diff options
| author | nfenwick <nfenwick@pglaf.org> | 2025-02-05 02:12:37 -0800 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | nfenwick <nfenwick@pglaf.org> | 2025-02-05 02:12:37 -0800 |
| commit | 670ed0bad1b2234fc8c11ccbf20e5501499d9283 (patch) | |
| tree | ad978e794a148ed2a1cc5a52cc1cfc30c5294139 /old/50465-0.txt | |
| parent | b431caa5ab229a163d81e4b5ee64db72fbdfc916 (diff) | |
Diffstat (limited to 'old/50465-0.txt')
| -rw-r--r-- | old/50465-0.txt | 19876 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 19876 deletions
diff --git a/old/50465-0.txt b/old/50465-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 01a0e9d..0000000 --- a/old/50465-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,19876 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg eBook, The China of Chiang K'ai-Shek, by Paul Myron -Anthony Linebarger - - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most -other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of -the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - - - - -Title: The China of Chiang K'ai-Shek - A Political Study - - -Author: Paul Myron Anthony Linebarger - - - -Release Date: December 8, 2015 [eBook #50465] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - - -***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE CHINA OF CHIANG K'AI-SHEK*** - - -E-text prepared by Judith Wirawan, Adam Buchbinder, and the Online -Distributed Proofreading Team (http://www.pgdp.net) - - - -Note: Project Gutenberg also has an HTML version of this - file which includes the original illustrations. - See 50465-h.htm or 50465-h.zip: - (http://www.gutenberg.org/files/50465/50465-h/50465-h.htm) - or - (http://www.gutenberg.org/files/50465/50465-h.zip) - - -Transcriber's note: - - Text enclosed by underscores is in italics (_italics_). - - Text enclosed by equal signs is in bold face (=bold=). - - Small capitals are presented as all capitals in this e-text. - - - - - - -[Illustration: _Generalissimo Chiang K'ai-shek_] - - -THE CHINA OF CHIANG K'AI-SHEK: - -A Political Study - -by - -PAUL M. A. LINEBARGER - -Duke University - - - - - - - -Greenwood Press, Publishers -Westport, Connecticut - -The Library of Congress has catalogued this publication as follows: -Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data -Linebarger, Paul Myron Anthony, 1913-1966. -The China of Chiang K'ai-shek; a political study. -Reprint of the 1943 ed. published by World Peace Foundation, Boston. -Includes bibliographical references. -1. China--Politics and government--1912-1949. -2. Chiang, Kai-shek, 1886- . I. Title. -DS774.L48 1973 320.9'51'042 73-725 -ISBN 0-8371-6779-5 - -Copyright 1942 by World Peace Foundation -Originally published in 1943 by World Peace Foundation, Boston - -Reprinted with the permission of World Peace Foundation -First Greenwood Reprinting 1973 - -Library of Congress Catalogue Card Number 73-725 -ISBN 0-8371-6779-5 - -Printed in the United States of America - - - - - TO MY MOTHER - - _With Love_ - - - - -ACKNOWLEDGMENTS - - -Acknowledgments, for a work of this type, are always insufficient and -often ungracious. Today, political and military conditions forbid -mention of some of the persons to whom I am most indebted. Furthermore, -it is unfeasible to thank those teachers and friends who have prepared -me in years past for the present work. Nevertheless, courtesy and candor -demand that I indicate the extent of my obligation, and tender these -inadequate thanks. - -For interviews, hospitality and other kindnesses shown me in Western -China I wish to thank Generalissimo and Mme. Chiang K'ai-shek; Their -Excellencies, Sun K'ê, Yü Yu-jen, H. H. Kung, Wang Ch'ung-hui, Chang -Chia-ngau, T. F. Tsiang, Yeh Ch'u-tsang, Kan Nai-kuang, Ch'ên Kuo-fu, -Wang Shih-chieh, Ch'u Chia-hua, Hollington Tong, and Ma Chao-chun; Major -Generals J. L. Huang and Ch'u Shih-ming; Bishop Paul Yu-pin; and Messrs. -Foo Ping-shêng, Chên Ming-shu, Lo Chia-lun, Edward Bing-shuey Lee, Han -Lih-wu, P. C. Kuo, Ch'ên Chih-mai, Kinn-wei Shaw, James Y. C. Yen, Wang -Shen-tsu, Shuming T. Liu, Jen Shieh, Li Ch'in-shui, and Ma P'in-ho. -Among the foreign community, I wish to thank the American Ambassador, -Mr. Nelson Johnson, and Mr. E. F. Drumwright for their kind reception; -and to thank Mr. Tillman Durdin, Mr. Theodore White, Mr. George Fitch, -Dr. J. B. Tayler, Professor Frank Price, and Professor and Mrs. J. B. -Slocum. - -I feel myself peculiarly fortunate in having three such good, loyal -friends as Drs. Chu Djang, Miao Chung-yi, and Yin Pao-yü, whose -kindnesses to me have continued ever since our student days together at -the Johns Hopkins. - -Dean Shen Ch'un-lu, Mr. Tso T'ao-fên and their associates in the -National Salvation movement; Colonel Ch'in Po-k'u of the Communist -Party; Mr. Chang Peh-chuen of the Third Party; Dr. Carson Chang of the -National Socialist Party, and other spokesmen for minority and -unofficial groups were most generous with their time and information. - -Messrs. You Shoo-tseng, Yang Chun, Wu Hsüeh-ping, Hawthorne Chen and -others translated Chinese materials for or with me. Save for their help, -so liberally and painstakingly rendered, this book would have been -delayed for months if not years. These gentlemen are not to be held -responsible for the selection of materials, nor for the translations in -their present form, since I have sought to check and revise this work as -far as time and my imperfect command of written Chinese have permitted. - -The International Peace Campaign (China Branch), The People's Foreign -Relations Association, The Chinese-American Institute for Cultural -Relations, and other institutions in Free China were generous with their -hospitality and facilities. I owe particular thanks to the Central Bank -of China for the high courtesy shown me through the Chief Secretary and -the following gentlemen: Mr. T. T. Wang, Chief of the Engineering -Division; Mr. Ch'ên Yin-sung, Manager, Kiating Branch; and Mr. Yang -Hsia-tz'ŭ, Manager, Chengtu Branch. The officers of the Bank went to -enormous pains to ensure my timely, safe return to Chungking when I was -ill, hurried, tardy, and in danger of missing my prearranged bookings -back to America. Special acknowledgment must also be offered to Mr. C. -C. Chi, for his unfailing kindness in providing interviews and trips, -and to the China National Aviation Corporation for their unusual -courtesies. - -In Hong Kong, I was assisted by Dr. Eugene Chen, Dr. Wên Yüan-ning, Dr. -Ch'en Han-seng, and Mr. Liu Yu-wan. - -In Shanghai, Mr. T. Nakada of the Japanese consulate-general was most -helpful. - -In Nanking, Messrs. Wên Chung-yao, Kiang Kang-hu, Tsu Min-yi, Lin -Pai-shêng, Li Shêng-wu, Hsü Liang, George Wên, P. C. Huang, T'ang -Leang-li, K. S. James Woo and L. K. Kentwell were most hospitable. Mr. -M. Kimura, of the Japanese Embassy in Nanking, was kind and courteous. I -wish to thank these gentlemen for their friendliness to an alien scholar -who had just come from the other side of the war. - -In Tokyo, Messrs. Yokachiro Suma, Yoji Hirota, Kaneo Tsuchida, and Nobuo -Fujimura of the Foreign Office were hospitable and informative. - -Mr. Robert Kempton, Mr. George Giffen, and Dr. Louis Wilkinson showed me -great kindness on my journey. - -In the United States, I am indebted for introductions and advice to Dr. -Hu Shih, the Chinese Ambassador; Professor George Taylor, of the -University of Washington; and Mr. Frederick V. Field, of the American -Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations. - -My colleagues and friends at Duke University have been very helpful. -Professors Homer Dubs and Paul H. Clyde, my colleagues in the Far -Eastern field, read the manuscript and made invaluable suggestions; -Professor Dubs' command of Chinese has saved me from many predicaments. -Professor Robert R. Wilson has been unfailing in his encouragement, -sympathetic interest, and facilitation of my plans. - -The Duke University Research Council has assisted me with annual grants -for the collections of documentary materials on Chinese politics. Save -for this, I have received no financial aid or subsidy from any -institution, person, or government whatever. - -Mr. J. C. Yang, Mr. and Mrs. R. E. Hosack, Mrs. Freda Townsend, and Mrs. -Margaret Linebarger have assisted me with manuscripts and proof. - -I wish to thank the Director, Dr. S. Shepard Jones, and the staff of the -World Peace Foundation for their patience, and helpfulness during the -preparation of this work for the press. Miss Marie J. Carroll has been -especially helpful. - -All opinions and statements herein expressed are my own, unless clearly -indicated as quotation. These acknowledgments are a record of thanks. I -assume sole and complete responsibility for the contents of this book. - - P. M. A. L. - _Durham, North Carolina - March 31, 1941_ - - - - -WORLD PEACE FOUNDATION - -[Illustration: Logo] - -40 Mt. Vernon Street, Boston, Massachusetts - -_Founded in 1910_ - - -_Board of Trustees_ - - GEORGE H. BLAKESLEE, _President_ - FRANK AYDELOTTE - JAMES PHINNEY BAXTER, 3d - HARVEY H. BUNDY - LEONARD W. CRONKHITE - STEPHEN DUGGAN - HARRY A. GARFIELD - CHRISTIAN A. HERTER - BRUCE C. HOPPER - MANLEY O. HUDSON - A. LAWRENCE LOWELL - J. GRAFTON ROGERS - CHARLES SEYMOUR - JOHN H. WILLIAMS - HENRY M. WRISTON - - -_General Staff_ - - S. SHEPARD JONES, _Director_ - DENYS P. MYERS, _Research_ - MARIE J. CARROLL, _Reference_ - MARY J. MACDONALD, _Treasurer_ - - -The World Peace Foundation is a non-profit organization which was -founded in 1910 by Edwin Ginn, the educational publisher, for the -purpose of promoting peace, justice and good-will among nations. For -many years the Foundation has sought to increase public understanding of -international problems by an objective presentation of the facts of -international relations. This purpose is accomplished principally -through its publications and by the maintenance of a Reference Service -which furnishes on request information on current international -problems. Recently increased attention has been focused on American -foreign relations by study groups organized for the consideration of -actual problems of policy. - - - - -CONTENTS - - - _Frontispiece_--Generalissimo Chiang K'ai-shek - PAGE - INTRODUCTION 1 - - The Chinese Political Inheritance: Some Continuing Aspects 1 - - China at the Outbreak of War 6 - - The Beginning of Active Hostilities 11 - - The Hankow Period 15 - - The Chungking Period 19 - - I. THE CONSTITUTION 21 - - The _Yüeh-fa_ of 1931 22 - - The Draft Permanent or Double Five Constitution 25 - - The Issue of Constitutional Change 31 - - II. THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT 41 - - The Five-Power Constitution 42 - - The Supreme National Defense Council 46 - - The President of the National Government 52 - - The Council of State 53 - - The Executive _Yüan_ 56 - - The Military Affairs Commission 60 - - The Judicial, Legislative, Examination and Control _Yüan_ 65 - - III. CONSULTATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANS 69 - - The People's Political Council 69 - - The Administrative Pattern 79 - - The Political Ministries 81 - - Social and Cultural Agencies 83 - - The Economic Ministries 85 - - IV. PROVINCIAL, LOCAL, AND SPECIAL-AREA GOVERNMENT 98 - - Chart on Provincial and Urban Government facing 98 - - The Provinces 99 - - Local Government 103 - - The Communist Zone 111 - - Guerrilla Governments 116 - - V. THE KUOMINTANG 124 - - The Party Constitutional System 125 - - Party Organization 129 - - The Kuomintang Bid for Leadership 140 - - Intra-Kuomintang Politics 142 - - The New Life Movement and Other Affiliates 149 - - VI. THE COMMUNIST AND MINOR PARTIES 159 - - The Chinese Communists: Party and Leaders 160 - - Communism: Patriotism or Betrayal? 171 - - The National Salvation Movement 175 - - The Third Party 178 - - The Chinese National Socialist Party 179 - - Social Democrats and _La Jeunesse_ 181 - - VII. GOVERNING INSTITUTIONS OF THE JAPANESE AND PRO-JAPANESE 183 - - The Japanese Army as a Chinese Government 185 - - The Problem of Puppet States 188 - - The Provisional and Reformed Governments 192 - - The Reorganized National Government of Wang Ch'ing-wei 197 - - VIII. EXTRA-POLITICAL FORCES 211 - - The Foundations of Chinese Government 212 - - Mass Education 214 - - Rural Reconstruction 218 - - The Chinese Industrial Cooperatives 223 - - Unorganized Pressure 234 - - IX. SUN YAT-SEN AND CHIANG K'AI-SHEK 239 - - Sun Yat-sen 240 - - The _San Min Chu I_ 250 - - Chiang K'ai-shek 254 - - Chinese Appraisals of Chiang 266 - - The Ideology of Chiang 269 - - CONCLUSION 273 - - The Chief Alternatives in China 274 - - The United States in Chinese Politics 277 - - APPENDICES - PAGE - APPENDIX I: GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS 283 - - A. The Government Draft of the Proposed Constitution 283 - - B. The System of Organization of the National Congress 300 - - C. Act of the Legislative _Yüan_, April 31, XXVI (1937) - Governing the Election of Representatives to the - National Congress 302 - - D. The Program of Resistance and Reconstruction 309 - - E. An Outline of War-time Controlment 313 - - F. A Chart of the Control _Yüan_ from July 1937 to June - 1940 318 - - G. Regulations Concerning the Organization of the Various - Classifications of _Hsien_ 324 - - H. A Chart of Government Organization facing 330 - - APPENDIX II: DOCUMENTS ON PARTY POLITICS 331 - - A. A Chart on Kuomintang Organization facing 331 - - B. Constitution of the _San Min Chu I_ Youth Corps, Year - XXVII (1938) 331 - - C. The Duties and General Activities of the _San Min Chu I_ - Youth Corps (Ch'ên Ch'êng) 340 - - D. The _Hsiao-tsu_ (Small Group) Training Program 354 - - E. Party Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party 359 - - APPENDIX III: MATERIALS ON POLICY 371 - - A. Reply to Questions (Chiang K'ai-shek) 371 - - B. What I Mean by Action, or A Philosophy of Action (Chiang - K'ai-shek) 373 - - C. Definition of the Problems Concerning the Organization - of the Various Classifications of _Hsien_ (Chiang - K'ai-shek) 388 - - Chart on _Hsien_ Classifications facing 388 - - D. A Discussion of Mao Tsê-tung's Comments on the Present - State of International Relations (Ch'ên Kuo-hsin) 403 - - E. China's Long-range Diplomatic Orientation (Wang - Ch'ung-hui) 418 - - GLOSSARY 423 - - INDEX 435 - - - - -INTRODUCTION - - -The National Government of the Republic of China, located at the -auxiliary capital of Chungking, is one of the most important governments -in contemporary world affairs. It has provided fairly effective -unification for the largest nation on earth, and has fought a great -power to a standstill. - -The present work is an analysis of this government. Not a biography of -Chiang K'ai-shek, it is instead a delineation of the institutions, the -parties and movements, and the armies which today determine the Chinese -destiny. Free China, mutilated as it is, is still far more populous and -complex than the Soviet Union or Germany. Its political institutions -cannot be reduced to the terms of one man's caprice, and the personality -of Chiang--while brilliantly conspicuous--is not the entire picture of -China. Generalissimo Chiang works, perhaps because he wishes to, -certainly because he must, within the framework of a triune -organization: the National Government, the central armies and the -Kuomintang. These institutions have developed to their present efficacy -only by means of thirty years of war, preceded by almost thirty years -more of conspiracy. They have become the norm of contemporary China and, -whatever their particular future, significant determinants of China's -eventual development. - - -THE CHINESE POLITICAL INHERITANCE: SOME CONTINUING ASPECTS - -Because of cultural and historical differences between China and the -West, the application of identical terms to both is probably either -wrong or meaningless. Nevertheless, Westerners can live in China, deal -with the Chinese, scrutinize their affairs, and transpose these to such -Western descriptions as may suit the purpose. In reading of China, -however, one should keep in mind the fact that the words are English, -freighted with special meanings, and are used not by scientific choice -but for lack of others. Part of this difference can be bridged if one -recalls the salient peculiarities of China as against the Western world. - -No other society comparable in size, duration and extent has ever -existed; the Chinese Empire, from the beginning of the Ch'in (221 B.C.) -to the end of the Manchus (A.D. 1911), remains the greatest social -edifice mankind has yet brought forth. As such, its modern successor is -everywhere stamped with archaic catholic traits which are today both -obsolescent and futuristic. To these must be added the characteristics -of China as a special area--a cultural zone seeking national form; -fragmented economies working their way out of backwardness in technology -and helplessness in world economics; a people in quest of government -which will give them power without enslaving them. This modern "Chinese -Republic," a Western-form state only by diplomatic courtesy in the years -succeeding 1912, has been the widest zone of anarchy in the modern -world; the Japanese attack on its emergent institutions has helped -immeasurably to re-identify the Chinese-speaking people and the officers -who presume to govern them. - -To understand Chinese government in war time, one might first check the -outstanding points of old Chinese development and their modern -derivatives. - -Pre-eminently, China has been _pro forma_ Confucian ever since the tenth -century after Christ. This has meant an ordering of classes in society -based on the ideal of scholarship and public administration, rather than -on ideals of valor, piety or acquisitiveness. By setting the -requirements of the examinations, and through concealed but sharp -discouragement of heterodoxy or wilful originality, the governing -mechanism made of itself a vast machine of scholars which--because its -authority rested in tradition, in language, in social usages--was able -to ride out domestic revolution and foreign invasion, and was in a -position to ensure its own perpetuation despite political or military -interruption. - -The traditions of scholastic bureaucracy working in a pluralistic -society have left the Chinese people largely independent of the routine -functioning of government. The Western state becomes the articulation of -society. The government of old China was pseudomorphic as a state, -having only some of the functions of the Western state, and its -governing power was the residual capacity of an organization devoted to -the ends of ceremony, exemplarization, education and the cultivation of -personality. Administration was confined chiefly to revenue collection, -flood control and defense. In the West, the most important purposes of -society are framed in law after discussion, and are executed as policy; -in China these purposes, defined by the Confucian ideology, were known -throughout the society, with scholar-officials as their expositors. -Fulfillment was by no means a prerogative of government alone. By -contrast with the Confucian standards, the Western states, whether -democracies or not, are capricious, despotic and nonmoral; by Western -standards, Chinese society was unresponsive, sanctimonious and -amorphous. - -This political excellence and stability was accompanied by economic -phenomena which are, by modern standards, less desirable. Overcrowding -and a slow rate of progress have been fairly constant features of -Chinese society since the Han. Owen Lattimore has recently appraised the -economics behind the dynastic cycle in China.[1] Each community in old -China was cell-like, largely autonomous and autarkic. Hence, the -increase of wealth was sought within the cell, and not within a larger -framework of economic advance--such as commerce or invention would -provide--and the economically predominant class (the landowners) -possessed a vested interest in overpopulation (which cheapened -agricultural labor and maintained a high, even urgent, demand for food -products). Equilibrium was reached, and a cycle of diminishing returns -initiated, when population began to outrun the land's subsistence -maximum. This drop in returns, in the face of continued population rise, -led to peasant rebellion, distributism and a reinauguration of the same -type of state--made necessary by the monopoly of managerial expertness -(essential to water conservancy, land wealth and the familiar intensive -cultivation) in the ideographically literate class. Control of the -richest water-conservancy region meant the hegemony of China. - - [Footnote 1: Lattimore, Owen, _Inner Asian Frontiers of China_, New - York, 1940, p. 45 and _passim_. The author, a noted geographer, - presents significant new analyses of the interconnections of Chinese - economics and culture.] - -The impact of Western imperialism has struck China in the past century, -during the critical or revolutionary phase of this immemorial cycle. -Chinese politics took the color of a back-country struggle. The centers -of modern power were beyond Chinese administrative reach. The emergent -Chinese state, deprived of its foci of power in the metropolises, was -promised control thereof only when it had become an effective and -complete state--a condition largely unobtainable without control of -Shanghai, Tientsin, Hankow, and the British Crown Colony of Hong Kong. - -In theory, the Chinese Republic was established January 1, 1912. In -practice, the name _Republic_ has masked a _mêlée_ of governments and -power-organizations, ranging from bandit gangs with pretentious -political color to authentic regional governments administering large -areas. This culminated in the National Government which, beginning as a -conspiracy, becoming the leading regional government, is now in the -position of _de facto_ government for virtually all Free China, the -Chinese dominions, and much of the occupied area. None of these -governments has ever held an election based on wide suffrage; none has -systematically subordinated policy to law; none has possessed a -treasury, fleet or air force worthy of a second-class power, until the -present war. Out of these unpromising materials the counter-attacking -Chinese state has arisen; only by legal formula is it the same Republic -as its predecessors; only by courtesy is this the Year XXX (1941) of the -Republic.[2] - - [Footnote 2: Detailed descriptions of the political history of the - period are to be found, _inter alia_, in Holcombe, Arthur N., _The - Chinese Revolution_, Cambridge, 1930; MacNair, Harley F., _China in - Revolution_, Chicago, 1931; and, most popularly, Escarra, Jean, _China - Then and Now_, Peiping, 1940. Descriptions of the government are Wu - Chih-fang, _Chinese Government and Politics_, Shanghai, 1934; Lum - Kalfred Dip, _Chinese Government_, Shanghai, 1934; and Linebarger, - Paul M. A., _Government in Republican China_, New York and London, - 1938.] - -The governmental developments of the Republican era fall conveniently -into four periods: the period of establishment, 1911-1916; the period of -_tuchünism_, 1917-1926; the rule of the National Government, 1927-1936; -the period of invasion, 1937 to the present. The turning points between -these periods are, respectively, the fall of the Manchu Empire of China -(1911), the death of the dictator-President Yüan Shih-k'ai (1916), the -Great Revolution under Kuomintang-Communist leadership (culminating, -1927), and the Sian affair (December 1936) followed by full-scale -invasion (July 1937). - -The present governments of China are accordingly the successors of a -wide variety of decaying imperial administration, experimental modernism -and outright confusion. Any change in China had to be made at the -expense of the _haves_--the Western powers and Japan. Japan, in seeking -the control of China, is fighting China and the Western powers; China, -in fighting back, must fight Japan, and behind Japan the whole structure -of imperialism. Most Chinese have abandoned hope of surviving as a -people without eventually triumphing as a state. In the past, they -absorbed conquerors whose bases were transferred to China; today, they -cannot accommodate invaders who come as transients from an overseas -base. The Chinese war of resistance is a revolution. It is a -continuation of the Nationalist revolution, begun against the Manchus, -continued against the imperialist powers, and now directed against the -Japanese and their Chinese associates. At the same time, this revolution -struggles to incorporate in its dynamics the drive of an endemic peasant -rebellion, Communist in its extreme phase. Nationalist in supreme -emphasis, the revolution finds its highest expression in the -articulation of an effective state--something not known in China for -twenty-two centuries. - - -CHINA AT THE OUTBREAK OF WAR - -Sun Yat-sen's legacy of doctrine included a program of revolution by -three stages: - -(1) the military conquest of power by the Kuomintang; - -(2) the tutelary dictatorship of the Kuomintang while democracy was -being instilled and adopted from the bottom up; and - -(3) constitutionalism, requiring abdication of the Kuomintang in favor -of a popularly elected government.[3] - - [Footnote 3: This is given in the _Chien Kuo Ta Kang_ (Outline of - National Reconstruction), of April 12, XIII (1924), particularly - points 3, 5, 6, 7, and 23. Translations are to be found in Hsü, - Leonard Shihlien, _Sun Yat-sen: His Political and Social Ideals_, Los - Angeles, 1933, and Wu Chih-fang, work cited, p. 430 _ff._] - -Upon coming to power in Nanking, the National Government had begun -promising a short period of tutelage and had made various gestures in -favor of experimental popular government. A Provisional Constitution was -adopted by a _Kuo-min Hui-i_ (commonly termed, National People's -Convention) in 1931, operating under complete government supervision; a -transition instrument, self-acknowledged as such, it anticipated a -Permanent Constitution upon the accomplishment of constitutional -government in a majority of provinces (Articles 86, 87).[4] Although the -Kuomintang has ruled parts of China for more than fifteen years, and is -by profession the party of democracy, it has not yet relinquished power. -The period of tutelage is still legally in force. - - [Footnote 4: For the text of this constitution, see Wu Chih-fang, - cited, p. 430 _ff._] - -In the years immediately preceding the outbreak of war, this monopoly of -governmental power by the Kuomintang was not only an important political -irritant but also an obstacle to effective Chinese unity. Discontent was -aggravated by inelasticity of the Party. Overweighted with petty -bureaucracy, it offered too few up-channel opportunities for potential -leaders. Since Nationalists were the Ins, Kuomintang membership carried -privileges rather than obligations. Many distinguished and active -citizens either refused to join, or let their purely nominal membership -ride along. The Party was saved from complete decline because it -included most of the government personnel, and new recruits to -government service gave it some freshness, vigor and inward criticism. - -The leading difficulty of both state-building and democratization had -been overcome by the creation of a government which was well-designed, -functioning _de facto_ and able to meet most of the specialized problems -of modern administration. The regime was far from being a crude -hierarchy of soldiers and taxgatherers, but had accrued about its -policy-making core the essential staff and line services of modern rule. -Inadequacies lay not in absolute lack of species of personnel or -structure, but in the relative weakness of many key functions. During -the third decade of the Republic the then Nanking Government, under -Chiang's leadership, gave China its first modern national government. - -Despite this beginning, which--without the invasion--stood a very good -chance of evolving into a paternalistic oligarchy in democratic form, -such as Brazil, there were enormous difficulties still facing genuine -China-wide government. First among these difficulties was the question -of regional autonomy--lingering vestiges of _tuchünism_, reinforced by a -vigorous provincialism. Whole regions of China were under the merely -nominal control of the National Government. - -The second difficulty was that of personal politics. Modern China has -had ample politics of principle. It is a rare ideological cult, of any -kind, anywhere, which does not have its Chinese affiliates. No other -nation has known such a wide choice of doctrines, each represented by -armed forces and by definite political leadership. At the same time, -this ideological struggle was and is paralleled by the politics of -individuals and cliques. This made the National Government function as -an oligarchy based on three patterns of control: - -(1) ideological eminence, orthodoxy, appeal and timeliness; - -(2) military or economic control of power in the form of soldiers or -cash, the two being for the most part interchangeable; and - -(3) governmental incumbency. - -A man like Hu Han-min could owe his importance almost altogether to his -past associations with the Party and with Dr. Sun, to his authority as -an exponent of the _San Min Chu I_, and to his appeal to the sense of -prestige, dignity and stability on the part of other people who did not -possess such power, which was exercised in the name of the Kuomintang -and its ideology. T. V. Soong, in money matters, or Chang Hsüeh-liang, -in military matters, were important because they had under their -immediate influence so much cash or so many troops, the availability and -mobility of which from day to day determined their actual share of -power. Lastly, these same men possessed political authority by narrowly -lawful means, i.e., by the governmental offices which they held. - -Thirdly, the government was deeply out of harmony with an overwhelming -majority of college students, much of the professional and intellectual -classes, and a broad section of the articulate farmer and labor groups. -In the pre-war years of strain, unofficial persons could follow world -fashions in ideas associated with Leftism. Although the full Western -pattern of Right, Center, and Left was not imposed upon Chinese -politics, many of the most active publicists wrote in these terms. There -was, accordingly, a traditional China and a Leftist China; the latter -faithfully imported European concepts and did much to change the -language of Chinese political struggle. The government--itself Left from -the point of view of the pre-existent order, yet committed to modes of -thought and policy formally little more radical than the American New -Deal--was constantly recalled to the most cold-blooded of -_realpolitische_ considerations. - -Fourthly, the student movement--in some phases a part of the general -Leftist drive--proved a constant source of difficulty and trouble. -Chinese students (both collegiate and secondary) are self-conscious, -frequently arrogant inheritors of the Chinese tradition of rule by -_literati_. Their influence over the masses is impressive; their -patriotism, however unreflective, is ardent; and their interest in -international affairs is violent.[5] - - [Footnote 5: In particular, see Freyn, Hubert, _Prelude to War: The - Chinese Student Rebellion of 1935-1936_, Shanghai, 1939. Reference to - contemporary Left-liberal and Left publications in Europe and America - will disclose numerous sympathetic eyewitness accounts of the troubles - and the fortitude of the students. Some of these accounts now possess - a wry, inadvertent humor in their characterization of Chiang as a - willing accomplice of Japan.] - -Fifthly, Chinese society, accustomed to acting independently of -government, urged varied foreign policies and sought wars. Almost every -kind of organization, from archaic guilds and secret societies to -business groups, sought to wage its own attack on Japan. Uncanalized, -counter-attacked, dammed up, these efforts might have undone the -government. Toward the end, the government raced frenziedly with time, -losing power through unpopularity, and increasing power through -rearmament and technical preparation. The vigorous extra-governmental -pressure of a populace accustomed to spontaneous mass action is a factor -which qualifies and will probably continue to qualify Chinese foreign -policy. It is often left out of account in Western comment on China. - -Sixthly, in the winter and spring of 1936-37, the National Government -was under pressure from its own subjects to begin the negotiation of -national unity, starting with a Communist armistice and continuing with -the incorporation of as many regions as possible into the sphere of the -government; but despite such increasing pressure, the government took no -effective step in this direction until after the kidnapping of Chiang at -Sian.[6] As a result of this melodramatic affair, however, the National -Government revised policies which had become traditions ten years old -and agreed to an armistice with the Communists. The Kuomintang--bearing -full responsibility for an actual emergent state--found intra-Chinese -diplomacy as perplexing as foreign. - - [Footnote 6: For the Generalissimo's own diary of the kidnapping, - together with a narrative by his wife, see Chiang, Mme. Mayling Soong, - _Sian: A Coup d'Etat_, bound with Chiang K'ai-shek, _A Fortnight in - Sian: Extracts from a Diary_, Shanghai, 1938. The Chinese edition of - this appeared as Chiang Wei-yüan-chang [Chairman Chiang], _Hsi-an Pan - Yüeh-chi_ [A Fortnight's Diary from Sian], Shanghai, XXVI (1937). A - first-hand Western account is Bertram, James M., _First Act in China_, - New York, 1938. Edgar Snow, in _Red Star over China_, New York, 1938, - p. 395 _ff._, gives an account sympathetic to the Left; Harold Isaacs, - in _The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution_, London, 1938, p. 445 - _ff._, presents a penetrating Trotskyist critique. An excellent - factual summary of this crucial year, written by a well-known writer - who visited the scene at first hand, is to be found in Bisson, T. A., - _Japan in China_, New York, 1938.] - -Thus, at the outbreak of war, the National Government had reached a -higher level of actual political and administrative power than its -predecessors, but was faced with grave problems. In any other country -the government would presumably have been on the verge of ruin. -Controlling only major sections of its internationally recognized -territory; faced by autonomous provinces, half-legal military satrapies -and outright warlord despotism, all backed by vehement provincialism, -great distances, linguistic difficulties and mutual geographical -isolation; unpopular with its own student, intellectual and professional -elites; ridden by personal politics; just emerging from a ten years' -civil war--with these handicaps, a second-rate power undertook to -challenge the greatest power of Asia to an irreversibly fateful war. The -Chinese went further: they sought in the war not only victory, but -unity, democracy and prosperity as well! This background of purpose -makes China's internal politics richly meaningful in relation to the -world scene. - - -THE BEGINNING OF ACTIVE HOSTILITIES - -After nearly six years of military and political conflict, a full -quasi-war[7] broke out with the episode at Loukouchiao on the night of -July 7-8, 1937. It was the evident intention of the Japanese to end an -unsatisfactory state of affairs (i.e., Chinese control) in that area -once and for all, although they were perfectly willing to express -temporary amity and _ad interim_ non-aggression toward what was left of -China. The National Government, after a few days of uncertainty, began -real preparations for war. Since the government's appeasement policy had -accustomed many to think of resistance in terms of the Left, there was -an enormous inflation of Leftist sentiment, not deflated for about -eighteen months. - - [Footnote 7: "War" used to mean the reciprocal application of violence - by public, armed bodies; private and informal homicide was termed - "murder" or was otherwise clearly designated. Today these distinctions - are less clear. The author must enter a _caveat lector_: no term is - employed in other than a general (i.e., literary) meaning, except upon - special notice. The Sino-Japanese hostilities differ greatly from war - in several interesting but technical respects; they are a very special - Japanese invention. Yet it would be cumbersome to refer to Chinese - changes in Conflict-time, or to speak meticulously of armies engaged - in an Incident.] - -While new mass organizations were formed, the Chinese military command -framed a plan for a three-stage war: - -(1) a period of resistance by heavy regular forces fighting -positionally; - -(2) a period of stalemate wherein enemy forces, immobilized by opposing -regular armies, found lines of communication, supplies and business -harassed by guerrillas and saboteurs; - -(3) a period of counter-attack in which the Chinese, having prepared -themselves technologically during the stalemate and having weakened the -enemy by a test of endurance, should drive the Japanese back into the -sea. - -The strategy of this type of war was based upon the plan of retreating -in space in order to advance in time--that is, to yield area slowly and -purposefully, without too great cost to oneself, in order to outlast the -enemy and reach victory. In thus purchasing time by the mile, the -Chinese could not afford to yield intact cities, factories, -communications, mines, docks, warehouses and the other goods of -business; such cessions would only profit Japan: hence _the scorched -earth_ policy. The strategy was obviously suited to a country rich in -territory and population, but poor in _matériel_. It not only made both -regulars and guerrillas effective against Japan but made each truly -reliant upon the other. Without the Nationalist regular armies, who in -attempting to suppress the Communists had done almost everything which -the Japanese now had to do--guarding railroads, pacifying disaffected -and hostile rural areas, promoting industries and watching -agitation--the Japanese forces might disperse enough to enable Japan to -patrol and pacify enough of China to pay for the occupation. Chiang had -to hold the Japanese together, immobilize large bodies of their troops, -keep their war expenses up, and wait for the time to counter-attack. -Meanwhile the guerrillas, together with the Communist veterans, were to -prevent the Japanese from settling down, to worry them with agitation, -to sabotage their economic efforts and to wear them out for Chiang's -_révanche_. - -One of the first governmental changes in wartime was the re-institution -of an effective propaganda service under the Political Department of the -Military Affairs Commission. In this Department, many of China's most -active controversialists, censored or exiled for years, found officially -sanctioned scope for their energies. Formal unity came slowly. Although -Shanghai was attacked on August 13, 1937, it was not until September 10 -following that a fairly definitive arrangement was reached in regard to -the Communist-occupied zone in the Northwest. - -The settlement transformed a pre-existing armistice into an -intranational alliance; technically it amounted to submission by the -Communists and their incorporation into the national government and -armies. The area of the Chinese Soviet Republic assumed the name Special -Regional Government of the Chinese Republic (_Chunghua Min-kuo T'ê-ch'ü -Chêng-fu_), which it had been using informally for months; the Chinese -Red Army became the Eighth Route Army (_Pa-lu-chün_); and the Chinese -Communist Party accepted the _San Min Chu I_ as the constitutional state -ideology of China, abandoning immediate measures of class war and -expropriation. The settlement was in the form of a Communist reply to -Kuomintang terms offered in February 1937 and the reply of the -Generalissimo as Chief of the Kuomintang to the Communist -declaration.[8] - - [Footnote 8: See Council of International Affairs, _The Chinese Year - Book, 1938-39_ [Hong Kong], 1939; article by Chu Chia-hua, - "Consolidation of Democracy in China," Chapter IV; "Reconciliation - with the Communists," p. 339-40. This Council is an informal and - extra-legal offshoot of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs; - accordingly the annual, rich in official materials, provides - insufficient data on Communist, guerrilla, and unofficial activities. - See also, Epstein, I., _The People's War_ [Shanghai], 1939, p. 88 - _ff._, for an excellent, clear account of this period.] - -For the first few months the war kept its quasi-European pattern. The -greater part of the fighting was done in the Shanghai area, while -Japanese forces proceeded down from North China. The Japanese still had -some expectation of localizing the North China and the Shanghai -conflicts. At most, they expected the war to be a short one, not -extending beyond the capture of Nanking. Occupation of the capital was -counted on for the ruin of the central government, the end of Chiang and -the reversion of China to a condition of malleable anarchy. - -December 1937 was the blackest month of the war for the Chinese. The -Japanese advanced toward Nanking, with Chinese resistance crumbling; -part of the armies withdrew in good order, but on occasion there were -hopeless, panicky routs. To this month the Japanese looked for victory, -and were so confident that they formed the pro-Japanese Provisional -Government of the Republic of China, in Peking on December 11.[9] Four -days later the Japanese forces entered Nanking, and the ensuing -fortnight set the record for atrocity in the modern world. The Japanese -forces were preoccupied with their own disorder. The National -Government escaped up-river to Hankow, where it promptly began to -function under the three-headquarters plan: some offices at Hankow, some -at Changsha and some at Chungking. The presence of the foreign affairs, -propaganda, and military agencies at Hankow made this the practical -capital of China, although Nanking was and is the constitutional -capital. - - [Footnote 9: See below, p. 193. See also Taylor, George E., _The - Struggle for North China_, New York, 1940, in the Inquiry Series of - the Institute of Pacific Relations.] - - -THE HANKOW PERIOD - -The greatest part of the year XXVII (1938) was spent in continuation of -slow retreat and heavy frontal resistance. Until October communications -with the outside world were wide open through the railroad to Canton. -Heavy supplies could arrive by the shipload. Hundreds of Japanese air -attacks on the railroad disrupted schedules but never led to serious -suspension of service. Leftist influence became overwhelming in -Hankow. That city had been the capital of the ill-fated Wu-han -Kuomintang-Communist government, which fell with the secession of Chiang -to Nanking eleven years before; its connotations still lingered. Even -conservative Kuomintang leaders, who had gone to lengths of appeasement -at which Neville Chamberlain would have blanched, tried to talk like -Negrin or Alvarez del Vayo. - -In January 1938, two organizations were formed which, along with the -Communist zone in the Northwest, were to be among the most active -agencies of guerrilla leadership. The first of these was the New Fourth -Army (_Hsin-ssŭ-chün_), which emerged in the area just south of the -Japanese forces at the Yangtze mouth. It was composed of peasant and -student militia, of regular army fragments, and of some Kuomintang -volunteers, under the leadership of Communist remnants which had hidden -away, banditti-fashion, when the Red Army trekked Northwest. Its -emergence was recognized by legal order of the National Military -Affairs Commission.[10] The other organization was the Provisional -Executive Committee of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Border Region -(_Chin-ch'a-chi Pien-ch'ü Lin-shih Hsing-chêng Wei-yüan-hui_), -established by a conference at Fup'ing, January 8-15, and authorized by -central government mandate. This agency also sprang from Leftist -organizations--in this case, a bold, determined, student-peasant -guerrilla army--which had first developed despite government opposition. -It was designed to provide an emergency guerrilla government for those -portions of the three provinces which were under occupation by the -Japanese. Unoccupied portions of the provinces retained their existing -administrations. - - [Footnote 10: See Epstein, I., work cited, p. 235 _ff._ and _The - Chinese Year Book 1938-39_, cited, article by the late P. C. Nyi, - "Plans for Political and Economic Hegemony in China"; this includes - a full administrative description of the Border Region, p. 254 _ff._ - The North China zone is arbitrarily translated "Border Region," to - distinguish it from the quondam Chinese Soviet Republic in the - Northwest, translated as "Frontier Area."] - -In the next month, February 1938, there was established an agency of -supreme importance, the Supreme National Defense Council.[11] This -replaced the Central Political Council,[12] which had exercised routine -functions of the Party's sovereign control over the government; like its -predecessor, the Supreme National Defense Council tended to act as the -supreme governmental organ, although it was technically a Party organ. -The Council provided and provides a unified civilian-military control -for the duration of the war; but the Kuomintang shares its power with -other groups only in the consultative organs of state, not in the -executive. - - [Footnote 11: See below, p. 46.] - - [Footnote 12: See chart on p. 47. Descriptions of the pre-war Central - Political Council are to be found in the texts cited on p. 5, n. 2, - and in the first two issues of _The Chinese Year Book, 1935-36_ and - _1936-37_, Shanghai, _passim_.] - -March 1938 followed with another political step forward--the Emergency -Session of the Kuomintang Party Congress. The Party Congress had the -functions of a special constituent assembly in part, and in part those -of a restricted parliament; in this session two further actions were -taken. The first was the adoption of the momentous Program of National -Resistance and Reconstruction (_K'ang-chan Chien-kuo Kang-ling_),[13] -which provides a plan for the war and commits the Kuomintang and the -National Government to a policy of victory, of industrialization, and of -economic reform as a means to war. - - [Footnote 13: See Appendix, p. 309.] - -The second step taken by this important Congress was the provision for a -People's Political Council (_Kuo-min Ts'an-chêng Hui_, also translatable -as People's Advisory Political Council). This was the first breach in -the Kuomintang monopoly of government since the establishment of the -Party dictatorship.[14] The government, through the constitutional -fiction of appointing members as representative individuals, provided a -rough, approximate, but fair representation of the active political -forces in China. - - [Footnote 14: See below, p. 69. This is to be distinguished from the - various constitutional conventions, the proposed national congress - (_kuo-min ta-hui_) which exists only in contemplation of the - constitutional drafters, and the Kuomintang Party Congress.] - -While the Emergency Session of the Party Congress took these steps for -further national defense, the Japanese were collecting a coterie of -ex-politicians, friends of Japan, and old men to serve as the Reformed -Government of the Republic of China at Nanking. They disregarded the -anomaly of having two "Chinese" national governments--the Provisional -Government in Peiping being undisturbed by these measures--and continued -to seek the division of China, even on the level of the pro-Japanese -States. The Reformed Government was established on March 27, 1938. - -The autumn of 1938 brought another phase of discouragement. Relying on -the prestige of British power and the nearness of Hong Kong, the -Chinese were not watchful in the Canton area. The Japanese landed almost -unopposed. Chinese negligence, corruption, and a little treachery worked -in their favor. The landing forces performed almost superhuman feats of -endurance in forced marches overland; on several occasions Japanese -advance troops ran so far ahead of schedule that Japanese warplanes, -thinking them disguised Chinese, strafed them![15] Canton fell without a -major battle. Hankow, the great radical capital, scene of the 1926-27 -Leftist upsurge and of the anti-Fascist enthusiasm of 1938, was entered -by the Imperial Japanese army, and the entire Wu-han area was lost to -China. - - [Footnote 15: An engrossing first-hand account of this is to be found - in Hino, Ashihei, _Sea and Soldiers_, Tokyo, 1940. This, with its - three companion volumes, _Mud and Soldiers_, _Flower and Soldiers_, - and _Barley and Soldiers_, Tokyo, 1939 and 1940, forms an eloquent, - humane, sensitive narrative of a young Japanese writer serving with - the Imperial forces in China. The series ranks with the great - narratives of the European war of 1914-18, and expresses the - Japanolatrist devoutness, the naïveté, and bewildering courage of much - of the Japanese infantry, but does so through the medium of a literary - craftsmanship rare in any army.] - -Not only was the Hankow period ended. By breaking the last rail -connection of the Chinese government and the outside world, and by -driving the Chinese leadership into the remote interior, Japan shut off -the ready play of international influence on domestic Chinese politics. -Foreign visitors became more rare. The government, moving to the -mountain fastnesses of Szechuan, found a home on the great -Gibraltar-like promontory of Chungking city, tiered along cliffs above -the Yangtze and Kialing rivers. The last withdrawal was a final test of -strength. Hankow, six hundred miles up-river, was commercially, -architecturally, and politically a coastal city. It was still an outpost -of world imperialism and of modern technology. With the next remove the -Chinese government found itself beyond tangible Western influence; for -the first time since 1860 the capital was out of the military reach of -Western powers, and in a city which had only slight traces of Western -influence. - - -THE CHUNGKING PERIOD - -The Chungking period began with the transfer of further government -offices to the West, to join President Lin Shên, and marks a distinct -phase in the process of government-building in China. As the Chungking -regime, the National Government took new forms of temper and character. -Government, Kuomintang, Communists--all were in the position of an -inner-Asiatic state, without convenient access to the sea, seeking to -fight an oceanic nation whose trade reached every port in the world. -Foreign imperialism could no longer be blamed for the demoralizations of -the hour; foreign aid was too tenuous and remote to qualify the inner -play of Chinese political growth. Politically, the Chinese had to stand -on their own feet. - -The second phase of the war had begun. Chinese armies stood -front-to-front against the Japanese, and kept hundreds of thousands of -invading troops immobilized. The guerrillas got to work. Most of all, -the machinery of modernization began functioning; all the programs had -been completed, and the task was clear. The international developments -of the time--the first American loan, $25,000,000 in 1938; the brief -Manchoukuo-Outer Mongol war of 1939, wherein Japan and Russia fought -each other through their respective dependencies; even the outbreak of -the European war--were remote from this far inland scene. Military -events had some effect, but nothing comparable to the Japanese victories -at Shanghai, Nanking, Canton, and Hankow recurred. The Japanese invaded -Kwangsi in the fall of 1939; they left a year later, when their drive -into French Indo-China made it unnecessary to cut those colonies off -from China. In South Hunan the Japanese suffered catastrophically when -they advanced boldly and contemptuously into non-modern areas and were -encircled by the Chinese. Even the flight and treason of Wang Ch'ing-wei -at the year's end of 1938, and his open cooperation with Japan in March -1940, did not change the general picture. The emphasis was no longer on -sudden changes, on personality, on dramatic shifts of power. It was on -construction--on the development of a modern, democratic, technically -equipped Chinese state out of the vast resources of China's hinterland. -The China which was to win had to be created before it could -counter-attack.[16] - - [Footnote 16: The literature of the war and of the struggles of Free - China has already reached an enormous extent. The present work makes - no attempt to present a step-by-step account of the interplay of - personal politics, the progress of the armies, or to provide a - first-hand personal account. Observers other than the author have - presented these topics exceedingly well. A few of the outstanding - works may be mentioned, however; a Shanghai press line usually - signifies that the book was reprinted there from a British or North - American edition. Epstein, I., _The People's War_, London, 1939, is a - spirited, detailed account of development down to the spring of 1939, - particularly useful for the New Fourth Army and the Border Region. - Among accounts of the war are Bertram, J. M., _Unconquered_, New York, - 1939; Oliver, Frank, _Special Undeclared War_, London, 1939, - containing interesting accounts, in particular, of Japanese military - and political behavior in China. Andersson, J. G., _China Fights for - the World_ [Shanghai], 1939; Utley, Freda, _China at War_ [Shanghai], - 1939, a significant personal account with special interest for the - Hankow period; Mowrer, Edgar, _Mowrer in China_, Harmondsworth - (England), 1938, published in America as _The Dragon Wakes_, New York, - 1939; Booker, Edna Lee, _News Is My Job_ [Shanghai], 1940, a - reminiscent anecdotage; Lady Hosie, _Brave New China_, [Shanghai], - n.d., a far more informed work than most of the autobiographical - accounts, by the daughter and widow of two British Orientalists, - herself a distinguished literary writer on China. On the North China - situation, four popular works stand out: Snow, Edgar, _Red Star Over - China_, New York, 1938, the great "scoop" on the Communists; and three - other books based on first-hand reconnaissance: Bisson, T. A., work - cited above; Hanson, Haldore, "_Humane Endeavour_" [Shanghai], n.d.; - and Carlson, Evans Fordyce, _Twin Stars of China_, New York, 1940, the - work of the U. S. Marine Corps Observer in the guerrilla area, unique - in its value as professional military interpretation. Gunther, John, - _Inside Asia_, New York, 1939, contains much of great interest. Very - special viewpoints are represented in the account of a - National-Socialist German observer, Urach, Fürst A., _Ostasien, Kampf - um das Kommende Grossreich_, Berlin, 1940; the commentary of two - British poets, Auden, W. H., and Isherwood, Christopher, _Journey to a - War_, New York, 1939; and the reportage of a distinguished Soviet - fellow-traveller, Strong, Anna Louise, _One-Fifth of Mankind_, New - York, 1938.] - - - - -CHAPTER I - -THE CONSTITUTION - - -The constitutional system, basic in most Western states, plays a -peculiar, subordinate role in China. Consideration of the issue of -constitutionalism high-lights the most practical aspects of the issues -of full democracy. Although the purely legal aspects of constitutional -development are still unimportant in the internal power politics of -China, further constitutional development involves a very real shift in -the domestic balance of power. The fullness of national unity, and -therefore the effectiveness of resistance against Japan, depend in part -on the successful solution or compromise of the problems of -constitutionalism. - -Ever since the beginnings of political modernization in China, demands -for constitutional government have included a written constitution as an -imperative prerequisite. The formidable Empress Dowager was troubled in -her last days by the Imperial constitution, a rather unimaginative -plagiarism of the Japanese Constitution of 1889. Since the Republic -began in 1912, China has continued constitutional drafting, amendment, -replacement, and suppression; many of these constitutions have gone into -legal effect. Law being what it was, practical politics flowed on -untroubled.[1] Only with the establishment of the National Government -at Nanking did constitutional structure and actual government develop -similarities. - - [Footnote 1: On the Manchu constitutional programs, see _Columbia - University Studies in Political Science_, Vol. XL, No. 1: Yen, - Hawkling L., "A Survey of Constitutional Development in China"; - Vinacke, Harold Monk, _Modern Constitutional Development in China_, - Princeton, 1920; Cameron, Meribeth, _The Reform Movement in China, - 1898-1912_, Stanford University, 1931; and Hsieh, Pao Chao, _The - Government of China (1644-1911)_, Baltimore, 1925. The earlier - constitutional developments under the Republic are summarized in - Escarra, Jean, _Le Droit Chinois_, Paris and Peiping, 1936, which - includes excellent bibliographies; Tsêng Yu-hao, _Modern Chinese Legal - and Political Philosophy_, Shanghai, 1934, Ch. VI, "The Law of Modern - Chinese Constitutions"; a characteristic proposal for a pre-Kuomintang - constitution is Bau, Mingchien Joshua, _Modern Democracy in China_, - Shanghai, 1927; and the works of Lum, Wu, and Linebarger, cited above.] - - -THE _Yüeh Fa_ OF 1931 - -In 1931, after three years' operation under an Organic Law, the National -Government adopted the _Yüeh Fa_ (Provisional Constitution),[2] designed -to cover the period between the first stage of the revolution, _military -conquest_, and the final one of _constitutional government_. This -intermediate period was formally labelled the stage of _political -tutelage_, although in fact the military unification of the country -continued. The Provisional Constitution, designed for five years' use, -has continued in force to the present (March 1941). It possesses the -merit of attempting to make actual practice and constitutional form -correspond. Grandiloquent, unenforceable provisions concerning elections -are omitted, and full exercise of the powers of sovereignty are frankly -entrusted to the tutelary Party, the Kuomintang. Such a constitution, -formally making the Kuomintang different from and higher than any other -party in China--and, for all that, in the world, since the Fascist, -National Socialist, and Communist parties are not formally the -constitutional superiors of their respective governments--and giving the -Party unrestricted authority, has provided China with government -realistic if not libertarian. - - [Footnote 2: The text of the _Yüeh Fa_ is to be found in _The China - Year Book, 1932_, Shanghai, 1932, and in Lum, work cited, p. 161 - _ff._, and Wu Chih-fang, work cited, p. 410 _ff._ The Chinese texts - of all outstanding Chinese constitutions, from the Imperial programs - down to the Double Five Draft of the _Hsien Fa_ are to be found in - Wang Shih-chieh, _Pi-chiao Hsien-fa_, Shanghai, 1937, p. 699-796.] - -The constitutional basis of the present Party-dictatorship in China is -well summarized by the distinguished constitutional commentator, Dr. -Wang Shih-chieh: - - According to Sun Chung-shan's[3] _Chien-kuo Ta-kang_ - [Outlines of National Reconstruction], China should pass - through a period of political tutelage under the Chinese - Kuomintang,[4] before the stage of constitutional government - be reached. The National Government is merely an - organization through which a true republic may be formed. - Hence, in order to demonstrate the structure of the National - Government clearly, we must first understand the meaning of - _tang chih_ [party government]. - - "Party government," so-called, signifies that the whole - system of government is under the control or dictatorship of - one political party only. The only difference between party - government and dictatorship is that the former is under the - dictatorship of an entire political party, while the latter - is under that of a single person. Party government is of - course different from democracy, inasmuch as with democracy, - all policies are to be decided by the entire body of - citizens, while with party government, policies are to be - decided by all the members of the particular party only. In - other words, the entire party as one man can exercise - political dictatorship, without taking into consideration - the opinions of those who are not the members of the party. - Any resolution passed by that party is considered a law not - only in fact, but sometimes even in name; moreover, the - party may cancel or change a law by a resolution passed in a - meeting. - - The above-mentioned points are phenomena common to countries - under party governments. - - After the Chinese Kuomintang has come into power, the system - of party government is not only a fact, but even prescribed - in laws. The _Laws Governing the System of Organization of - the National Government of the Republic of China_ - promulgated for the first time on July 1, Year XIV (1925) - were originally formulated by the Political Council of the - Chinese Kuomintang. Article I in this code of laws provided: - "The National Government discharges all the political - affairs of the entire country, under the direction and - superintendency of the Chinese Kuomintang." The said code - has been constantly amended since its first promulgation, - but this article has always remained unchanged. By the - summer of Year XVII (1928), when the successful Northern - Expedition undertaken by the National Revolutionary Army - unified China under one government, the period of political - tutelage of the Chinese Kuomintang began with the - formulation and promulgation of the _Outlines of Political - Tutelage_ on October 3, Year XVII (1928). Article I of the - said "Outlines" provided: "During the period of political - tutelage of the Republic of China, the National Party - Congress of the Chinese Kuomintang will take the place of - the National Convention to lead the people and enforce all - policies." By the beginning of June, in Year XX (1931), when - the _Provisional Constitution_ for the period of political - tutelage was promulgated, the _Outlines of Political - Tutelage_ were again formed into a part of the _Provisional - Constitution_, thereby giving party government a - constitutional recognition. Besides the _Outlines of - Political Tutelage_, Article 72 ("The National Government - [Council of State] has a President and a certain number of - state councillors, appointed by the Central Executive - Committee of the Chinese Kuomintang."), and Article 58 ("The - Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Kuomintang is - vested with the power of interpreting this Provisional - Constitution.") of the _Provisional Constitution_, and - Article 10 ("The National Government has a President, - twenty-four to thirty-six state councillors, a President and - a Vice-President of every _Yüan_, appointed by the Central - Executive Committee of the Chinese Kuomintang."), and - Article 15 ("Before the promulgation of the Constitution, - the Executive, Legislative, Judicial, Examination and - Control _Yüan_ will each be responsible to the Central - Executive Committee of the Chinese Kuomintang.") of the - _Laws Governing the System of Organization of the National - Government_ (December 30, Year XX [1931]) now being - enforced, form the legal basis for party government.[5] - - [Footnote 3: I.e., Sun Yat-sen; Chung-shan was a revolutionary alias, - which became a ceremonial posthumous name.] - - [Footnote 4: The term "Chinese Kuomintang" is not a redundancy; the - original is _Chung-kuo Kuo-min-tang_, "Central-Realm - Realm-people-association," and could be translated as the Chinese - Nationalist Populist Party, National Democratic Party, the Nation's - People's Party, etc. Several Japanese organizations have had - exceedingly similar names; hence the formal style for the Kuomintang - is always prefaced by _China_.] - - [Footnote 5: Wang Shih-chieh, work cited, p. 649-50.] - -Under Kuomintang trusteeship, demands have been heard within and without -the Party, for the promised abdication of the Party and for the -initiation of popular government. Since the Kuomintang, unlike European -one-party groups, established itself only for the formal purpose of -democratic training, and was pledged to tolerate multi-party government -as soon as possible, the continued monopoly of power was a frustration -of the Party ideology and programs. The frustration was serious; -involving much loss of popular sympathy for the government, this and -appeasement rather demoralized the Party in the years preceding the -invasion. - - -THE DRAFT PERMANENT OR DOUBLE FIVE CONSTITUTION - -The Legislative _Yüan_ brought forth on May 5, 1936 (in Chinese -chronology, 5/5/XXV, or double-five twenty-five), the celebrated -_Hsien-fa Ts'ao-an_ (Draft Permanent Constitution), which was promptly -dubbed the Double Five Constitution. Ever since its first promulgation, -this document has formed the center of all Chinese constitutional -debate, and--with very minor modifications--still stands as the official -proposal for a permanent constitution, awaiting ratification by the -_Kuo-min Ta-hui_ (National [Constituent] Congress), when and if that -long-postponed body ever convenes.[6] The Draft Constitution is the -joint work of many outstanding legal scholars. A product of collective -research and study, it thereby resembles collective private -codification of municipal and international law in the West more than it -does the creation of a deliberative assembly. The celebrated Chinese -jurist, Dr. John C. H. Wu, prepared the first informal draft,[7] and the -5/5/XXV version represents the fourth draft of the Legislative _Yüan_. -The preparation of the various drafts has not, from the scholastic point -of view, been secretive or private; but broad popular participation has -neither been offered nor solicited. - - [Footnote 6: The Double Five Draft Constitution is to be found in - Chinese in Wang Shih-chieh, work cited, and in English in Council of - International Affairs, _Information Bulletin_, Vol. III, No. 10 (April - 11, 1937), Nanking; Hsia, C. L., "Background and Features of the Draft - Constitution of China"; in Legislative _Yüan_, "Draft of the - Constitution of the Republic of China," Nanking, 1937; in _The China - Year Book_, Shanghai, and _The Chinese Year Book_, Shanghai and Hong - Kong, _v.i._ and _v.d._ The latest version of the Draft Constitution - is reprinted below. Appendix I (A), p. 283; the latest Chinese - annotated version of this is the Legislative _Yüan_, _Chung-hua - Min-kuo Hsien-fa Ts'ao-an Shuo-ming-shu_ (An Elucidation of the Draft - Permanent Constitution of the Chinese Republic), [Chungking], XXIX - (1940).] - - [Footnote 7: For a critique and appreciation of the final Draft - Constitution, see Wu, John C. H., "Notes on the Final Draft - Constitution" in _Tien Hsia Monthly_, Vol. X, No. 5 (May 1940), p. - 409-26. (Dr. Wu is one of the most extraordinary personages of the - modern world; he has taken all knowledge--East Asiatic and - Western--for his province. He writes a spirited, graceful English and - is capable of discussing anything from modern politics or abstruse - points of Anglo-American law to ancient Chinese hedonism or the - philosophical implications of the _Autobiography_ of St. Thérèse of - Lisieux. Dr. Wu, in a bomb-shelter, possesses much of the moral poise - and profound personal assurance for which such Westerners as T. S. - Eliot seek in vain.) See also Hsia, C. L., "A Comparative Study of - China's Draft Constitution with That of Other Modern States," in _The - China Quarterly_, Vol. 2, 1936-7, No. 1 (Summer), p. 89-101 and Hoh - Chih-hsiang, "A History of Constitution Making in China," the same, - Vol. 1, 1935-6, No. 4 (Summer), p. 105-117.] - -The Constitution consists of eight Chapters, comprising one hundred and -forty-seven articles. Chapter I defines the Chinese state as "a San Min -Chu I Republic" (_Art._ 1), declares sovereignty to be "vested in the -whole body of its citizens" (_Art._ 2), defines the territories of the -republic, specifies racial equality for the "races of the Republic of -China," designates the national flag, and declares Nanking to be the -capital. Chapter II covers, in nineteen very specific articles, the -entire field of private rights and of the civic privileges of -individuals. Most specifications carry the qualification, "in accordance -with law" or "except in accordance with law." Since law is defined -further in the Constitution as "that which has been passed by the -Legislative _Yüan_ and promulgated by the President," the qualification -impresses many persons as sinister rather than encouraging. Except for -this point, the specific constitutional guarantees exceed in number and -specificity those of almost any other modern constitution. - -The _Kuo-min Ta-hui_ (either "National Congress" or "People's Congress") -is the subject of Chapter III. This body has a function unlike that of -any Western agency; the nearest equivalent is the National Assembly of -the Third French Republic. This Congress is an electoral and constituent -body with fundamental legislative powers. It is not intended to usurp -the functions of the Legislative _Yüan_ by fulfilling the role of a -United States Congress, French Deputies and Senate, or a British -Parliament. Meeting once every three years for a one-month session, it -will be manifestly unable to act as a routine Western-type legislature. - -The Central Government is the topic of the fourth Chapter. The first -section of the Chapter describes the Presidency; the remaining five, the -five _Yüan_. This applies the five-fold separation of powers. Sun -Yat-sen held that a three-fold separation of powers, as known in the -West and applied to American government, was efficacious; he also -considered that the Imperial Chinese separation of powers (an implicit -one only) was also desirable. The West had executive, legislative, -judicial; old China combined these three into the governing power, and -joined thereto the examinative power and the _chien-ch'a_[8] power. (The -_chien-ch'a_ power involved the functions of the traditional Chinese -censorate; overt and active expressions are found in auditing and in the -lodgment of impeachment charges. The term is fundamentally -untranslatable, but if the tribunician connotations of _Censor_ or the -emergency meaning of _Control_ be recalled, either of these terms will -serve.) Sun Yat-sen combined the Western and the old-Chinese -separations, developing a theory of the five powers. The Draft -Constitution, like its two working predecessors, is a five-power -constitution, with five great _Yüan_ (Boards, Presidencies, or Courts), -each headed by a _Yüan-chang_ (_Yüan_ President). The fourth Chapter, by -including the President and all five _Yüan_, almost covers the full -reach of Chinese government. - - [Footnote 8: For a more extended discussion of this point, see the - author's _The Political Doctrines of Sun Yat-sen: An Exposition of the - San Min Chu I_, Baltimore, 1937, p. 218 _ff._, and also p. 96 _ff._] - -This Chapter contemplates the creation of a strong President. In the -Organic Law of 1928, the five Presidents of the _Yüan_ were relatively -less strong, and the Chairman of the _Kuo-min Chêng-fu Wei-yüan-hui_ -(National Government Council; or, Council of State) was the key figure -in the government. Most of this time, Chiang himself was Chairman. In -the 1931 Provisional Constitution, now in force, the Chairman of the -National Government--termed President by courtesy--is an officer -comparable to the President of the Third French Republic; the President -of the Executive _Yüan_ is a more active officer: Chiang K'ai-shek is -President of the Executive _Yüan_. The new President, under the Draft -Constitution, is one of the world's most powerful officers. Holding -office for six years, eligible for re-election, commander of all armed -forces, declarer of war, negotiator of peace, treaty-maker, chief -appointing and removing officer of the state, holder of an emergency -power greater than that conveyed by Article 48 of the German Weimar -Constitution, and superior to the executive, legislative, judicial, -examinative and control branches of the government--such a President is -fully responsible to the triennial People's Congress, and to that only! -Since the proposed President may be recalled at any time by the People's -Congress, he is in that respect similar to parliamentary chiefs of -state.[9] - - [Footnote 9: See Sun Fo [President of the Legislative _Yüan_, and son - of Sun Yat-sen], "The Spirit of the Draft Permanent Constitution," in - _The China Quarterly_, Vol. V, No. 3 (April 1940), Shanghai, p. - 377-84.] - -The President of the Executive _Yüan_, together with his subordinates, -is to be appointed and removed by the President of the Republic. The -_Yüan_ includes Cabinet Ministers--appointed to their posts from among a -special group of Executive Members of the _Yüan_, thereby providing a -simple, rational equivalent of Cabinet and Privy Council, as in Japan or -(less similarly) in Great Britain. - -The Legislative _Yüan_ is an interesting semi-cameral legislative body, -which seeks to embody the better features of legislative research organs -and of representative bodies. The Judicial _Yüan_ rationalizes the -structure and administration of courts and of judicial process. - -The Control [or Censor] _Yüan_ is, like the Legislative _Yüan_, a -quasi-cameral body, with indirect election of members by the People's -Congress from territorial electorates. Its functions are audit, inquiry, -and impeachment, with such ancillary powers as practice to date has -already indicated.[10] - - [Footnote 10: See Appendix I (F), p. 318-24, below.] - -Chapter V of the Draft Permanent Constitution deals with local -government. The institutions of provincial government are wittingly -minimized, because of recent trouble with provincial satrapies and the -dangerously centrifugal effect of provincial autonomism. In contrast to -this, government at the district (_hsien_) level is designed in strict -accordance with the realities of twenty-odd centuries' experience. It is -probable that no other constitution in the world provides for such -careful guarantee of district, county, canton, or _Kreis_ autonomy. The -old Imperial Chinese system was a loose pseudo-centralized federation of -two thousand near-autarkic and near-autonomous commonwealths; the Draft -Constitution attempts to reinstitute (at the political level) this -vigorous cooperative independence of the _hsien_. The _hsien_ meeting, -extrapolitical, unsystematic, and occasional in the past, is made the -foundation for the new legal structure. (These proposed reforms are now -being anticipated under the Provisional Constitution and current -statutory changes.[11]) - - [Footnote 11: See below, p. 106 _ff._, and Appendix I (G), p. 324.] - -Chapter VI provides that the economic system shall rest on Sun Yat-sen's -principle of _min shêng_ (_q.v._, below). Willing to apply whatever -worked best, Sun himself had no theoretical objections to capitalism, -communism, state socialism, or any other economic doctrine. Hence, -proletarian ownership of the means of production is not guaranteed; yet -state ownership is not restricted, and is specifically required in the -case of "all public utilities and enterprises of a monopolistic nature" -(_Art._ 123). Henry George's influence on Sun is shown by mandatory -taxation of unearned increment (_Art._ 119). Room for free future -adaptation from corporative economic techniques successful in the -outside world is assured (_Art._ 125): "Labor and capital shall, in -accordance with the principles of mutual help and cooperation, develop -together productive enterprises." It is likely that any imaginable -economic system would be constitutional on this basis, provided that it -was initiated by due legal procedure and without hardships irresponsibly -imposed. - -Chapter VII, on Education, opens: "The educational aim of the Republic -of China shall be to develop a national spirit, to cultivate a national -morality, to train the people for self-government and to increase their -ability to earn a livelihood, and thereby to build up a sound and -healthy body of citizens" (_Art._ 131), and continues, "Every citizen of -the Republic of China shall have an equal opportunity to receive -education" (_Art._ 132). State, secular control of educational policy is -assured. Articles 134 and 135 provide for tuition-free elementary -education for children and free elementary education for previously -non-privileged adults. (The constitutional guarantee concerning tuition -is indicative of the scholastic traditions of the Chinese, of the -modern educational revolution, and is reminiscent of _Art._ 12 of the -1931 Constitution of the Chinese Soviet Republic: "The Soviet Government -in China shall guarantee to all workers, peasants, and the toiling -masses the right to education. The Soviet Government will, as far as -possible, begin at once to introduce free universal education.")[12] - - [Footnote 12: This constitution is available in Yakhontoff, Victor A., - _The Chinese Soviets_, New York, 1934, p. 217-21, and in Kun, Bela - [prefator], _Fundamental Laws of the Chinese Soviet Republic_, New - York, 1934, p. 17-24. The writer has been unable to secure the Chinese - text of this document.] - -Chapter VIII deals with the interpretation and enforcement of the -Constitution. It was a labor of love by shrewd legal theorists, and -defines terms with great clarity. Interpretive power is vested in the -Judicial _Yüan_. - - -THE ISSUE OF CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE - -Nowhere in China is there outright denial of a need for constitutional -change. The need exists; the Double Five Draft is the government's -answer. Yet there are few patent demerits in the existing constitutional -system; the present political structure is more realistic, more broadly -national, more expressive of effective opinion than any other in modern -China. The question arises from commitments (dating back to the Empire) -promising to create actual constitutional government. The National -Government was established on the basis of this pledge. The democratic -ideology, whatever sects it may include, has a clean sweep of the field -of doctrine in China. No one seriously advocates monarchy, separatism, -or permanent dictatorship. The only question is: how and when? - -At the close of the third session of the advisory People's Political -Council, Chiang K'ai-shek replied to demands for immediate broadening of -popular control over the government by reaffirmation of his adherence -to the democratic dogma of Sun Yat-sen, together with the following -warnings: - - The democracy which _Tsung-Li_ [The Leader, i.e., Sun - Yat-sen] wished to establish was of the purest kind without - the slightest vestige of make-believe or artificiality. - Unfortunately, the Chinese people, having inherited all the - evil practices handed down throughout the numerous dynasties - of autocratic rule, were then at a low ebb both in - intelligence and in vitality. The people were used to - disorganization and selfishness.... - - We have to wait until our lost territories have been - recovered and domestic disorders liquidated before we can - have political tutelage and prepare ourselves for - constitutionalism.... - - People at that time [the inauguration of the Republic in - 1912] made the mistake of neglecting the necessary - procedures and instead they rivalled each other in talking - about democracy.... As a result, democracy has remained an - ideal.... - - We must make it clear to our people that democracy is not a - synonym for lack of law and order, or for anarchy. - - The public opinion on which democracy is based must be - sound, collective, and representative of the majority of the - people's wills. The freedom which democracy endows on people - should not conflict with public welfare, nor should it go - beyond the sphere as marked by laws of the State. With our - nation facing the worst invasion in history, we must teach - the people to respect the absolute authority of laws of the - State.[13] - - [Footnote 13: China Information Committee, Chungking, _News Release_, - No. 351 (February 25, 1939), p. 2269-71.] - -The clamor for a constitution continued. The difficulties of introducing -mass suffrage to Western China were apparent to everyone, but many -leaders felt that the advantages of constitutionalism would outweigh the -inescapable loss of efficiency, and would mobilize public opinion behind -the war and further democratic progress. The Generalissimo found this -view hard to reconcile with his military, direct notions of doing first -things first, as he saw them, but he yielded in the fourth session of -the People's Political Council and accepted the demand. He stated: - - In China ... [democratization] is a tremendously heavy task - which cannot be completed within a few days. I think that - the Constitution and laws may as well be promulgated at an - earlier date. But, gentlemen, please do not forget the - _Tsung-li's_ painful consideration ... [of the necessity of - an intermediate stage of real democratic training]. - Political tutelage does not end with the training of the - citizens by the government. It requires training of the - citizens by themselves. - - Today we should understand our object: to start the building - of a constitutional government. This means laying a - permanently sound basis for the nation. We are not concerned - with the time of starting constitutional government. Whether - to start it early or later does not matter much. What we are - really concerned with is, do we have a real intention of - forming a constitutional government? If we are truly so - minded, we might as well promulgate the Constitution before - the labor of political tutelage is completed.[14] - - [Footnote 14: [Chiang K'ai-shek], _Tsung-ts'ai Chien-kuo Yen-lun - Hsüan-chi_ (The Party Chief's Utterances on Reconstruction), - Chungking, 1940, p. 237-43. The Generalissimo concluded his speech - with a homiletic touch which is so characteristic that it may be - included here; it also explains his relative lack of interest in the - Constitution: "Lastly, I have another point to tell you gentlemen. I - have already repeated this, again and again, many times. Desiring to - complete our revolutionary work and national reconstruction, and to - have a constitutional government as seen in many modern states as soon - as possible, I often study the causes of the weakness and disorder - which exist in our country.... [He cites the traditional political - vigor and excellence of the centuries before the time of Christ, with - the "degeneration" and "departure from order" of the following - centuries.] The departure is not simply due to the failures in - politics and education and to the deprivation of the popular rights by - a few tyrannical kings and lords since the Ch'in and Han periods. It - is due to the fact that before the Chou, we had government by law - [_fa chih_] as a mere supplement to government by social standards - [_li chih_, also translatable as ideological control, or control - through moral indoctrination]. We had social organization as the - foundation of political organization. Everything was then - well-organized and well-trained. Everywhere, in schools, in armies, in - families, in society, order and the forms of propriety [i.e., social - standards] were regarded as most important. No citizen could evade his - duty and obligation."] - -Chiang thus reconciled the beginning of constitutionalism and the -continuance of political tutelage, although implying acquiescence, not -recommendation. A theorist holding all men to be driven by "a perpetuall -and restlesse desire of Power after power, that ceaseth only in -Death,"[15] might consistently suppose that Chiang merely dissimulated -an inward lust for authority; more plausible is the postulation that a -man who has for years lived with and for a doctrine, giving his life and -future reputation to the fulfilment of a program, would incline to -prudence and realism in climaxing that doctrine and program. In Chiang's -case this is Sun Yat-sen's _San Min Chu I_. Chiang's reluctance to apply -democracy then and there is understandable whatever the inmost motive; -so, too, is his yielding to a widespread demand. - - [Footnote 15: Thomas Hobbes, _Leviathan_, New York and London, 1934 - (Everyman's Edition), p. 49.] - -The convening of a special _Kuo-min Ta-hui_ as a national constituent -assembly was set for November 12, 1940; this day was chosen because it -was traditionally the seventy-fourth birthday of Sun Yat-sen. -Administrative machinery for preparation of a hall, secretariat, -publications, and other necessities was established and set in motion. -Following the severe fires of August 19-20, and the subsequent -large-scale demolition of above-ground downtown Chungking by raids, -indefinite postponement of the Congress was announced on September -25--on the grounds that military hazard prevented adequate assembly of -delegates, and no reasonably safe place for such a meeting could be -found. - -Meanwhile, recent years have seen an uproar of constitutional debate. -This may be summarized briefly, with the case against the Constitution -stated first: - -Constitutionalization would lead to the legalization of other parties, -instead of a mere condition of non-prosecution; this would disrupt the -orderliness required of a people at war. Why add discord in war time? -_Reply_: legitimization of other parties is not a struggle for power but -an act of union. It would widen the periphery of cooperation.[16] - - [Footnote 16: The writer is indebted for much of the material in this - chapter to Dr. Djang Chu, of the New Life Movement Headquarters, - Chungking, who supplied it to him in the form of a lecture and other - memoranda. Dr. Djang is, of course, not responsible for any - reinterpretations here made.] - -Sun Yat-sen required three stages of the revolution: conquest, tutelage, -constitution. China is not ready for mass suffrage. The majority of the -people are not yet literate. Public opinion is just developing. The -nation is, in fact, still in the period of military recapture of -national territories. _Reply_: Sun Yat-sen must not be interpreted -mechanically. If this is done, tutelage will never end, and Sun's -cherished democracy will remain forever in the future. Furthermore, the -guerrillas, the Border Region, and other instances have shown that the -Chinese masses can and will practice democracy right now. Again, the -issue has already been decided; the government has been committed to the -immediate inauguration of the Constitution. First it was to be 1939; the -elections were held in part, until the war finally stopped them on -August 13, 1937. It is too late to raise the issue: is China ready? -Everyone--government, Kuomintang, independent groups--has decided that -China is. - -Why change constitutions? The present one is satisfactory. If a war-time -amplification of the _Yüeh Fa_ is needed, it can be found in the -_Program of Resistance and Reconstruction_.[17] If a convocation of the -talents is needed, the People's Political Council is already there. What -is the use of a constitutional change in war time? _Reply_: the -constitutionalist movement is no new development. The _Program_ was a -democratic advance. "Besides, formation of the People's Political -Council was a step toward democracy. The constitutional movement was -not forced on the government, but was an outgrowth of the war; it has -not appeared overnight, but has a clear historical background. As soon -as the Sino-Japanese hostilities broke out, it was evident that more -democratic rule was necessary. As the war became prolonged, the -preliminary steps proved inadequate. A more perfect constitution, -whereby the whole people can be mobilized, is imminent. This fact was -duly recognized by the people and is the motive power of the present -constitutional movement." (This is the comment of an independent -writer.)[18] - - [Footnote 17: See Appendix I (D), p. 309.] - - [Footnote 18: Liu Shih, "Chung-kuo Hsien-chêng Yün-tung-ti Chi-ko - Chieh-tuan" (Stages of the Chinese Constitutional Movement) in _Li-lun - yü Hsien-shih_ (Theory and Reality), Vol. 1, No. 3, November 15, 1939, - p. 13 _ff._] - -A pointed question is raised and answered by Tso Tao-fen, one of the -Seven Gentlemen (_Ch'i Chüntzu_) who led the National Salvationists: - - Some say that as a matter of fact, the people themselves do - not want a constitution. And--to put it more bluntly--that - the people do not know what a constitution is. Therefore, - the constitutional movement represents the desires of only a - minority of the people, not the majority. You have a certain - element of truth if you say that most of the people do not - know what a constitution is, but it is not true that they do - not want a constitution. In the present war period, the - burden on the people is enormous. They should not be denied - any privileges to which they are entitled. All the proposed - constitutional stipulations concerning the duties, rights, - economic status, and education of the people have an - immediate effect on and relation to the people. Why do they - not want a constitution? If you proceed to ask one of the - common people, say a peasant, and you talk with him, - professorially as though you were in a classroom, about the - constitutional movement, he may be at a loss. But if you - bother to ask him about his daily life--the work he is - doing, his hopes, his bitterness, the cruelties inflicted on - him by unscrupulous officials and landlords and gentry--and - if he enjoys the freedom of speech, he will give you a good - talk!... If you say that the people do not know what a - constitution is, you should enlighten them about the close - relationship between themselves and the constitution, not - discontinue the constitutional movement.[19] - - [Footnote 19: From Tso Tao-fen, "A Few Questions Regarding the - Constitution" in Ch'üan-min K'ang-chan Shê [The United Front Club], - _Hsien-chêng Yün-tung Lun-wên Hsüan-chi_ (A Symposium on the - Constitutional Movement), Chungking, 1940, p. 1 _ff._] - -Other questions relate to specific points in the Draft Constitution. In -the opinion of some, the phrase "according to law" which follows every -guarantee of popular rights is a dangerous phrase, particularly in view -of the neat but arbitrary definition of "law" (_Art._ 139). Others, -remembering the Weimar Article 48, mistrust the emergency power of the -President. The President's sharing of the budgetary, pardoning, and war -powers with the Legislative _Yüan_ seems illogical to some critics, who -feel that these powers should be within reach of a more popular body, -not a technically legislative organ. - -Further discussion deals with the competence of the _Kuo-min Ta-hui_. -Many of the critics, particularly those of the Communist and independent -Left group, believe the long-heralded epoch of democracy would open -badly if it began with mechanical ratification of a dictated -constitution. A Communist leader said, "We want a Constitution, a -democratic Constitution--a _real_ democratic Constitution!" and pointed -out that the first Congress was too large, not truly representative of -the common people, and not given enough time to work out a constitution -by its own action; its task, as he supposed the government intended, -would be to rubber-stamp the Double Five Draft. In his opinion, this -Draft had many defects--chief of which was unresponsiveness of the -central government to popular control. The proposed Congress could not -do much with a mere triennial check; the five-power system as projected -was unsatisfactory. Democratic rights were insufficiently assured. He -added that the Communist Party of China was for a democracy, but that -the Double Five Draft was not "the constitution of a democracy."[20] - - [Footnote 20: Statement of Col. Ch'in Po-k'u at the Chungking office - of the 18th [Communist] Army Corps Headquarters, on July 29, 1940, to - the author.] - -Furthermore, the representativeness of the proposed -constitution-adopting _Kuo-min Ta-hui_ is called into question. The -present plan calls for 665 delegates from geographical constituencies, -380 from occupational, 155 "by special methods," 240 by government -appointment, and a large number of Kuomintang Party-officers _ex -officio_ (241 by a recent count).[21] The present administration would -obviously have a whip hand over all proceedings. The division into -groups has been criticized. A demand, for example, for 120 women members -has been made. Under the circumstances, with 1681 members already -scheduled, mere additional size could be no handicap. - - [Footnote 21: _China at War_, Vol. IV, No. 5 (June 1940), p. 79 _ff._] - -The question of qualifications has also been raised. About 900 of the -representatives had been elected when war broke out. These include men -who have since died, or have changed their opinions, or are reported -missing, and even a few traitors. Are all the available elected -representatives to be gathered together, years later? or is a new -election to be held? Whatever occurs, the supreme agency on -qualifications is the Election Committee for Representatives to the -People's [Constituent] Congress, attached directly to the Council of -State. - -The constitutional issue in China is no simple problem of reaction -versus progressivism. The vast majority of the population is not -literate, and is unprepared to deal with a complicated machinery of -opinion and election. Wire-pulling, corruption, adherence to form -instead of deed--these are all widespread in China. Democracy abruptly -established might frustrate further improvement, since sham-democracy -would have established itself. The opponents of sudden action also -press the telling point that the common people do not know they want -immediate democracy, although believing in the term as a symbol and -approving its trial application. The Generalissimo remains clearly -mistrustful about creating new organs of opinion, or using new political -processes; he would prefer to wait until the nation is unified, better -administered, and more literate. Hence his and the Kuomintang's -insistence on indirect elections, remoteness of policy-making -authorities from the electorate, and self-sufficient government. - -China did have, it is argued, an excellent democratic constitution in -1912, many more in the warlord years. All had admirable balances of -power, guarantees to the individual, libertarian and progressive -provisions. Like Chinese social legislation, they lifted China to the -level of the rest of the modern world--_de jure_, and that only! These -elevated documents remained elevated; life went on beneath them, and the -tragic gap between law and life was so enormous that no one thought of -bridging it. The nation would have been humiliated by legislation which -limited the working day to fourteen hours, prohibited the mutilation or -slavery of children, or required that torture be administered in the -presence of a physician. Hence it had eight, ten, or twelve-hour laws, -good child legislation, and absolute prohibition of torture for any -purpose; these were unenforceable. - -To counsels of caution, advocates of immediately responsive institutions -reply that the Chinese common people are better democrats than their -rulers, citing concrete cases in proof. They mention the general -strikes, strong peasant cooperation, the startling phenomena of -coordinate mass action--tens and hundreds of thousands strong--in -political protest, boycotts, or civic immobility. (In past years many a -warlord has been stopped by empty streets and closed houses: no -business, no traffic, no talking, no meetings--only the silence, -and somewhere, conspicuously inconspicuous, a committee of -plenipotentiaries!) They refer to the Frontier Area, the Border Region, -the New Fourth Zone, the guerrillas, the industrial cooperatives, and -the wealth of leadership called up from the millions by the war. They -quote to the Kuomintang its own professions of democracy, and the words -of its late Leader. Told that the masses do not understand modern -administration, modern economics, modern war, and that the peasantry and -workers would proceed to arbitrary class legislation, economic -levelling, and social revolution, they reply, "What do you -want--democracy?" It is most unlikely that the Communists would sweep -the country under free elections, but they and other dissidents, as the -political Outs, would be free to criticize the incumbents in a way sure -to bring support and involve new alignments of power. Some Kuomintang -leaders wish to shut out any group with foreign connections; the Chinese -face--despite their definite movement toward constitutionalism--the -question of the limits of democratic toleration. - - - - -CHAPTER II - -THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT - - -By constitutional stipulation, and by dogma legally established, the -National Government of the Chinese Republic is a Kuomintang -Party-dictatorship over the Chinese nation. This rule is formally -dictatorship by a minority democracy over the absolutely governed -majority, since the Party constitution requires intra-Party democracy. -No pretense is made of further formal democracy. Actual experience of -the past ten years has shown the government to be a broad, loosely -organized oligarchy in which the Party, the Government, the Army and -regional military, and independent leaders (such as bankers, college -professors and presidents, secret society chiefs, community spokesmen) -have shared power. The center of gravity has stayed somewhere near -Chiang K'ai-shek, who as co-leader and then formal Chief (_Tsung-ts'ai_, -"general ruler") of the Party and creator of the central army has -combined two of the chief sources of influence. Variety in the sources, -nature, and incidence of political power in recent Chinese affairs has, -however, not destroyed the constitutional theory: Party-dictatorship -pledged to national democracy. - -The state machinery--as it has been since promulgation of the -Provisional Constitution, 1931--is among the most elaborate in the -modern world, but is nevertheless effective. One may justly regard the -present government as the most efficacious, generally powerful, and -growing Chinese government since the mid-eighteenth century. This -government is pre-eminently the creation of the Kuomintang, and of -Kuomintang leaders. A war which threatens China's national existence -accordingly threatens the leaders as government officers, as Party -members, as patriotic citizens, and as members of the Chinese race. At -the time that they fight an alien enemy, they must simultaneously -increase state power and diffuse it so that a democracy may emerge and -survive. - -China's leadership is therefore posed a two-fold problem: to perpetuate -a regime, successful in one period of relative peace, through years of -invasion to a period of even deeper peace; and to permit popular access -to policy-forming agencies, allowing freer operation of pressures, -without endangering resistance and reconstruction thereby. To the -Western political scientist, it is amazing that they have carried into -the years of catastrophic war a unique, complex constitutional system, -treasuring it like an ark of the covenant. This is the five-power -system. - - -THE FIVE-POWER CONSTITUTION - -The five-power constitution (_wu-ch'üan hsien-fa_) is a legacy of Sun -Yat-sen, and is one of the cardinal dogmas of the _San Min Chu I_. -Distinctively, two new powers are added to the familiar three: namely, -the examinative and the control powers. Westerners might question the -importance of segregating the impeaching, auditing and critical powers, -unifying them into a new agency of government, along with a glorified, -independent civil service system. Yet the five-fold division is to China -a key point of governmental development. - -The five-power system is based on the notions Sun Yat-sen had of -democracy. He anticipated by a generation the need of strengthening -democratic machinery to compete with Caesarian techniques. Merely to -have qualified the suffrage, or to have narrowed the limits of -popular action, would not have sufficed, for it was authentic -democracy--government both representative and popular--which he desired, -not an empty shell of nominal republicanism. In an effort to solve this -dilemma, he employed the concepts _ch'üan_ and _nêng_,[1] which may be -translated "power" and "capacity," although the rendering would -necessarily vary in accordance with the connotations to be -encompassed.[2] He felt that it was a major discovery to apply in modern -politics a distinction between the power which the people should have -over government and the capability they had of operating the machine of -state. Abandoning the state to the vagaries of public opinion, allowing -the citizens free access to the powerful, complex controls of modern -governance, or assuming that anyone and everyone had an expert's -qualifications on all political subjects--this would, in Sun Yat-sen's -opinion, wreck the government. Nevertheless, the people had to reserve a -final power over policies and personnel of government, although they are -themselves unqualified to operate the state mechanism. Hence the people -were to exercise _the four powers_ over the government: initiative, -referendum, election, and recall. Compensatingly, the government was to -possess the _five rights_ over the people, based on the new separation -of powers. To Sun, as a Chinese, the state was not the hand of the -people; it was a separate institution above other institutions, -democratic only in allowing access to itself and in justifying its -authority by the ultimate sanction of popular vote. The new government -could not be kept clean, prompt, and high-minded by the freak, casual -operation of popular censure, nor staffed by whomever a mass fancy threw -into office. It was, instead, to be a traditionally Chinese -self-perpetuating bureaucracy, differing from the past only in being -controlled and revised by popular instead of imperial will. - - [Footnote 1: See Sun Yat-sen, _San Min Chu I_, Shanghai, 1927, - henceforth cited as "Price translation," p. 296 _ff._; or d'Elia, - Paschal M., S. J., _The Triple Demism of Sun Yat-sen_, Wuchang, 1931, - p. 348 _ff._] - - [Footnote 2: An attempt to correlate Sun's democratic theory with - Western concepts is made in the present author's _Political Doctrines - of Sun Yat-sen_, cited, p. 107-9. The notion is clearly put in - _L'Esprit des Lois_, Book 11, ch. 2.] - -Accordingly, the ideal toward which the Chungking government strives may -be epitomized as _perfect bureaucracy subject to complete popular -control_. The two powers new to the West--examination and control--are -to replace public opinion at levels of obscurity, technicality, and -persistence where outside criticism could not reach; the plan of Sun -Yat-sen provides for as much use of power through voting as is found in -any Western state. This attempted solution strikes near the core -problems of any modern government, wherever it may operate and whatever -its conditions. - -The five-power constitution posits a government of educated, expert men, -in which qualifying examinations will precede election for -administrative posts, and in which the examination and control _yüan_ -will--professionally, officially--replace the haphazard play of -sentiment, anger, fancy, envy upon which Western peoples count to keep -their democracy healthy and intact. The United States Government is the -most complex and important institution in the United States, possessing -inquisitorial powers wider and deeper than those of any private person -or institution. Yet the Americans have no unceasing, professional, -expert investigation of their government by their government, nor does a -merit system extend to offices where it might have the drastic effect of -thwarting operation of public opinion locally or temporarily debased. - -This function, specializing power to strengthen it, explains the -war-time survival of the five-power system as a fundamental theory of -state. The Chinese have suffered from weak government for decades. -Absence of dictatorship was largely owing to an inability to designate a -dictator. The five-power system was preceded by a Nationalist -government which employed the soviet form of organization--the one -instance outside the Soviet Union of such application.[3] This had been -set up for rapid, decisive action; thirteen years' preliminary -application of the five-power system has shown this to be no less swift -and effectual. Even the Communist leaders in China today are reconciled -to the retention of the five-power system, although they would certainly -like to modify its present organization.[4] - - [Footnote 3: See Holcombe, Arthur N., _The Chinese Revolution_, - Cambridge (Massachusetts), 1930, passim, for the outstanding - elaboration of this curious experiment, and for a lucid delineation of - the genesis of the National Government.] - - [Footnote 4: Statement to the author by Col. Ch'in Po-k'u, interview - cited, p. 38, n. 20, above.] - -Reference to the general chart of government organization (see p. 330) -shows the intricate pre-democratic system of government now applied. -Consideration of the sources of policy in such a structure have, -therefore, to appraise not merely two agencies--executive and -legislative, with only a glance at the judiciary--as in America, but to -examine a whole hierarchy of Party, general governmental, -military-governmental, and autonomous policy-making agencies. Were it -not for the thousands of miles, the unrelatedness in cultures, the -complexities of language, and the inescapable awareness of race, -Americans might long since have looked to China as the decisive, fresh -political experiment of our times. - -One further trait of the Chinese, which in Japan has been carried to the -point of a national mania, is the respect for the constitutional (or -Imperial) system as a symbol of purity and order. Western governments -are like machines in common use; they operate for the general -convenience and subject to the criticism of their members. Even -dictatorships try to seem practical. The Confucian traditions of -government by indoctrination, and particularly that of government -indoctrinating through conspicuous example, motivated heavy -ceremonialization of state functions. This often led a Chinese Emperor -to become more and more majestic and aloof, to strive for archetypal -perfection, until he became so much a model that he disappeared from -public sight altogether, swilling and carousing himself to death in the -gardens of the Forbidden City; his successors, if they came from the -people, would seem practical and workable for a few generations, until -they too succumbed to their own majesty. Some atrophy through majesty -occurs even in the relatively new Chinese National Government, arrested -but not eradicated by war-time vigor. - - -THE SUPREME NATIONAL DEFENSE COUNCIL - -The highest political agency in China is the Supreme National Defense -Council (_Kuo-fang Tsui-kao Wei-yüan-hui_).[5] This is not a part of the -government, _de jure_, since it is the war-time replacement of the -Kuomintang Central Political Council (_Chung-yang Chêng-chih -Wei-yüan-hui_), the high Party organ charged with exercise of the -Party's sovereign powers in government. The liberalization of the -policy-framing agencies in war-time cannot be better illustrated than by -the fact that this new Supreme National Defense Council reportedly -includes non-Party members, and acts in fact as a central board or -council of government, superseding not only the Kuomintang Central -Political Council but its governmental counterpart, the Council of State -(_Kuo-min Chêng-fu Wei-yüan-hui_) as well. Reference to the chart below -will clarify the relationship of these agencies: - - The KUOMINTANG, as a Party, - exercises sovereign powers through - - [The CENTRAL POLITICAL COUNCIL, superseded in - war-time by] - - The SUPREME NATIONAL DEFENSE COUNCIL, - which transmits commands - to - The COUNCIL OF STATE, highest governmental agency, - which transforms these commands into government - orders applicable - to - NATIONAL, PROVINCIAL, or LOCAL - GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, - in the form of - ORDERS, ORDINANCES, and LAWS - - [Footnote 5: The names of agencies and offices in the discussion of - government and Kuomintang organization are taken from K'ao-shih _Yüan_ - [Examination _Yüan_], _Tang Chêng Chien Chih T'u-piao_ [Charts of - Government and Party Development and Organization], Chungking, XXIX - (1940), _passim_. This work has not yet been published, since it is a - draft printing, to be revised and re-edited before formal publication. - The author was allowed to consult a copy through the courtesy of the - Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Wang Ch'ung-hui, and the kind - assistance of Mr. C. C. Chi of the Party-Ministry of Publicity. These - charts, provisional as they are, are by far the most systematic - presentation of modern Chinese government structure which the author - has ever seen. For a brief commentary on the Council, see the - one-paragraph section, _The Supreme National Defense Council_ in - Tsiang Ting-fu, "Reorganization of the National Government," _Chinese - Year Book 1938-39_, cited, p. 356. Dr. Tsiang, whose other writings on - Chinese government have been models of clarity, candor, and - concreteness, is obliged to state: "As its major functions are - involved in the prosecution of the war, military necessity compels - the writer to withhold the details of its organization and work for a - later issue."] - -The power of the Kuomintang is exercised by its Chief [_Tsung-ts'ai_] -and its Central Executive Committee, Central Committee, and their -respective Standing Committees (discussed below, p. 125 _ff._). - -Secretiveness in a nation's highest policy-making organ is somewhat -unusual in the modern world. In most states the invisible government of -practical acquaintance and association between leaders provides a -meeting ground, and traditions require a formal, open exercise of public -authority. As a matter of fact, a few generally accepted data concerning -the Supreme National Defense Council are readily apparent to the -observer in Chungking. In the first place, it is what its title -implies--the highest agency of political control. Its meetings are the -constant source of new policy and tangible control. Secondly, one finds -a universal belief that the Generalissimo, who attends these meetings in -the multiple capacity of Chairman of the Council, Party Chief of the -Kuomintang, President of the Executive _Yüan_, Chairman of the People's -Political Council, Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Navy, and Air Forces, -etc., faithfully employs Council meetings for very real debate and -discussion of government and Party policy, and for the conduct of the -war. He is not believed to take any important step arbitrarily, without -consulting the Council. (In the past, he has been known to act with -dramatic and concealed swiftness, opening his mind to no one before the -crucial consummation of his plans, but at the present time this has -apparently disappeared.[6]) - - [Footnote 6: For a biased but bitterly graphic portrayal of Chiang's - tiger leaps in politics, see Isaacs, Harold, work cited, _passim_. Mr. - Isaacs' portrayal of Chiang shows him as ambitious, able, and - villainous in his need for power and his hostility to the proletariat. - The Trotskyite viewpoint is a usefully different one from that - obviously adopted by the present author.] - -Third, the Council, while extending beyond the men who are primarily -Party leaders and including military and political figures who -(irrespective of nominal Party membership) are independent, has -transformed the arcanum of Party power into a body more representative -of the entire nation. Fourth, significant in connection with the -Japanese charge of Chungking Bolshevization, the Communists and other -Leftists, while fairly represented in advisory and even in military -bodies, are presumed to have no representation whatever on the Supreme -National Defense Council, nor is such representation regarded as -probable in the near future. Chiang K'ai-shek has at hand a counselling -and co-governing body whose fundamental purposes are completely one with -his own. - -A nice consistency would demand that the Supreme National Defense -Council (as a Party agency) should transmit its commands to the Council -of State (its government counterpart) for transformation into law. This -is actually done, whenever possible, but the frequency of crises and of -needs for immediate action have--in the period of hostilities--led to -the occasional issuance of commands direct to the Ministry or other -governmental organ concerned.[7] To the degree that the Supreme National -Defense Council does so, it becomes a directly governing authority, and -instead of perpetuating Party authority _over_ government, it is itself -government. - - [Footnote 7: Statement to the author, August 1, 1940, in Chungking, by - Dr. Wang Shih-chieh, Secretary-General of the People's Political - Council and Party-Minister of Publicity.] - -Since a cloud of military secrecy covers the functions of the Council, -some notion of its operation and working authority may be found by -analogy with the role of the Central Political Council, which it has -displaced. According to the leading Chinese constitutional writer on the -subject, the Central Political Council (also called [Central] Political -Committee)--for which read Supreme National Defense Council today--acted -as follows: - - According to Article IV of the _Principles Governing the - Organization of the C. E. C._ [of the Kuomintang] passed ... - December 6, XXIV (1935), "the Central Executive Committee - organizes a Political Committee, composed of a Chairman, a - Vice-Chairman, and nineteen to twenty-five members, - appointed by the Central Executive Committee, from among the - members of the Central Executive Committee and the Control - Committee." ... "During a session of the Political - Committee, the Chairmen and Vice-Chairmen of the Central - Standing Committees, the President of the National - Government, the Presidents and Vice-Presidents of the Five - _Yüan_, and the President and Vice-President of the Military - Affairs Commission should be present, while the leading - members of the special technical committees under the - [control] Political Committee, and other higher officials of - the National Government may be notified if necessary to - attend the sessions." [The author explains that, on the - basis of actual experience, "may be notified" signifies - "shall attend if matters relevant to their functions - arise."] ... - - It was originally fixed that the Political Committee should - meet once every week, but since December XXIV (1935), it - holds meetings either weekly or fortnightly. The number of - members required to constitute a forum is not fixed, and - resolutions have never been put in the form of motions - requiring formal vote. Regarding the proposition of a - motion, and the discussion of motions proposed _ex-tempore_, - the Political Committee has never fixed any rigid - regulations; moreover, even if a rule had been established - at one time, it has not been followed closely later. Before - being put to a decision, a motion is either studied and - examined beforehand, or it is not. There is no definite rule - as to whether every motion should be so studied or not, but - the Committee possesses the power to decide this point _ad - hoc_. The entire wording of a motion passed in a meeting is - rarely fully read, and is then read in the following session - as the minutes of the previous session. _Hence the Chairman - and the Secretary-General have a certain liberty in the - framing of the wording of resolutions. Judging from above - circumstances, important resolutions passed in the Political - Committee must actually represent the opinions of the - Chairman and a small number of influential members...._ - [Italics added in translation.][8] - - [Footnote 8: Wang Shih-chieh, _Pi-chiao Hsien-fa_, cited above, p. 658 - _ff._] - -Many of these features may reasonably be conjectured to have continued -in the Supreme National Defense Council, although the regular -meetings--whatever others there may be--seem to be considerably less -frequent, occurring presumably about once in five weeks.[9] In the -matter of authority, again, some continuity may be supposed between the -earlier agency and the later. Wang Shih-chieh continues: - - The authority of the Political Committee (or the Political - Council) has undergone very few changes since its - establishment. To speak concisely, the Political Committee - is the highest directing organ of all governmental policies. - Putting it in more detail, we may say that this Committee - has the power to decide the basic principles of legislation, - of governmental policies and their execution, and has also - the power to appoint and dismiss governmental officials.... - [A footnote adds the following detail.] According to the - outlines of organization now being enforced, there are still - five kinds of affairs that should be discussed and decided - by the Political Committee: (1) the basic principles of - legislation, (2) the general plans of executing government - policies, (3) important plans concerning military affairs, - (4) financial plans, (5) the appointment of officials of the - Especially Appointed category and of other governmental - officials, and (6) [_sic_] cases submitted for discussion by - the Central Executive Committee. The first four may be - collectively classified under the two names of execution and - legislation.[10] - - [Footnote 9: For example, the date of the law given in Appendix I (G), - p. 324, below, is given as August 31, 1939, and it is stated to have - passed the Council on that date at the _14th_ Regular Session; since - the Council had been established seventeen months previously, some - notion of the frequency or length of sessions may thus be derived.] - - [Footnote 10: Wang Shih-chieh, _Pi-chiao Hsien-fa_, cited, p. 662. The - author adds that though the Central Political Council possesses ample - authority to interfere in the specific work of the Judicial, - Examination, and Control _Yüan_, such authority was rarely exercised, - the Executive and Legislative _Yüan_ constituting the prime objects of - its attention.] - -Only from such description by analogy may the foreigner penetrate to the -inmost source of Chinese policy. This ambiguous and all-powerful agency, -a Party organ which controls government, a committee constellated about -its charismatic Chairman, is the heir both of the Grand Council of the -Manchu Empire and of the soviets established by Nationalists during the -entente with Soviet Russia. Should the fortune of war remove the -Generalissimo from the scene, this Council would become the storm center -of power; under his guidance and leadership, this agency above all -others distinguishes China from an outright dictatorship. Chiang, unlike -many other national leaders, has consistently shrunk from the regalia of -arbitrary power. In the highest matters, and at the ultimate control, -his action is veiled in the Supreme National Defense Council. The -actual play of personalities and power is hidden from us, his -contemporaries. Only the future may discover the exact degrees and -_modus operandi_ of his authority. - - -THE PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT - -The term National Government (_Kuo-min Chêng-fu_) is employed in two -senses. In the broad sense, it refers to the entire central government -of China. In the narrow sense, it is a synonym for National Government -Committee (_Kuo-min Chêng-fu Wei-yüan-hui_), commonly translated as -Council of State. The highest governmental officer of China is the -_Kuo-min Chêng-fu Chu-hsi_--literally, the Chairman of the National -Government. Since this officer is the formal head of the National -Government in both senses of the term, his office may with equal -appropriateness be described as Chairmanship of the Council of State and -as Presidency of the National Government. The latter has been most -commonly accepted, although it obscured the clarity of the Chinese -governmental pattern. It is essential to note, however, that in the -National Government period there has been no _President of the Chinese -Republic_; the highest officer has been the _President of the National -Government of the Chinese Republic_, and as such the titular head of the -Chinese state for international purposes. This officer possesses -prestige rather than power, and is roughly analogous to the President of -the Third French Republic. - -In his official capacity, the President acts as chairman of the meetings -of the Council of State, performs the ceremonial functions entailed by -his office, and serves as the custodian of the symbols of continuity and -legitimacy. Wang Shih-chieh writes: "... the Chairman more or less -occupies a nominal position. At most, he can give occasional advice, -only within certain limits, to the Executive or other _Yüan_, with no -power at all to decide or to reject the policies adopted by the _Yüan_. -As a matter of fact, from the end of the Year XXI (1932) down to the -present, since the man filling the office of Chairman [President] of the -National Government is very calm and law-abiding, he has never -interfered in the activities or policies of the various _Yüan_."[11] -This officer has been the veteran Kuomintang leader, Lin Shên, long a -resident of the United States, a key man in overseas affairs of the -Party, and a person of much dignity, charm, poise and prestige. With a -long beard and a humane, scholarly demeanor, President Lin has fulfilled -most admirably the requirements of his office. - - [Footnote 11: The same, p. 666.] - -Generalissimo Chiang regularly reports on government activities to Lin -_Chu-hsi_, addressing him attentively and respectfully. This is no -perfunctory sham, but appears to be a very real search for advice and -guidance. The two men are close associates and have been such for many -years; the Generalissimo gives every indication of regarding his -venerable colleague with affectionate esteem. During the Chungking -bombings, the President has commonly resided in a secure place outside -the city. He is not needed for the daily prosecution of the war, but -both the office and its incumbent are strongly stabilizing factors in -the National Government. (The Japanophile Wang Ch'ing-wei, establishing -his duplicate regime in Nanking, left the Presidency open for many -months, pirating Lin Shên's name. Finally Wang gave himself the title, -although he patently would have preferred Lin.) - - -THE COUNCIL OF STATE - -The Council of State (_Kuo-min Chêng-fu Wei-yüan-hui_, National -Government Committee) is the formal governmental core of the Chinese -Republic. Even in peacetime, however, its importance was seriously -undermined by the vigorous activity of the Central Political Council. -The members of the State Council are commonly persons who do not hold -other important office; hence the Council does not include the most -effective leaders. Although its sphere of activity is wide, its role as -ratifier of the decisions of the Supreme National Defense Council -reduces its plenary powers to a shadow. Amnesties, general appropriation -bills, appointments and removals, solemnification of legislation adopted -by the Legislative _Yüan_, and inter-_Yüan_ problems are all within the -scope of the State Council's authority, but except for the power of -organizing and supervising the central independent agencies, subordinate -only to itself, there has been little practical power for it to -exercise.[12] - - [Footnote 12: The same, p. 667-68. The following materials on the - independent agencies are also adapted in general from Wang - Shih-chieh's work, although interviews, other materials, and the - practical experience of the author have been taken into account. From - 1930 to 1937 the author's father, Judge Paul Linebarger, was Legal - Advisor (_Kuo-min Chêng-fu Fa-lü Ku-wên_), directly subordinate to the - Council of State, and throughout this period the author served as - Private Secretary to the Legal Advisor, being authorized by the - Council of State to take charge of the American office of the Advisor - during the latter's absences from the United States.] - -The independent agencies under the Council of State, together with the -latter's relation to the _Yüan_ and the Military Affairs Commission, are -best shown on the chart on p. 55.[13] - - [Footnote 13: Adapted from the Examination _Yüan_, _Tang Chêng Chien - Chih T'u-piao_, cited; various issues of _The Chinese Year Book_, - Shanghai and Hong Kong; and [The China Information Committee] _An - Outline of the Organization of the Kuomintang and the Chinese - Government_, Chungking, 1940.] - -Minor agencies are thus attached directly to the Council of State, which -also serves as a link and common formal superior to the five _Yüan_ and -the Military Affairs Commission. Authority of the Council is directed -primarily upon these agencies which, while minor, serve useful needs. -The Offices of Military (_Tsan-chün Ch'u_) and of Civil Affairs -(_Wên-kuan Ch'u_) are transmission and ceremonial agencies, charged with -the formal correctness of state documents and ceremonies; the military -office was originally designed to carry on more important functions, -including an independent inspectorate of troops, but now seems to be -restricted to matters of protocol. Chinese government has for centuries -operated on the basis of a two-way current of written materials: -memorials, petitions, and other communications come from the provinces -and dominions to the metropolis; orders, laws and other commands flow -outward in response.[14] - - [Footnote 14: For a description of this function in the T'ang dynasty, - see des Rotours, Baron Robert, _La Traite des Examens_, Paris, 1932, - _passim_; and see Fairbank, J. K., and Têng, S. Y., "Of the Types and - Uses of Ch'ing Documents," _Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies_, Vol. - 5, No. 1 (January 1940), particularly p. 5 _ff._, for the Manchu - empire.] - - THE SUPREME NATIONAL DEFENSE COUNCIL - | - | - President of the National Government - - THE COUNCIL OF STATE - | | | - Election Committee on } | | | { Office of the - Representation in the } | | | { Comptroller-General - People's Congress } | | | { - } | | |--{ Office of Civil Affairs - Academia Sinica } | | { (Transmission) - } | | { - Commission for the }--| | { Office of Military - Disciplinary } | { Affairs (Transmission) - Punishment of Public } | - Officials } | - } | - Planning Committee for } | { THE MILITARY AFFAIRS - the Western Capital } | { COMMISSION - |--{ The Chairman - THE PEOPLES POLITICAL | { The Military Departments - COUNCIL | - | { THE EXECUTIVE _YÜAN_ - |--{ The Executive Ministries - | { ("the cabinet") - | - |--{ THE LEGISLATIVE _YÜAN_ - | - |--{ THE JUDICIAL _YÜAN_ - | { The court system - | - |--{ THE EXAMINATION _YÜAN_ - | - |--{ THE CONTROL _YÜAN_ - -The other four agencies directly dependent on the Council of State are -all of important character, but likely to be impaired by a period of -crisis. The Academia Sinica (_Kuo-li Chung-yang Yen-chiu Yüan_) serves -scientific and educational work through its own research bureaus, -through systems of extended aid, and through a program of publications; -despite war, it has continued, making heroic efforts to preserve the -national cultural vitality and continuity. The three remaining agencies -are of less importance, although the Planning Committee for the Western -Capital (_Hsi-ching Ch'ou-pei Wei-yüan-hui_) found its work considerably -extended when, on October 1, 1940, Chungking was formally denominated an -auxiliary capital of the Chinese Republic, and a long-standing -anomaly--that of the city's uncertain status--was removed. - -The Council of State could be regarded, therefore, as a mere excrescence -upon the design of government were it not that ceremonial and formal -functions, indispensable to any government but particularly salient in -China, can be delegated to it, and the actual policy-making agencies -thereby stripped down to maximal utility and efficacy. - - -THE EXECUTIVE _Yüan_ - -The Executive _Yüan_ is the political organ which includes the -ministries, and is therefore roughly analogous to a cabinet, just as the -Council of State is in loose parallel to a Privy Council. Together with -the Supreme National Defense Council and the Military Affairs -Commission, it exercises actual control over the National Government in -war time. Its growth involves executive giantism, and atrophy for the -remaining _Yüan_. The President (_Yüan-chang_) of the Executive _Yüan_ -(_Hsing-chêng Yüan_) is the highest executive officer of the government. -This post has not always been held by Chiang K'ai-shek. At various times -Wang Ch'ing-wei (now in Nanking) and H. H. K'ung (now Minister of -Finance and Vice-President [_Fu-yüan-chang_] of the _Yüan_) have held -this office. - -The Executive _Yüan_ may be compared to a parliamentary cabinet in -respect to its relations to the President of the National Government, -but it possesses no authority whatever over the Supreme National Defense -Council, nor over the Kuomintang C. E. C. and the Kuomintang Congress. -It cannot ask for its own dissolution, nor demand the dissolution of the -higher policy-making agency whose will it executes.[15] It resembles a -cabinet, therefore, in its service as a consultative and unifying agency -for the entire executive, but differs in its lack of controlling -interdependence with a broad parliament. Again, the _Yüan_ is unique -among national executive agencies in the modern world with respect to -its division of the task of policy-making and policy-supervising. Most -cabinets consist of meetings of the heads of executive ministries or -departments, with the chief executive officer presiding, but have no -elaborate secretarial or administrative machinery interposed between the -cabinet and its direct subordinates (departments or ministries). The -Executive _Yüan_ is peculiar in possessing two elaborate staff agencies -which handle as much routine work as possible, act as a clearing house -for policy and general administration, and pre-digest a maximum of -problems. The outline on p. 58 illustrates the difference. - - [Footnote 15: Wang Shih-chieh, _Pi-chiao Hsien-fa_, cited, p. 671.] - -All matters short of the most critical moment are referred to one or the -other of the two staff organs (_Mi-shu Ch'u_ or Secretariat, under a -Secretary-General; and _Chêng-wu Ch'u_, or Office of Political -Affairs,[16] under a Director of Political Affairs), which are nominally -separate but actually almost fused, with the Director serving as a sort -of assistant Secretary-General. All official business (other than -crucial matters raised by the members of the Meeting) comes to these -agencies, where it is studied, assorted, and usually settled -provisionally, pending only formal ratification by the Meeting of the -Executive _Yüan_. - - [Footnote 16: Not to be confused with the Office of Civil Affairs - (_Wên-kuan Ch'u_), adjunct to the Council of State, described above.] - - THE PRESIDENT OR PREMIER - | - THE CABINET - _______________________________ - | | | | - Ministry Ministry Ministry etc. - (secretarial and administrative staff - usually concentrated at this level) - - THE EXECUTIVE _YÜAN_ PRESIDENT - | - THE _YÜAN_ MEETING - _______________________________________________________ - | (composed of officers of ministerial rank | - | and presided over by the President) | - | | - Office of Political Affairs: Sections Secretariat: Sections - | | | | : : - | | | | : : - ..|.............|............|...|..................... : - : | : | : | |________________:__________ : - : | : | : | | : |: - Ministry Ministry Ministry Ministry etc. - -The Executive _Yüan_ Meeting occurs once weekly, most commonly on -Tuesday.[17] Each Meeting is presented with a formidable agenda, -prepared by the Secretary-General, and divided into three categories: -reports, matters for discussion, and appointments. The membership of the -Meeting consists of the _Yüan_ President and Vice-President, the -Ministers heading the executive Ministries, and the Chairmen of -Commissions having the rank of Ministry.[18] The work of the Meeting is -carried on in a business-like fashion. The Generalissimo, as incumbent -_Yüan_ President, takes great interest in the work of the _Yüan_, and -makes faithfulness and punctuality in attendance a matter of high -importance. Because of the Japanese air raids over the capital, the -exact place and hour of the weekly meeting are not announced, nor are -the proceedings public. - - [Footnote 17: A brilliant and informative discussion of the practical - work of the Executive _Yüan_ is to be found in Tsiang Ting-fu, - "Executive _Yüan_," The Chinese Year Book 1936-37, cited, p. 241-6.] - - [Footnote 18: For these Ministries and Commissions, see the following - chapter. These are not to be lumped with the Party-Ministries and - Commissions which, if anything, are even more complex in structure, - but whose titles follow the same scheme of terminology as that of the - government.] - -In giving effect to the decisions reached by the _Yüan_ Meeting, the -_Yüan_ itself issues orders in its own name for matters which are of -general interest, or which cannot be handled by any single Ministry or -Commission. If the problem is within the province of a particular -agency, the _Yüan_--through its Secretariat--addresses the appropriate -form of intragovernmental communication, and the decision is then set -forth as the order or act of the agency involved. The following subjects -are within the jurisdiction of the Executive _Yüan_: - -(1) laws or legal problems submitted for promulgation by the Legislative -_Yüan_; - -(2) the budget, also passed _pro forma_ by the Council of State and put -into legal form by the Legislative _Yüan_; - -(3) declarations of war and peace, on the motion of the Legislative -_Yüan_; - -(4) appointment and discharge of the higher ranks of officials; - -(5) matters which cannot be settled by a single Ministry or Commission; - -(6) other matters which the _Yüan_ President sees fit to introduce for -discussion or decision. - -The Executive _Yüan_ has far outstripped all other _Yüan_ in war-time -growth. Its central position, the urgency of most government business, -and the need for speed have led to this. Executive exercise of the -ordinance-making power has led to the gradual desuetude of the -Legislative _Yüan_, which has found ample work in the preparation of the -Draft Permanent Constitution and the attempt to systematize legislation -in view of rapid territorial and administrative change. The Executive -_Yüan_, by controlling personnel, usually short-circuits the functions -of the Examination and Control _Yüan_; and the Judicial _Yüan_ has never -had practical political parity. Hence, the five-power system must be -regarded as a system with strong executive, weaker legislative, -examinative, and censoral, and dependent judicial divisions. Above the -five powers, the Supreme National Defense Council exercises its august -authority; within them, the Executive stands forth; and to them, in the -course of the war, a new agency, almost comparable to a sixth _yüan_, -has sprung forth with an elaborate bureaucracy of its own: the Military -Affairs Commission. - - -THE MILITARY AFFAIRS COMMISSION - -Some sense of the perpetual urgencies underlying Chinese government in -the past decade may be obtained by consideration of the Military Affairs -Commission.[19] A similar agency was one of the political wheels on -which the Nationalist-Communist machine rolled victoriously North in the -Great Revolution of 1925-27. After the organization of a relatively -stable government at Nanking, the separate military commission was due -for absorption into the coordinate pattern of government; instead, it -has lingered under one form or another for almost twenty years, growing -great in recurrent crises, while the Ministry of War (which was to have -absorbed it) has become its adjunct. War led to sudden distension of -the Commission, and the creation of an agency comparable to a sixth -_yüan_, if not to a duplicate, shogunal government in the Japanese -sense. The Commission had its own head, its own _Pu_ (Ministries or -Departments), its own staff and field services. Duplicating the regular -government on the one side, and the party administration on the -other, it flowered into bureaucracy so lavishly that a fourth -agency--co-ordinator for the first three--began to be needed. - - [Footnote 19: _Chün-shih Wei-yüan-hui_. _The Chinese Year Book_, - _v.d._, cited, and most of the official publicity from Chungking - translates this term as "National Military Council," which is far from - the original, literally "military-affairs-committee." "National - Military Council" is also easily confused with the Supreme National - Defense Council. Hence the present translation is employed, following - Tsang, O. B., _A Supplement to a Complete Chinese-English Dictionary_, - Shanghai, 1937, and the original.] - -Simplicity of government structure has not been a part of the Chinese -tradition; the quasi-state of the Empire had been as elaborate as its -more potent European counterparts; and the foliation of government at -war cannot be taken as _prima facie_ proof of inefficiency. Personnel is -provided by giving each officer two, five, even ten jobs; the work is -done--delegation and counter-delegation frequently cancel out--and the -creation of new agencies does not inescapably involve confusion. - -The Military Affairs Commission consists of a Chairman--the -Generalissimo (_Tsung-ssŭ-ling_), who is Chiang K'ai-shek--and seven -to nine other members, all appointed by the Council of State upon -designation by the Supreme National Defense Council.[20] The key -officers of the armed forces are _ex officio_ members, and the -Commission is charged with the military side of the prosecution of the -war. Its power has been liberally interpreted. New agencies have been -attached to it as they arose; now it deals with social work, relief, -education, agitation, propaganda, espionage, government-sponsored -"social revolution," and many economic matters in addition to its -narrowly military affairs. - - [Footnote 20: See Ho Yao-tsu, "The National Military Council," in _The - Chinese Year Book, 1938-39_, cited, p. 361-3; Carlson, Evans Fordyce, - _The Chinese Army: Its Organization and Military Efficiency_, New - York, 1940, p. 26 _ff._; and frequent references in _China At War_ and - the _News Release_ of the China Information Committee, both - semiofficial, particularly the issue of the latter for July 15, 1939. - A list of the highest military personnel and brief outline of the - General Staff may be found in Woodhead, H. G. W., editor, _The China - Year Book 1939_, Shanghai, n. d., p. 216-17, and p. 225.] - -The work of the Commission falls into two parts. On the one hand, it is -the supreme directing agency for all the armies; on the other, the -managing agency for a variegated war effort away from the combat lines. -The Commission's work in theory covers all armies, but in practice -confines its supervisory powers to the forces in Free China and--less -clearly--to the major guerrilla units in the occupied areas. - -The Commission's governmental structure coordinates military and -political functions. The Chief of the General Staff serves as assistant -to the Chairman of the Commission. The Main Office serves to smooth -interdepartmental affairs and to act as a central clearing point for -orders and other transmissions. Beneath the Commission and the main -office, there are twelve divisions with the rank of _Pu_. The Department -of Military Operations (_Chün-ling-pu_) serves as a military planning -and strategic agency. The Department of Military Training -(_Chün-hsün-pu_) supervises training facilities, military schools, and -in-service training.[21] The Directorate-General of Courts-Martial -(_Chün-fa Chih-hsing Tsung-chien-pu_) and Pensions Commission (_Fu-hsüeh -Wei-yüan-hui_) are explained by their titles; the pension program is -probably behind that of every Western power, and the personal grants -made by the Generalissimo under his own extra-governmental arrangements -are more effective than governmental pensions. The Military Advisory -Council (_Chün-shih Ts'an-i-yüan_) acts as a research and consultative -body, in no sense cameral. An Administration of Personnel (_Ch'uan-hsü -T'ing_) applies some principles of the merit system. A Service -Department (_Hou-fang Ch'in-wu-pu_) is in charge of transportation, -supplies, and sanitation. The National Aviation Commission (_Hang-k'ung -Wei-yüan-hui_) has won world-wide fame for its spectacular work in -procuring a Chinese air arm, and in keeping Chinese air power alive -against tremendous odds of finance, transportation, equipment, and -personnel; Mme. Chiang's association with and interest in its success -has been of material aid. Finally, on the strictly military side, there -is the Office of the Naval Commander-in-Chief (_Hai-chün -Tsung-ssŭ-ling-pu_), formerly the Naval Ministry, controlling the -up-river remnants of the navy. The War Ministry (_Chün-chêng-pu_) -occupies an anomalous position in this scheme. Subordinate to the -Executive _Yüan_, it is also subordinate to the Commission, so that in -effect it is a Ministry twice over, and is even shown as two ministries -on occasion.[22] General Ho Ying-chin, as Minister of War, is -subordinate to the Generalissimo as _Wei-yüan-chang_ (Chairman) of the -Commission. - - [Footnote 21: Descriptions of the subordinate organs of all these - agencies but the Pensions Commission and the War-Area Commission will - be found in Ho Yao-tsu, cited immediately above. The translations of - the titles here given, however, are those of the author.] - - [Footnote 22: As an instance, see _Outline of the Organization of the - Kuomintang_ ..., cited above, p. 54, n.^{13}.] - -The two remaining agencies of the Commission are of considerable -interest. A system of having political commissars in the army, a Soviet -device, was adopted by the Kuomintang forces when first organized under -Chiang K'ai-shek, and political training accounted for much -of that success of the Northward drive (1926-27). After the -Nationalist-Communist split, political training as such fell into -considerable disuse, and was replaced by ethical training provided by -the Officers' Moral Endeavor Corps.[23] With the renewed entente, and -war of national union for defense, a Political Department -(_Chêng-chih-pu_) was established. A graceful tribute to Communist skill -in combining war and agitation was paid when Chou En-lai, the celebrated -Red general, was designated Vice-Minister of this Department. One of the -Generalissimo's most orthodox and able subordinates was made Minister. -The Political Department extends its function in an enormous sweep -across China, and renders aid in military education within the armies, -in civilian organization, and in war propaganda. Active and omnipresent, -it is an excellent instance of functioning national unity. - - [Footnote 23: This is a semi-official agency sponsored by the - Generalissimo. See below, p. 149. The new war-time change is well - illustrated by the following statement: "Special commissioners were - assigned to every group army, and political departments in the - divisions were augmented. Enough political directors were assigned to - every company of troops withdrawn from the front for reorganization, - and to Chinese forces behind the enemy lines. In addition, political - corps were formed to organize and train civilians. Because of the lack - of personnel, so far there have been no political officers in units - engaged in military operations. - - "Conscious and hard-working, the political officers have done much to - remove irritations which used to occur between the commanding officers - and the political men.... - - "Political work in the army formerly consisted in a weekly or - fortnightly talk by the officers, whereas now well-planned lessons on - political subjects, reading classes, discussion groups, individual - conversations and twilight meetings are conducted with clockwise - regularity. Singing, theatricals, cartooning, sports, are promoted - among the soldiers so long as they do not jeopardize their discipline. - Among the civilians, the political officers have also been active. The - organization of people's service corps, self-defense units in areas - close to the war areas and money contributions to the war chest from - people in the rear are a few of their accomplishments." China - Information Committee, _News Release_, October 2, 1939. - - The comment of Generalissimo Chiang in the interview on p. 371 is, - despite its laconicism, relevant to this topic. A further discussion - is available in Chên Chêng, "Three Years of Political Training Work," - _The China Quarterly_, Vol. 5, No. 4 (Autumn 1940), p. 581-5.] - -The Party and Government War Area Commission (_Chan-ti Tang-chêng -Wei-yüan-hui_) is a coordinate agency for propaganda, relief, and -social, economic and military counter-attack within the war area (the -occupied zone), rather unusual in being a formal amalgamation of -Kuomintang and government administration. Through this agency most of -the guerrilla aid is extended, and the Nationalists seek to rival the -Communists and independents in the number of Japanese they can destroy, -or the amount of damage they can do. The more active branches of this -Commission are a part of the Party structure, but the dual function of -the Commission enables it to coordinate Party and Army work. The very -role of the Commission is indicative of the fact that the Kuomintang is -trying to meet rivalry by patriotic competition and not by suppression. -Its integration with the military makes it a perfect example of the -triune force which Nationalist China is bringing to bear on the -enemy--army, government, and Party all seek to reach into the occupied -zone, to articulate spontaneous mass resistance, to maintain the -authority of the central government pending the _révanche_, and to -uphold the existing political system, canalizing social change into -evolutionary rather than class-war lines.[24] - - [Footnote 24: The official view of this work, silent on the - competition of the Communists and independents, is found in Li - Chai-sum, "Chinese Government Organization behind the Enemy Lines," - last citation above, p. 595-600.] - - -THE JUDICIAL, LEGISLATIVE, EXAMINATION AND CONTROL _Yüan_ - -The appearance of an actual three-power administration--army, -government, Party--has led to the sharp relative decrease in importance -of the four further _Yüan_. The Judicial _Yüan_ (_Ssŭ-fa Yüan_) was -even in peace time the least important of the five divisions of the -government, failing to display--as an American might expect--a tendency -toward effective judicial independence to counterweight the executive -and legislative. The Legislative _Yüan_ (_Li-fa Yüan_), while -exceedingly active in the years between the Mukden and Loukouchiao -incidents, has been reduced in importance by the coming of hostilities. -Its work has been confined largely to drafting the Permanent -Constitution, and continued codification of administrative -law--particularly for coordination of central government and war area -(occupied China) affairs.[25] The Examination _Yüan_ (_K'ao-shih Yüan_) -has attempted to continue in the field of civil service reform, and the -Control _Yüan_ (_Chien-ch'a Yüan_) has maintained war-time efforts. - - [Footnote 25: Statement to the author by Sun K'ê (Sun Fo), President - of the Legislative _Yüan_, Chungking, July 17, 1940. A summary of the - work of the _Yüan_ will be found in various issues of _The Chinese - Year Book_; in Escarra, Jean, _Le Droit Chinois_, cited above, - containing bibliographies; and in Tyau, M. T. Z., "The Work and - Organization of the Legislative _Yüan_," _The China Quarterly_, Vol. - 2, No. 1 (Christmas Number, 1936), p. 73-88.] - -The Legislative _Yüan_, under the _Yüeh Fa_ of 1931, consists of a -_Yüan-chang_, a _Fu-yüan-chang_, and forty-nine to ninety-nine members -(_Li-fa Wei-yüan_), appointed by the Supreme National Defense Council -for a two-year term upon nomination by the _Yüan_ President. The term's -shortness increases the dependence of members upon the President, and -transforms the _Yüan_ to a legislative study institute. Furthermore, the -newly-developed People's Political Council has assumed the function of -representation. The President of the _Yüan_ retains sole and arbitrary -power over the agenda, the final decision, and the allocation of -personnel, although the incumbent, Dr. Sun K'ê, is one of China's -leading moderates and an exponent of constitutional process, not likely -to exercise arbitrary power. - -Apart from its significant constitutional powers, which remain -unimpaired, the _Yüan_ finds much of its work performed at present -through ordinances of the Supreme National Defense Council, -administrative action of the Executive _Yüan_, or commands by the -Military Affairs Commission. The jurisdiction retained includes: - - (1) general legislation; - - (2) the budget; - - (3) general amnesty; - - (4) declaration of war (never exercised); - - (5) declaration of peace; - - (6) "other important matters" (which, in practice, has - referred to the more open and solemn aspects of - treaty-making, and whatever topic may be assigned the _Yüan_ - by the highest Party agency).[26] - - [Footnote 26: Wang Shih-chieh, _Pi-chiao Hsien-fa_, cited, p. 676 - _ff._] - -The Judicial _Yüan_ serves as an administrative and budgetary agency for -four agencies. The Ministry of Justice (_Ssŭ-fa Hsing-chêng-pu_) is, -obviously, the prosecuting agency, attached to the executive in the -United States, but made a part of the general judicial system in China. -The Administrative Court (_Hsing-chêng Fa-yüan_) is an agency only -potentially important; so is the Commission for the Disciplinary -Punishment of Public Officers (_Kung-wu-yüan Ch'êng-chieh -Wei-yüan-hui_). The _Yüan_ President is _ex officio_ chief magistrate of -the Supreme Court (_Tsui-kao Fa-yüan_). Wang Shih-chieh says of this -_Yüan_: - - Because of the fact that the Judicial _Yüan_ is itself not - an organ of adjudication, and since all affairs concerning - prosecution at law are handled by the Ministry of Justice, - the actual work to be performed by the Judicial _Yüan_ is - very simple and light. In addition to framing the budget for - the _Yüan_ itself and approving the general estimates of the - organs under it, the Judicial _Yüan_ has only three further - duties to perform: (1) to bring before the Legislative - _Yüan_ legislative measures connected with the Judicial - _Yüan_ and its sub-organs; (2) to petition the President of - the National Government with respect to such cases as - special pardon, commutation of sentence, and the restoration - of civil rights; and (3) to unify the interpretation of laws - and orders, and changes in judicial procedure.[27] - - [Footnote 27: The same, p. 691.] - -With peace, reconstruction and prosperity, the Judicial _Yüan_ might -acquire importance through its control of the administrative and -technical aspects of the court system. Meanwhile, courts are more -closely associated with their respective levels or areas of government -than with one another in a unified judicial system. - -The Examination _Yüan_, with a President and Vice-President, is composed -of a central _Yüan_ office, which supervises two organs: the Ministry of -Personnel (_Ch'uan-hsü Pu_), operating a selective promotion system, and -the Examinations Commission (_K'ao-hsüan Wei-yüan-hui_). In absolute -numbers, few examinations have been held. In practice, standard -recruitment technique continues to involve introduction, influence, or -family connections. The familiarity of such devices in China at least -gives them a high polish, and precludes utter inefficiency. Under the -circumstances, the Examination _Yüan_ finds scope for valuable, creative -work in the preparation of administrative studies and analyses of very -considerable importance. - -The Control _Yüan_ is of interest to Westerners, because of the novelty -of its functions. Through the courtesy of the _Yüan_ President, a full -official memorandum on the structure and procedure was prepared, -surveying the work of the _Yüan_ during the course of the war. This is -reproduced as Appendices I (E) and I (F) below.[28] Some of the -unofficial observers, both Western and Chinese, felt that the _Yüan_ -possessed further enormous possibilities of activity, and that the need -for controlment was very great indeed. In general, the _Yüan_ resembles -its legislative, judicial and examination coordinates, in that the -war-time executive growth has relegated it to a secondary position. - - [Footnote 28: See p. 313 and p. 318.] - -Decrease in the importance of the _yüan_ system during hostilities -cannot be taken, by a too simple cause-and-effect argument, as proof of -the unwieldy or impractical character of this five-power system. -Measured on a scale of other world governments, success is slow; but it -is enormous in contrast to other Chinese central political institutions. -At present, it is most improbable that the form of government will be -changed, save in the event of catastrophe beyond all reckoning. - - - - -CHAPTER III - -CONSULTATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANS - - -The outbreak and continuance of war has left the fulcrum of power -relatively untouched. The highest organs of state are primarily in -Kuomintang hands; the Party Chief of the Kuomintang is, even at law, -governmentally more important today than in 1937; and the constitutional -monopoly of power remains under the Kuomintang. Even changes in the -highest organs--such as establishment of the Supreme National Defense -Council and the Military Affairs Commission--have left very little -impress on the sources of power. Reforms have altered only the mode of -power, not its tenure. - -Modifications have, however, been introduced at the level of government -just below the apex. These are important in two remarkable ways. The -People's Political Council (_Kuo-min Ts'an-chêng Hui_) admixed an -ingredient of representation which (save for the Party) had been lacking -since the dubious, betrayed, inaugural years of the Republic. -Furthermore, sweeping administrative reorganization and reinvigoration -made possible the vitalization of the central government in the course -of the war, so that despite Japanese pressure and rising Leftist -rivalry, the National Government is, on any absolute scale, becoming -more powerful year by year. - - -THE PEOPLE'S POLITICAL COUNCIL - -The People's Political Council was established by order of the Emergency -Session of the Kuomintang Party Congress held in Hankow, March 1938. Its -creation was a compromise measure between the proposal for a -European-type United Front government, based on popular elections to a -National Convention, and a continuation of the Kuomintang monopoly of -government hitherto prevalent. Like many similar compromises in other -countries, the institution has proved its viable and useful character. -Without exaggeration, it may be stated to be the closest approximation -of representative government which China has ever known. Simple, -improvised, legally an instrument promising little independence or -_élan_ in its work, the Council demonstrates the effectiveness of the -Chinese when purpose accompanies design. Formally the least -representative of the Chinese constitutional parliaments, congresses, or -conventions, the Council is the first to get down to business -and--almost unexpectedly--to represent! - -Membership, originally set at 150, was raised before the First Session -to 200, and again in the autumn of 1940 to 240.[1] The number, unlike -the 1681 tentatively projected for the People's Congress, is small -enough to allow genuine discussion and to avoid unwieldiness. -Attendance, considering war-time hazards, has been very good, with -between two-thirds and four-fifths of the members usually present. - - [Footnote 1: China Information Committee, _News Release_, Chungking, - September 30, 1940; and the same, December 30, 1940.] - -Although the Council was designed to meet quarterly by its fundamental -Statute,[2] it soon changed to semi-annual sessions and has actually met -at intervals running from six to eight months. Each session lasted for -ten days (legislative, not calendar).[3] As the Council sessions -recurred, the Council became more and more free and representative. -Despite the narrowness of its legal foundations, the Council has -provided invaluable exercise in the arts of democratic discussion. - - [Footnote 2: Wang Shih-chieh, "The People's Political Council," _The - Chinese Year Book 1938-39_, cited, p. 346-55; the same, _The People's - Political Council_, [Chungking], [1939?], pamphlet, reprinted from - _The China Quarterly_, Vol. 4, No. I (Winter 1938-39). Dr. Wang's - contributions, brief as they are, worthily supplement his pre-war - constitutional studies, and provide the most carefully annotated data - on the Council which the present author has found. The list of members - given in the first article, above, is one of the most interesting - documents of our time, giving, as it does, the residence, profession, - and age of each Councillor. Beside "Former Prime Minister" one finds - "Living Buddha attached to the Panchen Lama," "Reserve Member, - Executive Committee, the Third International," "Professor, National - Peking University" and "Head of the Mêng Clan, Descendants of - Mencius."] - - [Footnote 3: Woodhead, H. G. W., editor, _The China Year Book, 1939_, - Shanghai, n. d., Ch. IX, "The Kuomintang and the Government," contains - a detailed summary of the first two sessions of the People's Political - Council (p. 231-7). Quigley, Harold S., "Free China," _International - Conciliation_, No. 359 (April 1940), includes a judicious appraisal of - the work and meaning of the Council in its first two and one-half - years (p. 137-8).] - -As a technique of representation, the Council's recruitment system is -novel. The membership was, while the Council's total was at 200, divided -into the following four categories: - - _Group A_: representatives of the Provinces and Special - Municipalities--88; - _Group B_: four representatives for or from Mongolia and two for or - from Tibet--6; - _Group C_: representatives for or from the overseas Chinese--6; - _Group D_: representatives of cultural, professional, and economic - bodies, or persons who have been active in political - leadership--100. - -There were no elections. In the case of Group A candidates, nominations -were made by municipal or provincial governing bodies in joint session -with the Kuomintang Party organ of corresponding location and level. -Group B candidates were nominated by the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs -Commission. Group C candidates were nominated by the Overseas Chinese -Affairs Commission in the Executive _Yüan_. Group D candidates, which -included the representatives of the Communists and independent Left, -were nominated by the Supreme National Defense Council. Two candidates -could be presented for each seat on the Council. Subject to a minor -detour or two on qualifications or for other reasons,[4] the final -selection or election was made by the Central Executive Committee of the -Kuomintang. - - [Footnote 4: Wang Shih-chieh, "The People's Political Council," cited, - p. 346 _ff._ The new system, inaugurated early in 1941, provided for - 90 members to be directly elected by Provincial and Municipal People's - Political Councils.] - -Thus, an independent or Leftist, whose life had been more or less in -danger for years, because of his hostility to the Kuomintang and its -policies, might find himself nominated for the Council by the -Kuomintang's highest government-supervising agency, and elected by the -Kuomintang's highest Party agency. Leaders of the hitherto suppressed, -still technically illegal parties and factions--which meant all save the -Kuomintang--were designated representatives through the fiction of -selection for individual merits. They might take an active share in -hammering out policy, and--on the same day--find themselves legally -debarred from overt public expression of their own party work. By this -device, the Kuomintang provided a safety-valve for opposition without -touching the apparatus of its own power. - -Had the Kuomintang leaders been obtuse and made the Council something -less than a genuine sounding board for public opinion, or had they -picked unrepresentative members of the other groups, the whole -experiment would have failed. In practice, the compromise worked and -gave China a focus for the national concentration of will. - -The Council did not elect its own Speaker (_I-chang_) and Deputy-Speaker -(_Fu I-chang_); these were elected for it by the Central Executive -Committee of the Kuomintang. Down to 1940, the Council elected a -Resident Committee of fifteen to twenty-five members from its own -membership; under a recent reorganization, this and the Speaker and -Vice-Speaker are to be replaced by a Presidium, to be elected by but not -necessarily from among the Council, to consist of five members and to -hold the authority of designating presiding officers. This would amount -to a further step in the independence of the Council. In both cases, the -Secretariat (_Mi-shu-ch'u_) of the Council is to be under a -Secretary-General (_Mi-shu-chang_) and Deputy Secretary-General (_Fu -Mi-shu-chang_) and to include services of correspondence, general -affairs, Council affairs, and police.[5] - - [Footnote 5: _Tang Chêng Chien Chih T'u-piao_, cited, chart of the - _Kuo-min Ts'an-chêng Hui_.] - -With respect to competence, the Council is possessed of three powers: - -(1) the right to deliberate on all important measures, whether of -domestic or foreign policy, before these are enacted into law by the -Central Government (but not, however, the right of making such law); - -(2) the right to submit proposals to the government (but since the -Supreme National Defense Council is the highest government-directing -agency in China, its concurrence is patently necessary); - -(3) the right to demand and hear reports from the _Yüan_ and the -Ministries, and to interpellate the officers of state. - -The distinguished Chinese constitutional scholar, Wang Shih-chieh, -Secretary-General of the People's Political Council (Generalissimo -Chiang himself being the Speaker) writes of its functions: - - From the foregoing description, the peculiarities of the - People's Political Council may be clearly seen. It is not an - advisory body of the Government in the ordinary conception - of the term, because the Government is bound, except in - emergency cases, to submit to it for consideration all - important measures before they are carried out. The Council - possesses not only the power to advise, but also the right - to be consulted. Nor is it a legislative organ, as all its - resolutions merely embody broad principles of legislation or - administration, i.e., lines of policy which, even after - being assented to by the Supreme National Defense Council, - will still have to go through the ordinary legislative or - ordinance-making process in order to become laws or - administrative ordinances. - - As regards the representative character of the Council, it - rests not so much with the method by which the Councillors - are chosen, as with the fact that, being composed of men and - women most of whom enjoy wide popularity or respect in one - way or another, the Council can really speak for almost all - the articulate group-interests of the nation. In the less - than 30 years of China's experience in republican - government, numerous experiments had been attempted at - representative government before the convention of the - People's Political Council. Few of these were deficient in - theoretic grandiloquence, but none of them was found to be - serviceable in practical applicability. - - Theoretically, the Council is not a popular assembly; but, - as I remarked elsewhere,[*] "it is open to question whether - any form of election by popular suffrage can result in so - truly representative a body." Even with reference to the - limited scope of the Council's powers, I submit that the - provision represents a progressive step in that any - alternative that is less realistic would impede rather than - facilitate the contributive work of the Council.[6] - - [Footnote *: _Chinese Year Book, 1938_, Chap. 17. [Wang Shih-chieh's - note.]] - - [Footnote 6: Wang Shih-chieh, _The People's Political Council_, cited, - p. 5. Obvious misprints have been corrected.] - -The author adds that the resolutions have tended to be of an -extraordinarily practical character, and that bombast has remained -conspicuously absent. - -The procedure of the Council has been kept very simple. A quorum -requires only a simple majority (101 members), and a simple majority of -a quorum (51) is all that is needed to pass a resolution. To ensure the -proper spacing of the calendar, all resolutions initiating new business -must come within the first four days of the ten-day session. -Introduction may not be completed by the action of a single member; a -petition of 20 members, one proposing and 19 endorsing, is necessary for -introduction. Reference may then be either to the plenary session or to -the committees. (There are five standing committees--military, foreign, -civil, financial and economic, educational and cultural affairs--which -provide further facilities through subdivision into subcommittees, or -through the addition of special committees.) Reports by the government -are introduced during the first three days of each session.[7] - - [Footnote 7: The author is indebted for some of these facts to an - interview with Dr. Wang Shih-chieh in Chungking on August 1, 1940.] - -Members cannot waste time over the pork-barrel, log-rolling, riders, or -minor fiscal questions. Since they all have the same constituency at -law, and that constituency--the C. E. C. of the Kuomintang--asks nothing -of them except representation of their moral constituencies--the groups -and areas from which they derive, Councillors are untroubled by -constituents or appropriations. The budget is submitted by the -government to the Council for approval, not enactment. Salaries of the -Councillors are nil. Each is given Ch. $350.00 (about U. S. $20.00) per -mouth for expenses, without regard to mileage, and even overseas Chinese -representatives receive no further emoluments. Since government -officials are excluded from membership, use of a Council seat for -purposes of preferment is precluded. - -A liberalization of representation and of procedure occurred early in -1941. A new Council--involving the first turnover in membership since -1938--was elected. Educational and other unofficial representatives -obtained an additional twenty seats on the Council. The changes were -scarcely sufficient to compensate for the further postponement of the -promised Constitution, but they indicated a willingness of the -government to meet demands for democratization. Procedural changes -increased the effectiveness of individual members. A minor but -characteristic feature was the increase in number and importance of -women members. - -Partisan organization in the Council, although elementary, has begun to -function. Each clique has informal caucuses; careful scrutiny discloses -the presence of whips from these caucuses on the floor. The groupings in -the Council are so fluid that they can be variously classified by -persons with different viewpoints. (Formally, of course, everyone is -either Kuomintang or non-Party, even though _The Chinese Year Book_, -under informal Chungking government sponsorship, proudly lists the high -rank of the Communist members of the Council--"Chen Shao-yu (Wang Ming), -[age] 33, [province] Anhwei, [remarks] Member, Presidium, Central -Executive Committee, the Third International.")[8] The popular -classification of the Council cliques, commonly seen in the press, is -based on the Four Parties (_Ssŭ Tang_) and the Four Cliques (_Ssŭ -P'ai_). The four parties are the Kuomintang, National Socialist, -Communist, and _La Jeunesse_.[9] The Four Cliques, which according to -popular credence, formed soon after the first meetings of the Council, -are based on intellectual sympathy and the interplay of temperaments, -and not on dogma. - - [Footnote 8: _1938-39_ issue, p. 351.] - - [Footnote 9: Described below, p. 159 _ff._] - -The most Leftist clique is believed to be the _Hua-chung P'ai_ (Central -China Clique), with the National Salvationists' Seven Gentlemen at their -core. Deeply sympathetic with the masses, and violently patriotic, this -group helped to bring about the war by opposing appeasement. -Like-thinking Council members, however affiliated, are believed to fall -under the legislative leadership of the Central China Clique. Near to -this, still far to the Left of the government, is the _Tungpei P'ai_ -(Northeast Clique). The Northeastern Manchurian Chinese officers, -exiled in the Northwest, were the first bridge between the Communists -and the rest of the country. Since their native provinces and kinsfolk -have had almost ten years' Japanese domination, the Northeast group is -emphatic in demands for national unity. Communists circulate from one -group to the other, always cooperative in offering their leadership on -the basis of a United Front, which the Comintern still decrees for the -Far East after jettisoning the Popular Fronts of Europe. - -The two relatively Rightist cliques are the _Ch'ê-yeh Chiao-yü P'ai_ -(Vocational Educationists' Clique) and the _Chiao-shou P'ai_ -(Professors' Clique). Composed of men still so far from attaining office -that they possess perfect freedom of criticism, they therefore stand -Left of the government in daily comment, although they may be Right of -it in theory. The former group stresses simple, direct problems: it -seeks to attack the opium problem, disease, illiteracy, and so forth, -without necessarily fighting the social revolution against the -landlords. It derives its name from two distinguished leaders of the -vocational education movement who have abstained from active political -work until finding a forum in the Council. The Professors' Clique is -reputedly led by the group of young professors who were eminent in their -fields before the outbreak of war, opposed to the government's -appeasement policy, but tactful enough not to rebel. They are considered -to stand as far Right as anyone on the Council--that is, to discuss -politics in terms of soundness of public policy, budgetary -reasonableness, immediate practicality, and other common-sense -standards, which appear conservative beside the fervid idealism of their -colleagues. - -The description of the _Ssŭ P'ai_ just given is one which exists in -the popular credence. A more authoritative source placed the groups in -the Council under the following four headings: - - (1) the Kuomintang and non-Party majority; - (2) the _La Jeunesse_ Party and the National Socialists; - (3) the Communists; - (4) the "Popular Front" group, including the intellectuals and the - National Salvationists. - -On this basis, the Kuomintang would retain its working control of the -Council, which appears to be the case, in terms of work performed. The -unaffiliated majority, selected by their local governments and -Kuomintang offices and elected by the Kuomintang C. E. C., would in -doubtful cases be inclined to turn to Kuomintang leadership. The _La -Jeunesse_ Party, despite the fact that it is a Western-returned student -organization, is strong in Szechuan; its influence could be expected to -run with that of the National Socialists. Both parties, while minute, -are decidedly averse to Communist fellow-travelling and not at all -disposed to alter the _status quo_, except to carve modest niches for -themselves and to advance their programs in an agreeable way. The -Communists stand alone, although they offer their cooperation to the -independents. - -The Popular Front group is a category widely recognized in China--the -Left Kuomintang, the discontented idealists, the irrepressible patriots, -the minor parties, the indefatigable conspirators of Chinese hopefulness -who are always on the scene. For years they have been unforgotten -witnesses to the ferocious integrity of ideals which (in individuals -scattered at random at all levels of society) call Chinese out of the -lethargy of being very practical. - -The Popular Front leaders, more than any other in China, have withstood -perennial temptation for years and have kept their activities, under -whatever name undertaken, intact. They can be distinguished from other -Party leaders, both Nationalist and Communist, by the facts that they -have never set up a government, with jobs in it for themselves; have -never controlled a government, save through lacunae in power politics; -and have never preserved a government which they did control. -Warm-hearted, philanthropic, patriotic, their shrill zeal has been -audible in China for many years. Without formal organization, they have -stood behind others who sought real power, and today--between the cold, -realistic leaders of the two opposing Parties--are assembled, -ever-hopeful, and advocating a Popular Front. - -The Secretary-General stated to the author that he regarded three of the -Council's contributions as of history-making importance. First, the -Council openly expressed a Chinese national unity unprecedented in -modern history. Forms apart, never before had a crisis found all Chinese -so united; the Council gave a symbol to that unity. Second, the Council -raised the probability of successful democratic processes in China. -Failures under the Peking parliaments had reduced democratic discussion -to a sham. The Council erased this discredit, making many people believe -that democracy promises a real value to the country--not merely as an -ideal, but as a practicable means of government. This contribution was -reinforced by a third: the Council actually served to make definite, -serious, concrete improvements in government and Kuomintang structure, -through criticism and through the issues aired. - - -THE ADMINISTRATIVE PATTERN - -Central policy-making is complicated by a trifurcation of organs--Party -Headquarters, Military Affairs Commission, and Executive _Yüan_. For -example, the nation's publicity and broadcasting services, as well as -direction of the official news agencies, are under the (Kuomintang) -Party-Ministry of Publicity, while the Foreign Office possesses its own -publicity organs for the international relations field, and the -Political Department of the Military Affairs Commission handles much -domestic propaganda and agitation. The strictly governmental, permanent -administrative agencies are simplified from their pre-war complexity, as -the following list will show: - - EXECUTIVE _Yüan_ - - Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Ministry of the Interior - Ministry of Finance - Ministry of Economic Affairs (to be reorganized) - Ministry of Social Affairs (pending) - Ministry of Education - Ministry of Communications - Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry - Commission on Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs - Commission on Overseas Chinese Affairs - National Relief Commission - Ministry of War (also under the Military Affairs Commission) - Material and Resources Control and Supervision Ministry - (pending; status uncertain) - - JUDICIAL _Yüan_ - - Ministry of Justice - - CONTROL _Yüan_ - - Ministry of Audit - - EXAMINATION _Yüan_ - - Ministry of Personnel - Examination Commission - -The Ministries outside the Executive are well adapted to their -respective _Yüan_, although Americans may think the Ministry of Justice -misplaced. The Executive Ministries form the heart of the administrative -system, immediately below the cabinet (Executive _Yüan_ Meeting). The -Party scaffolding is to be torn down with constitutionalization; the -military scaffolding, with peace. The administrative organs at the -center will then bear the real burden of nourishing and protecting the -nation which now they help to create. - -Despite strong Chinese imprints, the central administrative agencies are -organizationally more Westernized than the policy-making agencies. For -this reason, and because administrative emphasis is on matters economic -(outside the scope of the present work), the reader is referred to other -sources for a detailed appraisal of the work of the ministries. -Particularly fortunate is it that _China Shall Rise Again_, partly -written and partly edited by Madame Chiang K'ai-shek,[10] has been -published, including authoritative statements by the leading ministers -on the work of their respective ministries. - - [Footnote 10: May-ling Soong Chiang (Madame Chiang K'ai-shek), _China - Shall Rise Again_, New York, 1941. Chinese economic developments are - the subject of careful study by the Institute of Pacific Relations, - whose _Far Eastern Survey_ follows contemporary developments closely - and whose _Inquiry Series_ offers a monumental collection of linked - works on Pacific affairs, with particular stress on the economic - background to politics. The volume in this series on Chinese political - development, by Lawrence K. Rosinger, may be expected to fill an - important gap in the literature on China today.] - -The Ministries (_pu_) may be classified into three groups, according to -the major tenor of their work: political, social and cultural, and -economic. Military defense through economic development and social -reconstruction remains their common goal, however divergent the -approaches. - - -THE POLITICAL MINISTRIES - -Senior and most famous of all Chinese ministries is that of Foreign -Affairs (_Wai-chiao Pu_). It inherits the splendid traditions of Chinese -diplomacy, dating back to the redoubtable Pan Ch'ao, who almost -single-handed conquered Central Asia in the first century A.D. by -unsleeping guile and consistent boldness. Modern Chinese diplomacy has -made the best of a hundred years of defeat, successfully exploiting the -mutual suspicions of the imperialist powers. The morale and -professional cohesion are high. Despite incessant political changes, -the foreign office and diplomatic service have preserved their -continuity from the Empire to the present. The Chungking government -probably possesses a foreign office superior to the Gaimusho of -Tokyo.[11] - - [Footnote 11: For the latest description of the organization of the - _Wai-chiao Pu_, see Wang Ch'ung-hui, "China's Foreign Relations during - the Sino-Japanese Hostilities 1937-1940," Chapter XIII of Chiang, - May-ling Soong, _China Shall Rise Again_, cited, p. 139-40.] - -The effectiveness of Chinese international statesmanship has aroused an -almost superstitious dread among the Japanese, publicists, officials, -and others. Japan consistently complains that China is superior at -propaganda, and sees, behind the world-wide mistrust of Japan, occult -forces from the Comintern or vile Chinese guile. After they perpetrated -the Nanking horrors, insulted neutral men and women in Tientsin, -machine-gunned a British ambassador, sank an American gunboat, and -violated all available international law, the Japanese believed that -British and American lack of sympathy was mostly due to the machinations -of Chinese diplomacy. The recent Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Wang -Ch'ung-hui, a former Judge of the Permanent Court of International -Justice (World Court), is one of the modern world's greatest legal -scholars. Eminent in political leadership ever since the first -foundation of the Republic, he has always urged moderation, legality, -and intelligence in government. - -The Ministry of the Interior (_Nei-chêng Pu_) forms the apex to China's -constitutional system of provincial and local governments. In accordance -with Sun Yat-sen's teaching, the National Government has consistently -sought to reduce the importance of the provinces and to foster direct -local-central intergovernmental relationships. The importance of this -ministry is reduced somewhat by the fact that other agencies possess -their own field services, and are therefore not obliged to route policy -through it, but it remains significant because of its control and -supervision of China-wide administrative development. The National -Health Administration (_Wei-shêng Shu_), formerly separate, is now a -department of this Ministry. - - -SOCIAL AND CULTURAL AGENCIES - -The Ministry of Education (_Chiao-yü Pu_) has continued active despite -the war. The heroic marches of the Chinese universities to their new -homes in the West have become a world-famous epic. Students, faculty, -and staffs moved out of the sinister zones of enemy occupation, usually -travelling on foot, until they found new homes hundreds or even -thousands of miles from their original locations. Some colleges have -found homes in old temples or in caves where, with a minimum of -equipment and library material, they continue their work. Others, more -fortunate, have become guests of West China institutions. West China -Union University in Chengtu has four other universities on its campus, -all using the same facilities for the duration of the war. Still other -institutions have been consolidated. - -The Ministry of Education has subsidized education as generously as -possible, and fosters progress despite the war and because of it. In -spite of all handicaps, institutions of higher learning have risen in -number from 91 in 1937-38 to 102 in 1939-40, with a corresponding rise -in enrollment of 31,188 to 41,494.[12] The entering class for 1940-41 -was about 12,000, indicating a continued rise.[13] - - [Footnote 12: _China at War_, Vol. V, No. 2 (October 1940), p. 37.] - - [Footnote 13: The same, Vol. V, No. 4 (November 1940), p. 78. See also - Wu Yi-fang and Price, Frank W., _China Rediscovers Her West_, New - York, 1940; Chapter VII, "Holding the Educational Front" (p. 69-76) is - by Y. G. Chen, President of the University of Nanking. The entire work - edited by Messrs. Wu and Price is of value; written from the - missionary point of view, it presents first-hand statements of affairs - on Western China, and continues with liberal and socially conscious - appraisals of the needs of Christian work.] - -In addition to the accredited institutions, there are innumerable -volunteer agencies, some of which are patriotic but educationally -elementary schools for saboteurs, agitators, and guerrillas. Education -is propaganda, but such is its immediate appeal that Left schools obtain -capacity attendance. A few students are disappointed. One wrote, "The -most unpleasant thing to me was that, as soon as I entered the -Resist-Japan University, I was deprived of my liberty. I was not free in -speech; I was not allowed to say anything outside of Marxism-Leninism -..." and went home.[14] The total attendance remains high; if added to -that of the accredited institutions operating according to government -standards, it would swell the sum enormously. - - [Footnote 14: Wang Wên-hsiang, "K'ang-jih Ta-hsüeh yü Ch'ing-nien - Fan-mên" ("The Sorrows of Youth and the Resist-Japan University") in - the symposium entitled So-wei "_Pien-ch'ü_" (The So-called "Frontier - Area"), Chungking, XXVIII (1939), p. 30 _ff._] - -In addition to formal aid to institutions of higher learning, and -administration of the National Government colleges, the Ministry -sponsors the mass literacy movement. In this it has had the benefit of -the work of Dr. James Y. C. Yen and his associates.[15] The war, moving -vast masses of people and shifting the modernized city-dwellers from the -coast to the interior, has proved a stimulus to the rise of literacy and -the demand for popular literature. - - [Footnote 15: See the discussion of the mass education problem, below, - p. 218.] - -The Ministry is headed by Ch'ên Li-fu, whose brother, Ch'ên Kuo-fu, is -head of the (Kuomintang) Central Political Institute. Together they -stand at the Right center of the Kuomintang, exerting enormous influence -on the Party and on the country. Both have been very close to the -Generalissimo, and took a large share in revitalization of the -Kuomintang before and during the war. - -The two Commissions serve important needs. The Commission on Overseas -Chinese Affairs (_Ch'iao-wu Wei-yüan-hui_) is the informal Chinese -equivalent of a colonial office. The Commission looks after the welfare -of the overseas settlements of the Chinese, fostering language schools, -hospitals and the like. It acts through Chinese community associations, -rarely through official channels. Practices of hyphenated citizenship, -so offensive to one Western nationality when undertaken by another, are -unobtrusive and necessary in the case of the Chinese. With the outside -states putting Chinese in a special economic, legal, and political -category--through immigration laws, administrative practice, and -extra-governmental pressure including lynching--the individual Chinese -who deracinates himself is indeed a lost soul. Few Chinese worry about -overseas Chinese _irredentas_. The Commission fosters no _putsches_ and -mobilizes no fifth columns, but does help to keep Chinese, whatever -their nationalities, still Chinese. - -The Commission on Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs (_Mêng Tsang -Wei-yüan-hui_) is the supreme agency for the dependencies. It has a -record of considerable success in fostering a good-neighbor policy -toward the half-autonomous dominions of Chinese Turkestan (Sinkiang, -also called Chinese Central Asia),[16] Tibet, and Inner Mongolia. Outer -Mongolia is under indirect Soviet control, and Eastern Inner Mongolia -under the Japanese. The Chinese have utilized every device of courtesy -and diplomacy in retaining their precarious grip on these areas. The -Commission includes dominion members. - - [Footnote 16: Among the recent books on Sinkiang, one, unusual because - it is by a Chinese author, stands out: Wu, Aitchen K., _Turkistan - Tumult_, London, 1940. The travel books of Sven Hedin, Ella Maillart, - Peter Fleming, and Sir Eric Teichman also contain material of - political interest.] - - -THE ECONOMIC MINISTRIES - -The Ministries dealing in economic matters bear the ultimate burden of -resistance. Upon their success depend China's tools of war. If -artillery, aircraft, machine-guns, munitions, food, clothing and other -necessities are not available to the central armies, the opportunity for -counter-attack may come and go, and China be lost--not through the power -of her enemy, but through her own weakness. Unless economic mobilization -succeeds, the guerrilla warfare in the occupied area will be frustrated, -since its purpose is merely to prepare for a _révanche_ from Free China; -history affords few examples of guerrillas defeating mass armies, -fighting positionally, without the intervention of other mass armies. - -The Ministry of Finance (_Ts'ai-chêng Pu_) is the leader of the Economic -Ministries. Headed by H. H. K'ung, successor to the celebrated T. V. -Soong, it has performed fiscal miracles in maintaining the credit of the -National Government. Chief among its accomplishments has been the -institution, within the past decade, of a managed currency on the -gold-exchange standard. Specie had been the immemorial medium of -exchange, and Chinese experience with paper money--from the earliest -times to the present--had been unfortunate. Starting with the 1860's, -China had undergone one paper-money inflation after another. -Governmental currency was frequently a receipt for silver on deposit, in -which case it amounted to no more than a commodity warehouse -certificate, thereby subject to discount for transportation charges, and -fluctuating meanwhile with the world price of silver; otherwise it was -fiat money, guaranteed by stranglers' cords and long knives. Fractional -coins passed by metallic weight; the shifts in the price of copper in -New York and London determined the number of pennies which farmers -received for their silver dollars, even on the threshold of Tibet. - -By putting private bank notes, both Chinese and foreign, out of -circulation, systematizing note issuance to four government banks and a -limited number of carefully supervised provincial agencies, the -National Government made the change with far less difficulty than -anyone, even optimists, dared to hope. Until the outbreak of war -subsidiary coinage was copper and aluminum; this has been replaced by -fractional paper, circulating decimally without discount for exchange -into larger bills. Simple peasants, who used to hide a slug of silver in -their fields, now conceal a Bank of China, Bank of Communications, -Central Bank of China, or Farmers' Bank of China _fa pi_ (legal tender) -note in roofs or walls. - -Other noteworthy reforms include the standardization of levies in the -provinces, now proceeding to some degree, and the imposition of direct -taxes, a revolutionary step for China. Income and inheritance taxes, -previously thought to be uncollectible in a pre-modern area such as -China's hinterland, are yielding substantial sums. War borrowing is done -almost entirely through domestic loans. These are issued in the form of -patriotic contribution bonds, and are available in denominations as low -as Ch. Nat. $5.00 (about 28 U. S. cents). Further support has come in -the form of American, British, and Soviet fiscal aid, and--until the -outbreak of the European war--additional credits, both private and -intergovernmental, from continental Europe. The Ministry has moved with -a financial prudence which promises to maintain China's domestic and -foreign credit for further years of war. - -The Ministry has engaged in direct conflict with the enemy through -bank-note rivalry. Throughout the occupied area, National Government -currency is in conflict with the issuances of the Japanese army and the -pro-Japanese governments. The Chungking policy has been to hold back the -invasion currencies, on the assumption that continued circulation of the -national currency maintains a continued popular stake in the government. -Many guerrilla leaders believe that the occupied areas should use -nothing of value to the Japanese, and therefore encourage the issuance -of local emergency currency. - -Under the Ministry of Finance, numerous efforts have been made to keep -foreign trade alive. With war-time pressure on transportation -facilities, foreign trade has become a virtual monopoly of the -government; few major transactions are made by wholly private interests, -since in addition to monopolizing the highways, government-owned -corporations also have access to differentials in foreign exchange -(which often mark the difference between great profits and none). In the -matter of the governmentalized Sino-American trade, correlated with the -American credits, the Foo Shing Corporation (export) and the Universal -Trading Corporation (import) control the current both ways. The -Ministries of Communications and of Economic Affairs also have a share -in this state-capitalist business.[17] - - [Footnote 17: _The Far Eastern Survey_ keeps effectively up to date - with all new developments in this field. An authoritative but - understandable explanation of the work of the Ministry is found in H. - H. K'ung, "Holding China's Financial Front," Ch. XI, work by Mme. - Chiang K'ai-shek, cited above.] - -Subdivisions in the Ministry of Finance include sections for customs, -salt gabelle, internal revenue, general taxation, public loans, -currency, national treasury, accounting, and general affairs. Efforts -are now in progress to consolidate all intragovernmental fiscal -services, so that the budget shall cover the entire government, and -separate agencies will no longer be able to make half-controlled -collections and disbursements. - -The Ministry of Economic Affairs (_Ching-chi Pu_) is in general -responsible for the industrialization of an area half the size of Europe -with well over two hundred million inhabitants. No non-industrial state -can defeat an industrial state unless it has access to the industrial -resources of third parties. The Chinese, realizing this, have launched a -modernization process unparalleled in modern history. The two greatest -migrations of the twentieth century have occurred, most probably, in -China: the first the settlement of Manchuria, and the second the flight -to the West. In each case more than twenty million persons have been -involved. The Ministry of Economic Affairs has transformed this rout -into a pioneering advance. Refugees have been taught to bring their -tools with them; when they had no tools their skills have been sought -out and utilized. As the national armies and government retreated up the -Yangtze and inward, they brought along the personnel of a modern -economic system, and set an industrial society down in a world -technologically backward. - -West-China modernization will probably be the most durable economic -consequence of the war. Cities near the edge of Tibet have underground -electric power and automatic telephone systems. Primitive salt-drying -areas have been modernized; in one instance, steel pipe being lacking, -bamboo pipelines, plastered and cemented for reinforcement, run -cross-country. Filthy, tax-ridden, vicious little cities which had been -the haunts of opium-sotted militarists are now given the double blessing -of fair government and a business boom. (The author felt, when he -returned to America in September 1940, that he was going from a new -country to an old, leaving the hope, zest and high spirits of the -Chinese frontier for the comfortable melancholy of American -half-prosperity.) - -On the government side, the stimulation to technological advance has -consisted of broad, experimental use of government personnel, subsidies, -and part-ownership, together with some outright state socialism. Four -types of encouragement appear with particular frequency: the -government-controlled movement of private industries from the endangered -areas to the West, government sponsorship of brand new industrial -enterprises, official encouragement of cooperatives, and state -ownership-management of enterprises. - -Many industries were saved for China through compulsory movement. -Thousands of tons of industrial equipment were moved up to the West, -floated on barges and river-boats, or dragged by hand over macadam -highways, dirt roads, and mud footpaths. One single enterprise, the -Chung Fu Joint Mining Administration of Honan, successfully transferred -one hundred and twenty thousand tons of equipment, now applied to coal -mining in the Southwest.[18] - - [Footnote 18: Wong Wen-hao, Minister of Economic Affairs, - "Industrialization of Western China," Ch. XIV, work by Mme. Chiang - K'ai-shek, cited above, p. 142.] - -Government sponsorship of new enterprises covers the entire field of -modern industry. Investors wait in line before opportune undertakings. -Electric light bulbs, safety matches, automobile parts and tools, -clothing--everything from machine-shop tools to luxury goods is being -produced in the West. Bottlenecks do occur in new industries competing -for priorities in imported machinery. - -In the field of cooperatives, the C. I. C. (China Industrial -Cooperatives) stand out as truly important social and economic -pioneering. (See below, p. 223.) - -Government ownership has not been niggard or timorous. In most cases it -has followed American patterns and appeared in the form of -government-owned corporations, but there are also a considerable number -of frankly state-operated enterprises, such as municipal food stores, -ferries, and heavier industrial undertakings. The munitions and motor -fuel trades are, so far as the author could find, entirely a matter of -government ownership. In the air communications and airplane production -field, government ownership is relaxed to the point of a senior -partnership in joint companies with foreign corporations; the latter -provide the supplies and trained personnel. - -The Ministry of Economic Affairs is under the control of Wong -Wen-hao,[19] whose career was first distinguished in geology and -educational administration. His scientific outlook stands him in good -stead, since the exploitation of West-China resources requires -scientific as well as business application. Subdivisions of his Ministry -include those of mining, industry, commerce, water conservancy, and -general affairs. - - [Footnote 19: He also spells it Oung Wen-hao; by the Wade - transliteration, Wêng Wên-hao.] - -A Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (_Nung Lin Pu_) was set up in -1940 as the third economic ministry. Industrialization's dependence on -farm products makes this an invaluable coordinate to the other two -Ministries. The Chinese are in many cases proceeding directly from -pre-industrial to the latest chemico-industrial techniques, and skipping -the phase of reliance upon subsoil minerals. Gasoline is being mixed -with fuel alcohol derived from grain; plastics are appearing. - -Agriculture also involved China's greatest social problem--that of -encouraging freehold or cooperative farming at the expense of -sharecropping. Much of the agricultural reform is undertaken by the new -local government and provincial government plans, but the problems of -farm prices, general farm planning, and utilization of agricultural -products fall on the Ministry. It is headed, not by a farm leader or -expert, but by the General Chên Chi-tang, former governor of Kwangtung -Province.[20] - - [Footnote 20: China Information Committee, _News Release_, Chungking, - July 1, 1940.] - -A proposed Material and Resources Control and Supervision Ministry (or -Ministry of Economic Warfare), based approximately upon the British -Ministry of Supplies, is in process of organization.[21] The Ministry -may be kept independent of either the Executive _Yüan_ or Military -Affairs Commission, since it is to coordinate a group of industrial and -commercial agencies which are now independent. Upon its establishment, -the Ministry of Economic Affairs will become one of Industry and -Commerce, and a central agency for economic war work will be available. - - [Footnote 21: The same, December 23, 1940.] - -The National Relief Commission (_Chên-chi Wei-yüan-hui_) supervises the -general relief work of the government, which is performed in part by the -extragovernmental war and Party agencies and in part by local and -provincial authorities. The immensity of the relief problem in China has -always been such that organized relief can do no more than stir the -misery of the masses. Opportunely for the National Government, the -Imperial Japanese Army is securely in possession of the world's greatest -relief problem, and unable to relinquish it. Chungking is more -fortunate. (The author never dreamed that prosperity such as he saw in -West China could exist in Asia. Prices are extremely high, but wages and -farm prices tend to follow, and unemployment--always low in China -because of the work-sharing role of the family--is almost completely out -of sight. Skilled labor commands remuneration fantastic by pre-existing -scales.) - -All these agencies, and much of the rest of the government, depend upon -the Ministry of Communications (_Chiao-t'ung Pu_). The invasion struck -at existing communications lines; Japanese are now in control of the -mouths of all major Chinese rivers, most of China's railway mileage, and -the coastal system of modern highways. A glance at the map of China will -show that Japanese forces have hugged modern communications lines, -whether steamship, railway, or highway. Whenever the Japanese ventured -far from these lines, they met with disaster. - -The Ministry of Communications has used existing facilities to draw new -networks. The short stretches of railway in Free China are still -operated; _matériel_ from the occupied zone was brought West on them, -and they are undergoing rapid development. Roadbeds are being -constructed in anticipation of future imports of steel rails. Steamship -enterprises, under government subsidy, operate extensively, and new -reaches of river have been opened to service. - -Three lines of reconstruction have proved very fruitful: motor -communications, telecommunications, and the rationalization of -pre-modern facilities already at hand. - -Motor communications, both highway and aerial, have shown enormous -progress. Air service is maintained by the China National Aviation -Corporation and the Eurasia Company, both owned by the Chinese -Government, the former jointly with Pan American Airways and the latter -with German interests. Through connections from New York to Berlin are -available by the combined services of the two companies. - -The highway system can be thought of as spider-like. Three enormous legs -reach to the outside: the Chungking-Kunming-Lashio route, famous as the -Burma Road; the trans-Sinkiang route, finally connecting with the Soviet -Turksib Railroad beyond thousands of miles of desert and mountains; and -the due North route, now being developed, reaching the Trans-Siberian -Railroad. The body of the system is a tight, well-metalled skein of -roads interconnecting the major cities of Free China. Most highways are -all-weather, and well-engineered, but niceties of surfacing have been -postponed. - -Truck and bus service is regular, but very crowded, with inescapable -confusion as to priority. The majority of the operating firms are -government-owned, either by the central government or the provinces. -Complaint has arisen over the restrictions to private enterprise in this -field. Since gasoline costs about U. S. $1.00 per gallon and is -available only under permit, further official obstructions to highway -use seem unnecessary. - -Telecommunications have been maintained and extended. Telegraph service -has reached into hitherto untapped areas, and wireless is extensively -employed. Radio services operate under the Kuomintang, not the -government; stations XGOX and XGOY reach North America and Europe with -propaganda in the world's leading languages. The telephone has come to -be a regular part of Chinese official and business life, and is to be -seen, far off the beaten track, as one of the heralds of -industrialization. - -All these modern services would, however, be grossly insufficient for -the needs of the whole nation at war. They have been supplemented -through the use of every available type of pre-modern transportation. -Most of these rely on man-power, and have had their own elaborate -organization for many centuries: boatmen's guilds, unions of transport -coolies, carters, muleteers and camel-drivers. It has been possible to -ship heavy freight through country consisting of mountains traversable -only by stone-flagged footpaths or torrential streams. The Ministry has -regimented this complicated pre-modern world, with impromptu -modernizations as startling as they are efficacious. Where once couriers -trotted, they now speed by on bicycles or motorcycles; the squealing -wooden-axled wheelbarrows of the Chinese countryside are yielding to -pneumatic-tired carts which resemble American farm trailers. Three to -eight men can drag one cart, with half a ton of freight, over any -terrain, making up to forty miles a day. Provision can be made, -therefore, for moving a quarter-million tons of raw materials across -territory lacking even the most elementary roads. The roughness of the -country, which bars the Japanese army, is no obstacle to huge coolie -gangs, drafted sometimes, but more usually hired. - -The Minister of Communications gave the following written answers to -questions put by the author:[22] - - 1. In view of the political interruptions to commerce - through British and French territories south of China, will - efforts be maintained to keep communications on the same - schedules southward that they had before? - - Yes, because commercial and export traffic is still being - carried on southward, and there is a large accumulation of - important materials to be moved from the frontier inward. - - 2. Will the restriction of gasoline lead to the abandonment - of certain truck and bus routes, and the maintenance of - others, or do you expect to restrict all routes evenly? - - We expect to restrict all important routes evenly if the - motor fuel situation becomes really acute. - - 3. Is a motor road running through Inner and Outer Mongolia - directly north to the Trans-Siberian Railroad a feasible - project? - - Yes, it is a feasible project. - - 4. For all practical purposes, is the Soviet route as it - exists an adequate although expensive channel for the import - of high-class American machinery, such as trucks? - - Yes, the Soviet route as it exists is adequate though - expensive for the purpose. - - 5. Is there evidence that mail between the United States and - China has been censored or tampered with while in transit - past Japan? - - No, there is no such evidence so far. - - 6. How extensive a foreign personnel do you have in the - varied agencies under your Ministry? - - Postal Service: 28 - China National Aviation Corporation: 15 - Eurasia Aviation Corporation: 13 - Railways: 8 - - 7. What developments of the last three years do you regard - with most pride, as evidence of China's power to cope with - the emergency? - - The timely completion of the Yunnan-Burma Highway may be - considered as evidence of China's power to cope with the - emergency and as an important development in the field of - war-time communications. The Highway is 960 kilometers long - from Kunming to Anting on the frontier. Construction began - in October 1937. Eleven months later, the road was opened to - through traffic. At one time during its construction, as - many as 100,000 laborers were employed on the road. - - The highest point on the Highway is 2,600 meters above the - sea level, yet the road has to pass two deep valleys, the - Mekong and the Salween, where the Highway dips a few - thousand feet within a distance of several miles in order to - reach the river bed, and rises precipitously again in the - same manner just beyond the suspension bridges over the two - turbulent rivers. The scarcity of local labor, the - enervating climate, and the wild and sparsely populated - country traversed, all combine to make the construction work - difficult. But now, anyone may take a motor car and cover - the distance between Chungking and Rangoon in two weeks, as - Ambassador Johnson did soon after the Highway was completed. - - [Footnote 22: Communication of August 12, 1940; in the present - author's possession.] - -The Minister Chang Kia-ngau (Chang Chia-ao) is one of the most eminent -bankers in China. His Ministry is a model of business-like organization -and systematic routines; he has a great reputation for getting things -done in the American fashion--quickly, and without ceremony. - -In addition to these major ministries, there are the _Pu_ of Justice -(part of the Judicial _Yüan_, sharing its war-time somnolence), of War -(affiliated with the Military Affairs Commission), of Audit, of -Personnel, and--in process of establishment--of Social Affairs, -supplementing the Party-Ministry of Social Movements (_Shê-hui Yün-tung -Pu_) now under the Kuomintang Headquarters. - -All Ministries are headed by a Minister (_Pu Chang_), seconded by a -Political Vice-Minister (_Chêng-wu Tzŭ-chang_) and Administrative -Vice-Minister (_Ch'ang-wu Tzŭ-chang_). Since almost all officers are -political appointees, and few of the new career men have touched the -higher levels of the bureaucracy, this duplication prevents a job famine -and keeps personnel levels high; the utility of a large administrative -staff depends, obviously, on the nature of the executive. Some of the -most crowded ministries seem permanently under-staffed because of the -intense activity they maintain; others, with skeleton staff, appear to -have far more civil servants than service. The over-all picture of the -Ministries, however, leads inescapably to the conclusion that they are -really functioning today. Long-transmitted vices of sloth and sinecures -are on the wane. The war, high-lighting every demerit into treason, has -created optimum conditions for administrative progress in China. - - - - -CHAPTER IV - -PROVINCIAL, LOCAL, AND SPECIAL-AREA GOVERNMENT - - -China consists of twenty-eight provinces, varying in size about as do -the European nations. Of the twenty-eight, fourteen are wholly under -Chinese control, or are so slightly touched by invasion that normal -governmental processes continue. Ten provinces are under dual or triple -government--by the Japanese and pro-Japanese Chinese, by guerrilla and -other semi-independent groups, and by the usual constitutional -authorities. The remaining four are under firm Japanese domination, -under the name _Manchoukuo_.[1] Well over half of China's population is -under the National Government, and about one-ninth under unchallengeable -Japanese control; the residuum is the subject of sharp political -competition. The war is not merely a war between governments: it is a -struggle for the creation of government.[2] - - [Footnote 1: For an excellent definition of Free China, see Quigley, - Harold S., "Free China," cited, p. 133-35. The most readable geography - of China is Cressey, George B., _China's Geographic Foundations_, New - York, 1934.] - - [Footnote 2: For further development of this problem, see below, p. - 185. The present author considered this question in relation to the - Chinese political heritage, in _Government in Republican China_, - cited, p. 2-12, 69-74, 188-89. Professor George Taylor, in _The - Struggle for North China_, cited, relates this problem to the broad - issues of world discussion, in a most acute analysis of "The Problem - of China," p. 8-16, and gives a clear answer to the questions thus - posed, p. 197-201.] - -This problem would be immense even if there were no war. Under the -successive Imperial dynasties of the past millennium, China developed -extreme regional autonomy. Despite absolutist theory, the provinces -under their governors or viceroys were practically as independent as -states of the American union in the early nineteenth century. - - PROVINCIAL AND URBAN GOVERNMENT - - National Government -------------+ Kuomintang - | | | | - Military Affairs Executive ..Other _Yüan_ | - Commission _Yüan_ : | - | | : | - | The Provincial Government[B] | - | _Shêng Chêng-fu_ | - | | | - | +-----------------------------+ | - | | Chairman | | - | | _Chu-hsi_ | | - | | | | - | +-----| The Provincial Government |...... | - | | | Committee | : | - | | | [_Shêng Chêng-fu_] | : | - | | | _Wei-yüan-hui_ | : | - | | +-----------------------------+ : | - | | | Standing | : | - +--------------+ +--| Committee | +-------------+ +----------+ - | Pacification | | | _Ch'ang-wu | | Provincial | | Party | - | Commissioner | | | Wei-yüan_ | | People's | | Agencies | - | _Sui-ching | | +------------+ | Political | +----------+ - | Chu-jên_ | | | | | | Council | | - +--------------+ | | | | | _Shêng | | - | | | | | | Ts'an-chêng | | - | | | | | | Hui_ | | - | | | | | +-------------+ | - | | | | | | - | | | | +-------------------+ | - | | | +----------------+ | | - | | | | | | - | | Reconstruction | | | - | | _Chien-shê Committees: | | - | | T'ing_ Industry | | - | | _Shih-yeh | | - | | T'ing_ | | - | +------------------------+ Secretarial | - | | | | Department | - | Civil Affairs | | _Mi-shu Ch'u_ | - | _Min-chêng T'ing_ | | | | - | | | | | - | Finance | +------------------+ | - | _Tsai-chêng T'ing_ | | The Municipal | | - | | | Government[B] | | - | Education | _Shih Chêng-fu_ | | - | _Chiao-yü T'ing_ +------------------+ | - | | | - | +------------------+ | - | | Mayor | | - | | _Shih Chang_ | | - | +-------------------+ | | | - | |Municipal Advisory | |Municipal Council | | - | |or People's Council|...|_Shih Chêng Hui-i_| | - | |_Shih Ts'an-i-hui_ | | | | - | +-------------------+ | Councillors| | - | | _Ts'an-shih_| | - Local +----------------------------------------------+ | - Military | | | | | | | | | | - | | | | | | | | | | - Other Bureaus | | | | | | | | | - as Needed | | | | | | | | | - | | | | | | | | | - Bureau of Public | | | | | | | | - Utilities[A] | | | | | | | | - _Kung-yung Chü_ | | | | | | | | - | | | | | | | | - Bureau of Local | | | | | | +----------+ - Government[A] | | | | | | | Party | - _Ti-chêng Chü_ | | | | | | | Agencies | - | | | | | | +----------+ - Bureau of Health[A] | | | | | | - _Wei-shêng Chü_ | | | | | | - | | | | | | - Bureau of | | | | | - Engineering | | | | | - _Kung-wu Chü_ | | | | | - | | | | | - Bureau of | | | | - Finance | | | | - _Tsai-chêng Chü_ | | | | - | | | | - Bureau of Public | | | - Safety | | | - _Kung-an Chü_ | | | - | | | - Bureau of Social Affairs | | - _Shê-hui Chü_ | | - | | - Secretariat | - _Mi-shu Ch'u_ +----------+ - | | Party | - Urban Local | Agencies | - Government +----------+ - - [Footnote A: optional] - - [Footnote B: legal, not administrative, entity] - -With the advent of war, the position of the provinces has become more -precarious, truly new political devices in the form of novel regional -governments have appeared, and the concrete problems of reform in the -village communities have become as imperative as military measures. - - -THE PROVINCES - -The war-lord period was ushered in by the death of Yüan Shih-k'ai, -dictator-President and commander-in-chief, in 1916. He had inherited a -tradition of dual government--civil and military--no less sharp than the -Japanese distinction, and had continued it by placing his military -henchmen in power as provincial satraps. After his death, each province -had a military governor (_Tuchün_), who sometimes tolerated a civil -governor (_Shêng-chang_) and sometimes held both posts concurrently. The -various _tuchün_ rivalled one another in a vain turmoil until the rise -of the National Government suppressed or incorporated them. Even today -some of these men hold remnants of their power, but it is still -declining. The power of the National Government has increased almost -every year for over fifteen years, and its programs, bequeathed by Sun -Yat-sen, call for the constant diminution of provincial authority, until -in the end the province shall be little more than a postal link between -the central government and the districts (_hsien_). - -Continued vitality of the provinces as a form of political life is shown -by the chariness with which the government approaches the problem of -re-subdividing the nation, by the continued effect of provincialism -through the influence of geography, botany, ecology, economics and -spoken language, and by the manifest utility of the provinces in the -prosecution of the war. It is impossible to discuss any aspect of -Chinese affairs for very long without entering into distinctions between -provinces. - -In mild, modified, and controlled form, the pattern of civil-military -contrast in provincial government still prevails. The civil governor, -now in almost all cases the weightier official, is legally termed -Chairman of the Province (_Shêng Chu-hsi_), but he frequently possesses -a military colleague amiably designated Pacification Commissioner -(_Sui-ching Chu-jên_).[3] The war has eradicated almost the last -vestiges of provincial militarism. No Chinese army is in a position to -make peace with Japan through the negotiated treason of its commander, -although small groups occasionally change sides both ways.[4] On the -other side of the picture, it is not altogether certain how far the -National Government could go in replacing local leaders; more has been -done than ever before, but the Generalissimo has tried to work honestly -with all leaders, provincial or independent, subsuming their power under -his and the Government's without destroying it. Four provinces still -show traces of autonomy. - - [Footnote 3: Tsang, O. B., _A Supplement to a Complete Chinese-English - Dictionary_, Shanghai, 1937, p. 267. The older, standard dictionaries - do not include the term. Lieutenant H. S. Aldrich, in his _Hua Yu Hsü - Chih: Practical Chinese_, Peiping, 1934, gives _Sui-ching - Ssŭ-ling_ as Pacification Commissioner (Vol. II, p. 74).] - - [Footnote 4: An apt, grisly story is reported in the semi-official - English-language journal of the Nanking regime. The "Peace Movement" - is, of course, the Japanophile movement of Mr. Wang Ch'ing-wei. This - is the way it was given in _The People's Tribune_, Vol. XXIX, Nos. - 7-10 (October-November 1940), p. 305: - - "In response to President Wang Ch'ing-Wei's peace appeal to the - nation, Mr. Tan Shih-Chang, member of the Chungking Air Force, flew to - Hankow by his own plane on June 10 to join the Peace Movement. Upon - his arrival in Nanking, Mr. Tan was warmly received by the - re-organized National Government. Later, he was sent to Macao on an - important mission, but upon his arrival there, he was instantly killed - by desperadoes in the employ of the Chungking regime. - - "It is learned that the plane he left in Hankow has now been repaired - by the Japanese Air Force and brought to the Capital. Following its - arrival, the plane was immediately handed over to the Military - Commission by the Japanese military authorities." - - (This would need further corroboration before it could definitely be - accepted.)] - -Largest of the four is Sinkiang (Chinese Central Asia), under the -military leader Shêng Shih-ts'ai; it is subject to very strong Soviet -influence, since it is more accessible from the Soviet side of the -border, via the Turksib Railroad, than from China. Its trade naturally -flows out through the Soviet Union. The provincial authorities have been -harsh toward Christian work, and casually cruel to occasional -travellers. Since the National Government is exceedingly anxious to -maintain good relations with the Soviet Union, and obtains much of its -supplies from that country across Sinkiang province, it has made no -attempt to interfere. The province has cooperated enthusiastically in -war efforts; it is strange to see Central Asiatics with European -features marching with Chinese troops. Many of the independent Leftist -leaders have been welcomed in the area, although simon-pure Marxians are -rare, and the province, with a new university, new air bases, new -industries, and a trans-Asia highway, is undergoing rather spectacular -development. The British and the Soviets are mutually so suspicious that -the Chinese are likely to keep control, but the Chinese central -government, taking no chances, cooperates rather than commands. - -Yünnan, under General Lung Yün, is the second province with special -features. Relatively isolated from the rest of China until the -completion of the Kunming-Chungking stretch of the Burma Road, it has -never been occupied by large National Government forces. The provincial -chairman submitting in form and cooperating in fact has been left -unmolested in his position. The province is becoming modernized by a -great deal of commerce and development; it is likely that this vestigial -autonomy will fade away unnoticed. - -Kwangsi province possesses as leader General Pai Chung-hsi, one of the -ablest military men in China. A Kuomintang leader of long standing, he -followed, in conjunction with the leaders in Kwangtung (Canton), a -policy of _de facto_ autonomy down to the very outbreak of war. He and -his associates even had an independent air force, which was promptly -merged into the National air service. During the war, he has fought in -central China. The economic ruin of Kwangtung and the occupation of -Canton city by the Japanese has quenched Cantonese autonomy, but Kwangsi -has been relatively untouched. No whisper of suspicion has imputed -separatism to General Pai, but should he desire it, he is one of the few -men left in China still to have the means. - -In Fukien province, General Ch'ên I serves as Chairman. He studied in -Japan and has a Japanese wife. He remains loyal to the National -Government, and he has fought the Japanese along the coast. No Chinese -observer has criticized him, but Westerners have observed that Fukien is -remarkably quiet; the Japanese have done little beyond blockading the -coast and seizing the major ports, and the Chinese have launched no -counter-attacks. It is possible that some unexpressed sense of -understanding between the Governor and the Japanese prevents further -conflict, while the Generalissimo--content to leave well enough -alone--lets matters stand as they are. - -Provincial government, as outlined in the chart at p. 98, is very simple -in structure. The Commission plan, similar in many respects to the -Galveston plan in American municipal government, reduces the Provincial -Chairman to the status of _primus inter pares_. The departments of the -provincial government are headed by members of the province's committee. -The presence of provincial offices of the Kuomintang, military services, -and war agencies makes a provincial capital a place more important than -it seems in theory. A valuable innovation in provincial administration -has been the inauguration of the Provincial People's Political Councils -(_Shêng Ts'an-chêng Hui_). These are being taken seriously by the -administrations. Although they occasionally pass visionary, -impracticable, or bombastic resolutions, their work has for the most -part been concrete. They have aided a great deal in transforming the -atmosphere of government, and act as competent outside critical bodies -to check the administrative officers. - -Provincial government has been significantly transformed by the war. Dr. -T. F. Tsiang (Chiang T'ing-fu), a distinguished historian who served on -a central inspection commission to the Southwest in 1940, stated[5] that -provincial government has improved in two outstanding ways: first, there -is a real desire to understand the common people, and to do something -for them. This was unheard-of a few years past. Second, all--or almost -all--of the officials work very hard. There is far more work than there -are men. Money is frequently available but unexpendable because there -are not enough experts to go round. Hence, the provincial governments -find their need is for men rather than funds, and the war is bringing -new levels of actual accomplishment. Although most of the governors have -military titles, many of these are like Kentucky colonelcies, courtesy -titles from time past. The over-all effect is of hard work and little -bombast. - - [Footnote 5: In an interview with the author, Chungking, July 31, - 1940; the interview was unfortunately terminated by the raid alarm. It - might be noted at this point that proposals for the reinstitution of - strong provincial executives have been postponed from year to year - since 1932. See _The China Year Book 1939_, cited, p. 217 n.] - -Special Municipalities, most of which are now under Japanese occupation, -are directly subject to the National Government and only incidentally a -part of the provinces in which they are located. Ordinary Municipalities -are under their respective provincial governments, but not under a -_hsien_ (district or county) administration; in some cases they include -several former hsien. The Municipality is headed by a Mayor -(_Shih-chang_), advised by a City Council (_Shih-chêng Hui-i_) composed -of the chiefs of the administrative sections, several supplementary -counsellors, and representatives from the Municipal Advisory Assembly -(_Shih Ts'an-i-hui_), if one exists. Below the _Shih_ the urban pattern -of local government differs somewhat from the rural, but otherwise city -government displays no features peculiarly Chinese. - - -LOCAL GOVERNMENT - -Chinese local government has been the ever-fertile soil out of which -successive Empires grew. To no other level of government has the -Republic reached so poorly. Since China is constituted of about half a -million villages, several thousand market towns, and a few hundred major -cities, the bulk of the population is rural, but rural in a way foreign -to the West. Congestion imposes upon agrarian China many problems and -evils known as urban in the West. Corruption in government, extortion in -economics, demoralization in social and family life--these start with -the village and the _hsien_. Inconspicuous in any single village, each -evil summed to its China-wide aggregate becomes tremendous. - -Government has not been beloved by the Chinese farmer. Governmental -benefits--for the continuance of scholastic culture, the protection of -the realm, the creation of grandiose public works--were remote, but -taxes were not; government meant the taxgatherer. Fêng Yü-hsiang, one of -the great war-lords and now a Kuomintang general, says of his own -childhood: - - The people, except for paying their taxes, had nothing to do - with the government. The government never paid any attention - to the conditions under which the people lived, and the - people never bothered themselves about what the government - was doing. One party collected the taxes; the other paid - them. That was all there was to it. Although Paoting city - was only about two _li_ [less than a mile] away, the - inhabitants of Kang-k'ê village showed no interest in city - civilization; instead, they rather looked down on that sort - of thing. No discussions of politics were heard, and nothing - about the encroachments of the foreign powers on China. All - the big changes seemed to have taken place in another world, - and very seldom affected this place. - - When the government was about to collect taxes, the _Li - Chêng_ [a petty local officer] would ring a gong from one - end of the village to the other, shouting: - - "Pay your taxes! Four hundred and sixty coins to the _mou_ - [about one third of an acre] for the first harvest!" - - When the people heard the gong, they did not go and pay - their taxes immediately. They would walk listlessly to their - doorways, only to withdraw after having taken a nonchalant - look at the _Li Chêng_--as though they had heard nothing. - They would wait until the very last minute, until they could - not put it off any more, and then go, group by group, to the - city to hand in money they had earned by sweat and blood. - - They were industrious and miserable all through the year - ...[6] - - [Footnote 6: Fêng Yü-hsiang, _Wo-ti Shêng-huo_ (My Life), Kweilin, - 1940, p. 22.] - -This basic level of Chinese society is not easily susceptible to -standardization, or the imposition of ready-made bureaucracies. Even in -the United States, it would be almost impossible to impose a uniform -plan for community organization from Bangor to San Diego and Walla Walla -to the Bronx. Sun Yat-sen once said to Judge Linebarger, "China is a -land of autonomy from the smallest village upward. Who shall dictate to -the sub-governments of China the form and manner in which they shall -express their local governmental needs? Of course, we must have a -minimum of uniformity for both economy and efficiency in government, but -the will of the people must be followed."[7] By seeking to remedy -political abuses the National Government apparently hopes that economic -inequalities will be ironed out by the people themselves. - - [Footnote 7: As reported by Paul M. W. Linebarger in his - _Conversations with Sun Yat-sen_ [as yet unpublished; in the author's - possession]. Book II, Chapter V.] - -The Chinese land problem cannot be understood except at the -politico-economic nexus, where low political morale exposes the farmers -to the unrestrained power of the gentry, acting in the triple capacity -of officials, landlords, and money-lenders. The cycle, familiar in the -West, of freehold farmers or yeomen first mortgaging their land, then -becoming tenants, and finally ending in utter economic helplessness, has -been familiar in China. In China's past, the cycle had another phase: -agrarian insurrection sweeping the land with banditry and innumerable -rebellions, thereby increasing the fiscal burden on the remaining land, -leading to worse exploitation, until the slate was swept clean by -dynastic collapse, general civil war, and a new Imperial house, whose -administrative decline began another cycle. The peasantry never won -completely, and never lost utterly. Today, if one judges by past -experience, rebellion or reform seems long overdue.[8] - - [Footnote 8: The author has sought to trace the political and military - aspects of this cycle in _Government in Republican China_, cited. - There are numerous works on the subject from the economists' point of - view. Outstanding are the books by John Lossing Buck, R. H. Tawney, J. - B. Condliffe, Karl Wittfogel, Ch'en Han-seng, and the articles by - Norman Hanwell (chiefly in _Asia_, _Amerasia_, and _The Far Eastern - Survey_).] - -The detailed legislation adopted by the National Government in war time -is given in Appendix I (G), and Chiang K'ai-shek's own explanation of -the new system in Appendix III (C).[9] One might explain the general -plan quite simply in terms of inter-connection between the central -government and the millions of households. The _pao-chia_ system is one -of mutual aid and mutual responsibility between households and groups of -households, under government supervision. It has appeared in China from -time to time since the Ch'in dynasty (221-203 B.C.). If used for -welfare purposes, it amounts to a recognition of the pluralistic -character of Chinese society by the government, and the happy -utilization of the family pattern. Applied for police purposes, it is -well suited to repression and terror. Thus, today the National -Government is applying the _pao-chia_ system (in relation to its whole -scheme of local government) as a measure of progress and reform, while -the Japanese encourage the same organizations in occupied China as a -device for despotism and exploitation. - - [Footnote 9: Below, p. 324, and p. 388.] - -Expressed in law, now being applied in fact, the _chia_ is a group of -six to fifteen families (households), and the _pao_, a group of six to -fifteen chia. The hsiang is formally composed of six to fifteen pao; -actually it approximates what is loosely termed a community in the -United States (_e.g._, a city ward, a single suburb, part of a rural -election district). The _ch'ü_ is the rough equivalent of a township. -The _hsien_ (district; county) is the fundamental unit of the -traditional China-wide bureaucracy. Hence the missing steps are not -those between the _hsien_, near to two thousand in number, and the -central government. The gaps occur between the half-billion Chinese and -their two thousand _hsien_. The following chart shows the broad outlines -of the system:[10] - - HSIEN - ("county") - ^ - | - Militia Elected | Schools, Kuomintang - | ^ CH'Ü | | - | | ("township") | | - | | | | | - and Police Representative | Secondary and Party - | | HSIANG | | - | | ("community") | | - | | | | | - | | PAO | | - | | ("neighborhood") | | - Organs Assemblies | Elementary Organizations - | | CHIA | | - | | ("a group of households") | | - | | | | | - | | \/ | | - | |--------->THE PEOPLE | | - | ^ | | - |____________________________|_____________|______________| - - [Footnote 10: A detailed chart will be found in Appendix III (C), at - p. 388.] - -This is the official government plan. If ever put into complete effect, -China will consist of hundreds upon hundreds of thousands of -self-governing units, arranged on seven levels (the five local levels; -provinces; nation), and the world will wonder at a massive new -democracy. In practical politics, what seems to be happening is that the -system extends to the National Government areas, involving less than -three hundred million people. Much of the application is purely formal, -and signifies no more than did the grant of an imaginary suffrage under -the first Republic. Elsewhere the new system is installed with telling -administrative effect, improving the bureaucracy, strengthening the -state, but not arousing much popular participation or enthusiasm. And in -the remainder the program is beginning to work as is intended with -genuine elections and popular participation in government. - -The three chief devices which have been applied to the reform of local -government are: instruction, mandate, and other remote controls; -inspection systems; and training courses. First are the attempts to -change local government by transmission from the capital of voluminous -instructions, manuals, etc., supplemented by similar Kuomintang action -for Party reform. In the second case, central officials go to the -provinces. During the summer of 1940, a number of such groups of -officials divided China between themselves, each group taking a number -of provinces for its inspection zone. The presence of a central -delegation in the field led to some housecleaning, provided an incentive -for immediate work, and informed the National Government of the -condition of the country. Some junketing was observable, but not enough -to vitiate the work of inspection. By the third device, local officials -are called to training centers. The Generalissimo is very fond of this -method. He encourages the selection of younger men, who thereby feel -that their careers are given a boost. They are taught modern -governmental practice while living, in most cases, a disciplined but -comfortable half-military life. Some training conferences are convened -_ad hoc_ in a promising area; others continue from year to year under -the government or related organizations. Many thousand men and women -undergo some form of training. The program has clearly discernible -effects in improving local government. The selection of persons who -either hold office or are likely to hold office provides a practical -self-interest motivation. Further minor devices of local government -reform include the grants in aid to the provinces, the establishment of -model _hsien_, the military eradication of banditry, the reclamation of -farm land and forests, some resettlement, and much planned modernization -with small-scale projects. Town after town has received the stimuli of -modernization from one of these sources. - -Estimates--nothing more could be found--concerning the effectiveness of -this program varied considerably. Since two equally skilled observers, -considering the same institution at first hand, can differ sharply in -their value judgments of efficacy or integrity, this is not surprising. -A few Westerners and Leftists have insisted that the program was almost -altogether sham. A few formal, optimistic officials have insisted that -it has succeeded almost everywhere. One competent foreign observer told -the author that he believed the _pao-chia_ system to be installed in 90 -per cent of Free China, and to be actually working in 50 per cent. -Another agreed more or less with these figures, but suggested that there -were enormous differences between the provinces, some being genuinely -transformed and others remaining unaffected. A Chinese official, himself -a social scientist, who had been intimately connected with local reform, -stated that 50 per cent application for all Free China would be much too -high an estimate, except for the holding of token elections. Only in -Kwangsi province was the new self-government structure working over -half of the countryside; elsewhere, the ratio was about one-fifth -effective as against four-fifths nominal. - -Most of all, genuine application consists in making institutions -available, and thereupon letting the people help themselves. If local -government is of practical use to the common people, they can be counted -on to discover its utility promptly. If it is of no practical use, they -will know that too. Whatever the present degree of success, obstacles -still confront the program. Local extragovernmental institutions possess -enormous vitality. If superficial or slipshod reforms are made, the new -local governments will be merely operated as screens for secret -societies, landlords' unions, or other narrow cliques. - -Contrastingly, a tradition of discussion and public action makes it -equally possible that the rural masses, familiar with cooperative -action, will operate the new institutions successfully. The difference -between success and failure is not to be measured in terms of wholly new -achievement; it is determined by the choice of existing institutions -which, transmuted and fitted, fill the pattern of the rationalized local -government system. If narrow, class-bound or unprogressive groups assume -the regalia of a novel legality, using their position to obstruct -further development, the program will fail. If the town-meeting, -cooperative potentialities of the entire adult population are aroused, -and if the ordinary farmer or coolie can see that he has the opportunity -of bettering his livelihood through political action, the success of -democracy will be assured. - -Potentialities in the field of local autonomy are enhanced by the fact -that the National Government has competitors. The Japanese have an -opportunity which, instead of utilizing, they have done their best to -destroy: conquest through prosperity. If they and their Chinese -associates offered low prices, easy marketing, and fair taxes, in the -place of arson, rape, thievery and bluster, their failure would become -less certain. As a third side to the triangle of competitive power, the -Communists and independent Left, while allied to the National -Government, rival it in winning the loyalty of the population. Huge -areas in Communist and guerrilla sections are sampling reform of a -drastic and immediate kind: the lowering of taxes, the democratization -of government, the abolition of usury. With the traitors on its Right -and the Communists or guerrillas on its Left, the National Government -does not abandon its chief politico-economic weapon by disregarding land -and labor reform. None of the three parties has anything to gain by -inaction. None has an interest which binds it to self-dooming reaction. - - -THE COMMUNIST ZONE - -Three new governmental areas which are neither provinces nor local -governments have come forth out of unification and war. Their -relationship to Chungking is strange, perhaps unique. They are not -states members of a federal union, since China is a unitary republic. -They are not new regional commissions, creatures and extensions of the -central government, because--whatever the theory--they were -independently initiated. They are not allies, because they profess -national unity. They are not rebellions, because they fight a common -enemy, only occasionally coming into conflict with government troops. -Yet they possess some of the features of each of the following: federal -states, regional subgovernments, allied states, and rebellions. They cut -across the pattern of the National Government. Two are governments; one -is an army. The army and one government are largely Communist; the other -government is a genuine United Front of the parties. Two are North -Chinese; one is Central Chinese. But all three have this in common: they -are Leftist, actively revolutionary; they are objects of patronizing -suspicion to the central authorities, who are glad of the help but worry -about its post-war cost. - -The first and most famous of these areas is the Communist zone in the -Northwest. Formally it includes eighteen _hsien_; the Communists claim -inclusion of twenty-three. After being termed the Special Administrative -District of the Chinese Republic (_Chung-hua Min-kuo T'ê-ch'ü -Chêng-fu_), and then Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Frontier Area (_Shan-kan-ning -Pien-ch'ü Chêng-fu_), the zone assumed the much more modest style of -Administrative Area of North Shensi (_Shan-pei Hsing-chêng-ch'ü_).[11] -This Frontier Area is in personnel and Party life a direct continuation -of the Chinese Soviet Republic. Leftist and Communist circles talk as -though it were a wholly autonomous state, resting on its own military -power, but cooperating with the National Government for national -resistance and reconstruction. This is largely true--at any rate, more -realistic than the opposing view, which avers that no change has taken -place in the Northern part of Shensi province, and that the Communists -are interfering with the proper processes of government. The following -is a characteristic statement of the latter position: - - At present the name "Frontier Area" seems to be very common - because it is so called in false propaganda about the - "independent sovereignty" [_tzŭ-li wei-wang_]. But if we - agree that the so-called "Frontier Area" is a part of the - territory of the Chinese Republic, the name ought to have - been issued in conformity with the decrees of the central - government. According to central government decree, it is - only a "Supplementary Recruitment Area for the Eighth Route - Army," but not an area of civil administration. [The author, - in an extended discussion, challenges the re-division of the - provinces as a matter not to be undertaken casually, denies - the legal foundation of the term "Frontier Area," and then - examines its practical justifications. He finds that the - Communists have two: the regime is now a _de facto_ system, - its existence is a _fait accompli_ and further discussion - must proceed from this point; also, the regime is founded in - popular opinion, and the government should not violate the - wishes of the people. He disagrees with both of these and - seeks to refute them, insisting on lawful procedure and - constitutional government. He concludes with a peroration to - the Communists themselves.] ... this problem is really quite - simple, unlike the Sudeten problem. Was it the Communist - Party of China which called the Sudeten Party of - Czechoslovakia violators of the unity of their own country - and running dogs of Fascism? Therefore, I think that they - would never imitate what the reactionary Sudeten party did. - And was it the Communists who originated the "United Front"? - Hence they must understand very clearly what unification - means to China, and must never utter things which they do - not really believe. Therefore, with the rising tide of - national unity and concentration, I suppose that the odd - name "Frontier Area," which is contrary to the real sense of - unification, will soon pass away and be a mere historical - term.[12] - - [Footnote 11: See above, p. 13. The last term is literally Executive - Area (or District) of North Shan (Shensi). In the text, Frontier Area - is used throughout as the simplest English equivalent.] - - [Footnote 12: Chin Chi-yin, 'Pien-ch'ü' ti Ming-ch'êng' (The Name - "Frontier Area"), in _So-wei "Pien-ch'ü_," cited above, p. 3-6.] - -In practical terms this implies the informal reconciliation of two -claims constitutionally and legally incompatible. The Chinese Communist -leaders operate under the national law codes as much as they are able. -They employ the national currency. They use the nationally standard -system for local government. They profess unity. At the same time they -maintain, as a hard reality, a separate regime in which the Communist -Party is supreme, the Party Line is gospel, and dissidents are dealt -with as "pro-Japanese traitors" or otherwise. Transit between National -Government territory and Communist territory is not altogether easy. -Leftists are reported to have died on their way to the Northwest, and -Nationalists are equally well reported to have disappeared after they -got there. - -The Area itself is an unpromising piece of land. "From 36° N. Lat. on -up, South of the Great Wall and West of the Yellow River, there lies a -vast, desolate tract of yellow plateau, inhabited by half a million -people. The plateau slopes from North to South; the further South it -runs, the lower the land lies, but it is still 1000 meters above -sea-level at the lowest place. This is what we have already known as -Northern Shensi. In this region, the ground is always covered with a -layer of yellow dust ... Furthermore, rainfall is scarce and no -irrigation has been introduced, so that agricultural products are -extremely scant. Under such geographical limitations, Northern Shensi -has become a region notorious for its poverty."[13] For a Chinese to -call an area notoriously poor implies a degree of destitution which the -American mind cannot grasp. In such an area, the welcome to Communism is -obvious, and the problems of Communism, once settled, are equally -obvious. The probability of mineral resources opens up opportunities for -development under Red rule, but these are distant. - - [Footnote 13: Ts'ui Yün-ch'ang, _Shan-pei Lun Kuo-hua_ (A Brief Sketch - of Northern Shensi), Kweilin, 1939, p. 4-5. This author concludes that - Communist rule worsened the economic status of the area. "Then there - occurred the campaigns for 'the extermination of landlordism' and for - 'division of the lands.' The result of such proletarian disturbances - was an astonishing decrease of population, caused by massacre and - emigration, and the devastation of much land." (p. 6.)] - -Interpretation of the achievements of the Communist regime vary with the -political standpoint of the observer, just as they do in the case of the -Soviet Union. Sympathetic observers, both Western and Chinese, report -enormous improvements in agriculture, fair land taxes, new cooperatives, -brilliant experimental democracy, bold education, and great -enthusiasm.[14] No unsympathetic Western visitors have been reported -admitted, and a few neutrals came away enthusiastic; but critical -Chinese have found as much to question as one might find in a similar -Western situation: terrorism, puppet elections, murder both judicial and -plain, sham education, and immorality are charged. - - [Footnote 14: See the works cited above, p. 20, n. 16. It is possible - to find a contradictory interpretation in Chinese sources for almost - every point cited by Western visitors as meritorious. Since the - Nationalists are not interested in promoting the international - reputation of the Frontier Area, and at the same time are unable to - launch any counter-propaganda (for fear of alienating Leftist - sentiment in the West, because it would give the Japanese a propaganda - advantage, and would disturb the appearance of the United Front), very - little criticism--sound or otherwise--of the Chinese Communist area - has appeared in the West. Even in a case such as the issuance of paper - money, universally regarded as a clever move by the Communists and - guerrillas, Chinese writers have charged that the issuance is fiat - currency imposed by Communist force (e.g., Wang Ssü-ch'êng, - _Ju-tz'ŭ Pien-ch'ü_ [So this is the Frontier Area!] Chungking, - 1938, p. 38 _ff._) Within China, Communism is just as open to - interpretation as the Soviets are in the Western world. Western data - now available seems to cover only one side of the case, which is - doubtless well-founded; but there must be another. There always is.] - -The position of the Frontier Area is clear in a few respects.[15] In the -first place, it is not declining. Communist strength is believed to be -growing, by persons of almost all forms of political belief; differences -arise only over the rate and probable maxima of that growth. The -Communist strength in the Northwest is far less than it was in South -Central China seven years ago, but much of that loss of power has been -compensated for by increased relations with sympathetic guerrillas. -Secondly, the Communist area is strategically poorly located. The land -itself is poor; the adjacent large cities are completely under -Nationalist control; and the general military-political locale is -something like northern Arkansas in the United States. This explains the -willingness of the Nationalist commanders to avoid friction with the -Communists, and the positive zest with which they suggest further -consolidation of Communist forces around the one center at Yenan. It -soothes the impatience of Communists who wish unrestricted rights of -agitation, organization, and propaganda throughout the country. Although -the Communists make little visible headway against the Japanese in the -great urban slums of the coast, they are anxious to obtain freer access -to city workers. Thirdly, the Communist area displays no structural -peculiarities of government. Its profound difference from the rest of -Free China is not a difference in institutional forms, but in the forces -operating behind and through those forms. The Chinese Communists have -achieved very considerable success in working within the legal limits of -another state philosophy, and have done it with a minimum of violence; -this augurs well for the perpetual continuation of the truce. Their -practical accomplishments are extensive and novel; their leadership, -brilliant; that their government should be so orthodox in form is all -the more significant. By remaining within orthodox limits they challenge -the National Government on common ground; the gain is theirs and -China's. - - [Footnote 15: Since the author has neither extensive acquaintance with - Chinese Communists, nor has visited Yenan, he offers these conclusions - more tentatively than he would others, concerning the Kuomintang.] - - -GUERRILLA GOVERNMENTS - -The special area second in importance is the Hopei-Chahar-Shansi Border -Region (_Chin-ch'a-chi Pien-ch'ü Lin-shih Hsing-chêng Wei-yüan-hui_). -Widely publicized in the Western world as the Hermit Government, this -regime functions altogether within the Japanese lines. A number of -competent Western observers have visited this area, among them Major -Evans Fordyce Carlson, Mr. Haldore Hanson, and Professor George Taylor. -All have come away most enthusiastic about the work of the government. -The governmental picture which emerges from their and other accounts is -one of a highly flexible mechanism, working with great efficacy and -superb morale.[16] The driving power behind the regime is social -revolution as a means to national resistance, made easy by the flight of -many former local bureaucrats, and by the treason of some -ultra-conservatives, who affiliated themselves with the Provisional -Government established by the Japanese in Peiping. The personnel is as -genuinely United Front as may be found anywhere in the world; the -position is eased by the circumjacency of the Japanese, and the formal -recognition of the area by the Military Affairs Commission and the -Executive _Yüan_. - - [Footnote 16: Professor George Taylor's _The Struggle for North China_ - presents a full and clear picture of the Border Region and the Peiping - regime in startlingly apposite juxtaposition. He concludes by pointing - out the significant paradox that the Japanese established a - reactionary regime designed to keep China agrarian, backward, and - exploitable, but that they had not managed to extend their affiliate - beyond the cities. The country, which they had hoped to capture, - escaped them through the political resurgence of the Border Region. P. - C. Nyi, article cited above, p. 16, n. 10, presents an outline of the - regime which supplements the first-hand materials Professor Taylor - appends to his work. Major E. F. Carlson's works, which describe this, - are _Twin Stars of China_ and _The Chinese Army_, both cited above; - the latter, a valuable contribution to the _Inquiry Series_ of the - Institute of Pacific Relations, includes Wang Yu-chuan, "The - Organization of a Typical Guerrilla Area in South Shantung" (p. - 84-130), a brilliant survey which reveals, sometimes unwittingly, the - values and dangers of a Communist-Nationalist-popular union. Mr. - Hanson's work is "_Humane Endeavour_," cited above; as a personal - account, it is the most engrossing of the group.] - -The Border Region, like smaller guerrilla areas elsewhere in occupied -China, is scarcely a domestic political problem because it is enfolded -by the Japanese armies. Even a United Front area, such as the Border -Region, would lead to far greater difficulties in political adjustment -if established in Free China. The tension and balance between the -Parties is such that this strain might not be borne. Behind the Japanese -lines, where the central armies cannot do anything even if they wish, -the Border Region finds Chungking's acquiescence to be stimulated by -Chungking's impotence. What could or will happen if the Japanese leave -the dividing area, and the Border Region has to settle the issue of -_status quo_ v. _status quo ante bellum_ with the central government, -no one knows. The Generalissimo told the present author that he did not -fear the encroachments of the guerrilla groups, because he and they were -all working for democracy. - -Following from this involuntarily protective and insulating role of the -Japanese forces is the constitutional theory of the Border Region. -Unlike the Frontier Area, where it is exceedingly difficult to gloss -over the autonomy of Communist rule, the Border Region is definitely -established as a war-time agency, controlling territory beyond the reach -of the provincial governments. The provincial governments still -function, in unoccupied corners of their provinces, or in exile, and the -openly provisional (_lin-shih_) nature of the Border Region makes it -palatable even to Kuomintang conservatives. - -The pattern of government is one of devolution from an Executive -Committee, which was established by a meeting of officials, volunteers, -mass organizations, and others at Fup'ing in January 1938. The area is -divided into provincial districts which are able to function with -economy of personnel. The following outline illustrates the structure of -this area:[17] - - EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE - - Secretariat - Civil Affairs Department - Financial Affairs Department - Education Department - Industry Department - Justice Department - - Inspectorates of the Seven Provincial Districts - - _Hsien_ Governments or Joint _Hsien_ Governments or - Sub-_Hsien_ Governments - - _Hsien_ Districts - - Village Committees - - [Footnote 17: P. C. Nyi, article cited in _The Chinese Year Book - 1938-39_, p. 255. Reading between the lines will illustrate much of - the Chungking attitude.] - -A very high degree of direct popular government has been achieved. Over -wide areas, the average age of the _hsien_ magistrates is in the -twenties. Recruitment to the Region of numerous professors and students -from Peiping has helped to fill the need for trained personnel, and has -assisted in maintaining the area as a genuine multi-group affair rather -than a Communist front. Communists, although present and highly -esteemed, do not hold the highest formal offices. (For further -consideration of the United Front problem, see below, p. 123.) - -The New Fourth Army (_Hsin-ssŭ-chün_), third of the special zones, -was formed by re-consolidation of the small mutually isolated Soviet -areas left behind when the main Communist forces made the celebrated -Long March. When first assembling under the truce, these Red units faced -a certain amount of difficulty from the provincial military who did not -grasp the United Front idea, but the Military Affairs Commission -recognized them. The Army did not establish a government except through -its Political Department, which coordinated political work of the -volunteer village committees.[18] - - [Footnote 18: On the New Fourth Army, see Epstein, I., _The People's - War_, cited above, p. 260 _ff._ Agnes Smedley, the well-known - pro-Communist writer, has lived among the New Fourth recently. Another - foreign visitor has been Jack Belton, of the Shanghai _Evening Post_. - Publicity for the New Fourth Army, reduced to an absolute minimum by - Chungking, is handled by an independent agency, the New China - Information Committee (not to be confused with the semi-official China - Information Committee) in Hong Kong. The China Defense League, in - which the moving spirit is Mme. Sun Yat-sen, also in Hong Kong, acts - as an agency for receiving gifts, etc., for the Army.] - -According to available reports, the Army stands far to the Left of the -Border Region. Formally United Front, its proportion of Communists is -much higher and Communist control more telling. Operating in East -Central China--the Anhwei-Kiangsu-Kiangsi-Fukien-Chekiang area--which -provided the base of ten years' Communist insurrection and was long the -home of the Chinese Soviet Republic, the New Fourth Army Zone represents -a recrudescence of Soviet activities under different names and with a -different military objective. This fact has caused intense -dissatisfaction among some Kuomintang generals, who spent half their -careers trying to root out Communism in that same area. They do not mind -the Communist zone in the Northwest, where an effective informal _cordon -sanitaire_ can be drawn, but renewed Communist activity in the Yangtze -valley impresses them as an evil not much less than pro-Japanese -treason. - -The New Fourth Zone, the Border Region, and the Frontier Area--together -with a wide scattering of guerrilla areas and governments individually -of less but collectively of equal importance--are the military -step-children of the Chinese government. They all receive subsidies for -their work, varying in amount. Usually this is calculated on the number -of _hsien_ actually occupied as bases, so that the sum provides for a -far smaller number of villages than those directly affected. In the case -of troops, the salary allowances are based on the permitted size of the -units, in almost all cases below the actual numbers. The money is paid -to the commanders or other leading officials, who then set salary rates -incomparably lower than those of the central forces. The money thus -saved is applied to the general budget of the forces. Corruption, while -occasional and inescapable, seems to be more sharply punished in the -guerrilla than in the government areas. - -In January 1941, the New Fourth Army was officially abolished, following -a clash with regular National Government forces. The clash arose from a -fundamental difference between the Generalissimo and the New Fourth -leaders concerning the nature of the Chinese government. The Communists -and their sympathizers held that the unity of China was a political -union between separate groups. When the Generalissimo ordered the New -Fourth Army to move North, and oppose the Japanese forces above the -Yangtze, the New Fourth countered with a demand for arms and funds. -Treating this as military insubordination in war time, the central -forces attacked the New Fourth--each side claiming that the other opened -hostilities--capturing Yeh Ting, the commander. The rest of the Army was -officially abolished, although its main forces were within the occupied -zone and outside the Generalissimo's reach. A full Communist-Nationalist -clash was avoided, however, and the Red leaders unwillingly acquiesced -in the Generalissimo's interpretation of the episode as a military and -not a political affair. The conflict brought forth the fundamental -Communist question: are the Chinese Communists loyal first to the -Chinese government, or first to the Communist Party? No answer was -forthcoming, although the Communists failed to rebel elsewhere. The -Generalissimo, by military swiftness and political acumen, had triumphed -in one more particular instance. - -With the parsimonious policy of the central government keeping them in -fiscal extremity, the more Leftist guerrilla units make up their lack of -funds with direct economic measures. These include suspensions of rents -to landlords, regulation of share-cropping, lowering of taxes on the -poorer farmers, and creation of cooperatives. The Communists have -strained every point to avoid actual class war, and the economic reforms -of the guerrilla and special areas are smoothed by the usual absence of -the landlords. The political necessity of a bold economic policy remains -important, if the special areas are to continue their activity against -Japan or--in the Frontier Area case--their independence. Political -development thus is inclined to stress the use of popular machinery of -government, not for the creation of systematic, modern, responsible -bureaucracy, but for pushing vigorous mass action, direct popular -government, and socio-economic reconstruction, revolutionary by -implication if not by immediate content. - -Not all the guerrilla areas fall into the Left pattern. The Kuomintang, -so long habituated to control of the state mechanism that its -revolutionary background is somewhat dimmed, is bringing Kuomintang -guerrilla work into action. The Party and Government War Area Commission -is the chief supervisory agency for this work, and an enormous amount of -planning has been done. Actual application of mass-movement work seems -as yet to lag behind that of the Left. Meanwhile, in most areas except -the Communist Northwest, Kuomintang officers, officials, teachers, and -volunteers are active. The guerrilla groups all accept the same flag, -hail Chiang as their leader, recognize the _San Min Chu I_ as the state -ideology, and maintain the cherished symbols of unity. - -The Government and the Kuomintang were reportedly seeking a settlement -of the whole special-area problem, in anticipation of the close of war, -by urging the movement of all Communist or Communist-infiltrated forces -Northward, so that a more or less continuous Left corridor would run -from the Border Region to the Frontier Area. This precipitated the clash -with the New Fourth Army; in March 1941 no settlement has been reached. -Part of this is owing to the Communist desire to have unrestricted -agitational rights, and to official Kuomintang insistence that no Party -other than itself is constitutionally legitimate. The special areas -meanwhile prepare fighters in the anti-Japanese war, and are helped by a -government which is proud of them as Chinese but mistrustful of them as -Leftists. And they develop vigorous applications of democratic formulae -which challenge the reality and sincerity of everything the National -Government does behind the lines. - -Despite recurrent clashes, it is likely that the areas and the -government will continue their present relations. In part this is owing -to the genuineness of the universal hatred of Japan and the devotion to -the long-cherished unification now achieved; in even greater part the -wrangling, acrimonious, but effective cooperation of the government and -the guerrilla Left depends on their equal and great desire for such -cooperation. The highest Kuomintang leaders--above all others, -Chiang--have pledged themselves to unity and cooperation, and are -determined to eschew civil war in the midst of invasion; the higher -Communist leaders are equally determined. In three years of -collaboration, the highest officers on each side have developed very -genuine respect for each other's sincerity. Quarrels are provoked by the -men in-between, overbearing Nationalists or the doctrinaire Communists, -who cannot forget 1927-37. (The author talked to one Communist leader -who had an odd, not unattractive muscular tic in his face: the -consequence of Kuomintang torture a few years past. Yet he collaborates, -and so do his Kuomintang equivalents, men whose parents lie in unknown -graves.) The common people on both sides want peace above all else, -internal peace between factions, and peace--after victory, and then -only--with Japan. The juxtaposed and competitive forces watch one -another, compete in the development of institutions, and engage in an -auction of good government: whoever wins the deepest love and esteem of -the Chinese people wins China in the end. Few institutional reforms in -the West have had such fateful stimuli. - - - - -CHAPTER V - -THE KUOMINTANG - - -The Kuomintang, a Chinese political party, was formed by federation of -old anti-Manchu secret societies, and has become the vehicle for the -will of its Leader, Sun Yat-sen: constitutionally and legally it is the -superior of the Chinese National Government; administratively, one of -the three chief organs of policy execution for the regime; politically, -the only legal political party in Free China. It has had undisputed -primacy, but not monopoly, in domestic Chinese politics for fourteen -years. Despite revolutionary purposes, and idealistic obligations, the -Kuomintang is responsible for the welfare of the government which it -created. Its interest is therefore superior to and identical with the -government's; the party of a one-party state has no business criticizing -the government, since the party at all times possesses the means of -correction or change. - -By its constitution and organization the Party is democratic. In -practice it has been a loose oligarchy, similar to the machinery whereby -American presidential candidates are nominated. In composition it is by -its own statement a cross section of China, composed of persons who -qualify as a political elite by their zeal in seeking and obtaining -entrance to the Party. Administratively, the Kuomintang possesses a -group of Ministries (_pu_), closely similar to the governmental -ministries, and executing quasi-governmental policy, plus an additional -group of separate or affiliated organizations having common purposes. In -power politics, the Kuomintang claims supremacy in all unoccupied China -and legitimate power over the occupied areas; in practice it yields -frequently to the demands of dissidents. In function, its highest -purpose--bequeathed by Sun Yat-sen--is to destroy its own monopoly of -power when the time for democracy shall come; like medicine, it is -committed to the eradication of the reason for its own existence. - - -THE PARTY CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM - -The Kuomintang adopted a Party-Constitution after thirty-odd years of -activity when, at the suggestion of Soviet advisers, it reorganized on -January 28, 1924 as a formal party, with membership books, regular dues, -etc. Up to then it had operated through techniques intermediate in -formality between American major-party looseness and Chinese -secret-society formality. In twelve chapters, the Constitution dealt -with Membership, Organization, Special Areas, the Leader (Sun Yat-sen, -_Tsung-li_), the Highest Party Organs, Provincial Party Organization, -_Hsien_ Organization, District (_ch'ü_) Organization, and Sub-district -(_ch'ü-fên_, roughly equivalent to the _pao_ in local government) -Organization, Terms of Office, Discipline, and Finance.[1] The actual -application of this Constitution is best described in the words of Wang -Shih-chieh, who wrote before the current hostilities:[2] - - The system of organization of the Chinese Kuomintang is - based upon the _Constitution and Bye-laws of the Chinese - Kuomintang_ [_Chung-kuo Kuo-min-tang Hsien-chang_] which was - passed in the First Party Congress [_Ch'üan-kuo Tai-piao - Ta-hui_] on January 28, Year XIII [1924], and amended in the - following two Party Congresses on January 16, Year XV - [1926] and on March 27, Year XVIII [1929]. No amendment of - any sort was made in the Fourth and Fifth Party Congresses - held in the Years XX [1931] and XXIV [1935] respectively. - - According to the above _Constitution and Bye-Laws_, the - Kuomintang has five divisional organizations, _viz._: one - for the whole country, one for each province, one for each - _hsien_ (or governmental district), one for each district, - and one for each district subdivision [_ch'ü-fên-pu_]. The - organ possessing the highest authority in the Kuomintang is - the Party Congress of the Kuomintang. When this Congress is - not in session, the Central Executive Committee is the - highest authority. The organization of the Congress and the - method of electing the Delegates are fixed by the Central - Executive Committee, while the members of the Central - Executive Committee are elected by the Party Congress. - Moreover the number of these members is also fixed by the - Congress. Article I of the "Outlines of the Organization of - the Central Executive Committee," passed in the First - Session of the Fifth Central Executive Committee Meeting, on - December 6, Year XXIV [1935], provides: "The Central - Executive Committee appoints nine standing members of the - Committee, to form a Standing Committee which shall - discharge the duties of the Central Executive Committee when - the latter is not in Session. The Standing Committee is - provided with a Chairman and a Vice-Chairman, elected from - among the nine standing members." Hence it can be said that - when the Central Executive Committee is not in session, this - Standing Committee represents the highest authority of the - Kuomintang. The offices of the Chairman [superseded by the - Party Chief, _Tsung-ts'ai_] and the Vice-Chairman have been - provided for since December, Year XXIV [1935]. Whether the - Chairman can be the representative of the highest authority - of the Kuomintang or not, under the tacit consent of the - Standing Committee, still depends upon the changes in - circumstances. The said "Outlines of the Organization" does - not state clearly the rights and duties of the Chairman and - the Vice-Chairman. Hence, the highest authorities of the - Kuomintang as prescribed by various written laws are (1) the - Party Congress, (2) the Central Executive Committee, and (3) - the Standing Committee of the Central Executive Committee. - When the larger organ is not in session, the next following - organ represents the highest authority of the Kuomintang. - But this only applies in theory. As a matter of fact, when - the lower organs are exercising their power, they can not - but be limited by certain restrictions. Whenever important - questions arise which may cause fierce disputes among - members or among the people, the lower organs which have the - authority to decide when the upper organ is not in session - usually reserve the questions for discussion in the meeting - of the upper organ. The resolutions passed by the upper - organs--the Party Congress down to the Central Executive - Committee Meeting--are usually elastic so that the lower - organs--the Standing Committee up to the Central Executive - Committee--do not experience great difficulties or - restrictions in facing various troublesome situations. - - According to the _Constitution and Bye-Laws of the Chinese - Kuomintang_, there is, besides the Central Executive - Committee, a Central Control Committee for the Kuomintang. - Its organization is similar to that of the Central Executive - Committee, though with fewer members. It occupies the same - rank as the Central Executive Committee, and its duty is to - superintend and inspect the personnel of the Kuomintang. - - The names and organizations of the various organs directly - controlled by the Central Executive Committee have - unavoidably undergone some changes, though in principle - their structures have remained the same. According to the - "Outlines of the Organization of the Central Executive - Committee," the organs under it are divided along three - lines: organization, publicity, and popular training, with - various committees. These organs are to discharge all - affairs of the Kuomintang. Besides these, there is a - Political Committee [superseded by the Supreme National - Defense Council], to "act as the highest directing organ in - all governmental policies and to be responsible to the - Central Executive Committee." Although these organs are - authorized by the Central Executive Committee and formed in - the Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee, the - Standing Committee can still exercise authority over them - when the Central Executive Committee is not in session, - because in accordance with the _Constitution and Bye-Laws_, - the Standing Committee takes the place of the Central - Executive Committee. As a matter of fact, since the - activities along the lines of organization, publicity, and - popular training are the internal activities within the - Kuomintang, these organs are usually under the rigid - control of the Standing Committee. As the Political - Committee discharges various political affairs, its position - may be said to be independent. Any resolution passed by this - Committee is sent to the government for execution, and the - Standing Committee has no power to restrict its activities. - Hence under the party government of the Chinese Kuomintang, - the Political Committee is in reality the highest directing - and supervisory authority in matters concerning governmental - policies. - - [Footnote 1: The text of this Constitution is given in Arthur N. - Holcombe's invaluable study of the Great Revolution, _The Chinese - Revolution: A Phase in the Regeneration of a World Power_, Cambridge, - Massachusetts, 1930, p. 356-70.] - - [Footnote 2: Wang Shih-chieh, _Pi-chiao Hsien-fa_, Shanghai, XXVI - (1937), p. 651-3.] - -The Emergency Party Congress of the Kuomintang, Hankow, March 29-April -1, 1938, provided for two further amendments to the Party Constitution. -It abolished the system of reserve members, and, far more significantly, -it created the post of _Tsung-ts'ai_, here translated Party Chief, which -was indistinguishable except as a matter of terminology from the post of -_Tsung-li_, held in perpetuity by Sun Yat-sen. Chiang K'ai-shek was -elected Party Chief, and the powers of his office were stated to be -duplicates of those given originally to the _Tsung-li:_ a general -provision that "all members shall follow the direction of" the -_Tsung-li_, which was not implemented; chairmanship of the Party -Congress and of the Central Executive Committee (_a fortiori_, of the -Standing Committee of the C.E.C.); and a veto over the acts of the -Congress and the C.E.C. Furthermore, the Political Committee (Central -Political Council) was replaced by the Supreme National Defense Council, -of which Chiang was also elected Chairman. - -Since Chiang had been Chairman of the Standing Committee, it follows -that the change of formal labels did not much alter the constitutional -organization of the Kuomintang, nor materially change Chiang's position. -Chiang does not help to create machinery of power in order to lurk -behind it, thus proclaiming it a mere façade. He, as a public servant -reared in the Confucian tradition, possesses sufficient respect for -words to let them mean what they are publicly declared to mean. The -post of _Tsung-ts'ai_ is more than ample in providing Chiang with the -power he feels necessary to accomplish national unification, mitigate -social injustice, and promote serious representative government. He -accepts the full measure of his power; doing so publicly, his subsequent -actions appear relatively modest. By Western standards, Chiang is naive -enough to be honest. - -A point brought out in connection with the National Government (p. 46, -above) is worth reiteration. Neither by Party action nor by governmental -change has the Kuomintang monopoly of political power been modified by -law. There is no United Front, Popular Front, or any other kind of front -in the legal system; even in practical administration, the entrance of -non-Party men has been at Party direction; and it is only in the Special -Areas, the special war services, and the military organization that the -Kuomintang has relaxed its control of power. Other groups are sharing in -the work of the People's Political Council. The prudence of such a -policy may appear open to question; its consistency is not. - - -PARTY ORGANIZATION - -Organizationally the Party is bipolar, with the power concentrated in -the entire membership at the base, and in the Chief (_Tsung-ts'ai_) at -the apex. The highest authority of the Kuomintang is the Party Congress -(_Ch'üan-kuo Tai-piao Ta-hui_), which could also be translated as -All-Nation Convention of Party Delegates. Party Congresses have been -held as follows: I, Canton, 1924; II, Canton, 1926; III, Nanking, 1929; -IV, Nanking, 1931; V, Nanking, 1935; and the Emergency Party Congress, -Hankow, 1938. Wang Ch'ing-wei organized a rump Kuomintang on the basis -of a "Sixth Party Congress" held in 1939; the legitimate Sixth Congress -has not yet been called. - -The Party Congress is the highest agency of the Kuomintang, and thereby -the highest legal authority in China--a position which it now shares -with the Party Chief, _ex officio_ its Chairman. The Kuomintang Party -Constitution provides that the Congress should ordinarily meet every -other year (_Art._ 27), but permits the C.E.C. to postpone a Congress -for not more than one year. This provision has frequently been violated. -In actual effect the Congress is neither an effective governing body, -nor, at the other extreme, a completely helpless tool. No Party Congress -has led to a drastic shift of actual political power. - -The barometer of influence functions outside the Congress, and the -Congress ratifies and establishes what has actually occurred. The high -authority of the incumbent C.E.C. in matters of accrediting delegates, -plus its power to appoint delegates from areas not represented (a -feature taken from Soviet practice), gives the political Ins a -formidable weapon with which to bludgeon down opposition, but since the -value of the Party Congress is that of a legitimizing agency, overt -interference with Party functions would destroy the utility of the -Congress. Its level of freedom and efficacy may be compared with -American party conventions. Unwieldy, improvised agencies are not able -to meet the challenges of well-knit executive groups, but their very -unmanageability preserves to them a freedom of incalculable action. The -Party Congress could not in practice exercise its formal, legal power of -overthrowing the entire Party leadership and starting the Party off on a -new tack; it could, however, so humiliate the incumbents by subtle but -obvious political gestures familiar to all Chinese, that the leadership -would retire for reasons of health, or because of a yearning to -contemplate the cosmos. - -The elaborate structure of the Kuomintang is shown on the chart of -organization (p. 331). Abstraction of the most essential features of -this chart reveals the following: - - -------------KUOMINTANG PARTY CONGRESS------------- - || Chairman: The Chief || - || || || - \/ \/ \/ - CENTRAL CONTROL CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE SUPREME NATIONAL - COMMITTEE Chairman: The Chief -----> DEFENSE COUNCIL - || || || - \/ \/ \/ - the _control_ power Party administration The National Government - over the Party through subordinate organs of China - || || || - \/ \/ \/ - supervisory system Party Branches, the political system - agencies and affiliates - -The Central Executive Committee (_Chung-yang Chih-hsing Wei-yüan-hui_) -is a relatively large body with one hundred and twenty members. The -Party Constitution requires that it meet every six months or less. These -sessions, the Plenary Sessions of the C.E.C., are by far the -best-established political processes in the Chinese state. Actual shifts -in power are here fought out, since the C.E.C. possesses authority ample -for almost any emergency. The expulsion of Wang Ch'ing-wei was effected -through C.E.C. action, and did not require the work of any higher body. - -The Central Control Committee (_Chung-yang Chien-ch'a Wei-yüan-hui_) is -an agency which the Chinese adapted from two sources, the Bolshevik -pattern of an independent intra-party control system, and the native -_chien-ch'a_ power. Similar in function to the Commission of Party -Control employed by the Communist Party in the Soviet Union rather than -to the Organization Bureau, the Central Control Committee (also termed, -in another common translation, Central Supervisory Committee) is in -charge of an inspective system. Because of the relative laxness of -Kuomintang organization, the work of this Committee is far less than one -might expect. It has not been adequate to ensure rigidly strict Party -efficiency, diligence, or honesty; neither has it become a terrorist -agency inflicting an inviolable Party line. Few faults in politics fail -to be virtues as well; inefficiency has its minor compensations. In -times of secure power, rigid Party discipline might let the Kuomintang -grow into a genuine and full-fledged tyranny; nevertheless, in times of -stress, such as the present, the Party stands in need of stiffening and -control. - -The third agency, the Supreme National Defense Council, is the Party's -agent in charge of government. (See above, p. 46 _ff._) - -Immediately under the Central Executive Committee there are three -agencies of vitality and importance. The first of these is the _San Min -Chu I Ch'ing-nien T'uan_ (usually translated _San Min Chu I_ Youth -Corps, or Kuomintang Youth Corps). A war-time addition to the Party, it -became politically possible when the abandonment of appeasement -re-aligned government and youth. The Communist Youth Corps (_Kung-ch'an -Ch'ing-nien T'uan_) provided a model and rival. The Constitution of the -Corps, together with an appraisal (from the official point of view) of -its work, is given below in Appendices II (B) and II (C). In terms of -practical political effect, the Corps is significant, although far less -important than its organization scheme would indicate. It combines some -of the functions of a military training system with social and -propaganda work. Leftists have complained against it bitterly as an -agency of espionage and repression within student groups; others have -acclaimed it as a meeting of the Kuomintang and the youth, fruitful in -terms of national unity. The importance of the Corps lies in its -organization of a broad group of young men, one or more steps up from -the bottom of the economic scale, and in the fact that the government -and Kuomintang--after years of overriding youth opinion--now find it -feasible to organize their own affiliate. Few charges of corruption have -touched the Corps, which lies particularly within the purview of the -Generalissimo. A minor but active element in the political scene, it -stands for the Kuomintang's bid for permanence, and, in the event of -internal dissension, would be a valuable prop to the _status quo_. The -political indecision and laxness of China in general has kept the group -from becoming either a _Hitlerjugend_ or a frankly democratic C.C.C. -(Civilian Conservation Corps) on the American plan; the Corps is at best -a laggard bid to young men, and a belated competition with the Left and -the Communists.[3] - - [Footnote 3: See _China at War_, Vol. V, No. 3 (October 1940), p. - 77-8, for a recent official account of the Corps.] - -The Party Affairs Committee (_Tang-wu Wei-yüan-hui_) supplements the -work of the Central Control Committee in investigating Party personnel -and acting as a supplementary housekeeping agency for intra-Party -organization. - -The third of these agencies is the [Central] Training Committee -(_Hsün-lien Wei-yüan-hui_). To this Committee has fallen the labor of -invigorating the Kuomintang under conditions of strain, from war, from -the Wang schism, and from new domestic competition. The Generalissimo -has put the most vigorous efforts into the work of this agency, and has -organized under it a Kuomintang Training Corps (_Hsün-lien T'uan_) which -is providing extensive new resources of leadership to the Party. -Enterprising or promising young men are gathered together in training -meetings, and given intensive work in Party doctrine, propaganda and -organization methods, local administration, etc. The Corps has tended to -accept youths and some men of middle age from positions of -responsibility, and to equip them with the knowledge and the discipline -necessary to continuation of pre-democratic government. In the constant -race between government activity as a positive force and government -apathy combined with outside anti-governmental revolution as negative -forces, the training agencies are doing as much as any single enterprise -to stabilize the regime. - -The Central Political Institute (_Chung-yang Chêng-chih Hsüeh-hsiao_) -tops the entire program, as a training agency combining features of a -university, a camp, and a Party office. Under the personal control and -leadership of Dr. Ch'ên Kuo-fu, one of the Generalissimo's intimates and -the elder of the celebrated Ch'ên brothers, the Institute stands high -for its selection of students, the discipline and instruction it -imparts, and its practical political effect. The Kuomintang, pronounced -moribund by competent foreign observers ten years ago, today is in a -better position for leadership and development than it has been for many -years. (The author, who visited the Institute during the summer of 1940, -found the student body as well disciplined as any he has seen outside of -Germany, the staff highly competent [mostly American-trained], and the -physical facilities unsurpassed.) Admission to the Institute is open to -graduates of Middle Schools (secondary); students who are married may be -admitted, but single students may not marry while in attendance. The -courses of study are in general the equivalent of American undergraduate -work, although some graduate study is offered. The curriculum includes -such subjects as military training, Japanese language and politics, and -Marxian thought (in connection with _min shêng chu-i_). The general -course is supplemented by two special courses--the Civil Service -Training Corps and the Advanced Civil Service Training Corps--which are -set up in collaboration with the Examination _Yüan_. Graduates are -organized into alumni associations, to which the faculty are admitted as -supervisory members. It is a matter of success and distinction to -undergo the training of the Institute, which is the equivalent of a West -Point for political and governmental work. The Generalissimo visits the -Institute and speaks before it as much as possible, frequently as often -as bi-weekly, but with occasional gaps of months.[4] In addition to the -Central Political Institute, there is a [Kuomintang] Northwest Academy -of Youth, which has been even more active in training young men for -Party and government service. Proximity to the Red training center at -Yenan makes its work urgent; training, according to report, is briefer, -cruder, and more vigorous than in the central agency. The sub-surface -possibility of renewed class war by the Communists makes the Academy -peculiarly necessary. - - [Footnote 4: Information given the author by Dr. Ch'ên Kuo-fu and - members of his staff, at the Central Political Institute, August 18, - 1940. Few places are more beautiful than the valley in which the cool, - spacious buildings of the Institute are set. Landscaped for centuries, - and celebrated as a beauty spot, the area is filled with carved - shrines, severely simple monuments, and flagstone walks. A river runs - through a forested gorge; waterfalls feed the stream. - - Dr. Ch'ên supplemented his hospitality in Western China by - transmitting to the author a series of statements in reply to - questions which were put to him in writing. Of these, the two most - interesting refer, first, to the economic status of the Institute's - students, and secondly, to the Kuomintang training plan in the - Northwest: "Judged by functions and economic levels, students of the - Central Political Institute represent all economic strata of Chinese - society. Those of peasant origin are most numerous, forming over 40% - of the total number."--"For the purpose of educating young men and - women in the border provinces, the Central Political Institute has - established a School for the Border Provinces, of which branches were - established at Powtow (Suiyuan province), Sinin (Chinghai province), - and Kangting (Sikong province) in October 1934. Another branch was - established at Shuchow (Kansu province) in August 1935, this being the - school sponsored by the Kuomintang in the Northwest. The Powtow branch - was suspended in 1940, and those in Sinin and Kangting were handed - over to the Provincial Governments concerned at the same time. So the - only Kuomintang school in the Northwest at present is the one at - Shuchow. It is subdivided into three parts: namely, a Normal School, a - Middle School, and a Primary School. Its annual budget is one hundred - thousand dollars Chinese national currency." (Letter to the author, - March 10, 1941.)] - -Apart from the Youth Corps, the training agencies, and the Party Affairs -Committee, but also directly underneath the Kuomintang C.E.C., come the -coordinated and uncoordinated agencies of Party administration. Their -organization is as follows: - - C.E.C. OF THE KUOMINTANG - STANDING COMMITTEE - - |||| |||||||| - _San Min Chu I_ Youth Corps-|||| ||||||||- Central Secretariat - ||| ||||||| - Training Committee-----------||| |||||||-- Party-Ministry of - Training Agencies || |||||| Organization - || ||||||--- Party-Ministry of Publicity - Party Affairs Committee-------|| ||||| - | |||||---- Party-Ministry of Social - Affiliates-------------------- | |||| Affairs - ||||----- Party-Ministry of Overseas - ||| Chinese Affairs - |||------ Party-Ministry of Women's - || Affairs - ||------- Special Committees: - | Revolutionary Achievement - | Investigation Committee - | Pension Committee - | Party History Committee - | Revolutionary Loans - | Committee - | Overseas-Chinese - Party Field Contributions Committee - Agencies - -The Party-Ministries[5] constitute a part of the governing machinery of -China. The Organization Party-Ministry is important because of its -intra-Party work; the Minister, Dr. Ch'u Chia-hua, a German-educated -student, is one of the most active Party leaders, and deeply suspect by -the Left. His work is the field of Kuomintang Party administration. The -Party-Ministries of Social and Overseas Chinese Affairs combine the -functions of government with those of the Party; the former is a bureau -of protocol, and the latter acts as an extra-governmental colonial -office. The Secretariats provide study agencies for the governmental -system. They perform functions which are in the United States both -governmental and private (e.g., the work of the Brookings Institution, -the Public Administration Clearing House, the various Presidential -research and advisory committees, and intra-departmental housekeeping -agencies). The system of local government reform is sponsored by the -Central Kuomintang Secretariat (_Chung-yang Mi-shu-ch'u_), even more -than by the Ministry of the Interior in the government, under whose -jurisdiction it falls. The Secretary-General is a benign revolutionary -veteran, Yeh-Ch'u-tsang; the Deputy Secretary-General, Dr. K'an -Nai-kuang, is a Party official of almost twenty years' standing, who -studied in the United States and visited Europe in quest of data on -administration. Boundlessly energetic, he is typical of the younger -scholars who combine the academic and the political and impart to the -Kuomintang a large share of its present energy. - - [Footnote 5: The term _pu_ is usually translated Board, but the - _pu-chang_ (_pu_ chief) is given as Minister. Since the identical - terms are rendered Ministry, Minister, Vice-Minister, etc., in the - case of the government, the term Party-Ministry is here adopted as - both distinct and descriptive.] - -Internationally, the most important Party-Ministry is that of Publicity -(_Chung-yang Hsüan-ch'uan Pu_), which carries out most of the Chinese -propaganda program. Headed by Dr. Wang Shih-chieh, a very outspoken man, -its functions are distributed between Sections of General Affairs, -Motion Pictures, Newspapers, Advisory, Consultation, and International -Publicity, together with services such as China's leading semi-official -news service (the Central News Agency), the Party newspapers, the -Central Motion Picture Studios, and the official broadcasting system. -Because of the difficulties of language, travel, and passports, the -International Department supplies most of the news which reaches the -world press from Free China. The function of the Western newspapermen -consists largely in editing and supplementing this news from whatever -independent source they can find, or, occasionally and at the cost of -considerable hardship, to attempt to discover the facts for themselves. - - -In general, the Chinese follow the policy of giving the favorable side -of the news, simply omitting anything that could conceivably be -unfavorable. Their publicity services are no more guilty of positive -_suggestio falsi_ than the services of the British or Americans. -Nevertheless, Chinese notions of dignity and public policy differ widely -from Americans'; news would be hard to obtain or valueless when -obtained, except for the fact that the staff of the International -Section is almost entirely American-trained and well-acquainted with -American notions of news. The very able and active Hollington Tong, one -of China's most successful newspapermen, who was in press work long -before he became a Party official, has led in the supply of ample news -in the face of great difficulties. He is esteemed by Westerners to be, -along with Mme. Chiang, one of the Generalissimo's most effective -publicity advisers. - -The Party-Ministry of Publicity also attends to the needs and interests -of Western newspapermen and other visitors, arranging appointments, -schedules, etc., and even boarding many of them at a Press Hostel. These -attentions, while from time to time irritatingly restrictive, are in the -end almost always appreciated as invaluable. Only the Leftists shun the -Publicity Ministry; they do so unsuccessfully, and to their loss. No -other Asiatic, and few Western, states can boast as alert and effective -a system of propaganda. In the troubled shifts and crises of world -politics, the Chinese have managed to retain the sympathy of the most -diverse audiences--from American church people to Soviet agitation -squads, and from British conservatives to Nazi clubs in Germany. The -American traditions of frankness, zest, liveliness in news are -transplanted; while they have suffered a sea-change, they still operate -with telling effect.[6] - - [Footnote 6: Visitors to Chungking owe much to the Foreign Affairs - Section of the International Publicity Department. Its chief, the - affable Mr. C. C. Chi, a well-known economist from Shanghai, has acted - as host to almost every visitor to Hankow or Chungking. He has - fulfilled endless requests--many of them irrational--with unfailing - patience, good humor, candor, and intelligence. Few books on - contemporary China fail to bear the imprint of his help; the present - one is no exception.] - -The Ministry of Women's Affairs, decreed in 1940, is in process of -organizing women's work for the Party. Previously, most women's -organizations had been knit together in the affiliated New Life -Movement. The minor committees of the Party--historical, pensions, -etc.--lie outside the scope of war activities. Although they continue, -their functions are subordinate to the purposes of resistance and -reconstruction. - -Formal field organization follows seven patterns: - - -----------------------PARTY CONGRESS - | | - Central Party Chief - Control | - Committee Central Executive Committee - Standing Committee - | - Party Secretariat - | - ------------Central Party Administrative System---------------- - | | | | | | | - | Overseas- | | | | Provincial - | Chinese | | | | Party - | Party | | | | Organ - | Organ | | | | | - | | | | | | | - | | | Special | | | - | | | Party Organ | | | - | | Special for Army | | _Hsien_ - Direct | Party Navy, | Special or - Overseas- | Organ Air Forces | Municipal Municipal - Chinese | for and | Party Party - Party | Railwaymen Military | Organ Organ - Organ | and Schools | | | - | | Seamen | | | | - | | | | Direct District District - | Branch District District District Party Party - | Party Party Organ Party Organ Party Organ Organ - | Organ | | organ | | - | | | | | | | - Sub-organ Sub-organ Sub- Sub- Sub- Sub- Sub- - [_Pu-fên_] | district district district district district - | | Party Party Party Party Party - | | Organ Organ Organ Organ Organ - | | | | | | | - Small Small Small Small Small Small Small - Group Group Group Group Group Group Group - [_Hsiao-tsu_] - -Much of this exists only on paper. After the break with the Communists -in 1927, and the transformation of the Kuomintang from a -government-destroying to a governing agency, the functional and -agitational groups were allowed to slip into desuetude. Under the -pressure of war, and the encouraging political situation, which puts a -premium on action, the Kuomintang has adopted a variety of policies -designed to maintain its position. - - -THE KUOMINTANG BID FOR LEADERSHIP - -Chief among the new devices is the reintroduction of the Small Group, or -Party Cell (_hsiao-tsu_). A comprehensive plan for small-unit -organization has been proclaimed; the text is given below, Appendix II -(D). This cell system, as explained by the Deputy Secretary-General of -the Kuomintang, Dr. K'an Nai-kuang, will provide the roots of the Party -with new vigor.[7] The small group provides for further diffusion of -Party work, and introduces novel principles of political organization to -the Party. Self-criticism, airing of opinion, mutual personal -examination--these are expected to stimulate Party work. The war -provides the Party with the opportunity to do with ease things which -seemed insurmountably slow and difficult before Japanese bombers helped -unification. Opium-suppression, bandit-eradication, and similar work of -organization and improvement challenges the Party to further effort. The -imminence of democracy requires more intensive preparation in discussion -and in self-organization for small groups. The _hsiao-tsu_ system is -designed to bolster Party morale, improve the Party work, and spread the -teaching of Sun Yat-sen. - - [Footnote 7: Statement to the author at Kuomintang Central - Headquarters, Chungking, July 16, 1940; Dr. K'an also supplied the - facts for the new organizational features of the Party. The following - interpretations are the author's alone.] - -The new governmental pattern of local government is to be reinforced by -the corresponding development of Kuomintang agencies. In the -government's plan, rural development operates on four levels: the -militia; the school system; the agricultural and industrial -cooperatives; and the political organization. The same person in each -village or hamlet would be responsible for all four. If he is to be a -Party man, he must be effective to be of service and a credit to the -Party. - -In order to eradicate undesirable personnel, the Kuomintang has -increased its Party-purging facilities with what is known as the Party -Supervisor's Net (_Tang-jên Chien-ch'a Wang_). By action of the C.E.C. -on June 13, 1940, the sub-district Party organs are to elect one to -three members each to serve, with a six months' term, as Control -Members. With a power of report on Party discipline, and responsibility -for Party conditions, this change was expected to drive undesirables -more effectively out of the Party. - -Three years from 1940 was set as the final date for the installation of -the new system. While the fractionization of a Party may seem to be of -minor importance, it actually is a major factor in the potential -development of the Kuomintang. In the period of Party government, the -more popular organs of Party members tended to slough off, leaving large -_Tangpu_ (Party Headquarters) in the _hsien_ or cities. These quite -often fell into the hands of local machines, with the consequence that -they interfered with government, and promoted the usual evils of party -machines. The diffusion of Party work, by letting individuals -participate more freely as individuals, may help to break the monopoly -of these bureaus, and restore the Party effectiveness with less reliance -on supervision from above. - -The Kuomintang, in addition to these reorganization devices, is meeting -competition from the Left by increasing its membership. Membership -figures are not available in war time; the total is probably over two -million. In some instances the new members are no particular improvement -on the pre-existing group, but in the majority of cases the Party -broadens its base of popular support. - - -INTRA-KUOMINTANG POLITICS - -The years which saw the rise of the Kuomintang to power, and its -subsequent period of authority, showed a diminution of the disparateness -of Party fractions. For a long time the adherents of Wang Ch'ing-wei -stood formally Left; those of Hu Han-min, formally Right; while various -older Party alignments preserved their outlines more or less clearly -(e.g., the Kuomintang Western Hills Group). With the consistent rise of -Chiang K'ai-shek to Party and national leadership, and the steady influx -of non-Party or merely nominal Party men into the government, Party -distinctions lost their cogency in practical affairs. - -In terms of influence, patronage, and effective policy-making, the -Kuomintang is a conglomeration of innumerable personal leaderships knit -together by a common outlook, a common interest in the maintenance of -the National Government and formal Party power, and a common loyalty to -the Party Chief. The clearest groups are those which are out of the -current political stream; most notable among these is the Wang schism, -and a few scattered irreconcilables of half-forgotten Party struggles. -Within the regime, Kuomintang groups tend to coalesce as the leaders -meet, negotiate, and govern together in the councils of state. - -So completely in the ascendant that they have lost their general -character as groups are the _Erh Ch'ên_ (literally "the two Ch'êns"; -also termed "C.C. group" by English-speaking Chinese), led by the -brothers, Ch'ên Li-fu, Minister of Education, and Ch'ên Kuo-fu, head of -the Central Political Institute, and the _Huangpu_ (Whampoa Academy) -groups, led by the Generalissimo himself. The Ch'ên brothers have been -close adherents of Chiang throughout his career. Brilliant, vigorous, -sharp in the retention of power, they have made themselves anathema to -the Left. They are effective reorganizers of the Kuomintang, keenly -aware of its position as monopoly Party, and their protégés and trainees -are omnipresent through government and Party. Their military counterpart -is the _Huangpu_ group. It includes officers either trained by Chiang -himself or under his close supervision. With the passage of each year, -the proportion of Whampoa (or daughter-institution) graduates in the -national armies rises. The officers include a high proportion of -technically qualified men, whose capabilities and interests are chiefly -military. Builders of the new army, they look to the Generalissimo and -the Party for dicta on social, economic, and political policy; they -provide China with the unpolitical army which has been an American -ideal, although rejected by Soviet and South American practice. The -officers are not encouraged to assume decisive roles in local politics, -but to refer such things back to Headquarters. In consequence, although -the danger of a new _tuchünism_ has almost disappeared, the army staff -does not readily adapt itself to a _levée en masse_, or to the problems -of a social-revolutionary army. The very factors which make of the army -a tool and not a practice-ground of government also make it somewhat -rigid in dealing with guerrilla situations. - -Both the C. C. and Whampoa groups are instilled with notions of Party -and military discipline which trace back in the first place to the -instruction given by Russians from the Soviet Union. While they follow -Sun and Chiang in accepting the promises of democracy, their notion of -democracy is as different from that of the Left as Washington's was from -the Jacobins'. They are interested in sound, disciplined, powerful -national government, representative, republican, and stable; they see -the revolution as largely complete in the power-destroying phase, and -are beginning to think in the reconstruction phase. After ten years of -strain and terror in fighting the Communists, they look with suspicion -on political changes which would open the nation to opportunist -Communist agitation, or make Chungking the helpless diplomatic -dependency of the Narkomindel. The bitterness of internecine conflict -has made them deeply suspicious of sudden or radical reform, although -they themselves profess a genuine interest in social welfare. The actual -reforms which have been accomplished are, in the scale of political -reality, already stupendous: opium eradication, tax collection, -diffusion of national authority, communications, industrialization, -military advance, etc. To the Kuomintang center, a demand for sharp or -shocking change is suspect. They desire to amplify what they have, and -to let changes wait on the ability of trained personnel--not entrusting -progress to the vagaries of mass movements with incalculable force and -direction. - -While the National Government was at Nanking, there was a _Fu-hsing Shê_ -(Regeneration Club), organized by a few hot-headed members of the -Kuomintang center. Its activities in support of the Generalissimo and -the government, under the further sobriquet of Bluejacket or Blue Shirt -group, earned it the reputation of a Chinese _Schutzstaffel_. The -comparison was at best fanciful, but any comparison at all was heartily -desired by the Europocentric Chinese Left and by the world press. -Magnified beyond recognition, the Club was identified with almost every -agency in the government and Party, not excluding the New Life Movement. -As applied, the name _Blue Shirt_ covered a wide scattering of unrelated -agencies which had the common features of a Kuomintang-center position, -an inclination to effective action (including violence) and some -secrecy. Effective political-police work is led by one T'ai Li, whose -name is whispered by dissidents; but counter-espionage and supervision -of suspects is also performed through Party agents, the regular -military, and governmental agencies. - -Around the Kuomintang center there are other groups, some closely -related to Chiang, some remote. The Political Scientists (_Chêng-hsüeh -Hsi_) owe their name to a society which once existed in Nanking. They -include many of the administrators, men with American training who are -interested in industrial and fiscal development. The clarity of this -group has faded by its absorption into the governing center. The -Cantonese are represented by two levels of politics: those who based -their power on Canton province and those who remained within the -government. President Sun K'ê of the Legislative _Yüan_ has been -outstanding in his willingness to cooperate with the Communists and -Left, and is on cordial terms with relatively independent progressives, -such as Mme. Sun Yat-sen. Further groups within the Kuomintang are -constituted by the loyalist followers of Wang Ch'ing-wei, who now attach -themselves to other leaders, and by other personal or regional -followings (e.g., the _Tungpei_ followers of Chang Hsüeh-liang, -ex-_tuchün_ of Manchuria and ex-Vice-Commander-in-Chief, still "retired" -as a result of the Sian kidnapping). Finally, a number of elder Party -leaders remain because of their seniority or connection with Sun -Yat-sen; they do not need to attach themselves to any particular clique -in order to retain their position. These include such men as the -venerable Secretary-General of the Party, Yeh Ch'u-tsang; the President -of the National Government, Lin Shên; and the President of the Control -_Yüan_, Yü Yu-jên. - -What has been said about the groups in the People's Political Council -(see p. 76 _ff._) applies to these. It is possible, as in American -congressional or administrative circles, to distinguish blocs of -leaders with differing interests or policy; but clarity fades upon -scrutiny. The orientation, even by the participants, is subjective. -Lacking continuous institutional form, clustering of leaders is -transient, shifting with political events. - -It is difficult to appraise the role of the Kuomintang without at the -same time assessing the position of the government. The two are -inescapably connected. Although the Communists profess recognition of -the government, and pledge it loyalty, they offer only comradeship--on -their own terms--to the Kuomintang. This arrangement may last for a -considerable length of time, but the National Government is a Kuomintang -creation; short of violent revolution, Party control will scarcely break -in war time. Upon the Party, therefore, depends much of the efficacy of -the Government. - -Many well-known Leftist writers on China--such as Edgar Snow--make the -comment that whereas the National Government is deserving as a -government, and worthy of support, the Kuomintang is hopelessly corrupt, -a creature of landlords and capitalists, or, of even worse, "feudal -elements." Such a distinction, based on strong moral urges and a desire -to achieve historical parallels, is untenable in practice. Kuomintang -power has weathered more than a decade of adversities. The Generalissimo -depends upon it. Analysis of the Kuomintang as the party of the Chinese -national bourgeoisie, and ascription of a mass character to the -Communists alone, is a fallacy, comparable to a consideration of Earl -Browder as the real leader of the American working class. - -In point of fact, neither the Kuomintang nor the Communist Party in -China is a mass party. Neither ever has been, although each sought mass -character in the Great Revolution. Still largely apolitical, the Chinese -masses are organized socially, culturally, and economically into a -village and guild system which functions through most of the country. -The Kuomintang includes a very high proportion of shopkeepers, returned -overseas-Chinese, Chinese still resident overseas, Christians, -landlords, and Western-returned students. The class composition of the -Kuomintang is largely incidental to its functional character. Since the -Kuomintang was the party of Westernization, it gathered in revolutionary -days Chinese of all classes who were sufficiently modernized to be -interested. Naturally the poorest peasants and the coastal proletariat -did not constitute a large proportion of such membership. The men who -entered did so as Christians, as travellers, as temperamental rebels, -rather than as representatives of the bourgeoisie. When the Communists, -whom a recent writer[8] with unconscious humor calls the party of the -Chinese proletariat, came on the scene, the same social elements -contributed to its membership. Once the Communist Party abandoned the -Trotskyist line of urban revolt for the leadership of endemic peasant -rebellions, its composition changed somewhat, although the Communist -leaders of today are socially much like their Kuomintang equivalents. -The men who are class-conscious are, like Lenin, historically, -philosophically, and morally so; it is a matter of literary necessity, -not of fact. - - [Footnote 8: For a Marxian analysis of the Kuomintang, carefully - stripped of frank Marxian verbiage, see "Wei-Meng-pu," "The Kuomintang - in China: Its Fabric and Future" in _Pacific Affairs_, Vol. XIII, No. - 1 (March 1940), p. 30-44. The author _a priori_ defines the Kuomintang - as the party of the national bourgeoisie in China, in effect exhorting - it to fulfill its historic mission of completing the national - democratic revolution, whereupon socialism [i.e., Stalinism] may - historically follow. Nevertheless, its comment on personalities is - informing in terms of practical politics.] - -The Kuomintang is in power; the Communist and Left parties are not. As -the governing group, the Kuomintang naturally attracts those persons who -would seek to enter any government. Since it has not and does not -promote rural class warfare, pre-existing class relationships continue. -The Party and the Government have sought, not always efficiently or -faithfully to the _n_th degree, to carry out the programs of land -reform, democratization, etc., to which they have been committed. The -Kuomintang has tolerated widespread sharecropping, land destitution, -usury, and rural despotism--because it found these in existence, and was -preoccupied with building a national government, a modern army, adequate -finance, and with eradicating some of the worst evils, such as opium, -bandits, and Communists (who, whatever their ideals, nevertheless helped -to impoverish a poor nation by merciless civil war). - -If the Kuomintang were out, it too could point to existing evils. -Whoever controls government bears the responsibility. A class element is -to a certain degree inescapable in any government; illiterate, -unqualified persons do not assume leadership even in the Soviet Union -until they have escaped their handicaps through training. But to make of -the Kuomintang the party of the Chinese landlords and merchants alone is -as fallacious as to make the Republicans or Democrats solely the -instruments of American capitalism. A comment such as this would be -unnecessary in the case of the United States; but persons who are not -Marxian with respect to the analysis of current American events often -assume a Left approach to China because of impatience with evils which -they see but cannot understand. - -The final appraisal of the Kuomintang must be based on the practical -work of the government and the Party. In 1940, their effective control -was wider and deeper than ever before. The Chinese state was more nearly -in existence. The armies were undefeated. The growth of China in the -past ten years, and the stand made by China at war, has been made under -the unrelaxed control of the Kuomintang monopoly of constitutional -power, together with its clear primacy in more tangible power--schools, -finance, armies, and police. - - -THE NEW LIFE MOVEMENT AND OTHER AFFILIATES - -The important New Life Movement (_Hsin Shêng-huo Yün-tung_) is, strictly -speaking, not a Party organization; but Chiang is its Chairman, and in -purposes and personnel it interlocks with the Party. Convinced that -institutional and economic reform required accompanying moral and -ideological reform, the Generalissimo founded an Officers' Moral -Endeavor Corps as early as 1927. This organization was placed, soon -after its initiation, in the hands of Colonel (now Major-General) J. L. -Huang, a graduate of Vanderbilt University and an experienced Y.M.C.A. -secretary. The Corps' purposes were comparable to those of a Y.M.C.A. -with American armies, but Chinese morality in general, not Christian -sectarian teaching, was stressed. With Chiang's encouragement, the Corps -came to include a high percentage of the officers. Teaching cleanliness, -truthfulness, promptness, kindness, dignity, etc., it helped build -morale. - -In 1934, after seven years of war against the Communist-led agrarian -insurrections in South Central China, the Generalissimo decided to -extend to the whole people the type of work done by the Corps. On -February 19, 1934, he made his first speech announcing the New Life -Movement and on the following March 11, a mass meeting of about one -hundred thousand people, representing five hundred organizations, -signalized the formal inauguration of the movement.[9] From then on the -Movement was continued as a regular phase of anti-Communist -reconstruction. It elicited praise for its attempt to reach the roots of -China's political demoralization, and its intent to remedy the everyday -life of the people,[10] although there was skepticism as to its -effectiveness in removing troubles deeply ingrained in the economic -system. - - [Footnote 9: The China Information Committee, _News Release_, March 4, - 1940. English translations of names such as the New Life Movement, - Officers' Moral Endeavor Corps, National Spiritual Mobilization, etc. - are often awkward or jejune where the original is not.] - - [Footnote 10: Young, C. W. H., _New Life for Kiangsi_, Shanghai, 1935, - is a missionary work which praises the New Life Movement highly. The - book includes interesting, first-hand, unfavorable accounts of the - rule of the quondam Chinese Soviet Republic, and explains some of the - opposition to the Communists. The interconnection between - Communist-suppression and the New Life Movement is consciously and - clearly demonstrated.] - -The type of evil against which the New Life Movement struggles is -well-illustrated by Mme. Chiang's enumeration of the seven deadly sins: -self-seeking, "face," cliquism, defeatism (_mei-yu fa-tzŭ_, the -Chinese _nitchevo_), inaccuracy (_ch'a-pu-to_), lack of self-discipline, -and evasion of responsibility.[11] In addition to these sins of social -and political behavior, there are others such as filthiness, -carelessness of infection, indecent or sloppy dress, bad manners, -unkindness, etc. The Movement, easily understood in view of the -traditional Confucian emphasis on personal conduct, seeks to reach -individual behavior. The West European and North American peoples have -been disciplined by technology itself: timeliness, cleanliness, -regularity, have come to be a part of daily life. Any nation which seeks -to shift from an agrarian to an industrial economy discovers that -amiable defects become ruinous flaws: machinery cannot wait; a machine -society requires a discipline of its own. The New Life Movement is -attacking the points of social behavior which strike the newcomer to -China most immediately and most unfavorably. - - [Footnote 11: Chiang, May-ling Soong, _China Shall Rise Again_, New - York, 1941, p. 38 _ff._ Mme. Chiang's work also includes a full - account of the enterprises of the New Life Movement and of its - affiliates.] - -The positive virtues of the New Life Movement were formulated by the -Generalissimo. Four in number, they are _li_, _i_, _lien_, and _ch'ih_. -_Li_ is the fundamental Confucian virtue, and is based upon _jên_. _Jên_ -being humane self-awareness, or consciousness of membership in society, -_li_ is the application of this awareness to conduct; it thereby -signifies proper behavior, not in the superficial sense of empty -formality, but in the sense of behavior which is _human_: the full -expression of man's moral and ethical stature. The traditional -translation of _li_ is _rites_, _ceremonies_, or _etiquette_--terms -which, because of their connotations of an empty ceremonialism, are -inadequate as a rendition of the original. The Generalissimo writes of -_li_: "It becomes natural law, when applied to nature; it becomes a -rule, when applied to social affairs; and signifies discipline, when -applied to national affairs. These three phases of one's life are all -regulated by reason. Therefore, 'li' can be interpreted as regulated -attitude of mind and heart."[12] Chiang thus reconciled, for his own -thought, the naturalistic ethics of Confucius, wherein man and nature -were parts of an inseparable ethical structure, and the pragmatism of -Sun Yat-sen. - - [Footnote 12: Chiang K'ai-shek, _Outline of the New Life Movement_, - Chungking (?), n.d. p. 8. This is the translation, by Mme. Chiang, of - _Hsin Shêng-huo Yün-tung Kang-yao_, Nanking, n.d., originally - published in May 1934.] - -_I_ is the element in man which makes him observe _li_: ethics or -justice. _Lien_ is "clear discrimination (honesty in personal, public, -and official life): Integrity." According to the lexicographer,[13] it -is "pure, incorrupt, not avaricious." The fourth principle is _ch'ih_, -given by the dictionary as "to feel shame,"[14] and rendered by the -Generalissimo and Madame Chiang as "real self-consciousness -(self-respect): Honor."[15] From this the Generalissimo evolved his -formulation of a theory of action.[16] That he is not unaware of -criticisms directed against him for talking about morality when people -are fighting and starving is shown by his spirited counter-attack: - - There are two kinds of skeptics: - - First, some hold the view that the four virtues are simply - rules of good conduct. No matter how good they may be, no - benefit to the nation can be derived from them if the - knowledge and technique used by that nation are inferior to - others. - - Those who hold this view do not seem to understand the - difference between matters of primary and secondary - importance. From the social and national point of view, only - those who are virtuous can best use their knowledge and - technique for the salvation of the country. Otherwise, - ability may be abused for dishonorable purposes. "Li," "i," - "lien," and "ch'ih" are the principal rules alike for a - community, a group, or the entire nation. Those who do not - observe these rules will probably utilize their knowledge - and ability to the disadvantage of society. Therefore, these - virtues may be considered as matters of primary importance - upon which the foundation of a nation can be solidly built. - - Secondly, there is another group of people who argue that - these virtues are merely refined formalities, which have - nothing to do with the actual necessities of daily life. For - instance, if one is hungry, can these formalities feed him? - This is probably due to some misunderstanding of the famous - teachings of Kuan-Tze, who said: "When one does not have to - worry about his food and clothing, then he cares for - personal honor; when the granary is full, then people learn - good manners." The sceptic fails to realize that the four - virtues teach one how to be a man. If one does not know - these, what is the use of having abundance of food and - clothing? Moreover, Kuan-Tze did not intend to make a - general statement, merely referring to a particular subject - at a particular time. When he was making broad statements, - he said: "'li,' 'i,' 'lien,' and 'ch'ih' are the four - pillars of the nation." When these virtues prevail, even if - food and clothing are temporarily insufficient, they can be - produced by man power: or, if the granary is empty, it can - be filled through human effort. On the other hand, when - these virtues are not observed, there will be robbery and - beggary in time of need: and from a social point of view - robbery and beggary can never achieve anything. Social order - is based on these virtues. When there is order, then - everything can be done properly: but when everything is in - confusion, very little can be achieved. Today robbers are - usually most numerous in the wealthiest cities of the world. - This is an obvious illustration of confusion caused by - non-observance of virtues. The fact that our country has - traitors as well as corrupt officials shows that we, too, - have neglected the cultivation of virtues, and if we are to - recover, these virtues must be adopted as the principles of - a new life.[17] - - [Footnote 13: Giles, Herbert, _A Chinese-English Dictionary_, Second - Edition, Shanghai and London, 1912; ideograph No. 7128.] - - [Footnote 14: The same; ideograph No. 1999.] - - [Footnote 15: Chiang K'ai-shek, cited, p. 7.] - - [Footnote 16: Reprinted as Appendix III (B), p. 373, below.] - - [Footnote 17: Chiang K'ai-shek, cited, p. 6-7.] - -Generalissimo and Mme. Chiang both work actively in the Movement, -inspecting its branches and enterprises, speaking at its meetings, and -supervising its functions. The Movement possesses a small but very -active central staff, with Major-General Huang as Secretary-General and -Dr. Chu Djang, a Johns Hopkins political scientist, as his assistant. -Efforts are made to improve the daily life of the people. Shops are -encouraged to join the Movement, on conditions requiring cleanliness, -uniform prices, etc. Thus in addition to the work of a Y.M.C.A. for all -ages and classes, the Movement attempts the role of a municipal health -campaign agency, a better business bureau, and a civic service club. -Marriages have traditionally depleted family budgets; many a Chinese -farmer or worker has fallen into usurious debt because of the social -necessity of extravagant feasting and celebration. The Movement -accordingly organized inexpensive mass marriages, collectively -celebrated under official auspices; the purpose is not to increase the -population, but to circumvent a wasteful custom. Peep-show operators -have been given displays which are patriotic instead of mythical, -chivalric, or licentious. Story-tellers are taught new, public-spirited -stories to tell. The New Life Movement seeks to reinvigorate Chinese -society by adapting existing institutions or businesses to new needs. - -In addition to attempting change in traditional life, the Movement has -introduced innovations. The only cafeteria in Chungking serving cheap -but dietetically sound meals is operated by the New Life Headquarters. -Chinese foods were hard to preserve and unpleasant to eat in the -darkness of air raid shelters; China has had no sandwiches, crackers, or -equivalent preparations; the New Life Movement concocted a cheap but -tasty and nutritious wheat and soy biscuit, and scattered the recipe -broadcast. News is distributed to the illiterates through lantern-slide -lectures in market-places. Mass singing, virtually unknown in China -until now, is making enormous strides with the war; the New Life -Movement is diffusing this, along with calisthenics.[18] - - [Footnote 18: Most of these and the following facts, but not the - interpretations, are based on interviews which the author had with the - hospitable Major-General J. L. Huang in Chungking, on July 14, 1940, - and subsequently.] - -A group of minor New Life agencies are clustered about the Headquarters. -These, like the Movement, are not financed by popular subscription, -membership fees, or collection drives. All administrative expenses are -borne by the Generalissimo and his closest associates, who contribute -from their private funds or from available contingent funds of their -offices, and from contributions by local governments. Since part of the -program is distribution of cash gifts to all wounded soldiers, the -budget runs into fairly high figures, but the Generalissimo realizes -that in China there is no better way to create mistrust of an enterprise -than to collect money for it. The leading agencies affiliated with the -New Life are: - -(1) the War Area Service Corps, designed for propaganda, instruction, -spreading of cooperatives, relief, etc., in the occupied and combat -zones; - -(2) the Rural Service Corps, designed to perform the same functions -behind the lines, and to aid in rural reconstruction; - -(3) the New Life Students Rural Summer Service Corps, an organization -which organizes students from the colleges during their summer -vacations, and sends them out on the land for service work, along with -new agricultural information, hygienic teaching, literacy drives, etc.; - -(4) the Wounded Soldiers' League, a self-help organization for disabled -veterans, who are assisted and encouraged to set up their own -cooperatives; they have done so with particular success in -cigarette-making, printing, and shoe-weaving; - -(5) the Friends of the Wounded Society, wherein volunteers become -friends to veterans who are in hospitals, or who return to civil life as -cripples (each Friend contributing money, transmitted direct to the -veteran; Friends are also encouraged to write or visit the veterans); - -(6) the New Life Secretaries' Camp, virtually a summer undergraduate -college, with an academic curriculum, strict discipline, and ample -organized recreation; and - -(7) the Women's Advisory Council, which in turn tops another pyramid of -war-time activity in the hands of women's organizations.[19] - - [Footnote 19: For an excellent outline of the role of women in the - war, see Chiang, May-ling Soong, _China Shall Rise Again_, cited, p. - 287 _ff._] - -In addition to these major activities, there are innumerable further -enterprises, including another industrial cooperative system, a really -extensive chain of orphanages for war orphans, schools for girls, -training camps for young women, etc. It is no uncommon sight to stand on -a city street in West China and see three-fourths of the young people -wearing the uniforms of various war activities, most of which--outside -the army--are affiliates of the Party or the Movement. - -These activities have not received much praise from Leftists or foreign -visitors. They begin at a level so far below American requirements of -social service that they seem ineffectual. The author once saw, in -China's _tuchün_ years, old people dying in the streets while -pedestrians walked by, uncomfortable but aloof; he saw children with -burnt-out eyes whining for alms, to the profit of a beggars' syndicate; -he watched soldiers rotting alive on the flagstones of temple -courtyards. The Kuomintang, the New Life, and their affiliates cannot -relieve the general poverty of China, nor alter the fundamental economic -faults and continuing maladjustments of class functions. These agencies -do, however, eliminate evils so bad that the ordinary American would not -remember them for his schedule of social reform. In the vast reaches of -Free China, these organizations--like many others--almost disappear in -the perpetual routines of ancient, enduring institutions: the -market-place, the hucksters' streets, the tea-house. But their influence -is felt. In contrast with the entire American New Deal, they are nothing -at all; in contrast with the Y.M.C.A., Komsomol, or similar -organizations, they are agents of one of the greatest practical social -reforms ever undertaken in Asia, and a step bound to have political -repercussions. - -Popular non-participation still stultifies them. The leadership of the -agencies parallels government personnel. Women leaders are in many -instances the wives of officials; an exceptional person, such as Mme. -Chiang or her celebrated sisters, may be a leader in her own right, but -this is no usual rule. In many agencies, such as intended mass -organizations for reform, instruction, health, etc., the mass character -is entirely lacking. The masses are the beneficiaries of Kuomintang -action, but not often participants in that action. The Communists and -the independent Left hold an enormous leverage in popular interest; -ignoring class lines, illiteracy, or lack of preparation, they draw the -common people into a real share in government and social reconstruction. -The Kuomintang has ignored this opportunity--in part because of the -Confucian cleavage between scholars and the untutored which made the -scholar, however benevolent or philanthropic, a being apart from the -commonalty. - -Two further organs--the National Spiritual Mobilization (_Kuo-min -Ching-shên Tsung-tung-yüan_) and the Mass Mobilization--are Kuomintang -devices for mass participation. The former, developed as an antidote to -defeatism engendered by protraction of the war, rising prices, and the -treason of Wang, actually consists in a propaganda machine, which holds -torchlight vigils, national fealty ceremonies, and similar festivals in -the larger cities; it has adapted some of the stagecraft of the German -National Socialists, but lacks a broadly popular character. The Mass -Mobilization is under the Training Department of the Military Affairs -Commission; useful as a military device, its political character is -slight in Free China. In the guerrilla and occupied zones, a genuine -_levée en masse_ has been accomplished; in the free areas, safeguards -which hedge Mobilization have robbed it of utility save that which is -strictly military. As an adjunct to the army, this is useful; otherwise -it has been ineffectual, despite the competitive success obtained by the -guerrilla zones in equivalent organizations. - -The over-all picture of the Kuomintang and its activities is hard to -bring into focus. One general contrast will point some of its strength -and weakness clearly: as a governing agency, which created and -maintained the government, the Kuomintang has been more effective than -any other group in China. The Party has met and overcome obstacles in -practical politics, international relations, working administration, -internal unification, and national defense. The Party has succeeded well -enough to remain in power, which none of its predecessors or competitors -have managed to do. As a social and political force, its governing -character colors its work. More has been done by the government for the -people than in any comparable situation in East Asia. But Kuomintang -rule, however excellent when measured by the standards of authoritary or -colonial government, still falls far short of even elementary -application of democratic techniques. The flexibility of the Party, and -a continued ability to yield power in order to retain power, are the -most hopeful factors in the view of the Kuomintang future. - -The Kuomintang could not be overthrown by any force--mere force--on -earth, unless the Party betrayed itself. Attacked by a major power, it -has emerged unscathed. But the Communists or other opponents may find -their most useful weapons in the weaknesses of the Kuomintang itself: in -the slowness of its change, or in its unadaptability to rapidly changing -conditions; or in an extra-Party resentment arising from severe economic -dislocation which, though consequent to war rather than to governmental -policies, was not swiftly enough controlled by a slowly-moving -Kuomintang. By contrast with 1935, however, the Kuomintang has gained -much power; the Communists have lost some. Regional and half-separatist -regimes, often corrupt, have almost altogether disappeared. Along with -the Kuomintang, the independent Leftists have also profited. - -No prediction, to be plausible, can assume the early demise or collapse -of the Kuomintang. The Party has obtained power; its organization is one -of the three policy-executing branches of the new national organization. -Ruin of the Kuomintang implies ruin of the emergent Chinese state, so -laboriously constructed; though a successor might arise, too much of the -work would have to be done over again. Many Chinese, of all classes, -realize this. Kuomintang rule is the _status quo_; despite demerits, it -is the first stable government modern China has had, and China's chief -tool of defense today. - - - - -CHAPTER VI - -THE COMMUNIST AND MINOR PARTIES - - -The party politics of Republican China fall into two periods: the early -period of competitive, pre-parliamentary parties, 1912 to the Great -Revolution; and a later period of struggling monopoly-power parties, -from the Great Revolution to the present. In the earlier period the -Kuomintang and its rivals tolerated one another's existence; each -regarded co-existing parties as natural, desirable, and useful. But the -sham democracy of the prostituted Republic disheartened the Kuomintang, -which thereupon bid for the complete conquest of power, brooking no -legitimate competitors; its rivals did likewise. The first coalition -(1922-27) of Kuomintang and Communists was therefore not the democratic -competition of two parties with different stresses upon a common -ideological foundation, but a war-time alliance of basically -incompatible forces. After the 1927 break, the Kuomintang became the -only legal party in most of the country, while the Communists--with a -rebel army, an unrecognized government, and a territory of their -own--enjoyed legality within the limits of their own swords. The -Kuomintang, embraced by all major groups save the Communists, became the -foremost vehicle for Chinese political life. Minor parties enjoyed -precarious, ineffectual existences, underground or expatriate. - -With the outbreak of war in 1937, Nationalists and Communists adopted a -truce, formally a Communist surrender of armed rebellion, subversive -ideology, and separate government. In actuality it was an alliance of -deadly enemies against the Japan which threatened them both. Today, -Chinese party politics revives in the People's Political Council, and to -a slight degree in public opinion. The legal prohibition of minor -parties, including the Communists, remains in effect. Chinese party -politics, in the Western sense of a friendly subdivision of common -opinion, remains vestigial. The only guarantee of party rights is an -unstable toleration extended by the Kuomintang in the negative form of -non-prosecution. The Kuomintang is the Party for most of China. The -Communist Party is the party for a separate fraction of China. The minor -parties, holding neither territory nor armies in the game of power, -maneuver between and about the two, struggling to attain legal -existence. - - -THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS: PARTY AND LEADERS - -Literary Marxism runs back to the Ch'ing dynasty, but the first formal -organization of a Chinese Communist Party occurred with the first -Congress of the Chinese C.P., in Shanghai, during July of 1921.[1] The -Soviet-Kuomintang entente was, strictly speaking, not a union between -the Kuomintang and the Communist parties, although it came to be such in -fact; it was collaboration between the Third International, which agreed -that Communism was unsuited to China, and the Kuomintang. The -development of a Chinese Communist Party, and open Communist debate -concerning the assumption of power, made the Kuomintang mistrustful, -repressive, and finally hostile. The suppression of the Communists by -Chiang in 1927 has become world history; Vincent Sheean and André -Malraux have preserved aspects of it in moving literature.[2] - - [Footnote 1: Miff, P., _Heroic China_, New York, 1937, p. 14. This - valuable pamphlet is by one of the Comintern's leading expounders of - Marxism as applied to China. Trotskyist Marxism is represented by a - far fuller, more careful work by Harold Isaacs, cited, together with - the following, cited on p. 20, n. 16. Edgar Snow, the distinguished - American journalist, operates on the basis of an independent, - unacknowledged type of Marxism, which shows itself in consistent - prejudice against the Kuomintang, and in a soul-hungry search for a - dialectical, inner meaning of things with which to supplement - common-sense observation; his "Things that Could Happen," _Asia_, Vol. - XLI, No. 1 (January 1941), employs Hegelianism at tenth-remove to - analyze the future. It leads to a frequent implication of motives and - to subjective interpretations which rearrange fact as it ought to be - in terms of a rational economic dialectic (i.e., an occult pattern - which provides a uniform key to all human experience). Thus, in his - _Red Star Over China_, p. 306, he ascribes the massacre of Reds by - Kuomintang officers to the fact that the officers were the sons of - local landlords, enraged by expropriation of the land. - Land-expropriation is a class motive; a moment's reflection would - reveal that previous massacre of the officers' families by Communists - would be a better common-sense motive for blood-thirstiness. This - feature of diluted Marxism would not be worth mentioning were it not - common to so many books about Communists written by self-proclaimed - "non-Communists" habituated to the dialectic. It is found in the - writings of Agnes Smedley, Victor Yakhontoff, Anna Louise Strong, and - I. Epstein, to mention but a few.] - - [Footnote 2: Sheean, Vincent, _Personal History_, New York, 1937; - Malraux, André, _Man's Fate_, New York, n.d.] - -In the period 1927-37 the Chinese Communists operated the Chinese Soviet -Republic (_Chung-hua Su-wei-ai Kung-ho-kuo_),[3] primarily in Kiangsi, -but also in the Ao-yü-wan (Hupeh, Honan, Anhui) area. In the Long March -of 1934-35 the main forces of the Communists, in the most spectacular -military move in China since the great Northern raid of the T'aip'ing, -marched a distance of some six thousand miles, and established their new -area in North Shensi (see above, p. 112 _ff._). Not only did the Chinese -Red Army remain intact; through great and successful effort, the -Communists transplanted schools, banks, and other institutions intact. -The Long March was comparable to the celebrated Flight of the Tartars, -in that it amounted to the transplanting of an entire people, their -worldly goods, and their most highly treasured institutions and -traditions. - - [Footnote 3: _Kung-ho-kuo_ is the Western-type term for Republic; the - Kuomintang uses _Min-kuo_ or Folk-realm. _Su-wei-ai_ is a phonetic - representation of "Soviet"; the characters, not intended to have - meaning, are unconsciously humorous in that their lexicographical - signification is "Revive (and) maintain dust!"] - -Despite Kuomintang theory, the Frontier Area is a one-party _imperium in -imperio_, and its unchallenged party is the Communist. Under conditions -requiring great fortitude, the Chinese Communist leaders have -consolidated power, and use their base to spread Marxism through the -guerrilla movement. They are thus in the best possible political -position; their strategic excellence makes them welcome in precisely -those zones wherein their doctrines can best take effect. Their party -organization controls the Frontier Area through formal appointment of -the leading officials by the National Military Affairs Commission, and -through formulae of election for the subordinate officials. - -The hierarchy of the Chinese C.P. is much like that of the Kuomintang, -which also copied Soviet models:[4] - - |--- - | CENTRAL PARTY<--COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL - | COMMITTEE - | - |--| NATIONAL PARTY CONGRESS----------------- - | |---------------| /\ | - \/ | || | - Executive Bureau | \/ |->Central Control - Political Bureau | National Party Committee - Special Departments: | Convention - Organization | /\ - Publicity | || - | \/ - | Provincial Council of Party Delegates - | Provincial Party Committee - | Standing Committee----------| - \/ /\ | - Communist Youth Corps || | - \/ \/ - _Hsien_ Councils of Municipal Councils - Party Delegates of Party Delegates - - _Hsien_ Party - Committee - /\ |-------->Municipal Party - || | Committee - \/ \/ - Party Members' Mass Meetings - District (_ch'ü_) Councils of Party Delegates - District Party Committees - /\ - || - \/ - Branch Party Organs (cells) - Branch Party Organ Executive Committees - - [Footnote 4: Based on the Party Constitution, _Kung-ch'an-tang - Tang-chang_ [Party Constitution of the Communist Party], [Chungking?], - XXVII (1938), p. 1-21. The entire Constitution is reprinted below as - Appendix II (E), p. 359.] - -The shibboleth of Democratic Centralism applies to the Chinese as well -as to other Communist Parties; in practice this means the high and -unqualified concentration of power at the top of the hierarchy -following action by the democratic, or mass, element of the party -through the Party Council or Congress. In effect, nothing is decided at -such elections, since the plebiscites, according to the familiar -authoritarian pattern, concern questions to which only one answer is -reasonably possible: the answer decided by the party rulers. The free -use of meaningless elections characterizes Communist activity in -governmental as well as party matters. The voting act gives the -impression of concurrence, improves morale, and ceremonializes the -approval of the majority for the minority. The purpose which elections -serve in democracies--that is, of providing a decision to issues not -previously ascertained--appears very rarely in Communist elections, -where a near unanimity is constructed to indicate popular support, and -contested elections, disunity. - -In terms of personnel, the Communist hierarchy has been consistently -compliant with world Communist policy as made in Moscow. This is a -tribute to the high international unity and uniformity of the ecumenical -Communist movement, but raises, in China, problems of intra-national -Communist policy. Revolutionary veterans of the party, who fought, -suffered, studied, and worked for their cause through ten, fifteen, or -twenty years of effort, often find themselves displaced, dictated to, or -expelled by the clique of younger men who have lived comfortably in -Moscow studying the dialectic mystagogy and acquiring an inside track in -Stalinist cliquism.[5] The Chinese Communist Party has been shaken by -violent schisms, casting off many once highly-valued leaders. - - [Footnote 5: Harold Isaacs, in the work cited, has many passing - references to this phenomenon; his caustic indictment of Ch'en Shao-yu - (Wang Ming), p. 438 _ff._, is a case in point. Note Ch'en Tu-hsiu, Li - Li-san, Chang Kuo-tao--in China, as in Russia, most of the founders - and early leaders of the Communists have been set aside.] - -No sooner does a man become suspect to the ultimate authorities than -his previous record, hitherto praised, is re-examined and captious -criticism proves that he was a traitor from the beginning, like Trotsky, -Bukharin, Chicherin, and Zinoviev. The profound vitality of the Chinese -Communist movement as a quasi-religious, self-sacrificial organization -is demonstrated by the fact that it has weathered these storms. The -terrible hunger for a guidance in life, an insight into the ethical -meanings of things, and an absolute which asks nothing but acceptance -and obedience--these factors call for courage, humility, abasement, -fortitude. They do not favor imagination, individual integrity of -thought, or the examination of fact. There has been no indication -whatever, despite the wishful thinking of Western liberals, that the -mentality of the Chinese Red leaders is one whit different from that of -Western Communists. They talk practical democracy, moderation, -collaboration with the Kuomintang; they do so because this is the -Comintern's China policy, just as they have fought the National -Government in the past when the Soviet authorities disliked Chiang more -than they did Japan. - -Their all-China collaboration is no doubt sincere; but the sincerity is -based not on the wish to collaborate, but on what, in their special -phrasing, is termed the "objective" analysis of the situation. If the -Soviet Union, the chief "proletarian" force in the world, turned against -Chiang, the Communist _ipso facto_ would be against collaboration. The -war of China against Japan would no longer be a war of "national -liberation" but an "inter-imperialist" war in which the true interests -of the "working classes" would be against _both_ sides. This provides to -Marxians, under the name "science," an absolute, infallible guide to -ethics in practical politics, because it presumes to reveal the -inescapable long-range meaning of human affairs. The supposition that -daily affairs may in fact possess none but short-range meaning, outside -of slow, general, nearly impalpable changes in ecology, demography, and -genetics, etc., is anathema to the Marxians. A humanism trained to deal -directly, pragmatically, and simply with events is as far beyond the -Chinese Communists as it is beyond other Marxians. - -This orthodoxy, so complete that it enthralls the leadership to Moscow -and paralyzes Marxian heretics in the very act of dissidence, reaches -throughout the upper levels of the party. This fact does not mean that -the Chinese Communist movement is in no wise different from other -national Communist movements. The historical basis of the Chinese -Communism, ever since Chiang smashed the urban unions in 1927, has been -that of an exotic faith imposed upon a native _jacquerie_, in which the -exoticism is unwittingly traditionalist. Peasant revolts of the Chinese -past have operated with the counter-ideocratic leverage of a -superstition, normally Taoist in derivation. The heads of the Yellow -Turbans (ca. 200 A.D.) and the Boxers (ca. 1900) were all magicians; the -T'aip'ing (ca. 1850) leader was a Christian in communication with God -Himself. These heresies against the all-pervading order of Confucian -common sense disappeared after their high-pitched dynamics died down in -social readjustment. - -Marxism provides an element of faith, devotion, and irrational -submission which has operated in past Chinese history. The frugality, -honesty, and integrity of the Chinese Red leaders are celebrated by -foreign visitors and even by Nationalist officials; such revolutionary -virtues seem new in China, whereas they are the twentieth-century -manifestation of a common enough phase of Chinese political activity. -However, one cannot herefrom conclude that the Chinese Communist -movement is destined to disappear with its predecessors, for it has -three things which they did not have: an extra-Chinese application, -which not only supports it, but proves its concreteness and relative -realizability; a modern system of education, and thereby a class of -counter-ideologues to compete with the post-Confucian Nationalists; and -leaders with revolutionary experience greater than any in the world, not -excepting that of the great Soviet leaders themselves. Ancient peasant -uprisings revealed a final cleavage between dervish-type organizers and -the peasants, once infuriated, who finally sought normalcy. If the -Chinese Communist leaders can, through the example of the Soviet Union, -or by education, or by dexterous leadership, make Communism into -normalcy, they may retain their hold on such sections of the peasantry -as their leadership has captured. - -Two men stand forth above all others in Chinese Communism. Both would be -remarkable individuals in any historical setting. Their partnership has -led them to be described by one hyphenated phrase: _Chu-Mao_: Chu Tê and -Mao Tse-tung. Chu Tê, the military genius of Chinese Communism, was born -of a gentry family in Szechuan, and attended the Yünnan Military Academy -at the time that Chiang was in Japan; he entered the years of his early -maturity as an aide to a provincial _tuchün_. According to Edgar Snow, -he was at this time sunk in vice, enjoying wealth, opium-smoking, a -harem, and the amenities of a war-lord existence.[6] Chu felt an urge -within himself to escape this rut. He abandoned his worthless existence, -leaving his harem provided for, and went to the coast, where he could -become acquainted with the revolutionary movement. On the way he broke -himself of the drug habit. He went to Europe, living in France and -Germany, and in the latter country joined the Chinese Communist branch -established among the students. He returned in 1926 during the Great -Revolution, and served as political officer in the Kuomintang forces. -Later he was instrumental in the creation of the Chinese Soviet -Republic, and was the prime military leader of the Communist forces in -the long civil war. He led the trek to the Northwest, and is esteemed as -a military hero of Arthurian proportions. Friendly, candid, interested -in specific tasks, he is characteristic of the superb leadership which -preserved Communism in China. He is the only Chinese military leader who -was not defeated by Chiang, although Chiang pursued him six thousand -miles. Major Evans Carlson, the American Marine officer, compares him -with Robert E. Lee, U. S. Grant, and Abraham Lincoln--drawing on the -best features of each for the purpose.[7] - - [Footnote 6: Snow, Edgar, work cited, p. 348 _ff._] - - [Footnote 7: _Twin Stars of China_, cited, p. 66. Major Carlson adds - to this description in his _The Chinese Army_, cited, p. 35 _ff._ Most - enthusiastically, he attributes to the Red Leaders honesty, humility, - selflessness, truthfulness, incorruptibility, and a desire to do what - is right. He praises their superb tactical abilities, their efficiency - as organizers, their competence as leaders. He accepts the statements - made by the Communist leaders as matters of good faith, and does not - question their sincerity. Since he is the only qualified military - visitor to put his impressions on record, these appraisals are - valuable.] - -Mao Tse-tung was born in Hunan in 1893 of a well-to-do farmer family. -His autobiography, dictated to Edgar Snow, is a classic of Western -literature on China.[8] His history was that of many other restless -young Chinese intellectuals, struggling for education amidst turmoil, -and adjusting their sense of values to the chaotic early Republic. He -was caught up by the Marxism of the literary Renaissance after 1917, -served in the Kuomintang during the Great Revolution, and worked as head -of the All-China Peasants Union. During the Soviet period, in which he -first became a colleague of Chu Tê, he stood forth as the chief -political leader. He and Chu between them formed a team to rival -Generalissimo Chiang, although Mao shared his political leadership with -various others, particularly Chang Kuo-tao. Mao is an expert -dialectician, skilled in rationalizing the policies of the Communist -International, and keenly critical within the limits of his Marxian -orthodoxy. Less genial than Chu Tê, he is nevertheless an inspiring -leader. His political skill, in following the lurches and shifts of the -Stalin party line while simultaneously leading an enormous Chinese -peasant revolt, is monumental. His earlier rivals and colleagues are in -most cases dead or forgotten. He survived both ideological and practical -ordeals. - - [Footnote 8: Snow, Edgar, _Red Star Over China_, cited, p. 111-167.] - -A third Communist leader, Chou En-lai, is of importance because he acts -as liaison officer between the National Government and the Frontier -Area. The Communist quasi-legation in Chungking is maintained as a -purchasing and communications office of the Eighteenth Army Corps -(formerly Eighth Route Army). Chou, who studied abroad in Japan, France, -and Germany, served at the Whampoa academy under Chiang, and in the -period of civil war he was one of the chief political officers, twice -Chinese Communist delegate to Moscow. He is an old acquaintance of many -Kuomintang leaders from Chiang on down, and appears to be one of the -most successful diplomats in the world. Despite acrimony from secondary -leaders on both sides, Chiang and Mao seek to maintain their alliance -against Japan, and Chou is their chief intermediary. At Chungking he is -seconded by the alert, brilliant Ch'in Po-k'u, a veteran of Communist -political-bureau work. - -The difficulties and conditions of Communist collaboration with the -National Government are well illustrated in the life of Chang Kuo-tao. -One of the founders of the Chinese Communist Party in Shanghai, in 1921, -Chang was of the upper classes, like Chu Tê; and like Mao, he was a -radical student in Peking. Just before his departure from the party in -1938, he had been chairman of the Northwestern Soviet, taking precedence -over Mao himself; but with the coming of national unity, Chang wished -to cooperate fully with China's leader, government, and legal Party, the -Kuomintang. He adopted subterfuges to get out of the Communist Area. -Arriving in Hankow, he announced his desire to form a genuine United -Front on the basis of a candid and sincere acceptance of the _San Min -Chu I_, which would mean the actual abandonment of Marxian dreams of -Communist "proletarian" dictatorship in China, even for the future. He -did not renounce Communism, but simply took his colleagues at their -words, and announced his intention of cooperating honestly, and not -through compulsion of the Moscow dialectic. He wrote: - - According to the views of the Chinese Communists, the - present United Front is only a temporary union of many - political groups, which are entirely different from one - another in nature. These political groups have their own - social bases, and they represent the interests of different - classes. "The Kuomintang," so they believe, "represents - landlords and capitalists, while the Communist Party - represents the working class." No [ultimate] compromise can - be made between the two parties. - - Now we often hear such slogans of the Chinese Communists as, - "Let's lead the people _together_," "Let's _all_ take - responsibilities," "Let us _both_ be progressive," and - "Let's act under the _same_ principles." These represent the - old ideas of striving for leadership. These show that they - do not have the foresight to work unselfishly for the nation - and the people. They want to retain their military forces. - They want to maintain the Frontier Area and special, - privileged positions in certain occupied areas. They keep - these in order to await future developments.... - - I hope they [the following suggestions] will receive the - consideration of the Chinese Communists: - - (1) the Chinese Communists should always remember that the - benefits of the nation and the people go before everything. - They should support the movement of Resistance and - Reconstruction under the leadership of Mr. Chiang K'ai-shek. - They should carry out the _San Min Chu I_ without - hesitation. What they do must agree with what they say; - - (2) there should be complete coordination of governmental - and military operations, under all conditions.... I hope the - Chinese Communists will not think that the Eighth Route Army - is one privately owned by the Communist Party.... The - Frontier Area [where Chang Kuo-tao had so recently been - leader] should not be made a Communist base, nor made into - an isolated place where Communist-made laws are executed and - prejudice, together with political persecution, prevails.... - - (3) with a view to working for the nation and the people, - the Communists should follow the foreign policies adopted by - the central government.[9] - - [Footnote 9: Chang Kuo-tao, _T'ou-li Kung-ch'an-tang Mien-mien-kuan_ - [An Impartial Survey of (My) Departure from the Communist Party], - Kuangchou [Canton], 1938, p. 27 _ff._] - -Chang demanded that the Communists react more sincerely, that they -accept the full implications of a united China, and abandon their -long-range dialectic for power.[10] For this he was denounced, his years -of service were reappraised, and he was dropped from the Communist -Party.[11] He was accused of hurting the United Front, because he urged -a more nearly perfect union. The chief Communist leaders challenged him -in open letters, revealing their continued adherence to an ideology -which made an eventual struggle for power inescapable. - - [Footnote 10: The same, p. 10.] - - [Footnote 11: The Resolutions of the Enlarged Sixth Plenary Session of - the Central Executive Committee of the Communist Party of China - comment as follows: "The danger of the 'Right' opportunists lies in - the fact that they execute the tactics of an anti-Japanese National - United Front at the expense of the independence of the party, - politically and organizationally distorting the policy of the - proletariat [_sic_] in building an Anti-Japanese National United Front - so that _the working class and the Communist Party become tails of the - bourgeoisie rather than the vanguard_." (Italics inserted in - translation.) New China Information Committee, _Resolutions and - Telegrams of the Sixth Plenum, Central Committee, Communist Party of - China, November 6, 1938_, Hong Kong [1939?], p. 9. The demand for - vanguard position from a minority party still technically illegal, and - the damning of the Government and Kuomintang as "bourgeois," are - continuous features of Communist policy. Their concept of cooperation - is, as in Germany, Spain, and elsewhere, cooperation _under_ Communist - leadership.] - -The Communists have, therefore, cooperated as far as they are able, -without emerging from the infallibilities of their cult. They retain the -Marxian rationalization apparatus, and the linkage with Moscow. As such, -they are welcome but not completely trustworthy allies. Their presence -is undoubtedly the greatest check to the development of democracy in -China; the presence of a totalitarian party, respecting no rules but its -own, jeopardizes the entire experiment. The Communists want democracy, -but they want it quite frankly as a step toward "working-class" -(Marxist) power; they accept the _San Min Chu I_ on the condition that -it be read as elementary Marxism. They do not insist on the term -Communism, but employ the terms "working-class" interests for their -party, "scientific objectivity" for their ideology, and "a people's -movement" for radical, arbitrary reforms to rip Free China open with -social revolution. The Kuomintang leaders are fully aware of the support -in name plus subversion in fact which the Communists offer, and complain -bitterly about the principles of Sun being twisted about to Marxism as -in the form of "'independent' nationalism, 'free' democracy, and -'beneficent' livelihood," the qualifying terms sufficing for the -alignment.[12] They understand that the Communists are incapable of -sincere extra-class democracy; the Communists are hurt by the -Kuomintang's unwillingness to admit that it is not a Party of patriots, -but the Party of a transitional, historically doomed middle class. - - [Footnote 12: Ch'ao Shê [The Morning Club], _Niu-wu Yen-lun Chien-t'ao - Kang-yao_ [A General Review of Fallacious Utterances], Chungking, XXIX - (1940), p. 7. The work is a Kuomintang reply to Communist theses in a - debate on the nature of national union.] - - -COMMUNISM: PATRIOTISM OR BETRAYAL? - -If the Communists were as inflexible, disciplined, ferocious, and -intransigeant as they like to appear to themselves, China would have -had a three-sided war long ago. In practice, however, the Chinese -Communists yield amazingly. The Communist International is not goading -the Chinese Communists into the sabotage of Chiang and of national -resistance. Whether Moscow could do so is a standing question of Chinese -politics. The answer cannot be known except by practical test. One -might, however, plausibly suppose that an attempt by Stalin to -consummate a Moscow-Tokyo pact (possibly in accordance with pressure -from Berlin, which would require immediate protection of the proletarian -fatherland) would create a deep schism in Communist ranks; but it is -unthinkable that all the Chinese Communists would abjure their faith. -Moscow would not be naive enough to require the Communists to cease -fighting Japan _in form_. Such a Kuomintang-Communist break would -probably weaken the National Government; it would not destroy the -Chungking regime unless the Generalissimo ignored the chance offered by -a Leftward turn, to retain some of the peasant-radical and guerrilla -forces in his own ranks. It would, however, enormously strengthen Japan, -and be a severe blow to China. The greatest danger of a -Kuomintang-Communist break would lie in an American defeat of Japan. By -removing the necessity of Soviet support of Chiang, and increasing the -power of the National Government, American aid would lessen the -opportunities of Communism in China. - -At present, however, the Chinese Communists welcome American aid, even -though the effect of such aid is to strengthen the China of Chiang as -against the China of Chu-Mao. The Communist spokesman, Ch'in Po-k'u, -told the author that American aid was not feared in China, but was -_welcome_, emphasizing the word. He even stated, in response to a -far-fetched hypothetical question, that actual American troops would be -welcome at Yenan, and stated that inter-party trouble was to be expected -only in case of defeat.[13] - - [Footnote 13: Statement of Col. Ch'in Po-k'u to the author, Chungking, - July 29, 1940.] - -The final picture of the Communist position which emerges in China is -about as follows: - -(1) the Communists are gaining ground because of their helpfulness and -vigorous leadership in organizing the guerrilla areas; wherever the -Japanese forces go, the Communists (thus shielded from Chinese National -armies) increase their influence; - -(2) the Communists are benefiting politically by a genuine popular -movement in both Free and occupied China, particularly in the latter, -where spontaneous mass action is providing a base either for -Sunyatsenist democracy or for Communism in the future; - -(3) in view of their belief that time is on their side, because of the -present direction of Soviet foreign policy, the Chinese Communists are -very cooperative in the alliance against Japan, patiently postponing -demands for "democracy" (i.e., unrestricted rights of organization and -agitation); - -(4) they have superlative leadership, rich in practical experience, -which represents the super-orthodox residuum of years of schism and -purging; such a leadership is not likely to abandon the fundamentals of -Communism, such as the dialectic, the class-outlook on all history and -politics, and belief in the inescapable universality of future -"proletarian" rule (Communist world conquest); therefore, it is almost -unthinkable that they would fail to do Moscow's bidding, if the party -line demanded national treason in war time; - -(5) the interests of the Soviet Union run parallel with those of -non-Communist China for a long time in the future, unless the European -balance of power forces the U.S.S.R. to appease Japan; under such -circumstances, the Soviet Union will be very anxious to maintain the -foothold of Communism in China, and will not be likely to ask the -Chinese Communists to commit candid treason; - -(6) lastly, the Kuomintang possesses the opportunity of rivaling -Communism, of overtaking its rate of growth in political power, by a -bold policy of freeing speech, constitutionalizing the government, -reforming the land tenure system, and pushing cooperative industrialism; -the base of Communism has been widespread peasant revolt. If the -conditions of peasant revolt are eliminated, Communism will not be much -more of a threat to China than it is to the advanced countries of -Europe. (Wisely or not, the Kuomintang has not consented to meet the -Communists in open ideological competition. If it did so, and won, -Kuomintang morale would be strengthened. At present the practical aims -of Party policy toward Communists are about as follows: restriction and -isolation of the Frontier Area and of the Border Region, so far as -agitation is concerned, before ingestion by the constitutional national -system; military precautions, balancing Communist forces with -Nationalist; standardization of Red military practice by national rules, -and the elimination of peculiar political features; eventual dissolution -of fellow-travelling organizations, and their absorption into the -corresponding officially sponsored movements; supervision of Communists -and channels of Communist propaganda; courtesy toward Communist leaders, -strictness toward Communist subordinates, and harshness toward the -Communist laboring class following. A corresponding policy toward the -Kuomintang is pursued by the Communists.) - -Finally, the deepest element eludes political analysis: the moderation -of the Chinese character, and the heritage of Confucian common sense. -The Chinese language and the Confucian inheritance of ideological -sophistication lead to clarity, pragmatism, and practicality. The -Chinese have long delighted in ingenious formulae with which to meet _de -jure_ impasses, while proceeding _de facto_ in quite another direction. -The Chinese are perhaps the only people in the world with enough finesse -about "face" to save the Communist face. The Generalissimo is in theory -consciously anti-Marxian; but when he was asked whether it is possible -that Communists or Leftists might exploit democratic rights for -unscrupulous power politics, he answered quietly by writing: "No, -because democracy in itself has the ability to work out the solutions -for those problems if there are any." A Communist leader said, the -Generalissimo would have nothing to fear from the Communists if he won -the war. His prestige would be unassailable. Chiang and the Communists -both know this. - - -THE NATIONAL SALVATION MOVEMENT - -The National Salvation (_Chiu Kuo_) movement is third in point of size -and influence, and has been largely instrumental in assisting national -unification and resistance. The movement began in 1935 with the -organization of a number of professors, students, and young -intellectuals who were influenced by the student anti-appeasement -movement in North China. It had a simple, and very clear program: stop -civil war; stop appeasement.[14] Unlike the Kuomintang or the -Communists, the National Salvationists never developed formal dogma, or -a comprehensive ideology. Genuinely a movement, it had no membership -books, no formal or systematic organization, no minorities, and no -schisms. The movement spread like wildfire, across the length and -breadth of China as well as overseas; and, because of its lack of formal -hierarchy, was ignored by the National Government. Its loose -organization, consciously based on the middle class of clerks, students, -business men, professors, etc., followed functional lines familiar to -the Chinese. - - [Footnote 14: An early statement of National Salvation views is found - in Wang Tsao-shih, "A Salvationist's View of the Sino-Japanese - Problem," _The China Quarterly_, Vol. II, No. 4 (Special Fall Number, - 1937), p. 681-9. The author is one of the Seven Gentlemen.] - -When the National Salvationists began the creation of a structure, -however rudimentary, by forming an inter-professional federation for -National Salvation, and when they followed this with the national -congress for National Salvation, the government took action, which -resulted in the celebrated trial of the Seven Gentlemen (_ch'i -chün-tzŭ_). The term (_chün-tzŭ_) is the Confucian word for -superior or upright person, without reference to gender, and was applied -in affectionate derision by the press. One of the _chün-tzŭ_ was a -lady. The seven, who included a celebrated and popular law school dean -(Shên Chun-lu), a banker, and authors (Tso Tao-fên, the spokesman among -them) were tried and imprisoned late in 1936. Demands for their release -figured in the Sian kidnapping. - -The movement was financed very simply through volunteer contributions. -Most of the work was done by volunteers who asked no pay, travelling and -working at their own expense. About Ch. $5,000 (then about U. S. $1,000) -sufficed to cover the whole expenses of headquarters. Despite the -imprisonment of its leaders, the movement gathered momentum. Funds were -collected to support guerrillas opposing Japan in transmural China. Most -literate persons not already committed to formal Kuomintang or Communist -membership fell under the influence of the movement. General Shêng -Shih-ts'ai in Sinkiang offered the movement a home, and many of its -workers went to the West. - -In practical terms, the National Salvationists often work with the -Communist Party, although they are strictly Chinese and do not have an -elaborate dialectic. A strain of economic determinism runs through their -thought, but this is not systematized. The leaders of the movement were -released after the outbreak of war, but their organizations continued to -be suppressed, and work is largely suspended. The leaders told the -author that they had no means of estimating the actual number of their -adherents; they had no formal membership roll, and they were still -legally suppressed in Chungking areas. The quest for policy and -principle instead of power is new to Chinese politics, and the National -Salvation leaders are esteemed almost universally and hated by none. -Nevertheless the Kuomintang has not admitted the legality of the -movement, which continues to exist in non-public fashion. Some of the -leaders were recognized to the extent of being put on the People's -Political Council. In addition to standing with the Communists in -matters of practical domestic reform, the National Salvation leaders -demand two fundamental policies: continuation of the war, and unity of -the country above all party considerations. - -The National Salvation leaders are able, modest, and patriotic. They -represent the older non-political sentiment of China, infused with -modern Leftist content. Dean Shên of Shanghai, the senior of the -movement, is an elderly man of almost dainty gentleness, keenly -intelligent demeanor, and serious but charming good humor. Mr. Tso -Tao-fên, an author, is a world traveller. Their colleagues are of the -student, publisher, author type: intellectual, patriotic, common-sense -in outlook. - -The National Salvation movement looks forward to constitutionalism. It -has become almost universal in the guerrilla areas. The leaders have -faith that the Constitution and liberalized public life are developing, -although they expected in the summer of 1940 that the Convention would -be postponed until 1941, to allow the Communists and Nationalists -further opportunity for balancing and adjusting power relationships. The -National Salvationists are past masters in the techniques of indirect, -almost invisible pressures. Their disinterestedness, high principles, -and patriotism put them in an admirable position to act as a determined -moderating force between the two major Parties. As such they are the -third party of China, although another, smaller group bears this name. - - -THE THIRD PARTY - -The party commonly called The Third Party (_Ti-san Tang_) was organized -by dissident Communists and Left Kuomintang members who wished to keep -on collaborating after the major parties broke apart in 1927, thus -ending the Great Revolution. Led by the indomitable Têng Yen-ta, who was -finally shot to death in Shanghai, the party began illustriously with -the participation of Mme. Sun Yat-sen (Soong Ching-ling) and the Left -ex-Foreign Minister, Eugene Chen. The formal names of the party varied. -From 1927 to 1929, and again from 1930 to 1937, it was the Revolutionary -Action Commission of the Chinese Kuomintang (_Chung-kuo Kuo-min-tang -K'ê-ming Hsing-chêng Wei-yüan-hui_); in 1929-1930, the Chinese -Revolutionary Party (_Chung-kuo K'ê-ming Tang_); and after 1937, the -Acting Commission for the National Emancipation of China (_Min-ts'u -Chieh-fang Hsing-chêng Wei-yüan-hui_).[15] The party is at present led -by Dr. Chang Pai-chün, a returned student from Germany and lieutenant to -the late Mr. Têng. It suffers from the official ban on minor parties, -but retains, by its own statement, a formal organized membership of -about 15,000. (This estimate would, in the opinion of independent -observers, need to be discounted.) - - [Footnote 15: Statement by the head of The Third Party, Dr. Chang - Pai-chün (Chang Peh Chuen), to the author, Chungking, August 2, 1940. - The translations were also supplied by Dr. Chang.] - -The Third Party is a _San Min Chu I_ party. It accepts the legacies of -Dr. Sun, in their Left-most phase as they were at the time of his death. -The party is strongly anti-imperialist, socialist, and land-reform in -its teaching. Its socialism is of an independent kind; the party neither -seeks nor wishes collaboration with the Third International, although it -is willing to cooperate with the Communists as well as the Kuomintang. -It finds its chief political dogma in the last policies of Sun, executed -in the period just before his death: (1) a pro-Soviet orientation in -international power politics; (2) a Nationalist-Communist entente; and -(3) immediate aid for the peasants and workers. It is therefore more -like the old Left Kuomintang than the Communists. - -At the present time, the party seeks to promote collaboration between -the two major parties, thus becoming the second third-party to that -friendship, and urges constitutional government. Eventually it would -prefer a representative government of the whole people (_p'ing min_), -with the executive agencies composed 60 per cent of peasants and -workers, 40 per cent of others, chiefly intellectuals. (The proportion -is believed to be Mme. Sun's contribution.) In past practical politics, -The Third Party took part in the Foochow insurrection of 1933-34, but -has on no other occasion obtained power. It is not expected to attain -major status. - - -THE CHINESE NATIONAL SOCIALIST PARTY - -The elder brother of Chang Kia-ngau, who is the enterprising Minister of -Economic Affairs, has organized a political party after the fashion of -the traditional pavilions of learning and patriotism. In China's past, -Confucians frequently developed an institution which admixed the -features of a perpetual resort camp, a library, a seminar, and a club. -Living together amid scenically beautiful and scholastically adequate -surroundings, they made their influence felt through their writings and -their example, whenever one of their number returned to public life. Dr. -Carson Chang (Chang Chia-shêng) has organized an Institute of National -Culture at Talifu in Yünnan, in the mountains just below Tibet. There -he associates with kindred souls to attempt a restoration of traditional -values in the traditional manner. - -The confusing and unhappy similarity of the name of his party to Adolf -Hitler's party is explained in the following communication: - - To give to the world in a clear and unambiguous way the - principles our party stands for and the platform we wish to - adopt should we have the chance to serve our country, I have - written a book, entitled _What A State Is Built On_. In - formulating my political philosophy, though I have drawn - freely upon the wisdom of the West, I have kept my eye - steadily on the needs of my people and the circumstances of - my country as the guiding and controlling principles in - shaping my own thought. In view of the possibility of - distortions you have suggested in your letter, an extract is - now being prepared in English, with the idea to facilitate - the understanding of our movement and to present to the - intellectual world of the West our principles and policies - ... - - The accidental similarity of names between our party and - Hitler's is indeed an endless source of misunderstanding, - but the similarity is truly "accidental." In Chinese the - name of our party runs "Kuo Chia She Hui Tang," which may be - literally translated into "Nation (Kuo Chia) Society (She - Hui) Party (Tang)," a name we adopted long before Hitler's - party became known, embodying principles widely different - from what Hitler's party stands for. The suspicion abroad of - our connection with Hitler's National Socialist Party may be - traced to an incident two years ago at Hankow when - Kuomintang first came to recognize the legal status of minor - political parties. The foreign correspondents, in reporting - my exchange of letters with Generalissimo Chiang with regard - to the recognition of our party, referred without a second - thought to our party as "Nazi," thus creating all - distortions which might have occurred even without such - mischief. I shall be more than grateful to you if you would - undertake to clear the suspicion on us and pave the way for - lasting understanding between us and your people.[16] - - [Footnote 16: Letter to the author, dated October 24, 1940.] - - -SOCIAL DEMOCRATS AND _La Jeunesse_ - -These two minuscule parties are both expatriate groups organized in -Paris. The Social Democratic Party was organized in 1925. It has no -connection with the Socialist Party of the pro-Japanese Kiang Kang-hu, -but is simply the Chinese affiliate of the Second International. The -Social Democratic Party may unite with the Third Party, in view of the -close similarity of aims and ideology; its leader, Mr. Yang Kan-tao, has -been recognized by being seated in the People's Political Council. - -The party called _Kuo-chia Chu-i Pai_ (_La Jeunesse_, or _Parti -Républicain Nationaliste de la Jeune Chine_) was organized in 1923 in -Paris, by a Mr. Tseng Chi, with whom is now associated Mr. Tso -Shen-sheng, the most active worker for the party. It survived for years -as an expatriate organization, joined by successive generations of -Chinese students in France. Its policies are strongly democratic and -social-minded. A functional legislature, the cooperative movement and -state capitalism have suggested a similarity to Fascism in the minds of -some observers; of Trotskyism, to others.[17] The party, through -accident and the family connections of its founder, has connections in -Szechuan, and the transfer of the National Government to Chungking was a -corresponding aid to the slight influence of the party. Long in exile, -it is known by one of its French names even in China; all it does is to -help diversify opinion. Mr. Tso occupies a seat in the People's -Political Council.[18] - - [Footnote 17: E.g., John Gunther in his _Inside Asia_, New York, 1939, - p. 272.] - - [Footnote 18: By far the most complete summary of the minor and - minuscule parties is to be found in two articles by a young Chinese - newspaperman: Shen, James, "Minority Parties in China," _Asia_, Vol. - XL, no. 2 (February 1940), p. 81-3; and a second installment, in the - same periodical. Vol. XL, no. 3 (March 1940), p. 137-9.] - -The National Salvationists are an operating force in China, and the -Communists, while a minority party, are not a minor party in the -American sense. Unhappily, the existence of minuscule parties among both -patriots and pro-Japanese elements suggests that multi-party -constitutionalism is likely to degenerate into innumerable party -fractions, splinter parties, and novel, unstable groups. The Kuomintang -and the Communists possess their respective monopolies of power; the -National Salvationists have a popular and sincere cause. The other -parties exist in part because they obtain recognition. As long as -Chinese political processes depend on leadership by personality, -individuals will be free to form their own parties, while the -geographical, cultural, and economic diversity of the country holds out -little hope for the appearance of two or three China-wide democratic -parties. Far more likely is it that, with the presumable advent of -constitutionalism, the Kuomintang-Communist alignment will continue, -while the present minor parties will gain some ground, and innumerable -new parties will appear in order to profit by democratic guarantees of -minimal representation, or to fulfill functions exercised by fraternal -societies in the United States. - - - - -CHAPTER VII - -GOVERNING INSTITUTIONS OF THE JAPANESE AND PRO-JAPANESE - - -Facing the National Armies, and encircling the guerrillas, lie the -Imperial Japanese forces. Frank agents of Imperial policy, they--unlike -the Hitler-Mussolini contingents in Spain--make no pretense of -subordination to their Chinese allies. Publicly and legally instruments -of the Japanese state, their function is to destroy the Chinese -government, to control and bend Chinese society to the Imperial -purposes, and to protect Chinese who come forth as allies. The Japanese -Empire is accordingly itself militarily extended to China; occasional, -half-hearted attempts to deny the ensuing international complications -have been sternly rejected by other great powers. The United States is -not alone in insisting on full Japanese responsibility for everything -that happens within the zone of Japanese control. - -The position of the Japanese army as a governing engine, unacknowledged -colonial machinery of a vast unassimilable colony, is not one relished -by the Japanese people or by their leaders. Even in the case of -Manchoukuo, the Japanese played a half-deception on themselves by -pretending that they were extending the area of their influence, not the -extent of their responsibilities. In part this distaste for overt -control is based on the ease, cheapness and irresponsibility of indirect -rule, employed in varying degrees by the British in Malaysia, the French -in Indo-China, and the Soviets in Outer Mongolia. The Japanese like to -think that they are aiding China, and incidentally themselves, to a New -Order in East Asia--autarkic, stable, racially independent of the -Whites, militarily secure. They do not like to contemplate the slaughter -of innocent people for sheer conquest, or to consider the hopeless -immensity of trying to overwhelm China. This complicates their -position.[1] - - [Footnote 1: An excellent bibliography, providing further references - to the Japanese side of the war, is found in Borton, Hugh, _et al._, - _A Selected List of Books and Articles on Japan_, Washington, D. C., - 1940. An outstanding short discussion is Colegrove, K. W., _Militarism - in Japan_, Boston (World Peace Foundation), 1936.] - -For if the status of the Japanese army in China is clear, its purposes -are not. The war aims of the Japanese are confused. Japan's goal is -defined by overtones of the inexpressible--in economic motivation, once -valid, no longer meaningful; in rationalizations so long reiterated that -they become genuine; in the toss and push of world affairs, tempting -Japan's leaders to this opportunism or that; in sheer sentiments of -Japanolatry, Emperor-worship, racialism, archaic resentment against -China, fellow-feeling for the Chinese orientals, and plain fear. A few -Japanese know exactly what they want. The policy as a whole, the policy -of the Imperial state, encompasses ill-assorted economic, political, -strategic, racial and purely ideological objectives. - -Even at the simple level of institutional control, the Japanese aim in -China has been ill-defined. The restoration of the Manchu monarchy in -Manchoukuo was an appeal to monarchist legitimism, to the Chinese past, -and to common Confucianist values. When the Japanese came further into -China, it was at first expected that they might install Mr. Chin P'u-yi -as Emperor of all China, and rehabilitate him in the Palace-museum he -left when a youth. Instead, they apparently attempted to create a chain -of linked, reactionary, agricultural Chinese states, mixed in form--a -federation of princes in Inner Mongolia, an Empire in Manchoukuo, -republics elsewhere. They began by going as far as to create a dozen or -more ephemeral pro-Japanese agencies--for a while one might legitimately -have expected that a Nanking government follow a Peking government, a -Hankow government, a Canton government, _ad infinitum_. But the trend -was reversed when the Autonomous East Hopei Anti-Communist Government of -Mr. Yin Ju-kêng was merged with the Peking regime, and--as pressure rose -in Japan for a settlement of the China affair--a China-wide Japanophile -government was first contemplated, and then established. The -establishment of these institutions has not meant the abdication of the -Imperial Japanese forces from the government of China. The pro-Japanese -governments were and are civil auxiliaries of the Japanese army; their -influence has in no case extended beyond the immediately effective reach -of the Japanese infantry. Even in planning the long-range permanent -settlement of Chinese affairs--on her own terms--Japan does not propose -to withdraw all her troops from China. - - -THE JAPANESE ARMY AS A CHINESE GOVERNMENT - -The Japanese army is the effective military government of occupied -China. The Japanophile Chinese have a few troops, who function in close -proximity to Japanese, and are in no sense a military counterweight to -the invaders. The Japanese army is a large force, modern by somewhat -second-rate standards, which requires the use of an effective -communications system, modern economic auxiliaries such as shops, banks, -post offices, and a variety of other services including hospitals, -shrines, brothels, and crematories. These do not exist in China in forms -suited to Japanese needs, nor could Japan afford to trust Chinese with -the railways, the air services, the river commerce, the telegraphs, the -food warehouses, and other most vital services. Thus, all over occupied -China, the Japanese have installed a military government. - -This government assumes direct responsibility for administering whatever -seems necessary or profitable. Thus, in the city of Nanking, the best -buildings are occupied by the Japanese, and the Wang government is -profoundly gratified to be allowed to share some of them, obtaining -second choice. The Japanese military, through protected corporations, -supervises the operation of the railroads and airlines, but it does not -even rely on the corporations to provide military transport, which is -under direct army control. If a Chinese who has gone over to the -Japanese and occupies a high position in their protected governments -wishes to ride on a Chinese train between Shanghai and Nanking, he must -buy a ticket from a Japanese clerk, show it to a Japanese conductor -under the eyes of a Japanese guard, with Japanese detectives standing -about, order a Sino-Japanese or pseudo-European meal in a Japanese -dining car with Japanese waitresses from a menu printed in Japanese, and -must pay, not in his own puppet-bank currency, but in special Japanese -currency not acceptable in Japan. - -To govern China, the Japanese Army has not developed beyond the usual -devices of military rule. There are several reasons for this, primary -among them the difficulty of governing Chinese at all. In a pluralistic -society, such as China, command is largely superseded by negotiation, -and the issuer of a command must be prepared for oblique thwarting. A -Japanese who tells a Chinese to do something needs a bayonet with which -to gesture; otherwise the Chinese, accustomed to circumventing, -avoiding, or mocking authority, will disregard him. The Germans may -order the Danes to make a two-way street a one-way street, and the -Danes, accustomed to authority, will concur. When the Japanese -promulgate a regulation, nothing short of massacre could ensure its -absolute, unconditional obedience. - -The language difficulty is another obstacle to direct Japanese -government. A cultivated Japanese and Chinese may write classical -Chinese to one another, and even the barely literate can scribble a few -characters, the meanings of which may coincide; but the spoken languages -differ from one another almost as much as English differs from either. -To govern China directly would involve an enormous feat of language -training, or an overnight re-shaping of the Chinese national character. -Non-violent resistance, wilful but concealed negligence, lurking -impertinence, consistent sloppiness, obsequiousness mingled with -hatred--these Chinese tools of resistance, added to the language -barrier, prevent any early Japanese hope of direct government. In years -to come, if such come, Japanese trained in the Chinese language could -supersede every Chinese above the level of foreman. A strong tendency in -that direction is observable in Manchoukuo.[2] - - [Footnote 2: Bisson, T. A., _Japan In China_, cited, _passim_, for - many instances.] - -The Japanese have abandoned direct government for the present. They -would defeat their own purposes by assuming a task for which they have -insufficient personnel, which would be very costly, and for which their -army is ill-equipped in morale or technical ability. Difficult though it -may be to employ pro-Japanese Chinese associates, it would be even more -difficult to find Chinese now ready to profess direct loyalty to Japan. -The only Chinese thus far Japanized are a number of Taiwanese -(Formosans), whose island was ceded to Japan forty-six years ago. -Chinese by blood and language, many of them have been reared in the -third generation of Japanese rule. Some are fighting with the Chinese -forces, but others, loyal to their lawful superiors, betray their -fellow-Chinese. The Formosans are insufficient in number to govern -China, or to provide Japan with even the most elementary foothold. The -Japanese have hence turned to the peculiar form of indirect rule -identified by the popular appellation, _puppet states_. - - -THE PROBLEM OF PUPPET STATES - -Lawful, well-established indirect rule is a familiar feature of colonial -practice. Constituting an internationally recognized legal relationship -between the paramount power and the encompassed state, it has been -applied extensively by the European powers in Africa and Asia. The -Indian and Malay states, under Britain; Cambodia and Annam-Tonkin, under -France; the East Indian sultanates, under the Netherlands--these offer a -rich repository of precedent. - -Unacknowledged intervention involving no legal relationship is also a -known feature of modern politics. The practices of the United States in -the Caribbean and Central America, particularly during the 1920's, are -familiar, but the leading case of intervention without responsibility -occurred in the relationship between the Soviet Union (first the -R.S.F.S.R.) and the Outer Mongol People's Republic. Four features of -what has since come to be called political puppetry are here made fully -manifest: first, the establishment of the subordinate through the -military aid of the superior; second, the continued effective control, -unacknowledged in law, of the subordinate by the superior, coupled with -economic coordination of the two; third, bilateral insistence upon the -formal independence of the subordinate state; fourth, the claim -of the superior that it _has not_ intervened, coupled with -international non-recognition of the new relationship. The four -features--establishment, coordination, fictitious independence and -international nonentity--were clearly defined by Soviet political -practice in Outer Mongolia and Tannu-Tuva long before Manchoukuo was -created. - -In addition to this neighborly example, the Japanese had another source, -commonly ignored in current Western comment on the Far East, on which to -draw: the quasi-familist Confucian international system which prevailed -down to the time of men now living. Successive Chinese Empires developed -a clear, viable scheme of senior-junior relationships controlling their -intercourse with other organized governments. The other, smaller states -acknowledged China to be the senior realm, conceding that the Chinese -Emperor was lord of the world. They paid formal tribute to China; their -envoys were not ambassadors but tributary agents, while Chinese envoys -came as high commissioners, superior in rank to the courts to which they -were accredited. This relationship (awkwardly termed "dependency," -"vassalage," "tributary" status, or subjection to "suzerainty," in -Western terms) could not be fitted into the Western state system. -Involving the assertion of Chinese power without concurrent admission of -Chinese responsibility, it was rejected by the Western states, and -lapsed following the French seizure of Indo-China, the British -occupation of Burma, and Korean independence under Japanese compulsion. -Today, Japan's moral effusions concerning the New Order in East Asia and -her digressions from Western patterns of international law in dealing -with Manchoukuo and Wang Ch'ing-wei both indicate that the Japanese move -freely, sincerely, and unconsciously in a frame of reference which, -obvious to them, is invisible to Westerners. The Japan-Manchoukuo or -Japan-Wang relationship could be aligned with the relationship which Li -Hung-chang wished, sixty years ago, to maintain in Korea, and found -significantly similar. The Japanese understood the position of -juniority in international relations: to their intense humiliation, they -confessed themselves China's junior during the Ashikaga period.[3] - - [Footnote 3: It is unfortunate that work on the nature of old Far - Eastern international relations has no more than just begun. - Descriptions from the viewpoint of Western international law often - possess the unreal lucidity of dialectical materialism or of - theosophy, since it is necessary to read into Chinese and other Far - Eastern political institutions the characteristic features of a - European invention--the juridical, omnicompetent, secular, - territorially limited state. See Djang Chu, _The Chinese Suzerainty_, - unpublished doctoral dissertation, the Johns Hopkins University, 1935; - Nelson, Melvin Frederick, _The International Status of Korea, - 1876-1910_ unpublished doctoral dissertation, Duke University, 1939, - particularly Part I, "The International Society of Confucian - Monarchies" and Part II, "Korea in Conflicting Societies of Nations"; - both attempt to reconstruct the working Asiatic theory in terms - comprehensible to the West. Clyde, Paul H., _United States Policy - Toward China_, Durham, 1940, Section XXIV, gives a succinct statement - and relevant American public documents.] - -A third meaningful context for Japanese practice is found in the basic, -factual scheme of current international relations. No nation in an -interdependent world is independent except by legal fiction; none could -maintain its present level of civilization without the existence of the -others. In these terms, legal independence fades as time passes, and -cross-national power becomes more evident. Western imperialism was -described by Sun Yat-sen as reducing China to a hypo-colony. More -recently, first the Communists and then the Japanese have accused Chiang -K'ai-shek of being the puppet of imperialism,[4] while occasional -Leftists regard Chiang as even now a puppet of Japan[5] and a few -citizens of imperialist states see him as a Communist puppet. The -Germans treat Churchill as the puppet of Roosevelt, and Roosevelt as a -puppet for international Jewry, while the present Stalinist line -attributes puppetry to the entire catalogue of world political -institutions save those made quick by its own infallibility. The -fundamental point of such appraisal depends upon the _attribution_ of -power relationships. Dependence is indisputable only if one government -functions within the military framework of another, or if the personnel -of the subordinate is drawn from the superior, or if clear and immediate -causal relationships can be proved between the continued fiscal or -military action of the sustaining government and the actual existence of -the sustained government--although even this last leads to subjective -interpretation. - - [Footnote 4: Taylor, George, _The Struggle for North China_, cited, p. - 66.] - - [Footnote 5: Statements to the author, by persons not in Chungking.] - -The term _puppet_ is not clear or apt, except in its most concrete -sense--that of a person who is almost literally a marionette, whose -utterances public and private are not his own, whose actions are -supervised, and whose personal choice or opinion is not merely thwarted, -but left out of consideration. Not all the Chinese who work with Japan -are ventriloquists' dummies. The author talked freely with men who -staked their careers on the inescapable success of the Japanese -military, and who functioned in absolute conformity to general limits of -policy and publicity laid down by the Japanese; these general limits -were wide enough to permit a considerable degree of latitude of manners, -and to allow variance in power and policy between the various Chinese -under Japan. Use of the term _puppet_ in such cases is not clear. It -implies a higher degree of effective Japanese control, and a greater -pliability of Chinese cooperators, than can be shown to exist. - -Since, however, the National Government is recognized, both by the -majority of the Chinese people and by _all_ powers (including Germany -and Italy) except Japan, to be the legitimate government of China, -representing the Chinese nation, action against that government may -properly and strictly be denominated treason; a person so acting may be -called, formally, a traitor and, less formally but more descriptively, a -Japanophile. Juridically the Chinese Soviet leaders were also traitors, -but they were never Japanophile. This term gains by specificity what it -loses through awkwardness. - - -THE PROVISIONAL AND REFORMED GOVERNMENTS - -The Japanese have determined, assisted and promoted establishment of a -number of friendly Chinese governments. Huapeikuo, a North China -separatist state, went the way of the Francophile Rhineland Republic; it -never got off the drafting board. The East Hopei Autonomous -Anti-Communist Government of Mr. Yin Ju-kêng provided, within the North -China demilitarized zone, a vast gateway for smuggling; when the -National Government withdrew its forces from North China, the Japanese -sought more pretentious aids to conquest. The Provisional Government was -the first of these, following an Inner Mongol federation (_Mêng-liu -Lien-ho Tzŭ-chih Chêng-fu_), affiliated with Manchoukuo; it was soon -rivaled by the Reformed Government; and in March 1940, both were -incorporated into the Reorganized National Government of Mr. Wang -Ch'ing-wei. Other governments, sponsored by various quarreling -departments of the Japanese military, or organized by Chinese confidence -men, have appeared transiently and then disappeared. - -Three points concerning Japanophile governments contribute to assessment -of their chances; their origin and structure; their ideological -(narrowly, propagandist) position; and their personnel. These points -illustrate a significantly ambivalent trend: the Japanese have found -their degree of freedom of action less than they had expected in Chinese -politics, and to that extent have been defeated; they have also yielded -to the demands of the situation, and have won, in part, in that their -chances of success appreciate with realism. - -The Provisional Government of the Republic of China (_Chung-hua Min-kuo -Lin-shih Chêng-fu_) was formed at Peking on December 14, 1937, and ended -by merger into the Wang Ch'ing-wei government on March 30, 1940, -perpetuating a high degree of separatism under the subgovernmental -style, North China Political Council. Like its predecessors and -successors, it was created by a self-proclaimed committee organized with -the consent and knowledge of the Japanese military, if not by the -Japanese directly. The members of the Provisional Government were old, -weak men, mostly adherents of the Anfu clique which had been Japanophile -during and after the War of 1914-18. A few were even brought forth from -more archaic strata, lonely adherents to the abandoned monarchy. The -youngest were in their fifties and the leading officers were extreme -conservatives--men of some intelligence and reputation, but obsolete. - -The structure of the _Lin-shih_ Government was interesting in that it -formed a republic of three committees, as follows:[6] - - PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT (Committee) - - | - |---Political Council - | - |--------Administrative - Executive Division (Committee)-----| Ministries and - | Boards - | - |---Secretariat - Legislative Division (Committee)---| - | - Judicial Division (Committee)------| - - - [Footnote 6: Nyi, P. C., "Plans for Economic and Political Hegemony in - China," cited, p. 239. Compare this with the chart in George Taylor, - work cited, p. 204. Professor Taylor's study covers the entire history - of the Provisional Government, significantly aligned with that of its - rival, the guerrilla Border Region.] - -Structurally important features are: the absence of any method of -election, direct or indirect, or of any ultimate source of "sovereign" -personnel--the government having borne itself out of chaos, -constitutionally a remarkable feat; the elimination of even nominal -party control of government, or cameral legislation, or constituent -assembly, these being hated vestiges of the Chinese and Western, but not -Japanese, notion that popular sovereignty is to receive genuflections if -not credence; and, most startlingly, the absence of a head! There was no -President, Protector, Chief of State, Leader, or Dictator; the highest -officer was the Shanghai banker, Mr. Wang K'ê-min, Chairman of the -Executive Division (literally, _yüan_, but not in the Nationalist -sense). The scope, succession and competence of this Provisional -Government were as much in doubt as its origin. - -Under the Provisional Government there flowered a new political -philosophy, the _Hsin Min Chu I_ ("Principles of the Renewed People," -"People-Renewing Principles," or "Principles of the New People"). The -similarity of this principle to the _San Min Chu I_ is striking, but is -no more than verbal. Propaganda under this credo resembled the -Japanese-prepared state-philosophy of _Wang Tao_, the _kingly_ (as -opposed to tyrannous and unnatural) _way_ of the Confucian canon, -which--revered throughout the Far East, even by Sun Yat-sen--had been -slanted to suit Manchoukuo through a Concordia Society (_Hsieh-ho-hui_). -Each of the Sunyatsenist principles was refuted in detail, Pan-Asian -racialism was encouraged, a class-war _between_ the nations was -emphasized, and conservatism in thought, manners, and morals -recommended. The Peking propaganda machinery was well-financed; the -_Hsin-min-hui_ became the only tolerated political group. This _hui_ was -headed by Mr. Miao Ping, a Kuomintang Party veteran whose -political-bureau experience dated back to the days of Borodin. His -renegation, never publicly explained, enabled Japan to issue a careful -parody of the _San Min Chu I_. His assistant was a Japanese. Business -associations, student groups, and educational administration were fitted -into the pattern. The principles were not logically or systematically -developed, but the key terms sufficed to coordinate opportunist appeals -justifying the invasion, and opposing resistance, guerrillas, -modernizations, and democracy. The _Hsin Min Chu I_ received no credence -through conversion, faith, or loyalty. Operating on sound advertising -principles, however, they served well even if they failed to command -obedience but did unsettle allegiance to the other side, and ubiquitous -iteration muddied thought. - -The personnel of the Provisional Government included no actively -important political leader. Many had been important long before; some -were conspicuous in fields other than politics, and had even served on -the semi-buffer Hopei-Chahar Political Council which was Chiang's last -compromise with Japan. Japan's failure to obtain an effective political -leader is important, for this lack eventually led to the acceptance of -Wang Ch'ing-wei. The old age, past misfortunes, the motley reputations -of the Provisional Government leaders attested a national sentiment -sufficient to enforce unity beyond the reach of national law. - -The Reformed Government of the Republic of China (_Chung-hua Min-kuo -Wei-hsin Chêng-fu_) was established March 28, 1938. It lapsed -simultaneously with its rival and colleague, the Provisional Government. -There were several suggestive points of difference, although the chief -difference was the fact that the Provisional Government operated from -Peiping and the Reformed from Nanking. Both were national in form, a -difficulty which was solved by the creation of a United Council to speak -for all occupied China. This Council had only the power to issue news -releases, which it did. Despite duplication of capitals and national -form, the Nanking government revealed a slipping in the Japanese -insistence on conformity to their ideas. - -In structure, the Reformed Government was a mutilated copy of the -National Government. It possessed five _yüan_, thereby continuing the -Sunyatsenist constitutional system which Japan first sought to destroy. -In doctrine, it took over the North China-Manchoukuo pattern, under the -name _Ta Min Chu I_ (Principles of the Great People), with a party under -the name _Ta-min-hui_. The walls of Nanking were covered with the emblem -of the party, a red circular shield with a yellow crescent moon -enclosing a white star. Quasi-educational work approximated that of the -North; but the Japanese found the Yangtze sympathetic to the National -Government and Kuomintang, and hence employed devices reminiscent of -Chungking. - -For Reformed Government personnel, the Japanese found individuals who -were in most instances either as old as their Peiping colleagues, but -less famous, or much younger, and relatively unknown. With the city of -Shanghai only partially under its control, because local opportunists -reached the tax offices first, the Reformed Government provided an -outlet for persons who had felt themselves unjustly denied office, or -slighted by the Kuomintang, or who had wrecked careers, once promising, -by some ghastly misstep or crime and now saw a miraculous chance to -return. - -These new governments could not on principle claim the allegiance of -their own clerks. The personnel, disloyal and of poor morale, was often -so corrupt that no government services--needed by Japanese civilians and -army alike--could be entrusted to them. Multiple taxes blocked Japanese -trade in the area Japan had occupied. The Japanese realized that the -United Council and the senescent politicians were not enough. Instead of -abandoning interventionist governments, they tried a leader of genuine -importance, considerable ability, and some following. His treason was -Japan's last chance to govern China without assuming the task herself, -risking a premature undertaking. To understand the moves and motives of -Wang Ch'ing-wei it is necessary to regard his character and political -history. - - -THE REORGANIZED NATIONAL GOVERNMENT OF WANG CH'ING-WEI - -In contrast to Chiang, who receives the obloquy which goes with power, -Wang Ch'ing-wei has spent the greater part of his life as a political -Out. He began brilliantly. While in his twenties, he became a -revolutionary hero by a bold attempt to assassinate the Prince Regent, -and after the establishment of the Republic followed the unhappy -meanders of the Nationalist movement. His association with Sun in the -years before Sun's death was very close, and he has as good a title as -anyone to the apostolic succession. (His title is not necessarily much -better than that of various other Kuomintang leaders; a score or so of -elder statesmen of the Party could claim a longer service of Party -leadership and equality or seniority to Wang in Party rank.) - -In 1927 Chiang and Wang had different regimes for the first time, and -Wang went into exile; he tried again in 1930, and went into exile; and -he is trying now. His cooperation with the Japanese must not be regarded -as the sudden prostitution of a worthy figure, nor as the culminating -criminality of an utter rogue. As in a Greek tragedy, Wang, blinded by -self-esteem and goaded by political frustration, has chosen his unsavory -course from understandable motives. Several lines of continuity lead up -to his establishment of the Reorganized National Government at Nanking, -and condition the nature of this government. - -Primarily, Wang has been an in-and-out schismatic in Kuomintang ranks. -It is quite possible that in terms of a head count, he may have had the -immediate support of a greater portion of the membership than did Chiang -in the first break in 1927, but his proportion has fairly steadily -declined ever since. There have been a large number of men who accepted -him as leader, just as in the preceding decade there were men _Wu mi_ -("infatuated with Wu [Pei-fu]"). In 1930-31 his organization paralleled -the Government-supported Kuomintang in all parts of the world. Today he -has some followers who follow even to Nanking. These men are bound to -him by ties of long, habitual obedience, by blood kinship, and by -generously offered loyalty: the distinguished and vigorous Ch'en -Kung-po, now Mayor of Shanghai; by Chou Fu-hai, who--before his -proscription--was the most popular commentator on the _San Min Chu I_; -Lin Pai-sheng, who had served Wang well as spokesman; and the -entertaining T'ang Leang-li, a Javanese-Chinese writer of international -fame, who has probably written more books on China in English than any -other Chinese. - -On the other hand, he has lost office-holding followers by the scores, -many of whom hold positions ranging up to Vice-Ministerships in -Chungking, and he seems to have lost almost all of his rank and file -followers. The chief defection was that of Messrs. Tao Hsi-shêng and Kao -Tsung-wu, who fled from Chungking to Shanghai and Nanking, and then fled -back again, bringing with them sensational copies of Wang's secret -preliminary agreements with the Japanese. Dr. Tao, a historian, served -Wang temporarily as Party-Minister of Publicity; Dr. Kao had been in the -foreign office while Wang still collaborated with Chiang.[7] His -following consisted almost entirely of politicians, ranging from the -rank of scholar-bureaucrat down to hooligans. The masses which he led -in 1927 have dwindled to hundreds, and the replacements are of distinct -unworthiness--persons, already cooperating with the Japanese, whom he -must lead for lack of better. He has lost followers with almost every -move he has made, whether rebelling, going into exile, accepting -government post under Chiang, or working with Japan. The Wang clique may -be represented by a consistently declining curve. - - [Footnote 7: _The Japan-Wang Ch'ing-wei Secret Agreements, - 1938-1939-1940_, Shanghai, 1910; these also appeared in the _China - Weekly Review_, January 27, 1940, p. 318; February 3, 1940, p. 341.] - -In the face of this, it is unexpected to find that Wang has been -reasonably honest and consistent, as were Trotsky and Röhm. His -consistency may be described as a perfectly regular spiral, which -maintains unchanging direction but never goes in a straight line. Wang -has always favored not-fighting, peace, civilian and constitutional -government, and making friends with any nation which professes -friendship for China. The loftiness of his motives might be impugned by -pointing out that each is the antithesis of one of Chiang's -characteristics; but the ultimate test of Wang's sincerity lies with the -psychiatrists rather than with political scientists. Assuming sincerity, -how did these consistent standards lead him to Nanking? - -In 1927 Chiang broke with the Communists quite a while before Wang did. -Wang was willing to yield a doubtful point here, to credit the other -side with good motives there, and to keep the Wuhan government going as -long as he could. His difficulties were the difficulties of a -constitutionalist willing to maintain the constitution at the cost of -some appeasement. In the following years of exile, he upbraided Chiang's -machine-boss tactics within the Kuomintang; the name "Reorganized -Kuomintang" which he selected for his schismatics, is indicative of his -desire to promote regularity in party elections and free democratic -discussion in party congresses. - -A striking instance of repetition may be seen in contrasting the -Nanking of 1940 with the Peking of 1930. In 1930 Chiang K'ai-shek had -been threatened by military attack and had found a great part of China -wrested from him by superior forces, those of the _tuchün_ Feng -Yü-hsiang and Yen Hsi-shan; but the National Government maintained its -position in the capital. In 1940, the capital had moved to Chungking and -the armed enemies were Japanese; Hu Han-min (the great Rightist leader) -was dead, a new Communist alliance was in effect, and the outside world -was in a turmoil more profound than China's. Despite the supervening -changes, Wang Ch'ing-wei was found in 1940 in precisely the role of -1930. Again he was the front for a military regime. In 1930 he had been -a Left-liberal front for native militarism; in 1940, he was the -appeasing, conservative front for the Imperial Japanese army. In 1930 he -had his own "Reorganized" Kuomintang; he had his "Orthodox" again in -1940. In 1930 he usurped the National Government offices, titles, and -regalia; he did this again in 1940. In 1930 his career ended with -military defeat and he went into exile, later bargaining his position -back into Chinese politics. - -Wang appears to have become the victim of an _idée fixe_: he believes -that if he impersonates government devotedly enough, and with careful -enough detail, he will become government. Brilliant, sincere, adroit, he -is burdened by a pathological self-esteem and is so much the victim of -his own past rationalizations that he is no longer inventive. Obviously -such a character, in the face of recurrent failure, cannot assume the -blame for it. Wang's demon is the Generalissimo. - -Another characteristic of Wang appears clearly at this point: the belief -of the appeaser that he can outsmart the appeased; he no doubt thought -that his _tuchün_ colleagues would become victims of the government -which they let him create. On his way out of China after Chiang's armies -and Chang Hsüeh-liang's intervention had settled this affair, he -stopped over in Canton to take part in an even more transitory and less -successful rebellion. - -The next round of Wang-Chiang rivalry displays the consummate political -strategy of the Generalissimo and the ruin of Wang by his own virtues. -For three full years, 1932 through 1935, Wang was President of the -Executive _Yüan_ and second only to Chiang. After a little more than a -year out of office--owing in part to a gunshot wound--he returned in the -crucial months of 1937 just before the outbreak of general hostilities, -and stayed with the National Government through the first year and a -half of the war--until December 1938. In fifteen more months he reached -terms with the Japanese; eight months after he set up a government with -their consent and sponsorship, they recognized that government. -Throughout this period Wang advocated peace, non-aggression to the point -of non-defense and surrender, and universal conciliation. These -attitudes made him very useful to Chiang when Chiang needed him, and -made him dispose of himself when he was no longer helpful to Chiang. - -Wang was ruined by the long, agonizing appeasement of which Chiang was -the leader, in the six years between the Japanese invasion of China's -Manchurian provinces and the outbreak of undeclared war in July 1937. -Throughout this period the forces of Leftist reform, of Communist -pressure (both military and political), of student sentiment, of -overseas-Chinese patriotism, and finally of national self-respect -itself, fed the opposition to Chiang, who knew that, whatever the cost, -China was not militarily or politically ready to fight Japan. Wang -Ch'ing-wei, who when out of office had espoused some of the most -genuinely popular and necessary reforms, found himself civilian leader -of a government following an intensely unpopular policy, and unable to -profit by the rise of opposition. The Generalissimo needed someone to -replace Hu Han-min, with whom he disagreed and whom he temporarily -incarcerated. Wang provided a counter-balance to the Hu Han-min group, -undermined his own popularity, and helped shield Chiang from -anti-appeasement criticism. - -Wang Ch'ing-wei, in this period, feared war and grasped at the -conciliation which the Japanese offered between successive invasions. In -1937, Wang worked for the localization of the war at the cost of North -China, on the theory that the Japanese could take what they wished. He -reiterated his old point that the Chinese could not possibly whip the -Japanese on the fields of battle, but that they might outmaneuver them -over the tables of diplomacy. The advent of war was a disappointment and -source of worry to him. - -In the course of the celebrated retreat from Nanking to Hankow, and from -Hankow to Chungking, Wang lost no opportunity to work for peace. When -the Germans offered themselves as intermediaries in the Hankow period, -Wang sought the opening of negotiations. There was a violent uproar in -the People's Political Council, not then reported in the press. When the -government moved to Chungking, Wang was even more despondent: victory -seemed remote, the Communists worried him as much as did the Japanese, -and the Generalissimo swept opposition aside with the slogans of -resistance. Like other peoples in war time, the Chinese began to confuse -peace and treason. Wang and his closest supporters felt that they were -being deprived of freedom of speech; their known inclination to -surrender and negotiate had supplied Chiang with a weapon which might -even prove personally dangerous to them. The death by firing-squad of -General Han Fu-ch'u showed that treason, or the charge of it, had become -serious. Wang and his followers rationalized their own fearfulness -concerning the war into the belief that they were expressing the will of -the peace-loving masses. In December 1938 he got out of China by a -surprise flight to Indo-China. His followers had previously been -filtering down to Hong Kong. The Konoye statement,[8] just issued, gave -him an opening to treat with the Japanese. - - [Footnote 8: Statement of the Japanese Prime Minister, Prince Fumimaro - Konoye, December 22, 1938, Jones and Myers, _Documents on American - Foreign Relations, 1939-40_, Boston (World Peace Foundation), p. 299.] - -Throughout the negotiations, Wang behaved as though he were himself the -legitimate Chinese government. He did not accept the minimum Japanese -conditions, but held out for an agreement which would preserve the -fictions of Chinese independence, allow him to fly the national flag, -establish his version of the Kuomintang, and attempt every kind of -linkage with the past. One of his followers asked the author in Nanking, -"Do you think we were traitors when we spent more than a year getting a -fair peace agreement from the Japanese?" This agreement, released by -Messrs. Tao and Kao, consisted of the cession of broad military, -foreign-relations, and economic rights over China to Japan. The Chinese -were to lose no territory _pro forma_, and were to keep a minimum of 35 -per cent interest in major economic enterprises. - -The regime is sufficiently well known so that there is no need to detail -its history: the long dickering with the two Japanophile "governments" -already established in Peking and Nanking, since they were the third -parties to the Japan-Wang negotiations, the installation of the -government in March 1940, and its recognition the following November. -The more significant problem is--what part can this Nanking -establishment play in the actual contest for power in East Asia? - -In the first place, the Reorganized National Government (_Chung-hua -Min-kuo Ts'an-chêng Kuo-min Chêng-fu_) of China is not a puppet -government in the sense that the Manchoukuoan government is. The -Japanese have a very loose surveillance of the officers of state. -Interviews with officials indicate pretty conclusively the absence of -dictaphones or of Japanese Special Service agents. The leaders in the -government at Nanking are not watched or hounded in any intimate way. -One of them said: "Why should the Japanese watch us? They know that we -cannot do anything to them, and they know that their only chance of -success lies in our becoming a real government." - -Secondly, the personnel of the Nanking regime is not sufficient to cope -with the problems which face it. The Nanking regime has no diplomatic -officer who has regularly represented any other Chinese government; only -a few consuls, in Japanese territory, joined it.[9] In no single -instance can a Nanking officeholder, compared with his Chungking -counterpart, be regarded (patriotism apart) as better-qualified or more -able than his rival. In an enterprise of this sort, it would seem likely -that Nanking should have the better man in some few positions. Diligent -and disinterested inquiry fails to reveal a single one. Finally, the -personnel is a mixture of Wang cliquists, politically obsolete -conservatives, careerist Japanophiles, colorless opportunists, and -actual criminals. - - [Footnote 9: Ch'ên Lo died, and the only persons with any diplomatic - experience had, in the past, been only casually connected with the - Foreign Office.] - -A Western newspaper man, well acquainted with the Nanking situation, -told the author that he estimated the regime as 5 per cent Japanophiles, -5 per cent upright men who worked with the enemy because of a sense of -public duty toward the Chinese people in the occupied areas, 20 per cent -opportunists, and 70 per cent low characters interested in thievery. -Nanking officials, to whom these estimates were communicated without -revelation of the source, felt the latter categories to be much too -high. Several of the more intelligent men in Nanking offered the -argument that if they did not share in the regime, unscrupulous elements -would deceive the Japanese and oppress the people; or they stated that -the Reorganized Government had brought back the flag, the constitution, -the titles, the law codes, and the political doctrines of the National -Government, so that occupied and unoccupied China had the same polity. -They disregarded the point that this abetted the enemy. - -Thirdly, the government has nothing to do. The power of the Nanking -regime in no instance reaches beyond the Japanese patrols. No counties -are under Nanking control which are not also under Japanese control. The -Ministry of Foreign Affairs has no foreign affairs. The Ministry of -Finance collects some excises and disburses many salaries, as well as -limited amounts for the upkeep of some schools, law courts, minimal -public services, and state property, insofar as the Japanese have -returned any. (It is interesting to note that the officials at Nanking, -deploring the "Communist" tendencies of Chiang, live in commandeered -houses, and use the commandeering of private property as a form of -patronage for their supporters.) The Central Political Council has so -little to do that it draws up a budget and solemnly debates items of -less than U. S. $100.[10] The officials cannot ride far from the city -limits of Nanking, because of the guerrillas who operate all about. The -railroad runs only by daylight. The Nanking police are mostly unarmed, -except for clubs--an unprecedented condition for modern China!--and many -who carry rifles or pistols seem to have no cartridges. - - [Footnote 10: See _The People's Tribune_ (Shanghai), XXIX, p. 130 - _ff._, August 1940. This is the semi-official English organ of the - regime; each issue contains a selection of public documents. It is - edited by the volatile T'ang Leang-li. The other English-language - journal is _The Voice of China_, fortnightly, Nanking, edited by Mr. - L. K. Kentwell, a graduate of Oxford and Columbia Universities, - Hawaiian-born of British and Cantonese parentage. The journal is - spirited, and very anti-British.] - -Fourthly, the Nanking government is an encouraging indication that the -modern Chinese have finally come to the point where five-power -republicanism is the norm. It is significant that the Nanking regime -practices an extreme purism of organization and nomenclature, conforming -precisely to antebellum practice.[11] The regime has changed the -theoretical structure of the National Government very little, but added -the Party ministries to the government cabinet. One further change has -consisted in the logically desirable transference of the Ministry of -Justice to the Executive _Yüan_ from the Judicial, thus eliminating the -anomaly of having both prosecuting and adjudicatory agencies under the -same control.[12] The minister, Li Shêng-wu, is a well-known scholar in -international law and an educational editor.[13] - - [Footnote 11: Such a chart is found in _The People's Tribune_, XXIX - (March 1940), p. 214, together with a list of incumbents on the - following pages. The issue is headed by an editorial, "The National - Government Returns to Its Capital" and "Peace, Struggle, and Save - China" by Wang Ching-wei (_sic_). The official outline of the - government is to be found in [Reorganized Government], _K'ao-shih Yüan - Kung-pao_ (Public Gazette of the Examination _Yüan_), Nanking. Vol. I, - No. 2 (June 1940), following p. 80.] - - [Footnote 12: [Reorganized Government], _Ssŭ-fa Hsing-chêng - Kung-pao_ (Public Gazette of the Ministry of Justice), Nanking, gives - a well-edited résumé of the work of the Ministry and its policy in - prosecutions.] - - [Footnote 13: [_China Weekly Review_; J. B. Powell, editor], _Who's - Who in China, Fifth Edition_, Shanghai, [1937], p. 145. For further - information see the supplement on the pro-Japanese leaders in _Who's - Who in China, Supplement to Fifth Edition_, Shanghai, [1940]. This - presents a hall of notoriety for all the major Chinese leaders - affiliated with the enemy. This _Who's Who_ is regarded by the present - author as one of the most valuable sources on all Far Eastern - politics. It is engrossingly good reading and entertainment, the - pictures of the subjects being included in most instances. Behind - these simple and short biographies, there lies more drama than - Hollywood dare produce.] - -Since the Japanese may be expected to foster the kind of Japanophile -government which would help them most, it is interesting that their -crusade against Sunyatsenism has turned to a quasi-Kuomintang structure -for aid. The attempt does not, as yet, seem to be working, but the -technique of the deception reveals the depth to which Kuomintang -principles and practices have penetrated in the past generation. The -Nanking incumbents make every effort to confuse their regime with the -National Government at Chungking, even to the extent of copying the -names of all minor offices, the forms of the stationery, and the -organization of semi-public cultural associations. Chinese fashion, they -confuse correct form and legitimacy. Given a long enough period, this -technique may succeed. Meanwhile, the failure of the earlier traitor -Governments, non-Nationalist in form, is a real indicium of the value of -the Sunyatsenist pattern. - -Along with the bewildering _Doppelgänger_ effect which prevails in all -other matters, there are two Kuomintangs. The major, recognized -Kuomintang continues from Chungking. At Nanking Wang and his friends -have organized the "Orthodox Kuomintang." This can scarcely be thought -of as a Party fraction, so much has it dwindled. The overseas branches -have been lost, and the populace in its own cities is savagely -contemptuous. Wang Ch'ing-wei held a "Sixth Plenary Session of the -C.E.C. of the Kuomintang" on August 29, 1939, and the affair seems to -have been an uproarious farce, with all of Wang's friends bringing in -random acquaintances in order to make up a quorum.[14] Since then, the -vestigial party has been equipped with appropriate party organs, and is -preparing to share its hypothetical power with an equally _ad hoc_ -Nanking People's Political Council. The Kuomintang leaders in Nanking, -as a part of their application to the Chungking pattern, have even -listed a considerable number of minor parties which are on their side of -the Japanese army. Persistent, specific inquiry in Nanking failed to -elicit the name of a single _bona fide_ minor party representative, -other than representatives of the _Hsin Min Hui_ (ex-Provisional), the -_Ta Min Hui_ (ex-Reformed), the Republicans (_Kung-ho Tang;_ Hankow; -merged with the Orthodox Kuomintang), and the Chinese Socialist Party, -which consists of the venerable Dr. Kiang Kang-hu. It is perhaps fair to -conclude that the Nanking regime is not a Kuomintang regime because a -sizable portion of the Kuomintang membership were weary of war, but -because some few Kuomintang leaders found no other way to power, and -because the Japanese had reluctantly decided that the simulacrum of the -Kuomintang was the minimum requirement of any Chinese government. - - [Footnote 14: For an account of this see, "Wang's Farcical C.E.C. - Session," _China At War_ (Hong Kong), III, No. 6, p. 57; January - 1940.] - -Lastly, the lack of success of Wang Ch'ing-wei and his government is -proof of the emergence of a state in China. This is not the first time -that Wang has set up his own government. It is not even the first time -that Chinese have accepted foreign aid in such enterprises. Wang -thought, and presumably thinks, that he is playing the accepted game of -Chinese politics; he is likely to find that he has committed a treason -which is disastrously real to him. The non-support of his government is -a clear proof of the rising race-national awareness among China's common -millions. - -Stripped of the confusion and distortion which have surrounded the Wang -Ch'ing-wei secession, the rivalry between Wang and Chiang is not so very -different from Benedict Arnold's departure from the then dubious -American revolution. In this century we have revised our opinion of -Benedict Arnold upward--in part--and Wang Ch'ing-wei may, perhaps, -justly fit the same category. A gifted but maladroit and unhappy -political leader had brought his misfortunes to the Japanese. They, -_faute de mieux_, have accepted his aid. So far this has been -ineffectual. Most probably, only a very long lapse of time or the truly -catastrophic ruin of their opponents could place Wang and his group in -a position of autonomous importance and power. On the world scene Wang -stands halfway between Quisling and Pétain. A traitor to the emergent -Chinese state, he demonstrates the ancient Chinese capacity to -surrender, appease, and survive. Had he antagonists less formidable than -Chiang and the infuriated masses, his Reorganized Government might -secure actual power. - -The Japanese finally recognized the Reorganized National Government of -Wang Ch'ing-wei on November 30, 1940, after many months of delay. _Art._ -I provided for mutual recognition, but added the provision that the two -countries should "... at the same time take mutually helpful and -friendly measures, political, economic, cultural, and otherwise ..." and -in the future prohibit "... such measures and causes as are destructive -to the amity between the two countries in politics, diplomacy, -education, propaganda, trade and commerce, and other spheres." _Art._ II -was an anti-Communist agreement leaving Japanese forces in North China -indefinitely. _Art._ IV left the problem of Japanese evacuation to -separate annexes. _Art._ VI provides "Economic cooperation," with the -inescapable implications. By _Art._ VII Japan relinquishes -extraterritoriality (in the future), but obtains the opening of all -China to Japan.[15] These terms, which not only involve admission of -Chinese defeat, but preclude any possible attempt of China to restore -military, economic, or political independence, are the best that Japan -has to offer. When one considers that even these are merely legal, -whittled back to realism by protocols and annexes, and that they are -made with Japan's Chinese friends, Japan appears incapable of ending -the China incident. The Japanese do not know when to stop. Gauche in -power politics, they are undone by greediness and inexperience. - - [Footnote 15: The full text of the treaty is to be found in China - Information Committee, _News Release_, December 2, 1940, together with - the Generalissimo's comment. For a brief account, clearly interpreted, - see Steiger, G. Nye, "Japan Makes Peace--with Wang," _Events_, Vol. 9, - No. 49 (January 1941), p. 60-2. The Generalissimo's comment on the - Nanking regime will also be found below, Appendix III (A), No. 7.] - -The recognition is important only in that it assists Japan in escaping -responsibility for action taken by or through the Chinese affiliates, -while at the same time pinning Japan to the Chinese earth and committing -the Empire to indefinite continuation of hostilities. If the Japanese -achieved complete success in international power politics, there is a -possibility that the Reorganized Government might remain as the -functioning half-autonomous affiliate of Japan. Otherwise, Nanking can -be nothing more than an ornamental, occasionally useful auxiliary to the -Imperial Japanese Army, itself an uncomfortable Chinese government _pro -tem_. Having ultimate authority, the Army cannot yet escape or delegate -final responsibility. - - - - -CHAPTER VIII - -EXTRA-POLITICAL FORCES - - -Government, wherever organized, is distinguished from other social -institutions by claims to universality of scope and competence, and -paramountcy of authority; the term _political_, on the basis of such a -distinction, refers to activities, occasionally individual but more -usually collective, involving access to the symbols of government; and -the term _governmental_ refers to the application of such symbols in -governmental sanctions and services. The process of government is -accordingly one wherein groups smaller than the totality of society seek -("politically") to obtain action in the name of the totality -("governmental"), for or against other groups according to shifting -interests. In the West this politico-governmental process has been -further characterized by ceremonial forms ("laws") and reinforced by -conceptions of amoral omnicompetence ("sovereignty"). - -The cellular socio-economic structure of old China, plus the Confucian -employment of ideological as opposed to governmental control, kept the -entire process of politics and government at a very low level of -intensity. Modern China, inheritor of an apolitical past, is still the -most pluralistic society in the world, and modern Chinese -government--despite recent gigantism--a frail legal superstructure above -a flood of extra-political power. Western societies depend upon their -states; the Chinese state depends upon a society which could, albeit -uncomfortably, dispense with states altogether. - -This condition amounts in international politics, to both a strength and -a weakness. Chinese society suffers more political ruin with less social -disturbance than does any comparable society; the guerrillas, for -example, probably find government helpful when available, but regard it -as a luxury rather than a necessity. Chinese society is near to an -orderly anarchy; uniform conditioning from the past, or uniform present -opinion, takes the place of mass organization and totalitarian -government. The high death rate of traitors is probably not owing to -activity on the part of Chungking, but to the spontaneous action of -ordinary men; on one occasion a high pro-Japanese official was shot by -his own bodyguard while the two sat in a sedan on a busy street: the -bodyguard had experienced a revulsion of conscience. Fu Hsiao-ên, Wang -Ch'ing-wei's Mayor of Shanghai, was also killed by a member of his own -household. Spontaneous but uniform action applies not only to -sensational political matters; it appears in less dramatic but equally -important affairs, such as commercial rivalry, landlord-tenant -relationships, and the police power of the community and the family. -However, in a contest for power, while the Chinese lose little by -defeat, their counter-attacks are correspondingly more difficult. The -fluid autonomy of innumerable groups slows down the engines of formal -power. The political-governmental process is apt to be sluggish in -crises. - - -THE FOUNDATIONS OF CHINESE GOVERNMENT - -The society upon which the National Government of China, its Left -associates, and its Japanophile rivals rest is not a settled, stagnant -society. An extraordinary ferment has gripped China for more than a -century--arising from cadastral, agrarian, technological, economic, -fiscal, ideological, political, and governmental change. The Chinese -people have endured; they have also acted. Within a single century, -three blazing revolutions have swept China: the T'aip'ing Rebellion, -put down with Western aid after fifteen years of war; the Boxer -uprising, deflected into xenophobia by the Manchus; and the Great -Revolution, which succeeded in part. Between these, there have been -changes, bloody but of secondary magnitude: the Moslem rebellions; the -minor uprisings of Sun Yat-sen; the Republican Revolution; the 1919 -movement; the _tuchün_ wars; the Communist communes, which failed -utterly in Shanghai and Canton; the Communist _jacqueries_, which -continued; and the present rip tide of resistance. None of these was -effectively mastered by organized government; each was exploited by one -government, and opposed by another. Unlike a Western state, wherein -government becomes the prime mobilizer during crises, Chinese society -shifts its incalculable forces, and governments leap forward to take -advantage of them. - -This extensive, unorganized residue of opinion and power, outside the -reach of government, keeps any modern Chinese government in a peculiar -condition. Like a perpetual process of revolution, social changes demand -that a government exploit them, deflect them, or employ them--but not -launch or stop them. The Kuomintang has failed in its attempts to launch -favorable mass movements, and also failed to stop antagonistic ones. The -secret of the Chinese Communist power has lain in the skill of the Red -leaders, who utilized available movements. Hence the continued -development of Chinese government rests upon the wills, fancies, -interests, mob action, enthusiasm or dispiritedness of a people who in -their own communities do not read newspapers, listen to radios, or pay -much attention to the national state. Despite attempts to bring society -under the control of government, in order to make it possible to bring -government under the control of society (constitutionalism), the -decisive forces of modern Chinese life are outside the reach of -propaganda or control. - -General opinion in China is not ascertainable, except through action. In -vital matters this action is apt to be either violent, or the equivalent -of violent: sit-down, general, or go-slow strikes; boycotts; universal -derision. The National Government possesses unprecedented amounts of -power by Chinese standards. By Western standards it is incredibly -obliging, casual, and unsystematic. The power which the Government, with -Chiang as leader, enjoys, arises from a support which it could not -compel, and which it cannot ensure by any means other than the pursuance -of support-arousing policies. The Kuomintang, the Communists, the -National Salvationists, the independent Left guerrilla leaders--these -agencies are not the organization of entire opinion groups, but the -spearheads of immeasurable forces. The modernization of government, both -administrative and constitutional, awaits the transformation of -materials around and under government. Greatest of these is popular -mentality. Ancillary are economic, organizational, educational and -cultural forces. Progress toward the omnicompetent state is slowed by -the fact that few Chinese wish to abandon the freedom of a pluralist -society for the efficient universality of legalism. They desire -modernization, but haggle at the price. - -Three factors in particular are working upon and among the millions of -farmers and townsmen: mass education, rural reconstruction, and the -cooperative movement. Each not only takes immediate, beneficial effect, -but also transforms the political material of China. These forces, not -in any strict sense political, possess enormous political importance. - - -MASS EDUCATION - -Literacy has risen very rapidly in modern China. Before the impact of -the West, becoming literate was in itself a career. By the time one -could read at all, one was a scholar, unless one learned the limited -quasi-shorthand of the merchants. Educational reforms came about as the -result of modern schools, particularly British and American Protestant -schools, and the action of the government. The fabric of Chinese society -had begun to change even before the downfall of the Ch'ing dynasty. The -literary revolution led by Hu Shih after 1915, which popularized -_pai-hua_ (a written form of the Chinese spoken language) had extensive -repercussions, and made possible the rapid diffusion of ideographic -literacy. (Phonetization failed then, and later.) Almost every -government in China has attempted the diffusion of literacy. The popular -demand is intense. - -The present status of literacy in China is revealed by official figures -from the Ministry of Education, which may err somewhat on the side of -optimism. These put the total population of China at 450 million -(Manchuria presumably remaining unmentioned), of which 90 million are -literate and 360 million illiterate. Such an estimate would give China -about the same absolute number of literates as the United States. The -remaining 360 million illiterates are broken down as follows: 40.05 -million children below the age of six; 45 million aged six to twelve; -29.25 million aged twelve to fifteen; 79.43 million persons over -forty-five; and 1.57 million dumb, deaf, cripples, or insane. The adults -to be reached by the mass literacy movement amount therefore to 165 -million; government estimates state that 46,348,469 illiterates were -educated since 1938, of whom 25.2 million were adults between fifteen -and forty-five, leaving roughly 140 million to be educated.[1] - - [Footnote 1: The China Information Committee, _News Release_, April 1, - 1940.] - -The mass education program is supplementary to the education of -children, which is far from complete or even adequate. The literacy -imparted is of the most elementary kind; but in a civilized society such -as China this has immediate effect. The author never knew a Chinese who -could read and was not addicted to it; a common sight in Western China -is a knot of coolies deciphering a newspaper together. The intense -reverence for learning and scholarship makes the training welcome, and -the teachers who seek to teach the minimum of one thousand ideographs in -six weeks never lack pupils. - -The program of the National Government was summarized by Ch'ên Li-fu, -the Minister of Education, speaking over the radio after the Mass -Education Conference of March 1940: - - Accordingly, our first step is to wipe out illiteracy. In - this respect we proceed simultaneously with the - enlightenment of the masses of adult illiterates, both men - and women, and with the education of children in order to - put an end to illiteracy that may otherwise arise in the - future. At the National Conference on People's Education - held from the twelfth day to the sixteenth day of this month - in Chungking, the _five-year plan for the people's - education_, adopted by the Executive _Yüan_, was further - deliberated and promulgated. The proper enforcement of this - plan will help to convert at least one hundred and forty - million (140,000,000) adult illiterates into intelligent - citizens for China within the coming five years. - - At present there are already 44 per cent of the entire - number of children of school age (from six to twelve) in - school; that is, nineteen million and eight hundred thousand - (19,800,000). By the enforcement of this plan, there should - be, during the first two years, at least one people's school - in every three _pao_. And each village should have a nucleus - school, according to the plan. In this way there should be - at least more than 260,000 people's schools for the 800,000 - _pao_ of the entire nation at the end of the first two - years. Each people's school consists of three divisions or - classes, namely, the children's division, the men's - division, and the women's division. During the second two - years there should be at least one people's school in every - two _pao_. In the fifth and last year there should be at - least one people's school in each _pao_. That is to say, at - the end of the fifth year there should be at least 800,000 - people's schools for the 800,000 _pao_ of the nation, - besides the 80,000 or more nucleus schools and the 200,000 - schools of the same grades now already existent which can - be improved, to provide education for at least 90 per cent - of the entire number of children of school age. As a matter - of fact, certain provinces have already succeeded in - establishing one or even two people's schools in each _pao_. - Kwangsi Province, for instance, has at present one people's - school in each _pao_, while Fukien Province even has two - people's schools in each _pao_. The fulfillment of this - five-year plan needs at least $2,932,000,000 and 1,600,000 - properly trained teachers. - - Our vocational education aims at building a sound middle - cadre for the various professions and industrial - enterprises. There are training schools and short-time - classes for mechanics, electrical communications, metal - work, etc. Also, special classes are opened in more than ten - colleges and universities for advanced studies along such - lines. - - Our attempt to universalize productive education may be - evidenced by the incorporation of productive education - courses into the middle school curriculum, besides - instituting organizations for the same in the various - vocational schools in order to facilitate the practice of - students along such lines.... In 1938, for example, only - 53.0 per cent of the entire number of students who took part - in the examination studied science and engineering, but in - 1939 it jumped to 59.4 per cent.[2] - - [Footnote 2: The same, April 8, 1940. Minor changes in punctuation - have been introduced.] - -This statement gives the official view, which is highly optimistic. In -terms of practical politics, however, the Generalissimo has given the -movement his cordial backing, and sees in it a preliminary to democracy. -Although final results might fall far short of the hopeful estimate, the -effect would still be considerable. Diffusion of literacy creates a -momentary satisfaction with the political system which makes literacy -possible, but the after-effect of literacy is to make men of any -nationality easier to govern well and harder to govern badly. A -government which diffuses literacy without advancing reforms is -sharpening weapons against itself. The National Government's -American-inspired trust in education as a panacea implies that Chiang -and his fellow leaders expect to remain popular, and do not contemplate -appeasement, reaction, or other unpopular measures. - - -RURAL RECONSTRUCTION - -An even more interesting aspect of the mass-education movement is its -connection with rural reconstruction. In this field much is owed to Dr. -James Y. C. Yen, a graduate of Yale and Princeton who began his work -with the Chinese labor corps in France during the 1914-18 war. The -war-time work of the correlated mass education and rural reconstruction -movement was summarized by Dr. Yen himself: - - The most hopeful factor in the whole China situation is that - her greatest and most valuable resource, the three hundred - and fifty million farmers, has not yet been tapped for the - upbuilding of the nation. The Chinese farmer has had a - measure of freedom and responsibility, of dignity and - independence. He is thrifty and industrious, intelligent and - an expert in intensive farming. A great number of our - national leaders are sons and daughters of our farmers. The - fathers of Dr. Sun Yat-sen and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek - were farmers. - - These nearly three years of terrible war have proved beyond - doubt that our faith in the Chinese farmer has not been - misplaced. It has revealed his greatness. Our nation is - rediscovering the "forgotten man," the tiller of the soil. - Most of our soldiers come from the farm. To a remarkable - extent he has also financed the war. He is the real hero of - this war. - - The Chinese Mass Education Movement was organized in 1923 to - explore the potentialities of the rural masses and find a - way of drawing out the best in them. Since the first - publication of the "thousand character test," it has been - estimated that some thirty million illiterate people have - been taught to read during the past five years. - - Beginning with 1929 the point of emphasis of the Movement - shifted from extensive promotion of literacy to intensive - study of the life of the farmers in the rural districts. As - a living social laboratory in which to do our research and - to work out principles and techniques, we selected - Tinghsien, a district of four hundred thousand people, - one-thousandth of the total population of China, in Hopei - Province. This was the first time in our history that an - organized group of Chinese intellectuals went deliberately - to the country to live among the rural people to study their - life and find out how to develop their latent possibilities. - The Movement has evolved what is known as the "Tinghsien - Four-fold Reconstruction Education" including the cultural, - economic, health, and the political. - - Several other experimental _hsien_,--Hengshan in Hunan, - Central China, and Hsintu in Szechwan, West China, were - established in cooperation with the provincial governments. - One of our special emphases in these experimental _hsien_ - has been the reform of the _hsien_ government, i.e. the - local government. - - The Tinghsien Experiment with its "laboratory approach" to - social and political problems and with its _correlated_ - program of rural reconstruction as demonstrated in the - district attracted attention from all over China and - inspired similar experiments in various parts of the - country. As a result the movement for rural reconstruction - gained great momentum in China. - - Since the outbreak of hostilities the Mass Education - Movement has thrown itself unreservedly into the task of - assisting the Central and Provincial governments in - strengthening the nation's struggle against the enemy. It - was most gratifying that at this hour of China's supreme - struggle we have been able to help the government to - revitalize the _hsien_ government, to train civil service - personnel and to mobilize the farmers. Extensive application - of the new system as developed in the experimental _hsien_ - was made to an entire province such as we did in Hunan--a - rich province with a population of thirty million. - - In order to insure that the new political machinery should - function effectively a School of Public Administration to - train administrative and technical personnel from the - magistrate down to the village elders was established with - the senior members of our Movement taking full charge. - Altogether the School trained about 4,000 higher officials - for the local government and some 35,000 of the village - elders. Since Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek assumed - concurrently the governorship of Szechwan, a new system of - _hsien_ government (chiefly modelled after the experimental - _hsien_ of the country) with the object of releasing the - new life of the rural masses has been promulgated. Under his - order the same is taking place in neighboring provinces. - - Unless serious and painstaking study of rural reconstruction - is made by scientists and scholars on the one hand, and - administrative and technical personnel are systematically - trained and imbued with a spirit of service to the rural - masses on the other, the movement for rural reconstruction - may dwindle away as so many other movements have done in the - past. - - It is most heartening to state that Generalissimo Chiang - Kai-shek has given his public approval and backing to the - new National Institute of Rural Reconstruction which he - considers to be of fundamental importance to China's - post-war reconstruction. The inspiration of the Institute - has already helped to mould the principal rural - reconstruction groups in the country into one national - force. The rural reconstruction movement has achieved a - united front unparalleled in its history. Today it is a - great unifying force, an outstanding national platform upon - which all Chinese can agree. It will meet the needs of China - today and lay the foundation for the China of tomorrow.[3] - - [Footnote 3: The same, May 6, 1940.] - -This program possesses obvious merit. Lacking a foundation of dogma, it -requires no implementation through terrorism. The politically innocuous -character of the movement is attested by the frequent demands by -provincial officials for personnel from the Mass Education training -centers. Since the purpose is to improve the entire community without -revolutionizing its class structure, the enlightened landlords are as -favorable as the peasants themselves. Unfortunately, enlightened -landlords are not always prevalent. Despite the modesty of the program, -it finds stumbling blocks in actual corruption, extortion, and -illegality. Many _hsien_ are under local machines which permit wealthy -conservatives to evade tax payments, steal government funds, and repress -genuine farmer organization. The consequence has been that the movement -succeeds only when it has the immediate backing of a provincial or -central authority; its progress has been slow. Many critics, both -Chinese and Western, have become disgusted with the slowness of social -reform on the land, and despair of anything save reconstruction through -implicit class war.[4] - - [Footnote 4: Research Staff of the Secretariat, Institute of Pacific - Relations, _Agrarian China, Selected Source Materials from Chinese - Authors_, Shanghai, 1938. A more Leftist and even gloomier view is - taken by Chen Han-seng, _Landlord and Peasant in China_, New York, - 1936, and the same author's _Industrial Capital and Chinese Peasants, - A Study of the Livelihood of Chinese Tobacco Cultivators_, Shanghai, - 1939. Two general surveys of the Chinese economy are Condliffe, J. B., - _China Today: Economic_, Boston, 1932, and Tawney, R. H., _Land and - Labour in China_, New York, 1932. A significant hypothesis of the - relations of economics, government, and culture in China is found in - Lattimore, Owen, _Inner Asian Frontiers of China_, New York, 1940, Ch. - III, esp. p. 39 _ff._; this rests in part upon Wittfogel, Karl August, - _Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Chinas_, Leipzig, 1931, the leading - Marxian exposition of the subject.] - -The present period of resistance and reconstruction opens a very -promising period in rural modernization. In the first place, war-time -stress puts great power in the Generalissimo's hands. Ubiquitous armies -can, on short notice, enforce orders from Chungking. The shift of troops -among provinces makes the central government an outside power now -physically present in tens of thousands of communities. Devolution of -watchfulness by the Commander-in-Chief and his staff results in slow but -irreversible accumulation of governmental authority. - -Secondly, the proclamation of manifold programs has the effect, -obviously, of drawing attention to each of them. The Kuomintang, anxious -to retain its paramountcy, promotes new local government changes. These -face frustration by mass illiteracy. Mass education is impeded by local -economic injustices. The Whampoa and _Erh Ch'ên_ groups in the -Kuomintang, while they have landlord connections, are interested--even -assuming a strong economic-class interest--in the maintenance of -government. Action is appearing, slow and haphazard by Western -standards, but indisputably present. The minimum of good government in -China is a very low minimum, but it is rising in the face of the -Communist and Japanese pressure. One may be sure that the National -Government will not pass below that minimum if the state's existence is -in danger. - -Thirdly, there is a very genuine boom condition in Western China. The -movement of the government to the West, and lightening of intolerable -but long-endured _tuchün_ exactions, would in itself have led to sudden -prosperity. To this are added more than twenty millions of new -population, a growing network of communications, a sharp but controlled -inflation. These further stimulate speculation and construction and -development. The most important factors in a new prosperity have been, -however, the reappearance of handicraft-type industry as a consequence -of blockade, and governmental advocacy of every conceivable development. -The author beheld, during the summer of 1940, conditions of prosperity -in Szechwan which he had not expected to find in China within the space -of one lifetime. Narcotics were eradicated. The working population was -commanding high wages, but suffering from high prices; the prices were -somewhat ahead of the wages, but not so far that social morale was -troubled. Skilled labor was in a superb bargaining position; chauffeurs, -electricians, good carpenters, etc. were in considerable demand. The -salaried classes were suffering at all levels, a factor which was -patently wholesome in stimulating working-class morale. The clerical -class, which had held itself aloof from manual labor with a persistence -which boded ill for China, was placed more nearly on a par with its -American equivalent. While poverty was still universal by Western -standards, the pathological squalor endemic to the coast was nowhere -visible. - - -THE CHINESE INDUSTRIAL COOPERATIVES - -The Chinese Industrial Cooperatives (_Chung-kuo Kung-yeh Ho-tso -Hsieh-hui_) are an important and widely publicized outgrowth of the war, -and are perhaps the only feature of domestic Chinese affairs--outside of -the Communist area and the roads program--which is as well known beyond -China as within. The purpose of the cooperatives is to launch an -enormous program of decentralized industry throughout Free China, with -thirty thousand separate industrial cooperatives for the first major -goal. The purpose is to develop an industrial system which will keep -China autarkic for resistance and reconstruction; long-range, the -purpose is to circumvent impending evils of concentrated industrialism, -slums, megalopolitan crowding, extra-legal oppression. China might thus -proceed directly from a decentralized half-handicraft economy to the -decentralized power economy of the future. Four principles underlie the -program: sound technical design, cooperative organization, voluntary -self-discipline, and social welfare on the basis of Sun's _min -shêng_.[5] - - [Footnote 5: Publicity release of Indusco, Inc., The American - Committee in Aid of Chinese Industrial Cooperatives, New York, January - 1940 [1941]. This agency, exceedingly active in publicizing China's - cooperative progress, has released a great deal of up-to-date - information on the movement. The Western literature on the C.I.C. has - appeared mostly in popular sources, to which _The Bulletin of Far - Eastern Bibliography_ issued by the Committees on Far Eastern Studies - of the American Council of Learned Societies, Washington, D. C., - serves as a useful guide. The writings of Edgar Snow are of special - value and vividness in treating this topic: articles in _Asia_, - various dates; "China's Blitzbuilder, Rewi Alley," _The Saturday - Evening Post_, Vol. 213, no. 32 (February 8, 1941); and his recent - _The Battle for Asia_, New York, 1941, which appeared as this work was - completed and sent to press. A convenient handbook is the anonymous - _The People Strike Back! or The Story of Chinese Industrial - Cooperatives_, Shanghai, (1939?).] - -Formally, the C.I.C. Headquarters is a social organization sponsored by -the Executive _Yüan_. H. H. K'ung, Minister of Finance and -Vice-President of the _Yüan_, is its Chairman. The Secretary-General -and Associate Secretary-General, Messrs. K. P. Liu and Hubert Liang, are -both American-returned students; the former once worked in the Ford -factories while studying at the University of Cincinnati and later was a -banker in Manchuria. The most inspiring force in the movement is Mr. -Rewi Alley, a New Zealander strongly interested in cooperatives and in -labor welfare, formerly factory inspector in the International -Settlement. Familiar, because of his Shanghai experiences and -famine-relief work, with the problems of economic organization in China, -he presented his plan to Generalissimo and Mme. Chiang through the -intervention of that extraordinarily popular British Ambassador, Sir -Archibald Clark-Kerr. The Chiangs were impressed with it, and the -Generalissimo gave it his support. A headquarters was established at -Hankow in August 1938, with the following five departments: _general_, -for secretarial and administrative housekeeping; _financial_, -administering funds for the headquarters and the cooperative units; -_organization_, in charge of planning and inauguration of cooperatives; -_technical_, devising simple industrial techniques; and _accounting_, an -independent agency of audit.[6] The Executive _Yüan_ has continued to -make administrative funds available; the central headquarters near -Chungking now has a staff of about seven hundred. Professor J. B. Tayler -of Yenching University, a noted economic expert, is consultant for staff -service. - - [Footnote 6: "The Movement in Action," _New Defense, A Journal of the - 30,000 Industrial Cooperatives Movement in China_ (Chungking) Vol. I, - no. 1 (April 1939), p. 5.] - -As projected by Rewi Alley and his fellow-enthusiasts, the C.I.C. had to -adjust itself to three zones of China's war-time economy. A guerrilla -zone in and around the combat area, as well as behind the Japanese -lines, concentrated on the creation of immediate war-time necessities. -Some of these were in the form of direct medical and military supplies; -others, replacements of indispensable articles which otherwise would -have been procured from the enemy. The second zone, of light industry, -was within easy reach of Japanese air raids and espionage, and -consequently given to enterprises having light capital investment, -mobile, and readily concealed. The third, or inmost Chinese zone, being -best protected, was the proper area for the development of the heavier -industries, although even here no grandiose or heavily centralized works -are planned. The ultimate aim, peace-time as well as military, of the -C.I.C. is to distribute industry across the countryside, replacing the -once flourishing handicraft industries, and allowing Chinese society to -develop naturally and continuously. - -The author attended a C.I.C. exhibit in Chungking which presented a -startling array of modern goods. Ford tools and auxiliary parts, -matches, lamps (electric, kerosene, and an improved wood-oil lamp which -equals kerosene), light electric appliances, lathes, machine-shop tools, -medical kits, Western shoes, toothpaste, canned foods, paper, printing -presses, books, and fountain pens--all were produced in areas which did -not even have the spinning wheel in some instances, and which until -recently imported all Western or modern goods from the coast or from -outside. - -The organization and practical accomplishments of the C.I.C. are well -summarized in a recent article by K. P. Liu, Secretary-General: - - INTRODUCTION: When it became clear that in order to continue - economic resistance against Japan China must at all costs - develop production in the rear of the fighting line, one of - the steps taken was the founding of the Chinese Industrial - Cooperatives by Dr. H. H. Kung. - - The plan was to construct throughout China chains of small - industries which should use local materials to supply the - manufactured goods fundamentally necessary to the life of - the people. - - Industrial cooperative societies are organized around about - 60 depots over 16 provinces. An average depot of about 25 - cooperatives is supervised and advised by a group of men - consisting of depotmaster, accountant, technician, and two - or three organizers. - - For the coordination of work depots are divided among five - regions: the Northwest (NW), the Southeast (SE), the - Chuankang (Szechwan and Sikang) region (CK), the Southwest - (SW), and Yunnan (Y). Each is headed by regional - headquarters, which are responsible to the Central - Headquarters at Chungking which represents the C.I.C. on - general questions and negotiations, and decides, in - consultation with regional chiefs, on broad lines of policy. - The Central Headquarters also supplies the services of - traveling advisers on engineering, accounting, and - organization problems. - - The staff of 700 is financed by Government funds, since the - C.I.C. has been named a social organization responsible to - the Executive Yüan. Further, the C.I.C. was given $5,000,000 - by the Central Government to be used as loan capital for - cooperatives. More recently, negotiations with various banks - have made new large sums available, so that the amount which - can now be used for the capitalization of cooperatives is - near $30,000,000. - - The above two sources of income provide no money for - education, research, evacuation of workers from occupied - areas, technical training, refugee work relief, medical - help, or capital loans in guerrilla regions. Necessary - auxiliary activities as these are provided for to a certain - extent by gifts from interested men and women in China and - abroad.... FORMING AN INDUSTRIAL COOPERATIVE: When a depot - is first set up, the depotmaster advertises the objectives - of the C.I.C. by posters and speeches. But as soon as a few - workmen get to know about its activities there is no more - need to advertise. There are always plenty of workers who - will prefer the security and freedom of a cooperative to - unemployment or to working for a master. - - The number of men needed to form a cooperative is at least - seven, but there is no upper limit. They first come to talk - things over with a C.I.C. organizer, present their plan for - setting up a factory or workshop, with proof of their - qualifications and a tentative budget showing how much loan - capital will be needed to start work. The organizer explains - to them the cooperative system of self-government, Chinese - cooperative law, and the C.I.C. Model Constitution. Then - they take some descriptive literature home, and discuss - among themselves whom they want as their officers. - - Meanwhile, their plans are talked over by the depotmaster, - accountant, organizer, and engineer, and modifications - suggested. If, as often happens, it turns out that they are - only merchants anxious to get rich quick and not _bona fide_ - workmen ready to work hard, the plans are rejected. - - If all is satisfactory, a meeting is held for the election - of officers, determination of share capital, voting of - wages, and work begins as soon as the loan is put through. - At least one quarter of the subscribed share capital must be - paid up immediately, and the total loan--long-term and - short--cannot exceed 20 times the subscribed share - capital.... The actual ratio of share to loan capital - averages about 1 to 6. - - INDUSTRIAL DISTRIBUTION: Distribution of industry is shown - in the following condensed table: - - Textiles 610 [cooperatives] - Engineering 49 - Mining 118 - Chemical 206 - Pottery 69 - Foodstuffs 83 - Transport 4 - Miscellaneous 395 - ----- - 1,534 - */ - - There are no less than 114 types of cooperatives, and almost - every daily need of the people can be met. - - Before any cooperative is organized, investigations are made - to ensure that (I) there are raw materials near at hand, - (II) there is skilled workmanship available, and (III) there - is a market for the finished product. Where these three do - not co-exist at one place, a compromise of the most - reasonable kind is effected if possible. Some examples--by - no means exhaustive--of the adaptation of types of industry - to meet local conditions are described as follows: - - _Wool_ ... In the beginning of 1939 woolspinners of Chentu - were still using either the simple old whorl or the - handturned wheel. The volume of production was very small. - But during 1939 the C.I.C. embarked on a huge program of - blanket production for the army, and improved streamlined - treadle spinners were introduced, and thousands of men and - women taught the technique of using them. Blankets were made - at eight centers of west and northern China; everywhere - improved woolspinning and woolweaving machines and - techniques brought new productive power. During the winter - of 1939-40, 400,000 blankets were turned out, and another - million and a half will be made during the remainder of - 1940. - - The wool used by the blanket-making cooperatives comes from - the highlands of Chinghai, Kansu, Ningsia, and Shensi, and - now instead of being carried raw to Tientsin or Shanghai as - in the old days, it is being spun and woven near to the - source of supply. Improvements are constantly being - made--better machines, finer spinning, use of waterpower, - better carding and finishing--so that the whole project - works to raise the efficiency and living standard of the - local people. - - _Cotton_. Wherever cotton is grown spinning and weaving - cooperatives are numerous, for clothing is one of the - fundamental needs of life.... - - _Grass Cloth_. Linen, or more correctly grass cloth, was - introduced into Szechwan from Kwangtung generations ago, and - now fine cloth is woven. Production thereof from ramie - thread was at its height 20 years ago, but since then the - craft has declined until recently, when the partial blockade - of the war made the industry profitable again.... - - _Goldwashing_. Placer gold exists along every river in West - China and in many parts of South China too. Even in - Chungking one may see needy coolies scraping up and washing - riverside mud for its tiny precious content. - - The gold is easily available by simple methods, though - certain difficulties have hitherto prevented its extraction - on a larger scale. But now every grain is an asset to China - in economic warfare, and so many goldwashing cooperatives - have been organized. In the whole country there are 66 - cooperatives, most of which are in the Han valley.... Now - the cooperatives ... are self-supporting and produce 60 to - 70 oz. of gold a day. - - _Coal and Iron_. Throughout the hinterland of China new - sources of coal and iron are being needed continually by - newly transplanted industry. Szechwan has good coal, - widespread, but rather thin in seam.... - - At the same time plans for the construction of blast - furnaces have been worked out by C.I.C. engineers, and only - wait for adequate financing. It is planned first to set up - in South Shensi at a point within easy distance of coal and - iron supplies a coke-making and a smelting plant, the total - capitalization being $105,000. - - _Alcohol._ A first experimental plant for the production of - 96 per cent pure alcohol has been running nearly a year with - a maximum output of 350 gallons a day. Since the cost of - such a plant is comparatively small, and available supplies - of grain make the cost of alcohol much less than that of - gasoline, other plants have been set up. There are now six - in operation and greater production in the future is - envisaged. The sites of alcohol plants are naturally at key - positions on the highway, where good supplies of coarse - grain meet with the traffic line. - - _Prime Movers._ In many cooperatives one may see a quaint - mixture of old and new, where big flywheels are turned by - human labor to maintain the spin of lathes, carding - machines, and the like. This is a useful temporary - expedient, possible where labor is cheap. Animal power is - also used. - - But C.I.C. engineers are not satisfied with this state of - affairs; they are always on the lookout for new sources of - power. So charcoal-or gasoline-burning internal combustion - engines are commonly employed. - - But most popular are waterwheels, and in every part of China - will be found old wheels adapted for modern uses--driving - textile machinery, turning lathes, grinding flour--undershot - or overshot, single or in series. Gradually the wheels are - being made of better materials and more efficient. Iron - wheels are constructed at present weighing about one ton, at - a cost of $3,000, and generating over 30 H.P. - - In the plains waterpower is rarely available, but in the - foothills of Tibet, the Tsingling Shan, or in the rough - country of southern China this cheapest of all forms of - power will come more and more into its own as C.I.C. machine - shops construct improved waterwheels. - - ACCOUNTING: During the past two years the C.I.C. staff has - tackled the question of modern accounting wholeheartedly in - every depot, and training classes in cost accounting have - been given for cooperative accountants who only know old - style Chinese bookkeeping. C.I.C. trained accountants have - been allocated to cooperatives--for big cooperatives one - accountant is employed by each society, for small, one - accountant serves two or three. Emphasis has been placed on - the presentation of monthly balance sheets and yearly - closing of accounts with profit sharing. - - Profits are divided among the members once--or in rare cases - twice--a year. The usual method of division, all claims - including interest on loans and shares having first been - paid, is as follows: - - Reserves 20 per cent - Emergency Fund 10 per cent - Bonus to Officers of Society 10 per cent - Common Good Fund 10 per cent - Divided among Members 50 per cent - */ - - The division accords with Chinese Law. The bonus to officers - is usually made to include gifts to apprentices and hired - workers such as cooks, and the Common Good Fund is used for - education, medical welfare, and other social service. The - division among members is made in strict proportion to wage - and time worked. - - Local conditions and various industries differ so much that - no wage-policy has at present been applied. In general it - may be said that wages in cooperatives--fixed by the members - themselves--are about the same as those in private factories - of the district. The products in general sell at prevailing - rates, though in some cases the prices have been lowered and - profiteering prevented by the action of the cooperatives. - - COOPERATIVE FEDERATIONS: Wherever the societies have passed - the first short period of infantile dependence on the C.I.C. - they have been associated into federations, sometimes - according to trade, but more often and more wholesomely, - according to districts. The most important immediate - function of the federation is to open a supply and marketing - agency, which by its centralization, specialization, and - greater supply of circulating capital is able to relieve the - cooperatives of most of their problems of buying and - selling.... - - TRAINING: Training of organizers is of vital importance, for - it is they who will succeed or fail in giving to the workers - true conceptions of cooperation, industry, and business, and - in inculcating efficient methods and habits. Classes for - organizers have consequently been held in every region. - - Training of cooperative chairmen in their duties is also - undertaken. They "learn by doing,"--how to conduct meetings, - business principles, cooperative law, history of - cooperation, scope and significance of industrial - cooperation in China.... The most usual training is by - weekly night classes and meetings. There is also constant - informal training by the organizers, who devote about one - day a week to each cooperative, and work with the members on - the solution of immediate problems by the application of - cooperative principles. Popular education of workers will be - described later. - - Another important aspect of training is technical. In no - case is a society organized until the technical ability of - the members is adequate for making a successful business. - So, with refugees and unskilled peasants it is usually - necessary to give preliminary training--mainly in textiles. - Wherever there is textile work, training classes have been - held in spinning and weaving.... - - SOCIAL WELFARE WORK: No statistics have been compiled about - the social contribution of the C.I.C. to the communities - around its depot. The work varies according to local needs - and opportunities, and according to available resources in - funds and manpower.... - - OUTLOOK: After the war there will undoubtedly come a period - of readjustment, when the renewed influx of machinery and - machine-finished goods will demand a shift of emphasis--for - instance handspinning cannot survive indefinitely, no matter - how essential it is at present. It is to be expected that at - that period the C.I.C. will continue to use in some - industries methods now employed, but that in others there - will be a transition to rationalization and mechanization. - With a soundly integrated network of skilled workmen, - experienced engineers, and bankers' confidence, the C.I.C. - will be able to make this transition without severe - dislocation. - - The C.I.C. is essentially a non-political organization; its - functions are all technical, and its staff is composed of - experts in various lines--cooperative methods, accounting, - engineering. Success does not depend on political position - or power, but on the simple and essential condition that - this type of industry produces efficiently the goods that - China needs. The C.I.C. objective is just Dr. Sun Yat-sen's - Third Principle--People's Livelihood--practically expressed. - - The success of cooperative movements in other parts of the - world--their ability to weather economic crises and - depressions--has been due to the solidarity that comes when - the motive force in industry and commerce is not the profit - of a few but the livelihood of many. In the same way the - C.I.C. can become a permanent force for national stability - and strength.[7] - - [Footnote 7: The China Information Committee, _News Release_, July 15, - 1940. The article and tables have been somewhat abridged. The - cooperatives spread so rapidly that figures are often obsolete before - they are tabulated.] - -The Model Constitution for an Industrial Cooperative[8] establishes -safeguards to keep the cooperatives from becoming profiteering -sweatshops. Bankrupts, drug addicts, persons incapable of working, and -persons already members of a unit are forbidden to join a unit being -formed (_Art._ 7). No member may subscribe more than 20 per cent of the -share capital of a single society (_Art._ 9). A general annual meeting, -with the quorum set at one-half, and action requiring the majority of a -quorum, is the highest authority in a unit (_Art._ 19). This meeting -elects a board of directors and a separate board of supervisors (_Arts._ -22 and 23). Sweeping disqualifications keep members from mixing personal -or outside interests and cooperative matters (_Art._ 32). The design of -the unit constitution is such that each unit is an authentic, autonomous -cooperative, governed well or badly in accordance with the abilities and -needs of its members, and is not a mere fraction of state capitalism. - - [Footnote 8: "Model Constitution for Chinese Cooperative Societies, - Revised July 7th, 1940," The China Information Committee, _News - Release_, July 15, 1940.] - -The C.I.C. taps a level of Chinese society hitherto largely -unused[9]--the family, guild, village, and volunteer-society devices of -the peasantry and townsmen who lived beneath the lowest limits of the -scholastic bureaucracy. The Communists act as the inheritors to -temporarily fanatical peasant rebellions; the National Government and -Kuomintang, to ascendant mandarinates; the C.I.C. brings into play the -rich experience of the Chinese with collective action. The resources of -the social power so mobilized cannot easily be estimated, but general -success would reshape much of Chinese society. - - [Footnote 9: Nevertheless, the rural cooperative movement must be - counted in as having made some beginnings, despite the obstacles it - has faced. More than seventy thousand credit and marketing - cooperatives were in service last year. (The same, April 22, 1940.)] - -In fitting the C.I.C. to the general Chinese scene, however, it is -important to compare the movement with some of the New Deal reforms in -the United States, such as T.V.A. (Tennessee Valley Authority). Though -these are important, neither the American nor the Chinese enterprises -proclaim social revolution or charter Utopias. The reforms of President -Roosevelt have had incalculable effect; no one knows what would have -happened without them. Nevertheless, it is excessive to suggest that the -existence of the United States as a political society depends upon these -reforms. Similarly, the continuation of the National Government of China -does not rest on the C.I.C., or on any other single institution alone. - -The C.I.C. extends patterns of cooperation and farm-factory balance -already tried in Europe, and also approached by such diverse agencies as -the Soviet state and collective farms, and Mr. Henry Ford's -worker-garden plans. Hitherto the Chinese cooperative workers have had a -closer contact with Dearborn, Michigan, than with Moscow, R.S.F.S.R. The -endeavor is a serious and important one. It supplements and develops the -facilities--themselves very extensive--which are under full -state-capitalist or private control. But Free China's markets, while -they contain C.I.C.-made goods, are mostly filled with private or -government products. A private Chinese business system which has -survived thirty years of domestic war does not obsolesce -instantaneously. The cooperative movement is, largely because of the -integrity, enthusiasm, and tirelessness of Mr. Alley, the nearest thing -to a realization of _min shêng_ which China has yet seen; but the Right -still plans for a China with vast state-capitalist and state-subsidized -private industries, along with an all-pervading flow of _laissez-faire_ -commerce. The Marxians look on sympathetically but contemptuously. - - -UNORGANIZED PRESSURE - -The long one-party rule of the Kuomintang, now relaxed but not -disestablished, has habituated the Chinese to the use of completely -non-political groups--families and their connections; economic -associations of various kinds; religious agencies--for political -leverage. There are relatively few groups which possess clear public -purposes and at the same time maintain unofficial status. Indeed, the -stamp of quasi-official approval is so highly prized that many groups -which seem to have no affiliation with the government are discovered to -seek affiliation or to have acquired it roundabout. - -Among the private or quasi-private groups which take most effect may be -mentioned, however, the People's Foreign Relations Association, the -League of Nations Union, and the China Branch of the International Peace -Campaign. The first of these publishes the useful quarterly, _The China -Herald_. The Campaign, which was launched as a world-wide -center-and-left drive for peace, was under respected European -leadership, and was favored by a large labor bloc in England. In the -United States it was associated in the minds of some people with the -Stalinist fellow-travellers--the elements who sat in the councils of the -temporarily-joined forces of anti-Fascism and pro-Stalinism, who -organized the American League for Peace and Democracy (a Popular Front -movement), the American Friends of the Chinese People, and who dominated -groups such as the American Youth Congress. In China, contrariwise, the -International Peace Campaign, fitting in with purposes of government and -people, seemed to offer a world-wide sympathy for China's -anti-aggression activities. The China Branch was among the most -effective organizations in the Campaign. It developed vitality in -diffusing peace propaganda--that is, for peace after the war. There was -no trace of defeatism, sabotage of national defense, or obstruction to -defensive war. With the outbreak of the European war, the I.P.C. -disappeared almost altogether from the Western scene, but continues in -China. Finally, the China League of Nations Union publishes _The China -Forum_, and carries on an educational campaign. - -Christian activities have been extended and activized by war. Never -before have the missions had as many opportunities for social and -national service in China. Their schools are filled; their hospitals, -crowded; their cause, related to America, to peace, and to a sane long -view, is welcomed. The Chinese Y.M.C.A. has met the shock of war with -extensive participation in relief, particularly among students and -soldiers. Medical aid, tragically inadequate but infinitely better than -nothing at all, is coming into China. The curtailment of mission -activities in occupied China makes exploitation of the Christian field -in the West even more desirable from the viewpoint of the Western -churches. A recent work, by two Christians born in China, one American -and the other Chinese, describes this situation clearly and -significantly: _China Rediscovers Her West_.[10] - - [Footnote 10: Wu Yi-fang and Price, Frank W., editors; New York, - 1940.] - -The other side of extra-political pressure comes in the form of class -and regional interests. The phenomena of lobbying and special favor are -less evident in Chungking than in previous governments of China. Special -groups representing industries, areas, or vested interests do appear, -but are apt to work through casual, untraceable patterns of personal -relationships. There is no Chinese C.I.O., nor A. F. of L., but there is -also no National Association of Manufacturers. The politics of economics -gains by diffusion and absence of protest what it loses in sensitivity -and explicitness. An economic group which feels itself outraged takes a -long time to develop group consciousness; hence, it is less apt to feel -outraged, and the generality of the people, the public, is often better -off. There are undoubtedly scurrilous, politically vile, selfish -advantages being taken in West China today; but the net outcome is -counterbalanced by concrete improvement in the condition of the people -as a whole, and the unquestionable morale of the leading and -administrative classes. - -Every government, where and however it may operate, has a double set of -barriers which form its corridor of further existence: on the left it -must meet the minimal needs of the governed, satisfy their physical and -moral appetites sufficiently to keep itself from being ignored or -overthrown; on the right it must compensate the persons who govern, and -do so well enough to retain personnel adequate to government. The -Marxians stress the former element; the Paretians, the latter. Both are -visible in China. Had the exigencies of reform, social change, and -military activity proved too sharp, too violent, too profitless, the -personnel trained by experience and fitted by temperament to government -might have gone over to Japan. The low caliber of Wang Ch'ing-wei and -his clique is testimony to the _élan_ of the West Chinese leaders. -Chungking has ample reserves of administrative talent, military -intelligence, and political acumen upon which to draw. - -The last part of the picture is the most important: the _lao-pai-hsing_, -the Old Hundred Names, the common people of China. They are the ultimate -arbiters of this war, and of all future wars in East Asia: to this -degree they are a superlative force in the world. Hundreds of millions -strong, adept, flexible, trained in a culture which has flowed under -(but not through) literacy for centuries, hard-working, patient, and -physiologically sound, they are perhaps the greatest unified human -group. Upon their anger against Japan depends the future of that Empire; -if the _lao-pai-hsing_ are determined to resist, Chiang could go, -Chungking fall, the government scatter, the Communists collapse, and -there would yet be war--restless, bitter, implacable, with the ferocity -of a sane man employing violence as a last defense against violence not -sane. Leaders exist aplenty in that sea of men, waiting for circumstance -to cast them forth. Intelligence, information, cunning, power, and -patience are all at hand. - -The difference between a strange half-industrial modern Chinese -Republic, striding toward the twenty-first century with seven-league -boots of progress, and a Chinese chaos stinking with vice and disease -under Japanese rule--this difference lies within the decision of the -common people. The war has roused the workers, peasants, and petty -townsmen. The Japanese bombers have carried ubiquitous messages of -alarm. The Western world gasped when across the dusty plains of North -China there rolled the tidal wave of Boxerism; but the _I Ho Ch'üan_ of -yesteryear is a passing fad in contrast to the bitterness and resolution -of today's common people. There is no defeat in most of the faces in -Shanghai, no surrender in the eyes of men who live, and must keep on -living, surrounded by enemy vainglory. The traitors are marked by their -own behavior; they bear the stigmata of a surrender to vice. Yet even -they cannot be trusted by Japan. One who has visited the sources and the -mouths of the rivers, who has seen the free Yangtze pouring out of Tibet -and the captive Yangtze ripple past the grey flanks of Imperial Japanese -destroyers, can testify that the Chinese people are not beaten now. If -they are ever going to be beaten, it will take a bigger force than -Japan to do it--a morally greater, technically surer, politically wiser -force. - -The Chinese people know they are unconquered. They do not know it with -their minds, despite hopeful calculations in terms of years and yen and -reserves of oil. They do not even know it with a conscious assumption of -faith, a fanatical determination to die for the new state. They know it -just as men have always known the simplest things of life--things so -simple that they may trouble the psychologist or elude the philosopher, -and never even enter the vocabulary of political science. The Chinese -sense of victory is like a reminiscent fragrance, a half-heard but -poignant sound, a flash of inexpressible but profound meaning out of -everyman's irrecoverable past. This omnipresent sense of victory and -freedom may be twisted. Weak and cunning men rationalize this sense of -victory into self-deceiving subterfuges of boring from within; they -accept Japanese salaries while promising themselves sometime, always -tomorrow, to subvert Japan; but even they lack no assurance of ultimate -Chinese victory. - -The winning of that victory lies on the sweating backs of men--in -paddy-fields, on flaring highways, on flagstone pathways across a world, -or behind the adobe and lattice walls of China's workshops. The war has -conjured up an awareness of power. No one asks the _lao-pai-hsing_ what -they want; no ballots, no polls can reach them. But no people can hold -such overt power and be unconscious of their own strength. China has -awakened. - - - - -[Illustration: _Dr. Sun Yat-sen_] - -CHAPTER IX - -SUN YAT-SEN AND CHIANG K'AI-SHEK - - -The two highest offices in the Kuomintang are _Tsung-li_ (Leader) and -_Tsung-ts'ai_ (Chief). These are occupied by Sun Yat-sen as Leader and -Chiang K'ai-shek as Chief. Sun Yat-sen, though he died on March 12, -1925, holds the higher office in perpetuity. So vast is his legacy to -modern China that it exceeds full enumeration: founder of the effective -revolutionary movement and Party, first practical republican, political -organizer of the modern and overseas Chinese, first President of the -Republic, and therefore officially acknowledged State Founder, a drafter -of the national plan of modernization, author of the accepted ideology -(_San Min Chu I_), initiator of the Nationalist-Communist entente and of -the consequent Great Revolution, promulgator of the Outline of National -Reconstruction, and posthumous patron of the National Government. Keenly -and devotedly an advocate of democracy, Sun Yat-sen established by -practical example the principle of charismatic leadership. He most -certainly left a mantle. This is now, after years of struggle, draped -about the shoulders of Chiang K'ai-shek, although Wang Ch'ing-wei -retains a few threads torn from the hem. - -Sun Yat-sen was a leader in the sense that the great religious and -philosophical figures have been leaders. He is not to be compared to -Alexander, Genghis Khan, Napoleon, or Hitler, but to Confucius, Gautama -Buddha, or Mohammed. Like the spiritual leaders he blended profound -humility and complete assurance. He knew that he was the savior of -China, and knew it long before anyone else did. He did not rely on -rising to power within a party, as did Lenin, or within a state, as did -Hitler. He created his own Party and his own state. Had he not -succeeded, he would have been labelled a maniac; so would most of the -other major figures of human history, had they failed. His success, -whatever its future fortune, is already so immense that it makes his -sense of leadership seem modest. And within the limits of success, he -was very modest; throughout life Sun remained more open-minded, ready to -consult, deferential to the opinions of others, and more willing to -yield power for the sake of harmony than the majority of his compeers. -This duality has troubled some of his biographers. As late as 1939 an -anonymous Englishman published an attack on Sun, which, missing the -history of six decades, failed to note that Sun had lived, had -succeeded, and had died objectively justified in his conception of -himself. - -Sun's example, unconsciously at variance with his teachings, has left a -strong Caesarian strain in practical Chinese politics. Without Sun -Yat-sen in the background, it is altogether impossible to understand the -role played by Chiang, or to resolve the contradiction between a state -pledged to democracy and a leader over-loaded with power. No group in -China, except the officials of Manchoukuo, disavows Sun Yat-sen: the -Japanophiles, the Nationalists, and the Communists all claim to execute -his will. - - -SUN YAT-SEN - -Sun Yat-sen was born in Kwangtung Province, near the Portuguese city of -Macao. Although he was uncertain of the date, the National Government -has found it to be November 12, 1866. Both his provincial and class -background had effect on his later life. The Cantonese are among the -most turbulent of Chinese, living at the southern edge of China and -speaking a dialect far different from the majority of the country. -Active, rebellious, enterprising, the Cantonese were disposed to change. -Sun's use of their tongue and knowledge of their customs gave him an -audience which both suffered and profited by its distinctness. Sun's -family was certainly not of the gentry class, and yet not so utterly -poor that it lacked all profitable connections. Otherwise his -potentialities might have been thwarted by ruinous poverty, disease, or -early death. - -In adolescence, Sun felt the stings and urges of resentment driving him -to reform and revolution. He had kin who were involved in the T'aip'ing -Rebellion (1850-65), the vast peasant uprising which, under Christian -collectivist leadership by the Messianic Hung Hsiu-ch'üan, swept North -to the Yangtze and drowned in a sea of blood less than two years before -Sun's birth. He thus had direct knowledge not merely of Chinese revolt -against the alien Manchu empire, but he knew of the revolutionary -technique of a religious leader. The effect of this presumptive -knowledge has never been explored; it would explain a great deal in -Sun's career--much of the sharp enthusiasm, the use of ecstatic slogans, -the emphasis on will, his demands for faith in himself--if one could -know that he followed the instance of a Chinese Joseph Smith or Brigham -Young, not that of a Chinese Mazzini or Marx. The other important -feature about his early life was Western education.[1] - - [Footnote 1: _Sun Yat-sen_ is the Cantonese pronunciation of _Sun - I-hsien_, just as _Chiang K'ai-shek_ is that of _Chiang Chieh-shih_. - Both men first acquired their world reputations under this - pronunciation, which has become standard in English. According to - Chinese custom, one's given name is used only by one's elders; - consequently Sun Yat-sen has been referred to, by his grateful - followers, by his "courtesy name" Wên, which is the name by which one - refers to one's elder. In addition, he is referred to by another - special name which he took for conspiratorial work, Chung-shan - (allusive to an ancient hero), or by his title--as _Tsung-li_ or _Sun - Tsung-li_, much as we refer to President Wilson rather than to Woodrow - Wilson. Sun was known most widely in life as Sun Wên; Chiang is most - commonly mentioned as Chiang Chung-chêng. The question of names is - extensively discussed in the biographies of the two leaders, cited - below.] - -Western training gave him a channel upward which the Confucian system -had denied a hundred generations of his predecessors. Patriots, rebels, -reformers--these have been sown by temperament and fortune across the -centuries of Chinese social existence, but such potential heroes have -been ploughed out or crippled by the language and the examinations. No -man could command power--save in its transient forms: banditry, -conspiracy, commerce--without mastering the Confucian canon. Once the -intricate scholarship of the past gripped him, the complex, beautiful, -archaic language of the mandarinate stopped up his mouth for plain -utterance. He was isolated from the people. Sun escaped this by the use -of the English language and the command of Western science. He was par -excellence the great counter-ideologue, whose self-confidence and -command of men rested upon foundations beyond the ken of his -adversaries. Judge Linebarger wrote, on the basis of what Sun told him: - - Like a soldier who after long study and practice has at - length mastered the manual of arms so as to have complete - confidence in his weapons, Sun now began to feel at last a - confidence in his ability to show others the path of his new - wisdom, for, while thus enjoying a steady advance under - English tutelage in the ways of the foreigner, he was by no - means neglecting his study of Chinese politics, even in the - pressure of college work. He knew now that he would have to - lead out in the Great Reform. At Hong Kong, Macao, and - Canton he had college intimates, and these he sought out as - often as his college course would permit.[2] - - [Footnote 2: Linebarger, Paul [M. W.], _Sun Yat-sen and the Chinese - Republic_, New York and London, 1925, p. 176; this is the authorized - life of Sun Yat-sen, written much as he wished it. The standard - critical biography is Sharman, Lyon, _Sun Yat-sen: His Life and Its - Meaning_, New York, 1934. Sun Yat-sen also wrote a number of short - autobiographies, some of which are deliberately inexact. Western - language material on Sun is surveyed in an annotated bibliography - appended to the present author's _The Political Doctrines of Sun - Yat-sen_, Baltimore, 1937, p. 265 _ff._ A work which has since - appeared is "Sagittarius," _The Strange Apotheosis of Sun Yat-sen_, - London, 1939.] - -Sun lived with his elder brother in Honolulu on two occasions, and -finally, after a period of discontent and rising turbulence at home, -went to study medicine in Hong Kong. He was the outstanding student in -the school because of his already fluent command of the English -language,[3] and was graduated as one of the very first Chinese -physicians to be trained in Western medicine. Through their very nature, -medical studies impart to the student a sense of responsibility for -others, and also incline them toward the expert's indifference to lay -opinion. Throughout his life Sun never lost confidence in the powers of -his own reason, or in the belief that, although difficult, it was both -necessary and possible to know the form and nature of social no less -than of biological processes, and to prescribe remedies for an ill -civilization as well as for a sick man. - - [Footnote 3: Statement to the author by Wên Chung-yao, President of - the Legislative _Yüan_ of the Reorganized National Government of Wang - Ch'ing-wei, at Nanking, September 5, 1940. Dr. Wên was a classmate of - Dr. Sun at Queen's College.] - -With traditional patriotism, a Cantonese background, the memory of -poverty, foreign training, and contact with overseas China, Sun was -already a marked man in his twenties. By 1895 he was important enough -for the Imperial Chinese Legation in London to kidnap him, preparing to -charter a ship to return him to China, where the torturers of the Board -of Punishments waited. In a _cause célèbre_, Sun was released; from then -on he had an international reputation. - -His technique of revolution was little affected by the growing -proletarian parties of Europe. He adhered to traditional Chinese -methods, working through the consolidation of pre-existent secret -societies, the recruitment of terrorists, the launching of insurrection -after insurrection in the hope that one of them would catch the waiting -tinder and blaze across China. In Japan, in America, and in Europe, he -travelled, gathering funds, carrying on vigorous polemics against his -fellow-exiles, the monarchist reformers. His followers were organized -under a variety of names, of which Kuomintang is the last and -best-known. By 1911 the revolution broke out, flared sporadically across -the central and southern provinces, then lapsed into negotiations -between the Republicans and the Empire. Sun Yat-sen, in America when the -clash was precipitated, returned home to be elected Provisional -President of the Chinese Republic, on January 1, 1912. But his -revolution had begun to pass into other hands. Opportunists, no rare -breed in China, leapt aboard the bandwagon, minimizing the role of the -Nationalists and grasping for the materials of power: offices, guns and -money, slogans. The new-born Republic was taken over by the formidable -Yüan Shih-k'ai and converted into a pyramid of military dictatorships; -with Yüan's death the nation fell into _tuchünism_ and foreign meddling. - -The years following were the saddest in Sun's life. He headed -miscellaneous governments in Canton, lived for a while in Shanghai, and -died at a fruitless unification conference in Peking. In his last years, -obsessed by his clear realization of the evils which beset his country, -he was even derided. He saw the vast economic maladjustments which would -follow the World War, and wrote a work, _The International Development -of China_[4] which in its grandeur anticipated the Five-Year and -Four-Year Plans; his idea was to finance a spectacular modernization of -China through public works by a scheme of international loans. Not only -would the imports of capital goods have benefited the Western powers, -but the development of a prosperous China would have provided the -expansion necessary to support an imperialist capitalism. His argument -was that international capitalism needed a market; China, one fourth of -humanity, provided a market; international guarantees and supervision -would make modernization possible; and modernization, while building -state-socialism and the material basis of prosperity in China, would -have enriched capitalism throughout the world. There is no evidence that -anyone save his followers and friends took his plan seriously. - - [Footnote 4: New York, 1922; reissue, 1929.] - -The next step, in 1922, was a turning from capitalist democracies, which -had disappointed him, to a Russia which professed a new justice in the -world. Sun negotiated with emissaries of the Third International, -accepting Red help on the clear understanding that Communism was -recognized, by him and by the Communists, as unsuited to China--a -proposition which history calls into question. Only in his last stay in -Canton did he escape the ten-year pattern of frustration which had been -broken only by his happy second marriage, to Soong Ching-ling. (The -author, then a small boy, remembers Sun in Shanghai as a man of gentle -kindness and rueful gaiety; Sun was never too busy to speak to him, nor -to remember little presents; and in the midst of revolution Sun found -time to write a note of encouragement and good cheer.) With the new -allies, Sun, a dying man, went South, founded the lineal predecessors of -the Chungking government, called his comrades to him, and discovered an -effective military helper--his first after Huang Hsing, dead in the -years of Yüan. This military aide was Chiang K'ai-shek. - -Just before his death Sun made sixteen lectures, out of a scheduled -program of eighteen. He did not write them, but they were transcribed -and roughly edited. In other years he had drafted monumental political -treatises; when the manuscripts were lost he did not reconstruct them. -The lectures, improvised, filled with minor inaccuracies, incomplete -arguments, and appeals to immediate opinion, rank nevertheless among -works of political genius. They are sharp, stirring, pointed, hopeful, -concrete. They define China's position in the world, and the goals of -the Chinese revolution. They adumbrate the reinforced democracy which -was to come and now fights for existence. And they prescribe an economic -philosophy humane beyond the dogma of the Russo-German dialecticians and -far more self-conscious than the obstinate torpor of Coolidge's -capitalism. Sun's lectures are today the foundation of the Chinese state -philosophy, taught in all curricula, required in all examinations. As -the _San Min Chu I_, they form an ideology with more legal adherents -than Marxism and National Socialism and Fascism combined. For democrats, -wherever they may be, this is a matter of importance, bearing directly -on the confused uncanalized struggles of our time. China possesses a -doctrine which indefeasibly associates her independence, her democracy, -and her prosperity. - -It would be a mistake to consider these lectures and Sun's lesser -writings the only source of Sun Yat-sen's dogma. Since the government is -in the hands of the Kuomintang, and Kuomintang seniority depends largely -on closeness of association with Sun Yat-sen, Sun's personal, casual, -unconsidered influence on his friends forms a vital background to state -policy. Sun's American biographer wrote, - - Some criticize the _San Min Chu I_, because it seems to them - severe and lofty. To this I reply that there are things - other than what is written in the _San Min Chu I_. The - English and other nations have their laws, written and - unwritten. So too do we, the partisans of Sun Yat-sen, have - our laws, written and unwritten. And this unwritten law is - to us the dearer, is closer to our hearts, and is more - moving as the goal of our activity, than even the written - commentaries. This unwritten law is for us, who, sitting at - his feet, received his teaching, the highest of all laws of - truth and fidelity, the law of _bona fides_.[5] - - [Footnote 5: Linebarger, Paul Myron, _Mes Mémoires Abrégés sur les - Révolutions de Sun Yat-sen_, Paris, 1938, p. 194. Paragraphing deleted - in translation from the French.] - -The continuing power of Sun Yat-sen is shown by the prestige and power -of his kin. Sun Yat-sen had two families. Early in life, before his -medical studies had ended, he was married to a woman of his own class -who was devoted, family-loving, characteristically Chinese, untouched by -the West, and undisposed to revolution. She bore him three children; the -son, Dr. Sun K'ê, was reared largely in the United States and has been -an important figure in Chinese politics ever since his return to China -from Columbia University. Successively Mayor of Canton, Chairman of -Kwangtung Province, Minister of Communications, of Finance, and of -Railways, President of the Executive and of the Legislative _Yüan_, he -has served with distinction. A practical and moderate man, he has always -advocated a moderate, constitutional application of his father's dogma, -has espoused full democratic government, stood for Party abdication, and -worked for national unity. One of his sisters died young and the other -married a gentleman who was later Chinese Minister to Brazil. Mrs. Sun -Yat-sen, Sun K'ê's mother, lived to a ripe old age in Macao. Charitable, -pious, humane, she was an enthusiastic Christian convert and a terror to -sluggard officials in that European outpost of vice. She took no part in -politics. - -Sun Yat-sen's second family was acquired when he married Miss Soong -Ching-ling. After his defeat by Yüan Shih-k'ai and the frustration of -the first Republic, Sun Yat-sen felt very much in need of a companion to -hearten him, help his work, and share his troubles. He had been on very -close terms with C. J. Soong, a Christian business man, and had asked -Mr. Soong's eldest daughter, Ai-ling, to act as his secretary. When Miss -Ai-ling Soong left, her sister succeeded her. Sun fell genuinely and -deeply in love with the beautiful, vivacious, American-educated girl who -understood his work and desired to share his troubles. In all his life, -it is likely that Sun met no one more devoted to himself, more -understanding of what he sought from life and from his work for China, -than Ching-ling Soong. They were married on October 15, 1915, in Japan, -Sun Yat-sen having provided for separation from his first wife. The -younger wife has since become world-famous as Mme. Sun Yat-sen. - -Ching-ling and Ai-ling Soong had a third sister,[6] May-ling, who -married Chiang K'ai-shek after Ai-ling had married H. H. K'ung. (Hence -Chiang K'ai-shek's closest family connection with Sun Yat-sen consists -in being brother-in-law to the second wife.) The three Soong sisters -thus married the two outstanding leaders and another who stood just -below. The Soong brothers were less successful, although one, T. V. -Soong, has been a leading fiscal reformer and financial expert. - - [Footnote 6: In the case of Chinese names which are commonly - transliterated in an Americanized form, the Western name-order is - preserved. According to standard Sinological practice, the three - sisters are Sung Ai-ling, Sung Ch'ing-ling, and Sung Mei-ling; their - famous brother (T. V. Soong) is Sung Tzŭ-wên.] - -The beauty, American education, polished cosmopolitan manners, and sense -of publicity of the three sisters have made them sensational news -figures. Their eldest brother's success has added distinction to this -family. The inescapable consequence has been a great deal of speculation -about the "Soong dynasty"; but the surprising feature of the Soongs is -not their fame and power through marriage, plus ability, but their -slight cohesion as a Chinese family. They have stood together only at -times of highest crisis, and not always then. Mme. Sun Yat-sen has -continued along the Leftist tangent which her husband followed just -before he died. For years she was the only Leftist in China who did not -fear death or a more painful fate. She kept her ideals; from the homes -of her family she wrote scathing denunciations of the blood-soaked -tyranny of her brother-in-law, her sisters, her stepson, and her -brother. Mme. K'ung appears to have worked most steadfastly in the -interest of the entire family, although rivalry between her brother and -her husband has been a matter of general report. Mme. Chiang K'ai-shek, -the youngest of the three sisters, has been a loyal wife first of all, -and has contributed enormously to the Generalissimo's international -prestige. No other modern leader possesses an able publicity adviser, -capable and apt, so near to himself. The family relationships of Sun -Yat-sen thus display themselves in his son, constitutional and moderate, -who is inclined to favor Mme. Sun, with Sun's sisters-in-law and -brothers-in-law following their respective political courses with their -own families--all on cordial political terms, but scarcely a monolithic -family bloc. - -In addition to his doctrine, his Party, his followers, and his family, -Sun Yat-sen has bequeathed his name. As Chung Shan, he fills the void in -Chinese polity left by the Emperor. Every Monday morning his will is -read, throughout every government office in the land. His picture is -seen everywhere. His sayings and slogans have become the shibboleths of -revolution, union, and reconstruction. The reverence paid to him is a -form of secular worship, focussed upon a magnificent mausoleum near the -cenotaphs of the Ming Emperors on Purple Mountain, Nanking. All virtues -and most knowledge are attributed to him; inescapably, some hard-headed -people react against the cult. Dead, he is to the Chinese what the King -is to the British, or the assembled forefathers to the Americans, -or--save partial eclipse by Stalin--Lenin is to the Soviet Union. -Perpetual leader of the Kuomintang, Sun has in death more power than -life vouchsafed him. In a world wild with alarm and hungry for -leadership, his sense of providential mission and of terrible political -urgency no longer seems shrill or vain. His is the greatest of -posthumous satisfactions: vindication by history. - - -THE SAN MIN CHU I - -Out of the broad body of doctrine embodied in the public and private -utterances of Sun Yat-sen, one single integrating philosophy stands -forth, which entitles him to rank as a major political thinker. This is -the _San Min Chu I_, which may be translated "three principles of the -people," "three principles of government for the benefit of the people," -"three principles concerning people" and so forth, or may--most -accurately--be represented by the neologism, "tridemism."[7] It consists -of an affirmation of a body of theory and a scheme of programs to be -applied generally to human experience, and particularly to the modern -problems of China. - - [Footnote 7: d'Elia, Paschal M., S. J., _The Triple Demism of Sun - Yat-sen_, Wuch'ang, 1931, p. 36-49, gives an exhaustive analysis of - possible translations. Stylistically, the term should be given _San - Min Chu I_ as a classical title; _san-min chu-i_ as a noun; and - _san-min-chu-i_ when used as an adjective. The first form alone is - followed because of its wide currency.] - -The prime problem faced by Sun Yat-sen was displacement of the Confucian -ideology, long refreshed and perpetuated by the mandarinate. (The -scholastic bureaucracy rested on the difficulty and character of the -language, which removed writing from speaking and, lacking what -Westerners commonly consider grammar, depended upon exact, appropriate -choice of terms.) Confucius, anticipating semantic controversialists by -many centuries, established a doctrine of meaning which made politics -the by-product of correct speech and thought, to be performed by -conspicuous, informed, and majestic persons. When ideas and ideals were -clear, moral standards firm and visible, and demeanor correct--as -determined by archaic natural standards--the realm would prosper. -Education was stressed as a means to public service. In succeeding -centuries Confucians first monopolized education, establishing the -Confucian classics as formal Chinese canons, and then monopolized the -bureaucracy. Providing for elementary circulation of an academic elite, -although economically based on land-ownership, they gave China a -modified sort of representative government, which operated by the -all-encompassing constitutionalism of common sense itself, and rested -ultimately on the lack of an alternative to common sense. The Confucians -were intellectually indifferent to natural science and economically -unfriendly to technological change; China, unsurpassed for political -sophistication and deliberate social order, was immobilized by an -ancient success. Ideological control led to veneration of the scholar, -even veneration of writing. Emperors, officials, people--all were -captive to accomplishment, and so completely indoctrinated that they -presumably enjoyed a very high conscious freedom. Rigid social and -mental uniformity spelled political laxity; the state became atrophied -and vestigial. - -Social rigidity made China only very slowly progressive in mechanical -terms. Political laxity made the country weak in the face of invasion, -exploitation, and possible partition. Intellectual traditionalism shut -off stimuli available from the outside. Confucius had said, "If terms be -not correct, language is not in accordance with the truth of things. If -language be not in accordance with the truth of things, affairs cannot -be carried on to success."[8] Sun Yat-sen, Confucian in spirit though -not in form, turned to the dynamics of ideological rather than legal -control. To stir the immense lethargy of China, he substituted science -for archaism; a Party elite for the scholastic system, propaganda to -replace doctrinal education, and agitation to supersede incantation and -reverence. - - [Footnote 8: _The Analects_, Book XIII, Ch. v; Legge, James, _The - Chinese Classics_, Oxford, 1893 [Peiping, 1939], I, p. 93; the word - _terms_ has been substituted for _names_ in rendering _ming_.] - -He struck at ideas first: "We cannot say in general that ideas, as -ideas, are either good or bad. We must judge whether, when put into -practice, they prove useful or not. If they are of practical use to us, -they are good; if they are impractical, they are bad. If they are useful -to the world, they are good; if they are not useful to the world, they -are not good."[9] This pragmatic utilitarianism was to be the -philosophical foundation of his revolution. The _San Min Chu I_ -therewith remained alien to Marxism, which is dependent upon the occult -mysteries of a topsy-turvy Hegelianism; Sun's thought is kin to the -working philosophy of America, a pragmatism tinctured by idealist -vestiges. - - [Footnote 9: d'Elia translation, cited, p. 130-1.] - -The first political principle he developed was _Nationalism_ (_min -ts'u_). The theoretical basis for this was a racialism which, -scientifically no more tenable than National Socialist Aryanism, is -clear in common practice. Very few Chinese have trouble in identifying -another Chinese. Sun Yat-sen pointed out that although the European -peoples were divided, China was to him both a race and a nation. He -thereby established for his followers a foundation for nationality more -credible than any mere appeal to state allegiance. Treason against one's -government is taken lightly in China: witness the Japanophiles. Treason -to the Chinese race is a far more serious matter. In order to preserve -the Chinese race-nation, Sun Yat-sen called for ideological -reconstruction from three elements: ancient Chinese morality, -traditional Chinese social knowledge (e.g., bureaucratic techniques; -arbitration instead of adjudication), and Western physical science. He -urged a return to cosmopolitanism through nationalism. By becoming -strong--instead of extinct under alien colonial rule--the Chinese state -could lead the world back to the old pacific cosmopolitanism of Eastern -Asia. - -Programmatically, Sun subsumed under his _min t'su_ theory, the -necessity of a patriotic elite, formed into the party of his followers, -which was to unify China and to cultivate a genuine state-allegiance -instead of the veneration of a concretely paramount Emperor or other -leader. He also advocated that China maintain independence, make -independence a reality in which the entire race-nation should share by -fostering actual autonomy (hence, democracy), and by fighting -defensively against economic exploitation by the imperialist powers. - -The second principle presented was _Democracy_ (_min ch'üan_). He -pointed out that old China was democratic in allowing considerable -social mobility, and much equality within the framework of that -mobility, and that popular government was a reality in local affairs, -while popular supremacy (corresponding to Western theories of popular -sovereignty) followed from the universally admitted Chinese right of -rebellion. He justified democracy on the grounds that it was commanded -by China's antique sages, was necessarily consequent upon nationalism, -was decreed by the _Zeitgeist_, was necessary to good administration, -and was a modernizing force. But he modified his democracy by a -distinction between _ch'üan_ (power) and _nêng_ (ability), keeping -government and people perpetually dual, and making the problem of -democratic personnel one of popular choice plus the control of popular -choice. The programs of democracy involved the revolution of three -stages, the five-_yüan_ government, and emphasis on the _hsien_.[10] - - [Footnote 10: See above, p. 42.] - -The third principle is based on Sun Yat-sen's own philosophy of history. -_Min shêng_, frequently translated "the principle of the people's -livelihood," rested upon Sun Yat-sen's belief that history is not based -exclusively on materialism and that it cannot be analyzed merely in -terms of the ownership of the means of production. He insisted that -history was based on the fundamental fact that man has _jên_--humane -self-awareness; human fellow-sympathy; consciousness of being located in -society, together with orientation by values social, not individually or -materially established; benevolence. _Min shêng_ is accordingly an -ethical doctrine first, and an economic one afterward. It is the basis -of history (_min-shêng wei li-shih-ti chung-hsin_). It presupposes, for -China: (1) a national economic revolution against imperialism and for -democracy; (2) an industrial revolution for the enrichment of China; and -(3) a prophylactic against social revolution. Although showing the -influence of Karl Marx, Henry George, and the modern American, Maurice -William,[11] the doctrine remained Chinese in spirit, pragmatically -collectivist in application. Under the programs of _min shêng_ Sun -included the bold projects for which he had sought all his life, -desiring the independent, socially just prosperity of his country. - - [Footnote 11: See William, Maurice, _Sun Yat-sen vs. Communism_, - Baltimore, 1932, for an appraisal which stresses the importance and - degree of this influence; on the opposite side, see "The Alleged - Influence of Maurice William on Sun Yat-sen" by P. C. Huang and W. P. - Yuen in _T'ien Hsia Monthly_, V, 4 (November 1937), p. 349-76.] - -These doctrines form the constitutional foundation of government action, -as well as being the Party credo of the Kuomintang. Whoever proposes -policy in China must first square it with the _San Min Chu I_. In this -the Generalissimo has combined adroitness with profound sincerity. - - -CHIANG K'AI-SHEK - -Despite a small shelf of biographies, Chiang K'ai-shek remains a -personality above and behind the news, not in it. His former teacher -and present publicity adviser, Hollington Tong, has written an -authorized life, clear, detailed, and well expurgated. The celebrated -Sven Hedin published a study of Chiang; virtues, but not specific -personality stood forth. An able American newspaperman had recourse to -his files, and some Chinese admirers sketched an incredibly soft, lovely -picture: the background was clarified, but not Chiang. Two world-famous -reporters, trained to epitomize a life or a nation in a double column or -sharp review, failed to grasp Chiang. He eludes everyone. - -Part of the trouble comes from the fact that he possesses virtues which, -once lauded, are now suspected of being mythical, wheresoever they -occur. Frederick the Great, George Washington, Julius Caesar in his -careerist years--authentic in history, as contemporaries these leaders -would strike the moderns as characters inflated or incredible. Sincerity -has become consistency with one's source of income; persons who fail to -fit into the accepted moral and intellectual types of Western -industrialist society are labelled fakes. One is a gentleman-liberal, an -intellectual-liberal, a capitalist, a picturesque _native_, a war-lord -sinister, obscene, cruel, and criminal--one fits such a type, and if one -doesn't, one does not exist. Yet Chiang exists, and is thereby suspect -to a host of commentators. Sun Yat-sen as First President was an -acceptable news figure; as Saint of the Great Revolution he became -vulnerable. When Chiang seems neither a general nor a reactionary, he -bewilders many Westerners. - -Within China, Chiang is more readily grasped. In any other age, he would -be the founder of a new dynasty. The establishers of Imperial houses -have, as a group, combined intense vigor with a flair for the -disreputably picturesque, in turn qualified by the highly respectable -associates they sought out after success. Several have been bandits; one -was an unfrocked Buddhist priest. For vigor and a timely -libertarianism, they compare favorably with the Claudian line. Today the -Dragon Throne is irrecoverably remote; the Manchoukuoan Emperor Kang Tê -lacks elementary plausibility. Chiang is far too wise, far too modern in -his own motivations, to wish or dare dream of Empire. Upon him has -descended grace of a new kind, the charismatic halo of Sun Yat-sen. His -reputation can be carved in the most enduring of materials: indefeasible -history. With a son who is a Bolshevik, a little Eurasian grandchild, -and an adopted son of no high merit, Chiang does not face the problem of -power-bequeathal. He has power now; it matters little where power goes -after his death; the value to him lies in immediate use. - -Assuming even an abnormal egocentrism, Chiang--at the apex of state--is -above ambition; he has no welfare but that of the state. In fact, Chiang -is a man of almost naively insistent morality. Even Westerners act on -the stage of today with posterity as an audience; Chinese, -state-building, moral, Chiang moves under the glare of his perpetual -reputation. As in the case of Sun, his sense of leadership would be -maniacal if not grounded on fact; but what assumption would not? A -peanut-vendor who thinks he is the King of Egypt is crazy; Farouk is not -therefore crazy because King of Egypt. If Chiang were not the leader of -China, he would be mad; but he, and he alone, is leader. His humility -begins with the assumption of his power. - -Twenty-one years the junior of Sun Yat-sen, Chiang was born in 1888 in -Chekiang province.[12] His family was of a class intermediate between -the truly eminent landlord-official or merchant families, and the -farmers. They had been farmers, but also minor gentry, and had been -connected with the salt-revenue system. His grandfather attained -considerable renown as a scholar, but Chiang's own father died when -Chiang was eight years of age. The child had few special advantages. His -family background is one which is of common occurrence among political -leaders; his widowed mother, mastering and managing for the family, -inculcated a sharp morality, an unrelenting frugality, and a persistent -drive of industriousness in her children. To such a person, who rises -from poverty and hardship by his own efforts, the failure of others to -do likewise becomes a personal problem. By his own case he has proved -that opportunities are there. He is impatient with the poor, the stupid, -or the shiftless; instead of re-arranging society to give them a chance, -he expects them to improve themselves to meet existing realities. Chiang -has not explicitly stated all these points; many of them are qualified -by the fact that the _status quo_ in modern China is the _status quo_ of -perpetual revolution. - - [Footnote 12: Biographies of Chiang are: Chen Tsung-hsi _et al._, - _General Chiang Kai-shek, the Builder of New China_, Shanghai, 1929; - Tong, Hollington K. (Tung Hsien-kuang), _Chiang Kai-shek, Soldier and - Statesman_, 2 vols., Shanghai, 1937, the authorized biography and a - model of its kind; Berkov, Robert, _Strong Man of China_, Boston, - 1938; and Hedin, Sven, _Chiang Kai-shek, Marshal of China_, New York, - 1940. _Who's Who in China_ is, as usual, useful for Chiang and for the - members of his family. Almost every book on modern China, or magazine - dealing with Asiatic materials, has discussions of Chiang. Among the - most noteworthy writers on his career and personality are Gustav - Amann, whose account remains the most carefully detailed; Edgar Snow - and John Gunther, the reporters mentioned above; and Harold Isaacs. - The Generalissimo's own diary and speeches, together with Mme. - Chiang's writings, are unconsciously rather than deliberately - revelatory.] - -Leftist commentators, dubbing Chiang a combined product of landlordism, -compradore class, and criminal gangs, explain him through a mystagogic -economic determinism. Actually, Western impress on Chiang is of a more -special nature: Western religion, and Western warfare. The ideals which -animate him, and determine--so far as these are visible--his own sense -of values, are concepts and attitudes extraneous to the Chinese scene. -Deduct the threaded recurrency of religion, and the sense of technique -from military training, and Chiang could be paired with many other -modern Chinese leaders--soldiers of turmoil, administrators of the _ad -interim_, complacent leaders of hypothetical groups. He and Sun stand -out because each had a Western technique so thoroughly mastered that it -gave him a clear competence over other men: Sun, the physician; Chiang, -the strategist. Each also had a Western moral drive which turned -hungrily to the past and justified itself in Chinese antiquity: Sun, the -all-around Christian, who professed and denied the churches alternately -throughout life, and Chiang, the Bible-quoting Methodist, both cite the -Confucian canons; both esteem the Chinese ethics; both discern the -forcefulness of Western spirituality. - -Leadership, plus technical power, plus alien moral reinforcement, spells -preeminence. The Confucians have gone; the serene mandarins are dead. -Methodist soldiers, Baptist bankers--such Chinese control China. -Marxism, which by combining jargon and act of faith, is both religion -and erudition, unites these ideocratic forces; Wang Ming can feel that -he is a scientist analyzing society with peculiar objectivity, and he -can feel morally gratified at the same time. Chiang and the Nationalist -leaders keep such sustenance dual. - -The special religious background came to him through his mother. Women -have traditionally turned to Buddhism for piety in China, and Mrs. -Chiang was one of the exceptional characters who combined intense hard -work with great piety. The children grew with the infinite looming over -them; every misstep meant thousands upon thousands of years of hopeless, -damnable rebirth. Buddhism can match the Christian, "It is a fearefull -thing to fall into the hands of the living God ...,"[13] with the even -more fearful doom of life in a world which does not want to live. -Buddhism, socially, goes about in circles; the Mahayana sect provides a -qualified kind of salvation, but not the salvation which a determined -man can wring bloody-handed out of circumstance itself. The discipline, -the austerity, were ready; Christianity, when it came to him, fell on -plowed and waiting ground. The other instinct of ascendancy was -cultivated by his education: professionalism. His life falls into three -stages after childhood: education; wasted years; and the mastery and use -of power. - - [Footnote 13: John Donne, in a sermon of commemoration of the Lady - Danvers, late wife of Sir John Danvers; 1627.] - -Chiang went to the Imperial Military Academy at Paotingfu. Aloof and -ambitious, he was so successful that within a year he was sent to the -Shinbo Gokyo (Preparatory Military Academy) in Tokyo; he remained in -Japan four years. The Japanese under whom he studied retained no special -impression of him, except that he eagerly accepted discipline. As a part -of his study, he served with the 13th Field Artillery (Takada) Regiment -of the Imperial Army. Chiang therewith acquired not merely military -knowledge, but a working insight into Japanese language, mentality, and -strength. - -His military studies were terminated by the outbreak of the Republican -Revolution in 1911. Chiang returned to Shanghai, and began a vigorous -military career under the local military commander, pro-Sun in politics. -Chiang himself had come into contact with the Republican-Nationalist -group while in Japan. There was already no question of where his -loyalties lay. He made rapid progress, and saw something of fighting. He -took part in the abortive Second Revolution, of 1913, which was the -military attempt by Sun Yat-sen and his first military coadjutant, Huang -Hsing, to check Yüan Shih-k'ai and to save the newborn Republic by -force. In this time, while the enthusiasm of his military studies had -not yet worn off, Chiang wrote prodigiously. No Westerner has, so far as -the present author knows, taken the trouble to go through Chiang's -writings in order to study him. Chinese commentators praise them as full -of military acumen, a sense of the novel and important forces in Chinese -society, and a vigorous moralism--modern-military in form, but archaic -in language--which animated Chiang's youthful desire to improve the -world with good, technically apt gunfire. He was at this time -twenty-three or twenty-four. - -Between this early career and the later years of Chiang's life--the -years in which his star rode incessantly ascendant--there is a gap of -several years, 1913 to 1918. In this time Chiang lived a life primarily -civilian, although he remained under the patronage of his first military -leader, General Chen Ch'i-mei, murdered in 1915. Chiang went on a -military intelligence trip for the Sun Yat-sen group, travelling through -Manchuria in 1915. He opposed Yüan's moves, and stayed in close contact -with the patriotic organization. Yet, the total picture of his life in -these years lacks the connecting linkage which binds his childhood, his -school days, and his mature career. His activity, while considerable, -was diffuse. - -He went down to Canton in 1918, and fought under the command of Sun -Yat-sen, with the inferior troops and hopeless expeditions which the -Leader, politically adept but strategically inexpert, kept throwing -against the confusion of the _tuchün_ wars, with the result that the -war-lords, counting him as another element in their balance of power, -did not even set up a united front against him. Chiang, a Central -Chinese, was unsympathetic to the intense provincialism of the -Cantonese, and was hopelessly tactless in criticizing old-type soldiers -upon whom Sun then relied. Disillusioned but still loyal, he went back -to Shanghai and wrote letters of advice to his friends in the South, -including Dr. Sun. Throughout this time he was simply one more among -the dozens of bright young military men who were, in the existing -crudity of warfare, unneeded in China. (Chu Tê, Chiang's present -colleague and rival who heads the Soviet Chinese military system, was at -this time besotted in Yünnan--a petty war-lord of landlord family, -trapped hopeless on his little island of power amidst ruin.) - -The period in the Shanghai years was filled in with business activity. -Chiang was acquainted with some of the most influential merchants of the -city, among them the crippled Chang Ching-chiang, a Paris merchant whose -personal wealth was an informal treasury of Sun's movement. Chiang -entered brokerage, and is supposed to have made a great deal of money. -He became acquainted with the modernized, Westernized young Chinese of -the metropolis, and left many friends behind him among the Chinese -business men and industrialists. - -Speculative or unfriendly writers asseverate that Chiang joined the -Green Gang, an association which combined the features of a protection -racket and a benevolent society. (Such a society, common in China during -periods of disturbance, is the archetype of the American-Chinese Tong -[_tang_] in its more violent phases.) If so, membership gave Chiang the -key to an underworld as well organized as François Villon's Paris, -wherein beggars, thieves, pickpockets, kidnappers, labor contractors, -burial societies, and legitimate associations merged under the -extra-legal government of a Masonic-like hierarchy. (The author is -acquainted with a Chinese League of Nations official who joined the Gang -as a necessary implement of social research, and was afforded genuine -courtesy in preparing a report, general but accurate as to prevailing -conditions, through the assistance of his fellow-members.) - -Chiang's marriage, which had been made Chinese-fashion in his late -boyhood, had given him posterity--a son, now the pro-Communist, -Soviet-trained Major-General Chiang Ching-kuo--but little companionship. -His wife and son remained most of the time at his native home, whence he -returned to see them and his mother, at Fenghua in Chekiang. Social -contacts, acquaintance with capitalism, looseness of family connections, -spasmodic work for the Revolution, and some military work--this, -combined with the making and the losing of a fortune, fill the early -maturity of Chiang. - -He appeared upon the national and the world scene by his selection in -1923 to go to Moscow under the terms of the Nationalist-Soviet -understanding, there to receive military training. He had definitely -cast in his lot with Sun Yat-sen, making soldiery his vocation, and the -selection implied that Sun began to see in him a military aide, to -replace Huang Hsing of the first revolution. Chiang spent four months in -the Soviet Union. The Communists, whom he was to fight six years later, -showed him their combination of political and military warfare applied -in Trotsky's Red Army. Chiang, already the beneficiary of Japanese -training, had found Japanese military science dependent upon the -framework of a stable constitutional system. In China his earlier -training had been superior to its environment and did not have the -practical utility of five years' banditry. Chiang, professional by -spirit, restless under the drive of conscience and ambition, now found -in Moscow the intermediate steps between modern warfare and -government-building. He found that an army, from being the tool of -pre-existing order, could become the spearhead of an accompanying order. -Returning to China via the Trans-Siberian Railroad, he met General -Galens (Vassili Bluecher), later his chief Soviet military aide at -Canton. - -In Canton, the first military creation on Soviet models was the Whampoa -(_Huangpu_) Academy. Decreed by Sun Yat-sen, who made Chiang chief, the -Academy had Soviet advisers, eager to instill revolutionary and -civil-war techniques. Chiang began the development of a modern army, and -the real accretion of his own power. Even before he commanded full -armies, Chiang used his cadets to good purpose in actual combat. - -From this point on, Chiang's career becomes a part of the military -history of the revolution. In his earlier years of power, Chiang emerged -to leadership by cooperating with various intra-Kuomintang groups. He -stood with the Left and utilized the Communists, although he managed to -provoke, suppress, and appease the Communists in a way which no one else -managed. He led the victorious Northern Expedition in 1925-27, carrying -his forces on the crest of the Great Revolution. He was little known, -but seen to be ambitious, zealous, incalculable, and a political -strategist of ruthless genius. He soon found himself one of the -triumvirate of Sun Yat-sen's successors: Hu Han-min, the Right -Kuomintang leader, editor of Sun's works; Chiang; and Wang Ch'ing-wei, -the Left Kuomintang leader. - -At Shanghai, in 1927, Chiang's troops turned suddenly against the -Communists and Left groups, quenching the uprising which had taken the -city under his flag. This coup was undertaken because Chiang felt that -the Communists were outrunning their promises. The Soviet advisers, who -had come to help the Nationalists, had professed their concern for -China's national struggle, and for the desirability of a fight against -imperialism. They had not told Sun himself that he was a mere precursor -to the proletarian revolution, nor informed the Nationalists that they -were being given the privilege of fighting a war to advance the -historical necessity of Nationalist extinction, as the next step in -China's dialectic progression. Trotsky talked openly in Moscow about -overthrowing the Chinese revolutionaries, and hijacking the Chinese -revolution with the Chinese Communists, while Stalin believed in -appeasing the Nationalists longer before discarding them. Of this Chiang -was fully aware, and he struck at the sources of Communist power, labor -and peasant unions, using a ruthlessness comparable to theirs. He went -further, establishing the National Government (in the five-power form) -at Nanking, and leaving the Left Kuomintang uneasily in the company of -the Communists at Hankow. When the Communists proceeded to debate the -question of monopolizing the remnants, even the Left-Kuomintang had had -enough. They suppressed the Communists, and dissolved, coming down river -to Nanking and joining the new government, while Chiang stepped -technically out of the picture to ease the healing of the schism. -Chiang's legitimacy in the leadership of the Kuomintang and the Sun -Yat-sen revolution is shown by the fact that within two years he had an -overwhelming majority of the veteran Kuomintang leaders at his capital. - -In the ensuing years Chiang dedicated himself to three tasks: the -development of the National Government, the stabilization of his own -power, and the modernization of the country, both moral and mechanical. -In 1927 he had married Miss May-ling Soong, and brought himself into -alliance with the influential Soong family. The success of his efforts -is attested by the continued functioning of a National Government at -Chungking, the resistance and unification of China, which Chiang has -come to symbolize, and the stalemate of Japan. These things would have -appeared in some form, even without Chiang, but they would probably not -exist with their present clarity and strength. The ten years of -armament, modernization, and Japan-appeasement built an area into a -nation, changing one more government into an elementary national state. - -The Generalissimo has changed in appearance and manner considerably in -the past ten years; these changes seem to have immediate bearing on his -political role. In 1931 he was unmistakably the first soldier of -China--brusque, forthright, sharp-voiced, and dismayingly lacking in the -devious but pleasant _k'ê-ch'i_ (ceremonial politeness) which is carried -to professional heights by Chinese officials. Even then he was a -masterful and clear-willed sort of man, who upset political precedents -by a directness which would have been naive were it not so obviously -both self-conscious and sincere. He possessed a keen awareness of his -own historical importance, and a consistent responsibility before -history--which still animates him--was the result. When coupled with the -regular exercise of authority, this trait may have the consequence of -moderating arbitrariness and minimizing opportunism. - -With Chiang's self-possession there went an impatience with opposing -views, a carelessness of means in the face of ends, and a fanatical -insistence on loyalty. He now seems little older in body, despite the -injury to his back during the Sian episode, but the years have left a -very clear impress on his moral character. To the sharp discipline and -authority of the soldier he has added the characteristics of a -teacher--reserved kindliness, a daily preoccupation with moral -questions, an inclination to harangue his followers on the general -meaning of their problems. Ten years ago it was very difficult to find -out what Chiang really believed and wanted; his ambition and patriotism -were both patent, but beyond them there was little detail to be filled -in. He is beginning to have the relationship of, let us say, Lenin to -Marx in his treatment of the _San Min Chu I_ of Sun Yat-sen, and is -beginning to stand forth as an interesting political theorist in his own -right. He gives every indication of maturing in office, and of rising in -stature in proportion to the responsibilities which are thrust upon him. - - - -CHINESE APPRAISALS OF CHIANG - -Among both official and unofficial circles in Chungking there is a -widespread and apparently well-founded belief that the two critical -points of China's resistance and continued national independence rest -more on Chiang's life, activity, and support than on any other single -man or institution. These points are, of course, the domestic armistice -and the promotion of resistance and reconstruction. The enormous strains -which collaboration imposes on Nationalists and Communists are borne by -Chiang. The finesse necessary to keep regions, classes, and groups in -line, would probably not be available if the Generalissimo were dead. It -is a tribute to his associates and followers of all parties that they -work with him and with each other, but at the same time it is the -supreme accomplishment of Chiang to have developed so that he can -personify unity. - -A question which the writer put to almost everyone he met in Western -China was, "What do you think of Chiang? And what do you think Chiang -thinks of himself?" The answers varied in tone and detail, but showed an -interesting unanimity in major stress. One of the National Salvationist -leaders,[14] bitter about Chiang's high-handed repression of -Left-liberal movements in pre-war years, replied "Impossible!" to the -question, "From your point of view, could General Chiang become an -outright dictator?" But this leader explained that Chiang differed from -President George Washington in that the latter's own conception of his -role was in close harmony with public expectation and governmental -necessity, whereas Chiang--believing in democracy as a part of his -loyalty to his leader, Dr. Sun, and to the _San Min Chu I_--found -himself unready to trust democratic processes in really vital issues. - - [Footnote 14: One of the Seven Gentlemen (_Ch'i Chüntzŭ_), whose - name is withheld by request, interviewed August 2, 1940, in - Chungking.] - -The critic continued by adding that the difference between Sun and -Chiang was to be found in the fact that the former, whatever his -impatience, let the Plenary Session of the C.E.C. of the Kuomintang -reach its decisions through discussion, whereas Chiang tried to help the -committee decide by lecturing at it. He concluded thus: if there were no -political group other than the Kuomintang, Chiang might become a -dictator in fact while remaining a democratic leader in name. The -presence of other parties and groups makes this difficult, if not -impossible. For example, the Kuomintang might try to apply the new -constitution in such a way as to prevent its being an additional step on -the road to democracy; but the other groups, including the Communists, -could thwart this move by refusing to take part in any of the -constitutional ceremonies, and thereupon [in the traditional Chinese -fashion] discredit the whole thing. These opinions are of special -interest when one considers that they stem from a group which is still -suffering from a very careful police supervision and a state of -non-recognition and semi-repression. - -Another interesting interpretation of Generalissimo Chiang's role is -found among the Communists. One of the Chinese Communist leaders[15] had -the question put to him, "On what long-range basis of practical politics -can you people and the Generalissimo cooperate? After all, you must be -consolidating power which can be used against him and he power which can -be turned against you?" He replied that if Chiang made terms with the -Japanese, or if he failed to resist, the Communists would need to have -nothing to do with him, nor he with them, since he would be ruined in -any case. On the other hand, if the war came to a successful end, Chiang -would be the supreme hero of modern China; the Communists could not turn -against him; and Chiang knew this well enough to know that if he -defeated Japan he had won China. The commentator did not explore other -obvious possibilities, such as a long stalemate in the Japanese war, or -a shift in Soviet policies, but what he said indicates the present -reality of the common interests between the Communists and the -Generalissimo. - - [Footnote 15: Communist leader, interviewed in Chungking, whose name - is also withheld by request.] - -From these and other comments, the visitor to China soon learns that -although Chiang is the Chief (_Tsung-ts'ai_) of the Kuomintang, his -power rests as much on broad national support as it does on Party power. -It is significant that although Chiang still has two groups of -semi-secret protective police, one Party and the other Army, he has far -less occasion to use them than he did five years ago. There is an -inadequacy of due process, of course, which would strike the lay -American as critically unsatisfactory, but the smoothness, evenness, and -relative frankness of government is far greater than at any other time -in modern China. - -Democracy is obtaining some real beginnings, not because of a sudden -lurch in political necessity, nor because of the charm of a theory, but -because the firm ground of a common opinion is knitting the country -together and affording the limits indispensable to the functioning of -democratic techniques; this common opinion, the universal popularity of -the war, is based on the resistance-and-reconstruction policy. The same -patriotic surge which supports the war supports Chiang, as the hero and -chief technician of the war. - -The political changes which translated Chiang from the status of a Party -leader and a new kind of militarist into a real national leader are -mirrored in his writings. His published political works now run to a -considerable number of volumes, representing collections of his speeches -and essays.[16] It would, perhaps, be interesting to note the main -trends of his political philosophy, since it serves as the firm ground -of his policy. It is possible that no other leader in the world, except -Stalin, has satisfied himself so thoroughly with the connection between -his own epistemological and ethical presuppositions and his working -conclusions in terms of action as has Chiang. - - [Footnote 16: Some of the recent volumes are: _Lu-shan Hsün-lien Chi - Hsüan-chi_ (Collected Papers of the Lu Shan Training Conference), - Chungking, 1939; _O-mei Hsün-lien Chi Hsüan-chi_ (Collected Papers of - the Omei Training Conference), Chungking, 1939; _Li-hsing Chê-hsiao_ - (The Philosophy of Being Practical), Chungking, 1940; _Tsung-ts'ai - Chien-kuo Yen-lun Hsüan-chi_ (The Tsung-ts'ai's Utterances on - Reconstruction), Chungking, 1940; _Tsung-ts'ai Wai-chiao Yen-lun - Hsüan-chi_ (The Tsung-ts'ai's Utterances on Diplomacy), Chungking, - 1940; and _Tsung-ts'ai K'ang-chan Yen-lun Hsüan-chi_ (The - Tsung-ts'ai's Utterances on Resistance), Chungking, 1940. A - collection of the Generalissimo's leading speeches, in English, is in - press and is to be issued soon by the China Information Publishing - Company, Hong Kong.] - - -THE IDEOLOGY OF CHIANG - -First and foremost, Chiang accepts the _San Min Chu I_ of Sun Yat-sen, -deviating from the letter of these doctrines by no single brush-stroke. -In his spirit of interpretation, he follows in general the Rightist -exegeses, as represented by the works of Hu Han-min and T'ai Ch'i-t'ao, -although he has developed his own conclusions in great part from his -first-hand memory of Dr. Sun, and from his own experience. (Needless to -say, he is worlds apart from the interpretations given by such Leftists -as the Communists, the Third Party, or Mme. Sun, or such ultra-Rightists -as the Japanophiles.) - -Secondly, he has found the pragmatic elements of Sun's philosophy highly -palatable. Apart from his public life, he has always made a fetish of -action, and has stood for getting something done. His orthodox but -modified Sunyatsenism and his practicality can best be shown by excerpts -from a recent essay of his which states his position.[17] One notes the -stress on practicality, the Christian influence in the matter of love, -and the opinions of Communism, Fascism, and Democracy: - - In order to make a scientific study of any subject it is - best to use the analytical, deductive and inductive methods. - By applying this principle to the study of the _San Min Chu - I_, I have made a chart showing its system and working - procedure.... In order to realize his ideas, Sun invented - the most complete and the most practical political - principles, the _San Min Chu I_. At the present there are - mainly three schools of political thought, namely, Democracy - so-called, Communism, and Fascism. None of them is perfect. - For instance, take Communism. It attaches enough importance - to the economic side of life and resembles the Principle of - Livelihood, but it ignores the ideas embodied in the - Principles of Nationalism and Democracy. Furthermore, it - considers the economic interests of only one class of - people, and not of all. The Fascist school stresses only - those ideas as embodied in the Principle of Nationalism and - ignores the other two principles. Besides, it ignores the - interests and welfare of other nationalities. So-called - Democracy is too much involved with capitalism and can - hardly solve the problems of _min shêng_. The Three - Principles of Sun are different from these in that they - originate from the idea that _the world belongs to the - public_. His aim is to bring about the real equality of the - people without any distinction of classes, religion, and - occupations. After this is realized in China, it is expected - that the equality of all nationalities in the whole world - can be brought about by means of the spirit of mutual help - and sincere cooperation. - - Of all the common human feelings, the sentiment of - nationality is the most worthy one. The Principle of - Nationalism is based on this point. Laws specifically define - the popular responsibilities and privileges which underlie - the Principle of Democracy. And lastly, in Livelihood, each - man's reasoning power is used to advantage in working out - the most rational way of distribution, whereby people will - be put in an equitable position economically. Thus it can be - seen that the Three Principles are very adaptable to China - as well as to any other nation. - - As I outline above, Sun, starting with the Principle of - _people's livelihood_ and embodying the idea that _the - world belongs to the public_, established the _San Min Chu - I_. But just having a Principle won't do; a motive power is - needed to fulfill it. That power is revolution.... - - Revolution is not an easy thing. It needs a very strong - driving force to carry it out. What are the driving forces - in the case of the Chinese revolution? They are wisdom, - love, and courage. I wish to point out specially that the - second factor is the most important. "Love" means, among - other things: Save your country, even at the cost of your - life! - - Let us define more fully the meanings of these three words. - Wisdom means, how to understand Love. It also means: first, - wide reading; second, care in your inquiries; third, careful - thinking; fourth, the power of distinguishing right and - wrong. By Love is meant loyalty, filial piety, faithfulness, - and peace. Courage means the determination to do what is - right. Besides, what is the most important is the need for - persistence, without which nothing can be accomplished. - - When you have the virtues of Wisdom, Love and Courage and - the persistence required, the next move is to start and - work. Sun told us that it is hard to know and easy to do. If - you study the _San Min Chu I_ carefully and yet don't do - what is required of you, it is not because you can't do it, - but because you won't do it. If you just won't do it, you - are not a faithful disciple of the _San Min Chu I_. - - When you are to start the revolutionary work, you must have - a Party, because in a Party all the revolutionary forces can - be consolidated and all the revolutionary activities can be - planned and directed.... - - [Footnote 17: [Chiang K'ai-shek], _San-min-chu-i chih T'i-hsi nai - ch'i-shih Hsing-ch'êng-hsü_ (The _San Min Chu I_ System and its - Method of Application), Chungking, 1939. This booklet is part of a - series called _Conclusions of the Party Chief_, published by the - Central Headquarters of the Kuomintang Training Corps, Chungking, - 1939.] - -The character of Chiang as a political leader which emerges from his -military training, his successful marriage and even more successful -jockeying for power, his maturity under the influence of that power, and -his somewhat crude but austere recognition of responsibility, is quite -different from the portraits drawn by the coastal diehards or by -Leftists. To the former he is just another Asiatic swashbuckler who -conceals murder and extortion behind orotund banality; to the latter he -is a sort of Franco, supinely cooperative with Anglo-American -imperialism because of his compradore-class mentality, who faces a last -chance of dialectical salvation if he yields to the Chinese Communists -in their version of democracy and promotes upper-class liquidation in -war time. It is likely that he will break the limits of either attempt -to define him, and will--if the war succeeds--play a distinctly Chinese -part in the construction of a China which, by reason of the speed of -technological progress coupled with the rising extent of governmental -economics, will break through the ruinous Right-Left pattern of Western -politics. Chiang probably has enough awareness of Chinese history to -realize that as the founder of an enduring democratic system his -prestige would exceed that obtainable by any process of dictatorship. If -he becomes a dictator, he will have successors; but as first President -of a real democracy, he would be eternally unique, and as _de facto_ -founder of a great power, a world figure for this century. Against his -desire to let democracy grow beneath his military aegis, his -conservatism of habit and his anxiety to get things done right continue -to militate; but there is thirteen years' evidence to show that he has -tried very hard to work within the limits of the constitutional system -of the National Government, has avoided arbitrariness as much as he -thought possible, and has at worst behaved like a Salazar, Atatürk, or -Pilsudski. - - - - -CONCLUSION - - -The China of Chiang K'ai-shek has withstood the shock of foreign war, -and has demonstrated its capacity to grow and survive as a state despite -heavy domestic adversity. The constitutional structure nears a condition -of realistic operation. The political organs, while still monopolized by -the Kuomintang, are highly effective; their unrepresentative character -is mitigated by the new experiments with consultative legislation. -Administratively, both as to special functions and in developing -local government, significant new enterprises are under way. -Communist-Nationalist rivalry, while still bitter, has avoided domestic -civil war during the invasion; despite the clash of National troops with -the New Fourth Army, the postponement may be indefinitely continued. -Taken all together, Free China presents a hopeful picture; and it -therefore acquires international importance as the presumptive -predecessor of a great Asiatic democracy. - -Nevertheless, the fact that a Chinese central government has emerged in -time for effective action, and has withstood invasion, does not provide -proof that Japan is doomed to fail. Japanese progress thus far in China -has depended in great part upon Japanese world commerce--on raw -materials and finance from her lucrative American trade. China's -resistance has depended, but to a lesser degree, on Western aid. In each -case, the early history of the conflict was qualified if not determined -by the character of third-party relations. If the United States, the -Soviet Union, Britain, and Germany continued for the next twenty-odd -years to do in the Far East precisely what they have been doing for the -past ten, the future might be more or less predictable on the basis of -the Far Eastern elements alone. Such a prediction is, however, wholly -unsupportable at the present time; it is indeed safe to predict the -contrary, and assume that it is impossible for the major outside powers -to continue their reciprocal power-relationships unchanged, in the Far -East or elsewhere. China's future is therefore bound up with European -and American uncertainties. The Three-Power Pact, signed at Berlin, -September 27, 1940 between Germany, Italy and Japan, and the American -Lease-Lend Bill have already begun to interlock the European and East -Asiatic wars. - - -THE CHIEF ALTERNATIVES IN CHINA - -The Chinese domestic situation will inescapably be bound up with China's -international position. The extremes of probability can be readily -marked off: on the one hand, it is most improbable that the Chinese -resistance should collapse altogether, and leave the way open for an -almost effortless Japanese victory, through the consolidation of the -Wang regime without guerrilla, volunteer or West-China opposition; on -the other hand, an immediate and complete Chinese victory, coupled with -solution of Nationalist-Communist rivalry, is not at all in sight. -Somewhere between these two extremes there lie a number of more probable -alternatives. - -Chief among these is a Kuomintang China, winning a slow victory against -Japan under the continuation of existent institutions and leadership. -Such a country--nationalist, democratic, and economically -pragmatist--would, by the fact of victory over Japan, create a nucleus -for liberal democracy in Asia.[1] A variant of this solution would be a -United Front China, wherein the independents and the Left actually -shared power with the Kuomintang under conditions of broad popular -suffrage; this would presumably lie between the United States and the -Soviet Union in the matter of ideology and foreign policy. Neither of -these would afford Japan much opportunity for continued influence on the -continent. - - [Footnote 1: This discussion includes extracts from the author's - "China: Right, Left, or Center?", _The Quarterly Review of the - Michigan Alumnus_, Vol. XLVI, No. 14 (Winter 1940).] - -A long continuation of the present hostilities might imply the -development of a permanently divided China--permanent save in terms of -centuries--with Nationalists and Communists landbound in inner Asia, and -pro-Japanese governments along the coast. Such a violation of Chinese -cultural and economic unity would perpetuate disequilibrium, and imply -continuing wars. Differing from this in degree rather than kind would be -a reversion of China to _tuchünism_ and anarchy. Neither of these -possibilities could command acceptance from the awakened, vigorous China -of today. - -Outside intervention presents a third group of alternatives: the -partition of China through a Soviet-Japanese understanding, or the -complete Sovietization of China, through the combined efforts of Soviet -and Chinese Communists. Soviet-Japanese partition, once almost -unthinkable, appears within the range of possibility because of the -apparent weakness of the Soviet Union, which calls for unconventional -remedies. If Communist dialectic insured the Soviets who shared China -with Japan an ultimate victory over Japan as well, the evil might seem -transitory to the Soviet Union. Were such a step taken to thwart rising -American influence, it might seem the lesser of two evils. Neither this -nor a Soviet China (which would swell the Communist frontier and -resources immeasurably) appeared probable in the spring of 1941. - -The more practical aspects of the China-building problem still concern -the immediate, local effectiveness of the Japanese military effort to -control the growth of Chinese government. - -To create a victorious condition, Japan has sought the collaboration of -phantom Japanophile governments. But in the face of the continuing -National Government, and guerrilla opposition, these governments are -incapable of functioning. When the conquerors of China entered the -cities, and took over the government, they were strangers holding mere -islands in the greatness of China. - -Japan has the seven most important cities of China. She has most of the -railroads. The waters around China are closed by the Japanese fleet. But -how is Japan to occupy the hundreds of thousands of villages? How is -Japan to persuade the Chinese people, who are still overwhelmingly -country people, that they are conquered when Japan thinks that they are? - -The Japanese have not yet succeeded in making much impression on the -Chinese farmers, except to anger them with cruelty and rapine. In -Manchuria, where the Japanese have had undisputed sway for ten long -years, thousands of bandits, a Chinese version of Minute Men, are still -fighting. Ten, five, even three miles from the great fortified centers -of the Japanese army in China, Chinese irregulars, peasant volunteers, -spring up in the night. In the darkness there is shooting, sudden -flames, perhaps an airplane burning or a gasoline storage tank set on -fire; when dawn comes there is nothing to be seen except the patient -quiet coolies working in their little fields. - -At the present time the war has reached its quiescent stage. The -Japanese army has done what in most other cases would be called winning -a victory. The battle is accordingly a battle between the Chinese -government in the West and the Japanese in the East of China, not with -guns or ships so much as with words and with price levels--not for -strategic territory, but for the support of the Chinese masses. - -The Chinese must make it possible for their own people to live -successfully and happily. But they have the world's greatest farm -problem, a problem of over-indebtedness, sharecropping, soil exhaustion, -prices and markets. Japan wanted to prevent the creation of a united -China strong enough to take Manchuria back, and to drive the Japanese -off the Asiatic continent back to Japan. Japan accordingly took the -disastrous and painful step of conquering the world's greatest relief -problem--the millions of underfed, undernourished, desperate Chinese -farmers. Now she has them. - -In this light, the Far Eastern conflict takes on a different appearance -from the usual picture of China versus Japan. It is a conflict, not -merely of one nation against another but of competing governments within -the same territory. China is trying to build one way; Japan, another; -but they are both building for the same end, control of the Far East, -and on the same foundations, the Chinese people. Both Japan and the -independent Chinese government are struggling for the mastery of an area -which is in the grip of a tragic farm problem. The key to power is the -mastery of the problem, not the mastery of the men. The Chinese farmers -would welcome Communism, capitalism, or almost any kind of leadership -which could guarantee them a good livelihood in return for their long -and patient labor. The basic issues are social, technological, and -economic, as well as political and military. The Japanese failure in -China is not a failure of the economic resources; Japan could have been -a weak but adequate economic partner to China. The failure of Japan now -leads China to look elsewhere for help. - - -THE UNITED STATES IN CHINESE POLITICS - -The American Lease-Lend Bill, designed primarily to extend effective aid -to Britain, also applied to China. The United States executive was -clearly aware of the purposes of Japan, and displayed a temper to -thwart them. Secretary of State Cordell Hull, presenting a statement in -support of the Bill to the House Foreign Affairs Committee on January -15, 1941, stated: - - It has been clear throughout that Japan has been actuated - from the start by broad and ambitious plans for establishing - herself in a dominant position in the entire region of the - Western Pacific. Her leaders have openly declared their - determination to achieve and maintain that position by force - of arms and thus to make themselves master of an area - containing almost one-half of the entire population of the - world. As a consequence, they would have arbitrary control - of the sea and trade routes in that region. - - * * * * * - - It should be manifest to every person that such a program - for the subjugation and ruthless exploitation by one country - of nearly one-half the population of the world is a matter - of immense significance, importance and concern to every - nation wherever located. - -On March 15, the President's speech to the White House Correspondents' -Association included a ringing promise to give help to the Chinese -people, who had asked for aid through Chiang K'ai-shek. The United -States moved toward a more definite policy in Asia as well as giving -more aid to Britain in the North Atlantic area. The lease-lend program -might upset the entire balance of power in the Far East even more -readily than in Europe; but immediate evidence of such large-scale -application was not forthcoming. - -In his message to President Roosevelt, March 18, 1941, Chiang K'ai-shek -said:[2] - - The people of China, whether engaged in fighting the - aggressor or toiling in the fields and workshops in the rear - in support of the defenders, will be immeasurably heartened - by your impressive reaffirmation of the will of the American - people to assist them in their struggle for freedom from - foreign domination, and in the resumption of their march - towards democracy and social justice for all. - - [Footnote 2: Department of State, _Bulletin_, IV, p. 335.] - -Significantly, the statement of Secretary Hull may apply to future -Soviet advance in China as well as to the Japanese invasion. American -aid which would weaken Japan and strengthen the Soviet Union thereby, -would be welcome to Stalin; but American influence, carried to the point -of consolidating the National Government against the Communists, and -reducing the probabilities of rising Communist influence, would not be -welcome. - -Whether the United States Government and the American people are -pro-Chinese or not, the National Government of China is pro-American. -The only influence to rival the American in modern China is that of the -Soviet Union. Soviet and American impress are found in intellectual -life, in political ideals, in standards and types of organization, and -in ethical creeds. It is no accident that the Kuomintang traces its -three principles back to Lincoln, while the Chinese Communists quote -Lenin and Stalin. The rivalry is clear, and acute. American aid to China -strengthens the pro-American party and weakens the Communists; cessation -of the Burma route traffic in the summer of 1940 stimulated discussion -of a closer Sino-Soviet rapprochement. - -Generalissimo Chiang is a Christian. He is surrounded by -American-trained officials. The common secondary language of the -Nationalists is English. The Chinese Industrial Cooperatives are based -on an American background with New Zealand and British advice. The -educational system is patterned after that of the United States in great -part; the American impress on the system of higher education, in -particular, cannot be overestimated. The interests, appetites, and -orientation of the Kuomintang and the National Government are -Pacific-centered; much bitterness of an intimate, almost uncomplaining -sort, has been aroused by America's continued aid to Japan through -business channels. - -Adjustments within China are bound to react to the pressures in the -outside world. If the United States abandons Free China, the Japanese -will probably not conquer China; but the Soviets will be in an excellent -position to try, for themselves or through agreement with the Japanese, -to demoralize Chinese resistance so that the Soviet forces could -intervene because of a political vacuum and protect the "racially kin -working classes," as in Poland. Whether China should go Communist -through the triumph of the Chinese Communists, or through military -occupation by the Soviet Red Army, would not matter much to the United -States. What would matter would be the loss of an incomparable ally, an -ally who today is almost embarrassingly cordial toward us, thankful to -us, and who admires our institutions and culture. - -Once Japan were forced out of the picture as an aggressive power, once -the United States and China were to reach an understanding, the Soviet -Union--debarred from a warm-water naval base on the Pacific--could be -left in the _status quo_, its menace removed, to work out its own -destiny if it did not challenge renewed intervention by renewed -provocation of co-existing societies. No other challenging power could -appear on the Pacific. A group of nations from Buenos Aires to Labrador, -from Melbourne to Kashgar, from Lhasa to Boston would cover three and -one-half continents. The area thus freed from war and aggression, -encompassing the Americas and the Pacific basin, would include every -necessary article in the entire schedule of man's appetites. The -Chungking government, elementarily and crudely, has broken ground for -the culture-political American advance into Asia. Strong without us, -Free China is a great power with us, and the one place in the world -where construction, liberty, education, and hope still rise day by day. -Both cosmopolitan and national, the Chinese are ready to accept their -share of responsibility for the new world order. - -The responsibility for building a democratic world, whether or not the -four authoritarian powers go down, lies in great part upon the United -States. Generalissimo Chiang, alone among leaders, has stood forth for -world government, for world freedom. He has written:[3] - -"In as much as cosmopolitanism and world peace are two of the main aims -of _San Min Chu I_, China will naturally be disposed to participate in -any world federation or confederation based on the equality of nations -and for the good of mankind." - - [Footnote 3: See below, p. 371.] - - - - -APPENDIX I. GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS - - - - -_A._ THE GOVERNMENT DRAFT OF THE PROPOSED CONSTITUTION[1] - - - [Footnote 1: _T'ien Hsia Monthly_, v. X, No. 3 (May 1940), p. - 493-506. The transliterations have not been altered. _Yüan_ therefore - appears as "Yuan."] - - Released April 30, 1937, this differs from the celebrated - Double Five Draft (_q.v._ in Text) by the omission of an - article providing that the first Kuo-min Ta-hui should - exercise full power, and not be confined to the preparation - of a constitution. This Draft represents the official - viewpoint and was prepared by the Legislative _Yüan_ with - the help and criticism of private persons; accordingly, it - is the outstanding draft constitution. - -By virtue of the mandate received from the whole body of citizens and in -accordance with the bequeathed teachings of Dr. Sun, Founder of the -Republic of China, the People's Congress of the Republic of China hereby -ordains and enacts this Constitution and causes it to be promulgated -throughout the land for faithful and perpetual observance by all. - - -CHAPTER I. GENERAL PROVISIONS - -ARTICLE 1. The Republic of China is a _SAN MIN CHU I_ Republic. - -ARTICLE 2. The sovereignty of the Republic of China is vested in the -whole body of its citizens. - -ARTICLE 3. Persons having acquired the nationality of the Republic of -China are citizens of the Republic of China. - -ARTICLE 4. The territory of the Republic of China consists of areas -originally constituting Kiangsu, Chekiang, Anhwei, Kiangsi, Hupeh, -Hunan, Szechwan, Sikang, Hopei, Shantung, Shansi, Honan, Shensi, Kansu, -Chinghai, Fukien, Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Yunnan, Kweichow, Liaoning, Kirin, -Heilungkiang, Jehol, Chahar, Suiyuan, Ningsia, Sinkiang, Mongolia and -Tibet. - -The territory of the Republic of China shall not be altered except by -resolution of the People's Congress. - -ARTICLE 5. All races of the Republic of China are component parts of the -Chinese Nation and shall be equal. - -ARTICLE 6. The National Flag of the Republic of China shall have a red -background with a blue sky and white sun in the upper left corner. - -ARTICLE 7. The National Capital of the Republic of China shall be at -Nanking. - - -CHAPTER II. RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF THE CITIZENS - -ARTICLE 8. All citizens of the Republic of China shall be equal before -the law. - -ARTICLE 9. Every citizen shall enjoy the liberty of the person. Except -in accordance with law, no one may be arrested, detained, tried or -punished. - -When a citizen is arrested or detained on suspicion of having committed -a criminal act, the authority responsible for such action shall -immediately inform the citizen himself and his relatives of the cause -for his arrest or detention and shall, within a period of twenty-four -hours, send him to a competent court for trial. The citizen so arrested -or detained, or any one else, may also petition the court to demand from -the authority responsible for such action the surrender, within -twenty-four hours, of his person to the court for trial. - -The court shall not reject such a petition; nor shall the responsible -authority refuse to execute such a writ as mentioned in the preceding -paragraph. - -ARTICLE 10. With the exception of those in active military service, no -one may be subject to military jurisdiction. - -ARTICLE 11. Every citizen shall have the freedom of domicile; no private -abode may be forcibly entered, searched or sealed except in accordance -with law. - -ARTICLE 12. Every citizen shall have the freedom to change his -residence; such freedom shall not be restricted except in accordance -with law. - -ARTICLE 13. Every citizen shall have the freedom of speech, writing and -publication; such freedom shall not be restricted except in accordance -with law. - -ARTICLE 14. Every citizen shall have the freedom of secrecy of -correspondence; such freedom shall not be restricted except in -accordance with law. - -ARTICLE 15. Every citizen shall have the freedom of religious belief; -such freedom shall not be restricted except in accordance with law. - -ARTICLE 16. Every citizen shall have the freedom of assembly and of -forming associations; such freedom shall not be restricted except in -accordance with law. - -ARTICLE 17. No private property shall be requisitioned, expropriated, -sealed or confiscated except in accordance with law. - -ARTICLE 18. Every citizen shall have the right to present petitions, -lodge complaints and institute legal proceedings in accordance with law. - -ARTICLE 19. Every citizen shall have the right to exercise, in -accordance with law, the powers of election, recall, initiative and -referendum. - -ARTICLE 20. Every citizen shall have the right to compete, in accordance -with law, in state examinations. - -ARTICLE 21. Every citizen shall, in accordance with law, be amenable to -the duty of paying taxes. - -ARTICLE 22. Every citizen shall, in accordance with law, be amenable to -the duty of performing military service. - -ARTICLE 23. Every citizen shall, in accordance with law, be amenable to -the duty of rendering public service. - -ARTICLE 24. All other liberties and rights of the citizens which are not -detrimental to public peace and order or public welfare shall be -guaranteed by the Constitution. - -ARTICLE 25. Only laws imperative for safeguarding national security, -averting a national crisis, maintaining public peace and order or -promoting public interest may restrict the citizens' liberties and -rights. - -ARTICLE 26. Any public functionary who illegally infringes upon any -private liberty or right, shall, besides being subject to disciplinary -punishment, be responsible under criminal and civil law. The injured -person may also, in accordance with law, claim indemnity from the State -for damages sustained. - - -CHAPTER III. THE PEOPLE'S CONGRESS - -ARTICLE 27. The People's Congress shall be constituted of delegates -elected as follows: - - 1. Each district, municipality or area of an equivalent - status shall elect one delegate, but in case its population - exceeds 300,000, one additional delegate shall be elected - for every additional 500,000 people. The status of areas to - be equivalent to a district or municipality shall be defined - by law. - - 2. The number of delegates to be elected from Mongolia and - Tibet shall be determined by law. - - 3. The number of delegates to be elected by Chinese citizens - residing abroad shall be determined by law. - -ARTICLE 28. Delegates to the People's Congress shall be elected by -universal, equal, and direct suffrage and by secret ballots. - -ARTICLE 29. Citizens of the Republic of China having attained the age of -twenty years shall, in accordance with law, have the right to elect -delegates. Citizens having attained the age of twenty-five years shall, -in accordance with law, have the right to be elected delegates. - -ARTICLE 30. The term of office of Delegates of the People's Congress -shall be six years. - -When a Delegate is found guilty of violation of a law or neglect of his -duty, his constituency shall recall him in accordance with law. - -ARTICLE 31. The People's Congress shall be convened by the President -once every three years. Its session shall last one month, but may be -extended another month when necessary. - -Extraordinary sessions of the People's Congress may be convened at the -instance of two-fifths or more of its members. - -The President may convene extraordinary sessions of the People's -Congress. - -The People's Congress shall meet at the place where the Central -Government is. - -ARTICLE 32. The powers and functions of the People's Congress shall be -as follows: - - 1. To elect the President and Vice-President of the - Republic, the President of the Legislative Yuan, the - President of the Censor Yuan, the Members of the Legislative - Yuan and the Members of the Censor Yuan. - - 2. To recall the President and Vice-President of the - Republic, the President of the Legislative Yuan, the - President of the Judicial Yuan, the President of the - Examination Yuan, the President of the Censor Yuan, the - Members of the Legislative Yuan and the Members of the - Censor Yuan. - - 3. To initiate laws. - - 4. To hold referenda on laws. - - 5. To amend the Constitution. - - 6. To exercise such other powers as are conferred by the - Constitution. - -ARTICLE 33. Delegates to the People's Congress shall not be held -responsible outside of Congress for opinions they may express and votes -they may cast during the session of Congress. - -ARTICLE 34. Without the permission of the People's Congress, no delegate -shall be arrested or detained during the session except when apprehended -in _flagrante delicto_. - -ARTICLE 35. The organization of the People's Congress and the election -as well as recall of its Delegates shall be determined by law. - - -CHAPTER IV. THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT - - -Section 1. _The President_ - -ARTICLE 36. The President is the Head of the State and represents the -Republic of China in foreign relations. - -ARTICLE 37. The President commands the land, sea and air forces of the -whole country. - -ARTICLE 38. The President shall, in accordance with law, promulgate laws -and issue orders with the counter-signature of the President of the Yuan -concerned. - -ARTICLE 39. The President shall, in accordance with law, exercise the -power of declaring war, negotiating peace and concluding treaties. - -ARTICLE 40. The President shall, in accordance with law, declare and -terminate a state of emergency. - -ARTICLE 41. The President shall, in accordance with law, exercise the -power of granting amnesties, special pardons, remission of sentences and -restoration of civil rights. - -ARTICLE 42. The President shall, in accordance with law, appoint and -remove civil and military officials. - -ARTICLE 43. The President shall, in accordance with law, confer honors -and award decorations. - -ARTICLE 44. In case the State is confronted with an emergency, or the -economic life of the State meets with a grave danger, which calls for -immediate action, the President, following the resolution of the -Executive Meeting, may issue orders of emergency and do whatever is -necessary to cope with the situation, provided that he shall submit his -action to the ratification of the Legislative Yuan within three months -after the issuance of the orders. - -ARTICLE 45. The President may call meetings of the Presidents of the -five Yuan to confer on matters relating to two or more Yuan, or on such -matters as the President may bring out for consultation. - -ARTICLE 46. The President shall be responsible to the People's Congress. - - -ARTICLE 47. Citizens of the Republic of China, having attained the age -of forty years, may be elected President or Vice-President of the -Republic. - -ARTICLE 48. The election of the President and Vice-President shall be -provided for by law. - -ARTICLE 49. The President and Vice-President shall hold office for a -term of six years and may be re-elected for a second term. - -ARTICLE 50. The President shall, on the day of his inauguration, take -the following oath: - -"I do solemnly and sincerely swear before the people that I will observe -the Constitution, faithfully perform my duties, promote the welfare of -the People, safeguard the security of the State and be loyal to the -trust of the people. Should I break my oath, I will submit myself to the -most severe punishment the law may provide." - -ARTICLE 51. When the Presidency is vacant, the Vice-President shall -succeed to the office. - -When the President is for some reason unable to attend to his duties, -the Vice-President shall act for him. If both the President and the -Vice-President are incapacitated, the President of the Executive Yuan -shall discharge the duties of the President's office. - -ARTICLE 52. The President shall retire from office on the day his term -expires. If by that time a new President has not been inducted into -office, the President of the Executive Yuan shall discharge the duties -of the President's office. - -ARTICLE 53. The period for the President of the Executive Yuan to -discharge the duties of the President's office shall not exceed six -months. - -ARTICLE 54. Except in case of an offense against the internal or -external security of the State, the President shall not be liable to -criminal prosecution until he has been recalled or has retired from -office. - - -Section 2. _The Executive Yuan_ - -ARTICLE 55. The Executive Yuan is the highest organ through which the -Central Government exercises its executive powers. - -ARTICLE 56. In the Executive Yuan, there shall be a President, a -Vice-President and a number of Executive Members, to be appointed and -removed by the President. - -The Executive Members mentioned in the preceding paragraph who do not -take charge of Ministries or Commissions shall not exceed half of those -who are in charge of Ministries or Commissions as provided in the first -paragraph of ARTICLE 58. - -ARTICLE 57. In the Executive Yuan, there shall be various Ministries and -Commissions which shall separately exercise their respective executive -powers. - -ARTICLE 58. The Ministers of the various Ministries and the Chairmen of -the various Commissions shall be appointed by the President from among -the Executive Members. - -The President and the Vice-President of the Executive Yuan may act -concurrently as Minister or Chairman mentioned in the preceding -paragraph. - -ARTICLE 59. The President of the Executive Yuan, the Executive Members, -the Ministers of the various Ministries and the Chairmen of the various -Commissions shall be individually responsible to the President. - -ARTICLE 60. In the Executive Yuan there shall be Executive Meetings -composed of the President, the President of the Executive Yuan and the -Executive Members to be presided over by the President. In case the -President is unable to be present, the President of the Executive Yuan -shall preside. - -ARTICLE 61. The following matters shall be decided at an Executive -Meeting: - - 1. Statutory and budgetary bills to be submitted to the - Legislative Yuan. - - 2. Bills concerning a state of emergency and special pardons - to be submitted to the Legislative Yuan. - - 3. Bills concerning declaration of war, negotiation of - peace, conclusion of treaties and other important - international affairs to be submitted to the Legislative - Yuan. - - 4. Matters of common concern to the various Ministries and - Commissions. - - 5. Matters submitted by the President. - - 6. Matters submitted by the President of the Executive Yuan, - the Executive Members, the various Ministries and - Commissions. - -ARTICLE 62. The organization of the Executive Yuan shall be determined -by law. - - -Section 3. _The Legislative Yuan_ - -ARTICLE 63. The Legislative Yuan is the highest organ through which the -Central Government exercises its legislative powers. It shall be -responsible to the People's Congress. - -ARTICLE 64. The Legislative Yuan shall have the power to decide on -measures concerning legislation, budgets, a state of emergency, special -pardons, declaration of war, negotiation of peace, conclusion of -treaties and other important international affairs. - -ARTICLE 65. In the discharge of its duties the Legislative Yuan may -interrogate the various Yuan, Ministries and Commissions. - -ARTICLE 66. In the Legislative Yuan, there shall be a President who -shall hold office for a term of three years and may be eligible for -re-election. - -ARTICLE 67. In regard to the election of Members of the Legislative -Yuan, the Delegates of the various provinces, Mongolia, Tibet and of -citizens residing abroad, to the People's Congress shall separately hold -a preliminary election to nominate their respective candidates and -submit a list of their names to the Congress for election. The -candidates are not confined to the Delegates to the People's Congress. -The respective number of candidates shall be proportioned as follows: - - 1. A province with a population of less than 5,000,000 shall - nominate four candidates. A province with a population of - more than 5,000,000 but less than 10,000,000 shall nominate - six candidates. A province with a population of more than - 10,000,000 but less than 15,000,000 shall nominate eight - candidates. A province with a population of more than - 15,000,000 but less than 20,000,000 shall nominate ten - candidates. A province with a population of more than - 20,000,000 but less than 25,000,000 shall nominate twelve - candidates. A province with a population of more than - 25,000,000 but less than 30,000,000 shall nominate fourteen - candidates. A province with a population of more than - 30,000,000 shall nominate sixteen candidates. - - 2. Mongolia and Tibet shall each nominate eight candidates. - - 3. Citizens residing abroad shall nominate eight candidates. - -ARTICLE 68. Members of the Legislative Yuan shall hold office for a term -of three years and may be eligible for re-election. - -ARTICLE 69. The Executive Yuan, Judicial Yuan, Examination Yuan, and -Censor Yuan may submit to the Legislative Yuan measures concerning -matters within their respective jurisdiction. - -ARTICLE 70. The President may, before the promulgation or execution of a -legislative measure, request the Legislative Yuan to reconsider it. - -If the Legislative Yuan, with regard to the request for consideration, -should decide to maintain the original measure by a two-thirds vote of -the Members present, the President shall promulgate or execute it -without delay; provided that in case of a bill of law or a treaty, the -President may submit it to the People's Congress for a referendum. - -ARTICLE 71. The President shall promulgate a measure presented by the -Legislative Yuan for promulgation within thirty days after its receipt. - -ARTICLE 72. Members of the Legislative Yuan shall not be held -responsible outside of the said Yuan for opinions they may express and -votes they may cast during its session. - -ARTICLE 73. Without the permission of the Legislative Yuan, no member -may be arrested or detained except when apprehended in _flagrante -delicto_. - -ARTICLE 74. No Member of the Legislative Yuan may concurrently hold any -other public office or engage in any business or profession. - -ARTICLE 75. The election of Members of the Legislative Yuan and the -organization of the Legislative Yuan shall be determined by law. - - -Section 4. _The Judicial Yuan_ - -ARTICLE 76. The Judicial Yuan is the highest organ through which the -Central Government exercises its judicial powers. It shall attend to the -adjudication of civil, criminal and administrative suits, the discipline -and punishment of public functionaries and judicial administration. - -ARTICLE 77. In the Judicial Yuan, there shall be a President who shall -hold office for a term of three years. He shall be appointed by the -President. - -The President of the Judicial Yuan shall be responsible to the People's -Congress. - -ARTICLE 78. Matters concerning special pardons, remission of sentence -and restoration of civil rights shall be submitted to the President for -action by the President of the Judicial Yuan in accordance with law. - -ARTICLE 79. The Judicial Yuan shall have the power to unify the -interpretation of statutes and ordinances. - -ARTICLE 80. Judicial officials shall, in accordance with law, have -perfect independence in the conduct of trials. - -ARTICLE 81. No judicial official may be removed from office unless he -has been subject to criminal or disciplinary punishment or declared an -interdicted person; nor may a judicial official be suspended or -transferred, or have his salary reduced except in accordance with law. - -ARTICLE 82. The organization of the Judicial Yuan and the various Courts -of Justice shall be determined by law. - - -Section 5. _The Examination Yuan_ - -ARTICLE 83. The Examination Yuan is the highest organ through which the -Central Government exercises its examination powers. It shall attend to -the selection of civil service candidates by examination and to the -registration of persons qualified for public service. - -ARTICLE 84. In the Examination Yuan there shall be a President who shall -hold office for a term of three years, to be appointed by the President. - -The President of the Examination Yuan shall be responsible to the -People's Congress. - -ARTICLE 85. The Examination Yuan shall, in accordance with law, by -examination and registration determine the following qualifications: - - 1. For appointment as a public functionary. - - 2. For candidacy to public office. - - 3. For practice in specialized professions and as technical - experts. - -ARTICLE 86. The organization of the Examination Yuan shall be determined -by law. - - -Section 6. _The Censor Yuan_ - -ARTICLE 87. The Censor Yuan is the highest organ through which the -Central Government exercises its censorial powers. It shall attend to -impeachment and auditing and be responsible to the People's Congress. - -ARTICLE 88. In the discharge of its censorial powers, the Censor Yuan -may, in accordance with law, interrogate the various Yuan, Ministries -and Commissions. - -ARTICLE 89. In the Censor Yuan, there shall be a President who shall -hold office for a term of three years and may be eligible for -re-election. - -ARTICLE 90. Members of the Censor Yuan shall be elected by the People's -Congress, from candidates separately nominated by the Delegates of the -various provinces, Mongolia, Tibet and Chinese citizens residing -abroad. Each group of Delegates shall nominate two candidates. The -candidates are not confined to Delegates to the Congress. - -ARTICLE 91. Members of the Censor Yuan shall hold office for a term of -four years and may be eligible for re-election. - -ARTICLE 92. When the Censor Yuan finds a public functionary in the -Central or local government guilty of violation of a law or neglect of -his duty, an impeachment may be instituted upon the proposal of one or -more Members and the indorsement, after due investigation, of five or -more Members. Impeachment against the President or Vice-President, the -President of the Executive Yuan, Legislative Yuan, Judicial Yuan, -Examination Yuan or Censor Yuan may be instituted only upon the proposal -of ten or more Members and the indorsement, after due investigation, of -one-half or more Members of the entire Yuan. - -ARTICLE 93. When an impeachment is instituted against the President or -Vice-President or the President of the Executive Yuan, Legislative Yuan, -Judicial Yuan, Examination Yuan or Censor Yuan in accordance with the -preceding Article, it shall be brought before the People's Congress. -During the adjournment of the People's Congress, the Delegates shall be -requested to convene in accordance with law an extraordinary session to -decide whether the impeached shall be removed from office. - -ARTICLE 94. Members of the Censor Yuan shall not be held responsible -outside of the said Yuan for opinions they may express and votes they -may cast while discharging their duties. - -ARTICLE 95. Without the permission of the Censor Yuan, no Member of the -Censor Yuan may be arrested or detained except when apprehended in -_flagrante delicto_. - -ARTICLE 96. No Member of the Censor Yuan may concurrently hold any other -public office or engage in any business or profession. - -ARTICLE 97. The election of the Members of the Censor Yuan and the -organization of the Censor Yuan shall be determined by law. - - -CHAPTER V. THE LOCAL INSTITUTIONS - - -Section 1. _The Provinces_ - -ARTICLE 98. In the Province, there shall be a Provincial Government -which shall execute the laws and orders of the Central Government and -supervise local self-government. - -ARTICLE 99. In the Provincial Government there shall be a Governor who -shall hold office for a term of three years. He shall be appointed and -removed by the Central Government. - -ARTICLE 100. In the province, there shall be a Provincial Assembly which -shall be composed of one member from each district or municipality to be -elected by the district or municipal council. Members of the Provincial -Assembly shall hold office for a term of three years and may be eligible -for re-election. - -ARTICLE 101. The organization of the Provincial Government and the -Provincial Assembly as well as the election and recall of the Members of -the Provincial Assembly shall be determined by law. - -ARTICLE 102. The government of areas not yet established as provinces -shall be determined by law. - - -Section 2. _The Districts_ - -ARTICLE 103. The district [_hsien_] is a unit of local self-government. - -ARTICLE 104. All matters that are local in nature are within the scope -of local self-government. - -The scope of local self-government shall be determined by law. - -ARTICLE 105. Citizens of the district shall, in accordance with law, -exercise the powers of initiative and referendum in matters concerning -district self-government as well as the powers of election and recall of -the District Magistrate and other elective officials in the service of -district self-government. - -ARTICLE 106. In the district, there shall be a District Council, the -members of which shall be directly elected by the citizens in the -District General Meeting. Members of the District Council shall hold -office for a term of three years and may be eligible for re-election. - -ARTICLE 107. District ordinances and regulations which are in conflict -with the laws and ordinances of the Central or Provincial Government -shall be null and void. - -ARTICLE 108. In the district, there shall be a District Government with -a District Magistrate who shall be elected by the citizens in the -District General Meeting. The Magistrate shall hold office for a term -of three years and may be eligible for re-election. - -Only those persons found qualified in the public examinations held by -the Central Government or adjudged qualified by the Ministry of Public -Service Registration may be candidates for the office of District -Magistrate. - -ARTICLE 109. The District Magistrate shall administer the affairs of the -district in accordance with the principles of self-government and, under -the direction of the Provincial Governor, execute matters assigned by -the Central and Provincial Governments. - -ARTICLE 110. The organization of the District Council and District -Government as well as the election and recall of the District Magistrate -and the Members of the District Council shall be determined by law. - - -Section 3. _The Municipalities_ - -ARTICLE 111. Unless otherwise provided by law, the provisions governing -self-government and administration of the district shall apply _mutatis -mutandis_ to the municipality [_shih_]. - -ARTICLE 112. In the municipality, there shall be a Municipal Council, -the Members of which shall be directly elected by the citizens in the -Municipal General Meeting. One-third of the Members shall retire and be -replaced by election annually. - -ARTICLE 113. In the municipality, there shall be a Municipal Government -with a Mayor to be directly elected by the citizens in the Municipal -General Meeting. He shall hold office for a term of three years and may -be eligible for re-election. - -Only those persons found qualified in the public examinations held by -the Central Government or adjudged qualified by the Ministry of Public -Service Registration may be a candidate for the office of Mayor. - -ARTICLE 114. The Mayor shall administer the affairs of the municipality -in accordance with the principles of municipal self-government and, -under direction of the competent supervising authority, execute matters -assigned by the Central or Provincial Government. - -ARTICLE 115. The organization of the Municipal Council and Municipal -Government as well as the election and recall of the Members of the -Municipal Council and the Mayor shall be determined by law. - - -CHAPTER VI. NATIONAL ECONOMIC LIFE - -ARTICLE 116. The economic system of the Republic of China shall be based -upon the Min Shêng Chu I (Principle of Livelihood) and shall aim at -national economic sufficiency and equality. - -ARTICLE 117. The land within the territorial limits of the Republic of -China belongs to the people as a whole. Any part thereof the ownership -of which has been lawfully acquired by an individual or individuals -shall be protected by, and subject to, the restrictions of law. - -The State may, in accordance with law, tax or expropriate private land -on the basis of the value declared by the owner or assessed by the -Government. - -Every landowner is amenable to the duty of utilizing his land to the -fullest extent. - -ARTICLE 118. All subterranean minerals and natural forces which are -economically utilizable for public benefit, belong to the State and -shall not be affected by private ownership of the land. - -ARTICLE 119. The unearned increment shall be taxed by means of a -land-value-increment tax and devoted to public benefit. - -ARTICLE 120. In readjusting the distribution of land, the State shall be -guided by the principle of aiding and protecting the land-owning farmers -and the land-utilizing owners. - -ARTICLE 121. The State may, in accordance with law, regulate private -wealth and enterprises when such wealth and enterprises are considered -detrimental to the balanced development of national economic life. - -ARTICLE 122. The State shall encourage, guide and protect the citizens' -productive enterprises and the nation's foreign trade. - -ARTICLE 123. All public utilities and enterprises of a monopolistic -nature shall be operated by the State; except in case of necessity when -the State may specially permit private operation. - -The private enterprises mentioned in the preceding paragraph may, in -case of emergency for national defense, be temporarily managed by the -State. The State may also, in accordance with law, take them over for -permanent operation upon payment of due compensation. - -ARTICLE 124. In order to improve the workers' living conditions, -increase their productive ability and relieve unemployment, the State -shall enforce labor protective policies. - -Women and children shall be afforded special protection in accordance -with their age and physical condition. - -ARTICLE 125. Labor and capital shall, in accordance with the principles -of mutual help and cooperation, develop together productive enterprises. - -ARTICLE 126. In order to promote agricultural development and the -welfare of the farming population, the State shall improve rural -economic and living conditions and increase farming efficiency by -employment of scientific farming. - -The State may regulate the production and distribution of agricultural -products, in kind and quantity. - -ARTICLE 127. The State shall accord due relief or compensation to those -who suffer disability or loss of life in the performance of military or -public services. - -ARTICLE 128. The State shall give suitable relief to the aged, feeble, -or disabled who are incapable of earning a living. - -ARTICLE 129. While the following powers appertain to the Legislative -Yuan in the case of the Central Government, they may be exercised by the -legally designated organ if, in accordance with law, such matters may be -effected independently by a province, district or municipality: - - 1. To impose or alter the rate of taxes and levies, fines, - penalties, or other imposts of a compulsory nature. - - 2. To raise public loans, dispose of public property or - conclude contracts which increase the burden of the public - treasury. - - 3. To establish or cancel public enterprises, monopolies, - franchises or any other profit-making enterprise. - - 4. To grant or cancel public enterprises, monopolies, - franchises or any other special privileges. - -Unless specially authorized by law, the government of a province, -district or municipality shall not raise foreign loans or directly -utilize foreign capital. - -ARTICLE 130. Within the territorial limits of the Republic of China all -goods shall be permitted to circulate freely. They shall not be seized -or detained except in accordance with law. - -Customs duty is a Central Government revenue. It shall be collected only -once when the goods enter or leave the country. - -The various grades of government shall not collect any dues on goods in -transit within the country, with the exception of tolls levied for the -purpose of improving the waterways and roads, on vessels and vehicles -making use of them. - -The right to impose taxes and levies on goods belongs to the Central -Government and shall not be exercised except in accordance with law. - - -CHAPTER VII. EDUCATION - -ARTICLE 131. The educational aim of the Republic of China shall be to -develop a national spirit, to cultivate a national morality, to train -the people for self-government and to increase their ability to earn a -livelihood, and thereby to build up a sound and healthy body of -citizens. - -ARTICLE 132. Every citizen of the Republic of China shall have an equal -opportunity to receive education. - -ARTICLE 133. All public and private educational institutions in the -country shall be subject to State supervision and amenable to the duty -of carrying out the educational policies formulated by the State. - -ARTICLE 134. Children between six and twelve years of age are of school -age and shall receive elementary education free of tuition. Detailed -provisions shall be provided by law. - -ARTICLE 135. All persons over school age who have not received an -elementary education shall receive supplementary education free of -tuition. Detailed provisions shall be provided by law. - -ARTICLE 136. In establishing universities and technical schools, the -State shall give special consideration to the needs of the respective -localities so as to afford the people thereof an equal opportunity to -receive higher education, thereby hastening a balanced national cultural -development. - -ARTICLE 137. Educational appropriations shall constitute no less than -fifteen per cent of the total amount of the budget of the Central -Government and no less than thirty per cent of the total amount of the -provincial, district and municipal budgets respectively. Educational -endowment funds independently set aside in accordance with law shall be -safeguarded. - -Educational expenditures in needy provinces shall be subsidized by the -central treasury. - -ARTICLE 138. The State shall encourage and subsidize the following -enterprises or citizens: - - 1. Private educational institutions with a high record of - achievement. - - 2. Education for Chinese citizens residing abroad. - - 3. Discoverers or inventors in academic or technical fields. - - 4. Teachers or administrative officers of educational - institutions having good records and long service. - - 5. Students of high records and good character who are - unable to pursue further studies. - - -CHAPTER VIII. THE ENFORCEMENT AND AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION - -ARTICLE 139. The term "law" as used in the Constitution means that which -has been passed by the Legislative Yuan and promulgated by the -President. - -ARTICLE 140. Laws in conflict with the Constitution are null and void. - -The question whether a law is in conflict with the Constitution shall be -settled by the Censor Yuan submitting the point to the Judicial Yuan for -interpretation within six months after its enforcement. - -ARTICLE 141. Administrative orders in conflict with the Constitution or -laws are null and void. - -ARTICLE 142. The interpretation of the Constitution shall be done by the -Judicial Yuan. - -ARTICLE 143. Before half or more of the provinces and territories have -completed the work of local self-government, the Members of the -Legislative Yuan and of the Censor Yuan shall be elected and appointed -in accordance with the following provisions: - - 1. The Members of the Legislative Yuan: The Delegates of the - various provinces, Mongolia, Tibet, and of the citizens - residing abroad, to the People's Congress shall separately - hold a preliminary election to nominate half of the number - of the candidates as determined in Article 67 and submit - their list to the People's Congress for election. The other - half shall be nominated by the President of the Legislative - Yuan for appointment by the President. - - 2. The Members of the Censor Yuan: The Delegates of the - various provinces, Mongolia, Tibet, and of the citizens - residing abroad, to the People's Congress shall separately - hold a preliminary election to nominate half of the number - of candidates as determined in Article 90 and submit their - list to the People's Congress for election. The other half - shall be nominated by the President of the Censor Yuan for - appointment by the President. - -ARTICLE 144. The Magistrates of districts where the work of -self-government is not yet completed shall be appointed and removed by -the Central Government. - -The preceding paragraph is applicable _mutatis mutandis_ to those -municipalities where the work of self-government is not yet completed. - -ARTICLE 145. The methods and procedure of helping the establishment of -local self-government shall be determined by law. - -ARTICLE 146. No amendment to the Constitution may be made unless it -shall have been proposed by over one-fourth of the delegates to the -People's Congress and passed by at least two-thirds of the delegates -present at a meeting having a quorum of over three-fourths of the entire -Congress. - -A proposed amendment to the Constitution shall be made public by the -proposer or proposers one year before the assembling of the People's -Congress. - -ARTICLE 147. In regard to those provisions of the Constitution which -require further procedure for their enforcement, such necessary -procedure shall be determined by law. - - - - -_B._ THE SYSTEM OF ORGANIZATION OF THE NATIONAL CONGRESS[1] - - - [Footnote 1: "Kuo-min Ta-hui Tsu-chih Fa" in Chung-yang Hsüan-ch'uan - Pu (Party-Ministry of Publicity), _Hsien-chêng Chien-shê Fa-kuei_, - Chungking, XXVIII (1939), p. 35-8.] - - The following laws were passed by the Legislative _Yüan_ - April 31, XXVI (1937), in amended form, after the election - had been postponed. - -ARTICLE 1. The National Congress shall frame the Constitution, and shall -determine its date of execution. - -ARTICLE 2. _i._ The National Congress shall be organized by the - Representatives of the people to the Congress. - _ii._ The manner of electing these Representatives is fixed - in another set of laws. - -ARTICLE 3. Members and reserve members of the Central Executive -Committee of the Kuomintang, and of the Central Supervisory Committee of -the Kuomintang shall be Representatives to the Congress without -election; members of the National Government and its officials may -attend the Congress. - -ARTICLE 4. The date of convening the Congress is to be fixed by the -National Government. - -ARTICLE 5. The Congress shall convene in the locality occupied by the -National Government. - -ARTICLE 6. Representatives to the Congress shall take an oath of -allegiance during the opening ceremonies of the Congress, to wit: -"I,------, do hereby promise with absolute sincerity that as a -representative of the Chinese people, I shall receive the instructions -of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the Father of the Republic, and that I shall execute -my official power only according to law, and shall obey the discipline -of the National Congress." - -After taking the oath, the Representatives should thereto sign their -names. - -ARTICLE 7. Thirty-one members shall be elected from among the -Representatives themselves to form the Presidium of the Congress. Their -duties shall be: - - _i._ To fix the manner of discussing motions and to regulate - the progress of the discussion. - _ii._ To discharge executive affairs of the Congress. - _iii._ To perform other duties fixed in this code of laws. - -ARTICLE 8. During a meeting of the Congress, the Presidium shall elect -the Chairman of the Meeting. - -ARTICLE 9. The National Congress shall form special committees to -examine the qualifications of the Representatives, to examine motions -and proposals and for other matters. These committees shall be organized -upon the request of the Presidium and passed by the Meeting. - -ARTICLE 10. The period of a session of the Congress is 10 to 20 days; it -may be extended whenever necessary. - -ARTICLE 11. The duties of the National Congress are fully discharged -when its Meeting closes. - -ARTICLE 12. A quorum shall consist of at least half of the total number -of members. Motion can be passed when more than half of the members -present vote for it. - -In adopting the Constitution, at least two-thirds of the total number of -the members shall be present, and adoption shall require a majority -greater than two-thirds of the members present. - -ARTICLE 13. The Congress may adopt any of the following methods to put a -motion to vote: raising the hands, standing up, or balloting. In case of -a tie, the Chairman may cast the deciding vote. - -ARTICLE 14. The National Congress shall have a Secretariat and an -organization of police guards. Their organization and duties shall be -decided by the Presidium. - -ARTICLE 15. The National Congress shall have a Secretary General, -appointed by the Presidium, and discharging the affairs of the entire -Congress. - -ARTICLE 16. The Representatives shall not assume any responsibility -towards the general public for any opinion expressed by them during the -session of the Congress. - -ARTICLE 17. Except by approval of the Congress, no Representative of the -Congress may be detained or arrested when the Congress is in session. - -ARTICLE 18. During the session, a Representative who does not abide by -the rules of the Congress may be warned by the Chairman, or may forfeit -his privilege to speak. Adequate punishment shall be imposed upon any -who may commit serious offenses. - -ARTICLE 19. The above mentioned punishment will be decided by the -Congress, upon the examination of the Punishment Committee (formed by -the Representatives to the Congress). - -ARTICLE 20. The date of adoption of this code of laws is to be fixed in -an order from the Central Government. - - - - -_C._ ACT OF THE LEGISLATIVE _YÜAN_, APRIL 31, XXVI (1937) GOVERNING THE -ELECTION OF REPRESENTATIVES TO THE NATIONAL CONGRESS[1] - - - [Footnote 1: "Kuo-min Ta-hui Tai-piao Hsüan-chü Fa" in Chung-yang - Hsüan-ch'uan Pu (Party-Ministry of Publicity) _Hsien-chêng Chien-shê - Fa-kuei_, Chungking, XXVIII (1939), p. 38-49.] - - [Note particularly the world-wide electoral areas.] - - -CHAPTER I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES - -ARTICLE 1. These laws are formulated in conjunction with what is -provided in Section _ii_ of Article 2 in the Law concerning the System -of Organization of the National Congress. - -ARTICLE 2. Besides the Representatives to the National Congress without -election, there shall also be provided: - - _i._ 665 Representatives elected through district election. - _ii._ 380 Representatives elected through professional election. - _iii._ 155 Representatives elected through special election. - _iv._ 240 Representatives appointed by the National Government. - -ARTICLE 3. All citizens of China above 20 years of age have the -privilege of voting for Representatives to Congress, upon taking the -oath of citizenship. - -ARTICLE 4. The following persons have no privilege of voting: - - _i._ Rebels against the National Government, proven or under arrest. - _ii._ Corrupt officials, proven or under arrest. - _iii._ Those whose citizenship privileges have been forfeited due to - crimes, etc. - _iv._ Those who are insolvent. - _v._ Those afflicted with mental diseases. - _vi._ Those smoking opium or substitutes therefor. - -ARTICLE 5. Each voter may have not more than two choices. - -Those who may both elect in the district and the professional elections -should participate in the professional election. Those who may both -elect in the professional election and the special election should elect -in the special election. In professional election, an elector eligible -in more than two professions should vote only in one of them at his -choice. - -ARTICLE 6. The Representatives to the National Congress are elected by -balloting which does not require signature, and by single entry. The -names of candidates for Representative should be printed on the ballot, -and the electors are to choose one man out of them. - -ARTICLE 7. Candidates for Representative who receive a majority vote are -elected as Representatives. In case of tie, the candidates shall draw -lots to decide who is the elected Representative. - -ARTICLE 8. After the full number of Representatives has been obtained, -those candidates who obtain some votes [but less than a majority] will -be reserve Representatives. Their rank will be based upon the number of -votes. In number the reserve Representatives shall correspond to the -elected Representatives. - - -CHAPTER II. DISTRICT ELECTION - -ARTICLE 9. All provinces and cities directly under the Executive Yüan -shall elect a number of Representatives corresponding to the attached -List No. 1, and according to the laws governing District Elections. - -ARTICLE 10. The Representatives from various provinces are elected in -various districts. The division of districts and the number of -Representatives elected in every district are fixed in the attached List -No. 2. - -ARTICLE 11. The Heads of the _hsiang_ [suburb of a city] and of the -_chên_ [a village market] of each _hsien_ in the electorate should -nominate candidates. The number should be ten times that of the number -of Representatives to be elected. If there is a _shih_ within the -electorate, the Head of the _fang_ [a group of houses in a _shih_] -should also participate in the nomination. If there is no Head of the -_hsiang_ or _chên_ in a _hsien_, then the corresponding officials of the -_hsiang_, _chên_, or _hsien_ shall nominate. - -ARTICLE 12. Candidates for Representative should have the following -qualifications: - - _i._ Possess the qualifications of an elector of the Representatives - and have taken the citizenship oath in an electorate other than - this one. - _ii._ Be above twenty-five years of age. - _iii._ Be a resident of the respective electoral district. - -ARTICLE 13. Representatives to the National Congress in each district -are elected in the manner prescribed in Article 6. - -ARTICLE 14. The Special Municipalities directly under the Executive Yüan -should elect their Representatives according to Articles 11-13 and -Article 15. - - -CHAPTER III. PROFESSIONAL ELECTION - -ARTICLE 15. The various professional organs in provinces or Special -Municipalities should elect a number of Representatives according to the -attached List No. 3. - -ARTICLE 16. Organs of the liberal professions shall elect -Representatives not according to localities or districts. Their numbers -are fixed in attached List No. 4. - -ARTICLE 17. The professional organs participating in the election are -limited to those who were legally recognized before the adoption of this -code of laws. - -ARTICLE 18. The officers of the various professional organs shall -nominate Representatives for those particular professions. Their number -should be three times the number of Representatives to be elected. The -officers mentioned above are limited to those who have executive power -in that particular professional organ. - -ARTICLE 19. Nominated Representatives for professional election should -have the following qualifications: - - _i._ Possess the privileges of an elector. - _ii._ Be above twenty-five years of age. - _iii._ Have been practicing in that profession for three years or - more. - _iv._ Be a member of that professional organization. - -The period of practicing that profession may be the sum of intermittent -periods of practice. - -ARTICLE 20. The Representatives of professional organs should be elected -by legally recognized electors according to Article 6. - -ARTICLE 21. If there are several sub-organs to a professional -organization, the nomination of Representatives should be made by the -officials of the lowest sub-organ, and elected by the members of the -lowest sub-organ. - -If the members of the professional organization form groups, then the -election of Representatives should be done by the individual members of -those groups. - -ARTICLE 22. In Special Municipalities directly under the Executive Yüan, -the nomination and election of Representatives from professional -organizations should be in accordance with Article 24. - -ARTICLE 23. For organs of the liberal professions, their manner of -nominating and electing is the same as for professional organizations. - - -CHAPTER IV. SPECIAL ELECTIONS - - -Section 1. _Elections in the Provinces of Liaoning, Kirin, Heilungkiang -and Jehol_ - -ARTICLE 24. No distinction concerning district or profession is made in -the election of Representatives in these four provinces. Their numbers -are: - - _i._ For Liaoning 14 - _ii._ For Kirin 13 - _iii._ For Heilungkiang 9 - _iv._ For Jehol 9 - -Two of the Representatives from Kirin are elected in the Special Eastern -District of that Province. - -[Provision is made for the use of polls in exile and for absentee -ballots.] - - -Section 2. _Elections in Mongolia and Tibet_ - -[This follows the provisions of Section 1.] - - -Section 3. _Representatives from Overseas_ - -ARTICLE 32. The numbers of Representatives from overseas are as follows: - - 1 from Hawaii 1 from Chile - 1 from Peru 1 from Cuba - 1 from Mexico 1 from Central America - 3 from the United States 2 from the Philippines - 2 from Canada 4 from Malaya - 3 from Annam 2 from Thailand (Siam) - 1 from India 2 from Burma - 1 from Europe 1 from Japan - 1 from Korea 1 from Australia - 1 from Tahiti 1 from Africa - 4 from The Netherlands 1 from Hong Kong - East Indies 1 from Formosa - 1 from Macao - -ARTICLE 33. The nomination of overseas Representatives is modelled after -that of Professional Elections. But the groups nominating the -Representatives are to be approved by the Central Committee of Overseas -Affairs. - -The National Government shall fix twice the number of Representatives -electable as nominated Representatives. - -ARTICLE 34. The election of Overseas Representatives is modelled after -that governing provincial districts. - - -Section 4. _Elections in the Army, Navy, and Air Forces_ - -ARTICLE 35. Thirty Representatives shall be elected from the Nation's -army, navy, air force, and other military organs. - -ARTICLE 36. Nominations of Representatives from the military are as -follows: - - _i._ The Army: Two nominations from every division. One from every - independent lü [brigade] or from special brigades holding more - than two tuan [regiments]. For the rest of the smaller forces, - nomination of Representatives shall be made by combination of - the forces. - _ii._ The Navy: Each fleet may nominate one Representative. All the - Marines combined may nominate one Representative. The - Department of the Navy will combine the remainder to nominate - Representatives. - _iii._ The Air Force shall nominate one Representative. - _iv._ Three Representatives shall be nominated by other military - organs. - -The National Government will appoint ninety Representatives thus -nominated as the nominated Representatives. - -ARTICLE 37. The nominated Representatives will be elected by the -officers and soldiers of the military who have the qualifications of -electors. Representatives are elected in the manner prescribed in -Article 6. - -ARTICLE 38. Representatives nominated should have the following -qualifications: - - _i._ Possess the qualifications of an elector. - _ii._ Be more than twenty-five years of age. - _iii._ Have served for more than five years in the troops with good - record, or be a graduate of good standing from a military - school. - - -CHAPTER V. ELECTION OF THE CHIEF ELECTION OFFICE AND OF THE ELECTION -INSPECTORS - -ARTICLE 39. The National Government forms the Chief Election Office of -the Representatives of the National Congress. The Office is headed by a -Commissioner and a Deputy Commissioner. Election Inspectors are also -specially appointed to direct and watch all affairs of the election. The -appointment of the Chief Election Office is determined by order. - -ARTICLE 40. The Election Inspector of every province is the Commissioner -of the Bureau of Civil Affairs of the province. - -The Provincial Election Inspector is the highest executive official of -the province. In case there is no highest official, the Chief Election -Office will appoint one of the executive officials to fill the post. - -ARTICLE 41. In Special Municipalities directly under the Executive Yüan, -the Inspector is the City Mayor. - -ARTICLE 42. In elections in Liaoning, Kirin, Heilungkiang, and Jehol, -and of liberal professional organizations, the Minister of the Ministry -of the Interior will be the Inspector-General. In elections in Mongolia -and Tibet, the Chairman of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission -will be the Inspector-General. In overseas elections, the Chairman of -the Overseas Affairs Committee will be the Inspector-General. - -ARTICLE 43. Elections in Mongolia, Tibet, and overseas and military -elections shall be under the Inspectors appointed by the Chief Election -Office. - -ARTICLE 44. The qualifications of the electors, the nominated and -elected Representatives shall be examined by the Inspectors. - -ARTICLE 45. The date and locality of the election are fixed by the -Election Inspectors. - -ARTICLE 46. The rest of the officials for the election, _e.g._, ballot -administrators and inspectors, etc., are also appointed by the -Inspectors-General. - -ARTICLE 47. Inspectors and officials for electoral affairs cannot be the -Congress Representatives of that district or professional organization. - -[ARTICLE 48 OMITTED IN THE TEXT.] - - -CHAPTER VI. ELECTION AND FORFEITED ELECTION - -ARTICLE 49. The election is considered null and void if: - - _i._ It is legally proved that more than one-third of the electorate - are cheating in or manipulating the election; or, - _ii._ It is legally proved that the election is not conducted - according to the laws prescribed. - -ARTICLE 50. In case of an election being forfeited, it should be -performed again according to law, unless it be too late to repeat under -the existing circumstances. - -ARTICLE 51. Elected Representatives lose their privilege when: - - _i._ They die; or, - _ii._ It is legally proved that their submitted qualifications are - false; or, - _iii._ It is legally proved that the number of ballots is incorrect. - -ARTICLE 52. When an elected Representative loses his privilege or when -he refuses to take his privilege, the reserve Representative will take -his place as prescribed in Article 8. - - -CHAPTER VII. LAW SUITS CONCERNING ELECTION AFFAIRS - -ARTICLE 53. Electors or nominated Representatives who are not elected -may file suit within ten days of the date of the election against any -administrative officer of the election if they hold that he abuses his -duty. - -ARTICLE 54. If electors or nominated Representatives who are not elected -see that the number of ballots cast for the elected Representatives are -untrue, or that the qualifications of the elected Representatives are -untrue, they may file suit within five days of the date for announcement -of successful candidates. - -ARTICLE 55. All law suits connected with election affairs will be heard -by the Supreme Court. They shall take precedence over all other cases, -and sentence will be given after one single hearing. Law suits connected -with military elections will be heard before a military tribunal. - -ARTICLE 56. Offenses committed during an election are governed by the -criminal code. - - -CHAPTER VIII. SUPPLEMENT - -ARTICLE 57. When it is impossible to elect in Special Elections as -prescribed in Chapter IV, the National Government may appoint -Representatives. - -ARTICLE 58. The Chief Election Office for the Election of -Representatives to the National Congress is the sole organ empowered to -interpret the meaning of this set of laws. - -ARTICLE 59. The detailed procedure for enforcing these laws will be -fixed by order. - -ARTICLE 60. The date of enforcing these laws will be fixed by order. - -[The attached lists are omitted.] - - - - -_D._ THE PROGRAM OF RESISTANCE AND RECONSTRUCTION[1] - - - [Footnote 1: Official English text from Ch'u Chia-hua (Party-Minister - of Organization of the Kuomintang), "Consolidation of Democracy in - China," in Council of International Affairs, _The Chinese Yearbook - 1938-39_, [Hong Kong], 1939, p. 337-8.] - - This quasi-constitutional proclamation of war policy for the - nation was adopted by the Kuomintang Party Congress, - Emergency Session, at Hankow, March 29, 1938. - - -A. GENERAL PRINCIPLES: - -1. Dr. Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary principles and his other teachings -are hereby declared to be the supreme authority, regulating all war-time -activities and the work of national reconstruction. - -2. All war-time powers and forces are hereby placed under the control -of the Kuomintang and of General Chiang K'ai-shek. - - -B. DIPLOMACY: - -3. China is prepared to ally herself with all states and nations that -sympathize with her cause, and to wage a common struggle for peace and -justice. - -4. China is prepared to safeguard and strengthen the machinery of peace -as well as all treaties and conventions that have the maintenance of -peace as their ultimate object. - -5. China is prepared to ally herself with all forces that are opposed to -Japanese imperialism in order to check Japanese aggression and to -safeguard peace in the Far East. - -6. China is prepared to improve still further the existing friendly -relations with other Powers in order to gain more sympathy for the -cause. - -7. All bogus political organizations which Japan has created in -consequence of her military occupation of Chinese territory, and all -their actions, are hereby repudiated and declared null and void. - - -C. MILITARY AFFAIRS: - -8. The army shall receive more political training, so that both officers -and men may appreciate the importance of war-time national -reconstruction and be ready to lay down their lives for the nation. - -9. All able-bodied men shall be trained; the people shall have their -military strength increased; the troops at the various fronts shall be -supplied with new recruits. Overseas Chinese who have returned home to -offer their services at the front shall be given a proper course of -training to fit them for their work. - -10. All people who have arms of their own shall receive the support and -encouragement of the Government and, under the direction of local -military authorities, shall cooperate with the regular army to defend -the country against foreign invasion. Guerrilla warfare shall be waged -in the enemy's rear with the object of smashing and dividing his -military forces. - -11. Both the wounded and the killed shall be pensioned; the disabled -shall be cared for; and the families of soldiers fighting at the front -shall be treated with the utmost consideration, so that people will -rejoice to fight for their country and the work of national mobilization -may proceed with the highest degree of efficiency. - - -D. POLITICS: - -12. A People's Political Council shall be created in order to unify the -national strength, to utilize the best minds of the nation, and to -facilitate the formulation and execution of national policies. - -13. The district [_hsien_] shall be taken as the fundamental unit from -which the work of increasing the self-defensive power of the people -shall be started. The conditions of local self-government shall be -fulfilled as soon as possible, so that the political and social basis of -the present war shall have been firmly established and a preparation -shall have been made for the eventual promulgation of a constitution. - -14. A thorough reform in the central and local governmental machinery -shall be instituted with the object of simplifying and making it -rational. Only thus can administrative efficiency be obtained to meet -the urgent needs of war. - -15. The conduct of all officials, both high and low, shall conform to -rules of propriety. They shall be faithful to their work, ready to -sacrifice themselves for the cause of the nation, observe discipline, -and obey orders, so that they may serve as a model for the people. If -they prove to be disloyal and obstruct the prosecution of the war, they -shall be tried by court martial. - -16. Corrupt officials shall be severely punished, and their property -shall be confiscated. - - -E. ECONOMICS: - -17. Economic reconstruction shall concern itself mainly with matters of -military importance, and incidentally with matters that contribute to -the improvement of the livelihood of the people. With these objects in -view, a planned economy shall be put into operation, investments by -people both at home and abroad shall be encouraged, and large-scale -war-time production shall be undertaken. - -18. The greatest measure of energy shall be devoted to the development -of village economy, the encouragement of cooperative enterprises, the -unhampered transportation of foodstuffs, the cultivation of waste land, -and the work of irrigation. - -19. Mining shall be undertaken; the foundations of heavy industries -shall be laid; light industries shall be encouraged; and handicraft -industries in the various provinces shall be developed. - -20. War-time taxes shall be levied, and thoroughgoing reforms in -financial administration shall be instituted. - -21. The banking business shall be strictly controlled, so that -commercial and industrial activities may be properly adjusted. - -22. The legal tender shall be made unassailable; foreign exchange shall -be controlled; and imports and exports shall be regulated in order to -secure financial stability. - -23. Facilities of communication shall be improved; transportation by -steamers, automobiles, and aeroplanes shall be undertaken; railroads and -highways shall be built; and air lines shall be increased. - -24. No profiteering or cornering shall be allowed; and a system of -price-fixing shall be instituted. - - -F. MASS MOVEMENT: - -25. The people throughout the country shall be organized into -occupational groups such as farmers, laborers, merchants, and students. -The principle shall be: From each according to his ability. The rich -shall contribute in money, and the able-bodied shall sweat. All classes -of people shall be mobilized for war. - -26. In the course of the war, the freedom of speech, the freedom of the -press, and the freedom of assembly shall be fully guaranteed to the -people, provided they do not contravene Dr. Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary -principles or the provisions of the law. - -27. Refugees from the war areas as well as unemployed people shall -receive relief, and shall be given proper training to fit them for -war-time work. - -28. National consciousness shall be instilled into the people, so that -they may assist the Government in detecting and eradicating treasonable -acts. Traitors shall be severely punished, and their property shall be -confiscated. - - -G. EDUCATION: - -29. The whole educational system shall be reorganized. A course of -war-time education shall be instituted and emphasis shall be placed on -the cultivation of morals, scientific research, and the expansion of -research facilities. - -30. Various technical experts shall be trained and assigned to proper -posts in order to meet the requirements of war. - -31. The youths of the nation shall be properly trained, so that they may -offer their services to society and contribute to the cause of the war. - - - - - -_E._ AN OUTLINE OF WAR-TIME CONTROLMENT[1] - - - [Footnote 1: An unpublished memorandum presented in manuscript by - President Yü Yu-jên of the Control _Yüan_ to the author in Chungking, - September 1940. It consists of nine folios, not numbered, with a - chart. It is entitled _Chan Shih Chien-ch'a K'ai-lüeh_ (An Outline of - War-time Controlment), and is dated August, XXVIII (1939). The present - extract is folios 1-A to 4-B.] - - An official but unpublished statement, this document was - presented by the President of the Control _Yüan_ to the - author for inclusion in the present work. - -According to Article 46, Chapter VIII of the Organic Law of the National -Government, the Control _Yüan_ is "the highest supervisory organ of the -government, obliged to exercise the power of impeachment and auditing in -accordance with law." Since the beginning of our resistance against the -Japanese invasion, the powers of control have been gradually -strengthened so as to meet the demands of this critical time. A static -control has developed into a dynamic one; that is, more emphasis is laid -upon prevention than upon correction. Therefore the duties of the office -become heavier and more complicated, as its work becomes more -intensified. But the influence which the _Yüan_ has exercised over -Chinese politics as a whole becomes also wider and wider. In this -report, we are going to describe the activities of the _Yüan_ under the -two headings of the Control _Yüan_ and the Ministry of Audit. - - -THE CONTROL YÜAN: - -The function of auditing is performed by the Ministry of Audit, -subsidiary to the _Yüan_. What is directly performed by the _Yüan_ is -impeachment. On the authority of the Impeachment Act, any motion of -impeachment, after being proposed by some control Committee or control -Commissioner, is to be reviewed by three other control Committees. If -the bill is passed by the three, the accused must be punished. Whenever -a bill is rejected and its proponent does not agree to the rejection, -the bill shall be reviewed once more by five other committees whose -determination shall be final. Furthermore, emergency relief measures may -be requested, according to the urgency of the occasion; and in order to -facilitate the performance of its functions, the _Yüan_ is permitted to -investigate the documents of other offices as well as to demand -explanations from them. The initiation of a motion of impeachment must -be based upon one of the three following conditions: - -_a._ Article 2, Impeachment Act: "If any illegal action or negligence of -duty of an official be discovered, the Control _Yüan_ itself is -permitted to bring an impeachment against him." - -_b._ Article 4, Regulations for the Execution of Government Rights; and -Article 11, Act for the Punishment of Officials: "Specified officials -may be impeached on demand of the superior who has submitted the case of -his guilty subordinate to the Control _Yüan_." - -_c._ "If an official be accused by the people, the case must be -investigated. If the accusation prove to be true, the accused shall be -impeached." - -Although it is very prudent that the legislators have obliged the -impeaching officers to take such steps as investigation, motion, and -review, yet in this critical time these complicated measures must be -considered too slow to keep pace with the development of affairs. - -After the outbreak of war, the Central Government published the -"Temporary Regulations for the Execution of War-time Controlment," in -which the Control _Yüan_ was charged with the duties of _censure_ and -_proposition_, besides what have already been mentioned. By censure it -is meant that when emergency measures must be taken against an official -whose illegal action or negligence of duty has been discovered, a -written notice of censure may be submitted to the officer who directly -controls, or is immediately superior to, the official in question. The -officer receiving the notice must decide in as short a time as possible -to deal with the censured with the administrative power in his hands. If -he holds the censured innocent, he must reply, giving sufficient -reasons. If he takes no measures, or fails to reply, or replies -groundlessly, the control Committee making the censure is obliged to -change the motion of censure into one of impeachment, and the impeached -is liable to a penalty. Hence the principal significance of censure is -that it takes emergency measures against the undesirable conduct of -officials, so as to meet the demands of the war-time. This also implies -further extension of the controlment to the administrative system, in -order to quicken efficiency. - -As for _proposition_, this means that when some legally specified -obligations of office are administered feebly or inadequately, the -Control _Yüan_ may make a proposal or express its views to the office -involved or to the office immediately superior. The office which -receives the proposal must in as short a time as possible take adequate -measures to remedy the situation. The duties of _proposition_, -therefore, can not only correct administrators, but can also improve -agencies. They are preventive, capable of requiring strict improvement -of governmental activities. Effective anticipatory control may now be -exercised over Chinese government agencies. Since being charged with the -two new duties of censure and proposition, the Control _Yüan_ has -carried them into action with prudence. And the effects are rather -remarkable. - -When, in 1937, the government was moved to Chungking, a part of the -_Yüan_ employees were ordered dismissed. But the _Yüan_ authorities -still prepared copies of "Directions for the Work of Control _Yüan_ -Employees in Their Native (or Other) Cities (or Provinces)," and -"Directions for the Work of Dismissed Control _Yüan_ Employees," which -were distributed to the dismissed. The former employees have been -obliged to make monthly reports upon the local phenomena according to -the "Directions." These reports are sent to the _Yüan_, thus helping its -understanding of the truth in all corners of China. - -In view of the fact that the "Temporary Regulations for the Execution of -War-time Controlment" came into force, the Control _Yüan_ accordingly -prepared "Directions for Inspection and Investigation." From time to -time, the control commissioners have been ordered to tour their -respective districts. Moreover, control committees have been selected -and sent out to different places to perform inspection of -administration, national spiritual mobilization, conscription, military -confiscation and requisition, the organization and training of the -people, hoarding and reserves of supplies, communication and -transportation, public support of the war, public security, the utter -erasure of traitors, anti-air-raid preparations, ambulance equipment, -the management of wounded soldiers and of refugees, taxation and other -imposts on the people, production, construction, education, and all -other things related to the war. Thus the work of the _Yüan_ has become -all the more intensified. In order to adapt itself to the circumstances, -its organization was readjusted. A "Board of Legislative Study," -subordinate to the _Yüan_, was established, with a view to studying Dr. -Sun Yat-sen's "Constitution based upon the Principle of the Separation -of Five Powers," the Control system, and anything related to war-time -legislation about controlment. Besides, a "Committee on Procedural -Technique" was added under the Secretariat, so that it will prepare -plans for the improvement of _Yüan_ activities, and will help to carry -them into action. - -In the spring of 1939, a "Plan of War-time Procedure for the Second -Stage of War" was passed in the Fifth Plenary Session of the C.E.C. and -C.S.C. of the Kuomintang. Both the decision concerning Article VI of -Political Report and the lecture delivered by Generalissimo Chiang -K'ai-shek in this meeting showed that much was expected from the Control -_Yüan_. Abiding by the government's policy and taking into consideration -its present needs, the _Yüan_, in addition to the performance of -impeachment, censure, proposition and other functions established by -law, prepared "An Outline of the Execution of War-time Controlment for -the Second Stage" and its "Preliminary Procedure," with the extension of -inspection as the chief means to set the machinery in motion. - -According to the aforementioned "Outline" and "Procedure," the work of -inspection is classified into two kinds. The inspection of the conduct -of political officers and administrative officials is termed the -_general inspection_. When special agents are sent out to inspect -specified cases, this is called the _special inspection_. For the -general inspection of the Central Government, the units are the offices, -while for that of the local governments, the units are the districts -[_hsien_]. In the case of a special inspection, when the agents are sent -out solely by the Control _Yüan_, the term used is _exclusive -inspection_; the inspection performed cooperatively by agents both of -the _Yüan_ and of other offices is called _joint inspection_. - -The general inspection has, since January 1940, been vigorously put into -effect. For instance, the anti-air-raid preparations on the outskirts of -Chungking, the relief and management of wounded soldiers, refugees, and -suffering children, and the spiritual mobilization of central and local -government offices (including problems of efficiency and diligence) have -all been carefully examined. Moreover, Control Committees have been sent -out to different districts within certain periods, the frequency of -which is based upon the importance of the place. Some went to Kweichow -and Szechwan to inspect local administration in different districts. -Recently, committees have been sent out to Shantung to make a variety -of inspections. As for the special inspections, delegates have been -incessantly sent out to make exclusive inspections; and joint -inspections have also been made, by the joining of many control -committees into the Itinerant Inspection Corps for Military Discipline -and Morale, and the War-time Economic Inspection Corps. Committees which -have thus been delegated to joint work are not only obliged to fulfil -duties required by the Corps, but are also permitted independently to -impeach or censure illegal or incompetent officials, whether civil or -military. The primary functions of the committees remain unaffected. - -Since military operations must be in harmony with political -administration, wherever the military power reaches, the power of -controlment must follow in its wake. The Control _Yüan_ recently -prepared the "Regulations for the Organization of Control _Yüan_ -War-time Inspection Corps of War Districts," which were later sanctioned -and then promulgated. The number of the corps and of the areas to be -inspected are fixed according to the War Districts marked off by the -Military Affairs Commission. Each corps consists of three committees, -and is organized by the control committees themselves; if there is a -control commissioner in the area, he of course joins the committee, and -performs all the functions established for him by law. Under each -committee there are one secretary, one inspecting agent, three -assistants, and one clerk--to assist the committees in routine -administration. - -Since the work of the control commissioners is stationary, behind the -battle lines, the Inspection Corps of War Districts are itinerant, so -that their emphasis can be laid upon the front. They are mutually -dependent and intimately correlated. The network of national controlment -is completed by the mobilization of the control committees to be sent -out to make inspections, so that corruption may be eliminated and law -and order enforced. And undoubtedly our resistance against the Japanese -invasion has been benefited. This work is indeed a great help to the -construction of a new China. - - - - -_F._ A CHART OF THE CONTROL _YÜAN_ FROM JULY 1937 TO JUNE 1940[1] - - - [Footnote 1: Continuation of Appendix I (E), p. 313; this comprises - folios 5-A to 9-A with chart.] - - -THE READJUSTMENT: - -Since the outbreak of war, the _Yüan_, together with other offices of -the Government, was moved from Nanking to Chungking. In order to adapt -itself to the circumstances, its organization was readjusted. A "Board -of Legislative Study" was established, while the six sections of General -Affairs, Editing, Book-Collection, Printing, Receipt and -Transmission,[2] and Archive, all subordinate to the Secretariat, were -merged into four departments. Moreover, a "Committee on Administrative -Procedure" and two new sections, called the first and the second, were -added to the main body of the _Yüan_. - - [Footnote 2: A formal agency for the receipt and registry of incoming - communications, and of verification and transmission of outgoing - ones.] - - -THE FUNCTIONS: - - | Impeachment------ | Acceptance of Popular - | | | Petitions - Functions | Censure | | - Established--| -----| Inquiry and - by Law | Proposition | Examination - | | - | Supervision of | Emergency Relief - | Examinations | Measures - | | - | Audit | Interpellation - - -THE PRESENT ORGANIZATION: - - The Control _Yüan_ - | |Committee on Administrative Procedure - | |First Department [of the _Yüan_] - | |Secretariat-------|Second Department - The _Yüan_--|Advisers' Office |--------------------Office for Review - Meeting |Board of |Third Department - | Legislative |--------------------Special Delegates' - | Study |Fourth Department Office - |Office of |First - | Regional Control | Section |Accounting--|Office of - | Commissioners |----------| Room | Accounting - |Ministry of Audit |Second | and - | | Section |Statistics--| Statistics - | |----------| Room - ------------------- |President's Office - | | |Office for the Receipt of Petitions - Auditing Offices Auditing - of Provinces Sub-Office - -THE WORK: - - 1. Acceptance of people's petitions and investigations: - Number of petitions received in this period.... - [Number is omitted from original report.] - Number of cases in which delegates were sent out to investigate.... - [Number omitted.] - Number of cases in which other offices were charged to - investigate.... - [Number omitted.] - -(Those petitions which were either outside the function of control or -false in the description of facts were remarked upon and preserved by -the committees.) - - 2. Motions: - Number of impeachments moved 121 - Number of censures moved 149 - Number of propositions moved 234 - 3. Supervisions of Civil Service Examinations: - Number of Higher Examinations supervised 2 - Number of Common Examinations supervised 5 - Number of Special Examinations supervised 34 - 4. Supervisions of the relief of sufferers from natural - calamities: - Total number 5 - 5. Inspections: - [A detailed enumeration of inspections performed and - results accomplished is here omitted.] - 6. Cooperation with other offices: - [The detailed summary is omitted.] - - -THE MINISTRY OF AUDIT: - -The functions of audit, as performed by the Ministry of Audit, are -founded upon the Auditing Act. The old Auditing Act, however, is too -tradition-bound and therefore inconvenient. The necessity of revision is -especially pressing in war-time. In the spring of 1938, the Ministry -prepared a draft Act and submitted it to the Legislative _Yüan_. The -latter adopted this and published a New Auditing Act. According to the -New Auditing Act, the Ministry is charged with three functions of -internal checking (interior auditing), auditing (post-auditing) and -supervision. These functions include: - - _i._ Supervision of the execution of the budgets; - _ii._ Scrutiny of orders of receipt and payment; - _iii._ Scrutiny of computations and balance sheets; - _iv._ Control of illegal or unfaithful conduct in financial affairs. - -Two merits of the New Auditing Act should be mentioned. In the first -place, emphasis has been laid upon visiting auditing. For instance, the -work of internal checking is not limited to the supervision of the -receipts and disbursements of the State Treasury by the scrutiny and -indorsement of the receiving and paying orders; but even receiving and -paying vouchers of Government offices have been made ineffective, unless -scrutinized and indorsed by auditors stationed in the offices by the -Ministry. Owing to the vastness of the area of China, and owing also to -the limited number of workers available in this line, this system is -not universally applicable. Only offices in which the work of receiving -and paying is especially heavy find such auditors present. As for -auditing, the Government offices were formerly obliged only to submit to -the Ministry accounting reports which they themselves had prepared. It -is different now. The New Act ordains that auditors should be sent out -periodically by the Ministry to visit the Government offices and -scrutinize their books and vouchers. Or in each year, some offices -should be selected to be thus scrutinized. The duties of supervision -were not clearly defined, but they now include the following items: -(_a_) the supervision of the revenue and expenditures of the offices; -(_b_) the scrutiny of cash, bills, and bonds in the offices; (_c_) the -supervision of the construction of buildings and of the purchase or sale -of the property attached to the offices; (_d_) the supervision of the -drawing and repayment of bonds and the destruction of bonds returned; -(_e_) joint-administration with the financial departments of other -offices; and (_f_) the scrutiny of other administrative affairs related -to finance. - -Secondly, the New Auditing Act ordains that the Ministry of Audit is -directly responsible for the auditing of financial affairs of the -offices of different ranks of the Central Government, while that of the -local governments is under the charge of local auditing offices, -subordinate to the Ministry. - -[A detailed narrative of the war-time work of the ministry is omitted.] - -Before the outbreak of war, the Ministry had established auditing -offices in the Provinces of Kiangsu, Chekiang, Hupeh, Shensi and Honan -and in the city of Shanghai, and one sub-office for the Tientsin-Pukow -Railway. The office of Shanghai concurrently took charge of the auditing -affairs of the Nanking-Shanghai Railway; and that of Hupeh, the affairs -of the Peiping-Hankow Railway. In 1938 the offices of Hunan, Kweichow -and Szechwan were established. In July 1939, a conference of auditors -was held in Chungking. All auditors sent out now returned to attend it. -They reported on their work, assisted the auditors in the Ministry, and -discussed with them the directions of war-time auditing. In October, Mr. -Lin Yün-kai, the Minister of Audit, visited Szechwan, Shensi, Kansu, and -Chinghai to inspect the audit work going on in Shensi and Szechwan and -at the same time to examine the local financial conditions as a step -toward the extension of the auditing system. - -In the spring of 1939, the Ministry prepared "An Outline for the -Execution of War-time Audits" which was passed and enacted by the -Supreme National Defense Council. There are eleven items, to be carried -out in several periods, in this outline. A part of them are required by -the New Auditing Act, while the rest are the new work arising from the -war. They are as follows: - -_a._ Auditing prefectural [_hsien_] finance: A prefecture, on the -authority of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Constitution, is the unit of -self-government; and whenever the self-government is accomplished, China -becomes constitutional. This being the case, the prefectural finance -actually concerns the future of the country and the people. Therefore, -beginning from 1939, the Ministry introduced the auditing of prefectural -finance. It ordered the provincial offices to have the prefectures make -monthly reports on their revenue and expenditure. The reports should be -submitted to the provincial auditing offices which will also send out -delegates to scrutinize the accounting records of some selected -prefectures as well as to investigate the prefectural financial -organizations, the taxation system, and the sorts of taxes. Up to June -1940, there have been 84 prefectures selected for such investigation. - -_b._ The auditing of the Central Government Offices in the provinces and -cities where no auditing offices have been established: In such cases, -the Ministry has appointed the auditing offices of neighboring -localities to take charge. But the Ministry has taken over the auditing -affairs of Chungking for the moment. Meantime, plans have been made to -establish auditing offices in Kwangsi, Fukien, etc. - -_c._ The auditing of the receipts and disbursements of public -treasuries: Since October 1939, when the Public Treasury Act came into -force, the Ministry has sent delegates to the State Treasury Bureau to -scrutinize and indorse the accounting vouchers, and the provincial -offices have sent delegates to Provincial Treasuries as well. - -_d._ The auditing of special funds: As a rule, the institutes in charge -of special funds have from time to time submitted their reports on their -receipts and disbursements to the Ministry. Since 1939, the Ministry has -also sent delegates to examine strictly these funds. - -_e._ Itinerant auditing: The present economic conditions do not permit -the Ministry to establish auditing offices in all the government-owned -concerns. But itinerant auditing, after the model of circuit courts, -has been introduced since 1939. The Suchow-Kunming and Yünnan-Burma -Railways have been thus examined. The provincial offices have also -applied this system to the business offices. - -_f._ The visiting auditing: The system of visiting auditing has been -developed gradually. Delegates have been stationed in Sufferers' Relief -Committee, City Government of Chungking, Ministry of Finance, Ministry -of Economics, and Ministry of Communications. Other delegates have been -sent out to visit some selected offices who have submitted their -accounting reports. - -_g._ The supervision of the revenue of government offices: Salt Tax and -Commodities Tax have been scrutinized. - -_h._ The supervision of clothing, provisions, and other military -supplies: Since the outbreak of war, the amount of clothing, provisions, -etc. purchased by the military authorities has greatly increased. The -delegates from the Ministry are always present on the occasions of -signing contracts, announcing the bids, deciding the winning bidder, and -delivering the goods. If the supplies are purchased in the provinces, -the provincial offices are in charge of the supervision. - -_i._ The supervision of mass purchase and constructions: The delegates -from the Ministry or its provincial offices are always present on the -occasions of signing contracts, announcing the bids, deciding the -winning bidder, and delivering the goods or completing constructions -when there are any mass purchases or sales of government-owned property -or any construction work. - -_j._ The financial scrutiny of the war-time provisional organizations: -There are huge sums of receipts and disbursements in such organizations -as the "Joint Emergency Air Raid Relief Office of Chungking" and the -general office of the "National Committee for Soldiers' Comfort," so -that their auditing affairs are made the charge of the delegates from -the Ministry. - -_k._ The supervision of the payment, preservation, and usage of -contributions of all sorts: National Salvation Bonds, Aviation -Contribution, and all other contributions donated by the Chinese at home -and abroad have been scrutinized by the Ministry delegates. - -Many considerable results have been achieved since the execution of the -above items from January 1939, to date. The "Auditing Plan for 1941" has -already been prepared by the Ministry. When it is passed by the Supreme -National Defense Council, it will come into force from January of next -year. - - - - -_G._ REGULATIONS CONCERNING THE ORGANIZATION OF THE VARIOUS -CLASSIFICATIONS OF _HSIEN_[1] - - - [Footnote 1: Chung-yang Hsün-lien T'uan [Central (Kuomintang) Training - Corps], _Hsien Ko-chi Tzŭ-chih Kang-yao_ [Regulations Concerning - the Organization of the Various Classifications of _Hsien_], - Chungking, XXVIII (1939); these regulations are also found in - Chung-yang Hsüan-ch'uan Pu [Central Publicity Board], _Hsien-cheng yü - Ti-fang Tzŭ-chih_ [Constitutional Government in Relation to Local - Self-Government], Chungking, XXVIII (1939), p. 37-44.] - - These laws, a fundamental charter for local self-government, - were approved and promulgated by the 14th Regular Meeting of - the Supreme National Defense Council, August 31, 1939. For - the Generalissimo's lecture on the same subject, see - Appendix III (C), p. 388. - - -A. GENERAL PRINCIPLES - -1. Each _hsien_ is a self-administrative unit. Its size and area are -determined by customs and history but subject to the demarcation of the -National Government. - -2. There are three to six classes of _hsien_, classified according to -area, population, and conditions of economy, culture, and -communications. The classifications are to be worked out by the -Provincial Government and subject to the approval of the Ministry of -Interior. - -3. Regulations governing _hsien_ administration are to be promulgated by -the National Government. - -4. Each _hsien_ is divided into _hsiang_, and each _hsiang_ is further -divided into _pao_ and _chia_. If a _hsien_ is too large, it may be -first divided into _ch'ü_ to be under the charge of several bureaus. -Education institutions, police, public health and tariff offices should -be distributed in accordance with above-mentioned divisions. - -5. Each _hsien_ and each _hsiang_ is a legal person. - -6. At the age of twenty, a man or woman of Chinese nationality, after -living in the _hsien_ for six months or more, or having possessed a -residence for more than one year, is qualified as a citizen of that -_hsien_. He or she has the right of suffrage, recall, initiative, and -referendum in this _hsien_. The following persons are disqualified: - -_a._ Those who are deprived of citizenship by the National Government. - -_b._ Those who owe governmental money. - -_c._ Those who have been imprisoned for [political] corruption[2] or -forgery. - -_d._ Those who are not allowed to possess personal property. - -_e._ Those who are opium or other poisonous smokers. - - [Footnote 2: The practice termed _squeeze_ on the coast.] - - -B. THE _Hsien_ GOVERNMENT (_hsien chêng-fu_) - -7. There shall be one magistrate (_hsien-chang_) for each _hsien_. His -duties are: - -_a._ To supervise the local administration of the whole _hsien_ under -the control of the Provincial Government. - -_b._ To carry out Provincial or Central Government orders under the -supervision of the Provincial Government. - -8. The _Hsien_ Government consists of the following departments: - -_a._ Civil Affairs Department. - -_b._ Financial Department. - -_c._ Educational Department. - -_d._ Reconstruction Department. - -_e._ Land Affairs Department. - -_f._ Social Affairs Department. - -The number of departments and the distribution of functions are -determined by the Provincial Government in accordance with the class and -necessities [of the _hsien_], and registered with the Ministry of the -Interior. - -9. In the _Hsien_ Government there are to be secretaries, department -heads, advisors, police officers, clerks and technicians. The number of -such staff and their salaries are to be determined by the Provincial -Government and subject to the approval of the Ministry of the Interior. - -10. The examination, training, appointing, and discharging of a -magistrate or of general staffs are to be done according to the -promulgated National law. - -11. There shall be a _Hsien_ Council (_hsien chêng hui_) which is to be -convened every two weeks. The following matters should be settled in -this Council: - -_a._ Cases brought out by the _Hsien_ People's Council. - -_b._ Other important matters concerning _hsien_ policies. - -(The regulations governing the _Hsien_ Council are promulgated by the -Ministry of the Interior.) - -12. The _Hsien_ Council meeting can be held before the establishment of -the _Hsien_ People's Council. - -13. Regulations concerning a _hsien_ shall be drafted by the Provincial -Government and submitted to the Executive _Yüan_ for its approval -through the Ministry of the Interior. - -Any organizations which are not mentioned in the regulations should not -be established. - -14. Regulations governing the _hsien_ administration shall be drafted by -the Provincial Government and registered in the Ministry of the -Interior. - - -C. THE _Hsien_ PEOPLE'S COUNCIL (_hsien ts'ang-chêng hui_) - -15. The _Hsien_ People's Council is organized by the members of the -Council who are elected from People's Representative Committee. Each -_hsiang_ elects one member. Representatives of public organizations may -be recognized as members, but the number of such members should not -comprise more than one-third of the whole Council. - -16. The chairman of the Council should be elected from its members. - -17. The bylaws and the duties of the Council shall be dealt with -separately. - - -D. FINANCES OF A _Hsien_ - -18. _Hsien_ revenue consists of the following items: - - _a._ Part of the land tax. - _b._ Surtax on the land tax. - _c._ Thirty per cent of the stamp tax. - _d._ Taxes on land after improvement. - _e._ Part of the business taxes. - _f._ Income from public properties. - _g._ Income from public enterprises. - _h._ Other legal taxes. - -19. Funds required for the execution of Provincial Government orders -shall be provided from the National Treasury or the Provincial Treasury. -Local collection of such funds is prohibited. _Hsien_ which are -financially self-sufficient may resort to their own treasuries to meet -educational and administrative expenses. _Hsien_ with scanty population -and most of their area uncultivated may be subsidized by both the -Provincial and National Treasuries. - -20. Extra expenses for reconstruction shall be collected by a means of -floating loans with the approval of the _Hsien_ People's Council and the -Provincial Government. - -21. The incomes and expenses of the _hsien_ proper shall be the -independent responsibility of the _Hsien_ Government. - -22. If the _Hsien_ People's Council has not been established, the -budgets and financial statements shall be examined by the _Hsien_ -Council and then submitted to the Provincial Government by the -Magistrate. - -23. After the establishment of the _Hsien_ People's Council, the budgets -and the financial statements shall be examined by this Council first and -then be submitted to the Provincial Government. In case of emergency the -Magistrate may submit such documents to the Provincial Government -directly. - - -E. _Ch'ü_ - -24. Each _ch'ü_ is constituted by fifteen to thirty _hsiang_. - -25. The _Ch'ü_ Bureau, a subsidiary office of _hsien_, represents the -_Hsien_ Government to perform the educational and administrative work. -If the _hsien_ is not divided into _ch'ü_ then this work is done by the -special officers sent by the _Hsien_ Government. - -26. There shall be one _Ch'ü_ Chief (_ch'ü-chang_) and two to five -advisers in each _ch'ü_. Their duties are to take charge of civil, -reconstruction, educational and military affairs. They shall be trained -and examined before appointment. - -27. There shall be police stations in each _ch'ü_ under the supervision -of the _Ch'ü_ Chief. - -28. A Rural Reconstruction Committee is to be formed in a _ch'ü_. The -members of this committee shall be elected from among the popular -persons in that _ch'ü_. The _Ch'ü_ Chief shall concurrently be Chairman -of the Committee. - - -F. _Hsiang_[3] - - [Footnote 3: In some areas termed the _chên_.] - -29. Each _hsiang_ is constituted by six to fifteen _pao_. [See Art. 45 -_ff._] - -30. Systems of _hsiang_ and _pao chia_ are to be worked out by the -_Hsien_ Government and submitted to the Provincial Government. They must -be registered with the Ministry of the Interior. - -31. There shall be one _Hsiang_ Chief (_hsiang-chang_) and one to two -Assistant Chiefs (_fu-hsiang-chang_) in each _hsiang_ office. They shall -be persons possessing the following qualifications: - -_a._ Those who have passed the ordinary examinations. - -_b._ Those who have served in the Delegated Appointment[4] capacity. - -_c._ Those who have graduated from Middle and Normal schools. - -_d._ Those who have contributed service for the public good. - - [Footnote 4: A level in the National civil service.] - -32. There shall be four sections in each _hsiang_ to take charge of the -civil, economic, educational affairs and police service. Each section -has one chief and several secretaries. One of the secretaries shall take -charge of controlment. The _hsiang_ staff shall be selected from among -the primary school teachers. If the _hsiang's_ financial resources are -insufficient these sections may be amalgamated into one office. - -33. The tenure of _Hsiang_ Chiefs shall be two years, with permissible -re-election. - -34. The offices _Hsiang_ Chief, the headmaster of the primary school, -and officer of militia[5] may be delegated to one person. If the -_hsiang_ possesses sufficient financial resources, the headmaster of the -primary school shall not be allowed to hold other office. - - [Footnote 5: _The chuang-ting-tui tui-chang_, heading a local force of - able-bodied citizens; the regular rank is not specified.] - -35. Plans initiated by the _hsiang_ itself must be passed by the -_Hsiang_ Council meeting before they are adopted. - -36. The _Hsiang_ Chief shall act as the chairman of the Hsiang Council -Meeting. Every section chief is required to attend the Meeting. The -_pao_ chiefs must also attend this Meeting. - -37. The procedure of training of _Hsiang_ Chiefs and other _hsiang_ -staff shall be dealt with separately. - - -G. THE _Hsiang_ PEOPLE'S COUNCIL - -38. The members of the _Hsiang_ People's Council shall be elected from -the _Pao_ People's Council. Each _pao_ shall elect two members. - -39. The _Hsiang_ Chief may act as the chairman of the _Hsiang_ People's -Council provided that he has been elected by the Council as the Chief. - -40. The bylaws and the duties of the _Hsiang_ People's Council shall be -dealt with separately. - - -H. FINANCE OF THE _Hsiang_ - -41. The _hsiang's_ revenue consists of the following items: - -_a._ All legal taxes. - -_b._ Income from public properties. - -_c._ Income from public enterprises. - -_d._ Subsidiary funds. - -_e._ Special incomes to be collected with the approval of the _Hsien_ -Government. - -42. The procedure of purchasing properties shall be dealt with -separately. - -43. The bylaws of the _Hsiang Treasury_ Committee shall be dealt with -separately. - -44. The financial report prepared by the _hsiang_ office shall be -submitted to the _Hsien_ Government. The expenses of the _hsiang_ shall -be included in the _hsien's_ financial report after audit. - - -I. _Pao_ AND _Chia_ - -45. Each _pao_ is constituted of six to fifteen _chia_. - -46. Public primary schools, cooperatives, and warehouses[6] shall be -established within two or three _pao_ where the population is dense. The -_Pao_ Chief shall be in charge of these institutions. Reserves of each -_pao_ shall be trained separately. - - [Footnote 6: In Far Eastern English parlance, _godown_.] - -47. There shall be one _Pao_ Chief (_pao-chang_) and one assistant _Pao_ -Chief (_fu-pao-chang_) in each _pao_. They are elected by the _Pao_ -People's Council. And they must be chosen from among persons with the -following qualifications: - -_a._ Those who have graduated from middle schools. - -_b._ Persons who have worked more than one year in Government. - -_c._ Those who have been specially trained. - -_d._ Those who are active in social work. - -Before the time of election, the _Pao_ Chief may be recommended by the -_hsiang_ office to the _Hsien_ Government for appointment. - -48. The tenure of the _Pao_ Chief shall be two years; he may be -re-elected. - -49. The offices of _Pao_ Chief, headmaster of the _pao_ primary school, -and militia officer may be delegated to one person. When the _pao's_ -financial resources are sufficient the headmaster is not allowed to hold -other office. - -50. There shall be two to four secretaries in each _pao_ to take charge -of the political, educational, cultural affairs, and police service. The -_pao_ staff shall be elected from among the primary school teachers. If -the _pao's_ financial resources are not sufficient, there shall be only -one person to take care of all these activities. - -51. The procedure of training of the _pao_ office staff shall be dealt -with separately. - -52. One representative of each family is required to be present at the -_Pao_ People's Council (_pao-min ta-hui_) meeting. The bylaws and the -duties of this council shall be dealt with separately. - -53. Each _chia_ consists of six to fifteen families. - -54. There shall be one _Chia_ Chief (_chia-chang_) in each _chia_. He is -elected by the Family Chiefs Council and is registered with the _hsiang_ -office through the _pao_. - -55. There shall be established a Family Chiefs Council and _Chia_ -People's Council in each _chia_. - -56. The old names of the streets may be used as the names of _pao_. - -57. The bylaws of _pao_ and _chia_ shall be dealt with separately. - -58. The controlment procedure for _pao_ and _chia_ shall be dealt with -separately. - -59. The present bylaws shall become effective after the date of -promulgation. - -60. If any item in these regulations conflicts with the National laws, -it shall be null. - - - - -_H._ A CHART OF GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION - - - The chart facing this page is a composite of various - official charts to which the author was allowed access in - Chungking. Revisions cover changes down to the opening of - 1941. - - - [KUOMINTANG: - SUPREME NATIONAL DEFENSE COUNCIL] - - NATIONAL GOVERNMENT OF CHINA: STATE COUNCIL - | | - Election Committee on Representation Office of the - in the People's Congress Comptroller-General - Academia Sinica Office of Civil Affairs - Commission for the Disciplinary Office of Military Affairs - Punishment of Public Officials - Planning Committee for the Western Capital - - THE PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT - | - ----------------------------------------- - | - |-|Military---Generalissimo---| Department of Military Operations - | |Affairs Commission | Department of Military Training - | |Commission Meeting | Directorate-General of Courts - | | | Martial - | | | Pensions Commission - | General Staff | Military Advisory Council - | | | Administration of Personnel - | | | Service Department - | Armed Forces | The National Aviation Commission - | | Office of the Naval - | | Commander-in-Chief - | |-| Party and Government War Area - | | | Commission--Occupied and - | | | Guerrilla Areas - | | |-Political Department - | | - | Ministry of War - |-People's Political | - | Council | |-Provincial - | |-| Ministry of | Governments - | | Foreign Affairs | Local - | | Ministry of the | Governments - | | Interior--------| - |-Executive---_Yüan_ Meeting--| Ministry of Finance |-Special - | _Yüan_ [Cabinet] | Ministry of Economic Municipalities - | | Affairs [to be - | | reorganized] - | | Ministry of Social Affairs [pending] - | | Ministry of Education - | | Ministry of Communications - | | Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry - | | Commission on Mongolian and - | | Tibetan Affairs----------Mongolia - | | and Tibet - | | Commission on Overseas - | | Chinese Affairs - | | National Relief Commission - | | Material and Resources Control and - | Supervisory Ministry [in process - | of organization] - |-Legislative---_Yüan_ Meeting - | _Yüan_ - | - |-Judicial---_Yüan_ Meeting---| Ministry of Justice - | _Yüan_ | Supreme Court - | | Administrative Court - | | Commission for the Disciplinary - | Punishment of Public Officers - | - |-Examination--_Yüan_ Meeting--| Examination Commission - | _Yüan_ | Ministry of Personnel - | - |-Control----_Yüan_ Meeting---| Ministry of Audit - _Yüan_ | Office of Regional Control - Commissioners - - - - -APPENDIX II. DOCUMENTS ON PARTY POLITICS - - - - -_A._ A CHART OF KUOMINTANG ORGANIZATION - - - The chart facing this page is a composite of various - official charts to which the author was allowed access in - July and August 1940. - - KUOMINTANG PARTY CONGRESS - | PARTY CHIEF | - |----------| | |----------------------| - | | | - Central Control Central Executive----[Central-----Supreme National - Committee Committee Political Defense Council - Standing Committee Standing Committee Council] | - | | - --------------------------------------------------- Government - | | | | - Training Party Affairs _San Min Chu I_ | - Committee Committee Youth Corps | - | | - General Affairs Section | - Advisory Section | - Planning Section | - Training Section | - | - --------------------------------------------------------- - | | | | | | | | | - OTHER | PARTY-MINISTRY OF | Provincial | | | CENTRAL - AFFILIATES | OVERSEAS CHINESE | Party Organ | | | SECRETARIAT - | AFFAIRS | | | | | | - | | | | | | | Statistics Bureau - SPECIAL First Section | _Hsien_ (or | | | Confidential - COMMITTEES Second Section | Municipal) | | | Affairs Section - | Third Section | Party Organ | | | Finance Section - | | | | | | Business Section - Revolutionary Achievements | | | | | - Investigation Committee | District | | | - Pension Committee | (_ch'ü_) | | PARTY-MINISTRY OF - Party History Committee | Party Organ | | ORGANIZATION - Revolutionary Loans Committee | | | | | - Overseas Chinese Contributions | | | | Regular Party - Committee | Sub-district| | Affairs Section - |------------------| (_ch'ü-fên_)| | Special-Area Party - | Party Organ | | Affairs Section - PARTY-MINISTRY | | | Army Party Affairs - OF SOCIAL | | | Section - AFFAIRS Small Group | | Party-Members Regi- - | | | | stration Section - Section for People's Organizations | | | General Affairs - Social Movements Section PARTY | | Section - Editing Section MEMBERSHIP | | Inspection Office - General Affairs Section | | - | | - |------------------------| |-------| - | | - PARTY-MINISTRY OF WOMEN'S AFFAIRS PARTY-MINISTRY - [in process of organization] OF PUBLICITY - | - |------------------------------| - | | - Publicity Advisers Publicity Advisory - The Central News Agency Section - Party Press International Publicity - The Central Motion Picture Studios Section - The Central Broadcasting Newspaper Section - Administration Section Motion Picture Section - General Affairs Section - - - -_B._ CONSTITUTION OF THE SAN MIN CHU I YOUTH CORPS, YEAR XXVII (1938)[1] - - - [Footnote 1: San-min-chu-i Ch'ing-nien T'uan Chung-yang T'uan-pu [_San - Min Chu I_ Youth Corps Central Corps Headquarters], _San-min-chu-i - Ch'ing-nien T'uan T'uan-chang_ [Corps Constitution of the _San Min Chu - I_ Youth Corps], Chungking, n.d.] - - Proclaimed June 16, 1938, amended by the Fourth Meeting of - the Corps' Provisional Central Managing Board, July 17, - 1939, this is the fundamental charter of the most - significant Kuomintang auxiliary to appear in many years. - - -CHAPTER I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES - -1. The name of the organization is the San Min Chu I Youth Corps. - -2. The object of the Corps is to unite and train young people, to -enforce the San Min Chu I, to defend the nation, and to bring national -rebirth. - - -CHAPTER II. MEMBERSHIP - -3. All Chinese youths, male or female, aged between 16 to 25, vowing to -abide by the Corps constitution, can become members of the Corps upon -the payment of the membership fee. - -Members of the Managing Boards of various subordinate Corps agencies and -other Headquarters officials specially admitted are not restricted by -the above rule. Members who pass 25 years of age can still retain their -membership in the Corps. - -4. Two members of the Corps must propose and second a member before the -latter can become eligible. The new member must also be approved by the -Sectional Corps and Troop and his name registered in the Central Corps -Headquarters. - -5. New members must take an oath before admittance, as follows: - -"I hereby swear that I promise to abide by the principles of San Min Chu -I, to obey the order of the Corps Leader, to abide by the constitution -of the corps, to act according to the principles of the New Life -Movement, to be ever loyal to the Principles, to work for all other -people, to stand firm against all hardships, and to be prepared to -sacrifice my all. I promise that if I fail to perform the above duties, -I will be willing to receive the severest punishments." - -6. The private life of the members should be in conformity with the -regulations fixed by the Corps. - -7. Members of the Corps who die in service or who lose their profession -because of service in the Corps will receive pensions or other relief. -The detailed procedure will be fixed later. - -8. Members, upon a change of profession or job, or upon removal to other -localities, must register with their identification cards at the local -Corps Headquarters. - - -CHAPTER III. SYSTEM OF ORGANIZATION - -9. The system of organization of the Corps is as follows: the Central -Corps Headquarters, the Branch Corps, the Divisional Corps, the -Sectional Corps, the Divisional Troop, the Sectional Troop. - -10. Besides the above, the Corps may organize other sub-organizations -according to the nature of the locality, the profession of the members, -etc. The details will be further fixed. - - -CHAPTER IV. THE CORPS LEADER - -11. The Corps Leader is the highest executive of the Corps, and is -concurrently the Party Chief of the Kuomintang [Chiang K'ai-shek]. - -12. The Corps Leader is the chairman in the All-Corps Representative -Assembly, and has the power to veto a resolution already passed by the -Assembly; he also has the power to finally sanction all resolutions -passed by the Central Managing Board and the Central Controlment Board. - - - -CHAPTER V. THE ALL-CORPS REPRESENTATIVE ASSEMBLY AND OTHER MEETINGS OF -REPRESENTATIVES - -13. The All-Corps Representative Assembly may be held every two years. -At the discretion of the Corps Leader or the Central Managing Board, -however, it may be postponed or a temporary meeting be held instead. - -14. The works of the All-Corps Representative Assembly are: - -_a._ to discuss and examine the report submitted by the Central Managing -Board and the Central Controlment Board. - -_b._ to fix plans for the Corps activities. - -_c._ to discuss motions proposed by the Corps Leader. - -15. The Meeting of Representatives of the Branch Corps may be held once -a year. At the discretion of the Central Managing Board, however, the -Meeting may be postponed or a temporary Meeting be held instead. - -16. The duties of the Meeting of Representatives of the Branch Corps -are: - -_a._ to examine and discuss the reports submitted by the Managing Board -and the Controlment Board of the Branch Corps. - -_b._ to fix plans for the Branch Corps activities. - -17. The Meeting of Members of the Sectional Corps is held every six -months. At the discretion of the Managing Board of the Branch Corps, it -may be postponed or a temporary meeting be held instead. If the number -of members of the Section is too big or if the communication system is -unfavorable, a Meeting of the Representatives of the Sectional Corps may -be held. - -18. The duties of the Meeting of the Members of the Sectional Corps are: - -_a._ to examine and discuss the reports submitted by the Managing Board -and the Controlment Board of the Sectional Corps. - -_b._ to fix plans for the Sectional Corps Activities. - -19. The Meeting of Members of the Divisional Troop is to take place -every three months. At the discretion of its Managing Board, it may be -postponed, or a temporary meeting be called. - -20. The duties of the Meeting of Members of the Divisional Troop are: - -_a._ to examine the reports submitted by the Leader of the Divisional -Troop. - -_b._ to fix the plans for the Divisional Troop activities. - -21. Meetings for the Members of the Sectional Troop will be held every -week, to be presided over by the Leaders of the Sectional Troop. Unless -specially permitted, these meetings must not be postponed. During these -meetings, reports concerning politics, the Troop activities, -discussions, etc., will be read. New members are admitted through these -meetings too, and plans for the Sectional Troop activities will be -fixed. - -22. The system of organization for the various Meetings of Members or -Meetings of Representatives will be fixed later. - - -CHAPTER VI. THE CENTRAL HEADQUARTERS - -23. The Central Managing Board of the Central Corps Headquarters is -formed by twenty-five to thirty-five managing directors, in addition to -the nine to fifteen reserve members of the Managing Board. - -24. The Central Managing Board has the following powers: - -_a._ to execute the orders of the Corps Leader [Chiang K'ai-shek] and to -execute the resolutions passed in the All-Corps Representative Assembly. - -_b._ to fix the plans for activities. - -_c._ to form various corps of lower rank, and to command or inspect -their activities. - -_d._ to execute all resolutions submitted by the Central Controlment -Board. - -_e._ to form a budget to regulate various financial questions of the -Corps. - -25. The Central Managing Board forms a Standing Managing Board -consisting of nine Standing Managing Directors, appointed by the Corps -Leader from among the twenty-five to thirty-five Managing Directors. -This Standing Managing Board fulfills the duties of the Central Managing -Board Meeting when the latter is not in session. - -26. The Corps Leader appoints a Secretary-General to the Central -Managing Board from among the Standing Managing Directors, to direct all -the affairs of the Board. - -27. The various sub-organs of the Central Managing Board will be -formulated later, together with their system of organization. - -28. There are a Manager and a Vice-Manager in the Office of the -Secretary-General. They are nominated by the Secretary and appointed by -the Corps Leader. - -29. In every Department of the Central Managing Board there is a -Commissioner and one or two Deputy Commissioners. They are appointed by -the Corps Leader upon the nomination of the Secretary-General. - -30. The Central Corps Headquarters has a Central Controlment Board of -twenty-five to thirty-five members and nine to fifteen reserve members. - -31. The duties of the Central Controlment Board are: - -_a._ to inspect the progress of the Corps activities. - -_b._ to raise and examine all statements concerning any member who does -not fulfill his duties. - -_c._ to audit all incomes and expenditures of the Corps. - -_d._ to direct Controlment Boards of lower rank in their work of -inspection. - -32. The Central Controlment Board forms a Standing Controlment Board -consisting of five members of the Controlment Board, appointed by the -Corps Leader. This Standing Controlment Board shall function when the -Controlment Board is not in session. - -33. The Central Controlment Board has also a Secretary-General, -appointed by the Corps Leader from among the Standing Controlment Board -members. He shall direct the affairs of the Central Controlment Board. - -34. The Central Controlment Board has various sub-organs, of which the -system of organization will be fixed later. - -35. Both the Central Managing Board and the Central Controlment Board -will hold meetings every three months, to be presided over by the Corps -Leader. Under special circumstances there may be temporary meetings or -combined meetings for the two Boards. - - -CHAPTER VII. THE BRANCH CORPS - -36. The Branch Corps has a Managing Board consisting of seven to eleven -members, besides the three to five reserve members. - -37. The duties of the Branch Corps Managing Board are: - -_a._ to execute the orders from the Central Corps Headquarters and the -resolutions passed in the Meeting of the Representatives of the Branch -Corps. - -_b._ to fix the plans for the activities of the Branch Corps. - -_c._ to command and inspect the works of the lower organs. - -_d._ to execute all resolutions submitted by the Branch Corps -Controlment Board. - -_e._ to form a budget regulating the financial state of the Branch -Corps. - -38. The Managing Board has a Secretary, appointed by the Corps Leader, -from among the members of the Managing Board. He is to direct all -affairs of the Managing Board. - -39. The Managing Board has various sub-organs, the system of -organization of which will be fixed later. - -40. The Branch Corps has a Controlment Board consisting of three to five -members with three reserve members. - -41. The Controlment Board has a Secretary, appointed by the Corps Leader -from among the Controlment Board members, to discharge all affairs of -the Board. - -42. The system of organization of the various sub-organs of the -Controlment Board will be fixed later. - -43. The duties of the Controlment Board are: - -_a._ to inspect the progress of the activities done by the lower organs. - -_b._ to raise and examine statements concerning any member who rebels -against the discipline of the Corps. - -_c._ to audit the budget and all financial statements of the Branch -Corps. - -_d._ to direct the Controlment Boards of lower rank in their work of -inspection. - -44. The Managing Board of the Branch Corps should hold meetings every -half-month. The Controlment Board should meet once every month. The -meetings are to be presided over by the Secretaries. Under special -circumstances, temporary sessions or combined meetings may be held. - -45. The Branch Corps has also one to five Directors, appointed by the -Corps Leader, to direct the affairs of the Branch Corps. - - -CHAPTER VIII. THE DIVISIONAL CORPS - -46. The Divisional Corps has three to five Managing Directors, who have -power to command, direct, inspect, and examine the work done by the -Divisional Corps, in accordance to the will of the higher Corps -Headquarters. - -47. There is a Secretary of the Divisional Corps, appointed by the Corps -Leader from among the Managing Directors, whose duty it is to discharge -all the affairs of the Divisional Corps. - -48. The Managing Directors should perform their duties in various -localities at various periods. - -49. Whenever necessary, the Secretary of the Divisional Corps can call a -Managing Directors' meeting. - -50. A Divisional Corps will be formed when there are more than five -Sectional Corps under it. But this may not take place if the Managing -Board of the Branch Corps sees no necessity for such action. - - -CHAPTER IX. THE SECTIONAL CORPS - -51. The Sectional Corps has a Managing Board formed by three to five -members and one to three reserve members, elected in the General Meeting -of the Members of the Sectional Corps or in the Meeting of the -Representatives of the Sectional Corps. - -52. The duties of the Managing Board are: - -_a._ to execute the orders of the higher Corps Headquarters and the -resolutions passed in the Meeting of the Members of the Sectional Corps -or the Meeting of the Representatives of the Sectional Corps. - -_b._ to fix the plans for activities. - -_c._ to direct and watch the activities of the lower organs. - -_d._ to form a budget and other financial statements. - -_e._ to execute the resolutions passed in the Meeting of the Controlment -Board. - -_f._ to examine the work done by the Divisional Troops and Sectional -Troops. - -53. The Managing Board has a Secretary, appointed by the Corps Leader -from among the members of the Managing Board, to discharge all the -affairs of the Managing Board. - -54. The system of organization of the various sub-organs of the Managing -Board will be formulated later. - -55. The Sectional Corps has a Controlment Board formed by three members -and one reserve member. Under special circumstances, there is sometimes -only one Controller without any Controlment Board. - -56. The Controlment Board has one Secretary, appointed by the Corps -Leader from among the members of the Controlment Board, who is to -discharge all affairs of the Board. - -57. The duties of the Controlment Board are: - -_a._ to inspect the works done by the Sectional Corps, and by the -Divisional and Sectional Troops under the Sectional Corps. - -_b._ to raise and examine statements concerning members who rebel -against the Corps discipline. - -_c._ to audit financial statements of the Sectional Corps and those of -the Divisional and Sectional Troops under it. - -58. The Managing Board and the Controlment Board of the Sectional Corps -will hold separate meetings once every half-month. The respective -Secretaries shall preside. Under special conditions they can call for -temporary sessions. - - -CHAPTER X. THE DIVISIONAL TROOP - -59. The Divisional Troop has a Leader and an Assistant Leader, elected -from among the Leaders and Assistant Leaders of the Sectional Troop and -by themselves. - -60. The Divisional Troop executes the orders of the superior organs and -the resolutions passed in the All-Corps Representative Assembly. The -Divisional Troop also directs and examines the work of the members. - - -CHAPTER XI. THE SECTIONAL TROOP - -61. The Sectional Troop is the basic organization of the San Min Chu I -Youth Corps. It is formed by eight to fifteen members, with a Leader and -an Assistant Leader elected by the members themselves. - -62. The chief duties of the Sectional Troop are: - -_a._ to execute the orders of all superior organs and all resolutions -passed in the Sectional Troop Meeting. - -_b._ to call for new members and to collect the fees. - -_c._ to train and examine every member. - -_d._ to read books, to propagate San Min Chu I and its policies, to -distribute publicity literature. - -_e._ to participate in all social activities. - -_f._ to investigate political and social conditions. - -63. All extra-Corps organs holding more than three members may form -special Groups, upon the sanction of the Sectional Troop. Their duty is -to execute the principles of the Corps and to watch the work of the -members. Whenever necessary, the chief of the Group may attend the -Sectional Corps Meetings. - - -CHAPTER XII. THE ELECTION OF OFFICERS AND THEIR TERM OF SERVICE - -64. Unless already specified, the members of the Managing Boards of the -various Corps and Troops are elected in the General Meeting or the -Meeting of Representatives of the respective Corps and Troops. Before -the General Meeting or the Meeting of Representatives, the members of -the Managing Boards are appointed by the Corps Leader. - -65. The duration of service of members of the Managing and Controlment -Boards of the Central Corps Headquarters is two years. That of members -of the corresponding Boards of the other Corps is one year. That of the -Leaders and Assistant Leaders of the two Corps is six months. All of -them can be re-elected. - - -CHAPTER XIII. DISCIPLINE - -66. All members should obey the following commandments: - -_a._ All questions may be freely discussed. But no dispute is allowed, -once the final resolution is passed. - -_b._ It is not allowed to rebel against the principles of the New Life -Movement. - -_c._ It is prohibited to reveal the secrets of the Corps. - -_d._ It is prohibited for members to join other organizations. - -_e._ It is prohibited to criticize unfavorably the Kuomintang and the -Corps, or to plot against other members. - -_f._ It is prohibited to express one's ideas too freely upon current -events, especially those that are against the resolved plans or policies -of the Kuomintang or the Corps. - -_g._. It is prohibited to form other organizations within the Corps. - -67. Those who are proved to act against the above rules will e punished -in the following ways: - - _a._ warning - _b._ demerit - _c._ cross-questioning - _d._ expulsion - _e._ other appropriate punishments. - - -CHAPTER XIV. FEES - -68. Every member must pay a membership fee of ten cents on entering the -Corps. - -69. A monthly contribution of ten cents is required of every member. -Under special circumstances other contributions may be called for. - - -CHAPTER XV. AMENDMENTS, ETC. - -70. This Constitution may be amended, with the approval of the Corps -Leader, in the All-Corps Representative Assembly or in the Meeting of -the Central Managing Board. - -71. The Constitution is enforced upon the day of announcement, having -been approved by the Corps Leader. - - - - -_C_. THE DUTIES AND GENERAL ACTIVITIES OF THE SAN MIN CHU I YOUTH CORPS -(CH'ÊN CH'ÊNG)[1] - - - [Footnote 1: Ch'ên Ch'êng, _K'ang-chan Chien-kuo Yü Ch'ing-nien - Tsê-jen_ [Resistance and Reconstruction in Relation to the Duties of - Youth], Chungking XXIX (1940), p. 43-68. The book was published by the - Political Department of the Military Affairs Commission (_Chün-shih - Wei-yüan-hui Chêng-chih-pu_) of the National Government.] - - A lecture delivered May 9, 1940, before a Kuomintang - training class: note the somewhat pedagogical outline. - General Ch'ên Ch'êng, until recently Secretary-General of - the Corps, is one of the closest military associates of the - Generalissimo. - - -OUTLINE - - -A. THE DUTIES AND NATURE OF THE CORPS: - -1. _Duties_: to organize and train the nation's youth with a view to -enforcing the San Min Chu I; to lead and unify the ideals, opinions and -activities of the nation's youth; to centralize and cultivate special -talents, forming a nucleus to serve as a model. - -2. _Activities_: to urge youths to join the practical work connected -with the war of national defense; to enforce military and political -training; to encourage civil progress, labor and skill in production. - -3. _Nature_: the Corps is an organization composed of young people and -included within the Kuomintang. The Kuomintang and the Corps are one and -indivisible. - - -B. THE GROWTH AND THE PLAN CONCERNING THE INTENSIFICATION OF THE WORK OF -THE CORPS: - -1. _Growth_: Period of formation, July 9, 1938 to September 1939; full -establishment since September 1939, when the Central Managing Board and -the Central Controlment Board were formed. - -2. _Plan concerning the intensification of activities_: Amendment of the -Corps Constitution; issuing of general procedures for the carrying out -of the activities to various sections; general principles governing the -future activities of the Corps. - - -C. GENERAL ACTIVITIES OF THE CORPS: - -1. _Organization_: general development of the organization in various -localities; calling for new members; regulating the inner structures of -the organization; the formation of a selected central nucleus. - -2. _Training_: entrance training and normal training; young men's summer -camp; training of talented gliders. - -3. _Publicity_: periodicals at fixed intervals; the compilation of -various collective works; the formation of a committee for publicity. - -4. _Social works_: the establishment of a Young Men's Labor Service -Camp; the distribution of Young Men's Entertaining Offices in various -localities; the work of Youths' Service Associations and Corps in -various localities. - -5. _Financial assistance_: compilation of Dr. Sun's works on economics; -aid given to young men's work for material productivity; planning of -business organizations under group management. - - -D. GENERAL DISCUSSION OF THE TWO YEARS' ACTIVITIES OF THE CORPS AND THE -PRINCIPLES GUIDING THE NATION'S YOUTH: - -1. _General discussion of the two years' activities_: its good as well -as its bad points. - -2. _Principles guiding the nation's youth_: conclusion. - - -A. THE DUTIES AND NATURE OF THE CORPS - - -1. The Duties - -It is two years since the establishment of the San Min Chu I Youth Corps -was declared at Hankow on July 7, 1938. From the name, we know that the -purpose of its creation is to employ the unified efforts of the -nation's youth in the work of carrying out the San Min Chu I. As youth -is the vital element in a nation's life and the foundation for all -future social and political progress, the Kuomintang has, in the second -and present stage of national salvation, especially organized a Youth -Corps to reinforce the powers of the Kuomintang by shouldering the -following epochal duties: - -First, to unite and train the nation's youth for the promulgation of San -Min Chu I, the defense of the nation and the salvation of its people. - -Secondly, to lead the nation's youth to a unity of thought and -activities so that they can justly perform the great task of national -salvation, thus completing the second phase of the achievements of the -People's Revolution.[2] - - [Footnote 2: _Kuo-min kê-ming_, i.e., the revolution (_kê-ming_) as - planned by Sun Yat-sen.] - -Thirdly, to collect youth of especial talents for the central nucleus as -a model for all, thereby giving new and ever-confirming life to the -Kuomintang, and enabling it to carry out its future work. - - -2. The Activities - -The Corps Leader [Chiang K'ai-shek] has clearly stated in his open -letter to the nation's youth that the chief activities of the Corps are -six in number: - -1. To mobilize the activities of youth according to the National General -Mobilization Act. - -2. To give thorough military training to develop the skill in defending -the nation. - -3. To heighten political training, giving every youth the required -political knowledge for a citizen of a republic. - -4. To encourage civil progress, thus raising the general intellectual -standard of the nation. - -5. To encourage labor and service, according to the motto: Life is to -serve. - -6. To develop the skill in material productivity according to scientific -principles, thus hastening the work of national construction. - -The first two of the above are collectively the fundamental works of -military reconstruction, the third and fourth are those of education, -and the last two those of economic reconstruction. The Corps has -classified the various aspects of the above works of national -construction as the works of the youth. Besides, we should clearly -understand that they are the fundamental requisites of a complete system -of national defense, and form the first stage towards the completion of -a republic based upon the San Min Chu I. - - -3. The Nature - -The Corps is a Youth association included within the organization of the -Kuomintang, under one principle, one leader, one command, and is willing -to struggle for the sake of the People's Revolution. The Kuomintang and -the Corps are one and indivisible. It is "The Kuomintang's [own] Corps." -If a distinction is necessary, then we may say that the members of the -Corps have a special duty to organize and train the nation's youth so -that it may be able to shoulder the responsibilities and work concerning -social welfare and national salvation. Thus the Corps may be said to be -the younger and newer life of the Kuomintang. Besides, it may also serve -the Kuomintang in various aspects; for example, if, as in case of -overseas localities, Kuomintang work is difficult to execute, the Corps -may be established instead, or also, if people are not willing to join -the Kuomintang, they may join the Corps. With the formation of the -Corps, therefore, the Kuomintang may be enlarged and strengthened. - -The relation between the Kuomintang members and the Corps members is -clearly stated. According to the amended Constitution of the Corps, the -age of members has been changed from eighteen to thirty-eight years, to -sixteen to twenty-five years. Also according to the resolution of the -Central Regular Meeting of the Kuomintang, the relation between the two -is as follows: - -1. Members joining the Kuomintang should be above twenty-five years of -age. - -2. Corps members reaching the age of 25 will become Kuomintang members. - -3. Students staying in schools, irrespective of their age, are -considered Corps members. Those who previously joined the Kuomintang -should also become members of the Corps, reserving their membership in -the Kuomintang. - -We can see that Kuomintang members and Corps members differ chiefly in -their ages. Except for this, the two are in fact one. - -With a view to the system of organization, the Kuomintang and the Corps -each has its own structure. The Kuomintang leads the Corps, but this -does not mean that the Corps is under the Kuomintang in authority. In -the speech, "The Relation between the Kuomintang and the Corps," made by -the Corps Leader [Chiang K'ai-shek], we are told that under the same -general system of organization, the aim of the Kuomintang's leadership -of the Corps is to unite all our efforts under the same banner. Leading -does not mean in the least commanding or ordering. To lead is to help. -Hence a Corps member may also lead a Kuomintang member. The idea is to -make both members combine their energy towards helping our leader. The -strength of the Corps depends upon the well-being of the Kuomintang, -while the future of the Kuomintang depends upon the growth of the Corps. -There should be mutual help between the two in order to reach the same -final goal. Hence the activities of the two organizations should be -everywhere combined into one, employing division of labor and -cooperation wherever and whenever possible. - - -B. THE GROWTH AND THE PLAN CONCERNING THE INTENSIFICATION OF THE WORKS -OF THE CORPS - - -1. The Growth - -In April 1938, the Representatives of the Kuomintang gathered together -for a Meeting (Congress) to amend the Constitution of the Kuomintang and -to form the San Min Chu I Youth Corps in order to gather the nation's -youth for the great task of national reconstruction. It was also -resolved that the Party Chief (Generalissimo Chiang K'ai-shek) is at the -same time the Corps Leader. On June 16, the Corps Leader issued his -Letter to the Nation's Youth, and announced the constitution of the -Corps. On July 9, a Central Managing Board was temporarily formed as the -Corps' central organization. The growth of the Corps activities can be -divided into two periods: - -1. _Period of formation_: July 1938 to September 1939. During this -period, the Central Managing Board was formed. While the other work of -organizing was done according to a principle of simplicity, as advised -by the Corps Leader, all other internal organs were formed according to -their necessity. The various subsections in different provinces and -districts were also formed during this period. - -2. _Period of full establishment_: September 1939 to the present. In -accordance with general opinions, the Central Managing Board temporarily -formed was dissolved after its fourth general meeting, and on September -1, 1939 a permanent Central Managing Board and a Central Controlment -Board were formed. The Corps Leader has on various occasions appointed -thirty-five members for the Central Managing Board with fifteen more as -reserve members, and thirty-five members for the Central Controlment -Board with fifteen reserve members also. Besides, there are five -standing members of the Central Managing Board and five standing members -of the Central Controlment Board. The rest of the officials are also -appointed. The system of organization is as follows: - - Office of the Sec.-Gen. - | - |Sessions of | | |-| |Department of General - The Corps |the Central | |Secretary-| | Administration - Chief |Managing Board |-|General |---|Organization - | | | | | | Department - |-----|Sessions of the | |Training - |Standing Committee| | Department - |of the Central | |Publicity - |Managing Board | | Department - |Department of - | Social Work - |Finance - | Department - |Young Women's - | Department - - -2. Plan concerning the Intensification of Activities - -The aim of having a permanent Central Managing Board is to conclude the -work of the formative period and start the work of calling for the -nation's youth in the task of national reconstruction. The plans -concerning the intensification of activities are all based upon the -orders of the Corps Leader, the past experiences of the Corps members, -and the present situation; the chief plans are: - -1. _Amendment of the Constitution_--to increase the training of the -Corps members and to fix the system of organization for the All-Corps -Representative Assembly in accordance with the idea of democracy. The -chief points are (_a_) the change in age limit from eighteen to -thirty-eight years to sixteen to twenty-five years, and (_b_) to fix the -system of organization for the General Meetings of the Corps members and -their Representatives; the fixing of rules concerning the election into -office of the members and their period of service. - -2. _Issuing of general procedures for the carrying out of the activities -of various sections_: (_a_) to make all members and all youth understand -that the Corps is a youth organization to train and unite all youth in -the principles of San Min Chu I, with the aim of strengthening the -nation's defense; (_b_) to lead the nation's youth in the cultivation of -good national characteristics, to exemplify their deeds and actions, and -to correct all fallacious beliefs, and childish actions. These are the -ways of training good useful youth for the national service; (_c_) the -subsections of the Corps should work for all the members of the Corps, -while the members should work for all the youth of the country. They -should encourage all youth to serve all the citizens of the nation, -thereby fulfilling the duties of youth toward the country; (_d_) in -calling for members, special attention is paid to discover youth of -higher abilities. At the same time it is necessary that the Corps work -should be good enough so as to be able to influence all the youth of the -nation so that they will join the Corps of their own accord; (_e_) the -subsections in schools should work in conjunction with the educational -authorities. The assistance of the teachers is necessary in order to -develop the political ideas, the mind work, the physical constitution of -the youth, besides the cultivation of the power to organize and -cooperate; (_f_) to organize society's youth, especially those having a -profession or those who are capable of material productivity, so that -they may be joined to the youth in schools in forming a combined -strength necessary to the establishment of a revolutionary nation; (_g_) -to point out to the youth the activities done in the war of national -defense, the international relations, and the intrigues of the traitors -and enemies, thus making every youth able to distinguish the right from -the wrong. At the same time, they should be encouraged under favorable -conditions to work for national defense; (_h_) to help every youth solve -the problem of his livelihood. For example, the choice of a profession, -the question of education, etc. The members should therefore look upon -their Corps as their family, not as a mere institution for work. - -3. _General principles governing the future activities of the Corps_: -(_a_) in obedience to the ideas expressed by the Corps Leader, and based -upon the experience obtained during the period of two years, it has been -resolved that the chief aim of the activities of the Corps is to -solidify the union of the members, so that it may become the central -motivating force for all the youth of the nation; (_b_) the activities -of the Corps will also be directed to benefit youths, especially those -in school, to help them solve all questions and troubles that usually -confront young men. Besides, the Corps also aims at mobilizing the youth -in war districts, and behind the enemy front, to increase the force of -national defense; (_c_) the principles regarding the admittance of new -members will be: 1, that quality as well as quantity will be considered; -2, that youths in schools will be especially fitted for membership, -although youths having professions will not be neglected; 3, that women -members will be especially welcome; (_d_) in establishing the various -subdivisions of the Corps in various localities, importance will be -especially given to provinces of Szechwan, Kweichow, Shensi, and Kansu. -Except these, attention is also given to overseas districts (the Malay -Archipelago) and behind the enemy lines. All subdivisions formerly -established will be unified under one status, and be turned into regular -subdivisions; (_e_) a date for the All-Corps Representative Assembly -will be fixed, as well as the dates for the General Meetings of Members; -(_f_) the training of the members will be chiefly military and -political, emphasizing the skill to produce, with plenty of practice in -various actual fields, so that the works of the Corps and those of -society will be interrelated; (_g_) the training of the members is -divided into primary, middle, and senior parts, with special attention -upon the lower two. Different training courses are given according to -the abilities, talents, and inclinations of the members; (_h_) the -training of the central nucleus is based upon the general training for -groups, laying special emphasis upon mental and physical training so -that the central nucleus may be the model for other members. - -(_i_) The central aim of publicity is to lead the nation's youth to -recognize the history and national character of the Chinese nation, to -fight for national unity and salvation, to find the way of becoming a -"Chinese," and to abolish all fallacious beliefs that are detrimental to -the growth of the nation; (_j_) to intensify the movement to all classes -of people, attention is drawn to the fact that: 1, every member is a -publicity member; 2, actions and not words should be the basis of -publicity; 3, care should be given to the difference in locality, time, -or people, when the members are helping to do social work; 4, members' -actions and thoughts should be earnest, devoted, intelligent, -ingenuous, and truthful; (_k_) to increase the cooperation between -youths, the amount of publicity literature should be increased. -Encouragement should also be given to the study of science and to -development of the physical constitution; (_l_) social service is -especially aimed at relieving the poor and the sick, paying attention to -the wounded soldiers, their families, refugees, and other helpless -people; (_m_) the calling in and training of students who have no chance -to study should be emphasized. Help should be given them to find work or -continue studies. Attention should also be given to those behind the -enemy's lines so that they may not turn out to be traitors. - -(_n_) The work of the Young Men's Labor Service Camp, the Young Men's -Service Association and Corps should be intensified, aiming at the -increase of necessary public services during wartime, and the hastening -of social advancement; (_o_) concerning the financial help given to the -members, attention is given to group works like cooperative stores, etc. -Encouragement is given for thrift, saving, etc.; (_p_) members should be -encouraged to produce more, to heighten the skill in production; (_q_) -members should spread the new economic thought expressed in the San Min -Chu I. They should also study the various books on economics; (_r_) -encouragement is given to young women, especially those in war districts -and students who want to join the Corps. Training will be given to them. -Their work is chiefly to spread the spirit of the Corps among women, to -render war-time assistance and educational help; (_s_) rigid inspection -of the Corps personnel is to be enforced: 1, not only may a lower -officer be reprimanded by a senior officer, but vice versa; 2, in every -subdivision of the Corps an organization to inspect the personnel is -formed; 3, attention is given to the reserve list of the Corps -personnel; 4, rigid censure of careless and corrupt officials, and also -of those who recommended them. - -(_t_) A system of inspecting the various activities of the Corps is to -be formed; 1, the inspectors are given the authority to watch and to -lead; 2, the various subdivisions should elect officials who shall -constantly make inspection tours; 3, close cooperation with the Central -Controlment Board should be established; (_u_) a competition of -activities among various subdivisions should be encouraged, whether it -be interdivisional, personal, etc. Competitions are based upon research -statistics, exchange of views, grading of work, etc. - - -C. THE GENERAL ACTIVITIES OF THE CORPS - - -1. Organization - -With the formation of the Central Managing Board of the Corps, -organizing work has been pushed ahead to hasten the mutual movements of -the nation's youth, especially those in the provinces of Szechwan, -Shensi, Kansu, and Kweichow. The chief points concerning the organizing -movement are as follows: - -1. _General development of the organization in various localities._ The -subdivisions originally planned have all been formed. In Szechwan, -subdivisions are formed in every city (_hsien_). In the rest of the -provinces, subdivisions are formed in different districts. Subdivisions -have also been formed in the chief universities and middle schools in -the country. Owing to special circumstances, overseas and war districts -are under the investigation of special officials sent there to inspect -the local surroundings before the subdivisions be formed. - -2. _Membership enrollment_: Members are chiefly youthful students and -youths with some ability. According to the report made in April 1940, -there are 126,111 members in the Corps. Members will be called according -to the basic plan in the future, and especially women members and other -young men will be encouraged to join. - -3. _Regulation of the inner structures of the organization and the -formation of a central nucleus_: to insure perfect harmony in carrying -out various activities, those temporary subdivisions which have been -doing good work and which have an efficient central nucleus are to be -made into regular subdivisions. The selection of the central executive -nucleus will be based upon the talent of the members. The method of -selection is by means of questioning, recommendation, or other ways. - - -2. The Training - -Training of the Corps members is to organize an efficient executive -organization for the sake of practical national reconstruction according -to the principles of San Min Chu I. Besides military and political -training, attention is given to the development of skill in production. -At present, the chief training work of the Corps is as follows: (_a_) -Entrance training and normal training: there are usually three stages of -training, viz.: entrance training, normal training, and special -training for nucleus members. Except the last mentioned, all members of -the Corps must undergo the first two trainings. The period of entrance -training is two weeks, during which the training of the mind is -emphasized. Normal training is divided into reading, discussion, and -recommended readings. Weekly gatherings are held for all members of a -division to attend. The recommended readings are based upon the Corps -Leader's "Recommended Readings and Methods of Discussion." Every member -must read a number of required books, according to the systematic plan -given. (_b_) Young Men's Summer Camp--this is aimed at collectively -training all members who are attending schools. During July and August -1938, a tentative camp has been formed at Chungking and Chengtu, with -mostly university and middle school students as attending members. It is -planned to start similar camps at Chengtu, Chungking, Sian, and Changsha -this year. (_c_) Training of gliders: this is aimed at heightening the -interest in aviation shown by youths. The Corps has arranged with the -Aviation Committee to form a class of amateur gliders, who will become -pilots in the future. - - -3. Publicity - -Besides the normal work concerning publicity, special attention is given -to: - -1. Fixed periodicals, such as the "Chinese Youth Monthly," the "News of -the Corps Activities," the "Civil News," the "Materials for Publicity," -etc. They aim at teaching the various subdivisions the work of publicity -and at supplying materials for publicity. Besides these, there are many -local publications of the Corps. - -2. The compilation of collected works, such as the "Young Men's Books -concerning National Defense," the "Young Men's Books of History and -Geography," the "San Min Chu I Series for Youth," etc. Among pamphlets -for publicity are "Dr. Sun's teachings for the Young Men," "The Way of -Leading Youth's Career," "The May 4 Movement and Modern Young Men's -Movements," etc. Besides these, the Corps has other publicity organs, -such as the Central Publicity Corps, the Youth's Dramatic Associations -of various subdivisions, etc. Publicity literature is distributed in -various localities by the China Civil Supply Association, or its -branches, or sometimes by specially chartered book companies. - - -4. Social Work - -At present the Social Work of the Corps is aimed at cultivating youths' -ability to serve, especially in the present stage of warfare: (_a_) the -formation of Young Men's Labor Service Camps--this is to develop the -skill of production so as to help the country materially. This camp was -tentatively formed at Chengtu and Chungking where young men were -gathered to receive the required training; (_b_) various local Young -Men's Entertaining Offices--these are established in eleven places among -which are Chungking, Sian, Changsha, Kweilin, Kinhwa. There is a monthly -accommodation capacity of about three thousand men. Many of them are to -be sent later to the Young Men's Labor Service Camp for training; (_c_) -various local Young Men's Service Associations and Corps--their aim is -to serve in the war zone, and to help the productivity of society. The -Service Associations under the various subdivisions of the Corps are -formed at Chengtu, Sian, Lanchow, Changsha, Kweilin, Ch'ü-chiang, etc., -numbering forty-two in all. The Service Corps are formed in twenty-three -places, such as Hungyang, Neichuan, Wanling, Kingshan, etc. - - -5. Financial Assistance - -The aim of this branch of work is to spread Dr. Sun's economic thoughts -as shown in the San Min Chu I, besides helping the members financially -by means of cooperative movements. At present, the works emphasized are: - -1. Compilation of Dr. Sun's economic works--they are based upon the San -Min Chu I, the various manifestos issued, and a study of comparative -economy of other countries. There are twelve series of books thus -published, _e.g._, "The Economic Theories and System of the San Min Chu -I," "The Population Policy of China," "The Labor Policy of China," "The -Policy of Land Tenure in China," etc. - -2. Aid given to youth along material productivity--the Corps pays -special attention to the theory and practice of material productivity. -It has arranged with the Board of Economy a plan to establish -cooperative organizations with the Board, and the Central Office for -Agricultural Research, so that the Corps members can have practical work -in economic reconstruction. - -3. Planning of business organizations under group -management--temporarily, the activities along this line will be the -establishment of cooperative stores. These are now the "Young Men's -Dressing Stores," the "Haosen Cooperative Store," and other local Young -Men's Cooperative Stores. - - -D. GENERAL DISCUSSION OF THE TWO YEARS' ACTIVITIES OF THE CORPS AND THE -PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE NATION'S YOUTH - - -1. Discussion of the Corps' Past Work - -Due to lack of experience, there were some unavoidable points which -await reformation. According to the reports submitted by the touring -inspectors, the work for 1939 and that of the first three months of 1940 -can be described in a list: - -1. _Bad Points_: 1, Due to the short period of time, activities of the -Corps have failed to cope with the original plan and schedule; 2, The -development of the Corps activities has not yet been made known to the -mass of youth. Thus the foundation of the Corps is not yet strong -enough; 3, Publicity and service have not yet been adequately mixed. The -ideal "service is publicity" has not yet been reached. At the same time, -owing to traffic interruption, publicity literature has not been widely -distributed; 4, Members are deficient in their conception of the central -activities of the Corps. The subdivisions in schools are especially -lacking in this conception. They require further training; 5, The -officers lack adequate force. Many of them occupy other positions so -that their whole attention cannot be concentrated upon the Corps -activities. - -2. _Good Points_: 1, On the whole, officers and members of the central -nucleus are persevering, and possess the will to sacrifice. The -remuneration of the Corps officers is very low. Those working in the -front receive a monthly maintenance fee of only fifteen to twenty -dollars. They are living a soldier's life; 2, Due to the care of the -Corps bestowed upon social services, many social activities were first -started by the Corps to be followed later by the people; 3, As a rule, -the youths trained by the Corps have good discipline; example may be -taken from the fact that all the university students of Chungking -behaved very well in their schools after the training; 4, As a rule, -members are influenced by the spiritual loftiness of the Corps Leader -[Generalissimo Chiang]. They have the will to sacrifice, as shown by the -fact that many have willingly taken up work behind the enemy's lines. - - -2. Principles Guiding the Nation's Youth - -Since the Corps has for its mission the training of youth, the officers -must shoulder the responsibility of leading youth to be good, to avoid -all past errors, corruption, etc., that harms the mind of youth instead -of benefiting it. - -We must lead the youth according to the following principles: - -1. As ones who have joined the People's Revolution, we should lead the -youth in accordance with the principles of San Min Chu I, in order that -we may conclude the work of the People's Revolution. We must use every -possible method to love and train all youth so as to make them strong -figures in the work of national defense and reconstruction. - -2. In order to lead youth, we must know the youthful mind. The few young -men who went the wrong way are not bad in themselves, but merely -influenced by untrue and selfish ideas. To correct this we must first -correct ourselves, and be their example. We must love them as we do our -own children. In this way they shall certainly be happy to come to us. - -3. It is necessary to know that the only real danger against our -People's Revolution is Japanese imperialism. The rest of the political -factions will be easily dealt with by political action in the future. We -must not be irritated at their existence. - -4. In leading the youths to fight against imperialism and other -reactionary ideas, we must first of all conquer our own worst selves -before we can expect to be their leaders. - -5. In leading the youths, we must induce them to shoulder all future -responsibilities. Let them understand that what they suffered in youth -should not be suffered by posterity. Do unto others what you expect -others to do unto you. The generations must progress, not go backward. - - * * * * * - -The future activities of the Corps will be chiefly to unite and train -youth in productive work. On the one hand, we should call for all good -youths to be members of the Corps. On the other, we should select -specially qualified ones to form a central nucleus to shoulder jointly -the activities of the Corps. In this respect, the Corps shall and must -be able to accomplish the task that has been ever hoped for by the Corps -Leader. - - - - -_D._ THE _HSIAO-TSU_ (SMALL GROUP) TRAINING PROGRAM[1] - - - [Footnote 1: Mimeographed memoranda from the Central Party - Headquarters of the Kuomintang; presented to the author on July 17, - 1940, by Dr. K'an Nei-kuang, Deputy Secretary-General of the - Kuomintang. The original title is _Hsiao-tsu Hsün-lien Kang-ling_; - undated, unpublished.] - - A formal statement of Party policy, this was passed by the - 117th session of the Fifth Central Standing Committee of the - Kuomintang on March 23, 1939 and amended by its 123rd - session on June 15, 1939. This typifies the Kuomintang drive - to establish closer contact with broad reaches of the - population. - - -INTRODUCTION - -The Sub-District Party Organ (_ch'ü-fen-pu_) is the fundamental unit of -the Kuomintang. Due to its large membership, it has been found extremely -difficult to give the members proper training. As a measure of remedy, -the Central Party Headquarters has promulgated a set of regulations -governing the small-group conference. However, due to the fact that the -position and nature of such an institution as well as its relations with -the Kuomintang have not been adequately defined, this plan has not been -successfully carried out. Recently, the Chairman of the Central -Executive Committee of the Kuomintang [The Party Chief, Chiang -K'ai-shek] has repeatedly instructed that the small-group conference be -put into practice in order to improve the Party affairs. Hence, the -regulations were promulgated to be enforced by the various Party organs. - -The Kuomintang aims to have a Party organ established in every -organization.[2] In order to realize this aim, the following points must -be observed: - - [Footnote 2: I.e., factory, cooperative, school, etc.] - -1. The small-group conference is just for training the Party members. It -is different from the Sub-District Party Organ which is the lowest -administrative authority. Consequently, only matters concerning the -Party principles are to be discussed in the small-group conference while -other important issues are left to the Sub-District Party Organ. - -2. The Sub-District Party Organ may have unlimited membership. Its -members may be organized into more than two small-group conferences. If -the members are not more than ten in number, one small-group conference -may be formed. - -3. As the small-group conference is to be organized from the -Sub-District Party Organs, a distinction between the District Party and -the Sub-District Party Organ must be made. The fundamental principle is -that there will be one Party organ for one single [extra-Party] -organization. If a Sub-District Party has too many members, several -Sub-District Party Organs may be formed under the charge of a District -Party Organ. It is not permissible for several parallel Party Organs to -exist in one single organization nor may the members of several -organizations go into one Party organ. However, if the number of Party -members of one organization is too small to form a Sub-District Party -Organ, they may join the neighbor Sub-District Party Organ. It is to be -remembered that the best policy is to have enough Party members in each -organization to form its own Sub-District Party Organ. - -4. Small-group conferences may be named in numerical order such as, -First and Second Small-Group Conference, or the First and Second -Small-Group Conference of a certain _hsien_ or Sub-District Party Organ. -If there is only one small-group conference, it will not necessarily be -named as such. - -5. When such small-group conference is organized in every institution -down to the _pao-chia_, then the people will be better enlightened -concerning the Government and Party policies. Thus it will help the -Government in having its orders fully enforced. - -6. The small-group conference and the Sub-District Party meeting should -take place every two weeks alternately. - -All the Party organs upon receipt of this memorandum should make a -careful study of the local conditions and submit to the Provincial -Kuomintang in ten days' time their working plan. Approval should be -given not later than ten days, and within a month all such small-group -conferences should be organized. However, if there should be any -difficulty encountered or any comments to be made they may be submitted -to the proper Party authority for their consideration. - - -A. ORGANIZATION - -1. A small-group conference is established for training the Party -members of the Sub-District Kuomintang Organ. - -2. A small-group conference may have three to ten members. If a -Sub-District Party Organ has more than ten members, two or more -small-group conferences may be organized and members distributed -according to their intellectual standing, interests and occupations. It -is the best policy that the members of higher education should be evenly -distributed among the small-group conferences. - -3. In the border districts, if the number of Party members is less than -five, and consequently a Sub-District Party Organ cannot be formed, a -small-group conference may be organized first to be under the direct -charge of some other higher Party authorities. - -4. A small-group conference may be reorganized every six months. If -there are too many shiftings of members and any other difficulties, it -may be reorganized before that time. - -5. Every small-group conference has one Chief who is responsible for -calling conferences, reading reports and giving guidance regarding the -thoughts and activities of his members. He is to be elected by the -members and may be re-elected after six-months' service. - -6. If the intellectual standing of the members of a small-group -conference is equivalent to that of a primary school student, the Chief -may be appointed by the Executive Committee of the Sub-District Party. - - -B. CONFERENCES - -7. Small-group conferences are to be held every two weeks. The -conference is to last not more than two hours. Members are to be -notified by the Chief of the time and place of the conference. It is -important that conferences should be planned so as not to interfere with -the work of the members. - -8. In the conferences each member may be the Chairman by turn. Minutes -are to be recorded by any member appointed at the conference. The -minutes are to be read by the Chief in the Sub-District Party meetings. - -9. Agenda of the small-group conference includes: - -_a._ The Chief announces the opening of the conference. - -_b._ The Chief reads Dr. Sun's will. - -_c._ The Chief reports communications from the Sub-District Party Organ, -important current problems, publications of the Chairman of the -Executive Committee of the Central Kuomintang Headquarters, and any -other topics. - -_d._ Discussions. - -_e._ Comments. - -_f._ The Chief reads regulations governing Party members. - -_g._ The Chief announces the adjournment of the conference. - -10. The discussions include: - -_a._ Party principles, - -_b._ current issues, - -_c._ working abilities, - -_d._ book reviews. - -11. Materials for discussion may be given by the Central Party -Headquarters or prepared by the _Hsien_ Party Organ, if necessary. - -12. Members are required to read certain books. In the case of those who -cannot read by themselves, assistance may be given by the fellow members -or by an instructor especially appointed for this purpose. Encouragement -should be given to those who can do good written work. - -13. Small-group conferences are responsible for the education of the -illiterate members. - -14. Every member should take part in the discussion. - -15. If the members of the small-group conference cannot reach an -agreement regarding any one of the four topics enumerated in the Item -No. 10, they may refer to Central Party Headquarters or the _Hsien_ -Party Headquarters through the Sub-District Party Organ. - -16. If it is found that all the small-group conferences cannot reach an -agreement regarding certain topics discussed or if the Secretary of the -Sub-District Party Organ considers it necessary, a Sub-District mass -meeting may be called to discuss these topics. The agenda for the -small-group conference can also be used for the Sub-District Party -meetings. - -17. When the small-group Chief considers it necessary, he may decide -whether to have the Item "Comment" only on the agenda. - -18. In commenting, the members may do: - -_a._ Self-comment: Members may tell in the conference their own -thoughts, activities and past experiences, as well as plans for the -future. - -_b._ Mutual comment: Members may make comments upon each other's -thoughts, activities, etc., in the most sincere and friendly manner. - -19. All the comments should be recorded in the minutes for future -reference. After the conference members should not broadcast each -other's secrets. - -20. At every fourth meeting, the conference may be held in the form of a -tea party or a picnic. In such meetings, members may express their ideas -freely regarding Party, politics, economics, and any other social -problems. It is not necessary to reach a conclusion, but the -discussions should be recorded. - -21. Regulations governing leave of absence for the Sub-District Party -Organ are applicable to the small-group conference. - - -C. GUIDANCE AND EXAMINATION - -22. Small-group conference is the major work of all the Party organs. -The Sub-District Party Organ may appoint a person to attend and -supervise the small-group conferences. - -23. The Sub-District Party Organ will see to it that the small-group -conferences are held according to schedule. It will submit monthly to -its superior organ the results of such small-group conferences and in -every three months to the Central Party Headquarters. - -24. The small-group conference Chiefs may attend the Sub-District Party -meeting to discuss matters concerning small-group training. - -25. The District Party Organ may send out inspectors at any time to -supervise the small-group conferences. Every six months it may call a -meeting which all the Secretaries of the Sub-District Party Organs, -small-group conference Chiefs, will attend to discuss matters concerning -small-group conferences. The Secretary of the Sub-District Party Organ -will take the chair in the meeting and the minutes will be submitted to -the _Hsien_ Party. - -26. The _Hsien_ Party Organ may also send out inspectors to supervise -the small-group conferences. Every six months, after the meeting as -stated in Item 25 has taken place, a _Hsien_ Party meeting is to be -called to discuss the small-group conferences in the whole _hsien_. The -Secretary of the _Hsien_ Party Organ will preside in such meetings. -Minutes are to be submitted to the Provincial Party Headquarters. - -27. If necessary, the _Hsien_ Party Organ may hold different -competitions in such fields as sports, speeches, Party principles, etc., -in order to make the small-group conferences more interesting. - -28. The Provincial Party Organ, besides sending out inspectors to make -inspections of the small-group conferences, may obtain at any time the -minutes of a certain small-group conference of a certain _hsien_ for -examination. - -29. The Provincial Party Organ may have a general examination of the -small-group conferences that have taken place, taking the _hsien_ as a -unit. Encouragement and punishment should be given according to merit. - -30. The Central Party Headquarters, besides sending out inspectors, may -obtain any number of minutes of the small-group conferences for -examination. - -31. Those Party organs below the _Hsien_ Party Organ should pay especial -attention to the character, morals and intellectual ability of the -members. The names of those members who have made special contributions -to the Party work should be filed with the Central Party Headquarters -for appointment. - - -D. APPENDIX - -32. All the _Hsien_ Parties upon receipt of this Program should make a -study of local conditions and make out a plan for carrying them out. - -33. For the border districts and war areas strict observance of these -items may be dispensed with, upon the request of the local Party organ -to the Central Party Headquarters. - -34. The items contained in this memorandum are applicable to Special -Municipal Party Organs, Seamen's Party Organs, Overseas Party Organs, -and agencies under the charge of the Central Party Headquarters. - -35. The above is effective after the approval of the Central Executive -Committee of the Kuomintang. - - - - -_E._ PARTY CONSTITUTION OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY[1] - - - [Footnote 1: _Kung-ch'an-tang Tang-chang_ [Party Constitution of the - Communist Party], [Chungking?], XXVII (1938), p. 1-21.] - - Despite the many changes in the governmental form of the - Communist-controlled areas, the Chinese Communist Party has - retained the same Party Constitution for many years. The - following constitution was adopted in 1928 by the Sixth - Party Congress. - - -CHAPTER I. TITLE - -ARTICLE 1. _The Title_: The Communist Party of China is a branch of the -Communist International. Therefore the title is "The Chinese Communist -Party." - - -CHAPTER II. THE MEMBERS - -ARTICLE 2. _Qualifications of Party Members_: The Party members should -accept the regulations and constitution of the Communist International -and of the Chinese Communist Party. They should join one of the Party -Organs and abide by the resolutions which have been passed by the -Communist International and the Chinese Communist Party. They are -required to pay the Party dues regularly. - -ARTICLE 3. _Procedure to Join the Party_: The candidates of the -following qualifications can be recognized as Party members with the -approval of the _hsien_ Party Councillor and the sanction of the Branch -Organs: - -_a._ Factory Laborers: recommended by one Party member and approved by -one Branch of Production Party Organ. - -_b._ Farmers, handicraft men, intellectuals and public functionaries of -the lower grades: recommended by two Party members. - -_c._ High public functionaries: recommended by three Party members. - - Note: - - 1. The sponsor must take full responsibility for the - candidate. In case qualifications are false, the sponsor - shall receive punishment according to the regulations. He - may be expelled in a serious case. - - 2. The candidate shall be asked to do some Party work for - trial before he can be recognized as a member, in order that - his qualifications and understanding of party principles can - be examined. - -_d._ A candidate who is an ex-member of other Parties shall become a -Communist Party member by the recommendation of three Party members of -more than three years' standing. If he was an ordinary Party member of -the other Party, his membership in the Communist Party shall be -sanctioned by the Provincial Party Committee; if he was a special member -of another Party, then his membership shall be sanctioned by the Central -Party Organ. - -ARTICLE 4. _The Adherence of Organized Groups_: In case other political -groups or branches of other parties want to join the Communist Party, -their organization systems must be studied and amended according to the -ideas of the Communist Central Party Organ. - -ARTICLE 5. _The Transfer of Members_: The Party members may be -transferred from one Organ to another if they move from one place to -another. The transfer, however, must be approved by the Central Party -Organ. - -ARTICLE 6. _The Expulsion of Members_: The expulsion of members must be -first passed by the general meeting of that particular Branch Organ and -then be approved by the higher Organ. Until the approval is obtained, it -is necessary to stop the work of the member involved. In case the member -is not satisfied with the discharge, he is allowed to send a petition to -the highest Party Organ for final judgment. Every Party committee has -the power to expel a member who is discovered as an anti-Communist. The -resolution must be communicated to the Organ to which that member -belonged. - - -CHAPTER III. THE ORGANIZATION - -ARTICLE 7. _The Principle of Organization_: Like other Communist -International Branch Parties, the essential of organization of the -Chinese Communist Party is Democratic Centralism. By Democratic -Centralism is meant: - -_a._ Both superior and subordinate Party Organs shall be formed -according to resolutions which have been passed in the Councils of Party -Delegates and the National Communist Party Congress. - -_b._ Each Party Organ is required to make a report of its newly elected -members. - -_c._ Subordinate Party Organs must accept orders issued by the higher -Organs. They shall strictly obey the regulations of the Party. They -shall effectively carry out the resolutions and plans which have been -determined by the Communist International Central Committee and its -supervisory Party Organs. The Party members may discuss and argue on -certain points which are not yet passed by the Party Organ. In other -words, they must obey unconditionally the resolutions which have been -already determined by the Communist International or their superior -Organs, whether they agree with these resolutions or not. - -ARTICLE 8. _The Supervisory Party Organs_: Under certain circumstances, -subordinate Party Organs are allowed to appoint new supervisory -Committees to join the Party with the sanction of its superior Organs. - -ARTICLE 9. _The Distribution of Party Organs_: The distribution of Party -Organs is according to geographic units. The Administrative Party Organ -in a certain place is the supervisory Organ of that place. People of -different nationalities may all join the Communist Party. However, they -must first join a Chinese District Party Organ before they can become -members of the Chinese Communist Party. - -ARTICLE 10. _Duties of the District Organs_: The District Organs have -the power to settle their local affairs within the scope of resolutions -passed by the Communist International and the Chinese Communist Party. - -ARTICLE 11. _The Supreme Party Organs_: The supreme Party Organs are the -Party Members' Mass Meeting and the Councils of Party Delegates. - -ARTICLE 12. _The Party Committee_: Different classes of Party committees -shall be elected from among the Party Members' Mass Meeting and the -Councils of Party Delegates[2] and the National Communist Party -Congress.[3] The committees shall supervise the routine procedures of -their subordinate Organs. - - [Footnote 2: The term _Tai-piao Ta-hui_ rendered "Council of Party - Delegates," may also be put as "Party Conference." Cf. "The Rules of - the Communist Party of the Soviet Union" in Rappard, William E., _et - al._, _Source Book on European Governments_, New York, 1937, p. - v34-v52.] - - [Footnote 3: _Ch'üan-kuo Ta-hui_ is given as "National Party - Congress"; the term _Ch'üan-kuo_ has been translated as "All-China" - elsewhere.] - -ARTICLE 13. _Problems of Criticism_: In the case of _hsien_ Branch Party -Delegates, it is necessary for them to undergo criticism by the -(subordinate) officers of higher Party Organs. - -ARTICLE 14. _The Organization System of the Communist Party Organs_: - -_a._ Different Branch Party Organs shall be established in every -factory, workshop, shop, street, village, and army unit. - -_b._ There shall be a District Party Council and District Council of -Party Delegates in every city or country district, under the supervision -of a District Party Committee. - -_c._ There shall be a Hsien or Municipal Council of Party Delegates in -each _hsien_ or municipality, under the supervision of a Municipal Party -Committee. - -_d._ A special Council of Party Delegates which is constituted by -several _hsien_ or parts of a province shall be established when -necessary. The establishment must be approved by the Provincial -Committee. - -_e._ There shall be a Provincial Council of Party Delegates in every -province, to be supervised by a Provincial Party Committee. - -_f._ There shall be a National Communist Congress in the nation, -supervised by the Central Committee. - -_g._ For the convenience in training Party members, a special Central -Executive Bureau shall be established and special central officers shall -be sent to different places. This Bureau and the officers shall be -appointed and supervised by the Central Committee. - -ARTICLE 15. Further departments and subordinate committees shall be -established to deal with special Party functions, such as the -Organization Department, Publicity Department, Labor Movement Committee -and Women's Movement Committee. These departments and committees shall -be under the supervision of their respective Party Committees. - - Note: To improve understanding of differences in custom and - language among Party members of different nationalities, - several Nationality Movement Departments shall be formed. - - -CHAPTER IV. BRANCH PARTY ORGANS - -ARTICLE 16. _Fundamental Organizations_: Branch Party Organs of the -factories, mines, workshops, shops, streets, villages, and armies are -the fundamental organization of the Communist Party. Members working in -the above-mentioned places shall join the Branch Party Organs. New -Branch Party Organs can be organized when there are at least three or -more members. But they must be under the control of the _Hsien_ -Committee. - -ARTICLE 17. _Special Organizations of the Branch Party Organs_: Members -of certain businesses can join the Production Branch Organ of the same -occupation in their neighboring city. Special Branch Organs shall be -organized according to the localities and the nature of their work, such -as handicraft laborers, free laborers, family laborers, or -intellectuals. - -ARTICLE 18. _Duties of the Branch Party Organs_: The Branch Party Organ -unites the strength of the farmers and laborers. Its duties are: - -_a._ To use its systematic and effective agitation and slogans to absorb -farmers and laborers into the Communist party. - -_b._ To use its power of organization to join the political and economic -struggles of the farmers and laborers. To encourage the people's -revolutionary spirit. To teach the meaning of class-struggles. To -supervise the farmers' and laborers' revolutions. To lead proletarians -to the Communist International and the Chinese Communist Party. - -_c._ To enlist and train new members. To distribute Party periodicals -among members and non-members in order to encourage political and -educational work. - -ARTICLE 19. _Branch Organ Executive Committee_: Each Branch shall have -three to five executive committeemen to manage the routine Party work. -They shall take charge of the division of labor, such as the publicity -work, distribution of printed materials, organization of farmer and -labor parties, women's movements, and youth movements. There shall be -one secretary; he shall carry out resolutions and orders. - - -CHAPTER V. CITY AND COUNTRY DISTRICT PARTY ORGANS - -ARTICLE 20. _The District Council of Party Delegates_: In the sphere of -the city or country districts the supreme Party Organs are the Party -Members' Mass Meeting and the District Councils of Party Delegates. The -Party Members' Mass Meeting and the Councils of Party Delegates shall -receive and approve the reports of the District Party Committee; shall -elect the Delegates to District, _Hsien_, Municipal, or Provincial -Councils of the Party Delegates Meeting. - -ARTICLE 21. _District Party Committee_: The District Party Committee -shall take charge of the supervision of affairs within that district -before and after the Party Members' Mass Meeting or the District Council -of Party Delegates' Meeting. Regular meetings of the city or rural -District Party Committee shall be directed by the Standing Committee, -elected by the Party Committee itself. - - -CHAPTER VI. _Hsien_ AND MUNICIPAL PARTY ORGANS - -ARTICLE 22. _The Hsien Council of Party Delegates_: The supreme Party -Organ in the _hsien_ is the _Hsien_ Council of Party Delegates. The -special meeting of the Council shall be called once in three months. It -shall be called by the demand of a majority of other organizations in -the _hsien_; by determination of the Provincial Party Committee or -Special District Party Committee. The _Hsien_ Council of Party Delegates -which is called by the _Hsien_ Party Committee shall read reports issued -by the _Hsien_ Party Committee or the _Hsien_ Control Committee. It -shall elect Delegates of the _Hsien_ Party Committee, _Hsien_ Control -Committee, Provincial Party Committee, and Special District Party -Committee. - -ARTICLE 23. _Hsien Party Committee_: The _Hsien_ Party Committee is -elected by the _Hsien_ Council of Party Delegates. Before and after the -meetings of _Hsien_ Council of Party Delegates this Committee is the -supreme Party Organ in the _hsien_. The Committee shall be constituted -by _Hsien_ Delegates and delegates from important villages. The meeting -of the Committee shall be called at least once a month, and its date -shall be determined by the _Hsien_ Committee itself. A Standing -Committee shall be elected to take care of routine Party affairs. There -shall be one secretary of the Standing Committee, to be elected from -among the Committee members. - -ARTICLE 24. A _Hsien_ Party Committee shall put into effect previously -passed resolutions of the _Hsien_ Council of Party Delegates, the -Provincial Party Committee, and the Central Party Committee. Whenever -possible, different committees, such as the Organization Committee, -Publicity Committee, Women's Movement Committee, and Farmers' Movement -Committee, shall be established. The _Hsien_ Party Committee shall also -appoint the editors of _Hsien_ Party newspapers. It shall take dual -responsibilities to obey the orders of its superior Organ and to report -its own merits to its superior Organs. - -ARTICLE 25. No Municipal Party Committee shall be formed in a city where -a _Hsien_ Party Committee has already been established. In such a case -the Party affairs of the city shall be in charge of the _Hsien_ Party -Committee. A City District Party Committee under it may be formed to -take an active part in the City Party affairs. - -ARTICLE 26. _The Municipal Party Committee_: The organization of the -Municipal Party Committee is the same as that of the _Hsien_ Party -Committee. A City District Party Committee is subordinate to it. This -Committee shall administer its Branch Party Organs and Branch Organs of -its neighbors. No Municipal Party Committee shall be established in a -place where the Provincial Party Committee or Special District Party -Committee has already been established. - -ARTICLE 27. The organization and functions of the Special District Party -Committee shall be the same as the _Hsien_ Party Committee. In the place -where there is no Provincial Party Committee provided then the Special -District Party Committee shall be directed by the Central Party -Committee. In such a case the functions and organization of the Special -Party Committee shall be the same as the Provincial Party Committee. - - -CHAPTER VII. PROVINCIAL PARTY ORGANS - -ARTICLE 28. _The Provincial Council of Party Delegates_: The Provincial -Council of Party Delegates is the supreme Party Organ in the province. -The regular meeting of the Council shall be called to meet once -semi-annually. Special meetings shall be called according to the demand -of a majority of other organizations of the province, or by the -determination of the Central Party Committee. The regular meeting of the -Provincial Council of Party Delegates, which is called by the Provincial -Party Committee, shall have the responsibility of hearing reports issued -by the Provincial Party Committee, and by the Provincial Control -Committee. It shall discuss the social work and Party affairs problems -of the province; and elect delegates to Provincial Party Committee, -Provincial Control Committee, and National Party Congress. - -ARTICLE 29. _Provincial Party Committee_: Before and after the meeting -of the Provincial Council of Party delegates, the Provincial Party -Committee is the supreme Party Organ in each province. Delegates of the -central Provincial organizations or other district Party Organs are -required to join the Provincial Party Committee. The meeting of the -Provincial Party Committee shall be called at least once in two months; -the date of the meeting shall be determined by the Committee itself. A -Standing Committee under it shall be authorized to take charge of Party -affairs before and after the meeting of the Provincial Party Committee. -Secretaries are to be appointed accordingly. - -ARTICLE 30. _The Duties and Organization of Provincial Party -Committees_: The duties of the Provincial Party Committee are: to put -into effect the passed resolutions of the Provincial Council of Party -Delegates or Central Party Committee; to organize the subsidiary Party -Organs; to appoint editors for the Party newspapers; to distribute the -Party funds; to control the accounting department; to supervise the -Party work among non-Communists; to draft regular reports to the Central -Party Committee; to announce the Party Movement to its subordinate -Organs. For the furtherance of important work different departments and -committees shall be provided, such as the Provincial Organization -Department, Publicity Department, Labor Movement Department, etc. The -department heads who act concurrently in the Provincial Party Committee -shall supervise Party affairs under the control of the Provincial -Standing Committee. - -ARTICLE 31. The Provincial Party Committee shall help the District Party -Committee to carry out the Party activities. Therefore the _Hsien_ Party -Committee in that particular city should only take care of the Party -work within its own sphere. - - -CHAPTER VIII. THE NATIONAL PARTY CONVENTION[4] - - [Footnote 4: _Ch'üan-kuo Hui-i_.] - -ARTICLE 32. The National Party Convention shall be called to meet twice -annually. The numbers of candidates and Delegates to be elected by -different organs are to be determined by the Central Party Committee. - -ARTICLE 33. The previously passed resolutions of the Convention shall be -put into effect after the approval of the Central Party Committee. - -ARTICLE 34. In case the Convention meeting is held before the meeting of -the Communist International then several Delegates can be elected to -attend the meeting of the latter. However, they must get the consent of -the International Communist Committee. - - -CHAPTER IX. THE NATIONAL PARTY CONGRESS - -ARTICLE 35. The National Party Congress is the supreme Party Organ in -the country. The meeting shall be called once annually by the Central -Party Committee and the Communist International. Special meetings can be -called by the Central Party Committee or initiated by the Communist -International. It may also be called by request of a majority of the -Delegates who attended the last meeting. The call of the special -meeting, however, must be approved by the Central Party Committee first. -Resolutions which have been passed by the majority of the Delegates -shall become effective. The number of Delegates and percentage in each -Party Organ shall be determined by the Communist International, the -Central Party Committee, or the preliminary session of the Party -Convention. - -ARTICLE 36. The duties of the National Party Congress are: - -_a._ To receive and examine reports issued by the Central Party -Committee. - -_b._ To determine Party regulations. - -_c._ To determine the important political or organization plans. - -_d._ To elect the Central Party Committee. - -ARTICLE 37. Delegates to the Party Congress are to be elected by the -Provincial Councils of Party Delegates. In special cases requiring -secret action, they may be appointed by the Provincial Party Committee -with the approval of the Communist International Committee. A -provisional Congress can be substituted for the regular Congress with -only the consent of the International Communist Committee. - - -CHAPTER X. THE CENTRAL PARTY COMMITTEE[5] - - [Footnote 5: _Chung-yang Wei-yüan-hui_.] - -ARTICLE 38. The number of the Central Party Committee members shall be -determined by the National Party Congress. - -ARTICLE 39. While the National Party Congress is in session, the Central -Party Committee is the supreme Party Organ. It represents the Party in -contacts with the other political parties. Besides this its duties are: -to establish various subordinate Party Organs; to supervise and control -subordinate Party Organs; to edit the Party newspapers; to send special -Party officers to different provinces; to form the Central Executive -Bureau in order to encourage Party principles; to distribute the Party -funds; to control the Central Accounting Department. The Central Party -Committee shall be called at least three times a month. - -ARTICLE 40. A Political Bureau shall be established in the Central Party -Committee. It shall supervise the political affairs before and after the -meeting of the Central Party Committee. A Standing Committee is to be -elected to take charge of routine work. - -ARTICLE 41. When necessary the Central Party Committee shall establish -different subordinate departments or committees such as the Organization -Department, Publicity Department, Laborers' Movement Committees, Women's -Movement Committees and Farmers' Movement Committees. The functions of -these Departments and Committees shall be guided by the Central Party -Committee, which shall also appoint Department heads and Chairmen. - -ARTICLE 42. The Central Party Committee shall determine the work and the -scope of work of the District Party Organs with reference to their -political and economic background. The distribution of Party Organs -shall also be settled by the Central Party Committee. - - -CHAPTER XI. THE CENTRAL CONTROL COMMITTEE[6] - - [Footnote 6: The term here is _shên-ch'a wei-yüan-hui_, not - _chien-ch'a_, which is the term used for "Control" as one of the five - powers of Sun Yat-sen's plan.] - -ARTICLE 43. For the control of the financial and accounting work of the -subordinate Party Organs, Central or District Control Committees shall -be elected by the National Party Congress, Central or District Party -Committee. - - -CHAPTER XII. THE PARTY DISCIPLINE - -ARTICLE 44. Strict obedience to Party discipline is the highest duty of -every Communist. Resolutions passed by the Communist International, -Central Party Committee, or other superior Party Organs shall be carried -out effectively and exactly by the Party members. Until resolutions have -been passed, members are allowed to discuss them freely. - -ARTICLE 45. Those who have failed to put into effect the orders or -resolutions, or those who violate the Party discipline shall be punished -by the Party Organs with reference to the Party regulations. The -punishments for Organs are: reprimand, dissolution, and reregistration -of its members. The punishments for the members are: reprimand, warning, -deprivation of Party activities, expulsion from membership, or -suspension from duties for stated periods. Cases involving punishment -shall be studied and examined by the Party Members' Mass Meeting or by -respective Party Organs. Special Committees may be formed with the -approval of Party Organs to settle difficult cases. Expulsion from -membership shall be carried out according to particulars stated in Item -6 of this Constitution. - - -CHAPTER XIII. PARTY FINANCE - -ARTICLE 46. The sources of the Party revenue are: Party fees, special -levies, income from printed materials, and the compensations from its -superior Organs. - -ARTICLE 47. The amount of the Party fee shall be determined by the -Central Committee. Members without employment or those in poverty are -allowed exemption from payment. Those who do not pay their fees for -three months, without stating reasons, shall be recognized as released -from membership, and their names shall be announced to the Mass -Meeting. - - -CHAPTER XIV. SPECIAL PARTY GROUPS [CORPS][7] - - [Footnote 7: _Tang-t'uan_.] - -ARTICLE 48. Special Party Groups are to be constituted by three or more -Party members. The main function of these Party Groups is the -encouragement of the Party principles among the non-Communist groups. -The routine affairs of the Group shall be in charge of a Managing Board -elected from the Party Group. Whenever a Party Committee and a Special -Party Group conflict and then come to an agreement on certain points, -these points shall be reconsidered and concurrently passed by the two -Organs. Quick action must be taken. If agreement is not reached, a -petition is required for submission to a superior Party Organ for final -determination. - -ARTICLE 49. Delegates of Party Groups shall attend the Party Committee -Meeting whenever there is matter dealing with the Party Group. - -ARTICLE 50. A Managing Board shall be formed in each Group with the -approval of the Party Committee. The Committee can appoint its members -to the Board and may also recall or remove those members when necessary. -In such cases, however, the reasons for recall or removal require -announcement to the Party Group. - -ARTICLE 51. A list of names of the staff members of the Party Group -shall be submitted to a Party Organ for approval. Removal of staff -members from a group shall also require approval by the Party Organ. - -ARTICLE 52. Resolutions to be carried out by the Party Group shall first -be passed by the Group Meeting or Meeting of the Managing Board. In a -Party Members' Mass Meeting all the Group members must support a -resolution which is already passed by its own Group. If one fails to do -so he may be punished according to the regulations. - - -CHAPTER XV. RELATIONSHIP WITH THE COMMUNIST YOUTH CORPS[8] - - [Footnote 8: _Kung-ch'an Ch'ing-nien T'uan_.] - -ARTICLE 53. The District or Central Party Organs shall send Delegates to -the Communist Youth Corps for exchanging ideas. At the same time the -Communist Youth Corps can also send their members to attend the various -meetings of the different Councils of the Party Delegates. - - - - -APPENDIX III. MATERIALS ON POLICY - - - - -_A._ REPLY TO QUESTIONS (CHIANG K'AI-SHEK)[1] - - - [Footnote 1: Private communication by and to the present author, and - in his possession.] - - Replies to the following questionnaire were very kindly - supplied by Generalissimo Chiang K'ai-shek. The questions by - the present author were submitted to him on July 23, 1940; - the replies were transmitted through the Vice-Minister of - Publicity, Mr. Hollington Tong, on November 26, 1940. - -(1) Do you believe that the _San Min Chu I_ are suited to China alone, -or do you think it possible that they represent a golden mean between -totalitarianism and democracy? - -_San Min Chu I is a type of democracy particularly suited to China. In -its general features, I think, it is similar to Western democracies._ - -(2) Do you feel that a _San Min Chu I_ China will have any positive -proposals to make concerning the subject of world federation or -confederation, if that subject is raised at the end of the current -European war? - -_In as much as cosmopolitanism and world peace are two of the main aims -of San Min Chu I, China will naturally be disposed to participate in any -world federation or confederation based on the principle of equality of -nations and for the good of mankind._ - -(3) Do you believe that the inauguration of the constitution and of a -constitutional period will lead to the uncontrolled freedom of minor -parties, including the Communist? Is there not a danger that the minor -parties, because they do not share the responsibility for government, -will be able to exploit formal democratic rights more unscrupulously -than the Kuomintang? - -_No, because democracy in itself has the ability to work out the -solutions for those problems if there are any._ - -(4) What do you regard as the clearest factual indication of the growth -of democracy in Free China? - -_The following are the clearest indications of the growth of democracy -in China: 1, the convocation of the People's Political Council; 2, the -convocation of the Provincial Political Councils; 3, the growth of -popular interest in both public and national affairs; 4, the growth of -the sentiment of national solidarity; 5, the spontaneous response to the -call for public services._ - -(5) Within the army, what democratic tendencies have you fostered or -observed? - -_Since the army is now recruited from the different walks of life, it -naturally shares the growing democratic sentiment. Within the army, -however, the soldiers and officers are of course trained and disciplined -in strict accordance with military regulations._ - -(6) When the war against Japan is successfully concluded, do you believe -that the National Government will have any difficulty in re-establishing -its full authority over the guerrilla-governed areas, which will have -tasted autonomy? - -_No, because all these forces are fighting for the liberty and -independence of China._ - -(7) Do you believe that the bogus Government at Nanking is intended by -the enemy to deceive the Chinese, to fool the Japanese home public, or -actually to govern China? Why do you think that a man as ambitious as -Wang Ch'ing-wei put himself in such a humiliating and ridiculous -position--before the world, and before history? - -_Whatever may be the intention of the Japanese in putting up Wang -Ch'ing-wei as the head of the bogus government, they certainly have no -idea of letting him or any other puppet govern China in reality. As to -the latter part of the question, I prefer that you would ask Wang -directly._ - - - - -_B._ WHAT I MEAN BY ACTION, OR A PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION (CHIANG -K'AI-SHEK)[1] - - - [Footnote 1: Chiang K'ai-shek, _A Philosophy of Action, or What I Mean - by Action_, Chungking, 1940; p. 7-20. The accompanying foreword and - notes are here omitted. The translation is the work of Mr. Ma P'in-ho, - a naturalized Chinese scholar but of European race and nativity.] - - The following essay, delivered as a speech, represents the - clearest formulation by Generalissimo Chiang of his own - philosophy. To this must be joined his exegesis on the San - Min Chu I, quoted in part above, p. 270. - -THE TRUTHS WE MUST ENDEAVOR TO GRASP ANEW - -In 1932 I delivered a lecture on the subject "Stages in the Development -of Revolutionary Philosophy." In it I dealt with two points of especial -importance. Firstly, I tried to explain how the actual grasp of what we -know comes only with positive action. I said: "The universe contains -spirit in addition to matter. Spirit implies mind, and mind implies -conscience. Conscience must find its expression in action, in the -practice of what it urges. Otherwise the conscience would be a barren -thing, and there would be no way of avoiding a futile idealism on the -one hand or determinist materialism on the other." Secondly, I explained -the importance of the philosophy of action in regard to the Revolution. -I said: "Only the word 'action' covers the meaning of what has brought -into being all things in space and time. Our philosophy therefore takes -as the one central principle of human life and thought the maxim: 'From -true knowledge action naturally proceeds.' In short, any philosophy of -ours must be a philosophy of action. The consummation of the Republican -revolution and the overthrow of Japanese Imperialist aggression depend -upon our putting into practice Dr. Sun's principle of action as the -natural product of knowledge." - -Since I suggested this term _philosophy of action_ and became the -advocate of _positive action_ as the course the revolutionary must -follow, a considerable effect has been visible in our ranks. The spirit -of positive action has been intensified among us. In the army and in -schools, and in political and social life generally, a gradual -transformation has taken place in the state of inert frustration, -vagueness and depression formerly prevalent. There has been a general -tendency to take the initiative, to express ourselves in positive -action. Such indeed was my aim in promoting this _philosophy of -action_. When I take note of the results achieved by our _action_, -however, I remain unsatisfied on a number of points. For instance, there -is sometimes mere action without clear realization of its why and -wherefore, resulting in what the ancients called "unreal action." With -others there is initial vigor and great positive effort, followed by -impatience of checks and failure to persevere in the face of -difficulties, leading some to throw the blame on circumstances and -others upon their fellow-men. The irritable then proceed to arguing and -quarrels; while the sweeter-tempered lose heart. In this way the real -issue is lost to sight and obstacles unnecessarily multiplied; or the -individual may be overcome with outright disgust and take on a -completely negative attitude, the initial speed of his progress being in -the end equalled by the speed of his subsequent retrogression. Another -kind of failure comes with a man who impulsively imitates others; who -when he sees others on the go feels any move on their part calls for -some move on his; who spends all his time in acting on the spur of some -transitory stimulus or exigency, forgetful of our broad revolutionary -conceptions and far-reaching aims. - -In seeking the reasons for such faulty conduct, I have been forced to -the conclusion that it is due to imperfect knowledge of the essential -meaning of _positive action_, and to imperfect realization of the -significance and nature of _action_, that there is lack of -determination, faith and perseverance among us. - - -ACTION IS LIFE ITSELF: THE TIRELESS PERTINACITY OF NATURE OUR EXAMPLE - -According to my own individual experience, our first step must be to -draw a clear distinction between _action_ and _motion_. The monosyllabic -structure of the Chinese language has occasioned the use of substantival -phrases consisting of two words. One of these phrases is _hsing-tung_ -(action-motion), which in common parlance often has the meaning properly -covered only by the word _hsing_ alone, a word of far deeper and wider -meaning than the word _tung_. In fact, we may say that action is _human -life_ itself. An antithesis is commonly implied between the words -_action_ and _thought_, and between _word_ and _act_. In reality, -however, thought and word are processes of action, and are properly to -be considered as included within the scope of _action_, rather than as -foreign to it. From birth to death, while he is subject to space and -time, a man cannot withdraw himself from the sphere of action; he grows -up in action and his character is formed and elevated by action. All -saintly and heroic men, like the devoted revolutionary, attain their -ends and achieve their nobility of character only through their planned -and determined actions. - -If we wish to realize the true nature of _action_ we can do no better -than take as the _point-de-départ_ for our thinking the words of the -_I-ching_ or _Book of Changes_: "Let the superior man exert himself with -the unfailing pertinacity of Nature." For the most obvious thing in the -universe, the very principle animating all its phenomena, is the -activity of the forces of Nature. The gloss reads: "Day by day the -heavens revolve, with a constancy that only a supreme pertinacity could -maintain. The superior man models himself upon it in the unceasing -exertion of his energies." This _pertinacity_ is something perennially -unimpaired and ever changeless, greatest strength united to greatest -durability, and moreover an absolute thoroughness and completeness. And -we must model ourselves on the activity of nature, on its spontaneous -and unremitting flow of energy. If there is this realization of the -value and place of human life in the universe, action will appear to us -something inevitable, and there will follow as a matter of course -single-minded devotion to purpose, a completely natural attitude, and -resolute advance with firm strides towards our ends--we shall have -achieved, in the words of the _Chung-yung_, "the highest integrity, -unfailing and enduring." Man's existence and progress depend entirely -upon his perception of these truths. - -_Action_, therefore, differs from _motion_. _Motion_ is by no means -necessarily _action_, though _action_ may on occasion include some form -of _motion_. Action is continuous, whereas motion is intermittent; -action is essential, whereas motion is accidental; action is -spontaneous, whereas motion is usually due to the application of -external force. Action is in response to the supreme order of things and -in harmony with the nature of man. Motion is impulsive response to some -fortuitous external stimulus. Action we may describe as more natural and -smoother intrinsically than motion; and extrinsically it is wholly good -in its outcome, whereas motion may be good or may be evil. Action -unfolds in uninterrupted continuity; motion proceeds by fits and starts. -As an illustration, action may be compared to a ceaseless flow of water, -in the words of Confucius, "racing on, unpausing day and night." The -unremitting and insistent character of _positive action_ may thus be -figured forth. Motion on the other hand may be compared to the impact of -a stone upon water into which it is thrown. The water is violently -agitated and leaps high into the air; its movement is tumultuous while -it lasts, but subsides when after a moment or so the extraneous force -that caused it is expended. Such motion is, therefore, transitory, -simply because its motive force comes from without. - - -ACTION IS NOT MERE MOTION - -We cannot of course say that all _motion_ is bad, but we can at least -say that the value of _motion_ is never comparable with that of -_action_. What we commonly call _impulse_ is a manifestation of the -reflex action of some sense or faculty. When we speak of a man's motions -as "blind," "wild," or "furious," it is always a case of response to -external stimulus or of the application of external force. Such motions -are not spontaneous and they therefore pursue no definite course; they -have no basis in the consciousness of the individual and no precise -direction or aim; the individual's concern with them is limited to the -passing moment of their duration; he envisages nothing as to what may be -their result. There may be great initial activity and force, but because -there is no basis in reason, consciousness and spontaneity, momentary -agitation is succeeded by relapse into quiescence. A man who lives by -passion and impulse, who _moves_ rather than _acts_ is like a bell, -which when struck vibrates and emits sound but unless struck is silent. -All passive and transient activity, arising from mere impulse and -sense-stimulation, is in opposition to the positive action required of -us by our revolutionary philosophy, for such _motion_ has no lasting -effect and is powerless to transform the lives of men. - -It is imperative therefore that there should be no confusion of what we -mean by _action_ with what is better termed _motion_. The action of -which I have been speaking is the operation of man's innate faculties -according to the true natural laws of his being; it is what I have -called the expression of conscience in practice, the exercise of -conscience. Although we colloquially speak of "violent actions" and -"wrong-minded action" in describing men's conduct, such conduct, being -that of men acting under the influence of impulse or illusion, should -properly be classed as a form of _motion_. It is not what we mean by -action. - - -ACTION IS NATURE AT WORK IN MAN: THE WHOLE UNIVERSE IS THE SCENE OF -ACTION - -Genuine action is necessarily ordered, rhythmical, systematic and -directed towards some aim. It arises from that fullness of consciousness -described as the "calm of mature reflection." It is inevitably -straightforward and continuous, undeviating and unhesitating. Such -motion as that of the revolving globe we ought not to call mere motion; -that ceaseless axial and orbital rotation is a phenomenon called in -ancient times the _activity_ of nature; and it may serve us as the best -possible illustration of the qualities of action. We may proceed to a -fuller description of the nature of action by saying it is always marked -by a certain regularity and order in the course of its fulfilment. Human -life in all its aspects of growth and development, in each transition -from stage to stage, in the preparatory and supplementary acquisitions -of substance and experience between phase and phase,--all this is -action. The normal routine of daily life,--sleeping, resting, eating and -working,--is all to be considered within the scope of action. For the -meaning of action may apply equally well to what occurs both in states -of repose and in states of movement. While work throughout the process -of carrying out a given task may clearly be action, recreation may also -be action. States of motion and repose are of course to a superficial -view opposites. Moreover in the modern world _motion_ is especially set -up in opposition to _repose_, and emphasized almost to the exclusion of -the latter. This has caused the importance of _stability_ to be lost to -view. - -For the truth of the matter is: "stability allows of repose; repose -allows of calm; calm allows of reflection, and reflection gives grasp." -It should be realized that repose can have a positive function. And what -I call the philosophy of action permits of no distinction between motion -and repose, a distinction which is superficial. A course of action may -involve intervals of both motion and of repose, just as the invisible -working of living matter contributes to the visible growth of the body. -We need only concern ourselves as to whether what is done is in harmony -with the laws of man's innate character. - -The natural processes of the universe and of human life go on -unceasingly, and in trying to ameliorate human life by positive action -we must realize that such action to be effectual must be similar to -those processes in its continuity and tenacity. Positive action in its -every phase, whether outwardly visible or impalpable, never ceases to be -action, never really for a moment comes to a halt. The whole universe is -the scene of such action, and man in so far as he truly acts -participates in its immense activity. Let us therefore distinguish -clearly between mere _motion_ and the true _action_ that works by a -steady advance in an undeviating course, with the timeless -inexhaustibility of flowing water towards its appointed aim. - -And now I have something more to add in definition of the essential -meaning of action and its relation to life. The ancients said "Man's -innate character is given him at birth together with life itself." I -consider _action_ to be the expression of that innate character, and so -as inseparable from life as it. Man in his earliest infancy can laugh -and cry, eat and drink; as he grows up he learns to gaze and listen, -speak and walk; and once grown up, no matter whether he be intelligent -or stupid, he strives for existence, progress, and development. Or, in -other words, he seeks to conform to the elementary needs of human life. -All these phenomena are phenomena of _action_, the action of the -faculties for discerning moral and material good, with which man is -naturally endowed. - -It is apparent to me that love of ease and dislike of exertion are no -part of fundamental human nature, but that on the contrary mankind is -naturally disposed to labor and work. If you compel a lively man -accustomed to be always on his feet and busy with his hands to be idle -and sedentary, depriving him of anything to do, he is certain to feel -exceedingly unhappy. In the same way, the least intelligent or -experienced of men has felt the satisfaction and content that come with -work, the joy of contributing to the accomplishment of some undertaking. -There is a colloquialism current in certain coastal districts of China -which substitutes the word "life" for the word "work"; thus, you may be -asked whether you have "lived your life" for the day, in the sense of -"have you done your day's work?" Work is indeed life; unless a man be -totally incapable he will inevitably require the means of expression for -his abilities, and particularly such expression as will accrue to the -benefit of somebody beyond himself. Even a little child is conscious of -the intense satisfaction to be derived from doing one's best in the -service of others. Though no praise be awarded the child it is aware of -an extraordinary complaisance within itself. - - -THE BROADEST SENSE OF LIFE - -All these little illustrations bear witness to the fact that action is -the object of man's life; and we should, vice versa, make life the -object of our action. We are born with faculties for the discernment of -moral and material good; life, from childhood to old age, is the -energetic, ceaseless, use of them, at first chiefly for the satisfaction -of the needs of one's own existence, to secure one's own footing in -life, but next, as one's mental perspective broadens, the family, the -village, the community, the nation, and mankind become objects of the -desire to express oneself and give of oneself. When we speak of _life_ -it should mean for us the life of mankind, the life and existence of -people and nation, the livelihood of masses and citizenry. And when we -speak of _action_, we should mean action performed in the service of -life in such a broad sense. - -The difference between man and the beasts of the field and the birds of -the air consists just in this. We read in the classics of "a virtue of -surpassing excellence, which is given to the people as a law of their -being," and the virtue alluded to is this propensity to look after one's -own welfare and at the same time the welfare of one's fellow-men. We are -naturally endowed with the disposition to will the good of others and to -act in their service. "Action," with the qualities I have sketched, is -something primordially bound up with life. - - -THE REVOLUTION DEMANDS ACTION OF ALL MEN AT ALL TIMES - -The essential meaning of action being once understood we may proceed to -inquire into its spirit and wherein it finds its highest expression. How -is it that men for all the apparent unity of their existence sometimes -live lives of such devotion to the good of mankind and the world that -they earn the admiration of posterity, while others live degenerate -lives governed by the lowest desires, to the detriment of themselves and -their neighbors? Education and environment are factors that play their -part in this, but more important is what the ancient called "material -desire"--the tendency to seek possession rather than creation, to enjoy -rather than contribute. In the words of Dr. Sun, "making one's aim -acquisition and not service" leads to degraded and uncontrolled conduct -which is an obstacle to human progress and what we as comrades in -Revolution must strive our utmost to avoid and eradicate. - -Revolutionary motives are motives of service, of self-sacrifice for the -good of others. The task the Revolution sets itself is the "practice of -goodwill" in the broadest sense of those words,--action inspired by love -for men to the exclusion of all that tends to their harm. In our -revolutionary zeal to promote _positive action_ throughout our world we -aim to create an all-pervading moral attitude to life such as is -rationally conformable to man's true nature; and we moreover seek to -bring into full play the deep funds of humanity and benevolence in our -own people. We push aside considerations of individual ability, of past -education and environment, and of how far bad habits acquired may have -become ingrained. We appeal to all as they are to take fresh stock of -their lives and realize how from the very fact of their being alive they -possess the ability to act,--to act in no less a sense than the great -deliverers of mankind in their saintly and heroic deeds. The difference -between such deeds and the actions of normal daily life is one of -degree, not of kind. We are everyone men born of woman and passing our -days between heaven and earth; not for us to vex ourselves with fear of -failure; the only failure is in failing to act. - - -THE MEANING OF EASE - -Let use take the three key-virtues of judgment, goodwill, and courage as -our guides in the task of "playing the man." For the rest, let us follow -the dictum of Sun Wên to the effect that "the very clever and able -should strive to serve ten million fellow-men; a man of lesser ability -may aspire to serve ten hundred men; while a man devoid of talent may -content himself with doing the best he can for a single fellow-man." The -highly talented may perform their duties with ease; the moderately -gifted may make smooth progress with theirs; while the poorly gifted may -do so with only a narrow margin of competence; but all that matters is -our full use of our faculties in positive action for the good of others. -If we advance without ever falling away from a pure and concentrated -resolve to do our best, we shall certainly be able to realize the ideal -of _action_. In a sense it will prove _easy_, though this does not of -course mean that anything can be got without pains or anything managed -in a facile and quiescent fashion. Nor does it mean that all will -necessarily be plain sailing, fraught with no obstacles. Our path -through life is strewn with dangers, hindrances and obstructions. -Revolutionary action is attended by many risks; it requires the will to -make great sacrifices. Nevertheless, man's capacity for positive action -has achieved many a colossal feat in the course of his history, the -prodigious hydraulic engineering of the ancients, ascent into the air -and penetration of the earth, and revolutionary deeds that have -transformed the face of human affairs. The ultimate consideration is -always whether we possess thorough determination and a spirit of -unflinching zeal, for with these we may overcome towering obstacles as -it were "in our stride," and "face dangers with imperturbable calm." A -man worthy of his place in the ranks of the Revolution will regard as -nothing extraordinary difficulties and dangers that would daunt others. -His revolutionary spirit, which is the very spirit of action, gives him -a sublime indifference to whatever may be the magnitude of the demands -his duty makes upon him; whatever his principles, faith and -responsibility involve is "all in the day's work" for him, though it be -ordeal by fire and water or the abnegation of everything dearest to him. -He takes no account of difficulty, and fear is a thing still stranger to -him. It is in the sense that to a man with such an attitude action is -_easy_ that I use the word. - -Action born of that innate character given us with life, conceived in -absolute sincerity, and aimed at the good of others treats things as -"all of a piece." From beginning to end of an appointed task it -maintains a uniform consistency and integrity of purpose. The seeds of -its final success are inherent in its first beginnings. Difficulty and -failure as I understand them can have no part in such action. - -Positive action with a complete integrity of purpose produces that -honesty and trustworthiness which are distinctive marks of all true -action. It penetrates to the core of matters, and deals only in -realities. It is free from superficial trappings and fuss; permits of no -slack approximation and evasion of the point, all of which comes from -that shrinking from effort and hardship that is so incompatible with the -spirit of positive action. Whereas I have called all true action _easy_, -those who go about things without its spirit find themselves confronted -with seemingly insurmountable difficulties everywhere. When the ancients -said: "There is nothing either difficult or easy in the world," they had -in mind this way of thinking, as I had too when I said that wartime and -peacetime were one and the same. - - -SINCERITY THE ROOT OF ACTION AND GOODWILL - -The next thing to consider is what is to be the central aim of our -action. I would answer if asked this with a single word: "Goodwill." -Action is the _practice of goodwill_ in its deepest sense. - -Goodwill is grounded in the sense of justice and issues from complete -sincerity. The sincere man is necessarily conscious of goodwill and he -is necessarily possessed of the moral courage required to practice it. -The ancients said "there is completeness in sincerity," and again, -"where there is not sincerity there is a void." The place of sincerity -in human life is indeed like that of energy in the atom, the structure -of which would collapse without it. If a man's life lacks "ardent -sincerity," he will likewise be powerless to form and manifest the three -key-virtues of judgment, goodwill, and courage. And without the strength -to be derived from those virtues, the Three Principles of the People can -make no headway. Only by action inspired with perfect sincerity can the -splendid truths of those Principles be asserted and translated into -fact. - -Sincerity is dependent upon the sense of justice. The keynote of our -Republican Revolution has been the smashing of selfish individualism and -the rescue of our people from their sufferings and of our nation from -its peril. To achieve what yet remains to be done, to acquit ourselves -well as a section of humanity, and to explore the full scope of possible -human well-being, all we do and enact must be grounded in perfect -sincerity. Then the pains we take and the plans we devise will prove -creative, progressive, and constructive; we shall put flesh on the bones -of the egalitarian philosophy of social justice; we shall be clear as to -what we think and are aiming at; we shall be able to give full -expression to our true nature and faculties, proceeding in all we do -resolutely, frankly, and boldly. - -Action attains its highest point of intensity in the giving of one's -life in the cause of justice, when death in that cause is accepted as -sweet and shorn of all its terrors. "One may die in the course of -willing men good, but life is not to be purchased at the price of -willing them ill" is a classical teaching we may take as a supreme ideal -of positive action. Action that lives up to that ideal will inevitably -be _revolutionary_, while, vice versa, it is only genuinely -revolutionary conduct that possesses the true qualities of positive -action. Sincerity is the primal motive force of action. With it, a man -is aware only of the interests he has in common with his fellow-men, and -of none that conflicts with those of his fellow-men. With sincerity, a -man acts his will to good in perfect self-possession, pushing steadily -onwards through difficulty and danger to success. This is the bearing of -Dr. Sun's teaching on the revolutionary movement. - - -THE LAWS OF ACTION - -In what I have said so far I have sketched the outlines of our -conception of action. Men differ in profession, rank and work; but there -is not a single one of us but must be a _man of action_ if our -revolutionary aims are to be completely realized. Action, however, is -subject to certain laws, which I now wish to go into. It must, firstly, -have its _point-de-départ_, secondly its regular order of procedure -(that is, a methodical and scientific plan), thirdly, its definite goal, -and lastly it must possess the qualities of constancy and continuity. - - -One: The Starting Point - -Firstly, by _point-de-départ_ we mean the careful selection of whatever -way of approach may be most appropriate, direct, and efficacious for the -carrying out of our projects. The same is true of study, affairs, and -revolutionary action. The ancients said: "Ascent must start from places -low; remote objectives are attained from near beginnings." This was -their way of expressing the nature of the _point-de-départ_. If any -mistake is made about it we are bound to miss our objective and -destination however sure we may be of the direction in which we want to -go. Again, if we try to run before we can walk, or skip preliminaries, -or gain the heights by some ill-considered short-cut, our work will -inevitably prove abortive. - - -Two: Ordered Unfolding of Plans - -Secondly, the necessity for what I have called "a regular order of -procedure" means the uselessness of reliance upon mere verve and -enthusiasm, and the futility of action taken on the spur of some -transitory turn of thought, action which is bound to encounter -unforeseen obstacles in its course, be disconcerted by them, and lose -its character as action by becoming some irrational form of _motion_. -Action must be preceded by the laying down of plans and choice of a mode -of procedure whereby all possible contingencies may be allowed for and -prepared for. The plans, moreover, must be precise in matters of time -and space, and in quantitative and numerical considerations. They must, -when decided upon, be carried out with due attention to detail, and with -periodical stock-taking of the ground covered. A steady rate of advance -will thus be maintained. When it is possible to make plans it is -obviously also possible to foresee to a great extent the circumstances -of time and place under which the plans will be carried out and the -quantitative and numerical requirements that will have to be met. In -scientific accordance with these foreseen circumstances and requirements -the execution of the whole project should be apportioned among the -persons involved so that each has work in all respects congenial to his -qualities, while provision is also made for cooperation between all -concerned. With order and method in procedure there will be no putting -of the cart before the horse, no abrupt intrusion of irrelevancies, no -slackening at moments of urgency, or precipitate speed where none is -needed; day by day and step by step substantial progress will be made. -In this way we shall have no abortive enterprises, nor the -disappointment they engender. - - -Three: Unswerving Aim at the Target - -Coming, thirdly, to the matter of _goal_, it should be like a -conspicuous target at which one takes steady, unfaltering, aim. No -matter whether the work we are engaged in be of vast or slight -dimensions, its aim should be seen, as it were, through sights trained -on the main target of an ideal goal. To every piece of work there must -be a beginning and an end, a clearly-defined destination. Before the -destination be reached there can be no pause in our concentrated effort. - - -Four: The Even Texture of a Life of Action - -Lastly, with regard to the fourth and especially important point: -perseverance and continuity, the very qualities that, as I said at the -beginning, distinguish _action_ from _motion_. I spoke of action as -essentially regular, orderly, and purposeful, and said that such action -would necessarily be revolutionary action and its influence -revolutionary influence. In other words, revolutionary action unfolds in -an unbroken uniformity of effort; it draws on the funds of moral vigor -in our national genius, and provides a new channel for the expression -of the great moral qualities of which that genius is composed, whereby -it may rehabilitate the status to which it is properly entitled. It must -be realized that our Revolutionary and the reconstructive activities -pursue a broad and enlightened policy free from all manner of trickery -and opportunism. We are actuated by a spirit of extraordinary power, but -what we are doing is nothing abnormal as the word should be understood, -and our methods are wholly realistic. - -All unnatural and inhuman conduct, and illogical and unscientific -methods, result in frustration and can have no place in revolutionary -activity. The ancients spoke of "acts of routine virtue" in their -emphasis upon the almost _humdrum_, stolid, qualities of true virtue. -Our Revolution is likewise dependent upon the capacity to maintain a -course of persevering and continuous effort; the behavior required is in -no way peculiar or foreign to everyday life. For out of continuity comes -perseverance and what we may call _ease_. Tsêng Kuo-fan said: "things -should be done soundlessly and as it were 'odorlessly,' with both -precision and economy of effort." By this he meant not wooden -impassivity or dry-as-dust pedantry but directness, simplicity, and an -absence of fuss, a straightforward and unassuming way of going about -things. In working for the success of the Revolution we should cultivate -the attitude of the nameless hero who braves dangers and endures -hardships as matters of course. We shall thus keep in touch with the -people and render the influence of what we do in the service of mankind -broad and lasting. - - -FORMATION AND CONSTANCY OF PURPOSE - -Unremitting perseverance to the very end of our task, every day we live -a day of positive action, and full employment of our powers in harmony -with the laws of Nature and Man, are the conditions for our successful -accomplishment of our revolutionary mission. Among Tsêng Kuo-fan's -self-admonitory words on "Formation of Purpose" there are the following -phrases: "To cast away the gifts of Heaven and live in sloth will bring -upon me some evil catastrophe.... This I swear never to forget as long -as I can still draw breath." That is to say, the formation of our -purpose in life requires of us diligent and courageous devotion and the -full exercise of our talents. The great writer and statesman also -admonished himself on the subject of steadfastness of purpose, -reproaching himself: "Again and again have you been delinquent in your -duties and endeavors, and been swayed by material temptations; but no -one has ever heard of your being unpunctual at mealtimes!" How is it, he -meant, that if we can be regular in attending to our material wants we -cannot be equally unfailing in the performance of our duties? The full -accomplishment of any aim requires strong-minded formation and -steadfastness of purpose. The true meaning of the words "let the -superior man exert himself with the unfailing pertinacity of Nature" -embraces this. - -I have now completed my explanation of the fundamental principles -involved in positive action. I wish to conclude by once again exhorting -you all to firm faith in the Tsung-li's teaching: "From true knowledge -action naturally proceeds." The meaning of the Revolution is as bright -and spacious as the skies; and the clearer our comprehension of it the -more vigor we shall put into the practice of it. Moreover, the methods -we are to adopt and the mode of procedure we are to follow have been -laid down for us in detail by Dr. Sun Wên. We have only to obey his -directions, each of us playing a part for which his temperament, calling -and knowledge fits him, relying upon his faculties for the discernment -of moral and material good at every step in his bold and resolute -execution of his duty to nation and people. - - -ACTION ENGENDERS KNOWLEDGE - -I wish to say another word on the subject of the _knowledge_ from which -as we have seen action proceeds; and what I have to say is: that just as -action proceeds from knowledge, action in its turn engenders knowledge. -Dr. Sun said: "The ability to know implies the ability to act." I would -add the words: "without action one cannot attain to knowledge." For -knowledge comes with experience, and apart from the broad and -fundamental truths of revolutionary thought our knowledge need not -necessarily be in the first place very rich. Though, therefore, we must -of course do all we can to acquire knowledge for its own sake, we must -at the same time seek it as one of the fruits of positive action. Any -knowledge acquired in the course of study, research, or experience which -we do not proceed to put to the test of practice in the field of -actuality is not to be considered with certainty as worthy of being -called true knowledge. So it is that in all our undertakings practice -will yield us true knowledge, and action alone will give us the ability -to extend and enrich our knowledge. Chu Hsi in his commentary on the -_Great Learning_ wrote: "By long application of our powers we one day -reach a point whence we see the whole scheme of things spread out before -us, we perceive the realities underlying phenomena, the relation of -accident to essence, and the structure and workings of the human mind." -This attainment can come only as the fruit of positive action. If in the -course of practice and experience knowledge we have acquired and methods -we have based on it prove inefficacious we may take it that what we -valued as knowledge was not true knowledge. In this way we shall be -constantly broadening the scope and sifting the quality of our -knowledge, which is the genuine process of gaining knowledge. "To be -aware of ignorance brings knowledge" and "the open mind invites the -entrance of information," are maxims than which none are better as -guides in the search for knowledge. - - -COMRADES IN REVOLUTION! RESOLVE ANEW! - -I am well aware of the magnitude of our revolutionary task of Resistance -and Reconstruction, and I have been no less impressed with recent -manifestations of my comrades' will to action. I have felt impelled by -the one and encouraged by the other to present you today this exposition -of positive action and of what is requisite for its success, in the hope -that you will all keep in mind these indispensable principles, gathering -fresh knowledge with experience, acting with deliberation, perspicacity, -and conscientiousness, spurning all things that tend to distract you -from your fixed purpose and involve you in the wild and motiveless -conduct of those who possess no such fixed purpose. In the _Chung-Yung_, -or _Doctrine of the Mean_, there is a passage emphasizing the importance -of "conscientiousness" in action, by which it means the refusal to be -satisfied with half-measures, the pursuit of ends to their logical -conclusion. If you give earnest thought to what I have said you will -realize that very much of what has long passed with us for action has -not been true action, that is, not positive action, and that therefore -we have failed in much that we have undertaken. It is only because our -action has not been really positive that we have allowed our minds to -enlarge on the difficulties and dangers of the Revolution. In fact, -these difficulties exist only for those whose minds lack resolution, -enthusiasm and faith. The ancient adage says: "There's nothing difficult -in the world if there's a man of spirit to be found" (where there's a -will there's a way). This is a piece of the age-old proverbial wisdom of -the people, and it may well serve us as a salutary warning against the -slack thinking and evil habits concealed beneath the airy phrase: "It's -easy enough to know what should be done; it's acting accordingly that's -hard." - -We need, therefore, in the revolutionary nation-building we have before -us only to assert our wills, inflame our hearts with a fresh sincerity -and faith, and give ourselves up to positive action. If everyone of us -does so, I have no hesitation in pronouncing it will mean the certainty -of our success. - - - - -_C._ DEFINITION OF THE PROBLEMS CONCERNING THE ORGANIZATION OF THE -VARIOUS CLASSIFICATIONS OF _HSIEN_ (CHIANG K'AI-SHEK)[1] - - - [Footnote 1: [Chiang K'ai-shek], _Ch'üeh-ting Hsien Ko-chi Tsu-chih - Wên-t'i_ (Definition of the Problems Concerning the Organization of - the Various Classifications of _Hsien_), [Chungking], 1939, p. 43 and - chart.] - - One of a series of lectures, each issued separately, - entitled _The Conclusions of the Party Chief_, and - originally delivered before the Party and Government - Training Class of the Central Training Corps. Compare with - Appendix I (G), p. 324. - - The chart, opposite, is a translation of the chart appended - to the original Chinese of the Generalissimo's booklet on - _Hsien_. P.M.A.L. - - -ORGANIZATION OF THE VARIOUS CLASSIFICATIONS OF _HSIEN_ - - +------------------+ _Hsien_ - _Hsien_ |_Hsien_ Government| _Hsien_ Party - People'.........................|------------------|.......................Party Supervisory - Council | _Hsien_ Chief | Organ Committee - | | (Magistrate) | | | - | +---------------------------------------------------------------+ | +--+ - | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +---------| | - |People's | | | | | | | | | | | | | |People's | | - |Organizations |Library|Middle-|Land |Mili- |Edu- |Civic | |Organizations: | | - |(_cont'd_): | |School |Section|tary |cation |Affairs| | Ex-Servicemen's | | - | Laborers Assn.| | | |Section|Section|Section| | Assn. | | - | Farmers' Assn.| Cooperative | | | | | | Elders' Assn. | | - | Merchants' | Union | | Reconstruction| Police | Women's Assn. | | - | Assn. | | | Section | Bureau | Able-bodied | | - | Education | Social | | | Citizens' Corps| | - | Assn. | Affairs | Finance | Young Men's Corps| | - | Others Experimental Section | Section | | | - | Farm | Public | | - | +------------------+ Health | | - | Reconstruction-----| _Ch'ü_ Bureau | Bureau District| - | Committee |------------------| Party | - | | _Ch'ü_ Chief | Organ | - | +---------------------------------------------------------+ | | - | | | | | | | | | | | | | | - | | Ch'ü |Military |Education|Director | Health | | | - | | Vocational |Director |Director |of Civic | Bureau | | | - | | Training | | |Affairs | | | | - | | Class | Reconstruction | | Able-bodied| | - | | | Director | Police Citizens' | | - | Cooperative | Finance Bureau Union | | - | Union | Director | | - _Hsiang_ +------------------+ | | - People's <==================> | _Hsiang_ [or | Sub- | - Council | _Ch'ên_] Office | district| - | |------------------| Party | - | | _Hsiang_ Chief | Organ | - | +-----------------------------------------+ | | - | | | | | | | | | | | | - | People's | School| Division| Division|People's | | - | Organizations | System| of | of |Organizations: | | - | (_cont'd_): | | Police | Economic| Ex-Servicemen's | | - | Laborers' Assn.| | Affairs | Affairs | Assn. | | - | Farmers' Assn. | | | | Elder's Assn. | | - | Education Assn.| | Division of | Women's Assn. | | - | Others | | Cultural | Able-bodied | | - | Cooperatives | Affairs | Citizens' Corps | | - | | | Young Men's Corps | | - _Pao_ +------------------+ | Small- | - People's <==================> | _Pao_ Office | Division Group | - Council |------------------| of Civic (cell) | - | | _Pao_ Chief | Affairs | | - | +-----------------------------------+ | | - | | | | | | | | | | Party - | |Citizen's| Economic| Police | _Pao_ Able-bodied | Super- - | |School | Affairs | Section | Citizens' Troop | visors' - | | | Section | | | Net - | _Pao_ | | Civic | - | Cooperatives | Cultural Affairs | - | | Affairs Section | - | | Section | - | | | - | +------------------+ _Chia_ Able-bodied | - | | _Chia_ Chief |-------------Citizens' Troop | - | +------------------+ | - | | | - |------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| - | The People | - +------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ - -At the fifth meeting of the Fourth Plenary Session of the Central -Executive and Supervisory Committees of the Kuomintang on April 8, 1938, -I made a speech on "The Reform of Party Affairs and Readjustments for -Party and Political Organizations." Attached to that speech was a draft -chart showing the interrelations among the Party and political -organizations under the _hsien_, with illustrations and explanations. I -pointed out then that the chart was only intended as an initial draft. -As to promulgating the detailed formulae and laws for execution, I -pointed out that the draft was only to serve as a basis and that the -wording in which the draft was written should not prove too binding. -There should be plenty of room for further study and discussion so that -perfection might be obtained. Furthermore, the draft chart was intended -mainly as an exposition of the relations between Party and political -organizations (hence it was also called "Party and Political Affairs -Chart"). The various administrative organizations were attached as an -appendix to it. - -Since the publication of this draft chart, the serious attention of many -of our comrades, scholars and specialists has been aroused. In many -districts experiments have been carried on--a fact which is indeed very -gratifying and which evidences the earnest desire on the part of various -local administrations for reform. - -The Party and Political Personnel Training Class was recently -inaugurated by the Central Training Corps. In order to lecture on the -problems covered in the draft chart and lay out the necessary formulae, -I had instructed several of my associates to collect views and data from -all possible sources and to make a thorough study of the question. Under -my personal supervision, the original draft has been revised and -supplemented. The main points contained therein may be summarized as -follows: - -1. In connection with Party organizations, the _ch'ü_[2] (township) -office should be linked up with the _hsiang_ (_chên_), while small units -should be established under the _pao chia_ system. Thus the Party -organizations are brought to conformity with the political. The network -of Party members' supervisory organizations should be placed directly -under the Supervisory Committee of the _hsien_ Party headquarters. - - [Footnote 2: For explanation of such local government terms as - _hsiang_, _pao_, _ch'ü_, see the text, p. 107.] - -2. The _hsien_ is the unit of local government autonomy. The _hsien_ -should be classified into three to six groups according to their area, -population, economic resources, cultural and communication development. -Below the _hsien_, the _hsiang_ (_chên_) constitutes the basic lower -unit, with _pao_ or village and streets as their constituents. -Elasticity may be allowed between the _hsien_ and _hsiang_ according to -local requirements. When and where necessary, a _ch'ü_ (township) office -may be established to serve as the connecting link, but if this is not -needed, the _hsiang_ (_chên_) should be placed under the direct -jurisdiction of the _hsien_. The same elasticity may exist between the -_hsiang_ (_chên_) and _pao_. In densely populated areas, a village and -a street may form one natural unit, inseparable from each other. In such -cases, one unit may consist of two or three _pao_ with one _pao chang_ -(chief of the _pao_) at the helm of affairs, so that unnecessary -breaking-up of the village from the street may be avoided. To eliminate -difficulties arising from finances and personnel, all the posts of -secretaries (_kan shih_) of the _hsiang_ (_chên_) and _pao_ (or village -and street) may be concurrently served by the teachers of primary -schools, while the school principals of the _hsiang_ (_chên_) and _pao_ -should concurrently serve as leader of the able-bodied citizens' corps -(_Chuang ting tui_) in accordance with the principle of unity of -administration, instruction, support and protection. In areas with -better economic and educational development where affairs concerning -local autonomy are multifarious, the principals of _hsiang_ (_chên_) -primary schools and pao citizens' [mass education] schools should -preferably concentrate on their school jobs with a view to efficiency. -The masses should be organized into different groups to undertake -different works in order to meet the actual requirements. - -3. In connection with organs for expressing the views and opinions of -the people, there should be organized the _pao_ people's assembly, the -_hsiang_ (_chên_) people's representative assembly, the _hsien_ council, -each vested with proper authority, with a view to increasing the -people's interest in participating in government affairs. Thus the -influence of the masses may be properly magnified and the goal of true -democracy attained. With a view to greater alacrity, I wish to explain -in further detail as follows: - - -A. READJUSTMENTS IN THE RELATIONS AMONG THE VARIOUS ADMINISTRATIVE PARTY -AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS OF THE _Hsien_ - -(_This item, consisting of eleven articles, is not intended for -publication._) - - A routine announcement of Party duties, of Party supervision - of local morale, of seniorities as between Party and - Government officers, etc. follows. It has been omitted in - accordance with the statement in parentheses. - - -B. POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS - -1. The _hsien_ is the unit of local autonomy. These units can be -classified into from three to six groups according to the population, -economic status, culture and communication. On the one hand, the _hsien_ -governments should handle affairs concerning local autonomy of their -respective district under the supervision of the provincial government -and on the other hand should carry out the orders of the Central and -provincial governments. - -_a._ The area of the _hsien_ under the present system should remain the -same as before. The cancellation of the _hsien_ and the change in its -area are to be decided upon only with the authorization and approval of -the Central Government. In the _hsien_ there should be a magistrate, -under whom there should be secretaries, section chiefs, directors, -police officers, senior and junior staff members in the different -sections, technicians and assistants and police patrol officers handling -civic, financial, educational, construction, military, land, and social -affairs. The number of sections to be provided under the _hsien_ -governments and their duties is to be decided by the provincial -government which in making decisions is to take into consideration the -local requirements of the _hsien_ concerned. The number of staff -members, and their ranks and salaries, is likewise to be decided upon by -the provincial government. - -_b._ In each _hsien_ there should be held _hsien_ political affairs -meetings at which decisions concerning the _hsien_ administration are to -be reached and proposals made for submission to the _hsien_ People's -Council. The _hsien_ political affairs meetings should be held -irrespective of whether the _hsien_ Council has been established or not. - -_c._ The rules and regulations governing the organization of the _hsien_ -governments should be promulgated by the provincial governments and then -submitted to the Central Government for approval. - -2. The _ch'ü_ (township) office is a subsidiary organization to the -_hsien_ government. Its duty is to supervise the affairs of the various -_hsiang_ (_chên_) on behalf of the _hsien_ government in connection with -the enforcement of local autonomy. - -_a._ The scope of the _ch'ü_ should consist of from six to fifteen -_hsiang_. In those _hsien_ in which the total number of _hsiang_ is -below fifteen, no _ch'ü_ office should be established. The _hsiang_ in -such cases are to be placed under the direct jurisdiction of the _hsien_ -government. In frontier regions where special conditions obtain, -specifications for the number of _hsiang_ for the _ch'ü_ office may be -modified. - -In _hsien_ where no _ch'ü_ office is established, the _hsien_ government -should appoint representatives to supervise the affairs of the different -_hsiang_. - -_b._ The _ch'ü_ office is headed by a district chief under whom there -should be two to five directors handling civic, financial, construction, -education, and military affairs. All such personnel are by special -appointment with pay, and they should be chosen by the superior -organizations from those who have received appropriate training. The -district chiefs should preferably be those who come from the districts -to which they are designated, their qualifications and treatment to be -fixed by law. - -_c._ In the place where the _ch'ü_ office is seated, there should be -established a police bureau which is to be under the direction of the -district chief dealing with the police administration of the place. - -_d._ In the _ch'ü_ there should be established the _hsiang_ -reconstruction committee comprising local leaders as members. This -committee is to conduct research and map out the plans concerning rural -reconstruction, the district chief acting concurrently as its chairman. - -_e._ In order to increase the vocational ability of the people and -develop local industries, there should be established in the _ch'ü_ -vocational training classes. - -_f._ In addition to the number of policemen as specified, there should -be organized in the _ch'ü_ the joint able-bodied citizens' corps -(_Chuang-ting lien tui-pu_) office which is to control and supervise the -_Chuang-ting_ of the various _hsiang_ (_chên_). Whenever necessary, the -_chuang-ting_ may be summoned together for special training and -organization. - -_g._ The _ch'ü_ office should unite together all the _hsiang_ (_chên_) -cooperative societies and organize them into cooperative unions. Each -union is to consist of several departments dealing with different -cooperative enterprises. The _ch'ü_ office should appoint a supervisor -to be stationed in the union. - -3. The _hsiang_ (_chên_) is to be defined as the basic administrative -unit under the _hsien_, and its organization should be substantiated -accordingly. - -a. Each _hsiang_ in principle comprises six to fifteen _pao_. In drawing -such limits, however, consideration should be given to the historical -background and natural conditions of the locality. The demarcation and -the organization of the _pao chia_ system are to be decided upon by the -_hsien_ government, subject to the approval of the provincial -government. Reports must also be submitted to the Central Government. - -_b._ The chief personnel of the _hsiang_ guild (_kung so_) should -include a director (_hsiang chang_) and one or two vice-directors. They -are to be elected from qualified citizens at the _hsiang_ people's -representative meetings. In the guild there should be provided four -departments, handling civic, police, economic and cultural affairs -respectively, each to be headed by one man with several staff members. -These posts should be held by the vice-directors and teachers of the -_hsiang_ primary schools. The date for the election of the director and -vice-directors of the _hsiang_ is to be fixed and announced in orders to -be issued by the _hsien_ government. The term of their office will be -two years. - -_c._ There should be established in each _hsiang_ a central school -composed of three divisions for children, women especially, and adults. -There should be primary and higher primary classes. The posts of the -school principal, leader of the able-bodied citizens' corps, and -director of the _hsiang_ are to be concurrently held by one man. The -teachers are to undertake the extracurricular duties of training and -supervising. They are also to help the _hsiang director_ to handle -affairs of the _hsiang_. In the higher primary class of the school -stress should be laid on training the masses to enable them to undertake -the work of census-taking, promotion of health and sanitation and -cooperative affairs. - -In places with better economic and educational development, the -principals of the _hsiang_ central schools should preferably concentrate -on their own duties at school. - -_d._ The cooperative societies also have the _hsiang_ as the unit (with -branch societies in the _pao_). There should also be established in the -_hsiang_ public safe-deposit agencies for the storage of articles. -Separate granaries should be set up whenever necessary. - -_e._ The leader of the _hsiang_ able-bodied citizens' corps should from -time to time summon chosen groups of the _chuang ting_ of the _pao_ to -the _hsiang_ to undergo advanced training. During the training period, -they are to perform police duties and when the period expires they are -to be sent back to take up the work as junior officers of the -able-bodied citizens' corps of the _pao_, charged also with the duties -of promoting local autonomy in the _pao_. Thus not only will the police -force be strengthened, but various activities properly developed. The -outposts established in the _hsiang_ by the _hsien_ police bureaus -should also be placed under the direction of the _hsiang_ director. - -_f._ The _hsiang_ should convene _hsiang_ affairs meetings with the -director as chairman and all the department heads and senior members of -the staff in attendance. The chiefs of the _pao_ concerning whom -proposals are submitted to the meeting should also be present. - -_g._ A hospital or clinic should be established for each _hsiang_ or a -number of _hsiang_. These hospitals or clinics should be staffed with -Western-trained doctors. In case of lack of personnel and finance, -[old-style] Chinese physicians may do on a temporary basis. - -4. The _pao_ should be defined as a constituent of the _hsiang_ and its -organization be substantiated accordingly. - -_a._ Each _pao_ is to consist of from six to fifteen _chia_, headed by a -_pao chang_ (chief of the _pao_) and an assistant _pao chang_. They are -to be elected from qualified citizens at the _pao_ people's meeting, and -their names are to be submitted by the _hsiang_ guild to the _hsien_ -government. Before the election, the _pao chang_ and assistant _pao -chang_ may be nominated by the _hsiang_ guild subject to official -appointment by the _hsien_ government. In the office of the _pao_ there -should be two to four secretaries (_kan shih_) handling civic, police, -economic and cultural affairs. These posts may be concurrently held by -the assistant _pao chang_ and teachers of citizens' (mass education) -schools. In _pao_ with limited finances, one secretary may suffice. - -The term of office for the _pao chang_ and assistant _pao chang_ will be -two years. They may be re-elected at the expiration of their term of -office. - -_b._ All affairs of the _pao_ should be discussed and transacted at -_pao_ affairs meeting in which as many capable citizens of the _pao_ as -possible are to be asked to participate, in order to hasten progress of -the reconstruction of the _pao_. - -_c._ All the activities undertaken by the _pao_ are to be under the -supervision and direction of the hsiang guild, the _ch'ü_ office and the -_hsien_ government. The latter superior organs should give constant help -and advice so that the program of work may be carried out step by step -as desired. - -_d._ Every _pao_ is to have a mass education school, with the principal -of the school concurrently serving as the _pao chang_ and as the leader -of the _pao_ able-bodied citizens' corps. The school is to comprise -three divisions for children, for women especially, and for adults, and -its aim is to raise the level of education and vocational ability of the -masses. Teachers are also to help the _pao chang_ in dealing with -various affairs of the _pao_. - -In _pao_ better-developed in economic resources and education, the -principles of the mass education schools should preferably concentrate -on their school duties. - -_e._ Membership of the _pao_ branches of the cooperative societies is -composed of the families in the _pao_. The directors of the branch -societies are to be elected by members. The _pao chang_ can be elected -and concurrently hold this office. - -_f._ The _pao_ office, the _pao_ able-bodied citizens' corps and the -_pao_ mass education schools should be simultaneously established. They -should have a joint office so that affairs of common interest may be -pushed from the same center. - -_g._ In densely populated areas where a village and a street seem each -to be an integral part of the other, two or three _pao_ may be -amalgamated, the amalgamation not exceeding three _pao_. The mass -education schools, branch cooperative societies and treasuries, -likewise, may be amalgamated, with only the _pao_ able-bodied citizens' -corps remaining separate. One presiding _pao chang_ is to be elected to -take the helm of affairs, and a joint office is to be established. - -_h._ The _pao_ should be equipped with a medicine box, with one of the -mass education school teachers trained in rudiments of the medical -science, in charge. He is to give simple treatment for diseases and to -give small-pox vaccination. If this should prove beyond the finances of -one _pao_, several _pao_ may join together. - -_i._ The organization of the _chia_ is to consist of from six to fifteen -families, headed by a _chia chang_. There should be meetings of the -heads of families, and general _chia_ conferences, held from time to -time. - -The _chia chang_ is to be elected at the meeting of heads of families. -His name is to be submitted by the _pao_ office to the _hsiang_ guild. - -_j._ The _pao_ may retain its old name, such as _ts'un_ (village), -_chieh_ (street) or _ch'ang_ (market), but it is desired that they -should gradually adopt the official name of _pao_ with a view to -uniformity. - - -C. PEOPLE'S ORGANS THROUGH WHICH POPULAR POLITICAL OPINIONS MAY BE -EXPRESSED - -1. To increase the people's interest in participation in government -affairs and to train their political insight and ability in accordance -with the principle of the inherent unity of teaching, learning and -practicing, people's organs for discussion of government affairs for the -various administrative units under the _hsien_ should be established -within specified time limits, and these organs should be vested with the -appropriate authority. - -2. In the _pao_ should be established the _pao_ people's meeting to -elect the _pao chang_; the _hsiang_, the _hsiang_ people's -representative meeting to elect the _hsiang chang_.[3] (The -qualifications and standards of both the _pao chang_ and the _hsiang -chang_ are to be specified by law.) Thus it is hoped to attain the ideal -standards of local government and to establish the system of the -people's supervision of the government. No people's organ is needed for -the _ch'ü_ (district), while the _hsien_ people's council will serve as -the general organ for people of the entire _hsien_. - - [Footnote 3: Heretofore translated as "director of the _hsiang_."] - -3. With a view to flexibility in the exercise of the people's -privileges, members of the _hsien_ people's council are to be brought -forth at the _hsiang_ people's representative meetings. Each _hsiang_ is -entitled to elect one representative as member of the council. The -number of representatives of legitimate professional bodies may be -increased in order to put representation of the districts and that of -the professions on equal footing. Representatives to the _hsiang_ -people's meeting are to be produced at the _pao_ people's meeting. Each -_pao_ is entitled to two representatives. The _pao_ people's meeting -should be attended by one person from each family whose qualifications -and position in the family conforms to specifications in the law. - -4. The _hsiang chang_ and _pao chang_ who are elected may both act as -chairmen of their respective people's organs, namely the _hsiang_ -people's representative meeting and the _pao_ people's meeting. The -_hsien_ people's council for the time being is not to elect the -magistrate. It is to elect its own chairman. - -5. Before the _hsien_ people's council is organized, the budget and -accounts of the _hsien_ government should be studied and passed by the -_hsien_ Administrative Meeting and then submitted by the magistrate to -the provincial government for approval. - -After the _hsien_ people's council is inaugurated, the budget and -accounts of the _hsien_ should be presented to the council for -examination and then submitted to the provincial government for -approval. When necessary, the budget and accounts may first be sent to -the provincial government for approval and then the council may be -approached for confirmation and verification. - - -EXPLANATION - -1. The basic spirit of this draft is to arouse and mobilize the masses, -to strengthen local organization and hasten district autonomy -enterprises so that the cornerstone of the revolution and national -reconstruction may be laid. Some may be of the opinion that as education -has not been popularized, it would be difficult to allow the masses -participation in government affairs. But the political system stressing -on people's privileges must be founded on the will of the masses. If -participation in government affairs is allowed only after education has -been developed on a nation-wide scale, the slogan "revolutionized -people's privileges" will be of no meaning. The people need only be -trained practically in the exercise of their political privileges, and -the main task of the government during the political tutelage period -lies in teaching the people how to exercise their four rights -[election; recall; initiative; referendum]. Tutelary government -[Party-dictatorship] and constitutional government are different only in -degree but not in fundamentals. During the period of tutelage, -therefore, the interest of the people in participation in government -affairs must be gradually aroused and increased. Thus measures enforced -with this purpose in view during the political tutelage period may not -contravene the aims of constitutional government, and the progress from -tutelage to constitutionalism may be attained smoothly. This explains -the transitional process from the beginning to the complete realization -of autonomous government and it was for such an explanation that this -draft was prepared. - -2. With a view to the solution of the personnel and financial problems -confronting the various basic administrative units, the _hsiang_ chief, -_hsiang_ central school principal, and the _hsiang_ leader of the -able-bodied citizens' corps, excepting in those areas more highly -developed in education and economic resources, should be the same man. -The same thing applies to the _pao_. All those charged with -administrative duties should pay attention to education which should -serve as the means to attain the objectives of the revolution and -national reconstruction. Those with educational responsibilities should -give their time and energy also to the organization and training of the -masses. They should consider the masses as their students, the society -as a school and all existing circumstances and conditions as references -of instruction. Emphasis should also be laid on instructing the people -how to live properly, how to accomplish their duties. The basic -principles governing the revolutionary movement and national -reconstruction as laid down by our late Leader [Sun Yat-sen], measures -on the control of rice and the control of land as stipulated in the -ordinances and regulations governing district autonomy, together with -the seven measures previously announced by the Central Government, -should all be included in the scope of instruction. It was with these -considerations in mind that this draft provides that teachers of the -_hsiang_ middle [secondary] and _pao_ mass-education schools should -concurrently act as secretaries of the _hsiang_ guild and _pao_ office. -It would not do to maintain the old system when school teachers only -taught in the classroom, with the result that in many places where -schools have been conducted for many years people still refuse to be -conscripted, to pay taxes, to observe the New Life principles. This -could be attributed to the fact that teachers and others in charge of -the schools failed to do their duties. - -It is also provided in the ordinances and regulations governing the -initial enforcement of district autonomy that "aside from enabling -people to read and write, schools should also emphasize what has been -known as the 'omnipotency of both hands' campaign." We should try to -make all the tools or machines that can increase the productive ability -of both hands, instead of relying on others. From now on, therefore, -local schools should emphasize vocational training by which the students -may be taught how to manufacture simple machines. This is not merely -scientific education but also an important way of carrying out the -doctrine of the people's livelihood. It is therefore provided in this -draft that in the _ch'ü_ (township) there should be established the -district vocational training class so that education and living may be -closely wedded. - -In the past, educational organization has been too complicated. Besides -primary schools, there have been mass education schools, short-term -primary schools, rural schools. Now, since it is stipulated that the -_pao_ has _pao_ mass education schools and the _hsiang_ has _hsiang_ -middle schools, the children and adults should be taught in separate -classes but at the same school so that all the former units of -education may be absorbed. The tutor (_tao shêng_) system should be used -as much as possible in the hope that the entire people of the nation may -be given at least the minimum education for citizenship within a limited -period of time. Thus all the personnel and finances may be concentrated; -the teachers may conveniently do their duty in directing the masses into -proper participation in various local enterprises. In this way, -education and autonomy may be closely affiliated with each other. - -3. The organization of the various local administrative units is roughly -in accordance with the decimal system. In such provisions of this draft, -allowances have been made whereby the difficulties in the way of -enforcement of the system may be solved. Once the scope of the various -local administrative units is fixed, all plans and programs such as -establishing schools, training personnel, appropriation of funds and -statistics may be mapped out according to definite standards. The -conduct of a big nation with its variegated enterprises depends on -strict organization in war-time as well as in peace-time. In the army, -for instance, the number of units composing each army corps is -definitely fixed. Scientific administration must be governed by rules -and regulations. - -For the convenience of execution, certain elasticity has been allowed in -provisions concerning organization in this draft. The _hsiang_, for -instance, is composed of from six to fifteen _pao_, and so on with other -lower administrative units. In cases where the village and the street -cannot be separated, joint organizations for the handling of affairs of -common interest is allowed. All these provisions are arrived at in order -to allow some flexibility whenever and wherever necessary. Within the -bounds of these regulations, the various local district governments may -exercise their discretion in disposing their respective affairs without -consulting their superior governments. But they will not be permitted to -trespass beyond the limits because disorderly organizations will make -control and supervision hard. - -After the scope of the various local administrative units is fixed, -their respective spheres of education, health, cooperative movements and -police must also be uniformly determined so that control, instruction, -support, and protection may have an equal and well-balanced development. - -4. Concerning the organization and training of the masses, it is indeed -regrettable that no wholesome accomplishments have been achieved during -the past many years. According to this new draft, the following -explanations have to be made: - -_a._ Demarcation among people's groups and organizations: the former is -determined by professions and the latter according to age and sex. From -the standpoint of the requirements of the country, the latter should be -organized first. Especially urgent is the demand for such organizations -as the able-bodied citizens' corps and women's associations. From the -standpoint of the needs of the people, the organization of the -professional groups should be put on a sound basis as soon as possible, -particularly the farmers, laborers, and merchants groups which are -vitally concerned with the economic reconstruction movement of the -country. Steps, therefore, should immediately be taken in the order of -urgency. Next, for people's organizations, emphasis is to be laid on -organization and training; for the groups, direction and supervision are -to be stressed. - -_b._ The work of organizing the various people's groups should proceed -from the bottom upwards because wholesome organizations can only be had -when the foundation is soundly laid. In peace-time, this will help -forward self-rule. In war-time, it will help meet military needs. In the -past, the various people's groups (such as farmers' associations and -women's associations) had only nominal existence, hanging their shingles -in the _hsien_ city, but few really worked. The reasons might be many, -but the main one has been the failure on the part of those responsible -to penetrate into the lower strata of activities and help develop them. -It must be realized that the various people's groups are necessary to -the various administrative units in the district autonomous government -system just as parts to the main body of a machine. Without the parts, -the machine would not be able to operate. From now on, therefore, -efforts must be made to substantiate the people's bodies so that they -may be enabled to function efficiently. - -_c._ The able-bodied citizens' corps are necessary in peace as well as -in war-time. Attention should be paid both to training and to the -supervision so that their usefulness may be fully developed. The -constituents of the able-bodied citizens' corps are the pillars of -society, and on them depends the successful realization of most -enterprises concerning district autonomy. In this lies the importance of -our late Leader's [Sun Yat-sen] teaching about "omnipotency of both -hands." During the training, emphasis should not be on military alone -but also on general and vocational ability, in order to turn corps -members into useful members of society. - -5. The people's organs for various local administrative units serve best -the purpose of training the people in the exercise of their rights in -government affairs. They constitute the prerequisites for democracy. In -the past, it has proved difficult to secure _hsiang_, _pao_ and _chia_ -chiefs; or, after they were elected to their respective offices, they -failed to do their duties and some of them even committed acts harmful -to the people which slipped the notice of the superior government -offices. All these shortcomings must be overcome by virtue of democratic -measures. The higher supervisory organizations, limited in personnel, -can hardly keep an eye on every small detail. The _hsiang_ and _pao_ -chiefs and other staff members under them are most closely associated -with the people. In order to prevent them from undermining the people's -interest for their selfish gains, the democratic (_Min-chu_) control and -supervision system should be enforced as the most efficient and -effective method. That the _pao_ people's meeting should be attended by -the families as representative units is a preliminary step. This is so -because China is an agricultural country, different from other -industrialized nations where the individual citizens constitute the -representative units. Representatives to the _hsiang_ people's -representative meetings are to be produced at the _pao_ people's -meeting. Councilors from the _hsiang_ and higher administrative units -for the _hsien_ people's council are to be produced by indirect instead -of direct election. Next comes the question of increasing the people's -economic stability and developing local enterprises. It is specially -provided that adequate representation to the various professional groups -should be given in the _hsien_ people's council. (This is limited to the -professional groups and their representation is not to exceed thirty per -cent.) In this way the district conception and the interests of -professions are given equal consideration. - -6. To prepare the personnel for the various local administrative -government units, the various grades of schools should be adapted to the -needs of the local organizations and enterprises. With such adaptation, -the school training may not be in vain and young students upon -graduation may find appropriate employment. A separate set of rules and -regulations should be promulgated whereby these youths may be encouraged -and their future welfare safeguarded. At present, the training of such -personnel and their future disposal have not been systematically enough -planned. Proper remedy must be provided so that definite standards may -be fixed. Most important of all, persons properly trained should be -assigned to places where are located their native home villages or -towns. All such jobs concerning the development of district enterprises -like insurance of treasuries or storehouses, transportation of rice and -foodstuffs, farmland irrigation, fishing, grazing, and land reclamation, -should all be filled by persons with special technical training. As the -development of such district enterprises continues, the demand for -appropriate personnel will grow as a foregone conclusion. - -7. With regard to financial problems, the late Leader instructed that -the district self-rule organizations should be founded on the basis of -"political and economic cooperation." The sources of finance, therefore, -should be derived from the people's public productive enterprises, -instead of depending on new taxes. There are many public properties in -various localities that should be utilized. Instead, these have mainly -been exploited and monopolized by individuals who cared for nothing but -their own selfish interests. Henceforth, these properties should be -placed under public control. With efficient management, the proceeds -from these enterprises should serve as finances for the entire _hsiang_ -or _pao_. In case such properties consist of land, they could be turned -into experimental farms and be placed under the management of the -schools for the improvement of agricultural products and for training -the people in reformed farming methods. The joint property of a clan -should be dealt with in a similar way so that their income may be -increased and the results of agricultural improvement programs may be -extended from one locality to another easily. In places where there are -no such lands, steps should be taken to reclaim the mountainous or hilly -regions or the streams and ponds. Free labor may be utilized with a view -to increasing the income. Besides, surplus rice may be stored in the -_hsiang_ and the _pao_, under the management of the people of the -respective districts. The various cooperative societies transporting -agricultural products should also provide granaries and issue mortgage -loans. Part of the profits thus derived should be devoted as funds for -the development of local enterprises. Thus not only will the financial -problem be solved but district autonomy development will follow local -needs. Before the local public enterprises (as described above) are so -developed that income is sufficient to meet financial requirements, -attention should be paid to the following measures: - -_a._ Taxes which the _hsiang_ guild may collect independent of the -superior government offices. - -_b._ The finances of the _hsien_ should be demarcated from those of the -province, and the quota of the former should be gradually increased if -possible. - -_c._ In lean _hsien_, the _hsien_ government should be subsidized by the -provincial government. - -8. Last of all, it should be pointed out that this draft was drawn up -after repeated discussions and studies. Henceforth, all the _hsien_ and -lower district government units in the autonomy system should observe -this draft as the basis. This is a time of national crisis when the -destiny of our entire nation and race is hanging between life and death. -It is hoped that all comrades of our Party and our fellow-countrymen -should strive with strong determination for nation-wide enforcement of -these district autonomy measures. Bold initiative should solve any -unforeseen difficulties that may arise. Fear and hesitation should never -be allowed to gain the upper hand. Only in this way, may we hope that -the cornerstone for various political levels of true democracy is laid -on a sound basis, and only in this way may we hope that the stupendous -task of national reconstruction can be accomplished. - - - - -_D._ A DISCUSSION OF MAO TSÊ-TUNG'S COMMENTS ON THE PRESENT STATE OF -INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (CH'ÊN KUO-HSIN)[1] - - - [Footnote 1: Min-i Ts'ung-k'an (Popular Opinion Series), _Mao Tsê-tung - Ch'ên Shao-yü Tsui-chin Yen-lun-ti Tsung Chien-t'ao_ (A General Review - of the Most Recent Utterances of Mao Tsê-tung and Ch'ên Shao-yü), - Chungking, 1940; p. 1-17.] - - The following article, expressing the general Kuomintang - view, but written and published unofficially, illustrates - debate on foreign policy, and the type of discussion between - Nationalists and Communists. Written in the autumn of 1939, - it was reprinted in 1940 as a part of a symposium, forming a - critique of Chinese Communist views. Mao Tsê-tung (see - above, p. 166) is the outstanding Chinese Communist leader. - - -I. THE QUESTION OF UNEXPECTED POLITICAL "COUPS" - -As the Central Government has already formulated correct principles of -action, the recent German-Soviet Pact has no influence upon our -National policies. If we follow these policies, that Pact does not -compel our attention. But it is not so with the Chinese Communists and -their external organs. They are confounded and struck dumb by this -unexpected blow so much that they can only keep their grief to -themselves. - -In all propaganda literature of the Communist Party, we can easily -discern the great confusion resulting from this coup. For example, -Hitler was the "Fascist Robber" or the "mad dog," but within these days, -he becomes the Führer, with all due respects. The word "Fascist" is -still being used, but whether they are planning to discard it -altogether, we do not know. For instance, on the day previous to the -announcement of the Pact, the Communists were saying, dreamily, that a -clause prohibiting Germany's seizure of other countries was included in -the Pact. Again, when Germany attacked Poland, the Communists cleverly -said that this was caused by Great Britain's playing Judas against -Poland, and they decisively said that Great Britain and France would not -aid her, and some even said that the two antagonistic fronts were still -there, though without giving any reason. When reports of these momentous -international changes arrived in quick succession, they tried every -means to make them appear unimportant. They did this perhaps to avoid -the too much "heating up" of their followers on one side, and to avoid -committing blunders before they could receive orders concerning their -future policy. They were afraid of punishment, to be sure. Hence many -ridiculed these poor people, saying that they were like a herd of sheep -without a shepherd, for they showed their ignorance, their childishness, -hesitation, and paradoxical thoughts and actions during this period. - -Public opinion as a whole praises the policies we now adopt since they -are independent of any outside element. On the other side, these praises -show that while the principles of National Defense are still as sound as -ever, the ten principles of the Communist Party are now just like ten -big stones falling on Communist toes. The Communists are about to be -killed by their own weapons. Had the Government of China been formed by -the Communists, it would, in that event, have collapsed as easily as any -Japanese cabinet since the War. What would become of the country, if -under the present crisis foreign policy were to be the speculation of -foreigners? These are exactly the ideas expressed by public gossip and -in discussions in schools. It is true that the Chinese Communists -cannot hold power because they lack political training and profound -learning. This is their inner, incurable trouble. In fact, many young -Communists have also spoken with me, and they show their sorrow when -they feel the lack of a really efficient central organ. - -But speaking with consideration, we can see their good qualities shown -by censoring a great part of the news concerning Moscow's abolition of -the Anti-Fascist movement, and on the other hand advertising in a -special manner the news concerning the will of the French Communists to -fight on the first line of defense, and to help the French Government to -destroy Fascism. Perhaps this is a true revelation of the editor's faith -in the principle "Country and Nation above all," so that unconsciously -he showed it in his actions. This point is worthy of our praise and -sympathy. - -After about ten days of hesitation and aimless probing, Mr. Mao -Tsê-tung, as the head of the Party, issued a lengthy talk entitled "On -the Present International Situation and the War of National Resistance," -in the form of a catechism in which the questions are asked by a news -reporter. In the first section, he explained the German-Soviet Pact; in -the second, he predicted the future development of international -affairs, in the third he discussed the future of China. His aim in -publishing this article is to pacify the agitated hearts of his fellow -Communists. But since it is made public, we have the liberty of -discussing it, especially so since the Communists themselves have the -same habit and they also emphasize free speech. I hope they will not be -irritated. - - -II. IS THE GERMAN-SOVIET PACT CASUAL? - -Mr. Mao seems to take it for a treaty that has been signed "all of a -sudden." Now this is quite untrue if we consider the facts. - -Many periodicals and newspapers have published articles proving that the -Pact was long-planned. We shall not consider them. We shall not even -consider the original friendship between Germany and monarchic Russia. -But we must remember how Germany brought Lenin back to Russia in a -sealed train, how the formation of the Red Army was based upon German -plans, and the fact that Germany established an aviation school in -Russia. We see how Germany helped the Russian Soviet Revolution to -succeed. I often think that if we trust the words of a country's -foreign minister and the slogans the people shout to provide us an -outline of the country's foreign policy, we end in the position of -buying goods upon reading an advertisement. In the end we will find -ourselves cheated. In fact shops which are "liquidating" their goods may -sell their goods at an even higher price than in an ordinary sale. A -more reliable way of observation is to judge the policy by studying the -secret tendencies in the actions of high military and economic organs -which are essential in national defense. If we believe in slogans alone, -we might as well ask a salesman about the curative power of his patent -medicine. In reality, the salesman is a mere hireling. What pharmacist -discloses his real formula and method of combinations? Hence, to probe -into the real relation between the two countries, we must ask the -smaller nations between them; these make the closest observations. - -For two years, these small states have been expecting this treaty. The -question of "which to side with" gives them sharp suffering which has -made them all the more sensitive. They know what the two countries have -been planning when they see so many secret delegates coming and going -very busily. Within the last two years, observers in Europe and America -have also predicted cooperation between Germany and Soviet Russia. Even -in China, did not Mr. Chiang Po-li write an essay to this effect, -warning the Chinese people? According to them, the slogans shouted in -both countries are strange diplomatic weapons; like the masques worn in -a Greek play, they do not show the faces of the actors. When the Jewish -Litvinoff went off the stage, it was the sign: "First Act Completed." -Now the spectators who wear red glasses are still enchanted by the first -act. Anyway, Mr. Mao's explanation that the Pact is a sudden one is -unreasonable. - -In China, many were doubting the National policy of independent -struggle. Not until their "Soviet Help," "Single Alliance with Russia" -essays had been erased by the recent coup, did the policy of independent -struggle begin to shine in its brilliancy. At first our policy of -independent foreign relations lost influence to the better-sounding -slogan of "A united foreign front." After this lesson, we can perhaps -see more clearly. Such a lesson to a political party not in power is a -very wholesome admonition; had the party been in power, we know the -damage which could have befallen the nation. Speaking with -consideration, I also earnestly hoped for the success in the -British-French-Soviet parleys because it would ensure safety in Europe -by safeguarding all lesser states. Furthermore, it would help us also by -checking Germany and Japan. But this was only a hope, and I seriously -doubted its realization. The "united foreign policy front" advocated by -the Communists is not too unreasonable; its error lies in stating with -certainty the necessity of two international fronts. Some even -acknowledged the existence of such a situation two years ago, and they -forbade any doubt expressed to fellow-members concerning this point. -Even a week prior to the signing of the Pact, they said with certainty -that the rumor of such a Pact was a mere invention of Trotskyites and -German spies. Such a ban on free speech is not only detrimental to the -progress of a nation, but even to the Communists' own welfare. Their -members will not only be made to look foolish, but they will even lose -their faith by being called upon to change about. For the sake of our -national intelligence, for the sake of the Communists themselves, I hope -that in the future, such bans will be lifted, thus encouraging freer and -more reasonable ideas. I hope this appeal will do some good, even to the -editors of their newspapers. - - -III. WHY THE GERMAN-SOVIET PACT? - -Concerning this Pact, Mao Tsê-tung used words like "reactionary," -"Capitalistic," "intrigue," etc., about Great Britain and France. On the -other hand, he employed words like "great" (to be added "talented" if -Ch'ên Shao-yü were to write it), "increasing the power," "more -progressive," etc., about Soviet Russia. In the end, he even used the -phrase "have laid the foundation for the world's oppressed people to -seek for liberty and emancipation." All right! The term does not sound -ugly, and to ensure better Sino-Soviet relations, we may leave it at -that. But under the present state of affairs, too many attacks directed -against Chamberlain and Daladier are certainly not good. As a matter of -fact, all this is like sending congratulations to Soviet Russia, and a -letter of condolence to those with whom Soviet Russia is dissatisfied. -All these are but social affairs, the only point is that in both the -ideas are not too logically expressed. That's all! - -Now if you look at the Pact in the same way that you look into a -kaleidoscope, you can see as many meanings as you want, while turning -the thing around. Basically, Germany's only reason for wanting this -Pact is, as she has stated, to avoid the British encircling policy. The -economic cooperation talked of by politicians can also give further -meaning to the Pact. Recently, in the occupation of Danzig and Warsaw, -the sound of guns is the wordless explanation. As to the plan of -partitioning Poland and absorbing the Eastern European States (enclosed -in a secret clause), we do not know yet. Let us for the time being not -discuss it. - -As to Soviet Russia, her effort at bettering her friendly relationship -with China can be no better revealed than in Molotov's own speech. He -said: "We have always been trying to increase the amity between the -peoples of Germany and Russia. This Pact is important because it means -that the two big Powers in Europe have decided to be friends and to live -peacefully." Thus we can see that the Pact is not a casual happening. -Molotov again says: "There are some who want to take advantage of the -strained relationship between Great Britain and Germany.... Such people -aim at involving Soviet Russia in a war against Germany by taking sides -with Great Britain. How foolish these political speculators for war -are!" Hence we know that the Pact was signed according to Soviet -Russia's own will, and, unlike what Mao said, it was planned long ago, -and not at all after the failure of the British-French-Soviet parleys. -Now we only want those who advocate "united foreign policy front" to -think of the meaning of words like "foolish" and "war speculators." -These words are new compared with "retrograde," "stubborn," -"Trotskyites," etc. - -Perhaps the greatest part of all in Molotov's speech is: "The Soviet -Union will still continue to proceed in her own independent policy which -is based upon the welfare of all Soviet Russian citizens." This -corresponds exactly with our "Nation and country above all!" Sun Yat-sen -also said that the success of the Soviet Russian October Revolution was -based upon its ability to apply the laws concerning Nationalism. -Leninism corrects Marxism by adding the idea of Nationalism. And -Stalinism intensifies Leninism by an even greater emphasis laid on -Nationalism. Hence we can say what the Soviet Revolution adopted was -Leninism, and that what the Soviet Union is now adopting is Stalinism. -The success of Lenin and Stalin is largely due to this reason. This Pact -between Germany and Soviet Russia is but the fruit borne out of the -principle "national welfare above all." The Soviets believe "The Soviet -Government above all." Now what should we in China have? - -As for Mr. Mao's reasons concerning the failure of the Three-Power -Parley, the explanation he gives is just a reduced and "Chinafied" copy -of the Soviet explanation concerning this problem. We can also say it is -abridged. Mr. Mao always "Chinafies" things. I am sorry that this -article has not been "Chinafied" (much to his distaste, I suppose) so -its power must be weaker. - - -IV. A DISCUSSION ON THE "NEW FRONT" AS MADE IN A CHINESE STORY-TELLER'S -WAY - -The manner in which Mr. Mao discussed the question resembles that of a -Chinese story-teller, though his speech is less vivid. When he spoke of -the "future development of the present international situation," it was -like talking to a class of naive schoolboys who are always credulous. - -He said that the present state of affairs in Europe was caused by the -policy of non-intervention. The Second Imperialistic War has already -entered the second stage. This is a war of plunder, not a rightful one. -Concerning the East, he also made a vain distinction. He said the -present state of affairs in China is also a new stage. No other -explanation was given. We suppose he is always careful in expressing his -ideas, so that if necessary he will have plenty of chances to make a -shift. He divided the imperialistic nations into several camps: Germany -and Italy belong to the Fascist[2] camp; Great Britain and France belong -to the Fascistic[3] camp; the Americas under the U. S. are a -capitalistic camp. As to Soviet Russia, she is presumably in another -world. Mr. Mao said that she would cooperate with the U. S. to start the -world's peace movement. Besides these, there were numerous tales as -enchanting as the Arabian Nights. The most important ones: in Europe, a -war on the entire front, and the movement planned by English and French -Communists and Social Democrats to overthrow the Fascist regime; in the -East, British policy was to partition China between herself and Japan. -According to him, these are "present" situations, and if we take into -consideration his manner of speaking, we can almost say that they meant -the "actual" position at present. - - [Footnote 2: _Fa-hsi-ssŭ_.] - - [Footnote 3: _Fa-hsi-ssŭ-hua-ti_, i.e., changing to Fascism.] - -His chess-board analysis of international situations resembles his -former "front" theory--perhaps it is his new front theory. His aim, we -believe, is to cheat his spectators. Being ignorant of the real -situation, he was at first dumbfounded. Now he tries to move our -attention to other things, just like a magician at work, who needs a -band to create enough noise to shift the audience's attention. We should -be considerate, knowing his difficulties. But I suppose such a manner of -doing things does not increase the reputation of the Chinese Communists, -does it? - -In fact, if any one of the following events occurs, his new front will -immediately be shattered: 1. Soviet Russia also adopts a -non-intervention policy; 2. Italy keeps herself aloof or joins the side -of the Allies; 3. A sufficiently large number of European states remain -neutral; 4. America cooperates with Great Britain; America or any -country in America declares war against Germany; 5. Great Britain does -not help Japan in dividing up China; 6. Soviet inclination to sign -treaty with Japan is revealed; etc., etc. I believe anyone who has -sufficient knowledge of international relations will know that the error -in the old "front" theory lies in its presumption that countries of the -same systems of government will tend to unite against those of another -system. The new front theory is based upon the presumption that the -central motivating ideas of different countries will form the basis of -separating them between two hostile fronts. This is an even more -mistaken conception than the first. It is built on sand. It is easy to -teach such a rigidly formulated doctrine of "hostile fronts" but in case -they meet with a really intelligent and well-informed member, they will -be certainly at a loss. Hence as a matter of fact, such authoritative -articles do more harm than good. Mr. Mao has written a great deal since -the war for publication; if we now connect all these articles together -for a thorough study, we can find numerous places where he is dropping a -stone upon his own toe. In fact such a chess-board analysis of the -international situation is based upon materials gotten from the G. P. U. -plus some "judgment" derived accidentally. As a matter of fact, such G. -P. U. reports are unreliable down to the last word. The work of the G. -P. U. is to pay special attention in getting the past record of a man or -organ important in a given country. - -When required, some high-sounding or bad names are added to the -personality so as to strengthen the mood of speech in propaganda -literature. So somebody even said: "If you wish to follow the propaganda -methods of the Communist Party, observe two dogs barking in the street. -After due observation you should analyze their points of difference. -You should be able to speak like this: This is a dog infused with -British, French, American, German or Japanese imperialistic ideas. He is -stubborn, retrograde, reactionary, capitalistic, Fascist, and in danger -of being a Trotskyite traitor or a person like Wang Ch'ing-wei. Now the -other is a Soviet Socialistic dog, talented, progressive, belonging to -the world of light, a supporter of world peace, a dog who sides with the -poor and oppressed." - -In fact how can confused international situations be so simply analyzed -by a mere figure drawn on a chess-board? Unless all their members are -mechanical men deprived of the power of thinking, they will have their -own doubts, especially when Mr. Mao has repeatedly dropped stones on his -own toe. The more he shouts the correctness of his views, or the success -of his work, the more he will be a laughing-stock to the people. He will -be the Don Quixote of China, or Ah-Q,[4] to be ridiculed by all. Yet in -fact, there is no necessity for him to make these comments, and such -methods of talking without material basis are usually avoided by -politicians, especially when they are in service or partly in service. -For example, Molotov spoke very cleverly on the Pact: after giving a -historical explanation of the necessities for signing the Pact, he -concluded, almost carelessly, by saying: "When Germany showed her -willingness to improve the friendship between the two countries, Soviet -Russia certainly had no reason to refuse. Hence the Pact is made." -Besides, he talked of the welfare of the nation, as if to give a further -proof of the necessity in signing the Pact. How clever his manipulations -are! But the same thing under Mr. Mao's pen becomes a series of -hot-faced scoldings, now praising A, then cursing B. And concerning his -doctrine that the German-Soviet Pact is caused by the failure of the -British-French-Soviet parleys, he expounded and expounded his reasons -and proof, only to lead himself into greater confusion, so that fewer -will believe him. Now comparing these two events, this will be very -detrimental to the Communists, who find it difficult to give a -satisfactory explanation. Even from a rhetorical point of view, no -matter how Mao curses the British non-intervention policy, no matter how -he curses this policy as the reason for Japanese invasion of China, for -German occupation of Austria, Czechoslovakia, no matter how he condemns -the Munich Meeting, any reader will correspondingly ask: Is Soviet -Russia also adopting the policy of non-intervention? How about Poland? -What is the difference between the Munich Meeting and the German-Soviet -Pact? All these questions will produce the exactly opposite effect in -the minds of the readers as that which was wished for by Mao. This is -but one point. If we go on to have a closer analysis, we see that Mr. -Mao's art of speaking needs more practice. As to his material proof in -his article, up to date [September 15, 1939], the Soviet attitude is -still the sit-and-look attitude condemned by him, as being the result of -non-intervention policy; the countries proclaiming their neutrality are -quite numerous; Italian attitude is yet uncertain; the British Communist -Party is declaring that full confidence is placed in Chamberlain; the -French Communists are on the front to fight for their motherland and the -Third International has now no power over them. On the other hand, there -are rumors concerning a _rapprochement_ between Japan and Soviet Russia. -All these only tend to disprove the sayings of Mr. Mao. - - [Footnote 4: The hero of a novella by Lu Hsün, China's outstanding - modern writer, Ah-Q is a figure of profound pathos.] - - -V. A SINGLE ENEMY? OR A SINGLE ALLY? - -Everybody knows that our foreign policy during the period of the war is -to spot one enemy only. We attack only Japan. We try to be friends with -every country other than Japan. This spirit can be seen in the -manifestoes and other proclamations of the Government. Hence although -Germany and Italy are the allies of our enemy, we still have every wish -to bind their friendship, and hope that they will help our enemy the -less in her war of aggression, and contribute more materially to our -success by selling us armaments. Such a "one-enemy" foreign policy is -the basis of our future success. Otherwise, the Nation will easily be -led into a path of thorns, if we adopt the policy of allying with one -today and cutting another tomorrow. In Molotov's report, there are -several sharp sentences: "In foreign policy, the aim is always not to -make more enemies, but rather to lessen the number of enemies." This can -be jotted down as a note to the "one-enemy" policy. - -But what about Mao Tsê-tung's idea? In fact he preaches "one-ally" -policy. He has condemned them all, except for the Soviet Union. Now he -again places Soviet Russia in another almost intangible world. What does -he mean, then? Does he mean that we can satisfy our hunger by looking at -a cake? In fact, this was the same old question long before disputed. -We can all remember that the Communists were the advocates of a military -alliance with Soviet Russia. Now it was Soviet Russia, not we, who -declined. Those who were boasting of the alliance were Communists; and -so were those who stopped it. Soviet Russia said that she alone was too -weak and that she hoped China could find more allies. Because of this, -the "one-ally" policy did not gain as much support as the -British-American-French-Soviet union. When the British-French-Soviet -parleys broke off, Mr. Mao found it difficult to give a good -explanation, so that he could not but take up the old theory of -"one-ally" to ward off attack. - -The chief countries helping China in the war are Great Britain, the U. -S. A., and Soviet Russia. In the past, at present, and in the future, -their central powers of aiding China are economic power from Great -Britain, political power from the U. S. A., and military power from -Soviet Russia. It is a fact that even if Soviet Russia remains at peace, -she can check Japan (unless Soviet Russia proclaims amity with Japan, -and makes adequate assurances, in which case it will greatly influence -our condition). But the economic power of Great Britain and the -political power of the U. S. A. are also absolutely necessary. At -present, we are still enjoying these advantages, and the breaking-up of -the British-French-Soviet parleys does not influence this situation. We -don't know why Mr. Mao is bent upon rejecting the friendly assistance of -Great Britain and the U. S. Should we act like this if we believe that -"the country and the nation are above all?" Now suppose we follow the -Communists and throw ourselves into the bosom of Soviet Russia, are we -sure that she will do everything for us? If she signs a treaty with our -enemy, what then? - -The most unreasonable point in Mao's discussion is his attitude toward -Great Britain. He probably wants to please his superiors by guessing -their ideas. Perhaps he thinks that the Third International is going -back on the policy adopted years ago--the policy of "Anti-Britain" so -much sung by Trotsky and his followers. Hence Mao starts this movement -in China, and gathers false proofs that Japan and Great Britain will -sooner or later be allies so that they can divide up China. Up to now, -Mr. Mao's words have not yet become fact. Furthermore, Great Britain has -reassured us that her policy towards China will not be changed. To us -this is good news--but perhaps unhappy news for Mr. Mao. - -Mr. Mao's opinion that we "may approach Germany" does not sound very -safe or very natural. Mr. Mao does not adopt the foreign policy of -"befriend those who help us and hate those who help our enemy," but -rather of "befriend Soviet Russia's friend, attack Soviet Russia's -enemies." This is flatly against the principles of independent foreign -policy. The old German-Italian line advocated by Wang Ch'ing-wei is -wrong because it makes us bend our knees. But we must also know what the -new German line amounts to. Japan's _rapprochement_ with Soviet Russia -and Great Britain are rumors scattered out simultaneously, but are -things that cannot be possible. According to foreign telegraphic -reports, the German foreign minister is now trying to pull together -Japan and Soviet Russia, with the hope of forming a future grand -alliance among Germany. Italy, Japan, and Soviet Russia. As to the -Japan-Soviet line, it is based upon the "double-south policy" of -attacking Great Britain. Japan will move south from the Pacific and -[Soviet] Russia will move south from Central Asia, so that British -interest in all districts lying between the Near and the Far East will -be equally divided up by [Soviet] Russia and Japan. Their method of -procedure is like this: 1, A treaty will be signed by Soviet Russia, as -the protector of Outer Mongolia, and Japan; Soviet Russia will stop -enmity against "Manchukuo" and Japan, so that Japan may concentrate her -attention on China. 2, A commercial treaty will be signed between them. -3, A final alliance promising mutual non-interference with appended -clauses. Of course this is Germany's dream, or may be a flat rumor, -since it is unbelievable that Soviet Russia should join Japan. Even from -the point of material benefit, why should Soviet Russia act so as to -hurt others but remain doubtful that she can derive real benefit? But to -insure absolute safety, we must be careful of any German intrigue. We -must warn her often. In the past we used to buy munitions from her, so -we must have her goodwill. Now with the War, it is unlikely that Germany -will still sell us munitions. Hence why must we still follow Germany and -"approach her"? After all, what is the difference between this and the -German-Italian line advocated by Wang Ch'ing-wei? Now, just a "warning": -if [Soviet] Russia and Japan do join up to form an alliance, I must ask -the Chinese Communist Party a question: Concerning the name, the Chinese -Communist Party, are they going to throw away the word "Chinese" and -adopt a Soviet Russian nationality, or, as said in the _Hsin Min Pao_, -to be so base as to join Wang Ch'ing-wei's regime, or shall they stick -to the word "Chinese" and cancel the word "Communist"? I hope they will -reply to my question. - -Concerning the theory of a Second Imperialistic War, Mao himself has for -two years forbidden his followers to comment, on the charge of being a -Rightist, a closed-door Rightest, a childish Rightest, or a Trotskyite -who is plotting with Germany. Now we see that he himself has fully -adopted a Trotskyite view. In that article he used the words -"progressive" and "retrogressive" to suppress any upheaval within his -party; but now what he means by "progressive" is exactly "retardation"; -what he formerly advocated as "progress" is now a discarded fig. He is -just making a circle, like a donkey fastened to turn a grind-stone, -pressed onward by whipping and kicking, and when he has turned half a -circle, he may be said to have retarded half a circle. - -Now Mr. Mao condemns every country as imperialistic. But we must ask, in -his opinion, does he think that Poland is imperialistic? Why is the war -of national defense on the part of Poland not a rightful war? Under the -exactly similar conditions, why did the Communists formerly show -sympathy for Abyssinia and Spain, and are now cold toward Poland? He -says that Communists always hate wars; then why did he advocate the -Help-Abyssinia Movement? This is a paradox. Perhaps the saying that -Communists hate war is invented by Mr. Mao himself. So far as we know, -the Communists in Poland, Great Britain, and France are absolutely -sympathizing with the Poles in their defensive war. - -There is another ridiculous point: Mr. Mao also labelled Chamberlain and -Daladier as Fascist Reactionaries. Before the German-Soviet Pact, they -were hailed as saints, but now they are convicts, as it were. If Mr. Mao -is not satisfied with them, then condemn them as he wishes. But why must -he put such a "Fascist" hat upon the oldest democratic countries? This -spring, one American political commentator predicted jokingly that in -the near future Hitler will say that the headquarters of the Communists -are located in London and Paris, hence anti-Communist will mean -anti-French. Now the direction of this pseudo-prophecy is already -established, though Hitler did not give the above reason. But we did not -expect that the Chinese Communists would adopt such a belief by calling -democratic countries Fascist and by advocating "that we may approach -Germany." This is perhaps a conclusion by their special logic. - - -VI. A REASONLESS CONCLUSION - -Concerning the future of China, Mr. Mao made many surface talks, though -in general there is no serious fault. But his theories and his -conclusions are disjointed. For example, if he makes light of the Polish -war, what will be the value of this Oriental war? Besides, is the policy -of "single alliance with Soviet Russia" in unison with the principle: -"We will befriend those who aid us, and attack those who aid our enemy"? -If Soviet Russia aids Japan, what shall then be done? If he opposes the -splitting movement, then why not advocate unity? These are but a few of -the numerous contradictions that may be found in his article. - -Especially strange is his idea that to ally with countries other than -Soviet Russia, we should ally with their peoples and not with their -governments. But the word "people" is not used in foreign affairs and -its meaning is also most indistinct. According to him (I presume) he -desires that China fan up revolutions in all countries while carrying on -the War of National Resistance. True, the method may apply to Japan, but -not to other countries. Otherwise, all world Powers will begin to hate -China who is still fighting the War of National Resistance. What will we -think of this? Now to speak frankly, the Communists in various countries -have not succeeded in fanning up revolutions in their countries, and on -the contrary, with their force weakening year after year, what shall we -help them for? When we ourselves have not yet stood up firmly, we are -already thinking of shouldering a weight of a thousand pounds. Is there -a reason in such an attempt? In reality, we know the force of the -Chinese proletarian classes. They amount to about two million people, -mostly in Shanghai and Tientsin. Now the puppet regimes of Yin Ju-keng -and Wang Ch'ing-wei are all formed in these districts. Ch'ên Shao-yü is -the chief representative of the Shanghai section of the Communist Party. -Has he gone there for an investigation? To whom do those who are -performing Anti-Japanese and Anti-Traitor work belong--to the Communist -Party, or what? It is better for Communists to moderate their tune and -not boast of any more world revolution. - -Concerning the present European war, Mr. Mao's attitude is that of a man -expressing his joy on seeing others' loss and misfortune. This is not -the way of the Chinese people. We always express our sorrow in a war. -What General Chiang has said concerning his hope for peace in Europe is -the natural revelation of the Chinese moral character based upon love -and compassion. What Mr. Mao expresses is something like the spirit of -"kill-kill-kill" advocated by the notorious robber Chang Shen-chou. This -is because Mr. Mao has not yet thoroughly imbibed the idea of -"Chinafying" things. I express my sympathy for him in his policy of -"Chinafication." This of course does not mean that I believe in the -preachings of old-fashioned Chinese that the eight planets were first -discovered by the Chinese because a line can be found in the _Book of -Poetry_:[5] "Three and Five stars in the East." What I mean by sympathy -is that I like the way he appreciates the Chinese national culture, and -wants to be a one hundred per cent Chinese.[6] In this respect he is -more worthy than Ch'ên Shao-yü, and hence deserving of greater -achievement. - - [Footnote 5: _Shih Ching_, one of the Confucian classics.] - - [Footnote 6: The Americanism, _i-pai-fên chih pai-ti Chung-kuo-jen_, - occurs in the original.] - -Lastly, I sincerely hope that Mr. Mao can find a better secretary, -without considering the question of class. He must not follow the -example of Mr. Lu, the Vice-President of the Anti-Japanese University, -who never employs a secretary unless she is beautiful. Though he does -not consider the question of class, such actions do not befit Mr. Mao. -But speaking about this, we can have a comparison. The second wife of -Mr. Mao, Miss Ho, is the heroine who marched with the Red Army for a -distance of twenty-five thousand _li_ to North Shensi. But why is it -that Mr. Mao sends her to Soviet Russia, and lives together with film -actress Miss Lan Pin? The reason is quite simple: considering the -question of class, Miss Ho stands higher than Miss Lan; considering the -question of sexual love, Miss Lan is much more beautiful than Miss Ho. -Hence with similar reasoning, I should say that the standard set by Mr. -Mao concerning the employment of a secretary will be whether she can -write beautifully, and the question of class must not be considered. If -so, I can predict that Mr. Mao's articles will be better written, not -like his past ones which arouse a great deal of unnecessary -argumentation. I hereby humbly present before him my personal ideas.[7] - - [Footnote 7: The conclusion, couched in billingsgate, is less a - violation of the unmentionable in China than it would be in America; - but it does strike a note sharply discordant to the gently sardonic - tone of the main line of debate. A secretary is germane to the point - of literary style, however; ghost-writing is a rarely disturbed - tradition of Chinese public life. Mao Tsê-tung, according to Western - observers, is, with Chiang K'ai-shek, one of the few leaders to write - his own speeches, so that the present charge, while familiar, is - certainly unjust.] - - - - -E. CHINA'S LONG-RANGE DIPLOMATIC ORIENTATION (WANG CH'UNG-HUI)[1] - - - [Footnote 1: Private communication transmitted from Chungking, - September 10, 1940; in possession of the present author.] - - This memorandum was graciously supplied by Dr. Wang - Ch'ung-hui. - - -1. OUTLINE OF CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY - -Since the establishment of the National Government, China's foreign -policy has been elucidated from time to time. Following the outbreak of -the war, the Extraordinary Session of the Kuomintang National Congress -convened in 1938 laid down five principles: - -"1. China is prepared to ally herself with all states and nations that -sympathize with her and to wage a common struggle for peace and justice. - -"2. China is prepared to safeguard and strengthen the machinery of peace -as well as all treaties and conventions that have the maintenance of -peace as their ultimate object. - -"3. China is prepared to ally herself with all forces that are opposed -to Japanese aggression and to safeguard peace in the Far East. - -"4. China will endeavor not only to preserve but also to enhance the -existing friendly relations with other countries. - -"5. China repudiates all bogus organizations which Japan has created and -declares all their actions null and void." - - -2. CHINA'S STAND VIS-À-VIS JAPAN - -From the above outline it can be clearly seen that China's foreign -policy aims at achieving independence internally and co-existence -externally. - -Shortly before the outbreak of the Lukouchiao Incident I told a group of -Japanese newspapermen in Nanking that "China's diplomatic policy has -always been consistent. It aims at self-existence and co-existence.... -It is important to harmonize the friendship between the two peoples; but -such a task should not rest only upon the shoulders of one party.... If -any foreign country has any designs on China, the Chinese people are -determined to resist.... I hope Japan will respect China's territorial -integrity and political sovereignty and will seek to readjust -Sino-Japanese relations through diplomatic channels and in accordance -with the spirit of reciprocity and equality." - -Japan was bent on disturbing peace and order and launched her attack on -North China on July 7, 1937. Not only had every effort at conciliation -failed, but the hostilities were extended to Shanghai on August 13th. On -the following day the Ministry of Foreign Affairs made China's position -clear in an official statement, an extract of which follows: - -"The Chinese Government now solemnly declares that China's territorial -integrity and sovereign rights have been wantonly violated by Japan in -glaring violation of such peace instruments as the Covenant of the -League of Nations, the Nine-Power Treaty and the Paris Peace Pact. China -is in duty bound to defend her territory and her national existence, as -well as the sanctity of the above-mentioned treaties. We will never -surrender any part of our territory. When confronted with aggression, we -cannot but exercise our natural right of self-defense. If Japan did not -entertain territorial designs on China, she should use her efforts to -seek a rational solution of Sino-Japanese problems and at the same time -cease all her aggressions and military movements in China. In the event -of such a happy change of heart, China would, in conformity with her -traditional policy of peace, continue her efforts to avert a situation -pregnant with dangerous possibilities both for East Asia and for the -world at large. - -"In this our supreme fight not only for a national but for a world -cause, not only for the preservation of our own territory and -sovereignty, but for the maintenance of international justice, we are -confident that all friendly nations, while showing sympathy with us, -will be conscious of their obligations under the international treaties -to which they have solemnly subscribed." - - -3. NON-RECOGNITION OF PUPPET REGIMES - -With regard to Japanese-sponsored puppet regimes in China, the Chinese -Government has consistently denounced them as illegal. On December 20, -1937, following the appearance of the so-called "Provisional Government" -in Peiping, the National Government solemnly declared that "the -establishment of any bogus regime in Peiping or other localities under -Japanese military occupation constitutes a violation by Japan of China's -sovereignty and administrative integrity. Any action taken by such -puppet regimes, whether of an internal or external nature, shall _ipso -facto_ be null and void." - -Following the installation by the Japanese of Wang Ch'ing-wei as the -chief puppet of the bogus "National Government" in Nanking, the Foreign -Minister reiterated this stand in his identic notes of March 30, 1940 to -the various embassies and legations in China to the following effect: - -"The Chinese Government desires to take this opportunity to repeat most -emphatically the declaration already made on several occasions that any -act done by such an unlawful organization as has just been set up in -Nanking or any other puppet body that may exist elsewhere in China, is -_ipso facto_ null and void and shall never be recognized by the Chinese -Government and people. The Chinese Government is convinced that all -self-respecting States will uphold law and justice in the conduct of -international relations and will never accord _de jure_ or _de facto_ -recognition to Japan's puppet organization in China. Any manifestation -of such recognition, in whatever form or manner, would be a violation of -international law and treaties and would be considered as an act most -unfriendly to the Chinese nation, for the consequences of which the -recognizing party would have to bear full responsibility." - - -4. CHINA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS BASED ON NINE-POWER TREATY - -China's foreign policy relating to the Sino-Japanese hostilities is -based upon the Nine-Power Treaty, which provides that the contracting -Powers, other than China, agreed to the following: - -1. To respect the sovereignty, the independence and the territorial and -administrative integrity of China; - -2. To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to -develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government; - -3. To use their influence for the purpose of effectually establishing -and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and -industry of all nations throughout the territory of China. - -4. To refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to -seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of -subjects or citizens of friendly States, and from countenancing action -inimical to the security of such States. - -Under present conditions, the aggressor is still reluctant to attend any -international conference for seeking a just settlement. Therefore, the -only alternative is for China to continue her war of resistance until -Japan comes to her senses or reaches the point of exhaustion, which can -be accomplished through the extension of greater assistance to China and -the application of an embargo on military supplies to Japan. - -There is no need to elaborate on the well-known fact that the role of -the United States in the maintenance of peace in the Pacific area is an -important one. We have great confidence in the sense of justice of -America, our traditional friend, who realizes the full significance of -the so-called "New Order in Greater East Asia," which Japanese spokesmen -admit applies to the South Seas region. - -World peace and peace between China and Japan are indivisible. An era of -prosperity in this part of the world, which cannot but be of benefit to -the world in general, can only be ushered in after a just and lasting -solution to the Sino-Japanese conflict has been found. - - - - -GLOSSARY - - -[Chinese ideographs have been attached to the names of all the more -important political terms, as given in the following list. Proper names -may be found with their correct ideographs in _Who's Who in China_ and -the _Supplement_ thereto, cited above. Place-names have been given in -the Chinese Postal transliteration; all other names and terms are given -in the Wade-Giles spelling, but with the tones omitted. In a few cases, -the spelling of a name has been well established by long newspaper -usage, by the caprice or decision of a man in re-spelling his own name, -or by common practice which has become standard English. Examples are -_tuchün_, Kuomintang (instead of _Kuo-min Tang_ or _Kuo-min-tang_) and -T. V. Soong. Capitalization and hyphenation follow, as closely as -possible, the practices established by the _Quarterly Bulletin of -Chinese Bibliography_, Peking and Kunming.] - -_Chan-ti Tang-chêng Wei-yüan-hui_ 戰地黨政委員會 the (Kuomintang) Party -and (National) Government War Area Commission; the Chungking agency for -the government of those parts of China technically occupied by the -Japanese; under the Military Affairs Commission - -_chang_ 長 a chief, or head - -_Ch'ang-wu Wei-yüan_ 常務委員 a Standing Committee, or administrative -committee - -_Ch'ang-wu Tz'ŭ-chang_ 常務次長 an Administrative Vice-Minister (of a -_pu_) - -_chên_ 鎮 a unit of local government; "community"; the equivalent of a -_hsiang_ - -_Chên-chi Wei-yüan-hui_ 振濟委員會 the (National) Relief Commission - -_Chêng-chih-pu_ 政治部 the Political Department (of the Military Affairs -Commission); the important and powerful agency which coordinates -civilian aid to the war from Chungking, in propaganda, civilian -mobilization, etc.; competitive with the Chinese Communists - -_Chêng-wu Ch'u_ 政務處 a Political Affairs Department; the political -secretariat of a _Yüan_ - -_Chêng-wu Tz'ŭ-chang_ 政務次長 a Political Vice-Minister (of a _pu_) - -_Ch'i Chün-tzŭ_ 七君子 the "Seven Gentlemen"; the leaders of the National -Salvation movement - -_chia_ 甲 a group of households; a unit in the _pao-chia_ system of -local government - -_Chiao-t'ung Pu_ 交通部 Ministry of Communications - -_Ch'iao-wu Wei-yüan-hui_ 僑務委員會 Commission on Overseas Chinese -Affairs (under the Executive _Yüan_) - -_Chiao-yü Pu_ 教育部 Ministry of Education (under the Executive _Yüan_) - -_chien-ch'a_ 監察 one of the five powers of government in the plans of -Sun Yat-sen; a combination of impeachment, audit, supervisory -investigation and other functions - -_Chien-ch'a Yüan_ 監察院 the Control (or Censoral) _Yüan_; one of the -five major divisions of the government - -_Chien Kuo Ta Kang_ 建國大綱 the _Outline of National Reconstruction_, a -manifesto by Sun Yat-sen which charted the subsequent formal policies of -the Kuomintang - -_ch'ih_ 恥 self-respect; honor - -_Chin-ch'a-chi Pien-ch'ü Lin-shih Hsing-chêng Wei-yüan-hui_ 晉察冀邊區臨時 -行政委員會 "Provisional Executive Committee of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei -Border Region"; formal style of the Border Region, _q.v._ - -_Ching-chi Pu_ 經濟部 Ministry of Economic Affairs (under the Executive -_Yüan_) - -_Chiu Kuo_ 救國 National Salvation; an anti-aggression movement -organized outside the Kuomintang - -_Chu-hsi_ 主席 chairman; refers particularly to the _Kuo-min Chêng-fu -Chu-hsi_ (President of the National Government) - -_ch'ü_ 區 a unit of local government above the _pao_, _chia_, and -_hsiang_, but below the _hsien_ ("county"); a township; with reference -to the Party organization of the Kuomintang, a district - -_ch'ü-fên_ 區分 sub-district; the lowest territorial unit in Kuomintang -organization - -_ch'üan_ 權 "power," _i.e._, of the people, as contrasted with the nêng -(capacity) of the government; the distinction is Sun Yat-sen's, and -applies to the political process - -_Ch'üan-hsü Pu_ 銓敘部 the Ministry of Personnel; under the Examination -_Yüan_ - -_Ch'üan-hsü T'ing_ 銓敘廳 Administration of Personnel (for the military); -under the Military Affairs Commission - -_Ch'üan-kuo Hui-i_ 全國會議 the (Chinese Communist) National Party -Convention - -_Ch'üan-kuo Ta-hui_ 全國大會 the (Chinese Communist) National Party -Congress - -_Ch'üan-kuo Tai-piao Ta-hui_ 全國代表大會 the (Kuomintang) Party Congress - -_Chün-chêng-pu_ 軍政部 the Ministry of War; under the joint jurisdiction -of the Executive _Yüan_ and the Military Affairs Commission - -_Chün-fa Chih-hsing Tsung-chien-pu_ 軍法執行總監部 the Directorate-General -of Courts Martial; under the Military Affairs Commission - -_Chün-hsün-pu_ 軍訓部 Department of Military Training; under the Military -Affairs Commission - -_Chün-ling-pu_ 軍令部 Department of Military Operation; office of the -Chinese high command; under the Military Affairs Commission - -_Chün-shih Ts'an-i-yüan_ 軍事參議院 Military Advisory Council; under the -Military Affairs Commission - -_Chün-shih Wei-yüan-hui_ 軍事委員會 the Military Affairs Commission; the -chief politico-military organ of the National Government - -_Chung-hua Min-kuo Kuo-min Chêng-fu_ 中華民國國民政府 literally: the -Republic of China, National Government; the style of the National -Government under the Kuomintang - -_Chung-hua Min-kuo Lin-shih Chêng-fu_ 中華民國臨時政府 the "Provisional -Government of the Republic of China," Peking, 1937-1940; pro-Japanese - -_Chung-hua Min-kuo T'ê-ch'ü Chêng-fu_ 中華民國特區政府 "Special District -Government of the Chinese Republic"; the first formal style of the -Chinese Soviet area in the Northwest after the intra-national armistice - -_Chung-hua Min-kuo Hsiu-chêng Kuo-min Chêng-fu_ 中華民國修正國民政府 the -"Reorganized National Government of the Republic of China"; the National -Government of Wang Ch'ing-wei at Nanking; pro-Japanese - -_Chung-hua Min-kuo Wei-hsin Chêng-fu_ 中華民國維新政府 the "Reformed -Government of the Republic of China," Nanking, 1938-1940; pro-Japanese - -_Chung-hua Su-wei-ai Kung-ho-kuo_ 中華蘇維埃共和國 the Chinese Soviet -Republic - -_Chung-kuo Kê-ming Tang_ 中國革命黨 the Chinese Revolutionary Party; -style of the Kuomintang, 1914-1920; style of the Third Party, 1929-1930 - -_Chung-kuo Kuo-min-tang Kê-ming Hsing-chêng Wei-yüan-hui_ 中國國民黨革命 -行政委員會 the Revolutionary Action Committee of the Chinese Kuomintang; -first style of the Third Party - -_Chung-kuo Kung-yeh Ho-tso Hsieh-hui_ 中國工業合作協會 the Chinese -Industrial Cooperatives - -_Chung-yang Chêng-chih Hsüeh-hsiao_ 中央政治學校 the Central Political -Institute; under the Kuomintang - -_Chung-yang Chêng-chih Wei-yüan-hui_ 中央政治委員會 the Central Political -Council; the agency whereby the Kuomintang exercised its power over the -National Government until the Supreme National Defense Council was -created - -_Chung-yang Chien-ch'a Wei-yüan-hui_ 中央監察委員會 the (Kuomintang) -Central Control Committee - -_Chung-yang Chih-hsing Wei-yüan-hui_ 中央執行委員會 the (Kuomintang) -Central Executive Committee - -_Chung-yang Hsüan-ch'uan Pu_ 中央宣傳部 the (Kuomintang) Party-Ministry -of Publicity [or Central Publicity Board] - -_Chung-yang Wei-yüan-hui_ 中央委員會 the (Chinese Communist Party) -Central Committee - -_fa pi_ 法幣 (National Government) legal tender notes - -_fang_ 坊 a territorial unit of municipal government; roughly, a -precinct - -_Fu-hsing Shê_ 復興社 the Regeneration Club; former center of the -so-called Blue Shirts - -_Fu-hsüeh Wei-yüan-hui_ 撫郋委員會 the Pensions Commission; under the -Military Affairs Commission - -_Fu I-chang_ 副議長 Deputy Speaker (of the People's Political Council) - -_Fu Mi-shu-chang_ 副秘書長 a Deputy Secretary-General - -_Fu-yüan-chang_ 副院長 the Vice-President of a _Yüan_ (one of the five -divisions of the government) - -_Hai-chün Tsung-ssŭ-ling-pu_ 海軍總司令部 Office of the Naval -Commander-in-Chief, successor to the Ministry of the Navy which manages -the up-river remnants of the Chinese fleet; under the Military Affairs -Commission - -_Hang-k'ung Wei-yüan-hui_ 航空委員會 the (National) Aviation Commission; -under the Military Affairs Commission - -_Hou-fang Ch'in-wu-pu_ 後方勤務部 the [Rear-Area] Service Department -under the Military Affairs Commission - -_hsiang_ 鄉 a unit of local government, also termed _chên_; a village or -community - -_hsiao-tsu_ 小粗 the "small-group"; the lowest fraction of Kuomintang -organization - -_Hsieh-ho-hui_ 協和會 the Concordia Society; the propaganda agency of -Manchoukuo - -_hsien_ 縣 district; roughly comparable to the American county - -_Hsien-fa Ts'ao-an_ 憲法草案 the Draft Permanent Constitution; the -official sponsored project for the new constitution, known most widely -in the version of the Double Five Draft of May 5, 1936 - -_Hsin-min-hui_ 新民會 a political "party" organized by pro-Japanese -elements in North China - -_Hsin Min Chu I_ 新民主義 a pro-Japanese doctrine taught in occupied -North China - -_Hsin Shêng-huo Yün-tung_ 新生活運動 the New Life Movement - -_Hsin-ssŭ-chün_ 新四軍 New Fourth Army; a guerrilla force under -Communist influence; operating in the Yangtze lowlands, it clashed with -Chinese National forces early in 1941, and was formally disbanded - -_Hsing-chêng Fa-yüan_ 行政法院 the Administrative Court; under the -Judicial Yüan - -_Hsing-chêng Yüan_ 行政院 the Executive _Yüan_, greatest of the five -divisions of the government - -_Hsün-lien T'uan_ 訓練團 the Training Corps (of the Kuomintang) - -_Hsün-lien Wei-yüan-hui_ 訓練委員會 the (Central) Training Committee (of -the Kuomintang) - -_Huangpu_ 黃埔 the name of a military academy (in Cantonese, Whampoa), -now applied to the Generalissimo's protégés as a political faction - -_hui_ 會 a meeting, guild, league, or society - -_Hui-i_ 會議 a deliberative body; particularly, a City Council -(Shih-chêng Hui-i) - -_i_ 議 propriety; ethics; justice - -_I-chang_ 議長 Speaker (of the People's Political Council) - -_I Ho Ch'üan_ 義和拳 the "Boxers" of 1900 - -_Kan Shih_ 幹事 the police executive in a _hsiang_ or _chên_ - -_K'ang-chan Chien-kuo Kang-ling_ 抗戰建馘綱領 the Program of Resistance -and Reconstruction; the formal declaration of government policy during -the invasion; adopted at Hankow in March, 1938 - -_K'ao-hsüan Wei-yüan-hui_ 考選委員會 the Examinations Commission; under -the Examination _Yüan_ - -_K'ao-shih Yüan_ 考試會 the Examination _Yüan_; one of the five major -divisions of the government - -_Kung-ch'an Ch'ing-nien T'uan_ 共產青年團 the Communist Youth Corps - -_Kung-ch'an Tang_ 共產黨 the (Chinese) Communist Party - -_Kung-wu-yüan Ch'eng-chieh Wei-yüan-hui_ 公務員懲戒委員會 the Commission -for the Disciplinary Punishment of Public Officers (under the Judicial -_Yüan_), a lower agency than the Commission for the Disciplinary -Punishment of Public Officials (attached to the Council of State) - -_Kuo-chia Chu-i P'ai_ 國家主義派 the "Nationalist Party"; Parti -Républicain Nationaliste de la Jeune Chine - -_Kuo-chia Shê-hui Tang_ 國家社會黨 the (Chinese) National Social(ist) -Party - -_Kuo-fang Tsui-kao Wei-yüan-hui_ 國防最高委員會 the Supreme National -Defense Council; the quasi-governmental agency whereby the Kuomintang -controls the National Government; established in 1938 as a war measure, -it supersedes the _Chung-yang Chêng-chih Wei-yüan-hui_ (Central -Political Council) - -_Kuo-li Chung-yang Yen-chiu Yüan_ 國立中央研究院 the Academia Sinica; the -national scientific and scholastic body, attached to the Council of -State - -_Kuo-min Chêng-fu Wei-yüan-hui_ 國民政府委員會 "National Government -Council"; commonly termed Council of State, this is the highest strictly -governmental agency in China - -_Kuo-min Chêng-fu Chu-hsi_ 國民政府主席 "chairman of the National -Government"; more formally, President of the National Government of -China; _ex-officio_ chairman of the Council of State, and ceremonial -chief of the government - -_Kuo-min Ching-shên Tsung-tung-yüan_ 國民精神總動員 the National Spiritual -Mobilization - -_Kuo-min Hui-i_ 國民會議 the National People's Convention of XX (1931), -which adopted the Provisional Constitution - -_Kuo-min Ts'an-chêng Hui_ 國民參政會 the People's Political Council; -advisory legislature inaugurated in Hankow - -_Kuo-min Ta-hui_ 國民大會 the National Congress or People's Congress; -this term designates both the constituent body which shall adopt the -projected Constitution, and a subsequent constitutional legislature -meeting triennially - -_lao-pai-hsing_ 老百姓 old inhabitants; common people; archaically or -etymologically, the Old Hundred Names - -_li_ 禮 rites; ceremonies; ideological conformity - -_Li-fa Wei-yüan_ 立法委會 members of the quasi-cameral plenary session of -the Legislative _Yüan_; experts in legal matters, they combine the -function of legislators with that of consultants in codification - -_Li-ja Yüan_ 立法會 the Legislative _Yüan_; one of the five divisions of -the government - -_lien_ 廉 integrity - -_lü_ 旅 a brigade - -_Mêng-ku Lien-ho Tzŭ-chih Chêng-fu_ 蒙古聯合自治政府 the "Federated -Autonomous Government of Mongolia"; pro-Japanese - -_Mêng Tsang Wei-yüan-hui_ 蒙藏委員會 Commission on Mongolian and Tibetan -Affairs (under the Executive _Yüan_) - -_Mi-shu-chang_ 秘書長 a Secretary-General - -_Mi-shu Ch'u_ 秘書處 a Secretariat; particularly important in the case of -the Executive _Yüan_ - -_min ch'üan chu-i_ 民權主義 the "principle of democracy," by Sun Yat-sen; -second of the _San Min Chu I_ - -_min-shêng chu-i_ 民生主義 the "principle of the people's livelihood," by -Sun Yat-sen; third of the _San Min Chu I_ - -_Min-ts'u Chieh-fang Hsing-chêng Wei-yüan-hui_ 民族解放行政委員會 the -Acting Commission for the National Emancipation of China; third, final, -formal style of the Third Party - -_min ts'u chu-i_ 民族主義 the "principle of nationalism," by Sun Yat-sen; -first of the _San Min Chu I_ - -_Nei-chêng Pu_ 內政部 the Ministry of the Interior (or of home affairs); -under the Executive _Yüan_ - -_nêng_ 能 "capacity" (see _ch'üan_) - -_Nung Lin Pu_ 農林部 Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (under the -Executive _Yüan_) - -_Pa-lu-chün_ 八路軍 "Eighth Route Army"; the chief Chinese Communist -force, formerly the Chinese Red Army and now the Eighteenth Army Corps - -_pao_ 保 a unit of local government; roughly, a neighborhood - -_pao-chia_ 保甲 a system of local government embodying principles of -collective responsibility and mutual aid within interlocking groups of -households and neighborhoods - -_Pien-ch'ü_ 邊區 Frontier Area or Border Region; the former translation -is used for the Communist zone in the Northwest, and the latter for the -guerrilla government in North China - -_Pu_ 部 a Ministry (under the _Yüan_), Department (under the Military -Affairs Commission), or equivalent organ of government; the term is one -of long standing in Chinese government - -_Pu Chang_ 部長 Minister; head of a _pu_ - -_San Min Chu I_ 三民主義 the three principles of the people; Sun -Yat-sen's political philosophy, now the official state dogma of China - -_San Min Chu I Ch'ing-nien T'uan_ 三民主義青年團 the _San Min Chu I_ -Youth Corps - -_Shan-kan-ning Pien-ch'ü Chêng-fu_ 陝甘寧邊區政府 the "Government of the -Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Frontier Area"; second formal style of the -Communist zone in the Northwest - -_Shan-pei Hsing-chêng-ch'ü_ 陝北行政區 the "Administrative Area of North -Shensi"; third formal style of the Communist zone in the Northwest -(Frontier Area) - -_Shê-hui Yün-tung Pu_ 社會運動部 the (Kuomintang) Party-Ministry of -Social Movements - -_Shên-ch'a Wei-yüan-hui_ 審查委員會 the (Chinese Communist Party) Control -Committee - -_Shêng_ 省 a province - -_Shêng-chang_ 省長 Governor; the civilian head of a province; now -superseded by a Provincial Chairman - -_Shêng Chêng-fu_ 省政府 a Provincial Government - -_Shih_ 市 a Municipality - -_Shih-chang_ 市長 a Mayor - -_Sui-ching Chu-jên_ 綏靖主任 a Pacification Commissioner; the chief -military officer of a province - -_Ssŭ-fa Hsing-chêng-pu_ 司法行政部 the Ministry of Justice, literally the -"executive ministry of the judiciary"; under the Judicial _Yüan_ in the -National Government, but under the executive in the Reorganized -Government of Wang Ch'ing-wei - -_Ssŭ-fa Yüan_ 司法院 the Judicial _Yüan_, one of the five divisions of -the government - -_ssŭ p'ai_ 四派 the "four cliques" (in the People's Political Council) - -_ssŭ tang_ 四黨 the "four parties" (in the People's Political Council) - -_Ta-min-hui_ 大民會 a political "party" organized by pro-Japanese -elements in Central China - -_tang chih_ 黨治 "party government"; the single-party tutelary -dictatorship of the Kuomintang - -_Tai-piao Ta-hui_ 代表大會 the (Chinese Communist) "Council of Party -Delegates" - -_Tangpu_ 黨部 (local) Party Headquarters of the Kuomintang - -_Ti-san Tang_ 第三黨 the Third Party; a popular name - -_Ts'ai-chêng Pu_ 財政部 Ministry of Finance - -_Ts'an-chêng-hui_ 參政會 a People's Political Council; preceded by a term -indicating the level at which established, _e.g._, _Shêng -Ts'an-chêng-hui_, Provincial People's Political Council - -_Ts'an-chün Ch'u_ 參軍處 Office of Military Affairs; a military -secretariat attached to the Council of State - -_Ts'an-i-hui_ 參議會 an Advisory Council, as in the Municipality - -_Tsui-kao Fa-yüan_ 最高法院 the Supreme Court; under the Judicial _Yüan_ - -_Tsung-li_ 總理 the [Party] Leader; the formal office held by Sun -Yat-sen in the Kuomintang; his in perpetuity, the title is used as a -respectful form of reference to Sun - -_Tsung-ts'ai_ 總裁 the [Party] Chief, or leader; title vested in Chiang -K'ai-shek as formal head of the Kuomintang by the Emergency Party -Congress, Hankow, March, 1938 - -_t'uan_ 團 a regiment - -_tuchün_ 督軍 the military chief of a province, a war-lord - -_Wai-chiao Pu_ [also written _Waichiaopu_] 外交部 the Ministry of Foreign -Affairs; under the Executive _Yüan_ - -_Wang Tao_ 王道 "the kingly way," a cardinal concept of traditional -Chinese political thought; now, reinterpreted, the state philosophy of -Manchoukuo - -_Wei-shêng Shu_ 衛生暑 National Health Administration (in the Ministry of -the Interior) - -_Wei-yüan-chang_ 委會長 chairman (of a committee, commission, etc.); this -title often refers to Generalissimo Chiang in his capacity of Chairman -of the Military Affairs Commission - -_Wên-kuan Ch'u_ 文官處 Office of Civil Affairs; a civilian secretariat -attached to the Council of State - -_wu-ch'üan hsien-fa_ 五權憲法 the "five power constitution"; the -five-fold separation of powers taught by Sun Yat-sen and applied by the -National Government - -_Yüan_ 院 literally "board"; one of the five divisions of the National -Government of China - -_Yüan-chang_ 院長 the President of a _Yüan_ - -_Yüeh Fa_ 約法 the Provisional Constitution, adopted in 1931 - - - - -INDEX - - - Ability (_nêng_), 253 - - Academia Sinica (_Kuo-li Chung-yang Yen-chiu Yüan_), 56 - - _Act Governing the Elections of Representatives to the National - Congress_, 302 - - _Acting Commission for the National Emancipation of China_ (_Min-ts'u - Chieh-fang Hsing-chêng Wei-yüan-hui_), 178 - - Administration of Personnel (_Ch'uan-hsü T'ing_), 62 - - Administrative agencies, chart, 80 - - Administrative Area of North Shensi (_Shan-pei Hsing-chêng-ch'ü_), 112 - - Administrative Court (_Hsing-chêng Fa-yüan_), 67 - - Administrative: - development, 96 - law, 65 - organs, 69 - pattern, 79 - - Administrative Vice-Minister (_Ch'ang-wu Tz'ŭ-chang_), 96 - - Adult education, 30 - - Agitation, 61 - - Agrarian problems, 104 - - Agriculture, 91 - - Agriculture and Forestry, Ministry of (_Nung Lin Pu_), 91 - - Air communications, 90 - - Alexander the Great, 239 - - Alley, Rewi, 224 - - Amendments to the Constitution (proposed constitutional provisions), 300 - - American Friends of the Chinese People, 234 - - American Lease-lend Bill, 217, 274 - - American loans, 19 - - Ao-yü-wan, 161 - - Appointment and discharge of officials, 59 - - Armistice, intra-national, 10 - - Army participation in rural reform, 221 - - Atatürk, Kemal, 272 - - Audit, Ministry of, 96, 320 - - Autonomous East Hopei Anti-Communist Government, 185 - - - Bank of China, 87 - - Bank of Communications, 87 - - Basic patterns of modern Chinese politics, 8 - - Bibliographical notes, 20, 21, 160, 190, 221, 223, 242, 256 - - "Blue Shirts," 144 - - Border Region, 16, 35, 116 - chart of government, 118 - - Boxers (_I Ho Ch'üan_), 213, 237 - - Buddhism, 258 - - Budget, 59, 75 - - Bureaucracy: - traditional ideal, 44 - at Chungking, 68 - - Burma, 189 - - Burma road, 93, 95, 279 - - Bukharin, 164 - - Bus services, 93 - - - Cabinet, 56 - - Canton, 18 - - Cantonese clique, 145 - - Capacity (_nêng_), 43 - - Capitalism, 30 - - Caribbean, 188 - - Carlson, Major Evans Fordyce, 116, 167 - - "C.C." clique, 142 - - Censor _Yüan_ (_see_ Control _Yüan_) - - Censoral power, 27 - - Censorship of news, 138 - - Censure, motion of, 314 - - Central America, 188 - - Central Bank of China, 87 - - Central China clique (_Hua-chung P'ai_), 76 - - Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang, 72 - - Central government (proposed constitutional provisions), 287 - - Central Secretariat of the Kuomintang (_Chung-yang Mi-shu-ch'u_), 137 - - Central News Agency, 137 - - Central Political Council (_Chung-yang Chêng-chih Wei-yüan-hui_), 16, 46 - - Central Political Institute (_Chung-yang Chêng-chih Hsüeh-hsiao_), 134 - - Central Publicity Board (_see_ Party-Ministry of Publicity) - - Chamberlain, Neville, 15 - - Chang, Carson (_Chang Chia-shêng_), 179 - - Chang Ching-chiang, 261 - - Chang Hsüeh-liang, 9, 200 - - Chang Kuo-tao, 163, 167, 168 - - Chang Peh Chuen (Chang Pai-chün), 178 - - Charts (_see also_ type of government) - Control _Yüan_, 318 - _Hsien_ classifications, 388 - Kuomintang organization, 331 - national governmental structure, 330 - provincial and urban government, 98 - - _Chên_ (_see_ Community) - - Chen Ch'i-mei, 260 - - Chen Chi-tang, 91 - - Chen, Eugene, 178 - - Ch'ên brothers, 134 - - Ch'ên Ch'êng, 340 - - Ch'ên I, 102 - - Ch'ên Kung-po, 198 - - Ch'ên Kuo-fu, 84, 134, 142 - - Ch'ên Kuo-hsin, essay on Mao Tsê-tung, 403 - - Ch'ên Li-fu, 84, 142 - - Ch'ên Lo, 204 - - Ch'ên Shao-yu (Wang Ming), 163 - - Ch'ên Tu-hsiu, 163 - - _Ch'ê-yeh Chiao-yü P'ai_ (_see_ Vocational Educationists' Clique) - - _Chia_, 107, 324, 395 - - Chiang Chieh-shih (_see_ Chiang K'ai-shek) - - Chiang Ching-kuo, 262 - - Chiang K'ai-shek: - biography, 254 - in Canton, 260 - character, 255 - childhood, 257 - Chinese appraisals, 266 - and Christianity, 257 - on constitutionalism, 32 - _Definition of the Problems of Various Classifications of Hsien_, 388 - ethical theory, 150 - governmental role, 48 - historical role, 255 - ideals, 257 - kidnapped at Sian, 10 - in the Kuomintang, 128 - life, 256 - marriage, 261 - military rise, 263 - military writings, 260 - nature of his power, 268 - and the New Life Movement, 149 - political theory, 265, 269 - present personality, 265 - and President Lin, 53 - relations with Wang Ch'ing-wei, 201 - rise in the Kuomintang, 263 - and Roosevelt, 278 - secret police, 268 - in Shanghai, 261 - and the Shanghai Communists, 263 - statement to the author, 371 - Soviet training, 262 - and Sun Yat-sen, 245 - training in Japan, 259 - _What I Mean by Action (Li-hsing Chê-hsiao)_, 373 - writings, 268 - - _Chiao-shou P'ai_ (_see_ Professors' Clique) - - Chicherin, 164 - - Chief (_Tsung-ts'ai_), 239 - - _Chien-ch'a_ power, 27 - - _Chien Kuo Ta Kang_, 6 - - _Ch'ih_, 150 - - China Branch of the International Peace Campaign, 234 - - China Defense League, 119 - - _China Forum, The_, 235 - - _China Herald, The_, 234 - - "China's Long-range Diplomatic Orientation," 418 - - China National Aviation Corporation, 93 - - Chinese Central Asia (_see_ Sinkiang) - - Chinese Communist Party (_see_ Communist Party) - - Chinese ideals, 2 - - Chinese Industrial Cooperatives (_see_ C.I.C.) - - Chinese Mass Education Movement, 218 - - Chinese National Socialist Party (_Kuo-chia Shê-hui Tang_), 179 - - Chinese Red Army, 13, 161 - - Chinese Republic, 2 - - Chinese Revolutionary Party (_Chung-kuo K'ê-ming Tang_), 178 - - Chinese Soviet Republic (_Chung-hua Su-wei-ai Kung-ho-kuo_), 13, 112, 161 - - Chinese Turkestan (_see also_ Sinkiang), 85 - - Chi, C.C., 139 - - Chin P'u-yi, 184, 256 - - Ch'in state and dynasty, 2, 107 - - Ch'in Po-k'u, 168 - - Chou En-lai, 64, 168 - - Chou Fu-hai, 198 - - Christian activities, 235 - - Chu Djang, 153 - - _Chu-Mao_, 166 - - Chung Fu Joint Mining Administration, 90 - - Chungking, 1, 15, 18, 56 - - Chung Shan (_see also_ Sun Yat-sen), 249 - - Chu Tê, 166, 261 - - _Ch'ü_, 107, 327, 391 - - _Ch'üan_ (power), 253 - - Ch'üan-min K'ang-chan Shê (United Front Club), cited, 37 - - Ch'u Chia-hua, 136 - - C.I.C. (Chinese Industrial Cooperatives; _Chung-kuo Kung-yeh Ho-tso - Hsieh-hui_): - appraisal, 233 - distribution of profits, 230 - establishment, 224 - formation of cooperatives, 226 - the Model Constitution, 232 - regions, 226 - relation to government, 223 - social welfare work, 231 - the three zones, 224 - - Citizenship (proposed constitutional provisions), 284 - - City Council (_Shih-chêng Hui-i_), 104 - - Civil governor of a province (_Shêng-chang_), 99 - - Civil service reform, 66 - - Civil Service Training Corps, 134 - - Clark-Kerr, Sir Archibald, 224 - - Class politics in China, 146 - - Class war, 13 - - Coal and iron, 228 - - Coal mining, 90 - - Collection of revenue, 86 - - College students, 9 - - Commission for the Disciplinary Punishment of Public Officers - (_Kung-wu-yüan Ch'êng-chieh Wei-yüan-hui_), 67 - - Commission on Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs (_Mêng Tsang - Wei-yüan-hui_), 8 - - Commission on Overseas Chinese Affairs (_Ch'iao-wu Wei-yüan-hui_), 84 - - Committee Chairman (_Wei-yüan-chang_; _see_ name of Committee) - - Communications, Ministry of (_Chiao-t'ung Pu_), 92 - - Communications Southward, 95 - - Communications system, foreign personnel in, 95 - - Communism, 30, 270 - - Communist communes, 213 - - Communist Party (_Kung-ch'an Tang_), 13, 159, 263, 275 - and American aid to China, 172 - appraisal of, 173 - Branch Party Organs, 363 - Central Party Committee, 368 - chart of structure, 162 - and Chiang K'ai-shek, 175 - _Constitution_, 359 - Council of Party Delegates, 162, 364 - foundation, 160 - _Hsien_ Organs, 364 - international policy, 403 - leaders, 166 - and Moscow, 163 - motives, 164 - National Party Congress, 367 - National Party Convention, 367 - organization, 361 - and peasants, 165, 213 - in perpetual revolution, 213 - policy toward the Kuomintang, 174 - potential treason, 172 - Provincial Party Organs, 366 - purges and schisms, 169 - Sun Yat-sen's alliance, 245 - Supreme Party Organs, 362 - views on Chiang K'ai-shek, 267 - - Communist Youth Corps (_Kung-ch'an Ch'ing-nien T'uan_), 132, 370 - - Communist zone (_see_ Frontier Area) - - Communists: - compared with Kuomintang, 146 - and the five-power system, 45 - and the guerrillas, 162 - in the People's Political Council, 76 - policy of collaboration, 121 - and the proposed Constitution, 37 - rivalry with Kuomintang, 159 - - "Community" (_hsiang_), 107 - - Community life in China, 4 - - Complexity of government structure, 61 - - Concordia Society (_Hsieh-ho-hui_), 194 - - Conflict: the term, 11 - - Confucianism, 2, 3, 45, 189, 250 - - Confucius, 239 - - Constitution, Chiang's comment on, 32 - - _Constitution of the Chinese Soviet Republic_, 31 - - _Constitution of the_ San Min Chu I _Youth Corps_, 331 - - Constitutional change, issues of, 31 - - Constitutionalism, 6, 177, 213, 371 - - Constitutions (_see also_ Draft Constitution), 21 - - Constitutions, ineffectual, 39 - - Consultative organs, 39 - - _Control_ (_chien-ch'a)_ power, 27 - - Control _Yüan_ (_Chien-ch'a Yüan_): - appraisal, 66 - chart of functions, 318 - diagram of organization, 319 - proposed constitutional provisions, 292 - reorganization under the proposed Constitution, 29 - war work, 313, 318 - - Cooperatives (_see also_ C.I.C.), 89, 393 - - Corruption, 38, 120 - - Cotton, 228 - - Council of State (_Kuo-min Chêng-fu Wei-yüan-hui_): - administrative and constitutional status, 52 - agencies directly attached, 54 - functions, 47 - proposed constitutional role, 28 - - County (_see hsien_) - - Courts of justice (proposed constitutional position), 292 - - Credit, national, 86 - - Currency, Japanese, 186 - - Currency rivalry, 87 - - Currents of documents in Chinese government, 55 - - Customs, 88 - - - Declarations of war and peace, 59 - - _Definition of the Problems Concerning the Organization of the - Various Classifications of Hsien_, 388 - - Delegates to the constituent People's Congress, 38 - - Democracy (_min chu_; Sun Yat-sen's term, _min ch'üan_), 270 - - Democracy in free China, 371 - - Democracy, inauguration of, 38 - - Democracy, prospects, 273 - - Democracy (_min ch'üan_), the theory of, 253 - - Democratic Centralism, 162 - - Democratic tendencies in the armies, 372 - - Democratic toleration, limits of, 40 - - Department of Military Operations (_Chün-ling-pu_), 62 - - Department of Military Training (_Chün-hsün-pu_), 62 - - Deputy Secretary-General (_Fu Mi-shu-chang_) of the People's - Political Council, 73 - - Deputy Speaker (_Fu I-chang_) of the People's Political Council, 72 - - Dialectical materialism (_see_ Communism, Communists) - - Diplomacy, 310 - - Diplomatic Orientation, China's Long-range, 418 - - Direct taxes, 87 - - Director of Political Affairs, 57 - - Directorate-General of Courts-Martial (_Chün-fa Chih-hsing - Tsung-chien-pu_), 62 - - _Discussion of Mao Tsê-tung's Comments on the Present State of - International Relations_ (Ch'ên Kuo-hsin), 403 - - District (_see hsien_ for government; _ch'ü_ for parties) - - Double Five Constitution (_see_ Draft Permanent Constitution) - - Draft Permanent Constitution (_Hsien-fa Ts'ao-an_), 25, 283 - - _Duties and General Activities of the_ San Min Chu I _Youth - Corps_, 340 - - - East Hopei Autonomous Anti-Communist Government, 192 - - Eastern Inner Mongolia, 85 - - Economic affairs: - advance in the West, 89 - industrial development, 90 - in _Program of Resistance and Reconstruction_, 311 - policy and administration, 85 - proposed constitutional provisions, 296 - war finance, 87 - - Economic Affairs, Ministry of (_Ching-chi Pu_), 88 - - Economic cycle in China, 106 - - Economic groups in politics, 236 - - Economic theory in the _San Min Chu I Youth Corps_, 351 - - Economics of old China, 3 - - Education, 30, 61, 83, 214, 312, 393 - - Education, Ministry of (_Chiao-yü Pu_), 83 - - Education: proposed constitutional provisions, 298 - - Eighteenth Army Corps, 168 - - Eighth Route Army, 13, 168 - - Election Committee for Representatives to the People's [Constituent] - Congress, 38 - - Elections, Communist, 163 - - Elections of representatives to the National [People's] - Congress, 302 - - Emergency Session of the Kuomintang Party Congress, 16 - - Empire, Chinese, 2 - - _Erh Ch'ên_ group, 142 - - Espionage, 61 - - Establishment, period of, 5 - - Eurasia airlines, 93 - - Examination _Yüan_, 56, 66, 68, 134 - proposed constitutional provisions, 292 - - Examinations Commission (_K'ao-hsüan Wei-yüan-hui_), 68 - - _Exclusive inspection_, 316 - - Executive _Yüan_ (_Hsing-chêng Yüan_): - executive responsibility, 57 - functions, 59 - Meeting, 58 - proposed constitutional provisions, 29, 288 - structure, 58 - - - _Fa chih_ (government of laws), 33 - - Farmers, 218 - - Farmers' Bank of China, 87 - - Fêng Yü-hsiang, 104 - - Fenghua, Chekiang, 262 - - Farouk, 255 - - Fascism, 270 - - Finance, Ministry of (_Ts'ai-chêng Pu_), 86 - - Five-fold separation of powers, 27, 206, 264 - - Five-power constitution (_wu-ch'üan hsien-fa_), 42, 68 - - _Five rights_, 43 - - Five _yüan_, 253 - - Foo Shing Corporation, 88 - - Foochow insurrection, 179 - - Ford, Henry, 233 - - Foreign Affairs, Ministry of (_Waichiaopu_), 81 - - Foreign financial aid, 87 - - Foreign policy, 403, 418 - - Foreign trade, 88 - - Formosans, 187 - - Four Cliques (_Ssŭ P'ai_), 76 - - Four Parties (_Ssŭ Tang_), 76 - - _Four powers_, 43 - - France, 181 - - Frederick the Great, 255 - - Free China, extent of, 98 - - Free China, prosperity, 89, 222 - - Freedoms under the proposed constitution: - assembly and forming associations, 285 - domicile, 284 - religious belief, 284 - speech, writing, and publication, 284 - - French Indo-China, 19 - - Friends of the Wounded Society, 155 - - Frontier Area (for Chinese, _see_ Administrative District of North - Shensi), 13, 16, 111, 115, 162 - - Fu Hsiao-ên, 212 - - Fukien province, 102, 217 - - Function of auditing, 313 - - Fup'ing, 118 - - Future development of Chinese politics, 274 - - - _Gaimusho_, 82 - - Galens, General (Vassili Blücher), 142 - - Gasoline, 91, 95 - - Gautama Buddha, 239 - - _General inspection_, 316 - - General Staff, 62 - - General strikes, 39 - - Generalissimo (_Tsung-ssŭ-ling_), 61 - - Genghis Khan, 239 - - Gentry in politics, 106 - - George, Henry, 30, 254 - - Germany, 273, 274 - - Glossary, 423-433 - - Gold-washing, 228 - - Government-owned corporations, 90 - - Government, nature of, 211 - - Government organization: chart, 330 - - Grants in aid to the provinces, 109 - - Grass cloth, 228 - - Great Revolution, 5, 60, 213 - - Green Gang, 261 - - Groups of households (_chia_), 107 - - Guerrillas: - areas, 372 - governments, 116 - and the Military Affairs Commission, 62 - and the National Salvationists, 177 - schools, 84 - strategy, 12 - warfare, 310 - zones under Chungking, 64 - - Guilds, 10 - - - Han dynasty, 3 - - Han Fu-ch'u, 202 - - Hankow, 4, 15 - - Hanson, Haldore, 116 - - Hedin, Sven, 255 - - Highway system, 93 - - Hitler, Adolf, 239 - - Hong Kong, 4 - - Honolulu, Sun Yat-sen in, 243 - - Hopei-Chahar Political Council, 195 - - Hopei-Chahar-Shansi Border Region (_Chin-ch'a-ch'i Pien-ch'ü Lin-shih - Hsing-chêng Wei-yüan-hui_), Provisional, Administrative Committee - of, 116 - - Ho Ying-chin, 63 - - _Hsiang_ (or _chên_; "community"), 107, 324, 391 - - _Hsiang_ guild, 393 - - _Hsiao-tsu_ ("small group") training program, 354 - - _Hsien_ ("county" or district), 29, 107, 253, 311 - area, 391 - definition of problems by Chiang K'ai-shek, 388 - experimental, 219 - governments, 391 - organizations of the Communists, 364 - proposed constitutional provisions, 294 - regulations (text), 324 - - _Hsin Min Chu I_, 194 - - _Hsin Min Hui_, 208 - - Huang, J. L., 149 - - Huang Hsing, 245, 259, 262 - - _Huangpu_ (Whampoa) Academy and political group, 142, 262 - - Huapeikuo, 194 - - Hu Han-min, 8, 142, 202, 262 - - _Hui-i_ (a legislative "council"; _see_ level of government concerned) - - Hull, Cordell, 278 - - Hunan, 19 - - Hung Hsiu-ch'üan, 241 - - Hu Shih, 215 - - Hypo-colony, 190 - - - _I_ (ethics), 150 - - Ideological control, 251 - - _I Ho Ch'üan_ (Boxers), 237 - - Impeachment, 313 - - Impeachment, proposed constitutional provisions, 293 - - "In accordance with law," 26 - - Incident, 11 - - Income taxes, 87 - - Indirect rule, 183 - - Indo-China, 183 - - Indusco (_see_ C.I.C.) - - Industrial cooperatives (_see_ C.I.C.) - - Inheritance, the Chinese political, 1 - - Inheritance taxes, 87 - - Inner Mongolia, Federated Autonomous Government of (_Mêng-ku Lien-ho - Tzŭ-chih Chêng-fu_), 192 - - Inner Mongolia and Chungking, 85 - - Inspection systems, 108 - - Institute of National Culture, 179 - - Intellectual traditionalism, 251 - - Interior, Ministry of (_Nei-chêng Pu_), 82 - - Internal revenue, 88 - - _International Development of China, The_, 244 - - International relations (_see_ diplomacy, foreign policy, etc.) - - Interpretation of statutes and ordinances: proposed constitutional - provisions, 291 - - Invasion, period of, 5 - - Italy, 274 - - - Japanese: - aims in China, 184 - army, 18, 276 - army as a Chinese government, 185 - attitudes to Chinese foreign policy, 82 - Imperial Government in China, 183 - prospects in China, 274 - recognition of Wang Ch'ing-wei, 209 - role of the army, 183 - subsidiary Chinese governments (_see_ Pro-Japanese Groups) - training of Chiang K'ai-shek, 259 - - Japan's puppets or Japanophiles (_see_ Pro-Japanese Groups) - - _Joint inspection_, 316 - - Judicial _Yüan_ (_Ssŭ-fa Yüan_), 65, 291 - - Justice, Ministry of (_Ssŭ-fa Hsing-chêng Pu_), 67, 96 - - - K'an Nai-kuang, 137, 140 - - Kang Tê, Emperor of Manchoukuo, the (_see_ Chin P'u-yi) - - Kao Tsung-wu, 198 - - Kentwell, L. K., 205 - - Kialing river, 18 - - Kiang Kang-hu, 181 - - Kiangsi, 161 - - Korea, 189 - - Kung, H. H., 57, 86, 223 - - Kung, Mme. H. H. (Ai-ling Soong), 248 - - Kung so, 393 - - _Kuo-chia Chu-i P'ai_ (_La Jeunesse_ party), 181 - - Kuomintang: - appraisal of, 146 - army connections, 143 - attitude toward Communists, 144 - Bolshevik pattern of organization, 131 - bureaucracy, 7 - central administrative structure, 72, 131, 137 - Central Control Committee (_Chung-yang Chien-ch'a - Wei-yüan-hui_), 127, 131 - Central Executive Committee (_Chung-yang Chih-hsing - Wei-yüan-hui_), 57, 126, 127, 131 - Central Political Institute (_Chung-yang Chêng-chih - Hsüeh-hsiao_), 134 - Central Publicity Board (_see_ Publicity, Party-Ministry of) - Central Training Committee (_Hsün-lien Wei-yüan-hui_), 133 - chart of field organization, 139 - chart of central organization, 131 - chart of general structure, 331 - and the Ch'ên brothers, 84 - and the Communists, 159 - Congress (_Ch'üan-kuo Tai-piao Ta-hui_), 57 - constitutional status, 124 - democratic outlook, 143 - and economic classes, 135 - Emergency Session of the Party Congress, 69, 128 - _hsiao-tsu_ ("small-group"), 140, 354 - intra-Party politics, 142 - membership, 141 - monopoly of government, 41 - organization, 125, 129, 331 - "Orthodox" fraction, 200 - Party cell, 140 - Party Chief (_Tsung-ts'ai_), 126, 128 - Party Congress (_see_ Congress) - Party Constitution, 125 - Party democracy, 124 - Party-Ministries, 136 - Party purges, 141 - in the People's Political Council, 76 - policy toward Communist Party, 174 - purposes, 125 - "Reorganized" fraction, 200 - rivalry with Communists in the Northwest, 135 - "small-group" (_see hsiao-tsu_) - Supreme National Defense Council (_Kuo-fang Tsui-kao - Wei-yüan-hui_), 132 - Training Corps (_Hsün-lien T'uan_), 133 - Wang Ch'ing-wei, 197 - Youth Corps (_see San Min Chu I_ Youth Corps) - - Kwangsi province, 19, 102, 109, 217 - - Kwangtung province, 102 - - - Labor: - law, 39 - proposed constitutional provisions, 297 - - _La Jeunesse_ (Parti ... de la jeune Chine; _Kuo-chia Chu-i - P'ai_), 76, 181 - - Land problem: - proposed constitutional provisions, 296 - reform, 106, 110, 218 - - Landlords, 4, 148, 221 - - _Lao-pai-hsing_ (the common people), 236 - - Lattimore, Owen, 3 - - Law: the term, 299 - - _Laws Governing the System of Organization of the National - Government of the Republic of China_ (1925), 23 - - _Laws Governing the System of Organization of the National - Government_ (1931), 24 - - Leader (_Tsung-li_), 239 - - League of Nations Union, 234 - - Left Kuomintang, 264 - - Leftists and Leftism, 9, 101, 111, 248 - - Legal Adviser to the National Government (_Kuo-min Chêng-fu Fa-lü - Ku-wên_), 54 - - Legal tender notes (_fa pi_), 87, 312 - - Legislative _Yüan_ (_Li-fa Yüan_): function, 65 - - Members (_Li-fa Wei-yüan_), 66 - proposed constitutional provisions, 29, 289 - - _Li_ (ideological conformity), 150 - - _Li chih_ (government by _li_), 33 - - Liang, Hubert, 224 - - _Lien_ (integrity), 150 - - Li Hung-chang, 189 - - Li Li-san, 163 - - Linebarger, Paul M. W., 54, 105, 242, 246 - - Lin Pai-shêng, 198 - - Lin Shên (Lin Sen; Lim Sun), 53, 145 - - Li Shêng-wu, 206 - - Literacy, 214, 215 - - Liu, K. P., 224 - - Local finance, 402 - - Local government (_see also hsien_): - appraisals, 109 - chart, 107 - Chiang K'ai-shek's comment, 397 - general role, 98 - under the _Hsien Fa_, 29 - proposed constitutional reforms, 294 - in the recent past, 104 - reform of, 311 - reform under the Kuomintang, 137 - reform methods, 108 - - Long March of the Chinese Reds, 119, 161 - - Long-Range Diplomatic Orientation, China's, 418 - - Lung Yün, 101 - - - Mahayana Buddhism, 259 - - Mail censorship, 95 - - Main Office of the Military Affairs Commission, 62 - - Malaysia, 183 - - Malraux, André, 161 - - Manchoukuo, 98, 183, 189, 256 - - Manchoukuo-Outer Mongol war, 19 - - Manchu Empire of China (Ch'ing dynasty), 5 - - Manchuria, 89 - - Manchus, 2, 241 - - Mao Tsê-tung, 166, 403-417 - - Marx, Karl, 241, 254 - - Marxism, 160, 234, 258, 263 - - Marxism and Chinese history, 165 - - Marxism-Leninism, 84 - - Marxist effect on the _San Min Chu I_, 252 - - Mass: - action, 10 - education, 215 - literacy movement, 84 - marriages, 153 - mobilization, 157 - movements, 312 - singing, 154 - - Material and Resources Control and Supervision Ministry, 91 - - Mayor (_Shih-chang_), 104 - - Mayors under the proposed constitution, 295 - - Mazzini, 241 - - Miao Ping, 194 - - Migration of schools, 83 - - Migrations, 88 - - Militarism in the provinces, 100 - - Military Advisory Council (_Chün-shih Ts'an-i-yüan_), 62 - - Military affairs, 310 - - Military Affairs Commission (_Chün-shih Wei-yüan-hui_), 13, 60, 162 - - Military governor (_tuchün_), 99 - - Military jurisdiction under the _Hsien Fa_, 284 - - Military policy, 61 - - Military service under the _Hsien Fa_, 285 - - Military unification, 6 - - Militia, 393 - - _Min-ch'üan chu-i_ (_see_ Democracy, Sun Yat-sen, and _San Min Chu I_) - - _Min shêng chu-i_, 30, 223, 253 - - _Min ts'u chu-i_ (_see_ Nationalism, Sun Yat-sen, and _San Min Chu I_) - - Ming Emperors, 249 - - Minister (_Pu Chang_), 96 - - Ministry of ---- (_see_ name of Ministry) - - Ministries, 81 - - Minor parties: - and constitutionalism, 34 - at Nanking, 208 - in occupied China, 235 - representation, 72 - status, 160 - - Minority democracy, 41 - - Mobilization, economic, 86 - - Model _hsien_, 109 - - Modernization of West China, 89 - - Mohammed, 239 - - Monarchist legitimism, 184 - - Morale, governmental, 236 - - Moscow (_see_ Communism) - - Moslem rebellions, 213 - - Motor communications, 93 - - Motor fuel trade, 90 - - Municipal Advisory Assembly (_Shih Ts'an-i-hui_), 72, 104 - - Municipal food stores, 90 - - Municipal government, 103 - - Municipal People's Political Council (_see_ Municipal Advisory - Assembly) - - Municipalities under the _Hsien Fa_, 295 - - Munitions, 90 - - - Nanking, capture of, 14 - - Nanking regimes (_see_ Reorganized Government; Reformed Government) - - Napoleon, 239 - - "National" (_see also_ "People's," "Chinese") - - National Aviation Commission, 63 - - National capital in the _Hsien Fa_, 284 - - National [Constituent] Congress (_Kuo-min Ta-hui_), 25, 27, 300 - - National Congress: election of representatives, 302 - - National Congress: system of organization, 300 - - National Government (_Kuo-min Chêng-fu_): the term, 52 - - National Government Committee (_see_ Council of State) - - National Health Administration (_Wei-shêng Shu_), 83 - - National Institute of Rural Reconstruction, 220 - - National Military Council (_see_ Military Affairs Commission) - - National People's Convention (_Kuo-min Hui-i_), 7 - - National Relief Commission (_Chên-chi Wei-yüan-hui_), 92 - - National Salvation (_Chiu Kuo_) movement, 175 - - National Socialism (German), 252 - - National Socialist Party (_Kuo-chia Shê-hui Tang_), 75, 179 - - National Spiritual Mobilization (_Kuo-min Ching-shên - Tsung-tung-yüan_), 157 - - National treasury, 88 - - Nationalism (_min ts'u_), theory of, 252 - - Negrin, 15 - - Neighborhood (_pao_), 107 - - Nêng (ability), 253 - - New Fourth Army (_Hsin-ssŭ-chün_), 119 - - New Life Movement (_Hsin Shêng-huo Yün-tung_), 149 - - New Life Secretaries' Camp, 155 - - New Life Students Rural Summer Service Corps, 154 - - New Order in East Asia, 184, 189 - - News services, 137 - - North China, 14 - - North Shensi (_see also_ Frontier Area), 161 - - Northeastern Clique (_Tungpei P'ai_), 76 - - - Occupied China: - Chungking control over, 64 - missions, 235 - poverty, 92 - - Office of Civil Affairs (_Wên-kuan Ch'u_), 54 - - Office of Military Affairs (_Tsan-chün Ch'u_), 54 - - Office of the Naval Commander-in-Chief (_Hai-chün - Tsung-ssŭ-ling-pu_), 63 - - Office of Political Affairs (_Chêng-wu Ch'u_), 57 - - Officers' Moral Endeavor Corps, 63, 149 - - Old China: - economics, 3 - government, 5 - socio-economic structure, 211 - in Sun Yat-sen's theory, 251 - - Old Hundred Names (_lao-pai-hsing_), 236 - - Opinion, public, 39 - - Organic Law of XVII (1928), 28 - - Organization of the Kuomintang, etc. (_see_ relevant group or agency) - - "Orthodox" Kuomintang, 200, 207 - - Outer Mongol People's Republic, 183, 188 - - _Outline of National Reconstruction_, 6 - - _Outline of War-Time Controlment_, 313 - - _Outlines of Political Tutelage_, 24 - - Overseas Chinese, 84 - - - Pacification Commissioner (_Sui-ching Chu-jên_), 100 - - Pai Chung-hsi, 102 - - _pai-hua_ (written vernacular), 215 - - Pan American airlines, 93 - - Panchen Lama, 71 - - Pan Ch'ao, 81 - - _Pao_ ("neighborhood"), 107, 324, 394 - - _Pao_ schools, 216 - - _Pao-chia_ system, 106 - - Paper money, 86 - - _Parti Républicain Nationaliste de la Jeune Chine_ (_see Kuo-chia - Chu-i P'ai_) - - Party Affairs Committee of the Kuomintang (_Tang-wu - Wei-yüan-hui_), 133 - - Party Chief (_Tsung-ts'ai_), 41 - - Party Constitution (_Tang-chang_): - Communist, 359 - Kuomintang, 125 - - Party dictatorship (_tang chih_), 6, 23 - - Party-government relations, 49 - - Party and Government War Area Commission (_Chan-ti Tang-chêng - Wei-yüan-hui_), 64, 112 - - Party headquarters, 141 - - Party-politics, 158 - - Party-politics in the People's Political Council, 76 - - Party Supervisor's Net (_Tang-jên Chien-ch'a Wang_), 141 - - Party-Ministries of the Kuomintang, 136 - - Party's role in the constitutional system, 23 - - Peasant rebellions, 4 - - Pensions Commission (_Fu-hsüeh Wei-yüan-hui_), 62 - - People's Advisory Political Council (_see_ People's Political Council) - - People's Congress (_see_ National Congress) - - People's Foreign Relations Association, 234 - - People's Political Council (_Kuo-min Ts'an-chêng Hui_): - competence, 73 - election, 72 - function of representation, 66 - membership, 70 - nominations, 71 - practicality, 74 - procedure, 74 - in _Program of Resistance and Reconstruction_, 311 - reorganization, 75 - sessions, 70 - - Permanent Constitution, Draft (_Hsien-fa Ts'ao-an_), 5, 25, 283 - - Personnel, Ministry of (_Ch'üan-hsü Pu_), 68, 96 - - _Philosophy of Action, A_, 373 - - _Pi Chiao Hsien Fa_ (_Comparative Constitutions_, by Wang Shihchieh), - translated and quoted, 23, 49, 50, 52, 67, 125 - - Pilsudski, 272 - - Planning Committee for the Western Capital (_Hsi-ching Ch'ou-pei - Wei-yüan-hui_), 56 - - Pluralism, 3, 211 - - Policy-making, 47, 74, 79 - - Political Affairs Department or Office (_Chêng-wu Ch'u_), 57 - - Political commissars in the army, 63 - - Political Department (_Chêng-chih-pu_) of the Military Affairs - Commission, 64 - - Political laxity, 251 - - Political rights: proposed constitutional provisions, 285 - - Political Scientists' group (_Chêng-hsüeh Hsi_), 145 - - Political Vice-Minister (_Chêng-wu Tz'u-chang_), 96 - - Politics of ideology, 8 - - Popular democracy, 39 - - Popular Front group, 78, 129 - - Popular government in the Border Region, 119 - - Population, 3 - - Poverty in occupied China, 222 - - Power (_ch'üan_), 43, 253 - - Pragmatic utilitarianism of Sun Yat-sen, 252 - - Presidency proposed under the _Hsien Fa_, 28, 287 - - President (_Yüan-chang_) of the Executive Yüan, 56 - - President (_Chu-hsi_) of the National Government, 52 - - Presidium of the People's Political Council, 73 - - Pressure politics, 234 - - Prime movers, 229 - - Principles of the Great People (_Ta Min Chu I_), 196 - - Private rights: proposed constitutional provisions, 284 - - Private property: proposed constitutional provisions, 285 - - Privy Council, 56 - - Problems of the _hsien_: comment of Chiang K'ai-shek, 388 - - Professors' Clique (_Chiao-shou P'ai_), 77 - - _Program of Resistance and Reconstruction_ (_K'ang-chan Chien-kuo - Kang-ling_), 17, 35, 309 - - Pro-Japanese elements, 186, 192, 212, 276, 310 - - Propaganda, 61, 137 - - _Proposition_, 314 - - Prosperity, 222 - - Protestant schools, 215 - - Provincial Governments (_Shêng Chêng-fu_): - Chairman (_Shêng Chêng-fu Chu-hsi_), 100, 294 - connection with central government, 82 - councils, 72 - current role, 98 - proposed constitutional provisions, 293 - Provincial People's Political Councils (_Shêng - Ts'an-chêng-hui_), 103 - structure, 102 - - Provincialism, 8, 99 - - Provisional Constitution (_Yüeh Fa_), 22, 24 - - Provisional Executive Committee of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Border - Region (_Chin-ch'a-chi Pien-ch'ü Lin-shih Hsing-chêng - Wei-yüan-hui_; _see also_ Border Region), 16 - - Provisional Government of the Republic of China (_Chung-hua Min-kuo - Lin-shih Chêng-fu_), 14, 192, 207 - - _Pu_ (ministries or departments), 61 - - Public Administration, School of, 219 - - Public opinion, 214 - - Public service: proposed constitutional provisions, 285 - - Public utilities: proposed constitutional provisions, 296 - - Publicity, 79 - - Publicity, Party-Ministry of (_Chung-yang Hsüan-ch'uan Pu_), 137 - - Publicity of the _San Min Chu I_ Youth Corps, 350 - - "Puppet states," 188 - - Purple Mountain, 249 - - P'u Yi (_see_ Chin P'u-yi) - - - Races: proposed constitutional provisions, 284 - - Radio, 94 - - Railways in Free China, 92 - - _Resistance and Reconstruction, Program of_, 309 - - Reformed Government of the Republic of China (_Chung-hua Min-kuo - Wei-hsin Chêng-fu_), 17, 192, 195 - - Regeneration Club (_Fu-hsing Shê_), 144 - - Regional autonomy, 8 - - Regular troops, 8 - - _Regulations Concerning the Organization of the Various - Classifications of Hsien_, 324 - - Relief, 61, 297 - - "Reorganized Kuomintang," 200 - - Reorganized National Government of China (_Hsiu-chêng Kuo-min - Chêng-fu_): - affiliation with Japan, 183 - creation and function, 197 - personnel, 204 - practical work, 205 - significance to Chiang K'ai-shek, 372 - status, 203 - - Representation, function of, 66 - - Republic: the term, 161 - - Republican revolution, 213 - - Republicans (_Kung-ho Tang_), 208 - - Resident Committee of the People's Political Council, 73 - - Resist-Japan University, 84 - - Resistance, 12, 213 - - Revolution by three stages, 6, 22, 35, 253 - - Revolutionary Action Commission of the Chinese Kuomintang (_Chung-hua - Kuo-min-tang K'ê-ming Hsing-chêng Wei-yüan-hui_), 178 - - Rights, constitutional, 28 - - Roosevelt, Franklin D., 233, 278 - - Rosinger, Lawrence K., 81 - - Rural education, 218 - - Rural reconstruction, 218, 397 - - Rural Service Corps, 154 - - Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic, (R.S.F.S.R.), 188 - - - Salazar, Antonio de O., 272 - - _San Min Chu I_: - and Chiang K'ai-shek, 270 - explanation and comment, 8, 13, 34, 178, 245, 250, 371 - and _Hsin Min Chu I_, 194 - proposed constitutional provisons, 287 - - _San Min Chu I_ Youth Corps (_San Min Chu I Ch'ing-nien T'uan_): - appraisal, 352 - chart of organization, 345 - Constitution, 331 - description by General Ch'ên Ch'êng, 340 - history, 341 - and the Kuomintang, 132 - Leader, 342 - - Salt gabelle, 88 - - Scholars of old China, 3 - - Scholastic bureaucracy, 3, 250 - - School for the Border Provinces, 135 - - Schools (_see_ education), 216 - - _Scorched earth_ policy, 12 - - Second Revolution, 259 - - Secret societies, 10 - - Secretariat (_Mi-shu-ch'u_), 57, 73 - - Secretary-General (_Mi-shu-chang_), 57, 73 - - Service Department, military (_Hou-fang Ch'in-wu-pu_), 63 - - Seven Gentlemen (_Ch'i Chün-tzu_), 36, 76, 176 - - Shanghai, 13 - - Sharecropping, 91 - - Sheean, Vincent, 161 - - Shên Chun-lu, 176 - - Shêng Shih-ts'ai, 176 - - Shensi (_see_ Frontier Area) - - Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Frontier Area (_Shan-kan-ning Pien-ch'ü - Chêng-fu_), 112 - - _Shih_ (_see_ municipality, _q.v._) - - Sian affair, 5, 10, 176 - - Sinkiang (Chinese Central Asia; Chinese Turkestan), 85, 101 - - Sino-American trade, 88 - - Sino-Siberian highway, 93, 95 - - Small-Group Training Program, 354 - - Smith, Joseph, 241 - - Snow, Edgar, 146, 160 - - Social Affairs, Ministry of, 96 - - Social Movements, Party-Ministry of (_Shê-hui Yün-tung Pu_; also - translated Party-Ministry of Social Affairs, Board of Social - Affairs), 96, 136 - - Social Democratic Party, 181 - - Social rigidity, 251 - - Social work, 61 - - Social work of the _San Min Chu I_ Youth Corps, 351 - - Socialist Party, 181, 208 - - Soong, C. J., 247 - - Soong, T. V., 9, 86, 248 - - Soong Ching-ling, 245 - - Soong sisters, 248 - - Sovereignty: proposed constitutional provisions, 283 - - Soviet China, 275 - - Soviet form of government in China, 45 - - Soviet influence in Sinkiang, 101 - - Soviet-Japanese understanding, 275 - - Soviet policy in China, 171 - - Soviet training of Chiang K'ai-shek, 262 - - Soviet Union (_see also_ Communists; Marxism), 188, 273, 275 - - Speaker (_I-chang_) of the People's Political Council, 72 - - Special Administrative District of the Chinese Republic (_Chung-hua - Min-kuo T'ê-ch'ü Chêng-fu_), 112 - - Special-area governments, 98, 111, 120 - - _Special inspection_, 316 - - Special Regional Government ... (_see_ Special Administrative - District ...) - - Specie, 86 - - Stalemate, 12 - - Stalin, Joseph, 263 - - Stalinism (_see also_ Communist Party), 234 - - State Council (_see_ Council of State) - - State examinations: proposed constitutional provisions, 285 - - State socialism, 30, 89 - - Steamships, 93 - - Strategy of the Chinese, 12 - - Sub-district (_ch'ü-fên_) of the Kuomintang, 126, 139 - - Subterranean minerals: proposed constitutional provisions, 296 - - Sung Ai-ling (_see_ Kung, Mme. H. H.) - - Sung Ch'ing-ling (_see_ Sun Yat-sen, Mme.) - - Sung Mei-ling, 248, 261 - - Sung Tzu-wên (_see_ Soong, T. V.) - - Sun I-hsien (_see_ Sun Yat-sen) - - Sun K'ê (Sun Fo), 66, 145, 247 - - Sun Yat-sen: - biography, 240 - doctrines (_see also San Min Chu I_), 6 - family, 247 - historical role, 239 - on imperialism, 190 - on local government, 105 - Provisional President, 244 - revolutionary technique, 244 - sense of mission, 240 - state planning, 245 - Western training, 242 - - Sun Yat-sen, Mme., 145, 178, 247 - - Supreme Court (_Tsui-kao Fa-yüan_), 67 - - Supreme National Defense Council (_Tsui-kao Kuo-fang - Wei-yüan-hui_), 16, 46 - - Symbolism of government, 45 - - System of organization of the National Congress, 300 - - Szechwan, 181 - - - T'ai Li, 145 - - T'aip'ing Rebellion, 161, 213, 241 - - Taiwanese, 187 - - _Ta Min Chu I_, 196 - - _Ta-min-hui_, 196, 208 - - _Tang Cheng Chien Chih T'u-piao_, cited, 46, 54 - - T'ang Leang-li, 198 - - Tannu-Tuva, 189 - - Tao Hsi-shêng, 198 - - Tayler, J. B., 224 - - Taylor, George, 116 - - Taxation: proposed constitutional provisions, 285 - - Telecommunications, 93 - - Telegraph, 94 - - Telephone, 94 - - Têng Yen-ta, 178 - - Territory: proposed constitutional provisions, 283 - - Third International (_see also_ Communist Party), 71, 161, 245 - - Third Party (_Ti-san Tang_), 178 - - Three-Power Pact, 274 - - Three-stage war, 12 - - Three stages of revolution (_see_ Revolution by three stages) - - "Three principles of the people" (_see San Min Chu I_) - - Tibet, 85 - - Tientsin, 4 - - Tinghsien, 219 - - Tong, Hollington, 138, 255 - - Tongs (_tang_), 261 - - Township (ch'ü), 107 - - Training Committee (_Hsün-lien Wei-yüan-hui_) of the Kuomintang, 133 - - Training conferences, 109 - - Trans-Sinkiang highway, 93 - - Tridemism (_see San Min Chu I_) - - Trotsky, Leon, 164, 263 - - Truck service, 93 - - Tseng Chi, 181 - - Tso Shen-sheng, 181 - - Tso Tao-fên, 36, 176 - - _Tsung-ts'ai_, 41 - - _Tuchünism_, 5, 244 - - _Tungpei P'ai_ (_see_ Northeastern Clique) - - Turksib railroad, 101 - - Tutelage, period of, 7 - - Tutelary dictatorship (_tang chih_), 23 - - Types of government sponsorship, 89 - - - Unearned increment, 30, 296 - - United Council of the pro-Japanese, 195 - - United Front, 70, 111, 113, 119, 129 - - United States of America, 273, 275, 277, 279 - - Universal Trading Corporation, 88 - - Urban pattern of local government, 104 - - _Utterances on Reconstruction, The Party Chief's (Tsung-ts'ai - Chien-kuo Yen-lun Hsüan-chi)_, quoted, 33 - - - Vayo, Julio Alvarez del, 15 - - Vice-President of a _Yüan (Fu-yüan-chang)_, 57 - - Vocational education, 217 - - Vocational Educationists' Clique (_Ch'ê-yeh Chiao-yü P'ai_), 77 - - - Wang Ch'ing-wei, 20, 53, 56, 129, 142, 145, 192, 197, 239, 263, 372 - agreements with the Japanese, 203 - flight from Chungking, 203 - following, 197 - record of schism, 199 - significance, 208 - - Wang Ch'ung-hui, 82, 418 - - Wang K'ê-min, 194 - - Wang Ming, 257 - - Wang Shih-chieh, 23, 73, 137 - - _Wang Tao_, 194 - - War Area Service Corps, 154 - - War finance, 87 - - War, Ministry of (_Chün-chêng-pu_), 60, 63, 96 - - War: the term, 11 - - War-time Controlment, Outline of, 313 - - Washington, George, 255 - - Water-conservancy regions, 4 - - Western imperialism, 4, 190 - - Western states, 3 - - Whampoa (_see Huangpu_) - - _What I Mean By Action_, 373 - - William, Maurice, 254 - - Wireless, 94 - - Women's Advisory Council of the New Life Movement, 155 - - Wong Wen-hao, 91 - - Wool, 227 - - Workers' living conditions: proposed constitutional provisions, 296 - - World federation, 371 - - World government: comment of Chiang, 281 - - Wounded Soldiers' League, 155 - - Wu, Dr. John C. H., 26 - - Wu-han government, 15 - - Wu Pei-fu, 198 - - - Yang Kan-tao, 181 - - Yangtze, 18 - - Yeh Ch'u-tsang, 137 - - Yen, Dr. James Y. C, 84, 218 - - Yenan, 115 - - Yin Ju-kêng, 185, 192 - - Y. M. C. A., 149, 235 - - Young, Brigham, 241 - - _Yüan_, 24, 28 - - _Yüan-chang_, 28 - - Yüan Shih-k'ai, 244, 259 - - Yü Yu-jên, 145 - - Yünnan, 101 - - - Zinoviev, G., 164 - - - - - * * * * * * - - - - -Transcriber's note: - -Obvious printer's errors have been corrected. - -Inconsistent spellings have been kept, as well as inconsistent use of -hyphens (e.g., "war-time," "wartime," and "war time"), inconsistent -use of space in contractions (e.g., "C. E. C." and "C.E.C.") and -inconsistent Chinese transcription (e.g., "Chün-tzŭ" and "Chüntzu"). - - - -***END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE CHINA OF CHIANG K'AI-SHEK*** - - -******* This file should be named 50465-0.txt or 50465-0.zip ******* - - -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: -http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/5/0/4/6/50465 - - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed. - -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United -States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. Special rules, set forth in the General Terms of Use part -of this license, apply to copying and distributing Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic works to protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm -concept and trademark. Project Gutenberg is a registered trademark, -and may not be used if you charge for the eBooks, unless you receive -specific permission. If you do not charge anything for copies of this -eBook, complying with the rules is very easy. You may use this eBook -for nearly any purpose such as creation of derivative works, reports, -performances and research. They may be modified and printed and given -away--you may do practically ANYTHING in the United States with eBooks -not protected by U.S. copyright law. Redistribution is subject to the -trademark license, especially commercial redistribution. - -START: FULL LICENSE - -THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG LICENSE -PLEASE READ THIS BEFORE YOU DISTRIBUTE OR USE THIS WORK - -To protect the Project Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting the free -distribution of electronic works, by using or distributing this work -(or any other work associated in any way with the phrase "Project -Gutenberg"), you agree to comply with all the terms of the Full -Project Gutenberg-tm License available with this file or online at -www.gutenberg.org/license. - -Section 1. General Terms of Use and Redistributing Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic works - -1.A. By reading or using any part of this Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic work, you indicate that you have read, understand, agree to -and accept all the terms of this license and intellectual property -(trademark/copyright) agreement. If you do not agree to abide by all -the terms of this agreement, you must cease using and return or -destroy all copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in your -possession. If you paid a fee for obtaining a copy of or access to a -Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work and you do not agree to be bound -by the terms of this agreement, you may obtain a refund from the -person or entity to whom you paid the fee as set forth in paragraph -1.E.8. - -1.B. "Project Gutenberg" is a registered trademark. It may only be -used on or associated in any way with an electronic work by people who -agree to be bound by the terms of this agreement. There are a few -things that you can do with most Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works -even without complying with the full terms of this agreement. See -paragraph 1.C below. There are a lot of things you can do with Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic works if you follow the terms of this -agreement and help preserve free future access to Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic works. See paragraph 1.E below. - -1.C. The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation ("the -Foundation" or PGLAF), owns a compilation copyright in the collection -of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works. Nearly all the individual -works in the collection are in the public domain in the United -States. If an individual work is unprotected by copyright law in the -United States and you are located in the United States, we do not -claim a right to prevent you from copying, distributing, performing, -displaying or creating derivative works based on the work as long as -all references to Project Gutenberg are removed. Of course, we hope -that you will support the Project Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting -free access to electronic works by freely sharing Project Gutenberg-tm -works in compliance with the terms of this agreement for keeping the -Project Gutenberg-tm name associated with the work. You can easily -comply with the terms of this agreement by keeping this work in the -same format with its attached full Project Gutenberg-tm License when -you share it without charge with others. - -1.D. The copyright laws of the place where you are located also govern -what you can do with this work. Copyright laws in most countries are -in a constant state of change. If you are outside the United States, -check the laws of your country in addition to the terms of this -agreement before downloading, copying, displaying, performing, -distributing or creating derivative works based on this work or any -other Project Gutenberg-tm work. The Foundation makes no -representations concerning the copyright status of any work in any -country outside the United States. - -1.E. Unless you have removed all references to Project Gutenberg: - -1.E.1. The following sentence, with active links to, or other -immediate access to, the full Project Gutenberg-tm License must appear -prominently whenever any copy of a Project Gutenberg-tm work (any work -on which the phrase "Project Gutenberg" appears, or with which the -phrase "Project Gutenberg" is associated) is accessed, displayed, -performed, viewed, copied or distributed: - - This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and - most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no - restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it - under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this - eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the - United States, you'll have to check the laws of the country where you - are located before using this ebook. - -1.E.2. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is -derived from texts not protected by U.S. copyright law (does not -contain a notice indicating that it is posted with permission of the -copyright holder), the work can be copied and distributed to anyone in -the United States without paying any fees or charges. If you are -redistributing or providing access to a work with the phrase "Project -Gutenberg" associated with or appearing on the work, you must comply -either with the requirements of paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 or -obtain permission for the use of the work and the Project Gutenberg-tm -trademark as set forth in paragraphs 1.E.8 or 1.E.9. - -1.E.3. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is posted -with the permission of the copyright holder, your use and distribution -must comply with both paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 and any -additional terms imposed by the copyright holder. Additional terms -will be linked to the Project Gutenberg-tm License for all works -posted with the permission of the copyright holder found at the -beginning of this work. - -1.E.4. Do not unlink or detach or remove the full Project Gutenberg-tm -License terms from this work, or any files containing a part of this -work or any other work associated with Project Gutenberg-tm. - -1.E.5. Do not copy, display, perform, distribute or redistribute this -electronic work, or any part of this electronic work, without -prominently displaying the sentence set forth in paragraph 1.E.1 with -active links or immediate access to the full terms of the Project -Gutenberg-tm License. - -1.E.6. You may convert to and distribute this work in any binary, -compressed, marked up, nonproprietary or proprietary form, including -any word processing or hypertext form. However, if you provide access -to or distribute copies of a Project Gutenberg-tm work in a format -other than "Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other format used in the official -version posted on the official Project Gutenberg-tm web site -(www.gutenberg.org), you must, at no additional cost, fee or expense -to the user, provide a copy, a means of exporting a copy, or a means -of obtaining a copy upon request, of the work in its original "Plain -Vanilla ASCII" or other form. Any alternate format must include the -full Project Gutenberg-tm License as specified in paragraph 1.E.1. - -1.E.7. Do not charge a fee for access to, viewing, displaying, -performing, copying or distributing any Project Gutenberg-tm works -unless you comply with paragraph 1.E.8 or 1.E.9. - -1.E.8. You may charge a reasonable fee for copies of or providing -access to or distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works -provided that - -* You pay a royalty fee of 20% of the gross profits you derive from - the use of Project Gutenberg-tm works calculated using the method - you already use to calculate your applicable taxes. The fee is owed - to the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark, but he has - agreed to donate royalties under this paragraph to the Project - Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation. Royalty payments must be paid - within 60 days following each date on which you prepare (or are - legally required to prepare) your periodic tax returns. Royalty - payments should be clearly marked as such and sent to the Project - Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation at the address specified in - Section 4, "Information about donations to the Project Gutenberg - Literary Archive Foundation." - -* You provide a full refund of any money paid by a user who notifies - you in writing (or by e-mail) within 30 days of receipt that s/he - does not agree to the terms of the full Project Gutenberg-tm - License. You must require such a user to return or destroy all - copies of the works possessed in a physical medium and discontinue - all use of and all access to other copies of Project Gutenberg-tm - works. - -* You provide, in accordance with paragraph 1.F.3, a full refund of - any money paid for a work or a replacement copy, if a defect in the - electronic work is discovered and reported to you within 90 days of - receipt of the work. - -* You comply with all other terms of this agreement for free - distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm works. - -1.E.9. If you wish to charge a fee or distribute a Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic work or group of works on different terms than -are set forth in this agreement, you must obtain permission in writing -from both the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation and The -Project Gutenberg Trademark LLC, the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm -trademark. Contact the Foundation as set forth in Section 3 below. - -1.F. - -1.F.1. Project Gutenberg volunteers and employees expend considerable -effort to identify, do copyright research on, transcribe and proofread -works not protected by U.S. copyright law in creating the Project -Gutenberg-tm collection. Despite these efforts, Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic works, and the medium on which they may be stored, may -contain "Defects," such as, but not limited to, incomplete, inaccurate -or corrupt data, transcription errors, a copyright or other -intellectual property infringement, a defective or damaged disk or -other medium, a computer virus, or computer codes that damage or -cannot be read by your equipment. - -1.F.2. LIMITED WARRANTY, DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES - Except for the "Right -of Replacement or Refund" described in paragraph 1.F.3, the Project -Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the owner of the Project -Gutenberg-tm trademark, and any other party distributing a Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic work under this agreement, disclaim all -liability to you for damages, costs and expenses, including legal -fees. YOU AGREE THAT YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE, STRICT -LIABILITY, BREACH OF WARRANTY OR BREACH OF CONTRACT EXCEPT THOSE -PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH 1.F.3. YOU AGREE THAT THE FOUNDATION, THE -TRADEMARK OWNER, AND ANY DISTRIBUTOR UNDER THIS AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE -LIABLE TO YOU FOR ACTUAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE OR -INCIDENTAL DAMAGES EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH -DAMAGE. - -1.F.3. LIMITED RIGHT OF REPLACEMENT OR REFUND - If you discover a -defect in this electronic work within 90 days of receiving it, you can -receive a refund of the money (if any) you paid for it by sending a -written explanation to the person you received the work from. If you -received the work on a physical medium, you must return the medium -with your written explanation. The person or entity that provided you -with the defective work may elect to provide a replacement copy in -lieu of a refund. If you received the work electronically, the person -or entity providing it to you may choose to give you a second -opportunity to receive the work electronically in lieu of a refund. If -the second copy is also defective, you may demand a refund in writing -without further opportunities to fix the problem. - -1.F.4. Except for the limited right of replacement or refund set forth -in paragraph 1.F.3, this work is provided to you 'AS-IS', WITH NO -OTHER WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT -LIMITED TO WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PURPOSE. - -1.F.5. Some states do not allow disclaimers of certain implied -warranties or the exclusion or limitation of certain types of -damages. If any disclaimer or limitation set forth in this agreement -violates the law of the state applicable to this agreement, the -agreement shall be interpreted to make the maximum disclaimer or -limitation permitted by the applicable state law. The invalidity or -unenforceability of any provision of this agreement shall not void the -remaining provisions. - -1.F.6. INDEMNITY - You agree to indemnify and hold the Foundation, the -trademark owner, any agent or employee of the Foundation, anyone -providing copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in -accordance with this agreement, and any volunteers associated with the -production, promotion and distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic works, harmless from all liability, costs and expenses, -including legal fees, that arise directly or indirectly from any of -the following which you do or cause to occur: (a) distribution of this -or any Project Gutenberg-tm work, (b) alteration, modification, or -additions or deletions to any Project Gutenberg-tm work, and (c) any -Defect you cause. - -Section 2. Information about the Mission of Project Gutenberg-tm - -Project Gutenberg-tm is synonymous with the free distribution of -electronic works in formats readable by the widest variety of -computers including obsolete, old, middle-aged and new computers. It -exists because of the efforts of hundreds of volunteers and donations -from people in all walks of life. - -Volunteers and financial support to provide volunteers with the -assistance they need are critical to reaching Project Gutenberg-tm's -goals and ensuring that the Project Gutenberg-tm collection will -remain freely available for generations to come. In 2001, the Project -Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation was created to provide a secure -and permanent future for Project Gutenberg-tm and future -generations. To learn more about the Project Gutenberg Literary -Archive Foundation and how your efforts and donations can help, see -Sections 3 and 4 and the Foundation information page at -www.gutenberg.org - -Section 3. Information about the Project Gutenberg Literary -Archive Foundation - -The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation is a non profit -501(c)(3) educational corporation organized under the laws of the -state of Mississippi and granted tax exempt status by the Internal -Revenue Service. The Foundation's EIN or federal tax identification -number is 64-6221541. Contributions to the Project Gutenberg Literary -Archive Foundation are tax deductible to the full extent permitted by -U.S. federal laws and your state's laws. - -The Foundation's principal office is in Fairbanks, Alaska, with the -mailing address: PO Box 750175, Fairbanks, AK 99775, but its -volunteers and employees are scattered throughout numerous -locations. Its business office is located at 809 North 1500 West, Salt -Lake City, UT 84116, (801) 596-1887. Email contact links and up to -date contact information can be found at the Foundation's web site and -official page at www.gutenberg.org/contact - -For additional contact information: - - Dr. Gregory B. Newby - Chief Executive and Director - gbnewby@pglaf.org - -Section 4. Information about Donations to the Project Gutenberg -Literary Archive Foundation - -Project Gutenberg-tm depends upon and cannot survive without wide -spread public support and donations to carry out its mission of -increasing the number of public domain and licensed works that can be -freely distributed in machine readable form accessible by the widest -array of equipment including outdated equipment. Many small donations -($1 to $5,000) are particularly important to maintaining tax exempt -status with the IRS. - -The Foundation is committed to complying with the laws regulating -charities and charitable donations in all 50 states of the United -States. Compliance requirements are not uniform and it takes a -considerable effort, much paperwork and many fees to meet and keep up -with these requirements. We do not solicit donations in locations -where we have not received written confirmation of compliance. To SEND -DONATIONS or determine the status of compliance for any particular -state visit www.gutenberg.org/donate - -While we cannot and do not solicit contributions from states where we -have not met the solicitation requirements, we know of no prohibition -against accepting unsolicited donations from donors in such states who -approach us with offers to donate. - -International donations are gratefully accepted, but we cannot make -any statements concerning tax treatment of donations received from -outside the United States. U.S. laws alone swamp our small staff. - -Please check the Project Gutenberg Web pages for current donation -methods and addresses. Donations are accepted in a number of other -ways including checks, online payments and credit card donations. To -donate, please visit: www.gutenberg.org/donate - -Section 5. General Information About Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works. - -Professor Michael S. Hart was the originator of the Project -Gutenberg-tm concept of a library of electronic works that could be -freely shared with anyone. For forty years, he produced and -distributed Project Gutenberg-tm eBooks with only a loose network of -volunteer support. - -Project Gutenberg-tm eBooks are often created from several printed -editions, all of which are confirmed as not protected by copyright in -the U.S. unless a copyright notice is included. Thus, we do not -necessarily keep eBooks in compliance with any particular paper -edition. - -Most people start at our Web site which has the main PG search -facility: www.gutenberg.org - -This Web site includes information about Project Gutenberg-tm, -including how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary -Archive Foundation, how to help produce our new eBooks, and how to -subscribe to our email newsletter to hear about new eBooks. - |