

+in its front and flanks, the Austrian army was completely routed.

+

+Marshal Daun experienced nearly the same fate as General Melas, at the

+battle of Torgau, in the campaign of 1760.

+

+The position of the Austrian army was excellent. It had its left upon

+Torgau, its right on the plateau of Siptitz, and its front covered by a

+large sheet of water.

+

+Frederick proposed to turn its right in order to make an attack upon

+the rear. For this purpose he divided his army into two corps, the one

+under the orders of Ziethen, with instructions to attack in front,

+following the edge of the water; the other under his own immediate

+command, with which he set out to turn the right of the Austrians.

+But Marshal Daun having had intimation of the movements of the enemy,

+changed his front by countermarching, and was thus enabled to repel

+the attacks of Frederick, whom he obliged to retreat. The two corps

+of the Prussian army had been acting without communication. Ziethen,

+in the meantime, hearing the fire recede, concluded that the king had

+been beaten, and commenced a movement by his left in order to rejoin

+him; but falling in with two battalions of the reserve, the Prussian

+general profited by this reinforcement to resume the offensive.

+Accordingly he renewed the attack with vigor, got possession of the

+plateau of Siptitz, and soon after of the whole field of battle. The

+sun had already set when the King of Prussia received the news of this

+unexpected good fortune. He returned in all haste, took advantage of

+the night to restore order in his disorganized army, and the day after

+the battle occupied Torgau.

+

+Marshal Daun was receiving congratulations upon his victory, when he

+heard that the Prussians had resumed the offensive. He immediately

+commanded a retreat, and at daybreak the Austrians repassed the Elbe

+with the loss of twelve thousand men, eight thousand prisoners, and

+forty-five pieces of cannon.

+

+After the battle of Marengo, General Melas, although in the midst

+of his fortresses and magazines, saw himself compelled to abandon

+everything, in order to save the wreck of his army.

+

+General Mack capitulated after the battle of Ulm, although in the

+centre of his own country.

+

+The Prussians, in spite of their depôts and reserves, were obliged,

+after the battle of Jena, and the French after that of Waterloo, to lay

+down their arms.

+

+Hence, we may conclude that the misfortune that results from the loss

+of a battle, does not consist so much in the destruction of men and of

+_materiel_ as in the discouragement which follows this disaster. The

+courage and confidence of the victors augment in proportion as those

+of the vanquished diminish; and whatever may be the resources of an

+army, it will be found that a retreat will degenerate rapidly into a

+rout unless the general-in-chief shall succeed, by combining boldness

+with skill, and perseverance with firmness, in restoring the _morale_

+of his army.

+

+

+

+

+MAXIM XXXII.

+

+

+The duty of an advanced guard does not consist in advancing or

+retiring, but in manœuvring. An advanced guard should be composed

+of light cavalry, supported by a reserve of heavy cavalry, and by

+battalions of infantry, supported also by artillery. An advanced guard

+should consist of picked troops, and the general officers, officers

+and men, should be selected for their respective capabilities and

+knowledge. A corps deficient in instruction is only an embarrassment to

+an advanced guard.

+

+

+NOTE.

+

+It was the opinion of Frederick that an advanced guard should be

+composed of detachments of troops of all arms. The commander should

+possess skill in the choice of ground, and he should take care to be

+instantly informed, by means of numerous patrols, of everything passing

+in the enemy’s camp.

+

+In war, it is not the business of an advanced guard to fight, but to

+observe the enemy, in order to cover the movements of the army. When in

+pursuit, the advanced guard should charge with vigor, and cut off the

+baggage and insulated corps of the retiring enemy. For this purpose, it

+should be reinforced with all the disposable light cavalry of the army.

+

+

+

+

+MAXIM XXXIII.

+

+

+It is contrary to the usages of war to allow parks or batteries of

+artillery to enter a defile, unless you hold the other extremity. In

+case of retreat, the guns will embarrass your movements and be lost.

+They should be left in position, under a sufficient escort, until you

+are master of the opening.

+

+

+NOTE.

+

+Nothing encumbers the march of an army so much as a quantity of

+baggage. In the campaign of 1796, Napoleon abandoned his battering

+train under the walls of Mantua, after spiking the guns and destroying

+the carriages. By this sacrifice, he acquired a facility of manœuvring

+rapidly his little army, and obtained the initiative as well as a

+general superiority over the numerous but divided forces of Marshal

+Wurmser.

+

+In 1799, during his retreat in Italy, General Moreau being compelled

+to manœuvre among the mountains, preferred separating himself entirely

+from his reserve artillery, which he directed upon France by the Col

+de Fenestrelle, rather than embarrass his march with this part of his

+equipment.

+

+These are the examples we should follow; for if, by a rapidity of

+march, and a facility of concentration upon decisive points, the

+victory is gained, the _materiel_ of an army is soon re-established.

+But if, on the other hand, we are beaten and compelled to retreat, it

+will be difficult to save our equipments, and we may have reason to

+congratulate ourselves that we abandoned them in time to prevent them

+from augmenting the trophies of the enemy.

+

+

+

+

+MAXIM XXXIV.

+

+

+It should be laid down as a principle, never to leave intervals by

+which the enemy can penetrate between corps formed in order of battle,

+unless it be to draw him into a snare.

+

+

+NOTE.

+

+In the campaign of 1757, the Prince of Lorraine, who was covering

+Prague with the Austrian army, perceived the Prussians threatening, by

+a flank movement, to turn his right. He immediately ordered a partial

+change of front by throwing back the infantry of that wing, so as to

+form a right angle with the rest of the line. But this manœuvre being

+executed in presence of the enemy, was not effected without some

+disorder. The heads of the columns having marched too quick, caused

+the rear to lengthen out, and when the line was formed to the right,

+a large interval appeared at the salient angle. Frederick, observing

+this error, hastened to take advantage of it. He directed his centre

+corps, commanded by the Duke of Bevern, to throw itself into this

+opening, and by this manœuvre decided the fate of the battle.

+

+The Prince of Lorraine returned to Prague, beaten and pursued, with the

+loss of sixteen thousand men and two hundred pieces of cannon.

+

+It should be observed at the same time, that this operation of throwing

+a corps into the intervals made by an army in time of battle, should

+never be attempted unless you are at least equal in force, and have

+an opportunity of outflanking the enemy on the one side or the other;

+for it is then only you can hope to divide his army in the centre, and

+insulate the wings entirely. If you are inferior in number, you run the

+risk of being stopped by the reverses, and overpowered by the enemy’s

+wings, which may deploy upon your flanks and surround you.

+

+It was by this manœuvre that the Duke of Berwick gained the battle of

+Almanza, in the year 1707, in Spain.

+

+The Anglo-Portuguese army, under the command of Lord Galloway, came to

+invest Villena. Marshal Berwick, who commanded the French and Spanish

+army, quitted his camp at Montalegre, and moved upon this town to

+raise the siege. At his approach, the English general, eager to fight

+a battle, advanced to meet him in the plains of Almanza. The issue was

+long doubtful. The first line, commanded by the Duke of Popoli, having

+been broken, the Chevalier d’Asfeldt, who had charge of the second,

+drew up his masses with large intervals between them; and when the

+English, who were in pursuit of the first line, reached these reserves,

+he took advantage of their disorder to attack them in flank and

+defeated them entirely.

+

+Marshal Berwick, perceiving the success of this manœuvre, threw open

+his front, and deploying upon the enemy’s flanks, while the reserve

+sustained the attack in front, and the cavalry manœuvred in their rear,

+obtained a complete victory.

+

+Lord Galloway, wounded and pursued, collected with difficulty the

+remains of his army, and took shelter with them in Tortosa.

+

+

+

+

+MAXIM XXXV.

+

+

+Encampments of the same army should always be formed so as to protect

+each other.

+

+

+NOTE.

+

+At the battle of Dresden, in the campaign of 1813, the camp of the

+allies, although advantageously placed upon the heights on the left

+bank of the Elbe, was nevertheless extremely defective, from being

+traversed longitudinally by a deep ravine, which separated the left

+wing completely from the centre and the right. This vicious arrangement

+did not escape the penetrating eye of Napoleon. He instantly directed

+the whole of his cavalry and two corps of infantry against the

+insulated wing, attacked it with superior numbers, overthrew it, and

+took ten thousand prisoners, before it was possible to come to its

+support.

+

+

+

+

+MAXIM XXXVI.

+

+

+When the enemy’s army is covered by a river, upon which he holds

+several _têtes de pont_, do not attack in front. This would divide

+your force and expose you to be turned. Approach the river in echelon

+of columns, in such a manner that the leading column shall be the

+only one the enemy can attack, without offering you his flank. In

+the meantime, let your light troops occupy the bank, and when you

+have decided on the point of passage, rush upon it and fling across

+your bridge. Observe that the point of passage should be always at a

+distance from the leading echelon, in order to deceive the enemy.

+

+

+NOTE.

+

+If you occupy a town or a village on the bank of a river, opposite

+to that held by the enemy, it is an advantage to make this spot the

+crossing point, because it is easier to cover your carriages and

+reserve artillery, as well as to mask the construction of your bridge,

+in a town, than in the open country. It is also a great advantage

+to pass a river opposite a village, when the latter is only weakly

+occupied by the enemy; because as soon as the advanced guard reaches

+the other side, it carries this post, makes a lodgment, and by

+throwing up a few defensive works, converts it easily into a _tête de

+pont_. By this means, the rest of the army is enabled to effect the

+passage with facility.

+

+

+

+

+MAXIM XXXVII.

+

+

+From the moment you are master of a position which commands the

+opposite bank, facilities are acquired for effecting the passage of

+the river; above all, if this position is sufficiently extensive to

+place upon it artillery in force. This advantage is diminished, if

+the river is more than three hundred toises (or six hundred yards)

+in breadth, because the distance being out of the range of grape, it

+is easy for the troops which defend the passage to line the bank and

+get under cover. Hence it follows that if the grenadiers, ordered to

+pass the river for the protection of the bridge, should reach the

+other side, they would be destroyed by the fire of the enemy; because

+his batteries, placed at the distance of two hundred toises from the

+landing, are capable of a most destructive effect, although removed

+above five hundred toises from the batteries of the crossing force.

+Thus the advantage of the artillery would be exclusively his. For

+the same reason, the passage is impracticable, unless you succeed in

+surprising the enemy, and are protected by an intermediate island, or,

+unless you are able to take advantage of an angle in the river, to

+establish a crossfire upon his works. In this case, the island or angle

+forms a natural _tête de pont_, and gives the advantage in artillery to

+the attacking army.

+

+When a river is less than sixty toises (or one hundred and twenty

+yards) in breadth, and you have a post upon the other side, the troops

+which are thrown across derive such advantages from the protection of

+your artillery, that, however small the angle may be, it is impossible

+for the enemy to prevent the establishment of a bridge. In this case,

+the most skilful generals, when they have discovered the project of

+their adversary, and brought their own army to the point of crossing,

+usually content themselves with opposing the passage of the bridge, by

+forming a semicircle round its extremity, as round the opening of a

+defile, and removing to the distance of three or four hundred toises

+from the fire of the opposite side.

+

+

+NOTE.

+

+Frederick observes, that “the passage of great rivers in the presence

+of the enemy is one of the most delicate operations in war.” Success on

+these occasions depends on secrecy, on the rapidity of the manœuvres,

+and the punctual execution of the orders given for the movements of

+each division. To pass such an obstacle in presence of an enemy, and

+without his knowledge, it is necessary not only that the previous

+dispositions should be well conceived, but that they should be executed

+without confusion.

+

+In the campaign of 1705, Prince Eugene, of Savoy, wishing to come to

+the assistance of the Prince of Piedmont, sought for a favorable point

+at which to force the passage of the Adda, defended at that time by

+the French army, under the command of the Duke de Vendome.

+

+After having selected an advantageous situation, Prince Eugene erected

+a battery of twenty pieces of cannon on a position which commanded the

+entire of the opposite bank, and covered his infantry by a line of

+entrenched parallels constructed on the slope of the declivity.

+

+They were working vigorously at the bridge, when the Duke de Vendome

+appeared with his whole army. At first he seemed determined to oppose

+its construction, but after having examined the position of Prince

+Eugene, he judged this to be impracticable.

+

+He therefore placed his army out of reach of the prince’s batteries,

+resting both his wings upon the river, so as to form a bow, of which

+the Adda was the cord. He then covered himself with entrenchments and

+abattis, and was thus enabled to charge the enemy’s columns whenever

+they debouched from the bridge, and to beat them in detail.

+

+Eugene, having reconnoitred the position of the French, considered the

+passage impossible. He therefore withdrew the bridge, and broke up his

+camp during the night.

+

+It was by this manœuvre, also, that, in the campaign of 1809, the

+Archduke Charles compelled the French to reoccupy the isle of Lobau,

+after having debouched on the left bank of the Danube. The march of the

+Archduke Charles was wholly concentric. He menaced Grosaspern with his

+right, Esling with his centre, and Enzersdorf with his left.

+

+His army, with both wings resting on the Danube, formed a semicircle

+around Esling. Napoleon immediately attacked and broke the centre of

+the Austrians; but after having forced their first line, he found

+himself arrested by the reserves. In the meantime, the bridges upon

+the Danube had been destroyed, and several of his corps, with their

+parks of artillery, were still on the right bank. This disappointment,

+joined to the favorable position of the Austrians, decided Napoleon

+to re-enter the isle of Lobau, where he had previously constructed a

+line of field-works, so as to give it all the advantages of a well

+entrenched camp.

+

+

+

+

+MAXIM XXXVIII.

+

+

+It is difficult to prevent an enemy, supplied with pontoons, from

+crossing a river. When the object of an army, which defends the

+passage, is to cover a siege, the moment the general has ascertained

+his inability to oppose the passage, he should take measures to arrive

+before the enemy, at an intermediate position between the river he

+defends and the place he desires to cover.

+

+

+NOTE.

+

+Here we may observe, that this intermediate position should be

+reconnoitred, or rather, well entrenched beforehand; for the enemy will

+be unable to make an offensive movement against the corps employed in

+the siege, until he has beaten the army of observation; and the latter,

+under cover of its camp, may always await a favorable opportunity to

+attack him in flank or in rear.

+

+Besides, the army which is once entrenched in this manner, has the

+advantage of being concentrated; while that of the enemy must act in

+detachments, if he wishes to cover his bridge, and watch the movements

+of the army of observation, so as to enable him to attack the besieging

+corps in its lines, without being exposed to an attempt on his rear, or

+being menaced with the loss of his bridge.

+

+

+

+

+MAXIM XXXIX.

+

+

+In the campaign of 1645, Turenne was attacked with his army before

+Philipsburg by a very superior force. There was no bridge here over

+the Rhine, but he took advantage of the ground between the river and

+the place to establish his camp. This should serve as a lesson to

+engineer officers, not merely in the construction of fortresses, but

+of _têtes de pont_. A space should always be left between the fortress

+and the river, where an army may form and rally without being obliged

+to throw itself into the place, and thereby compromise its security.

+An army retiring upon Mayence before a pursuing enemy, is necessarily

+compromised; for this reason, because it requires more than a day to

+pass the bridge, and because the lines of Cassel are too confined to

+admit an army to remain there without being blocked up. Two hundred

+toises should have been left between that place and the Rhine. It

+is essential that all _têtes de pont_ before great rivers should be

+constructed upon this principle, otherwise they will prove a very

+inefficient assistance to protect the passage of a retreating army.

+_Têtes de pont_, as laid down in our schools, are of use only for small

+rivers, the passage of which is comparatively short.

+

+

+NOTE.

+

+Marshal Saxe, in the campaign of 1741, having passed the Moldau in

+quest of a detached corps of fourteen thousand men, which was about to

+throw itself into Prague, left a thousand infantry upon that river,

+with orders to entrench themselves upon a height directly opposite the

+_tête de pont_. By this precaution, the marshal secured his retreat,

+and also the facility of repassing the bridge without disorder, by

+rallying his divisions between the entrenched height and the _tête de

+pont_.

+

+Were these examples unknown to the generals of modern times, or are

+they disposed to think such precautions superfluous?

+

+

+

+

+MAXIM XL.

+

+

+Fortresses are equally useful in offensive and defensive warfare. It

+is true, they will not in themselves arrest an army, but they are an

+excellent means of retarding, embarrassing, weakening and annoying a

+victorious enemy.

+

+

+NOTE.

+

+The brilliant success of the allied armies in the campaign of 1814, has

+given to many military men a false idea of the real value of fortresses.

+

+The formidable bodies which crossed the Rhine and the Alps at this

+period, were enabled to spare large detachments to blockade the strong

+places that covered the frontiers of France, without materially

+affecting the numerical superiority of the army which marched upon the

+capital. This army was in a condition, therefore, to act, without the

+fear of being menaced in its line of retreat.

+

+But at no period of military history were the armies of Europe so

+combined before, or governed so entirely by one common mind in the

+attainment of a single object. Under these circumstances, the line of

+fortresses which surround France was rendered unavailable during the

+campaign; but it would be very imprudent, therefore, to conclude that

+a frontier guarded by numerous fortresses may be passed with impunity;

+or that battles may be fought with these places in your rear, without

+previously besieging, or at least investing them with sufficient forces.

+

+

+

+

+MAXIM XLI.

+

+

+There are only two ways of insuring the success of a siege. The first,

+to begin by beating the enemy’s army employed to cover the place,

+forcing it out of the field, and throwing its remains beyond some great

+natural obstacle, such as a chain of mountains, or large river. Having

+accomplished this object, an army of observation should be placed

+behind the natural obstacle, until the trenches are finished and the

+place taken.

+

+But if it be desired to take the place in presence of a relieving army,

+without risking a battle, then the whole _materiel_ and equipment for

+a siege are necessary to begin with, together with ammunition and

+provisions for the presumed period of its duration, and also lines of

+contravallation and circumvallation, aided by all the localities of

+heights, woods, marshes and inundations.

+

+Having no longer occasion to keep up communications with your depôts,

+it is now only requisite to hold in check the relieving army. For

+this purpose, an army of observation should be formed, whose business

+it is never to lose sight of that of the enemy, and which, while it

+effectually bars all access to the place, has always time enough to

+arrive upon his flanks or rear in case he should attempt to steal a

+march.

+

+It is to be remembered, too, that by profiting judiciously by the

+lines of contravallation, a portion of the besieging army will always

+be available in giving battle to the approaching enemy.

+

+Upon the same general principle, when a place is to be besieged in

+presence of an enemy’s army, it is necessary to cover the siege by

+lines of _circumvallation_.

+

+If the besieging force is of numerical strength enough (after leaving

+a corps before the place four times the amount of the garrison) to

+cope with the relieving army, it may remove more than one day’s march

+from the place; but if it be inferior in numbers after providing for

+the siege, as above stated, it should remain only a short day’s march

+from the spot, in order to fall back upon its lines, if necessary, or

+receive succor in case of attack.

+

+If the investing corps and army of observation are only equal when

+united to the relieving force, the besieging army should remain entire

+within, or near its lines, and push the works and the siege with the

+greatest activity.

+

+

+NOTE.

+

+“When we undertake a siege,” says Montécuculli, “we should not seek to

+place ourselves opposite the weakest part of the fortress, but at the

+point most favorable for establishing a camp and executing the designs

+we have in view.”

+

+This maxim was well understood by the Duke of Berwick. Sent to form

+the siege of Nice in 1706, he determined to attack on the side of

+Montalban, contrary to the advice of Vauban, and even to the orders

+of the king. Having a very small army at his disposal, he began by

+securing his camp. This he did by constructing redoubts upon the

+heights that shut in the space between the Var and the Paillon,

+two rivers which supported his flanks. By this means, he protected

+himself against a surprise; for the Duke of Savoy, having the power

+of debouching suddenly by the Col de Tende, it was necessary that

+the marshal should be enabled to assemble his forces, so as to move

+rapidly upon his adversary, and fight him before he got into position;

+otherwise his inferiority in numbers would have obliged him to raise

+the siege.

+

+When Marshal Saxe was besieging Brussels, with only twenty-eight

+thousand men, opposed to a garrison of twelve thousand, he received

+intelligence that the Prince of Waldeck was assembling his forces

+to raise the siege. Not being strong enough to form an army of

+observation, the marshal reconnoitred a field of battle on the little

+river Voluve, and made all the necessary dispositions for moving

+rapidly to the spot, in case of the approach of the enemy. By this

+means he was prepared to receive his adversary without discontinuing

+the operations of the siege.

+

+

+

+

+MAXIM XLII.

+

+

+Feuquière says that “we should never wait for the enemy in the lines

+of circumvallation, but we should go out and attack him.” He is in

+error. There is no authority in war without exception; and it would be

+dangerous to proscribe the principle of awaiting the enemy within the

+lines of circumvallation.

+

+

+NOTE.

+

+During the siege of Mons, in 1691, the Prince of Orange assembled

+his army, and advanced as far as Notre Dame de Halle, making a

+demonstration to succor the place. Louis XIV, who commanded the siege

+in person, called a council of war to deliberate on what was to be

+done in case the Prince of Orange approached. The opinion of Marshal

+Luxembourg was to remain within the lines of circumvallation, and that

+opinion prevailed.

+

+The marshal laid it down as a principle that, when the besieging army

+is not strong enough to defend the whole extent of circumvallation, it

+should quit the lines and advance to meet the enemy; but when it is

+strong enough to encamp in two lines around a place, that it is better

+to profit by a good entrenchment--more especially as by this means the

+siege is not interrupted.

+

+In 1658, Marshal Turenne was besieging Dunkirk. He had already opened

+the trenches, when the Spanish army, under the orders of the Prince Don

+Juan, Condé, and D’Hocquincourt, appeared in sight, and took post upon

+the Downs, at a distance of a league from his lines. Turenne had the

+superiority in numbers, and he determined to quit his entrenchments.

+He had other advantages also. The enemy was without artillery, and

+their superiority in cavalry was rendered useless by the unfavorable

+nature of the ground. It was, therefore, of great importance to beat

+the Spanish army before it had time to entrench itself and bring up its

+artillery. The victory gained by the French on this occasion justified

+all the combinations of Marshal Turenne.

+

+When Marshal Berwick was laying siege to Philipsburg, in 1733, he had

+reason to apprehend that the Prince of Savoy would attack him with

+all the forces of the empire before its termination. The marshal,

+therefore, after having made his disposition of the troops intended for

+the siege, formed, with the rest of his army, a corps of observation to

+make head against Prince Eugene, in case the latter should choose to

+attack him in his lines, or attempt a diversion on the Moselle or Upper

+Rhine. Prince Eugene, having arrived in front of the besieging army,

+some general officers were of opinion that it was better not to await

+the enemy in the lines, but to move forward and attack him. But Marshal

+Berwick, who agreed with the Duke of Luxembourg, that an army which

+can occupy, completely, good entrenchments is not liable to be forced,

+persisted in remaining within his works. The result proved that this

+was also the opinion of Prince Eugene, for he did not dare to attack

+the entrenchments, which he would not have failed to do if he had any

+hopes of success.

+

+

+

+

+MAXIM XLIII.

+

+

+Those who proscribe lines of circumvallation, and all the assistance

+which the science of the engineer can afford, deprive themselves

+gratuitously of an auxiliary which is never injurious, almost always

+useful, and often indispensable. It must be admitted, at the same time,

+that the principles of field-fortification require improvement. This

+important branch of the art of war has made no progress since the time

+of the ancients. It is even inferior at this day to what it was two

+thousand years ago. Engineer officers should be encouraged in bringing

+this branch of their art to perfection, and in placing it upon a level

+with the rest.

+

+

+NOTE.

+

+“If we are inferior in numbers,” says Marshal Saxe, “entrenchments

+are of no use, for the enemy will bring all his forces to bear upon

+particular points. If we are of equal strength they are unnecessary

+also. If we are superior, we do not want them. Then why give ourselves

+the trouble to entrench?” Notwithstanding this opinion of the inutility

+of entrenchments, Marshal Saxe often had recourse to them.

+

+In 1797, Generals Provéra and Hohenzollern having presented themselves

+before Mantua (where Marshal Wurmser was shut up), for the purpose of

+raising the siege, they were stopped by the lines of contravallation of

+St. George. This slight obstacle sufficed to afford Napoleon time to

+arrive from Rivoli and defeat their enterprise. It was in consequence

+of neglecting to entrench themselves that the French had been obliged

+to raise the siege in the preceding campaign.

+

+

+

+

+MAXIM XLIV.

+

+

+If circumstances prevent a sufficient garrison being left to defend

+a fortified town, which contains an hospital and magazines, at least

+every means should be employed to secure the citadel against a _coup

+de main_.

+

+

+NOTE.

+

+A few battalions dispersed about a town, inspire no terror; but shut

+up in the more narrow outline of a citadel, they assume an imposing

+attitude. For this reason it appears to me that such a precaution

+is always necessary, not only in fortresses, but wherever there are

+hospitals or depôts of any kind. Where there is no citadel, some

+quarter of the town should be fixed upon most favorable for defence,

+and entrenched in such a manner as to oppose the greatest resistance

+possible.

+

+

+

+

+MAXIM XLV.

+

+

+A fortified place can only protect the garrison and detain the enemy

+for a certain time. When this time has elapsed, and the defences of

+the place are destroyed, the garrison should lay down its arms. All

+civilized nations are agreed on this point, and there never has been

+an argument except with reference to the greater or less degree of

+defence which a governor is bound to make before he capitulates. At the

+same time, there are generals--Villars among the number--who are of

+opinion that a governor should never surrender, but that in the last

+extremity he should blow up the fortifications, and take advantage of

+the night to cut his way through the besieging army. Where he is unable

+to blow up the fortifications, he may always retire, they say, with his

+garrison, and save the men.

+

+Officers who have adopted this line of conduct, have often brought off

+three-fourths of their garrison.

+

+

+NOTE.

+

+In 1705, the French, who were besieged in Haguenau by Count Thungen,

+found themselves incapable of sustaining an assault. Péri, the

+governor, who had already distinguished himself by a vigorous defence,

+despairing of being allowed to capitulate on any terms short of

+becoming prisoner of war, resolved to abandon the place and cut his way

+through the besiegers.

+

+In order to conceal his intention more effectually, and while he

+deceived the enemy, to sound at the same time the disposition of his

+officers, he assembled a council of war and declared his resolution to

+die in the breach. Then, under pretext of the extremity to which he was

+reduced, he commanded the whole garrison under arms; and leaving only a

+few sharpshooters in the breach, gave the order to march, and set out

+in silence, under cover of the night, from Haguenau. This audacious

+enterprise was crowned with success, and Péri reached Saverne without

+having suffered the smallest loss.

+

+Two fine instances of defence in later times are those of Massena at

+Genoa, and of Palafox at Saragossa.

+

+The first marched out with arms and baggage, and all the honors of

+war, after rejecting every summons, and defending himself until hunger

+alone compelled him to capitulate. The second only yielded after having

+buried his garrison amid the ruins of the city, which he defended from

+house to house, until famine and death left him no alternative but to

+surrender. This siege, which was equally honorable to the French as

+to the Spaniards, is one of the most memorable in the history of war.

+In the course of it, Palafox displayed every possible resource which

+courage and obstinacy can supply in the defence of a fortress.

+

+All real strength is founded in the mind; and on this account I am of

+opinion that we should be directed in the choice of a governor, less by

+his genius than his personal character. His most essential qualities

+should be courage, perseverance, and soldierlike devotedness. Above

+all, he should possess the talent not only of infusing courage into

+the garrison, but of kindling a spirit of resistance in the whole

+population. Where the latter is wanting, however art may multiply the

+defences of a place, the garrison will be compelled to capitulate after

+having sustained the first, or at most, the second assault.

+

+

+

+

+MAXIM XLVI.

+

+

+The keys of a fortress are well worth the retirement of the garrison,

+when it is resolved to yield only on those conditions. On this

+principle it is always wiser to grant an honorable capitulation to a

+garrison which has made a vigorous resistance, than to risk an assault.

+

+

+NOTE.

+

+Marshal Villars has justly observed, that “no governor of a place

+should be permitted to excuse himself for surrendering, on the ground

+of wishing to preserve the king’s troops. Every garrison that displays

+courage will escape being prisoners of war. For there is no general

+who, however well assured of carrying a place by assault, will not

+prefer granting terms of capitulation rather than risk the loss of a

+thousand men in forcing determined troops to surrender.”

+

+

+

+

+MAXIM XLVII.

+

+

+Infantry, cavalry, and artillery, are nothing without each other;

+therefore, they should always be so disposed in cantonments as to

+assist each other in case of surprise.

+

+

+NOTE.

+

+“A general,” says Frederick, “should direct his whole attention to

+the tranquility of his cantonments, in order that the soldier may be

+relieved from all anxiety, and repose in security from his fatigues.

+With this view, care should be taken that the troops are able to form

+rapidly upon ground which has been previously reconnoitered; that the

+generals remain always with their divisions or brigades, and that the

+service is carried on throughout with exactness.”

+

+Marshal Saxe is of opinion that an army should not be in a hurry to

+quit its cantonments, but that it should wait till the enemy has

+exhausted himself with marching, and be ready to fall upon him with

+fresh troops when he is overcome with fatigue.

+

+I believe, however, that it would be dangerous to trust implicitly

+to this high authority, for there are many occasions where all the

+advantage lies in the initiative, more especially when the enemy has

+been compelled to extend his cantonments, from scarcity of subsistence,

+and can be attacked before he has time to concentrate his forces.

+

+

+

+

+MAXIM XLVIII.

+

+

+The formation of infantry in line should be always in two ranks,

+because the length of the musket only admits of an effective fire in

+this formation. The discharge of the third rank is not only uncertain,

+but frequently dangerous to the ranks in its front. In drawing up

+infantry in two ranks, there should be a supernumerary behind every

+fourth or fifth file. A reserve should likewise be placed twenty-five

+paces in rear of each flank.

+

+

+NOTE.

+

+I am of opinion, if circumstances require a line of infantry to resort

+to a square, that two-deep is too light a formation to resist the

+shock of cavalry. However useless the third rank may appear for the

+purpose of file-firing, it is, notwithstanding necessary, in order to

+replace the men who fall in the ranks in front; otherwise you would

+be obliged to close in the files, and by this means leave intervals

+between the companies, which the cavalry would not fail to penetrate.

+It appears to me, also, that when infantry is formed in two ranks, the

+columns will be found to open out in marching to a flank. If it should

+be considered advantageous behind entrenchments to keep the infantry

+in two ranks, the third rank should be placed in reserve, and brought

+forward to relieve the front rank when fatigued, or when the fire is

+observed to slacken. I am induced to make these remarks, because I have

+seen an excellent pamphlet which proposes the two-deep formation for

+infantry as the best. The author supports his opinion by a variety of

+plausible reasons, but not sufficient, as it appears to me, to answer

+all the objections that may be offered to this practice.

+

+

+

+

+MAXIM XLIX.

+

+

+The practice of mixing small bodies of infantry and cavalry together is

+a bad one, and attended with many inconveniences. The cavalry loses its

+power of action. It becomes fettered in all its movements. Its energy

+is destroyed; even the infantry itself is compromised, for on the

+first movement of the cavalry it is left without support. The best mode

+of protecting cavalry is to cover its flank.

+

+

+NOTE.

+

+This also was the opinion of Marshal Saxe. “The weakness of the above

+formation,” says he, “is sufficient in itself to intimidate the

+platoons of infantry, because they must be lost if the cavalry is

+beaten.”

+

+The cavalry, also, which depends on the infantry for succor, is

+disconcerted the moment a brisk forward movement carries them out of

+sight of their supports. Marshal Turenne, and the generals of his time,

+sometimes employed this order of formation; but that does not, in my

+opinion, justify a modern author for recommending it in an essay,

+entitled “_Considerations sur l’Art de la Guerre_.” In fact, this

+formation has long been abandoned; and, since the introduction of light

+artillery, it appears to me almost ridiculous to propose it.

+

+

+

+

+MAXIM L.

+

+

+Charges of cavalry are equally useful at the beginning, the middle, and

+the end of a battle. They should be made always, if possible, on the

+flanks of the infantry, especially when the latter is engaged in front.

+

+

+NOTE.

+

+The Archduke Charles, in speaking of cavalry, recommends that it should

+be brought in mass upon a decisive point, when the moment for employing

+it arrives; that is to say, when it can attack with a certainty of

+success. As the rapidity of its movement enables cavalry to act along

+the whole line in the same day, the general who commands it should

+keep it together as much as possible, and avoid dividing it into many

+detachments. When the nature of the ground admits of cavalry being

+employed on all points of the line, it is desirable to form it in

+column behind the infantry, and in a position whence it may be easily

+directed wherever it is required. If cavalry is intended to cover a

+position, it should be placed sufficiently in the rear to meet at full

+speed any advance of troops coming to attack that position. If it is

+destined to cover the flank of the infantry, it should, for the same

+reason, be placed directly behind it. As the object of cavalry is

+purely offensive, it should be a rule to form it at such a distance

+only from the point of collision as to enable it to acquire its utmost

+impulse, and arrive at the top of its speed into action. With respect

+to the cavalry reserve, this should only be employed at the end of a

+battle, either to render the success more decisive, or to cover the

+retreat. Napoleon remarks that, at the battle of Waterloo, the cavalry

+of the guard which composed the reserve, was engaged against his

+orders. He complains of having been deprived from five o’clock of the

+use of this reserve, which, when well employed, had so often insured

+him the victory.

+

+

+

+

+MAXIM LI.

+

+

+It is the business of cavalry to follow up the victory, and to prevent

+the beaten enemy from rallying.

+

+

+NOTE.

+

+Victor or vanquished, it is of the greatest importance to have a body

+of cavalry in reserve, either to take advantage of victory, or to

+secure a retreat. The most decisive battles lose half their value to

+the conqueror, when the want of cavalry prevents him from following up

+his success, and depriving the enemy of the power of rallying.

+

+When a retiring army is pursued, it is more especially upon the flanks

+that the weight of cavalry should fall, if you are strong enough in

+that arm to cut off his retreat.

+

+

+

+

+MAXIM LII.

+

+

+Artillery is more essential to cavalry than to infantry, because

+cavalry has no fire for its defence, but depends upon the sabre.

+It is to remedy this deficiency that recourse has been had to

+horse-artillery. Cavalry, therefore, should never be without cannon,

+whether when attacking, rallying, or in position.

+

+

+NOTE.

+

+Horse-artillery is an invention of Frederick. Austria lost no time in

+introducing it into her armies, although in an imperfect degree. It was

+only in 1792 that this arm was adopted in France, where it was brought

+rapidly to its present perfection.

+

+The services of this arm during the wars of the Revolution were

+immense. It may be said to have changed to a certain extent the

+character of tactics, because its facility of movement enables it to

+bear with rapidity on every point where artillery can be employed

+with success. Napoleon has remarked in his memoirs that a flanking

+battery which strikes and rakes the enemy obliquely, is capable of

+deciding a victory in itself. To this we may add that, independent of

+the advantages which cavalry derives from horse-artillery in securing

+its flanks, and in opening the way for a successful charge by the

+destructiveness of its fire, it is desirable that these two arms

+should never be separated, but ready at all times to seize upon points

+where it may be necessary to employ cannon. On these occasions, the

+cavalry masks the march of the artillery, protects its establishment in

+position, and covers it from the attack of the enemy, until it is ready

+to open its fire.

+

+

+

+

+MAXIM LIII.

+

+

+In march, or in position, the greater part of the artillery should

+be with the divisions of infantry and cavalry. The rest should be in

+reserve. Each gun should have with it three hundred rounds, without

+including the limber. This is about the complement for two battles.

+

+

+NOTE.

+

+The better infantry is, the more important it is to support it by

+artillery, with a view to its preservation.

+

+It is essential, also, that the batteries attached to divisions should

+march in the front, because this has a strong influence on the _morale_

+of the soldier. He attacks always with confidence when he sees the

+flanks of the column well covered with cannon.

+

+The artillery reserve should be kept for a decisive moment, and then

+employed in full force, for it will be difficult for the enemy at such

+a time to presume to attack it.

+

+There is scarcely an instance of a battery of sixty pieces of cannon

+having been carried by a charge of infantry or cavalry, unless where

+it was entirely without support, or in a position to be easily turned.

+

+

+

+

+MAXIM LIV.

+

+

+Artillery should always be placed in the most advantageous positions,

+and as far in front of the line of cavalry and infantry as possible,

+without compromising the safety of the guns.

+

+Field batteries should command the whole country round from the level

+of the platform. They should on no account be masked on the right and

+left, but have free range in every direction.

+

+

+NOTE.

+

+The battery of eighteen pieces of cannon, which covered the centre of

+the Russian army at the battle of La Moskwa (Borodino), may be cited as

+an example.

+

+Its position, upon a circular height which commanded the field in every

+direction, added so powerfully to its effect, that its fire alone

+sufficed, for a considerable time, to paralyze the vigorous attack

+made by the French with their right. Although twice broken, the left

+of the Russian army closed to this battery, as to a pivot, and twice

+recovered its former position. After repeated attacks, conducted with

+a rare intrepidity, the battery was at length carried by the French,

+but not till they had lost the _élite_ of their army, and with it the

+Generals Caulincourt and Montbrun. Its capture decided the retreat of

+the Russian left.

+

+I might advert likewise to another instance, in the campaign of 1809,

+and to the terrible effect produced by the hundred pieces of cannon of

+the Guard which General Lauriston directed, at the battle of Wagram,

+against the right of the Austrian army.

+

+

+

+

+MAXIM LV.

+

+

+A General should never put his army into cantonments, when he has the

+means of collecting supplies of forage and provisions, and of thus

+providing for the wants of the soldier in the field.

+

+

+NOTE.

+

+One great advantage which results from having an army in camp is,

+that it is easier to direct its spirit and maintain its discipline

+there. The soldier in cantonments abandons himself to repose; he ends

+by finding a pleasure in idleness, and in fearing to return to the

+field. The reverse takes place in a camp. There, a feeling of _ennui_,

+and a severer discipline, make him anxious for the opening of the

+campaign, to interrupt the monotony of the service and relieve it with

+the chances and variety of war. Besides, an army in camp is much more

+secure from a surprise than in cantonments--the defect of which usually

+consists in their occupying too great an extent of ground. When an army

+is obliged to go into quarters, the Marquis de Feuquière recommends

+a camp to be selected in front of the line, where the troops can be

+frequently assembled--sometimes suddenly, in order to exercise their

+vigilance, or for the sole purpose of bringing the different corps

+together.

+

+

+

+

+MAXIM LVI.

+

+

+A good general, a well-organized system, good instructions, and severe

+discipline, aided by effective establishments, will always make good

+troops, independently of the cause for which they fight.

+

+At the same time, a love of country, a spirit of enthusiasm, a sense of

+national honor, and fanaticism, will operate upon young soldiers with

+advantage.

+

+

+NOTE.

+

+This remark appears to me less applicable to officers than to soldiers,

+for as war is not a state of things natural to man, it follows

+that those who maintain its cause must be governed by some strong

+excitement. Much enthusiasm and devotedness are required on the part

+of the troops for the general who commands, to induce an army to

+perform great actions in a war in which it takes no interest. This is

+sufficiently proved by the apathy of auxiliaries, unless when inspired

+by the conduct of their chief.

+

+

+

+

+MAXIM LVII.

+

+

+When a nation is without establishments and a military system, it is

+very difficult to organize an army.

+

+

+NOTE.

+

+This is an unanswerable truth, more particularly with reference to an

+army intended to act upon the system of modern war, and in which order,

+precision, and rapidity of movement, are the principal essentials to

+success.

+

+

+

+

+MAXIM LVIII.

+

+

+The first qualification of a soldier is fortitude under fatigue and

+privation. Courage is only the second; hardship, poverty and want, are

+the best school for a soldier.

+

+

+NOTE.

+

+Valor belongs to the young soldier as well as to the veteran; but in

+the former it is more evanescent. It is only by habits of service, and

+after several campaigns, that the soldier acquires that moral courage

+which makes him support the fatigues and privations of war without a

+murmur. Experience by this time has instructed him to supply his own

+wants. He is satisfied with what he can procure, because he knows that

+success is only to be obtained by fortitude and perseverance. Well

+might Napoleon say that misery and want were the best school for a

+soldier; for as nothing could be compared with the total destitution

+of the army of the Alps, when he assumed the command, so nothing

+could equal the brilliant success which he obtained with this army

+in the first campaign in Italy. The conquerors of Montenotte, Lodi,

+Castiglione, Bassano, Arcole and Rivoli had beheld, only a few months

+before, whole battalions covered with rags, and deserting for the want

+of subsistence.

+

+

+

+

+MAXIM LIX.

+

+

+There are five things the soldier should never be without--his musket,

+his ammunition, his knapsack, his provisions (for at least four days),

+and his entrenching-tool. The knapsack may be reduced to the smallest

+size possible, if it be thought proper, but the soldier should always

+have it with him.

+

+

+NOTE.

+

+It is fortunate that Napoleon has recognized the advantage of giving

+to every soldier an entrenching-tool. His authority is the best answer

+to the ridicule which has been thrown upon those who proposed it. An

+axe will be found to inconvenience the foot-soldier as little as the

+sword he wears at his side, and it will be infinitely more useful. When

+axes are given out to companies, or are carried by fatigue-men during

+a campaign, they are soon lost; and it often happens, when a camp is

+to be formed, that a difficulty arises in cutting wood and building

+huts for the soldier; whereas, by making the axe a part of every man’s

+appointments, he is obliged to have it always with him; and whether

+the object be to entrench himself in a village, or to erect huts in a

+camp, the commander of a corps will speedily see the advantage of this

+innovation.

+

+When once the axe has been generally adopted, we shall, perhaps,

+see the desirability of issuing pickaxes and shovels to particular

+companies, and also the benefit of more frequent entrenchments. It is

+more particularly during retreats that it is important to entrench when

+the army has reached a good position; for an entrenched camp not only

+furnishes the means of rallying troops which are pursued, but if it be

+fortified in such a manner as to render the issue of an attack doubtful

+to the enemy, it will not only sustain the _morale_ of the soldier in

+the retreat, but afford the general-in-chief opportunities for resuming

+the offensive, and profiting by the first false movement on the part of

+his adversary. It will be recollected how Frederick, in the campaign of

+1761, when surrounded by two Russian and Austrian armies, whose united

+force was quadruple his own, saved his army by entrenching himself in

+the camp of Buntzalvitz.

+

+

+

+

+MAXIM LX.

+

+

+Every means should be taken to attach the soldier to his colors. This

+is best accomplished by showing consideration and respect to the old

+soldier. His pay likewise should increase with his length of service.

+It is the height of injustice not to pay a veteran more than a recruit.

+

+

+NOTE.

+

+Some modern writers have recommended, on the other hand, to limit the

+period of service, in order to bring the whole youth of a country

+successively under arms. By this means they purpose to have the levies,

+_en masse_, all ready trained and capable of resisting successfully

+a war of invasion. But however advantageous at first sight such a

+military system may appear, I believe it will be found to have many

+objections.

+

+In the first place, the soldier fatigued with the minutiæ of discipline

+in a garrison, will not feel much inclined to re-enlist after he has

+received his discharge, more especially since, having served the

+prescribed time, he will consider himself to have fulfilled all the

+duties of a citizen to his country. Returning to his friends, he will

+probably marry, or establish himself in a trade. From that moment his

+military spirit declines, and he soon becomes ill adapted to the

+business of war. On the contrary, the soldier who serves long, becomes

+attached to his regiment as to a new family. He submits to the yoke of

+discipline, accustoms himself to the privations his situation imposes,

+and ends by finding his condition agreeable. There are few officers

+that have seen service who have not discovered the difference between

+old and young soldiers, with reference to their power of supporting

+the fatigues of a long campaign, to the determined courage that

+characterizes the attack, or to the ease with which they rally after

+being broken.

+

+Montécuculli observes, that “it takes time to discipline an army; more

+to inure it to war; and still more to constitute veterans.” For this

+reason, he recommends that great consideration should be shown to old

+soldiers; that they should be carefully provided for, and a large

+body of them kept always on foot. It seems to me, also, that it is

+not enough to increase the pay of the soldier according to his period

+of service, but that it is highly essential to confer on him some

+mark of distinction that shall secure to him privileges calculated to

+encourage him to grow gray under arms, and, above all, to do so with

+honor.

+

+

+

+

+MAXIM LXI.

+

+

+It is not set speeches at the moment of battle that render soldiers

+brave. The veteran scarcely listens to them, and the recruit forgets

+them at the first discharge. If discourses and harangues are useful, it

+is during the campaign: to do away unfavorable impressions, to correct

+false reports, to keep alive a proper spirit in the camp, and to

+furnish materials and amusement for the bivouac. All printed orders of

+the day should keep in view these objects.

+

+

+NOTE.

+

+The opinion of the general-in-chief, energetically expressed, is,

+notwithstanding, productive of great effect on the _morale_ of the

+soldier.

+

+In 1703, at the attack of Hornbec, Marshal Villars, seeing the troops

+advancing without spirit, threw himself at their head: “What!” said

+he, “is it expected that I, a marshal of France, should be the first to

+escalade, when I order YOU to attack?”

+

+These few words rekindled their ardor; officers and soldiers rushed

+upon the works, and the town was taken almost without loss.

+

+“We have retired far enough for to-day; you know I always sleep upon

+the field of battle!” said Napoleon, as he flew through the ranks

+at the moment of resuming the offensive at Marengo. These few words

+sufficed to revive the courage of the soldiers, and to make them forget

+the fatigues of the day, during which almost every man had been engaged.

+

+

+

+

+MAXIM LXII.

+

+

+Tents are unfavorable to health. The soldier is best when he bivouacs,

+because he sleeps with his feet to the fire, which speedily dries the

+ground on which he lies. A few planks, or a little straw, shelter him

+from the wind.

+

+On the other hand, tents are necessary for the superior officers, who

+have to write and to consult their maps. Tents should, therefore,

+be issued to these, with directions to them never to sleep in a

+house. Tents are always objects of observation to the enemy’s staff.

+They afford information in regard to your numbers and the ground you

+occupy; while an army bivouacking in two or three lines, is only

+distinguishable from afar by the smoke which mingles with the clouds.

+It is impossible to count the number of the fires.

+

+

+NOTE.

+

+The acknowledged advantage of bivouacking is another reason for

+adding an entrenching-tool to the equipment of the soldier; for, with

+the assistance of the axe and shovel, he can hut himself without

+difficulty. I have seen huts erected with the branches of trees,

+covered with turf, where the soldier was perfectly sheltered from the

+cold and wet, even in the worst season.

+

+

+

+

+MAXIM LXIII.

+

+

+All information obtained from prisoners should be received with

+caution, and estimated at its real value. A soldier seldom sees

+anything beyond his company; and an officer can afford intelligence of

+little more than the position and movements of the division to which

+his regiment belongs. On this account, the general of an army should

+never depend upon the information derived from prisoners, unless it

+agrees with the reports received from the advanced guards, in reference

+to the position, etc., of the enemy.

+

+

+NOTE.

+

+Montécuculli wisely observes that “prisoners should be interrogated

+separately, in order to ascertain, by the agreement in their answers,

+how far they may be endeavoring to mislead you.” Generally speaking,

+the information required from officers who are prisoners, should have

+reference to the strength and resources of the enemy, and sometimes to

+his localities and position. Frederick recommends that prisoners should

+be menaced with instant death if they are found attempting to deceive

+by false reports.

+

+

+

+

+MAXIM LXIV.

+

+

+Nothing is so important in war as an undivided command; for this

+reason, when war is carried on against a single power, there should be

+only one army, acting upon one base, and conducted by one chief.

+

+

+NOTE.

+

+“Success,” says the Archduke Charles, “is only to be obtained by

+simultaneous efforts, directed upon a given point, sustained with

+constancy, and executed with decision.” It rarely happens that any

+number of men who desire the same object are perfectly agreed as to the

+means of attaining it; and if the will of one individual is not allowed

+to predominate, there can be no _ensemble_ in the execution of their

+operations; neither will they attain the end proposed. It is useless to

+confirm this maxim by examples. History abounds in them.

+

+Prince Eugene and Marlborough would never have been so successful in

+the campaigns which they directed in concert, if a spirit of intrigue

+and difference of opinion had not constantly disorganized the armies

+opposed to them.

+

+

+

+

+MAXIM LXV.

+

+

+The same consequences which have uniformly attended long discussions

+and councils of war, will follow at all times. They will terminate

+in the adoption of the worst course, which in war is always the most

+timid, or, if you will, the most prudent. The only true wisdom in a

+general is determined courage.

+

+

+NOTE.

+

+Prince Eugene used to say that councils of war “are only useful when

+you want an excuse for attempting _nothing_.” This was also the opinion

+of Villars. A general-in-chief should avoid, therefore, assembling

+a council on occasions of difficulty, and should confine himself to

+consulting separately his most experienced generals in order to benefit

+by their advice, while he is governed at the same time in his decision

+by his own judgment. By this means, he becomes responsible, it is true,

+for the measures he pursues; but he has the advantage also of acting

+upon his own conviction, and of being certain that the secret of his

+operations will not be divulged, as is usually the case where it is

+discussed by a council of war.

+

+

+

+

+MAXIM LXVI.

+

+

+In war, the general alone can judge of certain arrangements. It depends

+on him alone to conquer difficulties by his own superior talents and

+resolution.

+

+

+NOTE.

+

+The officer who obeys, whatever may be the nature or extent of his

+command, will always stand excused for executing implicitly the

+orders which have been given to him. This is not the case with the

+general-in-chief, on whom the safety of the army and the success of the

+campaign depend. Occupied, without intermission, in the whole process

+of observation and reflection, it is easy to conceive that he will

+acquire by degrees a solidity of judgment which will enable him to see

+things in a clearer and more enlarged point of view than his inferior

+generals.

+

+Marshal Villars, in his campaigns, acted almost always in opposition

+to the advice of his generals, and he was almost always fortunate.

+So true it is, that a general, who feels confident in his talent for

+command, must follow the dictates of his own genius if he wishes to

+achieve success.

+

+

+

+

+MAXIM LXVII.

+

+

+To authorize generals or other officers to lay down their arms in

+virtue of a particular capitulation, under any other circumstances

+than when they are composing the garrison of a fortress, affords a

+dangerous latitude. It is destructive of all military character in a

+nation to open such a door to the cowardly, the weak, or even to the

+misdirected brave. Great extremities require extraordinary resolution.

+The more obstinate the resistance of an army, the greater the chances

+of assistance or of success.

+

+How many seeming impossibilities have been accomplished by men whose

+only resource was death!

+

+

+NOTE.

+

+In the campaign of 1759, Frederick directed General Fink, with eighteen

+thousand men, upon Maxen, for the purpose of cutting off the Austrian

+army from the defiles of Bohemia. Surrounded by twice his numbers, Fink

+capitulated after a sharp action, and fourteen thousand men laid down

+their arms. This conduct was the more disgraceful, because General

+Winch, who commanded the cavalry, cut his way through the enemy. The

+whole blame of the surrender fell, therefore, upon Fink, who was

+tried afterward by a court-martial, and sentenced to be cashiered and

+imprisoned for two years.

+

+In the campaign of Italy in 1796, the Austrian General Provéra

+capitulated with two thousand men in the castle of Cossaria.

+Subsequently, at the battle of La Favorite, the same general

+capitulated with a corps of six thousand men. I scarcely dare to revert

+to the shameful defection of General Mack in the capitulation of Ulm

+in 1805, where thirty thousand Austrians laid down their arms--when we

+have seen, during the wars of the Revolution, so many generals open

+themselves a way by a vigorous effort through the enemy, supported only

+by a few battalions.

+

+

+

+

+MAXIM LXVIII.

+

+

+There is no security for any sovereign, for any nation, or for any

+general, if officers are permitted to capitulate in the open field,

+and to lay down their arms in virtue of conditions favorable to the

+contracting party, but contrary to the interests of the army at large.

+To withdraw from danger, and thereby to involve their comrades in

+greater peril, is the height of cowardice. Such conduct should be

+proscribed, declared infamous, and made punishable with death. All

+generals, officers and soldiers, who capitulate in battle to save their

+own lives, should be decimated.

+

+He who gives the order, and those who obey, are alike traitors, and

+deserve capital punishment.

+

+

+NOTE.

+

+Soldiers, who are almost always ignorant of the designs of their

+chief, cannot be responsible for his conduct. If he orders them to

+lay down their arms, they must do so; otherwise they fail in that law

+of discipline which is more essential to an army than thousands of

+men. It appears to me, therefore, under these circumstances, that the

+chiefs alone are responsible, and liable to the punishment due to their

+cowardice. We have no example of soldiers being wanting in their duty

+in the most desperate situations, where they are commanded by officers

+of approved resolution.

+

+

+

+

+MAXIM LXIX.

+

+

+There is but one honorable mode of becoming prisoner of war. That

+is, by being taken separately; by which is meant, by being cut off

+entirely, and when we can no longer make use of our arms. In this case,

+there can be no conditions, for honor can impose none. We yield to an

+irresistible necessity.

+

+

+NOTE.

+

+There is always time enough to surrender prisoner of war. This should

+be deferred, therefore, till the last extremity. And here I may be

+permitted to cite an example of rare obstinacy in defence, which has

+been related to me by ocular witnesses. The captain of grenadiers,

+Dubrenil, of the thirty-seventh regiment of the line, having been

+sent on detachment with his company, was stopped on the march by a

+large party of Cossacks, who surrounded him on every side. Dubrenil

+formed his little force into square, and endeavored to gain the skirts

+of a wood (within a few muskets’ shot of the spot where he had been

+attacked), and reached it with very little loss. But as soon as the

+grenadiers saw this refuge secured to them, they broke and fled,

+leaving their captain and a few brave men, who were resolved not to

+abandon him, at the mercy of the enemy. In the meantime, the fugitives,

+who had rallied in the depth of the wood, ashamed of having forsaken

+their leader, came to the resolution of rescuing him from the enemy,

+if a prisoner, or of carrying off his body if he had fallen. With this

+view, they formed once more upon the outskirts, and opening a passage

+with their bayonets through the cavalry, penetrated to their captain,

+who, notwithstanding seventeen wounds, was defending himself still.

+They immediately surrounded him, and regained the wood with little

+loss. Such examples are not rare in the wars of the Revolution, and

+it were desirable to see them collected by some contemporary, that

+soldiers might learn how much is to be achieved in war by determined

+energy and sustained resolution.

+

+

+

+

+MAXIM LXX.

+

+

+The conduct of a general in a conquered country is full of

+difficulties. If severe, he irritates and increases the number of his

+enemies. If lenient, he gives birth to expectations which only render

+the abuses and vexations, inseparable from war, the more intolerable.

+A victorious general must know how to employ severity, justice and

+mildness by turns, if he would allay sedition or prevent it.

+

+

+NOTE.

+

+Among the Romans, generals were only permitted to arrive at the command

+of armies after having exercised the different functions of the

+magistracy. Thus by a previous knowledge of administration, they were

+prepared to govern the conquered provinces with all that discretion

+which a newly-acquired power, supported by arbitrary force, demands.

+

+In the military institutions of modern times, the generals, instructed

+only in what concerns the operation of strategy and tactics, are

+obliged to intrust the civil departments of the war to inferior agents,

+who, without belonging to the army, render all those abuses and

+vexations, inseparable from its operations, still more intolerable.

+

+This observation, which I do little more than repeat, seems to me,

+notwithstanding, deserving of particular attention; for if the leisure

+of general officers was directed in time of peace to the study of

+diplomacy--if they were employed in the different embassies which

+sovereigns send to foreign courts--they would acquire a knowledge of

+the laws and of the government of these countries, in which they may

+be called hereafter to carry on the war. They would learn also to

+distinguish those points of interest on which all treaties must be

+based, which have for their object the advantageous termination of a

+campaign. By the aid of this information they would obtain certain

+and positive results, since all the springs of action, as well as the

+machinery of war, would be in their hands. We have seen Prince Eugene,

+and Marshal Villars, each fulfilling with equal ability the duties of a

+general and a negotiator.

+

+When an army which occupies a conquered province observes strict

+discipline, there are few examples of insurrection among the people,

+unless indeed resistance is provoked (as but too often happens), by the

+exactions of inferior agents employed in the civil administration.

+

+It is to this point, therefore, that the general-in-chief should

+principally direct his attention, in order that the contributions

+imposed by the wants of the army may be levied with impartiality; and

+above all, that they may be applied to their true object, instead of

+serving to enrich the collectors, as is ordinarily the case.

+

+

+

+

+MAXIM LXXI.

+

+

+Nothing can excuse a general who takes advantage of the knowledge

+acquired in the service of his country, to deliver up her frontier and

+her towns to foreigners. This is a crime reprobated by every principle

+of religion, morality and honor.

+

+

+NOTE.

+

+Ambitious men who, listening only to their passions, arm natives of

+the same land against each other (under the deceitful pretext of

+the public good), are still more criminal. For however arbitrary a

+government, the institutions which have been consolidated by time, are

+always preferable to civil war, and to that anarchy which the latter is

+obliged to create for the justification of its crimes.

+

+To be faithful to his sovereign, and to respect the established

+government, are the first principles which ought to distinguish a

+soldier and a man of honor.

+

+

+

+

+MAXIM LXXII.

+

+

+A general-in-chief has no right to shelter his mistakes in war under

+cover of his sovereign, or of a minister, when these are both distant

+from the scene of operation, and must consequently be either ill

+informed or wholly ignorant of the actual state of things.

+

+Hence, it follows, that every general is culpable who undertakes the

+execution of a plan which he considers faulty. It is his duty to

+represent his reasons, to insist upon a change of plan, in short, to

+give in his resignation, rather than allow himself to be made the

+instrument of his army’s ruin. Every general-in-chief who fights a

+battle in consequence of superior orders, with the certainty of losing

+it, is equally blamable.

+

+In this last-mentioned case, the general ought to refuse obedience;

+because a blind obedience is due only to a military command given

+by a superior present on the spot at the moment of action. Being in

+possession of the real state of things, the superior has it then in his

+power to afford the necessary explanations to the person who executes

+his orders.

+

+But supposing a general-in-chief to receive positive order from

+his sovereign, directing him to fight a battle, with the further

+injunction, to yield to his adversary, and allow himself to be

+defeated--ought he to obey it? No. If the general should be able to

+comprehend the meaning or utility of such an order, he should execute

+it; otherwise he should refuse to obey it.

+

+

+NOTE.

+

+In the campaign of 1697, Prince Eugene caused the courier to be

+intercepted, who was bringing him orders from the emperor forbidding

+him to hazard a battle, for which everything had been prepared, and

+which he foresaw would prove decisive. He considered, therefore,

+that he did his duty in evading the orders of his sovereign; and the

+victory of Zanta, in which the Turks lost about thirty thousand men,

+and four thousand prisoners, rewarded his audacity. In the meantime,

+notwithstanding the immense advantages which accrued from this victory

+to the imperial arms, Eugene was disgraced on his arrival at Vienna.

+

+In 1793, General Hoche, having received orders to move upon Treves with

+an army harassed by constant marches in a mountainous and difficult

+country, refused to obey. He observed, with reason, that in order to

+obtain possession of an unimportant fortress, they were exposing his

+army to inevitable ruin. He caused, therefore, his troops to return

+into winter quarters, and preferred the preservation of his army, upon

+which the success of the future campaign depended, to his own safety.

+Recalled to Paris, he was thrown into a dungeon, which he only quitted

+on the downfall of Robespierre.

+

+I dare not decide if such examples are to be imitated; but it seems to

+me highly desirable that a question so new and so important, should be

+discussed by men who are capable of determining its merits.

+

+

+

+

+MAXIM LXXIII.

+

+

+The first qualification in a general-in-chief is a cool head--that

+is, a head which receives just impressions, and estimates things and

+objects at their real value. He must not allow himself to be elated by

+good news, or depressed by bad.

+

+The impressions he receives either successively or simultaneously in

+the course of the day, should be so classed as to take up only the

+exact place in his mind which they deserve to occupy; since it is upon

+a just comparison and consideration of the weight due to different

+impressions, that the power of reasoning and of right judgment depends.

+

+Some men are so physically and morally constituted as to see everything

+through a highly-colored medium. They raise up a picture in the mind on

+every slight occasion, and give to every trivial occurrence a dramatic

+interest. But whatever knowledge, or talent, or courage, or other good

+qualities such men may possess, nature has not formed them for the

+command of armies, or the direction of great military operations.

+

+

+NOTE.

+

+“The first quality in a general-in-chief,” says Montécuculli, “is a

+great knowledge of the art of war. This is not intuitive, but the

+result of experience. A man is not born a commander. He must become

+one. Not to be anxious; to be always cool; to avoid confusion in his

+commands; never to change countenance; to give his orders in the midst

+of battle with as much composure as if he were perfectly at ease. These

+are the proofs of valor in a general.

+

+“To encourage the timid; to increase the number of the truly brave; to

+revive the drooping ardor of the troops in battle; to rally those who

+are broken; to bring back to the charge those who are repulsed; to find

+resources in difficulty, and success even amid disaster; to be ready at

+a moment to devote himself, if necessary, for the welfare of the state.

+These are the actions which acquire for a general distinction and

+renown.”

+

+To this enumeration may be added, the talent of discriminating

+character, and of employing every man in the particular post which

+nature has qualified him to fill. “My principal attention,” said

+Marshal Villars, “was always directed to the study of the younger

+generals. Such a one I found, by the boldness of his character, fit

+to lead a column of attack; another, from a disposition naturally

+cautious, but without being deficient in courage, more perfectly to

+be relied on for the defence of a country.” It is only by a just

+application of these personal qualities to their respective objects,

+that it is possible to command success in war.

+

+

+

+

+MAXIM LXXIV.

+

+

+The leading qualifications which should distinguish an officer selected

+for the head of the staff, are, to know the country thoroughly; to

+be able to conduct a _reconnoissance_ with skill; to superintend the

+transmission of orders promptly; to lay down the most complicated

+movements intelligibly, but in a few words, and with simplicity.

+

+

+NOTE.

+

+Formerly, the duties of the chiefs of the staff were confined to the

+necessary preparations for carrying the plan of the campaign, and

+the operations resolved on by the general-in-chief, into effect.

+In a battle, they were only employed in directing movements and

+superintending their execution. But in the late wars, the officers

+of the staff were frequently intrusted with the command of a column

+of attack, or of large detachments, when the general-in-chief feared

+to disclose the secret of his plans by the transmission of orders or

+instructions. Great advantages have resulted from this innovation,

+although it was long resisted. By this means, the staff have been

+enabled to perfect their theory by practice, and they have acquired,

+moreover, the esteem of the soldiers and junior officers of the

+line, who are easily led to think lightly of their superiors, whom

+they do not see fighting in the ranks. The generals who have held

+the arduous situation of chief of the staff during the wars of the

+Revolution, have almost always been employed in the different branches

+of the profession. Marshal Berthier, who filled so conspicuously this

+appointment to Napoleon, was distinguished by all the essentials of a

+general. He possessed calm, and at the same time brilliant courage,

+excellent judgment, and approved experience. He bore arms during half

+a century, made war in the four quarters of the globe, opened and

+terminated thirty-two campaigns. In his youth he acquired, under the

+eye of his father, who was an engineer officer, the talent of tracing

+plans and finishing them with exactness, as well as the preliminary

+qualifications necessary to form a staff-officer. Admitted by the

+Prince de Lambesq into his regiment of dragoons, he was taught the

+skilful management of his horse and his sword--accomplishments so

+important to a soldier. Attached afterward to the staff of Count

+Rochambeau, he made his first campaign in America, where he soon began

+to distinguish himself by his valor, activity and talents. Having at

+length attained superior rank in the staff-corps formed by Marshal de

+Segur, he visited the camps of the King of Prussia, and discharged the

+duties of chief of the staff under the Baron de Bezenval.

+

+During nineteen years, consumed in sixteen campaigns, the history

+of Marshal Berthier’s life was little else but that of the wars of

+Napoleon, all the details of which he directed, both in the cabinet

+and the field. A stranger to the intrigues of politics, he labored

+with indefatigable activity; seized with promptitude and sagacity

+upon general views, and gave the necessary orders for attaining them

+with prudence, perspicuity, and conciseness. Discreet, impenetrable,

+modest; he was just, exact, and even severe, in everything that

+regarded the service; but he always set an example of vigilance and

+zeal in his own person, and knew how to maintain discipline, and to

+cause his authority to be respected by every rank under his orders.

+

+

+

+

+MAXIM LXXV.

+

+

+A commandant of artillery should understand well the general principles

+of each branch of the service, since he is called upon to supply

+arms and ammunition to the different corps of which it is composed.

+His correspondence with the commanding officers of artillery at the

+advanced posts, should put him in possession of all the movements of

+the army, and the disposition and management of the great park of

+artillery should depend upon this information.

+

+

+NOTE.

+

+After having recognized the advantage of intrusting the supply of

+arms and ammunition for an army to a military body, it appears to

+me extraordinary that the same regulation does not extend to that of

+provisions and forage, instead of leaving it in the hands of a separate

+administration, as is the practice at present.

+

+The civil establishments attached to armies are formed almost always at

+the commencement of a war, and composed of persons strangers to those

+laws of discipline which they are but too much inclined to disregard.

+These men are little esteemed by the military, because they serve only

+to enrich themselves, without respect to the means. They consider only

+their private interest in a service whose glory they cannot share,

+although some portion of its success depends upon their zeal. The

+disorders and defalcations incident to these establishments would

+assuredly cease, if they were confided to men who had been employed

+in the army, and who, in return for their labors, were permitted to

+partake with their fellow-soldiers the triumph of their success.

+

+

+

+

+MAXIM LXXVI.

+

+

+The qualities which distinguish a good general of advanced posts, are,

+to reconnoitre accurately defiles and fords of every description; to

+provide guides that may be depended on; to interrogate the _curé_

+and postmaster; to establish rapidly a good understanding with the

+inhabitants; to send out spies; to intercept public and private

+letters; to translate and analyze their contents; in a word, to be able

+to answer every question of the general-in-chief, when he arrives with

+the whole army.

+

+

+NOTE.

+

+Foraging parties, composed of small detachments, and which were usually

+intrusted to young officers, served formerly to make good officers

+of advanced posts; but now the army is supplied with provisions by

+regular contributions: it is only in a course of partisan warfare that

+the necessary experience can be acquired to fill these situations with

+success.

+

+A chief of partisans is, to a certain extent, independent of the army.

+He receives neither pay nor provisions from it, and rarely succor, and

+is abandoned during the whole campaign to his own resources.

+

+An officer so circumstanced must unite address with courage, and

+boldness with discretion, if he wishes to collect plunder without

+measuring the strength of his little corps with superior forces. Always

+harassed, always surrounded by dangers, which it is his business to

+foresee and surmount, a leader of partisans acquires in a short time an

+experience in the details of war rarely to be obtained by an officer

+of the line; because the latter is almost always under the guidance of

+superior authority, which directs the whole of his movements, while

+the talent and genius of the partisan are developed and sustained by a

+dependence on his own resources.

+

+

+

+

+MAXIM LXXVII.

+

+

+Generals-in-chief must be guided by their own experience, or their

+genius. Tactics, evolutions, the duties and knowledge of an engineer

+or artillery officer, may be learned in treatises, but the science

+of strategy is only to be acquired by experience, and by studying the

+campaigns of all the great captains.

+

+Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, and Frederick, as well as Alexander,

+Hannibal, and Cæsar, have all acted upon the same principles. These

+have been: to keep their forces united; to leave no weak part

+unguarded; to seize with rapidity on important points.

+

+Such are the principles which lead to victory, and which, by inspiring

+terror at the reputation of your arms, will at once maintain fidelity

+and secure subjection.

+

+

+NOTE.

+

+“A great captain can only be formed,” says the Archduke Charles, “by

+long experience and intense study: neither is his own experience

+enough--for whose life is there sufficiently fruitful of events to

+render his knowledge universal?” It is, therefore, by augmenting his

+information from the stock of others, by appreciating justly the

+discoveries of his predecessors, and by taking for his standard of

+comparison those great military exploits, in connection with their

+political results, in which the history of war abounds, that he can

+alone become a great commander.

+

+

+

+

+MAXIM LXXVIII.

+

+

+Peruse again and again the campaigns of Alexander, Hannibal, Cæsar,

+Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, Eugene, and Frederick. Model yourself

+upon them. This is the only means of becoming a great captain, and

+of acquiring the secret of the art of war. Your own genius will be

+enlightened and improved by this study, and you will learn to reject

+all maxims foreign to the principles of these great commanders.

+

+

+NOTE.

+

+It is in order to facilitate this object that I have formed the present

+collection. It is after reading and meditating upon the history of

+modern war that I have endeavored to illustrate, by examples, how the

+maxims of a great captain may be most successfully applied to this

+study. May the end I have had in view be accomplished!

+

+

+

+

+Transcriber’s Notes

+

+

+Cover created by Transcriber and placed in the Public Domain.

+

+Punctuation, hyphenation, and spelling were made consistent when a

+predominant preference was found in this book; otherwise they were not

+changed, except as noted below.

+

+Unusual and archaic spellings were not changed.

+

+Simple typographical errors were corrected; occasional unbalanced

+quotation marks retained.

+

+Ambiguous hyphens at the ends of lines were retained.

+

+Page 32: “spacious and extensive” was printed as “entensive” but

+changed here.

+

+Page 60: “1746” is a misprint; the correct date must be in the 1600's,

+perhaps “1646”.

+

+Page 63: “1798” may be a misprint for “1796”.

+

+Page 65: “1745” is a misprint; the correct year is “1645”.

+

+Page 75: “wo to the vanquished” was printed that way.

+

+Page 100: “Vauban” was printed as “Vanban” but changed here.

+

+

+

+

+

+End of Project Gutenberg's The Officer's Manual, by Napoleon Bonaparte

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+

+The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Officer's Manual, by Napoleon Bonaparte

+

+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most

+other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions

+whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of

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+www.gutenberg.org.  If you are not located in the United States, you'll have

+to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook.

+

+Title: The Officer's Manual

+       Napoleon's Maxims of War

+

+Author: Napoleon Bonaparte

+

+Release Date: December 23, 2015 [EBook #50750]

+

+Language: English

+

+Character set encoding: UTF-8

+

+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE OFFICER'S MANUAL ***

+

+

+

+

+Produced by Shaun Pinder, Charlie Howard, and the Online

+Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This

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+</pre>

+

+

+<div class="transnote center">

+<p class="center bold">Transcriber’s Note</p>

+<p class="covernote center">Cover created by Transcriber and placed into the Public Domain.</p>

+<p class="center">Table of Contents created by Transcriber and placed into the Public Domain.</p>

+</div>

+

+<h1 class="vspace">

+<span class="small">THE OFFICER’S MANUAL.</span><br /><br />

+NAPOLEON’S<br />

+<span class="larger gesperrt">MAXIMS OF WAR.</span></h1>

+

+<p class="p2 center vspace2"><span class="gesperrt">RICHMOND, VA.:<br />

+WEST &amp; JOHNSTON.</span><br />

+1862.

+</p>

+

+<p class="p2 center smaller vspace2">

+<span class="smcap">Evans &amp; Cogswell, Printers.<br />

+No. 3 Broad St., Charleston, S. C.</span>

+</p>

+

+<hr />

+

+<div class="chapter">

+<h2 id="CONTENTS">CONTENTS</h2>

+

+<div class="center"><div class="center-block vspacetoc">

+<a href="#RECOMMENDATION">RECOMMENDATION.</a><br />

+<a href="#PREFACE">PREFACE.</a><br />

+<a href="#NAPOLEONS">NAPOLEON’S</a><br />

+<a href="#MAXIM_I">MAXIM  I.</a><br />

+<a href="#MAXIM_II">MAXIM  II.</a><br />

+<a href="#MAXIM_III">MAXIM  III.</a><br />

+<a href="#MAXIM_IV">MAXIM  IV.</a><br />

+<a href="#MAXIM_V">MAXIM  V.</a><br />

+<a href="#MAXIM_VI">MAXIM  VI.</a><br />

+<a href="#MAXIM_VII">MAXIM  VII.</a><br />

+<a href="#MAXIM_VIII">MAXIM  VIII.</a><br />

+<a href="#MAXIM_IX">MAXIM  IX.</a><br />

+<a href="#MAXIM_X">MAXIM  X.</a><br />

+<a href="#MAXIM_XI">MAXIM  XI.</a><br />

+<a href="#MAXIM_XII">MAXIM  XII.</a><br />

+<a href="#MAXIM_XIII">MAXIM  XIII.</a><br />

+<a href="#MAXIM_XIV">MAXIM  XIV.</a><br />

+<a href="#MAXIM_XV">MAXIM  XV.</a><br />

+<a href="#MAXIM_XVI">MAXIM  XVI.</a><br />

+<a href="#MAXIM_XVII">MAXIM  XVII.</a><br />

+<a href="#MAXIM_XVIII">MAXIM  XVIII.</a><br />

+<a href="#MAXIM_XIX">MAXIM  XIX.</a><br />

+<a href="#MAXIM_XX">MAXIM  XX.</a><br />

+<a href="#MAXIM_XXI">MAXIM  XXI.</a><br />

+<a href="#MAXIM_XXII">MAXIM  XXII.</a><br />

+<a href="#MAXIM_XXIII">MAXIM  XXIII.</a><br />

+<a href="#MAXIM_XXIV">MAXIM  XXIV.</a><br />

+<a href="#MAXIM_XXV">MAXIM  XXV.</a><br />

+<a href="#MAXIM_XXVI">MAXIM  XXVI.</a><br />

+<a href="#MAXIM_XXVII">MAXIM  XXVII.</a><br />

+<a href="#MAXIM_XXVIII">MAXIM  XXVIII.</a><br />

+<a href="#MAXIM_XXIX">MAXIM  XXIX.</a><br />

+<a href="#MAXIM_XXX">MAXIM  XXX.</a><br />

+<a href="#MAXIM_XXXI">MAXIM  XXXI.</a><br />

+<a href="#MAXIM_XXXII">MAXIM  XXXII.</a><br />

+<a href="#MAXIM_XXXIII">MAXIM  XXXIII.</a><br />

+<a href="#MAXIM_XXXIV">MAXIM  XXXIV.</a><br />

+<a href="#MAXIM_XXXV">MAXIM  XXXV.</a><br />

+<a href="#MAXIM_XXXVI">MAXIM  XXXVI.</a><br />

+<a href="#MAXIM_XXXVII">MAXIM  XXXVII.</a><br />

+<a href="#MAXIM_XXXVIII">MAXIM  XXXVIII.</a><br />

+<a href="#MAXIM_XXXIX">MAXIM  XXXIX.</a><br />

+<a href="#MAXIM_XL">MAXIM  XL.</a><br />

+<a href="#MAXIM_XLI">MAXIM  XLI.</a><br />

+<a href="#MAXIM_XLII">MAXIM  XLII.</a><br />

+<a href="#MAXIM_XLIII">MAXIM  XLIII.</a><br />

+<a href="#MAXIM_XLIV">MAXIM  XLIV.</a><br />

+<a href="#MAXIM_XLV">MAXIM  XLV.</a><br />

+<a href="#MAXIM_XLVI">MAXIM  XLVI.</a><br />

+<a href="#MAXIM_XLVII">MAXIM  XLVII.</a><br />

+<a href="#MAXIM_XLVIII">MAXIM  XLVIII.</a><br />

+<a href="#MAXIM_XLIX">MAXIM  XLIX.</a><br />

+<a href="#MAXIM_L">MAXIM  L.</a><br />

+<a href="#MAXIM_LI">MAXIM  LI.</a><br />

+<a href="#MAXIM_LII">MAXIM  LII.</a><br />

+<a href="#MAXIM_LIII">MAXIM  LIII.</a><br />

+<a href="#MAXIM_LIV">MAXIM  LIV.</a><br />

+<a href="#MAXIM_LV">MAXIM  LV.</a><br />

+<a href="#MAXIM_LVI">MAXIM  LVI.</a><br />

+<a href="#MAXIM_LVII">MAXIM  LVII.</a><br />

+<a href="#MAXIM_LVIII">MAXIM  LVIII.</a><br />

+<a href="#MAXIM_LIX">MAXIM  LIX.</a><br />

+<a href="#MAXIM_LX">MAXIM  LX.</a><br />

+<a href="#MAXIM_LXI">MAXIM  LXI.</a><br />

+<a href="#MAXIM_LXII">MAXIM  LXII.</a><br />

+<a href="#MAXIM_LXIII">MAXIM  LXIII.</a><br />

+<a href="#MAXIM_LXIV">MAXIM  LXIV.</a><br />

+<a href="#MAXIM_LXV">MAXIM  LXV.</a><br />

+<a href="#MAXIM_LXVI">MAXIM  LXVI.</a><br />

+<a href="#MAXIM_LXVII">MAXIM  LXVII.</a><br />

+<a href="#MAXIM_LXVIII">MAXIM  LXVIII.</a><br />

+<a href="#MAXIM_LXIX">MAXIM  LXIX.</a><br />

+<a href="#MAXIM_LXX">MAXIM  LXX.</a><br />

+<a href="#MAXIM_LXXI">MAXIM  LXXI.</a><br />

+<a href="#MAXIM_LXXII">MAXIM  LXXII.</a><br />

+<a href="#MAXIM_LXXIII">MAXIM  LXXIII.</a><br />

+<a href="#MAXIM_LXXIV">MAXIM  LXXIV.</a><br />

+<a href="#MAXIM_LXXV">MAXIM  LXXV.</a><br />

+<a href="#MAXIM_LXXVI">MAXIM  LXXVI.</a><br />

+<a href="#MAXIM_LXXVII">MAXIM  LXXVII.</a><br />

+<a href="#MAXIM_LXXVIII">MAXIM  LXXVIII.</a><br />

+<a href="#Transcribers_Notes">Transcriber’s Notes</a>

+</div></div>

+

+</div>

+

+<hr />

+

+<div class="chapter">

+<h2><a id="RECOMMENDATION"></a>RECOMMENDATION.</h2>

+

+<p>“After refreshing my memory by looking over

+again ‘The Officer’s Manual,’ or ‘Maxims of Napoleon,’

+I think I may safely recommend the republication,

+in America, of the work in English, as likely to

+be called for by many officers, regular and volunteer.

+It contains a circle of maxims, deduced from the

+highest source of military science and experience,

+with practical illustrations of the principles taken

+from the most celebrated campaigns of modern times.

+The study of the book cannot fail to set all young

+officers on a course of inquiry and reflection greatly

+to their improvement.</p>

+

+<p class="sigright">

+“WINFIELD SCOTT.”

+</p>

+

+</div>

+

+<hr />

+

+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_5">5</a></span></p>

+

+<div class="chapter">

+<h2><a id="PREFACE"></a>PREFACE.</h2>

+

+<p>The publisher has reissued this little

+volume as a publication timely for the

+occasion. A collection of maxims which

+directed the military operations of the

+greatest captain of modern times, cannot

+fail to prove of great use to such young

+officers as really desire a knowledge of

+the art of war. The maxims are illustrated

+by instances drawn from the campaigns

+of Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne,

+Frederick, and Napoleon. These great

+men were all governed by the same

+principles, and it is by applying these

+principles to the perusal of their respective

+campaigns, that every military man

+will recognize their wisdom, and make<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_6">6</a></span>

+such use of them hereafter as his own

+particular genius shall point out.</p>

+

+<p>“And here, perhaps,” says the translator,

+Col. D’Aguilar, “my task might

+have been considered finished; but perceiving

+how incomplete the collection

+was alone, I have endeavored to supply

+the deficiency by having recourse for

+further illustration to the memoirs of

+Montécuculli, and the instructions of

+Frederick to his generals. The analogy

+of their principles with those of Napoleon,

+has convinced me that the art of

+war is susceptible of two points of view:

+one, which relates entirely to the acquirements

+and genius of the general; the

+other, which refers to matters of detail.</p>

+

+<p>“The first is the same in all ages, and

+with all nations, whatever be the arms

+with which they fight. Hence it follows

+that, in every age, great commanders

+have been governed by the same principles.</p>

+

+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_7">7</a></span></p>

+

+<p>“The business of detail, on the contrary,

+is controlled by existing circumstances.

+It varies with the character of

+a people, and the quality of their arms.</p>

+

+<p>“It is with a view to impress the justice

+of this remark, that I have sought

+for facts in different periods of history,

+to illustrate these maxims, and to prove

+that nothing is <em>problematical</em> in war; but

+that failure and success in military operations

+depend almost always on the natural

+genius and science of the chief.”</p>

+

+</div>

+

+<hr />

+

+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_9">9</a></span></p>

+

+<div class="chapter">

+<h2 class="vspace"><a id="NAPOLEONS"></a>NAPOLEON’S<br />

+<span class="larger gesperrt wspace">MAXIMS OF WAR.</span></h2>

+

+</div>

+

+<hr />

+

+<div class="chapter">

+<h2 class="nobreak"><a id="MAXIM_I"></a>MAXIM I.</h2>

+

+<p>The frontiers of states are either large

+rivers, or chains of mountains, or deserts.

+Of all these obstacles to the march of an

+army, the most difficult to overcome is

+the desert; mountains come next, and

+broad rivers occupy the third place.</p>

+

+<div class="note">

+<h3>NOTE.</h3>

+

+<p>Napoleon, in his military career, appears

+to have been called upon to surmount every

+difficulty which can occur in wars of invasion.</p>

+

+<p>In Egypt he traversed deserts, and vanquished

+and destroyed the Mamelukes, so

+celebrated for their address and courage.

+His genius knew how to accommodate itself

+to all the dangers of this distant enterprise,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_10">10</a></span>

+in a country ill adapted to supply the wants

+of his troops.</p>

+

+<p>In the conquest of Italy, he twice crossed

+the Alps by the most difficult passes, and at

+a season, too, which rendered this undertaking

+still more formidable. In three months

+he passed the Pyrenees, defeated and dispersed

+four Spanish armies. In short, from

+the Rhine to the Borysthenes, no natural

+obstacle could be found to arrest the rapid

+march of his victorious army.</p>

+

+</div></div>

+

+<hr />

+

+<div class="chapter">

+<h2><a id="MAXIM_II"></a>MAXIM II.</h2>

+

+<p>In forming the plan of a campaign, it

+is requisite to foresee everything the enemy

+may do, and to be prepared with the

+necessary means to counteract it.</p>

+

+<p>Plans of campaign may be modified

+<i xml:lang="la" lang="la">ad infinitum</i> according to circumstances&mdash;the

+genius of the general, the character

+of the troops, and the topography of the

+theatre of action.</p>

+

+<div class="note">

+<h3>NOTE.</h3>

+

+<p>Sometimes we see a hazardous campaign

+succeed, the plan of which is directly at variance<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_11">11</a></span>

+with the principles of the art of war.

+But this success depends generally on the

+caprice of fortune, or upon faults committed

+by the enemy&mdash;two things upon which a general

+must never count. Sometimes the plan

+of a campaign, although based on sound

+principles of war, runs the risk of failing at

+the outset if opposed by an adversary who

+acts at first on the defensive, and then, suddenly

+seizing the initiative, surprises by the

+skilfulness of his manœuvres. Such was the

+fate of the plan laid down by the Aulic council

+for the campaign of 1796, under the command

+of Marshal Wurmser. From his great

+numerical superiority, the marshal had calculated

+on the entire destruction of the French

+army, by cutting off its retreat. He founded

+his operations on the defensive attitude of

+his adversary, who was posted on the line

+of the Adige, and had to cover the siege of

+Mantua, as well as central and lower Italy.</p>

+

+<p>Wurmser, supposing the French army fixed

+in the neighborhood of Mantua, divided

+his forces into three corps, which marched

+separately, intending to unite at that place.

+Napoleon, having penetrated the design of

+the Austrian general, perceived the advantage

+to be derived from striking the first<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_12">12</a></span>

+blow against an army divided into three

+corps, with no communication between them.

+He hastened, therefore, to raise the siege of

+Mantua, assembled the whole of his forces,

+and by this means became superior to the

+imperialists, whose divisions he attacked and

+beat in detail. Thus Wurmser, who fancied

+he had only to march to certain victory,

+saw himself compelled, after ten days campaign,

+to retire with the remains of his army

+into the Tyrol, after a loss of twenty-five

+thousand men in killed and wounded, fifteen

+thousand prisoners, nine stand of colors, and

+seventy pieces of cannon.</p>

+

+<p>Hence, nothing is so difficult as to prescribe

+beforehand to a general the line of

+conduct he shall pursue during the course

+of a campaign. Success must often depend

+on circumstances that cannot be foreseen;

+and it should be remembered, likewise, that

+nothing cramps so much the efforts of genius

+as compelling the head of an army to be

+governed by any will but his own.</p>

+

+</div></div>

+

+<hr />

+

+<div class="chapter">

+<h2><a id="MAXIM_III"></a>MAXIM III.</h2>

+

+<p>An army which undertakes the conquest

+of a country, has its two wings<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_13">13</a></span>

+resting either upon neutral territories, or

+upon great natural obstacles, such as rivers

+or chains of mountains. It happens

+in some cases that only one wing is so

+supported; and in others that both are

+exposed.</p>

+

+<p>In the first instance cited, viz., where

+both wings are protected, a general has

+only to protect his front from being penetrated.

+In the second, where one wing

+only is supported, he should rest upon

+the supported wing. In the third, where

+both wings are exposed, he should depend

+upon a central formation, and never allow

+the different corps under his command to

+depart from this: for if it be difficult to

+contend with the disadvantage of having

+<em>two</em> flanks exposed, the inconvenience is

+doubled by having <em>four</em>, trebled if there

+be <em>six</em>&mdash;that is to say, if the army is divided

+into two or three different corps.

+In the first instance, then, as above quoted,

+the line of operation may rest indifferently

+on the right or on the left. In

+the second, it should be directed toward

+the wing in support. In the third, it<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_14">14</a></span>

+should be perpendicular to the centre of

+the army’s line of march. But in all

+these cases it is necessary, at a distance

+of every five or six days march, to have

+a strong post or an entrenched position

+upon the line of operation, in order to

+collect military stores and provisions, to

+organize convoys, to form of it a centre

+of movement, and establish a point of

+defence to shorten the line of operation

+of the army.</p>

+

+<div class="note">

+<h3>NOTE.</h3>

+

+<p>These general principles in the art of war

+were entirely unknown, or lost sight of, in

+the middle ages. The crusaders in their incursions

+into Palestine appear to have had

+no object but to fight and to conquer, so little

+pains did they take to profit by their

+victories. Hence, innumerable armies perished

+in Syria, without any other advantage

+than that derived from the momentary

+success obtained by superior numbers.</p>

+

+<p>It was by the neglect of these principles,

+also, that Charles XII, abandoning his line

+of operation and all communication with

+Sweden, threw himself into the Ukraine,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_15">15</a></span>

+and lost the greater part of his army by the

+fatigue of a winter campaign in a barren

+country destitute of resources.</p>

+

+<p>Defeated at Pultawa, he was obliged to

+seek refuge in Turkey, after crossing the

+Nieper with the remains of his army, diminished

+to little more than one thousand men.</p>

+

+<p>Gustavus Adolphus was the first who

+brought back the art of war to its true principles.

+His operations in Germany were

+bold, rapid, and well executed. He made

+success at all times conducive to future

+security, and established his line of operation

+so as to prevent the possibility of any

+interruption in his communications with

+Sweden. His campaigns form a new era in

+the art of war.</p>

+

+</div></div>

+

+<hr />

+

+<div class="chapter">

+<h2><a id="MAXIM_IV"></a>MAXIM IV.</h2>

+

+<p>When the conquest of a country is

+undertaken by two or three armies,

+which have each their separate line of

+operation, until they arrive at a point

+fixed upon for their concentration, it

+should be laid down as a principle, that<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_16">16</a></span>

+the union of these different corps should

+never take place near the enemy; because

+the enemy, in uniting his forces,

+may not only prevent this junction, but

+may beat the armies in detail.</p>

+

+<div class="note">

+<h3>NOTE.</h3>

+

+<p>In the campaign of 1757, Frederick,

+marching to the conquest of Bohemia with

+two armies, which had each their separate

+line of operation, succeeded, notwithstanding,

+in uniting them in sight of the Duke

+of Lorraine, who covered Prague with the

+imperial army; but his example should not

+be followed. The success of this march

+depended entirely on the inaction of the

+duke, who, at the head of seventy thousand

+men, did nothing to prevent the junction of

+the two Prussian armies.</p>

+

+</div></div>

+

+<hr />

+

+<div class="chapter">

+<h2><a id="MAXIM_V"></a>MAXIM V.</h2>

+

+<p>All wars should be governed by certain

+principles, for every war should have a

+definite object, and be conducted according

+to the rules of art. (A war should<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_17">17</a></span>

+only be undertaken with forces proportioned

+to the obstacles to be overcome.)</p>

+

+<div class="note">

+<h3>NOTE.</h3>

+

+<p>It was a saying of Marshal Villars, that

+when war is decided on, it is necessary to

+have exact information of the number of

+troops the enemy can bring into the field,

+since it is impossible to lay down any solid

+plan of offensive or defensive operation

+without an accurate knowledge of what

+you have to expect and fear. “When the

+first shot is fired,” observes Marshal Villars,

+“no one can calculate what will be the issue

+of the war. It is, therefore, of vast

+importance to reflect maturely before we

+begin it.” When once, however, this is

+decided, the marshal observes that the boldest

+and most extended plans are generally

+the wisest and the most successful. “When

+we are determined upon war,” he adds, “we

+should carry it on vigorously and without

+trifling.”</p>

+

+</div></div>

+

+<hr />

+

+<div class="chapter">

+<h2><a id="MAXIM_VI"></a>MAXIM VI.</h2>

+

+<p>At the commencement of a campaign,

+to <em>advance</em> or <em>not to advance</em>, is a matter<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_18">18</a></span>

+for grave consideration; but when once

+the offensive has been assumed, it must

+be sustained to the last extremity. However

+skilful the manœuvres in a retreat,

+it will always weaken the <em>morale</em> of an

+army, because, in losing the chances of

+success, these last are transferred to the

+enemy. Besides, retreats always cost

+more men and <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">materiel</i> than the most

+bloody engagements; with this difference,

+that in a battle the enemy’s loss is

+nearly equal to your own&mdash;whereas in a

+retreat the loss is on your side only.</p>

+

+<div class="note">

+<h3>NOTE.</h3>

+

+<p>Marshal Saxe remarks, that no retreats

+are so favorable as those which are made

+before a languid and unenterprising enemy,

+for when he pursues with vigor, the retreat

+soon degenerates into a rout. “Upon this

+principle it is a great error,” says the

+marshal, “to adhere to the proverb which

+recommends us to build a bridge of gold for

+a retreating enemy. No; follow him up

+with spirit, and he is destroyed!”</p>

+

+</div></div>

+

+<hr />

+

+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_19">19</a></span></p>

+

+<div class="chapter">

+<h2><a id="MAXIM_VII"></a>MAXIM VII.</h2>

+

+<p>An army should be ready every day,

+every night, and at all times of the day

+and night, to oppose all the resistance

+of which it is capable. With this view,

+the soldier should always be furnished

+completely with arms and ammunition;

+the infantry should never be without its

+artillery, its cavalry, and its generals;

+and the different divisions of the army

+should be constantly in a state to support,

+to be supported, and to protect

+itself.</p>

+

+<p>The troops, whether halted, or encamped,

+or on the march, should be

+always in favorable positions, possessing

+the essentials required for a field of battle;

+for example, the flanks should be

+well covered, and all the artillery so

+placed as to have free range, and to play

+with the greatest advantage. When an

+army is in column of march, it should

+have advanced guards and flanking parties,

+to examine well the country in front,

+to the right, and to the left, and always<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_20">20</a></span>

+at such distance as to enable the main

+body to deploy into position.</p>

+

+<div class="note">

+<h3>NOTE.</h3>

+

+<p>The following maxims, taken from the

+memoirs of Montécuculli, appear to me well

+suited to this place, and calculated to form a

+useful commentary on the general principles

+laid down in the preceding maxim:</p>

+

+<p>1. When war has been once decided on,

+the moment is past for doubts and scruples.

+On the contrary, we are bound to hope that

+all the evil which may ensue, will not; that

+Providence, or our own wisdom, may avert

+it; or that the want of talent on the part of

+the enemy may prevent him from benefiting

+by it. The first security for success is to

+confer the command on one individual.

+When the authority is divided, the opinions

+of the commanders often vary, and the operations

+are deprived of that <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">ensemble</i> which

+is the first essential to victory. Besides,

+when an enterprise is common to many, and

+not confined to a single person, it is conducted

+without vigor, and less interest is

+attached to the result.</p>

+

+<p>After having strictly conformed to all the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_21">21</a></span>

+rules of war, and satisfied ourselves that

+nothing has been omitted to ensure eventual

+success, we must then leave the issue in the

+hands of Providence, and repose ourselves

+tranquilly in the decision of a higher power.</p>

+

+<p>Let what will arrive, it is the part of a

+general-in-chief to remain firm and constant

+in his purposes; he must not allow himself

+to be elated by prosperity, nor to be depressed

+by adversity: for in war good and

+bad and fortune succeed each other by turns,

+form the ebb and flow of military operations.</p>

+

+<p>2. When your own army is strong and

+inured to service, and that of the enemy is

+weak and consists of new levies, or of troops

+enervated by long inaction, then you should

+exert every means to bring him to battle.</p>

+

+<p>If, on the other hand, your adversary has

+the advantage in troops, a decisive combat

+is to be avoided, and you must be content to

+impede his progress, by encamping advantageously,

+and fortifying favorable passes.

+When armies are nearly equal in force, it is

+desirable <em>not</em> to avoid a battle, but only to

+attempt to fight one to advantage. For this

+purpose, care should be taken to encamp always

+in front of the enemy; to move when

+he moves, and occupy the heights and advantageous<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_22">22</a></span>

+grounds that lie upon his line of

+march; to seize upon all the buildings and

+roads adjoining to his camp, and post yourself

+advantageously in the places by which

+he must pass. It is always something gained

+to make <em>him</em> lose time, to thwart his designs,

+or to retard their progress and execution.

+If, however, an army is altogether

+inferior to that of the enemy, and there is no

+possibility of manœuvring against him with

+success, then the campaign must be abandoned,

+and the troops must retire into the

+fortresses.</p>

+

+<p>3. The principal object of a general-in-chief,

+in the moment of battle, should be to

+secure the flanks of his army. It is true

+that natural positions may be found to effect

+this object, but these positions being fixed

+and immovable in themselves, they are only

+advantageous to a general who wishes to

+wait the shock of the enemy, and not to one

+who marches to the attack.</p>

+

+<p>A general can, therefore, rely only on the

+proper arrangement of his troops, to enable

+him to repel any attempt the adversary may

+make upon the front, or flanks, or rear of

+his army.</p>

+

+<p>If one flank of an army rests upon a river,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_23">23</a></span>

+or an impassable ravine, the whole of the

+cavalry may be posted with the other wing,

+in order to envelop the enemy more easily

+by its superiority in numbers.</p>

+

+<p>If the enemy has his flanks supported by

+woods, light cavalry or infantry should be

+despatched to attack him in flank or in rear

+during the heat of the battle. If practicable,

+also, an attack should be made upon the

+baggage, to add to his confusion.</p>

+

+<p>If you desire to beat the enemy’s left with

+your right wing, or his right with your

+left wing, the wing with which you attack

+should be reinforced by the <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">élite</i> of your

+army. At the same moment, the other wing

+should avoid battle, and the attacking wing

+brought rapidly forward, so as to overwhelm

+the enemy. If the nature of the ground

+admits, he should be approached by stealth,

+and attacked before he is on his guard. If

+any signs of fear are discoverable in the enemy,

+and which are always to be detected

+by confusion or disorder in his movements,

+he should be pursued immediately, without

+allowing him time to recover himself. It is

+now the cavalry should be brought into action,

+and manœuvre so as to surprise and

+cut off his artillery and baggage.</p>

+

+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_24">24</a></span></p>

+

+<p>4. The order of march should always be

+subservient to the order of battle, which last

+should be arranged beforehand. The march

+of an army is always well regulated when it

+is governed by the distance to be accomplished,

+and by the time required for its performance.

+The front of the column of march

+should be diminished or increased according

+to the nature of the country, taking care

+that the artillery always proceeds by the

+main road.</p>

+

+<p>When a river is to be passed, the artillery

+should be placed in battery upon the bank

+opposite the point of crossing.</p>

+

+<p>It is a great advantage, when a river

+forms a sweep or angle, and when a ford is

+to be found near the place where you wish

+to effect a passage. As the construction of

+the bridge proceeds, infantry should be advanced

+to cover the workmen, by keeping

+up a fire on the opposite bank; but the moment

+it is finished, a corps of infantry and

+cavalry, and some field-pieces, should be

+pushed across. The infantry should entrench

+itself immediately at the head of the bridge,

+and it is prudent, moreover, to fortify on the

+same side of the river, in order to protect

+the bridge in case the enemy should venture

+an offensive movement.</p>

+

+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_25">25</a></span></p>

+

+<p>The advanced guard of an army should

+be always provided with trusty guides, and

+with a corps of pioneers: the first to point

+out the best roads, the second to render

+these roads more practicable.</p>

+

+<p>If the army marches in detachments, the

+commander of each detachment should be

+furnished with the name of the place in

+writing, where the whole are to be reassembled;

+the place should be sufficiently removed

+from the enemy to prevent him from

+occupying it before the junction of all the

+detachments. To this end, it is of importance

+to keep the name a secret.</p>

+

+<p>From the moment an army approaches

+the enemy, it should march in the order in

+which it is intended to fight. If anything is

+to be apprehended, precautions are necessary

+in proportion to the degree of the danger.

+When a defile is to be passed, the troops

+should be halted beyond the extremity, until

+the whole army has quitted the defile.</p>

+

+<p>In order to conceal the movements of an

+army, it is necessary to march by night

+through woods and valleys, by the most retired

+roads, and out of reach of all inhabited

+places. No fires should be allowed; and, to

+favor the design still more, the troops should<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_26">26</a></span>

+move by verbal order. When the object of

+the march is to carry a post, or to relieve a

+place that is besieged, the advanced guard

+should march within musket shot of the

+main body, because then you are prepared

+for an immediate attack, and ready to overthrow

+all before you.</p>

+

+<p>When a march is made to force a pass

+guarded by the enemy, it is desirable to

+make a feint upon one point, while, by a

+rapid movement, you bring your real attack

+to bear upon another.</p>

+

+<p>Sometimes success is obtained by pretending

+to fall back upon the original line of

+march, and, by a sudden countermarch, seizing

+upon the pass, before the enemy is able

+to reoccupy it. Some generals have gained

+their point by manœuvring so as to deceive

+the enemy, while a detachment under the

+cover of high grounds has surprised the passage

+by a stolen march. The enemy being

+engaged in watching the movements of the

+main body, the detachment has an opportunity

+of entrenching itself in its new position.</p>

+

+<p>5. An army regulates its mode of encampment

+according to the greater or less degree

+of precaution, when circumstances require.

+In a friendly country the troops are divided,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_27">27</a></span>

+to afford better accommodation and supplies.

+But with the enemy in front, an army should

+always encamp in order of battle. With

+this view, it is of the highest importance to

+cover one part of the camp, as far as practicable,

+by natural defences, such as a river, a

+chain of rocks, or a ravine. Care should be

+taken also that the camp is not commanded,

+and that there is no obstacle to a free communication

+between the different corps, and

+which can prevent the troops from mutually

+succoring each other.</p>

+

+<p>When an army occupies a fixed camp, it is

+necessary to be well supplied with provisions

+and ammunition, or at least that these should

+be within certain reach and easily obtained.

+To insure this, the line of communication

+must be well established, and care taken not

+to leave an enemy’s fortress in your rear.</p>

+

+<p>When an army is established in winter

+quarters, its safety is best secured either by

+fortifying a camp (for which purpose a spot

+should be selected near a large commercial

+town, or a river affording facility of transport),

+or by distributing it in close cantonments,

+so that the troops should be near

+together, and capable of affording each other

+mutual support.</p>

+

+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_28">28</a></span></p>

+

+<p>The winter quarters of an army should be

+protected, likewise, by constructing small

+covered works on all the lines of approach

+to the cantonments, and by posting advanced

+guards of cavalry to observe the motions of

+the enemy.</p>

+

+<p>6. A battle is to be sought, when there is

+reason to hope for victory, or when an army

+runs the risk of being ruined without fighting;

+also when a besieged place is to be

+relieved, or when you desire to prevent

+a reinforcement from reaching the enemy.

+Battles are useful, likewise, when we wish

+to profit by a favorable opportunity which

+offers, to secure a certain advantage, such as

+seizing upon an undefended point or pass,

+attacking the enemy when he has committed

+a fault, or when some misunderstanding

+among his generals favors the undertaking.</p>

+

+<p>If an enemy declines an engagement, he

+may be compelled to it, either by besieging

+a place of importance, or by falling upon

+him unawares, and when he cannot easily

+effect his retreat. Or (after pretending to

+retire), by making a rapid countermarch,

+attacking him vigorously and forcing him to

+action.</p>

+

+<p>The different circumstances under which<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_29">29</a></span>

+a battle should be avoided or declined, are,

+when there is greater danger to be apprehended

+from defeat than advantage to be

+derived from victory; when you are very

+inferior to your adversary in numbers, and

+are expecting reinforcements; above all,

+when the enemy is advantageously posted,

+or when he is contributing to his own ruin

+by some inherent defect in his position, or

+by the errors and divisions of his generals.</p>

+

+<p>To gain a battle, each arm must be advantageously

+posted, and have the means

+of engaging its front and in flank. The

+wings must be protected by natural obstacles,

+where these present themselves, or by

+having recourse when necessary to the aid

+of art.</p>

+

+<p>The troops must be able to assist each

+other without confusion, and care must be

+taken that the broken corps do not fall

+back upon, and throw the rest into disorder.

+Above all, the intervals between

+the different corps must be sufficiently small

+to prevent the enemy from penetrating between

+them, for in that case you would be

+obliged to employ your reserves, and run

+the risk of being entirely overwhelmed.

+Sometimes victory is obtained by creating<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_30">30</a></span>

+a diversion in the middle of a battle, or

+even by depriving the soldier of all hope

+of retreat, and placing him in a situation

+where he is reduced to the necessity either

+to conquer or die.</p>

+

+<p>At the commencement of a battle, if the

+ground is level, you should advance to meet

+the enemy, in order to inspire the soldier

+with courage; but if you are well posted,

+and your artillery advantageously placed,

+then wait for him with determination: remembering

+always to fight resolutely, to

+succor opportunely those who require it,

+and never to bring your reserves into action

+except in the last extremity; and

+even then to preserve some support, behind

+which the broken corps may rally.</p>

+

+<p>When it is necessary to attack with your

+whole force, the battle should commence

+toward evening; because then, whatever

+be the issue, night will arrive to separate

+the combatants before your troops are exhausted.

+By this means, an opportunity

+is afforded of affecting an orderly retreat

+if the result of the battle requires it.</p>

+

+<p>During an action, the general-in-chief

+should occupy some spot whence he can,

+as far as possible, overlook his whole army.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_31">31</a></span>

+He should be informed, immediately, of

+everything that passes in the different

+divisions. He should be ready, in order to

+render success more complete, to operate

+with fresh troops upon those points where

+the enemy is giving way, and also to reinforce

+his own corps wherever they are inclined

+to yield. When the enemy is beaten,

+he must pursue him instantly, without

+giving him a moment to rally; on the

+other hand, if he is himself defeated, or

+despairs of victory, he must retreat in the

+best possible order.</p>

+

+<p>7. It shows great talent in a general

+to bring troops, who are prepared for action,

+into collision with those who are

+not: for example, fresh troops against those

+which are exhausted&mdash;brave and disciplined

+men against recruits. He must likewise be

+ready always to fall with his army upon

+a weak or detached corps, to follow the

+track of the enemy, and charge him among

+defiles before he can face about and get into

+position.</p>

+

+<p>8. A position is good when the different

+corps are so placed as to be engaged with

+advantage, and without any remaining unemployed.

+If you are superior in cavalry,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_32">32</a></span>

+positions are to be taken in plains and

+open ground; if in infantry, in an enclosed

+and covered country. If inferior in

+numbers, in confined and narrow places;

+if superior, in a spacious and extensive

+field. With a very inferior army, a difficult

+pass must be selected to occupy and

+fortify.</p>

+

+<p>9. In order to obtain every possible advantage

+from a diversion, we should ascertain

+first, that the country in which it is to

+be created is easily penetrated. A diversion

+should be made vigorously, and on those

+points where it is calculated to do the greatest

+mischief to the enemy.</p>

+

+<p>10. To make war with success, the following

+principles should never be departed

+from:</p>

+

+<p>To be superior to your enemy in numbers,

+as well as in <em>morale</em>; to fight battles in order

+to spread terror in the country; to divide

+your army into as many corps as may be

+effected without risk, in order to undertake

+several objects at the same time; to treat

+<span class="smcap smaller">WELL</span> those who yield, to <span class="smcap smaller">ILL</span> treat those who

+resist; to secure your rear, and occupy and

+strengthen yourself at the outset in some

+post which shall serve as a central point for<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_33">33</a></span>

+the support of your future movements; to

+guard against desertion; to make yourself

+master of the great rivers and principal

+passes, and to establish your line of communication

+by getting possession of the fortresses,

+by laying siege to them, and of the

+open country, by giving battle; for it is vain

+to expect that conquests are to be achieved

+without combats; although when a victory

+is won, they will be best maintained by

+uniting mildness with valor.</p>

+

+</div></div>

+

+<hr />

+

+<div class="chapter">

+<h2><a id="MAXIM_VIII"></a>MAXIM VIII.</h2>

+

+<p>A general-in-chief should ask himself

+frequently in the day: “What should I

+do if the enemy’s army appeared now in

+my front, or on my right, or my left?”

+If he have any difficulty in answering

+these questions, his position is bad, and

+he should seek to remedy it.</p>

+

+<div class="note">

+<h3>NOTE.</h3>

+

+<p>In the campaign of 1758, the position of

+the Prussian army at Hohen Kirk, being

+commanded by the batteries of the enemy,

+who occupied all the heights, was eminently<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_34">34</a></span>

+defective; notwithstanding, Frederick, who

+saw his rear menaced by the corps of Laudon,

+remained six days in his camp without seeking

+to correct his position. It would seem,

+indeed, that he was ignorant of his real danger:

+for Marshal Daun, having manœuvred

+during the night in order to attack by daybreak,

+surprised the Prussians in their lines

+before they were able to defend themselves,

+and by this means surrounded them completely.</p>

+

+<p>Frederick succeeded, however, in effecting

+his retreat with regularity, but not without

+the loss of ten thousand men, many general

+officers, and almost all of his artillery. If

+Marshal Daun had followed up his victory

+with greater boldness, the king of Prussia

+would never have been able to rally his

+army. On this occasion, Frederick’s good

+fortune balanced his imprudence.</p>

+

+<p>Marshal Saxe remarks, that there is more

+talent than is dreamt of in bad dispositions,

+if we possess the art of converting them into

+good ones when the favorable moment

+arrives. Nothing astonishes the enemy so

+much as this manœuvre; he has counted

+upon <em>something</em>; all his arrangements have

+been founded upon it accordingly&mdash;and at<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_35">35</a></span>

+the moment of attack it escapes him! “I

+must repeat,” says the marshal, “there is

+nothing that so completely disconcerts an

+enemy as this, or leads him to commit so

+many errors; for it follows, that if he does

+<em>not</em> change his arrangements, he is beaten;

+and if he <em>does</em> change them, in presence of

+his adversary, he is equally undone.”</p>

+

+<p>It seems to me, however, that a general

+who should rest the success of a battle upon

+such a principle, would be more likely to

+lose than to gain by it; for if he had to deal

+with a skilful adversary and an alert tactician,

+the latter would find time to take advantage

+of the previous bad arrangements,

+before he would be able to remedy them.</p>

+

+</div></div>

+

+<hr />

+

+<div class="chapter">

+<h2><a id="MAXIM_IX"></a>MAXIM IX.</h2>

+

+<p>The strength of an army, like the

+power in mechanics, is estimated by multiplying

+the mass by the rapidity; a rapid

+march augments the <em>morale</em> of an army,

+and increases its means of victory. Press

+on!</p>

+

+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_36">36</a></span></p>

+

+<div class="note">

+<h3>NOTE.</h3>

+

+<p>“Rapidity,” says Montécuculli, “is of importance

+in concealing the movements of an

+army, because it leaves no time to divulge

+the intention of its chief. It is, therefore,

+an advantage to attack the enemy unexpectedly,

+to take him off his guard, to surprise

+him, and let him feel the thunder before he

+sees the flash; but if too great celerity exhausts

+your troops, while, on the other hand,

+delay deprives you of the favorable moment,

+you must weigh the advantage against the

+disadvantage, and choose between.”</p>

+

+<p>Marshal Villars observes, that “in war

+everything depends upon being able to deceive

+the enemy; and having once gained

+this point, in never allowing him time to

+recover himself.” Villars has united practice

+to precept. His bold and rapid marches

+were almost always crowned with success.</p>

+

+<p>It was the opinion of Frederick that all

+wars should be short and rapid; because a

+long war insensibly relaxes discipline, depopulates

+the state, and exhausts its resources.</p>

+

+</div></div>

+

+<hr />

+

+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_37">37</a></span></p>

+

+<div class="chapter">

+<h2><a id="MAXIM_X"></a>MAXIM X.</h2>

+

+<p>When an army is inferior in number,

+inferior in cavalry, and in artillery, it is

+essential to avoid a general action. The

+first deficiency should be supplied by rapidity

+of movement; the want of artillery,

+by the nature of the manœuvres;

+and the inferiority in cavalry, by the

+choice of positions. In such circumstances,

+the <em>morale</em> of the soldier does much.</p>

+

+<div class="note">

+<h3>NOTE.</h3>

+

+<p>The campaign of 1814 in France was skilfully

+executed upon these principles. Napoleon,

+with an army inferior in number, an

+army discouraged by the disastrous retreats

+of Moscow and of Leipzig, and still more by

+the presence of the enemy in the French

+territory, contrived, notwithstanding, to supply

+his vast inequality of force by the rapidity

+and combination of his movements. By

+the success obtained at Champ-Aubert, Montmirail,

+Montereau, and Rheims, he began to

+restore the <em>morale</em> of the French army. The

+numerous recruits of which it was composed,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_38">38</a></span>

+had already acquired that steadiness

+of which the old regiments afforded them

+an example, when the capture of Paris, and

+the astonishing revolution it produced, compelled

+Napoleon to lay down his arms.</p>

+

+<p>But this consequence resulted rather from

+the force of circumstances than from any absolute

+necessity; for Napoleon, by carrying

+his army to the other side of the Loire,

+might easily have formed a junction with

+the armies of the Alps and Pyrenees, and

+have reappeared on the field of battle at the

+head of a hundred thousand men. Such a

+force would have amply sufficed to re-establish

+the chances of war in his favor; more

+especially as the armies of the allied sovereigns

+were obliged to manœuvre upon the

+French territory with all the strong places

+of Italy and France in their rear.</p>

+

+</div></div>

+

+<hr />

+

+<div class="chapter">

+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XI"></a>MAXIM XI.</h2>

+

+<p>To direct operations with lines far removed

+from each other, and without communications,

+is to commit a fault which

+always gives birth to a second. The<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_39">39</a></span>

+detached column has only its orders for

+the first day. Its operations on the following

+day depend upon what may have

+happened to the main body. Thus, this

+column either loses time upon emergency,

+in waiting for orders, or it will act without

+them, and at hazard. Let it therefore

+be held as a principle, that an army

+should always keep its columns so united

+as to prevent the enemy from passing between

+them with impunity. Whenever,

+for particular reasons, this principle is

+departed from, the detached corps should

+be independent in their operations. They

+should move toward a point fixed upon

+for their future junction. They should

+advance without hesitating, and without

+waiting for fresh orders; and every precaution

+should be taken to prevent an

+attack upon them in detail.</p>

+

+<div class="note">

+<h3>NOTE.</h3>

+

+<p>The Austrian army, commanded by Field-marshal

+Alvinzi, was divided into two corps,

+destined to act independently, until they

+should accomplish their junction before Mantua.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_40">40</a></span>

+The first of these corps, consisting of

+forty-five thousand men, was under the orders

+of Alvinzi. It was to debouch by Monte

+Baldo, upon the positions occupied by the

+French army on the Adige. The second

+corps, commanded by General Provéra, was

+destined to act upon the lower Adige, and

+to raise the blockade of Mantua. Napoleon,

+informed of the enemy’s movements,

+but not entirely comprehending his projects,

+confined himself to concentrating his masses,

+and giving orders to the troops to hold

+themselves in readiness to manœuvre. In

+the meantime, fresh information satisfied the

+general-in-chief of the French army that the

+corps which had debouched by La Coronna,

+over Monte Baldo, was endeavoring to form

+a junction with its cavalry and artillery&mdash;both

+which, having crossed the Adige at

+Dolce, were directing their march upon the

+plateau of Rivoli, by the great road leading

+by Incanole.</p>

+

+<p>Napoleon immediately foresaw that, by

+having possession of the plateau, he should

+be able to prevent this junction, and obtain

+all the advantages of the initiative. He accordingly

+put his troops in motion, and at

+two o’clock in the morning occupied that<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_41">41</a></span>

+important position. Once master of the point

+fixed upon for the junction of the Austrian

+columns, success followed all his dispositions.

+He repulsed every attack, made seven thousand

+prisoners, and took several standards

+and twelve pieces of cannon. At two o’clock

+in the afternoon, the battle of Rivoli was

+already gained, when Napoleon, learning

+that General Provéra had passed the Adige

+at Anghiari, and was directing his march

+upon Mantua, left to his generals the charge

+of following up the retreat of Alvinzi, and

+placed himself at the head of a division for

+the purpose of defeating the designs of Provéra.</p>

+

+<p>By a rapid march, he again succeeded in

+the initiatory movement, and in preventing

+the garrison of Mantua from uniting its force

+with the relieving army. The corps intrusted

+with the blockade, eager to distinguish

+itself under the eyes of the conqueror of

+Rivoli, compelled the garrison to retire into

+the place, while the division of Victor, forgetting

+the fatigues of a forced march, rushed

+with impetuosity on the relieving army in

+front. At this moment a sortie from the lines

+of St. George took him in flank, while the

+corps of Augereau, which had followed the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_42">42</a></span>

+march of the Austrian general, attacked him

+in rear. Provéra, surrounded on all sides,

+capitulated. The result of these two battles

+cost the Austrians three thousand men in

+killed and wounded, twenty-two thousand

+prisoners, twenty-four standards, and forty-six

+pieces of cannon.</p>

+

+</div></div>

+

+<hr />

+

+<div class="chapter">

+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XII"></a>MAXIM XII.</h2>

+

+<p>An army ought to have only one line

+of operation. This should be preserved

+with care, and never abandoned but in

+the last extremity.</p>

+

+<div class="note">

+<h3>NOTE.</h3>

+

+<p>“The line of communication of an army,”

+says Montécuculli, “must be certain and

+well established, for every army that acts

+from a distant base, and is not careful to

+keep this line perfectly open, marches upon

+a precipice. It moves to certain ruin, as may

+be seen by an infinity of examples. In fact,

+if the road by which provisions, ammunition

+and reinforcements are to be brought up, is

+not entirely secured&mdash;if the magazines, the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_43">43</a></span>

+hospitals, the depôts of arms, and the places

+of supply are not fixed and commodiously

+situated&mdash;not only the army cannot keep the

+field, but it will be exposed to the greatest

+dangers.”</p>

+

+</div></div>

+

+<hr />

+

+<div class="chapter">

+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XIII"></a>MAXIM XIII.</h2>

+

+<p>The distances permitted between corps

+of an army upon the march must be governed

+by the localities, by circumstances,

+and by the object in view.</p>

+

+<div class="note">

+<h3>NOTE.</h3>

+

+<p>When an army moves at a distance from

+the enemy, the columns may be disposed

+along the road so as to favor the artillery

+and baggage. But when it is marching into

+action, the different corps must be formed in

+close columns in order of battle. The generals

+must take care that the heads of the

+columns, which are to attack together, do not

+outstep each other, and that in approaching

+the field of action they preserve the relative

+intervals required for deployment.</p>

+

+<p>“The marches that are made preparatory<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_44">44</a></span>

+to a battle require,” says Frederick, “the

+greatest precaution.” With this view, he

+recommends his generals to be particularly

+on their guard, and to reconnoitre the ground

+at successive distances, in order to secure the

+initiative by occupying those positions most

+calculated to favor an attack. On a retreat,

+it is the opinion of many generals that an

+army should concentrate its forces, and

+march in close columns if it is still strong

+enough to resume the offensive; for by this

+means it is easy to form the line when a

+favorable opportunity presents itself, either

+for holding the enemy in check or for attacking

+him if he is not in a situation to

+accept battle.</p>

+

+<p>Such was Moreau’s retreat after the passage

+of the Adda by the Austro-Russian

+army. The French general, after having

+covered the evacuation of Milan, took up a

+position between the Po and the Tanaro.</p>

+

+<p>His camp rested upon Alexandria and

+Valentia, two capital fortresses, and had the

+advantage of covering the roads to Turin

+and Savona, by which he could effect his

+retreat in case he was unable to accomplish a

+junction with the <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">corps d’armee</i> of Macdonald,

+who had been ordered to quit the kingdom<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_45">45</a></span>

+of Naples, and hasten his march into

+Tuscany.</p>

+

+<p>Forced to abandon his position in consequence

+of the insurrection in Piedmont and

+Tuscany, Moreau retired upon Asti, where

+he learned that his communication with the

+river of Genoa had just been cut off by the

+capture of Ceva. After several ineffectual

+attempts to retake this place, he saw that

+his only safety depended upon throwing himself

+into the mountains.</p>

+

+<p>To effect this object, he directed the whole

+of his battering train and heavy baggage by

+the Col de Fenestrelle upon France; then

+opening himself a way over the St. Bernard,

+he gained Loano with his light artillery and

+the small proportion of field equipment he

+had been able to preserve.</p>

+

+<p>By this skilful movement, he not only retained

+his communications with France, but

+was enabled to observe the motions of the

+army from Naples, and to facilitate his junction

+with it by directing the whole of his

+force upon the points necessary for that

+purpose.</p>

+

+<p>Macdonald, in the meantime, whose only

+chance of success depended on concentrating

+his little army, neglected this precaution,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_46">46</a></span>

+and was beaten in three successive actions

+at the Trebia.</p>

+

+<p>By this retardment of his march, he rendered

+all Moreau’s measures to unite the

+two armies in the plains of the Po useless,

+and his retreat, after his brilliant but fruitless

+efforts at the Trebia, defeated the other

+arrangements, also, which the former had

+made to come to his support. The inactivity

+of Marshal Suwarrow, however, finally enabled

+the French general to accomplish his

+junction with the remains of the army from

+Naples. Moreau then concentrated his whole

+force upon the Appenines, and placed himself

+in a situation to defend the important

+positions of Liguria, until the chances of

+war should afford him an opportunity of resuming

+the offensive.</p>

+

+<p>When, after a decisive battle, an army has

+lost its artillery and equipments, and is consequently

+no longer in a state to assume the

+offensive, or even to arrest the pursuit of

+the enemy, it would seem most desirable to

+divide what remains into several corps, and

+order them to march by separate and distant

+routes upon the base of operation, and

+throw themselves into the fortresses. This

+is the only means of safety: for the enemy,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_47">47</a></span>

+uncertain as to the precise direction taken

+by the vanquished army, is ignorant in the

+first instance which corps to pursue, and it

+is in this moment of indecision that a march

+is gained upon him. Besides, the movements

+of a small body being so much easier

+than those of a larger one, these separate

+lines of march are all in favor of a retreating

+army.</p>

+

+</div></div>

+

+<hr />

+

+<div class="chapter">

+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XIV"></a>MAXIM XIV.</h2>

+

+<p>Among mountains, a great number of

+positions are always to be found very

+strong in themselves, and which it is dangerous

+to attack. The character of this

+mode of warfare consists in occupying

+camps on the flanks or in the rear of the

+enemy, leaving him only the alternative

+of abandoning his position without fighting,

+to take up another in the rear, or to

+descend from it in order to attack you.

+In mountain warfare, the assailant has

+always the disadvantage; even in offensive

+warfare in the open field, the great<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_48">48</a></span>

+secret consists in defensive combats, and

+in obliging the enemy to attack.</p>

+

+<div class="note">

+<h3>NOTE.</h3>

+

+<p>During the campaign of 1793, in the Maritime

+Alps, the French army, under the orders

+of General Brunet, did all in its power

+to get possession of the camps at Raus and

+at Fourches, by an attack in front. But

+these useless efforts served only to increase

+the courage of the Piedmontese, and to destroy

+the <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">élite</i> of the grenadiers of the republican

+army. The manœuvres by which Napoleon,

+without fighting, compelled the enemy

+to evacuate these positions in 1796, suffice to

+establish the truth of these principles, and

+to prove how much success in war depends

+upon the genius of the general as well as on

+the courage of the soldier.</p>

+

+</div></div>

+

+<hr />

+

+<div class="chapter">

+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XV"></a>MAXIM XV.</h2>

+

+<p>The first consideration with a general

+who offers battle, should be the glory and

+honor of his arms; the safety and preservation

+of his men is only the second; but<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_49">49</a></span>

+it is in the enterprise and courage resulting

+from the former, that the latter will

+most assuredly be found. In a retreat,

+besides the honor of the army, the loss of

+life is often greater than in two battles.

+For this reason, we should never despair

+while brave men are to be found with

+their colors. It is by this means that we

+obtain victory, and deserve to obtain it.</p>

+

+<div class="note">

+<h3>NOTE.</h3>

+

+<p>In 1645, the French army, under the orders

+of the Prince of Condé, was on the

+march to lay siege to Nordlingen, when it

+was discovered that Count Merci, who commanded

+the Bavarians, had foreseen this

+intention, and had entrenched himself in a

+strong position which defended Nordlingen

+at the same time that it covered Donawerth.</p>

+

+<p>Notwithstanding the favorable position of

+the enemy, Condé ordered the attack. The

+combat was terrible. All the infantry in

+the centre and on the right, after being

+successively engaged, was routed and dispersed,

+in spite of the efforts of the cavalry

+and the reserve, which were likewise carried

+away with the fugitives. The battle was<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_50">50</a></span>

+lost. Condé, in despair, having no longer

+either centre or right to depend upon, collected

+the remnants of his battalions, and

+directed his march to the left, where Turenne

+was still engaged. This perseverance reanimated

+the ardor of the troops. They

+broke the right wing of the enemy, and

+Turenne, by a change of front, returned to

+the attack upon his centre. Night, too,

+favored the boldness of Condé. An entire

+corps of Bavarians, fancying themselves cut

+off, laid down their arms; and the obstinacy

+of the French general in this struggle for

+victory was repaid by possession of the field

+of battle, together with a great number of

+prisoners, and almost all the enemy’s artillery.

+The Bavarian army beat a retreat,

+and the next day Nordlingen capitulated.</p>

+

+</div></div>

+

+<hr />

+

+<div class="chapter">

+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XVI"></a>MAXIM XVI.</h2>

+

+<p>It is an approved maxim in war, never

+to do what the enemy wishes you to do,

+for this reason alone, that he desires it.

+A field of battle, therefore, which he

+has previously studied and reconnoitred,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_51">51</a></span>

+should be avoided, and double care should

+be taken where he has had time to fortify

+and entrench. One consequence deducible

+from this principle is, never to attack

+a position in front which you can gain by

+turning.</p>

+

+<div class="note">

+<h3>NOTE.</h3>

+

+<p>It was without due regard to this principle,

+that Marshal Villeroi, on assuming the

+command of the army of Italy, during the

+campaign of 1701, attacked, with unwarrantable

+presumption, Prince Eugene, of

+Savoy, in his entrenched position of Chiavi,

+on the Oglio. The French generals, Catinat

+among the rest, considered the post unassailable,

+but Villeroi insisted, and the result

+of this otherwise unimportant battle was

+the loss of the <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">élite</i> of the French army. It

+would have been greater still, but for Catinat’s

+exertions.</p>

+

+<p>It was by neglecting the same principle,

+that the Prince of Condé, in the campaign

+of 1644, failed in all his attacks upon the

+entrenched position of the Bavarian army.

+The Count Merci, who commanded the latter,

+had drawn up his cavalry skilfully upon the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_52">52</a></span>

+plain, resting upon Freyberg, while his infantry

+occupied the mountain. After many

+fruitless attempts, the Prince of Condé,

+seeing the impossibility of dislodging the

+enemy, began to menace his communications&mdash;but

+the moment Merci perceived this,

+he broke up his camp and retired beyond

+the Black mountains.</p>

+

+</div></div>

+

+<hr />

+

+<div class="chapter">

+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XVII"></a>MAXIM XVII.</h2>

+

+<p>In a war of march and manœuvre, if

+you would avoid a battle with a superior

+army, it is necessary to entrench every

+night, and occupy a good defensive position.

+Those natural positions which are

+ordinarily met with, are not sufficient to

+protect an army against superior numbers

+without recourse to art.</p>

+

+<div class="note">

+<h3>NOTE.</h3>

+

+<p>The campaign of the French and Spanish

+army, commanded by the Duke of Berwick,

+against the Portuguese, in the year 1706,

+affords a good lesson on this subject. The

+two armies made almost the tour of Spain.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_53">53</a></span>

+They began the campaign near Badajoz, and

+after manœuvring across both Castiles, finished

+it in the kingdoms of Valencia and

+Murcia. The Duke of Berwick encamped

+his army eighty-five times, and although the

+campaign passed without a general action,

+he took about ten thousand prisoners from

+the enemy. Marshal Turenne also made a

+fine campaign of manœuvre against the

+Count Montécuculli, in 1675.</p>

+

+<p>The imperial army having made its arrangements

+to pass the Rhine at Strasburg,

+Turenne used all diligence, and, throwing a

+bridge over the river near the village of

+Ottenheim, three leagues below Strasburg,

+he crossed with the French army, and encamped

+close to the little town of Vilstet,

+which he occupied. This position covered

+the bridge of Strasburg, so that, by this

+manœuvre, Turenne deprived the enemy of

+all approach to that city.</p>

+

+<p>Upon this, Montécuculli made a movement

+with his whole army, threatening the bridge

+at Ottenheim, by which the French received

+their provisions from upper Alsace.</p>

+

+<p>As soon as Turenne discovered the design

+of the enemy, he left a detachment at Vilstet,

+and made a rapid march with his whole<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_54">54</a></span>

+force upon the village of Altenheim. This

+intermediate position between the two

+bridges, which he wished to preserve, gave

+him the advantage of being able to succor

+either of these posts before the enemy had

+time to carry them. Montécuculli seeing

+that any successful attack upon the bridges

+was not to be expected, resolved to pass

+the Rhine below Strasburg, and with this

+view returned to his first position at Offenburg.

+Marshal Turenne, who followed all

+the movements of the Austrian army, brought

+back his army also to Vilstet.</p>

+

+<p>In the meantime, this attempt of the

+enemy having convinced the French general

+of the danger to which his bridge had exposed

+him, removed it nearer to that of

+Strasburg, in order to diminish the extent

+of ground he had to defend.</p>

+

+<p>Montécuculli, having commanded the magistrates

+of Strasburg to collect materials

+for a bridge, moved to Scherzheim to receive

+them; but Turenne again defeated his projects

+by taking a position at Freistett, where

+he occupied the islands of the Rhine, and

+immediately constructed a stockade.</p>

+

+<p>Thus it was that, during the whole of

+this campaign, Turenne succeeded in gaining<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_55">55</a></span>

+the initiative of the enemy, and obliging

+him to follow his movements. He succeeded,

+also, by a rapid march, in cutting off Montécuculli

+from the Town of Offenburg, whence

+he drew his supplies, and would no doubt

+have prevented the Austrian general from

+effecting his junction with the corps of Caprara,

+had not a cannon-shot terminated this

+great man’s life.</p>

+

+</div></div>

+

+<hr />

+

+<div class="chapter">

+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XVIII"></a>MAXIM XVIII.</h2>

+

+<p>A general of ordinary talent occupying

+a bad position, and surprised by a superior

+force, seeks his safety in retreat; but

+a great captain supplies all deficiencies

+by his courage, and marches boldly to

+meet the attack. By this means he disconcerts

+his adversary; and if the latter

+shows any irresolution in his movements,

+a skilful leader, profiting by his indecision,

+may even hope for victory, or at least

+employ the day in manœuvring&mdash;at night

+he entrenches himself, or falls back to a

+better position. By this determined conduct<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_56">56</a></span>

+he maintains the honor of his arms,

+the first essential to all military superiority.</p>

+

+<div class="note">

+<h3>NOTE.</h3>

+

+<p>In 1653, Marshal Turenne was surprised

+by the Prince of Condé, in a position where

+his army was completely compromised. He

+had the power, indeed, by an immediate

+retreat, of covering himself by the Somme,

+which he possessed the means of crossing at

+Peronne, and whence he was distant only

+half a league; but, fearing the influence of

+this retrograde movement on the <em>morale</em> of

+his army, Turenne balanced all disadvantages

+by his courage, and marched boldly to

+meet the enemy with very inferior forces.

+After marching a league, he found an advantageous

+position, where he made every disposition

+for a battle. It was three o’clock

+in the afternoon; but the Spaniards, exhausted

+with fatigue, hesitated to attack

+him, and Turenne having covered himself

+with entrenchments during the night, the

+enemy no longer dared to risk a general

+action, and broke up his camp.</p>

+

+</div></div>

+

+<hr />

+

+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_57">57</a></span></p>

+

+<div class="chapter">

+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XIX"></a>MAXIM XIX.</h2>

+

+<p>The transition from the defensive to

+the offensive is one of the most delicate

+operations.</p>

+

+<div class="note">

+<h3>NOTE.</h3>

+

+<p>By studying the first campaign of Napoleon

+in Italy, we can learn what genius and

+boldness may effect in passing with an army

+from the <em>defensive</em> to the <em>offensive</em>. The army

+of the allies, commanded by General Beaulieu,

+was provided with every means that

+could render it formidable. Its force amounted

+to eighty thousand men, and two hundred

+pieces of cannon. The French army,

+on the contrary, could number scarcely thirty

+thousand men under arms, and thirty pieces

+of cannon. For some time there had been

+no issue of meat, and even the bread was

+irregularly supplied. The infantry was ill

+clothed, the cavalry wretchedly mounted.

+All the draught-horses had perished from

+want, so that the service of the artillery was

+performed by mules. To remedy these evils,

+large disbursements were necessary; and

+such was the state of the finances, that the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_58">58</a></span>

+government had only been able to furnish

+two thousand louis in specie for the opening

+of the campaign. The French army could

+not possibly exist in this state. To advance

+or retreat was absolutely necessary. Aware

+of the advantage of surprising the enemy at

+the very outset of the campaign by some

+decisive blow, Napoleon prepared for it by

+recasting the <em>morale</em> of his army.</p>

+

+<p>In a proclamation full of energy, he reminded

+them that an ignoble death alone

+remained for them, if they continued on the

+defensive; that they had nothing to expect

+from France, but everything to hope from

+victory. “Abundance courts you in the fertile

+plains of Italy,” said he; “are you deficient,

+soldiers, in constancy or in courage?”

+Profiting by the moment of enthusiasm

+which he had inspired, Napoleon concentrated

+his forces in order to fall with his

+whole weight on the different corps of the

+enemy. Immediately afterward, the battles

+of Montenotte, Milesimo, and Mondovi, added

+fresh confidence to the high opinion

+already entertained by the soldier for his

+chief; and that army which only a few days

+ago was encamped amid barren rocks, and

+consumed by famine, already aspired to the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_59">59</a></span>

+conquest of Italy. In one month after the

+opening of the campaign, Napoleon had terminated

+the war with the King of Sardinia,

+and conquered the Milanese. Rich cantonments

+soon dispelled from the recollection of

+the French soldier the misery and fatigue

+attendant on this rapid march, while a vigilant

+administration of the resources of the

+country reorganized the <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">materiel</i> of the

+French army, and created the means necessary

+for the attainment of future success.</p>

+

+</div></div>

+

+<hr />

+

+<div class="chapter">

+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XX"></a>MAXIM XX.</h2>

+

+<p>It may be laid down as a principle,

+that the line of operation should not be

+abandoned; but it is one of the most

+skilful manœuvres in war, to know how

+to change it, when circumstances authorize

+or render this necessary. An army

+which changes skilfully its line of operation

+deceives the enemy, who becomes

+ignorant where to look for its rear, or

+upon what weak points it is assailable.</p>

+

+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_60">60</a></span></p>

+

+<div class="note">

+<h3>NOTE.</h3>

+

+<p>Frederick sometimes changed his line of

+operation in the middle of a campaign; but

+he was enabled to do this, because he was

+manœuvring at that time in the centre of

+Germany&mdash;an abundant country, capable of

+supplying all the wants of his army in case

+his communications with Prussia were intercepted.</p>

+

+<p>Marshal Turenne, in the campaign of

+1746, gave up his line of communication to

+the allies in the same manner; but, like

+Frederick, he was carrying on the war at

+this time in the centre of Germany, and

+having fallen with his whole forces upon

+Rain, he took the precaution of securing

+to himself a depôt upon which to establish

+his base of operation.</p>

+

+<p>By a series of manœuvres, marked alike

+by audacity and genius, he subsequently

+compelled the imperial army to abandon

+its magazines, and retire into Austria for

+winter quarters.</p>

+

+<p>But these are examples which it appears to

+me should only be imitated when we have

+taken full measure of the capacity of our

+adversary, and above all, when we see no<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_61">61</a></span>

+reason to apprehend an insurrection in the

+country to which we transfer the theatre

+of war.</p>

+

+</div></div>

+

+<hr />

+

+<div class="chapter">

+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XXI"></a>MAXIM XXI.</h2>

+

+<p>When an army carries with it a battering

+train, or large convoys of sick and

+wounded, it cannot march by too short

+a line upon its depôts.</p>

+

+<div class="note">

+<h3>NOTE.</h3>

+

+<p>It is above all in mountainous countries,

+and in those interspersed with woods and

+marshes, that it is of importance to observe

+this maxim; for, the convoys and means of

+transport being frequently embarrassed in

+defiles, an enemy by manœuvring may easily

+disperse the escorts, or make even a successful

+attack upon the whole army, when it is

+obliged, from the nature of the country, to

+march in an extended column.</p>

+

+</div></div>

+

+<hr />

+

+<div class="chapter">

+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XXII"></a>MAXIM XXII.</h2>

+

+<p>The art of encamping in position is the

+same as taking up the line in order of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_62">62</a></span>

+battle in this position. To this end, the

+artillery should be advantageously placed,

+ground should be selected which is not

+commanded or liable to be turned, and,

+as far as possible, the guns should cover

+and command the surrounding country.</p>

+

+<div class="note">

+<h3>NOTE.</h3>

+

+<p>Frederick has remarked that, in order to

+be assured that your camp is well placed,

+you should see if, by making a small movement,

+you can oblige the enemy to make a

+greater; or, if after having forced him to

+retrograde one march you can compel him to

+fall back another.</p>

+

+<p>In defensive war, all camps should be entrenched

+in the front and wings of the position

+they occupy, and care should be taken

+that the rear is left perfectly open. If you

+are threatened with being turned, arrangements

+should be made beforehand for taking

+up a more distant position; and you should

+profit by any disorder in the enemy’s line of

+march, to make an attempt upon his artillery

+or baggage.</p>

+

+</div></div>

+

+<hr />

+

+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_63">63</a></span></p>

+

+<div class="chapter">

+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XXIII"></a>MAXIM XXIII.</h2>

+

+<p>When you are occupying a position

+which the enemy threatens to surround,

+collect all your force immediately, and

+menace <em>him</em> with an offensive movement.

+By this manœuvre, you will prevent him

+from detaching and annoying your flanks

+in case you should judge it necessary to

+retire.</p>

+

+<div class="note">

+<h3>NOTE.</h3>

+

+<p>This was the manœuvre practised by General

+Desaix, in 1798, near Radstadt. He made

+up for inferiority in numbers by audacity,

+and maintained himself the whole day in

+position in spite of the vigorous attacks of

+the Archduke Charles. At night he effected

+his retreat in good order, and took up a position

+in the rear.</p>

+

+<p>It was in accordance, also, with this principle,

+in the same campaign, that General

+Moreau gave battle at Biberach, to secure

+his retreat by the passes of the Black mountains.

+A few days after, he fought at Schliengen

+with the same object. Placed in a

+good defensive position, he menaced the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_64">64</a></span>

+Archduke Charles by a sudden return to the

+offensive, while his artillery and baggage

+were passing the Rhine by the bridge of

+Huningen, and he was making all the necessary

+arrangements for retiring behind that

+river himself.</p>

+

+<p>Here, however, I would observe, that the

+execution of such offensive demonstrations

+should be deferred always till toward the

+evening, in order that you may not be compromised

+by engaging too early in a combat

+which you cannot long maintain with success.</p>

+

+<p>Night, and the uncertainty of the enemy

+after an affair of this kind, will always favor

+your retreat, if it is judged necessary; but,

+with a view to mask the operation more

+effectually, fires should be lighted all along

+the lines, to deceive the enemy and prevent

+him from discovering this retrograde movement,

+for in a retreat it is a great advantage

+to gain a march upon your adversary.</p>

+

+</div></div>

+

+<hr />

+

+<div class="chapter">

+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XXIV"></a>MAXIM XXIV.</h2>

+

+<p>Never lose sight of this maxim: that

+you should establish your cantonments at<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_65">65</a></span>

+the most distant and best-protected point

+from the enemy, especially where a surprise

+is possible. By this means you will

+have time to unite all your forces before

+he can attack you.</p>

+

+<div class="note">

+<h3>NOTE.</h3>

+

+<p>In the campaign of 1745, Marshal Turenne

+lost the battle of Marienthal, by neglecting

+this principle; for if, instead of

+reassembling his divisions at Erbsthausen,

+he had rallied his troops at Mergentheim,

+behind the Tauber, his army would have

+been much sooner reunited; and Count Merci,

+in place of finding only three thousand

+men to fight at Erbsthausen (of which he

+was well informed), would have had the

+whole French army to attack in a position

+covered by a river.</p>

+

+<p>Some one having indiscreetly asked Viscount

+Turenne how he had lost the battle of

+Marienthal: “By my own fault,” replied the

+marshal; “but,” added he, “when a man has

+committed no faults in war, he can only

+have been engaged in it but a short time.”</p>

+

+</div></div>

+

+<hr />

+

+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_66">66</a></span></p>

+

+<div class="chapter">

+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XXV"></a>MAXIM XXV.</h2>

+

+<p>When two armies are in order of battle,

+and one has to retire over a bridge,

+while the other has the circumference of

+the circle open, all the advantages are in

+favor of the latter. It is then a general

+should show boldness, strike a decided

+blow, and manœuvre upon the flank of

+his enemy. The victory is in his hands.</p>

+

+<div class="note">

+<h3>NOTE.</h3>

+

+<p>This was the position of the French army

+at the famous battle of Leipzig, which terminated

+the campaign of 1813 so fatally for

+Napoleon; for the battle of Hanau was of

+no consequence, comparatively, in the desperate

+situation of that army.</p>

+

+<p>It strikes me that, in a situation like that

+of the French army previous to the battle

+of Leipzig, a general should never calculate

+upon any of those lucky chances which may

+arise out of a return to the offensive, but

+that he should rather adopt every possible

+means to secure his retreat. With this view,

+he should immediately cover himself with

+good entrenchments, to enable him to repel<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_67">67</a></span>

+with inferior numbers the attack of the enemy,

+while his own equipments are crossing

+the river. As fast as the troops reach the

+other side, they should occupy positions to

+protect the passage of the rear guard, and

+this last should be covered by a <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">tête de pont</i>

+as soon as the army breaks up its camp.

+During the wars of the Revolution, too little

+regard was paid to entrenchments; and it is

+for this reason we have seen large armies

+dispersed after a single reverse, and the fate

+of nations compromised by the issue of one

+battle.</p>

+

+</div></div>

+

+<hr />

+

+<div class="chapter">

+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XXVI"></a>MAXIM XXVI.</h2>

+

+<p>It is contrary to all true principle, to

+make corps, which have no communication

+with each other, act separately against

+a central force whose communications are

+cut off.</p>

+

+<div class="note">

+<h3>NOTE.</h3>

+

+<p>The Austrians lost the battle of Hohenlinden

+by neglecting this principle. The

+imperial army, under the orders of the archduke

+John, was divided into four columns,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_68">68</a></span>

+which had to march through an immense

+forest, previous to their junction in the plain

+of Anzing, where they intended to surprise

+the French. But these different corps, having

+no direct communication, found themselves

+compelled to engage separately with

+an enemy who had taken the precaution of

+concentrating his masses, and who could

+move them with facility in a country with

+which he had been long previously acquainted.</p>

+

+<p>Thus the Austrian army, enclosed in the

+defiles of the forest with its whole train of

+artillery and baggage, was attacked in its

+flanks and rear, and the archduke John was

+only enabled to rally his dispersed and shattered

+divisions under cover of the night.</p>

+

+<p>The trophies obtained by the French army

+on this day were immense. They consisted

+of eleven thousand prisoners, one hundred

+pieces of cannon, several stand of colors, and

+all the baggage of the enemy.</p>

+

+<p>The battle of Hohenlinden decided the fate

+of the campaign of 1800, and Moreau’s brilliant

+and well-merited success placed him in

+the rank of the first general of the age.</p>

+

+</div></div>

+

+<hr />

+

+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_69">69</a></span></p>

+

+<div class="chapter">

+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XXVII"></a>MAXIM XXVII.</h2>

+

+<p>When an army is driven from a first

+position, the retreating columns should

+rally always sufficiently in the rear, to

+prevent any interruption from the enemy.

+The greatest disaster that can happen, is

+when the columns are attacked in detail,

+and before their junction.</p>

+

+<div class="note">

+<h3>NOTE.</h3>

+

+<p>One great advantage which results from

+rallying your columns on a point far removed

+from the field of battle, or from the position

+previously occupied, is, that the enemy is

+uncertain as to the direction you mean to

+take.</p>

+

+<p>If he divides his force to pursue you, he

+exposes himself to see his detachments beaten

+in detail, especially if you have exerted all

+due diligence, and have effected the junction

+of your troops in sufficient time to get between

+his columns and disperse them one

+after the other.</p>

+

+<p>It was by a manœuvre of this kind in the

+campaign of Italy, in 1799, that General

+Melas gained the battle of Genola.</p>

+

+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_70">70</a></span></p>

+

+<p>General Championet commanded the

+French army, and endeavored to cut off the

+communication of the Austrians with Turin,

+by employing corps which manœuvred separately

+to get into their rear. Melas, who

+divined his project, made a retrograde march,

+by which he persuaded his adversary he was

+in full retreat, although the real object of his

+movement was to concentrate his forces at

+the point fixed for the junction of the different

+detachments of the French army, and

+which he beat and dispersed, one after

+another, by his great superiority in numbers.

+The result of this manœuvre, in which the

+Austrian general displayed vigor, decision,

+and foresight, secured to him the peaceable

+possession of Piedmont.</p>

+

+<p>It was also by the neglect of this principle

+that General Beaulieu, who commanded the

+Austro-Sardinian army in the campaign of

+1796, lost the battle of Milesimo after that

+of Montenotte.</p>

+

+<p>His object, in endeavoring to rally his

+different corps upon Milesimo, was, to cover

+the high roads of Turin and Milan; but

+Napoleon, aware of the advantages arising

+from the ardor of troops emboldened by

+recent success, attacked him before he could<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_71">71</a></span>

+assemble his divisions, and, by a series of

+skilful manœuvres, succeeded in separating

+the combined armies. They retired in the

+greatest disorder&mdash;the one by the road of

+Milan, the other by that of Turin.</p>

+

+</div></div>

+

+<hr />

+

+<div class="chapter">

+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XXVIII"></a>MAXIM XXVIII.</h2>

+

+<p>No force should be detached on the eve

+of a battle, because affairs may change

+during the night, either by the retreat of

+the enemy, or by the arrival of large reinforcements

+to enable him to resume the

+offensive, and counteract your previous

+arrangements.</p>

+

+<div class="note">

+<h3>NOTE.</h3>

+

+<p>In 1796, the army of the Sambre and

+Meuse, commanded by General Jourdan,

+effected a retreat, which was rendered still

+more difficult by the loss of his line of communication.

+Seeing, however, that the forces

+of the archduke Charles were scattered,

+Jourdan, in order to accomplish his retreat

+upon Frankfort, resolved to open himself a

+way by Wurtzburg, where there were at that<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_72">72</a></span>

+moment only two divisions of the Austrian

+army. This movement would have been attended

+with success, if the French general,

+believing he had simply these two divisions

+to contend with, had not committed the error

+of separating himself from the corps of Lefevre&mdash;which

+he left at Schweinfurt to cover

+the only direct communication of the army

+with its base of operation.</p>

+

+<p>The commission of this fault at the outset,

+added to some slowness in the march of the

+French general, secured the victory to the

+archduke, who hastened to concentrate his

+forces.</p>

+

+<p>The arrival of the two divisions, also, of

+Kray and Wartesleben, during the battle,

+enabled him to oppose fifty thousand men to

+the French army, which scarcely numbered

+thirty thousand combatants. This last was

+consequently beaten, and obliged to continue

+its retreat by the mountains of Fuldes, where

+the badness of the roads could be equalled

+only by the difficulty of the country.</p>

+

+<p>The division of Lefevre, amounting to fourteen

+thousand men, would, in all probability,

+have turned the scale in favor of Jourdan,

+had the latter not unfortunately conceived

+that two divisions only were opposing his

+passage to Wurtzburg.</p>

+

+</div></div>

+

+<hr />

+

+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_73">73</a></span></p>

+

+<div class="chapter">

+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XXIX"></a>MAXIM XXIX.</h2>

+

+<p>When you have resolved to fight a

+battle, collect your whole force. Dispense

+with nothing. A single battalion

+sometimes decides the day.</p>

+

+<div class="note">

+<h3>NOTE.</h3>

+

+<p>I think it here desirable to observe, that it

+is prudent before a battle to fix upon some

+point in rear of the reserve for the junction

+of the different detachments; for if, from

+unforeseen circumstances, these detachments

+should be prevented from joining before the

+action has commenced, they might be exposed,

+in case a retrograde movement should

+be found necessary, to the masses of the

+enemy. It is desirable also to keep the

+enemy in ignorance of these reinforcements,

+in order to employ them with greater effect.

+“A seasonable reinforcement,” says Frederick,

+“renders the success of a battle certain,

+because the enemy will always imagine

+it stronger than it really is, and lose courage

+accordingly.”</p>

+

+</div></div>

+

+<hr />

+

+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_74">74</a></span></p>

+

+<div class="chapter">

+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XXX"></a>MAXIM XXX.</h2>

+

+<p>Nothing is so rash or so contrary to

+principle, as to make a flank march before

+an army in position, especially when

+this army occupies heights at the foot

+of which you are forced to defile.</p>

+

+<div class="note">

+<h3>NOTE.</h3>

+

+<p>It was by a neglect of this principle that

+Frederick was beaten at Kollin in the first

+campaign of 1757. Notwithstanding prodigies

+of valor, the Prussians lost fifteen

+thousand men and a great portion of their

+artillery, while the loss of the Austrians did

+not exceed five thousand men. The consequence

+of this battle was more unfortunate

+still, since it obliged the King of Prussia to

+raise the siege of Prague, and to evacuate

+Bohemia.</p>

+

+<p>It was also by making a flank march

+before the Prussian army, that the French

+lost the disgraceful battle of Rosbach.</p>

+

+<p>This imprudent movement was still more

+to be reprehended, because the Prince de

+Soubise, who commanded the French army,

+was so negligent as to manœuvre, without<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_75">75</a></span>

+either advanced guards or flanking corps, in

+presence of the enemy. The result was,

+that his army, consisting of fifty thousand

+men, was beaten by six battalions and thirty

+squadrons. The French lost seven thousand

+men, twenty-seven standards, and a great

+number of cannon. The Prussians had only

+three hundred men disabled.</p>

+

+<p>Thus, by having forgotten this principle,

+<em>that a flank march is never to be made before

+an enemy in line of battle</em>, Frederick lost his

+army at Kollin; and Soubise, at Rosbach,

+lost both his army and his honor.</p>

+

+</div></div>

+

+<hr />

+

+<div class="chapter">

+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XXXI"></a>MAXIM XXXI.</h2>

+

+<p>When you determine to risk a battle,

+reserve to yourself every possible chance

+of success, more particularly if you have

+to deal with an adversary of superior

+talent; for if you are beaten, even in the

+midst of your magazines and your communications,

+wo to the vanquished!</p>

+

+<div class="note">

+<h3>NOTE.</h3>

+

+<p>“We should make war,” says Marshal

+Saxe, “without leaving anything to hazard,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_76">76</a></span>

+and in this especially consists the talent of a

+general. But when we have incurred the

+risk of a battle, we should know how to

+profit by the victory, and not merely content

+ourselves, according to custom, with

+possession of the field.”</p>

+

+<p>It was by neglecting to follow up the first

+success, that the Austrian army, after gaining

+the field of Marengo, saw itself compelled

+on the following day to evacuate the whole

+of Italy.</p>

+

+<p>General Melas, observing the French in

+retreat, left the direction of the movements

+of his army to the chief of his staff, and

+retired to Alexandria to repose from the

+fatigues of the day. Colonel Zach, equally

+convinced with his general that the French

+army was completely broken, and consisted

+only of fugitives, formed the divisions in

+column of route.</p>

+

+<p>By this arrangement, the imperial army

+prepared to enter upon its victorious march

+in a formation not less than three miles in

+depth.</p>

+

+<p>It was near four o’clock when General

+Desaix rejoined the French army with his

+division. His presence restored in some

+degree an equality between the contending<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_77">77</a></span>

+forces; and yet Napoleon hesitated for a

+moment whether to resume the offensive,

+or to make use of this corps to secure his

+retreat. The ardor of the troops to return

+to the charge, decided his irresolution. He

+rode rapidly along the front of his divisions,

+and addressing the soldiers&mdash;“We have retired

+far enough for to-day,” said he; “you

+know I always sleep upon the field of

+battle!”</p>

+

+<p>The army, with unanimous shout, proclaimed

+to him a promise of victory. Napoleon

+resumed the offensive. The Austrian

+advance guard, panic-struck at the sight of

+a formidable and unbroken body presenting

+itself suddenly at a point where, a few moments

+before, only fugitives were to be seen,

+went to the right about, and carried disorder

+into the mass of its columns. Attacked immediately

+afterward, with impetuosity, in its

+front and flanks, the Austrian army was

+completely routed.</p>

+

+<p>Marshal Daun experienced nearly the

+same fate as General Melas, at the battle

+of Torgau, in the campaign of 1760.</p>

+

+<p>The position of the Austrian army was

+excellent. It had its left upon Torgau, its

+right on the plateau of Siptitz, and its front

+covered by a large sheet of water.</p>

+

+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_78">78</a></span></p>

+

+<p>Frederick proposed to turn its right in

+order to make an attack upon the rear. For

+this purpose he divided his army into two

+corps, the one under the orders of Ziethen,

+with instructions to attack in front, following

+the edge of the water; the other under

+his own immediate command, with which he

+set out to turn the right of the Austrians.

+But Marshal Daun having had intimation of

+the movements of the enemy, changed his

+front by countermarching, and was thus

+enabled to repel the attacks of Frederick,

+whom he obliged to retreat. The two corps

+of the Prussian army had been acting without

+communication. Ziethen, in the meantime,

+hearing the fire recede, concluded that

+the king had been beaten, and commenced a

+movement by his left in order to rejoin him;

+but falling in with two battalions of the

+reserve, the Prussian general profited by this

+reinforcement to resume the offensive. Accordingly

+he renewed the attack with vigor,

+got possession of the plateau of Siptitz, and

+soon after of the whole field of battle. The

+sun had already set when the King of Prussia

+received the news of this unexpected

+good fortune. He returned in all haste, took

+advantage of the night to restore order in<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_79">79</a></span>

+his disorganized army, and the day after the

+battle occupied Torgau.</p>

+

+<p>Marshal Daun was receiving congratulations

+upon his victory, when he heard that

+the Prussians had resumed the offensive.

+He immediately commanded a retreat, and

+at daybreak the Austrians repassed the Elbe

+with the loss of twelve thousand men, eight

+thousand prisoners, and forty-five pieces of

+cannon.</p>

+

+<p>After the battle of Marengo, General Melas,

+although in the midst of his fortresses

+and magazines, saw himself compelled to

+abandon everything, in order to save the

+wreck of his army.</p>

+

+<p>General Mack capitulated after the battle

+of Ulm, although in the centre of his own

+country.</p>

+

+<p>The Prussians, in spite of their depôts

+and reserves, were obliged, after the battle

+of Jena, and the French after that of Waterloo,

+to lay down their arms.</p>

+

+<p>Hence, we may conclude that the misfortune

+that results from the loss of a battle,

+does not consist so much in the destruction

+of men and of <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">materiel</i> as in the discouragement

+which follows this disaster. The courage

+and confidence of the victors augment<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_80">80</a></span>

+in proportion as those of the vanquished

+diminish; and whatever may be the resources

+of an army, it will be found that a retreat

+will degenerate rapidly into a rout unless

+the general-in-chief shall succeed, by combining

+boldness with skill, and perseverance

+with firmness, in restoring the <em>morale</em> of his

+army.</p>

+

+</div></div>

+

+<hr />

+

+<div class="chapter">

+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XXXII"></a>MAXIM XXXII.</h2>

+

+<p>The duty of an advanced guard does

+not consist in advancing or retiring, but

+in manœuvring. An advanced guard

+should be composed of light cavalry, supported

+by a reserve of heavy cavalry, and

+by battalions of infantry, supported also

+by artillery. An advanced guard should

+consist of picked troops, and the general

+officers, officers and men, should be selected

+for their respective capabilities and

+knowledge. A corps deficient in instruction

+is only an embarrassment to an advanced

+guard.</p>

+

+<div class="note">

+<h3>NOTE.</h3>

+

+<p>It was the opinion of Frederick that an

+advanced guard should be composed of detachments<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_81">81</a></span>

+of troops of all arms. The commander

+should possess skill in the choice of

+ground, and he should take care to be instantly

+informed, by means of numerous

+patrols, of everything passing in the enemy’s

+camp.</p>

+

+<p>In war, it is not the business of an advanced

+guard to fight, but to observe the

+enemy, in order to cover the movements of

+the army. When in pursuit, the advanced

+guard should charge with vigor, and cut off

+the baggage and insulated corps of the retiring

+enemy. For this purpose, it should be

+reinforced with all the disposable light cavalry

+of the army.</p>

+

+</div></div>

+

+<hr />

+

+<div class="chapter">

+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XXXIII"></a>MAXIM XXXIII.</h2>

+

+<p>It is contrary to the usages of war to

+allow parks or batteries of artillery to

+enter a defile, unless you hold the other

+extremity. In case of retreat, the guns

+will embarrass your movements and be

+lost. They should be left in position,

+under a sufficient escort, until you are

+master of the opening.</p>

+

+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_82">82</a></span></p>

+

+<div class="note">

+<h3>NOTE.</h3>

+

+<p>Nothing encumbers the march of an army

+so much as a quantity of baggage. In the

+campaign of 1796, Napoleon abandoned his

+battering train under the walls of Mantua,

+after spiking the guns and destroying the

+carriages. By this sacrifice, he acquired a

+facility of manœuvring rapidly his little

+army, and obtained the initiative as well as

+a general superiority over the numerous but

+divided forces of Marshal Wurmser.</p>

+

+<p>In 1799, during his retreat in Italy, General

+Moreau being compelled to manœuvre

+among the mountains, preferred separating

+himself entirely from his reserve artillery,

+which he directed upon France by the Col

+de Fenestrelle, rather than embarrass his

+march with this part of his equipment.</p>

+

+<p>These are the examples we should follow;

+for if, by a rapidity of march, and a facility

+of concentration upon decisive points, the

+victory is gained, the <em>materiel</em> of an army is

+soon re-established. But if, on the other

+hand, we are beaten and compelled to retreat,

+it will be difficult to save our equipments,

+and we may have reason to congratulate<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_83">83</a></span>

+ourselves that we abandoned them in time

+to prevent them from augmenting the trophies

+of the enemy.</p>

+

+</div></div>

+

+<hr />

+

+<div class="chapter">

+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XXXIV"></a>MAXIM XXXIV.</h2>

+

+<p>It should be laid down as a principle,

+never to leave intervals by which the enemy

+can penetrate between corps formed

+in order of battle, unless it be to draw

+him into a snare.</p>

+

+<div class="note">

+<h3>NOTE.</h3>

+

+<p>In the campaign of 1757, the Prince of

+Lorraine, who was covering Prague with

+the Austrian army, perceived the Prussians

+threatening, by a flank movement, to turn

+his right. He immediately ordered a partial

+change of front by throwing back the infantry

+of that wing, so as to form a right angle

+with the rest of the line. But this manœuvre

+being executed in presence of the enemy,

+was not effected without some disorder.

+The heads of the columns having marched

+too quick, caused the rear to lengthen out,

+and when the line was formed to the right,

+a large interval appeared at the salient angle.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_84">84</a></span>

+Frederick, observing this error, hastened

+to take advantage of it. He directed his

+centre corps, commanded by the Duke of

+Bevern, to throw itself into this opening,

+and by this manœuvre decided the fate of

+the battle.</p>

+

+<p>The Prince of Lorraine returned to Prague,

+beaten and pursued, with the loss of sixteen

+thousand men and two hundred pieces of

+cannon.</p>

+

+<p>It should be observed at the same time,

+that this operation of throwing a corps into

+the intervals made by an army in time of

+battle, should never be attempted unless you

+are at least equal in force, and have an opportunity

+of outflanking the enemy on the

+one side or the other; for it is then only you

+can hope to divide his army in the centre,

+and insulate the wings entirely. If you are

+inferior in number, you run the risk of being

+stopped by the reverses, and overpowered

+by the enemy’s wings, which may deploy

+upon your flanks and surround you.</p>

+

+<p>It was by this manœuvre that the Duke of

+Berwick gained the battle of Almanza, in

+the year 1707, in Spain.</p>

+

+<p>The Anglo-Portuguese army, under the

+command of Lord Galloway, came to invest<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_85">85</a></span>

+Villena. Marshal Berwick, who commanded

+the French and Spanish army, quitted his

+camp at Montalegre, and moved upon this

+town to raise the siege. At his approach,

+the English general, eager to fight a battle,

+advanced to meet him in the plains of Almanza.

+The issue was long doubtful. The

+first line, commanded by the Duke of Popoli,

+having been broken, the Chevalier d’Asfeldt,

+who had charge of the second, drew up his

+masses with large intervals between them;

+and when the English, who were in pursuit

+of the first line, reached these reserves, he

+took advantage of their disorder to attack

+them in flank and defeated them entirely.</p>

+

+<p>Marshal Berwick, perceiving the success

+of this manœuvre, threw open his front, and

+deploying upon the enemy’s flanks, while

+the reserve sustained the attack in front,

+and the cavalry manœuvred in their rear,

+obtained a complete victory.</p>

+

+<p>Lord Galloway, wounded and pursued,

+collected with difficulty the remains of his

+army, and took shelter with them in Tortosa.</p>

+

+</div></div>

+

+<hr />

+

+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_86">86</a></span></p>

+

+<div class="chapter">

+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XXXV"></a>MAXIM XXXV.</h2>

+

+<p>Encampments of the same army should

+always be formed so as to protect each

+other.</p>

+

+<div class="note">

+<h3>NOTE.</h3>

+

+<p>At the battle of Dresden, in the campaign

+of 1813, the camp of the allies, although advantageously

+placed upon the heights on

+the left bank of the Elbe, was nevertheless

+extremely defective, from being traversed

+longitudinally by a deep ravine, which separated

+the left wing completely from the centre

+and the right. This vicious arrangement

+did not escape the penetrating eye of Napoleon.

+He instantly directed the whole of

+his cavalry and two corps of infantry against

+the insulated wing, attacked it with superior

+numbers, overthrew it, and took ten thousand

+prisoners, before it was possible to

+come to its support.</p>

+

+</div></div>

+

+<hr />

+

+<div class="chapter">

+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XXXVI"></a>MAXIM XXXVI.</h2>

+

+<p>When the enemy’s army is covered by

+a river, upon which he holds several <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">têtes de pont</i>, <span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_87">87</a></span>

+do not attack in front. This

+would divide your force and expose you

+to be turned. Approach the river in

+echelon of columns, in such a manner

+that the leading column shall be the only

+one the enemy can attack, without offering

+you his flank. In the meantime, let

+your light troops occupy the bank, and

+when you have decided on the point of

+passage, rush upon it and fling across

+your bridge. Observe that the point of

+passage should be always at a distance

+from the leading echelon, in order to deceive

+the enemy.</p>

+

+<div class="note">

+<h3>NOTE.</h3>

+

+<p>If you occupy a town or a village on the

+bank of a river, opposite to that held by the

+enemy, it is an advantage to make this spot

+the crossing point, because it is easier to

+cover your carriages and reserve artillery,

+as well as to mask the construction of your

+bridge, in a town, than in the open country.

+It is also a great advantage to pass a river

+opposite a village, when the latter is only

+weakly occupied by the enemy; because as

+soon as the advanced guard reaches the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_88">88</a></span>

+other side, it carries this post, makes a lodgment,

+and by throwing up a few defensive

+works, converts it easily into a <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">tête de pont</i>.

+By this means, the rest of the army is enabled

+to effect the passage with facility.</p>

+

+</div></div>

+

+<hr />

+

+<div class="chapter">

+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XXXVII"></a>MAXIM XXXVII.</h2>

+

+<p>From the moment you are master of a

+position which commands the opposite

+bank, facilities are acquired for effecting

+the passage of the river; above all, if this

+position is sufficiently extensive to place

+upon it artillery in force. This advantage

+is diminished, if the river is more than

+three hundred toises (or six hundred

+yards) in breadth, because the distance

+being out of the range of grape, it is easy

+for the troops which defend the passage

+to line the bank and get under cover.

+Hence it follows that if the grenadiers,

+ordered to pass the river for the protection

+of the bridge, should reach the other

+side, they would be destroyed by the

+fire of the enemy; because his batteries,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_89">89</a></span>

+placed at the distance of two hundred

+toises from the landing, are capable of a

+most destructive effect, although removed

+above five hundred toises from the batteries

+of the crossing force. Thus the

+advantage of the artillery would be exclusively

+his. For the same reason, the

+passage is impracticable, unless you succeed

+in surprising the enemy, and are

+protected by an intermediate island, or,

+unless you are able to take advantage of

+an angle in the river, to establish a crossfire

+upon his works. In this case, the

+island or angle forms a natural <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">tête de pont</i>,

+and gives the advantage in artillery to

+the attacking army.</p>

+

+<p>When a river is less than sixty toises

+(or one hundred and twenty yards) in

+breadth, and you have a post upon the

+other side, the troops which are thrown

+across derive such advantages from the

+protection of your artillery, that, however

+small the angle may be, it is impossible

+for the enemy to prevent the establishment

+of a bridge. In this case, the most

+skilful generals, when they have discovered<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_90">90</a></span>

+the project of their adversary, and

+brought their own army to the point of

+crossing, usually content themselves with

+opposing the passage of the bridge, by

+forming a semicircle round its extremity,

+as round the opening of a defile, and removing

+to the distance of three or four

+hundred toises from the fire of the opposite

+side.</p>

+

+<div class="note">

+<h3>NOTE.</h3>

+

+<p>Frederick observes, that “the passage of

+great rivers in the presence of the enemy is

+one of the most delicate operations in war.”

+Success on these occasions depends on secrecy,

+on the rapidity of the manœuvres,

+and the punctual execution of the orders

+given for the movements of each division.

+To pass such an obstacle in presence of an

+enemy, and without his knowledge, it is

+necessary not only that the previous dispositions

+should be well conceived, but that

+they should be executed without confusion.</p>

+

+<p>In the campaign of 1705, Prince Eugene,

+of Savoy, wishing to come to the assistance

+of the Prince of Piedmont, sought for a

+favorable point at which to force the passage<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_91">91</a></span>

+of the Adda, defended at that time by the

+French army, under the command of the

+Duke de Vendome.</p>

+

+<p>After having selected an advantageous

+situation, Prince Eugene erected a battery

+of twenty pieces of cannon on a position

+which commanded the entire of the opposite

+bank, and covered his infantry by a line of

+entrenched parallels constructed on the

+slope of the declivity.</p>

+

+<p>They were working vigorously at the

+bridge, when the Duke de Vendome appeared

+with his whole army. At first he seemed

+determined to oppose its construction, but

+after having examined the position of Prince

+Eugene, he judged this to be impracticable.</p>

+

+<p>He therefore placed his army out of reach

+of the prince’s batteries, resting both his

+wings upon the river, so as to form a bow,

+of which the Adda was the cord. He then

+covered himself with entrenchments and

+abattis, and was thus enabled to charge the

+enemy’s columns whenever they debouched

+from the bridge, and to beat them in detail.</p>

+

+<p>Eugene, having reconnoitred the position

+of the French, considered the passage impossible.

+He therefore withdrew the bridge,

+and broke up his camp during the night.</p>

+

+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_92">92</a></span></p>

+

+<p>It was by this manœuvre, also, that, in the

+campaign of 1809, the Archduke Charles

+compelled the French to reoccupy the isle

+of Lobau, after having debouched on the

+left bank of the Danube. The march of the

+Archduke Charles was wholly concentric.

+He menaced Grosaspern with his right, Esling

+with his centre, and Enzersdorf with

+his left.</p>

+

+<p>His army, with both wings resting on the

+Danube, formed a semicircle around Esling.

+Napoleon immediately attacked and broke

+the centre of the Austrians; but after having

+forced their first line, he found himself

+arrested by the reserves. In the meantime,

+the bridges upon the Danube had been destroyed,

+and several of his corps, with their

+parks of artillery, were still on the right

+bank. This disappointment, joined to the

+favorable position of the Austrians, decided

+Napoleon to re-enter the isle of Lobau, where

+he had previously constructed a line of field-works,

+so as to give it all the advantages of

+a well entrenched camp.</p>

+

+</div></div>

+

+<hr />

+

+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_93">93</a></span></p>

+

+<div class="chapter">

+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XXXVIII"></a>MAXIM XXXVIII.</h2>

+

+<p>It is difficult to prevent an enemy,

+supplied with pontoons, from crossing

+a river. When the object of an army,

+which defends the passage, is to cover a

+siege, the moment the general has ascertained

+his inability to oppose the passage,

+he should take measures to arrive before

+the enemy, at an intermediate position

+between the river he defends and the

+place he desires to cover.</p>

+

+<div class="note">

+<h3>NOTE.</h3>

+

+<p>Here we may observe, that this intermediate

+position should be reconnoitred, or

+rather, well entrenched beforehand; for the

+enemy will be unable to make an offensive

+movement against the corps employed in

+the siege, until he has beaten the army of

+observation; and the latter, under cover of

+its camp, may always await a favorable

+opportunity to attack him in flank or in

+rear.</p>

+

+<p>Besides, the army which is once entrenched

+in this manner, has the advantage of being<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_94">94</a></span>

+concentrated; while that of the enemy must

+act in detachments, if he wishes to cover his

+bridge, and watch the movements of the

+army of observation, so as to enable him to

+attack the besieging corps in its lines, without

+being exposed to an attempt on his rear,

+or being menaced with the loss of his bridge.</p>

+

+</div></div>

+

+<hr />

+

+<div class="chapter">

+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XXXIX"></a>MAXIM XXXIX.</h2>

+

+<p>In the campaign of 1645, Turenne was

+attacked with his army before Philipsburg

+by a very superior force. There was no

+bridge here over the Rhine, but he took

+advantage of the ground between the river

+and the place to establish his camp. This

+should serve as a lesson to engineer officers,

+not merely in the construction of fortresses,

+but of <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">têtes de pont</i>. A space should

+always be left between the fortress and

+the river, where an army may form and

+rally without being obliged to throw itself

+into the place, and thereby compromise

+its security. An army retiring upon Mayence

+before a pursuing enemy, is necessarily

+compromised; for this reason, because<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_95">95</a></span>

+it requires more than a day to pass the

+bridge, and because the lines of Cassel are

+too confined to admit an army to remain

+there without being blocked up. Two

+hundred toises should have been left between

+that place and the Rhine. It is

+essential that all <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">têtes de pont</i> before

+great rivers should be constructed upon

+this principle, otherwise they will prove a

+very inefficient assistance to protect the

+passage of a retreating army. <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">Têtes de

+pont</i>, as laid down in our schools, are of

+use only for small rivers, the passage of

+which is comparatively short.</p>

+

+<div class="note">

+<h3>NOTE.</h3>

+

+<p>Marshal Saxe, in the campaign of 1741,

+having passed the Moldau in quest of a detached

+corps of fourteen thousand men, which

+was about to throw itself into Prague, left a

+thousand infantry upon that river, with orders

+to entrench themselves upon a height

+directly opposite the <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">tête de pont</i>. By this

+precaution, the marshal secured his retreat,

+and also the facility of repassing the bridge

+without disorder, by rallying his divisions

+between the entrenched height and the <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">tête

+de pont</i>.</p>

+

+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_96">96</a></span></p>

+

+<p>Were these examples unknown to the generals

+of modern times, or are they disposed

+to think such precautions superfluous?</p>

+

+</div></div>

+

+<hr />

+

+<div class="chapter">

+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XL"></a>MAXIM XL.</h2>

+

+<p>Fortresses are equally useful in offensive

+and defensive warfare. It is true,

+they will not in themselves arrest an

+army, but they are an excellent means of

+retarding, embarrassing, weakening and

+annoying a victorious enemy.</p>

+

+<div class="note">

+<h3>NOTE.</h3>

+

+<p>The brilliant success of the allied armies in

+the campaign of 1814, has given to many

+military men a false idea of the real value of

+fortresses.</p>

+

+<p>The formidable bodies which crossed the

+Rhine and the Alps at this period, were enabled

+to spare large detachments to blockade

+the strong places that covered the frontiers

+of France, without materially affecting the

+numerical superiority of the army which

+marched upon the capital. This army was<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_97">97</a></span>

+in a condition, therefore, to act, without the

+fear of being menaced in its line of retreat.</p>

+

+<p>But at no period of military history were

+the armies of Europe so combined before, or

+governed so entirely by one common mind in

+the attainment of a single object. Under

+these circumstances, the line of fortresses

+which surround France was rendered unavailable

+during the campaign; but it would

+be very imprudent, therefore, to conclude

+that a frontier guarded by numerous fortresses

+may be passed with impunity; or

+that battles may be fought with these places

+in your rear, without previously besieging,

+or at least investing them with sufficient

+forces.</p>

+

+</div></div>

+

+<hr />

+

+<div class="chapter">

+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XLI"></a>MAXIM XLI.</h2>

+

+<p>There are only two ways of insuring the

+success of a siege. The first, to begin by

+beating the enemy’s army employed to

+cover the place, forcing it out of the field,

+and throwing its remains beyond some

+great natural obstacle, such as a chain of

+mountains, or large river. Having accomplished<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_98">98</a></span>

+this object, an army of observation

+should be placed behind the natural

+obstacle, until the trenches are finished

+and the place taken.</p>

+

+<p>But if it be desired to take the place in

+presence of a relieving army, without risking

+a battle, then the whole <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">materiel</i> and

+equipment for a siege are necessary to

+begin with, together with ammunition and

+provisions for the presumed period of its

+duration, and also lines of contravallation

+and circumvallation, aided by all the localities

+of heights, woods, marshes and

+inundations.</p>

+

+<p>Having no longer occasion to keep up

+communications with your depôts, it is

+now only requisite to hold in check the

+relieving army. For this purpose, an army

+of observation should be formed, whose

+business it is never to lose sight of that of

+the enemy, and which, while it effectually

+bars all access to the place, has always

+time enough to arrive upon his flanks or

+rear in case he should attempt to steal a

+march.</p>

+

+<p>It is to be remembered, too, that by<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_99">99</a></span>

+profiting judiciously by the lines of contravallation,

+a portion of the besieging

+army will always be available in giving

+battle to the approaching enemy.</p>

+

+<p>Upon the same general principle, when

+a place is to be besieged in presence of an

+enemy’s army, it is necessary to cover the

+siege by lines of <em>circumvallation</em>.</p>

+

+<p>If the besieging force is of numerical

+strength enough (after leaving a corps

+before the place four times the amount

+of the garrison) to cope with the relieving

+army, it may remove more than one

+day’s march from the place; but if it be

+inferior in numbers after providing for

+the siege, as above stated, it should remain

+only a short day’s march from the

+spot, in order to fall back upon its lines,

+if necessary, or receive succor in case of

+attack.</p>

+

+<p>If the investing corps and army of

+observation are only equal when united

+to the relieving force, the besieging army

+should remain entire within, or near its

+lines, and push the works and the siege

+with the greatest activity.</p>

+

+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_100">100</a></span></p>

+

+<div class="note">

+<h3>NOTE.</h3>

+

+<p>“When we undertake a siege,” says Montécuculli,

+“we should not seek to place ourselves

+opposite the weakest part of the fortress,

+but at the point most favorable for

+establishing a camp and executing the designs

+we have in view.”</p>

+

+<p>This maxim was well understood by the

+Duke of Berwick. Sent to form the siege of

+Nice in 1706, he determined to attack on the

+side of Montalban, contrary to the advice of

+Vauban, and even to the orders of the king.

+Having a very small army at his disposal,

+he began by securing his camp. This he did

+by constructing redoubts upon the heights

+that shut in the space between the Var and

+the Paillon, two rivers which supported his

+flanks. By this means, he protected himself

+against a surprise; for the Duke of Savoy,

+having the power of debouching suddenly

+by the Col de Tende, it was necessary that

+the marshal should be enabled to assemble

+his forces, so as to move rapidly upon his

+adversary, and fight him before he got into

+position; otherwise his inferiority in numbers

+would have obliged him to raise the

+siege.</p>

+

+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_101">101</a></span></p>

+

+<p>When Marshal Saxe was besieging Brussels,

+with only twenty-eight thousand men,

+opposed to a garrison of twelve thousand,

+he received intelligence that the Prince of

+Waldeck was assembling his forces to raise

+the siege. Not being strong enough to form

+an army of observation, the marshal reconnoitred

+a field of battle on the little river Voluve,

+and made all the necessary dispositions

+for moving rapidly to the spot, in case of

+the approach of the enemy. By this means

+he was prepared to receive his adversary

+without discontinuing the operations of the

+siege.</p>

+

+</div></div>

+

+<hr />

+

+<div class="chapter">

+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XLII"></a>MAXIM XLII.</h2>

+

+<p>Feuquière says that “we should never

+wait for the enemy in the lines of circumvallation,

+but we should go out and attack

+him.” He is in error. There is no authority

+in war without exception; and it

+would be dangerous to proscribe the principle

+of awaiting the enemy within the

+lines of circumvallation.</p>

+

+<div class="note">

+<h3>NOTE.</h3>

+

+<p>During the siege of Mons, in 1691, the

+Prince of Orange assembled his army, and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_102">102</a></span>

+advanced as far as Notre Dame de Halle,

+making a demonstration to succor the place.

+Louis XIV, who commanded the siege in

+person, called a council of war to deliberate

+on what was to be done in case the Prince

+of Orange approached. The opinion of

+Marshal Luxembourg was to remain within

+the lines of circumvallation, and that opinion

+prevailed.</p>

+

+<p>The marshal laid it down as a principle

+that, when the besieging army is not strong

+enough to defend the whole extent of circumvallation,

+it should quit the lines and

+advance to meet the enemy; but when it is

+strong enough to encamp in two lines around

+a place, that it is better to profit by a good

+entrenchment&mdash;more especially as by this

+means the siege is not interrupted.</p>

+

+<p>In 1658, Marshal Turenne was besieging

+Dunkirk. He had already opened the

+trenches, when the Spanish army, under

+the orders of the Prince Don Juan, Condé,

+and D’Hocquincourt, appeared in sight, and

+took post upon the Downs, at a distance of

+a league from his lines. Turenne had the

+superiority in numbers, and he determined

+to quit his entrenchments. He had other

+advantages also. The enemy was without<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_103">103</a></span>

+artillery, and their superiority in cavalry

+was rendered useless by the unfavorable

+nature of the ground. It was, therefore, of

+great importance to beat the Spanish army

+before it had time to entrench itself and

+bring up its artillery. The victory gained

+by the French on this occasion justified all

+the combinations of Marshal Turenne.</p>

+

+<p>When Marshal Berwick was laying siege

+to Philipsburg, in 1733, he had reason to

+apprehend that the Prince of Savoy would

+attack him with all the forces of the empire

+before its termination. The marshal, therefore,

+after having made his disposition of

+the troops intended for the siege, formed,

+with the rest of his army, a corps of observation

+to make head against Prince Eugene,

+in case the latter should choose to attack

+him in his lines, or attempt a diversion on

+the Moselle or Upper Rhine. Prince Eugene,

+having arrived in front of the besieging

+army, some general officers were of

+opinion that it was better not to await the

+enemy in the lines, but to move forward

+and attack him. But Marshal Berwick, who

+agreed with the Duke of Luxembourg, that

+an army which can occupy, completely, good

+entrenchments is not liable to be forced, persisted<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_104">104</a></span>

+in remaining within his works. The

+result proved that this was also the opinion of

+Prince Eugene, for he did not dare to attack

+the entrenchments, which he would not have

+failed to do if he had any hopes of success.</p>

+

+</div></div>

+

+<hr />

+

+<div class="chapter">

+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XLIII"></a>MAXIM XLIII.</h2>

+

+<p>Those who proscribe lines of circumvallation,

+and all the assistance which the

+science of the engineer can afford, deprive

+themselves gratuitously of an auxiliary

+which is never injurious, almost always

+useful, and often indispensable. It must

+be admitted, at the same time, that the

+principles of field-fortification require improvement.

+This important branch of

+the art of war has made no progress since

+the time of the ancients. It is even inferior

+at this day to what it was two thousand

+years ago. Engineer officers should

+be encouraged in bringing this branch of

+their art to perfection, and in placing it

+upon a level with the rest.</p>

+

+<div class="note">

+<h3>NOTE.</h3>

+

+<p>“If we are inferior in numbers,” says

+Marshal Saxe, “entrenchments are of no<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_105">105</a></span>

+use, for the enemy will bring all his forces

+to bear upon particular points. If we are

+of equal strength they are unnecessary also.

+If we are superior, we do not want them.

+Then why give ourselves the trouble to entrench?”

+Notwithstanding this opinion of

+the inutility of entrenchments, Marshal Saxe

+often had recourse to them.</p>

+

+<p>In 1797, Generals Provéra and Hohenzollern

+having presented themselves before

+Mantua (where Marshal Wurmser was shut

+up), for the purpose of raising the siege,

+they were stopped by the lines of contravallation

+of St. George. This slight obstacle

+sufficed to afford Napoleon time to arrive

+from Rivoli and defeat their enterprise. It

+was in consequence of neglecting to entrench

+themselves that the French had been

+obliged to raise the siege in the preceding

+campaign.</p>

+

+</div></div>

+

+<hr />

+

+<div class="chapter">

+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XLIV"></a>MAXIM XLIV.</h2>

+

+<p>If circumstances prevent a sufficient

+garrison being left to defend a fortified

+town, which contains an hospital and

+magazines, at least every means should<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_106">106</a></span>

+be employed to secure the citadel against

+a <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">coup de main</i>.</p>

+

+<div class="note">

+<h3>NOTE.</h3>

+

+<p>A few battalions dispersed about a town,

+inspire no terror; but shut up in the more

+narrow outline of a citadel, they assume an

+imposing attitude. For this reason it appears

+to me that such a precaution is always

+necessary, not only in fortresses, but

+wherever there are hospitals or depôts of any

+kind. Where there is no citadel, some quarter

+of the town should be fixed upon most

+favorable for defence, and entrenched in such

+a manner as to oppose the greatest resistance

+possible.</p>

+

+</div></div>

+

+<hr />

+

+<div class="chapter">

+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XLV"></a>MAXIM XLV.</h2>

+

+<p>A fortified place can only protect the

+garrison and detain the enemy for a certain

+time. When this time has elapsed,

+and the defences of the place are destroyed,

+the garrison should lay down its arms.

+All civilized nations are agreed on this

+point, and there never has been an argument<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_107">107</a></span>

+except with reference to the greater

+or less degree of defence which a governor

+is bound to make before he capitulates.

+At the same time, there are generals&mdash;Villars

+among the number&mdash;who are of

+opinion that a governor should never surrender,

+but that in the last extremity he

+should blow up the fortifications, and take

+advantage of the night to cut his way

+through the besieging army. Where he

+is unable to blow up the fortifications, he

+may always retire, they say, with his garrison,

+and save the men.</p>

+

+<p>Officers who have adopted this line of

+conduct, have often brought off three-fourths

+of their garrison.</p>

+

+<div class="note">

+<h3>NOTE.</h3>

+

+<p>In 1705, the French, who were besieged in

+Haguenau by Count Thungen, found themselves

+incapable of sustaining an assault.

+Péri, the governor, who had already distinguished

+himself by a vigorous defence,

+despairing of being allowed to capitulate on

+any terms short of becoming prisoner of

+war, resolved to abandon the place and cut

+his way through the besiegers.</p>

+

+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_108">108</a></span></p>

+

+<p>In order to conceal his intention more

+effectually, and while he deceived the enemy,

+to sound at the same time the disposition of

+his officers, he assembled a council of war

+and declared his resolution to die in the

+breach. Then, under pretext of the extremity

+to which he was reduced, he commanded

+the whole garrison under arms; and

+leaving only a few sharpshooters in the

+breach, gave the order to march, and set out

+in silence, under cover of the night, from

+Haguenau. This audacious enterprise was

+crowned with success, and Péri reached Saverne

+without having suffered the smallest

+loss.</p>

+

+<p>Two fine instances of defence in later times

+are those of Massena at Genoa, and of Palafox

+at Saragossa.</p>

+

+<p>The first marched out with arms and baggage,

+and all the honors of war, after rejecting

+every summons, and defending himself

+until hunger alone compelled him to capitulate.

+The second only yielded after having

+buried his garrison amid the ruins of the

+city, which he defended from house to house,

+until famine and death left him no alternative

+but to surrender. This siege, which

+was equally honorable to the French as to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_109">109</a></span>

+the Spaniards, is one of the most memorable

+in the history of war. In the course of it,

+Palafox displayed every possible resource

+which courage and obstinacy can supply in

+the defence of a fortress.</p>

+

+<p>All real strength is founded in the mind;

+and on this account I am of opinion that we

+should be directed in the choice of a governor,

+less by his genius than his personal

+character. His most essential qualities should

+be courage, perseverance, and soldierlike devotedness.

+Above all, he should possess the

+talent not only of infusing courage into the

+garrison, but of kindling a spirit of resistance

+in the whole population. Where the latter

+is wanting, however art may multiply the

+defences of a place, the garrison will be compelled

+to capitulate after having sustained

+the first, or at most, the second assault.</p>

+

+</div></div>

+

+<hr />

+

+<div class="chapter">

+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XLVI"></a>MAXIM XLVI.</h2>

+

+<p>The keys of a fortress are well worth

+the retirement of the garrison, when it is

+resolved to yield only on those conditions.

+On this principle it is always wiser to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_110">110</a></span>

+grant an honorable capitulation to a garrison

+which has made a vigorous resistance,

+than to risk an assault.</p>

+

+<div class="note">

+<h3>NOTE.</h3>

+

+<p>Marshal Villars has justly observed, that

+“no governor of a place should be permitted

+to excuse himself for surrendering, on the

+ground of wishing to preserve the king’s

+troops. Every garrison that displays courage

+will escape being prisoners of war. For there

+is no general who, however well assured of

+carrying a place by assault, will not prefer

+granting terms of capitulation rather than

+risk the loss of a thousand men in forcing

+determined troops to surrender.”</p>

+

+</div></div>

+

+<hr />

+

+<div class="chapter">

+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XLVII"></a>MAXIM XLVII.</h2>

+

+<p>Infantry, cavalry, and artillery, are nothing

+without each other; therefore, they

+should always be so disposed in cantonments

+as to assist each other in case of

+surprise.</p>

+

+<div class="note">

+<h3>NOTE.</h3>

+

+<p>“A general,” says Frederick, “should direct

+his whole attention to the tranquility of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_111">111</a></span>

+his cantonments, in order that the soldier

+may be relieved from all anxiety, and repose

+in security from his fatigues. With this

+view, care should be taken that the troops

+are able to form rapidly upon ground which

+has been previously reconnoitered; that the

+generals remain always with their divisions

+or brigades, and that the service is carried

+on throughout with exactness.”</p>

+

+<p>Marshal Saxe is of opinion that an army

+should not be in a hurry to quit its cantonments,

+but that it should wait till the

+enemy has exhausted himself with marching,

+and be ready to fall upon him with

+fresh troops when he is overcome with

+fatigue.</p>

+

+<p>I believe, however, that it would be dangerous

+to trust implicitly to this high authority,

+for there are many occasions where

+all the advantage lies in the initiative, more

+especially when the enemy has been compelled

+to extend his cantonments, from scarcity

+of subsistence, and can be attacked

+before he has time to concentrate his forces.</p>

+

+</div></div>

+

+<hr />

+

+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_112">112</a></span></p>

+

+<div class="chapter">

+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XLVIII"></a>MAXIM XLVIII.</h2>

+

+<p>The formation of infantry in line should

+be always in two ranks, because the

+length of the musket only admits of an

+effective fire in this formation. The discharge

+of the third rank is not only uncertain,

+but frequently dangerous to the

+ranks in its front. In drawing up infantry

+in two ranks, there should be a supernumerary

+behind every fourth or fifth

+file. A reserve should likewise be placed

+twenty-five paces in rear of each flank.</p>

+

+<div class="note">

+<h3>NOTE.</h3>

+

+<p>I am of opinion, if circumstances require

+a line of infantry to resort to a square, that

+two-deep is too light a formation to resist

+the shock of cavalry. However useless the

+third rank may appear for the purpose of

+file-firing, it is, notwithstanding necessary,

+in order to replace the men who fall in the

+ranks in front; otherwise you would be

+obliged to close in the files, and by this

+means leave intervals between the companies,

+which the cavalry would not fail to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_113">113</a></span>

+penetrate. It appears to me, also, that when

+infantry is formed in two ranks, the columns

+will be found to open out in marching to a

+flank. If it should be considered advantageous

+behind entrenchments to keep the infantry

+in two ranks, the third rank should

+be placed in reserve, and brought forward

+to relieve the front rank when fatigued, or

+when the fire is observed to slacken. I am

+induced to make these remarks, because I

+have seen an excellent pamphlet which proposes

+the two-deep formation for infantry as

+the best. The author supports his opinion

+by a variety of plausible reasons, but not

+sufficient, as it appears to me, to answer all

+the objections that may be offered to this

+practice.</p>

+

+</div></div>

+

+<hr />

+

+<div class="chapter">

+<h2><a id="MAXIM_XLIX"></a>MAXIM XLIX.</h2>

+

+<p>The practice of mixing small bodies of

+infantry and cavalry together is a bad

+one, and attended with many inconveniences.

+The cavalry loses its power of action.

+It becomes fettered in all its movements.

+Its energy is destroyed; even

+the infantry itself is compromised, for on<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_114">114</a></span>

+the first movement of the cavalry it is

+left without support. The best mode of

+protecting cavalry is to cover its flank.</p>

+

+<div class="note">

+<h3>NOTE.</h3>

+

+<p>This also was the opinion of Marshal

+Saxe. “The weakness of the above formation,”

+says he, “is sufficient in itself to intimidate

+the platoons of infantry, because

+they must be lost if the cavalry is beaten.”</p>

+

+<p>The cavalry, also, which depends on the

+infantry for succor, is disconcerted the moment

+a brisk forward movement carries

+them out of sight of their supports. Marshal

+Turenne, and the generals of his time,

+sometimes employed this order of formation;

+but that does not, in my opinion,

+justify a modern author for recommending

+it in an essay, entitled “<cite>Considerations sur

+l’Art de la Guerre</cite>.” In fact, this formation

+has long been abandoned; and, since the introduction

+of light artillery, it appears to

+me almost ridiculous to propose it.</p>

+

+</div></div>

+

+<hr />

+

+<div class="chapter">

+<h2><a id="MAXIM_L"></a>MAXIM L.</h2>

+

+<p>Charges of cavalry are equally useful

+at the beginning, the middle, and the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_115">115</a></span>

+end of a battle. They should be made

+always, if possible, on the flanks of the

+infantry, especially when the latter is engaged

+in front.</p>

+

+<div class="note">

+<h3>NOTE.</h3>

+

+<p>The Archduke Charles, in speaking of cavalry,

+recommends that it should be brought

+in mass upon a decisive point, when the moment

+for employing it arrives; that is to

+say, when it can attack with a certainty of

+success. As the rapidity of its movement

+enables cavalry to act along the whole line

+in the same day, the general who commands

+it should keep it together as much as possible,

+and avoid dividing it into many detachments.

+When the nature of the ground

+admits of cavalry being employed on all

+points of the line, it is desirable to form it

+in column behind the infantry, and in a position

+whence it may be easily directed

+wherever it is required. If cavalry is intended

+to cover a position, it should be

+placed sufficiently in the rear to meet at full

+speed any advance of troops coming to

+attack that position. If it is destined to

+cover the flank of the infantry, it should, for

+the same reason, be placed directly behind<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_116">116</a></span>

+it. As the object of cavalry is purely offensive,

+it should be a rule to form it at such a

+distance only from the point of collision as

+to enable it to acquire its utmost impulse,

+and arrive at the top of its speed into action.

+With respect to the cavalry reserve,

+this should only be employed at the end of

+a battle, either to render the success more

+decisive, or to cover the retreat. Napoleon

+remarks that, at the battle of Waterloo, the

+cavalry of the guard which composed the

+reserve, was engaged against his orders.

+He complains of having been deprived from

+five o’clock of the use of this reserve, which,

+when well employed, had so often insured

+him the victory.</p>

+

+</div></div>

+

+<hr />

+

+<div class="chapter">

+<h2><a id="MAXIM_LI"></a>MAXIM LI.</h2>

+

+<p>It is the business of cavalry to follow

+up the victory, and to prevent the beaten

+enemy from rallying.</p>

+

+<div class="note">

+<h3>NOTE.</h3>

+

+<p>Victor or vanquished, it is of the greatest

+importance to have a body of cavalry in

+reserve, either to take advantage of victory,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_117">117</a></span>

+or to secure a retreat. The most decisive

+battles lose half their value to the conqueror,

+when the want of cavalry prevents him

+from following up his success, and depriving

+the enemy of the power of rallying.</p>

+

+<p>When a retiring army is pursued, it is

+more especially upon the flanks that the

+weight of cavalry should fall, if you are

+strong enough in that arm to cut off his

+retreat.</p>

+

+</div></div>

+

+<hr />

+

+<div class="chapter">

+<h2><a id="MAXIM_LII"></a>MAXIM LII.</h2>

+

+<p>Artillery is more essential to cavalry

+than to infantry, because cavalry has no

+fire for its defence, but depends upon the

+sabre. It is to remedy this deficiency

+that recourse has been had to horse-artillery.

+Cavalry, therefore, should never

+be without cannon, whether when attacking,

+rallying, or in position.</p>

+

+<div class="note">

+<h3>NOTE.</h3>

+

+<p>Horse-artillery is an invention of Frederick.

+Austria lost no time in introducing

+it into her armies, although in an imperfect

+degree. It was only in 1792 that this<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_118">118</a></span>

+arm was adopted in France, where it was

+brought rapidly to its present perfection.</p>

+

+<p>The services of this arm during the wars

+of the Revolution were immense. It may

+be said to have changed to a certain extent

+the character of tactics, because its facility

+of movement enables it to bear with rapidity

+on every point where artillery can be

+employed with success. Napoleon has remarked

+in his memoirs that a flanking battery

+which strikes and rakes the enemy

+obliquely, is capable of deciding a victory

+in itself. To this we may add that, independent

+of the advantages which cavalry

+derives from horse-artillery in securing its

+flanks, and in opening the way for a successful

+charge by the destructiveness of its

+fire, it is desirable that these two arms

+should never be separated, but ready at all

+times to seize upon points where it may

+be necessary to employ cannon. On these

+occasions, the cavalry masks the march of

+the artillery, protects its establishment in

+position, and covers it from the attack of

+the enemy, until it is ready to open its

+fire.</p>

+

+</div></div>

+

+<hr />

+

+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_119">119</a></span></p>

+

+<div class="chapter">

+<h2><a id="MAXIM_LIII"></a>MAXIM LIII.</h2>

+

+<p>In march, or in position, the greater

+part of the artillery should be with the

+divisions of infantry and cavalry. The

+rest should be in reserve. Each gun

+should have with it three hundred rounds,

+without including the limber. This is

+about the complement for two battles.</p>

+

+<div class="note">

+<h3>NOTE.</h3>

+

+<p>The better infantry is, the more important

+it is to support it by artillery, with a view to

+its preservation.</p>

+

+<p>It is essential, also, that the batteries attached

+to divisions should march in the

+front, because this has a strong influence on

+the <em>morale</em> of the soldier. He attacks always

+with confidence when he sees the flanks of

+the column well covered with cannon.</p>

+

+<p>The artillery reserve should be kept for a

+decisive moment, and then employed in full

+force, for it will be difficult for the enemy at

+such a time to presume to attack it.</p>

+

+<p>There is scarcely an instance of a battery

+of sixty pieces of cannon having been carried<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_120">120</a></span>

+by a charge of infantry or cavalry,

+unless where it was entirely without support,

+or in a position to be easily turned.</p>

+

+</div></div>

+

+<hr />

+

+<div class="chapter">

+<h2><a id="MAXIM_LIV"></a>MAXIM LIV.</h2>

+

+<p>Artillery should always be placed in

+the most advantageous positions, and as

+far in front of the line of cavalry and

+infantry as possible, without compromising

+the safety of the guns.</p>

+

+<p>Field batteries should command the

+whole country round from the level of

+the platform. They should on no account

+be masked on the right and left,

+but have free range in every direction.</p>

+

+<div class="note">

+<h3>NOTE.</h3>

+

+<p>The battery of eighteen pieces of cannon,

+which covered the centre of the Russian

+army at the battle of La Moskwa (Borodino),

+may be cited as an example.</p>

+

+<p>Its position, upon a circular height which

+commanded the field in every direction, added

+so powerfully to its effect, that its fire alone

+sufficed, for a considerable time, to paralyze<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_121">121</a></span>

+the vigorous attack made by the French

+with their right. Although twice broken,

+the left of the Russian army closed to this

+battery, as to a pivot, and twice recovered

+its former position. After repeated attacks,

+conducted with a rare intrepidity, the battery

+was at length carried by the French,

+but not till they had lost the <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">élite</i> of their

+army, and with it the Generals Caulincourt

+and Montbrun. Its capture decided the retreat

+of the Russian left.</p>

+

+<p>I might advert likewise to another instance,

+in the campaign of 1809, and to the

+terrible effect produced by the hundred

+pieces of cannon of the Guard which General

+Lauriston directed, at the battle of

+Wagram, against the right of the Austrian

+army.</p>

+

+</div></div>

+

+<hr />

+

+<div class="chapter">

+<h2><a id="MAXIM_LV"></a>MAXIM LV.</h2>

+

+<p>A General should never put his army

+into cantonments, when he has the means

+of collecting supplies of forage and provisions,

+and of thus providing for the

+wants of the soldier in the field.</p>

+

+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_122">122</a></span></p>

+

+<div class="note">

+<h3>NOTE.</h3>

+

+<p>One great advantage which results from

+having an army in camp is, that it is easier

+to direct its spirit and maintain its discipline

+there. The soldier in cantonments abandons

+himself to repose; he ends by finding a

+pleasure in idleness, and in fearing to return

+to the field. The reverse takes place in a

+camp. There, a feeling of <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">ennui</i>, and a

+severer discipline, make him anxious for the

+opening of the campaign, to interrupt the

+monotony of the service and relieve it with

+the chances and variety of war. Besides, an

+army in camp is much more secure from a

+surprise than in cantonments&mdash;the defect of

+which usually consists in their occupying too

+great an extent of ground. When an army

+is obliged to go into quarters, the Marquis de

+Feuquière recommends a camp to be selected

+in front of the line, where the troops can be

+frequently assembled&mdash;sometimes suddenly,

+in order to exercise their vigilance, or for

+the sole purpose of bringing the different

+corps together.</p>

+

+</div></div>

+

+<hr />

+

+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_123">123</a></span></p>

+

+<div class="chapter">

+<h2><a id="MAXIM_LVI"></a>MAXIM LVI.</h2>

+

+<p>A good general, a well-organized system,

+good instructions, and severe discipline,

+aided by effective establishments,

+will always make good troops, independently

+of the cause for which they fight.</p>

+

+<p>At the same time, a love of country, a

+spirit of enthusiasm, a sense of national

+honor, and fanaticism, will operate upon

+young soldiers with advantage.</p>

+

+<div class="note">

+<h3>NOTE.</h3>

+

+<p>This remark appears to me less applicable

+to officers than to soldiers, for as war is not

+a state of things natural to man, it follows

+that those who maintain its cause must be

+governed by some strong excitement. Much

+enthusiasm and devotedness are required on

+the part of the troops for the general who

+commands, to induce an army to perform

+great actions in a war in which it takes

+no interest. This is sufficiently proved by

+the apathy of auxiliaries, unless when inspired

+by the conduct of their chief.</p>

+

+</div></div>

+

+<hr />

+

+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_124">124</a></span></p>

+

+<div class="chapter">

+<h2><a id="MAXIM_LVII"></a>MAXIM LVII.</h2>

+

+<p>When a nation is without establishments

+and a military system, it is very

+difficult to organize an army.</p>

+

+<div class="note">

+<h3>NOTE.</h3>

+

+<p>This is an unanswerable truth, more particularly

+with reference to an army intended

+to act upon the system of modern war, and

+in which order, precision, and rapidity of

+movement, are the principal essentials to

+success.</p>

+

+</div></div>

+

+<hr />

+

+<div class="chapter">

+<h2><a id="MAXIM_LVIII"></a>MAXIM LVIII.</h2>

+

+<p>The first qualification of a soldier is

+fortitude under fatigue and privation.

+Courage is only the second; hardship,

+poverty and want, are the best school

+for a soldier.</p>

+

+<div class="note">

+<h3>NOTE.</h3>

+

+<p>Valor belongs to the young soldier as

+well as to the veteran; but in the former

+it is more evanescent. It is only by habits<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_125">125</a></span>

+of service, and after several campaigns,

+that the soldier acquires that moral courage

+which makes him support the fatigues and

+privations of war without a murmur. Experience

+by this time has instructed him to

+supply his own wants. He is satisfied with

+what he can procure, because he knows that

+success is only to be obtained by fortitude

+and perseverance. Well might Napoleon

+say that misery and want were the best

+school for a soldier; for as nothing could be

+compared with the total destitution of the

+army of the Alps, when he assumed the

+command, so nothing could equal the brilliant

+success which he obtained with this

+army in the first campaign in Italy. The

+conquerors of Montenotte, Lodi, Castiglione,

+Bassano, Arcole and Rivoli had beheld, only

+a few months before, whole battalions covered

+with rags, and deserting for the want

+of subsistence.</p>

+

+</div></div>

+

+<hr />

+

+<div class="chapter">

+<h2><a id="MAXIM_LIX"></a>MAXIM LIX.</h2>

+

+<p>There are five things the soldier should

+never be without&mdash;his musket, his ammunition,

+his knapsack, his provisions<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_126">126</a></span>

+(for at least four days), and his entrenching-tool.

+The knapsack may be reduced

+to the smallest size possible, if it be

+thought proper, but the soldier should

+always have it with him.</p>

+

+<div class="note">

+<h3>NOTE.</h3>

+

+<p>It is fortunate that Napoleon has recognized

+the advantage of giving to every soldier

+an entrenching-tool. His authority is

+the best answer to the ridicule which has

+been thrown upon those who proposed it.

+An axe will be found to inconvenience the

+foot-soldier as little as the sword he wears

+at his side, and it will be infinitely more

+useful. When axes are given out to companies,

+or are carried by fatigue-men during

+a campaign, they are soon lost; and it

+often happens, when a camp is to be formed,

+that a difficulty arises in cutting wood and

+building huts for the soldier; whereas, by

+making the axe a part of every man’s appointments,

+he is obliged to have it always

+with him; and whether the object be to

+entrench himself in a village, or to erect huts

+in a camp, the commander of a corps will

+speedily see the advantage of this innovation.</p>

+

+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_127">127</a></span></p>

+

+<p>When once the axe has been generally

+adopted, we shall, perhaps, see the desirability

+of issuing pickaxes and shovels to

+particular companies, and also the benefit of

+more frequent entrenchments. It is more

+particularly during retreats that it is important

+to entrench when the army has reached

+a good position; for an entrenched camp

+not only furnishes the means of rallying

+troops which are pursued, but if it be fortified

+in such a manner as to render the issue

+of an attack doubtful to the enemy, it will

+not only sustain the <em>morale</em> of the soldier in

+the retreat, but afford the general-in-chief

+opportunities for resuming the offensive, and

+profiting by the first false movement on the

+part of his adversary. It will be recollected

+how Frederick, in the campaign of 1761,

+when surrounded by two Russian and Austrian

+armies, whose united force was quadruple

+his own, saved his army by entrenching

+himself in the camp of Buntzalvitz.</p>

+

+</div></div>

+

+<hr />

+

+<div class="chapter">

+<h2><a id="MAXIM_LX"></a>MAXIM LX.</h2>

+

+<p>Every means should be taken to attach

+the soldier to his colors. This is best<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_128">128</a></span>

+accomplished by showing consideration

+and respect to the old soldier. His pay

+likewise should increase with his length

+of service. It is the height of injustice

+not to pay a veteran more than a recruit.</p>

+

+<div class="note">

+<h3>NOTE.</h3>

+

+<p>Some modern writers have recommended,

+on the other hand, to limit the period of

+service, in order to bring the whole youth

+of a country successively under arms. By

+this means they purpose to have the levies,

+<i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">en masse</i>, all ready trained and capable of

+resisting successfully a war of invasion. But

+however advantageous at first sight such a

+military system may appear, I believe it

+will be found to have many objections.</p>

+

+<p>In the first place, the soldier fatigued with

+the minutiæ of discipline in a garrison, will

+not feel much inclined to re-enlist after he

+has received his discharge, more especially

+since, having served the prescribed time, he

+will consider himself to have fulfilled all the

+duties of a citizen to his country. Returning

+to his friends, he will probably marry,

+or establish himself in a trade. From that

+moment his military spirit declines, and he<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_129">129</a></span>

+soon becomes ill adapted to the business of

+war. On the contrary, the soldier who

+serves long, becomes attached to his regiment

+as to a new family. He submits to

+the yoke of discipline, accustoms himself to

+the privations his situation imposes, and

+ends by finding his condition agreeable.

+There are few officers that have seen service

+who have not discovered the difference

+between old and young soldiers, with reference

+to their power of supporting the

+fatigues of a long campaign, to the determined

+courage that characterizes the attack,

+or to the ease with which they rally after

+being broken.</p>

+

+<p>Montécuculli observes, that “it takes time

+to discipline an army; more to inure it to

+war; and still more to constitute veterans.”

+For this reason, he recommends that great

+consideration should be shown to old soldiers;

+that they should be carefully provided

+for, and a large body of them kept

+always on foot. It seems to me, also, that

+it is not enough to increase the pay of the

+soldier according to his period of service,

+but that it is highly essential to confer on

+him some mark of distinction that shall

+secure to him privileges calculated to encourage<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_130">130</a></span>

+him to grow gray under arms,

+and, above all, to do so with honor.</p>

+

+</div></div>

+

+<hr />

+

+<div class="chapter">

+<h2><a id="MAXIM_LXI"></a>MAXIM LXI.</h2>

+

+<p>It is not set speeches at the moment of

+battle that render soldiers brave. The

+veteran scarcely listens to them, and the

+recruit forgets them at the first discharge.

+If discourses and harangues are useful, it

+is during the campaign: to do away unfavorable

+impressions, to correct false

+reports, to keep alive a proper spirit in

+the camp, and to furnish materials and

+amusement for the bivouac. All printed

+orders of the day should keep in view

+these objects.</p>

+

+<div class="note">

+<h3>NOTE.</h3>

+

+<p>The opinion of the general-in-chief, energetically

+expressed, is, notwithstanding, productive

+of great effect on the <em>morale</em> of the

+soldier.</p>

+

+<p>In 1703, at the attack of Hornbec, Marshal

+Villars, seeing the troops advancing

+without spirit, threw himself at their head:<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_131">131</a></span>

+“What!” said he, “is it expected that I, a

+marshal of France, should be the first to

+escalade, when I order YOU to attack?”</p>

+

+<p>These few words rekindled their ardor;

+officers and soldiers rushed upon the works,

+and the town was taken almost without loss.</p>

+

+<p>“We have retired far enough for to-day;

+you know I always sleep upon the field of

+battle!” said Napoleon, as he flew through

+the ranks at the moment of resuming the

+offensive at Marengo. These few words sufficed

+to revive the courage of the soldiers,

+and to make them forget the fatigues of the

+day, during which almost every man had

+been engaged.</p>

+

+</div></div>

+

+<hr />

+

+<div class="chapter">

+<h2><a id="MAXIM_LXII"></a>MAXIM LXII.</h2>

+

+<p>Tents are unfavorable to health. The

+soldier is best when he bivouacs, because

+he sleeps with his feet to the fire, which

+speedily dries the ground on which he

+lies. A few planks, or a little straw, shelter

+him from the wind.</p>

+

+<p>On the other hand, tents are necessary

+for the superior officers, who have to write

+and to consult their maps. Tents should,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_132">132</a></span>

+therefore, be issued to these, with directions

+to them never to sleep in a house.

+Tents are always objects of observation

+to the enemy’s staff. They afford information

+in regard to your numbers and

+the ground you occupy; while an army

+bivouacking in two or three lines, is only

+distinguishable from afar by the smoke

+which mingles with the clouds. It is impossible

+to count the number of the fires.</p>

+

+<div class="note">

+<h3>NOTE.</h3>

+

+<p>The acknowledged advantage of bivouacking

+is another reason for adding an entrenching-tool

+to the equipment of the soldier; for,

+with the assistance of the axe and shovel,

+he can hut himself without difficulty. I have

+seen huts erected with the branches of trees,

+covered with turf, where the soldier was perfectly

+sheltered from the cold and wet, even

+in the worst season.</p>

+

+</div></div>

+

+<hr />

+

+<div class="chapter">

+<h2><a id="MAXIM_LXIII"></a>MAXIM LXIII.</h2>

+

+<p>All information obtained from prisoners

+should be received with caution, and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_133">133</a></span>

+estimated at its real value. A soldier

+seldom sees anything beyond his company;

+and an officer can afford intelligence

+of little more than the position and

+movements of the division to which his

+regiment belongs. On this account, the

+general of an army should never depend

+upon the information derived from prisoners,

+unless it agrees with the reports

+received from the advanced guards, in

+reference to the position, etc., of the

+enemy.</p>

+

+<div class="note">

+<h3>NOTE.</h3>

+

+<p>Montécuculli wisely observes that “prisoners

+should be interrogated separately, in

+order to ascertain, by the agreement in their

+answers, how far they may be endeavoring

+to mislead you.” Generally speaking, the information

+required from officers who are prisoners,

+should have reference to the strength

+and resources of the enemy, and sometimes

+to his localities and position. Frederick recommends

+that prisoners should be menaced

+with instant death if they are found attempting

+to deceive by false reports.</p>

+

+</div></div>

+

+<hr />

+

+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_134">134</a></span></p>

+

+<div class="chapter">

+<h2><a id="MAXIM_LXIV"></a>MAXIM LXIV.</h2>

+

+<p>Nothing is so important in war as an

+undivided command; for this reason,

+when war is carried on against a single

+power, there should be only one army,

+acting upon one base, and conducted by

+one chief.</p>

+

+<div class="note">

+<h3>NOTE.</h3>

+

+<p>“Success,” says the Archduke Charles, “is

+only to be obtained by simultaneous efforts,

+directed upon a given point, sustained with

+constancy, and executed with decision.” It

+rarely happens that any number of men

+who desire the same object are perfectly

+agreed as to the means of attaining it; and

+if the will of one individual is not allowed to

+predominate, there can be no <em>ensemble</em> in the

+execution of their operations; neither will

+they attain the end proposed. It is useless

+to confirm this maxim by examples. History

+abounds in them.</p>

+

+<p>Prince Eugene and Marlborough would

+never have been so successful in the campaigns

+which they directed in concert, if a

+spirit of intrigue and difference of opinion

+had not constantly disorganized the armies

+opposed to them.</p>

+

+</div></div>

+

+<hr />

+

+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_135">135</a></span></p>

+

+<div class="chapter">

+<h2><a id="MAXIM_LXV"></a>MAXIM LXV.</h2>

+

+<p>The same consequences which have

+uniformly attended long discussions and

+councils of war, will follow at all times.

+They will terminate in the adoption of the

+worst course, which in war is always the

+most timid, or, if you will, the most prudent.

+The only true wisdom in a general

+is determined courage.</p>

+

+<div class="note">

+<h3>NOTE.</h3>

+

+<p>Prince Eugene used to say that councils of

+war “are only useful when you want an

+excuse for attempting <em>nothing</em>.” This was

+also the opinion of Villars. A general-in-chief

+should avoid, therefore, assembling a

+council on occasions of difficulty, and should

+confine himself to consulting separately his

+most experienced generals in order to benefit

+by their advice, while he is governed at

+the same time in his decision by his own

+judgment. By this means, he becomes responsible,

+it is true, for the measures he

+pursues; but he has the advantage also of

+acting upon his own conviction, and of being<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_136">136</a></span>

+certain that the secret of his operations

+will not be divulged, as is usually the case

+where it is discussed by a council of war.</p>

+

+</div></div>

+

+<hr />

+

+<div class="chapter">

+<h2><a id="MAXIM_LXVI"></a>MAXIM LXVI.</h2>

+

+<p>In war, the general alone can judge of

+certain arrangements. It depends on him

+alone to conquer difficulties by his own

+superior talents and resolution.</p>

+

+<div class="note">

+<h3>NOTE.</h3>

+

+<p>The officer who obeys, whatever may be

+the nature or extent of his command, will

+always stand excused for executing implicitly

+the orders which have been given to him.

+This is not the case with the general-in-chief,

+on whom the safety of the army and the success

+of the campaign depend. Occupied, without

+intermission, in the whole process of

+observation and reflection, it is easy to conceive

+that he will acquire by degrees a

+solidity of judgment which will enable him

+to see things in a clearer and more enlarged

+point of view than his inferior generals.</p>

+

+<p>Marshal Villars, in his campaigns, acted<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_137">137</a></span>

+almost always in opposition to the advice of

+his generals, and he was almost always fortunate.

+So true it is, that a general, who feels

+confident in his talent for command, must

+follow the dictates of his own genius if he

+wishes to achieve success.</p>

+

+</div></div>

+

+<hr />

+

+<div class="chapter">

+<h2><a id="MAXIM_LXVII"></a>MAXIM LXVII.</h2>

+

+<p>To authorize generals or other officers

+to lay down their arms in virtue of a particular

+capitulation, under any other circumstances

+than when they are composing

+the garrison of a fortress, affords a dangerous

+latitude. It is destructive of all

+military character in a nation to open such

+a door to the cowardly, the weak, or even

+to the misdirected brave. Great extremities

+require extraordinary resolution. The

+more obstinate the resistance of an army,

+the greater the chances of assistance or of

+success.</p>

+

+<p>How many seeming impossibilities have

+been accomplished by men whose only

+resource was death!</p>

+

+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_138">138</a></span></p>

+

+<div class="note">

+<h3>NOTE.</h3>

+

+<p>In the campaign of 1759, Frederick directed

+General Fink, with eighteen thousand

+men, upon Maxen, for the purpose of cutting

+off the Austrian army from the defiles of Bohemia.

+Surrounded by twice his numbers,

+Fink capitulated after a sharp action, and

+fourteen thousand men laid down their arms.

+This conduct was the more disgraceful, because

+General Winch, who commanded the

+cavalry, cut his way through the enemy.

+The whole blame of the surrender fell, therefore,

+upon Fink, who was tried afterward by

+a court-martial, and sentenced to be cashiered

+and imprisoned for two years.</p>

+

+<p>In the campaign of Italy in 1796, the Austrian

+General Provéra capitulated with two

+thousand men in the castle of Cossaria. Subsequently,

+at the battle of La Favorite, the

+same general capitulated with a corps of six

+thousand men. I scarcely dare to revert to

+the shameful defection of General Mack in

+the capitulation of Ulm in 1805, where thirty

+thousand Austrians laid down their arms&mdash;when

+we have seen, during the wars of the

+Revolution, so many generals open themselves

+a way by a vigorous effort through

+the enemy, supported only by a few battalions.</p>

+

+</div></div>

+

+<hr />

+

+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_139">139</a></span></p>

+

+<div class="chapter">

+<h2><a id="MAXIM_LXVIII"></a>MAXIM LXVIII.</h2>

+

+<p>There is no security for any sovereign,

+for any nation, or for any general, if officers

+are permitted to capitulate in the

+open field, and to lay down their arms in

+virtue of conditions favorable to the contracting

+party, but contrary to the interests

+of the army at large. To withdraw

+from danger, and thereby to involve their

+comrades in greater peril, is the height of

+cowardice. Such conduct should be proscribed,

+declared infamous, and made punishable

+with death. All generals, officers

+and soldiers, who capitulate in battle to

+save their own lives, should be decimated.</p>

+

+<p>He who gives the order, and those who

+obey, are alike traitors, and deserve capital

+punishment.</p>

+

+<div class="note">

+<h3>NOTE.</h3>

+

+<p>Soldiers, who are almost always ignorant

+of the designs of their chief, cannot be responsible

+for his conduct. If he orders them

+to lay down their arms, they must do so;

+otherwise they fail in that law of discipline<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_140">140</a></span>

+which is more essential to an army than

+thousands of men. It appears to me, therefore,

+under these circumstances, that the

+chiefs alone are responsible, and liable to the

+punishment due to their cowardice. We have

+no example of soldiers being wanting in their

+duty in the most desperate situations, where

+they are commanded by officers of approved

+resolution.</p>

+

+</div></div>

+

+<hr />

+

+<div class="chapter">

+<h2><a id="MAXIM_LXIX"></a>MAXIM LXIX.</h2>

+

+<p>There is but one honorable mode of

+becoming prisoner of war. That is, by

+being taken separately; by which is meant,

+by being cut off entirely, and when we

+can no longer make use of our arms. In

+this case, there can be no conditions, for

+honor can impose none. We yield to an

+irresistible necessity.</p>

+

+<div class="note">

+<h3>NOTE.</h3>

+

+<p>There is always time enough to surrender

+prisoner of war. This should be deferred,

+therefore, till the last extremity. And here

+I may be permitted to cite an example of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_141">141</a></span>

+rare obstinacy in defence, which has been

+related to me by ocular witnesses. The captain

+of grenadiers, Dubrenil, of the thirty-seventh

+regiment of the line, having been

+sent on detachment with his company, was

+stopped on the march by a large party of

+Cossacks, who surrounded him on every side.

+Dubrenil formed his little force into square,

+and endeavored to gain the skirts of a wood

+(within a few muskets’ shot of the spot

+where he had been attacked), and reached

+it with very little loss. But as soon as the

+grenadiers saw this refuge secured to them,

+they broke and fled, leaving their captain

+and a few brave men, who were resolved not

+to abandon him, at the mercy of the enemy.

+In the meantime, the fugitives, who had rallied

+in the depth of the wood, ashamed of

+having forsaken their leader, came to the

+resolution of rescuing him from the enemy,

+if a prisoner, or of carrying off his body if

+he had fallen. With this view, they formed

+once more upon the outskirts, and opening

+a passage with their bayonets through the

+cavalry, penetrated to their captain, who,

+notwithstanding seventeen wounds, was defending

+himself still. They immediately surrounded

+him, and regained the wood with<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_142">142</a></span>

+little loss. Such examples are not rare in

+the wars of the Revolution, and it were desirable

+to see them collected by some contemporary,

+that soldiers might learn how

+much is to be achieved in war by determined

+energy and sustained resolution.</p>

+

+</div></div>

+

+<hr />

+

+<div class="chapter">

+<h2><a id="MAXIM_LXX"></a>MAXIM LXX.</h2>

+

+<p>The conduct of a general in a conquered

+country is full of difficulties. If severe,

+he irritates and increases the number of

+his enemies. If lenient, he gives birth to

+expectations which only render the abuses

+and vexations, inseparable from war, the

+more intolerable. A victorious general

+must know how to employ severity, justice

+and mildness by turns, if he would allay

+sedition or prevent it.</p>

+

+<div class="note">

+<h3>NOTE.</h3>

+

+<p>Among the Romans, generals were only

+permitted to arrive at the command of armies

+after having exercised the different functions

+of the magistracy. Thus by a previous

+knowledge of administration, they were prepared<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_143">143</a></span>

+to govern the conquered provinces

+with all that discretion which a newly-acquired

+power, supported by arbitrary force,

+demands.</p>

+

+<p>In the military institutions of modern

+times, the generals, instructed only in what

+concerns the operation of strategy and tactics,

+are obliged to intrust the civil departments

+of the war to inferior agents, who,

+without belonging to the army, render all

+those abuses and vexations, inseparable from

+its operations, still more intolerable.</p>

+

+<p>This observation, which I do little more

+than repeat, seems to me, notwithstanding,

+deserving of particular attention; for if the

+leisure of general officers was directed in

+time of peace to the study of diplomacy&mdash;if

+they were employed in the different embassies

+which sovereigns send to foreign courts&mdash;they

+would acquire a knowledge of the

+laws and of the government of these countries,

+in which they may be called hereafter

+to carry on the war. They would learn also

+to distinguish those points of interest on

+which all treaties must be based, which have

+for their object the advantageous termination

+of a campaign. By the aid of this

+information they would obtain certain and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_144">144</a></span>

+positive results, since all the springs of action,

+as well as the machinery of war, would

+be in their hands. We have seen Prince

+Eugene, and Marshal Villars, each fulfilling

+with equal ability the duties of a general

+and a negotiator.</p>

+

+<p>When an army which occupies a conquered

+province observes strict discipline, there are

+few examples of insurrection among the people,

+unless indeed resistance is provoked (as

+but too often happens), by the exactions of

+inferior agents employed in the civil administration.</p>

+

+<p>It is to this point, therefore, that the general-in-chief

+should principally direct his

+attention, in order that the contributions

+imposed by the wants of the army may be

+levied with impartiality; and above all, that

+they may be applied to their true object, instead

+of serving to enrich the collectors, as

+is ordinarily the case.</p>

+

+</div></div>

+

+<hr />

+

+<div class="chapter">

+<h2><a id="MAXIM_LXXI"></a>MAXIM LXXI.</h2>

+

+<p>Nothing can excuse a general who

+takes advantage of the knowledge acquired

+in the service of his country, to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_145">145</a></span>

+deliver up her frontier and her towns to

+foreigners. This is a crime reprobated

+by every principle of religion, morality

+and honor.</p>

+

+<div class="note">

+<h3>NOTE.</h3>

+

+<p>Ambitious men who, listening only to

+their passions, arm natives of the same land

+against each other (under the deceitful pretext

+of the public good), are still more criminal.

+For however arbitrary a government,

+the institutions which have been consolidated

+by time, are always preferable to civil

+war, and to that anarchy which the latter is

+obliged to create for the justification of its

+crimes.</p>

+

+<p>To be faithful to his sovereign, and to

+respect the established government, are the

+first principles which ought to distinguish a

+soldier and a man of honor.</p>

+

+</div></div>

+

+<hr />

+

+<div class="chapter">

+<h2><a id="MAXIM_LXXII"></a>MAXIM LXXII.</h2>

+

+<p>A general-in-chief has no right to shelter

+his mistakes in war under cover of his

+sovereign, or of a minister, when these

+are both distant from the scene of operation,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_146">146</a></span>

+and must consequently be either ill

+informed or wholly ignorant of the actual

+state of things.</p>

+

+<p>Hence, it follows, that every general is

+culpable who undertakes the execution of

+a plan which he considers faulty. It is

+his duty to represent his reasons, to insist

+upon a change of plan, in short, to give

+in his resignation, rather than allow himself

+to be made the instrument of his

+army’s ruin. Every general-in-chief who

+fights a battle in consequence of superior

+orders, with the certainty of losing it, is

+equally blamable.</p>

+

+<p>In this last-mentioned case, the general

+ought to refuse obedience; because a

+blind obedience is due only to a military

+command given by a superior present on

+the spot at the moment of action. Being

+in possession of the real state of things,

+the superior has it then in his power to

+afford the necessary explanations to the

+person who executes his orders.</p>

+

+<p>But supposing a general-in-chief to receive

+positive order from his sovereign,

+directing him to fight a battle, with the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_147">147</a></span>

+further injunction, to yield to his adversary,

+and allow himself to be defeated&mdash;ought

+he to obey it? No. If the general

+should be able to comprehend the meaning

+or utility of such an order, he should

+execute it; otherwise he should refuse to

+obey it.</p>

+

+<div class="note">

+<h3>NOTE.</h3>

+

+<p>In the campaign of 1697, Prince Eugene

+caused the courier to be intercepted, who

+was bringing him orders from the emperor

+forbidding him to hazard a battle, for which

+everything had been prepared, and which

+he foresaw would prove decisive. He considered,

+therefore, that he did his duty in

+evading the orders of his sovereign; and the

+victory of Zanta, in which the Turks lost

+about thirty thousand men, and four thousand

+prisoners, rewarded his audacity. In

+the meantime, notwithstanding the immense

+advantages which accrued from this victory

+to the imperial arms, Eugene was disgraced

+on his arrival at Vienna.</p>

+

+<p>In 1793, General Hoche, having received

+orders to move upon Treves with an army

+harassed by constant marches in a mountainous

+and difficult country, refused to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_148">148</a></span>

+obey. He observed, with reason, that in order

+to obtain possession of an unimportant

+fortress, they were exposing his army to

+inevitable ruin. He caused, therefore, his

+troops to return into winter quarters, and

+preferred the preservation of his army, upon

+which the success of the future campaign

+depended, to his own safety. Recalled to

+Paris, he was thrown into a dungeon, which

+he only quitted on the downfall of Robespierre.</p>

+

+<p>I dare not decide if such examples are to

+be imitated; but it seems to me highly desirable

+that a question so new and so important,

+should be discussed by men who are

+capable of determining its merits.</p>

+

+</div></div>

+

+<hr />

+

+<div class="chapter">

+<h2><a id="MAXIM_LXXIII"></a>MAXIM LXXIII.</h2>

+

+<p>The first qualification in a general-in-chief

+is a cool head&mdash;that is, a head which

+receives just impressions, and estimates

+things and objects at their real value.

+He must not allow himself to be elated

+by good news, or depressed by bad.</p>

+

+<p>The impressions he receives either successively<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_149">149</a></span>

+or simultaneously in the course

+of the day, should be so classed as to

+take up only the exact place in his mind

+which they deserve to occupy; since it is

+upon a just comparison and consideration

+of the weight due to different impressions,

+that the power of reasoning and of

+right judgment depends.</p>

+

+<p>Some men are so physically and morally

+constituted as to see everything

+through a highly-colored medium. They

+raise up a picture in the mind on every

+slight occasion, and give to every trivial

+occurrence a dramatic interest. But

+whatever knowledge, or talent, or courage,

+or other good qualities such men

+may possess, nature has not formed them

+for the command of armies, or the direction

+of great military operations.</p>

+

+<div class="note">

+<h3>NOTE.</h3>

+

+<p>“The first quality in a general-in-chief,”

+says Montécuculli, “is a great knowledge

+of the art of war. This is not intuitive,

+but the result of experience. A man is not

+born a commander. He must become one.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_150">150</a></span>

+Not to be anxious; to be always cool; to

+avoid confusion in his commands; never to

+change countenance; to give his orders in

+the midst of battle with as much composure

+as if he were perfectly at ease. These are

+the proofs of valor in a general.</p>

+

+<p>“To encourage the timid; to increase the

+number of the truly brave; to revive the

+drooping ardor of the troops in battle; to

+rally those who are broken; to bring back

+to the charge those who are repulsed; to

+find resources in difficulty, and success even

+amid disaster; to be ready at a moment to

+devote himself, if necessary, for the welfare

+of the state. These are the actions which

+acquire for a general distinction and renown.”</p>

+

+<p>To this enumeration may be added, the

+talent of discriminating character, and of

+employing every man in the particular post

+which nature has qualified him to fill. “My

+principal attention,” said Marshal Villars,

+“was always directed to the study of the

+younger generals. Such a one I found, by

+the boldness of his character, fit to lead a

+column of attack; another, from a disposition

+naturally cautious, but without being

+deficient in courage, more perfectly to be<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_151">151</a></span>

+relied on for the defence of a country.” It

+is only by a just application of these personal

+qualities to their respective objects,

+that it is possible to command success in

+war.</p>

+

+</div></div>

+

+<hr />

+

+<div class="chapter">

+<h2><a id="MAXIM_LXXIV"></a>MAXIM LXXIV.</h2>

+

+<p>The leading qualifications which should

+distinguish an officer selected for the

+head of the staff, are, to know the country

+thoroughly; to be able to conduct a

+<em>reconnoissance</em> with skill; to superintend

+the transmission of orders promptly; to

+lay down the most complicated movements

+intelligibly, but in a few words,

+and with simplicity.</p>

+

+<div class="note">

+<h3>NOTE.</h3>

+

+<p>Formerly, the duties of the chiefs of the

+staff were confined to the necessary preparations

+for carrying the plan of the campaign,

+and the operations resolved on by

+the general-in-chief, into effect. In a battle,

+they were only employed in directing movements

+and superintending their execution.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_152">152</a></span>

+But in the late wars, the officers of the staff

+were frequently intrusted with the command

+of a column of attack, or of large detachments,

+when the general-in-chief feared to

+disclose the secret of his plans by the transmission

+of orders or instructions. Great

+advantages have resulted from this innovation,

+although it was long resisted. By this

+means, the staff have been enabled to perfect

+their theory by practice, and they have

+acquired, moreover, the esteem of the soldiers

+and junior officers of the line, who are

+easily led to think lightly of their superiors,

+whom they do not see fighting in the ranks.

+The generals who have held the arduous

+situation of chief of the staff during the

+wars of the Revolution, have almost always

+been employed in the different branches of

+the profession. Marshal Berthier, who filled

+so conspicuously this appointment to Napoleon,

+was distinguished by all the essentials

+of a general. He possessed calm, and at

+the same time brilliant courage, excellent

+judgment, and approved experience. He

+bore arms during half a century, made war

+in the four quarters of the globe, opened

+and terminated thirty-two campaigns. In

+his youth he acquired, under the eye of his<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_153">153</a></span>

+father, who was an engineer officer, the talent

+of tracing plans and finishing them with

+exactness, as well as the preliminary qualifications

+necessary to form a staff-officer.

+Admitted by the Prince de Lambesq into

+his regiment of dragoons, he was taught

+the skilful management of his horse and his

+sword&mdash;accomplishments so important to a

+soldier. Attached afterward to the staff of

+Count Rochambeau, he made his first campaign

+in America, where he soon began to

+distinguish himself by his valor, activity

+and talents. Having at length attained

+superior rank in the staff-corps formed by

+Marshal de Segur, he visited the camps of

+the King of Prussia, and discharged the duties

+of chief of the staff under the Baron

+de Bezenval.</p>

+

+<p>During nineteen years, consumed in sixteen

+campaigns, the history of Marshal Berthier’s

+life was little else but that of the

+wars of Napoleon, all the details of which he

+directed, both in the cabinet and the field.

+A stranger to the intrigues of politics, he

+labored with indefatigable activity; seized

+with promptitude and sagacity upon general

+views, and gave the necessary orders for

+attaining them with prudence, perspicuity,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_154">154</a></span>

+and conciseness. Discreet, impenetrable,

+modest; he was just, exact, and even severe,

+in everything that regarded the service;

+but he always set an example of

+vigilance and zeal in his own person, and

+knew how to maintain discipline, and to

+cause his authority to be respected by every

+rank under his orders.</p>

+

+</div></div>

+

+<hr />

+

+<div class="chapter">

+<h2><a id="MAXIM_LXXV"></a>MAXIM LXXV.</h2>

+

+<p>A commandant of artillery should understand

+well the general principles of

+each branch of the service, since he is

+called upon to supply arms and ammunition

+to the different corps of which it is

+composed. His correspondence with the

+commanding officers of artillery at the

+advanced posts, should put him in possession

+of all the movements of the army,

+and the disposition and management of

+the great park of artillery should depend

+upon this information.</p>

+

+<div class="note">

+<h3>NOTE.</h3>

+

+<p>After having recognized the advantage of

+intrusting the supply of arms and ammunition<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_155">155</a></span>

+for an army to a military body, it

+appears to me extraordinary that the same

+regulation does not extend to that of provisions

+and forage, instead of leaving it in

+the hands of a separate administration, as is

+the practice at present.</p>

+

+<p>The civil establishments attached to armies

+are formed almost always at the commencement

+of a war, and composed of persons

+strangers to those laws of discipline

+which they are but too much inclined to

+disregard. These men are little esteemed

+by the military, because they serve only to

+enrich themselves, without respect to the

+means. They consider only their private

+interest in a service whose glory they cannot

+share, although some portion of its success

+depends upon their zeal. The disorders

+and defalcations incident to these establishments

+would assuredly cease, if they were

+confided to men who had been employed in

+the army, and who, in return for their labors,

+were permitted to partake with their

+fellow-soldiers the triumph of their success.</p>

+

+</div></div>

+

+<hr />

+

+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_156">156</a></span></p>

+

+<div class="chapter">

+<h2><a id="MAXIM_LXXVI"></a>MAXIM LXXVI.</h2>

+

+<p>The qualities which distinguish a good

+general of advanced posts, are, to reconnoitre

+accurately defiles and fords of every

+description; to provide guides that may

+be depended on; to interrogate the <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">curé</i>

+and postmaster; to establish rapidly a

+good understanding with the inhabitants;

+to send out spies; to intercept public and

+private letters; to translate and analyze

+their contents; in a word, to be able to

+answer every question of the general-in-chief,

+when he arrives with the whole

+army.</p>

+

+<div class="note">

+<h3>NOTE.</h3>

+

+<p>Foraging parties, composed of small detachments,

+and which were usually intrusted

+to young officers, served formerly to make

+good officers of advanced posts; but now the

+army is supplied with provisions by regular

+contributions: it is only in a course of partisan

+warfare that the necessary experience

+can be acquired to fill these situations with

+success.</p>

+

+<p>A chief of partisans is, to a certain extent,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_157">157</a></span>

+independent of the army. He receives

+neither pay nor provisions from it, and

+rarely succor, and is abandoned during the

+whole campaign to his own resources.</p>

+

+<p>An officer so circumstanced must unite

+address with courage, and boldness with

+discretion, if he wishes to collect plunder

+without measuring the strength of his little

+corps with superior forces. Always harassed,

+always surrounded by dangers, which

+it is his business to foresee and surmount, a

+leader of partisans acquires in a short time

+an experience in the details of war rarely to

+be obtained by an officer of the line; because

+the latter is almost always under the guidance

+of superior authority, which directs

+the whole of his movements, while the talent

+and genius of the partisan are developed

+and sustained by a dependence on his own

+resources.</p>

+

+</div></div>

+

+<hr />

+

+<div class="chapter">

+<h2><a id="MAXIM_LXXVII"></a>MAXIM LXXVII.</h2>

+

+<p>Generals-in-chief must be guided by

+their own experience, or their genius.

+Tactics, evolutions, the duties and knowledge

+of an engineer or artillery officer,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_158">158</a></span>

+may be learned in treatises, but the

+science of strategy is only to be acquired

+by experience, and by studying the campaigns

+of all the great captains.</p>

+

+<p>Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, and Frederick,

+as well as Alexander, Hannibal, and

+Cæsar, have all acted upon the same principles.

+These have been: to keep their

+forces united; to leave no weak part

+unguarded; to seize with rapidity on

+important points.</p>

+

+<p>Such are the principles which lead to

+victory, and which, by inspiring terror at

+the reputation of your arms, will at once

+maintain fidelity and secure subjection.</p>

+

+<div class="note">

+<h3>NOTE.</h3>

+

+<p>“A great captain can only be formed,”

+says the Archduke Charles, “by long experience

+and intense study: neither is his own

+experience enough&mdash;for whose life is there

+sufficiently fruitful of events to render his

+knowledge universal?” It is, therefore, by

+augmenting his information from the stock

+of others, by appreciating justly the discoveries

+of his predecessors, and by taking for

+his standard of comparison those great military<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_159">159</a></span>

+exploits, in connection with their political

+results, in which the history of war

+abounds, that he can alone become a great

+commander.</p>

+

+</div></div>

+

+<hr />

+

+<div class="chapter">

+<h2><a id="MAXIM_LXXVIII"></a>MAXIM LXXVIII.</h2>

+

+<p>Peruse again and again the campaigns

+of Alexander, Hannibal, Cæsar, Gustavus

+Adolphus, Turenne, Eugene, and Frederick.

+Model yourself upon them. This

+is the only means of becoming a great

+captain, and of acquiring the secret of the

+art of war. Your own genius will be

+enlightened and improved by this study,

+and you will learn to reject all maxims

+foreign to the principles of these great

+commanders.</p>

+

+<div class="note">

+<h3>NOTE.</h3>

+

+<p>It is in order to facilitate this object that

+I have formed the present collection. It is

+after reading and meditating upon the history

+of modern war that I have endeavored

+to illustrate, by examples, how the maxims

+of a great captain may be most successfully

+applied to this study. May the end I have

+had in view be accomplished!</p>

+

+</div></div>

+

+<div class="chapter">

+<div class="transnote">

+<h2 class="nobreak p1"><a id="Transcribers_Notes"></a>Transcriber’s Notes</h2>

+

+<p>Cover created by Transcriber and placed in the Public Domain.</p>

+

+<p>Punctuation, hyphenation, and spelling were made consistent when a predominant

+preference was found in this book; otherwise they were not changed,

+except as noted below.</p>

+

+<p>Unusual and archaic spellings were not changed.</p>

+

+<p>Simple typographical errors were corrected; occasional unbalanced

+quotation marks retained.</p>

+

+<p>Ambiguous hyphens at the ends of lines were retained.</p>

+

+<p>Page <a href="#Page_32">32</a>: “spacious and extensive” was printed as “entensive”

+but changed here.</p>

+

+<p>Page <a href="#Page_60">60</a>: “1746” is a misprint; the correct date must be in the 1600's,

+perhaps “1646”.</p>

+

+<p>Page <a href="#Page_63">63</a>: “1798” may be a misprint for “1796”.</p>

+

+<p>Page <a href="#Page_65">65</a>: “1745” is a misprint; the correct year is “1645”.</p>

+

+<p>Page <a href="#Page_75">75</a>: “wo to the vanquished” was printed that way.</p>

+

+<p>Page <a href="#Page_100">100</a>: “Vauban” was printed as “Vanban” but changed here.</p>

+</div>

+</div>

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+<pre>

+

+

+

+

+

+End of Project Gutenberg's The Officer's Manual, by Napoleon Bonaparte

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+</pre>

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