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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d7b82bc --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +*.txt text eol=lf +*.htm text eol=lf +*.html text eol=lf +*.md text eol=lf diff --git a/LICENSE.txt b/LICENSE.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6312041 --- /dev/null +++ b/LICENSE.txt @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +This eBook, including all associated images, markup, improvements, +metadata, and any other content or labor, has been confirmed to be +in the PUBLIC DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES. + +Procedures for determining public domain status are described in +the "Copyright How-To" at https://www.gutenberg.org. + +No investigation has been made concerning possible copyrights in +jurisdictions other than the United States. Anyone seeking to utilize +this eBook outside of the United States should confirm copyright +status under the laws that apply to them. diff --git a/README.md b/README.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..cf4dff2 --- /dev/null +++ b/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +Project Gutenberg (https://www.gutenberg.org) public repository for +eBook #50465 (https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/50465) diff --git a/old/50465-0.txt b/old/50465-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 01a0e9d..0000000 --- a/old/50465-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,19876 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg eBook, The China of Chiang K'ai-Shek, by Paul Myron -Anthony Linebarger - - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most -other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of -the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - - - - -Title: The China of Chiang K'ai-Shek - A Political Study - - -Author: Paul Myron Anthony Linebarger - - - -Release Date: December 8, 2015 [eBook #50465] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - - -***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE CHINA OF CHIANG K'AI-SHEK*** - - -E-text prepared by Judith Wirawan, Adam Buchbinder, and the Online -Distributed Proofreading Team (http://www.pgdp.net) - - - -Note: Project Gutenberg also has an HTML version of this - file which includes the original illustrations. - See 50465-h.htm or 50465-h.zip: - (http://www.gutenberg.org/files/50465/50465-h/50465-h.htm) - or - (http://www.gutenberg.org/files/50465/50465-h.zip) - - -Transcriber's note: - - Text enclosed by underscores is in italics (_italics_). - - Text enclosed by equal signs is in bold face (=bold=). - - Small capitals are presented as all capitals in this e-text. - - - - - - -[Illustration: _Generalissimo Chiang K'ai-shek_] - - -THE CHINA OF CHIANG K'AI-SHEK: - -A Political Study - -by - -PAUL M. A. LINEBARGER - -Duke University - - - - - - - -Greenwood Press, Publishers -Westport, Connecticut - -The Library of Congress has catalogued this publication as follows: -Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data -Linebarger, Paul Myron Anthony, 1913-1966. -The China of Chiang K'ai-shek; a political study. -Reprint of the 1943 ed. published by World Peace Foundation, Boston. -Includes bibliographical references. -1. China--Politics and government--1912-1949. -2. Chiang, Kai-shek, 1886- . I. Title. -DS774.L48 1973 320.9'51'042 73-725 -ISBN 0-8371-6779-5 - -Copyright 1942 by World Peace Foundation -Originally published in 1943 by World Peace Foundation, Boston - -Reprinted with the permission of World Peace Foundation -First Greenwood Reprinting 1973 - -Library of Congress Catalogue Card Number 73-725 -ISBN 0-8371-6779-5 - -Printed in the United States of America - - - - - TO MY MOTHER - - _With Love_ - - - - -ACKNOWLEDGMENTS - - -Acknowledgments, for a work of this type, are always insufficient and -often ungracious. Today, political and military conditions forbid -mention of some of the persons to whom I am most indebted. Furthermore, -it is unfeasible to thank those teachers and friends who have prepared -me in years past for the present work. Nevertheless, courtesy and candor -demand that I indicate the extent of my obligation, and tender these -inadequate thanks. - -For interviews, hospitality and other kindnesses shown me in Western -China I wish to thank Generalissimo and Mme. Chiang K'ai-shek; Their -Excellencies, Sun K'ê, Yü Yu-jen, H. H. Kung, Wang Ch'ung-hui, Chang -Chia-ngau, T. F. Tsiang, Yeh Ch'u-tsang, Kan Nai-kuang, Ch'ên Kuo-fu, -Wang Shih-chieh, Ch'u Chia-hua, Hollington Tong, and Ma Chao-chun; Major -Generals J. L. Huang and Ch'u Shih-ming; Bishop Paul Yu-pin; and Messrs. -Foo Ping-shêng, Chên Ming-shu, Lo Chia-lun, Edward Bing-shuey Lee, Han -Lih-wu, P. C. Kuo, Ch'ên Chih-mai, Kinn-wei Shaw, James Y. C. Yen, Wang -Shen-tsu, Shuming T. Liu, Jen Shieh, Li Ch'in-shui, and Ma P'in-ho. -Among the foreign community, I wish to thank the American Ambassador, -Mr. Nelson Johnson, and Mr. E. F. Drumwright for their kind reception; -and to thank Mr. Tillman Durdin, Mr. Theodore White, Mr. George Fitch, -Dr. J. B. Tayler, Professor Frank Price, and Professor and Mrs. J. B. -Slocum. - -I feel myself peculiarly fortunate in having three such good, loyal -friends as Drs. Chu Djang, Miao Chung-yi, and Yin Pao-yü, whose -kindnesses to me have continued ever since our student days together at -the Johns Hopkins. - -Dean Shen Ch'un-lu, Mr. Tso T'ao-fên and their associates in the -National Salvation movement; Colonel Ch'in Po-k'u of the Communist -Party; Mr. Chang Peh-chuen of the Third Party; Dr. Carson Chang of the -National Socialist Party, and other spokesmen for minority and -unofficial groups were most generous with their time and information. - -Messrs. You Shoo-tseng, Yang Chun, Wu Hsüeh-ping, Hawthorne Chen and -others translated Chinese materials for or with me. Save for their help, -so liberally and painstakingly rendered, this book would have been -delayed for months if not years. These gentlemen are not to be held -responsible for the selection of materials, nor for the translations in -their present form, since I have sought to check and revise this work as -far as time and my imperfect command of written Chinese have permitted. - -The International Peace Campaign (China Branch), The People's Foreign -Relations Association, The Chinese-American Institute for Cultural -Relations, and other institutions in Free China were generous with their -hospitality and facilities. I owe particular thanks to the Central Bank -of China for the high courtesy shown me through the Chief Secretary and -the following gentlemen: Mr. T. T. Wang, Chief of the Engineering -Division; Mr. Ch'ên Yin-sung, Manager, Kiating Branch; and Mr. Yang -Hsia-tz'ŭ, Manager, Chengtu Branch. The officers of the Bank went to -enormous pains to ensure my timely, safe return to Chungking when I was -ill, hurried, tardy, and in danger of missing my prearranged bookings -back to America. Special acknowledgment must also be offered to Mr. C. -C. Chi, for his unfailing kindness in providing interviews and trips, -and to the China National Aviation Corporation for their unusual -courtesies. - -In Hong Kong, I was assisted by Dr. Eugene Chen, Dr. Wên Yüan-ning, Dr. -Ch'en Han-seng, and Mr. Liu Yu-wan. - -In Shanghai, Mr. T. Nakada of the Japanese consulate-general was most -helpful. - -In Nanking, Messrs. Wên Chung-yao, Kiang Kang-hu, Tsu Min-yi, Lin -Pai-shêng, Li Shêng-wu, Hsü Liang, George Wên, P. C. Huang, T'ang -Leang-li, K. S. James Woo and L. K. Kentwell were most hospitable. Mr. -M. Kimura, of the Japanese Embassy in Nanking, was kind and courteous. I -wish to thank these gentlemen for their friendliness to an alien scholar -who had just come from the other side of the war. - -In Tokyo, Messrs. Yokachiro Suma, Yoji Hirota, Kaneo Tsuchida, and Nobuo -Fujimura of the Foreign Office were hospitable and informative. - -Mr. Robert Kempton, Mr. George Giffen, and Dr. Louis Wilkinson showed me -great kindness on my journey. - -In the United States, I am indebted for introductions and advice to Dr. -Hu Shih, the Chinese Ambassador; Professor George Taylor, of the -University of Washington; and Mr. Frederick V. Field, of the American -Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations. - -My colleagues and friends at Duke University have been very helpful. -Professors Homer Dubs and Paul H. Clyde, my colleagues in the Far -Eastern field, read the manuscript and made invaluable suggestions; -Professor Dubs' command of Chinese has saved me from many predicaments. -Professor Robert R. Wilson has been unfailing in his encouragement, -sympathetic interest, and facilitation of my plans. - -The Duke University Research Council has assisted me with annual grants -for the collections of documentary materials on Chinese politics. Save -for this, I have received no financial aid or subsidy from any -institution, person, or government whatever. - -Mr. J. C. Yang, Mr. and Mrs. R. E. Hosack, Mrs. Freda Townsend, and Mrs. -Margaret Linebarger have assisted me with manuscripts and proof. - -I wish to thank the Director, Dr. S. Shepard Jones, and the staff of the -World Peace Foundation for their patience, and helpfulness during the -preparation of this work for the press. Miss Marie J. Carroll has been -especially helpful. - -All opinions and statements herein expressed are my own, unless clearly -indicated as quotation. These acknowledgments are a record of thanks. I -assume sole and complete responsibility for the contents of this book. - - P. M. A. L. - _Durham, North Carolina - March 31, 1941_ - - - - -WORLD PEACE FOUNDATION - -[Illustration: Logo] - -40 Mt. Vernon Street, Boston, Massachusetts - -_Founded in 1910_ - - -_Board of Trustees_ - - GEORGE H. BLAKESLEE, _President_ - FRANK AYDELOTTE - JAMES PHINNEY BAXTER, 3d - HARVEY H. BUNDY - LEONARD W. CRONKHITE - STEPHEN DUGGAN - HARRY A. GARFIELD - CHRISTIAN A. HERTER - BRUCE C. HOPPER - MANLEY O. HUDSON - A. LAWRENCE LOWELL - J. GRAFTON ROGERS - CHARLES SEYMOUR - JOHN H. WILLIAMS - HENRY M. WRISTON - - -_General Staff_ - - S. SHEPARD JONES, _Director_ - DENYS P. MYERS, _Research_ - MARIE J. CARROLL, _Reference_ - MARY J. MACDONALD, _Treasurer_ - - -The World Peace Foundation is a non-profit organization which was -founded in 1910 by Edwin Ginn, the educational publisher, for the -purpose of promoting peace, justice and good-will among nations. For -many years the Foundation has sought to increase public understanding of -international problems by an objective presentation of the facts of -international relations. This purpose is accomplished principally -through its publications and by the maintenance of a Reference Service -which furnishes on request information on current international -problems. Recently increased attention has been focused on American -foreign relations by study groups organized for the consideration of -actual problems of policy. - - - - -CONTENTS - - - _Frontispiece_--Generalissimo Chiang K'ai-shek - PAGE - INTRODUCTION 1 - - The Chinese Political Inheritance: Some Continuing Aspects 1 - - China at the Outbreak of War 6 - - The Beginning of Active Hostilities 11 - - The Hankow Period 15 - - The Chungking Period 19 - - I. THE CONSTITUTION 21 - - The _Yüeh-fa_ of 1931 22 - - The Draft Permanent or Double Five Constitution 25 - - The Issue of Constitutional Change 31 - - II. THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT 41 - - The Five-Power Constitution 42 - - The Supreme National Defense Council 46 - - The President of the National Government 52 - - The Council of State 53 - - The Executive _Yüan_ 56 - - The Military Affairs Commission 60 - - The Judicial, Legislative, Examination and Control _Yüan_ 65 - - III. CONSULTATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANS 69 - - The People's Political Council 69 - - The Administrative Pattern 79 - - The Political Ministries 81 - - Social and Cultural Agencies 83 - - The Economic Ministries 85 - - IV. PROVINCIAL, LOCAL, AND SPECIAL-AREA GOVERNMENT 98 - - Chart on Provincial and Urban Government facing 98 - - The Provinces 99 - - Local Government 103 - - The Communist Zone 111 - - Guerrilla Governments 116 - - V. THE KUOMINTANG 124 - - The Party Constitutional System 125 - - Party Organization 129 - - The Kuomintang Bid for Leadership 140 - - Intra-Kuomintang Politics 142 - - The New Life Movement and Other Affiliates 149 - - VI. THE COMMUNIST AND MINOR PARTIES 159 - - The Chinese Communists: Party and Leaders 160 - - Communism: Patriotism or Betrayal? 171 - - The National Salvation Movement 175 - - The Third Party 178 - - The Chinese National Socialist Party 179 - - Social Democrats and _La Jeunesse_ 181 - - VII. GOVERNING INSTITUTIONS OF THE JAPANESE AND PRO-JAPANESE 183 - - The Japanese Army as a Chinese Government 185 - - The Problem of Puppet States 188 - - The Provisional and Reformed Governments 192 - - The Reorganized National Government of Wang Ch'ing-wei 197 - - VIII. EXTRA-POLITICAL FORCES 211 - - The Foundations of Chinese Government 212 - - Mass Education 214 - - Rural Reconstruction 218 - - The Chinese Industrial Cooperatives 223 - - Unorganized Pressure 234 - - IX. SUN YAT-SEN AND CHIANG K'AI-SHEK 239 - - Sun Yat-sen 240 - - The _San Min Chu I_ 250 - - Chiang K'ai-shek 254 - - Chinese Appraisals of Chiang 266 - - The Ideology of Chiang 269 - - CONCLUSION 273 - - The Chief Alternatives in China 274 - - The United States in Chinese Politics 277 - - APPENDICES - PAGE - APPENDIX I: GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS 283 - - A. The Government Draft of the Proposed Constitution 283 - - B. The System of Organization of the National Congress 300 - - C. Act of the Legislative _Yüan_, April 31, XXVI (1937) - Governing the Election of Representatives to the - National Congress 302 - - D. The Program of Resistance and Reconstruction 309 - - E. An Outline of War-time Controlment 313 - - F. A Chart of the Control _Yüan_ from July 1937 to June - 1940 318 - - G. Regulations Concerning the Organization of the Various - Classifications of _Hsien_ 324 - - H. A Chart of Government Organization facing 330 - - APPENDIX II: DOCUMENTS ON PARTY POLITICS 331 - - A. A Chart on Kuomintang Organization facing 331 - - B. Constitution of the _San Min Chu I_ Youth Corps, Year - XXVII (1938) 331 - - C. The Duties and General Activities of the _San Min Chu I_ - Youth Corps (Ch'ên Ch'êng) 340 - - D. The _Hsiao-tsu_ (Small Group) Training Program 354 - - E. Party Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party 359 - - APPENDIX III: MATERIALS ON POLICY 371 - - A. Reply to Questions (Chiang K'ai-shek) 371 - - B. What I Mean by Action, or A Philosophy of Action (Chiang - K'ai-shek) 373 - - C. Definition of the Problems Concerning the Organization - of the Various Classifications of _Hsien_ (Chiang - K'ai-shek) 388 - - Chart on _Hsien_ Classifications facing 388 - - D. A Discussion of Mao Tsê-tung's Comments on the Present - State of International Relations (Ch'ên Kuo-hsin) 403 - - E. China's Long-range Diplomatic Orientation (Wang - Ch'ung-hui) 418 - - GLOSSARY 423 - - INDEX 435 - - - - -INTRODUCTION - - -The National Government of the Republic of China, located at the -auxiliary capital of Chungking, is one of the most important governments -in contemporary world affairs. It has provided fairly effective -unification for the largest nation on earth, and has fought a great -power to a standstill. - -The present work is an analysis of this government. Not a biography of -Chiang K'ai-shek, it is instead a delineation of the institutions, the -parties and movements, and the armies which today determine the Chinese -destiny. Free China, mutilated as it is, is still far more populous and -complex than the Soviet Union or Germany. Its political institutions -cannot be reduced to the terms of one man's caprice, and the personality -of Chiang--while brilliantly conspicuous--is not the entire picture of -China. Generalissimo Chiang works, perhaps because he wishes to, -certainly because he must, within the framework of a triune -organization: the National Government, the central armies and the -Kuomintang. These institutions have developed to their present efficacy -only by means of thirty years of war, preceded by almost thirty years -more of conspiracy. They have become the norm of contemporary China and, -whatever their particular future, significant determinants of China's -eventual development. - - -THE CHINESE POLITICAL INHERITANCE: SOME CONTINUING ASPECTS - -Because of cultural and historical differences between China and the -West, the application of identical terms to both is probably either -wrong or meaningless. Nevertheless, Westerners can live in China, deal -with the Chinese, scrutinize their affairs, and transpose these to such -Western descriptions as may suit the purpose. In reading of China, -however, one should keep in mind the fact that the words are English, -freighted with special meanings, and are used not by scientific choice -but for lack of others. Part of this difference can be bridged if one -recalls the salient peculiarities of China as against the Western world. - -No other society comparable in size, duration and extent has ever -existed; the Chinese Empire, from the beginning of the Ch'in (221 B.C.) -to the end of the Manchus (A.D. 1911), remains the greatest social -edifice mankind has yet brought forth. As such, its modern successor is -everywhere stamped with archaic catholic traits which are today both -obsolescent and futuristic. To these must be added the characteristics -of China as a special area--a cultural zone seeking national form; -fragmented economies working their way out of backwardness in technology -and helplessness in world economics; a people in quest of government -which will give them power without enslaving them. This modern "Chinese -Republic," a Western-form state only by diplomatic courtesy in the years -succeeding 1912, has been the widest zone of anarchy in the modern -world; the Japanese attack on its emergent institutions has helped -immeasurably to re-identify the Chinese-speaking people and the officers -who presume to govern them. - -To understand Chinese government in war time, one might first check the -outstanding points of old Chinese development and their modern -derivatives. - -Pre-eminently, China has been _pro forma_ Confucian ever since the tenth -century after Christ. This has meant an ordering of classes in society -based on the ideal of scholarship and public administration, rather than -on ideals of valor, piety or acquisitiveness. By setting the -requirements of the examinations, and through concealed but sharp -discouragement of heterodoxy or wilful originality, the governing -mechanism made of itself a vast machine of scholars which--because its -authority rested in tradition, in language, in social usages--was able -to ride out domestic revolution and foreign invasion, and was in a -position to ensure its own perpetuation despite political or military -interruption. - -The traditions of scholastic bureaucracy working in a pluralistic -society have left the Chinese people largely independent of the routine -functioning of government. The Western state becomes the articulation of -society. The government of old China was pseudomorphic as a state, -having only some of the functions of the Western state, and its -governing power was the residual capacity of an organization devoted to -the ends of ceremony, exemplarization, education and the cultivation of -personality. Administration was confined chiefly to revenue collection, -flood control and defense. In the West, the most important purposes of -society are framed in law after discussion, and are executed as policy; -in China these purposes, defined by the Confucian ideology, were known -throughout the society, with scholar-officials as their expositors. -Fulfillment was by no means a prerogative of government alone. By -contrast with the Confucian standards, the Western states, whether -democracies or not, are capricious, despotic and nonmoral; by Western -standards, Chinese society was unresponsive, sanctimonious and -amorphous. - -This political excellence and stability was accompanied by economic -phenomena which are, by modern standards, less desirable. Overcrowding -and a slow rate of progress have been fairly constant features of -Chinese society since the Han. Owen Lattimore has recently appraised the -economics behind the dynastic cycle in China.[1] Each community in old -China was cell-like, largely autonomous and autarkic. Hence, the -increase of wealth was sought within the cell, and not within a larger -framework of economic advance--such as commerce or invention would -provide--and the economically predominant class (the landowners) -possessed a vested interest in overpopulation (which cheapened -agricultural labor and maintained a high, even urgent, demand for food -products). Equilibrium was reached, and a cycle of diminishing returns -initiated, when population began to outrun the land's subsistence -maximum. This drop in returns, in the face of continued population rise, -led to peasant rebellion, distributism and a reinauguration of the same -type of state--made necessary by the monopoly of managerial expertness -(essential to water conservancy, land wealth and the familiar intensive -cultivation) in the ideographically literate class. Control of the -richest water-conservancy region meant the hegemony of China. - - [Footnote 1: Lattimore, Owen, _Inner Asian Frontiers of China_, New - York, 1940, p. 45 and _passim_. The author, a noted geographer, - presents significant new analyses of the interconnections of Chinese - economics and culture.] - -The impact of Western imperialism has struck China in the past century, -during the critical or revolutionary phase of this immemorial cycle. -Chinese politics took the color of a back-country struggle. The centers -of modern power were beyond Chinese administrative reach. The emergent -Chinese state, deprived of its foci of power in the metropolises, was -promised control thereof only when it had become an effective and -complete state--a condition largely unobtainable without control of -Shanghai, Tientsin, Hankow, and the British Crown Colony of Hong Kong. - -In theory, the Chinese Republic was established January 1, 1912. In -practice, the name _Republic_ has masked a _mêlée_ of governments and -power-organizations, ranging from bandit gangs with pretentious -political color to authentic regional governments administering large -areas. This culminated in the National Government which, beginning as a -conspiracy, becoming the leading regional government, is now in the -position of _de facto_ government for virtually all Free China, the -Chinese dominions, and much of the occupied area. None of these -governments has ever held an election based on wide suffrage; none has -systematically subordinated policy to law; none has possessed a -treasury, fleet or air force worthy of a second-class power, until the -present war. Out of these unpromising materials the counter-attacking -Chinese state has arisen; only by legal formula is it the same Republic -as its predecessors; only by courtesy is this the Year XXX (1941) of the -Republic.[2] - - [Footnote 2: Detailed descriptions of the political history of the - period are to be found, _inter alia_, in Holcombe, Arthur N., _The - Chinese Revolution_, Cambridge, 1930; MacNair, Harley F., _China in - Revolution_, Chicago, 1931; and, most popularly, Escarra, Jean, _China - Then and Now_, Peiping, 1940. Descriptions of the government are Wu - Chih-fang, _Chinese Government and Politics_, Shanghai, 1934; Lum - Kalfred Dip, _Chinese Government_, Shanghai, 1934; and Linebarger, - Paul M. A., _Government in Republican China_, New York and London, - 1938.] - -The governmental developments of the Republican era fall conveniently -into four periods: the period of establishment, 1911-1916; the period of -_tuchünism_, 1917-1926; the rule of the National Government, 1927-1936; -the period of invasion, 1937 to the present. The turning points between -these periods are, respectively, the fall of the Manchu Empire of China -(1911), the death of the dictator-President Yüan Shih-k'ai (1916), the -Great Revolution under Kuomintang-Communist leadership (culminating, -1927), and the Sian affair (December 1936) followed by full-scale -invasion (July 1937). - -The present governments of China are accordingly the successors of a -wide variety of decaying imperial administration, experimental modernism -and outright confusion. Any change in China had to be made at the -expense of the _haves_--the Western powers and Japan. Japan, in seeking -the control of China, is fighting China and the Western powers; China, -in fighting back, must fight Japan, and behind Japan the whole structure -of imperialism. Most Chinese have abandoned hope of surviving as a -people without eventually triumphing as a state. In the past, they -absorbed conquerors whose bases were transferred to China; today, they -cannot accommodate invaders who come as transients from an overseas -base. The Chinese war of resistance is a revolution. It is a -continuation of the Nationalist revolution, begun against the Manchus, -continued against the imperialist powers, and now directed against the -Japanese and their Chinese associates. At the same time, this revolution -struggles to incorporate in its dynamics the drive of an endemic peasant -rebellion, Communist in its extreme phase. Nationalist in supreme -emphasis, the revolution finds its highest expression in the -articulation of an effective state--something not known in China for -twenty-two centuries. - - -CHINA AT THE OUTBREAK OF WAR - -Sun Yat-sen's legacy of doctrine included a program of revolution by -three stages: - -(1) the military conquest of power by the Kuomintang; - -(2) the tutelary dictatorship of the Kuomintang while democracy was -being instilled and adopted from the bottom up; and - -(3) constitutionalism, requiring abdication of the Kuomintang in favor -of a popularly elected government.[3] - - [Footnote 3: This is given in the _Chien Kuo Ta Kang_ (Outline of - National Reconstruction), of April 12, XIII (1924), particularly - points 3, 5, 6, 7, and 23. Translations are to be found in Hsü, - Leonard Shihlien, _Sun Yat-sen: His Political and Social Ideals_, Los - Angeles, 1933, and Wu Chih-fang, work cited, p. 430 _ff._] - -Upon coming to power in Nanking, the National Government had begun -promising a short period of tutelage and had made various gestures in -favor of experimental popular government. A Provisional Constitution was -adopted by a _Kuo-min Hui-i_ (commonly termed, National People's -Convention) in 1931, operating under complete government supervision; a -transition instrument, self-acknowledged as such, it anticipated a -Permanent Constitution upon the accomplishment of constitutional -government in a majority of provinces (Articles 86, 87).[4] Although the -Kuomintang has ruled parts of China for more than fifteen years, and is -by profession the party of democracy, it has not yet relinquished power. -The period of tutelage is still legally in force. - - [Footnote 4: For the text of this constitution, see Wu Chih-fang, - cited, p. 430 _ff._] - -In the years immediately preceding the outbreak of war, this monopoly of -governmental power by the Kuomintang was not only an important political -irritant but also an obstacle to effective Chinese unity. Discontent was -aggravated by inelasticity of the Party. Overweighted with petty -bureaucracy, it offered too few up-channel opportunities for potential -leaders. Since Nationalists were the Ins, Kuomintang membership carried -privileges rather than obligations. Many distinguished and active -citizens either refused to join, or let their purely nominal membership -ride along. The Party was saved from complete decline because it -included most of the government personnel, and new recruits to -government service gave it some freshness, vigor and inward criticism. - -The leading difficulty of both state-building and democratization had -been overcome by the creation of a government which was well-designed, -functioning _de facto_ and able to meet most of the specialized problems -of modern administration. The regime was far from being a crude -hierarchy of soldiers and taxgatherers, but had accrued about its -policy-making core the essential staff and line services of modern rule. -Inadequacies lay not in absolute lack of species of personnel or -structure, but in the relative weakness of many key functions. During -the third decade of the Republic the then Nanking Government, under -Chiang's leadership, gave China its first modern national government. - -Despite this beginning, which--without the invasion--stood a very good -chance of evolving into a paternalistic oligarchy in democratic form, -such as Brazil, there were enormous difficulties still facing genuine -China-wide government. First among these difficulties was the question -of regional autonomy--lingering vestiges of _tuchünism_, reinforced by a -vigorous provincialism. Whole regions of China were under the merely -nominal control of the National Government. - -The second difficulty was that of personal politics. Modern China has -had ample politics of principle. It is a rare ideological cult, of any -kind, anywhere, which does not have its Chinese affiliates. No other -nation has known such a wide choice of doctrines, each represented by -armed forces and by definite political leadership. At the same time, -this ideological struggle was and is paralleled by the politics of -individuals and cliques. This made the National Government function as -an oligarchy based on three patterns of control: - -(1) ideological eminence, orthodoxy, appeal and timeliness; - -(2) military or economic control of power in the form of soldiers or -cash, the two being for the most part interchangeable; and - -(3) governmental incumbency. - -A man like Hu Han-min could owe his importance almost altogether to his -past associations with the Party and with Dr. Sun, to his authority as -an exponent of the _San Min Chu I_, and to his appeal to the sense of -prestige, dignity and stability on the part of other people who did not -possess such power, which was exercised in the name of the Kuomintang -and its ideology. T. V. Soong, in money matters, or Chang Hsüeh-liang, -in military matters, were important because they had under their -immediate influence so much cash or so many troops, the availability and -mobility of which from day to day determined their actual share of -power. Lastly, these same men possessed political authority by narrowly -lawful means, i.e., by the governmental offices which they held. - -Thirdly, the government was deeply out of harmony with an overwhelming -majority of college students, much of the professional and intellectual -classes, and a broad section of the articulate farmer and labor groups. -In the pre-war years of strain, unofficial persons could follow world -fashions in ideas associated with Leftism. Although the full Western -pattern of Right, Center, and Left was not imposed upon Chinese -politics, many of the most active publicists wrote in these terms. There -was, accordingly, a traditional China and a Leftist China; the latter -faithfully imported European concepts and did much to change the -language of Chinese political struggle. The government--itself Left from -the point of view of the pre-existent order, yet committed to modes of -thought and policy formally little more radical than the American New -Deal--was constantly recalled to the most cold-blooded of -_realpolitische_ considerations. - -Fourthly, the student movement--in some phases a part of the general -Leftist drive--proved a constant source of difficulty and trouble. -Chinese students (both collegiate and secondary) are self-conscious, -frequently arrogant inheritors of the Chinese tradition of rule by -_literati_. Their influence over the masses is impressive; their -patriotism, however unreflective, is ardent; and their interest in -international affairs is violent.[5] - - [Footnote 5: In particular, see Freyn, Hubert, _Prelude to War: The - Chinese Student Rebellion of 1935-1936_, Shanghai, 1939. Reference to - contemporary Left-liberal and Left publications in Europe and America - will disclose numerous sympathetic eyewitness accounts of the troubles - and the fortitude of the students. Some of these accounts now possess - a wry, inadvertent humor in their characterization of Chiang as a - willing accomplice of Japan.] - -Fifthly, Chinese society, accustomed to acting independently of -government, urged varied foreign policies and sought wars. Almost every -kind of organization, from archaic guilds and secret societies to -business groups, sought to wage its own attack on Japan. Uncanalized, -counter-attacked, dammed up, these efforts might have undone the -government. Toward the end, the government raced frenziedly with time, -losing power through unpopularity, and increasing power through -rearmament and technical preparation. The vigorous extra-governmental -pressure of a populace accustomed to spontaneous mass action is a factor -which qualifies and will probably continue to qualify Chinese foreign -policy. It is often left out of account in Western comment on China. - -Sixthly, in the winter and spring of 1936-37, the National Government -was under pressure from its own subjects to begin the negotiation of -national unity, starting with a Communist armistice and continuing with -the incorporation of as many regions as possible into the sphere of the -government; but despite such increasing pressure, the government took no -effective step in this direction until after the kidnapping of Chiang at -Sian.[6] As a result of this melodramatic affair, however, the National -Government revised policies which had become traditions ten years old -and agreed to an armistice with the Communists. The Kuomintang--bearing -full responsibility for an actual emergent state--found intra-Chinese -diplomacy as perplexing as foreign. - - [Footnote 6: For the Generalissimo's own diary of the kidnapping, - together with a narrative by his wife, see Chiang, Mme. Mayling Soong, - _Sian: A Coup d'Etat_, bound with Chiang K'ai-shek, _A Fortnight in - Sian: Extracts from a Diary_, Shanghai, 1938. The Chinese edition of - this appeared as Chiang Wei-yüan-chang [Chairman Chiang], _Hsi-an Pan - Yüeh-chi_ [A Fortnight's Diary from Sian], Shanghai, XXVI (1937). A - first-hand Western account is Bertram, James M., _First Act in China_, - New York, 1938. Edgar Snow, in _Red Star over China_, New York, 1938, - p. 395 _ff._, gives an account sympathetic to the Left; Harold Isaacs, - in _The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution_, London, 1938, p. 445 - _ff._, presents a penetrating Trotskyist critique. An excellent - factual summary of this crucial year, written by a well-known writer - who visited the scene at first hand, is to be found in Bisson, T. A., - _Japan in China_, New York, 1938.] - -Thus, at the outbreak of war, the National Government had reached a -higher level of actual political and administrative power than its -predecessors, but was faced with grave problems. In any other country -the government would presumably have been on the verge of ruin. -Controlling only major sections of its internationally recognized -territory; faced by autonomous provinces, half-legal military satrapies -and outright warlord despotism, all backed by vehement provincialism, -great distances, linguistic difficulties and mutual geographical -isolation; unpopular with its own student, intellectual and professional -elites; ridden by personal politics; just emerging from a ten years' -civil war--with these handicaps, a second-rate power undertook to -challenge the greatest power of Asia to an irreversibly fateful war. The -Chinese went further: they sought in the war not only victory, but -unity, democracy and prosperity as well! This background of purpose -makes China's internal politics richly meaningful in relation to the -world scene. - - -THE BEGINNING OF ACTIVE HOSTILITIES - -After nearly six years of military and political conflict, a full -quasi-war[7] broke out with the episode at Loukouchiao on the night of -July 7-8, 1937. It was the evident intention of the Japanese to end an -unsatisfactory state of affairs (i.e., Chinese control) in that area -once and for all, although they were perfectly willing to express -temporary amity and _ad interim_ non-aggression toward what was left of -China. The National Government, after a few days of uncertainty, began -real preparations for war. Since the government's appeasement policy had -accustomed many to think of resistance in terms of the Left, there was -an enormous inflation of Leftist sentiment, not deflated for about -eighteen months. - - [Footnote 7: "War" used to mean the reciprocal application of violence - by public, armed bodies; private and informal homicide was termed - "murder" or was otherwise clearly designated. Today these distinctions - are less clear. The author must enter a _caveat lector_: no term is - employed in other than a general (i.e., literary) meaning, except upon - special notice. The Sino-Japanese hostilities differ greatly from war - in several interesting but technical respects; they are a very special - Japanese invention. Yet it would be cumbersome to refer to Chinese - changes in Conflict-time, or to speak meticulously of armies engaged - in an Incident.] - -While new mass organizations were formed, the Chinese military command -framed a plan for a three-stage war: - -(1) a period of resistance by heavy regular forces fighting -positionally; - -(2) a period of stalemate wherein enemy forces, immobilized by opposing -regular armies, found lines of communication, supplies and business -harassed by guerrillas and saboteurs; - -(3) a period of counter-attack in which the Chinese, having prepared -themselves technologically during the stalemate and having weakened the -enemy by a test of endurance, should drive the Japanese back into the -sea. - -The strategy of this type of war was based upon the plan of retreating -in space in order to advance in time--that is, to yield area slowly and -purposefully, without too great cost to oneself, in order to outlast the -enemy and reach victory. In thus purchasing time by the mile, the -Chinese could not afford to yield intact cities, factories, -communications, mines, docks, warehouses and the other goods of -business; such cessions would only profit Japan: hence _the scorched -earth_ policy. The strategy was obviously suited to a country rich in -territory and population, but poor in _matériel_. It not only made both -regulars and guerrillas effective against Japan but made each truly -reliant upon the other. Without the Nationalist regular armies, who in -attempting to suppress the Communists had done almost everything which -the Japanese now had to do--guarding railroads, pacifying disaffected -and hostile rural areas, promoting industries and watching -agitation--the Japanese forces might disperse enough to enable Japan to -patrol and pacify enough of China to pay for the occupation. Chiang had -to hold the Japanese together, immobilize large bodies of their troops, -keep their war expenses up, and wait for the time to counter-attack. -Meanwhile the guerrillas, together with the Communist veterans, were to -prevent the Japanese from settling down, to worry them with agitation, -to sabotage their economic efforts and to wear them out for Chiang's -_révanche_. - -One of the first governmental changes in wartime was the re-institution -of an effective propaganda service under the Political Department of the -Military Affairs Commission. In this Department, many of China's most -active controversialists, censored or exiled for years, found officially -sanctioned scope for their energies. Formal unity came slowly. Although -Shanghai was attacked on August 13, 1937, it was not until September 10 -following that a fairly definitive arrangement was reached in regard to -the Communist-occupied zone in the Northwest. - -The settlement transformed a pre-existing armistice into an -intranational alliance; technically it amounted to submission by the -Communists and their incorporation into the national government and -armies. The area of the Chinese Soviet Republic assumed the name Special -Regional Government of the Chinese Republic (_Chunghua Min-kuo T'ê-ch'ü -Chêng-fu_), which it had been using informally for months; the Chinese -Red Army became the Eighth Route Army (_Pa-lu-chün_); and the Chinese -Communist Party accepted the _San Min Chu I_ as the constitutional state -ideology of China, abandoning immediate measures of class war and -expropriation. The settlement was in the form of a Communist reply to -Kuomintang terms offered in February 1937 and the reply of the -Generalissimo as Chief of the Kuomintang to the Communist -declaration.[8] - - [Footnote 8: See Council of International Affairs, _The Chinese Year - Book, 1938-39_ [Hong Kong], 1939; article by Chu Chia-hua, - "Consolidation of Democracy in China," Chapter IV; "Reconciliation - with the Communists," p. 339-40. This Council is an informal and - extra-legal offshoot of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs; - accordingly the annual, rich in official materials, provides - insufficient data on Communist, guerrilla, and unofficial activities. - See also, Epstein, I., _The People's War_ [Shanghai], 1939, p. 88 - _ff._, for an excellent, clear account of this period.] - -For the first few months the war kept its quasi-European pattern. The -greater part of the fighting was done in the Shanghai area, while -Japanese forces proceeded down from North China. The Japanese still had -some expectation of localizing the North China and the Shanghai -conflicts. At most, they expected the war to be a short one, not -extending beyond the capture of Nanking. Occupation of the capital was -counted on for the ruin of the central government, the end of Chiang and -the reversion of China to a condition of malleable anarchy. - -December 1937 was the blackest month of the war for the Chinese. The -Japanese advanced toward Nanking, with Chinese resistance crumbling; -part of the armies withdrew in good order, but on occasion there were -hopeless, panicky routs. To this month the Japanese looked for victory, -and were so confident that they formed the pro-Japanese Provisional -Government of the Republic of China, in Peking on December 11.[9] Four -days later the Japanese forces entered Nanking, and the ensuing -fortnight set the record for atrocity in the modern world. The Japanese -forces were preoccupied with their own disorder. The National -Government escaped up-river to Hankow, where it promptly began to -function under the three-headquarters plan: some offices at Hankow, some -at Changsha and some at Chungking. The presence of the foreign affairs, -propaganda, and military agencies at Hankow made this the practical -capital of China, although Nanking was and is the constitutional -capital. - - [Footnote 9: See below, p. 193. See also Taylor, George E., _The - Struggle for North China_, New York, 1940, in the Inquiry Series of - the Institute of Pacific Relations.] - - -THE HANKOW PERIOD - -The greatest part of the year XXVII (1938) was spent in continuation of -slow retreat and heavy frontal resistance. Until October communications -with the outside world were wide open through the railroad to Canton. -Heavy supplies could arrive by the shipload. Hundreds of Japanese air -attacks on the railroad disrupted schedules but never led to serious -suspension of service. Leftist influence became overwhelming in -Hankow. That city had been the capital of the ill-fated Wu-han -Kuomintang-Communist government, which fell with the secession of Chiang -to Nanking eleven years before; its connotations still lingered. Even -conservative Kuomintang leaders, who had gone to lengths of appeasement -at which Neville Chamberlain would have blanched, tried to talk like -Negrin or Alvarez del Vayo. - -In January 1938, two organizations were formed which, along with the -Communist zone in the Northwest, were to be among the most active -agencies of guerrilla leadership. The first of these was the New Fourth -Army (_Hsin-ssŭ-chün_), which emerged in the area just south of the -Japanese forces at the Yangtze mouth. It was composed of peasant and -student militia, of regular army fragments, and of some Kuomintang -volunteers, under the leadership of Communist remnants which had hidden -away, banditti-fashion, when the Red Army trekked Northwest. Its -emergence was recognized by legal order of the National Military -Affairs Commission.[10] The other organization was the Provisional -Executive Committee of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Border Region -(_Chin-ch'a-chi Pien-ch'ü Lin-shih Hsing-chêng Wei-yüan-hui_), -established by a conference at Fup'ing, January 8-15, and authorized by -central government mandate. This agency also sprang from Leftist -organizations--in this case, a bold, determined, student-peasant -guerrilla army--which had first developed despite government opposition. -It was designed to provide an emergency guerrilla government for those -portions of the three provinces which were under occupation by the -Japanese. Unoccupied portions of the provinces retained their existing -administrations. - - [Footnote 10: See Epstein, I., work cited, p. 235 _ff._ and _The - Chinese Year Book 1938-39_, cited, article by the late P. C. Nyi, - "Plans for Political and Economic Hegemony in China"; this includes - a full administrative description of the Border Region, p. 254 _ff._ - The North China zone is arbitrarily translated "Border Region," to - distinguish it from the quondam Chinese Soviet Republic in the - Northwest, translated as "Frontier Area."] - -In the next month, February 1938, there was established an agency of -supreme importance, the Supreme National Defense Council.[11] This -replaced the Central Political Council,[12] which had exercised routine -functions of the Party's sovereign control over the government; like its -predecessor, the Supreme National Defense Council tended to act as the -supreme governmental organ, although it was technically a Party organ. -The Council provided and provides a unified civilian-military control -for the duration of the war; but the Kuomintang shares its power with -other groups only in the consultative organs of state, not in the -executive. - - [Footnote 11: See below, p. 46.] - - [Footnote 12: See chart on p. 47. Descriptions of the pre-war Central - Political Council are to be found in the texts cited on p. 5, n. 2, - and in the first two issues of _The Chinese Year Book, 1935-36_ and - _1936-37_, Shanghai, _passim_.] - -March 1938 followed with another political step forward--the Emergency -Session of the Kuomintang Party Congress. The Party Congress had the -functions of a special constituent assembly in part, and in part those -of a restricted parliament; in this session two further actions were -taken. The first was the adoption of the momentous Program of National -Resistance and Reconstruction (_K'ang-chan Chien-kuo Kang-ling_),[13] -which provides a plan for the war and commits the Kuomintang and the -National Government to a policy of victory, of industrialization, and of -economic reform as a means to war. - - [Footnote 13: See Appendix, p. 309.] - -The second step taken by this important Congress was the provision for a -People's Political Council (_Kuo-min Ts'an-chêng Hui_, also translatable -as People's Advisory Political Council). This was the first breach in -the Kuomintang monopoly of government since the establishment of the -Party dictatorship.[14] The government, through the constitutional -fiction of appointing members as representative individuals, provided a -rough, approximate, but fair representation of the active political -forces in China. - - [Footnote 14: See below, p. 69. This is to be distinguished from the - various constitutional conventions, the proposed national congress - (_kuo-min ta-hui_) which exists only in contemplation of the - constitutional drafters, and the Kuomintang Party Congress.] - -While the Emergency Session of the Party Congress took these steps for -further national defense, the Japanese were collecting a coterie of -ex-politicians, friends of Japan, and old men to serve as the Reformed -Government of the Republic of China at Nanking. They disregarded the -anomaly of having two "Chinese" national governments--the Provisional -Government in Peiping being undisturbed by these measures--and continued -to seek the division of China, even on the level of the pro-Japanese -States. The Reformed Government was established on March 27, 1938. - -The autumn of 1938 brought another phase of discouragement. Relying on -the prestige of British power and the nearness of Hong Kong, the -Chinese were not watchful in the Canton area. The Japanese landed almost -unopposed. Chinese negligence, corruption, and a little treachery worked -in their favor. The landing forces performed almost superhuman feats of -endurance in forced marches overland; on several occasions Japanese -advance troops ran so far ahead of schedule that Japanese warplanes, -thinking them disguised Chinese, strafed them![15] Canton fell without a -major battle. Hankow, the great radical capital, scene of the 1926-27 -Leftist upsurge and of the anti-Fascist enthusiasm of 1938, was entered -by the Imperial Japanese army, and the entire Wu-han area was lost to -China. - - [Footnote 15: An engrossing first-hand account of this is to be found - in Hino, Ashihei, _Sea and Soldiers_, Tokyo, 1940. This, with its - three companion volumes, _Mud and Soldiers_, _Flower and Soldiers_, - and _Barley and Soldiers_, Tokyo, 1939 and 1940, forms an eloquent, - humane, sensitive narrative of a young Japanese writer serving with - the Imperial forces in China. The series ranks with the great - narratives of the European war of 1914-18, and expresses the - Japanolatrist devoutness, the naïveté, and bewildering courage of much - of the Japanese infantry, but does so through the medium of a literary - craftsmanship rare in any army.] - -Not only was the Hankow period ended. By breaking the last rail -connection of the Chinese government and the outside world, and by -driving the Chinese leadership into the remote interior, Japan shut off -the ready play of international influence on domestic Chinese politics. -Foreign visitors became more rare. The government, moving to the -mountain fastnesses of Szechuan, found a home on the great -Gibraltar-like promontory of Chungking city, tiered along cliffs above -the Yangtze and Kialing rivers. The last withdrawal was a final test of -strength. Hankow, six hundred miles up-river, was commercially, -architecturally, and politically a coastal city. It was still an outpost -of world imperialism and of modern technology. With the next remove the -Chinese government found itself beyond tangible Western influence; for -the first time since 1860 the capital was out of the military reach of -Western powers, and in a city which had only slight traces of Western -influence. - - -THE CHUNGKING PERIOD - -The Chungking period began with the transfer of further government -offices to the West, to join President Lin Shên, and marks a distinct -phase in the process of government-building in China. As the Chungking -regime, the National Government took new forms of temper and character. -Government, Kuomintang, Communists--all were in the position of an -inner-Asiatic state, without convenient access to the sea, seeking to -fight an oceanic nation whose trade reached every port in the world. -Foreign imperialism could no longer be blamed for the demoralizations of -the hour; foreign aid was too tenuous and remote to qualify the inner -play of Chinese political growth. Politically, the Chinese had to stand -on their own feet. - -The second phase of the war had begun. Chinese armies stood -front-to-front against the Japanese, and kept hundreds of thousands of -invading troops immobilized. The guerrillas got to work. Most of all, -the machinery of modernization began functioning; all the programs had -been completed, and the task was clear. The international developments -of the time--the first American loan, $25,000,000 in 1938; the brief -Manchoukuo-Outer Mongol war of 1939, wherein Japan and Russia fought -each other through their respective dependencies; even the outbreak of -the European war--were remote from this far inland scene. Military -events had some effect, but nothing comparable to the Japanese victories -at Shanghai, Nanking, Canton, and Hankow recurred. The Japanese invaded -Kwangsi in the fall of 1939; they left a year later, when their drive -into French Indo-China made it unnecessary to cut those colonies off -from China. In South Hunan the Japanese suffered catastrophically when -they advanced boldly and contemptuously into non-modern areas and were -encircled by the Chinese. Even the flight and treason of Wang Ch'ing-wei -at the year's end of 1938, and his open cooperation with Japan in March -1940, did not change the general picture. The emphasis was no longer on -sudden changes, on personality, on dramatic shifts of power. It was on -construction--on the development of a modern, democratic, technically -equipped Chinese state out of the vast resources of China's hinterland. -The China which was to win had to be created before it could -counter-attack.[16] - - [Footnote 16: The literature of the war and of the struggles of Free - China has already reached an enormous extent. The present work makes - no attempt to present a step-by-step account of the interplay of - personal politics, the progress of the armies, or to provide a - first-hand personal account. Observers other than the author have - presented these topics exceedingly well. A few of the outstanding - works may be mentioned, however; a Shanghai press line usually - signifies that the book was reprinted there from a British or North - American edition. Epstein, I., _The People's War_, London, 1939, is a - spirited, detailed account of development down to the spring of 1939, - particularly useful for the New Fourth Army and the Border Region. - Among accounts of the war are Bertram, J. M., _Unconquered_, New York, - 1939; Oliver, Frank, _Special Undeclared War_, London, 1939, - containing interesting accounts, in particular, of Japanese military - and political behavior in China. Andersson, J. G., _China Fights for - the World_ [Shanghai], 1939; Utley, Freda, _China at War_ [Shanghai], - 1939, a significant personal account with special interest for the - Hankow period; Mowrer, Edgar, _Mowrer in China_, Harmondsworth - (England), 1938, published in America as _The Dragon Wakes_, New York, - 1939; Booker, Edna Lee, _News Is My Job_ [Shanghai], 1940, a - reminiscent anecdotage; Lady Hosie, _Brave New China_, [Shanghai], - n.d., a far more informed work than most of the autobiographical - accounts, by the daughter and widow of two British Orientalists, - herself a distinguished literary writer on China. On the North China - situation, four popular works stand out: Snow, Edgar, _Red Star Over - China_, New York, 1938, the great "scoop" on the Communists; and three - other books based on first-hand reconnaissance: Bisson, T. A., work - cited above; Hanson, Haldore, "_Humane Endeavour_" [Shanghai], n.d.; - and Carlson, Evans Fordyce, _Twin Stars of China_, New York, 1940, the - work of the U. S. Marine Corps Observer in the guerrilla area, unique - in its value as professional military interpretation. Gunther, John, - _Inside Asia_, New York, 1939, contains much of great interest. Very - special viewpoints are represented in the account of a - National-Socialist German observer, Urach, Fürst A., _Ostasien, Kampf - um das Kommende Grossreich_, Berlin, 1940; the commentary of two - British poets, Auden, W. H., and Isherwood, Christopher, _Journey to a - War_, New York, 1939; and the reportage of a distinguished Soviet - fellow-traveller, Strong, Anna Louise, _One-Fifth of Mankind_, New - York, 1938.] - - - - -CHAPTER I - -THE CONSTITUTION - - -The constitutional system, basic in most Western states, plays a -peculiar, subordinate role in China. Consideration of the issue of -constitutionalism high-lights the most practical aspects of the issues -of full democracy. Although the purely legal aspects of constitutional -development are still unimportant in the internal power politics of -China, further constitutional development involves a very real shift in -the domestic balance of power. The fullness of national unity, and -therefore the effectiveness of resistance against Japan, depend in part -on the successful solution or compromise of the problems of -constitutionalism. - -Ever since the beginnings of political modernization in China, demands -for constitutional government have included a written constitution as an -imperative prerequisite. The formidable Empress Dowager was troubled in -her last days by the Imperial constitution, a rather unimaginative -plagiarism of the Japanese Constitution of 1889. Since the Republic -began in 1912, China has continued constitutional drafting, amendment, -replacement, and suppression; many of these constitutions have gone into -legal effect. Law being what it was, practical politics flowed on -untroubled.[1] Only with the establishment of the National Government -at Nanking did constitutional structure and actual government develop -similarities. - - [Footnote 1: On the Manchu constitutional programs, see _Columbia - University Studies in Political Science_, Vol. XL, No. 1: Yen, - Hawkling L., "A Survey of Constitutional Development in China"; - Vinacke, Harold Monk, _Modern Constitutional Development in China_, - Princeton, 1920; Cameron, Meribeth, _The Reform Movement in China, - 1898-1912_, Stanford University, 1931; and Hsieh, Pao Chao, _The - Government of China (1644-1911)_, Baltimore, 1925. The earlier - constitutional developments under the Republic are summarized in - Escarra, Jean, _Le Droit Chinois_, Paris and Peiping, 1936, which - includes excellent bibliographies; Tsêng Yu-hao, _Modern Chinese Legal - and Political Philosophy_, Shanghai, 1934, Ch. VI, "The Law of Modern - Chinese Constitutions"; a characteristic proposal for a pre-Kuomintang - constitution is Bau, Mingchien Joshua, _Modern Democracy in China_, - Shanghai, 1927; and the works of Lum, Wu, and Linebarger, cited above.] - - -THE _Yüeh Fa_ OF 1931 - -In 1931, after three years' operation under an Organic Law, the National -Government adopted the _Yüeh Fa_ (Provisional Constitution),[2] designed -to cover the period between the first stage of the revolution, _military -conquest_, and the final one of _constitutional government_. This -intermediate period was formally labelled the stage of _political -tutelage_, although in fact the military unification of the country -continued. The Provisional Constitution, designed for five years' use, -has continued in force to the present (March 1941). It possesses the -merit of attempting to make actual practice and constitutional form -correspond. Grandiloquent, unenforceable provisions concerning elections -are omitted, and full exercise of the powers of sovereignty are frankly -entrusted to the tutelary Party, the Kuomintang. Such a constitution, -formally making the Kuomintang different from and higher than any other -party in China--and, for all that, in the world, since the Fascist, -National Socialist, and Communist parties are not formally the -constitutional superiors of their respective governments--and giving the -Party unrestricted authority, has provided China with government -realistic if not libertarian. - - [Footnote 2: The text of the _Yüeh Fa_ is to be found in _The China - Year Book, 1932_, Shanghai, 1932, and in Lum, work cited, p. 161 - _ff._, and Wu Chih-fang, work cited, p. 410 _ff._ The Chinese texts - of all outstanding Chinese constitutions, from the Imperial programs - down to the Double Five Draft of the _Hsien Fa_ are to be found in - Wang Shih-chieh, _Pi-chiao Hsien-fa_, Shanghai, 1937, p. 699-796.] - -The constitutional basis of the present Party-dictatorship in China is -well summarized by the distinguished constitutional commentator, Dr. -Wang Shih-chieh: - - According to Sun Chung-shan's[3] _Chien-kuo Ta-kang_ - [Outlines of National Reconstruction], China should pass - through a period of political tutelage under the Chinese - Kuomintang,[4] before the stage of constitutional government - be reached. The National Government is merely an - organization through which a true republic may be formed. - Hence, in order to demonstrate the structure of the National - Government clearly, we must first understand the meaning of - _tang chih_ [party government]. - - "Party government," so-called, signifies that the whole - system of government is under the control or dictatorship of - one political party only. The only difference between party - government and dictatorship is that the former is under the - dictatorship of an entire political party, while the latter - is under that of a single person. Party government is of - course different from democracy, inasmuch as with democracy, - all policies are to be decided by the entire body of - citizens, while with party government, policies are to be - decided by all the members of the particular party only. In - other words, the entire party as one man can exercise - political dictatorship, without taking into consideration - the opinions of those who are not the members of the party. - Any resolution passed by that party is considered a law not - only in fact, but sometimes even in name; moreover, the - party may cancel or change a law by a resolution passed in a - meeting. - - The above-mentioned points are phenomena common to countries - under party governments. - - After the Chinese Kuomintang has come into power, the system - of party government is not only a fact, but even prescribed - in laws. The _Laws Governing the System of Organization of - the National Government of the Republic of China_ - promulgated for the first time on July 1, Year XIV (1925) - were originally formulated by the Political Council of the - Chinese Kuomintang. Article I in this code of laws provided: - "The National Government discharges all the political - affairs of the entire country, under the direction and - superintendency of the Chinese Kuomintang." The said code - has been constantly amended since its first promulgation, - but this article has always remained unchanged. By the - summer of Year XVII (1928), when the successful Northern - Expedition undertaken by the National Revolutionary Army - unified China under one government, the period of political - tutelage of the Chinese Kuomintang began with the - formulation and promulgation of the _Outlines of Political - Tutelage_ on October 3, Year XVII (1928). Article I of the - said "Outlines" provided: "During the period of political - tutelage of the Republic of China, the National Party - Congress of the Chinese Kuomintang will take the place of - the National Convention to lead the people and enforce all - policies." By the beginning of June, in Year XX (1931), when - the _Provisional Constitution_ for the period of political - tutelage was promulgated, the _Outlines of Political - Tutelage_ were again formed into a part of the _Provisional - Constitution_, thereby giving party government a - constitutional recognition. Besides the _Outlines of - Political Tutelage_, Article 72 ("The National Government - [Council of State] has a President and a certain number of - state councillors, appointed by the Central Executive - Committee of the Chinese Kuomintang."), and Article 58 ("The - Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Kuomintang is - vested with the power of interpreting this Provisional - Constitution.") of the _Provisional Constitution_, and - Article 10 ("The National Government has a President, - twenty-four to thirty-six state councillors, a President and - a Vice-President of every _Yüan_, appointed by the Central - Executive Committee of the Chinese Kuomintang."), and - Article 15 ("Before the promulgation of the Constitution, - the Executive, Legislative, Judicial, Examination and - Control _Yüan_ will each be responsible to the Central - Executive Committee of the Chinese Kuomintang.") of the - _Laws Governing the System of Organization of the National - Government_ (December 30, Year XX [1931]) now being - enforced, form the legal basis for party government.[5] - - [Footnote 3: I.e., Sun Yat-sen; Chung-shan was a revolutionary alias, - which became a ceremonial posthumous name.] - - [Footnote 4: The term "Chinese Kuomintang" is not a redundancy; the - original is _Chung-kuo Kuo-min-tang_, "Central-Realm - Realm-people-association," and could be translated as the Chinese - Nationalist Populist Party, National Democratic Party, the Nation's - People's Party, etc. Several Japanese organizations have had - exceedingly similar names; hence the formal style for the Kuomintang - is always prefaced by _China_.] - - [Footnote 5: Wang Shih-chieh, work cited, p. 649-50.] - -Under Kuomintang trusteeship, demands have been heard within and without -the Party, for the promised abdication of the Party and for the -initiation of popular government. Since the Kuomintang, unlike European -one-party groups, established itself only for the formal purpose of -democratic training, and was pledged to tolerate multi-party government -as soon as possible, the continued monopoly of power was a frustration -of the Party ideology and programs. The frustration was serious; -involving much loss of popular sympathy for the government, this and -appeasement rather demoralized the Party in the years preceding the -invasion. - - -THE DRAFT PERMANENT OR DOUBLE FIVE CONSTITUTION - -The Legislative _Yüan_ brought forth on May 5, 1936 (in Chinese -chronology, 5/5/XXV, or double-five twenty-five), the celebrated -_Hsien-fa Ts'ao-an_ (Draft Permanent Constitution), which was promptly -dubbed the Double Five Constitution. Ever since its first promulgation, -this document has formed the center of all Chinese constitutional -debate, and--with very minor modifications--still stands as the official -proposal for a permanent constitution, awaiting ratification by the -_Kuo-min Ta-hui_ (National [Constituent] Congress), when and if that -long-postponed body ever convenes.[6] The Draft Constitution is the -joint work of many outstanding legal scholars. A product of collective -research and study, it thereby resembles collective private -codification of municipal and international law in the West more than it -does the creation of a deliberative assembly. The celebrated Chinese -jurist, Dr. John C. H. Wu, prepared the first informal draft,[7] and the -5/5/XXV version represents the fourth draft of the Legislative _Yüan_. -The preparation of the various drafts has not, from the scholastic point -of view, been secretive or private; but broad popular participation has -neither been offered nor solicited. - - [Footnote 6: The Double Five Draft Constitution is to be found in - Chinese in Wang Shih-chieh, work cited, and in English in Council of - International Affairs, _Information Bulletin_, Vol. III, No. 10 (April - 11, 1937), Nanking; Hsia, C. L., "Background and Features of the Draft - Constitution of China"; in Legislative _Yüan_, "Draft of the - Constitution of the Republic of China," Nanking, 1937; in _The China - Year Book_, Shanghai, and _The Chinese Year Book_, Shanghai and Hong - Kong, _v.i._ and _v.d._ The latest version of the Draft Constitution - is reprinted below. Appendix I (A), p. 283; the latest Chinese - annotated version of this is the Legislative _Yüan_, _Chung-hua - Min-kuo Hsien-fa Ts'ao-an Shuo-ming-shu_ (An Elucidation of the Draft - Permanent Constitution of the Chinese Republic), [Chungking], XXIX - (1940).] - - [Footnote 7: For a critique and appreciation of the final Draft - Constitution, see Wu, John C. H., "Notes on the Final Draft - Constitution" in _Tien Hsia Monthly_, Vol. X, No. 5 (May 1940), p. - 409-26. (Dr. Wu is one of the most extraordinary personages of the - modern world; he has taken all knowledge--East Asiatic and - Western--for his province. He writes a spirited, graceful English and - is capable of discussing anything from modern politics or abstruse - points of Anglo-American law to ancient Chinese hedonism or the - philosophical implications of the _Autobiography_ of St. Thérèse of - Lisieux. Dr. Wu, in a bomb-shelter, possesses much of the moral poise - and profound personal assurance for which such Westerners as T. S. - Eliot seek in vain.) See also Hsia, C. L., "A Comparative Study of - China's Draft Constitution with That of Other Modern States," in _The - China Quarterly_, Vol. 2, 1936-7, No. 1 (Summer), p. 89-101 and Hoh - Chih-hsiang, "A History of Constitution Making in China," the same, - Vol. 1, 1935-6, No. 4 (Summer), p. 105-117.] - -The Constitution consists of eight Chapters, comprising one hundred and -forty-seven articles. Chapter I defines the Chinese state as "a San Min -Chu I Republic" (_Art._ 1), declares sovereignty to be "vested in the -whole body of its citizens" (_Art._ 2), defines the territories of the -republic, specifies racial equality for the "races of the Republic of -China," designates the national flag, and declares Nanking to be the -capital. Chapter II covers, in nineteen very specific articles, the -entire field of private rights and of the civic privileges of -individuals. Most specifications carry the qualification, "in accordance -with law" or "except in accordance with law." Since law is defined -further in the Constitution as "that which has been passed by the -Legislative _Yüan_ and promulgated by the President," the qualification -impresses many persons as sinister rather than encouraging. Except for -this point, the specific constitutional guarantees exceed in number and -specificity those of almost any other modern constitution. - -The _Kuo-min Ta-hui_ (either "National Congress" or "People's Congress") -is the subject of Chapter III. This body has a function unlike that of -any Western agency; the nearest equivalent is the National Assembly of -the Third French Republic. This Congress is an electoral and constituent -body with fundamental legislative powers. It is not intended to usurp -the functions of the Legislative _Yüan_ by fulfilling the role of a -United States Congress, French Deputies and Senate, or a British -Parliament. Meeting once every three years for a one-month session, it -will be manifestly unable to act as a routine Western-type legislature. - -The Central Government is the topic of the fourth Chapter. The first -section of the Chapter describes the Presidency; the remaining five, the -five _Yüan_. This applies the five-fold separation of powers. Sun -Yat-sen held that a three-fold separation of powers, as known in the -West and applied to American government, was efficacious; he also -considered that the Imperial Chinese separation of powers (an implicit -one only) was also desirable. The West had executive, legislative, -judicial; old China combined these three into the governing power, and -joined thereto the examinative power and the _chien-ch'a_[8] power. (The -_chien-ch'a_ power involved the functions of the traditional Chinese -censorate; overt and active expressions are found in auditing and in the -lodgment of impeachment charges. The term is fundamentally -untranslatable, but if the tribunician connotations of _Censor_ or the -emergency meaning of _Control_ be recalled, either of these terms will -serve.) Sun Yat-sen combined the Western and the old-Chinese -separations, developing a theory of the five powers. The Draft -Constitution, like its two working predecessors, is a five-power -constitution, with five great _Yüan_ (Boards, Presidencies, or Courts), -each headed by a _Yüan-chang_ (_Yüan_ President). The fourth Chapter, by -including the President and all five _Yüan_, almost covers the full -reach of Chinese government. - - [Footnote 8: For a more extended discussion of this point, see the - author's _The Political Doctrines of Sun Yat-sen: An Exposition of the - San Min Chu I_, Baltimore, 1937, p. 218 _ff._, and also p. 96 _ff._] - -This Chapter contemplates the creation of a strong President. In the -Organic Law of 1928, the five Presidents of the _Yüan_ were relatively -less strong, and the Chairman of the _Kuo-min Chêng-fu Wei-yüan-hui_ -(National Government Council; or, Council of State) was the key figure -in the government. Most of this time, Chiang himself was Chairman. In -the 1931 Provisional Constitution, now in force, the Chairman of the -National Government--termed President by courtesy--is an officer -comparable to the President of the Third French Republic; the President -of the Executive _Yüan_ is a more active officer: Chiang K'ai-shek is -President of the Executive _Yüan_. The new President, under the Draft -Constitution, is one of the world's most powerful officers. Holding -office for six years, eligible for re-election, commander of all armed -forces, declarer of war, negotiator of peace, treaty-maker, chief -appointing and removing officer of the state, holder of an emergency -power greater than that conveyed by Article 48 of the German Weimar -Constitution, and superior to the executive, legislative, judicial, -examinative and control branches of the government--such a President is -fully responsible to the triennial People's Congress, and to that only! -Since the proposed President may be recalled at any time by the People's -Congress, he is in that respect similar to parliamentary chiefs of -state.[9] - - [Footnote 9: See Sun Fo [President of the Legislative _Yüan_, and son - of Sun Yat-sen], "The Spirit of the Draft Permanent Constitution," in - _The China Quarterly_, Vol. V, No. 3 (April 1940), Shanghai, p. - 377-84.] - -The President of the Executive _Yüan_, together with his subordinates, -is to be appointed and removed by the President of the Republic. The -_Yüan_ includes Cabinet Ministers--appointed to their posts from among a -special group of Executive Members of the _Yüan_, thereby providing a -simple, rational equivalent of Cabinet and Privy Council, as in Japan or -(less similarly) in Great Britain. - -The Legislative _Yüan_ is an interesting semi-cameral legislative body, -which seeks to embody the better features of legislative research organs -and of representative bodies. The Judicial _Yüan_ rationalizes the -structure and administration of courts and of judicial process. - -The Control [or Censor] _Yüan_ is, like the Legislative _Yüan_, a -quasi-cameral body, with indirect election of members by the People's -Congress from territorial electorates. Its functions are audit, inquiry, -and impeachment, with such ancillary powers as practice to date has -already indicated.[10] - - [Footnote 10: See Appendix I (F), p. 318-24, below.] - -Chapter V of the Draft Permanent Constitution deals with local -government. The institutions of provincial government are wittingly -minimized, because of recent trouble with provincial satrapies and the -dangerously centrifugal effect of provincial autonomism. In contrast to -this, government at the district (_hsien_) level is designed in strict -accordance with the realities of twenty-odd centuries' experience. It is -probable that no other constitution in the world provides for such -careful guarantee of district, county, canton, or _Kreis_ autonomy. The -old Imperial Chinese system was a loose pseudo-centralized federation of -two thousand near-autarkic and near-autonomous commonwealths; the Draft -Constitution attempts to reinstitute (at the political level) this -vigorous cooperative independence of the _hsien_. The _hsien_ meeting, -extrapolitical, unsystematic, and occasional in the past, is made the -foundation for the new legal structure. (These proposed reforms are now -being anticipated under the Provisional Constitution and current -statutory changes.[11]) - - [Footnote 11: See below, p. 106 _ff._, and Appendix I (G), p. 324.] - -Chapter VI provides that the economic system shall rest on Sun Yat-sen's -principle of _min shêng_ (_q.v._, below). Willing to apply whatever -worked best, Sun himself had no theoretical objections to capitalism, -communism, state socialism, or any other economic doctrine. Hence, -proletarian ownership of the means of production is not guaranteed; yet -state ownership is not restricted, and is specifically required in the -case of "all public utilities and enterprises of a monopolistic nature" -(_Art._ 123). Henry George's influence on Sun is shown by mandatory -taxation of unearned increment (_Art._ 119). Room for free future -adaptation from corporative economic techniques successful in the -outside world is assured (_Art._ 125): "Labor and capital shall, in -accordance with the principles of mutual help and cooperation, develop -together productive enterprises." It is likely that any imaginable -economic system would be constitutional on this basis, provided that it -was initiated by due legal procedure and without hardships irresponsibly -imposed. - -Chapter VII, on Education, opens: "The educational aim of the Republic -of China shall be to develop a national spirit, to cultivate a national -morality, to train the people for self-government and to increase their -ability to earn a livelihood, and thereby to build up a sound and -healthy body of citizens" (_Art._ 131), and continues, "Every citizen of -the Republic of China shall have an equal opportunity to receive -education" (_Art._ 132). State, secular control of educational policy is -assured. Articles 134 and 135 provide for tuition-free elementary -education for children and free elementary education for previously -non-privileged adults. (The constitutional guarantee concerning tuition -is indicative of the scholastic traditions of the Chinese, of the -modern educational revolution, and is reminiscent of _Art._ 12 of the -1931 Constitution of the Chinese Soviet Republic: "The Soviet Government -in China shall guarantee to all workers, peasants, and the toiling -masses the right to education. The Soviet Government will, as far as -possible, begin at once to introduce free universal education.")[12] - - [Footnote 12: This constitution is available in Yakhontoff, Victor A., - _The Chinese Soviets_, New York, 1934, p. 217-21, and in Kun, Bela - [prefator], _Fundamental Laws of the Chinese Soviet Republic_, New - York, 1934, p. 17-24. The writer has been unable to secure the Chinese - text of this document.] - -Chapter VIII deals with the interpretation and enforcement of the -Constitution. It was a labor of love by shrewd legal theorists, and -defines terms with great clarity. Interpretive power is vested in the -Judicial _Yüan_. - - -THE ISSUE OF CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE - -Nowhere in China is there outright denial of a need for constitutional -change. The need exists; the Double Five Draft is the government's -answer. Yet there are few patent demerits in the existing constitutional -system; the present political structure is more realistic, more broadly -national, more expressive of effective opinion than any other in modern -China. The question arises from commitments (dating back to the Empire) -promising to create actual constitutional government. The National -Government was established on the basis of this pledge. The democratic -ideology, whatever sects it may include, has a clean sweep of the field -of doctrine in China. No one seriously advocates monarchy, separatism, -or permanent dictatorship. The only question is: how and when? - -At the close of the third session of the advisory People's Political -Council, Chiang K'ai-shek replied to demands for immediate broadening of -popular control over the government by reaffirmation of his adherence -to the democratic dogma of Sun Yat-sen, together with the following -warnings: - - The democracy which _Tsung-Li_ [The Leader, i.e., Sun - Yat-sen] wished to establish was of the purest kind without - the slightest vestige of make-believe or artificiality. - Unfortunately, the Chinese people, having inherited all the - evil practices handed down throughout the numerous dynasties - of autocratic rule, were then at a low ebb both in - intelligence and in vitality. The people were used to - disorganization and selfishness.... - - We have to wait until our lost territories have been - recovered and domestic disorders liquidated before we can - have political tutelage and prepare ourselves for - constitutionalism.... - - People at that time [the inauguration of the Republic in - 1912] made the mistake of neglecting the necessary - procedures and instead they rivalled each other in talking - about democracy.... As a result, democracy has remained an - ideal.... - - We must make it clear to our people that democracy is not a - synonym for lack of law and order, or for anarchy. - - The public opinion on which democracy is based must be - sound, collective, and representative of the majority of the - people's wills. The freedom which democracy endows on people - should not conflict with public welfare, nor should it go - beyond the sphere as marked by laws of the State. With our - nation facing the worst invasion in history, we must teach - the people to respect the absolute authority of laws of the - State.[13] - - [Footnote 13: China Information Committee, Chungking, _News Release_, - No. 351 (February 25, 1939), p. 2269-71.] - -The clamor for a constitution continued. The difficulties of introducing -mass suffrage to Western China were apparent to everyone, but many -leaders felt that the advantages of constitutionalism would outweigh the -inescapable loss of efficiency, and would mobilize public opinion behind -the war and further democratic progress. The Generalissimo found this -view hard to reconcile with his military, direct notions of doing first -things first, as he saw them, but he yielded in the fourth session of -the People's Political Council and accepted the demand. He stated: - - In China ... [democratization] is a tremendously heavy task - which cannot be completed within a few days. I think that - the Constitution and laws may as well be promulgated at an - earlier date. But, gentlemen, please do not forget the - _Tsung-li's_ painful consideration ... [of the necessity of - an intermediate stage of real democratic training]. - Political tutelage does not end with the training of the - citizens by the government. It requires training of the - citizens by themselves. - - Today we should understand our object: to start the building - of a constitutional government. This means laying a - permanently sound basis for the nation. We are not concerned - with the time of starting constitutional government. Whether - to start it early or later does not matter much. What we are - really concerned with is, do we have a real intention of - forming a constitutional government? If we are truly so - minded, we might as well promulgate the Constitution before - the labor of political tutelage is completed.[14] - - [Footnote 14: [Chiang K'ai-shek], _Tsung-ts'ai Chien-kuo Yen-lun - Hsüan-chi_ (The Party Chief's Utterances on Reconstruction), - Chungking, 1940, p. 237-43. The Generalissimo concluded his speech - with a homiletic touch which is so characteristic that it may be - included here; it also explains his relative lack of interest in the - Constitution: "Lastly, I have another point to tell you gentlemen. I - have already repeated this, again and again, many times. Desiring to - complete our revolutionary work and national reconstruction, and to - have a constitutional government as seen in many modern states as soon - as possible, I often study the causes of the weakness and disorder - which exist in our country.... [He cites the traditional political - vigor and excellence of the centuries before the time of Christ, with - the "degeneration" and "departure from order" of the following - centuries.] The departure is not simply due to the failures in - politics and education and to the deprivation of the popular rights by - a few tyrannical kings and lords since the Ch'in and Han periods. It - is due to the fact that before the Chou, we had government by law - [_fa chih_] as a mere supplement to government by social standards - [_li chih_, also translatable as ideological control, or control - through moral indoctrination]. We had social organization as the - foundation of political organization. Everything was then - well-organized and well-trained. Everywhere, in schools, in armies, in - families, in society, order and the forms of propriety [i.e., social - standards] were regarded as most important. No citizen could evade his - duty and obligation."] - -Chiang thus reconciled the beginning of constitutionalism and the -continuance of political tutelage, although implying acquiescence, not -recommendation. A theorist holding all men to be driven by "a perpetuall -and restlesse desire of Power after power, that ceaseth only in -Death,"[15] might consistently suppose that Chiang merely dissimulated -an inward lust for authority; more plausible is the postulation that a -man who has for years lived with and for a doctrine, giving his life and -future reputation to the fulfilment of a program, would incline to -prudence and realism in climaxing that doctrine and program. In Chiang's -case this is Sun Yat-sen's _San Min Chu I_. Chiang's reluctance to apply -democracy then and there is understandable whatever the inmost motive; -so, too, is his yielding to a widespread demand. - - [Footnote 15: Thomas Hobbes, _Leviathan_, New York and London, 1934 - (Everyman's Edition), p. 49.] - -The convening of a special _Kuo-min Ta-hui_ as a national constituent -assembly was set for November 12, 1940; this day was chosen because it -was traditionally the seventy-fourth birthday of Sun Yat-sen. -Administrative machinery for preparation of a hall, secretariat, -publications, and other necessities was established and set in motion. -Following the severe fires of August 19-20, and the subsequent -large-scale demolition of above-ground downtown Chungking by raids, -indefinite postponement of the Congress was announced on September -25--on the grounds that military hazard prevented adequate assembly of -delegates, and no reasonably safe place for such a meeting could be -found. - -Meanwhile, recent years have seen an uproar of constitutional debate. -This may be summarized briefly, with the case against the Constitution -stated first: - -Constitutionalization would lead to the legalization of other parties, -instead of a mere condition of non-prosecution; this would disrupt the -orderliness required of a people at war. Why add discord in war time? -_Reply_: legitimization of other parties is not a struggle for power but -an act of union. It would widen the periphery of cooperation.[16] - - [Footnote 16: The writer is indebted for much of the material in this - chapter to Dr. Djang Chu, of the New Life Movement Headquarters, - Chungking, who supplied it to him in the form of a lecture and other - memoranda. Dr. Djang is, of course, not responsible for any - reinterpretations here made.] - -Sun Yat-sen required three stages of the revolution: conquest, tutelage, -constitution. China is not ready for mass suffrage. The majority of the -people are not yet literate. Public opinion is just developing. The -nation is, in fact, still in the period of military recapture of -national territories. _Reply_: Sun Yat-sen must not be interpreted -mechanically. If this is done, tutelage will never end, and Sun's -cherished democracy will remain forever in the future. Furthermore, the -guerrillas, the Border Region, and other instances have shown that the -Chinese masses can and will practice democracy right now. Again, the -issue has already been decided; the government has been committed to the -immediate inauguration of the Constitution. First it was to be 1939; the -elections were held in part, until the war finally stopped them on -August 13, 1937. It is too late to raise the issue: is China ready? -Everyone--government, Kuomintang, independent groups--has decided that -China is. - -Why change constitutions? The present one is satisfactory. If a war-time -amplification of the _Yüeh Fa_ is needed, it can be found in the -_Program of Resistance and Reconstruction_.[17] If a convocation of the -talents is needed, the People's Political Council is already there. What -is the use of a constitutional change in war time? _Reply_: the -constitutionalist movement is no new development. The _Program_ was a -democratic advance. "Besides, formation of the People's Political -Council was a step toward democracy. The constitutional movement was -not forced on the government, but was an outgrowth of the war; it has -not appeared overnight, but has a clear historical background. As soon -as the Sino-Japanese hostilities broke out, it was evident that more -democratic rule was necessary. As the war became prolonged, the -preliminary steps proved inadequate. A more perfect constitution, -whereby the whole people can be mobilized, is imminent. This fact was -duly recognized by the people and is the motive power of the present -constitutional movement." (This is the comment of an independent -writer.)[18] - - [Footnote 17: See Appendix I (D), p. 309.] - - [Footnote 18: Liu Shih, "Chung-kuo Hsien-chêng Yün-tung-ti Chi-ko - Chieh-tuan" (Stages of the Chinese Constitutional Movement) in _Li-lun - yü Hsien-shih_ (Theory and Reality), Vol. 1, No. 3, November 15, 1939, - p. 13 _ff._] - -A pointed question is raised and answered by Tso Tao-fen, one of the -Seven Gentlemen (_Ch'i Chüntzu_) who led the National Salvationists: - - Some say that as a matter of fact, the people themselves do - not want a constitution. And--to put it more bluntly--that - the people do not know what a constitution is. Therefore, - the constitutional movement represents the desires of only a - minority of the people, not the majority. You have a certain - element of truth if you say that most of the people do not - know what a constitution is, but it is not true that they do - not want a constitution. In the present war period, the - burden on the people is enormous. They should not be denied - any privileges to which they are entitled. All the proposed - constitutional stipulations concerning the duties, rights, - economic status, and education of the people have an - immediate effect on and relation to the people. Why do they - not want a constitution? If you proceed to ask one of the - common people, say a peasant, and you talk with him, - professorially as though you were in a classroom, about the - constitutional movement, he may be at a loss. But if you - bother to ask him about his daily life--the work he is - doing, his hopes, his bitterness, the cruelties inflicted on - him by unscrupulous officials and landlords and gentry--and - if he enjoys the freedom of speech, he will give you a good - talk!... If you say that the people do not know what a - constitution is, you should enlighten them about the close - relationship between themselves and the constitution, not - discontinue the constitutional movement.[19] - - [Footnote 19: From Tso Tao-fen, "A Few Questions Regarding the - Constitution" in Ch'üan-min K'ang-chan Shê [The United Front Club], - _Hsien-chêng Yün-tung Lun-wên Hsüan-chi_ (A Symposium on the - Constitutional Movement), Chungking, 1940, p. 1 _ff._] - -Other questions relate to specific points in the Draft Constitution. In -the opinion of some, the phrase "according to law" which follows every -guarantee of popular rights is a dangerous phrase, particularly in view -of the neat but arbitrary definition of "law" (_Art._ 139). Others, -remembering the Weimar Article 48, mistrust the emergency power of the -President. The President's sharing of the budgetary, pardoning, and war -powers with the Legislative _Yüan_ seems illogical to some critics, who -feel that these powers should be within reach of a more popular body, -not a technically legislative organ. - -Further discussion deals with the competence of the _Kuo-min Ta-hui_. -Many of the critics, particularly those of the Communist and independent -Left group, believe the long-heralded epoch of democracy would open -badly if it began with mechanical ratification of a dictated -constitution. A Communist leader said, "We want a Constitution, a -democratic Constitution--a _real_ democratic Constitution!" and pointed -out that the first Congress was too large, not truly representative of -the common people, and not given enough time to work out a constitution -by its own action; its task, as he supposed the government intended, -would be to rubber-stamp the Double Five Draft. In his opinion, this -Draft had many defects--chief of which was unresponsiveness of the -central government to popular control. The proposed Congress could not -do much with a mere triennial check; the five-power system as projected -was unsatisfactory. Democratic rights were insufficiently assured. He -added that the Communist Party of China was for a democracy, but that -the Double Five Draft was not "the constitution of a democracy."[20] - - [Footnote 20: Statement of Col. Ch'in Po-k'u at the Chungking office - of the 18th [Communist] Army Corps Headquarters, on July 29, 1940, to - the author.] - -Furthermore, the representativeness of the proposed -constitution-adopting _Kuo-min Ta-hui_ is called into question. The -present plan calls for 665 delegates from geographical constituencies, -380 from occupational, 155 "by special methods," 240 by government -appointment, and a large number of Kuomintang Party-officers _ex -officio_ (241 by a recent count).[21] The present administration would -obviously have a whip hand over all proceedings. The division into -groups has been criticized. A demand, for example, for 120 women members -has been made. Under the circumstances, with 1681 members already -scheduled, mere additional size could be no handicap. - - [Footnote 21: _China at War_, Vol. IV, No. 5 (June 1940), p. 79 _ff._] - -The question of qualifications has also been raised. About 900 of the -representatives had been elected when war broke out. These include men -who have since died, or have changed their opinions, or are reported -missing, and even a few traitors. Are all the available elected -representatives to be gathered together, years later? or is a new -election to be held? Whatever occurs, the supreme agency on -qualifications is the Election Committee for Representatives to the -People's [Constituent] Congress, attached directly to the Council of -State. - -The constitutional issue in China is no simple problem of reaction -versus progressivism. The vast majority of the population is not -literate, and is unprepared to deal with a complicated machinery of -opinion and election. Wire-pulling, corruption, adherence to form -instead of deed--these are all widespread in China. Democracy abruptly -established might frustrate further improvement, since sham-democracy -would have established itself. The opponents of sudden action also -press the telling point that the common people do not know they want -immediate democracy, although believing in the term as a symbol and -approving its trial application. The Generalissimo remains clearly -mistrustful about creating new organs of opinion, or using new political -processes; he would prefer to wait until the nation is unified, better -administered, and more literate. Hence his and the Kuomintang's -insistence on indirect elections, remoteness of policy-making -authorities from the electorate, and self-sufficient government. - -China did have, it is argued, an excellent democratic constitution in -1912, many more in the warlord years. All had admirable balances of -power, guarantees to the individual, libertarian and progressive -provisions. Like Chinese social legislation, they lifted China to the -level of the rest of the modern world--_de jure_, and that only! These -elevated documents remained elevated; life went on beneath them, and the -tragic gap between law and life was so enormous that no one thought of -bridging it. The nation would have been humiliated by legislation which -limited the working day to fourteen hours, prohibited the mutilation or -slavery of children, or required that torture be administered in the -presence of a physician. Hence it had eight, ten, or twelve-hour laws, -good child legislation, and absolute prohibition of torture for any -purpose; these were unenforceable. - -To counsels of caution, advocates of immediately responsive institutions -reply that the Chinese common people are better democrats than their -rulers, citing concrete cases in proof. They mention the general -strikes, strong peasant cooperation, the startling phenomena of -coordinate mass action--tens and hundreds of thousands strong--in -political protest, boycotts, or civic immobility. (In past years many a -warlord has been stopped by empty streets and closed houses: no -business, no traffic, no talking, no meetings--only the silence, -and somewhere, conspicuously inconspicuous, a committee of -plenipotentiaries!) They refer to the Frontier Area, the Border Region, -the New Fourth Zone, the guerrillas, the industrial cooperatives, and -the wealth of leadership called up from the millions by the war. They -quote to the Kuomintang its own professions of democracy, and the words -of its late Leader. Told that the masses do not understand modern -administration, modern economics, modern war, and that the peasantry and -workers would proceed to arbitrary class legislation, economic -levelling, and social revolution, they reply, "What do you -want--democracy?" It is most unlikely that the Communists would sweep -the country under free elections, but they and other dissidents, as the -political Outs, would be free to criticize the incumbents in a way sure -to bring support and involve new alignments of power. Some Kuomintang -leaders wish to shut out any group with foreign connections; the Chinese -face--despite their definite movement toward constitutionalism--the -question of the limits of democratic toleration. - - - - -CHAPTER II - -THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT - - -By constitutional stipulation, and by dogma legally established, the -National Government of the Chinese Republic is a Kuomintang -Party-dictatorship over the Chinese nation. This rule is formally -dictatorship by a minority democracy over the absolutely governed -majority, since the Party constitution requires intra-Party democracy. -No pretense is made of further formal democracy. Actual experience of -the past ten years has shown the government to be a broad, loosely -organized oligarchy in which the Party, the Government, the Army and -regional military, and independent leaders (such as bankers, college -professors and presidents, secret society chiefs, community spokesmen) -have shared power. The center of gravity has stayed somewhere near -Chiang K'ai-shek, who as co-leader and then formal Chief (_Tsung-ts'ai_, -"general ruler") of the Party and creator of the central army has -combined two of the chief sources of influence. Variety in the sources, -nature, and incidence of political power in recent Chinese affairs has, -however, not destroyed the constitutional theory: Party-dictatorship -pledged to national democracy. - -The state machinery--as it has been since promulgation of the -Provisional Constitution, 1931--is among the most elaborate in the -modern world, but is nevertheless effective. One may justly regard the -present government as the most efficacious, generally powerful, and -growing Chinese government since the mid-eighteenth century. This -government is pre-eminently the creation of the Kuomintang, and of -Kuomintang leaders. A war which threatens China's national existence -accordingly threatens the leaders as government officers, as Party -members, as patriotic citizens, and as members of the Chinese race. At -the time that they fight an alien enemy, they must simultaneously -increase state power and diffuse it so that a democracy may emerge and -survive. - -China's leadership is therefore posed a two-fold problem: to perpetuate -a regime, successful in one period of relative peace, through years of -invasion to a period of even deeper peace; and to permit popular access -to policy-forming agencies, allowing freer operation of pressures, -without endangering resistance and reconstruction thereby. To the -Western political scientist, it is amazing that they have carried into -the years of catastrophic war a unique, complex constitutional system, -treasuring it like an ark of the covenant. This is the five-power -system. - - -THE FIVE-POWER CONSTITUTION - -The five-power constitution (_wu-ch'üan hsien-fa_) is a legacy of Sun -Yat-sen, and is one of the cardinal dogmas of the _San Min Chu I_. -Distinctively, two new powers are added to the familiar three: namely, -the examinative and the control powers. Westerners might question the -importance of segregating the impeaching, auditing and critical powers, -unifying them into a new agency of government, along with a glorified, -independent civil service system. Yet the five-fold division is to China -a key point of governmental development. - -The five-power system is based on the notions Sun Yat-sen had of -democracy. He anticipated by a generation the need of strengthening -democratic machinery to compete with Caesarian techniques. Merely to -have qualified the suffrage, or to have narrowed the limits of -popular action, would not have sufficed, for it was authentic -democracy--government both representative and popular--which he desired, -not an empty shell of nominal republicanism. In an effort to solve this -dilemma, he employed the concepts _ch'üan_ and _nêng_,[1] which may be -translated "power" and "capacity," although the rendering would -necessarily vary in accordance with the connotations to be -encompassed.[2] He felt that it was a major discovery to apply in modern -politics a distinction between the power which the people should have -over government and the capability they had of operating the machine of -state. Abandoning the state to the vagaries of public opinion, allowing -the citizens free access to the powerful, complex controls of modern -governance, or assuming that anyone and everyone had an expert's -qualifications on all political subjects--this would, in Sun Yat-sen's -opinion, wreck the government. Nevertheless, the people had to reserve a -final power over policies and personnel of government, although they are -themselves unqualified to operate the state mechanism. Hence the people -were to exercise _the four powers_ over the government: initiative, -referendum, election, and recall. Compensatingly, the government was to -possess the _five rights_ over the people, based on the new separation -of powers. To Sun, as a Chinese, the state was not the hand of the -people; it was a separate institution above other institutions, -democratic only in allowing access to itself and in justifying its -authority by the ultimate sanction of popular vote. The new government -could not be kept clean, prompt, and high-minded by the freak, casual -operation of popular censure, nor staffed by whomever a mass fancy threw -into office. It was, instead, to be a traditionally Chinese -self-perpetuating bureaucracy, differing from the past only in being -controlled and revised by popular instead of imperial will. - - [Footnote 1: See Sun Yat-sen, _San Min Chu I_, Shanghai, 1927, - henceforth cited as "Price translation," p. 296 _ff._; or d'Elia, - Paschal M., S. J., _The Triple Demism of Sun Yat-sen_, Wuchang, 1931, - p. 348 _ff._] - - [Footnote 2: An attempt to correlate Sun's democratic theory with - Western concepts is made in the present author's _Political Doctrines - of Sun Yat-sen_, cited, p. 107-9. The notion is clearly put in - _L'Esprit des Lois_, Book 11, ch. 2.] - -Accordingly, the ideal toward which the Chungking government strives may -be epitomized as _perfect bureaucracy subject to complete popular -control_. The two powers new to the West--examination and control--are -to replace public opinion at levels of obscurity, technicality, and -persistence where outside criticism could not reach; the plan of Sun -Yat-sen provides for as much use of power through voting as is found in -any Western state. This attempted solution strikes near the core -problems of any modern government, wherever it may operate and whatever -its conditions. - -The five-power constitution posits a government of educated, expert men, -in which qualifying examinations will precede election for -administrative posts, and in which the examination and control _yüan_ -will--professionally, officially--replace the haphazard play of -sentiment, anger, fancy, envy upon which Western peoples count to keep -their democracy healthy and intact. The United States Government is the -most complex and important institution in the United States, possessing -inquisitorial powers wider and deeper than those of any private person -or institution. Yet the Americans have no unceasing, professional, -expert investigation of their government by their government, nor does a -merit system extend to offices where it might have the drastic effect of -thwarting operation of public opinion locally or temporarily debased. - -This function, specializing power to strengthen it, explains the -war-time survival of the five-power system as a fundamental theory of -state. The Chinese have suffered from weak government for decades. -Absence of dictatorship was largely owing to an inability to designate a -dictator. The five-power system was preceded by a Nationalist -government which employed the soviet form of organization--the one -instance outside the Soviet Union of such application.[3] This had been -set up for rapid, decisive action; thirteen years' preliminary -application of the five-power system has shown this to be no less swift -and effectual. Even the Communist leaders in China today are reconciled -to the retention of the five-power system, although they would certainly -like to modify its present organization.[4] - - [Footnote 3: See Holcombe, Arthur N., _The Chinese Revolution_, - Cambridge (Massachusetts), 1930, passim, for the outstanding - elaboration of this curious experiment, and for a lucid delineation of - the genesis of the National Government.] - - [Footnote 4: Statement to the author by Col. Ch'in Po-k'u, interview - cited, p. 38, n. 20, above.] - -Reference to the general chart of government organization (see p. 330) -shows the intricate pre-democratic system of government now applied. -Consideration of the sources of policy in such a structure have, -therefore, to appraise not merely two agencies--executive and -legislative, with only a glance at the judiciary--as in America, but to -examine a whole hierarchy of Party, general governmental, -military-governmental, and autonomous policy-making agencies. Were it -not for the thousands of miles, the unrelatedness in cultures, the -complexities of language, and the inescapable awareness of race, -Americans might long since have looked to China as the decisive, fresh -political experiment of our times. - -One further trait of the Chinese, which in Japan has been carried to the -point of a national mania, is the respect for the constitutional (or -Imperial) system as a symbol of purity and order. Western governments -are like machines in common use; they operate for the general -convenience and subject to the criticism of their members. Even -dictatorships try to seem practical. The Confucian traditions of -government by indoctrination, and particularly that of government -indoctrinating through conspicuous example, motivated heavy -ceremonialization of state functions. This often led a Chinese Emperor -to become more and more majestic and aloof, to strive for archetypal -perfection, until he became so much a model that he disappeared from -public sight altogether, swilling and carousing himself to death in the -gardens of the Forbidden City; his successors, if they came from the -people, would seem practical and workable for a few generations, until -they too succumbed to their own majesty. Some atrophy through majesty -occurs even in the relatively new Chinese National Government, arrested -but not eradicated by war-time vigor. - - -THE SUPREME NATIONAL DEFENSE COUNCIL - -The highest political agency in China is the Supreme National Defense -Council (_Kuo-fang Tsui-kao Wei-yüan-hui_).[5] This is not a part of the -government, _de jure_, since it is the war-time replacement of the -Kuomintang Central Political Council (_Chung-yang Chêng-chih -Wei-yüan-hui_), the high Party organ charged with exercise of the -Party's sovereign powers in government. The liberalization of the -policy-framing agencies in war-time cannot be better illustrated than by -the fact that this new Supreme National Defense Council reportedly -includes non-Party members, and acts in fact as a central board or -council of government, superseding not only the Kuomintang Central -Political Council but its governmental counterpart, the Council of State -(_Kuo-min Chêng-fu Wei-yüan-hui_) as well. Reference to the chart below -will clarify the relationship of these agencies: - - The KUOMINTANG, as a Party, - exercises sovereign powers through - - [The CENTRAL POLITICAL COUNCIL, superseded in - war-time by] - - The SUPREME NATIONAL DEFENSE COUNCIL, - which transmits commands - to - The COUNCIL OF STATE, highest governmental agency, - which transforms these commands into government - orders applicable - to - NATIONAL, PROVINCIAL, or LOCAL - GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, - in the form of - ORDERS, ORDINANCES, and LAWS - - [Footnote 5: The names of agencies and offices in the discussion of - government and Kuomintang organization are taken from K'ao-shih _Yüan_ - [Examination _Yüan_], _Tang Chêng Chien Chih T'u-piao_ [Charts of - Government and Party Development and Organization], Chungking, XXIX - (1940), _passim_. This work has not yet been published, since it is a - draft printing, to be revised and re-edited before formal publication. - The author was allowed to consult a copy through the courtesy of the - Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Wang Ch'ung-hui, and the kind - assistance of Mr. C. C. Chi of the Party-Ministry of Publicity. These - charts, provisional as they are, are by far the most systematic - presentation of modern Chinese government structure which the author - has ever seen. For a brief commentary on the Council, see the - one-paragraph section, _The Supreme National Defense Council_ in - Tsiang Ting-fu, "Reorganization of the National Government," _Chinese - Year Book 1938-39_, cited, p. 356. Dr. Tsiang, whose other writings on - Chinese government have been models of clarity, candor, and - concreteness, is obliged to state: "As its major functions are - involved in the prosecution of the war, military necessity compels - the writer to withhold the details of its organization and work for a - later issue."] - -The power of the Kuomintang is exercised by its Chief [_Tsung-ts'ai_] -and its Central Executive Committee, Central Committee, and their -respective Standing Committees (discussed below, p. 125 _ff._). - -Secretiveness in a nation's highest policy-making organ is somewhat -unusual in the modern world. In most states the invisible government of -practical acquaintance and association between leaders provides a -meeting ground, and traditions require a formal, open exercise of public -authority. As a matter of fact, a few generally accepted data concerning -the Supreme National Defense Council are readily apparent to the -observer in Chungking. In the first place, it is what its title -implies--the highest agency of political control. Its meetings are the -constant source of new policy and tangible control. Secondly, one finds -a universal belief that the Generalissimo, who attends these meetings in -the multiple capacity of Chairman of the Council, Party Chief of the -Kuomintang, President of the Executive _Yüan_, Chairman of the People's -Political Council, Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Navy, and Air Forces, -etc., faithfully employs Council meetings for very real debate and -discussion of government and Party policy, and for the conduct of the -war. He is not believed to take any important step arbitrarily, without -consulting the Council. (In the past, he has been known to act with -dramatic and concealed swiftness, opening his mind to no one before the -crucial consummation of his plans, but at the present time this has -apparently disappeared.[6]) - - [Footnote 6: For a biased but bitterly graphic portrayal of Chiang's - tiger leaps in politics, see Isaacs, Harold, work cited, _passim_. Mr. - Isaacs' portrayal of Chiang shows him as ambitious, able, and - villainous in his need for power and his hostility to the proletariat. - The Trotskyite viewpoint is a usefully different one from that - obviously adopted by the present author.] - -Third, the Council, while extending beyond the men who are primarily -Party leaders and including military and political figures who -(irrespective of nominal Party membership) are independent, has -transformed the arcanum of Party power into a body more representative -of the entire nation. Fourth, significant in connection with the -Japanese charge of Chungking Bolshevization, the Communists and other -Leftists, while fairly represented in advisory and even in military -bodies, are presumed to have no representation whatever on the Supreme -National Defense Council, nor is such representation regarded as -probable in the near future. Chiang K'ai-shek has at hand a counselling -and co-governing body whose fundamental purposes are completely one with -his own. - -A nice consistency would demand that the Supreme National Defense -Council (as a Party agency) should transmit its commands to the Council -of State (its government counterpart) for transformation into law. This -is actually done, whenever possible, but the frequency of crises and of -needs for immediate action have--in the period of hostilities--led to -the occasional issuance of commands direct to the Ministry or other -governmental organ concerned.[7] To the degree that the Supreme National -Defense Council does so, it becomes a directly governing authority, and -instead of perpetuating Party authority _over_ government, it is itself -government. - - [Footnote 7: Statement to the author, August 1, 1940, in Chungking, by - Dr. Wang Shih-chieh, Secretary-General of the People's Political - Council and Party-Minister of Publicity.] - -Since a cloud of military secrecy covers the functions of the Council, -some notion of its operation and working authority may be found by -analogy with the role of the Central Political Council, which it has -displaced. According to the leading Chinese constitutional writer on the -subject, the Central Political Council (also called [Central] Political -Committee)--for which read Supreme National Defense Council today--acted -as follows: - - According to Article IV of the _Principles Governing the - Organization of the C. E. C._ [of the Kuomintang] passed ... - December 6, XXIV (1935), "the Central Executive Committee - organizes a Political Committee, composed of a Chairman, a - Vice-Chairman, and nineteen to twenty-five members, - appointed by the Central Executive Committee, from among the - members of the Central Executive Committee and the Control - Committee." ... "During a session of the Political - Committee, the Chairmen and Vice-Chairmen of the Central - Standing Committees, the President of the National - Government, the Presidents and Vice-Presidents of the Five - _Yüan_, and the President and Vice-President of the Military - Affairs Commission should be present, while the leading - members of the special technical committees under the - [control] Political Committee, and other higher officials of - the National Government may be notified if necessary to - attend the sessions." [The author explains that, on the - basis of actual experience, "may be notified" signifies - "shall attend if matters relevant to their functions - arise."] ... - - It was originally fixed that the Political Committee should - meet once every week, but since December XXIV (1935), it - holds meetings either weekly or fortnightly. The number of - members required to constitute a forum is not fixed, and - resolutions have never been put in the form of motions - requiring formal vote. Regarding the proposition of a - motion, and the discussion of motions proposed _ex-tempore_, - the Political Committee has never fixed any rigid - regulations; moreover, even if a rule had been established - at one time, it has not been followed closely later. Before - being put to a decision, a motion is either studied and - examined beforehand, or it is not. There is no definite rule - as to whether every motion should be so studied or not, but - the Committee possesses the power to decide this point _ad - hoc_. The entire wording of a motion passed in a meeting is - rarely fully read, and is then read in the following session - as the minutes of the previous session. _Hence the Chairman - and the Secretary-General have a certain liberty in the - framing of the wording of resolutions. Judging from above - circumstances, important resolutions passed in the Political - Committee must actually represent the opinions of the - Chairman and a small number of influential members...._ - [Italics added in translation.][8] - - [Footnote 8: Wang Shih-chieh, _Pi-chiao Hsien-fa_, cited above, p. 658 - _ff._] - -Many of these features may reasonably be conjectured to have continued -in the Supreme National Defense Council, although the regular -meetings--whatever others there may be--seem to be considerably less -frequent, occurring presumably about once in five weeks.[9] In the -matter of authority, again, some continuity may be supposed between the -earlier agency and the later. Wang Shih-chieh continues: - - The authority of the Political Committee (or the Political - Council) has undergone very few changes since its - establishment. To speak concisely, the Political Committee - is the highest directing organ of all governmental policies. - Putting it in more detail, we may say that this Committee - has the power to decide the basic principles of legislation, - of governmental policies and their execution, and has also - the power to appoint and dismiss governmental officials.... - [A footnote adds the following detail.] According to the - outlines of organization now being enforced, there are still - five kinds of affairs that should be discussed and decided - by the Political Committee: (1) the basic principles of - legislation, (2) the general plans of executing government - policies, (3) important plans concerning military affairs, - (4) financial plans, (5) the appointment of officials of the - Especially Appointed category and of other governmental - officials, and (6) [_sic_] cases submitted for discussion by - the Central Executive Committee. The first four may be - collectively classified under the two names of execution and - legislation.[10] - - [Footnote 9: For example, the date of the law given in Appendix I (G), - p. 324, below, is given as August 31, 1939, and it is stated to have - passed the Council on that date at the _14th_ Regular Session; since - the Council had been established seventeen months previously, some - notion of the frequency or length of sessions may thus be derived.] - - [Footnote 10: Wang Shih-chieh, _Pi-chiao Hsien-fa_, cited, p. 662. The - author adds that though the Central Political Council possesses ample - authority to interfere in the specific work of the Judicial, - Examination, and Control _Yüan_, such authority was rarely exercised, - the Executive and Legislative _Yüan_ constituting the prime objects of - its attention.] - -Only from such description by analogy may the foreigner penetrate to the -inmost source of Chinese policy. This ambiguous and all-powerful agency, -a Party organ which controls government, a committee constellated about -its charismatic Chairman, is the heir both of the Grand Council of the -Manchu Empire and of the soviets established by Nationalists during the -entente with Soviet Russia. Should the fortune of war remove the -Generalissimo from the scene, this Council would become the storm center -of power; under his guidance and leadership, this agency above all -others distinguishes China from an outright dictatorship. Chiang, unlike -many other national leaders, has consistently shrunk from the regalia of -arbitrary power. In the highest matters, and at the ultimate control, -his action is veiled in the Supreme National Defense Council. The -actual play of personalities and power is hidden from us, his -contemporaries. Only the future may discover the exact degrees and -_modus operandi_ of his authority. - - -THE PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT - -The term National Government (_Kuo-min Chêng-fu_) is employed in two -senses. In the broad sense, it refers to the entire central government -of China. In the narrow sense, it is a synonym for National Government -Committee (_Kuo-min Chêng-fu Wei-yüan-hui_), commonly translated as -Council of State. The highest governmental officer of China is the -_Kuo-min Chêng-fu Chu-hsi_--literally, the Chairman of the National -Government. Since this officer is the formal head of the National -Government in both senses of the term, his office may with equal -appropriateness be described as Chairmanship of the Council of State and -as Presidency of the National Government. The latter has been most -commonly accepted, although it obscured the clarity of the Chinese -governmental pattern. It is essential to note, however, that in the -National Government period there has been no _President of the Chinese -Republic_; the highest officer has been the _President of the National -Government of the Chinese Republic_, and as such the titular head of the -Chinese state for international purposes. This officer possesses -prestige rather than power, and is roughly analogous to the President of -the Third French Republic. - -In his official capacity, the President acts as chairman of the meetings -of the Council of State, performs the ceremonial functions entailed by -his office, and serves as the custodian of the symbols of continuity and -legitimacy. Wang Shih-chieh writes: "... the Chairman more or less -occupies a nominal position. At most, he can give occasional advice, -only within certain limits, to the Executive or other _Yüan_, with no -power at all to decide or to reject the policies adopted by the _Yüan_. -As a matter of fact, from the end of the Year XXI (1932) down to the -present, since the man filling the office of Chairman [President] of the -National Government is very calm and law-abiding, he has never -interfered in the activities or policies of the various _Yüan_."[11] -This officer has been the veteran Kuomintang leader, Lin Shên, long a -resident of the United States, a key man in overseas affairs of the -Party, and a person of much dignity, charm, poise and prestige. With a -long beard and a humane, scholarly demeanor, President Lin has fulfilled -most admirably the requirements of his office. - - [Footnote 11: The same, p. 666.] - -Generalissimo Chiang regularly reports on government activities to Lin -_Chu-hsi_, addressing him attentively and respectfully. This is no -perfunctory sham, but appears to be a very real search for advice and -guidance. The two men are close associates and have been such for many -years; the Generalissimo gives every indication of regarding his -venerable colleague with affectionate esteem. During the Chungking -bombings, the President has commonly resided in a secure place outside -the city. He is not needed for the daily prosecution of the war, but -both the office and its incumbent are strongly stabilizing factors in -the National Government. (The Japanophile Wang Ch'ing-wei, establishing -his duplicate regime in Nanking, left the Presidency open for many -months, pirating Lin Shên's name. Finally Wang gave himself the title, -although he patently would have preferred Lin.) - - -THE COUNCIL OF STATE - -The Council of State (_Kuo-min Chêng-fu Wei-yüan-hui_, National -Government Committee) is the formal governmental core of the Chinese -Republic. Even in peacetime, however, its importance was seriously -undermined by the vigorous activity of the Central Political Council. -The members of the State Council are commonly persons who do not hold -other important office; hence the Council does not include the most -effective leaders. Although its sphere of activity is wide, its role as -ratifier of the decisions of the Supreme National Defense Council -reduces its plenary powers to a shadow. Amnesties, general appropriation -bills, appointments and removals, solemnification of legislation adopted -by the Legislative _Yüan_, and inter-_Yüan_ problems are all within the -scope of the State Council's authority, but except for the power of -organizing and supervising the central independent agencies, subordinate -only to itself, there has been little practical power for it to -exercise.[12] - - [Footnote 12: The same, p. 667-68. The following materials on the - independent agencies are also adapted in general from Wang - Shih-chieh's work, although interviews, other materials, and the - practical experience of the author have been taken into account. From - 1930 to 1937 the author's father, Judge Paul Linebarger, was Legal - Advisor (_Kuo-min Chêng-fu Fa-lü Ku-wên_), directly subordinate to the - Council of State, and throughout this period the author served as - Private Secretary to the Legal Advisor, being authorized by the - Council of State to take charge of the American office of the Advisor - during the latter's absences from the United States.] - -The independent agencies under the Council of State, together with the -latter's relation to the _Yüan_ and the Military Affairs Commission, are -best shown on the chart on p. 55.[13] - - [Footnote 13: Adapted from the Examination _Yüan_, _Tang Chêng Chien - Chih T'u-piao_, cited; various issues of _The Chinese Year Book_, - Shanghai and Hong Kong; and [The China Information Committee] _An - Outline of the Organization of the Kuomintang and the Chinese - Government_, Chungking, 1940.] - -Minor agencies are thus attached directly to the Council of State, which -also serves as a link and common formal superior to the five _Yüan_ and -the Military Affairs Commission. Authority of the Council is directed -primarily upon these agencies which, while minor, serve useful needs. -The Offices of Military (_Tsan-chün Ch'u_) and of Civil Affairs -(_Wên-kuan Ch'u_) are transmission and ceremonial agencies, charged with -the formal correctness of state documents and ceremonies; the military -office was originally designed to carry on more important functions, -including an independent inspectorate of troops, but now seems to be -restricted to matters of protocol. Chinese government has for centuries -operated on the basis of a two-way current of written materials: -memorials, petitions, and other communications come from the provinces -and dominions to the metropolis; orders, laws and other commands flow -outward in response.[14] - - [Footnote 14: For a description of this function in the T'ang dynasty, - see des Rotours, Baron Robert, _La Traite des Examens_, Paris, 1932, - _passim_; and see Fairbank, J. K., and Têng, S. Y., "Of the Types and - Uses of Ch'ing Documents," _Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies_, Vol. - 5, No. 1 (January 1940), particularly p. 5 _ff._, for the Manchu - empire.] - - THE SUPREME NATIONAL DEFENSE COUNCIL - | - | - President of the National Government - - THE COUNCIL OF STATE - | | | - Election Committee on } | | | { Office of the - Representation in the } | | | { Comptroller-General - People's Congress } | | | { - } | | |--{ Office of Civil Affairs - Academia Sinica } | | { (Transmission) - } | | { - Commission for the }--| | { Office of Military - Disciplinary } | { Affairs (Transmission) - Punishment of Public } | - Officials } | - } | - Planning Committee for } | { THE MILITARY AFFAIRS - the Western Capital } | { COMMISSION - |--{ The Chairman - THE PEOPLES POLITICAL | { The Military Departments - COUNCIL | - | { THE EXECUTIVE _YÜAN_ - |--{ The Executive Ministries - | { ("the cabinet") - | - |--{ THE LEGISLATIVE _YÜAN_ - | - |--{ THE JUDICIAL _YÜAN_ - | { The court system - | - |--{ THE EXAMINATION _YÜAN_ - | - |--{ THE CONTROL _YÜAN_ - -The other four agencies directly dependent on the Council of State are -all of important character, but likely to be impaired by a period of -crisis. The Academia Sinica (_Kuo-li Chung-yang Yen-chiu Yüan_) serves -scientific and educational work through its own research bureaus, -through systems of extended aid, and through a program of publications; -despite war, it has continued, making heroic efforts to preserve the -national cultural vitality and continuity. The three remaining agencies -are of less importance, although the Planning Committee for the Western -Capital (_Hsi-ching Ch'ou-pei Wei-yüan-hui_) found its work considerably -extended when, on October 1, 1940, Chungking was formally denominated an -auxiliary capital of the Chinese Republic, and a long-standing -anomaly--that of the city's uncertain status--was removed. - -The Council of State could be regarded, therefore, as a mere excrescence -upon the design of government were it not that ceremonial and formal -functions, indispensable to any government but particularly salient in -China, can be delegated to it, and the actual policy-making agencies -thereby stripped down to maximal utility and efficacy. - - -THE EXECUTIVE _Yüan_ - -The Executive _Yüan_ is the political organ which includes the -ministries, and is therefore roughly analogous to a cabinet, just as the -Council of State is in loose parallel to a Privy Council. Together with -the Supreme National Defense Council and the Military Affairs -Commission, it exercises actual control over the National Government in -war time. Its growth involves executive giantism, and atrophy for the -remaining _Yüan_. The President (_Yüan-chang_) of the Executive _Yüan_ -(_Hsing-chêng Yüan_) is the highest executive officer of the government. -This post has not always been held by Chiang K'ai-shek. At various times -Wang Ch'ing-wei (now in Nanking) and H. H. K'ung (now Minister of -Finance and Vice-President [_Fu-yüan-chang_] of the _Yüan_) have held -this office. - -The Executive _Yüan_ may be compared to a parliamentary cabinet in -respect to its relations to the President of the National Government, -but it possesses no authority whatever over the Supreme National Defense -Council, nor over the Kuomintang C. E. C. and the Kuomintang Congress. -It cannot ask for its own dissolution, nor demand the dissolution of the -higher policy-making agency whose will it executes.[15] It resembles a -cabinet, therefore, in its service as a consultative and unifying agency -for the entire executive, but differs in its lack of controlling -interdependence with a broad parliament. Again, the _Yüan_ is unique -among national executive agencies in the modern world with respect to -its division of the task of policy-making and policy-supervising. Most -cabinets consist of meetings of the heads of executive ministries or -departments, with the chief executive officer presiding, but have no -elaborate secretarial or administrative machinery interposed between the -cabinet and its direct subordinates (departments or ministries). The -Executive _Yüan_ is peculiar in possessing two elaborate staff agencies -which handle as much routine work as possible, act as a clearing house -for policy and general administration, and pre-digest a maximum of -problems. The outline on p. 58 illustrates the difference. - - [Footnote 15: Wang Shih-chieh, _Pi-chiao Hsien-fa_, cited, p. 671.] - -All matters short of the most critical moment are referred to one or the -other of the two staff organs (_Mi-shu Ch'u_ or Secretariat, under a -Secretary-General; and _Chêng-wu Ch'u_, or Office of Political -Affairs,[16] under a Director of Political Affairs), which are nominally -separate but actually almost fused, with the Director serving as a sort -of assistant Secretary-General. All official business (other than -crucial matters raised by the members of the Meeting) comes to these -agencies, where it is studied, assorted, and usually settled -provisionally, pending only formal ratification by the Meeting of the -Executive _Yüan_. - - [Footnote 16: Not to be confused with the Office of Civil Affairs - (_Wên-kuan Ch'u_), adjunct to the Council of State, described above.] - - THE PRESIDENT OR PREMIER - | - THE CABINET - _______________________________ - | | | | - Ministry Ministry Ministry etc. - (secretarial and administrative staff - usually concentrated at this level) - - THE EXECUTIVE _YÜAN_ PRESIDENT - | - THE _YÜAN_ MEETING - _______________________________________________________ - | (composed of officers of ministerial rank | - | and presided over by the President) | - | | - Office of Political Affairs: Sections Secretariat: Sections - | | | | : : - | | | | : : - ..|.............|............|...|..................... : - : | : | : | |________________:__________ : - : | : | : | | : |: - Ministry Ministry Ministry Ministry etc. - -The Executive _Yüan_ Meeting occurs once weekly, most commonly on -Tuesday.[17] Each Meeting is presented with a formidable agenda, -prepared by the Secretary-General, and divided into three categories: -reports, matters for discussion, and appointments. The membership of the -Meeting consists of the _Yüan_ President and Vice-President, the -Ministers heading the executive Ministries, and the Chairmen of -Commissions having the rank of Ministry.[18] The work of the Meeting is -carried on in a business-like fashion. The Generalissimo, as incumbent -_Yüan_ President, takes great interest in the work of the _Yüan_, and -makes faithfulness and punctuality in attendance a matter of high -importance. Because of the Japanese air raids over the capital, the -exact place and hour of the weekly meeting are not announced, nor are -the proceedings public. - - [Footnote 17: A brilliant and informative discussion of the practical - work of the Executive _Yüan_ is to be found in Tsiang Ting-fu, - "Executive _Yüan_," The Chinese Year Book 1936-37, cited, p. 241-6.] - - [Footnote 18: For these Ministries and Commissions, see the following - chapter. These are not to be lumped with the Party-Ministries and - Commissions which, if anything, are even more complex in structure, - but whose titles follow the same scheme of terminology as that of the - government.] - -In giving effect to the decisions reached by the _Yüan_ Meeting, the -_Yüan_ itself issues orders in its own name for matters which are of -general interest, or which cannot be handled by any single Ministry or -Commission. If the problem is within the province of a particular -agency, the _Yüan_--through its Secretariat--addresses the appropriate -form of intragovernmental communication, and the decision is then set -forth as the order or act of the agency involved. The following subjects -are within the jurisdiction of the Executive _Yüan_: - -(1) laws or legal problems submitted for promulgation by the Legislative -_Yüan_; - -(2) the budget, also passed _pro forma_ by the Council of State and put -into legal form by the Legislative _Yüan_; - -(3) declarations of war and peace, on the motion of the Legislative -_Yüan_; - -(4) appointment and discharge of the higher ranks of officials; - -(5) matters which cannot be settled by a single Ministry or Commission; - -(6) other matters which the _Yüan_ President sees fit to introduce for -discussion or decision. - -The Executive _Yüan_ has far outstripped all other _Yüan_ in war-time -growth. Its central position, the urgency of most government business, -and the need for speed have led to this. Executive exercise of the -ordinance-making power has led to the gradual desuetude of the -Legislative _Yüan_, which has found ample work in the preparation of the -Draft Permanent Constitution and the attempt to systematize legislation -in view of rapid territorial and administrative change. The Executive -_Yüan_, by controlling personnel, usually short-circuits the functions -of the Examination and Control _Yüan_; and the Judicial _Yüan_ has never -had practical political parity. Hence, the five-power system must be -regarded as a system with strong executive, weaker legislative, -examinative, and censoral, and dependent judicial divisions. Above the -five powers, the Supreme National Defense Council exercises its august -authority; within them, the Executive stands forth; and to them, in the -course of the war, a new agency, almost comparable to a sixth _yüan_, -has sprung forth with an elaborate bureaucracy of its own: the Military -Affairs Commission. - - -THE MILITARY AFFAIRS COMMISSION - -Some sense of the perpetual urgencies underlying Chinese government in -the past decade may be obtained by consideration of the Military Affairs -Commission.[19] A similar agency was one of the political wheels on -which the Nationalist-Communist machine rolled victoriously North in the -Great Revolution of 1925-27. After the organization of a relatively -stable government at Nanking, the separate military commission was due -for absorption into the coordinate pattern of government; instead, it -has lingered under one form or another for almost twenty years, growing -great in recurrent crises, while the Ministry of War (which was to have -absorbed it) has become its adjunct. War led to sudden distension of -the Commission, and the creation of an agency comparable to a sixth -_yüan_, if not to a duplicate, shogunal government in the Japanese -sense. The Commission had its own head, its own _Pu_ (Ministries or -Departments), its own staff and field services. Duplicating the regular -government on the one side, and the party administration on the -other, it flowered into bureaucracy so lavishly that a fourth -agency--co-ordinator for the first three--began to be needed. - - [Footnote 19: _Chün-shih Wei-yüan-hui_. _The Chinese Year Book_, - _v.d._, cited, and most of the official publicity from Chungking - translates this term as "National Military Council," which is far from - the original, literally "military-affairs-committee." "National - Military Council" is also easily confused with the Supreme National - Defense Council. Hence the present translation is employed, following - Tsang, O. B., _A Supplement to a Complete Chinese-English Dictionary_, - Shanghai, 1937, and the original.] - -Simplicity of government structure has not been a part of the Chinese -tradition; the quasi-state of the Empire had been as elaborate as its -more potent European counterparts; and the foliation of government at -war cannot be taken as _prima facie_ proof of inefficiency. Personnel is -provided by giving each officer two, five, even ten jobs; the work is -done--delegation and counter-delegation frequently cancel out--and the -creation of new agencies does not inescapably involve confusion. - -The Military Affairs Commission consists of a Chairman--the -Generalissimo (_Tsung-ssŭ-ling_), who is Chiang K'ai-shek--and seven -to nine other members, all appointed by the Council of State upon -designation by the Supreme National Defense Council.[20] The key -officers of the armed forces are _ex officio_ members, and the -Commission is charged with the military side of the prosecution of the -war. Its power has been liberally interpreted. New agencies have been -attached to it as they arose; now it deals with social work, relief, -education, agitation, propaganda, espionage, government-sponsored -"social revolution," and many economic matters in addition to its -narrowly military affairs. - - [Footnote 20: See Ho Yao-tsu, "The National Military Council," in _The - Chinese Year Book, 1938-39_, cited, p. 361-3; Carlson, Evans Fordyce, - _The Chinese Army: Its Organization and Military Efficiency_, New - York, 1940, p. 26 _ff._; and frequent references in _China At War_ and - the _News Release_ of the China Information Committee, both - semiofficial, particularly the issue of the latter for July 15, 1939. - A list of the highest military personnel and brief outline of the - General Staff may be found in Woodhead, H. G. W., editor, _The China - Year Book 1939_, Shanghai, n. d., p. 216-17, and p. 225.] - -The work of the Commission falls into two parts. On the one hand, it is -the supreme directing agency for all the armies; on the other, the -managing agency for a variegated war effort away from the combat lines. -The Commission's work in theory covers all armies, but in practice -confines its supervisory powers to the forces in Free China and--less -clearly--to the major guerrilla units in the occupied areas. - -The Commission's governmental structure coordinates military and -political functions. The Chief of the General Staff serves as assistant -to the Chairman of the Commission. The Main Office serves to smooth -interdepartmental affairs and to act as a central clearing point for -orders and other transmissions. Beneath the Commission and the main -office, there are twelve divisions with the rank of _Pu_. The Department -of Military Operations (_Chün-ling-pu_) serves as a military planning -and strategic agency. The Department of Military Training -(_Chün-hsün-pu_) supervises training facilities, military schools, and -in-service training.[21] The Directorate-General of Courts-Martial -(_Chün-fa Chih-hsing Tsung-chien-pu_) and Pensions Commission (_Fu-hsüeh -Wei-yüan-hui_) are explained by their titles; the pension program is -probably behind that of every Western power, and the personal grants -made by the Generalissimo under his own extra-governmental arrangements -are more effective than governmental pensions. The Military Advisory -Council (_Chün-shih Ts'an-i-yüan_) acts as a research and consultative -body, in no sense cameral. An Administration of Personnel (_Ch'uan-hsü -T'ing_) applies some principles of the merit system. A Service -Department (_Hou-fang Ch'in-wu-pu_) is in charge of transportation, -supplies, and sanitation. The National Aviation Commission (_Hang-k'ung -Wei-yüan-hui_) has won world-wide fame for its spectacular work in -procuring a Chinese air arm, and in keeping Chinese air power alive -against tremendous odds of finance, transportation, equipment, and -personnel; Mme. Chiang's association with and interest in its success -has been of material aid. Finally, on the strictly military side, there -is the Office of the Naval Commander-in-Chief (_Hai-chün -Tsung-ssŭ-ling-pu_), formerly the Naval Ministry, controlling the -up-river remnants of the navy. The War Ministry (_Chün-chêng-pu_) -occupies an anomalous position in this scheme. Subordinate to the -Executive _Yüan_, it is also subordinate to the Commission, so that in -effect it is a Ministry twice over, and is even shown as two ministries -on occasion.[22] General Ho Ying-chin, as Minister of War, is -subordinate to the Generalissimo as _Wei-yüan-chang_ (Chairman) of the -Commission. - - [Footnote 21: Descriptions of the subordinate organs of all these - agencies but the Pensions Commission and the War-Area Commission will - be found in Ho Yao-tsu, cited immediately above. The translations of - the titles here given, however, are those of the author.] - - [Footnote 22: As an instance, see _Outline of the Organization of the - Kuomintang_ ..., cited above, p. 54, n.^{13}.] - -The two remaining agencies of the Commission are of considerable -interest. A system of having political commissars in the army, a Soviet -device, was adopted by the Kuomintang forces when first organized under -Chiang K'ai-shek, and political training accounted for much -of that success of the Northward drive (1926-27). After the -Nationalist-Communist split, political training as such fell into -considerable disuse, and was replaced by ethical training provided by -the Officers' Moral Endeavor Corps.[23] With the renewed entente, and -war of national union for defense, a Political Department -(_Chêng-chih-pu_) was established. A graceful tribute to Communist skill -in combining war and agitation was paid when Chou En-lai, the celebrated -Red general, was designated Vice-Minister of this Department. One of the -Generalissimo's most orthodox and able subordinates was made Minister. -The Political Department extends its function in an enormous sweep -across China, and renders aid in military education within the armies, -in civilian organization, and in war propaganda. Active and omnipresent, -it is an excellent instance of functioning national unity. - - [Footnote 23: This is a semi-official agency sponsored by the - Generalissimo. See below, p. 149. The new war-time change is well - illustrated by the following statement: "Special commissioners were - assigned to every group army, and political departments in the - divisions were augmented. Enough political directors were assigned to - every company of troops withdrawn from the front for reorganization, - and to Chinese forces behind the enemy lines. In addition, political - corps were formed to organize and train civilians. Because of the lack - of personnel, so far there have been no political officers in units - engaged in military operations. - - "Conscious and hard-working, the political officers have done much to - remove irritations which used to occur between the commanding officers - and the political men.... - - "Political work in the army formerly consisted in a weekly or - fortnightly talk by the officers, whereas now well-planned lessons on - political subjects, reading classes, discussion groups, individual - conversations and twilight meetings are conducted with clockwise - regularity. Singing, theatricals, cartooning, sports, are promoted - among the soldiers so long as they do not jeopardize their discipline. - Among the civilians, the political officers have also been active. The - organization of people's service corps, self-defense units in areas - close to the war areas and money contributions to the war chest from - people in the rear are a few of their accomplishments." China - Information Committee, _News Release_, October 2, 1939. - - The comment of Generalissimo Chiang in the interview on p. 371 is, - despite its laconicism, relevant to this topic. A further discussion - is available in Chên Chêng, "Three Years of Political Training Work," - _The China Quarterly_, Vol. 5, No. 4 (Autumn 1940), p. 581-5.] - -The Party and Government War Area Commission (_Chan-ti Tang-chêng -Wei-yüan-hui_) is a coordinate agency for propaganda, relief, and -social, economic and military counter-attack within the war area (the -occupied zone), rather unusual in being a formal amalgamation of -Kuomintang and government administration. Through this agency most of -the guerrilla aid is extended, and the Nationalists seek to rival the -Communists and independents in the number of Japanese they can destroy, -or the amount of damage they can do. The more active branches of this -Commission are a part of the Party structure, but the dual function of -the Commission enables it to coordinate Party and Army work. The very -role of the Commission is indicative of the fact that the Kuomintang is -trying to meet rivalry by patriotic competition and not by suppression. -Its integration with the military makes it a perfect example of the -triune force which Nationalist China is bringing to bear on the -enemy--army, government, and Party all seek to reach into the occupied -zone, to articulate spontaneous mass resistance, to maintain the -authority of the central government pending the _révanche_, and to -uphold the existing political system, canalizing social change into -evolutionary rather than class-war lines.[24] - - [Footnote 24: The official view of this work, silent on the - competition of the Communists and independents, is found in Li - Chai-sum, "Chinese Government Organization behind the Enemy Lines," - last citation above, p. 595-600.] - - -THE JUDICIAL, LEGISLATIVE, EXAMINATION AND CONTROL _Yüan_ - -The appearance of an actual three-power administration--army, -government, Party--has led to the sharp relative decrease in importance -of the four further _Yüan_. The Judicial _Yüan_ (_Ssŭ-fa Yüan_) was -even in peace time the least important of the five divisions of the -government, failing to display--as an American might expect--a tendency -toward effective judicial independence to counterweight the executive -and legislative. The Legislative _Yüan_ (_Li-fa Yüan_), while -exceedingly active in the years between the Mukden and Loukouchiao -incidents, has been reduced in importance by the coming of hostilities. -Its work has been confined largely to drafting the Permanent -Constitution, and continued codification of administrative -law--particularly for coordination of central government and war area -(occupied China) affairs.[25] The Examination _Yüan_ (_K'ao-shih Yüan_) -has attempted to continue in the field of civil service reform, and the -Control _Yüan_ (_Chien-ch'a Yüan_) has maintained war-time efforts. - - [Footnote 25: Statement to the author by Sun K'ê (Sun Fo), President - of the Legislative _Yüan_, Chungking, July 17, 1940. A summary of the - work of the _Yüan_ will be found in various issues of _The Chinese - Year Book_; in Escarra, Jean, _Le Droit Chinois_, cited above, - containing bibliographies; and in Tyau, M. T. Z., "The Work and - Organization of the Legislative _Yüan_," _The China Quarterly_, Vol. - 2, No. 1 (Christmas Number, 1936), p. 73-88.] - -The Legislative _Yüan_, under the _Yüeh Fa_ of 1931, consists of a -_Yüan-chang_, a _Fu-yüan-chang_, and forty-nine to ninety-nine members -(_Li-fa Wei-yüan_), appointed by the Supreme National Defense Council -for a two-year term upon nomination by the _Yüan_ President. The term's -shortness increases the dependence of members upon the President, and -transforms the _Yüan_ to a legislative study institute. Furthermore, the -newly-developed People's Political Council has assumed the function of -representation. The President of the _Yüan_ retains sole and arbitrary -power over the agenda, the final decision, and the allocation of -personnel, although the incumbent, Dr. Sun K'ê, is one of China's -leading moderates and an exponent of constitutional process, not likely -to exercise arbitrary power. - -Apart from its significant constitutional powers, which remain -unimpaired, the _Yüan_ finds much of its work performed at present -through ordinances of the Supreme National Defense Council, -administrative action of the Executive _Yüan_, or commands by the -Military Affairs Commission. The jurisdiction retained includes: - - (1) general legislation; - - (2) the budget; - - (3) general amnesty; - - (4) declaration of war (never exercised); - - (5) declaration of peace; - - (6) "other important matters" (which, in practice, has - referred to the more open and solemn aspects of - treaty-making, and whatever topic may be assigned the _Yüan_ - by the highest Party agency).[26] - - [Footnote 26: Wang Shih-chieh, _Pi-chiao Hsien-fa_, cited, p. 676 - _ff._] - -The Judicial _Yüan_ serves as an administrative and budgetary agency for -four agencies. The Ministry of Justice (_Ssŭ-fa Hsing-chêng-pu_) is, -obviously, the prosecuting agency, attached to the executive in the -United States, but made a part of the general judicial system in China. -The Administrative Court (_Hsing-chêng Fa-yüan_) is an agency only -potentially important; so is the Commission for the Disciplinary -Punishment of Public Officers (_Kung-wu-yüan Ch'êng-chieh -Wei-yüan-hui_). The _Yüan_ President is _ex officio_ chief magistrate of -the Supreme Court (_Tsui-kao Fa-yüan_). Wang Shih-chieh says of this -_Yüan_: - - Because of the fact that the Judicial _Yüan_ is itself not - an organ of adjudication, and since all affairs concerning - prosecution at law are handled by the Ministry of Justice, - the actual work to be performed by the Judicial _Yüan_ is - very simple and light. In addition to framing the budget for - the _Yüan_ itself and approving the general estimates of the - organs under it, the Judicial _Yüan_ has only three further - duties to perform: (1) to bring before the Legislative - _Yüan_ legislative measures connected with the Judicial - _Yüan_ and its sub-organs; (2) to petition the President of - the National Government with respect to such cases as - special pardon, commutation of sentence, and the restoration - of civil rights; and (3) to unify the interpretation of laws - and orders, and changes in judicial procedure.[27] - - [Footnote 27: The same, p. 691.] - -With peace, reconstruction and prosperity, the Judicial _Yüan_ might -acquire importance through its control of the administrative and -technical aspects of the court system. Meanwhile, courts are more -closely associated with their respective levels or areas of government -than with one another in a unified judicial system. - -The Examination _Yüan_, with a President and Vice-President, is composed -of a central _Yüan_ office, which supervises two organs: the Ministry of -Personnel (_Ch'uan-hsü Pu_), operating a selective promotion system, and -the Examinations Commission (_K'ao-hsüan Wei-yüan-hui_). In absolute -numbers, few examinations have been held. In practice, standard -recruitment technique continues to involve introduction, influence, or -family connections. The familiarity of such devices in China at least -gives them a high polish, and precludes utter inefficiency. Under the -circumstances, the Examination _Yüan_ finds scope for valuable, creative -work in the preparation of administrative studies and analyses of very -considerable importance. - -The Control _Yüan_ is of interest to Westerners, because of the novelty -of its functions. Through the courtesy of the _Yüan_ President, a full -official memorandum on the structure and procedure was prepared, -surveying the work of the _Yüan_ during the course of the war. This is -reproduced as Appendices I (E) and I (F) below.[28] Some of the -unofficial observers, both Western and Chinese, felt that the _Yüan_ -possessed further enormous possibilities of activity, and that the need -for controlment was very great indeed. In general, the _Yüan_ resembles -its legislative, judicial and examination coordinates, in that the -war-time executive growth has relegated it to a secondary position. - - [Footnote 28: See p. 313 and p. 318.] - -Decrease in the importance of the _yüan_ system during hostilities -cannot be taken, by a too simple cause-and-effect argument, as proof of -the unwieldy or impractical character of this five-power system. -Measured on a scale of other world governments, success is slow; but it -is enormous in contrast to other Chinese central political institutions. -At present, it is most improbable that the form of government will be -changed, save in the event of catastrophe beyond all reckoning. - - - - -CHAPTER III - -CONSULTATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANS - - -The outbreak and continuance of war has left the fulcrum of power -relatively untouched. The highest organs of state are primarily in -Kuomintang hands; the Party Chief of the Kuomintang is, even at law, -governmentally more important today than in 1937; and the constitutional -monopoly of power remains under the Kuomintang. Even changes in the -highest organs--such as establishment of the Supreme National Defense -Council and the Military Affairs Commission--have left very little -impress on the sources of power. Reforms have altered only the mode of -power, not its tenure. - -Modifications have, however, been introduced at the level of government -just below the apex. These are important in two remarkable ways. The -People's Political Council (_Kuo-min Ts'an-chêng Hui_) admixed an -ingredient of representation which (save for the Party) had been lacking -since the dubious, betrayed, inaugural years of the Republic. -Furthermore, sweeping administrative reorganization and reinvigoration -made possible the vitalization of the central government in the course -of the war, so that despite Japanese pressure and rising Leftist -rivalry, the National Government is, on any absolute scale, becoming -more powerful year by year. - - -THE PEOPLE'S POLITICAL COUNCIL - -The People's Political Council was established by order of the Emergency -Session of the Kuomintang Party Congress held in Hankow, March 1938. Its -creation was a compromise measure between the proposal for a -European-type United Front government, based on popular elections to a -National Convention, and a continuation of the Kuomintang monopoly of -government hitherto prevalent. Like many similar compromises in other -countries, the institution has proved its viable and useful character. -Without exaggeration, it may be stated to be the closest approximation -of representative government which China has ever known. Simple, -improvised, legally an instrument promising little independence or -_élan_ in its work, the Council demonstrates the effectiveness of the -Chinese when purpose accompanies design. Formally the least -representative of the Chinese constitutional parliaments, congresses, or -conventions, the Council is the first to get down to business -and--almost unexpectedly--to represent! - -Membership, originally set at 150, was raised before the First Session -to 200, and again in the autumn of 1940 to 240.[1] The number, unlike -the 1681 tentatively projected for the People's Congress, is small -enough to allow genuine discussion and to avoid unwieldiness. -Attendance, considering war-time hazards, has been very good, with -between two-thirds and four-fifths of the members usually present. - - [Footnote 1: China Information Committee, _News Release_, Chungking, - September 30, 1940; and the same, December 30, 1940.] - -Although the Council was designed to meet quarterly by its fundamental -Statute,[2] it soon changed to semi-annual sessions and has actually met -at intervals running from six to eight months. Each session lasted for -ten days (legislative, not calendar).[3] As the Council sessions -recurred, the Council became more and more free and representative. -Despite the narrowness of its legal foundations, the Council has -provided invaluable exercise in the arts of democratic discussion. - - [Footnote 2: Wang Shih-chieh, "The People's Political Council," _The - Chinese Year Book 1938-39_, cited, p. 346-55; the same, _The People's - Political Council_, [Chungking], [1939?], pamphlet, reprinted from - _The China Quarterly_, Vol. 4, No. I (Winter 1938-39). Dr. Wang's - contributions, brief as they are, worthily supplement his pre-war - constitutional studies, and provide the most carefully annotated data - on the Council which the present author has found. The list of members - given in the first article, above, is one of the most interesting - documents of our time, giving, as it does, the residence, profession, - and age of each Councillor. Beside "Former Prime Minister" one finds - "Living Buddha attached to the Panchen Lama," "Reserve Member, - Executive Committee, the Third International," "Professor, National - Peking University" and "Head of the Mêng Clan, Descendants of - Mencius."] - - [Footnote 3: Woodhead, H. G. W., editor, _The China Year Book, 1939_, - Shanghai, n. d., Ch. IX, "The Kuomintang and the Government," contains - a detailed summary of the first two sessions of the People's Political - Council (p. 231-7). Quigley, Harold S., "Free China," _International - Conciliation_, No. 359 (April 1940), includes a judicious appraisal of - the work and meaning of the Council in its first two and one-half - years (p. 137-8).] - -As a technique of representation, the Council's recruitment system is -novel. The membership was, while the Council's total was at 200, divided -into the following four categories: - - _Group A_: representatives of the Provinces and Special - Municipalities--88; - _Group B_: four representatives for or from Mongolia and two for or - from Tibet--6; - _Group C_: representatives for or from the overseas Chinese--6; - _Group D_: representatives of cultural, professional, and economic - bodies, or persons who have been active in political - leadership--100. - -There were no elections. In the case of Group A candidates, nominations -were made by municipal or provincial governing bodies in joint session -with the Kuomintang Party organ of corresponding location and level. -Group B candidates were nominated by the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs -Commission. Group C candidates were nominated by the Overseas Chinese -Affairs Commission in the Executive _Yüan_. Group D candidates, which -included the representatives of the Communists and independent Left, -were nominated by the Supreme National Defense Council. Two candidates -could be presented for each seat on the Council. Subject to a minor -detour or two on qualifications or for other reasons,[4] the final -selection or election was made by the Central Executive Committee of the -Kuomintang. - - [Footnote 4: Wang Shih-chieh, "The People's Political Council," cited, - p. 346 _ff._ The new system, inaugurated early in 1941, provided for - 90 members to be directly elected by Provincial and Municipal People's - Political Councils.] - -Thus, an independent or Leftist, whose life had been more or less in -danger for years, because of his hostility to the Kuomintang and its -policies, might find himself nominated for the Council by the -Kuomintang's highest government-supervising agency, and elected by the -Kuomintang's highest Party agency. Leaders of the hitherto suppressed, -still technically illegal parties and factions--which meant all save the -Kuomintang--were designated representatives through the fiction of -selection for individual merits. They might take an active share in -hammering out policy, and--on the same day--find themselves legally -debarred from overt public expression of their own party work. By this -device, the Kuomintang provided a safety-valve for opposition without -touching the apparatus of its own power. - -Had the Kuomintang leaders been obtuse and made the Council something -less than a genuine sounding board for public opinion, or had they -picked unrepresentative members of the other groups, the whole -experiment would have failed. In practice, the compromise worked and -gave China a focus for the national concentration of will. - -The Council did not elect its own Speaker (_I-chang_) and Deputy-Speaker -(_Fu I-chang_); these were elected for it by the Central Executive -Committee of the Kuomintang. Down to 1940, the Council elected a -Resident Committee of fifteen to twenty-five members from its own -membership; under a recent reorganization, this and the Speaker and -Vice-Speaker are to be replaced by a Presidium, to be elected by but not -necessarily from among the Council, to consist of five members and to -hold the authority of designating presiding officers. This would amount -to a further step in the independence of the Council. In both cases, the -Secretariat (_Mi-shu-ch'u_) of the Council is to be under a -Secretary-General (_Mi-shu-chang_) and Deputy Secretary-General (_Fu -Mi-shu-chang_) and to include services of correspondence, general -affairs, Council affairs, and police.[5] - - [Footnote 5: _Tang Chêng Chien Chih T'u-piao_, cited, chart of the - _Kuo-min Ts'an-chêng Hui_.] - -With respect to competence, the Council is possessed of three powers: - -(1) the right to deliberate on all important measures, whether of -domestic or foreign policy, before these are enacted into law by the -Central Government (but not, however, the right of making such law); - -(2) the right to submit proposals to the government (but since the -Supreme National Defense Council is the highest government-directing -agency in China, its concurrence is patently necessary); - -(3) the right to demand and hear reports from the _Yüan_ and the -Ministries, and to interpellate the officers of state. - -The distinguished Chinese constitutional scholar, Wang Shih-chieh, -Secretary-General of the People's Political Council (Generalissimo -Chiang himself being the Speaker) writes of its functions: - - From the foregoing description, the peculiarities of the - People's Political Council may be clearly seen. It is not an - advisory body of the Government in the ordinary conception - of the term, because the Government is bound, except in - emergency cases, to submit to it for consideration all - important measures before they are carried out. The Council - possesses not only the power to advise, but also the right - to be consulted. Nor is it a legislative organ, as all its - resolutions merely embody broad principles of legislation or - administration, i.e., lines of policy which, even after - being assented to by the Supreme National Defense Council, - will still have to go through the ordinary legislative or - ordinance-making process in order to become laws or - administrative ordinances. - - As regards the representative character of the Council, it - rests not so much with the method by which the Councillors - are chosen, as with the fact that, being composed of men and - women most of whom enjoy wide popularity or respect in one - way or another, the Council can really speak for almost all - the articulate group-interests of the nation. In the less - than 30 years of China's experience in republican - government, numerous experiments had been attempted at - representative government before the convention of the - People's Political Council. Few of these were deficient in - theoretic grandiloquence, but none of them was found to be - serviceable in practical applicability. - - Theoretically, the Council is not a popular assembly; but, - as I remarked elsewhere,[*] "it is open to question whether - any form of election by popular suffrage can result in so - truly representative a body." Even with reference to the - limited scope of the Council's powers, I submit that the - provision represents a progressive step in that any - alternative that is less realistic would impede rather than - facilitate the contributive work of the Council.[6] - - [Footnote *: _Chinese Year Book, 1938_, Chap. 17. [Wang Shih-chieh's - note.]] - - [Footnote 6: Wang Shih-chieh, _The People's Political Council_, cited, - p. 5. Obvious misprints have been corrected.] - -The author adds that the resolutions have tended to be of an -extraordinarily practical character, and that bombast has remained -conspicuously absent. - -The procedure of the Council has been kept very simple. A quorum -requires only a simple majority (101 members), and a simple majority of -a quorum (51) is all that is needed to pass a resolution. To ensure the -proper spacing of the calendar, all resolutions initiating new business -must come within the first four days of the ten-day session. -Introduction may not be completed by the action of a single member; a -petition of 20 members, one proposing and 19 endorsing, is necessary for -introduction. Reference may then be either to the plenary session or to -the committees. (There are five standing committees--military, foreign, -civil, financial and economic, educational and cultural affairs--which -provide further facilities through subdivision into subcommittees, or -through the addition of special committees.) Reports by the government -are introduced during the first three days of each session.[7] - - [Footnote 7: The author is indebted for some of these facts to an - interview with Dr. Wang Shih-chieh in Chungking on August 1, 1940.] - -Members cannot waste time over the pork-barrel, log-rolling, riders, or -minor fiscal questions. Since they all have the same constituency at -law, and that constituency--the C. E. C. of the Kuomintang--asks nothing -of them except representation of their moral constituencies--the groups -and areas from which they derive, Councillors are untroubled by -constituents or appropriations. The budget is submitted by the -government to the Council for approval, not enactment. Salaries of the -Councillors are nil. Each is given Ch. $350.00 (about U. S. $20.00) per -mouth for expenses, without regard to mileage, and even overseas Chinese -representatives receive no further emoluments. Since government -officials are excluded from membership, use of a Council seat for -purposes of preferment is precluded. - -A liberalization of representation and of procedure occurred early in -1941. A new Council--involving the first turnover in membership since -1938--was elected. Educational and other unofficial representatives -obtained an additional twenty seats on the Council. The changes were -scarcely sufficient to compensate for the further postponement of the -promised Constitution, but they indicated a willingness of the -government to meet demands for democratization. Procedural changes -increased the effectiveness of individual members. A minor but -characteristic feature was the increase in number and importance of -women members. - -Partisan organization in the Council, although elementary, has begun to -function. Each clique has informal caucuses; careful scrutiny discloses -the presence of whips from these caucuses on the floor. The groupings in -the Council are so fluid that they can be variously classified by -persons with different viewpoints. (Formally, of course, everyone is -either Kuomintang or non-Party, even though _The Chinese Year Book_, -under informal Chungking government sponsorship, proudly lists the high -rank of the Communist members of the Council--"Chen Shao-yu (Wang Ming), -[age] 33, [province] Anhwei, [remarks] Member, Presidium, Central -Executive Committee, the Third International.")[8] The popular -classification of the Council cliques, commonly seen in the press, is -based on the Four Parties (_Ssŭ Tang_) and the Four Cliques (_Ssŭ -P'ai_). The four parties are the Kuomintang, National Socialist, -Communist, and _La Jeunesse_.[9] The Four Cliques, which according to -popular credence, formed soon after the first meetings of the Council, -are based on intellectual sympathy and the interplay of temperaments, -and not on dogma. - - [Footnote 8: _1938-39_ issue, p. 351.] - - [Footnote 9: Described below, p. 159 _ff._] - -The most Leftist clique is believed to be the _Hua-chung P'ai_ (Central -China Clique), with the National Salvationists' Seven Gentlemen at their -core. Deeply sympathetic with the masses, and violently patriotic, this -group helped to bring about the war by opposing appeasement. -Like-thinking Council members, however affiliated, are believed to fall -under the legislative leadership of the Central China Clique. Near to -this, still far to the Left of the government, is the _Tungpei P'ai_ -(Northeast Clique). The Northeastern Manchurian Chinese officers, -exiled in the Northwest, were the first bridge between the Communists -and the rest of the country. Since their native provinces and kinsfolk -have had almost ten years' Japanese domination, the Northeast group is -emphatic in demands for national unity. Communists circulate from one -group to the other, always cooperative in offering their leadership on -the basis of a United Front, which the Comintern still decrees for the -Far East after jettisoning the Popular Fronts of Europe. - -The two relatively Rightist cliques are the _Ch'ê-yeh Chiao-yü P'ai_ -(Vocational Educationists' Clique) and the _Chiao-shou P'ai_ -(Professors' Clique). Composed of men still so far from attaining office -that they possess perfect freedom of criticism, they therefore stand -Left of the government in daily comment, although they may be Right of -it in theory. The former group stresses simple, direct problems: it -seeks to attack the opium problem, disease, illiteracy, and so forth, -without necessarily fighting the social revolution against the -landlords. It derives its name from two distinguished leaders of the -vocational education movement who have abstained from active political -work until finding a forum in the Council. The Professors' Clique is -reputedly led by the group of young professors who were eminent in their -fields before the outbreak of war, opposed to the government's -appeasement policy, but tactful enough not to rebel. They are considered -to stand as far Right as anyone on the Council--that is, to discuss -politics in terms of soundness of public policy, budgetary -reasonableness, immediate practicality, and other common-sense -standards, which appear conservative beside the fervid idealism of their -colleagues. - -The description of the _Ssŭ P'ai_ just given is one which exists in -the popular credence. A more authoritative source placed the groups in -the Council under the following four headings: - - (1) the Kuomintang and non-Party majority; - (2) the _La Jeunesse_ Party and the National Socialists; - (3) the Communists; - (4) the "Popular Front" group, including the intellectuals and the - National Salvationists. - -On this basis, the Kuomintang would retain its working control of the -Council, which appears to be the case, in terms of work performed. The -unaffiliated majority, selected by their local governments and -Kuomintang offices and elected by the Kuomintang C. E. C., would in -doubtful cases be inclined to turn to Kuomintang leadership. The _La -Jeunesse_ Party, despite the fact that it is a Western-returned student -organization, is strong in Szechuan; its influence could be expected to -run with that of the National Socialists. Both parties, while minute, -are decidedly averse to Communist fellow-travelling and not at all -disposed to alter the _status quo_, except to carve modest niches for -themselves and to advance their programs in an agreeable way. The -Communists stand alone, although they offer their cooperation to the -independents. - -The Popular Front group is a category widely recognized in China--the -Left Kuomintang, the discontented idealists, the irrepressible patriots, -the minor parties, the indefatigable conspirators of Chinese hopefulness -who are always on the scene. For years they have been unforgotten -witnesses to the ferocious integrity of ideals which (in individuals -scattered at random at all levels of society) call Chinese out of the -lethargy of being very practical. - -The Popular Front leaders, more than any other in China, have withstood -perennial temptation for years and have kept their activities, under -whatever name undertaken, intact. They can be distinguished from other -Party leaders, both Nationalist and Communist, by the facts that they -have never set up a government, with jobs in it for themselves; have -never controlled a government, save through lacunae in power politics; -and have never preserved a government which they did control. -Warm-hearted, philanthropic, patriotic, their shrill zeal has been -audible in China for many years. Without formal organization, they have -stood behind others who sought real power, and today--between the cold, -realistic leaders of the two opposing Parties--are assembled, -ever-hopeful, and advocating a Popular Front. - -The Secretary-General stated to the author that he regarded three of the -Council's contributions as of history-making importance. First, the -Council openly expressed a Chinese national unity unprecedented in -modern history. Forms apart, never before had a crisis found all Chinese -so united; the Council gave a symbol to that unity. Second, the Council -raised the probability of successful democratic processes in China. -Failures under the Peking parliaments had reduced democratic discussion -to a sham. The Council erased this discredit, making many people believe -that democracy promises a real value to the country--not merely as an -ideal, but as a practicable means of government. This contribution was -reinforced by a third: the Council actually served to make definite, -serious, concrete improvements in government and Kuomintang structure, -through criticism and through the issues aired. - - -THE ADMINISTRATIVE PATTERN - -Central policy-making is complicated by a trifurcation of organs--Party -Headquarters, Military Affairs Commission, and Executive _Yüan_. For -example, the nation's publicity and broadcasting services, as well as -direction of the official news agencies, are under the (Kuomintang) -Party-Ministry of Publicity, while the Foreign Office possesses its own -publicity organs for the international relations field, and the -Political Department of the Military Affairs Commission handles much -domestic propaganda and agitation. The strictly governmental, permanent -administrative agencies are simplified from their pre-war complexity, as -the following list will show: - - EXECUTIVE _Yüan_ - - Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Ministry of the Interior - Ministry of Finance - Ministry of Economic Affairs (to be reorganized) - Ministry of Social Affairs (pending) - Ministry of Education - Ministry of Communications - Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry - Commission on Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs - Commission on Overseas Chinese Affairs - National Relief Commission - Ministry of War (also under the Military Affairs Commission) - Material and Resources Control and Supervision Ministry - (pending; status uncertain) - - JUDICIAL _Yüan_ - - Ministry of Justice - - CONTROL _Yüan_ - - Ministry of Audit - - EXAMINATION _Yüan_ - - Ministry of Personnel - Examination Commission - -The Ministries outside the Executive are well adapted to their -respective _Yüan_, although Americans may think the Ministry of Justice -misplaced. The Executive Ministries form the heart of the administrative -system, immediately below the cabinet (Executive _Yüan_ Meeting). The -Party scaffolding is to be torn down with constitutionalization; the -military scaffolding, with peace. The administrative organs at the -center will then bear the real burden of nourishing and protecting the -nation which now they help to create. - -Despite strong Chinese imprints, the central administrative agencies are -organizationally more Westernized than the policy-making agencies. For -this reason, and because administrative emphasis is on matters economic -(outside the scope of the present work), the reader is referred to other -sources for a detailed appraisal of the work of the ministries. -Particularly fortunate is it that _China Shall Rise Again_, partly -written and partly edited by Madame Chiang K'ai-shek,[10] has been -published, including authoritative statements by the leading ministers -on the work of their respective ministries. - - [Footnote 10: May-ling Soong Chiang (Madame Chiang K'ai-shek), _China - Shall Rise Again_, New York, 1941. Chinese economic developments are - the subject of careful study by the Institute of Pacific Relations, - whose _Far Eastern Survey_ follows contemporary developments closely - and whose _Inquiry Series_ offers a monumental collection of linked - works on Pacific affairs, with particular stress on the economic - background to politics. The volume in this series on Chinese political - development, by Lawrence K. Rosinger, may be expected to fill an - important gap in the literature on China today.] - -The Ministries (_pu_) may be classified into three groups, according to -the major tenor of their work: political, social and cultural, and -economic. Military defense through economic development and social -reconstruction remains their common goal, however divergent the -approaches. - - -THE POLITICAL MINISTRIES - -Senior and most famous of all Chinese ministries is that of Foreign -Affairs (_Wai-chiao Pu_). It inherits the splendid traditions of Chinese -diplomacy, dating back to the redoubtable Pan Ch'ao, who almost -single-handed conquered Central Asia in the first century A.D. by -unsleeping guile and consistent boldness. Modern Chinese diplomacy has -made the best of a hundred years of defeat, successfully exploiting the -mutual suspicions of the imperialist powers. The morale and -professional cohesion are high. Despite incessant political changes, -the foreign office and diplomatic service have preserved their -continuity from the Empire to the present. The Chungking government -probably possesses a foreign office superior to the Gaimusho of -Tokyo.[11] - - [Footnote 11: For the latest description of the organization of the - _Wai-chiao Pu_, see Wang Ch'ung-hui, "China's Foreign Relations during - the Sino-Japanese Hostilities 1937-1940," Chapter XIII of Chiang, - May-ling Soong, _China Shall Rise Again_, cited, p. 139-40.] - -The effectiveness of Chinese international statesmanship has aroused an -almost superstitious dread among the Japanese, publicists, officials, -and others. Japan consistently complains that China is superior at -propaganda, and sees, behind the world-wide mistrust of Japan, occult -forces from the Comintern or vile Chinese guile. After they perpetrated -the Nanking horrors, insulted neutral men and women in Tientsin, -machine-gunned a British ambassador, sank an American gunboat, and -violated all available international law, the Japanese believed that -British and American lack of sympathy was mostly due to the machinations -of Chinese diplomacy. The recent Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Wang -Ch'ung-hui, a former Judge of the Permanent Court of International -Justice (World Court), is one of the modern world's greatest legal -scholars. Eminent in political leadership ever since the first -foundation of the Republic, he has always urged moderation, legality, -and intelligence in government. - -The Ministry of the Interior (_Nei-chêng Pu_) forms the apex to China's -constitutional system of provincial and local governments. In accordance -with Sun Yat-sen's teaching, the National Government has consistently -sought to reduce the importance of the provinces and to foster direct -local-central intergovernmental relationships. The importance of this -ministry is reduced somewhat by the fact that other agencies possess -their own field services, and are therefore not obliged to route policy -through it, but it remains significant because of its control and -supervision of China-wide administrative development. The National -Health Administration (_Wei-shêng Shu_), formerly separate, is now a -department of this Ministry. - - -SOCIAL AND CULTURAL AGENCIES - -The Ministry of Education (_Chiao-yü Pu_) has continued active despite -the war. The heroic marches of the Chinese universities to their new -homes in the West have become a world-famous epic. Students, faculty, -and staffs moved out of the sinister zones of enemy occupation, usually -travelling on foot, until they found new homes hundreds or even -thousands of miles from their original locations. Some colleges have -found homes in old temples or in caves where, with a minimum of -equipment and library material, they continue their work. Others, more -fortunate, have become guests of West China institutions. West China -Union University in Chengtu has four other universities on its campus, -all using the same facilities for the duration of the war. Still other -institutions have been consolidated. - -The Ministry of Education has subsidized education as generously as -possible, and fosters progress despite the war and because of it. In -spite of all handicaps, institutions of higher learning have risen in -number from 91 in 1937-38 to 102 in 1939-40, with a corresponding rise -in enrollment of 31,188 to 41,494.[12] The entering class for 1940-41 -was about 12,000, indicating a continued rise.[13] - - [Footnote 12: _China at War_, Vol. V, No. 2 (October 1940), p. 37.] - - [Footnote 13: The same, Vol. V, No. 4 (November 1940), p. 78. See also - Wu Yi-fang and Price, Frank W., _China Rediscovers Her West_, New - York, 1940; Chapter VII, "Holding the Educational Front" (p. 69-76) is - by Y. G. Chen, President of the University of Nanking. The entire work - edited by Messrs. Wu and Price is of value; written from the - missionary point of view, it presents first-hand statements of affairs - on Western China, and continues with liberal and socially conscious - appraisals of the needs of Christian work.] - -In addition to the accredited institutions, there are innumerable -volunteer agencies, some of which are patriotic but educationally -elementary schools for saboteurs, agitators, and guerrillas. Education -is propaganda, but such is its immediate appeal that Left schools obtain -capacity attendance. A few students are disappointed. One wrote, "The -most unpleasant thing to me was that, as soon as I entered the -Resist-Japan University, I was deprived of my liberty. I was not free in -speech; I was not allowed to say anything outside of Marxism-Leninism -..." and went home.[14] The total attendance remains high; if added to -that of the accredited institutions operating according to government -standards, it would swell the sum enormously. - - [Footnote 14: Wang Wên-hsiang, "K'ang-jih Ta-hsüeh yü Ch'ing-nien - Fan-mên" ("The Sorrows of Youth and the Resist-Japan University") in - the symposium entitled So-wei "_Pien-ch'ü_" (The So-called "Frontier - Area"), Chungking, XXVIII (1939), p. 30 _ff._] - -In addition to formal aid to institutions of higher learning, and -administration of the National Government colleges, the Ministry -sponsors the mass literacy movement. In this it has had the benefit of -the work of Dr. James Y. C. Yen and his associates.[15] The war, moving -vast masses of people and shifting the modernized city-dwellers from the -coast to the interior, has proved a stimulus to the rise of literacy and -the demand for popular literature. - - [Footnote 15: See the discussion of the mass education problem, below, - p. 218.] - -The Ministry is headed by Ch'ên Li-fu, whose brother, Ch'ên Kuo-fu, is -head of the (Kuomintang) Central Political Institute. Together they -stand at the Right center of the Kuomintang, exerting enormous influence -on the Party and on the country. Both have been very close to the -Generalissimo, and took a large share in revitalization of the -Kuomintang before and during the war. - -The two Commissions serve important needs. The Commission on Overseas -Chinese Affairs (_Ch'iao-wu Wei-yüan-hui_) is the informal Chinese -equivalent of a colonial office. The Commission looks after the welfare -of the overseas settlements of the Chinese, fostering language schools, -hospitals and the like. It acts through Chinese community associations, -rarely through official channels. Practices of hyphenated citizenship, -so offensive to one Western nationality when undertaken by another, are -unobtrusive and necessary in the case of the Chinese. With the outside -states putting Chinese in a special economic, legal, and political -category--through immigration laws, administrative practice, and -extra-governmental pressure including lynching--the individual Chinese -who deracinates himself is indeed a lost soul. Few Chinese worry about -overseas Chinese _irredentas_. The Commission fosters no _putsches_ and -mobilizes no fifth columns, but does help to keep Chinese, whatever -their nationalities, still Chinese. - -The Commission on Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs (_Mêng Tsang -Wei-yüan-hui_) is the supreme agency for the dependencies. It has a -record of considerable success in fostering a good-neighbor policy -toward the half-autonomous dominions of Chinese Turkestan (Sinkiang, -also called Chinese Central Asia),[16] Tibet, and Inner Mongolia. Outer -Mongolia is under indirect Soviet control, and Eastern Inner Mongolia -under the Japanese. The Chinese have utilized every device of courtesy -and diplomacy in retaining their precarious grip on these areas. The -Commission includes dominion members. - - [Footnote 16: Among the recent books on Sinkiang, one, unusual because - it is by a Chinese author, stands out: Wu, Aitchen K., _Turkistan - Tumult_, London, 1940. The travel books of Sven Hedin, Ella Maillart, - Peter Fleming, and Sir Eric Teichman also contain material of - political interest.] - - -THE ECONOMIC MINISTRIES - -The Ministries dealing in economic matters bear the ultimate burden of -resistance. Upon their success depend China's tools of war. If -artillery, aircraft, machine-guns, munitions, food, clothing and other -necessities are not available to the central armies, the opportunity for -counter-attack may come and go, and China be lost--not through the power -of her enemy, but through her own weakness. Unless economic mobilization -succeeds, the guerrilla warfare in the occupied area will be frustrated, -since its purpose is merely to prepare for a _révanche_ from Free China; -history affords few examples of guerrillas defeating mass armies, -fighting positionally, without the intervention of other mass armies. - -The Ministry of Finance (_Ts'ai-chêng Pu_) is the leader of the Economic -Ministries. Headed by H. H. K'ung, successor to the celebrated T. V. -Soong, it has performed fiscal miracles in maintaining the credit of the -National Government. Chief among its accomplishments has been the -institution, within the past decade, of a managed currency on the -gold-exchange standard. Specie had been the immemorial medium of -exchange, and Chinese experience with paper money--from the earliest -times to the present--had been unfortunate. Starting with the 1860's, -China had undergone one paper-money inflation after another. -Governmental currency was frequently a receipt for silver on deposit, in -which case it amounted to no more than a commodity warehouse -certificate, thereby subject to discount for transportation charges, and -fluctuating meanwhile with the world price of silver; otherwise it was -fiat money, guaranteed by stranglers' cords and long knives. Fractional -coins passed by metallic weight; the shifts in the price of copper in -New York and London determined the number of pennies which farmers -received for their silver dollars, even on the threshold of Tibet. - -By putting private bank notes, both Chinese and foreign, out of -circulation, systematizing note issuance to four government banks and a -limited number of carefully supervised provincial agencies, the -National Government made the change with far less difficulty than -anyone, even optimists, dared to hope. Until the outbreak of war -subsidiary coinage was copper and aluminum; this has been replaced by -fractional paper, circulating decimally without discount for exchange -into larger bills. Simple peasants, who used to hide a slug of silver in -their fields, now conceal a Bank of China, Bank of Communications, -Central Bank of China, or Farmers' Bank of China _fa pi_ (legal tender) -note in roofs or walls. - -Other noteworthy reforms include the standardization of levies in the -provinces, now proceeding to some degree, and the imposition of direct -taxes, a revolutionary step for China. Income and inheritance taxes, -previously thought to be uncollectible in a pre-modern area such as -China's hinterland, are yielding substantial sums. War borrowing is done -almost entirely through domestic loans. These are issued in the form of -patriotic contribution bonds, and are available in denominations as low -as Ch. Nat. $5.00 (about 28 U. S. cents). Further support has come in -the form of American, British, and Soviet fiscal aid, and--until the -outbreak of the European war--additional credits, both private and -intergovernmental, from continental Europe. The Ministry has moved with -a financial prudence which promises to maintain China's domestic and -foreign credit for further years of war. - -The Ministry has engaged in direct conflict with the enemy through -bank-note rivalry. Throughout the occupied area, National Government -currency is in conflict with the issuances of the Japanese army and the -pro-Japanese governments. The Chungking policy has been to hold back the -invasion currencies, on the assumption that continued circulation of the -national currency maintains a continued popular stake in the government. -Many guerrilla leaders believe that the occupied areas should use -nothing of value to the Japanese, and therefore encourage the issuance -of local emergency currency. - -Under the Ministry of Finance, numerous efforts have been made to keep -foreign trade alive. With war-time pressure on transportation -facilities, foreign trade has become a virtual monopoly of the -government; few major transactions are made by wholly private interests, -since in addition to monopolizing the highways, government-owned -corporations also have access to differentials in foreign exchange -(which often mark the difference between great profits and none). In the -matter of the governmentalized Sino-American trade, correlated with the -American credits, the Foo Shing Corporation (export) and the Universal -Trading Corporation (import) control the current both ways. The -Ministries of Communications and of Economic Affairs also have a share -in this state-capitalist business.[17] - - [Footnote 17: _The Far Eastern Survey_ keeps effectively up to date - with all new developments in this field. An authoritative but - understandable explanation of the work of the Ministry is found in H. - H. K'ung, "Holding China's Financial Front," Ch. XI, work by Mme. - Chiang K'ai-shek, cited above.] - -Subdivisions in the Ministry of Finance include sections for customs, -salt gabelle, internal revenue, general taxation, public loans, -currency, national treasury, accounting, and general affairs. Efforts -are now in progress to consolidate all intragovernmental fiscal -services, so that the budget shall cover the entire government, and -separate agencies will no longer be able to make half-controlled -collections and disbursements. - -The Ministry of Economic Affairs (_Ching-chi Pu_) is in general -responsible for the industrialization of an area half the size of Europe -with well over two hundred million inhabitants. No non-industrial state -can defeat an industrial state unless it has access to the industrial -resources of third parties. The Chinese, realizing this, have launched a -modernization process unparalleled in modern history. The two greatest -migrations of the twentieth century have occurred, most probably, in -China: the first the settlement of Manchuria, and the second the flight -to the West. In each case more than twenty million persons have been -involved. The Ministry of Economic Affairs has transformed this rout -into a pioneering advance. Refugees have been taught to bring their -tools with them; when they had no tools their skills have been sought -out and utilized. As the national armies and government retreated up the -Yangtze and inward, they brought along the personnel of a modern -economic system, and set an industrial society down in a world -technologically backward. - -West-China modernization will probably be the most durable economic -consequence of the war. Cities near the edge of Tibet have underground -electric power and automatic telephone systems. Primitive salt-drying -areas have been modernized; in one instance, steel pipe being lacking, -bamboo pipelines, plastered and cemented for reinforcement, run -cross-country. Filthy, tax-ridden, vicious little cities which had been -the haunts of opium-sotted militarists are now given the double blessing -of fair government and a business boom. (The author felt, when he -returned to America in September 1940, that he was going from a new -country to an old, leaving the hope, zest and high spirits of the -Chinese frontier for the comfortable melancholy of American -half-prosperity.) - -On the government side, the stimulation to technological advance has -consisted of broad, experimental use of government personnel, subsidies, -and part-ownership, together with some outright state socialism. Four -types of encouragement appear with particular frequency: the -government-controlled movement of private industries from the endangered -areas to the West, government sponsorship of brand new industrial -enterprises, official encouragement of cooperatives, and state -ownership-management of enterprises. - -Many industries were saved for China through compulsory movement. -Thousands of tons of industrial equipment were moved up to the West, -floated on barges and river-boats, or dragged by hand over macadam -highways, dirt roads, and mud footpaths. One single enterprise, the -Chung Fu Joint Mining Administration of Honan, successfully transferred -one hundred and twenty thousand tons of equipment, now applied to coal -mining in the Southwest.[18] - - [Footnote 18: Wong Wen-hao, Minister of Economic Affairs, - "Industrialization of Western China," Ch. XIV, work by Mme. Chiang - K'ai-shek, cited above, p. 142.] - -Government sponsorship of new enterprises covers the entire field of -modern industry. Investors wait in line before opportune undertakings. -Electric light bulbs, safety matches, automobile parts and tools, -clothing--everything from machine-shop tools to luxury goods is being -produced in the West. Bottlenecks do occur in new industries competing -for priorities in imported machinery. - -In the field of cooperatives, the C. I. C. (China Industrial -Cooperatives) stand out as truly important social and economic -pioneering. (See below, p. 223.) - -Government ownership has not been niggard or timorous. In most cases it -has followed American patterns and appeared in the form of -government-owned corporations, but there are also a considerable number -of frankly state-operated enterprises, such as municipal food stores, -ferries, and heavier industrial undertakings. The munitions and motor -fuel trades are, so far as the author could find, entirely a matter of -government ownership. In the air communications and airplane production -field, government ownership is relaxed to the point of a senior -partnership in joint companies with foreign corporations; the latter -provide the supplies and trained personnel. - -The Ministry of Economic Affairs is under the control of Wong -Wen-hao,[19] whose career was first distinguished in geology and -educational administration. His scientific outlook stands him in good -stead, since the exploitation of West-China resources requires -scientific as well as business application. Subdivisions of his Ministry -include those of mining, industry, commerce, water conservancy, and -general affairs. - - [Footnote 19: He also spells it Oung Wen-hao; by the Wade - transliteration, Wêng Wên-hao.] - -A Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (_Nung Lin Pu_) was set up in -1940 as the third economic ministry. Industrialization's dependence on -farm products makes this an invaluable coordinate to the other two -Ministries. The Chinese are in many cases proceeding directly from -pre-industrial to the latest chemico-industrial techniques, and skipping -the phase of reliance upon subsoil minerals. Gasoline is being mixed -with fuel alcohol derived from grain; plastics are appearing. - -Agriculture also involved China's greatest social problem--that of -encouraging freehold or cooperative farming at the expense of -sharecropping. Much of the agricultural reform is undertaken by the new -local government and provincial government plans, but the problems of -farm prices, general farm planning, and utilization of agricultural -products fall on the Ministry. It is headed, not by a farm leader or -expert, but by the General Chên Chi-tang, former governor of Kwangtung -Province.[20] - - [Footnote 20: China Information Committee, _News Release_, Chungking, - July 1, 1940.] - -A proposed Material and Resources Control and Supervision Ministry (or -Ministry of Economic Warfare), based approximately upon the British -Ministry of Supplies, is in process of organization.[21] The Ministry -may be kept independent of either the Executive _Yüan_ or Military -Affairs Commission, since it is to coordinate a group of industrial and -commercial agencies which are now independent. Upon its establishment, -the Ministry of Economic Affairs will become one of Industry and -Commerce, and a central agency for economic war work will be available. - - [Footnote 21: The same, December 23, 1940.] - -The National Relief Commission (_Chên-chi Wei-yüan-hui_) supervises the -general relief work of the government, which is performed in part by the -extragovernmental war and Party agencies and in part by local and -provincial authorities. The immensity of the relief problem in China has -always been such that organized relief can do no more than stir the -misery of the masses. Opportunely for the National Government, the -Imperial Japanese Army is securely in possession of the world's greatest -relief problem, and unable to relinquish it. Chungking is more -fortunate. (The author never dreamed that prosperity such as he saw in -West China could exist in Asia. Prices are extremely high, but wages and -farm prices tend to follow, and unemployment--always low in China -because of the work-sharing role of the family--is almost completely out -of sight. Skilled labor commands remuneration fantastic by pre-existing -scales.) - -All these agencies, and much of the rest of the government, depend upon -the Ministry of Communications (_Chiao-t'ung Pu_). The invasion struck -at existing communications lines; Japanese are now in control of the -mouths of all major Chinese rivers, most of China's railway mileage, and -the coastal system of modern highways. A glance at the map of China will -show that Japanese forces have hugged modern communications lines, -whether steamship, railway, or highway. Whenever the Japanese ventured -far from these lines, they met with disaster. - -The Ministry of Communications has used existing facilities to draw new -networks. The short stretches of railway in Free China are still -operated; _matériel_ from the occupied zone was brought West on them, -and they are undergoing rapid development. Roadbeds are being -constructed in anticipation of future imports of steel rails. Steamship -enterprises, under government subsidy, operate extensively, and new -reaches of river have been opened to service. - -Three lines of reconstruction have proved very fruitful: motor -communications, telecommunications, and the rationalization of -pre-modern facilities already at hand. - -Motor communications, both highway and aerial, have shown enormous -progress. Air service is maintained by the China National Aviation -Corporation and the Eurasia Company, both owned by the Chinese -Government, the former jointly with Pan American Airways and the latter -with German interests. Through connections from New York to Berlin are -available by the combined services of the two companies. - -The highway system can be thought of as spider-like. Three enormous legs -reach to the outside: the Chungking-Kunming-Lashio route, famous as the -Burma Road; the trans-Sinkiang route, finally connecting with the Soviet -Turksib Railroad beyond thousands of miles of desert and mountains; and -the due North route, now being developed, reaching the Trans-Siberian -Railroad. The body of the system is a tight, well-metalled skein of -roads interconnecting the major cities of Free China. Most highways are -all-weather, and well-engineered, but niceties of surfacing have been -postponed. - -Truck and bus service is regular, but very crowded, with inescapable -confusion as to priority. The majority of the operating firms are -government-owned, either by the central government or the provinces. -Complaint has arisen over the restrictions to private enterprise in this -field. Since gasoline costs about U. S. $1.00 per gallon and is -available only under permit, further official obstructions to highway -use seem unnecessary. - -Telecommunications have been maintained and extended. Telegraph service -has reached into hitherto untapped areas, and wireless is extensively -employed. Radio services operate under the Kuomintang, not the -government; stations XGOX and XGOY reach North America and Europe with -propaganda in the world's leading languages. The telephone has come to -be a regular part of Chinese official and business life, and is to be -seen, far off the beaten track, as one of the heralds of -industrialization. - -All these modern services would, however, be grossly insufficient for -the needs of the whole nation at war. They have been supplemented -through the use of every available type of pre-modern transportation. -Most of these rely on man-power, and have had their own elaborate -organization for many centuries: boatmen's guilds, unions of transport -coolies, carters, muleteers and camel-drivers. It has been possible to -ship heavy freight through country consisting of mountains traversable -only by stone-flagged footpaths or torrential streams. The Ministry has -regimented this complicated pre-modern world, with impromptu -modernizations as startling as they are efficacious. Where once couriers -trotted, they now speed by on bicycles or motorcycles; the squealing -wooden-axled wheelbarrows of the Chinese countryside are yielding to -pneumatic-tired carts which resemble American farm trailers. Three to -eight men can drag one cart, with half a ton of freight, over any -terrain, making up to forty miles a day. Provision can be made, -therefore, for moving a quarter-million tons of raw materials across -territory lacking even the most elementary roads. The roughness of the -country, which bars the Japanese army, is no obstacle to huge coolie -gangs, drafted sometimes, but more usually hired. - -The Minister of Communications gave the following written answers to -questions put by the author:[22] - - 1. In view of the political interruptions to commerce - through British and French territories south of China, will - efforts be maintained to keep communications on the same - schedules southward that they had before? - - Yes, because commercial and export traffic is still being - carried on southward, and there is a large accumulation of - important materials to be moved from the frontier inward. - - 2. Will the restriction of gasoline lead to the abandonment - of certain truck and bus routes, and the maintenance of - others, or do you expect to restrict all routes evenly? - - We expect to restrict all important routes evenly if the - motor fuel situation becomes really acute. - - 3. Is a motor road running through Inner and Outer Mongolia - directly north to the Trans-Siberian Railroad a feasible - project? - - Yes, it is a feasible project. - - 4. For all practical purposes, is the Soviet route as it - exists an adequate although expensive channel for the import - of high-class American machinery, such as trucks? - - Yes, the Soviet route as it exists is adequate though - expensive for the purpose. - - 5. Is there evidence that mail between the United States and - China has been censored or tampered with while in transit - past Japan? - - No, there is no such evidence so far. - - 6. How extensive a foreign personnel do you have in the - varied agencies under your Ministry? - - Postal Service: 28 - China National Aviation Corporation: 15 - Eurasia Aviation Corporation: 13 - Railways: 8 - - 7. What developments of the last three years do you regard - with most pride, as evidence of China's power to cope with - the emergency? - - The timely completion of the Yunnan-Burma Highway may be - considered as evidence of China's power to cope with the - emergency and as an important development in the field of - war-time communications. The Highway is 960 kilometers long - from Kunming to Anting on the frontier. Construction began - in October 1937. Eleven months later, the road was opened to - through traffic. At one time during its construction, as - many as 100,000 laborers were employed on the road. - - The highest point on the Highway is 2,600 meters above the - sea level, yet the road has to pass two deep valleys, the - Mekong and the Salween, where the Highway dips a few - thousand feet within a distance of several miles in order to - reach the river bed, and rises precipitously again in the - same manner just beyond the suspension bridges over the two - turbulent rivers. The scarcity of local labor, the - enervating climate, and the wild and sparsely populated - country traversed, all combine to make the construction work - difficult. But now, anyone may take a motor car and cover - the distance between Chungking and Rangoon in two weeks, as - Ambassador Johnson did soon after the Highway was completed. - - [Footnote 22: Communication of August 12, 1940; in the present - author's possession.] - -The Minister Chang Kia-ngau (Chang Chia-ao) is one of the most eminent -bankers in China. His Ministry is a model of business-like organization -and systematic routines; he has a great reputation for getting things -done in the American fashion--quickly, and without ceremony. - -In addition to these major ministries, there are the _Pu_ of Justice -(part of the Judicial _Yüan_, sharing its war-time somnolence), of War -(affiliated with the Military Affairs Commission), of Audit, of -Personnel, and--in process of establishment--of Social Affairs, -supplementing the Party-Ministry of Social Movements (_Shê-hui Yün-tung -Pu_) now under the Kuomintang Headquarters. - -All Ministries are headed by a Minister (_Pu Chang_), seconded by a -Political Vice-Minister (_Chêng-wu Tzŭ-chang_) and Administrative -Vice-Minister (_Ch'ang-wu Tzŭ-chang_). Since almost all officers are -political appointees, and few of the new career men have touched the -higher levels of the bureaucracy, this duplication prevents a job famine -and keeps personnel levels high; the utility of a large administrative -staff depends, obviously, on the nature of the executive. Some of the -most crowded ministries seem permanently under-staffed because of the -intense activity they maintain; others, with skeleton staff, appear to -have far more civil servants than service. The over-all picture of the -Ministries, however, leads inescapably to the conclusion that they are -really functioning today. Long-transmitted vices of sloth and sinecures -are on the wane. The war, high-lighting every demerit into treason, has -created optimum conditions for administrative progress in China. - - - - -CHAPTER IV - -PROVINCIAL, LOCAL, AND SPECIAL-AREA GOVERNMENT - - -China consists of twenty-eight provinces, varying in size about as do -the European nations. Of the twenty-eight, fourteen are wholly under -Chinese control, or are so slightly touched by invasion that normal -governmental processes continue. Ten provinces are under dual or triple -government--by the Japanese and pro-Japanese Chinese, by guerrilla and -other semi-independent groups, and by the usual constitutional -authorities. The remaining four are under firm Japanese domination, -under the name _Manchoukuo_.[1] Well over half of China's population is -under the National Government, and about one-ninth under unchallengeable -Japanese control; the residuum is the subject of sharp political -competition. The war is not merely a war between governments: it is a -struggle for the creation of government.[2] - - [Footnote 1: For an excellent definition of Free China, see Quigley, - Harold S., "Free China," cited, p. 133-35. The most readable geography - of China is Cressey, George B., _China's Geographic Foundations_, New - York, 1934.] - - [Footnote 2: For further development of this problem, see below, p. - 185. The present author considered this question in relation to the - Chinese political heritage, in _Government in Republican China_, - cited, p. 2-12, 69-74, 188-89. Professor George Taylor, in _The - Struggle for North China_, cited, relates this problem to the broad - issues of world discussion, in a most acute analysis of "The Problem - of China," p. 8-16, and gives a clear answer to the questions thus - posed, p. 197-201.] - -This problem would be immense even if there were no war. Under the -successive Imperial dynasties of the past millennium, China developed -extreme regional autonomy. Despite absolutist theory, the provinces -under their governors or viceroys were practically as independent as -states of the American union in the early nineteenth century. - - PROVINCIAL AND URBAN GOVERNMENT - - National Government -------------+ Kuomintang - | | | | - Military Affairs Executive ..Other _Yüan_ | - Commission _Yüan_ : | - | | : | - | The Provincial Government[B] | - | _Shêng Chêng-fu_ | - | | | - | +-----------------------------+ | - | | Chairman | | - | | _Chu-hsi_ | | - | | | | - | +-----| The Provincial Government |...... | - | | | Committee | : | - | | | [_Shêng Chêng-fu_] | : | - | | | _Wei-yüan-hui_ | : | - | | +-----------------------------+ : | - | | | Standing | : | - +--------------+ +--| Committee | +-------------+ +----------+ - | Pacification | | | _Ch'ang-wu | | Provincial | | Party | - | Commissioner | | | Wei-yüan_ | | People's | | Agencies | - | _Sui-ching | | +------------+ | Political | +----------+ - | Chu-jên_ | | | | | | Council | | - +--------------+ | | | | | _Shêng | | - | | | | | | Ts'an-chêng | | - | | | | | | Hui_ | | - | | | | | +-------------+ | - | | | | | | - | | | | +-------------------+ | - | | | +----------------+ | | - | | | | | | - | | Reconstruction | | | - | | _Chien-shê Committees: | | - | | T'ing_ Industry | | - | | _Shih-yeh | | - | | T'ing_ | | - | +------------------------+ Secretarial | - | | | | Department | - | Civil Affairs | | _Mi-shu Ch'u_ | - | _Min-chêng T'ing_ | | | | - | | | | | - | Finance | +------------------+ | - | _Tsai-chêng T'ing_ | | The Municipal | | - | | | Government[B] | | - | Education | _Shih Chêng-fu_ | | - | _Chiao-yü T'ing_ +------------------+ | - | | | - | +------------------+ | - | | Mayor | | - | | _Shih Chang_ | | - | +-------------------+ | | | - | |Municipal Advisory | |Municipal Council | | - | |or People's Council|...|_Shih Chêng Hui-i_| | - | |_Shih Ts'an-i-hui_ | | | | - | +-------------------+ | Councillors| | - | | _Ts'an-shih_| | - Local +----------------------------------------------+ | - Military | | | | | | | | | | - | | | | | | | | | | - Other Bureaus | | | | | | | | | - as Needed | | | | | | | | | - | | | | | | | | | - Bureau of Public | | | | | | | | - Utilities[A] | | | | | | | | - _Kung-yung Chü_ | | | | | | | | - | | | | | | | | - Bureau of Local | | | | | | +----------+ - Government[A] | | | | | | | Party | - _Ti-chêng Chü_ | | | | | | | Agencies | - | | | | | | +----------+ - Bureau of Health[A] | | | | | | - _Wei-shêng Chü_ | | | | | | - | | | | | | - Bureau of | | | | | - Engineering | | | | | - _Kung-wu Chü_ | | | | | - | | | | | - Bureau of | | | | - Finance | | | | - _Tsai-chêng Chü_ | | | | - | | | | - Bureau of Public | | | - Safety | | | - _Kung-an Chü_ | | | - | | | - Bureau of Social Affairs | | - _Shê-hui Chü_ | | - | | - Secretariat | - _Mi-shu Ch'u_ +----------+ - | | Party | - Urban Local | Agencies | - Government +----------+ - - [Footnote A: optional] - - [Footnote B: legal, not administrative, entity] - -With the advent of war, the position of the provinces has become more -precarious, truly new political devices in the form of novel regional -governments have appeared, and the concrete problems of reform in the -village communities have become as imperative as military measures. - - -THE PROVINCES - -The war-lord period was ushered in by the death of Yüan Shih-k'ai, -dictator-President and commander-in-chief, in 1916. He had inherited a -tradition of dual government--civil and military--no less sharp than the -Japanese distinction, and had continued it by placing his military -henchmen in power as provincial satraps. After his death, each province -had a military governor (_Tuchün_), who sometimes tolerated a civil -governor (_Shêng-chang_) and sometimes held both posts concurrently. The -various _tuchün_ rivalled one another in a vain turmoil until the rise -of the National Government suppressed or incorporated them. Even today -some of these men hold remnants of their power, but it is still -declining. The power of the National Government has increased almost -every year for over fifteen years, and its programs, bequeathed by Sun -Yat-sen, call for the constant diminution of provincial authority, until -in the end the province shall be little more than a postal link between -the central government and the districts (_hsien_). - -Continued vitality of the provinces as a form of political life is shown -by the chariness with which the government approaches the problem of -re-subdividing the nation, by the continued effect of provincialism -through the influence of geography, botany, ecology, economics and -spoken language, and by the manifest utility of the provinces in the -prosecution of the war. It is impossible to discuss any aspect of -Chinese affairs for very long without entering into distinctions between -provinces. - -In mild, modified, and controlled form, the pattern of civil-military -contrast in provincial government still prevails. The civil governor, -now in almost all cases the weightier official, is legally termed -Chairman of the Province (_Shêng Chu-hsi_), but he frequently possesses -a military colleague amiably designated Pacification Commissioner -(_Sui-ching Chu-jên_).[3] The war has eradicated almost the last -vestiges of provincial militarism. No Chinese army is in a position to -make peace with Japan through the negotiated treason of its commander, -although small groups occasionally change sides both ways.[4] On the -other side of the picture, it is not altogether certain how far the -National Government could go in replacing local leaders; more has been -done than ever before, but the Generalissimo has tried to work honestly -with all leaders, provincial or independent, subsuming their power under -his and the Government's without destroying it. Four provinces still -show traces of autonomy. - - [Footnote 3: Tsang, O. B., _A Supplement to a Complete Chinese-English - Dictionary_, Shanghai, 1937, p. 267. The older, standard dictionaries - do not include the term. Lieutenant H. S. Aldrich, in his _Hua Yu Hsü - Chih: Practical Chinese_, Peiping, 1934, gives _Sui-ching - Ssŭ-ling_ as Pacification Commissioner (Vol. II, p. 74).] - - [Footnote 4: An apt, grisly story is reported in the semi-official - English-language journal of the Nanking regime. The "Peace Movement" - is, of course, the Japanophile movement of Mr. Wang Ch'ing-wei. This - is the way it was given in _The People's Tribune_, Vol. XXIX, Nos. - 7-10 (October-November 1940), p. 305: - - "In response to President Wang Ch'ing-Wei's peace appeal to the - nation, Mr. Tan Shih-Chang, member of the Chungking Air Force, flew to - Hankow by his own plane on June 10 to join the Peace Movement. Upon - his arrival in Nanking, Mr. Tan was warmly received by the - re-organized National Government. Later, he was sent to Macao on an - important mission, but upon his arrival there, he was instantly killed - by desperadoes in the employ of the Chungking regime. - - "It is learned that the plane he left in Hankow has now been repaired - by the Japanese Air Force and brought to the Capital. Following its - arrival, the plane was immediately handed over to the Military - Commission by the Japanese military authorities." - - (This would need further corroboration before it could definitely be - accepted.)] - -Largest of the four is Sinkiang (Chinese Central Asia), under the -military leader Shêng Shih-ts'ai; it is subject to very strong Soviet -influence, since it is more accessible from the Soviet side of the -border, via the Turksib Railroad, than from China. Its trade naturally -flows out through the Soviet Union. The provincial authorities have been -harsh toward Christian work, and casually cruel to occasional -travellers. Since the National Government is exceedingly anxious to -maintain good relations with the Soviet Union, and obtains much of its -supplies from that country across Sinkiang province, it has made no -attempt to interfere. The province has cooperated enthusiastically in -war efforts; it is strange to see Central Asiatics with European -features marching with Chinese troops. Many of the independent Leftist -leaders have been welcomed in the area, although simon-pure Marxians are -rare, and the province, with a new university, new air bases, new -industries, and a trans-Asia highway, is undergoing rather spectacular -development. The British and the Soviets are mutually so suspicious that -the Chinese are likely to keep control, but the Chinese central -government, taking no chances, cooperates rather than commands. - -Yünnan, under General Lung Yün, is the second province with special -features. Relatively isolated from the rest of China until the -completion of the Kunming-Chungking stretch of the Burma Road, it has -never been occupied by large National Government forces. The provincial -chairman submitting in form and cooperating in fact has been left -unmolested in his position. The province is becoming modernized by a -great deal of commerce and development; it is likely that this vestigial -autonomy will fade away unnoticed. - -Kwangsi province possesses as leader General Pai Chung-hsi, one of the -ablest military men in China. A Kuomintang leader of long standing, he -followed, in conjunction with the leaders in Kwangtung (Canton), a -policy of _de facto_ autonomy down to the very outbreak of war. He and -his associates even had an independent air force, which was promptly -merged into the National air service. During the war, he has fought in -central China. The economic ruin of Kwangtung and the occupation of -Canton city by the Japanese has quenched Cantonese autonomy, but Kwangsi -has been relatively untouched. No whisper of suspicion has imputed -separatism to General Pai, but should he desire it, he is one of the few -men left in China still to have the means. - -In Fukien province, General Ch'ên I serves as Chairman. He studied in -Japan and has a Japanese wife. He remains loyal to the National -Government, and he has fought the Japanese along the coast. No Chinese -observer has criticized him, but Westerners have observed that Fukien is -remarkably quiet; the Japanese have done little beyond blockading the -coast and seizing the major ports, and the Chinese have launched no -counter-attacks. It is possible that some unexpressed sense of -understanding between the Governor and the Japanese prevents further -conflict, while the Generalissimo--content to leave well enough -alone--lets matters stand as they are. - -Provincial government, as outlined in the chart at p. 98, is very simple -in structure. The Commission plan, similar in many respects to the -Galveston plan in American municipal government, reduces the Provincial -Chairman to the status of _primus inter pares_. The departments of the -provincial government are headed by members of the province's committee. -The presence of provincial offices of the Kuomintang, military services, -and war agencies makes a provincial capital a place more important than -it seems in theory. A valuable innovation in provincial administration -has been the inauguration of the Provincial People's Political Councils -(_Shêng Ts'an-chêng Hui_). These are being taken seriously by the -administrations. Although they occasionally pass visionary, -impracticable, or bombastic resolutions, their work has for the most -part been concrete. They have aided a great deal in transforming the -atmosphere of government, and act as competent outside critical bodies -to check the administrative officers. - -Provincial government has been significantly transformed by the war. Dr. -T. F. Tsiang (Chiang T'ing-fu), a distinguished historian who served on -a central inspection commission to the Southwest in 1940, stated[5] that -provincial government has improved in two outstanding ways: first, there -is a real desire to understand the common people, and to do something -for them. This was unheard-of a few years past. Second, all--or almost -all--of the officials work very hard. There is far more work than there -are men. Money is frequently available but unexpendable because there -are not enough experts to go round. Hence, the provincial governments -find their need is for men rather than funds, and the war is bringing -new levels of actual accomplishment. Although most of the governors have -military titles, many of these are like Kentucky colonelcies, courtesy -titles from time past. The over-all effect is of hard work and little -bombast. - - [Footnote 5: In an interview with the author, Chungking, July 31, - 1940; the interview was unfortunately terminated by the raid alarm. It - might be noted at this point that proposals for the reinstitution of - strong provincial executives have been postponed from year to year - since 1932. See _The China Year Book 1939_, cited, p. 217 n.] - -Special Municipalities, most of which are now under Japanese occupation, -are directly subject to the National Government and only incidentally a -part of the provinces in which they are located. Ordinary Municipalities -are under their respective provincial governments, but not under a -_hsien_ (district or county) administration; in some cases they include -several former hsien. The Municipality is headed by a Mayor -(_Shih-chang_), advised by a City Council (_Shih-chêng Hui-i_) composed -of the chiefs of the administrative sections, several supplementary -counsellors, and representatives from the Municipal Advisory Assembly -(_Shih Ts'an-i-hui_), if one exists. Below the _Shih_ the urban pattern -of local government differs somewhat from the rural, but otherwise city -government displays no features peculiarly Chinese. - - -LOCAL GOVERNMENT - -Chinese local government has been the ever-fertile soil out of which -successive Empires grew. To no other level of government has the -Republic reached so poorly. Since China is constituted of about half a -million villages, several thousand market towns, and a few hundred major -cities, the bulk of the population is rural, but rural in a way foreign -to the West. Congestion imposes upon agrarian China many problems and -evils known as urban in the West. Corruption in government, extortion in -economics, demoralization in social and family life--these start with -the village and the _hsien_. Inconspicuous in any single village, each -evil summed to its China-wide aggregate becomes tremendous. - -Government has not been beloved by the Chinese farmer. Governmental -benefits--for the continuance of scholastic culture, the protection of -the realm, the creation of grandiose public works--were remote, but -taxes were not; government meant the taxgatherer. Fêng Yü-hsiang, one of -the great war-lords and now a Kuomintang general, says of his own -childhood: - - The people, except for paying their taxes, had nothing to do - with the government. The government never paid any attention - to the conditions under which the people lived, and the - people never bothered themselves about what the government - was doing. One party collected the taxes; the other paid - them. That was all there was to it. Although Paoting city - was only about two _li_ [less than a mile] away, the - inhabitants of Kang-k'ê village showed no interest in city - civilization; instead, they rather looked down on that sort - of thing. No discussions of politics were heard, and nothing - about the encroachments of the foreign powers on China. All - the big changes seemed to have taken place in another world, - and very seldom affected this place. - - When the government was about to collect taxes, the _Li - Chêng_ [a petty local officer] would ring a gong from one - end of the village to the other, shouting: - - "Pay your taxes! Four hundred and sixty coins to the _mou_ - [about one third of an acre] for the first harvest!" - - When the people heard the gong, they did not go and pay - their taxes immediately. They would walk listlessly to their - doorways, only to withdraw after having taken a nonchalant - look at the _Li Chêng_--as though they had heard nothing. - They would wait until the very last minute, until they could - not put it off any more, and then go, group by group, to the - city to hand in money they had earned by sweat and blood. - - They were industrious and miserable all through the year - ...[6] - - [Footnote 6: Fêng Yü-hsiang, _Wo-ti Shêng-huo_ (My Life), Kweilin, - 1940, p. 22.] - -This basic level of Chinese society is not easily susceptible to -standardization, or the imposition of ready-made bureaucracies. Even in -the United States, it would be almost impossible to impose a uniform -plan for community organization from Bangor to San Diego and Walla Walla -to the Bronx. Sun Yat-sen once said to Judge Linebarger, "China is a -land of autonomy from the smallest village upward. Who shall dictate to -the sub-governments of China the form and manner in which they shall -express their local governmental needs? Of course, we must have a -minimum of uniformity for both economy and efficiency in government, but -the will of the people must be followed."[7] By seeking to remedy -political abuses the National Government apparently hopes that economic -inequalities will be ironed out by the people themselves. - - [Footnote 7: As reported by Paul M. W. Linebarger in his - _Conversations with Sun Yat-sen_ [as yet unpublished; in the author's - possession]. Book II, Chapter V.] - -The Chinese land problem cannot be understood except at the -politico-economic nexus, where low political morale exposes the farmers -to the unrestrained power of the gentry, acting in the triple capacity -of officials, landlords, and money-lenders. The cycle, familiar in the -West, of freehold farmers or yeomen first mortgaging their land, then -becoming tenants, and finally ending in utter economic helplessness, has -been familiar in China. In China's past, the cycle had another phase: -agrarian insurrection sweeping the land with banditry and innumerable -rebellions, thereby increasing the fiscal burden on the remaining land, -leading to worse exploitation, until the slate was swept clean by -dynastic collapse, general civil war, and a new Imperial house, whose -administrative decline began another cycle. The peasantry never won -completely, and never lost utterly. Today, if one judges by past -experience, rebellion or reform seems long overdue.[8] - - [Footnote 8: The author has sought to trace the political and military - aspects of this cycle in _Government in Republican China_, cited. - There are numerous works on the subject from the economists' point of - view. Outstanding are the books by John Lossing Buck, R. H. Tawney, J. - B. Condliffe, Karl Wittfogel, Ch'en Han-seng, and the articles by - Norman Hanwell (chiefly in _Asia_, _Amerasia_, and _The Far Eastern - Survey_).] - -The detailed legislation adopted by the National Government in war time -is given in Appendix I (G), and Chiang K'ai-shek's own explanation of -the new system in Appendix III (C).[9] One might explain the general -plan quite simply in terms of inter-connection between the central -government and the millions of households. The _pao-chia_ system is one -of mutual aid and mutual responsibility between households and groups of -households, under government supervision. It has appeared in China from -time to time since the Ch'in dynasty (221-203 B.C.). If used for -welfare purposes, it amounts to a recognition of the pluralistic -character of Chinese society by the government, and the happy -utilization of the family pattern. Applied for police purposes, it is -well suited to repression and terror. Thus, today the National -Government is applying the _pao-chia_ system (in relation to its whole -scheme of local government) as a measure of progress and reform, while -the Japanese encourage the same organizations in occupied China as a -device for despotism and exploitation. - - [Footnote 9: Below, p. 324, and p. 388.] - -Expressed in law, now being applied in fact, the _chia_ is a group of -six to fifteen families (households), and the _pao_, a group of six to -fifteen chia. The hsiang is formally composed of six to fifteen pao; -actually it approximates what is loosely termed a community in the -United States (_e.g._, a city ward, a single suburb, part of a rural -election district). The _ch'ü_ is the rough equivalent of a township. -The _hsien_ (district; county) is the fundamental unit of the -traditional China-wide bureaucracy. Hence the missing steps are not -those between the _hsien_, near to two thousand in number, and the -central government. The gaps occur between the half-billion Chinese and -their two thousand _hsien_. The following chart shows the broad outlines -of the system:[10] - - HSIEN - ("county") - ^ - | - Militia Elected | Schools, Kuomintang - | ^ CH'Ü | | - | | ("township") | | - | | | | | - and Police Representative | Secondary and Party - | | HSIANG | | - | | ("community") | | - | | | | | - | | PAO | | - | | ("neighborhood") | | - Organs Assemblies | Elementary Organizations - | | CHIA | | - | | ("a group of households") | | - | | | | | - | | \/ | | - | |--------->THE PEOPLE | | - | ^ | | - |____________________________|_____________|______________| - - [Footnote 10: A detailed chart will be found in Appendix III (C), at - p. 388.] - -This is the official government plan. If ever put into complete effect, -China will consist of hundreds upon hundreds of thousands of -self-governing units, arranged on seven levels (the five local levels; -provinces; nation), and the world will wonder at a massive new -democracy. In practical politics, what seems to be happening is that the -system extends to the National Government areas, involving less than -three hundred million people. Much of the application is purely formal, -and signifies no more than did the grant of an imaginary suffrage under -the first Republic. Elsewhere the new system is installed with telling -administrative effect, improving the bureaucracy, strengthening the -state, but not arousing much popular participation or enthusiasm. And in -the remainder the program is beginning to work as is intended with -genuine elections and popular participation in government. - -The three chief devices which have been applied to the reform of local -government are: instruction, mandate, and other remote controls; -inspection systems; and training courses. First are the attempts to -change local government by transmission from the capital of voluminous -instructions, manuals, etc., supplemented by similar Kuomintang action -for Party reform. In the second case, central officials go to the -provinces. During the summer of 1940, a number of such groups of -officials divided China between themselves, each group taking a number -of provinces for its inspection zone. The presence of a central -delegation in the field led to some housecleaning, provided an incentive -for immediate work, and informed the National Government of the -condition of the country. Some junketing was observable, but not enough -to vitiate the work of inspection. By the third device, local officials -are called to training centers. The Generalissimo is very fond of this -method. He encourages the selection of younger men, who thereby feel -that their careers are given a boost. They are taught modern -governmental practice while living, in most cases, a disciplined but -comfortable half-military life. Some training conferences are convened -_ad hoc_ in a promising area; others continue from year to year under -the government or related organizations. Many thousand men and women -undergo some form of training. The program has clearly discernible -effects in improving local government. The selection of persons who -either hold office or are likely to hold office provides a practical -self-interest motivation. Further minor devices of local government -reform include the grants in aid to the provinces, the establishment of -model _hsien_, the military eradication of banditry, the reclamation of -farm land and forests, some resettlement, and much planned modernization -with small-scale projects. Town after town has received the stimuli of -modernization from one of these sources. - -Estimates--nothing more could be found--concerning the effectiveness of -this program varied considerably. Since two equally skilled observers, -considering the same institution at first hand, can differ sharply in -their value judgments of efficacy or integrity, this is not surprising. -A few Westerners and Leftists have insisted that the program was almost -altogether sham. A few formal, optimistic officials have insisted that -it has succeeded almost everywhere. One competent foreign observer told -the author that he believed the _pao-chia_ system to be installed in 90 -per cent of Free China, and to be actually working in 50 per cent. -Another agreed more or less with these figures, but suggested that there -were enormous differences between the provinces, some being genuinely -transformed and others remaining unaffected. A Chinese official, himself -a social scientist, who had been intimately connected with local reform, -stated that 50 per cent application for all Free China would be much too -high an estimate, except for the holding of token elections. Only in -Kwangsi province was the new self-government structure working over -half of the countryside; elsewhere, the ratio was about one-fifth -effective as against four-fifths nominal. - -Most of all, genuine application consists in making institutions -available, and thereupon letting the people help themselves. If local -government is of practical use to the common people, they can be counted -on to discover its utility promptly. If it is of no practical use, they -will know that too. Whatever the present degree of success, obstacles -still confront the program. Local extragovernmental institutions possess -enormous vitality. If superficial or slipshod reforms are made, the new -local governments will be merely operated as screens for secret -societies, landlords' unions, or other narrow cliques. - -Contrastingly, a tradition of discussion and public action makes it -equally possible that the rural masses, familiar with cooperative -action, will operate the new institutions successfully. The difference -between success and failure is not to be measured in terms of wholly new -achievement; it is determined by the choice of existing institutions -which, transmuted and fitted, fill the pattern of the rationalized local -government system. If narrow, class-bound or unprogressive groups assume -the regalia of a novel legality, using their position to obstruct -further development, the program will fail. If the town-meeting, -cooperative potentialities of the entire adult population are aroused, -and if the ordinary farmer or coolie can see that he has the opportunity -of bettering his livelihood through political action, the success of -democracy will be assured. - -Potentialities in the field of local autonomy are enhanced by the fact -that the National Government has competitors. The Japanese have an -opportunity which, instead of utilizing, they have done their best to -destroy: conquest through prosperity. If they and their Chinese -associates offered low prices, easy marketing, and fair taxes, in the -place of arson, rape, thievery and bluster, their failure would become -less certain. As a third side to the triangle of competitive power, the -Communists and independent Left, while allied to the National -Government, rival it in winning the loyalty of the population. Huge -areas in Communist and guerrilla sections are sampling reform of a -drastic and immediate kind: the lowering of taxes, the democratization -of government, the abolition of usury. With the traitors on its Right -and the Communists or guerrillas on its Left, the National Government -does not abandon its chief politico-economic weapon by disregarding land -and labor reform. None of the three parties has anything to gain by -inaction. None has an interest which binds it to self-dooming reaction. - - -THE COMMUNIST ZONE - -Three new governmental areas which are neither provinces nor local -governments have come forth out of unification and war. Their -relationship to Chungking is strange, perhaps unique. They are not -states members of a federal union, since China is a unitary republic. -They are not new regional commissions, creatures and extensions of the -central government, because--whatever the theory--they were -independently initiated. They are not allies, because they profess -national unity. They are not rebellions, because they fight a common -enemy, only occasionally coming into conflict with government troops. -Yet they possess some of the features of each of the following: federal -states, regional subgovernments, allied states, and rebellions. They cut -across the pattern of the National Government. Two are governments; one -is an army. The army and one government are largely Communist; the other -government is a genuine United Front of the parties. Two are North -Chinese; one is Central Chinese. But all three have this in common: they -are Leftist, actively revolutionary; they are objects of patronizing -suspicion to the central authorities, who are glad of the help but worry -about its post-war cost. - -The first and most famous of these areas is the Communist zone in the -Northwest. Formally it includes eighteen _hsien_; the Communists claim -inclusion of twenty-three. After being termed the Special Administrative -District of the Chinese Republic (_Chung-hua Min-kuo T'ê-ch'ü -Chêng-fu_), and then Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Frontier Area (_Shan-kan-ning -Pien-ch'ü Chêng-fu_), the zone assumed the much more modest style of -Administrative Area of North Shensi (_Shan-pei Hsing-chêng-ch'ü_).[11] -This Frontier Area is in personnel and Party life a direct continuation -of the Chinese Soviet Republic. Leftist and Communist circles talk as -though it were a wholly autonomous state, resting on its own military -power, but cooperating with the National Government for national -resistance and reconstruction. This is largely true--at any rate, more -realistic than the opposing view, which avers that no change has taken -place in the Northern part of Shensi province, and that the Communists -are interfering with the proper processes of government. The following -is a characteristic statement of the latter position: - - At present the name "Frontier Area" seems to be very common - because it is so called in false propaganda about the - "independent sovereignty" [_tzŭ-li wei-wang_]. But if we - agree that the so-called "Frontier Area" is a part of the - territory of the Chinese Republic, the name ought to have - been issued in conformity with the decrees of the central - government. According to central government decree, it is - only a "Supplementary Recruitment Area for the Eighth Route - Army," but not an area of civil administration. [The author, - in an extended discussion, challenges the re-division of the - provinces as a matter not to be undertaken casually, denies - the legal foundation of the term "Frontier Area," and then - examines its practical justifications. He finds that the - Communists have two: the regime is now a _de facto_ system, - its existence is a _fait accompli_ and further discussion - must proceed from this point; also, the regime is founded in - popular opinion, and the government should not violate the - wishes of the people. He disagrees with both of these and - seeks to refute them, insisting on lawful procedure and - constitutional government. He concludes with a peroration to - the Communists themselves.] ... this problem is really quite - simple, unlike the Sudeten problem. Was it the Communist - Party of China which called the Sudeten Party of - Czechoslovakia violators of the unity of their own country - and running dogs of Fascism? Therefore, I think that they - would never imitate what the reactionary Sudeten party did. - And was it the Communists who originated the "United Front"? - Hence they must understand very clearly what unification - means to China, and must never utter things which they do - not really believe. Therefore, with the rising tide of - national unity and concentration, I suppose that the odd - name "Frontier Area," which is contrary to the real sense of - unification, will soon pass away and be a mere historical - term.[12] - - [Footnote 11: See above, p. 13. The last term is literally Executive - Area (or District) of North Shan (Shensi). In the text, Frontier Area - is used throughout as the simplest English equivalent.] - - [Footnote 12: Chin Chi-yin, 'Pien-ch'ü' ti Ming-ch'êng' (The Name - "Frontier Area"), in _So-wei "Pien-ch'ü_," cited above, p. 3-6.] - -In practical terms this implies the informal reconciliation of two -claims constitutionally and legally incompatible. The Chinese Communist -leaders operate under the national law codes as much as they are able. -They employ the national currency. They use the nationally standard -system for local government. They profess unity. At the same time they -maintain, as a hard reality, a separate regime in which the Communist -Party is supreme, the Party Line is gospel, and dissidents are dealt -with as "pro-Japanese traitors" or otherwise. Transit between National -Government territory and Communist territory is not altogether easy. -Leftists are reported to have died on their way to the Northwest, and -Nationalists are equally well reported to have disappeared after they -got there. - -The Area itself is an unpromising piece of land. "From 36° N. Lat. on -up, South of the Great Wall and West of the Yellow River, there lies a -vast, desolate tract of yellow plateau, inhabited by half a million -people. The plateau slopes from North to South; the further South it -runs, the lower the land lies, but it is still 1000 meters above -sea-level at the lowest place. This is what we have already known as -Northern Shensi. In this region, the ground is always covered with a -layer of yellow dust ... Furthermore, rainfall is scarce and no -irrigation has been introduced, so that agricultural products are -extremely scant. Under such geographical limitations, Northern Shensi -has become a region notorious for its poverty."[13] For a Chinese to -call an area notoriously poor implies a degree of destitution which the -American mind cannot grasp. In such an area, the welcome to Communism is -obvious, and the problems of Communism, once settled, are equally -obvious. The probability of mineral resources opens up opportunities for -development under Red rule, but these are distant. - - [Footnote 13: Ts'ui Yün-ch'ang, _Shan-pei Lun Kuo-hua_ (A Brief Sketch - of Northern Shensi), Kweilin, 1939, p. 4-5. This author concludes that - Communist rule worsened the economic status of the area. "Then there - occurred the campaigns for 'the extermination of landlordism' and for - 'division of the lands.' The result of such proletarian disturbances - was an astonishing decrease of population, caused by massacre and - emigration, and the devastation of much land." (p. 6.)] - -Interpretation of the achievements of the Communist regime vary with the -political standpoint of the observer, just as they do in the case of the -Soviet Union. Sympathetic observers, both Western and Chinese, report -enormous improvements in agriculture, fair land taxes, new cooperatives, -brilliant experimental democracy, bold education, and great -enthusiasm.[14] No unsympathetic Western visitors have been reported -admitted, and a few neutrals came away enthusiastic; but critical -Chinese have found as much to question as one might find in a similar -Western situation: terrorism, puppet elections, murder both judicial and -plain, sham education, and immorality are charged. - - [Footnote 14: See the works cited above, p. 20, n. 16. It is possible - to find a contradictory interpretation in Chinese sources for almost - every point cited by Western visitors as meritorious. Since the - Nationalists are not interested in promoting the international - reputation of the Frontier Area, and at the same time are unable to - launch any counter-propaganda (for fear of alienating Leftist - sentiment in the West, because it would give the Japanese a propaganda - advantage, and would disturb the appearance of the United Front), very - little criticism--sound or otherwise--of the Chinese Communist area - has appeared in the West. Even in a case such as the issuance of paper - money, universally regarded as a clever move by the Communists and - guerrillas, Chinese writers have charged that the issuance is fiat - currency imposed by Communist force (e.g., Wang Ssü-ch'êng, - _Ju-tz'ŭ Pien-ch'ü_ [So this is the Frontier Area!] Chungking, - 1938, p. 38 _ff._) Within China, Communism is just as open to - interpretation as the Soviets are in the Western world. Western data - now available seems to cover only one side of the case, which is - doubtless well-founded; but there must be another. There always is.] - -The position of the Frontier Area is clear in a few respects.[15] In the -first place, it is not declining. Communist strength is believed to be -growing, by persons of almost all forms of political belief; differences -arise only over the rate and probable maxima of that growth. The -Communist strength in the Northwest is far less than it was in South -Central China seven years ago, but much of that loss of power has been -compensated for by increased relations with sympathetic guerrillas. -Secondly, the Communist area is strategically poorly located. The land -itself is poor; the adjacent large cities are completely under -Nationalist control; and the general military-political locale is -something like northern Arkansas in the United States. This explains the -willingness of the Nationalist commanders to avoid friction with the -Communists, and the positive zest with which they suggest further -consolidation of Communist forces around the one center at Yenan. It -soothes the impatience of Communists who wish unrestricted rights of -agitation, organization, and propaganda throughout the country. Although -the Communists make little visible headway against the Japanese in the -great urban slums of the coast, they are anxious to obtain freer access -to city workers. Thirdly, the Communist area displays no structural -peculiarities of government. Its profound difference from the rest of -Free China is not a difference in institutional forms, but in the forces -operating behind and through those forms. The Chinese Communists have -achieved very considerable success in working within the legal limits of -another state philosophy, and have done it with a minimum of violence; -this augurs well for the perpetual continuation of the truce. Their -practical accomplishments are extensive and novel; their leadership, -brilliant; that their government should be so orthodox in form is all -the more significant. By remaining within orthodox limits they challenge -the National Government on common ground; the gain is theirs and -China's. - - [Footnote 15: Since the author has neither extensive acquaintance with - Chinese Communists, nor has visited Yenan, he offers these conclusions - more tentatively than he would others, concerning the Kuomintang.] - - -GUERRILLA GOVERNMENTS - -The special area second in importance is the Hopei-Chahar-Shansi Border -Region (_Chin-ch'a-chi Pien-ch'ü Lin-shih Hsing-chêng Wei-yüan-hui_). -Widely publicized in the Western world as the Hermit Government, this -regime functions altogether within the Japanese lines. A number of -competent Western observers have visited this area, among them Major -Evans Fordyce Carlson, Mr. Haldore Hanson, and Professor George Taylor. -All have come away most enthusiastic about the work of the government. -The governmental picture which emerges from their and other accounts is -one of a highly flexible mechanism, working with great efficacy and -superb morale.[16] The driving power behind the regime is social -revolution as a means to national resistance, made easy by the flight of -many former local bureaucrats, and by the treason of some -ultra-conservatives, who affiliated themselves with the Provisional -Government established by the Japanese in Peiping. The personnel is as -genuinely United Front as may be found anywhere in the world; the -position is eased by the circumjacency of the Japanese, and the formal -recognition of the area by the Military Affairs Commission and the -Executive _Yüan_. - - [Footnote 16: Professor George Taylor's _The Struggle for North China_ - presents a full and clear picture of the Border Region and the Peiping - regime in startlingly apposite juxtaposition. He concludes by pointing - out the significant paradox that the Japanese established a - reactionary regime designed to keep China agrarian, backward, and - exploitable, but that they had not managed to extend their affiliate - beyond the cities. The country, which they had hoped to capture, - escaped them through the political resurgence of the Border Region. P. - C. Nyi, article cited above, p. 16, n. 10, presents an outline of the - regime which supplements the first-hand materials Professor Taylor - appends to his work. Major E. F. Carlson's works, which describe this, - are _Twin Stars of China_ and _The Chinese Army_, both cited above; - the latter, a valuable contribution to the _Inquiry Series_ of the - Institute of Pacific Relations, includes Wang Yu-chuan, "The - Organization of a Typical Guerrilla Area in South Shantung" (p. - 84-130), a brilliant survey which reveals, sometimes unwittingly, the - values and dangers of a Communist-Nationalist-popular union. Mr. - Hanson's work is "_Humane Endeavour_," cited above; as a personal - account, it is the most engrossing of the group.] - -The Border Region, like smaller guerrilla areas elsewhere in occupied -China, is scarcely a domestic political problem because it is enfolded -by the Japanese armies. Even a United Front area, such as the Border -Region, would lead to far greater difficulties in political adjustment -if established in Free China. The tension and balance between the -Parties is such that this strain might not be borne. Behind the Japanese -lines, where the central armies cannot do anything even if they wish, -the Border Region finds Chungking's acquiescence to be stimulated by -Chungking's impotence. What could or will happen if the Japanese leave -the dividing area, and the Border Region has to settle the issue of -_status quo_ v. _status quo ante bellum_ with the central government, -no one knows. The Generalissimo told the present author that he did not -fear the encroachments of the guerrilla groups, because he and they were -all working for democracy. - -Following from this involuntarily protective and insulating role of the -Japanese forces is the constitutional theory of the Border Region. -Unlike the Frontier Area, where it is exceedingly difficult to gloss -over the autonomy of Communist rule, the Border Region is definitely -established as a war-time agency, controlling territory beyond the reach -of the provincial governments. The provincial governments still -function, in unoccupied corners of their provinces, or in exile, and the -openly provisional (_lin-shih_) nature of the Border Region makes it -palatable even to Kuomintang conservatives. - -The pattern of government is one of devolution from an Executive -Committee, which was established by a meeting of officials, volunteers, -mass organizations, and others at Fup'ing in January 1938. The area is -divided into provincial districts which are able to function with -economy of personnel. The following outline illustrates the structure of -this area:[17] - - EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE - - Secretariat - Civil Affairs Department - Financial Affairs Department - Education Department - Industry Department - Justice Department - - Inspectorates of the Seven Provincial Districts - - _Hsien_ Governments or Joint _Hsien_ Governments or - Sub-_Hsien_ Governments - - _Hsien_ Districts - - Village Committees - - [Footnote 17: P. C. Nyi, article cited in _The Chinese Year Book - 1938-39_, p. 255. Reading between the lines will illustrate much of - the Chungking attitude.] - -A very high degree of direct popular government has been achieved. Over -wide areas, the average age of the _hsien_ magistrates is in the -twenties. Recruitment to the Region of numerous professors and students -from Peiping has helped to fill the need for trained personnel, and has -assisted in maintaining the area as a genuine multi-group affair rather -than a Communist front. Communists, although present and highly -esteemed, do not hold the highest formal offices. (For further -consideration of the United Front problem, see below, p. 123.) - -The New Fourth Army (_Hsin-ssŭ-chün_), third of the special zones, -was formed by re-consolidation of the small mutually isolated Soviet -areas left behind when the main Communist forces made the celebrated -Long March. When first assembling under the truce, these Red units faced -a certain amount of difficulty from the provincial military who did not -grasp the United Front idea, but the Military Affairs Commission -recognized them. The Army did not establish a government except through -its Political Department, which coordinated political work of the -volunteer village committees.[18] - - [Footnote 18: On the New Fourth Army, see Epstein, I., _The People's - War_, cited above, p. 260 _ff._ Agnes Smedley, the well-known - pro-Communist writer, has lived among the New Fourth recently. Another - foreign visitor has been Jack Belton, of the Shanghai _Evening Post_. - Publicity for the New Fourth Army, reduced to an absolute minimum by - Chungking, is handled by an independent agency, the New China - Information Committee (not to be confused with the semi-official China - Information Committee) in Hong Kong. The China Defense League, in - which the moving spirit is Mme. Sun Yat-sen, also in Hong Kong, acts - as an agency for receiving gifts, etc., for the Army.] - -According to available reports, the Army stands far to the Left of the -Border Region. Formally United Front, its proportion of Communists is -much higher and Communist control more telling. Operating in East -Central China--the Anhwei-Kiangsu-Kiangsi-Fukien-Chekiang area--which -provided the base of ten years' Communist insurrection and was long the -home of the Chinese Soviet Republic, the New Fourth Army Zone represents -a recrudescence of Soviet activities under different names and with a -different military objective. This fact has caused intense -dissatisfaction among some Kuomintang generals, who spent half their -careers trying to root out Communism in that same area. They do not mind -the Communist zone in the Northwest, where an effective informal _cordon -sanitaire_ can be drawn, but renewed Communist activity in the Yangtze -valley impresses them as an evil not much less than pro-Japanese -treason. - -The New Fourth Zone, the Border Region, and the Frontier Area--together -with a wide scattering of guerrilla areas and governments individually -of less but collectively of equal importance--are the military -step-children of the Chinese government. They all receive subsidies for -their work, varying in amount. Usually this is calculated on the number -of _hsien_ actually occupied as bases, so that the sum provides for a -far smaller number of villages than those directly affected. In the case -of troops, the salary allowances are based on the permitted size of the -units, in almost all cases below the actual numbers. The money is paid -to the commanders or other leading officials, who then set salary rates -incomparably lower than those of the central forces. The money thus -saved is applied to the general budget of the forces. Corruption, while -occasional and inescapable, seems to be more sharply punished in the -guerrilla than in the government areas. - -In January 1941, the New Fourth Army was officially abolished, following -a clash with regular National Government forces. The clash arose from a -fundamental difference between the Generalissimo and the New Fourth -leaders concerning the nature of the Chinese government. The Communists -and their sympathizers held that the unity of China was a political -union between separate groups. When the Generalissimo ordered the New -Fourth Army to move North, and oppose the Japanese forces above the -Yangtze, the New Fourth countered with a demand for arms and funds. -Treating this as military insubordination in war time, the central -forces attacked the New Fourth--each side claiming that the other opened -hostilities--capturing Yeh Ting, the commander. The rest of the Army was -officially abolished, although its main forces were within the occupied -zone and outside the Generalissimo's reach. A full Communist-Nationalist -clash was avoided, however, and the Red leaders unwillingly acquiesced -in the Generalissimo's interpretation of the episode as a military and -not a political affair. The conflict brought forth the fundamental -Communist question: are the Chinese Communists loyal first to the -Chinese government, or first to the Communist Party? No answer was -forthcoming, although the Communists failed to rebel elsewhere. The -Generalissimo, by military swiftness and political acumen, had triumphed -in one more particular instance. - -With the parsimonious policy of the central government keeping them in -fiscal extremity, the more Leftist guerrilla units make up their lack of -funds with direct economic measures. These include suspensions of rents -to landlords, regulation of share-cropping, lowering of taxes on the -poorer farmers, and creation of cooperatives. The Communists have -strained every point to avoid actual class war, and the economic reforms -of the guerrilla and special areas are smoothed by the usual absence of -the landlords. The political necessity of a bold economic policy remains -important, if the special areas are to continue their activity against -Japan or--in the Frontier Area case--their independence. Political -development thus is inclined to stress the use of popular machinery of -government, not for the creation of systematic, modern, responsible -bureaucracy, but for pushing vigorous mass action, direct popular -government, and socio-economic reconstruction, revolutionary by -implication if not by immediate content. - -Not all the guerrilla areas fall into the Left pattern. The Kuomintang, -so long habituated to control of the state mechanism that its -revolutionary background is somewhat dimmed, is bringing Kuomintang -guerrilla work into action. The Party and Government War Area Commission -is the chief supervisory agency for this work, and an enormous amount of -planning has been done. Actual application of mass-movement work seems -as yet to lag behind that of the Left. Meanwhile, in most areas except -the Communist Northwest, Kuomintang officers, officials, teachers, and -volunteers are active. The guerrilla groups all accept the same flag, -hail Chiang as their leader, recognize the _San Min Chu I_ as the state -ideology, and maintain the cherished symbols of unity. - -The Government and the Kuomintang were reportedly seeking a settlement -of the whole special-area problem, in anticipation of the close of war, -by urging the movement of all Communist or Communist-infiltrated forces -Northward, so that a more or less continuous Left corridor would run -from the Border Region to the Frontier Area. This precipitated the clash -with the New Fourth Army; in March 1941 no settlement has been reached. -Part of this is owing to the Communist desire to have unrestricted -agitational rights, and to official Kuomintang insistence that no Party -other than itself is constitutionally legitimate. The special areas -meanwhile prepare fighters in the anti-Japanese war, and are helped by a -government which is proud of them as Chinese but mistrustful of them as -Leftists. And they develop vigorous applications of democratic formulae -which challenge the reality and sincerity of everything the National -Government does behind the lines. - -Despite recurrent clashes, it is likely that the areas and the -government will continue their present relations. In part this is owing -to the genuineness of the universal hatred of Japan and the devotion to -the long-cherished unification now achieved; in even greater part the -wrangling, acrimonious, but effective cooperation of the government and -the guerrilla Left depends on their equal and great desire for such -cooperation. The highest Kuomintang leaders--above all others, -Chiang--have pledged themselves to unity and cooperation, and are -determined to eschew civil war in the midst of invasion; the higher -Communist leaders are equally determined. In three years of -collaboration, the highest officers on each side have developed very -genuine respect for each other's sincerity. Quarrels are provoked by the -men in-between, overbearing Nationalists or the doctrinaire Communists, -who cannot forget 1927-37. (The author talked to one Communist leader -who had an odd, not unattractive muscular tic in his face: the -consequence of Kuomintang torture a few years past. Yet he collaborates, -and so do his Kuomintang equivalents, men whose parents lie in unknown -graves.) The common people on both sides want peace above all else, -internal peace between factions, and peace--after victory, and then -only--with Japan. The juxtaposed and competitive forces watch one -another, compete in the development of institutions, and engage in an -auction of good government: whoever wins the deepest love and esteem of -the Chinese people wins China in the end. Few institutional reforms in -the West have had such fateful stimuli. - - - - -CHAPTER V - -THE KUOMINTANG - - -The Kuomintang, a Chinese political party, was formed by federation of -old anti-Manchu secret societies, and has become the vehicle for the -will of its Leader, Sun Yat-sen: constitutionally and legally it is the -superior of the Chinese National Government; administratively, one of -the three chief organs of policy execution for the regime; politically, -the only legal political party in Free China. It has had undisputed -primacy, but not monopoly, in domestic Chinese politics for fourteen -years. Despite revolutionary purposes, and idealistic obligations, the -Kuomintang is responsible for the welfare of the government which it -created. Its interest is therefore superior to and identical with the -government's; the party of a one-party state has no business criticizing -the government, since the party at all times possesses the means of -correction or change. - -By its constitution and organization the Party is democratic. In -practice it has been a loose oligarchy, similar to the machinery whereby -American presidential candidates are nominated. In composition it is by -its own statement a cross section of China, composed of persons who -qualify as a political elite by their zeal in seeking and obtaining -entrance to the Party. Administratively, the Kuomintang possesses a -group of Ministries (_pu_), closely similar to the governmental -ministries, and executing quasi-governmental policy, plus an additional -group of separate or affiliated organizations having common purposes. In -power politics, the Kuomintang claims supremacy in all unoccupied China -and legitimate power over the occupied areas; in practice it yields -frequently to the demands of dissidents. In function, its highest -purpose--bequeathed by Sun Yat-sen--is to destroy its own monopoly of -power when the time for democracy shall come; like medicine, it is -committed to the eradication of the reason for its own existence. - - -THE PARTY CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM - -The Kuomintang adopted a Party-Constitution after thirty-odd years of -activity when, at the suggestion of Soviet advisers, it reorganized on -January 28, 1924 as a formal party, with membership books, regular dues, -etc. Up to then it had operated through techniques intermediate in -formality between American major-party looseness and Chinese -secret-society formality. In twelve chapters, the Constitution dealt -with Membership, Organization, Special Areas, the Leader (Sun Yat-sen, -_Tsung-li_), the Highest Party Organs, Provincial Party Organization, -_Hsien_ Organization, District (_ch'ü_) Organization, and Sub-district -(_ch'ü-fên_, roughly equivalent to the _pao_ in local government) -Organization, Terms of Office, Discipline, and Finance.[1] The actual -application of this Constitution is best described in the words of Wang -Shih-chieh, who wrote before the current hostilities:[2] - - The system of organization of the Chinese Kuomintang is - based upon the _Constitution and Bye-laws of the Chinese - Kuomintang_ [_Chung-kuo Kuo-min-tang Hsien-chang_] which was - passed in the First Party Congress [_Ch'üan-kuo Tai-piao - Ta-hui_] on January 28, Year XIII [1924], and amended in the - following two Party Congresses on January 16, Year XV - [1926] and on March 27, Year XVIII [1929]. No amendment of - any sort was made in the Fourth and Fifth Party Congresses - held in the Years XX [1931] and XXIV [1935] respectively. - - According to the above _Constitution and Bye-Laws_, the - Kuomintang has five divisional organizations, _viz._: one - for the whole country, one for each province, one for each - _hsien_ (or governmental district), one for each district, - and one for each district subdivision [_ch'ü-fên-pu_]. The - organ possessing the highest authority in the Kuomintang is - the Party Congress of the Kuomintang. When this Congress is - not in session, the Central Executive Committee is the - highest authority. The organization of the Congress and the - method of electing the Delegates are fixed by the Central - Executive Committee, while the members of the Central - Executive Committee are elected by the Party Congress. - Moreover the number of these members is also fixed by the - Congress. Article I of the "Outlines of the Organization of - the Central Executive Committee," passed in the First - Session of the Fifth Central Executive Committee Meeting, on - December 6, Year XXIV [1935], provides: "The Central - Executive Committee appoints nine standing members of the - Committee, to form a Standing Committee which shall - discharge the duties of the Central Executive Committee when - the latter is not in Session. The Standing Committee is - provided with a Chairman and a Vice-Chairman, elected from - among the nine standing members." Hence it can be said that - when the Central Executive Committee is not in session, this - Standing Committee represents the highest authority of the - Kuomintang. The offices of the Chairman [superseded by the - Party Chief, _Tsung-ts'ai_] and the Vice-Chairman have been - provided for since December, Year XXIV [1935]. Whether the - Chairman can be the representative of the highest authority - of the Kuomintang or not, under the tacit consent of the - Standing Committee, still depends upon the changes in - circumstances. The said "Outlines of the Organization" does - not state clearly the rights and duties of the Chairman and - the Vice-Chairman. Hence, the highest authorities of the - Kuomintang as prescribed by various written laws are (1) the - Party Congress, (2) the Central Executive Committee, and (3) - the Standing Committee of the Central Executive Committee. - When the larger organ is not in session, the next following - organ represents the highest authority of the Kuomintang. - But this only applies in theory. As a matter of fact, when - the lower organs are exercising their power, they can not - but be limited by certain restrictions. Whenever important - questions arise which may cause fierce disputes among - members or among the people, the lower organs which have the - authority to decide when the upper organ is not in session - usually reserve the questions for discussion in the meeting - of the upper organ. The resolutions passed by the upper - organs--the Party Congress down to the Central Executive - Committee Meeting--are usually elastic so that the lower - organs--the Standing Committee up to the Central Executive - Committee--do not experience great difficulties or - restrictions in facing various troublesome situations. - - According to the _Constitution and Bye-Laws of the Chinese - Kuomintang_, there is, besides the Central Executive - Committee, a Central Control Committee for the Kuomintang. - Its organization is similar to that of the Central Executive - Committee, though with fewer members. It occupies the same - rank as the Central Executive Committee, and its duty is to - superintend and inspect the personnel of the Kuomintang. - - The names and organizations of the various organs directly - controlled by the Central Executive Committee have - unavoidably undergone some changes, though in principle - their structures have remained the same. According to the - "Outlines of the Organization of the Central Executive - Committee," the organs under it are divided along three - lines: organization, publicity, and popular training, with - various committees. These organs are to discharge all - affairs of the Kuomintang. Besides these, there is a - Political Committee [superseded by the Supreme National - Defense Council], to "act as the highest directing organ in - all governmental policies and to be responsible to the - Central Executive Committee." Although these organs are - authorized by the Central Executive Committee and formed in - the Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee, the - Standing Committee can still exercise authority over them - when the Central Executive Committee is not in session, - because in accordance with the _Constitution and Bye-Laws_, - the Standing Committee takes the place of the Central - Executive Committee. As a matter of fact, since the - activities along the lines of organization, publicity, and - popular training are the internal activities within the - Kuomintang, these organs are usually under the rigid - control of the Standing Committee. As the Political - Committee discharges various political affairs, its position - may be said to be independent. Any resolution passed by this - Committee is sent to the government for execution, and the - Standing Committee has no power to restrict its activities. - Hence under the party government of the Chinese Kuomintang, - the Political Committee is in reality the highest directing - and supervisory authority in matters concerning governmental - policies. - - [Footnote 1: The text of this Constitution is given in Arthur N. - Holcombe's invaluable study of the Great Revolution, _The Chinese - Revolution: A Phase in the Regeneration of a World Power_, Cambridge, - Massachusetts, 1930, p. 356-70.] - - [Footnote 2: Wang Shih-chieh, _Pi-chiao Hsien-fa_, Shanghai, XXVI - (1937), p. 651-3.] - -The Emergency Party Congress of the Kuomintang, Hankow, March 29-April -1, 1938, provided for two further amendments to the Party Constitution. -It abolished the system of reserve members, and, far more significantly, -it created the post of _Tsung-ts'ai_, here translated Party Chief, which -was indistinguishable except as a matter of terminology from the post of -_Tsung-li_, held in perpetuity by Sun Yat-sen. Chiang K'ai-shek was -elected Party Chief, and the powers of his office were stated to be -duplicates of those given originally to the _Tsung-li:_ a general -provision that "all members shall follow the direction of" the -_Tsung-li_, which was not implemented; chairmanship of the Party -Congress and of the Central Executive Committee (_a fortiori_, of the -Standing Committee of the C.E.C.); and a veto over the acts of the -Congress and the C.E.C. Furthermore, the Political Committee (Central -Political Council) was replaced by the Supreme National Defense Council, -of which Chiang was also elected Chairman. - -Since Chiang had been Chairman of the Standing Committee, it follows -that the change of formal labels did not much alter the constitutional -organization of the Kuomintang, nor materially change Chiang's position. -Chiang does not help to create machinery of power in order to lurk -behind it, thus proclaiming it a mere façade. He, as a public servant -reared in the Confucian tradition, possesses sufficient respect for -words to let them mean what they are publicly declared to mean. The -post of _Tsung-ts'ai_ is more than ample in providing Chiang with the -power he feels necessary to accomplish national unification, mitigate -social injustice, and promote serious representative government. He -accepts the full measure of his power; doing so publicly, his subsequent -actions appear relatively modest. By Western standards, Chiang is naive -enough to be honest. - -A point brought out in connection with the National Government (p. 46, -above) is worth reiteration. Neither by Party action nor by governmental -change has the Kuomintang monopoly of political power been modified by -law. There is no United Front, Popular Front, or any other kind of front -in the legal system; even in practical administration, the entrance of -non-Party men has been at Party direction; and it is only in the Special -Areas, the special war services, and the military organization that the -Kuomintang has relaxed its control of power. Other groups are sharing in -the work of the People's Political Council. The prudence of such a -policy may appear open to question; its consistency is not. - - -PARTY ORGANIZATION - -Organizationally the Party is bipolar, with the power concentrated in -the entire membership at the base, and in the Chief (_Tsung-ts'ai_) at -the apex. The highest authority of the Kuomintang is the Party Congress -(_Ch'üan-kuo Tai-piao Ta-hui_), which could also be translated as -All-Nation Convention of Party Delegates. Party Congresses have been -held as follows: I, Canton, 1924; II, Canton, 1926; III, Nanking, 1929; -IV, Nanking, 1931; V, Nanking, 1935; and the Emergency Party Congress, -Hankow, 1938. Wang Ch'ing-wei organized a rump Kuomintang on the basis -of a "Sixth Party Congress" held in 1939; the legitimate Sixth Congress -has not yet been called. - -The Party Congress is the highest agency of the Kuomintang, and thereby -the highest legal authority in China--a position which it now shares -with the Party Chief, _ex officio_ its Chairman. The Kuomintang Party -Constitution provides that the Congress should ordinarily meet every -other year (_Art._ 27), but permits the C.E.C. to postpone a Congress -for not more than one year. This provision has frequently been violated. -In actual effect the Congress is neither an effective governing body, -nor, at the other extreme, a completely helpless tool. No Party Congress -has led to a drastic shift of actual political power. - -The barometer of influence functions outside the Congress, and the -Congress ratifies and establishes what has actually occurred. The high -authority of the incumbent C.E.C. in matters of accrediting delegates, -plus its power to appoint delegates from areas not represented (a -feature taken from Soviet practice), gives the political Ins a -formidable weapon with which to bludgeon down opposition, but since the -value of the Party Congress is that of a legitimizing agency, overt -interference with Party functions would destroy the utility of the -Congress. Its level of freedom and efficacy may be compared with -American party conventions. Unwieldy, improvised agencies are not able -to meet the challenges of well-knit executive groups, but their very -unmanageability preserves to them a freedom of incalculable action. The -Party Congress could not in practice exercise its formal, legal power of -overthrowing the entire Party leadership and starting the Party off on a -new tack; it could, however, so humiliate the incumbents by subtle but -obvious political gestures familiar to all Chinese, that the leadership -would retire for reasons of health, or because of a yearning to -contemplate the cosmos. - -The elaborate structure of the Kuomintang is shown on the chart of -organization (p. 331). Abstraction of the most essential features of -this chart reveals the following: - - -------------KUOMINTANG PARTY CONGRESS------------- - || Chairman: The Chief || - || || || - \/ \/ \/ - CENTRAL CONTROL CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE SUPREME NATIONAL - COMMITTEE Chairman: The Chief -----> DEFENSE COUNCIL - || || || - \/ \/ \/ - the _control_ power Party administration The National Government - over the Party through subordinate organs of China - || || || - \/ \/ \/ - supervisory system Party Branches, the political system - agencies and affiliates - -The Central Executive Committee (_Chung-yang Chih-hsing Wei-yüan-hui_) -is a relatively large body with one hundred and twenty members. The -Party Constitution requires that it meet every six months or less. These -sessions, the Plenary Sessions of the C.E.C., are by far the -best-established political processes in the Chinese state. Actual shifts -in power are here fought out, since the C.E.C. possesses authority ample -for almost any emergency. The expulsion of Wang Ch'ing-wei was effected -through C.E.C. action, and did not require the work of any higher body. - -The Central Control Committee (_Chung-yang Chien-ch'a Wei-yüan-hui_) is -an agency which the Chinese adapted from two sources, the Bolshevik -pattern of an independent intra-party control system, and the native -_chien-ch'a_ power. Similar in function to the Commission of Party -Control employed by the Communist Party in the Soviet Union rather than -to the Organization Bureau, the Central Control Committee (also termed, -in another common translation, Central Supervisory Committee) is in -charge of an inspective system. Because of the relative laxness of -Kuomintang organization, the work of this Committee is far less than one -might expect. It has not been adequate to ensure rigidly strict Party -efficiency, diligence, or honesty; neither has it become a terrorist -agency inflicting an inviolable Party line. Few faults in politics fail -to be virtues as well; inefficiency has its minor compensations. In -times of secure power, rigid Party discipline might let the Kuomintang -grow into a genuine and full-fledged tyranny; nevertheless, in times of -stress, such as the present, the Party stands in need of stiffening and -control. - -The third agency, the Supreme National Defense Council, is the Party's -agent in charge of government. (See above, p. 46 _ff._) - -Immediately under the Central Executive Committee there are three -agencies of vitality and importance. The first of these is the _San Min -Chu I Ch'ing-nien T'uan_ (usually translated _San Min Chu I_ Youth -Corps, or Kuomintang Youth Corps). A war-time addition to the Party, it -became politically possible when the abandonment of appeasement -re-aligned government and youth. The Communist Youth Corps (_Kung-ch'an -Ch'ing-nien T'uan_) provided a model and rival. The Constitution of the -Corps, together with an appraisal (from the official point of view) of -its work, is given below in Appendices II (B) and II (C). In terms of -practical political effect, the Corps is significant, although far less -important than its organization scheme would indicate. It combines some -of the functions of a military training system with social and -propaganda work. Leftists have complained against it bitterly as an -agency of espionage and repression within student groups; others have -acclaimed it as a meeting of the Kuomintang and the youth, fruitful in -terms of national unity. The importance of the Corps lies in its -organization of a broad group of young men, one or more steps up from -the bottom of the economic scale, and in the fact that the government -and Kuomintang--after years of overriding youth opinion--now find it -feasible to organize their own affiliate. Few charges of corruption have -touched the Corps, which lies particularly within the purview of the -Generalissimo. A minor but active element in the political scene, it -stands for the Kuomintang's bid for permanence, and, in the event of -internal dissension, would be a valuable prop to the _status quo_. The -political indecision and laxness of China in general has kept the group -from becoming either a _Hitlerjugend_ or a frankly democratic C.C.C. -(Civilian Conservation Corps) on the American plan; the Corps is at best -a laggard bid to young men, and a belated competition with the Left and -the Communists.[3] - - [Footnote 3: See _China at War_, Vol. V, No. 3 (October 1940), p. - 77-8, for a recent official account of the Corps.] - -The Party Affairs Committee (_Tang-wu Wei-yüan-hui_) supplements the -work of the Central Control Committee in investigating Party personnel -and acting as a supplementary housekeeping agency for intra-Party -organization. - -The third of these agencies is the [Central] Training Committee -(_Hsün-lien Wei-yüan-hui_). To this Committee has fallen the labor of -invigorating the Kuomintang under conditions of strain, from war, from -the Wang schism, and from new domestic competition. The Generalissimo -has put the most vigorous efforts into the work of this agency, and has -organized under it a Kuomintang Training Corps (_Hsün-lien T'uan_) which -is providing extensive new resources of leadership to the Party. -Enterprising or promising young men are gathered together in training -meetings, and given intensive work in Party doctrine, propaganda and -organization methods, local administration, etc. The Corps has tended to -accept youths and some men of middle age from positions of -responsibility, and to equip them with the knowledge and the discipline -necessary to continuation of pre-democratic government. In the constant -race between government activity as a positive force and government -apathy combined with outside anti-governmental revolution as negative -forces, the training agencies are doing as much as any single enterprise -to stabilize the regime. - -The Central Political Institute (_Chung-yang Chêng-chih Hsüeh-hsiao_) -tops the entire program, as a training agency combining features of a -university, a camp, and a Party office. Under the personal control and -leadership of Dr. Ch'ên Kuo-fu, one of the Generalissimo's intimates and -the elder of the celebrated Ch'ên brothers, the Institute stands high -for its selection of students, the discipline and instruction it -imparts, and its practical political effect. The Kuomintang, pronounced -moribund by competent foreign observers ten years ago, today is in a -better position for leadership and development than it has been for many -years. (The author, who visited the Institute during the summer of 1940, -found the student body as well disciplined as any he has seen outside of -Germany, the staff highly competent [mostly American-trained], and the -physical facilities unsurpassed.) Admission to the Institute is open to -graduates of Middle Schools (secondary); students who are married may be -admitted, but single students may not marry while in attendance. The -courses of study are in general the equivalent of American undergraduate -work, although some graduate study is offered. The curriculum includes -such subjects as military training, Japanese language and politics, and -Marxian thought (in connection with _min shêng chu-i_). The general -course is supplemented by two special courses--the Civil Service -Training Corps and the Advanced Civil Service Training Corps--which are -set up in collaboration with the Examination _Yüan_. Graduates are -organized into alumni associations, to which the faculty are admitted as -supervisory members. It is a matter of success and distinction to -undergo the training of the Institute, which is the equivalent of a West -Point for political and governmental work. The Generalissimo visits the -Institute and speaks before it as much as possible, frequently as often -as bi-weekly, but with occasional gaps of months.[4] In addition to the -Central Political Institute, there is a [Kuomintang] Northwest Academy -of Youth, which has been even more active in training young men for -Party and government service. Proximity to the Red training center at -Yenan makes its work urgent; training, according to report, is briefer, -cruder, and more vigorous than in the central agency. The sub-surface -possibility of renewed class war by the Communists makes the Academy -peculiarly necessary. - - [Footnote 4: Information given the author by Dr. Ch'ên Kuo-fu and - members of his staff, at the Central Political Institute, August 18, - 1940. Few places are more beautiful than the valley in which the cool, - spacious buildings of the Institute are set. Landscaped for centuries, - and celebrated as a beauty spot, the area is filled with carved - shrines, severely simple monuments, and flagstone walks. A river runs - through a forested gorge; waterfalls feed the stream. - - Dr. Ch'ên supplemented his hospitality in Western China by - transmitting to the author a series of statements in reply to - questions which were put to him in writing. Of these, the two most - interesting refer, first, to the economic status of the Institute's - students, and secondly, to the Kuomintang training plan in the - Northwest: "Judged by functions and economic levels, students of the - Central Political Institute represent all economic strata of Chinese - society. Those of peasant origin are most numerous, forming over 40% - of the total number."--"For the purpose of educating young men and - women in the border provinces, the Central Political Institute has - established a School for the Border Provinces, of which branches were - established at Powtow (Suiyuan province), Sinin (Chinghai province), - and Kangting (Sikong province) in October 1934. Another branch was - established at Shuchow (Kansu province) in August 1935, this being the - school sponsored by the Kuomintang in the Northwest. The Powtow branch - was suspended in 1940, and those in Sinin and Kangting were handed - over to the Provincial Governments concerned at the same time. So the - only Kuomintang school in the Northwest at present is the one at - Shuchow. It is subdivided into three parts: namely, a Normal School, a - Middle School, and a Primary School. Its annual budget is one hundred - thousand dollars Chinese national currency." (Letter to the author, - March 10, 1941.)] - -Apart from the Youth Corps, the training agencies, and the Party Affairs -Committee, but also directly underneath the Kuomintang C.E.C., come the -coordinated and uncoordinated agencies of Party administration. Their -organization is as follows: - - C.E.C. OF THE KUOMINTANG - STANDING COMMITTEE - - |||| |||||||| - _San Min Chu I_ Youth Corps-|||| ||||||||- Central Secretariat - ||| ||||||| - Training Committee-----------||| |||||||-- Party-Ministry of - Training Agencies || |||||| Organization - || ||||||--- Party-Ministry of Publicity - Party Affairs Committee-------|| ||||| - | |||||---- Party-Ministry of Social - Affiliates-------------------- | |||| Affairs - ||||----- Party-Ministry of Overseas - ||| Chinese Affairs - |||------ Party-Ministry of Women's - || Affairs - ||------- Special Committees: - | Revolutionary Achievement - | Investigation Committee - | Pension Committee - | Party History Committee - | Revolutionary Loans - | Committee - | Overseas-Chinese - Party Field Contributions Committee - Agencies - -The Party-Ministries[5] constitute a part of the governing machinery of -China. The Organization Party-Ministry is important because of its -intra-Party work; the Minister, Dr. Ch'u Chia-hua, a German-educated -student, is one of the most active Party leaders, and deeply suspect by -the Left. His work is the field of Kuomintang Party administration. The -Party-Ministries of Social and Overseas Chinese Affairs combine the -functions of government with those of the Party; the former is a bureau -of protocol, and the latter acts as an extra-governmental colonial -office. The Secretariats provide study agencies for the governmental -system. They perform functions which are in the United States both -governmental and private (e.g., the work of the Brookings Institution, -the Public Administration Clearing House, the various Presidential -research and advisory committees, and intra-departmental housekeeping -agencies). The system of local government reform is sponsored by the -Central Kuomintang Secretariat (_Chung-yang Mi-shu-ch'u_), even more -than by the Ministry of the Interior in the government, under whose -jurisdiction it falls. The Secretary-General is a benign revolutionary -veteran, Yeh-Ch'u-tsang; the Deputy Secretary-General, Dr. K'an -Nai-kuang, is a Party official of almost twenty years' standing, who -studied in the United States and visited Europe in quest of data on -administration. Boundlessly energetic, he is typical of the younger -scholars who combine the academic and the political and impart to the -Kuomintang a large share of its present energy. - - [Footnote 5: The term _pu_ is usually translated Board, but the - _pu-chang_ (_pu_ chief) is given as Minister. Since the identical - terms are rendered Ministry, Minister, Vice-Minister, etc., in the - case of the government, the term Party-Ministry is here adopted as - both distinct and descriptive.] - -Internationally, the most important Party-Ministry is that of Publicity -(_Chung-yang Hsüan-ch'uan Pu_), which carries out most of the Chinese -propaganda program. Headed by Dr. Wang Shih-chieh, a very outspoken man, -its functions are distributed between Sections of General Affairs, -Motion Pictures, Newspapers, Advisory, Consultation, and International -Publicity, together with services such as China's leading semi-official -news service (the Central News Agency), the Party newspapers, the -Central Motion Picture Studios, and the official broadcasting system. -Because of the difficulties of language, travel, and passports, the -International Department supplies most of the news which reaches the -world press from Free China. The function of the Western newspapermen -consists largely in editing and supplementing this news from whatever -independent source they can find, or, occasionally and at the cost of -considerable hardship, to attempt to discover the facts for themselves. - - -In general, the Chinese follow the policy of giving the favorable side -of the news, simply omitting anything that could conceivably be -unfavorable. Their publicity services are no more guilty of positive -_suggestio falsi_ than the services of the British or Americans. -Nevertheless, Chinese notions of dignity and public policy differ widely -from Americans'; news would be hard to obtain or valueless when -obtained, except for the fact that the staff of the International -Section is almost entirely American-trained and well-acquainted with -American notions of news. The very able and active Hollington Tong, one -of China's most successful newspapermen, who was in press work long -before he became a Party official, has led in the supply of ample news -in the face of great difficulties. He is esteemed by Westerners to be, -along with Mme. Chiang, one of the Generalissimo's most effective -publicity advisers. - -The Party-Ministry of Publicity also attends to the needs and interests -of Western newspapermen and other visitors, arranging appointments, -schedules, etc., and even boarding many of them at a Press Hostel. These -attentions, while from time to time irritatingly restrictive, are in the -end almost always appreciated as invaluable. Only the Leftists shun the -Publicity Ministry; they do so unsuccessfully, and to their loss. No -other Asiatic, and few Western, states can boast as alert and effective -a system of propaganda. In the troubled shifts and crises of world -politics, the Chinese have managed to retain the sympathy of the most -diverse audiences--from American church people to Soviet agitation -squads, and from British conservatives to Nazi clubs in Germany. The -American traditions of frankness, zest, liveliness in news are -transplanted; while they have suffered a sea-change, they still operate -with telling effect.[6] - - [Footnote 6: Visitors to Chungking owe much to the Foreign Affairs - Section of the International Publicity Department. Its chief, the - affable Mr. C. C. Chi, a well-known economist from Shanghai, has acted - as host to almost every visitor to Hankow or Chungking. He has - fulfilled endless requests--many of them irrational--with unfailing - patience, good humor, candor, and intelligence. Few books on - contemporary China fail to bear the imprint of his help; the present - one is no exception.] - -The Ministry of Women's Affairs, decreed in 1940, is in process of -organizing women's work for the Party. Previously, most women's -organizations had been knit together in the affiliated New Life -Movement. The minor committees of the Party--historical, pensions, -etc.--lie outside the scope of war activities. Although they continue, -their functions are subordinate to the purposes of resistance and -reconstruction. - -Formal field organization follows seven patterns: - - -----------------------PARTY CONGRESS - | | - Central Party Chief - Control | - Committee Central Executive Committee - Standing Committee - | - Party Secretariat - | - ------------Central Party Administrative System---------------- - | | | | | | | - | Overseas- | | | | Provincial - | Chinese | | | | Party - | Party | | | | Organ - | Organ | | | | | - | | | | | | | - | | | Special | | | - | | | Party Organ | | | - | | Special for Army | | _Hsien_ - Direct | Party Navy, | Special or - Overseas- | Organ Air Forces | Municipal Municipal - Chinese | for and | Party Party - Party | Railwaymen Military | Organ Organ - Organ | and Schools | | | - | | Seamen | | | | - | | | | Direct District District - | Branch District District District Party Party - | Party Party Organ Party Organ Party Organ Organ - | Organ | | organ | | - | | | | | | | - Sub-organ Sub-organ Sub- Sub- Sub- Sub- Sub- - [_Pu-fên_] | district district district district district - | | Party Party Party Party Party - | | Organ Organ Organ Organ Organ - | | | | | | | - Small Small Small Small Small Small Small - Group Group Group Group Group Group Group - [_Hsiao-tsu_] - -Much of this exists only on paper. After the break with the Communists -in 1927, and the transformation of the Kuomintang from a -government-destroying to a governing agency, the functional and -agitational groups were allowed to slip into desuetude. Under the -pressure of war, and the encouraging political situation, which puts a -premium on action, the Kuomintang has adopted a variety of policies -designed to maintain its position. - - -THE KUOMINTANG BID FOR LEADERSHIP - -Chief among the new devices is the reintroduction of the Small Group, or -Party Cell (_hsiao-tsu_). A comprehensive plan for small-unit -organization has been proclaimed; the text is given below, Appendix II -(D). This cell system, as explained by the Deputy Secretary-General of -the Kuomintang, Dr. K'an Nai-kuang, will provide the roots of the Party -with new vigor.[7] The small group provides for further diffusion of -Party work, and introduces novel principles of political organization to -the Party. Self-criticism, airing of opinion, mutual personal -examination--these are expected to stimulate Party work. The war -provides the Party with the opportunity to do with ease things which -seemed insurmountably slow and difficult before Japanese bombers helped -unification. Opium-suppression, bandit-eradication, and similar work of -organization and improvement challenges the Party to further effort. The -imminence of democracy requires more intensive preparation in discussion -and in self-organization for small groups. The _hsiao-tsu_ system is -designed to bolster Party morale, improve the Party work, and spread the -teaching of Sun Yat-sen. - - [Footnote 7: Statement to the author at Kuomintang Central - Headquarters, Chungking, July 16, 1940; Dr. K'an also supplied the - facts for the new organizational features of the Party. The following - interpretations are the author's alone.] - -The new governmental pattern of local government is to be reinforced by -the corresponding development of Kuomintang agencies. In the -government's plan, rural development operates on four levels: the -militia; the school system; the agricultural and industrial -cooperatives; and the political organization. The same person in each -village or hamlet would be responsible for all four. If he is to be a -Party man, he must be effective to be of service and a credit to the -Party. - -In order to eradicate undesirable personnel, the Kuomintang has -increased its Party-purging facilities with what is known as the Party -Supervisor's Net (_Tang-jên Chien-ch'a Wang_). By action of the C.E.C. -on June 13, 1940, the sub-district Party organs are to elect one to -three members each to serve, with a six months' term, as Control -Members. With a power of report on Party discipline, and responsibility -for Party conditions, this change was expected to drive undesirables -more effectively out of the Party. - -Three years from 1940 was set as the final date for the installation of -the new system. While the fractionization of a Party may seem to be of -minor importance, it actually is a major factor in the potential -development of the Kuomintang. In the period of Party government, the -more popular organs of Party members tended to slough off, leaving large -_Tangpu_ (Party Headquarters) in the _hsien_ or cities. These quite -often fell into the hands of local machines, with the consequence that -they interfered with government, and promoted the usual evils of party -machines. The diffusion of Party work, by letting individuals -participate more freely as individuals, may help to break the monopoly -of these bureaus, and restore the Party effectiveness with less reliance -on supervision from above. - -The Kuomintang, in addition to these reorganization devices, is meeting -competition from the Left by increasing its membership. Membership -figures are not available in war time; the total is probably over two -million. In some instances the new members are no particular improvement -on the pre-existing group, but in the majority of cases the Party -broadens its base of popular support. - - -INTRA-KUOMINTANG POLITICS - -The years which saw the rise of the Kuomintang to power, and its -subsequent period of authority, showed a diminution of the disparateness -of Party fractions. For a long time the adherents of Wang Ch'ing-wei -stood formally Left; those of Hu Han-min, formally Right; while various -older Party alignments preserved their outlines more or less clearly -(e.g., the Kuomintang Western Hills Group). With the consistent rise of -Chiang K'ai-shek to Party and national leadership, and the steady influx -of non-Party or merely nominal Party men into the government, Party -distinctions lost their cogency in practical affairs. - -In terms of influence, patronage, and effective policy-making, the -Kuomintang is a conglomeration of innumerable personal leaderships knit -together by a common outlook, a common interest in the maintenance of -the National Government and formal Party power, and a common loyalty to -the Party Chief. The clearest groups are those which are out of the -current political stream; most notable among these is the Wang schism, -and a few scattered irreconcilables of half-forgotten Party struggles. -Within the regime, Kuomintang groups tend to coalesce as the leaders -meet, negotiate, and govern together in the councils of state. - -So completely in the ascendant that they have lost their general -character as groups are the _Erh Ch'ên_ (literally "the two Ch'êns"; -also termed "C.C. group" by English-speaking Chinese), led by the -brothers, Ch'ên Li-fu, Minister of Education, and Ch'ên Kuo-fu, head of -the Central Political Institute, and the _Huangpu_ (Whampoa Academy) -groups, led by the Generalissimo himself. The Ch'ên brothers have been -close adherents of Chiang throughout his career. Brilliant, vigorous, -sharp in the retention of power, they have made themselves anathema to -the Left. They are effective reorganizers of the Kuomintang, keenly -aware of its position as monopoly Party, and their protégés and trainees -are omnipresent through government and Party. Their military counterpart -is the _Huangpu_ group. It includes officers either trained by Chiang -himself or under his close supervision. With the passage of each year, -the proportion of Whampoa (or daughter-institution) graduates in the -national armies rises. The officers include a high proportion of -technically qualified men, whose capabilities and interests are chiefly -military. Builders of the new army, they look to the Generalissimo and -the Party for dicta on social, economic, and political policy; they -provide China with the unpolitical army which has been an American -ideal, although rejected by Soviet and South American practice. The -officers are not encouraged to assume decisive roles in local politics, -but to refer such things back to Headquarters. In consequence, although -the danger of a new _tuchünism_ has almost disappeared, the army staff -does not readily adapt itself to a _levée en masse_, or to the problems -of a social-revolutionary army. The very factors which make of the army -a tool and not a practice-ground of government also make it somewhat -rigid in dealing with guerrilla situations. - -Both the C. C. and Whampoa groups are instilled with notions of Party -and military discipline which trace back in the first place to the -instruction given by Russians from the Soviet Union. While they follow -Sun and Chiang in accepting the promises of democracy, their notion of -democracy is as different from that of the Left as Washington's was from -the Jacobins'. They are interested in sound, disciplined, powerful -national government, representative, republican, and stable; they see -the revolution as largely complete in the power-destroying phase, and -are beginning to think in the reconstruction phase. After ten years of -strain and terror in fighting the Communists, they look with suspicion -on political changes which would open the nation to opportunist -Communist agitation, or make Chungking the helpless diplomatic -dependency of the Narkomindel. The bitterness of internecine conflict -has made them deeply suspicious of sudden or radical reform, although -they themselves profess a genuine interest in social welfare. The actual -reforms which have been accomplished are, in the scale of political -reality, already stupendous: opium eradication, tax collection, -diffusion of national authority, communications, industrialization, -military advance, etc. To the Kuomintang center, a demand for sharp or -shocking change is suspect. They desire to amplify what they have, and -to let changes wait on the ability of trained personnel--not entrusting -progress to the vagaries of mass movements with incalculable force and -direction. - -While the National Government was at Nanking, there was a _Fu-hsing Shê_ -(Regeneration Club), organized by a few hot-headed members of the -Kuomintang center. Its activities in support of the Generalissimo and -the government, under the further sobriquet of Bluejacket or Blue Shirt -group, earned it the reputation of a Chinese _Schutzstaffel_. The -comparison was at best fanciful, but any comparison at all was heartily -desired by the Europocentric Chinese Left and by the world press. -Magnified beyond recognition, the Club was identified with almost every -agency in the government and Party, not excluding the New Life Movement. -As applied, the name _Blue Shirt_ covered a wide scattering of unrelated -agencies which had the common features of a Kuomintang-center position, -an inclination to effective action (including violence) and some -secrecy. Effective political-police work is led by one T'ai Li, whose -name is whispered by dissidents; but counter-espionage and supervision -of suspects is also performed through Party agents, the regular -military, and governmental agencies. - -Around the Kuomintang center there are other groups, some closely -related to Chiang, some remote. The Political Scientists (_Chêng-hsüeh -Hsi_) owe their name to a society which once existed in Nanking. They -include many of the administrators, men with American training who are -interested in industrial and fiscal development. The clarity of this -group has faded by its absorption into the governing center. The -Cantonese are represented by two levels of politics: those who based -their power on Canton province and those who remained within the -government. President Sun K'ê of the Legislative _Yüan_ has been -outstanding in his willingness to cooperate with the Communists and -Left, and is on cordial terms with relatively independent progressives, -such as Mme. Sun Yat-sen. Further groups within the Kuomintang are -constituted by the loyalist followers of Wang Ch'ing-wei, who now attach -themselves to other leaders, and by other personal or regional -followings (e.g., the _Tungpei_ followers of Chang Hsüeh-liang, -ex-_tuchün_ of Manchuria and ex-Vice-Commander-in-Chief, still "retired" -as a result of the Sian kidnapping). Finally, a number of elder Party -leaders remain because of their seniority or connection with Sun -Yat-sen; they do not need to attach themselves to any particular clique -in order to retain their position. These include such men as the -venerable Secretary-General of the Party, Yeh Ch'u-tsang; the President -of the National Government, Lin Shên; and the President of the Control -_Yüan_, Yü Yu-jên. - -What has been said about the groups in the People's Political Council -(see p. 76 _ff._) applies to these. It is possible, as in American -congressional or administrative circles, to distinguish blocs of -leaders with differing interests or policy; but clarity fades upon -scrutiny. The orientation, even by the participants, is subjective. -Lacking continuous institutional form, clustering of leaders is -transient, shifting with political events. - -It is difficult to appraise the role of the Kuomintang without at the -same time assessing the position of the government. The two are -inescapably connected. Although the Communists profess recognition of -the government, and pledge it loyalty, they offer only comradeship--on -their own terms--to the Kuomintang. This arrangement may last for a -considerable length of time, but the National Government is a Kuomintang -creation; short of violent revolution, Party control will scarcely break -in war time. Upon the Party, therefore, depends much of the efficacy of -the Government. - -Many well-known Leftist writers on China--such as Edgar Snow--make the -comment that whereas the National Government is deserving as a -government, and worthy of support, the Kuomintang is hopelessly corrupt, -a creature of landlords and capitalists, or, of even worse, "feudal -elements." Such a distinction, based on strong moral urges and a desire -to achieve historical parallels, is untenable in practice. Kuomintang -power has weathered more than a decade of adversities. The Generalissimo -depends upon it. Analysis of the Kuomintang as the party of the Chinese -national bourgeoisie, and ascription of a mass character to the -Communists alone, is a fallacy, comparable to a consideration of Earl -Browder as the real leader of the American working class. - -In point of fact, neither the Kuomintang nor the Communist Party in -China is a mass party. Neither ever has been, although each sought mass -character in the Great Revolution. Still largely apolitical, the Chinese -masses are organized socially, culturally, and economically into a -village and guild system which functions through most of the country. -The Kuomintang includes a very high proportion of shopkeepers, returned -overseas-Chinese, Chinese still resident overseas, Christians, -landlords, and Western-returned students. The class composition of the -Kuomintang is largely incidental to its functional character. Since the -Kuomintang was the party of Westernization, it gathered in revolutionary -days Chinese of all classes who were sufficiently modernized to be -interested. Naturally the poorest peasants and the coastal proletariat -did not constitute a large proportion of such membership. The men who -entered did so as Christians, as travellers, as temperamental rebels, -rather than as representatives of the bourgeoisie. When the Communists, -whom a recent writer[8] with unconscious humor calls the party of the -Chinese proletariat, came on the scene, the same social elements -contributed to its membership. Once the Communist Party abandoned the -Trotskyist line of urban revolt for the leadership of endemic peasant -rebellions, its composition changed somewhat, although the Communist -leaders of today are socially much like their Kuomintang equivalents. -The men who are class-conscious are, like Lenin, historically, -philosophically, and morally so; it is a matter of literary necessity, -not of fact. - - [Footnote 8: For a Marxian analysis of the Kuomintang, carefully - stripped of frank Marxian verbiage, see "Wei-Meng-pu," "The Kuomintang - in China: Its Fabric and Future" in _Pacific Affairs_, Vol. XIII, No. - 1 (March 1940), p. 30-44. The author _a priori_ defines the Kuomintang - as the party of the national bourgeoisie in China, in effect exhorting - it to fulfill its historic mission of completing the national - democratic revolution, whereupon socialism [i.e., Stalinism] may - historically follow. Nevertheless, its comment on personalities is - informing in terms of practical politics.] - -The Kuomintang is in power; the Communist and Left parties are not. As -the governing group, the Kuomintang naturally attracts those persons who -would seek to enter any government. Since it has not and does not -promote rural class warfare, pre-existing class relationships continue. -The Party and the Government have sought, not always efficiently or -faithfully to the _n_th degree, to carry out the programs of land -reform, democratization, etc., to which they have been committed. The -Kuomintang has tolerated widespread sharecropping, land destitution, -usury, and rural despotism--because it found these in existence, and was -preoccupied with building a national government, a modern army, adequate -finance, and with eradicating some of the worst evils, such as opium, -bandits, and Communists (who, whatever their ideals, nevertheless helped -to impoverish a poor nation by merciless civil war). - -If the Kuomintang were out, it too could point to existing evils. -Whoever controls government bears the responsibility. A class element is -to a certain degree inescapable in any government; illiterate, -unqualified persons do not assume leadership even in the Soviet Union -until they have escaped their handicaps through training. But to make of -the Kuomintang the party of the Chinese landlords and merchants alone is -as fallacious as to make the Republicans or Democrats solely the -instruments of American capitalism. A comment such as this would be -unnecessary in the case of the United States; but persons who are not -Marxian with respect to the analysis of current American events often -assume a Left approach to China because of impatience with evils which -they see but cannot understand. - -The final appraisal of the Kuomintang must be based on the practical -work of the government and the Party. In 1940, their effective control -was wider and deeper than ever before. The Chinese state was more nearly -in existence. The armies were undefeated. The growth of China in the -past ten years, and the stand made by China at war, has been made under -the unrelaxed control of the Kuomintang monopoly of constitutional -power, together with its clear primacy in more tangible power--schools, -finance, armies, and police. - - -THE NEW LIFE MOVEMENT AND OTHER AFFILIATES - -The important New Life Movement (_Hsin Shêng-huo Yün-tung_) is, strictly -speaking, not a Party organization; but Chiang is its Chairman, and in -purposes and personnel it interlocks with the Party. Convinced that -institutional and economic reform required accompanying moral and -ideological reform, the Generalissimo founded an Officers' Moral -Endeavor Corps as early as 1927. This organization was placed, soon -after its initiation, in the hands of Colonel (now Major-General) J. L. -Huang, a graduate of Vanderbilt University and an experienced Y.M.C.A. -secretary. The Corps' purposes were comparable to those of a Y.M.C.A. -with American armies, but Chinese morality in general, not Christian -sectarian teaching, was stressed. With Chiang's encouragement, the Corps -came to include a high percentage of the officers. Teaching cleanliness, -truthfulness, promptness, kindness, dignity, etc., it helped build -morale. - -In 1934, after seven years of war against the Communist-led agrarian -insurrections in South Central China, the Generalissimo decided to -extend to the whole people the type of work done by the Corps. On -February 19, 1934, he made his first speech announcing the New Life -Movement and on the following March 11, a mass meeting of about one -hundred thousand people, representing five hundred organizations, -signalized the formal inauguration of the movement.[9] From then on the -Movement was continued as a regular phase of anti-Communist -reconstruction. It elicited praise for its attempt to reach the roots of -China's political demoralization, and its intent to remedy the everyday -life of the people,[10] although there was skepticism as to its -effectiveness in removing troubles deeply ingrained in the economic -system. - - [Footnote 9: The China Information Committee, _News Release_, March 4, - 1940. English translations of names such as the New Life Movement, - Officers' Moral Endeavor Corps, National Spiritual Mobilization, etc. - are often awkward or jejune where the original is not.] - - [Footnote 10: Young, C. W. H., _New Life for Kiangsi_, Shanghai, 1935, - is a missionary work which praises the New Life Movement highly. The - book includes interesting, first-hand, unfavorable accounts of the - rule of the quondam Chinese Soviet Republic, and explains some of the - opposition to the Communists. The interconnection between - Communist-suppression and the New Life Movement is consciously and - clearly demonstrated.] - -The type of evil against which the New Life Movement struggles is -well-illustrated by Mme. Chiang's enumeration of the seven deadly sins: -self-seeking, "face," cliquism, defeatism (_mei-yu fa-tzŭ_, the -Chinese _nitchevo_), inaccuracy (_ch'a-pu-to_), lack of self-discipline, -and evasion of responsibility.[11] In addition to these sins of social -and political behavior, there are others such as filthiness, -carelessness of infection, indecent or sloppy dress, bad manners, -unkindness, etc. The Movement, easily understood in view of the -traditional Confucian emphasis on personal conduct, seeks to reach -individual behavior. The West European and North American peoples have -been disciplined by technology itself: timeliness, cleanliness, -regularity, have come to be a part of daily life. Any nation which seeks -to shift from an agrarian to an industrial economy discovers that -amiable defects become ruinous flaws: machinery cannot wait; a machine -society requires a discipline of its own. The New Life Movement is -attacking the points of social behavior which strike the newcomer to -China most immediately and most unfavorably. - - [Footnote 11: Chiang, May-ling Soong, _China Shall Rise Again_, New - York, 1941, p. 38 _ff._ Mme. Chiang's work also includes a full - account of the enterprises of the New Life Movement and of its - affiliates.] - -The positive virtues of the New Life Movement were formulated by the -Generalissimo. Four in number, they are _li_, _i_, _lien_, and _ch'ih_. -_Li_ is the fundamental Confucian virtue, and is based upon _jên_. _Jên_ -being humane self-awareness, or consciousness of membership in society, -_li_ is the application of this awareness to conduct; it thereby -signifies proper behavior, not in the superficial sense of empty -formality, but in the sense of behavior which is _human_: the full -expression of man's moral and ethical stature. The traditional -translation of _li_ is _rites_, _ceremonies_, or _etiquette_--terms -which, because of their connotations of an empty ceremonialism, are -inadequate as a rendition of the original. The Generalissimo writes of -_li_: "It becomes natural law, when applied to nature; it becomes a -rule, when applied to social affairs; and signifies discipline, when -applied to national affairs. These three phases of one's life are all -regulated by reason. Therefore, 'li' can be interpreted as regulated -attitude of mind and heart."[12] Chiang thus reconciled, for his own -thought, the naturalistic ethics of Confucius, wherein man and nature -were parts of an inseparable ethical structure, and the pragmatism of -Sun Yat-sen. - - [Footnote 12: Chiang K'ai-shek, _Outline of the New Life Movement_, - Chungking (?), n.d. p. 8. This is the translation, by Mme. Chiang, of - _Hsin Shêng-huo Yün-tung Kang-yao_, Nanking, n.d., originally - published in May 1934.] - -_I_ is the element in man which makes him observe _li_: ethics or -justice. _Lien_ is "clear discrimination (honesty in personal, public, -and official life): Integrity." According to the lexicographer,[13] it -is "pure, incorrupt, not avaricious." The fourth principle is _ch'ih_, -given by the dictionary as "to feel shame,"[14] and rendered by the -Generalissimo and Madame Chiang as "real self-consciousness -(self-respect): Honor."[15] From this the Generalissimo evolved his -formulation of a theory of action.[16] That he is not unaware of -criticisms directed against him for talking about morality when people -are fighting and starving is shown by his spirited counter-attack: - - There are two kinds of skeptics: - - First, some hold the view that the four virtues are simply - rules of good conduct. No matter how good they may be, no - benefit to the nation can be derived from them if the - knowledge and technique used by that nation are inferior to - others. - - Those who hold this view do not seem to understand the - difference between matters of primary and secondary - importance. From the social and national point of view, only - those who are virtuous can best use their knowledge and - technique for the salvation of the country. Otherwise, - ability may be abused for dishonorable purposes. "Li," "i," - "lien," and "ch'ih" are the principal rules alike for a - community, a group, or the entire nation. Those who do not - observe these rules will probably utilize their knowledge - and ability to the disadvantage of society. Therefore, these - virtues may be considered as matters of primary importance - upon which the foundation of a nation can be solidly built. - - Secondly, there is another group of people who argue that - these virtues are merely refined formalities, which have - nothing to do with the actual necessities of daily life. For - instance, if one is hungry, can these formalities feed him? - This is probably due to some misunderstanding of the famous - teachings of Kuan-Tze, who said: "When one does not have to - worry about his food and clothing, then he cares for - personal honor; when the granary is full, then people learn - good manners." The sceptic fails to realize that the four - virtues teach one how to be a man. If one does not know - these, what is the use of having abundance of food and - clothing? Moreover, Kuan-Tze did not intend to make a - general statement, merely referring to a particular subject - at a particular time. When he was making broad statements, - he said: "'li,' 'i,' 'lien,' and 'ch'ih' are the four - pillars of the nation." When these virtues prevail, even if - food and clothing are temporarily insufficient, they can be - produced by man power: or, if the granary is empty, it can - be filled through human effort. On the other hand, when - these virtues are not observed, there will be robbery and - beggary in time of need: and from a social point of view - robbery and beggary can never achieve anything. Social order - is based on these virtues. When there is order, then - everything can be done properly: but when everything is in - confusion, very little can be achieved. Today robbers are - usually most numerous in the wealthiest cities of the world. - This is an obvious illustration of confusion caused by - non-observance of virtues. The fact that our country has - traitors as well as corrupt officials shows that we, too, - have neglected the cultivation of virtues, and if we are to - recover, these virtues must be adopted as the principles of - a new life.[17] - - [Footnote 13: Giles, Herbert, _A Chinese-English Dictionary_, Second - Edition, Shanghai and London, 1912; ideograph No. 7128.] - - [Footnote 14: The same; ideograph No. 1999.] - - [Footnote 15: Chiang K'ai-shek, cited, p. 7.] - - [Footnote 16: Reprinted as Appendix III (B), p. 373, below.] - - [Footnote 17: Chiang K'ai-shek, cited, p. 6-7.] - -Generalissimo and Mme. Chiang both work actively in the Movement, -inspecting its branches and enterprises, speaking at its meetings, and -supervising its functions. The Movement possesses a small but very -active central staff, with Major-General Huang as Secretary-General and -Dr. Chu Djang, a Johns Hopkins political scientist, as his assistant. -Efforts are made to improve the daily life of the people. Shops are -encouraged to join the Movement, on conditions requiring cleanliness, -uniform prices, etc. Thus in addition to the work of a Y.M.C.A. for all -ages and classes, the Movement attempts the role of a municipal health -campaign agency, a better business bureau, and a civic service club. -Marriages have traditionally depleted family budgets; many a Chinese -farmer or worker has fallen into usurious debt because of the social -necessity of extravagant feasting and celebration. The Movement -accordingly organized inexpensive mass marriages, collectively -celebrated under official auspices; the purpose is not to increase the -population, but to circumvent a wasteful custom. Peep-show operators -have been given displays which are patriotic instead of mythical, -chivalric, or licentious. Story-tellers are taught new, public-spirited -stories to tell. The New Life Movement seeks to reinvigorate Chinese -society by adapting existing institutions or businesses to new needs. - -In addition to attempting change in traditional life, the Movement has -introduced innovations. The only cafeteria in Chungking serving cheap -but dietetically sound meals is operated by the New Life Headquarters. -Chinese foods were hard to preserve and unpleasant to eat in the -darkness of air raid shelters; China has had no sandwiches, crackers, or -equivalent preparations; the New Life Movement concocted a cheap but -tasty and nutritious wheat and soy biscuit, and scattered the recipe -broadcast. News is distributed to the illiterates through lantern-slide -lectures in market-places. Mass singing, virtually unknown in China -until now, is making enormous strides with the war; the New Life -Movement is diffusing this, along with calisthenics.[18] - - [Footnote 18: Most of these and the following facts, but not the - interpretations, are based on interviews which the author had with the - hospitable Major-General J. L. Huang in Chungking, on July 14, 1940, - and subsequently.] - -A group of minor New Life agencies are clustered about the Headquarters. -These, like the Movement, are not financed by popular subscription, -membership fees, or collection drives. All administrative expenses are -borne by the Generalissimo and his closest associates, who contribute -from their private funds or from available contingent funds of their -offices, and from contributions by local governments. Since part of the -program is distribution of cash gifts to all wounded soldiers, the -budget runs into fairly high figures, but the Generalissimo realizes -that in China there is no better way to create mistrust of an enterprise -than to collect money for it. The leading agencies affiliated with the -New Life are: - -(1) the War Area Service Corps, designed for propaganda, instruction, -spreading of cooperatives, relief, etc., in the occupied and combat -zones; - -(2) the Rural Service Corps, designed to perform the same functions -behind the lines, and to aid in rural reconstruction; - -(3) the New Life Students Rural Summer Service Corps, an organization -which organizes students from the colleges during their summer -vacations, and sends them out on the land for service work, along with -new agricultural information, hygienic teaching, literacy drives, etc.; - -(4) the Wounded Soldiers' League, a self-help organization for disabled -veterans, who are assisted and encouraged to set up their own -cooperatives; they have done so with particular success in -cigarette-making, printing, and shoe-weaving; - -(5) the Friends of the Wounded Society, wherein volunteers become -friends to veterans who are in hospitals, or who return to civil life as -cripples (each Friend contributing money, transmitted direct to the -veteran; Friends are also encouraged to write or visit the veterans); - -(6) the New Life Secretaries' Camp, virtually a summer undergraduate -college, with an academic curriculum, strict discipline, and ample -organized recreation; and - -(7) the Women's Advisory Council, which in turn tops another pyramid of -war-time activity in the hands of women's organizations.[19] - - [Footnote 19: For an excellent outline of the role of women in the - war, see Chiang, May-ling Soong, _China Shall Rise Again_, cited, p. - 287 _ff._] - -In addition to these major activities, there are innumerable further -enterprises, including another industrial cooperative system, a really -extensive chain of orphanages for war orphans, schools for girls, -training camps for young women, etc. It is no uncommon sight to stand on -a city street in West China and see three-fourths of the young people -wearing the uniforms of various war activities, most of which--outside -the army--are affiliates of the Party or the Movement. - -These activities have not received much praise from Leftists or foreign -visitors. They begin at a level so far below American requirements of -social service that they seem ineffectual. The author once saw, in -China's _tuchün_ years, old people dying in the streets while -pedestrians walked by, uncomfortable but aloof; he saw children with -burnt-out eyes whining for alms, to the profit of a beggars' syndicate; -he watched soldiers rotting alive on the flagstones of temple -courtyards. The Kuomintang, the New Life, and their affiliates cannot -relieve the general poverty of China, nor alter the fundamental economic -faults and continuing maladjustments of class functions. These agencies -do, however, eliminate evils so bad that the ordinary American would not -remember them for his schedule of social reform. In the vast reaches of -Free China, these organizations--like many others--almost disappear in -the perpetual routines of ancient, enduring institutions: the -market-place, the hucksters' streets, the tea-house. But their influence -is felt. In contrast with the entire American New Deal, they are nothing -at all; in contrast with the Y.M.C.A., Komsomol, or similar -organizations, they are agents of one of the greatest practical social -reforms ever undertaken in Asia, and a step bound to have political -repercussions. - -Popular non-participation still stultifies them. The leadership of the -agencies parallels government personnel. Women leaders are in many -instances the wives of officials; an exceptional person, such as Mme. -Chiang or her celebrated sisters, may be a leader in her own right, but -this is no usual rule. In many agencies, such as intended mass -organizations for reform, instruction, health, etc., the mass character -is entirely lacking. The masses are the beneficiaries of Kuomintang -action, but not often participants in that action. The Communists and -the independent Left hold an enormous leverage in popular interest; -ignoring class lines, illiteracy, or lack of preparation, they draw the -common people into a real share in government and social reconstruction. -The Kuomintang has ignored this opportunity--in part because of the -Confucian cleavage between scholars and the untutored which made the -scholar, however benevolent or philanthropic, a being apart from the -commonalty. - -Two further organs--the National Spiritual Mobilization (_Kuo-min -Ching-shên Tsung-tung-yüan_) and the Mass Mobilization--are Kuomintang -devices for mass participation. The former, developed as an antidote to -defeatism engendered by protraction of the war, rising prices, and the -treason of Wang, actually consists in a propaganda machine, which holds -torchlight vigils, national fealty ceremonies, and similar festivals in -the larger cities; it has adapted some of the stagecraft of the German -National Socialists, but lacks a broadly popular character. The Mass -Mobilization is under the Training Department of the Military Affairs -Commission; useful as a military device, its political character is -slight in Free China. In the guerrilla and occupied zones, a genuine -_levée en masse_ has been accomplished; in the free areas, safeguards -which hedge Mobilization have robbed it of utility save that which is -strictly military. As an adjunct to the army, this is useful; otherwise -it has been ineffectual, despite the competitive success obtained by the -guerrilla zones in equivalent organizations. - -The over-all picture of the Kuomintang and its activities is hard to -bring into focus. One general contrast will point some of its strength -and weakness clearly: as a governing agency, which created and -maintained the government, the Kuomintang has been more effective than -any other group in China. The Party has met and overcome obstacles in -practical politics, international relations, working administration, -internal unification, and national defense. The Party has succeeded well -enough to remain in power, which none of its predecessors or competitors -have managed to do. As a social and political force, its governing -character colors its work. More has been done by the government for the -people than in any comparable situation in East Asia. But Kuomintang -rule, however excellent when measured by the standards of authoritary or -colonial government, still falls far short of even elementary -application of democratic techniques. The flexibility of the Party, and -a continued ability to yield power in order to retain power, are the -most hopeful factors in the view of the Kuomintang future. - -The Kuomintang could not be overthrown by any force--mere force--on -earth, unless the Party betrayed itself. Attacked by a major power, it -has emerged unscathed. But the Communists or other opponents may find -their most useful weapons in the weaknesses of the Kuomintang itself: in -the slowness of its change, or in its unadaptability to rapidly changing -conditions; or in an extra-Party resentment arising from severe economic -dislocation which, though consequent to war rather than to governmental -policies, was not swiftly enough controlled by a slowly-moving -Kuomintang. By contrast with 1935, however, the Kuomintang has gained -much power; the Communists have lost some. Regional and half-separatist -regimes, often corrupt, have almost altogether disappeared. Along with -the Kuomintang, the independent Leftists have also profited. - -No prediction, to be plausible, can assume the early demise or collapse -of the Kuomintang. The Party has obtained power; its organization is one -of the three policy-executing branches of the new national organization. -Ruin of the Kuomintang implies ruin of the emergent Chinese state, so -laboriously constructed; though a successor might arise, too much of the -work would have to be done over again. Many Chinese, of all classes, -realize this. Kuomintang rule is the _status quo_; despite demerits, it -is the first stable government modern China has had, and China's chief -tool of defense today. - - - - -CHAPTER VI - -THE COMMUNIST AND MINOR PARTIES - - -The party politics of Republican China fall into two periods: the early -period of competitive, pre-parliamentary parties, 1912 to the Great -Revolution; and a later period of struggling monopoly-power parties, -from the Great Revolution to the present. In the earlier period the -Kuomintang and its rivals tolerated one another's existence; each -regarded co-existing parties as natural, desirable, and useful. But the -sham democracy of the prostituted Republic disheartened the Kuomintang, -which thereupon bid for the complete conquest of power, brooking no -legitimate competitors; its rivals did likewise. The first coalition -(1922-27) of Kuomintang and Communists was therefore not the democratic -competition of two parties with different stresses upon a common -ideological foundation, but a war-time alliance of basically -incompatible forces. After the 1927 break, the Kuomintang became the -only legal party in most of the country, while the Communists--with a -rebel army, an unrecognized government, and a territory of their -own--enjoyed legality within the limits of their own swords. The -Kuomintang, embraced by all major groups save the Communists, became the -foremost vehicle for Chinese political life. Minor parties enjoyed -precarious, ineffectual existences, underground or expatriate. - -With the outbreak of war in 1937, Nationalists and Communists adopted a -truce, formally a Communist surrender of armed rebellion, subversive -ideology, and separate government. In actuality it was an alliance of -deadly enemies against the Japan which threatened them both. Today, -Chinese party politics revives in the People's Political Council, and to -a slight degree in public opinion. The legal prohibition of minor -parties, including the Communists, remains in effect. Chinese party -politics, in the Western sense of a friendly subdivision of common -opinion, remains vestigial. The only guarantee of party rights is an -unstable toleration extended by the Kuomintang in the negative form of -non-prosecution. The Kuomintang is the Party for most of China. The -Communist Party is the party for a separate fraction of China. The minor -parties, holding neither territory nor armies in the game of power, -maneuver between and about the two, struggling to attain legal -existence. - - -THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS: PARTY AND LEADERS - -Literary Marxism runs back to the Ch'ing dynasty, but the first formal -organization of a Chinese Communist Party occurred with the first -Congress of the Chinese C.P., in Shanghai, during July of 1921.[1] The -Soviet-Kuomintang entente was, strictly speaking, not a union between -the Kuomintang and the Communist parties, although it came to be such in -fact; it was collaboration between the Third International, which agreed -that Communism was unsuited to China, and the Kuomintang. The -development of a Chinese Communist Party, and open Communist debate -concerning the assumption of power, made the Kuomintang mistrustful, -repressive, and finally hostile. The suppression of the Communists by -Chiang in 1927 has become world history; Vincent Sheean and André -Malraux have preserved aspects of it in moving literature.[2] - - [Footnote 1: Miff, P., _Heroic China_, New York, 1937, p. 14. This - valuable pamphlet is by one of the Comintern's leading expounders of - Marxism as applied to China. Trotskyist Marxism is represented by a - far fuller, more careful work by Harold Isaacs, cited, together with - the following, cited on p. 20, n. 16. Edgar Snow, the distinguished - American journalist, operates on the basis of an independent, - unacknowledged type of Marxism, which shows itself in consistent - prejudice against the Kuomintang, and in a soul-hungry search for a - dialectical, inner meaning of things with which to supplement - common-sense observation; his "Things that Could Happen," _Asia_, Vol. - XLI, No. 1 (January 1941), employs Hegelianism at tenth-remove to - analyze the future. It leads to a frequent implication of motives and - to subjective interpretations which rearrange fact as it ought to be - in terms of a rational economic dialectic (i.e., an occult pattern - which provides a uniform key to all human experience). Thus, in his - _Red Star Over China_, p. 306, he ascribes the massacre of Reds by - Kuomintang officers to the fact that the officers were the sons of - local landlords, enraged by expropriation of the land. - Land-expropriation is a class motive; a moment's reflection would - reveal that previous massacre of the officers' families by Communists - would be a better common-sense motive for blood-thirstiness. This - feature of diluted Marxism would not be worth mentioning were it not - common to so many books about Communists written by self-proclaimed - "non-Communists" habituated to the dialectic. It is found in the - writings of Agnes Smedley, Victor Yakhontoff, Anna Louise Strong, and - I. Epstein, to mention but a few.] - - [Footnote 2: Sheean, Vincent, _Personal History_, New York, 1937; - Malraux, André, _Man's Fate_, New York, n.d.] - -In the period 1927-37 the Chinese Communists operated the Chinese Soviet -Republic (_Chung-hua Su-wei-ai Kung-ho-kuo_),[3] primarily in Kiangsi, -but also in the Ao-yü-wan (Hupeh, Honan, Anhui) area. In the Long March -of 1934-35 the main forces of the Communists, in the most spectacular -military move in China since the great Northern raid of the T'aip'ing, -marched a distance of some six thousand miles, and established their new -area in North Shensi (see above, p. 112 _ff._). Not only did the Chinese -Red Army remain intact; through great and successful effort, the -Communists transplanted schools, banks, and other institutions intact. -The Long March was comparable to the celebrated Flight of the Tartars, -in that it amounted to the transplanting of an entire people, their -worldly goods, and their most highly treasured institutions and -traditions. - - [Footnote 3: _Kung-ho-kuo_ is the Western-type term for Republic; the - Kuomintang uses _Min-kuo_ or Folk-realm. _Su-wei-ai_ is a phonetic - representation of "Soviet"; the characters, not intended to have - meaning, are unconsciously humorous in that their lexicographical - signification is "Revive (and) maintain dust!"] - -Despite Kuomintang theory, the Frontier Area is a one-party _imperium in -imperio_, and its unchallenged party is the Communist. Under conditions -requiring great fortitude, the Chinese Communist leaders have -consolidated power, and use their base to spread Marxism through the -guerrilla movement. They are thus in the best possible political -position; their strategic excellence makes them welcome in precisely -those zones wherein their doctrines can best take effect. Their party -organization controls the Frontier Area through formal appointment of -the leading officials by the National Military Affairs Commission, and -through formulae of election for the subordinate officials. - -The hierarchy of the Chinese C.P. is much like that of the Kuomintang, -which also copied Soviet models:[4] - - |--- - | CENTRAL PARTY<--COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL - | COMMITTEE - | - |--| NATIONAL PARTY CONGRESS----------------- - | |---------------| /\ | - \/ | || | - Executive Bureau | \/ |->Central Control - Political Bureau | National Party Committee - Special Departments: | Convention - Organization | /\ - Publicity | || - | \/ - | Provincial Council of Party Delegates - | Provincial Party Committee - | Standing Committee----------| - \/ /\ | - Communist Youth Corps || | - \/ \/ - _Hsien_ Councils of Municipal Councils - Party Delegates of Party Delegates - - _Hsien_ Party - Committee - /\ |-------->Municipal Party - || | Committee - \/ \/ - Party Members' Mass Meetings - District (_ch'ü_) Councils of Party Delegates - District Party Committees - /\ - || - \/ - Branch Party Organs (cells) - Branch Party Organ Executive Committees - - [Footnote 4: Based on the Party Constitution, _Kung-ch'an-tang - Tang-chang_ [Party Constitution of the Communist Party], [Chungking?], - XXVII (1938), p. 1-21. The entire Constitution is reprinted below as - Appendix II (E), p. 359.] - -The shibboleth of Democratic Centralism applies to the Chinese as well -as to other Communist Parties; in practice this means the high and -unqualified concentration of power at the top of the hierarchy -following action by the democratic, or mass, element of the party -through the Party Council or Congress. In effect, nothing is decided at -such elections, since the plebiscites, according to the familiar -authoritarian pattern, concern questions to which only one answer is -reasonably possible: the answer decided by the party rulers. The free -use of meaningless elections characterizes Communist activity in -governmental as well as party matters. The voting act gives the -impression of concurrence, improves morale, and ceremonializes the -approval of the majority for the minority. The purpose which elections -serve in democracies--that is, of providing a decision to issues not -previously ascertained--appears very rarely in Communist elections, -where a near unanimity is constructed to indicate popular support, and -contested elections, disunity. - -In terms of personnel, the Communist hierarchy has been consistently -compliant with world Communist policy as made in Moscow. This is a -tribute to the high international unity and uniformity of the ecumenical -Communist movement, but raises, in China, problems of intra-national -Communist policy. Revolutionary veterans of the party, who fought, -suffered, studied, and worked for their cause through ten, fifteen, or -twenty years of effort, often find themselves displaced, dictated to, or -expelled by the clique of younger men who have lived comfortably in -Moscow studying the dialectic mystagogy and acquiring an inside track in -Stalinist cliquism.[5] The Chinese Communist Party has been shaken by -violent schisms, casting off many once highly-valued leaders. - - [Footnote 5: Harold Isaacs, in the work cited, has many passing - references to this phenomenon; his caustic indictment of Ch'en Shao-yu - (Wang Ming), p. 438 _ff._, is a case in point. Note Ch'en Tu-hsiu, Li - Li-san, Chang Kuo-tao--in China, as in Russia, most of the founders - and early leaders of the Communists have been set aside.] - -No sooner does a man become suspect to the ultimate authorities than -his previous record, hitherto praised, is re-examined and captious -criticism proves that he was a traitor from the beginning, like Trotsky, -Bukharin, Chicherin, and Zinoviev. The profound vitality of the Chinese -Communist movement as a quasi-religious, self-sacrificial organization -is demonstrated by the fact that it has weathered these storms. The -terrible hunger for a guidance in life, an insight into the ethical -meanings of things, and an absolute which asks nothing but acceptance -and obedience--these factors call for courage, humility, abasement, -fortitude. They do not favor imagination, individual integrity of -thought, or the examination of fact. There has been no indication -whatever, despite the wishful thinking of Western liberals, that the -mentality of the Chinese Red leaders is one whit different from that of -Western Communists. They talk practical democracy, moderation, -collaboration with the Kuomintang; they do so because this is the -Comintern's China policy, just as they have fought the National -Government in the past when the Soviet authorities disliked Chiang more -than they did Japan. - -Their all-China collaboration is no doubt sincere; but the sincerity is -based not on the wish to collaborate, but on what, in their special -phrasing, is termed the "objective" analysis of the situation. If the -Soviet Union, the chief "proletarian" force in the world, turned against -Chiang, the Communist _ipso facto_ would be against collaboration. The -war of China against Japan would no longer be a war of "national -liberation" but an "inter-imperialist" war in which the true interests -of the "working classes" would be against _both_ sides. This provides to -Marxians, under the name "science," an absolute, infallible guide to -ethics in practical politics, because it presumes to reveal the -inescapable long-range meaning of human affairs. The supposition that -daily affairs may in fact possess none but short-range meaning, outside -of slow, general, nearly impalpable changes in ecology, demography, and -genetics, etc., is anathema to the Marxians. A humanism trained to deal -directly, pragmatically, and simply with events is as far beyond the -Chinese Communists as it is beyond other Marxians. - -This orthodoxy, so complete that it enthralls the leadership to Moscow -and paralyzes Marxian heretics in the very act of dissidence, reaches -throughout the upper levels of the party. This fact does not mean that -the Chinese Communist movement is in no wise different from other -national Communist movements. The historical basis of the Chinese -Communism, ever since Chiang smashed the urban unions in 1927, has been -that of an exotic faith imposed upon a native _jacquerie_, in which the -exoticism is unwittingly traditionalist. Peasant revolts of the Chinese -past have operated with the counter-ideocratic leverage of a -superstition, normally Taoist in derivation. The heads of the Yellow -Turbans (ca. 200 A.D.) and the Boxers (ca. 1900) were all magicians; the -T'aip'ing (ca. 1850) leader was a Christian in communication with God -Himself. These heresies against the all-pervading order of Confucian -common sense disappeared after their high-pitched dynamics died down in -social readjustment. - -Marxism provides an element of faith, devotion, and irrational -submission which has operated in past Chinese history. The frugality, -honesty, and integrity of the Chinese Red leaders are celebrated by -foreign visitors and even by Nationalist officials; such revolutionary -virtues seem new in China, whereas they are the twentieth-century -manifestation of a common enough phase of Chinese political activity. -However, one cannot herefrom conclude that the Chinese Communist -movement is destined to disappear with its predecessors, for it has -three things which they did not have: an extra-Chinese application, -which not only supports it, but proves its concreteness and relative -realizability; a modern system of education, and thereby a class of -counter-ideologues to compete with the post-Confucian Nationalists; and -leaders with revolutionary experience greater than any in the world, not -excepting that of the great Soviet leaders themselves. Ancient peasant -uprisings revealed a final cleavage between dervish-type organizers and -the peasants, once infuriated, who finally sought normalcy. If the -Chinese Communist leaders can, through the example of the Soviet Union, -or by education, or by dexterous leadership, make Communism into -normalcy, they may retain their hold on such sections of the peasantry -as their leadership has captured. - -Two men stand forth above all others in Chinese Communism. Both would be -remarkable individuals in any historical setting. Their partnership has -led them to be described by one hyphenated phrase: _Chu-Mao_: Chu Tê and -Mao Tse-tung. Chu Tê, the military genius of Chinese Communism, was born -of a gentry family in Szechuan, and attended the Yünnan Military Academy -at the time that Chiang was in Japan; he entered the years of his early -maturity as an aide to a provincial _tuchün_. According to Edgar Snow, -he was at this time sunk in vice, enjoying wealth, opium-smoking, a -harem, and the amenities of a war-lord existence.[6] Chu felt an urge -within himself to escape this rut. He abandoned his worthless existence, -leaving his harem provided for, and went to the coast, where he could -become acquainted with the revolutionary movement. On the way he broke -himself of the drug habit. He went to Europe, living in France and -Germany, and in the latter country joined the Chinese Communist branch -established among the students. He returned in 1926 during the Great -Revolution, and served as political officer in the Kuomintang forces. -Later he was instrumental in the creation of the Chinese Soviet -Republic, and was the prime military leader of the Communist forces in -the long civil war. He led the trek to the Northwest, and is esteemed as -a military hero of Arthurian proportions. Friendly, candid, interested -in specific tasks, he is characteristic of the superb leadership which -preserved Communism in China. He is the only Chinese military leader who -was not defeated by Chiang, although Chiang pursued him six thousand -miles. Major Evans Carlson, the American Marine officer, compares him -with Robert E. Lee, U. S. Grant, and Abraham Lincoln--drawing on the -best features of each for the purpose.[7] - - [Footnote 6: Snow, Edgar, work cited, p. 348 _ff._] - - [Footnote 7: _Twin Stars of China_, cited, p. 66. Major Carlson adds - to this description in his _The Chinese Army_, cited, p. 35 _ff._ Most - enthusiastically, he attributes to the Red Leaders honesty, humility, - selflessness, truthfulness, incorruptibility, and a desire to do what - is right. He praises their superb tactical abilities, their efficiency - as organizers, their competence as leaders. He accepts the statements - made by the Communist leaders as matters of good faith, and does not - question their sincerity. Since he is the only qualified military - visitor to put his impressions on record, these appraisals are - valuable.] - -Mao Tse-tung was born in Hunan in 1893 of a well-to-do farmer family. -His autobiography, dictated to Edgar Snow, is a classic of Western -literature on China.[8] His history was that of many other restless -young Chinese intellectuals, struggling for education amidst turmoil, -and adjusting their sense of values to the chaotic early Republic. He -was caught up by the Marxism of the literary Renaissance after 1917, -served in the Kuomintang during the Great Revolution, and worked as head -of the All-China Peasants Union. During the Soviet period, in which he -first became a colleague of Chu Tê, he stood forth as the chief -political leader. He and Chu between them formed a team to rival -Generalissimo Chiang, although Mao shared his political leadership with -various others, particularly Chang Kuo-tao. Mao is an expert -dialectician, skilled in rationalizing the policies of the Communist -International, and keenly critical within the limits of his Marxian -orthodoxy. Less genial than Chu Tê, he is nevertheless an inspiring -leader. His political skill, in following the lurches and shifts of the -Stalin party line while simultaneously leading an enormous Chinese -peasant revolt, is monumental. His earlier rivals and colleagues are in -most cases dead or forgotten. He survived both ideological and practical -ordeals. - - [Footnote 8: Snow, Edgar, _Red Star Over China_, cited, p. 111-167.] - -A third Communist leader, Chou En-lai, is of importance because he acts -as liaison officer between the National Government and the Frontier -Area. The Communist quasi-legation in Chungking is maintained as a -purchasing and communications office of the Eighteenth Army Corps -(formerly Eighth Route Army). Chou, who studied abroad in Japan, France, -and Germany, served at the Whampoa academy under Chiang, and in the -period of civil war he was one of the chief political officers, twice -Chinese Communist delegate to Moscow. He is an old acquaintance of many -Kuomintang leaders from Chiang on down, and appears to be one of the -most successful diplomats in the world. Despite acrimony from secondary -leaders on both sides, Chiang and Mao seek to maintain their alliance -against Japan, and Chou is their chief intermediary. At Chungking he is -seconded by the alert, brilliant Ch'in Po-k'u, a veteran of Communist -political-bureau work. - -The difficulties and conditions of Communist collaboration with the -National Government are well illustrated in the life of Chang Kuo-tao. -One of the founders of the Chinese Communist Party in Shanghai, in 1921, -Chang was of the upper classes, like Chu Tê; and like Mao, he was a -radical student in Peking. Just before his departure from the party in -1938, he had been chairman of the Northwestern Soviet, taking precedence -over Mao himself; but with the coming of national unity, Chang wished -to cooperate fully with China's leader, government, and legal Party, the -Kuomintang. He adopted subterfuges to get out of the Communist Area. -Arriving in Hankow, he announced his desire to form a genuine United -Front on the basis of a candid and sincere acceptance of the _San Min -Chu I_, which would mean the actual abandonment of Marxian dreams of -Communist "proletarian" dictatorship in China, even for the future. He -did not renounce Communism, but simply took his colleagues at their -words, and announced his intention of cooperating honestly, and not -through compulsion of the Moscow dialectic. He wrote: - - According to the views of the Chinese Communists, the - present United Front is only a temporary union of many - political groups, which are entirely different from one - another in nature. These political groups have their own - social bases, and they represent the interests of different - classes. "The Kuomintang," so they believe, "represents - landlords and capitalists, while the Communist Party - represents the working class." No [ultimate] compromise can - be made between the two parties. - - Now we often hear such slogans of the Chinese Communists as, - "Let's lead the people _together_," "Let's _all_ take - responsibilities," "Let us _both_ be progressive," and - "Let's act under the _same_ principles." These represent the - old ideas of striving for leadership. These show that they - do not have the foresight to work unselfishly for the nation - and the people. They want to retain their military forces. - They want to maintain the Frontier Area and special, - privileged positions in certain occupied areas. They keep - these in order to await future developments.... - - I hope they [the following suggestions] will receive the - consideration of the Chinese Communists: - - (1) the Chinese Communists should always remember that the - benefits of the nation and the people go before everything. - They should support the movement of Resistance and - Reconstruction under the leadership of Mr. Chiang K'ai-shek. - They should carry out the _San Min Chu I_ without - hesitation. What they do must agree with what they say; - - (2) there should be complete coordination of governmental - and military operations, under all conditions.... I hope the - Chinese Communists will not think that the Eighth Route Army - is one privately owned by the Communist Party.... The - Frontier Area [where Chang Kuo-tao had so recently been - leader] should not be made a Communist base, nor made into - an isolated place where Communist-made laws are executed and - prejudice, together with political persecution, prevails.... - - (3) with a view to working for the nation and the people, - the Communists should follow the foreign policies adopted by - the central government.[9] - - [Footnote 9: Chang Kuo-tao, _T'ou-li Kung-ch'an-tang Mien-mien-kuan_ - [An Impartial Survey of (My) Departure from the Communist Party], - Kuangchou [Canton], 1938, p. 27 _ff._] - -Chang demanded that the Communists react more sincerely, that they -accept the full implications of a united China, and abandon their -long-range dialectic for power.[10] For this he was denounced, his years -of service were reappraised, and he was dropped from the Communist -Party.[11] He was accused of hurting the United Front, because he urged -a more nearly perfect union. The chief Communist leaders challenged him -in open letters, revealing their continued adherence to an ideology -which made an eventual struggle for power inescapable. - - [Footnote 10: The same, p. 10.] - - [Footnote 11: The Resolutions of the Enlarged Sixth Plenary Session of - the Central Executive Committee of the Communist Party of China - comment as follows: "The danger of the 'Right' opportunists lies in - the fact that they execute the tactics of an anti-Japanese National - United Front at the expense of the independence of the party, - politically and organizationally distorting the policy of the - proletariat [_sic_] in building an Anti-Japanese National United Front - so that _the working class and the Communist Party become tails of the - bourgeoisie rather than the vanguard_." (Italics inserted in - translation.) New China Information Committee, _Resolutions and - Telegrams of the Sixth Plenum, Central Committee, Communist Party of - China, November 6, 1938_, Hong Kong [1939?], p. 9. The demand for - vanguard position from a minority party still technically illegal, and - the damning of the Government and Kuomintang as "bourgeois," are - continuous features of Communist policy. Their concept of cooperation - is, as in Germany, Spain, and elsewhere, cooperation _under_ Communist - leadership.] - -The Communists have, therefore, cooperated as far as they are able, -without emerging from the infallibilities of their cult. They retain the -Marxian rationalization apparatus, and the linkage with Moscow. As such, -they are welcome but not completely trustworthy allies. Their presence -is undoubtedly the greatest check to the development of democracy in -China; the presence of a totalitarian party, respecting no rules but its -own, jeopardizes the entire experiment. The Communists want democracy, -but they want it quite frankly as a step toward "working-class" -(Marxist) power; they accept the _San Min Chu I_ on the condition that -it be read as elementary Marxism. They do not insist on the term -Communism, but employ the terms "working-class" interests for their -party, "scientific objectivity" for their ideology, and "a people's -movement" for radical, arbitrary reforms to rip Free China open with -social revolution. The Kuomintang leaders are fully aware of the support -in name plus subversion in fact which the Communists offer, and complain -bitterly about the principles of Sun being twisted about to Marxism as -in the form of "'independent' nationalism, 'free' democracy, and -'beneficent' livelihood," the qualifying terms sufficing for the -alignment.[12] They understand that the Communists are incapable of -sincere extra-class democracy; the Communists are hurt by the -Kuomintang's unwillingness to admit that it is not a Party of patriots, -but the Party of a transitional, historically doomed middle class. - - [Footnote 12: Ch'ao Shê [The Morning Club], _Niu-wu Yen-lun Chien-t'ao - Kang-yao_ [A General Review of Fallacious Utterances], Chungking, XXIX - (1940), p. 7. The work is a Kuomintang reply to Communist theses in a - debate on the nature of national union.] - - -COMMUNISM: PATRIOTISM OR BETRAYAL? - -If the Communists were as inflexible, disciplined, ferocious, and -intransigeant as they like to appear to themselves, China would have -had a three-sided war long ago. In practice, however, the Chinese -Communists yield amazingly. The Communist International is not goading -the Chinese Communists into the sabotage of Chiang and of national -resistance. Whether Moscow could do so is a standing question of Chinese -politics. The answer cannot be known except by practical test. One -might, however, plausibly suppose that an attempt by Stalin to -consummate a Moscow-Tokyo pact (possibly in accordance with pressure -from Berlin, which would require immediate protection of the proletarian -fatherland) would create a deep schism in Communist ranks; but it is -unthinkable that all the Chinese Communists would abjure their faith. -Moscow would not be naive enough to require the Communists to cease -fighting Japan _in form_. Such a Kuomintang-Communist break would -probably weaken the National Government; it would not destroy the -Chungking regime unless the Generalissimo ignored the chance offered by -a Leftward turn, to retain some of the peasant-radical and guerrilla -forces in his own ranks. It would, however, enormously strengthen Japan, -and be a severe blow to China. The greatest danger of a -Kuomintang-Communist break would lie in an American defeat of Japan. By -removing the necessity of Soviet support of Chiang, and increasing the -power of the National Government, American aid would lessen the -opportunities of Communism in China. - -At present, however, the Chinese Communists welcome American aid, even -though the effect of such aid is to strengthen the China of Chiang as -against the China of Chu-Mao. The Communist spokesman, Ch'in Po-k'u, -told the author that American aid was not feared in China, but was -_welcome_, emphasizing the word. He even stated, in response to a -far-fetched hypothetical question, that actual American troops would be -welcome at Yenan, and stated that inter-party trouble was to be expected -only in case of defeat.[13] - - [Footnote 13: Statement of Col. Ch'in Po-k'u to the author, Chungking, - July 29, 1940.] - -The final picture of the Communist position which emerges in China is -about as follows: - -(1) the Communists are gaining ground because of their helpfulness and -vigorous leadership in organizing the guerrilla areas; wherever the -Japanese forces go, the Communists (thus shielded from Chinese National -armies) increase their influence; - -(2) the Communists are benefiting politically by a genuine popular -movement in both Free and occupied China, particularly in the latter, -where spontaneous mass action is providing a base either for -Sunyatsenist democracy or for Communism in the future; - -(3) in view of their belief that time is on their side, because of the -present direction of Soviet foreign policy, the Chinese Communists are -very cooperative in the alliance against Japan, patiently postponing -demands for "democracy" (i.e., unrestricted rights of organization and -agitation); - -(4) they have superlative leadership, rich in practical experience, -which represents the super-orthodox residuum of years of schism and -purging; such a leadership is not likely to abandon the fundamentals of -Communism, such as the dialectic, the class-outlook on all history and -politics, and belief in the inescapable universality of future -"proletarian" rule (Communist world conquest); therefore, it is almost -unthinkable that they would fail to do Moscow's bidding, if the party -line demanded national treason in war time; - -(5) the interests of the Soviet Union run parallel with those of -non-Communist China for a long time in the future, unless the European -balance of power forces the U.S.S.R. to appease Japan; under such -circumstances, the Soviet Union will be very anxious to maintain the -foothold of Communism in China, and will not be likely to ask the -Chinese Communists to commit candid treason; - -(6) lastly, the Kuomintang possesses the opportunity of rivaling -Communism, of overtaking its rate of growth in political power, by a -bold policy of freeing speech, constitutionalizing the government, -reforming the land tenure system, and pushing cooperative industrialism; -the base of Communism has been widespread peasant revolt. If the -conditions of peasant revolt are eliminated, Communism will not be much -more of a threat to China than it is to the advanced countries of -Europe. (Wisely or not, the Kuomintang has not consented to meet the -Communists in open ideological competition. If it did so, and won, -Kuomintang morale would be strengthened. At present the practical aims -of Party policy toward Communists are about as follows: restriction and -isolation of the Frontier Area and of the Border Region, so far as -agitation is concerned, before ingestion by the constitutional national -system; military precautions, balancing Communist forces with -Nationalist; standardization of Red military practice by national rules, -and the elimination of peculiar political features; eventual dissolution -of fellow-travelling organizations, and their absorption into the -corresponding officially sponsored movements; supervision of Communists -and channels of Communist propaganda; courtesy toward Communist leaders, -strictness toward Communist subordinates, and harshness toward the -Communist laboring class following. A corresponding policy toward the -Kuomintang is pursued by the Communists.) - -Finally, the deepest element eludes political analysis: the moderation -of the Chinese character, and the heritage of Confucian common sense. -The Chinese language and the Confucian inheritance of ideological -sophistication lead to clarity, pragmatism, and practicality. The -Chinese have long delighted in ingenious formulae with which to meet _de -jure_ impasses, while proceeding _de facto_ in quite another direction. -The Chinese are perhaps the only people in the world with enough finesse -about "face" to save the Communist face. The Generalissimo is in theory -consciously anti-Marxian; but when he was asked whether it is possible -that Communists or Leftists might exploit democratic rights for -unscrupulous power politics, he answered quietly by writing: "No, -because democracy in itself has the ability to work out the solutions -for those problems if there are any." A Communist leader said, the -Generalissimo would have nothing to fear from the Communists if he won -the war. His prestige would be unassailable. Chiang and the Communists -both know this. - - -THE NATIONAL SALVATION MOVEMENT - -The National Salvation (_Chiu Kuo_) movement is third in point of size -and influence, and has been largely instrumental in assisting national -unification and resistance. The movement began in 1935 with the -organization of a number of professors, students, and young -intellectuals who were influenced by the student anti-appeasement -movement in North China. It had a simple, and very clear program: stop -civil war; stop appeasement.[14] Unlike the Kuomintang or the -Communists, the National Salvationists never developed formal dogma, or -a comprehensive ideology. Genuinely a movement, it had no membership -books, no formal or systematic organization, no minorities, and no -schisms. The movement spread like wildfire, across the length and -breadth of China as well as overseas; and, because of its lack of formal -hierarchy, was ignored by the National Government. Its loose -organization, consciously based on the middle class of clerks, students, -business men, professors, etc., followed functional lines familiar to -the Chinese. - - [Footnote 14: An early statement of National Salvation views is found - in Wang Tsao-shih, "A Salvationist's View of the Sino-Japanese - Problem," _The China Quarterly_, Vol. II, No. 4 (Special Fall Number, - 1937), p. 681-9. The author is one of the Seven Gentlemen.] - -When the National Salvationists began the creation of a structure, -however rudimentary, by forming an inter-professional federation for -National Salvation, and when they followed this with the national -congress for National Salvation, the government took action, which -resulted in the celebrated trial of the Seven Gentlemen (_ch'i -chün-tzŭ_). The term (_chün-tzŭ_) is the Confucian word for -superior or upright person, without reference to gender, and was applied -in affectionate derision by the press. One of the _chün-tzŭ_ was a -lady. The seven, who included a celebrated and popular law school dean -(Shên Chun-lu), a banker, and authors (Tso Tao-fên, the spokesman among -them) were tried and imprisoned late in 1936. Demands for their release -figured in the Sian kidnapping. - -The movement was financed very simply through volunteer contributions. -Most of the work was done by volunteers who asked no pay, travelling and -working at their own expense. About Ch. $5,000 (then about U. S. $1,000) -sufficed to cover the whole expenses of headquarters. Despite the -imprisonment of its leaders, the movement gathered momentum. Funds were -collected to support guerrillas opposing Japan in transmural China. Most -literate persons not already committed to formal Kuomintang or Communist -membership fell under the influence of the movement. General Shêng -Shih-ts'ai in Sinkiang offered the movement a home, and many of its -workers went to the West. - -In practical terms, the National Salvationists often work with the -Communist Party, although they are strictly Chinese and do not have an -elaborate dialectic. A strain of economic determinism runs through their -thought, but this is not systematized. The leaders of the movement were -released after the outbreak of war, but their organizations continued to -be suppressed, and work is largely suspended. The leaders told the -author that they had no means of estimating the actual number of their -adherents; they had no formal membership roll, and they were still -legally suppressed in Chungking areas. The quest for policy and -principle instead of power is new to Chinese politics, and the National -Salvation leaders are esteemed almost universally and hated by none. -Nevertheless the Kuomintang has not admitted the legality of the -movement, which continues to exist in non-public fashion. Some of the -leaders were recognized to the extent of being put on the People's -Political Council. In addition to standing with the Communists in -matters of practical domestic reform, the National Salvation leaders -demand two fundamental policies: continuation of the war, and unity of -the country above all party considerations. - -The National Salvation leaders are able, modest, and patriotic. They -represent the older non-political sentiment of China, infused with -modern Leftist content. Dean Shên of Shanghai, the senior of the -movement, is an elderly man of almost dainty gentleness, keenly -intelligent demeanor, and serious but charming good humor. Mr. Tso -Tao-fên, an author, is a world traveller. Their colleagues are of the -student, publisher, author type: intellectual, patriotic, common-sense -in outlook. - -The National Salvation movement looks forward to constitutionalism. It -has become almost universal in the guerrilla areas. The leaders have -faith that the Constitution and liberalized public life are developing, -although they expected in the summer of 1940 that the Convention would -be postponed until 1941, to allow the Communists and Nationalists -further opportunity for balancing and adjusting power relationships. The -National Salvationists are past masters in the techniques of indirect, -almost invisible pressures. Their disinterestedness, high principles, -and patriotism put them in an admirable position to act as a determined -moderating force between the two major Parties. As such they are the -third party of China, although another, smaller group bears this name. - - -THE THIRD PARTY - -The party commonly called The Third Party (_Ti-san Tang_) was organized -by dissident Communists and Left Kuomintang members who wished to keep -on collaborating after the major parties broke apart in 1927, thus -ending the Great Revolution. Led by the indomitable Têng Yen-ta, who was -finally shot to death in Shanghai, the party began illustriously with -the participation of Mme. Sun Yat-sen (Soong Ching-ling) and the Left -ex-Foreign Minister, Eugene Chen. The formal names of the party varied. -From 1927 to 1929, and again from 1930 to 1937, it was the Revolutionary -Action Commission of the Chinese Kuomintang (_Chung-kuo Kuo-min-tang -K'ê-ming Hsing-chêng Wei-yüan-hui_); in 1929-1930, the Chinese -Revolutionary Party (_Chung-kuo K'ê-ming Tang_); and after 1937, the -Acting Commission for the National Emancipation of China (_Min-ts'u -Chieh-fang Hsing-chêng Wei-yüan-hui_).[15] The party is at present led -by Dr. Chang Pai-chün, a returned student from Germany and lieutenant to -the late Mr. Têng. It suffers from the official ban on minor parties, -but retains, by its own statement, a formal organized membership of -about 15,000. (This estimate would, in the opinion of independent -observers, need to be discounted.) - - [Footnote 15: Statement by the head of The Third Party, Dr. Chang - Pai-chün (Chang Peh Chuen), to the author, Chungking, August 2, 1940. - The translations were also supplied by Dr. Chang.] - -The Third Party is a _San Min Chu I_ party. It accepts the legacies of -Dr. Sun, in their Left-most phase as they were at the time of his death. -The party is strongly anti-imperialist, socialist, and land-reform in -its teaching. Its socialism is of an independent kind; the party neither -seeks nor wishes collaboration with the Third International, although it -is willing to cooperate with the Communists as well as the Kuomintang. -It finds its chief political dogma in the last policies of Sun, executed -in the period just before his death: (1) a pro-Soviet orientation in -international power politics; (2) a Nationalist-Communist entente; and -(3) immediate aid for the peasants and workers. It is therefore more -like the old Left Kuomintang than the Communists. - -At the present time, the party seeks to promote collaboration between -the two major parties, thus becoming the second third-party to that -friendship, and urges constitutional government. Eventually it would -prefer a representative government of the whole people (_p'ing min_), -with the executive agencies composed 60 per cent of peasants and -workers, 40 per cent of others, chiefly intellectuals. (The proportion -is believed to be Mme. Sun's contribution.) In past practical politics, -The Third Party took part in the Foochow insurrection of 1933-34, but -has on no other occasion obtained power. It is not expected to attain -major status. - - -THE CHINESE NATIONAL SOCIALIST PARTY - -The elder brother of Chang Kia-ngau, who is the enterprising Minister of -Economic Affairs, has organized a political party after the fashion of -the traditional pavilions of learning and patriotism. In China's past, -Confucians frequently developed an institution which admixed the -features of a perpetual resort camp, a library, a seminar, and a club. -Living together amid scenically beautiful and scholastically adequate -surroundings, they made their influence felt through their writings and -their example, whenever one of their number returned to public life. Dr. -Carson Chang (Chang Chia-shêng) has organized an Institute of National -Culture at Talifu in Yünnan, in the mountains just below Tibet. There -he associates with kindred souls to attempt a restoration of traditional -values in the traditional manner. - -The confusing and unhappy similarity of the name of his party to Adolf -Hitler's party is explained in the following communication: - - To give to the world in a clear and unambiguous way the - principles our party stands for and the platform we wish to - adopt should we have the chance to serve our country, I have - written a book, entitled _What A State Is Built On_. In - formulating my political philosophy, though I have drawn - freely upon the wisdom of the West, I have kept my eye - steadily on the needs of my people and the circumstances of - my country as the guiding and controlling principles in - shaping my own thought. In view of the possibility of - distortions you have suggested in your letter, an extract is - now being prepared in English, with the idea to facilitate - the understanding of our movement and to present to the - intellectual world of the West our principles and policies - ... - - The accidental similarity of names between our party and - Hitler's is indeed an endless source of misunderstanding, - but the similarity is truly "accidental." In Chinese the - name of our party runs "Kuo Chia She Hui Tang," which may be - literally translated into "Nation (Kuo Chia) Society (She - Hui) Party (Tang)," a name we adopted long before Hitler's - party became known, embodying principles widely different - from what Hitler's party stands for. The suspicion abroad of - our connection with Hitler's National Socialist Party may be - traced to an incident two years ago at Hankow when - Kuomintang first came to recognize the legal status of minor - political parties. The foreign correspondents, in reporting - my exchange of letters with Generalissimo Chiang with regard - to the recognition of our party, referred without a second - thought to our party as "Nazi," thus creating all - distortions which might have occurred even without such - mischief. I shall be more than grateful to you if you would - undertake to clear the suspicion on us and pave the way for - lasting understanding between us and your people.[16] - - [Footnote 16: Letter to the author, dated October 24, 1940.] - - -SOCIAL DEMOCRATS AND _La Jeunesse_ - -These two minuscule parties are both expatriate groups organized in -Paris. The Social Democratic Party was organized in 1925. It has no -connection with the Socialist Party of the pro-Japanese Kiang Kang-hu, -but is simply the Chinese affiliate of the Second International. The -Social Democratic Party may unite with the Third Party, in view of the -close similarity of aims and ideology; its leader, Mr. Yang Kan-tao, has -been recognized by being seated in the People's Political Council. - -The party called _Kuo-chia Chu-i Pai_ (_La Jeunesse_, or _Parti -Républicain Nationaliste de la Jeune Chine_) was organized in 1923 in -Paris, by a Mr. Tseng Chi, with whom is now associated Mr. Tso -Shen-sheng, the most active worker for the party. It survived for years -as an expatriate organization, joined by successive generations of -Chinese students in France. Its policies are strongly democratic and -social-minded. A functional legislature, the cooperative movement and -state capitalism have suggested a similarity to Fascism in the minds of -some observers; of Trotskyism, to others.[17] The party, through -accident and the family connections of its founder, has connections in -Szechuan, and the transfer of the National Government to Chungking was a -corresponding aid to the slight influence of the party. Long in exile, -it is known by one of its French names even in China; all it does is to -help diversify opinion. Mr. Tso occupies a seat in the People's -Political Council.[18] - - [Footnote 17: E.g., John Gunther in his _Inside Asia_, New York, 1939, - p. 272.] - - [Footnote 18: By far the most complete summary of the minor and - minuscule parties is to be found in two articles by a young Chinese - newspaperman: Shen, James, "Minority Parties in China," _Asia_, Vol. - XL, no. 2 (February 1940), p. 81-3; and a second installment, in the - same periodical. Vol. XL, no. 3 (March 1940), p. 137-9.] - -The National Salvationists are an operating force in China, and the -Communists, while a minority party, are not a minor party in the -American sense. Unhappily, the existence of minuscule parties among both -patriots and pro-Japanese elements suggests that multi-party -constitutionalism is likely to degenerate into innumerable party -fractions, splinter parties, and novel, unstable groups. The Kuomintang -and the Communists possess their respective monopolies of power; the -National Salvationists have a popular and sincere cause. The other -parties exist in part because they obtain recognition. As long as -Chinese political processes depend on leadership by personality, -individuals will be free to form their own parties, while the -geographical, cultural, and economic diversity of the country holds out -little hope for the appearance of two or three China-wide democratic -parties. Far more likely is it that, with the presumable advent of -constitutionalism, the Kuomintang-Communist alignment will continue, -while the present minor parties will gain some ground, and innumerable -new parties will appear in order to profit by democratic guarantees of -minimal representation, or to fulfill functions exercised by fraternal -societies in the United States. - - - - -CHAPTER VII - -GOVERNING INSTITUTIONS OF THE JAPANESE AND PRO-JAPANESE - - -Facing the National Armies, and encircling the guerrillas, lie the -Imperial Japanese forces. Frank agents of Imperial policy, they--unlike -the Hitler-Mussolini contingents in Spain--make no pretense of -subordination to their Chinese allies. Publicly and legally instruments -of the Japanese state, their function is to destroy the Chinese -government, to control and bend Chinese society to the Imperial -purposes, and to protect Chinese who come forth as allies. The Japanese -Empire is accordingly itself militarily extended to China; occasional, -half-hearted attempts to deny the ensuing international complications -have been sternly rejected by other great powers. The United States is -not alone in insisting on full Japanese responsibility for everything -that happens within the zone of Japanese control. - -The position of the Japanese army as a governing engine, unacknowledged -colonial machinery of a vast unassimilable colony, is not one relished -by the Japanese people or by their leaders. Even in the case of -Manchoukuo, the Japanese played a half-deception on themselves by -pretending that they were extending the area of their influence, not the -extent of their responsibilities. In part this distaste for overt -control is based on the ease, cheapness and irresponsibility of indirect -rule, employed in varying degrees by the British in Malaysia, the French -in Indo-China, and the Soviets in Outer Mongolia. The Japanese like to -think that they are aiding China, and incidentally themselves, to a New -Order in East Asia--autarkic, stable, racially independent of the -Whites, militarily secure. They do not like to contemplate the slaughter -of innocent people for sheer conquest, or to consider the hopeless -immensity of trying to overwhelm China. This complicates their -position.[1] - - [Footnote 1: An excellent bibliography, providing further references - to the Japanese side of the war, is found in Borton, Hugh, _et al._, - _A Selected List of Books and Articles on Japan_, Washington, D. C., - 1940. An outstanding short discussion is Colegrove, K. W., _Militarism - in Japan_, Boston (World Peace Foundation), 1936.] - -For if the status of the Japanese army in China is clear, its purposes -are not. The war aims of the Japanese are confused. Japan's goal is -defined by overtones of the inexpressible--in economic motivation, once -valid, no longer meaningful; in rationalizations so long reiterated that -they become genuine; in the toss and push of world affairs, tempting -Japan's leaders to this opportunism or that; in sheer sentiments of -Japanolatry, Emperor-worship, racialism, archaic resentment against -China, fellow-feeling for the Chinese orientals, and plain fear. A few -Japanese know exactly what they want. The policy as a whole, the policy -of the Imperial state, encompasses ill-assorted economic, political, -strategic, racial and purely ideological objectives. - -Even at the simple level of institutional control, the Japanese aim in -China has been ill-defined. The restoration of the Manchu monarchy in -Manchoukuo was an appeal to monarchist legitimism, to the Chinese past, -and to common Confucianist values. When the Japanese came further into -China, it was at first expected that they might install Mr. Chin P'u-yi -as Emperor of all China, and rehabilitate him in the Palace-museum he -left when a youth. Instead, they apparently attempted to create a chain -of linked, reactionary, agricultural Chinese states, mixed in form--a -federation of princes in Inner Mongolia, an Empire in Manchoukuo, -republics elsewhere. They began by going as far as to create a dozen or -more ephemeral pro-Japanese agencies--for a while one might legitimately -have expected that a Nanking government follow a Peking government, a -Hankow government, a Canton government, _ad infinitum_. But the trend -was reversed when the Autonomous East Hopei Anti-Communist Government of -Mr. Yin Ju-kêng was merged with the Peking regime, and--as pressure rose -in Japan for a settlement of the China affair--a China-wide Japanophile -government was first contemplated, and then established. The -establishment of these institutions has not meant the abdication of the -Imperial Japanese forces from the government of China. The pro-Japanese -governments were and are civil auxiliaries of the Japanese army; their -influence has in no case extended beyond the immediately effective reach -of the Japanese infantry. Even in planning the long-range permanent -settlement of Chinese affairs--on her own terms--Japan does not propose -to withdraw all her troops from China. - - -THE JAPANESE ARMY AS A CHINESE GOVERNMENT - -The Japanese army is the effective military government of occupied -China. The Japanophile Chinese have a few troops, who function in close -proximity to Japanese, and are in no sense a military counterweight to -the invaders. The Japanese army is a large force, modern by somewhat -second-rate standards, which requires the use of an effective -communications system, modern economic auxiliaries such as shops, banks, -post offices, and a variety of other services including hospitals, -shrines, brothels, and crematories. These do not exist in China in forms -suited to Japanese needs, nor could Japan afford to trust Chinese with -the railways, the air services, the river commerce, the telegraphs, the -food warehouses, and other most vital services. Thus, all over occupied -China, the Japanese have installed a military government. - -This government assumes direct responsibility for administering whatever -seems necessary or profitable. Thus, in the city of Nanking, the best -buildings are occupied by the Japanese, and the Wang government is -profoundly gratified to be allowed to share some of them, obtaining -second choice. The Japanese military, through protected corporations, -supervises the operation of the railroads and airlines, but it does not -even rely on the corporations to provide military transport, which is -under direct army control. If a Chinese who has gone over to the -Japanese and occupies a high position in their protected governments -wishes to ride on a Chinese train between Shanghai and Nanking, he must -buy a ticket from a Japanese clerk, show it to a Japanese conductor -under the eyes of a Japanese guard, with Japanese detectives standing -about, order a Sino-Japanese or pseudo-European meal in a Japanese -dining car with Japanese waitresses from a menu printed in Japanese, and -must pay, not in his own puppet-bank currency, but in special Japanese -currency not acceptable in Japan. - -To govern China, the Japanese Army has not developed beyond the usual -devices of military rule. There are several reasons for this, primary -among them the difficulty of governing Chinese at all. In a pluralistic -society, such as China, command is largely superseded by negotiation, -and the issuer of a command must be prepared for oblique thwarting. A -Japanese who tells a Chinese to do something needs a bayonet with which -to gesture; otherwise the Chinese, accustomed to circumventing, -avoiding, or mocking authority, will disregard him. The Germans may -order the Danes to make a two-way street a one-way street, and the -Danes, accustomed to authority, will concur. When the Japanese -promulgate a regulation, nothing short of massacre could ensure its -absolute, unconditional obedience. - -The language difficulty is another obstacle to direct Japanese -government. A cultivated Japanese and Chinese may write classical -Chinese to one another, and even the barely literate can scribble a few -characters, the meanings of which may coincide; but the spoken languages -differ from one another almost as much as English differs from either. -To govern China directly would involve an enormous feat of language -training, or an overnight re-shaping of the Chinese national character. -Non-violent resistance, wilful but concealed negligence, lurking -impertinence, consistent sloppiness, obsequiousness mingled with -hatred--these Chinese tools of resistance, added to the language -barrier, prevent any early Japanese hope of direct government. In years -to come, if such come, Japanese trained in the Chinese language could -supersede every Chinese above the level of foreman. A strong tendency in -that direction is observable in Manchoukuo.[2] - - [Footnote 2: Bisson, T. A., _Japan In China_, cited, _passim_, for - many instances.] - -The Japanese have abandoned direct government for the present. They -would defeat their own purposes by assuming a task for which they have -insufficient personnel, which would be very costly, and for which their -army is ill-equipped in morale or technical ability. Difficult though it -may be to employ pro-Japanese Chinese associates, it would be even more -difficult to find Chinese now ready to profess direct loyalty to Japan. -The only Chinese thus far Japanized are a number of Taiwanese -(Formosans), whose island was ceded to Japan forty-six years ago. -Chinese by blood and language, many of them have been reared in the -third generation of Japanese rule. Some are fighting with the Chinese -forces, but others, loyal to their lawful superiors, betray their -fellow-Chinese. The Formosans are insufficient in number to govern -China, or to provide Japan with even the most elementary foothold. The -Japanese have hence turned to the peculiar form of indirect rule -identified by the popular appellation, _puppet states_. - - -THE PROBLEM OF PUPPET STATES - -Lawful, well-established indirect rule is a familiar feature of colonial -practice. Constituting an internationally recognized legal relationship -between the paramount power and the encompassed state, it has been -applied extensively by the European powers in Africa and Asia. The -Indian and Malay states, under Britain; Cambodia and Annam-Tonkin, under -France; the East Indian sultanates, under the Netherlands--these offer a -rich repository of precedent. - -Unacknowledged intervention involving no legal relationship is also a -known feature of modern politics. The practices of the United States in -the Caribbean and Central America, particularly during the 1920's, are -familiar, but the leading case of intervention without responsibility -occurred in the relationship between the Soviet Union (first the -R.S.F.S.R.) and the Outer Mongol People's Republic. Four features of -what has since come to be called political puppetry are here made fully -manifest: first, the establishment of the subordinate through the -military aid of the superior; second, the continued effective control, -unacknowledged in law, of the subordinate by the superior, coupled with -economic coordination of the two; third, bilateral insistence upon the -formal independence of the subordinate state; fourth, the claim -of the superior that it _has not_ intervened, coupled with -international non-recognition of the new relationship. The four -features--establishment, coordination, fictitious independence and -international nonentity--were clearly defined by Soviet political -practice in Outer Mongolia and Tannu-Tuva long before Manchoukuo was -created. - -In addition to this neighborly example, the Japanese had another source, -commonly ignored in current Western comment on the Far East, on which to -draw: the quasi-familist Confucian international system which prevailed -down to the time of men now living. Successive Chinese Empires developed -a clear, viable scheme of senior-junior relationships controlling their -intercourse with other organized governments. The other, smaller states -acknowledged China to be the senior realm, conceding that the Chinese -Emperor was lord of the world. They paid formal tribute to China; their -envoys were not ambassadors but tributary agents, while Chinese envoys -came as high commissioners, superior in rank to the courts to which they -were accredited. This relationship (awkwardly termed "dependency," -"vassalage," "tributary" status, or subjection to "suzerainty," in -Western terms) could not be fitted into the Western state system. -Involving the assertion of Chinese power without concurrent admission of -Chinese responsibility, it was rejected by the Western states, and -lapsed following the French seizure of Indo-China, the British -occupation of Burma, and Korean independence under Japanese compulsion. -Today, Japan's moral effusions concerning the New Order in East Asia and -her digressions from Western patterns of international law in dealing -with Manchoukuo and Wang Ch'ing-wei both indicate that the Japanese move -freely, sincerely, and unconsciously in a frame of reference which, -obvious to them, is invisible to Westerners. The Japan-Manchoukuo or -Japan-Wang relationship could be aligned with the relationship which Li -Hung-chang wished, sixty years ago, to maintain in Korea, and found -significantly similar. The Japanese understood the position of -juniority in international relations: to their intense humiliation, they -confessed themselves China's junior during the Ashikaga period.[3] - - [Footnote 3: It is unfortunate that work on the nature of old Far - Eastern international relations has no more than just begun. - Descriptions from the viewpoint of Western international law often - possess the unreal lucidity of dialectical materialism or of - theosophy, since it is necessary to read into Chinese and other Far - Eastern political institutions the characteristic features of a - European invention--the juridical, omnicompetent, secular, - territorially limited state. See Djang Chu, _The Chinese Suzerainty_, - unpublished doctoral dissertation, the Johns Hopkins University, 1935; - Nelson, Melvin Frederick, _The International Status of Korea, - 1876-1910_ unpublished doctoral dissertation, Duke University, 1939, - particularly Part I, "The International Society of Confucian - Monarchies" and Part II, "Korea in Conflicting Societies of Nations"; - both attempt to reconstruct the working Asiatic theory in terms - comprehensible to the West. Clyde, Paul H., _United States Policy - Toward China_, Durham, 1940, Section XXIV, gives a succinct statement - and relevant American public documents.] - -A third meaningful context for Japanese practice is found in the basic, -factual scheme of current international relations. No nation in an -interdependent world is independent except by legal fiction; none could -maintain its present level of civilization without the existence of the -others. In these terms, legal independence fades as time passes, and -cross-national power becomes more evident. Western imperialism was -described by Sun Yat-sen as reducing China to a hypo-colony. More -recently, first the Communists and then the Japanese have accused Chiang -K'ai-shek of being the puppet of imperialism,[4] while occasional -Leftists regard Chiang as even now a puppet of Japan[5] and a few -citizens of imperialist states see him as a Communist puppet. The -Germans treat Churchill as the puppet of Roosevelt, and Roosevelt as a -puppet for international Jewry, while the present Stalinist line -attributes puppetry to the entire catalogue of world political -institutions save those made quick by its own infallibility. The -fundamental point of such appraisal depends upon the _attribution_ of -power relationships. Dependence is indisputable only if one government -functions within the military framework of another, or if the personnel -of the subordinate is drawn from the superior, or if clear and immediate -causal relationships can be proved between the continued fiscal or -military action of the sustaining government and the actual existence of -the sustained government--although even this last leads to subjective -interpretation. - - [Footnote 4: Taylor, George, _The Struggle for North China_, cited, p. - 66.] - - [Footnote 5: Statements to the author, by persons not in Chungking.] - -The term _puppet_ is not clear or apt, except in its most concrete -sense--that of a person who is almost literally a marionette, whose -utterances public and private are not his own, whose actions are -supervised, and whose personal choice or opinion is not merely thwarted, -but left out of consideration. Not all the Chinese who work with Japan -are ventriloquists' dummies. The author talked freely with men who -staked their careers on the inescapable success of the Japanese -military, and who functioned in absolute conformity to general limits of -policy and publicity laid down by the Japanese; these general limits -were wide enough to permit a considerable degree of latitude of manners, -and to allow variance in power and policy between the various Chinese -under Japan. Use of the term _puppet_ in such cases is not clear. It -implies a higher degree of effective Japanese control, and a greater -pliability of Chinese cooperators, than can be shown to exist. - -Since, however, the National Government is recognized, both by the -majority of the Chinese people and by _all_ powers (including Germany -and Italy) except Japan, to be the legitimate government of China, -representing the Chinese nation, action against that government may -properly and strictly be denominated treason; a person so acting may be -called, formally, a traitor and, less formally but more descriptively, a -Japanophile. Juridically the Chinese Soviet leaders were also traitors, -but they were never Japanophile. This term gains by specificity what it -loses through awkwardness. - - -THE PROVISIONAL AND REFORMED GOVERNMENTS - -The Japanese have determined, assisted and promoted establishment of a -number of friendly Chinese governments. Huapeikuo, a North China -separatist state, went the way of the Francophile Rhineland Republic; it -never got off the drafting board. The East Hopei Autonomous -Anti-Communist Government of Mr. Yin Ju-kêng provided, within the North -China demilitarized zone, a vast gateway for smuggling; when the -National Government withdrew its forces from North China, the Japanese -sought more pretentious aids to conquest. The Provisional Government was -the first of these, following an Inner Mongol federation (_Mêng-liu -Lien-ho Tzŭ-chih Chêng-fu_), affiliated with Manchoukuo; it was soon -rivaled by the Reformed Government; and in March 1940, both were -incorporated into the Reorganized National Government of Mr. Wang -Ch'ing-wei. Other governments, sponsored by various quarreling -departments of the Japanese military, or organized by Chinese confidence -men, have appeared transiently and then disappeared. - -Three points concerning Japanophile governments contribute to assessment -of their chances; their origin and structure; their ideological -(narrowly, propagandist) position; and their personnel. These points -illustrate a significantly ambivalent trend: the Japanese have found -their degree of freedom of action less than they had expected in Chinese -politics, and to that extent have been defeated; they have also yielded -to the demands of the situation, and have won, in part, in that their -chances of success appreciate with realism. - -The Provisional Government of the Republic of China (_Chung-hua Min-kuo -Lin-shih Chêng-fu_) was formed at Peking on December 14, 1937, and ended -by merger into the Wang Ch'ing-wei government on March 30, 1940, -perpetuating a high degree of separatism under the subgovernmental -style, North China Political Council. Like its predecessors and -successors, it was created by a self-proclaimed committee organized with -the consent and knowledge of the Japanese military, if not by the -Japanese directly. The members of the Provisional Government were old, -weak men, mostly adherents of the Anfu clique which had been Japanophile -during and after the War of 1914-18. A few were even brought forth from -more archaic strata, lonely adherents to the abandoned monarchy. The -youngest were in their fifties and the leading officers were extreme -conservatives--men of some intelligence and reputation, but obsolete. - -The structure of the _Lin-shih_ Government was interesting in that it -formed a republic of three committees, as follows:[6] - - PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT (Committee) - - | - |---Political Council - | - |--------Administrative - Executive Division (Committee)-----| Ministries and - | Boards - | - |---Secretariat - Legislative Division (Committee)---| - | - Judicial Division (Committee)------| - - - [Footnote 6: Nyi, P. C., "Plans for Economic and Political Hegemony in - China," cited, p. 239. Compare this with the chart in George Taylor, - work cited, p. 204. Professor Taylor's study covers the entire history - of the Provisional Government, significantly aligned with that of its - rival, the guerrilla Border Region.] - -Structurally important features are: the absence of any method of -election, direct or indirect, or of any ultimate source of "sovereign" -personnel--the government having borne itself out of chaos, -constitutionally a remarkable feat; the elimination of even nominal -party control of government, or cameral legislation, or constituent -assembly, these being hated vestiges of the Chinese and Western, but not -Japanese, notion that popular sovereignty is to receive genuflections if -not credence; and, most startlingly, the absence of a head! There was no -President, Protector, Chief of State, Leader, or Dictator; the highest -officer was the Shanghai banker, Mr. Wang K'ê-min, Chairman of the -Executive Division (literally, _yüan_, but not in the Nationalist -sense). The scope, succession and competence of this Provisional -Government were as much in doubt as its origin. - -Under the Provisional Government there flowered a new political -philosophy, the _Hsin Min Chu I_ ("Principles of the Renewed People," -"People-Renewing Principles," or "Principles of the New People"). The -similarity of this principle to the _San Min Chu I_ is striking, but is -no more than verbal. Propaganda under this credo resembled the -Japanese-prepared state-philosophy of _Wang Tao_, the _kingly_ (as -opposed to tyrannous and unnatural) _way_ of the Confucian canon, -which--revered throughout the Far East, even by Sun Yat-sen--had been -slanted to suit Manchoukuo through a Concordia Society (_Hsieh-ho-hui_). -Each of the Sunyatsenist principles was refuted in detail, Pan-Asian -racialism was encouraged, a class-war _between_ the nations was -emphasized, and conservatism in thought, manners, and morals -recommended. The Peking propaganda machinery was well-financed; the -_Hsin-min-hui_ became the only tolerated political group. This _hui_ was -headed by Mr. Miao Ping, a Kuomintang Party veteran whose -political-bureau experience dated back to the days of Borodin. His -renegation, never publicly explained, enabled Japan to issue a careful -parody of the _San Min Chu I_. His assistant was a Japanese. Business -associations, student groups, and educational administration were fitted -into the pattern. The principles were not logically or systematically -developed, but the key terms sufficed to coordinate opportunist appeals -justifying the invasion, and opposing resistance, guerrillas, -modernizations, and democracy. The _Hsin Min Chu I_ received no credence -through conversion, faith, or loyalty. Operating on sound advertising -principles, however, they served well even if they failed to command -obedience but did unsettle allegiance to the other side, and ubiquitous -iteration muddied thought. - -The personnel of the Provisional Government included no actively -important political leader. Many had been important long before; some -were conspicuous in fields other than politics, and had even served on -the semi-buffer Hopei-Chahar Political Council which was Chiang's last -compromise with Japan. Japan's failure to obtain an effective political -leader is important, for this lack eventually led to the acceptance of -Wang Ch'ing-wei. The old age, past misfortunes, the motley reputations -of the Provisional Government leaders attested a national sentiment -sufficient to enforce unity beyond the reach of national law. - -The Reformed Government of the Republic of China (_Chung-hua Min-kuo -Wei-hsin Chêng-fu_) was established March 28, 1938. It lapsed -simultaneously with its rival and colleague, the Provisional Government. -There were several suggestive points of difference, although the chief -difference was the fact that the Provisional Government operated from -Peiping and the Reformed from Nanking. Both were national in form, a -difficulty which was solved by the creation of a United Council to speak -for all occupied China. This Council had only the power to issue news -releases, which it did. Despite duplication of capitals and national -form, the Nanking government revealed a slipping in the Japanese -insistence on conformity to their ideas. - -In structure, the Reformed Government was a mutilated copy of the -National Government. It possessed five _yüan_, thereby continuing the -Sunyatsenist constitutional system which Japan first sought to destroy. -In doctrine, it took over the North China-Manchoukuo pattern, under the -name _Ta Min Chu I_ (Principles of the Great People), with a party under -the name _Ta-min-hui_. The walls of Nanking were covered with the emblem -of the party, a red circular shield with a yellow crescent moon -enclosing a white star. Quasi-educational work approximated that of the -North; but the Japanese found the Yangtze sympathetic to the National -Government and Kuomintang, and hence employed devices reminiscent of -Chungking. - -For Reformed Government personnel, the Japanese found individuals who -were in most instances either as old as their Peiping colleagues, but -less famous, or much younger, and relatively unknown. With the city of -Shanghai only partially under its control, because local opportunists -reached the tax offices first, the Reformed Government provided an -outlet for persons who had felt themselves unjustly denied office, or -slighted by the Kuomintang, or who had wrecked careers, once promising, -by some ghastly misstep or crime and now saw a miraculous chance to -return. - -These new governments could not on principle claim the allegiance of -their own clerks. The personnel, disloyal and of poor morale, was often -so corrupt that no government services--needed by Japanese civilians and -army alike--could be entrusted to them. Multiple taxes blocked Japanese -trade in the area Japan had occupied. The Japanese realized that the -United Council and the senescent politicians were not enough. Instead of -abandoning interventionist governments, they tried a leader of genuine -importance, considerable ability, and some following. His treason was -Japan's last chance to govern China without assuming the task herself, -risking a premature undertaking. To understand the moves and motives of -Wang Ch'ing-wei it is necessary to regard his character and political -history. - - -THE REORGANIZED NATIONAL GOVERNMENT OF WANG CH'ING-WEI - -In contrast to Chiang, who receives the obloquy which goes with power, -Wang Ch'ing-wei has spent the greater part of his life as a political -Out. He began brilliantly. While in his twenties, he became a -revolutionary hero by a bold attempt to assassinate the Prince Regent, -and after the establishment of the Republic followed the unhappy -meanders of the Nationalist movement. His association with Sun in the -years before Sun's death was very close, and he has as good a title as -anyone to the apostolic succession. (His title is not necessarily much -better than that of various other Kuomintang leaders; a score or so of -elder statesmen of the Party could claim a longer service of Party -leadership and equality or seniority to Wang in Party rank.) - -In 1927 Chiang and Wang had different regimes for the first time, and -Wang went into exile; he tried again in 1930, and went into exile; and -he is trying now. His cooperation with the Japanese must not be regarded -as the sudden prostitution of a worthy figure, nor as the culminating -criminality of an utter rogue. As in a Greek tragedy, Wang, blinded by -self-esteem and goaded by political frustration, has chosen his unsavory -course from understandable motives. Several lines of continuity lead up -to his establishment of the Reorganized National Government at Nanking, -and condition the nature of this government. - -Primarily, Wang has been an in-and-out schismatic in Kuomintang ranks. -It is quite possible that in terms of a head count, he may have had the -immediate support of a greater portion of the membership than did Chiang -in the first break in 1927, but his proportion has fairly steadily -declined ever since. There have been a large number of men who accepted -him as leader, just as in the preceding decade there were men _Wu mi_ -("infatuated with Wu [Pei-fu]"). In 1930-31 his organization paralleled -the Government-supported Kuomintang in all parts of the world. Today he -has some followers who follow even to Nanking. These men are bound to -him by ties of long, habitual obedience, by blood kinship, and by -generously offered loyalty: the distinguished and vigorous Ch'en -Kung-po, now Mayor of Shanghai; by Chou Fu-hai, who--before his -proscription--was the most popular commentator on the _San Min Chu I_; -Lin Pai-sheng, who had served Wang well as spokesman; and the -entertaining T'ang Leang-li, a Javanese-Chinese writer of international -fame, who has probably written more books on China in English than any -other Chinese. - -On the other hand, he has lost office-holding followers by the scores, -many of whom hold positions ranging up to Vice-Ministerships in -Chungking, and he seems to have lost almost all of his rank and file -followers. The chief defection was that of Messrs. Tao Hsi-shêng and Kao -Tsung-wu, who fled from Chungking to Shanghai and Nanking, and then fled -back again, bringing with them sensational copies of Wang's secret -preliminary agreements with the Japanese. Dr. Tao, a historian, served -Wang temporarily as Party-Minister of Publicity; Dr. Kao had been in the -foreign office while Wang still collaborated with Chiang.[7] His -following consisted almost entirely of politicians, ranging from the -rank of scholar-bureaucrat down to hooligans. The masses which he led -in 1927 have dwindled to hundreds, and the replacements are of distinct -unworthiness--persons, already cooperating with the Japanese, whom he -must lead for lack of better. He has lost followers with almost every -move he has made, whether rebelling, going into exile, accepting -government post under Chiang, or working with Japan. The Wang clique may -be represented by a consistently declining curve. - - [Footnote 7: _The Japan-Wang Ch'ing-wei Secret Agreements, - 1938-1939-1940_, Shanghai, 1910; these also appeared in the _China - Weekly Review_, January 27, 1940, p. 318; February 3, 1940, p. 341.] - -In the face of this, it is unexpected to find that Wang has been -reasonably honest and consistent, as were Trotsky and Röhm. His -consistency may be described as a perfectly regular spiral, which -maintains unchanging direction but never goes in a straight line. Wang -has always favored not-fighting, peace, civilian and constitutional -government, and making friends with any nation which professes -friendship for China. The loftiness of his motives might be impugned by -pointing out that each is the antithesis of one of Chiang's -characteristics; but the ultimate test of Wang's sincerity lies with the -psychiatrists rather than with political scientists. Assuming sincerity, -how did these consistent standards lead him to Nanking? - -In 1927 Chiang broke with the Communists quite a while before Wang did. -Wang was willing to yield a doubtful point here, to credit the other -side with good motives there, and to keep the Wuhan government going as -long as he could. His difficulties were the difficulties of a -constitutionalist willing to maintain the constitution at the cost of -some appeasement. In the following years of exile, he upbraided Chiang's -machine-boss tactics within the Kuomintang; the name "Reorganized -Kuomintang" which he selected for his schismatics, is indicative of his -desire to promote regularity in party elections and free democratic -discussion in party congresses. - -A striking instance of repetition may be seen in contrasting the -Nanking of 1940 with the Peking of 1930. In 1930 Chiang K'ai-shek had -been threatened by military attack and had found a great part of China -wrested from him by superior forces, those of the _tuchün_ Feng -Yü-hsiang and Yen Hsi-shan; but the National Government maintained its -position in the capital. In 1940, the capital had moved to Chungking and -the armed enemies were Japanese; Hu Han-min (the great Rightist leader) -was dead, a new Communist alliance was in effect, and the outside world -was in a turmoil more profound than China's. Despite the supervening -changes, Wang Ch'ing-wei was found in 1940 in precisely the role of -1930. Again he was the front for a military regime. In 1930 he had been -a Left-liberal front for native militarism; in 1940, he was the -appeasing, conservative front for the Imperial Japanese army. In 1930 he -had his own "Reorganized" Kuomintang; he had his "Orthodox" again in -1940. In 1930 he usurped the National Government offices, titles, and -regalia; he did this again in 1940. In 1930 his career ended with -military defeat and he went into exile, later bargaining his position -back into Chinese politics. - -Wang appears to have become the victim of an _idée fixe_: he believes -that if he impersonates government devotedly enough, and with careful -enough detail, he will become government. Brilliant, sincere, adroit, he -is burdened by a pathological self-esteem and is so much the victim of -his own past rationalizations that he is no longer inventive. Obviously -such a character, in the face of recurrent failure, cannot assume the -blame for it. Wang's demon is the Generalissimo. - -Another characteristic of Wang appears clearly at this point: the belief -of the appeaser that he can outsmart the appeased; he no doubt thought -that his _tuchün_ colleagues would become victims of the government -which they let him create. On his way out of China after Chiang's armies -and Chang Hsüeh-liang's intervention had settled this affair, he -stopped over in Canton to take part in an even more transitory and less -successful rebellion. - -The next round of Wang-Chiang rivalry displays the consummate political -strategy of the Generalissimo and the ruin of Wang by his own virtues. -For three full years, 1932 through 1935, Wang was President of the -Executive _Yüan_ and second only to Chiang. After a little more than a -year out of office--owing in part to a gunshot wound--he returned in the -crucial months of 1937 just before the outbreak of general hostilities, -and stayed with the National Government through the first year and a -half of the war--until December 1938. In fifteen more months he reached -terms with the Japanese; eight months after he set up a government with -their consent and sponsorship, they recognized that government. -Throughout this period Wang advocated peace, non-aggression to the point -of non-defense and surrender, and universal conciliation. These -attitudes made him very useful to Chiang when Chiang needed him, and -made him dispose of himself when he was no longer helpful to Chiang. - -Wang was ruined by the long, agonizing appeasement of which Chiang was -the leader, in the six years between the Japanese invasion of China's -Manchurian provinces and the outbreak of undeclared war in July 1937. -Throughout this period the forces of Leftist reform, of Communist -pressure (both military and political), of student sentiment, of -overseas-Chinese patriotism, and finally of national self-respect -itself, fed the opposition to Chiang, who knew that, whatever the cost, -China was not militarily or politically ready to fight Japan. Wang -Ch'ing-wei, who when out of office had espoused some of the most -genuinely popular and necessary reforms, found himself civilian leader -of a government following an intensely unpopular policy, and unable to -profit by the rise of opposition. The Generalissimo needed someone to -replace Hu Han-min, with whom he disagreed and whom he temporarily -incarcerated. Wang provided a counter-balance to the Hu Han-min group, -undermined his own popularity, and helped shield Chiang from -anti-appeasement criticism. - -Wang Ch'ing-wei, in this period, feared war and grasped at the -conciliation which the Japanese offered between successive invasions. In -1937, Wang worked for the localization of the war at the cost of North -China, on the theory that the Japanese could take what they wished. He -reiterated his old point that the Chinese could not possibly whip the -Japanese on the fields of battle, but that they might outmaneuver them -over the tables of diplomacy. The advent of war was a disappointment and -source of worry to him. - -In the course of the celebrated retreat from Nanking to Hankow, and from -Hankow to Chungking, Wang lost no opportunity to work for peace. When -the Germans offered themselves as intermediaries in the Hankow period, -Wang sought the opening of negotiations. There was a violent uproar in -the People's Political Council, not then reported in the press. When the -government moved to Chungking, Wang was even more despondent: victory -seemed remote, the Communists worried him as much as did the Japanese, -and the Generalissimo swept opposition aside with the slogans of -resistance. Like other peoples in war time, the Chinese began to confuse -peace and treason. Wang and his closest supporters felt that they were -being deprived of freedom of speech; their known inclination to -surrender and negotiate had supplied Chiang with a weapon which might -even prove personally dangerous to them. The death by firing-squad of -General Han Fu-ch'u showed that treason, or the charge of it, had become -serious. Wang and his followers rationalized their own fearfulness -concerning the war into the belief that they were expressing the will of -the peace-loving masses. In December 1938 he got out of China by a -surprise flight to Indo-China. His followers had previously been -filtering down to Hong Kong. The Konoye statement,[8] just issued, gave -him an opening to treat with the Japanese. - - [Footnote 8: Statement of the Japanese Prime Minister, Prince Fumimaro - Konoye, December 22, 1938, Jones and Myers, _Documents on American - Foreign Relations, 1939-40_, Boston (World Peace Foundation), p. 299.] - -Throughout the negotiations, Wang behaved as though he were himself the -legitimate Chinese government. He did not accept the minimum Japanese -conditions, but held out for an agreement which would preserve the -fictions of Chinese independence, allow him to fly the national flag, -establish his version of the Kuomintang, and attempt every kind of -linkage with the past. One of his followers asked the author in Nanking, -"Do you think we were traitors when we spent more than a year getting a -fair peace agreement from the Japanese?" This agreement, released by -Messrs. Tao and Kao, consisted of the cession of broad military, -foreign-relations, and economic rights over China to Japan. The Chinese -were to lose no territory _pro forma_, and were to keep a minimum of 35 -per cent interest in major economic enterprises. - -The regime is sufficiently well known so that there is no need to detail -its history: the long dickering with the two Japanophile "governments" -already established in Peking and Nanking, since they were the third -parties to the Japan-Wang negotiations, the installation of the -government in March 1940, and its recognition the following November. -The more significant problem is--what part can this Nanking -establishment play in the actual contest for power in East Asia? - -In the first place, the Reorganized National Government (_Chung-hua -Min-kuo Ts'an-chêng Kuo-min Chêng-fu_) of China is not a puppet -government in the sense that the Manchoukuoan government is. The -Japanese have a very loose surveillance of the officers of state. -Interviews with officials indicate pretty conclusively the absence of -dictaphones or of Japanese Special Service agents. The leaders in the -government at Nanking are not watched or hounded in any intimate way. -One of them said: "Why should the Japanese watch us? They know that we -cannot do anything to them, and they know that their only chance of -success lies in our becoming a real government." - -Secondly, the personnel of the Nanking regime is not sufficient to cope -with the problems which face it. The Nanking regime has no diplomatic -officer who has regularly represented any other Chinese government; only -a few consuls, in Japanese territory, joined it.[9] In no single -instance can a Nanking officeholder, compared with his Chungking -counterpart, be regarded (patriotism apart) as better-qualified or more -able than his rival. In an enterprise of this sort, it would seem likely -that Nanking should have the better man in some few positions. Diligent -and disinterested inquiry fails to reveal a single one. Finally, the -personnel is a mixture of Wang cliquists, politically obsolete -conservatives, careerist Japanophiles, colorless opportunists, and -actual criminals. - - [Footnote 9: Ch'ên Lo died, and the only persons with any diplomatic - experience had, in the past, been only casually connected with the - Foreign Office.] - -A Western newspaper man, well acquainted with the Nanking situation, -told the author that he estimated the regime as 5 per cent Japanophiles, -5 per cent upright men who worked with the enemy because of a sense of -public duty toward the Chinese people in the occupied areas, 20 per cent -opportunists, and 70 per cent low characters interested in thievery. -Nanking officials, to whom these estimates were communicated without -revelation of the source, felt the latter categories to be much too -high. Several of the more intelligent men in Nanking offered the -argument that if they did not share in the regime, unscrupulous elements -would deceive the Japanese and oppress the people; or they stated that -the Reorganized Government had brought back the flag, the constitution, -the titles, the law codes, and the political doctrines of the National -Government, so that occupied and unoccupied China had the same polity. -They disregarded the point that this abetted the enemy. - -Thirdly, the government has nothing to do. The power of the Nanking -regime in no instance reaches beyond the Japanese patrols. No counties -are under Nanking control which are not also under Japanese control. The -Ministry of Foreign Affairs has no foreign affairs. The Ministry of -Finance collects some excises and disburses many salaries, as well as -limited amounts for the upkeep of some schools, law courts, minimal -public services, and state property, insofar as the Japanese have -returned any. (It is interesting to note that the officials at Nanking, -deploring the "Communist" tendencies of Chiang, live in commandeered -houses, and use the commandeering of private property as a form of -patronage for their supporters.) The Central Political Council has so -little to do that it draws up a budget and solemnly debates items of -less than U. S. $100.[10] The officials cannot ride far from the city -limits of Nanking, because of the guerrillas who operate all about. The -railroad runs only by daylight. The Nanking police are mostly unarmed, -except for clubs--an unprecedented condition for modern China!--and many -who carry rifles or pistols seem to have no cartridges. - - [Footnote 10: See _The People's Tribune_ (Shanghai), XXIX, p. 130 - _ff._, August 1940. This is the semi-official English organ of the - regime; each issue contains a selection of public documents. It is - edited by the volatile T'ang Leang-li. The other English-language - journal is _The Voice of China_, fortnightly, Nanking, edited by Mr. - L. K. Kentwell, a graduate of Oxford and Columbia Universities, - Hawaiian-born of British and Cantonese parentage. The journal is - spirited, and very anti-British.] - -Fourthly, the Nanking government is an encouraging indication that the -modern Chinese have finally come to the point where five-power -republicanism is the norm. It is significant that the Nanking regime -practices an extreme purism of organization and nomenclature, conforming -precisely to antebellum practice.[11] The regime has changed the -theoretical structure of the National Government very little, but added -the Party ministries to the government cabinet. One further change has -consisted in the logically desirable transference of the Ministry of -Justice to the Executive _Yüan_ from the Judicial, thus eliminating the -anomaly of having both prosecuting and adjudicatory agencies under the -same control.[12] The minister, Li Shêng-wu, is a well-known scholar in -international law and an educational editor.[13] - - [Footnote 11: Such a chart is found in _The People's Tribune_, XXIX - (March 1940), p. 214, together with a list of incumbents on the - following pages. The issue is headed by an editorial, "The National - Government Returns to Its Capital" and "Peace, Struggle, and Save - China" by Wang Ching-wei (_sic_). The official outline of the - government is to be found in [Reorganized Government], _K'ao-shih Yüan - Kung-pao_ (Public Gazette of the Examination _Yüan_), Nanking. Vol. I, - No. 2 (June 1940), following p. 80.] - - [Footnote 12: [Reorganized Government], _Ssŭ-fa Hsing-chêng - Kung-pao_ (Public Gazette of the Ministry of Justice), Nanking, gives - a well-edited résumé of the work of the Ministry and its policy in - prosecutions.] - - [Footnote 13: [_China Weekly Review_; J. B. Powell, editor], _Who's - Who in China, Fifth Edition_, Shanghai, [1937], p. 145. For further - information see the supplement on the pro-Japanese leaders in _Who's - Who in China, Supplement to Fifth Edition_, Shanghai, [1940]. This - presents a hall of notoriety for all the major Chinese leaders - affiliated with the enemy. This _Who's Who_ is regarded by the present - author as one of the most valuable sources on all Far Eastern - politics. It is engrossingly good reading and entertainment, the - pictures of the subjects being included in most instances. Behind - these simple and short biographies, there lies more drama than - Hollywood dare produce.] - -Since the Japanese may be expected to foster the kind of Japanophile -government which would help them most, it is interesting that their -crusade against Sunyatsenism has turned to a quasi-Kuomintang structure -for aid. The attempt does not, as yet, seem to be working, but the -technique of the deception reveals the depth to which Kuomintang -principles and practices have penetrated in the past generation. The -Nanking incumbents make every effort to confuse their regime with the -National Government at Chungking, even to the extent of copying the -names of all minor offices, the forms of the stationery, and the -organization of semi-public cultural associations. Chinese fashion, they -confuse correct form and legitimacy. Given a long enough period, this -technique may succeed. Meanwhile, the failure of the earlier traitor -Governments, non-Nationalist in form, is a real indicium of the value of -the Sunyatsenist pattern. - -Along with the bewildering _Doppelgänger_ effect which prevails in all -other matters, there are two Kuomintangs. The major, recognized -Kuomintang continues from Chungking. At Nanking Wang and his friends -have organized the "Orthodox Kuomintang." This can scarcely be thought -of as a Party fraction, so much has it dwindled. The overseas branches -have been lost, and the populace in its own cities is savagely -contemptuous. Wang Ch'ing-wei held a "Sixth Plenary Session of the -C.E.C. of the Kuomintang" on August 29, 1939, and the affair seems to -have been an uproarious farce, with all of Wang's friends bringing in -random acquaintances in order to make up a quorum.[14] Since then, the -vestigial party has been equipped with appropriate party organs, and is -preparing to share its hypothetical power with an equally _ad hoc_ -Nanking People's Political Council. The Kuomintang leaders in Nanking, -as a part of their application to the Chungking pattern, have even -listed a considerable number of minor parties which are on their side of -the Japanese army. Persistent, specific inquiry in Nanking failed to -elicit the name of a single _bona fide_ minor party representative, -other than representatives of the _Hsin Min Hui_ (ex-Provisional), the -_Ta Min Hui_ (ex-Reformed), the Republicans (_Kung-ho Tang;_ Hankow; -merged with the Orthodox Kuomintang), and the Chinese Socialist Party, -which consists of the venerable Dr. Kiang Kang-hu. It is perhaps fair to -conclude that the Nanking regime is not a Kuomintang regime because a -sizable portion of the Kuomintang membership were weary of war, but -because some few Kuomintang leaders found no other way to power, and -because the Japanese had reluctantly decided that the simulacrum of the -Kuomintang was the minimum requirement of any Chinese government. - - [Footnote 14: For an account of this see, "Wang's Farcical C.E.C. - Session," _China At War_ (Hong Kong), III, No. 6, p. 57; January - 1940.] - -Lastly, the lack of success of Wang Ch'ing-wei and his government is -proof of the emergence of a state in China. This is not the first time -that Wang has set up his own government. It is not even the first time -that Chinese have accepted foreign aid in such enterprises. Wang -thought, and presumably thinks, that he is playing the accepted game of -Chinese politics; he is likely to find that he has committed a treason -which is disastrously real to him. The non-support of his government is -a clear proof of the rising race-national awareness among China's common -millions. - -Stripped of the confusion and distortion which have surrounded the Wang -Ch'ing-wei secession, the rivalry between Wang and Chiang is not so very -different from Benedict Arnold's departure from the then dubious -American revolution. In this century we have revised our opinion of -Benedict Arnold upward--in part--and Wang Ch'ing-wei may, perhaps, -justly fit the same category. A gifted but maladroit and unhappy -political leader had brought his misfortunes to the Japanese. They, -_faute de mieux_, have accepted his aid. So far this has been -ineffectual. Most probably, only a very long lapse of time or the truly -catastrophic ruin of their opponents could place Wang and his group in -a position of autonomous importance and power. On the world scene Wang -stands halfway between Quisling and Pétain. A traitor to the emergent -Chinese state, he demonstrates the ancient Chinese capacity to -surrender, appease, and survive. Had he antagonists less formidable than -Chiang and the infuriated masses, his Reorganized Government might -secure actual power. - -The Japanese finally recognized the Reorganized National Government of -Wang Ch'ing-wei on November 30, 1940, after many months of delay. _Art._ -I provided for mutual recognition, but added the provision that the two -countries should "... at the same time take mutually helpful and -friendly measures, political, economic, cultural, and otherwise ..." and -in the future prohibit "... such measures and causes as are destructive -to the amity between the two countries in politics, diplomacy, -education, propaganda, trade and commerce, and other spheres." _Art._ II -was an anti-Communist agreement leaving Japanese forces in North China -indefinitely. _Art._ IV left the problem of Japanese evacuation to -separate annexes. _Art._ VI provides "Economic cooperation," with the -inescapable implications. By _Art._ VII Japan relinquishes -extraterritoriality (in the future), but obtains the opening of all -China to Japan.[15] These terms, which not only involve admission of -Chinese defeat, but preclude any possible attempt of China to restore -military, economic, or political independence, are the best that Japan -has to offer. When one considers that even these are merely legal, -whittled back to realism by protocols and annexes, and that they are -made with Japan's Chinese friends, Japan appears incapable of ending -the China incident. The Japanese do not know when to stop. Gauche in -power politics, they are undone by greediness and inexperience. - - [Footnote 15: The full text of the treaty is to be found in China - Information Committee, _News Release_, December 2, 1940, together with - the Generalissimo's comment. For a brief account, clearly interpreted, - see Steiger, G. Nye, "Japan Makes Peace--with Wang," _Events_, Vol. 9, - No. 49 (January 1941), p. 60-2. The Generalissimo's comment on the - Nanking regime will also be found below, Appendix III (A), No. 7.] - -The recognition is important only in that it assists Japan in escaping -responsibility for action taken by or through the Chinese affiliates, -while at the same time pinning Japan to the Chinese earth and committing -the Empire to indefinite continuation of hostilities. If the Japanese -achieved complete success in international power politics, there is a -possibility that the Reorganized Government might remain as the -functioning half-autonomous affiliate of Japan. Otherwise, Nanking can -be nothing more than an ornamental, occasionally useful auxiliary to the -Imperial Japanese Army, itself an uncomfortable Chinese government _pro -tem_. Having ultimate authority, the Army cannot yet escape or delegate -final responsibility. - - - - -CHAPTER VIII - -EXTRA-POLITICAL FORCES - - -Government, wherever organized, is distinguished from other social -institutions by claims to universality of scope and competence, and -paramountcy of authority; the term _political_, on the basis of such a -distinction, refers to activities, occasionally individual but more -usually collective, involving access to the symbols of government; and -the term _governmental_ refers to the application of such symbols in -governmental sanctions and services. The process of government is -accordingly one wherein groups smaller than the totality of society seek -("politically") to obtain action in the name of the totality -("governmental"), for or against other groups according to shifting -interests. In the West this politico-governmental process has been -further characterized by ceremonial forms ("laws") and reinforced by -conceptions of amoral omnicompetence ("sovereignty"). - -The cellular socio-economic structure of old China, plus the Confucian -employment of ideological as opposed to governmental control, kept the -entire process of politics and government at a very low level of -intensity. Modern China, inheritor of an apolitical past, is still the -most pluralistic society in the world, and modern Chinese -government--despite recent gigantism--a frail legal superstructure above -a flood of extra-political power. Western societies depend upon their -states; the Chinese state depends upon a society which could, albeit -uncomfortably, dispense with states altogether. - -This condition amounts in international politics, to both a strength and -a weakness. Chinese society suffers more political ruin with less social -disturbance than does any comparable society; the guerrillas, for -example, probably find government helpful when available, but regard it -as a luxury rather than a necessity. Chinese society is near to an -orderly anarchy; uniform conditioning from the past, or uniform present -opinion, takes the place of mass organization and totalitarian -government. The high death rate of traitors is probably not owing to -activity on the part of Chungking, but to the spontaneous action of -ordinary men; on one occasion a high pro-Japanese official was shot by -his own bodyguard while the two sat in a sedan on a busy street: the -bodyguard had experienced a revulsion of conscience. Fu Hsiao-ên, Wang -Ch'ing-wei's Mayor of Shanghai, was also killed by a member of his own -household. Spontaneous but uniform action applies not only to -sensational political matters; it appears in less dramatic but equally -important affairs, such as commercial rivalry, landlord-tenant -relationships, and the police power of the community and the family. -However, in a contest for power, while the Chinese lose little by -defeat, their counter-attacks are correspondingly more difficult. The -fluid autonomy of innumerable groups slows down the engines of formal -power. The political-governmental process is apt to be sluggish in -crises. - - -THE FOUNDATIONS OF CHINESE GOVERNMENT - -The society upon which the National Government of China, its Left -associates, and its Japanophile rivals rest is not a settled, stagnant -society. An extraordinary ferment has gripped China for more than a -century--arising from cadastral, agrarian, technological, economic, -fiscal, ideological, political, and governmental change. The Chinese -people have endured; they have also acted. Within a single century, -three blazing revolutions have swept China: the T'aip'ing Rebellion, -put down with Western aid after fifteen years of war; the Boxer -uprising, deflected into xenophobia by the Manchus; and the Great -Revolution, which succeeded in part. Between these, there have been -changes, bloody but of secondary magnitude: the Moslem rebellions; the -minor uprisings of Sun Yat-sen; the Republican Revolution; the 1919 -movement; the _tuchün_ wars; the Communist communes, which failed -utterly in Shanghai and Canton; the Communist _jacqueries_, which -continued; and the present rip tide of resistance. None of these was -effectively mastered by organized government; each was exploited by one -government, and opposed by another. Unlike a Western state, wherein -government becomes the prime mobilizer during crises, Chinese society -shifts its incalculable forces, and governments leap forward to take -advantage of them. - -This extensive, unorganized residue of opinion and power, outside the -reach of government, keeps any modern Chinese government in a peculiar -condition. Like a perpetual process of revolution, social changes demand -that a government exploit them, deflect them, or employ them--but not -launch or stop them. The Kuomintang has failed in its attempts to launch -favorable mass movements, and also failed to stop antagonistic ones. The -secret of the Chinese Communist power has lain in the skill of the Red -leaders, who utilized available movements. Hence the continued -development of Chinese government rests upon the wills, fancies, -interests, mob action, enthusiasm or dispiritedness of a people who in -their own communities do not read newspapers, listen to radios, or pay -much attention to the national state. Despite attempts to bring society -under the control of government, in order to make it possible to bring -government under the control of society (constitutionalism), the -decisive forces of modern Chinese life are outside the reach of -propaganda or control. - -General opinion in China is not ascertainable, except through action. In -vital matters this action is apt to be either violent, or the equivalent -of violent: sit-down, general, or go-slow strikes; boycotts; universal -derision. The National Government possesses unprecedented amounts of -power by Chinese standards. By Western standards it is incredibly -obliging, casual, and unsystematic. The power which the Government, with -Chiang as leader, enjoys, arises from a support which it could not -compel, and which it cannot ensure by any means other than the pursuance -of support-arousing policies. The Kuomintang, the Communists, the -National Salvationists, the independent Left guerrilla leaders--these -agencies are not the organization of entire opinion groups, but the -spearheads of immeasurable forces. The modernization of government, both -administrative and constitutional, awaits the transformation of -materials around and under government. Greatest of these is popular -mentality. Ancillary are economic, organizational, educational and -cultural forces. Progress toward the omnicompetent state is slowed by -the fact that few Chinese wish to abandon the freedom of a pluralist -society for the efficient universality of legalism. They desire -modernization, but haggle at the price. - -Three factors in particular are working upon and among the millions of -farmers and townsmen: mass education, rural reconstruction, and the -cooperative movement. Each not only takes immediate, beneficial effect, -but also transforms the political material of China. These forces, not -in any strict sense political, possess enormous political importance. - - -MASS EDUCATION - -Literacy has risen very rapidly in modern China. Before the impact of -the West, becoming literate was in itself a career. By the time one -could read at all, one was a scholar, unless one learned the limited -quasi-shorthand of the merchants. Educational reforms came about as the -result of modern schools, particularly British and American Protestant -schools, and the action of the government. The fabric of Chinese society -had begun to change even before the downfall of the Ch'ing dynasty. The -literary revolution led by Hu Shih after 1915, which popularized -_pai-hua_ (a written form of the Chinese spoken language) had extensive -repercussions, and made possible the rapid diffusion of ideographic -literacy. (Phonetization failed then, and later.) Almost every -government in China has attempted the diffusion of literacy. The popular -demand is intense. - -The present status of literacy in China is revealed by official figures -from the Ministry of Education, which may err somewhat on the side of -optimism. These put the total population of China at 450 million -(Manchuria presumably remaining unmentioned), of which 90 million are -literate and 360 million illiterate. Such an estimate would give China -about the same absolute number of literates as the United States. The -remaining 360 million illiterates are broken down as follows: 40.05 -million children below the age of six; 45 million aged six to twelve; -29.25 million aged twelve to fifteen; 79.43 million persons over -forty-five; and 1.57 million dumb, deaf, cripples, or insane. The adults -to be reached by the mass literacy movement amount therefore to 165 -million; government estimates state that 46,348,469 illiterates were -educated since 1938, of whom 25.2 million were adults between fifteen -and forty-five, leaving roughly 140 million to be educated.[1] - - [Footnote 1: The China Information Committee, _News Release_, April 1, - 1940.] - -The mass education program is supplementary to the education of -children, which is far from complete or even adequate. The literacy -imparted is of the most elementary kind; but in a civilized society such -as China this has immediate effect. The author never knew a Chinese who -could read and was not addicted to it; a common sight in Western China -is a knot of coolies deciphering a newspaper together. The intense -reverence for learning and scholarship makes the training welcome, and -the teachers who seek to teach the minimum of one thousand ideographs in -six weeks never lack pupils. - -The program of the National Government was summarized by Ch'ên Li-fu, -the Minister of Education, speaking over the radio after the Mass -Education Conference of March 1940: - - Accordingly, our first step is to wipe out illiteracy. In - this respect we proceed simultaneously with the - enlightenment of the masses of adult illiterates, both men - and women, and with the education of children in order to - put an end to illiteracy that may otherwise arise in the - future. At the National Conference on People's Education - held from the twelfth day to the sixteenth day of this month - in Chungking, the _five-year plan for the people's - education_, adopted by the Executive _Yüan_, was further - deliberated and promulgated. The proper enforcement of this - plan will help to convert at least one hundred and forty - million (140,000,000) adult illiterates into intelligent - citizens for China within the coming five years. - - At present there are already 44 per cent of the entire - number of children of school age (from six to twelve) in - school; that is, nineteen million and eight hundred thousand - (19,800,000). By the enforcement of this plan, there should - be, during the first two years, at least one people's school - in every three _pao_. And each village should have a nucleus - school, according to the plan. In this way there should be - at least more than 260,000 people's schools for the 800,000 - _pao_ of the entire nation at the end of the first two - years. Each people's school consists of three divisions or - classes, namely, the children's division, the men's - division, and the women's division. During the second two - years there should be at least one people's school in every - two _pao_. In the fifth and last year there should be at - least one people's school in each _pao_. That is to say, at - the end of the fifth year there should be at least 800,000 - people's schools for the 800,000 _pao_ of the nation, - besides the 80,000 or more nucleus schools and the 200,000 - schools of the same grades now already existent which can - be improved, to provide education for at least 90 per cent - of the entire number of children of school age. As a matter - of fact, certain provinces have already succeeded in - establishing one or even two people's schools in each _pao_. - Kwangsi Province, for instance, has at present one people's - school in each _pao_, while Fukien Province even has two - people's schools in each _pao_. The fulfillment of this - five-year plan needs at least $2,932,000,000 and 1,600,000 - properly trained teachers. - - Our vocational education aims at building a sound middle - cadre for the various professions and industrial - enterprises. There are training schools and short-time - classes for mechanics, electrical communications, metal - work, etc. Also, special classes are opened in more than ten - colleges and universities for advanced studies along such - lines. - - Our attempt to universalize productive education may be - evidenced by the incorporation of productive education - courses into the middle school curriculum, besides - instituting organizations for the same in the various - vocational schools in order to facilitate the practice of - students along such lines.... In 1938, for example, only - 53.0 per cent of the entire number of students who took part - in the examination studied science and engineering, but in - 1939 it jumped to 59.4 per cent.[2] - - [Footnote 2: The same, April 8, 1940. Minor changes in punctuation - have been introduced.] - -This statement gives the official view, which is highly optimistic. In -terms of practical politics, however, the Generalissimo has given the -movement his cordial backing, and sees in it a preliminary to democracy. -Although final results might fall far short of the hopeful estimate, the -effect would still be considerable. Diffusion of literacy creates a -momentary satisfaction with the political system which makes literacy -possible, but the after-effect of literacy is to make men of any -nationality easier to govern well and harder to govern badly. A -government which diffuses literacy without advancing reforms is -sharpening weapons against itself. The National Government's -American-inspired trust in education as a panacea implies that Chiang -and his fellow leaders expect to remain popular, and do not contemplate -appeasement, reaction, or other unpopular measures. - - -RURAL RECONSTRUCTION - -An even more interesting aspect of the mass-education movement is its -connection with rural reconstruction. In this field much is owed to Dr. -James Y. C. Yen, a graduate of Yale and Princeton who began his work -with the Chinese labor corps in France during the 1914-18 war. The -war-time work of the correlated mass education and rural reconstruction -movement was summarized by Dr. Yen himself: - - The most hopeful factor in the whole China situation is that - her greatest and most valuable resource, the three hundred - and fifty million farmers, has not yet been tapped for the - upbuilding of the nation. The Chinese farmer has had a - measure of freedom and responsibility, of dignity and - independence. He is thrifty and industrious, intelligent and - an expert in intensive farming. A great number of our - national leaders are sons and daughters of our farmers. The - fathers of Dr. Sun Yat-sen and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek - were farmers. - - These nearly three years of terrible war have proved beyond - doubt that our faith in the Chinese farmer has not been - misplaced. It has revealed his greatness. Our nation is - rediscovering the "forgotten man," the tiller of the soil. - Most of our soldiers come from the farm. To a remarkable - extent he has also financed the war. He is the real hero of - this war. - - The Chinese Mass Education Movement was organized in 1923 to - explore the potentialities of the rural masses and find a - way of drawing out the best in them. Since the first - publication of the "thousand character test," it has been - estimated that some thirty million illiterate people have - been taught to read during the past five years. - - Beginning with 1929 the point of emphasis of the Movement - shifted from extensive promotion of literacy to intensive - study of the life of the farmers in the rural districts. As - a living social laboratory in which to do our research and - to work out principles and techniques, we selected - Tinghsien, a district of four hundred thousand people, - one-thousandth of the total population of China, in Hopei - Province. This was the first time in our history that an - organized group of Chinese intellectuals went deliberately - to the country to live among the rural people to study their - life and find out how to develop their latent possibilities. - The Movement has evolved what is known as the "Tinghsien - Four-fold Reconstruction Education" including the cultural, - economic, health, and the political. - - Several other experimental _hsien_,--Hengshan in Hunan, - Central China, and Hsintu in Szechwan, West China, were - established in cooperation with the provincial governments. - One of our special emphases in these experimental _hsien_ - has been the reform of the _hsien_ government, i.e. the - local government. - - The Tinghsien Experiment with its "laboratory approach" to - social and political problems and with its _correlated_ - program of rural reconstruction as demonstrated in the - district attracted attention from all over China and - inspired similar experiments in various parts of the - country. As a result the movement for rural reconstruction - gained great momentum in China. - - Since the outbreak of hostilities the Mass Education - Movement has thrown itself unreservedly into the task of - assisting the Central and Provincial governments in - strengthening the nation's struggle against the enemy. It - was most gratifying that at this hour of China's supreme - struggle we have been able to help the government to - revitalize the _hsien_ government, to train civil service - personnel and to mobilize the farmers. Extensive application - of the new system as developed in the experimental _hsien_ - was made to an entire province such as we did in Hunan--a - rich province with a population of thirty million. - - In order to insure that the new political machinery should - function effectively a School of Public Administration to - train administrative and technical personnel from the - magistrate down to the village elders was established with - the senior members of our Movement taking full charge. - Altogether the School trained about 4,000 higher officials - for the local government and some 35,000 of the village - elders. Since Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek assumed - concurrently the governorship of Szechwan, a new system of - _hsien_ government (chiefly modelled after the experimental - _hsien_ of the country) with the object of releasing the - new life of the rural masses has been promulgated. Under his - order the same is taking place in neighboring provinces. - - Unless serious and painstaking study of rural reconstruction - is made by scientists and scholars on the one hand, and - administrative and technical personnel are systematically - trained and imbued with a spirit of service to the rural - masses on the other, the movement for rural reconstruction - may dwindle away as so many other movements have done in the - past. - - It is most heartening to state that Generalissimo Chiang - Kai-shek has given his public approval and backing to the - new National Institute of Rural Reconstruction which he - considers to be of fundamental importance to China's - post-war reconstruction. The inspiration of the Institute - has already helped to mould the principal rural - reconstruction groups in the country into one national - force. The rural reconstruction movement has achieved a - united front unparalleled in its history. Today it is a - great unifying force, an outstanding national platform upon - which all Chinese can agree. It will meet the needs of China - today and lay the foundation for the China of tomorrow.[3] - - [Footnote 3: The same, May 6, 1940.] - -This program possesses obvious merit. Lacking a foundation of dogma, it -requires no implementation through terrorism. The politically innocuous -character of the movement is attested by the frequent demands by -provincial officials for personnel from the Mass Education training -centers. Since the purpose is to improve the entire community without -revolutionizing its class structure, the enlightened landlords are as -favorable as the peasants themselves. Unfortunately, enlightened -landlords are not always prevalent. Despite the modesty of the program, -it finds stumbling blocks in actual corruption, extortion, and -illegality. Many _hsien_ are under local machines which permit wealthy -conservatives to evade tax payments, steal government funds, and repress -genuine farmer organization. The consequence has been that the movement -succeeds only when it has the immediate backing of a provincial or -central authority; its progress has been slow. Many critics, both -Chinese and Western, have become disgusted with the slowness of social -reform on the land, and despair of anything save reconstruction through -implicit class war.[4] - - [Footnote 4: Research Staff of the Secretariat, Institute of Pacific - Relations, _Agrarian China, Selected Source Materials from Chinese - Authors_, Shanghai, 1938. A more Leftist and even gloomier view is - taken by Chen Han-seng, _Landlord and Peasant in China_, New York, - 1936, and the same author's _Industrial Capital and Chinese Peasants, - A Study of the Livelihood of Chinese Tobacco Cultivators_, Shanghai, - 1939. Two general surveys of the Chinese economy are Condliffe, J. B., - _China Today: Economic_, Boston, 1932, and Tawney, R. H., _Land and - Labour in China_, New York, 1932. A significant hypothesis of the - relations of economics, government, and culture in China is found in - Lattimore, Owen, _Inner Asian Frontiers of China_, New York, 1940, Ch. - III, esp. p. 39 _ff._; this rests in part upon Wittfogel, Karl August, - _Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Chinas_, Leipzig, 1931, the leading - Marxian exposition of the subject.] - -The present period of resistance and reconstruction opens a very -promising period in rural modernization. In the first place, war-time -stress puts great power in the Generalissimo's hands. Ubiquitous armies -can, on short notice, enforce orders from Chungking. The shift of troops -among provinces makes the central government an outside power now -physically present in tens of thousands of communities. Devolution of -watchfulness by the Commander-in-Chief and his staff results in slow but -irreversible accumulation of governmental authority. - -Secondly, the proclamation of manifold programs has the effect, -obviously, of drawing attention to each of them. The Kuomintang, anxious -to retain its paramountcy, promotes new local government changes. These -face frustration by mass illiteracy. Mass education is impeded by local -economic injustices. The Whampoa and _Erh Ch'ên_ groups in the -Kuomintang, while they have landlord connections, are interested--even -assuming a strong economic-class interest--in the maintenance of -government. Action is appearing, slow and haphazard by Western -standards, but indisputably present. The minimum of good government in -China is a very low minimum, but it is rising in the face of the -Communist and Japanese pressure. One may be sure that the National -Government will not pass below that minimum if the state's existence is -in danger. - -Thirdly, there is a very genuine boom condition in Western China. The -movement of the government to the West, and lightening of intolerable -but long-endured _tuchün_ exactions, would in itself have led to sudden -prosperity. To this are added more than twenty millions of new -population, a growing network of communications, a sharp but controlled -inflation. These further stimulate speculation and construction and -development. The most important factors in a new prosperity have been, -however, the reappearance of handicraft-type industry as a consequence -of blockade, and governmental advocacy of every conceivable development. -The author beheld, during the summer of 1940, conditions of prosperity -in Szechwan which he had not expected to find in China within the space -of one lifetime. Narcotics were eradicated. The working population was -commanding high wages, but suffering from high prices; the prices were -somewhat ahead of the wages, but not so far that social morale was -troubled. Skilled labor was in a superb bargaining position; chauffeurs, -electricians, good carpenters, etc. were in considerable demand. The -salaried classes were suffering at all levels, a factor which was -patently wholesome in stimulating working-class morale. The clerical -class, which had held itself aloof from manual labor with a persistence -which boded ill for China, was placed more nearly on a par with its -American equivalent. While poverty was still universal by Western -standards, the pathological squalor endemic to the coast was nowhere -visible. - - -THE CHINESE INDUSTRIAL COOPERATIVES - -The Chinese Industrial Cooperatives (_Chung-kuo Kung-yeh Ho-tso -Hsieh-hui_) are an important and widely publicized outgrowth of the war, -and are perhaps the only feature of domestic Chinese affairs--outside of -the Communist area and the roads program--which is as well known beyond -China as within. The purpose of the cooperatives is to launch an -enormous program of decentralized industry throughout Free China, with -thirty thousand separate industrial cooperatives for the first major -goal. The purpose is to develop an industrial system which will keep -China autarkic for resistance and reconstruction; long-range, the -purpose is to circumvent impending evils of concentrated industrialism, -slums, megalopolitan crowding, extra-legal oppression. China might thus -proceed directly from a decentralized half-handicraft economy to the -decentralized power economy of the future. Four principles underlie the -program: sound technical design, cooperative organization, voluntary -self-discipline, and social welfare on the basis of Sun's _min -shêng_.[5] - - [Footnote 5: Publicity release of Indusco, Inc., The American - Committee in Aid of Chinese Industrial Cooperatives, New York, January - 1940 [1941]. This agency, exceedingly active in publicizing China's - cooperative progress, has released a great deal of up-to-date - information on the movement. The Western literature on the C.I.C. has - appeared mostly in popular sources, to which _The Bulletin of Far - Eastern Bibliography_ issued by the Committees on Far Eastern Studies - of the American Council of Learned Societies, Washington, D. C., - serves as a useful guide. The writings of Edgar Snow are of special - value and vividness in treating this topic: articles in _Asia_, - various dates; "China's Blitzbuilder, Rewi Alley," _The Saturday - Evening Post_, Vol. 213, no. 32 (February 8, 1941); and his recent - _The Battle for Asia_, New York, 1941, which appeared as this work was - completed and sent to press. A convenient handbook is the anonymous - _The People Strike Back! or The Story of Chinese Industrial - Cooperatives_, Shanghai, (1939?).] - -Formally, the C.I.C. Headquarters is a social organization sponsored by -the Executive _Yüan_. H. H. K'ung, Minister of Finance and -Vice-President of the _Yüan_, is its Chairman. The Secretary-General -and Associate Secretary-General, Messrs. K. P. Liu and Hubert Liang, are -both American-returned students; the former once worked in the Ford -factories while studying at the University of Cincinnati and later was a -banker in Manchuria. The most inspiring force in the movement is Mr. -Rewi Alley, a New Zealander strongly interested in cooperatives and in -labor welfare, formerly factory inspector in the International -Settlement. Familiar, because of his Shanghai experiences and -famine-relief work, with the problems of economic organization in China, -he presented his plan to Generalissimo and Mme. Chiang through the -intervention of that extraordinarily popular British Ambassador, Sir -Archibald Clark-Kerr. The Chiangs were impressed with it, and the -Generalissimo gave it his support. A headquarters was established at -Hankow in August 1938, with the following five departments: _general_, -for secretarial and administrative housekeeping; _financial_, -administering funds for the headquarters and the cooperative units; -_organization_, in charge of planning and inauguration of cooperatives; -_technical_, devising simple industrial techniques; and _accounting_, an -independent agency of audit.[6] The Executive _Yüan_ has continued to -make administrative funds available; the central headquarters near -Chungking now has a staff of about seven hundred. Professor J. B. Tayler -of Yenching University, a noted economic expert, is consultant for staff -service. - - [Footnote 6: "The Movement in Action," _New Defense, A Journal of the - 30,000 Industrial Cooperatives Movement in China_ (Chungking) Vol. I, - no. 1 (April 1939), p. 5.] - -As projected by Rewi Alley and his fellow-enthusiasts, the C.I.C. had to -adjust itself to three zones of China's war-time economy. A guerrilla -zone in and around the combat area, as well as behind the Japanese -lines, concentrated on the creation of immediate war-time necessities. -Some of these were in the form of direct medical and military supplies; -others, replacements of indispensable articles which otherwise would -have been procured from the enemy. The second zone, of light industry, -was within easy reach of Japanese air raids and espionage, and -consequently given to enterprises having light capital investment, -mobile, and readily concealed. The third, or inmost Chinese zone, being -best protected, was the proper area for the development of the heavier -industries, although even here no grandiose or heavily centralized works -are planned. The ultimate aim, peace-time as well as military, of the -C.I.C. is to distribute industry across the countryside, replacing the -once flourishing handicraft industries, and allowing Chinese society to -develop naturally and continuously. - -The author attended a C.I.C. exhibit in Chungking which presented a -startling array of modern goods. Ford tools and auxiliary parts, -matches, lamps (electric, kerosene, and an improved wood-oil lamp which -equals kerosene), light electric appliances, lathes, machine-shop tools, -medical kits, Western shoes, toothpaste, canned foods, paper, printing -presses, books, and fountain pens--all were produced in areas which did -not even have the spinning wheel in some instances, and which until -recently imported all Western or modern goods from the coast or from -outside. - -The organization and practical accomplishments of the C.I.C. are well -summarized in a recent article by K. P. Liu, Secretary-General: - - INTRODUCTION: When it became clear that in order to continue - economic resistance against Japan China must at all costs - develop production in the rear of the fighting line, one of - the steps taken was the founding of the Chinese Industrial - Cooperatives by Dr. H. H. Kung. - - The plan was to construct throughout China chains of small - industries which should use local materials to supply the - manufactured goods fundamentally necessary to the life of - the people. - - Industrial cooperative societies are organized around about - 60 depots over 16 provinces. An average depot of about 25 - cooperatives is supervised and advised by a group of men - consisting of depotmaster, accountant, technician, and two - or three organizers. - - For the coordination of work depots are divided among five - regions: the Northwest (NW), the Southeast (SE), the - Chuankang (Szechwan and Sikang) region (CK), the Southwest - (SW), and Yunnan (Y). Each is headed by regional - headquarters, which are responsible to the Central - Headquarters at Chungking which represents the C.I.C. on - general questions and negotiations, and decides, in - consultation with regional chiefs, on broad lines of policy. - The Central Headquarters also supplies the services of - traveling advisers on engineering, accounting, and - organization problems. - - The staff of 700 is financed by Government funds, since the - C.I.C. has been named a social organization responsible to - the Executive Yüan. Further, the C.I.C. was given $5,000,000 - by the Central Government to be used as loan capital for - cooperatives. More recently, negotiations with various banks - have made new large sums available, so that the amount which - can now be used for the capitalization of cooperatives is - near $30,000,000. - - The above two sources of income provide no money for - education, research, evacuation of workers from occupied - areas, technical training, refugee work relief, medical - help, or capital loans in guerrilla regions. Necessary - auxiliary activities as these are provided for to a certain - extent by gifts from interested men and women in China and - abroad.... FORMING AN INDUSTRIAL COOPERATIVE: When a depot - is first set up, the depotmaster advertises the objectives - of the C.I.C. by posters and speeches. But as soon as a few - workmen get to know about its activities there is no more - need to advertise. There are always plenty of workers who - will prefer the security and freedom of a cooperative to - unemployment or to working for a master. - - The number of men needed to form a cooperative is at least - seven, but there is no upper limit. They first come to talk - things over with a C.I.C. organizer, present their plan for - setting up a factory or workshop, with proof of their - qualifications and a tentative budget showing how much loan - capital will be needed to start work. The organizer explains - to them the cooperative system of self-government, Chinese - cooperative law, and the C.I.C. Model Constitution. Then - they take some descriptive literature home, and discuss - among themselves whom they want as their officers. - - Meanwhile, their plans are talked over by the depotmaster, - accountant, organizer, and engineer, and modifications - suggested. If, as often happens, it turns out that they are - only merchants anxious to get rich quick and not _bona fide_ - workmen ready to work hard, the plans are rejected. - - If all is satisfactory, a meeting is held for the election - of officers, determination of share capital, voting of - wages, and work begins as soon as the loan is put through. - At least one quarter of the subscribed share capital must be - paid up immediately, and the total loan--long-term and - short--cannot exceed 20 times the subscribed share - capital.... The actual ratio of share to loan capital - averages about 1 to 6. - - INDUSTRIAL DISTRIBUTION: Distribution of industry is shown - in the following condensed table: - - Textiles 610 [cooperatives] - Engineering 49 - Mining 118 - Chemical 206 - Pottery 69 - Foodstuffs 83 - Transport 4 - Miscellaneous 395 - ----- - 1,534 - */ - - There are no less than 114 types of cooperatives, and almost - every daily need of the people can be met. - - Before any cooperative is organized, investigations are made - to ensure that (I) there are raw materials near at hand, - (II) there is skilled workmanship available, and (III) there - is a market for the finished product. Where these three do - not co-exist at one place, a compromise of the most - reasonable kind is effected if possible. Some examples--by - no means exhaustive--of the adaptation of types of industry - to meet local conditions are described as follows: - - _Wool_ ... In the beginning of 1939 woolspinners of Chentu - were still using either the simple old whorl or the - handturned wheel. The volume of production was very small. - But during 1939 the C.I.C. embarked on a huge program of - blanket production for the army, and improved streamlined - treadle spinners were introduced, and thousands of men and - women taught the technique of using them. Blankets were made - at eight centers of west and northern China; everywhere - improved woolspinning and woolweaving machines and - techniques brought new productive power. During the winter - of 1939-40, 400,000 blankets were turned out, and another - million and a half will be made during the remainder of - 1940. - - The wool used by the blanket-making cooperatives comes from - the highlands of Chinghai, Kansu, Ningsia, and Shensi, and - now instead of being carried raw to Tientsin or Shanghai as - in the old days, it is being spun and woven near to the - source of supply. Improvements are constantly being - made--better machines, finer spinning, use of waterpower, - better carding and finishing--so that the whole project - works to raise the efficiency and living standard of the - local people. - - _Cotton_. Wherever cotton is grown spinning and weaving - cooperatives are numerous, for clothing is one of the - fundamental needs of life.... - - _Grass Cloth_. Linen, or more correctly grass cloth, was - introduced into Szechwan from Kwangtung generations ago, and - now fine cloth is woven. Production thereof from ramie - thread was at its height 20 years ago, but since then the - craft has declined until recently, when the partial blockade - of the war made the industry profitable again.... - - _Goldwashing_. Placer gold exists along every river in West - China and in many parts of South China too. Even in - Chungking one may see needy coolies scraping up and washing - riverside mud for its tiny precious content. - - The gold is easily available by simple methods, though - certain difficulties have hitherto prevented its extraction - on a larger scale. But now every grain is an asset to China - in economic warfare, and so many goldwashing cooperatives - have been organized. In the whole country there are 66 - cooperatives, most of which are in the Han valley.... Now - the cooperatives ... are self-supporting and produce 60 to - 70 oz. of gold a day. - - _Coal and Iron_. Throughout the hinterland of China new - sources of coal and iron are being needed continually by - newly transplanted industry. Szechwan has good coal, - widespread, but rather thin in seam.... - - At the same time plans for the construction of blast - furnaces have been worked out by C.I.C. engineers, and only - wait for adequate financing. It is planned first to set up - in South Shensi at a point within easy distance of coal and - iron supplies a coke-making and a smelting plant, the total - capitalization being $105,000. - - _Alcohol._ A first experimental plant for the production of - 96 per cent pure alcohol has been running nearly a year with - a maximum output of 350 gallons a day. Since the cost of - such a plant is comparatively small, and available supplies - of grain make the cost of alcohol much less than that of - gasoline, other plants have been set up. There are now six - in operation and greater production in the future is - envisaged. The sites of alcohol plants are naturally at key - positions on the highway, where good supplies of coarse - grain meet with the traffic line. - - _Prime Movers._ In many cooperatives one may see a quaint - mixture of old and new, where big flywheels are turned by - human labor to maintain the spin of lathes, carding - machines, and the like. This is a useful temporary - expedient, possible where labor is cheap. Animal power is - also used. - - But C.I.C. engineers are not satisfied with this state of - affairs; they are always on the lookout for new sources of - power. So charcoal-or gasoline-burning internal combustion - engines are commonly employed. - - But most popular are waterwheels, and in every part of China - will be found old wheels adapted for modern uses--driving - textile machinery, turning lathes, grinding flour--undershot - or overshot, single or in series. Gradually the wheels are - being made of better materials and more efficient. Iron - wheels are constructed at present weighing about one ton, at - a cost of $3,000, and generating over 30 H.P. - - In the plains waterpower is rarely available, but in the - foothills of Tibet, the Tsingling Shan, or in the rough - country of southern China this cheapest of all forms of - power will come more and more into its own as C.I.C. machine - shops construct improved waterwheels. - - ACCOUNTING: During the past two years the C.I.C. staff has - tackled the question of modern accounting wholeheartedly in - every depot, and training classes in cost accounting have - been given for cooperative accountants who only know old - style Chinese bookkeeping. C.I.C. trained accountants have - been allocated to cooperatives--for big cooperatives one - accountant is employed by each society, for small, one - accountant serves two or three. Emphasis has been placed on - the presentation of monthly balance sheets and yearly - closing of accounts with profit sharing. - - Profits are divided among the members once--or in rare cases - twice--a year. The usual method of division, all claims - including interest on loans and shares having first been - paid, is as follows: - - Reserves 20 per cent - Emergency Fund 10 per cent - Bonus to Officers of Society 10 per cent - Common Good Fund 10 per cent - Divided among Members 50 per cent - */ - - The division accords with Chinese Law. The bonus to officers - is usually made to include gifts to apprentices and hired - workers such as cooks, and the Common Good Fund is used for - education, medical welfare, and other social service. The - division among members is made in strict proportion to wage - and time worked. - - Local conditions and various industries differ so much that - no wage-policy has at present been applied. In general it - may be said that wages in cooperatives--fixed by the members - themselves--are about the same as those in private factories - of the district. The products in general sell at prevailing - rates, though in some cases the prices have been lowered and - profiteering prevented by the action of the cooperatives. - - COOPERATIVE FEDERATIONS: Wherever the societies have passed - the first short period of infantile dependence on the C.I.C. - they have been associated into federations, sometimes - according to trade, but more often and more wholesomely, - according to districts. The most important immediate - function of the federation is to open a supply and marketing - agency, which by its centralization, specialization, and - greater supply of circulating capital is able to relieve the - cooperatives of most of their problems of buying and - selling.... - - TRAINING: Training of organizers is of vital importance, for - it is they who will succeed or fail in giving to the workers - true conceptions of cooperation, industry, and business, and - in inculcating efficient methods and habits. Classes for - organizers have consequently been held in every region. - - Training of cooperative chairmen in their duties is also - undertaken. They "learn by doing,"--how to conduct meetings, - business principles, cooperative law, history of - cooperation, scope and significance of industrial - cooperation in China.... The most usual training is by - weekly night classes and meetings. There is also constant - informal training by the organizers, who devote about one - day a week to each cooperative, and work with the members on - the solution of immediate problems by the application of - cooperative principles. Popular education of workers will be - described later. - - Another important aspect of training is technical. In no - case is a society organized until the technical ability of - the members is adequate for making a successful business. - So, with refugees and unskilled peasants it is usually - necessary to give preliminary training--mainly in textiles. - Wherever there is textile work, training classes have been - held in spinning and weaving.... - - SOCIAL WELFARE WORK: No statistics have been compiled about - the social contribution of the C.I.C. to the communities - around its depot. The work varies according to local needs - and opportunities, and according to available resources in - funds and manpower.... - - OUTLOOK: After the war there will undoubtedly come a period - of readjustment, when the renewed influx of machinery and - machine-finished goods will demand a shift of emphasis--for - instance handspinning cannot survive indefinitely, no matter - how essential it is at present. It is to be expected that at - that period the C.I.C. will continue to use in some - industries methods now employed, but that in others there - will be a transition to rationalization and mechanization. - With a soundly integrated network of skilled workmen, - experienced engineers, and bankers' confidence, the C.I.C. - will be able to make this transition without severe - dislocation. - - The C.I.C. is essentially a non-political organization; its - functions are all technical, and its staff is composed of - experts in various lines--cooperative methods, accounting, - engineering. Success does not depend on political position - or power, but on the simple and essential condition that - this type of industry produces efficiently the goods that - China needs. The C.I.C. objective is just Dr. Sun Yat-sen's - Third Principle--People's Livelihood--practically expressed. - - The success of cooperative movements in other parts of the - world--their ability to weather economic crises and - depressions--has been due to the solidarity that comes when - the motive force in industry and commerce is not the profit - of a few but the livelihood of many. In the same way the - C.I.C. can become a permanent force for national stability - and strength.[7] - - [Footnote 7: The China Information Committee, _News Release_, July 15, - 1940. The article and tables have been somewhat abridged. The - cooperatives spread so rapidly that figures are often obsolete before - they are tabulated.] - -The Model Constitution for an Industrial Cooperative[8] establishes -safeguards to keep the cooperatives from becoming profiteering -sweatshops. Bankrupts, drug addicts, persons incapable of working, and -persons already members of a unit are forbidden to join a unit being -formed (_Art._ 7). No member may subscribe more than 20 per cent of the -share capital of a single society (_Art._ 9). A general annual meeting, -with the quorum set at one-half, and action requiring the majority of a -quorum, is the highest authority in a unit (_Art._ 19). This meeting -elects a board of directors and a separate board of supervisors (_Arts._ -22 and 23). Sweeping disqualifications keep members from mixing personal -or outside interests and cooperative matters (_Art._ 32). The design of -the unit constitution is such that each unit is an authentic, autonomous -cooperative, governed well or badly in accordance with the abilities and -needs of its members, and is not a mere fraction of state capitalism. - - [Footnote 8: "Model Constitution for Chinese Cooperative Societies, - Revised July 7th, 1940," The China Information Committee, _News - Release_, July 15, 1940.] - -The C.I.C. taps a level of Chinese society hitherto largely -unused[9]--the family, guild, village, and volunteer-society devices of -the peasantry and townsmen who lived beneath the lowest limits of the -scholastic bureaucracy. The Communists act as the inheritors to -temporarily fanatical peasant rebellions; the National Government and -Kuomintang, to ascendant mandarinates; the C.I.C. brings into play the -rich experience of the Chinese with collective action. The resources of -the social power so mobilized cannot easily be estimated, but general -success would reshape much of Chinese society. - - [Footnote 9: Nevertheless, the rural cooperative movement must be - counted in as having made some beginnings, despite the obstacles it - has faced. More than seventy thousand credit and marketing - cooperatives were in service last year. (The same, April 22, 1940.)] - -In fitting the C.I.C. to the general Chinese scene, however, it is -important to compare the movement with some of the New Deal reforms in -the United States, such as T.V.A. (Tennessee Valley Authority). Though -these are important, neither the American nor the Chinese enterprises -proclaim social revolution or charter Utopias. The reforms of President -Roosevelt have had incalculable effect; no one knows what would have -happened without them. Nevertheless, it is excessive to suggest that the -existence of the United States as a political society depends upon these -reforms. Similarly, the continuation of the National Government of China -does not rest on the C.I.C., or on any other single institution alone. - -The C.I.C. extends patterns of cooperation and farm-factory balance -already tried in Europe, and also approached by such diverse agencies as -the Soviet state and collective farms, and Mr. Henry Ford's -worker-garden plans. Hitherto the Chinese cooperative workers have had a -closer contact with Dearborn, Michigan, than with Moscow, R.S.F.S.R. The -endeavor is a serious and important one. It supplements and develops the -facilities--themselves very extensive--which are under full -state-capitalist or private control. But Free China's markets, while -they contain C.I.C.-made goods, are mostly filled with private or -government products. A private Chinese business system which has -survived thirty years of domestic war does not obsolesce -instantaneously. The cooperative movement is, largely because of the -integrity, enthusiasm, and tirelessness of Mr. Alley, the nearest thing -to a realization of _min shêng_ which China has yet seen; but the Right -still plans for a China with vast state-capitalist and state-subsidized -private industries, along with an all-pervading flow of _laissez-faire_ -commerce. The Marxians look on sympathetically but contemptuously. - - -UNORGANIZED PRESSURE - -The long one-party rule of the Kuomintang, now relaxed but not -disestablished, has habituated the Chinese to the use of completely -non-political groups--families and their connections; economic -associations of various kinds; religious agencies--for political -leverage. There are relatively few groups which possess clear public -purposes and at the same time maintain unofficial status. Indeed, the -stamp of quasi-official approval is so highly prized that many groups -which seem to have no affiliation with the government are discovered to -seek affiliation or to have acquired it roundabout. - -Among the private or quasi-private groups which take most effect may be -mentioned, however, the People's Foreign Relations Association, the -League of Nations Union, and the China Branch of the International Peace -Campaign. The first of these publishes the useful quarterly, _The China -Herald_. The Campaign, which was launched as a world-wide -center-and-left drive for peace, was under respected European -leadership, and was favored by a large labor bloc in England. In the -United States it was associated in the minds of some people with the -Stalinist fellow-travellers--the elements who sat in the councils of the -temporarily-joined forces of anti-Fascism and pro-Stalinism, who -organized the American League for Peace and Democracy (a Popular Front -movement), the American Friends of the Chinese People, and who dominated -groups such as the American Youth Congress. In China, contrariwise, the -International Peace Campaign, fitting in with purposes of government and -people, seemed to offer a world-wide sympathy for China's -anti-aggression activities. The China Branch was among the most -effective organizations in the Campaign. It developed vitality in -diffusing peace propaganda--that is, for peace after the war. There was -no trace of defeatism, sabotage of national defense, or obstruction to -defensive war. With the outbreak of the European war, the I.P.C. -disappeared almost altogether from the Western scene, but continues in -China. Finally, the China League of Nations Union publishes _The China -Forum_, and carries on an educational campaign. - -Christian activities have been extended and activized by war. Never -before have the missions had as many opportunities for social and -national service in China. Their schools are filled; their hospitals, -crowded; their cause, related to America, to peace, and to a sane long -view, is welcomed. The Chinese Y.M.C.A. has met the shock of war with -extensive participation in relief, particularly among students and -soldiers. Medical aid, tragically inadequate but infinitely better than -nothing at all, is coming into China. The curtailment of mission -activities in occupied China makes exploitation of the Christian field -in the West even more desirable from the viewpoint of the Western -churches. A recent work, by two Christians born in China, one American -and the other Chinese, describes this situation clearly and -significantly: _China Rediscovers Her West_.[10] - - [Footnote 10: Wu Yi-fang and Price, Frank W., editors; New York, - 1940.] - -The other side of extra-political pressure comes in the form of class -and regional interests. The phenomena of lobbying and special favor are -less evident in Chungking than in previous governments of China. Special -groups representing industries, areas, or vested interests do appear, -but are apt to work through casual, untraceable patterns of personal -relationships. There is no Chinese C.I.O., nor A. F. of L., but there is -also no National Association of Manufacturers. The politics of economics -gains by diffusion and absence of protest what it loses in sensitivity -and explicitness. An economic group which feels itself outraged takes a -long time to develop group consciousness; hence, it is less apt to feel -outraged, and the generality of the people, the public, is often better -off. There are undoubtedly scurrilous, politically vile, selfish -advantages being taken in West China today; but the net outcome is -counterbalanced by concrete improvement in the condition of the people -as a whole, and the unquestionable morale of the leading and -administrative classes. - -Every government, where and however it may operate, has a double set of -barriers which form its corridor of further existence: on the left it -must meet the minimal needs of the governed, satisfy their physical and -moral appetites sufficiently to keep itself from being ignored or -overthrown; on the right it must compensate the persons who govern, and -do so well enough to retain personnel adequate to government. The -Marxians stress the former element; the Paretians, the latter. Both are -visible in China. Had the exigencies of reform, social change, and -military activity proved too sharp, too violent, too profitless, the -personnel trained by experience and fitted by temperament to government -might have gone over to Japan. The low caliber of Wang Ch'ing-wei and -his clique is testimony to the _élan_ of the West Chinese leaders. -Chungking has ample reserves of administrative talent, military -intelligence, and political acumen upon which to draw. - -The last part of the picture is the most important: the _lao-pai-hsing_, -the Old Hundred Names, the common people of China. They are the ultimate -arbiters of this war, and of all future wars in East Asia: to this -degree they are a superlative force in the world. Hundreds of millions -strong, adept, flexible, trained in a culture which has flowed under -(but not through) literacy for centuries, hard-working, patient, and -physiologically sound, they are perhaps the greatest unified human -group. Upon their anger against Japan depends the future of that Empire; -if the _lao-pai-hsing_ are determined to resist, Chiang could go, -Chungking fall, the government scatter, the Communists collapse, and -there would yet be war--restless, bitter, implacable, with the ferocity -of a sane man employing violence as a last defense against violence not -sane. Leaders exist aplenty in that sea of men, waiting for circumstance -to cast them forth. Intelligence, information, cunning, power, and -patience are all at hand. - -The difference between a strange half-industrial modern Chinese -Republic, striding toward the twenty-first century with seven-league -boots of progress, and a Chinese chaos stinking with vice and disease -under Japanese rule--this difference lies within the decision of the -common people. The war has roused the workers, peasants, and petty -townsmen. The Japanese bombers have carried ubiquitous messages of -alarm. The Western world gasped when across the dusty plains of North -China there rolled the tidal wave of Boxerism; but the _I Ho Ch'üan_ of -yesteryear is a passing fad in contrast to the bitterness and resolution -of today's common people. There is no defeat in most of the faces in -Shanghai, no surrender in the eyes of men who live, and must keep on -living, surrounded by enemy vainglory. The traitors are marked by their -own behavior; they bear the stigmata of a surrender to vice. Yet even -they cannot be trusted by Japan. One who has visited the sources and the -mouths of the rivers, who has seen the free Yangtze pouring out of Tibet -and the captive Yangtze ripple past the grey flanks of Imperial Japanese -destroyers, can testify that the Chinese people are not beaten now. If -they are ever going to be beaten, it will take a bigger force than -Japan to do it--a morally greater, technically surer, politically wiser -force. - -The Chinese people know they are unconquered. They do not know it with -their minds, despite hopeful calculations in terms of years and yen and -reserves of oil. They do not even know it with a conscious assumption of -faith, a fanatical determination to die for the new state. They know it -just as men have always known the simplest things of life--things so -simple that they may trouble the psychologist or elude the philosopher, -and never even enter the vocabulary of political science. The Chinese -sense of victory is like a reminiscent fragrance, a half-heard but -poignant sound, a flash of inexpressible but profound meaning out of -everyman's irrecoverable past. This omnipresent sense of victory and -freedom may be twisted. Weak and cunning men rationalize this sense of -victory into self-deceiving subterfuges of boring from within; they -accept Japanese salaries while promising themselves sometime, always -tomorrow, to subvert Japan; but even they lack no assurance of ultimate -Chinese victory. - -The winning of that victory lies on the sweating backs of men--in -paddy-fields, on flaring highways, on flagstone pathways across a world, -or behind the adobe and lattice walls of China's workshops. The war has -conjured up an awareness of power. No one asks the _lao-pai-hsing_ what -they want; no ballots, no polls can reach them. But no people can hold -such overt power and be unconscious of their own strength. China has -awakened. - - - - -[Illustration: _Dr. Sun Yat-sen_] - -CHAPTER IX - -SUN YAT-SEN AND CHIANG K'AI-SHEK - - -The two highest offices in the Kuomintang are _Tsung-li_ (Leader) and -_Tsung-ts'ai_ (Chief). These are occupied by Sun Yat-sen as Leader and -Chiang K'ai-shek as Chief. Sun Yat-sen, though he died on March 12, -1925, holds the higher office in perpetuity. So vast is his legacy to -modern China that it exceeds full enumeration: founder of the effective -revolutionary movement and Party, first practical republican, political -organizer of the modern and overseas Chinese, first President of the -Republic, and therefore officially acknowledged State Founder, a drafter -of the national plan of modernization, author of the accepted ideology -(_San Min Chu I_), initiator of the Nationalist-Communist entente and of -the consequent Great Revolution, promulgator of the Outline of National -Reconstruction, and posthumous patron of the National Government. Keenly -and devotedly an advocate of democracy, Sun Yat-sen established by -practical example the principle of charismatic leadership. He most -certainly left a mantle. This is now, after years of struggle, draped -about the shoulders of Chiang K'ai-shek, although Wang Ch'ing-wei -retains a few threads torn from the hem. - -Sun Yat-sen was a leader in the sense that the great religious and -philosophical figures have been leaders. He is not to be compared to -Alexander, Genghis Khan, Napoleon, or Hitler, but to Confucius, Gautama -Buddha, or Mohammed. Like the spiritual leaders he blended profound -humility and complete assurance. He knew that he was the savior of -China, and knew it long before anyone else did. He did not rely on -rising to power within a party, as did Lenin, or within a state, as did -Hitler. He created his own Party and his own state. Had he not -succeeded, he would have been labelled a maniac; so would most of the -other major figures of human history, had they failed. His success, -whatever its future fortune, is already so immense that it makes his -sense of leadership seem modest. And within the limits of success, he -was very modest; throughout life Sun remained more open-minded, ready to -consult, deferential to the opinions of others, and more willing to -yield power for the sake of harmony than the majority of his compeers. -This duality has troubled some of his biographers. As late as 1939 an -anonymous Englishman published an attack on Sun, which, missing the -history of six decades, failed to note that Sun had lived, had -succeeded, and had died objectively justified in his conception of -himself. - -Sun's example, unconsciously at variance with his teachings, has left a -strong Caesarian strain in practical Chinese politics. Without Sun -Yat-sen in the background, it is altogether impossible to understand the -role played by Chiang, or to resolve the contradiction between a state -pledged to democracy and a leader over-loaded with power. No group in -China, except the officials of Manchoukuo, disavows Sun Yat-sen: the -Japanophiles, the Nationalists, and the Communists all claim to execute -his will. - - -SUN YAT-SEN - -Sun Yat-sen was born in Kwangtung Province, near the Portuguese city of -Macao. Although he was uncertain of the date, the National Government -has found it to be November 12, 1866. Both his provincial and class -background had effect on his later life. The Cantonese are among the -most turbulent of Chinese, living at the southern edge of China and -speaking a dialect far different from the majority of the country. -Active, rebellious, enterprising, the Cantonese were disposed to change. -Sun's use of their tongue and knowledge of their customs gave him an -audience which both suffered and profited by its distinctness. Sun's -family was certainly not of the gentry class, and yet not so utterly -poor that it lacked all profitable connections. Otherwise his -potentialities might have been thwarted by ruinous poverty, disease, or -early death. - -In adolescence, Sun felt the stings and urges of resentment driving him -to reform and revolution. He had kin who were involved in the T'aip'ing -Rebellion (1850-65), the vast peasant uprising which, under Christian -collectivist leadership by the Messianic Hung Hsiu-ch'üan, swept North -to the Yangtze and drowned in a sea of blood less than two years before -Sun's birth. He thus had direct knowledge not merely of Chinese revolt -against the alien Manchu empire, but he knew of the revolutionary -technique of a religious leader. The effect of this presumptive -knowledge has never been explored; it would explain a great deal in -Sun's career--much of the sharp enthusiasm, the use of ecstatic slogans, -the emphasis on will, his demands for faith in himself--if one could -know that he followed the instance of a Chinese Joseph Smith or Brigham -Young, not that of a Chinese Mazzini or Marx. The other important -feature about his early life was Western education.[1] - - [Footnote 1: _Sun Yat-sen_ is the Cantonese pronunciation of _Sun - I-hsien_, just as _Chiang K'ai-shek_ is that of _Chiang Chieh-shih_. - Both men first acquired their world reputations under this - pronunciation, which has become standard in English. According to - Chinese custom, one's given name is used only by one's elders; - consequently Sun Yat-sen has been referred to, by his grateful - followers, by his "courtesy name" Wên, which is the name by which one - refers to one's elder. In addition, he is referred to by another - special name which he took for conspiratorial work, Chung-shan - (allusive to an ancient hero), or by his title--as _Tsung-li_ or _Sun - Tsung-li_, much as we refer to President Wilson rather than to Woodrow - Wilson. Sun was known most widely in life as Sun Wên; Chiang is most - commonly mentioned as Chiang Chung-chêng. The question of names is - extensively discussed in the biographies of the two leaders, cited - below.] - -Western training gave him a channel upward which the Confucian system -had denied a hundred generations of his predecessors. Patriots, rebels, -reformers--these have been sown by temperament and fortune across the -centuries of Chinese social existence, but such potential heroes have -been ploughed out or crippled by the language and the examinations. No -man could command power--save in its transient forms: banditry, -conspiracy, commerce--without mastering the Confucian canon. Once the -intricate scholarship of the past gripped him, the complex, beautiful, -archaic language of the mandarinate stopped up his mouth for plain -utterance. He was isolated from the people. Sun escaped this by the use -of the English language and the command of Western science. He was par -excellence the great counter-ideologue, whose self-confidence and -command of men rested upon foundations beyond the ken of his -adversaries. Judge Linebarger wrote, on the basis of what Sun told him: - - Like a soldier who after long study and practice has at - length mastered the manual of arms so as to have complete - confidence in his weapons, Sun now began to feel at last a - confidence in his ability to show others the path of his new - wisdom, for, while thus enjoying a steady advance under - English tutelage in the ways of the foreigner, he was by no - means neglecting his study of Chinese politics, even in the - pressure of college work. He knew now that he would have to - lead out in the Great Reform. At Hong Kong, Macao, and - Canton he had college intimates, and these he sought out as - often as his college course would permit.[2] - - [Footnote 2: Linebarger, Paul [M. W.], _Sun Yat-sen and the Chinese - Republic_, New York and London, 1925, p. 176; this is the authorized - life of Sun Yat-sen, written much as he wished it. The standard - critical biography is Sharman, Lyon, _Sun Yat-sen: His Life and Its - Meaning_, New York, 1934. Sun Yat-sen also wrote a number of short - autobiographies, some of which are deliberately inexact. Western - language material on Sun is surveyed in an annotated bibliography - appended to the present author's _The Political Doctrines of Sun - Yat-sen_, Baltimore, 1937, p. 265 _ff._ A work which has since - appeared is "Sagittarius," _The Strange Apotheosis of Sun Yat-sen_, - London, 1939.] - -Sun lived with his elder brother in Honolulu on two occasions, and -finally, after a period of discontent and rising turbulence at home, -went to study medicine in Hong Kong. He was the outstanding student in -the school because of his already fluent command of the English -language,[3] and was graduated as one of the very first Chinese -physicians to be trained in Western medicine. Through their very nature, -medical studies impart to the student a sense of responsibility for -others, and also incline them toward the expert's indifference to lay -opinion. Throughout his life Sun never lost confidence in the powers of -his own reason, or in the belief that, although difficult, it was both -necessary and possible to know the form and nature of social no less -than of biological processes, and to prescribe remedies for an ill -civilization as well as for a sick man. - - [Footnote 3: Statement to the author by Wên Chung-yao, President of - the Legislative _Yüan_ of the Reorganized National Government of Wang - Ch'ing-wei, at Nanking, September 5, 1940. Dr. Wên was a classmate of - Dr. Sun at Queen's College.] - -With traditional patriotism, a Cantonese background, the memory of -poverty, foreign training, and contact with overseas China, Sun was -already a marked man in his twenties. By 1895 he was important enough -for the Imperial Chinese Legation in London to kidnap him, preparing to -charter a ship to return him to China, where the torturers of the Board -of Punishments waited. In a _cause célèbre_, Sun was released; from then -on he had an international reputation. - -His technique of revolution was little affected by the growing -proletarian parties of Europe. He adhered to traditional Chinese -methods, working through the consolidation of pre-existent secret -societies, the recruitment of terrorists, the launching of insurrection -after insurrection in the hope that one of them would catch the waiting -tinder and blaze across China. In Japan, in America, and in Europe, he -travelled, gathering funds, carrying on vigorous polemics against his -fellow-exiles, the monarchist reformers. His followers were organized -under a variety of names, of which Kuomintang is the last and -best-known. By 1911 the revolution broke out, flared sporadically across -the central and southern provinces, then lapsed into negotiations -between the Republicans and the Empire. Sun Yat-sen, in America when the -clash was precipitated, returned home to be elected Provisional -President of the Chinese Republic, on January 1, 1912. But his -revolution had begun to pass into other hands. Opportunists, no rare -breed in China, leapt aboard the bandwagon, minimizing the role of the -Nationalists and grasping for the materials of power: offices, guns and -money, slogans. The new-born Republic was taken over by the formidable -Yüan Shih-k'ai and converted into a pyramid of military dictatorships; -with Yüan's death the nation fell into _tuchünism_ and foreign meddling. - -The years following were the saddest in Sun's life. He headed -miscellaneous governments in Canton, lived for a while in Shanghai, and -died at a fruitless unification conference in Peking. In his last years, -obsessed by his clear realization of the evils which beset his country, -he was even derided. He saw the vast economic maladjustments which would -follow the World War, and wrote a work, _The International Development -of China_[4] which in its grandeur anticipated the Five-Year and -Four-Year Plans; his idea was to finance a spectacular modernization of -China through public works by a scheme of international loans. Not only -would the imports of capital goods have benefited the Western powers, -but the development of a prosperous China would have provided the -expansion necessary to support an imperialist capitalism. His argument -was that international capitalism needed a market; China, one fourth of -humanity, provided a market; international guarantees and supervision -would make modernization possible; and modernization, while building -state-socialism and the material basis of prosperity in China, would -have enriched capitalism throughout the world. There is no evidence that -anyone save his followers and friends took his plan seriously. - - [Footnote 4: New York, 1922; reissue, 1929.] - -The next step, in 1922, was a turning from capitalist democracies, which -had disappointed him, to a Russia which professed a new justice in the -world. Sun negotiated with emissaries of the Third International, -accepting Red help on the clear understanding that Communism was -recognized, by him and by the Communists, as unsuited to China--a -proposition which history calls into question. Only in his last stay in -Canton did he escape the ten-year pattern of frustration which had been -broken only by his happy second marriage, to Soong Ching-ling. (The -author, then a small boy, remembers Sun in Shanghai as a man of gentle -kindness and rueful gaiety; Sun was never too busy to speak to him, nor -to remember little presents; and in the midst of revolution Sun found -time to write a note of encouragement and good cheer.) With the new -allies, Sun, a dying man, went South, founded the lineal predecessors of -the Chungking government, called his comrades to him, and discovered an -effective military helper--his first after Huang Hsing, dead in the -years of Yüan. This military aide was Chiang K'ai-shek. - -Just before his death Sun made sixteen lectures, out of a scheduled -program of eighteen. He did not write them, but they were transcribed -and roughly edited. In other years he had drafted monumental political -treatises; when the manuscripts were lost he did not reconstruct them. -The lectures, improvised, filled with minor inaccuracies, incomplete -arguments, and appeals to immediate opinion, rank nevertheless among -works of political genius. They are sharp, stirring, pointed, hopeful, -concrete. They define China's position in the world, and the goals of -the Chinese revolution. They adumbrate the reinforced democracy which -was to come and now fights for existence. And they prescribe an economic -philosophy humane beyond the dogma of the Russo-German dialecticians and -far more self-conscious than the obstinate torpor of Coolidge's -capitalism. Sun's lectures are today the foundation of the Chinese state -philosophy, taught in all curricula, required in all examinations. As -the _San Min Chu I_, they form an ideology with more legal adherents -than Marxism and National Socialism and Fascism combined. For democrats, -wherever they may be, this is a matter of importance, bearing directly -on the confused uncanalized struggles of our time. China possesses a -doctrine which indefeasibly associates her independence, her democracy, -and her prosperity. - -It would be a mistake to consider these lectures and Sun's lesser -writings the only source of Sun Yat-sen's dogma. Since the government is -in the hands of the Kuomintang, and Kuomintang seniority depends largely -on closeness of association with Sun Yat-sen, Sun's personal, casual, -unconsidered influence on his friends forms a vital background to state -policy. Sun's American biographer wrote, - - Some criticize the _San Min Chu I_, because it seems to them - severe and lofty. To this I reply that there are things - other than what is written in the _San Min Chu I_. The - English and other nations have their laws, written and - unwritten. So too do we, the partisans of Sun Yat-sen, have - our laws, written and unwritten. And this unwritten law is - to us the dearer, is closer to our hearts, and is more - moving as the goal of our activity, than even the written - commentaries. This unwritten law is for us, who, sitting at - his feet, received his teaching, the highest of all laws of - truth and fidelity, the law of _bona fides_.[5] - - [Footnote 5: Linebarger, Paul Myron, _Mes Mémoires Abrégés sur les - Révolutions de Sun Yat-sen_, Paris, 1938, p. 194. Paragraphing deleted - in translation from the French.] - -The continuing power of Sun Yat-sen is shown by the prestige and power -of his kin. Sun Yat-sen had two families. Early in life, before his -medical studies had ended, he was married to a woman of his own class -who was devoted, family-loving, characteristically Chinese, untouched by -the West, and undisposed to revolution. She bore him three children; the -son, Dr. Sun K'ê, was reared largely in the United States and has been -an important figure in Chinese politics ever since his return to China -from Columbia University. Successively Mayor of Canton, Chairman of -Kwangtung Province, Minister of Communications, of Finance, and of -Railways, President of the Executive and of the Legislative _Yüan_, he -has served with distinction. A practical and moderate man, he has always -advocated a moderate, constitutional application of his father's dogma, -has espoused full democratic government, stood for Party abdication, and -worked for national unity. One of his sisters died young and the other -married a gentleman who was later Chinese Minister to Brazil. Mrs. Sun -Yat-sen, Sun K'ê's mother, lived to a ripe old age in Macao. Charitable, -pious, humane, she was an enthusiastic Christian convert and a terror to -sluggard officials in that European outpost of vice. She took no part in -politics. - -Sun Yat-sen's second family was acquired when he married Miss Soong -Ching-ling. After his defeat by Yüan Shih-k'ai and the frustration of -the first Republic, Sun Yat-sen felt very much in need of a companion to -hearten him, help his work, and share his troubles. He had been on very -close terms with C. J. Soong, a Christian business man, and had asked -Mr. Soong's eldest daughter, Ai-ling, to act as his secretary. When Miss -Ai-ling Soong left, her sister succeeded her. Sun fell genuinely and -deeply in love with the beautiful, vivacious, American-educated girl who -understood his work and desired to share his troubles. In all his life, -it is likely that Sun met no one more devoted to himself, more -understanding of what he sought from life and from his work for China, -than Ching-ling Soong. They were married on October 15, 1915, in Japan, -Sun Yat-sen having provided for separation from his first wife. The -younger wife has since become world-famous as Mme. Sun Yat-sen. - -Ching-ling and Ai-ling Soong had a third sister,[6] May-ling, who -married Chiang K'ai-shek after Ai-ling had married H. H. K'ung. (Hence -Chiang K'ai-shek's closest family connection with Sun Yat-sen consists -in being brother-in-law to the second wife.) The three Soong sisters -thus married the two outstanding leaders and another who stood just -below. The Soong brothers were less successful, although one, T. V. -Soong, has been a leading fiscal reformer and financial expert. - - [Footnote 6: In the case of Chinese names which are commonly - transliterated in an Americanized form, the Western name-order is - preserved. According to standard Sinological practice, the three - sisters are Sung Ai-ling, Sung Ch'ing-ling, and Sung Mei-ling; their - famous brother (T. V. Soong) is Sung Tzŭ-wên.] - -The beauty, American education, polished cosmopolitan manners, and sense -of publicity of the three sisters have made them sensational news -figures. Their eldest brother's success has added distinction to this -family. The inescapable consequence has been a great deal of speculation -about the "Soong dynasty"; but the surprising feature of the Soongs is -not their fame and power through marriage, plus ability, but their -slight cohesion as a Chinese family. They have stood together only at -times of highest crisis, and not always then. Mme. Sun Yat-sen has -continued along the Leftist tangent which her husband followed just -before he died. For years she was the only Leftist in China who did not -fear death or a more painful fate. She kept her ideals; from the homes -of her family she wrote scathing denunciations of the blood-soaked -tyranny of her brother-in-law, her sisters, her stepson, and her -brother. Mme. K'ung appears to have worked most steadfastly in the -interest of the entire family, although rivalry between her brother and -her husband has been a matter of general report. Mme. Chiang K'ai-shek, -the youngest of the three sisters, has been a loyal wife first of all, -and has contributed enormously to the Generalissimo's international -prestige. No other modern leader possesses an able publicity adviser, -capable and apt, so near to himself. The family relationships of Sun -Yat-sen thus display themselves in his son, constitutional and moderate, -who is inclined to favor Mme. Sun, with Sun's sisters-in-law and -brothers-in-law following their respective political courses with their -own families--all on cordial political terms, but scarcely a monolithic -family bloc. - -In addition to his doctrine, his Party, his followers, and his family, -Sun Yat-sen has bequeathed his name. As Chung Shan, he fills the void in -Chinese polity left by the Emperor. Every Monday morning his will is -read, throughout every government office in the land. His picture is -seen everywhere. His sayings and slogans have become the shibboleths of -revolution, union, and reconstruction. The reverence paid to him is a -form of secular worship, focussed upon a magnificent mausoleum near the -cenotaphs of the Ming Emperors on Purple Mountain, Nanking. All virtues -and most knowledge are attributed to him; inescapably, some hard-headed -people react against the cult. Dead, he is to the Chinese what the King -is to the British, or the assembled forefathers to the Americans, -or--save partial eclipse by Stalin--Lenin is to the Soviet Union. -Perpetual leader of the Kuomintang, Sun has in death more power than -life vouchsafed him. In a world wild with alarm and hungry for -leadership, his sense of providential mission and of terrible political -urgency no longer seems shrill or vain. His is the greatest of -posthumous satisfactions: vindication by history. - - -THE SAN MIN CHU I - -Out of the broad body of doctrine embodied in the public and private -utterances of Sun Yat-sen, one single integrating philosophy stands -forth, which entitles him to rank as a major political thinker. This is -the _San Min Chu I_, which may be translated "three principles of the -people," "three principles of government for the benefit of the people," -"three principles concerning people" and so forth, or may--most -accurately--be represented by the neologism, "tridemism."[7] It consists -of an affirmation of a body of theory and a scheme of programs to be -applied generally to human experience, and particularly to the modern -problems of China. - - [Footnote 7: d'Elia, Paschal M., S. J., _The Triple Demism of Sun - Yat-sen_, Wuch'ang, 1931, p. 36-49, gives an exhaustive analysis of - possible translations. Stylistically, the term should be given _San - Min Chu I_ as a classical title; _san-min chu-i_ as a noun; and - _san-min-chu-i_ when used as an adjective. The first form alone is - followed because of its wide currency.] - -The prime problem faced by Sun Yat-sen was displacement of the Confucian -ideology, long refreshed and perpetuated by the mandarinate. (The -scholastic bureaucracy rested on the difficulty and character of the -language, which removed writing from speaking and, lacking what -Westerners commonly consider grammar, depended upon exact, appropriate -choice of terms.) Confucius, anticipating semantic controversialists by -many centuries, established a doctrine of meaning which made politics -the by-product of correct speech and thought, to be performed by -conspicuous, informed, and majestic persons. When ideas and ideals were -clear, moral standards firm and visible, and demeanor correct--as -determined by archaic natural standards--the realm would prosper. -Education was stressed as a means to public service. In succeeding -centuries Confucians first monopolized education, establishing the -Confucian classics as formal Chinese canons, and then monopolized the -bureaucracy. Providing for elementary circulation of an academic elite, -although economically based on land-ownership, they gave China a -modified sort of representative government, which operated by the -all-encompassing constitutionalism of common sense itself, and rested -ultimately on the lack of an alternative to common sense. The Confucians -were intellectually indifferent to natural science and economically -unfriendly to technological change; China, unsurpassed for political -sophistication and deliberate social order, was immobilized by an -ancient success. Ideological control led to veneration of the scholar, -even veneration of writing. Emperors, officials, people--all were -captive to accomplishment, and so completely indoctrinated that they -presumably enjoyed a very high conscious freedom. Rigid social and -mental uniformity spelled political laxity; the state became atrophied -and vestigial. - -Social rigidity made China only very slowly progressive in mechanical -terms. Political laxity made the country weak in the face of invasion, -exploitation, and possible partition. Intellectual traditionalism shut -off stimuli available from the outside. Confucius had said, "If terms be -not correct, language is not in accordance with the truth of things. If -language be not in accordance with the truth of things, affairs cannot -be carried on to success."[8] Sun Yat-sen, Confucian in spirit though -not in form, turned to the dynamics of ideological rather than legal -control. To stir the immense lethargy of China, he substituted science -for archaism; a Party elite for the scholastic system, propaganda to -replace doctrinal education, and agitation to supersede incantation and -reverence. - - [Footnote 8: _The Analects_, Book XIII, Ch. v; Legge, James, _The - Chinese Classics_, Oxford, 1893 [Peiping, 1939], I, p. 93; the word - _terms_ has been substituted for _names_ in rendering _ming_.] - -He struck at ideas first: "We cannot say in general that ideas, as -ideas, are either good or bad. We must judge whether, when put into -practice, they prove useful or not. If they are of practical use to us, -they are good; if they are impractical, they are bad. If they are useful -to the world, they are good; if they are not useful to the world, they -are not good."[9] This pragmatic utilitarianism was to be the -philosophical foundation of his revolution. The _San Min Chu I_ -therewith remained alien to Marxism, which is dependent upon the occult -mysteries of a topsy-turvy Hegelianism; Sun's thought is kin to the -working philosophy of America, a pragmatism tinctured by idealist -vestiges. - - [Footnote 9: d'Elia translation, cited, p. 130-1.] - -The first political principle he developed was _Nationalism_ (_min -ts'u_). The theoretical basis for this was a racialism which, -scientifically no more tenable than National Socialist Aryanism, is -clear in common practice. Very few Chinese have trouble in identifying -another Chinese. Sun Yat-sen pointed out that although the European -peoples were divided, China was to him both a race and a nation. He -thereby established for his followers a foundation for nationality more -credible than any mere appeal to state allegiance. Treason against one's -government is taken lightly in China: witness the Japanophiles. Treason -to the Chinese race is a far more serious matter. In order to preserve -the Chinese race-nation, Sun Yat-sen called for ideological -reconstruction from three elements: ancient Chinese morality, -traditional Chinese social knowledge (e.g., bureaucratic techniques; -arbitration instead of adjudication), and Western physical science. He -urged a return to cosmopolitanism through nationalism. By becoming -strong--instead of extinct under alien colonial rule--the Chinese state -could lead the world back to the old pacific cosmopolitanism of Eastern -Asia. - -Programmatically, Sun subsumed under his _min t'su_ theory, the -necessity of a patriotic elite, formed into the party of his followers, -which was to unify China and to cultivate a genuine state-allegiance -instead of the veneration of a concretely paramount Emperor or other -leader. He also advocated that China maintain independence, make -independence a reality in which the entire race-nation should share by -fostering actual autonomy (hence, democracy), and by fighting -defensively against economic exploitation by the imperialist powers. - -The second principle presented was _Democracy_ (_min ch'üan_). He -pointed out that old China was democratic in allowing considerable -social mobility, and much equality within the framework of that -mobility, and that popular government was a reality in local affairs, -while popular supremacy (corresponding to Western theories of popular -sovereignty) followed from the universally admitted Chinese right of -rebellion. He justified democracy on the grounds that it was commanded -by China's antique sages, was necessarily consequent upon nationalism, -was decreed by the _Zeitgeist_, was necessary to good administration, -and was a modernizing force. But he modified his democracy by a -distinction between _ch'üan_ (power) and _nêng_ (ability), keeping -government and people perpetually dual, and making the problem of -democratic personnel one of popular choice plus the control of popular -choice. The programs of democracy involved the revolution of three -stages, the five-_yüan_ government, and emphasis on the _hsien_.[10] - - [Footnote 10: See above, p. 42.] - -The third principle is based on Sun Yat-sen's own philosophy of history. -_Min shêng_, frequently translated "the principle of the people's -livelihood," rested upon Sun Yat-sen's belief that history is not based -exclusively on materialism and that it cannot be analyzed merely in -terms of the ownership of the means of production. He insisted that -history was based on the fundamental fact that man has _jên_--humane -self-awareness; human fellow-sympathy; consciousness of being located in -society, together with orientation by values social, not individually or -materially established; benevolence. _Min shêng_ is accordingly an -ethical doctrine first, and an economic one afterward. It is the basis -of history (_min-shêng wei li-shih-ti chung-hsin_). It presupposes, for -China: (1) a national economic revolution against imperialism and for -democracy; (2) an industrial revolution for the enrichment of China; and -(3) a prophylactic against social revolution. Although showing the -influence of Karl Marx, Henry George, and the modern American, Maurice -William,[11] the doctrine remained Chinese in spirit, pragmatically -collectivist in application. Under the programs of _min shêng_ Sun -included the bold projects for which he had sought all his life, -desiring the independent, socially just prosperity of his country. - - [Footnote 11: See William, Maurice, _Sun Yat-sen vs. Communism_, - Baltimore, 1932, for an appraisal which stresses the importance and - degree of this influence; on the opposite side, see "The Alleged - Influence of Maurice William on Sun Yat-sen" by P. C. Huang and W. P. - Yuen in _T'ien Hsia Monthly_, V, 4 (November 1937), p. 349-76.] - -These doctrines form the constitutional foundation of government action, -as well as being the Party credo of the Kuomintang. Whoever proposes -policy in China must first square it with the _San Min Chu I_. In this -the Generalissimo has combined adroitness with profound sincerity. - - -CHIANG K'AI-SHEK - -Despite a small shelf of biographies, Chiang K'ai-shek remains a -personality above and behind the news, not in it. His former teacher -and present publicity adviser, Hollington Tong, has written an -authorized life, clear, detailed, and well expurgated. The celebrated -Sven Hedin published a study of Chiang; virtues, but not specific -personality stood forth. An able American newspaperman had recourse to -his files, and some Chinese admirers sketched an incredibly soft, lovely -picture: the background was clarified, but not Chiang. Two world-famous -reporters, trained to epitomize a life or a nation in a double column or -sharp review, failed to grasp Chiang. He eludes everyone. - -Part of the trouble comes from the fact that he possesses virtues which, -once lauded, are now suspected of being mythical, wheresoever they -occur. Frederick the Great, George Washington, Julius Caesar in his -careerist years--authentic in history, as contemporaries these leaders -would strike the moderns as characters inflated or incredible. Sincerity -has become consistency with one's source of income; persons who fail to -fit into the accepted moral and intellectual types of Western -industrialist society are labelled fakes. One is a gentleman-liberal, an -intellectual-liberal, a capitalist, a picturesque _native_, a war-lord -sinister, obscene, cruel, and criminal--one fits such a type, and if one -doesn't, one does not exist. Yet Chiang exists, and is thereby suspect -to a host of commentators. Sun Yat-sen as First President was an -acceptable news figure; as Saint of the Great Revolution he became -vulnerable. When Chiang seems neither a general nor a reactionary, he -bewilders many Westerners. - -Within China, Chiang is more readily grasped. In any other age, he would -be the founder of a new dynasty. The establishers of Imperial houses -have, as a group, combined intense vigor with a flair for the -disreputably picturesque, in turn qualified by the highly respectable -associates they sought out after success. Several have been bandits; one -was an unfrocked Buddhist priest. For vigor and a timely -libertarianism, they compare favorably with the Claudian line. Today the -Dragon Throne is irrecoverably remote; the Manchoukuoan Emperor Kang Tê -lacks elementary plausibility. Chiang is far too wise, far too modern in -his own motivations, to wish or dare dream of Empire. Upon him has -descended grace of a new kind, the charismatic halo of Sun Yat-sen. His -reputation can be carved in the most enduring of materials: indefeasible -history. With a son who is a Bolshevik, a little Eurasian grandchild, -and an adopted son of no high merit, Chiang does not face the problem of -power-bequeathal. He has power now; it matters little where power goes -after his death; the value to him lies in immediate use. - -Assuming even an abnormal egocentrism, Chiang--at the apex of state--is -above ambition; he has no welfare but that of the state. In fact, Chiang -is a man of almost naively insistent morality. Even Westerners act on -the stage of today with posterity as an audience; Chinese, -state-building, moral, Chiang moves under the glare of his perpetual -reputation. As in the case of Sun, his sense of leadership would be -maniacal if not grounded on fact; but what assumption would not? A -peanut-vendor who thinks he is the King of Egypt is crazy; Farouk is not -therefore crazy because King of Egypt. If Chiang were not the leader of -China, he would be mad; but he, and he alone, is leader. His humility -begins with the assumption of his power. - -Twenty-one years the junior of Sun Yat-sen, Chiang was born in 1888 in -Chekiang province.[12] His family was of a class intermediate between -the truly eminent landlord-official or merchant families, and the -farmers. They had been farmers, but also minor gentry, and had been -connected with the salt-revenue system. His grandfather attained -considerable renown as a scholar, but Chiang's own father died when -Chiang was eight years of age. The child had few special advantages. His -family background is one which is of common occurrence among political -leaders; his widowed mother, mastering and managing for the family, -inculcated a sharp morality, an unrelenting frugality, and a persistent -drive of industriousness in her children. To such a person, who rises -from poverty and hardship by his own efforts, the failure of others to -do likewise becomes a personal problem. By his own case he has proved -that opportunities are there. He is impatient with the poor, the stupid, -or the shiftless; instead of re-arranging society to give them a chance, -he expects them to improve themselves to meet existing realities. Chiang -has not explicitly stated all these points; many of them are qualified -by the fact that the _status quo_ in modern China is the _status quo_ of -perpetual revolution. - - [Footnote 12: Biographies of Chiang are: Chen Tsung-hsi _et al._, - _General Chiang Kai-shek, the Builder of New China_, Shanghai, 1929; - Tong, Hollington K. (Tung Hsien-kuang), _Chiang Kai-shek, Soldier and - Statesman_, 2 vols., Shanghai, 1937, the authorized biography and a - model of its kind; Berkov, Robert, _Strong Man of China_, Boston, - 1938; and Hedin, Sven, _Chiang Kai-shek, Marshal of China_, New York, - 1940. _Who's Who in China_ is, as usual, useful for Chiang and for the - members of his family. Almost every book on modern China, or magazine - dealing with Asiatic materials, has discussions of Chiang. Among the - most noteworthy writers on his career and personality are Gustav - Amann, whose account remains the most carefully detailed; Edgar Snow - and John Gunther, the reporters mentioned above; and Harold Isaacs. - The Generalissimo's own diary and speeches, together with Mme. - Chiang's writings, are unconsciously rather than deliberately - revelatory.] - -Leftist commentators, dubbing Chiang a combined product of landlordism, -compradore class, and criminal gangs, explain him through a mystagogic -economic determinism. Actually, Western impress on Chiang is of a more -special nature: Western religion, and Western warfare. The ideals which -animate him, and determine--so far as these are visible--his own sense -of values, are concepts and attitudes extraneous to the Chinese scene. -Deduct the threaded recurrency of religion, and the sense of technique -from military training, and Chiang could be paired with many other -modern Chinese leaders--soldiers of turmoil, administrators of the _ad -interim_, complacent leaders of hypothetical groups. He and Sun stand -out because each had a Western technique so thoroughly mastered that it -gave him a clear competence over other men: Sun, the physician; Chiang, -the strategist. Each also had a Western moral drive which turned -hungrily to the past and justified itself in Chinese antiquity: Sun, the -all-around Christian, who professed and denied the churches alternately -throughout life, and Chiang, the Bible-quoting Methodist, both cite the -Confucian canons; both esteem the Chinese ethics; both discern the -forcefulness of Western spirituality. - -Leadership, plus technical power, plus alien moral reinforcement, spells -preeminence. The Confucians have gone; the serene mandarins are dead. -Methodist soldiers, Baptist bankers--such Chinese control China. -Marxism, which by combining jargon and act of faith, is both religion -and erudition, unites these ideocratic forces; Wang Ming can feel that -he is a scientist analyzing society with peculiar objectivity, and he -can feel morally gratified at the same time. Chiang and the Nationalist -leaders keep such sustenance dual. - -The special religious background came to him through his mother. Women -have traditionally turned to Buddhism for piety in China, and Mrs. -Chiang was one of the exceptional characters who combined intense hard -work with great piety. The children grew with the infinite looming over -them; every misstep meant thousands upon thousands of years of hopeless, -damnable rebirth. Buddhism can match the Christian, "It is a fearefull -thing to fall into the hands of the living God ...,"[13] with the even -more fearful doom of life in a world which does not want to live. -Buddhism, socially, goes about in circles; the Mahayana sect provides a -qualified kind of salvation, but not the salvation which a determined -man can wring bloody-handed out of circumstance itself. The discipline, -the austerity, were ready; Christianity, when it came to him, fell on -plowed and waiting ground. The other instinct of ascendancy was -cultivated by his education: professionalism. His life falls into three -stages after childhood: education; wasted years; and the mastery and use -of power. - - [Footnote 13: John Donne, in a sermon of commemoration of the Lady - Danvers, late wife of Sir John Danvers; 1627.] - -Chiang went to the Imperial Military Academy at Paotingfu. Aloof and -ambitious, he was so successful that within a year he was sent to the -Shinbo Gokyo (Preparatory Military Academy) in Tokyo; he remained in -Japan four years. The Japanese under whom he studied retained no special -impression of him, except that he eagerly accepted discipline. As a part -of his study, he served with the 13th Field Artillery (Takada) Regiment -of the Imperial Army. Chiang therewith acquired not merely military -knowledge, but a working insight into Japanese language, mentality, and -strength. - -His military studies were terminated by the outbreak of the Republican -Revolution in 1911. Chiang returned to Shanghai, and began a vigorous -military career under the local military commander, pro-Sun in politics. -Chiang himself had come into contact with the Republican-Nationalist -group while in Japan. There was already no question of where his -loyalties lay. He made rapid progress, and saw something of fighting. He -took part in the abortive Second Revolution, of 1913, which was the -military attempt by Sun Yat-sen and his first military coadjutant, Huang -Hsing, to check Yüan Shih-k'ai and to save the newborn Republic by -force. In this time, while the enthusiasm of his military studies had -not yet worn off, Chiang wrote prodigiously. No Westerner has, so far as -the present author knows, taken the trouble to go through Chiang's -writings in order to study him. Chinese commentators praise them as full -of military acumen, a sense of the novel and important forces in Chinese -society, and a vigorous moralism--modern-military in form, but archaic -in language--which animated Chiang's youthful desire to improve the -world with good, technically apt gunfire. He was at this time -twenty-three or twenty-four. - -Between this early career and the later years of Chiang's life--the -years in which his star rode incessantly ascendant--there is a gap of -several years, 1913 to 1918. In this time Chiang lived a life primarily -civilian, although he remained under the patronage of his first military -leader, General Chen Ch'i-mei, murdered in 1915. Chiang went on a -military intelligence trip for the Sun Yat-sen group, travelling through -Manchuria in 1915. He opposed Yüan's moves, and stayed in close contact -with the patriotic organization. Yet, the total picture of his life in -these years lacks the connecting linkage which binds his childhood, his -school days, and his mature career. His activity, while considerable, -was diffuse. - -He went down to Canton in 1918, and fought under the command of Sun -Yat-sen, with the inferior troops and hopeless expeditions which the -Leader, politically adept but strategically inexpert, kept throwing -against the confusion of the _tuchün_ wars, with the result that the -war-lords, counting him as another element in their balance of power, -did not even set up a united front against him. Chiang, a Central -Chinese, was unsympathetic to the intense provincialism of the -Cantonese, and was hopelessly tactless in criticizing old-type soldiers -upon whom Sun then relied. Disillusioned but still loyal, he went back -to Shanghai and wrote letters of advice to his friends in the South, -including Dr. Sun. Throughout this time he was simply one more among -the dozens of bright young military men who were, in the existing -crudity of warfare, unneeded in China. (Chu Tê, Chiang's present -colleague and rival who heads the Soviet Chinese military system, was at -this time besotted in Yünnan--a petty war-lord of landlord family, -trapped hopeless on his little island of power amidst ruin.) - -The period in the Shanghai years was filled in with business activity. -Chiang was acquainted with some of the most influential merchants of the -city, among them the crippled Chang Ching-chiang, a Paris merchant whose -personal wealth was an informal treasury of Sun's movement. Chiang -entered brokerage, and is supposed to have made a great deal of money. -He became acquainted with the modernized, Westernized young Chinese of -the metropolis, and left many friends behind him among the Chinese -business men and industrialists. - -Speculative or unfriendly writers asseverate that Chiang joined the -Green Gang, an association which combined the features of a protection -racket and a benevolent society. (Such a society, common in China during -periods of disturbance, is the archetype of the American-Chinese Tong -[_tang_] in its more violent phases.) If so, membership gave Chiang the -key to an underworld as well organized as François Villon's Paris, -wherein beggars, thieves, pickpockets, kidnappers, labor contractors, -burial societies, and legitimate associations merged under the -extra-legal government of a Masonic-like hierarchy. (The author is -acquainted with a Chinese League of Nations official who joined the Gang -as a necessary implement of social research, and was afforded genuine -courtesy in preparing a report, general but accurate as to prevailing -conditions, through the assistance of his fellow-members.) - -Chiang's marriage, which had been made Chinese-fashion in his late -boyhood, had given him posterity--a son, now the pro-Communist, -Soviet-trained Major-General Chiang Ching-kuo--but little companionship. -His wife and son remained most of the time at his native home, whence he -returned to see them and his mother, at Fenghua in Chekiang. Social -contacts, acquaintance with capitalism, looseness of family connections, -spasmodic work for the Revolution, and some military work--this, -combined with the making and the losing of a fortune, fill the early -maturity of Chiang. - -He appeared upon the national and the world scene by his selection in -1923 to go to Moscow under the terms of the Nationalist-Soviet -understanding, there to receive military training. He had definitely -cast in his lot with Sun Yat-sen, making soldiery his vocation, and the -selection implied that Sun began to see in him a military aide, to -replace Huang Hsing of the first revolution. Chiang spent four months in -the Soviet Union. The Communists, whom he was to fight six years later, -showed him their combination of political and military warfare applied -in Trotsky's Red Army. Chiang, already the beneficiary of Japanese -training, had found Japanese military science dependent upon the -framework of a stable constitutional system. In China his earlier -training had been superior to its environment and did not have the -practical utility of five years' banditry. Chiang, professional by -spirit, restless under the drive of conscience and ambition, now found -in Moscow the intermediate steps between modern warfare and -government-building. He found that an army, from being the tool of -pre-existing order, could become the spearhead of an accompanying order. -Returning to China via the Trans-Siberian Railroad, he met General -Galens (Vassili Bluecher), later his chief Soviet military aide at -Canton. - -In Canton, the first military creation on Soviet models was the Whampoa -(_Huangpu_) Academy. Decreed by Sun Yat-sen, who made Chiang chief, the -Academy had Soviet advisers, eager to instill revolutionary and -civil-war techniques. Chiang began the development of a modern army, and -the real accretion of his own power. Even before he commanded full -armies, Chiang used his cadets to good purpose in actual combat. - -From this point on, Chiang's career becomes a part of the military -history of the revolution. In his earlier years of power, Chiang emerged -to leadership by cooperating with various intra-Kuomintang groups. He -stood with the Left and utilized the Communists, although he managed to -provoke, suppress, and appease the Communists in a way which no one else -managed. He led the victorious Northern Expedition in 1925-27, carrying -his forces on the crest of the Great Revolution. He was little known, -but seen to be ambitious, zealous, incalculable, and a political -strategist of ruthless genius. He soon found himself one of the -triumvirate of Sun Yat-sen's successors: Hu Han-min, the Right -Kuomintang leader, editor of Sun's works; Chiang; and Wang Ch'ing-wei, -the Left Kuomintang leader. - -At Shanghai, in 1927, Chiang's troops turned suddenly against the -Communists and Left groups, quenching the uprising which had taken the -city under his flag. This coup was undertaken because Chiang felt that -the Communists were outrunning their promises. The Soviet advisers, who -had come to help the Nationalists, had professed their concern for -China's national struggle, and for the desirability of a fight against -imperialism. They had not told Sun himself that he was a mere precursor -to the proletarian revolution, nor informed the Nationalists that they -were being given the privilege of fighting a war to advance the -historical necessity of Nationalist extinction, as the next step in -China's dialectic progression. Trotsky talked openly in Moscow about -overthrowing the Chinese revolutionaries, and hijacking the Chinese -revolution with the Chinese Communists, while Stalin believed in -appeasing the Nationalists longer before discarding them. Of this Chiang -was fully aware, and he struck at the sources of Communist power, labor -and peasant unions, using a ruthlessness comparable to theirs. He went -further, establishing the National Government (in the five-power form) -at Nanking, and leaving the Left Kuomintang uneasily in the company of -the Communists at Hankow. When the Communists proceeded to debate the -question of monopolizing the remnants, even the Left-Kuomintang had had -enough. They suppressed the Communists, and dissolved, coming down river -to Nanking and joining the new government, while Chiang stepped -technically out of the picture to ease the healing of the schism. -Chiang's legitimacy in the leadership of the Kuomintang and the Sun -Yat-sen revolution is shown by the fact that within two years he had an -overwhelming majority of the veteran Kuomintang leaders at his capital. - -In the ensuing years Chiang dedicated himself to three tasks: the -development of the National Government, the stabilization of his own -power, and the modernization of the country, both moral and mechanical. -In 1927 he had married Miss May-ling Soong, and brought himself into -alliance with the influential Soong family. The success of his efforts -is attested by the continued functioning of a National Government at -Chungking, the resistance and unification of China, which Chiang has -come to symbolize, and the stalemate of Japan. These things would have -appeared in some form, even without Chiang, but they would probably not -exist with their present clarity and strength. The ten years of -armament, modernization, and Japan-appeasement built an area into a -nation, changing one more government into an elementary national state. - -The Generalissimo has changed in appearance and manner considerably in -the past ten years; these changes seem to have immediate bearing on his -political role. In 1931 he was unmistakably the first soldier of -China--brusque, forthright, sharp-voiced, and dismayingly lacking in the -devious but pleasant _k'ê-ch'i_ (ceremonial politeness) which is carried -to professional heights by Chinese officials. Even then he was a -masterful and clear-willed sort of man, who upset political precedents -by a directness which would have been naive were it not so obviously -both self-conscious and sincere. He possessed a keen awareness of his -own historical importance, and a consistent responsibility before -history--which still animates him--was the result. When coupled with the -regular exercise of authority, this trait may have the consequence of -moderating arbitrariness and minimizing opportunism. - -With Chiang's self-possession there went an impatience with opposing -views, a carelessness of means in the face of ends, and a fanatical -insistence on loyalty. He now seems little older in body, despite the -injury to his back during the Sian episode, but the years have left a -very clear impress on his moral character. To the sharp discipline and -authority of the soldier he has added the characteristics of a -teacher--reserved kindliness, a daily preoccupation with moral -questions, an inclination to harangue his followers on the general -meaning of their problems. Ten years ago it was very difficult to find -out what Chiang really believed and wanted; his ambition and patriotism -were both patent, but beyond them there was little detail to be filled -in. He is beginning to have the relationship of, let us say, Lenin to -Marx in his treatment of the _San Min Chu I_ of Sun Yat-sen, and is -beginning to stand forth as an interesting political theorist in his own -right. He gives every indication of maturing in office, and of rising in -stature in proportion to the responsibilities which are thrust upon him. - - - -CHINESE APPRAISALS OF CHIANG - -Among both official and unofficial circles in Chungking there is a -widespread and apparently well-founded belief that the two critical -points of China's resistance and continued national independence rest -more on Chiang's life, activity, and support than on any other single -man or institution. These points are, of course, the domestic armistice -and the promotion of resistance and reconstruction. The enormous strains -which collaboration imposes on Nationalists and Communists are borne by -Chiang. The finesse necessary to keep regions, classes, and groups in -line, would probably not be available if the Generalissimo were dead. It -is a tribute to his associates and followers of all parties that they -work with him and with each other, but at the same time it is the -supreme accomplishment of Chiang to have developed so that he can -personify unity. - -A question which the writer put to almost everyone he met in Western -China was, "What do you think of Chiang? And what do you think Chiang -thinks of himself?" The answers varied in tone and detail, but showed an -interesting unanimity in major stress. One of the National Salvationist -leaders,[14] bitter about Chiang's high-handed repression of -Left-liberal movements in pre-war years, replied "Impossible!" to the -question, "From your point of view, could General Chiang become an -outright dictator?" But this leader explained that Chiang differed from -President George Washington in that the latter's own conception of his -role was in close harmony with public expectation and governmental -necessity, whereas Chiang--believing in democracy as a part of his -loyalty to his leader, Dr. Sun, and to the _San Min Chu I_--found -himself unready to trust democratic processes in really vital issues. - - [Footnote 14: One of the Seven Gentlemen (_Ch'i Chüntzŭ_), whose - name is withheld by request, interviewed August 2, 1940, in - Chungking.] - -The critic continued by adding that the difference between Sun and -Chiang was to be found in the fact that the former, whatever his -impatience, let the Plenary Session of the C.E.C. of the Kuomintang -reach its decisions through discussion, whereas Chiang tried to help the -committee decide by lecturing at it. He concluded thus: if there were no -political group other than the Kuomintang, Chiang might become a -dictator in fact while remaining a democratic leader in name. The -presence of other parties and groups makes this difficult, if not -impossible. For example, the Kuomintang might try to apply the new -constitution in such a way as to prevent its being an additional step on -the road to democracy; but the other groups, including the Communists, -could thwart this move by refusing to take part in any of the -constitutional ceremonies, and thereupon [in the traditional Chinese -fashion] discredit the whole thing. These opinions are of special -interest when one considers that they stem from a group which is still -suffering from a very careful police supervision and a state of -non-recognition and semi-repression. - -Another interesting interpretation of Generalissimo Chiang's role is -found among the Communists. One of the Chinese Communist leaders[15] had -the question put to him, "On what long-range basis of practical politics -can you people and the Generalissimo cooperate? After all, you must be -consolidating power which can be used against him and he power which can -be turned against you?" He replied that if Chiang made terms with the -Japanese, or if he failed to resist, the Communists would need to have -nothing to do with him, nor he with them, since he would be ruined in -any case. On the other hand, if the war came to a successful end, Chiang -would be the supreme hero of modern China; the Communists could not turn -against him; and Chiang knew this well enough to know that if he -defeated Japan he had won China. The commentator did not explore other -obvious possibilities, such as a long stalemate in the Japanese war, or -a shift in Soviet policies, but what he said indicates the present -reality of the common interests between the Communists and the -Generalissimo. - - [Footnote 15: Communist leader, interviewed in Chungking, whose name - is also withheld by request.] - -From these and other comments, the visitor to China soon learns that -although Chiang is the Chief (_Tsung-ts'ai_) of the Kuomintang, his -power rests as much on broad national support as it does on Party power. -It is significant that although Chiang still has two groups of -semi-secret protective police, one Party and the other Army, he has far -less occasion to use them than he did five years ago. There is an -inadequacy of due process, of course, which would strike the lay -American as critically unsatisfactory, but the smoothness, evenness, and -relative frankness of government is far greater than at any other time -in modern China. - -Democracy is obtaining some real beginnings, not because of a sudden -lurch in political necessity, nor because of the charm of a theory, but -because the firm ground of a common opinion is knitting the country -together and affording the limits indispensable to the functioning of -democratic techniques; this common opinion, the universal popularity of -the war, is based on the resistance-and-reconstruction policy. The same -patriotic surge which supports the war supports Chiang, as the hero and -chief technician of the war. - -The political changes which translated Chiang from the status of a Party -leader and a new kind of militarist into a real national leader are -mirrored in his writings. His published political works now run to a -considerable number of volumes, representing collections of his speeches -and essays.[16] It would, perhaps, be interesting to note the main -trends of his political philosophy, since it serves as the firm ground -of his policy. It is possible that no other leader in the world, except -Stalin, has satisfied himself so thoroughly with the connection between -his own epistemological and ethical presuppositions and his working -conclusions in terms of action as has Chiang. - - [Footnote 16: Some of the recent volumes are: _Lu-shan Hsün-lien Chi - Hsüan-chi_ (Collected Papers of the Lu Shan Training Conference), - Chungking, 1939; _O-mei Hsün-lien Chi Hsüan-chi_ (Collected Papers of - the Omei Training Conference), Chungking, 1939; _Li-hsing Chê-hsiao_ - (The Philosophy of Being Practical), Chungking, 1940; _Tsung-ts'ai - Chien-kuo Yen-lun Hsüan-chi_ (The Tsung-ts'ai's Utterances on - Reconstruction), Chungking, 1940; _Tsung-ts'ai Wai-chiao Yen-lun - Hsüan-chi_ (The Tsung-ts'ai's Utterances on Diplomacy), Chungking, - 1940; and _Tsung-ts'ai K'ang-chan Yen-lun Hsüan-chi_ (The - Tsung-ts'ai's Utterances on Resistance), Chungking, 1940. A - collection of the Generalissimo's leading speeches, in English, is in - press and is to be issued soon by the China Information Publishing - Company, Hong Kong.] - - -THE IDEOLOGY OF CHIANG - -First and foremost, Chiang accepts the _San Min Chu I_ of Sun Yat-sen, -deviating from the letter of these doctrines by no single brush-stroke. -In his spirit of interpretation, he follows in general the Rightist -exegeses, as represented by the works of Hu Han-min and T'ai Ch'i-t'ao, -although he has developed his own conclusions in great part from his -first-hand memory of Dr. Sun, and from his own experience. (Needless to -say, he is worlds apart from the interpretations given by such Leftists -as the Communists, the Third Party, or Mme. Sun, or such ultra-Rightists -as the Japanophiles.) - -Secondly, he has found the pragmatic elements of Sun's philosophy highly -palatable. Apart from his public life, he has always made a fetish of -action, and has stood for getting something done. His orthodox but -modified Sunyatsenism and his practicality can best be shown by excerpts -from a recent essay of his which states his position.[17] One notes the -stress on practicality, the Christian influence in the matter of love, -and the opinions of Communism, Fascism, and Democracy: - - In order to make a scientific study of any subject it is - best to use the analytical, deductive and inductive methods. - By applying this principle to the study of the _San Min Chu - I_, I have made a chart showing its system and working - procedure.... In order to realize his ideas, Sun invented - the most complete and the most practical political - principles, the _San Min Chu I_. At the present there are - mainly three schools of political thought, namely, Democracy - so-called, Communism, and Fascism. None of them is perfect. - For instance, take Communism. It attaches enough importance - to the economic side of life and resembles the Principle of - Livelihood, but it ignores the ideas embodied in the - Principles of Nationalism and Democracy. Furthermore, it - considers the economic interests of only one class of - people, and not of all. The Fascist school stresses only - those ideas as embodied in the Principle of Nationalism and - ignores the other two principles. Besides, it ignores the - interests and welfare of other nationalities. So-called - Democracy is too much involved with capitalism and can - hardly solve the problems of _min shêng_. The Three - Principles of Sun are different from these in that they - originate from the idea that _the world belongs to the - public_. His aim is to bring about the real equality of the - people without any distinction of classes, religion, and - occupations. After this is realized in China, it is expected - that the equality of all nationalities in the whole world - can be brought about by means of the spirit of mutual help - and sincere cooperation. - - Of all the common human feelings, the sentiment of - nationality is the most worthy one. The Principle of - Nationalism is based on this point. Laws specifically define - the popular responsibilities and privileges which underlie - the Principle of Democracy. And lastly, in Livelihood, each - man's reasoning power is used to advantage in working out - the most rational way of distribution, whereby people will - be put in an equitable position economically. Thus it can be - seen that the Three Principles are very adaptable to China - as well as to any other nation. - - As I outline above, Sun, starting with the Principle of - _people's livelihood_ and embodying the idea that _the - world belongs to the public_, established the _San Min Chu - I_. But just having a Principle won't do; a motive power is - needed to fulfill it. That power is revolution.... - - Revolution is not an easy thing. It needs a very strong - driving force to carry it out. What are the driving forces - in the case of the Chinese revolution? They are wisdom, - love, and courage. I wish to point out specially that the - second factor is the most important. "Love" means, among - other things: Save your country, even at the cost of your - life! - - Let us define more fully the meanings of these three words. - Wisdom means, how to understand Love. It also means: first, - wide reading; second, care in your inquiries; third, careful - thinking; fourth, the power of distinguishing right and - wrong. By Love is meant loyalty, filial piety, faithfulness, - and peace. Courage means the determination to do what is - right. Besides, what is the most important is the need for - persistence, without which nothing can be accomplished. - - When you have the virtues of Wisdom, Love and Courage and - the persistence required, the next move is to start and - work. Sun told us that it is hard to know and easy to do. If - you study the _San Min Chu I_ carefully and yet don't do - what is required of you, it is not because you can't do it, - but because you won't do it. If you just won't do it, you - are not a faithful disciple of the _San Min Chu I_. - - When you are to start the revolutionary work, you must have - a Party, because in a Party all the revolutionary forces can - be consolidated and all the revolutionary activities can be - planned and directed.... - - [Footnote 17: [Chiang K'ai-shek], _San-min-chu-i chih T'i-hsi nai - ch'i-shih Hsing-ch'êng-hsü_ (The _San Min Chu I_ System and its - Method of Application), Chungking, 1939. This booklet is part of a - series called _Conclusions of the Party Chief_, published by the - Central Headquarters of the Kuomintang Training Corps, Chungking, - 1939.] - -The character of Chiang as a political leader which emerges from his -military training, his successful marriage and even more successful -jockeying for power, his maturity under the influence of that power, and -his somewhat crude but austere recognition of responsibility, is quite -different from the portraits drawn by the coastal diehards or by -Leftists. To the former he is just another Asiatic swashbuckler who -conceals murder and extortion behind orotund banality; to the latter he -is a sort of Franco, supinely cooperative with Anglo-American -imperialism because of his compradore-class mentality, who faces a last -chance of dialectical salvation if he yields to the Chinese Communists -in their version of democracy and promotes upper-class liquidation in -war time. It is likely that he will break the limits of either attempt -to define him, and will--if the war succeeds--play a distinctly Chinese -part in the construction of a China which, by reason of the speed of -technological progress coupled with the rising extent of governmental -economics, will break through the ruinous Right-Left pattern of Western -politics. Chiang probably has enough awareness of Chinese history to -realize that as the founder of an enduring democratic system his -prestige would exceed that obtainable by any process of dictatorship. If -he becomes a dictator, he will have successors; but as first President -of a real democracy, he would be eternally unique, and as _de facto_ -founder of a great power, a world figure for this century. Against his -desire to let democracy grow beneath his military aegis, his -conservatism of habit and his anxiety to get things done right continue -to militate; but there is thirteen years' evidence to show that he has -tried very hard to work within the limits of the constitutional system -of the National Government, has avoided arbitrariness as much as he -thought possible, and has at worst behaved like a Salazar, Atatürk, or -Pilsudski. - - - - -CONCLUSION - - -The China of Chiang K'ai-shek has withstood the shock of foreign war, -and has demonstrated its capacity to grow and survive as a state despite -heavy domestic adversity. The constitutional structure nears a condition -of realistic operation. The political organs, while still monopolized by -the Kuomintang, are highly effective; their unrepresentative character -is mitigated by the new experiments with consultative legislation. -Administratively, both as to special functions and in developing -local government, significant new enterprises are under way. -Communist-Nationalist rivalry, while still bitter, has avoided domestic -civil war during the invasion; despite the clash of National troops with -the New Fourth Army, the postponement may be indefinitely continued. -Taken all together, Free China presents a hopeful picture; and it -therefore acquires international importance as the presumptive -predecessor of a great Asiatic democracy. - -Nevertheless, the fact that a Chinese central government has emerged in -time for effective action, and has withstood invasion, does not provide -proof that Japan is doomed to fail. Japanese progress thus far in China -has depended in great part upon Japanese world commerce--on raw -materials and finance from her lucrative American trade. China's -resistance has depended, but to a lesser degree, on Western aid. In each -case, the early history of the conflict was qualified if not determined -by the character of third-party relations. If the United States, the -Soviet Union, Britain, and Germany continued for the next twenty-odd -years to do in the Far East precisely what they have been doing for the -past ten, the future might be more or less predictable on the basis of -the Far Eastern elements alone. Such a prediction is, however, wholly -unsupportable at the present time; it is indeed safe to predict the -contrary, and assume that it is impossible for the major outside powers -to continue their reciprocal power-relationships unchanged, in the Far -East or elsewhere. China's future is therefore bound up with European -and American uncertainties. The Three-Power Pact, signed at Berlin, -September 27, 1940 between Germany, Italy and Japan, and the American -Lease-Lend Bill have already begun to interlock the European and East -Asiatic wars. - - -THE CHIEF ALTERNATIVES IN CHINA - -The Chinese domestic situation will inescapably be bound up with China's -international position. The extremes of probability can be readily -marked off: on the one hand, it is most improbable that the Chinese -resistance should collapse altogether, and leave the way open for an -almost effortless Japanese victory, through the consolidation of the -Wang regime without guerrilla, volunteer or West-China opposition; on -the other hand, an immediate and complete Chinese victory, coupled with -solution of Nationalist-Communist rivalry, is not at all in sight. -Somewhere between these two extremes there lie a number of more probable -alternatives. - -Chief among these is a Kuomintang China, winning a slow victory against -Japan under the continuation of existent institutions and leadership. -Such a country--nationalist, democratic, and economically -pragmatist--would, by the fact of victory over Japan, create a nucleus -for liberal democracy in Asia.[1] A variant of this solution would be a -United Front China, wherein the independents and the Left actually -shared power with the Kuomintang under conditions of broad popular -suffrage; this would presumably lie between the United States and the -Soviet Union in the matter of ideology and foreign policy. Neither of -these would afford Japan much opportunity for continued influence on the -continent. - - [Footnote 1: This discussion includes extracts from the author's - "China: Right, Left, or Center?", _The Quarterly Review of the - Michigan Alumnus_, Vol. XLVI, No. 14 (Winter 1940).] - -A long continuation of the present hostilities might imply the -development of a permanently divided China--permanent save in terms of -centuries--with Nationalists and Communists landbound in inner Asia, and -pro-Japanese governments along the coast. Such a violation of Chinese -cultural and economic unity would perpetuate disequilibrium, and imply -continuing wars. Differing from this in degree rather than kind would be -a reversion of China to _tuchünism_ and anarchy. Neither of these -possibilities could command acceptance from the awakened, vigorous China -of today. - -Outside intervention presents a third group of alternatives: the -partition of China through a Soviet-Japanese understanding, or the -complete Sovietization of China, through the combined efforts of Soviet -and Chinese Communists. Soviet-Japanese partition, once almost -unthinkable, appears within the range of possibility because of the -apparent weakness of the Soviet Union, which calls for unconventional -remedies. If Communist dialectic insured the Soviets who shared China -with Japan an ultimate victory over Japan as well, the evil might seem -transitory to the Soviet Union. Were such a step taken to thwart rising -American influence, it might seem the lesser of two evils. Neither this -nor a Soviet China (which would swell the Communist frontier and -resources immeasurably) appeared probable in the spring of 1941. - -The more practical aspects of the China-building problem still concern -the immediate, local effectiveness of the Japanese military effort to -control the growth of Chinese government. - -To create a victorious condition, Japan has sought the collaboration of -phantom Japanophile governments. But in the face of the continuing -National Government, and guerrilla opposition, these governments are -incapable of functioning. When the conquerors of China entered the -cities, and took over the government, they were strangers holding mere -islands in the greatness of China. - -Japan has the seven most important cities of China. She has most of the -railroads. The waters around China are closed by the Japanese fleet. But -how is Japan to occupy the hundreds of thousands of villages? How is -Japan to persuade the Chinese people, who are still overwhelmingly -country people, that they are conquered when Japan thinks that they are? - -The Japanese have not yet succeeded in making much impression on the -Chinese farmers, except to anger them with cruelty and rapine. In -Manchuria, where the Japanese have had undisputed sway for ten long -years, thousands of bandits, a Chinese version of Minute Men, are still -fighting. Ten, five, even three miles from the great fortified centers -of the Japanese army in China, Chinese irregulars, peasant volunteers, -spring up in the night. In the darkness there is shooting, sudden -flames, perhaps an airplane burning or a gasoline storage tank set on -fire; when dawn comes there is nothing to be seen except the patient -quiet coolies working in their little fields. - -At the present time the war has reached its quiescent stage. The -Japanese army has done what in most other cases would be called winning -a victory. The battle is accordingly a battle between the Chinese -government in the West and the Japanese in the East of China, not with -guns or ships so much as with words and with price levels--not for -strategic territory, but for the support of the Chinese masses. - -The Chinese must make it possible for their own people to live -successfully and happily. But they have the world's greatest farm -problem, a problem of over-indebtedness, sharecropping, soil exhaustion, -prices and markets. Japan wanted to prevent the creation of a united -China strong enough to take Manchuria back, and to drive the Japanese -off the Asiatic continent back to Japan. Japan accordingly took the -disastrous and painful step of conquering the world's greatest relief -problem--the millions of underfed, undernourished, desperate Chinese -farmers. Now she has them. - -In this light, the Far Eastern conflict takes on a different appearance -from the usual picture of China versus Japan. It is a conflict, not -merely of one nation against another but of competing governments within -the same territory. China is trying to build one way; Japan, another; -but they are both building for the same end, control of the Far East, -and on the same foundations, the Chinese people. Both Japan and the -independent Chinese government are struggling for the mastery of an area -which is in the grip of a tragic farm problem. The key to power is the -mastery of the problem, not the mastery of the men. The Chinese farmers -would welcome Communism, capitalism, or almost any kind of leadership -which could guarantee them a good livelihood in return for their long -and patient labor. The basic issues are social, technological, and -economic, as well as political and military. The Japanese failure in -China is not a failure of the economic resources; Japan could have been -a weak but adequate economic partner to China. The failure of Japan now -leads China to look elsewhere for help. - - -THE UNITED STATES IN CHINESE POLITICS - -The American Lease-Lend Bill, designed primarily to extend effective aid -to Britain, also applied to China. The United States executive was -clearly aware of the purposes of Japan, and displayed a temper to -thwart them. Secretary of State Cordell Hull, presenting a statement in -support of the Bill to the House Foreign Affairs Committee on January -15, 1941, stated: - - It has been clear throughout that Japan has been actuated - from the start by broad and ambitious plans for establishing - herself in a dominant position in the entire region of the - Western Pacific. Her leaders have openly declared their - determination to achieve and maintain that position by force - of arms and thus to make themselves master of an area - containing almost one-half of the entire population of the - world. As a consequence, they would have arbitrary control - of the sea and trade routes in that region. - - * * * * * - - It should be manifest to every person that such a program - for the subjugation and ruthless exploitation by one country - of nearly one-half the population of the world is a matter - of immense significance, importance and concern to every - nation wherever located. - -On March 15, the President's speech to the White House Correspondents' -Association included a ringing promise to give help to the Chinese -people, who had asked for aid through Chiang K'ai-shek. The United -States moved toward a more definite policy in Asia as well as giving -more aid to Britain in the North Atlantic area. The lease-lend program -might upset the entire balance of power in the Far East even more -readily than in Europe; but immediate evidence of such large-scale -application was not forthcoming. - -In his message to President Roosevelt, March 18, 1941, Chiang K'ai-shek -said:[2] - - The people of China, whether engaged in fighting the - aggressor or toiling in the fields and workshops in the rear - in support of the defenders, will be immeasurably heartened - by your impressive reaffirmation of the will of the American - people to assist them in their struggle for freedom from - foreign domination, and in the resumption of their march - towards democracy and social justice for all. - - [Footnote 2: Department of State, _Bulletin_, IV, p. 335.] - -Significantly, the statement of Secretary Hull may apply to future -Soviet advance in China as well as to the Japanese invasion. American -aid which would weaken Japan and strengthen the Soviet Union thereby, -would be welcome to Stalin; but American influence, carried to the point -of consolidating the National Government against the Communists, and -reducing the probabilities of rising Communist influence, would not be -welcome. - -Whether the United States Government and the American people are -pro-Chinese or not, the National Government of China is pro-American. -The only influence to rival the American in modern China is that of the -Soviet Union. Soviet and American impress are found in intellectual -life, in political ideals, in standards and types of organization, and -in ethical creeds. It is no accident that the Kuomintang traces its -three principles back to Lincoln, while the Chinese Communists quote -Lenin and Stalin. The rivalry is clear, and acute. American aid to China -strengthens the pro-American party and weakens the Communists; cessation -of the Burma route traffic in the summer of 1940 stimulated discussion -of a closer Sino-Soviet rapprochement. - -Generalissimo Chiang is a Christian. He is surrounded by -American-trained officials. The common secondary language of the -Nationalists is English. The Chinese Industrial Cooperatives are based -on an American background with New Zealand and British advice. The -educational system is patterned after that of the United States in great -part; the American impress on the system of higher education, in -particular, cannot be overestimated. The interests, appetites, and -orientation of the Kuomintang and the National Government are -Pacific-centered; much bitterness of an intimate, almost uncomplaining -sort, has been aroused by America's continued aid to Japan through -business channels. - -Adjustments within China are bound to react to the pressures in the -outside world. If the United States abandons Free China, the Japanese -will probably not conquer China; but the Soviets will be in an excellent -position to try, for themselves or through agreement with the Japanese, -to demoralize Chinese resistance so that the Soviet forces could -intervene because of a political vacuum and protect the "racially kin -working classes," as in Poland. Whether China should go Communist -through the triumph of the Chinese Communists, or through military -occupation by the Soviet Red Army, would not matter much to the United -States. What would matter would be the loss of an incomparable ally, an -ally who today is almost embarrassingly cordial toward us, thankful to -us, and who admires our institutions and culture. - -Once Japan were forced out of the picture as an aggressive power, once -the United States and China were to reach an understanding, the Soviet -Union--debarred from a warm-water naval base on the Pacific--could be -left in the _status quo_, its menace removed, to work out its own -destiny if it did not challenge renewed intervention by renewed -provocation of co-existing societies. No other challenging power could -appear on the Pacific. A group of nations from Buenos Aires to Labrador, -from Melbourne to Kashgar, from Lhasa to Boston would cover three and -one-half continents. The area thus freed from war and aggression, -encompassing the Americas and the Pacific basin, would include every -necessary article in the entire schedule of man's appetites. The -Chungking government, elementarily and crudely, has broken ground for -the culture-political American advance into Asia. Strong without us, -Free China is a great power with us, and the one place in the world -where construction, liberty, education, and hope still rise day by day. -Both cosmopolitan and national, the Chinese are ready to accept their -share of responsibility for the new world order. - -The responsibility for building a democratic world, whether or not the -four authoritarian powers go down, lies in great part upon the United -States. Generalissimo Chiang, alone among leaders, has stood forth for -world government, for world freedom. He has written:[3] - -"In as much as cosmopolitanism and world peace are two of the main aims -of _San Min Chu I_, China will naturally be disposed to participate in -any world federation or confederation based on the equality of nations -and for the good of mankind." - - [Footnote 3: See below, p. 371.] - - - - -APPENDIX I. GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS - - - - -_A._ THE GOVERNMENT DRAFT OF THE PROPOSED CONSTITUTION[1] - - - [Footnote 1: _T'ien Hsia Monthly_, v. X, No. 3 (May 1940), p. - 493-506. The transliterations have not been altered. _Yüan_ therefore - appears as "Yuan."] - - Released April 30, 1937, this differs from the celebrated - Double Five Draft (_q.v._ in Text) by the omission of an - article providing that the first Kuo-min Ta-hui should - exercise full power, and not be confined to the preparation - of a constitution. This Draft represents the official - viewpoint and was prepared by the Legislative _Yüan_ with - the help and criticism of private persons; accordingly, it - is the outstanding draft constitution. - -By virtue of the mandate received from the whole body of citizens and in -accordance with the bequeathed teachings of Dr. Sun, Founder of the -Republic of China, the People's Congress of the Republic of China hereby -ordains and enacts this Constitution and causes it to be promulgated -throughout the land for faithful and perpetual observance by all. - - -CHAPTER I. GENERAL PROVISIONS - -ARTICLE 1. The Republic of China is a _SAN MIN CHU I_ Republic. - -ARTICLE 2. The sovereignty of the Republic of China is vested in the -whole body of its citizens. - -ARTICLE 3. Persons having acquired the nationality of the Republic of -China are citizens of the Republic of China. - -ARTICLE 4. The territory of the Republic of China consists of areas -originally constituting Kiangsu, Chekiang, Anhwei, Kiangsi, Hupeh, -Hunan, Szechwan, Sikang, Hopei, Shantung, Shansi, Honan, Shensi, Kansu, -Chinghai, Fukien, Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Yunnan, Kweichow, Liaoning, Kirin, -Heilungkiang, Jehol, Chahar, Suiyuan, Ningsia, Sinkiang, Mongolia and -Tibet. - -The territory of the Republic of China shall not be altered except by -resolution of the People's Congress. - -ARTICLE 5. All races of the Republic of China are component parts of the -Chinese Nation and shall be equal. - -ARTICLE 6. The National Flag of the Republic of China shall have a red -background with a blue sky and white sun in the upper left corner. - -ARTICLE 7. The National Capital of the Republic of China shall be at -Nanking. - - -CHAPTER II. RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF THE CITIZENS - -ARTICLE 8. All citizens of the Republic of China shall be equal before -the law. - -ARTICLE 9. Every citizen shall enjoy the liberty of the person. Except -in accordance with law, no one may be arrested, detained, tried or -punished. - -When a citizen is arrested or detained on suspicion of having committed -a criminal act, the authority responsible for such action shall -immediately inform the citizen himself and his relatives of the cause -for his arrest or detention and shall, within a period of twenty-four -hours, send him to a competent court for trial. The citizen so arrested -or detained, or any one else, may also petition the court to demand from -the authority responsible for such action the surrender, within -twenty-four hours, of his person to the court for trial. - -The court shall not reject such a petition; nor shall the responsible -authority refuse to execute such a writ as mentioned in the preceding -paragraph. - -ARTICLE 10. With the exception of those in active military service, no -one may be subject to military jurisdiction. - -ARTICLE 11. Every citizen shall have the freedom of domicile; no private -abode may be forcibly entered, searched or sealed except in accordance -with law. - -ARTICLE 12. Every citizen shall have the freedom to change his -residence; such freedom shall not be restricted except in accordance -with law. - -ARTICLE 13. Every citizen shall have the freedom of speech, writing and -publication; such freedom shall not be restricted except in accordance -with law. - -ARTICLE 14. Every citizen shall have the freedom of secrecy of -correspondence; such freedom shall not be restricted except in -accordance with law. - -ARTICLE 15. Every citizen shall have the freedom of religious belief; -such freedom shall not be restricted except in accordance with law. - -ARTICLE 16. Every citizen shall have the freedom of assembly and of -forming associations; such freedom shall not be restricted except in -accordance with law. - -ARTICLE 17. No private property shall be requisitioned, expropriated, -sealed or confiscated except in accordance with law. - -ARTICLE 18. Every citizen shall have the right to present petitions, -lodge complaints and institute legal proceedings in accordance with law. - -ARTICLE 19. Every citizen shall have the right to exercise, in -accordance with law, the powers of election, recall, initiative and -referendum. - -ARTICLE 20. Every citizen shall have the right to compete, in accordance -with law, in state examinations. - -ARTICLE 21. Every citizen shall, in accordance with law, be amenable to -the duty of paying taxes. - -ARTICLE 22. Every citizen shall, in accordance with law, be amenable to -the duty of performing military service. - -ARTICLE 23. Every citizen shall, in accordance with law, be amenable to -the duty of rendering public service. - -ARTICLE 24. All other liberties and rights of the citizens which are not -detrimental to public peace and order or public welfare shall be -guaranteed by the Constitution. - -ARTICLE 25. Only laws imperative for safeguarding national security, -averting a national crisis, maintaining public peace and order or -promoting public interest may restrict the citizens' liberties and -rights. - -ARTICLE 26. Any public functionary who illegally infringes upon any -private liberty or right, shall, besides being subject to disciplinary -punishment, be responsible under criminal and civil law. The injured -person may also, in accordance with law, claim indemnity from the State -for damages sustained. - - -CHAPTER III. THE PEOPLE'S CONGRESS - -ARTICLE 27. The People's Congress shall be constituted of delegates -elected as follows: - - 1. Each district, municipality or area of an equivalent - status shall elect one delegate, but in case its population - exceeds 300,000, one additional delegate shall be elected - for every additional 500,000 people. The status of areas to - be equivalent to a district or municipality shall be defined - by law. - - 2. The number of delegates to be elected from Mongolia and - Tibet shall be determined by law. - - 3. The number of delegates to be elected by Chinese citizens - residing abroad shall be determined by law. - -ARTICLE 28. Delegates to the People's Congress shall be elected by -universal, equal, and direct suffrage and by secret ballots. - -ARTICLE 29. Citizens of the Republic of China having attained the age of -twenty years shall, in accordance with law, have the right to elect -delegates. Citizens having attained the age of twenty-five years shall, -in accordance with law, have the right to be elected delegates. - -ARTICLE 30. The term of office of Delegates of the People's Congress -shall be six years. - -When a Delegate is found guilty of violation of a law or neglect of his -duty, his constituency shall recall him in accordance with law. - -ARTICLE 31. The People's Congress shall be convened by the President -once every three years. Its session shall last one month, but may be -extended another month when necessary. - -Extraordinary sessions of the People's Congress may be convened at the -instance of two-fifths or more of its members. - -The President may convene extraordinary sessions of the People's -Congress. - -The People's Congress shall meet at the place where the Central -Government is. - -ARTICLE 32. The powers and functions of the People's Congress shall be -as follows: - - 1. To elect the President and Vice-President of the - Republic, the President of the Legislative Yuan, the - President of the Censor Yuan, the Members of the Legislative - Yuan and the Members of the Censor Yuan. - - 2. To recall the President and Vice-President of the - Republic, the President of the Legislative Yuan, the - President of the Judicial Yuan, the President of the - Examination Yuan, the President of the Censor Yuan, the - Members of the Legislative Yuan and the Members of the - Censor Yuan. - - 3. To initiate laws. - - 4. To hold referenda on laws. - - 5. To amend the Constitution. - - 6. To exercise such other powers as are conferred by the - Constitution. - -ARTICLE 33. Delegates to the People's Congress shall not be held -responsible outside of Congress for opinions they may express and votes -they may cast during the session of Congress. - -ARTICLE 34. Without the permission of the People's Congress, no delegate -shall be arrested or detained during the session except when apprehended -in _flagrante delicto_. - -ARTICLE 35. The organization of the People's Congress and the election -as well as recall of its Delegates shall be determined by law. - - -CHAPTER IV. THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT - - -Section 1. _The President_ - -ARTICLE 36. The President is the Head of the State and represents the -Republic of China in foreign relations. - -ARTICLE 37. The President commands the land, sea and air forces of the -whole country. - -ARTICLE 38. The President shall, in accordance with law, promulgate laws -and issue orders with the counter-signature of the President of the Yuan -concerned. - -ARTICLE 39. The President shall, in accordance with law, exercise the -power of declaring war, negotiating peace and concluding treaties. - -ARTICLE 40. The President shall, in accordance with law, declare and -terminate a state of emergency. - -ARTICLE 41. The President shall, in accordance with law, exercise the -power of granting amnesties, special pardons, remission of sentences and -restoration of civil rights. - -ARTICLE 42. The President shall, in accordance with law, appoint and -remove civil and military officials. - -ARTICLE 43. The President shall, in accordance with law, confer honors -and award decorations. - -ARTICLE 44. In case the State is confronted with an emergency, or the -economic life of the State meets with a grave danger, which calls for -immediate action, the President, following the resolution of the -Executive Meeting, may issue orders of emergency and do whatever is -necessary to cope with the situation, provided that he shall submit his -action to the ratification of the Legislative Yuan within three months -after the issuance of the orders. - -ARTICLE 45. The President may call meetings of the Presidents of the -five Yuan to confer on matters relating to two or more Yuan, or on such -matters as the President may bring out for consultation. - -ARTICLE 46. The President shall be responsible to the People's Congress. - - -ARTICLE 47. Citizens of the Republic of China, having attained the age -of forty years, may be elected President or Vice-President of the -Republic. - -ARTICLE 48. The election of the President and Vice-President shall be -provided for by law. - -ARTICLE 49. The President and Vice-President shall hold office for a -term of six years and may be re-elected for a second term. - -ARTICLE 50. The President shall, on the day of his inauguration, take -the following oath: - -"I do solemnly and sincerely swear before the people that I will observe -the Constitution, faithfully perform my duties, promote the welfare of -the People, safeguard the security of the State and be loyal to the -trust of the people. Should I break my oath, I will submit myself to the -most severe punishment the law may provide." - -ARTICLE 51. When the Presidency is vacant, the Vice-President shall -succeed to the office. - -When the President is for some reason unable to attend to his duties, -the Vice-President shall act for him. If both the President and the -Vice-President are incapacitated, the President of the Executive Yuan -shall discharge the duties of the President's office. - -ARTICLE 52. The President shall retire from office on the day his term -expires. If by that time a new President has not been inducted into -office, the President of the Executive Yuan shall discharge the duties -of the President's office. - -ARTICLE 53. The period for the President of the Executive Yuan to -discharge the duties of the President's office shall not exceed six -months. - -ARTICLE 54. Except in case of an offense against the internal or -external security of the State, the President shall not be liable to -criminal prosecution until he has been recalled or has retired from -office. - - -Section 2. _The Executive Yuan_ - -ARTICLE 55. The Executive Yuan is the highest organ through which the -Central Government exercises its executive powers. - -ARTICLE 56. In the Executive Yuan, there shall be a President, a -Vice-President and a number of Executive Members, to be appointed and -removed by the President. - -The Executive Members mentioned in the preceding paragraph who do not -take charge of Ministries or Commissions shall not exceed half of those -who are in charge of Ministries or Commissions as provided in the first -paragraph of ARTICLE 58. - -ARTICLE 57. In the Executive Yuan, there shall be various Ministries and -Commissions which shall separately exercise their respective executive -powers. - -ARTICLE 58. The Ministers of the various Ministries and the Chairmen of -the various Commissions shall be appointed by the President from among -the Executive Members. - -The President and the Vice-President of the Executive Yuan may act -concurrently as Minister or Chairman mentioned in the preceding -paragraph. - -ARTICLE 59. The President of the Executive Yuan, the Executive Members, -the Ministers of the various Ministries and the Chairmen of the various -Commissions shall be individually responsible to the President. - -ARTICLE 60. In the Executive Yuan there shall be Executive Meetings -composed of the President, the President of the Executive Yuan and the -Executive Members to be presided over by the President. In case the -President is unable to be present, the President of the Executive Yuan -shall preside. - -ARTICLE 61. The following matters shall be decided at an Executive -Meeting: - - 1. Statutory and budgetary bills to be submitted to the - Legislative Yuan. - - 2. Bills concerning a state of emergency and special pardons - to be submitted to the Legislative Yuan. - - 3. Bills concerning declaration of war, negotiation of - peace, conclusion of treaties and other important - international affairs to be submitted to the Legislative - Yuan. - - 4. Matters of common concern to the various Ministries and - Commissions. - - 5. Matters submitted by the President. - - 6. Matters submitted by the President of the Executive Yuan, - the Executive Members, the various Ministries and - Commissions. - -ARTICLE 62. The organization of the Executive Yuan shall be determined -by law. - - -Section 3. _The Legislative Yuan_ - -ARTICLE 63. The Legislative Yuan is the highest organ through which the -Central Government exercises its legislative powers. It shall be -responsible to the People's Congress. - -ARTICLE 64. The Legislative Yuan shall have the power to decide on -measures concerning legislation, budgets, a state of emergency, special -pardons, declaration of war, negotiation of peace, conclusion of -treaties and other important international affairs. - -ARTICLE 65. In the discharge of its duties the Legislative Yuan may -interrogate the various Yuan, Ministries and Commissions. - -ARTICLE 66. In the Legislative Yuan, there shall be a President who -shall hold office for a term of three years and may be eligible for -re-election. - -ARTICLE 67. In regard to the election of Members of the Legislative -Yuan, the Delegates of the various provinces, Mongolia, Tibet and of -citizens residing abroad, to the People's Congress shall separately hold -a preliminary election to nominate their respective candidates and -submit a list of their names to the Congress for election. The -candidates are not confined to the Delegates to the People's Congress. -The respective number of candidates shall be proportioned as follows: - - 1. A province with a population of less than 5,000,000 shall - nominate four candidates. A province with a population of - more than 5,000,000 but less than 10,000,000 shall nominate - six candidates. A province with a population of more than - 10,000,000 but less than 15,000,000 shall nominate eight - candidates. A province with a population of more than - 15,000,000 but less than 20,000,000 shall nominate ten - candidates. A province with a population of more than - 20,000,000 but less than 25,000,000 shall nominate twelve - candidates. A province with a population of more than - 25,000,000 but less than 30,000,000 shall nominate fourteen - candidates. A province with a population of more than - 30,000,000 shall nominate sixteen candidates. - - 2. Mongolia and Tibet shall each nominate eight candidates. - - 3. Citizens residing abroad shall nominate eight candidates. - -ARTICLE 68. Members of the Legislative Yuan shall hold office for a term -of three years and may be eligible for re-election. - -ARTICLE 69. The Executive Yuan, Judicial Yuan, Examination Yuan, and -Censor Yuan may submit to the Legislative Yuan measures concerning -matters within their respective jurisdiction. - -ARTICLE 70. The President may, before the promulgation or execution of a -legislative measure, request the Legislative Yuan to reconsider it. - -If the Legislative Yuan, with regard to the request for consideration, -should decide to maintain the original measure by a two-thirds vote of -the Members present, the President shall promulgate or execute it -without delay; provided that in case of a bill of law or a treaty, the -President may submit it to the People's Congress for a referendum. - -ARTICLE 71. The President shall promulgate a measure presented by the -Legislative Yuan for promulgation within thirty days after its receipt. - -ARTICLE 72. Members of the Legislative Yuan shall not be held -responsible outside of the said Yuan for opinions they may express and -votes they may cast during its session. - -ARTICLE 73. Without the permission of the Legislative Yuan, no member -may be arrested or detained except when apprehended in _flagrante -delicto_. - -ARTICLE 74. No Member of the Legislative Yuan may concurrently hold any -other public office or engage in any business or profession. - -ARTICLE 75. The election of Members of the Legislative Yuan and the -organization of the Legislative Yuan shall be determined by law. - - -Section 4. _The Judicial Yuan_ - -ARTICLE 76. The Judicial Yuan is the highest organ through which the -Central Government exercises its judicial powers. It shall attend to the -adjudication of civil, criminal and administrative suits, the discipline -and punishment of public functionaries and judicial administration. - -ARTICLE 77. In the Judicial Yuan, there shall be a President who shall -hold office for a term of three years. He shall be appointed by the -President. - -The President of the Judicial Yuan shall be responsible to the People's -Congress. - -ARTICLE 78. Matters concerning special pardons, remission of sentence -and restoration of civil rights shall be submitted to the President for -action by the President of the Judicial Yuan in accordance with law. - -ARTICLE 79. The Judicial Yuan shall have the power to unify the -interpretation of statutes and ordinances. - -ARTICLE 80. Judicial officials shall, in accordance with law, have -perfect independence in the conduct of trials. - -ARTICLE 81. No judicial official may be removed from office unless he -has been subject to criminal or disciplinary punishment or declared an -interdicted person; nor may a judicial official be suspended or -transferred, or have his salary reduced except in accordance with law. - -ARTICLE 82. The organization of the Judicial Yuan and the various Courts -of Justice shall be determined by law. - - -Section 5. _The Examination Yuan_ - -ARTICLE 83. The Examination Yuan is the highest organ through which the -Central Government exercises its examination powers. It shall attend to -the selection of civil service candidates by examination and to the -registration of persons qualified for public service. - -ARTICLE 84. In the Examination Yuan there shall be a President who shall -hold office for a term of three years, to be appointed by the President. - -The President of the Examination Yuan shall be responsible to the -People's Congress. - -ARTICLE 85. The Examination Yuan shall, in accordance with law, by -examination and registration determine the following qualifications: - - 1. For appointment as a public functionary. - - 2. For candidacy to public office. - - 3. For practice in specialized professions and as technical - experts. - -ARTICLE 86. The organization of the Examination Yuan shall be determined -by law. - - -Section 6. _The Censor Yuan_ - -ARTICLE 87. The Censor Yuan is the highest organ through which the -Central Government exercises its censorial powers. It shall attend to -impeachment and auditing and be responsible to the People's Congress. - -ARTICLE 88. In the discharge of its censorial powers, the Censor Yuan -may, in accordance with law, interrogate the various Yuan, Ministries -and Commissions. - -ARTICLE 89. In the Censor Yuan, there shall be a President who shall -hold office for a term of three years and may be eligible for -re-election. - -ARTICLE 90. Members of the Censor Yuan shall be elected by the People's -Congress, from candidates separately nominated by the Delegates of the -various provinces, Mongolia, Tibet and Chinese citizens residing -abroad. Each group of Delegates shall nominate two candidates. The -candidates are not confined to Delegates to the Congress. - -ARTICLE 91. Members of the Censor Yuan shall hold office for a term of -four years and may be eligible for re-election. - -ARTICLE 92. When the Censor Yuan finds a public functionary in the -Central or local government guilty of violation of a law or neglect of -his duty, an impeachment may be instituted upon the proposal of one or -more Members and the indorsement, after due investigation, of five or -more Members. Impeachment against the President or Vice-President, the -President of the Executive Yuan, Legislative Yuan, Judicial Yuan, -Examination Yuan or Censor Yuan may be instituted only upon the proposal -of ten or more Members and the indorsement, after due investigation, of -one-half or more Members of the entire Yuan. - -ARTICLE 93. When an impeachment is instituted against the President or -Vice-President or the President of the Executive Yuan, Legislative Yuan, -Judicial Yuan, Examination Yuan or Censor Yuan in accordance with the -preceding Article, it shall be brought before the People's Congress. -During the adjournment of the People's Congress, the Delegates shall be -requested to convene in accordance with law an extraordinary session to -decide whether the impeached shall be removed from office. - -ARTICLE 94. Members of the Censor Yuan shall not be held responsible -outside of the said Yuan for opinions they may express and votes they -may cast while discharging their duties. - -ARTICLE 95. Without the permission of the Censor Yuan, no Member of the -Censor Yuan may be arrested or detained except when apprehended in -_flagrante delicto_. - -ARTICLE 96. No Member of the Censor Yuan may concurrently hold any other -public office or engage in any business or profession. - -ARTICLE 97. The election of the Members of the Censor Yuan and the -organization of the Censor Yuan shall be determined by law. - - -CHAPTER V. THE LOCAL INSTITUTIONS - - -Section 1. _The Provinces_ - -ARTICLE 98. In the Province, there shall be a Provincial Government -which shall execute the laws and orders of the Central Government and -supervise local self-government. - -ARTICLE 99. In the Provincial Government there shall be a Governor who -shall hold office for a term of three years. He shall be appointed and -removed by the Central Government. - -ARTICLE 100. In the province, there shall be a Provincial Assembly which -shall be composed of one member from each district or municipality to be -elected by the district or municipal council. Members of the Provincial -Assembly shall hold office for a term of three years and may be eligible -for re-election. - -ARTICLE 101. The organization of the Provincial Government and the -Provincial Assembly as well as the election and recall of the Members of -the Provincial Assembly shall be determined by law. - -ARTICLE 102. The government of areas not yet established as provinces -shall be determined by law. - - -Section 2. _The Districts_ - -ARTICLE 103. The district [_hsien_] is a unit of local self-government. - -ARTICLE 104. All matters that are local in nature are within the scope -of local self-government. - -The scope of local self-government shall be determined by law. - -ARTICLE 105. Citizens of the district shall, in accordance with law, -exercise the powers of initiative and referendum in matters concerning -district self-government as well as the powers of election and recall of -the District Magistrate and other elective officials in the service of -district self-government. - -ARTICLE 106. In the district, there shall be a District Council, the -members of which shall be directly elected by the citizens in the -District General Meeting. Members of the District Council shall hold -office for a term of three years and may be eligible for re-election. - -ARTICLE 107. District ordinances and regulations which are in conflict -with the laws and ordinances of the Central or Provincial Government -shall be null and void. - -ARTICLE 108. In the district, there shall be a District Government with -a District Magistrate who shall be elected by the citizens in the -District General Meeting. The Magistrate shall hold office for a term -of three years and may be eligible for re-election. - -Only those persons found qualified in the public examinations held by -the Central Government or adjudged qualified by the Ministry of Public -Service Registration may be candidates for the office of District -Magistrate. - -ARTICLE 109. The District Magistrate shall administer the affairs of the -district in accordance with the principles of self-government and, under -the direction of the Provincial Governor, execute matters assigned by -the Central and Provincial Governments. - -ARTICLE 110. The organization of the District Council and District -Government as well as the election and recall of the District Magistrate -and the Members of the District Council shall be determined by law. - - -Section 3. _The Municipalities_ - -ARTICLE 111. Unless otherwise provided by law, the provisions governing -self-government and administration of the district shall apply _mutatis -mutandis_ to the municipality [_shih_]. - -ARTICLE 112. In the municipality, there shall be a Municipal Council, -the Members of which shall be directly elected by the citizens in the -Municipal General Meeting. One-third of the Members shall retire and be -replaced by election annually. - -ARTICLE 113. In the municipality, there shall be a Municipal Government -with a Mayor to be directly elected by the citizens in the Municipal -General Meeting. He shall hold office for a term of three years and may -be eligible for re-election. - -Only those persons found qualified in the public examinations held by -the Central Government or adjudged qualified by the Ministry of Public -Service Registration may be a candidate for the office of Mayor. - -ARTICLE 114. The Mayor shall administer the affairs of the municipality -in accordance with the principles of municipal self-government and, -under direction of the competent supervising authority, execute matters -assigned by the Central or Provincial Government. - -ARTICLE 115. The organization of the Municipal Council and Municipal -Government as well as the election and recall of the Members of the -Municipal Council and the Mayor shall be determined by law. - - -CHAPTER VI. NATIONAL ECONOMIC LIFE - -ARTICLE 116. The economic system of the Republic of China shall be based -upon the Min Shêng Chu I (Principle of Livelihood) and shall aim at -national economic sufficiency and equality. - -ARTICLE 117. The land within the territorial limits of the Republic of -China belongs to the people as a whole. Any part thereof the ownership -of which has been lawfully acquired by an individual or individuals -shall be protected by, and subject to, the restrictions of law. - -The State may, in accordance with law, tax or expropriate private land -on the basis of the value declared by the owner or assessed by the -Government. - -Every landowner is amenable to the duty of utilizing his land to the -fullest extent. - -ARTICLE 118. All subterranean minerals and natural forces which are -economically utilizable for public benefit, belong to the State and -shall not be affected by private ownership of the land. - -ARTICLE 119. The unearned increment shall be taxed by means of a -land-value-increment tax and devoted to public benefit. - -ARTICLE 120. In readjusting the distribution of land, the State shall be -guided by the principle of aiding and protecting the land-owning farmers -and the land-utilizing owners. - -ARTICLE 121. The State may, in accordance with law, regulate private -wealth and enterprises when such wealth and enterprises are considered -detrimental to the balanced development of national economic life. - -ARTICLE 122. The State shall encourage, guide and protect the citizens' -productive enterprises and the nation's foreign trade. - -ARTICLE 123. All public utilities and enterprises of a monopolistic -nature shall be operated by the State; except in case of necessity when -the State may specially permit private operation. - -The private enterprises mentioned in the preceding paragraph may, in -case of emergency for national defense, be temporarily managed by the -State. The State may also, in accordance with law, take them over for -permanent operation upon payment of due compensation. - -ARTICLE 124. In order to improve the workers' living conditions, -increase their productive ability and relieve unemployment, the State -shall enforce labor protective policies. - -Women and children shall be afforded special protection in accordance -with their age and physical condition. - -ARTICLE 125. Labor and capital shall, in accordance with the principles -of mutual help and cooperation, develop together productive enterprises. - -ARTICLE 126. In order to promote agricultural development and the -welfare of the farming population, the State shall improve rural -economic and living conditions and increase farming efficiency by -employment of scientific farming. - -The State may regulate the production and distribution of agricultural -products, in kind and quantity. - -ARTICLE 127. The State shall accord due relief or compensation to those -who suffer disability or loss of life in the performance of military or -public services. - -ARTICLE 128. The State shall give suitable relief to the aged, feeble, -or disabled who are incapable of earning a living. - -ARTICLE 129. While the following powers appertain to the Legislative -Yuan in the case of the Central Government, they may be exercised by the -legally designated organ if, in accordance with law, such matters may be -effected independently by a province, district or municipality: - - 1. To impose or alter the rate of taxes and levies, fines, - penalties, or other imposts of a compulsory nature. - - 2. To raise public loans, dispose of public property or - conclude contracts which increase the burden of the public - treasury. - - 3. To establish or cancel public enterprises, monopolies, - franchises or any other profit-making enterprise. - - 4. To grant or cancel public enterprises, monopolies, - franchises or any other special privileges. - -Unless specially authorized by law, the government of a province, -district or municipality shall not raise foreign loans or directly -utilize foreign capital. - -ARTICLE 130. Within the territorial limits of the Republic of China all -goods shall be permitted to circulate freely. They shall not be seized -or detained except in accordance with law. - -Customs duty is a Central Government revenue. It shall be collected only -once when the goods enter or leave the country. - -The various grades of government shall not collect any dues on goods in -transit within the country, with the exception of tolls levied for the -purpose of improving the waterways and roads, on vessels and vehicles -making use of them. - -The right to impose taxes and levies on goods belongs to the Central -Government and shall not be exercised except in accordance with law. - - -CHAPTER VII. EDUCATION - -ARTICLE 131. The educational aim of the Republic of China shall be to -develop a national spirit, to cultivate a national morality, to train -the people for self-government and to increase their ability to earn a -livelihood, and thereby to build up a sound and healthy body of -citizens. - -ARTICLE 132. Every citizen of the Republic of China shall have an equal -opportunity to receive education. - -ARTICLE 133. All public and private educational institutions in the -country shall be subject to State supervision and amenable to the duty -of carrying out the educational policies formulated by the State. - -ARTICLE 134. Children between six and twelve years of age are of school -age and shall receive elementary education free of tuition. Detailed -provisions shall be provided by law. - -ARTICLE 135. All persons over school age who have not received an -elementary education shall receive supplementary education free of -tuition. Detailed provisions shall be provided by law. - -ARTICLE 136. In establishing universities and technical schools, the -State shall give special consideration to the needs of the respective -localities so as to afford the people thereof an equal opportunity to -receive higher education, thereby hastening a balanced national cultural -development. - -ARTICLE 137. Educational appropriations shall constitute no less than -fifteen per cent of the total amount of the budget of the Central -Government and no less than thirty per cent of the total amount of the -provincial, district and municipal budgets respectively. Educational -endowment funds independently set aside in accordance with law shall be -safeguarded. - -Educational expenditures in needy provinces shall be subsidized by the -central treasury. - -ARTICLE 138. The State shall encourage and subsidize the following -enterprises or citizens: - - 1. Private educational institutions with a high record of - achievement. - - 2. Education for Chinese citizens residing abroad. - - 3. Discoverers or inventors in academic or technical fields. - - 4. Teachers or administrative officers of educational - institutions having good records and long service. - - 5. Students of high records and good character who are - unable to pursue further studies. - - -CHAPTER VIII. THE ENFORCEMENT AND AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION - -ARTICLE 139. The term "law" as used in the Constitution means that which -has been passed by the Legislative Yuan and promulgated by the -President. - -ARTICLE 140. Laws in conflict with the Constitution are null and void. - -The question whether a law is in conflict with the Constitution shall be -settled by the Censor Yuan submitting the point to the Judicial Yuan for -interpretation within six months after its enforcement. - -ARTICLE 141. Administrative orders in conflict with the Constitution or -laws are null and void. - -ARTICLE 142. The interpretation of the Constitution shall be done by the -Judicial Yuan. - -ARTICLE 143. Before half or more of the provinces and territories have -completed the work of local self-government, the Members of the -Legislative Yuan and of the Censor Yuan shall be elected and appointed -in accordance with the following provisions: - - 1. The Members of the Legislative Yuan: The Delegates of the - various provinces, Mongolia, Tibet, and of the citizens - residing abroad, to the People's Congress shall separately - hold a preliminary election to nominate half of the number - of the candidates as determined in Article 67 and submit - their list to the People's Congress for election. The other - half shall be nominated by the President of the Legislative - Yuan for appointment by the President. - - 2. The Members of the Censor Yuan: The Delegates of the - various provinces, Mongolia, Tibet, and of the citizens - residing abroad, to the People's Congress shall separately - hold a preliminary election to nominate half of the number - of candidates as determined in Article 90 and submit their - list to the People's Congress for election. The other half - shall be nominated by the President of the Censor Yuan for - appointment by the President. - -ARTICLE 144. The Magistrates of districts where the work of -self-government is not yet completed shall be appointed and removed by -the Central Government. - -The preceding paragraph is applicable _mutatis mutandis_ to those -municipalities where the work of self-government is not yet completed. - -ARTICLE 145. The methods and procedure of helping the establishment of -local self-government shall be determined by law. - -ARTICLE 146. No amendment to the Constitution may be made unless it -shall have been proposed by over one-fourth of the delegates to the -People's Congress and passed by at least two-thirds of the delegates -present at a meeting having a quorum of over three-fourths of the entire -Congress. - -A proposed amendment to the Constitution shall be made public by the -proposer or proposers one year before the assembling of the People's -Congress. - -ARTICLE 147. In regard to those provisions of the Constitution which -require further procedure for their enforcement, such necessary -procedure shall be determined by law. - - - - -_B._ THE SYSTEM OF ORGANIZATION OF THE NATIONAL CONGRESS[1] - - - [Footnote 1: "Kuo-min Ta-hui Tsu-chih Fa" in Chung-yang Hsüan-ch'uan - Pu (Party-Ministry of Publicity), _Hsien-chêng Chien-shê Fa-kuei_, - Chungking, XXVIII (1939), p. 35-8.] - - The following laws were passed by the Legislative _Yüan_ - April 31, XXVI (1937), in amended form, after the election - had been postponed. - -ARTICLE 1. The National Congress shall frame the Constitution, and shall -determine its date of execution. - -ARTICLE 2. _i._ The National Congress shall be organized by the - Representatives of the people to the Congress. - _ii._ The manner of electing these Representatives is fixed - in another set of laws. - -ARTICLE 3. Members and reserve members of the Central Executive -Committee of the Kuomintang, and of the Central Supervisory Committee of -the Kuomintang shall be Representatives to the Congress without -election; members of the National Government and its officials may -attend the Congress. - -ARTICLE 4. The date of convening the Congress is to be fixed by the -National Government. - -ARTICLE 5. The Congress shall convene in the locality occupied by the -National Government. - -ARTICLE 6. Representatives to the Congress shall take an oath of -allegiance during the opening ceremonies of the Congress, to wit: -"I,------, do hereby promise with absolute sincerity that as a -representative of the Chinese people, I shall receive the instructions -of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the Father of the Republic, and that I shall execute -my official power only according to law, and shall obey the discipline -of the National Congress." - -After taking the oath, the Representatives should thereto sign their -names. - -ARTICLE 7. Thirty-one members shall be elected from among the -Representatives themselves to form the Presidium of the Congress. Their -duties shall be: - - _i._ To fix the manner of discussing motions and to regulate - the progress of the discussion. - _ii._ To discharge executive affairs of the Congress. - _iii._ To perform other duties fixed in this code of laws. - -ARTICLE 8. During a meeting of the Congress, the Presidium shall elect -the Chairman of the Meeting. - -ARTICLE 9. The National Congress shall form special committees to -examine the qualifications of the Representatives, to examine motions -and proposals and for other matters. These committees shall be organized -upon the request of the Presidium and passed by the Meeting. - -ARTICLE 10. The period of a session of the Congress is 10 to 20 days; it -may be extended whenever necessary. - -ARTICLE 11. The duties of the National Congress are fully discharged -when its Meeting closes. - -ARTICLE 12. A quorum shall consist of at least half of the total number -of members. Motion can be passed when more than half of the members -present vote for it. - -In adopting the Constitution, at least two-thirds of the total number of -the members shall be present, and adoption shall require a majority -greater than two-thirds of the members present. - -ARTICLE 13. The Congress may adopt any of the following methods to put a -motion to vote: raising the hands, standing up, or balloting. In case of -a tie, the Chairman may cast the deciding vote. - -ARTICLE 14. The National Congress shall have a Secretariat and an -organization of police guards. Their organization and duties shall be -decided by the Presidium. - -ARTICLE 15. The National Congress shall have a Secretary General, -appointed by the Presidium, and discharging the affairs of the entire -Congress. - -ARTICLE 16. The Representatives shall not assume any responsibility -towards the general public for any opinion expressed by them during the -session of the Congress. - -ARTICLE 17. Except by approval of the Congress, no Representative of the -Congress may be detained or arrested when the Congress is in session. - -ARTICLE 18. During the session, a Representative who does not abide by -the rules of the Congress may be warned by the Chairman, or may forfeit -his privilege to speak. Adequate punishment shall be imposed upon any -who may commit serious offenses. - -ARTICLE 19. The above mentioned punishment will be decided by the -Congress, upon the examination of the Punishment Committee (formed by -the Representatives to the Congress). - -ARTICLE 20. The date of adoption of this code of laws is to be fixed in -an order from the Central Government. - - - - -_C._ ACT OF THE LEGISLATIVE _YÜAN_, APRIL 31, XXVI (1937) GOVERNING THE -ELECTION OF REPRESENTATIVES TO THE NATIONAL CONGRESS[1] - - - [Footnote 1: "Kuo-min Ta-hui Tai-piao Hsüan-chü Fa" in Chung-yang - Hsüan-ch'uan Pu (Party-Ministry of Publicity) _Hsien-chêng Chien-shê - Fa-kuei_, Chungking, XXVIII (1939), p. 38-49.] - - [Note particularly the world-wide electoral areas.] - - -CHAPTER I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES - -ARTICLE 1. These laws are formulated in conjunction with what is -provided in Section _ii_ of Article 2 in the Law concerning the System -of Organization of the National Congress. - -ARTICLE 2. Besides the Representatives to the National Congress without -election, there shall also be provided: - - _i._ 665 Representatives elected through district election. - _ii._ 380 Representatives elected through professional election. - _iii._ 155 Representatives elected through special election. - _iv._ 240 Representatives appointed by the National Government. - -ARTICLE 3. All citizens of China above 20 years of age have the -privilege of voting for Representatives to Congress, upon taking the -oath of citizenship. - -ARTICLE 4. The following persons have no privilege of voting: - - _i._ Rebels against the National Government, proven or under arrest. - _ii._ Corrupt officials, proven or under arrest. - _iii._ Those whose citizenship privileges have been forfeited due to - crimes, etc. - _iv._ Those who are insolvent. - _v._ Those afflicted with mental diseases. - _vi._ Those smoking opium or substitutes therefor. - -ARTICLE 5. Each voter may have not more than two choices. - -Those who may both elect in the district and the professional elections -should participate in the professional election. Those who may both -elect in the professional election and the special election should elect -in the special election. In professional election, an elector eligible -in more than two professions should vote only in one of them at his -choice. - -ARTICLE 6. The Representatives to the National Congress are elected by -balloting which does not require signature, and by single entry. The -names of candidates for Representative should be printed on the ballot, -and the electors are to choose one man out of them. - -ARTICLE 7. Candidates for Representative who receive a majority vote are -elected as Representatives. In case of tie, the candidates shall draw -lots to decide who is the elected Representative. - -ARTICLE 8. After the full number of Representatives has been obtained, -those candidates who obtain some votes [but less than a majority] will -be reserve Representatives. Their rank will be based upon the number of -votes. In number the reserve Representatives shall correspond to the -elected Representatives. - - -CHAPTER II. DISTRICT ELECTION - -ARTICLE 9. All provinces and cities directly under the Executive Yüan -shall elect a number of Representatives corresponding to the attached -List No. 1, and according to the laws governing District Elections. - -ARTICLE 10. The Representatives from various provinces are elected in -various districts. The division of districts and the number of -Representatives elected in every district are fixed in the attached List -No. 2. - -ARTICLE 11. The Heads of the _hsiang_ [suburb of a city] and of the -_chên_ [a village market] of each _hsien_ in the electorate should -nominate candidates. The number should be ten times that of the number -of Representatives to be elected. If there is a _shih_ within the -electorate, the Head of the _fang_ [a group of houses in a _shih_] -should also participate in the nomination. If there is no Head of the -_hsiang_ or _chên_ in a _hsien_, then the corresponding officials of the -_hsiang_, _chên_, or _hsien_ shall nominate. - -ARTICLE 12. Candidates for Representative should have the following -qualifications: - - _i._ Possess the qualifications of an elector of the Representatives - and have taken the citizenship oath in an electorate other than - this one. - _ii._ Be above twenty-five years of age. - _iii._ Be a resident of the respective electoral district. - -ARTICLE 13. Representatives to the National Congress in each district -are elected in the manner prescribed in Article 6. - -ARTICLE 14. The Special Municipalities directly under the Executive Yüan -should elect their Representatives according to Articles 11-13 and -Article 15. - - -CHAPTER III. PROFESSIONAL ELECTION - -ARTICLE 15. The various professional organs in provinces or Special -Municipalities should elect a number of Representatives according to the -attached List No. 3. - -ARTICLE 16. Organs of the liberal professions shall elect -Representatives not according to localities or districts. Their numbers -are fixed in attached List No. 4. - -ARTICLE 17. The professional organs participating in the election are -limited to those who were legally recognized before the adoption of this -code of laws. - -ARTICLE 18. The officers of the various professional organs shall -nominate Representatives for those particular professions. Their number -should be three times the number of Representatives to be elected. The -officers mentioned above are limited to those who have executive power -in that particular professional organ. - -ARTICLE 19. Nominated Representatives for professional election should -have the following qualifications: - - _i._ Possess the privileges of an elector. - _ii._ Be above twenty-five years of age. - _iii._ Have been practicing in that profession for three years or - more. - _iv._ Be a member of that professional organization. - -The period of practicing that profession may be the sum of intermittent -periods of practice. - -ARTICLE 20. The Representatives of professional organs should be elected -by legally recognized electors according to Article 6. - -ARTICLE 21. If there are several sub-organs to a professional -organization, the nomination of Representatives should be made by the -officials of the lowest sub-organ, and elected by the members of the -lowest sub-organ. - -If the members of the professional organization form groups, then the -election of Representatives should be done by the individual members of -those groups. - -ARTICLE 22. In Special Municipalities directly under the Executive Yüan, -the nomination and election of Representatives from professional -organizations should be in accordance with Article 24. - -ARTICLE 23. For organs of the liberal professions, their manner of -nominating and electing is the same as for professional organizations. - - -CHAPTER IV. SPECIAL ELECTIONS - - -Section 1. _Elections in the Provinces of Liaoning, Kirin, Heilungkiang -and Jehol_ - -ARTICLE 24. No distinction concerning district or profession is made in -the election of Representatives in these four provinces. Their numbers -are: - - _i._ For Liaoning 14 - _ii._ For Kirin 13 - _iii._ For Heilungkiang 9 - _iv._ For Jehol 9 - -Two of the Representatives from Kirin are elected in the Special Eastern -District of that Province. - -[Provision is made for the use of polls in exile and for absentee -ballots.] - - -Section 2. _Elections in Mongolia and Tibet_ - -[This follows the provisions of Section 1.] - - -Section 3. _Representatives from Overseas_ - -ARTICLE 32. The numbers of Representatives from overseas are as follows: - - 1 from Hawaii 1 from Chile - 1 from Peru 1 from Cuba - 1 from Mexico 1 from Central America - 3 from the United States 2 from the Philippines - 2 from Canada 4 from Malaya - 3 from Annam 2 from Thailand (Siam) - 1 from India 2 from Burma - 1 from Europe 1 from Japan - 1 from Korea 1 from Australia - 1 from Tahiti 1 from Africa - 4 from The Netherlands 1 from Hong Kong - East Indies 1 from Formosa - 1 from Macao - -ARTICLE 33. The nomination of overseas Representatives is modelled after -that of Professional Elections. But the groups nominating the -Representatives are to be approved by the Central Committee of Overseas -Affairs. - -The National Government shall fix twice the number of Representatives -electable as nominated Representatives. - -ARTICLE 34. The election of Overseas Representatives is modelled after -that governing provincial districts. - - -Section 4. _Elections in the Army, Navy, and Air Forces_ - -ARTICLE 35. Thirty Representatives shall be elected from the Nation's -army, navy, air force, and other military organs. - -ARTICLE 36. Nominations of Representatives from the military are as -follows: - - _i._ The Army: Two nominations from every division. One from every - independent lü [brigade] or from special brigades holding more - than two tuan [regiments]. For the rest of the smaller forces, - nomination of Representatives shall be made by combination of - the forces. - _ii._ The Navy: Each fleet may nominate one Representative. All the - Marines combined may nominate one Representative. The - Department of the Navy will combine the remainder to nominate - Representatives. - _iii._ The Air Force shall nominate one Representative. - _iv._ Three Representatives shall be nominated by other military - organs. - -The National Government will appoint ninety Representatives thus -nominated as the nominated Representatives. - -ARTICLE 37. The nominated Representatives will be elected by the -officers and soldiers of the military who have the qualifications of -electors. Representatives are elected in the manner prescribed in -Article 6. - -ARTICLE 38. Representatives nominated should have the following -qualifications: - - _i._ Possess the qualifications of an elector. - _ii._ Be more than twenty-five years of age. - _iii._ Have served for more than five years in the troops with good - record, or be a graduate of good standing from a military - school. - - -CHAPTER V. ELECTION OF THE CHIEF ELECTION OFFICE AND OF THE ELECTION -INSPECTORS - -ARTICLE 39. The National Government forms the Chief Election Office of -the Representatives of the National Congress. The Office is headed by a -Commissioner and a Deputy Commissioner. Election Inspectors are also -specially appointed to direct and watch all affairs of the election. The -appointment of the Chief Election Office is determined by order. - -ARTICLE 40. The Election Inspector of every province is the Commissioner -of the Bureau of Civil Affairs of the province. - -The Provincial Election Inspector is the highest executive official of -the province. In case there is no highest official, the Chief Election -Office will appoint one of the executive officials to fill the post. - -ARTICLE 41. In Special Municipalities directly under the Executive Yüan, -the Inspector is the City Mayor. - -ARTICLE 42. In elections in Liaoning, Kirin, Heilungkiang, and Jehol, -and of liberal professional organizations, the Minister of the Ministry -of the Interior will be the Inspector-General. In elections in Mongolia -and Tibet, the Chairman of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission -will be the Inspector-General. In overseas elections, the Chairman of -the Overseas Affairs Committee will be the Inspector-General. - -ARTICLE 43. Elections in Mongolia, Tibet, and overseas and military -elections shall be under the Inspectors appointed by the Chief Election -Office. - -ARTICLE 44. The qualifications of the electors, the nominated and -elected Representatives shall be examined by the Inspectors. - -ARTICLE 45. The date and locality of the election are fixed by the -Election Inspectors. - -ARTICLE 46. The rest of the officials for the election, _e.g._, ballot -administrators and inspectors, etc., are also appointed by the -Inspectors-General. - -ARTICLE 47. Inspectors and officials for electoral affairs cannot be the -Congress Representatives of that district or professional organization. - -[ARTICLE 48 OMITTED IN THE TEXT.] - - -CHAPTER VI. ELECTION AND FORFEITED ELECTION - -ARTICLE 49. The election is considered null and void if: - - _i._ It is legally proved that more than one-third of the electorate - are cheating in or manipulating the election; or, - _ii._ It is legally proved that the election is not conducted - according to the laws prescribed. - -ARTICLE 50. In case of an election being forfeited, it should be -performed again according to law, unless it be too late to repeat under -the existing circumstances. - -ARTICLE 51. Elected Representatives lose their privilege when: - - _i._ They die; or, - _ii._ It is legally proved that their submitted qualifications are - false; or, - _iii._ It is legally proved that the number of ballots is incorrect. - -ARTICLE 52. When an elected Representative loses his privilege or when -he refuses to take his privilege, the reserve Representative will take -his place as prescribed in Article 8. - - -CHAPTER VII. LAW SUITS CONCERNING ELECTION AFFAIRS - -ARTICLE 53. Electors or nominated Representatives who are not elected -may file suit within ten days of the date of the election against any -administrative officer of the election if they hold that he abuses his -duty. - -ARTICLE 54. If electors or nominated Representatives who are not elected -see that the number of ballots cast for the elected Representatives are -untrue, or that the qualifications of the elected Representatives are -untrue, they may file suit within five days of the date for announcement -of successful candidates. - -ARTICLE 55. All law suits connected with election affairs will be heard -by the Supreme Court. They shall take precedence over all other cases, -and sentence will be given after one single hearing. Law suits connected -with military elections will be heard before a military tribunal. - -ARTICLE 56. Offenses committed during an election are governed by the -criminal code. - - -CHAPTER VIII. SUPPLEMENT - -ARTICLE 57. When it is impossible to elect in Special Elections as -prescribed in Chapter IV, the National Government may appoint -Representatives. - -ARTICLE 58. The Chief Election Office for the Election of -Representatives to the National Congress is the sole organ empowered to -interpret the meaning of this set of laws. - -ARTICLE 59. The detailed procedure for enforcing these laws will be -fixed by order. - -ARTICLE 60. The date of enforcing these laws will be fixed by order. - -[The attached lists are omitted.] - - - - -_D._ THE PROGRAM OF RESISTANCE AND RECONSTRUCTION[1] - - - [Footnote 1: Official English text from Ch'u Chia-hua (Party-Minister - of Organization of the Kuomintang), "Consolidation of Democracy in - China," in Council of International Affairs, _The Chinese Yearbook - 1938-39_, [Hong Kong], 1939, p. 337-8.] - - This quasi-constitutional proclamation of war policy for the - nation was adopted by the Kuomintang Party Congress, - Emergency Session, at Hankow, March 29, 1938. - - -A. GENERAL PRINCIPLES: - -1. Dr. Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary principles and his other teachings -are hereby declared to be the supreme authority, regulating all war-time -activities and the work of national reconstruction. - -2. All war-time powers and forces are hereby placed under the control -of the Kuomintang and of General Chiang K'ai-shek. - - -B. DIPLOMACY: - -3. China is prepared to ally herself with all states and nations that -sympathize with her cause, and to wage a common struggle for peace and -justice. - -4. China is prepared to safeguard and strengthen the machinery of peace -as well as all treaties and conventions that have the maintenance of -peace as their ultimate object. - -5. China is prepared to ally herself with all forces that are opposed to -Japanese imperialism in order to check Japanese aggression and to -safeguard peace in the Far East. - -6. China is prepared to improve still further the existing friendly -relations with other Powers in order to gain more sympathy for the -cause. - -7. All bogus political organizations which Japan has created in -consequence of her military occupation of Chinese territory, and all -their actions, are hereby repudiated and declared null and void. - - -C. MILITARY AFFAIRS: - -8. The army shall receive more political training, so that both officers -and men may appreciate the importance of war-time national -reconstruction and be ready to lay down their lives for the nation. - -9. All able-bodied men shall be trained; the people shall have their -military strength increased; the troops at the various fronts shall be -supplied with new recruits. Overseas Chinese who have returned home to -offer their services at the front shall be given a proper course of -training to fit them for their work. - -10. All people who have arms of their own shall receive the support and -encouragement of the Government and, under the direction of local -military authorities, shall cooperate with the regular army to defend -the country against foreign invasion. Guerrilla warfare shall be waged -in the enemy's rear with the object of smashing and dividing his -military forces. - -11. Both the wounded and the killed shall be pensioned; the disabled -shall be cared for; and the families of soldiers fighting at the front -shall be treated with the utmost consideration, so that people will -rejoice to fight for their country and the work of national mobilization -may proceed with the highest degree of efficiency. - - -D. POLITICS: - -12. A People's Political Council shall be created in order to unify the -national strength, to utilize the best minds of the nation, and to -facilitate the formulation and execution of national policies. - -13. The district [_hsien_] shall be taken as the fundamental unit from -which the work of increasing the self-defensive power of the people -shall be started. The conditions of local self-government shall be -fulfilled as soon as possible, so that the political and social basis of -the present war shall have been firmly established and a preparation -shall have been made for the eventual promulgation of a constitution. - -14. A thorough reform in the central and local governmental machinery -shall be instituted with the object of simplifying and making it -rational. Only thus can administrative efficiency be obtained to meet -the urgent needs of war. - -15. The conduct of all officials, both high and low, shall conform to -rules of propriety. They shall be faithful to their work, ready to -sacrifice themselves for the cause of the nation, observe discipline, -and obey orders, so that they may serve as a model for the people. If -they prove to be disloyal and obstruct the prosecution of the war, they -shall be tried by court martial. - -16. Corrupt officials shall be severely punished, and their property -shall be confiscated. - - -E. ECONOMICS: - -17. Economic reconstruction shall concern itself mainly with matters of -military importance, and incidentally with matters that contribute to -the improvement of the livelihood of the people. With these objects in -view, a planned economy shall be put into operation, investments by -people both at home and abroad shall be encouraged, and large-scale -war-time production shall be undertaken. - -18. The greatest measure of energy shall be devoted to the development -of village economy, the encouragement of cooperative enterprises, the -unhampered transportation of foodstuffs, the cultivation of waste land, -and the work of irrigation. - -19. Mining shall be undertaken; the foundations of heavy industries -shall be laid; light industries shall be encouraged; and handicraft -industries in the various provinces shall be developed. - -20. War-time taxes shall be levied, and thoroughgoing reforms in -financial administration shall be instituted. - -21. The banking business shall be strictly controlled, so that -commercial and industrial activities may be properly adjusted. - -22. The legal tender shall be made unassailable; foreign exchange shall -be controlled; and imports and exports shall be regulated in order to -secure financial stability. - -23. Facilities of communication shall be improved; transportation by -steamers, automobiles, and aeroplanes shall be undertaken; railroads and -highways shall be built; and air lines shall be increased. - -24. No profiteering or cornering shall be allowed; and a system of -price-fixing shall be instituted. - - -F. MASS MOVEMENT: - -25. The people throughout the country shall be organized into -occupational groups such as farmers, laborers, merchants, and students. -The principle shall be: From each according to his ability. The rich -shall contribute in money, and the able-bodied shall sweat. All classes -of people shall be mobilized for war. - -26. In the course of the war, the freedom of speech, the freedom of the -press, and the freedom of assembly shall be fully guaranteed to the -people, provided they do not contravene Dr. Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary -principles or the provisions of the law. - -27. Refugees from the war areas as well as unemployed people shall -receive relief, and shall be given proper training to fit them for -war-time work. - -28. National consciousness shall be instilled into the people, so that -they may assist the Government in detecting and eradicating treasonable -acts. Traitors shall be severely punished, and their property shall be -confiscated. - - -G. EDUCATION: - -29. The whole educational system shall be reorganized. A course of -war-time education shall be instituted and emphasis shall be placed on -the cultivation of morals, scientific research, and the expansion of -research facilities. - -30. Various technical experts shall be trained and assigned to proper -posts in order to meet the requirements of war. - -31. The youths of the nation shall be properly trained, so that they may -offer their services to society and contribute to the cause of the war. - - - - - -_E._ AN OUTLINE OF WAR-TIME CONTROLMENT[1] - - - [Footnote 1: An unpublished memorandum presented in manuscript by - President Yü Yu-jên of the Control _Yüan_ to the author in Chungking, - September 1940. It consists of nine folios, not numbered, with a - chart. It is entitled _Chan Shih Chien-ch'a K'ai-lüeh_ (An Outline of - War-time Controlment), and is dated August, XXVIII (1939). The present - extract is folios 1-A to 4-B.] - - An official but unpublished statement, this document was - presented by the President of the Control _Yüan_ to the - author for inclusion in the present work. - -According to Article 46, Chapter VIII of the Organic Law of the National -Government, the Control _Yüan_ is "the highest supervisory organ of the -government, obliged to exercise the power of impeachment and auditing in -accordance with law." Since the beginning of our resistance against the -Japanese invasion, the powers of control have been gradually -strengthened so as to meet the demands of this critical time. A static -control has developed into a dynamic one; that is, more emphasis is laid -upon prevention than upon correction. Therefore the duties of the office -become heavier and more complicated, as its work becomes more -intensified. But the influence which the _Yüan_ has exercised over -Chinese politics as a whole becomes also wider and wider. In this -report, we are going to describe the activities of the _Yüan_ under the -two headings of the Control _Yüan_ and the Ministry of Audit. - - -THE CONTROL YÜAN: - -The function of auditing is performed by the Ministry of Audit, -subsidiary to the _Yüan_. What is directly performed by the _Yüan_ is -impeachment. On the authority of the Impeachment Act, any motion of -impeachment, after being proposed by some control Committee or control -Commissioner, is to be reviewed by three other control Committees. If -the bill is passed by the three, the accused must be punished. Whenever -a bill is rejected and its proponent does not agree to the rejection, -the bill shall be reviewed once more by five other committees whose -determination shall be final. Furthermore, emergency relief measures may -be requested, according to the urgency of the occasion; and in order to -facilitate the performance of its functions, the _Yüan_ is permitted to -investigate the documents of other offices as well as to demand -explanations from them. The initiation of a motion of impeachment must -be based upon one of the three following conditions: - -_a._ Article 2, Impeachment Act: "If any illegal action or negligence of -duty of an official be discovered, the Control _Yüan_ itself is -permitted to bring an impeachment against him." - -_b._ Article 4, Regulations for the Execution of Government Rights; and -Article 11, Act for the Punishment of Officials: "Specified officials -may be impeached on demand of the superior who has submitted the case of -his guilty subordinate to the Control _Yüan_." - -_c._ "If an official be accused by the people, the case must be -investigated. If the accusation prove to be true, the accused shall be -impeached." - -Although it is very prudent that the legislators have obliged the -impeaching officers to take such steps as investigation, motion, and -review, yet in this critical time these complicated measures must be -considered too slow to keep pace with the development of affairs. - -After the outbreak of war, the Central Government published the -"Temporary Regulations for the Execution of War-time Controlment," in -which the Control _Yüan_ was charged with the duties of _censure_ and -_proposition_, besides what have already been mentioned. By censure it -is meant that when emergency measures must be taken against an official -whose illegal action or negligence of duty has been discovered, a -written notice of censure may be submitted to the officer who directly -controls, or is immediately superior to, the official in question. The -officer receiving the notice must decide in as short a time as possible -to deal with the censured with the administrative power in his hands. If -he holds the censured innocent, he must reply, giving sufficient -reasons. If he takes no measures, or fails to reply, or replies -groundlessly, the control Committee making the censure is obliged to -change the motion of censure into one of impeachment, and the impeached -is liable to a penalty. Hence the principal significance of censure is -that it takes emergency measures against the undesirable conduct of -officials, so as to meet the demands of the war-time. This also implies -further extension of the controlment to the administrative system, in -order to quicken efficiency. - -As for _proposition_, this means that when some legally specified -obligations of office are administered feebly or inadequately, the -Control _Yüan_ may make a proposal or express its views to the office -involved or to the office immediately superior. The office which -receives the proposal must in as short a time as possible take adequate -measures to remedy the situation. The duties of _proposition_, -therefore, can not only correct administrators, but can also improve -agencies. They are preventive, capable of requiring strict improvement -of governmental activities. Effective anticipatory control may now be -exercised over Chinese government agencies. Since being charged with the -two new duties of censure and proposition, the Control _Yüan_ has -carried them into action with prudence. And the effects are rather -remarkable. - -When, in 1937, the government was moved to Chungking, a part of the -_Yüan_ employees were ordered dismissed. But the _Yüan_ authorities -still prepared copies of "Directions for the Work of Control _Yüan_ -Employees in Their Native (or Other) Cities (or Provinces)," and -"Directions for the Work of Dismissed Control _Yüan_ Employees," which -were distributed to the dismissed. The former employees have been -obliged to make monthly reports upon the local phenomena according to -the "Directions." These reports are sent to the _Yüan_, thus helping its -understanding of the truth in all corners of China. - -In view of the fact that the "Temporary Regulations for the Execution of -War-time Controlment" came into force, the Control _Yüan_ accordingly -prepared "Directions for Inspection and Investigation." From time to -time, the control commissioners have been ordered to tour their -respective districts. Moreover, control committees have been selected -and sent out to different places to perform inspection of -administration, national spiritual mobilization, conscription, military -confiscation and requisition, the organization and training of the -people, hoarding and reserves of supplies, communication and -transportation, public support of the war, public security, the utter -erasure of traitors, anti-air-raid preparations, ambulance equipment, -the management of wounded soldiers and of refugees, taxation and other -imposts on the people, production, construction, education, and all -other things related to the war. Thus the work of the _Yüan_ has become -all the more intensified. In order to adapt itself to the circumstances, -its organization was readjusted. A "Board of Legislative Study," -subordinate to the _Yüan_, was established, with a view to studying Dr. -Sun Yat-sen's "Constitution based upon the Principle of the Separation -of Five Powers," the Control system, and anything related to war-time -legislation about controlment. Besides, a "Committee on Procedural -Technique" was added under the Secretariat, so that it will prepare -plans for the improvement of _Yüan_ activities, and will help to carry -them into action. - -In the spring of 1939, a "Plan of War-time Procedure for the Second -Stage of War" was passed in the Fifth Plenary Session of the C.E.C. and -C.S.C. of the Kuomintang. Both the decision concerning Article VI of -Political Report and the lecture delivered by Generalissimo Chiang -K'ai-shek in this meeting showed that much was expected from the Control -_Yüan_. Abiding by the government's policy and taking into consideration -its present needs, the _Yüan_, in addition to the performance of -impeachment, censure, proposition and other functions established by -law, prepared "An Outline of the Execution of War-time Controlment for -the Second Stage" and its "Preliminary Procedure," with the extension of -inspection as the chief means to set the machinery in motion. - -According to the aforementioned "Outline" and "Procedure," the work of -inspection is classified into two kinds. The inspection of the conduct -of political officers and administrative officials is termed the -_general inspection_. When special agents are sent out to inspect -specified cases, this is called the _special inspection_. For the -general inspection of the Central Government, the units are the offices, -while for that of the local governments, the units are the districts -[_hsien_]. In the case of a special inspection, when the agents are sent -out solely by the Control _Yüan_, the term used is _exclusive -inspection_; the inspection performed cooperatively by agents both of -the _Yüan_ and of other offices is called _joint inspection_. - -The general inspection has, since January 1940, been vigorously put into -effect. For instance, the anti-air-raid preparations on the outskirts of -Chungking, the relief and management of wounded soldiers, refugees, and -suffering children, and the spiritual mobilization of central and local -government offices (including problems of efficiency and diligence) have -all been carefully examined. Moreover, Control Committees have been sent -out to different districts within certain periods, the frequency of -which is based upon the importance of the place. Some went to Kweichow -and Szechwan to inspect local administration in different districts. -Recently, committees have been sent out to Shantung to make a variety -of inspections. As for the special inspections, delegates have been -incessantly sent out to make exclusive inspections; and joint -inspections have also been made, by the joining of many control -committees into the Itinerant Inspection Corps for Military Discipline -and Morale, and the War-time Economic Inspection Corps. Committees which -have thus been delegated to joint work are not only obliged to fulfil -duties required by the Corps, but are also permitted independently to -impeach or censure illegal or incompetent officials, whether civil or -military. The primary functions of the committees remain unaffected. - -Since military operations must be in harmony with political -administration, wherever the military power reaches, the power of -controlment must follow in its wake. The Control _Yüan_ recently -prepared the "Regulations for the Organization of Control _Yüan_ -War-time Inspection Corps of War Districts," which were later sanctioned -and then promulgated. The number of the corps and of the areas to be -inspected are fixed according to the War Districts marked off by the -Military Affairs Commission. Each corps consists of three committees, -and is organized by the control committees themselves; if there is a -control commissioner in the area, he of course joins the committee, and -performs all the functions established for him by law. Under each -committee there are one secretary, one inspecting agent, three -assistants, and one clerk--to assist the committees in routine -administration. - -Since the work of the control commissioners is stationary, behind the -battle lines, the Inspection Corps of War Districts are itinerant, so -that their emphasis can be laid upon the front. They are mutually -dependent and intimately correlated. The network of national controlment -is completed by the mobilization of the control committees to be sent -out to make inspections, so that corruption may be eliminated and law -and order enforced. And undoubtedly our resistance against the Japanese -invasion has been benefited. This work is indeed a great help to the -construction of a new China. - - - - -_F._ A CHART OF THE CONTROL _YÜAN_ FROM JULY 1937 TO JUNE 1940[1] - - - [Footnote 1: Continuation of Appendix I (E), p. 313; this comprises - folios 5-A to 9-A with chart.] - - -THE READJUSTMENT: - -Since the outbreak of war, the _Yüan_, together with other offices of -the Government, was moved from Nanking to Chungking. In order to adapt -itself to the circumstances, its organization was readjusted. A "Board -of Legislative Study" was established, while the six sections of General -Affairs, Editing, Book-Collection, Printing, Receipt and -Transmission,[2] and Archive, all subordinate to the Secretariat, were -merged into four departments. Moreover, a "Committee on Administrative -Procedure" and two new sections, called the first and the second, were -added to the main body of the _Yüan_. - - [Footnote 2: A formal agency for the receipt and registry of incoming - communications, and of verification and transmission of outgoing - ones.] - - -THE FUNCTIONS: - - | Impeachment------ | Acceptance of Popular - | | | Petitions - Functions | Censure | | - Established--| -----| Inquiry and - by Law | Proposition | Examination - | | - | Supervision of | Emergency Relief - | Examinations | Measures - | | - | Audit | Interpellation - - -THE PRESENT ORGANIZATION: - - The Control _Yüan_ - | |Committee on Administrative Procedure - | |First Department [of the _Yüan_] - | |Secretariat-------|Second Department - The _Yüan_--|Advisers' Office |--------------------Office for Review - Meeting |Board of |Third Department - | Legislative |--------------------Special Delegates' - | Study |Fourth Department Office - |Office of |First - | Regional Control | Section |Accounting--|Office of - | Commissioners |----------| Room | Accounting - |Ministry of Audit |Second | and - | | Section |Statistics--| Statistics - | |----------| Room - ------------------- |President's Office - | | |Office for the Receipt of Petitions - Auditing Offices Auditing - of Provinces Sub-Office - -THE WORK: - - 1. Acceptance of people's petitions and investigations: - Number of petitions received in this period.... - [Number is omitted from original report.] - Number of cases in which delegates were sent out to investigate.... - [Number omitted.] - Number of cases in which other offices were charged to - investigate.... - [Number omitted.] - -(Those petitions which were either outside the function of control or -false in the description of facts were remarked upon and preserved by -the committees.) - - 2. Motions: - Number of impeachments moved 121 - Number of censures moved 149 - Number of propositions moved 234 - 3. Supervisions of Civil Service Examinations: - Number of Higher Examinations supervised 2 - Number of Common Examinations supervised 5 - Number of Special Examinations supervised 34 - 4. Supervisions of the relief of sufferers from natural - calamities: - Total number 5 - 5. Inspections: - [A detailed enumeration of inspections performed and - results accomplished is here omitted.] - 6. Cooperation with other offices: - [The detailed summary is omitted.] - - -THE MINISTRY OF AUDIT: - -The functions of audit, as performed by the Ministry of Audit, are -founded upon the Auditing Act. The old Auditing Act, however, is too -tradition-bound and therefore inconvenient. The necessity of revision is -especially pressing in war-time. In the spring of 1938, the Ministry -prepared a draft Act and submitted it to the Legislative _Yüan_. The -latter adopted this and published a New Auditing Act. According to the -New Auditing Act, the Ministry is charged with three functions of -internal checking (interior auditing), auditing (post-auditing) and -supervision. These functions include: - - _i._ Supervision of the execution of the budgets; - _ii._ Scrutiny of orders of receipt and payment; - _iii._ Scrutiny of computations and balance sheets; - _iv._ Control of illegal or unfaithful conduct in financial affairs. - -Two merits of the New Auditing Act should be mentioned. In the first -place, emphasis has been laid upon visiting auditing. For instance, the -work of internal checking is not limited to the supervision of the -receipts and disbursements of the State Treasury by the scrutiny and -indorsement of the receiving and paying orders; but even receiving and -paying vouchers of Government offices have been made ineffective, unless -scrutinized and indorsed by auditors stationed in the offices by the -Ministry. Owing to the vastness of the area of China, and owing also to -the limited number of workers available in this line, this system is -not universally applicable. Only offices in which the work of receiving -and paying is especially heavy find such auditors present. As for -auditing, the Government offices were formerly obliged only to submit to -the Ministry accounting reports which they themselves had prepared. It -is different now. The New Act ordains that auditors should be sent out -periodically by the Ministry to visit the Government offices and -scrutinize their books and vouchers. Or in each year, some offices -should be selected to be thus scrutinized. The duties of supervision -were not clearly defined, but they now include the following items: -(_a_) the supervision of the revenue and expenditures of the offices; -(_b_) the scrutiny of cash, bills, and bonds in the offices; (_c_) the -supervision of the construction of buildings and of the purchase or sale -of the property attached to the offices; (_d_) the supervision of the -drawing and repayment of bonds and the destruction of bonds returned; -(_e_) joint-administration with the financial departments of other -offices; and (_f_) the scrutiny of other administrative affairs related -to finance. - -Secondly, the New Auditing Act ordains that the Ministry of Audit is -directly responsible for the auditing of financial affairs of the -offices of different ranks of the Central Government, while that of the -local governments is under the charge of local auditing offices, -subordinate to the Ministry. - -[A detailed narrative of the war-time work of the ministry is omitted.] - -Before the outbreak of war, the Ministry had established auditing -offices in the Provinces of Kiangsu, Chekiang, Hupeh, Shensi and Honan -and in the city of Shanghai, and one sub-office for the Tientsin-Pukow -Railway. The office of Shanghai concurrently took charge of the auditing -affairs of the Nanking-Shanghai Railway; and that of Hupeh, the affairs -of the Peiping-Hankow Railway. In 1938 the offices of Hunan, Kweichow -and Szechwan were established. In July 1939, a conference of auditors -was held in Chungking. All auditors sent out now returned to attend it. -They reported on their work, assisted the auditors in the Ministry, and -discussed with them the directions of war-time auditing. In October, Mr. -Lin Yün-kai, the Minister of Audit, visited Szechwan, Shensi, Kansu, and -Chinghai to inspect the audit work going on in Shensi and Szechwan and -at the same time to examine the local financial conditions as a step -toward the extension of the auditing system. - -In the spring of 1939, the Ministry prepared "An Outline for the -Execution of War-time Audits" which was passed and enacted by the -Supreme National Defense Council. There are eleven items, to be carried -out in several periods, in this outline. A part of them are required by -the New Auditing Act, while the rest are the new work arising from the -war. They are as follows: - -_a._ Auditing prefectural [_hsien_] finance: A prefecture, on the -authority of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Constitution, is the unit of -self-government; and whenever the self-government is accomplished, China -becomes constitutional. This being the case, the prefectural finance -actually concerns the future of the country and the people. Therefore, -beginning from 1939, the Ministry introduced the auditing of prefectural -finance. It ordered the provincial offices to have the prefectures make -monthly reports on their revenue and expenditure. The reports should be -submitted to the provincial auditing offices which will also send out -delegates to scrutinize the accounting records of some selected -prefectures as well as to investigate the prefectural financial -organizations, the taxation system, and the sorts of taxes. Up to June -1940, there have been 84 prefectures selected for such investigation. - -_b._ The auditing of the Central Government Offices in the provinces and -cities where no auditing offices have been established: In such cases, -the Ministry has appointed the auditing offices of neighboring -localities to take charge. But the Ministry has taken over the auditing -affairs of Chungking for the moment. Meantime, plans have been made to -establish auditing offices in Kwangsi, Fukien, etc. - -_c._ The auditing of the receipts and disbursements of public -treasuries: Since October 1939, when the Public Treasury Act came into -force, the Ministry has sent delegates to the State Treasury Bureau to -scrutinize and indorse the accounting vouchers, and the provincial -offices have sent delegates to Provincial Treasuries as well. - -_d._ The auditing of special funds: As a rule, the institutes in charge -of special funds have from time to time submitted their reports on their -receipts and disbursements to the Ministry. Since 1939, the Ministry has -also sent delegates to examine strictly these funds. - -_e._ Itinerant auditing: The present economic conditions do not permit -the Ministry to establish auditing offices in all the government-owned -concerns. But itinerant auditing, after the model of circuit courts, -has been introduced since 1939. The Suchow-Kunming and Yünnan-Burma -Railways have been thus examined. The provincial offices have also -applied this system to the business offices. - -_f._ The visiting auditing: The system of visiting auditing has been -developed gradually. Delegates have been stationed in Sufferers' Relief -Committee, City Government of Chungking, Ministry of Finance, Ministry -of Economics, and Ministry of Communications. Other delegates have been -sent out to visit some selected offices who have submitted their -accounting reports. - -_g._ The supervision of the revenue of government offices: Salt Tax and -Commodities Tax have been scrutinized. - -_h._ The supervision of clothing, provisions, and other military -supplies: Since the outbreak of war, the amount of clothing, provisions, -etc. purchased by the military authorities has greatly increased. The -delegates from the Ministry are always present on the occasions of -signing contracts, announcing the bids, deciding the winning bidder, and -delivering the goods. If the supplies are purchased in the provinces, -the provincial offices are in charge of the supervision. - -_i._ The supervision of mass purchase and constructions: The delegates -from the Ministry or its provincial offices are always present on the -occasions of signing contracts, announcing the bids, deciding the -winning bidder, and delivering the goods or completing constructions -when there are any mass purchases or sales of government-owned property -or any construction work. - -_j._ The financial scrutiny of the war-time provisional organizations: -There are huge sums of receipts and disbursements in such organizations -as the "Joint Emergency Air Raid Relief Office of Chungking" and the -general office of the "National Committee for Soldiers' Comfort," so -that their auditing affairs are made the charge of the delegates from -the Ministry. - -_k._ The supervision of the payment, preservation, and usage of -contributions of all sorts: National Salvation Bonds, Aviation -Contribution, and all other contributions donated by the Chinese at home -and abroad have been scrutinized by the Ministry delegates. - -Many considerable results have been achieved since the execution of the -above items from January 1939, to date. The "Auditing Plan for 1941" has -already been prepared by the Ministry. When it is passed by the Supreme -National Defense Council, it will come into force from January of next -year. - - - - -_G._ REGULATIONS CONCERNING THE ORGANIZATION OF THE VARIOUS -CLASSIFICATIONS OF _HSIEN_[1] - - - [Footnote 1: Chung-yang Hsün-lien T'uan [Central (Kuomintang) Training - Corps], _Hsien Ko-chi Tzŭ-chih Kang-yao_ [Regulations Concerning - the Organization of the Various Classifications of _Hsien_], - Chungking, XXVIII (1939); these regulations are also found in - Chung-yang Hsüan-ch'uan Pu [Central Publicity Board], _Hsien-cheng yü - Ti-fang Tzŭ-chih_ [Constitutional Government in Relation to Local - Self-Government], Chungking, XXVIII (1939), p. 37-44.] - - These laws, a fundamental charter for local self-government, - were approved and promulgated by the 14th Regular Meeting of - the Supreme National Defense Council, August 31, 1939. For - the Generalissimo's lecture on the same subject, see - Appendix III (C), p. 388. - - -A. GENERAL PRINCIPLES - -1. Each _hsien_ is a self-administrative unit. Its size and area are -determined by customs and history but subject to the demarcation of the -National Government. - -2. There are three to six classes of _hsien_, classified according to -area, population, and conditions of economy, culture, and -communications. The classifications are to be worked out by the -Provincial Government and subject to the approval of the Ministry of -Interior. - -3. Regulations governing _hsien_ administration are to be promulgated by -the National Government. - -4. Each _hsien_ is divided into _hsiang_, and each _hsiang_ is further -divided into _pao_ and _chia_. If a _hsien_ is too large, it may be -first divided into _ch'ü_ to be under the charge of several bureaus. -Education institutions, police, public health and tariff offices should -be distributed in accordance with above-mentioned divisions. - -5. Each _hsien_ and each _hsiang_ is a legal person. - -6. At the age of twenty, a man or woman of Chinese nationality, after -living in the _hsien_ for six months or more, or having possessed a -residence for more than one year, is qualified as a citizen of that -_hsien_. He or she has the right of suffrage, recall, initiative, and -referendum in this _hsien_. The following persons are disqualified: - -_a._ Those who are deprived of citizenship by the National Government. - -_b._ Those who owe governmental money. - -_c._ Those who have been imprisoned for [political] corruption[2] or -forgery. - -_d._ Those who are not allowed to possess personal property. - -_e._ Those who are opium or other poisonous smokers. - - [Footnote 2: The practice termed _squeeze_ on the coast.] - - -B. THE _Hsien_ GOVERNMENT (_hsien chêng-fu_) - -7. There shall be one magistrate (_hsien-chang_) for each _hsien_. His -duties are: - -_a._ To supervise the local administration of the whole _hsien_ under -the control of the Provincial Government. - -_b._ To carry out Provincial or Central Government orders under the -supervision of the Provincial Government. - -8. The _Hsien_ Government consists of the following departments: - -_a._ Civil Affairs Department. - -_b._ Financial Department. - -_c._ Educational Department. - -_d._ Reconstruction Department. - -_e._ Land Affairs Department. - -_f._ Social Affairs Department. - -The number of departments and the distribution of functions are -determined by the Provincial Government in accordance with the class and -necessities [of the _hsien_], and registered with the Ministry of the -Interior. - -9. In the _Hsien_ Government there are to be secretaries, department -heads, advisors, police officers, clerks and technicians. The number of -such staff and their salaries are to be determined by the Provincial -Government and subject to the approval of the Ministry of the Interior. - -10. The examination, training, appointing, and discharging of a -magistrate or of general staffs are to be done according to the -promulgated National law. - -11. There shall be a _Hsien_ Council (_hsien chêng hui_) which is to be -convened every two weeks. The following matters should be settled in -this Council: - -_a._ Cases brought out by the _Hsien_ People's Council. - -_b._ Other important matters concerning _hsien_ policies. - -(The regulations governing the _Hsien_ Council are promulgated by the -Ministry of the Interior.) - -12. The _Hsien_ Council meeting can be held before the establishment of -the _Hsien_ People's Council. - -13. Regulations concerning a _hsien_ shall be drafted by the Provincial -Government and submitted to the Executive _Yüan_ for its approval -through the Ministry of the Interior. - -Any organizations which are not mentioned in the regulations should not -be established. - -14. Regulations governing the _hsien_ administration shall be drafted by -the Provincial Government and registered in the Ministry of the -Interior. - - -C. THE _Hsien_ PEOPLE'S COUNCIL (_hsien ts'ang-chêng hui_) - -15. The _Hsien_ People's Council is organized by the members of the -Council who are elected from People's Representative Committee. Each -_hsiang_ elects one member. Representatives of public organizations may -be recognized as members, but the number of such members should not -comprise more than one-third of the whole Council. - -16. The chairman of the Council should be elected from its members. - -17. The bylaws and the duties of the Council shall be dealt with -separately. - - -D. FINANCES OF A _Hsien_ - -18. _Hsien_ revenue consists of the following items: - - _a._ Part of the land tax. - _b._ Surtax on the land tax. - _c._ Thirty per cent of the stamp tax. - _d._ Taxes on land after improvement. - _e._ Part of the business taxes. - _f._ Income from public properties. - _g._ Income from public enterprises. - _h._ Other legal taxes. - -19. Funds required for the execution of Provincial Government orders -shall be provided from the National Treasury or the Provincial Treasury. -Local collection of such funds is prohibited. _Hsien_ which are -financially self-sufficient may resort to their own treasuries to meet -educational and administrative expenses. _Hsien_ with scanty population -and most of their area uncultivated may be subsidized by both the -Provincial and National Treasuries. - -20. Extra expenses for reconstruction shall be collected by a means of -floating loans with the approval of the _Hsien_ People's Council and the -Provincial Government. - -21. The incomes and expenses of the _hsien_ proper shall be the -independent responsibility of the _Hsien_ Government. - -22. If the _Hsien_ People's Council has not been established, the -budgets and financial statements shall be examined by the _Hsien_ -Council and then submitted to the Provincial Government by the -Magistrate. - -23. After the establishment of the _Hsien_ People's Council, the budgets -and the financial statements shall be examined by this Council first and -then be submitted to the Provincial Government. In case of emergency the -Magistrate may submit such documents to the Provincial Government -directly. - - -E. _Ch'ü_ - -24. Each _ch'ü_ is constituted by fifteen to thirty _hsiang_. - -25. The _Ch'ü_ Bureau, a subsidiary office of _hsien_, represents the -_Hsien_ Government to perform the educational and administrative work. -If the _hsien_ is not divided into _ch'ü_ then this work is done by the -special officers sent by the _Hsien_ Government. - -26. There shall be one _Ch'ü_ Chief (_ch'ü-chang_) and two to five -advisers in each _ch'ü_. Their duties are to take charge of civil, -reconstruction, educational and military affairs. They shall be trained -and examined before appointment. - -27. There shall be police stations in each _ch'ü_ under the supervision -of the _Ch'ü_ Chief. - -28. A Rural Reconstruction Committee is to be formed in a _ch'ü_. The -members of this committee shall be elected from among the popular -persons in that _ch'ü_. The _Ch'ü_ Chief shall concurrently be Chairman -of the Committee. - - -F. _Hsiang_[3] - - [Footnote 3: In some areas termed the _chên_.] - -29. Each _hsiang_ is constituted by six to fifteen _pao_. [See Art. 45 -_ff._] - -30. Systems of _hsiang_ and _pao chia_ are to be worked out by the -_Hsien_ Government and submitted to the Provincial Government. They must -be registered with the Ministry of the Interior. - -31. There shall be one _Hsiang_ Chief (_hsiang-chang_) and one to two -Assistant Chiefs (_fu-hsiang-chang_) in each _hsiang_ office. They shall -be persons possessing the following qualifications: - -_a._ Those who have passed the ordinary examinations. - -_b._ Those who have served in the Delegated Appointment[4] capacity. - -_c._ Those who have graduated from Middle and Normal schools. - -_d._ Those who have contributed service for the public good. - - [Footnote 4: A level in the National civil service.] - -32. There shall be four sections in each _hsiang_ to take charge of the -civil, economic, educational affairs and police service. Each section -has one chief and several secretaries. One of the secretaries shall take -charge of controlment. The _hsiang_ staff shall be selected from among -the primary school teachers. If the _hsiang's_ financial resources are -insufficient these sections may be amalgamated into one office. - -33. The tenure of _Hsiang_ Chiefs shall be two years, with permissible -re-election. - -34. The offices _Hsiang_ Chief, the headmaster of the primary school, -and officer of militia[5] may be delegated to one person. If the -_hsiang_ possesses sufficient financial resources, the headmaster of the -primary school shall not be allowed to hold other office. - - [Footnote 5: _The chuang-ting-tui tui-chang_, heading a local force of - able-bodied citizens; the regular rank is not specified.] - -35. Plans initiated by the _hsiang_ itself must be passed by the -_Hsiang_ Council meeting before they are adopted. - -36. The _Hsiang_ Chief shall act as the chairman of the Hsiang Council -Meeting. Every section chief is required to attend the Meeting. The -_pao_ chiefs must also attend this Meeting. - -37. The procedure of training of _Hsiang_ Chiefs and other _hsiang_ -staff shall be dealt with separately. - - -G. THE _Hsiang_ PEOPLE'S COUNCIL - -38. The members of the _Hsiang_ People's Council shall be elected from -the _Pao_ People's Council. Each _pao_ shall elect two members. - -39. The _Hsiang_ Chief may act as the chairman of the _Hsiang_ People's -Council provided that he has been elected by the Council as the Chief. - -40. The bylaws and the duties of the _Hsiang_ People's Council shall be -dealt with separately. - - -H. FINANCE OF THE _Hsiang_ - -41. The _hsiang's_ revenue consists of the following items: - -_a._ All legal taxes. - -_b._ Income from public properties. - -_c._ Income from public enterprises. - -_d._ Subsidiary funds. - -_e._ Special incomes to be collected with the approval of the _Hsien_ -Government. - -42. The procedure of purchasing properties shall be dealt with -separately. - -43. The bylaws of the _Hsiang Treasury_ Committee shall be dealt with -separately. - -44. The financial report prepared by the _hsiang_ office shall be -submitted to the _Hsien_ Government. The expenses of the _hsiang_ shall -be included in the _hsien's_ financial report after audit. - - -I. _Pao_ AND _Chia_ - -45. Each _pao_ is constituted of six to fifteen _chia_. - -46. Public primary schools, cooperatives, and warehouses[6] shall be -established within two or three _pao_ where the population is dense. The -_Pao_ Chief shall be in charge of these institutions. Reserves of each -_pao_ shall be trained separately. - - [Footnote 6: In Far Eastern English parlance, _godown_.] - -47. There shall be one _Pao_ Chief (_pao-chang_) and one assistant _Pao_ -Chief (_fu-pao-chang_) in each _pao_. They are elected by the _Pao_ -People's Council. And they must be chosen from among persons with the -following qualifications: - -_a._ Those who have graduated from middle schools. - -_b._ Persons who have worked more than one year in Government. - -_c._ Those who have been specially trained. - -_d._ Those who are active in social work. - -Before the time of election, the _Pao_ Chief may be recommended by the -_hsiang_ office to the _Hsien_ Government for appointment. - -48. The tenure of the _Pao_ Chief shall be two years; he may be -re-elected. - -49. The offices of _Pao_ Chief, headmaster of the _pao_ primary school, -and militia officer may be delegated to one person. When the _pao's_ -financial resources are sufficient the headmaster is not allowed to hold -other office. - -50. There shall be two to four secretaries in each _pao_ to take charge -of the political, educational, cultural affairs, and police service. The -_pao_ staff shall be elected from among the primary school teachers. If -the _pao's_ financial resources are not sufficient, there shall be only -one person to take care of all these activities. - -51. The procedure of training of the _pao_ office staff shall be dealt -with separately. - -52. One representative of each family is required to be present at the -_Pao_ People's Council (_pao-min ta-hui_) meeting. The bylaws and the -duties of this council shall be dealt with separately. - -53. Each _chia_ consists of six to fifteen families. - -54. There shall be one _Chia_ Chief (_chia-chang_) in each _chia_. He is -elected by the Family Chiefs Council and is registered with the _hsiang_ -office through the _pao_. - -55. There shall be established a Family Chiefs Council and _Chia_ -People's Council in each _chia_. - -56. The old names of the streets may be used as the names of _pao_. - -57. The bylaws of _pao_ and _chia_ shall be dealt with separately. - -58. The controlment procedure for _pao_ and _chia_ shall be dealt with -separately. - -59. The present bylaws shall become effective after the date of -promulgation. - -60. If any item in these regulations conflicts with the National laws, -it shall be null. - - - - -_H._ A CHART OF GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION - - - The chart facing this page is a composite of various - official charts to which the author was allowed access in - Chungking. Revisions cover changes down to the opening of - 1941. - - - [KUOMINTANG: - SUPREME NATIONAL DEFENSE COUNCIL] - - NATIONAL GOVERNMENT OF CHINA: STATE COUNCIL - | | - Election Committee on Representation Office of the - in the People's Congress Comptroller-General - Academia Sinica Office of Civil Affairs - Commission for the Disciplinary Office of Military Affairs - Punishment of Public Officials - Planning Committee for the Western Capital - - THE PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT - | - ----------------------------------------- - | - |-|Military---Generalissimo---| Department of Military Operations - | |Affairs Commission | Department of Military Training - | |Commission Meeting | Directorate-General of Courts - | | | Martial - | | | Pensions Commission - | General Staff | Military Advisory Council - | | | Administration of Personnel - | | | Service Department - | Armed Forces | The National Aviation Commission - | | Office of the Naval - | | Commander-in-Chief - | |-| Party and Government War Area - | | | Commission--Occupied and - | | | Guerrilla Areas - | | |-Political Department - | | - | Ministry of War - |-People's Political | - | Council | |-Provincial - | |-| Ministry of | Governments - | | Foreign Affairs | Local - | | Ministry of the | Governments - | | Interior--------| - |-Executive---_Yüan_ Meeting--| Ministry of Finance |-Special - | _Yüan_ [Cabinet] | Ministry of Economic Municipalities - | | Affairs [to be - | | reorganized] - | | Ministry of Social Affairs [pending] - | | Ministry of Education - | | Ministry of Communications - | | Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry - | | Commission on Mongolian and - | | Tibetan Affairs----------Mongolia - | | and Tibet - | | Commission on Overseas - | | Chinese Affairs - | | National Relief Commission - | | Material and Resources Control and - | Supervisory Ministry [in process - | of organization] - |-Legislative---_Yüan_ Meeting - | _Yüan_ - | - |-Judicial---_Yüan_ Meeting---| Ministry of Justice - | _Yüan_ | Supreme Court - | | Administrative Court - | | Commission for the Disciplinary - | Punishment of Public Officers - | - |-Examination--_Yüan_ Meeting--| Examination Commission - | _Yüan_ | Ministry of Personnel - | - |-Control----_Yüan_ Meeting---| Ministry of Audit - _Yüan_ | Office of Regional Control - Commissioners - - - - -APPENDIX II. DOCUMENTS ON PARTY POLITICS - - - - -_A._ A CHART OF KUOMINTANG ORGANIZATION - - - The chart facing this page is a composite of various - official charts to which the author was allowed access in - July and August 1940. - - KUOMINTANG PARTY CONGRESS - | PARTY CHIEF | - |----------| | |----------------------| - | | | - Central Control Central Executive----[Central-----Supreme National - Committee Committee Political Defense Council - Standing Committee Standing Committee Council] | - | | - --------------------------------------------------- Government - | | | | - Training Party Affairs _San Min Chu I_ | - Committee Committee Youth Corps | - | | - General Affairs Section | - Advisory Section | - Planning Section | - Training Section | - | - --------------------------------------------------------- - | | | | | | | | | - OTHER | PARTY-MINISTRY OF | Provincial | | | CENTRAL - AFFILIATES | OVERSEAS CHINESE | Party Organ | | | SECRETARIAT - | AFFAIRS | | | | | | - | | | | | | | Statistics Bureau - SPECIAL First Section | _Hsien_ (or | | | Confidential - COMMITTEES Second Section | Municipal) | | | Affairs Section - | Third Section | Party Organ | | | Finance Section - | | | | | | Business Section - Revolutionary Achievements | | | | | - Investigation Committee | District | | | - Pension Committee | (_ch'ü_) | | PARTY-MINISTRY OF - Party History Committee | Party Organ | | ORGANIZATION - Revolutionary Loans Committee | | | | | - Overseas Chinese Contributions | | | | Regular Party - Committee | Sub-district| | Affairs Section - |------------------| (_ch'ü-fên_)| | Special-Area Party - | Party Organ | | Affairs Section - PARTY-MINISTRY | | | Army Party Affairs - OF SOCIAL | | | Section - AFFAIRS Small Group | | Party-Members Regi- - | | | | stration Section - Section for People's Organizations | | | General Affairs - Social Movements Section PARTY | | Section - Editing Section MEMBERSHIP | | Inspection Office - General Affairs Section | | - | | - |------------------------| |-------| - | | - PARTY-MINISTRY OF WOMEN'S AFFAIRS PARTY-MINISTRY - [in process of organization] OF PUBLICITY - | - |------------------------------| - | | - Publicity Advisers Publicity Advisory - The Central News Agency Section - Party Press International Publicity - The Central Motion Picture Studios Section - The Central Broadcasting Newspaper Section - Administration Section Motion Picture Section - General Affairs Section - - - -_B._ CONSTITUTION OF THE SAN MIN CHU I YOUTH CORPS, YEAR XXVII (1938)[1] - - - [Footnote 1: San-min-chu-i Ch'ing-nien T'uan Chung-yang T'uan-pu [_San - Min Chu I_ Youth Corps Central Corps Headquarters], _San-min-chu-i - Ch'ing-nien T'uan T'uan-chang_ [Corps Constitution of the _San Min Chu - I_ Youth Corps], Chungking, n.d.] - - Proclaimed June 16, 1938, amended by the Fourth Meeting of - the Corps' Provisional Central Managing Board, July 17, - 1939, this is the fundamental charter of the most - significant Kuomintang auxiliary to appear in many years. - - -CHAPTER I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES - -1. The name of the organization is the San Min Chu I Youth Corps. - -2. The object of the Corps is to unite and train young people, to -enforce the San Min Chu I, to defend the nation, and to bring national -rebirth. - - -CHAPTER II. MEMBERSHIP - -3. All Chinese youths, male or female, aged between 16 to 25, vowing to -abide by the Corps constitution, can become members of the Corps upon -the payment of the membership fee. - -Members of the Managing Boards of various subordinate Corps agencies and -other Headquarters officials specially admitted are not restricted by -the above rule. Members who pass 25 years of age can still retain their -membership in the Corps. - -4. Two members of the Corps must propose and second a member before the -latter can become eligible. The new member must also be approved by the -Sectional Corps and Troop and his name registered in the Central Corps -Headquarters. - -5. New members must take an oath before admittance, as follows: - -"I hereby swear that I promise to abide by the principles of San Min Chu -I, to obey the order of the Corps Leader, to abide by the constitution -of the corps, to act according to the principles of the New Life -Movement, to be ever loyal to the Principles, to work for all other -people, to stand firm against all hardships, and to be prepared to -sacrifice my all. I promise that if I fail to perform the above duties, -I will be willing to receive the severest punishments." - -6. The private life of the members should be in conformity with the -regulations fixed by the Corps. - -7. Members of the Corps who die in service or who lose their profession -because of service in the Corps will receive pensions or other relief. -The detailed procedure will be fixed later. - -8. Members, upon a change of profession or job, or upon removal to other -localities, must register with their identification cards at the local -Corps Headquarters. - - -CHAPTER III. SYSTEM OF ORGANIZATION - -9. The system of organization of the Corps is as follows: the Central -Corps Headquarters, the Branch Corps, the Divisional Corps, the -Sectional Corps, the Divisional Troop, the Sectional Troop. - -10. Besides the above, the Corps may organize other sub-organizations -according to the nature of the locality, the profession of the members, -etc. The details will be further fixed. - - -CHAPTER IV. THE CORPS LEADER - -11. The Corps Leader is the highest executive of the Corps, and is -concurrently the Party Chief of the Kuomintang [Chiang K'ai-shek]. - -12. The Corps Leader is the chairman in the All-Corps Representative -Assembly, and has the power to veto a resolution already passed by the -Assembly; he also has the power to finally sanction all resolutions -passed by the Central Managing Board and the Central Controlment Board. - - - -CHAPTER V. THE ALL-CORPS REPRESENTATIVE ASSEMBLY AND OTHER MEETINGS OF -REPRESENTATIVES - -13. The All-Corps Representative Assembly may be held every two years. -At the discretion of the Corps Leader or the Central Managing Board, -however, it may be postponed or a temporary meeting be held instead. - -14. The works of the All-Corps Representative Assembly are: - -_a._ to discuss and examine the report submitted by the Central Managing -Board and the Central Controlment Board. - -_b._ to fix plans for the Corps activities. - -_c._ to discuss motions proposed by the Corps Leader. - -15. The Meeting of Representatives of the Branch Corps may be held once -a year. At the discretion of the Central Managing Board, however, the -Meeting may be postponed or a temporary Meeting be held instead. - -16. The duties of the Meeting of Representatives of the Branch Corps -are: - -_a._ to examine and discuss the reports submitted by the Managing Board -and the Controlment Board of the Branch Corps. - -_b._ to fix plans for the Branch Corps activities. - -17. The Meeting of Members of the Sectional Corps is held every six -months. At the discretion of the Managing Board of the Branch Corps, it -may be postponed or a temporary meeting be held instead. If the number -of members of the Section is too big or if the communication system is -unfavorable, a Meeting of the Representatives of the Sectional Corps may -be held. - -18. The duties of the Meeting of the Members of the Sectional Corps are: - -_a._ to examine and discuss the reports submitted by the Managing Board -and the Controlment Board of the Sectional Corps. - -_b._ to fix plans for the Sectional Corps Activities. - -19. The Meeting of Members of the Divisional Troop is to take place -every three months. At the discretion of its Managing Board, it may be -postponed, or a temporary meeting be called. - -20. The duties of the Meeting of Members of the Divisional Troop are: - -_a._ to examine the reports submitted by the Leader of the Divisional -Troop. - -_b._ to fix the plans for the Divisional Troop activities. - -21. Meetings for the Members of the Sectional Troop will be held every -week, to be presided over by the Leaders of the Sectional Troop. Unless -specially permitted, these meetings must not be postponed. During these -meetings, reports concerning politics, the Troop activities, -discussions, etc., will be read. New members are admitted through these -meetings too, and plans for the Sectional Troop activities will be -fixed. - -22. The system of organization for the various Meetings of Members or -Meetings of Representatives will be fixed later. - - -CHAPTER VI. THE CENTRAL HEADQUARTERS - -23. The Central Managing Board of the Central Corps Headquarters is -formed by twenty-five to thirty-five managing directors, in addition to -the nine to fifteen reserve members of the Managing Board. - -24. The Central Managing Board has the following powers: - -_a._ to execute the orders of the Corps Leader [Chiang K'ai-shek] and to -execute the resolutions passed in the All-Corps Representative Assembly. - -_b._ to fix the plans for activities. - -_c._ to form various corps of lower rank, and to command or inspect -their activities. - -_d._ to execute all resolutions submitted by the Central Controlment -Board. - -_e._ to form a budget to regulate various financial questions of the -Corps. - -25. The Central Managing Board forms a Standing Managing Board -consisting of nine Standing Managing Directors, appointed by the Corps -Leader from among the twenty-five to thirty-five Managing Directors. -This Standing Managing Board fulfills the duties of the Central Managing -Board Meeting when the latter is not in session. - -26. The Corps Leader appoints a Secretary-General to the Central -Managing Board from among the Standing Managing Directors, to direct all -the affairs of the Board. - -27. The various sub-organs of the Central Managing Board will be -formulated later, together with their system of organization. - -28. There are a Manager and a Vice-Manager in the Office of the -Secretary-General. They are nominated by the Secretary and appointed by -the Corps Leader. - -29. In every Department of the Central Managing Board there is a -Commissioner and one or two Deputy Commissioners. They are appointed by -the Corps Leader upon the nomination of the Secretary-General. - -30. The Central Corps Headquarters has a Central Controlment Board of -twenty-five to thirty-five members and nine to fifteen reserve members. - -31. The duties of the Central Controlment Board are: - -_a._ to inspect the progress of the Corps activities. - -_b._ to raise and examine all statements concerning any member who does -not fulfill his duties. - -_c._ to audit all incomes and expenditures of the Corps. - -_d._ to direct Controlment Boards of lower rank in their work of -inspection. - -32. The Central Controlment Board forms a Standing Controlment Board -consisting of five members of the Controlment Board, appointed by the -Corps Leader. This Standing Controlment Board shall function when the -Controlment Board is not in session. - -33. The Central Controlment Board has also a Secretary-General, -appointed by the Corps Leader from among the Standing Controlment Board -members. He shall direct the affairs of the Central Controlment Board. - -34. The Central Controlment Board has various sub-organs, of which the -system of organization will be fixed later. - -35. Both the Central Managing Board and the Central Controlment Board -will hold meetings every three months, to be presided over by the Corps -Leader. Under special circumstances there may be temporary meetings or -combined meetings for the two Boards. - - -CHAPTER VII. THE BRANCH CORPS - -36. The Branch Corps has a Managing Board consisting of seven to eleven -members, besides the three to five reserve members. - -37. The duties of the Branch Corps Managing Board are: - -_a._ to execute the orders from the Central Corps Headquarters and the -resolutions passed in the Meeting of the Representatives of the Branch -Corps. - -_b._ to fix the plans for the activities of the Branch Corps. - -_c._ to command and inspect the works of the lower organs. - -_d._ to execute all resolutions submitted by the Branch Corps -Controlment Board. - -_e._ to form a budget regulating the financial state of the Branch -Corps. - -38. The Managing Board has a Secretary, appointed by the Corps Leader, -from among the members of the Managing Board. He is to direct all -affairs of the Managing Board. - -39. The Managing Board has various sub-organs, the system of -organization of which will be fixed later. - -40. The Branch Corps has a Controlment Board consisting of three to five -members with three reserve members. - -41. The Controlment Board has a Secretary, appointed by the Corps Leader -from among the Controlment Board members, to discharge all affairs of -the Board. - -42. The system of organization of the various sub-organs of the -Controlment Board will be fixed later. - -43. The duties of the Controlment Board are: - -_a._ to inspect the progress of the activities done by the lower organs. - -_b._ to raise and examine statements concerning any member who rebels -against the discipline of the Corps. - -_c._ to audit the budget and all financial statements of the Branch -Corps. - -_d._ to direct the Controlment Boards of lower rank in their work of -inspection. - -44. The Managing Board of the Branch Corps should hold meetings every -half-month. The Controlment Board should meet once every month. The -meetings are to be presided over by the Secretaries. Under special -circumstances, temporary sessions or combined meetings may be held. - -45. The Branch Corps has also one to five Directors, appointed by the -Corps Leader, to direct the affairs of the Branch Corps. - - -CHAPTER VIII. THE DIVISIONAL CORPS - -46. The Divisional Corps has three to five Managing Directors, who have -power to command, direct, inspect, and examine the work done by the -Divisional Corps, in accordance to the will of the higher Corps -Headquarters. - -47. There is a Secretary of the Divisional Corps, appointed by the Corps -Leader from among the Managing Directors, whose duty it is to discharge -all the affairs of the Divisional Corps. - -48. The Managing Directors should perform their duties in various -localities at various periods. - -49. Whenever necessary, the Secretary of the Divisional Corps can call a -Managing Directors' meeting. - -50. A Divisional Corps will be formed when there are more than five -Sectional Corps under it. But this may not take place if the Managing -Board of the Branch Corps sees no necessity for such action. - - -CHAPTER IX. THE SECTIONAL CORPS - -51. The Sectional Corps has a Managing Board formed by three to five -members and one to three reserve members, elected in the General Meeting -of the Members of the Sectional Corps or in the Meeting of the -Representatives of the Sectional Corps. - -52. The duties of the Managing Board are: - -_a._ to execute the orders of the higher Corps Headquarters and the -resolutions passed in the Meeting of the Members of the Sectional Corps -or the Meeting of the Representatives of the Sectional Corps. - -_b._ to fix the plans for activities. - -_c._ to direct and watch the activities of the lower organs. - -_d._ to form a budget and other financial statements. - -_e._ to execute the resolutions passed in the Meeting of the Controlment -Board. - -_f._ to examine the work done by the Divisional Troops and Sectional -Troops. - -53. The Managing Board has a Secretary, appointed by the Corps Leader -from among the members of the Managing Board, to discharge all the -affairs of the Managing Board. - -54. The system of organization of the various sub-organs of the Managing -Board will be formulated later. - -55. The Sectional Corps has a Controlment Board formed by three members -and one reserve member. Under special circumstances, there is sometimes -only one Controller without any Controlment Board. - -56. The Controlment Board has one Secretary, appointed by the Corps -Leader from among the members of the Controlment Board, who is to -discharge all affairs of the Board. - -57. The duties of the Controlment Board are: - -_a._ to inspect the works done by the Sectional Corps, and by the -Divisional and Sectional Troops under the Sectional Corps. - -_b._ to raise and examine statements concerning members who rebel -against the Corps discipline. - -_c._ to audit financial statements of the Sectional Corps and those of -the Divisional and Sectional Troops under it. - -58. The Managing Board and the Controlment Board of the Sectional Corps -will hold separate meetings once every half-month. The respective -Secretaries shall preside. Under special conditions they can call for -temporary sessions. - - -CHAPTER X. THE DIVISIONAL TROOP - -59. The Divisional Troop has a Leader and an Assistant Leader, elected -from among the Leaders and Assistant Leaders of the Sectional Troop and -by themselves. - -60. The Divisional Troop executes the orders of the superior organs and -the resolutions passed in the All-Corps Representative Assembly. The -Divisional Troop also directs and examines the work of the members. - - -CHAPTER XI. THE SECTIONAL TROOP - -61. The Sectional Troop is the basic organization of the San Min Chu I -Youth Corps. It is formed by eight to fifteen members, with a Leader and -an Assistant Leader elected by the members themselves. - -62. The chief duties of the Sectional Troop are: - -_a._ to execute the orders of all superior organs and all resolutions -passed in the Sectional Troop Meeting. - -_b._ to call for new members and to collect the fees. - -_c._ to train and examine every member. - -_d._ to read books, to propagate San Min Chu I and its policies, to -distribute publicity literature. - -_e._ to participate in all social activities. - -_f._ to investigate political and social conditions. - -63. All extra-Corps organs holding more than three members may form -special Groups, upon the sanction of the Sectional Troop. Their duty is -to execute the principles of the Corps and to watch the work of the -members. Whenever necessary, the chief of the Group may attend the -Sectional Corps Meetings. - - -CHAPTER XII. THE ELECTION OF OFFICERS AND THEIR TERM OF SERVICE - -64. Unless already specified, the members of the Managing Boards of the -various Corps and Troops are elected in the General Meeting or the -Meeting of Representatives of the respective Corps and Troops. Before -the General Meeting or the Meeting of Representatives, the members of -the Managing Boards are appointed by the Corps Leader. - -65. The duration of service of members of the Managing and Controlment -Boards of the Central Corps Headquarters is two years. That of members -of the corresponding Boards of the other Corps is one year. That of the -Leaders and Assistant Leaders of the two Corps is six months. All of -them can be re-elected. - - -CHAPTER XIII. DISCIPLINE - -66. All members should obey the following commandments: - -_a._ All questions may be freely discussed. But no dispute is allowed, -once the final resolution is passed. - -_b._ It is not allowed to rebel against the principles of the New Life -Movement. - -_c._ It is prohibited to reveal the secrets of the Corps. - -_d._ It is prohibited for members to join other organizations. - -_e._ It is prohibited to criticize unfavorably the Kuomintang and the -Corps, or to plot against other members. - -_f._ It is prohibited to express one's ideas too freely upon current -events, especially those that are against the resolved plans or policies -of the Kuomintang or the Corps. - -_g._. It is prohibited to form other organizations within the Corps. - -67. Those who are proved to act against the above rules will e punished -in the following ways: - - _a._ warning - _b._ demerit - _c._ cross-questioning - _d._ expulsion - _e._ other appropriate punishments. - - -CHAPTER XIV. FEES - -68. Every member must pay a membership fee of ten cents on entering the -Corps. - -69. A monthly contribution of ten cents is required of every member. -Under special circumstances other contributions may be called for. - - -CHAPTER XV. AMENDMENTS, ETC. - -70. This Constitution may be amended, with the approval of the Corps -Leader, in the All-Corps Representative Assembly or in the Meeting of -the Central Managing Board. - -71. The Constitution is enforced upon the day of announcement, having -been approved by the Corps Leader. - - - - -_C_. THE DUTIES AND GENERAL ACTIVITIES OF THE SAN MIN CHU I YOUTH CORPS -(CH'ÊN CH'ÊNG)[1] - - - [Footnote 1: Ch'ên Ch'êng, _K'ang-chan Chien-kuo Yü Ch'ing-nien - Tsê-jen_ [Resistance and Reconstruction in Relation to the Duties of - Youth], Chungking XXIX (1940), p. 43-68. The book was published by the - Political Department of the Military Affairs Commission (_Chün-shih - Wei-yüan-hui Chêng-chih-pu_) of the National Government.] - - A lecture delivered May 9, 1940, before a Kuomintang - training class: note the somewhat pedagogical outline. - General Ch'ên Ch'êng, until recently Secretary-General of - the Corps, is one of the closest military associates of the - Generalissimo. - - -OUTLINE - - -A. THE DUTIES AND NATURE OF THE CORPS: - -1. _Duties_: to organize and train the nation's youth with a view to -enforcing the San Min Chu I; to lead and unify the ideals, opinions and -activities of the nation's youth; to centralize and cultivate special -talents, forming a nucleus to serve as a model. - -2. _Activities_: to urge youths to join the practical work connected -with the war of national defense; to enforce military and political -training; to encourage civil progress, labor and skill in production. - -3. _Nature_: the Corps is an organization composed of young people and -included within the Kuomintang. The Kuomintang and the Corps are one and -indivisible. - - -B. THE GROWTH AND THE PLAN CONCERNING THE INTENSIFICATION OF THE WORK OF -THE CORPS: - -1. _Growth_: Period of formation, July 9, 1938 to September 1939; full -establishment since September 1939, when the Central Managing Board and -the Central Controlment Board were formed. - -2. _Plan concerning the intensification of activities_: Amendment of the -Corps Constitution; issuing of general procedures for the carrying out -of the activities to various sections; general principles governing the -future activities of the Corps. - - -C. GENERAL ACTIVITIES OF THE CORPS: - -1. _Organization_: general development of the organization in various -localities; calling for new members; regulating the inner structures of -the organization; the formation of a selected central nucleus. - -2. _Training_: entrance training and normal training; young men's summer -camp; training of talented gliders. - -3. _Publicity_: periodicals at fixed intervals; the compilation of -various collective works; the formation of a committee for publicity. - -4. _Social works_: the establishment of a Young Men's Labor Service -Camp; the distribution of Young Men's Entertaining Offices in various -localities; the work of Youths' Service Associations and Corps in -various localities. - -5. _Financial assistance_: compilation of Dr. Sun's works on economics; -aid given to young men's work for material productivity; planning of -business organizations under group management. - - -D. GENERAL DISCUSSION OF THE TWO YEARS' ACTIVITIES OF THE CORPS AND THE -PRINCIPLES GUIDING THE NATION'S YOUTH: - -1. _General discussion of the two years' activities_: its good as well -as its bad points. - -2. _Principles guiding the nation's youth_: conclusion. - - -A. THE DUTIES AND NATURE OF THE CORPS - - -1. The Duties - -It is two years since the establishment of the San Min Chu I Youth Corps -was declared at Hankow on July 7, 1938. From the name, we know that the -purpose of its creation is to employ the unified efforts of the -nation's youth in the work of carrying out the San Min Chu I. As youth -is the vital element in a nation's life and the foundation for all -future social and political progress, the Kuomintang has, in the second -and present stage of national salvation, especially organized a Youth -Corps to reinforce the powers of the Kuomintang by shouldering the -following epochal duties: - -First, to unite and train the nation's youth for the promulgation of San -Min Chu I, the defense of the nation and the salvation of its people. - -Secondly, to lead the nation's youth to a unity of thought and -activities so that they can justly perform the great task of national -salvation, thus completing the second phase of the achievements of the -People's Revolution.[2] - - [Footnote 2: _Kuo-min kê-ming_, i.e., the revolution (_kê-ming_) as - planned by Sun Yat-sen.] - -Thirdly, to collect youth of especial talents for the central nucleus as -a model for all, thereby giving new and ever-confirming life to the -Kuomintang, and enabling it to carry out its future work. - - -2. The Activities - -The Corps Leader [Chiang K'ai-shek] has clearly stated in his open -letter to the nation's youth that the chief activities of the Corps are -six in number: - -1. To mobilize the activities of youth according to the National General -Mobilization Act. - -2. To give thorough military training to develop the skill in defending -the nation. - -3. To heighten political training, giving every youth the required -political knowledge for a citizen of a republic. - -4. To encourage civil progress, thus raising the general intellectual -standard of the nation. - -5. To encourage labor and service, according to the motto: Life is to -serve. - -6. To develop the skill in material productivity according to scientific -principles, thus hastening the work of national construction. - -The first two of the above are collectively the fundamental works of -military reconstruction, the third and fourth are those of education, -and the last two those of economic reconstruction. The Corps has -classified the various aspects of the above works of national -construction as the works of the youth. Besides, we should clearly -understand that they are the fundamental requisites of a complete system -of national defense, and form the first stage towards the completion of -a republic based upon the San Min Chu I. - - -3. The Nature - -The Corps is a Youth association included within the organization of the -Kuomintang, under one principle, one leader, one command, and is willing -to struggle for the sake of the People's Revolution. The Kuomintang and -the Corps are one and indivisible. It is "The Kuomintang's [own] Corps." -If a distinction is necessary, then we may say that the members of the -Corps have a special duty to organize and train the nation's youth so -that it may be able to shoulder the responsibilities and work concerning -social welfare and national salvation. Thus the Corps may be said to be -the younger and newer life of the Kuomintang. Besides, it may also serve -the Kuomintang in various aspects; for example, if, as in case of -overseas localities, Kuomintang work is difficult to execute, the Corps -may be established instead, or also, if people are not willing to join -the Kuomintang, they may join the Corps. With the formation of the -Corps, therefore, the Kuomintang may be enlarged and strengthened. - -The relation between the Kuomintang members and the Corps members is -clearly stated. According to the amended Constitution of the Corps, the -age of members has been changed from eighteen to thirty-eight years, to -sixteen to twenty-five years. Also according to the resolution of the -Central Regular Meeting of the Kuomintang, the relation between the two -is as follows: - -1. Members joining the Kuomintang should be above twenty-five years of -age. - -2. Corps members reaching the age of 25 will become Kuomintang members. - -3. Students staying in schools, irrespective of their age, are -considered Corps members. Those who previously joined the Kuomintang -should also become members of the Corps, reserving their membership in -the Kuomintang. - -We can see that Kuomintang members and Corps members differ chiefly in -their ages. Except for this, the two are in fact one. - -With a view to the system of organization, the Kuomintang and the Corps -each has its own structure. The Kuomintang leads the Corps, but this -does not mean that the Corps is under the Kuomintang in authority. In -the speech, "The Relation between the Kuomintang and the Corps," made by -the Corps Leader [Chiang K'ai-shek], we are told that under the same -general system of organization, the aim of the Kuomintang's leadership -of the Corps is to unite all our efforts under the same banner. Leading -does not mean in the least commanding or ordering. To lead is to help. -Hence a Corps member may also lead a Kuomintang member. The idea is to -make both members combine their energy towards helping our leader. The -strength of the Corps depends upon the well-being of the Kuomintang, -while the future of the Kuomintang depends upon the growth of the Corps. -There should be mutual help between the two in order to reach the same -final goal. Hence the activities of the two organizations should be -everywhere combined into one, employing division of labor and -cooperation wherever and whenever possible. - - -B. THE GROWTH AND THE PLAN CONCERNING THE INTENSIFICATION OF THE WORKS -OF THE CORPS - - -1. The Growth - -In April 1938, the Representatives of the Kuomintang gathered together -for a Meeting (Congress) to amend the Constitution of the Kuomintang and -to form the San Min Chu I Youth Corps in order to gather the nation's -youth for the great task of national reconstruction. It was also -resolved that the Party Chief (Generalissimo Chiang K'ai-shek) is at the -same time the Corps Leader. On June 16, the Corps Leader issued his -Letter to the Nation's Youth, and announced the constitution of the -Corps. On July 9, a Central Managing Board was temporarily formed as the -Corps' central organization. The growth of the Corps activities can be -divided into two periods: - -1. _Period of formation_: July 1938 to September 1939. During this -period, the Central Managing Board was formed. While the other work of -organizing was done according to a principle of simplicity, as advised -by the Corps Leader, all other internal organs were formed according to -their necessity. The various subsections in different provinces and -districts were also formed during this period. - -2. _Period of full establishment_: September 1939 to the present. In -accordance with general opinions, the Central Managing Board temporarily -formed was dissolved after its fourth general meeting, and on September -1, 1939 a permanent Central Managing Board and a Central Controlment -Board were formed. The Corps Leader has on various occasions appointed -thirty-five members for the Central Managing Board with fifteen more as -reserve members, and thirty-five members for the Central Controlment -Board with fifteen reserve members also. Besides, there are five -standing members of the Central Managing Board and five standing members -of the Central Controlment Board. The rest of the officials are also -appointed. The system of organization is as follows: - - Office of the Sec.-Gen. - | - |Sessions of | | |-| |Department of General - The Corps |the Central | |Secretary-| | Administration - Chief |Managing Board |-|General |---|Organization - | | | | | | Department - |-----|Sessions of the | |Training - |Standing Committee| | Department - |of the Central | |Publicity - |Managing Board | | Department - |Department of - | Social Work - |Finance - | Department - |Young Women's - | Department - - -2. Plan concerning the Intensification of Activities - -The aim of having a permanent Central Managing Board is to conclude the -work of the formative period and start the work of calling for the -nation's youth in the task of national reconstruction. The plans -concerning the intensification of activities are all based upon the -orders of the Corps Leader, the past experiences of the Corps members, -and the present situation; the chief plans are: - -1. _Amendment of the Constitution_--to increase the training of the -Corps members and to fix the system of organization for the All-Corps -Representative Assembly in accordance with the idea of democracy. The -chief points are (_a_) the change in age limit from eighteen to -thirty-eight years to sixteen to twenty-five years, and (_b_) to fix the -system of organization for the General Meetings of the Corps members and -their Representatives; the fixing of rules concerning the election into -office of the members and their period of service. - -2. _Issuing of general procedures for the carrying out of the activities -of various sections_: (_a_) to make all members and all youth understand -that the Corps is a youth organization to train and unite all youth in -the principles of San Min Chu I, with the aim of strengthening the -nation's defense; (_b_) to lead the nation's youth in the cultivation of -good national characteristics, to exemplify their deeds and actions, and -to correct all fallacious beliefs, and childish actions. These are the -ways of training good useful youth for the national service; (_c_) the -subsections of the Corps should work for all the members of the Corps, -while the members should work for all the youth of the country. They -should encourage all youth to serve all the citizens of the nation, -thereby fulfilling the duties of youth toward the country; (_d_) in -calling for members, special attention is paid to discover youth of -higher abilities. At the same time it is necessary that the Corps work -should be good enough so as to be able to influence all the youth of the -nation so that they will join the Corps of their own accord; (_e_) the -subsections in schools should work in conjunction with the educational -authorities. The assistance of the teachers is necessary in order to -develop the political ideas, the mind work, the physical constitution of -the youth, besides the cultivation of the power to organize and -cooperate; (_f_) to organize society's youth, especially those having a -profession or those who are capable of material productivity, so that -they may be joined to the youth in schools in forming a combined -strength necessary to the establishment of a revolutionary nation; (_g_) -to point out to the youth the activities done in the war of national -defense, the international relations, and the intrigues of the traitors -and enemies, thus making every youth able to distinguish the right from -the wrong. At the same time, they should be encouraged under favorable -conditions to work for national defense; (_h_) to help every youth solve -the problem of his livelihood. For example, the choice of a profession, -the question of education, etc. The members should therefore look upon -their Corps as their family, not as a mere institution for work. - -3. _General principles governing the future activities of the Corps_: -(_a_) in obedience to the ideas expressed by the Corps Leader, and based -upon the experience obtained during the period of two years, it has been -resolved that the chief aim of the activities of the Corps is to -solidify the union of the members, so that it may become the central -motivating force for all the youth of the nation; (_b_) the activities -of the Corps will also be directed to benefit youths, especially those -in school, to help them solve all questions and troubles that usually -confront young men. Besides, the Corps also aims at mobilizing the youth -in war districts, and behind the enemy front, to increase the force of -national defense; (_c_) the principles regarding the admittance of new -members will be: 1, that quality as well as quantity will be considered; -2, that youths in schools will be especially fitted for membership, -although youths having professions will not be neglected; 3, that women -members will be especially welcome; (_d_) in establishing the various -subdivisions of the Corps in various localities, importance will be -especially given to provinces of Szechwan, Kweichow, Shensi, and Kansu. -Except these, attention is also given to overseas districts (the Malay -Archipelago) and behind the enemy lines. All subdivisions formerly -established will be unified under one status, and be turned into regular -subdivisions; (_e_) a date for the All-Corps Representative Assembly -will be fixed, as well as the dates for the General Meetings of Members; -(_f_) the training of the members will be chiefly military and -political, emphasizing the skill to produce, with plenty of practice in -various actual fields, so that the works of the Corps and those of -society will be interrelated; (_g_) the training of the members is -divided into primary, middle, and senior parts, with special attention -upon the lower two. Different training courses are given according to -the abilities, talents, and inclinations of the members; (_h_) the -training of the central nucleus is based upon the general training for -groups, laying special emphasis upon mental and physical training so -that the central nucleus may be the model for other members. - -(_i_) The central aim of publicity is to lead the nation's youth to -recognize the history and national character of the Chinese nation, to -fight for national unity and salvation, to find the way of becoming a -"Chinese," and to abolish all fallacious beliefs that are detrimental to -the growth of the nation; (_j_) to intensify the movement to all classes -of people, attention is drawn to the fact that: 1, every member is a -publicity member; 2, actions and not words should be the basis of -publicity; 3, care should be given to the difference in locality, time, -or people, when the members are helping to do social work; 4, members' -actions and thoughts should be earnest, devoted, intelligent, -ingenuous, and truthful; (_k_) to increase the cooperation between -youths, the amount of publicity literature should be increased. -Encouragement should also be given to the study of science and to -development of the physical constitution; (_l_) social service is -especially aimed at relieving the poor and the sick, paying attention to -the wounded soldiers, their families, refugees, and other helpless -people; (_m_) the calling in and training of students who have no chance -to study should be emphasized. Help should be given them to find work or -continue studies. Attention should also be given to those behind the -enemy's lines so that they may not turn out to be traitors. - -(_n_) The work of the Young Men's Labor Service Camp, the Young Men's -Service Association and Corps should be intensified, aiming at the -increase of necessary public services during wartime, and the hastening -of social advancement; (_o_) concerning the financial help given to the -members, attention is given to group works like cooperative stores, etc. -Encouragement is given for thrift, saving, etc.; (_p_) members should be -encouraged to produce more, to heighten the skill in production; (_q_) -members should spread the new economic thought expressed in the San Min -Chu I. They should also study the various books on economics; (_r_) -encouragement is given to young women, especially those in war districts -and students who want to join the Corps. Training will be given to them. -Their work is chiefly to spread the spirit of the Corps among women, to -render war-time assistance and educational help; (_s_) rigid inspection -of the Corps personnel is to be enforced: 1, not only may a lower -officer be reprimanded by a senior officer, but vice versa; 2, in every -subdivision of the Corps an organization to inspect the personnel is -formed; 3, attention is given to the reserve list of the Corps -personnel; 4, rigid censure of careless and corrupt officials, and also -of those who recommended them. - -(_t_) A system of inspecting the various activities of the Corps is to -be formed; 1, the inspectors are given the authority to watch and to -lead; 2, the various subdivisions should elect officials who shall -constantly make inspection tours; 3, close cooperation with the Central -Controlment Board should be established; (_u_) a competition of -activities among various subdivisions should be encouraged, whether it -be interdivisional, personal, etc. Competitions are based upon research -statistics, exchange of views, grading of work, etc. - - -C. THE GENERAL ACTIVITIES OF THE CORPS - - -1. Organization - -With the formation of the Central Managing Board of the Corps, -organizing work has been pushed ahead to hasten the mutual movements of -the nation's youth, especially those in the provinces of Szechwan, -Shensi, Kansu, and Kweichow. The chief points concerning the organizing -movement are as follows: - -1. _General development of the organization in various localities._ The -subdivisions originally planned have all been formed. In Szechwan, -subdivisions are formed in every city (_hsien_). In the rest of the -provinces, subdivisions are formed in different districts. Subdivisions -have also been formed in the chief universities and middle schools in -the country. Owing to special circumstances, overseas and war districts -are under the investigation of special officials sent there to inspect -the local surroundings before the subdivisions be formed. - -2. _Membership enrollment_: Members are chiefly youthful students and -youths with some ability. According to the report made in April 1940, -there are 126,111 members in the Corps. Members will be called according -to the basic plan in the future, and especially women members and other -young men will be encouraged to join. - -3. _Regulation of the inner structures of the organization and the -formation of a central nucleus_: to insure perfect harmony in carrying -out various activities, those temporary subdivisions which have been -doing good work and which have an efficient central nucleus are to be -made into regular subdivisions. The selection of the central executive -nucleus will be based upon the talent of the members. The method of -selection is by means of questioning, recommendation, or other ways. - - -2. The Training - -Training of the Corps members is to organize an efficient executive -organization for the sake of practical national reconstruction according -to the principles of San Min Chu I. Besides military and political -training, attention is given to the development of skill in production. -At present, the chief training work of the Corps is as follows: (_a_) -Entrance training and normal training: there are usually three stages of -training, viz.: entrance training, normal training, and special -training for nucleus members. Except the last mentioned, all members of -the Corps must undergo the first two trainings. The period of entrance -training is two weeks, during which the training of the mind is -emphasized. Normal training is divided into reading, discussion, and -recommended readings. Weekly gatherings are held for all members of a -division to attend. The recommended readings are based upon the Corps -Leader's "Recommended Readings and Methods of Discussion." Every member -must read a number of required books, according to the systematic plan -given. (_b_) Young Men's Summer Camp--this is aimed at collectively -training all members who are attending schools. During July and August -1938, a tentative camp has been formed at Chungking and Chengtu, with -mostly university and middle school students as attending members. It is -planned to start similar camps at Chengtu, Chungking, Sian, and Changsha -this year. (_c_) Training of gliders: this is aimed at heightening the -interest in aviation shown by youths. The Corps has arranged with the -Aviation Committee to form a class of amateur gliders, who will become -pilots in the future. - - -3. Publicity - -Besides the normal work concerning publicity, special attention is given -to: - -1. Fixed periodicals, such as the "Chinese Youth Monthly," the "News of -the Corps Activities," the "Civil News," the "Materials for Publicity," -etc. They aim at teaching the various subdivisions the work of publicity -and at supplying materials for publicity. Besides these, there are many -local publications of the Corps. - -2. The compilation of collected works, such as the "Young Men's Books -concerning National Defense," the "Young Men's Books of History and -Geography," the "San Min Chu I Series for Youth," etc. Among pamphlets -for publicity are "Dr. Sun's teachings for the Young Men," "The Way of -Leading Youth's Career," "The May 4 Movement and Modern Young Men's -Movements," etc. Besides these, the Corps has other publicity organs, -such as the Central Publicity Corps, the Youth's Dramatic Associations -of various subdivisions, etc. Publicity literature is distributed in -various localities by the China Civil Supply Association, or its -branches, or sometimes by specially chartered book companies. - - -4. Social Work - -At present the Social Work of the Corps is aimed at cultivating youths' -ability to serve, especially in the present stage of warfare: (_a_) the -formation of Young Men's Labor Service Camps--this is to develop the -skill of production so as to help the country materially. This camp was -tentatively formed at Chengtu and Chungking where young men were -gathered to receive the required training; (_b_) various local Young -Men's Entertaining Offices--these are established in eleven places among -which are Chungking, Sian, Changsha, Kweilin, Kinhwa. There is a monthly -accommodation capacity of about three thousand men. Many of them are to -be sent later to the Young Men's Labor Service Camp for training; (_c_) -various local Young Men's Service Associations and Corps--their aim is -to serve in the war zone, and to help the productivity of society. The -Service Associations under the various subdivisions of the Corps are -formed at Chengtu, Sian, Lanchow, Changsha, Kweilin, Ch'ü-chiang, etc., -numbering forty-two in all. The Service Corps are formed in twenty-three -places, such as Hungyang, Neichuan, Wanling, Kingshan, etc. - - -5. Financial Assistance - -The aim of this branch of work is to spread Dr. Sun's economic thoughts -as shown in the San Min Chu I, besides helping the members financially -by means of cooperative movements. At present, the works emphasized are: - -1. Compilation of Dr. Sun's economic works--they are based upon the San -Min Chu I, the various manifestos issued, and a study of comparative -economy of other countries. There are twelve series of books thus -published, _e.g._, "The Economic Theories and System of the San Min Chu -I," "The Population Policy of China," "The Labor Policy of China," "The -Policy of Land Tenure in China," etc. - -2. Aid given to youth along material productivity--the Corps pays -special attention to the theory and practice of material productivity. -It has arranged with the Board of Economy a plan to establish -cooperative organizations with the Board, and the Central Office for -Agricultural Research, so that the Corps members can have practical work -in economic reconstruction. - -3. Planning of business organizations under group -management--temporarily, the activities along this line will be the -establishment of cooperative stores. These are now the "Young Men's -Dressing Stores," the "Haosen Cooperative Store," and other local Young -Men's Cooperative Stores. - - -D. GENERAL DISCUSSION OF THE TWO YEARS' ACTIVITIES OF THE CORPS AND THE -PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE NATION'S YOUTH - - -1. Discussion of the Corps' Past Work - -Due to lack of experience, there were some unavoidable points which -await reformation. According to the reports submitted by the touring -inspectors, the work for 1939 and that of the first three months of 1940 -can be described in a list: - -1. _Bad Points_: 1, Due to the short period of time, activities of the -Corps have failed to cope with the original plan and schedule; 2, The -development of the Corps activities has not yet been made known to the -mass of youth. Thus the foundation of the Corps is not yet strong -enough; 3, Publicity and service have not yet been adequately mixed. The -ideal "service is publicity" has not yet been reached. At the same time, -owing to traffic interruption, publicity literature has not been widely -distributed; 4, Members are deficient in their conception of the central -activities of the Corps. The subdivisions in schools are especially -lacking in this conception. They require further training; 5, The -officers lack adequate force. Many of them occupy other positions so -that their whole attention cannot be concentrated upon the Corps -activities. - -2. _Good Points_: 1, On the whole, officers and members of the central -nucleus are persevering, and possess the will to sacrifice. The -remuneration of the Corps officers is very low. Those working in the -front receive a monthly maintenance fee of only fifteen to twenty -dollars. They are living a soldier's life; 2, Due to the care of the -Corps bestowed upon social services, many social activities were first -started by the Corps to be followed later by the people; 3, As a rule, -the youths trained by the Corps have good discipline; example may be -taken from the fact that all the university students of Chungking -behaved very well in their schools after the training; 4, As a rule, -members are influenced by the spiritual loftiness of the Corps Leader -[Generalissimo Chiang]. They have the will to sacrifice, as shown by the -fact that many have willingly taken up work behind the enemy's lines. - - -2. Principles Guiding the Nation's Youth - -Since the Corps has for its mission the training of youth, the officers -must shoulder the responsibility of leading youth to be good, to avoid -all past errors, corruption, etc., that harms the mind of youth instead -of benefiting it. - -We must lead the youth according to the following principles: - -1. As ones who have joined the People's Revolution, we should lead the -youth in accordance with the principles of San Min Chu I, in order that -we may conclude the work of the People's Revolution. We must use every -possible method to love and train all youth so as to make them strong -figures in the work of national defense and reconstruction. - -2. In order to lead youth, we must know the youthful mind. The few young -men who went the wrong way are not bad in themselves, but merely -influenced by untrue and selfish ideas. To correct this we must first -correct ourselves, and be their example. We must love them as we do our -own children. In this way they shall certainly be happy to come to us. - -3. It is necessary to know that the only real danger against our -People's Revolution is Japanese imperialism. The rest of the political -factions will be easily dealt with by political action in the future. We -must not be irritated at their existence. - -4. In leading the youths to fight against imperialism and other -reactionary ideas, we must first of all conquer our own worst selves -before we can expect to be their leaders. - -5. In leading the youths, we must induce them to shoulder all future -responsibilities. Let them understand that what they suffered in youth -should not be suffered by posterity. Do unto others what you expect -others to do unto you. The generations must progress, not go backward. - - * * * * * - -The future activities of the Corps will be chiefly to unite and train -youth in productive work. On the one hand, we should call for all good -youths to be members of the Corps. On the other, we should select -specially qualified ones to form a central nucleus to shoulder jointly -the activities of the Corps. In this respect, the Corps shall and must -be able to accomplish the task that has been ever hoped for by the Corps -Leader. - - - - -_D._ THE _HSIAO-TSU_ (SMALL GROUP) TRAINING PROGRAM[1] - - - [Footnote 1: Mimeographed memoranda from the Central Party - Headquarters of the Kuomintang; presented to the author on July 17, - 1940, by Dr. K'an Nei-kuang, Deputy Secretary-General of the - Kuomintang. The original title is _Hsiao-tsu Hsün-lien Kang-ling_; - undated, unpublished.] - - A formal statement of Party policy, this was passed by the - 117th session of the Fifth Central Standing Committee of the - Kuomintang on March 23, 1939 and amended by its 123rd - session on June 15, 1939. This typifies the Kuomintang drive - to establish closer contact with broad reaches of the - population. - - -INTRODUCTION - -The Sub-District Party Organ (_ch'ü-fen-pu_) is the fundamental unit of -the Kuomintang. Due to its large membership, it has been found extremely -difficult to give the members proper training. As a measure of remedy, -the Central Party Headquarters has promulgated a set of regulations -governing the small-group conference. However, due to the fact that the -position and nature of such an institution as well as its relations with -the Kuomintang have not been adequately defined, this plan has not been -successfully carried out. Recently, the Chairman of the Central -Executive Committee of the Kuomintang [The Party Chief, Chiang -K'ai-shek] has repeatedly instructed that the small-group conference be -put into practice in order to improve the Party affairs. Hence, the -regulations were promulgated to be enforced by the various Party organs. - -The Kuomintang aims to have a Party organ established in every -organization.[2] In order to realize this aim, the following points must -be observed: - - [Footnote 2: I.e., factory, cooperative, school, etc.] - -1. The small-group conference is just for training the Party members. It -is different from the Sub-District Party Organ which is the lowest -administrative authority. Consequently, only matters concerning the -Party principles are to be discussed in the small-group conference while -other important issues are left to the Sub-District Party Organ. - -2. The Sub-District Party Organ may have unlimited membership. Its -members may be organized into more than two small-group conferences. If -the members are not more than ten in number, one small-group conference -may be formed. - -3. As the small-group conference is to be organized from the -Sub-District Party Organs, a distinction between the District Party and -the Sub-District Party Organ must be made. The fundamental principle is -that there will be one Party organ for one single [extra-Party] -organization. If a Sub-District Party has too many members, several -Sub-District Party Organs may be formed under the charge of a District -Party Organ. It is not permissible for several parallel Party Organs to -exist in one single organization nor may the members of several -organizations go into one Party organ. However, if the number of Party -members of one organization is too small to form a Sub-District Party -Organ, they may join the neighbor Sub-District Party Organ. It is to be -remembered that the best policy is to have enough Party members in each -organization to form its own Sub-District Party Organ. - -4. Small-group conferences may be named in numerical order such as, -First and Second Small-Group Conference, or the First and Second -Small-Group Conference of a certain _hsien_ or Sub-District Party Organ. -If there is only one small-group conference, it will not necessarily be -named as such. - -5. When such small-group conference is organized in every institution -down to the _pao-chia_, then the people will be better enlightened -concerning the Government and Party policies. Thus it will help the -Government in having its orders fully enforced. - -6. The small-group conference and the Sub-District Party meeting should -take place every two weeks alternately. - -All the Party organs upon receipt of this memorandum should make a -careful study of the local conditions and submit to the Provincial -Kuomintang in ten days' time their working plan. Approval should be -given not later than ten days, and within a month all such small-group -conferences should be organized. However, if there should be any -difficulty encountered or any comments to be made they may be submitted -to the proper Party authority for their consideration. - - -A. ORGANIZATION - -1. A small-group conference is established for training the Party -members of the Sub-District Kuomintang Organ. - -2. A small-group conference may have three to ten members. If a -Sub-District Party Organ has more than ten members, two or more -small-group conferences may be organized and members distributed -according to their intellectual standing, interests and occupations. It -is the best policy that the members of higher education should be evenly -distributed among the small-group conferences. - -3. In the border districts, if the number of Party members is less than -five, and consequently a Sub-District Party Organ cannot be formed, a -small-group conference may be organized first to be under the direct -charge of some other higher Party authorities. - -4. A small-group conference may be reorganized every six months. If -there are too many shiftings of members and any other difficulties, it -may be reorganized before that time. - -5. Every small-group conference has one Chief who is responsible for -calling conferences, reading reports and giving guidance regarding the -thoughts and activities of his members. He is to be elected by the -members and may be re-elected after six-months' service. - -6. If the intellectual standing of the members of a small-group -conference is equivalent to that of a primary school student, the Chief -may be appointed by the Executive Committee of the Sub-District Party. - - -B. CONFERENCES - -7. Small-group conferences are to be held every two weeks. The -conference is to last not more than two hours. Members are to be -notified by the Chief of the time and place of the conference. It is -important that conferences should be planned so as not to interfere with -the work of the members. - -8. In the conferences each member may be the Chairman by turn. Minutes -are to be recorded by any member appointed at the conference. The -minutes are to be read by the Chief in the Sub-District Party meetings. - -9. Agenda of the small-group conference includes: - -_a._ The Chief announces the opening of the conference. - -_b._ The Chief reads Dr. Sun's will. - -_c._ The Chief reports communications from the Sub-District Party Organ, -important current problems, publications of the Chairman of the -Executive Committee of the Central Kuomintang Headquarters, and any -other topics. - -_d._ Discussions. - -_e._ Comments. - -_f._ The Chief reads regulations governing Party members. - -_g._ The Chief announces the adjournment of the conference. - -10. The discussions include: - -_a._ Party principles, - -_b._ current issues, - -_c._ working abilities, - -_d._ book reviews. - -11. Materials for discussion may be given by the Central Party -Headquarters or prepared by the _Hsien_ Party Organ, if necessary. - -12. Members are required to read certain books. In the case of those who -cannot read by themselves, assistance may be given by the fellow members -or by an instructor especially appointed for this purpose. Encouragement -should be given to those who can do good written work. - -13. Small-group conferences are responsible for the education of the -illiterate members. - -14. Every member should take part in the discussion. - -15. If the members of the small-group conference cannot reach an -agreement regarding any one of the four topics enumerated in the Item -No. 10, they may refer to Central Party Headquarters or the _Hsien_ -Party Headquarters through the Sub-District Party Organ. - -16. If it is found that all the small-group conferences cannot reach an -agreement regarding certain topics discussed or if the Secretary of the -Sub-District Party Organ considers it necessary, a Sub-District mass -meeting may be called to discuss these topics. The agenda for the -small-group conference can also be used for the Sub-District Party -meetings. - -17. When the small-group Chief considers it necessary, he may decide -whether to have the Item "Comment" only on the agenda. - -18. In commenting, the members may do: - -_a._ Self-comment: Members may tell in the conference their own -thoughts, activities and past experiences, as well as plans for the -future. - -_b._ Mutual comment: Members may make comments upon each other's -thoughts, activities, etc., in the most sincere and friendly manner. - -19. All the comments should be recorded in the minutes for future -reference. After the conference members should not broadcast each -other's secrets. - -20. At every fourth meeting, the conference may be held in the form of a -tea party or a picnic. In such meetings, members may express their ideas -freely regarding Party, politics, economics, and any other social -problems. It is not necessary to reach a conclusion, but the -discussions should be recorded. - -21. Regulations governing leave of absence for the Sub-District Party -Organ are applicable to the small-group conference. - - -C. GUIDANCE AND EXAMINATION - -22. Small-group conference is the major work of all the Party organs. -The Sub-District Party Organ may appoint a person to attend and -supervise the small-group conferences. - -23. The Sub-District Party Organ will see to it that the small-group -conferences are held according to schedule. It will submit monthly to -its superior organ the results of such small-group conferences and in -every three months to the Central Party Headquarters. - -24. The small-group conference Chiefs may attend the Sub-District Party -meeting to discuss matters concerning small-group training. - -25. The District Party Organ may send out inspectors at any time to -supervise the small-group conferences. Every six months it may call a -meeting which all the Secretaries of the Sub-District Party Organs, -small-group conference Chiefs, will attend to discuss matters concerning -small-group conferences. The Secretary of the Sub-District Party Organ -will take the chair in the meeting and the minutes will be submitted to -the _Hsien_ Party. - -26. The _Hsien_ Party Organ may also send out inspectors to supervise -the small-group conferences. Every six months, after the meeting as -stated in Item 25 has taken place, a _Hsien_ Party meeting is to be -called to discuss the small-group conferences in the whole _hsien_. The -Secretary of the _Hsien_ Party Organ will preside in such meetings. -Minutes are to be submitted to the Provincial Party Headquarters. - -27. If necessary, the _Hsien_ Party Organ may hold different -competitions in such fields as sports, speeches, Party principles, etc., -in order to make the small-group conferences more interesting. - -28. The Provincial Party Organ, besides sending out inspectors to make -inspections of the small-group conferences, may obtain at any time the -minutes of a certain small-group conference of a certain _hsien_ for -examination. - -29. The Provincial Party Organ may have a general examination of the -small-group conferences that have taken place, taking the _hsien_ as a -unit. Encouragement and punishment should be given according to merit. - -30. The Central Party Headquarters, besides sending out inspectors, may -obtain any number of minutes of the small-group conferences for -examination. - -31. Those Party organs below the _Hsien_ Party Organ should pay especial -attention to the character, morals and intellectual ability of the -members. The names of those members who have made special contributions -to the Party work should be filed with the Central Party Headquarters -for appointment. - - -D. APPENDIX - -32. All the _Hsien_ Parties upon receipt of this Program should make a -study of local conditions and make out a plan for carrying them out. - -33. For the border districts and war areas strict observance of these -items may be dispensed with, upon the request of the local Party organ -to the Central Party Headquarters. - -34. The items contained in this memorandum are applicable to Special -Municipal Party Organs, Seamen's Party Organs, Overseas Party Organs, -and agencies under the charge of the Central Party Headquarters. - -35. The above is effective after the approval of the Central Executive -Committee of the Kuomintang. - - - - -_E._ PARTY CONSTITUTION OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY[1] - - - [Footnote 1: _Kung-ch'an-tang Tang-chang_ [Party Constitution of the - Communist Party], [Chungking?], XXVII (1938), p. 1-21.] - - Despite the many changes in the governmental form of the - Communist-controlled areas, the Chinese Communist Party has - retained the same Party Constitution for many years. The - following constitution was adopted in 1928 by the Sixth - Party Congress. - - -CHAPTER I. TITLE - -ARTICLE 1. _The Title_: The Communist Party of China is a branch of the -Communist International. Therefore the title is "The Chinese Communist -Party." - - -CHAPTER II. THE MEMBERS - -ARTICLE 2. _Qualifications of Party Members_: The Party members should -accept the regulations and constitution of the Communist International -and of the Chinese Communist Party. They should join one of the Party -Organs and abide by the resolutions which have been passed by the -Communist International and the Chinese Communist Party. They are -required to pay the Party dues regularly. - -ARTICLE 3. _Procedure to Join the Party_: The candidates of the -following qualifications can be recognized as Party members with the -approval of the _hsien_ Party Councillor and the sanction of the Branch -Organs: - -_a._ Factory Laborers: recommended by one Party member and approved by -one Branch of Production Party Organ. - -_b._ Farmers, handicraft men, intellectuals and public functionaries of -the lower grades: recommended by two Party members. - -_c._ High public functionaries: recommended by three Party members. - - Note: - - 1. The sponsor must take full responsibility for the - candidate. In case qualifications are false, the sponsor - shall receive punishment according to the regulations. He - may be expelled in a serious case. - - 2. The candidate shall be asked to do some Party work for - trial before he can be recognized as a member, in order that - his qualifications and understanding of party principles can - be examined. - -_d._ A candidate who is an ex-member of other Parties shall become a -Communist Party member by the recommendation of three Party members of -more than three years' standing. If he was an ordinary Party member of -the other Party, his membership in the Communist Party shall be -sanctioned by the Provincial Party Committee; if he was a special member -of another Party, then his membership shall be sanctioned by the Central -Party Organ. - -ARTICLE 4. _The Adherence of Organized Groups_: In case other political -groups or branches of other parties want to join the Communist Party, -their organization systems must be studied and amended according to the -ideas of the Communist Central Party Organ. - -ARTICLE 5. _The Transfer of Members_: The Party members may be -transferred from one Organ to another if they move from one place to -another. The transfer, however, must be approved by the Central Party -Organ. - -ARTICLE 6. _The Expulsion of Members_: The expulsion of members must be -first passed by the general meeting of that particular Branch Organ and -then be approved by the higher Organ. Until the approval is obtained, it -is necessary to stop the work of the member involved. In case the member -is not satisfied with the discharge, he is allowed to send a petition to -the highest Party Organ for final judgment. Every Party committee has -the power to expel a member who is discovered as an anti-Communist. The -resolution must be communicated to the Organ to which that member -belonged. - - -CHAPTER III. THE ORGANIZATION - -ARTICLE 7. _The Principle of Organization_: Like other Communist -International Branch Parties, the essential of organization of the -Chinese Communist Party is Democratic Centralism. By Democratic -Centralism is meant: - -_a._ Both superior and subordinate Party Organs shall be formed -according to resolutions which have been passed in the Councils of Party -Delegates and the National Communist Party Congress. - -_b._ Each Party Organ is required to make a report of its newly elected -members. - -_c._ Subordinate Party Organs must accept orders issued by the higher -Organs. They shall strictly obey the regulations of the Party. They -shall effectively carry out the resolutions and plans which have been -determined by the Communist International Central Committee and its -supervisory Party Organs. The Party members may discuss and argue on -certain points which are not yet passed by the Party Organ. In other -words, they must obey unconditionally the resolutions which have been -already determined by the Communist International or their superior -Organs, whether they agree with these resolutions or not. - -ARTICLE 8. _The Supervisory Party Organs_: Under certain circumstances, -subordinate Party Organs are allowed to appoint new supervisory -Committees to join the Party with the sanction of its superior Organs. - -ARTICLE 9. _The Distribution of Party Organs_: The distribution of Party -Organs is according to geographic units. The Administrative Party Organ -in a certain place is the supervisory Organ of that place. People of -different nationalities may all join the Communist Party. However, they -must first join a Chinese District Party Organ before they can become -members of the Chinese Communist Party. - -ARTICLE 10. _Duties of the District Organs_: The District Organs have -the power to settle their local affairs within the scope of resolutions -passed by the Communist International and the Chinese Communist Party. - -ARTICLE 11. _The Supreme Party Organs_: The supreme Party Organs are the -Party Members' Mass Meeting and the Councils of Party Delegates. - -ARTICLE 12. _The Party Committee_: Different classes of Party committees -shall be elected from among the Party Members' Mass Meeting and the -Councils of Party Delegates[2] and the National Communist Party -Congress.[3] The committees shall supervise the routine procedures of -their subordinate Organs. - - [Footnote 2: The term _Tai-piao Ta-hui_ rendered "Council of Party - Delegates," may also be put as "Party Conference." Cf. "The Rules of - the Communist Party of the Soviet Union" in Rappard, William E., _et - al._, _Source Book on European Governments_, New York, 1937, p. - v34-v52.] - - [Footnote 3: _Ch'üan-kuo Ta-hui_ is given as "National Party - Congress"; the term _Ch'üan-kuo_ has been translated as "All-China" - elsewhere.] - -ARTICLE 13. _Problems of Criticism_: In the case of _hsien_ Branch Party -Delegates, it is necessary for them to undergo criticism by the -(subordinate) officers of higher Party Organs. - -ARTICLE 14. _The Organization System of the Communist Party Organs_: - -_a._ Different Branch Party Organs shall be established in every -factory, workshop, shop, street, village, and army unit. - -_b._ There shall be a District Party Council and District Council of -Party Delegates in every city or country district, under the supervision -of a District Party Committee. - -_c._ There shall be a Hsien or Municipal Council of Party Delegates in -each _hsien_ or municipality, under the supervision of a Municipal Party -Committee. - -_d._ A special Council of Party Delegates which is constituted by -several _hsien_ or parts of a province shall be established when -necessary. The establishment must be approved by the Provincial -Committee. - -_e._ There shall be a Provincial Council of Party Delegates in every -province, to be supervised by a Provincial Party Committee. - -_f._ There shall be a National Communist Congress in the nation, -supervised by the Central Committee. - -_g._ For the convenience in training Party members, a special Central -Executive Bureau shall be established and special central officers shall -be sent to different places. This Bureau and the officers shall be -appointed and supervised by the Central Committee. - -ARTICLE 15. Further departments and subordinate committees shall be -established to deal with special Party functions, such as the -Organization Department, Publicity Department, Labor Movement Committee -and Women's Movement Committee. These departments and committees shall -be under the supervision of their respective Party Committees. - - Note: To improve understanding of differences in custom and - language among Party members of different nationalities, - several Nationality Movement Departments shall be formed. - - -CHAPTER IV. BRANCH PARTY ORGANS - -ARTICLE 16. _Fundamental Organizations_: Branch Party Organs of the -factories, mines, workshops, shops, streets, villages, and armies are -the fundamental organization of the Communist Party. Members working in -the above-mentioned places shall join the Branch Party Organs. New -Branch Party Organs can be organized when there are at least three or -more members. But they must be under the control of the _Hsien_ -Committee. - -ARTICLE 17. _Special Organizations of the Branch Party Organs_: Members -of certain businesses can join the Production Branch Organ of the same -occupation in their neighboring city. Special Branch Organs shall be -organized according to the localities and the nature of their work, such -as handicraft laborers, free laborers, family laborers, or -intellectuals. - -ARTICLE 18. _Duties of the Branch Party Organs_: The Branch Party Organ -unites the strength of the farmers and laborers. Its duties are: - -_a._ To use its systematic and effective agitation and slogans to absorb -farmers and laborers into the Communist party. - -_b._ To use its power of organization to join the political and economic -struggles of the farmers and laborers. To encourage the people's -revolutionary spirit. To teach the meaning of class-struggles. To -supervise the farmers' and laborers' revolutions. To lead proletarians -to the Communist International and the Chinese Communist Party. - -_c._ To enlist and train new members. To distribute Party periodicals -among members and non-members in order to encourage political and -educational work. - -ARTICLE 19. _Branch Organ Executive Committee_: Each Branch shall have -three to five executive committeemen to manage the routine Party work. -They shall take charge of the division of labor, such as the publicity -work, distribution of printed materials, organization of farmer and -labor parties, women's movements, and youth movements. There shall be -one secretary; he shall carry out resolutions and orders. - - -CHAPTER V. CITY AND COUNTRY DISTRICT PARTY ORGANS - -ARTICLE 20. _The District Council of Party Delegates_: In the sphere of -the city or country districts the supreme Party Organs are the Party -Members' Mass Meeting and the District Councils of Party Delegates. The -Party Members' Mass Meeting and the Councils of Party Delegates shall -receive and approve the reports of the District Party Committee; shall -elect the Delegates to District, _Hsien_, Municipal, or Provincial -Councils of the Party Delegates Meeting. - -ARTICLE 21. _District Party Committee_: The District Party Committee -shall take charge of the supervision of affairs within that district -before and after the Party Members' Mass Meeting or the District Council -of Party Delegates' Meeting. Regular meetings of the city or rural -District Party Committee shall be directed by the Standing Committee, -elected by the Party Committee itself. - - -CHAPTER VI. _Hsien_ AND MUNICIPAL PARTY ORGANS - -ARTICLE 22. _The Hsien Council of Party Delegates_: The supreme Party -Organ in the _hsien_ is the _Hsien_ Council of Party Delegates. The -special meeting of the Council shall be called once in three months. It -shall be called by the demand of a majority of other organizations in -the _hsien_; by determination of the Provincial Party Committee or -Special District Party Committee. The _Hsien_ Council of Party Delegates -which is called by the _Hsien_ Party Committee shall read reports issued -by the _Hsien_ Party Committee or the _Hsien_ Control Committee. It -shall elect Delegates of the _Hsien_ Party Committee, _Hsien_ Control -Committee, Provincial Party Committee, and Special District Party -Committee. - -ARTICLE 23. _Hsien Party Committee_: The _Hsien_ Party Committee is -elected by the _Hsien_ Council of Party Delegates. Before and after the -meetings of _Hsien_ Council of Party Delegates this Committee is the -supreme Party Organ in the _hsien_. The Committee shall be constituted -by _Hsien_ Delegates and delegates from important villages. The meeting -of the Committee shall be called at least once a month, and its date -shall be determined by the _Hsien_ Committee itself. A Standing -Committee shall be elected to take care of routine Party affairs. There -shall be one secretary of the Standing Committee, to be elected from -among the Committee members. - -ARTICLE 24. A _Hsien_ Party Committee shall put into effect previously -passed resolutions of the _Hsien_ Council of Party Delegates, the -Provincial Party Committee, and the Central Party Committee. Whenever -possible, different committees, such as the Organization Committee, -Publicity Committee, Women's Movement Committee, and Farmers' Movement -Committee, shall be established. The _Hsien_ Party Committee shall also -appoint the editors of _Hsien_ Party newspapers. It shall take dual -responsibilities to obey the orders of its superior Organ and to report -its own merits to its superior Organs. - -ARTICLE 25. No Municipal Party Committee shall be formed in a city where -a _Hsien_ Party Committee has already been established. In such a case -the Party affairs of the city shall be in charge of the _Hsien_ Party -Committee. A City District Party Committee under it may be formed to -take an active part in the City Party affairs. - -ARTICLE 26. _The Municipal Party Committee_: The organization of the -Municipal Party Committee is the same as that of the _Hsien_ Party -Committee. A City District Party Committee is subordinate to it. This -Committee shall administer its Branch Party Organs and Branch Organs of -its neighbors. No Municipal Party Committee shall be established in a -place where the Provincial Party Committee or Special District Party -Committee has already been established. - -ARTICLE 27. The organization and functions of the Special District Party -Committee shall be the same as the _Hsien_ Party Committee. In the place -where there is no Provincial Party Committee provided then the Special -District Party Committee shall be directed by the Central Party -Committee. In such a case the functions and organization of the Special -Party Committee shall be the same as the Provincial Party Committee. - - -CHAPTER VII. PROVINCIAL PARTY ORGANS - -ARTICLE 28. _The Provincial Council of Party Delegates_: The Provincial -Council of Party Delegates is the supreme Party Organ in the province. -The regular meeting of the Council shall be called to meet once -semi-annually. Special meetings shall be called according to the demand -of a majority of other organizations of the province, or by the -determination of the Central Party Committee. The regular meeting of the -Provincial Council of Party Delegates, which is called by the Provincial -Party Committee, shall have the responsibility of hearing reports issued -by the Provincial Party Committee, and by the Provincial Control -Committee. It shall discuss the social work and Party affairs problems -of the province; and elect delegates to Provincial Party Committee, -Provincial Control Committee, and National Party Congress. - -ARTICLE 29. _Provincial Party Committee_: Before and after the meeting -of the Provincial Council of Party delegates, the Provincial Party -Committee is the supreme Party Organ in each province. Delegates of the -central Provincial organizations or other district Party Organs are -required to join the Provincial Party Committee. The meeting of the -Provincial Party Committee shall be called at least once in two months; -the date of the meeting shall be determined by the Committee itself. A -Standing Committee under it shall be authorized to take charge of Party -affairs before and after the meeting of the Provincial Party Committee. -Secretaries are to be appointed accordingly. - -ARTICLE 30. _The Duties and Organization of Provincial Party -Committees_: The duties of the Provincial Party Committee are: to put -into effect the passed resolutions of the Provincial Council of Party -Delegates or Central Party Committee; to organize the subsidiary Party -Organs; to appoint editors for the Party newspapers; to distribute the -Party funds; to control the accounting department; to supervise the -Party work among non-Communists; to draft regular reports to the Central -Party Committee; to announce the Party Movement to its subordinate -Organs. For the furtherance of important work different departments and -committees shall be provided, such as the Provincial Organization -Department, Publicity Department, Labor Movement Department, etc. The -department heads who act concurrently in the Provincial Party Committee -shall supervise Party affairs under the control of the Provincial -Standing Committee. - -ARTICLE 31. The Provincial Party Committee shall help the District Party -Committee to carry out the Party activities. Therefore the _Hsien_ Party -Committee in that particular city should only take care of the Party -work within its own sphere. - - -CHAPTER VIII. THE NATIONAL PARTY CONVENTION[4] - - [Footnote 4: _Ch'üan-kuo Hui-i_.] - -ARTICLE 32. The National Party Convention shall be called to meet twice -annually. The numbers of candidates and Delegates to be elected by -different organs are to be determined by the Central Party Committee. - -ARTICLE 33. The previously passed resolutions of the Convention shall be -put into effect after the approval of the Central Party Committee. - -ARTICLE 34. In case the Convention meeting is held before the meeting of -the Communist International then several Delegates can be elected to -attend the meeting of the latter. However, they must get the consent of -the International Communist Committee. - - -CHAPTER IX. THE NATIONAL PARTY CONGRESS - -ARTICLE 35. The National Party Congress is the supreme Party Organ in -the country. The meeting shall be called once annually by the Central -Party Committee and the Communist International. Special meetings can be -called by the Central Party Committee or initiated by the Communist -International. It may also be called by request of a majority of the -Delegates who attended the last meeting. The call of the special -meeting, however, must be approved by the Central Party Committee first. -Resolutions which have been passed by the majority of the Delegates -shall become effective. The number of Delegates and percentage in each -Party Organ shall be determined by the Communist International, the -Central Party Committee, or the preliminary session of the Party -Convention. - -ARTICLE 36. The duties of the National Party Congress are: - -_a._ To receive and examine reports issued by the Central Party -Committee. - -_b._ To determine Party regulations. - -_c._ To determine the important political or organization plans. - -_d._ To elect the Central Party Committee. - -ARTICLE 37. Delegates to the Party Congress are to be elected by the -Provincial Councils of Party Delegates. In special cases requiring -secret action, they may be appointed by the Provincial Party Committee -with the approval of the Communist International Committee. A -provisional Congress can be substituted for the regular Congress with -only the consent of the International Communist Committee. - - -CHAPTER X. THE CENTRAL PARTY COMMITTEE[5] - - [Footnote 5: _Chung-yang Wei-yüan-hui_.] - -ARTICLE 38. The number of the Central Party Committee members shall be -determined by the National Party Congress. - -ARTICLE 39. While the National Party Congress is in session, the Central -Party Committee is the supreme Party Organ. It represents the Party in -contacts with the other political parties. Besides this its duties are: -to establish various subordinate Party Organs; to supervise and control -subordinate Party Organs; to edit the Party newspapers; to send special -Party officers to different provinces; to form the Central Executive -Bureau in order to encourage Party principles; to distribute the Party -funds; to control the Central Accounting Department. The Central Party -Committee shall be called at least three times a month. - -ARTICLE 40. A Political Bureau shall be established in the Central Party -Committee. It shall supervise the political affairs before and after the -meeting of the Central Party Committee. A Standing Committee is to be -elected to take charge of routine work. - -ARTICLE 41. When necessary the Central Party Committee shall establish -different subordinate departments or committees such as the Organization -Department, Publicity Department, Laborers' Movement Committees, Women's -Movement Committees and Farmers' Movement Committees. The functions of -these Departments and Committees shall be guided by the Central Party -Committee, which shall also appoint Department heads and Chairmen. - -ARTICLE 42. The Central Party Committee shall determine the work and the -scope of work of the District Party Organs with reference to their -political and economic background. The distribution of Party Organs -shall also be settled by the Central Party Committee. - - -CHAPTER XI. THE CENTRAL CONTROL COMMITTEE[6] - - [Footnote 6: The term here is _shên-ch'a wei-yüan-hui_, not - _chien-ch'a_, which is the term used for "Control" as one of the five - powers of Sun Yat-sen's plan.] - -ARTICLE 43. For the control of the financial and accounting work of the -subordinate Party Organs, Central or District Control Committees shall -be elected by the National Party Congress, Central or District Party -Committee. - - -CHAPTER XII. THE PARTY DISCIPLINE - -ARTICLE 44. Strict obedience to Party discipline is the highest duty of -every Communist. Resolutions passed by the Communist International, -Central Party Committee, or other superior Party Organs shall be carried -out effectively and exactly by the Party members. Until resolutions have -been passed, members are allowed to discuss them freely. - -ARTICLE 45. Those who have failed to put into effect the orders or -resolutions, or those who violate the Party discipline shall be punished -by the Party Organs with reference to the Party regulations. The -punishments for Organs are: reprimand, dissolution, and reregistration -of its members. The punishments for the members are: reprimand, warning, -deprivation of Party activities, expulsion from membership, or -suspension from duties for stated periods. Cases involving punishment -shall be studied and examined by the Party Members' Mass Meeting or by -respective Party Organs. Special Committees may be formed with the -approval of Party Organs to settle difficult cases. Expulsion from -membership shall be carried out according to particulars stated in Item -6 of this Constitution. - - -CHAPTER XIII. PARTY FINANCE - -ARTICLE 46. The sources of the Party revenue are: Party fees, special -levies, income from printed materials, and the compensations from its -superior Organs. - -ARTICLE 47. The amount of the Party fee shall be determined by the -Central Committee. Members without employment or those in poverty are -allowed exemption from payment. Those who do not pay their fees for -three months, without stating reasons, shall be recognized as released -from membership, and their names shall be announced to the Mass -Meeting. - - -CHAPTER XIV. SPECIAL PARTY GROUPS [CORPS][7] - - [Footnote 7: _Tang-t'uan_.] - -ARTICLE 48. Special Party Groups are to be constituted by three or more -Party members. The main function of these Party Groups is the -encouragement of the Party principles among the non-Communist groups. -The routine affairs of the Group shall be in charge of a Managing Board -elected from the Party Group. Whenever a Party Committee and a Special -Party Group conflict and then come to an agreement on certain points, -these points shall be reconsidered and concurrently passed by the two -Organs. Quick action must be taken. If agreement is not reached, a -petition is required for submission to a superior Party Organ for final -determination. - -ARTICLE 49. Delegates of Party Groups shall attend the Party Committee -Meeting whenever there is matter dealing with the Party Group. - -ARTICLE 50. A Managing Board shall be formed in each Group with the -approval of the Party Committee. The Committee can appoint its members -to the Board and may also recall or remove those members when necessary. -In such cases, however, the reasons for recall or removal require -announcement to the Party Group. - -ARTICLE 51. A list of names of the staff members of the Party Group -shall be submitted to a Party Organ for approval. Removal of staff -members from a group shall also require approval by the Party Organ. - -ARTICLE 52. Resolutions to be carried out by the Party Group shall first -be passed by the Group Meeting or Meeting of the Managing Board. In a -Party Members' Mass Meeting all the Group members must support a -resolution which is already passed by its own Group. If one fails to do -so he may be punished according to the regulations. - - -CHAPTER XV. RELATIONSHIP WITH THE COMMUNIST YOUTH CORPS[8] - - [Footnote 8: _Kung-ch'an Ch'ing-nien T'uan_.] - -ARTICLE 53. The District or Central Party Organs shall send Delegates to -the Communist Youth Corps for exchanging ideas. At the same time the -Communist Youth Corps can also send their members to attend the various -meetings of the different Councils of the Party Delegates. - - - - -APPENDIX III. MATERIALS ON POLICY - - - - -_A._ REPLY TO QUESTIONS (CHIANG K'AI-SHEK)[1] - - - [Footnote 1: Private communication by and to the present author, and - in his possession.] - - Replies to the following questionnaire were very kindly - supplied by Generalissimo Chiang K'ai-shek. The questions by - the present author were submitted to him on July 23, 1940; - the replies were transmitted through the Vice-Minister of - Publicity, Mr. Hollington Tong, on November 26, 1940. - -(1) Do you believe that the _San Min Chu I_ are suited to China alone, -or do you think it possible that they represent a golden mean between -totalitarianism and democracy? - -_San Min Chu I is a type of democracy particularly suited to China. In -its general features, I think, it is similar to Western democracies._ - -(2) Do you feel that a _San Min Chu I_ China will have any positive -proposals to make concerning the subject of world federation or -confederation, if that subject is raised at the end of the current -European war? - -_In as much as cosmopolitanism and world peace are two of the main aims -of San Min Chu I, China will naturally be disposed to participate in any -world federation or confederation based on the principle of equality of -nations and for the good of mankind._ - -(3) Do you believe that the inauguration of the constitution and of a -constitutional period will lead to the uncontrolled freedom of minor -parties, including the Communist? Is there not a danger that the minor -parties, because they do not share the responsibility for government, -will be able to exploit formal democratic rights more unscrupulously -than the Kuomintang? - -_No, because democracy in itself has the ability to work out the -solutions for those problems if there are any._ - -(4) What do you regard as the clearest factual indication of the growth -of democracy in Free China? - -_The following are the clearest indications of the growth of democracy -in China: 1, the convocation of the People's Political Council; 2, the -convocation of the Provincial Political Councils; 3, the growth of -popular interest in both public and national affairs; 4, the growth of -the sentiment of national solidarity; 5, the spontaneous response to the -call for public services._ - -(5) Within the army, what democratic tendencies have you fostered or -observed? - -_Since the army is now recruited from the different walks of life, it -naturally shares the growing democratic sentiment. Within the army, -however, the soldiers and officers are of course trained and disciplined -in strict accordance with military regulations._ - -(6) When the war against Japan is successfully concluded, do you believe -that the National Government will have any difficulty in re-establishing -its full authority over the guerrilla-governed areas, which will have -tasted autonomy? - -_No, because all these forces are fighting for the liberty and -independence of China._ - -(7) Do you believe that the bogus Government at Nanking is intended by -the enemy to deceive the Chinese, to fool the Japanese home public, or -actually to govern China? Why do you think that a man as ambitious as -Wang Ch'ing-wei put himself in such a humiliating and ridiculous -position--before the world, and before history? - -_Whatever may be the intention of the Japanese in putting up Wang -Ch'ing-wei as the head of the bogus government, they certainly have no -idea of letting him or any other puppet govern China in reality. As to -the latter part of the question, I prefer that you would ask Wang -directly._ - - - - -_B._ WHAT I MEAN BY ACTION, OR A PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION (CHIANG -K'AI-SHEK)[1] - - - [Footnote 1: Chiang K'ai-shek, _A Philosophy of Action, or What I Mean - by Action_, Chungking, 1940; p. 7-20. The accompanying foreword and - notes are here omitted. The translation is the work of Mr. Ma P'in-ho, - a naturalized Chinese scholar but of European race and nativity.] - - The following essay, delivered as a speech, represents the - clearest formulation by Generalissimo Chiang of his own - philosophy. To this must be joined his exegesis on the San - Min Chu I, quoted in part above, p. 270. - -THE TRUTHS WE MUST ENDEAVOR TO GRASP ANEW - -In 1932 I delivered a lecture on the subject "Stages in the Development -of Revolutionary Philosophy." In it I dealt with two points of especial -importance. Firstly, I tried to explain how the actual grasp of what we -know comes only with positive action. I said: "The universe contains -spirit in addition to matter. Spirit implies mind, and mind implies -conscience. Conscience must find its expression in action, in the -practice of what it urges. Otherwise the conscience would be a barren -thing, and there would be no way of avoiding a futile idealism on the -one hand or determinist materialism on the other." Secondly, I explained -the importance of the philosophy of action in regard to the Revolution. -I said: "Only the word 'action' covers the meaning of what has brought -into being all things in space and time. Our philosophy therefore takes -as the one central principle of human life and thought the maxim: 'From -true knowledge action naturally proceeds.' In short, any philosophy of -ours must be a philosophy of action. The consummation of the Republican -revolution and the overthrow of Japanese Imperialist aggression depend -upon our putting into practice Dr. Sun's principle of action as the -natural product of knowledge." - -Since I suggested this term _philosophy of action_ and became the -advocate of _positive action_ as the course the revolutionary must -follow, a considerable effect has been visible in our ranks. The spirit -of positive action has been intensified among us. In the army and in -schools, and in political and social life generally, a gradual -transformation has taken place in the state of inert frustration, -vagueness and depression formerly prevalent. There has been a general -tendency to take the initiative, to express ourselves in positive -action. Such indeed was my aim in promoting this _philosophy of -action_. When I take note of the results achieved by our _action_, -however, I remain unsatisfied on a number of points. For instance, there -is sometimes mere action without clear realization of its why and -wherefore, resulting in what the ancients called "unreal action." With -others there is initial vigor and great positive effort, followed by -impatience of checks and failure to persevere in the face of -difficulties, leading some to throw the blame on circumstances and -others upon their fellow-men. The irritable then proceed to arguing and -quarrels; while the sweeter-tempered lose heart. In this way the real -issue is lost to sight and obstacles unnecessarily multiplied; or the -individual may be overcome with outright disgust and take on a -completely negative attitude, the initial speed of his progress being in -the end equalled by the speed of his subsequent retrogression. Another -kind of failure comes with a man who impulsively imitates others; who -when he sees others on the go feels any move on their part calls for -some move on his; who spends all his time in acting on the spur of some -transitory stimulus or exigency, forgetful of our broad revolutionary -conceptions and far-reaching aims. - -In seeking the reasons for such faulty conduct, I have been forced to -the conclusion that it is due to imperfect knowledge of the essential -meaning of _positive action_, and to imperfect realization of the -significance and nature of _action_, that there is lack of -determination, faith and perseverance among us. - - -ACTION IS LIFE ITSELF: THE TIRELESS PERTINACITY OF NATURE OUR EXAMPLE - -According to my own individual experience, our first step must be to -draw a clear distinction between _action_ and _motion_. The monosyllabic -structure of the Chinese language has occasioned the use of substantival -phrases consisting of two words. One of these phrases is _hsing-tung_ -(action-motion), which in common parlance often has the meaning properly -covered only by the word _hsing_ alone, a word of far deeper and wider -meaning than the word _tung_. In fact, we may say that action is _human -life_ itself. An antithesis is commonly implied between the words -_action_ and _thought_, and between _word_ and _act_. In reality, -however, thought and word are processes of action, and are properly to -be considered as included within the scope of _action_, rather than as -foreign to it. From birth to death, while he is subject to space and -time, a man cannot withdraw himself from the sphere of action; he grows -up in action and his character is formed and elevated by action. All -saintly and heroic men, like the devoted revolutionary, attain their -ends and achieve their nobility of character only through their planned -and determined actions. - -If we wish to realize the true nature of _action_ we can do no better -than take as the _point-de-départ_ for our thinking the words of the -_I-ching_ or _Book of Changes_: "Let the superior man exert himself with -the unfailing pertinacity of Nature." For the most obvious thing in the -universe, the very principle animating all its phenomena, is the -activity of the forces of Nature. The gloss reads: "Day by day the -heavens revolve, with a constancy that only a supreme pertinacity could -maintain. The superior man models himself upon it in the unceasing -exertion of his energies." This _pertinacity_ is something perennially -unimpaired and ever changeless, greatest strength united to greatest -durability, and moreover an absolute thoroughness and completeness. And -we must model ourselves on the activity of nature, on its spontaneous -and unremitting flow of energy. If there is this realization of the -value and place of human life in the universe, action will appear to us -something inevitable, and there will follow as a matter of course -single-minded devotion to purpose, a completely natural attitude, and -resolute advance with firm strides towards our ends--we shall have -achieved, in the words of the _Chung-yung_, "the highest integrity, -unfailing and enduring." Man's existence and progress depend entirely -upon his perception of these truths. - -_Action_, therefore, differs from _motion_. _Motion_ is by no means -necessarily _action_, though _action_ may on occasion include some form -of _motion_. Action is continuous, whereas motion is intermittent; -action is essential, whereas motion is accidental; action is -spontaneous, whereas motion is usually due to the application of -external force. Action is in response to the supreme order of things and -in harmony with the nature of man. Motion is impulsive response to some -fortuitous external stimulus. Action we may describe as more natural and -smoother intrinsically than motion; and extrinsically it is wholly good -in its outcome, whereas motion may be good or may be evil. Action -unfolds in uninterrupted continuity; motion proceeds by fits and starts. -As an illustration, action may be compared to a ceaseless flow of water, -in the words of Confucius, "racing on, unpausing day and night." The -unremitting and insistent character of _positive action_ may thus be -figured forth. Motion on the other hand may be compared to the impact of -a stone upon water into which it is thrown. The water is violently -agitated and leaps high into the air; its movement is tumultuous while -it lasts, but subsides when after a moment or so the extraneous force -that caused it is expended. Such motion is, therefore, transitory, -simply because its motive force comes from without. - - -ACTION IS NOT MERE MOTION - -We cannot of course say that all _motion_ is bad, but we can at least -say that the value of _motion_ is never comparable with that of -_action_. What we commonly call _impulse_ is a manifestation of the -reflex action of some sense or faculty. When we speak of a man's motions -as "blind," "wild," or "furious," it is always a case of response to -external stimulus or of the application of external force. Such motions -are not spontaneous and they therefore pursue no definite course; they -have no basis in the consciousness of the individual and no precise -direction or aim; the individual's concern with them is limited to the -passing moment of their duration; he envisages nothing as to what may be -their result. There may be great initial activity and force, but because -there is no basis in reason, consciousness and spontaneity, momentary -agitation is succeeded by relapse into quiescence. A man who lives by -passion and impulse, who _moves_ rather than _acts_ is like a bell, -which when struck vibrates and emits sound but unless struck is silent. -All passive and transient activity, arising from mere impulse and -sense-stimulation, is in opposition to the positive action required of -us by our revolutionary philosophy, for such _motion_ has no lasting -effect and is powerless to transform the lives of men. - -It is imperative therefore that there should be no confusion of what we -mean by _action_ with what is better termed _motion_. The action of -which I have been speaking is the operation of man's innate faculties -according to the true natural laws of his being; it is what I have -called the expression of conscience in practice, the exercise of -conscience. Although we colloquially speak of "violent actions" and -"wrong-minded action" in describing men's conduct, such conduct, being -that of men acting under the influence of impulse or illusion, should -properly be classed as a form of _motion_. It is not what we mean by -action. - - -ACTION IS NATURE AT WORK IN MAN: THE WHOLE UNIVERSE IS THE SCENE OF -ACTION - -Genuine action is necessarily ordered, rhythmical, systematic and -directed towards some aim. It arises from that fullness of consciousness -described as the "calm of mature reflection." It is inevitably -straightforward and continuous, undeviating and unhesitating. Such -motion as that of the revolving globe we ought not to call mere motion; -that ceaseless axial and orbital rotation is a phenomenon called in -ancient times the _activity_ of nature; and it may serve us as the best -possible illustration of the qualities of action. We may proceed to a -fuller description of the nature of action by saying it is always marked -by a certain regularity and order in the course of its fulfilment. Human -life in all its aspects of growth and development, in each transition -from stage to stage, in the preparatory and supplementary acquisitions -of substance and experience between phase and phase,--all this is -action. The normal routine of daily life,--sleeping, resting, eating and -working,--is all to be considered within the scope of action. For the -meaning of action may apply equally well to what occurs both in states -of repose and in states of movement. While work throughout the process -of carrying out a given task may clearly be action, recreation may also -be action. States of motion and repose are of course to a superficial -view opposites. Moreover in the modern world _motion_ is especially set -up in opposition to _repose_, and emphasized almost to the exclusion of -the latter. This has caused the importance of _stability_ to be lost to -view. - -For the truth of the matter is: "stability allows of repose; repose -allows of calm; calm allows of reflection, and reflection gives grasp." -It should be realized that repose can have a positive function. And what -I call the philosophy of action permits of no distinction between motion -and repose, a distinction which is superficial. A course of action may -involve intervals of both motion and of repose, just as the invisible -working of living matter contributes to the visible growth of the body. -We need only concern ourselves as to whether what is done is in harmony -with the laws of man's innate character. - -The natural processes of the universe and of human life go on -unceasingly, and in trying to ameliorate human life by positive action -we must realize that such action to be effectual must be similar to -those processes in its continuity and tenacity. Positive action in its -every phase, whether outwardly visible or impalpable, never ceases to be -action, never really for a moment comes to a halt. The whole universe is -the scene of such action, and man in so far as he truly acts -participates in its immense activity. Let us therefore distinguish -clearly between mere _motion_ and the true _action_ that works by a -steady advance in an undeviating course, with the timeless -inexhaustibility of flowing water towards its appointed aim. - -And now I have something more to add in definition of the essential -meaning of action and its relation to life. The ancients said "Man's -innate character is given him at birth together with life itself." I -consider _action_ to be the expression of that innate character, and so -as inseparable from life as it. Man in his earliest infancy can laugh -and cry, eat and drink; as he grows up he learns to gaze and listen, -speak and walk; and once grown up, no matter whether he be intelligent -or stupid, he strives for existence, progress, and development. Or, in -other words, he seeks to conform to the elementary needs of human life. -All these phenomena are phenomena of _action_, the action of the -faculties for discerning moral and material good, with which man is -naturally endowed. - -It is apparent to me that love of ease and dislike of exertion are no -part of fundamental human nature, but that on the contrary mankind is -naturally disposed to labor and work. If you compel a lively man -accustomed to be always on his feet and busy with his hands to be idle -and sedentary, depriving him of anything to do, he is certain to feel -exceedingly unhappy. In the same way, the least intelligent or -experienced of men has felt the satisfaction and content that come with -work, the joy of contributing to the accomplishment of some undertaking. -There is a colloquialism current in certain coastal districts of China -which substitutes the word "life" for the word "work"; thus, you may be -asked whether you have "lived your life" for the day, in the sense of -"have you done your day's work?" Work is indeed life; unless a man be -totally incapable he will inevitably require the means of expression for -his abilities, and particularly such expression as will accrue to the -benefit of somebody beyond himself. Even a little child is conscious of -the intense satisfaction to be derived from doing one's best in the -service of others. Though no praise be awarded the child it is aware of -an extraordinary complaisance within itself. - - -THE BROADEST SENSE OF LIFE - -All these little illustrations bear witness to the fact that action is -the object of man's life; and we should, vice versa, make life the -object of our action. We are born with faculties for the discernment of -moral and material good; life, from childhood to old age, is the -energetic, ceaseless, use of them, at first chiefly for the satisfaction -of the needs of one's own existence, to secure one's own footing in -life, but next, as one's mental perspective broadens, the family, the -village, the community, the nation, and mankind become objects of the -desire to express oneself and give of oneself. When we speak of _life_ -it should mean for us the life of mankind, the life and existence of -people and nation, the livelihood of masses and citizenry. And when we -speak of _action_, we should mean action performed in the service of -life in such a broad sense. - -The difference between man and the beasts of the field and the birds of -the air consists just in this. We read in the classics of "a virtue of -surpassing excellence, which is given to the people as a law of their -being," and the virtue alluded to is this propensity to look after one's -own welfare and at the same time the welfare of one's fellow-men. We are -naturally endowed with the disposition to will the good of others and to -act in their service. "Action," with the qualities I have sketched, is -something primordially bound up with life. - - -THE REVOLUTION DEMANDS ACTION OF ALL MEN AT ALL TIMES - -The essential meaning of action being once understood we may proceed to -inquire into its spirit and wherein it finds its highest expression. How -is it that men for all the apparent unity of their existence sometimes -live lives of such devotion to the good of mankind and the world that -they earn the admiration of posterity, while others live degenerate -lives governed by the lowest desires, to the detriment of themselves and -their neighbors? Education and environment are factors that play their -part in this, but more important is what the ancient called "material -desire"--the tendency to seek possession rather than creation, to enjoy -rather than contribute. In the words of Dr. Sun, "making one's aim -acquisition and not service" leads to degraded and uncontrolled conduct -which is an obstacle to human progress and what we as comrades in -Revolution must strive our utmost to avoid and eradicate. - -Revolutionary motives are motives of service, of self-sacrifice for the -good of others. The task the Revolution sets itself is the "practice of -goodwill" in the broadest sense of those words,--action inspired by love -for men to the exclusion of all that tends to their harm. In our -revolutionary zeal to promote _positive action_ throughout our world we -aim to create an all-pervading moral attitude to life such as is -rationally conformable to man's true nature; and we moreover seek to -bring into full play the deep funds of humanity and benevolence in our -own people. We push aside considerations of individual ability, of past -education and environment, and of how far bad habits acquired may have -become ingrained. We appeal to all as they are to take fresh stock of -their lives and realize how from the very fact of their being alive they -possess the ability to act,--to act in no less a sense than the great -deliverers of mankind in their saintly and heroic deeds. The difference -between such deeds and the actions of normal daily life is one of -degree, not of kind. We are everyone men born of woman and passing our -days between heaven and earth; not for us to vex ourselves with fear of -failure; the only failure is in failing to act. - - -THE MEANING OF EASE - -Let use take the three key-virtues of judgment, goodwill, and courage as -our guides in the task of "playing the man." For the rest, let us follow -the dictum of Sun Wên to the effect that "the very clever and able -should strive to serve ten million fellow-men; a man of lesser ability -may aspire to serve ten hundred men; while a man devoid of talent may -content himself with doing the best he can for a single fellow-man." The -highly talented may perform their duties with ease; the moderately -gifted may make smooth progress with theirs; while the poorly gifted may -do so with only a narrow margin of competence; but all that matters is -our full use of our faculties in positive action for the good of others. -If we advance without ever falling away from a pure and concentrated -resolve to do our best, we shall certainly be able to realize the ideal -of _action_. In a sense it will prove _easy_, though this does not of -course mean that anything can be got without pains or anything managed -in a facile and quiescent fashion. Nor does it mean that all will -necessarily be plain sailing, fraught with no obstacles. Our path -through life is strewn with dangers, hindrances and obstructions. -Revolutionary action is attended by many risks; it requires the will to -make great sacrifices. Nevertheless, man's capacity for positive action -has achieved many a colossal feat in the course of his history, the -prodigious hydraulic engineering of the ancients, ascent into the air -and penetration of the earth, and revolutionary deeds that have -transformed the face of human affairs. The ultimate consideration is -always whether we possess thorough determination and a spirit of -unflinching zeal, for with these we may overcome towering obstacles as -it were "in our stride," and "face dangers with imperturbable calm." A -man worthy of his place in the ranks of the Revolution will regard as -nothing extraordinary difficulties and dangers that would daunt others. -His revolutionary spirit, which is the very spirit of action, gives him -a sublime indifference to whatever may be the magnitude of the demands -his duty makes upon him; whatever his principles, faith and -responsibility involve is "all in the day's work" for him, though it be -ordeal by fire and water or the abnegation of everything dearest to him. -He takes no account of difficulty, and fear is a thing still stranger to -him. It is in the sense that to a man with such an attitude action is -_easy_ that I use the word. - -Action born of that innate character given us with life, conceived in -absolute sincerity, and aimed at the good of others treats things as -"all of a piece." From beginning to end of an appointed task it -maintains a uniform consistency and integrity of purpose. The seeds of -its final success are inherent in its first beginnings. Difficulty and -failure as I understand them can have no part in such action. - -Positive action with a complete integrity of purpose produces that -honesty and trustworthiness which are distinctive marks of all true -action. It penetrates to the core of matters, and deals only in -realities. It is free from superficial trappings and fuss; permits of no -slack approximation and evasion of the point, all of which comes from -that shrinking from effort and hardship that is so incompatible with the -spirit of positive action. Whereas I have called all true action _easy_, -those who go about things without its spirit find themselves confronted -with seemingly insurmountable difficulties everywhere. When the ancients -said: "There is nothing either difficult or easy in the world," they had -in mind this way of thinking, as I had too when I said that wartime and -peacetime were one and the same. - - -SINCERITY THE ROOT OF ACTION AND GOODWILL - -The next thing to consider is what is to be the central aim of our -action. I would answer if asked this with a single word: "Goodwill." -Action is the _practice of goodwill_ in its deepest sense. - -Goodwill is grounded in the sense of justice and issues from complete -sincerity. The sincere man is necessarily conscious of goodwill and he -is necessarily possessed of the moral courage required to practice it. -The ancients said "there is completeness in sincerity," and again, -"where there is not sincerity there is a void." The place of sincerity -in human life is indeed like that of energy in the atom, the structure -of which would collapse without it. If a man's life lacks "ardent -sincerity," he will likewise be powerless to form and manifest the three -key-virtues of judgment, goodwill, and courage. And without the strength -to be derived from those virtues, the Three Principles of the People can -make no headway. Only by action inspired with perfect sincerity can the -splendid truths of those Principles be asserted and translated into -fact. - -Sincerity is dependent upon the sense of justice. The keynote of our -Republican Revolution has been the smashing of selfish individualism and -the rescue of our people from their sufferings and of our nation from -its peril. To achieve what yet remains to be done, to acquit ourselves -well as a section of humanity, and to explore the full scope of possible -human well-being, all we do and enact must be grounded in perfect -sincerity. Then the pains we take and the plans we devise will prove -creative, progressive, and constructive; we shall put flesh on the bones -of the egalitarian philosophy of social justice; we shall be clear as to -what we think and are aiming at; we shall be able to give full -expression to our true nature and faculties, proceeding in all we do -resolutely, frankly, and boldly. - -Action attains its highest point of intensity in the giving of one's -life in the cause of justice, when death in that cause is accepted as -sweet and shorn of all its terrors. "One may die in the course of -willing men good, but life is not to be purchased at the price of -willing them ill" is a classical teaching we may take as a supreme ideal -of positive action. Action that lives up to that ideal will inevitably -be _revolutionary_, while, vice versa, it is only genuinely -revolutionary conduct that possesses the true qualities of positive -action. Sincerity is the primal motive force of action. With it, a man -is aware only of the interests he has in common with his fellow-men, and -of none that conflicts with those of his fellow-men. With sincerity, a -man acts his will to good in perfect self-possession, pushing steadily -onwards through difficulty and danger to success. This is the bearing of -Dr. Sun's teaching on the revolutionary movement. - - -THE LAWS OF ACTION - -In what I have said so far I have sketched the outlines of our -conception of action. Men differ in profession, rank and work; but there -is not a single one of us but must be a _man of action_ if our -revolutionary aims are to be completely realized. Action, however, is -subject to certain laws, which I now wish to go into. It must, firstly, -have its _point-de-départ_, secondly its regular order of procedure -(that is, a methodical and scientific plan), thirdly, its definite goal, -and lastly it must possess the qualities of constancy and continuity. - - -One: The Starting Point - -Firstly, by _point-de-départ_ we mean the careful selection of whatever -way of approach may be most appropriate, direct, and efficacious for the -carrying out of our projects. The same is true of study, affairs, and -revolutionary action. The ancients said: "Ascent must start from places -low; remote objectives are attained from near beginnings." This was -their way of expressing the nature of the _point-de-départ_. If any -mistake is made about it we are bound to miss our objective and -destination however sure we may be of the direction in which we want to -go. Again, if we try to run before we can walk, or skip preliminaries, -or gain the heights by some ill-considered short-cut, our work will -inevitably prove abortive. - - -Two: Ordered Unfolding of Plans - -Secondly, the necessity for what I have called "a regular order of -procedure" means the uselessness of reliance upon mere verve and -enthusiasm, and the futility of action taken on the spur of some -transitory turn of thought, action which is bound to encounter -unforeseen obstacles in its course, be disconcerted by them, and lose -its character as action by becoming some irrational form of _motion_. -Action must be preceded by the laying down of plans and choice of a mode -of procedure whereby all possible contingencies may be allowed for and -prepared for. The plans, moreover, must be precise in matters of time -and space, and in quantitative and numerical considerations. They must, -when decided upon, be carried out with due attention to detail, and with -periodical stock-taking of the ground covered. A steady rate of advance -will thus be maintained. When it is possible to make plans it is -obviously also possible to foresee to a great extent the circumstances -of time and place under which the plans will be carried out and the -quantitative and numerical requirements that will have to be met. In -scientific accordance with these foreseen circumstances and requirements -the execution of the whole project should be apportioned among the -persons involved so that each has work in all respects congenial to his -qualities, while provision is also made for cooperation between all -concerned. With order and method in procedure there will be no putting -of the cart before the horse, no abrupt intrusion of irrelevancies, no -slackening at moments of urgency, or precipitate speed where none is -needed; day by day and step by step substantial progress will be made. -In this way we shall have no abortive enterprises, nor the -disappointment they engender. - - -Three: Unswerving Aim at the Target - -Coming, thirdly, to the matter of _goal_, it should be like a -conspicuous target at which one takes steady, unfaltering, aim. No -matter whether the work we are engaged in be of vast or slight -dimensions, its aim should be seen, as it were, through sights trained -on the main target of an ideal goal. To every piece of work there must -be a beginning and an end, a clearly-defined destination. Before the -destination be reached there can be no pause in our concentrated effort. - - -Four: The Even Texture of a Life of Action - -Lastly, with regard to the fourth and especially important point: -perseverance and continuity, the very qualities that, as I said at the -beginning, distinguish _action_ from _motion_. I spoke of action as -essentially regular, orderly, and purposeful, and said that such action -would necessarily be revolutionary action and its influence -revolutionary influence. In other words, revolutionary action unfolds in -an unbroken uniformity of effort; it draws on the funds of moral vigor -in our national genius, and provides a new channel for the expression -of the great moral qualities of which that genius is composed, whereby -it may rehabilitate the status to which it is properly entitled. It must -be realized that our Revolutionary and the reconstructive activities -pursue a broad and enlightened policy free from all manner of trickery -and opportunism. We are actuated by a spirit of extraordinary power, but -what we are doing is nothing abnormal as the word should be understood, -and our methods are wholly realistic. - -All unnatural and inhuman conduct, and illogical and unscientific -methods, result in frustration and can have no place in revolutionary -activity. The ancients spoke of "acts of routine virtue" in their -emphasis upon the almost _humdrum_, stolid, qualities of true virtue. -Our Revolution is likewise dependent upon the capacity to maintain a -course of persevering and continuous effort; the behavior required is in -no way peculiar or foreign to everyday life. For out of continuity comes -perseverance and what we may call _ease_. Tsêng Kuo-fan said: "things -should be done soundlessly and as it were 'odorlessly,' with both -precision and economy of effort." By this he meant not wooden -impassivity or dry-as-dust pedantry but directness, simplicity, and an -absence of fuss, a straightforward and unassuming way of going about -things. In working for the success of the Revolution we should cultivate -the attitude of the nameless hero who braves dangers and endures -hardships as matters of course. We shall thus keep in touch with the -people and render the influence of what we do in the service of mankind -broad and lasting. - - -FORMATION AND CONSTANCY OF PURPOSE - -Unremitting perseverance to the very end of our task, every day we live -a day of positive action, and full employment of our powers in harmony -with the laws of Nature and Man, are the conditions for our successful -accomplishment of our revolutionary mission. Among Tsêng Kuo-fan's -self-admonitory words on "Formation of Purpose" there are the following -phrases: "To cast away the gifts of Heaven and live in sloth will bring -upon me some evil catastrophe.... This I swear never to forget as long -as I can still draw breath." That is to say, the formation of our -purpose in life requires of us diligent and courageous devotion and the -full exercise of our talents. The great writer and statesman also -admonished himself on the subject of steadfastness of purpose, -reproaching himself: "Again and again have you been delinquent in your -duties and endeavors, and been swayed by material temptations; but no -one has ever heard of your being unpunctual at mealtimes!" How is it, he -meant, that if we can be regular in attending to our material wants we -cannot be equally unfailing in the performance of our duties? The full -accomplishment of any aim requires strong-minded formation and -steadfastness of purpose. The true meaning of the words "let the -superior man exert himself with the unfailing pertinacity of Nature" -embraces this. - -I have now completed my explanation of the fundamental principles -involved in positive action. I wish to conclude by once again exhorting -you all to firm faith in the Tsung-li's teaching: "From true knowledge -action naturally proceeds." The meaning of the Revolution is as bright -and spacious as the skies; and the clearer our comprehension of it the -more vigor we shall put into the practice of it. Moreover, the methods -we are to adopt and the mode of procedure we are to follow have been -laid down for us in detail by Dr. Sun Wên. We have only to obey his -directions, each of us playing a part for which his temperament, calling -and knowledge fits him, relying upon his faculties for the discernment -of moral and material good at every step in his bold and resolute -execution of his duty to nation and people. - - -ACTION ENGENDERS KNOWLEDGE - -I wish to say another word on the subject of the _knowledge_ from which -as we have seen action proceeds; and what I have to say is: that just as -action proceeds from knowledge, action in its turn engenders knowledge. -Dr. Sun said: "The ability to know implies the ability to act." I would -add the words: "without action one cannot attain to knowledge." For -knowledge comes with experience, and apart from the broad and -fundamental truths of revolutionary thought our knowledge need not -necessarily be in the first place very rich. Though, therefore, we must -of course do all we can to acquire knowledge for its own sake, we must -at the same time seek it as one of the fruits of positive action. Any -knowledge acquired in the course of study, research, or experience which -we do not proceed to put to the test of practice in the field of -actuality is not to be considered with certainty as worthy of being -called true knowledge. So it is that in all our undertakings practice -will yield us true knowledge, and action alone will give us the ability -to extend and enrich our knowledge. Chu Hsi in his commentary on the -_Great Learning_ wrote: "By long application of our powers we one day -reach a point whence we see the whole scheme of things spread out before -us, we perceive the realities underlying phenomena, the relation of -accident to essence, and the structure and workings of the human mind." -This attainment can come only as the fruit of positive action. If in the -course of practice and experience knowledge we have acquired and methods -we have based on it prove inefficacious we may take it that what we -valued as knowledge was not true knowledge. In this way we shall be -constantly broadening the scope and sifting the quality of our -knowledge, which is the genuine process of gaining knowledge. "To be -aware of ignorance brings knowledge" and "the open mind invites the -entrance of information," are maxims than which none are better as -guides in the search for knowledge. - - -COMRADES IN REVOLUTION! RESOLVE ANEW! - -I am well aware of the magnitude of our revolutionary task of Resistance -and Reconstruction, and I have been no less impressed with recent -manifestations of my comrades' will to action. I have felt impelled by -the one and encouraged by the other to present you today this exposition -of positive action and of what is requisite for its success, in the hope -that you will all keep in mind these indispensable principles, gathering -fresh knowledge with experience, acting with deliberation, perspicacity, -and conscientiousness, spurning all things that tend to distract you -from your fixed purpose and involve you in the wild and motiveless -conduct of those who possess no such fixed purpose. In the _Chung-Yung_, -or _Doctrine of the Mean_, there is a passage emphasizing the importance -of "conscientiousness" in action, by which it means the refusal to be -satisfied with half-measures, the pursuit of ends to their logical -conclusion. If you give earnest thought to what I have said you will -realize that very much of what has long passed with us for action has -not been true action, that is, not positive action, and that therefore -we have failed in much that we have undertaken. It is only because our -action has not been really positive that we have allowed our minds to -enlarge on the difficulties and dangers of the Revolution. In fact, -these difficulties exist only for those whose minds lack resolution, -enthusiasm and faith. The ancient adage says: "There's nothing difficult -in the world if there's a man of spirit to be found" (where there's a -will there's a way). This is a piece of the age-old proverbial wisdom of -the people, and it may well serve us as a salutary warning against the -slack thinking and evil habits concealed beneath the airy phrase: "It's -easy enough to know what should be done; it's acting accordingly that's -hard." - -We need, therefore, in the revolutionary nation-building we have before -us only to assert our wills, inflame our hearts with a fresh sincerity -and faith, and give ourselves up to positive action. If everyone of us -does so, I have no hesitation in pronouncing it will mean the certainty -of our success. - - - - -_C._ DEFINITION OF THE PROBLEMS CONCERNING THE ORGANIZATION OF THE -VARIOUS CLASSIFICATIONS OF _HSIEN_ (CHIANG K'AI-SHEK)[1] - - - [Footnote 1: [Chiang K'ai-shek], _Ch'üeh-ting Hsien Ko-chi Tsu-chih - Wên-t'i_ (Definition of the Problems Concerning the Organization of - the Various Classifications of _Hsien_), [Chungking], 1939, p. 43 and - chart.] - - One of a series of lectures, each issued separately, - entitled _The Conclusions of the Party Chief_, and - originally delivered before the Party and Government - Training Class of the Central Training Corps. Compare with - Appendix I (G), p. 324. - - The chart, opposite, is a translation of the chart appended - to the original Chinese of the Generalissimo's booklet on - _Hsien_. P.M.A.L. - - -ORGANIZATION OF THE VARIOUS CLASSIFICATIONS OF _HSIEN_ - - +------------------+ _Hsien_ - _Hsien_ |_Hsien_ Government| _Hsien_ Party - People'.........................|------------------|.......................Party Supervisory - Council | _Hsien_ Chief | Organ Committee - | | (Magistrate) | | | - | +---------------------------------------------------------------+ | +--+ - | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +---------| | - |People's | | | | | | | | | | | | | |People's | | - |Organizations |Library|Middle-|Land |Mili- |Edu- |Civic | |Organizations: | | - |(_cont'd_): | |School |Section|tary |cation |Affairs| | Ex-Servicemen's | | - | Laborers Assn.| | | |Section|Section|Section| | Assn. | | - | Farmers' Assn.| Cooperative | | | | | | Elders' Assn. | | - | Merchants' | Union | | Reconstruction| Police | Women's Assn. | | - | Assn. | | | Section | Bureau | Able-bodied | | - | Education | Social | | | Citizens' Corps| | - | Assn. | Affairs | Finance | Young Men's Corps| | - | Others Experimental Section | Section | | | - | Farm | Public | | - | +------------------+ Health | | - | Reconstruction-----| _Ch'ü_ Bureau | Bureau District| - | Committee |------------------| Party | - | | _Ch'ü_ Chief | Organ | - | +---------------------------------------------------------+ | | - | | | | | | | | | | | | | | - | | Ch'ü |Military |Education|Director | Health | | | - | | Vocational |Director |Director |of Civic | Bureau | | | - | | Training | | |Affairs | | | | - | | Class | Reconstruction | | Able-bodied| | - | | | Director | Police Citizens' | | - | Cooperative | Finance Bureau Union | | - | Union | Director | | - _Hsiang_ +------------------+ | | - People's <==================> | _Hsiang_ [or | Sub- | - Council | _Ch'ên_] Office | district| - | |------------------| Party | - | | _Hsiang_ Chief | Organ | - | +-----------------------------------------+ | | - | | | | | | | | | | | | - | People's | School| Division| Division|People's | | - | Organizations | System| of | of |Organizations: | | - | (_cont'd_): | | Police | Economic| Ex-Servicemen's | | - | Laborers' Assn.| | Affairs | Affairs | Assn. | | - | Farmers' Assn. | | | | Elder's Assn. | | - | Education Assn.| | Division of | Women's Assn. | | - | Others | | Cultural | Able-bodied | | - | Cooperatives | Affairs | Citizens' Corps | | - | | | Young Men's Corps | | - _Pao_ +------------------+ | Small- | - People's <==================> | _Pao_ Office | Division Group | - Council |------------------| of Civic (cell) | - | | _Pao_ Chief | Affairs | | - | +-----------------------------------+ | | - | | | | | | | | | | Party - | |Citizen's| Economic| Police | _Pao_ Able-bodied | Super- - | |School | Affairs | Section | Citizens' Troop | visors' - | | | Section | | | Net - | _Pao_ | | Civic | - | Cooperatives | Cultural Affairs | - | | Affairs Section | - | | Section | - | | | - | +------------------+ _Chia_ Able-bodied | - | | _Chia_ Chief |-------------Citizens' Troop | - | +------------------+ | - | | | - |------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| - | The People | - +------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ - -At the fifth meeting of the Fourth Plenary Session of the Central -Executive and Supervisory Committees of the Kuomintang on April 8, 1938, -I made a speech on "The Reform of Party Affairs and Readjustments for -Party and Political Organizations." Attached to that speech was a draft -chart showing the interrelations among the Party and political -organizations under the _hsien_, with illustrations and explanations. I -pointed out then that the chart was only intended as an initial draft. -As to promulgating the detailed formulae and laws for execution, I -pointed out that the draft was only to serve as a basis and that the -wording in which the draft was written should not prove too binding. -There should be plenty of room for further study and discussion so that -perfection might be obtained. Furthermore, the draft chart was intended -mainly as an exposition of the relations between Party and political -organizations (hence it was also called "Party and Political Affairs -Chart"). The various administrative organizations were attached as an -appendix to it. - -Since the publication of this draft chart, the serious attention of many -of our comrades, scholars and specialists has been aroused. In many -districts experiments have been carried on--a fact which is indeed very -gratifying and which evidences the earnest desire on the part of various -local administrations for reform. - -The Party and Political Personnel Training Class was recently -inaugurated by the Central Training Corps. In order to lecture on the -problems covered in the draft chart and lay out the necessary formulae, -I had instructed several of my associates to collect views and data from -all possible sources and to make a thorough study of the question. Under -my personal supervision, the original draft has been revised and -supplemented. The main points contained therein may be summarized as -follows: - -1. In connection with Party organizations, the _ch'ü_[2] (township) -office should be linked up with the _hsiang_ (_chên_), while small units -should be established under the _pao chia_ system. Thus the Party -organizations are brought to conformity with the political. The network -of Party members' supervisory organizations should be placed directly -under the Supervisory Committee of the _hsien_ Party headquarters. - - [Footnote 2: For explanation of such local government terms as - _hsiang_, _pao_, _ch'ü_, see the text, p. 107.] - -2. The _hsien_ is the unit of local government autonomy. The _hsien_ -should be classified into three to six groups according to their area, -population, economic resources, cultural and communication development. -Below the _hsien_, the _hsiang_ (_chên_) constitutes the basic lower -unit, with _pao_ or village and streets as their constituents. -Elasticity may be allowed between the _hsien_ and _hsiang_ according to -local requirements. When and where necessary, a _ch'ü_ (township) office -may be established to serve as the connecting link, but if this is not -needed, the _hsiang_ (_chên_) should be placed under the direct -jurisdiction of the _hsien_. The same elasticity may exist between the -_hsiang_ (_chên_) and _pao_. In densely populated areas, a village and -a street may form one natural unit, inseparable from each other. In such -cases, one unit may consist of two or three _pao_ with one _pao chang_ -(chief of the _pao_) at the helm of affairs, so that unnecessary -breaking-up of the village from the street may be avoided. To eliminate -difficulties arising from finances and personnel, all the posts of -secretaries (_kan shih_) of the _hsiang_ (_chên_) and _pao_ (or village -and street) may be concurrently served by the teachers of primary -schools, while the school principals of the _hsiang_ (_chên_) and _pao_ -should concurrently serve as leader of the able-bodied citizens' corps -(_Chuang ting tui_) in accordance with the principle of unity of -administration, instruction, support and protection. In areas with -better economic and educational development where affairs concerning -local autonomy are multifarious, the principals of _hsiang_ (_chên_) -primary schools and pao citizens' [mass education] schools should -preferably concentrate on their school jobs with a view to efficiency. -The masses should be organized into different groups to undertake -different works in order to meet the actual requirements. - -3. In connection with organs for expressing the views and opinions of -the people, there should be organized the _pao_ people's assembly, the -_hsiang_ (_chên_) people's representative assembly, the _hsien_ council, -each vested with proper authority, with a view to increasing the -people's interest in participating in government affairs. Thus the -influence of the masses may be properly magnified and the goal of true -democracy attained. With a view to greater alacrity, I wish to explain -in further detail as follows: - - -A. READJUSTMENTS IN THE RELATIONS AMONG THE VARIOUS ADMINISTRATIVE PARTY -AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS OF THE _Hsien_ - -(_This item, consisting of eleven articles, is not intended for -publication._) - - A routine announcement of Party duties, of Party supervision - of local morale, of seniorities as between Party and - Government officers, etc. follows. It has been omitted in - accordance with the statement in parentheses. - - -B. POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS - -1. The _hsien_ is the unit of local autonomy. These units can be -classified into from three to six groups according to the population, -economic status, culture and communication. On the one hand, the _hsien_ -governments should handle affairs concerning local autonomy of their -respective district under the supervision of the provincial government -and on the other hand should carry out the orders of the Central and -provincial governments. - -_a._ The area of the _hsien_ under the present system should remain the -same as before. The cancellation of the _hsien_ and the change in its -area are to be decided upon only with the authorization and approval of -the Central Government. In the _hsien_ there should be a magistrate, -under whom there should be secretaries, section chiefs, directors, -police officers, senior and junior staff members in the different -sections, technicians and assistants and police patrol officers handling -civic, financial, educational, construction, military, land, and social -affairs. The number of sections to be provided under the _hsien_ -governments and their duties is to be decided by the provincial -government which in making decisions is to take into consideration the -local requirements of the _hsien_ concerned. The number of staff -members, and their ranks and salaries, is likewise to be decided upon by -the provincial government. - -_b._ In each _hsien_ there should be held _hsien_ political affairs -meetings at which decisions concerning the _hsien_ administration are to -be reached and proposals made for submission to the _hsien_ People's -Council. The _hsien_ political affairs meetings should be held -irrespective of whether the _hsien_ Council has been established or not. - -_c._ The rules and regulations governing the organization of the _hsien_ -governments should be promulgated by the provincial governments and then -submitted to the Central Government for approval. - -2. The _ch'ü_ (township) office is a subsidiary organization to the -_hsien_ government. Its duty is to supervise the affairs of the various -_hsiang_ (_chên_) on behalf of the _hsien_ government in connection with -the enforcement of local autonomy. - -_a._ The scope of the _ch'ü_ should consist of from six to fifteen -_hsiang_. In those _hsien_ in which the total number of _hsiang_ is -below fifteen, no _ch'ü_ office should be established. The _hsiang_ in -such cases are to be placed under the direct jurisdiction of the _hsien_ -government. In frontier regions where special conditions obtain, -specifications for the number of _hsiang_ for the _ch'ü_ office may be -modified. - -In _hsien_ where no _ch'ü_ office is established, the _hsien_ government -should appoint representatives to supervise the affairs of the different -_hsiang_. - -_b._ The _ch'ü_ office is headed by a district chief under whom there -should be two to five directors handling civic, financial, construction, -education, and military affairs. All such personnel are by special -appointment with pay, and they should be chosen by the superior -organizations from those who have received appropriate training. The -district chiefs should preferably be those who come from the districts -to which they are designated, their qualifications and treatment to be -fixed by law. - -_c._ In the place where the _ch'ü_ office is seated, there should be -established a police bureau which is to be under the direction of the -district chief dealing with the police administration of the place. - -_d._ In the _ch'ü_ there should be established the _hsiang_ -reconstruction committee comprising local leaders as members. This -committee is to conduct research and map out the plans concerning rural -reconstruction, the district chief acting concurrently as its chairman. - -_e._ In order to increase the vocational ability of the people and -develop local industries, there should be established in the _ch'ü_ -vocational training classes. - -_f._ In addition to the number of policemen as specified, there should -be organized in the _ch'ü_ the joint able-bodied citizens' corps -(_Chuang-ting lien tui-pu_) office which is to control and supervise the -_Chuang-ting_ of the various _hsiang_ (_chên_). Whenever necessary, the -_chuang-ting_ may be summoned together for special training and -organization. - -_g._ The _ch'ü_ office should unite together all the _hsiang_ (_chên_) -cooperative societies and organize them into cooperative unions. Each -union is to consist of several departments dealing with different -cooperative enterprises. The _ch'ü_ office should appoint a supervisor -to be stationed in the union. - -3. The _hsiang_ (_chên_) is to be defined as the basic administrative -unit under the _hsien_, and its organization should be substantiated -accordingly. - -a. Each _hsiang_ in principle comprises six to fifteen _pao_. In drawing -such limits, however, consideration should be given to the historical -background and natural conditions of the locality. The demarcation and -the organization of the _pao chia_ system are to be decided upon by the -_hsien_ government, subject to the approval of the provincial -government. Reports must also be submitted to the Central Government. - -_b._ The chief personnel of the _hsiang_ guild (_kung so_) should -include a director (_hsiang chang_) and one or two vice-directors. They -are to be elected from qualified citizens at the _hsiang_ people's -representative meetings. In the guild there should be provided four -departments, handling civic, police, economic and cultural affairs -respectively, each to be headed by one man with several staff members. -These posts should be held by the vice-directors and teachers of the -_hsiang_ primary schools. The date for the election of the director and -vice-directors of the _hsiang_ is to be fixed and announced in orders to -be issued by the _hsien_ government. The term of their office will be -two years. - -_c._ There should be established in each _hsiang_ a central school -composed of three divisions for children, women especially, and adults. -There should be primary and higher primary classes. The posts of the -school principal, leader of the able-bodied citizens' corps, and -director of the _hsiang_ are to be concurrently held by one man. The -teachers are to undertake the extracurricular duties of training and -supervising. They are also to help the _hsiang director_ to handle -affairs of the _hsiang_. In the higher primary class of the school -stress should be laid on training the masses to enable them to undertake -the work of census-taking, promotion of health and sanitation and -cooperative affairs. - -In places with better economic and educational development, the -principals of the _hsiang_ central schools should preferably concentrate -on their own duties at school. - -_d._ The cooperative societies also have the _hsiang_ as the unit (with -branch societies in the _pao_). There should also be established in the -_hsiang_ public safe-deposit agencies for the storage of articles. -Separate granaries should be set up whenever necessary. - -_e._ The leader of the _hsiang_ able-bodied citizens' corps should from -time to time summon chosen groups of the _chuang ting_ of the _pao_ to -the _hsiang_ to undergo advanced training. During the training period, -they are to perform police duties and when the period expires they are -to be sent back to take up the work as junior officers of the -able-bodied citizens' corps of the _pao_, charged also with the duties -of promoting local autonomy in the _pao_. Thus not only will the police -force be strengthened, but various activities properly developed. The -outposts established in the _hsiang_ by the _hsien_ police bureaus -should also be placed under the direction of the _hsiang_ director. - -_f._ The _hsiang_ should convene _hsiang_ affairs meetings with the -director as chairman and all the department heads and senior members of -the staff in attendance. The chiefs of the _pao_ concerning whom -proposals are submitted to the meeting should also be present. - -_g._ A hospital or clinic should be established for each _hsiang_ or a -number of _hsiang_. These hospitals or clinics should be staffed with -Western-trained doctors. In case of lack of personnel and finance, -[old-style] Chinese physicians may do on a temporary basis. - -4. The _pao_ should be defined as a constituent of the _hsiang_ and its -organization be substantiated accordingly. - -_a._ Each _pao_ is to consist of from six to fifteen _chia_, headed by a -_pao chang_ (chief of the _pao_) and an assistant _pao chang_. They are -to be elected from qualified citizens at the _pao_ people's meeting, and -their names are to be submitted by the _hsiang_ guild to the _hsien_ -government. Before the election, the _pao chang_ and assistant _pao -chang_ may be nominated by the _hsiang_ guild subject to official -appointment by the _hsien_ government. In the office of the _pao_ there -should be two to four secretaries (_kan shih_) handling civic, police, -economic and cultural affairs. These posts may be concurrently held by -the assistant _pao chang_ and teachers of citizens' (mass education) -schools. In _pao_ with limited finances, one secretary may suffice. - -The term of office for the _pao chang_ and assistant _pao chang_ will be -two years. They may be re-elected at the expiration of their term of -office. - -_b._ All affairs of the _pao_ should be discussed and transacted at -_pao_ affairs meeting in which as many capable citizens of the _pao_ as -possible are to be asked to participate, in order to hasten progress of -the reconstruction of the _pao_. - -_c._ All the activities undertaken by the _pao_ are to be under the -supervision and direction of the hsiang guild, the _ch'ü_ office and the -_hsien_ government. The latter superior organs should give constant help -and advice so that the program of work may be carried out step by step -as desired. - -_d._ Every _pao_ is to have a mass education school, with the principal -of the school concurrently serving as the _pao chang_ and as the leader -of the _pao_ able-bodied citizens' corps. The school is to comprise -three divisions for children, for women especially, and for adults, and -its aim is to raise the level of education and vocational ability of the -masses. Teachers are also to help the _pao chang_ in dealing with -various affairs of the _pao_. - -In _pao_ better-developed in economic resources and education, the -principles of the mass education schools should preferably concentrate -on their school duties. - -_e._ Membership of the _pao_ branches of the cooperative societies is -composed of the families in the _pao_. The directors of the branch -societies are to be elected by members. The _pao chang_ can be elected -and concurrently hold this office. - -_f._ The _pao_ office, the _pao_ able-bodied citizens' corps and the -_pao_ mass education schools should be simultaneously established. They -should have a joint office so that affairs of common interest may be -pushed from the same center. - -_g._ In densely populated areas where a village and a street seem each -to be an integral part of the other, two or three _pao_ may be -amalgamated, the amalgamation not exceeding three _pao_. The mass -education schools, branch cooperative societies and treasuries, -likewise, may be amalgamated, with only the _pao_ able-bodied citizens' -corps remaining separate. One presiding _pao chang_ is to be elected to -take the helm of affairs, and a joint office is to be established. - -_h._ The _pao_ should be equipped with a medicine box, with one of the -mass education school teachers trained in rudiments of the medical -science, in charge. He is to give simple treatment for diseases and to -give small-pox vaccination. If this should prove beyond the finances of -one _pao_, several _pao_ may join together. - -_i._ The organization of the _chia_ is to consist of from six to fifteen -families, headed by a _chia chang_. There should be meetings of the -heads of families, and general _chia_ conferences, held from time to -time. - -The _chia chang_ is to be elected at the meeting of heads of families. -His name is to be submitted by the _pao_ office to the _hsiang_ guild. - -_j._ The _pao_ may retain its old name, such as _ts'un_ (village), -_chieh_ (street) or _ch'ang_ (market), but it is desired that they -should gradually adopt the official name of _pao_ with a view to -uniformity. - - -C. PEOPLE'S ORGANS THROUGH WHICH POPULAR POLITICAL OPINIONS MAY BE -EXPRESSED - -1. To increase the people's interest in participation in government -affairs and to train their political insight and ability in accordance -with the principle of the inherent unity of teaching, learning and -practicing, people's organs for discussion of government affairs for the -various administrative units under the _hsien_ should be established -within specified time limits, and these organs should be vested with the -appropriate authority. - -2. In the _pao_ should be established the _pao_ people's meeting to -elect the _pao chang_; the _hsiang_, the _hsiang_ people's -representative meeting to elect the _hsiang chang_.[3] (The -qualifications and standards of both the _pao chang_ and the _hsiang -chang_ are to be specified by law.) Thus it is hoped to attain the ideal -standards of local government and to establish the system of the -people's supervision of the government. No people's organ is needed for -the _ch'ü_ (district), while the _hsien_ people's council will serve as -the general organ for people of the entire _hsien_. - - [Footnote 3: Heretofore translated as "director of the _hsiang_."] - -3. With a view to flexibility in the exercise of the people's -privileges, members of the _hsien_ people's council are to be brought -forth at the _hsiang_ people's representative meetings. Each _hsiang_ is -entitled to elect one representative as member of the council. The -number of representatives of legitimate professional bodies may be -increased in order to put representation of the districts and that of -the professions on equal footing. Representatives to the _hsiang_ -people's meeting are to be produced at the _pao_ people's meeting. Each -_pao_ is entitled to two representatives. The _pao_ people's meeting -should be attended by one person from each family whose qualifications -and position in the family conforms to specifications in the law. - -4. The _hsiang chang_ and _pao chang_ who are elected may both act as -chairmen of their respective people's organs, namely the _hsiang_ -people's representative meeting and the _pao_ people's meeting. The -_hsien_ people's council for the time being is not to elect the -magistrate. It is to elect its own chairman. - -5. Before the _hsien_ people's council is organized, the budget and -accounts of the _hsien_ government should be studied and passed by the -_hsien_ Administrative Meeting and then submitted by the magistrate to -the provincial government for approval. - -After the _hsien_ people's council is inaugurated, the budget and -accounts of the _hsien_ should be presented to the council for -examination and then submitted to the provincial government for -approval. When necessary, the budget and accounts may first be sent to -the provincial government for approval and then the council may be -approached for confirmation and verification. - - -EXPLANATION - -1. The basic spirit of this draft is to arouse and mobilize the masses, -to strengthen local organization and hasten district autonomy -enterprises so that the cornerstone of the revolution and national -reconstruction may be laid. Some may be of the opinion that as education -has not been popularized, it would be difficult to allow the masses -participation in government affairs. But the political system stressing -on people's privileges must be founded on the will of the masses. If -participation in government affairs is allowed only after education has -been developed on a nation-wide scale, the slogan "revolutionized -people's privileges" will be of no meaning. The people need only be -trained practically in the exercise of their political privileges, and -the main task of the government during the political tutelage period -lies in teaching the people how to exercise their four rights -[election; recall; initiative; referendum]. Tutelary government -[Party-dictatorship] and constitutional government are different only in -degree but not in fundamentals. During the period of tutelage, -therefore, the interest of the people in participation in government -affairs must be gradually aroused and increased. Thus measures enforced -with this purpose in view during the political tutelage period may not -contravene the aims of constitutional government, and the progress from -tutelage to constitutionalism may be attained smoothly. This explains -the transitional process from the beginning to the complete realization -of autonomous government and it was for such an explanation that this -draft was prepared. - -2. With a view to the solution of the personnel and financial problems -confronting the various basic administrative units, the _hsiang_ chief, -_hsiang_ central school principal, and the _hsiang_ leader of the -able-bodied citizens' corps, excepting in those areas more highly -developed in education and economic resources, should be the same man. -The same thing applies to the _pao_. All those charged with -administrative duties should pay attention to education which should -serve as the means to attain the objectives of the revolution and -national reconstruction. Those with educational responsibilities should -give their time and energy also to the organization and training of the -masses. They should consider the masses as their students, the society -as a school and all existing circumstances and conditions as references -of instruction. Emphasis should also be laid on instructing the people -how to live properly, how to accomplish their duties. The basic -principles governing the revolutionary movement and national -reconstruction as laid down by our late Leader [Sun Yat-sen], measures -on the control of rice and the control of land as stipulated in the -ordinances and regulations governing district autonomy, together with -the seven measures previously announced by the Central Government, -should all be included in the scope of instruction. It was with these -considerations in mind that this draft provides that teachers of the -_hsiang_ middle [secondary] and _pao_ mass-education schools should -concurrently act as secretaries of the _hsiang_ guild and _pao_ office. -It would not do to maintain the old system when school teachers only -taught in the classroom, with the result that in many places where -schools have been conducted for many years people still refuse to be -conscripted, to pay taxes, to observe the New Life principles. This -could be attributed to the fact that teachers and others in charge of -the schools failed to do their duties. - -It is also provided in the ordinances and regulations governing the -initial enforcement of district autonomy that "aside from enabling -people to read and write, schools should also emphasize what has been -known as the 'omnipotency of both hands' campaign." We should try to -make all the tools or machines that can increase the productive ability -of both hands, instead of relying on others. From now on, therefore, -local schools should emphasize vocational training by which the students -may be taught how to manufacture simple machines. This is not merely -scientific education but also an important way of carrying out the -doctrine of the people's livelihood. It is therefore provided in this -draft that in the _ch'ü_ (township) there should be established the -district vocational training class so that education and living may be -closely wedded. - -In the past, educational organization has been too complicated. Besides -primary schools, there have been mass education schools, short-term -primary schools, rural schools. Now, since it is stipulated that the -_pao_ has _pao_ mass education schools and the _hsiang_ has _hsiang_ -middle schools, the children and adults should be taught in separate -classes but at the same school so that all the former units of -education may be absorbed. The tutor (_tao shêng_) system should be used -as much as possible in the hope that the entire people of the nation may -be given at least the minimum education for citizenship within a limited -period of time. Thus all the personnel and finances may be concentrated; -the teachers may conveniently do their duty in directing the masses into -proper participation in various local enterprises. In this way, -education and autonomy may be closely affiliated with each other. - -3. The organization of the various local administrative units is roughly -in accordance with the decimal system. In such provisions of this draft, -allowances have been made whereby the difficulties in the way of -enforcement of the system may be solved. Once the scope of the various -local administrative units is fixed, all plans and programs such as -establishing schools, training personnel, appropriation of funds and -statistics may be mapped out according to definite standards. The -conduct of a big nation with its variegated enterprises depends on -strict organization in war-time as well as in peace-time. In the army, -for instance, the number of units composing each army corps is -definitely fixed. Scientific administration must be governed by rules -and regulations. - -For the convenience of execution, certain elasticity has been allowed in -provisions concerning organization in this draft. The _hsiang_, for -instance, is composed of from six to fifteen _pao_, and so on with other -lower administrative units. In cases where the village and the street -cannot be separated, joint organizations for the handling of affairs of -common interest is allowed. All these provisions are arrived at in order -to allow some flexibility whenever and wherever necessary. Within the -bounds of these regulations, the various local district governments may -exercise their discretion in disposing their respective affairs without -consulting their superior governments. But they will not be permitted to -trespass beyond the limits because disorderly organizations will make -control and supervision hard. - -After the scope of the various local administrative units is fixed, -their respective spheres of education, health, cooperative movements and -police must also be uniformly determined so that control, instruction, -support, and protection may have an equal and well-balanced development. - -4. Concerning the organization and training of the masses, it is indeed -regrettable that no wholesome accomplishments have been achieved during -the past many years. According to this new draft, the following -explanations have to be made: - -_a._ Demarcation among people's groups and organizations: the former is -determined by professions and the latter according to age and sex. From -the standpoint of the requirements of the country, the latter should be -organized first. Especially urgent is the demand for such organizations -as the able-bodied citizens' corps and women's associations. From the -standpoint of the needs of the people, the organization of the -professional groups should be put on a sound basis as soon as possible, -particularly the farmers, laborers, and merchants groups which are -vitally concerned with the economic reconstruction movement of the -country. Steps, therefore, should immediately be taken in the order of -urgency. Next, for people's organizations, emphasis is to be laid on -organization and training; for the groups, direction and supervision are -to be stressed. - -_b._ The work of organizing the various people's groups should proceed -from the bottom upwards because wholesome organizations can only be had -when the foundation is soundly laid. In peace-time, this will help -forward self-rule. In war-time, it will help meet military needs. In the -past, the various people's groups (such as farmers' associations and -women's associations) had only nominal existence, hanging their shingles -in the _hsien_ city, but few really worked. The reasons might be many, -but the main one has been the failure on the part of those responsible -to penetrate into the lower strata of activities and help develop them. -It must be realized that the various people's groups are necessary to -the various administrative units in the district autonomous government -system just as parts to the main body of a machine. Without the parts, -the machine would not be able to operate. From now on, therefore, -efforts must be made to substantiate the people's bodies so that they -may be enabled to function efficiently. - -_c._ The able-bodied citizens' corps are necessary in peace as well as -in war-time. Attention should be paid both to training and to the -supervision so that their usefulness may be fully developed. The -constituents of the able-bodied citizens' corps are the pillars of -society, and on them depends the successful realization of most -enterprises concerning district autonomy. In this lies the importance of -our late Leader's [Sun Yat-sen] teaching about "omnipotency of both -hands." During the training, emphasis should not be on military alone -but also on general and vocational ability, in order to turn corps -members into useful members of society. - -5. The people's organs for various local administrative units serve best -the purpose of training the people in the exercise of their rights in -government affairs. They constitute the prerequisites for democracy. In -the past, it has proved difficult to secure _hsiang_, _pao_ and _chia_ -chiefs; or, after they were elected to their respective offices, they -failed to do their duties and some of them even committed acts harmful -to the people which slipped the notice of the superior government -offices. All these shortcomings must be overcome by virtue of democratic -measures. The higher supervisory organizations, limited in personnel, -can hardly keep an eye on every small detail. The _hsiang_ and _pao_ -chiefs and other staff members under them are most closely associated -with the people. In order to prevent them from undermining the people's -interest for their selfish gains, the democratic (_Min-chu_) control and -supervision system should be enforced as the most efficient and -effective method. That the _pao_ people's meeting should be attended by -the families as representative units is a preliminary step. This is so -because China is an agricultural country, different from other -industrialized nations where the individual citizens constitute the -representative units. Representatives to the _hsiang_ people's -representative meetings are to be produced at the _pao_ people's -meeting. Councilors from the _hsiang_ and higher administrative units -for the _hsien_ people's council are to be produced by indirect instead -of direct election. Next comes the question of increasing the people's -economic stability and developing local enterprises. It is specially -provided that adequate representation to the various professional groups -should be given in the _hsien_ people's council. (This is limited to the -professional groups and their representation is not to exceed thirty per -cent.) In this way the district conception and the interests of -professions are given equal consideration. - -6. To prepare the personnel for the various local administrative -government units, the various grades of schools should be adapted to the -needs of the local organizations and enterprises. With such adaptation, -the school training may not be in vain and young students upon -graduation may find appropriate employment. A separate set of rules and -regulations should be promulgated whereby these youths may be encouraged -and their future welfare safeguarded. At present, the training of such -personnel and their future disposal have not been systematically enough -planned. Proper remedy must be provided so that definite standards may -be fixed. Most important of all, persons properly trained should be -assigned to places where are located their native home villages or -towns. All such jobs concerning the development of district enterprises -like insurance of treasuries or storehouses, transportation of rice and -foodstuffs, farmland irrigation, fishing, grazing, and land reclamation, -should all be filled by persons with special technical training. As the -development of such district enterprises continues, the demand for -appropriate personnel will grow as a foregone conclusion. - -7. With regard to financial problems, the late Leader instructed that -the district self-rule organizations should be founded on the basis of -"political and economic cooperation." The sources of finance, therefore, -should be derived from the people's public productive enterprises, -instead of depending on new taxes. There are many public properties in -various localities that should be utilized. Instead, these have mainly -been exploited and monopolized by individuals who cared for nothing but -their own selfish interests. Henceforth, these properties should be -placed under public control. With efficient management, the proceeds -from these enterprises should serve as finances for the entire _hsiang_ -or _pao_. In case such properties consist of land, they could be turned -into experimental farms and be placed under the management of the -schools for the improvement of agricultural products and for training -the people in reformed farming methods. The joint property of a clan -should be dealt with in a similar way so that their income may be -increased and the results of agricultural improvement programs may be -extended from one locality to another easily. In places where there are -no such lands, steps should be taken to reclaim the mountainous or hilly -regions or the streams and ponds. Free labor may be utilized with a view -to increasing the income. Besides, surplus rice may be stored in the -_hsiang_ and the _pao_, under the management of the people of the -respective districts. The various cooperative societies transporting -agricultural products should also provide granaries and issue mortgage -loans. Part of the profits thus derived should be devoted as funds for -the development of local enterprises. Thus not only will the financial -problem be solved but district autonomy development will follow local -needs. Before the local public enterprises (as described above) are so -developed that income is sufficient to meet financial requirements, -attention should be paid to the following measures: - -_a._ Taxes which the _hsiang_ guild may collect independent of the -superior government offices. - -_b._ The finances of the _hsien_ should be demarcated from those of the -province, and the quota of the former should be gradually increased if -possible. - -_c._ In lean _hsien_, the _hsien_ government should be subsidized by the -provincial government. - -8. Last of all, it should be pointed out that this draft was drawn up -after repeated discussions and studies. Henceforth, all the _hsien_ and -lower district government units in the autonomy system should observe -this draft as the basis. This is a time of national crisis when the -destiny of our entire nation and race is hanging between life and death. -It is hoped that all comrades of our Party and our fellow-countrymen -should strive with strong determination for nation-wide enforcement of -these district autonomy measures. Bold initiative should solve any -unforeseen difficulties that may arise. Fear and hesitation should never -be allowed to gain the upper hand. Only in this way, may we hope that -the cornerstone for various political levels of true democracy is laid -on a sound basis, and only in this way may we hope that the stupendous -task of national reconstruction can be accomplished. - - - - -_D._ A DISCUSSION OF MAO TSÊ-TUNG'S COMMENTS ON THE PRESENT STATE OF -INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (CH'ÊN KUO-HSIN)[1] - - - [Footnote 1: Min-i Ts'ung-k'an (Popular Opinion Series), _Mao Tsê-tung - Ch'ên Shao-yü Tsui-chin Yen-lun-ti Tsung Chien-t'ao_ (A General Review - of the Most Recent Utterances of Mao Tsê-tung and Ch'ên Shao-yü), - Chungking, 1940; p. 1-17.] - - The following article, expressing the general Kuomintang - view, but written and published unofficially, illustrates - debate on foreign policy, and the type of discussion between - Nationalists and Communists. Written in the autumn of 1939, - it was reprinted in 1940 as a part of a symposium, forming a - critique of Chinese Communist views. Mao Tsê-tung (see - above, p. 166) is the outstanding Chinese Communist leader. - - -I. THE QUESTION OF UNEXPECTED POLITICAL "COUPS" - -As the Central Government has already formulated correct principles of -action, the recent German-Soviet Pact has no influence upon our -National policies. If we follow these policies, that Pact does not -compel our attention. But it is not so with the Chinese Communists and -their external organs. They are confounded and struck dumb by this -unexpected blow so much that they can only keep their grief to -themselves. - -In all propaganda literature of the Communist Party, we can easily -discern the great confusion resulting from this coup. For example, -Hitler was the "Fascist Robber" or the "mad dog," but within these days, -he becomes the Führer, with all due respects. The word "Fascist" is -still being used, but whether they are planning to discard it -altogether, we do not know. For instance, on the day previous to the -announcement of the Pact, the Communists were saying, dreamily, that a -clause prohibiting Germany's seizure of other countries was included in -the Pact. Again, when Germany attacked Poland, the Communists cleverly -said that this was caused by Great Britain's playing Judas against -Poland, and they decisively said that Great Britain and France would not -aid her, and some even said that the two antagonistic fronts were still -there, though without giving any reason. When reports of these momentous -international changes arrived in quick succession, they tried every -means to make them appear unimportant. They did this perhaps to avoid -the too much "heating up" of their followers on one side, and to avoid -committing blunders before they could receive orders concerning their -future policy. They were afraid of punishment, to be sure. Hence many -ridiculed these poor people, saying that they were like a herd of sheep -without a shepherd, for they showed their ignorance, their childishness, -hesitation, and paradoxical thoughts and actions during this period. - -Public opinion as a whole praises the policies we now adopt since they -are independent of any outside element. On the other side, these praises -show that while the principles of National Defense are still as sound as -ever, the ten principles of the Communist Party are now just like ten -big stones falling on Communist toes. The Communists are about to be -killed by their own weapons. Had the Government of China been formed by -the Communists, it would, in that event, have collapsed as easily as any -Japanese cabinet since the War. What would become of the country, if -under the present crisis foreign policy were to be the speculation of -foreigners? These are exactly the ideas expressed by public gossip and -in discussions in schools. It is true that the Chinese Communists -cannot hold power because they lack political training and profound -learning. This is their inner, incurable trouble. In fact, many young -Communists have also spoken with me, and they show their sorrow when -they feel the lack of a really efficient central organ. - -But speaking with consideration, we can see their good qualities shown -by censoring a great part of the news concerning Moscow's abolition of -the Anti-Fascist movement, and on the other hand advertising in a -special manner the news concerning the will of the French Communists to -fight on the first line of defense, and to help the French Government to -destroy Fascism. Perhaps this is a true revelation of the editor's faith -in the principle "Country and Nation above all," so that unconsciously -he showed it in his actions. This point is worthy of our praise and -sympathy. - -After about ten days of hesitation and aimless probing, Mr. Mao -Tsê-tung, as the head of the Party, issued a lengthy talk entitled "On -the Present International Situation and the War of National Resistance," -in the form of a catechism in which the questions are asked by a news -reporter. In the first section, he explained the German-Soviet Pact; in -the second, he predicted the future development of international -affairs, in the third he discussed the future of China. His aim in -publishing this article is to pacify the agitated hearts of his fellow -Communists. But since it is made public, we have the liberty of -discussing it, especially so since the Communists themselves have the -same habit and they also emphasize free speech. I hope they will not be -irritated. - - -II. IS THE GERMAN-SOVIET PACT CASUAL? - -Mr. Mao seems to take it for a treaty that has been signed "all of a -sudden." Now this is quite untrue if we consider the facts. - -Many periodicals and newspapers have published articles proving that the -Pact was long-planned. We shall not consider them. We shall not even -consider the original friendship between Germany and monarchic Russia. -But we must remember how Germany brought Lenin back to Russia in a -sealed train, how the formation of the Red Army was based upon German -plans, and the fact that Germany established an aviation school in -Russia. We see how Germany helped the Russian Soviet Revolution to -succeed. I often think that if we trust the words of a country's -foreign minister and the slogans the people shout to provide us an -outline of the country's foreign policy, we end in the position of -buying goods upon reading an advertisement. In the end we will find -ourselves cheated. In fact shops which are "liquidating" their goods may -sell their goods at an even higher price than in an ordinary sale. A -more reliable way of observation is to judge the policy by studying the -secret tendencies in the actions of high military and economic organs -which are essential in national defense. If we believe in slogans alone, -we might as well ask a salesman about the curative power of his patent -medicine. In reality, the salesman is a mere hireling. What pharmacist -discloses his real formula and method of combinations? Hence, to probe -into the real relation between the two countries, we must ask the -smaller nations between them; these make the closest observations. - -For two years, these small states have been expecting this treaty. The -question of "which to side with" gives them sharp suffering which has -made them all the more sensitive. They know what the two countries have -been planning when they see so many secret delegates coming and going -very busily. Within the last two years, observers in Europe and America -have also predicted cooperation between Germany and Soviet Russia. Even -in China, did not Mr. Chiang Po-li write an essay to this effect, -warning the Chinese people? According to them, the slogans shouted in -both countries are strange diplomatic weapons; like the masques worn in -a Greek play, they do not show the faces of the actors. When the Jewish -Litvinoff went off the stage, it was the sign: "First Act Completed." -Now the spectators who wear red glasses are still enchanted by the first -act. Anyway, Mr. Mao's explanation that the Pact is a sudden one is -unreasonable. - -In China, many were doubting the National policy of independent -struggle. Not until their "Soviet Help," "Single Alliance with Russia" -essays had been erased by the recent coup, did the policy of independent -struggle begin to shine in its brilliancy. At first our policy of -independent foreign relations lost influence to the better-sounding -slogan of "A united foreign front." After this lesson, we can perhaps -see more clearly. Such a lesson to a political party not in power is a -very wholesome admonition; had the party been in power, we know the -damage which could have befallen the nation. Speaking with -consideration, I also earnestly hoped for the success in the -British-French-Soviet parleys because it would ensure safety in Europe -by safeguarding all lesser states. Furthermore, it would help us also by -checking Germany and Japan. But this was only a hope, and I seriously -doubted its realization. The "united foreign policy front" advocated by -the Communists is not too unreasonable; its error lies in stating with -certainty the necessity of two international fronts. Some even -acknowledged the existence of such a situation two years ago, and they -forbade any doubt expressed to fellow-members concerning this point. -Even a week prior to the signing of the Pact, they said with certainty -that the rumor of such a Pact was a mere invention of Trotskyites and -German spies. Such a ban on free speech is not only detrimental to the -progress of a nation, but even to the Communists' own welfare. Their -members will not only be made to look foolish, but they will even lose -their faith by being called upon to change about. For the sake of our -national intelligence, for the sake of the Communists themselves, I hope -that in the future, such bans will be lifted, thus encouraging freer and -more reasonable ideas. I hope this appeal will do some good, even to the -editors of their newspapers. - - -III. WHY THE GERMAN-SOVIET PACT? - -Concerning this Pact, Mao Tsê-tung used words like "reactionary," -"Capitalistic," "intrigue," etc., about Great Britain and France. On the -other hand, he employed words like "great" (to be added "talented" if -Ch'ên Shao-yü were to write it), "increasing the power," "more -progressive," etc., about Soviet Russia. In the end, he even used the -phrase "have laid the foundation for the world's oppressed people to -seek for liberty and emancipation." All right! The term does not sound -ugly, and to ensure better Sino-Soviet relations, we may leave it at -that. But under the present state of affairs, too many attacks directed -against Chamberlain and Daladier are certainly not good. As a matter of -fact, all this is like sending congratulations to Soviet Russia, and a -letter of condolence to those with whom Soviet Russia is dissatisfied. -All these are but social affairs, the only point is that in both the -ideas are not too logically expressed. That's all! - -Now if you look at the Pact in the same way that you look into a -kaleidoscope, you can see as many meanings as you want, while turning -the thing around. Basically, Germany's only reason for wanting this -Pact is, as she has stated, to avoid the British encircling policy. The -economic cooperation talked of by politicians can also give further -meaning to the Pact. Recently, in the occupation of Danzig and Warsaw, -the sound of guns is the wordless explanation. As to the plan of -partitioning Poland and absorbing the Eastern European States (enclosed -in a secret clause), we do not know yet. Let us for the time being not -discuss it. - -As to Soviet Russia, her effort at bettering her friendly relationship -with China can be no better revealed than in Molotov's own speech. He -said: "We have always been trying to increase the amity between the -peoples of Germany and Russia. This Pact is important because it means -that the two big Powers in Europe have decided to be friends and to live -peacefully." Thus we can see that the Pact is not a casual happening. -Molotov again says: "There are some who want to take advantage of the -strained relationship between Great Britain and Germany.... Such people -aim at involving Soviet Russia in a war against Germany by taking sides -with Great Britain. How foolish these political speculators for war -are!" Hence we know that the Pact was signed according to Soviet -Russia's own will, and, unlike what Mao said, it was planned long ago, -and not at all after the failure of the British-French-Soviet parleys. -Now we only want those who advocate "united foreign policy front" to -think of the meaning of words like "foolish" and "war speculators." -These words are new compared with "retrograde," "stubborn," -"Trotskyites," etc. - -Perhaps the greatest part of all in Molotov's speech is: "The Soviet -Union will still continue to proceed in her own independent policy which -is based upon the welfare of all Soviet Russian citizens." This -corresponds exactly with our "Nation and country above all!" Sun Yat-sen -also said that the success of the Soviet Russian October Revolution was -based upon its ability to apply the laws concerning Nationalism. -Leninism corrects Marxism by adding the idea of Nationalism. And -Stalinism intensifies Leninism by an even greater emphasis laid on -Nationalism. Hence we can say what the Soviet Revolution adopted was -Leninism, and that what the Soviet Union is now adopting is Stalinism. -The success of Lenin and Stalin is largely due to this reason. This Pact -between Germany and Soviet Russia is but the fruit borne out of the -principle "national welfare above all." The Soviets believe "The Soviet -Government above all." Now what should we in China have? - -As for Mr. Mao's reasons concerning the failure of the Three-Power -Parley, the explanation he gives is just a reduced and "Chinafied" copy -of the Soviet explanation concerning this problem. We can also say it is -abridged. Mr. Mao always "Chinafies" things. I am sorry that this -article has not been "Chinafied" (much to his distaste, I suppose) so -its power must be weaker. - - -IV. A DISCUSSION ON THE "NEW FRONT" AS MADE IN A CHINESE STORY-TELLER'S -WAY - -The manner in which Mr. Mao discussed the question resembles that of a -Chinese story-teller, though his speech is less vivid. When he spoke of -the "future development of the present international situation," it was -like talking to a class of naive schoolboys who are always credulous. - -He said that the present state of affairs in Europe was caused by the -policy of non-intervention. The Second Imperialistic War has already -entered the second stage. This is a war of plunder, not a rightful one. -Concerning the East, he also made a vain distinction. He said the -present state of affairs in China is also a new stage. No other -explanation was given. We suppose he is always careful in expressing his -ideas, so that if necessary he will have plenty of chances to make a -shift. He divided the imperialistic nations into several camps: Germany -and Italy belong to the Fascist[2] camp; Great Britain and France belong -to the Fascistic[3] camp; the Americas under the U. S. are a -capitalistic camp. As to Soviet Russia, she is presumably in another -world. Mr. Mao said that she would cooperate with the U. S. to start the -world's peace movement. Besides these, there were numerous tales as -enchanting as the Arabian Nights. The most important ones: in Europe, a -war on the entire front, and the movement planned by English and French -Communists and Social Democrats to overthrow the Fascist regime; in the -East, British policy was to partition China between herself and Japan. -According to him, these are "present" situations, and if we take into -consideration his manner of speaking, we can almost say that they meant -the "actual" position at present. - - [Footnote 2: _Fa-hsi-ssŭ_.] - - [Footnote 3: _Fa-hsi-ssŭ-hua-ti_, i.e., changing to Fascism.] - -His chess-board analysis of international situations resembles his -former "front" theory--perhaps it is his new front theory. His aim, we -believe, is to cheat his spectators. Being ignorant of the real -situation, he was at first dumbfounded. Now he tries to move our -attention to other things, just like a magician at work, who needs a -band to create enough noise to shift the audience's attention. We should -be considerate, knowing his difficulties. But I suppose such a manner of -doing things does not increase the reputation of the Chinese Communists, -does it? - -In fact, if any one of the following events occurs, his new front will -immediately be shattered: 1. Soviet Russia also adopts a -non-intervention policy; 2. Italy keeps herself aloof or joins the side -of the Allies; 3. A sufficiently large number of European states remain -neutral; 4. America cooperates with Great Britain; America or any -country in America declares war against Germany; 5. Great Britain does -not help Japan in dividing up China; 6. Soviet inclination to sign -treaty with Japan is revealed; etc., etc. I believe anyone who has -sufficient knowledge of international relations will know that the error -in the old "front" theory lies in its presumption that countries of the -same systems of government will tend to unite against those of another -system. The new front theory is based upon the presumption that the -central motivating ideas of different countries will form the basis of -separating them between two hostile fronts. This is an even more -mistaken conception than the first. It is built on sand. It is easy to -teach such a rigidly formulated doctrine of "hostile fronts" but in case -they meet with a really intelligent and well-informed member, they will -be certainly at a loss. Hence as a matter of fact, such authoritative -articles do more harm than good. Mr. Mao has written a great deal since -the war for publication; if we now connect all these articles together -for a thorough study, we can find numerous places where he is dropping a -stone upon his own toe. In fact such a chess-board analysis of the -international situation is based upon materials gotten from the G. P. U. -plus some "judgment" derived accidentally. As a matter of fact, such G. -P. U. reports are unreliable down to the last word. The work of the G. -P. U. is to pay special attention in getting the past record of a man or -organ important in a given country. - -When required, some high-sounding or bad names are added to the -personality so as to strengthen the mood of speech in propaganda -literature. So somebody even said: "If you wish to follow the propaganda -methods of the Communist Party, observe two dogs barking in the street. -After due observation you should analyze their points of difference. -You should be able to speak like this: This is a dog infused with -British, French, American, German or Japanese imperialistic ideas. He is -stubborn, retrograde, reactionary, capitalistic, Fascist, and in danger -of being a Trotskyite traitor or a person like Wang Ch'ing-wei. Now the -other is a Soviet Socialistic dog, talented, progressive, belonging to -the world of light, a supporter of world peace, a dog who sides with the -poor and oppressed." - -In fact how can confused international situations be so simply analyzed -by a mere figure drawn on a chess-board? Unless all their members are -mechanical men deprived of the power of thinking, they will have their -own doubts, especially when Mr. Mao has repeatedly dropped stones on his -own toe. The more he shouts the correctness of his views, or the success -of his work, the more he will be a laughing-stock to the people. He will -be the Don Quixote of China, or Ah-Q,[4] to be ridiculed by all. Yet in -fact, there is no necessity for him to make these comments, and such -methods of talking without material basis are usually avoided by -politicians, especially when they are in service or partly in service. -For example, Molotov spoke very cleverly on the Pact: after giving a -historical explanation of the necessities for signing the Pact, he -concluded, almost carelessly, by saying: "When Germany showed her -willingness to improve the friendship between the two countries, Soviet -Russia certainly had no reason to refuse. Hence the Pact is made." -Besides, he talked of the welfare of the nation, as if to give a further -proof of the necessity in signing the Pact. How clever his manipulations -are! But the same thing under Mr. Mao's pen becomes a series of -hot-faced scoldings, now praising A, then cursing B. And concerning his -doctrine that the German-Soviet Pact is caused by the failure of the -British-French-Soviet parleys, he expounded and expounded his reasons -and proof, only to lead himself into greater confusion, so that fewer -will believe him. Now comparing these two events, this will be very -detrimental to the Communists, who find it difficult to give a -satisfactory explanation. Even from a rhetorical point of view, no -matter how Mao curses the British non-intervention policy, no matter how -he curses this policy as the reason for Japanese invasion of China, for -German occupation of Austria, Czechoslovakia, no matter how he condemns -the Munich Meeting, any reader will correspondingly ask: Is Soviet -Russia also adopting the policy of non-intervention? How about Poland? -What is the difference between the Munich Meeting and the German-Soviet -Pact? All these questions will produce the exactly opposite effect in -the minds of the readers as that which was wished for by Mao. This is -but one point. If we go on to have a closer analysis, we see that Mr. -Mao's art of speaking needs more practice. As to his material proof in -his article, up to date [September 15, 1939], the Soviet attitude is -still the sit-and-look attitude condemned by him, as being the result of -non-intervention policy; the countries proclaiming their neutrality are -quite numerous; Italian attitude is yet uncertain; the British Communist -Party is declaring that full confidence is placed in Chamberlain; the -French Communists are on the front to fight for their motherland and the -Third International has now no power over them. On the other hand, there -are rumors concerning a _rapprochement_ between Japan and Soviet Russia. -All these only tend to disprove the sayings of Mr. Mao. - - [Footnote 4: The hero of a novella by Lu Hsün, China's outstanding - modern writer, Ah-Q is a figure of profound pathos.] - - -V. A SINGLE ENEMY? OR A SINGLE ALLY? - -Everybody knows that our foreign policy during the period of the war is -to spot one enemy only. We attack only Japan. We try to be friends with -every country other than Japan. This spirit can be seen in the -manifestoes and other proclamations of the Government. Hence although -Germany and Italy are the allies of our enemy, we still have every wish -to bind their friendship, and hope that they will help our enemy the -less in her war of aggression, and contribute more materially to our -success by selling us armaments. Such a "one-enemy" foreign policy is -the basis of our future success. Otherwise, the Nation will easily be -led into a path of thorns, if we adopt the policy of allying with one -today and cutting another tomorrow. In Molotov's report, there are -several sharp sentences: "In foreign policy, the aim is always not to -make more enemies, but rather to lessen the number of enemies." This can -be jotted down as a note to the "one-enemy" policy. - -But what about Mao Tsê-tung's idea? In fact he preaches "one-ally" -policy. He has condemned them all, except for the Soviet Union. Now he -again places Soviet Russia in another almost intangible world. What does -he mean, then? Does he mean that we can satisfy our hunger by looking at -a cake? In fact, this was the same old question long before disputed. -We can all remember that the Communists were the advocates of a military -alliance with Soviet Russia. Now it was Soviet Russia, not we, who -declined. Those who were boasting of the alliance were Communists; and -so were those who stopped it. Soviet Russia said that she alone was too -weak and that she hoped China could find more allies. Because of this, -the "one-ally" policy did not gain as much support as the -British-American-French-Soviet union. When the British-French-Soviet -parleys broke off, Mr. Mao found it difficult to give a good -explanation, so that he could not but take up the old theory of -"one-ally" to ward off attack. - -The chief countries helping China in the war are Great Britain, the U. -S. A., and Soviet Russia. In the past, at present, and in the future, -their central powers of aiding China are economic power from Great -Britain, political power from the U. S. A., and military power from -Soviet Russia. It is a fact that even if Soviet Russia remains at peace, -she can check Japan (unless Soviet Russia proclaims amity with Japan, -and makes adequate assurances, in which case it will greatly influence -our condition). But the economic power of Great Britain and the -political power of the U. S. A. are also absolutely necessary. At -present, we are still enjoying these advantages, and the breaking-up of -the British-French-Soviet parleys does not influence this situation. We -don't know why Mr. Mao is bent upon rejecting the friendly assistance of -Great Britain and the U. S. Should we act like this if we believe that -"the country and the nation are above all?" Now suppose we follow the -Communists and throw ourselves into the bosom of Soviet Russia, are we -sure that she will do everything for us? If she signs a treaty with our -enemy, what then? - -The most unreasonable point in Mao's discussion is his attitude toward -Great Britain. He probably wants to please his superiors by guessing -their ideas. Perhaps he thinks that the Third International is going -back on the policy adopted years ago--the policy of "Anti-Britain" so -much sung by Trotsky and his followers. Hence Mao starts this movement -in China, and gathers false proofs that Japan and Great Britain will -sooner or later be allies so that they can divide up China. Up to now, -Mr. Mao's words have not yet become fact. Furthermore, Great Britain has -reassured us that her policy towards China will not be changed. To us -this is good news--but perhaps unhappy news for Mr. Mao. - -Mr. Mao's opinion that we "may approach Germany" does not sound very -safe or very natural. Mr. Mao does not adopt the foreign policy of -"befriend those who help us and hate those who help our enemy," but -rather of "befriend Soviet Russia's friend, attack Soviet Russia's -enemies." This is flatly against the principles of independent foreign -policy. The old German-Italian line advocated by Wang Ch'ing-wei is -wrong because it makes us bend our knees. But we must also know what the -new German line amounts to. Japan's _rapprochement_ with Soviet Russia -and Great Britain are rumors scattered out simultaneously, but are -things that cannot be possible. According to foreign telegraphic -reports, the German foreign minister is now trying to pull together -Japan and Soviet Russia, with the hope of forming a future grand -alliance among Germany. Italy, Japan, and Soviet Russia. As to the -Japan-Soviet line, it is based upon the "double-south policy" of -attacking Great Britain. Japan will move south from the Pacific and -[Soviet] Russia will move south from Central Asia, so that British -interest in all districts lying between the Near and the Far East will -be equally divided up by [Soviet] Russia and Japan. Their method of -procedure is like this: 1, A treaty will be signed by Soviet Russia, as -the protector of Outer Mongolia, and Japan; Soviet Russia will stop -enmity against "Manchukuo" and Japan, so that Japan may concentrate her -attention on China. 2, A commercial treaty will be signed between them. -3, A final alliance promising mutual non-interference with appended -clauses. Of course this is Germany's dream, or may be a flat rumor, -since it is unbelievable that Soviet Russia should join Japan. Even from -the point of material benefit, why should Soviet Russia act so as to -hurt others but remain doubtful that she can derive real benefit? But to -insure absolute safety, we must be careful of any German intrigue. We -must warn her often. In the past we used to buy munitions from her, so -we must have her goodwill. Now with the War, it is unlikely that Germany -will still sell us munitions. Hence why must we still follow Germany and -"approach her"? After all, what is the difference between this and the -German-Italian line advocated by Wang Ch'ing-wei? Now, just a "warning": -if [Soviet] Russia and Japan do join up to form an alliance, I must ask -the Chinese Communist Party a question: Concerning the name, the Chinese -Communist Party, are they going to throw away the word "Chinese" and -adopt a Soviet Russian nationality, or, as said in the _Hsin Min Pao_, -to be so base as to join Wang Ch'ing-wei's regime, or shall they stick -to the word "Chinese" and cancel the word "Communist"? I hope they will -reply to my question. - -Concerning the theory of a Second Imperialistic War, Mao himself has for -two years forbidden his followers to comment, on the charge of being a -Rightist, a closed-door Rightest, a childish Rightest, or a Trotskyite -who is plotting with Germany. Now we see that he himself has fully -adopted a Trotskyite view. In that article he used the words -"progressive" and "retrogressive" to suppress any upheaval within his -party; but now what he means by "progressive" is exactly "retardation"; -what he formerly advocated as "progress" is now a discarded fig. He is -just making a circle, like a donkey fastened to turn a grind-stone, -pressed onward by whipping and kicking, and when he has turned half a -circle, he may be said to have retarded half a circle. - -Now Mr. Mao condemns every country as imperialistic. But we must ask, in -his opinion, does he think that Poland is imperialistic? Why is the war -of national defense on the part of Poland not a rightful war? Under the -exactly similar conditions, why did the Communists formerly show -sympathy for Abyssinia and Spain, and are now cold toward Poland? He -says that Communists always hate wars; then why did he advocate the -Help-Abyssinia Movement? This is a paradox. Perhaps the saying that -Communists hate war is invented by Mr. Mao himself. So far as we know, -the Communists in Poland, Great Britain, and France are absolutely -sympathizing with the Poles in their defensive war. - -There is another ridiculous point: Mr. Mao also labelled Chamberlain and -Daladier as Fascist Reactionaries. Before the German-Soviet Pact, they -were hailed as saints, but now they are convicts, as it were. If Mr. Mao -is not satisfied with them, then condemn them as he wishes. But why must -he put such a "Fascist" hat upon the oldest democratic countries? This -spring, one American political commentator predicted jokingly that in -the near future Hitler will say that the headquarters of the Communists -are located in London and Paris, hence anti-Communist will mean -anti-French. Now the direction of this pseudo-prophecy is already -established, though Hitler did not give the above reason. But we did not -expect that the Chinese Communists would adopt such a belief by calling -democratic countries Fascist and by advocating "that we may approach -Germany." This is perhaps a conclusion by their special logic. - - -VI. A REASONLESS CONCLUSION - -Concerning the future of China, Mr. Mao made many surface talks, though -in general there is no serious fault. But his theories and his -conclusions are disjointed. For example, if he makes light of the Polish -war, what will be the value of this Oriental war? Besides, is the policy -of "single alliance with Soviet Russia" in unison with the principle: -"We will befriend those who aid us, and attack those who aid our enemy"? -If Soviet Russia aids Japan, what shall then be done? If he opposes the -splitting movement, then why not advocate unity? These are but a few of -the numerous contradictions that may be found in his article. - -Especially strange is his idea that to ally with countries other than -Soviet Russia, we should ally with their peoples and not with their -governments. But the word "people" is not used in foreign affairs and -its meaning is also most indistinct. According to him (I presume) he -desires that China fan up revolutions in all countries while carrying on -the War of National Resistance. True, the method may apply to Japan, but -not to other countries. Otherwise, all world Powers will begin to hate -China who is still fighting the War of National Resistance. What will we -think of this? Now to speak frankly, the Communists in various countries -have not succeeded in fanning up revolutions in their countries, and on -the contrary, with their force weakening year after year, what shall we -help them for? When we ourselves have not yet stood up firmly, we are -already thinking of shouldering a weight of a thousand pounds. Is there -a reason in such an attempt? In reality, we know the force of the -Chinese proletarian classes. They amount to about two million people, -mostly in Shanghai and Tientsin. Now the puppet regimes of Yin Ju-keng -and Wang Ch'ing-wei are all formed in these districts. Ch'ên Shao-yü is -the chief representative of the Shanghai section of the Communist Party. -Has he gone there for an investigation? To whom do those who are -performing Anti-Japanese and Anti-Traitor work belong--to the Communist -Party, or what? It is better for Communists to moderate their tune and -not boast of any more world revolution. - -Concerning the present European war, Mr. Mao's attitude is that of a man -expressing his joy on seeing others' loss and misfortune. This is not -the way of the Chinese people. We always express our sorrow in a war. -What General Chiang has said concerning his hope for peace in Europe is -the natural revelation of the Chinese moral character based upon love -and compassion. What Mr. Mao expresses is something like the spirit of -"kill-kill-kill" advocated by the notorious robber Chang Shen-chou. This -is because Mr. Mao has not yet thoroughly imbibed the idea of -"Chinafying" things. I express my sympathy for him in his policy of -"Chinafication." This of course does not mean that I believe in the -preachings of old-fashioned Chinese that the eight planets were first -discovered by the Chinese because a line can be found in the _Book of -Poetry_:[5] "Three and Five stars in the East." What I mean by sympathy -is that I like the way he appreciates the Chinese national culture, and -wants to be a one hundred per cent Chinese.[6] In this respect he is -more worthy than Ch'ên Shao-yü, and hence deserving of greater -achievement. - - [Footnote 5: _Shih Ching_, one of the Confucian classics.] - - [Footnote 6: The Americanism, _i-pai-fên chih pai-ti Chung-kuo-jen_, - occurs in the original.] - -Lastly, I sincerely hope that Mr. Mao can find a better secretary, -without considering the question of class. He must not follow the -example of Mr. Lu, the Vice-President of the Anti-Japanese University, -who never employs a secretary unless she is beautiful. Though he does -not consider the question of class, such actions do not befit Mr. Mao. -But speaking about this, we can have a comparison. The second wife of -Mr. Mao, Miss Ho, is the heroine who marched with the Red Army for a -distance of twenty-five thousand _li_ to North Shensi. But why is it -that Mr. Mao sends her to Soviet Russia, and lives together with film -actress Miss Lan Pin? The reason is quite simple: considering the -question of class, Miss Ho stands higher than Miss Lan; considering the -question of sexual love, Miss Lan is much more beautiful than Miss Ho. -Hence with similar reasoning, I should say that the standard set by Mr. -Mao concerning the employment of a secretary will be whether she can -write beautifully, and the question of class must not be considered. If -so, I can predict that Mr. Mao's articles will be better written, not -like his past ones which arouse a great deal of unnecessary -argumentation. I hereby humbly present before him my personal ideas.[7] - - [Footnote 7: The conclusion, couched in billingsgate, is less a - violation of the unmentionable in China than it would be in America; - but it does strike a note sharply discordant to the gently sardonic - tone of the main line of debate. A secretary is germane to the point - of literary style, however; ghost-writing is a rarely disturbed - tradition of Chinese public life. Mao Tsê-tung, according to Western - observers, is, with Chiang K'ai-shek, one of the few leaders to write - his own speeches, so that the present charge, while familiar, is - certainly unjust.] - - - - -E. CHINA'S LONG-RANGE DIPLOMATIC ORIENTATION (WANG CH'UNG-HUI)[1] - - - [Footnote 1: Private communication transmitted from Chungking, - September 10, 1940; in possession of the present author.] - - This memorandum was graciously supplied by Dr. Wang - Ch'ung-hui. - - -1. OUTLINE OF CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY - -Since the establishment of the National Government, China's foreign -policy has been elucidated from time to time. Following the outbreak of -the war, the Extraordinary Session of the Kuomintang National Congress -convened in 1938 laid down five principles: - -"1. China is prepared to ally herself with all states and nations that -sympathize with her and to wage a common struggle for peace and justice. - -"2. China is prepared to safeguard and strengthen the machinery of peace -as well as all treaties and conventions that have the maintenance of -peace as their ultimate object. - -"3. China is prepared to ally herself with all forces that are opposed -to Japanese aggression and to safeguard peace in the Far East. - -"4. China will endeavor not only to preserve but also to enhance the -existing friendly relations with other countries. - -"5. China repudiates all bogus organizations which Japan has created and -declares all their actions null and void." - - -2. CHINA'S STAND VIS-À-VIS JAPAN - -From the above outline it can be clearly seen that China's foreign -policy aims at achieving independence internally and co-existence -externally. - -Shortly before the outbreak of the Lukouchiao Incident I told a group of -Japanese newspapermen in Nanking that "China's diplomatic policy has -always been consistent. It aims at self-existence and co-existence.... -It is important to harmonize the friendship between the two peoples; but -such a task should not rest only upon the shoulders of one party.... If -any foreign country has any designs on China, the Chinese people are -determined to resist.... I hope Japan will respect China's territorial -integrity and political sovereignty and will seek to readjust -Sino-Japanese relations through diplomatic channels and in accordance -with the spirit of reciprocity and equality." - -Japan was bent on disturbing peace and order and launched her attack on -North China on July 7, 1937. Not only had every effort at conciliation -failed, but the hostilities were extended to Shanghai on August 13th. On -the following day the Ministry of Foreign Affairs made China's position -clear in an official statement, an extract of which follows: - -"The Chinese Government now solemnly declares that China's territorial -integrity and sovereign rights have been wantonly violated by Japan in -glaring violation of such peace instruments as the Covenant of the -League of Nations, the Nine-Power Treaty and the Paris Peace Pact. China -is in duty bound to defend her territory and her national existence, as -well as the sanctity of the above-mentioned treaties. We will never -surrender any part of our territory. When confronted with aggression, we -cannot but exercise our natural right of self-defense. If Japan did not -entertain territorial designs on China, she should use her efforts to -seek a rational solution of Sino-Japanese problems and at the same time -cease all her aggressions and military movements in China. In the event -of such a happy change of heart, China would, in conformity with her -traditional policy of peace, continue her efforts to avert a situation -pregnant with dangerous possibilities both for East Asia and for the -world at large. - -"In this our supreme fight not only for a national but for a world -cause, not only for the preservation of our own territory and -sovereignty, but for the maintenance of international justice, we are -confident that all friendly nations, while showing sympathy with us, -will be conscious of their obligations under the international treaties -to which they have solemnly subscribed." - - -3. NON-RECOGNITION OF PUPPET REGIMES - -With regard to Japanese-sponsored puppet regimes in China, the Chinese -Government has consistently denounced them as illegal. On December 20, -1937, following the appearance of the so-called "Provisional Government" -in Peiping, the National Government solemnly declared that "the -establishment of any bogus regime in Peiping or other localities under -Japanese military occupation constitutes a violation by Japan of China's -sovereignty and administrative integrity. Any action taken by such -puppet regimes, whether of an internal or external nature, shall _ipso -facto_ be null and void." - -Following the installation by the Japanese of Wang Ch'ing-wei as the -chief puppet of the bogus "National Government" in Nanking, the Foreign -Minister reiterated this stand in his identic notes of March 30, 1940 to -the various embassies and legations in China to the following effect: - -"The Chinese Government desires to take this opportunity to repeat most -emphatically the declaration already made on several occasions that any -act done by such an unlawful organization as has just been set up in -Nanking or any other puppet body that may exist elsewhere in China, is -_ipso facto_ null and void and shall never be recognized by the Chinese -Government and people. The Chinese Government is convinced that all -self-respecting States will uphold law and justice in the conduct of -international relations and will never accord _de jure_ or _de facto_ -recognition to Japan's puppet organization in China. Any manifestation -of such recognition, in whatever form or manner, would be a violation of -international law and treaties and would be considered as an act most -unfriendly to the Chinese nation, for the consequences of which the -recognizing party would have to bear full responsibility." - - -4. CHINA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS BASED ON NINE-POWER TREATY - -China's foreign policy relating to the Sino-Japanese hostilities is -based upon the Nine-Power Treaty, which provides that the contracting -Powers, other than China, agreed to the following: - -1. To respect the sovereignty, the independence and the territorial and -administrative integrity of China; - -2. To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to -develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government; - -3. To use their influence for the purpose of effectually establishing -and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and -industry of all nations throughout the territory of China. - -4. To refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to -seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of -subjects or citizens of friendly States, and from countenancing action -inimical to the security of such States. - -Under present conditions, the aggressor is still reluctant to attend any -international conference for seeking a just settlement. Therefore, the -only alternative is for China to continue her war of resistance until -Japan comes to her senses or reaches the point of exhaustion, which can -be accomplished through the extension of greater assistance to China and -the application of an embargo on military supplies to Japan. - -There is no need to elaborate on the well-known fact that the role of -the United States in the maintenance of peace in the Pacific area is an -important one. We have great confidence in the sense of justice of -America, our traditional friend, who realizes the full significance of -the so-called "New Order in Greater East Asia," which Japanese spokesmen -admit applies to the South Seas region. - -World peace and peace between China and Japan are indivisible. An era of -prosperity in this part of the world, which cannot but be of benefit to -the world in general, can only be ushered in after a just and lasting -solution to the Sino-Japanese conflict has been found. - - - - -GLOSSARY - - -[Chinese ideographs have been attached to the names of all the more -important political terms, as given in the following list. Proper names -may be found with their correct ideographs in _Who's Who in China_ and -the _Supplement_ thereto, cited above. Place-names have been given in -the Chinese Postal transliteration; all other names and terms are given -in the Wade-Giles spelling, but with the tones omitted. In a few cases, -the spelling of a name has been well established by long newspaper -usage, by the caprice or decision of a man in re-spelling his own name, -or by common practice which has become standard English. Examples are -_tuchün_, Kuomintang (instead of _Kuo-min Tang_ or _Kuo-min-tang_) and -T. V. Soong. Capitalization and hyphenation follow, as closely as -possible, the practices established by the _Quarterly Bulletin of -Chinese Bibliography_, Peking and Kunming.] - -_Chan-ti Tang-chêng Wei-yüan-hui_ 戰地黨政委員會 the (Kuomintang) Party -and (National) Government War Area Commission; the Chungking agency for -the government of those parts of China technically occupied by the -Japanese; under the Military Affairs Commission - -_chang_ 長 a chief, or head - -_Ch'ang-wu Wei-yüan_ 常務委員 a Standing Committee, or administrative -committee - -_Ch'ang-wu Tz'ŭ-chang_ 常務次長 an Administrative Vice-Minister (of a -_pu_) - -_chên_ 鎮 a unit of local government; "community"; the equivalent of a -_hsiang_ - -_Chên-chi Wei-yüan-hui_ 振濟委員會 the (National) Relief Commission - -_Chêng-chih-pu_ 政治部 the Political Department (of the Military Affairs -Commission); the important and powerful agency which coordinates -civilian aid to the war from Chungking, in propaganda, civilian -mobilization, etc.; competitive with the Chinese Communists - -_Chêng-wu Ch'u_ 政務處 a Political Affairs Department; the political -secretariat of a _Yüan_ - -_Chêng-wu Tz'ŭ-chang_ 政務次長 a Political Vice-Minister (of a _pu_) - -_Ch'i Chün-tzŭ_ 七君子 the "Seven Gentlemen"; the leaders of the National -Salvation movement - -_chia_ 甲 a group of households; a unit in the _pao-chia_ system of -local government - -_Chiao-t'ung Pu_ 交通部 Ministry of Communications - -_Ch'iao-wu Wei-yüan-hui_ 僑務委員會 Commission on Overseas Chinese -Affairs (under the Executive _Yüan_) - -_Chiao-yü Pu_ 教育部 Ministry of Education (under the Executive _Yüan_) - -_chien-ch'a_ 監察 one of the five powers of government in the plans of -Sun Yat-sen; a combination of impeachment, audit, supervisory -investigation and other functions - -_Chien-ch'a Yüan_ 監察院 the Control (or Censoral) _Yüan_; one of the -five major divisions of the government - -_Chien Kuo Ta Kang_ 建國大綱 the _Outline of National Reconstruction_, a -manifesto by Sun Yat-sen which charted the subsequent formal policies of -the Kuomintang - -_ch'ih_ 恥 self-respect; honor - -_Chin-ch'a-chi Pien-ch'ü Lin-shih Hsing-chêng Wei-yüan-hui_ 晉察冀邊區臨時 -行政委員會 "Provisional Executive Committee of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei -Border Region"; formal style of the Border Region, _q.v._ - -_Ching-chi Pu_ 經濟部 Ministry of Economic Affairs (under the Executive -_Yüan_) - -_Chiu Kuo_ 救國 National Salvation; an anti-aggression movement -organized outside the Kuomintang - -_Chu-hsi_ 主席 chairman; refers particularly to the _Kuo-min Chêng-fu -Chu-hsi_ (President of the National Government) - -_ch'ü_ 區 a unit of local government above the _pao_, _chia_, and -_hsiang_, but below the _hsien_ ("county"); a township; with reference -to the Party organization of the Kuomintang, a district - -_ch'ü-fên_ 區分 sub-district; the lowest territorial unit in Kuomintang -organization - -_ch'üan_ 權 "power," _i.e._, of the people, as contrasted with the nêng -(capacity) of the government; the distinction is Sun Yat-sen's, and -applies to the political process - -_Ch'üan-hsü Pu_ 銓敘部 the Ministry of Personnel; under the Examination -_Yüan_ - -_Ch'üan-hsü T'ing_ 銓敘廳 Administration of Personnel (for the military); -under the Military Affairs Commission - -_Ch'üan-kuo Hui-i_ 全國會議 the (Chinese Communist) National Party -Convention - -_Ch'üan-kuo Ta-hui_ 全國大會 the (Chinese Communist) National Party -Congress - -_Ch'üan-kuo Tai-piao Ta-hui_ 全國代表大會 the (Kuomintang) Party Congress - -_Chün-chêng-pu_ 軍政部 the Ministry of War; under the joint jurisdiction -of the Executive _Yüan_ and the Military Affairs Commission - -_Chün-fa Chih-hsing Tsung-chien-pu_ 軍法執行總監部 the Directorate-General -of Courts Martial; under the Military Affairs Commission - -_Chün-hsün-pu_ 軍訓部 Department of Military Training; under the Military -Affairs Commission - -_Chün-ling-pu_ 軍令部 Department of Military Operation; office of the -Chinese high command; under the Military Affairs Commission - -_Chün-shih Ts'an-i-yüan_ 軍事參議院 Military Advisory Council; under the -Military Affairs Commission - -_Chün-shih Wei-yüan-hui_ 軍事委員會 the Military Affairs Commission; the -chief politico-military organ of the National Government - -_Chung-hua Min-kuo Kuo-min Chêng-fu_ 中華民國國民政府 literally: the -Republic of China, National Government; the style of the National -Government under the Kuomintang - -_Chung-hua Min-kuo Lin-shih Chêng-fu_ 中華民國臨時政府 the "Provisional -Government of the Republic of China," Peking, 1937-1940; pro-Japanese - -_Chung-hua Min-kuo T'ê-ch'ü Chêng-fu_ 中華民國特區政府 "Special District -Government of the Chinese Republic"; the first formal style of the -Chinese Soviet area in the Northwest after the intra-national armistice - -_Chung-hua Min-kuo Hsiu-chêng Kuo-min Chêng-fu_ 中華民國修正國民政府 the -"Reorganized National Government of the Republic of China"; the National -Government of Wang Ch'ing-wei at Nanking; pro-Japanese - -_Chung-hua Min-kuo Wei-hsin Chêng-fu_ 中華民國維新政府 the "Reformed -Government of the Republic of China," Nanking, 1938-1940; pro-Japanese - -_Chung-hua Su-wei-ai Kung-ho-kuo_ 中華蘇維埃共和國 the Chinese Soviet -Republic - -_Chung-kuo Kê-ming Tang_ 中國革命黨 the Chinese Revolutionary Party; -style of the Kuomintang, 1914-1920; style of the Third Party, 1929-1930 - -_Chung-kuo Kuo-min-tang Kê-ming Hsing-chêng Wei-yüan-hui_ 中國國民黨革命 -行政委員會 the Revolutionary Action Committee of the Chinese Kuomintang; -first style of the Third Party - -_Chung-kuo Kung-yeh Ho-tso Hsieh-hui_ 中國工業合作協會 the Chinese -Industrial Cooperatives - -_Chung-yang Chêng-chih Hsüeh-hsiao_ 中央政治學校 the Central Political -Institute; under the Kuomintang - -_Chung-yang Chêng-chih Wei-yüan-hui_ 中央政治委員會 the Central Political -Council; the agency whereby the Kuomintang exercised its power over the -National Government until the Supreme National Defense Council was -created - -_Chung-yang Chien-ch'a Wei-yüan-hui_ 中央監察委員會 the (Kuomintang) -Central Control Committee - -_Chung-yang Chih-hsing Wei-yüan-hui_ 中央執行委員會 the (Kuomintang) -Central Executive Committee - -_Chung-yang Hsüan-ch'uan Pu_ 中央宣傳部 the (Kuomintang) Party-Ministry -of Publicity [or Central Publicity Board] - -_Chung-yang Wei-yüan-hui_ 中央委員會 the (Chinese Communist Party) -Central Committee - -_fa pi_ 法幣 (National Government) legal tender notes - -_fang_ 坊 a territorial unit of municipal government; roughly, a -precinct - -_Fu-hsing Shê_ 復興社 the Regeneration Club; former center of the -so-called Blue Shirts - -_Fu-hsüeh Wei-yüan-hui_ 撫郋委員會 the Pensions Commission; under the -Military Affairs Commission - -_Fu I-chang_ 副議長 Deputy Speaker (of the People's Political Council) - -_Fu Mi-shu-chang_ 副秘書長 a Deputy Secretary-General - -_Fu-yüan-chang_ 副院長 the Vice-President of a _Yüan_ (one of the five -divisions of the government) - -_Hai-chün Tsung-ssŭ-ling-pu_ 海軍總司令部 Office of the Naval -Commander-in-Chief, successor to the Ministry of the Navy which manages -the up-river remnants of the Chinese fleet; under the Military Affairs -Commission - -_Hang-k'ung Wei-yüan-hui_ 航空委員會 the (National) Aviation Commission; -under the Military Affairs Commission - -_Hou-fang Ch'in-wu-pu_ 後方勤務部 the [Rear-Area] Service Department -under the Military Affairs Commission - -_hsiang_ 鄉 a unit of local government, also termed _chên_; a village or -community - -_hsiao-tsu_ 小粗 the "small-group"; the lowest fraction of Kuomintang -organization - -_Hsieh-ho-hui_ 協和會 the Concordia Society; the propaganda agency of -Manchoukuo - -_hsien_ 縣 district; roughly comparable to the American county - -_Hsien-fa Ts'ao-an_ 憲法草案 the Draft Permanent Constitution; the -official sponsored project for the new constitution, known most widely -in the version of the Double Five Draft of May 5, 1936 - -_Hsin-min-hui_ 新民會 a political "party" organized by pro-Japanese -elements in North China - -_Hsin Min Chu I_ 新民主義 a pro-Japanese doctrine taught in occupied -North China - -_Hsin Shêng-huo Yün-tung_ 新生活運動 the New Life Movement - -_Hsin-ssŭ-chün_ 新四軍 New Fourth Army; a guerrilla force under -Communist influence; operating in the Yangtze lowlands, it clashed with -Chinese National forces early in 1941, and was formally disbanded - -_Hsing-chêng Fa-yüan_ 行政法院 the Administrative Court; under the -Judicial Yüan - -_Hsing-chêng Yüan_ 行政院 the Executive _Yüan_, greatest of the five -divisions of the government - -_Hsün-lien T'uan_ 訓練團 the Training Corps (of the Kuomintang) - -_Hsün-lien Wei-yüan-hui_ 訓練委員會 the (Central) Training Committee (of -the Kuomintang) - -_Huangpu_ 黃埔 the name of a military academy (in Cantonese, Whampoa), -now applied to the Generalissimo's protégés as a political faction - -_hui_ 會 a meeting, guild, league, or society - -_Hui-i_ 會議 a deliberative body; particularly, a City Council -(Shih-chêng Hui-i) - -_i_ 議 propriety; ethics; justice - -_I-chang_ 議長 Speaker (of the People's Political Council) - -_I Ho Ch'üan_ 義和拳 the "Boxers" of 1900 - -_Kan Shih_ 幹事 the police executive in a _hsiang_ or _chên_ - -_K'ang-chan Chien-kuo Kang-ling_ 抗戰建馘綱領 the Program of Resistance -and Reconstruction; the formal declaration of government policy during -the invasion; adopted at Hankow in March, 1938 - -_K'ao-hsüan Wei-yüan-hui_ 考選委員會 the Examinations Commission; under -the Examination _Yüan_ - -_K'ao-shih Yüan_ 考試會 the Examination _Yüan_; one of the five major -divisions of the government - -_Kung-ch'an Ch'ing-nien T'uan_ 共產青年團 the Communist Youth Corps - -_Kung-ch'an Tang_ 共產黨 the (Chinese) Communist Party - -_Kung-wu-yüan Ch'eng-chieh Wei-yüan-hui_ 公務員懲戒委員會 the Commission -for the Disciplinary Punishment of Public Officers (under the Judicial -_Yüan_), a lower agency than the Commission for the Disciplinary -Punishment of Public Officials (attached to the Council of State) - -_Kuo-chia Chu-i P'ai_ 國家主義派 the "Nationalist Party"; Parti -Républicain Nationaliste de la Jeune Chine - -_Kuo-chia Shê-hui Tang_ 國家社會黨 the (Chinese) National Social(ist) -Party - -_Kuo-fang Tsui-kao Wei-yüan-hui_ 國防最高委員會 the Supreme National -Defense Council; the quasi-governmental agency whereby the Kuomintang -controls the National Government; established in 1938 as a war measure, -it supersedes the _Chung-yang Chêng-chih Wei-yüan-hui_ (Central -Political Council) - -_Kuo-li Chung-yang Yen-chiu Yüan_ 國立中央研究院 the Academia Sinica; the -national scientific and scholastic body, attached to the Council of -State - -_Kuo-min Chêng-fu Wei-yüan-hui_ 國民政府委員會 "National Government -Council"; commonly termed Council of State, this is the highest strictly -governmental agency in China - -_Kuo-min Chêng-fu Chu-hsi_ 國民政府主席 "chairman of the National -Government"; more formally, President of the National Government of -China; _ex-officio_ chairman of the Council of State, and ceremonial -chief of the government - -_Kuo-min Ching-shên Tsung-tung-yüan_ 國民精神總動員 the National Spiritual -Mobilization - -_Kuo-min Hui-i_ 國民會議 the National People's Convention of XX (1931), -which adopted the Provisional Constitution - -_Kuo-min Ts'an-chêng Hui_ 國民參政會 the People's Political Council; -advisory legislature inaugurated in Hankow - -_Kuo-min Ta-hui_ 國民大會 the National Congress or People's Congress; -this term designates both the constituent body which shall adopt the -projected Constitution, and a subsequent constitutional legislature -meeting triennially - -_lao-pai-hsing_ 老百姓 old inhabitants; common people; archaically or -etymologically, the Old Hundred Names - -_li_ 禮 rites; ceremonies; ideological conformity - -_Li-fa Wei-yüan_ 立法委會 members of the quasi-cameral plenary session of -the Legislative _Yüan_; experts in legal matters, they combine the -function of legislators with that of consultants in codification - -_Li-ja Yüan_ 立法會 the Legislative _Yüan_; one of the five divisions of -the government - -_lien_ 廉 integrity - -_lü_ 旅 a brigade - -_Mêng-ku Lien-ho Tzŭ-chih Chêng-fu_ 蒙古聯合自治政府 the "Federated -Autonomous Government of Mongolia"; pro-Japanese - -_Mêng Tsang Wei-yüan-hui_ 蒙藏委員會 Commission on Mongolian and Tibetan -Affairs (under the Executive _Yüan_) - -_Mi-shu-chang_ 秘書長 a Secretary-General - -_Mi-shu Ch'u_ 秘書處 a Secretariat; particularly important in the case of -the Executive _Yüan_ - -_min ch'üan chu-i_ 民權主義 the "principle of democracy," by Sun Yat-sen; -second of the _San Min Chu I_ - -_min-shêng chu-i_ 民生主義 the "principle of the people's livelihood," by -Sun Yat-sen; third of the _San Min Chu I_ - -_Min-ts'u Chieh-fang Hsing-chêng Wei-yüan-hui_ 民族解放行政委員會 the -Acting Commission for the National Emancipation of China; third, final, -formal style of the Third Party - -_min ts'u chu-i_ 民族主義 the "principle of nationalism," by Sun Yat-sen; -first of the _San Min Chu I_ - -_Nei-chêng Pu_ 內政部 the Ministry of the Interior (or of home affairs); -under the Executive _Yüan_ - -_nêng_ 能 "capacity" (see _ch'üan_) - -_Nung Lin Pu_ 農林部 Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (under the -Executive _Yüan_) - -_Pa-lu-chün_ 八路軍 "Eighth Route Army"; the chief Chinese Communist -force, formerly the Chinese Red Army and now the Eighteenth Army Corps - -_pao_ 保 a unit of local government; roughly, a neighborhood - -_pao-chia_ 保甲 a system of local government embodying principles of -collective responsibility and mutual aid within interlocking groups of -households and neighborhoods - -_Pien-ch'ü_ 邊區 Frontier Area or Border Region; the former translation -is used for the Communist zone in the Northwest, and the latter for the -guerrilla government in North China - -_Pu_ 部 a Ministry (under the _Yüan_), Department (under the Military -Affairs Commission), or equivalent organ of government; the term is one -of long standing in Chinese government - -_Pu Chang_ 部長 Minister; head of a _pu_ - -_San Min Chu I_ 三民主義 the three principles of the people; Sun -Yat-sen's political philosophy, now the official state dogma of China - -_San Min Chu I Ch'ing-nien T'uan_ 三民主義青年團 the _San Min Chu I_ -Youth Corps - -_Shan-kan-ning Pien-ch'ü Chêng-fu_ 陝甘寧邊區政府 the "Government of the -Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Frontier Area"; second formal style of the -Communist zone in the Northwest - -_Shan-pei Hsing-chêng-ch'ü_ 陝北行政區 the "Administrative Area of North -Shensi"; third formal style of the Communist zone in the Northwest -(Frontier Area) - -_Shê-hui Yün-tung Pu_ 社會運動部 the (Kuomintang) Party-Ministry of -Social Movements - -_Shên-ch'a Wei-yüan-hui_ 審查委員會 the (Chinese Communist Party) Control -Committee - -_Shêng_ 省 a province - -_Shêng-chang_ 省長 Governor; the civilian head of a province; now -superseded by a Provincial Chairman - -_Shêng Chêng-fu_ 省政府 a Provincial Government - -_Shih_ 市 a Municipality - -_Shih-chang_ 市長 a Mayor - -_Sui-ching Chu-jên_ 綏靖主任 a Pacification Commissioner; the chief -military officer of a province - -_Ssŭ-fa Hsing-chêng-pu_ 司法行政部 the Ministry of Justice, literally the -"executive ministry of the judiciary"; under the Judicial _Yüan_ in the -National Government, but under the executive in the Reorganized -Government of Wang Ch'ing-wei - -_Ssŭ-fa Yüan_ 司法院 the Judicial _Yüan_, one of the five divisions of -the government - -_ssŭ p'ai_ 四派 the "four cliques" (in the People's Political Council) - -_ssŭ tang_ 四黨 the "four parties" (in the People's Political Council) - -_Ta-min-hui_ 大民會 a political "party" organized by pro-Japanese -elements in Central China - -_tang chih_ 黨治 "party government"; the single-party tutelary -dictatorship of the Kuomintang - -_Tai-piao Ta-hui_ 代表大會 the (Chinese Communist) "Council of Party -Delegates" - -_Tangpu_ 黨部 (local) Party Headquarters of the Kuomintang - -_Ti-san Tang_ 第三黨 the Third Party; a popular name - -_Ts'ai-chêng Pu_ 財政部 Ministry of Finance - -_Ts'an-chêng-hui_ 參政會 a People's Political Council; preceded by a term -indicating the level at which established, _e.g._, _Shêng -Ts'an-chêng-hui_, Provincial People's Political Council - -_Ts'an-chün Ch'u_ 參軍處 Office of Military Affairs; a military -secretariat attached to the Council of State - -_Ts'an-i-hui_ 參議會 an Advisory Council, as in the Municipality - -_Tsui-kao Fa-yüan_ 最高法院 the Supreme Court; under the Judicial _Yüan_ - -_Tsung-li_ 總理 the [Party] Leader; the formal office held by Sun -Yat-sen in the Kuomintang; his in perpetuity, the title is used as a -respectful form of reference to Sun - -_Tsung-ts'ai_ 總裁 the [Party] Chief, or leader; title vested in Chiang -K'ai-shek as formal head of the Kuomintang by the Emergency Party -Congress, Hankow, March, 1938 - -_t'uan_ 團 a regiment - -_tuchün_ 督軍 the military chief of a province, a war-lord - -_Wai-chiao Pu_ [also written _Waichiaopu_] 外交部 the Ministry of Foreign -Affairs; under the Executive _Yüan_ - -_Wang Tao_ 王道 "the kingly way," a cardinal concept of traditional -Chinese political thought; now, reinterpreted, the state philosophy of -Manchoukuo - -_Wei-shêng Shu_ 衛生暑 National Health Administration (in the Ministry of -the Interior) - -_Wei-yüan-chang_ 委會長 chairman (of a committee, commission, etc.); this -title often refers to Generalissimo Chiang in his capacity of Chairman -of the Military Affairs Commission - -_Wên-kuan Ch'u_ 文官處 Office of Civil Affairs; a civilian secretariat -attached to the Council of State - -_wu-ch'üan hsien-fa_ 五權憲法 the "five power constitution"; the -five-fold separation of powers taught by Sun Yat-sen and applied by the -National Government - -_Yüan_ 院 literally "board"; one of the five divisions of the National -Government of China - -_Yüan-chang_ 院長 the President of a _Yüan_ - -_Yüeh Fa_ 約法 the Provisional Constitution, adopted in 1931 - - - - -INDEX - - - Ability (_nêng_), 253 - - Academia Sinica (_Kuo-li Chung-yang Yen-chiu Yüan_), 56 - - _Act Governing the Elections of Representatives to the National - Congress_, 302 - - _Acting Commission for the National Emancipation of China_ (_Min-ts'u - Chieh-fang Hsing-chêng Wei-yüan-hui_), 178 - - Administration of Personnel (_Ch'uan-hsü T'ing_), 62 - - Administrative agencies, chart, 80 - - Administrative Area of North Shensi (_Shan-pei Hsing-chêng-ch'ü_), 112 - - Administrative Court (_Hsing-chêng Fa-yüan_), 67 - - Administrative: - development, 96 - law, 65 - organs, 69 - pattern, 79 - - Administrative Vice-Minister (_Ch'ang-wu Tz'ŭ-chang_), 96 - - Adult education, 30 - - Agitation, 61 - - Agrarian problems, 104 - - Agriculture, 91 - - Agriculture and Forestry, Ministry of (_Nung Lin Pu_), 91 - - Air communications, 90 - - Alexander the Great, 239 - - Alley, Rewi, 224 - - Amendments to the Constitution (proposed constitutional provisions), 300 - - American Friends of the Chinese People, 234 - - American Lease-lend Bill, 217, 274 - - American loans, 19 - - Ao-yü-wan, 161 - - Appointment and discharge of officials, 59 - - Armistice, intra-national, 10 - - Army participation in rural reform, 221 - - Atatürk, Kemal, 272 - - Audit, Ministry of, 96, 320 - - Autonomous East Hopei Anti-Communist Government, 185 - - - Bank of China, 87 - - Bank of Communications, 87 - - Basic patterns of modern Chinese politics, 8 - - Bibliographical notes, 20, 21, 160, 190, 221, 223, 242, 256 - - "Blue Shirts," 144 - - Border Region, 16, 35, 116 - chart of government, 118 - - Boxers (_I Ho Ch'üan_), 213, 237 - - Buddhism, 258 - - Budget, 59, 75 - - Bureaucracy: - traditional ideal, 44 - at Chungking, 68 - - Burma, 189 - - Burma road, 93, 95, 279 - - Bukharin, 164 - - Bus services, 93 - - - Cabinet, 56 - - Canton, 18 - - Cantonese clique, 145 - - Capacity (_nêng_), 43 - - Capitalism, 30 - - Caribbean, 188 - - Carlson, Major Evans Fordyce, 116, 167 - - "C.C." clique, 142 - - Censor _Yüan_ (_see_ Control _Yüan_) - - Censoral power, 27 - - Censorship of news, 138 - - Censure, motion of, 314 - - Central America, 188 - - Central Bank of China, 87 - - Central China clique (_Hua-chung P'ai_), 76 - - Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang, 72 - - Central government (proposed constitutional provisions), 287 - - Central Secretariat of the Kuomintang (_Chung-yang Mi-shu-ch'u_), 137 - - Central News Agency, 137 - - Central Political Council (_Chung-yang Chêng-chih Wei-yüan-hui_), 16, 46 - - Central Political Institute (_Chung-yang Chêng-chih Hsüeh-hsiao_), 134 - - Central Publicity Board (_see_ Party-Ministry of Publicity) - - Chamberlain, Neville, 15 - - Chang, Carson (_Chang Chia-shêng_), 179 - - Chang Ching-chiang, 261 - - Chang Hsüeh-liang, 9, 200 - - Chang Kuo-tao, 163, 167, 168 - - Chang Peh Chuen (Chang Pai-chün), 178 - - Charts (_see also_ type of government) - Control _Yüan_, 318 - _Hsien_ classifications, 388 - Kuomintang organization, 331 - national governmental structure, 330 - provincial and urban government, 98 - - _Chên_ (_see_ Community) - - Chen Ch'i-mei, 260 - - Chen Chi-tang, 91 - - Chen, Eugene, 178 - - Ch'ên brothers, 134 - - Ch'ên Ch'êng, 340 - - Ch'ên I, 102 - - Ch'ên Kung-po, 198 - - Ch'ên Kuo-fu, 84, 134, 142 - - Ch'ên Kuo-hsin, essay on Mao Tsê-tung, 403 - - Ch'ên Li-fu, 84, 142 - - Ch'ên Lo, 204 - - Ch'ên Shao-yu (Wang Ming), 163 - - Ch'ên Tu-hsiu, 163 - - _Ch'ê-yeh Chiao-yü P'ai_ (_see_ Vocational Educationists' Clique) - - _Chia_, 107, 324, 395 - - Chiang Chieh-shih (_see_ Chiang K'ai-shek) - - Chiang Ching-kuo, 262 - - Chiang K'ai-shek: - biography, 254 - in Canton, 260 - character, 255 - childhood, 257 - Chinese appraisals, 266 - and Christianity, 257 - on constitutionalism, 32 - _Definition of the Problems of Various Classifications of Hsien_, 388 - ethical theory, 150 - governmental role, 48 - historical role, 255 - ideals, 257 - kidnapped at Sian, 10 - in the Kuomintang, 128 - life, 256 - marriage, 261 - military rise, 263 - military writings, 260 - nature of his power, 268 - and the New Life Movement, 149 - political theory, 265, 269 - present personality, 265 - and President Lin, 53 - relations with Wang Ch'ing-wei, 201 - rise in the Kuomintang, 263 - and Roosevelt, 278 - secret police, 268 - in Shanghai, 261 - and the Shanghai Communists, 263 - statement to the author, 371 - Soviet training, 262 - and Sun Yat-sen, 245 - training in Japan, 259 - _What I Mean by Action (Li-hsing Chê-hsiao)_, 373 - writings, 268 - - _Chiao-shou P'ai_ (_see_ Professors' Clique) - - Chicherin, 164 - - Chief (_Tsung-ts'ai_), 239 - - _Chien-ch'a_ power, 27 - - _Chien Kuo Ta Kang_, 6 - - _Ch'ih_, 150 - - China Branch of the International Peace Campaign, 234 - - China Defense League, 119 - - _China Forum, The_, 235 - - _China Herald, The_, 234 - - "China's Long-range Diplomatic Orientation," 418 - - China National Aviation Corporation, 93 - - Chinese Central Asia (_see_ Sinkiang) - - Chinese Communist Party (_see_ Communist Party) - - Chinese ideals, 2 - - Chinese Industrial Cooperatives (_see_ C.I.C.) - - Chinese Mass Education Movement, 218 - - Chinese National Socialist Party (_Kuo-chia Shê-hui Tang_), 179 - - Chinese Red Army, 13, 161 - - Chinese Republic, 2 - - Chinese Revolutionary Party (_Chung-kuo K'ê-ming Tang_), 178 - - Chinese Soviet Republic (_Chung-hua Su-wei-ai Kung-ho-kuo_), 13, 112, 161 - - Chinese Turkestan (_see also_ Sinkiang), 85 - - Chi, C.C., 139 - - Chin P'u-yi, 184, 256 - - Ch'in state and dynasty, 2, 107 - - Ch'in Po-k'u, 168 - - Chou En-lai, 64, 168 - - Chou Fu-hai, 198 - - Christian activities, 235 - - Chu Djang, 153 - - _Chu-Mao_, 166 - - Chung Fu Joint Mining Administration, 90 - - Chungking, 1, 15, 18, 56 - - Chung Shan (_see also_ Sun Yat-sen), 249 - - Chu Tê, 166, 261 - - _Ch'ü_, 107, 327, 391 - - _Ch'üan_ (power), 253 - - Ch'üan-min K'ang-chan Shê (United Front Club), cited, 37 - - Ch'u Chia-hua, 136 - - C.I.C. (Chinese Industrial Cooperatives; _Chung-kuo Kung-yeh Ho-tso - Hsieh-hui_): - appraisal, 233 - distribution of profits, 230 - establishment, 224 - formation of cooperatives, 226 - the Model Constitution, 232 - regions, 226 - relation to government, 223 - social welfare work, 231 - the three zones, 224 - - Citizenship (proposed constitutional provisions), 284 - - City Council (_Shih-chêng Hui-i_), 104 - - Civil governor of a province (_Shêng-chang_), 99 - - Civil service reform, 66 - - Civil Service Training Corps, 134 - - Clark-Kerr, Sir Archibald, 224 - - Class politics in China, 146 - - Class war, 13 - - Coal and iron, 228 - - Coal mining, 90 - - Collection of revenue, 86 - - College students, 9 - - Commission for the Disciplinary Punishment of Public Officers - (_Kung-wu-yüan Ch'êng-chieh Wei-yüan-hui_), 67 - - Commission on Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs (_Mêng Tsang - Wei-yüan-hui_), 8 - - Commission on Overseas Chinese Affairs (_Ch'iao-wu Wei-yüan-hui_), 84 - - Committee Chairman (_Wei-yüan-chang_; _see_ name of Committee) - - Communications, Ministry of (_Chiao-t'ung Pu_), 92 - - Communications Southward, 95 - - Communications system, foreign personnel in, 95 - - Communism, 30, 270 - - Communist communes, 213 - - Communist Party (_Kung-ch'an Tang_), 13, 159, 263, 275 - and American aid to China, 172 - appraisal of, 173 - Branch Party Organs, 363 - Central Party Committee, 368 - chart of structure, 162 - and Chiang K'ai-shek, 175 - _Constitution_, 359 - Council of Party Delegates, 162, 364 - foundation, 160 - _Hsien_ Organs, 364 - international policy, 403 - leaders, 166 - and Moscow, 163 - motives, 164 - National Party Congress, 367 - National Party Convention, 367 - organization, 361 - and peasants, 165, 213 - in perpetual revolution, 213 - policy toward the Kuomintang, 174 - potential treason, 172 - Provincial Party Organs, 366 - purges and schisms, 169 - Sun Yat-sen's alliance, 245 - Supreme Party Organs, 362 - views on Chiang K'ai-shek, 267 - - Communist Youth Corps (_Kung-ch'an Ch'ing-nien T'uan_), 132, 370 - - Communist zone (_see_ Frontier Area) - - Communists: - compared with Kuomintang, 146 - and the five-power system, 45 - and the guerrillas, 162 - in the People's Political Council, 76 - policy of collaboration, 121 - and the proposed Constitution, 37 - rivalry with Kuomintang, 159 - - "Community" (_hsiang_), 107 - - Community life in China, 4 - - Complexity of government structure, 61 - - Concordia Society (_Hsieh-ho-hui_), 194 - - Conflict: the term, 11 - - Confucianism, 2, 3, 45, 189, 250 - - Confucius, 239 - - Constitution, Chiang's comment on, 32 - - _Constitution of the Chinese Soviet Republic_, 31 - - _Constitution of the_ San Min Chu I _Youth Corps_, 331 - - Constitutional change, issues of, 31 - - Constitutionalism, 6, 177, 213, 371 - - Constitutions (_see also_ Draft Constitution), 21 - - Constitutions, ineffectual, 39 - - Consultative organs, 39 - - _Control_ (_chien-ch'a)_ power, 27 - - Control _Yüan_ (_Chien-ch'a Yüan_): - appraisal, 66 - chart of functions, 318 - diagram of organization, 319 - proposed constitutional provisions, 292 - reorganization under the proposed Constitution, 29 - war work, 313, 318 - - Cooperatives (_see also_ C.I.C.), 89, 393 - - Corruption, 38, 120 - - Cotton, 228 - - Council of State (_Kuo-min Chêng-fu Wei-yüan-hui_): - administrative and constitutional status, 52 - agencies directly attached, 54 - functions, 47 - proposed constitutional role, 28 - - County (_see hsien_) - - Courts of justice (proposed constitutional position), 292 - - Credit, national, 86 - - Currency, Japanese, 186 - - Currency rivalry, 87 - - Currents of documents in Chinese government, 55 - - Customs, 88 - - - Declarations of war and peace, 59 - - _Definition of the Problems Concerning the Organization of the - Various Classifications of Hsien_, 388 - - Delegates to the constituent People's Congress, 38 - - Democracy (_min chu_; Sun Yat-sen's term, _min ch'üan_), 270 - - Democracy in free China, 371 - - Democracy, inauguration of, 38 - - Democracy, prospects, 273 - - Democracy (_min ch'üan_), the theory of, 253 - - Democratic Centralism, 162 - - Democratic tendencies in the armies, 372 - - Democratic toleration, limits of, 40 - - Department of Military Operations (_Chün-ling-pu_), 62 - - Department of Military Training (_Chün-hsün-pu_), 62 - - Deputy Secretary-General (_Fu Mi-shu-chang_) of the People's - Political Council, 73 - - Deputy Speaker (_Fu I-chang_) of the People's Political Council, 72 - - Dialectical materialism (_see_ Communism, Communists) - - Diplomacy, 310 - - Diplomatic Orientation, China's Long-range, 418 - - Direct taxes, 87 - - Director of Political Affairs, 57 - - Directorate-General of Courts-Martial (_Chün-fa Chih-hsing - Tsung-chien-pu_), 62 - - _Discussion of Mao Tsê-tung's Comments on the Present State of - International Relations_ (Ch'ên Kuo-hsin), 403 - - District (_see hsien_ for government; _ch'ü_ for parties) - - Double Five Constitution (_see_ Draft Permanent Constitution) - - Draft Permanent Constitution (_Hsien-fa Ts'ao-an_), 25, 283 - - _Duties and General Activities of the_ San Min Chu I _Youth - Corps_, 340 - - - East Hopei Autonomous Anti-Communist Government, 192 - - Eastern Inner Mongolia, 85 - - Economic affairs: - advance in the West, 89 - industrial development, 90 - in _Program of Resistance and Reconstruction_, 311 - policy and administration, 85 - proposed constitutional provisions, 296 - war finance, 87 - - Economic Affairs, Ministry of (_Ching-chi Pu_), 88 - - Economic cycle in China, 106 - - Economic groups in politics, 236 - - Economic theory in the _San Min Chu I Youth Corps_, 351 - - Economics of old China, 3 - - Education, 30, 61, 83, 214, 312, 393 - - Education, Ministry of (_Chiao-yü Pu_), 83 - - Education: proposed constitutional provisions, 298 - - Eighteenth Army Corps, 168 - - Eighth Route Army, 13, 168 - - Election Committee for Representatives to the People's [Constituent] - Congress, 38 - - Elections, Communist, 163 - - Elections of representatives to the National [People's] - Congress, 302 - - Emergency Session of the Kuomintang Party Congress, 16 - - Empire, Chinese, 2 - - _Erh Ch'ên_ group, 142 - - Espionage, 61 - - Establishment, period of, 5 - - Eurasia airlines, 93 - - Examination _Yüan_, 56, 66, 68, 134 - proposed constitutional provisions, 292 - - Examinations Commission (_K'ao-hsüan Wei-yüan-hui_), 68 - - _Exclusive inspection_, 316 - - Executive _Yüan_ (_Hsing-chêng Yüan_): - executive responsibility, 57 - functions, 59 - Meeting, 58 - proposed constitutional provisions, 29, 288 - structure, 58 - - - _Fa chih_ (government of laws), 33 - - Farmers, 218 - - Farmers' Bank of China, 87 - - Fêng Yü-hsiang, 104 - - Fenghua, Chekiang, 262 - - Farouk, 255 - - Fascism, 270 - - Finance, Ministry of (_Ts'ai-chêng Pu_), 86 - - Five-fold separation of powers, 27, 206, 264 - - Five-power constitution (_wu-ch'üan hsien-fa_), 42, 68 - - _Five rights_, 43 - - Five _yüan_, 253 - - Foo Shing Corporation, 88 - - Foochow insurrection, 179 - - Ford, Henry, 233 - - Foreign Affairs, Ministry of (_Waichiaopu_), 81 - - Foreign financial aid, 87 - - Foreign policy, 403, 418 - - Foreign trade, 88 - - Formosans, 187 - - Four Cliques (_Ssŭ P'ai_), 76 - - Four Parties (_Ssŭ Tang_), 76 - - _Four powers_, 43 - - France, 181 - - Frederick the Great, 255 - - Free China, extent of, 98 - - Free China, prosperity, 89, 222 - - Freedoms under the proposed constitution: - assembly and forming associations, 285 - domicile, 284 - religious belief, 284 - speech, writing, and publication, 284 - - French Indo-China, 19 - - Friends of the Wounded Society, 155 - - Frontier Area (for Chinese, _see_ Administrative District of North - Shensi), 13, 16, 111, 115, 162 - - Fu Hsiao-ên, 212 - - Fukien province, 102, 217 - - Function of auditing, 313 - - Fup'ing, 118 - - Future development of Chinese politics, 274 - - - _Gaimusho_, 82 - - Galens, General (Vassili Blücher), 142 - - Gasoline, 91, 95 - - Gautama Buddha, 239 - - _General inspection_, 316 - - General Staff, 62 - - General strikes, 39 - - Generalissimo (_Tsung-ssŭ-ling_), 61 - - Genghis Khan, 239 - - Gentry in politics, 106 - - George, Henry, 30, 254 - - Germany, 273, 274 - - Glossary, 423-433 - - Gold-washing, 228 - - Government-owned corporations, 90 - - Government, nature of, 211 - - Government organization: chart, 330 - - Grants in aid to the provinces, 109 - - Grass cloth, 228 - - Great Revolution, 5, 60, 213 - - Green Gang, 261 - - Groups of households (_chia_), 107 - - Guerrillas: - areas, 372 - governments, 116 - and the Military Affairs Commission, 62 - and the National Salvationists, 177 - schools, 84 - strategy, 12 - warfare, 310 - zones under Chungking, 64 - - Guilds, 10 - - - Han dynasty, 3 - - Han Fu-ch'u, 202 - - Hankow, 4, 15 - - Hanson, Haldore, 116 - - Hedin, Sven, 255 - - Highway system, 93 - - Hitler, Adolf, 239 - - Hong Kong, 4 - - Honolulu, Sun Yat-sen in, 243 - - Hopei-Chahar Political Council, 195 - - Hopei-Chahar-Shansi Border Region (_Chin-ch'a-ch'i Pien-ch'ü Lin-shih - Hsing-chêng Wei-yüan-hui_), Provisional, Administrative Committee - of, 116 - - Ho Ying-chin, 63 - - _Hsiang_ (or _chên_; "community"), 107, 324, 391 - - _Hsiang_ guild, 393 - - _Hsiao-tsu_ ("small group") training program, 354 - - _Hsien_ ("county" or district), 29, 107, 253, 311 - area, 391 - definition of problems by Chiang K'ai-shek, 388 - experimental, 219 - governments, 391 - organizations of the Communists, 364 - proposed constitutional provisions, 294 - regulations (text), 324 - - _Hsin Min Chu I_, 194 - - _Hsin Min Hui_, 208 - - Huang, J. L., 149 - - Huang Hsing, 245, 259, 262 - - _Huangpu_ (Whampoa) Academy and political group, 142, 262 - - Huapeikuo, 194 - - Hu Han-min, 8, 142, 202, 262 - - _Hui-i_ (a legislative "council"; _see_ level of government concerned) - - Hull, Cordell, 278 - - Hunan, 19 - - Hung Hsiu-ch'üan, 241 - - Hu Shih, 215 - - Hypo-colony, 190 - - - _I_ (ethics), 150 - - Ideological control, 251 - - _I Ho Ch'üan_ (Boxers), 237 - - Impeachment, 313 - - Impeachment, proposed constitutional provisions, 293 - - "In accordance with law," 26 - - Incident, 11 - - Income taxes, 87 - - Indirect rule, 183 - - Indo-China, 183 - - Indusco (_see_ C.I.C.) - - Industrial cooperatives (_see_ C.I.C.) - - Inheritance, the Chinese political, 1 - - Inheritance taxes, 87 - - Inner Mongolia, Federated Autonomous Government of (_Mêng-ku Lien-ho - Tzŭ-chih Chêng-fu_), 192 - - Inner Mongolia and Chungking, 85 - - Inspection systems, 108 - - Institute of National Culture, 179 - - Intellectual traditionalism, 251 - - Interior, Ministry of (_Nei-chêng Pu_), 82 - - Internal revenue, 88 - - _International Development of China, The_, 244 - - International relations (_see_ diplomacy, foreign policy, etc.) - - Interpretation of statutes and ordinances: proposed constitutional - provisions, 291 - - Invasion, period of, 5 - - Italy, 274 - - - Japanese: - aims in China, 184 - army, 18, 276 - army as a Chinese government, 185 - attitudes to Chinese foreign policy, 82 - Imperial Government in China, 183 - prospects in China, 274 - recognition of Wang Ch'ing-wei, 209 - role of the army, 183 - subsidiary Chinese governments (_see_ Pro-Japanese Groups) - training of Chiang K'ai-shek, 259 - - Japan's puppets or Japanophiles (_see_ Pro-Japanese Groups) - - _Joint inspection_, 316 - - Judicial _Yüan_ (_Ssŭ-fa Yüan_), 65, 291 - - Justice, Ministry of (_Ssŭ-fa Hsing-chêng Pu_), 67, 96 - - - K'an Nai-kuang, 137, 140 - - Kang Tê, Emperor of Manchoukuo, the (_see_ Chin P'u-yi) - - Kao Tsung-wu, 198 - - Kentwell, L. K., 205 - - Kialing river, 18 - - Kiang Kang-hu, 181 - - Kiangsi, 161 - - Korea, 189 - - Kung, H. H., 57, 86, 223 - - Kung, Mme. H. H. (Ai-ling Soong), 248 - - Kung so, 393 - - _Kuo-chia Chu-i P'ai_ (_La Jeunesse_ party), 181 - - Kuomintang: - appraisal of, 146 - army connections, 143 - attitude toward Communists, 144 - Bolshevik pattern of organization, 131 - bureaucracy, 7 - central administrative structure, 72, 131, 137 - Central Control Committee (_Chung-yang Chien-ch'a - Wei-yüan-hui_), 127, 131 - Central Executive Committee (_Chung-yang Chih-hsing - Wei-yüan-hui_), 57, 126, 127, 131 - Central Political Institute (_Chung-yang Chêng-chih - Hsüeh-hsiao_), 134 - Central Publicity Board (_see_ Publicity, Party-Ministry of) - Central Training Committee (_Hsün-lien Wei-yüan-hui_), 133 - chart of field organization, 139 - chart of central organization, 131 - chart of general structure, 331 - and the Ch'ên brothers, 84 - and the Communists, 159 - Congress (_Ch'üan-kuo Tai-piao Ta-hui_), 57 - constitutional status, 124 - democratic outlook, 143 - and economic classes, 135 - Emergency Session of the Party Congress, 69, 128 - _hsiao-tsu_ ("small-group"), 140, 354 - intra-Party politics, 142 - membership, 141 - monopoly of government, 41 - organization, 125, 129, 331 - "Orthodox" fraction, 200 - Party cell, 140 - Party Chief (_Tsung-ts'ai_), 126, 128 - Party Congress (_see_ Congress) - Party Constitution, 125 - Party democracy, 124 - Party-Ministries, 136 - Party purges, 141 - in the People's Political Council, 76 - policy toward Communist Party, 174 - purposes, 125 - "Reorganized" fraction, 200 - rivalry with Communists in the Northwest, 135 - "small-group" (_see hsiao-tsu_) - Supreme National Defense Council (_Kuo-fang Tsui-kao - Wei-yüan-hui_), 132 - Training Corps (_Hsün-lien T'uan_), 133 - Wang Ch'ing-wei, 197 - Youth Corps (_see San Min Chu I_ Youth Corps) - - Kwangsi province, 19, 102, 109, 217 - - Kwangtung province, 102 - - - Labor: - law, 39 - proposed constitutional provisions, 297 - - _La Jeunesse_ (Parti ... de la jeune Chine; _Kuo-chia Chu-i - P'ai_), 76, 181 - - Land problem: - proposed constitutional provisions, 296 - reform, 106, 110, 218 - - Landlords, 4, 148, 221 - - _Lao-pai-hsing_ (the common people), 236 - - Lattimore, Owen, 3 - - Law: the term, 299 - - _Laws Governing the System of Organization of the National - Government of the Republic of China_ (1925), 23 - - _Laws Governing the System of Organization of the National - Government_ (1931), 24 - - Leader (_Tsung-li_), 239 - - League of Nations Union, 234 - - Left Kuomintang, 264 - - Leftists and Leftism, 9, 101, 111, 248 - - Legal Adviser to the National Government (_Kuo-min Chêng-fu Fa-lü - Ku-wên_), 54 - - Legal tender notes (_fa pi_), 87, 312 - - Legislative _Yüan_ (_Li-fa Yüan_): function, 65 - - Members (_Li-fa Wei-yüan_), 66 - proposed constitutional provisions, 29, 289 - - _Li_ (ideological conformity), 150 - - _Li chih_ (government by _li_), 33 - - Liang, Hubert, 224 - - _Lien_ (integrity), 150 - - Li Hung-chang, 189 - - Li Li-san, 163 - - Linebarger, Paul M. W., 54, 105, 242, 246 - - Lin Pai-shêng, 198 - - Lin Shên (Lin Sen; Lim Sun), 53, 145 - - Li Shêng-wu, 206 - - Literacy, 214, 215 - - Liu, K. P., 224 - - Local finance, 402 - - Local government (_see also hsien_): - appraisals, 109 - chart, 107 - Chiang K'ai-shek's comment, 397 - general role, 98 - under the _Hsien Fa_, 29 - proposed constitutional reforms, 294 - in the recent past, 104 - reform of, 311 - reform under the Kuomintang, 137 - reform methods, 108 - - Long March of the Chinese Reds, 119, 161 - - Long-Range Diplomatic Orientation, China's, 418 - - Lung Yün, 101 - - - Mahayana Buddhism, 259 - - Mail censorship, 95 - - Main Office of the Military Affairs Commission, 62 - - Malaysia, 183 - - Malraux, André, 161 - - Manchoukuo, 98, 183, 189, 256 - - Manchoukuo-Outer Mongol war, 19 - - Manchu Empire of China (Ch'ing dynasty), 5 - - Manchuria, 89 - - Manchus, 2, 241 - - Mao Tsê-tung, 166, 403-417 - - Marx, Karl, 241, 254 - - Marxism, 160, 234, 258, 263 - - Marxism and Chinese history, 165 - - Marxism-Leninism, 84 - - Marxist effect on the _San Min Chu I_, 252 - - Mass: - action, 10 - education, 215 - literacy movement, 84 - marriages, 153 - mobilization, 157 - movements, 312 - singing, 154 - - Material and Resources Control and Supervision Ministry, 91 - - Mayor (_Shih-chang_), 104 - - Mayors under the proposed constitution, 295 - - Mazzini, 241 - - Miao Ping, 194 - - Migration of schools, 83 - - Migrations, 88 - - Militarism in the provinces, 100 - - Military Advisory Council (_Chün-shih Ts'an-i-yüan_), 62 - - Military affairs, 310 - - Military Affairs Commission (_Chün-shih Wei-yüan-hui_), 13, 60, 162 - - Military governor (_tuchün_), 99 - - Military jurisdiction under the _Hsien Fa_, 284 - - Military policy, 61 - - Military service under the _Hsien Fa_, 285 - - Military unification, 6 - - Militia, 393 - - _Min-ch'üan chu-i_ (_see_ Democracy, Sun Yat-sen, and _San Min Chu I_) - - _Min shêng chu-i_, 30, 223, 253 - - _Min ts'u chu-i_ (_see_ Nationalism, Sun Yat-sen, and _San Min Chu I_) - - Ming Emperors, 249 - - Minister (_Pu Chang_), 96 - - Ministry of ---- (_see_ name of Ministry) - - Ministries, 81 - - Minor parties: - and constitutionalism, 34 - at Nanking, 208 - in occupied China, 235 - representation, 72 - status, 160 - - Minority democracy, 41 - - Mobilization, economic, 86 - - Model _hsien_, 109 - - Modernization of West China, 89 - - Mohammed, 239 - - Monarchist legitimism, 184 - - Morale, governmental, 236 - - Moscow (_see_ Communism) - - Moslem rebellions, 213 - - Motor communications, 93 - - Motor fuel trade, 90 - - Municipal Advisory Assembly (_Shih Ts'an-i-hui_), 72, 104 - - Municipal food stores, 90 - - Municipal government, 103 - - Municipal People's Political Council (_see_ Municipal Advisory - Assembly) - - Municipalities under the _Hsien Fa_, 295 - - Munitions, 90 - - - Nanking, capture of, 14 - - Nanking regimes (_see_ Reorganized Government; Reformed Government) - - Napoleon, 239 - - "National" (_see also_ "People's," "Chinese") - - National Aviation Commission, 63 - - National capital in the _Hsien Fa_, 284 - - National [Constituent] Congress (_Kuo-min Ta-hui_), 25, 27, 300 - - National Congress: election of representatives, 302 - - National Congress: system of organization, 300 - - National Government (_Kuo-min Chêng-fu_): the term, 52 - - National Government Committee (_see_ Council of State) - - National Health Administration (_Wei-shêng Shu_), 83 - - National Institute of Rural Reconstruction, 220 - - National Military Council (_see_ Military Affairs Commission) - - National People's Convention (_Kuo-min Hui-i_), 7 - - National Relief Commission (_Chên-chi Wei-yüan-hui_), 92 - - National Salvation (_Chiu Kuo_) movement, 175 - - National Socialism (German), 252 - - National Socialist Party (_Kuo-chia Shê-hui Tang_), 75, 179 - - National Spiritual Mobilization (_Kuo-min Ching-shên - Tsung-tung-yüan_), 157 - - National treasury, 88 - - Nationalism (_min ts'u_), theory of, 252 - - Negrin, 15 - - Neighborhood (_pao_), 107 - - Nêng (ability), 253 - - New Fourth Army (_Hsin-ssŭ-chün_), 119 - - New Life Movement (_Hsin Shêng-huo Yün-tung_), 149 - - New Life Secretaries' Camp, 155 - - New Life Students Rural Summer Service Corps, 154 - - New Order in East Asia, 184, 189 - - News services, 137 - - North China, 14 - - North Shensi (_see also_ Frontier Area), 161 - - Northeastern Clique (_Tungpei P'ai_), 76 - - - Occupied China: - Chungking control over, 64 - missions, 235 - poverty, 92 - - Office of Civil Affairs (_Wên-kuan Ch'u_), 54 - - Office of Military Affairs (_Tsan-chün Ch'u_), 54 - - Office of the Naval Commander-in-Chief (_Hai-chün - Tsung-ssŭ-ling-pu_), 63 - - Office of Political Affairs (_Chêng-wu Ch'u_), 57 - - Officers' Moral Endeavor Corps, 63, 149 - - Old China: - economics, 3 - government, 5 - socio-economic structure, 211 - in Sun Yat-sen's theory, 251 - - Old Hundred Names (_lao-pai-hsing_), 236 - - Opinion, public, 39 - - Organic Law of XVII (1928), 28 - - Organization of the Kuomintang, etc. (_see_ relevant group or agency) - - "Orthodox" Kuomintang, 200, 207 - - Outer Mongol People's Republic, 183, 188 - - _Outline of National Reconstruction_, 6 - - _Outline of War-Time Controlment_, 313 - - _Outlines of Political Tutelage_, 24 - - Overseas Chinese, 84 - - - Pacification Commissioner (_Sui-ching Chu-jên_), 100 - - Pai Chung-hsi, 102 - - _pai-hua_ (written vernacular), 215 - - Pan American airlines, 93 - - Panchen Lama, 71 - - Pan Ch'ao, 81 - - _Pao_ ("neighborhood"), 107, 324, 394 - - _Pao_ schools, 216 - - _Pao-chia_ system, 106 - - Paper money, 86 - - _Parti Républicain Nationaliste de la Jeune Chine_ (_see Kuo-chia - Chu-i P'ai_) - - Party Affairs Committee of the Kuomintang (_Tang-wu - Wei-yüan-hui_), 133 - - Party Chief (_Tsung-ts'ai_), 41 - - Party Constitution (_Tang-chang_): - Communist, 359 - Kuomintang, 125 - - Party dictatorship (_tang chih_), 6, 23 - - Party-government relations, 49 - - Party and Government War Area Commission (_Chan-ti Tang-chêng - Wei-yüan-hui_), 64, 112 - - Party headquarters, 141 - - Party-politics, 158 - - Party-politics in the People's Political Council, 76 - - Party Supervisor's Net (_Tang-jên Chien-ch'a Wang_), 141 - - Party-Ministries of the Kuomintang, 136 - - Party's role in the constitutional system, 23 - - Peasant rebellions, 4 - - Pensions Commission (_Fu-hsüeh Wei-yüan-hui_), 62 - - People's Advisory Political Council (_see_ People's Political Council) - - People's Congress (_see_ National Congress) - - People's Foreign Relations Association, 234 - - People's Political Council (_Kuo-min Ts'an-chêng Hui_): - competence, 73 - election, 72 - function of representation, 66 - membership, 70 - nominations, 71 - practicality, 74 - procedure, 74 - in _Program of Resistance and Reconstruction_, 311 - reorganization, 75 - sessions, 70 - - Permanent Constitution, Draft (_Hsien-fa Ts'ao-an_), 5, 25, 283 - - Personnel, Ministry of (_Ch'üan-hsü Pu_), 68, 96 - - _Philosophy of Action, A_, 373 - - _Pi Chiao Hsien Fa_ (_Comparative Constitutions_, by Wang Shihchieh), - translated and quoted, 23, 49, 50, 52, 67, 125 - - Pilsudski, 272 - - Planning Committee for the Western Capital (_Hsi-ching Ch'ou-pei - Wei-yüan-hui_), 56 - - Pluralism, 3, 211 - - Policy-making, 47, 74, 79 - - Political Affairs Department or Office (_Chêng-wu Ch'u_), 57 - - Political commissars in the army, 63 - - Political Department (_Chêng-chih-pu_) of the Military Affairs - Commission, 64 - - Political laxity, 251 - - Political rights: proposed constitutional provisions, 285 - - Political Scientists' group (_Chêng-hsüeh Hsi_), 145 - - Political Vice-Minister (_Chêng-wu Tz'u-chang_), 96 - - Politics of ideology, 8 - - Popular democracy, 39 - - Popular Front group, 78, 129 - - Popular government in the Border Region, 119 - - Population, 3 - - Poverty in occupied China, 222 - - Power (_ch'üan_), 43, 253 - - Pragmatic utilitarianism of Sun Yat-sen, 252 - - Presidency proposed under the _Hsien Fa_, 28, 287 - - President (_Yüan-chang_) of the Executive Yüan, 56 - - President (_Chu-hsi_) of the National Government, 52 - - Presidium of the People's Political Council, 73 - - Pressure politics, 234 - - Prime movers, 229 - - Principles of the Great People (_Ta Min Chu I_), 196 - - Private rights: proposed constitutional provisions, 284 - - Private property: proposed constitutional provisions, 285 - - Privy Council, 56 - - Problems of the _hsien_: comment of Chiang K'ai-shek, 388 - - Professors' Clique (_Chiao-shou P'ai_), 77 - - _Program of Resistance and Reconstruction_ (_K'ang-chan Chien-kuo - Kang-ling_), 17, 35, 309 - - Pro-Japanese elements, 186, 192, 212, 276, 310 - - Propaganda, 61, 137 - - _Proposition_, 314 - - Prosperity, 222 - - Protestant schools, 215 - - Provincial Governments (_Shêng Chêng-fu_): - Chairman (_Shêng Chêng-fu Chu-hsi_), 100, 294 - connection with central government, 82 - councils, 72 - current role, 98 - proposed constitutional provisions, 293 - Provincial People's Political Councils (_Shêng - Ts'an-chêng-hui_), 103 - structure, 102 - - Provincialism, 8, 99 - - Provisional Constitution (_Yüeh Fa_), 22, 24 - - Provisional Executive Committee of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Border - Region (_Chin-ch'a-chi Pien-ch'ü Lin-shih Hsing-chêng - Wei-yüan-hui_; _see also_ Border Region), 16 - - Provisional Government of the Republic of China (_Chung-hua Min-kuo - Lin-shih Chêng-fu_), 14, 192, 207 - - _Pu_ (ministries or departments), 61 - - Public Administration, School of, 219 - - Public opinion, 214 - - Public service: proposed constitutional provisions, 285 - - Public utilities: proposed constitutional provisions, 296 - - Publicity, 79 - - Publicity, Party-Ministry of (_Chung-yang Hsüan-ch'uan Pu_), 137 - - Publicity of the _San Min Chu I_ Youth Corps, 350 - - "Puppet states," 188 - - Purple Mountain, 249 - - P'u Yi (_see_ Chin P'u-yi) - - - Races: proposed constitutional provisions, 284 - - Radio, 94 - - Railways in Free China, 92 - - _Resistance and Reconstruction, Program of_, 309 - - Reformed Government of the Republic of China (_Chung-hua Min-kuo - Wei-hsin Chêng-fu_), 17, 192, 195 - - Regeneration Club (_Fu-hsing Shê_), 144 - - Regional autonomy, 8 - - Regular troops, 8 - - _Regulations Concerning the Organization of the Various - Classifications of Hsien_, 324 - - Relief, 61, 297 - - "Reorganized Kuomintang," 200 - - Reorganized National Government of China (_Hsiu-chêng Kuo-min - Chêng-fu_): - affiliation with Japan, 183 - creation and function, 197 - personnel, 204 - practical work, 205 - significance to Chiang K'ai-shek, 372 - status, 203 - - Representation, function of, 66 - - Republic: the term, 161 - - Republican revolution, 213 - - Republicans (_Kung-ho Tang_), 208 - - Resident Committee of the People's Political Council, 73 - - Resist-Japan University, 84 - - Resistance, 12, 213 - - Revolution by three stages, 6, 22, 35, 253 - - Revolutionary Action Commission of the Chinese Kuomintang (_Chung-hua - Kuo-min-tang K'ê-ming Hsing-chêng Wei-yüan-hui_), 178 - - Rights, constitutional, 28 - - Roosevelt, Franklin D., 233, 278 - - Rosinger, Lawrence K., 81 - - Rural education, 218 - - Rural reconstruction, 218, 397 - - Rural Service Corps, 154 - - Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic, (R.S.F.S.R.), 188 - - - Salazar, Antonio de O., 272 - - _San Min Chu I_: - and Chiang K'ai-shek, 270 - explanation and comment, 8, 13, 34, 178, 245, 250, 371 - and _Hsin Min Chu I_, 194 - proposed constitutional provisons, 287 - - _San Min Chu I_ Youth Corps (_San Min Chu I Ch'ing-nien T'uan_): - appraisal, 352 - chart of organization, 345 - Constitution, 331 - description by General Ch'ên Ch'êng, 340 - history, 341 - and the Kuomintang, 132 - Leader, 342 - - Salt gabelle, 88 - - Scholars of old China, 3 - - Scholastic bureaucracy, 3, 250 - - School for the Border Provinces, 135 - - Schools (_see_ education), 216 - - _Scorched earth_ policy, 12 - - Second Revolution, 259 - - Secret societies, 10 - - Secretariat (_Mi-shu-ch'u_), 57, 73 - - Secretary-General (_Mi-shu-chang_), 57, 73 - - Service Department, military (_Hou-fang Ch'in-wu-pu_), 63 - - Seven Gentlemen (_Ch'i Chün-tzu_), 36, 76, 176 - - Shanghai, 13 - - Sharecropping, 91 - - Sheean, Vincent, 161 - - Shên Chun-lu, 176 - - Shêng Shih-ts'ai, 176 - - Shensi (_see_ Frontier Area) - - Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Frontier Area (_Shan-kan-ning Pien-ch'ü - Chêng-fu_), 112 - - _Shih_ (_see_ municipality, _q.v._) - - Sian affair, 5, 10, 176 - - Sinkiang (Chinese Central Asia; Chinese Turkestan), 85, 101 - - Sino-American trade, 88 - - Sino-Siberian highway, 93, 95 - - Small-Group Training Program, 354 - - Smith, Joseph, 241 - - Snow, Edgar, 146, 160 - - Social Affairs, Ministry of, 96 - - Social Movements, Party-Ministry of (_Shê-hui Yün-tung Pu_; also - translated Party-Ministry of Social Affairs, Board of Social - Affairs), 96, 136 - - Social Democratic Party, 181 - - Social rigidity, 251 - - Social work, 61 - - Social work of the _San Min Chu I_ Youth Corps, 351 - - Socialist Party, 181, 208 - - Soong, C. J., 247 - - Soong, T. V., 9, 86, 248 - - Soong Ching-ling, 245 - - Soong sisters, 248 - - Sovereignty: proposed constitutional provisions, 283 - - Soviet China, 275 - - Soviet form of government in China, 45 - - Soviet influence in Sinkiang, 101 - - Soviet-Japanese understanding, 275 - - Soviet policy in China, 171 - - Soviet training of Chiang K'ai-shek, 262 - - Soviet Union (_see also_ Communists; Marxism), 188, 273, 275 - - Speaker (_I-chang_) of the People's Political Council, 72 - - Special Administrative District of the Chinese Republic (_Chung-hua - Min-kuo T'ê-ch'ü Chêng-fu_), 112 - - Special-area governments, 98, 111, 120 - - _Special inspection_, 316 - - Special Regional Government ... (_see_ Special Administrative - District ...) - - Specie, 86 - - Stalemate, 12 - - Stalin, Joseph, 263 - - Stalinism (_see also_ Communist Party), 234 - - State Council (_see_ Council of State) - - State examinations: proposed constitutional provisions, 285 - - State socialism, 30, 89 - - Steamships, 93 - - Strategy of the Chinese, 12 - - Sub-district (_ch'ü-fên_) of the Kuomintang, 126, 139 - - Subterranean minerals: proposed constitutional provisions, 296 - - Sung Ai-ling (_see_ Kung, Mme. H. H.) - - Sung Ch'ing-ling (_see_ Sun Yat-sen, Mme.) - - Sung Mei-ling, 248, 261 - - Sung Tzu-wên (_see_ Soong, T. V.) - - Sun I-hsien (_see_ Sun Yat-sen) - - Sun K'ê (Sun Fo), 66, 145, 247 - - Sun Yat-sen: - biography, 240 - doctrines (_see also San Min Chu I_), 6 - family, 247 - historical role, 239 - on imperialism, 190 - on local government, 105 - Provisional President, 244 - revolutionary technique, 244 - sense of mission, 240 - state planning, 245 - Western training, 242 - - Sun Yat-sen, Mme., 145, 178, 247 - - Supreme Court (_Tsui-kao Fa-yüan_), 67 - - Supreme National Defense Council (_Tsui-kao Kuo-fang - Wei-yüan-hui_), 16, 46 - - Symbolism of government, 45 - - System of organization of the National Congress, 300 - - Szechwan, 181 - - - T'ai Li, 145 - - T'aip'ing Rebellion, 161, 213, 241 - - Taiwanese, 187 - - _Ta Min Chu I_, 196 - - _Ta-min-hui_, 196, 208 - - _Tang Cheng Chien Chih T'u-piao_, cited, 46, 54 - - T'ang Leang-li, 198 - - Tannu-Tuva, 189 - - Tao Hsi-shêng, 198 - - Tayler, J. B., 224 - - Taylor, George, 116 - - Taxation: proposed constitutional provisions, 285 - - Telecommunications, 93 - - Telegraph, 94 - - Telephone, 94 - - Têng Yen-ta, 178 - - Territory: proposed constitutional provisions, 283 - - Third International (_see also_ Communist Party), 71, 161, 245 - - Third Party (_Ti-san Tang_), 178 - - Three-Power Pact, 274 - - Three-stage war, 12 - - Three stages of revolution (_see_ Revolution by three stages) - - "Three principles of the people" (_see San Min Chu I_) - - Tibet, 85 - - Tientsin, 4 - - Tinghsien, 219 - - Tong, Hollington, 138, 255 - - Tongs (_tang_), 261 - - Township (ch'ü), 107 - - Training Committee (_Hsün-lien Wei-yüan-hui_) of the Kuomintang, 133 - - Training conferences, 109 - - Trans-Sinkiang highway, 93 - - Tridemism (_see San Min Chu I_) - - Trotsky, Leon, 164, 263 - - Truck service, 93 - - Tseng Chi, 181 - - Tso Shen-sheng, 181 - - Tso Tao-fên, 36, 176 - - _Tsung-ts'ai_, 41 - - _Tuchünism_, 5, 244 - - _Tungpei P'ai_ (_see_ Northeastern Clique) - - Turksib railroad, 101 - - Tutelage, period of, 7 - - Tutelary dictatorship (_tang chih_), 23 - - Types of government sponsorship, 89 - - - Unearned increment, 30, 296 - - United Council of the pro-Japanese, 195 - - United Front, 70, 111, 113, 119, 129 - - United States of America, 273, 275, 277, 279 - - Universal Trading Corporation, 88 - - Urban pattern of local government, 104 - - _Utterances on Reconstruction, The Party Chief's (Tsung-ts'ai - Chien-kuo Yen-lun Hsüan-chi)_, quoted, 33 - - - Vayo, Julio Alvarez del, 15 - - Vice-President of a _Yüan (Fu-yüan-chang)_, 57 - - Vocational education, 217 - - Vocational Educationists' Clique (_Ch'ê-yeh Chiao-yü P'ai_), 77 - - - Wang Ch'ing-wei, 20, 53, 56, 129, 142, 145, 192, 197, 239, 263, 372 - agreements with the Japanese, 203 - flight from Chungking, 203 - following, 197 - record of schism, 199 - significance, 208 - - Wang Ch'ung-hui, 82, 418 - - Wang K'ê-min, 194 - - Wang Ming, 257 - - Wang Shih-chieh, 23, 73, 137 - - _Wang Tao_, 194 - - War Area Service Corps, 154 - - War finance, 87 - - War, Ministry of (_Chün-chêng-pu_), 60, 63, 96 - - War: the term, 11 - - War-time Controlment, Outline of, 313 - - Washington, George, 255 - - Water-conservancy regions, 4 - - Western imperialism, 4, 190 - - Western states, 3 - - Whampoa (_see Huangpu_) - - _What I Mean By Action_, 373 - - William, Maurice, 254 - - Wireless, 94 - - Women's Advisory Council of the New Life Movement, 155 - - Wong Wen-hao, 91 - - Wool, 227 - - Workers' living conditions: proposed constitutional provisions, 296 - - World federation, 371 - - World government: comment of Chiang, 281 - - Wounded Soldiers' League, 155 - - Wu, Dr. John C. H., 26 - - Wu-han government, 15 - - Wu Pei-fu, 198 - - - Yang Kan-tao, 181 - - Yangtze, 18 - - Yeh Ch'u-tsang, 137 - - Yen, Dr. James Y. C, 84, 218 - - Yenan, 115 - - Yin Ju-kêng, 185, 192 - - Y. M. C. A., 149, 235 - - Young, Brigham, 241 - - _Yüan_, 24, 28 - - _Yüan-chang_, 28 - - Yüan Shih-k'ai, 244, 259 - - Yü Yu-jên, 145 - - Yünnan, 101 - - - Zinoviev, G., 164 - - - - - * * * * * * - - - - -Transcriber's note: - -Obvious printer's errors have been corrected. - -Inconsistent spellings have been kept, as well as inconsistent use of -hyphens (e.g., "war-time," "wartime," and "war time"), inconsistent -use of space in contractions (e.g., "C. E. C." and "C.E.C.") and -inconsistent Chinese transcription (e.g., "Chün-tzŭ" and "Chüntzu"). - - - -***END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE CHINA OF CHIANG K'AI-SHEK*** - - -******* This file should be named 50465-0.txt or 50465-0.zip ******* - - -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: -http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/5/0/4/6/50465 - - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed. - -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United -States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. Special rules, set forth in the General Terms of Use part -of this license, apply to copying and distributing Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic works to protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm -concept and trademark. 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You may copy it, give it away or re-use it -under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this -eBook or online at <a -href="http://www.gutenberg.org">www.gutenberg.org</a>. If you are not -located in the United States, you'll have to check the laws of the -country where you are located before using this ebook.</p> -<p>Title: The China of Chiang K'ai-Shek</p> -<p> A Political Study</p> -<p>Author: Paul Myron Anthony Linebarger</p> -<p>Release Date: December 8, 2015 [eBook #50465]</p> -<p>Language: English</p> -<p>Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1</p> -<p>***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE CHINA OF CHIANG K'AI-SHEK***</p> -<p> </p> -<h3>E-text prepared by Judith Wirawan, Adam Buchbinder,<br /> - and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team<br /> - (http://www.pgdp.net)</h3> -<p> </p> -<hr class="full" /> -<p> </p> -<p> </p> -<p> </p> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 400px;"> -<img src="images/i_frontis.jpg" width="400" height="555" alt="Generalissimo Chiang K'ai-shek" /> -<span class="caption"><i>Generalissimo Chiang K'ai-shek</i></span> -</div> - -<hr class="chap" /> - - -<h1><i>THE CHINA</i><br /> - -<i><small>OF</small></i><br /> - -<i>CHIANG K'AI-SHEK:</i><br /> - -<i><small>A Political Study</small></i></h1> - - -<p class="center space-above space-below">BY<br /> - -<big>PAUL M. A. LINEBARGER</big><br /> -<i>Duke University</i></p> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 52px;"> -<img src="images/i_logo_i.jpg" width="52" height="60" alt="Logo" /> -</div> - -<p class="center"><big>GREENWOOD PRESS, PUBLISHERS</big><br /> -WESTPORT, CONNECTICUT</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<blockquote> - -<p><i>The Library of Congress has catalogued this publication as follows</i>:</p> - -<hr class="pub" /> - -<p><b>Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data</b></p> - -<p>Linebarger, Paul Myron Anthony, 1913-1966.<br /> -<span style="margin-left:1em;">The China of Chiang K'ai-shek; a political study.</span></p> - -<p><span style="margin-left:1em;">Reprint of the 1943 ed. published by World Peace Foundation, Boston.</span><br /> - -<span style="margin-left:1em;">Includes bibliographical references.</span><br /> - -<span style="margin-left:1em;">1. China—Politics and government—1912-1949.</span><br /> -2. Chiang, Kai-shek, 1886-<span style="margin-left:1em;">.</span><span style="margin-left:1em;">I.</span> Title.<br /> -DS774.L48 1973<span style="margin-left:1em;">320.9'51'042</span><span style="margin-left:1em;">73-725</span><br /> -ISBN 0-8371-6779-5</p> -<hr class="pub" /> -</blockquote> - -<p class="space-above"><i>Copyright</i> 1942 by World Peace Foundation</p> - -<p>Originally published in 1943<br /> -by World Peace Foundation, Boston</p> - -<p>Reprinted with the permission<br /> -of World Peace Foundation</p> - -<p>First Greenwood Reprinting 1973</p> - -<p>Library of Congress Catalogue Card Number 73-725</p> - -<p>ISBN 0-8371-6779-5</p> - -<p>Printed in the United States of America</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - - -<p class="center">TO MY MOTHER<br /> - -<i>With Love</i></p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - - -<h2>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</h2> - - -<p>Acknowledgments, for a work of this type, are always insufficient -and often ungracious. Today, political and military -conditions forbid mention of some of the persons to -whom I am most indebted. Furthermore, it is unfeasible to -thank those teachers and friends who have prepared me in -years past for the present work. Nevertheless, courtesy and -candor demand that I indicate the extent of my obligation, -and tender these inadequate thanks.</p> - -<p>For interviews, hospitality and other kindnesses shown -me in Western China I wish to thank Generalissimo and -Mme. Chiang K'ai-shek; Their Excellencies, Sun K'ê, Yü -Yu-jen, H. H. Kung, Wang Ch'ung-hui, Chang Chia-ngau, -T. F. Tsiang, Yeh Ch'u-tsang, Kan Nai-kuang, Ch'ên Kuo-fu, -Wang Shih-chieh, Ch'u Chia-hua, Hollington Tong, and -Ma Chao-chun; Major Generals J. L. Huang and Ch'u -Shih-ming; Bishop Paul Yu-pin; and Messrs. Foo Ping-shêng, -Chên Ming-shu, Lo Chia-lun, Edward Bing-shuey -Lee, Han Lih-wu, P. C. Kuo, Ch'ên Chih-mai, Kinn-wei -Shaw, James Y. C. Yen, Wang Shen-tsu, Shuming T. Liu, Jen -Shieh, Li Ch'in-shui, and Ma P'in-ho. Among the foreign -community, I wish to thank the American Ambassador, Mr. -Nelson Johnson, and Mr. E. F. Drumwright for their kind -reception; and to thank Mr. Tillman Durdin, Mr. Theodore -White, Mr. George Fitch, Dr. J. B. Tayler, Professor Frank -Price, and Professor and Mrs. J. B. Slocum.</p> - -<p>I feel myself peculiarly fortunate in having three such -good, loyal friends as Drs. Chu Djang, Miao Chung-yi, and -Yin Pao-yü, whose kindnesses to me have continued ever -since our student days together at the Johns Hopkins.</p> - -<p>Dean Shen Ch'un-lu, Mr. Tso T'ao-fên and their associates -in the National Salvation movement; Colonel Ch'in Po-k'u -of the Communist Party; Mr. Chang Peh-chuen of the Third -Party; Dr. Carson Chang of the National Socialist Party, -and other spokesmen for minority and unofficial groups -were most generous with their time and information.</p> - -<p>Messrs. You Shoo-tseng, Yang Chun, Wu Hsüeh-ping, -Hawthorne Chen and others translated Chinese materials -for or with me. Save for their help, so liberally and painstakingly -rendered, this book would have been delayed for -months if not years. These gentlemen are not to be held -responsible for the selection of materials, nor for the translations -in their present form, since I have sought to check -and revise this work as far as time and my imperfect command -of written Chinese have permitted.</p> - -<p>The International Peace Campaign (China Branch), -The People's Foreign Relations Association, The Chinese-American -Institute for Cultural Relations, and other institutions -in Free China were generous with their hospitality -and facilities. I owe particular thanks to the Central Bank -of China for the high courtesy shown me through the -Chief Secretary and the following gentlemen: Mr. T. T. -Wang, Chief of the Engineering Division; Mr. Ch'ên Yin-sung, -Manager, Kiating Branch; and Mr. Yang Hsia-tz'ŭ, -Manager, Chengtu Branch. The officers of the Bank went -to enormous pains to ensure my timely, safe return to -Chungking when I was ill, hurried, tardy, and in danger of -missing my prearranged bookings back to America. Special -acknowledgment must also be offered to Mr. C. C. Chi, -for his unfailing kindness in providing interviews and trips, -and to the China National Aviation Corporation for their -unusual courtesies.</p> - -<p>In Hong Kong, I was assisted by Dr. Eugene Chen, Dr. -Wên Yüan-ning, Dr. Ch'en Han-seng, and Mr. Liu Yu-wan.</p> - -<p>In Shanghai, Mr. T. Nakada of the Japanese consulate-general -was most helpful.</p> - -<p>In Nanking, Messrs. Wên Chung-yao, Kiang Kang-hu, -Tsu Min-yi, Lin Pai-shêng, Li Shêng-wu, Hsü Liang, George -Wên, P. C. Huang, T'ang Leang-li, K. S. James Woo and -L. K. Kentwell were most hospitable. Mr. M. Kimura, of -the Japanese Embassy in Nanking, was kind and courteous. -I wish to thank these gentlemen for their friendliness to an -alien scholar who had just come from the other side of the -war.</p> - -<p>In Tokyo, Messrs. Yokachiro Suma, Yoji Hirota, Kaneo -Tsuchida, and Nobuo Fujimura of the Foreign Office were -hospitable and informative.</p> - -<p>Mr. Robert Kempton, Mr. George Giffen, and Dr. Louis -Wilkinson showed me great kindness on my journey.</p> - -<p>In the United States, I am indebted for introductions and -advice to Dr. Hu Shih, the Chinese Ambassador; Professor -George Taylor, of the University of Washington; and Mr. -Frederick V. Field, of the American Council of the Institute -of Pacific Relations.</p> - -<p>My colleagues and friends at Duke University have been -very helpful. Professors Homer Dubs and Paul H. Clyde, -my colleagues in the Far Eastern field, read the manuscript -and made invaluable suggestions; Professor Dubs' command -of Chinese has saved me from many predicaments. Professor -Robert R. Wilson has been unfailing in his encouragement, -sympathetic interest, and facilitation of my plans.</p> - -<p>The Duke University Research Council has assisted me -with annual grants for the collections of documentary materials -on Chinese politics. Save for this, I have received no -financial aid or subsidy from any institution, person, or -government whatever.</p> - -<p>Mr. J. C. Yang, Mr. and Mrs. R. E. Hosack, Mrs. Freda -Townsend, and Mrs. Margaret Linebarger have assisted me -with manuscripts and proof.</p> - -<p>I wish to thank the Director, Dr. S. Shepard Jones, and -the staff of the World Peace Foundation for their patience, -and helpfulness during the preparation of this work for the -press. Miss Marie J. Carroll has been especially helpful.</p> - -<p>All opinions and statements herein expressed are my -own, unless clearly indicated as quotation. These acknowledgments -are a record of thanks. I assume sole and complete -responsibility for the contents of this book.</p> - -<p class="right">P. M. A. L.</p> - -<p><i>Durham, North Carolina<br /> -March 31, 1941</i></p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - - -<div class="center"> -<table border="0" cellpadding="4" cellspacing="0" summary="World Peace Foundation"> -<tr><td><div class="figcenter" style="width: 99px;"> -<img src="images/i_logo_viii.png" width="99" height="97" alt="Logo" /> -</div></td> - <td><b>WORLD PEACE FOUNDATION</b><br /> - 40 Mt. Vernon Street, Boston, Massachusetts<br /> - <i>Founded in</i> 1910</td></tr> -</table></div> - -<div class="center"> -<table border="0" cellpadding="4" cellspacing="5" summary="World Peace Foundation"> -<tr><td align="left" class="bor_right_yes"><i>Board of Trustees</i><br /> -<span class="smcap">George H. Blakeslee</span>, <i>President</i><br /> -<span class="smcap">Frank Aydelotte</span><br /> -<span class="smcap">James Phinney Baxter</span>, 3d<br /> -<span class="smcap">Harvey H. Bundy</span><br /> -<span class="smcap">Leonard W. Cronkhite</span><br /> -<span class="smcap">Stephen Duggan</span><br /> -<span class="smcap">Harry A. Garfield</span><br /> -<span class="smcap">Christian A. Herter</span><br /> -<span class="smcap">Bruce C. Hopper</span><br /> -<span class="smcap">Manley O. Hudson</span><br /> -<span class="smcap">A. Lawrence Lowell</span><br /> -<span class="smcap">J. Grafton Rogers</span><br /> -<span class="smcap">Charles Seymour</span><br /> -<span class="smcap">John H. Williams</span><br /> -<span class="smcap">Henry M. Wriston</span><br /> -<br /> -<i>General Staff</i><br /> -<span class="smcap">S. Shepard Jones</span>, <i>Director</i><br /> -<span class="smcap">Denys P. Myers</span>, <i>Research</i><br /> -<span class="smcap">Marie J. Carroll</span>, <i>Reference</i><br /> -<span class="smcap">Mary J. MacDonald</span>, <i>Treasurer</i></td> - -<td align="left">The World Peace Foundation is a -non-profit organization which -was founded in 1910 by Edwin Ginn, -the educational publisher, for the purpose -of promoting peace, justice and -good-will among nations. For many -years the Foundation has sought to increase -public understanding of international -problems by an objective -presentation of the facts of international -relations. This purpose is accomplished -principally through its -publications and by the maintenance -of a Reference Service which furnishes -on request information on current -international problems. Recently -increased attention has been focused -on American foreign relations by -study groups organized for the consideration -of actual problems of -policy.</td></tr> -</table></div> - -<hr class="chap" /> - - -<h2>CONTENTS</h2> - -<div class="center"> -<table border="0" cellpadding="4" cellspacing="0" summary="Contents"> -<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left"><i>Frontispiece</i>—Generalissimo Chiang K'ai-shek</td></tr> -<tr><td colspan="3"></td><td align="right"><small>PAGE</small></td></tr> -<tr><td></td><td colspan="2" align="left"><span class="smcap">Introduction</span></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_1">1</a></td></tr> -<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">The Chinese Political Inheritance: Some Continuing Aspects</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_1">1</a></td></tr> -<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">China at the Outbreak of War</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_6">6</a></td></tr> -<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">The Beginning of Active Hostilities</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_11">11</a></td></tr> -<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">The Hankow Period</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_15">15</a></td></tr> -<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">The Chungking Period</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_19">19</a></td></tr> -<tr><td colspan="2" align="right">I.</td><td align="left"><span class="smcap">The Constitution</span></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_21">21</a></td></tr> -<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">The <i>Yüeh-fa</i> of 1931</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_22">22</a></td></tr> -<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">The Draft Permanent or Double Five Constitution</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_25">25</a></td></tr> -<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">The Issue of Constitutional Change</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_31">31</a></td></tr> -<tr><td colspan="2" align="right">II.</td><td align="left"><span class="smcap">The Political Organs of the National Government</span></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_41">41</a></td></tr> -<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">The Five-Power Constitution</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_42">42</a></td></tr> -<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">The Supreme National Defense Council</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_46">46</a></td></tr> -<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">The President of the National Government</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_52">52</a></td></tr> -<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">The Council of State</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_53">53</a></td></tr> -<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">The Executive <i>Yüan</i></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_56">56</a></td></tr> -<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">The Military Affairs Commission</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_60">60</a></td></tr> -<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">The Judicial, Legislative, Examination and Control <i>Yüan</i></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_65">65</a></td></tr> -<tr><td colspan="2" align="right">III.</td><td align="left"><span class="smcap">Consultative and Administrative Organs</span></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_69">69</a></td></tr> -<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">The People's Political Council</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_69">69</a></td></tr> -<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">The Administrative Pattern</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_79">79</a></td></tr> -<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">The Political Ministries</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_81">81</a></td></tr> -<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">Social and Cultural Agencies</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_83">83</a></td></tr> -<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">The Economic Ministries</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_85">85</a></td></tr> -<tr><td colspan="2" align="right">IV.</td><td align="left"><span class="smcap">Provincial, Local, and Special-Area Government</span></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_98">98</a></td></tr> -<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">Chart on Provincial and Urban Government</td><td align="right">facing <a href="#Page_98">98</a></td></tr> -<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">The Provinces</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_99">99</a></td></tr> -<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">Local Government</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_103">103</a></td></tr> -<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">The Communist Zone</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_111">111</a></td></tr> -<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">Guerrilla Governments</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_116">116</a></td></tr> -<tr><td colspan="2" align="right">V.</td><td align="left"><span class="smcap">The Kuomintang</span></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_124">124</a></td></tr> -<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">The Party Constitutional System</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_125">125</a></td></tr> -<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">Party Organization</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_129">129</a></td></tr> -<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">The Kuomintang Bid for Leadership</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_140">140</a></td></tr> -<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">Intra-Kuomintang Politics</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_142">142</a></td></tr> -<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">The New Life Movement and Other Affiliates</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_149">149</a></td></tr> -<tr><td colspan="2" align="right">VI.</td><td align="left"><span class="smcap">The Communist and Minor Parties</span></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_159">159</a></td></tr> -<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">The Chinese Communists: Party and Leaders</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_160">160</a></td></tr> -<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">Communism: Patriotism or Betrayal?</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_171">171</a></td></tr> -<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">The National Salvation Movement</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_175">175</a></td></tr> -<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">The Third Party</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_178">178</a></td></tr> -<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">The Chinese National Socialist Party</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_179">179</a></td></tr> -<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">Social Democrats and <i>La Jeunesse</i></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_181">181</a></td></tr> -<tr><td colspan="2" align="right">VII.</td><td align="left"><span class="smcap">Governing Institutions of the Japanese and Pro-Japanese</span></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_183">183</a></td></tr> -<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">The Japanese Army as a Chinese Government</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_185">185</a></td></tr> -<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">The Problem of Puppet States</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_188">188</a></td></tr> -<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">The Provisional and Reformed Governments</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_192">192</a></td></tr> -<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">The Reorganized National Government of Wang Ch'ing-wei</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_197">197</a></td></tr> -<tr><td colspan="2" align="right">VIII.</td><td align="left"><span class="smcap">Extra-Political Forces</span></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_211">211</a></td></tr> -<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">The Foundations of Chinese Government</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_212">212</a></td></tr> -<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">Mass Education</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_214">214</a></td></tr> -<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">Rural Reconstruction</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_218">218</a></td></tr> -<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">The Chinese Industrial Cooperatives</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_223">223</a></td></tr> -<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">Unorganized Pressure</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_234">234</a></td></tr> -<tr><td colspan="2" align="right">IX.</td><td align="left"><span class="smcap">Sun Yat-sen and Chiang K'ai-shek</span></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_239">239</a></td></tr> -<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">Sun Yat-sen</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_240">240</a></td></tr> -<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">The <i>San Min Chu I</i></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_250">250</a></td></tr> -<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">Chiang K'ai-shek</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_254">254</a></td></tr> -<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">Chinese Appraisals of Chiang</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_266">266</a></td></tr> -<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">The Ideology of Chiang</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_269">269</a></td></tr> -<tr><td></td><td colspan="2" align="left"><span class="smcap">Conclusion</span></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_273">273</a></td></tr> -<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">The Chief Alternatives in China</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_274">274</a></td></tr> -<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">The United States in Chinese Politics</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_277">277</a></td></tr> -<tr><td colspan="3"><hr class="tb" /></td></tr> -<tr><td colspan="3">APPENDICES</td></tr> -<tr><td colspan="3"></td><td align="right"><small>PAGE</small></td></tr> -<tr><td align="left" colspan="3"><span class="smcap">Appendix I: Government Documents</span></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_283">283</a></td></tr> -<tr><td></td><td align="left">A.</td><td align="left">The Government Draft of the Proposed Constitution</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_283">283</a></td></tr> -<tr><td></td><td align="left">B.</td><td align="left">The System of Organization of the National Congress</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_300">300</a></td></tr> -<tr><td></td><td align="left">C.</td><td align="left">Act of the Legislative <i>Yüan</i>, April 31, XXVI (1937) Governing the Election of Representatives to the National Congress</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_302">302</a></td></tr> -<tr><td></td><td align="left">D.</td><td align="left">The Program of Resistance and Reconstruction</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_309">309</a></td></tr> -<tr><td></td><td align="left">E.</td><td align="left">An Outline of War-time Controlment</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_313">313</a></td></tr> -<tr><td></td><td align="left">F.</td><td align="left">A Chart of the Control <i>Yüan</i> from July 1937 to June 1940</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_318">318</a></td></tr> -<tr><td></td><td align="left">G.</td><td align="left">Regulations Concerning the Organization of the Various Classifications of <i>Hsien</i></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_324">324</a></td></tr> -<tr><td></td><td align="left">H.</td><td align="left">A Chart of Government Organization</td><td align="right">facing <a href="#Page_330">330</a></td></tr> -<tr><td align="left" colspan="3"><span class="smcap">Appendix II: Documents on Party Politics</span></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_331">331</a></td></tr> -<tr><td></td><td align="left">A.</td><td align="left">A Chart on Kuomintang Organization</td><td align="right">facing <a href="#Page_331">331</a></td></tr> -<tr><td></td><td align="left">B.</td><td align="left">Constitution of the <i>San Min Chu I</i> Youth Corps, Year XXVII (1938)</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_331">331</a></td></tr> -<tr><td></td><td align="left">C.</td><td align="left">The Duties and General Activities of the <i>San Min Chu I</i> Youth Corps (Ch'ên Ch'êng)</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_340">340</a></td></tr> -<tr><td></td><td align="left">D.</td><td align="left">The <i>Hsiao-tsu</i> (Small Group) Training Program</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_354">354</a></td></tr> -<tr><td></td><td align="left">E.</td><td align="left">Party Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_359">359</a></td></tr> -<tr><td align="left" colspan="3"><span class="smcap">Appendix III: Materials on Policy</span></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_371">371</a></td></tr> -<tr><td></td><td align="left">A.</td><td align="left">Reply to Questions (Chiang K'ai-shek)</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_371">371</a></td></tr> -<tr><td></td><td align="left">B.</td><td align="left">What I Mean by Action, or A Philosophy of Action (Chiang K'ai-shek)</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_373">373</a></td></tr> -<tr><td></td><td align="left">C.</td><td align="left">Definition of the Problems Concerning the Organization of the Various Classifications of <i>Hsien</i> (Chiang K'ai-shek)</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_388">388</a></td></tr> -<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td align="left">Chart on <i>Hsien</i> Classifications</td><td align="right">facing <a href="#Page_388">388</a></td></tr> -<tr><td></td><td align="left">D.</td><td align="left">A Discussion of Mao Tsê-tung's Comments on the Present State of International Relations (Ch'ên Kuo-hsin)</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_403">403</a></td></tr> -<tr><td></td><td align="left">E.</td><td align="left">China's Long-range Diplomatic Orientation (Wang Ch'ung-hui)</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_418">418</a></td></tr> -<tr><td align="left" colspan="3"><span class="smcap">Glossary</span></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_423">423</a></td></tr> -<tr><td align="left" colspan="3"><span class="smcap">Index</span></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_435">435</a></td></tr> -</table></div> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_1" id="Page_1">[Pg 1]</a></span></p> - - -<h2>INTRODUCTION</h2> - - -<p>The National Government of the Republic of -China, located at the auxiliary capital of Chungking, -is one of the most important governments in contemporary -world affairs. It has provided fairly effective -unification for the largest nation on earth, and has -fought a great power to a standstill.</p> - -<p>The present work is an analysis of this government. -Not a biography of Chiang K'ai-shek, it is instead a -delineation of the institutions, the parties and movements, -and the armies which today determine the -Chinese destiny. Free China, mutilated as it is, is still -far more populous and complex than the Soviet Union -or Germany. Its political institutions cannot be reduced -to the terms of one man's caprice, and the personality -of Chiang—while brilliantly conspicuous—is not the -entire picture of China. Generalissimo Chiang works, -perhaps because he wishes to, certainly because he must, -within the framework of a triune organization: the National -Government, the central armies and the Kuomintang. -These institutions have developed to their present -efficacy only by means of thirty years of war, preceded -by almost thirty years more of conspiracy. They have -become the norm of contemporary China and, whatever -their particular future, significant determinants of -China's eventual development.</p> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">The Chinese Political Inheritance: -Some Continuing Aspects</span></h3> - -<p>Because of cultural and historical differences between -China and the West, the application of identical terms -to both is probably either wrong or meaningless.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_2" id="Page_2">[Pg 2]</a></span> -Nevertheless, Westerners can live in China, deal with -the Chinese, scrutinize their affairs, and transpose these -to such Western descriptions as may suit the purpose. -In reading of China, however, one should keep in mind -the fact that the words are English, freighted with special -meanings, and are used not by scientific choice but for -lack of others. Part of this difference can be bridged if -one recalls the salient peculiarities of China as against -the Western world.</p> - -<p>No other society comparable in size, duration and -extent has ever existed; the Chinese Empire, from the -beginning of the Ch'in (221 <span class="smcap lowercase">B.C.</span>) to the end of the -Manchus (<span class="smcap lowercase">A.D.</span> 1911), remains the greatest social edifice -mankind has yet brought forth. As such, its modern -successor is everywhere stamped with archaic catholic -traits which are today both obsolescent and futuristic. -To these must be added the characteristics of China -as a special area—a cultural zone seeking national form; -fragmented economies working their way out of backwardness -in technology and helplessness in world economics; -a people in quest of government which will -give them power without enslaving them. This modern -"Chinese Republic," a Western-form state only by -diplomatic courtesy in the years succeeding 1912, has -been the widest zone of anarchy in the modern world; -the Japanese attack on its emergent institutions has -helped immeasurably to re-identify the Chinese-speaking -people and the officers who presume to govern -them.</p> - -<p>To understand Chinese government in war time, one -might first check the outstanding points of old Chinese -development and their modern derivatives.</p> - -<p>Pre-eminently, China has been <i>pro forma</i> Confucian -ever since the tenth century after Christ. This has -meant an ordering of classes in society based on the -ideal of scholarship and public administration, rather -than on ideals of valor, piety or acquisitiveness. By<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_3" id="Page_3">[Pg 3]</a></span> -setting the requirements of the examinations, and -through concealed but sharp discouragement of heterodoxy -or wilful originality, the governing mechanism -made of itself a vast machine of scholars which—because -its authority rested in tradition, in language, in social -usages—was able to ride out domestic revolution and -foreign invasion, and was in a position to ensure its -own perpetuation despite political or military interruption.</p> - -<p>The traditions of scholastic bureaucracy working in -a pluralistic society have left the Chinese people largely -independent of the routine functioning of government. -The Western state becomes the articulation of society. -The government of old China was pseudomorphic as a -state, having only some of the functions of the Western -state, and its governing power was the residual capacity -of an organization devoted to the ends of ceremony, -exemplarization, education and the cultivation of personality. -Administration was confined chiefly to revenue -collection, flood control and defense. In the West, the -most important purposes of society are framed in -law after discussion, and are executed as policy; in -China these purposes, defined by the Confucian ideology, -were known throughout the society, with scholar-officials -as their expositors. Fulfillment was by no -means a prerogative of government alone. By contrast -with the Confucian standards, the Western states, -whether democracies or not, are capricious, despotic -and nonmoral; by Western standards, Chinese society -was unresponsive, sanctimonious and amorphous.</p> - -<p>This political excellence and stability was accompanied -by economic phenomena which are, by modern -standards, less desirable. Overcrowding and a slow rate -of progress have been fairly constant features of Chinese -society since the Han. Owen Lattimore has recently -appraised the economics behind the dynastic cycle in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_4" id="Page_4">[Pg 4]</a></span> -China.<a name="FNanchor_1_1" id="FNanchor_1_1"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_1" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> Each community in old China was cell-like, -largely autonomous and autarkic. Hence, the increase -of wealth was sought within the cell, and not within a -larger framework of economic advance—such as commerce -or invention would provide—and the economically -predominant class (the landowners) possessed a -vested interest in overpopulation (which cheapened -agricultural labor and maintained a high, even urgent, -demand for food products). Equilibrium was reached, -and a cycle of diminishing returns initiated, when population -began to outrun the land's subsistence maximum. -This drop in returns, in the face of continued population -rise, led to peasant rebellion, distributism and -a reinauguration of the same type of state—made necessary -by the monopoly of managerial expertness (essential -to water conservancy, land wealth and the familiar -intensive cultivation) in the ideographically literate -class. Control of the richest water-conservancy region -meant the hegemony of China.</p> - -<p>The impact of Western imperialism has struck China -in the past century, during the critical or revolutionary -phase of this immemorial cycle. Chinese politics took -the color of a back-country struggle. The centers of -modern power were beyond Chinese administrative -reach. The emergent Chinese state, deprived of its foci -of power in the metropolises, was promised control -thereof only when it had become an effective and complete -state—a condition largely unobtainable without -control of Shanghai, Tientsin, Hankow, and the British -Crown Colony of Hong Kong.</p> - -<p>In theory, the Chinese Republic was established January -1, 1912. In practice, the name <i>Republic</i> has masked -a <i>mêlée</i> of governments and power-organizations, ranging -from bandit gangs with pretentious political color to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_5" id="Page_5">[Pg 5]</a></span> -authentic regional governments administering large -areas. This culminated in the National Government -which, beginning as a conspiracy, becoming the leading -regional government, is now in the position of <i>de facto</i> -government for virtually all Free China, the Chinese -dominions, and much of the occupied area. None of -these governments has ever held an election based on -wide suffrage; none has systematically subordinated policy -to law; none has possessed a treasury, fleet or air force -worthy of a second-class power, until the present war. -Out of these unpromising materials the counter-attacking -Chinese state has arisen; only by legal formula is it -the same Republic as its predecessors; only by courtesy -is this the Year XXX (1941) of the Republic.<a name="FNanchor_2_2" id="FNanchor_2_2"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_2" class="fnanchor">[2]</a></p> - -<p>The governmental developments of the Republican -era fall conveniently into four periods: the period of -establishment, 1911-1916; the period of <i>tuchünism</i>, -1917-1926; the rule of the National Government, 1927-1936; -the period of invasion, 1937 to the present. The -turning points between these periods are, respectively, -the fall of the Manchu Empire of China (1911), the -death of the dictator-President Yüan Shih-k'ai (1916), -the Great Revolution under Kuomintang-Communist -leadership (culminating, 1927), and the Sian affair -(December 1936) followed by full-scale invasion (July -1937).</p> - -<p>The present governments of China are accordingly -the successors of a wide variety of decaying imperial administration, -experimental modernism and outright -confusion. Any change in China had to be made at the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_6" id="Page_6">[Pg 6]</a></span> -expense of the <i>haves</i>—the Western powers and Japan. -Japan, in seeking the control of China, is fighting China -and the Western powers; China, in fighting back, must -fight Japan, and behind Japan the whole structure of -imperialism. Most Chinese have abandoned hope of -surviving as a people without eventually triumphing as -a state. In the past, they absorbed conquerors whose -bases were transferred to China; today, they cannot accommodate -invaders who come as transients from an -overseas base. The Chinese war of resistance is a revolution. -It is a continuation of the Nationalist revolution, -begun against the Manchus, continued against the imperialist -powers, and now directed against the Japanese -and their Chinese associates. At the same time, this revolution -struggles to incorporate in its dynamics the drive -of an endemic peasant rebellion, Communist in its extreme -phase. Nationalist in supreme emphasis, the -revolution finds its highest expression in the articulation -of an effective state—something not known in China -for twenty-two centuries.</p> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">China at the Outbreak of War</span></h3> - -<p>Sun Yat-sen's legacy of doctrine included a program -of revolution by three stages:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>(1) the military conquest of power by the Kuomintang;</p> - -<p>(2) the tutelary dictatorship of the Kuomintang -while democracy was being instilled and adopted from -the bottom up; and</p> - -<p>(3) constitutionalism, requiring abdication of the -Kuomintang in favor of a popularly elected government.<a name="FNanchor_3_3" id="FNanchor_3_3"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_3" class="fnanchor">[3]</a></p> -</blockquote> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_7" id="Page_7">[Pg 7]</a></span></p> -<p>Upon coming to power in Nanking, the National -Government had begun promising a short period of tutelage -and had made various gestures in favor of experimental -popular government. A Provisional Constitution -was adopted by a <i>Kuo-min Hui-i</i> (commonly -termed, National People's Convention) in 1931, -operating under complete government supervision; a -transition instrument, self-acknowledged as such, it anticipated -a Permanent Constitution upon the accomplishment -of constitutional government in a majority -of provinces (Articles 86, 87).<a name="FNanchor_4_4" id="FNanchor_4_4"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_4" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> Although the Kuomintang -has ruled parts of China for more than fifteen years, -and is by profession the party of democracy, it has not -yet relinquished power. The period of tutelage is still -legally in force.</p> - -<p>In the years immediately preceding the outbreak of -war, this monopoly of governmental power by the -Kuomintang was not only an important political irritant -but also an obstacle to effective Chinese unity. Discontent -was aggravated by inelasticity of the Party. Overweighted -with petty bureaucracy, it offered too few -up-channel opportunities for potential leaders. Since -Nationalists were the Ins, Kuomintang membership -carried privileges rather than obligations. Many distinguished -and active citizens either refused to join, or -let their purely nominal membership ride along. The -Party was saved from complete decline because it included -most of the government personnel, and new -recruits to government service gave it some freshness, -vigor and inward criticism.</p> - -<p>The leading difficulty of both state-building and -democratization had been overcome by the creation of -a government which was well-designed, functioning <i>de -facto</i> and able to meet most of the specialized problems -of modern administration. The regime was far from -being a crude hierarchy of soldiers and taxgatherers,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_8" id="Page_8">[Pg 8]</a></span> -but had accrued about its policy-making core the essential -staff and line services of modern rule. Inadequacies -lay not in absolute lack of species of personnel -or structure, but in the relative weakness of many key -functions. During the third decade of the Republic the -then Nanking Government, under Chiang's leadership, -gave China its first modern national government.</p> - -<p>Despite this beginning, which—without the invasion—stood -a very good chance of evolving into a paternalistic -oligarchy in democratic form, such as Brazil, there -were enormous difficulties still facing genuine China-wide -government. First among these difficulties was the -question of regional autonomy—lingering vestiges of -<i>tuchünism</i>, reinforced by a vigorous provincialism. -Whole regions of China were under the merely nominal -control of the National Government.</p> - -<p>The second difficulty was that of personal politics. -Modern China has had ample politics of principle. It -is a rare ideological cult, of any kind, anywhere, which -does not have its Chinese affiliates. No other nation has -known such a wide choice of doctrines, each represented -by armed forces and by definite political leadership. At -the same time, this ideological struggle was and is paralleled -by the politics of individuals and cliques. This -made the National Government function as an oligarchy -based on three patterns of control:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>(1) ideological eminence, orthodoxy, appeal and -timeliness;</p> - -<p>(2) military or economic control of power in the -form of soldiers or cash, the two being for the most part -interchangeable; and</p> - -<p>(3) governmental incumbency.</p> - -</blockquote> - -<p>A man like Hu Han-min could owe his importance almost -altogether to his past associations with the Party -and with Dr. Sun, to his authority as an exponent of the -<i>San Min Chu I</i>, and to his appeal to the sense of -prestige, dignity and stability on the part of other people<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_9" id="Page_9">[Pg 9]</a></span> -who did not possess such power, which was exercised in -the name of the Kuomintang and its ideology. T. V. -Soong, in money matters, or Chang Hsüeh-liang, in military -matters, were important because they had under -their immediate influence so much cash or so many -troops, the availability and mobility of which from day -to day determined their actual share of power. Lastly, -these same men possessed political authority by narrowly -lawful means, i.e., by the governmental offices -which they held.</p> - -<p>Thirdly, the government was deeply out of harmony -with an overwhelming majority of college students, -much of the professional and intellectual classes, and a -broad section of the articulate farmer and labor groups. -In the pre-war years of strain, unofficial persons could -follow world fashions in ideas associated with Leftism. -Although the full Western pattern of Right, Center, and -Left was not imposed upon Chinese politics, many of -the most active publicists wrote in these terms. There -was, accordingly, a traditional China and a Leftist -China; the latter faithfully imported European concepts -and did much to change the language of Chinese political -struggle. The government—itself Left from the point -of view of the pre-existent order, yet committed to -modes of thought and policy formally little more radical -than the American New Deal—was constantly recalled -to the most cold-blooded of <i>realpolitische</i> considerations.</p> - -<p>Fourthly, the student movement—in some phases a -part of the general Leftist drive—proved a constant -source of difficulty and trouble. Chinese students (both -collegiate and secondary) are self-conscious, frequently -arrogant inheritors of the Chinese tradition of rule by -<i>literati</i>. Their influence over the masses is impressive; -their patriotism, however unreflective, is ardent; and -their interest in international affairs is violent.<a name="FNanchor_5_5" id="FNanchor_5_5"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_5" class="fnanchor">[5]</a></p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_10" id="Page_10">[Pg 10]</a></span></p> -<p>Fifthly, Chinese society, accustomed to acting independently -of government, urged varied foreign policies -and sought wars. Almost every kind of organization, -from archaic guilds and secret societies to business -groups, sought to wage its own attack on Japan. Uncanalized, -counter-attacked, dammed up, these efforts -might have undone the government. Toward the end, -the government raced frenziedly with time, losing power -through unpopularity, and increasing power through -rearmament and technical preparation. The vigorous -extra-governmental pressure of a populace accustomed -to spontaneous mass action is a factor which qualifies -and will probably continue to qualify Chinese foreign -policy. It is often left out of account in Western comment -on China.</p> - -<p>Sixthly, in the winter and spring of 1936-37, the -National Government was under pressure from its own -subjects to begin the negotiation of national unity, starting -with a Communist armistice and continuing with -the incorporation of as many regions as possible into the -sphere of the government; but despite such increasing -pressure, the government took no effective step in this -direction until after the kidnapping of Chiang at Sian.<a name="FNanchor_6_6" id="FNanchor_6_6"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_6" class="fnanchor">[6]</a> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_11" id="Page_11">[Pg 11]</a></span> -As a result of this melodramatic affair, however, the -National Government revised policies which had become -traditions ten years old and agreed to an armistice -with the Communists. The Kuomintang—bearing -full responsibility for an actual emergent state—found -intra-Chinese diplomacy as perplexing as foreign.</p> - -<p>Thus, at the outbreak of war, the National Government -had reached a higher level of actual political and -administrative power than its predecessors, but was faced -with grave problems. In any other country the government -would presumably have been on the verge of ruin. -Controlling only major sections of its internationally -recognized territory; faced by autonomous provinces, -half-legal military satrapies and outright warlord despotism, -all backed by vehement provincialism, great distances, -linguistic difficulties and mutual geographical -isolation; unpopular with its own student, intellectual -and professional elites; ridden by personal politics; just -emerging from a ten years' civil war—with these handicaps, -a second-rate power undertook to challenge the -greatest power of Asia to an irreversibly fateful war. -The Chinese went further: they sought in the war not -only victory, but unity, democracy and prosperity as -well! This background of purpose makes China's internal -politics richly meaningful in relation to the -world scene.</p> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">The Beginning of Active Hostilities</span></h3> - -<p>After nearly six years of military and political conflict, -a full quasi-war<a name="FNanchor_7_7" id="FNanchor_7_7"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_7" class="fnanchor">[7]</a> broke out with the episode at Loukouchiao<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_12" id="Page_12">[Pg 12]</a></span> -on the night of July 7-8, 1937. It was the evident -intention of the Japanese to end an unsatisfactory -state of affairs (i.e., Chinese control) in that area once -and for all, although they were perfectly willing to express -temporary amity and <i>ad interim</i> non-aggression -toward what was left of China. The National Government, -after a few days of uncertainty, began real preparations -for war. Since the government's appeasement policy -had accustomed many to think of resistance in terms -of the Left, there was an enormous inflation of Leftist -sentiment, not deflated for about eighteen months.</p> - -<p>While new mass organizations were formed, the Chinese -military command framed a plan for a three-stage -war:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>(1) a period of resistance by heavy regular forces -fighting positionally;</p> - -<p>(2) a period of stalemate wherein enemy forces, immobilized -by opposing regular armies, found lines of -communication, supplies and business harassed by guerrillas -and saboteurs;</p> - -<p>(3) a period of counter-attack in which the Chinese, -having prepared themselves technologically during the -stalemate and having weakened the enemy by a test of -endurance, should drive the Japanese back into the sea.</p> - -</blockquote> - -<p>The strategy of this type of war was based upon the -plan of retreating in space in order to advance in time—that -is, to yield area slowly and purposefully, without -too great cost to oneself, in order to outlast the enemy -and reach victory. In thus purchasing time by the mile, -the Chinese could not afford to yield intact cities, factories, -communications, mines, docks, warehouses and -the other goods of business; such cessions would only -profit Japan: hence <i>the scorched earth</i> policy. The -strategy was obviously suited to a country rich in territory -and population, but poor in <i>matériel</i>. It not only -made both regulars and guerrillas effective against Japan -but made each truly reliant upon the other. Without<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_13" id="Page_13">[Pg 13]</a></span> -the Nationalist regular armies, who in attempting to -suppress the Communists had done almost everything -which the Japanese now had to do—guarding railroads, -pacifying disaffected and hostile rural areas, promoting -industries and watching agitation—the Japanese forces -might disperse enough to enable Japan to patrol and -pacify enough of China to pay for the occupation. -Chiang had to hold the Japanese together, immobilize -large bodies of their troops, keep their war expenses up, -and wait for the time to counter-attack. Meanwhile the -guerrillas, together with the Communist veterans, were -to prevent the Japanese from settling down, to worry -them with agitation, to sabotage their economic efforts -and to wear them out for Chiang's <i>révanche</i>.</p> - -<p>One of the first governmental changes in wartime was -the re-institution of an effective propaganda service under -the Political Department of the Military Affairs -Commission. In this Department, many of China's most -active controversialists, censored or exiled for years, -found officially sanctioned scope for their energies. -Formal unity came slowly. Although Shanghai was attacked -on August 13, 1937, it was not until September -10 following that a fairly definitive arrangement was -reached in regard to the Communist-occupied zone in -the Northwest.</p> - -<p>The settlement transformed a pre-existing armistice -into an intranational alliance; technically it amounted -to submission by the Communists and their incorporation -into the national government and armies. The area -of the Chinese Soviet Republic assumed the name -Special Regional Government of the Chinese Republic -(<i>Chunghua Min-kuo T'ê-ch'ü Chêng-fu</i>), which it had -been using informally for months; the Chinese Red -Army became the Eighth Route Army (<i>Pa-lu-chün</i>); -and the Chinese Communist Party accepted the <i>San Min -Chu I</i> as the constitutional state ideology of China, -abandoning immediate measures of class war and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_14" id="Page_14">[Pg 14]</a></span> -expropriation. The settlement was in the form of a Communist -reply to Kuomintang terms offered in February -1937 and the reply of the Generalissimo as Chief of -the Kuomintang to the Communist declaration.<a name="FNanchor_8_8" id="FNanchor_8_8"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_8" class="fnanchor">[8]</a></p> - -<p>For the first few months the war kept its quasi-European -pattern. The greater part of the fighting was -done in the Shanghai area, while Japanese forces proceeded -down from North China. The Japanese still -had some expectation of localizing the North China -and the Shanghai conflicts. At most, they expected the -war to be a short one, not extending beyond the capture -of Nanking. Occupation of the capital was counted on -for the ruin of the central government, the end of -Chiang and the reversion of China to a condition of -malleable anarchy.</p> - -<p>December 1937 was the blackest month of the war for -the Chinese. The Japanese advanced toward Nanking, -with Chinese resistance crumbling; part of the armies -withdrew in good order, but on occasion there were -hopeless, panicky routs. To this month the Japanese -looked for victory, and were so confident that they -formed the pro-Japanese Provisional Government of the -Republic of China, in Peking on December 11.<a name="FNanchor_9_9" id="FNanchor_9_9"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_9" class="fnanchor">[9]</a> Four -days later the Japanese forces entered Nanking, and the -ensuing fortnight set the record for atrocity in the -modern world. The Japanese forces were preoccupied -with their own disorder. The National Government<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_15" id="Page_15">[Pg 15]</a></span> -escaped up-river to Hankow, where it promptly began -to function under the three-headquarters plan: some -offices at Hankow, some at Changsha and some at -Chungking. The presence of the foreign affairs, propaganda, -and military agencies at Hankow made this the -practical capital of China, although Nanking was and is -the constitutional capital.</p> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">The Hankow Period</span></h3> - -<p>The greatest part of the year XXVII (1938) was spent -in continuation of slow retreat and heavy frontal resistance. -Until October communications with the outside -world were wide open through the railroad to -Canton. Heavy supplies could arrive by the shipload. -Hundreds of Japanese air attacks on the railroad disrupted -schedules but never led to serious suspension of -service. Leftist influence became overwhelming in Hankow. -That city had been the capital of the ill-fated -Wu-han Kuomintang-Communist government, which -fell with the secession of Chiang to Nanking eleven -years before; its connotations still lingered. Even conservative -Kuomintang leaders, who had gone to lengths -of appeasement at which Neville Chamberlain would -have blanched, tried to talk like Negrin or Alvarez del -Vayo.</p> - -<p>In January 1938, two organizations were formed -which, along with the Communist zone in the Northwest, -were to be among the most active agencies of guerrilla -leadership. The first of these was the New Fourth -Army (<i>Hsin-ssŭ-chün</i>), which emerged in the area just -south of the Japanese forces at the Yangtze mouth. It -was composed of peasant and student militia, of regular -army fragments, and of some Kuomintang volunteers, -under the leadership of Communist remnants which -had hidden away, banditti-fashion, when the Red Army -trekked Northwest. Its emergence was recognized by -legal order of the National Military Affairs<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_16" id="Page_16">[Pg 16]</a></span> -Commission.<a name="FNanchor_10_10" id="FNanchor_10_10"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_10" class="fnanchor">[10]</a> The other organization was the Provisional Executive -Committee of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Border -Region (<i>Chin-ch'a-chi Pien-ch'ü Lin-shih Hsing-chêng -Wei-yüan-hui</i>), established by a conference at Fup'ing, -January 8-15, and authorized by central government -mandate. This agency also sprang from Leftist organizations—in -this case, a bold, determined, student-peasant -guerrilla army—which had first developed despite government -opposition. It was designed to provide an -emergency guerrilla government for those portions of -the three provinces which were under occupation by -the Japanese. Unoccupied portions of the provinces -retained their existing administrations.</p> - -<p>In the next month, February 1938, there was established -an agency of supreme importance, the Supreme -National Defense Council.<a name="FNanchor_11_11" id="FNanchor_11_11"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_11" class="fnanchor">[11]</a> This replaced the Central -Political Council,<a name="FNanchor_12_12" id="FNanchor_12_12"></a><a href="#Footnote_12_12" class="fnanchor">[12]</a> which had exercised routine functions -of the Party's sovereign control over the government; -like its predecessor, the Supreme National Defense -Council tended to act as the supreme governmental -organ, although it was technically a Party organ. -The Council provided and provides a unified civilian-military -control for the duration of the war; but the -Kuomintang shares its power with other groups only -in the consultative organs of state, not in the executive.</p> - -<p>March 1938 followed with another political step -forward—the Emergency Session of the Kuomintang<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_17" id="Page_17">[Pg 17]</a></span> -Party Congress. The Party Congress had the functions -of a special constituent assembly in part, and in part -those of a restricted parliament; in this session two -further actions were taken. The first was the adoption -of the momentous Program of National Resistance and -Reconstruction (<i>K'ang-chan Chien-kuo Kang-ling</i>),<a name="FNanchor_13_13" id="FNanchor_13_13"></a><a href="#Footnote_13_13" class="fnanchor">[13]</a> -which provides a plan for the war and commits the -Kuomintang and the National Government to a policy -of victory, of industrialization, and of economic reform -as a means to war.</p> - -<p>The second step taken by this important Congress -was the provision for a People's Political Council (<i>Kuo-min -Ts'an-chêng Hui</i>, also translatable as People's Advisory -Political Council). This was the first breach in -the Kuomintang monopoly of government since the establishment -of the Party dictatorship.<a name="FNanchor_14_14" id="FNanchor_14_14"></a><a href="#Footnote_14_14" class="fnanchor">[14]</a> The government, -through the constitutional fiction of appointing -members as representative individuals, provided a -rough, approximate, but fair representation of the active -political forces in China.</p> - -<p>While the Emergency Session of the Party Congress -took these steps for further national defense, the Japanese -were collecting a coterie of ex-politicians, friends -of Japan, and old men to serve as the Reformed Government -of the Republic of China at Nanking. They -disregarded the anomaly of having two "Chinese" national -governments—the Provisional Government in Peiping -being undisturbed by these measures—and continued -to seek the division of China, even on the level -of the pro-Japanese States. The Reformed Government -was established on March 27, 1938.</p> - -<p>The autumn of 1938 brought another phase of discouragement. -Relying on the prestige of British power<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_18" id="Page_18">[Pg 18]</a></span> -and the nearness of Hong Kong, the Chinese were not -watchful in the Canton area. The Japanese landed almost -unopposed. Chinese negligence, corruption, and -a little treachery worked in their favor. The landing -forces performed almost superhuman feats of endurance -in forced marches overland; on several occasions Japanese -advance troops ran so far ahead of schedule that -Japanese warplanes, thinking them disguised Chinese, -strafed them!<a name="FNanchor_15_15" id="FNanchor_15_15"></a><a href="#Footnote_15_15" class="fnanchor">[15]</a> Canton fell without a major battle. -Hankow, the great radical capital, scene of the 1926-27 -Leftist upsurge and of the anti-Fascist enthusiasm of -1938, was entered by the Imperial Japanese army, and -the entire Wu-han area was lost to China.</p> - -<p>Not only was the Hankow period ended. By breaking -the last rail connection of the Chinese government and -the outside world, and by driving the Chinese leadership -into the remote interior, Japan shut off the ready -play of international influence on domestic Chinese -politics. Foreign visitors became more rare. The government, -moving to the mountain fastnesses of Szechuan, -found a home on the great Gibraltar-like promontory -of Chungking city, tiered along cliffs above -the Yangtze and Kialing rivers. The last withdrawal -was a final test of strength. Hankow, six hundred miles -up-river, was commercially, architecturally, and politically -a coastal city. It was still an outpost of world -imperialism and of modern technology. With the next -remove the Chinese government found itself beyond -tangible Western influence; for the first time since 1860 -the capital was out of the military reach of Western<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_19" id="Page_19">[Pg 19]</a></span> -powers, and in a city which had only slight traces of -Western influence.</p> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">The Chungking Period</span></h3> - -<p>The Chungking period began with the transfer of further -government offices to the West, to join President -Lin Shên, and marks a distinct phase in the process of -government-building in China. As the Chungking regime, -the National Government took new forms of -temper and character. Government, Kuomintang, Communists—all -were in the position of an inner-Asiatic -state, without convenient access to the sea, seeking to -fight an oceanic nation whose trade reached every port -in the world. Foreign imperialism could no longer be -blamed for the demoralizations of the hour; foreign aid -was too tenuous and remote to qualify the inner play of -Chinese political growth. Politically, the Chinese had -to stand on their own feet.</p> - -<p>The second phase of the war had begun. Chinese -armies stood front-to-front against the Japanese, and -kept hundreds of thousands of invading troops immobilized. -The guerrillas got to work. Most of all, -the machinery of modernization began functioning; all -the programs had been completed, and the task was -clear. The international developments of the time—the -first American loan, $25,000,000 in 1938; the brief Manchoukuo-Outer -Mongol war of 1939, wherein Japan and -Russia fought each other through their respective dependencies; -even the outbreak of the European war—were -remote from this far inland scene. Military events -had some effect, but nothing comparable to the Japanese -victories at Shanghai, Nanking, Canton, and Hankow -recurred. The Japanese invaded Kwangsi in the -fall of 1939; they left a year later, when their drive into -French Indo-China made it unnecessary to cut those -colonies off from China. In South Hunan the Japanese -suffered catastrophically when they advanced boldly and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_20" id="Page_20">[Pg 20]</a></span> -contemptuously into non-modern areas and were encircled -by the Chinese. Even the flight and treason of -Wang Ch'ing-wei at the year's end of 1938, and his open -cooperation with Japan in March 1940, did not change -the general picture. The emphasis was no longer on -sudden changes, on personality, on dramatic shifts of -power. It was on construction—on the development of -a modern, democratic, technically equipped Chinese -state out of the vast resources of China's hinterland. -The China which was to win had to be created before it -could counter-attack.<a name="FNanchor_16_16" id="FNanchor_16_16"></a><a href="#Footnote_16_16" class="fnanchor">[16]</a></p> - - -<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_1" id="Footnote_1_1"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_1"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> Lattimore, Owen, <i>Inner Asian Frontiers of China</i>, New York, 1940, -p. 45 and <i>passim</i>. The author, a noted geographer, presents significant -new analyses of the interconnections of Chinese economics and culture.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_2" id="Footnote_2_2"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_2"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> Detailed descriptions of the political history of the period are to -be found, <i>inter alia</i>, in Holcombe, Arthur N., <i>The Chinese Revolution</i>, -Cambridge, 1930; MacNair, Harley F., <i>China in Revolution</i>, Chicago, -1931; and, most popularly, Escarra, Jean, <i>China Then and Now</i>, Peiping, -1940. Descriptions of the government are Wu Chih-fang, <i>Chinese Government -and Politics</i>, Shanghai, 1934; Lum Kalfred Dip, <i>Chinese Government</i>, -Shanghai, 1934; and Linebarger, Paul M. A., <i>Government in -Republican China</i>, New York and London, 1938.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_3" id="Footnote_3_3"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_3"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> This is given in the <i>Chien Kuo Ta Kang</i> (Outline of National Reconstruction), -of April 12, XIII (1924), particularly points 3, 5, 6, 7, and -23. Translations are to be found in Hsü, Leonard Shihlien, <i>Sun Yat-sen: -His Political and Social Ideals</i>, Los Angeles, 1933, and Wu Chih-fang, -work cited, p. 430 <i>ff.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_4" id="Footnote_4_4"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_4"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> For the text of this constitution, see Wu Chih-fang, cited, p. 430 <i>ff.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_5_5" id="Footnote_5_5"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_5"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> In particular, see Freyn, Hubert, <i>Prelude to War: The Chinese -Student Rebellion of 1935-1936</i>, Shanghai, 1939. Reference to contemporary -Left-liberal and Left publications in Europe and America -will disclose numerous sympathetic eyewitness accounts of the troubles -and the fortitude of the students. Some of these accounts now possess -a wry, inadvertent humor in their characterization of Chiang as a -willing accomplice of Japan.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_6_6" id="Footnote_6_6"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_6"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> For the Generalissimo's own diary of the kidnapping, together -with a narrative by his wife, see Chiang, Mme. Mayling Soong, <i>Sian: -A Coup d'Etat</i>, bound with Chiang K'ai-shek, <i>A Fortnight in Sian: -Extracts from a Diary</i>, Shanghai, 1938. The Chinese edition of this appeared -as Chiang Wei-yüan-chang [Chairman Chiang], <i>Hsi-an Pan -Yüeh-chi</i> [A Fortnight's Diary from Sian], Shanghai, XXVI (1937). A -first-hand Western account is Bertram, James M., <i>First Act in China</i>, -New York, 1938. Edgar Snow, in <i>Red Star over China</i>, New York, 1938, -p. 395 <i>ff.</i>, gives an account sympathetic to the Left; Harold Isaacs, in -<i>The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution</i>, London, 1938, p. 445 <i>ff.</i>, presents -a penetrating Trotskyist critique. An excellent factual summary -of this crucial year, written by a well-known writer who visited the -scene at first hand, is to be found in Bisson, T. A., <i>Japan in China</i>, -New York, 1938.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_7_7" id="Footnote_7_7"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_7"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> "War" used to mean the reciprocal application of violence by public, -armed bodies; private and informal homicide was termed "murder" -or was otherwise clearly designated. Today these distinctions are less -clear. The author must enter a <i>caveat lector</i>: no term is employed in -other than a general (i.e., literary) meaning, except upon special notice. -The Sino-Japanese hostilities differ greatly from war in several interesting -but technical respects; they are a very special Japanese invention. -Yet it would be cumbersome to refer to Chinese changes in Conflict-time, -or to speak meticulously of armies engaged in an Incident.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_8_8" id="Footnote_8_8"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_8"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> See Council of International Affairs, <i>The Chinese Year Book, -1938-39</i> [Hong Kong], 1939; article by Chu Chia-hua, "Consolidation of -Democracy in China," Chapter IV; "Reconciliation with the Communists," -p. 339-40. This Council is an informal and extra-legal offshoot -of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs; accordingly the -annual, rich in official materials, provides insufficient data on Communist, -guerrilla, and unofficial activities. See also, Epstein, I., <i>The -People's War</i> [Shanghai], 1939, p. 88 <i>ff.</i>, for an excellent, clear account -of this period.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_9_9" id="Footnote_9_9"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_9"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> See below, p. <a href="#Page_193">193</a>. See also Taylor, George E., <i>The Struggle for -North China</i>, New York, 1940, in the Inquiry Series of the Institute of -Pacific Relations.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_10_10" id="Footnote_10_10"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_10"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> See Epstein, I., work cited, p. 235 <i>ff.</i> and <i>The Chinese Year Book -1938-39</i>, cited, article by the late P. C. Nyi, "Plans for Political and Economic -Hegemony in China"; this includes a full administrative description -of the Border Region, p. 254 <i>ff.</i> The North China zone is arbitrarily -translated "Border Region," to distinguish it from the quondam -Chinese Soviet Republic in the Northwest, translated as "Frontier -Area."</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_11_11" id="Footnote_11_11"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_11"><span class="label">[11]</span></a> See below, p. <a href="#Page_46">46</a>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_12_12" id="Footnote_12_12"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_12"><span class="label">[12]</span></a> See chart on p. <a href="#Page_47">47</a>. Descriptions of the pre-war Central Political -Council are to be found in the texts cited on p. 5, n. 2, and in the -first two issues of <i>The Chinese Year Book, 1935-36</i> and <i>1936-37</i>, Shanghai, -<i>passim</i>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_13_13" id="Footnote_13_13"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13_13"><span class="label">[13]</span></a> See Appendix, p. <a href="#Page_309">309</a>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_14_14" id="Footnote_14_14"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14_14"><span class="label">[14]</span></a> See below, p. <a href="#Page_69">69</a>. This is to be distinguished from the various -constitutional conventions, the proposed national congress (<i>kuo-min -ta-hui</i>) which exists only in contemplation of the constitutional drafters, -and the Kuomintang Party Congress.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_15_15" id="Footnote_15_15"></a><a href="#FNanchor_15_15"><span class="label">[15]</span></a> An engrossing first-hand account of this is to be found in Hino, -Ashihei, <i>Sea and Soldiers</i>, Tokyo, 1940. This, with its three companion -volumes, <i>Mud and Soldiers</i>, <i>Flower and Soldiers</i>, and <i>Barley and -Soldiers</i>, Tokyo, 1939 and 1940, forms an eloquent, humane, sensitive -narrative of a young Japanese writer serving with the Imperial forces -in China. The series ranks with the great narratives of the European -war of 1914-18, and expresses the Japanolatrist devoutness, the naïveté, -and bewildering courage of much of the Japanese infantry, but does so -through the medium of a literary craftsmanship rare in any army.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_16_16" id="Footnote_16_16"></a><a href="#FNanchor_16_16"><span class="label">[16]</span></a> The literature of the war and of the struggles of Free China has -already reached an enormous extent. The present work makes no attempt -to present a step-by-step account of the interplay of personal -politics, the progress of the armies, or to provide a first-hand personal -account. Observers other than the author have presented these topics -exceedingly well. A few of the outstanding works may be mentioned, -however; a Shanghai press line usually signifies that the book was -reprinted there from a British or North American edition. Epstein, I., -<i>The People's War</i>, London, 1939, is a spirited, detailed account of -development down to the spring of 1939, particularly useful for the -New Fourth Army and the Border Region. Among accounts of the -war are Bertram, J. M., <i>Unconquered</i>, New York, 1939; Oliver, Frank, -<i>Special Undeclared War</i>, London, 1939, containing interesting accounts, -in particular, of Japanese military and political behavior in China. -Andersson, J. G., <i>China Fights for the World</i> [Shanghai], 1939; Utley, -Freda, <i>China at War</i> [Shanghai], 1939, a significant personal account -with special interest for the Hankow period; Mowrer, Edgar, <i>Mowrer in -China</i>, Harmondsworth (England), 1938, published in America as -<i>The Dragon Wakes</i>, New York, 1939; Booker, Edna Lee, <i>News Is My -Job</i> [Shanghai], 1940, a reminiscent anecdotage; Lady Hosie, <i>Brave New -China</i>, [Shanghai], n.d., a far more informed work than most of the -autobiographical accounts, by the daughter and widow of two British -Orientalists, herself a distinguished literary writer on China. On the -North China situation, four popular works stand out: Snow, Edgar, -<i>Red Star Over China</i>, New York, 1938, the great "scoop" on the Communists; -and three other books based on first-hand reconnaissance: -Bisson, T. A., work cited above; Hanson, Haldore, "<i>Humane Endeavour</i>" -[Shanghai], n.d.; and Carlson, Evans Fordyce, <i>Twin Stars of -China</i>, New York, 1940, the work of the U. S. Marine Corps Observer in -the guerrilla area, unique in its value as professional military interpretation. -Gunther, John, <i>Inside Asia</i>, New York, 1939, contains much of -great interest. Very special viewpoints are represented in the account -of a National-Socialist German observer, Urach, Fürst A., <i>Ostasien, -Kampf um das Kommende Grossreich</i>, Berlin, 1940; the commentary -of two British poets, Auden, W. H., and Isherwood, Christopher, -<i>Journey to a War</i>, New York, 1939; and the reportage of a distinguished -Soviet fellow-traveller, Strong, Anna Louise, <i>One-Fifth of Mankind</i>, -New York, 1938.</p></div></div> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_21" id="Page_21">[Pg 21]</a></span></p> - - -<h2><span class="smcap">Chapter I</span><br /> - -THE CONSTITUTION</h2> - - -<p>The constitutional system, basic in most Western -states, plays a peculiar, subordinate role in China. -Consideration of the issue of constitutionalism high-lights -the most practical aspects of the issues of full -democracy. Although the purely legal aspects of constitutional -development are still unimportant in the internal -power politics of China, further constitutional -development involves a very real shift in the domestic -balance of power. The fullness of national unity, and -therefore the effectiveness of resistance against Japan, -depend in part on the successful solution or compromise -of the problems of constitutionalism.</p> - -<p>Ever since the beginnings of political modernization -in China, demands for constitutional government have -included a written constitution as an imperative prerequisite. -The formidable Empress Dowager was -troubled in her last days by the Imperial constitution, -a rather unimaginative plagiarism of the Japanese Constitution -of 1889. Since the Republic began in 1912, -China has continued constitutional drafting, amendment, -replacement, and suppression; many of these -constitutions have gone into legal effect. Law being -what it was, practical politics flowed on untroubled.<a name="FNanchor_1_17" id="FNanchor_1_17"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_17" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_22" id="Page_22">[Pg 22]</a></span> -Only with the establishment of the National Government -at Nanking did constitutional structure and actual -government develop similarities.</p> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">The</span> <i>Yüeh Fa</i> -<span class="smcap">of 1931</span></h3> - -<p>In 1931, after three years' operation under an Organic -Law, the National Government adopted the <i>Yüeh -Fa</i> (Provisional Constitution),<a name="FNanchor_2_18" id="FNanchor_2_18"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_18" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> designed to cover the -period between the first stage of the revolution, <i>military -conquest</i>, and the final one of <i>constitutional government</i>. -This intermediate period was formally labelled -the stage of <i>political tutelage</i>, although in fact the military -unification of the country continued. The Provisional -Constitution, designed for five years' use, has -continued in force to the present (March 1941). It -possesses the merit of attempting to make actual practice -and constitutional form correspond. Grandiloquent, -unenforceable provisions concerning elections are omitted, -and full exercise of the powers of sovereignty are -frankly entrusted to the tutelary Party, the Kuomintang. -Such a constitution, formally making the Kuomintang -different from and higher than any other party -in China—and, for all that, in the world, since the Fascist, -National Socialist, and Communist parties are not formally -the constitutional superiors of their respective governments—and -giving the Party unrestricted authority, -has provided China with government realistic if not -libertarian.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_23" id="Page_23">[Pg 23]</a></span></p> -<p>The constitutional basis of the present Party-dictatorship -in China is well summarized by the distinguished -constitutional commentator, Dr. Wang Shih-chieh:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>According to Sun Chung-shan's<a name="FNanchor_3_19" id="FNanchor_3_19"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_19" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> <i>Chien-kuo Ta-kang</i> -[Outlines of National Reconstruction], China should pass -through a period of political tutelage under the Chinese -Kuomintang,<a name="FNanchor_4_20" id="FNanchor_4_20"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_20" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> before the stage of constitutional government -be reached. The National Government is merely an organization -through which a true republic may be formed. Hence, -in order to demonstrate the structure of the National Government -clearly, we must first understand the meaning of -<i>tang chih</i> [party government].</p> - -<p>"Party government," so-called, signifies that the whole -system of government is under the control or dictatorship -of one political party only. The only difference between -party government and dictatorship is that the former is -under the dictatorship of an entire political party, while -the latter is under that of a single person. Party government -is of course different from democracy, inasmuch as -with democracy, all policies are to be decided by the entire -body of citizens, while with party government, policies are -to be decided by all the members of the particular party -only. In other words, the entire party as one man can exercise -political dictatorship, without taking into consideration -the opinions of those who are not the members of -the party. Any resolution passed by that party is considered -a law not only in fact, but sometimes even in name; moreover, -the party may cancel or change a law by a resolution -passed in a meeting.</p> - -<p>The above-mentioned points are phenomena common to -countries under party governments.</p> - -<p>After the Chinese Kuomintang has come into power, the -system of party government is not only a fact, but even -prescribed in laws. The <i>Laws Governing the System of -Organization of the National Government of the Republic -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_24" id="Page_24">[Pg 24]</a></span>of China</i> promulgated for the first time on July 1, Year -XIV (1925) were originally formulated by the Political -Council of the Chinese Kuomintang. Article I in this code -of laws provided: "The National Government discharges -all the political affairs of the entire country, under the -direction and superintendency of the Chinese Kuomintang." -The said code has been constantly amended since its first -promulgation, but this article has always remained unchanged. -By the summer of Year XVII (1928), when the -successful Northern Expedition undertaken by the National -Revolutionary Army unified China under one government, -the period of political tutelage of the Chinese Kuomintang -began with the formulation and promulgation of -the <i>Outlines of Political Tutelage</i> on October 3, Year XVII -(1928). Article I of the said "Outlines" provided: "During -the period of political tutelage of the Republic of -China, the National Party Congress of the Chinese Kuomintang -will take the place of the National Convention to -lead the people and enforce all policies." By the beginning -of June, in Year XX (1931), when the <i>Provisional Constitution</i> -for the period of political tutelage was promulgated, -the <i>Outlines of Political Tutelage</i> were again formed into -a part of the <i>Provisional Constitution</i>, thereby giving party -government a constitutional recognition. Besides the <i>Outlines -of Political Tutelage</i>, Article 72 ("The National -Government [Council of State] has a President and a certain -number of state councillors, appointed by the Central -Executive Committee of the Chinese Kuomintang."), and -Article 58 ("The Central Executive Committee of the -Chinese Kuomintang is vested with the power of interpreting -this Provisional Constitution.") of the <i>Provisional -Constitution</i>, and Article 10 ("The National Government -has a President, twenty-four to thirty-six state councillors, a -President and a Vice-President of every <i>Yüan</i>, appointed -by the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Kuomintang."), -and Article 15 ("Before the promulgation of -the Constitution, the Executive, Legislative, Judicial, Examination -and Control <i>Yüan</i> will each be responsible to the -Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Kuomintang.") -of the <i>Laws Governing the System of Organization -of the National Government</i> (December 30, Year XX -[1931]) now being enforced, form the legal basis for party -government.<a name="FNanchor_5_21" id="FNanchor_5_21"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_21" class="fnanchor">[5]</a></p></blockquote> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_25" id="Page_25">[Pg 25]</a></span></p> -<p>Under Kuomintang trusteeship, demands have been -heard within and without the Party, for the promised -abdication of the Party and for the initiation of popular -government. Since the Kuomintang, unlike European -one-party groups, established itself only for the formal -purpose of democratic training, and was pledged to -tolerate multi-party government as soon as possible, the -continued monopoly of power was a frustration of the -Party ideology and programs. The frustration was serious; -involving much loss of popular sympathy for the -government, this and appeasement rather demoralized -the Party in the years preceding the invasion.</p> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">The Draft Permanent or Double Five Constitution</span></h3> - -<p>The Legislative <i>Yüan</i> brought forth on May 5, 1936 -(in Chinese chronology, 5/5/XXV, or double-five -twenty-five), the celebrated <i>Hsien-fa Ts'ao-an</i> (Draft -Permanent Constitution), which was promptly dubbed -the Double Five Constitution. Ever since its first -promulgation, this document has formed the center of -all Chinese constitutional debate, and—with very minor -modifications—still stands as the official proposal for a -permanent constitution, awaiting ratification by the -<i>Kuo-min Ta-hui</i> (National [Constituent] Congress), -when and if that long-postponed body ever convenes.<a name="FNanchor_6_22" id="FNanchor_6_22"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_22" class="fnanchor">[6]</a> -The Draft Constitution is the joint work of many outstanding -legal scholars. A product of collective research<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_26" id="Page_26">[Pg 26]</a></span> -and study, it thereby resembles collective private codification -of municipal and international law in the West -more than it does the creation of a deliberative assembly. -The celebrated Chinese jurist, Dr. John C. H. -Wu, prepared the first informal draft,<a name="FNanchor_7_23" id="FNanchor_7_23"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_23" class="fnanchor">[7]</a> and the 5/5/XXV -version represents the fourth draft of the Legislative -<i>Yüan</i>. The preparation of the various drafts has not, -from the scholastic point of view, been secretive or -private; but broad popular participation has neither -been offered nor solicited.</p> - -<p>The Constitution consists of eight Chapters, comprising -one hundred and forty-seven articles. Chapter I -defines the Chinese state as "a San Min Chu I Republic" -(<i>Art.</i> 1), declares sovereignty to be "vested in the whole -body of its citizens" (<i>Art.</i> 2), defines the territories of -the republic, specifies racial equality for the "races of -the Republic of China," designates the national flag, -and declares Nanking to be the capital. Chapter II -covers, in nineteen very specific articles, the entire field -of private rights and of the civic privileges of individuals. -Most specifications carry the qualification, "in -accordance with law" or "except in accordance with -law." Since law is defined further in the Constitution -as "that which has been passed by the Legislative <i>Yüan</i> -and promulgated by the President," the qualification<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_27" id="Page_27">[Pg 27]</a></span> -impresses many persons as sinister rather than encouraging. -Except for this point, the specific constitutional -guarantees exceed in number and specificity those of -almost any other modern constitution.</p> - -<p>The <i>Kuo-min Ta-hui</i> (either "National Congress" or -"People's Congress") is the subject of Chapter III. This -body has a function unlike that of any Western agency; -the nearest equivalent is the National Assembly of the -Third French Republic. This Congress is an electoral -and constituent body with fundamental legislative -powers. It is not intended to usurp the functions of the -Legislative <i>Yüan</i> by fulfilling the role of a United States -Congress, French Deputies and Senate, or a British Parliament. -Meeting once every three years for a one-month -session, it will be manifestly unable to act as a routine -Western-type legislature.</p> - -<p>The Central Government is the topic of the fourth -Chapter. The first section of the Chapter describes the -Presidency; the remaining five, the five <i>Yüan</i>. This applies -the five-fold separation of powers. Sun Yat-sen -held that a three-fold separation of powers, as known in -the West and applied to American government, was -efficacious; he also considered that the Imperial Chinese -separation of powers (an implicit one only) was also -desirable. The West had executive, legislative, judicial; -old China combined these three into the governing -power, and joined thereto the examinative power and -the <i>chien-ch'a</i><a name="FNanchor_8_24" id="FNanchor_8_24"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_24" class="fnanchor">[8]</a> power. (The <i>chien-ch'a</i> power involved -the functions of the traditional Chinese censorate; overt -and active expressions are found in auditing and in the -lodgment of impeachment charges. The term is fundamentally -untranslatable, but if the tribunician connotations -of <i>Censor</i> or the emergency meaning of <i>Control</i> be -recalled, either of these terms will serve.) Sun Yat-sen<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_28" id="Page_28">[Pg 28]</a></span> -combined the Western and the old-Chinese separations, -developing a theory of the five powers. The Draft Constitution, -like its two working predecessors, is a five-power -constitution, with five great <i>Yüan</i> (Boards, Presidencies, -or Courts), each headed by a <i>Yüan-chang</i> (<i>Yüan</i> -President). The fourth Chapter, by including the -President and all five <i>Yüan</i>, almost covers the full reach -of Chinese government.</p> - -<p>This Chapter contemplates the creation of a strong -President. In the Organic Law of 1928, the five Presidents -of the <i>Yüan</i> were relatively less strong, and the -Chairman of the <i>Kuo-min Chêng-fu Wei-yüan-hui</i> (National -Government Council; or, Council of State) was -the key figure in the government. Most of this time, -Chiang himself was Chairman. In the 1931 Provisional -Constitution, now in force, the Chairman of the National -Government—termed President by courtesy—is -an officer comparable to the President of the Third -French Republic; the President of the Executive <i>Yüan</i> -is a more active officer: Chiang K'ai-shek is President of -the Executive <i>Yüan</i>. The new President, under the -Draft Constitution, is one of the world's most powerful -officers. Holding office for six years, eligible for re-election, -commander of all armed forces, declarer of war, -negotiator of peace, treaty-maker, chief appointing and -removing officer of the state, holder of an emergency -power greater than that conveyed by Article 48 of the -German Weimar Constitution, and superior to the executive, -legislative, judicial, examinative and control -branches of the government—such a President is fully -responsible to the triennial People's Congress, and to -that only! Since the proposed President may be recalled -at any time by the People's Congress, he is in that respect -similar to parliamentary chiefs of state.<a name="FNanchor_9_25" id="FNanchor_9_25"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_25" class="fnanchor">[9]</a></p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_29" id="Page_29">[Pg 29]</a></span></p> -<p>The President of the Executive <i>Yüan</i>, together with -his subordinates, is to be appointed and removed by -the President of the Republic. The <i>Yüan</i> includes -Cabinet Ministers—appointed to their posts from among -a special group of Executive Members of the <i>Yüan</i>, -thereby providing a simple, rational equivalent of Cabinet -and Privy Council, as in Japan or (less similarly) -in Great Britain.</p> - -<p>The Legislative <i>Yüan</i> is an interesting semi-cameral -legislative body, which seeks to embody the better -features of legislative research organs and of representative -bodies. The Judicial <i>Yüan</i> rationalizes the structure -and administration of courts and of judicial process.</p> - -<p>The Control [or Censor] <i>Yüan</i> is, like the Legislative -<i>Yüan</i>, a quasi-cameral body, with indirect election of -members by the People's Congress from territorial electorates. -Its functions are audit, inquiry, and impeachment, -with such ancillary powers as practice to date has -already indicated.<a name="FNanchor_10_26" id="FNanchor_10_26"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_26" class="fnanchor">[10]</a></p> - -<p>Chapter V of the Draft Permanent Constitution deals -with local government. The institutions of provincial -government are wittingly minimized, because of recent -trouble with provincial satrapies and the dangerously -centrifugal effect of provincial autonomism. In contrast -to this, government at the district (<i>hsien</i>) level is designed -in strict accordance with the realities of twenty-odd -centuries' experience. It is probable that no other -constitution in the world provides for such careful -guarantee of district, county, canton, or <i>Kreis</i> autonomy. -The old Imperial Chinese system was a loose pseudo-centralized -federation of two thousand near-autarkic and -near-autonomous commonwealths; the Draft Constitution -attempts to reinstitute (at the political level) this -vigorous cooperative independence of the <i>hsien</i>. The -<i>hsien</i> meeting, extrapolitical, unsystematic, and occasional -in the past, is made the foundation for the new<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_30" id="Page_30">[Pg 30]</a></span> -legal structure. (These proposed reforms are now being -anticipated under the Provisional Constitution and -current statutory changes.<a name="FNanchor_11_27" id="FNanchor_11_27"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_27" class="fnanchor">[11]</a>)</p> - -<p>Chapter VI provides that the economic system shall -rest on Sun Yat-sen's principle of <i>min shêng</i> (<i>q.v.</i>, below). -Willing to apply whatever worked best, Sun himself -had no theoretical objections to capitalism, communism, -state socialism, or any other economic doctrine. -Hence, proletarian ownership of the means of -production is not guaranteed; yet state ownership is not -restricted, and is specifically required in the case of "all -public utilities and enterprises of a monopolistic nature" -(<i>Art.</i> 123). Henry George's influence on Sun is -shown by mandatory taxation of unearned increment -(<i>Art.</i> 119). Room for free future adaptation from corporative -economic techniques successful in the outside -world is assured (<i>Art.</i> 125): "Labor and capital shall, in -accordance with the principles of mutual help and cooperation, -develop together productive enterprises." It -is likely that any imaginable economic system would -be constitutional on this basis, provided that it was initiated -by due legal procedure and without hardships -irresponsibly imposed.</p> - -<p>Chapter VII, on Education, opens: "The educational -aim of the Republic of China shall be to develop a national -spirit, to cultivate a national morality, to train -the people for self-government and to increase their -ability to earn a livelihood, and thereby to build up a -sound and healthy body of citizens" (<i>Art.</i> 131), and continues, -"Every citizen of the Republic of China shall -have an equal opportunity to receive education" (<i>Art.</i> -132). State, secular control of educational policy is -assured. Articles 134 and 135 provide for tuition-free -elementary education for children and free elementary -education for previously non-privileged adults. (The -constitutional guarantee concerning tuition is indicative<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_31" id="Page_31">[Pg 31]</a></span> -of the scholastic traditions of the Chinese, of the modern -educational revolution, and is reminiscent of <i>Art.</i> 12 -of the 1931 Constitution of the Chinese Soviet Republic: -"The Soviet Government in China shall guarantee -to all workers, peasants, and the toiling masses the right -to education. The Soviet Government will, as far as -possible, begin at once to introduce free universal education.")<a name="FNanchor_12_28" id="FNanchor_12_28"></a><a href="#Footnote_12_28" class="fnanchor">[12]</a></p> - -<p>Chapter VIII deals with the interpretation and enforcement -of the Constitution. It was a labor of love -by shrewd legal theorists, and defines terms with great -clarity. Interpretive power is vested in the Judicial -<i>Yüan</i>.</p> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">The Issue of Constitutional Change</span></h3> - -<p>Nowhere in China is there outright denial of a need -for constitutional change. The need exists; the Double -Five Draft is the government's answer. Yet there are -few patent demerits in the existing constitutional system; -the present political structure is more realistic, -more broadly national, more expressive of effective -opinion than any other in modern China. The question -arises from commitments (dating back to the Empire) -promising to create actual constitutional government. -The National Government was established on the basis -of this pledge. The democratic ideology, whatever sects -it may include, has a clean sweep of the field of doctrine -in China. No one seriously advocates monarchy, separatism, -or permanent dictatorship. The only question is: -how and when?</p> - -<p>At the close of the third session of the advisory People's -Political Council, Chiang K'ai-shek replied to demands -for immediate broadening of popular control<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_32" id="Page_32">[Pg 32]</a></span> -over the government by reaffirmation of his adherence to -the democratic dogma of Sun Yat-sen, together with the -following warnings:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>The democracy which <i>Tsung-Li</i> [The Leader, i.e., Sun -Yat-sen] wished to establish was of the purest kind without -the slightest vestige of make-believe or artificiality. Unfortunately, -the Chinese people, having inherited all the -evil practices handed down throughout the numerous -dynasties of autocratic rule, were then at a low ebb both -in intelligence and in vitality. The people were used to -disorganization and selfishness....</p> - -<p>We have to wait until our lost territories have been -recovered and domestic disorders liquidated before we can -have political tutelage and prepare ourselves for constitutionalism....</p> - -<p>People at that time [the inauguration of the Republic -in 1912] made the mistake of neglecting the necessary -procedures and instead they rivalled each other in talking -about democracy.... As a result, democracy has remained -an ideal....</p> - -<p>We must make it clear to our people that democracy -is not a synonym for lack of law and order, or for anarchy.</p> - -<p>The public opinion on which democracy is based must -be sound, collective, and representative of the majority -of the people's wills. The freedom which democracy endows -on people should not conflict with public welfare, nor -should it go beyond the sphere as marked by laws of the -State. With our nation facing the worst invasion in history, -we must teach the people to respect the absolute authority -of laws of the State.<a name="FNanchor_13_29" id="FNanchor_13_29"></a><a href="#Footnote_13_29" class="fnanchor">[13]</a></p></blockquote> - -<p>The clamor for a constitution continued. The difficulties -of introducing mass suffrage to Western China -were apparent to everyone, but many leaders felt that -the advantages of constitutionalism would outweigh the -inescapable loss of efficiency, and would mobilize public -opinion behind the war and further democratic progress. -The Generalissimo found this view hard to reconcile -with his military, direct notions of doing first things<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_33" id="Page_33">[Pg 33]</a></span> -first, as he saw them, but he yielded in the fourth session -of the People's Political Council and accepted the demand. -He stated:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>In China ... [democratization] is a tremendously heavy -task which cannot be completed within a few days. I think -that the Constitution and laws may as well be promulgated -at an earlier date. But, gentlemen, please do not forget -the <i>Tsung-li's</i> painful consideration ... [of the necessity -of an intermediate stage of real democratic training]. -Political tutelage does not end with the training of the -citizens by the government. It requires training of the -citizens by themselves.</p> - -<p>Today we should understand our object: to start the -building of a constitutional government. This means laying -a permanently sound basis for the nation. We are not -concerned with the time of starting constitutional government. -Whether to start it early or later does not matter -much. What we are really concerned with is, do we have a -real intention of forming a constitutional government? If -we are truly so minded, we might as well promulgate the -Constitution before the labor of political tutelage is completed.<a name="FNanchor_14_30" id="FNanchor_14_30"></a><a href="#Footnote_14_30" class="fnanchor">[14]</a></p></blockquote> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_34" id="Page_34">[Pg 34]</a></span></p> - -<p>Chiang thus reconciled the beginning of constitutionalism -and the continuance of political tutelage, although -implying acquiescence, not recommendation. A -theorist holding all men to be driven by "a perpetuall -and restlesse desire of Power after power, that ceaseth -only in Death,"<a name="FNanchor_15_31" id="FNanchor_15_31"></a><a href="#Footnote_15_31" class="fnanchor">[15]</a> might consistently suppose that -Chiang merely dissimulated an inward lust for authority; -more plausible is the postulation that a man who -has for years lived with and for a doctrine, giving his -life and future reputation to the fulfilment of a program, -would incline to prudence and realism in climaxing that -doctrine and program. In Chiang's case this is Sun -Yat-sen's <i>San Min Chu I</i>. Chiang's reluctance to apply -democracy then and there is understandable whatever -the inmost motive; so, too, is his yielding to a widespread -demand.</p> - -<p>The convening of a special <i>Kuo-min Ta-hui</i> as a -national constituent assembly was set for November 12, -1940; this day was chosen because it was traditionally -the seventy-fourth birthday of Sun Yat-sen. Administrative -machinery for preparation of a hall, secretariat, publications, -and other necessities was established and set -in motion. Following the severe fires of August 19-20, -and the subsequent large-scale demolition of above-ground -downtown Chungking by raids, indefinite postponement -of the Congress was announced on September -25—on the grounds that military hazard prevented adequate -assembly of delegates, and no reasonably safe place -for such a meeting could be found.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile, recent years have seen an uproar of constitutional -debate. This may be summarized briefly, -with the case against the Constitution stated first:</p> - -<p>Constitutionalization would lead to the legalization -of other parties, instead of a mere condition of non-prosecution; -this would disrupt the orderliness required<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_35" id="Page_35">[Pg 35]</a></span> -of a people at war. Why add discord in war time? -<i>Reply</i>: legitimization of other parties is not a struggle -for power but an act of union. It would widen the -periphery of cooperation.<a name="FNanchor_16_32" id="FNanchor_16_32"></a><a href="#Footnote_16_32" class="fnanchor">[16]</a></p> - -<p>Sun Yat-sen required three stages of the revolution: -conquest, tutelage, constitution. China is not ready for -mass suffrage. The majority of the people are not yet -literate. Public opinion is just developing. The nation -is, in fact, still in the period of military recapture of national -territories. <i>Reply</i>: Sun Yat-sen must not be interpreted -mechanically. If this is done, tutelage will -never end, and Sun's cherished democracy will remain -forever in the future. Furthermore, the guerrillas, the -Border Region, and other instances have shown that the -Chinese masses can and will practice democracy right -now. Again, the issue has already been decided; the -government has been committed to the immediate inauguration -of the Constitution. First it was to be 1939; -the elections were held in part, until the war finally -stopped them on August 13, 1937. It is too late to raise -the issue: is China ready? Everyone—government, Kuomintang, -independent groups—has decided that China is.</p> - -<p>Why change constitutions? The present one is satisfactory. -If a war-time amplification of the <i>Yüeh Fa</i> is -needed, it can be found in the <i>Program of Resistance -and Reconstruction</i>.<a name="FNanchor_17_33" id="FNanchor_17_33"></a><a href="#Footnote_17_33" class="fnanchor">[17]</a> If a convocation of the talents -is needed, the People's Political Council is already there. -What is the use of a constitutional change in war time? -<i>Reply</i>: the constitutionalist movement is no new development. -The <i>Program</i> was a democratic advance. -"Besides, formation of the People's Political Council -was a step toward democracy. The constitutional<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_36" id="Page_36">[Pg 36]</a></span> -movement was not forced on the government, but was an -outgrowth of the war; it has not appeared overnight, -but has a clear historical background. As soon as the -Sino-Japanese hostilities broke out, it was evident that -more democratic rule was necessary. As the war became -prolonged, the preliminary steps proved inadequate. A -more perfect constitution, whereby the whole people -can be mobilized, is imminent. This fact was duly -recognized by the people and is the motive power of the -present constitutional movement." (This is the comment -of an independent writer.)<a name="FNanchor_18_34" id="FNanchor_18_34"></a><a href="#Footnote_18_34" class="fnanchor">[18]</a></p> - -<p>A pointed question is raised and answered by Tso -Tao-fen, one of the Seven Gentlemen (<i>Ch'i Chüntzu</i>) -who led the National Salvationists:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>Some say that as a matter of fact, the people themselves -do not want a constitution. And—to put it more bluntly—that -the people do not know what a constitution is. Therefore, -the constitutional movement represents the desires of -only a minority of the people, not the majority. You have -a certain element of truth if you say that most of the people -do not know what a constitution is, but it is not true that -they do not want a constitution. In the present war period, -the burden on the people is enormous. They should not -be denied any privileges to which they are entitled. All the -proposed constitutional stipulations concerning the duties, -rights, economic status, and education of the people have -an immediate effect on and relation to the people. Why do -they not want a constitution? If you proceed to ask one -of the common people, say a peasant, and you talk with -him, professorially as though you were in a classroom, about -the constitutional movement, he may be at a loss. But if -you bother to ask him about his daily life—the work he is -doing, his hopes, his bitterness, the cruelties inflicted on him -by unscrupulous officials and landlords and gentry—and -if he enjoys the freedom of speech, he will give you a good -talk!... If you say that the people do not know what a -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_37" id="Page_37">[Pg 37]</a></span>constitution is, you should enlighten them about the close -relationship between themselves and the constitution, not -discontinue the constitutional movement.<a name="FNanchor_19_35" id="FNanchor_19_35"></a><a href="#Footnote_19_35" class="fnanchor">[19]</a></p></blockquote> - -<p>Other questions relate to specific points in the Draft -Constitution. In the opinion of some, the phrase "according -to law" which follows every guarantee of popular -rights is a dangerous phrase, particularly in view of -the neat but arbitrary definition of "law" (<i>Art.</i> 139). -Others, remembering the Weimar Article 48, mistrust -the emergency power of the President. The President's -sharing of the budgetary, pardoning, and war powers -with the Legislative <i>Yüan</i> seems illogical to some critics, -who feel that these powers should be within reach of -a more popular body, not a technically legislative organ.</p> - -<p>Further discussion deals with the competence of the -<i>Kuo-min Ta-hui</i>. Many of the critics, particularly those -of the Communist and independent Left group, believe -the long-heralded epoch of democracy would open badly -if it began with mechanical ratification of a dictated constitution. -A Communist leader said, "We want a Constitution, -a democratic Constitution—a <i>real</i> democratic -Constitution!" and pointed out that the first Congress -was too large, not truly representative of the common -people, and not given enough time to work out a constitution -by its own action; its task, as he supposed the -government intended, would be to rubber-stamp the -Double Five Draft. In his opinion, this Draft had many -defects—chief of which was unresponsiveness of the -central government to popular control. The proposed -Congress could not do much with a mere triennial -check; the five-power system as projected was unsatisfactory. -Democratic rights were insufficiently assured. -He added that the Communist Party of China was for<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_38" id="Page_38">[Pg 38]</a></span> -a democracy, but that the Double Five Draft was not -"the constitution of a democracy."<a name="FNanchor_20_36" id="FNanchor_20_36"></a><a href="#Footnote_20_36" class="fnanchor">[20]</a></p> - -<p>Furthermore, the representativeness of the proposed -constitution-adopting <i>Kuo-min Ta-hui</i> is called into -question. The present plan calls for 665 delegates from -geographical constituencies, 380 from occupational, 155 -"by special methods," 240 by government appointment, -and a large number of Kuomintang Party-officers <i>ex -officio</i> (241 by a recent count).<a name="FNanchor_21_37" id="FNanchor_21_37"></a><a href="#Footnote_21_37" class="fnanchor">[21]</a> The present administration -would obviously have a whip hand over all proceedings. -The division into groups has been criticized. -A demand, for example, for 120 women members has -been made. Under the circumstances, with 1681 members -already scheduled, mere additional size could be -no handicap.</p> - -<p>The question of qualifications has also been raised. -About 900 of the representatives had been elected when -war broke out. These include men who have since died, -or have changed their opinions, or are reported missing, -and even a few traitors. Are all the available elected -representatives to be gathered together, years later? -or is a new election to be held? Whatever occurs, the -supreme agency on qualifications is the Election Committee -for Representatives to the People's [Constituent] -Congress, attached directly to the Council of State.</p> - -<p>The constitutional issue in China is no simple problem -of reaction versus progressivism. The vast majority -of the population is not literate, and is unprepared to -deal with a complicated machinery of opinion and -election. Wire-pulling, corruption, adherence to form -instead of deed—these are all widespread in China. -Democracy abruptly established might frustrate further -improvement, since sham-democracy would have<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_39" id="Page_39">[Pg 39]</a></span> -established itself. The opponents of sudden action also press -the telling point that the common people do not know -they want immediate democracy, although believing -in the term as a symbol and approving its trial application. -The Generalissimo remains clearly mistrustful -about creating new organs of opinion, or using new -political processes; he would prefer to wait until the nation -is unified, better administered, and more literate. -Hence his and the Kuomintang's insistence on indirect -elections, remoteness of policy-making authorities from -the electorate, and self-sufficient government.</p> - -<p>China did have, it is argued, an excellent democratic -constitution in 1912, many more in the warlord years. -All had admirable balances of power, guarantees to the -individual, libertarian and progressive provisions. Like -Chinese social legislation, they lifted China to the level -of the rest of the modern world—<i>de jure</i>, and that only! -These elevated documents remained elevated; life went -on beneath them, and the tragic gap between law and -life was so enormous that no one thought of bridging -it. The nation would have been humiliated by legislation -which limited the working day to fourteen hours, -prohibited the mutilation or slavery of children, or -required that torture be administered in the presence -of a physician. Hence it had eight, ten, or twelve-hour -laws, good child legislation, and absolute prohibition of -torture for any purpose; these were unenforceable.</p> - -<p>To counsels of caution, advocates of immediately responsive -institutions reply that the Chinese common -people are better democrats than their rulers, citing -concrete cases in proof. They mention the general -strikes, strong peasant cooperation, the startling phenomena -of coordinate mass action—tens and hundreds -of thousands strong—in political protest, boycotts, or -civic immobility. (In past years many a warlord has -been stopped by empty streets and closed houses: no -business, no traffic, no talking, no meetings—only the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_40" id="Page_40">[Pg 40]</a></span> -silence, and somewhere, conspicuously inconspicuous, a -committee of plenipotentiaries!) They refer to the -Frontier Area, the Border Region, the New Fourth -Zone, the guerrillas, the industrial cooperatives, and -the wealth of leadership called up from the millions by -the war. They quote to the Kuomintang its own professions -of democracy, and the words of its late Leader. -Told that the masses do not understand modern administration, -modern economics, modern war, and that -the peasantry and workers would proceed to arbitrary -class legislation, economic levelling, and social revolution, -they reply, "What do you want—democracy?" It -is most unlikely that the Communists would sweep the -country under free elections, but they and other dissidents, -as the political Outs, would be free to criticize the -incumbents in a way sure to bring support and involve -new alignments of power. Some Kuomintang leaders -wish to shut out any group with foreign connections; -the Chinese face—despite their definite movement -toward constitutionalism—the question of the limits of -democratic toleration</p> - - -<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_17" id="Footnote_1_17"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_17"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> On the Manchu constitutional programs, see <i>Columbia University -Studies in Political Science</i>, Vol. XL, No. 1: Yen, Hawkling L., "A -Survey of Constitutional Development in China"; Vinacke, Harold -Monk, <i>Modern Constitutional Development in China</i>, Princeton, 1920; -Cameron, Meribeth, <i>The Reform Movement in China, 1898-1912</i>, -Stanford University, 1931; and Hsieh, Pao Chao, <i>The Government of -China (1644-1911)</i>, Baltimore, 1925. The earlier constitutional developments -under the Republic are summarized in Escarra, Jean, <i>Le Droit</i> -<i>Chinois</i>, Paris and Peiping, 1936, which includes excellent bibliographies; -Tsêng Yu-hao, <i>Modern Chinese Legal and Political Philosophy</i>, -Shanghai, 1934, Ch. VI, "The Law of Modern Chinese Constitutions"; -a characteristic proposal for a pre-Kuomintang constitution is Bau, -Mingchien Joshua, <i>Modern Democracy in China</i>, Shanghai, 1927; and -the works of Lum, Wu, and Linebarger, cited above.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_18" id="Footnote_2_18"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_18"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> The text of the <i>Yüeh Fa</i> is to be found in <i>The China Year Book, -1932</i>, Shanghai, 1932, and in Lum, work cited, p. 161 <i>ff.</i>, and Wu Chih-fang, -work cited, p. 410 <i>ff.</i> The Chinese texts of all outstanding Chinese -constitutions, from the Imperial programs down to the Double Five -Draft of the <i>Hsien Fa</i> are to be found in Wang Shih-chieh, <i>Pi-chiao -Hsien-fa</i>, Shanghai, 1937, p. 699-796.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_19" id="Footnote_3_19"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_19"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> I.e., Sun Yat-sen; Chung-shan was a revolutionary alias, which -became a ceremonial posthumous name.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_20" id="Footnote_4_20"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_20"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> The term "Chinese Kuomintang" is not a redundancy; the original -is <i>Chung-kuo Kuo-min-tang</i>, "Central-Realm Realm-people-association," -and could be translated as the Chinese Nationalist Populist Party, National -Democratic Party, the Nation's People's Party, etc. Several -Japanese organizations have had exceedingly similar names; hence -the formal style for the Kuomintang is always prefaced by <i>China</i>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_5_21" id="Footnote_5_21"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_21"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> Wang Shih-chieh, work cited, p. 649-50.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_6_22" id="Footnote_6_22"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_22"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> The Double Five Draft Constitution is to be found in Chinese in -Wang Shih-chieh, work cited, and in English in Council of International -Affairs, <i>Information Bulletin</i>, Vol. III, No. 10 (April 11, 1937), Nanking; -Hsia, C. L., "Background and Features of the Draft Constitution -of China"; in Legislative <i>Yüan</i>, "Draft of the Constitution of the Republic -of China," Nanking, 1937; in <i>The China Year Book</i>, Shanghai, -and <i>The Chinese Year Book</i>, Shanghai and Hong Kong, <i>v.i.</i> and <i>v.d.</i> -The latest version of the Draft Constitution is reprinted below. Appendix -I (A), p. <a href="#Page_283">283</a>; the latest Chinese annotated version of this is -the Legislative <i>Yüan</i>, <i>Chung-hua Min-kuo Hsien-fa Ts'ao-an Shuo-ming-shu</i> -(An Elucidation of the Draft Permanent Constitution of the -Chinese Republic), [Chungking], XXIX (1940).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_7_23" id="Footnote_7_23"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_23"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> For a critique and appreciation of the final Draft Constitution, see -Wu, John C. H., "Notes on the Final Draft Constitution" in <i>Tien Hsia -Monthly</i>, Vol. X, No. 5 (May 1940), p. 409-26. (Dr. Wu is one of the -most extraordinary personages of the modern world; he has taken all -knowledge—East Asiatic and Western—for his province. He writes a -spirited, graceful English and is capable of discussing anything from -modern politics or abstruse points of Anglo-American law to ancient -Chinese hedonism or the philosophical implications of the <i>Autobiography</i> -of St. Thérèse of Lisieux. Dr. Wu, in a bomb-shelter, possesses -much of the moral poise and profound personal assurance for which -such Westerners as T. S. Eliot seek in vain.) See also Hsia, C. L., -"A Comparative Study of China's Draft Constitution with That of Other -Modern States," in <i>The China Quarterly</i>, Vol. 2, 1936-7, No. 1 (Summer), -p. 89-101 and Hoh Chih-hsiang, "A History of Constitution -Making in China," the same, Vol. 1, 1935-6, No. 4 (Summer), p. 105-117.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_8_24" id="Footnote_8_24"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_24"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> For a more extended discussion of this point, see the author's -<i>The Political Doctrines of Sun Yat-sen: An Exposition of the San Min -Chu I</i>, Baltimore, 1937, p. 218 <i>ff.</i>, and also p. 96 <i>ff.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_9_25" id="Footnote_9_25"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_25"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> See Sun Fo [President of the Legislative <i>Yüan</i>, and son of Sun Yat-sen], -"The Spirit of the Draft Permanent Constitution," in <i>The China -Quarterly</i>, Vol. V, No. 3 (April 1940), Shanghai, p. 377-84.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_10_26" id="Footnote_10_26"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_26"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> See Appendix I (F), p. <a href="#Page_318">318</a>-<a href="#Page_324">24</a>, below.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_11_27" id="Footnote_11_27"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_27"><span class="label">[11]</span></a> See below, p. <a href="#Page_106">106</a> <i>ff.</i>, and Appendix I (G), p. <a href="#Page_324">324</a>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_12_28" id="Footnote_12_28"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_28"><span class="label">[12]</span></a> This constitution is available in Yakhontoff, Victor A., <i>The Chinese -Soviets</i>, New York, 1934, p. 217-21, and in Kun, Bela [prefator], -<i>Fundamental Laws of the Chinese Soviet Republic</i>, New York, 1934, -p. 17-24. The writer has been unable to secure the Chinese text of this -document.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_13_29" id="Footnote_13_29"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13_29"><span class="label">[13]</span></a> China Information Committee, Chungking, <i>News Release</i>, No. 351 -(February 25, 1939), p. 2269-71.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_14_30" id="Footnote_14_30"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14_30"><span class="label">[14]</span></a> [Chiang K'ai-shek], <i>Tsung-ts'ai Chien-kuo Yen-lun Hsüan-chi</i> (The -Party Chief's Utterances on Reconstruction), Chungking, 1940, p. 237-43. -The Generalissimo concluded his speech with a homiletic touch -which is so characteristic that it may be included here; it also explains -his relative lack of interest in the Constitution: "Lastly, I have another -point to tell you gentlemen. I have already repeated this, again and -again, many times. Desiring to complete our revolutionary work and -national reconstruction, and to have a constitutional government as -seen in many modern states as soon as possible, I often study the -causes of the weakness and disorder which exist in our country.... [He -cites the traditional political vigor and excellence of the centuries -before the time of Christ, with the "degeneration" and "departure from -order" of the following centuries.] The departure is not simply due to -the failures in politics and education and to the deprivation of the -popular rights by a few tyrannical kings and lords since the Ch'in and -Han periods. It is due to the fact that before the Chou, we had -government by law [<i>fa chih</i>] as a mere supplement to government by -social standards [<i>li chih</i>, also translatable as ideological control, or -control through moral indoctrination]. We had social organization as -the foundation of political organization. Everything was then well-organized -and well-trained. Everywhere, in schools, in armies, in -families, in society, order and the forms of propriety [i.e., social -standards] were regarded as most important. No citizen could evade his -duty and obligation."</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_15_31" id="Footnote_15_31"></a><a href="#FNanchor_15_31"><span class="label">[15]</span></a> Thomas Hobbes, <i>Leviathan</i>, New York and London, 1934 (Everyman's -Edition), p. 49.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_16_32" id="Footnote_16_32"></a><a href="#FNanchor_16_32"><span class="label">[16]</span></a> The writer is indebted for much of the material in this chapter -to Dr. Djang Chu, of the New Life Movement Headquarters, Chungking, -who supplied it to him in the form of a lecture and other -memoranda. Dr. Djang is, of course, not responsible for any reinterpretations -here made.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_17_33" id="Footnote_17_33"></a><a href="#FNanchor_17_33"><span class="label">[17]</span></a> See Appendix I (D), p. <a href="#Page_309">309</a>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_18_34" id="Footnote_18_34"></a><a href="#FNanchor_18_34"><span class="label">[18]</span></a> Liu Shih, "Chung-kuo Hsien-chêng Yün-tung-ti Chi-ko Chieh-tuan" -(Stages of the Chinese Constitutional Movement) in <i>Li-lun yü -Hsien-shih</i> (Theory and Reality), Vol. 1, No. 3, November 15, 1939, -p. 13 <i>ff.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_19_35" id="Footnote_19_35"></a><a href="#FNanchor_19_35"><span class="label">[19]</span></a> From Tso Tao-fen, "A Few Questions Regarding the Constitution" -in Ch'üan-min K'ang-chan Shê [The United Front Club], <i>Hsien-chêng -Yün-tung Lun-wên Hsüan-chi</i> (A Symposium on the Constitutional -Movement), Chungking, 1940, p. 1 <i>ff.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_20_36" id="Footnote_20_36"></a><a href="#FNanchor_20_36"><span class="label">[20]</span></a> Statement of Col. Ch'in Po-k'u at the Chungking office of the -18th [Communist] Army Corps Headquarters, on July 29, 1940, to the -author.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_21_37" id="Footnote_21_37"></a><a href="#FNanchor_21_37"><span class="label">[21]</span></a> <i>China at War</i>, Vol. IV, No. 5 (June 1940), p. 79 <i>ff.</i></p></div></div> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_41" id="Page_41">[Pg 41]</a></span></p> - - -<h2><span class="smcap">Chapter II</span><br /> - -THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT</h2> - - -<p>By constitutional stipulation, and by dogma legally -established, the National Government of the Chinese -Republic is a Kuomintang Party-dictatorship over -the Chinese nation. This rule is formally dictatorship -by a minority democracy over the absolutely governed -majority, since the Party constitution requires intra-Party -democracy. No pretense is made of further formal -democracy. Actual experience of the past ten years -has shown the government to be a broad, loosely organized -oligarchy in which the Party, the Government, the -Army and regional military, and independent leaders -(such as bankers, college professors and presidents, -secret society chiefs, community spokesmen) have -shared power. The center of gravity has stayed somewhere -near Chiang K'ai-shek, who as co-leader and then -formal Chief (<i>Tsung-ts'ai</i>, "general ruler") of the Party -and creator of the central army has combined two of -the chief sources of influence. Variety in the sources, -nature, and incidence of political power in recent -Chinese affairs has, however, not destroyed the constitutional -theory: Party-dictatorship pledged to national -democracy.</p> - -<p>The state machinery—as it has been since promulgation -of the Provisional Constitution, 1931—is among the -most elaborate in the modern world, but is nevertheless -effective. One may justly regard the present government -as the most efficacious, generally powerful, and -growing Chinese government since the mid-eighteenth<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_42" id="Page_42">[Pg 42]</a></span> -century. This government is pre-eminently the creation -of the Kuomintang, and of Kuomintang leaders. A war -which threatens China's national existence accordingly -threatens the leaders as government officers, as Party -members, as patriotic citizens, and as members of the -Chinese race. At the time that they fight an alien enemy, -they must simultaneously increase state power and diffuse -it so that a democracy may emerge and survive.</p> - -<p>China's leadership is therefore posed a two-fold problem: -to perpetuate a regime, successful in one period of -relative peace, through years of invasion to a period of -even deeper peace; and to permit popular access to -policy-forming agencies, allowing freer operation of -pressures, without endangering resistance and reconstruction -thereby. To the Western political scientist, it -is amazing that they have carried into the years of -catastrophic war a unique, complex constitutional system, -treasuring it like an ark of the covenant. This is -the five-power system.</p> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">The Five-Power Constitution</span></h3> - -<p>The five-power constitution (<i>wu-ch'üan hsien-fa</i>) is -a legacy of Sun Yat-sen, and is one of the cardinal dogmas -of the <i>San Min Chu I</i>. Distinctively, two new powers -are added to the familiar three: namely, the examinative -and the control powers. Westerners might question the -importance of segregating the impeaching, auditing and -critical powers, unifying them into a new agency of -government, along with a glorified, independent civil -service system. Yet the five-fold division is to China a -key point of governmental development.</p> - -<p>The five-power system is based on the notions Sun -Yat-sen had of democracy. He anticipated by a generation -the need of strengthening democratic machinery -to compete with Caesarian techniques. Merely to have -qualified the suffrage, or to have narrowed the limits -of popular action, would not have sufficed, for it was<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_43" id="Page_43">[Pg 43]</a></span> -authentic democracy—government both representative -and popular—which he desired, not an empty shell of -nominal republicanism. In an effort to solve this -dilemma, he employed the concepts <i>ch'üan</i> and <i>nêng</i>,<a name="FNanchor_1_38" id="FNanchor_1_38"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_38" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> -which may be translated "power" and "capacity," although -the rendering would necessarily vary in accordance -with the connotations to be encompassed.<a name="FNanchor_2_39" id="FNanchor_2_39"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_39" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> -He felt that it was a major discovery to apply in modern -politics a distinction between the power which the -people should have over government and the capability -they had of operating the machine of state. Abandoning -the state to the vagaries of public opinion, allowing -the citizens free access to the powerful, complex controls -of modern governance, or assuming that anyone and -everyone had an expert's qualifications on all political -subjects—this would, in Sun Yat-sen's opinion, wreck -the government. Nevertheless, the people had to reserve -a final power over policies and personnel of government, -although they are themselves unqualified to operate the -state mechanism. Hence the people were to exercise <i>the -four powers</i> over the government: initiative, referendum, -election, and recall. Compensatingly, the government -was to possess the <i>five rights</i> over the people, based on -the new separation of powers. To Sun, as a Chinese, the -state was not the hand of the people; it was a separate -institution above other institutions, democratic only in -allowing access to itself and in justifying its authority -by the ultimate sanction of popular vote. The new government -could not be kept clean, prompt, and high-minded -by the freak, casual operation of popular censure, -nor staffed by whomever a mass fancy threw into<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_44" id="Page_44">[Pg 44]</a></span> -office. It was, instead, to be a traditionally Chinese self-perpetuating -bureaucracy, differing from the past only -in being controlled and revised by popular instead of -imperial will.</p> - -<p>Accordingly, the ideal toward which the Chungking -government strives may be epitomized as <i>perfect bureaucracy -subject to complete popular control</i>. The two -powers new to the West—examination and control—are -to replace public opinion at levels of obscurity, technicality, -and persistence where outside criticism could not -reach; the plan of Sun Yat-sen provides for as much use -of power through voting as is found in any Western -state. This attempted solution strikes near the core -problems of any modern government, wherever it may -operate and whatever its conditions.</p> - -<p>The five-power constitution posits a government of -educated, expert men, in which qualifying examinations -will precede election for administrative posts, and in -which the examination and control <i>yüan</i> will—professionally, -officially—replace the haphazard play of sentiment, -anger, fancy, envy upon which Western peoples -count to keep their democracy healthy and intact. The -United States Government is the most complex and important -institution in the United States, possessing inquisitorial -powers wider and deeper than those of any -private person or institution. Yet the Americans have -no unceasing, professional, expert investigation of their -government by their government, nor does a merit system -extend to offices where it might have the drastic -effect of thwarting operation of public opinion locally -or temporarily debased.</p> - -<p>This function, specializing power to strengthen it, explains -the war-time survival of the five-power system as -a fundamental theory of state. The Chinese have suffered -from weak government for decades. Absence of -dictatorship was largely owing to an inability to designate -a dictator. The five-power system was preceded by<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_45" id="Page_45">[Pg 45]</a></span> -a Nationalist government which employed the soviet -form of organization—the one instance outside the -Soviet Union of such application.<a name="FNanchor_3_40" id="FNanchor_3_40"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_40" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> This had been set up -for rapid, decisive action; thirteen years' preliminary -application of the five-power system has shown this to -be no less swift and effectual. Even the Communist -leaders in China today are reconciled to the retention -of the five-power system, although they would certainly -like to modify its present organization.<a name="FNanchor_4_41" id="FNanchor_4_41"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_41" class="fnanchor">[4]</a></p> - -<p>Reference to the general chart of government organization -(see p. <a href="#Page_330">330</a>) shows the intricate pre-democratic -system of government now applied. Consideration of -the sources of policy in such a structure have, therefore, -to appraise not merely two agencies—executive and -legislative, with only a glance at the judiciary—as in -America, but to examine a whole hierarchy of Party, -general governmental, military-governmental, and autonomous -policy-making agencies. Were it not for the -thousands of miles, the unrelatedness in cultures, the -complexities of language, and the inescapable awareness -of race, Americans might long since have looked to -China as the decisive, fresh political experiment of our -times.</p> - -<p>One further trait of the Chinese, which in Japan has -been carried to the point of a national mania, is the -respect for the constitutional (or Imperial) system as -a symbol of purity and order. Western governments are -like machines in common use; they operate for the general -convenience and subject to the criticism of their -members. Even dictatorships try to seem practical. -The Confucian traditions of government by indoctrination, -and particularly that of government indoctrinating<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_46" id="Page_46">[Pg 46]</a></span> -through conspicuous example, motivated heavy ceremonialization -of state functions. This often led a -Chinese Emperor to become more and more majestic -and aloof, to strive for archetypal perfection, until he -became so much a model that he disappeared from public -sight altogether, swilling and carousing himself to -death in the gardens of the Forbidden City; his successors, -if they came from the people, would seem practical -and workable for a few generations, until they too succumbed -to their own majesty. Some atrophy through -majesty occurs even in the relatively new Chinese National -Government, arrested but not eradicated by war-time -vigor.</p> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">The Supreme National Defense Council</span></h3> - -<p>The highest political agency in China is the Supreme -National Defense Council (<i>Kuo-fang Tsui-kao Wei-yüan-hui</i>).<a name="FNanchor_5_42" id="FNanchor_5_42"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_42" class="fnanchor">[5]</a> -This is not a part of the government, <i>de -jure</i>, since it is the war-time replacement of the Kuomintang -Central Political Council (<i>Chung-yang -Chêng-chih Wei-yüan-hui</i>), the high Party organ charged -with exercise of the Party's sovereign powers in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_47" id="Page_47">[Pg 47]</a></span> -government. The liberalization of the policy-framing -agencies in war-time cannot be better illustrated than -by the fact that this new Supreme National Defense -Council reportedly includes non-Party members, and -acts in fact as a central board or council of government, -superseding not only the Kuomintang Central Political -Council but its governmental counterpart, the Council -of State (<i>Kuo-min Chêng-fu Wei-yüan-hui</i>) as well. -Reference to the chart below will clarify the relationship -of these agencies:</p> - -<p class="center">The KUOMINTANG, as a Party,<br /> -exercises sovereign powers through<br /> -[The CENTRAL POLITICAL COUNCIL, superseded in war-time by]<br /> -The SUPREME NATIONAL DEFENSE COUNCIL,<br /> -which transmits commands<br /> -to<br /> -The COUNCIL OF STATE, highest governmental agency, -which transforms these commands into government -orders applicable<br /> -to<br /> -NATIONAL, PROVINCIAL, or LOCAL GOVERNMENT AGENCIES,<br /> -in the form of<br /> -ORDERS, ORDINANCES, and LAWS</p> - -<p>The power of the Kuomintang is exercised by its Chief -[<i>Tsung-ts'ai</i>] and its Central Executive Committee, Central -Committee, and their respective Standing Committees -(discussed below, p. <a href="#Page_125">125</a> <i>ff.</i>).</p> - -<p>Secretiveness in a nation's highest policy-making organ -is somewhat unusual in the modern world. In most -states the invisible government of practical acquaintance -and association between leaders provides a meeting -ground, and traditions require a formal, open exercise -of public authority. As a matter of fact, a few generally -accepted data concerning the Supreme National Defense -Council are readily apparent to the observer in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_48" id="Page_48">[Pg 48]</a></span> -Chungking. In the first place, it is what its title implies—the -highest agency of political control. Its meetings -are the constant source of new policy and tangible control. -Secondly, one finds a universal belief that the -Generalissimo, who attends these meetings in the multiple -capacity of Chairman of the Council, Party Chief -of the Kuomintang, President of the Executive <i>Yüan</i>, -Chairman of the People's Political Council, Commander-in-Chief -of the Army, Navy, and Air Forces, etc., -faithfully employs Council meetings for very real debate -and discussion of government and Party policy, -and for the conduct of the war. He is not believed to -take any important step arbitrarily, without consulting -the Council. (In the past, he has been known to act with -dramatic and concealed swiftness, opening his mind to -no one before the crucial consummation of his plans, but -at the present time this has apparently disappeared.<a name="FNanchor_6_43" id="FNanchor_6_43"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_43" class="fnanchor">[6]</a>)</p> - -<p>Third, the Council, while extending beyond the men -who are primarily Party leaders and including military -and political figures who (irrespective of nominal Party -membership) are independent, has transformed the -arcanum of Party power into a body more representative -of the entire nation. Fourth, significant in connection -with the Japanese charge of Chungking Bolshevization, -the Communists and other Leftists, while -fairly represented in advisory and even in military -bodies, are presumed to have no representation whatever -on the Supreme National Defense Council, nor is -such representation regarded as probable in the near -future. Chiang K'ai-shek has at hand a counselling and -co-governing body whose fundamental purposes are -completely one with his own.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_49" id="Page_49">[Pg 49]</a></span></p> - -<p>A nice consistency would demand that the Supreme -National Defense Council (as a Party agency) should -transmit its commands to the Council of State (its government -counterpart) for transformation into law. -This is actually done, whenever possible, but the frequency -of crises and of needs for immediate action have—in -the period of hostilities—led to the occasional issuance -of commands direct to the Ministry or other governmental -organ concerned.<a name="FNanchor_7_44" id="FNanchor_7_44"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_44" class="fnanchor">[7]</a> To the degree that the -Supreme National Defense Council does so, it becomes -a directly governing authority, and instead of perpetuating -Party authority <i>over</i> government, it is itself government.</p> - -<p>Since a cloud of military secrecy covers the functions -of the Council, some notion of its operation and working -authority may be found by analogy with the role of -the Central Political Council, which it has displaced. -According to the leading Chinese constitutional writer -on the subject, the Central Political Council (also -called [Central] Political Committee)—for which read -Supreme National Defense Council today—acted as follows:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>According to Article IV of the <i>Principles Governing the -Organization of the C. E. C.</i> [of the Kuomintang] passed -... December 6, XXIV (1935), "the Central Executive -Committee organizes a Political Committee, composed of -a Chairman, a Vice-Chairman, and nineteen to twenty-five -members, appointed by the Central Executive Committee, -from among the members of the Central Executive Committee -and the Control Committee." ... "During a session -of the Political Committee, the Chairmen and Vice-Chairmen -of the Central Standing Committees, the President -of the National Government, the Presidents and Vice-Presidents -of the Five <i>Yüan</i>, and the President and Vice-President -of the Military Affairs Commission should be -present, while the leading members of the special technical -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_50" id="Page_50">[Pg 50]</a></span>committees under the [control] Political Committee, and -other higher officials of the National Government may be -notified if necessary to attend the sessions." [The author -explains that, on the basis of actual experience, "may be -notified" signifies "shall attend if matters relevant to their -functions arise."] ...</p> - -<p>It was originally fixed that the Political Committee -should meet once every week, but since December XXIV -(1935), it holds meetings either weekly or fortnightly. The -number of members required to constitute a forum is not -fixed, and resolutions have never been put in the form of -motions requiring formal vote. Regarding the proposition -of a motion, and the discussion of motions proposed <i>ex-tempore</i>, -the Political Committee has never fixed any rigid -regulations; moreover, even if a rule had been established -at one time, it has not been followed closely later. Before -being put to a decision, a motion is either studied and -examined beforehand, or it is not. There is no definite rule -as to whether every motion should be so studied or not, but -the Committee possesses the power to decide this point -<i>ad hoc</i>. The entire wording of a motion passed in a meeting -is rarely fully read, and is then read in the following session -as the minutes of the previous session. <i>Hence the Chairman -and the Secretary-General have a certain liberty in the -framing of the wording of resolutions. Judging from above -circumstances, important resolutions passed in the Political -Committee must actually represent the opinions of the -Chairman and a small number of influential members....</i> -[Italics added in translation.]<a name="FNanchor_8_45" id="FNanchor_8_45"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_45" class="fnanchor">[8]</a></p></blockquote> - -<p>Many of these features may reasonably be conjectured -to have continued in the Supreme National Defense -Council, although the regular meetings—whatever others -there may be—seem to be considerably less frequent, -occurring presumably about once in five weeks.<a name="FNanchor_9_46" id="FNanchor_9_46"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_46" class="fnanchor">[9]</a> In the -matter of authority, again, some continuity may be supposed -between the earlier agency and the later. Wang -Shih-chieh continues:</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_51" id="Page_51">[Pg 51]</a></span></p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>The authority of the Political Committee (or the Political -Council) has undergone very few changes since its establishment. -To speak concisely, the Political Committee is the -highest directing organ of all governmental policies. Putting -it in more detail, we may say that this Committee has -the power to decide the basic principles of legislation, of -governmental policies and their execution, and has also -the power to appoint and dismiss governmental officials.... [A -footnote adds the following detail.] According to -the outlines of organization now being enforced, there are -still five kinds of affairs that should be discussed and decided -by the Political Committee: (1) the basic principles of legislation, -(2) the general plans of executing government -policies, (3) important plans concerning military affairs, -(4) financial plans, (5) the appointment of officials of the -Especially Appointed category and of other governmental -officials, and (6) [<i>sic</i>] cases submitted for discussion by the -Central Executive Committee. The first four may be collectively -classified under the two names of execution and -legislation.<a name="FNanchor_10_47" id="FNanchor_10_47"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_47" class="fnanchor">[10]</a></p></blockquote> - -<p>Only from such description by analogy may the foreigner -penetrate to the inmost source of Chinese policy. -This ambiguous and all-powerful agency, a Party organ -which controls government, a committee constellated -about its charismatic Chairman, is the heir both of the -Grand Council of the Manchu Empire and of the soviets -established by Nationalists during the entente with -Soviet Russia. Should the fortune of war remove the -Generalissimo from the scene, this Council would become -the storm center of power; under his guidance -and leadership, this agency above all others distinguishes -China from an outright dictatorship. Chiang, unlike -many other national leaders, has consistently shrunk -from the regalia of arbitrary power. In the highest matters, -and at the ultimate control, his action is veiled in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_52" id="Page_52">[Pg 52]</a></span> -the Supreme National Defense Council. The actual -play of personalities and power is hidden from us, his -contemporaries. Only the future may discover the exact -degrees and <i>modus operandi</i> of his authority.</p> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">The President of the National Government</span></h3> - -<p>The term National Government (<i>Kuo-min Chêng-fu</i>) -is employed in two senses. In the broad sense, it refers -to the entire central government of China. In the narrow -sense, it is a synonym for National Government -Committee (<i>Kuo-min Chêng-fu Wei-yüan-hui</i>), commonly -translated as Council of State. The highest governmental -officer of China is the <i>Kuo-min Chêng-fu -Chu-hsi</i>—literally, the Chairman of the National Government. -Since this officer is the formal head of the National -Government in both senses of the term, his office -may with equal appropriateness be described as Chairmanship -of the Council of State and as Presidency of -the National Government. The latter has been most -commonly accepted, although it obscured the clarity of -the Chinese governmental pattern. It is essential to -note, however, that in the National Government period -there has been no <i>President of the Chinese Republic</i>; -the highest officer has been the <i>President of the National -Government of the Chinese Republic</i>, and as such the -titular head of the Chinese state for international purposes. -This officer possesses prestige rather than power, -and is roughly analogous to the President of the Third -French Republic.</p> - -<p>In his official capacity, the President acts as chairman -of the meetings of the Council of State, performs the -ceremonial functions entailed by his office, and serves -as the custodian of the symbols of continuity and legitimacy. -Wang Shih-chieh writes: "... the Chairman -more or less occupies a nominal position. At most, he -can give occasional advice, only within certain limits, to -the Executive or other <i>Yüan</i>, with no power at all to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_53" id="Page_53">[Pg 53]</a></span> -decide or to reject the policies adopted by the <i>Yüan</i>. -As a matter of fact, from the end of the Year XXI (1932) -down to the present, since the man filling the office of -Chairman [President] of the National Government is -very calm and law-abiding, he has never interfered in the -activities or policies of the various <i>Yüan</i>."<a name="FNanchor_11_48" id="FNanchor_11_48"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_48" class="fnanchor">[11]</a> This officer -has been the veteran Kuomintang leader, Lin Shên, long -a resident of the United States, a key man in overseas -affairs of the Party, and a person of much dignity, -charm, poise and prestige. With a long beard and a -humane, scholarly demeanor, President Lin has fulfilled -most admirably the requirements of his office.</p> - -<p>Generalissimo Chiang regularly reports on government -activities to Lin <i>Chu-hsi</i>, addressing him attentively -and respectfully. This is no perfunctory sham, -but appears to be a very real search for advice and -guidance. The two men are close associates and have -been such for many years; the Generalissimo gives every -indication of regarding his venerable colleague with -affectionate esteem. During the Chungking bombings, -the President has commonly resided in a secure place -outside the city. He is not needed for the daily prosecution -of the war, but both the office and its incumbent -are strongly stabilizing factors in the National Government. -(The Japanophile Wang Ch'ing-wei, establishing -his duplicate regime in Nanking, left the Presidency -open for many months, pirating Lin Shên's name. -Finally Wang gave himself the title, although he patently -would have preferred Lin.)</p> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">The Council of State</span></h3> - -<p>The Council of State (<i>Kuo-min Chêng-fu Wei-yüan-hui</i>, -National Government Committee) is the formal -governmental core of the Chinese Republic. Even in -peacetime, however, its importance was seriously undermined -by the vigorous activity of the Central Political<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_54" id="Page_54">[Pg 54]</a></span> -Council. The members of the State Council are commonly -persons who do not hold other important office; -hence the Council does not include the most effective -leaders. Although its sphere of activity is wide, its role -as ratifier of the decisions of the Supreme National Defense -Council reduces its plenary powers to a shadow. -Amnesties, general appropriation bills, appointments -and removals, solemnification of legislation adopted by -the Legislative <i>Yüan</i>, and inter-<i>Yüan</i> problems are all -within the scope of the State Council's authority, but -except for the power of organizing and supervising the -central independent agencies, subordinate only to itself, -there has been little practical power for it to exercise.<a name="FNanchor_12_49" id="FNanchor_12_49"></a><a href="#Footnote_12_49" class="fnanchor">[12]</a></p> - -<p>The independent agencies under the Council of State, -together with the latter's relation to the <i>Yüan</i> and the -Military Affairs Commission, are best shown on the -chart on p. 55.<a name="FNanchor_13_50" id="FNanchor_13_50"></a><a href="#Footnote_13_50" class="fnanchor">[13]</a></p> - -<p>Minor agencies are thus attached directly to the Council -of State, which also serves as a link and common -formal superior to the five <i>Yüan</i> and the Military Affairs -Commission. Authority of the Council is directed -primarily upon these agencies which, while minor, -serve useful needs. The Offices of Military (<i>Tsan-chün -Ch'u</i>) and of Civil Affairs (<i>Wên-kuan Ch'u</i>) are transmission -and ceremonial agencies, charged with the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_55" id="Page_55">[Pg 55]</a></span> -formal correctness of state documents and ceremonies; -the military office was originally designed to carry on -more important functions, including an independent -inspectorate of troops, but now seems to be restricted -to matters of protocol. Chinese government has for -centuries operated on the basis of a two-way current of -written materials: memorials, petitions, and other communications -come from the provinces and dominions to -the metropolis; orders, laws and other commands flow -outward in response.<a name="FNanchor_14_51" id="FNanchor_14_51"></a><a href="#Footnote_14_51" class="fnanchor">[14]</a></p> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 400px;"> -<img src="images/i_055.jpg" width="400" height="426" alt="The Supreme National Defense Council" /> -</div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_56" id="Page_56">[Pg 56]</a></span></p> -<p>The other four agencies directly dependent on the -Council of State are all of important character, but likely -to be impaired by a period of crisis. The Academia -Sinica (<i>Kuo-li Chung-yang Yen-chiu Yüan</i>) serves scientific -and educational work through its own research -bureaus, through systems of extended aid, and through -a program of publications; despite war, it has continued, -making heroic efforts to preserve the national cultural -vitality and continuity. The three remaining agencies -are of less importance, although the Planning Committee -for the Western Capital (<i>Hsi-ching Ch'ou-pei Wei-yüan-hui</i>) -found its work considerably extended when, -on October 1, 1940, Chungking was formally denominated -an auxiliary capital of the Chinese Republic, and -a long-standing anomaly—that of the city's uncertain -status—was removed.</p> - -<p>The Council of State could be regarded, therefore, as -a mere excrescence upon the design of government were -it not that ceremonial and formal functions, indispensable -to any government but particularly salient in China, -can be delegated to it, and the actual policy-making -agencies thereby stripped down to maximal utility and -efficacy.</p> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">The Executive</span> <i>Yüan</i></h3> - -<p>The Executive <i>Yüan</i> is the political organ which includes -the ministries, and is therefore roughly analogous -to a cabinet, just as the Council of State is in loose parallel -to a Privy Council. Together with the Supreme National -Defense Council and the Military Affairs Commission, -it exercises actual control over the National -Government in war time. Its growth involves executive -giantism, and atrophy for the remaining <i>Yüan</i>. The -President (<i>Yüan-chang</i>) of the Executive <i>Yüan</i> (<i>Hsing-chêng -Yüan</i>) is the highest executive officer of the government. -This post has not always been held by Chiang -K'ai-shek. At various times Wang Ch'ing-wei (now in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_57" id="Page_57">[Pg 57]</a></span> -Nanking) and H. H. K'ung (now Minister of Finance -and Vice-President [<i>Fu-yüan-chang</i>] of the <i>Yüan</i>) have -held this office.</p> - -<p>The Executive <i>Yüan</i> may be compared to a parliamentary -cabinet in respect to its relations to the President -of the National Government, but it possesses no -authority whatever over the Supreme National Defense -Council, nor over the Kuomintang C. E. C. and -the Kuomintang Congress. It cannot ask for its own -dissolution, nor demand the dissolution of the higher -policy-making agency whose will it executes.<a name="FNanchor_15_52" id="FNanchor_15_52"></a><a href="#Footnote_15_52" class="fnanchor">[15]</a> It resembles -a cabinet, therefore, in its service as a consultative -and unifying agency for the entire executive, but -differs in its lack of controlling interdependence with -a broad parliament. Again, the <i>Yüan</i> is unique among -national executive agencies in the modern world with -respect to its division of the task of policy-making and -policy-supervising. Most cabinets consist of meetings of -the heads of executive ministries or departments, with -the chief executive officer presiding, but have no elaborate -secretarial or administrative machinery interposed -between the cabinet and its direct subordinates (departments -or ministries). The Executive <i>Yüan</i> is peculiar -in possessing two elaborate staff agencies which -handle as much routine work as possible, act as a clearing -house for policy and general administration, and pre-digest -a maximum of problems. The outline on p. 58 -illustrates the difference.</p> - -<p>All matters short of the most critical moment are -referred to one or the other of the two staff organs -(<i>Mi-shu Ch'u</i> or Secretariat, under a Secretary-General; -and <i>Chêng-wu Ch'u</i>, or Office of Political Affairs,<a name="FNanchor_16_53" id="FNanchor_16_53"></a><a href="#Footnote_16_53" class="fnanchor">[16]</a> under -a Director of Political Affairs), which are nominally -separate but actually almost fused, with the Director<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_58" id="Page_58">[Pg 58]</a></span> -serving as a sort of assistant Secretary-General. All official -business (other than crucial matters raised by the -members of the Meeting) comes to these agencies, where -it is studied, assorted, and usually settled provisionally, -pending only formal ratification by the Meeting of the -Executive <i>Yüan</i>.</p> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 400px;"> -<img src="images/i_058.jpg" width="400" height="300" alt="The Cabinet" /> -</div> - -<p>The Executive <i>Yüan</i> Meeting occurs once weekly, -most commonly on Tuesday.<a name="FNanchor_17_54" id="FNanchor_17_54"></a><a href="#Footnote_17_54" class="fnanchor">[17]</a> Each Meeting is presented -with a formidable agenda, prepared by the Secretary-General, -and divided into three categories: reports, -matters for discussion, and appointments. The membership -of the Meeting consists of the <i>Yüan</i> President -and Vice-President, the Ministers heading the executive -Ministries, and the Chairmen of Commissions having -the rank of Ministry.<a name="FNanchor_18_55" id="FNanchor_18_55"></a><a href="#Footnote_18_55" class="fnanchor">[18]</a> The work of the Meeting is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_59" id="Page_59">[Pg 59]</a></span> -carried on in a business-like fashion. The Generalissimo, -as incumbent <i>Yüan</i> President, takes great interest in the -work of the <i>Yüan</i>, and makes faithfulness and punctuality -in attendance a matter of high importance. Because -of the Japanese air raids over the capital, the exact -place and hour of the weekly meeting are not announced, -nor are the proceedings public.</p> - -<p>In giving effect to the decisions reached by the <i>Yüan</i> -Meeting, the <i>Yüan</i> itself issues orders in its own name -for matters which are of general interest, or which cannot -be handled by any single Ministry or Commission. -If the problem is within the province of a particular -agency, the <i>Yüan</i>—through its Secretariat—addresses the -appropriate form of intragovernmental communication, -and the decision is then set forth as the order or act of -the agency involved. The following subjects are within -the jurisdiction of the Executive <i>Yüan</i>:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>(1) laws or legal problems submitted for promulgation -by the Legislative <i>Yüan</i>;</p> - -<p>(2) the budget, also passed <i>pro forma</i> by the Council -of State and put into legal form by the Legislative -<i>Yüan</i>;</p> - -<p>(3) declarations of war and peace, on the motion of -the Legislative <i>Yüan</i>;</p> - -<p>(4) appointment and discharge of the higher ranks -of officials;</p> - -<p>(5) matters which cannot be settled by a single Ministry -or Commission;</p> - -<p>(6) other matters which the <i>Yüan</i> President sees fit -to introduce for discussion or decision.</p> -</blockquote> - -<p>The Executive <i>Yüan</i> has far outstripped all other -<i>Yüan</i> in war-time growth. Its central position, the urgency -of most government business, and the need for -speed have led to this. Executive exercise of the ordinance-making -power has led to the gradual desuetude of -the Legislative <i>Yüan</i>, which has found ample work in -the preparation of the Draft Permanent Constitution<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_60" id="Page_60">[Pg 60]</a></span> -and the attempt to systematize legislation in view of -rapid territorial and administrative change. The Executive -<i>Yüan</i>, by controlling personnel, usually short-circuits -the functions of the Examination and Control -<i>Yüan</i>; and the Judicial <i>Yüan</i> has never had practical -political parity. Hence, the five-power system must be -regarded as a system with strong executive, weaker legislative, -examinative, and censoral, and dependent judicial -divisions. Above the five powers, the Supreme National -Defense Council exercises its august authority; -within them, the Executive stands forth; and to them, -in the course of the war, a new agency, almost comparable -to a sixth <i>yüan</i>, has sprung forth with an elaborate -bureaucracy of its own: the Military Affairs Commission.</p> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">The Military Affairs Commission</span></h3> - -<p>Some sense of the perpetual urgencies underlying Chinese -government in the past decade may be obtained -by consideration of the Military Affairs Commission.<a name="FNanchor_19_56" id="FNanchor_19_56"></a><a href="#Footnote_19_56" class="fnanchor">[19]</a> -A similar agency was one of the political wheels on -which the Nationalist-Communist machine rolled victoriously -North in the Great Revolution of 1925-27. -After the organization of a relatively stable government -at Nanking, the separate military commission was due -for absorption into the coordinate pattern of government; -instead, it has lingered under one form or another -for almost twenty years, growing great in recurrent -crises, while the Ministry of War (which was to -have absorbed it) has become its adjunct. War led to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_61" id="Page_61">[Pg 61]</a></span> -sudden distension of the Commission, and the creation -of an agency comparable to a sixth <i>yüan</i>, if not to a -duplicate, shogunal government in the Japanese sense. -The Commission had its own head, its own <i>Pu</i> (Ministries -or Departments), its own staff and field services. -Duplicating the regular government on the one -side, and the party administration on the other, it -flowered into bureaucracy so lavishly that a fourth -agency—co-ordinator for the first three—began to be -needed.</p> - -<p>Simplicity of government structure has not been a -part of the Chinese tradition; the quasi-state of the -Empire had been as elaborate as its more potent European -counterparts; and the foliation of government at -war cannot be taken as <i>prima facie</i> proof of inefficiency. -Personnel is provided by giving each officer two, five, -even ten jobs; the work is done—delegation and counter-delegation -frequently cancel out—and the creation of -new agencies does not inescapably involve confusion.</p> - -<p>The Military Affairs Commission consists of a Chairman—the -Generalissimo (<i>Tsung-ssŭ-ling</i>), who is -Chiang K'ai-shek—and seven to nine other members, -all appointed by the Council of State upon designation -by the Supreme National Defense Council.<a name="FNanchor_20_57" id="FNanchor_20_57"></a><a href="#Footnote_20_57" class="fnanchor">[20]</a> The key -officers of the armed forces are <i>ex officio</i> members, and -the Commission is charged with the military side of -the prosecution of the war. Its power has been liberally -interpreted. New agencies have been attached to it as -they arose; now it deals with social work, relief, education, -agitation, propaganda, espionage,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_62" id="Page_62">[Pg 62]</a></span> -government-sponsored "social revolution," and many economic matters -in addition to its narrowly military affairs.</p> - -<p>The work of the Commission falls into two parts. On -the one hand, it is the supreme directing agency for all -the armies; on the other, the managing agency for a -variegated war effort away from the combat lines. The -Commission's work in theory covers all armies, but in -practice confines its supervisory powers to the forces in -Free China and—less clearly—to the major guerrilla units -in the occupied areas.</p> - -<p>The Commission's governmental structure coordinates -military and political functions. The Chief of the -General Staff serves as assistant to the Chairman of the -Commission. The Main Office serves to smooth interdepartmental -affairs and to act as a central clearing point -for orders and other transmissions. Beneath the Commission -and the main office, there are twelve divisions -with the rank of <i>Pu</i>. The Department of Military -Operations (<i>Chün-ling-pu</i>) serves as a military planning -and strategic agency. The Department of Military -Training (<i>Chün-hsün-pu</i>) supervises training facilities, -military schools, and in-service training.<a name="FNanchor_21_58" id="FNanchor_21_58"></a><a href="#Footnote_21_58" class="fnanchor">[21]</a> The Directorate-General -of Courts-Martial (<i>Chün-fa Chih-hsing -Tsung-chien-pu</i>) and Pensions Commission (<i>Fu-hsüeh -Wei-yüan-hui</i>) are explained by their titles; the pension -program is probably behind that of every Western -power, and the personal grants made by the Generalissimo -under his own extra-governmental arrangements -are more effective than governmental pensions. The -Military Advisory Council (<i>Chün-shih Ts'an-i-yüan</i>) -acts as a research and consultative body, in no sense -cameral. An Administration of Personnel (<i>Ch'uan-hsü -T'ing</i>) applies some principles of the merit system. A<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_63" id="Page_63">[Pg 63]</a></span> -Service Department (<i>Hou-fang Ch'in-wu-pu</i>) is in -charge of transportation, supplies, and sanitation. The -National Aviation Commission (<i>Hang-k'ung Wei-yüan-hui</i>) -has won world-wide fame for its spectacular work -in procuring a Chinese air arm, and in keeping Chinese -air power alive against tremendous odds of finance, -transportation, equipment, and personnel; Mme. -Chiang's association with and interest in its success has -been of material aid. Finally, on the strictly military -side, there is the Office of the Naval Commander-in-Chief -(<i>Hai-chün Tsung-ssŭ-ling-pu</i>), formerly the Naval -Ministry, controlling the up-river remnants of the -navy. The War Ministry (<i>Chün-chêng-pu</i>) occupies an -anomalous position in this scheme. Subordinate to the -Executive <i>Yüan</i>, it is also subordinate to the Commission, -so that in effect it is a Ministry twice over, and is -even shown as two ministries on occasion.<a name="FNanchor_22_59" id="FNanchor_22_59"></a><a href="#Footnote_22_59" class="fnanchor">[22]</a> General Ho -Ying-chin, as Minister of War, is subordinate to the -Generalissimo as <i>Wei-yüan-chang</i> (Chairman) of the -Commission.</p> - -<p>The two remaining agencies of the Commission are -of considerable interest. A system of having political -commissars in the army, a Soviet device, was adopted -by the Kuomintang forces when first organized under -Chiang K'ai-shek, and political training accounted for -much of that success of the Northward drive (1926-27). -After the Nationalist-Communist split, political training -as such fell into considerable disuse, and was replaced -by ethical training provided by the Officers' -Moral Endeavor Corps.<a name="FNanchor_23_60" id="FNanchor_23_60"></a><a href="#Footnote_23_60" class="fnanchor">[23]</a> With the renewed entente,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_64" id="Page_64">[Pg 64]</a></span> -and war of national union for defense, a Political Department -(<i>Chêng-chih-pu</i>) was established. A graceful -tribute to Communist skill in combining war and agitation -was paid when Chou En-lai, the celebrated Red -general, was designated Vice-Minister of this Department. -One of the Generalissimo's most orthodox and -able subordinates was made Minister. The Political Department -extends its function in an enormous sweep -across China, and renders aid in military education -within the armies, in civilian organization, and in war -propaganda. Active and omnipresent, it is an excellent -instance of functioning national unity.</p> - -<p>The Party and Government War Area Commission -(<i>Chan-ti Tang-chêng Wei-yüan-hui</i>) is a coordinate -agency for propaganda, relief, and social, economic and -military counter-attack within the war area (the occupied -zone), rather unusual in being a formal amalgamation -of Kuomintang and government administration. -Through this agency most of the guerrilla aid is extended, -and the Nationalists seek to rival the Communists -and independents in the number of Japanese<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_65" id="Page_65">[Pg 65]</a></span> -they can destroy, or the amount of damage they can do. -The more active branches of this Commission are a part -of the Party structure, but the dual function of the -Commission enables it to coordinate Party and Army -work. The very role of the Commission is indicative -of the fact that the Kuomintang is trying to meet rivalry -by patriotic competition and not by suppression. Its -integration with the military makes it a perfect example -of the triune force which Nationalist China is -bringing to bear on the enemy—army, government, and -Party all seek to reach into the occupied zone, to articulate -spontaneous mass resistance, to maintain the authority -of the central government pending the <i>révanche</i>, -and to uphold the existing political system, canalizing -social change into evolutionary rather than class-war -lines.<a name="FNanchor_24_61" id="FNanchor_24_61"></a><a href="#Footnote_24_61" class="fnanchor">[24]</a></p> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">The Judicial, Legislative, Examination and -Control</span> <i>Yüan</i></h3> - -<p>The appearance of an actual three-power administration—army, -government, Party—has led to the sharp -relative decrease in importance of the four further <i>Yüan</i>. -The Judicial <i>Yüan</i> (<i>Ssŭ-fa Yüan</i>) was even in peace -time the least important of the five divisions of the -government, failing to display—as an American might -expect—a tendency toward effective judicial independence -to counterweight the executive and legislative. -The Legislative <i>Yüan</i> (<i>Li-fa Yüan</i>), while exceedingly -active in the years between the Mukden and Loukouchiao -incidents, has been reduced in importance by -the coming of hostilities. Its work has been confined -largely to drafting the Permanent Constitution, and continued -codification of administrative law—particularly<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_66" id="Page_66">[Pg 66]</a></span> -for coordination of central government and war area -(occupied China) affairs.<a name="FNanchor_25_62" id="FNanchor_25_62"></a><a href="#Footnote_25_62" class="fnanchor">[25]</a> The Examination <i>Yüan</i> -(<i>K'ao-shih Yüan</i>) has attempted to continue in the field -of civil service reform, and the Control <i>Yüan</i> (<i>Chien-ch'a -Yüan</i>) has maintained war-time efforts.</p> - -<p>The Legislative <i>Yüan</i>, under the <i>Yüeh Fa</i> of 1931, -consists of a <i>Yüan-chang</i>, a <i>Fu-yüan-chang</i>, and forty-nine -to ninety-nine members (<i>Li-fa Wei-yüan</i>), appointed -by the Supreme National Defense Council for -a two-year term upon nomination by the <i>Yüan</i> President. -The term's shortness increases the dependence -of members upon the President, and transforms the -<i>Yüan</i> to a legislative study institute. Furthermore, the -newly-developed People's Political Council has assumed -the function of representation. The President of the -<i>Yüan</i> retains sole and arbitrary power over the agenda, -the final decision, and the allocation of personnel, although -the incumbent, Dr. Sun K'ê, is one of China's -leading moderates and an exponent of constitutional -process, not likely to exercise arbitrary power.</p> - -<p>Apart from its significant constitutional powers, which -remain unimpaired, the <i>Yüan</i> finds much of its work -performed at present through ordinances of the Supreme -National Defense Council, administrative action -of the Executive <i>Yüan</i>, or commands by the Military -Affairs Commission. The jurisdiction retained includes:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>(1) general legislation;</p> - -<p>(2) the budget;</p> - -<p>(3) general amnesty;</p> - -<p>(4) declaration of war (never exercised);</p> - -<p>(5) declaration of peace;</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_67" id="Page_67">[Pg 67]</a></span></p> -<p>(6) "other important matters" (which, in practice, -has referred to the more open and solemn aspects of -treaty-making, and whatever topic may be assigned the -<i>Yüan</i> by the highest Party agency). -<a name="FNanchor_26_63" id="FNanchor_26_63"></a><a href="#Footnote_26_63" class="fnanchor">[26]</a> -</p></blockquote> - -<p>The Judicial <i>Yüan</i> serves as an administrative and -budgetary agency for four agencies. The Ministry of -Justice (<i>Ssŭ-fa Hsing-chêng-pu</i>) is, obviously, the prosecuting -agency, attached to the executive in the United -States, but made a part of the general judicial system in -China. The Administrative Court (<i>Hsing-chêng Fa-yüan</i>) -is an agency only potentially important; so is the -Commission for the Disciplinary Punishment of Public -Officers (<i>Kung-wu-yüan Ch'êng-chieh Wei-yüan-hui</i>). -The <i>Yüan</i> President is <i>ex officio</i> chief magistrate of the -Supreme Court (<i>Tsui-kao Fa-yüan</i>). Wang Shih-chieh -says of this <i>Yüan</i>:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>Because of the fact that the Judicial <i>Yüan</i> is itself not -an organ of adjudication, and since all affairs concerning -prosecution at law are handled by the Ministry of Justice, -the actual work to be performed by the Judicial <i>Yüan</i> is -very simple and light. In addition to framing the budget -for the <i>Yüan</i> itself and approving the general estimates of -the organs under it, the Judicial <i>Yüan</i> has only three further -duties to perform: (1) to bring before the Legislative -<i>Yüan</i> legislative measures connected with the Judicial -<i>Yüan</i> and its sub-organs; (2) to petition the President of -the National Government with respect to such cases as -special pardon, commutation of sentence, and the restoration -of civil rights; and (3) to unify the interpretation of -laws and orders, and changes in judicial procedure.<a name="FNanchor_27_64" id="FNanchor_27_64"></a><a href="#Footnote_27_64" class="fnanchor">[27]</a></p></blockquote> - -<p>With peace, reconstruction and prosperity, the Judicial -<i>Yüan</i> might acquire importance through its control -of the administrative and technical aspects of the court -system. Meanwhile, courts are more closely associated -with their respective levels or areas of government than -with one another in a unified judicial system.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_68" id="Page_68">[Pg 68]</a></span></p> - -<p>The Examination <i>Yüan</i>, with a President and Vice-President, -is composed of a central <i>Yüan</i> office, which -supervises two organs: the Ministry of Personnel -(<i>Ch'uan-hsü Pu</i>), operating a selective promotion system, -and the Examinations Commission (<i>K'ao-hsüan -Wei-yüan-hui</i>). In absolute numbers, few examinations -have been held. In practice, standard recruitment technique -continues to involve introduction, influence, or -family connections. The familiarity of such devices in -China at least gives them a high polish, and precludes -utter inefficiency. Under the circumstances, the Examination -<i>Yüan</i> finds scope for valuable, creative work -in the preparation of administrative studies and analyses -of very considerable importance.</p> - -<p>The Control <i>Yüan</i> is of interest to Westerners, because -of the novelty of its functions. Through the -courtesy of the <i>Yüan</i> President, a full official memorandum -on the structure and procedure was prepared, -surveying the work of the <i>Yüan</i> during the course of the -war. This is reproduced as Appendices <a href="#Page_313">I (E)</a> and <a href="#Page_318">I (F)</a> -below.<a name="FNanchor_28_65" id="FNanchor_28_65"></a><a href="#Footnote_28_65" class="fnanchor">[28]</a> Some of the unofficial observers, both Western -and Chinese, felt that the <i>Yüan</i> possessed further enormous -possibilities of activity, and that the need for controlment -was very great indeed. In general, the <i>Yüan</i> -resembles its legislative, judicial and examination coordinates, -in that the war-time executive growth has -relegated it to a secondary position.</p> - -<p>Decrease in the importance of the <i>yüan</i> system during -hostilities cannot be taken, by a too simple cause-and-effect -argument, as proof of the unwieldy or impractical -character of this five-power system. Measured -on a scale of other world governments, success is slow; -but it is enormous in contrast to other Chinese central -political institutions. At present, it is most improbable -that the form of government will be changed, save in -the event of catastrophe beyond all reckoning</p> - - -<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_38" id="Footnote_1_38"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_38"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> See Sun Yat-sen, <i>San Min Chu I</i>, Shanghai, 1927, henceforth cited -as "Price translation," p. 296 <i>ff.</i>; or d'Elia, Paschal M., S. J., <i>The Triple -Demism of Sun Yat-sen</i>, Wuchang, 1931, p. 348 <i>ff.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_39" id="Footnote_2_39"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_39"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> An attempt to correlate Sun's democratic theory with Western concepts -is made in the present author's <i>Political Doctrines of Sun Yat-sen</i>, -cited, p. 107-9. The notion is clearly put in <i>L'Esprit des Lois</i>, Book 11, -ch. 2.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_40" id="Footnote_3_40"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_40"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> See Holcombe, Arthur N., <i>The Chinese Revolution</i>, Cambridge -(Massachusetts), 1930, passim, for the outstanding elaboration of this -curious experiment, and for a lucid delineation of the genesis of the -National Government.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_41" id="Footnote_4_41"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_41"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> Statement to the author by Col. Ch'in Po-k'u, interview cited, -p. <a href="#Page_38">38</a>, n. 20, above.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_5_42" id="Footnote_5_42"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_42"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> The names of agencies and offices in the discussion of government -and Kuomintang organization are taken from K'ao-shih <i>Yüan</i> [Examination -<i>Yüan</i>], <i>Tang Chêng Chien Chih T'u-piao</i> [Charts of Government -and Party Development and Organization], Chungking, XXIX (1940), -<i>passim</i>. This work has not yet been published, since it is a draft printing, -to be revised and re-edited before formal publication. The author -was allowed to consult a copy through the courtesy of the Minister of -Foreign Affairs, Dr. Wang Ch'ung-hui, and the kind assistance of -Mr. C. C. Chi of the Party-Ministry of Publicity. These charts, provisional -as they are, are by far the most systematic presentation of -modern Chinese government structure which the author has ever -seen. For a brief commentary on the Council, see the one-paragraph -section, <i>The Supreme National Defense Council</i> in Tsiang Ting-fu, -"Reorganization of the National Government," <i>Chinese Year Book -1938-39</i>, cited, p. 356. Dr. Tsiang, whose other writings on Chinese -government have been models of clarity, candor, and concreteness, is -obliged to state: "As its major functions are involved in the prosecution -of the war, military necessity compels the writer to withhold the -details of its organization and work for a later issue."</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_6_43" id="Footnote_6_43"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_43"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> For a biased but bitterly graphic portrayal of Chiang's tiger leaps -in politics, see Isaacs, Harold, work cited, <i>passim</i>. Mr. Isaacs' portrayal -of Chiang shows him as ambitious, able, and villainous in his need -for power and his hostility to the proletariat. The Trotskyite viewpoint -is a usefully different one from that obviously adopted by the -present author.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_7_44" id="Footnote_7_44"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_44"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> Statement to the author, August 1, 1940, in Chungking, by Dr. -Wang Shih-chieh, Secretary-General of the People's Political Council -and Party-Minister of Publicity.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_8_45" id="Footnote_8_45"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_45"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> Wang Shih-chieh, <i>Pi-chiao Hsien-fa</i>, cited above, p. 658 <i>ff.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_9_46" id="Footnote_9_46"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_46"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> For example, the date of the law given in Appendix I (G), p. <a href="#Page_324">324</a>, -below, is given as August 31, 1939, and it is stated to have passed the -Council on that date at the <i>14th</i> Regular Session; since the Council -had been established seventeen months previously, some notion of the -frequency or length of sessions may thus be derived.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_10_47" id="Footnote_10_47"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_47"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> Wang Shih-chieh, <i>Pi-chiao Hsien-fa</i>, cited, p. 662. The author -adds that though the Central Political Council possesses ample -authority to interfere in the specific work of the Judicial, Examination, -and Control <i>Yüan</i>, such authority was rarely exercised, the Executive -and Legislative <i>Yüan</i> constituting the prime objects of its attention.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_11_48" id="Footnote_11_48"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_48"><span class="label">[11]</span></a> The same, p. 666.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_12_49" id="Footnote_12_49"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_49"><span class="label">[12]</span></a> The same, p. 667-68. The following materials on the independent -agencies are also adapted in general from Wang Shih-chieh's work, although -interviews, other materials, and the practical experience of the -author have been taken into account. From 1930 to 1937 the author's -father, Judge Paul Linebarger, was Legal Advisor (<i>Kuo-min Chêng-fu -Fa-lü Ku-wên</i>), directly subordinate to the Council of State, and -throughout this period the author served as Private Secretary to the -Legal Advisor, being authorized by the Council of State to take charge -of the American office of the Advisor during the latter's absences from -the United States.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_13_50" id="Footnote_13_50"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13_50"><span class="label">[13]</span></a> Adapted from the Examination <i>Yüan</i>, <i>Tang Chêng Chien Chih -T'u-piao</i>, cited; various issues of <i>The Chinese Year Book</i>, Shanghai -and Hong Kong; and [The China Information Committee] <i>An Outline -of the Organization of the Kuomintang and the Chinese Government</i>, -Chungking, 1940.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_14_51" id="Footnote_14_51"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14_51"><span class="label">[14]</span></a> For a description of this function in the T'ang dynasty, see des -Rotours, Baron Robert, <i>La Traite des Examens</i>, Paris, 1932, <i>passim</i>; -and see Fairbank, J. K., and Têng, S. Y., "Of the Types and Uses of -Ch'ing Documents," <i>Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies</i>, Vol. 5, No. 1 -(January 1940), particularly p. 5 <i>ff.</i>, for the Manchu empire.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_15_52" id="Footnote_15_52"></a><a href="#FNanchor_15_52"><span class="label">[15]</span></a> Wang Shih-chieh, <i>Pi-chiao Hsien-fa</i>, cited, p. 671.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_16_53" id="Footnote_16_53"></a><a href="#FNanchor_16_53"><span class="label">[16]</span></a> Not to be confused with the Office of Civil Affairs (<i>Wên-kuan -Ch'u</i>), adjunct to the Council of State, described above.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_17_54" id="Footnote_17_54"></a><a href="#FNanchor_17_54"><span class="label">[17]</span></a> A brilliant and informative discussion of the practical work of the -Executive <i>Yüan</i> is to be found in Tsiang Ting-fu, "Executive <i>Yüan</i>," -The Chinese Year Book 1936-37, cited, p. 241-6.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_18_55" id="Footnote_18_55"></a><a href="#FNanchor_18_55"><span class="label">[18]</span></a> For these Ministries and Commissions, see the following <a href="#Page_69">chapter</a>. -These are not to be lumped with the Party-Ministries and Commissions -which, if anything, are even more complex in structure, but whose titles -follow the same scheme of terminology as that of the government.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_19_56" id="Footnote_19_56"></a><a href="#FNanchor_19_56"><span class="label">[19]</span></a> <i>Chün-shih Wei-yüan-hui</i>. <i>The Chinese Year Book</i>, <i>v.d.</i>, cited, -and most of the official publicity from Chungking translates this term -as "National Military Council," which is far from the original, literally -"military-affairs-committee." "National Military Council" is also easily -confused with the Supreme National Defense Council. Hence the present -translation is employed, following Tsang, O. B., <i>A Supplement to -a Complete Chinese-English Dictionary</i>, Shanghai, 1937, and the -original.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_20_57" id="Footnote_20_57"></a><a href="#FNanchor_20_57"><span class="label">[20]</span></a> See Ho Yao-tsu, "The National Military Council," in <i>The Chinese -Year Book, 1938-39</i>, cited, p. 361-3; Carlson, Evans Fordyce, <i>The -Chinese Army: Its Organization and Military Efficiency</i>, New York, -1940, p. 26 <i>ff.</i>; and frequent references in <i>China At War</i> and the <i>News -Release</i> of the China Information Committee, both semiofficial, particularly -the issue of the latter for July 15, 1939. A list of the highest -military personnel and brief outline of the General Staff may be -found in Woodhead, H. G. W., editor, <i>The China Year Book 1939</i>, -Shanghai, n. d., p. 216-17, and p. 225.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_21_58" id="Footnote_21_58"></a><a href="#FNanchor_21_58"><span class="label">[21]</span></a> Descriptions of the subordinate organs of all these agencies but -the Pensions Commission and the War-Area Commission will be found -in Ho Yao-tsu, cited immediately above. The translations of the titles -here given, however, are those of the author.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_22_59" id="Footnote_22_59"></a><a href="#FNanchor_22_59"><span class="label">[22]</span></a> As an instance, see <i>Outline of the Organization of the Kuomintang</i> ..., cited -above, p. <a href="#Page_54">54</a>, n. 13.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_23_60" id="Footnote_23_60"></a><a href="#FNanchor_23_60"><span class="label">[23]</span></a> This is a semi-official agency sponsored by the Generalissimo. See -below, p. <a href="#Page_149">149</a>. The new war-time change is well illustrated by the -following statement: "Special commissioners were assigned to every -group army, and political departments in the divisions were augmented. -Enough political directors were assigned to every company of troops -withdrawn from the front for reorganization, and to Chinese forces behind -the enemy lines. In addition, political corps were formed to -organize and train civilians. Because of the lack of personnel, so far -there have been no political officers in units engaged in military operations. -</p> -<p> -"Conscious and hard-working, the political officers have done much -to remove irritations which used to occur between the commanding -officers and the political men.... -</p> -<p> -"Political work in the army formerly consisted in a weekly or fortnightly -talk by the officers, whereas now well-planned lessons on -political subjects, reading classes, discussion groups, individual conversations -and twilight meetings are conducted with clockwise regularity. -Singing, theatricals, cartooning, sports, are promoted among the -soldiers so long as they do not jeopardize their discipline. Among the -civilians, the political officers have also been active. The organization -of people's service corps, self-defense units in areas close to the war -areas and money contributions to the war chest from people in the rear -are a few of their accomplishments." China Information Committee, -<i>News Release</i>, October 2, 1939. -</p> -<p> -The comment of Generalissimo Chiang in the interview on p. 371 -is, despite its laconicism, relevant to this topic. A further discussion -is available in Chên Chêng, "Three Years of Political Training Work," -<i>The China Quarterly</i>, Vol. 5, No. 4 (Autumn 1940), p. 581-5.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_24_61" id="Footnote_24_61"></a><a href="#FNanchor_24_61"><span class="label">[24]</span></a> The official view of this work, silent on the competition of the -Communists and independents, is found in Li Chai-sum, "Chinese -Government Organization behind the Enemy Lines," last citation above, -p. 595-600.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_25_62" id="Footnote_25_62"></a><a href="#FNanchor_25_62"><span class="label">[25]</span></a> Statement to the author by Sun K'ê (Sun Fo), President of the -Legislative <i>Yüan</i>, Chungking, July 17, 1940. A summary of the work -of the <i>Yüan</i> will be found in various issues of <i>The Chinese Year Book</i>; -in Escarra, Jean, <i>Le Droit Chinois</i>, cited above, containing bibliographies; -and in Tyau, M. T. Z., "The Work and Organization of the -Legislative <i>Yüan</i>," <i>The China Quarterly</i>, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Christmas -Number, 1936), p. 73-88.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_26_63" id="Footnote_26_63"></a><a href="#FNanchor_26_63"><span class="label">[26]</span></a> Wang Shih-chieh, <i>Pi-chiao Hsien-fa</i>, cited, p. 676 <i>ff.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_27_64" id="Footnote_27_64"></a><a href="#FNanchor_27_64"><span class="label">[27]</span></a> The same, p. 691.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_28_65" id="Footnote_28_65"></a><a href="#FNanchor_28_65"><span class="label">[28]</span></a> See p. <a href="#Page_313">313</a> and p. <a href="#Page_318">318</a>.</p></div></div> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_69" id="Page_69">[Pg 69]</a></span></p> - - -<h2><span class="smcap">Chapter III</span><br /> - -CONSULTATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANS</h2> - - -<p>The outbreak and continuance of war has left the -fulcrum of power relatively untouched. The highest -organs of state are primarily in Kuomintang hands; -the Party Chief of the Kuomintang is, even at law, governmentally -more important today than in 1937; and -the constitutional monopoly of power remains under the -Kuomintang. Even changes in the highest organs—such -as establishment of the Supreme National Defense -Council and the Military Affairs Commission—have left -very little impress on the sources of power. Reforms -have altered only the mode of power, not its tenure.</p> - -<p>Modifications have, however, been introduced at the -level of government just below the apex. These are -important in two remarkable ways. The People's Political -Council (<i>Kuo-min Ts'an-chêng Hui</i>) admixed an -ingredient of representation which (save for the Party) -had been lacking since the dubious, betrayed, inaugural -years of the Republic. Furthermore, sweeping administrative -reorganization and reinvigoration made possible -the vitalization of the central government in the course -of the war, so that despite Japanese pressure and rising -Leftist rivalry, the National Government is, on any absolute -scale, becoming more powerful year by year.</p> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">The People's Political Council</span></h3> - -<p>The People's Political Council was established by -order of the Emergency Session of the Kuomintang -Party Congress held in Hankow, March 1938. Its creation<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_70" id="Page_70">[Pg 70]</a></span> -was a compromise measure between the proposal -for a European-type United Front government, based -on popular elections to a National Convention, and a -continuation of the Kuomintang monopoly of government -hitherto prevalent. Like many similar compromises -in other countries, the institution has proved -its viable and useful character. Without exaggeration, -it may be stated to be the closest approximation of representative -government which China has ever known. -Simple, improvised, legally an instrument promising -little independence or <i>élan</i> in its work, the Council -demonstrates the effectiveness of the Chinese when purpose -accompanies design. Formally the least representative -of the Chinese constitutional parliaments, congresses, -or conventions, the Council is the first to get -down to business and—almost unexpectedly—to represent!</p> - -<p>Membership, originally set at 150, was raised before -the First Session to 200, and again in the autumn of -1940 to 240.<a name="FNanchor_1_66" id="FNanchor_1_66"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_66" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> The number, unlike the 1681 tentatively -projected for the People's Congress, is small enough to -allow genuine discussion and to avoid unwieldiness. -Attendance, considering war-time hazards, has been -very good, with between two-thirds and four-fifths of -the members usually present.</p> - -<p>Although the Council was designed to meet quarterly -by its fundamental Statute,<a name="FNanchor_2_67" id="FNanchor_2_67"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_67" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> it soon changed to semi-annual -sessions and has actually met at intervals running -from six to eight months. Each session lasted for<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_71" id="Page_71">[Pg 71]</a></span> -ten days (legislative, not calendar).<a name="FNanchor_3_68" id="FNanchor_3_68"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_68" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> As the Council -sessions recurred, the Council became more and more -free and representative. Despite the narrowness of its -legal foundations, the Council has provided invaluable -exercise in the arts of democratic discussion.</p> - -<p>As a technique of representation, the Council's recruitment -system is novel. The membership was, while -the Council's total was at 200, divided into the following -four categories:</p> - -<blockquote> -<p><i>Group A</i>: representatives of the Provinces and Special -Municipalities—88;</p> - -<p><i>Group B</i>: four representatives for or from Mongolia -and two for or from Tibet—6;</p> - -<p><i>Group C</i>: representatives for or from the overseas -Chinese—6;</p> - -<p><i>Group D</i>: representatives of cultural, professional, -and economic bodies, or persons who have been active -in political leadership—100.</p> -</blockquote> - -<p>There were no elections. In the case of Group A -candidates, nominations were made by municipal or -provincial governing bodies in joint session with the -Kuomintang Party organ of corresponding location and -level. Group B candidates were nominated by the -Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission. Group C -candidates were nominated by the Overseas Chinese Affairs -Commission in the Executive <i>Yüan</i>. Group D<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_72" id="Page_72">[Pg 72]</a></span> -candidates, which included the representatives of the -Communists and independent Left, were nominated -by the Supreme National Defense Council. Two candidates -could be presented for each seat on the Council. -Subject to a minor detour or two on qualifications or for -other reasons,<a name="FNanchor_4_69" id="FNanchor_4_69"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_69" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> the final selection or election was made -by the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang.</p> - -<p>Thus, an independent or Leftist, whose life had been -more or less in danger for years, because of his hostility -to the Kuomintang and its policies, might find himself -nominated for the Council by the Kuomintang's highest -government-supervising agency, and elected by the -Kuomintang's highest Party agency. Leaders of the -hitherto suppressed, still technically illegal parties and -factions—which meant all save the Kuomintang—were -designated representatives through the fiction of selection -for individual merits. They might take an active -share in hammering out policy, and—on the same day—find -themselves legally debarred from overt public expression -of their own party work. By this device, the -Kuomintang provided a safety-valve for opposition without -touching the apparatus of its own power.</p> - -<p>Had the Kuomintang leaders been obtuse and made -the Council something less than a genuine sounding -board for public opinion, or had they picked unrepresentative -members of the other groups, the whole experiment -would have failed. In practice, the compromise -worked and gave China a focus for the national concentration -of will.</p> - -<p>The Council did not elect its own Speaker (<i>I-chang</i>) -and Deputy-Speaker (<i>Fu I-chang</i>); these were elected -for it by the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang. Down<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_73" id="Page_73">[Pg 73]</a></span> -to 1940, the Council elected a Resident -Committee of fifteen to twenty-five members from its -own membership; under a recent reorganization, this -and the Speaker and Vice-Speaker are to be replaced by -a Presidium, to be elected by but not necessarily from -among the Council, to consist of five members and to -hold the authority of designating presiding officers. -This would amount to a further step in the independence -of the Council. In both cases, the Secretariat (<i>Mi-shu-ch'u</i>) -of the Council is to be under a Secretary-General -(<i>Mi-shu-chang</i>) and Deputy Secretary-General (<i>Fu -Mi-shu-chang</i>) and to include services of correspondence, -general affairs, Council affairs, and police.<a name="FNanchor_5_70" id="FNanchor_5_70"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_70" class="fnanchor">[5]</a></p> - -<p>With respect to competence, the Council is possessed -of three powers:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>(1) the right to deliberate on all important measures, -whether of domestic or foreign policy, before these are -enacted into law by the Central Government (but not, -however, the right of making such law);</p> - -<p>(2) the right to submit proposals to the government -(but since the Supreme National Defense Council is -the highest government-directing agency in China, its -concurrence is patently necessary);</p> - -<p>(3) the right to demand and hear reports from the -<i>Yüan</i> and the Ministries, and to interpellate the officers -of state.</p> -</blockquote> - -<p>The distinguished Chinese constitutional scholar, -Wang Shih-chieh, Secretary-General of the People's Political -Council (Generalissimo Chiang himself being the -Speaker) writes of its functions:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>From the foregoing description, the peculiarities of -the People's Political Council may be clearly seen. It is -not an advisory body of the Government in the ordinary -conception of the term, because the Government is bound, -except in emergency cases, to submit to it for consideration -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_74" id="Page_74">[Pg 74]</a></span>all important measures before they are carried out. The -Council possesses not only the power to advise, but also -the right to be consulted. Nor is it a legislative organ, as all -its resolutions merely embody broad principles of legislation -or administration, i.e., lines of policy which, even -after being assented to by the Supreme National Defense -Council, will still have to go through the ordinary legislative -or ordinance-making process in order to become laws -or administrative ordinances.</p> - -<p>As regards the representative character of the Council, -it rests not so much with the method by which the Councillors -are chosen, as with the fact that, being composed of -men and women most of whom enjoy wide popularity or -respect in one way or another, the Council can really speak -for almost all the articulate group-interests of the nation. -In the less than 30 years of China's experience in republican -government, numerous experiments had been attempted -at representative government before the convention of the -People's Political Council. Few of these were deficient in -theoretic grandiloquence, but none of them was found to -be serviceable in practical applicability.</p> - -<p>Theoretically, the Council is not a popular assembly; but, -as I remarked elsewhere,* "it is open to question whether -any form of election by popular suffrage can result in so -truly representative a body." Even with reference to the -limited scope of the Council's powers, I submit that the -provision represents a progressive step in that any alternative -that is less realistic would impede rather than facilitate -the contributive work of the Council.<a name="FNanchor_6_71" id="FNanchor_6_71"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_71" class="fnanchor">[6]</a></p> - -<p>* <i>Chinese Year Book, 1938</i>, Chap. 17. [Wang Shih-chieh's note.]</p></blockquote> - -<p>The author adds that the resolutions have tended -to be of an extraordinarily practical character, and that -bombast has remained conspicuously absent.</p> - -<p>The procedure of the Council has been kept very -simple. A quorum requires only a simple majority -(101 members), and a simple majority of a quorum (51) -is all that is needed to pass a resolution. To ensure -the proper spacing of the calendar, all resolutions initiating -new business must come within the first four days<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_75" id="Page_75">[Pg 75]</a></span> -of the ten-day session. Introduction may not be completed -by the action of a single member; a petition of -20 members, one proposing and 19 endorsing, is necessary -for introduction. Reference may then be either to -the plenary session or to the committees. (There are -five standing committees—military, foreign, civil, financial -and economic, educational and cultural affairs—which -provide further facilities through subdivision into -subcommittees, or through the addition of special committees.) -Reports by the government are introduced -during the first three days of each session.<a name="FNanchor_7_72" id="FNanchor_7_72"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_72" class="fnanchor">[7]</a></p> - -<p>Members cannot waste time over the pork-barrel, log-rolling, -riders, or minor fiscal questions. Since they -all have the same constituency at law, and that constituency—the -C. E. C. of the Kuomintang—asks nothing -of them except representation of their moral constituencies—the -groups and areas from which they derive, -Councillors are untroubled by constituents or appropriations. -The budget is submitted by the government -to the Council for approval, not enactment. Salaries -of the Councillors are nil. Each is given Ch. $350.00 -(about U. S. $20.00) per mouth for expenses, without -regard to mileage, and even overseas Chinese representatives -receive no further emoluments. Since government -officials are excluded from membership, use of a -Council seat for purposes of preferment is precluded.</p> - -<p>A liberalization of representation and of procedure -occurred early in 1941. A new Council—involving the -first turnover in membership since 1938—was elected. -Educational and other unofficial representatives obtained -an additional twenty seats on the Council. The -changes were scarcely sufficient to compensate for the -further postponement of the promised Constitution, -but they indicated a willingness of the government to -meet demands for democratization. Procedural changes<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_76" id="Page_76">[Pg 76]</a></span> -increased the effectiveness of individual members. A -minor but characteristic feature was the increase in -number and importance of women members.</p> - -<p>Partisan organization in the Council, although elementary, -has begun to function. Each clique has informal -caucuses; careful scrutiny discloses the presence -of whips from these caucuses on the floor. The groupings -in the Council are so fluid that they can be variously -classified by persons with different viewpoints. (Formally, -of course, everyone is either Kuomintang or -non-Party, even though <i>The Chinese Year Book</i>, under -informal Chungking government sponsorship, proudly -lists the high rank of the Communist members of the -Council—"Chen Shao-yu (Wang Ming), [age] 33, [province] -Anhwei, [remarks] Member, Presidium, Central -Executive Committee, the Third International.")<a name="FNanchor_8_73" id="FNanchor_8_73"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_73" class="fnanchor">[8]</a> -The popular classification of the Council cliques, commonly -seen in the press, is based on the Four Parties -(<i>Ssŭ Tang</i>) and the Four Cliques (<i>Ssŭ P'ai</i>). The four -parties are the Kuomintang, National Socialist, Communist, -and <i>La Jeunesse</i>.<a name="FNanchor_9_74" id="FNanchor_9_74"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_74" class="fnanchor">[9]</a> The Four Cliques, which -according to popular credence, formed soon after the -first meetings of the Council, are based on intellectual -sympathy and the interplay of temperaments, and not -on dogma.</p> - -<p>The most Leftist clique is believed to be the <i>Hua-chung -P'ai</i> (Central China Clique), with the National -Salvationists' Seven Gentlemen at their core. Deeply -sympathetic with the masses, and violently patriotic, -this group helped to bring about the war by opposing -appeasement. Like-thinking Council members, however -affiliated, are believed to fall under the legislative leadership -of the Central China Clique. Near to this, still far -to the Left of the government, is the <i>Tungpei P'ai</i> -(Northeast Clique). The Northeastern Manchurian<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_77" id="Page_77">[Pg 77]</a></span> -Chinese officers, exiled in the Northwest, were the first -bridge between the Communists and the rest of the -country. Since their native provinces and kinsfolk have -had almost ten years' Japanese domination, the Northeast -group is emphatic in demands for national unity. -Communists circulate from one group to the other, always -cooperative in offering their leadership on the -basis of a United Front, which the Comintern still decrees -for the Far East after jettisoning the Popular -Fronts of Europe.</p> - -<p>The two relatively Rightist cliques are the <i>Ch'ê-yeh -Chiao-yü P'ai</i> (Vocational Educationists' Clique) and -the <i>Chiao-shou P'ai</i> (Professors' Clique). Composed of -men still so far from attaining office that they possess -perfect freedom of criticism, they therefore stand Left -of the government in daily comment, although they -may be Right of it in theory. The former group stresses -simple, direct problems: it seeks to attack the opium -problem, disease, illiteracy, and so forth, without necessarily -fighting the social revolution against the landlords. -It derives its name from two distinguished leaders -of the vocational education movement who have abstained -from active political work until finding a forum -in the Council. The Professors' Clique is reputedly led -by the group of young professors who were eminent in -their fields before the outbreak of war, opposed to the -government's appeasement policy, but tactful enough -not to rebel. They are considered to stand as far Right -as anyone on the Council—that is, to discuss politics in -terms of soundness of public policy, budgetary reasonableness, -immediate practicality, and other common-sense -standards, which appear conservative beside the -fervid idealism of their colleagues.</p> - -<p>The description of the <i>Ssŭ P'ai</i> just given is one which -exists in the popular credence. A more authoritative -source placed the groups in the Council under the following -four headings:</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_78" id="Page_78">[Pg 78]</a></span></p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>(1) the Kuomintang and non-Party majority;</p> - -<p>(2) the <i>La Jeunesse</i> Party and the National Socialists;</p> -<p>(3) the Communists;</p> -<p>(4) the "Popular Front" group, including the intellectuals and the National Salvationists. -</p></blockquote> - -<p>On this basis, the Kuomintang would retain its working -control of the Council, which appears to be the -case, in terms of work performed. The unaffiliated -majority, selected by their local governments and Kuomintang -offices and elected by the Kuomintang C. E. C., -would in doubtful cases be inclined to turn to Kuomintang -leadership. The <i>La Jeunesse</i> Party, despite the fact -that it is a Western-returned student organization, is -strong in Szechuan; its influence could be expected to -run with that of the National Socialists. Both parties, -while minute, are decidedly averse to Communist fellow-travelling -and not at all disposed to alter the <i>status -quo</i>, except to carve modest niches for themselves and -to advance their programs in an agreeable way. The -Communists stand alone, although they offer their cooperation -to the independents.</p> - -<p>The Popular Front group is a category widely recognized -in China—the Left Kuomintang, the discontented -idealists, the irrepressible patriots, the minor -parties, the indefatigable conspirators of Chinese hopefulness -who are always on the scene. For years they -have been unforgotten witnesses to the ferocious integrity -of ideals which (in individuals scattered at random -at all levels of society) call Chinese out of the -lethargy of being very practical.</p> - -<p>The Popular Front leaders, more than any other in -China, have withstood perennial temptation for years -and have kept their activities, under whatever name -undertaken, intact. They can be distinguished from -other Party leaders, both Nationalist and Communist, -by the facts that they have never set up a government,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_79" id="Page_79">[Pg 79]</a></span> -with jobs in it for themselves; have never controlled -a government, save through lacunae in power politics; -and have never preserved a government which they did -control. Warm-hearted, philanthropic, patriotic, their -shrill zeal has been audible in China for many years. -Without formal organization, they have stood behind -others who sought real power, and today—between the -cold, realistic leaders of the two opposing Parties—are -assembled, ever-hopeful, and advocating a Popular -Front.</p> - -<p>The Secretary-General stated to the author that he -regarded three of the Council's contributions as of -history-making importance. First, the Council openly -expressed a Chinese national unity unprecedented in -modern history. Forms apart, never before had a -crisis found all Chinese so united; the Council gave a -symbol to that unity. Second, the Council raised the -probability of successful democratic processes in China. -Failures under the Peking parliaments had reduced -democratic discussion to a sham. The Council erased -this discredit, making many people believe that democracy -promises a real value to the country—not merely -as an ideal, but as a practicable means of government. -This contribution was reinforced by a third: the Council -actually served to make definite, serious, concrete -improvements in government and Kuomintang structure, -through criticism and through the issues aired.</p> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">The Administrative Pattern</span></h3> - -<p>Central policy-making is complicated by a trifurcation -of organs—Party Headquarters, Military Affairs -Commission, and Executive <i>Yüan</i>. For example, the -nation's publicity and broadcasting services, as well as -direction of the official news agencies, are under the -(Kuomintang) Party-Ministry of Publicity, while the -Foreign Office possesses its own publicity organs for the -international relations field, and the Political Department<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_80" id="Page_80">[Pg 80]</a></span> -of the Military Affairs Commission handles much -domestic propaganda and agitation. The strictly governmental, -permanent administrative agencies are simplified -from their pre-war complexity, as the following -list will show:</p> - -<p><span class="smcap lowercase">EXECUTIVE</span> <i>Yüan</i></p> - -<blockquote><p> -Ministry of Foreign Affairs<br /> -Ministry of the Interior<br /> -Ministry of Finance<br /> -Ministry of Economic Affairs (to be reorganized)<br /> -Ministry of Social Affairs (pending)<br /> -Ministry of Education<br /> -Ministry of Communications<br /> -Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry<br /> -Commission on Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs<br /> -Commission on Overseas Chinese Affairs<br /> -National Relief Commission<br /> -Ministry of War (also under the Military Affairs Commission)<br /> -Material and Resources Control and Supervision Ministry (pending; status uncertain)</p> -</blockquote> - -<p><span class="smcap lowercase">JUDICIAL</span> <i>Yüan</i></p> - -<blockquote><p>Ministry of Justice</p></blockquote> - -<p><span class="smcap lowercase">CONTROL</span> <i>Yüan</i></p> - -<blockquote><p>Ministry of Audit</p></blockquote> - -<p><span class="smcap lowercase">EXAMINATION</span> <i>Yüan</i></p> - -<blockquote><p>Ministry of Personnel<br /> -Examination Commission</p></blockquote> - -<p>The Ministries outside the Executive are well adapted -to their respective <i>Yüan</i>, although Americans may -think the Ministry of Justice misplaced. The Executive -Ministries form the heart of the administrative system, -immediately below the cabinet (Executive <i>Yüan</i> Meeting). -The Party scaffolding is to be torn down with -constitutionalization; the military scaffolding, with -peace. The administrative organs at the center will<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_81" id="Page_81">[Pg 81]</a></span> -then bear the real burden of nourishing and protecting -the nation which now they help to create.</p> - -<p>Despite strong Chinese imprints, the central administrative -agencies are organizationally more Westernized -than the policy-making agencies. For this reason, and -because administrative emphasis is on matters economic -(outside the scope of the present work), the reader is -referred to other sources for a detailed appraisal of the -work of the ministries. Particularly fortunate is it that -<i>China Shall Rise Again</i>, partly written and partly edited -by Madame Chiang K'ai-shek,<a name="FNanchor_10_75" id="FNanchor_10_75"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_75" class="fnanchor">[10]</a> has been published, -including authoritative statements by the leading ministers -on the work of their respective ministries.</p> - -<p>The Ministries (<i>pu</i>) may be classified into three -groups, according to the major tenor of their work: political, -social and cultural, and economic. Military defense -through economic development and social reconstruction -remains their common goal, however divergent -the approaches.</p> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">The Political Ministries</span></h3> - -<p>Senior and most famous of all Chinese ministries is -that of Foreign Affairs (<i>Wai-chiao Pu</i>). It inherits the -splendid traditions of Chinese diplomacy, dating back to -the redoubtable Pan Ch'ao, who almost single-handed -conquered Central Asia in the first century <span class="smcap lowercase">A.D.</span> by unsleeping -guile and consistent boldness. Modern Chinese -diplomacy has made the best of a hundred years of defeat, -successfully exploiting the mutual suspicions of -the imperialist powers. The morale and professional<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_82" id="Page_82">[Pg 82]</a></span> -cohesion are high. Despite incessant political changes, -the foreign office and diplomatic service have preserved -their continuity from the Empire to the present. The -Chungking government probably possesses a foreign -office superior to the Gaimusho of Tokyo.<a name="FNanchor_11_76" id="FNanchor_11_76"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_76" class="fnanchor">[11]</a></p> - -<p>The effectiveness of Chinese international statesmanship -has aroused an almost superstitious dread among -the Japanese, publicists, officials, and others. Japan consistently -complains that China is superior at propaganda, -and sees, behind the world-wide mistrust of Japan, occult -forces from the Comintern or vile Chinese guile. -After they perpetrated the Nanking horrors, insulted -neutral men and women in Tientsin, machine-gunned -a British ambassador, sank an American gunboat, and -violated all available international law, the Japanese -believed that British and American lack of sympathy -was mostly due to the machinations of Chinese diplomacy. -The recent Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. -Wang Ch'ung-hui, a former Judge of the Permanent -Court of International Justice (World Court), is one -of the modern world's greatest legal scholars. Eminent -in political leadership ever since the first foundation of -the Republic, he has always urged moderation, legality, -and intelligence in government.</p> - -<p>The Ministry of the Interior (<i>Nei-chêng Pu</i>) forms -the apex to China's constitutional system of provincial -and local governments. In accordance with Sun Yat-sen's -teaching, the National Government has consistently -sought to reduce the importance of the provinces -and to foster direct local-central intergovernmental relationships. -The importance of this ministry is reduced -somewhat by the fact that other agencies possess their -own field services, and are therefore not obliged to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_83" id="Page_83">[Pg 83]</a></span> -route policy through it, but it remains significant because -of its control and supervision of China-wide administrative -development. The National Health Administration -(<i>Wei-shêng Shu</i>), formerly separate, is -now a department of this Ministry.</p> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">Social and Cultural Agencies</span></h3> - -<p>The Ministry of Education (<i>Chiao-yü Pu</i>) has continued -active despite the war. The heroic marches of -the Chinese universities to their new homes in the West -have become a world-famous epic. Students, faculty, and -staffs moved out of the sinister zones of enemy occupation, -usually travelling on foot, until they found new -homes hundreds or even thousands of miles from their -original locations. Some colleges have found homes in -old temples or in caves where, with a minimum of -equipment and library material, they continue their -work. Others, more fortunate, have become guests of -West China institutions. West China Union University -in Chengtu has four other universities on its campus, -all using the same facilities for the duration of the war. -Still other institutions have been consolidated.</p> - -<p>The Ministry of Education has subsidized education -as generously as possible, and fosters progress despite -the war and because of it. In spite of all handicaps, -institutions of higher learning have risen in number -from 91 in 1937-38 to 102 in 1939-40, with a corresponding -rise in enrollment of 31,188 to 41,494.<a name="FNanchor_12_77" id="FNanchor_12_77"></a><a href="#Footnote_12_77" class="fnanchor">[12]</a> The -entering class for 1940-41 was about 12,000, indicating -a continued rise.<a name="FNanchor_13_78" id="FNanchor_13_78"></a><a href="#Footnote_13_78" class="fnanchor">[13]</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_84" id="Page_84">[Pg 84]</a></span></p> - -<p>In addition to the accredited institutions, there are -innumerable volunteer agencies, some of which are -patriotic but educationally elementary schools for saboteurs, -agitators, and guerrillas. Education is propaganda, -but such is its immediate appeal that Left schools -obtain capacity attendance. A few students are disappointed. -One wrote, "The most unpleasant thing to me -was that, as soon as I entered the Resist-Japan University, -I was deprived of my liberty. I was not free in -speech; I was not allowed to say anything outside of -Marxism-Leninism ..." and went home.<a name="FNanchor_14_79" id="FNanchor_14_79"></a><a href="#Footnote_14_79" class="fnanchor">[14]</a> The total -attendance remains high; if added to that of the accredited -institutions operating according to government -standards, it would swell the sum enormously.</p> - -<p>In addition to formal aid to institutions of higher -learning, and administration of the National Government -colleges, the Ministry sponsors the mass literacy -movement. In this it has had the benefit of the work of -Dr. James Y. C. Yen and his associates.<a name="FNanchor_15_80" id="FNanchor_15_80"></a><a href="#Footnote_15_80" class="fnanchor">[15]</a> The war, -moving vast masses of people and shifting the modernized -city-dwellers from the coast to the interior, has -proved a stimulus to the rise of literacy and the demand -for popular literature.</p> - -<p>The Ministry is headed by Ch'ên Li-fu, whose -brother, Ch'ên Kuo-fu, is head of the (Kuomintang) -Central Political Institute. Together they stand at the -Right center of the Kuomintang, exerting enormous influence -on the Party and on the country. Both have -been very close to the Generalissimo, and took a large -share in revitalization of the Kuomintang before and -during the war.</p> - -<p>The two Commissions serve important needs. The -Commission on Overseas Chinese Affairs (<i>Ch'iao-wu<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_85" id="Page_85">[Pg 85]</a></span> -Wei-yüan-hui</i>) is the informal Chinese equivalent of a -colonial office. The Commission looks after the welfare -of the overseas settlements of the Chinese, fostering -language schools, hospitals and the like. It acts through -Chinese community associations, rarely through official -channels. Practices of hyphenated citizenship, so offensive -to one Western nationality when undertaken by -another, are unobtrusive and necessary in the case of the -Chinese. With the outside states putting Chinese in a -special economic, legal, and political category—through -immigration laws, administrative practice, and extra-governmental -pressure including lynching—the individual -Chinese who deracinates himself is indeed a lost -soul. Few Chinese worry about overseas Chinese <i>irredentas</i>. -The Commission fosters no <i>putsches</i> and -mobilizes no fifth columns, but does help to keep Chinese, -whatever their nationalities, still Chinese.</p> - -<p>The Commission on Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs -(<i>Mêng Tsang Wei-yüan-hui</i>) is the supreme agency for -the dependencies. It has a record of considerable success -in fostering a good-neighbor policy toward the half-autonomous -dominions of Chinese Turkestan (Sinkiang, -also called Chinese Central Asia),<a name="FNanchor_16_81" id="FNanchor_16_81"></a><a href="#Footnote_16_81" class="fnanchor">[16]</a> Tibet, and -Inner Mongolia. Outer Mongolia is under indirect -Soviet control, and Eastern Inner Mongolia under -the Japanese. The Chinese have utilized every device -of courtesy and diplomacy in retaining their precarious -grip on these areas. The Commission includes dominion -members.</p> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">The Economic Ministries</span></h3> - -<p>The Ministries dealing in economic matters bear the -ultimate burden of resistance. Upon their success<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_86" id="Page_86">[Pg 86]</a></span> -depend China's tools of war. If artillery, aircraft, machine-guns, -munitions, food, clothing and other necessities are -not available to the central armies, the opportunity for -counter-attack may come and go, and China be lost—not -through the power of her enemy, but through her -own weakness. Unless economic mobilization succeeds, -the guerrilla warfare in the occupied area will be frustrated, -since its purpose is merely to prepare for a -<i>révanche</i> from Free China; history affords few examples -of guerrillas defeating mass armies, fighting positionally, -without the intervention of other mass armies.</p> - -<p>The Ministry of Finance (<i>Ts'ai-chêng Pu</i>) is the -leader of the Economic Ministries. Headed by H. H. -K'ung, successor to the celebrated T. V. Soong, it has -performed fiscal miracles in maintaining the credit of -the National Government. Chief among its accomplishments -has been the institution, within the past decade, -of a managed currency on the gold-exchange standard. -Specie had been the immemorial medium of exchange, -and Chinese experience with paper money—from the -earliest times to the present—had been unfortunate. -Starting with the 1860's, China had undergone one -paper-money inflation after another. Governmental currency -was frequently a receipt for silver on deposit, in -which case it amounted to no more than a commodity -warehouse certificate, thereby subject to discount for -transportation charges, and fluctuating meanwhile with -the world price of silver; otherwise it was fiat money, -guaranteed by stranglers' cords and long knives. Fractional -coins passed by metallic weight; the shifts in the -price of copper in New York and London determined -the number of pennies which farmers received for their -silver dollars, even on the threshold of Tibet.</p> - -<p>By putting private bank notes, both Chinese and -foreign, out of circulation, systematizing note issuance -to four government banks and a limited number of -carefully supervised provincial agencies, the National<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_87" id="Page_87">[Pg 87]</a></span> -Government made the change with far less difficulty -than anyone, even optimists, dared to hope. Until the -outbreak of war subsidiary coinage was copper and -aluminum; this has been replaced by fractional paper, -circulating decimally without discount for exchange -into larger bills. Simple peasants, who used to hide -a slug of silver in their fields, now conceal a Bank of -China, Bank of Communications, Central Bank of -China, or Farmers' Bank of China <i>fa pi</i> (legal tender) -note in roofs or walls.</p> - -<p>Other noteworthy reforms include the standardization -of levies in the provinces, now proceeding to some -degree, and the imposition of direct taxes, a revolutionary -step for China. Income and inheritance taxes, -previously thought to be uncollectible in a pre-modern -area such as China's hinterland, are yielding substantial -sums. War borrowing is done almost entirely through -domestic loans. These are issued in the form of patriotic -contribution bonds, and are available in denominations -as low as Ch. Nat. $5.00 (about 28 U. S. cents). Further -support has come in the form of American, British, and -Soviet fiscal aid, and—until the outbreak of the European -war—additional credits, both private and intergovernmental, -from continental Europe. The Ministry has -moved with a financial prudence which promises to -maintain China's domestic and foreign credit for further -years of war.</p> - -<p>The Ministry has engaged in direct conflict with the -enemy through bank-note rivalry. Throughout the occupied -area, National Government currency is in conflict -with the issuances of the Japanese army and the -pro-Japanese governments. The Chungking policy has -been to hold back the invasion currencies, on the assumption -that continued circulation of the national -currency maintains a continued popular stake in the -government. Many guerrilla leaders believe that the occupied -areas should use nothing of value to the Japanese,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_88" id="Page_88">[Pg 88]</a></span> -and therefore encourage the issuance of local emergency -currency.</p> - -<p>Under the Ministry of Finance, numerous efforts have -been made to keep foreign trade alive. With war-time -pressure on transportation facilities, foreign trade has -become a virtual monopoly of the government; few -major transactions are made by wholly private interests, -since in addition to monopolizing the highways, government-owned -corporations also have access to differentials -in foreign exchange (which often mark the -difference between great profits and none). In the -matter of the governmentalized Sino-American trade, -correlated with the American credits, the Foo Shing -Corporation (export) and the Universal Trading Corporation -(import) control the current both ways. The -Ministries of Communications and of Economic Affairs -also have a share in this state-capitalist business.<a name="FNanchor_17_82" id="FNanchor_17_82"></a><a href="#Footnote_17_82" class="fnanchor">[17]</a></p> - -<p>Subdivisions in the Ministry of Finance include sections -for customs, salt gabelle, internal revenue, general -taxation, public loans, currency, national treasury, accounting, -and general affairs. Efforts are now in progress -to consolidate all intragovernmental fiscal services, -so that the budget shall cover the entire government, and -separate agencies will no longer be able to make half-controlled -collections and disbursements.</p> - -<p>The Ministry of Economic Affairs (<i>Ching-chi Pu</i>) is -in general responsible for the industrialization of an -area half the size of Europe with well over two hundred -million inhabitants. No non-industrial state can defeat -an industrial state unless it has access to the industrial -resources of third parties. The Chinese, realizing this, -have launched a modernization process unparalleled -in modern history. The two greatest migrations of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_89" id="Page_89">[Pg 89]</a></span> -twentieth century have occurred, most probably, in -China: the first the settlement of Manchuria, and the -second the flight to the West. In each case more than -twenty million persons have been involved. The Ministry -of Economic Affairs has transformed this rout into -a pioneering advance. Refugees have been taught to -bring their tools with them; when they had no tools -their skills have been sought out and utilized. As the -national armies and government retreated up the Yangtze -and inward, they brought along the personnel of -a modern economic system, and set an industrial society -down in a world technologically backward.</p> - -<p>West-China modernization will probably be the most -durable economic consequence of the war. Cities near -the edge of Tibet have underground electric power and -automatic telephone systems. Primitive salt-drying areas -have been modernized; in one instance, steel pipe being -lacking, bamboo pipelines, plastered and cemented for -reinforcement, run cross-country. Filthy, tax-ridden, -vicious little cities which had been the haunts of opium-sotted -militarists are now given the double blessing of -fair government and a business boom. (The author felt, -when he returned to America in September 1940, that -he was going from a new country to an old, leaving -the hope, zest and high spirits of the Chinese -frontier for the comfortable melancholy of American -half-prosperity.)</p> - -<p>On the government side, the stimulation to technological -advance has consisted of broad, experimental use -of government personnel, subsidies, and part-ownership, -together with some outright state socialism. Four types -of encouragement appear with particular frequency: -the government-controlled movement of private industries -from the endangered areas to the West, government -sponsorship of brand new industrial enterprises, -official encouragement of cooperatives, and state ownership-management -of enterprises.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_90" id="Page_90">[Pg 90]</a></span></p> - -<p>Many industries were saved for China through compulsory -movement. Thousands of tons of industrial -equipment were moved up to the West, floated on -barges and river-boats, or dragged by hand over macadam -highways, dirt roads, and mud footpaths. One -single enterprise, the Chung Fu Joint Mining Administration -of Honan, successfully transferred one hundred -and twenty thousand tons of equipment, now applied -to coal mining in the Southwest.<a name="FNanchor_18_83" id="FNanchor_18_83"></a><a href="#Footnote_18_83" class="fnanchor">[18]</a></p> - -<p>Government sponsorship of new enterprises covers -the entire field of modern industry. Investors wait in -line before opportune undertakings. Electric light -bulbs, safety matches, automobile parts and tools, clothing—everything -from machine-shop tools to luxury -goods is being produced in the West. Bottlenecks do -occur in new industries competing for priorities in imported -machinery.</p> - -<p>In the field of cooperatives, the C. I. C. (China Industrial -Cooperatives) stand out as truly important social -and economic pioneering. (See below, p. <a href="#Page_223">223</a>.)</p> - -<p>Government ownership has not been niggard or -timorous. In most cases it has followed American patterns -and appeared in the form of government-owned -corporations, but there are also a considerable number -of frankly state-operated enterprises, such as municipal -food stores, ferries, and heavier industrial undertakings. -The munitions and motor fuel trades are, so far as the -author could find, entirely a matter of government ownership. -In the air communications and airplane production -field, government ownership is relaxed to the point -of a senior partnership in joint companies with foreign -corporations; the latter provide the supplies and trained -personnel.</p> - -<p>The Ministry of Economic Affairs is under the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_91" id="Page_91">[Pg 91]</a></span> -control of Wong Wen-hao,<a name="FNanchor_19_84" id="FNanchor_19_84"></a><a href="#Footnote_19_84" class="fnanchor">[19]</a> whose career was first distinguished -in geology and educational administration. His -scientific outlook stands him in good stead, since the -exploitation of West-China resources requires scientific -as well as business application. Subdivisions of his Ministry -include those of mining, industry, commerce, water -conservancy, and general affairs.</p> - -<p>A Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (<i>Nung Lin -Pu</i>) was set up in 1940 as the third economic ministry. -Industrialization's dependence on farm products makes -this an invaluable coordinate to the other two Ministries. -The Chinese are in many cases proceeding directly -from pre-industrial to the latest chemico-industrial -techniques, and skipping the phase of reliance -upon subsoil minerals. Gasoline is being mixed with -fuel alcohol derived from grain; plastics are appearing.</p> - -<p>Agriculture also involved China's greatest social problem—that -of encouraging freehold or cooperative farming -at the expense of sharecropping. Much of the agricultural -reform is undertaken by the new local government -and provincial government plans, but the problems -of farm prices, general farm planning, and utilization -of agricultural products fall on the Ministry. -It is headed, not by a farm leader or expert, but by the -General Chên Chi-tang, former governor of Kwangtung -Province.<a name="FNanchor_20_85" id="FNanchor_20_85"></a><a href="#Footnote_20_85" class="fnanchor">[20]</a></p> - -<p>A proposed Material and Resources Control and Supervision -Ministry (or Ministry of Economic Warfare), -based approximately upon the British Ministry of -Supplies, is in process of organization.<a name="FNanchor_21_86" id="FNanchor_21_86"></a><a href="#Footnote_21_86" class="fnanchor">[21]</a> The Ministry -may be kept independent of either the Executive <i>Yüan</i> -or Military Affairs Commission, since it is to coordinate -a group of industrial and commercial agencies which<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_92" id="Page_92">[Pg 92]</a></span> -are now independent. Upon its establishment, the -Ministry of Economic Affairs will become one of Industry -and Commerce, and a central agency for economic -war work will be available.</p> - -<p>The National Relief Commission (<i>Chên-chi Wei-yüan-hui</i>) -supervises the general relief work of the government, -which is performed in part by the extragovernmental -war and Party agencies and in part by local and -provincial authorities. The immensity of the relief -problem in China has always been such that organized -relief can do no more than stir the misery of the masses. -Opportunely for the National Government, the Imperial -Japanese Army is securely in possession of the world's -greatest relief problem, and unable to relinquish it. -Chungking is more fortunate. (The author never -dreamed that prosperity such as he saw in West China -could exist in Asia. Prices are extremely high, but -wages and farm prices tend to follow, and unemployment—always -low in China because of the work-sharing -role of the family—is almost completely out of sight. -Skilled labor commands remuneration fantastic by pre-existing -scales.)</p> - -<p>All these agencies, and much of the rest of the government, -depend upon the Ministry of Communications -(<i>Chiao-t'ung Pu</i>). The invasion struck at existing communications -lines; Japanese are now in control of the -mouths of all major Chinese rivers, most of China's -railway mileage, and the coastal system of modern highways. -A glance at the map of China will show that -Japanese forces have hugged modern communications -lines, whether steamship, railway, or highway. Whenever -the Japanese ventured far from these lines, they -met with disaster.</p> - -<p>The Ministry of Communications has used existing -facilities to draw new networks. The short stretches of -railway in Free China are still operated; <i>matériel</i> from -the occupied zone was brought West on them, and they<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_93" id="Page_93">[Pg 93]</a></span> -are undergoing rapid development. Roadbeds are being -constructed in anticipation of future imports of -steel rails. Steamship enterprises, under government -subsidy, operate extensively, and new reaches of river -have been opened to service.</p> - -<p>Three lines of reconstruction have proved very fruitful: -motor communications, telecommunications, and -the rationalization of pre-modern facilities already at -hand.</p> - -<p>Motor communications, both highway and aerial, -have shown enormous progress. Air service is maintained -by the China National Aviation Corporation and -the Eurasia Company, both owned by the Chinese Government, -the former jointly with Pan American Airways -and the latter with German interests. Through connections -from New York to Berlin are available by the -combined services of the two companies.</p> - -<p>The highway system can be thought of as spider-like. -Three enormous legs reach to the outside: the Chungking-Kunming-Lashio -route, famous as the Burma -Road; the trans-Sinkiang route, finally connecting -with the Soviet Turksib Railroad beyond thousands of -miles of desert and mountains; and the due North -route, now being developed, reaching the Trans-Siberian -Railroad. The body of the system is a tight, -well-metalled skein of roads interconnecting the major -cities of Free China. Most highways are all-weather, -and well-engineered, but niceties of surfacing have been -postponed.</p> - -<p>Truck and bus service is regular, but very crowded, -with inescapable confusion as to priority. The majority -of the operating firms are government-owned, either by -the central government or the provinces. Complaint has -arisen over the restrictions to private enterprise in this -field. Since gasoline costs about U. S. $1.00 per gallon -and is available only under permit, further official obstructions -to highway use seem unnecessary.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_94" id="Page_94">[Pg 94]</a></span></p> - -<p>Telecommunications have been maintained and extended. -Telegraph service has reached into hitherto -untapped areas, and wireless is extensively employed. -Radio services operate under the Kuomintang, not the -government; stations XGOX and XGOY reach North -America and Europe with propaganda in the world's -leading languages. The telephone has come to be a -regular part of Chinese official and business life, and -is to be seen, far off the beaten track, as one of the -heralds of industrialization.</p> - -<p>All these modern services would, however, be grossly -insufficient for the needs of the whole nation at war. -They have been supplemented through the use of every -available type of pre-modern transportation. Most of -these rely on man-power, and have had their own -elaborate organization for many centuries: boatmen's -guilds, unions of transport coolies, carters, muleteers -and camel-drivers. It has been possible to ship heavy -freight through country consisting of mountains traversable -only by stone-flagged footpaths or torrential -streams. The Ministry has regimented this complicated -pre-modern world, with impromptu modernizations as -startling as they are efficacious. Where once couriers -trotted, they now speed by on bicycles or motorcycles; -the squealing wooden-axled wheelbarrows of the Chinese -countryside are yielding to pneumatic-tired carts -which resemble American farm trailers. Three to eight -men can drag one cart, with half a ton of freight, over -any terrain, making up to forty miles a day. Provision -can be made, therefore, for moving a quarter-million -tons of raw materials across territory lacking even the -most elementary roads. The roughness of the country, -which bars the Japanese army, is no obstacle to huge -coolie gangs, drafted sometimes, but more usually hired.</p> - -<p>The Minister of Communications gave the following -written answers to questions put by the author:<a name="FNanchor_22_87" id="FNanchor_22_87"></a><a href="#Footnote_22_87" class="fnanchor">[22]</a> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_95" id="Page_95">[Pg 95]</a></span></p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>1. In view of the political interruptions to commerce -through British and French territories south of China, will -efforts be maintained to keep communications on the same -schedules southward that they had before?</p> - -<p>Yes, because commercial and export traffic is still being -carried on southward, and there is a large accumulation -of important materials to be moved from the frontier -inward.</p> - -<p>2. Will the restriction of gasoline lead to the abandonment -of certain truck and bus routes, and the maintenance -of others, or do you expect to restrict all routes evenly?</p> - -<p>We expect to restrict all important routes evenly if the -motor fuel situation becomes really acute.</p> - -<p>3. Is a motor road running through Inner and Outer -Mongolia directly north to the Trans-Siberian Railroad -a feasible project?</p> - -<p>Yes, it is a feasible project.</p> - -<p>4. For all practical purposes, is the Soviet route as it -exists an adequate although expensive channel for the import -of high-class American machinery, such as trucks?</p> - -<p>Yes, the Soviet route as it exists is adequate though expensive -for the purpose.</p> - -<p>5. Is there evidence that mail between the United States -and China has been censored or tampered with while in -transit past Japan?</p> - -<p>No, there is no such evidence so far.</p> - -<p>6. How extensive a foreign personnel do you have in -the varied agencies under your Ministry?</p> - - -<div class="center"> -<table border="0" cellpadding="4" cellspacing="0" summary=" Agencies under the Ministry"> -<tr><td align="left">Postal Service:</td><td align="right">28</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">China National Aviation Corporation:</td><td align="right">15</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">Eurasia Aviation Corporation:</td><td align="right">13</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">Railways:</td><td align="right">8</td></tr> -</table></div> - -<p>7. What developments of the last three years do you -regard with most pride, as evidence of China's power to -cope with the emergency?</p> - -<p>The timely completion of the Yunnan-Burma Highway -may be considered as evidence of China's power to cope -with the emergency and as an important development in -the field of war-time communications. The Highway is -960 kilometers long from Kunming to Anting on the -frontier. Construction began in October 1937. Eleven -months later, the road was opened to through traffic. At -one time during its construction, as many as 100,000 laborers -were employed on the road.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_96" id="Page_96">[Pg 96]</a></span></p> -<p>The highest point on the Highway is 2,600 meters above -the sea level, yet the road has to pass two deep valleys, the -Mekong and the Salween, where the Highway dips a few -thousand feet within a distance of several miles in order -to reach the river bed, and rises precipitously again in the -same manner just beyond the suspension bridges over the -two turbulent rivers. The scarcity of local labor, the -enervating climate, and the wild and sparsely populated -country traversed, all combine to make the construction -work difficult. But now, anyone may take a motor car and -cover the distance between Chungking and Rangoon in -two weeks, as Ambassador Johnson did soon after the Highway -was completed.</p></blockquote> - -<p>The Minister Chang Kia-ngau (Chang Chia-ao) is -one of the most eminent bankers in China. His Ministry -is a model of business-like organization and systematic -routines; he has a great reputation for getting -things done in the American fashion—quickly, and -without ceremony.</p> - -<p>In addition to these major ministries, there are the <i>Pu</i> -of Justice (part of the Judicial <i>Yüan</i>, sharing its war-time -somnolence), of War (affiliated with the Military -Affairs Commission), of Audit, of Personnel, and—in -process of establishment—of Social Affairs, supplementing -the Party-Ministry of Social Movements (<i>Shê-hui -Yün-tung Pu</i>) now under the Kuomintang Headquarters.</p> - -<p>All Ministries are headed by a Minister (<i>Pu Chang</i>), -seconded by a Political Vice-Minister (<i>Chêng-wu Tzŭ-chang</i>) -and Administrative Vice-Minister (<i>Ch'ang-wu -Tzŭ-chang</i>). Since almost all officers are political appointees, -and few of the new career men have touched -the higher levels of the bureaucracy, this duplication -prevents a job famine and keeps personnel levels high; -the utility of a large administrative staff depends, obviously, -on the nature of the executive. Some of the -most crowded ministries seem permanently under-staffed -because of the intense activity they maintain; others, -with skeleton staff, appear to have far more civil servants<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_97" id="Page_97">[Pg 97]</a></span> -than service. The over-all picture of the Ministries, -however, leads inescapably to the conclusion that they -are really functioning today. Long-transmitted vices of -sloth and sinecures are on the wane. The war, high-lighting -every demerit into treason, has created optimum -conditions for administrative progress in China.</p> - - -<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_66" id="Footnote_1_66"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_66"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> China Information Committee, <i>News Release</i>, Chungking, September -30, 1940; and the same, December 30, 1940.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_67" id="Footnote_2_67"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_67"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> Wang Shih-chieh, "The People's Political Council," <i>The Chinese -Year Book 1938-39</i>, cited, p. 346-55; the same, <i>The People's Political -Council</i>, [Chungking], [1939?], pamphlet, reprinted from <i>The China -Quarterly</i>, Vol. 4, No. I (Winter 1938-39). Dr. Wang's contributions, -brief as they are, worthily supplement his pre-war constitutional -studies, and provide the most carefully annotated data on the Council -which the present author has found. The list of members given in -the first article, above, is one of the most interesting documents of -our time, giving, as it does, the residence, profession, and age of each -Councillor. Beside "Former Prime Minister" one finds "Living -Buddha attached to the Panchen Lama," "Reserve Member, Executive -Committee, the Third International," "Professor, National Peking -University" and "Head of the Mêng Clan, Descendants of Mencius."</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_68" id="Footnote_3_68"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_68"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> Woodhead, H. G. W., editor, <i>The China Year Book, 1939</i>, Shanghai, -n. d., Ch. IX, "The Kuomintang and the Government," contains -a detailed summary of the first two sessions of the People's Political -Council (p. 231-7). Quigley, Harold S., "Free China," <i>International -Conciliation</i>, No. 359 (April 1940), includes a judicious appraisal of -the work and meaning of the Council in its first two and one-half -years (p. 137-8).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_69" id="Footnote_4_69"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_69"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> Wang Shih-chieh, "The People's Political Council," cited, p. 346 <i>ff.</i> -The new system, inaugurated early in 1941, provided for 90 members -to be directly elected by Provincial and Municipal People's Political -Councils.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_5_70" id="Footnote_5_70"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_70"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> <i>Tang Chêng Chien Chih T'u-piao</i>, cited, chart of the <i>Kuo-min -Ts'an-chêng Hui</i>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_6_71" id="Footnote_6_71"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_71"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> Wang Shih-chieh, <i>The People's Political Council</i>, cited, p. 5. -Obvious misprints have been corrected.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_7_72" id="Footnote_7_72"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_72"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> The author is indebted for some of these facts to an interview with -Dr. Wang Shih-chieh in Chungking on August 1, 1940.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_8_73" id="Footnote_8_73"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_73"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> <i>1938-39</i> issue, p. 351.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_9_74" id="Footnote_9_74"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_74"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> Described below, p. <a href="#Page_159">159</a> <i>ff.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_10_75" id="Footnote_10_75"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_75"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> May-ling Soong Chiang (Madame Chiang K'ai-shek), <i>China Shall -Rise Again</i>, New York, 1941. Chinese economic developments are the -subject of careful study by the Institute of Pacific Relations, whose -<i>Far Eastern Survey</i> follows contemporary developments closely and -whose <i>Inquiry Series</i> offers a monumental collection of linked works on -Pacific affairs, with particular stress on the economic background to -politics. The volume in this series on Chinese political development, -by Lawrence K. Rosinger, may be expected to fill an important gap -in the literature on China today.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_11_76" id="Footnote_11_76"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_76"><span class="label">[11]</span></a> For the latest description of the organization of the <i>Wai-chiao Pu</i>, -see Wang Ch'ung-hui, "China's Foreign Relations during the Sino-Japanese -Hostilities 1937-1940," Chapter XIII of Chiang, May-ling -Soong, <i>China Shall Rise Again</i>, cited, p. 139-40.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_12_77" id="Footnote_12_77"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_77"><span class="label">[12]</span></a> <i>China at War</i>, Vol. V, No. 2 (October 1940), p. 37.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_13_78" id="Footnote_13_78"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13_78"><span class="label">[13]</span></a> The same, Vol. V, No. 4 (November 1940), p. 78. See also Wu Yi-fang -and Price, Frank W., <i>China Rediscovers Her West</i>, New York, -1940; Chapter VII, "Holding the Educational Front" (p. 69-76) is by -Y. G. Chen, President of the University of Nanking. The entire work -edited by Messrs. Wu and Price is of value; written from the missionary -point of view, it presents first-hand statements of affairs on Western -China, and continues with liberal and socially conscious appraisals -of the needs of Christian work.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_14_79" id="Footnote_14_79"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14_79"><span class="label">[14]</span></a> Wang Wên-hsiang, "K'ang-jih Ta-hsüeh yü Ch'ing-nien Fan-mên" -("The Sorrows of Youth and the Resist-Japan University") in -the symposium entitled So-wei "<i>Pien-ch'ü</i>" (The So-called "Frontier -Area"), Chungking, XXVIII (1939), p. 30 <i>ff.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_15_80" id="Footnote_15_80"></a><a href="#FNanchor_15_80"><span class="label">[15]</span></a> See the discussion of the mass education problem, below, p. <a href="#Page_218">218</a>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_16_81" id="Footnote_16_81"></a><a href="#FNanchor_16_81"><span class="label">[16]</span></a> Among the recent books on Sinkiang, one, unusual because -it is by a Chinese author, stands out: Wu, Aitchen K., <i>Turkistan -Tumult</i>, London, 1940. The travel books of Sven Hedin, Ella Maillart, -Peter Fleming, and Sir Eric Teichman also contain material of -political interest.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_17_82" id="Footnote_17_82"></a><a href="#FNanchor_17_82"><span class="label">[17]</span></a> <i>The Far Eastern Survey</i> keeps effectively up to date with all new -developments in this field. An authoritative but understandable explanation -of the work of the Ministry is found in H. H. K'ung, -"Holding China's Financial Front," Ch. XI, work by Mme. Chiang -K'ai-shek, cited above.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_18_83" id="Footnote_18_83"></a><a href="#FNanchor_18_83"><span class="label">[18]</span></a> Wong Wen-hao, Minister of Economic Affairs, "Industrialization -of Western China," Ch. XIV, work by Mme. Chiang K'ai-shek, cited -above, p. 142.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_19_84" id="Footnote_19_84"></a><a href="#FNanchor_19_84"><span class="label">[19]</span></a> He also spells it Oung Wen-hao; by the Wade transliteration, -Wêng Wên-hao.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_20_85" id="Footnote_20_85"></a><a href="#FNanchor_20_85"><span class="label">[20]</span></a> China Information Committee, <i>News Release</i>, Chungking, July 1, -1940.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_21_86" id="Footnote_21_86"></a><a href="#FNanchor_21_86"><span class="label">[21]</span></a> The same, December 23, 1940.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_22_87" id="Footnote_22_87"></a><a href="#FNanchor_22_87"><span class="label">[22]</span></a> Communication of August 12, 1940; in the present author's -possession.</p></div></div> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_98" id="Page_98">[Pg 98]</a></span></p> - - -<h2>Chapter IV<br /> - -PROVINCIAL, LOCAL, AND SPECIAL-AREA GOVERNMENT</h2> - - -<p>China consists of twenty-eight provinces, varying -in size about as do the European nations. Of the -twenty-eight, fourteen are wholly under Chinese control, -or are so slightly touched by invasion that normal -governmental processes continue. Ten provinces are -under dual or triple government—by the Japanese and -pro-Japanese Chinese, by guerrilla and other semi-independent -groups, and by the usual constitutional -authorities. The remaining four are under firm Japanese -domination, under the name <i>Manchoukuo</i>.<a name="FNanchor_1_88" id="FNanchor_1_88"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_88" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> Well -over half of China's population is under the National -Government, and about one-ninth under unchallengeable -Japanese control; the residuum is the subject of -sharp political competition. The war is not merely a -war between governments: it is a struggle for the creation -of government.<a name="FNanchor_2_89" id="FNanchor_2_89"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_89" class="fnanchor">[2]</a></p> - -<p>This problem would be immense even if there were -no war. Under the successive Imperial dynasties of the -past millennium, China developed extreme regional -autonomy. Despite absolutist theory, the provinces -under their governors or viceroys were practically as -independent as states of the American union in the early -nineteenth century.</p> - -<p class="center">PROVINCIAL AND URBAN GOVERNMENT</p> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 400px;"> -<a href="images/i_098fp-large.jpg"><img src="images/i_098fp.jpg" width="400" height="529" alt="Provincial and Urban Government" /></a> -</div> - -<p class="center">* optional<span style="margin-left: 5em;">† legal, not administrative, entity</span></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_99" id="Page_99">[Pg 99]</a></span></p> - -<p>With the advent of war, the position of the provinces -has become more precarious, truly new political devices -in the form of novel regional governments have -appeared, and the concrete problems of reform in the -village communities have become as imperative as -military measures.</p> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">The Provinces</span></h3> - -<p>The war-lord period was ushered in by the death of -Yüan Shih-k'ai, dictator-President and commander-in-chief, -in 1916. He had inherited a tradition of dual -government—civil and military—no less sharp than the -Japanese distinction, and had continued it by placing -his military henchmen in power as provincial satraps. -After his death, each province had a military governor -(<i>Tuchün</i>), who sometimes tolerated a civil governor -(<i>Shêng-chang</i>) and sometimes held both posts concurrently. -The various <i>tuchün</i> rivalled one another in a -vain turmoil until the rise of the National Government -suppressed or incorporated them. Even today some of -these men hold remnants of their power, but it is still -declining. The power of the National Government has -increased almost every year for over fifteen years, and -its programs, bequeathed by Sun Yat-sen, call for the -constant diminution of provincial authority, until in -the end the province shall be little more than a postal -link between the central government and the districts -(<i>hsien</i>).</p> - -<p>Continued vitality of the provinces as a form of political -life is shown by the chariness with which the government -approaches the problem of re-subdividing the nation, -by the continued effect of provincialism through -the influence of geography, botany, ecology, economics<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_100" id="Page_100">[Pg 100]</a></span> -and spoken language, and by the manifest utility of the -provinces in the prosecution of the war. It is impossible -to discuss any aspect of Chinese affairs for very long -without entering into distinctions between provinces.</p> - -<p>In mild, modified, and controlled form, the pattern -of civil-military contrast in provincial government still -prevails. The civil governor, now in almost all cases -the weightier official, is legally termed Chairman of the -Province (<i>Shêng Chu-hsi</i>), but he frequently possesses -a military colleague amiably designated Pacification -Commissioner (<i>Sui-ching Chu-jên</i>).<a name="FNanchor_3_90" id="FNanchor_3_90"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_90" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> The war has eradicated -almost the last vestiges of provincial militarism. -No Chinese army is in a position to make peace with -Japan through the negotiated treason of its commander, -although small groups occasionally change sides both -ways.<a name="FNanchor_4_91" id="FNanchor_4_91"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_91" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> On the other side of the picture, it is not altogether -certain how far the National Government could -go in replacing local leaders; more has been done than -ever before, but the Generalissimo has tried to work<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_101" id="Page_101">[Pg 101]</a></span> -honestly with all leaders, provincial or independent, -subsuming their power under his and the Government's -without destroying it. Four provinces still show -traces of autonomy.</p> - -<p>Largest of the four is Sinkiang (Chinese Central -Asia), under the military leader Shêng Shih-ts'ai; it is -subject to very strong Soviet influence, since it is more -accessible from the Soviet side of the border, via the -Turksib Railroad, than from China. Its trade naturally -flows out through the Soviet Union. The provincial -authorities have been harsh toward Christian work, and -casually cruel to occasional travellers. Since the National -Government is exceedingly anxious to maintain -good relations with the Soviet Union, and obtains much -of its supplies from that country across Sinkiang province, -it has made no attempt to interfere. The province -has cooperated enthusiastically in war efforts; it is -strange to see Central Asiatics with European features -marching with Chinese troops. Many of the independent -Leftist leaders have been welcomed in the area, although -simon-pure Marxians are rare, and the province, -with a new university, new air bases, new industries, and -a trans-Asia highway, is undergoing rather spectacular -development. The British and the Soviets are mutually -so suspicious that the Chinese are likely to keep -control, but the Chinese central government, taking no -chances, cooperates rather than commands.</p> - -<p>Yünnan, under General Lung Yün, is the second -province with special features. Relatively isolated from -the rest of China until the completion of the Kunming-Chungking -stretch of the Burma Road, it has never -been occupied by large National Government forces. -The provincial chairman submitting in form and cooperating -in fact has been left unmolested in his position. -The province is becoming modernized by a great -deal of commerce and development; it is likely that this -vestigial autonomy will fade away unnoticed.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_102" id="Page_102">[Pg 102]</a></span></p> - -<p>Kwangsi province possesses as leader General Pai -Chung-hsi, one of the ablest military men in China. A -Kuomintang leader of long standing, he followed, in -conjunction with the leaders in Kwangtung (Canton), -a policy of <i>de facto</i> autonomy down to the very outbreak -of war. He and his associates even had an independent -air force, which was promptly merged into the National -air service. During the war, he has fought in central -China. The economic ruin of Kwangtung and the occupation -of Canton city by the Japanese has quenched -Cantonese autonomy, but Kwangsi has been relatively -untouched. No whisper of suspicion has imputed separatism -to General Pai, but should he desire it, he is one -of the few men left in China still to have the means.</p> - -<p>In Fukien province, General Ch'ên I serves as Chairman. -He studied in Japan and has a Japanese wife. He -remains loyal to the National Government, and he has -fought the Japanese along the coast. No Chinese observer -has criticized him, but Westerners have observed -that Fukien is remarkably quiet; the Japanese have done -little beyond blockading the coast and seizing the major -ports, and the Chinese have launched no counter-attacks. -It is possible that some unexpressed sense of understanding -between the Governor and the Japanese prevents -further conflict, while the Generalissimo—content -to leave well enough alone—lets matters stand as they -are.</p> - -<p>Provincial government, as outlined in the chart at -p. 98, is very simple in structure. The Commission -plan, similar in many respects to the Galveston plan in -American municipal government, reduces the Provincial -Chairman to the status of <i>primus inter pares</i>. The departments -of the provincial government are headed by -members of the province's committee. The presence of -provincial offices of the Kuomintang, military services, -and war agencies makes a provincial capital a place more -important than it seems in theory. A valuable innovation<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_103" id="Page_103">[Pg 103]</a></span> -in provincial administration has been the inauguration -of the Provincial People's Political Councils (<i>Shêng -Ts'an-chêng Hui</i>). These are being taken seriously by -the administrations. Although they occasionally pass -visionary, impracticable, or bombastic resolutions, their -work has for the most part been concrete. They have -aided a great deal in transforming the atmosphere of -government, and act as competent outside critical bodies -to check the administrative officers.</p> - -<p>Provincial government has been significantly transformed -by the war. Dr. T. F. Tsiang (Chiang T'ing-fu), -a distinguished historian who served on a central -inspection commission to the Southwest in 1940, stated<a name="FNanchor_5_92" id="FNanchor_5_92"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_92" class="fnanchor">[5]</a> -that provincial government has improved in two -outstanding ways: first, there is a real desire to understand -the common people, and to do something for -them. This was unheard-of a few years past. Second, -all—or almost all—of the officials work very hard. There -is far more work than there are men. Money is frequently -available but unexpendable because there are -not enough experts to go round. Hence, the provincial -governments find their need is for men rather than -funds, and the war is bringing new levels of actual accomplishment. -Although most of the governors have -military titles, many of these are like Kentucky colonelcies, -courtesy titles from time past. The over-all -effect is of hard work and little bombast.</p> - -<p>Special Municipalities, most of which are now under -Japanese occupation, are directly subject to the National -Government and only incidentally a part of the provinces -in which they are located. Ordinary Municipalities -are under their respective provincial governments, -but not under a <i>hsien</i> (district or county) administration; in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_104" id="Page_104">[Pg 104]</a></span> -some cases they include several former hsien. -The Municipality is headed by a Mayor (<i>Shih-chang</i>), -advised by a City Council (<i>Shih-chêng Hui-i</i>) composed -of the chiefs of the administrative sections, several supplementary -counsellors, and representatives from the -Municipal Advisory Assembly (<i>Shih Ts'an-i-hui</i>), if -one exists. Below the <i>Shih</i> the urban pattern of local -government differs somewhat from the rural, but otherwise -city government displays no features peculiarly -Chinese.</p> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">Local Government</span></h3> - -<p>Chinese local government has been the ever-fertile -soil out of which successive Empires grew. To no other -level of government has the Republic reached so poorly. -Since China is constituted of about half a million villages, -several thousand market towns, and a few hundred -major cities, the bulk of the population is rural, but -rural in a way foreign to the West. Congestion imposes -upon agrarian China many problems and evils known -as urban in the West. Corruption in government, extortion -in economics, demoralization in social and family -life—these start with the village and the <i>hsien</i>. Inconspicuous -in any single village, each evil summed to -its China-wide aggregate becomes tremendous.</p> - -<p>Government has not been beloved by the Chinese -farmer. Governmental benefits—for the continuance of -scholastic culture, the protection of the realm, the creation -of grandiose public works—were remote, but taxes -were not; government meant the taxgatherer. Fêng Yü-hsiang, -one of the great war-lords and now a Kuomintang -general, says of his own childhood:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>The people, except for paying their taxes, had nothing -to do with the government. The government never paid -any attention to the conditions under which the people -lived, and the people never bothered themselves about what -the government was doing. One party collected the taxes; -the other paid them. That was all there was to it. Although Paoting -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_105" id="Page_105">[Pg 105]</a></span>city was only about two <i>li</i> [less than a mile] -away, the inhabitants of Kang-k'ê village showed no interest -in city civilization; instead, they rather looked down -on that sort of thing. No discussions of politics were -heard, and nothing about the encroachments of the foreign -powers on China. All the big changes seemed to have taken -place in another world, and very seldom affected this place.</p> - -<p>When the government was about to collect taxes, the <i>Li -Chêng</i> [a petty local officer] would ring a gong from one -end of the village to the other, shouting:</p> - -<p>"Pay your taxes! Four hundred and sixty coins to the -<i>mou</i> [about one third of an acre] for the first harvest!"</p> - -<p>When the people heard the gong, they did not go and -pay their taxes immediately. They would walk listlessly -to their doorways, only to withdraw after having taken a -nonchalant look at the <i>Li Chêng</i>—as though they had -heard nothing. They would wait until the very last minute, -until they could not put it off any more, and then go, group -by group, to the city to hand in money they had earned by -sweat and blood.</p> - -<p>They were industrious and miserable all through the -year ...<a name="FNanchor_6_93" id="FNanchor_6_93"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_93" class="fnanchor">[6]</a></p></blockquote> - -<p>This basic level of Chinese society is not easily susceptible -to standardization, or the imposition of ready-made -bureaucracies. Even in the United States, it would -be almost impossible to impose a uniform plan for community -organization from Bangor to San Diego and -Walla Walla to the Bronx. Sun Yat-sen once said to -Judge Linebarger, "China is a land of autonomy from -the smallest village upward. Who shall dictate to the -sub-governments of China the form and manner in -which they shall express their local governmental needs? -Of course, we must have a minimum of uniformity for -both economy and efficiency in government, but the -will of the people must be followed."<a name="FNanchor_7_94" id="FNanchor_7_94"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_94" class="fnanchor">[7]</a> By seeking to -remedy political abuses the National Government<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_106" id="Page_106">[Pg 106]</a></span> -apparently hopes that economic inequalities will be ironed -out by the people themselves.</p> - -<p>The Chinese land problem cannot be understood except -at the politico-economic nexus, where low political -morale exposes the farmers to the unrestrained power -of the gentry, acting in the triple capacity of officials, -landlords, and money-lenders. The cycle, familiar in -the West, of freehold farmers or yeomen first mortgaging -their land, then becoming tenants, and finally ending -in utter economic helplessness, has been familiar in -China. In China's past, the cycle had another phase: -agrarian insurrection sweeping the land with banditry -and innumerable rebellions, thereby increasing the fiscal -burden on the remaining land, leading to worse exploitation, -until the slate was swept clean by dynastic -collapse, general civil war, and a new Imperial house, -whose administrative decline began another cycle. The -peasantry never won completely, and never lost utterly. -Today, if one judges by past experience, rebellion or reform -seems long overdue.<a name="FNanchor_8_95" id="FNanchor_8_95"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_95" class="fnanchor">[8]</a></p> - -<p>The detailed legislation adopted by the National -Government in war time is given in <a href="#Page_324">Appendix I (G)</a>, -and Chiang K'ai-shek's own explanation of the new -system in <a href="#Page_388">Appendix III (C)</a>.<a name="FNanchor_9_96" id="FNanchor_9_96"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_96" class="fnanchor">[9]</a> One might explain the -general plan quite simply in terms of inter-connection -between the central government and the millions of -households. The <i>pao-chia</i> system is one of mutual aid -and mutual responsibility between households and -groups of households, under government supervision. -It has appeared in China from time to time since the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_107" id="Page_107">[Pg 107]</a></span> -Ch'in dynasty (221-203 <span class="smcap lowercase">B.C.</span>). If used for welfare purposes, -it amounts to a recognition of the pluralistic -character of Chinese society by the government, and the -happy utilization of the family pattern. Applied for -police purposes, it is well suited to repression and terror. -Thus, today the National Government is applying the -<i>pao-chia</i> system (in relation to its whole scheme of -local government) as a measure of progress and reform, -while the Japanese encourage the same organizations in -occupied China as a device for despotism and exploitation.</p> - -<p>Expressed in law, now being applied in fact, the <i>chia</i> -is a group of six to fifteen families (households), and -the <i>pao</i>, a group of six to fifteen chia. The hsiang is -formally composed of six to fifteen pao; actually it approximates -what is loosely termed a community in the -United States (<i>e.g.</i>, a city ward, a single suburb, part of -a rural election district). The <i>ch'ü</i> is the rough equivalent -of a township. The <i>hsien</i> (district; county) is the -fundamental unit of the traditional China-wide bureaucracy. -Hence the missing steps are not those between -the <i>hsien</i>, near to two thousand in number, and the -central government. The gaps occur between the half-billion -Chinese and their two thousand <i>hsien</i>. The following -chart shows the broad outlines of the system:<a name="FNanchor_10_97" id="FNanchor_10_97"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_97" class="fnanchor">[10]</a></p> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 400px;"> -<img src="images/i_107.jpg" width="400" height="211" alt="Outlines of The System" /> -</div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_108" id="Page_108">[Pg 108]</a></span></p> - -<p>This is the official government plan. If ever put into -complete effect, China will consist of hundreds upon -hundreds of thousands of self-governing units, arranged -on seven levels (the five local levels; provinces; nation), -and the world will wonder at a massive new democracy. -In practical politics, what seems to be happening is that -the system extends to the National Government areas, -involving less than three hundred million people. Much -of the application is purely formal, and signifies no more -than did the grant of an imaginary suffrage under the -first Republic. Elsewhere the new system is installed -with telling administrative effect, improving the bureaucracy, -strengthening the state, but not arousing -much popular participation or enthusiasm. And in the -remainder the program is beginning to work as is intended -with genuine elections and popular participation -in government.</p> - -<p>The three chief devices which have been applied to -the reform of local government are: instruction, mandate, -and other remote controls; inspection systems; and -training courses. First are the attempts to change local -government by transmission from the capital of voluminous -instructions, manuals, etc., supplemented by -similar Kuomintang action for Party reform. In the -second case, central officials go to the provinces. During -the summer of 1940, a number of such groups of officials -divided China between themselves, each group taking -a number of provinces for its inspection zone. The -presence of a central delegation in the field led to some -housecleaning, provided an incentive for immediate -work, and informed the National Government of the -condition of the country. Some junketing was observable, -but not enough to vitiate the work of inspection. -By the third device, local officials are called to training -centers. The Generalissimo is very fond of this method. -He encourages the selection of younger men, who -thereby feel that their careers are given a boost. They<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_109" id="Page_109">[Pg 109]</a></span> -are taught modern governmental practice while living, -in most cases, a disciplined but comfortable half-military -life. Some training conferences are convened <i>ad hoc</i> in -a promising area; others continue from year to year under -the government or related organizations. Many -thousand men and women undergo some form of training. -The program has clearly discernible effects in improving -local government. The selection of persons -who either hold office or are likely to hold office provides -a practical self-interest motivation. Further minor devices -of local government reform include the grants in -aid to the provinces, the establishment of model <i>hsien</i>, -the military eradication of banditry, the reclamation of -farm land and forests, some resettlement, and much -planned modernization with small-scale projects. Town -after town has received the stimuli of modernization -from one of these sources.</p> - -<p>Estimates—nothing more could be found—concerning -the effectiveness of this program varied considerably. -Since two equally skilled observers, considering the -same institution at first hand, can differ sharply in their -value judgments of efficacy or integrity, this is not surprising. -A few Westerners and Leftists have insisted that -the program was almost altogether sham. A few formal, -optimistic officials have insisted that it has succeeded -almost everywhere. One competent foreign observer -told the author that he believed the <i>pao-chia</i> system to -be installed in 90 per cent of Free China, and to be -actually working in 50 per cent. Another agreed more -or less with these figures, but suggested that there were -enormous differences between the provinces, some being -genuinely transformed and others remaining unaffected. -A Chinese official, himself a social scientist, -who had been intimately connected with local reform, -stated that 50 per cent application for all Free China -would be much too high an estimate, except for the -holding of token elections. Only in Kwangsi province<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_110" id="Page_110">[Pg 110]</a></span> -was the new self-government structure working over -half of the countryside; elsewhere, the ratio was about -one-fifth effective as against four-fifths nominal.</p> - -<p>Most of all, genuine application consists in making -institutions available, and thereupon letting the people -help themselves. If local government is of practical use -to the common people, they can be counted on to discover -its utility promptly. If it is of no practical use, -they will know that too. Whatever the present degree -of success, obstacles still confront the program. Local -extragovernmental institutions possess enormous vitality. -If superficial or slipshod reforms are made, the new -local governments will be merely operated as screens -for secret societies, landlords' unions, or other narrow -cliques.</p> - -<p>Contrastingly, a tradition of discussion and public -action makes it equally possible that the rural masses, -familiar with cooperative action, will operate the new -institutions successfully. The difference between success -and failure is not to be measured in terms of wholly -new achievement; it is determined by the choice of -existing institutions which, transmuted and fitted, fill -the pattern of the rationalized local government system. -If narrow, class-bound or unprogressive groups assume -the regalia of a novel legality, using their position to -obstruct further development, the program will fail. -If the town-meeting, cooperative potentialities of the -entire adult population are aroused, and if the ordinary -farmer or coolie can see that he has the opportunity of -bettering his livelihood through political action, the -success of democracy will be assured.</p> - -<p>Potentialities in the field of local autonomy are enhanced -by the fact that the National Government has -competitors. The Japanese have an opportunity which, -instead of utilizing, they have done their best to destroy: -conquest through prosperity. If they and their Chinese -associates offered low prices, easy marketing, and fair<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_111" id="Page_111">[Pg 111]</a></span> -taxes, in the place of arson, rape, thievery and bluster, -their failure would become less certain. As a third side -to the triangle of competitive power, the Communists -and independent Left, while allied to the National -Government, rival it in winning the loyalty of the population. -Huge areas in Communist and guerrilla sections -are sampling reform of a drastic and immediate kind: -the lowering of taxes, the democratization of government, -the abolition of usury. With the traitors on its -Right and the Communists or guerrillas on its Left, the -National Government does not abandon its chief politico-economic -weapon by disregarding land and labor -reform. None of the three parties has anything to gain -by inaction. None has an interest which binds it to self-dooming -reaction.</p> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">The Communist Zone</span></h3> - -<p>Three new governmental areas which are neither -provinces nor local governments have come forth out -of unification and war. Their relationship to Chungking -is strange, perhaps unique. They are not states -members of a federal union, since China is a unitary republic. -They are not new regional commissions, creatures -and extensions of the central government, because—whatever -the theory—they were independently initiated. -They are not allies, because they profess national -unity. They are not rebellions, because they fight -a common enemy, only occasionally coming into conflict -with government troops. Yet they possess some of -the features of each of the following: federal states, -regional subgovernments, allied states, and rebellions. -They cut across the pattern of the National Government. -Two are governments; one is an army. The -army and one government are largely Communist; the -other government is a genuine United Front of the -parties. Two are North Chinese; one is Central Chinese. -But all three have this in common: they are Leftist,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_112" id="Page_112">[Pg 112]</a></span> -actively revolutionary; they are objects of patronizing -suspicion to the central authorities, who are glad of -the help but worry about its post-war cost.</p> - -<p>The first and most famous of these areas is the Communist -zone in the Northwest. Formally it includes -eighteen <i>hsien</i>; the Communists claim inclusion of twenty-three. -After being termed the Special Administrative -District of the Chinese Republic (<i>Chung-hua Min-kuo -T'ê-ch'ü Chêng-fu</i>), and then Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia -Frontier Area (<i>Shan-kan-ning Pien-ch'ü Chêng-fu</i>), the -zone assumed the much more modest style of Administrative -Area of North Shensi (<i>Shan-pei Hsing-chêng-ch'ü</i>).<a name="FNanchor_11_98" id="FNanchor_11_98"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_98" class="fnanchor">[11]</a> -This Frontier Area is in personnel and Party -life a direct continuation of the Chinese Soviet Republic. -Leftist and Communist circles talk as though it -were a wholly autonomous state, resting on its own -military power, but cooperating with the National Government -for national resistance and reconstruction. -This is largely true—at any rate, more realistic than the -opposing view, which avers that no change has taken -place in the Northern part of Shensi province, and that -the Communists are interfering with the proper processes -of government. The following is a characteristic -statement of the latter position:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>At present the name "Frontier Area" seems to be very -common because it is so called in false propaganda about -the "independent sovereignty" [<i>tzŭ-li wei-wang</i>]. But if -we agree that the so-called "Frontier Area" is a part of -the territory of the Chinese Republic, the name ought to -have been issued in conformity with the decrees of the -central government. According to central government decree, -it is only a "Supplementary Recruitment Area for the -Eighth Route Army," but not an area of civil administration. -[The author, in an extended discussion, challenges -the re-division of the provinces as a matter not to be undertaken -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_113" id="Page_113">[Pg 113]</a></span>casually, denies the legal foundation of the term -"Frontier Area," and then examines its practical justifications. -He finds that the Communists have two: the regime -is now a <i>de facto</i> system, its existence is a <i>fait accompli</i> and -further discussion must proceed from this point; also, the -regime is founded in popular opinion, and the government -should not violate the wishes of the people. He disagrees -with both of these and seeks to refute them, insisting on -lawful procedure and constitutional government. He concludes -with a peroration to the Communists themselves.] ... this -problem is really quite simple, unlike the Sudeten -problem. Was it the Communist Party of China which -called the Sudeten Party of Czechoslovakia violators of the -unity of their own country and running dogs of Fascism? -Therefore, I think that they would never imitate what the -reactionary Sudeten party did. And was it the Communists -who originated the "United Front"? Hence they must understand -very clearly what unification means to China, and -must never utter things which they do not really believe. -Therefore, with the rising tide of national unity and -concentration, I suppose that the odd name "Frontier -Area," which is contrary to the real sense of unification, will -soon pass away and be a mere historical term.<a name="FNanchor_12_99" id="FNanchor_12_99"></a><a href="#Footnote_12_99" class="fnanchor">[12]</a></p></blockquote> - -<p>In practical terms this implies the informal reconciliation -of two claims constitutionally and legally incompatible. -The Chinese Communist leaders operate -under the national law codes as much as they are able. -They employ the national currency. They use the -nationally standard system for local government. They -profess unity. At the same time they maintain, as a -hard reality, a separate regime in which the Communist -Party is supreme, the Party Line is gospel, and dissidents -are dealt with as "pro-Japanese traitors" or otherwise. -Transit between National Government territory -and Communist territory is not altogether easy. Leftists -are reported to have died on their way to the Northwest, -and Nationalists are equally well reported to have -disappeared after they got there.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_114" id="Page_114">[Pg 114]</a></span></p> -<p>The Area itself is an unpromising piece of land. -"From 36° N. Lat. on up, South of the Great Wall and -West of the Yellow River, there lies a vast, desolate -tract of yellow plateau, inhabited by half a million people. -The plateau slopes from North to South; the further -South it runs, the lower the land lies, but it is still -1000 meters above sea-level at the lowest place. This is -what we have already known as Northern Shensi. In this -region, the ground is always covered with a layer of -yellow dust ... Furthermore, rainfall is scarce and no -irrigation has been introduced, so that agricultural -products are extremely scant. Under such geographical -limitations, Northern Shensi has become a region notorious -for its poverty."<a name="FNanchor_13_100" id="FNanchor_13_100"></a><a href="#Footnote_13_100" class="fnanchor">[13]</a> For a Chinese to call an area -notoriously poor implies a degree of destitution which -the American mind cannot grasp. In such an area, the -welcome to Communism is obvious, and the problems -of Communism, once settled, are equally obvious. The -probability of mineral resources opens up opportunities -for development under Red rule, but these are distant.</p> - -<p>Interpretation of the achievements of the Communist -regime vary with the political standpoint of the observer, -just as they do in the case of the Soviet Union. Sympathetic -observers, both Western and Chinese, report -enormous improvements in agriculture, fair land taxes, -new cooperatives, brilliant experimental democracy, -bold education, and great enthusiasm.<a name="FNanchor_14_101" id="FNanchor_14_101"></a><a href="#Footnote_14_101" class="fnanchor">[14]</a> No<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_115" id="Page_115">[Pg 115]</a></span> -unsympathetic Western visitors have been reported admitted, -and a few neutrals came away enthusiastic; but critical -Chinese have found as much to question as one might -find in a similar Western situation: terrorism, puppet -elections, murder both judicial and plain, sham education, -and immorality are charged.</p> - -<p>The position of the Frontier Area is clear in a few -respects.<a name="FNanchor_15_102" id="FNanchor_15_102"></a><a href="#Footnote_15_102" class="fnanchor">[15]</a> In the first place, it is not declining. Communist -strength is believed to be growing, by persons -of almost all forms of political belief; differences arise -only over the rate and probable maxima of that growth. -The Communist strength in the Northwest is far less -than it was in South Central China seven years ago, but -much of that loss of power has been compensated for -by increased relations with sympathetic guerrillas. Secondly, -the Communist area is strategically poorly located. -The land itself is poor; the adjacent large cities -are completely under Nationalist control; and the general -military-political locale is something like northern -Arkansas in the United States. This explains the willingness -of the Nationalist commanders to avoid friction -with the Communists, and the positive zest with which -they suggest further consolidation of Communist forces -around the one center at Yenan. It soothes the impatience -of Communists who wish unrestricted rights<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_116" id="Page_116">[Pg 116]</a></span> -of agitation, organization, and propaganda throughout -the country. Although the Communists make little -visible headway against the Japanese in the great urban -slums of the coast, they are anxious to obtain freer access -to city workers. Thirdly, the Communist area displays -no structural peculiarities of government. Its profound -difference from the rest of Free China is not a -difference in institutional forms, but in the forces operating -behind and through those forms. The Chinese -Communists have achieved very considerable success in -working within the legal limits of another state philosophy, -and have done it with a minimum of violence; -this augurs well for the perpetual continuation of the -truce. Their practical accomplishments are extensive -and novel; their leadership, brilliant; that their government -should be so orthodox in form is all the more -significant. By remaining within orthodox limits they -challenge the National Government on common -ground; the gain is theirs and China's.</p> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">Guerrilla Governments</span></h3> - -<p>The special area second in importance is the Hopei-Chahar-Shansi -Border Region (<i>Chin-ch'a-chi Pien-ch'ü -Lin-shih Hsing-chêng Wei-yüan-hui</i>). Widely publicized -in the Western world as the Hermit Government, -this regime functions altogether within the Japanese -lines. A number of competent Western observers have -visited this area, among them Major Evans Fordyce Carlson, -Mr. Haldore Hanson, and Professor George Taylor. -All have come away most enthusiastic about the work -of the government. The governmental picture which -emerges from their and other accounts is one of a -highly flexible mechanism, working with great efficacy -and superb morale.<a name="FNanchor_16_103" id="FNanchor_16_103"></a><a href="#Footnote_16_103" class="fnanchor">[16]</a> The driving power behind the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_117" id="Page_117">[Pg 117]</a></span> -regime is social revolution as a means to national resistance, -made easy by the flight of many former local -bureaucrats, and by the treason of some ultra-conservatives, -who affiliated themselves with the Provisional -Government established by the Japanese in Peiping. -The personnel is as genuinely United Front as may be -found anywhere in the world; the position is eased by -the circumjacency of the Japanese, and the formal recognition -of the area by the Military Affairs Commission -and the Executive <i>Yüan</i>.</p> - -<p>The Border Region, like smaller guerrilla areas elsewhere -in occupied China, is scarcely a domestic political -problem because it is enfolded by the Japanese armies. -Even a United Front area, such as the Border Region, -would lead to far greater difficulties in political adjustment -if established in Free China. The tension and -balance between the Parties is such that this strain might -not be borne. Behind the Japanese lines, where the -central armies cannot do anything even if they wish, -the Border Region finds Chungking's acquiescence to -be stimulated by Chungking's impotence. What could -or will happen if the Japanese leave the dividing area, -and the Border Region has to settle the issue of <i>status -quo</i> v. <i>status quo ante bellum</i> with the central -govern<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_118" id="Page_118">[Pg 118]</a></span>ment, no one knows. The Generalissimo told the present -author that he did not fear the encroachments of -the guerrilla groups, because he and they were all working -for democracy.</p> - -<p>Following from this involuntarily protective and insulating -role of the Japanese forces is the constitutional -theory of the Border Region. Unlike the Frontier -Area, where it is exceedingly difficult to gloss over the -autonomy of Communist rule, the Border Region is -definitely established as a war-time agency, controlling -territory beyond the reach of the provincial governments. -The provincial governments still function, in -unoccupied corners of their provinces, or in exile, and -the openly provisional (<i>lin-shih</i>) nature of the Border -Region makes it palatable even to Kuomintang conservatives.</p> - -<p>The pattern of government is one of devolution from -an Executive Committee, which was established by a -meeting of officials, volunteers, mass organizations, and -others at Fup'ing in January 1938. The area is divided -into provincial districts which are able to function with -economy of personnel. The following outline illustrates -the structure of this area:<a name="FNanchor_17_104" id="FNanchor_17_104"></a><a href="#Footnote_17_104" class="fnanchor">[17]</a></p> - -<p class="center">EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE</p> - -<p class="center">Secretariat<br /> -Civil Affairs Department<br /> -Financial Affairs Department<br /> -Education Department<br /> -Industry Department<br /> -Justice Department</p> - -<p class="center">Inspectorates of the Seven Provincial Districts</p> - -<p class="center"><i>Hsien</i> Governments or Joint <i>Hsien</i> Governments or -Sub-<i>Hsien</i> Governments</p> - -<p class="center"><i>Hsien</i> Districts</p> - -<p class="center">Village Committees</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_119" id="Page_119">[Pg 119]</a></span></p> - -<p>A very high degree of direct popular government has -been achieved. Over wide areas, the average age of the -<i>hsien</i> magistrates is in the twenties. Recruitment to the -Region of numerous professors and students from Peiping -has helped to fill the need for trained personnel, -and has assisted in maintaining the area as a genuine -multi-group affair rather than a Communist front. -Communists, although present and highly esteemed, do -not hold the highest formal offices. (For further consideration -of the United Front problem, see below, -p. <a href="#Page_123">123</a>.)</p> - -<p>The New Fourth Army (<i>Hsin-ssŭ-chün</i>), third of -the special zones, was formed by re-consolidation of the -small mutually isolated Soviet areas left behind when -the main Communist forces made the celebrated Long -March. When first assembling under the truce, these -Red units faced a certain amount of difficulty from -the provincial military who did not grasp the United -Front idea, but the Military Affairs Commission recognized -them. The Army did not establish a government -except through its Political Department, which -coordinated political work of the volunteer village -committees.<a name="FNanchor_18_105" id="FNanchor_18_105"></a><a href="#Footnote_18_105" class="fnanchor">[18]</a></p> - -<p>According to available reports, the Army stands far -to the Left of the Border Region. Formally United -Front, its proportion of Communists is much higher -and Communist control more telling. Operating in East -Central China—the Anhwei-Kiangsu-Kiangsi-Fukien-Chekiang -area—which provided the base of ten years'<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_120" id="Page_120">[Pg 120]</a></span> -Communist insurrection and was long the home of the -Chinese Soviet Republic, the New Fourth Army Zone -represents a recrudescence of Soviet activities under -different names and with a different military objective. -This fact has caused intense dissatisfaction among some -Kuomintang generals, who spent half their careers trying -to root out Communism in that same area. They do -not mind the Communist zone in the Northwest, where -an effective informal <i>cordon sanitaire</i> can be drawn, -but renewed Communist activity in the Yangtze valley -impresses them as an evil not much less than pro-Japanese -treason.</p> - -<p>The New Fourth Zone, the Border Region, and the -Frontier Area—together with a wide scattering of guerrilla -areas and governments individually of less but -collectively of equal importance—are the military step-children -of the Chinese government. They all receive -subsidies for their work, varying in amount. Usually -this is calculated on the number of <i>hsien</i> actually occupied -as bases, so that the sum provides for a far smaller -number of villages than those directly affected. In the -case of troops, the salary allowances are based on the -permitted size of the units, in almost all cases below the -actual numbers. The money is paid to the commanders -or other leading officials, who then set salary rates incomparably -lower than those of the central forces. The -money thus saved is applied to the general budget of -the forces. Corruption, while occasional and inescapable, -seems to be more sharply punished in the guerrilla -than in the government areas.</p> - -<p>In January 1941, the New Fourth Army was officially -abolished, following a clash with regular National -Government forces. The clash arose from a fundamental -difference between the Generalissimo and the -New Fourth leaders concerning the nature of the Chinese -government. The Communists and their sympathizers -held that the unity of China was a political<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_121" id="Page_121">[Pg 121]</a></span> -union between separate groups. When the Generalissimo -ordered the New Fourth Army to move North, and -oppose the Japanese forces above the Yangtze, the New -Fourth countered with a demand for arms and funds. -Treating this as military insubordination in war time, -the central forces attacked the New Fourth—each side -claiming that the other opened hostilities—capturing -Yeh Ting, the commander. The rest of the Army was -officially abolished, although its main forces were within -the occupied zone and outside the Generalissimo's -reach. A full Communist-Nationalist clash was avoided, -however, and the Red leaders unwillingly acquiesced in -the Generalissimo's interpretation of the episode as a -military and not a political affair. The conflict brought -forth the fundamental Communist question: are the -Chinese Communists loyal first to the Chinese government, -or first to the Communist Party? No answer -was forthcoming, although the Communists failed to -rebel elsewhere. The Generalissimo, by military swiftness -and political acumen, had triumphed in one more -particular instance.</p> - -<p>With the parsimonious policy of the central government -keeping them in fiscal extremity, the more Leftist -guerrilla units make up their lack of funds with direct -economic measures. These include suspensions of rents -to landlords, regulation of share-cropping, lowering of -taxes on the poorer farmers, and creation of cooperatives. -The Communists have strained every point to -avoid actual class war, and the economic reforms of -the guerrilla and special areas are smoothed by the -usual absence of the landlords. The political necessity -of a bold economic policy remains important, if the -special areas are to continue their activity against Japan -or—in the Frontier Area case—their independence. Political -development thus is inclined to stress the use of -popular machinery of government, not for the creation -of systematic, modern, responsible bureaucracy, but for<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_122" id="Page_122">[Pg 122]</a></span> -pushing vigorous mass action, direct popular government, -and socio-economic reconstruction, revolutionary -by implication if not by immediate content.</p> - -<p>Not all the guerrilla areas fall into the Left pattern. -The Kuomintang, so long habituated to control of the -state mechanism that its revolutionary background is -somewhat dimmed, is bringing Kuomintang guerrilla -work into action. The Party and Government War -Area Commission is the chief supervisory agency for -this work, and an enormous amount of planning has -been done. Actual application of mass-movement work -seems as yet to lag behind that of the Left. Meanwhile, -in most areas except the Communist Northwest, Kuomintang -officers, officials, teachers, and volunteers are -active. The guerrilla groups all accept the same flag, -hail Chiang as their leader, recognize the <i>San Min Chu I</i> -as the state ideology, and maintain the cherished symbols -of unity.</p> - -<p>The Government and the Kuomintang were reportedly -seeking a settlement of the whole special-area -problem, in anticipation of the close of war, by urging -the movement of all Communist or Communist-infiltrated -forces Northward, so that a more or less continuous -Left corridor would run from the Border Region -to the Frontier Area. This precipitated the clash -with the New Fourth Army; in March 1941 no settlement -has been reached. Part of this is owing to the -Communist desire to have unrestricted agitational -rights, and to official Kuomintang insistence that no -Party other than itself is constitutionally legitimate. -The special areas meanwhile prepare fighters in the -anti-Japanese war, and are helped by a government -which is proud of them as Chinese but mistrustful of -them as Leftists. And they develop vigorous applications -of democratic formulae which challenge the reality -and sincerity of everything the National Government -does behind the lines.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_123" id="Page_123">[Pg 123]</a></span></p> -<p>Despite recurrent clashes, it is likely that the areas -and the government will continue their present relations. -In part this is owing to the genuineness of the -universal hatred of Japan and the devotion to the long-cherished -unification now achieved; in even greater -part the wrangling, acrimonious, but effective cooperation -of the government and the guerrilla Left depends -on their equal and great desire for such cooperation. -The highest Kuomintang leaders—above all others, -Chiang—have pledged themselves to unity and cooperation, -and are determined to eschew civil war in the -midst of invasion; the higher Communist leaders are -equally determined. In three years of collaboration, -the highest officers on each side have developed very -genuine respect for each other's sincerity. Quarrels are -provoked by the men in-between, overbearing Nationalists -or the doctrinaire Communists, who cannot forget -1927-37. (The author talked to one Communist leader -who had an odd, not unattractive muscular tic in his -face: the consequence of Kuomintang torture a few -years past. Yet he collaborates, and so do his Kuomintang -equivalents, men whose parents lie in unknown -graves.) The common people on both sides want peace -above all else, internal peace between factions, and -peace—after victory, and then only—with Japan. The -juxtaposed and competitive forces watch one another, -compete in the development of institutions, and engage -in an auction of good government: whoever wins -the deepest love and esteem of the Chinese people -wins China in the end. Few institutional reforms in -the West have had such fateful stimuli.</p> - - -<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_88" id="Footnote_1_88"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_88"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> For an excellent definition of Free China, see Quigley, Harold S., -"Free China," cited, p. 133-35. The most readable geography of -China is Cressey, George B., <i>China's Geographic Foundations</i>, New -York, 1934.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_89" id="Footnote_2_89"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_89"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> For further development of this problem, see below, p. <a href="#Page_185">185</a>. The -present author considered this question in relation to the Chinese -political heritage, in <i>Government in Republican China</i>, cited, p. 2-12, -69-74, 188-89. Professor George Taylor, in <i>The Struggle for North -China</i>, cited, relates this problem to the broad issues of world discussion, -in a most acute analysis of "The Problem of China," p. 8-16, -and gives a clear answer to the questions thus posed, p. 197-201.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_90" id="Footnote_3_90"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_90"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> Tsang, O. B., <i>A Supplement to a Complete Chinese-English Dictionary</i>, -Shanghai, 1937, p. 267. The older, standard dictionaries do -not include the term. Lieutenant H. S. Aldrich, in his <i>Hua Yu Hsü -Chih: Practical Chinese</i>, Peiping, 1934, gives <i>Sui-ching Ssŭ-ling</i> as -Pacification Commissioner (Vol. II, p. 74).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_91" id="Footnote_4_91"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_91"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> An apt, grisly story is reported in the semi-official English-language -journal of the Nanking regime. The "Peace Movement" is, of course, -the Japanophile movement of Mr. Wang Ch'ing-wei. This is the way -it was given in <i>The People's Tribune</i>, Vol. XXIX, Nos. 7-10 (October-November -1940), p. 305: -</p> -<p> -"In response to President Wang Ch'ing-Wei's peace appeal to the -nation, Mr. Tan Shih-Chang, member of the Chungking Air Force, -flew to Hankow by his own plane on June 10 to join the Peace Movement. -Upon his arrival in Nanking, Mr. Tan was warmly received by -the re-organized National Government. Later, he was sent to Macao -on an important mission, but upon his arrival there, he was instantly -killed by desperadoes in the employ of the Chungking regime. -</p> -<p> -"It is learned that the plane he left in Hankow has now been repaired -by the Japanese Air Force and brought to the Capital. Following -its arrival, the plane was immediately handed over to the Military -Commission by the Japanese military authorities." -</p> -<p> -(This would need further corroboration before it could definitely -be accepted.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_5_92" id="Footnote_5_92"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_92"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> In an interview with the author, Chungking, July 31, 1940; the -interview was unfortunately terminated by the raid alarm. It might -be noted at this point that proposals for the reinstitution of strong -provincial executives have been postponed from year to year since -1932. See <i>The China Year Book 1939</i>, cited, p. 217 n.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_6_93" id="Footnote_6_93"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_93"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> Fêng Yü-hsiang, <i>Wo-ti Shêng-huo</i> (My Life), Kweilin, 1940, -p. 22.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_7_94" id="Footnote_7_94"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_94"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> As reported by Paul M. W. Linebarger in his <i>Conversations with -Sun Yat-sen</i> [as yet unpublished; in the author's possession]. Book -II, Chapter V.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_8_95" id="Footnote_8_95"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_95"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> The author has sought to trace the political and military aspects -of this cycle in <i>Government in Republican China</i>, cited. There are -numerous works on the subject from the economists' point of view. -Outstanding are the books by John Lossing Buck, R. H. Tawney, -J. B. Condliffe, Karl Wittfogel, Ch'en Han-seng, and the articles -by Norman Hanwell (chiefly in <i>Asia</i>, <i>Amerasia</i>, and <i>The Far Eastern -Survey</i>).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_9_96" id="Footnote_9_96"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_96"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> Below, p. 324, and p. 388.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_10_97" id="Footnote_10_97"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_97"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> A detailed chart will be found in Appendix III (C), at p. <a href="#Page_253">388</a>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_11_98" id="Footnote_11_98"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_98"><span class="label">[11]</span></a> See above, p. <a href="#Page_13">13</a>. The last term is literally Executive Area (or -District) of North Shan (Shensi). In the text, Frontier Area is used -throughout as the simplest English equivalent.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_12_99" id="Footnote_12_99"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_99"><span class="label">[12]</span></a> Chin Chi-yin, 'Pien-ch'ü' ti Ming-ch'êng' (The Name "Frontier -Area"), in <i>So-wei "Pien-ch'ü</i>," cited above, p. 3-6.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_13_100" id="Footnote_13_100"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13_100"><span class="label">[13]</span></a> Ts'ui Yün-ch'ang, <i>Shan-pei Lun Kuo-hua</i> (A Brief Sketch of -Northern Shensi), Kweilin, 1939, p. 4-5. This author concludes that -Communist rule worsened the economic status of the area. "Then -there occurred the campaigns for 'the extermination of landlordism' -and for 'division of the lands.' The result of such proletarian disturbances -was an astonishing decrease of population, caused by massacre -and emigration, and the devastation of much land." (p. 6.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_14_101" id="Footnote_14_101"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14_101"><span class="label">[14]</span></a> See the works cited above, p. <a href="#Page_20">20</a>, n. 16. It is possible to find -a contradictory interpretation in Chinese sources for almost every point -cited by Western visitors as meritorious. Since the Nationalists are -not interested in promoting the international reputation of the -Frontier Area, and at the same time are unable to launch any counter-propaganda -(for fear of alienating Leftist sentiment in the West, because -it would give the Japanese a propaganda advantage, and would -disturb the appearance of the United Front), very little criticism—sound -or otherwise—of the Chinese Communist area has appeared in -the West. Even in a case such as the issuance of paper money, universally -regarded as a clever move by the Communists and guerrillas, -Chinese writers have charged that the issuance is fiat currency imposed -by Communist force (e.g., Wang Ssü-ch'êng, <i>Ju-tz'ŭ Pien-ch'ü</i> -[So this is the Frontier Area!] Chungking, 1938, p. 38 <i>ff.</i>) Within -China, Communism is just as open to interpretation as the Soviets are -in the Western world. Western data now available seems to cover -only one side of the case, which is doubtless well-founded; but there -must be another. There always is.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_15_102" id="Footnote_15_102"></a><a href="#FNanchor_15_102"><span class="label">[15]</span></a> Since the author has neither extensive acquaintance with Chinese -Communists, nor has visited Yenan, he offers these conclusions -more tentatively than he would others, concerning the Kuomintang.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_16_103" id="Footnote_16_103"></a><a href="#FNanchor_16_103"><span class="label">[16]</span></a> Professor George Taylor's <i>The Struggle for North China</i> presents -a full and clear picture of the Border Region and the Peiping -regime in startlingly apposite juxtaposition. He concludes by pointing -out the significant paradox that the Japanese established a reactionary -regime designed to keep China agrarian, backward, and exploitable, -but that they had not managed to extend their affiliate beyond the -cities. The country, which they had hoped to capture, escaped them -through the political resurgence of the Border Region. P. C. Nyi, -article cited above, p. <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, n. 10, presents an outline of the regime -which supplements the first-hand materials Professor Taylor appends -to his work. Major E. F. Carlson's works, which describe this, -are <i>Twin Stars of China</i> and <i>The Chinese Army</i>, both cited above; -the latter, a valuable contribution to the <i>Inquiry Series</i> of the Institute -of Pacific Relations, includes Wang Yu-chuan, "The Organization -of a Typical Guerrilla Area in South Shantung" (p. 84-130), a -brilliant survey which reveals, sometimes unwittingly, the values and -dangers of a Communist-Nationalist-popular union. Mr. Hanson's -work is "<i>Humane Endeavour</i>," cited above; as a personal account, it -is the most engrossing of the group.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_17_104" id="Footnote_17_104"></a><a href="#FNanchor_17_104"><span class="label">[17]</span></a> P. C. Nyi, article cited in <i>The Chinese Year Book 1938-39</i>, p. 255. -Reading between the lines will illustrate much of the Chungking attitude.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_18_105" id="Footnote_18_105"></a><a href="#FNanchor_18_105"><span class="label">[18]</span></a> On the New Fourth Army, see Epstein, I., <i>The People's War</i>, -cited above, p. 260 <i>ff.</i> Agnes Smedley, the well-known pro-Communist -writer, has lived among the New Fourth recently. Another foreign -visitor has been Jack Belton, of the Shanghai <i>Evening Post</i>. Publicity -for the New Fourth Army, reduced to an absolute minimum by -Chungking, is handled by an independent agency, the New China -Information Committee (not to be confused with the semi-official -China Information Committee) in Hong Kong. The China Defense -League, in which the moving spirit is Mme. Sun Yat-sen, also in Hong -Kong, acts as an agency for receiving gifts, etc., for the Army.</p></div></div> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_124" id="Page_124">[Pg 124]</a></span></p> - - -<h2><span class="smcap">Chapter V</span><br /> - -THE KUOMINTANG</h2> - - -<p>The Kuomintang, a Chinese political party, was -formed by federation of old anti-Manchu secret societies, -and has become the vehicle for the will of its -Leader, Sun Yat-sen: constitutionally and legally it is -the superior of the Chinese National Government; administratively, -one of the three chief organs of policy -execution for the regime; politically, the only legal -political party in Free China. It has had undisputed -primacy, but not monopoly, in domestic Chinese politics -for fourteen years. Despite revolutionary purposes, and -idealistic obligations, the Kuomintang is responsible for -the welfare of the government which it created. Its interest -is therefore superior to and identical with the -government's; the party of a one-party state has no business -criticizing the government, since the party at all -times possesses the means of correction or change.</p> - -<p>By its constitution and organization the Party is -democratic. In practice it has been a loose oligarchy, -similar to the machinery whereby American presidential -candidates are nominated. In composition it is by its -own statement a cross section of China, composed of -persons who qualify as a political elite by their zeal -in seeking and obtaining entrance to the Party. Administratively, -the Kuomintang possesses a group of -Ministries (<i>pu</i>), closely similar to the governmental -ministries, and executing quasi-governmental policy, -plus an additional group of separate or affiliated organizations -having common purposes. In power politics, -the Kuomintang claims supremacy in all unoccupied<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_125" id="Page_125">[Pg 125]</a></span> -China and legitimate power over the occupied areas; in -practice it yields frequently to the demands of dissidents. -In function, its highest purpose—bequeathed by Sun -Yat-sen—is to destroy its own monopoly of power when -the time for democracy shall come; like medicine, it is -committed to the eradication of the reason for its own -existence.</p> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">The Party Constitutional System</span></h3> - -<p>The Kuomintang adopted a Party-Constitution after -thirty-odd years of activity when, at the suggestion of -Soviet advisers, it reorganized on January 28, 1924 -as a formal party, with membership books, regular dues, -etc. Up to then it had operated through techniques -intermediate in formality between American major-party -looseness and Chinese secret-society formality. In -twelve chapters, the Constitution dealt with Membership, -Organization, Special Areas, the Leader (Sun -Yat-sen, <i>Tsung-li</i>), the Highest Party Organs, Provincial -Party Organization, <i>Hsien</i> Organization, District -(<i>ch'ü</i>) Organization, and Sub-district (<i>ch'ü-fên</i>, -roughly equivalent to the <i>pao</i> in local government) -Organization, Terms of Office, Discipline, and Finance.<a name="FNanchor_1_106" id="FNanchor_1_106"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_106" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> -The actual application of this Constitution is best described -in the words of Wang Shih-chieh, who wrote -before the current hostilities:<a name="FNanchor_2_107" id="FNanchor_2_107"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_107" class="fnanchor">[2]</a></p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>The system of organization of the Chinese Kuomintang -is based upon the <i>Constitution and Bye-laws of the Chinese -Kuomintang</i> [<i>Chung-kuo Kuo-min-tang Hsien-chang</i>] which -was passed in the First Party Congress [<i>Ch'üan-kuo Tai-piao -Ta-hui</i>] on January 28, Year XIII [1924], and amended in -the following two Party Congresses on January 16, Year -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_126" id="Page_126">[Pg 126]</a></span>XV [1926] and on March 27, Year XVIII [1929]. No amendment -of any sort was made in the Fourth and Fifth Party -Congresses held in the Years XX [1931] and XXIV [1935] respectively.</p> - -<p>According to the above <i>Constitution and Bye-Laws</i>, the -Kuomintang has five divisional organizations, <i>viz.</i>: one for -the whole country, one for each province, one for each -<i>hsien</i> (or governmental district), one for each district, and -one for each district subdivision [<i>ch'ü-fên-pu</i>]. The organ -possessing the highest authority in the Kuomintang is -the Party Congress of the Kuomintang. When this Congress -is not in session, the Central Executive Committee is -the highest authority. The organization of the Congress -and the method of electing the Delegates are fixed by the -Central Executive Committee, while the members of the -Central Executive Committee are elected by the Party -Congress. Moreover the number of these members is also -fixed by the Congress. Article I of the "Outlines of the -Organization of the Central Executive Committee," passed -in the First Session of the Fifth Central Executive Committee -Meeting, on December 6, Year XXIV [1935], provides: -"The Central Executive Committee appoints nine -standing members of the Committee, to form a Standing -Committee which shall discharge the duties of the Central -Executive Committee when the latter is not in Session. The -Standing Committee is provided with a Chairman and a -Vice-Chairman, elected from among the nine standing -members." Hence it can be said that when the Central -Executive Committee is not in session, this Standing Committee -represents the highest authority of the Kuomintang. -The offices of the Chairman [superseded by the Party Chief, -<i>Tsung-ts'ai</i>] and the Vice-Chairman have been provided -for since December, Year XXIV [1935]. Whether the Chairman -can be the representative of the highest authority of -the Kuomintang or not, under the tacit consent of the -Standing Committee, still depends upon the changes in -circumstances. The said "Outlines of the Organization" -does not state clearly the rights and duties of the Chairman -and the Vice-Chairman. Hence, the highest authorities -of the Kuomintang as prescribed by various written laws are -(1) the Party Congress, (2) the Central Executive Committee, -and (3) the Standing Committee of the Central -Executive Committee. When the larger organ is not in -session, the next following organ represents the highest -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_127" id="Page_127">[Pg 127]</a></span>authority of the Kuomintang. But this only applies in theory. -As a matter of fact, when the lower organs are exercising -their power, they can not but be limited by certain restrictions. -Whenever important questions arise which may -cause fierce disputes among members or among the people, -the lower organs which have the authority to decide when -the upper organ is not in session usually reserve the questions -for discussion in the meeting of the upper organ. The -resolutions passed by the upper organs—the Party Congress -down to the Central Executive Committee Meeting—are -usually elastic so that the lower organs—the Standing -Committee up to the Central Executive Committee—do not -experience great difficulties or restrictions in facing various -troublesome situations.</p> - -<p>According to the <i>Constitution and Bye-Laws of the -Chinese Kuomintang</i>, there is, besides the Central Executive -Committee, a Central Control Committee for the Kuomintang. -Its organization is similar to that of the Central -Executive Committee, though with fewer members. It occupies -the same rank as the Central Executive Committee, -and its duty is to superintend and inspect the personnel -of the Kuomintang.</p> - -<p>The names and organizations of the various organs directly -controlled by the Central Executive Committee have -unavoidably undergone some changes, though in principle -their structures have remained the same. According to the -"Outlines of the Organization of the Central Executive -Committee," the organs under it are divided along three -lines: organization, publicity, and popular training, with -various committees. These organs are to discharge all -affairs of the Kuomintang. Besides these, there is a Political -Committee [superseded by the Supreme National Defense -Council], to "act as the highest directing organ in all governmental -policies and to be responsible to the Central -Executive Committee." Although these organs are authorized -by the Central Executive Committee and formed in the -Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee, the -Standing Committee can still exercise authority over them -when the Central Executive Committee is not in session, -because in accordance with the <i>Constitution and Bye-Laws</i>, -the Standing Committee takes the place of the Central Executive -Committee. As a matter of fact, since the activities -along the lines of organization, publicity, and popular -training are the internal activities within the Kuomintang, -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_128" id="Page_128">[Pg 128]</a></span>these organs are usually under the rigid control of the -Standing Committee. As the Political Committee discharges -various political affairs, its position may be said to be -independent. Any resolution passed by this Committee is -sent to the government for execution, and the Standing -Committee has no power to restrict its activities. Hence -under the party government of the Chinese Kuomintang, -the Political Committee is in reality the highest directing -and supervisory authority in matters concerning governmental -policies.</p></blockquote> - -<p>The Emergency Party Congress of the Kuomintang, -Hankow, March 29-April 1, 1938, provided for two -further amendments to the Party Constitution. It -abolished the system of reserve members, and, far more -significantly, it created the post of <i>Tsung-ts'ai</i>, here -translated Party Chief, which was indistinguishable except -as a matter of terminology from the post of <i>Tsung-li</i>, -held in perpetuity by Sun Yat-sen. Chiang K'ai-shek -was elected Party Chief, and the powers of his office -were stated to be duplicates of those given originally to -the <i>Tsung-li:</i> a general provision that "all members -shall follow the direction of" the <i>Tsung-li</i>, which was -not implemented; chairmanship of the Party Congress -and of the Central Executive Committee (<i>a fortiori</i>, of -the Standing Committee of the C.E.C.); and a veto -over the acts of the Congress and the C.E.C. Furthermore, -the Political Committee (Central Political Council) -was replaced by the Supreme National Defense -Council, of which Chiang was also elected Chairman.</p> - -<p>Since Chiang had been Chairman of the Standing -Committee, it follows that the change of formal labels -did not much alter the constitutional organization of -the Kuomintang, nor materially change Chiang's position. -Chiang does not help to create machinery of -power in order to lurk behind it, thus proclaiming -it a mere façade. He, as a public servant reared in the -Confucian tradition, possesses sufficient respect for -words to let them mean what they are publicly declared<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_129" id="Page_129">[Pg 129]</a></span> -to mean. The post of <i>Tsung-ts'ai</i> is more than ample in -providing Chiang with the power he feels necessary to -accomplish national unification, mitigate social injustice, -and promote serious representative government. -He accepts the full measure of his power; doing so publicly, -his subsequent actions appear relatively modest. -By Western standards, Chiang is naive enough to be -honest.</p> - -<p>A point brought out in connection with the National -Government (p. <a href="#Page_46">46</a>, above) is worth reiteration. -Neither by Party action nor by governmental change -has the Kuomintang monopoly of political power been -modified by law. There is no United Front, Popular -Front, or any other kind of front in the legal system; -even in practical administration, the entrance of non-Party -men has been at Party direction; and it is only -in the Special Areas, the special war services, and the -military organization that the Kuomintang has relaxed -its control of power. Other groups are sharing in the -work of the People's Political Council. The prudence -of such a policy may appear open to question; its consistency -is not.</p> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">Party Organization</span></h3> - -<p>Organizationally the Party is bipolar, with the power -concentrated in the entire membership at the base, and -in the Chief (<i>Tsung-ts'ai</i>) at the apex. The highest -authority of the Kuomintang is the Party Congress -(<i>Ch'üan-kuo Tai-piao Ta-hui</i>), which could also be -translated as All-Nation Convention of Party Delegates. -Party Congresses have been held as follows: I, Canton, -1924; II, Canton, 1926; III, Nanking, 1929; IV, Nanking, -1931; V, Nanking, 1935; and the Emergency -Party Congress, Hankow, 1938. Wang Ch'ing-wei organized -a rump Kuomintang on the basis of a "Sixth -Party Congress" held in 1939; the legitimate Sixth -Congress has not yet been called.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_130" id="Page_130">[Pg 130]</a></span></p> -<p>The Party Congress is the highest agency of the -Kuomintang, and thereby the highest legal authority -in China—a position which it now shares with the Party -Chief, <i>ex officio</i> its Chairman. The Kuomintang Party -Constitution provides that the Congress should ordinarily -meet every other year (<i>Art.</i> 27), but permits -the C.E.C. to postpone a Congress for not more than -one year. This provision has frequently been violated. -In actual effect the Congress is neither an effective governing -body, nor, at the other extreme, a completely -helpless tool. No Party Congress has led to a drastic -shift of actual political power.</p> - -<p>The barometer of influence functions outside the -Congress, and the Congress ratifies and establishes what -has actually occurred. The high authority of the incumbent -C.E.C. in matters of accrediting delegates, -plus its power to appoint delegates from areas not represented -(a feature taken from Soviet practice), gives the -political Ins a formidable weapon with which to bludgeon -down opposition, but since the value of the -Party Congress is that of a legitimizing agency, overt -interference with Party functions would destroy the -utility of the Congress. Its level of freedom and efficacy -may be compared with American party conventions. -Unwieldy, improvised agencies are not able to meet the -challenges of well-knit executive groups, but their very -unmanageability preserves to them a freedom of incalculable -action. The Party Congress could not in -practice exercise its formal, legal power of overthrowing -the entire Party leadership and starting the Party off -on a new tack; it could, however, so humiliate the incumbents -by subtle but obvious political gestures -familiar to all Chinese, that the leadership would retire -for reasons of health, or because of a yearning to contemplate -the cosmos.</p> - -<p>The elaborate structure of the Kuomintang is shown -on the chart of organization (p. 331). Abstraction of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_131" id="Page_131">[Pg 131]</a></span> -the most essential features of this chart reveals the -following:</p> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 400px;"> -<img src="images/i_131.jpg" width="400" height="132" alt="Kuomintang chart of organization" /> -</div> - -<p>The Central Executive Committee (<i>Chung-yang Chih-hsing -Wei-yüan-hui</i>) is a relatively large body with one -hundred and twenty members. The Party Constitution -requires that it meet every six months or less. These -sessions, the Plenary Sessions of the C.E.C., are by far -the best-established political processes in the Chinese -state. Actual shifts in power are here fought out, since -the C.E.C. possesses authority ample for almost any -emergency. The expulsion of Wang Ch'ing-wei was -effected through C.E.C. action, and did not require the -work of any higher body.</p> - -<p>The Central Control Committee (<i>Chung-yang Chien-ch'a -Wei-yüan-hui</i>) is an agency which the Chinese -adapted from two sources, the Bolshevik pattern of an -independent intra-party control system, and the native -<i>chien-ch'a</i> power. Similar in function to the Commission -of Party Control employed by the Communist -Party in the Soviet Union rather than to the Organization -Bureau, the Central Control Committee (also -termed, in another common translation, Central Supervisory -Committee) is in charge of an inspective system. -Because of the relative laxness of Kuomintang organization, -the work of this Committee is far less than one -might expect. It has not been adequate to ensure rigidly -strict Party efficiency, diligence, or honesty; neither has it -become a terrorist agency inflicting an inviolable Party -line. Few faults in politics fail to be virtues as well; -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_132" id="Page_132">[Pg 132]</a></span>inefficiency has its minor compensations. In times of secure -power, rigid Party discipline might let the Kuomintang -grow into a genuine and full-fledged tyranny; -nevertheless, in times of stress, such as the present, the -Party stands in need of stiffening and control.</p> - -<p>The third agency, the Supreme National Defense -Council, is the Party's agent in charge of government. -(See above, p. <a href="#Page_46">46</a> <i>ff.</i>)</p> - -<p>Immediately under the Central Executive Committee -there are three agencies of vitality and importance. -The first of these is the <i>San Min Chu I Ch'ing-nien -T'uan</i> (usually translated <i>San Min Chu I</i> Youth Corps, -or Kuomintang Youth Corps). A war-time addition -to the Party, it became politically possible when the -abandonment of appeasement re-aligned government -and youth. The Communist Youth Corps (<i>Kung-ch'an -Ch'ing-nien T'uan</i>) provided a model and rival. The -Constitution of the Corps, together with an appraisal -(from the official point of view) of its work, is given -below in Appendices <a href="#Page_313">II (B)</a> and <a href="#Page_340">II (C)</a>. In terms of -practical political effect, the Corps is significant, although -far less important than its organization scheme -would indicate. It combines some of the functions of -a military training system with social and propaganda -work. Leftists have complained against it bitterly as an -agency of espionage and repression within student -groups; others have acclaimed it as a meeting of the -Kuomintang and the youth, fruitful in terms of national -unity. The importance of the Corps lies in its organization -of a broad group of young men, one or more steps -up from the bottom of the economic scale, and in the -fact that the government and Kuomintang—after years -of overriding youth opinion—now find it feasible to -organize their own affiliate. Few charges of corruption -have touched the Corps, which lies particularly within -the purview of the Generalissimo. A minor but active -element in the political scene, it stands for the Kuomintang's<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_133" id="Page_133">[Pg 133]</a></span> -bid for permanence, and, in the event of internal -dissension, would be a valuable prop to the -<i>status quo</i>. The political indecision and laxness of -China in general has kept the group from becoming -either a <i>Hitlerjugend</i> or a frankly democratic C.C.C. -(Civilian Conservation Corps) on the American plan; -the Corps is at best a laggard bid to young men, and a -belated competition with the Left and the Communists.<a name="FNanchor_3_108" id="FNanchor_3_108"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_108" class="fnanchor">[3]</a></p> - -<p>The Party Affairs Committee (<i>Tang-wu Wei-yüan-hui</i>) -supplements the work of the Central Control -Committee in investigating Party personnel and acting -as a supplementary housekeeping agency for intra-Party -organization.</p> - -<p>The third of these agencies is the [Central] Training -Committee (<i>Hsün-lien Wei-yüan-hui</i>). To this Committee -has fallen the labor of invigorating the Kuomintang -under conditions of strain, from war, from -the Wang schism, and from new domestic competition. -The Generalissimo has put the most vigorous efforts -into the work of this agency, and has organized under -it a Kuomintang Training Corps (<i>Hsün-lien T'uan</i>) -which is providing extensive new resources of leadership -to the Party. Enterprising or promising young men are -gathered together in training meetings, and given intensive -work in Party doctrine, propaganda and organization -methods, local administration, etc. The Corps -has tended to accept youths and some men of middle age -from positions of responsibility, and to equip them with -the knowledge and the discipline necessary to continuation -of pre-democratic government. In the constant -race between government activity as a positive force and -government apathy combined with outside anti-governmental -revolution as negative forces, the training -agencies are doing as much as any single enterprise to -stabilize the regime.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_134" id="Page_134">[Pg 134]</a></span></p> -<p>The Central Political Institute (<i>Chung-yang Chêng-chih -Hsüeh-hsiao</i>) tops the entire program, as a training -agency combining features of a university, a camp, and -a Party office. Under the personal control and leadership -of Dr. Ch'ên Kuo-fu, one of the Generalissimo's -intimates and the elder of the celebrated Ch'ên brothers, -the Institute stands high for its selection of students, -the discipline and instruction it imparts, and its practical -political effect. The Kuomintang, pronounced moribund -by competent foreign observers ten years ago, -today is in a better position for leadership and development -than it has been for many years. (The author, -who visited the Institute during the summer of 1940, -found the student body as well disciplined as any he -has seen outside of Germany, the staff highly competent -[mostly American-trained], and the physical facilities -unsurpassed.) Admission to the Institute is open to -graduates of Middle Schools (secondary); students who -are married may be admitted, but single students may -not marry while in attendance. The courses of study are -in general the equivalent of American undergraduate -work, although some graduate study is offered. The -curriculum includes such subjects as military training, -Japanese language and politics, and Marxian thought -(in connection with <i>min shêng chu-i</i>). The general -course is supplemented by two special courses—the -Civil Service Training Corps and the Advanced Civil -Service Training Corps—which are set up in collaboration -with the Examination <i>Yüan</i>. Graduates are organized -into alumni associations, to which the faculty -are admitted as supervisory members. It is a matter -of success and distinction to undergo the training of -the Institute, which is the equivalent of a West Point -for political and governmental work. The Generalissimo -visits the Institute and speaks before it as much -as possible, frequently as often as bi-weekly, but with<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_135" id="Page_135">[Pg 135]</a></span> -occasional gaps of months.<a name="FNanchor_4_109" id="FNanchor_4_109"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_109" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> In addition to the Central -Political Institute, there is a [Kuomintang] Northwest -Academy of Youth, which has been even more active -in training young men for Party and government service. -Proximity to the Red training center at Yenan -makes its work urgent; training, according to report, is -briefer, cruder, and more vigorous than in the central -agency. The sub-surface possibility of renewed class -war by the Communists makes the Academy peculiarly -necessary.</p> - -<p>Apart from the Youth Corps, the training agencies, -and the Party Affairs Committee, but also directly underneath -the Kuomintang C.E.C., come the coordinated -and uncoordinated agencies of Party administration. -Their organization is as follows:</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_136" id="Page_136">[Pg 136]</a></span></p> - -<p class="center">C.E.C. OF THE KUOMINTANG STANDING COMMITTEE</p> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 400px;"> -<img src="images/i_136.jpg" width="400" height="321" alt="Agencies of party administration" /> -</div> - -<p>The Party-Ministries<a name="FNanchor_5_110" id="FNanchor_5_110"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_110" class="fnanchor">[5]</a> constitute a part of the governing -machinery of China. The Organization Party-Ministry -is important because of its intra-Party work; -the Minister, Dr. Ch'u Chia-hua, a German-educated -student, is one of the most active Party leaders, and -deeply suspect by the Left. His work is the field of -Kuomintang Party administration. The Party-Ministries -of Social and Overseas Chinese Affairs combine -the functions of government with those of the Party; -the former is a bureau of protocol, and the latter acts -as an extra-governmental colonial office. The Secretariats -provide study agencies for the governmental<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_137" id="Page_137">[Pg 137]</a></span> -system. They perform functions which are in the -United States both governmental and private (e.g., -the work of the Brookings Institution, the Public Administration -Clearing House, the various Presidential -research and advisory committees, and intra-departmental -housekeeping agencies). The system of local -government reform is sponsored by the Central Kuomintang -Secretariat (<i>Chung-yang Mi-shu-ch'u</i>), even -more than by the Ministry of the Interior in the government, -under whose jurisdiction it falls. The Secretary-General -is a benign revolutionary veteran, Yeh-Ch'u-tsang; -the Deputy Secretary-General, Dr. K'an Nai-kuang, -is a Party official of almost twenty years' standing, -who studied in the United States and visited Europe -in quest of data on administration. Boundlessly energetic, -he is typical of the younger scholars who combine -the academic and the political and impart to the Kuomintang -a large share of its present energy.</p> - -<p>Internationally, the most important Party-Ministry -is that of Publicity (<i>Chung-yang Hsüan-ch'uan Pu</i>), -which carries out most of the Chinese propaganda program. -Headed by Dr. Wang Shih-chieh, a very outspoken -man, its functions are distributed between Sections -of General Affairs, Motion Pictures, Newspapers, -Advisory, Consultation, and International Publicity, -together with services such as China's leading semi-official -news service (the Central News Agency), the -Party newspapers, the Central Motion Picture Studios, -and the official broadcasting system. Because of the difficulties -of language, travel, and passports, the International -Department supplies most of the news which -reaches the world press from Free China. The function -of the Western newspapermen consists largely in editing -and supplementing this news from whatever independent -source they can find, or, occasionally and at -the cost of considerable hardship, to attempt to discover -the facts for themselves.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_138" id="Page_138">[Pg 138]</a></span></p> -<p>In general, the Chinese follow the policy of giving -the favorable side of the news, simply omitting anything -that could conceivably be unfavorable. Their publicity -services are no more guilty of positive <i>suggestio falsi</i> -than the services of the British or Americans. Nevertheless, -Chinese notions of dignity and public policy -differ widely from Americans'; news would be hard -to obtain or valueless when obtained, except for the -fact that the staff of the International Section is almost -entirely American-trained and well-acquainted with -American notions of news. The very able and active -Hollington Tong, one of China's most successful newspapermen, -who was in press work long before he became -a Party official, has led in the supply of ample -news in the face of great difficulties. He is esteemed by -Westerners to be, along with Mme. Chiang, one of the -Generalissimo's most effective publicity advisers.</p> - -<p>The Party-Ministry of Publicity also attends to the -needs and interests of Western newspapermen and other -visitors, arranging appointments, schedules, etc., and -even boarding many of them at a Press Hostel. These -attentions, while from time to time irritatingly restrictive, -are in the end almost always appreciated as -invaluable. Only the Leftists shun the Publicity Ministry; -they do so unsuccessfully, and to their loss. No -other Asiatic, and few Western, states can boast as alert -and effective a system of propaganda. In the troubled -shifts and crises of world politics, the Chinese have -managed to retain the sympathy of the most diverse -audiences—from American church people to Soviet agitation -squads, and from British conservatives to Nazi -clubs in Germany. The American traditions of frankness, -zest, liveliness in news are transplanted; while they -have suffered a sea-change, they still operate with telling -effect.<a name="FNanchor_6_111" id="FNanchor_6_111"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_111" class="fnanchor">[6]</a></p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_139" id="Page_139">[Pg 139]</a></span></p> -<p>The Ministry of Women's Affairs, decreed in 1940, -is in process of organizing women's work for the Party. -Previously, most women's organizations had been knit -together in the affiliated New Life Movement. The -minor committees of the Party—historical, pensions, etc.—lie -outside the scope of war activities. Although they -continue, their functions are subordinate to the purposes -of resistance and reconstruction.</p> - -<p>Formal field organization follows seven patterns:</p> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 400px;"> -<img src="images/i_139.jpg" width="400" height="381" alt="Formal field organization" /> -</div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_140" id="Page_140">[Pg 140]</a></span></p> - -<p>Much of this exists only on paper. After the break -with the Communists in 1927, and the transformation -of the Kuomintang from a government-destroying to a -governing agency, the functional and agitational groups -were allowed to slip into desuetude. Under the pressure -of war, and the encouraging political situation, -which puts a premium on action, the Kuomintang has -adopted a variety of policies designed to maintain its -position.</p> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">The Kuomintang Bid for Leadership</span></h3> - -<p>Chief among the new devices is the reintroduction of -the Small Group, or Party Cell (<i>hsiao-tsu</i>). A comprehensive -plan for small-unit organization has been proclaimed; -the text is given below, <a href="#Page_354">Appendix II (D)</a>. -This cell system, as explained by the Deputy Secretary-General -of the Kuomintang, Dr. K'an Nai-kuang, will -provide the roots of the Party with new vigor.<a name="FNanchor_7_112" id="FNanchor_7_112"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_112" class="fnanchor">[7]</a> The -small group provides for further diffusion of Party work, -and introduces novel principles of political organization -to the Party. Self-criticism, airing of opinion, mutual -personal examination—these are expected to stimulate -Party work. The war provides the Party with the -opportunity to do with ease things which seemed insurmountably -slow and difficult before Japanese bombers -helped unification. Opium-suppression, bandit-eradication, -and similar work of organization and improvement -challenges the Party to further effort. The -imminence of democracy requires more intensive preparation -in discussion and in self-organization for small -groups. The <i>hsiao-tsu</i> system is designed to bolster -Party morale, improve the Party work, and spread the -teaching of Sun Yat-sen.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_141" id="Page_141">[Pg 141]</a></span></p> - -<p>The new governmental pattern of local government -is to be reinforced by the corresponding development -of Kuomintang agencies. In the government's plan, -rural development operates on four levels: the militia; -the school system; the agricultural and industrial cooperatives; -and the political organization. The same -person in each village or hamlet would be responsible -for all four. If he is to be a Party man, he must be -effective to be of service and a credit to the Party.</p> - -<p>In order to eradicate undesirable personnel, the Kuomintang -has increased its Party-purging facilities with -what is known as the Party Supervisor's Net (<i>Tang-jên -Chien-ch'a Wang</i>). By action of the C.E.C. on -June 13, 1940, the sub-district Party organs are to elect -one to three members each to serve, with a six months' -term, as Control Members. With a power of report -on Party discipline, and responsibility for Party conditions, -this change was expected to drive undesirables -more effectively out of the Party.</p> - -<p>Three years from 1940 was set as the final date for -the installation of the new system. While the fractionization -of a Party may seem to be of minor importance, -it actually is a major factor in the potential development -of the Kuomintang. In the period of Party government, -the more popular organs of Party members -tended to slough off, leaving large <i>Tangpu</i> (Party Headquarters) -in the <i>hsien</i> or cities. These quite often fell -into the hands of local machines, with the consequence -that they interfered with government, and promoted -the usual evils of party machines. The diffusion of -Party work, by letting individuals participate more -freely as individuals, may help to break the monopoly -of these bureaus, and restore the Party effectiveness -with less reliance on supervision from above.</p> - -<p>The Kuomintang, in addition to these reorganization -devices, is meeting competition from the Left by increasing -its membership. Membership figures are not<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_142" id="Page_142">[Pg 142]</a></span> -available in war time; the total is probably over two -million. In some instances the new members are no -particular improvement on the pre-existing group, but -in the majority of cases the Party broadens its base of -popular support.</p> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">Intra-Kuomintang Politics</span></h3> - -<p>The years which saw the rise of the Kuomintang to -power, and its subsequent period of authority, showed -a diminution of the disparateness of Party fractions. -For a long time the adherents of Wang Ch'ing-wei stood -formally Left; those of Hu Han-min, formally Right; -while various older Party alignments preserved their -outlines more or less clearly (e.g., the Kuomintang -Western Hills Group). With the consistent rise of -Chiang K'ai-shek to Party and national leadership, and -the steady influx of non-Party or merely nominal Party -men into the government, Party distinctions lost their -cogency in practical affairs.</p> - -<p>In terms of influence, patronage, and effective policy-making, -the Kuomintang is a conglomeration of innumerable -personal leaderships knit together by a common -outlook, a common interest in the maintenance of -the National Government and formal Party power, and -a common loyalty to the Party Chief. The clearest -groups are those which are out of the current political -stream; most notable among these is the Wang schism, -and a few scattered irreconcilables of half-forgotten -Party struggles. Within the regime, Kuomintang groups -tend to coalesce as the leaders meet, negotiate, and -govern together in the councils of state.</p> - -<p>So completely in the ascendant that they have lost -their general character as groups are the <i>Erh Ch'ên</i> -(literally "the two Ch'êns"; also termed "C.C. group" -by English-speaking Chinese), led by the brothers, -Ch'ên Li-fu, Minister of Education, and Ch'ên Kuo-fu, -head of the Central Political Institute, and the <i>Huangpu</i> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_143" id="Page_143">[Pg 143]</a></span>(Whampoa Academy) groups, led by the Generalissimo -himself. The Ch'ên brothers have been close adherents -of Chiang throughout his career. Brilliant, -vigorous, sharp in the retention of power, they have -made themselves anathema to the Left. They are effective -reorganizers of the Kuomintang, keenly aware of -its position as monopoly Party, and their protégés and -trainees are omnipresent through government and Party. -Their military counterpart is the <i>Huangpu</i> group. It includes -officers either trained by Chiang himself or under -his close supervision. With the passage of each year, the -proportion of Whampoa (or daughter-institution) graduates -in the national armies rises. The officers include a -high proportion of technically qualified men, whose -capabilities and interests are chiefly military. Builders -of the new army, they look to the Generalissimo and the -Party for dicta on social, economic, and political policy; -they provide China with the unpolitical army which has -been an American ideal, although rejected by Soviet -and South American practice. The officers are not -encouraged to assume decisive roles in local politics, -but to refer such things back to Headquarters. In consequence, -although the danger of a new <i>tuchünism</i> has -almost disappeared, the army staff does not readily -adapt itself to a <i>levée en masse</i>, or to the problems of a -social-revolutionary army. The very factors which make -of the army a tool and not a practice-ground of government -also make it somewhat rigid in dealing with guerrilla -situations.</p> - -<p>Both the C. C. and Whampoa groups are instilled -with notions of Party and military discipline which trace -back in the first place to the instruction given by Russians -from the Soviet Union. While they follow Sun and -Chiang in accepting the promises of democracy, their -notion of democracy is as different from that of the Left -as Washington's was from the Jacobins'. They are interested -in sound, disciplined, powerful national government, -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_144" id="Page_144">[Pg 144]</a></span>representative, republican, and stable; they see the -revolution as largely complete in the power-destroying -phase, and are beginning to think in the reconstruction -phase. After ten years of strain and terror in fighting -the Communists, they look with suspicion on political -changes which would open the nation to -opportunist Communist agitation, or make Chungking -the helpless diplomatic dependency of the Narkomindel. -The bitterness of internecine conflict has made -them deeply suspicious of sudden or radical reform, although -they themselves profess a genuine interest in -social welfare. The actual reforms which have been accomplished -are, in the scale of political reality, already -stupendous: opium eradication, tax collection, diffusion -of national authority, communications, industrialization, -military advance, etc. To the Kuomintang center, -a demand for sharp or shocking change is suspect. They -desire to amplify what they have, and to let changes wait -on the ability of trained personnel—not entrusting -progress to the vagaries of mass movements with incalculable -force and direction.</p> - -<p>While the National Government was at Nanking, -there was a <i>Fu-hsing Shê</i> (Regeneration Club), organized -by a few hot-headed members of the Kuomintang -center. Its activities in support of the Generalissimo -and the government, under the further sobriquet of -Bluejacket or Blue Shirt group, earned it the reputation -of a Chinese <i>Schutzstaffel</i>. The comparison was -at best fanciful, but any comparison at all was heartily -desired by the Europocentric Chinese Left and by the -world press. Magnified beyond recognition, the Club -was identified with almost every agency in the government -and Party, not excluding the New Life Movement. -As applied, the name <i>Blue Shirt</i> covered a wide -scattering of unrelated agencies which had the common -features of a Kuomintang-center position, an inclination -to effective action (including violence) and some<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_145" id="Page_145">[Pg 145]</a></span> -secrecy. Effective political-police work is led by one -T'ai Li, whose name is whispered by dissidents; but -counter-espionage and supervision of suspects is also -performed through Party agents, the regular military, -and governmental agencies.</p> - -<p>Around the Kuomintang center there are other -groups, some closely related to Chiang, some remote. -The Political Scientists (<i>Chêng-hsüeh Hsi</i>) owe their -name to a society which once existed in Nanking. They -include many of the administrators, men with American -training who are interested in industrial and fiscal development. -The clarity of this group has faded by -its absorption into the governing center. The Cantonese -are represented by two levels of politics: those who -based their power on Canton province and those who -remained within the government. President Sun K'ê -of the Legislative <i>Yüan</i> has been outstanding in his -willingness to cooperate with the Communists and Left, -and is on cordial terms with relatively independent progressives, -such as Mme. Sun Yat-sen. Further groups -within the Kuomintang are constituted by the loyalist -followers of Wang Ch'ing-wei, who now attach themselves -to other leaders, and by other personal or regional -followings (e.g., the <i>Tungpei</i> followers of Chang Hsüeh-liang, -ex-<i>tuchün</i> of Manchuria and ex-Vice-Commander-in-Chief, -still "retired" as a result of the Sian -kidnapping). Finally, a number of elder Party leaders -remain because of their seniority or connection -with Sun Yat-sen; they do not need to attach themselves -to any particular clique in order to retain their -position. These include such men as the venerable -Secretary-General of the Party, Yeh Ch'u-tsang; the -President of the National Government, Lin Shên; and -the President of the Control <i>Yüan</i>, Yü Yu-jên.</p> - -<p>What has been said about the groups in the People's -Political Council (see p. <a href="#Page_76">76</a> <i>ff.</i>) applies to these. It is -possible, as in American congressional or administrative<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_146" id="Page_146">[Pg 146]</a></span> -circles, to distinguish blocs of leaders with differing interests -or policy; but clarity fades upon scrutiny. The -orientation, even by the participants, is subjective. -Lacking continuous institutional form, clustering of -leaders is transient, shifting with political events.</p> - -<p>It is difficult to appraise the role of the Kuomintang -without at the same time assessing the position of the -government. The two are inescapably connected. Although -the Communists profess recognition of the government, -and pledge it loyalty, they offer only comradeship—on -their own terms—to the Kuomintang. -This arrangement may last for a considerable length -of time, but the National Government is a Kuomintang -creation; short of violent revolution, Party control -will scarcely break in war time. Upon the Party, therefore, -depends much of the efficacy of the Government.</p> - -<p>Many well-known Leftist writers on China—such as -Edgar Snow—make the comment that whereas the National -Government is deserving as a government, and -worthy of support, the Kuomintang is hopelessly corrupt, -a creature of landlords and capitalists, or, of even -worse, "feudal elements." Such a distinction, based on -strong moral urges and a desire to achieve historical -parallels, is untenable in practice. Kuomintang power -has weathered more than a decade of adversities. The -Generalissimo depends upon it. Analysis of the Kuomintang -as the party of the Chinese national bourgeoisie, -and ascription of a mass character to the Communists -alone, is a fallacy, comparable to a consideration -of Earl Browder as the real leader of the American -working class.</p> - -<p>In point of fact, neither the Kuomintang nor the -Communist Party in China is a mass party. Neither ever -has been, although each sought mass character in the -Great Revolution. Still largely apolitical, the Chinese -masses are organized socially, culturally, and economically -into a village and guild system which functions<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_147" id="Page_147">[Pg 147]</a></span> -through most of the country. The Kuomintang includes -a very high proportion of shopkeepers, returned overseas-Chinese, -Chinese still resident overseas, Christians, -landlords, and Western-returned students. The class -composition of the Kuomintang is largely incidental -to its functional character. Since the Kuomintang was -the party of Westernization, it gathered in revolutionary -days Chinese of all classes who were sufficiently modernized -to be interested. Naturally the poorest peasants -and the coastal proletariat did not constitute a large -proportion of such membership. The men who entered -did so as Christians, as travellers, as temperamental -rebels, rather than as representatives of the bourgeoisie. -When the Communists, whom a recent writer<a name="FNanchor_8_113" id="FNanchor_8_113"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_113" class="fnanchor">[8]</a> with -unconscious humor calls the party of the Chinese proletariat, -came on the scene, the same social elements -contributed to its membership. Once the Communist -Party abandoned the Trotskyist line of urban revolt -for the leadership of endemic peasant rebellions, its -composition changed somewhat, although the Communist -leaders of today are socially much like their -Kuomintang equivalents. The men who are class-conscious -are, like Lenin, historically, philosophically, and -morally so; it is a matter of literary necessity, not of -fact.</p> - -<p>The Kuomintang is in power; the Communist and -Left parties are not. As the governing group, the Kuomintang -naturally attracts those persons who would -seek to enter any government. Since it has not and does -not promote rural class warfare, pre-existing class<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_148" id="Page_148">[Pg 148]</a></span> -relationships continue. The Party and the Government -have sought, not always efficiently or faithfully to the <i>n</i>th -degree, to carry out the programs of land reform, democratization, -etc., to which they have been committed. -The Kuomintang has tolerated widespread sharecropping, -land destitution, usury, and rural despotism—because -it found these in existence, and was preoccupied -with building a national government, a modern army, -adequate finance, and with eradicating some of the -worst evils, such as opium, bandits, and Communists -(who, whatever their ideals, nevertheless helped to impoverish -a poor nation by merciless civil war).</p> - -<p>If the Kuomintang were out, it too could point to -existing evils. Whoever controls government bears the -responsibility. A class element is to a certain degree -inescapable in any government; illiterate, unqualified -persons do not assume leadership even in the Soviet -Union until they have escaped their handicaps through -training. But to make of the Kuomintang the party of -the Chinese landlords and merchants alone is as fallacious -as to make the Republicans or Democrats solely -the instruments of American capitalism. A comment -such as this would be unnecessary in the case of the -United States; but persons who are not Marxian with -respect to the analysis of current American events often -assume a Left approach to China because of impatience -with evils which they see but cannot understand.</p> - -<p>The final appraisal of the Kuomintang must be based -on the practical work of the government and the Party. -In 1940, their effective control was wider and deeper -than ever before. The Chinese state was more nearly -in existence. The armies were undefeated. The growth -of China in the past ten years, and the stand made by -China at war, has been made under the unrelaxed control -of the Kuomintang monopoly of constitutional -power, together with its clear primacy in more tangible -power—schools, finance, armies, and police.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_149" id="Page_149">[Pg 149]</a></span></p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">The New Life Movement and Other Affiliates</span></h3> - -<p>The important New Life Movement (<i>Hsin Shêng-huo -Yün-tung</i>) is, strictly speaking, not a Party organization; -but Chiang is its Chairman, and in purposes -and personnel it interlocks with the Party. Convinced -that institutional and economic reform required accompanying -moral and ideological reform, the Generalissimo -founded an Officers' Moral Endeavor Corps -as early as 1927. This organization was placed, soon -after its initiation, in the hands of Colonel (now Major-General) -J. L. Huang, a graduate of Vanderbilt University -and an experienced Y.M.C.A. secretary. The -Corps' purposes were comparable to those of a Y.M.C.A. -with American armies, but Chinese morality in general, -not Christian sectarian teaching, was stressed. With -Chiang's encouragement, the Corps came to include -a high percentage of the officers. Teaching cleanliness, -truthfulness, promptness, kindness, dignity, etc., it -helped build morale.</p> - -<p>In 1934, after seven years of war against the Communist-led -agrarian insurrections in South Central -China, the Generalissimo decided to extend to the -whole people the type of work done by the Corps. On -February 19, 1934, he made his first speech announcing -the New Life Movement and on the following March -11, a mass meeting of about one hundred thousand -people, representing five hundred organizations, signalized -the formal inauguration of the movement.<a name="FNanchor_9_114" id="FNanchor_9_114"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_114" class="fnanchor">[9]</a> From -then on the Movement was continued as a regular phase -of anti-Communist reconstruction. It elicited praise for -its attempt to reach the roots of China's political demoralization, -and its intent to remedy the everyday<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_150" id="Page_150">[Pg 150]</a></span> -life of the people,<a name="FNanchor_10_115" id="FNanchor_10_115"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_115" class="fnanchor">[10]</a> although there was skepticism as -to its effectiveness in removing troubles deeply ingrained -in the economic system.</p> - -<p>The type of evil against which the New Life Movement -struggles is well-illustrated by Mme. Chiang's -enumeration of the seven deadly sins: self-seeking, -"face," cliquism, defeatism (<i>mei-yu fa-tzŭ</i>, the Chinese -<i>nitchevo</i>), inaccuracy (<i>ch'a-pu-to</i>), lack of self-discipline, -and evasion of responsibility.<a name="FNanchor_11_116" id="FNanchor_11_116"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_116" class="fnanchor">[11]</a> In addition to -these sins of social and political behavior, there are -others such as filthiness, carelessness of infection, indecent -or sloppy dress, bad manners, unkindness, etc. -The Movement, easily understood in view of the traditional -Confucian emphasis on personal conduct, seeks -to reach individual behavior. The West European and -North American peoples have been disciplined by -technology itself: timeliness, cleanliness, regularity, -have come to be a part of daily life. Any nation which -seeks to shift from an agrarian to an industrial economy -discovers that amiable defects become ruinous flaws: -machinery cannot wait; a machine society requires a -discipline of its own. The New Life Movement is attacking -the points of social behavior which strike the -newcomer to China most immediately and most unfavorably.</p> - -<p>The positive virtues of the New Life Movement were -formulated by the Generalissimo. Four in number, -they are <i>li</i>, <i>i</i>, <i>lien</i>, and <i>ch'ih</i>. <i>Li</i> is the fundamental -Confucian virtue, and is based upon <i>jên</i>. <i>Jên</i> being<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_151" id="Page_151">[Pg 151]</a></span> -humane self-awareness, or consciousness of membership -in society, <i>li</i> is the application of this awareness to conduct; -it thereby signifies proper behavior, not in the -superficial sense of empty formality, but in the sense -of behavior which is <i>human</i>: the full expression of -man's moral and ethical stature. The traditional translation -of <i>li</i> is <i>rites</i>, <i>ceremonies</i>, or <i>etiquette</i>—terms -which, because of their connotations of an empty ceremonialism, -are inadequate as a rendition of the original. -The Generalissimo writes of <i>li</i>: "It becomes natural -law, when applied to nature; it becomes a rule, when -applied to social affairs; and signifies discipline, when -applied to national affairs. These three phases of one's -life are all regulated by reason. Therefore, 'li' can -be interpreted as regulated attitude of mind and -heart."<a name="FNanchor_12_117" id="FNanchor_12_117"></a><a href="#Footnote_12_117" class="fnanchor">[12]</a> Chiang thus reconciled, for his own thought, -the naturalistic ethics of Confucius, wherein man and -nature were parts of an inseparable ethical structure, -and the pragmatism of Sun Yat-sen.</p> - -<p><i>I</i> is the element in man which makes him observe <i>li</i>: -ethics or justice. <i>Lien</i> is "clear discrimination (honesty -in personal, public, and official life): Integrity." -According to the lexicographer,<a name="FNanchor_13_118" id="FNanchor_13_118"></a><a href="#Footnote_13_118" class="fnanchor">[13]</a> it is "pure, incorrupt, -not avaricious." The fourth principle is <i>ch'ih</i>, given -by the dictionary as "to feel shame,"<a name="FNanchor_14_119" id="FNanchor_14_119"></a><a href="#Footnote_14_119" class="fnanchor">[14]</a> and rendered by -the Generalissimo and Madame Chiang as "real self-consciousness -(self-respect): Honor."<a name="FNanchor_15_120" id="FNanchor_15_120"></a><a href="#Footnote_15_120" class="fnanchor">[15]</a> From this the -Generalissimo evolved his formulation of a theory of -action.<a name="FNanchor_16_121" id="FNanchor_16_121"></a><a href="#Footnote_16_121" class="fnanchor">[16]</a> That he is not unaware of criticisms directed -against him for talking about morality when people are<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_152" id="Page_152">[Pg 152]</a></span> -fighting and starving is shown by his spirited counter-attack:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>There are two kinds of skeptics:</p> - -<p>First, some hold the view that the four virtues are simply -rules of good conduct. No matter how good they may be, -no benefit to the nation can be derived from them if the -knowledge and technique used by that nation are inferior -to others.</p> - -<p>Those who hold this view do not seem to understand the -difference between matters of primary and secondary importance. -From the social and national point of view, only -those who are virtuous can best use their knowledge and -technique for the salvation of the country. Otherwise, -ability may be abused for dishonorable purposes. "Li," "i," -"lien," and "ch'ih" are the principal rules alike for a community, -a group, or the entire nation. Those who do not -observe these rules will probably utilize their knowledge and -ability to the disadvantage of society. Therefore, these -virtues may be considered as matters of primary importance -upon which the foundation of a nation can be solidly built.</p> - -<p>Secondly, there is another group of people who argue -that these virtues are merely refined formalities, which have -nothing to do with the actual necessities of daily life. For -instance, if one is hungry, can these formalities feed him? -This is probably due to some misunderstanding of the -famous teachings of Kuan-Tze, who said: "When one does -not have to worry about his food and clothing, then he -cares for personal honor; when the granary is full, then -people learn good manners." The sceptic fails to realize -that the four virtues teach one how to be a man. If one -does not know these, what is the use of having abundance -of food and clothing? Moreover, Kuan-Tze did not intend -to make a general statement, merely referring to a particular -subject at a particular time. When he was making broad -statements, he said: "'li,' 'i,' 'lien,' and 'ch'ih' are the four -pillars of the nation." When these virtues prevail, even if -food and clothing are temporarily insufficient, they can be -produced by man power: or, if the granary is empty, it -can be filled through human effort. On the other hand, -when these virtues are not observed, there will be robbery -and beggary in time of need: and from a social point of -view robbery and beggary can never achieve anything. -Social order is based on these virtues. When there is order, -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_153" id="Page_153">[Pg 153]</a></span>then everything can be done properly: but when everything -is in confusion, very little can be achieved. Today robbers -are usually most numerous in the wealthiest cities of the -world. This is an obvious illustration of confusion caused -by non-observance of virtues. The fact that our country -has traitors as well as corrupt officials shows that we, too, -have neglected the cultivation of virtues, and if we are to -recover, these virtues must be adopted as the principles of -a new life.<a name="FNanchor_17_122" id="FNanchor_17_122"></a><a href="#Footnote_17_122" class="fnanchor">[17]</a></p></blockquote> - -<p>Generalissimo and Mme. Chiang both work actively -in the Movement, inspecting its branches and enterprises, -speaking at its meetings, and supervising its -functions. The Movement possesses a small but very -active central staff, with Major-General Huang as -Secretary-General and Dr. Chu Djang, a Johns Hopkins -political scientist, as his assistant. Efforts are made to -improve the daily life of the people. Shops are encouraged -to join the Movement, on conditions requiring -cleanliness, uniform prices, etc. Thus in addition to -the work of a Y.M.C.A. for all ages and classes, the -Movement attempts the role of a municipal health campaign -agency, a better business bureau, and a civic -service club. Marriages have traditionally depleted family -budgets; many a Chinese farmer or worker has -fallen into usurious debt because of the social necessity -of extravagant feasting and celebration. The Movement -accordingly organized inexpensive mass marriages, collectively -celebrated under official auspices; the purpose -is not to increase the population, but to circumvent a -wasteful custom. Peep-show operators have been given -displays which are patriotic instead of mythical, chivalric, -or licentious. Story-tellers are taught new, public-spirited -stories to tell. The New Life Movement seeks -to reinvigorate Chinese society by adapting existing institutions -or businesses to new needs.</p> - -<p>In addition to attempting change in traditional life, -the Movement has introduced innovations. The only<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_154" id="Page_154">[Pg 154]</a></span> -cafeteria in Chungking serving cheap but dietetically -sound meals is operated by the New Life Headquarters. -Chinese foods were hard to preserve and unpleasant to -eat in the darkness of air raid shelters; China has had -no sandwiches, crackers, or equivalent preparations; the -New Life Movement concocted a cheap but tasty and -nutritious wheat and soy biscuit, and scattered the recipe -broadcast. News is distributed to the illiterates through -lantern-slide lectures in market-places. Mass singing, -virtually unknown in China until now, is making -enormous strides with the war; the New Life Movement -is diffusing this, along with calisthenics.<a name="FNanchor_18_123" id="FNanchor_18_123"></a><a href="#Footnote_18_123" class="fnanchor">[18]</a></p> - -<p>A group of minor New Life agencies are clustered -about the Headquarters. These, like the Movement, are -not financed by popular subscription, membership fees, -or collection drives. All administrative expenses are -borne by the Generalissimo and his closest associates, -who contribute from their private funds or from available -contingent funds of their offices, and from contributions -by local governments. Since part of the program -is distribution of cash gifts to all wounded soldiers, -the budget runs into fairly high figures, but the Generalissimo -realizes that in China there is no better way -to create mistrust of an enterprise than to collect money -for it. The leading agencies affiliated with the New -Life are:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>(1) the War Area Service Corps, designed for propaganda, -instruction, spreading of cooperatives, relief, etc., -in the occupied and combat zones;</p> - -<p>(2) the Rural Service Corps, designed to perform -the same functions behind the lines, and to aid in rural -reconstruction;</p> - -<p>(3) the New Life Students Rural Summer Service -Corps, an organization which organizes students from<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_155" id="Page_155">[Pg 155]</a></span> -the colleges during their summer vacations, and sends -them out on the land for service work, along with new -agricultural information, hygienic teaching, literacy -drives, etc.;</p> - -<p>(4) the Wounded Soldiers' League, a self-help organization -for disabled veterans, who are assisted and -encouraged to set up their own cooperatives; they have -done so with particular success in cigarette-making, -printing, and shoe-weaving;</p> - -<p>(5) the Friends of the Wounded Society, wherein -volunteers become friends to veterans who are in hospitals, -or who return to civil life as cripples (each Friend -contributing money, transmitted direct to the veteran; -Friends are also encouraged to write or visit the veterans);</p> - -<p>(6) the New Life Secretaries' Camp, virtually a summer -undergraduate college, with an academic curriculum, -strict discipline, and ample organized recreation; -and</p> - -<p>(7) the Women's Advisory Council, which in turn -tops another pyramid of war-time activity in the hands -of women's organizations.<a name="FNanchor_19_124" id="FNanchor_19_124"></a><a href="#Footnote_19_124" class="fnanchor">[19]</a></p> - -</blockquote> - -<p>In addition to these major activities, there are innumerable -further enterprises, including another industrial -cooperative system, a really extensive chain of -orphanages for war orphans, schools for girls, training -camps for young women, etc. It is no uncommon sight -to stand on a city street in West China and see three-fourths -of the young people wearing the uniforms of -various war activities, most of which—outside the army—are -affiliates of the Party or the Movement.</p> - -<p>These activities have not received much praise from -Leftists or foreign visitors. They begin at a level so -far below American requirements of social service that -they seem ineffectual. The author once saw, in China's -<i>tuchün</i> years, old people dying in the streets while<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_156" id="Page_156">[Pg 156]</a></span> -pedestrians walked by, uncomfortable but aloof; he saw -children with burnt-out eyes whining for alms, to the -profit of a beggars' syndicate; he watched soldiers rotting -alive on the flagstones of temple courtyards. The -Kuomintang, the New Life, and their affiliates cannot -relieve the general poverty of China, nor alter the -fundamental economic faults and continuing maladjustments -of class functions. These agencies do, however, -eliminate evils so bad that the ordinary American -would not remember them for his schedule of social -reform. In the vast reaches of Free China, these organizations—like -many others—almost disappear in the -perpetual routines of ancient, enduring institutions: -the market-place, the hucksters' streets, the tea-house. -But their influence is felt. In contrast with the entire -American New Deal, they are nothing at all; in contrast -with the Y.M.C.A., Komsomol, or similar organizations, -they are agents of one of the greatest practical -social reforms ever undertaken in Asia, and a step bound -to have political repercussions.</p> - -<p>Popular non-participation still stultifies them. The -leadership of the agencies parallels government personnel. -Women leaders are in many instances the wives -of officials; an exceptional person, such as Mme. Chiang -or her celebrated sisters, may be a leader in her own -right, but this is no usual rule. In many agencies, such -as intended mass organizations for reform, instruction, -health, etc., the mass character is entirely lacking. The -masses are the beneficiaries of Kuomintang action, but -not often participants in that action. The Communists -and the independent Left hold an enormous leverage -in popular interest; ignoring class lines, illiteracy, or -lack of preparation, they draw the common people into -a real share in government and social reconstruction. -The Kuomintang has ignored this opportunity—in part -because of the Confucian cleavage between scholars and -the untutored which made the scholar, however benevolent<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_157" id="Page_157">[Pg 157]</a></span> -or philanthropic, a being apart from the commonalty.</p> - -<p>Two further organs—the National Spiritual Mobilization -(<i>Kuo-min Ching-shên Tsung-tung-yüan</i>) and the -Mass Mobilization—are Kuomintang devices for mass -participation. The former, developed as an antidote to -defeatism engendered by protraction of the war, rising -prices, and the treason of Wang, actually consists in a -propaganda machine, which holds torchlight vigils, national -fealty ceremonies, and similar festivals in the -larger cities; it has adapted some of the stagecraft of -the German National Socialists, but lacks a broadly popular -character. The Mass Mobilization is under the -Training Department of the Military Affairs Commission; -useful as a military device, its political character -is slight in Free China. In the guerrilla and occupied -zones, a genuine <i>levée en masse</i> has been accomplished; -in the free areas, safeguards which hedge Mobilization -have robbed it of utility save that which is strictly military. -As an adjunct to the army, this is useful; otherwise -it has been ineffectual, despite the competitive success -obtained by the guerrilla zones in equivalent organizations.</p> - -<p>The over-all picture of the Kuomintang and its activities -is hard to bring into focus. One general contrast -will point some of its strength and weakness clearly: as -a governing agency, which created and maintained the -government, the Kuomintang has been more effective -than any other group in China. The Party has met -and overcome obstacles in practical politics, international -relations, working administration, internal unification, -and national defense. The Party has succeeded -well enough to remain in power, which none of its predecessors -or competitors have managed to do. As a -social and political force, its governing character colors -its work. More has been done by the government for -the people than in any comparable situation in East<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_158" id="Page_158">[Pg 158]</a></span> -Asia. But Kuomintang rule, however excellent when -measured by the standards of authoritary or colonial -government, still falls far short of even elementary application -of democratic techniques. The flexibility of the -Party, and a continued ability to yield power in order -to retain power, are the most hopeful factors in the -view of the Kuomintang future.</p> - -<p>The Kuomintang could not be overthrown by any -force—mere force—on earth, unless the Party betrayed -itself. Attacked by a major power, it has emerged unscathed. -But the Communists or other opponents may -find their most useful weapons in the weaknesses of the -Kuomintang itself: in the slowness of its change, or in -its unadaptability to rapidly changing conditions; or -in an extra-Party resentment arising from severe economic -dislocation which, though consequent to war -rather than to governmental policies, was not swiftly -enough controlled by a slowly-moving Kuomintang. By -contrast with 1935, however, the Kuomintang has -gained much power; the Communists have lost some. -Regional and half-separatist regimes, often corrupt, -have almost altogether disappeared. Along with the -Kuomintang, the independent Leftists have also profited.</p> - -<p>No prediction, to be plausible, can assume the early -demise or collapse of the Kuomintang. The Party has -obtained power; its organization is one of the three -policy-executing branches of the new national organization. -Ruin of the Kuomintang implies ruin of the -emergent Chinese state, so laboriously constructed; -though a successor might arise, too much of the work -would have to be done over again. Many Chinese, of -all classes, realize this. Kuomintang rule is the <i>status -quo</i>; despite demerits, it is the first stable government -modern China has had, and China's chief tool of defense -today.</p> - - -<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_106" id="Footnote_1_106"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_106"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> The text of this Constitution is given in Arthur N. Holcombe's -invaluable study of the Great Revolution, <i>The Chinese Revolution: -A Phase in the Regeneration of a World Power</i>, Cambridge, Massachusetts, -1930, p. 356-70.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_107" id="Footnote_2_107"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_107"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> Wang Shih-chieh, <i>Pi-chiao Hsien-fa</i>, Shanghai, XXVI (1937), -p. 651-3.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_108" id="Footnote_3_108"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_108"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> See <i>China at War</i>, Vol. V, No. 3 (October 1940), p. 77-8, for a -recent official account of the Corps.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_109" id="Footnote_4_109"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_109"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> Information given the author by Dr. Ch'ên Kuo-fu and members -of his staff, at the Central Political Institute, August 18, 1940. Few -places are more beautiful than the valley in which the cool, spacious -buildings of the Institute are set. Landscaped for centuries, and celebrated -as a beauty spot, the area is filled with carved shrines, severely -simple monuments, and flagstone walks. A river runs through a -forested gorge; waterfalls feed the stream. -</p> -<p> -Dr. Ch'ên supplemented his hospitality in Western China by transmitting -to the author a series of statements in reply to questions which -were put to him in writing. Of these, the two most interesting refer, -first, to the economic status of the Institute's students, and secondly, to -the Kuomintang training plan in the Northwest: "Judged by functions -and economic levels, students of the Central Political Institute -represent all economic strata of Chinese society. Those of peasant origin -are most numerous, forming over 40% of the total number."—"For -the purpose of educating young men and women in the border provinces, -the Central Political Institute has established a School for the -Border Provinces, of which branches were established at Powtow -(Suiyuan province), Sinin (Chinghai province), and Kangting (Sikong -province) in October 1934. Another branch was established at Shuchow -(Kansu province) in August 1935, this being the school sponsored by -the Kuomintang in the Northwest. The Powtow branch was suspended -in 1940, and those in Sinin and Kangting were handed over to the -Provincial Governments concerned at the same time. So the only -Kuomintang school in the Northwest at present is the one at Shuchow. -It is subdivided into three parts: namely, a Normal School, a Middle -School, and a Primary School. Its annual budget is one hundred thousand -dollars Chinese national currency." (Letter to the author, -March 10, 1941.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_5_110" id="Footnote_5_110"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_110"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> The term <i>pu</i> is usually translated Board, but the <i>pu-chang</i> (<i>pu</i> -chief) is given as Minister. Since the identical terms are rendered -Ministry, Minister, Vice-Minister, etc., in the case of the government, -the term Party-Ministry is here adopted as both distinct and descriptive.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_6_111" id="Footnote_6_111"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_111"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> Visitors to Chungking owe much to the Foreign Affairs Section -of the International Publicity Department. Its chief, the -affable Mr. C. C. Chi, a well-known economist from Shanghai, has acted as host -to almost every visitor to Hankow or Chungking. He has fulfilled -endless requests—many of them irrational—with unfailing patience, -good humor, candor, and intelligence. Few books on contemporary -China fail to bear the imprint of his help; the present one is no -exception.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_7_112" id="Footnote_7_112"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_112"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> Statement to the author at Kuomintang Central Headquarters, -Chungking, July 16, 1940; Dr. K'an also supplied the facts for the -new organizational features of the Party. The following interpretations -are the author's alone.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_8_113" id="Footnote_8_113"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_113"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> For a Marxian analysis of the Kuomintang, carefully stripped of -frank Marxian verbiage, see "Wei-Meng-pu," "The Kuomintang in -China: Its Fabric and Future" in <i>Pacific Affairs</i>, Vol. XIII, No. 1 -(March 1940), p. 30-44. The author <i>a priori</i> defines the Kuomintang -as the party of the national bourgeoisie in China, in effect exhorting -it to fulfill its historic mission of completing the national -democratic revolution, whereupon socialism [i.e., Stalinism] may historically -follow. Nevertheless, its comment on personalities is informing -in terms of practical politics.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_9_114" id="Footnote_9_114"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_114"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> The China Information Committee, <i>News Release</i>, March 4, 1940. -English translations of names such as the New Life Movement, Officers' -Moral Endeavor Corps, National Spiritual Mobilization, etc. -are often awkward or jejune where the original is not.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_10_115" id="Footnote_10_115"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_115"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> Young, C. W. H., <i>New Life for Kiangsi</i>, Shanghai, 1935, is a -missionary work which praises the New Life Movement highly. The -book includes interesting, first-hand, unfavorable accounts of the -rule of the quondam Chinese Soviet Republic, and explains some of -the opposition to the Communists. The interconnection between -Communist-suppression and the New Life Movement is consciously -and clearly demonstrated.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_11_116" id="Footnote_11_116"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_116"><span class="label">[11]</span></a> Chiang, May-ling Soong, <i>China Shall Rise Again</i>, New York, -1941, p. 38 <i>ff.</i> Mme. Chiang's work also includes a full account of the -enterprises of the New Life Movement and of its affiliates.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_12_117" id="Footnote_12_117"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_117"><span class="label">[12]</span></a> Chiang K'ai-shek, <i>Outline of the New Life Movement</i>, Chungking (?), -n.d. p. 8. This is the translation, by Mme. Chiang, of -<i>Hsin Shêng-huo Yün-tung Kang-yao</i>, Nanking, n.d., originally published -in May 1934.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_13_118" id="Footnote_13_118"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13_118"><span class="label">[13]</span></a> Giles, Herbert, <i>A Chinese-English Dictionary</i>, Second Edition, -Shanghai and London, 1912; ideograph No. 7128.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_14_119" id="Footnote_14_119"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14_119"><span class="label">[14]</span></a> The same; ideograph No. 1999.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_15_120" id="Footnote_15_120"></a><a href="#FNanchor_15_120"><span class="label">[15]</span></a> Chiang K'ai-shek, cited, p. 7.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_16_121" id="Footnote_16_121"></a><a href="#FNanchor_16_121"><span class="label">[16]</span></a> Reprinted as Appendix III (B), p. <a href="#Page_373">373</a>, below.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_17_122" id="Footnote_17_122"></a><a href="#FNanchor_17_122"><span class="label">[17]</span></a> Chiang K'ai-shek, cited, p. 6-7.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_18_123" id="Footnote_18_123"></a><a href="#FNanchor_18_123"><span class="label">[18]</span></a> Most of these and the following facts, but not the interpretations, -are based on interviews which the author had with the hospitable -Major-General J. L. Huang in Chungking, on July 14, 1940, and -subsequently.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_19_124" id="Footnote_19_124"></a><a href="#FNanchor_19_124"><span class="label">[19]</span></a> For an excellent outline of the role of women in the war, see -Chiang, May-ling Soong, <i>China Shall Rise Again</i>, cited, p. 287 <i>ff.</i></p></div></div> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_159" id="Page_159">[Pg 159]</a></span></p> - - -<h2><span class="smcap">Chapter VI</span><br /> - -THE COMMUNIST AND MINOR PARTIES</h2> - - -<p>The party politics of Republican China fall into -two periods: the early period of competitive, pre-parliamentary -parties, 1912 to the Great Revolution; -and a later period of struggling monopoly-power parties, -from the Great Revolution to the present. In the earlier -period the Kuomintang and its rivals tolerated one another's -existence; each regarded co-existing parties as -natural, desirable, and useful. But the sham democracy -of the prostituted Republic disheartened the Kuomintang, -which thereupon bid for the complete conquest -of power, brooking no legitimate competitors; its rivals -did likewise. The first coalition (1922-27) of Kuomintang -and Communists was therefore not the democratic -competition of two parties with different stresses upon -a common ideological foundation, but a war-time alliance -of basically incompatible forces. After the 1927 -break, the Kuomintang became the only legal party in -most of the country, while the Communists—with a -rebel army, an unrecognized government, and a territory -of their own—enjoyed legality within the limits of -their own swords. The Kuomintang, embraced by all -major groups save the Communists, became the foremost -vehicle for Chinese political life. Minor parties -enjoyed precarious, ineffectual existences, underground -or expatriate.</p> - -<p>With the outbreak of war in 1937, Nationalists and -Communists adopted a truce, formally a Communist -surrender of armed rebellion, subversive ideology, and -separate government. In actuality it was an alliance<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_160" id="Page_160">[Pg 160]</a></span> -of deadly enemies against the Japan which threatened -them both. Today, Chinese party politics revives in the -People's Political Council, and to a slight degree in -public opinion. The legal prohibition of minor parties, -including the Communists, remains in effect. Chinese -party politics, in the Western sense of a friendly subdivision -of common opinion, remains vestigial. The -only guarantee of party rights is an unstable toleration -extended by the Kuomintang in the negative form of -non-prosecution. The Kuomintang is the Party for -most of China. The Communist Party is the party for -a separate fraction of China. The minor parties, holding -neither territory nor armies in the game of power, -maneuver between and about the two, struggling to -attain legal existence.</p> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">The Chinese Communists: Party and Leaders</span></h3> - -<p>Literary Marxism runs back to the Ch'ing dynasty, -but the first formal organization of a Chinese Communist -Party occurred with the first Congress of the Chinese -C.P., in Shanghai, during July of 1921.<a name="FNanchor_1_125" id="FNanchor_1_125"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_125" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> The -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_161" id="Page_161">[Pg 161]</a></span>Soviet-Kuomintang entente was, strictly speaking, not a union -between the Kuomintang and the Communist parties, -although it came to be such in fact; it was collaboration -between the Third International, which agreed that -Communism was unsuited to China, and the Kuomintang. -The development of a Chinese Communist Party, -and open Communist debate concerning the assumption -of power, made the Kuomintang mistrustful, repressive, -and finally hostile. The suppression of the Communists -by Chiang in 1927 has become world history; Vincent -Sheean and André Malraux have preserved aspects of -it in moving literature.<a name="FNanchor_2_126" id="FNanchor_2_126"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_126" class="fnanchor">[2]</a></p> - -<p>In the period 1927-37 the Chinese Communists operated -the Chinese Soviet Republic (<i>Chung-hua Su-wei-ai -Kung-ho-kuo</i>),<a name="FNanchor_3_127" id="FNanchor_3_127"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_127" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> primarily in Kiangsi, but also in the -Ao-yü-wan (Hupeh, Honan, Anhui) area. In the Long -March of 1934-35 the main forces of the Communists, -in the most spectacular military move in China since -the great Northern raid of the T'aip'ing, marched a -distance of some six thousand miles, and established -their new area in North Shensi (see above, p. <a href="#Page_112">112</a> <i>ff.</i>). -Not only did the Chinese Red Army remain intact; -through great and successful effort, the Communists -transplanted schools, banks, and other institutions intact. -The Long March was comparable to the celebrated -Flight of the Tartars, in that it amounted to the transplanting -of an entire people, their worldly goods, and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_162" id="Page_162">[Pg 162]</a></span> -their most highly treasured institutions and traditions.</p> - -<p>Despite Kuomintang theory, the Frontier Area is a -one-party <i>imperium in imperio</i>, and its unchallenged -party is the Communist. Under conditions requiring -great fortitude, the Chinese Communist leaders have -consolidated power, and use their base to spread Marxism -through the guerrilla movement. They are thus in -the best possible political position; their strategic excellence -makes them welcome in precisely those zones -wherein their doctrines can best take effect. Their party -organization controls the Frontier Area through formal -appointment of the leading officials by the National -Military Affairs Commission, and through formulae of -election for the subordinate officials.</p> - -<p>The hierarchy of the Chinese C.P. is much like that -of the Kuomintang, which also copied Soviet models:<a name="FNanchor_4_128" id="FNanchor_4_128"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_128" class="fnanchor">[4]</a></p> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 400px;"> -<img src="images/i_162.jpg" width="400" height="240" alt="Chinese Communist Party Hierarchy" /> -</div> - -<p>The shibboleth of Democratic Centralism applies to -the Chinese as well as to other Communist Parties; in -practice this means the high and unqualified concentration<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_163" id="Page_163">[Pg 163]</a></span> -of power at the top of the hierarchy following -action by the democratic, or mass, element of the party -through the Party Council or Congress. In effect, nothing -is decided at such elections, since the plebiscites, -according to the familiar authoritarian pattern, concern -questions to which only one answer is reasonably -possible: the answer decided by the party rulers. The -free use of meaningless elections characterizes Communist -activity in governmental as well as party matters. -The voting act gives the impression of concurrence, improves -morale, and ceremonializes the approval of the -majority for the minority. The purpose which elections -serve in democracies—that is, of providing a decision to -issues not previously ascertained—appears very rarely in -Communist elections, where a near unanimity is constructed -to indicate popular support, and contested elections, -disunity.</p> - -<p>In terms of personnel, the Communist hierarchy has -been consistently compliant with world Communist -policy as made in Moscow. This is a tribute to the high -international unity and uniformity of the ecumenical -Communist movement, but raises, in China, problems -of intra-national Communist policy. Revolutionary -veterans of the party, who fought, suffered, studied, and -worked for their cause through ten, fifteen, or twenty -years of effort, often find themselves displaced, dictated -to, or expelled by the clique of younger men who have -lived comfortably in Moscow studying the dialectic -mystagogy and acquiring an inside track in Stalinist -cliquism.<a name="FNanchor_5_129" id="FNanchor_5_129"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_129" class="fnanchor">[5]</a> The Chinese Communist Party has been -shaken by violent schisms, casting off many once highly-valued -leaders.</p> - -<p>No sooner does a man become suspect to the ultimate<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_164" id="Page_164">[Pg 164]</a></span> -authorities than his previous record, hitherto -praised, is re-examined and captious criticism proves -that he was a traitor from the beginning, like Trotsky, -Bukharin, Chicherin, and Zinoviev. The profound -vitality of the Chinese Communist movement as a -quasi-religious, self-sacrificial organization is demonstrated -by the fact that it has weathered these storms. -The terrible hunger for a guidance in life, an insight -into the ethical meanings of things, and an absolute -which asks nothing but acceptance and obedience—these -factors call for courage, humility, abasement, -fortitude. They do not favor imagination, individual -integrity of thought, or the examination of fact. There -has been no indication whatever, despite the wishful -thinking of Western liberals, that the mentality of the -Chinese Red leaders is one whit different from that of -Western Communists. They talk practical democracy, -moderation, collaboration with the Kuomintang; they -do so because this is the Comintern's China policy, just -as they have fought the National Government in the -past when the Soviet authorities disliked Chiang more -than they did Japan.</p> - -<p>Their all-China collaboration is no doubt sincere; -but the sincerity is based not on the wish to collaborate, -but on what, in their special phrasing, is termed the -"objective" analysis of the situation. If the Soviet -Union, the chief "proletarian" force in the world, -turned against Chiang, the Communist <i>ipso facto</i> would -be against collaboration. The war of China against -Japan would no longer be a war of "national liberation" -but an "inter-imperialist" war in which the true -interests of the "working classes" would be against -<i>both</i> sides. This provides to Marxians, under the name -"science," an absolute, infallible guide to ethics in -practical politics, because it presumes to reveal the -inescapable long-range meaning of human affairs. The -supposition that daily affairs may in fact possess none<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_165" id="Page_165">[Pg 165]</a></span> -but short-range meaning, outside of slow, general, -nearly impalpable changes in ecology, demography, and -genetics, etc., is anathema to the Marxians. A humanism -trained to deal directly, pragmatically, and simply -with events is as far beyond the Chinese Communists -as it is beyond other Marxians.</p> - -<p>This orthodoxy, so complete that it enthralls the -leadership to Moscow and paralyzes Marxian heretics in -the very act of dissidence, reaches throughout the upper -levels of the party. This fact does not mean that the -Chinese Communist movement is in no wise different -from other national Communist movements. The historical -basis of the Chinese Communism, ever since -Chiang smashed the urban unions in 1927, has been -that of an exotic faith imposed upon a native <i>jacquerie</i>, -in which the exoticism is unwittingly traditionalist. -Peasant revolts of the Chinese past have operated with -the counter-ideocratic leverage of a superstition, normally -Taoist in derivation. The heads of the Yellow -Turbans (ca. 200 <span class="smcap lowercase">A.D.</span>) and the Boxers (ca. 1900) were -all magicians; the T'aip'ing (ca. 1850) leader was a -Christian in communication with God Himself. These -heresies against the all-pervading order of Confucian -common sense disappeared after their high-pitched dynamics -died down in social readjustment.</p> - -<p>Marxism provides an element of faith, devotion, and -irrational submission which has operated in past Chinese -history. The frugality, honesty, and integrity of -the Chinese Red leaders are celebrated by foreign visitors -and even by Nationalist officials; such revolutionary -virtues seem new in China, whereas they are the twentieth-century -manifestation of a common enough phase -of Chinese political activity. However, one cannot -herefrom conclude that the Chinese Communist movement -is destined to disappear with its predecessors, for -it has three things which they did not have: an extra-Chinese -application, which not only supports it, but<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_166" id="Page_166">[Pg 166]</a></span> -proves its concreteness and relative realizability; a modern -system of education, and thereby a class of counter-ideologues -to compete with the post-Confucian Nationalists; -and leaders with revolutionary experience -greater than any in the world, not excepting that of the -great Soviet leaders themselves. Ancient peasant uprisings -revealed a final cleavage between dervish-type organizers -and the peasants, once infuriated, who finally -sought normalcy. If the Chinese Communist leaders -can, through the example of the Soviet Union, or by -education, or by dexterous leadership, make Communism -into normalcy, they may retain their hold on -such sections of the peasantry as their leadership has -captured.</p> - -<p>Two men stand forth above all others in Chinese -Communism. Both would be remarkable individuals -in any historical setting. Their partnership has led -them to be described by one hyphenated phrase: <i>Chu-Mao</i>: -Chu Tê and Mao Tse-tung. Chu Tê, the military -genius of Chinese Communism, was born of a gentry -family in Szechuan, and attended the Yünnan Military -Academy at the time that Chiang was in Japan; he entered -the years of his early maturity as an aide to a -provincial <i>tuchün</i>. According to Edgar Snow, he was -at this time sunk in vice, enjoying wealth, opium-smoking, -a harem, and the amenities of a war-lord existence.<a name="FNanchor_6_130" id="FNanchor_6_130"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_130" class="fnanchor">[6]</a> -Chu felt an urge within himself to escape this rut. He -abandoned his worthless existence, leaving his harem -provided for, and went to the coast, where he could become -acquainted with the revolutionary movement. -On the way he broke himself of the drug habit. He -went to Europe, living in France and Germany, and in -the latter country joined the Chinese Communist -branch established among the students. He returned -in 1926 during the Great Revolution, and served as -political officer in the Kuomintang forces. Later he<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_167" id="Page_167">[Pg 167]</a></span> -was instrumental in the creation of the Chinese Soviet -Republic, and was the prime military leader of the -Communist forces in the long civil war. He led the trek -to the Northwest, and is esteemed as a military hero of -Arthurian proportions. Friendly, candid, interested in -specific tasks, he is characteristic of the superb leadership -which preserved Communism in China. He is the -only Chinese military leader who was not defeated by -Chiang, although Chiang pursued him six thousand -miles. Major Evans Carlson, the American Marine -officer, compares him with Robert E. Lee, U. S. Grant, -and Abraham Lincoln—drawing on the best features of -each for the purpose.<a name="FNanchor_7_131" id="FNanchor_7_131"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_131" class="fnanchor">[7]</a></p> - -<p>Mao Tse-tung was born in Hunan in 1893 of a well-to-do -farmer family. His autobiography, dictated to Edgar -Snow, is a classic of Western literature on China.<a name="FNanchor_8_132" id="FNanchor_8_132"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_132" class="fnanchor">[8]</a> His -history was that of many other restless young Chinese -intellectuals, struggling for education amidst turmoil, -and adjusting their sense of values to the chaotic early -Republic. He was caught up by the Marxism of the -literary Renaissance after 1917, served in the Kuomintang -during the Great Revolution, and worked as head -of the All-China Peasants Union. During the Soviet -period, in which he first became a colleague of Chu Tê, -he stood forth as the chief political leader. He and Chu -between them formed a team to rival Generalissimo -Chiang, although Mao shared his political leadership -with various others, particularly Chang Kuo-tao. Mao<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_168" id="Page_168">[Pg 168]</a></span> -is an expert dialectician, skilled in rationalizing the -policies of the Communist International, and keenly -critical within the limits of his Marxian orthodoxy. -Less genial than Chu Tê, he is nevertheless an inspiring -leader. His political skill, in following the lurches and -shifts of the Stalin party line while simultaneously leading -an enormous Chinese peasant revolt, is monumental. -His earlier rivals and colleagues are in most cases dead -or forgotten. He survived both ideological and practical -ordeals.</p> - -<p>A third Communist leader, Chou En-lai, is of importance -because he acts as liaison officer between the -National Government and the Frontier Area. The Communist -quasi-legation in Chungking is maintained as -a purchasing and communications office of the Eighteenth -Army Corps (formerly Eighth Route Army). -Chou, who studied abroad in Japan, France, and Germany, -served at the Whampoa academy under Chiang, -and in the period of civil war he was one of the chief -political officers, twice Chinese Communist delegate -to Moscow. He is an old acquaintance of many Kuomintang -leaders from Chiang on down, and appears -to be one of the most successful diplomats in the world. -Despite acrimony from secondary leaders on both -sides, Chiang and Mao seek to maintain their alliance -against Japan, and Chou is their chief intermediary. At -Chungking he is seconded by the alert, brilliant Ch'in -Po-k'u, a veteran of Communist political-bureau work.</p> - -<p>The difficulties and conditions of Communist collaboration -with the National Government are well illustrated -in the life of Chang Kuo-tao. One of the -founders of the Chinese Communist Party in Shanghai, -in 1921, Chang was of the upper classes, like Chu Tê; -and like Mao, he was a radical student in Peking. Just -before his departure from the party in 1938, he had -been chairman of the Northwestern Soviet, taking precedence -over Mao himself; but with the coming of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_169" id="Page_169">[Pg 169]</a></span> -national unity, Chang wished to cooperate fully with -China's leader, government, and legal Party, the Kuomintang. -He adopted subterfuges to get out of the -Communist Area. Arriving in Hankow, he announced -his desire to form a genuine United Front on the basis -of a candid and sincere acceptance of the <i>San Min Chu I</i>, -which would mean the actual abandonment of Marxian -dreams of Communist "proletarian" dictatorship in -China, even for the future. He did not renounce Communism, -but simply took his colleagues at their words, -and announced his intention of cooperating honestly, -and not through compulsion of the Moscow dialectic. -He wrote:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>According to the views of the Chinese Communists, the -present United Front is only a temporary union of many -political groups, which are entirely different from one another -in nature. These political groups have their own social -bases, and they represent the interests of different -classes. "The Kuomintang," so they believe, "represents -landlords and capitalists, while the Communist Party represents -the working class." No [ultimate] compromise can -be made between the two parties.</p> - -<p>Now we often hear such slogans of the Chinese Communists -as, "Let's lead the people <i>together</i>," "Let's <i>all</i> take -responsibilities," "Let us <i>both</i> be progressive," and "Let's -act under the <i>same</i> principles." These represent the old -ideas of striving for leadership. These show that they do not -have the foresight to work unselfishly for the nation and -the people. They want to retain their military forces. They -want to maintain the Frontier Area and special, privileged -positions in certain occupied areas. They keep these in -order to await future developments....</p> - -<p>I hope they [the following suggestions] will receive the -consideration of the Chinese Communists:</p> - -<p>(1) the Chinese Communists should always remember -that the benefits of the nation and the people go before -everything. They should support the movement of Resistance -and Reconstruction under the leadership of Mr. -Chiang K'ai-shek. They should carry out the <i>San Min Chu I</i> -without hesitation. What they do must agree with what -they say;</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_170" id="Page_170">[Pg 170]</a></span></p> -<p>(2) there should be complete coordination of governmental -and military operations, under all conditions.... -I hope the Chinese Communists will not think that the -Eighth Route Army is one privately owned by the Communist -Party.... The Frontier Area [where Chang Kuo-tao -had so recently been leader] should not be made a Communist -base, nor made into an isolated place where Communist-made -laws are executed and prejudice, together -with political persecution, prevails....</p> - -<p>(3) with a view to working for the nation and the -people, the Communists should follow the foreign policies -adopted by the central government.<a name="FNanchor_9_133" id="FNanchor_9_133"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_133" class="fnanchor">[9]</a></p> - -</blockquote> - -<p>Chang demanded that the Communists react more -sincerely, that they accept the full implications of a -united China, and abandon their long-range dialectic -for power.<a name="FNanchor_10_134" id="FNanchor_10_134"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_134" class="fnanchor">[10]</a> For this he was denounced, his years of -service were reappraised, and he was dropped from the -Communist Party.<a name="FNanchor_11_135" id="FNanchor_11_135"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_135" class="fnanchor">[11]</a> He was accused of hurting the -United Front, because he urged a more nearly perfect -union. The chief Communist leaders challenged him -in open letters, revealing their continued adherence to -an ideology which made an eventual struggle for power -inescapable.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_171" id="Page_171">[Pg 171]</a></span></p> - -<p>The Communists have, therefore, cooperated as far -as they are able, without emerging from the infallibilities -of their cult. They retain the Marxian rationalization -apparatus, and the linkage with Moscow. As such, they -are welcome but not completely trustworthy allies. -Their presence is undoubtedly the greatest check to the -development of democracy in China; the presence of a -totalitarian party, respecting no rules but its own, -jeopardizes the entire experiment. The Communists -want democracy, but they want it quite frankly as a -step toward "working-class" (Marxist) power; they accept -the <i>San Min Chu I</i> on the condition that it be read -as elementary Marxism. They do not insist on the term -Communism, but employ the terms "working-class" -interests for their party, "scientific objectivity" for their -ideology, and "a people's movement" for radical, arbitrary -reforms to rip Free China open with social revolution. -The Kuomintang leaders are fully aware of the -support in name plus subversion in fact which the -Communists offer, and complain bitterly about the -principles of Sun being twisted about to Marxism as in -the form of "'independent' nationalism, 'free' democracy, -and 'beneficent' livelihood," the qualifying -terms sufficing for the alignment.<a name="FNanchor_12_136" id="FNanchor_12_136"></a><a href="#Footnote_12_136" class="fnanchor">[12]</a> They understand -that the Communists are incapable of sincere extra-class -democracy; the Communists are hurt by the Kuomintang's -unwillingness to admit that it is not a Party of -patriots, but the Party of a transitional, historically -doomed middle class.</p> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">Communism: Patriotism or Betrayal?</span></h3> - -<p>If the Communists were as inflexible, disciplined, -ferocious, and intransigeant as they like to appear to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_172" id="Page_172">[Pg 172]</a></span> -themselves, China would have had a three-sided war -long ago. In practice, however, the Chinese Communists -yield amazingly. The Communist International -is not goading the Chinese Communists into the sabotage -of Chiang and of national resistance. Whether -Moscow could do so is a standing question of Chinese -politics. The answer cannot be known except by practical -test. One might, however, plausibly suppose that -an attempt by Stalin to consummate a Moscow-Tokyo -pact (possibly in accordance with pressure from Berlin, -which would require immediate protection of the proletarian -fatherland) would create a deep schism in Communist -ranks; but it is unthinkable that all the Chinese -Communists would abjure their faith. Moscow would -not be naive enough to require the Communists to -cease fighting Japan <i>in form</i>. Such a Kuomintang-Communist -break would probably weaken the National -Government; it would not destroy the Chungking -regime unless the Generalissimo ignored the -chance offered by a Leftward turn, to retain some -of the peasant-radical and guerrilla forces in his -own ranks. It would, however, enormously strengthen -Japan, and be a severe blow to China. The greatest -danger of a Kuomintang-Communist break would lie -in an American defeat of Japan. By removing the -necessity of Soviet support of Chiang, and increasing -the power of the National Government, American -aid would lessen the opportunities of Communism in -China.</p> - -<p>At present, however, the Chinese Communists welcome -American aid, even though the effect of such -aid is to strengthen the China of Chiang as against -the China of Chu-Mao. The Communist spokesman, -Ch'in Po-k'u, told the author that American aid was -not feared in China, but was <i>welcome</i>, emphasizing the -word. He even stated, in response to a far-fetched hypothetical -question, that actual American troops would<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_173" id="Page_173">[Pg 173]</a></span> -be welcome at Yenan, and stated that inter-party trouble -was to be expected only in case of defeat.<a name="FNanchor_13_137" id="FNanchor_13_137"></a><a href="#Footnote_13_137" class="fnanchor">[13]</a></p> - -<p>The final picture of the Communist position which -emerges in China is about as follows:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>(1) the Communists are gaining ground because of -their helpfulness and vigorous leadership in organizing -the guerrilla areas; wherever the Japanese forces -go, the Communists (thus shielded from Chinese National -armies) increase their influence;</p> - -<p>(2) the Communists are benefiting politically by -a genuine popular movement in both Free and occupied -China, particularly in the latter, where spontaneous -mass action is providing a base either for -Sunyatsenist democracy or for Communism in the -future;</p> - -<p>(3) in view of their belief that time is on their -side, because of the present direction of Soviet foreign -policy, the Chinese Communists are very cooperative -in the alliance against Japan, patiently postponing -demands for "democracy" (i.e., unrestricted rights of -organization and agitation);</p> - -<p>(4) they have superlative leadership, rich in practical -experience, which represents the super-orthodox -residuum of years of schism and purging; such a leadership -is not likely to abandon the fundamentals of -Communism, such as the dialectic, the class-outlook -on all history and politics, and belief in the inescapable -universality of future "proletarian" rule (Communist -world conquest); therefore, it is almost unthinkable -that they would fail to do Moscow's bidding, if the -party line demanded national treason in war time;</p> - -<p>(5) the interests of the Soviet Union run parallel -with those of non-Communist China for a long time -in the future, unless the European balance of power -forces the U.S.S.R. to appease Japan; under such circumstances,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_174" id="Page_174">[Pg 174]</a></span> -the Soviet Union will be very anxious to maintain -the foothold of Communism in China, and will -not be likely to ask the Chinese Communists to commit -candid treason;</p> - -<p>(6) lastly, the Kuomintang possesses the opportunity -of rivaling Communism, of overtaking its rate of growth -in political power, by a bold policy of freeing speech, -constitutionalizing the government, reforming the land -tenure system, and pushing cooperative industrialism; -the base of Communism has been widespread peasant -revolt. If the conditions of peasant revolt are eliminated, -Communism will not be much more of a threat to -China than it is to the advanced countries of Europe. -(Wisely or not, the Kuomintang has not consented to -meet the Communists in open ideological competition. -If it did so, and won, Kuomintang morale would be -strengthened. At present the practical aims of Party -policy toward Communists are about as follows: restriction -and isolation of the Frontier Area and of the -Border Region, so far as agitation is concerned, before -ingestion by the constitutional national system; military -precautions, balancing Communist forces with Nationalist; -standardization of Red military practice by -national rules, and the elimination of peculiar political -features; eventual dissolution of fellow-travelling organizations, -and their absorption into the corresponding -officially sponsored movements; supervision of Communists -and channels of Communist propaganda; courtesy -toward Communist leaders, strictness toward Communist -subordinates, and harshness toward the Communist -laboring class following. A corresponding policy -toward the Kuomintang is pursued by the Communists.)</p></blockquote> - -<p>Finally, the deepest element eludes political analysis: -the moderation of the Chinese character, and the heritage -of Confucian common sense. The Chinese language -and the Confucian inheritance of ideological -sophistication lead to clarity, pragmatism, and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_175" id="Page_175">[Pg 175]</a></span> -practicality. The Chinese have long delighted in ingenious -formulae with which to meet <i>de jure</i> impasses, while -proceeding <i>de facto</i> in quite another direction. The -Chinese are perhaps the only people in the world with -enough finesse about "face" to save the Communist -face. The Generalissimo is in theory consciously anti-Marxian; -but when he was asked whether it is possible -that Communists or Leftists might exploit democratic -rights for unscrupulous power politics, he answered -quietly by writing: "No, because democracy in -itself has the ability to work out the solutions for those -problems if there are any." A Communist leader said, -the Generalissimo would have nothing to fear from the -Communists if he won the war. His prestige would be -unassailable. Chiang and the Communists both know this.</p> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">The National Salvation Movement</span></h3> - -<p>The National Salvation (<i>Chiu Kuo</i>) movement is -third in point of size and influence, and has been largely -instrumental in assisting national unification and resistance. -The movement began in 1935 with the organization -of a number of professors, students, and -young intellectuals who were influenced by the student -anti-appeasement movement in North China. It had -a simple, and very clear program: stop civil war; stop -appeasement.<a name="FNanchor_14_138" id="FNanchor_14_138"></a><a href="#Footnote_14_138" class="fnanchor">[14]</a> Unlike the Kuomintang or the Communists, -the National Salvationists never developed -formal dogma, or a comprehensive ideology. Genuinely -a movement, it had no membership books, no formal or -systematic organization, no minorities, and no schisms. -The movement spread like wildfire, across the length -and breadth of China as well as overseas; and, because -of its lack of formal hierarchy, was ignored by<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_176" id="Page_176">[Pg 176]</a></span> -the National Government. Its loose organization, consciously -based on the middle class of clerks, students, business -men, professors, etc., followed functional lines familiar -to the Chinese.</p> - -<p>When the National Salvationists began the creation -of a structure, however rudimentary, by forming an -inter-professional federation for National Salvation, and -when they followed this with the national congress for -National Salvation, the government took action, which -resulted in the celebrated trial of the Seven Gentlemen -(<i>ch'i chün-tzŭ</i>). The term (<i>chün-tzŭ</i>) is the Confucian -word for superior or upright person, without reference -to gender, and was applied in affectionate derision by -the press. One of the <i>chün-tzŭ</i> was a lady. The seven, -who included a celebrated and popular law school dean -(Shên Chun-lu), a banker, and authors (Tso Tao-fên, -the spokesman among them) were tried and imprisoned -late in 1936. Demands for their release figured in the -Sian kidnapping.</p> - -<p>The movement was financed very simply through -volunteer contributions. Most of the work was done -by volunteers who asked no pay, travelling and working -at their own expense. About Ch. $5,000 (then about -U. S. $1,000) sufficed to cover the whole expenses of -headquarters. Despite the imprisonment of its leaders, -the movement gathered momentum. Funds were collected -to support guerrillas opposing Japan in transmural -China. Most literate persons not already committed -to formal Kuomintang or Communist membership -fell under the influence of the movement. General -Shêng Shih-ts'ai in Sinkiang offered the movement a -home, and many of its workers went to the West.</p> - -<p>In practical terms, the National Salvationists often -work with the Communist Party, although they are -strictly Chinese and do not have an elaborate dialectic. -A strain of economic determinism runs through their -thought, but this is not systematized. The leaders of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_177" id="Page_177">[Pg 177]</a></span> -the movement were released after the outbreak of war, -but their organizations continued to be suppressed, -and work is largely suspended. The leaders told the -author that they had no means of estimating the actual -number of their adherents; they had no formal membership -roll, and they were still legally suppressed in -Chungking areas. The quest for policy and principle -instead of power is new to Chinese politics, and the -National Salvation leaders are esteemed almost universally -and hated by none. Nevertheless the Kuomintang -has not admitted the legality of the movement, -which continues to exist in non-public fashion. Some -of the leaders were recognized to the extent of being put -on the People's Political Council. In addition to standing -with the Communists in matters of practical domestic -reform, the National Salvation leaders demand -two fundamental policies: continuation of the war, -and unity of the country above all party considerations.</p> - -<p>The National Salvation leaders are able, modest, and -patriotic. They represent the older non-political sentiment -of China, infused with modern Leftist content. -Dean Shên of Shanghai, the senior of the movement, is -an elderly man of almost dainty gentleness, keenly intelligent -demeanor, and serious but charming good -humor. Mr. Tso Tao-fên, an author, is a world traveller. -Their colleagues are of the student, publisher, -author type: intellectual, patriotic, common-sense in -outlook.</p> - -<p>The National Salvation movement looks forward to -constitutionalism. It has become almost universal in the -guerrilla areas. The leaders have faith that the Constitution -and liberalized public life are developing, although -they expected in the summer of 1940 that the -Convention would be postponed until 1941, to allow -the Communists and Nationalists further opportunity -for balancing and adjusting power relationships. The -National Salvationists are past masters in the techniques<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_178" id="Page_178">[Pg 178]</a></span> -of indirect, almost invisible pressures. Their disinterestedness, -high principles, and patriotism put them -in an admirable position to act as a determined moderating -force between the two major Parties. As such they -are the third party of China, although another, smaller -group bears this name.</p> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">The Third Party</span></h3> - -<p>The party commonly called The Third Party (<i>Ti-san -Tang</i>) was organized by dissident Communists and -Left Kuomintang members who wished to keep on collaborating -after the major parties broke apart in 1927, -thus ending the Great Revolution. Led by the indomitable -Têng Yen-ta, who was finally shot to death in -Shanghai, the party began illustriously with the participation -of Mme. Sun Yat-sen (Soong Ching-ling) and -the Left ex-Foreign Minister, Eugene Chen. The -formal names of the party varied. From 1927 to 1929, -and again from 1930 to 1937, it was the Revolutionary -Action Commission of the Chinese Kuomintang -(<i>Chung-kuo Kuo-min-tang K'ê-ming Hsing-chêng Wei-yüan-hui</i>); -in 1929-1930, the Chinese Revolutionary -Party (<i>Chung-kuo K'ê-ming Tang</i>); and after 1937, -the Acting Commission for the National Emancipation -of China (<i>Min-ts'u Chieh-fang Hsing-chêng Wei-yüan-hui</i>).<a name="FNanchor_15_139" id="FNanchor_15_139"></a><a href="#Footnote_15_139" class="fnanchor">[15]</a> -The party is at present led by Dr. Chang Pai-chün, -a returned student from Germany and lieutenant -to the late Mr. Têng. It suffers from the official ban -on minor parties, but retains, by its own statement, -a formal organized membership of about 15,000. (This -estimate would, in the opinion of independent observers, -need to be discounted.)</p> - -<p>The Third Party is a <i>San Min Chu I</i> party. It accepts -the legacies of Dr. Sun, in their Left-most phase as they -were at the time of his death. The party is strongly<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_179" id="Page_179">[Pg 179]</a></span> -anti-imperialist, socialist, and land-reform in its teaching. -Its socialism is of an independent kind; the party -neither seeks nor wishes collaboration with the Third -International, although it is willing to cooperate with -the Communists as well as the Kuomintang. It finds -its chief political dogma in the last policies of Sun, -executed in the period just before his death: (1) a pro-Soviet -orientation in international power politics; (2) -a Nationalist-Communist entente; and (3) immediate -aid for the peasants and workers. It is therefore more -like the old Left Kuomintang than the Communists.</p> - -<p>At the present time, the party seeks to promote collaboration -between the two major parties, thus becoming -the second third-party to that friendship, and -urges constitutional government. Eventually it would -prefer a representative government of the whole people -(<i>p'ing min</i>), with the executive agencies composed 60 -per cent of peasants and workers, 40 per cent of others, -chiefly intellectuals. (The proportion is believed to be -Mme. Sun's contribution.) In past practical politics, -The Third Party took part in the Foochow insurrection -of 1933-34, but has on no other occasion obtained -power. It is not expected to attain major status.</p> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">The Chinese National Socialist Party</span></h3> - -<p>The elder brother of Chang Kia-ngau, who is the -enterprising Minister of Economic Affairs, has organized -a political party after the fashion of the traditional -pavilions of learning and patriotism. In China's -past, Confucians frequently developed an institution -which admixed the features of a perpetual resort camp, -a library, a seminar, and a club. Living together amid -scenically beautiful and scholastically adequate surroundings, -they made their influence felt through their -writings and their example, whenever one of their -number returned to public life. Dr. Carson Chang -(Chang Chia-shêng) has organized an Institute of National -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_180" id="Page_180">[Pg 180]</a></span>Culture at Talifu in Yünnan, in the mountains -just below Tibet. There he associates with kindred -souls to attempt a restoration of traditional values in -the traditional manner.</p> - -<p>The confusing and unhappy similarity of the name -of his party to Adolf Hitler's party is explained in the -following communication:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>To give to the world in a clear and unambiguous way -the principles our party stands for and the platform we -wish to adopt should we have the chance to serve our -country, I have written a book, entitled <i>What A State Is -Built On</i>. In formulating my political philosophy, though -I have drawn freely upon the wisdom of the West, I have -kept my eye steadily on the needs of my people and the circumstances -of my country as the guiding and controlling -principles in shaping my own thought. In view of the -possibility of distortions you have suggested in your letter, -an extract is now being prepared in English, with the idea -to facilitate the understanding of our movement and to -present to the intellectual world of the West our principles -and policies ...</p> - -<p>The accidental similarity of names between our party -and Hitler's is indeed an endless source of misunderstanding, -but the similarity is truly "accidental." In Chinese -the name of our party runs "Kuo Chia She Hui Tang," -which may be literally translated into "Nation (Kuo Chia) -Society (She Hui) Party (Tang)," a name we adopted long -before Hitler's party became known, embodying principles -widely different from what Hitler's party stands for. The -suspicion abroad of our connection with Hitler's National -Socialist Party may be traced to an incident two years ago -at Hankow when Kuomintang first came to recognize the -legal status of minor political parties. The foreign correspondents, -in reporting my exchange of letters with -Generalissimo Chiang with regard to the recognition of -our party, referred without a second thought to our party -as "Nazi," thus creating all distortions which might have -occurred even without such mischief. I shall be more than -grateful to you if you would undertake to clear the suspicion -on us and pave the way for lasting understanding between -us and your people.<a name="FNanchor_16_140" id="FNanchor_16_140"></a><a href="#Footnote_16_140" class="fnanchor">[16]</a></p></blockquote> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_181" id="Page_181">[Pg 181]</a></span></p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Social Democrats and</span> <i>La Jeunesse</i></h3> - -<p>These two minuscule parties are both expatriate -groups organized in Paris. The Social Democratic -Party was organized in 1925. It has no connection with -the Socialist Party of the pro-Japanese Kiang Kang-hu, -but is simply the Chinese affiliate of the Second International. -The Social Democratic Party may unite with -the Third Party, in view of the close similarity of aims -and ideology; its leader, Mr. Yang Kan-tao, has been -recognized by being seated in the People's Political -Council.</p> - -<p>The party called <i>Kuo-chia Chu-i Pai</i> (<i>La Jeunesse</i>, or -<i>Parti Républicain Nationaliste de la Jeune Chine</i>) was -organized in 1923 in Paris, by a Mr. Tseng Chi, with -whom is now associated Mr. Tso Shen-sheng, the most -active worker for the party. It survived for years as an -expatriate organization, joined by successive generations -of Chinese students in France. Its policies are -strongly democratic and social-minded. A functional -legislature, the cooperative movement and state capitalism -have suggested a similarity to Fascism in the minds -of some observers; of Trotskyism, to others.<a name="FNanchor_17_141" id="FNanchor_17_141"></a><a href="#Footnote_17_141" class="fnanchor">[17]</a> The -party, through accident and the family connections of -its founder, has connections in Szechuan, and the transfer -of the National Government to Chungking was a -corresponding aid to the slight influence of the party. -Long in exile, it is known by one of its French names -even in China; all it does is to help diversify opinion. -Mr. Tso occupies a seat in the People's Political Council.<a name="FNanchor_18_142" id="FNanchor_18_142"></a><a href="#Footnote_18_142" class="fnanchor">[18]</a></p> - -<p>The National Salvationists are an operating force<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_182" id="Page_182">[Pg 182]</a></span> -in China, and the Communists, while a minority party, -are not a minor party in the American sense. Unhappily, -the existence of minuscule parties among both -patriots and pro-Japanese elements suggests that multi-party -constitutionalism is likely to degenerate into innumerable -party fractions, splinter parties, and novel, -unstable groups. The Kuomintang and the Communists -possess their respective monopolies of power; the -National Salvationists have a popular and sincere cause. -The other parties exist in part because they obtain -recognition. As long as Chinese political processes -depend on leadership by personality, individuals will -be free to form their own parties, while the geographical, -cultural, and economic diversity of the country -holds out little hope for the appearance of two or -three China-wide democratic parties. Far more likely -is it that, with the presumable advent of constitutionalism, -the Kuomintang-Communist alignment will continue, -while the present minor parties will gain some -ground, and innumerable new parties will appear in -order to profit by democratic guarantees of minimal -representation, or to fulfill functions exercised by fraternal -societies in the United States.</p> - - -<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_125" id="Footnote_1_125"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_125"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> Miff, P., <i>Heroic China</i>, New York, 1937, p. 14. This valuable -pamphlet is by one of the Comintern's leading expounders of Marxism -as applied to China. Trotskyist Marxism is represented by a far -fuller, more careful work by Harold Isaacs, cited, together with the -following, cited on p. 20, n. 16. Edgar Snow, the distinguished -American journalist, operates on the basis of an independent, unacknowledged -type of Marxism, which shows itself in consistent -prejudice against the Kuomintang, and in a soul-hungry search for -a dialectical, inner meaning of things with which to supplement -common-sense observation; his "Things that Could Happen," <i>Asia</i>, -Vol. XLI, No. 1 (January 1941), employs Hegelianism at tenth-remove -to analyze the future. It leads to a frequent implication of motives -and to subjective interpretations which rearrange fact as it -ought to be in terms of a rational economic dialectic (i.e., an occult -pattern which provides a uniform key to all human experience). -Thus, in his <i>Red Star Over China</i>, p. 306, he ascribes the massacre -of Reds by Kuomintang officers to the fact that the officers were -the sons of local landlords, enraged by expropriation of the land. -Land-expropriation is a class motive; a moment's reflection would -reveal that previous massacre of the officers' families by Communists -would be a better common-sense motive for blood-thirstiness. This -feature of diluted Marxism would not be worth mentioning were -it not common to so many books about Communists written by -self-proclaimed "non-Communists" habituated to the dialectic. It is -found in the writings of Agnes Smedley, Victor Yakhontoff, Anna -Louise Strong, and I. Epstein, to mention but a few.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_126" id="Footnote_2_126"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_126"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> Sheean, Vincent, <i>Personal History</i>, New York, 1937; Malraux, -André, <i>Man's Fate</i>, New York, n.d.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_127" id="Footnote_3_127"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_127"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> <i>Kung-ho-kuo</i> is the Western-type term for Republic; the Kuomintang -uses <i>Min-kuo</i> or Folk-realm. <i>Su-wei-ai</i> is a phonetic representation -of "Soviet"; the characters, not intended to have meaning, -are unconsciously humorous in that their lexicographical signification -is "Revive (and) maintain dust!"</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_128" id="Footnote_4_128"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_128"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> Based on the Party Constitution, <i>Kung-ch'an-tang Tang-chang</i> -[Party Constitution of the Communist Party], [Chungking?], XXVII -(1938), p. 1-21. The entire Constitution is reprinted below as -Appendix II (E), p. <a href="#Page_359">359</a>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_5_129" id="Footnote_5_129"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_129"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> Harold Isaacs, in the work cited, has many passing references -to this phenomenon; his caustic indictment of Ch'en Shao-yu (Wang -Ming), p. 438 <i>ff.</i>, is a case in point. Note Ch'en Tu-hsiu, Li Li-san, -Chang Kuo-tao—in China, as in Russia, most of the founders and -early leaders of the Communists have been set aside.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_6_130" id="Footnote_6_130"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_130"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> Snow, Edgar, work cited, p. 348 <i>ff.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_7_131" id="Footnote_7_131"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_131"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> <i>Twin Stars of China</i>, cited, p. 66. Major Carlson adds to this -description in his <i>The Chinese Army</i>, cited, p. 35 <i>ff.</i> Most enthusiastically, -he attributes to the Red Leaders honesty, humility, selflessness, -truthfulness, incorruptibility, and a desire to do what is right. -He praises their superb tactical abilities, their efficiency as organizers, -their competence as leaders. He accepts the statements made -by the Communist leaders as matters of good faith, and does not -question their sincerity. Since he is the only qualified military -visitor to put his impressions on record, these appraisals are valuable.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_8_132" id="Footnote_8_132"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_132"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> Snow, Edgar, <i>Red Star Over China</i>, cited, p. 111-167.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_9_133" id="Footnote_9_133"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_133"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> Chang Kuo-tao, <i>T'ou-li Kung-ch'an-tang Mien-mien-kuan</i> [An -Impartial Survey of (My) Departure from the Communist Party], -Kuangchou [Canton], 1938, p. 27 <i>ff.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_10_134" id="Footnote_10_134"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_134"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> The same, p. 10.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_11_135" id="Footnote_11_135"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_135"><span class="label">[11]</span></a> The Resolutions of the Enlarged Sixth Plenary Session of the -Central Executive Committee of the Communist Party of China -comment as follows: "The danger of the 'Right' opportunists lies -in the fact that they execute the tactics of an anti-Japanese National -United Front at the expense of the independence of the party, politically -and organizationally distorting the policy of the proletariat -[<i>sic</i>] in building an Anti-Japanese National United Front so that <i>the -working class and the Communist Party become tails of the bourgeoisie -rather than the vanguard</i>." (Italics inserted in translation.) New -China Information Committee, <i>Resolutions and Telegrams of the -Sixth Plenum, Central Committee, Communist Party of China, November -6, 1938</i>, Hong Kong [1939?], p. 9. The demand for vanguard -position from a minority party still technically illegal, and the damning -of the Government and Kuomintang as "bourgeois," are continuous -features of Communist policy. Their concept of cooperation is, -as in Germany, Spain, and elsewhere, cooperation <i>under</i> Communist -leadership.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_12_136" id="Footnote_12_136"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_136"><span class="label">[12]</span></a> Ch'ao Shê [The Morning Club], <i>Niu-wu Yen-lun Chien-t'ao Kang-yao</i> -[A General Review of Fallacious Utterances], Chungking, XXIX -(1940), p. 7. The work is a Kuomintang reply to Communist theses -in a debate on the nature of national union.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_13_137" id="Footnote_13_137"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13_137"><span class="label">[13]</span></a> Statement of Col. Ch'in Po-k'u to the author, Chungking, July -29, 1940.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_14_138" id="Footnote_14_138"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14_138"><span class="label">[14]</span></a> An early statement of National Salvation views is found in -Wang Tsao-shih, "A Salvationist's View of the Sino-Japanese Problem," -<i>The China Quarterly</i>, Vol. II, No. 4 (Special Fall Number, 1937), -p. 681-9. The author is one of the Seven Gentlemen.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_15_139" id="Footnote_15_139"></a><a href="#FNanchor_15_139"><span class="label">[15]</span></a> Statement by the head of The Third Party, Dr. Chang Pai-chün -(Chang Peh Chuen), to the author, Chungking, August 2, 1940. The -translations were also supplied by Dr. Chang.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_16_140" id="Footnote_16_140"></a><a href="#FNanchor_16_140"><span class="label">[16]</span></a> Letter to the author, dated October 24, 1940.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_17_141" id="Footnote_17_141"></a><a href="#FNanchor_17_141"><span class="label">[17]</span></a> E.g., John Gunther in his <i>Inside Asia</i>, New York, 1939, p. 272.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_18_142" id="Footnote_18_142"></a><a href="#FNanchor_18_142"><span class="label">[18]</span></a> By far the most complete summary of the minor and minuscule -parties is to be found in two articles by a young Chinese newspaperman: -Shen, James, "Minority Parties in China," <i>Asia</i>, Vol. XL, no. 2 -(February 1940), p. 81-3; and a second installment, in the same -periodical. Vol. XL, no. 3 (March 1940), p. 137-9.</p></div></div> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_183" id="Page_183">[Pg 183]</a></span></p> - - -<h2><span class="smcap">Chapter VII</span><br /> - -GOVERNING INSTITUTIONS OF THE JAPANESE AND PRO-JAPANESE</h2> - - -<p>Facing the National Armies, and encircling the -guerrillas, lie the Imperial Japanese forces. Frank -agents of Imperial policy, they—unlike the Hitler-Mussolini -contingents in Spain—make no pretense of subordination -to their Chinese allies. Publicly and legally -instruments of the Japanese state, their function is to -destroy the Chinese government, to control and bend -Chinese society to the Imperial purposes, and to protect -Chinese who come forth as allies. The Japanese -Empire is accordingly itself militarily extended to -China; occasional, half-hearted attempts to deny the -ensuing international complications have been sternly -rejected by other great powers. The United States is -not alone in insisting on full Japanese responsibility -for everything that happens within the zone of Japanese -control.</p> - -<p>The position of the Japanese army as a governing -engine, unacknowledged colonial machinery of a vast -unassimilable colony, is not one relished by the Japanese -people or by their leaders. Even in the case of -Manchoukuo, the Japanese played a half-deception -on themselves by pretending that they were extending -the area of their influence, not the extent of their -responsibilities. In part this distaste for overt control -is based on the ease, cheapness and irresponsibility of -indirect rule, employed in varying degrees by the British -in Malaysia, the French in Indo-China, and the Soviets -in Outer Mongolia. The Japanese like to think that<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_184" id="Page_184">[Pg 184]</a></span> -they are aiding China, and incidentally themselves, -to a New Order in East Asia—autarkic, stable, racially -independent of the Whites, militarily secure. They do -not like to contemplate the slaughter of innocent people -for sheer conquest, or to consider the hopeless immensity -of trying to overwhelm China. This complicates -their position.<a name="FNanchor_1_143" id="FNanchor_1_143"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_143" class="fnanchor">[1]</a></p> - -<p>For if the status of the Japanese army in China is -clear, its purposes are not. The war aims of the Japanese -are confused. Japan's goal is defined by overtones -of the inexpressible—in economic motivation, -once valid, no longer meaningful; in rationalizations so -long reiterated that they become genuine; in the toss -and push of world affairs, tempting Japan's leaders to -this opportunism or that; in sheer sentiments of Japanolatry, -Emperor-worship, racialism, archaic resentment -against China, fellow-feeling for the Chinese -orientals, and plain fear. A few Japanese know exactly -what they want. The policy as a whole, the policy -of the Imperial state, encompasses ill-assorted economic, -political, strategic, racial and purely ideological -objectives.</p> - -<p>Even at the simple level of institutional control, the -Japanese aim in China has been ill-defined. The restoration -of the Manchu monarchy in Manchoukuo was an -appeal to monarchist legitimism, to the Chinese past, -and to common Confucianist values. When the Japanese -came further into China, it was at first expected -that they might install Mr. Chin P'u-yi as Emperor -of all China, and rehabilitate him in the Palace-museum -he left when a youth. Instead, they apparently attempted -to create a chain of linked, reactionary, agricultural -Chinese states, mixed in form—a federation of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_185" id="Page_185">[Pg 185]</a></span> -princes in Inner Mongolia, an Empire in Manchoukuo, -republics elsewhere. They began by going as far as -to create a dozen or more ephemeral pro-Japanese agencies—for -a while one might legitimately have expected -that a Nanking government follow a Peking government, -a Hankow government, a Canton government, -<i>ad infinitum</i>. But the trend was reversed when the -Autonomous East Hopei Anti-Communist Government -of Mr. Yin Ju-kêng was merged with the Peking regime, -and—as pressure rose in Japan for a settlement of the -China affair—a China-wide Japanophile government -was first contemplated, and then established. The establishment -of these institutions has not meant the -abdication of the Imperial Japanese forces from the -government of China. The pro-Japanese governments -were and are civil auxiliaries of the Japanese army; their -influence has in no case extended beyond the immediately -effective reach of the Japanese infantry. Even -in planning the long-range permanent settlement of -Chinese affairs—on her own terms—Japan does not propose -to withdraw all her troops from China.</p> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">The Japanese Army as a Chinese Government</span></h3> - -<p>The Japanese army is the effective military government -of occupied China. The Japanophile Chinese -have a few troops, who function in close proximity to -Japanese, and are in no sense a military counterweight -to the invaders. The Japanese army is a large force, -modern by somewhat second-rate standards, which requires -the use of an effective communications system, -modern economic auxiliaries such as shops, banks, post -offices, and a variety of other services including hospitals, -shrines, brothels, and crematories. These do not -exist in China in forms suited to Japanese needs, nor -could Japan afford to trust Chinese with the railways, -the air services, the river commerce, the telegraphs, the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_186" id="Page_186">[Pg 186]</a></span> -food warehouses, and other most vital services. Thus, -all over occupied China, the Japanese have installed a -military government.</p> - -<p>This government assumes direct responsibility for -administering whatever seems necessary or profitable. -Thus, in the city of Nanking, the best buildings are -occupied by the Japanese, and the Wang government -is profoundly gratified to be allowed to share some of -them, obtaining second choice. The Japanese military, -through protected corporations, supervises the operation -of the railroads and airlines, but it does not even -rely on the corporations to provide military transport, -which is under direct army control. If a Chinese who -has gone over to the Japanese and occupies a high position -in their protected governments wishes to ride on -a Chinese train between Shanghai and Nanking, he -must buy a ticket from a Japanese clerk, show it to a -Japanese conductor under the eyes of a Japanese guard, -with Japanese detectives standing about, order a Sino-Japanese -or pseudo-European meal in a Japanese dining -car with Japanese waitresses from a menu printed -in Japanese, and must pay, not in his own puppet-bank -currency, but in special Japanese currency not -acceptable in Japan.</p> - -<p>To govern China, the Japanese Army has not developed -beyond the usual devices of military rule. There -are several reasons for this, primary among them the -difficulty of governing Chinese at all. In a pluralistic -society, such as China, command is largely superseded -by negotiation, and the issuer of a command must be -prepared for oblique thwarting. A Japanese who tells -a Chinese to do something needs a bayonet with which -to gesture; otherwise the Chinese, accustomed to circumventing, -avoiding, or mocking authority, will disregard -him. The Germans may order the Danes to -make a two-way street a one-way street, and the -Danes, accustomed to authority, will concur. When<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_187" id="Page_187">[Pg 187]</a></span> -the Japanese promulgate a regulation, nothing short -of massacre could ensure its absolute, unconditional -obedience.</p> - -<p>The language difficulty is another obstacle to direct -Japanese government. A cultivated Japanese and Chinese -may write classical Chinese to one another, and -even the barely literate can scribble a few characters, -the meanings of which may coincide; but the spoken -languages differ from one another almost as much as -English differs from either. To govern China directly -would involve an enormous feat of language training, -or an overnight re-shaping of the Chinese national -character. Non-violent resistance, wilful but concealed -negligence, lurking impertinence, consistent sloppiness, -obsequiousness mingled with hatred—these Chinese -tools of resistance, added to the language barrier, prevent -any early Japanese hope of direct government. In -years to come, if such come, Japanese trained in the -Chinese language could supersede every Chinese above -the level of foreman. A strong tendency in that direction -is observable in Manchoukuo.<a name="FNanchor_2_144" id="FNanchor_2_144"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_144" class="fnanchor">[2]</a></p> - -<p>The Japanese have abandoned direct government for -the present. They would defeat their own purposes by -assuming a task for which they have insufficient personnel, -which would be very costly, and for which their -army is ill-equipped in morale or technical ability. -Difficult though it may be to employ pro-Japanese Chinese -associates, it would be even more difficult to find -Chinese now ready to profess direct loyalty to Japan. -The only Chinese thus far Japanized are a number of -Taiwanese (Formosans), whose island was ceded to -Japan forty-six years ago. Chinese by blood and language, -many of them have been reared in the third -generation of Japanese rule. Some are fighting with -the Chinese forces, but others, loyal to their lawful -superiors, betray their fellow-Chinese. The Formosans<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_188" id="Page_188">[Pg 188]</a></span> -are insufficient in number to govern China, or to provide -Japan with even the most elementary foothold. -The Japanese have hence turned to the peculiar form -of indirect rule identified by the popular appellation, -<i>puppet states</i>.</p> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">The Problem of Puppet States</span></h3> - -<p>Lawful, well-established indirect rule is a familiar -feature of colonial practice. Constituting an internationally -recognized legal relationship between the paramount -power and the encompassed state, it has been applied -extensively by the European powers in Africa -and Asia. The Indian and Malay states, under Britain; -Cambodia and Annam-Tonkin, under France; the East -Indian sultanates, under the Netherlands—these offer -a rich repository of precedent.</p> - -<p>Unacknowledged intervention involving no legal relationship -is also a known feature of modern politics. -The practices of the United States in the Caribbean and -Central America, particularly during the 1920's, are -familiar, but the leading case of intervention without -responsibility occurred in the relationship between the -Soviet Union (first the R.S.F.S.R.) and the Outer Mongol -People's Republic. Four features of what has since -come to be called political puppetry are here made -fully manifest: first, the establishment of the subordinate -through the military aid of the superior; second, -the continued effective control, unacknowledged in -law, of the subordinate by the superior, coupled with -economic coordination of the two; third, bilateral insistence -upon the formal independence of the subordinate -state; fourth, the claim of the superior that it -<i>has not</i> intervened, coupled with international non-recognition -of the new relationship. The four features—establishment, -coordination, fictitious independence<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_189" id="Page_189">[Pg 189]</a></span> -and international nonentity—were clearly defined by -Soviet political practice in Outer Mongolia and Tannu-Tuva -long before Manchoukuo was created.</p> - -<p>In addition to this neighborly example, the Japanese -had another source, commonly ignored in current Western -comment on the Far East, on which to draw: the -quasi-familist Confucian international system which -prevailed down to the time of men now living. Successive -Chinese Empires developed a clear, viable scheme -of senior-junior relationships controlling their intercourse -with other organized governments. The other, -smaller states acknowledged China to be the senior -realm, conceding that the Chinese Emperor was lord of -the world. They paid formal tribute to China; their envoys -were not ambassadors but tributary agents, while -Chinese envoys came as high commissioners, superior in -rank to the courts to which they were accredited. This -relationship (awkwardly termed "dependency," "vassalage," -"tributary" status, or subjection to "suzerainty," -in Western terms) could not be fitted into the Western -state system. Involving the assertion of Chinese power -without concurrent admission of Chinese responsibility, -it was rejected by the Western states, and lapsed following -the French seizure of Indo-China, the British occupation -of Burma, and Korean independence under -Japanese compulsion. Today, Japan's moral effusions -concerning the New Order in East Asia and her digressions -from Western patterns of international law -in dealing with Manchoukuo and Wang Ch'ing-wei -both indicate that the Japanese move freely, sincerely, -and unconsciously in a frame of reference which, obvious -to them, is invisible to Westerners. The Japan-Manchoukuo -or Japan-Wang relationship could be -aligned with the relationship which Li Hung-chang -wished, sixty years ago, to maintain in Korea, and found -significantly similar. The Japanese understood the position<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_190" id="Page_190">[Pg 190]</a></span> -of juniority in international relations: to their intense -humiliation, they confessed themselves China's -junior during the Ashikaga period.<a name="FNanchor_3_145" id="FNanchor_3_145"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_145" class="fnanchor">[3]</a></p> - -<p>A third meaningful context for Japanese practice -is found in the basic, factual scheme of current international -relations. No nation in an interdependent world -is independent except by legal fiction; none could maintain -its present level of civilization without the existence -of the others. In these terms, legal independence fades -as time passes, and cross-national power becomes more -evident. Western imperialism was described by Sun -Yat-sen as reducing China to a hypo-colony. More recently, -first the Communists and then the Japanese have -accused Chiang K'ai-shek of being the puppet of imperialism,<a name="FNanchor_4_146" id="FNanchor_4_146"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_146" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> -while occasional Leftists regard Chiang as -even now a puppet of Japan<a name="FNanchor_5_147" id="FNanchor_5_147"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_147" class="fnanchor">[5]</a> and a few citizens of imperialist -states see him as a Communist puppet. The -Germans treat Churchill as the puppet of Roosevelt, -and Roosevelt as a puppet for international Jewry, -while the present Stalinist line attributes puppetry to -the entire catalogue of world political institutions save -those made quick by its own infallibility. The fundamental<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_191" id="Page_191">[Pg 191]</a></span> -point of such appraisal depends upon the <i>attribution</i> -of power relationships. Dependence is indisputable -only if one government functions within the military -framework of another, or if the personnel of the -subordinate is drawn from the superior, or if clear -and immediate causal relationships can be proved between -the continued fiscal or military action of the -sustaining government and the actual existence of the -sustained government—although even this last leads to -subjective interpretation.</p> - -<p>The term <i>puppet</i> is not clear or apt, except in its most -concrete sense—that of a person who is almost literally -a marionette, whose utterances public and private are -not his own, whose actions are supervised, and whose -personal choice or opinion is not merely thwarted, -but left out of consideration. Not all the Chinese who -work with Japan are ventriloquists' dummies. The author -talked freely with men who staked their careers -on the inescapable success of the Japanese military, -and who functioned in absolute conformity to general -limits of policy and publicity laid down by the Japanese; -these general limits were wide enough to permit -a considerable degree of latitude of manners, and to -allow variance in power and policy between the various -Chinese under Japan. Use of the term <i>puppet</i> in such -cases is not clear. It implies a higher degree of effective -Japanese control, and a greater pliability of Chinese -cooperators, than can be shown to exist.</p> - -<p>Since, however, the National Government is recognized, -both by the majority of the Chinese people and -by <i>all</i> powers (including Germany and Italy) except -Japan, to be the legitimate government of China, representing -the Chinese nation, action against that government -may properly and strictly be denominated -treason; a person so acting may be called, formally, a -traitor and, less formally but more descriptively, a Japanophile. -Juridically the Chinese Soviet leaders were<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_192" id="Page_192">[Pg 192]</a></span> -also traitors, but they were never Japanophile. This -term gains by specificity what it loses through awkwardness.</p> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">The Provisional and Reformed Governments</span></h3> - -<p>The Japanese have determined, assisted and promoted -establishment of a number of friendly Chinese -governments. Huapeikuo, a North China separatist -state, went the way of the Francophile Rhineland Republic; -it never got off the drafting board. The East -Hopei Autonomous Anti-Communist Government of -Mr. Yin Ju-kêng provided, within the North China demilitarized -zone, a vast gateway for smuggling; when -the National Government withdrew its forces from -North China, the Japanese sought more pretentious -aids to conquest. The Provisional Government was -the first of these, following an Inner Mongol federation -(<i>Mêng-liu Lien-ho Tzŭ-chih Chêng-fu</i>), affiliated -with Manchoukuo; it was soon rivaled by the Reformed -Government; and in March 1940, both were incorporated -into the Reorganized National Government of -Mr. Wang Ch'ing-wei. Other governments, sponsored -by various quarreling departments of the Japanese military, -or organized by Chinese confidence men, have -appeared transiently and then disappeared.</p> - -<p>Three points concerning Japanophile governments -contribute to assessment of their chances; their origin -and structure; their ideological (narrowly, propagandist) -position; and their personnel. These points illustrate -a significantly ambivalent trend: the Japanese -have found their degree of freedom of action less -than they had expected in Chinese politics, and to -that extent have been defeated; they have also yielded -to the demands of the situation, and have won, in -part, in that their chances of success appreciate with -realism.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_193" id="Page_193">[Pg 193]</a></span></p> -<p>The Provisional Government of the Republic of -China (<i>Chung-hua Min-kuo Lin-shih Chêng-fu</i>) was -formed at Peking on December 14, 1937, and ended -by merger into the Wang Ch'ing-wei government on -March 30, 1940, perpetuating a high degree of separatism -under the subgovernmental style, North China -Political Council. Like its predecessors and successors, -it was created by a self-proclaimed committee organized -with the consent and knowledge of the Japanese military, -if not by the Japanese directly. The members of -the Provisional Government were old, weak men, -mostly adherents of the Anfu clique which had been -Japanophile during and after the War of 1914-18. A -few were even brought forth from more archaic strata, -lonely adherents to the abandoned monarchy. The -youngest were in their fifties and the leading officers -were extreme conservatives—men of some intelligence -and reputation, but obsolete.</p> - -<p>The structure of the <i>Lin-shih</i> Government was interesting -in that it formed a republic of three committees, -as follows:<a name="FNanchor_6_148" id="FNanchor_6_148"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_148" class="fnanchor">[6]</a></p> - -<p class="center">PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT (Committee)</p> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 400px;"> -<img src="images/i_193.jpg" width="400" height="168" alt="Lin-shih government" /> -</div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_194" id="Page_194">[Pg 194]</a></span></p> - -<p>Structurally important features are: the absence of -any method of election, direct or indirect, or of any -ultimate source of "sovereign" personnel—the government -having borne itself out of chaos, constitutionally -a remarkable feat; the elimination of even nominal -party control of government, or cameral legislation, or -constituent assembly, these being hated vestiges of the -Chinese and Western, but not Japanese, notion that -popular sovereignty is to receive genuflections if not -credence; and, most startlingly, the absence of a head! -There was no President, Protector, Chief of State, -Leader, or Dictator; the highest officer was the Shanghai -banker, Mr. Wang K'ê-min, Chairman of the Executive -Division (literally, <i>yüan</i>, but not in the Nationalist -sense). The scope, succession and competence -of this Provisional Government were as much in doubt -as its origin.</p> - -<p>Under the Provisional Government there flowered a -new political philosophy, the <i>Hsin Min Chu I</i> ("Principles -of the Renewed People," "People-Renewing Principles," -or "Principles of the New People"). The similarity -of this principle to the <i>San Min Chu I</i> is striking, -but is no more than verbal. Propaganda under this -credo resembled the Japanese-prepared state-philosophy -of <i>Wang Tao</i>, the <i>kingly</i> (as opposed to tyrannous and -unnatural) <i>way</i> of the Confucian canon, which—revered -throughout the Far East, even by Sun Yat-sen—had been -slanted to suit Manchoukuo through a Concordia Society -(<i>Hsieh-ho-hui</i>). Each of the Sunyatsenist principles -was refuted in detail, Pan-Asian racialism was -encouraged, a class-war <i>between</i> the nations was emphasized, -and conservatism in thought, manners, and -morals recommended. The Peking propaganda machinery -was well-financed; the <i>Hsin-min-hui</i> became the -only tolerated political group. This <i>hui</i> was headed by -Mr. Miao Ping, a Kuomintang Party veteran whose political-bureau -experience dated back to the days of -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_195" id="Page_195">[Pg 195]</a></span>Borodin. His renegation, never publicly explained, -enabled Japan to issue a careful parody of the <i>San Min -Chu I</i>. His assistant was a Japanese. Business associations, -student groups, and educational administration -were fitted into the pattern. The principles were not -logically or systematically developed, but the key terms -sufficed to coordinate opportunist appeals justifying the -invasion, and opposing resistance, guerrillas, modernizations, -and democracy. The <i>Hsin Min Chu I</i> received -no credence through conversion, faith, or loyalty. Operating -on sound advertising principles, however, they -served well even if they failed to command obedience -but did unsettle allegiance to the other side, and ubiquitous -iteration muddied thought.</p> - -<p>The personnel of the Provisional Government included -no actively important political leader. Many -had been important long before; some were conspicuous -in fields other than politics, and had even served on -the semi-buffer Hopei-Chahar Political Council which -was Chiang's last compromise with Japan. Japan's failure -to obtain an effective political leader is important, -for this lack eventually led to the acceptance of Wang -Ch'ing-wei. The old age, past misfortunes, the motley -reputations of the Provisional Government leaders attested -a national sentiment sufficient to enforce unity -beyond the reach of national law.</p> - -<p>The Reformed Government of the Republic of -China (<i>Chung-hua Min-kuo Wei-hsin Chêng-fu</i>) was -established March 28, 1938. It lapsed simultaneously -with its rival and colleague, the Provisional Government. -There were several suggestive points of difference, -although the chief difference was the fact that the -Provisional Government operated from Peiping and the -Reformed from Nanking. Both were national in form, -a difficulty which was solved by the creation of a United -Council to speak for all occupied China. This Council -had only the power to issue news releases, which it did. -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_196" id="Page_196">[Pg 196]</a></span>Despite duplication of capitals and national form, the -Nanking government revealed a slipping in the Japanese -insistence on conformity to their ideas.</p> - -<p>In structure, the Reformed Government was a mutilated -copy of the National Government. It possessed -five <i>yüan</i>, thereby continuing the Sunyatsenist constitutional -system which Japan first sought to destroy. In -doctrine, it took over the North China-Manchoukuo -pattern, under the name <i>Ta Min Chu I</i> (Principles of -the Great People), with a party under the name <i>Ta-min-hui</i>. -The walls of Nanking were covered with the -emblem of the party, a red circular shield with a yellow -crescent moon enclosing a white star. Quasi-educational -work approximated that of the North; but the Japanese -found the Yangtze sympathetic to the National Government -and Kuomintang, and hence employed devices -reminiscent of Chungking.</p> - -<p>For Reformed Government personnel, the Japanese -found individuals who were in most instances either as -old as their Peiping colleagues, but less famous, or much -younger, and relatively unknown. With the city of -Shanghai only partially under its control, because local -opportunists reached the tax offices first, the Reformed -Government provided an outlet for persons who had -felt themselves unjustly denied office, or slighted by -the Kuomintang, or who had wrecked careers, once -promising, by some ghastly misstep or crime and now -saw a miraculous chance to return.</p> - -<p>These new governments could not on principle claim -the allegiance of their own clerks. The personnel, disloyal -and of poor morale, was often so corrupt that -no government services—needed by Japanese civilians -and army alike—could be entrusted to them. Multiple -taxes blocked Japanese trade in the area Japan had -occupied. The Japanese realized that the United Council -and the senescent politicians were not enough. Instead -of abandoning interventionist governments, they<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_197" id="Page_197">[Pg 197]</a></span> -tried a leader of genuine importance, considerable ability, -and some following. His treason was Japan's last -chance to govern China without assuming the task herself, -risking a premature undertaking. To understand -the moves and motives of Wang Ch'ing-wei it is necessary -to regard his character and political history.</p> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">The Reorganized National Government of Wang -Ch'ing-wei</span></h3> - -<p>In contrast to Chiang, who receives the obloquy -which goes with power, Wang Ch'ing-wei has spent the -greater part of his life as a political Out. He began brilliantly. -While in his twenties, he became a revolutionary -hero by a bold attempt to assassinate the Prince -Regent, and after the establishment of the Republic -followed the unhappy meanders of the Nationalist -movement. His association with Sun in the years before -Sun's death was very close, and he has as good a title -as anyone to the apostolic succession. (His title is not -necessarily much better than that of various other Kuomintang -leaders; a score or so of elder statesmen of the -Party could claim a longer service of Party leadership -and equality or seniority to Wang in Party rank.)</p> - -<p>In 1927 Chiang and Wang had different regimes -for the first time, and Wang went into exile; he tried -again in 1930, and went into exile; and he is trying -now. His cooperation with the Japanese must not be -regarded as the sudden prostitution of a worthy figure, -nor as the culminating criminality of an utter rogue. -As in a Greek tragedy, Wang, blinded by self-esteem and -goaded by political frustration, has chosen his unsavory -course from understandable motives. Several lines of -continuity lead up to his establishment of the Reorganized -National Government at Nanking, and condition -the nature of this government.</p> - -<p>Primarily, Wang has been an in-and-out schismatic -in Kuomintang ranks. It is quite possible that in terms<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_198" id="Page_198">[Pg 198]</a></span> -of a head count, he may have had the immediate support -of a greater portion of the membership than did -Chiang in the first break in 1927, but his proportion -has fairly steadily declined ever since. There have been -a large number of men who accepted him as leader, -just as in the preceding decade there were men <i>Wu mi</i> -("infatuated with Wu [Pei-fu]"). In 1930-31 his -organization paralleled the Government-supported Kuomintang -in all parts of the world. Today he has some -followers who follow even to Nanking. These men are -bound to him by ties of long, habitual obedience, by -blood kinship, and by generously offered loyalty: the -distinguished and vigorous Ch'en Kung-po, now Mayor -of Shanghai; by Chou Fu-hai, who—before his proscription—was -the most popular commentator on the <i>San -Min Chu I</i>; Lin Pai-sheng, who had served Wang well -as spokesman; and the entertaining T'ang Leang-li, a -Javanese-Chinese writer of international fame, who has -probably written more books on China in English than -any other Chinese.</p> - -<p>On the other hand, he has lost office-holding followers -by the scores, many of whom hold positions ranging -up to Vice-Ministerships in Chungking, and he -seems to have lost almost all of his rank and file followers. -The chief defection was that of Messrs. Tao -Hsi-shêng and Kao Tsung-wu, who fled from Chungking -to Shanghai and Nanking, and then fled back -again, bringing with them sensational copies of Wang's -secret preliminary agreements with the Japanese. Dr. -Tao, a historian, served Wang temporarily as Party-Minister -of Publicity; Dr. Kao had been in the foreign -office while Wang still collaborated with Chiang.<a name="FNanchor_7_149" id="FNanchor_7_149"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_149" class="fnanchor">[7]</a> His -following consisted almost entirely of politicians, ranging -from the rank of scholar-bureaucrat down to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_199" id="Page_199">[Pg 199]</a></span> -hooligans. The masses which he led in 1927 have dwindled -to hundreds, and the replacements are of distinct unworthiness—persons, -already cooperating with the Japanese, -whom he must lead for lack of better. He has lost -followers with almost every move he has made, whether -rebelling, going into exile, accepting government post -under Chiang, or working with Japan. The Wang -clique may be represented by a consistently declining -curve.</p> - -<p>In the face of this, it is unexpected to find that Wang -has been reasonably honest and consistent, as were -Trotsky and Röhm. His consistency may be described -as a perfectly regular spiral, which maintains unchanging -direction but never goes in a straight line. Wang -has always favored not-fighting, peace, civilian and constitutional -government, and making friends with any -nation which professes friendship for China. The loftiness -of his motives might be impugned by pointing out -that each is the antithesis of one of Chiang's characteristics; -but the ultimate test of Wang's sincerity lies with -the psychiatrists rather than with political scientists. -Assuming sincerity, how did these consistent standards -lead him to Nanking?</p> - -<p>In 1927 Chiang broke with the Communists quite a -while before Wang did. Wang was willing to yield a -doubtful point here, to credit the other side with good -motives there, and to keep the Wuhan government going -as long as he could. His difficulties were the difficulties -of a constitutionalist willing to maintain the -constitution at the cost of some appeasement. In the -following years of exile, he upbraided Chiang's machine-boss -tactics within the Kuomintang; the name -"Reorganized Kuomintang" which he selected for his -schismatics, is indicative of his desire to promote regularity -in party elections and free democratic discussion -in party congresses.</p> - -<p>A striking instance of repetition may be seen in contrasting<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_200" id="Page_200">[Pg 200]</a></span> -the Nanking of 1940 with the Peking of 1930. -In 1930 Chiang K'ai-shek had been threatened by military -attack and had found a great part of China wrested -from him by superior forces, those of the <i>tuchün</i> Feng -Yü-hsiang and Yen Hsi-shan; but the National Government -maintained its position in the capital. In 1940, -the capital had moved to Chungking and the armed -enemies were Japanese; Hu Han-min (the great Rightist -leader) was dead, a new Communist alliance was in -effect, and the outside world was in a turmoil more -profound than China's. Despite the supervening -changes, Wang Ch'ing-wei was found in 1940 in precisely -the role of 1930. Again he was the front for a -military regime. In 1930 he had been a Left-liberal -front for native militarism; in 1940, he was the appeasing, -conservative front for the Imperial Japanese army. -In 1930 he had his own "Reorganized" Kuomintang; -he had his "Orthodox" again in 1940. In 1930 he -usurped the National Government offices, titles, and -regalia; he did this again in 1940. In 1930 his career -ended with military defeat and he went into exile, later -bargaining his position back into Chinese politics.</p> - -<p>Wang appears to have become the victim of an <i>idée -fixe</i>: he believes that if he impersonates government -devotedly enough, and with careful enough detail, he -will become government. Brilliant, sincere, adroit, he -is burdened by a pathological self-esteem and is so much -the victim of his own past rationalizations that he is no -longer inventive. Obviously such a character, in the -face of recurrent failure, cannot assume the blame for -it. Wang's demon is the Generalissimo.</p> - -<p>Another characteristic of Wang appears clearly at -this point: the belief of the appeaser that he can outsmart -the appeased; he no doubt thought that his -<i>tuchün</i> colleagues would become victims of the government -which they let him create. On his way out of -China after Chiang's armies and Chang Hsüeh-liang's<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_201" id="Page_201">[Pg 201]</a></span> -intervention had settled this affair, he stopped over in -Canton to take part in an even more transitory and less -successful rebellion.</p> - -<p>The next round of Wang-Chiang rivalry displays the -consummate political strategy of the Generalissimo and -the ruin of Wang by his own virtues. For three full -years, 1932 through 1935, Wang was President of the -Executive <i>Yüan</i> and second only to Chiang. After a -little more than a year out of office—owing in part to a -gunshot wound—he returned in the crucial months of -1937 just before the outbreak of general hostilities, -and stayed with the National Government through the -first year and a half of the war—until December 1938. -In fifteen more months he reached terms with the Japanese; -eight months after he set up a government with -their consent and sponsorship, they recognized that -government. Throughout this period Wang advocated -peace, non-aggression to the point of non-defense and -surrender, and universal conciliation. These attitudes -made him very useful to Chiang when Chiang needed -him, and made him dispose of himself when he was no -longer helpful to Chiang.</p> - -<p>Wang was ruined by the long, agonizing appeasement -of which Chiang was the leader, in the six years between -the Japanese invasion of China's Manchurian provinces -and the outbreak of undeclared war in July 1937. -Throughout this period the forces of Leftist reform, of -Communist pressure (both military and political), of -student sentiment, of overseas-Chinese patriotism, and -finally of national self-respect itself, fed the opposition -to Chiang, who knew that, whatever the cost, China -was not militarily or politically ready to fight Japan. -Wang Ch'ing-wei, who when out of office had espoused -some of the most genuinely popular and necessary reforms, -found himself civilian leader of a government -following an intensely unpopular policy, and unable -to profit by the rise of opposition. The Generalissimo<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_202" id="Page_202">[Pg 202]</a></span> -needed someone to replace Hu Han-min, with whom -he disagreed and whom he temporarily incarcerated. -Wang provided a counter-balance to the Hu Han-min -group, undermined his own popularity, and helped -shield Chiang from anti-appeasement criticism.</p> - -<p>Wang Ch'ing-wei, in this period, feared war and -grasped at the conciliation which the Japanese offered -between successive invasions. In 1937, Wang worked for -the localization of the war at the cost of North China, -on the theory that the Japanese could take what they -wished. He reiterated his old point that the Chinese -could not possibly whip the Japanese on the fields of -battle, but that they might outmaneuver them over the -tables of diplomacy. The advent of war was a disappointment -and source of worry to him.</p> - -<p>In the course of the celebrated retreat from Nanking -to Hankow, and from Hankow to Chungking, Wang lost -no opportunity to work for peace. When the Germans -offered themselves as intermediaries in the Hankow -period, Wang sought the opening of negotiations. -There was a violent uproar in the People's Political -Council, not then reported in the press. When the government -moved to Chungking, Wang was even more -despondent: victory seemed remote, the Communists -worried him as much as did the Japanese, and the Generalissimo -swept opposition aside with the slogans of -resistance. Like other peoples in war time, the Chinese -began to confuse peace and treason. Wang and his -closest supporters felt that they were being deprived -of freedom of speech; their known inclination to surrender -and negotiate had supplied Chiang with a weapon -which might even prove personally dangerous to -them. The death by firing-squad of General Han Fu-ch'u -showed that treason, or the charge of it, had become -serious. Wang and his followers rationalized their -own fearfulness concerning the war into the belief that -they were expressing the will of the peace-loving masses.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_203" id="Page_203">[Pg 203]</a></span> -In December 1938 he got out of China by a surprise -flight to Indo-China. His followers had previously been -filtering down to Hong Kong. The Konoye statement,<a name="FNanchor_8_150" id="FNanchor_8_150"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_150" class="fnanchor">[8]</a> -just issued, gave him an opening to treat with the Japanese.</p> - -<p>Throughout the negotiations, Wang behaved as -though he were himself the legitimate Chinese government. -He did not accept the minimum Japanese -conditions, but held out for an agreement which would -preserve the fictions of Chinese independence, allow -him to fly the national flag, establish his version of -the Kuomintang, and attempt every kind of linkage -with the past. One of his followers asked the author in -Nanking, "Do you think we were traitors when we spent -more than a year getting a fair peace agreement from -the Japanese?" This agreement, released by Messrs. -Tao and Kao, consisted of the cession of broad military, -foreign-relations, and economic rights over China to -Japan. The Chinese were to lose no territory <i>pro forma</i>, -and were to keep a minimum of 35 per cent interest in -major economic enterprises.</p> - -<p>The regime is sufficiently well known so that there -is no need to detail its history: the long dickering with -the two Japanophile "governments" already established -in Peking and Nanking, since they were the third parties -to the Japan-Wang negotiations, the installation of -the government in March 1940, and its recognition the -following November. The more significant problem is—what -part can this Nanking establishment play in -the actual contest for power in East Asia?</p> - -<p>In the first place, the Reorganized National Government -(<i>Chung-hua Min-kuo Ts'an-chêng Kuo-min -Chêng-fu</i>) of China is not a puppet government in the -sense that the Manchoukuoan government is. The<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_204" id="Page_204">[Pg 204]</a></span> -Japanese have a very loose surveillance of the officers -of state. Interviews with officials indicate pretty conclusively -the absence of dictaphones or of Japanese -Special Service agents. The leaders in the government -at Nanking are not watched or hounded in -any intimate way. One of them said: "Why should the -Japanese watch us? They know that we cannot do anything -to them, and they know that their only chance -of success lies in our becoming a real government."</p> - -<p>Secondly, the personnel of the Nanking regime is not -sufficient to cope with the problems which face it. The -Nanking regime has no diplomatic officer who has -regularly represented any other Chinese government; -only a few consuls, in Japanese territory, joined it.<a name="FNanchor_9_151" id="FNanchor_9_151"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_151" class="fnanchor">[9]</a> In -no single instance can a Nanking officeholder, compared -with his Chungking counterpart, be regarded -(patriotism apart) as better-qualified or more able than -his rival. In an enterprise of this sort, it would seem -likely that Nanking should have the better man in -some few positions. Diligent and disinterested inquiry -fails to reveal a single one. Finally, the personnel is a -mixture of Wang cliquists, politically obsolete conservatives, -careerist Japanophiles, colorless opportunists, -and actual criminals.</p> - -<p>A Western newspaper man, well acquainted with the -Nanking situation, told the author that he estimated -the regime as 5 per cent Japanophiles, 5 per cent upright -men who worked with the enemy because of a -sense of public duty toward the Chinese people in the -occupied areas, 20 per cent opportunists, and 70 per cent -low characters interested in thievery. Nanking officials, -to whom these estimates were communicated without -revelation of the source, felt the latter categories to be -much too high. Several of the more intelligent men in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_205" id="Page_205">[Pg 205]</a></span> -Nanking offered the argument that if they did not share -in the regime, unscrupulous elements would deceive the -Japanese and oppress the people; or they stated that -the Reorganized Government had brought back the -flag, the constitution, the titles, the law codes, and the -political doctrines of the National Government, so that -occupied and unoccupied China had the same polity. -They disregarded the point that this abetted the enemy.</p> - -<p>Thirdly, the government has nothing to do. The -power of the Nanking regime in no instance reaches -beyond the Japanese patrols. No counties are under -Nanking control which are not also under Japanese control. -The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has no foreign -affairs. The Ministry of Finance collects some excises -and disburses many salaries, as well as limited amounts -for the upkeep of some schools, law courts, minimal -public services, and state property, insofar as the Japanese -have returned any. (It is interesting to note that -the officials at Nanking, deploring the "Communist" -tendencies of Chiang, live in commandeered houses, -and use the commandeering of private property as a -form of patronage for their supporters.) The Central -Political Council has so little to do that it draws up a -budget and solemnly debates items of less than U. S. -$100.<a name="FNanchor_10_152" id="FNanchor_10_152"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_152" class="fnanchor">[10]</a> The officials cannot ride far from the city limits -of Nanking, because of the guerrillas who operate all -about. The railroad runs only by daylight. The Nanking -police are mostly unarmed, except for clubs—an -unprecedented condition for modern China!—and many -who carry rifles or pistols seem to have no cartridges.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_206" id="Page_206">[Pg 206]</a></span></p> - -<p>Fourthly, the Nanking government is an encouraging -indication that the modern Chinese have finally come -to the point where five-power republicanism is the -norm. It is significant that the Nanking regime practices -an extreme purism of organization and nomenclature, -conforming precisely to antebellum practice.<a name="FNanchor_11_153" id="FNanchor_11_153"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_153" class="fnanchor">[11]</a> -The regime has changed the theoretical structure of -the National Government very little, but added the -Party ministries to the government cabinet. One further -change has consisted in the logically desirable -transference of the Ministry of Justice to the Executive -<i>Yüan</i> from the Judicial, thus eliminating the anomaly -of having both prosecuting and adjudicatory agencies -under the same control.<a name="FNanchor_12_154" id="FNanchor_12_154"></a><a href="#Footnote_12_154" class="fnanchor">[12]</a> The minister, Li Shêng-wu, -is a well-known scholar in international law and an educational -editor.<a name="FNanchor_13_155" id="FNanchor_13_155"></a><a href="#Footnote_13_155" class="fnanchor">[13]</a></p> - -<p>Since the Japanese may be expected to foster the -kind of Japanophile government which would help -them most, it is interesting that their crusade against -Sunyatsenism has turned to a quasi-Kuomintang structure<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_207" id="Page_207">[Pg 207]</a></span> -for aid. The attempt does not, as yet, seem to be -working, but the technique of the deception reveals -the depth to which Kuomintang principles and practices -have penetrated in the past generation. The Nanking -incumbents make every effort to confuse their regime -with the National Government at Chungking, even to -the extent of copying the names of all minor offices, the -forms of the stationery, and the organization of semi-public -cultural associations. Chinese fashion, they confuse -correct form and legitimacy. Given a long enough -period, this technique may succeed. Meanwhile, the -failure of the earlier traitor Governments, non-Nationalist -in form, is a real indicium of the value of the Sunyatsenist -pattern.</p> - -<p>Along with the bewildering <i>Doppelgänger</i> effect -which prevails in all other matters, there are two Kuomintangs. -The major, recognized Kuomintang continues -from Chungking. At Nanking Wang and his -friends have organized the "Orthodox Kuomintang." -This can scarcely be thought of as a Party fraction, so -much has it dwindled. The overseas branches have -been lost, and the populace in its own cities is savagely -contemptuous. Wang Ch'ing-wei held a "Sixth Plenary -Session of the C.E.C. of the Kuomintang" on August 29, -1939, and the affair seems to have been an uproarious -farce, with all of Wang's friends bringing in random -acquaintances in order to make up a quorum.<a name="FNanchor_14_156" id="FNanchor_14_156"></a><a href="#Footnote_14_156" class="fnanchor">[14]</a> Since -then, the vestigial party has been equipped with appropriate -party organs, and is preparing to share its -hypothetical power with an equally <i>ad hoc</i> Nanking -People's Political Council. The Kuomintang leaders in -Nanking, as a part of their application to the Chungking -pattern, have even listed a considerable number of -minor parties which are on their side of the Japanese -army. Persistent, specific inquiry in Nanking failed<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_208" id="Page_208">[Pg 208]</a></span> -to elicit the name of a single <i>bona fide</i> minor party -representative, other than representatives of the <i>Hsin -Min Hui</i> (ex-Provisional), the <i>Ta Min Hui</i> (ex-Reformed), -the Republicans (<i>Kung-ho Tang;</i> Hankow; -merged with the Orthodox Kuomintang), and the Chinese -Socialist Party, which consists of the venerable Dr. -Kiang Kang-hu. It is perhaps fair to conclude that the -Nanking regime is not a Kuomintang regime because -a sizable portion of the Kuomintang membership were -weary of war, but because some few Kuomintang leaders -found no other way to power, and because the Japanese -had reluctantly decided that the simulacrum of the -Kuomintang was the minimum requirement of any -Chinese government.</p> - -<p>Lastly, the lack of success of Wang Ch'ing-wei and his -government is proof of the emergence of a state in -China. This is not the first time that Wang has set -up his own government. It is not even the first time -that Chinese have accepted foreign aid in such enterprises. -Wang thought, and presumably thinks, that he -is playing the accepted game of Chinese politics; he is -likely to find that he has committed a treason which is -disastrously real to him. The non-support of his government -is a clear proof of the rising race-national -awareness among China's common millions.</p> - -<p>Stripped of the confusion and distortion which have -surrounded the Wang Ch'ing-wei secession, the rivalry -between Wang and Chiang is not so very different from -Benedict Arnold's departure from the then dubious -American revolution. In this century we have revised -our opinion of Benedict Arnold upward—in part—and -Wang Ch'ing-wei may, perhaps, justly fit the same category. -A gifted but maladroit and unhappy political -leader had brought his misfortunes to the Japanese. -They, <i>faute de mieux</i>, have accepted his aid. So far -this has been ineffectual. Most probably, only a very -long lapse of time or the truly catastrophic ruin of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_209" id="Page_209">[Pg 209]</a></span> -their opponents could place Wang and his group in a -position of autonomous importance and power. On the -world scene Wang stands halfway between Quisling and -Pétain. A traitor to the emergent Chinese state, he -demonstrates the ancient Chinese capacity to surrender, -appease, and survive. Had he antagonists less formidable -than Chiang and the infuriated masses, his Reorganized -Government might secure actual power.</p> - -<p>The Japanese finally recognized the Reorganized National -Government of Wang Ch'ing-wei on November -30, 1940, after many months of delay. <i>Art.</i> I provided -for mutual recognition, but added the provision that -the two countries should "... at the same time take -mutually helpful and friendly measures, political, economic, -cultural, and otherwise ..." and in the future -prohibit "... such measures and causes as are destructive -to the amity between the two countries in politics, -diplomacy, education, propaganda, trade and commerce, -and other spheres." <i>Art.</i> II was an anti-Communist -agreement leaving Japanese forces in North China indefinitely. -<i>Art.</i> IV left the problem of Japanese evacuation -to separate annexes. <i>Art.</i> VI provides "Economic -cooperation," with the inescapable implications. By -<i>Art.</i> VII Japan relinquishes extraterritoriality (in the -future), but obtains the opening of all China to Japan.<a name="FNanchor_15_157" id="FNanchor_15_157"></a><a href="#Footnote_15_157" class="fnanchor">[15]</a> -These terms, which not only involve admission of Chinese -defeat, but preclude any possible attempt of China -to restore military, economic, or political independence, -are the best that Japan has to offer. When one considers -that even these are merely legal, whittled back to -realism by protocols and annexes, and that they are -made with Japan's Chinese friends, Japan appears<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_210" id="Page_210">[Pg 210]</a></span> -incapable of ending the China incident. The Japanese do -not know when to stop. Gauche in power politics, they -are undone by greediness and inexperience.</p> - -<p>The recognition is important only in that it assists -Japan in escaping responsibility for action taken by or -through the Chinese affiliates, while at the same time -pinning Japan to the Chinese earth and committing the -Empire to indefinite continuation of hostilities. If the -Japanese achieved complete success in international -power politics, there is a possibility that the Reorganized -Government might remain as the functioning half-autonomous -affiliate of Japan. Otherwise, Nanking can -be nothing more than an ornamental, occasionally useful -auxiliary to the Imperial Japanese Army, itself an -uncomfortable Chinese government <i>pro tem</i>. Having -ultimate authority, the Army cannot yet escape or delegate -final responsibility.</p> - - -<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_143" id="Footnote_1_143"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_143"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> An excellent bibliography, providing further references to the -Japanese side of the war, is found in Borton, Hugh, <i>et al.</i>, <i>A Selected -List of Books and Articles on Japan</i>, Washington, D. C., 1940. An -outstanding short discussion is Colegrove, K. W., <i>Militarism in Japan</i>, -Boston (World Peace Foundation), 1936.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_144" id="Footnote_2_144"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_144"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> Bisson, T. A., <i>Japan In China</i>, cited, <i>passim</i>, for many instances.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_145" id="Footnote_3_145"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_145"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> It is unfortunate that work on the nature of old Far Eastern -international relations has no more than just begun. Descriptions -from the viewpoint of Western international law often possess the -unreal lucidity of dialectical materialism or of theosophy, since it is -necessary to read into Chinese and other Far Eastern political institutions -the characteristic features of a European invention—the -juridical, omnicompetent, secular, territorially limited state. See -Djang Chu, <i>The Chinese Suzerainty</i>, unpublished doctoral dissertation, -the Johns Hopkins University, 1935; Nelson, Melvin Frederick, -<i>The International Status of Korea, 1876-1910</i> unpublished doctoral -dissertation, Duke University, 1939, particularly Part I, "The International -Society of Confucian Monarchies" and Part II, "Korea in -Conflicting Societies of Nations"; both attempt to reconstruct the -working Asiatic theory in terms comprehensible to the West. Clyde, -Paul H., <i>United States Policy Toward China</i>, Durham, 1940, Section -XXIV, gives a succinct statement and relevant American public -documents.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_146" id="Footnote_4_146"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_146"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> Taylor, George, <i>The Struggle for North China</i>, cited, p. 66.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_5_147" id="Footnote_5_147"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_147"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> Statements to the author, by persons not in Chungking.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_6_148" id="Footnote_6_148"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_148"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> Nyi, P. C., "Plans for Economic and Political Hegemony in -China," cited, p. 239. Compare this with the chart in George Taylor, -work cited, p. 204. Professor Taylor's study covers the entire history -of the Provisional Government, significantly aligned with that of -its rival, the guerrilla Border Region.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_7_149" id="Footnote_7_149"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_149"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> <i>The Japan-Wang Ch'ing-wei Secret Agreements, 1938-1939-1940</i>, -Shanghai, 1910; these also appeared in the <i>China Weekly Review</i>, -January 27, 1940, p. 318; February 3, 1940, p. 341.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_8_150" id="Footnote_8_150"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_150"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> Statement of the Japanese Prime Minister, Prince Fumimaro -Konoye, December 22, 1938, Jones and Myers, <i>Documents on American -Foreign Relations, 1939-40</i>, Boston (World Peace Foundation), p. 299.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_9_151" id="Footnote_9_151"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_151"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> Ch'ên Lo died, and the only persons with any diplomatic experience -had, in the past, been only casually connected with the -Foreign Office.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_10_152" id="Footnote_10_152"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_152"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> See <i>The People's Tribune</i> (Shanghai), XXIX, p. 130 <i>ff.</i>, August -1940. This is the semi-official English organ of the regime; each issue -contains a selection of public documents. It is edited by the volatile -T'ang Leang-li. The other English-language journal is <i>The Voice -of China</i>, fortnightly, Nanking, edited by Mr. L. K. Kentwell, a graduate -of Oxford and Columbia Universities, Hawaiian-born of British -and Cantonese parentage. The journal is spirited, and very anti-British.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_11_153" id="Footnote_11_153"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_153"><span class="label">[11]</span></a> Such a chart is found in <i>The People's Tribune</i>, XXIX (March -1940), p. 214, together with a list of incumbents on the following -pages. The issue is headed by an editorial, "The National Government -Returns to Its Capital" and "Peace, Struggle, and Save China" -by Wang Ching-wei (<i>sic</i>). The official outline of the government -is to be found in [Reorganized Government], <i>K'ao-shih Yüan Kung-pao</i> -(Public Gazette of the Examination <i>Yüan</i>), Nanking. Vol. I, -No. 2 (June 1940), following p. 80.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_12_154" id="Footnote_12_154"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_154"><span class="label">[12]</span></a> [Reorganized Government], <i>Ssŭ-fa Hsing-chêng Kung-pao</i> (Public -Gazette of the Ministry of Justice), Nanking, gives a well-edited -résumé of the work of the Ministry and its policy in prosecutions.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_13_155" id="Footnote_13_155"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13_155"><span class="label">[13]</span></a> [<i>China Weekly Review</i>; J. B. Powell, editor], <i>Who's Who in -China, Fifth Edition</i>, Shanghai, [1937], p. 145. For further information -see the supplement on the pro-Japanese leaders in <i>Who's Who -in China, Supplement to Fifth Edition</i>, Shanghai, [1940]. This presents -a hall of notoriety for all the major Chinese leaders affiliated -with the enemy. This <i>Who's Who</i> is regarded by the present author -as one of the most valuable sources on all Far Eastern politics. It is -engrossingly good reading and entertainment, the pictures of the -subjects being included in most instances. Behind these simple and -short biographies, there lies more drama than Hollywood dare produce.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_14_156" id="Footnote_14_156"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14_156"><span class="label">[14]</span></a> For an account of this see, "Wang's Farcical C.E.C. Session," -<i>China At War</i> (Hong Kong), III, No. 6, p. 57; January 1940.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_15_157" id="Footnote_15_157"></a><a href="#FNanchor_15_157"><span class="label">[15]</span></a> The full text of the treaty is to be found in China Information -Committee, <i>News Release</i>, December 2, 1940, together with the -Generalissimo's comment. For a brief account, clearly interpreted, -see Steiger, G. Nye, "Japan Makes Peace—with Wang," <i>Events</i>, Vol. 9, -No. 49 (January 1941), p. 60-2. The Generalissimo's comment on -the Nanking regime will also be found below, Appendix III (A), <a href="#Page_372">No. 7</a>.</p></div></div> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_211" id="Page_211">[Pg 211]</a></span></p> - - -<h2><span class="smcap">Chapter VIII</span><br /> - -EXTRA-POLITICAL FORCES</h2> - - -<p>Government, wherever organized, is distinguished -from other social institutions by claims -to universality of scope and competence, and paramountcy -of authority; the term <i>political</i>, on the basis -of such a distinction, refers to activities, occasionally -individual but more usually collective, involving access -to the symbols of government; and the term <i>governmental</i> -refers to the application of such symbols in governmental -sanctions and services. The process of government -is accordingly one wherein groups smaller -than the totality of society seek ("politically") to obtain -action in the name of the totality ("governmental"), -for or against other groups according to -shifting interests. In the West this politico-governmental -process has been further characterized by ceremonial -forms ("laws") and reinforced by conceptions -of amoral omnicompetence ("sovereignty").</p> - -<p>The cellular socio-economic structure of old China, -plus the Confucian employment of ideological as opposed -to governmental control, kept the entire process -of politics and government at a very low level of intensity. -Modern China, inheritor of an apolitical past, -is still the most pluralistic society in the world, and -modern Chinese government—despite recent gigantism—a -frail legal superstructure above a flood of extra-political -power. Western societies depend upon their -states; the Chinese state depends upon a society which -could, albeit uncomfortably, dispense with states altogether.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_212" id="Page_212">[Pg 212]</a></span></p> -<p>This condition amounts in international politics, to -both a strength and a weakness. Chinese society suffers -more political ruin with less social disturbance than -does any comparable society; the guerrillas, for example, -probably find government helpful when available, but -regard it as a luxury rather than a necessity. Chinese -society is near to an orderly anarchy; uniform conditioning -from the past, or uniform present opinion, takes -the place of mass organization and totalitarian government. -The high death rate of traitors is probably not -owing to activity on the part of Chungking, but to the -spontaneous action of ordinary men; on one occasion a -high pro-Japanese official was shot by his own bodyguard -while the two sat in a sedan on a busy street: the -bodyguard had experienced a revulsion of conscience. -Fu Hsiao-ên, Wang Ch'ing-wei's Mayor of Shanghai, was -also killed by a member of his own household. Spontaneous -but uniform action applies not only to sensational -political matters; it appears in less dramatic but -equally important affairs, such as commercial rivalry, -landlord-tenant relationships, and the police power of -the community and the family. However, in a contest -for power, while the Chinese lose little by defeat, their -counter-attacks are correspondingly more difficult. The -fluid autonomy of innumerable groups slows down the -engines of formal power. The political-governmental -process is apt to be sluggish in crises.</p> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">The Foundations of Chinese Government</span></h3> - -<p>The society upon which the National Government -of China, its Left associates, and its Japanophile rivals -rest is not a settled, stagnant society. An extraordinary -ferment has gripped China for more than a century—arising -from cadastral, agrarian, technological, economic, -fiscal, ideological, political, and governmental -change. The Chinese people have endured; they have -also acted. Within a single century, three blazing revolutions<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_213" id="Page_213">[Pg 213]</a></span> -have swept China: the T'aip'ing Rebellion, put -down with Western aid after fifteen years of war; the -Boxer uprising, deflected into xenophobia by the -Manchus; and the Great Revolution, which succeeded -in part. Between these, there have been changes, bloody -but of secondary magnitude: the Moslem rebellions; -the minor uprisings of Sun Yat-sen; the Republican -Revolution; the 1919 movement; the <i>tuchün</i> wars; the -Communist communes, which failed utterly in Shanghai -and Canton; the Communist <i>jacqueries</i>, which continued; -and the present rip tide of resistance. None of -these was effectively mastered by organized government; -each was exploited by one government, and opposed by -another. Unlike a Western state, wherein government -becomes the prime mobilizer during crises, Chinese -society shifts its incalculable forces, and governments -leap forward to take advantage of them.</p> - -<p>This extensive, unorganized residue of opinion and -power, outside the reach of government, keeps any -modern Chinese government in a peculiar condition. -Like a perpetual process of revolution, social changes -demand that a government exploit them, deflect them, -or employ them—but not launch or stop them. The -Kuomintang has failed in its attempts to launch favorable -mass movements, and also failed to stop antagonistic -ones. The secret of the Chinese Communist power -has lain in the skill of the Red leaders, who utilized -available movements. Hence the continued development -of Chinese government rests upon the wills, -fancies, interests, mob action, enthusiasm or dispiritedness -of a people who in their own communities do not -read newspapers, listen to radios, or pay much attention -to the national state. Despite attempts to bring -society under the control of government, in order to -make it possible to bring government under the control -of society (constitutionalism), the decisive forces -of modern Chinese life are outside the reach of propaganda -or control.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_214" id="Page_214">[Pg 214]</a></span></p> -<p>General opinion in China is not ascertainable, except -through action. In vital matters this action is apt to -be either violent, or the equivalent of violent: sit-down, -general, or go-slow strikes; boycotts; universal derision. -The National Government possesses unprecedented -amounts of power by Chinese standards. By -Western standards it is incredibly obliging, casual, and -unsystematic. The power which the Government, with -Chiang as leader, enjoys, arises from a support which -it could not compel, and which it cannot ensure by any -means other than the pursuance of support-arousing -policies. The Kuomintang, the Communists, the National -Salvationists, the independent Left guerrilla -leaders—these agencies are not the organization of entire -opinion groups, but the spearheads of immeasurable -forces. The modernization of government, both administrative -and constitutional, awaits the transformation -of materials around and under government. Greatest -of these is popular mentality. Ancillary are economic, -organizational, educational and cultural forces. -Progress toward the omnicompetent state is slowed by -the fact that few Chinese wish to abandon the freedom -of a pluralist society for the efficient universality of -legalism. They desire modernization, but haggle at the -price.</p> - -<p>Three factors in particular are working upon and -among the millions of farmers and townsmen: mass education, -rural reconstruction, and the cooperative movement. -Each not only takes immediate, beneficial effect, -but also transforms the political material of China. -These forces, not in any strict sense political, possess -enormous political importance.</p> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">Mass Education</span></h3> - -<p>Literacy has risen very rapidly in modern China. -Before the impact of the West, becoming literate was -in itself a career. By the time one could read at all, one<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_215" id="Page_215">[Pg 215]</a></span> -was a scholar, unless one learned the limited quasi-shorthand -of the merchants. Educational reforms came -about as the result of modern schools, particularly -British and American Protestant schools, and the action -of the government. The fabric of Chinese society had -begun to change even before the downfall of the Ch'ing -dynasty. The literary revolution led by Hu Shih after -1915, which popularized <i>pai-hua</i> (a written form of the -Chinese spoken language) had extensive repercussions, -and made possible the rapid diffusion of ideographic -literacy. (Phonetization failed then, and later.) Almost -every government in China has attempted the diffusion -of literacy. The popular demand is intense.</p> - -<p>The present status of literacy in China is revealed -by official figures from the Ministry of Education, which -may err somewhat on the side of optimism. These put -the total population of China at 450 million (Manchuria -presumably remaining unmentioned), of which -90 million are literate and 360 million illiterate. Such -an estimate would give China about the same absolute -number of literates as the United States. The remaining -360 million illiterates are broken down as follows: -40.05 million children below the age of six; 45 million -aged six to twelve; 29.25 million aged twelve to fifteen; -79.43 million persons over forty-five; and 1.57 million -dumb, deaf, cripples, or insane. The adults to be -reached by the mass literacy movement amount therefore -to 165 million; government estimates state that -46,348,469 illiterates were educated since 1938, of -whom 25.2 million were adults between fifteen and -forty-five, leaving roughly 140 million to be educated.<a name="FNanchor_1_158" id="FNanchor_1_158"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_158" class="fnanchor">[1]</a></p> - -<p>The mass education program is supplementary to -the education of children, which is far from complete -or even adequate. The literacy imparted is of the most -elementary kind; but in a civilized society such as China -this has immediate effect. The author never knew a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_216" id="Page_216">[Pg 216]</a></span> -Chinese who could read and was not addicted to it; a -common sight in Western China is a knot of coolies -deciphering a newspaper together. The intense reverence -for learning and scholarship makes the training -welcome, and the teachers who seek to teach the minimum -of one thousand ideographs in six weeks never -lack pupils.</p> - -<p>The program of the National Government was summarized -by Ch'ên Li-fu, the Minister of Education, -speaking over the radio after the Mass Education Conference -of March 1940:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>Accordingly, our first step is to wipe out illiteracy. In -this respect we proceed simultaneously with the enlightenment -of the masses of adult illiterates, both men and women, -and with the education of children in order to put an end -to illiteracy that may otherwise arise in the future. At -the National Conference on People's Education held from -the twelfth day to the sixteenth day of this month in -Chungking, the <i>five-year plan for the people's education</i>, -adopted by the Executive <i>Yüan</i>, was further deliberated -and promulgated. The proper enforcement of this plan -will help to convert at least one hundred and forty million -(140,000,000) adult illiterates into intelligent citizens -for China within the coming five years.</p> - -<p>At present there are already 44 per cent of the entire -number of children of school age (from six to twelve) in -school; that is, nineteen million and eight hundred thousand -(19,800,000). By the enforcement of this plan, there -should be, during the first two years, at least one people's -school in every three <i>pao</i>. And each village should have a -nucleus school, according to the plan. In this way there -should be at least more than 260,000 people's schools for -the 800,000 <i>pao</i> of the entire nation at the end of the first -two years. Each people's school consists of three divisions -or classes, namely, the children's division, the men's division, -and the women's division. During the second two -years there should be at least one people's school in every -two <i>pao</i>. In the fifth and last year there should be at least -one people's school in each <i>pao</i>. That is to say, at the end -of the fifth year there should be at least 800,000 people's -schools for the 800,000 <i>pao</i> of the nation, besides the 80,000 -or more nucleus schools and the 200,000 schools of the -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_217" id="Page_217">[Pg 217]</a></span>same grades now already existent which can be improved, -to provide education for at least 90 per cent of the entire -number of children of school age. As a matter of fact, -certain provinces have already succeeded in establishing -one or even two people's schools in each <i>pao</i>. Kwangsi -Province, for instance, has at present one people's school in -each <i>pao</i>, while Fukien Province even has two people's -schools in each <i>pao</i>. The fulfillment of this five-year plan -needs at least $2,932,000,000 and 1,600,000 properly trained -teachers.</p> - -<p>Our vocational education aims at building a sound -middle cadre for the various professions and industrial -enterprises. There are training schools and short-time classes -for mechanics, electrical communications, metal work, etc. -Also, special classes are opened in more than ten colleges -and universities for advanced studies along such -lines.</p> - -<p>Our attempt to universalize productive education may -be evidenced by the incorporation of productive education -courses into the middle school curriculum, besides instituting -organizations for the same in the various vocational schools -in order to facilitate the practice of students along such -lines.... In 1938, for example, only 53.0 per cent of -the entire number of students who took part in the examination -studied science and engineering, but in 1939 it -jumped to 59.4 per cent.<a name="FNanchor_2_159" id="FNanchor_2_159"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_159" class="fnanchor">[2]</a></p></blockquote> - -<p>This statement gives the official view, which is highly -optimistic. In terms of practical politics, however, the -Generalissimo has given the movement his cordial backing, -and sees in it a preliminary to democracy. Although -final results might fall far short of the hopeful -estimate, the effect would still be considerable. Diffusion -of literacy creates a momentary satisfaction with -the political system which makes literacy possible, but -the after-effect of literacy is to make men of any nationality -easier to govern well and harder to govern -badly. A government which diffuses literacy without -advancing reforms is sharpening weapons against itself. -The National Government's American-inspired trust in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_218" id="Page_218">[Pg 218]</a></span> -education as a panacea implies that Chiang and his fellow -leaders expect to remain popular, and do not contemplate -appeasement, reaction, or other unpopular -measures.</p> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">Rural Reconstruction</span></h3> - -<p>An even more interesting aspect of the mass-education -movement is its connection with rural reconstruction. -In this field much is owed to Dr. James Y. C. Yen, a -graduate of Yale and Princeton who began his work -with the Chinese labor corps in France during the -1914-18 war. The war-time work of the correlated mass -education and rural reconstruction movement was summarized -by Dr. Yen himself:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>The most hopeful factor in the whole China situation is -that her greatest and most valuable resource, the three hundred -and fifty million farmers, has not yet been tapped for -the upbuilding of the nation. The Chinese farmer has had -a measure of freedom and responsibility, of dignity and independence. -He is thrifty and industrious, intelligent and -an expert in intensive farming. A great number of our -national leaders are sons and daughters of our farmers. -The fathers of Dr. Sun Yat-sen and Generalissimo Chiang -Kai-shek were farmers.</p> - -<p>These nearly three years of terrible war have proved -beyond doubt that our faith in the Chinese farmer has not -been misplaced. It has revealed his greatness. Our nation -is rediscovering the "forgotten man," the tiller of the soil. -Most of our soldiers come from the farm. To a remarkable -extent he has also financed the war. He is the real hero -of this war.</p> - -<p>The Chinese Mass Education Movement was organized -in 1923 to explore the potentialities of the rural masses -and find a way of drawing out the best in them. Since -the first publication of the "thousand character test," it has -been estimated that some thirty million illiterate people -have been taught to read during the past five years.</p> - -<p>Beginning with 1929 the point of emphasis of the Movement -shifted from extensive promotion of literacy to intensive -study of the life of the farmers in the rural districts. -As a living social laboratory in which to do our research -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_219" id="Page_219">[Pg 219]</a></span>and to work out principles and techniques, we selected -Tinghsien, a district of four hundred thousand people, -one-thousandth of the total population of China, in Hopei -Province. This was the first time in our history that an -organized group of Chinese intellectuals went deliberately -to the country to live among the rural people to study -their life and find out how to develop their latent possibilities. -The Movement has evolved what is known as the -"Tinghsien Four-fold Reconstruction Education" including -the cultural, economic, health, and the political.</p> - -<p>Several other experimental <i>hsien</i>,—Hengshan in Hunan, -Central China, and Hsintu in Szechwan, West China, were -established in cooperation with the provincial governments. -One of our special emphases in these experimental -<i>hsien</i> has been the reform of the <i>hsien</i> government, i.e. the -local government.</p> - -<p>The Tinghsien Experiment with its "laboratory approach" -to social and political problems and with its <i>correlated</i> -program of rural reconstruction as demonstrated in -the district attracted attention from all over China and inspired -similar experiments in various parts of the country. -As a result the movement for rural reconstruction gained -great momentum in China.</p> - -<p>Since the outbreak of hostilities the Mass Education -Movement has thrown itself unreservedly into the task of -assisting the Central and Provincial governments in -strengthening the nation's struggle against the enemy. It -was most gratifying that at this hour of China's supreme -struggle we have been able to help the government to revitalize -the <i>hsien</i> government, to train civil service personnel -and to mobilize the farmers. Extensive application of the -new system as developed in the experimental <i>hsien</i> was -made to an entire province such as we did in Hunan—a rich -province with a population of thirty million.</p> - -<p>In order to insure that the new political machinery should -function effectively a School of Public Administration to -train administrative and technical personnel from the -magistrate down to the village elders was established with -the senior members of our Movement taking full charge. -Altogether the School trained about 4,000 higher officials -for the local government and some 35,000 of the village elders. -Since Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek assumed concurrently -the governorship of Szechwan, a new system of <i>hsien</i> -government (chiefly modelled after the experimental <i>hsien</i> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_220" id="Page_220">[Pg 220]</a></span>of the country) with the object of releasing the new life of -the rural masses has been promulgated. Under his order -the same is taking place in neighboring provinces.</p> - -<p>Unless serious and painstaking study of rural reconstruction -is made by scientists and scholars on the one hand, -and administrative and technical personnel are systematically -trained and imbued with a spirit of service to the rural -masses on the other, the movement for rural reconstruction -may dwindle away as so many other movements have done -in the past.</p> - -<p>It is most heartening to state that Generalissimo Chiang -Kai-shek has given his public approval and backing to the -new National Institute of Rural Reconstruction which he -considers to be of fundamental importance to China's -post-war reconstruction. The inspiration of the Institute -has already helped to mould the principal rural reconstruction -groups in the country into one national force. The -rural reconstruction movement has achieved a united front -unparalleled in its history. Today it is a great unifying -force, an outstanding national platform upon which all -Chinese can agree. It will meet the needs of China today -and lay the foundation for the China of tomorrow.<a name="FNanchor_3_160" id="FNanchor_3_160"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_160" class="fnanchor">[3]</a></p></blockquote> - -<p>This program possesses obvious merit. Lacking a -foundation of dogma, it requires no implementation -through terrorism. The politically innocuous character -of the movement is attested by the frequent demands by -provincial officials for personnel from the Mass Education -training centers. Since the purpose is to improve -the entire community without revolutionizing its class -structure, the enlightened landlords are as favorable as -the peasants themselves. Unfortunately, enlightened -landlords are not always prevalent. Despite the modesty -of the program, it finds stumbling blocks in actual corruption, -extortion, and illegality. Many <i>hsien</i> are under -local machines which permit wealthy conservatives to -evade tax payments, steal government funds, and repress -genuine farmer organization. The consequence -has been that the movement succeeds only when it has<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_221" id="Page_221">[Pg 221]</a></span> -the immediate backing of a provincial or central authority; -its progress has been slow. Many critics, both -Chinese and Western, have become disgusted with the -slowness of social reform on the land, and despair of -anything save reconstruction through implicit class -war.<a name="FNanchor_4_161" id="FNanchor_4_161"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_161" class="fnanchor">[4]</a></p> - -<p>The present period of resistance and reconstruction -opens a very promising period in rural modernization. -In the first place, war-time stress puts great power in -the Generalissimo's hands. Ubiquitous armies can, on -short notice, enforce orders from Chungking. The -shift of troops among provinces makes the central government -an outside power now physically present in -tens of thousands of communities. Devolution of -watchfulness by the Commander-in-Chief and his staff -results in slow but irreversible accumulation of governmental -authority.</p> - -<p>Secondly, the proclamation of manifold programs has -the effect, obviously, of drawing attention to each of -them. The Kuomintang, anxious to retain its paramountcy, -promotes new local government changes. -These face frustration by mass illiteracy. Mass education -is impeded by local economic injustices. The -Whampoa and <i>Erh Ch'ên</i> groups in the Kuomintang, -while they have landlord connections, are interested—even -assuming a strong economic-class interest—in the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_222" id="Page_222">[Pg 222]</a></span> -maintenance of government. Action is appearing, slow -and haphazard by Western standards, but indisputably -present. The minimum of good government in China -is a very low minimum, but it is rising in the face of the -Communist and Japanese pressure. One may be sure -that the National Government will not pass below that -minimum if the state's existence is in danger.</p> - -<p>Thirdly, there is a very genuine boom condition in -Western China. The movement of the government to -the West, and lightening of intolerable but long-endured -<i>tuchün</i> exactions, would in itself have led to -sudden prosperity. To this are added more than twenty -millions of new population, a growing network of communications, -a sharp but controlled inflation. These -further stimulate speculation and construction and -development. The most important factors in a new -prosperity have been, however, the reappearance of -handicraft-type industry as a consequence of blockade, -and governmental advocacy of every conceivable development. -The author beheld, during the summer of -1940, conditions of prosperity in Szechwan which he -had not expected to find in China within the space of -one lifetime. Narcotics were eradicated. The working -population was commanding high wages, but suffering -from high prices; the prices were somewhat ahead of the -wages, but not so far that social morale was troubled. -Skilled labor was in a superb bargaining position; chauffeurs, -electricians, good carpenters, etc. were in considerable -demand. The salaried classes were suffering at -all levels, a factor which was patently wholesome in -stimulating working-class morale. The clerical class, -which had held itself aloof from manual labor with a -persistence which boded ill for China, was placed more -nearly on a par with its American equivalent. While -poverty was still universal by Western standards, the -pathological squalor endemic to the coast was nowhere -visible.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_223" id="Page_223">[Pg 223]</a></span></p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">The Chinese Industrial Cooperatives</span></h3> - -<p>The Chinese Industrial Cooperatives (<i>Chung-kuo -Kung-yeh Ho-tso Hsieh-hui</i>) are an important and -widely publicized outgrowth of the war, and are perhaps -the only feature of domestic Chinese affairs—outside -of the Communist area and the roads program—which -is as well known beyond China as within. The -purpose of the cooperatives is to launch an enormous -program of decentralized industry throughout Free -China, with thirty thousand separate industrial cooperatives -for the first major goal. The purpose is to -develop an industrial system which will keep China -autarkic for resistance and reconstruction; long-range, -the purpose is to circumvent impending evils of concentrated -industrialism, slums, megalopolitan crowding, -extra-legal oppression. China might thus proceed directly -from a decentralized half-handicraft economy to -the decentralized power economy of the future. Four -principles underlie the program: sound technical design, -cooperative organization, voluntary self-discipline, -and social welfare on the basis of Sun's <i>min shêng</i>.<a name="FNanchor_5_162" id="FNanchor_5_162"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_162" class="fnanchor">[5]</a></p> - -<p>Formally, the C.I.C. Headquarters is a social organization -sponsored by the Executive <i>Yüan</i>. H. H. K'ung, -Minister of Finance and Vice-President of the <i>Yüan</i>, is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_224" id="Page_224">[Pg 224]</a></span> -its Chairman. The Secretary-General and Associate -Secretary-General, Messrs. K. P. Liu and Hubert Liang, -are both American-returned students; the former once -worked in the Ford factories while studying at the University -of Cincinnati and later was a banker in Manchuria. -The most inspiring force in the movement is -Mr. Rewi Alley, a New Zealander strongly interested -in cooperatives and in labor welfare, formerly factory -inspector in the International Settlement. Familiar, -because of his Shanghai experiences and famine-relief -work, with the problems of economic organization in -China, he presented his plan to Generalissimo and -Mme. Chiang through the intervention of that extraordinarily -popular British Ambassador, Sir Archibald Clark-Kerr. -The Chiangs were impressed with it, and the -Generalissimo gave it his support. A headquarters was -established at Hankow in August 1938, with the following -five departments: <i>general</i>, for secretarial and administrative -housekeeping; <i>financial</i>, administering -funds for the headquarters and the cooperative units; -<i>organization</i>, in charge of planning and inauguration -of cooperatives; <i>technical</i>, devising simple industrial -techniques; and <i>accounting</i>, an independent agency of -audit.<a name="FNanchor_6_163" id="FNanchor_6_163"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_163" class="fnanchor">[6]</a> The Executive <i>Yüan</i> has continued to make administrative -funds available; the central headquarters -near Chungking now has a staff of about seven hundred. -Professor J. B. Tayler of Yenching University, -a noted economic expert, is consultant for staff service.</p> - -<p>As projected by Rewi Alley and his fellow-enthusiasts, -the C.I.C. had to adjust itself to three zones of China's -war-time economy. A guerrilla zone in and around -the combat area, as well as behind the Japanese lines, -concentrated on the creation of immediate war-time -necessities. Some of these were in the form of direct<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_225" id="Page_225">[Pg 225]</a></span> -medical and military supplies; others, replacements of -indispensable articles which otherwise would have been -procured from the enemy. The second zone, of light -industry, was within easy reach of Japanese air raids -and espionage, and consequently given to enterprises -having light capital investment, mobile, and readily -concealed. The third, or inmost Chinese zone, being -best protected, was the proper area for the development -of the heavier industries, although even here no grandiose -or heavily centralized works are planned. The -ultimate aim, peace-time as well as military, of the -C.I.C. is to distribute industry across the countryside, -replacing the once flourishing handicraft industries, -and allowing Chinese society to develop naturally and -continuously.</p> - -<p>The author attended a C.I.C. exhibit in Chungking -which presented a startling array of modern goods. Ford -tools and auxiliary parts, matches, lamps (electric, -kerosene, and an improved wood-oil lamp which equals -kerosene), light electric appliances, lathes, machine-shop -tools, medical kits, Western shoes, toothpaste, -canned foods, paper, printing presses, books, and fountain -pens—all were produced in areas which did not -even have the spinning wheel in some instances, and -which until recently imported all Western or modern -goods from the coast or from outside.</p> - -<p>The organization and practical accomplishments of -the C.I.C. are well summarized in a recent article by -K. P. Liu, Secretary-General:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p><span class="smcap lowercase">INTRODUCTION</span>: When it became clear that in order to continue -economic resistance against Japan China must at all -costs develop production in the rear of the fighting line, -one of the steps taken was the founding of the Chinese Industrial -Cooperatives by Dr. H. H. Kung.</p> - -<p>The plan was to construct throughout China chains of -small industries which should use local materials to supply -the manufactured goods fundamentally necessary to the life -of the people.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_226" id="Page_226">[Pg 226]</a></span></p> -<p>Industrial cooperative societies are organized around -about 60 depots over 16 provinces. An average depot of -about 25 cooperatives is supervised and advised by a group -of men consisting of depotmaster, accountant, technician, -and two or three organizers.</p> - -<p>For the coordination of work depots are divided among -five regions: the Northwest (NW), the Southeast (SE), -the Chuankang (Szechwan and Sikang) region (CK), the -Southwest (SW), and Yunnan (Y). Each is headed by -regional headquarters, which are responsible to the Central -Headquarters at Chungking which represents the C.I.C. on -general questions and negotiations, and decides, in consultation -with regional chiefs, on broad lines of policy. The -Central Headquarters also supplies the services of traveling -advisers on engineering, accounting, and organization problems.</p> - -<p>The staff of 700 is financed by Government funds, since -the C.I.C. has been named a social organization responsible -to the Executive Yüan. Further, the C.I.C. was given -$5,000,000 by the Central Government to be used as loan -capital for cooperatives. More recently, negotiations with -various banks have made new large sums available, so that -the amount which can now be used for the capitalization of -cooperatives is near $30,000,000.</p> - -<p>The above two sources of income provide no money for -education, research, evacuation of workers from occupied -areas, technical training, refugee work relief, medical help, -or capital loans in guerrilla regions. Necessary auxiliary activities -as these are provided for to a certain extent by gifts -from interested men and women in China and abroad.... -<span class="smcap lowercase">FORMING AN INDUSTRIAL COOPERATIVE</span>: When a depot is first -set up, the depotmaster advertises the objectives of the -C.I.C. by posters and speeches. But as soon as a few workmen -get to know about its activities there is no more need -to advertise. There are always plenty of workers who will -prefer the security and freedom of a cooperative to unemployment -or to working for a master.</p> - -<p>The number of men needed to form a cooperative is at -least seven, but there is no upper limit. They first come to -talk things over with a C.I.C. organizer, present their plan -for setting up a factory or workshop, with proof of their -qualifications and a tentative budget showing how much -loan capital will be needed to start work. The organizer explains -to them the cooperative system of self-government, -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_227" id="Page_227">[Pg 227]</a></span>Chinese cooperative law, and the C.I.C. Model Constitution. -Then they take some descriptive literature home, -and discuss among themselves whom they want as their -officers.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile, their plans are talked over by the depotmaster, -accountant, organizer, and engineer, and modifications -suggested. If, as often happens, it turns out that they -are only merchants anxious to get rich quick and not <i>bona -fide</i> workmen ready to work hard, the plans are rejected.</p> - -<p>If all is satisfactory, a meeting is held for the election of -officers, determination of share capital, voting of wages, and -work begins as soon as the loan is put through. At least -one quarter of the subscribed share capital must be paid up -immediately, and the total loan—long-term and short—cannot -exceed 20 times the subscribed share capital.... -The actual ratio of share to loan capital averages about -1 to 6.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap lowercase">INDUSTRIAL DISTRIBUTION:</span> Distribution of industry is shown -in the following condensed table:</p> - - -<div class="center"> -<table border="0" cellpadding="4" cellspacing="0" summary="Industrial Distribution"> -<tr><td align="left">Textiles</td><td align="right">610</td><td>[cooperatives]</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">Engineering</td><td align="right">49</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">Mining</td><td align="right">118</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">Chemical</td><td align="right">206</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">Pottery</td><td align="right">69</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">Foodstuffs</td><td align="right">83</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">Transport</td><td align="right">4</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">Miscellaneous</td><td align="right">395</td></tr> -<tr><td></td><td align="right">———</td></tr> -<tr><td></td><td align="right">1,534</td></tr> -</table></div> -<p>There are no less than 114 types of cooperatives, and almost -every daily need of the people can be met.</p> - -<p>Before any cooperative is organized, investigations are -made to ensure that (I) there are raw materials near at -hand, (II) there is skilled workmanship available, and -(III) there is a market for the finished product. Where -these three do not co-exist at one place, a compromise of -the most reasonable kind is effected if possible. Some examples—by -no means exhaustive—of the adaptation of -types of industry to meet local conditions are described as -follows:</p> - -<p><i>Wool</i> ... In the beginning of 1939 woolspinners of -Chentu were still using either the simple old whorl or the -handturned wheel. The volume of production was very<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_228" id="Page_228">[Pg 228]</a></span> -small. But during 1939 the C.I.C. embarked on a huge -program of blanket production for the army, and improved -streamlined treadle spinners were introduced, and thousands -of men and women taught the technique of using -them. Blankets were made at eight centers of west and -northern China; everywhere improved woolspinning and -woolweaving machines and techniques brought new productive -power. During the winter of 1939-40, 400,000 -blankets were turned out, and another million and a half -will be made during the remainder of 1940.</p> - -<p>The wool used by the blanket-making cooperatives comes -from the highlands of Chinghai, Kansu, Ningsia, and -Shensi, and now instead of being carried raw to Tientsin -or Shanghai as in the old days, it is being spun and woven -near to the source of supply. Improvements are constantly -being made—better machines, finer spinning, use of waterpower, -better carding and finishing—so that the whole project -works to raise the efficiency and living standard of the -local people.</p> - -<p><i>Cotton</i>. Wherever cotton is grown spinning and weaving -cooperatives are numerous, for clothing is one of the fundamental -needs of life....</p> - -<p><i>Grass Cloth</i>. Linen, or more correctly grass cloth, was -introduced into Szechwan from Kwangtung generations -ago, and now fine cloth is woven. Production thereof from -ramie thread was at its height 20 years ago, but since then -the craft has declined until recently, when the partial -blockade of the war made the industry profitable again....</p> - -<p><i>Goldwashing</i>. Placer gold exists along every river in West -China and in many parts of South China too. Even in -Chungking one may see needy coolies scraping up and -washing riverside mud for its tiny precious content.</p> - -<p>The gold is easily available by simple methods, though -certain difficulties have hitherto prevented its extraction on -a larger scale. But now every grain is an asset to China in -economic warfare, and so many goldwashing cooperatives -have been organized. In the whole country there are 66 -cooperatives, most of which are in the Han valley.... -Now the cooperatives ... are self-supporting and produce -60 to 70 oz. of gold a day.</p> - -<p><i>Coal and Iron</i>. Throughout the hinterland of China -new sources of coal and iron are being needed continually -by newly transplanted industry. Szechwan has good coal, -widespread, but rather thin in seam....</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_229" id="Page_229">[Pg 229]</a></span></p> -<p>At the same time plans for the construction of blast -furnaces have been worked out by C.I.C. engineers, and -only wait for adequate financing. It is planned first to set -up in South Shensi at a point within easy distance of coal -and iron supplies a coke-making and a smelting plant, the -total capitalization being $105,000.</p> - -<p><i>Alcohol.</i> A first experimental plant for the production of -96 per cent pure alcohol has been running nearly a year -with a maximum output of 350 gallons a day. Since the cost -of such a plant is comparatively small, and available supplies -of grain make the cost of alcohol much less than that -of gasoline, other plants have been set up. There are now -six in operation and greater production in the future is -envisaged. The sites of alcohol plants are naturally at key -positions on the highway, where good supplies of coarse -grain meet with the traffic line.</p> - -<p><i>Prime Movers.</i> In many cooperatives one may see a -quaint mixture of old and new, where big flywheels are -turned by human labor to maintain the spin of lathes, -carding machines, and the like. This is a useful temporary -expedient, possible where labor is cheap. Animal power is -also used.</p> - -<p>But C.I.C. engineers are not satisfied with this state of -affairs; they are always on the lookout for new sources of -power. So charcoal-or gasoline-burning internal combustion -engines are commonly employed.</p> - -<p>But most popular are waterwheels, and in every part of -China will be found old wheels adapted for modern uses—driving -textile machinery, turning lathes, grinding flour—undershot -or overshot, single or in series. Gradually the -wheels are being made of better materials and more efficient. -Iron wheels are constructed at present weighing about one -ton, at a cost of $3,000, and generating over 30 H.P.</p> - -<p>In the plains waterpower is rarely available, but in the -foothills of Tibet, the Tsingling Shan, or in the rough -country of southern China this cheapest of all forms of -power will come more and more into its own as C.I.C. machine -shops construct improved waterwheels.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap lowercase">ACCOUNTING:</span> During the past two years the C.I.C. staff has -tackled the question of modern accounting wholeheartedly -in every depot, and training classes in cost accounting have -been given for cooperative accountants who only know old -style Chinese bookkeeping. C.I.C. trained accountants -have been allocated to cooperatives—for big cooperatives<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_230" id="Page_230">[Pg 230]</a></span> -one accountant is employed by each society, for small, one -accountant serves two or three. Emphasis has been placed -on the presentation of monthly balance sheets and yearly -closing of accounts with profit sharing.</p> - -<p>Profits are divided among the members once—or in rare -cases twice—a year. The usual method of division, all claims -including interest on loans and shares having first been -paid, is as follows:</p> - - -<div class="center"> -<table border="0" cellpadding="4" cellspacing="0" summary="Method of Profit Division"> -<tr><td align="left">Reserves</td><td align="left">20 per cent</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">Emergency Fund</td><td align="left">10 per cent</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">Bonus to Officers of Society</td><td align="left">10 per cent</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">Common Good Fund</td><td align="left">10 per cent</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">Divided among Members</td><td align="left">50 per cent</td></tr> -</table></div> -<p>The division accords with Chinese Law. The bonus to -officers is usually made to include gifts to apprentices and -hired workers such as cooks, and the Common Good Fund -is used for education, medical welfare, and other social -service. The division among members is made in strict -proportion to wage and time worked.</p> - -<p>Local conditions and various industries differ so much -that no wage-policy has at present been applied. In general -it may be said that wages in cooperatives—fixed by the -members themselves—are about the same as those in private -factories of the district. The products in general sell at -prevailing rates, though in some cases the prices have been -lowered and profiteering prevented by the action of the -cooperatives.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap lowercase">COOPERATIVE FEDERATIONS:</span> Wherever the societies have -passed the first short period of infantile dependence on the -C.I.C. they have been associated into federations, sometimes -according to trade, but more often and more wholesomely, -according to districts. The most important immediate -function of the federation is to open a supply -and marketing agency, which by its centralization, specialization, -and greater supply of circulating capital is able to -relieve the cooperatives of most of their problems of buying -and selling....</p> - -<p><span class="smcap lowercase">TRAINING:</span> Training of organizers is of vital importance, -for it is they who will succeed or fail in giving to the workers -true conceptions of cooperation, industry, and business, -and in inculcating efficient methods and habits. Classes for -organizers have consequently been held in every region.</p> - -<p>Training of cooperative chairmen in their duties is also<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_231" id="Page_231">[Pg 231]</a></span> -undertaken. They "learn by doing,"—how to conduct meetings, -business principles, cooperative law, history of cooperation, -scope and significance of industrial cooperation -in China.... The most usual training is by weekly night -classes and meetings. There is also constant informal training -by the organizers, who devote about one day a week to -each cooperative, and work with the members on the solution -of immediate problems by the application of cooperative -principles. Popular education of workers will -be described later.</p> - -<p>Another important aspect of training is technical. In -no case is a society organized until the technical ability of -the members is adequate for making a successful business. -So, with refugees and unskilled peasants it is usually necessary -to give preliminary training—mainly in textiles. Wherever -there is textile work, training classes have been held in -spinning and weaving....</p> - -<p><span class="smcap lowercase">SOCIAL WELFARE WORK:</span> No statistics have been compiled -about the social contribution of the C.I.C. to the communities -around its depot. The work varies according to -local needs and opportunities, and according to available -resources in funds and manpower....</p> - -<p><span class="smcap lowercase">OUTLOOK:</span> After the war there will undoubtedly come a -period of readjustment, when the renewed influx of machinery -and machine-finished goods will demand a shift of -emphasis—for instance handspinning cannot survive indefinitely, -no matter how essential it is at present. It is -to be expected that at that period the C.I.C. will continue -to use in some industries methods now employed, but that -in others there will be a transition to rationalization and -mechanization. With a soundly integrated network of -skilled workmen, experienced engineers, and bankers' confidence, -the C.I.C. will be able to make this transition without -severe dislocation.</p> - -<p>The C.I.C. is essentially a non-political organization; its -functions are all technical, and its staff is composed of experts -in various lines—cooperative methods, accounting, -engineering. Success does not depend on political position -or power, but on the simple and essential condition that this -type of industry produces efficiently the goods that China -needs. The C.I.C. objective is just Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Third -Principle—People's Livelihood—practically expressed.</p> - -<p>The success of cooperative movements in other parts of -the world—their ability to weather economic crises and -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_232" id="Page_232">[Pg 232]</a></span>depressions—has been due to the solidarity that comes when -the motive force in industry and commerce is not the profit -of a few but the livelihood of many. In the same way the -C.I.C. can become a permanent force for national stability -and strength.<a name="FNanchor_7_164" id="FNanchor_7_164"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_164" class="fnanchor">[7]</a></p></blockquote> - -<p>The Model Constitution for an Industrial Cooperative<a name="FNanchor_8_165" id="FNanchor_8_165"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_165" class="fnanchor">[8]</a> -establishes safeguards to keep the cooperatives -from becoming profiteering sweatshops. Bankrupts, -drug addicts, persons incapable of working, and persons -already members of a unit are forbidden to join a unit -being formed (<i>Art.</i> 7). No member may subscribe -more than 20 per cent of the share capital of a single -society (<i>Art.</i> 9). A general annual meeting, with the -quorum set at one-half, and action requiring the majority -of a quorum, is the highest authority in a unit -(<i>Art.</i> 19). This meeting elects a board of directors and -a separate board of supervisors (<i>Arts.</i> 22 and 23). -Sweeping disqualifications keep members from mixing -personal or outside interests and cooperative matters -(<i>Art.</i> 32). The design of the unit constitution is such -that each unit is an authentic, autonomous cooperative, -governed well or badly in accordance with the abilities -and needs of its members, and is not a mere fraction of -state capitalism.</p> - -<p>The C.I.C. taps a level of Chinese society hitherto -largely unused<a name="FNanchor_9_166" id="FNanchor_9_166"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_166" class="fnanchor">[9]</a>—the family, guild, village, and volunteer-society -devices of the peasantry and townsmen who -lived beneath the lowest limits of the scholastic bureaucracy. The -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_233" id="Page_233">[Pg 233]</a></span>Communists act as the inheritors to temporarily -fanatical peasant rebellions; the National Government -and Kuomintang, to ascendant mandarinates; -the C.I.C. brings into play the rich experience of the -Chinese with collective action. The resources of the -social power so mobilized cannot easily be estimated, -but general success would reshape much of Chinese -society.</p> - -<p>In fitting the C.I.C. to the general Chinese scene, -however, it is important to compare the movement with -some of the New Deal reforms in the United States, -such as T.V.A. (Tennessee Valley Authority). Though -these are important, neither the American nor the Chinese -enterprises proclaim social revolution or charter -Utopias. The reforms of President Roosevelt have had -incalculable effect; no one knows what would have happened -without them. Nevertheless, it is excessive to -suggest that the existence of the United States as a -political society depends upon these reforms. Similarly, -the continuation of the National Government of China -does not rest on the C.I.C., or on any other single institution -alone.</p> - -<p>The C.I.C. extends patterns of cooperation and farm-factory -balance already tried in Europe, and also approached -by such diverse agencies as the Soviet state -and collective farms, and Mr. Henry Ford's worker-garden -plans. Hitherto the Chinese cooperative workers -have had a closer contact with Dearborn, Michigan, than -with Moscow, R.S.F.S.R. The endeavor is a serious and -important one. It supplements and develops the facilities—themselves -very extensive—which are under full -state-capitalist or private control. But Free China's -markets, while they contain C.I.C.-made goods, are -mostly filled with private or government products. A -private Chinese business system which has survived -thirty years of domestic war does not obsolesce instantaneously. -The cooperative movement is, largely because<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_234" id="Page_234">[Pg 234]</a></span> -of the integrity, enthusiasm, and tirelessness of -Mr. Alley, the nearest thing to a realization of <i>min shêng</i> -which China has yet seen; but the Right still plans for -a China with vast state-capitalist and state-subsidized -private industries, along with an all-pervading flow of -<i>laissez-faire</i> commerce. The Marxians look on sympathetically -but contemptuously.</p> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">Unorganized Pressure</span></h3> - -<p>The long one-party rule of the Kuomintang, now -relaxed but not disestablished, has habituated the Chinese -to the use of completely non-political groups—families -and their connections; economic associations -of various kinds; religious agencies—for political leverage. -There are relatively few groups which possess clear -public purposes and at the same time maintain unofficial -status. Indeed, the stamp of quasi-official approval -is so highly prized that many groups which seem -to have no affiliation with the government are discovered -to seek affiliation or to have acquired it roundabout.</p> - -<p>Among the private or quasi-private groups which -take most effect may be mentioned, however, the People's -Foreign Relations Association, the League of Nations -Union, and the China Branch of the International -Peace Campaign. The first of these publishes the useful -quarterly, <i>The China Herald</i>. The Campaign, which -was launched as a world-wide center-and-left drive for -peace, was under respected European leadership, and -was favored by a large labor bloc in England. In the -United States it was associated in the minds of some -people with the Stalinist fellow-travellers—the elements -who sat in the councils of the temporarily-joined forces -of anti-Fascism and pro-Stalinism, who organized the -American League for Peace and Democracy (a Popular -Front movement), the American Friends of the Chinese -People, and who dominated groups such as the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_235" id="Page_235">[Pg 235]</a></span> -American Youth Congress. In China, contrariwise, the -International Peace Campaign, fitting in with purposes -of government and people, seemed to offer a -world-wide sympathy for China's anti-aggression activities. -The China Branch was among the most effective -organizations in the Campaign. It developed vitality -in diffusing peace propaganda—that is, for peace -after the war. There was no trace of defeatism, sabotage -of national defense, or obstruction to defensive war. -With the outbreak of the European war, the I.P.C. disappeared -almost altogether from the Western scene, but -continues in China. Finally, the China League of Nations -Union publishes <i>The China Forum</i>, and carries -on an educational campaign.</p> - -<p>Christian activities have been extended and activized -by war. Never before have the missions had as many opportunities -for social and national service in China. -Their schools are filled; their hospitals, crowded; their -cause, related to America, to peace, and to a sane long -view, is welcomed. The Chinese Y.M.C.A. has met the -shock of war with extensive participation in relief, -particularly among students and soldiers. Medical aid, -tragically inadequate but infinitely better than nothing -at all, is coming into China. The curtailment of mission -activities in occupied China makes exploitation of the -Christian field in the West even more desirable from -the viewpoint of the Western churches. A recent work, -by two Christians born in China, one American and -the other Chinese, describes this situation clearly and -significantly: <i>China Rediscovers Her West</i>.<a name="FNanchor_10_167" id="FNanchor_10_167"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_167" class="fnanchor">[10]</a></p> - -<p>The other side of extra-political pressure comes in -the form of class and regional interests. The phenomena -of lobbying and special favor are less evident -in Chungking than in previous governments of China. -Special groups representing industries, areas, or vested -interests do appear, but are apt to work through casual,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_236" id="Page_236">[Pg 236]</a></span> -untraceable patterns of personal relationships. There -is no Chinese C.I.O., nor A. F. of L., but there is also -no National Association of Manufacturers. The politics -of economics gains by diffusion and absence of protest -what it loses in sensitivity and explicitness. An -economic group which feels itself outraged takes a -long time to develop group consciousness; hence, it is -less apt to feel outraged, and the generality of the -people, the public, is often better off. There are undoubtedly -scurrilous, politically vile, selfish advantages -being taken in West China today; but the net outcome -is counterbalanced by concrete improvement in the condition -of the people as a whole, and the unquestionable -morale of the leading and administrative classes.</p> - -<p>Every government, where and however it may operate, -has a double set of barriers which form its corridor of -further existence: on the left it must meet the minimal -needs of the governed, satisfy their physical and moral -appetites sufficiently to keep itself from being ignored -or overthrown; on the right it must compensate the -persons who govern, and do so well enough to retain -personnel adequate to government. The Marxians stress -the former element; the Paretians, the latter. Both are -visible in China. Had the exigencies of reform, social -change, and military activity proved too sharp, too -violent, too profitless, the personnel trained by experience -and fitted by temperament to government -might have gone over to Japan. The low caliber of -Wang Ch'ing-wei and his clique is testimony to the -<i>élan</i> of the West Chinese leaders. Chungking has ample -reserves of administrative talent, military intelligence, -and political acumen upon which to draw.</p> - -<p>The last part of the picture is the most important: -the <i>lao-pai-hsing</i>, the Old Hundred Names, the common -people of China. They are the ultimate arbiters of this -war, and of all future wars in East Asia: to this degree -they are a superlative force in the world. Hundreds of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_237" id="Page_237">[Pg 237]</a></span> -millions strong, adept, flexible, trained in a culture -which has flowed under (but not through) literacy for -centuries, hard-working, patient, and physiologically -sound, they are perhaps the greatest unified human -group. Upon their anger against Japan depends the -future of that Empire; if the <i>lao-pai-hsing</i> are determined -to resist, Chiang could go, Chungking fall, the -government scatter, the Communists collapse, and there -would yet be war—restless, bitter, implacable, with the -ferocity of a sane man employing violence as a last -defense against violence not sane. Leaders exist aplenty -in that sea of men, waiting for circumstance to cast them -forth. Intelligence, information, cunning, power, and -patience are all at hand.</p> - -<p>The difference between a strange half-industrial -modern Chinese Republic, striding toward the twenty-first -century with seven-league boots of progress, and a -Chinese chaos stinking with vice and disease under -Japanese rule—this difference lies within the decision -of the common people. The war has roused the workers, -peasants, and petty townsmen. The Japanese bombers -have carried ubiquitous messages of alarm. The -Western world gasped when across the dusty plains of -North China there rolled the tidal wave of Boxerism; -but the <i>I Ho Ch'üan</i> of yesteryear is a passing fad in -contrast to the bitterness and resolution of today's -common people. There is no defeat in most of the faces -in Shanghai, no surrender in the eyes of men who live, -and must keep on living, surrounded by enemy vainglory. -The traitors are marked by their own behavior; -they bear the stigmata of a surrender to vice. Yet even -they cannot be trusted by Japan. One who has visited -the sources and the mouths of the rivers, who has seen -the free Yangtze pouring out of Tibet and the captive -Yangtze ripple past the grey flanks of Imperial Japanese -destroyers, can testify that the Chinese people are not -beaten now. If they are ever going to be beaten, it will<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_238" id="Page_238">[Pg 238]</a></span> -take a bigger force than Japan to do it—a morally -greater, technically surer, politically wiser force.</p> - -<p>The Chinese people know they are unconquered. -They do not know it with their minds, despite hopeful -calculations in terms of years and yen and reserves of -oil. They do not even know it with a conscious assumption -of faith, a fanatical determination to die for the -new state. They know it just as men have always known -the simplest things of life—things so simple that they -may trouble the psychologist or elude the philosopher, -and never even enter the vocabulary of political science. -The Chinese sense of victory is like a reminiscent -fragrance, a half-heard but poignant sound, a flash of -inexpressible but profound meaning out of everyman's -irrecoverable past. This omnipresent sense of victory -and freedom may be twisted. Weak and cunning men -rationalize this sense of victory into self-deceiving subterfuges -of boring from within; they accept Japanese -salaries while promising themselves sometime, always -tomorrow, to subvert Japan; but even they lack no assurance -of ultimate Chinese victory.</p> - -<p>The winning of that victory lies on the sweating -backs of men—in paddy-fields, on flaring highways, on -flagstone pathways across a world, or behind the adobe -and lattice walls of China's workshops. The war has -conjured up an awareness of power. No one asks the -<i>lao-pai-hsing</i> what they want; no ballots, no polls can -reach them. But no people can hold such overt power -and be unconscious of their own strength. China has -awakened.</p> - - -<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_158" id="Footnote_1_158"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_158"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> The China Information Committee, <i>News Release</i>, April 1, 1940.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_159" id="Footnote_2_159"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_159"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> The same, April 8, 1940. Minor changes in punctuation have -been introduced.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_160" id="Footnote_3_160"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_160"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> The same, May 6, 1940.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_161" id="Footnote_4_161"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_161"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> Research Staff of the Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, -<i>Agrarian China, Selected Source Materials from Chinese Authors</i>, -Shanghai, 1938. A more Leftist and even gloomier view is taken -by Chen Han-seng, <i>Landlord and Peasant in China</i>, New York, 1936, -and the same author's <i>Industrial Capital and Chinese Peasants, A -Study of the Livelihood of Chinese Tobacco Cultivators</i>, Shanghai, -1939. Two general surveys of the Chinese economy are Condliffe, J. B., -<i>China Today: Economic</i>, Boston, 1932, and Tawney, R. H., <i>Land -and Labour in China</i>, New York, 1932. A significant hypothesis of -the relations of economics, government, and culture in China is -found in Lattimore, Owen, <i>Inner Asian Frontiers of China</i>, New York, -1940, Ch. III, esp. p. 39 <i>ff.</i>; this rests in part upon Wittfogel, Karl -August, <i>Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Chinas</i>, Leipzig, 1931, the leading -Marxian exposition of the subject.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_5_162" id="Footnote_5_162"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_162"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> Publicity release of Indusco, Inc., The American Committee in -Aid of Chinese Industrial Cooperatives, New York, January 1940 -[1941]. This agency, exceedingly active in publicizing China's cooperative -progress, has released a great deal of up-to-date information -on the movement. The Western literature on the C.I.C. has appeared -mostly in popular sources, to which <i>The Bulletin of Far Eastern -Bibliography</i> issued by the Committees on Far Eastern Studies of the -American Council of Learned Societies, Washington, D. C., serves -as a useful guide. The writings of Edgar Snow are of special -value and vividness in treating this topic: articles in <i>Asia</i>, various -dates; "China's Blitzbuilder, Rewi Alley," <i>The Saturday Evening -Post</i>, Vol. 213, no. 32 (February 8, 1941); and his recent <i>The Battle -for Asia</i>, New York, 1941, which appeared as this work was completed -and sent to press. A convenient handbook is the anonymous -<i>The People Strike Back! or The Story of Chinese Industrial Cooperatives</i>, -Shanghai, (1939?).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_6_163" id="Footnote_6_163"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_163"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> "The Movement in Action," <i>New Defense, A Journal of the -30,000 Industrial Cooperatives Movement in China</i> (Chungking) -Vol. I, no. 1 (April 1939), p. 5.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_7_164" id="Footnote_7_164"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_164"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> The China Information Committee, <i>News Release</i>, July 15, 1940. -The article and tables have been somewhat abridged. The cooperatives -spread so rapidly that figures are often obsolete before they are -tabulated.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_8_165" id="Footnote_8_165"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_165"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> "Model Constitution for Chinese Cooperative Societies, Revised -July 7th, 1940," The China Information Committee, <i>News Release</i>, -July 15, 1940.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_9_166" id="Footnote_9_166"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_166"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> Nevertheless, the rural cooperative movement must be counted -in as having made some beginnings, despite the obstacles it has faced. -More than seventy thousand credit and marketing cooperatives were -in service last year. (The same, April 22, 1940.)</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_10_167" id="Footnote_10_167"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_167"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> Wu Yi-fang and Price, Frank W., editors; New York, 1940.</p></div></div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_239" id="Page_239">[Pg 239]</a></span></p> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 400px;"> -<img src="images/i_239fp.jpg" width="400" height="525" alt="Dr. Sun Yat-sen" /> -<span class="caption"><i>Dr. Sun Yat-sen</i></span> -</div> - -<hr class="chap" /> - - - -<h2><span class="smcap">Chapter IX</span><br /> - -SUN YAT-SEN AND CHIANG K'AI-SHEK</h2> - - -<p>The two highest offices in the Kuomintang are -<i>Tsung-li</i> (Leader) and <i>Tsung-ts'ai</i> (Chief). These -are occupied by Sun Yat-sen as Leader and Chiang -K'ai-shek as Chief. Sun Yat-sen, though he died on -March 12, 1925, holds the higher office in perpetuity. -So vast is his legacy to modern China that it exceeds full -enumeration: founder of the effective revolutionary -movement and Party, first practical republican, political -organizer of the modern and overseas Chinese, first -President of the Republic, and therefore officially -acknowledged State Founder, a drafter of the national -plan of modernization, author of the accepted ideology -(<i>San Min Chu I</i>), initiator of the Nationalist-Communist -entente and of the consequent Great Revolution, -promulgator of the Outline of National Reconstruction, -and posthumous patron of the National -Government. Keenly and devotedly an advocate of -democracy, Sun Yat-sen established by practical example -the principle of charismatic leadership. He most -certainly left a mantle. This is now, after years of -struggle, draped about the shoulders of Chiang K'ai-shek, -although Wang Ch'ing-wei retains a few threads -torn from the hem.</p> - -<p>Sun Yat-sen was a leader in the sense that the great -religious and philosophical figures have been leaders. -He is not to be compared to Alexander, Genghis Khan, -Napoleon, or Hitler, but to Confucius, Gautama Buddha, -or Mohammed. Like the spiritual leaders he -blended profound humility and complete assurance. -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_240" id="Page_240">[Pg 240]</a></span>He knew that he was the savior of China, and knew it -long before anyone else did. He did not rely on rising -to power within a party, as did Lenin, or within a state, -as did Hitler. He created his own Party and his own -state. Had he not succeeded, he would have been -labelled a maniac; so would most of the other major -figures of human history, had they failed. His success, -whatever its future fortune, is already so immense that -it makes his sense of leadership seem modest. And -within the limits of success, he was very modest; -throughout life Sun remained more open-minded, ready -to consult, deferential to the opinions of others, and -more willing to yield power for the sake of harmony -than the majority of his compeers. This duality has -troubled some of his biographers. As late as 1939 an -anonymous Englishman published an attack on Sun, -which, missing the history of six decades, failed to note -that Sun had lived, had succeeded, and had died objectively -justified in his conception of himself.</p> - -<p>Sun's example, unconsciously at variance with his -teachings, has left a strong Caesarian strain in practical -Chinese politics. Without Sun Yat-sen in the background, -it is altogether impossible to understand the -role played by Chiang, or to resolve the contradiction -between a state pledged to democracy and a leader over-loaded -with power. No group in China, except the -officials of Manchoukuo, disavows Sun Yat-sen: the -Japanophiles, the Nationalists, and the Communists all -claim to execute his will.</p> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">Sun Yat-sen</span></h3> - -<p>Sun Yat-sen was born in Kwangtung Province, near -the Portuguese city of Macao. Although he was uncertain -of the date, the National Government has found -it to be November 12, 1866. Both his provincial and -class background had effect on his later life. The -Cantonese are among the most turbulent of Chinese,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_241" id="Page_241">[Pg 241]</a></span> -living at the southern edge of China and speaking a -dialect far different from the majority of the country. -Active, rebellious, enterprising, the Cantonese were disposed -to change. Sun's use of their tongue and knowledge -of their customs gave him an audience which both -suffered and profited by its distinctness. Sun's family -was certainly not of the gentry class, and yet not so -utterly poor that it lacked all profitable connections. -Otherwise his potentialities might have been thwarted -by ruinous poverty, disease, or early death.</p> - -<p>In adolescence, Sun felt the stings and urges of resentment -driving him to reform and revolution. He -had kin who were involved in the T'aip'ing Rebellion -(1850-65), the vast peasant uprising which, under -Christian collectivist leadership by the Messianic Hung -Hsiu-ch'üan, swept North to the Yangtze and drowned -in a sea of blood less than two years before Sun's birth. -He thus had direct knowledge not merely of Chinese -revolt against the alien Manchu empire, but he knew -of the revolutionary technique of a religious leader. -The effect of this presumptive knowledge has never -been explored; it would explain a great deal in Sun's -career—much of the sharp enthusiasm, the use of -ecstatic slogans, the emphasis on will, his demands for -faith in himself—if one could know that he followed the -instance of a Chinese Joseph Smith or Brigham Young, -not that of a Chinese Mazzini or Marx. The other important -feature about his early life was Western education.<a name="FNanchor_1_168" id="FNanchor_1_168"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_168" class="fnanchor">[1]</a></p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_242" id="Page_242">[Pg 242]</a></span></p> -<p>Western training gave him a channel upward which -the Confucian system had denied a hundred generations -of his predecessors. Patriots, rebels, reformers—these -have been sown by temperament and fortune -across the centuries of Chinese social existence, but -such potential heroes have been ploughed out or crippled -by the language and the examinations. No man could -command power—save in its transient forms: banditry, -conspiracy, commerce—without mastering the Confucian -canon. Once the intricate scholarship of the past -gripped him, the complex, beautiful, archaic language -of the mandarinate stopped up his mouth for plain -utterance. He was isolated from the people. Sun escaped -this by the use of the English language and the -command of Western science. He was par excellence the -great counter-ideologue, whose self-confidence and command -of men rested upon foundations beyond the ken -of his adversaries. Judge Linebarger wrote, on the -basis of what Sun told him:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>Like a soldier who after long study and practice has at -length mastered the manual of arms so as to have complete -confidence in his weapons, Sun now began to feel at last -a confidence in his ability to show others the path of his -new wisdom, for, while thus enjoying a steady advance -under English tutelage in the ways of the foreigner, he was -by no means neglecting his study of Chinese politics, even -in the pressure of college work. He knew now that he -would have to lead out in the Great Reform. At Hong -Kong, Macao, and Canton he had college intimates, and -these he sought out as often as his college course would -permit.<a name="FNanchor_2_169" id="FNanchor_2_169"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_169" class="fnanchor">[2]</a></p></blockquote> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_243" id="Page_243">[Pg 243]</a></span></p> -<p>Sun lived with his elder brother in Honolulu on two -occasions, and finally, after a period of discontent and -rising turbulence at home, went to study medicine in -Hong Kong. He was the outstanding student in the -school because of his already fluent command of the -English language,<a name="FNanchor_3_170" id="FNanchor_3_170"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_170" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> and was graduated as one of the -very first Chinese physicians to be trained in Western -medicine. Through their very nature, medical studies -impart to the student a sense of responsibility for others, -and also incline them toward the expert's indifference -to lay opinion. Throughout his life Sun never lost -confidence in the powers of his own reason, or in the -belief that, although difficult, it was both necessary -and possible to know the form and nature of social -no less than of biological processes, and to prescribe -remedies for an ill civilization as well as for a sick -man.</p> - -<p>With traditional patriotism, a Cantonese background, -the memory of poverty, foreign training, and contact -with overseas China, Sun was already a marked man in -his twenties. By 1895 he was important enough for the -Imperial Chinese Legation in London to kidnap him, -preparing to charter a ship to return him to China, -where the torturers of the Board of Punishments waited. -In a <i>cause célèbre</i>, Sun was released; from then on he -had an international reputation.</p> - -<p>His technique of revolution was little affected by the -growing proletarian parties of Europe. He adhered to -traditional Chinese methods, working through the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_244" id="Page_244">[Pg 244]</a></span> -consolidation of pre-existent secret societies, the recruitment -of terrorists, the launching of insurrection after -insurrection in the hope that one of them would catch -the waiting tinder and blaze across China. In Japan, -in America, and in Europe, he travelled, gathering -funds, carrying on vigorous polemics against his fellow-exiles, -the monarchist reformers. His followers were -organized under a variety of names, of which Kuomintang -is the last and best-known. By 1911 the revolution -broke out, flared sporadically across the central -and southern provinces, then lapsed into negotiations -between the Republicans and the Empire. Sun Yat-sen, -in America when the clash was precipitated, returned -home to be elected Provisional President of the Chinese -Republic, on January 1, 1912. But his revolution had -begun to pass into other hands. Opportunists, no rare -breed in China, leapt aboard the bandwagon, minimizing -the role of the Nationalists and grasping for the materials -of power: offices, guns and money, slogans. The -new-born Republic was taken over by the formidable -Yüan Shih-k'ai and converted into a pyramid of military -dictatorships; with Yüan's death the nation fell into -<i>tuchünism</i> and foreign meddling.</p> - -<p>The years following were the saddest in Sun's life. He -headed miscellaneous governments in Canton, lived for -a while in Shanghai, and died at a fruitless unification -conference in Peking. In his last years, obsessed by his -clear realization of the evils which beset his country, -he was even derided. He saw the vast economic maladjustments -which would follow the World War, and -wrote a work, <i>The International Development of -China</i><a name="FNanchor_4_171" id="FNanchor_4_171"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_171" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> which in its grandeur anticipated the Five-Year -and Four-Year Plans; his idea was to finance a spectacular -modernization of China through public works -by a scheme of international loans. Not only would the -imports of capital goods have benefited the Western<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_245" id="Page_245">[Pg 245]</a></span> -powers, but the development of a prosperous China -would have provided the expansion necessary to support -an imperialist capitalism. His argument was that -international capitalism needed a market; China, one -fourth of humanity, provided a market; international -guarantees and supervision would make modernization -possible; and modernization, while building state-socialism -and the material basis of prosperity in China, -would have enriched capitalism throughout the world. -There is no evidence that anyone save his followers and -friends took his plan seriously.</p> - -<p>The next step, in 1922, was a turning from capitalist -democracies, which had disappointed him, to a Russia -which professed a new justice in the world. Sun negotiated -with emissaries of the Third International, accepting -Red help on the clear understanding that Communism -was recognized, by him and by the Communists, -as unsuited to China—a proposition which -history calls into question. Only in his last stay in -Canton did he escape the ten-year pattern of frustration -which had been broken only by his happy second -marriage, to Soong Ching-ling. (The author, then a -small boy, remembers Sun in Shanghai as a man of -gentle kindness and rueful gaiety; Sun was never too -busy to speak to him, nor to remember little presents; -and in the midst of revolution Sun found time to write -a note of encouragement and good cheer.) With the -new allies, Sun, a dying man, went South, founded the -lineal predecessors of the Chungking government, called -his comrades to him, and discovered an effective military -helper—his first after Huang Hsing, dead in the -years of Yüan. This military aide was Chiang K'ai-shek.</p> - -<p>Just before his death Sun made sixteen lectures, out -of a scheduled program of eighteen. He did not write -them, but they were transcribed and roughly edited. -In other years he had drafted monumental political<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_246" id="Page_246">[Pg 246]</a></span> -treatises; when the manuscripts were lost he did not -reconstruct them. The lectures, improvised, filled with -minor inaccuracies, incomplete arguments, and appeals -to immediate opinion, rank nevertheless among works -of political genius. They are sharp, stirring, pointed, -hopeful, concrete. They define China's position in the -world, and the goals of the Chinese revolution. They -adumbrate the reinforced democracy which was to come -and now fights for existence. And they prescribe an economic -philosophy humane beyond the dogma of the -Russo-German dialecticians and far more self-conscious -than the obstinate torpor of Coolidge's capitalism. Sun's -lectures are today the foundation of the Chinese state -philosophy, taught in all curricula, required in all examinations. -As the <i>San Min Chu I</i>, they form an ideology -with more legal adherents than Marxism and National -Socialism and Fascism combined. For democrats, -wherever they may be, this is a matter of importance, -bearing directly on the confused uncanalized -struggles of our time. China possesses a doctrine which -indefeasibly associates her independence, her democracy, -and her prosperity.</p> - -<p>It would be a mistake to consider these lectures and -Sun's lesser writings the only source of Sun Yat-sen's -dogma. Since the government is in the hands of the -Kuomintang, and Kuomintang seniority depends largely -on closeness of association with Sun Yat-sen, Sun's personal, -casual, unconsidered influence on his friends -forms a vital background to state policy. Sun's American -biographer wrote,</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>Some criticize the <i>San Min Chu I</i>, because it seems to -them severe and lofty. To this I reply that there are things -other than what is written in the <i>San Min Chu I</i>. The -English and other nations have their laws, written and -unwritten. So too do we, the partisans of Sun Yat-sen, have -our laws, written and unwritten. And this unwritten law -is to us the dearer, is closer to our hearts, and is more moving -as the goal of our activity, than even the written -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_247" id="Page_247">[Pg 247]</a></span>commentaries. This unwritten law is for us, who, sitting at -his feet, received his teaching, the highest of all laws of -truth and fidelity, the law of <i>bona fides</i>.<a name="FNanchor_5_172" id="FNanchor_5_172"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_172" class="fnanchor">[5]</a></p></blockquote> - -<p>The continuing power of Sun Yat-sen is shown by the -prestige and power of his kin. Sun Yat-sen had two -families. Early in life, before his medical studies had -ended, he was married to a woman of his own class who -was devoted, family-loving, characteristically Chinese, -untouched by the West, and undisposed to revolution. -She bore him three children; the son, Dr. Sun K'ê, -was reared largely in the United States and has been an -important figure in Chinese politics ever since his return -to China from Columbia University. Successively -Mayor of Canton, Chairman of Kwangtung Province, -Minister of Communications, of Finance, and of Railways, -President of the Executive and of the Legislative -<i>Yüan</i>, he has served with distinction. A practical and -moderate man, he has always advocated a moderate, constitutional -application of his father's dogma, has espoused -full democratic government, stood for Party -abdication, and worked for national unity. One of his -sisters died young and the other married a gentleman -who was later Chinese Minister to Brazil. Mrs. Sun -Yat-sen, Sun K'ê's mother, lived to a ripe old age in -Macao. Charitable, pious, humane, she was an enthusiastic -Christian convert and a terror to sluggard -officials in that European outpost of vice. She took no -part in politics.</p> - -<p>Sun Yat-sen's second family was acquired when he -married Miss Soong Ching-ling. After his defeat by -Yüan Shih-k'ai and the frustration of the first Republic, -Sun Yat-sen felt very much in need of a companion to -hearten him, help his work, and share his troubles. -He had been on very close terms with C. J. Soong, a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_248" id="Page_248">[Pg 248]</a></span> -Christian business man, and had asked Mr. Soong's eldest -daughter, Ai-ling, to act as his secretary. When Miss -Ai-ling Soong left, her sister succeeded her. Sun fell -genuinely and deeply in love with the beautiful, vivacious, -American-educated girl who understood his work -and desired to share his troubles. In all his life, it is -likely that Sun met no one more devoted to himself, -more understanding of what he sought from life and -from his work for China, than Ching-ling Soong. They -were married on October 15, 1915, in Japan, Sun Yat-sen -having provided for separation from his first wife. -The younger wife has since become world-famous as -Mme. Sun Yat-sen.</p> - -<p>Ching-ling and Ai-ling Soong had a third sister,<a name="FNanchor_6_173" id="FNanchor_6_173"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_173" class="fnanchor">[6]</a> -May-ling, who married Chiang K'ai-shek after Ai-ling -had married H. H. K'ung. (Hence Chiang K'ai-shek's -closest family connection with Sun Yat-sen consists in -being brother-in-law to the second wife.) The three -Soong sisters thus married the two outstanding leaders -and another who stood just below. The Soong brothers -were less successful, although one, T. V. Soong, has -been a leading fiscal reformer and financial expert.</p> - -<p>The beauty, American education, polished cosmopolitan -manners, and sense of publicity of the three -sisters have made them sensational news figures. Their -eldest brother's success has added distinction to this -family. The inescapable consequence has been a great -deal of speculation about the "Soong dynasty"; but -the surprising feature of the Soongs is not their fame -and power through marriage, plus ability, but their -slight cohesion as a Chinese family. They have stood -together only at times of highest crisis, and not always -then. Mme. Sun Yat-sen has continued along the Leftist<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_249" id="Page_249">[Pg 249]</a></span> -tangent which her husband followed just before he -died. For years she was the only Leftist in China who -did not fear death or a more painful fate. She kept -her ideals; from the homes of her family she wrote -scathing denunciations of the blood-soaked tyranny of -her brother-in-law, her sisters, her stepson, and her -brother. Mme. K'ung appears to have worked most -steadfastly in the interest of the entire family, although -rivalry between her brother and her husband has been -a matter of general report. Mme. Chiang K'ai-shek, -the youngest of the three sisters, has been a loyal wife -first of all, and has contributed enormously to the Generalissimo's -international prestige. No other modern -leader possesses an able publicity adviser, capable and -apt, so near to himself. The family relationships of -Sun Yat-sen thus display themselves in his son, constitutional -and moderate, who is inclined to favor Mme. -Sun, with Sun's sisters-in-law and brothers-in-law following -their respective political courses with their own -families—all on cordial political terms, but scarcely a -monolithic family bloc.</p> - -<p>In addition to his doctrine, his Party, his followers, -and his family, Sun Yat-sen has bequeathed his name. -As Chung Shan, he fills the void in Chinese polity left -by the Emperor. Every Monday morning his will is -read, throughout every government office in the land. -His picture is seen everywhere. His sayings and slogans -have become the shibboleths of revolution, union, and -reconstruction. The reverence paid to him is a form -of secular worship, focussed upon a magnificent mausoleum -near the cenotaphs of the Ming Emperors on -Purple Mountain, Nanking. All virtues and most knowledge -are attributed to him; inescapably, some hard-headed -people react against the cult. Dead, he is to the -Chinese what the King is to the British, or the assembled -forefathers to the Americans, or—save partial -eclipse by Stalin—Lenin is to the Soviet Union. Perpetual<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_250" id="Page_250">[Pg 250]</a></span> -leader of the Kuomintang, Sun has in death -more power than life vouchsafed him. In a world wild -with alarm and hungry for leadership, his sense of providential -mission and of terrible political urgency no -longer seems shrill or vain. His is the greatest of posthumous -satisfactions: vindication by history.</p> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">The San Min Chu I</span></h3> - -<p>Out of the broad body of doctrine embodied in the -public and private utterances of Sun Yat-sen, one single -integrating philosophy stands forth, which entitles him -to rank as a major political thinker. This is the <i>San -Min Chu I</i>, which may be translated "three principles -of the people," "three principles of government for the -benefit of the people," "three principles concerning -people" and so forth, or may—most accurately—be represented -by the neologism, "tridemism."<a name="FNanchor_7_174" id="FNanchor_7_174"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_174" class="fnanchor">[7]</a> It consists -of an affirmation of a body of theory and a scheme of -programs to be applied generally to human experience, -and particularly to the modern problems of China.</p> - -<p>The prime problem faced by Sun Yat-sen was displacement -of the Confucian ideology, long refreshed -and perpetuated by the mandarinate. (The scholastic -bureaucracy rested on the difficulty and character of the -language, which removed writing from speaking and, -lacking what Westerners commonly consider grammar, -depended upon exact, appropriate choice of terms.) -Confucius, anticipating semantic controversialists by -many centuries, established a doctrine of meaning -which made politics the by-product of correct speech -and thought, to be performed by conspicuous, informed, -and majestic persons. When ideas and ideals were clear,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_251" id="Page_251">[Pg 251]</a></span> -moral standards firm and visible, and demeanor correct—as -determined by archaic natural standards—the realm -would prosper. Education was stressed as a means to -public service. In succeeding centuries Confucians first -monopolized education, establishing the Confucian -classics as formal Chinese canons, and then monopolized -the bureaucracy. Providing for elementary circulation -of an academic elite, although economically based on -land-ownership, they gave China a modified sort of -representative government, which operated by the all-encompassing -constitutionalism of common sense itself, -and rested ultimately on the lack of an alternative to -common sense. The Confucians were intellectually indifferent -to natural science and economically unfriendly -to technological change; China, unsurpassed for political -sophistication and deliberate social order, was -immobilized by an ancient success. Ideological control -led to veneration of the scholar, even veneration of -writing. Emperors, officials, people—all were captive to -accomplishment, and so completely indoctrinated that -they presumably enjoyed a very high conscious freedom. -Rigid social and mental uniformity spelled political -laxity; the state became atrophied and vestigial.</p> - -<p>Social rigidity made China only very slowly progressive -in mechanical terms. Political laxity made the -country weak in the face of invasion, exploitation, and -possible partition. Intellectual traditionalism shut off -stimuli available from the outside. Confucius had said, -"If terms be not correct, language is not in accordance -with the truth of things. If language be not in accordance -with the truth of things, affairs cannot be carried -on to success."<a name="FNanchor_8_175" id="FNanchor_8_175"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_175" class="fnanchor">[8]</a> Sun Yat-sen, Confucian in spirit -though not in form, turned to the dynamics of ideological -rather than legal control. To stir the immense<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_252" id="Page_252">[Pg 252]</a></span> -lethargy of China, he substituted science for archaism; -a Party elite for the scholastic system, propaganda to -replace doctrinal education, and agitation to supersede -incantation and reverence.</p> - -<p>He struck at ideas first: "We cannot say in general -that ideas, as ideas, are either good or bad. We must -judge whether, when put into practice, they prove useful -or not. If they are of practical use to us, they are -good; if they are impractical, they are bad. If they are -useful to the world, they are good; if they are not useful -to the world, they are not good."<a name="FNanchor_9_176" id="FNanchor_9_176"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_176" class="fnanchor">[9]</a> This pragmatic -utilitarianism was to be the philosophical foundation -of his revolution. The <i>San Min Chu I</i> therewith remained -alien to Marxism, which is dependent upon the -occult mysteries of a topsy-turvy Hegelianism; Sun's -thought is kin to the working philosophy of America, -a pragmatism tinctured by idealist vestiges.</p> - -<p>The first political principle he developed was <i>Nationalism</i> -(<i>min ts'u</i>). The theoretical basis for this was -a racialism which, scientifically no more tenable than -National Socialist Aryanism, is clear in common practice. -Very few Chinese have trouble in identifying -another Chinese. Sun Yat-sen pointed out that although -the European peoples were divided, China was to him -both a race and a nation. He thereby established for -his followers a foundation for nationality more credible -than any mere appeal to state allegiance. Treason -against one's government is taken lightly in China: -witness the Japanophiles. Treason to the Chinese race -is a far more serious matter. In order to preserve the -Chinese race-nation, Sun Yat-sen called for ideological -reconstruction from three elements: ancient Chinese -morality, traditional Chinese social knowledge (e.g., -bureaucratic techniques; arbitration instead of adjudication), -and Western physical science. He urged -a return to cosmopolitanism through nationalism. By<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_253" id="Page_253">[Pg 253]</a></span> -becoming strong—instead of extinct under alien colonial -rule—the Chinese state could lead the world back to -the old pacific cosmopolitanism of Eastern Asia.</p> - -<p>Programmatically, Sun subsumed under his <i>min t'su</i> -theory, the necessity of a patriotic elite, formed into -the party of his followers, which was to unify China -and to cultivate a genuine state-allegiance instead of -the veneration of a concretely paramount Emperor -or other leader. He also advocated that China maintain -independence, make independence a reality in which -the entire race-nation should share by fostering actual -autonomy (hence, democracy), and by fighting defensively -against economic exploitation by the imperialist -powers.</p> - -<p>The second principle presented was <i>Democracy</i> (<i>min -ch'üan</i>). He pointed out that old China was democratic -in allowing considerable social mobility, and much -equality within the framework of that mobility, and -that popular government was a reality in local affairs, -while popular supremacy (corresponding to Western -theories of popular sovereignty) followed from the universally -admitted Chinese right of rebellion. He justified -democracy on the grounds that it was commanded -by China's antique sages, was necessarily consequent -upon nationalism, was decreed by the <i>Zeitgeist</i>, was -necessary to good administration, and was a modernizing -force. But he modified his democracy by a distinction -between <i>ch'üan</i> (power) and <i>nêng</i> (ability), keeping -government and people perpetually dual, and making -the problem of democratic personnel one of popular -choice plus the control of popular choice. The programs -of democracy involved the revolution of three -stages, the five-<i>yüan</i> government, and emphasis on the -<i>hsien</i>.<a name="FNanchor_10_177" id="FNanchor_10_177"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_177" class="fnanchor">[10]</a></p> - -<p>The third principle is based on Sun Yat-sen's own -philosophy of history. <i>Min shêng</i>, frequently<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_254" id="Page_254">[Pg 254]</a></span> -translated "the principle of the people's livelihood," rested -upon Sun Yat-sen's belief that history is not based exclusively -on materialism and that it cannot be analyzed -merely in terms of the ownership of the means of production. -He insisted that history was based on the -fundamental fact that man has <i>jên</i>—humane self-awareness; -human fellow-sympathy; consciousness of being -located in society, together with orientation by values -social, not individually or materially established; benevolence. -<i>Min shêng</i> is accordingly an ethical doctrine -first, and an economic one afterward. It is the basis of -history (<i>min-shêng wei li-shih-ti chung-hsin</i>). It presupposes, -for China: (1) a national economic revolution -against imperialism and for democracy; (2) an industrial -revolution for the enrichment of China; and (3) a -prophylactic against social revolution. Although showing -the influence of Karl Marx, Henry George, and -the modern American, Maurice William,<a name="FNanchor_11_178" id="FNanchor_11_178"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_178" class="fnanchor">[11]</a> the doctrine -remained Chinese in spirit, pragmatically collectivist in -application. Under the programs of <i>min shêng</i> Sun included -the bold projects for which he had sought all -his life, desiring the independent, socially just prosperity -of his country.</p> - -<p>These doctrines form the constitutional foundation -of government action, as well as being the Party credo -of the Kuomintang. Whoever proposes policy in China -must first square it with the <i>San Min Chu I</i>. In this -the Generalissimo has combined adroitness with profound -sincerity.</p> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">Chiang K'ai-shek</span></h3> - -<p>Despite a small shelf of biographies, Chiang K'ai-shek -remains a personality above and behind the news,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_255" id="Page_255">[Pg 255]</a></span> -not in it. His former teacher and present publicity adviser, -Hollington Tong, has written an authorized life, -clear, detailed, and well expurgated. The celebrated -Sven Hedin published a study of Chiang; virtues, but -not specific personality stood forth. An able American -newspaperman had recourse to his files, and some Chinese -admirers sketched an incredibly soft, lovely picture: -the background was clarified, but not Chiang. -Two world-famous reporters, trained to epitomize a life -or a nation in a double column or sharp review, failed -to grasp Chiang. He eludes everyone.</p> - -<p>Part of the trouble comes from the fact that he possesses -virtues which, once lauded, are now suspected -of being mythical, wheresoever they occur. Frederick the -Great, George Washington, Julius Caesar in his careerist -years—authentic in history, as contemporaries these -leaders would strike the moderns as characters inflated -or incredible. Sincerity has become consistency with -one's source of income; persons who fail to fit into the -accepted moral and intellectual types of Western industrialist -society are labelled fakes. One is a gentleman-liberal, -an intellectual-liberal, a capitalist, a picturesque -<i>native</i>, a war-lord sinister, obscene, cruel, and -criminal—one fits such a type, and if one doesn't, one -does not exist. Yet Chiang exists, and is thereby suspect -to a host of commentators. Sun Yat-sen as First President -was an acceptable news figure; as Saint of the -Great Revolution he became vulnerable. When Chiang -seems neither a general nor a reactionary, he bewilders -many Westerners.</p> - -<p>Within China, Chiang is more readily grasped. In -any other age, he would be the founder of a new dynasty. -The establishers of Imperial houses have, as a group, -combined intense vigor with a flair for the disreputably -picturesque, in turn qualified by the highly respectable -associates they sought out after success. Several have -been bandits; one was an unfrocked Buddhist priest. -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_256" id="Page_256">[Pg 256]</a></span>For vigor and a timely libertarianism, they compare -favorably with the Claudian line. Today the Dragon -Throne is irrecoverably remote; the Manchoukuoan -Emperor Kang Tê lacks elementary plausibility. Chiang -is far too wise, far too modern in his own motivations, -to wish or dare dream of Empire. Upon him has descended -grace of a new kind, the charismatic halo of Sun -Yat-sen. His reputation can be carved in the most enduring -of materials: indefeasible history. With a son who is -a Bolshevik, a little Eurasian grandchild, and an -adopted son of no high merit, Chiang does not face -the problem of power-bequeathal. He has power now; -it matters little where power goes after his death; the -value to him lies in immediate use.</p> - -<p>Assuming even an abnormal egocentrism, Chiang—at -the apex of state—is above ambition; he has no welfare -but that of the state. In fact, Chiang is a man of -almost naively insistent morality. Even Westerners act -on the stage of today with posterity as an audience; Chinese, -state-building, moral, Chiang moves under the -glare of his perpetual reputation. As in the case of -Sun, his sense of leadership would be maniacal if not -grounded on fact; but what assumption would not? -A peanut-vendor who thinks he is the King of Egypt -is crazy; Farouk is not therefore crazy because King -of Egypt. If Chiang were not the leader of China, he -would be mad; but he, and he alone, is leader. His -humility begins with the assumption of his power.</p> - -<p>Twenty-one years the junior of Sun Yat-sen, Chiang -was born in 1888 in Chekiang province.<a name="FNanchor_12_179" id="FNanchor_12_179"></a><a href="#Footnote_12_179" class="fnanchor">[12]</a> His family<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_257" id="Page_257">[Pg 257]</a></span> -was of a class intermediate between the truly eminent -landlord-official or merchant families, and the farmers. -They had been farmers, but also minor gentry, and -had been connected with the salt-revenue system. His -grandfather attained considerable renown as a scholar, -but Chiang's own father died when Chiang was eight -years of age. The child had few special advantages. His -family background is one which is of common occurrence -among political leaders; his widowed mother, -mastering and managing for the family, inculcated a -sharp morality, an unrelenting frugality, and a persistent -drive of industriousness in her children. To -such a person, who rises from poverty and hardship by -his own efforts, the failure of others to do likewise -becomes a personal problem. By his own case he has -proved that opportunities are there. He is impatient -with the poor, the stupid, or the shiftless; instead of re-arranging -society to give them a chance, he expects them -to improve themselves to meet existing realities. Chiang -has not explicitly stated all these points; many of them -are qualified by the fact that the <i>status quo</i> in modern -China is the <i>status quo</i> of perpetual revolution.</p> - -<p>Leftist commentators, dubbing Chiang a combined -product of landlordism, compradore class, and criminal -gangs, explain him through a mystagogic economic -determinism. Actually, Western impress on Chiang is -of a more special nature: Western religion, and Western -warfare. The ideals which animate him, and determine—so -far as these are visible—his own sense of values, -are concepts and attitudes extraneous to the Chinese -scene. Deduct the threaded recurrency of religion, and -the sense of technique from military training, and -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_258" id="Page_258">[Pg 258]</a></span>Chiang could be paired with many other modern Chinese -leaders—soldiers of turmoil, administrators of the -<i>ad interim</i>, complacent leaders of hypothetical groups. -He and Sun stand out because each had a Western -technique so thoroughly mastered that it gave him a -clear competence over other men: Sun, the physician; -Chiang, the strategist. Each also had a Western moral -drive which turned hungrily to the past and justified -itself in Chinese antiquity: Sun, the all-around Christian, -who professed and denied the churches alternately -throughout life, and Chiang, the Bible-quoting Methodist, -both cite the Confucian canons; both esteem the -Chinese ethics; both discern the forcefulness of Western -spirituality.</p> - -<p>Leadership, plus technical power, plus alien moral -reinforcement, spells preeminence. The Confucians -have gone; the serene mandarins are dead. Methodist -soldiers, Baptist bankers—such Chinese control China. -Marxism, which by combining jargon and act of faith, -is both religion and erudition, unites these ideocratic -forces; Wang Ming can feel that he is a scientist analyzing -society with peculiar objectivity, and he can feel -morally gratified at the same time. Chiang and the -Nationalist leaders keep such sustenance dual.</p> - -<p>The special religious background came to him -through his mother. Women have traditionally turned -to Buddhism for piety in China, and Mrs. Chiang was -one of the exceptional characters who combined intense -hard work with great piety. The children grew with -the infinite looming over them; every misstep meant -thousands upon thousands of years of hopeless, damnable -rebirth. Buddhism can match the Christian, "It -is a fearefull thing to fall into the hands of the living -God ...,"<a name="FNanchor_13_180" id="FNanchor_13_180"></a><a href="#Footnote_13_180" class="fnanchor">[13]</a> with the even more fearful doom of life -in a world which does not want to live. Buddhism, -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_259" id="Page_259">[Pg 259]</a></span>socially, goes about in circles; the Mahayana sect provides -a qualified kind of salvation, but not the salvation -which a determined man can wring bloody-handed -out of circumstance itself. The discipline, the austerity, -were ready; Christianity, when it came to him, fell on -plowed and waiting ground. The other instinct of -ascendancy was cultivated by his education: professionalism. -His life falls into three stages after childhood: -education; wasted years; and the mastery and use of -power.</p> - -<p>Chiang went to the Imperial Military Academy at -Paotingfu. Aloof and ambitious, he was so successful -that within a year he was sent to the Shinbo Gokyo -(Preparatory Military Academy) in Tokyo; he remained -in Japan four years. The Japanese under whom -he studied retained no special impression of him, except -that he eagerly accepted discipline. As a part of -his study, he served with the 13th Field Artillery (Takada) -Regiment of the Imperial Army. Chiang therewith -acquired not merely military knowledge, but a -working insight into Japanese language, mentality, and -strength.</p> - -<p>His military studies were terminated by the outbreak -of the Republican Revolution in 1911. Chiang returned -to Shanghai, and began a vigorous military -career under the local military commander, pro-Sun -in politics. Chiang himself had come into contact with -the Republican-Nationalist group while in Japan. -There was already no question of where his loyalties -lay. He made rapid progress, and saw something of -fighting. He took part in the abortive Second Revolution, -of 1913, which was the military attempt by Sun -Yat-sen and his first military coadjutant, Huang Hsing, -to check Yüan Shih-k'ai and to save the newborn Republic -by force. In this time, while the enthusiasm of -his military studies had not yet worn off, Chiang wrote -prodigiously. No Westerner has, so far as the present<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_260" id="Page_260">[Pg 260]</a></span> -author knows, taken the trouble to go through Chiang's -writings in order to study him. Chinese commentators -praise them as full of military acumen, a sense of the -novel and important forces in Chinese society, and a -vigorous moralism—modern-military in form, but archaic -in language—which animated Chiang's youthful -desire to improve the world with good, technically -apt gunfire. He was at this time twenty-three or twenty-four.</p> - -<p>Between this early career and the later years of -Chiang's life—the years in which his star rode incessantly -ascendant—there is a gap of several years, 1913 to -1918. In this time Chiang lived a life primarily civilian, -although he remained under the patronage of his first -military leader, General Chen Ch'i-mei, murdered in -1915. Chiang went on a military intelligence trip for -the Sun Yat-sen group, travelling through Manchuria -in 1915. He opposed Yüan's moves, and stayed in close -contact with the patriotic organization. Yet, the total -picture of his life in these years lacks the connecting -linkage which binds his childhood, his school days, and -his mature career. His activity, while considerable, was -diffuse.</p> - -<p>He went down to Canton in 1918, and fought under -the command of Sun Yat-sen, with the inferior troops -and hopeless expeditions which the Leader, politically -adept but strategically inexpert, kept throwing against -the confusion of the <i>tuchün</i> wars, with the result that -the war-lords, counting him as another element in their -balance of power, did not even set up a united front -against him. Chiang, a Central Chinese, was unsympathetic -to the intense provincialism of the Cantonese, -and was hopelessly tactless in criticizing old-type soldiers -upon whom Sun then relied. Disillusioned but still -loyal, he went back to Shanghai and wrote letters of -advice to his friends in the South, including Dr. Sun. -Throughout this time he was simply one more among<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_261" id="Page_261">[Pg 261]</a></span> -the dozens of bright young military men who were, in -the existing crudity of warfare, unneeded in China. -(Chu Tê, Chiang's present colleague and rival who -heads the Soviet Chinese military system, was at this -time besotted in Yünnan—a petty war-lord of landlord -family, trapped hopeless on his little island of power -amidst ruin.)</p> - -<p>The period in the Shanghai years was filled in with -business activity. Chiang was acquainted with some of -the most influential merchants of the city, among them -the crippled Chang Ching-chiang, a Paris merchant -whose personal wealth was an informal treasury of -Sun's movement. Chiang entered brokerage, and is -supposed to have made a great deal of money. He became -acquainted with the modernized, Westernized -young Chinese of the metropolis, and left many friends -behind him among the Chinese business men and industrialists.</p> - -<p>Speculative or unfriendly writers asseverate that -Chiang joined the Green Gang, an association which -combined the features of a protection racket and a -benevolent society. (Such a society, common in China -during periods of disturbance, is the archetype of the -American-Chinese Tong [<i>tang</i>] in its more violent -phases.) If so, membership gave Chiang the key to an -underworld as well organized as François Villon's Paris, -wherein beggars, thieves, pickpockets, kidnappers, labor -contractors, burial societies, and legitimate associations -merged under the extra-legal government of a Masonic-like -hierarchy. (The author is acquainted with a Chinese -League of Nations official who joined the Gang -as a necessary implement of social research, and was -afforded genuine courtesy in preparing a report, general -but accurate as to prevailing conditions, through the -assistance of his fellow-members.)</p> - -<p>Chiang's marriage, which had been made Chinese-fashion -in his late boyhood, had given him posterity—a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_262" id="Page_262">[Pg 262]</a></span> -son, now the pro-Communist, Soviet-trained Major-General -Chiang Ching-kuo—but little companionship. -His wife and son remained most of the time at his native -home, whence he returned to see them and his mother, -at Fenghua in Chekiang. Social contacts, acquaintance -with capitalism, looseness of family connections, spasmodic -work for the Revolution, and some military -work—this, combined with the making and the losing -of a fortune, fill the early maturity of Chiang.</p> - -<p>He appeared upon the national and the world scene -by his selection in 1923 to go to Moscow under the terms -of the Nationalist-Soviet understanding, there to receive -military training. He had definitely cast in his lot with -Sun Yat-sen, making soldiery his vocation, and the selection -implied that Sun began to see in him a military -aide, to replace Huang Hsing of the first revolution. -Chiang spent four months in the Soviet Union. The -Communists, whom he was to fight six years later, -showed him their combination of political and military -warfare applied in Trotsky's Red Army. Chiang, -already the beneficiary of Japanese training, had found -Japanese military science dependent upon the framework -of a stable constitutional system. In China his -earlier training had been superior to its environment -and did not have the practical utility of five years' -banditry. Chiang, professional by spirit, restless under -the drive of conscience and ambition, now found in -Moscow the intermediate steps between modern warfare -and government-building. He found that an army, -from being the tool of pre-existing order, could become -the spearhead of an accompanying order. Returning -to China via the Trans-Siberian Railroad, he -met General Galens (Vassili Bluecher), later his chief -Soviet military aide at Canton.</p> - -<p>In Canton, the first military creation on Soviet models -was the Whampoa (<i>Huangpu</i>) Academy. Decreed by -Sun Yat-sen, who made Chiang chief, the Academy had<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_263" id="Page_263">[Pg 263]</a></span> -Soviet advisers, eager to instill revolutionary and civil-war -techniques. Chiang began the development of a -modern army, and the real accretion of his own power. -Even before he commanded full armies, Chiang used -his cadets to good purpose in actual combat.</p> - -<p>From this point on, Chiang's career becomes a part -of the military history of the revolution. In his earlier -years of power, Chiang emerged to leadership by cooperating -with various intra-Kuomintang groups. He -stood with the Left and utilized the Communists, although -he managed to provoke, suppress, and appease -the Communists in a way which no one else managed. -He led the victorious Northern Expedition in 1925-27, -carrying his forces on the crest of the Great Revolution. -He was little known, but seen to be ambitious, zealous, -incalculable, and a political strategist of ruthless genius. -He soon found himself one of the triumvirate of Sun -Yat-sen's successors: Hu Han-min, the Right Kuomintang -leader, editor of Sun's works; Chiang; and Wang -Ch'ing-wei, the Left Kuomintang leader.</p> - -<p>At Shanghai, in 1927, Chiang's troops turned suddenly -against the Communists and Left groups, quenching -the uprising which had taken the city under his -flag. This coup was undertaken because Chiang felt -that the Communists were outrunning their promises. -The Soviet advisers, who had come to help the Nationalists, -had professed their concern for China's -national struggle, and for the desirability of a fight -against imperialism. They had not told Sun himself -that he was a mere precursor to the proletarian revolution, -nor informed the Nationalists that they were being -given the privilege of fighting a war to advance the -historical necessity of Nationalist extinction, as the next -step in China's dialectic progression. Trotsky talked -openly in Moscow about overthrowing the Chinese -revolutionaries, and hijacking the Chinese revolution -with the Chinese Communists, while Stalin believed<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_264" id="Page_264">[Pg 264]</a></span> -in appeasing the Nationalists longer before discarding -them. Of this Chiang was fully aware, and he struck -at the sources of Communist power, labor and peasant -unions, using a ruthlessness comparable to theirs. He -went further, establishing the National Government (in -the five-power form) at Nanking, and leaving the Left -Kuomintang uneasily in the company of the Communists -at Hankow. When the Communists proceeded -to debate the question of monopolizing the remnants, -even the Left-Kuomintang had had enough. They -suppressed the Communists, and dissolved, coming down -river to Nanking and joining the new government, -while Chiang stepped technically out of the picture -to ease the healing of the schism. Chiang's legitimacy -in the leadership of the Kuomintang and the Sun Yat-sen -revolution is shown by the fact that within two years -he had an overwhelming majority of the veteran Kuomintang -leaders at his capital.</p> - -<p>In the ensuing years Chiang dedicated himself to -three tasks: the development of the National Government, -the stabilization of his own power, and the -modernization of the country, both moral and mechanical. -In 1927 he had married Miss May-ling Soong, -and brought himself into alliance with the influential -Soong family. The success of his efforts is attested by -the continued functioning of a National Government at -Chungking, the resistance and unification of China, -which Chiang has come to symbolize, and the stalemate -of Japan. These things would have appeared in some -form, even without Chiang, but they would probably -not exist with their present clarity and strength. The -ten years of armament, modernization, and Japan-appeasement -built an area into a nation, changing one -more government into an elementary national state.</p> - -<p>The Generalissimo has changed in appearance and -manner considerably in the past ten years; these changes<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_265" id="Page_265">[Pg 265]</a></span> -seem to have immediate bearing on his political role. -In 1931 he was unmistakably the first soldier of China—brusque, -forthright, sharp-voiced, and dismayingly lacking -in the devious but pleasant <i>k'ê-ch'i</i> (ceremonial -politeness) which is carried to professional heights by -Chinese officials. Even then he was a masterful and -clear-willed sort of man, who upset political precedents -by a directness which would have been naive were it not -so obviously both self-conscious and sincere. He possessed -a keen awareness of his own historical importance, -and a consistent responsibility before history—which -still animates him—was the result. When coupled with -the regular exercise of authority, this trait may have -the consequence of moderating arbitrariness and minimizing -opportunism.</p> - -<p>With Chiang's self-possession there went an impatience -with opposing views, a carelessness of means -in the face of ends, and a fanatical insistence on loyalty. -He now seems little older in body, despite the injury -to his back during the Sian episode, but the years have -left a very clear impress on his moral character. To -the sharp discipline and authority of the soldier he has -added the characteristics of a teacher—reserved kindliness, -a daily preoccupation with moral questions, an -inclination to harangue his followers on the general -meaning of their problems. Ten years ago it was very -difficult to find out what Chiang really believed and -wanted; his ambition and patriotism were both patent, -but beyond them there was little detail to be filled -in. He is beginning to have the relationship of, let -us say, Lenin to Marx in his treatment of the <i>San Min -Chu I</i> of Sun Yat-sen, and is beginning to stand forth -as an interesting political theorist in his own right. He -gives every indication of maturing in office, and of rising -in stature in proportion to the responsibilities which -are thrust upon him.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_266" id="Page_266">[Pg 266]</a></span></p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Chinese Appraisals of Chiang</span></h3> - -<p>Among both official and unofficial circles in Chungking -there is a widespread and apparently well-founded -belief that the two critical points of China's resistance -and continued national independence rest more on -Chiang's life, activity, and support than on any other -single man or institution. These points are, of course, -the domestic armistice and the promotion of resistance -and reconstruction. The enormous strains which collaboration -imposes on Nationalists and Communists -are borne by Chiang. The finesse necessary to keep regions, -classes, and groups in line, would probably not -be available if the Generalissimo were dead. It is a -tribute to his associates and followers of all parties that -they work with him and with each other, but at the -same time it is the supreme accomplishment of Chiang -to have developed so that he can personify unity.</p> - -<p>A question which the writer put to almost everyone -he met in Western China was, "What do you think -of Chiang? And what do you think Chiang thinks of -himself?" The answers varied in tone and detail, but -showed an interesting unanimity in major stress. One -of the National Salvationist leaders,<a name="FNanchor_14_181" id="FNanchor_14_181"></a><a href="#Footnote_14_181" class="fnanchor">[14]</a> bitter about -Chiang's high-handed repression of Left-liberal movements -in pre-war years, replied "Impossible!" to the -question, "From your point of view, could General -Chiang become an outright dictator?" But this leader -explained that Chiang differed from President George -Washington in that the latter's own conception of his -role was in close harmony with public expectation and -governmental necessity, whereas Chiang—believing in -democracy as a part of his loyalty to his leader, Dr. -Sun, and to the <i>San Min Chu I</i>—found himself unready -to trust democratic processes in really vital issues.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_267" id="Page_267">[Pg 267]</a></span></p> - -<p>The critic continued by adding that the difference -between Sun and Chiang was to be found in the fact -that the former, whatever his impatience, let the Plenary -Session of the C.E.C. of the Kuomintang reach its -decisions through discussion, whereas Chiang tried to -help the committee decide by lecturing at it. He concluded -thus: if there were no political group other -than the Kuomintang, Chiang might become a dictator -in fact while remaining a democratic leader in name. -The presence of other parties and groups makes this difficult, -if not impossible. For example, the Kuomintang -might try to apply the new constitution in such a way -as to prevent its being an additional step on the road -to democracy; but the other groups, including the Communists, -could thwart this move by refusing to take -part in any of the constitutional ceremonies, and thereupon -[in the traditional Chinese fashion] discredit the -whole thing. These opinions are of special interest -when one considers that they stem from a group which -is still suffering from a very careful police supervision -and a state of non-recognition and semi-repression.</p> - -<p>Another interesting interpretation of Generalissimo -Chiang's role is found among the Communists. One -of the Chinese Communist leaders<a name="FNanchor_15_182" id="FNanchor_15_182"></a><a href="#Footnote_15_182" class="fnanchor">[15]</a> had the question -put to him, "On what long-range basis of practical -politics can you people and the Generalissimo cooperate? -After all, you must be consolidating power which -can be used against him and he power which can be -turned against you?" He replied that if Chiang made -terms with the Japanese, or if he failed to resist, the -Communists would need to have nothing to do with -him, nor he with them, since he would be ruined in -any case. On the other hand, if the war came to a successful -end, Chiang would be the supreme hero of -modern China; the Communists could not turn against<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_268" id="Page_268">[Pg 268]</a></span> -him; and Chiang knew this well enough to know that -if he defeated Japan he had won China. The commentator -did not explore other obvious possibilities, such -as a long stalemate in the Japanese war, or a shift in -Soviet policies, but what he said indicates the present -reality of the common interests between the Communists -and the Generalissimo.</p> - -<p>From these and other comments, the visitor to China -soon learns that although Chiang is the Chief (<i>Tsung-ts'ai</i>) -of the Kuomintang, his power rests as much on -broad national support as it does on Party power. It -is significant that although Chiang still has two groups -of semi-secret protective police, one Party and the other -Army, he has far less occasion to use them than he -did five years ago. There is an inadequacy of due -process, of course, which would strike the lay American -as critically unsatisfactory, but the smoothness, -evenness, and relative frankness of government is far -greater than at any other time in modern China.</p> - -<p>Democracy is obtaining some real beginnings, not -because of a sudden lurch in political necessity, nor because -of the charm of a theory, but because the firm -ground of a common opinion is knitting the country -together and affording the limits indispensable to the -functioning of democratic techniques; this common -opinion, the universal popularity of the war, is based on -the resistance-and-reconstruction policy. The same patriotic -surge which supports the war supports Chiang, -as the hero and chief technician of the war.</p> - -<p>The political changes which translated Chiang from -the status of a Party leader and a new kind of militarist -into a real national leader are mirrored in his writings. -His published political works now run to a considerable -number of volumes, representing collections of his -speeches and essays.<a name="FNanchor_16_183" id="FNanchor_16_183"></a><a href="#Footnote_16_183" class="fnanchor">[16]</a> It would, perhaps, be interesting<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_269" id="Page_269">[Pg 269]</a></span> -to note the main trends of his political philosophy, since -it serves as the firm ground of his policy. It is possible -that no other leader in the world, except Stalin, has -satisfied himself so thoroughly with the connection between -his own epistemological and ethical presuppositions -and his working conclusions in terms of action -as has Chiang.</p> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">The Ideology of Chiang</span></h3> - -<p>First and foremost, Chiang accepts the <i>San Min Chu -I</i> of Sun Yat-sen, deviating from the letter of these doctrines -by no single brush-stroke. In his spirit of interpretation, -he follows in general the Rightist exegeses, -as represented by the works of Hu Han-min and T'ai -Ch'i-t'ao, although he has developed his own conclusions -in great part from his first-hand memory of Dr. -Sun, and from his own experience. (Needless to say, -he is worlds apart from the interpretations given by such -Leftists as the Communists, the Third Party, or Mme. -Sun, or such ultra-Rightists as the Japanophiles.)</p> - -<p>Secondly, he has found the pragmatic elements of -Sun's philosophy highly palatable. Apart from his public -life, he has always made a fetish of action, and has -stood for getting something done. His orthodox but -modified Sunyatsenism and his practicality can best be -shown by excerpts from a recent essay of his which -states his position.<a name="FNanchor_17_184" id="FNanchor_17_184"></a><a href="#Footnote_17_184" class="fnanchor">[17]</a> One notes the stress on practicality,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_270" id="Page_270">[Pg 270]</a></span> -the Christian influence in the matter of love, and the -opinions of Communism, Fascism, and Democracy:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>In order to make a scientific study of any subject it is -best to use the analytical, deductive and inductive methods. -By applying this principle to the study of the <i>San Min Chu -I</i>, I have made a chart showing its system and working -procedure.... In order to realize his ideas, Sun invented -the most complete and the most practical political principles, -the <i>San Min Chu I</i>. At the present there are mainly -three schools of political thought, namely, Democracy so-called, -Communism, and Fascism. None of them is perfect. -For instance, take Communism. It attaches enough importance -to the economic side of life and resembles the -Principle of Livelihood, but it ignores the ideas embodied in -the Principles of Nationalism and Democracy. Furthermore, -it considers the economic interests of only one class of people, -and not of all. The Fascist school stresses only those ideas -as embodied in the Principle of Nationalism and ignores -the other two principles. Besides, it ignores the interests -and welfare of other nationalities. So-called Democracy -is too much involved with capitalism and can hardly solve -the problems of <i>min shêng</i>. The Three Principles of Sun -are different from these in that they originate from the -idea that <i>the world belongs to the public</i>. His aim is to -bring about the real equality of the people without any -distinction of classes, religion, and occupations. After this -is realized in China, it is expected that the equality of all -nationalities in the whole world can be brought about by -means of the spirit of mutual help and sincere cooperation.</p> - -<p>Of all the common human feelings, the sentiment of -nationality is the most worthy one. The Principle of Nationalism -is based on this point. Laws specifically define -the popular responsibilities and privileges which underlie -the Principle of Democracy. And lastly, in Livelihood, -each man's reasoning power is used to advantage in working -out the most rational way of distribution, whereby -people will be put in an equitable position economically. -Thus it can be seen that the Three Principles are very -adaptable to China as well as to any other nation.</p> - -<p>As I outline above, Sun, starting with the Principle of -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_271" id="Page_271">[Pg 271]</a></span><i>people's livelihood</i> and embodying the idea that <i>the world -belongs to the public</i>, established the <i>San Min Chu I</i>. But -just having a Principle won't do; a motive power is needed -to fulfill it. That power is revolution....</p> - -<p>Revolution is not an easy thing. It needs a very strong -driving force to carry it out. What are the driving forces -in the case of the Chinese revolution? They are wisdom, -love, and courage. I wish to point out specially that the -second factor is the most important. "Love" means, among -other things: Save your country, even at the cost of your -life!</p> - -<p>Let us define more fully the meanings of these three -words. Wisdom means, how to understand Love. It also -means: first, wide reading; second, care in your inquiries; -third, careful thinking; fourth, the power of distinguishing -right and wrong. By Love is meant loyalty, filial piety, -faithfulness, and peace. Courage means the determination -to do what is right. Besides, what is the most important -is the need for persistence, without which nothing can be -accomplished.</p> - -<p>When you have the virtues of Wisdom, Love and Courage -and the persistence required, the next move is to start and -work. Sun told us that it is hard to know and easy to do. -If you study the <i>San Min Chu I</i> carefully and yet don't do -what is required of you, it is not because you can't do it, but -because you won't do it. If you just won't do it, you are not -a faithful disciple of the <i>San Min Chu I</i>.</p> - -<p>When you are to start the revolutionary work, you must -have a Party, because in a Party all the revolutionary forces -can be consolidated and all the revolutionary activities can -be planned and directed....</p></blockquote> - -<p>The character of Chiang as a political leader which -emerges from his military training, his successful marriage -and even more successful jockeying for power, -his maturity under the influence of that power, and his -somewhat crude but austere recognition of responsibility, -is quite different from the portraits drawn by -the coastal diehards or by Leftists. To the former he -is just another Asiatic swashbuckler who conceals murder -and extortion behind orotund banality; to the latter -he is a sort of Franco, supinely cooperative with -Anglo-American imperialism because of his<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_272" id="Page_272">[Pg 272]</a></span> -compradore-class mentality, who faces a last chance of dialectical -salvation if he yields to the Chinese Communists in -their version of democracy and promotes upper-class -liquidation in war time. It is likely that he will break -the limits of either attempt to define him, and will—if -the war succeeds—play a distinctly Chinese part in -the construction of a China which, by reason of the -speed of technological progress coupled with the rising -extent of governmental economics, will break through -the ruinous Right-Left pattern of Western politics. -Chiang probably has enough awareness of Chinese history -to realize that as the founder of an enduring democratic -system his prestige would exceed that obtainable -by any process of dictatorship. If he becomes a dictator, -he will have successors; but as first President of a real -democracy, he would be eternally unique, and as <i>de -facto</i> founder of a great power, a world figure for this -century. Against his desire to let democracy grow beneath -his military aegis, his conservatism of habit and -his anxiety to get things done right continue to militate; -but there is thirteen years' evidence to show that he has -tried very hard to work within the limits of the constitutional -system of the National Government, has -avoided arbitrariness as much as he thought possible, -and has at worst behaved like a Salazar, Atatürk, or -Pilsudski.</p> - - -<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_168" id="Footnote_1_168"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_168"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> <i>Sun Yat-sen</i> is the Cantonese pronunciation of <i>Sun I-hsien</i>, just -as <i>Chiang K'ai-shek</i> is that of <i>Chiang Chieh-shih</i>. Both men first -acquired their world reputations under this pronunciation, which has -become standard in English. According to Chinese custom, one's given -name is used only by one's elders; consequently Sun Yat-sen has been -referred to, by his grateful followers, by his "courtesy name" Wên, -which is the name by which one refers to one's elder. In addition, -he is referred to by another special name which he took for conspiratorial -work, Chung-shan (allusive to an ancient hero), or by his -title—as <i>Tsung-li</i> or <i>Sun Tsung-li</i>, much as we refer to President -Wilson rather than to Woodrow Wilson. Sun was known most widely in -life as Sun Wên; Chiang is most commonly mentioned as Chiang -Chung-chêng. The question of names is extensively discussed in -the biographies of the two leaders, cited below.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_169" id="Footnote_2_169"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_169"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> Linebarger, Paul [M. W.], <i>Sun Yat-sen and the Chinese Republic</i>, -New York and London, 1925, p. 176; this is the authorized life of -Sun Yat-sen, written much as he wished it. The standard critical -biography is Sharman, Lyon, <i>Sun Yat-sen: His Life and Its Meaning</i>, -New York, 1934. Sun Yat-sen also wrote a number of short autobiographies, -some of which are deliberately inexact. Western language -material on Sun is surveyed in an annotated bibliography appended -to the present author's <i>The Political Doctrines of Sun Yat-sen</i>, Baltimore, -1937, p. 265 <i>ff.</i> A work which has since appeared is "Sagittarius," -<i>The Strange Apotheosis of Sun Yat-sen</i>, London, 1939.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_170" id="Footnote_3_170"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_170"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> Statement to the author by Wên Chung-yao, President of the -Legislative <i>Yüan</i> of the Reorganized National Government of Wang -Ch'ing-wei, at Nanking, September 5, 1940. Dr. Wên was a classmate -of Dr. Sun at Queen's College.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_171" id="Footnote_4_171"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_171"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> New York, 1922; reissue, 1929.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_5_172" id="Footnote_5_172"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_172"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> Linebarger, Paul Myron, <i>Mes Mémoires Abrégés sur les Révolutions -de Sun Yat-sen</i>, Paris, 1938, p. 194. Paragraphing deleted in -translation from the French.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_6_173" id="Footnote_6_173"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_173"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> In the case of Chinese names which are commonly transliterated -in an Americanized form, the Western name-order is preserved. According -to standard Sinological practice, the three sisters are Sung -Ai-ling, Sung Ch'ing-ling, and Sung Mei-ling; their famous brother -(T. V. Soong) is Sung Tzŭ-wên.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_7_174" id="Footnote_7_174"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_174"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> d'Elia, Paschal M., S. J., <i>The Triple Demism of Sun Yat-sen</i>, -Wuch'ang, 1931, p. 36-49, gives an exhaustive analysis of possible -translations. Stylistically, the term should be given <i>San Min Chu I</i> -as a classical title; <i>san-min chu-i</i> as a noun; and <i>san-min-chu-i</i> when -used as an adjective. The first form alone is followed because of its -wide currency.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_8_175" id="Footnote_8_175"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_175"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> <i>The Analects</i>, Book XIII, Ch. v; Legge, James, <i>The Chinese -Classics</i>, Oxford, 1893 [Peiping, 1939], I, p. 93; the word <i>terms</i> has been -substituted for <i>names</i> in rendering <i>ming</i>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_9_176" id="Footnote_9_176"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_176"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> d'Elia translation, cited, p. 130-1.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_10_177" id="Footnote_10_177"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_177"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> See above, p. <a href="#Page_42">42</a>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_11_178" id="Footnote_11_178"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_178"><span class="label">[11]</span></a> See William, Maurice, <i>Sun Yat-sen vs. Communism</i>, Baltimore, -1932, for an appraisal which stresses the importance and degree of -this influence; on the opposite side, see "The Alleged Influence of -Maurice William on Sun Yat-sen" by P. C. Huang and W. P. Yuen -in <i>T'ien Hsia Monthly</i>, V, 4 (November 1937), p. 349-76.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_12_179" id="Footnote_12_179"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_179"><span class="label">[12]</span></a> Biographies of Chiang are: Chen Tsung-hsi <i>et al.</i>, <i>General -Chiang Kai-shek, the Builder of New China</i>, Shanghai, 1929; Tong, -Hollington K. (Tung Hsien-kuang), <i>Chiang Kai-shek, Soldier and -Statesman</i>, 2 vols., Shanghai, 1937, the authorized biography and a -model of its kind; Berkov, Robert, <i>Strong Man of China</i>, Boston. -1938; and Hedin, Sven, <i>Chiang Kai-shek, Marshal of China</i>, New York, -1940. <i>Who's Who in China</i> is, as usual, useful for Chiang and for the -members of his family. Almost every book on modern China, or -magazine dealing with Asiatic materials, has discussions of Chiang. -Among the most noteworthy writers on his career and personality are -Gustav Amann, whose account remains the most carefully detailed; -Edgar Snow and John Gunther, the reporters mentioned above; and -Harold Isaacs. The Generalissimo's own diary and speeches, together -with Mme. Chiang's writings, are unconsciously rather than deliberately -revelatory.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_13_180" id="Footnote_13_180"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13_180"><span class="label">[13]</span></a> John Donne, in a sermon of commemoration of the Lady Danvers, -late wife of Sir John Danvers; 1627.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_14_181" id="Footnote_14_181"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14_181"><span class="label">[14]</span></a> One of the Seven Gentlemen (<i>Ch'i Chüntzŭ</i>), whose name is withheld -by request, interviewed August 2, 1940, in Chungking.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_15_182" id="Footnote_15_182"></a><a href="#FNanchor_15_182"><span class="label">[15]</span></a> Communist leader, interviewed in Chungking, whose name is -also withheld by request.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_16_183" id="Footnote_16_183"></a><a href="#FNanchor_16_183"><span class="label">[16]</span></a> Some of the recent volumes are: <i>Lu-shan Hsün-lien Chi Hsüan-chi</i> -(Collected Papers of the Lu Shan Training Conference), Chungking, -1939; <i>O-mei Hsün-lien Chi Hsüan-chi</i> (Collected Papers of the -Omei Training Conference), Chungking, 1939; <i>Li-hsing Chê-hsiao</i> -(The Philosophy of Being Practical), Chungking, 1940; <i>Tsung-ts'ai -Chien-kuo Yen-lun Hsüan-chi</i> (The Tsung-ts'ai's Utterances on Reconstruction), -Chungking, 1940; <i>Tsung-ts'ai Wai-chiao Yen-lun Hsüan-chi</i> -(The Tsung-ts'ai's Utterances on Diplomacy), Chungking, 1940; -and <i>Tsung-ts'ai K'ang-chan Yen-lun Hsüan-chi</i> (The Tsung-ts'ai's -Utterances on Resistance), Chungking, 1940. A collection of the -Generalissimo's leading speeches, in English, is in press and is to be -issued soon by the China Information Publishing Company, Hong -Kong.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_17_184" id="Footnote_17_184"></a><a href="#FNanchor_17_184"><span class="label">[17]</span></a> [Chiang K'ai-shek], <i>San-min-chu-i chih T'i-hsi nai ch'i-shih -Hsing-ch'êng-hsü</i> (The <i>San Min Chu I</i> System and its Method of -Application), Chungking, 1939. This booklet is part of a series called -<i>Conclusions of the Party Chief</i>, published by the Central Headquarters -of the Kuomintang Training Corps, Chungking, 1939.</p></div></div> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_273" id="Page_273">[Pg 273]</a></span></p> - - -<h2>CONCLUSION</h2> - - -<p>The China of Chiang K'ai-shek has withstood the -shock of foreign war, and has demonstrated its -capacity to grow and survive as a state despite heavy -domestic adversity. The constitutional structure nears -a condition of realistic operation. The political organs, -while still monopolized by the Kuomintang, are highly -effective; their unrepresentative character is mitigated -by the new experiments with consultative legislation. -Administratively, both as to special functions and in -developing local government, significant new enterprises -are under way. Communist-Nationalist rivalry, -while still bitter, has avoided domestic civil war during -the invasion; despite the clash of National troops with -the New Fourth Army, the postponement may be indefinitely -continued. Taken all together, Free China -presents a hopeful picture; and it therefore acquires international -importance as the presumptive predecessor -of a great Asiatic democracy.</p> - -<p>Nevertheless, the fact that a Chinese central government -has emerged in time for effective action, and has -withstood invasion, does not provide proof that Japan -is doomed to fail. Japanese progress thus far in China -has depended in great part upon Japanese world commerce—on -raw materials and finance from her lucrative -American trade. China's resistance has depended, but -to a lesser degree, on Western aid. In each case, the -early history of the conflict was qualified if not determined -by the character of third-party relations. If -the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, and Germany -continued for the next twenty-odd years to do in -the Far East precisely what they have been doing for the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_274" id="Page_274">[Pg 274]</a></span> -past ten, the future might be more or less predictable -on the basis of the Far Eastern elements alone. Such -a prediction is, however, wholly unsupportable at the -present time; it is indeed safe to predict the contrary, -and assume that it is impossible for the major outside -powers to continue their reciprocal power-relationships -unchanged, in the Far East or elsewhere. China's future -is therefore bound up with European and American -uncertainties. The Three-Power Pact, signed at Berlin, -September 27, 1940 between Germany, Italy and Japan, -and the American Lease-Lend Bill have already begun -to interlock the European and East Asiatic wars.</p> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">The Chief Alternatives in China</span></h3> - -<p>The Chinese domestic situation will inescapably be -bound up with China's international position. The -extremes of probability can be readily marked off: on -the one hand, it is most improbable that the Chinese -resistance should collapse altogether, and leave the way -open for an almost effortless Japanese victory, through -the consolidation of the Wang regime without guerrilla, -volunteer or West-China opposition; on the other -hand, an immediate and complete Chinese victory, -coupled with solution of Nationalist-Communist rivalry, -is not at all in sight. Somewhere between these -two extremes there lie a number of more probable alternatives.</p> - -<p>Chief among these is a Kuomintang China, winning -a slow victory against Japan under the continuation of -existent institutions and leadership. Such a country—nationalist, -democratic, and economically pragmatist—would, -by the fact of victory over Japan, create a nucleus -for liberal democracy in Asia.<a name="FNanchor_1_185" id="FNanchor_1_185"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_185" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> A variant of this -solution would be a United Front China, wherein the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_275" id="Page_275">[Pg 275]</a></span> -independents and the Left actually shared power with -the Kuomintang under conditions of broad popular -suffrage; this would presumably lie between the United -States and the Soviet Union in the matter of ideology -and foreign policy. Neither of these would afford Japan -much opportunity for continued influence on the continent.</p> - -<p>A long continuation of the present hostilities might -imply the development of a permanently divided China—permanent -save in terms of centuries—with Nationalists -and Communists landbound in inner Asia, and -pro-Japanese governments along the coast. Such a -violation of Chinese cultural and economic unity would -perpetuate disequilibrium, and imply continuing wars. -Differing from this in degree rather than kind would be -a reversion of China to <i>tuchünism</i> and anarchy. Neither -of these possibilities could command acceptance from -the awakened, vigorous China of today.</p> - -<p>Outside intervention presents a third group of alternatives: -the partition of China through a Soviet-Japanese -understanding, or the complete Sovietization of -China, through the combined efforts of Soviet and Chinese -Communists. Soviet-Japanese partition, once almost -unthinkable, appears within the range of possibility -because of the apparent weakness of the Soviet -Union, which calls for unconventional remedies. If -Communist dialectic insured the Soviets who shared -China with Japan an ultimate victory over Japan as -well, the evil might seem transitory to the Soviet Union. -Were such a step taken to thwart rising American influence, -it might seem the lesser of two evils. Neither -this nor a Soviet China (which would swell the Communist -frontier and resources immeasurably) appeared -probable in the spring of 1941.</p> - -<p>The more practical aspects of the China-building -problem still concern the immediate, local effectiveness -of the Japanese military effort to control the growth -of Chinese government.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_276" id="Page_276">[Pg 276]</a></span></p> -<p>To create a victorious condition, Japan has sought -the collaboration of phantom Japanophile governments. -But in the face of the continuing National Government, -and guerrilla opposition, these governments are -incapable of functioning. When the conquerors of -China entered the cities, and took over the government, -they were strangers holding mere islands in the -greatness of China.</p> - -<p>Japan has the seven most important cities of China. -She has most of the railroads. The waters around China -are closed by the Japanese fleet. But how is Japan to occupy -the hundreds of thousands of villages? How is -Japan to persuade the Chinese people, who are still -overwhelmingly country people, that they are conquered -when Japan thinks that they are?</p> - -<p>The Japanese have not yet succeeded in making much -impression on the Chinese farmers, except to anger -them with cruelty and rapine. In Manchuria, where the -Japanese have had undisputed sway for ten long years, -thousands of bandits, a Chinese version of Minute Men, -are still fighting. Ten, five, even three miles from the -great fortified centers of the Japanese army in China, -Chinese irregulars, peasant volunteers, spring up in -the night. In the darkness there is shooting, sudden -flames, perhaps an airplane burning or a gasoline storage -tank set on fire; when dawn comes there is nothing to -be seen except the patient quiet coolies working in their -little fields.</p> - -<p>At the present time the war has reached its quiescent -stage. The Japanese army has done what in most other -cases would be called winning a victory. The battle is -accordingly a battle between the Chinese government -in the West and the Japanese in the East of China, -not with guns or ships so much as with words and with -price levels—not for strategic territory, but for the support -of the Chinese masses.</p> - -<p>The Chinese must make it possible for their own people<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_277" id="Page_277">[Pg 277]</a></span> -to live successfully and happily. But they have the -world's greatest farm problem, a problem of over-indebtedness, -sharecropping, soil exhaustion, prices and -markets. Japan wanted to prevent the creation of a -united China strong enough to take Manchuria back, -and to drive the Japanese off the Asiatic continent back -to Japan. Japan accordingly took the disastrous and -painful step of conquering the world's greatest relief -problem—the millions of underfed, undernourished, -desperate Chinese farmers. Now she has them.</p> - -<p>In this light, the Far Eastern conflict takes on a different -appearance from the usual picture of China -versus Japan. It is a conflict, not merely of one nation -against another but of competing governments within -the same territory. China is trying to build one way; -Japan, another; but they are both building for the same -end, control of the Far East, and on the same foundations, -the Chinese people. Both Japan and the independent -Chinese government are struggling for the -mastery of an area which is in the grip of a tragic farm -problem. The key to power is the mastery of the problem, -not the mastery of the men. The Chinese farmers -would welcome Communism, capitalism, or almost any -kind of leadership which could guarantee them a good -livelihood in return for their long and patient labor. -The basic issues are social, technological, and economic, -as well as political and military. The Japanese failure in -China is not a failure of the economic resources; Japan -could have been a weak but adequate economic partner -to China. The failure of Japan now leads China -to look elsewhere for help.</p> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">The United States in Chinese Politics</span></h3> - -<p>The American Lease-Lend Bill, designed primarily -to extend effective aid to Britain, also applied to China. -The United States executive was clearly aware of the -purposes of Japan, and displayed a temper to thwart<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_278" id="Page_278">[Pg 278]</a></span> -them. Secretary of State Cordell Hull, presenting a -statement in support of the Bill to the House Foreign -Affairs Committee on January 15, 1941, stated:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>It has been clear throughout that Japan has been actuated -from the start by broad and ambitious plans for -establishing herself in a dominant position in the entire -region of the Western Pacific. Her leaders have openly declared -their determination to achieve and maintain that -position by force of arms and thus to make themselves -master of an area containing almost one-half of the entire -population of the world. As a consequence, they would -have arbitrary control of the sea and trade routes in that -region.</p> - -<p class="center">.<span style="margin-left:1em;">.</span> -<span style="margin-left:1em;">.</span> -<span style="margin-left:1em;">.</span> -<span style="margin-left:1em;">.</span> -<span style="margin-left:1em;">.</span> -<span style="margin-left:1em;">.</span> -<span style="margin-left:1em;">.</span> -<span style="margin-left:1em;">.</span> -<span style="margin-left:1em;">.</span> -<span style="margin-left:1em;">.</span> -<span style="margin-left:1em;">.</span></p> - -<p>It should be manifest to every person that such a program -for the subjugation and ruthless exploitation by one country -of nearly one-half the population of the world is a matter -of immense significance, importance and concern to -every nation wherever located.</p></blockquote> - -<p>On March 15, the President's speech to the White -House Correspondents' Association included a ringing -promise to give help to the Chinese people, who had -asked for aid through Chiang K'ai-shek. The United -States moved toward a more definite policy in Asia as -well as giving more aid to Britain in the North Atlantic -area. The lease-lend program might upset the entire -balance of power in the Far East even more readily than -in Europe; but immediate evidence of such large-scale -application was not forthcoming.</p> - -<p>In his message to President Roosevelt, March 18, -1941, Chiang K'ai-shek said:<a name="FNanchor_2_186" id="FNanchor_2_186"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_186" class="fnanchor">[2]</a></p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>The people of China, whether engaged in fighting the -aggressor or toiling in the fields and workshops in the rear -in support of the defenders, will be immeasurably heartened -by your impressive reaffirmation of the will of the American -people to assist them in their struggle for freedom from -foreign domination, and in the resumption of their march -towards democracy and social justice for all.</p></blockquote> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_279" id="Page_279">[Pg 279]</a></span></p> - -<p>Significantly, the statement of Secretary Hull may -apply to future Soviet advance in China as well as to -the Japanese invasion. American aid which would -weaken Japan and strengthen the Soviet Union thereby, -would be welcome to Stalin; but American influence, -carried to the point of consolidating the National Government -against the Communists, and reducing the -probabilities of rising Communist influence, would not -be welcome.</p> - -<p>Whether the United States Government and the -American people are pro-Chinese or not, the National -Government of China is pro-American. The only influence -to rival the American in modern China is that -of the Soviet Union. Soviet and American impress are -found in intellectual life, in political ideals, in standards -and types of organization, and in ethical creeds. It is no -accident that the Kuomintang traces its three principles -back to Lincoln, while the Chinese Communists quote -Lenin and Stalin. The rivalry is clear, and acute. American -aid to China strengthens the pro-American party -and weakens the Communists; cessation of the Burma -route traffic in the summer of 1940 stimulated discussion -of a closer Sino-Soviet rapprochement.</p> - -<p>Generalissimo Chiang is a Christian. He is surrounded -by American-trained officials. The common -secondary language of the Nationalists is English. The -Chinese Industrial Cooperatives are based on an American -background with New Zealand and British advice. -The educational system is patterned after that of the -United States in great part; the American impress on -the system of higher education, in particular, cannot be -overestimated. The interests, appetites, and orientation -of the Kuomintang and the National Government -are Pacific-centered; much bitterness of an intimate, -almost uncomplaining sort, has been aroused by America's -continued aid to Japan through business channels.</p> - -<p>Adjustments within China are bound to react to the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_280" id="Page_280">[Pg 280]</a></span> -pressures in the outside world. If the United States -abandons Free China, the Japanese will probably not -conquer China; but the Soviets will be in an excellent -position to try, for themselves or through agreement -with the Japanese, to demoralize Chinese resistance so -that the Soviet forces could intervene because of a political -vacuum and protect the "racially kin working -classes," as in Poland. Whether China should go Communist -through the triumph of the Chinese Communists, -or through military occupation by the Soviet Red -Army, would not matter much to the United States. -What would matter would be the loss of an incomparable -ally, an ally who today is almost embarrassingly -cordial toward us, thankful to us, and who admires our -institutions and culture.</p> - -<p>Once Japan were forced out of the picture as an aggressive -power, once the United States and China were -to reach an understanding, the Soviet Union—debarred -from a warm-water naval base on the Pacific—could be -left in the <i>status quo</i>, its menace removed, to work out -its own destiny if it did not challenge renewed intervention -by renewed provocation of co-existing societies. -No other challenging power could appear on the Pacific. -A group of nations from Buenos Aires to Labrador, -from Melbourne to Kashgar, from Lhasa to Boston -would cover three and one-half continents. The area -thus freed from war and aggression, encompassing the -Americas and the Pacific basin, would include every -necessary article in the entire schedule of man's appetites. -The Chungking government, elementarily and -crudely, has broken ground for the culture-political -American advance into Asia. Strong without us, Free -China is a great power with us, and the one place in -the world where construction, liberty, education, and -hope still rise day by day. Both cosmopolitan and national, -the Chinese are ready to accept their share of -responsibility for the new world order.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_281" id="Page_281">[Pg 281]</a></span></p> -<p>The responsibility for building a democratic world, -whether or not the four authoritarian powers go down, -lies in great part upon the United States. Generalissimo -Chiang, alone among leaders, has stood forth for world -government, for world freedom. He has written:<a name="FNanchor_3_187" id="FNanchor_3_187"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_187" class="fnanchor">[3]</a></p> - -<p>"In as much as cosmopolitanism and world peace are -two of the main aims of <i>San Min Chu I</i>, China will -naturally be disposed to participate in any world federation -or confederation based on the equality of nations -and for the good of mankind."</p> - - -<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_185" id="Footnote_1_185"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_185"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> This discussion includes extracts from the author's "China: Right, -Left, or Center?", <i>The Quarterly Review of the Michigan Alumnus</i>, -Vol. XLVI, No. 14 (Winter 1940).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_186" id="Footnote_2_186"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_186"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> Department of State, <i>Bulletin</i>, IV, p. 335.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_187" id="Footnote_3_187"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_187"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> See below, p. <a href="#Page_371">371</a>.</p></div> -</div> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_283" id="Page_283">[Pg 283]</a></span></p> - - -<h2>APPENDIX I. GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS</h2> - - - -<hr class="chap" /> -<h2><i>A.</i> THE GOVERNMENT DRAFT OF THE PROPOSED CONSTITUTION<a name="FNanchor_1_188" id="FNanchor_1_188"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_188" class="fnanchor">[1]</a></h2> - - -<blockquote> - -<p>Released April 30, 1937, this differs from the celebrated Double Five -Draft (<i>q.v.</i> in Text) by the omission of an article providing that the -first Kuo-min Ta-hui should exercise full power, and not be confined -to the preparation of a constitution. This Draft represents the official -viewpoint and was prepared by the Legislative <i>Yüan</i> with the help and -criticism of private persons; accordingly, it is the outstanding draft -constitution.</p></blockquote> - -<p>By virtue of the mandate received from the whole body -of citizens and in accordance with the bequeathed teachings -of Dr. Sun, Founder of the Republic of China, the People's -Congress of the Republic of China hereby ordains and -enacts this Constitution and causes it to be promulgated -throughout the land for faithful and perpetual observance -by all.</p> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">Chapter I. General Provisions</span></h3> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 1. The Republic of China is a <i>SAN MIN CHU -I</i> Republic.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 2. The sovereignty of the Republic of China is -vested in the whole body of its citizens.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 3. Persons having acquired the nationality of -the Republic of China are citizens of the Republic of China.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 4. The territory of the Republic of China consists -of areas originally constituting Kiangsu, Chekiang, -Anhwei, Kiangsi, Hupeh, Hunan, Szechwan, Sikang, Hopei, -Shantung, Shansi, Honan, Shensi, Kansu, Chinghai, Fukien, -Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Yunnan, Kweichow, Liaoning, Kirin, -Heilungkiang, Jehol, Chahar, Suiyuan, Ningsia, Sinkiang, -Mongolia and Tibet.</p> - -<p>The territory of the Republic of China shall not be -altered except by resolution of the People's Congress.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_284" id="Page_284">[Pg 284]</a></span></p> -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 5. All races of the Republic of China are component -parts of the Chinese Nation and shall be equal.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 6. The National Flag of the Republic of China -shall have a red background with a blue sky and white sun -in the upper left corner.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 7. The National Capital of the Republic of -China shall be at Nanking.</p> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">Chapter II. Rights and Duties of the Citizens</span></h3> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 8. All citizens of the Republic of China shall -be equal before the law.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 9. Every citizen shall enjoy the liberty of the -person. Except in accordance with law, no one may be -arrested, detained, tried or punished.</p> - -<p>When a citizen is arrested or detained on suspicion of -having committed a criminal act, the authority responsible -for such action shall immediately inform the citizen himself -and his relatives of the cause for his arrest or detention -and shall, within a period of twenty-four hours, send him -to a competent court for trial. The citizen so arrested or -detained, or any one else, may also petition the court to -demand from the authority responsible for such action the -surrender, within twenty-four hours, of his person to the -court for trial.</p> - -<p>The court shall not reject such a petition; nor shall the -responsible authority refuse to execute such a writ as mentioned -in the preceding paragraph.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 10. With the exception of those in active military -service, no one may be subject to military jurisdiction.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 11. Every citizen shall have the freedom of -domicile; no private abode may be forcibly entered, -searched or sealed except in accordance with law.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 12. Every citizen shall have the freedom to -change his residence; such freedom shall not be restricted -except in accordance with law.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 13. Every citizen shall have the freedom of -speech, writing and publication; such freedom shall not be -restricted except in accordance with law.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 14. Every citizen shall have the freedom of -secrecy of correspondence; such freedom shall not be restricted -except in accordance with law.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 15. Every citizen shall have the freedom of -religious belief; such freedom shall not be restricted except -in accordance with law.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_285" id="Page_285">[Pg 285]</a></span></p> -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 16. Every citizen shall have the freedom of assembly -and of forming associations; such freedom shall -not be restricted except in accordance with law.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 17. No private property shall be requisitioned, -expropriated, sealed or confiscated except in accordance -with law.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 18. Every citizen shall have the right to present -petitions, lodge complaints and institute legal proceedings -in accordance with law.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 19. Every citizen shall have the right to exercise, -in accordance with law, the powers of election, recall, -initiative and referendum.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 20. Every citizen shall have the right to compete, -in accordance with law, in state examinations.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 21. Every citizen shall, in accordance with law, -be amenable to the duty of paying taxes.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 22. Every citizen shall, in accordance with law, -be amenable to the duty of performing military service.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 23. Every citizen shall, in accordance with law, -be amenable to the duty of rendering public service.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 24. All other liberties and rights of the citizens -which are not detrimental to public peace and order or -public welfare shall be guaranteed by the Constitution.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 25. Only laws imperative for safeguarding national -security, averting a national crisis, maintaining public -peace and order or promoting public interest may restrict -the citizens' liberties and rights.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 26. Any public functionary who illegally infringes -upon any private liberty or right, shall, besides -being subject to disciplinary punishment, be responsible -under criminal and civil law. The injured person may -also, in accordance with law, claim indemnity from the -State for damages sustained.</p> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">Chapter III. The People's Congress</span></h3> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 27. The People's Congress shall be constituted -of delegates elected as follows:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>1. Each district, municipality or area of an equivalent -status shall elect one delegate, but in case its population -exceeds 300,000, one additional delegate shall be elected -for every additional 500,000 people. The status of areas -to be equivalent to a district or municipality shall be defined -by law.</p> - -<p>2. The number of delegates to be elected from Mongolia -and Tibet shall be determined by law.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_286" id="Page_286">[Pg 286]</a></span></p> -<p>3. The number of delegates to be elected by Chinese -citizens residing abroad shall be determined by law.</p></blockquote> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article 28.</span> Delegates to the People's Congress shall -be elected by universal, equal, and direct suffrage and by -secret ballots.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article 29.</span> Citizens of the Republic of China having -attained the age of twenty years shall, in accordance with -law, have the right to elect delegates. Citizens having attained -the age of twenty-five years shall, in accordance with -law, have the right to be elected delegates.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article 30.</span> The term of office of Delegates of the People's -Congress shall be six years.</p> - -<p>When a Delegate is found guilty of violation of a law -or neglect of his duty, his constituency shall recall him in -accordance with law.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article 31.</span> The People's Congress shall be convened -by the President once every three years. Its session shall -last one month, but may be extended another month when -necessary.</p> - -<p>Extraordinary sessions of the People's Congress may be -convened at the instance of two-fifths or more of its members.</p> - -<p>The President may convene extraordinary sessions of the -People's Congress.</p> - -<p>The People's Congress shall meet at the place where -the Central Government is.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article 32.</span> The powers and functions of the People's -Congress shall be as follows:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>1. To elect the President and Vice-President of the -Republic, the President of the Legislative Yuan, the -President of the Censor Yuan, the Members of the Legislative -Yuan and the Members of the Censor Yuan.</p> - -<p>2. To recall the President and Vice-President of the -Republic, the President of the Legislative Yuan, the -President of the Judicial Yuan, the President of the -Examination Yuan, the President of the Censor Yuan, -the Members of the Legislative Yuan and the Members -of the Censor Yuan.</p> - -<p>3. To initiate laws.</p> - -<p>4. To hold referenda on laws.</p> - -<p>5. To amend the Constitution.</p> - -<p>6. To exercise such other powers as are conferred by -the Constitution.</p></blockquote> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article 33.</span> Delegates to the People's Congress shall not -be held responsible outside of Congress for opinions they<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_287" id="Page_287">[Pg 287]</a></span> -may express and votes they may cast during the session of -Congress.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article 34.</span> Without the permission of the People's Congress, -no delegate shall be arrested or detained during the -session except when apprehended in <i>flagrante delicto</i>.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article 35.</span> The organization of the People's Congress -and the election as well as recall of its Delegates shall be -determined by law.</p> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">Chapter IV. The Central Government</span></h3> - - -<h4>Section 1. <i>The President</i></h4> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article 36.</span> The President is the Head of the State -and represents the Republic of China in foreign relations.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article 37.</span> The President commands the land, sea and -air forces of the whole country.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article 38.</span> The President shall, in accordance with law, -promulgate laws and issue orders with the counter-signature -of the President of the Yuan concerned.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article 39.</span> The President shall, in accordance with law, -exercise the power of declaring war, negotiating peace and -concluding treaties.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article 40.</span> The President shall, in accordance with -law, declare and terminate a state of emergency.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article 41.</span> The President shall, in accordance with law, -exercise the power of granting amnesties, special pardons, -remission of sentences and restoration of civil rights.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article 42.</span> The President shall, in accordance with law, -appoint and remove civil and military officials.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article 43.</span> The President shall, in accordance with law, -confer honors and award decorations.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article 44.</span> In case the State is confronted with an -emergency, or the economic life of the State meets with a -grave danger, which calls for immediate action, the President, -following the resolution of the Executive Meeting, -may issue orders of emergency and do whatever is necessary -to cope with the situation, provided that he shall submit his -action to the ratification of the Legislative Yuan within -three months after the issuance of the orders.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article 45.</span> The President may call meetings of the -Presidents of the five Yuan to confer on matters relating -to two or more Yuan, or on such matters as the President -may bring out for consultation.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article 46.</span> The President shall be responsible to the -People's Congress.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_288" id="Page_288">[Pg 288]</a></span></p> -<p><span class="smcap">Article 47.</span> Citizens of the Republic of China, having -attained the age of forty years, may be elected President or -Vice-President of the Republic.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article 48.</span> The election of the President and Vice-President -shall be provided for by law.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article 49.</span> The President and Vice-President shall hold -office for a term of six years and may be re-elected for a -second term.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article 50.</span> The President shall, on the day of his inauguration, -take the following oath:</p> - -<p>"I do solemnly and sincerely swear before the people that -I will observe the Constitution, faithfully perform my -duties, promote the welfare of the People, safeguard the -security of the State and be loyal to the trust of the people. -Should I break my oath, I will submit myself to the most -severe punishment the law may provide."</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article 51.</span> When the Presidency is vacant, the Vice-President -shall succeed to the office.</p> - -<p>When the President is for some reason unable to attend -to his duties, the Vice-President shall act for him. If both -the President and the Vice-President are incapacitated, the -President of the Executive Yuan shall discharge the duties -of the President's office.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article 52.</span> The President shall retire from office on -the day his term expires. If by that time a new President -has not been inducted into office, the President of the -Executive Yuan shall discharge the duties of the President's -office.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article 53.</span> The period for the President of the Executive -Yuan to discharge the duties of the President's office -shall not exceed six months.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article 54.</span> Except in case of an offense against the -internal or external security of the State, the President -shall not be liable to criminal prosecution until he has -been recalled or has retired from office.</p> - - -<h4>Section 2. <i>The Executive Yuan</i></h4> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article 55.</span> The Executive Yuan is the highest organ -through which the Central Government exercises its executive -powers.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article 56.</span> In the Executive Yuan, there shall be a -President, a Vice-President and a number of Executive -Members, to be appointed and removed by the President.</p> - -<p>The Executive Members mentioned in the preceding -paragraph who do not take charge of Ministries or Commissions<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_289" id="Page_289">[Pg 289]</a></span> -shall not exceed half of those who are in charge of -Ministries or Commissions as provided in the first paragraph -of <span class="smcap">Article 58.</span></p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article 57.</span> In the Executive Yuan, there shall be various -Ministries and Commissions which shall separately exercise -their respective executive powers.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article 58.</span> The Ministers of the various Ministries and -the Chairmen of the various Commissions shall be appointed -by the President from among the Executive Members.</p> - -<p>The President and the Vice-President of the Executive -Yuan may act concurrently as Minister or Chairman mentioned -in the preceding paragraph.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article 59.</span> The President of the Executive Yuan, the -Executive Members, the Ministers of the various Ministries -and the Chairmen of the various Commissions shall be individually -responsible to the President.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article 60.</span> In the Executive Yuan there shall be Executive -Meetings composed of the President, the President -of the Executive Yuan and the Executive Members to be -presided over by the President. In case the President is unable -to be present, the President of the Executive Yuan -shall preside.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article 61.</span> The following matters shall be decided at -an Executive Meeting:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>1. Statutory and budgetary bills to be submitted to -the Legislative Yuan.</p> - -<p>2. Bills concerning a state of emergency and special -pardons to be submitted to the Legislative Yuan.</p> - -<p>3. Bills concerning declaration of war, negotiation of -peace, conclusion of treaties and other important international -affairs to be submitted to the Legislative -Yuan.</p> - -<p>4. Matters of common concern to the various Ministries -and Commissions.</p> - -<p>5. Matters submitted by the President.</p> - -<p>6. Matters submitted by the President of the Executive -Yuan, the Executive Members, the various Ministries -and Commissions.</p></blockquote> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article 62.</span> The organization of the Executive Yuan -shall be determined by law.</p> - - -<h4>Section 3. <i>The Legislative Yuan</i></h4> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article 63.</span> The Legislative Yuan is the highest organ -through which the Central Government exercises its legislative<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_290" id="Page_290">[Pg 290]</a></span> -powers. It shall be responsible to the People's Congress.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 64. The Legislative Yuan shall have the power -to decide on measures concerning legislation, budgets, a -state of emergency, special pardons, declaration of war, -negotiation of peace, conclusion of treaties and other important -international affairs.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 65. In the discharge of its duties the Legislative -Yuan may interrogate the various Yuan, Ministries and -Commissions.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 66. In the Legislative Yuan, there shall be a -President who shall hold office for a term of three years -and may be eligible for re-election.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 67. In regard to the election of Members of the -Legislative Yuan, the Delegates of the various provinces, -Mongolia, Tibet and of citizens residing abroad, to the -People's Congress shall separately hold a preliminary election -to nominate their respective candidates and submit -a list of their names to the Congress for election. The candidates -are not confined to the Delegates to the People's -Congress. The respective number of candidates shall be -proportioned as follows:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>1. A province with a population of less than 5,000,000 -shall nominate four candidates. A province with a population -of more than 5,000,000 but less than 10,000,000 -shall nominate six candidates. A province with a population -of more than 10,000,000 but less than 15,000,000 -shall nominate eight candidates. A province with a -population of more than 15,000,000 but less than 20,000,000 -shall nominate ten candidates. A province with -a population of more than 20,000,000 but less than 25,000,000 -shall nominate twelve candidates. A province -with a population of more than 25,000,000 but less than -30,000,000 shall nominate fourteen candidates. A province -with a population of more than 30,000,000 shall -nominate sixteen candidates.</p> - -<p>2. Mongolia and Tibet shall each nominate eight -candidates.</p> - -<p>3. Citizens residing abroad shall nominate eight candidates.</p></blockquote> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 68. Members of the Legislative Yuan shall hold -office for a term of three years and may be eligible for re-election.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 69. The Executive Yuan, Judicial Yuan, Examination -Yuan, and Censor Yuan may submit to the -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_291" id="Page_291">[Pg 291]</a></span>Legislative Yuan measures concerning matters within their -respective jurisdiction.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 70. The President may, before the promulgation -or execution of a legislative measure, request the -Legislative Yuan to reconsider it.</p> - -<p>If the Legislative Yuan, with regard to the request for -consideration, should decide to maintain the original measure -by a two-thirds vote of the Members present, the President -shall promulgate or execute it without delay; provided -that in case of a bill of law or a treaty, the President may -submit it to the People's Congress for a referendum.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 71. The President shall promulgate a measure -presented by the Legislative Yuan for promulgation within -thirty days after its receipt.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 72. Members of the Legislative Yuan shall not -be held responsible outside of the said Yuan for opinions -they may express and votes they may cast during its session.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 73. Without the permission of the Legislative -Yuan, no member may be arrested or detained except when -apprehended in <i>flagrante delicto</i>.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 74. No Member of the Legislative Yuan may -concurrently hold any other public office or engage in any -business or profession.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 75. The election of Members of the Legislative -Yuan and the organization of the Legislative Yuan shall -be determined by law.</p> - - -<h4>Section 4. <i>The Judicial Yuan</i></h4> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 76. The Judicial Yuan is the highest organ -through which the Central Government exercises its judicial -powers. It shall attend to the adjudication of civil, criminal -and administrative suits, the discipline and punishment -of public functionaries and judicial administration.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 77. In the Judicial Yuan, there shall be a President -who shall hold office for a term of three years. He -shall be appointed by the President.</p> - -<p>The President of the Judicial Yuan shall be responsible -to the People's Congress.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 78. Matters concerning special pardons, remission -of sentence and restoration of civil rights shall be submitted -to the President for action by the President of the -Judicial Yuan in accordance with law.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 79. The Judicial Yuan shall have the power to -unify the interpretation of statutes and ordinances.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_292" id="Page_292">[Pg 292]</a></span></p> -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 80. Judicial officials shall, in accordance with -law, have perfect independence in the conduct of trials.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 81. No judicial official may be removed from -office unless he has been subject to criminal or disciplinary -punishment or declared an interdicted person; nor may -a judicial official be suspended or transferred, or have his -salary reduced except in accordance with law.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 82. The organization of the Judicial Yuan and -the various Courts of Justice shall be determined by law.</p> - - -<h4>Section 5. <i>The Examination Yuan</i></h4> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 83. The Examination Yuan is the highest organ -through which the Central Government exercises its examination -powers. It shall attend to the selection of civil -service candidates by examination and to the registration -of persons qualified for public service.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 84. In the Examination Yuan there shall be a -President who shall hold office for a term of three years, to -be appointed by the President.</p> - -<p>The President of the Examination Yuan shall be responsible -to the People's Congress.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 85. The Examination Yuan shall, in accordance -with law, by examination and registration determine the -following qualifications:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>1. For appointment as a public functionary.</p> - -<p>2. For candidacy to public office.</p> - -<p>3. For practice in specialized professions and as technical -experts.</p></blockquote> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 86. The organization of the Examination Yuan -shall be determined by law.</p> - - -<h4>Section 6. <i>The Censor Yuan</i></h4> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 87. The Censor Yuan is the highest organ -through which the Central Government exercises its censorial -powers. It shall attend to impeachment and auditing -and be responsible to the People's Congress.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 88. In the discharge of its censorial powers, the -Censor Yuan may, in accordance with law, interrogate the -various Yuan, Ministries and Commissions.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 89. In the Censor Yuan, there shall be a President -who shall hold office for a term of three years and -may be eligible for re-election.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 90. Members of the Censor Yuan shall be -elected by the People's Congress, from candidates separately -nominated by the Delegates of the various provinces, Mongolia, -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_293" id="Page_293">[Pg 293]</a></span>Tibet and Chinese citizens residing abroad. Each -group of Delegates shall nominate two candidates. The -candidates are not confined to Delegates to the Congress.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 91. Members of the Censor Yuan shall hold -office for a term of four years and may be eligible for re-election.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 92. When the Censor Yuan finds a public functionary -in the Central or local government guilty of violation -of a law or neglect of his duty, an impeachment may be -instituted upon the proposal of one or more Members and -the indorsement, after due investigation, of five or more -Members. Impeachment against the President or Vice-President, -the President of the Executive Yuan, Legislative -Yuan, Judicial Yuan, Examination Yuan or Censor Yuan -may be instituted only upon the proposal of ten or more -Members and the indorsement, after due investigation, of -one-half or more Members of the entire Yuan.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 93. When an impeachment is instituted against -the President or Vice-President or the President of the -Executive Yuan, Legislative Yuan, Judicial Yuan, Examination -Yuan or Censor Yuan in accordance with the preceding -Article, it shall be brought before the People's Congress. -During the adjournment of the People's Congress, -the Delegates shall be requested to convene in accordance -with law an extraordinary session to decide whether the -impeached shall be removed from office.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 94. Members of the Censor Yuan shall not be -held responsible outside of the said Yuan for opinions they -may express and votes they may cast while discharging their -duties.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 95. Without the permission of the Censor Yuan, -no Member of the Censor Yuan may be arrested or detained -except when apprehended in <i>flagrante delicto</i>.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 96. No Member of the Censor Yuan may concurrently -hold any other public office or engage in any -business or profession.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 97. The election of the Members of the Censor -Yuan and the organization of the Censor Yuan shall be -determined by law.</p> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">Chapter V. The Local Institutions</span></h3> - - -<h4>Section 1. <i>The Provinces</i></h4> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 98. In the Province, there shall be a Provincial -Government which shall execute the laws and orders of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_294" id="Page_294">[Pg 294]</a></span> -the Central Government and supervise local self-government.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 99. In the Provincial Government there shall -be a Governor who shall hold office for a term of three -years. He shall be appointed and removed by the Central -Government.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 100. In the province, there shall be a Provincial -Assembly which shall be composed of one member from -each district or municipality to be elected by the district -or municipal council. Members of the Provincial Assembly -shall hold office for a term of three years and may be eligible -for re-election.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 101. The organization of the Provincial Government -and the Provincial Assembly as well as the election -and recall of the Members of the Provincial Assembly -shall be determined by law.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 102. The government of areas not yet established -as provinces shall be determined by law.</p> - - -<h4>Section 2. <i>The Districts</i></h4> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 103. The district [<i>hsien</i>] is a unit of local self-government.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 104. All matters that are local in nature are -within the scope of local self-government.</p> - -<p>The scope of local self-government shall be determined -by law.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 105. Citizens of the district shall, in accordance -with law, exercise the powers of initiative and referendum -in matters concerning district self-government as well as the -powers of election and recall of the District Magistrate and -other elective officials in the service of district self-government.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 106. In the district, there shall be a District -Council, the members of which shall be directly elected by -the citizens in the District General Meeting. Members of -the District Council shall hold office for a term of three -years and may be eligible for re-election.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 107. District ordinances and regulations which -are in conflict with the laws and ordinances of the -Central or Provincial Government shall be null and -void.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 108. In the district, there shall be a District -Government with a District Magistrate who shall be elected -by the citizens in the District General Meeting. The Magistrate<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_295" id="Page_295">[Pg 295]</a></span> -shall hold office for a term of three years and may be -eligible for re-election.</p> - -<p>Only those persons found qualified in the public examinations -held by the Central Government or adjudged qualified -by the Ministry of Public Service Registration may be candidates -for the office of District Magistrate.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 109. The District Magistrate shall administer -the affairs of the district in accordance with the principles -of self-government and, under the direction of the Provincial -Governor, execute matters assigned by the Central -and Provincial Governments.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 110. The organization of the District Council -and District Government as well as the election and recall -of the District Magistrate and the Members of the District -Council shall be determined by law.</p> - - -<h4>Section 3. <i>The Municipalities</i></h4> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 111. Unless otherwise provided by law, the provisions -governing self-government and administration of -the district shall apply <i>mutatis mutandis</i> to the municipality -[<i>shih</i>].</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 112. In the municipality, there shall be a Municipal -Council, the Members of which shall be directly -elected by the citizens in the Municipal General Meeting. -One-third of the Members shall retire and be replaced by -election annually.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 113. In the municipality, there shall be a Municipal -Government with a Mayor to be directly elected -by the citizens in the Municipal General Meeting. He shall -hold office for a term of three years and may be eligible for -re-election.</p> - -<p>Only those persons found qualified in the public examinations -held by the Central Government or adjudged qualified -by the Ministry of Public Service Registration may be -a candidate for the office of Mayor.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 114. The Mayor shall administer the affairs of -the municipality in accordance with the principles of municipal -self-government and, under direction of the competent -supervising authority, execute matters assigned by -the Central or Provincial Government.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 115. The organization of the Municipal Council -and Municipal Government as well as the election and -recall of the Members of the Municipal Council and the -Mayor shall be determined by law.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_296" id="Page_296">[Pg 296]</a></span></p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Chapter VI. National Economic Life</span></h3> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 116. The economic system of the Republic of -China shall be based upon the Min Shêng Chu I (Principle -of Livelihood) and shall aim at national economic sufficiency -and equality.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 117. The land within the territorial limits of -the Republic of China belongs to the people as a whole. -Any part thereof the ownership of which has been lawfully -acquired by an individual or individuals shall be protected -by, and subject to, the restrictions of law.</p> - -<p>The State may, in accordance with law, tax or expropriate -private land on the basis of the value declared by the owner -or assessed by the Government.</p> - -<p>Every landowner is amenable to the duty of utilizing -his land to the fullest extent.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 118. All subterranean minerals and natural -forces which are economically utilizable for public benefit, -belong to the State and shall not be affected by private -ownership of the land.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 119. The unearned increment shall be taxed by -means of a land-value-increment tax and devoted to public -benefit.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 120. In readjusting the distribution of land, -the State shall be guided by the principle of aiding and -protecting the land-owning farmers and the land-utilizing -owners.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 121. The State may, in accordance with law, -regulate private wealth and enterprises when such wealth -and enterprises are considered detrimental to the balanced -development of national economic life.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 122. The State shall encourage, guide and protect -the citizens' productive enterprises and the nation's -foreign trade.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 123. All public utilities and enterprises of a -monopolistic nature shall be operated by the State; except -in case of necessity when the State may specially permit -private operation.</p> - -<p>The private enterprises mentioned in the preceding paragraph -may, in case of emergency for national defense, be -temporarily managed by the State. The State may also, -in accordance with law, take them over for permanent -operation upon payment of due compensation.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 124. In order to improve the workers' living -conditions, increase their productive ability and relieve<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_297" id="Page_297">[Pg 297]</a></span> -unemployment, the State shall enforce labor protective policies.</p> - -<p>Women and children shall be afforded special protection -in accordance with their age and physical condition.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 125. Labor and capital shall, in accordance with -the principles of mutual help and cooperation, develop together -productive enterprises.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 126. In order to promote agricultural development -and the welfare of the farming population, the State -shall improve rural economic and living conditions and -increase farming efficiency by employment of scientific farming.</p> - -<p>The State may regulate the production and distribution -of agricultural products, in kind and quantity.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 127. The State shall accord due relief or compensation -to those who suffer disability or loss of life in -the performance of military or public services.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 128. The State shall give suitable relief to the -aged, feeble, or disabled who are incapable of earning a -living.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 129. While the following powers appertain to -the Legislative Yuan in the case of the Central Government, -they may be exercised by the legally designated organ -if, in accordance with law, such matters may be effected independently -by a province, district or municipality:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>1. To impose or alter the rate of taxes and levies, fines, -penalties, or other imposts of a compulsory nature.</p> - -<p>2. To raise public loans, dispose of public property -or conclude contracts which increase the burden of the -public treasury.</p> - -<p>3. To establish or cancel public enterprises, monopolies, -franchises or any other profit-making enterprise.</p> - -<p>4. To grant or cancel public enterprises, monopolies, -franchises or any other special privileges.</p></blockquote> - -<p>Unless specially authorized by law, the government of a -province, district or municipality shall not raise foreign -loans or directly utilize foreign capital.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 130. Within the territorial limits of the Republic -of China all goods shall be permitted to circulate -freely. They shall not be seized or detained except in accordance -with law.</p> - -<p>Customs duty is a Central Government revenue. It shall -be collected only once when the goods enter or leave the -country.</p> - -<p>The various grades of government shall not collect any<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_298" id="Page_298">[Pg 298]</a></span> -dues on goods in transit within the country, with the exception -of tolls levied for the purpose of improving the -waterways and roads, on vessels and vehicles making use of -them.</p> - -<p>The right to impose taxes and levies on goods belongs -to the Central Government and shall not be exercised except -in accordance with law.</p> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">Chapter VII. Education</span></h3> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 131. The educational aim of the Republic of -China shall be to develop a national spirit, to cultivate a -national morality, to train the people for self-government -and to increase their ability to earn a livelihood, and -thereby to build up a sound and healthy body of citizens.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 132. Every citizen of the Republic of China -shall have an equal opportunity to receive education.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 133. All public and private educational institutions -in the country shall be subject to State supervision -and amenable to the duty of carrying out the educational -policies formulated by the State.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 134. Children between six and twelve years of -age are of school age and shall receive elementary education -free of tuition. Detailed provisions shall be provided by -law.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 135. All persons over school age who have not -received an elementary education shall receive supplementary -education free of tuition. Detailed provisions shall -be provided by law.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 136. In establishing universities and technical -schools, the State shall give special consideration to the -needs of the respective localities so as to afford the people -thereof an equal opportunity to receive higher education, -thereby hastening a balanced national cultural development.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 137. Educational appropriations shall constitute -no less than fifteen per cent of the total amount of the -budget of the Central Government and no less than thirty -per cent of the total amount of the provincial, district -and municipal budgets respectively. Educational endowment -funds independently set aside in accordance with law -shall be safeguarded.</p> - -<p>Educational expenditures in needy provinces shall be -subsidized by the central treasury.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 138. The State shall encourage and subsidize -the following enterprises or citizens:</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_299" id="Page_299">[Pg 299]</a></span></p> -<blockquote> - -<p>1. Private educational institutions with a high record -of achievement.</p> - -<p>2. Education for Chinese citizens residing abroad.</p> - -<p>3. Discoverers or inventors in academic or technical -fields.</p> - -<p>4. Teachers or administrative officers of educational -institutions having good records and long service.</p> - -<p>5. Students of high records and good character who -are unable to pursue further studies.</p></blockquote> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">Chapter VIII. The Enforcement and Amendment of the Constitution</span></h3> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 139. The term "law" as used in the Constitution -means that which has been passed by the Legislative -Yuan and promulgated by the President.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 140. Laws in conflict with the Constitution are -null and void.</p> - -<p>The question whether a law is in conflict with the Constitution -shall be settled by the Censor Yuan submitting -the point to the Judicial Yuan for interpretation within -six months after its enforcement.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 141. Administrative orders in conflict with the -Constitution or laws are null and void.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 142. The interpretation of the Constitution -shall be done by the Judicial Yuan.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 143. Before half or more of the provinces and -territories have completed the work of local self-government, -the Members of the Legislative Yuan and of the -Censor Yuan shall be elected and appointed in accordance -with the following provisions:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>1. The Members of the Legislative Yuan: The Delegates -of the various provinces, Mongolia, Tibet, and of -the citizens residing abroad, to the People's Congress -shall separately hold a preliminary election to nominate -half of the number of the candidates as determined in -Article 67 and submit their list to the People's Congress -for election. The other half shall be nominated by the -President of the Legislative Yuan for appointment by the -President.</p> - -<p>2. The Members of the Censor Yuan: The Delegates -of the various provinces, Mongolia, Tibet, and of the -citizens residing abroad, to the People's Congress shall -separately hold a preliminary election to nominate half -of the number of candidates as determined in Article 90 -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_300" id="Page_300">[Pg 300]</a></span>and submit their list to the People's Congress for election. -The other half shall be nominated by the President of -the Censor Yuan for appointment by the President.</p></blockquote> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 144. The Magistrates of districts where the -work of self-government is not yet completed shall be appointed -and removed by the Central Government.</p> - -<p>The preceding paragraph is applicable <i>mutatis mutandis</i> -to those municipalities where the work of self-government -is not yet completed.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 145. The methods and procedure of helping -the establishment of local self-government shall be determined -by law.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 146. No amendment to the Constitution may be -made unless it shall have been proposed by over one-fourth -of the delegates to the People's Congress and passed by at -least two-thirds of the delegates present at a meeting having -a quorum of over three-fourths of the entire Congress.</p> - -<p>A proposed amendment to the Constitution shall be made -public by the proposer or proposers one year before the assembling -of the People's Congress.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 147. In regard to those provisions of the Constitution -which require further procedure for their enforcement, -such necessary procedure shall be determined by law.</p> - -<div class="footnotes"> -<h3>FOOTNOTE:</h3> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_188" id="Footnote_1_188"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_188"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> <i>T'ien Hsia Monthly</i>, v. X, No. 3 (May 1940), p. 493-506. The -transliterations have not been altered. <i>Yüan</i> therefore appears as -"Yuan."</p></div></div> - - -<hr class="chap" /> - - -<h2><i>B.</i> THE SYSTEM OF ORGANIZATION OF THE NATIONAL CONGRESS<a name="FNanchor_1_189" id="FNanchor_1_189"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_189" class="fnanchor">[1]</a></h2> - - -<blockquote> - -<p>The following laws were passed by the Legislative <i>Yüan</i> April 31, -XXVI (1937), in amended form, after the election had been postponed.</p></blockquote> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 1. The National Congress shall frame the Constitution, -and shall determine its date of execution.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 2. <i>i.</i> The National Congress shall be organized -by the Representatives of the people to the Congress.</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p><i>ii.</i> The manner of electing these Representatives is -fixed in another set of laws.</p></blockquote> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 3. Members and reserve members of the Central -Executive Committee of the Kuomintang, and of the -Central Supervisory Committee of the Kuomintang shall be -Representatives to the Congress without election; members<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_301" id="Page_301">[Pg 301]</a></span> -of the National Government and its officials may attend -the Congress.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 4. The date of convening the Congress is to be -fixed by the National Government.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 5. The Congress shall convene in the locality -occupied by the National Government.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 6. Representatives to the Congress shall take an -oath of allegiance during the opening ceremonies of the -Congress, to wit: "I,———, do hereby promise with absolute -sincerity that as a representative of the Chinese people, -I shall receive the instructions of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the -Father of the Republic, and that I shall execute my official -power only according to law, and shall obey the discipline -of the National Congress."</p> - -<p>After taking the oath, the Representatives should thereto -sign their names.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 7. Thirty-one members shall be elected from -among the Representatives themselves to form the Presidium -of the Congress. Their duties shall be:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p><i>i.</i> To fix the manner of discussing motions and to -regulate the progress of the discussion.</p> - -<p><i>ii.</i> To discharge executive affairs of the Congress.</p> - -<p><i>iii.</i> To perform other duties fixed in this code of laws.</p></blockquote> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 8. During a meeting of the Congress, the Presidium -shall elect the Chairman of the Meeting.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 9. The National Congress shall form special -committees to examine the qualifications of the Representatives, -to examine motions and proposals and for other -matters. These committees shall be organized upon the request -of the Presidium and passed by the Meeting.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 10. The period of a session of the Congress is -10 to 20 days; it may be extended whenever necessary.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 11. The duties of the National Congress are -fully discharged when its Meeting closes.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 12. A quorum shall consist of at least half of the -total number of members. Motion can be passed when more -than half of the members present vote for it.</p> - -<p>In adopting the Constitution, at least two-thirds of the -total number of the members shall be present, and adoption -shall require a majority greater than two-thirds of the members -present.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 13. The Congress may adopt any of the following -methods to put a motion to vote: raising the hands, -standing up, or balloting. In case of a tie, the Chairman -may cast the deciding vote.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_302" id="Page_302">[Pg 302]</a></span></p> -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 14. The National Congress shall have a Secretariat -and an organization of police guards. Their organization -and duties shall be decided by the Presidium.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 15. The National Congress shall have a Secretary -General, appointed by the Presidium, and discharging -the affairs of the entire Congress.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 16. The Representatives shall not assume any -responsibility towards the general public for any opinion -expressed by them during the session of the Congress.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 17. Except by approval of the Congress, no -Representative of the Congress may be detained or arrested -when the Congress is in session.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 18. During the session, a Representative who -does not abide by the rules of the Congress may be warned -by the Chairman, or may forfeit his privilege to speak. -Adequate punishment shall be imposed upon any who may -commit serious offenses.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 19. The above mentioned punishment will be -decided by the Congress, upon the examination of the -Punishment Committee (formed by the Representatives to -the Congress).</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 20. The date of adoption of this code of laws -is to be fixed in an order from the Central Government.</p> - -<div class="footnotes"> -<h3>FOOTNOTE:</h3> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_189" id="Footnote_1_189"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_189"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> "Kuo-min Ta-hui Tsu-chih Fa" in Chung-yang Hsüan-ch'uan Pu -(Party-Ministry of Publicity), <i>Hsien-chêng Chien-shê Fa-kuei</i>, Chungking, -XXVIII (1939), p. 35-8.</p></div></div> - -<hr class="chap" /> - - - -<h2><i>C.</i> ACT OF THE LEGISLATIVE <i>YÜAN</i>, APRIL 31, -XXVI (1937) GOVERNING THE ELECTION OF REPRESENTATIVES TO THE -NATIONAL CONGRESS<a name="FNanchor_1_190" id="FNanchor_1_190"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_190" class="fnanchor">[1]</a></h2> - - -<blockquote> - -<p>[Note particularly the world-wide electoral areas.]</p></blockquote> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">Chapter I. General Principles</span></h3> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 1. These laws are formulated in conjunction -with what is provided in Section <i>ii</i> of Article 2 in the Law -concerning the System of Organization of the National -Congress.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 2. Besides the Representatives to the National -Congress without election, there shall also be provided:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p><i>i.</i> 665 Representatives elected through district election.</p> - -<p><i>ii.</i> 380 Representatives elected through professional -election.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_303" id="Page_303">[Pg 303]</a></span></p> -<p><i>iii.</i> 155 Representatives elected through special election.</p> - -<p><i>iv.</i> 240 Representatives appointed by the National -Government.</p></blockquote> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 3. All citizens of China above 20 years of age -have the privilege of voting for Representatives to Congress, -upon taking the oath of citizenship.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 4. The following persons have no privilege of -voting:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p><i>i.</i> Rebels against the National Government, proven -or under arrest.</p> - -<p><i>ii.</i> Corrupt officials, proven or under arrest.</p> - -<p><i>iii.</i> Those whose citizenship privileges have been forfeited -due to crimes, etc.</p> - -<p><i>iv.</i> Those who are insolvent.</p> - -<p><i>v.</i> Those afflicted with mental diseases.</p> - -<p><i>vi.</i> Those smoking opium or substitutes therefor.</p></blockquote> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 5. Each voter may have not more than two -choices.</p> - -<p>Those who may both elect in the district and the professional -elections should participate in the professional election. -Those who may both elect in the professional election -and the special election should elect in the special election. -In professional election, an elector eligible in more than -two professions should vote only in one of them at his -choice.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 6. The Representatives to the National Congress -are elected by balloting which does not require signature, -and by single entry. The names of candidates for Representative -should be printed on the ballot, and the electors are -to choose one man out of them.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 7. Candidates for Representative who receive a -majority vote are elected as Representatives. In case of tie, -the candidates shall draw lots to decide who is the elected -Representative.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 8. After the full number of Representatives has -been obtained, those candidates who obtain some votes [but -less than a majority] will be reserve Representatives. Their -rank will be based upon the number of votes. In number -the reserve Representatives shall correspond to the elected -Representatives.</p> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">Chapter II. District Election</span></h3> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 9. All provinces and cities directly under the -Executive Yüan shall elect a number of Representatives<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_304" id="Page_304">[Pg 304]</a></span> -corresponding to the attached List No. 1, and according to the -laws governing District Elections.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 10. The Representatives from various provinces -are elected in various districts. The division of districts and -the number of Representatives elected in every district are -fixed in the attached List No. 2.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 11. The Heads of the <i>hsiang</i> [suburb of a city] -and of the <i>chên</i> [a village market] of each <i>hsien</i> in the electorate -should nominate candidates. The number should be -ten times that of the number of Representatives to be -elected. If there is a <i>shih</i> within the electorate, the Head of -the <i>fang</i> [a group of houses in a <i>shih</i>] should also participate -in the nomination. If there is no Head of the <i>hsiang</i> -or <i>chên</i> in a <i>hsien</i>, then the corresponding officials of the -<i>hsiang</i>, <i>chên</i>, or <i>hsien</i> shall nominate.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 12. Candidates for Representative should have -the following qualifications:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p><i>i.</i> Possess the qualifications of an elector of the Representatives -and have taken the citizenship oath in an -electorate other than this one.</p> - -<p><i>ii.</i> Be above twenty-five years of age.</p> - -<p><i>iii.</i> Be a resident of the respective electoral district.</p></blockquote> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 13. Representatives to the National Congress in -each district are elected in the manner prescribed in Article 6.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 14. The Special Municipalities directly under -the Executive Yüan should elect their Representatives according -to Articles 11-13 and Article 15.</p> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">Chapter III. Professional Election</span></h3> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 15. The various professional organs in provinces -or Special Municipalities should elect a number of -Representatives according to the attached List No. 3.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 16. Organs of the liberal professions shall elect -Representatives not according to localities or districts. -Their numbers are fixed in attached List No. 4.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 17. The professional organs participating in -the election are limited to those who were legally recognized -before the adoption of this code of laws.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 18. The officers of the various professional organs -shall nominate Representatives for those particular -professions. Their number should be three times the number -of Representatives to be elected. The officers mentioned -above are limited to those who have executive power -in that particular professional organ.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_305" id="Page_305">[Pg 305]</a></span></p> -<p><span class="smcap">Article 19.</span> Nominated Representatives for professional -election should have the following qualifications:</p> - -<blockquote> -<p><i>i.</i> Possess the privileges of an elector.</p> - -<p><i>ii.</i> Be above twenty-five years of age.</p> - -<p><i>iii.</i> Have been practicing in that profession for three years or more.</p> - -<p><i>iv.</i> Be a member of that professional organization.</p> -</blockquote> - -<p>The period of practicing that profession may be the sum -of intermittent periods of practice.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article 20.</span> The Representatives of professional organs -should be elected by legally recognized electors according to -Article 6.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article 21.</span> If there are several sub-organs to a professional -organization, the nomination of Representatives -should be made by the officials of the lowest sub-organ, and -elected by the members of the lowest sub-organ.</p> - -<p>If the members of the professional organization form -groups, then the election of Representatives should be done -by the individual members of those groups.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article 22.</span> In Special Municipalities directly under the -Executive Yüan, the nomination and election of Representatives -from professional organizations should be in accordance -with Article 24.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article 23.</span> For organs of the liberal professions, their -manner of nominating and electing is the same as for professional -organizations.</p> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">Chapter IV. Special Elections</span></h3> - - -<h4>Section 1. <i>Elections in the Provinces of Liaoning, Kirin, Heilungkiang and Jehol</i></h4> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article 24.</span> No distinction concerning district or profession -is made in the election of Representatives in these -four provinces. Their numbers are:</p> - - -<div class="center"> -<table border="0" cellpadding="4" cellspacing="0" summary="Numbers of representatives from provinces"> -<tr><td align="right"><i>i.</i></td><td align="left">For Liaoning</td><td align="right">14</td></tr> -<tr><td align="right"><i>ii.</i></td><td align="left">For Kirin</td><td align="right">13</td></tr> -<tr><td align="right"><i>iii.</i></td><td align="left">For Heilungkiang</td><td align="right">9</td></tr> -<tr><td align="right"><i>iv.</i></td><td align="left">For Jehol</td><td align="right">9</td></tr> -</table></div> - -<p>Two of the Representatives from Kirin are elected in the -Special Eastern District of that Province.</p> - -<p>[Provision is made for the use of polls in exile and for -absentee ballots.]</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_306" id="Page_306">[Pg 306]</a></span></p> - -<h4>Section 2. <i>Elections in Mongolia and Tibet</i></h4> - -<p>[This follows the provisions of Section 1.]</p> - - -<h4>Section 3. <i>Representatives from Overseas</i></h4> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article 32.</span> The numbers of Representatives from overseas -are as follows:</p> - - -<div class="center"> -<table border="0" cellpadding="4" cellspacing="0" summary="Representatives from overseas"> -<tr><td align="left">1 from Hawaii</td><td align="left">1 from Chile</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">1 from Peru</td><td align="left">1 from Cuba</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">1 from Mexico</td><td align="left">1 from Central America</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">3 from the United States</td><td align="left">2 from the Philippines</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">2 from Canada</td><td align="left">4 from Malaya</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">3 from Annam</td><td align="left">2 from Thailand (Siam)</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">1 from India</td><td align="left">2 from Burma</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">1 from Europe</td><td align="left">1 from Japan</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">1 from Korea</td><td align="left">1 from Australia</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">1 from Tahiti</td><td align="left">1 from Africa</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">4 from The Netherlands East Indies</td><td align="left">1 from Hong Kong</td></tr> -<tr><td align="left">1 from Macao</td><td align="left">1 from Formosa</td></tr> -</table></div> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article 33.</span> The nomination of overseas Representatives -is modelled after that of Professional Elections. But the -groups nominating the Representatives are to be approved -by the Central Committee of Overseas Affairs.</p> - -<p>The National Government shall fix twice the number of -Representatives electable as nominated Representatives.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article 34.</span> The election of Overseas Representatives is -modelled after that governing provincial districts.</p> - - -<h4>Section 4. <i>Elections in the Army, Navy, and Air Forces</i></h4> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article 35.</span> Thirty Representatives shall be elected from -the Nation's army, navy, air force, and other military organs.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article 36.</span> Nominations of Representatives from the -military are as follows:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p><i>i.</i> The Army: Two nominations from every division. -One from every independent lü [brigade] or from special -brigades holding more than two tuan [regiments]. For -the rest of the smaller forces, nomination of Representatives -shall be made by combination of the forces.</p> - -<p><i>ii.</i> The Navy: Each fleet may nominate one Representative. -All the Marines combined may nominate one -Representative. The Department of the Navy will combine -the remainder to nominate Representatives.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_307" id="Page_307">[Pg 307]</a></span></p> -<p><i>iii.</i> The Air Force shall nominate one Representative.</p> - -<p><i>iv.</i> Three Representatives shall be nominated by other -military organs.</p></blockquote> - -<p>The National Government will appoint ninety Representatives -thus nominated as the nominated Representatives.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article 37.</span> The nominated Representatives will be -elected by the officers and soldiers of the military who have -the qualifications of electors. Representatives are elected in -the manner prescribed in Article 6.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article 38.</span> Representatives nominated should have the -following qualifications:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p><i>i.</i> Possess the qualifications of an elector.</p> - -<p><i>ii.</i> Be more than twenty-five years of age.</p> - -<p><i>iii.</i> Have served for more than five years in the troops -with good record, or be a graduate of good standing from -a military school.</p></blockquote> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">Chapter V. Election of the Chief Election Office and of the Election Inspectors</span></h3> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article 39.</span> The National Government forms the Chief -Election Office of the Representatives of the National Congress. -The Office is headed by a Commissioner and a Deputy -Commissioner. Election Inspectors are also specially -appointed to direct and watch all affairs of the election. -The appointment of the Chief Election Office is determined -by order.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article 40.</span> The Election Inspector of every province is -the Commissioner of the Bureau of Civil Affairs of the -province.</p> - -<p>The Provincial Election Inspector is the highest executive -official of the province. In case there is no highest official, -the Chief Election Office will appoint one of the executive -officials to fill the post.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article 41.</span> In Special Municipalities directly under the -Executive Yüan, the Inspector is the City Mayor.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article 42.</span> In elections in Liaoning, Kirin, Heilungkiang, -and Jehol, and of liberal professional organizations, -the Minister of the Ministry of the Interior will be the -Inspector-General. In elections in Mongolia and Tibet, the -Chairman of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission -will be the Inspector-General. In overseas elections, -the Chairman of the Overseas Affairs Committee will be the -Inspector-General.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_308" id="Page_308">[Pg 308]</a></span></p> -<p><span class="smcap">Article 43.</span> Elections in Mongolia, Tibet, and overseas -and military elections shall be under the Inspectors appointed -by the Chief Election Office.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article 44.</span> The qualifications of the electors, the nominated -and elected Representatives shall be examined by -the Inspectors.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article 45.</span> The date and locality of the election are -fixed by the Election Inspectors.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article 46.</span> The rest of the officials for the election, <i>e.g.</i>, -ballot administrators and inspectors, etc., are also appointed -by the Inspectors-General.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article 47.</span> Inspectors and officials for electoral affairs -cannot be the Congress Representatives of that district or -professional organization.</p> - -<p>[<span class="smcap">Article 48 omitted in the text.</span>]</p> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">Chapter VI. Election and Forfeited Election</span></h3> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article 49.</span> The election is considered null and void if:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p><i>i.</i> It is legally proved that more than one-third of -the electorate are cheating in or manipulating the election; -or,</p> - -<p><i>ii.</i> It is legally proved that the election is not conducted -according to the laws prescribed.</p></blockquote> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article 50.</span> In case of an election being forfeited, it -should be performed again according to law, unless it be -too late to repeat under the existing circumstances.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article 51.</span> Elected Representatives lose their privilege -when:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p><i>i.</i> They die; or,</p> - -<p><i>ii.</i> It is legally proved that their submitted qualifications -are false; or,</p> - -<p><i>iii.</i> It is legally proved that the number of ballots is -incorrect.</p></blockquote> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article 52.</span> When an elected Representative loses his -privilege or when he refuses to take his privilege, the reserve -Representative will take his place as prescribed in -Article 8.</p> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">Chapter VII. Law Suits Concerning Election Affairs</span></h3> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article 53.</span> Electors or nominated Representatives who -are not elected may file suit within ten days of the date of -the election against any administrative officer of the election -if they hold that he abuses his duty.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_309" id="Page_309">[Pg 309]</a></span></p> -<p><span class="smcap">Article 54.</span> If electors or nominated Representatives -who are not elected see that the number of ballots cast for -the elected Representatives are untrue, or that the qualifications -of the elected Representatives are untrue, they may -file suit within five days of the date for announcement of -successful candidates.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article 55.</span> All law suits connected with election affairs -will be heard by the Supreme Court. They shall take -precedence over all other cases, and sentence will be given -after one single hearing. Law suits connected with military -elections will be heard before a military tribunal.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article 56.</span> Offenses committed during an election are -governed by the criminal code.</p> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">Chapter VIII. Supplement</span></h3> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article 57.</span> When it is impossible to elect in Special -Elections as prescribed in Chapter IV, the National Government -may appoint Representatives.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article 58.</span> The Chief Election Office for the Election -of Representatives to the National Congress is the sole organ -empowered to interpret the meaning of this set of laws.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article 59.</span> The detailed procedure for enforcing these -laws will be fixed by order.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article 60.</span> The date of enforcing these laws will be -fixed by order.</p> - -<p>[The attached lists are omitted.]</p> - -<div class="footnotes"> -<h3>FOOTNOTE:</h3> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_190" id="Footnote_1_190"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_190"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> "Kuo-min Ta-hui Tai-piao Hsüan-chü Fa" in Chung-yang Hsüan-ch'uan -Pu (Party-Ministry of Publicity) <i>Hsien-chêng Chien-shê Fa-kuei</i>, -Chungking, XXVIII (1939), p. 38-49.</p></div></div> - -<hr class="chap" /> - - - -<h2><i>D.</i> THE PROGRAM OF RESISTANCE AND RECONSTRUCTION<a name="FNanchor_1_191" id="FNanchor_1_191"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_191" class="fnanchor">[1]</a></h2> - - -<blockquote> - -<p>This quasi-constitutional proclamation of war policy for the nation -was adopted by the Kuomintang Party Congress, Emergency Session, -at Hankow, March 29, 1938.</p></blockquote> - - -<h3>A. GENERAL PRINCIPLES:</h3> - -<p>1. Dr. Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary principles and his -other teachings are hereby declared to be the supreme authority, -regulating all war-time activities and the work of -national reconstruction.</p> - -<p>2. All war-time powers and forces are hereby placed under<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_310" id="Page_310">[Pg 310]</a></span> -the control of the Kuomintang and of General Chiang -K'ai-shek.</p> - - -<h3>B. DIPLOMACY:</h3> - -<p>3. China is prepared to ally herself with all states and -nations that sympathize with her cause, and to wage a common -struggle for peace and justice.</p> - -<p>4. China is prepared to safeguard and strengthen the -machinery of peace as well as all treaties and conventions -that have the maintenance of peace as their ultimate object.</p> - -<p>5. China is prepared to ally herself with all forces that -are opposed to Japanese imperialism in order to check -Japanese aggression and to safeguard peace in the Far East.</p> - -<p>6. China is prepared to improve still further the existing -friendly relations with other Powers in order to gain -more sympathy for the cause.</p> - -<p>7. All bogus political organizations which Japan has -created in consequence of her military occupation of Chinese -territory, and all their actions, are hereby repudiated -and declared null and void.</p> - - -<h3>C. MILITARY AFFAIRS:</h3> - -<p>8. The army shall receive more political training, so that -both officers and men may appreciate the importance of -war-time national reconstruction and be ready to lay down -their lives for the nation.</p> - -<p>9. All able-bodied men shall be trained; the people shall -have their military strength increased; the troops at the -various fronts shall be supplied with new recruits. Overseas -Chinese who have returned home to offer their services -at the front shall be given a proper course of training to fit -them for their work.</p> - -<p>10. All people who have arms of their own shall receive -the support and encouragement of the Government and, -under the direction of local military authorities, shall cooperate -with the regular army to defend the country against -foreign invasion. Guerrilla warfare shall be waged in the -enemy's rear with the object of smashing and dividing his -military forces.</p> - -<p>11. Both the wounded and the killed shall be pensioned; -the disabled shall be cared for; and the families of soldiers -fighting at the front shall be treated with the utmost consideration, -so that people will rejoice to fight for their -country and the work of national mobilization may proceed -with the highest degree of efficiency.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_311" id="Page_311">[Pg 311]</a></span></p> - -<h3>D. POLITICS:</h3> - -<p>12. A People's Political Council shall be created in order -to unify the national strength, to utilize the best minds of -the nation, and to facilitate the formulation and execution -of national policies.</p> - -<p>13. The district [<i>hsien</i>] shall be taken as the fundamental -unit from which the work of increasing the self-defensive -power of the people shall be started. The conditions of -local self-government shall be fulfilled as soon as possible, so -that the political and social basis of the present war shall -have been firmly established and a preparation shall have -been made for the eventual promulgation of a constitution.</p> - -<p>14. A thorough reform in the central and local governmental -machinery shall be instituted with the object of -simplifying and making it rational. Only thus can administrative -efficiency be obtained to meet the urgent needs -of war.</p> - -<p>15. The conduct of all officials, both high and low, shall -conform to rules of propriety. They shall be faithful to -their work, ready to sacrifice themselves for the cause of the -nation, observe discipline, and obey orders, so that they -may serve as a model for the people. If they prove to be -disloyal and obstruct the prosecution of the war, they shall -be tried by court martial.</p> - -<p>16. Corrupt officials shall be severely punished, and their -property shall be confiscated.</p> - - -<h3>E. ECONOMICS:</h3> - -<p>17. Economic reconstruction shall concern itself mainly -with matters of military importance, and incidentally with -matters that contribute to the improvement of the livelihood -of the people. With these objects in view, a planned -economy shall be put into operation, investments by people -both at home and abroad shall be encouraged, and large-scale -war-time production shall be undertaken.</p> - -<p>18. The greatest measure of energy shall be devoted to -the development of village economy, the encouragement of -cooperative enterprises, the unhampered transportation of -foodstuffs, the cultivation of waste land, and the work of -irrigation.</p> - -<p>19. Mining shall be undertaken; the foundations of -heavy industries shall be laid; light industries shall be encouraged; -and handicraft industries in the various provinces -shall be developed.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_312" id="Page_312">[Pg 312]</a></span></p> -<p>20. War-time taxes shall be levied, and thoroughgoing -reforms in financial administration shall be instituted.</p> - -<p>21. The banking business shall be strictly controlled, so -that commercial and industrial activities may be properly -adjusted.</p> - -<p>22. The legal tender shall be made unassailable; foreign -exchange shall be controlled; and imports and exports shall -be regulated in order to secure financial stability.</p> - -<p>23. Facilities of communication shall be improved; transportation -by steamers, automobiles, and aeroplanes shall -be undertaken; railroads and highways shall be built; and -air lines shall be increased.</p> - -<p>24. No profiteering or cornering shall be allowed; and a -system of price-fixing shall be instituted.</p> - - -<h3>F. MASS MOVEMENT:</h3> - -<p>25. The people throughout the country shall be organized -into occupational groups such as farmers, laborers, -merchants, and students. The principle shall be: From -each according to his ability. The rich shall contribute in -money, and the able-bodied shall sweat. All classes of people -shall be mobilized for war.</p> - -<p>26. In the course of the war, the freedom of speech, the -freedom of the press, and the freedom of assembly shall be -fully guaranteed to the people, provided they do not contravene -Dr. Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary principles or the -provisions of the law.</p> - -<p>27. Refugees from the war areas as well as unemployed -people shall receive relief, and shall be given proper training -to fit them for war-time work.</p> - -<p>28. National consciousness shall be instilled into the people, -so that they may assist the Government in detecting and -eradicating treasonable acts. Traitors shall be severely punished, -and their property shall be confiscated.</p> - - -<h3>G. EDUCATION:</h3> - -<p>29. The whole educational system shall be reorganized. -A course of war-time education shall be instituted and -emphasis shall be placed on the cultivation of morals, -scientific research, and the expansion of research facilities.</p> - -<p>30. Various technical experts shall be trained and assigned -to proper posts in order to meet the requirements of -war.</p> - -<p>31. The youths of the nation shall be properly trained, -so that they may offer their services to society and contribute -to the cause of the war.</p> - -<div class="footnotes"> -<h3>FOOTNOTE:</h3> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_191" id="Footnote_1_191"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_191"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> Official English text from Ch'u Chia-hua (Party-Minister of Organization -of the Kuomintang), "Consolidation of Democracy in -China," in Council of International Affairs, <i>The Chinese Yearbook -1938-39</i>, [Hong Kong], 1939, p. 337-8.</p></div></div> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_313" id="Page_313">[Pg 313]</a></span></p> - - -<h2><i>E.</i> AN OUTLINE OF WAR-TIME CONTROLMENT<a name="FNanchor_1_192" id="FNanchor_1_192"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_192" class="fnanchor">[1]</a></h2> - - -<blockquote> - -<p>An official but unpublished statement, this document was presented -by the President of the Control <i>Yüan</i> to the author for inclusion in -the present work.</p></blockquote> - -<p>According to Article 46, Chapter VIII of the Organic -Law of the National Government, the Control <i>Yüan</i> is "the -highest supervisory organ of the government, obliged to -exercise the power of impeachment and auditing in accordance -with law." Since the beginning of our resistance -against the Japanese invasion, the powers of control have -been gradually strengthened so as to meet the demands of -this critical time. A static control has developed into a -dynamic one; that is, more emphasis is laid upon prevention -than upon correction. Therefore the duties of the -office become heavier and more complicated, as its work becomes -more intensified. But the influence which the <i>Yüan</i> -has exercised over Chinese politics as a whole becomes also -wider and wider. In this report, we are going to describe the -activities of the <i>Yüan</i> under the two headings of the Control -<i>Yüan</i> and the Ministry of Audit.</p> - - -<h3>THE CONTROL YÜAN:</h3> - -<p>The function of auditing is performed by the Ministry of -Audit, subsidiary to the <i>Yüan</i>. What is directly performed -by the <i>Yüan</i> is impeachment. On the authority of the Impeachment -Act, any motion of impeachment, after being -proposed by some control Committee or control Commissioner, -is to be reviewed by three other control Committees. -If the bill is passed by the three, the accused must be punished. -Whenever a bill is rejected and its proponent does -not agree to the rejection, the bill shall be reviewed once -more by five other committees whose determination shall -be final. Furthermore, emergency relief measures may be -requested, according to the urgency of the occasion; and in -order to facilitate the performance of its functions, the -<i>Yüan</i> is permitted to investigate the documents of other<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_314" id="Page_314">[Pg 314]</a></span> -offices as well as to demand explanations from them. The -initiation of a motion of impeachment must be based upon -one of the three following conditions:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p><i>a.</i> Article 2, Impeachment Act: "If any illegal action or -negligence of duty of an official be discovered, the Control -<i>Yüan</i> itself is permitted to bring an impeachment against -him."</p> - -<p><i>b.</i> Article 4, Regulations for the Execution of Government -Rights; and Article 11, Act for the Punishment of -Officials: "Specified officials may be impeached on demand -of the superior who has submitted the case of his guilty -subordinate to the Control <i>Yüan</i>."</p> - -<p><i>c.</i> "If an official be accused by the people, the case must -be investigated. If the accusation prove to be true, the accused -shall be impeached."</p> -</blockquote> - -<p>Although it is very prudent that the legislators have -obliged the impeaching officers to take such steps as investigation, -motion, and review, yet in this critical time -these complicated measures must be considered too slow to -keep pace with the development of affairs.</p> - -<p>After the outbreak of war, the Central Government published -the "Temporary Regulations for the Execution of -War-time Controlment," in which the Control <i>Yüan</i> was -charged with the duties of <i>censure</i> and <i>proposition</i>, besides -what have already been mentioned. By censure it is meant -that when emergency measures must be taken against an -official whose illegal action or negligence of duty has been -discovered, a written notice of censure may be submitted -to the officer who directly controls, or is immediately superior -to, the official in question. The officer receiving the -notice must decide in as short a time as possible to deal -with the censured with the administrative power in his -hands. If he holds the censured innocent, he must reply, -giving sufficient reasons. If he takes no measures, or fails -to reply, or replies groundlessly, the control Committee -making the censure is obliged to change the motion of -censure into one of impeachment, and the impeached is -liable to a penalty. Hence the principal significance of -censure is that it takes emergency measures against the undesirable -conduct of officials, so as to meet the demands of -the war-time. This also implies further extension of the -controlment to the administrative system, in order to -quicken efficiency.</p> - -<p>As for <i>proposition</i>, this means that when some legally -specified obligations of office are administered feebly or<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_315" id="Page_315">[Pg 315]</a></span> -inadequately, the Control <i>Yüan</i> may make a proposal or express -its views to the office involved or to the office immediately -superior. The office which receives the proposal -must in as short a time as possible take adequate measures -to remedy the situation. The duties of <i>proposition</i>, therefore, -can not only correct administrators, but can also improve -agencies. They are preventive, capable of requiring -strict improvement of governmental activities. Effective anticipatory -control may now be exercised over Chinese government -agencies. Since being charged with the two new -duties of censure and proposition, the Control <i>Yüan</i> has -carried them into action with prudence. And the effects -are rather remarkable.</p> - -<p>When, in 1937, the government was moved to Chungking, -a part of the <i>Yüan</i> employees were ordered dismissed. But -the <i>Yüan</i> authorities still prepared copies of "Directions for -the Work of Control <i>Yüan</i> Employees in Their Native (or -Other) Cities (or Provinces)," and "Directions for the -Work of Dismissed Control <i>Yüan</i> Employees," which were -distributed to the dismissed. The former employees have -been obliged to make monthly reports upon the local phenomena -according to the "Directions." These reports are -sent to the <i>Yüan</i>, thus helping its understanding of the -truth in all corners of China.</p> - -<p>In view of the fact that the "Temporary Regulations for -the Execution of War-time Controlment" came into force, -the Control <i>Yüan</i> accordingly prepared "Directions for Inspection -and Investigation." From time to time, the control -commissioners have been ordered to tour their respective -districts. Moreover, control committees have been -selected and sent out to different places to perform inspection -of administration, national spiritual mobilization, conscription, -military confiscation and requisition, the organization -and training of the people, hoarding and reserves of -supplies, communication and transportation, public support -of the war, public security, the utter erasure of traitors, -anti-air-raid preparations, ambulance equipment, the management -of wounded soldiers and of refugees, taxation and -other imposts on the people, production, construction, education, -and all other things related to the war. Thus the -work of the <i>Yüan</i> has become all the more intensified. In -order to adapt itself to the circumstances, its organization -was readjusted. A "Board of Legislative Study," subordinate -to the <i>Yüan</i>, was established, with a view to studying Dr. -Sun Yat-sen's "Constitution based upon the Principle of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_316" id="Page_316">[Pg 316]</a></span> -Separation of Five Powers," the Control system, and anything -related to war-time legislation about controlment. -Besides, a "Committee on Procedural Technique" was -added under the Secretariat, so that it will prepare plans for -the improvement of <i>Yüan</i> activities, and will help to carry -them into action.</p> - -<p>In the spring of 1939, a "Plan of War-time Procedure -for the Second Stage of War" was passed in the Fifth Plenary -Session of the C.E.C. and C.S.C. of the Kuomintang. -Both the decision concerning Article VI of Political Report -and the lecture delivered by Generalissimo Chiang K'ai-shek -in this meeting showed that much was expected from -the Control <i>Yüan</i>. Abiding by the government's policy and -taking into consideration its present needs, the <i>Yüan</i>, in -addition to the performance of impeachment, censure, proposition -and other functions established by law, prepared -"An Outline of the Execution of War-time Controlment for -the Second Stage" and its "Preliminary Procedure," with -the extension of inspection as the chief means to set the -machinery in motion.</p> - -<p>According to the aforementioned "Outline" and "Procedure," -the work of inspection is classified into two kinds. -The inspection of the conduct of political officers and administrative -officials is termed the <i>general inspection</i>. When -special agents are sent out to inspect specified cases, this is -called the <i>special inspection</i>. For the general inspection -of the Central Government, the units are the offices, while -for that of the local governments, the units are the districts -[<i>hsien</i>]. In the case of a special inspection, when the agents -are sent out solely by the Control <i>Yüan</i>, the term used is -<i>exclusive inspection</i>; the inspection performed cooperatively -by agents both of the <i>Yüan</i> and of other offices is called -<i>joint inspection</i>.</p> - -<p>The general inspection has, since January 1940, been -vigorously put into effect. For instance, the anti-air-raid -preparations on the outskirts of Chungking, the relief and -management of wounded soldiers, refugees, and suffering -children, and the spiritual mobilization of central and local -government offices (including problems of efficiency and -diligence) have all been carefully examined. Moreover, -Control Committees have been sent out to different districts -within certain periods, the frequency of which is based upon -the importance of the place. Some went to Kweichow and -Szechwan to inspect local administration in different districts. -Recently, committees have been sent out to Shantung<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_317" id="Page_317">[Pg 317]</a></span> -to make a variety of inspections. As for the special -inspections, delegates have been incessantly sent out to -make exclusive inspections; and joint inspections have also -been made, by the joining of many control committees into -the Itinerant Inspection Corps for Military Discipline and -Morale, and the War-time Economic Inspection Corps. -Committees which have thus been delegated to joint work -are not only obliged to fulfil duties required by the Corps, -but are also permitted independently to impeach or censure -illegal or incompetent officials, whether civil or military. -The primary functions of the committees remain unaffected.</p> - -<p>Since military operations must be in harmony with political -administration, wherever the military power reaches, -the power of controlment must follow in its wake. The -Control <i>Yüan</i> recently prepared the "Regulations for the -Organization of Control <i>Yüan</i> War-time Inspection Corps -of War Districts," which were later sanctioned and then -promulgated. The number of the corps and of the areas to -be inspected are fixed according to the War Districts marked -off by the Military Affairs Commission. Each corps consists -of three committees, and is organized by the control committees -themselves; if there is a control commissioner in the -area, he of course joins the committee, and performs all the -functions established for him by law. Under each committee -there are one secretary, one inspecting agent, three -assistants, and one clerk—to assist the committees in routine -administration.</p> - -<p>Since the work of the control commissioners is stationary, -behind the battle lines, the Inspection Corps of War Districts -are itinerant, so that their emphasis can be laid upon -the front. They are mutually dependent and intimately -correlated. The network of national controlment is completed -by the mobilization of the control committees to be -sent out to make inspections, so that corruption may be eliminated -and law and order enforced. And undoubtedly our -resistance against the Japanese invasion has been benefited. -This work is indeed a great help to the construction of a -new China.</p> - -<div class="footnotes"> -<h3>FOOTNOTE:</h3> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_192" id="Footnote_1_192"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_192"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> An unpublished memorandum presented in manuscript by President -Yü Yu-jên of the Control <i>Yüan</i> to the author in Chungking, -September 1940. It consists of nine folios, not numbered, with a chart. -It is entitled <i>Chan Shih Chien-ch'a K'ai-lüeh</i> (An Outline of War-time -Controlment), and is dated August, XXVIII (1939). The present extract -is folios 1-A to 4-B.</p></div></div> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_318" id="Page_318">[Pg 318]</a></span></p> - - -<h2><i>F.</i> A CHART OF THE CONTROL <i>YÜAN</i> FROM JULY 1937 TO -JUNE 1940<a name="FNanchor_1_193" id="FNanchor_1_193"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_193" class="fnanchor">[1]</a></h2> - - - -<h3>THE READJUSTMENT:</h3> - -<p>Since the outbreak of war, the <i>Yüan</i>, together with other -offices of the Government, was moved from Nanking to -Chungking. In order to adapt itself to the circumstances, -its organization was readjusted. A "Board of Legislative -Study" was established, while the six sections of General -Affairs, Editing, Book-Collection, Printing, Receipt and -Transmission,<a name="FNanchor_2_194" id="FNanchor_2_194"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_194" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> and Archive, all subordinate to the Secretariat, -were merged into four departments. Moreover, a -"Committee on Administrative Procedure" and two new -sections, called the first and the second, were added to the -main body of the <i>Yüan</i>.</p> - - -<h3>THE FUNCTIONS:</h3> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 400px;"> -<img src="images/i_318.jpg" width="400" height="129" alt="The functions" /> -</div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_319" id="Page_319">[Pg 319]</a></span></p> - -<h3>THE PRESENT ORGANIZATION:</h3> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 400px;"> -<img src="images/i_319.jpg" width="400" height="165" alt="The present organization" /> -</div> - -<h3>THE WORK:</h3> - - -<div class="center"> -<table border="0" cellpadding="4" cellspacing="0" summary="The Work"> -<tr><td>1.</td><td align="left">Acceptance of people's petitions and investigations:</td></tr> -<tr><td></td><td align="left">Number of petitions received in this period....<br /> - <span style="margin-left: 1em;">[Number is omitted from original report.]</span></td></tr> -<tr><td></td><td align="left">Number of cases in which delegates were sent out to investigate....<br /> - <span style="margin-left: 1em;">[Number omitted.]</span></td></tr> -<tr><td></td><td align="left">Number of cases in which other offices were charged to investigate....<br /> - <span style="margin-left: 1em;">[Number omitted.]</span></td></tr> -<tr><td></td><td align="left" colspan="3">(Those petitions which were either outside the function -of control or false in the<br /> -description of facts were remarked upon and preserved by the committees.)</td></tr> -<tr><td>2.</td><td align="left">Motions:</td></tr> -<tr><td></td><td align="left">Number of impeachments moved</td><td align="right">121</td></tr> -<tr><td></td><td align="left">Number of censures moved</td><td align="right">149</td></tr> -<tr><td></td><td align="left">Number of propositions moved</td><td align="right">234</td></tr> -<tr><td>3.</td><td align="left">Supervisions of Civil Service Examinations:</td></tr> -<tr><td></td><td align="left">Number of Higher Examinations supervised</td><td align="right">2</td></tr> -<tr><td></td><td align="left">Number of Common Examinations supervised</td><td align="right">5</td></tr> -<tr><td></td><td align="left">Number of Special Examinations supervised</td><td align="right">34</td></tr> -<tr><td>4.</td><td align="left">Supervisions of the relief of sufferers from natural calamities:</td></tr> -<tr><td></td><td align="left">Total number</td><td align="right">5</td></tr> -<tr><td>5.</td><td align="left" colspan="2">Inspections:<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">[A detailed enumeration of inspections performed and results - accomplished is here omitted.]</span></td></tr> -<tr><td>6.</td><td align="left">Cooperation with other offices:<br /> - <span style="margin-left: 1em;">[The detailed summary is omitted.]</span></td></tr> -</table></div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_320" id="Page_320">[Pg 320]</a></span></p> - -<h3>THE MINISTRY OF AUDIT:</h3> - -<p>The functions of audit, as performed by the Ministry -of Audit, are founded upon the Auditing Act. The old -Auditing Act, however, is too tradition-bound and therefore -inconvenient. The necessity of revision is especially -pressing in war-time. In the spring of 1938, the Ministry -prepared a draft Act and submitted it to the Legislative -<i>Yüan</i>. The latter adopted this and published a New Auditing -Act. According to the New Auditing Act, the Ministry -is charged with three functions of internal checking (interior -auditing), auditing (post-auditing) and supervision. -These functions include:</p> - -<blockquote> -<p><i>i.</i> Supervision of the execution of the budgets;</p> - -<p><i>ii.</i> Scrutiny of orders of receipt and payment;</p> - -<p><i>iii.</i> Scrutiny of computations and balance sheets;</p> - -<p><i>iv.</i> Control of illegal or unfaithful conduct in financial affairs. -</p></blockquote> - -<p>Two merits of the New Auditing Act should be mentioned. -In the first place, emphasis has been laid upon -visiting auditing. For instance, the work of internal checking -is not limited to the supervision of the receipts and -disbursements of the State Treasury by the scrutiny and -indorsement of the receiving and paying orders; but even -receiving and paying vouchers of Government offices have -been made ineffective, unless scrutinized and indorsed by -auditors stationed in the offices by the Ministry. Owing to -the vastness of the area of China, and owing also to the -limited number of workers available in this line, this system<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_321" id="Page_321">[Pg 321]</a></span> -is not universally applicable. Only offices in which the -work of receiving and paying is especially heavy find such -auditors present. As for auditing, the Government offices -were formerly obliged only to submit to the Ministry accounting -reports which they themselves had prepared. It -is different now. The New Act ordains that auditors should -be sent out periodically by the Ministry to visit the Government -offices and scrutinize their books and vouchers. -Or in each year, some offices should be selected to be thus -scrutinized. The duties of supervision were not clearly defined, -but they now include the following items: (<i>a</i>) the -supervision of the revenue and expenditures of the offices; -(<i>b</i>) the scrutiny of cash, bills, and bonds in the offices; -(<i>c</i>) the supervision of the construction of buildings and of -the purchase or sale of the property attached to the offices; -(<i>d</i>) the supervision of the drawing and repayment of bonds -and the destruction of bonds returned; (<i>e</i>) joint-administration -with the financial departments of other offices; and -(<i>f</i>) the scrutiny of other administrative affairs related to -finance.</p> - -<p>Secondly, the New Auditing Act ordains that the Ministry -of Audit is directly responsible for the auditing of financial -affairs of the offices of different ranks of the Central Government, -while that of the local governments is under the -charge of local auditing offices, subordinate to the Ministry.</p> - -<p>[A detailed narrative of the war-time work of the ministry -is omitted.]</p> - -<p>Before the outbreak of war, the Ministry had established -auditing offices in the Provinces of Kiangsu, Chekiang, Hupeh, -Shensi and Honan and in the city of Shanghai, and -one sub-office for the Tientsin-Pukow Railway. The office -of Shanghai concurrently took charge of the auditing -affairs of the Nanking-Shanghai Railway; and that of -Hupeh, the affairs of the Peiping-Hankow Railway. In -1938 the offices of Hunan, Kweichow and Szechwan were -established. In July 1939, a conference of auditors was -held in Chungking. All auditors sent out now returned to -attend it. They reported on their work, assisted the auditors -in the Ministry, and discussed with them the directions -of war-time auditing. In October, Mr. Lin Yün-kai, -the Minister of Audit, visited Szechwan, Shensi, Kansu, -and Chinghai to inspect the audit work going on in Shensi -and Szechwan and at the same time to examine the local -financial conditions as a step toward the extension of the -auditing system.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_322" id="Page_322">[Pg 322]</a></span></p> - -<p>In the spring of 1939, the Ministry prepared "An Outline -for the Execution of War-time Audits" which was passed -and enacted by the Supreme National Defense Council. -There are eleven items, to be carried out in several periods, -in this outline. A part of them are required by the New -Auditing Act, while the rest are the new work arising from -the war. They are as follows:</p> - -<blockquote> -<p><i>a.</i> Auditing prefectural [<i>hsien</i>] finance: A prefecture, on -the authority of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Constitution, is the unit -of self-government; and whenever the self-government is accomplished, -China becomes constitutional. This being the -case, the prefectural finance actually concerns the future of -the country and the people. Therefore, beginning from -1939, the Ministry introduced the auditing of prefectural -finance. It ordered the provincial offices to have the prefectures -make monthly reports on their revenue and expenditure. -The reports should be submitted to the provincial -auditing offices which will also send out delegates to scrutinize -the accounting records of some selected prefectures -as well as to investigate the prefectural financial organizations, -the taxation system, and the sorts of taxes. Up to -June 1940, there have been 84 prefectures selected for such -investigation.</p> - -<p><i>b.</i> The auditing of the Central Government Offices in -the provinces and cities where no auditing offices have been -established: In such cases, the Ministry has appointed the -auditing offices of neighboring localities to take charge. -But the Ministry has taken over the auditing affairs of -Chungking for the moment. Meantime, plans have been -made to establish auditing offices in Kwangsi, Fukien, -etc.</p> - -<p><i>c.</i> The auditing of the receipts and disbursements of -public treasuries: Since October 1939, when the Public -Treasury Act came into force, the Ministry has sent delegates -to the State Treasury Bureau to scrutinize and indorse -the accounting vouchers, and the provincial offices have -sent delegates to Provincial Treasuries as well.</p> - -<p><i>d.</i> The auditing of special funds: As a rule, the institutes -in charge of special funds have from time to time submitted -their reports on their receipts and disbursements to the -Ministry. Since 1939, the Ministry has also sent delegates to -examine strictly these funds.</p> - -<p><i>e.</i> Itinerant auditing: The present economic conditions -do not permit the Ministry to establish auditing offices in -all the government-owned concerns. But itinerant auditing,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_323" id="Page_323">[Pg 323]</a></span> -after the model of circuit courts, has been introduced since -1939. The Suchow-Kunming and Yünnan-Burma Railways -have been thus examined. The provincial offices have also -applied this system to the business offices.</p> - -<p><i>f.</i> The visiting auditing: The system of visiting auditing -has been developed gradually. Delegates have been stationed -in Sufferers' Relief Committee, City Government of -Chungking, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Economics, -and Ministry of Communications. Other delegates have -been sent out to visit some selected offices who have submitted -their accounting reports.</p> - -<p><i>g.</i> The supervision of the revenue of government offices: -Salt Tax and Commodities Tax have been scrutinized.</p> - -<p><i>h.</i> The supervision of clothing, provisions, and other -military supplies: Since the outbreak of war, the amount -of clothing, provisions, etc. purchased by the military -authorities has greatly increased. The delegates from the -Ministry are always present on the occasions of signing contracts, -announcing the bids, deciding the winning bidder, -and delivering the goods. If the supplies are purchased in -the provinces, the provincial offices are in charge of the -supervision.</p> - -<p><i>i.</i> The supervision of mass purchase and constructions: -The delegates from the Ministry or its provincial offices are -always present on the occasions of signing contracts, announcing -the bids, deciding the winning bidder, and delivering -the goods or completing constructions when there -are any mass purchases or sales of government-owned property -or any construction work.</p> - -<p><i>j.</i> The financial scrutiny of the war-time provisional organizations: -There are huge sums of receipts and disbursements -in such organizations as the "Joint Emergency Air -Raid Relief Office of Chungking" and the general office -of the "National Committee for Soldiers' Comfort," so that -their auditing affairs are made the charge of the delegates -from the Ministry.</p> - -<p><i>k.</i> The supervision of the payment, preservation, and -usage of contributions of all sorts: National Salvation Bonds, -Aviation Contribution, and all other contributions donated -by the Chinese at home and abroad have been scrutinized -by the Ministry delegates.</p> -</blockquote> - -<p>Many considerable results have been achieved since the -execution of the above items from January 1939, to date. -The "Auditing Plan for 1941" has already been prepared -by the Ministry. When it is passed by the Supreme -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_324" id="Page_324">[Pg 324]</a></span>National Defense Council, it will come into force from January -of next year.</p> - - -<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_193" id="Footnote_1_193"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_193"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> Continuation of Appendix I (E), p. <a href="#Page_133">313</a>; this comprises folios -5-A to 9-A with chart.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_194" id="Footnote_2_194"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_194"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> A formal agency for the receipt and registry of incoming communications, -and of verification and transmission of outgoing ones.</p></div></div> - - -<hr class="chap" /> - - -<h2><i>G.</i> REGULATIONS CONCERNING THE ORGANIZATION -OF THE VARIOUS CLASSIFICATIONS OF <i>HSIEN</i><a name="FNanchor_1_195" id="FNanchor_1_195"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_195" class="fnanchor">[1]</a></h2> - - -<blockquote> - -<p>These laws, a fundamental charter for local self-government, were -approved and promulgated by the 14th Regular Meeting of the Supreme -National Defense Council, August 31, 1939. For the Generalissimo's -lecture on the same subject, see Appendix III (C), p. <a href="#Page_388">388</a>.</p></blockquote> - - -<h3>A. GENERAL PRINCIPLES</h3> - -<p>1. Each <i>hsien</i> is a self-administrative unit. Its size and -area are determined by customs and history but subject to -the demarcation of the National Government.</p> - -<p>2. There are three to six classes of <i>hsien</i>, classified according -to area, population, and conditions of economy, -culture, and communications. The classifications are to -be worked out by the Provincial Government and subject -to the approval of the Ministry of Interior.</p> - -<p>3. Regulations governing <i>hsien</i> administration are to -be promulgated by the National Government.</p> - -<p>4. Each <i>hsien</i> is divided into <i>hsiang</i>, and each <i>hsiang</i> is -further divided into <i>pao</i> and <i>chia</i>. If a <i>hsien</i> is too large, -it may be first divided into <i>ch'ü</i> to be under the charge of -several bureaus. Education institutions, police, public -health and tariff offices should be distributed in accordance -with above-mentioned divisions.</p> - -<p>5. Each <i>hsien</i> and each <i>hsiang</i> is a legal person.</p> - -<p>6. At the age of twenty, a man or woman of Chinese nationality, -after living in the <i>hsien</i> for six months or more, -or having possessed a residence for more than one year, is -qualified as a citizen of that <i>hsien</i>. He or she has the right -of suffrage, recall, initiative, and referendum in this <i>hsien</i>. -The following persons are disqualified:</p> - -<blockquote> -<p><i>a.</i> Those who are deprived of citizenship by the National -Government.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_325" id="Page_325">[Pg 325]</a></span></p> -<p><i>b.</i> Those who owe governmental money.</p> - -<p><i>c.</i> Those who have been imprisoned for [political] corruption<a name="FNanchor_2_196" id="FNanchor_2_196"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_196" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> -or forgery.</p> - -<p><i>d.</i> Those who are not allowed to possess personal property.</p> - -<p><i>e.</i> Those who are opium or other poisonous smokers.</p> -</blockquote> - -<h3>B. THE <i>Hsien</i> GOVERNMENT (<i>hsien chêng-fu</i>)</h3> - -<p>7. There shall be one magistrate (<i>hsien-chang</i>) for each -<i>hsien</i>. His duties are:</p> - -<blockquote> -<p><i>a.</i> To supervise the local administration of the whole -<i>hsien</i> under the control of the Provincial Government.</p> - -<p><i>b.</i> To carry out Provincial or Central Government orders -under the supervision of the Provincial Government.</p> -</blockquote> - -<p>8. The <i>Hsien</i> Government consists of the following departments:</p> - -<blockquote> -<p><i>a.</i> Civil Affairs Department.</p> - -<p><i>b.</i> Financial Department.</p> - -<p><i>c.</i> Educational Department.</p> - -<p><i>d.</i> Reconstruction Department.</p> - -<p><i>e.</i> Land Affairs Department.</p> - -<p><i>f.</i> Social Affairs Department.</p> -</blockquote> - -<p>The number of departments and the distribution of functions -are determined by the Provincial Government in accordance -with the class and necessities [of the <i>hsien</i>], and -registered with the Ministry of the Interior.</p> - -<p>9. In the <i>Hsien</i> Government there are to be secretaries, -department heads, advisors, police officers, clerks and technicians. -The number of such staff and their salaries are to -be determined by the Provincial Government and subject -to the approval of the Ministry of the Interior.</p> - -<p>10. The examination, training, appointing, and discharging -of a magistrate or of general staffs are to be done according -to the promulgated National law.</p> - -<p>11. There shall be a <i>Hsien</i> Council (<i>hsien chêng hui</i>) -which is to be convened every two weeks. The following -matters should be settled in this Council:</p> - -<blockquote> -<p><i>a.</i> Cases brought out by the <i>Hsien</i> People's Council.</p> - -<p><i>b.</i> Other important matters concerning <i>hsien</i> policies.</p> -</blockquote> - -<p>(The regulations governing the <i>Hsien</i> Council are promulgated -by the Ministry of the Interior.)</p> - -<p>12. The <i>Hsien</i> Council meeting can be held before the -establishment of the <i>Hsien</i> People's Council.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_326" id="Page_326">[Pg 326]</a></span></p> -<p>13. Regulations concerning a <i>hsien</i> shall be drafted by -the Provincial Government and submitted to the Executive -<i>Yüan</i> for its approval through the Ministry of the Interior.</p> - -<p>Any organizations which are not mentioned in the regulations -should not be established.</p> - -<p>14. Regulations governing the <i>hsien</i> administration shall -be drafted by the Provincial Government and registered in -the Ministry of the Interior.</p> - - -<h3>C. THE <i>Hsien</i> PEOPLE'S COUNCIL (<i>hsien ts'ang-chêng hui</i>)</h3> - -<p>15. The <i>Hsien</i> People's Council is organized by the members -of the Council who are elected from People's Representative -Committee. Each <i>hsiang</i> elects one member. Representatives -of public organizations may be recognized as -members, but the number of such members should not comprise -more than one-third of the whole Council.</p> - -<p>16. The chairman of the Council should be elected from -its members.</p> - -<p>17. The bylaws and the duties of the Council shall be -dealt with separately.</p> - - -<h3>D. FINANCES OF A <i>Hsien</i></h3> - -<p>18. <i>Hsien</i> revenue consists of the following items:</p> - -<blockquote><p><i>a.</i> Part of the land tax.</p> - -<p><i>b.</i> Surtax on the land tax.</p> - -<p><i>c.</i> Thirty per cent of the stamp tax.</p> - -<p><i>d.</i> Taxes on land after improvement.</p> - -<p><i>e.</i> Part of the business taxes.</p> - -<p><i>f.</i> Income from public properties.</p> - -<p><i>g.</i> Income from public enterprises.</p> - -<p><i>h.</i> Other legal taxes.</p></blockquote> - -<p>19. Funds required for the execution of Provincial Government -orders shall be provided from the National Treasury -or the Provincial Treasury. Local collection of such -funds is prohibited. <i>Hsien</i> which are financially self-sufficient -may resort to their own treasuries to meet educational -and administrative expenses. <i>Hsien</i> with scanty population -and most of their area uncultivated may be subsidized by -both the Provincial and National Treasuries.</p> - -<p>20. Extra expenses for reconstruction shall be collected -by a means of floating loans with the approval of the <i>Hsien</i> -People's Council and the Provincial Government.</p> - -<p>21. The incomes and expenses of the <i>hsien</i> proper shall -be the independent responsibility of the <i>Hsien</i> Government.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_327" id="Page_327">[Pg 327]</a></span></p> -<p>22. If the <i>Hsien</i> People's Council has not been established, -the budgets and financial statements shall be examined -by the <i>Hsien</i> Council and then submitted to the -Provincial Government by the Magistrate.</p> - -<p>23. After the establishment of the <i>Hsien</i> People's Council, -the budgets and the financial statements shall be examined -by this Council first and then be submitted to the Provincial -Government. In case of emergency the Magistrate may submit -such documents to the Provincial Government directly.</p> - - -<h3>E. <i>Ch'ü</i></h3> - -<p>24. Each <i>ch'ü</i> is constituted by fifteen to thirty <i>hsiang</i>.</p> - -<p>25. The <i>Ch'ü</i> Bureau, a subsidiary office of <i>hsien</i>, represents -the <i>Hsien</i> Government to perform the educational and -administrative work. If the <i>hsien</i> is not divided into <i>ch'ü</i> -then this work is done by the special officers sent by the <i>Hsien</i> -Government.</p> - -<p>26. There shall be one <i>Ch'ü</i> Chief (<i>ch'ü-chang</i>) and two -to five advisers in each <i>ch'ü</i>. Their duties are to take charge -of civil, reconstruction, educational and military affairs. -They shall be trained and examined before appointment.</p> - -<p>27. There shall be police stations in each <i>ch'ü</i> under the -supervision of the <i>Ch'ü</i> Chief.</p> - -<p>28. A Rural Reconstruction Committee is to be formed -in a <i>ch'ü</i>. The members of this committee shall be elected -from among the popular persons in that <i>ch'ü</i>. The <i>Ch'ü</i> -Chief shall concurrently be Chairman of the Committee.</p> - - -<h3>F. <i>Hsiang</i><a name="FNanchor_3_197" id="FNanchor_3_197"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_197" class="fnanchor">[3]</a></h3> - -<p>29. Each <i>hsiang</i> is constituted by six to fifteen <i>pao</i>. -[See <a href="#Page_329">Art. 45</a> <i>ff.</i>]</p> - -<p>30. Systems of <i>hsiang</i> and <i>pao chia</i> are to be worked out -by the <i>Hsien</i> Government and submitted to the Provincial -Government. They must be registered with the Ministry of -the Interior.</p> - -<p>31. There shall be one <i>Hsiang</i> Chief (<i>hsiang-chang</i>) and -one to two Assistant Chiefs (<i>fu-hsiang-chang</i>) in each <i>hsiang</i> -office. They shall be persons possessing the following qualifications:</p> - -<blockquote> -<p><i>a.</i> Those who have passed the ordinary examinations.</p> - -<p><i>b.</i> Those who have served in the Delegated Appointment<a name="FNanchor_4_198" id="FNanchor_4_198"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_198" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> -capacity.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_328" id="Page_328">[Pg 328]</a></span></p> - -<p><i>c.</i> Those who have graduated from Middle and Normal -schools.</p> - -<p><i>d.</i> Those who have contributed service for the public -good.</p> -</blockquote> - -<p>32. There shall be four sections in each <i>hsiang</i> to take -charge of the civil, economic, educational affairs and police -service. Each section has one chief and several secretaries. -One of the secretaries shall take charge of controlment. The -<i>hsiang</i> staff shall be selected from among the primary school -teachers. If the <i>hsiang's</i> financial resources are insufficient -these sections may be amalgamated into one office.</p> - -<p>33. The tenure of <i>Hsiang</i> Chiefs shall be two years, with -permissible re-election.</p> - -<p>34. The offices <i>Hsiang</i> Chief, the headmaster of the -primary school, and officer of militia<a name="FNanchor_5_199" id="FNanchor_5_199"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_199" class="fnanchor">[5]</a> may be delegated to -one person. If the <i>hsiang</i> possesses sufficient financial resources, -the headmaster of the primary school shall not be -allowed to hold other office.</p> - -<p>35. Plans initiated by the <i>hsiang</i> itself must be passed -by the <i>Hsiang</i> Council meeting before they are adopted.</p> - -<p>36. The <i>Hsiang</i> Chief shall act as the chairman of the -Hsiang Council Meeting. Every section chief is required to -attend the Meeting. The <i>pao</i> chiefs must also attend this -Meeting.</p> - -<p>37. The procedure of training of <i>Hsiang</i> Chiefs and other -<i>hsiang</i> staff shall be dealt with separately.</p> - - -<h3>G. THE <i>Hsiang</i> PEOPLE'S COUNCIL</h3> - -<p>38. The members of the <i>Hsiang</i> People's Council shall -be elected from the <i>Pao</i> People's Council. Each <i>pao</i> shall -elect two members.</p> - -<p>39. The <i>Hsiang</i> Chief may act as the chairman of the -<i>Hsiang</i> People's Council provided that he has been elected -by the Council as the Chief.</p> - -<p>40. The bylaws and the duties of the <i>Hsiang</i> People's -Council shall be dealt with separately.</p> - - -<h3>H. FINANCE OF THE <i>Hsiang</i></h3> - -<p>41. The <i>hsiang's</i> revenue consists of the following items:</p> - -<blockquote> -<p><i>a.</i> All legal taxes.</p> - -<p><i>b.</i> Income from public properties.</p> - -<p><i>c.</i> Income from public enterprises.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_329" id="Page_329">[Pg 329]</a></span></p> -<p><i>d.</i> Subsidiary funds.</p> - -<p><i>e.</i> Special incomes to be collected with the approval of the -<i>Hsien</i> Government.</p> -</blockquote> - -<p>42. The procedure of purchasing properties shall be -dealt with separately.</p> - -<p>43. The bylaws of the <i>Hsiang Treasury</i> Committee shall -be dealt with separately.</p> - -<p>44. The financial report prepared by the <i>hsiang</i> office -shall be submitted to the <i>Hsien</i> Government. The expenses -of the <i>hsiang</i> shall be included in the <i>hsien's</i> financial report -after audit.</p> - - -<h3>I. <i>Pao</i> AND <i>Chia</i></h3> - -<p>45. Each <i>pao</i> is constituted of six to fifteen <i>chia</i>.</p> - -<p>46. Public primary schools, cooperatives, and warehouses<a name="FNanchor_6_200" id="FNanchor_6_200"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_200" class="fnanchor">[6]</a> -shall be established within two or three <i>pao</i> where -the population is dense. The <i>Pao</i> Chief shall be in charge -of these institutions. Reserves of each <i>pao</i> shall be trained -separately.</p> - -<p>47. There shall be one <i>Pao</i> Chief (<i>pao-chang</i>) and one -assistant <i>Pao</i> Chief (<i>fu-pao-chang</i>) in each <i>pao</i>. They -are elected by the <i>Pao</i> People's Council. And they must be -chosen from among persons with the following qualifications:</p> - -<blockquote> -<p><i>a.</i> Those who have graduated from middle schools.</p> - -<p><i>b.</i> Persons who have worked more than one year in -Government.</p> - -<p><i>c.</i> Those who have been specially trained.</p> - -<p><i>d.</i> Those who are active in social work.</p> -</blockquote> - -<p>Before the time of election, the <i>Pao</i> Chief may be recommended -by the <i>hsiang</i> office to the <i>Hsien</i> Government for -appointment.</p> - -<p>48. The tenure of the <i>Pao</i> Chief shall be two years; he -may be re-elected.</p> - -<p>49. The offices of <i>Pao</i> Chief, headmaster of the <i>pao</i> -primary school, and militia officer may be delegated to one -person. When the <i>pao's</i> financial resources are sufficient the -headmaster is not allowed to hold other office.</p> - -<p>50. There shall be two to four secretaries in each <i>pao</i> -to take charge of the political, educational, cultural affairs, -and police service. The <i>pao</i> staff shall be elected from -among the primary school teachers. If the <i>pao's</i> financial -resources are not sufficient, there shall be only one person -to take care of all these activities.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_330" id="Page_330">[Pg 330]</a></span></p> -<p>51. The procedure of training of the <i>pao</i> office staff shall -be dealt with separately.</p> - -<p>52. One representative of each family is required to be -present at the <i>Pao</i> People's Council (<i>pao-min ta-hui</i>) meeting. -The bylaws and the duties of this council shall be -dealt with separately.</p> - -<p>53. Each <i>chia</i> consists of six to fifteen families.</p> - -<p>54. There shall be one <i>Chia</i> Chief (<i>chia-chang</i>) in each -<i>chia</i>. He is elected by the Family Chiefs Council and is -registered with the <i>hsiang</i> office through the <i>pao</i>.</p> - -<p>55. There shall be established a Family Chiefs Council -and <i>Chia</i> People's Council in each <i>chia</i>.</p> - -<p>56. The old names of the streets may be used as the names -of <i>pao</i>.</p> - -<p>57. The bylaws of <i>pao</i> and <i>chia</i> shall be dealt with -separately.</p> - -<p>58. The controlment procedure for <i>pao</i> and <i>chia</i> shall -be dealt with separately.</p> - -<p>59. The present bylaws shall become effective after the -date of promulgation.</p> - -<p>60. If any item in these regulations conflicts with the -National laws, it shall be null.</p> - - -<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_195" id="Footnote_1_195"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_195"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> Chung-yang Hsün-lien T'uan [Central (Kuomintang) Training -Corps], <i>Hsien Ko-chi Tzŭ-chih Kang-yao</i> [Regulations Concerning the -Organization of the Various Classifications of <i>Hsien</i>], Chungking, XXVIII -(1939); these regulations are also found in Chung-yang Hsüan-ch'uan -Pu [Central Publicity Board], <i>Hsien-cheng yü Ti-fang Tzŭ-chih</i> -[Constitutional Government in Relation to Local Self-Government], -Chungking, XXVIII (1939), p. 37-44.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_196" id="Footnote_2_196"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_196"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> The practice termed <i>squeeze</i> on the coast.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_197" id="Footnote_3_197"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_197"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> In some areas termed the <i>chên</i>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_198" id="Footnote_4_198"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_198"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> A level in the National civil service.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_5_199" id="Footnote_5_199"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_199"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> <i>The chuang-ting-tui tui-chang</i>, heading a local force of able-bodied -citizens; the regular rank is not specified.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_6_200" id="Footnote_6_200"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_200"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> In Far Eastern English parlance, <i>godown</i>.</p></div></div> - - -<hr class="chap" /> - - -<h2><i>H.</i> A CHART OF GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION</h2> - - -<blockquote> - -<p>The chart facing this page is a composite of various official charts to -which the author was allowed access in Chungking. Revisions cover -changes down to the opening of 1941.</p></blockquote> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 400px;"> -<a href="images/i_330fp-large.jpg"><img src="images/i_330fp.jpg" width="400" height="259" alt="Chart of Government Organization" /></a> -</div> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_331" id="Page_331">[Pg 331]</a></span></p> - - -<h2>APPENDIX II. DOCUMENTS ON PARTY POLITICS</h2> - - -<hr class="chap" /> -<h2><i>A.</i> A CHART OF KUOMINTANG ORGANIZATION</h2> - - -<blockquote> - -<p>The chart facing this page is a composite of various official charts to -which the author was allowed access in July and August 1940.</p></blockquote> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 400px;"> -<a href="images/i_331fp-large.jpg"><img src="images/i_331fp.jpg" width="400" height="282" alt="Chart of Kuomintang Organization" /></a> -</div> - -<hr class="chap" /> - - - -<h2><i>B.</i> CONSTITUTION OF THE SAN MIN CHU I YOUTH CORPS, YEAR XXVII -(1938)<a name="FNanchor_1_201" id="FNanchor_1_201"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_201" class="fnanchor">[1]</a></h2> - - -<blockquote> - -<p>Proclaimed June 16, 1938, amended by the Fourth Meeting of the -Corps' Provisional Central Managing Board, July 17, 1939, this is the -fundamental charter of the most significant Kuomintang auxiliary to -appear in many years.</p></blockquote> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">Chapter I. General Principles</span></h3> - -<p>1. The name of the organization is the San Min Chu I -Youth Corps.</p> - -<p>2. The object of the Corps is to unite and train young -people, to enforce the San Min Chu I, to defend the nation, -and to bring national rebirth.</p> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">Chapter II. Membership</span></h3> - -<p>3. All Chinese youths, male or female, aged between 16 -to 25, vowing to abide by the Corps constitution, can become -members of the Corps upon the payment of the -membership fee.</p> - -<p>Members of the Managing Boards of various subordinate -Corps agencies and other Headquarters officials specially -admitted are not restricted by the above rule. Members -who pass 25 years of age can still retain their membership -in the Corps.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_332" id="Page_332">[Pg 332]</a></span></p> -<p>4. Two members of the Corps must propose and second -a member before the latter can become eligible. The new -member must also be approved by the Sectional Corps and -Troop and his name registered in the Central Corps Headquarters.</p> - -<p>5. New members must take an oath before admittance, as -follows:</p> - -<p>"I hereby swear that I promise to abide by the principles -of San Min Chu I, to obey the order of the Corps Leader, -to abide by the constitution of the corps, to act according -to the principles of the New Life Movement, to be ever loyal -to the Principles, to work for all other people, to stand firm -against all hardships, and to be prepared to sacrifice my -all. I promise that if I fail to perform the above duties, -I will be willing to receive the severest punishments."</p> - -<p>6. The private life of the members should be in conformity -with the regulations fixed by the Corps.</p> - -<p>7. Members of the Corps who die in service or who -lose their profession because of service in the Corps will -receive pensions or other relief. The detailed procedure will -be fixed later.</p> - -<p>8. Members, upon a change of profession or job, or upon -removal to other localities, must register with their identification -cards at the local Corps Headquarters.</p> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">Chapter III. System of Organization</span></h3> - -<p>9. The system of organization of the Corps is as follows: -the Central Corps Headquarters, the Branch Corps, the -Divisional Corps, the Sectional Corps, the Divisional Troop, -the Sectional Troop.</p> - -<p>10. Besides the above, the Corps may organize other -sub-organizations according to the nature of the locality, -the profession of the members, etc. The details will be -further fixed.</p> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">Chapter IV. The Corps Leader</span></h3> - -<p>11. The Corps Leader is the highest executive of the -Corps, and is concurrently the Party Chief of the Kuomintang -[Chiang K'ai-shek].</p> - -<p>12. The Corps Leader is the chairman in the All-Corps -Representative Assembly, and has the power to veto a -resolution already passed by the Assembly; he also has the -power to finally sanction all resolutions passed by the Central -Managing Board and the Central Controlment Board.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_333" id="Page_333">[Pg 333]</a></span></p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Chapter V. The All-Corps Representative Assembly -and Other Meetings of Representatives</span></h3> - -<p>13. The All-Corps Representative Assembly may be held -every two years. At the discretion of the Corps Leader or -the Central Managing Board, however, it may be postponed -or a temporary meeting be held instead.</p> - -<p>14. The works of the All-Corps Representative Assembly -are:</p> - -<blockquote> -<p><i>a.</i> to discuss and examine the report submitted by the -Central Managing Board and the Central Controlment -Board.</p> - -<p><i>b.</i> to fix plans for the Corps activities.</p> - -<p><i>c.</i> to discuss motions proposed by the Corps Leader.</p> -</blockquote> - -<p>15. The Meeting of Representatives of the Branch Corps -may be held once a year. At the discretion of the Central -Managing Board, however, the Meeting may be postponed -or a temporary Meeting be held instead.</p> - -<p>16. The duties of the Meeting of Representatives of the -Branch Corps are:</p> - -<blockquote> -<p><i>a.</i> to examine and discuss the reports submitted by the -Managing Board and the Controlment Board of the Branch -Corps.</p> - -<p><i>b.</i> to fix plans for the Branch Corps activities.</p> -</blockquote> - -<p>17. The Meeting of Members of the Sectional Corps is -held every six months. At the discretion of the Managing -Board of the Branch Corps, it may be postponed or a -temporary meeting be held instead. If the number of members -of the Section is too big or if the communication system -is unfavorable, a Meeting of the Representatives of the -Sectional Corps may be held.</p> - -<p>18. The duties of the Meeting of the Members of the -Sectional Corps are:</p> - -<blockquote> -<p><i>a.</i> to examine and discuss the reports submitted by the -Managing Board and the Controlment Board of the Sectional -Corps.</p> - -<p><i>b.</i> to fix plans for the Sectional Corps Activities.</p> -</blockquote> - -<p>19. The Meeting of Members of the Divisional Troop -is to take place every three months. At the discretion of its -Managing Board, it may be postponed, or a temporary -meeting be called.</p> - -<p>20. The duties of the Meeting of Members of the Divisional -Troop are:</p> - -<blockquote> -<p><i>a.</i> to examine the reports submitted by the Leader -of the Divisional Troop.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_334" id="Page_334">[Pg 334]</a></span></p> -<p><i>b.</i> to fix the plans for the Divisional Troop activities.</p> -</blockquote> - -<p>21. Meetings for the Members of the Sectional Troop -will be held every week, to be presided over by the Leaders -of the Sectional Troop. Unless specially permitted, these -meetings must not be postponed. During these meetings, -reports concerning politics, the Troop activities, discussions, -etc., will be read. New members are admitted through -these meetings too, and plans for the Sectional Troop -activities will be fixed.</p> - -<p>22. The system of organization for the various Meetings -of Members or Meetings of Representatives will be fixed -later.</p> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">Chapter VI. The Central Headquarters</span></h3> - -<p>23. The Central Managing Board of the Central Corps -Headquarters is formed by twenty-five to thirty-five managing -directors, in addition to the nine to fifteen reserve members -of the Managing Board.</p> - -<p>24. The Central Managing Board has the following -powers:</p> - -<blockquote> -<p><i>a.</i> to execute the orders of the Corps Leader [Chiang -K'ai-shek] and to execute the resolutions passed in the -All-Corps Representative Assembly.</p> - -<p><i>b.</i> to fix the plans for activities.</p> - -<p><i>c.</i> to form various corps of lower rank, and to command -or inspect their activities.</p> - -<p><i>d.</i> to execute all resolutions submitted by the Central -Controlment Board.</p> - -<p><i>e.</i> to form a budget to regulate various financial questions -of the Corps.</p> -</blockquote> - -<p>25. The Central Managing Board forms a Standing -Managing Board consisting of nine Standing Managing -Directors, appointed by the Corps Leader from among the -twenty-five to thirty-five Managing Directors. This Standing -Managing Board fulfills the duties of the Central -Managing Board Meeting when the latter is not in session.</p> - -<p>26. The Corps Leader appoints a Secretary-General to -the Central Managing Board from among the Standing -Managing Directors, to direct all the affairs of the Board.</p> - -<p>27. The various sub-organs of the Central Managing -Board will be formulated later, together with their system -of organization.</p> - -<p>28. There are a Manager and a Vice-Manager in the -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_335" id="Page_335">[Pg 335]</a></span>Office of the Secretary-General. They are nominated by -the Secretary and appointed by the Corps Leader.</p> - -<p>29. In every Department of the Central Managing -Board there is a Commissioner and one or two Deputy -Commissioners. They are appointed by the Corps Leader -upon the nomination of the Secretary-General.</p> - -<p>30. The Central Corps Headquarters has a Central -Controlment Board of twenty-five to thirty-five members -and nine to fifteen reserve members.</p> - -<p>31. The duties of the Central Controlment Board are:</p> - -<blockquote> -<p><i>a.</i> to inspect the progress of the Corps activities.</p> - -<p><i>b.</i> to raise and examine all statements concerning any -member who does not fulfill his duties.</p> - -<p><i>c.</i> to audit all incomes and expenditures of the Corps.</p> - -<p><i>d.</i> to direct Controlment Boards of lower rank in their -work of inspection.</p> -</blockquote> - -<p>32. The Central Controlment Board forms a Standing -Controlment Board consisting of five members of the Controlment -Board, appointed by the Corps Leader. This -Standing Controlment Board shall function when the Controlment -Board is not in session.</p> - -<p>33. The Central Controlment Board has also a Secretary-General, -appointed by the Corps Leader from among the -Standing Controlment Board members. He shall direct -the affairs of the Central Controlment Board.</p> - -<p>34. The Central Controlment Board has various sub-organs, -of which the system of organization will be fixed -later.</p> - -<p>35. Both the Central Managing Board and the Central -Controlment Board will hold meetings every three months, -to be presided over by the Corps Leader. Under special -circumstances there may be temporary meetings or combined -meetings for the two Boards.</p> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">Chapter VII. The Branch Corps</span></h3> - -<p>36. The Branch Corps has a Managing Board consisting -of seven to eleven members, besides the three to five reserve -members.</p> - -<p>37. The duties of the Branch Corps Managing Board -are:</p> - -<blockquote> -<p><i>a.</i> to execute the orders from the Central Corps Headquarters -and the resolutions passed in the Meeting of the -Representatives of the Branch Corps.</p> - -<p><i>b.</i> to fix the plans for the activities of the Branch Corps.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_336" id="Page_336">[Pg 336]</a></span></p> -<p><i>c.</i> to command and inspect the works of the lower organs.</p> - -<p><i>d.</i> to execute all resolutions submitted by the Branch -Corps Controlment Board.</p> - -<p><i>e.</i> to form a budget regulating the financial state of the -Branch Corps.</p> -</blockquote> - -<p>38. The Managing Board has a Secretary, appointed -by the Corps Leader, from among the members of the -Managing Board. He is to direct all affairs of the Managing -Board.</p> - -<p>39. The Managing Board has various sub-organs, the -system of organization of which will be fixed later.</p> - -<p>40. The Branch Corps has a Controlment Board consisting -of three to five members with three reserve members.</p> - -<p>41. The Controlment Board has a Secretary, appointed -by the Corps Leader from among the Controlment Board -members, to discharge all affairs of the Board.</p> - -<p>42. The system of organization of the various sub-organs -of the Controlment Board will be fixed later.</p> - -<p>43. The duties of the Controlment Board are:</p> - -<blockquote> -<p><i>a.</i> to inspect the progress of the activities done by the -lower organs.</p> - -<p><i>b.</i> to raise and examine statements concerning any member -who rebels against the discipline of the Corps.</p> - -<p><i>c.</i> to audit the budget and all financial statements of the -Branch Corps.</p> - -<p><i>d.</i> to direct the Controlment Boards of lower rank in -their work of inspection.</p> -</blockquote> - -<p>44. The Managing Board of the Branch Corps should -hold meetings every half-month. The Controlment Board -should meet once every month. The meetings are to be -presided over by the Secretaries. Under special circumstances, -temporary sessions or combined meetings may -be held.</p> - -<p>45. The Branch Corps has also one to five Directors, appointed -by the Corps Leader, to direct the affairs of the -Branch Corps.</p> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">Chapter VIII. The Divisional Corps</span></h3> - -<p>46. The Divisional Corps has three to five Managing -Directors, who have power to command, direct, inspect, -and examine the work done by the Divisional Corps, in -accordance to the will of the higher Corps Headquarters.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_337" id="Page_337">[Pg 337]</a></span></p> -<p>47. There is a Secretary of the Divisional Corps, appointed -by the Corps Leader from among the Managing -Directors, whose duty it is to discharge all the affairs of -the Divisional Corps.</p> - -<p>48. The Managing Directors should perform their duties -in various localities at various periods.</p> - -<p>49. Whenever necessary, the Secretary of the Divisional -Corps can call a Managing Directors' meeting.</p> - -<p>50. A Divisional Corps will be formed when there are -more than five Sectional Corps under it. But this may not -take place if the Managing Board of the Branch Corps -sees no necessity for such action.</p> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">Chapter IX. The Sectional Corps</span></h3> - -<p>51. The Sectional Corps has a Managing Board formed -by three to five members and one to three reserve members, -elected in the General Meeting of the Members of the -Sectional Corps or in the Meeting of the Representatives of -the Sectional Corps.</p> - -<p>52. The duties of the Managing Board are:</p> - -<blockquote> -<p><i>a.</i> to execute the orders of the higher Corps Headquarters -and the resolutions passed in the Meeting of the -Members of the Sectional Corps or the Meeting of the -Representatives of the Sectional Corps.</p> - -<p><i>b.</i> to fix the plans for activities.</p> - -<p><i>c.</i> to direct and watch the activities of the lower organs.</p> - -<p><i>d.</i> to form a budget and other financial statements.</p> - -<p><i>e.</i> to execute the resolutions passed in the Meeting of -the Controlment Board.</p> - -<p><i>f.</i> to examine the work done by the Divisional Troops -and Sectional Troops.</p> -</blockquote> - -<p>53. The Managing Board has a Secretary, appointed by -the Corps Leader from among the members of the Managing -Board, to discharge all the affairs of the Managing -Board.</p> - -<p>54. The system of organization of the various sub-organs -of the Managing Board will be formulated later.</p> - -<p>55. The Sectional Corps has a Controlment Board -formed by three members and one reserve member. Under -special circumstances, there is sometimes only one Controller -without any Controlment Board.</p> - -<p>56. The Controlment Board has one Secretary, appointed -by the Corps Leader from among the members of the Controlment -Board, who is to discharge all affairs of the Board.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_338" id="Page_338">[Pg 338]</a></span></p> -<p>57. The duties of the Controlment Board are:</p> - -<blockquote> -<p><i>a.</i> to inspect the works done by the Sectional Corps, and -by the Divisional and Sectional Troops under the Sectional -Corps.</p> - -<p><i>b.</i> to raise and examine statements concerning members -who rebel against the Corps discipline.</p> - -<p><i>c.</i> to audit financial statements of the Sectional Corps -and those of the Divisional and Sectional Troops under it.</p> -</blockquote> - -<p>58. The Managing Board and the Controlment Board -of the Sectional Corps will hold separate meetings once -every half-month. The respective Secretaries shall preside. -Under special conditions they can call for temporary -sessions.</p> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">Chapter X. The Divisional Troop</span></h3> - -<p>59. The Divisional Troop has a Leader and an Assistant -Leader, elected from among the Leaders and Assistant -Leaders of the Sectional Troop and by themselves.</p> - -<p>60. The Divisional Troop executes the orders of the -superior organs and the resolutions passed in the All-Corps -Representative Assembly. The Divisional Troop also -directs and examines the work of the members.</p> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">Chapter XI. The Sectional Troop</span></h3> - -<p>61. The Sectional Troop is the basic organization of the -San Min Chu I Youth Corps. It is formed by eight to -fifteen members, with a Leader and an Assistant Leader -elected by the members themselves.</p> - -<p>62. The chief duties of the Sectional Troop are:</p> - -<blockquote> -<p><i>a.</i> to execute the orders of all superior organs and all -resolutions passed in the Sectional Troop Meeting.</p> - -<p><i>b.</i> to call for new members and to collect the fees.</p> - -<p><i>c.</i> to train and examine every member.</p> - -<p><i>d.</i> to read books, to propagate San Min Chu I and its -policies, to distribute publicity literature.</p> - -<p><i>e.</i> to participate in all social activities.</p> - -<p><i>f.</i> to investigate political and social conditions.</p> -</blockquote> - -<p>63. All extra-Corps organs holding more than three -members may form special Groups, upon the sanction of -the Sectional Troop. Their duty is to execute the principles -of the Corps and to watch the work of the members. Whenever -necessary, the chief of the Group may attend the Sectional -Corps Meetings.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_339" id="Page_339">[Pg 339]</a></span></p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Chapter XII. The Election of Officers and Their Term of Service</span></h3> - -<p>64. Unless already specified, the members of the Managing -Boards of the various Corps and Troops are elected in -the General Meeting or the Meeting of Representatives -of the respective Corps and Troops. Before the General -Meeting or the Meeting of Representatives, the members -of the Managing Boards are appointed by the Corps Leader.</p> - -<p>65. The duration of service of members of the Managing -and Controlment Boards of the Central Corps Headquarters -is two years. That of members of the corresponding -Boards of the other Corps is one year. That of the Leaders -and Assistant Leaders of the two Corps is six months. All -of them can be re-elected.</p> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">Chapter XIII. Discipline</span></h3> - -<p>66. All members should obey the following commandments:</p> - -<blockquote> -<p><i>a.</i> All questions may be freely discussed. But no dispute -is allowed, once the final resolution is passed.</p> - -<p><i>b.</i> It is not allowed to rebel against the principles of -the New Life Movement.</p> - -<p><i>c.</i> It is prohibited to reveal the secrets of the Corps.</p> - -<p><i>d.</i> It is prohibited for members to join other organizations.</p> - -<p><i>e.</i> It is prohibited to criticize unfavorably the Kuomintang -and the Corps, or to plot against other members.</p> - -<p><i>f.</i> It is prohibited to express one's ideas too freely upon -current events, especially those that are against the resolved -plans or policies of the Kuomintang or the Corps.</p> - -<p><i>g.</i>. It is prohibited to form other organizations within -the Corps.</p> -</blockquote> - -<p>67. Those who are proved to act against the above rules -will e punished in the following ways:</p> - -<blockquote><p><i>a.</i> warning</p> - -<p><i>b.</i> demerit</p> - -<p><i>c.</i> cross-questioning</p> - -<p><i>d.</i> expulsion</p> - -<p><i>e.</i> other appropriate punishments.</p></blockquote> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">Chapter XIV. Fees</span></h3> - -<p>68. Every member must pay a membership fee of ten -cents on entering the Corps.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_340" id="Page_340">[Pg 340]</a></span></p> -<p>69. A monthly contribution of ten cents is required of -every member. Under special circumstances other contributions -may be called for.</p> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">Chapter XV. Amendments, etc.</span></h3> - -<p>70. This Constitution may be amended, with the approval -of the Corps Leader, in the All-Corps Representative -Assembly or in the Meeting of the Central Managing -Board.</p> - -<p>71. The Constitution is enforced upon the day of announcement, -having been approved by the Corps Leader.</p> - -<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTE:</h3> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_201" id="Footnote_1_201"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_201"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> San-min-chu-i Ch'ing-nien T'uan Chung-yang T'uan-pu [<i>San Min -Chu I</i> Youth Corps Central Corps Headquarters], <i>San-min-chu-i -Ch'ing-nien T'uan T'uan-chang</i> [Corps Constitution of the <i>San -Min Chu I</i> Youth Corps], Chungking, n.d.</p></div></div> - - -<hr class="chap" /> - - -<h2><i>C</i>. THE DUTIES AND GENERAL ACTIVITIES -OF THE SAN MIN CHU I YOUTH CORPS (CH'ÊN CH'ÊNG)<a name="FNanchor_1_202" id="FNanchor_1_202"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_202" class="fnanchor">[1]</a></h2> - - -<blockquote> - -<p>A lecture delivered May 9, 1940, before a Kuomintang training class: -note the somewhat pedagogical outline. General Ch'ên Ch'êng, until -recently Secretary-General of the Corps, is one of the closest military -associates of the Generalissimo.</p></blockquote> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">Outline</span></h3> - - -<p>A. THE DUTIES AND NATURE OF THE CORPS:</p> - -<blockquote> -<p>1. <i>Duties</i>: to organize and train the nation's youth with -a view to enforcing the San Min Chu I; to lead and unify -the ideals, opinions and activities of the nation's youth; to -centralize and cultivate special talents, forming a nucleus to -serve as a model.</p> - -<p>2. <i>Activities</i>: to urge youths to join the practical work -connected with the war of national defense; to enforce -military and political training; to encourage civil progress, -labor and skill in production.</p> - -<p>3. <i>Nature</i>: the Corps is an organization composed of -young people and included within the Kuomintang. The -Kuomintang and the Corps are one and indivisible.</p></blockquote> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_341" id="Page_341">[Pg 341]</a></span></p> - -<p>B. THE GROWTH AND THE PLAN CONCERNING THE INTENSIFICATION -OF THE WORK OF THE CORPS:</p> - -<blockquote> -<p>1. <i>Growth</i>: Period of formation, July 9, 1938 to September -1939; full establishment since September 1939, when -the Central Managing Board and the Central Controlment -Board were formed.</p> - -<p>2. <i>Plan concerning the intensification of activities</i>: -Amendment of the Corps Constitution; issuing of general -procedures for the carrying out of the activities to various -sections; general principles governing the future activities -of the Corps.</p> -</blockquote> - -<p>C. GENERAL ACTIVITIES OF THE CORPS:</p> - -<blockquote> -<p>1. <i>Organization</i>: general development of the organization -in various localities; calling for new members; regulating -the inner structures of the organization; the formation -of a selected central nucleus.</p> - -<p>2. <i>Training</i>: entrance training and normal training; -young men's summer camp; training of talented gliders.</p> - -<p>3. <i>Publicity</i>: periodicals at fixed intervals; the compilation -of various collective works; the formation of a committee -for publicity.</p> - -<p>4. <i>Social works</i>: the establishment of a Young Men's -Labor Service Camp; the distribution of Young Men's Entertaining -Offices in various localities; the work of Youths' -Service Associations and Corps in various localities.</p> - -<p>5. <i>Financial assistance</i>: compilation of Dr. Sun's works -on economics; aid given to young men's work for material -productivity; planning of business organizations under -group management.</p> -</blockquote> - -<p>D. GENERAL DISCUSSION OF THE TWO YEARS' ACTIVITIES OF -THE CORPS AND THE PRINCIPLES GUIDING THE NATION'S YOUTH:</p> - -<blockquote> -<p>1. <i>General discussion of the two years' activities</i>: its good -as well as its bad points.</p> - -<p>2. <i>Principles guiding the nation's youth</i>: conclusion.</p> -</blockquote> - -<h3><span class="smcap">A. The Duties and Nature of the Corps</span></h3> - - -<h4>1. The Duties</h4> - -<p>It is two years since the establishment of the San Min -Chu I Youth Corps was declared at Hankow on July 7, -1938. From the name, we know that the purpose of its<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_342" id="Page_342">[Pg 342]</a></span> -creation is to employ the unified efforts of the nation's -youth in the work of carrying out the San Min Chu I. As -youth is the vital element in a nation's life and the foundation -for all future social and political progress, the Kuomintang -has, in the second and present stage of national salvation, -especially organized a Youth Corps to reinforce the -powers of the Kuomintang by shouldering the following -epochal duties:</p> - -<p>First, to unite and train the nation's youth for the promulgation -of San Min Chu I, the defense of the nation and -the salvation of its people.</p> - -<p>Secondly, to lead the nation's youth to a unity of thought -and activities so that they can justly perform the great task -of national salvation, thus completing the second phase of -the achievements of the People's Revolution.<a name="FNanchor_2_203" id="FNanchor_2_203"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_203" class="fnanchor">[2]</a></p> - -<p>Thirdly, to collect youth of especial talents for the central -nucleus as a model for all, thereby giving new and -ever-confirming life to the Kuomintang, and enabling it -to carry out its future work.</p> - - -<h4>2. The Activities</h4> - -<p>The Corps Leader [Chiang K'ai-shek] has clearly stated -in his open letter to the nation's youth that the chief activities -of the Corps are six in number:</p> - -<blockquote> -<p>1. To mobilize the activities of youth according to the -National General Mobilization Act.</p> - -<p>2. To give thorough military training to develop the -skill in defending the nation.</p> - -<p>3. To heighten political training, giving every youth -the required political knowledge for a citizen of a republic.</p> - -<p>4. To encourage civil progress, thus raising the general -intellectual standard of the nation.</p> - -<p>5. To encourage labor and service, according to the -motto: Life is to serve.</p> - -<p>6. To develop the skill in material productivity according -to scientific principles, thus hastening the work of national -construction.</p> -</blockquote> - -<p>The first two of the above are collectively the fundamental -works of military reconstruction, the third and -fourth are those of education, and the last two those of -economic reconstruction. The Corps has classified the various -aspects of the above works of national construction as<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_343" id="Page_343">[Pg 343]</a></span> -the works of the youth. Besides, we should clearly understand -that they are the fundamental requisites of a complete -system of national defense, and form the first stage -towards the completion of a republic based upon the San -Min Chu I.</p> - - -<h4>3. The Nature</h4> - -<p>The Corps is a Youth association included within the -organization of the Kuomintang, under one principle, one -leader, one command, and is willing to struggle for the -sake of the People's Revolution. The Kuomintang and -the Corps are one and indivisible. It is "The Kuomintang's -[own] Corps." If a distinction is necessary, then we may -say that the members of the Corps have a special duty to -organize and train the nation's youth so that it may be -able to shoulder the responsibilities and work concerning -social welfare and national salvation. Thus the Corps may -be said to be the younger and newer life of the Kuomintang. -Besides, it may also serve the Kuomintang in various aspects; -for example, if, as in case of overseas localities, Kuomintang -work is difficult to execute, the Corps may be established -instead, or also, if people are not willing to join the Kuomintang, -they may join the Corps. With the formation of the -Corps, therefore, the Kuomintang may be enlarged and -strengthened.</p> - -<p>The relation between the Kuomintang members and the -Corps members is clearly stated. According to the amended -Constitution of the Corps, the age of members has been -changed from eighteen to thirty-eight years, to sixteen to -twenty-five years. Also according to the resolution of the -Central Regular Meeting of the Kuomintang, the relation -between the two is as follows:</p> - -<blockquote> -<p>1. Members joining the Kuomintang should be above -twenty-five years of age.</p> - -<p>2. Corps members reaching the age of 25 will become -Kuomintang members.</p> - -<p>3. Students staying in schools, irrespective of their age, -are considered Corps members. Those who previously -joined the Kuomintang should also become members of -the Corps, reserving their membership in the Kuomintang.</p> -</blockquote> - -<p>We can see that Kuomintang members and Corps members -differ chiefly in their ages. Except for this, the two -are in fact one.</p> - -<p>With a view to the system of organization, the Kuomintang -and the Corps each has its own structure. The Kuomintang<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_344" id="Page_344">[Pg 344]</a></span> -leads the Corps, but this does not mean that the -Corps is under the Kuomintang in authority. In the speech, -"The Relation between the Kuomintang and the Corps," -made by the Corps Leader [Chiang K'ai-shek], we are told -that under the same general system of organization, the -aim of the Kuomintang's leadership of the Corps is to unite -all our efforts under the same banner. Leading does not -mean in the least commanding or ordering. To lead is to -help. Hence a Corps member may also lead a Kuomintang -member. The idea is to make both members combine their -energy towards helping our leader. The strength of the -Corps depends upon the well-being of the Kuomintang, -while the future of the Kuomintang depends upon the -growth of the Corps. There should be mutual help between -the two in order to reach the same final goal. -Hence the activities of the two organizations should be -everywhere combined into one, employing division of -labor and cooperation wherever and whenever possible.</p> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">B. The Growth and the Plan concerning the -Intensification of the Works of the Corps</span></h3> - - -<h4>1. The Growth</h4> - -<p>In April 1938, the Representatives of the Kuomintang -gathered together for a Meeting (Congress) to amend the -Constitution of the Kuomintang and to form the San Min -Chu I Youth Corps in order to gather the nation's youth -for the great task of national reconstruction. It was also -resolved that the Party Chief (Generalissimo Chiang K'ai-shek) -is at the same time the Corps Leader. On June 16, -the Corps Leader issued his Letter to the Nation's Youth, and -announced the constitution of the Corps. On July 9, a -Central Managing Board was temporarily formed as the -Corps' central organization. The growth of the Corps activities -can be divided into two periods:</p> - -<blockquote> -<p>1. <i>Period of formation</i>: July 1938 to September 1939. -During this period, the Central Managing Board was -formed. While the other work of organizing was done according -to a principle of simplicity, as advised by the Corps -Leader, all other internal organs were formed according -to their necessity. The various subsections in different -provinces and districts were also formed during this period.</p> - -<p>2. <i>Period of full establishment</i>: September 1939 to the -present. In accordance with general opinions, the Central -Managing Board temporarily formed was dissolved after<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_345" id="Page_345">[Pg 345]</a></span> -its fourth general meeting, and on September 1, 1939 a -permanent Central Managing Board and a Central Controlment -Board were formed. The Corps Leader has on -various occasions appointed thirty-five members for the -Central Managing Board with fifteen more as reserve members, -and thirty-five members for the Central Controlment -Board with fifteen reserve members also. Besides, there -are five standing members of the Central Managing Board -and five standing members of the Central Controlment -Board. The rest of the officials are also appointed. The -system of organization is as follows:</p> -</blockquote> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 400px;"> -<img src="images/i_345.jpg" width="400" height="202" alt="System of Organization" /> -</div> - -<h4>2. Plan concerning the Intensification of Activities</h4> - -<p>The aim of having a permanent Central Managing Board -is to conclude the work of the formative period and start -the work of calling for the nation's youth in the task of -national reconstruction. The plans concerning the intensification -of activities are all based upon the orders of the -Corps Leader, the past experiences of the Corps members, -and the present situation; the chief plans are:</p> - -<blockquote> -<p>1. <i>Amendment of the Constitution</i>—to increase the training -of the Corps members and to fix the system of organization -for the All-Corps Representative Assembly in accordance -with the idea of democracy. The chief points are (<i>a</i>) -the change in age limit from eighteen to thirty-eight years -to sixteen to twenty-five years, and (<i>b</i>) to fix the system -of organization for the General Meetings of the Corps -members and their Representatives; the fixing of rules concerning -the election into office of the members and their -period of service.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_346" id="Page_346">[Pg 346]</a></span></p> -<p>2. <i>Issuing of general procedures for the carrying out of -the activities of various sections</i>: (<i>a</i>) to make all members -and all youth understand that the Corps is a youth organization -to train and unite all youth in the principles of San -Min Chu I, with the aim of strengthening the nation's defense; -(<i>b</i>) to lead the nation's youth in the cultivation of -good national characteristics, to exemplify their deeds and -actions, and to correct all fallacious beliefs, and childish -actions. These are the ways of training good useful youth -for the national service; (<i>c</i>) the subsections of the Corps -should work for all the members of the Corps, while the -members should work for all the youth of the country. -They should encourage all youth to serve all the citizens of -the nation, thereby fulfilling the duties of youth toward the -country; (<i>d</i>) in calling for members, special attention is -paid to discover youth of higher abilities. At the same time -it is necessary that the Corps work should be good enough -so as to be able to influence all the youth of the nation so -that they will join the Corps of their own accord; (<i>e</i>) the -subsections in schools should work in conjunction with the -educational authorities. The assistance of the teachers is -necessary in order to develop the political ideas, the mind -work, the physical constitution of the youth, besides the -cultivation of the power to organize and cooperate; (<i>f</i>) to -organize society's youth, especially those having a profession -or those who are capable of material productivity, so -that they may be joined to the youth in schools in forming -a combined strength necessary to the establishment of a -revolutionary nation; (<i>g</i>) to point out to the youth the -activities done in the war of national defense, the international -relations, and the intrigues of the traitors and -enemies, thus making every youth able to distinguish the -right from the wrong. At the same time, they should be -encouraged under favorable conditions to work for national -defense; (<i>h</i>) to help every youth solve the problem of -his livelihood. For example, the choice of a profession, the -question of education, etc. The members should therefore -look upon their Corps as their family, not as a mere institution -for work.</p> - -<p>3. <i>General principles governing the future activities of -the Corps</i>: (<i>a</i>) in obedience to the ideas expressed by the -Corps Leader, and based upon the experience obtained during -the period of two years, it has been resolved that the -chief aim of the activities of the Corps is to solidify the -union of the members, so that it may become the central<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_347" id="Page_347">[Pg 347]</a></span> -motivating force for all the youth of the nation; (<i>b</i>) the -activities of the Corps will also be directed to benefit youths, -especially those in school, to help them solve all questions -and troubles that usually confront young men. Besides, the -Corps also aims at mobilizing the youth in war districts, and -behind the enemy front, to increase the force of national -defense; (<i>c</i>) the principles regarding the admittance of -new members will be: 1, that quality as well as quantity -will be considered; 2, that youths in schools will be especially -fitted for membership, although youths having professions -will not be neglected; 3, that women members will -be especially welcome; (<i>d</i>) in establishing the various subdivisions -of the Corps in various localities, importance will -be especially given to provinces of Szechwan, Kweichow, -Shensi, and Kansu. Except these, attention is also given -to overseas districts (the Malay Archipelago) and behind -the enemy lines. All subdivisions formerly established will -be unified under one status, and be turned into regular -subdivisions; (<i>e</i>) a date for the All-Corps Representative -Assembly will be fixed, as well as the dates for the General -Meetings of Members; (<i>f</i>) the training of the members will -be chiefly military and political, emphasizing the skill to -produce, with plenty of practice in various actual fields, so -that the works of the Corps and those of society will be -interrelated; (<i>g</i>) the training of the members is divided -into primary, middle, and senior parts, with special attention -upon the lower two. Different training courses are -given according to the abilities, talents, and inclinations -of the members; (<i>h</i>) the training of the central nucleus -is based upon the general training for groups, laying special -emphasis upon mental and physical training so that -the central nucleus may be the model for other members.</p> - -<p>(<i>i</i>) The central aim of publicity is to lead the nation's -youth to recognize the history and national character of -the Chinese nation, to fight for national unity and salvation, -to find the way of becoming a "Chinese," and to abolish all -fallacious beliefs that are detrimental to the growth of the -nation; (<i>j</i>) to intensify the movement to all classes of people, -attention is drawn to the fact that: 1, every member -is a publicity member; 2, actions and not words should be -the basis of publicity; 3, care should be given to the difference -in locality, time, or people, when the members -are helping to do social work; 4, members' actions and -thoughts should be earnest, devoted, intelligent, ingenuous,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_348" id="Page_348">[Pg 348]</a></span> -and truthful; (<i>k</i>) to increase the cooperation between -youths, the amount of publicity literature should be increased. -Encouragement should also be given to the study -of science and to development of the physical constitution; -(<i>l</i>) social service is especially aimed at relieving the poor -and the sick, paying attention to the wounded soldiers, -their families, refugees, and other helpless people; (<i>m</i>) the -calling in and training of students who have no chance to -study should be emphasized. Help should be given them to -find work or continue studies. Attention should also be -given to those behind the enemy's lines so that they may -not turn out to be traitors.</p> - -<p>(<i>n</i>) The work of the Young Men's Labor Service Camp, -the Young Men's Service Association and Corps should be -intensified, aiming at the increase of necessary public services -during wartime, and the hastening of social advancement; -(<i>o</i>) concerning the financial help given to the members, -attention is given to group works like cooperative -stores, etc. Encouragement is given for thrift, saving, etc.; -(<i>p</i>) members should be encouraged to produce more, to -heighten the skill in production; (<i>q</i>) members should spread -the new economic thought expressed in the San Min Chu I. -They should also study the various books on economics; -(<i>r</i>) encouragement is given to young women, especially -those in war districts and students who want to join the -Corps. Training will be given to them. Their work is -chiefly to spread the spirit of the Corps among women, -to render war-time assistance and educational help; (<i>s</i>) -rigid inspection of the Corps personnel is to be enforced: -1, not only may a lower officer be reprimanded by a senior -officer, but vice versa; 2, in every subdivision of the Corps -an organization to inspect the personnel is formed; 3, attention -is given to the reserve list of the Corps personnel; -4, rigid censure of careless and corrupt officials, and also -of those who recommended them.</p> - -<p>(<i>t</i>) A system of inspecting the various activities of the -Corps is to be formed; 1, the inspectors are given the authority -to watch and to lead; 2, the various subdivisions -should elect officials who shall constantly make inspection -tours; 3, close cooperation with the Central Controlment -Board should be established; (<i>u</i>) a competition of activities -among various subdivisions should be encouraged, whether -it be interdivisional, personal, etc. Competitions are based -upon research statistics, exchange of views, grading of work, -etc.</p></blockquote> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_349" id="Page_349">[Pg 349]</a></span></p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">C. The General Activities of the Corps</span></h3> - - -<h4>1. Organization</h4> - -<p>With the formation of the Central Managing Board of -the Corps, organizing work has been pushed ahead to -hasten the mutual movements of the nation's youth, especially -those in the provinces of Szechwan, Shensi, Kansu, -and Kweichow. The chief points concerning the organizing -movement are as follows:</p> - -<blockquote> -<p>1. <i>General development of the organization in various -localities.</i> The subdivisions originally planned have all been -formed. In Szechwan, subdivisions are formed in every city -(<i>hsien</i>). In the rest of the provinces, subdivisions are -formed in different districts. Subdivisions have also been -formed in the chief universities and middle schools in the -country. Owing to special circumstances, overseas and war -districts are under the investigation of special officials sent -there to inspect the local surroundings before the subdivisions -be formed.</p> - -<p>2. <i>Membership enrollment</i>: Members are chiefly youthful -students and youths with some ability. According to -the report made in April 1940, there are 126,111 members -in the Corps. Members will be called according to the -basic plan in the future, and especially women members -and other young men will be encouraged to join.</p> - -<p>3. <i>Regulation of the inner structures of the organization -and the formation of a central nucleus</i>: to insure perfect -harmony in carrying out various activities, those temporary -subdivisions which have been doing good work and -which have an efficient central nucleus are to be made into -regular subdivisions. The selection of the central executive -nucleus will be based upon the talent of the members. The -method of selection is by means of questioning, recommendation, -or other ways.</p> -</blockquote> - -<h4>2. The Training</h4> - -<p>Training of the Corps members is to organize an efficient -executive organization for the sake of practical national -reconstruction according to the principles of San -Min Chu I. Besides military and political training, attention -is given to the development of skill in production. -At present, the chief training work of the Corps is as follows: -(<i>a</i>) Entrance training and normal training: there -are usually three stages of training, viz.: entrance training,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_350" id="Page_350">[Pg 350]</a></span> -normal training, and special training for nucleus members. -Except the last mentioned, all members of the Corps -must undergo the first two trainings. The period of entrance -training is two weeks, during which the training of -the mind is emphasized. Normal training is divided into -reading, discussion, and recommended readings. Weekly -gatherings are held for all members of a division to attend. -The recommended readings are based upon the -Corps Leader's "Recommended Readings and Methods of -Discussion." Every member must read a number of required -books, according to the systematic plan given. -(<i>b</i>) Young Men's Summer Camp—this is aimed at collectively -training all members who are attending schools. -During July and August 1938, a tentative camp has been -formed at Chungking and Chengtu, with mostly university -and middle school students as attending members. It is -planned to start similar camps at Chengtu, Chungking, -Sian, and Changsha this year. (<i>c</i>) Training of gliders: this -is aimed at heightening the interest in aviation shown by -youths. The Corps has arranged with the Aviation Committee -to form a class of amateur gliders, who will become -pilots in the future.</p> - - -<h4>3. Publicity</h4> - -<p>Besides the normal work concerning publicity, special -attention is given to:</p> - -<blockquote> -<p>1. Fixed periodicals, such as the "Chinese Youth -Monthly," the "News of the Corps Activities," the "Civil -News," the "Materials for Publicity," etc. They aim at -teaching the various subdivisions the work of publicity and -at supplying materials for publicity. Besides these, there -are many local publications of the Corps.</p> - -<p>2. The compilation of collected works, such as the -"Young Men's Books concerning National Defense," the -"Young Men's Books of History and Geography," the "San -Min Chu I Series for Youth," etc. Among pamphlets for -publicity are "Dr. Sun's teachings for the Young Men," -"The Way of Leading Youth's Career," "The May 4 Movement -and Modern Young Men's Movements," etc. Besides -these, the Corps has other publicity organs, such as the -Central Publicity Corps, the Youth's Dramatic Associations -of various subdivisions, etc. Publicity literature is distributed -in various localities by the China Civil Supply Association, -or its branches, or sometimes by specially chartered -book companies.</p></blockquote> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_351" id="Page_351">[Pg 351]</a></span></p> - -<h4>4. Social Work</h4> - -<p>At present the Social Work of the Corps is aimed at -cultivating youths' ability to serve, especially in the present -stage of warfare: (<i>a</i>) the formation of Young Men's Labor -Service Camps—this is to develop the skill of production so -as to help the country materially. This camp was tentatively -formed at Chengtu and Chungking where young men -were gathered to receive the required training; (<i>b</i>) various -local Young Men's Entertaining Offices—these are established -in eleven places among which are Chungking, Sian, -Changsha, Kweilin, Kinhwa. There is a monthly accommodation -capacity of about three thousand men. Many of -them are to be sent later to the Young Men's Labor Service -Camp for training; (<i>c</i>) various local Young Men's Service -Associations and Corps—their aim is to serve in the war -zone, and to help the productivity of society. The Service -Associations under the various subdivisions of the Corps -are formed at Chengtu, Sian, Lanchow, Changsha, Kweilin, -Ch'ü-chiang, etc., numbering forty-two in all. The Service -Corps are formed in twenty-three places, such as Hungyang, -Neichuan, Wanling, Kingshan, etc.</p> - - -<h4>5. Financial Assistance</h4> - -<p>The aim of this branch of work is to spread Dr. Sun's -economic thoughts as shown in the San Min Chu I, besides -helping the members financially by means of cooperative -movements. At present, the works emphasized are:</p> - -<blockquote> -<p>1. Compilation of Dr. Sun's economic works—they are -based upon the San Min Chu I, the various manifestos issued, -and a study of comparative economy of other countries. -There are twelve series of books thus published, <i>e.g.</i>, -"The Economic Theories and System of the San Min Chu -I," "The Population Policy of China," "The Labor Policy -of China," "The Policy of Land Tenure in China," etc.</p> - -<p>2. Aid given to youth along material productivity—the -Corps pays special attention to the theory and practice of -material productivity. It has arranged with the Board of -Economy a plan to establish cooperative organizations with -the Board, and the Central Office for Agricultural Research, -so that the Corps members can have practical work in -economic reconstruction.</p> - -<p>3. Planning of business organizations under group management—temporarily, -the activities along this line will be -the establishment of cooperative stores. These are now the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_352" id="Page_352">[Pg 352]</a></span> -"Young Men's Dressing Stores," the "Haosen Cooperative -Store," and other local Young Men's Cooperative Stores.</p> -</blockquote> - -<h3><span class="smcap">D. General Discussion of the Two Years' Activities of -the Corps and the Principles Governing the Nation's Youth</span></h3> - - -<h4>1. Discussion of the Corps' Past Work</h4> - -<p>Due to lack of experience, there were some unavoidable -points which await reformation. According to the reports -submitted by the touring inspectors, the work for 1939 and -that of the first three months of 1940 can be described in -a list:</p> - -<blockquote> -<p>1. <i>Bad Points</i>: 1, Due to the short period of time, activities -of the Corps have failed to cope with the original plan -and schedule; 2, The development of the Corps activities -has not yet been made known to the mass of youth. Thus -the foundation of the Corps is not yet strong enough; 3, -Publicity and service have not yet been adequately mixed. -The ideal "service is publicity" has not yet been reached. -At the same time, owing to traffic interruption, publicity -literature has not been widely distributed; 4, Members are -deficient in their conception of the central activities of the -Corps. The subdivisions in schools are especially lacking -in this conception. They require further training; 5, The -officers lack adequate force. Many of them occupy other -positions so that their whole attention cannot be concentrated -upon the Corps activities.</p> - -<p>2. <i>Good Points</i>: 1, On the whole, officers and members -of the central nucleus are persevering, and possess the -will to sacrifice. The remuneration of the Corps officers is -very low. Those working in the front receive a monthly -maintenance fee of only fifteen to twenty dollars. They -are living a soldier's life; 2, Due to the care of the Corps bestowed -upon social services, many social activities were first -started by the Corps to be followed later by the people; 3, -As a rule, the youths trained by the Corps have good discipline; -example may be taken from the fact that all the -university students of Chungking behaved very well in their -schools after the training; 4, As a rule, members are influenced -by the spiritual loftiness of the Corps Leader [Generalissimo -Chiang]. They have the will to sacrifice, as shown -by the fact that many have willingly taken up work behind -the enemy's lines.</p></blockquote> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_353" id="Page_353">[Pg 353]</a></span></p> - -<h4>2. Principles Guiding the Nation's Youth</h4> - -<p>Since the Corps has for its mission the training of -youth, the officers must shoulder the responsibility of -leading youth to be good, to avoid all past errors, corruption, -etc., that harms the mind of youth instead of benefiting -it.</p> - -<p>We must lead the youth according to the following principles:</p> - -<blockquote> -<p>1. As ones who have joined the People's Revolution, we -should lead the youth in accordance with the principles of -San Min Chu I, in order that we may conclude the work of -the People's Revolution. We must use every possible -method to love and train all youth so as to make them -strong figures in the work of national defense and reconstruction.</p> - -<p>2. In order to lead youth, we must know the youthful -mind. The few young men who went the wrong way are -not bad in themselves, but merely influenced by untrue and -selfish ideas. To correct this we must first correct ourselves, -and be their example. We must love them as we do -our own children. In this way they shall certainly be happy -to come to us.</p> - -<p>3. It is necessary to know that the only real danger -against our People's Revolution is Japanese imperialism. -The rest of the political factions will be easily dealt with -by political action in the future. We must not be irritated -at their existence.</p> - -<p>4. In leading the youths to fight against imperialism and -other reactionary ideas, we must first of all conquer our -own worst selves before we can expect to be their leaders.</p> - -<p>5. In leading the youths, we must induce them to shoulder -all future responsibilities. Let them understand that -what they suffered in youth should not be suffered by posterity. -Do unto others what you expect others to do unto you. -The generations must progress, not go backward.</p> -</blockquote> - -<p>The future activities of the Corps will be chiefly to unite -and train youth in productive work. On the one hand, we -should call for all good youths to be members of the Corps. -On the other, we should select specially qualified ones to -form a central nucleus to shoulder jointly the activities of -the Corps. In this respect, the Corps shall and must be -able to accomplish the task that has been ever hoped for by -the Corps Leader.</p> - - -<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_202" id="Footnote_1_202"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_202"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> Ch'ên Ch'êng, <i>K'ang-chan Chien-kuo Yü Ch'ing-nien Tsê-jen</i> [Resistance -and Reconstruction in Relation to the Duties of Youth], -Chungking XXIX (1940), p. 43-68. The book was published by the -Political Department of the Military Affairs Commission (<i>Chün-shih -Wei-yüan-hui Chêng-chih-pu</i>) of the National Government.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_203" id="Footnote_2_203"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_203"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> <i>Kuo-min kê-ming</i>, i.e., the revolution (<i>kê-ming</i>) as planned by -Sun Yat-sen.</p></div></div> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_354" id="Page_354">[Pg 354]</a></span></p> - - -<h2><i>D.</i> THE <i>HSIAO-TSU</i> (SMALL GROUP) TRAINING PROGRAM<a name="FNanchor_1_204" id="FNanchor_1_204"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_204" class="fnanchor">[1]</a></h2> - - -<blockquote> - -<p>A formal statement of Party policy, this was passed by the 117th -session of the Fifth Central Standing Committee of the Kuomintang -on March 23, 1939 and amended by its 123rd session on June 15, 1939. -This typifies the Kuomintang drive to establish closer contact with -broad reaches of the population.</p></blockquote> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">Introduction</span></h3> - -<p>The Sub-District Party Organ (<i>ch'ü-fen-pu</i>) is the fundamental -unit of the Kuomintang. Due to its large membership, -it has been found extremely difficult to give the members -proper training. As a measure of remedy, the Central -Party Headquarters has promulgated a set of regulations -governing the small-group conference. However, due to the -fact that the position and nature of such an institution as -well as its relations with the Kuomintang have not been -adequately defined, this plan has not been successfully -carried out. Recently, the Chairman of the Central Executive -Committee of the Kuomintang [The Party Chief, -Chiang K'ai-shek] has repeatedly instructed that the small-group -conference be put into practice in order to improve -the Party affairs. Hence, the regulations were promulgated -to be enforced by the various Party organs.</p> - -<p>The Kuomintang aims to have a Party organ established -in every organization.<a name="FNanchor_2_205" id="FNanchor_2_205"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_205" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> In order to realize this aim, the -following points must be observed:</p> - -<blockquote> -<p>1. The small-group conference is just for training the -Party members. It is different from the Sub-District Party -Organ which is the lowest administrative authority. Consequently, -only matters concerning the Party principles are -to be discussed in the small-group conference while other -important issues are left to the Sub-District Party Organ.</p> - -<p>2. The Sub-District Party Organ may have unlimited -membership. Its members may be organized into more than -two small-group conferences. If the members are not more -than ten in number, one small-group conference may be -formed.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_355" id="Page_355">[Pg 355]</a></span></p> -<p>3. As the small-group conference is to be organized from -the Sub-District Party Organs, a distinction between the -District Party and the Sub-District Party Organ must be -made. The fundamental principle is that there will be one -Party organ for one single [extra-Party] organization. If a -Sub-District Party has too many members, several Sub-District -Party Organs may be formed under the charge of a -District Party Organ. It is not permissible for several -parallel Party Organs to exist in one single organization -nor may the members of several organizations go into one -Party organ. However, if the number of Party members -of one organization is too small to form a Sub-District -Party Organ, they may join the neighbor Sub-District Party -Organ. It is to be remembered that the best policy is to -have enough Party members in each organization to form -its own Sub-District Party Organ.</p> - -<p>4. Small-group conferences may be named in numerical -order such as, First and Second Small-Group Conference, or -the First and Second Small-Group Conference of a certain -<i>hsien</i> or Sub-District Party Organ. If there is only one -small-group conference, it will not necessarily be named -as such.</p> - -<p>5. When such small-group conference is organized in -every institution down to the <i>pao-chia</i>, then the people will -be better enlightened concerning the Government and Party -policies. Thus it will help the Government in having its -orders fully enforced.</p> - -<p>6. The small-group conference and the Sub-District -Party meeting should take place every two weeks alternately.</p> -</blockquote> - -<p>All the Party organs upon receipt of this memorandum -should make a careful study of the local conditions and -submit to the Provincial Kuomintang in ten days' time their -working plan. Approval should be given not later than ten -days, and within a month all such small-group conferences -should be organized. However, if there should be any difficulty -encountered or any comments to be made they may -be submitted to the proper Party authority for their consideration.</p> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">A. Organization</span></h3> - -<p>1. A small-group conference is established for training -the Party members of the Sub-District Kuomintang Organ.</p> - -<p>2. A small-group conference may have three to ten members. -If a Sub-District Party Organ has more than ten members, -two or more small-group conferences may be organized<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_356" id="Page_356">[Pg 356]</a></span> -and members distributed according to their intellectual -standing, interests and occupations. It is the best policy -that the members of higher education should be evenly distributed -among the small-group conferences.</p> - -<p>3. In the border districts, if the number of Party members -is less than five, and consequently a Sub-District Party -Organ cannot be formed, a small-group conference may be -organized first to be under the direct charge of some other -higher Party authorities.</p> - -<p>4. A small-group conference may be reorganized every -six months. If there are too many shiftings of members and -any other difficulties, it may be reorganized before that time.</p> - -<p>5. Every small-group conference has one Chief who is -responsible for calling conferences, reading reports and giving -guidance regarding the thoughts and activities of his -members. He is to be elected by the members and may be -re-elected after six-months' service.</p> - -<p>6. If the intellectual standing of the members of a small-group -conference is equivalent to that of a primary school -student, the Chief may be appointed by the Executive Committee -of the Sub-District Party.</p> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">B. Conferences</span></h3> - -<p>7. Small-group conferences are to be held every two -weeks. The conference is to last not more than two hours. -Members are to be notified by the Chief of the time and -place of the conference. It is important that conferences -should be planned so as not to interfere with the work of -the members.</p> - -<p>8. In the conferences each member may be the Chairman -by turn. Minutes are to be recorded by any member appointed -at the conference. The minutes are to be read by -the Chief in the Sub-District Party meetings.</p> - -<p>9. Agenda of the small-group conference includes:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p><i>a.</i> The Chief announces the opening of the conference.</p> - -<p><i>b.</i> The Chief reads Dr. Sun's will.</p> - -<p><i>c.</i> The Chief reports communications from the Sub-District -Party Organ, important current problems, publications -of the Chairman of the Executive Committee of the -Central Kuomintang Headquarters, and any other topics.</p> - -<p><i>d.</i> Discussions.</p> - -<p><i>e.</i> Comments.</p> - -<p><i>f.</i> The Chief reads regulations governing Party members.</p> - -<p><i>g.</i> The Chief announces the adjournment of the conference.</p></blockquote> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_357" id="Page_357">[Pg 357]</a></span></p> - -<p>10. The discussions include:</p> - -<blockquote> -<p><i>a.</i> Party principles,</p> - -<p><i>b.</i> current issues,</p> - -<p><i>c.</i> working abilities,</p> - -<p><i>d.</i> book reviews.</p> -</blockquote> - -<p>11. Materials for discussion may be given by the Central -Party Headquarters or prepared by the <i>Hsien</i> Party Organ, -if necessary.</p> - -<p>12. Members are required to read certain books. In the -case of those who cannot read by themselves, assistance may -be given by the fellow members or by an instructor especially -appointed for this purpose. Encouragement should -be given to those who can do good written work.</p> - -<p>13. Small-group conferences are responsible for the education -of the illiterate members.</p> - -<p>14. Every member should take part in the discussion.</p> - -<p>15. If the members of the small-group conference cannot -reach an agreement regarding any one of the four topics -enumerated in the Item No. 10, they may refer to Central -Party Headquarters or the <i>Hsien</i> Party Headquarters -through the Sub-District Party Organ.</p> - -<p>16. If it is found that all the small-group conferences -cannot reach an agreement regarding certain topics discussed -or if the Secretary of the Sub-District Party Organ -considers it necessary, a Sub-District mass meeting may be -called to discuss these topics. The agenda for the small-group -conference can also be used for the Sub-District Party -meetings.</p> - -<p>17. When the small-group Chief considers it necessary, -he may decide whether to have the Item "Comment" only -on the agenda.</p> - -<p>18. In commenting, the members may do:</p> - -<blockquote> -<p><i>a.</i> Self-comment: Members may tell in the conference -their own thoughts, activities and past experiences, as well -as plans for the future.</p> - -<p><i>b.</i> Mutual comment: Members may make comments upon -each other's thoughts, activities, etc., in the most sincere and -friendly manner.</p> -</blockquote> - -<p>19. All the comments should be recorded in the minutes -for future reference. After the conference members should -not broadcast each other's secrets.</p> - -<p>20. At every fourth meeting, the conference may be held -in the form of a tea party or a picnic. In such meetings, -members may express their ideas freely regarding Party, -politics, economics, and any other social problems. It is not<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_358" id="Page_358">[Pg 358]</a></span> -necessary to reach a conclusion, but the discussions should -be recorded.</p> - -<p>21. Regulations governing leave of absence for the Sub-District -Party Organ are applicable to the small-group conference.</p> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">C. Guidance and Examination</span></h3> - -<p>22. Small-group conference is the major work of all the -Party organs. The Sub-District Party Organ may appoint -a person to attend and supervise the small-group conferences.</p> - -<p>23. The Sub-District Party Organ will see to it that the -small-group conferences are held according to schedule. It -will submit monthly to its superior organ the results of -such small-group conferences and in every three months to -the Central Party Headquarters.</p> - -<p>24. The small-group conference Chiefs may attend the -Sub-District Party meeting to discuss matters concerning -small-group training.</p> - -<p>25. The District Party Organ may send out inspectors at -any time to supervise the small-group conferences. Every -six months it may call a meeting which all the Secretaries -of the Sub-District Party Organs, small-group conference -Chiefs, will attend to discuss matters concerning small-group -conferences. The Secretary of the Sub-District Party -Organ will take the chair in the meeting and the minutes -will be submitted to the <i>Hsien</i> Party.</p> - -<p>26. The <i>Hsien</i> Party Organ may also send out inspectors -to supervise the small-group conferences. Every six months, -after the meeting as stated in Item 25 has taken place, a -<i>Hsien</i> Party meeting is to be called to discuss the small-group -conferences in the whole <i>hsien</i>. The Secretary of -the <i>Hsien</i> Party Organ will preside in such meetings. Minutes -are to be submitted to the Provincial Party Headquarters.</p> - -<p>27. If necessary, the <i>Hsien</i> Party Organ may hold different -competitions in such fields as sports, speeches, Party -principles, etc., in order to make the small-group conferences -more interesting.</p> - -<p>28. The Provincial Party Organ, besides sending out inspectors -to make inspections of the small-group conferences, -may obtain at any time the minutes of a certain small-group -conference of a certain <i>hsien</i> for examination.</p> - -<p>29. The Provincial Party Organ may have a general examination -of the small-group conferences that have taken<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_359" id="Page_359">[Pg 359]</a></span> -place, taking the <i>hsien</i> as a unit. Encouragement and punishment -should be given according to merit.</p> - -<p>30. The Central Party Headquarters, besides sending out -inspectors, may obtain any number of minutes of the small-group -conferences for examination.</p> - -<p>31. Those Party organs below the <i>Hsien</i> Party Organ -should pay especial attention to the character, morals and -intellectual ability of the members. The names of those -members who have made special contributions to the Party -work should be filed with the Central Party Headquarters -for appointment.</p> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">D. Appendix</span></h3> - -<p>32. All the <i>Hsien</i> Parties upon receipt of this Program -should make a study of local conditions and make out a -plan for carrying them out.</p> - -<p>33. For the border districts and war areas strict observance -of these items may be dispensed with, upon the request -of the local Party organ to the Central Party Headquarters.</p> - -<p>34. The items contained in this memorandum are -applicable to Special Municipal Party Organs, Seamen's -Party Organs, Overseas Party Organs, and agencies under -the charge of the Central Party Headquarters.</p> - -<p>35. The above is effective after the approval of the Central -Executive Committee of the Kuomintang.</p> - - -<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_204" id="Footnote_1_204"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_204"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> Mimeographed memoranda from the Central Party Headquarters -of the Kuomintang; presented to the author on July 17, 1940, by -Dr. K'an Nei-kuang, Deputy Secretary-General of the Kuomintang. -The original title is <i>Hsiao-tsu Hsün-lien Kang-ling</i>; undated, unpublished.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_205" id="Footnote_2_205"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_205"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> I.e., factory, cooperative, school, etc.</p></div></div> - - -<hr class="chap" /> - - -<h2><i>E.</i> PARTY CONSTITUTION OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY<a name="FNanchor_1_206" id="FNanchor_1_206"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_206" class="fnanchor">[1]</a></h2> - - -<blockquote> - -<p>Despite the many changes in the governmental form of the Communist-controlled -areas, the Chinese Communist Party has retained -the same Party Constitution for many years. The following constitution -was adopted in 1928 by the Sixth Party Congress.</p></blockquote> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">Chapter I. Title</span></h3> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 1. <i>The Title</i>: The Communist Party of China -is a branch of the Communist International. Therefore the -title is "The Chinese Communist Party."</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_360" id="Page_360">[Pg 360]</a></span></p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Chapter II. The Members</span></h3> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 2. <i>Qualifications of Party Members</i>: The Party -members should accept the regulations and constitution of -the Communist International and of the Chinese Communist -Party. They should join one of the Party Organs -and abide by the resolutions which have been passed by the -Communist International and the Chinese Communist -Party. They are required to pay the Party dues regularly.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 3. <i>Procedure to Join the Party</i>: The candidates -of the following qualifications can be recognized as Party -members with the approval of the <i>hsien</i> Party Councillor -and the sanction of the Branch Organs:</p> - -<blockquote> -<p><i>a.</i> Factory Laborers: recommended by one Party member -and approved by one Branch of Production Party -Organ.</p> - -<p><i>b.</i> Farmers, handicraft men, intellectuals and public -functionaries of the lower grades: recommended by two -Party members.</p> - -<p><i>c.</i> High public functionaries: recommended by three -Party members.</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>Note:</p> - -<p>1. The sponsor must take full responsibility for the -candidate. In case qualifications are false, the sponsor -shall receive punishment according to the regulations. -He may be expelled in a serious case.</p> - -<p>2. The candidate shall be asked to do some Party -work for trial before he can be recognized as a member, -in order that his qualifications and understanding of -party principles can be examined.</p></blockquote> - -<p><i>d.</i> A candidate who is an ex-member of other Parties -shall become a Communist Party member by the recommendation -of three Party members of more than three years' -standing. If he was an ordinary Party member of the other -Party, his membership in the Communist Party shall be -sanctioned by the Provincial Party Committee; if he was a -special member of another Party, then his membership shall -be sanctioned by the Central Party Organ.</p> -</blockquote> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 4. <i>The Adherence of Organized Groups</i>: In -case other political groups or branches of other parties want -to join the Communist Party, their organization systems -must be studied and amended according to the ideas of the -Communist Central Party Organ.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 5. <i>The Transfer of Members</i>: The Party members -may be transferred from one Organ to another if they<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_361" id="Page_361">[Pg 361]</a></span> -move from one place to another. The transfer, however, -must be approved by the Central Party Organ.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 6. <i>The Expulsion of Members</i>: The expulsion -of members must be first passed by the general meeting of -that particular Branch Organ and then be approved by the -higher Organ. Until the approval is obtained, it is necessary -to stop the work of the member involved. In case the -member is not satisfied with the discharge, he is allowed to -send a petition to the highest Party Organ for final judgment. -Every Party committee has the power to expel a -member who is discovered as an anti-Communist. The -resolution must be communicated to the Organ to which -that member belonged.</p> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">Chapter III. The Organization</span></h3> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 7. <i>The Principle of Organization</i>: Like other -Communist International Branch Parties, the essential of -organization of the Chinese Communist Party is Democratic -Centralism. By Democratic Centralism is meant:</p> - -<blockquote> -<p><i>a.</i> Both superior and subordinate Party Organs shall be -formed according to resolutions which have been passed -in the Councils of Party Delegates and the National Communist -Party Congress.</p> - -<p><i>b.</i> Each Party Organ is required to make a report of its -newly elected members.</p> - -<p><i>c.</i> Subordinate Party Organs must accept orders issued -by the higher Organs. They shall strictly obey the regulations -of the Party. They shall effectively carry out the resolutions -and plans which have been determined by the Communist -International Central Committee and its supervisory -Party Organs. The Party members may discuss and argue -on certain points which are not yet passed by the Party -Organ. In other words, they must obey unconditionally -the resolutions which have been already determined by the -Communist International or their superior Organs, whether -they agree with these resolutions or not.</p> -</blockquote> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 8. <i>The Supervisory Party Organs</i>: Under certain -circumstances, subordinate Party Organs are allowed to -appoint new supervisory Committees to join the Party with -the sanction of its superior Organs.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 9. <i>The Distribution of Party Organs</i>: The distribution -of Party Organs is according to geographic units. -The Administrative Party Organ in a certain place is the -supervisory Organ of that place. People of different nationalities<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_362" id="Page_362">[Pg 362]</a></span> -may all join the Communist Party. However, they -must first join a Chinese District Party Organ before they -can become members of the Chinese Communist Party.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 10. <i>Duties of the District Organs</i>: The District -Organs have the power to settle their local affairs within the -scope of resolutions passed by the Communist International -and the Chinese Communist Party.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 11. <i>The Supreme Party Organs</i>: The supreme -Party Organs are the Party Members' Mass Meeting and the -Councils of Party Delegates.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 12. <i>The Party Committee</i>: Different classes of -Party committees shall be elected from among the Party -Members' Mass Meeting and the Councils of Party Delegates<a name="FNanchor_2_207" id="FNanchor_2_207"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_207" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> -and the National Communist Party Congress.<a name="FNanchor_3_208" id="FNanchor_3_208"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_208" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> The -committees shall supervise the routine procedures of their -subordinate Organs.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 13. <i>Problems of Criticism</i>: In the case of <i>hsien</i> -Branch Party Delegates, it is necessary for them to undergo -criticism by the (subordinate) officers of higher Party Organs.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 14. <i>The Organization System of the Communist -Party Organs</i>:</p> - -<blockquote> -<p><i>a.</i> Different Branch Party Organs shall be established in -every factory, workshop, shop, street, village, and army unit.</p> - -<p><i>b.</i> There shall be a District Party Council and District -Council of Party Delegates in every city or country district, -under the supervision of a District Party Committee.</p> - -<p><i>c.</i> There shall be a Hsien or Municipal Council of Party -Delegates in each <i>hsien</i> or municipality, under the supervision -of a Municipal Party Committee.</p> - -<p><i>d.</i> A special Council of Party Delegates which is constituted -by several <i>hsien</i> or parts of a province shall be established -when necessary. The establishment must be approved -by the Provincial Committee.</p> - -<p><i>e.</i> There shall be a Provincial Council of Party Delegates -in every province, to be supervised by a Provincial Party -Committee.</p> - -<p><i>f.</i> There shall be a National Communist Congress in -the nation, supervised by the Central Committee.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_363" id="Page_363">[Pg 363]</a></span></p> -<p><i>g.</i> For the convenience in training Party members, a special -Central Executive Bureau shall be established and -special central officers shall be sent to different places. This -Bureau and the officers shall be appointed and supervised -by the Central Committee.</p> -</blockquote> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 15. Further departments and subordinate committees -shall be established to deal with special Party functions, -such as the Organization Department, Publicity Department, -Labor Movement Committee and Women's Movement -Committee. These departments and committees shall -be under the supervision of their respective Party Committees.</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>Note: To improve understanding of differences in custom -and language among Party members of different -nationalities, several Nationality Movement Departments -shall be formed.</p></blockquote> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">Chapter IV. Branch Party Organs</span></h3> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 16. <i>Fundamental Organizations</i>: Branch Party -Organs of the factories, mines, workshops, shops, streets, villages, -and armies are the fundamental organization of the -Communist Party. Members working in the above-mentioned -places shall join the Branch Party Organs. New -Branch Party Organs can be organized when there are at -least three or more members. But they must be under the -control of the <i>Hsien</i> Committee.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 17. <i>Special Organizations of the Branch Party -Organs</i>: Members of certain businesses can join the Production -Branch Organ of the same occupation in their -neighboring city. Special Branch Organs shall be organized -according to the localities and the nature of their work, -such as handicraft laborers, free laborers, family laborers, or -intellectuals.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 18. <i>Duties of the Branch Party Organs</i>: The -Branch Party Organ unites the strength of the farmers and -laborers. Its duties are:</p> - -<blockquote> -<p><i>a.</i> To use its systematic and effective agitation and -slogans to absorb farmers and laborers into the Communist -party.</p> - -<p><i>b.</i> To use its power of organization to join the political -and economic struggles of the farmers and laborers. To encourage -the people's revolutionary spirit. To teach the -meaning of class-struggles. To supervise the farmers' and -laborers' revolutions. To lead proletarians to the Communist -International and the Chinese Communist Party.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_364" id="Page_364">[Pg 364]</a></span></p> -<p><i>c.</i> To enlist and train new members. To distribute -Party periodicals among members and non-members in order -to encourage political and educational work.</p> -</blockquote> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 19. <i>Branch Organ Executive Committee</i>: Each -Branch shall have three to five executive committeemen to -manage the routine Party work. They shall take charge of -the division of labor, such as the publicity work, distribution -of printed materials, organization of farmer and labor -parties, women's movements, and youth movements. There -shall be one secretary; he shall carry out resolutions and -orders.</p> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">Chapter V. City and Country District Party Organs</span></h3> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 20. <i>The District Council of Party Delegates</i>: -In the sphere of the city or country districts the supreme -Party Organs are the Party Members' Mass Meeting and -the District Councils of Party Delegates. The Party Members' -Mass Meeting and the Councils of Party Delegates -shall receive and approve the reports of the District Party -Committee; shall elect the Delegates to District, <i>Hsien</i>, -Municipal, or Provincial Councils of the Party Delegates -Meeting.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 21. <i>District Party Committee</i>: The District -Party Committee shall take charge of the supervision -of affairs within that district before and after the Party -Members' Mass Meeting or the District Council of Party -Delegates' Meeting. Regular meetings of the city or -rural District Party Committee shall be directed by the -Standing Committee, elected by the Party Committee -itself.</p> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">Chapter VI.</span> <i>Hsien</i> <span class="smcap">and Municipal Party Organs</span></h3> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 22. <i>The Hsien Council of Party Delegates</i>: The -supreme Party Organ in the <i>hsien</i> is the <i>Hsien</i> Council of -Party Delegates. The special meeting of the Council shall -be called once in three months. It shall be called by the -demand of a majority of other organizations in the <i>hsien</i>; -by determination of the Provincial Party Committee or -Special District Party Committee. The <i>Hsien</i> Council of -Party Delegates which is called by the <i>Hsien</i> Party Committee -shall read reports issued by the <i>Hsien</i> Party Committee -or the <i>Hsien</i> Control Committee. It shall elect Delegates -of the <i>Hsien</i> Party Committee, <i>Hsien</i> Control Committee, -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_365" id="Page_365">[Pg 365]</a></span>Provincial Party Committee, and Special District -Party Committee.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 23. <i>Hsien Party Committee</i>: The <i>Hsien</i> Party -Committee is elected by the <i>Hsien</i> Council of Party Delegates. -Before and after the meetings of <i>Hsien</i> Council of -Party Delegates this Committee is the supreme Party Organ -in the <i>hsien</i>. The Committee shall be constituted by <i>Hsien</i> -Delegates and delegates from important villages. The meeting -of the Committee shall be called at least once a month, -and its date shall be determined by the <i>Hsien</i> Committee -itself. A Standing Committee shall be elected to take care -of routine Party affairs. There shall be one secretary of -the Standing Committee, to be elected from among the -Committee members.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 24. A <i>Hsien</i> Party Committee shall put into effect -previously passed resolutions of the <i>Hsien</i> Council of -Party Delegates, the Provincial Party Committee, and the -Central Party Committee. Whenever possible, different -committees, such as the Organization Committee, Publicity -Committee, Women's Movement Committee, and Farmers' -Movement Committee, shall be established. The <i>Hsien</i> -Party Committee shall also appoint the editors of <i>Hsien</i> -Party newspapers. It shall take dual responsibilities to obey -the orders of its superior Organ and to report its own merits -to its superior Organs.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 25. No Municipal Party Committee shall be -formed in a city where a <i>Hsien</i> Party Committee has already -been established. In such a case the Party affairs of the -city shall be in charge of the <i>Hsien</i> Party Committee. A -City District Party Committee under it may be formed to -take an active part in the City Party affairs.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 26. <i>The Municipal Party Committee</i>: The organization -of the Municipal Party Committee is the same -as that of the <i>Hsien</i> Party Committee. A City District Party -Committee is subordinate to it. This Committee shall administer -its Branch Party Organs and Branch Organs of its -neighbors. No Municipal Party Committee shall be established -in a place where the Provincial Party Committee -or Special District Party Committee has already been established.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 27. The organization and functions of the Special -District Party Committee shall be the same as the <i>Hsien</i> -Party Committee. In the place where there is no Provincial -Party Committee provided then the Special District Party -Committee shall be directed by the Central Party -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_366" id="Page_366">[Pg 366]</a></span>Committee. In such a case the functions and organization of the -Special Party Committee shall be the same as the Provincial -Party Committee.</p> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">Chapter VII. Provincial Party Organs</span></h3> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 28. <i>The Provincial Council of Party Delegates</i>: -The Provincial Council of Party Delegates is the supreme -Party Organ in the province. The regular meeting of the -Council shall be called to meet once semi-annually. Special -meetings shall be called according to the demand of a -majority of other organizations of the province, or by the -determination of the Central Party Committee. The regular -meeting of the Provincial Council of Party Delegates, which -is called by the Provincial Party Committee, shall have the -responsibility of hearing reports issued by the Provincial -Party Committee, and by the Provincial Control Committee. -It shall discuss the social work and Party affairs -problems of the province; and elect delegates to Provincial -Party Committee, Provincial Control Committee, and National -Party Congress.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 29. <i>Provincial Party Committee</i>: Before and -after the meeting of the Provincial Council of Party delegates, -the Provincial Party Committee is the supreme Party -Organ in each province. Delegates of the central Provincial -organizations or other district Party Organs are required to -join the Provincial Party Committee. The meeting of the -Provincial Party Committee shall be called at least once in -two months; the date of the meeting shall be determined -by the Committee itself. A Standing Committee under it -shall be authorized to take charge of Party affairs before -and after the meeting of the Provincial Party Committee. -Secretaries are to be appointed accordingly.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 30. <i>The Duties and Organization of Provincial -Party Committees</i>: The duties of the Provincial Party Committee -are: to put into effect the passed resolutions of the -Provincial Council of Party Delegates or Central Party -Committee; to organize the subsidiary Party Organs; to -appoint editors for the Party newspapers; to distribute the -Party funds; to control the accounting department; to supervise -the Party work among non-Communists; to draft -regular reports to the Central Party Committee; to announce -the Party Movement to its subordinate Organs. For -the furtherance of important work different departments -and committees shall be provided, such as the Provincial -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_367" id="Page_367">[Pg 367]</a></span>Organization Department, Publicity Department, Labor -Movement Department, etc. The department heads who act -concurrently in the Provincial Party Committee shall supervise -Party affairs under the control of the Provincial Standing -Committee.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article 31</span>. The Provincial Party Committee shall help -the District Party Committee to carry out the Party activities. -Therefore the <i>Hsien</i> Party Committee in that particular -city should only take care of the Party work within its -own sphere.</p> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">Chapter VIII. The National Party Convention</span><a name="FNanchor_4_209" id="FNanchor_4_209"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_209" class="fnanchor">[4]</a></h3> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article 32</span>. The National Party Convention shall be -called to meet twice annually. The numbers of candidates -and Delegates to be elected by different organs are to be -determined by the Central Party Committee.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article 33</span>. The previously passed resolutions of the -Convention shall be put into effect after the approval of -the Central Party Committee.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article 34</span>. In case the Convention meeting is held before -the meeting of the Communist International then -several Delegates can be elected to attend the meeting of the -latter. However, they must get the consent of the International -Communist Committee.</p> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">Chapter IX. The National Party Congress</span></h3> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article 35</span>. The National Party Congress is the supreme -Party Organ in the country. The meeting shall be -called once annually by the Central Party Committee and the -Communist International. Special meetings can be called -by the Central Party Committee or initiated by the Communist -International. It may also be called by request of -a majority of the Delegates who attended the last meeting. -The call of the special meeting, however, must be approved -by the Central Party Committee first. Resolutions which -have been passed by the majority of the Delegates shall -become effective. The number of Delegates and percentage -in each Party Organ shall be determined by the Communist -International, the Central Party Committee, or the -preliminary session of the Party Convention.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article 36</span>. The duties of the National Party Congress -are:</p> - -<blockquote> -<p><i>a.</i> To receive and examine reports issued by the Central -Party Committee.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_368" id="Page_368">[Pg 368]</a></span></p> -<p><i>b.</i> To determine Party regulations.</p> - -<p><i>c.</i> To determine the important political or organization -plans.</p> - -<p><i>d.</i> To elect the Central Party Committee.</p> -</blockquote> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 37. Delegates to the Party Congress are to be -elected by the Provincial Councils of Party Delegates. In -special cases requiring secret action, they may be appointed -by the Provincial Party Committee with the approval of -the Communist International Committee. A provisional -Congress can be substituted for the regular Congress with -only the consent of the International Communist Committee.</p> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">Chapter X. The Central Party Committee</span><a name="FNanchor_5_210" id="FNanchor_5_210"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_210" class="fnanchor">[5]</a></h3> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 38. The number of the Central Party Committee -members shall be determined by the National Party -Congress.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 39. While the National Party Congress is in session, -the Central Party Committee is the supreme Party -Organ. It represents the Party in contacts with the other -political parties. Besides this its duties are: to establish -various subordinate Party Organs; to supervise and control -subordinate Party Organs; to edit the Party newspapers; -to send special Party officers to different provinces; to -form the Central Executive Bureau in order to encourage -Party principles; to distribute the Party funds; to control -the Central Accounting Department. The Central Party -Committee shall be called at least three times a month.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 40. A Political Bureau shall be established in -the Central Party Committee. It shall supervise the political -affairs before and after the meeting of the Central Party -Committee. A Standing Committee is to be elected to take -charge of routine work.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 41. When necessary the Central Party Committee -shall establish different subordinate departments or -committees such as the Organization Department, Publicity -Department, Laborers' Movement Committees, Women's -Movement Committees and Farmers' Movement Committees. -The functions of these Departments and Committees -shall be guided by the Central Party Committee, -which shall also appoint Department heads and Chairmen.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 42. The Central Party Committee shall determine -the work and the scope of work of the District Party -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_369" id="Page_369">[Pg 369]</a></span>Organs with reference to their political and economic background. -The distribution of Party Organs shall also be -settled by the Central Party Committee.</p> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">Chapter XI. The Central Control Committee</span><a name="FNanchor_6_211" id="FNanchor_6_211"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_211" class="fnanchor">[6]</a></h3> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 43. For the control of the financial and accounting -work of the subordinate Party Organs, Central or District -Control Committees shall be elected by the National -Party Congress, Central or District Party Committee.</p> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">Chapter XII. The Party Discipline</span></h3> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 44. Strict obedience to Party discipline is the -highest duty of every Communist. Resolutions passed by -the Communist International, Central Party Committee, or -other superior Party Organs shall be carried out effectively -and exactly by the Party members. Until resolutions have -been passed, members are allowed to discuss them freely.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 45. Those who have failed to put into effect -the orders or resolutions, or those who violate the Party -discipline shall be punished by the Party Organs with reference -to the Party regulations. The punishments for -Organs are: reprimand, dissolution, and reregistration of its -members. The punishments for the members are: reprimand, -warning, deprivation of Party activities, expulsion -from membership, or suspension from duties for stated -periods. Cases involving punishment shall be studied and -examined by the Party Members' Mass Meeting or by -respective Party Organs. Special Committees may be formed -with the approval of Party Organs to settle difficult cases. -Expulsion from membership shall be carried out according -to particulars stated in Item 6 of this Constitution.</p> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">Chapter XIII. Party Finance</span></h3> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 46. The sources of the Party revenue are: -Party fees, special levies, income from printed materials, -and the compensations from its superior Organs.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 47. The amount of the Party fee shall be determined -by the Central Committee. Members without employment -or those in poverty are allowed exemption from -payment. Those who do not pay their fees for three months, -without stating reasons, shall be recognized as released from<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_370" id="Page_370">[Pg 370]</a></span> -membership, and their names shall be announced to the -Mass Meeting.</p> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">Chapter XIV. Special Party Groups [Corps]</span><a name="FNanchor_7_212" id="FNanchor_7_212"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_212" class="fnanchor">[7]</a></h3> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 48. Special Party Groups are to be constituted -by three or more Party members. The main function of -these Party Groups is the encouragement of the Party principles -among the non-Communist groups. The routine affairs -of the Group shall be in charge of a Managing Board -elected from the Party Group. Whenever a Party Committee -and a Special Party Group conflict and then come to -an agreement on certain points, these points shall be reconsidered -and concurrently passed by the two Organs. -Quick action must be taken. If agreement is not reached, -a petition is required for submission to a superior Party -Organ for final determination.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 49. Delegates of Party Groups shall attend the -Party Committee Meeting whenever there is matter dealing -with the Party Group.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 50. A Managing Board shall be formed in each -Group with the approval of the Party Committee. The -Committee can appoint its members to the Board and may -also recall or remove those members when necessary. In -such cases, however, the reasons for recall or removal require -announcement to the Party Group.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 51. A list of names of the staff members of the -Party Group shall be submitted to a Party Organ for approval. -Removal of staff members from a group shall also -require approval by the Party Organ.</p> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 52. Resolutions to be carried out by the Party -Group shall first be passed by the Group Meeting or Meeting -of the Managing Board. In a Party Members' Mass -Meeting all the Group members must support a resolution -which is already passed by its own Group. If one fails to -do so he may be punished according to the regulations.</p> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">Chapter XV. Relationship with the Communist -Youth Corps</span><a name="FNanchor_8_213" id="FNanchor_8_213"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_213" class="fnanchor">[8]</a></h3> - -<p><span class="smcap">Article</span> 53. The District or Central Party Organs shall -send Delegates to the Communist Youth Corps for exchanging -ideas. At the same time the Communist Youth Corps -can also send their members to attend the various meetings -of the different Councils of the Party Delegates.</p> - - -<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_206" id="Footnote_1_206"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_206"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> <i>Kung-ch'an-tang Tang-chang</i> [Party Constitution of the Communist -Party], [Chungking?], XXVII (1938), p. 1-21.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_207" id="Footnote_2_207"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_207"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> The term <i>Tai-piao Ta-hui</i> rendered "Council of Party Delegates," -may also be put as "Party Conference." Cf. "The Rules of the Communist -Party of the Soviet Union" in Rappard, William E., <i>et al.</i>, -<i>Source Book on European Governments</i>, New York, 1937, p. v34-v52.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_208" id="Footnote_3_208"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_208"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> <i>Ch'üan-kuo Ta-hui</i> is given as "National Party Congress"; the -term <i>Ch'üan-kuo</i> has been translated as "All-China" elsewhere.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_209" id="Footnote_4_209"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_209"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> <i>Ch'üan-kuo Hui-i</i>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_5_210" id="Footnote_5_210"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_210"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> <i>Chung-yang Wei-yüan-hui</i>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_6_211" id="Footnote_6_211"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_211"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> The term here is <i>shên-ch'a wei-yüan-hui</i>, not <i>chien-ch'a</i>, which is -the term used for "Control" as one of the five powers of Sun Yat-sen's -plan.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_7_212" id="Footnote_7_212"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_212"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> <i>Tang-t'uan</i>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_8_213" id="Footnote_8_213"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_213"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> <i>Kung-ch'an Ch'ing-nien T'uan</i>.</p></div> -</div> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_371" id="Page_371">[Pg 371]</a></span></p> - - -<h2>APPENDIX III. MATERIALS ON POLICY</h2> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<h2><i>A.</i> REPLY TO QUESTIONS (CHIANG K'AI-SHEK)<a name="FNanchor_1_214" id="FNanchor_1_214"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_214" class="fnanchor">[1]</a></h2> - - -<blockquote> - -<p>Replies to the following questionnaire were very kindly supplied -by Generalissimo Chiang K'ai-shek. The questions by the present -author were submitted to him on July 23, 1940; the replies were transmitted -through the Vice-Minister of Publicity, Mr. Hollington Tong, -on November 26, 1940.</p></blockquote> - -<p>(1) Do you believe that the <i>San Min Chu I</i> are suited to -China alone, or do you think it possible that they represent -a golden mean between totalitarianism and democracy?</p> - -<p><i>San Min Chu I is a type of democracy particularly -suited to China. In its general features, I think, it is -similar to Western democracies.</i></p> - -<p>(2) Do you feel that a <i>San Min Chu I</i> China will have any -positive proposals to make concerning the subject of -world federation or confederation, if that subject is -raised at the end of the current European war?</p> - -<p><i>In as much as cosmopolitanism and world peace are -two of the main aims of San Min Chu I, China will -naturally be disposed to participate in any world federation -or confederation based on the principle of equality -of nations and for the good of mankind.</i></p> - -<p>(3) Do you believe that the inauguration of the constitution -and of a constitutional period will lead to the uncontrolled -freedom of minor parties, including the -Communist? Is there not a danger that the minor parties, -because they do not share the responsibility for -government, will be able to exploit formal democratic -rights more unscrupulously than the Kuomintang?</p> - -<p><i>No, because democracy in itself has the ability to work -out the solutions for those problems if there are any.</i></p> - -<p>(4) What do you regard as the clearest factual indication of -the growth of democracy in Free China?</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_372" id="Page_372">[Pg 372]</a></span></p> -<p><i>The following are the clearest indications of the -growth of democracy in China: 1, the convocation of -the People's Political Council; 2, the convocation of -the Provincial Political Councils; 3, the growth of -popular interest in both public and national affairs; -4, the growth of the sentiment of national solidarity; -5, the spontaneous response to the call for public -services.</i></p> - -<p>(5) Within the army, what democratic tendencies have you -fostered or observed?</p> - -<p><i>Since the army is now recruited from the different -walks of life, it naturally shares the growing democratic -sentiment. Within the army, however, the soldiers and -officers are of course trained and disciplined in strict accordance -with military regulations.</i></p> - -<p>(6) When the war against Japan is successfully concluded, -do you believe that the National Government will have -any difficulty in re-establishing its full authority over -the guerrilla-governed areas, which will have tasted -autonomy?</p> - -<p><i>No, because all these forces are fighting for the liberty -and independence of China.</i></p> - -<p>(7) Do you believe that the bogus Government at Nanking -is intended by the enemy to deceive the Chinese, -to fool the Japanese home public, or actually to govern -China? Why do you think that a man as ambitious as -Wang Ch'ing-wei put himself in such a humiliating -and ridiculous position—before the world, and before -history?</p> - -<p><i>Whatever may be the intention of the Japanese in putting -up Wang Ch'ing-wei as the head of the bogus government, -they certainly have no idea of letting him or -any other puppet govern China in reality. As to the -latter part of the question, I prefer that you would ask -Wang directly.</i></p> - - -<div class="footnotes"> -<h3>FOOTNOTE:</h3> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_214" id="Footnote_1_214"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_214"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> Private communication by and to the present author, and in -his possession.</p></div></div> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_373" id="Page_373">[Pg 373]</a></span></p> - - -<h2><i>B.</i> WHAT I MEAN BY ACTION, OR A PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION (CHIANG -K'AI-SHEK)<a name="FNanchor_1_215" id="FNanchor_1_215"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_215" class="fnanchor">[1]</a></h2> - - -<blockquote> - -<p>The following essay, delivered as a speech, represents the clearest -formulation by Generalissimo Chiang of his own philosophy. To this -must be joined his exegesis on the San Min Chu I, quoted in part -above, p. <a href="#Page_270">270</a>.</p></blockquote> - -<h3><span class="smcap">The Truths We Must Endeavor to Grasp Anew</span></h3> - -<p>In 1932 I delivered a lecture on the subject "Stages in -the Development of Revolutionary Philosophy." In it I dealt -with two points of especial importance. Firstly, I tried to -explain how the actual grasp of what we know comes only -with positive action. I said: "The universe contains spirit in -addition to matter. Spirit implies mind, and mind implies -conscience. Conscience must find its expression in action, in -the practice of what it urges. Otherwise the conscience -would be a barren thing, and there would be no way of -avoiding a futile idealism on the one hand or determinist -materialism on the other." Secondly, I explained the importance -of the philosophy of action in regard to the -Revolution. I said: "Only the word 'action' covers the -meaning of what has brought into being all things in -space and time. Our philosophy therefore takes as the one -central principle of human life and thought the maxim: -'From true knowledge action naturally proceeds.' In short, -any philosophy of ours must be a philosophy of action. -The consummation of the Republican revolution and the -overthrow of Japanese Imperialist aggression depend upon -our putting into practice Dr. Sun's principle of action as the -natural product of knowledge."</p> - -<p>Since I suggested this term <i>philosophy of action</i> and -became the advocate of <i>positive action</i> as the course the -revolutionary must follow, a considerable effect has been -visible in our ranks. The spirit of positive action has been -intensified among us. In the army and in schools, and in -political and social life generally, a gradual transformation -has taken place in the state of inert frustration, vagueness -and depression formerly prevalent. There has been a general -tendency to take the initiative, to express ourselves in -positive action. Such indeed was my aim in promoting this<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_374" id="Page_374">[Pg 374]</a></span> -<i>philosophy of action</i>. When I take note of the results -achieved by our <i>action</i>, however, I remain unsatisfied on a -number of points. For instance, there is sometimes mere -action without clear realization of its why and wherefore, -resulting in what the ancients called "unreal action." With -others there is initial vigor and great positive effort, followed -by impatience of checks and failure to persevere in -the face of difficulties, leading some to throw the blame on -circumstances and others upon their fellow-men. The -irritable then proceed to arguing and quarrels; while the -sweeter-tempered lose heart. In this way the real issue is -lost to sight and obstacles unnecessarily multiplied; or the -individual may be overcome with outright disgust and take -on a completely negative attitude, the initial speed of his -progress being in the end equalled by the speed of his -subsequent retrogression. Another kind of failure comes -with a man who impulsively imitates others; who when he -sees others on the go feels any move on their part calls for -some move on his; who spends all his time in acting on the -spur of some transitory stimulus or exigency, forgetful of -our broad revolutionary conceptions and far-reaching aims.</p> - -<p>In seeking the reasons for such faulty conduct, I have -been forced to the conclusion that it is due to imperfect -knowledge of the essential meaning of <i>positive action</i>, and -to imperfect realization of the significance and nature of -<i>action</i>, that there is lack of determination, faith and perseverance -among us.</p> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">Action Is Life Itself: the Tireless Pertinacity -of Nature Our Example</span></h3> - -<p>According to my own individual experience, our first step -must be to draw a clear distinction between <i>action</i> and <i>motion</i>. -The monosyllabic structure of the Chinese language -has occasioned the use of substantival phrases consisting of -two words. One of these phrases is <i>hsing-tung</i> (action-motion), -which in common parlance often has the meaning -properly covered only by the word <i>hsing</i> alone, a word of -far deeper and wider meaning than the word <i>tung</i>. In -fact, we may say that action is <i>human life</i> itself. An antithesis -is commonly implied between the words <i>action</i> and -<i>thought</i>, and between <i>word</i> and <i>act</i>. In reality, however, -thought and word are processes of action, and are properly -to be considered as included within the scope of <i>action</i>, -rather than as foreign to it. From birth to death, while he<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_375" id="Page_375">[Pg 375]</a></span> -is subject to space and time, a man cannot withdraw himself -from the sphere of action; he grows up in action and -his character is formed and elevated by action. All saintly -and heroic men, like the devoted revolutionary, attain their -ends and achieve their nobility of character only through -their planned and determined actions.</p> - -<p>If we wish to realize the true nature of <i>action</i> we can do -no better than take as the <i>point-de-départ</i> for our thinking -the words of the <i>I-ching</i> or <i>Book of Changes</i>: "Let the superior -man exert himself with the unfailing pertinacity of -Nature." For the most obvious thing in the universe, the -very principle animating all its phenomena, is the activity -of the forces of Nature. The gloss reads: "Day by day the -heavens revolve, with a constancy that only a supreme -pertinacity could maintain. The superior man models himself -upon it in the unceasing exertion of his energies." This -<i>pertinacity</i> is something perennially unimpaired and ever -changeless, greatest strength united to greatest durability, -and moreover an absolute thoroughness and completeness. -And we must model ourselves on the activity of nature, on -its spontaneous and unremitting flow of energy. If there is -this realization of the value and place of human life in the -universe, action will appear to us something inevitable, and -there will follow as a matter of course single-minded devotion -to purpose, a completely natural attitude, and resolute -advance with firm strides towards our ends—we shall have -achieved, in the words of the <i>Chung-yung</i>, "the highest integrity, -unfailing and enduring." Man's existence and progress -depend entirely upon his perception of these truths.</p> - -<p><i>Action</i>, therefore, differs from <i>motion</i>. <i>Motion</i> is by no -means necessarily <i>action</i>, though <i>action</i> may on occasion include -some form of <i>motion</i>. Action is continuous, whereas -motion is intermittent; action is essential, whereas motion is -accidental; action is spontaneous, whereas motion is usually -due to the application of external force. Action is in response -to the supreme order of things and in harmony with -the nature of man. Motion is impulsive response to some -fortuitous external stimulus. Action we may describe as -more natural and smoother intrinsically than motion; and -extrinsically it is wholly good in its outcome, whereas motion -may be good or may be evil. Action unfolds in uninterrupted -continuity; motion proceeds by fits and starts. -As an illustration, action may be compared to a ceaseless -flow of water, in the words of Confucius, "racing on, unpausing -day and night." The unremitting and insistent<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_376" id="Page_376">[Pg 376]</a></span> -character of <i>positive action</i> may thus be figured forth. Motion -on the other hand may be compared to the impact of -a stone upon water into which it is thrown. The water is -violently agitated and leaps high into the air; its movement -is tumultuous while it lasts, but subsides when after a -moment or so the extraneous force that caused it is expended. -Such motion is, therefore, transitory, simply because -its motive force comes from without.</p> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">Action Is Not Mere Motion</span></h3> - -<p>We cannot of course say that all <i>motion</i> is bad, but we -can at least say that the value of <i>motion</i> is never comparable -with that of <i>action</i>. What we commonly call <i>impulse</i> is a -manifestation of the reflex action of some sense or faculty. -When we speak of a man's motions as "blind," "wild," or -"furious," it is always a case of response to external stimulus -or of the application of external force. Such motions are not -spontaneous and they therefore pursue no definite course; -they have no basis in the consciousness of the individual and -no precise direction or aim; the individual's concern with -them is limited to the passing moment of their duration; he -envisages nothing as to what may be their result. There may -be great initial activity and force, but because there is no -basis in reason, consciousness and spontaneity, momentary -agitation is succeeded by relapse into quiescence. A man -who lives by passion and impulse, who <i>moves</i> rather than -<i>acts</i> is like a bell, which when struck vibrates and emits -sound but unless struck is silent. All passive and transient -activity, arising from mere impulse and sense-stimulation, is -in opposition to the positive action required of us by -our revolutionary philosophy, for such <i>motion</i> has no -lasting effect and is powerless to transform the lives of -men.</p> - -<p>It is imperative therefore that there should be no confusion -of what we mean by <i>action</i> with what is better termed -<i>motion</i>. The action of which I have been speaking is the -operation of man's innate faculties according to the true -natural laws of his being; it is what I have called the expression -of conscience in practice, the exercise of conscience. -Although we colloquially speak of "violent actions" and -"wrong-minded action" in describing men's conduct, such -conduct, being that of men acting under the influence of -impulse or illusion, should properly be classed as a form of -<i>motion</i>. It is not what we mean by action.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_377" id="Page_377">[Pg 377]</a></span></p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Action Is Nature at Work in Man: the Whole -Universe Is the Scene of Action</span></h3> - -<p>Genuine action is necessarily ordered, rhythmical, systematic -and directed towards some aim. It arises from -that fullness of consciousness described as the "calm of -mature reflection." It is inevitably straightforward and continuous, -undeviating and unhesitating. Such motion as that -of the revolving globe we ought not to call mere motion; -that ceaseless axial and orbital rotation is a phenomenon -called in ancient times the <i>activity</i> of nature; and it may -serve us as the best possible illustration of the qualities of -action. We may proceed to a fuller description of the nature -of action by saying it is always marked by a certain regularity -and order in the course of its fulfilment. Human life in -all its aspects of growth and development, in each transition -from stage to stage, in the preparatory and supplementary -acquisitions of substance and experience between phase and -phase,—all this is action. The normal routine of daily life,—sleeping, -resting, eating and working,—is all to be considered -within the scope of action. For the meaning of -action may apply equally well to what occurs both in states -of repose and in states of movement. While work throughout -the process of carrying out a given task may clearly be -action, recreation may also be action. States of motion and -repose are of course to a superficial view opposites. Moreover -in the modern world <i>motion</i> is especially set up in opposition -to <i>repose</i>, and emphasized almost to the exclusion -of the latter. This has caused the importance of <i>stability</i> to -be lost to view.</p> - -<p>For the truth of the matter is: "stability allows of repose; -repose allows of calm; calm allows of reflection, and reflection -gives grasp." It should be realized that repose can -have a positive function. And what I call the philosophy of -action permits of no distinction between motion and repose, -a distinction which is superficial. A course of action may involve -intervals of both motion and of repose, just as the -invisible working of living matter contributes to the -visible growth of the body. We need only concern ourselves -as to whether what is done is in harmony with the -laws of man's innate character.</p> - -<p>The natural processes of the universe and of human life -go on unceasingly, and in trying to ameliorate human life -by positive action we must realize that such action to be -effectual must be similar to those processes in its continuity<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_378" id="Page_378">[Pg 378]</a></span> -and tenacity. Positive action in its every phase, whether -outwardly visible or impalpable, never ceases to be action, -never really for a moment comes to a halt. The whole universe -is the scene of such action, and man in so far as he -truly acts participates in its immense activity. Let us therefore -distinguish clearly between mere <i>motion</i> and the true -<i>action</i> that works by a steady advance in an undeviating -course, with the timeless inexhaustibility of flowing water -towards its appointed aim.</p> - -<p>And now I have something more to add in definition of -the essential meaning of action and its relation to life. The -ancients said "Man's innate character is given him at birth -together with life itself." I consider <i>action</i> to be the expression -of that innate character, and so as inseparable -from life as it. Man in his earliest infancy can laugh and -cry, eat and drink; as he grows up he learns to gaze and -listen, speak and walk; and once grown up, no matter -whether he be intelligent or stupid, he strives for existence, -progress, and development. Or, in other words, he seeks to -conform to the elementary needs of human life. All these -phenomena are phenomena of <i>action</i>, the action of the -faculties for discerning moral and material good, with which -man is naturally endowed.</p> - -<p>It is apparent to me that love of ease and dislike of exertion -are no part of fundamental human nature, but that on -the contrary mankind is naturally disposed to labor and -work. If you compel a lively man accustomed to be always -on his feet and busy with his hands to be idle and sedentary, -depriving him of anything to do, he is certain to feel exceedingly -unhappy. In the same way, the least intelligent or -experienced of men has felt the satisfaction and content that -come with work, the joy of contributing to the accomplishment -of some undertaking. There is a colloquialism current -in certain coastal districts of China which substitutes the -word "life" for the word "work"; thus, you may be asked -whether you have "lived your life" for the day, in the sense -of "have you done your day's work?" Work is indeed life; -unless a man be totally incapable he will inevitably require -the means of expression for his abilities, and particularly -such expression as will accrue to the benefit of somebody -beyond himself. Even a little child is conscious of the intense -satisfaction to be derived from doing one's best in -the service of others. Though no praise be awarded the -child it is aware of an extraordinary complaisance within -itself.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_379" id="Page_379">[Pg 379]</a></span></p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">The Broadest Sense of Life</span></h3> - -<p>All these little illustrations bear witness to the fact that -action is the object of man's life; and we should, vice versa, -make life the object of our action. We are born with -faculties for the discernment of moral and material good; -life, from childhood to old age, is the energetic, ceaseless, -use of them, at first chiefly for the satisfaction of the needs -of one's own existence, to secure one's own footing in life, -but next, as one's mental perspective broadens, the family, -the village, the community, the nation, and mankind become -objects of the desire to express oneself and give of -oneself. When we speak of <i>life</i> it should mean for us the -life of mankind, the life and existence of people and nation, -the livelihood of masses and citizenry. And when we speak -of <i>action</i>, we should mean action performed in the service -of life in such a broad sense.</p> - -<p>The difference between man and the beasts of the field -and the birds of the air consists just in this. We read in -the classics of "a virtue of surpassing excellence, which is -given to the people as a law of their being," and the virtue -alluded to is this propensity to look after one's own welfare -and at the same time the welfare of one's fellow-men. We -are naturally endowed with the disposition to will the good -of others and to act in their service. "Action," with the -qualities I have sketched, is something primordially bound -up with life.</p> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">The Revolution Demands Action of All Men at All -Times</span></h3> - -<p>The essential meaning of action being once understood we -may proceed to inquire into its spirit and wherein it finds -its highest expression. How is it that men for all the apparent -unity of their existence sometimes live lives of such -devotion to the good of mankind and the world that they -earn the admiration of posterity, while others live degenerate -lives governed by the lowest desires, to the detriment -of themselves and their neighbors? Education and environment -are factors that play their part in this, but more important -is what the ancient called "material desire"—the -tendency to seek possession rather than creation, to enjoy -rather than contribute. In the words of Dr. Sun, "making -one's aim acquisition and not service" leads to degraded and -uncontrolled conduct which is an obstacle to human progress<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_380" id="Page_380">[Pg 380]</a></span> -and what we as comrades in Revolution must strive our -utmost to avoid and eradicate.</p> - -<p>Revolutionary motives are motives of service, of self-sacrifice -for the good of others. The task the Revolution -sets itself is the "practice of goodwill" in the broadest -sense of those words,—action inspired by love for men to the -exclusion of all that tends to their harm. In our revolutionary -zeal to promote <i>positive action</i> throughout our world -we aim to create an all-pervading moral attitude to life such -as is rationally conformable to man's true nature; and we -moreover seek to bring into full play the deep funds of -humanity and benevolence in our own people. We push -aside considerations of individual ability, of past education -and environment, and of how far bad habits acquired may -have become ingrained. We appeal to all as they are to take -fresh stock of their lives and realize how from the very fact -of their being alive they possess the ability to act,—to act in -no less a sense than the great deliverers of mankind in their -saintly and heroic deeds. The difference between such deeds -and the actions of normal daily life is one of degree, not of -kind. We are everyone men born of woman and passing our -days between heaven and earth; not for us to vex ourselves -with fear of failure; the only failure is in failing to act.</p> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">The Meaning of Ease</span></h3> - -<p>Let use take the three key-virtues of judgment, goodwill, -and courage as our guides in the task of "playing the -man." For the rest, let us follow the dictum of Sun Wên to -the effect that "the very clever and able should strive to -serve ten million fellow-men; a man of lesser ability may -aspire to serve ten hundred men; while a man devoid of -talent may content himself with doing the best he can for a -single fellow-man." The highly talented may perform their -duties with ease; the moderately gifted may make smooth -progress with theirs; while the poorly gifted may do so with -only a narrow margin of competence; but all that matters is -our full use of our faculties in positive action for the good -of others. If we advance without ever falling away from a -pure and concentrated resolve to do our best, we shall certainly -be able to realize the ideal of <i>action</i>. In a sense it -will prove <i>easy</i>, though this does not of course mean that -anything can be got without pains or anything managed in -a facile and quiescent fashion. Nor does it mean that all -will necessarily be plain sailing, fraught with no obstacles. -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_381" id="Page_381">[Pg 381]</a></span>Our path through life is strewn with dangers, hindrances -and obstructions. Revolutionary action is attended by many -risks; it requires the will to make great sacrifices. Nevertheless, -man's capacity for positive action has achieved many a -colossal feat in the course of his history, the prodigious -hydraulic engineering of the ancients, ascent into the air -and penetration of the earth, and revolutionary deeds that -have transformed the face of human affairs. The ultimate -consideration is always whether we possess thorough determination -and a spirit of unflinching zeal, for with these -we may overcome towering obstacles as it were "in our -stride," and "face dangers with imperturbable calm." A -man worthy of his place in the ranks of the Revolution will -regard as nothing extraordinary difficulties and dangers that -would daunt others. His revolutionary spirit, which is the -very spirit of action, gives him a sublime indifference to -whatever may be the magnitude of the demands his duty -makes upon him; whatever his principles, faith and responsibility -involve is "all in the day's work" for him, -though it be ordeal by fire and water or the abnegation of -everything dearest to him. He takes no account of difficulty, -and fear is a thing still stranger to him. It is in the sense -that to a man with such an attitude action is <i>easy</i> that I use -the word.</p> - -<p>Action born of that innate character given us with life, -conceived in absolute sincerity, and aimed at the good of -others treats things as "all of a piece." From beginning to -end of an appointed task it maintains a uniform consistency -and integrity of purpose. The seeds of its final success are -inherent in its first beginnings. Difficulty and failure as I -understand them can have no part in such action.</p> - -<p>Positive action with a complete integrity of purpose -produces that honesty and trustworthiness which are distinctive -marks of all true action. It penetrates to the core of -matters, and deals only in realities. It is free from superficial -trappings and fuss; permits of no slack approximation and -evasion of the point, all of which comes from that shrinking -from effort and hardship that is so incompatible with the -spirit of positive action. Whereas I have called all true action -<i>easy</i>, those who go about things without its spirit find -themselves confronted with seemingly insurmountable difficulties -everywhere. When the ancients said: "There is -nothing either difficult or easy in the world," they had in -mind this way of thinking, as I had too when I said that -wartime and peacetime were one and the same.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_382" id="Page_382">[Pg 382]</a></span></p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Sincerity the Root of Action and Goodwill</span></h3> - -<p>The next thing to consider is what is to be the central -aim of our action. I would answer if asked this with a -single word: "Goodwill." Action is the <i>practice of goodwill</i> -in its deepest sense.</p> - -<p>Goodwill is grounded in the sense of justice and issues -from complete sincerity. The sincere man is necessarily -conscious of goodwill and he is necessarily possessed of the -moral courage required to practice it. The ancients said -"there is completeness in sincerity," and again, "where -there is not sincerity there is a void." The place of sincerity -in human life is indeed like that of energy in the atom, the -structure of which would collapse without it. If a man's -life lacks "ardent sincerity," he will likewise be powerless -to form and manifest the three key-virtues of judgment, -goodwill, and courage. And without the strength to be -derived from those virtues, the Three Principles of the -People can make no headway. Only by action inspired -with perfect sincerity can the splendid truths of those Principles -be asserted and translated into fact.</p> - -<p>Sincerity is dependent upon the sense of justice. The -keynote of our Republican Revolution has been the smashing -of selfish individualism and the rescue of our people -from their sufferings and of our nation from its peril. To -achieve what yet remains to be done, to acquit ourselves -well as a section of humanity, and to explore the full -scope of possible human well-being, all we do and enact -must be grounded in perfect sincerity. Then the pains we -take and the plans we devise will prove creative, progressive, -and constructive; we shall put flesh on the bones of the -egalitarian philosophy of social justice; we shall be clear -as to what we think and are aiming at; we shall be able -to give full expression to our true nature and faculties, -proceeding in all we do resolutely, frankly, and boldly.</p> - -<p>Action attains its highest point of intensity in the giving -of one's life in the cause of justice, when death in that -cause is accepted as sweet and shorn of all its terrors. "One -may die in the course of willing men good, but life is not to -be purchased at the price of willing them ill" is a classical -teaching we may take as a supreme ideal of positive action. -Action that lives up to that ideal will inevitably be <i>revolutionary</i>, -while, vice versa, it is only genuinely revolutionary -conduct that possesses the true qualities of positive action. -Sincerity is the primal motive force of action. With it, a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_383" id="Page_383">[Pg 383]</a></span> -man is aware only of the interests he has in common with -his fellow-men, and of none that conflicts with those of -his fellow-men. With sincerity, a man acts his will to good -in perfect self-possession, pushing steadily onwards through -difficulty and danger to success. This is the bearing of Dr. -Sun's teaching on the revolutionary movement.</p> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">The Laws of Action</span></h3> - -<p>In what I have said so far I have sketched the outlines of -our conception of action. Men differ in profession, rank -and work; but there is not a single one of us but must be -a <i>man of action</i> if our revolutionary aims are to be completely -realized. Action, however, is subject to certain laws, -which I now wish to go into. It must, firstly, have its <i>point-de-départ</i>, -secondly its regular order of procedure (that is, -a methodical and scientific plan), thirdly, its definite goal, -and lastly it must possess the qualities of constancy and -continuity.</p> - - -<h4>One: The Starting Point</h4> - -<p>Firstly, by <i>point-de-départ</i> we mean the careful selection -of whatever way of approach may be most appropriate, direct, -and efficacious for the carrying out of our projects. -The same is true of study, affairs, and revolutionary action. -The ancients said: "Ascent must start from places low; remote -objectives are attained from near beginnings." This -was their way of expressing the nature of the <i>point-de-départ</i>. -If any mistake is made about it we are bound to miss our -objective and destination however sure we may be of the -direction in which we want to go. Again, if we try to run -before we can walk, or skip preliminaries, or gain the -heights by some ill-considered short-cut, our work will inevitably -prove abortive.</p> - - -<h4>Two: Ordered Unfolding of Plans</h4> - -<p>Secondly, the necessity for what I have called "a regular -order of procedure" means the uselessness of reliance upon -mere verve and enthusiasm, and the futility of action taken -on the spur of some transitory turn of thought, action which -is bound to encounter unforeseen obstacles in its course, -be disconcerted by them, and lose its character as action -by becoming some irrational form of <i>motion</i>. Action must -be preceded by the laying down of plans and choice of -a mode of procedure whereby all possible contingencies<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_384" id="Page_384">[Pg 384]</a></span> -may be allowed for and prepared for. The plans, moreover, -must be precise in matters of time and space, and -in quantitative and numerical considerations. They must, -when decided upon, be carried out with due attention to -detail, and with periodical stock-taking of the ground covered. -A steady rate of advance will thus be maintained. -When it is possible to make plans it is obviously also possible -to foresee to a great extent the circumstances of time -and place under which the plans will be carried out and -the quantitative and numerical requirements that will have -to be met. In scientific accordance with these foreseen circumstances -and requirements the execution of the whole -project should be apportioned among the persons involved -so that each has work in all respects congenial to his qualities, -while provision is also made for cooperation between -all concerned. With order and method in procedure there -will be no putting of the cart before the horse, no abrupt -intrusion of irrelevancies, no slackening at moments of -urgency, or precipitate speed where none is needed; day by -day and step by step substantial progress will be made. -In this way we shall have no abortive enterprises, nor the -disappointment they engender.</p> - - -<h4>Three: Unswerving Aim at the Target</h4> - -<p>Coming, thirdly, to the matter of <i>goal</i>, it should be like -a conspicuous target at which one takes steady, unfaltering, -aim. No matter whether the work we are engaged in be -of vast or slight dimensions, its aim should be seen, as it -were, through sights trained on the main target of an ideal -goal. To every piece of work there must be a beginning and -an end, a clearly-defined destination. Before the destination -be reached there can be no pause in our concentrated -effort.</p> - - -<h4>Four: The Even Texture of a Life of Action</h4> - -<p>Lastly, with regard to the fourth and especially important -point: perseverance and continuity, the very qualities that, -as I said at the beginning, distinguish <i>action</i> from <i>motion</i>. -I spoke of action as essentially regular, orderly, and purposeful, -and said that such action would necessarily be revolutionary -action and its influence revolutionary influence. In -other words, revolutionary action unfolds in an unbroken -uniformity of effort; it draws on the funds of moral vigor -in our national genius, and provides a new channel for the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_385" id="Page_385">[Pg 385]</a></span> -expression of the great moral qualities of which that genius -is composed, whereby it may rehabilitate the status to which -it is properly entitled. It must be realized that our Revolutionary -and the reconstructive activities pursue a broad -and enlightened policy free from all manner of trickery -and opportunism. We are actuated by a spirit of extraordinary -power, but what we are doing is nothing abnormal -as the word should be understood, and our methods -are wholly realistic.</p> - -<p>All unnatural and inhuman conduct, and illogical and -unscientific methods, result in frustration and can have no -place in revolutionary activity. The ancients spoke of -"acts of routine virtue" in their emphasis upon the almost -<i>humdrum</i>, stolid, qualities of true virtue. Our Revolution -is likewise dependent upon the capacity to maintain a -course of persevering and continuous effort; the behavior -required is in no way peculiar or foreign to everyday life. -For out of continuity comes perseverance and what we -may call <i>ease</i>. Tsêng Kuo-fan said: "things should be done -soundlessly and as it were 'odorlessly,' with both precision -and economy of effort." By this he meant not wooden impassivity -or dry-as-dust pedantry but directness, simplicity, -and an absence of fuss, a straightforward and unassuming -way of going about things. In working for the success of -the Revolution we should cultivate the attitude of the -nameless hero who braves dangers and endures hardships -as matters of course. We shall thus keep in touch with the -people and render the influence of what we do in the service -of mankind broad and lasting.</p> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">Formation and Constancy of Purpose</span></h3> - -<p>Unremitting perseverance to the very end of our task, -every day we live a day of positive action, and full employment -of our powers in harmony with the laws of Nature -and Man, are the conditions for our successful accomplishment -of our revolutionary mission. Among Tsêng Kuo-fan's -self-admonitory words on "Formation of Purpose" -there are the following phrases: "To cast away the gifts of -Heaven and live in sloth will bring upon me some evil -catastrophe.... This I swear never to forget as long as I -can still draw breath." That is to say, the formation of -our purpose in life requires of us diligent and courageous -devotion and the full exercise of our talents. The great -writer and statesman also admonished himself on the subject<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_386" id="Page_386">[Pg 386]</a></span> -of steadfastness of purpose, reproaching himself: "Again -and again have you been delinquent in your duties and -endeavors, and been swayed by material temptations; but -no one has ever heard of your being unpunctual at mealtimes!" -How is it, he meant, that if we can be regular in -attending to our material wants we cannot be equally unfailing -in the performance of our duties? The full accomplishment -of any aim requires strong-minded formation and -steadfastness of purpose. The true meaning of the words -"let the superior man exert himself with the unfailing -pertinacity of Nature" embraces this.</p> - -<p>I have now completed my explanation of the fundamental -principles involved in positive action. I wish to conclude -by once again exhorting you all to firm faith in the Tsung-li's -teaching: "From true knowledge action naturally proceeds." -The meaning of the Revolution is as bright and -spacious as the skies; and the clearer our comprehension of -it the more vigor we shall put into the practice of it. -Moreover, the methods we are to adopt and the mode of -procedure we are to follow have been laid down for us in -detail by Dr. Sun Wên. We have only to obey his directions, -each of us playing a part for which his temperament, -calling and knowledge fits him, relying upon his faculties -for the discernment of moral and material good at every -step in his bold and resolute execution of his duty to nation -and people.</p> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">Action Engenders Knowledge</span></h3> - -<p>I wish to say another word on the subject of the <i>knowledge</i> -from which as we have seen action proceeds; and what -I have to say is: that just as action proceeds from knowledge, -action in its turn engenders knowledge. Dr. Sun said: -"The ability to know implies the ability to act." I would -add the words: "without action one cannot attain to knowledge." -For knowledge comes with experience, and apart -from the broad and fundamental truths of revolutionary -thought our knowledge need not necessarily be in the first -place very rich. Though, therefore, we must of course do -all we can to acquire knowledge for its own sake, we must -at the same time seek it as one of the fruits of positive -action. Any knowledge acquired in the course of study, research, -or experience which we do not proceed to put to the -test of practice in the field of actuality is not to be considered -with certainty as worthy of being called true knowledge. -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_387" id="Page_387">[Pg 387]</a></span>So it is that in all our undertakings practice will -yield us true knowledge, and action alone will give us the -ability to extend and enrich our knowledge. Chu Hsi in his -commentary on the <i>Great Learning</i> wrote: "By long application -of our powers we one day reach a point whence we -see the whole scheme of things spread out before us, we -perceive the realities underlying phenomena, the relation -of accident to essence, and the structure and workings of the -human mind." This attainment can come only as the -fruit of positive action. If in the course of practice and -experience knowledge we have acquired and methods we -have based on it prove inefficacious we may take it that -what we valued as knowledge was not true knowledge. In -this way we shall be constantly broadening the scope and -sifting the quality of our knowledge, which is the genuine -process of gaining knowledge. "To be aware of ignorance -brings knowledge" and "the open mind invites the entrance -of information," are maxims than which none are better -as guides in the search for knowledge.</p> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">Comrades in Revolution! Resolve Anew!</span></h3> - -<p>I am well aware of the magnitude of our revolutionary -task of Resistance and Reconstruction, and I have been no -less impressed with recent manifestations of my comrades' -will to action. I have felt impelled by the one and encouraged -by the other to present you today this exposition -of positive action and of what is requisite for its success, -in the hope that you will all keep in mind these indispensable -principles, gathering fresh knowledge with experience, -acting with deliberation, perspicacity, and conscientiousness, -spurning all things that tend to distract you from your -fixed purpose and involve you in the wild and motiveless -conduct of those who possess no such fixed purpose. In -the <i>Chung-Yung</i>, or <i>Doctrine of the Mean</i>, there is a passage -emphasizing the importance of "conscientiousness" in -action, by which it means the refusal to be satisfied with -half-measures, the pursuit of ends to their logical conclusion. -If you give earnest thought to what I have said you -will realize that very much of what has long passed with us -for action has not been true action, that is, not positive -action, and that therefore we have failed in much that we -have undertaken. It is only because our action has not been -really positive that we have allowed our minds to enlarge -on the difficulties and dangers of the Revolution. In fact,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_388" id="Page_388">[Pg 388]</a></span> -these difficulties exist only for those whose minds lack -resolution, enthusiasm and faith. The ancient adage says: -"There's nothing difficult in the world if there's a man of -spirit to be found" (where there's a will there's a way). -This is a piece of the age-old proverbial wisdom of the -people, and it may well serve us as a salutary warning -against the slack thinking and evil habits concealed beneath -the airy phrase: "It's easy enough to know what should be -done; it's acting accordingly that's hard."</p> - -<p>We need, therefore, in the revolutionary nation-building -we have before us only to assert our wills, inflame our -hearts with a fresh sincerity and faith, and give ourselves -up to positive action. If everyone of us does so, I have no -hesitation in pronouncing it will mean the certainty of -our success.</p> - -<div class="footnotes"> - -<h3>FOOTNOTE:</h3> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_215" id="Footnote_1_215"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_215"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> Chiang K'ai-shek, <i>A Philosophy of Action, or What I Mean by -Action</i>, Chungking, 1940; p. 7-20. The accompanying foreword and -notes are here omitted. The translation is the work of Mr. Ma P'in-ho, -a naturalized Chinese scholar but of European race and nativity.</p></div></div> - - -<hr class="chap" /> - - -<h2><i>C.</i> DEFINITION OF THE PROBLEMS CONCERNING THE ORGANIZATION OF -THE VARIOUS CLASSIFICATIONS OF <i>HSIEN</i> (CHIANG K'AI-SHEK)<a name="FNanchor_1_216" id="FNanchor_1_216"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_216" class="fnanchor">[1]</a></h2> - - -<blockquote> - -<p>One of a series of lectures, each issued separately, entitled <i>The Conclusions -of the Party Chief</i>, and originally delivered before the Party -and Government Training Class of the Central Training Corps. Compare -with Appendix I (G), p. <a href="#Page_324">324</a>.</p> - -<p>The chart, opposite, is a translation of the chart appended to the -original Chinese of the Generalissimo's booklet on <i>Hsien</i>. P.M.A.L.</p></blockquote> - - -<p class="center">ORGANIZATION OF THE VARIOUS CLASSIFICATIONS OF HSIEN</p> - -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 400px;"> -<a href="images/i_388fp-large.jpg"><img src="images/i_388fp.jpg" width="400" height="663" alt="" /></a> -</div> - -<p>At the fifth meeting of the Fourth Plenary Session of the -Central Executive and Supervisory Committees of the -Kuomintang on April 8, 1938, I made a speech on "The -Reform of Party Affairs and Readjustments for Party and -Political Organizations." Attached to that speech was a -draft chart showing the interrelations among the Party and -political organizations under the <i>hsien</i>, with illustrations -and explanations. I pointed out then that the chart was -only intended as an initial draft. As to promulgating the -detailed formulae and laws for execution, I pointed out that -the draft was only to serve as a basis and that the wording -in which the draft was written should not prove too<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_389" id="Page_389">[Pg 389]</a></span> -binding. There should be plenty of room for further study and -discussion so that perfection might be obtained. Furthermore, -the draft chart was intended mainly as an exposition -of the relations between Party and political organizations -(hence it was also called "Party and Political Affairs -Chart"). The various administrative organizations were attached -as an appendix to it.</p> - -<p>Since the publication of this draft chart, the serious attention -of many of our comrades, scholars and specialists -has been aroused. In many districts experiments have been -carried on—a fact which is indeed very gratifying and -which evidences the earnest desire on the part of various -local administrations for reform.</p> - -<p>The Party and Political Personnel Training Class was -recently inaugurated by the Central Training Corps. In -order to lecture on the problems covered in the draft chart -and lay out the necessary formulae, I had instructed several -of my associates to collect views and data from all possible -sources and to make a thorough study of the question. -Under my personal supervision, the original draft has been -revised and supplemented. The main points contained -therein may be summarized as follows:</p> - -<blockquote> -<p>1. In connection with Party organizations, the <i>ch'ü</i><a name="FNanchor_2_217" id="FNanchor_2_217"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_217" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> -(township) office should be linked up with the <i>hsiang</i> -(<i>chên</i>), while small units should be established under the -<i>pao chia</i> system. Thus the Party organizations are brought -to conformity with the political. The network of Party members' -supervisory organizations should be placed directly -under the Supervisory Committee of the <i>hsien</i> Party headquarters.</p> - -<p>2. The <i>hsien</i> is the unit of local government autonomy. -The <i>hsien</i> should be classified into three to six groups according -to their area, population, economic resources, cultural -and communication development. Below the <i>hsien</i>, -the <i>hsiang</i> (<i>chên</i>) constitutes the basic lower unit, with <i>pao</i> -or village and streets as their constituents. Elasticity may -be allowed between the <i>hsien</i> and <i>hsiang</i> according to local -requirements. When and where necessary, a <i>ch'ü</i> (township) -office may be established to serve as the connecting link, -but if this is not needed, the <i>hsiang</i> (<i>chên</i>) should be placed -under the direct jurisdiction of the <i>hsien</i>. The same elasticity -may exist between the <i>hsiang</i> (<i>chên</i>) and <i>pao</i>. In densely<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_390" id="Page_390">[Pg 390]</a></span> -populated areas, a village and a street may form one natural -unit, inseparable from each other. In such cases, one unit -may consist of two or three <i>pao</i> with one <i>pao chang</i> (chief -of the <i>pao</i>) at the helm of affairs, so that unnecessary breaking-up -of the village from the street may be avoided. To -eliminate difficulties arising from finances and personnel, -all the posts of secretaries (<i>kan shih</i>) of the <i>hsiang</i> (<i>chên</i>) -and <i>pao</i> (or village and street) may be concurrently served -by the teachers of primary schools, while the school principals -of the <i>hsiang</i> (<i>chên</i>) and <i>pao</i> should concurrently -serve as leader of the able-bodied citizens' corps (<i>Chuang -ting tui</i>) in accordance with the principle of unity of administration, -instruction, support and protection. In areas -with better economic and educational development where -affairs concerning local autonomy are multifarious, the -principals of <i>hsiang</i> (<i>chên</i>) primary schools and pao citizens' -[mass education] schools should preferably concentrate -on their school jobs with a view to efficiency. The masses -should be organized into different groups to undertake -different works in order to meet the actual requirements.</p> - -<p>3. In connection with organs for expressing the views -and opinions of the people, there should be organized the -<i>pao</i> people's assembly, the <i>hsiang</i> (<i>chên</i>) people's representative -assembly, the <i>hsien</i> council, each vested with -proper authority, with a view to increasing the people's -interest in participating in government affairs. Thus the -influence of the masses may be properly magnified and the -goal of true democracy attained. With a view to greater -alacrity, I wish to explain in further detail as follows:</p> -</blockquote> - -<h3><span class="smcap">A. Readjustments in the Relations among the Various Administrative -Party and Political Organizations of the</span> <i>Hsien</i></h3> - -<p class="center">(<i>This item, consisting of eleven articles, is not intended for publication.</i>)</p> - -<p>A routine announcement of Party duties, of Party supervision of -local morale, of seniorities as between Party and Government officers, -etc. follows. It has been omitted in accordance with the statement in -parentheses.</p> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">B. Political Organizations</span></h3> - -<p>1. The <i>hsien</i> is the unit of local autonomy. These units -can be classified into from three to six groups according to -the population, economic status, culture and communication. -On the one hand, the <i>hsien</i> governments should<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_391" id="Page_391">[Pg 391]</a></span> -handle affairs concerning local autonomy of their respective -district under the supervision of the provincial government -and on the other hand should carry out the orders of the -Central and provincial governments.</p> - -<blockquote> -<p><i>a.</i> The area of the <i>hsien</i> under the present system -should remain the same as before. The cancellation of the -<i>hsien</i> and the change in its area are to be decided upon only -with the authorization and approval of the Central Government. -In the <i>hsien</i> there should be a magistrate, under -whom there should be secretaries, section chiefs, directors, -police officers, senior and junior staff members in the different -sections, technicians and assistants and police patrol -officers handling civic, financial, educational, construction, -military, land, and social affairs. The number of sections -to be provided under the <i>hsien</i> governments and their duties -is to be decided by the provincial government which in making -decisions is to take into consideration the local requirements -of the <i>hsien</i> concerned. The number of staff members, -and their ranks and salaries, is likewise to be decided upon -by the provincial government.</p> - -<p><i>b.</i> In each <i>hsien</i> there should be held <i>hsien</i> political -affairs meetings at which decisions concerning the <i>hsien</i> -administration are to be reached and proposals made for -submission to the <i>hsien</i> People's Council. The <i>hsien</i> political -affairs meetings should be held irrespective of whether -the <i>hsien</i> Council has been established or not.</p> - -<p><i>c.</i> The rules and regulations governing the organization -of the <i>hsien</i> governments should be promulgated by -the provincial governments and then submitted to the Central -Government for approval.</p> -</blockquote> - -<p>2. The <i>ch'ü</i> (township) office is a subsidiary organization -to the <i>hsien</i> government. Its duty is to supervise the -affairs of the various <i>hsiang</i> (<i>chên</i>) on behalf of the <i>hsien</i> -government in connection with the enforcement of local -autonomy.</p> - -<blockquote> -<p><i>a.</i> The scope of the <i>ch'ü</i> should consist of from six -to fifteen <i>hsiang</i>. In those <i>hsien</i> in which the total number -of <i>hsiang</i> is below fifteen, no <i>ch'ü</i> office should be established. -The <i>hsiang</i> in such cases are to be placed under -the direct jurisdiction of the <i>hsien</i> government. In frontier -regions where special conditions obtain, specifications for -the number of <i>hsiang</i> for the <i>ch'ü</i> office may be modified.</p> - -<p>In <i>hsien</i> where no <i>ch'ü</i> office is established, the <i>hsien</i> -government should appoint representatives to supervise -the affairs of the different <i>hsiang</i>.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_392" id="Page_392">[Pg 392]</a></span></p> - -<p><i>b.</i> The <i>ch'ü</i> office is headed by a district chief under -whom there should be two to five directors handling civic, -financial, construction, education, and military affairs. All -such personnel are by special appointment with pay, and -they should be chosen by the superior organizations from -those who have received appropriate training. The district -chiefs should preferably be those who come from the districts -to which they are designated, their qualifications and treatment -to be fixed by law.</p> - -<p><i>c.</i> In the place where the <i>ch'ü</i> office is seated, there -should be established a police bureau which is to be under -the direction of the district chief dealing with the police -administration of the place.</p> - -<p><i>d.</i> In the <i>ch'ü</i> there should be established the <i>hsiang</i> -reconstruction committee comprising local leaders as members. -This committee is to conduct research and map out -the plans concerning rural reconstruction, the district -chief acting concurrently as its chairman.</p> - -<p><i>e.</i> In order to increase the vocational ability of the -people and develop local industries, there should be established -in the <i>ch'ü</i> vocational training classes.</p> - -<p><i>f.</i> In addition to the number of policemen as specified, -there should be organized in the <i>ch'ü</i> the joint able-bodied -citizens' corps (<i>Chuang-ting lien tui-pu</i>) office which is -to control and supervise the <i>Chuang-ting</i> of the various -<i>hsiang</i> (<i>chên</i>). Whenever necessary, the <i>chuang-ting</i> may -be summoned together for special training and organization.</p> - -<p><i>g.</i> The <i>ch'ü</i> office should unite together all the <i>hsiang</i> -(<i>chên</i>) cooperative societies and organize them into cooperative -unions. Each union is to consist of several departments -dealing with different cooperative enterprises. The -<i>ch'ü</i> office should appoint a supervisor to be stationed in -the union.</p> -</blockquote> - -<p>3. The <i>hsiang</i> (<i>chên</i>) is to be defined as the basic administrative -unit under the <i>hsien</i>, and its organization -should be substantiated accordingly.</p> - -<blockquote> -<p>a. Each <i>hsiang</i> in principle comprises six to fifteen <i>pao</i>. -In drawing such limits, however, consideration should be -given to the historical background and natural conditions -of the locality. The demarcation and the organization of -the <i>pao chia</i> system are to be decided upon by the <i>hsien</i> -government, subject to the approval of the provincial -government. Reports must also be submitted to the Central -Government.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_393" id="Page_393">[Pg 393]</a></span></p> -<p><i>b.</i> The chief personnel of the <i>hsiang</i> guild (<i>kung so</i>) -should include a director (<i>hsiang chang</i>) and one or two -vice-directors. They are to be elected from qualified citizens -at the <i>hsiang</i> people's representative meetings. In the guild -there should be provided four departments, handling civic, -police, economic and cultural affairs respectively, each to be -headed by one man with several staff members. These posts -should be held by the vice-directors and teachers of the -<i>hsiang</i> primary schools. The date for the election of the -director and vice-directors of the <i>hsiang</i> is to be fixed and -announced in orders to be issued by the <i>hsien</i> government. -The term of their office will be two years.</p> - -<p><i>c.</i> There should be established in each <i>hsiang</i> a central -school composed of three divisions for children, women -especially, and adults. There should be primary and -higher primary classes. The posts of the school principal, -leader of the able-bodied citizens' corps, and director of the -<i>hsiang</i> are to be concurrently held by one man. The -teachers are to undertake the extracurricular duties of -training and supervising. They are also to help the <i>hsiang -director</i> to handle affairs of the <i>hsiang</i>. In the higher -primary class of the school stress should be laid on training -the masses to enable them to undertake the work of census-taking, -promotion of health and sanitation and cooperative -affairs.</p> - -<p>In places with better economic and educational development, -the principals of the <i>hsiang</i> central schools should -preferably concentrate on their own duties at school.</p> - -<p><i>d.</i> The cooperative societies also have the <i>hsiang</i> as -the unit (with branch societies in the <i>pao</i>). There should -also be established in the <i>hsiang</i> public safe-deposit agencies -for the storage of articles. Separate granaries should be -set up whenever necessary.</p> - -<p><i>e.</i> The leader of the <i>hsiang</i> able-bodied citizens' corps -should from time to time summon chosen groups of the -<i>chuang ting</i> of the <i>pao</i> to the <i>hsiang</i> to undergo advanced -training. During the training period, they are to perform -police duties and when the period expires they are to be -sent back to take up the work as junior officers of the able-bodied -citizens' corps of the <i>pao</i>, charged also with the -duties of promoting local autonomy in the <i>pao</i>. Thus not -only will the police force be strengthened, but various -activities properly developed. The outposts established in -the <i>hsiang</i> by the <i>hsien</i> police bureaus should also be placed -under the direction of the <i>hsiang</i> director.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_394" id="Page_394">[Pg 394]</a></span></p> -<p><i>f.</i> The <i>hsiang</i> should convene <i>hsiang</i> affairs meetings -with the director as chairman and all the department heads -and senior members of the staff in attendance. The chiefs -of the <i>pao</i> concerning whom proposals are submitted to -the meeting should also be present.</p> - -<p><i>g.</i> A hospital or clinic should be established for each -<i>hsiang</i> or a number of <i>hsiang</i>. These hospitals or clinics -should be staffed with Western-trained doctors. In case of -lack of personnel and finance, [old-style] Chinese physicians -may do on a temporary basis.</p> -</blockquote> - -<p>4. The <i>pao</i> should be defined as a constituent of the -<i>hsiang</i> and its organization be substantiated accordingly.</p> - -<blockquote> -<p><i>a.</i> Each <i>pao</i> is to consist of from six to fifteen <i>chia</i>, -headed by a <i>pao chang</i> (chief of the <i>pao</i>) and an assistant -<i>pao chang</i>. They are to be elected from qualified citizens -at the <i>pao</i> people's meeting, and their names are to be submitted -by the <i>hsiang</i> guild to the <i>hsien</i> government. Before -the election, the <i>pao chang</i> and assistant <i>pao chang</i> may -be nominated by the <i>hsiang</i> guild subject to official appointment -by the <i>hsien</i> government. In the office of the <i>pao</i> there -should be two to four secretaries (<i>kan shih</i>) handling civic, -police, economic and cultural affairs. These posts may be -concurrently held by the assistant <i>pao chang</i> and teachers -of citizens' (mass education) schools. In <i>pao</i> with limited -finances, one secretary may suffice.</p> - -<p>The term of office for the <i>pao chang</i> and assistant <i>pao -chang</i> will be two years. They may be re-elected at the expiration -of their term of office.</p> - -<p><i>b.</i> All affairs of the <i>pao</i> should be discussed and transacted -at <i>pao</i> affairs meeting in which as many capable citizens -of the <i>pao</i> as possible are to be asked to participate, in -order to hasten progress of the reconstruction of the <i>pao</i>.</p> - -<p><i>c.</i> All the activities undertaken by the <i>pao</i> are to be -under the supervision and direction of the hsiang guild, -the <i>ch'ü</i> office and the <i>hsien</i> government. The latter superior -organs should give constant help and advice so that the -program of work may be carried out step by step as desired.</p> - -<p><i>d.</i> Every <i>pao</i> is to have a mass education school, with -the principal of the school concurrently serving as the <i>pao -chang</i> and as the leader of the <i>pao</i> able-bodied citizens' -corps. The school is to comprise three divisions for children, -for women especially, and for adults, and its aim is -to raise the level of education and vocational ability of the -masses. Teachers are also to help the <i>pao chang</i> in dealing -with various affairs of the <i>pao</i>.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_395" id="Page_395">[Pg 395]</a></span></p> -<p>In <i>pao</i> better-developed in economic resources and education, -the principles of the mass education schools should -preferably concentrate on their school duties.</p> - -<p><i>e.</i> Membership of the <i>pao</i> branches of the cooperative -societies is composed of the families in the <i>pao</i>. The directors -of the branch societies are to be elected by members. -The <i>pao chang</i> can be elected and concurrently hold this -office.</p> - -<p><i>f.</i> The <i>pao</i> office, the <i>pao</i> able-bodied citizens' corps -and the <i>pao</i> mass education schools should be simultaneously -established. They should have a joint office so that -affairs of common interest may be pushed from the same -center.</p> - -<p><i>g.</i> In densely populated areas where a village and a -street seem each to be an integral part of the other, two -or three <i>pao</i> may be amalgamated, the amalgamation not -exceeding three <i>pao</i>. The mass education schools, branch -cooperative societies and treasuries, likewise, may be amalgamated, -with only the <i>pao</i> able-bodied citizens' corps remaining -separate. One presiding <i>pao chang</i> is to be elected -to take the helm of affairs, and a joint office is to be established.</p> - -<p><i>h.</i> The <i>pao</i> should be equipped with a medicine box, -with one of the mass education school teachers trained in -rudiments of the medical science, in charge. He is to -give simple treatment for diseases and to give small-pox -vaccination. If this should prove beyond the finances of -one <i>pao</i>, several <i>pao</i> may join together.</p> - -<p><i>i.</i> The organization of the <i>chia</i> is to consist of from -six to fifteen families, headed by a <i>chia chang</i>. There should -be meetings of the heads of families, and general <i>chia</i> conferences, -held from time to time.</p> - -<p>The <i>chia chang</i> is to be elected at the meeting of heads -of families. His name is to be submitted by the <i>pao</i> office -to the <i>hsiang</i> guild.</p> - -<p><i>j.</i> The <i>pao</i> may retain its old name, such as <i>ts'un</i> -(village), <i>chieh</i> (street) or <i>ch'ang</i> (market), but it is desired -that they should gradually adopt the official name of -<i>pao</i> with a view to uniformity.</p> -</blockquote> - -<h3>C. <span class="smcap">People's Organs through Which Popular -Political Opinions May Be Expressed</span></h3> - -<p>1. To increase the people's interest in participation in -government affairs and to train their political insight and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_396" id="Page_396">[Pg 396]</a></span> -ability in accordance with the principle of the inherent -unity of teaching, learning and practicing, people's organs -for discussion of government affairs for the various administrative -units under the <i>hsien</i> should be established -within specified time limits, and these organs should be -vested with the appropriate authority.</p> - -<p>2. In the <i>pao</i> should be established the <i>pao</i> people's -meeting to elect the <i>pao chang</i>; the <i>hsiang</i>, the <i>hsiang</i> people's -representative meeting to elect the <i>hsiang chang</i>.<a name="FNanchor_3_218" id="FNanchor_3_218"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_218" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> -(The qualifications and standards of both the <i>pao chang</i> -and the <i>hsiang chang</i> are to be specified by law.) Thus it -is hoped to attain the ideal standards of local government -and to establish the system of the people's supervision of -the government. No people's organ is needed for the <i>ch'ü</i> -(district), while the <i>hsien</i> people's council will serve as -the general organ for people of the entire <i>hsien</i>.</p> - -<p>3. With a view to flexibility in the exercise of the people's -privileges, members of the <i>hsien</i> people's council are -to be brought forth at the <i>hsiang</i> people's representative -meetings. Each <i>hsiang</i> is entitled to elect one representative -as member of the council. The number of representatives -of legitimate professional bodies may be increased in order -to put representation of the districts and that of the professions -on equal footing. Representatives to the <i>hsiang</i> -people's meeting are to be produced at the <i>pao</i> people's -meeting. Each <i>pao</i> is entitled to two representatives. The -<i>pao</i> people's meeting should be attended by one person -from each family whose qualifications and position in the -family conforms to specifications in the law.</p> - -<p>4. The <i>hsiang chang</i> and <i>pao chang</i> who are elected may -both act as chairmen of their respective people's organs, -namely the <i>hsiang</i> people's representative meeting and the -<i>pao</i> people's meeting. The <i>hsien</i> people's council for the -time being is not to elect the magistrate. It is to elect its -own chairman.</p> - -<p>5. Before the <i>hsien</i> people's council is organized, the -budget and accounts of the <i>hsien</i> government should be -studied and passed by the <i>hsien</i> Administrative Meeting and -then submitted by the magistrate to the provincial government -for approval.</p> - -<p>After the <i>hsien</i> people's council is inaugurated, the -budget and accounts of the <i>hsien</i> should be presented to -the council for examination and then submitted to the -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_397" id="Page_397">[Pg 397]</a></span>provincial government for approval. When necessary, the -budget and accounts may first be sent to the provincial -government for approval and then the council may be -approached for confirmation and verification.</p> - - -<h3><span class="smcap">Explanation</span></h3> - -<p>1. The basic spirit of this draft is to arouse and mobilize -the masses, to strengthen local organization and hasten -district autonomy enterprises so that the cornerstone of -the revolution and national reconstruction may be laid. -Some may be of the opinion that as education has not -been popularized, it would be difficult to allow the masses -participation in government affairs. But the political system -stressing on people's privileges must be founded on -the will of the masses. If participation in government affairs -is allowed only after education has been developed -on a nation-wide scale, the slogan "revolutionized people's -privileges" will be of no meaning. The people need only -be trained practically in the exercise of their political -privileges, and the main task of the government during the -political tutelage period lies in teaching the people how to -exercise their four rights [election; recall; initiative; referendum]. -Tutelary government [Party-dictatorship] and constitutional -government are different only in degree but not in -fundamentals. During the period of tutelage, therefore, the -interest of the people in participation in government affairs -must be gradually aroused and increased. Thus measures -enforced with this purpose in view during the political -tutelage period may not contravene the aims of constitutional -government, and the progress from tutelage to constitutionalism -may be attained smoothly. This explains the -transitional process from the beginning to the complete -realization of autonomous government and it was for such -an explanation that this draft was prepared.</p> - -<p>2. With a view to the solution of the personnel and -financial problems confronting the various basic administrative -units, the <i>hsiang</i> chief, <i>hsiang</i> central school principal, -and the <i>hsiang</i> leader of the able-bodied citizens' -corps, excepting in those areas more highly developed in -education and economic resources, should be the same man. -The same thing applies to the <i>pao</i>. All those charged with -administrative duties should pay attention to education -which should serve as the means to attain the objectives of -the revolution and national reconstruction. Those with<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_398" id="Page_398">[Pg 398]</a></span> -educational responsibilities should give their time and -energy also to the organization and training of the masses. -They should consider the masses as their students, the -society as a school and all existing circumstances and conditions -as references of instruction. Emphasis should also -be laid on instructing the people how to live properly, how -to accomplish their duties. The basic principles governing -the revolutionary movement and national reconstruction as -laid down by our late Leader [Sun Yat-sen], measures on the -control of rice and the control of land as stipulated in the -ordinances and regulations governing district autonomy, -together with the seven measures previously announced by -the Central Government, should all be included in the scope -of instruction. It was with these considerations in mind -that this draft provides that teachers of the <i>hsiang</i> middle -[secondary] and <i>pao</i> mass-education schools should concurrently -act as secretaries of the <i>hsiang</i> guild and <i>pao</i> office. -It would not do to maintain the old system when school -teachers only taught in the classroom, with the result that -in many places where schools have been conducted for -many years people still refuse to be conscripted, to pay -taxes, to observe the New Life principles. This could be attributed -to the fact that teachers and others in charge of -the schools failed to do their duties.</p> - -<p>It is also provided in the ordinances and regulations governing -the initial enforcement of district autonomy that -"aside from enabling people to read and write, schools -should also emphasize what has been known as the 'omnipotency -of both hands' campaign." We should try to make -all the tools or machines that can increase the productive -ability of both hands, instead of relying on others. From -now on, therefore, local schools should emphasize vocational -training by which the students may be taught how to manufacture -simple machines. This is not merely scientific education -but also an important way of carrying out the doctrine -of the people's livelihood. It is therefore provided in -this draft that in the <i>ch'ü</i> (township) there should be established -the district vocational training class so that education -and living may be closely wedded.</p> - -<p>In the past, educational organization has been too complicated. -Besides primary schools, there have been mass -education schools, short-term primary schools, rural schools. -Now, since it is stipulated that the <i>pao</i> has <i>pao</i> mass education -schools and the <i>hsiang</i> has <i>hsiang</i> middle schools, the -children and adults should be taught in separate classes<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_399" id="Page_399">[Pg 399]</a></span> -but at the same school so that all the former units of education -may be absorbed. The tutor (<i>tao shêng</i>) system should -be used as much as possible in the hope that the entire -people of the nation may be given at least the minimum -education for citizenship within a limited period of time. -Thus all the personnel and finances may be concentrated; -the teachers may conveniently do their duty in directing -the masses into proper participation in various local enterprises. -In this way, education and autonomy may be closely -affiliated with each other.</p> - -<p>3. The organization of the various local administrative -units is roughly in accordance with the decimal system. In -such provisions of this draft, allowances have been made -whereby the difficulties in the way of enforcement of the -system may be solved. Once the scope of the various local -administrative units is fixed, all plans and programs such -as establishing schools, training personnel, appropriation -of funds and statistics may be mapped out according to -definite standards. The conduct of a big nation with its -variegated enterprises depends on strict organization in -war-time as well as in peace-time. In the army, for instance, -the number of units composing each army corps is definitely -fixed. Scientific administration must be governed by rules -and regulations.</p> - -<p>For the convenience of execution, certain elasticity has -been allowed in provisions concerning organization in this -draft. The <i>hsiang</i>, for instance, is composed of from six to -fifteen <i>pao</i>, and so on with other lower administrative units. -In cases where the village and the street cannot be separated, -joint organizations for the handling of affairs of common -interest is allowed. All these provisions are arrived at -in order to allow some flexibility whenever and wherever -necessary. Within the bounds of these regulations, the -various local district governments may exercise their discretion -in disposing their respective affairs without consulting -their superior governments. But they will not be permitted -to trespass beyond the limits because disorderly organizations -will make control and supervision hard.</p> - -<p>After the scope of the various local administrative units -is fixed, their respective spheres of education, health, cooperative -movements and police must also be uniformly determined -so that control, instruction, support, and protection -may have an equal and well-balanced development.</p> - -<p>4. Concerning the organization and training of the -masses, it is indeed regrettable that no wholesome<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_400" id="Page_400">[Pg 400]</a></span> -accomplishments have been achieved during the past many -years. According to this new draft, the following explanations -have to be made:</p> - -<blockquote> -<p><i>a.</i> Demarcation among people's groups and organizations: -the former is determined by professions and the latter -according to age and sex. From the standpoint of the requirements -of the country, the latter should be organized -first. Especially urgent is the demand for such organizations -as the able-bodied citizens' corps and women's associations. -From the standpoint of the needs of the people, the -organization of the professional groups should be put on -a sound basis as soon as possible, particularly the farmers, -laborers, and merchants groups which are vitally concerned -with the economic reconstruction movement of the country. -Steps, therefore, should immediately be taken in the -order of urgency. Next, for people's organizations, emphasis -is to be laid on organization and training; for the groups, -direction and supervision are to be stressed.</p> - -<p><i>b.</i> The work of organizing the various people's groups -should proceed from the bottom upwards because wholesome -organizations can only be had when the foundation is -soundly laid. In peace-time, this will help forward self-rule. -In war-time, it will help meet military needs. In the -past, the various people's groups (such as farmers' associations -and women's associations) had only nominal existence, -hanging their shingles in the <i>hsien</i> city, but few really -worked. The reasons might be many, but the main one has -been the failure on the part of those responsible to penetrate -into the lower strata of activities and help develop -them. It must be realized that the various people's groups -are necessary to the various administrative units in the -district autonomous government system just as parts to the -main body of a machine. Without the parts, the machine -would not be able to operate. From now on, therefore, -efforts must be made to substantiate the people's bodies so -that they may be enabled to function efficiently.</p> - -<p><i>c.</i> The able-bodied citizens' corps are necessary in -peace as well as in war-time. Attention should be paid both -to training and to the supervision so that their usefulness -may be fully developed. The constituents of the able-bodied -citizens' corps are the pillars of society, and on them -depends the successful realization of most enterprises concerning -district autonomy. In this lies the importance of -our late Leader's [Sun Yat-sen] teaching about "omnipotency -of both hands." During the training, emphasis should<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_401" id="Page_401">[Pg 401]</a></span> -not be on military alone but also on general and vocational -ability, in order to turn corps members into useful members -of society.</p> -</blockquote> - -<p>5. The people's organs for various local administrative -units serve best the purpose of training the people in the -exercise of their rights in government affairs. They constitute -the prerequisites for democracy. In the past, it has -proved difficult to secure <i>hsiang</i>, <i>pao</i> and <i>chia</i> chiefs; or, -after they were elected to their respective offices, they failed -to do their duties and some of them even committed acts -harmful to the people which slipped the notice of the superior -government offices. All these shortcomings must be -overcome by virtue of democratic measures. The higher -supervisory organizations, limited in personnel, can hardly -keep an eye on every small detail. The <i>hsiang</i> and <i>pao</i> -chiefs and other staff members under them are most closely -associated with the people. In order to prevent them from -undermining the people's interest for their selfish gains, -the democratic (<i>Min-chu</i>) control and supervision system -should be enforced as the most efficient and effective method. -That the <i>pao</i> people's meeting should be attended by the -families as representative units is a preliminary step. This -is so because China is an agricultural country, different -from other industrialized nations where the individual citizens -constitute the representative units. Representatives to -the <i>hsiang</i> people's representative meetings are to be produced -at the <i>pao</i> people's meeting. Councilors from the -<i>hsiang</i> and higher administrative units for the <i>hsien</i> people's -council are to be produced by indirect instead of direct -election. Next comes the question of increasing the -people's economic stability and developing local enterprises. -It is specially provided that adequate representation to the -various professional groups should be given in the <i>hsien</i> -people's council. (This is limited to the professional groups -and their representation is not to exceed thirty per cent.) -In this way the district conception and the interests of professions -are given equal consideration.</p> - -<p>6. To prepare the personnel for the various local administrative -government units, the various grades of schools -should be adapted to the needs of the local organizations -and enterprises. With such adaptation, the school training -may not be in vain and young students upon graduation -may find appropriate employment. A separate set of rules -and regulations should be promulgated whereby these -youths may be encouraged and their future welfare<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_402" id="Page_402">[Pg 402]</a></span> -safeguarded. At present, the training of such personnel and -their future disposal have not been systematically enough -planned. Proper remedy must be provided so that definite -standards may be fixed. Most important of all, persons -properly trained should be assigned to places where are -located their native home villages or towns. All such jobs -concerning the development of district enterprises like insurance -of treasuries or storehouses, transportation of rice -and foodstuffs, farmland irrigation, fishing, grazing, and -land reclamation, should all be filled by persons with -special technical training. As the development of such -district enterprises continues, the demand for appropriate -personnel will grow as a foregone conclusion.</p> - -<p>7. With regard to financial problems, the late Leader instructed -that the district self-rule organizations should be -founded on the basis of "political and economic cooperation." -The sources of finance, therefore, should be derived -from the people's public productive enterprises, instead of -depending on new taxes. There are many public properties -in various localities that should be utilized. Instead, these -have mainly been exploited and monopolized by individuals -who cared for nothing but their own selfish interests. Henceforth, -these properties should be placed under public control. -With efficient management, the proceeds from these -enterprises should serve as finances for the entire <i>hsiang</i> or -<i>pao</i>. In case such properties consist of land, they could be -turned into experimental farms and be placed under the -management of the schools for the improvement of agricultural -products and for training the people in reformed -farming methods. The joint property of a clan should be -dealt with in a similar way so that their income may be -increased and the results of agricultural improvement programs -may be extended from one locality to another easily. -In places where there are no such lands, steps should be -taken to reclaim the mountainous or hilly regions or the -streams and ponds. Free labor may be utilized with a view -to increasing the income. Besides, surplus rice may be -stored in the <i>hsiang</i> and the <i>pao</i>, under the management of -the people of the respective districts. The various cooperative -societies transporting agricultural products should also -provide granaries and issue mortgage loans. Part of the -profits thus derived should be devoted as funds for the development -of local enterprises. Thus not only will the -financial problem be solved but district autonomy development -will follow local needs. Before the local public<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_403" id="Page_403">[Pg 403]</a></span> -enterprises (as described above) are so developed that -income is sufficient to meet financial requirements, attention -should be paid to the following measures:</p> - -<blockquote> -<p><i>a.</i> Taxes which the <i>hsiang</i> guild may collect independent -of the superior government offices.</p> - -<p><i>b.</i> The finances of the <i>hsien</i> should be demarcated -from those of the province, and the quota of the former -should be gradually increased if possible.</p> - -<p><i>c.</i> In lean <i>hsien</i>, the <i>hsien</i> government should be subsidized -by the provincial government.</p> -</blockquote> - -<p>8. Last of all, it should be pointed out that this draft -was drawn up after repeated discussions and studies. Henceforth, -all the <i>hsien</i> and lower district government units in -the autonomy system should observe this draft as the basis. -This is a time of national crisis when the destiny of our -entire nation and race is hanging between life and death. It -is hoped that all comrades of our Party and our fellow-countrymen -should strive with strong determination for -nation-wide enforcement of these district autonomy measures. -Bold initiative should solve any unforeseen difficulties -that may arise. Fear and hesitation should never -be allowed to gain the upper hand. Only in this way, may -we hope that the cornerstone for various political levels of -true democracy is laid on a sound basis, and only in this -way may we hope that the stupendous task of national reconstruction -can be accomplished.</p> - - -<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_216" id="Footnote_1_216"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_216"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> [Chiang K'ai-shek], <i>Ch'üeh-ting Hsien Ko-chi Tsu-chih Wên-t'i</i> -(Definition of the Problems Concerning the Organization of the Various -Classifications of <i>Hsien</i>), [Chungking], 1939, p. 43 and chart.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_217" id="Footnote_2_217"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_217"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> For explanation of such local government terms as <i>hsiang</i>, <i>pao</i>, -<i>ch'ü</i>, see the text, p. <a href="#Page_107">107</a>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_218" id="Footnote_3_218"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_218"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> Heretofore translated as "director of the <i>hsiang</i>."</p></div></div> - - -<hr class="chap" /> - - -<h2><i>D.</i> A DISCUSSION OF MAO TSÊ-TUNG'S COMMENTS -ON THE PRESENT STATE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (CH'ÊN KUO-HSIN)<a name="FNanchor_1_219" id="FNanchor_1_219"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_219" class="fnanchor">[1]</a></h2> - - -<blockquote> - -<p>The following article, expressing the general Kuomintang view, -but written and published unofficially, illustrates debate on foreign -policy, and the type of discussion between Nationalists and Communists. -Written in the autumn of 1939, it was reprinted in 1940 -as a part of a symposium, forming a critique of Chinese Communist -views. Mao Tsê-tung (see above, p. <a href="#Page_166">166</a>) is the outstanding Chinese -Communist leader.</p></blockquote> - - -<h3>I. <span class="smcap">The Question of Unexpected Political "Coups"</span></h3> - -<p>As the Central Government has already formulated correct -principles of action, the recent German-Soviet Pact has<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_404" id="Page_404">[Pg 404]</a></span> -no influence upon our National policies. If we follow these -policies, that Pact does not compel our attention. But it is -not so with the Chinese Communists and their external organs. -They are confounded and struck dumb by this unexpected -blow so much that they can only keep their grief -to themselves.</p> - -<p>In all propaganda literature of the Communist Party, we -can easily discern the great confusion resulting from this -coup. For example, Hitler was the "Fascist Robber" or the -"mad dog," but within these days, he becomes the Führer, -with all due respects. The word "Fascist" is still being used, -but whether they are planning to discard it altogether, we -do not know. For instance, on the day previous to the announcement -of the Pact, the Communists were saying, -dreamily, that a clause prohibiting Germany's seizure of -other countries was included in the Pact. Again, when -Germany attacked Poland, the Communists cleverly said -that this was caused by Great Britain's playing Judas against -Poland, and they decisively said that Great Britain and -France would not aid her, and some even said that the two -antagonistic fronts were still there, though without giving -any reason. When reports of these momentous international -changes arrived in quick succession, they tried every means -to make them appear unimportant. They did this perhaps -to avoid the too much "heating up" of their followers on -one side, and to avoid committing blunders before they -could receive orders concerning their future policy. They -were afraid of punishment, to be sure. Hence many ridiculed -these poor people, saying that they were like a herd -of sheep without a shepherd, for they showed their ignorance, -their childishness, hesitation, and paradoxical -thoughts and actions during this period.</p> - -<p>Public opinion as a whole praises the policies we now -adopt since they are independent of any outside element. -On the other side, these praises show that while the principles -of National Defense are still as sound as ever, the ten -principles of the Communist Party are now just like ten big -stones falling on Communist toes. The Communists are -about to be killed by their own weapons. Had the Government -of China been formed by the Communists, it -would, in that event, have collapsed as easily as any Japanese -cabinet since the War. What would become of the -country, if under the present crisis foreign policy were to be -the speculation of foreigners? These are exactly the ideas -expressed by public gossip and in discussions in schools. It<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_405" id="Page_405">[Pg 405]</a></span> -is true that the Chinese Communists cannot hold power because -they lack political training and profound learning. -This is their inner, incurable trouble. In fact, many young -Communists have also spoken with me, and they show their -sorrow when they feel the lack of a really efficient central -organ.</p> - -<p>But speaking with consideration, we can see their good -qualities shown by censoring a great part of the news concerning -Moscow's abolition of the Anti-Fascist movement, -and on the other hand advertising in a special manner the -news concerning the will of the French Communists to fight -on the first line of defense, and to help the French Government -to destroy Fascism. Perhaps this is a true revelation -of the editor's faith in the principle "Country and -Nation above all," so that unconsciously he showed it in his -actions. This point is worthy of our praise and sympathy.</p> - -<p>After about ten days of hesitation and aimless probing, -Mr. Mao Tsê-tung, as the head of the Party, issued a lengthy -talk entitled "On the Present International Situation and -the War of National Resistance," in the form of a catechism -in which the questions are asked by a news reporter. -In the first section, he explained the German-Soviet Pact; -in the second, he predicted the future development of international -affairs, in the third he discussed the future of -China. His aim in publishing this article is to pacify the -agitated hearts of his fellow Communists. But since it is -made public, we have the liberty of discussing it, especially -so since the Communists themselves have the same habit -and they also emphasize free speech. I hope they will not -be irritated.</p> - - -<h3>II. <span class="smcap">Is the German-Soviet Pact Casual?</span></h3> - -<p>Mr. Mao seems to take it for a treaty that has been signed -"all of a sudden." Now this is quite untrue if we consider -the facts.</p> - -<p>Many periodicals and newspapers have published articles -proving that the Pact was long-planned. We shall not consider -them. We shall not even consider the original friendship -between Germany and monarchic Russia. But we must -remember how Germany brought Lenin back to Russia in a -sealed train, how the formation of the Red Army was based -upon German plans, and the fact that Germany established -an aviation school in Russia. We see how Germany helped -the Russian Soviet Revolution to succeed. I often think<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_406" id="Page_406">[Pg 406]</a></span> -that if we trust the words of a country's foreign minister and -the slogans the people shout to provide us an outline of the -country's foreign policy, we end in the position of buying -goods upon reading an advertisement. In the end we will -find ourselves cheated. In fact shops which are "liquidating" -their goods may sell their goods at an even higher -price than in an ordinary sale. A more reliable way of -observation is to judge the policy by studying the secret -tendencies in the actions of high military and economic -organs which are essential in national defense. If we believe -in slogans alone, we might as well ask a salesman -about the curative power of his patent medicine. In reality, -the salesman is a mere hireling. What pharmacist discloses -his real formula and method of combinations? Hence, to -probe into the real relation between the two countries, we -must ask the smaller nations between them; these make the -closest observations.</p> - -<p>For two years, these small states have been expecting this -treaty. The question of "which to side with" gives them -sharp suffering which has made them all the more sensitive. -They know what the two countries have been planning -when they see so many secret delegates coming and going -very busily. Within the last two years, observers in Europe -and America have also predicted cooperation between Germany -and Soviet Russia. Even in China, did not Mr. Chiang -Po-li write an essay to this effect, warning the Chinese people? -According to them, the slogans shouted in both countries -are strange diplomatic weapons; like the masques worn -in a Greek play, they do not show the faces of the actors. -When the Jewish Litvinoff went off the stage, it was the -sign: "First Act Completed." Now the spectators who wear -red glasses are still enchanted by the first act. Anyway, Mr. -Mao's explanation that the Pact is a sudden one is unreasonable.</p> - -<p>In China, many were doubting the National policy of independent -struggle. Not until their "Soviet Help," "Single -Alliance with Russia" essays had been erased by the recent -coup, did the policy of independent struggle begin to shine -in its brilliancy. At first our policy of independent foreign -relations lost influence to the better-sounding slogan of "A -united foreign front." After this lesson, we can perhaps see -more clearly. Such a lesson to a political party not in power -is a very wholesome admonition; had the party been in -power, we know the damage which could have befallen the -nation. Speaking with consideration, I also earnestly hoped<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_407" id="Page_407">[Pg 407]</a></span> -for the success in the British-French-Soviet parleys because -it would ensure safety in Europe by safeguarding all lesser -states. Furthermore, it would help us also by checking -Germany and Japan. But this was only a hope, and I -seriously doubted its realization. The "united foreign policy -front" advocated by the Communists is not too unreasonable; -its error lies in stating with certainty the necessity of -two international fronts. Some even acknowledged the -existence of such a situation two years ago, and they forbade -any doubt expressed to fellow-members concerning -this point. Even a week prior to the signing of the Pact, -they said with certainty that the rumor of such a Pact was -a mere invention of Trotskyites and German spies. Such a -ban on free speech is not only detrimental to the progress of -a nation, but even to the Communists' own welfare. Their -members will not only be made to look foolish, but they -will even lose their faith by being called upon to change -about. For the sake of our national intelligence, for the -sake of the Communists themselves, I hope that in the future, -such bans will be lifted, thus encouraging freer and -more reasonable ideas. I hope this appeal will do some -good, even to the editors of their newspapers.</p> - - -<h3>III. <span class="smcap">Why the German-Soviet Pact?</span></h3> - -<p>Concerning this Pact, Mao Tsê-tung used words like -"reactionary," "Capitalistic," "intrigue," etc., about Great -Britain and France. On the other hand, he employed words -like "great" (to be added "talented" if Ch'ên Shao-yü were -to write it), "increasing the power," "more progressive," -etc., about Soviet Russia. In the end, he even used the -phrase "have laid the foundation for the world's oppressed -people to seek for liberty and emancipation." All right! -The term does not sound ugly, and to ensure better Sino-Soviet -relations, we may leave it at that. But under the -present state of affairs, too many attacks directed against -Chamberlain and Daladier are certainly not good. As a -matter of fact, all this is like sending congratulations to -Soviet Russia, and a letter of condolence to those with whom -Soviet Russia is dissatisfied. All these are but social affairs, -the only point is that in both the ideas are not too logically -expressed. That's all!</p> - -<p>Now if you look at the Pact in the same way that you -look into a kaleidoscope, you can see as many meanings as -you want, while turning the thing around. Basically, Germany's<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_408" id="Page_408">[Pg 408]</a></span> -only reason for wanting this Pact is, as she has -stated, to avoid the British encircling policy. The economic -cooperation talked of by politicians can also give further -meaning to the Pact. Recently, in the occupation of Danzig -and Warsaw, the sound of guns is the wordless explanation. -As to the plan of partitioning Poland and absorbing -the Eastern European States (enclosed in a secret clause), -we do not know yet. Let us for the time being not discuss it.</p> - -<p>As to Soviet Russia, her effort at bettering her friendly -relationship with China can be no better revealed than in -Molotov's own speech. He said: "We have always been trying -to increase the amity between the peoples of Germany -and Russia. This Pact is important because it means that -the two big Powers in Europe have decided to be friends and -to live peacefully." Thus we can see that the Pact is not a -casual happening. Molotov again says: "There are some -who want to take advantage of the strained relationship -between Great Britain and Germany.... Such people aim -at involving Soviet Russia in a war against Germany by -taking sides with Great Britain. How foolish these political -speculators for war are!" Hence we know that the -Pact was signed according to Soviet Russia's own will, and, -unlike what Mao said, it was planned long ago, and not -at all after the failure of the British-French-Soviet parleys. -Now we only want those who advocate "united foreign -policy front" to think of the meaning of words like "foolish" -and "war speculators." These words are new compared -with "retrograde," "stubborn," "Trotskyites," etc.</p> - -<p>Perhaps the greatest part of all in Molotov's speech is: -"The Soviet Union will still continue to proceed in her -own independent policy which is based upon the welfare -of all Soviet Russian citizens." This corresponds exactly -with our "Nation and country above all!" Sun Yat-sen also -said that the success of the Soviet Russian October Revolution -was based upon its ability to apply the laws concerning -Nationalism. Leninism corrects Marxism by adding the -idea of Nationalism. And Stalinism intensifies Leninism by -an even greater emphasis laid on Nationalism. Hence we -can say what the Soviet Revolution adopted was Leninism, -and that what the Soviet Union is now adopting is Stalinism. -The success of Lenin and Stalin is largely due to this -reason. This Pact between Germany and Soviet Russia is -but the fruit borne out of the principle "national welfare -above all." The Soviets believe "The Soviet Government -above all." Now what should we in China have?</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_409" id="Page_409">[Pg 409]</a></span></p> - -<p>As for Mr. Mao's reasons concerning the failure of the -Three-Power Parley, the explanation he gives is just a reduced -and "Chinafied" copy of the Soviet explanation concerning -this problem. We can also say it is abridged. Mr. -Mao always "Chinafies" things. I am sorry that this article -has not been "Chinafied" (much to his distaste, I suppose) -so its power must be weaker.</p> - - -<h3>IV. <span class="smcap">A Discussion on the "New Front" as Made -in a Chinese Story-Teller's Way</span></h3> - -<p>The manner in which Mr. Mao discussed the question -resembles that of a Chinese story-teller, though his speech -is less vivid. When he spoke of the "future development of -the present international situation," it was like talking to -a class of naive schoolboys who are always credulous.</p> - -<p>He said that the present state of affairs in Europe was -caused by the policy of non-intervention. The Second Imperialistic -War has already entered the second stage. This -is a war of plunder, not a rightful one. Concerning the -East, he also made a vain distinction. He said the present -state of affairs in China is also a new stage. No other explanation -was given. We suppose he is always careful in -expressing his ideas, so that if necessary he will have plenty -of chances to make a shift. He divided the imperialistic -nations into several camps: Germany and Italy belong to -the Fascist<a name="FNanchor_2_220" id="FNanchor_2_220"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_220" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> camp; Great Britain and France belong to the -Fascistic<a name="FNanchor_3_221" id="FNanchor_3_221"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_221" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> camp; the Americas under the U. S. are a capitalistic -camp. As to Soviet Russia, she is presumably in another -world. Mr. Mao said that she would cooperate with the -U. S. to start the world's peace movement. Besides these, -there were numerous tales as enchanting as the Arabian -Nights. The most important ones: in Europe, a war on the -entire front, and the movement planned by English and -French Communists and Social Democrats to overthrow -the Fascist regime; in the East, British policy was to partition -China between herself and Japan. According to him, -these are "present" situations, and if we take into consideration -his manner of speaking, we can almost say that -they meant the "actual" position at present.</p> - -<p>His chess-board analysis of international situations resembles -his former "front" theory—perhaps it is his new -front theory. His aim, we believe, is to cheat his spectators. -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_410" id="Page_410">[Pg 410]</a></span>Being ignorant of the real situation, he was at first dumbfounded. -Now he tries to move our attention to other -things, just like a magician at work, who needs a band to -create enough noise to shift the audience's attention. We -should be considerate, knowing his difficulties. But I suppose -such a manner of doing things does not increase the -reputation of the Chinese Communists, does it?</p> - -<p>In fact, if any one of the following events occurs, his -new front will immediately be shattered: 1. Soviet Russia -also adopts a non-intervention policy; 2. Italy keeps herself -aloof or joins the side of the Allies; 3. A sufficiently -large number of European states remain neutral; 4. America -cooperates with Great Britain; America or any country in -America declares war against Germany; 5. Great Britain -does not help Japan in dividing up China; 6. Soviet inclination -to sign treaty with Japan is revealed; etc., etc. I -believe anyone who has sufficient knowledge of international -relations will know that the error in the old -"front" theory lies in its presumption that countries of the -same systems of government will tend to unite against those -of another system. The new front theory is based upon the -presumption that the central motivating ideas of different -countries will form the basis of separating them between two -hostile fronts. This is an even more mistaken conception -than the first. It is built on sand. It is easy to teach such -a rigidly formulated doctrine of "hostile fronts" but in case -they meet with a really intelligent and well-informed member, -they will be certainly at a loss. Hence as a matter of -fact, such authoritative articles do more harm than good. -Mr. Mao has written a great deal since the war for publication; -if we now connect all these articles together for a -thorough study, we can find numerous places where he is -dropping a stone upon his own toe. In fact such a chess-board -analysis of the international situation is based upon -materials gotten from the G. P. U. plus some "judgment" -derived accidentally. As a matter of fact, such G. P. U. reports -are unreliable down to the last word. The work of -the G. P. U. is to pay special attention in getting the past -record of a man or organ important in a given country.</p> - -<p>When required, some high-sounding or bad names are -added to the personality so as to strengthen the mood of -speech in propaganda literature. So somebody even said: -"If you wish to follow the propaganda methods of the Communist -Party, observe two dogs barking in the street. After -due observation you should analyze their points of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_411" id="Page_411">[Pg 411]</a></span> -difference. You should be able to speak like this: This is a -dog infused with British, French, American, German or -Japanese imperialistic ideas. He is stubborn, retrograde, -reactionary, capitalistic, Fascist, and in danger of being a -Trotskyite traitor or a person like Wang Ch'ing-wei. Now -the other is a Soviet Socialistic dog, talented, progressive, -belonging to the world of light, a supporter of world peace, -a dog who sides with the poor and oppressed."</p> - -<p>In fact how can confused international situations be so -simply analyzed by a mere figure drawn on a chess-board? -Unless all their members are mechanical men deprived of -the power of thinking, they will have their own doubts, -especially when Mr. Mao has repeatedly dropped stones on -his own toe. The more he shouts the correctness of his -views, or the success of his work, the more he will be a -laughing-stock to the people. He will be the Don Quixote -of China, or Ah-Q,<a name="FNanchor_4_222" id="FNanchor_4_222"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_222" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> to be ridiculed by all. Yet in fact, -there is no necessity for him to make these comments, and -such methods of talking without material basis are usually -avoided by politicians, especially when they are in service -or partly in service. For example, Molotov spoke very -cleverly on the Pact: after giving a historical explanation of -the necessities for signing the Pact, he concluded, almost -carelessly, by saying: "When Germany showed her willingness -to improve the friendship between the two countries, -Soviet Russia certainly had no reason to refuse. Hence the -Pact is made." Besides, he talked of the welfare of the nation, -as if to give a further proof of the necessity in signing -the Pact. How clever his manipulations are! But the same -thing under Mr. Mao's pen becomes a series of hot-faced -scoldings, now praising A, then cursing B. And concerning -his doctrine that the German-Soviet Pact is caused by the -failure of the British-French-Soviet parleys, he expounded -and expounded his reasons and proof, only to lead himself -into greater confusion, so that fewer will believe him. Now -comparing these two events, this will be very detrimental to -the Communists, who find it difficult to give a satisfactory -explanation. Even from a rhetorical point of view, no matter -how Mao curses the British non-intervention policy, no -matter how he curses this policy as the reason for Japanese -invasion of China, for German occupation of Austria, -Czechoslovakia, no matter how he condemns the Munich -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_412" id="Page_412">[Pg 412]</a></span>Meeting, any reader will correspondingly ask: Is Soviet Russia -also adopting the policy of non-intervention? How about -Poland? What is the difference between the Munich Meeting -and the German-Soviet Pact? All these questions will -produce the exactly opposite effect in the minds of the readers -as that which was wished for by Mao. This is but one -point. If we go on to have a closer analysis, we see that Mr. -Mao's art of speaking needs more practice. As to his material -proof in his article, up to date [September 15, 1939], the -Soviet attitude is still the sit-and-look attitude condemned -by him, as being the result of non-intervention policy; the -countries proclaiming their neutrality are quite numerous; -Italian attitude is yet uncertain; the British Communist -Party is declaring that full confidence is placed in Chamberlain; -the French Communists are on the front to fight -for their motherland and the Third International has now -no power over them. On the other hand, there are rumors -concerning a <i>rapprochement</i> between Japan and -Soviet Russia. All these only tend to disprove the sayings -of Mr. Mao.</p> - - -<h3>V. <span class="smcap">A Single Enemy? Or a Single Ally?</span></h3> - -<p>Everybody knows that our foreign policy during the -period of the war is to spot one enemy only. We attack -only Japan. We try to be friends with every country other -than Japan. This spirit can be seen in the manifestoes and -other proclamations of the Government. Hence although -Germany and Italy are the allies of our enemy, we still have -every wish to bind their friendship, and hope that they will -help our enemy the less in her war of aggression, and contribute -more materially to our success by selling us armaments. -Such a "one-enemy" foreign policy is the basis of -our future success. Otherwise, the Nation will easily be -led into a path of thorns, if we adopt the policy of allying -with one today and cutting another tomorrow. In Molotov's -report, there are several sharp sentences: "In foreign -policy, the aim is always not to make more enemies, but -rather to lessen the number of enemies." This can be jotted -down as a note to the "one-enemy" policy.</p> - -<p>But what about Mao Tsê-tung's idea? In fact he preaches -"one-ally" policy. He has condemned them all, except for -the Soviet Union. Now he again places Soviet Russia in -another almost intangible world. What does he mean, then? -Does he mean that we can satisfy our hunger by looking at -a cake? In fact, this was the same old question long before<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_413" id="Page_413">[Pg 413]</a></span> -disputed. We can all remember that the Communists were -the advocates of a military alliance with Soviet Russia. -Now it was Soviet Russia, not we, who declined. Those -who were boasting of the alliance were Communists; and -so were those who stopped it. Soviet Russia said that she -alone was too weak and that she hoped China could find -more allies. Because of this, the "one-ally" policy did not -gain as much support as the British-American-French-Soviet -union. When the British-French-Soviet parleys broke off, -Mr. Mao found it difficult to give a good explanation, so -that he could not but take up the old theory of "one-ally" -to ward off attack.</p> - -<p>The chief countries helping China in the war are Great -Britain, the U. S. A., and Soviet Russia. In the past, at -present, and in the future, their central powers of aiding -China are economic power from Great Britain, political -power from the U. S. A., and military power from Soviet -Russia. It is a fact that even if Soviet Russia remains at -peace, she can check Japan (unless Soviet Russia proclaims -amity with Japan, and makes adequate assurances, in which -case it will greatly influence our condition). But the -economic power of Great Britain and the political power -of the U. S. A. are also absolutely necessary. At present, we -are still enjoying these advantages, and the breaking-up of -the British-French-Soviet parleys does not influence this -situation. We don't know why Mr. Mao is bent upon rejecting -the friendly assistance of Great Britain and the -U. S. Should we act like this if we believe that "the country -and the nation are above all?" Now suppose we follow -the Communists and throw ourselves into the bosom of -Soviet Russia, are we sure that she will do everything for -us? If she signs a treaty with our enemy, what then?</p> - -<p>The most unreasonable point in Mao's discussion is his -attitude toward Great Britain. He probably wants to please -his superiors by guessing their ideas. Perhaps he thinks -that the Third International is going back on the policy -adopted years ago—the policy of "Anti-Britain" so much -sung by Trotsky and his followers. Hence Mao starts this -movement in China, and gathers false proofs that Japan -and Great Britain will sooner or later be allies so that they -can divide up China. Up to now, Mr. Mao's words have not -yet become fact. Furthermore, Great Britain has reassured -us that her policy towards China will not be changed. To -us this is good news—but perhaps unhappy news for Mr. -Mao.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_414" id="Page_414">[Pg 414]</a></span></p> -<p>Mr. Mao's opinion that we "may approach Germany" -does not sound very safe or very natural. Mr. Mao does not -adopt the foreign policy of "befriend those who help us and -hate those who help our enemy," but rather of "befriend -Soviet Russia's friend, attack Soviet Russia's enemies." This -is flatly against the principles of independent foreign policy. -The old German-Italian line advocated by Wang Ch'ing-wei -is wrong because it makes us bend our knees. But we -must also know what the new German line amounts to. -Japan's <i>rapprochement</i> with Soviet Russia and Great Britain -are rumors scattered out simultaneously, but are things -that cannot be possible. According to foreign telegraphic -reports, the German foreign minister is now trying to pull -together Japan and Soviet Russia, with the hope of forming -a future grand alliance among Germany. Italy, Japan, -and Soviet Russia. As to the Japan-Soviet line, it is based -upon the "double-south policy" of attacking Great Britain. -Japan will move south from the Pacific and [Soviet] Russia -will move south from Central Asia, so that British interest -in all districts lying between the Near and the Far East will -be equally divided up by [Soviet] Russia and Japan. Their -method of procedure is like this: 1, A treaty will be signed -by Soviet Russia, as the protector of Outer Mongolia, and -Japan; Soviet Russia will stop enmity against "Manchukuo" -and Japan, so that Japan may concentrate her attention -on China. 2, A commercial treaty will be signed -between them. 3, A final alliance promising mutual non-interference -with appended clauses. Of course this is Germany's -dream, or may be a flat rumor, since it is unbelievable -that Soviet Russia should join Japan. Even from the -point of material benefit, why should Soviet Russia act so -as to hurt others but remain doubtful that she can derive -real benefit? But to insure absolute safety, we must be -careful of any German intrigue. We must warn her often. -In the past we used to buy munitions from her, so we must -have her goodwill. Now with the War, it is unlikely that -Germany will still sell us munitions. Hence why must we -still follow Germany and "approach her"? After all, what -is the difference between this and the German-Italian line -advocated by Wang Ch'ing-wei? Now, just a "warning": -if [Soviet] Russia and Japan do join up to form an alliance, -I must ask the Chinese Communist Party a question: Concerning -the name, the Chinese Communist Party, are they -going to throw away the word "Chinese" and adopt a Soviet -Russian nationality, or, as said in the <i>Hsin Min Pao</i>, to be<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_415" id="Page_415">[Pg 415]</a></span> -so base as to join Wang Ch'ing-wei's regime, or shall they -stick to the word "Chinese" and cancel the word "Communist"? -I hope they will reply to my question.</p> - -<p>Concerning the theory of a Second Imperialistic War, -Mao himself has for two years forbidden his followers to -comment, on the charge of being a Rightist, a closed-door -Rightest, a childish Rightest, or a Trotskyite who is plotting -with Germany. Now we see that he himself has fully -adopted a Trotskyite view. In that article he used the -words "progressive" and "retrogressive" to suppress any upheaval -within his party; but now what he means by "progressive" -is exactly "retardation"; what he formerly advocated -as "progress" is now a discarded fig. He is just making a -circle, like a donkey fastened to turn a grind-stone, pressed -onward by whipping and kicking, and when he has turned -half a circle, he may be said to have retarded half a circle.</p> - -<p>Now Mr. Mao condemns every country as imperialistic. -But we must ask, in his opinion, does he think that Poland -is imperialistic? Why is the war of national defense on the -part of Poland not a rightful war? Under the exactly similar -conditions, why did the Communists formerly show -sympathy for Abyssinia and Spain, and are now cold toward -Poland? He says that Communists always hate wars; -then why did he advocate the Help-Abyssinia Movement? -This is a paradox. Perhaps the saying that Communists -hate war is invented by Mr. Mao himself. So far as we -know, the Communists in Poland, Great Britain, and France -are absolutely sympathizing with the Poles in their defensive -war.</p> - -<p>There is another ridiculous point: Mr. Mao also labelled -Chamberlain and Daladier as Fascist Reactionaries. Before -the German-Soviet Pact, they were hailed as saints, but now -they are convicts, as it were. If Mr. Mao is not satisfied with -them, then condemn them as he wishes. But why must he -put such a "Fascist" hat upon the oldest democratic countries? -This spring, one American political commentator -predicted jokingly that in the near future Hitler will say -that the headquarters of the Communists are located in -London and Paris, hence anti-Communist will mean anti-French. -Now the direction of this pseudo-prophecy is already -established, though Hitler did not give the above -reason. But we did not expect that the Chinese Communists -would adopt such a belief by calling democratic countries -Fascist and by advocating "that we may approach Germany." -This is perhaps a conclusion by their special logic.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_416" id="Page_416">[Pg 416]</a></span></p> - -<h3>VI. <span class="smcap">A Reasonless Conclusion</span></h3> - -<p>Concerning the future of China, Mr. Mao made many -surface talks, though in general there is no serious fault. -But his theories and his conclusions are disjointed. For -example, if he makes light of the Polish war, what will -be the value of this Oriental war? Besides, is the policy -of "single alliance with Soviet Russia" in unison with the -principle: "We will befriend those who aid us, and attack -those who aid our enemy"? If Soviet Russia aids Japan, -what shall then be done? If he opposes the splitting movement, -then why not advocate unity? These are but a few -of the numerous contradictions that may be found in his -article.</p> - -<p>Especially strange is his idea that to ally with countries -other than Soviet Russia, we should ally with their peoples -and not with their governments. But the word "people" is -not used in foreign affairs and its meaning is also most -indistinct. According to him (I presume) he desires that -China fan up revolutions in all countries while carrying on -the War of National Resistance. True, the method may -apply to Japan, but not to other countries. Otherwise, all -world Powers will begin to hate China who is still fighting -the War of National Resistance. What will we think of -this? Now to speak frankly, the Communists in various -countries have not succeeded in fanning up revolutions in -their countries, and on the contrary, with their force weakening -year after year, what shall we help them for? When -we ourselves have not yet stood up firmly, we are already -thinking of shouldering a weight of a thousand pounds. Is -there a reason in such an attempt? In reality, we know the -force of the Chinese proletarian classes. They amount to -about two million people, mostly in Shanghai and Tientsin. -Now the puppet regimes of Yin Ju-keng and Wang Ch'ing-wei -are all formed in these districts. Ch'ên Shao-yü is the -chief representative of the Shanghai section of the Communist -Party. Has he gone there for an investigation? To -whom do those who are performing Anti-Japanese and -Anti-Traitor work belong—to the Communist Party, or -what? It is better for Communists to moderate their tune -and not boast of any more world revolution.</p> - -<p>Concerning the present European war, Mr. Mao's attitude -is that of a man expressing his joy on seeing others' loss -and misfortune. This is not the way of the Chinese people. -We always express our sorrow in a war. What General -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_417" id="Page_417">[Pg 417]</a></span>Chiang has said concerning his hope for peace in Europe is -the natural revelation of the Chinese moral character based -upon love and compassion. What Mr. Mao expresses is -something like the spirit of "kill-kill-kill" advocated by the -notorious robber Chang Shen-chou. This is because Mr. -Mao has not yet thoroughly imbibed the idea of "Chinafying" -things. I express my sympathy for him in his policy -of "Chinafication." This of course does not mean that I -believe in the preachings of old-fashioned Chinese that the -eight planets were first discovered by the Chinese because -a line can be found in the <i>Book of Poetry</i>:<a name="FNanchor_5_223" id="FNanchor_5_223"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_223" class="fnanchor">[5]</a> "Three and -Five stars in the East." What I mean by sympathy is that -I like the way he appreciates the Chinese national culture, -and wants to be a one hundred per cent Chinese.<a name="FNanchor_6_224" id="FNanchor_6_224"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_224" class="fnanchor">[6]</a> In this -respect he is more worthy than Ch'ên Shao-yü, and hence -deserving of greater achievement.</p> - -<p>Lastly, I sincerely hope that Mr. Mao can find a better -secretary, without considering the question of class. He -must not follow the example of Mr. Lu, the Vice-President -of the Anti-Japanese University, who never employs a secretary -unless she is beautiful. Though he does not consider -the question of class, such actions do not befit Mr. Mao. -But speaking about this, we can have a comparison. The -second wife of Mr. Mao, Miss Ho, is the heroine who -marched with the Red Army for a distance of twenty-five -thousand <i>li</i> to North Shensi. But why is it that Mr. Mao -sends her to Soviet Russia, and lives together with film -actress Miss Lan Pin? The reason is quite simple: considering -the question of class, Miss Ho stands higher than Miss -Lan; considering the question of sexual love, Miss Lan is -much more beautiful than Miss Ho. Hence with similar -reasoning, I should say that the standard set by Mr. Mao -concerning the employment of a secretary will be whether -she can write beautifully, and the question of class must not -be considered. If so, I can predict that Mr. Mao's articles -will be better written, not like his past ones which arouse a -great deal of unnecessary argumentation. I hereby humbly -present before him my personal ideas.<a name="FNanchor_7_225" id="FNanchor_7_225"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_225" class="fnanchor">[7]</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_418" id="Page_418">[Pg 418]</a></span></p> - -<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_219" id="Footnote_1_219"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_219"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> Min-i Ts'ung-k'an (Popular Opinion Series), <i>Mao Tsê-tung Ch'ên -Shao-yü Tsui-chin Yen-lun-ti Tsung Chien-t'ao</i> (A General Review of -the Most Recent Utterances of Mao Tsê-tung and Ch'ên Shao-yü), -Chungking, 1940; p. 1-17.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_220" id="Footnote_2_220"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_220"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> <i>Fa-hsi-ssŭ</i>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_221" id="Footnote_3_221"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_221"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> <i>Fa-hsi-ssŭ-hua-ti</i>, i.e., changing to Fascism.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_222" id="Footnote_4_222"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_222"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> The hero of a novella by Lu Hsün, China's outstanding modern -writer, Ah-Q is a figure of profound pathos.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_5_223" id="Footnote_5_223"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_223"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> <i>Shih Ching</i>, one of the Confucian classics.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_6_224" id="Footnote_6_224"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_224"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> The Americanism, <i>i-pai-fên chih pai-ti Chung-kuo-jen</i>, occurs in -the original.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_7_225" id="Footnote_7_225"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_225"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> The conclusion, couched in billingsgate, is less a violation of -the unmentionable in China than it would be in America; but it -does strike a note sharply discordant to the gently sardonic tone of -the main line of debate. A secretary is germane to the point of -literary style, however; ghost-writing is a rarely disturbed tradition -of Chinese public life. Mao Tsê-tung, according to Western observers, -is, with Chiang K'ai-shek, one of the few leaders to write his own -speeches, so that the present charge, while familiar, is certainly -unjust.</p></div></div> - - -<hr class="chap" /> - - -<h2>E. <span class="smcap lowercase">CHINA'S LONG-RANGE DIPLOMATIC ORIENTATION (WANG CH'UNG-HUI)</span><a name="FNanchor_1_226" id="FNanchor_1_226"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_226" class="fnanchor">[1]</a></h2> - - -<blockquote> - -<p>This memorandum was graciously supplied by Dr. Wang Ch'ung-hui.</p></blockquote> - - -<h3>1. <span class="smcap">Outline of China's Foreign Policy</span></h3> - -<p>Since the establishment of the National Government, -China's foreign policy has been elucidated from time to -time. Following the outbreak of the war, the Extraordinary -Session of the Kuomintang National Congress convened -in 1938 laid down five principles:</p> - -<blockquote> -<p>"1. China is prepared to ally herself with all states and -nations that sympathize with her and to wage a common -struggle for peace and justice.</p> - -<p>"2. China is prepared to safeguard and strengthen the -machinery of peace as well as all treaties and conventions -that have the maintenance of peace as their ultimate object.</p> - -<p>"3. China is prepared to ally herself with all forces that -are opposed to Japanese aggression and to safeguard peace -in the Far East.</p> - -<p>"4. China will endeavor not only to preserve but also -to enhance the existing friendly relations with other countries.</p> - -<p>"5. China repudiates all bogus organizations which -Japan has created and declares all their actions null and -void."</p> -</blockquote> - -<h3>2. <span class="smcap">China's Stand Vis-à-Vis Japan</span></h3> - -<p>From the above outline it can be clearly seen that China's -foreign policy aims at achieving independence internally -and co-existence externally.</p> - -<p>Shortly before the outbreak of the Lukouchiao Incident I -told a group of Japanese newspapermen in Nanking that -"China's diplomatic policy has always been consistent. It -aims at self-existence and co-existence.... It is important -to harmonize the friendship between the two peoples; but -such a task should not rest only upon the shoulders of one<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_419" id="Page_419">[Pg 419]</a></span> -party.... If any foreign country has any designs on China, -the Chinese people are determined to resist.... I hope -Japan will respect China's territorial integrity and political -sovereignty and will seek to readjust Sino-Japanese relations -through diplomatic channels and in accordance with -the spirit of reciprocity and equality."</p> - -<p>Japan was bent on disturbing peace and order and -launched her attack on North China on July 7, 1937. Not -only had every effort at conciliation failed, but the hostilities -were extended to Shanghai on August 13th. On the -following day the Ministry of Foreign Affairs made China's -position clear in an official statement, an extract of which -follows:</p> - -<p>"The Chinese Government now solemnly declares that -China's territorial integrity and sovereign rights have been -wantonly violated by Japan in glaring violation of such -peace instruments as the Covenant of the League of Nations, -the Nine-Power Treaty and the Paris Peace Pact. -China is in duty bound to defend her territory and her -national existence, as well as the sanctity of the above-mentioned -treaties. We will never surrender any part of -our territory. When confronted with aggression, we cannot -but exercise our natural right of self-defense. If Japan -did not entertain territorial designs on China, she should -use her efforts to seek a rational solution of Sino-Japanese -problems and at the same time cease all her aggressions and -military movements in China. In the event of such a -happy change of heart, China would, in conformity with -her traditional policy of peace, continue her efforts to -avert a situation pregnant with dangerous possibilities both -for East Asia and for the world at large.</p> - -<p>"In this our supreme fight not only for a national but for -a world cause, not only for the preservation of our own -territory and sovereignty, but for the maintenance of international -justice, we are confident that all friendly nations, -while showing sympathy with us, will be conscious of their -obligations under the international treaties to which they -have solemnly subscribed."</p> - - -<h3>3. <span class="smcap">Non-Recognition of Puppet Regimes</span></h3> - -<p>With regard to Japanese-sponsored puppet regimes in -China, the Chinese Government has consistently denounced -them as illegal. On December 20, 1937, following the appearance -of the so-called "Provisional Government" in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_420" id="Page_420">[Pg 420]</a></span> -Peiping, the National Government solemnly declared that -"the establishment of any bogus regime in Peiping or other -localities under Japanese military occupation constitutes a -violation by Japan of China's sovereignty and administrative -integrity. Any action taken by such puppet regimes, -whether of an internal or external nature, shall <i>ipso facto</i> -be null and void."</p> - -<p>Following the installation by the Japanese of Wang -Ch'ing-wei as the chief puppet of the bogus "National Government" -in Nanking, the Foreign Minister reiterated this -stand in his identic notes of March 30, 1940 to the various -embassies and legations in China to the following effect:</p> - -<p>"The Chinese Government desires to take this opportunity -to repeat most emphatically the declaration already -made on several occasions that any act done by such an -unlawful organization as has just been set up in Nanking or -any other puppet body that may exist elsewhere in China, -is <i>ipso facto</i> null and void and shall never be recognized -by the Chinese Government and people. The Chinese -Government is convinced that all self-respecting States will -uphold law and justice in the conduct of international relations -and will never accord <i>de jure</i> or <i>de facto</i> recognition -to Japan's puppet organization in China. Any manifestation -of such recognition, in whatever form or manner, -would be a violation of international law and treaties and -would be considered as an act most unfriendly to the -Chinese nation, for the consequences of which the recognizing -party would have to bear full responsibility."</p> - - -<h3>4. <span class="smcap">China's Foreign Relations Based on Nine-Power Treaty</span></h3> - -<p>China's foreign policy relating to the Sino-Japanese hostilities -is based upon the Nine-Power Treaty, which provides -that the contracting Powers, other than China, agreed to -the following:</p> - -<blockquote> -<p>1. To respect the sovereignty, the independence and -the territorial and administrative integrity of China;</p> - -<p>2. To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity -to China to develop and maintain for herself -an effective and stable government;</p> - -<p>3. To use their influence for the purpose of effectually -establishing and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity -for the commerce and industry of all nations -throughout the territory of China.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_421" id="Page_421">[Pg 421]</a></span></p> -<p>4. To refrain from taking advantage of conditions in -China in order to seek special rights or privileges which -would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly -States, and from countenancing action inimical to the -security of such States.</p> -</blockquote> - -<p>Under present conditions, the aggressor is still reluctant -to attend any international conference for seeking a just -settlement. Therefore, the only alternative is for China to -continue her war of resistance until Japan comes to her -senses or reaches the point of exhaustion, which can be -accomplished through the extension of greater assistance -to China and the application of an embargo on military -supplies to Japan.</p> - -<p>There is no need to elaborate on the well-known fact that -the role of the United States in the maintenance of peace -in the Pacific area is an important one. We have great confidence -in the sense of justice of America, our traditional -friend, who realizes the full significance of the so-called -"New Order in Greater East Asia," which Japanese spokesmen -admit applies to the South Seas region.</p> - -<p>World peace and peace between China and Japan are -indivisible. An era of prosperity in this part of the world, -which cannot but be of benefit to the world in general, can -only be ushered in after a just and lasting solution to the -Sino-Japanese conflict has been found.</p> - -<div class="footnotes"> -<h3>FOOTNOTE:</h3> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_226" id="Footnote_1_226"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_226"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> Private communication transmitted from Chungking, September -10, 1940; in possession of the present author.</p></div></div> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_423" id="Page_423">[Pg 423]</a></span></p> - - -<h2>GLOSSARY</h2> - - -<p>[Chinese ideographs have been attached to the names of all -the more important political terms, as given in the following -list. Proper names may be found with their correct ideographs -in <i>Who's Who in China</i> and the <i>Supplement</i> thereto, cited above. -Place-names have been given in the Chinese Postal transliteration; -all other names and terms are given in the Wade-Giles -spelling, but with the tones omitted. In a few cases, the -spelling of a name has been well established by long newspaper -usage, by the caprice or decision of a man in re-spelling -his own name, or by common practice which has become -standard English. Examples are <i>tuchün</i>, Kuomintang (instead -of <i>Kuo-min Tang</i> or <i>Kuo-min-tang</i>) and T. V. Soong. Capitalization -and hyphenation follow, as closely as possible, the -practices established by the <i>Quarterly Bulletin of Chinese Bibliography</i>, -Peking and Kunming.]</p> - -<p><i>Chan-ti Tang-chêng Wei-yüan-hui</i> 戰地黨政委員會 the (Kuomintang) -Party and (National) Government War Area Commission; -the Chungking agency for the government of -those parts of China technically occupied by the Japanese; -under the Military Affairs Commission</p> - -<p><i>chang</i> 長 a chief, or head</p> - -<p><i>Ch'ang-wu Wei-yüan</i> 常務委員 a Standing Committee, or administrative -committee</p> - -<p><i>Ch'ang-wu Tz'ŭ-chang</i> 常務次長 an Administrative Vice-Minister -(of a <i>pu</i>)</p> - -<p><i>chên</i> 鎮 a unit of local government; "community"; the equivalent -of a <i>hsiang</i></p> - -<p><i>Chên-chi Wei-yüan-hui</i> 振濟委員會 the (National) Relief Commission</p> - -<p><i>Chêng-chih-pu</i> 政治部 the Political Department (of the Military -Affairs Commission); the important and powerful agency -which coordinates civilian aid to the war from Chungking, -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_424" id="Page_424">[Pg 424]</a></span>in propaganda, civilian mobilization, etc.; competitive -with the Chinese Communists</p> - -<p><i>Chêng-wu Ch'u</i> 政務處 a Political Affairs Department; the political -secretariat of a <i>Yüan</i></p> - -<p><i>Chêng-wu Tz'ŭ-chang</i> 政務次長 a Political Vice-Minister (of a -<i>pu</i>)</p> - -<p><i>Ch'i Chün-tzŭ</i> 七君子 the "Seven Gentlemen"; the leaders of -the National Salvation movement</p> - -<p><i>chia</i> 甲 a group of households; a unit in the <i>pao-chia</i> system of -local government</p> - -<p><i>Chiao-t'ung Pu</i> 交通部 Ministry of Communications</p> - -<p><i>Ch'iao-wu Wei-yüan-hui</i> 僑務委員會 Commission on Overseas -Chinese Affairs (under the Executive <i>Yüan</i>)</p> - -<p><i>Chiao-yü Pu</i> 教育部 Ministry of Education (under the Executive -<i>Yüan</i>)</p> - -<p><i>chien-ch'a</i> 監察 one of the five powers of government in the -plans of Sun Yat-sen; a combination of impeachment, -audit, supervisory investigation and other functions</p> - -<p><i>Chien-ch'a Yüan</i> 監察院 the Control (or Censoral) <i>Yüan</i>; one -of the five major divisions of the government</p> - -<p><i>Chien Kuo Ta Kang</i> 建國大綱 the <i>Outline of National Reconstruction</i>, -a manifesto by Sun Yat-sen which charted the subsequent -formal policies of the Kuomintang</p> - -<p><i>ch'ih</i> 恥 self-respect; honor</p> - -<p><i>Chin-ch'a-chi Pien-ch'ü Lin-shih Hsing-chêng Wei-yüan-hui</i> -晉察冀邊區臨時行政委員會 "Provisional Executive -Committee of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Border Region"; -formal style of the Border Region, <i>q.v.</i></p> - -<p><i>Ching-chi Pu</i> 經濟部 Ministry of Economic Affairs (under the -Executive <i>Yüan</i>)</p> - -<p><i>Chiu Kuo</i> 救國 National Salvation; an anti-aggression movement -organized outside the Kuomintang</p> - -<p><i>Chu-hsi</i> 主席 chairman; refers particularly to the <i>Kuo-min -Chêng-fu Chu-hsi</i> (President of the National Government)</p> - -<p><i>ch'ü</i> 區 a unit of local government above the <i>pao</i>, <i>chia</i>, and -<i>hsiang</i>, but below the <i>hsien</i> ("county"); a township; with -reference to the Party organization of the Kuomintang, a -district</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_425" id="Page_425">[Pg 425]</a></span></p> -<p><i>ch'ü-fên</i> 區分 sub-district; the lowest territorial unit in Kuomintang -organization</p> - -<p><i>ch'üan</i> 權 "power," <i>i.e.</i>, of the people, as contrasted with the -nêng (capacity) of the government; the distinction is Sun -Yat-sen's, and applies to the political process</p> - -<p><i>Ch'üan-hsü Pu</i> 銓敘部 the Ministry of Personnel; under the -Examination <i>Yüan</i></p> - -<p><i>Ch'üan-hsü T'ing</i> 銓敘廳 Administration of Personnel (for the -military); under the Military Affairs Commission</p> - -<p><i>Ch'üan-kuo Hui-i</i> 全國會議 the (Chinese Communist) National -Party Convention</p> - -<p><i>Ch'üan-kuo Ta-hui</i> 全國大會 the (Chinese Communist) National -Party Congress</p> - -<p><i>Ch'üan-kuo Tai-piao Ta-hui</i> 全國代表大會 the (Kuomintang) -Party Congress</p> - -<p><i>Chün-chêng-pu</i> 軍政部 the Ministry of War; under the joint -jurisdiction of the Executive <i>Yüan</i> and the Military -Affairs Commission</p> - -<p><i>Chün-fa Chih-hsing Tsung-chien-pu</i> 軍法執行總監部 the Directorate-General -of Courts Martial; under the Military Affairs Commission</p> - -<p><i>Chün-hsün-pu</i> 軍訓部 Department of Military Training; under -the Military Affairs Commission</p> - -<p><i>Chün-ling-pu</i> 軍令部 Department of Military Operation; -office of the Chinese high command; under the Military -Affairs Commission</p> - -<p><i>Chün-shih Ts'an-i-yüan</i> 軍事參議院 Military Advisory Council; -under the Military Affairs Commission</p> - -<p><i>Chün-shih Wei-yüan-hui</i> 軍事委員會 the Military Affairs Commission; -the chief politico-military organ of the National -Government</p> - -<p><i>Chung-hua Min-kuo Kuo-min Chêng-fu</i> 中華民國國民政府 literally: -the Republic of China, National Government; the -style of the National Government under the Kuomintang</p> - -<p><i>Chung-hua Min-kuo Lin-shih Chêng-fu</i> 中華民國國民政府 the -"Provisional Government of the Republic of China," -Peking, 1937-1940; pro-Japanese</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_426" id="Page_426">[Pg 426]</a></span></p> -<p><i>Chung-hua Min-kuo T'ê-ch'ü</i> 中華民國特區政府 -"Special District Government of the Chinese Republic"; -the first formal style of the Chinese Soviet area in the -Northwest after the intra-national armistice</p> - -<p><i>Chung-hua Min-kuo Hsiu-chêng Kuo-min Chêng-fu</i> 中華民國修正國民政府 -the "Reorganized National Government of the -Republic of China"; the National Government of Wang -Ch'ing-wei at Nanking; pro-Japanese</p> - -<p><i>Chung-hua Min-kuo Wei-hsin Chêng-fu</i> 中華民國維新政府 the -"Reformed Government of the Republic of China," -Nanking, 1938-1940; pro-Japanese</p> - -<p><i>Chung-hua Su-wei-ai Kung-ho-kuo</i> 中華蘇維埃共和國 the Chinese -Soviet Republic</p> - -<p><i>Chung-kuo Kê-ming Tang</i> 中國革命黨 the Chinese Revolutionary -Party; style of the Kuomintang, 1914-1920; style -of the Third Party, 1929-1930</p> - -<p><i>Chung-kuo Kuo-min-tang Kê-ming Hsing-chêng Wei-yüan-hui</i> -中國國民黨革命行政委員會 the Revolutionary Action -Committee of the Chinese Kuomintang; first style of the -Third Party</p> - -<p><i>Chung-kuo Kung-yeh Ho-tso Hsieh-hui</i> 中國工業合作協會 the -Chinese Industrial Cooperatives</p> - -<p><i>Chung-yang Chêng-chih Hsüeh-hsiao</i> 中央政治學校 the Central -Political Institute; under the Kuomintang</p> - -<p><i>Chung-yang Chêng-chih Wei-yüan-hui</i> 中央政治委員會 the Central -Political Council; the agency whereby the Kuomintang -exercised its power over the National Government -until the Supreme National Defense Council was -created</p> - -<p><i>Chung-yang Chien-ch'a Wei-yüan-hui</i> 中央監察委員會 the (Kuomintang) -Central Control Committee</p> - -<p><i>Chung-yang Chih-hsing Wei-yüan-hui</i> 中央執行委員會 the (Kuomintang) -Central Executive Committee</p> - -<p><i>Chung-yang Hsüan-ch'uan Pu</i> 中央宣傳部 the (Kuomintang) -Party-Ministry of Publicity [or Central Publicity Board]</p> - -<p><i>Chung-yang Wei-yüan-hui</i> 中央委員會 the (Chinese Communist -Party) Central Committee</p> - -<p><i>fa pi</i> 法幣 (National Government) legal tender notes</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_427" id="Page_427">[Pg 427]</a></span></p> -<p><i>fang</i> 坊 a territorial unit of municipal government; roughly, a -precinct</p> - -<p><i>Fu-hsing Shê</i> 復興社 the Regeneration Club; former center of -the so-called Blue Shirts</p> - -<p><i>Fu-hsüeh Wei-yüan-hui</i> 撫郋委員會 the Pensions Commission; -under the Military Affairs Commission</p> - -<p><i>Fu I-chang</i> 副議長 Deputy Speaker (of the People's Political -Council)</p> - -<p><i>Fu Mi-shu-chang</i> 副秘書長 a Deputy Secretary-General</p> - -<p><i>Fu-yüan-chang</i> 副院長 the Vice-President of a <i>Yüan</i> (one of the -five divisions of the government)</p> - -<p><i>Hai-chün Tsung-ssŭ-ling-pu</i> 海軍總司令部 Office of the Naval -Commander-in-Chief, successor to the Ministry of the -Navy which manages the up-river remnants of the -Chinese fleet; under the Military Affairs Commission</p> - -<p><i>Hang-k'ung Wei-yüan-hui</i> 航空委員會 the (National) Aviation -Commission; under the Military Affairs Commission</p> - -<p><i>Hou-fang Ch'in-wu-pu</i> 後方勤務部 the [Rear-Area] Service -Department under the Military Affairs Commission</p> - -<p><i>hsiang</i> 鄉 a unit of local government, also termed <i>chên</i>; a village -or community</p> - -<p><i>hsiao-tsu</i> 小粗 the "small-group"; the lowest fraction of Kuomintang -organization</p> - -<p><i>Hsieh-ho-hui</i> 協和會 the Concordia Society; the propaganda -agency of Manchoukuo</p> - -<p><i>hsien</i> 縣 district; roughly comparable to the American -county</p> - -<p><i>Hsien-fa Ts'ao-an</i> 憲法草案 the Draft Permanent Constitution; -the official sponsored project for the new constitution, -known most widely in the version of the Double Five Draft -of May 5, 1936</p> - -<p><i>Hsin-min-hui</i> 新民會 a political "party" organized by pro-Japanese -elements in North China</p> - -<p><i>Hsin Min Chu I</i> 新民主義 a pro-Japanese doctrine taught in -occupied North China</p> - -<p><i>Hsin Shêng-huo Yün-tung</i> 新生活運動 the New Life Movement</p> - -<p><i>Hsin-ssŭ-chün</i> 新四軍 New Fourth Army; a guerrilla force -under Communist influence; operating in the Yangtze -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_428" id="Page_428">[Pg 428]</a></span>lowlands, it clashed with Chinese National forces early -in 1941, and was formally disbanded</p> - -<p><i>Hsing-chêng Fa-yüan</i> 行政法院 the Administrative Court; under -the Judicial Yüan</p> - -<p><i>Hsing-chêng Yüan</i> 行政院 the Executive <i>Yüan</i>, greatest of the -five divisions of the government</p> - -<p><i>Hsün-lien T'uan</i> 訓練團 the Training Corps (of the Kuomintang)</p> - -<p><i>Hsün-lien Wei-yüan-hui</i> 訓練委員會 the (Central) Training -Committee (of the Kuomintang)</p> - -<p><i>Huangpu</i> 黃埔 the name of a military academy (in Cantonese, -Whampoa), now applied to the Generalissimo's protégés -as a political faction</p> - -<p><i>hui</i> 會 a meeting, guild, league, or society</p> - -<p><i>Hui-i</i> 會議 a deliberative body; particularly, a City Council -(Shih-chêng Hui-i)</p> - -<p><i>i</i> 議 propriety; ethics; justice</p> - -<p><i>I-chang</i> 議長 Speaker (of the People's Political Council)</p> - -<p><i>I Ho Ch'üan</i> 義和拳 the "Boxers" of 1900</p> - -<p><i>Kan Shih</i> 幹事 the police executive in a <i>hsiang</i> or <i>chên</i></p> - -<p><i>K'ang-chan Chien-kuo Kang-ling</i> 抗戰建馘綱領 the Program of -Resistance and Reconstruction; the formal declaration of -government policy during the invasion; adopted at -Hankow in March, 1938</p> - -<p><i>K'ao-hsüan Wei-yüan-hui</i> 考選委員會 the Examinations Commission; -under the Examination <i>Yüan</i></p> - -<p><i>K'ao-shih Yüan</i> 考試會 the Examination <i>Yüan</i>; one of the five -major divisions of the government</p> - -<p><i>Kung-ch'an Ch'ing-nien T'uan</i> 共產青年團 the Communist -Youth Corps</p> - -<p><i>Kung-ch'an Tang</i> 共產黨 the (Chinese) Communist Party</p> - -<p><i>Kung-wu-yüan Ch'eng-chieh Wei-yüan-hui</i> 公務員懲戒委員會 the -Commission for the Disciplinary Punishment of Public -Officers (under the Judicial <i>Yüan</i>), a lower agency than -the Commission for the Disciplinary Punishment of Public -Officials (attached to the Council of State)</p> - -<p><i>Kuo-chia Chu-i P'ai</i> 國家主義派 the "Nationalist Party"; Parti -Républicain Nationaliste de la Jeune Chine</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_429" id="Page_429">[Pg 429]</a></span></p> -<p><i>Kuo-chia Shê-hui Tang</i> 國家社會黨 the (Chinese) National -Social(ist) Party</p> - -<p><i>Kuo-fang Tsui-kao Wei-yüan-hui</i> 國防最高委員會 the Supreme -National Defense Council; the quasi-governmental -agency whereby the Kuomintang controls the National -Government; established in 1938 as a war measure, it -supersedes the <i>Chung-yang Chêng-chih Wei-yüan-hui</i> (Central -Political Council)</p> - -<p><i>Kuo-li Chung-yang Yen-chiu Yüan</i> 國立中央研究院 the Academia -Sinica; the national scientific and scholastic body, -attached to the Council of State</p> - -<p><i>Kuo-min Chêng-fu Wei-yüan-hui</i> 國民政府委員會 "National -Government Council"; commonly termed Council of -State, this is the highest strictly governmental agency in -China</p> - -<p><i>Kuo-min Chêng-fu Chu-hsi</i> 國民政府主席 "chairman of the -National Government"; more formally, President of the -National Government of China; <i>ex-officio</i> chairman of the -Council of State, and ceremonial chief of the government</p> - -<p><i>Kuo-min Ching-shên Tsung-tung-yüan</i> 國民精神總動員 the National -Spiritual Mobilization</p> - -<p><i>Kuo-min Hui-i</i> 國民會議 the National People's Convention of -XX (1931), which adopted the Provisional Constitution</p> - -<p><i>Kuo-min Ts'an-chêng Hui</i> 國民參政會 the People's Political -Council; advisory legislature inaugurated in Hankow</p> - -<p><i>Kuo-min Ta-hui</i> 國民大會 the National Congress or People's -Congress; this term designates both the constituent body -which shall adopt the projected Constitution, and a subsequent -constitutional legislature meeting triennially</p> - -<p><i>lao-pai-hsing</i> 老百姓 old inhabitants; common people; archaically -or etymologically, the Old Hundred Names</p> - -<p><i>li</i> 禮 rites; ceremonies; ideological conformity</p> - -<p><i>Li-fa Wei-yüan</i> 立法委會 members of the quasi-cameral plenary -session of the Legislative <i>Yüan</i>; experts in legal matters, -they combine the function of legislators with that of consultants -in codification</p> - -<p><i>Li-ja Yüan</i> 立法會 the Legislative <i>Yüan</i>; one of the five divisions -of the government</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_430" id="Page_430">[Pg 430]</a></span></p> -<p><i>lien</i> 廉 integrity</p> - -<p><i>lü</i> 旅 a brigade</p> - -<p><i>Mêng-ku Lien-ho Tzŭ-chih Chêng-fu</i> 蒙古聯合自治政府 the -"Federated Autonomous Government of Mongolia"; -pro-Japanese</p> - -<p><i>Mêng Tsang Wei-yüan-hui</i> 蒙藏委員會 Commission on Mongolian -and Tibetan Affairs (under the Executive <i>Yüan</i>)</p> - -<p><i>Mi-shu-chang</i> 秘書長 a Secretary-General</p> - -<p><i>Mi-shu Ch'u</i> 秘書處 a Secretariat; particularly important in -the case of the Executive <i>Yüan</i></p> - -<p><i>min ch'üan chu-i</i> 民權主義 the "principle of democracy," by -Sun Yat-sen; second of the <i>San Min Chu I</i></p> - -<p><i>min-shêng chu-i</i> 民生主義 the "principle of the people's livelihood," -by Sun Yat-sen; third of the <i>San Min Chu I</i></p> - -<p><i>Min-ts'u Chieh-fang Hsing-chêng Wei-yüan-hui</i> 民族解放行政委員會 -the Acting Commission for the National Emancipation -of China; third, final, formal style of the Third -Party</p> - -<p><i>min ts'u chu-i</i> 民族主義 the "principle of nationalism," by Sun -Yat-sen; first of the <i>San Min Chu I</i></p> - -<p><i>Nei-chêng Pu</i> 內政部 the Ministry of the Interior (or of home -affairs); under the Executive <i>Yüan</i></p> - -<p><i>nêng</i> 能 "capacity" (see <i>ch'üan</i>)</p> - -<p><i>Nung Lin Pu</i> 農林部 Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry -(under the Executive <i>Yüan</i>)</p> - -<p><i>Pa-lu-chün</i> 八路軍 "Eighth Route Army"; the chief Chinese -Communist force, formerly the Chinese Red Army and -now the Eighteenth Army Corps</p> - -<p><i>pao</i> 保 a unit of local government; roughly, a neighborhood</p> - -<p><i>pao-chia</i> 保甲 a system of local government embodying principles -of collective responsibility and mutual aid within -interlocking groups of households and neighborhoods</p> - -<p><i>Pien-ch'ü</i> 邊區 Frontier Area or Border Region; the former -translation is used for the Communist zone in the Northwest, -and the latter for the guerrilla government in North -China</p> - -<p><i>Pu</i> 部 a Ministry (under the <i>Yüan</i>), Department (under the -Military Affairs Commission), or equivalent organ of -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_431" id="Page_431">[Pg 431]</a></span>government; the term is one of long standing in Chinese -government</p> - -<p><i>Pu Chang</i> 部長 Minister; head of a <i>pu</i></p> - -<p><i>San Min Chu I</i> 三民主義 the three principles of the people; -Sun Yat-sen's political philosophy, now the official state -dogma of China</p> - -<p><i>San Min Chu I Ch'ing-nien T'uan</i> 三民主義青年團 the <i>San Min -Chu I</i> Youth Corps</p> - -<p><i>Shan-kan-ning Pien-ch'ü Chêng-fu</i> 陝甘寧邊區政府 the "Government -of the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Frontier Area"; -second formal style of the Communist zone in the Northwest</p> - -<p><i>Shan-pei Hsing-chêng-ch'ü</i> 陝北行政區 the "Administrative -Area of North Shensi"; third formal style of the Communist -zone in the Northwest (Frontier Area)</p> - -<p><i>Shê-hui Yün-tung Pu</i> 社會運動部 the (Kuomintang) Party-Ministry -of Social Movements</p> - -<p><i>Shên-ch'a Wei-yüan-hui</i> 審查委員會 the (Chinese Communist -Party) Control Committee</p> - -<p><i>Shêng</i> 省 a province</p> - -<p><i>Shêng-chang</i> 省長 Governor; the civilian head of a province; -now superseded by a Provincial Chairman</p> - -<p><i>Shêng Chêng-fu</i> 省政府 a Provincial Government</p> - -<p><i>Shih</i> 市 a Municipality</p> - -<p><i>Shih-chang</i> 市長 a Mayor</p> - -<p><i>Sui-ching Chu-jên</i> 綏靖主任 a Pacification Commissioner; the -chief military officer of a province</p> - -<p><i>Ssŭ-fa Hsing-chêng-pu</i> 司法行政部 the Ministry of Justice, literally -the "executive ministry of the judiciary"; under the -Judicial <i>Yüan</i> in the National Government, but under the -executive in the Reorganized Government of Wang -Ch'ing-wei</p> - -<p><i>Ssŭ-fa Yüan</i> 司法院 the Judicial <i>Yüan</i>, one of the five divisions -of the government</p> - -<p><i>ssŭ p'ai</i> 四派 the "four cliques" (in the People's Political -Council)</p> - -<p><i>ssŭ tang</i> 四黨 the "four parties" (in the People's Political -Council)</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_432" id="Page_432">[Pg 432]</a></span></p> -<p><i>Ta-min-hui</i> 大民會 a political "party" organized by pro-Japanese -elements in Central China</p> - -<p><i>tang chih</i> 黨治 "party government"; the single-party tutelary -dictatorship of the Kuomintang</p> - -<p><i>Tai-piao Ta-hui</i> 代表大會 the (Chinese Communist) "Council -of Party Delegates"</p> - -<p><i>Tangpu</i> 黨部 (local) Party Headquarters of the Kuomintang</p> - -<p><i>Ti-san Tang</i> 第三黨 the Third Party; a popular name</p> - -<p><i>Ts'ai-chêng Pu</i> 財政部 Ministry of Finance</p> - -<p><i>Ts'an-chêng-hui</i> 參政會 a People's Political Council; preceded -by a term indicating the level at which established, <i>e.g.</i>, -<i>Shêng Ts'an-chêng-hui</i>, Provincial People's Political Council</p> - -<p><i>Ts'an-chün Ch'u</i> 參軍處 Office of Military Affairs; a military -secretariat attached to the Council of State</p> - -<p><i>Ts'an-i-hui</i> 參議會 an Advisory Council, as in the Municipality</p> - -<p><i>Tsui-kao Fa-yüan</i> 最高法院 the Supreme Court; under the -Judicial <i>Yüan</i></p> - -<p><i>Tsung-li</i> 總理 the [Party] Leader; the formal office held by -Sun Yat-sen in the Kuomintang; his in perpetuity, the -title is used as a respectful form of reference to Sun</p> - -<p><i>Tsung-ts'ai</i> 總裁 the [Party] Chief, or leader; title vested in -Chiang K'ai-shek as formal head of the Kuomintang by -the Emergency Party Congress, Hankow, March, 1938</p> - -<p><i>t'uan</i> 團 a regiment</p> - -<p><i>tuchün</i> 督軍 the military chief of a province, a war-lord</p> - -<p><i>Wai-chiao Pu</i> [also written <i>Waichiaopu</i>] 外交部 the Ministry of -Foreign Affairs; under the Executive <i>Yüan</i></p> - -<p><i>Wang Tao</i> 王道 "the kingly way," a cardinal concept of traditional -Chinese political thought; now, reinterpreted, the -state philosophy of Manchoukuo</p> - -<p><i>Wei-shêng Shu</i> 衛生暑 National Health Administration (in the -Ministry of the Interior)</p> - -<p><i>Wei-yüan-chang</i> 委會長 chairman (of a committee, commission, -etc.); this title often refers to Generalissimo Chiang in -his capacity of Chairman of the Military Affairs Commission</p> - -<p><i>Wên-kuan Ch'u</i> 文官處 Office of Civil Affairs; a civilian -secretariat attached to the Council of State</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_433" id="Page_433">[Pg 433]</a></span></p> -<p><i>wu-ch'üan hsien-fa</i> 五權憲法 the "five power constitution"; the -five-fold separation of powers taught by Sun Yat-sen and -applied by the National Government</p> - -<p><i>Yüan</i> 院 literally "board"; one of the five divisions of the -National Government of China</p> - -<p><i>Yüan-chang</i> 院長 the President of a <i>Yüan</i></p> - -<p><i>Yüeh Fa</i> 約法 the Provisional Constitution, adopted in 1931</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_435" id="Page_435">[Pg 435]</a></span></p> - - -<h2>INDEX</h2> - - -<div> -Ability (<i>nêng</i>), <a href="#Page_253">253</a><br /> -<br /> -Academia Sinica (<i>Kuo-li Chung-yang Yen-chiu Yüan</i>), <a href="#Page_56">56</a><br /> -<br /> -<i>Act Governing the Elections of Representatives to the National Congress</i>, <a href="#Page_302">302</a><br /> -<br /> -<i>Acting Commission for the National Emancipation of China</i> (<i>Min-ts'u Chieh-fang Hsing-chêng Wei-yüan-hui</i>), <a href="#Page_178">178</a><br /> -<br /> -Administration of Personnel (<i>Ch'uan-hsü T'ing</i>), <a href="#Page_62">62</a><br /> -<br /> -Administrative agencies, chart, <a href="#Page_80">80</a><br /> -<br /> -Administrative Area of North Shensi (<i>Shan-pei Hsing-chêng-ch'ü</i>), <a href="#Page_112">112</a><br /> -<br /> -Administrative Court (<i>Hsing-chêng Fa-yüan</i>), <a href="#Page_67">67</a><br /> -<br /> -Administrative:<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">development, <a href="#Page_96">96</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">law, <a href="#Page_65">65</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">organs, <a href="#Page_69">69</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">pattern, <a href="#Page_79">79</a></span><br /> -<br /> -Administrative Vice-Minister (<i>Ch'ang-wu Tz'ŭ-chang</i>), <a href="#Page_96">96</a><br /> -<br /> -Adult education, <a href="#Page_30">30</a><br /> -<br /> -Agitation, <a href="#Page_61">61</a><br /> -<br /> -Agrarian problems, <a href="#Page_104">104</a><br /> -<br /> -Agriculture, <a href="#Page_91">91</a><br /> -<br /> -Agriculture and Forestry, Ministry of (<i>Nung Lin Pu</i>), <a href="#Page_91">91</a><br /> -<br /> -Air communications, <a href="#Page_90">90</a><br /> -<br /> -Alexander the Great, <a href="#Page_239">239</a><br /> -<br /> -Alley, Rewi, <a href="#Page_224">224</a><br /> -<br /> -Amendments to the Constitution (proposed constitutional provisions), <a href="#Page_300">300</a><br /> -<br /> -American Friends of the Chinese People, <a href="#Page_234">234</a><br /> -<br /> -American Lease-lend Bill, <a href="#Page_217">217</a>, <a href="#Page_274">274</a><br /> -<br /> -American loans, <a href="#Page_19">19</a><br /> -<br /> -Ao-yü-wan, <a href="#Page_161">161</a><br /> -<br /> -Appointment and discharge of officials, <a href="#Page_59">59</a><br /> -<br /> -Armistice, intra-national, <a href="#Page_10">10</a><br /> -<br /> -Army participation in rural reform, <a href="#Page_221">221</a><br /> -<br /> -Atatürk, Kemal, <a href="#Page_272">272</a><br /> -<br /> -Audit, Ministry of, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>, <a href="#Page_320">320</a><br /> -<br /> -Autonomous East Hopei Anti-Communist Government, <a href="#Page_185">185</a><br /> -<br /> -<br /> -Bank of China, <a href="#Page_87">87</a><br /> -<br /> -Bank of Communications, <a href="#Page_87">87</a><br /> -<br /> -Basic patterns of modern Chinese politics, <a href="#Page_8">8</a><br /> -<br /> -Bibliographical notes, <a href="#Page_20">20</a>, <a href="#Page_21">21</a>, <a href="#Page_160">160</a>, <a href="#Page_190">190</a>, <a href="#Page_221">221</a>, <a href="#Page_223">223</a>, <a href="#Page_242">242</a>, <a href="#Page_256">256</a><br /> -<br /> -"Blue Shirts," <a href="#Page_144">144</a><br /> -<br /> -Border Region, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_35">35</a>, <a href="#Page_116">116</a><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">chart of government, <a href="#Page_118">118</a></span><br /> -<br /> -Boxers (<i>I Ho Ch'üan</i>), <a href="#Page_213">213</a>, <a href="#Page_237">237</a><br /> -<br /> -Buddhism, <a href="#Page_258">258</a><br /> -<br /> -Budget, <a href="#Page_59">59</a>, <a href="#Page_75">75</a><br /> -<br /> -Bureaucracy:<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">traditional ideal, <a href="#Page_44">44</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">at Chungking, <a href="#Page_68">68</a></span><br /> -<br /> -Burma, <a href="#Page_189">189</a><br /> -<br /> -Burma road, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>, <a href="#Page_95">95</a>, <a href="#Page_279">279</a><br /> -<br /> -Bukharin, <a href="#Page_164">164</a><br /> -<br /> -Bus services, <a href="#Page_93">93</a><br /> -<br /> -<br /> -Cabinet, <a href="#Page_56">56</a><br /> -<br /> -Canton, <a href="#Page_18">18</a><br /> -<br /> -Cantonese clique, <a href="#Page_145">145</a><br /> -<br /> -Capacity (<i>nêng</i>), <a href="#Page_43">43</a><br /> -<br /> -Capitalism, <a href="#Page_30">30</a><br /> -<br /> -Caribbean, <a href="#Page_188">188</a><br /> -<br /> -Carlson, Major Evans Fordyce, <a href="#Page_116">116</a>, <a href="#Page_167">167</a><br /> -<br /> -"C.C." clique, <a href="#Page_142">142</a><br /> -<br /> -Censor <i>Yüan</i> (<i>see</i> Control <i>Yüan</i>)<br /> -<br /> -Censoral power, <a href="#Page_27">27</a><br /> -<br /> -Censorship of news, <a href="#Page_138">138</a><br /> -<br /> -Censure, motion of, <a href="#Page_314">314</a><br /> -<br /> -Central America, <a href="#Page_188">188</a><br /> -<br /> -Central Bank of China, <a href="#Page_87">87</a><br /> -<br /> -Central China clique (<i>Hua-chung P'ai</i>), <a href="#Page_76">76</a><br /> -<br /> -Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang, <a href="#Page_72">72</a><br /> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_436" id="Page_436">[Pg 436]</a></span><br /> -Central government (proposed constitutional provisions), <a href="#Page_287">287</a><br /> -<br /> -Central Secretariat of the Kuomintang (<i>Chung-yang Mi-shu-ch'u</i>), <a href="#Page_137">137</a><br /> -<br /> -Central News Agency, <a href="#Page_137">137</a><br /> -<br /> -Central Political Council (<i>Chung-yang Chêng-chih Wei-yüan-hui</i>), <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_46">46</a><br /> -<br /> -Central Political Institute (<i>Chung-yang Chêng-chih Hsüeh-hsiao</i>), <a href="#Page_134">134</a><br /> -<br /> -Central Publicity Board (<i>see</i> Party-Ministry of Publicity)<br /> -<br /> -Chamberlain, Neville, <a href="#Page_15">15</a><br /> -<br /> -Chang, Carson (<i>Chang Chia-shêng</i>), <a href="#Page_179">179</a><br /> -<br /> -Chang Ching-chiang, <a href="#Page_261">261</a><br /> -<br /> -Chang Hsüeh-liang, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_200">200</a><br /> -<br /> -Chang Kuo-tao, <a href="#Page_163">163</a>, <a href="#Page_167">167</a>, <a href="#Page_168">168</a><br /> -<br /> -Chang Peh Chuen (Chang Pai-chün), <a href="#Page_178">178</a><br /> -<br /> -Charts (<i>see also</i> type of government)<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Control <i>Yüan</i>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><i>Hsien</i> classifications, <a href="#Page_388">388</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Kuomintang organization, <a href="#Page_331">331</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">national governmental structure, <a href="#Page_330">330</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">provincial and urban government, <a href="#Page_98">98</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<i>Chên</i> (<i>see</i> Community)<br /> -<br /> -Chen Ch'i-mei, <a href="#Page_260">260</a><br /> -<br /> -Chen Chi-tang, <a href="#Page_91">91</a><br /> -<br /> -Chen, Eugene, <a href="#Page_178">178</a><br /> -<br /> -Ch'ên brothers, <a href="#Page_134">134</a><br /> -<br /> -Ch'ên Ch'êng, <a href="#Page_340">340</a><br /> -<br /> -Ch'ên I, <a href="#Page_102">102</a><br /> -<br /> -Ch'ên Kung-po, <a href="#Page_198">198</a><br /> -<br /> -Ch'ên Kuo-fu, <a href="#Page_84">84</a>, <a href="#Page_134">134</a>, <a href="#Page_142">142</a><br /> -<br /> -Ch'ên Kuo-hsin, essay on Mao Tsê-tung, <a href="#Page_403">403</a><br /> -<br /> -Ch'ên Li-fu, <a href="#Page_84">84</a>, <a href="#Page_142">142</a><br /> -<br /> -Ch'ên Lo, <a href="#Page_204">204</a><br /> -<br /> -Ch'ên Shao-yu (Wang Ming), <a href="#Page_163">163</a><br /> -<br /> -Ch'ên Tu-hsiu, <a href="#Page_163">163</a><br /> -<br /> -<i>Ch'ê-yeh Chiao-yü P'ai</i> (<i>see</i> Vocational Educationists' Clique)<br /> -<br /> -<i>Chia</i>, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, <a href="#Page_324">324</a>, <a href="#Page_395">395</a><br /> -<br /> -Chiang Chieh-shih (<i>see</i> Chiang K'ai-shek)<br /> -<br /> -Chiang Ching-kuo, <a href="#Page_262">262</a><br /> -<br /> -Chiang K'ai-shek:<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">biography, <a href="#Page_254">254</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in Canton, <a href="#Page_260">260</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">character, <a href="#Page_255">255</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">childhood, <a href="#Page_257">257</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Chinese appraisals, <a href="#Page_266">266</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and Christianity, <a href="#Page_257">257</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on constitutionalism, <a href="#Page_32">32</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><i>Definition of the Problems of Various Classifications of Hsien</i>, <a href="#Page_388">388</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">ethical theory, <a href="#Page_150">150</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">governmental role, <a href="#Page_48">48</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">historical role, <a href="#Page_255">255</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">ideals, <a href="#Page_257">257</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">kidnapped at Sian, <a href="#Page_10">10</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in the Kuomintang, <a href="#Page_128">128</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">life, <a href="#Page_256">256</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">marriage, <a href="#Page_261">261</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">military rise, <a href="#Page_263">263</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">military writings, <a href="#Page_260">260</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">nature of his power, <a href="#Page_268">268</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and the New Life Movement, <a href="#Page_149">149</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">political theory, <a href="#Page_265">265</a>, <a href="#Page_269">269</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">present personality, <a href="#Page_265">265</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and President Lin, <a href="#Page_53">53</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">relations with Wang Ch'ing-wei, <a href="#Page_201">201</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">rise in the Kuomintang, <a href="#Page_263">263</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and Roosevelt, <a href="#Page_278">278</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">secret police, <a href="#Page_268">268</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in Shanghai, <a href="#Page_261">261</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and the Shanghai Communists, <a href="#Page_263">263</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">statement to the author, <a href="#Page_371">371</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Soviet training, <a href="#Page_262">262</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and Sun Yat-sen, <a href="#Page_245">245</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">training in Japan, <a href="#Page_259">259</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><i>What I Mean by Action (Li-hsing Chê-hsiao)</i>, <a href="#Page_373">373</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">writings, <a href="#Page_268">268</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<i>Chiao-shou P'ai</i> (<i>see</i> Professors' Clique)<br /> -<br /> -Chicherin, <a href="#Page_164">164</a><br /> -<br /> -Chief (<i>Tsung-ts'ai</i>), <a href="#Page_239">239</a><br /> -<br /> -<i>Chien-ch'a</i> power, <a href="#Page_27">27</a><br /> -<br /> -<i>Chien Kuo Ta Kang</i>, <a href="#Page_6">6</a><br /> -<br /> -<i>Ch'ih</i>, <a href="#Page_150">150</a><br /> -<br /> -China Branch of the International Peace Campaign, <a href="#Page_234">234</a><br /> -<br /> -China Defense League, <a href="#Page_119">119</a><br /> -<br /> -<i>China Forum, The</i>, <a href="#Page_235">235</a><br /> -<br /> -<i>China Herald, The</i>, <a href="#Page_234">234</a><br /> -<br /> -"China's Long-range Diplomatic Orientation," <a href="#Page_418">418</a><br /> -<br /> -China National Aviation Corporation, <a href="#Page_93">93</a><br /> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_437" id="Page_437">[Pg 437]</a></span><br /> -Chinese Central Asia (<i>see</i> Sinkiang)<br /> -<br /> -Chinese Communist Party (<i>see</i> Communist Party)<br /> -<br /> -Chinese ideals, <a href="#Page_2">2</a><br /> -<br /> -Chinese Industrial Cooperatives (<i>see</i> C.I.C.)<br /> -<br /> -Chinese Mass Education Movement, <a href="#Page_218">218</a><br /> -<br /> -Chinese National Socialist Party (<i>Kuo-chia Shê-hui Tang</i>), <a href="#Page_179">179</a><br /> -<br /> -Chinese Red Army, <a href="#Page_13">13</a>, <a href="#Page_161">161</a><br /> -<br /> -Chinese Republic, <a href="#Page_2">2</a><br /> -<br /> -Chinese Revolutionary Party (<i>Chung-kuo K'ê-ming Tang</i>), <a href="#Page_178">178</a><br /> -<br /> -Chinese Soviet Republic (<i>Chung-hua Su-wei-ai Kung-ho-kuo</i>), <a href="#Page_13">13</a>, <a href="#Page_112">112</a>, <a href="#Page_161">161</a><br /> -<br /> -Chinese Turkestan (<i>see also</i> Sinkiang), <a href="#Page_85">85</a><br /> -<br /> -Chi, C.C., <a href="#Page_139">139</a><br /> -<br /> -Chin P'u-yi, <a href="#Page_184">184</a>, <a href="#Page_256">256</a><br /> -<br /> -Ch'in state and dynasty, <a href="#Page_2">2</a>, <a href="#Page_107">107</a><br /> -<br /> -Ch'in Po-k'u, <a href="#Page_168">168</a><br /> -<br /> -Chou En-lai, <a href="#Page_64">64</a>, <a href="#Page_168">168</a><br /> -<br /> -Chou Fu-hai, <a href="#Page_198">198</a><br /> -<br /> -Christian activities, <a href="#Page_235">235</a><br /> -<br /> -Chu Djang, <a href="#Page_153">153</a><br /> -<br /> -<i>Chu-Mao</i>, <a href="#Page_166">166</a><br /> -<br /> -Chung Fu Joint Mining Administration, <a href="#Page_90">90</a><br /> -<br /> -Chungking, <a href="#Page_1">1</a>, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>, <a href="#Page_18">18</a>, <a href="#Page_56">56</a><br /> -<br /> -Chung Shan (<i>see also</i> Sun Yat-sen), <a href="#Page_249">249</a><br /> -<br /> -Chu Tê, <a href="#Page_166">166</a>, <a href="#Page_261">261</a><br /> -<br /> -<i>Ch'ü</i>, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, <a href="#Page_327">327</a>, <a href="#Page_391">391</a><br /> -<br /> -<i>Ch'üan</i> (power), <a href="#Page_253">253</a><br /> -<br /> -Ch'üan-min K'ang-chan Shê (United Front Club), cited, <a href="#Page_37">37</a><br /> -<br /> -Ch'u Chia-hua, <a href="#Page_136">136</a><br /> -<br /> -C.I.C. (Chinese Industrial Cooperatives; <i>Chung-kuo Kung-yeh Ho-tso Hsieh-hui</i>):<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">appraisal, <a href="#Page_233">233</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">distribution of profits, <a href="#Page_230">230</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">establishment, <a href="#Page_224">224</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">formation of cooperatives, <a href="#Page_226">226</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">the Model Constitution, <a href="#Page_232">232</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">regions, <a href="#Page_226">226</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">relation to government, <a href="#Page_223">223</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">social welfare work, <a href="#Page_231">231</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">the three zones, <a href="#Page_224">224</a></span><br /> -<br /> -Citizenship (proposed constitutional provisions), <a href="#Page_284">284</a><br /> -<br /> -City Council (<i>Shih-chêng Hui-i</i>), <a href="#Page_104">104</a><br /> -<br /> -Civil governor of a province (<i>Shêng-chang</i>), <a href="#Page_99">99</a><br /> -<br /> -Civil service reform, <a href="#Page_66">66</a><br /> -<br /> -Civil Service Training Corps, <a href="#Page_134">134</a><br /> -<br /> -Clark-Kerr, Sir Archibald, <a href="#Page_224">224</a><br /> -<br /> -Class politics in China, <a href="#Page_146">146</a><br /> -<br /> -Class war, <a href="#Page_13">13</a><br /> -<br /> -Coal and iron, <a href="#Page_228">228</a><br /> -<br /> -Coal mining, <a href="#Page_90">90</a><br /> -<br /> -Collection of revenue, <a href="#Page_86">86</a><br /> -<br /> -College students, <a href="#Page_9">9</a><br /> -<br /> -Commission for the Disciplinary Punishment of Public Officers (<i>Kung-wu-yüan Ch'êng-chieh Wei-yüan-hui</i>), <a href="#Page_67">67</a><br /> -<br /> -Commission on Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs (<i>Mêng Tsang Wei-yüan-hui</i>), <a href="#Page_8">8</a><br /> -<br /> -Commission on Overseas Chinese Affairs (<i>Ch'iao-wu Wei-yüan-hui</i>), <a href="#Page_84">84</a><br /> -<br /> -Committee Chairman (<i>Wei-yüan-chang</i>; <i>see</i> name of Committee)<br /> -<br /> -Communications, Ministry of (<i>Chiao-t'ung Pu</i>), <a href="#Page_92">92</a><br /> -<br /> -Communications Southward, <a href="#Page_95">95</a><br /> -<br /> -Communications system, foreign personnel in, <a href="#Page_95">95</a><br /> -<br /> -Communism, <a href="#Page_30">30</a>, <a href="#Page_270">270</a><br /> -<br /> -Communist communes, <a href="#Page_213">213</a><br /> -<br /> -Communist Party (<i>Kung-ch'an Tang</i>), <a href="#Page_13">13</a>, <a href="#Page_159">159</a>, <a href="#Page_263">263</a>, <a href="#Page_275">275</a><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and American aid to China, <a href="#Page_172">172</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">appraisal of, <a href="#Page_173">173</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Branch Party Organs, <a href="#Page_363">363</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Central Party Committee, <a href="#Page_368">368</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">chart of structure, <a href="#Page_162">162</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and Chiang K'ai-shek, <a href="#Page_175">175</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><i>Constitution</i>, <a href="#Page_359">359</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Council of Party Delegates, <a href="#Page_162">162</a>, <a href="#Page_364">364</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">foundation, <a href="#Page_160">160</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><i>Hsien</i> Organs, <a href="#Page_364">364</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">international policy, <a href="#Page_403">403</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">leaders, <a href="#Page_166">166</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and Moscow, <a href="#Page_163">163</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">motives, <a href="#Page_164">164</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">National Party Congress, <a href="#Page_367">367</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">National Party Convention, <a href="#Page_367">367</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">organization, <a href="#Page_361">361</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and peasants, <a href="#Page_165">165</a>, <a href="#Page_213">213</a></span><br /> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_438" id="Page_438">[Pg 438]</a></span><span style="margin-left: 1em;">in perpetual revolution, <a href="#Page_213">213</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">policy toward the Kuomintang, <a href="#Page_174">174</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">potential treason, <a href="#Page_172">172</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Provincial Party Organs, <a href="#Page_366">366</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">purges and schisms, <a href="#Page_169">169</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Sun Yat-sen's alliance, <a href="#Page_245">245</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Supreme Party Organs, <a href="#Page_362">362</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">views on Chiang K'ai-shek, <a href="#Page_267">267</a></span><br /> -<br /> -Communist Youth Corps (<i>Kung-ch'an Ch'ing-nien T'uan</i>), <a href="#Page_132">132</a>, <a href="#Page_370">370</a><br /> -<br /> -Communist zone (<i>see</i> Frontier Area)<br /> -<br /> -Communists:<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">compared with Kuomintang, <a href="#Page_146">146</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and the five-power system, <a href="#Page_45">45</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and the guerrillas, <a href="#Page_162">162</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in the People's Political Council, <a href="#Page_76">76</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">policy of collaboration, <a href="#Page_121">121</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and the proposed Constitution, <a href="#Page_37">37</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">rivalry with Kuomintang, <a href="#Page_159">159</a></span><br /> -<br /> -"Community" (<i>hsiang</i>), <a href="#Page_107">107</a><br /> -<br /> -Community life in China, <a href="#Page_4">4</a><br /> -<br /> -Complexity of government structure, <a href="#Page_61">61</a><br /> -<br /> -Concordia Society (<i>Hsieh-ho-hui</i>), <a href="#Page_194">194</a><br /> -<br /> -Conflict: the term, <a href="#Page_11">11</a><br /> -<br /> -Confucianism, <a href="#Page_2">2</a>, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_45">45</a>, <a href="#Page_189">189</a>, <a href="#Page_250">250</a><br /> -<br /> -Confucius, <a href="#Page_239">239</a><br /> -<br /> -Constitution, Chiang's comment on, <a href="#Page_32">32</a><br /> -<br /> -<i>Constitution of the Chinese Soviet Republic</i>, <a href="#Page_31">31</a><br /> -<br /> -<i>Constitution of the</i> San Min Chu I <i>Youth Corps</i>, <a href="#Page_331">331</a><br /> -<br /> -Constitutional change, issues of, <a href="#Page_31">31</a><br /> -<br /> -Constitutionalism, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>, <a href="#Page_177">177</a>, <a href="#Page_213">213</a>, <a href="#Page_371">371</a><br /> -<br /> -Constitutions (<i>see also</i> Draft Constitution), <a href="#Page_21">21</a><br /> -<br /> -Constitutions, ineffectual, <a href="#Page_39">39</a><br /> -<br /> -Consultative organs, <a href="#Page_39">39</a><br /> -<br /> -<i>Control</i> (<i>chien-ch'a)</i> power, <a href="#Page_27">27</a><br /> -<br /> -Control <i>Yüan</i> (<i>Chien-ch'a Yüan</i>):<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">appraisal, <a href="#Page_66">66</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">chart of functions, <a href="#Page_318">318</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">diagram of organization, <a href="#Page_319">319</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">proposed constitutional provisions, <a href="#Page_292">292</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">reorganization under the proposed Constitution, <a href="#Page_29">29</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">war work, <a href="#Page_313">313</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a></span><br /> -<br /> -Cooperatives (<i>see also</i> C.I.C.), <a href="#Page_89">89</a>, <a href="#Page_393">393</a><br /> -<br /> -Corruption, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>, <a href="#Page_120">120</a><br /> -<br /> -Cotton, <a href="#Page_228">228</a><br /> -<br /> -Council of State (<i>Kuo-min Chêng-fu Wei-yüan-hui</i>):<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">administrative and constitutional status, <a href="#Page_52">52</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">agencies directly attached, <a href="#Page_54">54</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">functions, <a href="#Page_47">47</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">proposed constitutional role, <a href="#Page_28">28</a></span><br /> -<br /> -County (<i>see hsien</i>)<br /> -<br /> -Courts of justice (proposed constitutional position), <a href="#Page_292">292</a><br /> -<br /> -Credit, national, <a href="#Page_86">86</a><br /> -<br /> -Currency, Japanese, <a href="#Page_186">186</a><br /> -<br /> -Currency rivalry, <a href="#Page_87">87</a><br /> -<br /> -Currents of documents in Chinese government, <a href="#Page_55">55</a><br /> -<br /> -Customs, <a href="#Page_88">88</a><br /> -<br /> -<br /> -Declarations of war and peace, <a href="#Page_59">59</a><br /> -<br /> -<i>Definition of the Problems Concerning the Organization of the Various Classifications of Hsien</i>, <a href="#Page_388">388</a><br /> -<br /> -Delegates to the constituent People's Congress, <a href="#Page_38">38</a><br /> -<br /> -Democracy (<i>min chu</i>; Sun Yat-sen's term, <i>min ch'üan</i>), <a href="#Page_270">270</a><br /> -<br /> -Democracy in free China, <a href="#Page_371">371</a><br /> -<br /> -Democracy, inauguration of, <a href="#Page_38">38</a><br /> -<br /> -Democracy, prospects, <a href="#Page_273">273</a><br /> -<br /> -Democracy (<i>min ch'üan</i>), the theory of, <a href="#Page_253">253</a><br /> -<br /> -Democratic Centralism, <a href="#Page_162">162</a><br /> -<br /> -Democratic tendencies in the armies, <a href="#Page_372">372</a><br /> -<br /> -Democratic toleration, limits of, <a href="#Page_40">40</a><br /> -<br /> -Department of Military Operations (<i>Chün-ling-pu</i>), <a href="#Page_62">62</a><br /> -<br /> -Department of Military Training (<i>Chün-hsün-pu</i>), <a href="#Page_62">62</a><br /> -<br /> -Deputy Secretary-General (<i>Fu Mi-shu-chang</i>) of the People's Political Council, <a href="#Page_73">73</a><br /> -<br /> -Deputy Speaker (<i>Fu I-chang</i>) of the People's Political Council, <a href="#Page_72">72</a><br /> -<br /> -Dialectical materialism (<i>see</i> Communism, Communists)<br /> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_439" id="Page_439">[Pg 439]</a></span><br /> -Diplomacy, <a href="#Page_310">310</a><br /> -<br /> -Diplomatic Orientation, China's Long-range, <a href="#Page_418">418</a><br /> -<br /> -Direct taxes, <a href="#Page_87">87</a><br /> -<br /> -Director of Political Affairs, <a href="#Page_57">57</a><br /> -<br /> -Directorate-General of Courts-Martial (<i>Chün-fa Chih-hsing Tsung-chien-pu</i>), <a href="#Page_62">62</a><br /> -<br /> -<i>Discussion of Mao Tsê-tung's Comments on the Present State of International Relations</i> (Ch'ên Kuo-hsin), <a href="#Page_403">403</a><br /> -<br /> -District (<i>see hsien</i> for government; <i>ch'ü</i> for parties)<br /> -<br /> -Double Five Constitution (<i>see</i> Draft Permanent Constitution)<br /> -<br /> -Draft Permanent Constitution (<i>Hsien-fa Ts'ao-an</i>), <a href="#Page_25">25</a>, <a href="#Page_283">283</a><br /> -<br /> -<i>Duties and General Activities of the</i> San Min Chu I <i>Youth Corps</i>, <a href="#Page_340">340</a><br /> -<br /> -<br /> -East Hopei Autonomous Anti-Communist Government, <a href="#Page_192">192</a><br /> -<br /> -Eastern Inner Mongolia, <a href="#Page_85">85</a><br /> -<br /> -Economic affairs:<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">advance in the West, <a href="#Page_89">89</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">industrial development, <a href="#Page_90">90</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in <i>Program of Resistance and Reconstruction</i>, <a href="#Page_311">311</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">policy and administration, <a href="#Page_85">85</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">proposed constitutional provisions, <a href="#Page_296">296</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">war finance, <a href="#Page_87">87</a></span><br /> -<br /> -Economic Affairs, Ministry of (<i>Ching-chi Pu</i>), <a href="#Page_88">88</a><br /> -<br /> -Economic cycle in China, <a href="#Page_106">106</a><br /> -<br /> -Economic groups in politics, <a href="#Page_236">236</a><br /> -<br /> -Economic theory in the <i>San Min Chu I Youth Corps</i>, <a href="#Page_351">351</a><br /> -<br /> -Economics of old China, <a href="#Page_3">3</a><br /> -<br /> -Education, <a href="#Page_30">30</a>, <a href="#Page_61">61</a>, <a href="#Page_83">83</a>, <a href="#Page_214">214</a>, <a href="#Page_312">312</a>, <a href="#Page_393">393</a><br /> -<br /> -Education, Ministry of (<i>Chiao-yü Pu</i>), <a href="#Page_83">83</a><br /> -<br /> -Education: proposed constitutional provisions, <a href="#Page_298">298</a><br /> -<br /> -Eighteenth Army Corps, <a href="#Page_168">168</a><br /> -<br /> -Eighth Route Army, <a href="#Page_13">13</a>, <a href="#Page_168">168</a><br /> -<br /> -Election Committee for Representatives to the People's [Constituent] Congress, <a href="#Page_38">38</a><br /> -<br /> -Elections, Communist, <a href="#Page_163">163</a><br /> -<br /> -Elections of representatives to the National [People's] Congress, <a href="#Page_302">302</a><br /> -<br /> -Emergency Session of the Kuomintang Party Congress, <a href="#Page_16">16</a><br /> -<br /> -Empire, Chinese, <a href="#Page_2">2</a><br /> -<br /> -<i>Erh Ch'ên</i> group, <a href="#Page_142">142</a><br /> -<br /> -Espionage, <a href="#Page_61">61</a><br /> -<br /> -Establishment, period of, <a href="#Page_5">5</a><br /> -<br /> -Eurasia airlines, <a href="#Page_93">93</a><br /> -<br /> -Examination <i>Yüan</i>, <a href="#Page_56">56</a>, <a href="#Page_66">66</a>, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>, <a href="#Page_134">134</a><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">proposed constitutional provisions, <a href="#Page_292">292</a></span><br /> -<br /> -Examinations Commission (<i>K'ao-hsüan Wei-yüan-hui</i>), <a href="#Page_68">68</a><br /> -<br /> -<i>Exclusive inspection</i>, <a href="#Page_316">316</a><br /> -<br /> -Executive <i>Yüan</i> (<i>Hsing-chêng Yüan</i>):<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">executive responsibility, <a href="#Page_57">57</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">functions, <a href="#Page_59">59</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Meeting, <a href="#Page_58">58</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">proposed constitutional provisions, <a href="#Page_29">29</a>, <a href="#Page_288">288</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">structure, <a href="#Page_58">58</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<br /> -<i>Fa chih</i> (government of laws), <a href="#Page_33">33</a><br /> -<br /> -Farmers, <a href="#Page_218">218</a><br /> -<br /> -Farmers' Bank of China, <a href="#Page_87">87</a><br /> -<br /> -Fêng Yü-hsiang, <a href="#Page_104">104</a><br /> -<br /> -Fenghua, Chekiang, <a href="#Page_262">262</a><br /> -<br /> -Farouk, <a href="#Page_255">255</a><br /> -<br /> -Fascism, <a href="#Page_270">270</a><br /> -<br /> -Finance, Ministry of (<i>Ts'ai-chêng Pu</i>), <a href="#Page_86">86</a><br /> -<br /> -Five-fold separation of powers, <a href="#Page_27">27</a>, <a href="#Page_206">206</a>, <a href="#Page_264">264</a><br /> -<br /> -Five-power constitution (<i>wu-ch'üan hsien-fa</i>), <a href="#Page_42">42</a>, <a href="#Page_68">68</a><br /> -<br /> -<i>Five rights</i>, <a href="#Page_43">43</a><br /> -<br /> -Five <i>yüan</i>, <a href="#Page_253">253</a><br /> -<br /> -Foo Shing Corporation, <a href="#Page_88">88</a><br /> -<br /> -Foochow insurrection, <a href="#Page_179">179</a><br /> -<br /> -Ford, Henry, <a href="#Page_233">233</a><br /> -<br /> -Foreign Affairs, Ministry of (<i>Waichiaopu</i>), <a href="#Page_81">81</a><br /> -<br /> -Foreign financial aid, <a href="#Page_87">87</a><br /> -<br /> -Foreign policy, <a href="#Page_403">403</a>, <a href="#Page_418">418</a><br /> -<br /> -Foreign trade, <a href="#Page_88">88</a><br /> -<br /> -Formosans, <a href="#Page_187">187</a><br /> -<br /> -Four Cliques (<i>Ssŭ P'ai</i>), <a href="#Page_76">76</a><br /> -<br /> -Four Parties (<i>Ssŭ Tang</i>), <a href="#Page_76">76</a><br /> -<br /> -<i>Four powers</i>, <a href="#Page_43">43</a><br /> -<br /> -France, <a href="#Page_181">181</a><br /> -<br /> -Frederick the Great, <a href="#Page_255">255</a><br /> -<br /> -Free China, extent of, <a href="#Page_98">98</a><br /> -<br /> -Free China, prosperity, <a href="#Page_89">89</a>, <a href="#Page_222">222</a><br /> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_440" id="Page_440">[Pg 440]</a></span><br /> -Freedoms under the proposed constitution:<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">assembly and forming associations, <a href="#Page_285">285</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">domicile, <a href="#Page_284">284</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">religious belief, <a href="#Page_284">284</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">speech, writing, and publication, <a href="#Page_284">284</a></span><br /> -<br /> -French Indo-China, <a href="#Page_19">19</a><br /> -<br /> -Friends of the Wounded Society, <a href="#Page_155">155</a><br /> -<br /> -Frontier Area (for Chinese, <i>see</i> Administrative District of North Shensi), <a href="#Page_13">13</a>, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_111">111</a>, <a href="#Page_115">115</a>, <a href="#Page_162">162</a><br /> -<br /> -Fu Hsiao-ên, <a href="#Page_212">212</a><br /> -<br /> -Fukien province, <a href="#Page_102">102</a>, <a href="#Page_217">217</a><br /> -<br /> -Function of auditing, <a href="#Page_313">313</a><br /> -<br /> -Fup'ing, <a href="#Page_118">118</a><br /> -<br /> -Future development of Chinese politics, <a href="#Page_274">274</a><br /> -<br /> -<br /> -<i>Gaimusho</i>, <a href="#Page_82">82</a><br /> -<br /> -Galens, General (Vassili Blücher), <a href="#Page_142">142</a><br /> -<br /> -Gasoline, <a href="#Page_91">91</a>, <a href="#Page_95">95</a><br /> -<br /> -Gautama Buddha, <a href="#Page_239">239</a><br /> -<br /> -<i>General inspection</i>, <a href="#Page_316">316</a><br /> -<br /> -General Staff, <a href="#Page_62">62</a><br /> -<br /> -General strikes, <a href="#Page_39">39</a><br /> -<br /> -Generalissimo (<i>Tsung-ssŭ-ling</i>), <a href="#Page_61">61</a><br /> -<br /> -Genghis Khan, <a href="#Page_239">239</a><br /> -<br /> -Gentry in politics, <a href="#Page_106">106</a><br /> -<br /> -George, Henry, <a href="#Page_30">30</a>, <a href="#Page_254">254</a><br /> -<br /> -Germany, <a href="#Page_273">273</a>, <a href="#Page_274">274</a><br /> -<br /> -Glossary, <a href="#Page_423">423</a>-<a href="#Page_433">433</a><br /> -<br /> -Gold-washing, <a href="#Page_228">228</a><br /> -<br /> -Government-owned corporations, <a href="#Page_90">90</a><br /> -<br /> -Government, nature of, <a href="#Page_211">211</a><br /> -<br /> -Government organization: chart, <a href="#Page_330">330</a><br /> -<br /> -Grants in aid to the provinces, <a href="#Page_109">109</a><br /> -<br /> -Grass cloth, <a href="#Page_228">228</a><br /> -<br /> -Great Revolution, <a href="#Page_5">5</a>, <a href="#Page_60">60</a>, <a href="#Page_213">213</a><br /> -<br /> -Green Gang, <a href="#Page_261">261</a><br /> -<br /> -Groups of households (<i>chia</i>), <a href="#Page_107">107</a><br /> -<br /> -Guerrillas:<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">areas, <a href="#Page_372">372</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">governments, <a href="#Page_116">116</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and the Military Affairs Commission, <a href="#Page_62">62</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and the National Salvationists, <a href="#Page_177">177</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">schools, <a href="#Page_84">84</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">strategy, <a href="#Page_12">12</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">warfare, <a href="#Page_310">310</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">zones under Chungking, <a href="#Page_64">64</a></span><br /> -<br /> -Guilds, <a href="#Page_10">10</a><br /> -<br /> -<br /> -Han dynasty, <a href="#Page_3">3</a><br /> -<br /> -Han Fu-ch'u, <a href="#Page_202">202</a><br /> -<br /> -Hankow, <a href="#Page_4">4</a>, <a href="#Page_15">15</a><br /> -<br /> -Hanson, Haldore, <a href="#Page_116">116</a><br /> -<br /> -Hedin, Sven, <a href="#Page_255">255</a><br /> -<br /> -Highway system, <a href="#Page_93">93</a><br /> -<br /> -Hitler, Adolf, <a href="#Page_239">239</a><br /> -<br /> -Hong Kong, <a href="#Page_4">4</a><br /> -<br /> -Honolulu, Sun Yat-sen in, <a href="#Page_243">243</a><br /> -<br /> -Hopei-Chahar Political Council, <a href="#Page_195">195</a><br /> -<br /> -Hopei-Chahar-Shansi Border Region (<i>Chin-ch'a-ch'i Pien-ch'ü Lin-shih Hsing-chêng Wei-yüan-hui</i>), Provisional, Administrative Committee of, <a href="#Page_116">116</a><br /> -<br /> -Ho Ying-chin, <a href="#Page_63">63</a><br /> -<br /> -<i>Hsiang</i> (or <i>chên</i>; "community"), <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, <a href="#Page_324">324</a>, <a href="#Page_391">391</a><br /> -<br /> -<i>Hsiang</i> guild, <a href="#Page_393">393</a><br /> -<br /> -<i>Hsiao-tsu</i> ("small group") training program, <a href="#Page_354">354</a><br /> -<br /> -<i>Hsien</i> ("county" or district), <a href="#Page_29">29</a>, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, <a href="#Page_253">253</a>, <a href="#Page_311">311</a><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">area, <a href="#Page_391">391</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">definition of problems by Chiang K'ai-shek, <a href="#Page_388">388</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">experimental, <a href="#Page_219">219</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">governments, <a href="#Page_391">391</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">organizations of the Communists, <a href="#Page_364">364</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">proposed constitutional provisions, <a href="#Page_294">294</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">regulations (text), <a href="#Page_324">324</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<i>Hsin Min Chu I</i>, <a href="#Page_194">194</a><br /> -<br /> -<i>Hsin Min Hui</i>, <a href="#Page_208">208</a><br /> -<br /> -Huang, J. L., <a href="#Page_149">149</a><br /> -<br /> -Huang Hsing, <a href="#Page_245">245</a>, <a href="#Page_259">259</a>, <a href="#Page_262">262</a><br /> -<br /> -<i>Huangpu</i> (Whampoa) Academy and political group, <a href="#Page_142">142</a>, <a href="#Page_262">262</a><br /> -<br /> -Huapeikuo, <a href="#Page_194">194</a><br /> -<br /> -Hu Han-min, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_142">142</a>, <a href="#Page_202">202</a>, <a href="#Page_262">262</a><br /> -<br /> -<i>Hui-i</i> (a legislative "council"; <i>see</i> level of government concerned)<br /> -<br /> -Hull, Cordell, <a href="#Page_278">278</a><br /> -<br /> -Hunan, <a href="#Page_19">19</a><br /> -<br /> -Hung Hsiu-ch'üan, <a href="#Page_241">241</a><br /> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_441" id="Page_441">[Pg 441]</a></span><br /> -Hu Shih, <a href="#Page_215">215</a><br /> -<br /> -Hypo-colony, <a href="#Page_190">190</a><br /> -<br /> -<br /> -<i>I</i> (ethics), <a href="#Page_150">150</a><br /> -<br /> -Ideological control, <a href="#Page_251">251</a><br /> -<br /> -<i>I Ho Ch'üan</i> (Boxers), <a href="#Page_237">237</a><br /> -<br /> -Impeachment, <a href="#Page_313">313</a><br /> -<br /> -Impeachment, proposed constitutional provisions, <a href="#Page_293">293</a><br /> -<br /> -"In accordance with law," <a href="#Page_26">26</a><br /> -<br /> -Incident, <a href="#Page_11">11</a><br /> -<br /> -Income taxes, <a href="#Page_87">87</a><br /> -<br /> -Indirect rule, <a href="#Page_183">183</a><br /> -<br /> -Indo-China, <a href="#Page_183">183</a><br /> -<br /> -Indusco (<i>see</i> C.I.C.)<br /> -<br /> -Industrial cooperatives (<i>see</i> C.I.C.)<br /> -<br /> -Inheritance, the Chinese political, <a href="#Page_1">1</a><br /> -<br /> -Inheritance taxes, <a href="#Page_87">87</a><br /> -<br /> -Inner Mongolia, Federated Autonomous Government of (<i>Mêng-ku Lien-ho Tzŭ-chih Chêng-fu</i>), <a href="#Page_192">192</a><br /> -<br /> -Inner Mongolia and Chungking, <a href="#Page_85">85</a><br /> -<br /> -Inspection systems, <a href="#Page_108">108</a><br /> -<br /> -Institute of National Culture, <a href="#Page_179">179</a><br /> -<br /> -Intellectual traditionalism, <a href="#Page_251">251</a><br /> -<br /> -Interior, Ministry of (<i>Nei-chêng Pu</i>), <a href="#Page_82">82</a><br /> -<br /> -Internal revenue, <a href="#Page_88">88</a><br /> -<br /> -<i>International Development of China, The</i>, <a href="#Page_244">244</a><br /> -<br /> -International relations (<i>see</i> diplomacy, foreign policy, etc.)<br /> -<br /> -Interpretation of statutes and ordinances: proposed constitutional provisions, <a href="#Page_291">291</a><br /> -<br /> -Invasion, period of, <a href="#Page_5">5</a><br /> -<br /> -Italy, <a href="#Page_274">274</a><br /> -<br /> -<br /> -Japanese:<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">aims in China, <a href="#Page_184">184</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">army, <a href="#Page_18">18</a>, <a href="#Page_276">276</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">army as a Chinese government, <a href="#Page_185">185</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">attitudes to Chinese foreign policy, <a href="#Page_82">82</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Imperial Government in China, <a href="#Page_183">183</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">prospects in China, <a href="#Page_274">274</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">recognition of Wang Ch'ing-wei, <a href="#Page_209">209</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">role of the army, <a href="#Page_183">183</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">subsidiary Chinese governments (<i>see</i> Pro-Japanese Groups)</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">training of Chiang K'ai-shek, <a href="#Page_259">259</a></span><br /> -<br /> -Japan's puppets or Japanophiles (<i>see</i> Pro-Japanese Groups)<br /> -<br /> -<i>Joint inspection</i>, <a href="#Page_316">316</a><br /> -<br /> -Judicial <i>Yüan</i> (<i>Ssŭ-fa Yüan</i>), <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, <a href="#Page_291">291</a><br /> -<br /> -Justice, Ministry of (<i>Ssŭ-fa Hsing-chêng Pu</i>), <a href="#Page_67">67</a>, <a href="#Page_96">96</a><br /> -<br /> -<br /> -K'an Nai-kuang, <a href="#Page_137">137</a>, <a href="#Page_140">140</a><br /> -<br /> -Kang Tê, Emperor of Manchoukuo, the (<i>see</i> Chin P'u-yi)<br /> -<br /> -Kao Tsung-wu, <a href="#Page_198">198</a><br /> -<br /> -Kentwell, L. K., <a href="#Page_205">205</a><br /> -<br /> -Kialing river, <a href="#Page_18">18</a><br /> -<br /> -Kiang Kang-hu, <a href="#Page_181">181</a><br /> -<br /> -Kiangsi, <a href="#Page_161">161</a><br /> -<br /> -Korea, <a href="#Page_189">189</a><br /> -<br /> -Kung, H. H., <a href="#Page_57">57</a>, <a href="#Page_86">86</a>, <a href="#Page_223">223</a><br /> -<br /> -Kung, Mme. H. H. (Ai-ling Soong), <a href="#Page_248">248</a><br /> -<br /> -Kung so, <a href="#Page_393">393</a><br /> -<br /> -<i>Kuo-chia Chu-i P'ai</i> (<i>La Jeunesse</i> party), <a href="#Page_181">181</a><br /> -<br /> -Kuomintang:<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">appraisal of, <a href="#Page_146">146</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">army connections, <a href="#Page_143">143</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">attitude toward Communists, <a href="#Page_144">144</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Bolshevik pattern of organization, <a href="#Page_131">131</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">bureaucracy, <a href="#Page_7">7</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">central administrative structure, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>, <a href="#Page_131">131</a>, <a href="#Page_137">137</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Central Control Committee (<i>Chung-yang Chien-ch'a Wei-yüan-hui</i>), <a href="#Page_127">127</a>, <a href="#Page_131">131</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Central Executive Committee (<i>Chung-yang Chih-hsing Wei-yüan-hui</i>), <a href="#Page_57">57</a>, <a href="#Page_126">126</a>, <a href="#Page_127">127</a>, <a href="#Page_131">131</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Central Political Institute (<i>Chung-yang Chêng-chih Hsüeh-hsiao</i>), <a href="#Page_134">134</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Central Publicity Board (<i>see</i> Publicity, Party-Ministry of)</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Central Training Committee (<i>Hsün-lien Wei-yüan-hui</i>), <a href="#Page_133">133</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">chart of field organization, <a href="#Page_139">139</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">chart of central organization, <a href="#Page_131">131</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">chart of general structure, <a href="#Page_331">331</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and the Ch'ên brothers, <a href="#Page_84">84</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and the Communists, <a href="#Page_159">159</a></span><br /> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_442" id="Page_442">[Pg 442]</a></span><span style="margin-left: 1em;">Congress (<i>Ch'üan-kuo Tai-piao Ta-hui</i>), <a href="#Page_57">57</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">constitutional status, <a href="#Page_124">124</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">democratic outlook, <a href="#Page_143">143</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and economic classes, <a href="#Page_135">135</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Emergency Session of the Party Congress, <a href="#Page_69">69</a>, <a href="#Page_128">128</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;"><i>hsiao-tsu</i> ("small-group"), <a href="#Page_140">140</a>, <a href="#Page_354">354</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">intra-Party politics, <a href="#Page_142">142</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">membership, <a href="#Page_141">141</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">monopoly of government, <a href="#Page_41">41</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">organization, <a href="#Page_125">125</a>, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>, <a href="#Page_331">331</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">"Orthodox" fraction, <a href="#Page_200">200</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Party cell, <a href="#Page_140">140</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Party Chief (<i>Tsung-ts'ai</i>), <a href="#Page_126">126</a>, <a href="#Page_128">128</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Party Congress (<i>see</i> Congress)</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Party Constitution, <a href="#Page_125">125</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Party democracy, <a href="#Page_124">124</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Party-Ministries, <a href="#Page_136">136</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Party purges, <a href="#Page_141">141</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in the People's Political Council, <a href="#Page_76">76</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">policy toward Communist Party, <a href="#Page_174">174</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">purposes, <a href="#Page_125">125</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">"Reorganized" fraction, <a href="#Page_200">200</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">rivalry with Communists in the Northwest, <a href="#Page_135">135</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">"small-group" (<i>see hsiao-tsu</i>)</span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Supreme National Defense Council (<i>Kuo-fang Tsui-kao Wei-yüan-hui</i>), <a href="#Page_132">132</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Training Corps (<i>Hsün-lien T'uan</i>), <a href="#Page_133">133</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Wang Ch'ing-wei, <a href="#Page_197">197</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Youth Corps (<i>see San Min Chu I</i> Youth Corps)</span><br /> -<br /> -Kwangsi province, <a href="#Page_19">19</a>, <a href="#Page_102">102</a>, <a href="#Page_109">109</a>, <a href="#Page_217">217</a><br /> -<br /> -Kwangtung province, <a href="#Page_102">102</a><br /> -<br /> -<br /> -Labor:<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">law, <a href="#Page_39">39</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">proposed constitutional provisions, <a href="#Page_297">297</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<i>La Jeunesse</i> (Parti ... de la jeune Chine; <i>Kuo-chia Chu-i P'ai</i>), <a href="#Page_76">76</a>, <a href="#Page_181">181</a><br /> -<br /> -Land problem:<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">proposed constitutional provisions, <a href="#Page_296">296</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">reform, <a href="#Page_106">106</a>, <a href="#Page_110">110</a>, <a href="#Page_218">218</a></span><br /> -<br /> -Landlords, <a href="#Page_4">4</a>, <a href="#Page_148">148</a>, <a href="#Page_221">221</a><br /> -<br /> -<i>Lao-pai-hsing</i> (the common people), <a href="#Page_236">236</a><br /> -<br /> -Lattimore, Owen, <a href="#Page_3">3</a><br /> -<br /> -Law: the term, <a href="#Page_299">299</a><br /> -<br /> -<i>Laws Governing the System of Organization of the National Government of the Republic of China</i> (1925), <a href="#Page_23">23</a><br /> -<br /> -<i>Laws Governing the System of Organization of the National Government</i> (1931), <a href="#Page_24">24</a><br /> -<br /> -Leader (<i>Tsung-li</i>), <a href="#Page_239">239</a><br /> -<br /> -League of Nations Union, <a href="#Page_234">234</a><br /> -<br /> -Left Kuomintang, <a href="#Page_264">264</a><br /> -<br /> -Leftists and Leftism, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_101">101</a>, <a href="#Page_111">111</a>, <a href="#Page_248">248</a><br /> -<br /> -Legal Adviser to the National Government (<i>Kuo-min Chêng-fu Fa-lü Ku-wên</i>), <a href="#Page_54">54</a><br /> -<br /> -Legal tender notes (<i>fa pi</i>), <a href="#Page_87">87</a>, <a href="#Page_312">312</a><br /> -<br /> -Legislative <i>Yüan</i> (<i>Li-fa Yüan</i>): function, <a href="#Page_65">65</a><br /> -<br /> -Members (<i>Li-fa Wei-yüan</i>), <a href="#Page_66">66</a><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">proposed constitutional provisions, <a href="#Page_29">29</a>, <a href="#Page_289">289</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<i>Li</i> (ideological conformity), <a href="#Page_150">150</a><br /> -<br /> -<i>Li chih</i> (government by <i>li</i>), <a href="#Page_33">33</a><br /> -<br /> -Liang, Hubert, <a href="#Page_224">224</a><br /> -<br /> -<i>Lien</i> (integrity), <a href="#Page_150">150</a><br /> -<br /> -Li Hung-chang, <a href="#Page_189">189</a><br /> -<br /> -Li Li-san, <a href="#Page_163">163</a><br /> -<br /> -Linebarger, Paul M. W., <a href="#Page_54">54</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_242">242</a>, <a href="#Page_246">246</a><br /> -<br /> -Lin Pai-shêng, <a href="#Page_198">198</a><br /> -<br /> -Lin Shên (Lin Sen; Lim Sun), <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_145">145</a><br /> -<br /> -Li Shêng-wu, <a href="#Page_206">206</a><br /> -<br /> -Literacy, <a href="#Page_214">214</a>, <a href="#Page_215">215</a><br /> -<br /> -Liu, K. P., <a href="#Page_224">224</a><br /> -<br /> -Local finance, <a href="#Page_402">402</a><br /> -<br /> -Local government (<i>see also hsien</i>):<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">appraisals, <a href="#Page_109">109</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">chart, <a href="#Page_107">107</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Chiang K'ai-shek's comment, <a href="#Page_397">397</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">general role, <a href="#Page_98">98</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">under the <i>Hsien Fa</i>, <a href="#Page_29">29</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">proposed constitutional reforms, <a href="#Page_294">294</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in the recent past, <a href="#Page_104">104</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">reform of, <a href="#Page_311">311</a></span><br /> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_443" id="Page_443">[Pg 443]</a></span><span style="margin-left: 1em;">reform under the Kuomintang, <a href="#Page_137">137</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">reform methods, <a href="#Page_108">108</a></span><br /> -<br /> -Long March of the Chinese Reds, <a href="#Page_119">119</a>, <a href="#Page_161">161</a><br /> -<br /> -Long-Range Diplomatic Orientation, China's, <a href="#Page_418">418</a><br /> -<br /> -Lung Yün, <a href="#Page_101">101</a><br /> -<br /> -<br /> -Mahayana Buddhism, <a href="#Page_259">259</a><br /> -<br /> -Mail censorship, <a href="#Page_95">95</a><br /> -<br /> -Main Office of the Military Affairs Commission, <a href="#Page_62">62</a><br /> -<br /> -Malaysia, <a href="#Page_183">183</a><br /> -<br /> -Malraux, André, <a href="#Page_161">161</a><br /> -<br /> -Manchoukuo, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>, <a href="#Page_183">183</a>, <a href="#Page_189">189</a>, <a href="#Page_256">256</a><br /> -<br /> -Manchoukuo-Outer Mongol war, <a href="#Page_19">19</a><br /> -<br /> -Manchu Empire of China (Ch'ing dynasty), <a href="#Page_5">5</a><br /> -<br /> -Manchuria, <a href="#Page_89">89</a><br /> -<br /> -Manchus, <a href="#Page_2">2</a>, <a href="#Page_241">241</a><br /> -<br /> -Mao Tsê-tung, <a href="#Page_166">166</a>, <a href="#Page_403">403</a>-<a href="#Page_417">417</a><br /> -<br /> -Marx, Karl, <a href="#Page_241">241</a>, <a href="#Page_254">254</a><br /> -<br /> -Marxism, <a href="#Page_160">160</a>, <a href="#Page_234">234</a>, <a href="#Page_258">258</a>, <a href="#Page_263">263</a><br /> -<br /> -Marxism and Chinese history, <a href="#Page_165">165</a><br /> -<br /> -Marxism-Leninism, <a href="#Page_84">84</a><br /> -<br /> -Marxist effect on the <i>San Min Chu I</i>, <a href="#Page_252">252</a><br /> -<br /> -Mass:<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">action, <a href="#Page_10">10</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">education, <a href="#Page_215">215</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">literacy movement, <a href="#Page_84">84</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">marriages, <a href="#Page_153">153</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">mobilization, <a href="#Page_157">157</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">movements, <a href="#Page_312">312</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">singing, <a href="#Page_154">154</a></span><br /> -<br /> -Material and Resources Control and Supervision Ministry, <a href="#Page_91">91</a><br /> -<br /> -Mayor (<i>Shih-chang</i>), <a href="#Page_104">104</a><br /> -<br /> -Mayors under the proposed constitution, <a href="#Page_295">295</a><br /> -<br /> -Mazzini, <a href="#Page_241">241</a><br /> -<br /> -Miao Ping, <a href="#Page_194">194</a><br /> -<br /> -Migration of schools, <a href="#Page_83">83</a><br /> -<br /> -Migrations, <a href="#Page_88">88</a><br /> -<br /> -Militarism in the provinces, <a href="#Page_100">100</a><br /> -<br /> -Military Advisory Council (<i>Chün-shih Ts'an-i-yüan</i>), <a href="#Page_62">62</a><br /> -<br /> -Military affairs, <a href="#Page_310">310</a><br /> -<br /> -Military Affairs Commission (<i>Chün-shih Wei-yüan-hui</i>), <a href="#Page_13">13</a>, <a href="#Page_60">60</a>, <a href="#Page_162">162</a><br /> -<br /> -Military governor (<i>tuchün</i>), <a href="#Page_99">99</a><br /> -<br /> -Military jurisdiction under the <i>Hsien Fa</i>, <a href="#Page_284">284</a><br /> -<br /> -Military policy, <a href="#Page_61">61</a><br /> -<br /> -Military service under the <i>Hsien Fa</i>, <a href="#Page_285">285</a><br /> -<br /> -Military unification, <a href="#Page_6">6</a><br /> -<br /> -Militia, <a href="#Page_393">393</a><br /> -<br /> -<i>Min-ch'üan chu-i</i> (<i>see</i> Democracy, Sun Yat-sen, and <i>San Min Chu I</i>)<br /> -<br /> -<i>Min shêng chu-i</i>, <a href="#Page_30">30</a>, <a href="#Page_223">223</a>, <a href="#Page_253">253</a><br /> -<br /> -<i>Min ts'u chu-i</i> (<i>see</i> Nationalism, Sun Yat-sen, and <i>San Min Chu I</i>)<br /> -<br /> -Ming Emperors, <a href="#Page_249">249</a><br /> -<br /> -Minister (<i>Pu Chang</i>), <a href="#Page_96">96</a><br /> -<br /> -Ministry of —— (<i>see</i> name of Ministry)<br /> -<br /> -Ministries, <a href="#Page_81">81</a><br /> -<br /> -Minor parties:<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and constitutionalism, <a href="#Page_34">34</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">at Nanking, <a href="#Page_208">208</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in occupied China, <a href="#Page_235">235</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">representation, <a href="#Page_72">72</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">status, <a href="#Page_160">160</a></span><br /> -<br /> -Minority democracy, <a href="#Page_41">41</a><br /> -<br /> -Mobilization, economic, <a href="#Page_86">86</a><br /> -<br /> -Model <i>hsien</i>, <a href="#Page_109">109</a><br /> -<br /> -Modernization of West China, <a href="#Page_89">89</a><br /> -<br /> -Mohammed, <a href="#Page_239">239</a><br /> -<br /> -Monarchist legitimism, <a href="#Page_184">184</a><br /> -<br /> -Morale, governmental, <a href="#Page_236">236</a><br /> -<br /> -Moscow (<i>see</i> Communism)<br /> -<br /> -Moslem rebellions, <a href="#Page_213">213</a><br /> -<br /> -Motor communications, <a href="#Page_93">93</a><br /> -<br /> -Motor fuel trade, <a href="#Page_90">90</a><br /> -<br /> -Municipal Advisory Assembly (<i>Shih Ts'an-i-hui</i>), <a href="#Page_72">72</a>, <a href="#Page_104">104</a><br /> -<br /> -Municipal food stores, <a href="#Page_90">90</a><br /> -<br /> -Municipal government, <a href="#Page_103">103</a><br /> -<br /> -Municipal People's Political Council (<i>see</i> Municipal Advisory Assembly)<br /> -<br /> -Municipalities under the <i>Hsien Fa</i>, <a href="#Page_295">295</a><br /> -<br /> -Munitions, <a href="#Page_90">90</a><br /> -<br /> -<br /> -Nanking, capture of, <a href="#Page_14">14</a><br /> -<br /> -Nanking regimes (<i>see</i> Reorganized Government; Reformed Government)<br /> -<br /> -Napoleon, <a href="#Page_239">239</a><br /> -<br /> -"National" (<i>see also</i> "People's," "Chinese")<br /> -<br /> -National Aviation Commission, <a href="#Page_63">63</a><br /> -<br /> -National capital in the <i>Hsien Fa</i>, <a href="#Page_284">284</a><br /> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_444" id="Page_444">[Pg 444]</a></span><br /> -National [Constituent] Congress (<i>Kuo-min Ta-hui</i>), <a href="#Page_25">25</a>, <a href="#Page_27">27</a>, <a href="#Page_300">300</a><br /> -<br /> -National Congress: election of representatives, <a href="#Page_302">302</a><br /> -<br /> -National Congress: system of organization, <a href="#Page_300">300</a><br /> -<br /> -National Government (<i>Kuo-min Chêng-fu</i>): the term, <a href="#Page_52">52</a><br /> -<br /> -National Government Committee (<i>see</i> Council of State)<br /> -<br /> -National Health Administration (<i>Wei-shêng Shu</i>), <a href="#Page_83">83</a><br /> -<br /> -National Institute of Rural Reconstruction, <a href="#Page_220">220</a><br /> -<br /> -National Military Council (<i>see</i> Military Affairs Commission)<br /> -<br /> -National People's Convention (<i>Kuo-min Hui-i</i>), <a href="#Page_7">7</a><br /> -<br /> -National Relief Commission (<i>Chên-chi Wei-yüan-hui</i>), <a href="#Page_92">92</a><br /> -<br /> -National Salvation (<i>Chiu Kuo</i>) movement, <a href="#Page_175">175</a><br /> -<br /> -National Socialism (German), <a href="#Page_252">252</a><br /> -<br /> -National Socialist Party (<i>Kuo-chia Shê-hui Tang</i>), <a href="#Page_75">75</a>, <a href="#Page_179">179</a><br /> -<br /> -National Spiritual Mobilization (<i>Kuo-min Ching-shên Tsung-tung-yüan</i>), <a href="#Page_157">157</a><br /> -<br /> -National treasury, <a href="#Page_88">88</a><br /> -<br /> -Nationalism (<i>min ts'u</i>), theory of, <a href="#Page_252">252</a><br /> -<br /> -Negrin, <a href="#Page_15">15</a><br /> -<br /> -Neighborhood (<i>pao</i>), <a href="#Page_107">107</a><br /> -<br /> -Nêng (ability), <a href="#Page_253">253</a><br /> -<br /> -New Fourth Army (<i>Hsin-ssŭ-chün</i>), <a href="#Page_119">119</a><br /> -<br /> -New Life Movement (<i>Hsin Shêng-huo Yün-tung</i>), <a href="#Page_149">149</a><br /> -<br /> -New Life Secretaries' Camp, <a href="#Page_155">155</a><br /> -<br /> -New Life Students Rural Summer Service Corps, <a href="#Page_154">154</a><br /> -<br /> -New Order in East Asia, <a href="#Page_184">184</a>, <a href="#Page_189">189</a><br /> -<br /> -News services, <a href="#Page_137">137</a><br /> -<br /> -North China, <a href="#Page_14">14</a><br /> -<br /> -North Shensi (<i>see also</i> Frontier Area), <a href="#Page_161">161</a><br /> -<br /> -Northeastern Clique (<i>Tungpei P'ai</i>), <a href="#Page_76">76</a><br /> -<br /> -<br /> -Occupied China:<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Chungking control over, <a href="#Page_64">64</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">missions, <a href="#Page_235">235</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">poverty, <a href="#Page_92">92</a></span><br /> -<br /> -Office of Civil Affairs (<i>Wên-kuan Ch'u</i>), <a href="#Page_54">54</a><br /> -<br /> -Office of Military Affairs (<i>Tsan-chün Ch'u</i>), <a href="#Page_54">54</a><br /> -<br /> -Office of the Naval Commander-in-Chief (<i>Hai-chün Tsung-ssŭ-ling-pu</i>), <a href="#Page_63">63</a><br /> -<br /> -Office of Political Affairs (<i>Chêng-wu Ch'u</i>), <a href="#Page_57">57</a><br /> -<br /> -Officers' Moral Endeavor Corps, <a href="#Page_63">63</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a><br /> -<br /> -Old China:<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">economics, <a href="#Page_3">3</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">government, <a href="#Page_5">5</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">socio-economic structure, <a href="#Page_211">211</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in Sun Yat-sen's theory, <a href="#Page_251">251</a></span><br /> -<br /> -Old Hundred Names (<i>lao-pai-hsing</i>), <a href="#Page_236">236</a><br /> -<br /> -Opinion, public, <a href="#Page_39">39</a><br /> -<br /> -Organic Law of XVII (1928), <a href="#Page_28">28</a><br /> -<br /> -Organization of the Kuomintang, etc. (<i>see</i> relevant group or agency)<br /> -<br /> -"Orthodox" Kuomintang, <a href="#Page_200">200</a>, <a href="#Page_207">207</a><br /> -<br /> -Outer Mongol People's Republic, <a href="#Page_183">183</a>, <a href="#Page_188">188</a><br /> -<br /> -<i>Outline of National Reconstruction</i>, <a href="#Page_6">6</a><br /> -<br /> -<i>Outline of War-Time Controlment</i>, <a href="#Page_313">313</a><br /> -<br /> -<i>Outlines of Political Tutelage</i>, <a href="#Page_24">24</a><br /> -<br /> -Overseas Chinese, <a href="#Page_84">84</a><br /> -<br /> -<br /> -Pacification Commissioner (<i>Sui-ching Chu-jên</i>), <a href="#Page_100">100</a><br /> -<br /> -Pai Chung-hsi, <a href="#Page_102">102</a><br /> -<br /> -<i>pai-hua</i> (written vernacular), <a href="#Page_215">215</a><br /> -<br /> -Pan American airlines, <a href="#Page_93">93</a><br /> -<br /> -Panchen Lama, <a href="#Page_71">71</a><br /> -<br /> -Pan Ch'ao, <a href="#Page_81">81</a><br /> -<br /> -<i>Pao</i> ("neighborhood"), <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, <a href="#Page_324">324</a>, <a href="#Page_394">394</a><br /> -<br /> -<i>Pao</i> schools, <a href="#Page_216">216</a><br /> -<br /> -<i>Pao-chia</i> system, <a href="#Page_106">106</a><br /> -<br /> -Paper money, <a href="#Page_86">86</a><br /> -<br /> -<i>Parti Républicain Nationaliste de la Jeune Chine</i> (<i>see Kuo-chia Chu-i P'ai</i>)<br /> -<br /> -Party Affairs Committee of the Kuomintang (<i>Tang-wu Wei-yüan-hui</i>), <a href="#Page_133">133</a><br /> -<br /> -Party Chief (<i>Tsung-ts'ai</i>), <a href="#Page_41">41</a><br /> -<br /> -Party Constitution (<i>Tang-chang</i>):<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Communist, <a href="#Page_359">359</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Kuomintang, <a href="#Page_125">125</a></span><br /> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_445" id="Page_445">[Pg 445]</a></span><br /> -Party dictatorship (<i>tang chih</i>), <a href="#Page_6">6</a>, <a href="#Page_23">23</a><br /> -<br /> -Party-government relations, <a href="#Page_49">49</a><br /> -<br /> -Party and Government War Area Commission (<i>Chan-ti Tang-chêng Wei-yüan-hui</i>), <a href="#Page_64">64</a>, <a href="#Page_112">112</a><br /> -<br /> -Party headquarters, <a href="#Page_141">141</a><br /> -<br /> -Party-politics, <a href="#Page_158">158</a><br /> -<br /> -Party-politics in the People's Political Council, <a href="#Page_76">76</a><br /> -<br /> -Party Supervisor's Net (<i>Tang-jên Chien-ch'a Wang</i>), <a href="#Page_141">141</a><br /> -<br /> -Party-Ministries of the Kuomintang, <a href="#Page_136">136</a><br /> -<br /> -Party's role in the constitutional system, <a href="#Page_23">23</a><br /> -<br /> -Peasant rebellions, <a href="#Page_4">4</a><br /> -<br /> -Pensions Commission (<i>Fu-hsüeh Wei-yüan-hui</i>), <a href="#Page_62">62</a><br /> -<br /> -People's Advisory Political Council (<i>see</i> People's Political Council)<br /> -<br /> -People's Congress (<i>see</i> National Congress)<br /> -<br /> -People's Foreign Relations Association, <a href="#Page_234">234</a><br /> -<br /> -People's Political Council (<i>Kuo-min Ts'an-chêng Hui</i>):<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">competence, <a href="#Page_73">73</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">election, <a href="#Page_72">72</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">function of representation, <a href="#Page_66">66</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">membership, <a href="#Page_70">70</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">nominations, <a href="#Page_71">71</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">practicality, <a href="#Page_74">74</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">procedure, <a href="#Page_74">74</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">in <i>Program of Resistance and Reconstruction</i>, <a href="#Page_311">311</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">reorganization, <a href="#Page_75">75</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">sessions, <a href="#Page_70">70</a></span><br /> -<br /> -Permanent Constitution, Draft (<i>Hsien-fa Ts'ao-an</i>), <a href="#Page_5">5</a>, <a href="#Page_25">25</a>, <a href="#Page_283">283</a><br /> -<br /> -Personnel, Ministry of (<i>Ch'üan-hsü Pu</i>), <a href="#Page_68">68</a>, <a href="#Page_96">96</a><br /> -<br /> -<i>Philosophy of Action, A</i>, <a href="#Page_373">373</a><br /> -<br /> -<i>Pi Chiao Hsien Fa</i> (<i>Comparative Constitutions</i>, by Wang Shihchieh), translated and quoted, <a href="#Page_23">23</a>, <a href="#Page_49">49</a>, <a href="#Page_50">50</a>, <a href="#Page_52">52</a>, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>, <a href="#Page_125">125</a><br /> -<br /> -Pilsudski, <a href="#Page_272">272</a><br /> -<br /> -Planning Committee for the Western Capital (<i>Hsi-ching Ch'ou-pei Wei-yüan-hui</i>), <a href="#Page_56">56</a><br /> -<br /> -Pluralism, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_211">211</a><br /> -<br /> -Policy-making, <a href="#Page_47">47</a>, <a href="#Page_74">74</a>, <a href="#Page_79">79</a><br /> -<br /> -Political Affairs Department or Office (<i>Chêng-wu Ch'u</i>), <a href="#Page_57">57</a><br /> -<br /> -Political commissars in the army, <a href="#Page_63">63</a><br /> -<br /> -Political Department (<i>Chêng-chih-pu</i>) of the Military Affairs Commission, <a href="#Page_64">64</a><br /> -<br /> -Political laxity, <a href="#Page_251">251</a><br /> -<br /> -Political rights: proposed constitutional provisions, <a href="#Page_285">285</a><br /> -<br /> -Political Scientists' group (<i>Chêng-hsüeh Hsi</i>), <a href="#Page_145">145</a><br /> -<br /> -Political Vice-Minister (<i>Chêng-wu Tz'u-chang</i>), <a href="#Page_96">96</a><br /> -<br /> -Politics of ideology, <a href="#Page_8">8</a><br /> -<br /> -Popular democracy, <a href="#Page_39">39</a><br /> -<br /> -Popular Front group, <a href="#Page_78">78</a>, <a href="#Page_129">129</a><br /> -<br /> -Popular government in the Border Region, <a href="#Page_119">119</a><br /> -<br /> -Population, <a href="#Page_3">3</a><br /> -<br /> -Poverty in occupied China, <a href="#Page_222">222</a><br /> -<br /> -Power (<i>ch'üan</i>), <a href="#Page_43">43</a>, <a href="#Page_253">253</a><br /> -<br /> -Pragmatic utilitarianism of Sun Yat-sen, <a href="#Page_252">252</a><br /> -<br /> -Presidency proposed under the <i>Hsien Fa</i>, <a href="#Page_28">28</a>, <a href="#Page_287">287</a><br /> -<br /> -President (<i>Yüan-chang</i>) of the Executive Yüan, <a href="#Page_56">56</a><br /> -<br /> -President (<i>Chu-hsi</i>) of the National Government, <a href="#Page_52">52</a><br /> -<br /> -Presidium of the People's Political Council, <a href="#Page_73">73</a><br /> -<br /> -Pressure politics, <a href="#Page_234">234</a><br /> -<br /> -Prime movers, <a href="#Page_229">229</a><br /> -<br /> -Principles of the Great People (<i>Ta Min Chu I</i>), <a href="#Page_196">196</a><br /> -<br /> -Private rights: proposed constitutional provisions, <a href="#Page_284">284</a><br /> -<br /> -Private property: proposed constitutional provisions, <a href="#Page_285">285</a><br /> -<br /> -Privy Council, <a href="#Page_56">56</a><br /> -<br /> -Problems of the <i>hsien</i>: comment of Chiang K'ai-shek, <a href="#Page_388">388</a><br /> -<br /> -Professors' Clique (<i>Chiao-shou P'ai</i>), <a href="#Page_77">77</a><br /> -<br /> -<i>Program of Resistance and Reconstruction</i> (<i>K'ang-chan Chien-kuo Kang-ling</i>), <a href="#Page_17">17</a>, <a href="#Page_35">35</a>, <a href="#Page_309">309</a><br /> -<br /> -Pro-Japanese elements, <a href="#Page_186">186</a>, <a href="#Page_192">192</a>, <a href="#Page_212">212</a>, <a href="#Page_276">276</a>, <a href="#Page_310">310</a><br /> -<br /> -Propaganda, <a href="#Page_61">61</a>, <a href="#Page_137">137</a><br /> -<br /> -<i>Proposition</i>, <a href="#Page_314">314</a><br /> -<br /> -Prosperity, <a href="#Page_222">222</a><br /> -<br /> -Protestant schools, <a href="#Page_215">215</a><br /> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_446" id="Page_446">[Pg 446]</a></span><br /> -Provincial Governments (<i>Shêng Chêng-fu</i>):<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Chairman (<i>Shêng Chêng-fu Chu-hsi</i>), <a href="#Page_100">100</a>, <a href="#Page_294">294</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">connection with central government, <a href="#Page_82">82</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">councils, <a href="#Page_72">72</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">current role, <a href="#Page_98">98</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">proposed constitutional provisions, <a href="#Page_293">293</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Provincial People's Political Councils (<i>Shêng Ts'an-chêng-hui</i>), <a href="#Page_103">103</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">structure, <a href="#Page_102">102</a></span><br /> -<br /> -Provincialism, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_99">99</a><br /> -<br /> -Provisional Constitution (<i>Yüeh Fa</i>), <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_24">24</a><br /> -<br /> -Provisional Executive Committee of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Border Region (<i>Chin-ch'a-chi Pien-ch'ü Lin-shih Hsing-chêng Wei-yüan-hui</i>; <i>see also</i> Border Region), <a href="#Page_16">16</a><br /> -<br /> -Provisional Government of the Republic of China (<i>Chung-hua Min-kuo Lin-shih Chêng-fu</i>), <a href="#Page_14">14</a>, <a href="#Page_192">192</a>, <a href="#Page_207">207</a><br /> -<br /> -<i>Pu</i> (ministries or departments), <a href="#Page_61">61</a><br /> -<br /> -Public Administration, School of, <a href="#Page_219">219</a><br /> -<br /> -Public opinion, <a href="#Page_214">214</a><br /> -<br /> -Public service: proposed constitutional provisions, <a href="#Page_285">285</a><br /> -<br /> -Public utilities: proposed constitutional provisions, <a href="#Page_296">296</a><br /> -<br /> -Publicity, <a href="#Page_79">79</a><br /> -<br /> -Publicity, Party-Ministry of (<i>Chung-yang Hsüan-ch'uan Pu</i>), <a href="#Page_137">137</a><br /> -<br /> -Publicity of the <i>San Min Chu I</i> Youth Corps, <a href="#Page_350">350</a><br /> -<br /> -"Puppet states," <a href="#Page_188">188</a><br /> -<br /> -Purple Mountain, <a href="#Page_249">249</a><br /> -<br /> -P'u Yi (<i>see</i> Chin P'u-yi)<br /> -<br /> -<br /> -Races: proposed constitutional provisions, <a href="#Page_284">284</a><br /> -<br /> -Radio, <a href="#Page_94">94</a><br /> -<br /> -Railways in Free China, <a href="#Page_92">92</a><br /> -<br /> -<i>Resistance and Reconstruction, Program of</i>, <a href="#Page_309">309</a><br /> -<br /> -Reformed Government of the Republic of China (<i>Chung-hua Min-kuo Wei-hsin Chêng-fu</i>), <a href="#Page_17">17</a>, <a href="#Page_192">192</a>, <a href="#Page_195">195</a><br /> -<br /> -Regeneration Club (<i>Fu-hsing Shê</i>), <a href="#Page_144">144</a><br /> -<br /> -Regional autonomy, <a href="#Page_8">8</a><br /> -<br /> -Regular troops, <a href="#Page_8">8</a><br /> -<br /> -<i>Regulations Concerning the Organization of the Various Classifications of Hsien</i>, <a href="#Page_324">324</a><br /> -<br /> -Relief, <a href="#Page_61">61</a>, <a href="#Page_297">297</a><br /> -<br /> -"Reorganized Kuomintang," <a href="#Page_200">200</a><br /> -<br /> -Reorganized National Government of China (<i>Hsiu-chêng Kuo-min Chêng-fu</i>):<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">affiliation with Japan, <a href="#Page_183">183</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">creation and function, <a href="#Page_197">197</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">personnel, <a href="#Page_204">204</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">practical work, <a href="#Page_205">205</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">significance to Chiang K'ai-shek, <a href="#Page_372">372</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">status, <a href="#Page_203">203</a></span><br /> -<br /> -Representation, function of, <a href="#Page_66">66</a><br /> -<br /> -Republic: the term, <a href="#Page_161">161</a><br /> -<br /> -Republican revolution, <a href="#Page_213">213</a><br /> -<br /> -Republicans (<i>Kung-ho Tang</i>), <a href="#Page_208">208</a><br /> -<br /> -Resident Committee of the People's Political Council, <a href="#Page_73">73</a><br /> -<br /> -Resist-Japan University, <a href="#Page_84">84</a><br /> -<br /> -Resistance, <a href="#Page_12">12</a>, <a href="#Page_213">213</a><br /> -<br /> -Revolution by three stages, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_35">35</a>, <a href="#Page_253">253</a><br /> -<br /> -Revolutionary Action Commission of the Chinese Kuomintang (<i>Chung-hua Kuo-min-tang K'ê-ming Hsing-chêng Wei-yüan-hui</i>), <a href="#Page_178">178</a><br /> -<br /> -Rights, constitutional, <a href="#Page_28">28</a><br /> -<br /> -Roosevelt, Franklin D., <a href="#Page_233">233</a>, <a href="#Page_278">278</a><br /> -<br /> -Rosinger, Lawrence K., <a href="#Page_81">81</a><br /> -<br /> -Rural education, <a href="#Page_218">218</a><br /> -<br /> -Rural reconstruction, <a href="#Page_218">218</a>, <a href="#Page_397">397</a><br /> -<br /> -Rural Service Corps, <a href="#Page_154">154</a><br /> -<br /> -Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic, (R.S.F.S.R.), <a href="#Page_188">188</a><br /> -<br /> -<br /> -Salazar, Antonio de O., <a href="#Page_272">272</a><br /> -<br /> -<i>San Min Chu I</i>:<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and Chiang K'ai-shek, <a href="#Page_270">270</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">explanation and comment, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_13">13</a>, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>, <a href="#Page_178">178</a>, <a href="#Page_245">245</a>, <a href="#Page_250">250</a>, <a href="#Page_371">371</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and <i>Hsin Min Chu I</i>, <a href="#Page_194">194</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">proposed constitutional provisons, <a href="#Page_287">287</a></span><br /> -<br /> -<i>San Min Chu I</i> Youth Corps (<i>San Min Chu I Ch'ing-nien T'uan</i>):<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">appraisal, <a href="#Page_352">352</a></span><br /> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_447" id="Page_447">[Pg 447]</a></span><span style="margin-left: 1em;">chart of organization, <a href="#Page_345">345</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Constitution, <a href="#Page_331">331</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">description by General Ch'ên Ch'êng, <a href="#Page_340">340</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">history, <a href="#Page_341">341</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">and the Kuomintang, <a href="#Page_132">132</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Leader, <a href="#Page_342">342</a></span><br /> -<br /> -Salt gabelle, <a href="#Page_88">88</a><br /> -<br /> -Scholars of old China, <a href="#Page_3">3</a><br /> -<br /> -Scholastic bureaucracy, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_250">250</a><br /> -<br /> -School for the Border Provinces, <a href="#Page_135">135</a><br /> -<br /> -Schools (<i>see</i> education), <a href="#Page_216">216</a><br /> -<br /> -<i>Scorched earth</i> policy, <a href="#Page_12">12</a><br /> -<br /> -Second Revolution, <a href="#Page_259">259</a><br /> -<br /> -Secret societies, <a href="#Page_10">10</a><br /> -<br /> -Secretariat (<i>Mi-shu-ch'u</i>), <a href="#Page_57">57</a>, <a href="#Page_73">73</a><br /> -<br /> -Secretary-General (<i>Mi-shu-chang</i>), <a href="#Page_57">57</a>, <a href="#Page_73">73</a><br /> -<br /> -Service Department, military (<i>Hou-fang Ch'in-wu-pu</i>), <a href="#Page_63">63</a><br /> -<br /> -Seven Gentlemen (<i>Ch'i Chün-tzu</i>), <a href="#Page_36">36</a>, <a href="#Page_76">76</a>, <a href="#Page_176">176</a><br /> -<br /> -Shanghai, <a href="#Page_13">13</a><br /> -<br /> -Sharecropping, <a href="#Page_91">91</a><br /> -<br /> -Sheean, Vincent, <a href="#Page_161">161</a><br /> -<br /> -Shên Chun-lu, <a href="#Page_176">176</a><br /> -<br /> -Shêng Shih-ts'ai, <a href="#Page_176">176</a><br /> -<br /> -Shensi (<i>see</i> Frontier Area)<br /> -<br /> -Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Frontier Area (<i>Shan-kan-ning Pien-ch'ü Chêng-fu</i>), <a href="#Page_112">112</a><br /> -<br /> -<i>Shih</i> (<i>see</i> municipality, <i>q.v.</i>)<br /> -<br /> -Sian affair, <a href="#Page_5">5</a>, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_176">176</a><br /> -<br /> -Sinkiang (Chinese Central Asia; Chinese Turkestan), <a href="#Page_85">85</a>, <a href="#Page_101">101</a><br /> -<br /> -Sino-American trade, <a href="#Page_88">88</a><br /> -<br /> -Sino-Siberian highway, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>, <a href="#Page_95">95</a><br /> -<br /> -Small-Group Training Program, <a href="#Page_354">354</a><br /> -<br /> -Smith, Joseph, <a href="#Page_241">241</a><br /> -<br /> -Snow, Edgar, <a href="#Page_146">146</a>, <a href="#Page_160">160</a><br /> -<br /> -Social Affairs, Ministry of, <a href="#Page_96">96</a><br /> -<br /> -Social Movements, Party-Ministry of (<i>Shê-hui Yün-tung Pu</i>; also translated Party-Ministry of Social Affairs, Board of Social Affairs), <a href="#Page_96">96</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a><br /> -<br /> -Social Democratic Party, <a href="#Page_181">181</a><br /> -<br /> -Social rigidity, <a href="#Page_251">251</a><br /> -<br /> -Social work, <a href="#Page_61">61</a><br /> -<br /> -Social work of the <i>San Min Chu I</i> Youth Corps, <a href="#Page_351">351</a><br /> -<br /> -Socialist Party, <a href="#Page_181">181</a>, <a href="#Page_208">208</a><br /> -<br /> -Soong, C. J., <a href="#Page_247">247</a><br /> -<br /> -Soong, T. V., <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_86">86</a>, <a href="#Page_248">248</a><br /> -<br /> -Soong Ching-ling, <a href="#Page_245">245</a><br /> -<br /> -Soong sisters, <a href="#Page_248">248</a><br /> -<br /> -Sovereignty: proposed constitutional provisions, <a href="#Page_283">283</a><br /> -<br /> -Soviet China, <a href="#Page_275">275</a><br /> -<br /> -Soviet form of government in China, <a href="#Page_45">45</a><br /> -<br /> -Soviet influence in Sinkiang, <a href="#Page_101">101</a><br /> -<br /> -Soviet-Japanese understanding, <a href="#Page_275">275</a><br /> -<br /> -Soviet policy in China, <a href="#Page_171">171</a><br /> -<br /> -Soviet training of Chiang K'ai-shek, <a href="#Page_262">262</a><br /> -<br /> -Soviet Union (<i>see also</i> Communists; Marxism), <a href="#Page_188">188</a>, <a href="#Page_273">273</a>, <a href="#Page_275">275</a><br /> -<br /> -Speaker (<i>I-chang</i>) of the People's Political Council, <a href="#Page_72">72</a><br /> -<br /> -Special Administrative District of the Chinese Republic (<i>Chung-hua Min-kuo T'ê-ch'ü Chêng-fu</i>), <a href="#Page_112">112</a><br /> -<br /> -Special-area governments, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>, <a href="#Page_111">111</a>, <a href="#Page_120">120</a><br /> -<br /> -<i>Special inspection</i>, <a href="#Page_316">316</a><br /> -<br /> -Special Regional Government ... (<i>see</i> Special Administrative District ...)<br /> -<br /> -Specie, <a href="#Page_86">86</a><br /> -<br /> -Stalemate, <a href="#Page_12">12</a><br /> -<br /> -Stalin, Joseph, <a href="#Page_263">263</a><br /> -<br /> -Stalinism (<i>see also</i> Communist Party), <a href="#Page_234">234</a><br /> -<br /> -State Council (<i>see</i> Council of State)<br /> -<br /> -State examinations: proposed constitutional provisions, <a href="#Page_285">285</a><br /> -<br /> -State socialism, <a href="#Page_30">30</a>, <a href="#Page_89">89</a><br /> -<br /> -Steamships, <a href="#Page_93">93</a><br /> -<br /> -Strategy of the Chinese, <a href="#Page_12">12</a><br /> -<br /> -Sub-district (<i>ch'ü-fên</i>) of the Kuomintang, <a href="#Page_126">126</a>, <a href="#Page_139">139</a><br /> -<br /> -Subterranean minerals: proposed constitutional provisions, <a href="#Page_296">296</a><br /> -<br /> -Sung Ai-ling (<i>see</i> Kung, Mme. H. H.)<br /> -<br /> -Sung Ch'ing-ling (<i>see</i> Sun Yat-sen, Mme.)<br /> -<br /> -Sung Mei-ling, <a href="#Page_248">248</a>, <a href="#Page_261">261</a><br /> -<br /> -Sung Tzu-wên (<i>see</i> Soong, T. V.)<br /> -<br /> -Sun I-hsien (<i>see</i> Sun Yat-sen)<br /> -<br /> -Sun K'ê (Sun Fo), <a href="#Page_66">66</a>, <a href="#Page_145">145</a>, <a href="#Page_247">247</a><br /> -<br /> -Sun Yat-sen:<br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">biography, <a href="#Page_240">240</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">doctrines (<i>see also San Min Chu I</i>), <a href="#Page_6">6</a></span><br /> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_448" id="Page_448">[Pg 448]</a></span><span style="margin-left: 1em;">family, <a href="#Page_247">247</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">historical role, <a href="#Page_239">239</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on imperialism, <a href="#Page_190">190</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">on local government, <a href="#Page_105">105</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Provisional President, <a href="#Page_244">244</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">revolutionary technique, <a href="#Page_244">244</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">sense of mission, <a href="#Page_240">240</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">state planning, <a href="#Page_245">245</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">Western training, <a href="#Page_242">242</a></span><br /> -<br /> -Sun Yat-sen, Mme., <a href="#Page_145">145</a>, <a href="#Page_178">178</a>, <a href="#Page_247">247</a><br /> -<br /> -Supreme Court (<i>Tsui-kao Fa-yüan</i>), <a href="#Page_67">67</a><br /> -<br /> -Supreme National Defense Council (<i>Tsui-kao Kuo-fang Wei-yüan-hui</i>), <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_46">46</a><br /> -<br /> -Symbolism of government, <a href="#Page_45">45</a><br /> -<br /> -System of organization of the National Congress, <a href="#Page_300">300</a><br /> -<br /> -Szechwan, <a href="#Page_181">181</a><br /> -<br /> -<br /> -T'ai Li, <a href="#Page_145">145</a><br /> -<br /> -T'aip'ing Rebellion, <a href="#Page_161">161</a>, <a href="#Page_213">213</a>, <a href="#Page_241">241</a><br /> -<br /> -Taiwanese, <a href="#Page_187">187</a><br /> -<br /> -<i>Ta Min Chu I</i>, <a href="#Page_196">196</a><br /> -<br /> -<i>Ta-min-hui</i>, <a href="#Page_196">196</a>, <a href="#Page_208">208</a><br /> -<br /> -<i>Tang Cheng Chien Chih T'u-piao</i>, cited, <a href="#Page_46">46</a>, <a href="#Page_54">54</a><br /> -<br /> -T'ang Leang-li, <a href="#Page_198">198</a><br /> -<br /> -Tannu-Tuva, <a href="#Page_189">189</a><br /> -<br /> -Tao Hsi-shêng, <a href="#Page_198">198</a><br /> -<br /> -Tayler, J. B., <a href="#Page_224">224</a><br /> -<br /> -Taylor, George, <a href="#Page_116">116</a><br /> -<br /> -Taxation: proposed constitutional provisions, <a href="#Page_285">285</a><br /> -<br /> -Telecommunications, <a href="#Page_93">93</a><br /> -<br /> -Telegraph, <a href="#Page_94">94</a><br /> -<br /> -Telephone, <a href="#Page_94">94</a><br /> -<br /> -Têng Yen-ta, <a href="#Page_178">178</a><br /> -<br /> -Territory: proposed constitutional provisions, <a href="#Page_283">283</a><br /> -<br /> -Third International (<i>see also</i> Communist Party), <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_161">161</a>, <a href="#Page_245">245</a><br /> -<br /> -Third Party (<i>Ti-san Tang</i>), <a href="#Page_178">178</a><br /> -<br /> -Three-Power Pact, <a href="#Page_274">274</a><br /> -<br /> -Three-stage war, <a href="#Page_12">12</a><br /> -<br /> -Three stages of revolution (<i>see</i> Revolution by three stages)<br /> -<br /> -"Three principles of the people" (<i>see San Min Chu I</i>)<br /> -<br /> -Tibet, <a href="#Page_85">85</a><br /> -<br /> -Tientsin, <a href="#Page_4">4</a><br /> -<br /> -Tinghsien, <a href="#Page_219">219</a><br /> -<br /> -Tong, Hollington, <a href="#Page_138">138</a>, <a href="#Page_255">255</a><br /> -<br /> -Tongs (<i>tang</i>), <a href="#Page_261">261</a><br /> -<br /> -Township (ch'ü), <a href="#Page_107">107</a><br /> -<br /> -Training Committee (<i>Hsün-lien Wei-yüan-hui</i>) of the Kuomintang, <a href="#Page_133">133</a><br /> -<br /> -Training conferences, <a href="#Page_109">109</a><br /> -<br /> -Trans-Sinkiang highway, <a href="#Page_93">93</a><br /> -<br /> -Tridemism (<i>see San Min Chu I</i>)<br /> -<br /> -Trotsky, Leon, <a href="#Page_164">164</a>, <a href="#Page_263">263</a><br /> -<br /> -Truck service, <a href="#Page_93">93</a><br /> -<br /> -Tseng Chi, <a href="#Page_181">181</a><br /> -<br /> -Tso Shen-sheng, <a href="#Page_181">181</a><br /> -<br /> -Tso Tao-fên, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>, <a href="#Page_176">176</a><br /> -<br /> -<i>Tsung-ts'ai</i>, <a href="#Page_41">41</a><br /> -<br /> -<i>Tuchünism</i>, <a href="#Page_5">5</a>, <a href="#Page_244">244</a><br /> -<br /> -<i>Tungpei P'ai</i> (<i>see</i> Northeastern Clique)<br /> -<br /> -Turksib railroad, <a href="#Page_101">101</a><br /> -<br /> -Tutelage, period of, <a href="#Page_7">7</a><br /> -<br /> -Tutelary dictatorship (<i>tang chih</i>), <a href="#Page_23">23</a><br /> -<br /> -Types of government sponsorship, <a href="#Page_89">89</a><br /> -<br /> -<br /> -Unearned increment, <a href="#Page_30">30</a>, <a href="#Page_296">296</a><br /> -<br /> -United Council of the pro-Japanese, <a href="#Page_195">195</a><br /> -<br /> -United Front, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>, <a href="#Page_111">111</a>, <a href="#Page_113">113</a>, <a href="#Page_119">119</a>, <a href="#Page_129">129</a><br /> -<br /> -United States of America, <a href="#Page_273">273</a>, <a href="#Page_275">275</a>, <a href="#Page_277">277</a>, <a href="#Page_279">279</a><br /> -<br /> -Universal Trading Corporation, <a href="#Page_88">88</a><br /> -<br /> -Urban pattern of local government, <a href="#Page_104">104</a><br /> -<br /> -<i>Utterances on Reconstruction, The Party Chief's (Tsung-ts'ai Chien-kuo Yen-lun Hsüan-chi)</i>, quoted, <a href="#Page_33">33</a><br /> -<br /> -<br /> -Vayo, Julio Alvarez del, <a href="#Page_15">15</a><br /> -<br /> -Vice-President of a <i>Yüan (Fu-yüan-chang)</i>, <a href="#Page_57">57</a><br /> -<br /> -Vocational education, <a href="#Page_217">217</a><br /> -<br /> -Vocational Educationists' Clique (<i>Ch'ê-yeh Chiao-yü P'ai</i>), <a href="#Page_77">77</a><br /> -<br /> -<br /> -Wang Ch'ing-wei, <a href="#Page_20">20</a>, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_56">56</a>, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>, <a href="#Page_142">142</a>, <a href="#Page_145">145</a>, <a href="#Page_192">192</a>, <a href="#Page_197">197</a>, <a href="#Page_239">239</a>, <a href="#Page_263">263</a>, <a href="#Page_372">372</a><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">agreements with the Japanese, <a href="#Page_203">203</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">flight from Chungking, <a href="#Page_203">203</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">following, <a href="#Page_197">197</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">record of schism, <a href="#Page_199">199</a></span><br /> -<span style="margin-left: 1em;">significance, <a href="#Page_208">208</a></span><br /> -<br /> -Wang Ch'ung-hui, <a href="#Page_82">82</a>, <a href="#Page_418">418</a><br /> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_449" id="Page_449">[Pg 449]</a></span><br /> -Wang K'ê-min, <a href="#Page_194">194</a><br /> -<br /> -Wang Ming, <a href="#Page_257">257</a><br /> -<br /> -Wang Shih-chieh, <a href="#Page_23">23</a>, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, <a href="#Page_137">137</a><br /> -<br /> -<i>Wang Tao</i>, <a href="#Page_194">194</a><br /> -<br /> -War Area Service Corps, <a href="#Page_154">154</a><br /> -<br /> -War finance, <a href="#Page_87">87</a><br /> -<br /> -War, Ministry of (<i>Chün-chêng-pu</i>), <a href="#Page_60">60</a>, <a href="#Page_63">63</a>, <a href="#Page_96">96</a><br /> -<br /> -War: the term, <a href="#Page_11">11</a><br /> -<br /> -War-time Controlment, Outline of, <a href="#Page_313">313</a><br /> -<br /> -Washington, George, <a href="#Page_255">255</a><br /> -<br /> -Water-conservancy regions, <a href="#Page_4">4</a><br /> -<br /> -Western imperialism, <a href="#Page_4">4</a>, <a href="#Page_190">190</a><br /> -<br /> -Western states, <a href="#Page_3">3</a><br /> -<br /> -Whampoa (<i>see Huangpu</i>)<br /> -<br /> -<i>What I Mean By Action</i>, <a href="#Page_373">373</a><br /> -<br /> -William, Maurice, <a href="#Page_254">254</a><br /> -<br /> -Wireless, <a href="#Page_94">94</a><br /> -<br /> -Women's Advisory Council of the New Life Movement, <a href="#Page_155">155</a><br /> -<br /> -Wong Wen-hao, <a href="#Page_91">91</a><br /> -<br /> -Wool, <a href="#Page_227">227</a><br /> -<br /> -Workers' living conditions: proposed constitutional provisions, <a href="#Page_296">296</a><br /> -<br /> -World federation, <a href="#Page_371">371</a><br /> -<br /> -World government: comment of Chiang, <a href="#Page_281">281</a><br /> -<br /> -Wounded Soldiers' League, <a href="#Page_155">155</a><br /> -<br /> -Wu, Dr. John C. H., <a href="#Page_26">26</a><br /> -<br /> -Wu-han government, <a href="#Page_15">15</a><br /> -<br /> -Wu Pei-fu, <a href="#Page_198">198</a><br /> -<br /> -<br /> -Yang Kan-tao, <a href="#Page_181">181</a><br /> -<br /> -Yangtze, <a href="#Page_18">18</a><br /> -<br /> -Yeh Ch'u-tsang, <a href="#Page_137">137</a><br /> -<br /> -Yen, Dr. James Y. C, <a href="#Page_84">84</a>, <a href="#Page_218">218</a><br /> -<br /> -Yenan, <a href="#Page_115">115</a><br /> -<br /> -Yin Ju-kêng, <a href="#Page_185">185</a>, <a href="#Page_192">192</a><br /> -<br /> -Y. M. C. A., <a href="#Page_149">149</a>, <a href="#Page_235">235</a><br /> -<br /> -Young, Brigham, <a href="#Page_241">241</a><br /> -<br /> -<i>Yüan</i>, <a href="#Page_24">24</a>, <a href="#Page_28">28</a><br /> -<br /> -<i>Yüan-chang</i>, <a href="#Page_28">28</a><br /> -<br /> -Yüan Shih-k'ai, <a href="#Page_244">244</a>, <a href="#Page_259">259</a><br /> -<br /> -Yü Yu-jên, <a href="#Page_145">145</a><br /> -<br /> -Yünnan, <a href="#Page_101">101</a><br /> -<br /> -<br /> -Zinoviev, G., <a href="#Page_164">164</a><br /> -</div> - -<hr class="chap" /> -<p> </p> -<p> </p> - -<div class="transnote"> - -<h2>TRANSCRIBER'S NOTE:</h2> - -<p>Obvious printer's errors have been corrected.</p> - -<p>Inconsistent spellings have been kept, as well as inconsistent use of -hyphens (<i>e.g.</i>, "war-time," "wartime," and "war time"), inconsistent -use of space in contractions (<i>e.g.</i>, "C. E. C." and "C.E.C.") and -inconsistent Chinese transcription (<i>e.g.</i>, "Chün-tzŭ" and -"Chüntzu").</p> -</div> - -<p> </p> -<hr class="full" /> -<p>***END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE CHINA OF CHIANG K'AI-SHEK***</p> -<p>******* This file should be named 50465-h.htm or 50465-h.zip *******</p> -<p>This and all associated files of various formats will be found in:<br /> -<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/5/0/4/6/50465">http://www.gutenberg.org/5/0/4/6/50465</a></p> -<p> -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed.</p> - -<p>Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United -States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. 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