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-The Project Gutenberg EBook of First Offensive: The Marine Campaign for
-Guadalcanal, by Henry I. Shaw
-
-This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most
-other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions
-whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of
-the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at
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-to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook.
-
-Title: First Offensive: The Marine Campaign for Guadalcanal
-
-Author: Henry I. Shaw
-
-Release Date: April 27, 2015 [EBook #48807]
-
-Language: English
-
-Character set encoding: UTF-8
-
-*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK FIRST OFFENSIVE: GUADALCANAL ***
-
-
-
-
-Produced by Brian Coe, Charlie Howard, and the Online
-Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This
-file was produced from images generously made available
-by The Internet Archive)
-
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-
-
-
-Transcriber’s note: Table of Contents added by Transcriber and placed
-into the public domain. Boldface text is indicated by =equals signs=.
-
-Contents
-
-  First Offensive: The Marine Campaign for Guadalcanal
-    SIDEBAR: General Alexander A. Vandegrift
-  The Landing and August Battles
-    SIDEBAR: First Marine Utility Uniform Issued in World War II
-    SIDEBAR: LVT (1)--The ‘Amtrac’
-    SIDEBAR: General Vandegrift and His 1st Marine Division Staff
-    SIDEBAR: The Coastwatchers
-    SIDEBAR: The 1st Marine Division Patch
-  September and the Ridge
-    SIDEBAR: Sergeant Major Sir Jacob Charles Vouza
-    SIDEBAR: M3A1 37mm Antitank Gun
-    SIDEBAR: Douglas Albert Munro
-  October and the Japanese Offensive
-    SIDEBAR: Reising Gun
-  November and the Continuing Buildup
-    SIDEBAR: 75mm Pack Howitzer--Workhorse of the Artillery
-    SIDEBAR: The Japanese Model 89 (1929) 50mm Heavy Grenade Discharger
-  December and the Final Stages
-    SIDEBAR: The ‘George’ Medal
-  Sources
-  About the Author
-  About this series of pamphlets
-  Transcriber’s Notes
-
-
-
-
-    FIRST OFFENSIVE:
-    THE MARINE CAMPAIGN
-    FOR GUADALCANAL
-
-
-    MARINES IN
-    WORLD WAR II
-    COMMEMORATIVE SERIES
-
-    BY HENRY I. SHAW, JR.
-
-[Illustration: _A Marine machine gunner and his Browning .30-caliber
-M1917 heavy machine gun stand guard while 1st Marine Division engineers
-clean up in the Lunga River._ (Department of Defense [USMC] Photo
-588741)]
-
-[Illustration: _It was from a Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress such as this
-that LtCol Merrill B. Twining and Maj William B. McKean reconnoitered
-the Watchtower target area and discovered the Japanese building an
-airfield on Guadalcanal._ (National Archives Photo 80-G-34887)]
-
-
-
-
-First Offensive: The Marine Campaign for Guadalcanal
-
-_by Henry I. Shaw, Jr._
-
-
-In the early summer of 1942, intelligence reports of the construction
-of a Japanese airfield near Lunga Point on Guadalcanal in the Solomon
-Islands triggered a demand for offensive action in the South Pacific.
-The leading offensive advocate in Washington was Admiral Ernest J.
-King, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). In the Pacific, his view was
-shared by Admiral Chester A. Nimitz, Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet
-(CinCPac), who had already proposed sending the 1st Marine Raider
-Battalion to Tulagi, an island 20 miles north of Guadalcanal across
-Sealark Channel, to destroy a Japanese seaplane base there. Although
-the Battle of the Coral Sea had forestalled a Japanese amphibious
-assault on Port Moresby, the Allied base of supply in eastern New
-Guinea, completion of the Guadalcanal airfield might signal the
-beginning of a renewed enemy advance to the south and an increased
-threat to the lifeline of American aid to New Zealand and Australia. On
-23 July 1942, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in Washington agreed that
-the line of communications in the South Pacific had to be secured. The
-Japanese advance had to be stopped. Thus, Operation Watchtower, the
-seizure of Guadalcanal and Tulagi, came into being.
-
-The islands of the Solomons lie nestled in the backwaters of the South
-Pacific. Spanish fortune-hunters discovered them in the mid-sixteenth
-century, but no European power foresaw any value in the islands until
-Germany sought to expand its budding colonial empire more than two
-centuries later. In 1884, Germany proclaimed a protectorate over
-northern New Guinea, the Bismarck Archipelago, and the northern
-Solomons. Great Britain countered by establishing a protectorate over
-the southern Solomons and by annexing the remainder of New Guinea. In
-1905, the British crown passed administrative control over all its
-territories in the region to Australia, and the Territory of Papua,
-with its capital at Port Moresby, came into being. Germany’s holdings
-in the region fell under the administrative control of the League of
-Nations following World War I, with the seat of the colonial government
-located at Rabaul on New Britain. The Solomons lay 10 degrees below the
-Equator--hot, humid, and buffeted by torrential rains. The celebrated
-adventure novelist, Jack London, supposedly muttered: “If I were king,
-the worst punishment I could inflict on my enemies would be to banish
-them to the Solomons.”
-
-On 23 January 1942, Japanese forces seized Rabaul and fortified it
-extensively. The site provided an excellent harbor and numerous
-positions for airfields. The devastating enemy carrier and plane
-losses at the Battle of Midway (3-6 June 1942) had caused _Imperial
-General Headquarters_ to cancel orders for the invasion of Midway, New
-Caledonia, Fiji, and Samoa, but plans to construct a major seaplane
-base at Tulagi went forward. The location offered one of the best
-anchorages in the South Pacific and it was strategically located: 560
-miles from the New Hebrides, 800 miles from New Caledonia, and 1,000
-miles from Fiji.
-
-The outposts at Tulagi and Guadalcanal were the forward evidences of a
-sizeable Japanese force in the region, beginning with the _Seventeenth
-Army_, headquartered at Rabaul. The enemy’s _Eighth Fleet_, _Eleventh
-Air Fleet_, and _1st_, _7th_, _8th_, and _14th Naval Base Forces_
-also were on New Britain. Beginning on 5 August 1942, Japanese signal
-intelligence units began to pick up transmissions between Noumea on
-New Caledonia and Melbourne, Australia. Enemy analysts concluded that
-Vice Admiral Richard L. Ghormley, commanding the South Pacific Area
-(ComSoPac), was signalling a British or Australian force in preparation
-for an offensive in the Solomons or at New Guinea. The warnings were
-passed to Japanese headquarters at Rabaul and Truk, but were ignored.
-
-[Illustration: THE PACIFIC AREAS
-
-1 AUGUST 1942]
-
-The invasion force was indeed on its way to its targets, Guadalcanal,
-Tulagi, and the tiny islets of Gavutu and Tanambogo close by Tulagi’s
-shore. The landing force was composed of Marines; the covering force
-and transport force were U.S. Navy with a reinforcement of Australian
-warships. There was not much mystery to the selection of the 1st
-Marine Division to make the landings. Five U.S. Army divisions were
-located in the South and Southwest Pacific: three in Australia, the
-37th Infantry in Fiji, and the Americal Division on New Caledonia.
-None was amphibiously trained and all were considered vital parts of
-defensive garrisons. The 1st Marine Division, minus one of its infantry
-regiments, had begun arriving in New Zealand in mid-June when the
-division headquarters and the 5th Marines reached Wellington. At that
-time, the rest of the reinforced division’s major units were getting
-ready to embark. The 1st Marines were at San Francisco, the 1st Raider
-Battalion was on New Caledonia, and the 3d Defense Battalion was at
-Pearl Harbor. The 2d Marines of the 2d Marine Division, a unit which
-would replace the 1st Division’s 7th Marines stationed in British
-Samoa, was loading out from San Diego. All three infantry regiments
-of the landing force had battalions of artillery attached, from the
-11th Marines, in the case of the 5th and 1st; the 2d Marines drew its
-reinforcing 75mm howitzers from the 2d Division’s 10th Marines.
-
-The news that his division would be the landing force for Watchtower
-came as a surprise to Major General Alexander A. Vandegrift, who
-had anticipated that the 1st Division would have six months of
-training in the South Pacific before it saw action. The changeover
-from administrative loading of the various units’ supplies to combat
-loading, where first-needed equipment, weapons, ammunition, and rations
-were positioned to come off ship first with the assault troops,
-occasioned a never-to-be-forgotten scene on Wellington’s docks. The
-combat troops took the place of civilian stevedores and unloaded and
-reloaded the cargo and passenger vessels in an increasing round of
-working parties, often during rainstorms which hampered the task, but
-the job was done. Succeeding echelons of the division’s forces all got
-their share of labor on the docks as various shipping groups arrived
-and the time grew shorter. General Vandegrift was able to convince
-Admiral Ghormley and the Joint Chiefs that he would not be able to meet
-a proposed D-Day of 1 August, but the extended landing date, 7 August,
-did little to improve the situation.
-
-An amphibious operation is a vastly complicated affair, particularly
-when the forces involved are assembled on short notice from all over
-the Pacific. The pressure that Vandegrift felt was not unique to
-the landing force commander. The U.S. Navy’s ships were the key to
-success and they were scarce and invaluable. Although the Battles of
-Coral Sea and Midway had badly damaged the Japanese fleet’s offensive
-capabilities and crippled its carrier forces, enemy naval aircraft
-could fight as well ashore as afloat and enemy warships were still
-numerous and lethal. American losses at Pearl Harbor, Coral Sea, and
-Midway were considerable, and Navy admirals were well aware that the
-ships they commanded were in short supply. The day was coming when
-America’s shipyards and factories would fill the seas with warships
-of all types, but that day had not arrived in 1942. Calculated risk
-was the name of the game where the Navy was concerned, and if the risk
-seemed too great, the Watchtower landing force might be a casualty. As
-it happened, the Navy never ceased to risk its ships in the waters of
-the Solomons, but the naval lifeline to the troops ashore stretched
-mighty thin at times.
-
-Tactical command of the invasion force approaching Guadalcanal in early
-August was vested in Vice Admiral Frank J. Fletcher as Expeditionary
-Force Commander (Task Force 61). His force consisted of the amphibious
-shipping carrying the 1st Marine Division, under Rear Admiral Richmond
-K. Turner, and the Air Support Force led by Rear Admiral Leigh Noyes.
-Admiral Ghormley contributed land-based air forces commanded by Rear
-Admiral John S. McCain. Fletcher’s support force consisted of three
-fleet carriers, the _Saratoga_ (CV 3), _Enterprise_ (CV 6), and _Wasp_
-(CV 7); the battleship _North Carolina_ (BB 55), 6 cruisers, 16
-destroyers, and 3 oilers. Admiral Turner’s covering force included five
-cruisers and nine destroyers.
-
-
-[Sidebar (page 3): General Alexander A. Vandegrift
-
-[Illustration]
-
-A distinguished military analyst once noted that if titles were awarded
-in America as they are in England, the commanding general of Marine
-Corps forces at Guadalcanal would be known simply as “Vandegrift of
-Guadalcanal.” But America does not bestow aristocratic titles, and
-besides, such a formality would not be in keeping with the soft-spoken,
-modest demeanor of Alexander A. Vandegrift.
-
-The man destined to lead the 1st Marine Division in America’s
-first ground offensive operation of World War II was born in 1887
-in Charlottesville, Virginia, where he grew up fascinated by his
-grandfather’s stories of life in the Confederate Army during the Civil
-War. It was axiomatic that young Alexander would settle on a military
-career. Commissioned a Marine lieutenant in 1909, Vandegrift received
-an early baptism of fire in 1912 during the bombardment, assault, and
-capture of Coyotepe in Nicaragua. Two years later he participated in
-the capture and occupation of Vera Cruz. Vandegrift would spend the
-greater part of the next decade in Haiti, where he fought Caco bandits,
-and served as an inspector of constabulary with the Gendarmerie
-d’Haiti. It was in Haiti that he met and was befriended by Marine
-Colonel Smedley D. Butler, who called him “Sunny Jim.” The lessons of
-these formative years fighting an elusive enemy in a hostile jungle
-environment were not lost upon the young Marine officer.
-
-He spent the next 18 years in various posts and stations in the United
-States, along with two tours of China duty at Peiping and Tientsin.
-Prior to Pearl Harbor, Vandegrift was appointed assistant to the
-Major General Commandant, and in April 1940 received the single star
-of a brigadier general. He was detached to the 1st Marine Division
-in November 1941, and in May 1942 sailed for the South Pacific as
-commanding general of the first Marine division ever to leave the
-United States. On 7 August 1942, after exhorting his Marines with the
-reminder that “God favors the bold and strong of heart,” he led the 1st
-Marine Division ashore in the Solomon Islands in the first large-scale
-offensive action against the Japanese.
-
-His triumph at Guadalcanal earned General Vandegrift the Medal of
-Honor, the Navy Cross, and the praise of a grateful nation. In July
-1943 he took command of I Marine Amphibious Corps and planned the
-landing at Empress Augusta Bay, Bougainville, Northern Solomons, on
-1 November 1943. He then was recalled to Washington, to become the
-Eighteenth Commandant of the Marine Corps.
-
-On 1 January 1944, as a lieutenant general, Vandegrift was sworn in as
-Commandant. On 4 April 1945 he was promoted to general, and thus became
-the first Marine officer on active duty to attain four-star rank.
-
-In the final stages of the war, General Vandegrift directed an elite
-force approaching half-a-million men and women, with its own aviation
-force. Comparing his Marines with the Japanese, he noted that the
-Japanese soldier “was trained to go to a place, stay there, fight and
-die. We train our men to go to a place, fight to win, and to live. I
-can assure you, it is a better theory.”
-
-After the war, Vandegrift fought another battle, this time in the halls
-of Congress, with the stakes being the survival of the Marine Corps.
-His counter-testimony during Congressional hearings of the spring
-of 1946 was instrumental in defeating initial attempts to merge or
-“unify” the U.S. Armed Forces. Although his term as Commandant ended
-on 31 December 1947, General Vandegrift would live to see passage of
-Public Law 416, which preserved the Corps and its historic mission. His
-official retirement date of 1 April 1949 ended just over 40 years of
-service.
-
-General Vandegrift outlived both his wife Mildred and their only son,
-Colonel Alexander A. Vandegrift, Jr., who fought in World War II and
-Korea. He spent most of his final years in Delray, Florida. He died on
-8 May 1973.--_Robert V. Aquilina_
-]
-
-
-
-
-_The Landing and August Battles_
-
-
-On board the transports approaching the Solomons, the Marines were
-looking for a tough fight. They knew little about the targets, even
-less about their opponents. Those maps that were available were poor,
-constructions based upon outdated hydrographic charts and information
-provided by former island residents. While maps based on aerial
-photographs had been prepared they were misplaced by the Navy in
-Auckland, New Zealand, and never got to the Marines at Wellington.
-
-On 17 July, a couple of division staff officers, Lieutenant Colonel
-Merrill B. Twining and Major William McKean, had been able to join the
-crew of a B-17 flying from Port Moresby on a reconnaissance mission
-over Guadalcanal. They reported what they had seen, and their analysis,
-coupled with aerial photographs, indicated no extensive defenses along
-the beaches of Guadalcanal’s north shore.
-
-[Illustration: GUADALCANAL
-
-TULAGI-GAVUTU
-
-and
-
-Florida Islands]
-
-This news was indeed welcome. The division intelligence officer (G-2),
-Lieutenant Colonel Frank B. Goettge, had concluded that about 8,400
-Japanese occupied Guadalcanal and Tulagi. Admiral Turner’s staff
-figured that the Japanese amounted to 7,125 men. Admiral Ghormley’s
-intelligence officer pegged the enemy strength at 3,100--closest to the
-3,457 actual total of Japanese troops; 2,571 of these were stationed on
-Guadalcanal and were mostly laborers working on the airfield.
-
-To oppose the Japanese, the Marines had an overwhelming superiority
-of men. At the time, the tables of organization for a Marine Corps
-division indicated a total of 19,514 officers and enlisted men,
-including naval medical and engineer (Seabee) units. Infantry
-regiments numbered 3,168 and consisted of a headquarters company, a
-weapons company, and three battalions. Each infantry battalion (933
-Marines) was organized into a headquarters company (89), a weapons
-company (273), and three rifle companies (183). The artillery regiment
-had 2,581 officers and men organized into three 75mm pack howitzer
-battalions and one 105mm howitzer battalion. A light tank battalion,
-a special weapons battalion of antiaircraft and antitank guns, and a
-parachute battalion added combat power. An engineer regiment (2,452
-Marines) with battalions of engineers, pioneers, and Seabees, provided
-a hefty combat and service element. The total was rounded out by
-division headquarters battalion’s headquarters, signal, and military
-police companies and the division’s service troops--service, motor
-transport, amphibian tractor, and medical battalions. For Watchtower,
-the 1st Raider Battalion and the 3d Defense Battalion had been added to
-Vandegrift’s command to provide more infantrymen and much needed coast
-defense and antiaircraft guns and crews.
-
-Unfortunately, the division’s heaviest ordnance had been left behind
-in New Zealand. Limited ship space and time meant that the division’s
-big guns, a 155mm howitzer battalion, and all the motor transport
-battalion’s two-and-a-half-ton trucks were not loaded. Colonel Pedro
-A. del Valle, commanding the 11th Marines, was unhappy at the loss of
-his heavy howitzers and equally distressed that essential sound and
-flash-ranging equipment necessary for effective counterbattery fire was
-left behind. Also failing to make the cut in the battle for shipping
-space, were all spare clothing, bedding rolls, and supplies necessary
-to support the reinforced division beyond 60 days of combat. Ten days
-supply of ammunition for each of the division’s weapons remained in New
-Zealand.
-
-[Illustration:
-
-    Naval Historical Photographic Collection 880-CF-117-4-63
-
-_Enroute to Guadalcanal RAdm Richmond Kelly Turner, commander of the
-Amphibious Force, and MajGen Alexander A. Vandegrift, 1st Marine
-Division commander, review the Operation Watchtower plan for landings
-in the Solomon Islands._]
-
-In the opinion of the 1st Division’s historian and a veteran of
-the landing, the men on the approaching transports “thought they’d
-have a bad time getting ashore.” They were confident, certainly,
-and sure that they could not be defeated, but most of the men were
-entering combat for the first time. There were combat veteran officers
-and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) throughout the division, but
-the majority of the men were going into their initial battle. The
-commanding officer of the 1st Marines, Colonel Clifton B. Cates,
-estimated that 90 percent of his men had enlisted after Pearl Harbor.
-The fabled 1st Marine Division of later World War II, Korean War,
-Vietnam War, and Persian Gulf War fame, the most highly decorated
-division in the U.S. Armed Forces, had not yet established its
-reputation.
-
-The convoy of ships, with its outriding protective screen of carriers,
-reached Koro in the Fiji Islands on 26 July. Practice landings did
-little more than exercise the transports’ landing craft, since reefs
-precluded an actual beach landing. The rendezvous at Koro did give the
-senior commanders a chance to have a face-to-face meeting. Fletcher,
-McCain, Turner, and Vandegrift got together with Ghormley’s chief of
-staff, Rear Admiral Daniel J. Callaghan, who notified the conferees
-that ComSoPac had ordered the 7th Marines on Samoa to be prepared to
-embark on four days notice as a reinforcement for Watchtower. To this
-decidedly good news, Admiral Fletcher added some bad news. In view of
-the threat from enemy land-based air, he could not “keep the carriers
-in the area for more than 48 hours after the landing.” Vandegrift
-protested that he needed at least four days to get the division’s gear
-ashore, and Fletcher reluctantly agreed to keep his carriers at risk
-another day.
-
-On the 28th the ships sailed from the Fijis, proceeding as if they were
-headed for Australia. At noon on 5 August, the convoy and its escorts
-turned north for the Solomons. Undetected by the Japanese, the assault
-force reached its target during the night of 6-7 August and split into
-two landing groups, Transport Division X-Ray, 15 transports heading
-for the north shore of Guadalcanal east of Lunga Point, and Transport
-Division Yoke, eight transports headed for Tulagi, Gavutu, Tanambogo,
-and the nearby Florida Island, which loomed over the smaller islands.
-
-Vandegrift’s plans for the landings would put two of his infantry
-regiments (Colonel LeRoy P. Hunt’s 5th Marines and Colonel Cates’
-1st Marines) ashore on both sides of the Lunga River prepared to
-attack inland to seize the airfield. The 11th Marines, the 3d Defense
-Battalion, and most of the division’s supporting units would also land
-near the Lunga, prepared to exploit the beachhead. Across the 20 miles
-of Sealark Channel, the division’s assistant commander, Brigadier
-General William H. Rupertus, led the assault forces slated to take
-Tulagi, Gavutu, and Tanambogo: the 1st Raider Battalion (Lieutenant
-Colonel Merritt A. Edson); the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines (Lieutenant
-Colonel Harold E. Rosecrans); and the 1st Parachute Battalion (Major
-Robert H. Williams). Company A of the 2d Marines would reconnoiter
-the nearby shores of Florida Island and the rest of Colonel John A.
-Arthur’s regiment would stand by in reserve to land where needed.
-
-As the ships slipped through the channels on either side of rugged
-Savo Island, which split Sealark near its western end, heavy clouds
-and dense rain blanketed the task force. Later the moon came out and
-silhouetted the islands. On board his command ship, Vandegrift wrote
-to his wife: “Tomorrow morning at dawn we land in our first major
-offensive of the war. Our plans have been made and God grant that our
-judgement has been sound ... whatever happens you’ll know I did my
-best. Let us hope that best will be good enough.”
-
-[Illustration: _MajGen Alexander A. Vandegrift, CG, 1st Marine
-Division, confers with his staff on board the transport USS _McCawley_
-(APA-4) enroute to Guadalcanal. From left: Gen Vandegrift; LtCol
-Gerald C. Thomas, operations officer; LtCol Randolph McC. Pate,
-logistics officer; LtCol Frank B. Goettge, intelligence officer; and
-Col William Capers James, chief of staff._
-
-    National Archives Photo 80-G-17065
-]
-
-At 0641 on 7 August, Turner signalled his ships to “land the landing
-force.” Just 28 minutes before, the heavy cruiser _Quincy_ (CA 39)
-had begun shelling the landing beaches at Guadalcanal. The sun came
-up that fateful Friday at 0650, and the first landing craft carrying
-assault troops of the 5th Marines touched down at 0909 on Red Beach.
-To the men’s surprise (and relief), no Japanese appeared to resist the
-landing. Hunt immediately moved his assault troops off the beach and
-into the surrounding jungle, waded the steep-banked Ilu River, and
-headed for the enemy airfield. The following 1st Marines were able to
-cross the Ilu on a bridge the engineers had hastily thrown up with
-an amphibian tractor bracing its middle. The silence was eerie and
-the absence of opposition was worrisome to the riflemen. The Japanese
-troops, most of whom were Korean laborers, had fled to the west,
-spooked by a week’s B-17 bombardment, the pre-assault naval gunfire,
-and the sight of the ships offshore. The situation was not the same
-across Sealark. The Marines on Guadalcanal could hear faint rumbles of
-a firefight across the waters.
-
-[Illustration:
-
-    National Archives Photo 80-CF-112-5-3
-
-_First Division Marines storm ashore across Guadalcanal’s beaches on
-D-Day, 7 August 1942, from the attack transport _Barnett_ (AP-11) and
-attack cargo ship _Fomalhaut_ (AK-22). The invaders were surprised at
-the lack of enemy opposition._]
-
-[Illustration:
-
-    LANDING ON GUADALCANAL
-    and Capture of the Airfield
-    7-8 AUGUST 1942
-]
-
-[Illustration:
-
-    Photo courtesy of Col James A. Donovan, Jr.
-
-_When the 5th Marines entered the jungle from the beachhead, and had to
-cross the steep banks of the Ilu River, 1st Marine Division engineers
-hastily constructed a bridge supported by amphibian tractors. Though
-heavily used, the bridge held up._]
-
-[Illustration: _Photographed immediately after a prelanding strike by
-USS _Enterprise_ aircraft flown by Navy pilots, Tanambogo and Gavutu
-Islands lie smoking and in ruins in the morning sun. Gavutu is at the
-left across the causeway from Tanambogo._
-
-    National Archives Photo 80-C-11034
-]
-
-The Japanese on Tulagi were special naval landing force sailors and
-they had no intention of giving up what they held without a vicious,
-no-surrender battle. Edson’s men landed first, following by Rosecrans’
-battalion, hitting Tulagi’s south coast and moving inland towards
-the ridge which ran lengthwise through the island. The battalions
-encountered pockets of resistance in the undergrowth of the islands
-thick vegetation and maneuvered to outflank and overrun the opposition.
-The advance of the Marines was steady but casualties were frequent. By
-nightfall, Edson had reached the former British residency overlooking
-Tulagi’s harbor and dug in for the night across a hill that overlooked
-the Japanese final position, a ravine on the islands southern tip. The
-2d Battalion, 5th Marines, had driven through to the northern shore,
-cleaning its sector of enemy; Rosecrans moved into position to back
-up the raiders. By the end of its first day ashore, 2d Battalion had
-lost 56 men killed and wounded; 1st Raider Battalion casualties were 99
-Marines.
-
-[Illustration:
-
-    Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 52231
-
-_After the battle, almost all palm trees on Gavutu were shorn of their
-foliage. Despite naval gunfire and close air support hitting the enemy
-emplacements, Japanese opposition from caves proved to be serious
-obstacles for attacking Marines._]
-
-Throughout the night, the Japanese swarmed from hillside caves in four
-separate attacks, trying to penetrate the raider lines. They were
-unsuccessful and most died in the attempts. At dawn, the 2d Battalion,
-2d Marines, landed to reinforce the attackers and by the afternoon of 8
-August, the mop-up was completed and the battle for Tulagi was over.
-
-The fight for tiny Gavutu and Tanambogo, both little more than small
-hills rising out of the sea, connected by a hundred-yard causeway, was
-every bit as intense as that on Tulagi. The area of combat was much
-smaller and the opportunities for fire support from offshore ships
-and carrier planes was severely limited once the Marines had landed.
-After naval gunfire from the light cruiser _San Juan_ (CL 54) and two
-destroyers, and a strike by F4F Wildcats flying from the _Wasp_, the
-1st Parachute Battalion landed near noon in three waves, 395 men in
-all, on Gavutu. The Japanese, secure in cave positions, opened fire on
-the second and third waves, pinning down the first Marines ashore on
-the beach. Major Williams took a bullet in the lungs and was evacuated;
-32 Marines were killed in the withering enemy fire. This time, 2d
-Marines reinforcements were really needed; the 1st Battalion’s Company
-B landed on Gavutu and attempted to take Tanambogo; the attackers were
-driven to ground and had to pull back to Gavutu.
-
-After a rough night of close-in fighting with the defenders of both
-islands, the 3d Battalion, 2d Marines, reinforced the men already
-ashore and mopped up on each island. The toll of Marines dead on the
-three islands was 144; the wounded numbered 194. The few Japanese who
-survived the battles fled to Florida Island, which had been scouted by
-the 2d Marines on D-Day and found clear of the enemy.
-
-The Marines’ landings and the concentration of shipping in Guadalcanal
-waters acted as a magnet to the Japanese at Rabaul. At Admiral
-Ghormley’s headquarters, Tulagi’s radio was heard on D-Day “frantically
-calling for [the] dispatch of surface forces to the scene” and
-designating transports and carriers as targets for heavy bombing.
-The messages were sent in plain language, emphasizing the plight
-of the threatened garrison. And the enemy response was prompt and
-characteristic of the months of naval air and surface attacks to come.
-
-At 1030 on 7 August, an Australian coastwatcher hidden in the hills of
-the islands north of Guadalcanal signalled that a Japanese air strike
-composed of heavy bombers, light bombers, and fighters was headed for
-the island. Fletcher’s pilots, whose carriers were positioned 100 miles
-south of Guadalcanal, jumped the approaching planes 20 miles northwest
-of the landing areas before they could disrupt the operation. But the
-Japanese were not daunted by the setback; other planes and ships were
-enroute to the inviting target.
-
-On 8 August, the Marines consolidated their positions ashore, seizing
-the airfield on Guadalcanal and establishing a beachhead. Supplies were
-being unloaded as fast as landing craft could make the turnaround from
-ship to shore, but the shore party was woefully inadequate to handle
-the influx of ammunition, rations, tents, aviation gas, vehicles--all
-gear necessary to sustain the Marines. The beach itself became a
-dumpsite. And almost as soon as the initial supplies were landed, they
-had to be moved to positions nearer Kukum village and Lunga Point
-within the planned perimeter. Fortunately, the lack of Japanese ground
-opposition enabled Vandegrift to shift the supply beaches west to a new
-beachhead.
-
-[Illustration:
-
-    Marine Corps Personal Papers Collection
-
-_Immediately after assault troops cleared the beachhead and moved
-inland, supplies and equipment, inviting targets for enemy bombers,
-began to litter the beach._]
-
-Japanese bombers did penetrate the American fighter screen on 8 August.
-Dropping their bombs from 20,000 feet or more to escape antiaircraft
-fire, the enemy planes were not very accurate. They concentrated on the
-ships in the channel, hitting and damaging a number of them and sinking
-the destroyer _Jarvis_ (DD 393). In their battles to turn back the
-attacking planes, the carrier fighter squadrons lost 21 Wildcats on 7-8
-August.
-
-The primary Japanese targets were the Allied ships. At this time,
-and for a thankfully and unbelievably long time to come, the
-Japanese commanders at Rabaul grossly underestimated the strength of
-Vandegrift’s forces. They thought the Marine landings constituted a
-reconnaissance in force, perhaps 2,000 men, on Guadalcanal. By the
-evening of 8 August, Vandegrift had 10,900 troops ashore on Guadalcanal
-and another 6,075 on Tulagi. Three infantry regiments had landed and
-each had a supporting 75mm pack howitzer battalion--the 2d and 3d
-Battalions, 11th Marines on Guadalcanal, and the 3d Battalion, 10th
-Marines on Tulagi. The 5th Battalion, 11th Marines’ 105mm howitzers
-were in general support.
-
-That night a cruiser-destroyer force of the Imperial Japanese Navy
-reacted to the American invasion with a stinging response. Admiral
-Turner had positioned three cruiser-destroyer groups to bar the
-Tulagi-Guadalcanal approaches. At the Battle of Savo, the Japanese
-demonstrated their superiority in night fighting at this stage of
-the war, shattering two of Turners covering forces without loss to
-themselves. Four heavy cruisers went to the bottom--three American, one
-Australian--and another lost her bow. As the sun came up over what soon
-would be called “Ironbottom Sound,” Marines watched grimly as Higgins
-boats swarmed out to rescue survivors. Approximately 1,300 sailors
-died that night and another 700 suffered wounds or were badly burned.
-Japanese casualties numbered less than 200 men.
-
-The Japanese suffered damage to only one ship in the encounter, the
-cruiser _Chokai_. The American cruisers _Vincennes_ (CA 44), _Astoria_
-(CA 34), and _Quincy_ (CA 39) went to the bottom, as did the Australian
-Navy’s HMAS _Canberra_, so critically damaged that she had to be sunk
-by American torpedoes. Both the cruiser _Chicago_ (CA 29) and destroyer
-_Talbot_ (DD 114) were badly damaged. Fortunately for the Marines
-ashore, the Japanese force--five heavy cruisers, two light cruisers,
-and a destroyer--departed before dawn without attempting to disrupt the
-landing further.
-
-[Illustration: U.S. 105mm Howitzer]
-
-When the attack-force leader, Vice Admiral Gunichi Mikawa, returned to
-Rabaul, he expected to receive the accolades of his superiors. He did
-get those, but he also found himself the subject of criticism. Admiral
-Isoroku Yamamoto, the Japanese fleet commander, chided his subordinate
-for failing to attack the transports. Mikawa could only reply, somewhat
-lamely, that he did not know Fletcher’s aircraft carriers were so far
-away from Guadalcanal. Of equal significance to the Marines on the
-beach, the Japanese naval victory caused celebrating superiors in Tokyo
-to allow the event to overshadow the importance of the amphibious
-operation.
-
-The disaster prompted the American admirals to reconsider Navy support
-for operations ashore. Fletcher feared for the safety of his carriers;
-he had already lost about a quarter of his fighter aircraft. The
-commander of the expeditionary force had lost a carrier at Coral Sea
-and another at Midway. He felt he could not risk the loss of a third,
-even if it meant leaving the Marines on their own. Before the Japanese
-cruiser attack, he obtained Admiral Ghormley’s permission to withdraw
-from the area.
-
-[Illustration: _When ships carrying barbed wire and engineering tools
-needed ashore were forced to leave the Guadalcanal area because of
-enemy air and surface threats, Marines had to prepare such hasty field
-expedients as this_ _cheval de frise_ _of sharpened stakes._
-
-    Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 5157
-]
-
-At a conference on board Turner’s flagship transport, the _McCawley_,
-on the night of 8 August, the admiral told General Vandegrift that
-Fletcher’s impending withdrawal meant that he would have to pull out
-the amphibious force’s ships. The Battle of Savo Island reinforced
-the decision to get away before enemy aircraft, unchecked by American
-interceptors, struck. On 9 August, the transports withdrew to Noumea.
-The unloading of supplies ended abruptly, and ships still half-full
-steamed away. The forces ashore had 17 days’ rations--after counting
-captured Japanese food--and only four days’ supply of ammunition for
-all weapons. Not only did the ships take away the rest of the supplies,
-they also took the Marines still on board, including the 2d Marines’
-headquarters element. Dropped off at the island of Espiritu Santo in
-the New Hebrides, the infantry Marines and their commander, Colonel
-Arthur, were most unhappy and remained so until they finally reached
-Guadalcanal on 29 October.
-
-Ashore in the Marine beachheads, General Vandegrift ordered rations
-reduced to two meals a day. The reduced food intake would last for
-six weeks, and the Marines would become very familiar with Japanese
-canned fish and rice. Most of the Marines smoked and they were soon
-disgustedly smoking Japanese-issue brands. They found that the separate
-paper filters that came with the cigarettes were necessary to keep the
-fast-burning tobacco from scorching their lips. The retreating ships
-had also hauled away empty sand bags and valuable engineer tools. So
-the Marines used Japanese shovels to fill Japanese rice bags with sand
-to strengthen their defensive positions.
-
-[Illustration: U.S. 90mm Antiaircraft Gun]
-
-The Marines dug in along the beaches between the Tenaru and the ridges
-west of Kukum. A Japanese counter-landing was a distinct possibility.
-Inland of the beaches, defensive gun pits and foxholes lined the west
-bank of the Tenaru and crowned the hills that faced west toward the
-Matanikau River and Point Cruz. South of the airfield where densely
-jungled ridges and ravines abounded, the beachhead perimeter was
-guarded by outposts and these were manned in large part by combat
-support troops. The engineer, pioneer, and amphibious tractor battalion
-all had their positions on the front line. In fact, any Marine with a
-rifle, and that was virtually every Marine, stood night defensive duty.
-There was no place within the perimeter that could be counted safe from
-enemy infiltration.
-
-[Illustration:
-
-    Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 150993
-
-_Col Kiyono Ichiki, a battle-seasoned Japanese Army veteran, led his
-force in an impetuous and ill-fated attack on strong Marine positions
-in the Battle of the Tenaru on the night of 20-21 August._]
-
-Almost as Turner’s transports sailed away, the Japanese began a
-pattern of harassing air attacks on the beachhead. Sometimes the raids
-came during the day, but the 3d Defense Battalion’s 90mm antiaircraft
-guns forced the bombers to fly too high for effective bombing. The
-erratic pattern of bombs, however, meant that no place was safe near
-the airfield, the preferred target, and no place could claim it was
-bomb-free. The most disturbing aspect of Japanese air attacks soon
-became the nightly harassment by Japanese aircraft which singly,
-it seemed, roamed over the perimeter, dropping bombs and flares
-indiscriminately. The nightly visitors, whose planes’ engines were soon
-well known sounds, won the singular title “Washing Machine Charlie,”
-at first, and later, “Louie the Louse,” when their presence heralded
-Japanese shore bombardment. Technically, “Charlie” was a twin-engine
-night bomber from Rabaul. “Louie” was a cruiser float plane that
-signalled to the bombardment ships. But the harassed Marines used the
-names interchangeably.
-
-Even though most of the division’s heavy engineering equipment had
-disappeared with the Navy’s transports, the resourceful Marines soon
-completed the airfield’s runway with captured Japanese gear. On 12
-August Admiral McCain’s aide piloted in a PBY-5 Catalina flying boat
-and bumped to a halt on what was now officially Henderson Field, named
-for a Marine pilot, Major Lofton R. Henderson, lost at Midway. The Navy
-officer pronounced the airfield fit for fighter use and took off with a
-load of wounded Marines, the first of 2,879 to be evacuated. Henderson
-Field was the centerpiece of Vandegrift’s strategy; he would hold it at
-all costs.
-
-Although it was only 2,000 feet long and lacked a taxiway and adequate
-drainage, the tiny airstrip, often riddled with potholes and rendered
-unusable because of frequent, torrential downpours, was essential to
-the success of the landing force. With it operational, supplies could
-be flown in and wounded flown out. At least in the Marines’ minds, Navy
-ships ceased to be the only lifeline for the defenders.
-
-While Vandegrift’s Marines dug in east and west of Henderson Field,
-Japanese headquarters in Rabaul planned what it considered an effective
-response to the American offensive. Misled by intelligence estimates
-that the Marines numbered perhaps 2,000 men, Japanese staff officers
-believed that a modest force quickly sent could overwhelm the invaders.
-
-On 12 August, CinCPac determined that a sizable Japanese force was
-massing at Truk to steam to the Solomons and attempt to eject the
-Americans. Ominously, the group included the heavy carriers _Shokaku_
-and _Zuikaku_ and the light carrier _Ryujo_. Despite the painful losses
-at Savo Island, the only significant increases to American naval forces
-in the Solomons was the assignment of a new battleship, the _South
-Dakota_ (BB 57).
-
-[Illustration: _Of his watercolor painting “Instructions to a Patrol,”
-Capt Donald L. Dickson said that three men have volunteered to locate
-a Japanese bivouac. The one in the center is a clean-cut corporal with
-the bearing of a high-school athlete. The man on the right is “rough
-and ready.” To the one at left, it’s just another job; he may do it
-heroically, but it’s just another job._
-
-    Captain Donald L. Dickson, USMCR
-]
-
-Imperial General Headquarters in Tokyo had ordered Lieutenant General
-Haruyoshi Hyakutake’s _Seventeenth Army_ to attack the Marine
-perimeter. For his assault force, Hyakutake chose the _35th Infantry
-Brigade_ (Reinforced), commanded by Major General Kiyotake Kawaguchi.
-At the time, Kawaguchi’s main force was in the Palaus. Hyakutake
-selected a crack infantry regiment--the _28th_--commanded by Colonel
-Kiyono Ichiki to land first. Alerted for its mission while it was at
-Guam, the Ichiki Detachment assault echelon, one battalion of 900
-men, was transported to the Solomons on the only shipping available,
-six destroyers. As a result the troops carried just small amounts of
-ordnance and supplies. A follow-on echelon of 1,200 of Ichiki’s troops
-was to join the assault battalion on Guadalcanal.
-
-[Illustration:
-
-    National Archives Photo 80-G-37932
-
-_On 20 August, the first Marine Corps aircraft such as this F4F Grumman
-Wildcat landed on Henderson Field to begin combat air operations
-against the Japanese._]
-
-While the Japanese landing force was headed for Guadalcanal, the
-Japanese already on the island provided an unpleasant reminder that
-they, too, were full of fight. A captured enemy naval rating, taken in
-the constant patrolling to the west of the perimeter, indicated that a
-Japanese group wanted to surrender near the village of Kokumbona, seven
-miles west of the Matanikau. This was the area that Lieutenant Colonel
-Goettge considered held most of the enemy troops who had fled the
-airfield. On the night of 12 August, a reconnaissance patrol of 25 men
-led by Goettge himself left the perimeter by landing craft. The patrol
-landed near its objective, was ambushed, and virtually wiped out. Only
-three men managed to swim and wade back to the Marine lines. The bodies
-of the other members of the patrol were never found. To this day, the
-fate of the Goettge patrol continues to intrigue researchers.
-
-After the loss of Goettge and his men, vigilance increased on the
-perimeter. On the 14th, a fabled character, the coastwatcher Martin
-Clemens, came strolling out of the jungle into the Marine lines. He
-had watched the landing from the hills south of the airfield and now
-brought his bodyguard of native policemen with him. A retired sergeant
-major of the British Solomon Islands Constabulary, Jacob C. Vouza,
-volunteered about this time to search out Japanese to the east of
-the perimeter, where patrol sightings and contacts had indicated the
-Japanese might have effected a landing.
-
-The ominous news of Japanese sightings to the east and west of the
-perimeter were balanced out by the joyous word that more Marines
-had landed. This time the Marines were aviators. On 20 August, two
-squadrons of Marine Aircraft Group (MAG)-23 were launched from the
-escort carrier _Long Island_ (CVE-1) located 200 miles southeast of
-Guadalcanal. Captain John L. Smith led 19 Grumman F4F-4 Wildcats of
-Marine Fighting Squadron (VMF)-223 onto Henderson’s narrow runway.
-Smith’s fighters were followed by Major Richard C. Mangrum’s Marine
-Scout-Bombing Squadron (VMSB)-232 with 12 Douglas SBD-3 Dauntless dive
-bombers.
-
-From this point of the campaign, the radio identification for
-Guadalcanal, Cactus, became increasingly synonymous with the island.
-The Marine planes became the first elements of what would informally be
-known as Cactus Air Force.
-
-[Illustration: _The first Army Air Forces P-400 Bell Air Cobras arrived
-on Guadalcanal on 22 August, two days after the first Marine planes,
-and began operations immediately._
-
-    National Archives Photo 208-N-4932
-]
-
-Wasting no time, the Marine pilots were soon in action against the
-Japanese naval aircraft which frequently attacked Guadalcanal. Smith
-shot down his first enemy Zero fighter on 21 August; three days later
-VMF-223’s Wildcats intercepted a strong Japanese aerial attack force
-and downed 16 enemy planes. In this action, Captain Marion E. Carl, a
-veteran of Midway, shot down three planes. On the 22d, coastwatchers
-alerted Cactus to an approaching air attack and 13 of 16 enemy bombers
-were destroyed. At the same time, Mangrum’s dive bombers damaged
-three enemy destroyer-transports attempting to reach Guadalcanal. On
-24 August, the American attacking aircraft, which now included Navy
-scout-bombers from the _Saratoga_’s Scouting Squadron (VS) 5, succeeded
-in turning back a Japanese reinforcement convoy of warships and
-destroyers.
-
-On 22 August, five Bell P-400 Air Cobras of the Army’s 67th Fighter
-Squadron had landed at Henderson, followed within the week by nine more
-Air Cobras. The Army planes, which had serious altitude and climb-rate
-deficiencies, were destined to see most action in ground combat support
-roles.
-
-The frenzied action in what became known as the Battle of the Eastern
-Solomons was matched ashore. Japanese destroyers had delivered the
-vanguard of the Ichiki force at Taivu Point, 25 miles east of the
-Marine perimeter. A long-range patrol of Marines from Company A, 1st
-Battalion, 1st Marines ambushed a sizable Japanese force near Taivu on
-19 August. The Japanese dead were readily identified as Army troops and
-the debris of their defeat included fresh uniforms and a large amount
-of communication gear. Clearly, a new phase of the fighting had begun.
-All Japanese encountered to this point had been naval troops.
-
-Alerted by patrols, the Marines now dug in along the Ilu River, often
-misnamed the Tenaru on Marine maps, were ready for Colonel Ichiki. The
-Japanese commander’s orders directed him to “quickly recapture and
-maintain the airfield at Guadalcanal,” and his own directive to his
-troops emphasized that they would fight “to the last breath of the last
-man.” And they did.
-
-[Illustration: U.S. M-3 Light Tank]
-
-Too full of his mission to wait for the rest of his regiment and sure
-that he faced only a few thousand men overall, Ichiki marched from
-Taivu to the Marines’ lines. Before he attacked on the night of the
-20th, a bloody figure stumbled out of the jungle with a warning that
-the Japanese were coming. It was Sergeant Major Vouza. Captured by the
-Japanese, who found a small American flag secreted in his loincloth, he
-was tortured in a failed attempt to gain information on the invasion
-force. Tied to a tree, bayonetted twice through the chest, and beaten
-with rifle butts, the resolute Vouza chewed through his bindings
-to escape. Taken to Lieutenant Colonel Edwin A. Pollock, whose 2d
-Battalion, 1st Marines held the Ilu mouth’s defenses, he gasped a
-warning that an estimated 250-500 Japanese soldiers were coming behind
-him. The resolute Vouza, rushed immediately to an aid station and then
-to the division hospital, miraculously survived his ordeal and was
-awarded a Silver Star for his heroism by General Vandegrift, and later
-a Legion of Merit. Vandegrift also made Vouza an honorary sergeant
-major of U.S. Marines.
-
-At 0130 on 21 August, Ichiki’s troops stormed the Marines’ lines in a
-screaming, frenzied display of the “spiritual strength” which they had
-been assured would sweep aside their American enemy. As the Japanese
-charged across the sand bar astride the Ilu’s mouth, Pollock’s Marines
-cut them down. After a mortar preparation, the Japanese tried again
-to storm past the sand bar. A section of 37mm guns sprayed the enemy
-force with deadly canister. Lieutenant Colonel Lenard B. Cresswell’s
-1st Battalion, 1st Marines moved upstream on the Ilu at daybreak, waded
-across the sluggish, 50-foot-wide stream, and moved on the flank of the
-Japanese. Wildcats from VMF-223 strafed the beleagured enemy force.
-Five light tanks blasted the retreating Japanese. By 1700, as the sun
-was setting, the battle ended.
-
-Colonel Ichiki, disgraced in his own mind by his defeat, burned his
-regimental colors and shot himself. Close to 800 of his men joined
-him in death. The few survivors fled eastward towards Taivu Point.
-Rear Admiral Raizo Tanaka, whose reinforcement force of transports and
-destroyers was largely responsible for the subsequent Japanese troop
-buildup on Guadalcanal, recognized that the unsupported Japanese attack
-was sheer folly and reflected that “this tragedy should have taught us
-the hopelessness of bamboo spear tactics.” Fortunately for the Marines,
-Ichiki’s overconfidence was not unique among Japanese commanders.
-
-[Illustration:
-
-    Captain Donald L. Dickson, USMCR
-
-_Capt Donald L. Dickson said of his watercolor: “I wanted to catch on
-paper the feeling one has as a shell comes whistling over.... There is
-a sense of being alone, naked and unprotected. And time seems endless
-until the shell strikes somewhere.”_]
-
-Following the 1st Marines’ tangle with the Ichiki detachment, General
-Vandegrift was inspired to write the Marine Commandant, Lieutenant
-General Thomas Holcomb, and report: “These youngsters are the darndest
-people when they get started you ever saw.” And all the Marines on
-the island, young and old, tyro and veteran, were becoming accomplished
-jungle fighters. They were no longer “trigger happy” as many had been
-in their first days ashore, shooting at shadows and imagined enemy.
-They were waiting for targets, patrolling with enthusiasm, sure of
-themselves. The misnamed Battle of the Tenaru had cost Colonel Hunt’s
-regiment 34 killed in action and 75 wounded. All the division’s Marines
-now felt they were bloodied. What the men on Tulagi, Gavutu, and
-Tanambogo and those of the Ilu had done was prove that the 1st Marine
-Division would hold fast to what it had won.
-
-[Illustration: _Cactus Air Force commander, MajGen Roy S. Geiger,
-poses with Capt Joseph J. Foss, the leading ace at Guadalcanal with
-26 Japanese aircraft downed. Capt Foss was later awarded the Medal of
-Honor for his heroic exploits in the air._
-
-    Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 52622
-]
-
-While the division’s Marines and sailors had earned a breathing spell
-as the Japanese regrouped for another onslaught, the action in the air
-over the Solomons intensified. Almost every day, Japanese aircraft
-arrived around noon to bomb the perimeter. Marine fighter pilots
-found the twin-engine Betty bombers easy targets; Zero fighters were
-another story. Although the Wildcats were a much sturdier aircraft, the
-Japanese Zeros’ superior speed and better maneuverability gave them a
-distinct edge in a dogfight. The American planes, however, when warned
-by the coastwatchers of Japanese attacks, had time to climb above the
-oncoming enemy and preferably attacked by making firing runs during
-high speed dives. Their tactics made the air space over the Solomons
-dangerous for the Japanese. On 29 August, the carrier _Ryujo_ launched
-aircraft for a strike against the airstrip. Smith’s Wildcats shot down
-16, with a loss of four of their own. Still, the Japanese continued to
-strike at Henderson Field without letup. Two days after the _Ryujo_
-raid, enemy bombers inflicted heavy damage on the airfield, setting
-aviation fuel ablaze and incinerating parked aircraft. VMF-223’s
-retaliation was a further bag of 13 attackers.
-
-On 30 August, two more MAG-23 squadrons, VMF-224 and VMSB-231, flew in
-to Henderson. The air reinforcements were more than welcome. Steady
-combat attrition, frequent damage in the air and on the ground, and
-scant repair facilities and parts kept the number of aircraft available
-a dwindling resource.
-
-Plainly, General Vandegrift needed infantry reinforcements as much
-as he did additional aircraft. He brought the now-combined raider and
-parachute battalions, both under Edson’s command, and the 2d Battalion,
-5th Marines, over to Guadalcanal from Tulagi. This gave the division
-commander a chance to order out larger reconnaissance patrols to probe
-for the Japanese. On 27 August, the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, made a
-shore-to-shore landing near Kokumbona and marched back to the beachhead
-without any measurable results. If the Japanese were out there beyond
-the Matanikau--and they were--they watched the Marines and waited for a
-better opportunity to attack.
-
-
-[Sidebar (page 5): First Marine Utility Uniform Issued in World War II
-
-The United States Marine Corps entered World War II wearing essentially
-the same summer field uniform that it had worn during the “Banana
-Wars.” The Marines defending America’s Pacific outposts on Guam, Wake
-Island, and in the Philippines in the late months of 1941 wore a
-summer field uniform consisting of a khaki cotton shirt and trousers,
-leggings, and a M1917A1 steel helmet. Plans to change this uniform had
-been underway for at least one year prior to the opening of hostilities.
-
-As had the Army, the Marine Corps had used a loose-fitting blue denim
-fatigue uniform for work details and some field exercises since the
-1920s. This fatigue uniform was either a one-piece coverall or a
-two-piece bib overall and jacket, both with “USMC” metal buttons. In
-June 1940, it was replaced by a green cotton coverall. This uniform
-and the summer field uniform were replaced by what would become known
-as the utility uniform. Approved for general issue on the Marine
-Corps’ 166th birthday, 10 November 1941, this new uniform was made of
-sage-green (although “olive drab” was called for in the specifications)
-herringbone twill cotton, then a popular material for civilian work
-clothing. The two-piece uniform consisted of a coat (often referred to
-as a “jacket” by Marines) and trousers. In 1943, a cap made of the same
-material would be issued.
-
-The loose-fitting coat was closed down the front by four two-piece
-rivetted bronze-finished steel buttons, each bearing the words “U.S.
-MARINE CORPS” in relief. The cuffs were closed by similar buttons. Two
-large patch pockets were sewn on the front skirts of the jacket and a
-single patch pocket was stitched to the left breast. This pocket had
-the Marine Corps eagle, globe, and anchor insignia and the letters
-“USMC” stencilled on it in black ink. The trousers, worn with and
-without the khaki canvas leggings, had two slashed front pockets and
-two rear patch pockets.
-
-[Illustration]
-
-The new uniform was issued to the flood of new recruits crowding
-the recruit depots in the early months of 1942 and was first worn
-in combat during the landing on Guadalcanal in August 1942. This
-uniform was subsequently worn by Marines of all arms from the Solomons
-Campaign to the end of the war. Originally, the buttons on the coat
-and the trousers were all copper-plated, but an emergency alternate
-specification was approved on 15 August 1942, eight days after the
-landing on Guadalcanal, which allowed for a variety of finishes on the
-buttons. Towards the end of the war, a new “modified” utility uniform
-which had been developed after Tarawa was also issued, in addition
-to a variety of camouflage uniforms. All of these utility uniforms,
-along with Army-designed Ml helmets and Marine Corps-designed cord and
-rubber-soled rough-side-out leather “boondocker” shoes, would be worn
-throughout the war in the Pacific, during the postwar years, and into
-the Korean War.--_Kenneth L. Smith-Christmas_
-]
-
-
-[Sidebar (page 11): LVT (1)--The ‘Amtrac’
-
-While the Marine Corps was developing amphibious warfare doctrine
-during the 1920s and 1930s, it was apparent that a motorized amphibian
-vehicle was needed to transport men and equipment from ships across
-fringing reefs and beaches into battle, particularly when the beach was
-defended.
-
-In 1940, the Marines adopted the Landing Vehicle, Tracked (1), designed
-by Donald Roebling. More commonly known as the “amtrac” (short for
-amphibian tractor), the LVT(1) had a driver’s cab in front and a small
-engine compartment in the rear, with the bulk of the body used for
-carrying space. During the next three years, 1,225 LVT(1)s were built,
-primarily by the Food Machinery Corporation.
-
-The LVT(1) was constructed of welded steel and was propelled on both
-land and water by paddle-type treads. Designed solely as a supply
-vehicle, it could carry 4,500 pounds of cargo. In August 1942, the
-LVT(1) first saw combat on Guadalcanal with the 1st Amphibian Tractor
-Battalion, 1st Marine Division. Throughout the Solomon Islands
-campaigns, the LVT(1) provided Marines all types of logistical support,
-moving thousands of tons of supplies to the front lines. At times they
-also were pressed into tactical use: moving artillery pieces, holding
-defensive positions, and occasionally supporting Marines in the attack
-with their machine guns. They also were used as pontoons to support
-bridges across Guadalcanal rivers.
-
-The LVT proved to be more seaworthy than a boat of comparable size; it
-was able to remain afloat with its entire cargo hold full of water.
-However, defects in the design soon became apparent. The paddle treads
-on the tracks and the rigid suspension system were both susceptible
-to damage when driven on land and did not provide the desired speeds
-on land or water. Although the LVT(1) performed admirably against
-undefended beachheads, its lack of armor made it unsuitable for
-assaults against the heavily defended islands of the central Pacific.
-This weakness was apparent during the fighting in the Solomon Islands,
-but LVT(1)s with improvised armor were still in use at the assault on
-Tarawa, where 75 percent of them were lost in three days.
-
-The LVT(1) proved its value and validated the amphibious vehicle
-concept through the great versatility and mobility it demonstrated
-throughout numerous campaigns in the Pacific. Although intended
-solely for supply purposes, it was thrust into combat use in early
-war engagements. In its initial role as a support vehicle, the LVT(1)
-delivered ammunition, supplies and reinforcements that made the
-difference between victory and defeat.--_Second Lieutenant Wesley L.
-Feight, USMC_
-
-[Illustration]
-]
-
-
-[Sidebar (page 14): General Vandegrift and His 1st Marine Division
-Staff
-
-Whenever a work about the Guadalcanal operation is published, one of
-the pictures always included is that of Major General Alexander A.
-Vandegrift, 1st Marine Division commanding general, and his staff
-officers and commanders, who posed for the photograph on 11 August
-1942, just four days after the assault landings on the island. Besides
-General Vandegrift, there are 40 Marines and one naval officer in
-this picture, and each one deserves a page of his own in Marine Corps
-history.
-
-Among the Marines, 23 were promoted to general officer rank and three
-became Commandants of the Marine Corps: General Vandegrift and Colonels
-Cates and Pate. The naval officer, division surgeon Commander Warwick
-T. Brown, MC, USN, also made flag officer rank while on active duty and
-was promoted to vice admiral upon retirement.
-
-Four of the officers in the picture served in three wars. Lieutenant
-Colonels Gerald C. Thomas, division operations officer, and Randolph
-McC. Pate, division logistics officer, served in both World Wars I
-and II, and each commanded the 1st Marine Division in Korea. Colonel
-William J. Whaling similarly served in World Wars I and II, and was
-General Thomas’ assistant division commander in Korea. Major Henry W.
-Buse, Jr., assistant operations officer, served in World War II, Korea,
-and the Vietnam War. Others served in two wars--World Wars I and II,
-or World War II and Korea. Represented in the photograph is a total
-of nearly 700 years of cumulative experience on active Marine Corps
-service.
-
-Three key members of the division--the Assistant Division Commander,
-Brigadier General William H. Rupertus; the Assistant Chief of Staff,
-G-1, Colonel Robert C. Kilmartin, Jr.; and the commanding officer of
-the 1st Raider Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Merritt A. Edson--were not
-in this picture for a good reason. They were on Tulagi, where Rupertus
-headed the Tulagi Command Group with Kilmartin as his chief of staff,
-and Edson commanded the combat troops. Also notably absent from this
-photograph was the commander of the 7th Marines, Colonel James C. Webb,
-who had not joined the division from Samoa, where the regiment had been
-sent before the division deployed overseas.
-
-In his memoir, _Once a Marine_, General Vandegrift explained why this
-photograph was taken. The division’s morale was affected by the fact
-that Vice Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher was forced to withdraw his
-fleet from the area--with many of his ships not yet fully unloaded
-and holding more than half of the division’s supplies still needed
-ashore. Adding to the Marines’ uneasiness at seeing their naval support
-disappear below the horizon, was the fact that they had been under
-almost constant enemy air attacks beginning shortly after their landing
-on Guadalcanal. In an effort to counter the adverse influence on morale
-of the day and night air attacks, Vandegrift began making tours of the
-division perimeter every morning to talk to as many of his Marines as
-possible, and to keep a personal eye on the command. As he noted:
-
-  By August 11, the full impact of the vanished transports was
-  permeating the command, so again I called a conference of my staff
-  and command officers.... I ended the conference by posing with this
-  fine group of officers, a morale device that worked because they
-  thought if I went to the trouble of having the picture taken then I
-  obviously planned to enjoy it in future years.
-
-Recently, General Merrill B. “Bill” Twining, on Guadalcanal a
-lieutenant colonel and assistant D-3, recalled the circumstances of the
-photograph and philosophized about the men who appeared in it:
-
-  The group is lined up on the slope of the coral ridge which
-  provided a degree of protection from naval gunfire coming from the
-  north and was therefore selected as division CP....
-
-  There was no vital reason for the conclave. I think V[andegrift]
-  just wanted to see who was in his outfit. Do you realize these
-  people had never been together before? Some came from as far away
-  as Iceland....
-
-  V[andegrift] mainly introduced himself, gave a brief pep talk....
-  I have often been asked how we could afford to congregate all
-  this talent in the face of the enemy. We didn’t believe we (_at
-  the moment_) faced any threat from the Japanese. The defense area
-  was small and every responsible commander could reach his CP in 5
-  minutes and after all there were a lot of good people along those
-  lines. Most of the fresh-caught second lieutenants were battalion
-  commanders two years later. We believed in each other and trusted.
-
-            --_Benis M. Frank_
-
-The General and His Officers on Guadalcanal, According to the Chart
-
-[Illustration]
-
-[Illustration]
-
-     1. Col George R. Rowan
-     2. Col Pedro A. del Valle
-     3. Col William C. James
-     4. MajGen Alexander A. Vandegrift
-     5. LtCol Gerald C. Thomas
-     6. Col Clifton B. Cates
-     7. Col Randolph McC. Pate
-     8. Cdr Warwick T. Brown, USN
-     9. Col William J. Whaling
-    10. Col Frank B. Goettge
-    11. Col LeRoy P. Hunt, Jr.
-    12. LtCol Frederick C. Biebush
-    13. LtCol Edwin A. Pollock
-    14. LtCol Edmund J. Buckley
-    15. LtCol Walter W. Barr
-    16. LtCol Raymond P. Coffman
-    17. LtCol Francis R. Geraci
-    18. LtCol William E. Maxwell
-    19. LtCol Edward G. Hagen
-    20. LtCol William N. McKelvy, Jr.
-    21. LtCol Julian N. Frisbie
-    22. Maj Milton V. O’Connell
-    23. Maj William Chalfant III
-    24. Maj Horace W. Fuller
-    25. Maj Forest C. Thompson
-    26. Maj Robert G. Ballance
-    27. Maj Henry C. Buse, Jr.
-    28. Maj James W. Frazer
-    29. Maj Henry H. Crockett
-    30. LtCol Lenard B. Cresswell
-    31. Maj Robert O. Brown
-    32. LtCol John A. Bemis
-    33. Col Kenneth W. Benner
-    34. Maj Robert B. Luckey
-    35. LtCol Samuel B. Taxis
-    36. LtCol Eugene H. Price
-    37. LtCol Merrill B. Twining
-    38. LtCol Walker A. Reaves
-    39. LtCol John D. Macklin
-    40. LtCol Hawley C. Waterman
-    41. Maj James C. Murray, Jr.
-]
-
-
-[Sidebar (page 17): The Coastwatchers
-
-A group of fewer than 1,500 native Coastwatchers served as the eyes and
-ears of Allied forces in reporting movements of Japanese units on the
-ground, in the air, and at sea.
-
-Often performing their jobs in remote jungle outposts, the
-Coastwatchers were possessed of both mental and physical courage.
-Their knowledge of the geography and peoples of the Pacific made them
-invaluable additions to the Allied war effort.
-
-The concept for this service originated in 1919 in a proposal by the
-Royal Australian Navy to form a civilian coastwatching organization
-to provide early warning in the event of an invasion. By the outbreak
-of war in September 1939, approximately 800 persons were serving as
-coastwatchers, operating observation posts mainly on the Australian
-coast. They were, at the outset, government officials aided by
-missionaries and planters who, as war with Japan neared, were placed
-under the control of the intelligence section of the Australian Navy.
-
-[Illustration: _Coastwatcher Capt W. F. Martin Clemens, British Solomon
-Islands Defence Force, poses with some of his constabulary._
-
-    National Archives Photo 80-G-17080 courtesy of Richard Frank
-]
-
-By 1942, the system of coastwatchers and the accompanying intelligence
-network covered an area of 500,000 square miles, and was placed
-under the control of the Allied Intelligence Bureau (AIB). The AIB
-coordinated Allied intelligence activities in the southwest Pacific,
-and had as its initial principal mission the collection of all possible
-information about the enemy in the vicinity of Guadalcanal.
-
-Coastwatchers proved extremely useful to U.S. Marine forces in
-providing reports on the number and movement of Japanese troops.
-Officers from the 1st Marine Division obtained accurate information
-on the location of enemy forces in their objective areas, and were
-provided vital reports on approaching Japanese bombing raids. On 8
-August 1942, Coastwatcher Jack Reed on Bougainville alerted American
-forces to an upcoming raid by 40 Japanese bombers, which resulted in
-36 of the enemy planes being destroyed. The “early warning system”
-provided by the Coastwatchers helped Marine forces on Guadalcanal to
-hold onto the Henderson Field airstrip.
-
-The Coastwatchers also rescued and sheltered 118 Allied pilots,
-including Marines, during the Solomons Campaign, often at the immediate
-risk of their own lives. Pipe-smoking Coastwatcher Reed also was
-responsible for coordinating the evacuation on Bougainville of four
-nuns and 25 civilians by the U.S. submarine _Nautilus_.
-
-It is unknown exactly how many Coastwatchers paid the ultimate
-sacrifice in the performance of their duties. Many died in anonymity,
-without knowledge of the contribution their services had made to
-final victory. Perhaps they would be gratified to know that no
-less an authority than Admiral William F. Halsey recorded that
-the Coastwatchers saved Guadalcanal, and Guadalcanal saved the
-Pacific.--_Robert V. Aquilina_
-]
-
-
-[Sidebar (page 19): The 1st Marine Division Patch
-
-[Illustration]
-
-The 1st Division shoulder patch originally was authorized for wear by
-members of units who were organic or attached to the division in its
-four landings in the Pacific War. It was the first unit patch to be
-authorized for wear in World War II and specifically commemorated the
-division’s sacrifices and victory in the battle for Guadalcanal.
-
-As recalled by General Merrill B. Twining, a lieutenant colonel and the
-division’s operations officer on Guadalcanal, for a short time before
-the 1st left Guadalcanal for Australia, there had been some discussion
-by the senior staff about uniforming the troops. It appeared that the
-Marines might have to wear Army uniforms, which meant that they would
-lose their identity and Twining came up with the idea for a division
-patch. A number of different designs were devised by both Lieutenant
-Colonel Twining and Captain Donald L. Dickson, adjutant of the 5th
-Marines, who had been an artist in civilian life. The one which Twining
-prepared on the flight out of Guadalcanal was approved by Major General
-Alexander A. Vandegrift, the division commander.
-
-General Twining further recalled that he drew a diamond in his notebook
-and “in the middle of the diamond I doodled a numeral one ... [and]
-I sketched in the word ‘Guadalcanal’ down its length.... I got to
-thinking that the whole operation had been under the Southern Cross, so
-I drew that in, too.... About an hour later I took the drawing up to
-the front of the aircraft to General Vandegrift. He said, ‘Yes, that’s
-it!’ and wrote his initials, A.A.V., on the bottom of the notebook
-page.”
-
-[Illustration: _Designer of the patch, LtCol Merrill B. Twining (later
-Gen) sits in the 1st Marine Division operations bunker. Behind him is
-his assistant D-3, a very tired Maj Henry IV. Buse, Jr._]
-
-After he arrived in Brisbane, Australia, Colonel Twining bought a
-child’s watercolor set and, while confined to his hotel room by a bout
-of malaria, drew a bunch of diamonds on a big sheet, coloring each one
-differently. He then took samples to General Vandegrift, who chose one
-which was colored a shade of blue that he liked. Then Twining took
-the sketch to the Australian Knitting Mills to have it reproduced,
-pledging the credit of the post exchange funds to pay for the patches’
-manufacture. Within a week or two the patches began to roll off the
-knitting machines, and Colonel Twining was there to approve them.
-General Twining further recalled: “After they came off the machine, I
-picked up a sheet of them. They looked very good, and when they were
-cut, I picked up one of the patches. It was one of the first off the
-machine.”
-
-The division’s post exchanges began selling the patches almost
-immediately and they proved to be popular, with Marines buying extras
-to give away as souvenirs to Australian friends or to send home to
-families. Before long, newly established Marine divisions, as well as
-the raider and parachute units, and as the aircraft wings, sea-going
-Marines, Fleet Marine Force Pacific units, and others, were authorized
-to have their own distinctive patch, a total of 33, following the lead
-of the 1st Marine Division. Marines returning to the United States for
-duty or on leave from a unit having a distinctive shoulder insignia
-were authorized to wear that insignia until they were assigned to
-another unit having a shoulder patch of its own. For many 1st Marine
-Division men joining another unit and having to relinquish the wearing
-of the 1st Division patch, this rankled.
-
-Shortly after the end of the war, Colonel Twining went to now-Marine
-Commandant General Vandegrift saying that he “no longer thought Marines
-should wear anything on their uniforms to distinguish them from other
-Marines. He agreed and the patches came off for good.”--_Benis M. Frank_
-]
-
-
-
-
-_September and the Ridge_
-
-
-Admiral McCain visited Guadalcanal at the end of August, arriving
-in time to greet the aerial reinforcements he had ordered forward,
-and also in time for a taste of Japanese nightly bombing. He got to
-experience, too, what was becoming another unwanted feature of Cactus
-nights: bombardment by Japanese cruisers and destroyers. General
-Vandegrift noted that McCain had gotten a dose of the “normal ration
-of shells.” The admiral saw enough to signal his superiors that
-increased support for Guadalcanal operations was imperative and that
-the “situation admits no delay whatsoever.” He also sent a prophetic
-message to Admirals King and Nimitz: “Cactus can be a sinkhole for
-enemy air power and can be consolidated, expanded, and exploited to the
-enemy’s mortal hurt.”
-
-On 3 September, the Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing,
-Brigadier General Roy S. Geiger, and his assistant wing commander,
-Colonel Louis Woods, moved forward to Guadalcanal to take charge of
-air operations. The arrival of the veteran Marine aviators provided
-an instant lift to the morale of the pilots and ground crews. It
-reinforced their belief that they were at the leading edge of air
-combat, that they were setting the pace for the rest of Marine
-aviation. Vandegrift could thankfully turn over the day-to-day
-management of the aerial defenses of Cactus to the able and experienced
-Geiger. There was no shortage of targets for the mixed air force of
-Marine, Army, and Navy flyers. Daily air attacks by the Japanese,
-coupled with steady reinforcement attempts by Tanaka’s destroyers
-and transports, meant that every type of plane that could lift off
-Henderson’s runway was airborne as often as possible. Seabees had begun
-work on a second airstrip, Fighter One, which could relieve some of the
-pressure on the primary airfield.
-
-[Illustration:
-
-    National Archives Photo 80-G-29536-413C
-
-_This is an oblique view of Henderson Field looking north with
-Ironbottom Sound (Sealark Channel) in the background. At the left
-center is the “Pagoda,” operations center of Cactus Air Force flyers
-throughout their first months of operations ashore._]
-
-Most of General Kawaguchi’s brigade had reached Guadalcanal. Those
-who hadn’t, missed their landfall forever as a result of American air
-attacks. Kawaguchi had in mind a surprise attack on the heart of the
-Marine position, a thrust from the jungle directly at the airfield. To
-reach his jumpoff position, the Japanese general would have to move
-through difficult terrain unobserved, carving his way through the dense
-vegetation out of sight of Marine patrols. The rugged approach route
-would lead him to a prominent ridge topped by Kunai grass which wove
-snake-like through the jungle to within a mile of Henderson’s runway.
-Unknown to the Japanese, General Vandegrift planned on moving his
-headquarters to the shelter of a spot at the inland base of this ridge,
-a site better protected, it was hoped, from enemy bombing and shellfire.
-
-[Illustration: _Marine ground crewmen attempt to put out one of many
-fires occuring after a Japanese bombing raid on Henderson Field causing
-the loss of much-needed aircraft._
-
-    Marine Corps Personal Papers Collection
-]
-
-The success of Kawaguchi’s plan depended upon the Marines keeping the
-inland perimeter thinly manned while they concentrated their forces on
-the east and west flanks. This was not to be. Available intelligence,
-including a captured enemy map, pointed to the likelihood of an attack
-on the airfield and Vandegrift moved his combined raider-parachute
-battalion to the most obvious enemy approach route, the ridge. Colonel
-Edson’s men, who scouted Savo Island after moving to Guadalcanal
-and destroyed a Japanese supply base at Tasimboko in another
-shore-to-shore raid, took up positions on the forward slopes of the
-ridge at the edge of the encroaching jungle on 10 September. Their
-commander later said that he “was firmly convinced that we were in the
-path of the next Jap attack.” Earlier patrols had spotted a sizable
-Japanese force approaching. Accordingly, Edson patrolled extensively as
-his men dug in on the ridge and in the flanking jungle. On the 12th,
-the Marines made contact with enemy patrols confirming the fact that
-Japanese troops were definitely “out front.” Kawaguchi had about 2,000
-of his men with him, enough he thought to punch through to the airfield.
-
-Japanese planes had dropped 500-pound bombs along the ridge on the 11th
-and enemy ships began shelling the area after nightfall on the 12th,
-once the threat of American air attacks subsided. The first Japanese
-thrust came at 2100 against Edson’s left flank. Boiling out of the
-jungle, the enemy soldiers attacked fearlessly into the face of rifle
-and machine gun fire, closing to bayonet range. They were thrown back.
-They came again, this time against the right flank, penetrating the
-Marines’ positions. Again they were thrown back. A third attack closed
-out the night’s action. Again it was a close affair, but by 0230 Edson
-told Vandegrift his men could hold. And they did.
-
-[Illustration: _The raging battle of Edson’s Ridge is depicted in all
-its fury in this oil painting by the late Col Donald L. Dickson, who,
-as a captain, was adjutant of the 5th Marines on Guadalcanal. Dickson’s
-artwork later was shown widely in the United States._
-
-    Captain Donald L. Dickson, USMCR
-]
-
-On the morning of 13 September, Edson called his company commanders
-together and told them: “They were just testing, just testing. They’ll
-be back.” He ordered all positions improved and defenses consolidated
-and pulled his lines towards the airfield along the ridge’s center
-spine. The 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, his backup on Tulagi, moved into
-position to reinforce again.
-
-[Illustration: EDSON’S (BLOODY) RIDGE
-
-12-14 SEPTEMBER 1942]
-
-[Illustration: _Edson’s or Raider’s Ridge is calm after the fighting
-on the nights of 12-13 and 13-14 September, when it was the scene of a
-valiant and bloody defense crucial to safeguarding Henderson Field and
-the Marine perimeter on Guadalcanal. The knobs at left background were
-Col Edson’s final defensive position, while Henderson Field lies beyond
-the trees in the background._
-
-    Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 500007
-]
-
-[Illustration:
-
-    Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 310563
-
-_Maj Kenneth D. Bailey, commander of Company C, 1st Raider Battalion,
-was awarded the Medal of Honor posthumously for heroic and inspiring
-leadership during the Battle of Edson’s Ridge._]
-
-The next night’s attacks were as fierce as any man had seen. The
-Japanese were everywhere, fighting hand-to-hand in the Marines’
-foxholes and gun pits and filtering past forward positions to attack
-from the rear. Division Sergeant Major Sheffield Banta shot one in the
-new command post. Colonel Edson appeared wherever the fighting was
-toughest, encouraging his men to their utmost efforts. The man-to-man
-battles lapped over into the jungle on either flank of the ridge, and
-engineer and pioneer positions were attacked. The reserve from the 5th
-Marines was fed into the fight. Artillerymen from the 5th Battalion,
-11th Marines, as they had on the previous night, fired their 105mm
-howitzers at any called target. The range grew as short as 1,600
-yards from tube to impact. The Japanese finally could take no more.
-They pulled back as dawn approached. On the slopes of the ridge and in
-the surrounding jungle they left more than 600 bodies; another 600 men
-were wounded. The remnants of the Kawaguchi force staggered back toward
-their lines to the west, a grueling, hellish eight-day march that saw
-many more of the enemy perish.
-
-The cost to Edson’s force for its epic defense was also heavy.
-Fifty-nine men were dead, 10 were missing in action, and 194 were
-wounded. These losses, coupled with the casualties of Tulagi, Gavutu,
-and Tanambogo, meant the end of the 1st Parachute Battalion as an
-effective fighting unit. Only 89 men of the parachutists’ original
-strength could walk off the ridge, soon in legend to become “Bloody
-Ridge” or “Edson’s Ridge.” Both Colonel Edson and Captain Kenneth D.
-Bailey, commanding the raider’s Company C, were awarded the Medal of
-Honor for their heroic and inspirational actions.
-
-On 13 and 14 September, the Japanese attempted to support Kawaguchi’s
-attack on the ridge with thrusts against the flanks of the Marine
-perimeter. On the east, enemy troops attempting to penetrate the lines
-of the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, were caught in the open on a grass
-plain and smothered by artillery fire; at least 200 died. On the west,
-the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, holding ridge positions covering the
-coastal road, fought off a determined attacking force that reached its
-front lines.
-
-[Illustration: _The Pagoda at Henderson Field, served as headquarters
-for Cactus Air Force throughout the first months of air operations
-on Guadalcanal. From this building, Allied planes were sent against
-Japanese troops on other islands of the Solomons._
-
-    Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 50921
-]
-
-The victory at the ridge gave a great boost to Allied homefront
-morale, and reinforced the opinion of the men ashore on Guadalcanal
-that they could take on anything the enemy could send against them. At
-upper command echelons, the leaders were not so sure that the ground
-Marines and their motley air force could hold. Intercepted Japanese
-dispatches revealed that the myth of the 2,000-man defending force
-had been completely dispelled. Sizable naval forces and two divisions
-of Japanese troops were now committed to conquer the Americans on
-Guadalcanal. Cactus Air Force, augmented frequently by Navy carrier
-squadrons, made the planned reinforcement effort a high-risk venture.
-But it was a risk the Japanese were prepared to take.
-
-On 18 September, the long-awaited 7th Marines, reinforced by the
-1st Battalion, 11th Marines, and other division troops, arrived at
-Guadalcanal. As the men from Samoa landed they were greeted with
-friendly derision by Marines already on the island. The 7th had been
-the first regiment of the 1st Division to go overseas; its men, many
-thought then, were likely to be the first to see combat. The division
-had been careful to send some of its best men to Samoa and now had
-them back. One of the new and salty combat veterans of the 5th Marines
-remarked to a friend in the 7th that he had waited a long time “to see
-our first team get into the game.” Providentially, a separate supply
-convoy reached the island at the same time as the 7th’s arrival,
-bringing with it badly needed aviation gas and the first resupply of
-ammunition since D-Day.
-
-The Navy covering force for the American reinforcement and supply
-convoys was hit hard by Japanese submarines. The carrier _Wasp_ was
-torpedoed and sunk, the battleship _North Carolina_ (BB 55) was
-damaged, and the destroyer _O’Brien_ (DD 415) was hit so badly it
-broke up and sank on its way to drydock. The Navy had accomplished
-its mission, the 7th Marines had landed, but at a terrible cost. About
-the only good result of the devastating Japanese torpedo attacks was
-that the _Wasp_’s surviving aircraft joined Cactus Air Force, as the
-planes of the _Saratoga_ and _Enterprise_ had done when their carriers
-required combat repairs. Now, the _Hornet_ (CV 8) was the only whole
-fleet carrier left in the South Pacific.
-
-As the ships that brought the 7th Marines withdrew, they took with them
-the survivors of the 1st Parachute Battalion and sick bays full of
-badly wounded men. General Vandegrift now had 10 infantry battalions,
-one understrength raider battalion, and five artillery battalions
-ashore; the 3d Battalion, 2d Marines, had come over from Tulagi also.
-He reorganized the defensive perimeter into 10 sectors for better
-control, giving the engineer, pioneer, and amphibian tractor battalions
-sectors along the beach. Infantry battalions manned the other sectors,
-including the inland perimeter in the jungle. Each infantry regiment
-had two battalions on line and one in reserve. Vandegrift also had the
-use of a select group of infantrymen who were training to be scouts and
-snipers under the leadership of Colonel William J. “Wild Bill” Whaling,
-an experienced jungle hand, marksman, and hunter, whom he had appointed
-to run a school to sharpen the division’s fighting skills. As men
-finished their training under Whaling and went back to their outfits,
-others took their place and the Whaling group was available to scout
-and spearhead operations.
-
-Vandegrift now had enough men ashore on Guadalcanal, 19,200, to expand
-his defensive scheme. He decided to seize a forward position along the
-east bank of the Matanikau River, in effect strongly outposting his
-west flank defenses against the probability of strong enemy attacks
-from the area where most Japanese troops were landing. First, however,
-he was going to test the Japanese reaction with a strong probing force.
-
-He chose the fresh 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, commanded by Lieutenant
-Colonel Lewis B. “Chesty” Puller, to move inland along the slopes of
-Mt. Austen and patrol north towards the coast and the Japanese-held
-area. Puller’s battalion ran into Japanese troops bivouacked on the
-slopes of Austen on the 24th and in a sharp firefight had seven men
-killed and 25 wounded. Vandegrift sent the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines,
-forward to reinforce Puller and help provide the men needed to carry
-the casualties out of the jungle. Now reinforced, Puller continued
-his advance, moving down the east bank of the Matanikau. He reached
-the coast on the 26th as planned, where he drew intensive fire from
-enemy positions on the ridges west of the river. An attempt by the 2d
-Battalion, 5th Marines, to cross was beaten back.
-
-About this time, the 1st Raider Battalion, its original mission one of
-establishing a patrol base west of the Matanikau, reached the vicinity
-of the firefight, and joined in. Vandegrift sent Colonel Edson, now the
-commander of the 5th Marines, forward to take charge of the expanded
-force. He was directed to attack on the 27th and decided to send the
-raiders inland to outflank the Japanese defenders. The battalion,
-commanded by Edson’s former executive officer, Lieutenant Colonel
-Samuel B. Griffith II, ran into a hornet’s nest of Japanese who had
-crossed the Matanikau during the night. A garbled message led Edson to
-believe that Griffith’s men were advancing according to plan, so he
-decided to land the companies of the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, behind
-the enemy’s Matanikau position and strike the Japanese from the rear
-while Rosecran’s men attacked across the river.
-
-The landing was made without incident and the 7th Marines’ companies
-moved inland only to be ambushed and cut off from the sea by the
-Japanese. A rescue force of landing craft moved with difficulty through
-Japanese fire, urged on by Puller who accompanied the boats on the
-destroyer _Ballard_ (DD 660). The Marines were evacuated after fighting
-their way to the beach covered by the destroyer’s fire and the machine
-guns of a Marine SBD overhead. Once the 7th Marines companies got
-back to the perimeter, landing near Kukum, the raider and 5th Marines
-battalions pulled back from the Matanikau. The confirmation that the
-Japanese would strongly contest any westward advance cost the Marines
-60 men killed and 100 wounded.
-
-[Illustration: _Shortly after becoming Commander, South Pacific Area
-and Forces, VAdm William F. Halsey visited Guadalcanal and the 1st
-Marine Division. Here he is shown talking with Col Gerald C. Thomas,
-1st Marine Division D-3 (Operations Officer)._
-
-    Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 53523
-]
-
-The Japanese the Marines had encountered were mainly men from the
-_4th Regiment_ of the _2d (Sendai) Division_; prisoners confirmed
-that the division was landing on the island. Included in the enemy
-reinforcements were 150mm howitzers, guns capable of shelling the
-airfield from positions near Kokumbona. Clearly, a new and stronger
-enemy attack was pending.
-
-As September drew to a close, a flood of promotions had reached the
-division, nine lieutenant colonels put on their colonel’s eagles and
-there were 14 new lieutenant colonels also. Vandegrift made Colonel
-Gerald C. Thomas, his former operations officer, the new division
-chief of staff, and had a short time earlier given Edson the 5th
-Marines. Many of the older, senior officers, picked for the most part
-in the order they had joined the division, were now sent back to the
-States. There they would provide a new level of combat expertise in the
-training and organization of the many Marine units that were forming.
-The air wing was not quite ready yet to return its experienced pilots
-to rear areas, but the vital combat knowledge they possessed was much
-needed in the training pipeline. They, too--the survivors--would soon
-be rotating back to rear areas, some for a much-needed break before
-returning to combat and others to lead new squadrons into the fray.
-
-[Illustration: Japanese Model 4 (1919) 150mm Howitzer]
-
-
-[Sidebar (page 22): Sergeant Major Sir Jacob Charles Vouza
-
-[Illustration]
-
-Jacob Charles Vouza was born in 1900 at Tasimboko, Guadalcanal,
-British Solomon Islands Protectorate, and educated at the South Seas
-Evangelical Mission School there. In 1916 he joined the Solomon Islands
-Protectorate Armed Constabulary, from which he retired at the rank of
-sergeant major in 1941 after 25 years of service.
-
-After the Japanese invaded his home island in World War II, he returned
-to active duty with the British forces and volunteered to work with
-the Coastwatchers. Vouza’s experience as a scout had already been
-established when the 1st Marine Division landed on Guadalcanal. On 7
-August 1942 he rescued a downed naval pilot from the USS _Wasp_ who was
-shot down inside Japanese territory. He guided the pilot to friendly
-lines where Vouza met the Marines for the first time.
-
-Vouza then volunteered to scout behind enemy lines for the Marines.
-On 27 August he was captured by the Japanese while on a Marine Corps
-mission to locate suspected enemy lookout stations. Having found a
-small American flag in Vouza’s loincloth, the Japanese tied him to a
-tree and tried to force him to reveal information about Allied forces.
-Vouza was questioned for hours, but refused to talk. He was tortured
-and bayoneted about the arms, throat, shoulder, face, and stomach, and
-left to die.
-
-He managed to free himself after his captors departed, and made his way
-through the miles of jungle to American lines. There he gave valuable
-intelligence information to the Marines about an impending Japanese
-attack before accepting medical attention.
-
-After spending 12 days in the hospital, Vouza then returned to duty
-as the chief scout for the Marines. He accompanied Lieutenant Colonel
-Evans F. Carlson and the 2d Marine Raider Battalion when they made
-their 30-day raid behind enemy lines at Guadalcanal.
-
-Sergeant Major Vouza was highly decorated for his World War II service.
-The Silver Star was presented to him personally by Major General
-Alexander A. Vandegrift, commanding general of the 1st Marine Division,
-for refusing to give information under Japanese torture. He also was
-awarded the Legion of Merit for outstanding service with the 2d Raider
-Battalion during November and December 1942, and the British George
-Medal for gallant conduct and exceptional devotion to duty. He later
-received the Police Long Service Medal and, in 1957, was made a Member
-of the British Empire for long and faithful government service.
-
-After the war, Vouza continued to serve his fellow islanders. In 1949,
-he was appointed district headman, and president of the Guadalcanal
-Council, from 1952-1958. He served as a member of the British Solomon
-Islands Protectorate Advisory Council from 1950 to 1960.
-
-He made many friends during his long association with the U.S. Marine
-Corps and through the years was continually visited on Guadalcanal by
-Marines. During 1968, Vouza visited the United States, where he was
-the honored guest of the 1st Marine Division Association. In 1979,
-he was knighted by Britain’s Queen Elizabeth II. He died on 15 March
-1984.--_Ann A. Ferrante_
-]
-
-
-[Sidebar (page 23): M3A1 37mm Antitank Gun
-
-The M3 antitank gun, based on the successful German _Panzer Abwehr
-Kanone_ (PAK)-36, was developed by the U.S. Army in the late 1930s as
-a replacement for the French 37mm Puteaux gun, used in World War I but
-unable to destroy new tanks being produced.
-
-The M3 was adopted because of its accuracy, fire control, penetration,
-and mobility. Towed by its prime mover, the 4×4 quarter-ton truck,
-the gun would trail at 50 mph on roads. When traveling crosscountry,
-gullies, shell holes, mud holes, and slopes of 26 degrees were
-negotiated with ease. In 1941, the gun was redesignated the M3A1 when
-the muzzles were threaded to accept a muzzle brake that was rarely, if
-ever, used.
-
-At the time of its adoption, the M3 could destroy any tank then being
-produced in the world. However, by the time the United States entered
-the war, the M3 was outmatched by the tanks it would have met in
-Europe. The Japanese tanks were smaller and more vulnerable to the
-M3 throughout the war. In the Pacific, it was used against bunkers,
-pillboxes and, when loaded with canister, against banzai charges. It
-was employed throughout the war by Marine regimental weapons companies,
-but in reduced numbers as the fighting continued. It was replaced in
-the European Theater by the M1 57mm antitank gun.
-
-The 37mm antitank gun, manned by a crew of four who fired a 1.61-pound
-projectile with an effective range of 500 yards.--_Stephen L. Amos and
-Kenneth L. Smith-Christmas_
-
-[Illustration]
-]
-
-
-[Sidebar (page 29):
-
-    The President of the United States
-    takes pleasure in presenting
-    the Medal of Honor posthumously to
-    Douglas Albert Munro
-    Signalman First Class
-    United States Coast Guard
-    for service as set forth
-    in the following citation:
-
-[Illustration:
-
-    Painting by Bernard D’Andrea, Courtesy of U.S. Coast Guard
-    Historical Office
-]
-
-  For extraordinary heroism and conspicuous gallantry in action above
-  and beyond the call of duty as Officer in Charge of a group of
-  twenty-four Higgins boats engaged in the evacuation of a battalion
-  of Marines trapped by enemy Japanese forces at Point Cruz,
-  Guadalcanal, on September 27, 1942. After making preliminary plans
-  for the evacuation of nearly five hundred beleaguered Marines,
-  Munro, under constant strafing by enemy machine guns on the island
-  and at great risk of his life, daringly led five of his small craft
-  toward the shore. As he closed the beach, he signalled the others
-  to land and then in order to draw the enemy’s fire and protect the
-  heavily loaded boats, he valiantly placed his craft, with its two
-  small guns, as a shield between the beachhead and the Japanese.
-  When the perilous task of evacuation was nearly completed, Munro
-  was instantly killed by enemy fire, but his crew, two of whom
-  were wounded, carried on until the last boat had loaded and
-  cleared the beach. By his outstanding leadership, expert planning,
-  and dauntless devotion to duty, he and his courageous comrades
-  undoubtedly saved the lives of many who otherwise would have
-  perished. He gallantly gave up his life in defense of his country.
-  /s/ Franklin Roosevelt
-]
-
-
-
-
-_October and the Japanese Offensive_
-
-
-On 30 September, unexpectedly, a B-17 carrying Admiral Nimitz made an
-emergency landing at Henderson Field. The CinCPac made the most of the
-opportunity. He visited the front lines, saw Edson’s Ridge, and talked
-to a number of Marines. He reaffirmed to Vandegrift that his overriding
-mission was to hold the airfield. He promised all the support he could
-give and after awarding Navy Crosses to a number of Marines, including
-Vandegrift, left the next day visibly encouraged by what he had seen.
-
-[Illustration: _Visiting Guadalcanal on 30 September, Adm Chester W.
-Nimitz, CinCPac, took time to decorate LtCol Evans C. Carlson, CO, 2d
-Raider Battalion; MajGen Vandegrift, in rear; and, from left, BGen
-William H. Rupertus, ADC; Col Merritt A. Edson, CO, 5th Marines; LtCol
-Edwin A. Pollock, CO, 2d Battalion, 1st Marines; Maj John L. Smith, CO,
-VMF-223._
-
-    Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 50883
-]
-
-The next Marine move involved a punishing return to the Matanikau,
-this time with five infantry battalions and the Whaling group. Whaling
-commanded his men and the 3d Battalion, 2d Marines, in a thrust
-inland to clear the way for two battalions of the 7th Marines, the
-1st and 2d, to drive through and hook toward the coast, hitting the
-Japanese holding along the Matanikau. Edson’s 2d and 3d Battalions
-would attack across the river mouth. All the division’s artillery was
-positioned to fire in support.
-
-[Illustration:
-
-    Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 61534
-
-_A M1918 155mm howitzer is fired by artillery crewmen of the 11th
-Marines in support of ground forces attacking the enemy. Despite the
-lack of sound-flash equipment to locate hostile artillery, Col del
-Valle’s guns were able to quiet enemy fire._]
-
-On the 7th, Whaling’s force moved into the jungle about 2,000 yards
-upstream on the Matanikau, encountering Japanese troops that harassed
-his forward elements, but not in enough strength to stop the advance.
-He bypassed the enemy positions and dug in for the night. Behind him
-the 7th Marines followed suit, prepared to move through his lines,
-cross the river, and attack north toward the Japanese on the 8th. The
-5th Marines’ assault battalions moving toward the Matanikau on the
-7th ran into Japanese in strength about 400 yards from the river.
-Unwittingly, the Marines had run into strong advance elements of the
-Japanese _4th Regiment_, which had crossed the Matanikau in order
-to establish a base from which artillery could fire into the Marine
-perimeter. The fighting was intense and the 3d Battalion, 5th, could
-make little progress, although the 2d Battalion encountered slight
-opposition and won through to the river bank. It then turned north to
-hit the inland flank of the enemy troops. Vandegrift sent forward a
-company of raiders to reinforce the 5th, and it took a holding position
-on the right, towards the beach.
-
-Rain poured down on the 8th, all day long, virtually stopping all
-forward progress, but not halting the close-in fighting around the
-Japanese pocket. The enemy troops finally retreated, attempting to
-escape the gradually encircling Marines. They smashed into the raider’s
-position nearest to their escape route. A wild hand-to-hand battle
-ensued and a few Japanese broke through to reach and cross the river.
-The rest died fighting.
-
-[Illustration:
-
-    Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 50963
-
-_More than 200 Japanese soldiers alone were killed in a frenzied attack
-in the sandspit where the Tenaru River flows into Ironbottom Sound
-(Sealark Channel)._]
-
-On the 9th, Whaling’s force, flanked by the 2d and then the 1st
-Battalion, 7th Marines, crossed the Matanikau and then turned and
-followed ridge lines to the sea. Puller’s battalion discovered a
-number of Japanese in a ravine to his front, fired his mortars, and
-called in artillery, while his men used rifles and machine guns to pick
-off enemy troops trying to escape what proved to be a death trap. When
-his mortar ammunition began to run short, Puller moved on toward the
-beach, joining the rest of Whaling’s force, which had encountered no
-opposition. The Marines then recrossed the Mantanikau, joined Edson’s
-troops, and marched back to the perimeter, leaving a strong combat
-outpost at the Matanikau, now cleared of Japanese. General Vandegrift,
-apprised by intelligence sources that a major Japanese attack was
-coming from the west, decided to consolidate his positions, leaving no
-sizable Marine force more than a day’s march from the perimeter. The
-Marine advance on 7-9 October had thwarted Japanese plans for an early
-attack and cost the enemy more than 700 men. The Marines paid a price
-too, 65 dead and 125 wounded.
-
-There was another price that Guadalcanal was exacting from both sides.
-Disease was beginning to fell men in numbers that equalled the battle
-casualties. In addition to gastroenteritis, which greatly weakened
-those who suffered its crippling stomach cramps, there were all kinds
-of tropical fungus infections, collectively known as “jungle rot,”
-which produced uncomfortable rashes on men’s feet, armpits, elbows,
-and crotches, a product of seldom being dry. If it didn’t rain, sweat
-provided the moisture. On top of this came hundreds of cases of
-malaria. Atabrine tablets provided some relief, besides turning the
-skin yellow, but they were not effective enough to stop the spread of
-the mosquito-borne infection. Malaria attacks were so pervasive that
-nothing short of complete prostration, becoming a litter case, could
-earn a respite in the hospital. Naturally enough, all these diseases
-affected most strongly the men who had been on the island the longest,
-particularly those who experienced the early days of short rations.
-Vandegrift had already argued with his superiors that when his men
-eventually got relieved they should not be sent to another tropical
-island hospital, but rather to a place where there was a real change
-of atmosphere and climate. He asked that Auckland or Wellington, New
-Zealand, be considered.
-
-For the present, however, there was to be no relief for men starting
-their third month on Guadalcanal. The Japanese would not abandon their
-plan to seize back Guadalcanal and gave painful evidence of their
-intentions near mid-October. General Hyakutake himself landed on
-Guadalcanal on 7 October to oversee the coming offensive. Elements of
-Major General Masao Maruyama’s _Sendai Division_, already a factor in
-the fighting near the Matanikau, landed with him. More men were coming.
-And the Japanese, taking advantage of the fact that Cactus flyers had
-no night attack capability, planned to ensure that no planes at all
-would rise from Guadalcanal to meet them.
-
-[Illustration: _By October, malaria began to claim as many casualties
-as Japanese artillery, bombs, and naval gunfire. Shown here are the
-patients in the division hospital who are ministered to by physicians
-and corpsmen working under minimal conditions._]
-
-On 11 October, U.S. Navy surface ships took a hand in stopping
-the “Tokyo Express,” the nickname that had been given to Admiral
-Tanaka’s almost nightly reinforcement forays. A covering force of
-five cruisers and five destroyers, located near Rennell Island and
-commanded by Rear Admiral Norman Scott, got word that many ships were
-approaching Guadalcanal. Scott’s mission was to protect an approaching
-reinforcement convoy and he steamed toward Cactus at flank speed
-eager to engage. He encountered more ships than he had expected, a
-bombardment group of three heavy cruisers and two destroyers, as
-well as six destroyers escorting two seaplane carrier transports.
-Scott maneuvered between Savo Island and Cape Esperance, Guadalcanal’s
-western tip, and ran head-on into the bombardment group.
-
-Alerted by a scout plane from his flagship, _San Francisco_ (CA 38),
-spottings later confirmed by radar contacts on the _Helena_ (CL 50),
-the Americans opened fire before the Japanese, who had no radar,
-knew of their presence. One enemy destroyer sank immediately, two
-cruisers were badly damaged, one, the _Furutaka_, later foundered,
-and the remaining cruiser and destroyer turned away from the inferno
-of American fire. Scott’s own force was punished by enemy return fire
-which damaged two cruisers and two destroyers, one of which, the
-_Duncan_ (DD 485), sank the following day. On the 12th too, Cactus
-flyers spotted two of the reinforcement destroyer escorts retiring
-and sank them both. The Battle of Cape Esperance could be counted an
-American naval victory, one sorely needed at the time.
-
-[Illustration: _Maj Harold W. Bauer, VMF-212 commander, here a captain,
-was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor after being lost during a
-scramble with Japanese aircraft over Guadalcanal._
-
-    Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 410772
-]
-
-Its way cleared by Scott’s encounter with the Japanese, a really
-welcome reinforcement convoy arrived at the island on 13 October when
-the 164th Infantry of the Americal Division arrived. The soldiers,
-members of a National Guard outfit originally from North Dakota, were
-equipped with Garand M-1 rifles, a weapon of which most overseas
-Marines had only heard. In rate of fire, the semiautomatic Garand could
-easily outperform the single-shot, bolt-action Springfields the Marines
-carried and the bolt-action rifles the Japanese carried, but most 1st
-Division Marines of necessity touted the Springfield as inherently more
-accurate and a better weapon. This did not prevent some light-fingered
-Marines from acquiring Garands when the occasion presented itself. And
-such an occasion did present itself while the soldiers were landing and
-their supplies were being moved to dumps. Several flights of Japanese
-bombers arrived over Henderson Field, relatively unscathed by the
-defending fighters, and began dropping their bombs. The soldiers headed
-for cover and alert Marines, inured to the bombing, used the interval
-to “liberate” interesting cartons and crates. The news that the Army
-had arrived spread across the island like wildfire, for it meant to all
-Marines that they eventually would be relieved. There was hope.
-
-[Illustration:
-
-    Department of Defense (USMC) Photos 304183 and 302980
-
-_Two other Marine aviators awarded the Medal of Honor for heroism and
-intrepidity in the air were Capt Jefferson J. DeBlanc, left, and Maj
-Robert E. Galer, right._]
-
-As if the bombing was not enough grief, the Japanese opened on the
-airfield with their 150mm howitzers also. Altogether the men of the
-164th got a rude welcome to Guadalcanal. And on that night, 13-14
-October, they shared a terrifying experience with the Marines that no
-one would ever forget.
-
-Determined to knock out Henderson Field and protect their soldiers
-landing in strength west of Koli Point, the enemy commanders sent the
-battleships _Kongo_ and _Haruna_ into Ironbottom Sound to bombard
-the Marine positions. The usual Japanese flare planes heralded
-the bombardment, 80 minutes of sheer hell which had 14-inch shells
-exploding with such effect that the accompanying cruiser fire was
-scarcely noticed. No one was safe; no place was safe. No dugout had
-been built to withstand 14-inch shells. One witness, a seasoned veteran
-demonstrably cool under enemy fire, opined that there was nothing worse
-in war than helplessly being on the receiving end of naval gunfire.
-He remembered “huge trees being cut apart and flying about like
-toothpicks.” And he was on the frontlines, not the prime enemy target.
-The airfield and its environs were a shambles when dawn broke. The
-naval shelling, together with the night’s artillery fire and bombing,
-had left Cactus Air Force’s commander, General Geiger, with a handful
-of aircraft still flyable, an airfield thickly cratered by shells and
-bombs, and a death toll of 41. Still, from Henderson or Fighter One,
-which now became the main airstrip, the Cactus Flyers had to attack,
-for the morning also revealed a shore and sea full of inviting targets.
-
-The expected enemy convoy had gotten through and Japanese transports
-and landing craft were everywhere near Tassafaronga. At sea the
-escorting cruisers and destroyers provided a formidable antiaircraft
-screen. Every American plane that could fly did. General Geiger’s aide,
-Major Jack Cram, took off in the general’s PBY, hastily rigged to carry
-two torpedoes, and put one of them into the side of an enemy transport
-as it was unloading. He landed the lumbering flying boat with enemy
-aircraft hot on his tail. A new squadron of F4Fs, VMF-212, commanded
-by Major Harold W. Bauer, flew in during the day’s action, landed,
-refueled, and took off to join the fighting. An hour later, Bauer
-landed again, this time with four enemy bombers to his credit. Bauer,
-who added to his score of Japanese aircraft kills in later air battles,
-was subsequently lost in action. He was awarded the Medal of Honor, as
-were four other Marine pilots of the early Cactus Air Force: Captain
-Jefferson J. DeBlanc (VMF-112); Captain Joseph J. Foss (VMF-121); Major
-Robert E. Galer (VMF-224); and Major John L. Smith (VMF-223).
-
-The Japanese had landed more than enough troops to destroy the Marine
-beachhead and seize the airfield. At least General Hyakutake thought
-so, and he heartily approved General Maruyama’s plan to move most of
-the _Sendai Division_ through the jungle, out of sight and out of
-contact with the Marines, to strike from the south in the vicinity
-of Edson’s Ridge. Roughly 7,000 men, each carrying a mortar or
-artillery shell, started the trek along the Maruyama Trail which had
-been partially hacked out of the jungle well inland from the Marine
-positions. Maruyama, who had approved the trail’s name to indicate his
-confidence, intended to support this attack with heavy mortars and
-infantry guns (70mm pack howitzers). The men who had to lug, push, and
-drag these supporting arms over the miles of broken ground, across
-two major streams, the Mantanikau and the Lunga, and through heavy
-underbrush, might have had another name for their commander’s path to
-supposed glory.
-
-[Illustration: _A Marine examines a Japanese 70mm howitzer captured at
-the Battle of the Tenaru. Gen Maruyama’s troops “had to lug, push, and
-drag these supporting arms over the miles of broken ground, across two
-major streams and through heavy underbrush” to get them to the target
-area--but they never did. The trail behind them was littered with the
-supplies they carried._
-
-    Photo courtesy of Col James A. Donovan, Jr.
-]
-
-General Vandegrift knew the Japanese were going to attack. Patrols and
-reconnaissance flights had clearly indicated the push would be from the
-west, where the enemy reinforcements had landed. The American commander
-changed his dispositions accordingly. There were Japanese troops east
-of the perimeter, too, but not in any significant strength. The new
-infantry regiment, the 164th, reinforced by Marine special weapons
-units, was put into the line to hold the eastern flank along 6,600
-yards, curving inland to join up with 7th Marines near Edson’s Ridge.
-The 7th held 2,500 yards from the ridge to the Lunga. From the Lunga,
-the 1st Marines had a 3,500-yard sector of jungle running west to the
-point where the line curved back to the beach again in the 5th Marines’
-sector. Since the attack was expected from the west, the 3d Battalions
-of each of the 1st and 7th Marines held a strong outpost position
-forward of the 5th Marines’ lines along the east bank of the Matanikau.
-
-In the lull before the attack, if a time of patrol clashes, Japanese
-cruiser-destroyer bombardments, bomber attacks, and artillery
-harassment could properly be called a lull, Vandegrift was visited
-by the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Lieutenant General Thomas
-Holcomb. The Commandant flew in on 21 October to see for himself
-how his Marines were faring. It also proved to be an occasion for
-both senior Marines to meet the new ComSoPac, Vice Admiral William F.
-“Bull” Halsey. Admiral Nimitz had announced Halsey’s appointment on 18
-October and the news was welcome in Navy and Marine ranks throughout
-the Pacific. Halsey’s deserved reputation for elan and aggressiveness
-promised renewed attention to the situation on Guadalcanal. On the
-22d, Holcomb and Vandegrift flew to Noumea to meet with Halsey and to
-receive and give a round of briefings on the Allied situation. After
-Vandegrift had described his position, he argued strongly against the
-diversion of reinforcements intended for Cactus to any other South
-Pacific venue, a sometime factor of Admiral Turner’s strategic vision.
-He insisted that he needed all of the Americal Division and another 2d
-Marine Division regiment to beef up his forces, and that more than half
-of his veterans were worn out by three months’ fighting and the ravages
-of jungle-incurred diseases. Admiral Halsey told the Marine general:
-“You go back there, Vandegrift. I promise to get you everything I have.”
-
-[Illustration:
-
-    Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 13628
-
-_During a lull in the fight, a Marine machine gunner takes a break for
-coffee, with his sub-machine gun on his knee and his 30-caliber light
-machine gun in position._]
-
-When Vandegrift returned to Guadalcanal, Holcomb moved on to Pearl
-Harbor to meet with Nimitz, carrying Halsey’s recommendation that, in
-the future, landing force commanders once established ashore, would
-have equal command status with Navy amphibious force commanders. At
-Pearl, Nimitz approved Halsey’s recommendation--which Holcomb had
-drafted--and in Washington so did King. In effect, then, the command
-status of all future Pacific amphibious operations was determined by
-the events of Guadalcanal. Another piece of news Vandegrift received
-from Holcomb also boded well for the future of the Marine Corps.
-Holcomb indicated that if President Roosevelt did not reappoint him,
-unlikely in view of his age and two terms in office, he would recommend
-that Vandegrift be appointed the next Commandant.
-
-[Illustration:
-
-    Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 513191
-
-_On the occasion of the visit of the Commandant, MajGen Thomas Holcomb,
-some of Operation Watchtower’s major staff and command officers took
-time out from the fighting to pose with him. From left, front row:
-Col William J. Whaling (Whaling Group); Col Amor LeRoy Sims (CO, 7th
-Marines); Col Gerald C. Thomas (Division Chief of Staff); Col Pedro
-A. del Valle (CO, 11th Marines); Col William E. Riley (member of
-Gen Holcomb’s party); MajGen Roy S. Geiger (CG, 1st Marine Aircraft
-Wing); Gen Holcomb; MajGen Ralph J. Mitchell (Director of Aviation,
-Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps); BGen Bennet Puryear, Jr. (Assistant
-Quartermaster of the Marine Corps); Col Clifton B. Cates (CO, 1st
-Marines). Second row (between Whaling and Sims): LtCol Raymond P.
-Coffman (Division Supply Officer); Maj James C. Murray (Division
-Personnel Officer); (behind Gen Holcomb) LtCol Merrill B. Twining
-(Division Operations Officer)._]
-
-This news of future events had little chance of diverting Vandegrift’s
-attention when he flew back to Guadalcanal, for the Japanese were in
-the midst of their planned offensive. On the 20th, an enemy patrol
-accompanied by two tanks tried to find a way through the line held
-by Lieutenant Colonel William N. McKelvy, Jr.’s 3d Battalion, 1st
-Marines. A sharpshooting 37mm gun crew knocked out one tank and the
-enemy force fell back, meanwhile shelling the Marine positions with
-artillery. Near sunset the next day, the Japanese tried again, this
-time with more artillery fire and more tanks in the fore, but again
-a 37mm gun knocked out a lead tank and discouraged the attack. On 22
-October, the enemy paused, waiting for Maruyama’s force to get into
-position inland. On the 23d, planned as the day of the _Sendai_’s main
-attack, the Japanese dropped a heavy rain of artillery and mortar fire
-on McKelvy’s positions near the Matanikau River mouth. Near dusk, nine
-18-ton medium tanks clanked out of the trees onto the river’s sandbar
-and just as quickly eight of them were riddled by the 37s. One tank got
-across the river, a Marine blasted a track off with a grenade, and
-a 75mm halftrack finished it off in the ocean’s surf. The following
-enemy infantry was smothered by Marine artillery fire as all battalions
-of the augmented 11th Marines rained shells on the massed attackers.
-Hundreds of Japanese were casualties and three more tanks were
-destroyed. Later, an inland thrust further upstream was easily beaten
-back. The abortive coastal attack did almost nothing to aid Maruyama’s
-inland offensive, but did cause Vandegrift to shift one battalion, the
-2d Battalion, 7th Marines, out of the lines to the east and into the
-4,000-yard gap between the Matanikau position and the perimeter. This
-move proved providential since one of Maruyama’s planned attacks was
-headed right for this area.
-
-Although patrols had encountered no Japanese east or south of the
-jungled perimeter up to the 24th, the Matanikau attempts had alerted
-everyone. When General Maruyama finally was satisfied that his men had
-struggled through to appropriate assault positions, after delaying his
-day of attack three times, he was ready on 24 October. The Marines were
-waiting.
-
-An observer from the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, spotted an enemy
-officer surveying Edson’s Ridge on the 24th, and scout-snipers reported
-smoke from numerous rice fires rising from a valley about two miles
-south of Lieutenant Colonel Puller’s positions. Six battalions of the
-_Sendai Division_ were poised to attack, and near midnight the first
-elements of the enemy hit and bypassed a platoon-sized outpost forward
-of Puller’s barbed-wire entanglements. Warned by the outpost, Puller’s
-men waited, straining to see through a dark night and a driving rain.
-Suddenly, the Japanese charged out of the jungle, attacking in Puller’s
-area near the ridge and the flat ground to the east. The Marines
-replied with everything they had, calling in artillery, firing
-mortars, relying heavily on crossing fields of machine gun fire to cut
-down the enemy infantrymen. Thankfully, the enemy’s artillery, mortars,
-and other supporting arms were scattered back along the Maruyama Trail;
-they had proved too much of a burden for the infantrymen to carry
-forward.
-
-[Illustration:
-
-    Marine Corps Personal Papers Collection
-
-_Five Japanese tanks sit dead in the water, destroyed by Marine 37mm
-gunfire during the abortive attempt to force the Marine perimeter
-near the mouth of the Matanikau River in late October. Many Japanese
-soldiers lost their lives also._]
-
-A wedge was driven into the Marine lines, but eventually straightened
-out with repeated counterattacks. Puller soon realized his battalion
-was being hit by a strong Japanese force capable of repeated attacks.
-He called for reinforcements and the Army’s 3d Battalion, 164th
-Infantry (Lieutenant Colonel Robert K. Hall), was ordered forward, its
-men sliding and slipping in the rain as they trudged a mile south along
-Edson’s Ridge. Puller met Hall at the head of his column, and the two
-officers walked down the length of the Marine lines, peeling off an
-Army squad at a time to feed into the lines. When the Japanese attacked
-again as they did all night long, the soldiers and Marines fought back
-together. By 0330, the Army battalion was completely integrated into
-the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines’ lines and the enemy attacks were
-getting weaker and weaker. The American return fire--including flanking
-fire from machine guns and Weapons Company, 7th Marines’ 37mm guns
-remaining in the positions held by 2d Battalion, 164th Infantry, on
-Puller’s left--was just too much to take. Near dawn, Maruyama pulled
-his men back to regroup and prepare to attack again.
-
-With daylight, Puller and Hall reordered the lines, putting the 3d
-Battalion, 164th, into its own positions on Puller’s left, tying in
-with the rest of the Army regiment. The driving rains had turned
-Fighter One into a quagmire, effectively grounding Cactus flyers.
-Japanese planes used the “free ride” to bomb Marine positions. Their
-artillery fired incessantly and a pair of Japanese destroyers added
-their gunfire to the bombardment until they got too close to the shore
-and the 3d Defense Battalion’s 5-inch guns drove them off. As the sun
-bore down, the runways dried and afternoon enemy attacks were met by
-Cactus fighters, who downed 22 Japanese planes with a loss of three of
-their own.
-
-As night came on again, Maruyama tried more of the same, with the same
-result. The Army-Marine lines held and the Japanese were cut down in
-droves by rifle, machine gun, mortar, 37mm, and artillery fire. To the
-west, an enemy battalion mounted three determined attacks against the
-positions held by Lieutenant Colonel Herman H. Hanneken’s 2d Battalion,
-7th Marines, thinly tied in with Puller’s battalion on the left and the
-3d Battalion, 7th Marines, on the right. The enemy finally penetrated
-the positions held by Company F, but a counterattack led by Major Odell
-M. Conoley, the battalion’s executive officer, drove off the Japanese.
-Again at daylight the American positions were secure and the enemy had
-retreated. They would not come back; the grand Japanese offensive of
-the _Sendai Division_ was over.
-
-About 3,500 enemy troops had died during the attacks. General
-Maruyama’s proud boast that he “would exterminate the enemy around
-the airfield in one blow” proved an empty one. What was left of his
-force now straggled back over the Maruyama Trail, losing, as had the
-Kawaguchi force in the same situation, most of its seriously wounded
-men. The Americans, Marines and soldiers together, probably lost 300
-men killed and wounded; existing records are sketchy and incomplete.
-One result of the battle, however, was a warm welcome to the 164th
-Infantry from the 1st Marine Division. Vandegrift particularly
-commended Lieutenant Colonel Hall’s battalion, stating the “division
-was proud to have serving with it another unit which had stood the test
-of battle.” And Colonel Cates sent a message to the 164th’s Colonel
-Bryant Moore saying that the 1st Marines “were proud to serve with a
-unit such as yours.”
-
-Amidst all the heroics of the two nights’ fighting there were many men
-who were singled out for recognition and an equally large number who
-performed great deeds that were never recognized. Two men stood out
-above all others, and on succeeding nights, Sergeant John Basilone of
-the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, and Platoon Sergeant Mitchell Paige of
-the 2d Battalion, both machine gun section heads, were recognized as
-having performed “above and beyond the call of duty” in the inspiring
-words of their Medal of Honor citations.
-
-
-[Sidebar (page 37): Reising Gun
-
-The Reising gun was designed and developed by noted gun inventor Eugene
-Reising. It was patented in 1940 and manufactured by the old gun-making
-firm of Harrington and Richardson of Worcester, Massachusetts. It is
-said that it was made on existing machine tools, some dating back
-to the Civil War, and of ordinary steel rather than ordnance steel.
-With new machine tools and ordnance steel scarce and needed for more
-demanding weapons, the Reising met an immediate requirement for many
-sub-machine guns at a time when production of Thompson M1928 and M1
-sub-machine guns hadn’t caught up with demand and the stamped-out M3
-“grease gun” had not yet been invented. It was a wartime expedient.
-
-[Illustration:
-
-    Captain Donald L. Dickson, USMCR
-]
-
-The Reising was made in two different models, the 50 and the 55. The
-Model 50 had a full wooden stock and a Cutts compensator attached
-to the muzzle. The compensator, a device which reduced the upward
-muzzle climb from recoil, was invented by Richard M. Cutts, Sr., and
-his son, Richard M. Cutts, Jr., both of whom became Marine brigadier
-generals. The other version was dubbed the Model 55. It had a folding
-metal-wire shoulder stock which swivelled on the wooden pistol grip.
-It also had a shorter barrel and no compensator. It was intended for
-use by parachutists, tank crews, and others needing a compact weapon.
-Both versions of the Reising fired .45-caliber ammunition, the same
-cartridge as the Colt automatic pistol and the Thompson.
-
-In all, there were approximately 100,000 Reising sub-machine guns
-produced between 1940 and 1942. Small numbers of the weapons were
-acquired by both Great Britain and the Soviet Union. However, most
-were used by the U.S. Marine Corps in the Solomon Islands campaign.
-The Model 55 was issued to both Marine parachute battalions and Marine
-raiders, seeing service first on Guadalcanal. After its dubious debut
-in combat it was withdrawn from frontline service in 1943 due to
-several flaws in design and manufacture.
-
-The Reising’s major shortcoming was its propensity for jamming. This
-was due to both a design problem in the magazine lips and the fact
-that magazines were made of a soft sheet steel. The weapon’s safety
-mechanism didn’t always work and if the butt was slammed down on the
-deck, the hammer would set back against the mainspring and then fly
-forward, firing a chambered cartridge. The design allowed the entry of
-dirt into the mechanism and close tolerances caused it to jam. Finally,
-the steel used allowed excessive rust to form in the tropical humidity
-of the Solomons. Nevertheless, at six pounds, the Reising was handier
-than the 10-pound Thompson, more accurate, pleasanter to shoot, and
-reliable under other than combat conditions, but one always had to
-keep the muzzle pointed in a safe direction. The Model 50 was also
-issued to Marines for guard duty at posts and stations in the United
-States.--_John G. Griffiths_
-]
-
-
-
-
-_November and the Continuing Buildup_
-
-
-While the soldiers and Marines were battling the Japanese ashore,
-a patrol plane sighted a large Japanese fleet near the Santa Cruz
-Islands to the east of the Solomons. The enemy force was formidable, 4
-carriers and 4 battleships, 8 cruisers and 28 destroyers, all poised
-for a victorious attack when Maruyama’s capture of Henderson Field
-was signalled. Admiral Halsey’s reaction to the inviting targets was
-characteristic, he signaled Rear Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid, with the
-_Hornet_ and _Enterprise_ carrier groups located north of the New
-Hebrides: “Attack Repeat Attack.”
-
-[Illustration: _Heavy tropical downpours at Guadalcanal all but flood
-out a Marine camp near Henderson Field, and the field as well. Marines’
-damp clothing and bedding contributed to the heavy incidence of
-tormenting skin infections and fungal disorders._
-
-    Department of Defense (USMC) Photo
-]
-
-Early on 26 October, American SBDs located the Japanese carriers
-at about the same time Japanese scout planes spotted the American
-carriers. The Japanese _Zuiho_’s flight deck was holed by the scout
-bombers, cancelling flight operations, but the other three enemy
-carriers launched strikes. The two air armadas tangled as each strove
-to reach the other’s carriers. The _Hornet_ was hit repeatedly by bombs
-and torpedoes; two Japanese pilots also crashed their planes on board.
-The damage to the ship was so extensive, the _Hornet_ was abandoned
-and sunk. The _Enterprise_, the battleship _South Dakota_, the light
-cruiser _San Juan_ (CL 54), and the destroyer _Smith_ (DD 378) were
-also hit; the destroyer _Porter_ (DD 356) was sunk. On the Japanese
-side, no ships were sunk, but three carriers and two destroyers were
-damaged. One hundred Japanese planes were lost; 74 U.S. planes went
-down. Taken together, the results of the Battle of Santa Cruz were
-a standoff. The Japanese naval leaders might have continued their
-attacks, but instead, disheartened by the defeat of their ground
-forces on Guadalcanal, withdrew to attack another day.
-
-[Illustration:
-
-    Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 74093
-
-_Marine engineers repair a flood-damaged Lunga River bridge washed out
-during a period when 8 inches of rain fell in 24 hours and the river
-rose 7 feet above normal._]
-
-The departure of the enemy naval force marked a period in which
-substantial reinforcements reached the island. The headquarters of the
-2d Marines had finally found transport space to come up from Espiritu
-Santo and on 29 and 30 October, Colonel Arthur moved his regiment
-from Tulagi to Guadalcanal, exchanging his 1st and 2d Battalions for
-the well-blooded 3d, which took up the Tulagi duties. The 2d Marines’
-battalions at Tulagi had performed the very necessary task of scouting
-and securing all the small islands of the Florida group while they had
-camped, frustrated, watching the battles across Sealark Channel. The
-men now would no longer be spectators at the big show.
-
-On 2 November, planes from VMSB-132 and VMF-211 flew into the Cactus
-fields from New Caledonia. MAG-11 squadrons moved forward from New
-Caledonia to Espiritu Santo to be closer to the battle scene; the
-flight echelons now could operate forward to Guadalcanal and with
-relative ease. On the ground side, two batteries of 155mm guns, one
-Army and one Marine, landed on 2 November, providing Vandegrift with
-his first artillery units capable of matching the enemy’s long-range
-150mm guns. On the 4th and 5th, the 8th Marines (Colonel Richard H.
-Jeschke) arrived from American Samoa. The full-strength regiment,
-reinforced by the 75mm howitzers of the 1st Battalion, 10th Marines,
-added another 4,000 men to the defending forces. All the fresh troops
-reflected a renewed emphasis at all levels of command on making sure
-Guadalcanal would be held. The reinforcement-replacement pipeline was
-being filled. In the offing as part of the Guadalcanal defending force
-were the rest of the Americal Division, the remainder of the 2d Marine
-Division, and the Army’s 25th Infantry Division, then in Hawaii. More
-planes of every type and from Allied as well as American sources were
-slated to reinforce and replace the battered and battle-weary Cactus
-veterans.
-
-The impetus for the heightened pace of reinforcement had been provided
-by President Roosevelt. Cutting through the myriad demands for American
-forces worldwide, he had told each of the Joint Chiefs on 24 October
-that Guadalcanal must be reinforced, and without delay.
-
-On the island, the pace of operations did not slacken after the
-Maruyama offensive was beaten back. General Vandegrift wanted to clear
-the area immediately west of the Matanikau of all Japanese troops,
-forestalling, if he could, another buildup of attacking forces. Admiral
-Tanaka’s Tokyo Express was still operating and despite punishing
-attacks by Cactus aircraft and new and deadly opponents, American motor
-torpedo boats, now based at Tulagi.
-
-On 1 November, the 5th Marines, backed up by the newly arrived
-2d Marines, attacked across bridges engineers had laid over the
-Matanikau during the previous night. Inland, Colonel Whaling led
-his scout-snipers and the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, in a screening
-movement to protect the flank of the main attack. Opposition was fierce
-in the shore area where the 1st Battalion, 5th, drove forward toward
-Point Cruz, but inland the 2d Battalion and Whaling’s group encountered
-slight opposition. By nightfall, when the Marines dug in, it was clear
-that the only sizable enemy force was in the Point Cruz area. In the
-days bitter fighting, Corporal Anthony Casamento, a badly wounded
-machine gun squad leader in Edson’s 1st Battalion, had so distinguished
-himself that he was recommended for a Navy Cross; many years later, in
-August 1980, President Jimmy Carter approved the award of the Medal of
-Honor in its stead.
-
-[Illustration:
-
-    Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 56749
-
-_2dLt Mitchell Paige, third from left, and PltSgt John Basilone,
-extreme right, received the Medal of Honor at a parade at Camp
-Balcombe, Australia, on 21 May 1943. MajGen Vandegrift, left, received
-his medal in a White House ceremony the previous 5 February, while Col
-Merritt A. Edson was decorated 31 December 1943. Note the 1st Marine
-Division patches on the right shoulders of each participant._]
-
-On the 2d, the attack continued with the reserve 3d Battalion moving
-into the fight and all three 5th Marines units moving to surround
-the enemy defenders. On 3 November, the Japanese pocket just west
-of the base at Point Cruz was eliminated; well over 300 enemy had
-been killed. Elsewhere, the attacking Marines had encountered spotty
-resistance and advanced slowly across difficult terrain to a point
-about 1,000 yards beyond the 5th Marines’ action. There, just as the
-offensive’s objectives seemed well in hand, the advance was halted.
-Again, the intelligence that a massive enemy reinforcement attempt was
-pending forced Vandegrift to pull back most of his men to safeguard
-the all-important airfield perimeter. This time, however, he left a
-regiment to outpost the ground that had been gained, Colonel Arthur’s
-2d Marines, reinforced by the Army’s 1st Battalion, 164th Infantry.
-
-Emphasizing the need for caution in Vandegrift’s mind was the fact that
-the Japanese were again discovered in strength east of the perimeter.
-On 3 November, Lieutenant Colonel Hanneken’s 2d Battalion, 7th Marines,
-on a reconnaissance in force towards Koli Point, could see the
-Japanese ships clustered near Tetere, eight miles from the perimeter.
-His Marines encountered strong Japanese resistance from obviously
-fresh troops and he began to pull back. A regiment of the enemy’s
-_38th Division_ had landed, as Hyakutake experimented with a Japanese
-Navy-promoted scheme of attacking the perimeter from both flanks.
-
-[Illustration:
-
-    Marine Corps Historical Photo Collection
-
-_In a White House ceremony, former Cpl Anthony Casamento, a machine
-gun squad leader in the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, was decorated by
-President Jimmy Carter on 22 August 1980, 38 years after the battle for
-Guadalcanal. Looking on are Casarnento’s wife and daughters and Gen
-Robert H. Barrow, Marine Commandant._]
-
-[Illustration: _Sgt Clyde Thomason, who was killed in action
-participating in the Makin Island raid with the 2d Raider Battalion,
-was the first enlisted Marine in World War II to be awarded the Medal
-of Honor._
-
-    Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 310616
-]
-
-As Hanneken’s battalion executed a fighting withdrawal along the beach,
-it began to receive fire from the jungle inland, too. A rescue force
-was soon put together under General Rupertus: two tank companies,
-the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, and the 2d and 3d Battalions of the
-164th. The Japanese troops, members of the _38th Division_ regiment and
-remnants of Kawaguchi’s brigade, fought doggedly to hold their ground
-as the Marines drove forward along the coast and the soldiers attempted
-to outflank the enemy in the jungle. The running battle continued for
-days, supported by Cactus air, naval gunfire, and the newly landed
-155mm guns.
-
-The enemy commander received new orders as he was struggling to hold
-off the Americans. He was to break off the action, move inland, and
-march to rejoin the main Japanese forces west of the perimeter, a tall
-order to fulfill. The two-pronged attack scheme had been abandoned.
-The Japanese managed the first part; on the 11th the enemy force found
-a gap in the 164th’s line and broke through along a meandering jungle
-stream. Behind they left 450 dead over the course of a seven-day
-battle; the Marines and soldiers had lost 40 dead and 120 wounded.
-
-Essentially, the Japanese who broke out of the encircling Americans
-escaped from the frying pan only to fall into the fire. Admiral
-Turner finally had been able to effect one of his several schemes for
-alternative landings and beachheads, all of which General Vandegrift
-vehemently opposed. At Aola Bay, 40 miles east of the main perimeter,
-the Navy put an airfield construction and defense force ashore on 4
-November. Then, while the Japanese were still battling the Marines near
-Tetere, Vandegrift was able to persuade Turner to detach part of this
-landing force, the 2d Raider Battalion, to sweep west, to discover and
-destroy any enemy forces it encountered.
-
-Lieutenant Colonel Evans F. Carlson’s raider battalion already had seen
-action before it reached Guadalcanal. Two companies had reinforced the
-defenders of Midway Island when the Japanese attacked there in June.
-The rest of the battalion had landed from submarines on Makin Island
-in the Gilberts on 17-18 August, destroying the garrison there. For his
-part in the fighting on Makin, Sergeant Clyde Thomason had been awarded
-a Medal of Honor posthumously, the first Marine enlisted man to receive
-his country’s highest award in World War II.
-
-In its march from Aola Bay, the 2d Raider Battalion encountered the
-Japanese who were attempting to retreat to the west. On 12 November,
-the raiders beat off attacks by two enemy companies and then
-relentlessly pursued the Japanese, fighting a series of small actions
-over the next five days before they contacted the main Japanese body.
-From 17 November to 4 December, when the raiders finally came down out
-of the jungled ridges into the perimeter, Carlson’s men harried the
-retreating enemy. They killed nearly 500 Japanese. Their own losses
-were 16 killed and 18 wounded.
-
-The Aola Bay venture, which had provided the 2d Raider Battalion a
-starting point for its month-long jungle campaign, proved a bust. The
-site chosen for a new airfield was unsuitable, too wet and unstable,
-and the whole force moved to Koli Point in early December, where
-another airfield eventually was constructed.
-
-The buildup on Guadalcanal continued, by both sides. On 11 November,
-guarded by a cruiser-destroyer covering force, a convoy ran in carrying
-the 182d Infantry, another regiment of the Americal Division. The ships
-were pounded by enemy bombers and three transports were hit, but the
-men landed. General Vandegrift needed the new men badly. His veterans
-were truly ready for replacement; more than a thousand new cases of
-malaria and related diseases were reported each week. The Japanese who
-had been on the island any length of time were no better off; they
-were, in fact, in worse shape. Medical supplies and rations were in
-short supply. The whole thrust of the Japanese reinforcement effort
-continued to be to get troops and combat equipment ashore. The idea
-prevailed in Tokyo, despite all evidence to the contrary, that one
-overwhelming coordinated assault would crush the American resistance.
-The enemy drive to take Port Moresby on New Guinea was put on hold to
-concentrate all efforts on driving the Americans off of Guadalcanal.
-
-[Illustration:
-
-    Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 51728
-
-_Native guides lead 2d Raider Battalion Marines on a
-combat/reconnaissance patrol behind Japanese lines. The patrol lasted
-for less than a month, during which the Marines covered 150 miles and
-fought more than a dozen actions._]
-
-On 12 November, a multifaceted Japanese naval force converged on
-Guadalcanal to cover the landing of the main body of the _38th
-Division_. Rear Admiral Daniel J. Callaghan’s cruisers and destroyers,
-the close-in protection for the 182d’s transports, moved to stop
-the enemy. Coastwatcher and scout plane sightings and radio traffic
-intercepts had identified two battleships, two carriers, four cruisers,
-and a host of destroyers all headed toward Guadalcanal. A bombardment
-group led by the battleships _Hiei_ and _Kirishima_, with the light
-cruiser _Nagura_, and 15 destroyers spearheaded the attack. Shortly
-after midnight, near Savo Island, Callaghan’s cruisers picked up the
-Japanese on radar and continued to close. The battle was joined at
-such short range that each side fired at times on their own ships.
-Callaghan’s flagship, the _San Francisco_, was hit 15 times, Callaghan
-was killed, and the ship had to limp away. The cruiser _Atlanta_ (CL
-104) was also hit and set afire. Rear Admiral Norman Scott, who was
-on board, was killed. Despite the hammering by Japanese fire, the
-Americans held and continued fighting. The battleship _Hiei_, hit
-by more than 80 shells, retired and with it went the rest of the
-bombardment force. Three destroyers were sunk and four others damaged.
-
-[Illustration:
-
-    Department of Defense (Navy) Photos 80-G-20824 and 80-G-21099
-
-_In the great naval Battle of Guadalcanal, 12-15 November, RAdm Daniel
-J. Callaghan was killed when his flagship, the heavy cruiser_ San
-Francisco _(CA 38) took 15 major hits and was forced to limp away in
-the dark from the scene of action._]
-
-The Americans had accomplished their purpose; they had forced the
-Japanese to turn back. The cost was high. Two antiaircraft cruisers,
-the _Atlanta_ and the _Juneau_ (CL 52), were sunk; four destroyers, the
-_Barton_ (DD 599), _Cushing_ (DD 376), _Monssen_ (DD 436), and _Laffey_
-(DD 459), also went to the bottom. In addition to the _San Francisco_,
-the heavy cruiser _Portland_ (CA 33) and the destroyers _Sterret_ (DD
-407) and _Aaron Ward_ (DD 483) were damaged. Only one destroyer of the
-13 American ships engaged, the _Fletcher_ (DD 445), was unscathed when
-the survivors retired to the New Hebrides.
-
-With daylight came the Cactus bombers and fighters; they found the
-crippled _Hiei_ and pounded it mercilessly. On the 14th the Japanese
-were forced to scuttle it. Admiral Halsey ordered his only surviving
-carrier, the _Enterprise_, out of the Guadalcanal area to get it out of
-reach of Japanese aircraft and sent his battleships _Washington_ (BB
-56) and _South Dakota_ (BB 55) with four escorting destroyers north
-to meet the Japanese. Some of the _Enterprise_’s planes flew in to
-Henderson Field to help even the odds.
-
-On 14 November Cactus and _Enterprise_ flyers found a Japanese
-cruiser-destroyer force that had pounded the island on the night of 13
-November. They damaged four cruisers and a destroyer. After refueling
-and rearming they went after the approaching Japanese troop convoy.
-They hit several transports in one attack and sank one when they came
-back again. Army B-17s up from Espiritu Santo scored one hit and
-several near misses, bombing from 17,000 feet.
-
-Moving in a continuous pattern of attack, return, refuel, rearm, and
-attack again, the planes from Guadalcanal hit nine transports, sinking
-seven. Many of the 5,000 troops on the stricken ships were rescued
-by Tanaka’s destroyers, which were firing furiously and laying smoke
-screens in an attempt to protect the transports. The admiral later
-recalled that day as indelible in his mind, with memories of “bombs
-wobbling down from high-flying B-17s; of carrier bombers roaring
-towards targets as though to plunge full into the water, releasing
-bombs and pulling out barely in time, each miss sending up towering
-clouds of mist and spray, every hit raising clouds of smoke and fire.”
-Despite the intensive aerial attack, Tanaka continued on to Guadalcanal
-with four destroyers and four transports.
-
-Japanese intelligence had picked up the approaching American battleship
-force and warned Tanaka of its advent. In turn, the enemy admirals sent
-their own battleship-cruiser force to intercept. The Americans, led by
-Rear Admiral Willis A. Lee in the _Washington_, reached Sealark Channel
-about 2100 on the 14th. An hour later, a Japanese cruiser was picked up
-north of Savo. Battleship fire soon turned it away. The Japanese now
-learned that their opponents would not be the cruisers they expected.
-
-The resulting clash, fought in the glare of gunfire and Japanese
-searchlights, was perhaps the most significant fought at sea for
-Guadalcanal. When the melee was over, the American battleships’ 16-inch
-guns had more than matched the Japanese. Both the _South Dakota_ and
-the _Washington_ were damaged badly enough to force their retirement,
-but the _Kirishima_ was punished to its abandonment and death. One
-Japanese and three American destroyers, the _Benham_ (DD 796), the
-_Walke_ (DD 416), and the _Preston_ (DD 379), were sunk. When the
-Japanese attack force retired, Admiral Tanaka ran his four transports
-onto the beach, knowing they would be sitting targets at daylight.
-Most of the men on board, however, did manage to get ashore before the
-inevitable pounding by American planes, warships, and artillery.
-
-Ten thousand troops of the _38th Division_ had landed, but the Japanese
-were in no shape to ever again attempt a massive reinforcement. The
-horrific losses in the frequent naval clashes, which seemed at times
-to favor the Japanese, did not really represent a standoff. Every
-American ship lost or damaged could and would be replaced; every
-Japanese ship lost meant a steadily diminishing fleet. In the air, the
-losses on both sides were daunting, but the enemy naval air arm would
-never recover from its losses of experienced carrier pilots. Two years
-later, the Battle of the Philippine Sea between American and Japanese
-carriers would aptly be called the “Marianas Turkey Shoot” because of
-the ineptitude of the Japanese trainee pilots.
-
-[Illustration:
-
-    Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 53510
-
-_A Japanese troop transport and her landing craft were badly damaged
-by the numerous Marine air attacks and were forced to run aground on
-Kokumbona beach after the naval Battle of Guadalcanal. Many enemy
-troops were killed in the attacks._]
-
-The enemy troops who had been fortunate enough to reach land were
-not immediately ready to assault the American positions. The _38th
-Division_ and the remnants of the various Japanese units that had
-previously tried to penetrate the Marine lines needed to be shaped into
-a coherent attack force before General Hyakutake could again attempt to
-take Henderson Field.
-
-General Vandegrift now had enough fresh units to begin to replace his
-veteran troops along the front lines. The decision to replace the 1st
-Marine Division with the Army’s 25th Infantry Division had been made.
-Admiral Turner had told Vandegrift to leave all of his heavy equipment
-on the island when he did pull out “in hopes of getting your units
-re-equipped when you come out.” He also told the Marine general that
-the Army would command the final phases of the Guadalcanal operation
-since it would provide the majority of the combat forces once the 1st
-Division departed. Major General Alexander M. Patch, commander of
-the Americal Division, would relieve Vandegrift as senior American
-officer ashore. His air support would continue to be Marine-dominated
-as General Geiger, now located on Espiritu Santo with 1st Wing
-headquarters, fed his squadrons forward to maintain the offensive. And
-the air command on Guadalcanal itself would continue to be a mixed bag
-of Army, Navy, Marine, and Allied squadrons.
-
-The sick list of the 1st Marine Division in November included more than
-3,200 men with malaria. The men of the 1st still manning the frontline
-foxholes and the rear areas--if anyplace within Guadalcanal’s perimeter
-could properly be called a rear area--were plain worn out. They had
-done their part and they knew it.
-
-On 29 November, General Vandegrift was handed a message from the Joint
-Chiefs of Staff. The crux of it read: “1st MarDiv is to be relieved
-without delay ... and will proceed to Australia for rehabilitation and
-employment.” The word soon spread that the 1st was leaving and where it
-was going. Australia was not yet the cherished place it would become in
-the division’s future, but _any_ place was preferable to Guadalcanal.
-
-
-[Sidebar (page 41): 75mm Pack Howitzer--Workhorse of the Artillery
-
-[Illustration]
-
-During the summer of 1930, the Marine Corps began replacing its old
-French 75mm guns (Model 1897) with the 75mm Pack Howitzer Model
-1923-E2. This weapon was designed for use in the Army primarily as
-mountain artillery. Since it could be broken down and manhandled ashore
-in six loads from ships’ boats, the pack howitzer was an important
-supporting weapon of the Marine Corps landing forces in prewar landing
-exercises.
-
-The 75mm pack howitzer saw extensive service with the Marine Corps
-throughout World War II in almost every major landing in the Pacific.
-Crewed by five Marines, the howitzer could hurl a 16-pound shell nearly
-10,000 yards. In the D Series table of organization with which the
-1st Marine Division went to war, and through the following E and F
-series, there were three pack howitzer battalions for each artillery
-regiment.--_Anthony Wayne Tommell and Kenneth L. Smith-Christmas_
-]
-
-
-[Sidebar (page 45): The Japanese Model 89 (1929) 50mm Heavy Grenade
-Discharger
-
-[Illustration]
-
-Born out of the need to bridge the gap in range between hand grenades
-and mortars, the grenade discharger evolved in the Imperial Japanese
-Army from a special purpose weapon of infantry assault and defense to
-an essential item of standard equipment with all Japanese ground forces.
-
-Commonly called _Juteki_ by the Japanese, this weapon officially was
-designated _Hachikyu Shiki Jutekidarto_, or 1189 Model Heavy Grenade
-Discharger, the term “heavy” being justified by the powerful 1-pound,
-12-ounce high explosive shell it was designed to fire, although it also
-fired the standard Model 91 fragmentation grenade.
-
-To the American Marines and soldiers who first encountered this weapon
-and others of its kind in combat they were known as “knee mortars,”
-likely so named because they generally were fired from a kneeling
-position. Typically, the discharger’s concave baseplate was pressed
-firmly into the surface of the ground by the firer’s foot to support
-the heavy recoil of the fired shell, but unfortunately the term “knee
-mortar” suggested to some untutored captors of these weapons that they
-were to be fired with the baseplate resting against the knee or thigh.
-When a Marine fired one of these dischargers from his thigh and broke
-his upper leg bone, efforts were swiftly undertaken in the field to
-educate all combat troops in the safe and proper handling of these very
-useful weapons.
-
-The Model 89 (1929) 50mm Heavy Grenade Discharger is a muzzle-loaded,
-high-angle-of-fire weapon which weighs 10-1/4 pounds and is 24 inches
-in overall length. Its design is compact and simple. The discharger
-has three major components: the rifled barrel, the supporting barrel
-pedestal with firing mechanism, and the base plate. Operation of the
-Model 89 was easy and straightforward, and with practice its user could
-deliver accurate fire registered quickly on target.
-
-Encountered in all major battles in the Pacific War, the Model 89
-Grenade Discharger was an uncomplicated, very portable, and highly
-efficient weapon operated easily by one man. It was carried in a cloth
-or leather case with a sling, and its one-piece construction allowed
-it to be brought into action very quickly. This grenade discharger
-had the advantage over most mortars in that it could be aimed and
-fired mechanically after a projectile had been placed in the barrel,
-projectile firing not being dependent upon dropping down the barrel
-against a stationary firing pin as with most mortars, where barrel
-fouling sometimes caused dangerous hangfires. Although an instantaneous
-fuze employed on the Model 89 high explosive shell restricted this
-shell’s use to open areas, the Model 91 fragmentation grenade with its
-seven-second fuze made this discharger effective in a jungle or forest
-setting, with complete safety for the user from premature detonation
-of projectiles by overhanging foliage. Smoke and signal shells, and an
-incendiary grenade, were special types of ammunition used with this
-versatile and effective weapon which won the respect of all who came to
-know it.--_Edwin F. Libby_
-]
-
-
-
-
-_December and the Final Stages_
-
-
-On 7 December, one year after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor,
-General Vandegrift sent a message to all men under his command in the
-Guadalcanal area thanking them for their courage and steadfastness,
-commending particularly the pilots and “all who labored and sweated
-within the lines in all manner of prodigious and vital tasks.” He
-reminded them all that their “unbelievable achievements had made
-‘Guadalcanal’ a synonym for death and disaster in the language of our
-enemy.” On 9 December, he handed over his command to General Patch and
-flew out to Australia at the same time the first elements of the 5th
-Marines were boarding ship. The 1st, 11th, and 7th Marines would soon
-follow together with all the division’s supporting units. The men who
-were leaving were thin, tired, hollow-eyed, and apathetic; they were
-young men who had grown old in four months time. They left behind 681
-dead in the island’s cemetery.
-
-[Illustration: _As he tells it, “Too Many, Too Close, Too Long,” is
-Donald L. Dickson’s portrait of one of the “little guys, just plain
-worn out. His stamina and his spirit stretched beyond human endurance.
-He has had no real sleep for a long time.... And he probably hasn’t
-stopped ducking and fighting long enough to discover that he has
-malaria. He is going to discover it now, however. He is through.”_
-
-    Captain Donald L. Dickson, USMCR
-]
-
-[Illustration:
-
-    U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo SC164898
-
-_Americal Division commander, MajGen Alexander M. Patch, Jr., watches
-while his troops and supplies are staged on Guadalcanal’s beaches on 8
-December, the day before he relieved Gen Vandegrift and his wornout 1st
-Marine Division._]
-
-The final regiment of the Americal Division, the 132d Infantry, landed
-on 8 December as the 5th Marines was preparing to leave. The 2d Marine
-Division’s regiments already on the island, the 2d, 8th, and part
-of the 10th, knew that the 6th Marines was on its way to rejoin. It
-seemed to many of the men of the 2d Marines, who had landed on D-Day, 7
-August, that they, too, should be leaving. These took slim comfort in
-the thought that they, by all rights, should be the first of the 2d to
-depart the island whenever that hoped-for day came.
-
-General Patch received a steady stream of ground reinforcements
-and replacements in December. He was not ready yet to undertake a
-full-scale offensive until the 25th Division and the rest of the 2d
-Marine Division arrived, but he kept all frontline units active in
-combat and reconnaissance patrols, particularly toward the western
-flank.
-
-The island commander’s air defense capabilities also grew
-substantially. Cactus Air Force, organized into a fighter command and a
-strike (bomber) command, now operated from a newly redesignated Marine
-Corps Air Base. The Henderson Field complex included a new airstrip,
-Fighter Two, which replaced Fighter One, which had severe drainage
-problems. Brigadier General Louis Woods, who had taken over as senior
-aviator when Geiger returned to Espiritu Santo, was relieved on 26
-December by Brigadier General Francis P. Mulcahy, Commanding General,
-2d Marine Aircraft Wing. New fighter and bomber squadrons from both the
-1st and 2d Wings sent their flight echelons forward on a regular basis.
-The Army added three fighter squadrons and a medium bomber squadron
-of B-26s. The Royal New Zealand Air Force flew in a reconnaissance
-squadron of Lockheed Hudsons. And the U.S. Navy sent forward a squadron
-of Consolidated PBY Catalina patrol planes which had a much needed
-night-flying capability.
-
-The aerial buildup forced the Japanese to curtail all air attacks and
-made daylight naval reinforcement attempts an event of the past. The
-nighttime visits of the Tokyo Express destroyers now brought only
-supplies encased in metal drums which were rolled over the ships’ sides
-in hope they would float into shore. The men ashore desperately needed
-everything that could be sent, even by this method, but most of the
-drums never reached the beaches.
-
-Still, however desperate the enemy situation was becoming, he was
-prepared to fight. General Hyakutake continued to plan the seizure of
-the airfield. General Hitoshi Immamura, commander of the _Eighth Area
-Army_, arrived in Rabaul on 2 December with orders to continue the
-offensive. He had 50,000 men to add to the embattled Japanese troops on
-Guadalcanal.
-
-Before these new enemy units could be employed, the Americans were
-prepared to move out from the perimeter in their own offensive.
-Conscious that the Mt. Austen area was a continuing threat to his
-inland flank in any drive to the west, Patch committed the Americal’s
-132d Infantry to the task of clearing the mountain’s wooded slopes
-on 17 December. The Army regiment succeeded in isolating the major
-Japanese force in the area by early January. The 1st Battalion, 2d
-Marines, took up hill positions to the southeast of the 132d to
-increase flank protection.
-
-By this time, the 25th Infantry Division (Major General J. Lawton
-Collins) had arrived and so had the 6th Marines (6 January) and the
-rest of the 2d Division’s headquarters and support troops. Brigadier
-General Alphonse De Carre, the Marine division’s assistant commander,
-took charge of all Marine ground forces on the island. The 2d
-Division’s commander, Major General John Marston, remained in New
-Zealand because he was senior to General Patch.
-
-With three divisions under his command, General Patch was designated
-Commanding General, XIV Corps, on 2 January. His corps headquarters
-numbered less than a score of officers and men, almost all taken from
-the Americal’s staff. Brigadier General Edmund B. Sebree, who had
-already led both Army and Marine units in attacks on the Japanese,
-took command of the Americal Division. On 10 January, Patch gave the
-signal to start the strongest American offensive yet in the Guadalcanal
-campaign. The mission of the troops was simple and to the point:
-“Attack and destroy the Japanese forces remaining on Guadalcanal.”
-
-The initial objective of the corps’ attack was a line about 1,000 to
-1,500 yards west of jump-off positions. These ran inland from Point
-Cruz to the vicinity of Hill 66, about 3,000 yards from the beach.
-In order to reach Hill 66, the 25th Infantry Division attacked first
-with the 35th and 27th Infantry driving west and southwest across a
-scrambled series of ridges. The going was rough and the dug-in enemy,
-elements of two regiments of the _38th Division_, gave way reluctantly
-and slowly. By the 13th, however, the American soldiers, aided by
-Marines of the 1st Battalion, 2d Marines, had won through to positions
-on the southern flank of the 2d Marine Division.
-
-On 12 January, the Marines began their advance with the 8th Marines
-along the shore and 2d Marines inland. At the base of Point Cruz, in
-the 3d Battalion, 8th Marines’ sector, regimental weapons company
-halftracks ran over seven enemy machine gun nests. The attack was
-then held up by an extensive emplacement until the weapons company
-commander, Captain Henry P. “Jim” Crowe, took charge of a half-dozen
-Marine infantrymen taking cover from enemy fire with the classic
-remarks: “You’ll never get a Purple Heart hiding in a fox hole. Follow
-me!” The men did and they destroyed the emplacement.
-
-[Illustration: U.S. Halftrack Mounting a 75mm Pack Howitzer and a
-.50-Caliber Air-Cooled Machine Gun]
-
-All along the front of the advancing assault companies the going was
-rough. The Japanese, remnants of the _Sendai Division_, were dug
-into the sides of a series of cross compartments and their fire took
-the Marines in the flank as they advanced. Progress was slow despite
-massive artillery support and naval gunfire from four destroyers
-offshore. In two days of heavy fighting, flamethrowers were employed
-for the first time and tanks were brought into play. The 2d Marines
-was now relieved and the 6th Marines moved into the attack along the
-coast while the 8th Marines took up the advance inland. Naval gunfire
-support, spotted by naval officers ashore, improved measurably. On the
-15th, the Americans, both Army and Marine, reached the initial corps
-objective. In the Marine attack zone, 600 Japanese were dead.
-
-[Illustration: FINAL PHASE
-
-26 JANUARY-9 FEBRUARY 1943]
-
-The battle-weary 2d Marines had seen its last infantry action of
-Guadalcanal. A new unit now came into being, a composite Army-Marine
-division, or CAM division, formed from units of the Americal and
-2d Marine Divisions. The directing staff was from the 2d Division,
-since the Americal had responsibility for the main perimeter. Two of
-its regiments, the 147th and the 182d Infantry, moved up to attack
-in line with the 6th Marines still along the coast. The 8th Marines
-was essentially pinched out of the front lines by a narrowing attack
-corridor as the inland mountains and hills pressed closer to the
-coastal trail. The 25th Division, which was advancing across this
-rugged terrain, had the mission of outflanking the Japanese in the
-vicinity of Kokumbona, while the CAM division drove west. On the 23d,
-as the CAM troops approached Kokumbona, the 1st Battalion of the 27th
-Infantry struck north out of the hills and overran the village site
-and Japanese base. There was only slight but steady opposition to the
-American advance as the enemy withdrew west toward Cape Esperance.
-
-The Japanese had decided, reluctantly, to give up the attempt to retake
-Guadalcanal. The orders were sent in the name of the Emperor and senior
-staff officers were sent to Guadalcanal to ensure their acceptance. The
-Navy would make the final runs of the Tokyo Express, only this time
-in reverse, to evacuate the garrison so it could fight again in later
-battles to hold the Solomons.
-
-Receiving intelligence that enemy ships were massing again to the
-northwest, General Patch took steps, as Vandegrift had before him on
-many occasions, to guard against overextending his forces in the face
-of what appeared to be another enemy attempt at reinforcement. He
-pulled the 25th Division back to bolster the main perimeter defenses
-and ordered the CAM division to continue its attack. When the Marines
-and soldiers moved out on 26 January, they had a surprisingly easy time
-of it, gaining 1,000 yards the first day and 2,000 the following day.
-The Japanese were still contesting every attack, but not in strength.
-
-By 30 January, the sole frontline unit in the American advance was the
-147th Infantry; the 6th Marines held positions to its left rear.
-
-The Japanese destroyer transports made their first run to the island
-on the night of 1-2 February, taking out 2,300 men from evacuation
-positions near Cape Esperance. On the night of 4-5 February, they
-returned and took out most of the _Sendai_ survivors and General
-Hyakutake and his _Seventeenth Army_ staff. The final evacuation
-operation was carried out on the night of 7-8 February, when a
-3,000-man rear guard was embarked. In all, the Japanese withdrew about
-11,000 men in those three nights and evacuated about 13,000 soldiers
-from Guadalcanal overall. The Americans would meet many of these men
-again in later battles, but not the 600 evacuees who died, too worn and
-sick to survive their rescue.
-
-On 9 February, American soldiers advancing from east and west met at
-Tenaro village on Cape Esperance. The only Marine ground unit still
-in action was the 3d Battalion, 10th Marines, supporting the advance.
-General Patch could happily report the “complete and total defeat of
-Japanese forces on Guadalcanal.” No organized Japanese units remained.
-
-On 31 January, the 2d Marines and the 1st Battalion, 8th Marines,
-boarded ship to leave Guadalcanal. As was true with the 1st Marine
-Division, some of these men were so debilitated by malaria they had to
-be carried on board. All of them struck observers again as young men
-grown old “with their skins cracked and furrowed and wrinkled.” On 9
-February, the rest of the 8th Marines and a good part of the division
-supporting units boarded transports. The 6th Marines, thankfully
-only six weeks on the island, left on the 19th. All were headed for
-Wellington, New Zealand, the 2d Marines for the first time. Left behind
-on the island as a legacy of the 2d Marine Division were 263 dead.
-
-[Illustration: _President Franklin D. Roosevelt presents Gen Vandegrift
-the Medal of Honor for his heroic accomplishments against the Japanese
-in the Solomons. Looking on are Mrs. Vandegrift, and the general’s son,
-Maj Alexander A. Vandegrift, Jr._
-
-    National Archives Photo 208-PU-209V-4
-]
-
-The total cost of the Guadalcanal campaign to the American ground
-combat forces was 1,598 officers and men killed, 1,152 of them
-Marines. The wounded totaled 4,709, and 2,799 of these were Marines.
-Marine aviation casualties were 147 killed and 127 wounded. The
-Japanese in their turn lost close to 25,000 men on Guadalcanal, about
-half of whom were killed in action. The rest succumbed to illness,
-wounds, and starvation.
-
-[Illustration: _The temporary resting place of a Marine killed in the
-fighting at Lunga Point is shown here. The grave marker was erected by
-his friends. The Marine’s remains were later removed to the division
-cemetery on Guadalcanal, and further reburial at war’s end either in
-his hometown or the Punchbowl National Cemetery in Hawaii with the
-honors due a fallen hero._]
-
-At sea, the comparative losses were about equal, with each side
-losing about the same number of fighting ships. The enemy loss of
-2 battleships, 3 carriers, 12 cruisers, and 25 destroyers, was
-irreplaceable. The Allied ship losses, though costly, were not fatal;
-in essence, all ships lost were replaced. In the air, at least 600
-Japanese planes were shot down; even more costly was the death of
-2,300 experienced pilots and aircrewmen. The Allied plane losses were
-less than half the enemy’s number and the pilot and aircrew losses
-substantially lower.
-
-President Roosevelt, reflecting the thanks of a grateful nation,
-awarded General Vandegrift the Medal of Honor for “outstanding and
-heroic accomplishment” in his leadership of American forces on
-Guadalcanal from 7 August to 9 December 1942. And for the same period,
-he awarded the Presidential Unit Citation to the 1st Marine Division
-(Reinforced) for “outstanding gallantry” reflecting “courage and
-determination ... of an inspiring order.” Included in the division’s
-citation and award, besides the organic units of the 1st Division, were
-the 2d and 8th Marines and attached units of the 2d Marine Division,
-all of the Americal Division, the 1st Parachute and 1st and 2d Raider
-Battalions, elements of the 3d, 5th, and 14th Defense Battalions, the
-1st Aviation Engineer Battalion, the 6th Naval Construction Battalion,
-and two motor torpedo boat squadrons. The indispensable Cactus Air
-Force was included, also represented by 7 Marine headquarters and
-service squadrons, 16 Marine flying squadrons, 16 Navy flying
-squadrons, and 5 Army flying squadrons.
-
-The victory at Guadalcanal marked a crucial turning point in the
-Pacific War. No longer were the Japanese on the offensive. Some of the
-Japanese Emperor’s best infantrymen, pilots, and seamen had been bested
-in close combat by the Americans and their Allies. There were years of
-fierce fighting ahead, but there was now no question of its outcome.
-
-When the veterans of the 1st Marine Division were gathered in thankful
-reunion 20 years later, they received a poignant message from
-Guadalcanal. The sender was a legend to all “Canal” Marines, Honorary
-U.S. Marine Corps Sergeant Major Jacob C. Vouza. The Solomons native in
-his halting English said: “Tell them I love them all. Me old man now,
-and me no look good no more. But me never forget.”
-
-
-[Sidebar (page 48): The ‘George’ Medal
-
-
-The George Medal is legendary among 1st Marine Division veterans of
-Guadalcanal. Only about 50 were cast, in Australia, before the mold
-gave out.
-
-The medal commemorates the difficult situation of the division during
-the early days on Guadalcanal, when ammunition, food, and heavy
-equipment were short and the Japanese plentiful. When the issue was
-no longer in doubt, Marines had time to reflect on the D-plus-3 Navy
-withdrawal in the face of increasing Japanese air attacks and surface
-action which left the division in such a tight spot.
-
-In the recollection of then-Captain Donald L. Dickson, adjutant of
-the 5th Marines, the Division G-3, then-Lieutenant Colonel Merrill B.
-Twining, resolved to commemorate the occasion. Twining told artist
-Dickson in general terms what he had in mind. Dickson went to work
-designing an appropriate medal using a fifty-cent piece to draw a
-circle on a captured Japanese blank military postcard.
-
-Dickson’s design was approved and when the division got to Australia a
-mold was made by a local metal craftsman and a small number were cast
-before the mold became unserviceable. Those wanting a medal paid one
-Australian pound for it and received a certificate as well. The medals
-are now an even greater rarity than at the time. In recent years,
-reproductions have been cast, and can be identified by the different
-metal and a poor definition of details.
-
-The obverse design shows a hand and sleeve dropping a hot potato in
-the shape of Guadalcanal into the arms of a grateful Marine. In the
-original design the sleeve bore the stripes of a vice admiral intended
-to be either Vice Admiral Robert L. Ghormley, ComSoPac, or Vice Admiral
-Frank Jack Fletcher, Commander Joint Expeditionary Force, but the final
-medal diplomatically omitted this identification.
-
-Also on the obverse is a Saguaro cactus, indigenous to Arizona, not
-Guadalcanal, but representing the code name for the island, “Cactus.”
-The obverse inscription is _Facia Georgius_, “Let George Do It.” Thus
-it became known as the George Medal.
-
-The medal’s reverse pictures a cow (the original design showed a
-Japanese soldier with breeches down) and an electric fan, and is
-inscribed: “In fond remembrance of the happy days spent from Aug. 7th
-1942 to Jan. 5th 1943. U.S.M.C.”
-
-The suspension ribbon was made, appropriately, of the pale green
-herringbone twill from some Marine’s utility uniform. Legend has it
-that to be authentic the utilities from which the ribbons were made had
-to have been washed in the waters of Guadalcanal’s Lunga River. Some
-medals were provided with the oversized safety pin used to identify
-laundry bags in Navy shipboard laundries.
-
-Such unofficial commemorative mementoes are not uncommon in military
-circles and recall, among others, the Soochow Creek medals recognizing
-the defense of Shanghai’s International Settlement during the Japanese
-invasions of 1932 and 1937 which were inspired by the Military Order of
-the Dragon medals of veterans of the China Relief Expedition or Boxer
-Rebellion.--_Brooke Nihart_
-
-[Illustration]
-]
-
-
-
-
-_Sources_
-
-
-The basic source work for this booklet is the first volume in the
-series _History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II, Pearl
-Harbor to Guadalcanal_, written by LtCol Frank O. Hough, Maj Verle E.
-Ludwig, and Henry I. Shaw, Jr. (Washington: Historical Branch, G-3
-Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1958). Other books used in
-writing this narrative were: BGen Samuel B. Griffith II, _The Battle
-for Guadalcanal_ (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1963); Gen Alexander
-A. Vandegrift as told to Robert B. Asprey, _Once a Marine: The Memoirs
-of General A. A. Vandegrift, USMC_ (New York: W. W. Norton, 1964); Col
-Mitchell Paige, _A Marine Named Mitch_ (New York: Vantage Press, 1975);
-Burke Davis, _Marine: The Life of Chesty Puller_ (Boston: Little,
-Brown, 1962); George McMillan, _The Old Breed: A History of the 1st
-Marine Division in World War II_ (Washington: Infantry Journal Press,
-1949); and Richard W. Johnston, _Follow Me!: The Story of the Second
-Marine Division in World War II_ (New York: Random House, 1948).
-
-The correspondence of General Vandegrift with General Holcomb and
-other senior Marines, held at the Marine Corps Historical Center,
-was helpful. Equally of value were conversations that the author had
-had with General Vandegrift after his retirement. In the course of
-his career as a Marine historian, the author has talked with other
-Guadalcanal veterans of all ranks; hopefully, this has resulted in a
-“feel” for the campaign, essential in writing such an overview.
-
-The literature on the Guadalcanal operation is extensive. In addition
-to the books cited above, there are several which are personally
-recommended to the interested reader: Robert Leckie, _Helmet for My
-Pillow_ (New York: Random House, 1957); Herbert Merillat, _Guadalcanal
-Remembered_ (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1982); John Miller, Jr., _The United
-States Army in World War II: The War in the Pacific_; _Guadalcanal,
-The First Offensive_ (Washington: Historical Division, Department
-of the Army, 1949); T. Grady Gallant, _On Valor’s Side_ (New York:
-Doubleday, 1963); Robert Sherrod, _History of Marine Corps Aviation
-in World War II_ (Washington: Combat Forces Press, 1952); Maj John L.
-Zimmerman, _The Guadalcanal Campaign_ (Washington: Historical Division,
-Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1949); RAdm Samuel E. Morrison, _The
-Struggle for Guadalcanal: History of United States Naval Operations
-in World War II_, Vol V (Boston: Little, Brown, 1950); and a recent,
-comprehensive account, Richard B. Frank, _Guadalcanal_ (New York:
-Random House, 1990).
-
-
-
-
-_About the Author_
-
-
-[Illustration]
-
-Henry I. Shaw, Jr., former chief historian of the History and Museums
-Division, was a Marine Corps historian from 1951-1990. He attended The
-Citadel, 1943-1944, and was graduated with a bachelor of arts cum laude
-in history from Hope College, Holland, Michigan. He received a master
-of arts degree in history from Columbia University. Mr. Shaw served as
-a Marine in both World War II and the Korean War. He is the co-author
-of four of the five volumes of the official history of Marine Corps
-operations in World War II and was the senior editor of most of the
-official histories of Marines in Vietnam. In addition, he has written a
-number of brief Marine Corps histories. He has written many articles on
-military history and has had more than 50 signed book reviews.
-
-       *       *       *       *       *
-
-_The author gratefully acknowledges the permission granted by the
-Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company of America to use the maps
-from BGen Samuel B. Griffith II’s_ The Battle for Guadalcanal _and by
-Doubleday Books and Jack Coggins for use of the sketches from his_ The
-Campaign for Guadalcanal. _The author also wishes to thank Richard
-J. Frank and Herbert C. Merillat for permission to reproduce their
-photographs._
-
-
-
-
-[Illustration]
-
-=THIS PAMPHLET HISTORY=, one in a series devoted to U.S. Marines in
-the World War II era, is published for the education and training of
-Marines by the History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine
-Corps, Washington, D.C., as a part of the U.S. Department of Defense
-observance of the 50th anniversary of victory in that war.
-
-Editorial costs of preparing this pamphlet have been defrayed in part
-by a bequest from the estate of Emilie H. Watts, in memory of her late
-husband, Thomas M. Watts, who served as a Marine and was the recipient
-of a Purple Heart.
-
-    WORLD WAR II COMMEMORATIVE SERIES
-
-    _DIRECTOR OF MARINE CORPS HISTORY AND MUSEUMS_
-    =Brigadier General Edwin H. Simmons, USMC (Ret)=
-
-    _GENERAL EDITOR,
-    WORLD WAR II COMMEMORATIVE SERIES_
-    =Benis M. Frank=
-
-    _CARTOGRAPHIC CONSULTANT_
-    =George C. MacGillivray=
-
-    _EDITING AND DESIGN SECTION, HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISION_
-    =Robert E. Struder=, Senior Editor;
-    =W. Stephen Hill=, Visual Information Specialist;
-    =Catherine A. Kerns=, Composition Services Technician
-
-    Marine Corps Historical Center
-    Building 58, Washington Navy Yard
-    Washington, D.C. 20374-0580
-
-    1992
-
-    PCN 190 003117 00
-
-
-[Illustration (back cover)]
-
-
-
-
-Transcriber’s Notes
-
-
-Punctuation, hyphenation, and spelling were made consistent when a
-predominant preference was found in this book; otherwise they were not
-changed.
-
-Simple typographical errors were corrected; occasional unbalanced
-quotation marks retained.
-
-To make this eBook easier to read, particularly on handheld devices,
-some images have been made relatively larger than in the original
-pamphlet, and centered, rather than offset to one side or the other;
-and some were placed a little earlier or later than in the
-original. Sidebars in the original have been repositioned between
-chapters and identified as “[Sidebar (page nn):”, where the
-page reference is to the original location in the source book. In the
-Plain Text version, the matching closing right bracket follows the last
-line of the Sidebar’s text and is on a separate line to make it more
-noticeable. In the HTML versions, that bracket follows the colon, and
-each Sidebar is displayed within a box.
-
-Descriptions of the Cover and Frontispiece have been moved from page 1
-of the book to just below those illustrations, and text referring to
-the locations of those illustrations has been deleted.
-
-Page 3: “He spent most of his final years” was misprinted without the
-“of”.
-
-Page 21: “disgraced in his own” was misprinted without the “his”.
-
-
-
-
-
-End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of First Offensive: The Marine Campaign
-for Guadalcanal, by Henry I. Shaw
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+*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 48807 ***
+
+Transcriber’s note: Table of Contents added by Transcriber and placed
+into the public domain. Boldface text is indicated by =equals signs=.
+
+Contents
+
+  First Offensive: The Marine Campaign for Guadalcanal
+    SIDEBAR: General Alexander A. Vandegrift
+  The Landing and August Battles
+    SIDEBAR: First Marine Utility Uniform Issued in World War II
+    SIDEBAR: LVT (1)--The ‘Amtrac’
+    SIDEBAR: General Vandegrift and His 1st Marine Division Staff
+    SIDEBAR: The Coastwatchers
+    SIDEBAR: The 1st Marine Division Patch
+  September and the Ridge
+    SIDEBAR: Sergeant Major Sir Jacob Charles Vouza
+    SIDEBAR: M3A1 37mm Antitank Gun
+    SIDEBAR: Douglas Albert Munro
+  October and the Japanese Offensive
+    SIDEBAR: Reising Gun
+  November and the Continuing Buildup
+    SIDEBAR: 75mm Pack Howitzer--Workhorse of the Artillery
+    SIDEBAR: The Japanese Model 89 (1929) 50mm Heavy Grenade Discharger
+  December and the Final Stages
+    SIDEBAR: The ‘George’ Medal
+  Sources
+  About the Author
+  About this series of pamphlets
+  Transcriber’s Notes
+
+
+
+
+    FIRST OFFENSIVE:
+    THE MARINE CAMPAIGN
+    FOR GUADALCANAL
+
+
+    MARINES IN
+    WORLD WAR II
+    COMMEMORATIVE SERIES
+
+    BY HENRY I. SHAW, JR.
+
+[Illustration: _A Marine machine gunner and his Browning .30-caliber
+M1917 heavy machine gun stand guard while 1st Marine Division engineers
+clean up in the Lunga River._ (Department of Defense [USMC] Photo
+588741)]
+
+[Illustration: _It was from a Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress such as this
+that LtCol Merrill B. Twining and Maj William B. McKean reconnoitered
+the Watchtower target area and discovered the Japanese building an
+airfield on Guadalcanal._ (National Archives Photo 80-G-34887)]
+
+
+
+
+First Offensive: The Marine Campaign for Guadalcanal
+
+_by Henry I. Shaw, Jr._
+
+
+In the early summer of 1942, intelligence reports of the construction
+of a Japanese airfield near Lunga Point on Guadalcanal in the Solomon
+Islands triggered a demand for offensive action in the South Pacific.
+The leading offensive advocate in Washington was Admiral Ernest J.
+King, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). In the Pacific, his view was
+shared by Admiral Chester A. Nimitz, Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet
+(CinCPac), who had already proposed sending the 1st Marine Raider
+Battalion to Tulagi, an island 20 miles north of Guadalcanal across
+Sealark Channel, to destroy a Japanese seaplane base there. Although
+the Battle of the Coral Sea had forestalled a Japanese amphibious
+assault on Port Moresby, the Allied base of supply in eastern New
+Guinea, completion of the Guadalcanal airfield might signal the
+beginning of a renewed enemy advance to the south and an increased
+threat to the lifeline of American aid to New Zealand and Australia. On
+23 July 1942, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in Washington agreed that
+the line of communications in the South Pacific had to be secured. The
+Japanese advance had to be stopped. Thus, Operation Watchtower, the
+seizure of Guadalcanal and Tulagi, came into being.
+
+The islands of the Solomons lie nestled in the backwaters of the South
+Pacific. Spanish fortune-hunters discovered them in the mid-sixteenth
+century, but no European power foresaw any value in the islands until
+Germany sought to expand its budding colonial empire more than two
+centuries later. In 1884, Germany proclaimed a protectorate over
+northern New Guinea, the Bismarck Archipelago, and the northern
+Solomons. Great Britain countered by establishing a protectorate over
+the southern Solomons and by annexing the remainder of New Guinea. In
+1905, the British crown passed administrative control over all its
+territories in the region to Australia, and the Territory of Papua,
+with its capital at Port Moresby, came into being. Germany’s holdings
+in the region fell under the administrative control of the League of
+Nations following World War I, with the seat of the colonial government
+located at Rabaul on New Britain. The Solomons lay 10 degrees below the
+Equator--hot, humid, and buffeted by torrential rains. The celebrated
+adventure novelist, Jack London, supposedly muttered: “If I were king,
+the worst punishment I could inflict on my enemies would be to banish
+them to the Solomons.”
+
+On 23 January 1942, Japanese forces seized Rabaul and fortified it
+extensively. The site provided an excellent harbor and numerous
+positions for airfields. The devastating enemy carrier and plane
+losses at the Battle of Midway (3-6 June 1942) had caused _Imperial
+General Headquarters_ to cancel orders for the invasion of Midway, New
+Caledonia, Fiji, and Samoa, but plans to construct a major seaplane
+base at Tulagi went forward. The location offered one of the best
+anchorages in the South Pacific and it was strategically located: 560
+miles from the New Hebrides, 800 miles from New Caledonia, and 1,000
+miles from Fiji.
+
+The outposts at Tulagi and Guadalcanal were the forward evidences of a
+sizeable Japanese force in the region, beginning with the _Seventeenth
+Army_, headquartered at Rabaul. The enemy’s _Eighth Fleet_, _Eleventh
+Air Fleet_, and _1st_, _7th_, _8th_, and _14th Naval Base Forces_
+also were on New Britain. Beginning on 5 August 1942, Japanese signal
+intelligence units began to pick up transmissions between Noumea on
+New Caledonia and Melbourne, Australia. Enemy analysts concluded that
+Vice Admiral Richard L. Ghormley, commanding the South Pacific Area
+(ComSoPac), was signalling a British or Australian force in preparation
+for an offensive in the Solomons or at New Guinea. The warnings were
+passed to Japanese headquarters at Rabaul and Truk, but were ignored.
+
+[Illustration: THE PACIFIC AREAS
+
+1 AUGUST 1942]
+
+The invasion force was indeed on its way to its targets, Guadalcanal,
+Tulagi, and the tiny islets of Gavutu and Tanambogo close by Tulagi’s
+shore. The landing force was composed of Marines; the covering force
+and transport force were U.S. Navy with a reinforcement of Australian
+warships. There was not much mystery to the selection of the 1st
+Marine Division to make the landings. Five U.S. Army divisions were
+located in the South and Southwest Pacific: three in Australia, the
+37th Infantry in Fiji, and the Americal Division on New Caledonia.
+None was amphibiously trained and all were considered vital parts of
+defensive garrisons. The 1st Marine Division, minus one of its infantry
+regiments, had begun arriving in New Zealand in mid-June when the
+division headquarters and the 5th Marines reached Wellington. At that
+time, the rest of the reinforced division’s major units were getting
+ready to embark. The 1st Marines were at San Francisco, the 1st Raider
+Battalion was on New Caledonia, and the 3d Defense Battalion was at
+Pearl Harbor. The 2d Marines of the 2d Marine Division, a unit which
+would replace the 1st Division’s 7th Marines stationed in British
+Samoa, was loading out from San Diego. All three infantry regiments
+of the landing force had battalions of artillery attached, from the
+11th Marines, in the case of the 5th and 1st; the 2d Marines drew its
+reinforcing 75mm howitzers from the 2d Division’s 10th Marines.
+
+The news that his division would be the landing force for Watchtower
+came as a surprise to Major General Alexander A. Vandegrift, who
+had anticipated that the 1st Division would have six months of
+training in the South Pacific before it saw action. The changeover
+from administrative loading of the various units’ supplies to combat
+loading, where first-needed equipment, weapons, ammunition, and rations
+were positioned to come off ship first with the assault troops,
+occasioned a never-to-be-forgotten scene on Wellington’s docks. The
+combat troops took the place of civilian stevedores and unloaded and
+reloaded the cargo and passenger vessels in an increasing round of
+working parties, often during rainstorms which hampered the task, but
+the job was done. Succeeding echelons of the division’s forces all got
+their share of labor on the docks as various shipping groups arrived
+and the time grew shorter. General Vandegrift was able to convince
+Admiral Ghormley and the Joint Chiefs that he would not be able to meet
+a proposed D-Day of 1 August, but the extended landing date, 7 August,
+did little to improve the situation.
+
+An amphibious operation is a vastly complicated affair, particularly
+when the forces involved are assembled on short notice from all over
+the Pacific. The pressure that Vandegrift felt was not unique to
+the landing force commander. The U.S. Navy’s ships were the key to
+success and they were scarce and invaluable. Although the Battles of
+Coral Sea and Midway had badly damaged the Japanese fleet’s offensive
+capabilities and crippled its carrier forces, enemy naval aircraft
+could fight as well ashore as afloat and enemy warships were still
+numerous and lethal. American losses at Pearl Harbor, Coral Sea, and
+Midway were considerable, and Navy admirals were well aware that the
+ships they commanded were in short supply. The day was coming when
+America’s shipyards and factories would fill the seas with warships
+of all types, but that day had not arrived in 1942. Calculated risk
+was the name of the game where the Navy was concerned, and if the risk
+seemed too great, the Watchtower landing force might be a casualty. As
+it happened, the Navy never ceased to risk its ships in the waters of
+the Solomons, but the naval lifeline to the troops ashore stretched
+mighty thin at times.
+
+Tactical command of the invasion force approaching Guadalcanal in early
+August was vested in Vice Admiral Frank J. Fletcher as Expeditionary
+Force Commander (Task Force 61). His force consisted of the amphibious
+shipping carrying the 1st Marine Division, under Rear Admiral Richmond
+K. Turner, and the Air Support Force led by Rear Admiral Leigh Noyes.
+Admiral Ghormley contributed land-based air forces commanded by Rear
+Admiral John S. McCain. Fletcher’s support force consisted of three
+fleet carriers, the _Saratoga_ (CV 3), _Enterprise_ (CV 6), and _Wasp_
+(CV 7); the battleship _North Carolina_ (BB 55), 6 cruisers, 16
+destroyers, and 3 oilers. Admiral Turner’s covering force included five
+cruisers and nine destroyers.
+
+
+[Sidebar (page 3): General Alexander A. Vandegrift
+
+[Illustration]
+
+A distinguished military analyst once noted that if titles were awarded
+in America as they are in England, the commanding general of Marine
+Corps forces at Guadalcanal would be known simply as “Vandegrift of
+Guadalcanal.” But America does not bestow aristocratic titles, and
+besides, such a formality would not be in keeping with the soft-spoken,
+modest demeanor of Alexander A. Vandegrift.
+
+The man destined to lead the 1st Marine Division in America’s
+first ground offensive operation of World War II was born in 1887
+in Charlottesville, Virginia, where he grew up fascinated by his
+grandfather’s stories of life in the Confederate Army during the Civil
+War. It was axiomatic that young Alexander would settle on a military
+career. Commissioned a Marine lieutenant in 1909, Vandegrift received
+an early baptism of fire in 1912 during the bombardment, assault, and
+capture of Coyotepe in Nicaragua. Two years later he participated in
+the capture and occupation of Vera Cruz. Vandegrift would spend the
+greater part of the next decade in Haiti, where he fought Caco bandits,
+and served as an inspector of constabulary with the Gendarmerie
+d’Haiti. It was in Haiti that he met and was befriended by Marine
+Colonel Smedley D. Butler, who called him “Sunny Jim.” The lessons of
+these formative years fighting an elusive enemy in a hostile jungle
+environment were not lost upon the young Marine officer.
+
+He spent the next 18 years in various posts and stations in the United
+States, along with two tours of China duty at Peiping and Tientsin.
+Prior to Pearl Harbor, Vandegrift was appointed assistant to the
+Major General Commandant, and in April 1940 received the single star
+of a brigadier general. He was detached to the 1st Marine Division
+in November 1941, and in May 1942 sailed for the South Pacific as
+commanding general of the first Marine division ever to leave the
+United States. On 7 August 1942, after exhorting his Marines with the
+reminder that “God favors the bold and strong of heart,” he led the 1st
+Marine Division ashore in the Solomon Islands in the first large-scale
+offensive action against the Japanese.
+
+His triumph at Guadalcanal earned General Vandegrift the Medal of
+Honor, the Navy Cross, and the praise of a grateful nation. In July
+1943 he took command of I Marine Amphibious Corps and planned the
+landing at Empress Augusta Bay, Bougainville, Northern Solomons, on
+1 November 1943. He then was recalled to Washington, to become the
+Eighteenth Commandant of the Marine Corps.
+
+On 1 January 1944, as a lieutenant general, Vandegrift was sworn in as
+Commandant. On 4 April 1945 he was promoted to general, and thus became
+the first Marine officer on active duty to attain four-star rank.
+
+In the final stages of the war, General Vandegrift directed an elite
+force approaching half-a-million men and women, with its own aviation
+force. Comparing his Marines with the Japanese, he noted that the
+Japanese soldier “was trained to go to a place, stay there, fight and
+die. We train our men to go to a place, fight to win, and to live. I
+can assure you, it is a better theory.”
+
+After the war, Vandegrift fought another battle, this time in the halls
+of Congress, with the stakes being the survival of the Marine Corps.
+His counter-testimony during Congressional hearings of the spring
+of 1946 was instrumental in defeating initial attempts to merge or
+“unify” the U.S. Armed Forces. Although his term as Commandant ended
+on 31 December 1947, General Vandegrift would live to see passage of
+Public Law 416, which preserved the Corps and its historic mission. His
+official retirement date of 1 April 1949 ended just over 40 years of
+service.
+
+General Vandegrift outlived both his wife Mildred and their only son,
+Colonel Alexander A. Vandegrift, Jr., who fought in World War II and
+Korea. He spent most of his final years in Delray, Florida. He died on
+8 May 1973.--_Robert V. Aquilina_
+]
+
+
+
+
+_The Landing and August Battles_
+
+
+On board the transports approaching the Solomons, the Marines were
+looking for a tough fight. They knew little about the targets, even
+less about their opponents. Those maps that were available were poor,
+constructions based upon outdated hydrographic charts and information
+provided by former island residents. While maps based on aerial
+photographs had been prepared they were misplaced by the Navy in
+Auckland, New Zealand, and never got to the Marines at Wellington.
+
+On 17 July, a couple of division staff officers, Lieutenant Colonel
+Merrill B. Twining and Major William McKean, had been able to join the
+crew of a B-17 flying from Port Moresby on a reconnaissance mission
+over Guadalcanal. They reported what they had seen, and their analysis,
+coupled with aerial photographs, indicated no extensive defenses along
+the beaches of Guadalcanal’s north shore.
+
+[Illustration: GUADALCANAL
+
+TULAGI-GAVUTU
+
+and
+
+Florida Islands]
+
+This news was indeed welcome. The division intelligence officer (G-2),
+Lieutenant Colonel Frank B. Goettge, had concluded that about 8,400
+Japanese occupied Guadalcanal and Tulagi. Admiral Turner’s staff
+figured that the Japanese amounted to 7,125 men. Admiral Ghormley’s
+intelligence officer pegged the enemy strength at 3,100--closest to the
+3,457 actual total of Japanese troops; 2,571 of these were stationed on
+Guadalcanal and were mostly laborers working on the airfield.
+
+To oppose the Japanese, the Marines had an overwhelming superiority
+of men. At the time, the tables of organization for a Marine Corps
+division indicated a total of 19,514 officers and enlisted men,
+including naval medical and engineer (Seabee) units. Infantry
+regiments numbered 3,168 and consisted of a headquarters company, a
+weapons company, and three battalions. Each infantry battalion (933
+Marines) was organized into a headquarters company (89), a weapons
+company (273), and three rifle companies (183). The artillery regiment
+had 2,581 officers and men organized into three 75mm pack howitzer
+battalions and one 105mm howitzer battalion. A light tank battalion,
+a special weapons battalion of antiaircraft and antitank guns, and a
+parachute battalion added combat power. An engineer regiment (2,452
+Marines) with battalions of engineers, pioneers, and Seabees, provided
+a hefty combat and service element. The total was rounded out by
+division headquarters battalion’s headquarters, signal, and military
+police companies and the division’s service troops--service, motor
+transport, amphibian tractor, and medical battalions. For Watchtower,
+the 1st Raider Battalion and the 3d Defense Battalion had been added to
+Vandegrift’s command to provide more infantrymen and much needed coast
+defense and antiaircraft guns and crews.
+
+Unfortunately, the division’s heaviest ordnance had been left behind
+in New Zealand. Limited ship space and time meant that the division’s
+big guns, a 155mm howitzer battalion, and all the motor transport
+battalion’s two-and-a-half-ton trucks were not loaded. Colonel Pedro
+A. del Valle, commanding the 11th Marines, was unhappy at the loss of
+his heavy howitzers and equally distressed that essential sound and
+flash-ranging equipment necessary for effective counterbattery fire was
+left behind. Also failing to make the cut in the battle for shipping
+space, were all spare clothing, bedding rolls, and supplies necessary
+to support the reinforced division beyond 60 days of combat. Ten days
+supply of ammunition for each of the division’s weapons remained in New
+Zealand.
+
+[Illustration:
+
+    Naval Historical Photographic Collection 880-CF-117-4-63
+
+_Enroute to Guadalcanal RAdm Richmond Kelly Turner, commander of the
+Amphibious Force, and MajGen Alexander A. Vandegrift, 1st Marine
+Division commander, review the Operation Watchtower plan for landings
+in the Solomon Islands._]
+
+In the opinion of the 1st Division’s historian and a veteran of
+the landing, the men on the approaching transports “thought they’d
+have a bad time getting ashore.” They were confident, certainly,
+and sure that they could not be defeated, but most of the men were
+entering combat for the first time. There were combat veteran officers
+and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) throughout the division, but
+the majority of the men were going into their initial battle. The
+commanding officer of the 1st Marines, Colonel Clifton B. Cates,
+estimated that 90 percent of his men had enlisted after Pearl Harbor.
+The fabled 1st Marine Division of later World War II, Korean War,
+Vietnam War, and Persian Gulf War fame, the most highly decorated
+division in the U.S. Armed Forces, had not yet established its
+reputation.
+
+The convoy of ships, with its outriding protective screen of carriers,
+reached Koro in the Fiji Islands on 26 July. Practice landings did
+little more than exercise the transports’ landing craft, since reefs
+precluded an actual beach landing. The rendezvous at Koro did give the
+senior commanders a chance to have a face-to-face meeting. Fletcher,
+McCain, Turner, and Vandegrift got together with Ghormley’s chief of
+staff, Rear Admiral Daniel J. Callaghan, who notified the conferees
+that ComSoPac had ordered the 7th Marines on Samoa to be prepared to
+embark on four days notice as a reinforcement for Watchtower. To this
+decidedly good news, Admiral Fletcher added some bad news. In view of
+the threat from enemy land-based air, he could not “keep the carriers
+in the area for more than 48 hours after the landing.” Vandegrift
+protested that he needed at least four days to get the division’s gear
+ashore, and Fletcher reluctantly agreed to keep his carriers at risk
+another day.
+
+On the 28th the ships sailed from the Fijis, proceeding as if they were
+headed for Australia. At noon on 5 August, the convoy and its escorts
+turned north for the Solomons. Undetected by the Japanese, the assault
+force reached its target during the night of 6-7 August and split into
+two landing groups, Transport Division X-Ray, 15 transports heading
+for the north shore of Guadalcanal east of Lunga Point, and Transport
+Division Yoke, eight transports headed for Tulagi, Gavutu, Tanambogo,
+and the nearby Florida Island, which loomed over the smaller islands.
+
+Vandegrift’s plans for the landings would put two of his infantry
+regiments (Colonel LeRoy P. Hunt’s 5th Marines and Colonel Cates’
+1st Marines) ashore on both sides of the Lunga River prepared to
+attack inland to seize the airfield. The 11th Marines, the 3d Defense
+Battalion, and most of the division’s supporting units would also land
+near the Lunga, prepared to exploit the beachhead. Across the 20 miles
+of Sealark Channel, the division’s assistant commander, Brigadier
+General William H. Rupertus, led the assault forces slated to take
+Tulagi, Gavutu, and Tanambogo: the 1st Raider Battalion (Lieutenant
+Colonel Merritt A. Edson); the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines (Lieutenant
+Colonel Harold E. Rosecrans); and the 1st Parachute Battalion (Major
+Robert H. Williams). Company A of the 2d Marines would reconnoiter
+the nearby shores of Florida Island and the rest of Colonel John A.
+Arthur’s regiment would stand by in reserve to land where needed.
+
+As the ships slipped through the channels on either side of rugged
+Savo Island, which split Sealark near its western end, heavy clouds
+and dense rain blanketed the task force. Later the moon came out and
+silhouetted the islands. On board his command ship, Vandegrift wrote
+to his wife: “Tomorrow morning at dawn we land in our first major
+offensive of the war. Our plans have been made and God grant that our
+judgement has been sound ... whatever happens you’ll know I did my
+best. Let us hope that best will be good enough.”
+
+[Illustration: _MajGen Alexander A. Vandegrift, CG, 1st Marine
+Division, confers with his staff on board the transport USS _McCawley_
+(APA-4) enroute to Guadalcanal. From left: Gen Vandegrift; LtCol
+Gerald C. Thomas, operations officer; LtCol Randolph McC. Pate,
+logistics officer; LtCol Frank B. Goettge, intelligence officer; and
+Col William Capers James, chief of staff._
+
+    National Archives Photo 80-G-17065
+]
+
+At 0641 on 7 August, Turner signalled his ships to “land the landing
+force.” Just 28 minutes before, the heavy cruiser _Quincy_ (CA 39)
+had begun shelling the landing beaches at Guadalcanal. The sun came
+up that fateful Friday at 0650, and the first landing craft carrying
+assault troops of the 5th Marines touched down at 0909 on Red Beach.
+To the men’s surprise (and relief), no Japanese appeared to resist the
+landing. Hunt immediately moved his assault troops off the beach and
+into the surrounding jungle, waded the steep-banked Ilu River, and
+headed for the enemy airfield. The following 1st Marines were able to
+cross the Ilu on a bridge the engineers had hastily thrown up with
+an amphibian tractor bracing its middle. The silence was eerie and
+the absence of opposition was worrisome to the riflemen. The Japanese
+troops, most of whom were Korean laborers, had fled to the west,
+spooked by a week’s B-17 bombardment, the pre-assault naval gunfire,
+and the sight of the ships offshore. The situation was not the same
+across Sealark. The Marines on Guadalcanal could hear faint rumbles of
+a firefight across the waters.
+
+[Illustration:
+
+    National Archives Photo 80-CF-112-5-3
+
+_First Division Marines storm ashore across Guadalcanal’s beaches on
+D-Day, 7 August 1942, from the attack transport _Barnett_ (AP-11) and
+attack cargo ship _Fomalhaut_ (AK-22). The invaders were surprised at
+the lack of enemy opposition._]
+
+[Illustration:
+
+    LANDING ON GUADALCANAL
+    and Capture of the Airfield
+    7-8 AUGUST 1942
+]
+
+[Illustration:
+
+    Photo courtesy of Col James A. Donovan, Jr.
+
+_When the 5th Marines entered the jungle from the beachhead, and had to
+cross the steep banks of the Ilu River, 1st Marine Division engineers
+hastily constructed a bridge supported by amphibian tractors. Though
+heavily used, the bridge held up._]
+
+[Illustration: _Photographed immediately after a prelanding strike by
+USS _Enterprise_ aircraft flown by Navy pilots, Tanambogo and Gavutu
+Islands lie smoking and in ruins in the morning sun. Gavutu is at the
+left across the causeway from Tanambogo._
+
+    National Archives Photo 80-C-11034
+]
+
+The Japanese on Tulagi were special naval landing force sailors and
+they had no intention of giving up what they held without a vicious,
+no-surrender battle. Edson’s men landed first, following by Rosecrans’
+battalion, hitting Tulagi’s south coast and moving inland towards
+the ridge which ran lengthwise through the island. The battalions
+encountered pockets of resistance in the undergrowth of the islands
+thick vegetation and maneuvered to outflank and overrun the opposition.
+The advance of the Marines was steady but casualties were frequent. By
+nightfall, Edson had reached the former British residency overlooking
+Tulagi’s harbor and dug in for the night across a hill that overlooked
+the Japanese final position, a ravine on the islands southern tip. The
+2d Battalion, 5th Marines, had driven through to the northern shore,
+cleaning its sector of enemy; Rosecrans moved into position to back
+up the raiders. By the end of its first day ashore, 2d Battalion had
+lost 56 men killed and wounded; 1st Raider Battalion casualties were 99
+Marines.
+
+[Illustration:
+
+    Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 52231
+
+_After the battle, almost all palm trees on Gavutu were shorn of their
+foliage. Despite naval gunfire and close air support hitting the enemy
+emplacements, Japanese opposition from caves proved to be serious
+obstacles for attacking Marines._]
+
+Throughout the night, the Japanese swarmed from hillside caves in four
+separate attacks, trying to penetrate the raider lines. They were
+unsuccessful and most died in the attempts. At dawn, the 2d Battalion,
+2d Marines, landed to reinforce the attackers and by the afternoon of 8
+August, the mop-up was completed and the battle for Tulagi was over.
+
+The fight for tiny Gavutu and Tanambogo, both little more than small
+hills rising out of the sea, connected by a hundred-yard causeway, was
+every bit as intense as that on Tulagi. The area of combat was much
+smaller and the opportunities for fire support from offshore ships
+and carrier planes was severely limited once the Marines had landed.
+After naval gunfire from the light cruiser _San Juan_ (CL 54) and two
+destroyers, and a strike by F4F Wildcats flying from the _Wasp_, the
+1st Parachute Battalion landed near noon in three waves, 395 men in
+all, on Gavutu. The Japanese, secure in cave positions, opened fire on
+the second and third waves, pinning down the first Marines ashore on
+the beach. Major Williams took a bullet in the lungs and was evacuated;
+32 Marines were killed in the withering enemy fire. This time, 2d
+Marines reinforcements were really needed; the 1st Battalion’s Company
+B landed on Gavutu and attempted to take Tanambogo; the attackers were
+driven to ground and had to pull back to Gavutu.
+
+After a rough night of close-in fighting with the defenders of both
+islands, the 3d Battalion, 2d Marines, reinforced the men already
+ashore and mopped up on each island. The toll of Marines dead on the
+three islands was 144; the wounded numbered 194. The few Japanese who
+survived the battles fled to Florida Island, which had been scouted by
+the 2d Marines on D-Day and found clear of the enemy.
+
+The Marines’ landings and the concentration of shipping in Guadalcanal
+waters acted as a magnet to the Japanese at Rabaul. At Admiral
+Ghormley’s headquarters, Tulagi’s radio was heard on D-Day “frantically
+calling for [the] dispatch of surface forces to the scene” and
+designating transports and carriers as targets for heavy bombing.
+The messages were sent in plain language, emphasizing the plight
+of the threatened garrison. And the enemy response was prompt and
+characteristic of the months of naval air and surface attacks to come.
+
+At 1030 on 7 August, an Australian coastwatcher hidden in the hills of
+the islands north of Guadalcanal signalled that a Japanese air strike
+composed of heavy bombers, light bombers, and fighters was headed for
+the island. Fletcher’s pilots, whose carriers were positioned 100 miles
+south of Guadalcanal, jumped the approaching planes 20 miles northwest
+of the landing areas before they could disrupt the operation. But the
+Japanese were not daunted by the setback; other planes and ships were
+enroute to the inviting target.
+
+On 8 August, the Marines consolidated their positions ashore, seizing
+the airfield on Guadalcanal and establishing a beachhead. Supplies were
+being unloaded as fast as landing craft could make the turnaround from
+ship to shore, but the shore party was woefully inadequate to handle
+the influx of ammunition, rations, tents, aviation gas, vehicles--all
+gear necessary to sustain the Marines. The beach itself became a
+dumpsite. And almost as soon as the initial supplies were landed, they
+had to be moved to positions nearer Kukum village and Lunga Point
+within the planned perimeter. Fortunately, the lack of Japanese ground
+opposition enabled Vandegrift to shift the supply beaches west to a new
+beachhead.
+
+[Illustration:
+
+    Marine Corps Personal Papers Collection
+
+_Immediately after assault troops cleared the beachhead and moved
+inland, supplies and equipment, inviting targets for enemy bombers,
+began to litter the beach._]
+
+Japanese bombers did penetrate the American fighter screen on 8 August.
+Dropping their bombs from 20,000 feet or more to escape antiaircraft
+fire, the enemy planes were not very accurate. They concentrated on the
+ships in the channel, hitting and damaging a number of them and sinking
+the destroyer _Jarvis_ (DD 393). In their battles to turn back the
+attacking planes, the carrier fighter squadrons lost 21 Wildcats on 7-8
+August.
+
+The primary Japanese targets were the Allied ships. At this time,
+and for a thankfully and unbelievably long time to come, the
+Japanese commanders at Rabaul grossly underestimated the strength of
+Vandegrift’s forces. They thought the Marine landings constituted a
+reconnaissance in force, perhaps 2,000 men, on Guadalcanal. By the
+evening of 8 August, Vandegrift had 10,900 troops ashore on Guadalcanal
+and another 6,075 on Tulagi. Three infantry regiments had landed and
+each had a supporting 75mm pack howitzer battalion--the 2d and 3d
+Battalions, 11th Marines on Guadalcanal, and the 3d Battalion, 10th
+Marines on Tulagi. The 5th Battalion, 11th Marines’ 105mm howitzers
+were in general support.
+
+That night a cruiser-destroyer force of the Imperial Japanese Navy
+reacted to the American invasion with a stinging response. Admiral
+Turner had positioned three cruiser-destroyer groups to bar the
+Tulagi-Guadalcanal approaches. At the Battle of Savo, the Japanese
+demonstrated their superiority in night fighting at this stage of
+the war, shattering two of Turners covering forces without loss to
+themselves. Four heavy cruisers went to the bottom--three American, one
+Australian--and another lost her bow. As the sun came up over what soon
+would be called “Ironbottom Sound,” Marines watched grimly as Higgins
+boats swarmed out to rescue survivors. Approximately 1,300 sailors
+died that night and another 700 suffered wounds or were badly burned.
+Japanese casualties numbered less than 200 men.
+
+The Japanese suffered damage to only one ship in the encounter, the
+cruiser _Chokai_. The American cruisers _Vincennes_ (CA 44), _Astoria_
+(CA 34), and _Quincy_ (CA 39) went to the bottom, as did the Australian
+Navy’s HMAS _Canberra_, so critically damaged that she had to be sunk
+by American torpedoes. Both the cruiser _Chicago_ (CA 29) and destroyer
+_Talbot_ (DD 114) were badly damaged. Fortunately for the Marines
+ashore, the Japanese force--five heavy cruisers, two light cruisers,
+and a destroyer--departed before dawn without attempting to disrupt the
+landing further.
+
+[Illustration: U.S. 105mm Howitzer]
+
+When the attack-force leader, Vice Admiral Gunichi Mikawa, returned to
+Rabaul, he expected to receive the accolades of his superiors. He did
+get those, but he also found himself the subject of criticism. Admiral
+Isoroku Yamamoto, the Japanese fleet commander, chided his subordinate
+for failing to attack the transports. Mikawa could only reply, somewhat
+lamely, that he did not know Fletcher’s aircraft carriers were so far
+away from Guadalcanal. Of equal significance to the Marines on the
+beach, the Japanese naval victory caused celebrating superiors in Tokyo
+to allow the event to overshadow the importance of the amphibious
+operation.
+
+The disaster prompted the American admirals to reconsider Navy support
+for operations ashore. Fletcher feared for the safety of his carriers;
+he had already lost about a quarter of his fighter aircraft. The
+commander of the expeditionary force had lost a carrier at Coral Sea
+and another at Midway. He felt he could not risk the loss of a third,
+even if it meant leaving the Marines on their own. Before the Japanese
+cruiser attack, he obtained Admiral Ghormley’s permission to withdraw
+from the area.
+
+[Illustration: _When ships carrying barbed wire and engineering tools
+needed ashore were forced to leave the Guadalcanal area because of
+enemy air and surface threats, Marines had to prepare such hasty field
+expedients as this_ _cheval de frise_ _of sharpened stakes._
+
+    Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 5157
+]
+
+At a conference on board Turner’s flagship transport, the _McCawley_,
+on the night of 8 August, the admiral told General Vandegrift that
+Fletcher’s impending withdrawal meant that he would have to pull out
+the amphibious force’s ships. The Battle of Savo Island reinforced
+the decision to get away before enemy aircraft, unchecked by American
+interceptors, struck. On 9 August, the transports withdrew to Noumea.
+The unloading of supplies ended abruptly, and ships still half-full
+steamed away. The forces ashore had 17 days’ rations--after counting
+captured Japanese food--and only four days’ supply of ammunition for
+all weapons. Not only did the ships take away the rest of the supplies,
+they also took the Marines still on board, including the 2d Marines’
+headquarters element. Dropped off at the island of Espiritu Santo in
+the New Hebrides, the infantry Marines and their commander, Colonel
+Arthur, were most unhappy and remained so until they finally reached
+Guadalcanal on 29 October.
+
+Ashore in the Marine beachheads, General Vandegrift ordered rations
+reduced to two meals a day. The reduced food intake would last for
+six weeks, and the Marines would become very familiar with Japanese
+canned fish and rice. Most of the Marines smoked and they were soon
+disgustedly smoking Japanese-issue brands. They found that the separate
+paper filters that came with the cigarettes were necessary to keep the
+fast-burning tobacco from scorching their lips. The retreating ships
+had also hauled away empty sand bags and valuable engineer tools. So
+the Marines used Japanese shovels to fill Japanese rice bags with sand
+to strengthen their defensive positions.
+
+[Illustration: U.S. 90mm Antiaircraft Gun]
+
+The Marines dug in along the beaches between the Tenaru and the ridges
+west of Kukum. A Japanese counter-landing was a distinct possibility.
+Inland of the beaches, defensive gun pits and foxholes lined the west
+bank of the Tenaru and crowned the hills that faced west toward the
+Matanikau River and Point Cruz. South of the airfield where densely
+jungled ridges and ravines abounded, the beachhead perimeter was
+guarded by outposts and these were manned in large part by combat
+support troops. The engineer, pioneer, and amphibious tractor battalion
+all had their positions on the front line. In fact, any Marine with a
+rifle, and that was virtually every Marine, stood night defensive duty.
+There was no place within the perimeter that could be counted safe from
+enemy infiltration.
+
+[Illustration:
+
+    Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 150993
+
+_Col Kiyono Ichiki, a battle-seasoned Japanese Army veteran, led his
+force in an impetuous and ill-fated attack on strong Marine positions
+in the Battle of the Tenaru on the night of 20-21 August._]
+
+Almost as Turner’s transports sailed away, the Japanese began a
+pattern of harassing air attacks on the beachhead. Sometimes the raids
+came during the day, but the 3d Defense Battalion’s 90mm antiaircraft
+guns forced the bombers to fly too high for effective bombing. The
+erratic pattern of bombs, however, meant that no place was safe near
+the airfield, the preferred target, and no place could claim it was
+bomb-free. The most disturbing aspect of Japanese air attacks soon
+became the nightly harassment by Japanese aircraft which singly,
+it seemed, roamed over the perimeter, dropping bombs and flares
+indiscriminately. The nightly visitors, whose planes’ engines were soon
+well known sounds, won the singular title “Washing Machine Charlie,”
+at first, and later, “Louie the Louse,” when their presence heralded
+Japanese shore bombardment. Technically, “Charlie” was a twin-engine
+night bomber from Rabaul. “Louie” was a cruiser float plane that
+signalled to the bombardment ships. But the harassed Marines used the
+names interchangeably.
+
+Even though most of the division’s heavy engineering equipment had
+disappeared with the Navy’s transports, the resourceful Marines soon
+completed the airfield’s runway with captured Japanese gear. On 12
+August Admiral McCain’s aide piloted in a PBY-5 Catalina flying boat
+and bumped to a halt on what was now officially Henderson Field, named
+for a Marine pilot, Major Lofton R. Henderson, lost at Midway. The Navy
+officer pronounced the airfield fit for fighter use and took off with a
+load of wounded Marines, the first of 2,879 to be evacuated. Henderson
+Field was the centerpiece of Vandegrift’s strategy; he would hold it at
+all costs.
+
+Although it was only 2,000 feet long and lacked a taxiway and adequate
+drainage, the tiny airstrip, often riddled with potholes and rendered
+unusable because of frequent, torrential downpours, was essential to
+the success of the landing force. With it operational, supplies could
+be flown in and wounded flown out. At least in the Marines’ minds, Navy
+ships ceased to be the only lifeline for the defenders.
+
+While Vandegrift’s Marines dug in east and west of Henderson Field,
+Japanese headquarters in Rabaul planned what it considered an effective
+response to the American offensive. Misled by intelligence estimates
+that the Marines numbered perhaps 2,000 men, Japanese staff officers
+believed that a modest force quickly sent could overwhelm the invaders.
+
+On 12 August, CinCPac determined that a sizable Japanese force was
+massing at Truk to steam to the Solomons and attempt to eject the
+Americans. Ominously, the group included the heavy carriers _Shokaku_
+and _Zuikaku_ and the light carrier _Ryujo_. Despite the painful losses
+at Savo Island, the only significant increases to American naval forces
+in the Solomons was the assignment of a new battleship, the _South
+Dakota_ (BB 57).
+
+[Illustration: _Of his watercolor painting “Instructions to a Patrol,”
+Capt Donald L. Dickson said that three men have volunteered to locate
+a Japanese bivouac. The one in the center is a clean-cut corporal with
+the bearing of a high-school athlete. The man on the right is “rough
+and ready.” To the one at left, it’s just another job; he may do it
+heroically, but it’s just another job._
+
+    Captain Donald L. Dickson, USMCR
+]
+
+Imperial General Headquarters in Tokyo had ordered Lieutenant General
+Haruyoshi Hyakutake’s _Seventeenth Army_ to attack the Marine
+perimeter. For his assault force, Hyakutake chose the _35th Infantry
+Brigade_ (Reinforced), commanded by Major General Kiyotake Kawaguchi.
+At the time, Kawaguchi’s main force was in the Palaus. Hyakutake
+selected a crack infantry regiment--the _28th_--commanded by Colonel
+Kiyono Ichiki to land first. Alerted for its mission while it was at
+Guam, the Ichiki Detachment assault echelon, one battalion of 900
+men, was transported to the Solomons on the only shipping available,
+six destroyers. As a result the troops carried just small amounts of
+ordnance and supplies. A follow-on echelon of 1,200 of Ichiki’s troops
+was to join the assault battalion on Guadalcanal.
+
+[Illustration:
+
+    National Archives Photo 80-G-37932
+
+_On 20 August, the first Marine Corps aircraft such as this F4F Grumman
+Wildcat landed on Henderson Field to begin combat air operations
+against the Japanese._]
+
+While the Japanese landing force was headed for Guadalcanal, the
+Japanese already on the island provided an unpleasant reminder that
+they, too, were full of fight. A captured enemy naval rating, taken in
+the constant patrolling to the west of the perimeter, indicated that a
+Japanese group wanted to surrender near the village of Kokumbona, seven
+miles west of the Matanikau. This was the area that Lieutenant Colonel
+Goettge considered held most of the enemy troops who had fled the
+airfield. On the night of 12 August, a reconnaissance patrol of 25 men
+led by Goettge himself left the perimeter by landing craft. The patrol
+landed near its objective, was ambushed, and virtually wiped out. Only
+three men managed to swim and wade back to the Marine lines. The bodies
+of the other members of the patrol were never found. To this day, the
+fate of the Goettge patrol continues to intrigue researchers.
+
+After the loss of Goettge and his men, vigilance increased on the
+perimeter. On the 14th, a fabled character, the coastwatcher Martin
+Clemens, came strolling out of the jungle into the Marine lines. He
+had watched the landing from the hills south of the airfield and now
+brought his bodyguard of native policemen with him. A retired sergeant
+major of the British Solomon Islands Constabulary, Jacob C. Vouza,
+volunteered about this time to search out Japanese to the east of
+the perimeter, where patrol sightings and contacts had indicated the
+Japanese might have effected a landing.
+
+The ominous news of Japanese sightings to the east and west of the
+perimeter were balanced out by the joyous word that more Marines
+had landed. This time the Marines were aviators. On 20 August, two
+squadrons of Marine Aircraft Group (MAG)-23 were launched from the
+escort carrier _Long Island_ (CVE-1) located 200 miles southeast of
+Guadalcanal. Captain John L. Smith led 19 Grumman F4F-4 Wildcats of
+Marine Fighting Squadron (VMF)-223 onto Henderson’s narrow runway.
+Smith’s fighters were followed by Major Richard C. Mangrum’s Marine
+Scout-Bombing Squadron (VMSB)-232 with 12 Douglas SBD-3 Dauntless dive
+bombers.
+
+From this point of the campaign, the radio identification for
+Guadalcanal, Cactus, became increasingly synonymous with the island.
+The Marine planes became the first elements of what would informally be
+known as Cactus Air Force.
+
+[Illustration: _The first Army Air Forces P-400 Bell Air Cobras arrived
+on Guadalcanal on 22 August, two days after the first Marine planes,
+and began operations immediately._
+
+    National Archives Photo 208-N-4932
+]
+
+Wasting no time, the Marine pilots were soon in action against the
+Japanese naval aircraft which frequently attacked Guadalcanal. Smith
+shot down his first enemy Zero fighter on 21 August; three days later
+VMF-223’s Wildcats intercepted a strong Japanese aerial attack force
+and downed 16 enemy planes. In this action, Captain Marion E. Carl, a
+veteran of Midway, shot down three planes. On the 22d, coastwatchers
+alerted Cactus to an approaching air attack and 13 of 16 enemy bombers
+were destroyed. At the same time, Mangrum’s dive bombers damaged
+three enemy destroyer-transports attempting to reach Guadalcanal. On
+24 August, the American attacking aircraft, which now included Navy
+scout-bombers from the _Saratoga_’s Scouting Squadron (VS) 5, succeeded
+in turning back a Japanese reinforcement convoy of warships and
+destroyers.
+
+On 22 August, five Bell P-400 Air Cobras of the Army’s 67th Fighter
+Squadron had landed at Henderson, followed within the week by nine more
+Air Cobras. The Army planes, which had serious altitude and climb-rate
+deficiencies, were destined to see most action in ground combat support
+roles.
+
+The frenzied action in what became known as the Battle of the Eastern
+Solomons was matched ashore. Japanese destroyers had delivered the
+vanguard of the Ichiki force at Taivu Point, 25 miles east of the
+Marine perimeter. A long-range patrol of Marines from Company A, 1st
+Battalion, 1st Marines ambushed a sizable Japanese force near Taivu on
+19 August. The Japanese dead were readily identified as Army troops and
+the debris of their defeat included fresh uniforms and a large amount
+of communication gear. Clearly, a new phase of the fighting had begun.
+All Japanese encountered to this point had been naval troops.
+
+Alerted by patrols, the Marines now dug in along the Ilu River, often
+misnamed the Tenaru on Marine maps, were ready for Colonel Ichiki. The
+Japanese commander’s orders directed him to “quickly recapture and
+maintain the airfield at Guadalcanal,” and his own directive to his
+troops emphasized that they would fight “to the last breath of the last
+man.” And they did.
+
+[Illustration: U.S. M-3 Light Tank]
+
+Too full of his mission to wait for the rest of his regiment and sure
+that he faced only a few thousand men overall, Ichiki marched from
+Taivu to the Marines’ lines. Before he attacked on the night of the
+20th, a bloody figure stumbled out of the jungle with a warning that
+the Japanese were coming. It was Sergeant Major Vouza. Captured by the
+Japanese, who found a small American flag secreted in his loincloth, he
+was tortured in a failed attempt to gain information on the invasion
+force. Tied to a tree, bayonetted twice through the chest, and beaten
+with rifle butts, the resolute Vouza chewed through his bindings
+to escape. Taken to Lieutenant Colonel Edwin A. Pollock, whose 2d
+Battalion, 1st Marines held the Ilu mouth’s defenses, he gasped a
+warning that an estimated 250-500 Japanese soldiers were coming behind
+him. The resolute Vouza, rushed immediately to an aid station and then
+to the division hospital, miraculously survived his ordeal and was
+awarded a Silver Star for his heroism by General Vandegrift, and later
+a Legion of Merit. Vandegrift also made Vouza an honorary sergeant
+major of U.S. Marines.
+
+At 0130 on 21 August, Ichiki’s troops stormed the Marines’ lines in a
+screaming, frenzied display of the “spiritual strength” which they had
+been assured would sweep aside their American enemy. As the Japanese
+charged across the sand bar astride the Ilu’s mouth, Pollock’s Marines
+cut them down. After a mortar preparation, the Japanese tried again
+to storm past the sand bar. A section of 37mm guns sprayed the enemy
+force with deadly canister. Lieutenant Colonel Lenard B. Cresswell’s
+1st Battalion, 1st Marines moved upstream on the Ilu at daybreak, waded
+across the sluggish, 50-foot-wide stream, and moved on the flank of the
+Japanese. Wildcats from VMF-223 strafed the beleagured enemy force.
+Five light tanks blasted the retreating Japanese. By 1700, as the sun
+was setting, the battle ended.
+
+Colonel Ichiki, disgraced in his own mind by his defeat, burned his
+regimental colors and shot himself. Close to 800 of his men joined
+him in death. The few survivors fled eastward towards Taivu Point.
+Rear Admiral Raizo Tanaka, whose reinforcement force of transports and
+destroyers was largely responsible for the subsequent Japanese troop
+buildup on Guadalcanal, recognized that the unsupported Japanese attack
+was sheer folly and reflected that “this tragedy should have taught us
+the hopelessness of bamboo spear tactics.” Fortunately for the Marines,
+Ichiki’s overconfidence was not unique among Japanese commanders.
+
+[Illustration:
+
+    Captain Donald L. Dickson, USMCR
+
+_Capt Donald L. Dickson said of his watercolor: “I wanted to catch on
+paper the feeling one has as a shell comes whistling over.... There is
+a sense of being alone, naked and unprotected. And time seems endless
+until the shell strikes somewhere.”_]
+
+Following the 1st Marines’ tangle with the Ichiki detachment, General
+Vandegrift was inspired to write the Marine Commandant, Lieutenant
+General Thomas Holcomb, and report: “These youngsters are the darndest
+people when they get started you ever saw.” And all the Marines on
+the island, young and old, tyro and veteran, were becoming accomplished
+jungle fighters. They were no longer “trigger happy” as many had been
+in their first days ashore, shooting at shadows and imagined enemy.
+They were waiting for targets, patrolling with enthusiasm, sure of
+themselves. The misnamed Battle of the Tenaru had cost Colonel Hunt’s
+regiment 34 killed in action and 75 wounded. All the division’s Marines
+now felt they were bloodied. What the men on Tulagi, Gavutu, and
+Tanambogo and those of the Ilu had done was prove that the 1st Marine
+Division would hold fast to what it had won.
+
+[Illustration: _Cactus Air Force commander, MajGen Roy S. Geiger,
+poses with Capt Joseph J. Foss, the leading ace at Guadalcanal with
+26 Japanese aircraft downed. Capt Foss was later awarded the Medal of
+Honor for his heroic exploits in the air._
+
+    Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 52622
+]
+
+While the division’s Marines and sailors had earned a breathing spell
+as the Japanese regrouped for another onslaught, the action in the air
+over the Solomons intensified. Almost every day, Japanese aircraft
+arrived around noon to bomb the perimeter. Marine fighter pilots
+found the twin-engine Betty bombers easy targets; Zero fighters were
+another story. Although the Wildcats were a much sturdier aircraft, the
+Japanese Zeros’ superior speed and better maneuverability gave them a
+distinct edge in a dogfight. The American planes, however, when warned
+by the coastwatchers of Japanese attacks, had time to climb above the
+oncoming enemy and preferably attacked by making firing runs during
+high speed dives. Their tactics made the air space over the Solomons
+dangerous for the Japanese. On 29 August, the carrier _Ryujo_ launched
+aircraft for a strike against the airstrip. Smith’s Wildcats shot down
+16, with a loss of four of their own. Still, the Japanese continued to
+strike at Henderson Field without letup. Two days after the _Ryujo_
+raid, enemy bombers inflicted heavy damage on the airfield, setting
+aviation fuel ablaze and incinerating parked aircraft. VMF-223’s
+retaliation was a further bag of 13 attackers.
+
+On 30 August, two more MAG-23 squadrons, VMF-224 and VMSB-231, flew in
+to Henderson. The air reinforcements were more than welcome. Steady
+combat attrition, frequent damage in the air and on the ground, and
+scant repair facilities and parts kept the number of aircraft available
+a dwindling resource.
+
+Plainly, General Vandegrift needed infantry reinforcements as much
+as he did additional aircraft. He brought the now-combined raider and
+parachute battalions, both under Edson’s command, and the 2d Battalion,
+5th Marines, over to Guadalcanal from Tulagi. This gave the division
+commander a chance to order out larger reconnaissance patrols to probe
+for the Japanese. On 27 August, the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, made a
+shore-to-shore landing near Kokumbona and marched back to the beachhead
+without any measurable results. If the Japanese were out there beyond
+the Matanikau--and they were--they watched the Marines and waited for a
+better opportunity to attack.
+
+
+[Sidebar (page 5): First Marine Utility Uniform Issued in World War II
+
+The United States Marine Corps entered World War II wearing essentially
+the same summer field uniform that it had worn during the “Banana
+Wars.” The Marines defending America’s Pacific outposts on Guam, Wake
+Island, and in the Philippines in the late months of 1941 wore a
+summer field uniform consisting of a khaki cotton shirt and trousers,
+leggings, and a M1917A1 steel helmet. Plans to change this uniform had
+been underway for at least one year prior to the opening of hostilities.
+
+As had the Army, the Marine Corps had used a loose-fitting blue denim
+fatigue uniform for work details and some field exercises since the
+1920s. This fatigue uniform was either a one-piece coverall or a
+two-piece bib overall and jacket, both with “USMC” metal buttons. In
+June 1940, it was replaced by a green cotton coverall. This uniform
+and the summer field uniform were replaced by what would become known
+as the utility uniform. Approved for general issue on the Marine
+Corps’ 166th birthday, 10 November 1941, this new uniform was made of
+sage-green (although “olive drab” was called for in the specifications)
+herringbone twill cotton, then a popular material for civilian work
+clothing. The two-piece uniform consisted of a coat (often referred to
+as a “jacket” by Marines) and trousers. In 1943, a cap made of the same
+material would be issued.
+
+The loose-fitting coat was closed down the front by four two-piece
+rivetted bronze-finished steel buttons, each bearing the words “U.S.
+MARINE CORPS” in relief. The cuffs were closed by similar buttons. Two
+large patch pockets were sewn on the front skirts of the jacket and a
+single patch pocket was stitched to the left breast. This pocket had
+the Marine Corps eagle, globe, and anchor insignia and the letters
+“USMC” stencilled on it in black ink. The trousers, worn with and
+without the khaki canvas leggings, had two slashed front pockets and
+two rear patch pockets.
+
+[Illustration]
+
+The new uniform was issued to the flood of new recruits crowding
+the recruit depots in the early months of 1942 and was first worn
+in combat during the landing on Guadalcanal in August 1942. This
+uniform was subsequently worn by Marines of all arms from the Solomons
+Campaign to the end of the war. Originally, the buttons on the coat
+and the trousers were all copper-plated, but an emergency alternate
+specification was approved on 15 August 1942, eight days after the
+landing on Guadalcanal, which allowed for a variety of finishes on the
+buttons. Towards the end of the war, a new “modified” utility uniform
+which had been developed after Tarawa was also issued, in addition
+to a variety of camouflage uniforms. All of these utility uniforms,
+along with Army-designed Ml helmets and Marine Corps-designed cord and
+rubber-soled rough-side-out leather “boondocker” shoes, would be worn
+throughout the war in the Pacific, during the postwar years, and into
+the Korean War.--_Kenneth L. Smith-Christmas_
+]
+
+
+[Sidebar (page 11): LVT (1)--The ‘Amtrac’
+
+While the Marine Corps was developing amphibious warfare doctrine
+during the 1920s and 1930s, it was apparent that a motorized amphibian
+vehicle was needed to transport men and equipment from ships across
+fringing reefs and beaches into battle, particularly when the beach was
+defended.
+
+In 1940, the Marines adopted the Landing Vehicle, Tracked (1), designed
+by Donald Roebling. More commonly known as the “amtrac” (short for
+amphibian tractor), the LVT(1) had a driver’s cab in front and a small
+engine compartment in the rear, with the bulk of the body used for
+carrying space. During the next three years, 1,225 LVT(1)s were built,
+primarily by the Food Machinery Corporation.
+
+The LVT(1) was constructed of welded steel and was propelled on both
+land and water by paddle-type treads. Designed solely as a supply
+vehicle, it could carry 4,500 pounds of cargo. In August 1942, the
+LVT(1) first saw combat on Guadalcanal with the 1st Amphibian Tractor
+Battalion, 1st Marine Division. Throughout the Solomon Islands
+campaigns, the LVT(1) provided Marines all types of logistical support,
+moving thousands of tons of supplies to the front lines. At times they
+also were pressed into tactical use: moving artillery pieces, holding
+defensive positions, and occasionally supporting Marines in the attack
+with their machine guns. They also were used as pontoons to support
+bridges across Guadalcanal rivers.
+
+The LVT proved to be more seaworthy than a boat of comparable size; it
+was able to remain afloat with its entire cargo hold full of water.
+However, defects in the design soon became apparent. The paddle treads
+on the tracks and the rigid suspension system were both susceptible
+to damage when driven on land and did not provide the desired speeds
+on land or water. Although the LVT(1) performed admirably against
+undefended beachheads, its lack of armor made it unsuitable for
+assaults against the heavily defended islands of the central Pacific.
+This weakness was apparent during the fighting in the Solomon Islands,
+but LVT(1)s with improvised armor were still in use at the assault on
+Tarawa, where 75 percent of them were lost in three days.
+
+The LVT(1) proved its value and validated the amphibious vehicle
+concept through the great versatility and mobility it demonstrated
+throughout numerous campaigns in the Pacific. Although intended
+solely for supply purposes, it was thrust into combat use in early
+war engagements. In its initial role as a support vehicle, the LVT(1)
+delivered ammunition, supplies and reinforcements that made the
+difference between victory and defeat.--_Second Lieutenant Wesley L.
+Feight, USMC_
+
+[Illustration]
+]
+
+
+[Sidebar (page 14): General Vandegrift and His 1st Marine Division
+Staff
+
+Whenever a work about the Guadalcanal operation is published, one of
+the pictures always included is that of Major General Alexander A.
+Vandegrift, 1st Marine Division commanding general, and his staff
+officers and commanders, who posed for the photograph on 11 August
+1942, just four days after the assault landings on the island. Besides
+General Vandegrift, there are 40 Marines and one naval officer in
+this picture, and each one deserves a page of his own in Marine Corps
+history.
+
+Among the Marines, 23 were promoted to general officer rank and three
+became Commandants of the Marine Corps: General Vandegrift and Colonels
+Cates and Pate. The naval officer, division surgeon Commander Warwick
+T. Brown, MC, USN, also made flag officer rank while on active duty and
+was promoted to vice admiral upon retirement.
+
+Four of the officers in the picture served in three wars. Lieutenant
+Colonels Gerald C. Thomas, division operations officer, and Randolph
+McC. Pate, division logistics officer, served in both World Wars I
+and II, and each commanded the 1st Marine Division in Korea. Colonel
+William J. Whaling similarly served in World Wars I and II, and was
+General Thomas’ assistant division commander in Korea. Major Henry W.
+Buse, Jr., assistant operations officer, served in World War II, Korea,
+and the Vietnam War. Others served in two wars--World Wars I and II,
+or World War II and Korea. Represented in the photograph is a total
+of nearly 700 years of cumulative experience on active Marine Corps
+service.
+
+Three key members of the division--the Assistant Division Commander,
+Brigadier General William H. Rupertus; the Assistant Chief of Staff,
+G-1, Colonel Robert C. Kilmartin, Jr.; and the commanding officer of
+the 1st Raider Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Merritt A. Edson--were not
+in this picture for a good reason. They were on Tulagi, where Rupertus
+headed the Tulagi Command Group with Kilmartin as his chief of staff,
+and Edson commanded the combat troops. Also notably absent from this
+photograph was the commander of the 7th Marines, Colonel James C. Webb,
+who had not joined the division from Samoa, where the regiment had been
+sent before the division deployed overseas.
+
+In his memoir, _Once a Marine_, General Vandegrift explained why this
+photograph was taken. The division’s morale was affected by the fact
+that Vice Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher was forced to withdraw his
+fleet from the area--with many of his ships not yet fully unloaded
+and holding more than half of the division’s supplies still needed
+ashore. Adding to the Marines’ uneasiness at seeing their naval support
+disappear below the horizon, was the fact that they had been under
+almost constant enemy air attacks beginning shortly after their landing
+on Guadalcanal. In an effort to counter the adverse influence on morale
+of the day and night air attacks, Vandegrift began making tours of the
+division perimeter every morning to talk to as many of his Marines as
+possible, and to keep a personal eye on the command. As he noted:
+
+  By August 11, the full impact of the vanished transports was
+  permeating the command, so again I called a conference of my staff
+  and command officers.... I ended the conference by posing with this
+  fine group of officers, a morale device that worked because they
+  thought if I went to the trouble of having the picture taken then I
+  obviously planned to enjoy it in future years.
+
+Recently, General Merrill B. “Bill” Twining, on Guadalcanal a
+lieutenant colonel and assistant D-3, recalled the circumstances of the
+photograph and philosophized about the men who appeared in it:
+
+  The group is lined up on the slope of the coral ridge which
+  provided a degree of protection from naval gunfire coming from the
+  north and was therefore selected as division CP....
+
+  There was no vital reason for the conclave. I think V[andegrift]
+  just wanted to see who was in his outfit. Do you realize these
+  people had never been together before? Some came from as far away
+  as Iceland....
+
+  V[andegrift] mainly introduced himself, gave a brief pep talk....
+  I have often been asked how we could afford to congregate all
+  this talent in the face of the enemy. We didn’t believe we (_at
+  the moment_) faced any threat from the Japanese. The defense area
+  was small and every responsible commander could reach his CP in 5
+  minutes and after all there were a lot of good people along those
+  lines. Most of the fresh-caught second lieutenants were battalion
+  commanders two years later. We believed in each other and trusted.
+
+            --_Benis M. Frank_
+
+The General and His Officers on Guadalcanal, According to the Chart
+
+[Illustration]
+
+[Illustration]
+
+     1. Col George R. Rowan
+     2. Col Pedro A. del Valle
+     3. Col William C. James
+     4. MajGen Alexander A. Vandegrift
+     5. LtCol Gerald C. Thomas
+     6. Col Clifton B. Cates
+     7. Col Randolph McC. Pate
+     8. Cdr Warwick T. Brown, USN
+     9. Col William J. Whaling
+    10. Col Frank B. Goettge
+    11. Col LeRoy P. Hunt, Jr.
+    12. LtCol Frederick C. Biebush
+    13. LtCol Edwin A. Pollock
+    14. LtCol Edmund J. Buckley
+    15. LtCol Walter W. Barr
+    16. LtCol Raymond P. Coffman
+    17. LtCol Francis R. Geraci
+    18. LtCol William E. Maxwell
+    19. LtCol Edward G. Hagen
+    20. LtCol William N. McKelvy, Jr.
+    21. LtCol Julian N. Frisbie
+    22. Maj Milton V. O’Connell
+    23. Maj William Chalfant III
+    24. Maj Horace W. Fuller
+    25. Maj Forest C. Thompson
+    26. Maj Robert G. Ballance
+    27. Maj Henry C. Buse, Jr.
+    28. Maj James W. Frazer
+    29. Maj Henry H. Crockett
+    30. LtCol Lenard B. Cresswell
+    31. Maj Robert O. Brown
+    32. LtCol John A. Bemis
+    33. Col Kenneth W. Benner
+    34. Maj Robert B. Luckey
+    35. LtCol Samuel B. Taxis
+    36. LtCol Eugene H. Price
+    37. LtCol Merrill B. Twining
+    38. LtCol Walker A. Reaves
+    39. LtCol John D. Macklin
+    40. LtCol Hawley C. Waterman
+    41. Maj James C. Murray, Jr.
+]
+
+
+[Sidebar (page 17): The Coastwatchers
+
+A group of fewer than 1,500 native Coastwatchers served as the eyes and
+ears of Allied forces in reporting movements of Japanese units on the
+ground, in the air, and at sea.
+
+Often performing their jobs in remote jungle outposts, the
+Coastwatchers were possessed of both mental and physical courage.
+Their knowledge of the geography and peoples of the Pacific made them
+invaluable additions to the Allied war effort.
+
+The concept for this service originated in 1919 in a proposal by the
+Royal Australian Navy to form a civilian coastwatching organization
+to provide early warning in the event of an invasion. By the outbreak
+of war in September 1939, approximately 800 persons were serving as
+coastwatchers, operating observation posts mainly on the Australian
+coast. They were, at the outset, government officials aided by
+missionaries and planters who, as war with Japan neared, were placed
+under the control of the intelligence section of the Australian Navy.
+
+[Illustration: _Coastwatcher Capt W. F. Martin Clemens, British Solomon
+Islands Defence Force, poses with some of his constabulary._
+
+    National Archives Photo 80-G-17080 courtesy of Richard Frank
+]
+
+By 1942, the system of coastwatchers and the accompanying intelligence
+network covered an area of 500,000 square miles, and was placed
+under the control of the Allied Intelligence Bureau (AIB). The AIB
+coordinated Allied intelligence activities in the southwest Pacific,
+and had as its initial principal mission the collection of all possible
+information about the enemy in the vicinity of Guadalcanal.
+
+Coastwatchers proved extremely useful to U.S. Marine forces in
+providing reports on the number and movement of Japanese troops.
+Officers from the 1st Marine Division obtained accurate information
+on the location of enemy forces in their objective areas, and were
+provided vital reports on approaching Japanese bombing raids. On 8
+August 1942, Coastwatcher Jack Reed on Bougainville alerted American
+forces to an upcoming raid by 40 Japanese bombers, which resulted in
+36 of the enemy planes being destroyed. The “early warning system”
+provided by the Coastwatchers helped Marine forces on Guadalcanal to
+hold onto the Henderson Field airstrip.
+
+The Coastwatchers also rescued and sheltered 118 Allied pilots,
+including Marines, during the Solomons Campaign, often at the immediate
+risk of their own lives. Pipe-smoking Coastwatcher Reed also was
+responsible for coordinating the evacuation on Bougainville of four
+nuns and 25 civilians by the U.S. submarine _Nautilus_.
+
+It is unknown exactly how many Coastwatchers paid the ultimate
+sacrifice in the performance of their duties. Many died in anonymity,
+without knowledge of the contribution their services had made to
+final victory. Perhaps they would be gratified to know that no
+less an authority than Admiral William F. Halsey recorded that
+the Coastwatchers saved Guadalcanal, and Guadalcanal saved the
+Pacific.--_Robert V. Aquilina_
+]
+
+
+[Sidebar (page 19): The 1st Marine Division Patch
+
+[Illustration]
+
+The 1st Division shoulder patch originally was authorized for wear by
+members of units who were organic or attached to the division in its
+four landings in the Pacific War. It was the first unit patch to be
+authorized for wear in World War II and specifically commemorated the
+division’s sacrifices and victory in the battle for Guadalcanal.
+
+As recalled by General Merrill B. Twining, a lieutenant colonel and the
+division’s operations officer on Guadalcanal, for a short time before
+the 1st left Guadalcanal for Australia, there had been some discussion
+by the senior staff about uniforming the troops. It appeared that the
+Marines might have to wear Army uniforms, which meant that they would
+lose their identity and Twining came up with the idea for a division
+patch. A number of different designs were devised by both Lieutenant
+Colonel Twining and Captain Donald L. Dickson, adjutant of the 5th
+Marines, who had been an artist in civilian life. The one which Twining
+prepared on the flight out of Guadalcanal was approved by Major General
+Alexander A. Vandegrift, the division commander.
+
+General Twining further recalled that he drew a diamond in his notebook
+and “in the middle of the diamond I doodled a numeral one ... [and]
+I sketched in the word ‘Guadalcanal’ down its length.... I got to
+thinking that the whole operation had been under the Southern Cross, so
+I drew that in, too.... About an hour later I took the drawing up to
+the front of the aircraft to General Vandegrift. He said, ‘Yes, that’s
+it!’ and wrote his initials, A.A.V., on the bottom of the notebook
+page.”
+
+[Illustration: _Designer of the patch, LtCol Merrill B. Twining (later
+Gen) sits in the 1st Marine Division operations bunker. Behind him is
+his assistant D-3, a very tired Maj Henry IV. Buse, Jr._]
+
+After he arrived in Brisbane, Australia, Colonel Twining bought a
+child’s watercolor set and, while confined to his hotel room by a bout
+of malaria, drew a bunch of diamonds on a big sheet, coloring each one
+differently. He then took samples to General Vandegrift, who chose one
+which was colored a shade of blue that he liked. Then Twining took
+the sketch to the Australian Knitting Mills to have it reproduced,
+pledging the credit of the post exchange funds to pay for the patches’
+manufacture. Within a week or two the patches began to roll off the
+knitting machines, and Colonel Twining was there to approve them.
+General Twining further recalled: “After they came off the machine, I
+picked up a sheet of them. They looked very good, and when they were
+cut, I picked up one of the patches. It was one of the first off the
+machine.”
+
+The division’s post exchanges began selling the patches almost
+immediately and they proved to be popular, with Marines buying extras
+to give away as souvenirs to Australian friends or to send home to
+families. Before long, newly established Marine divisions, as well as
+the raider and parachute units, and as the aircraft wings, sea-going
+Marines, Fleet Marine Force Pacific units, and others, were authorized
+to have their own distinctive patch, a total of 33, following the lead
+of the 1st Marine Division. Marines returning to the United States for
+duty or on leave from a unit having a distinctive shoulder insignia
+were authorized to wear that insignia until they were assigned to
+another unit having a shoulder patch of its own. For many 1st Marine
+Division men joining another unit and having to relinquish the wearing
+of the 1st Division patch, this rankled.
+
+Shortly after the end of the war, Colonel Twining went to now-Marine
+Commandant General Vandegrift saying that he “no longer thought Marines
+should wear anything on their uniforms to distinguish them from other
+Marines. He agreed and the patches came off for good.”--_Benis M. Frank_
+]
+
+
+
+
+_September and the Ridge_
+
+
+Admiral McCain visited Guadalcanal at the end of August, arriving
+in time to greet the aerial reinforcements he had ordered forward,
+and also in time for a taste of Japanese nightly bombing. He got to
+experience, too, what was becoming another unwanted feature of Cactus
+nights: bombardment by Japanese cruisers and destroyers. General
+Vandegrift noted that McCain had gotten a dose of the “normal ration
+of shells.” The admiral saw enough to signal his superiors that
+increased support for Guadalcanal operations was imperative and that
+the “situation admits no delay whatsoever.” He also sent a prophetic
+message to Admirals King and Nimitz: “Cactus can be a sinkhole for
+enemy air power and can be consolidated, expanded, and exploited to the
+enemy’s mortal hurt.”
+
+On 3 September, the Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing,
+Brigadier General Roy S. Geiger, and his assistant wing commander,
+Colonel Louis Woods, moved forward to Guadalcanal to take charge of
+air operations. The arrival of the veteran Marine aviators provided
+an instant lift to the morale of the pilots and ground crews. It
+reinforced their belief that they were at the leading edge of air
+combat, that they were setting the pace for the rest of Marine
+aviation. Vandegrift could thankfully turn over the day-to-day
+management of the aerial defenses of Cactus to the able and experienced
+Geiger. There was no shortage of targets for the mixed air force of
+Marine, Army, and Navy flyers. Daily air attacks by the Japanese,
+coupled with steady reinforcement attempts by Tanaka’s destroyers
+and transports, meant that every type of plane that could lift off
+Henderson’s runway was airborne as often as possible. Seabees had begun
+work on a second airstrip, Fighter One, which could relieve some of the
+pressure on the primary airfield.
+
+[Illustration:
+
+    National Archives Photo 80-G-29536-413C
+
+_This is an oblique view of Henderson Field looking north with
+Ironbottom Sound (Sealark Channel) in the background. At the left
+center is the “Pagoda,” operations center of Cactus Air Force flyers
+throughout their first months of operations ashore._]
+
+Most of General Kawaguchi’s brigade had reached Guadalcanal. Those
+who hadn’t, missed their landfall forever as a result of American air
+attacks. Kawaguchi had in mind a surprise attack on the heart of the
+Marine position, a thrust from the jungle directly at the airfield. To
+reach his jumpoff position, the Japanese general would have to move
+through difficult terrain unobserved, carving his way through the dense
+vegetation out of sight of Marine patrols. The rugged approach route
+would lead him to a prominent ridge topped by Kunai grass which wove
+snake-like through the jungle to within a mile of Henderson’s runway.
+Unknown to the Japanese, General Vandegrift planned on moving his
+headquarters to the shelter of a spot at the inland base of this ridge,
+a site better protected, it was hoped, from enemy bombing and shellfire.
+
+[Illustration: _Marine ground crewmen attempt to put out one of many
+fires occuring after a Japanese bombing raid on Henderson Field causing
+the loss of much-needed aircraft._
+
+    Marine Corps Personal Papers Collection
+]
+
+The success of Kawaguchi’s plan depended upon the Marines keeping the
+inland perimeter thinly manned while they concentrated their forces on
+the east and west flanks. This was not to be. Available intelligence,
+including a captured enemy map, pointed to the likelihood of an attack
+on the airfield and Vandegrift moved his combined raider-parachute
+battalion to the most obvious enemy approach route, the ridge. Colonel
+Edson’s men, who scouted Savo Island after moving to Guadalcanal
+and destroyed a Japanese supply base at Tasimboko in another
+shore-to-shore raid, took up positions on the forward slopes of the
+ridge at the edge of the encroaching jungle on 10 September. Their
+commander later said that he “was firmly convinced that we were in the
+path of the next Jap attack.” Earlier patrols had spotted a sizable
+Japanese force approaching. Accordingly, Edson patrolled extensively as
+his men dug in on the ridge and in the flanking jungle. On the 12th,
+the Marines made contact with enemy patrols confirming the fact that
+Japanese troops were definitely “out front.” Kawaguchi had about 2,000
+of his men with him, enough he thought to punch through to the airfield.
+
+Japanese planes had dropped 500-pound bombs along the ridge on the 11th
+and enemy ships began shelling the area after nightfall on the 12th,
+once the threat of American air attacks subsided. The first Japanese
+thrust came at 2100 against Edson’s left flank. Boiling out of the
+jungle, the enemy soldiers attacked fearlessly into the face of rifle
+and machine gun fire, closing to bayonet range. They were thrown back.
+They came again, this time against the right flank, penetrating the
+Marines’ positions. Again they were thrown back. A third attack closed
+out the night’s action. Again it was a close affair, but by 0230 Edson
+told Vandegrift his men could hold. And they did.
+
+[Illustration: _The raging battle of Edson’s Ridge is depicted in all
+its fury in this oil painting by the late Col Donald L. Dickson, who,
+as a captain, was adjutant of the 5th Marines on Guadalcanal. Dickson’s
+artwork later was shown widely in the United States._
+
+    Captain Donald L. Dickson, USMCR
+]
+
+On the morning of 13 September, Edson called his company commanders
+together and told them: “They were just testing, just testing. They’ll
+be back.” He ordered all positions improved and defenses consolidated
+and pulled his lines towards the airfield along the ridge’s center
+spine. The 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, his backup on Tulagi, moved into
+position to reinforce again.
+
+[Illustration: EDSON’S (BLOODY) RIDGE
+
+12-14 SEPTEMBER 1942]
+
+[Illustration: _Edson’s or Raider’s Ridge is calm after the fighting
+on the nights of 12-13 and 13-14 September, when it was the scene of a
+valiant and bloody defense crucial to safeguarding Henderson Field and
+the Marine perimeter on Guadalcanal. The knobs at left background were
+Col Edson’s final defensive position, while Henderson Field lies beyond
+the trees in the background._
+
+    Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 500007
+]
+
+[Illustration:
+
+    Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 310563
+
+_Maj Kenneth D. Bailey, commander of Company C, 1st Raider Battalion,
+was awarded the Medal of Honor posthumously for heroic and inspiring
+leadership during the Battle of Edson’s Ridge._]
+
+The next night’s attacks were as fierce as any man had seen. The
+Japanese were everywhere, fighting hand-to-hand in the Marines’
+foxholes and gun pits and filtering past forward positions to attack
+from the rear. Division Sergeant Major Sheffield Banta shot one in the
+new command post. Colonel Edson appeared wherever the fighting was
+toughest, encouraging his men to their utmost efforts. The man-to-man
+battles lapped over into the jungle on either flank of the ridge, and
+engineer and pioneer positions were attacked. The reserve from the 5th
+Marines was fed into the fight. Artillerymen from the 5th Battalion,
+11th Marines, as they had on the previous night, fired their 105mm
+howitzers at any called target. The range grew as short as 1,600
+yards from tube to impact. The Japanese finally could take no more.
+They pulled back as dawn approached. On the slopes of the ridge and in
+the surrounding jungle they left more than 600 bodies; another 600 men
+were wounded. The remnants of the Kawaguchi force staggered back toward
+their lines to the west, a grueling, hellish eight-day march that saw
+many more of the enemy perish.
+
+The cost to Edson’s force for its epic defense was also heavy.
+Fifty-nine men were dead, 10 were missing in action, and 194 were
+wounded. These losses, coupled with the casualties of Tulagi, Gavutu,
+and Tanambogo, meant the end of the 1st Parachute Battalion as an
+effective fighting unit. Only 89 men of the parachutists’ original
+strength could walk off the ridge, soon in legend to become “Bloody
+Ridge” or “Edson’s Ridge.” Both Colonel Edson and Captain Kenneth D.
+Bailey, commanding the raider’s Company C, were awarded the Medal of
+Honor for their heroic and inspirational actions.
+
+On 13 and 14 September, the Japanese attempted to support Kawaguchi’s
+attack on the ridge with thrusts against the flanks of the Marine
+perimeter. On the east, enemy troops attempting to penetrate the lines
+of the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, were caught in the open on a grass
+plain and smothered by artillery fire; at least 200 died. On the west,
+the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, holding ridge positions covering the
+coastal road, fought off a determined attacking force that reached its
+front lines.
+
+[Illustration: _The Pagoda at Henderson Field, served as headquarters
+for Cactus Air Force throughout the first months of air operations
+on Guadalcanal. From this building, Allied planes were sent against
+Japanese troops on other islands of the Solomons._
+
+    Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 50921
+]
+
+The victory at the ridge gave a great boost to Allied homefront
+morale, and reinforced the opinion of the men ashore on Guadalcanal
+that they could take on anything the enemy could send against them. At
+upper command echelons, the leaders were not so sure that the ground
+Marines and their motley air force could hold. Intercepted Japanese
+dispatches revealed that the myth of the 2,000-man defending force
+had been completely dispelled. Sizable naval forces and two divisions
+of Japanese troops were now committed to conquer the Americans on
+Guadalcanal. Cactus Air Force, augmented frequently by Navy carrier
+squadrons, made the planned reinforcement effort a high-risk venture.
+But it was a risk the Japanese were prepared to take.
+
+On 18 September, the long-awaited 7th Marines, reinforced by the
+1st Battalion, 11th Marines, and other division troops, arrived at
+Guadalcanal. As the men from Samoa landed they were greeted with
+friendly derision by Marines already on the island. The 7th had been
+the first regiment of the 1st Division to go overseas; its men, many
+thought then, were likely to be the first to see combat. The division
+had been careful to send some of its best men to Samoa and now had
+them back. One of the new and salty combat veterans of the 5th Marines
+remarked to a friend in the 7th that he had waited a long time “to see
+our first team get into the game.” Providentially, a separate supply
+convoy reached the island at the same time as the 7th’s arrival,
+bringing with it badly needed aviation gas and the first resupply of
+ammunition since D-Day.
+
+The Navy covering force for the American reinforcement and supply
+convoys was hit hard by Japanese submarines. The carrier _Wasp_ was
+torpedoed and sunk, the battleship _North Carolina_ (BB 55) was
+damaged, and the destroyer _O’Brien_ (DD 415) was hit so badly it
+broke up and sank on its way to drydock. The Navy had accomplished
+its mission, the 7th Marines had landed, but at a terrible cost. About
+the only good result of the devastating Japanese torpedo attacks was
+that the _Wasp_’s surviving aircraft joined Cactus Air Force, as the
+planes of the _Saratoga_ and _Enterprise_ had done when their carriers
+required combat repairs. Now, the _Hornet_ (CV 8) was the only whole
+fleet carrier left in the South Pacific.
+
+As the ships that brought the 7th Marines withdrew, they took with them
+the survivors of the 1st Parachute Battalion and sick bays full of
+badly wounded men. General Vandegrift now had 10 infantry battalions,
+one understrength raider battalion, and five artillery battalions
+ashore; the 3d Battalion, 2d Marines, had come over from Tulagi also.
+He reorganized the defensive perimeter into 10 sectors for better
+control, giving the engineer, pioneer, and amphibian tractor battalions
+sectors along the beach. Infantry battalions manned the other sectors,
+including the inland perimeter in the jungle. Each infantry regiment
+had two battalions on line and one in reserve. Vandegrift also had the
+use of a select group of infantrymen who were training to be scouts and
+snipers under the leadership of Colonel William J. “Wild Bill” Whaling,
+an experienced jungle hand, marksman, and hunter, whom he had appointed
+to run a school to sharpen the division’s fighting skills. As men
+finished their training under Whaling and went back to their outfits,
+others took their place and the Whaling group was available to scout
+and spearhead operations.
+
+Vandegrift now had enough men ashore on Guadalcanal, 19,200, to expand
+his defensive scheme. He decided to seize a forward position along the
+east bank of the Matanikau River, in effect strongly outposting his
+west flank defenses against the probability of strong enemy attacks
+from the area where most Japanese troops were landing. First, however,
+he was going to test the Japanese reaction with a strong probing force.
+
+He chose the fresh 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, commanded by Lieutenant
+Colonel Lewis B. “Chesty” Puller, to move inland along the slopes of
+Mt. Austen and patrol north towards the coast and the Japanese-held
+area. Puller’s battalion ran into Japanese troops bivouacked on the
+slopes of Austen on the 24th and in a sharp firefight had seven men
+killed and 25 wounded. Vandegrift sent the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines,
+forward to reinforce Puller and help provide the men needed to carry
+the casualties out of the jungle. Now reinforced, Puller continued
+his advance, moving down the east bank of the Matanikau. He reached
+the coast on the 26th as planned, where he drew intensive fire from
+enemy positions on the ridges west of the river. An attempt by the 2d
+Battalion, 5th Marines, to cross was beaten back.
+
+About this time, the 1st Raider Battalion, its original mission one of
+establishing a patrol base west of the Matanikau, reached the vicinity
+of the firefight, and joined in. Vandegrift sent Colonel Edson, now the
+commander of the 5th Marines, forward to take charge of the expanded
+force. He was directed to attack on the 27th and decided to send the
+raiders inland to outflank the Japanese defenders. The battalion,
+commanded by Edson’s former executive officer, Lieutenant Colonel
+Samuel B. Griffith II, ran into a hornet’s nest of Japanese who had
+crossed the Matanikau during the night. A garbled message led Edson to
+believe that Griffith’s men were advancing according to plan, so he
+decided to land the companies of the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, behind
+the enemy’s Matanikau position and strike the Japanese from the rear
+while Rosecran’s men attacked across the river.
+
+The landing was made without incident and the 7th Marines’ companies
+moved inland only to be ambushed and cut off from the sea by the
+Japanese. A rescue force of landing craft moved with difficulty through
+Japanese fire, urged on by Puller who accompanied the boats on the
+destroyer _Ballard_ (DD 660). The Marines were evacuated after fighting
+their way to the beach covered by the destroyer’s fire and the machine
+guns of a Marine SBD overhead. Once the 7th Marines companies got
+back to the perimeter, landing near Kukum, the raider and 5th Marines
+battalions pulled back from the Matanikau. The confirmation that the
+Japanese would strongly contest any westward advance cost the Marines
+60 men killed and 100 wounded.
+
+[Illustration: _Shortly after becoming Commander, South Pacific Area
+and Forces, VAdm William F. Halsey visited Guadalcanal and the 1st
+Marine Division. Here he is shown talking with Col Gerald C. Thomas,
+1st Marine Division D-3 (Operations Officer)._
+
+    Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 53523
+]
+
+The Japanese the Marines had encountered were mainly men from the
+_4th Regiment_ of the _2d (Sendai) Division_; prisoners confirmed
+that the division was landing on the island. Included in the enemy
+reinforcements were 150mm howitzers, guns capable of shelling the
+airfield from positions near Kokumbona. Clearly, a new and stronger
+enemy attack was pending.
+
+As September drew to a close, a flood of promotions had reached the
+division, nine lieutenant colonels put on their colonel’s eagles and
+there were 14 new lieutenant colonels also. Vandegrift made Colonel
+Gerald C. Thomas, his former operations officer, the new division
+chief of staff, and had a short time earlier given Edson the 5th
+Marines. Many of the older, senior officers, picked for the most part
+in the order they had joined the division, were now sent back to the
+States. There they would provide a new level of combat expertise in the
+training and organization of the many Marine units that were forming.
+The air wing was not quite ready yet to return its experienced pilots
+to rear areas, but the vital combat knowledge they possessed was much
+needed in the training pipeline. They, too--the survivors--would soon
+be rotating back to rear areas, some for a much-needed break before
+returning to combat and others to lead new squadrons into the fray.
+
+[Illustration: Japanese Model 4 (1919) 150mm Howitzer]
+
+
+[Sidebar (page 22): Sergeant Major Sir Jacob Charles Vouza
+
+[Illustration]
+
+Jacob Charles Vouza was born in 1900 at Tasimboko, Guadalcanal,
+British Solomon Islands Protectorate, and educated at the South Seas
+Evangelical Mission School there. In 1916 he joined the Solomon Islands
+Protectorate Armed Constabulary, from which he retired at the rank of
+sergeant major in 1941 after 25 years of service.
+
+After the Japanese invaded his home island in World War II, he returned
+to active duty with the British forces and volunteered to work with
+the Coastwatchers. Vouza’s experience as a scout had already been
+established when the 1st Marine Division landed on Guadalcanal. On 7
+August 1942 he rescued a downed naval pilot from the USS _Wasp_ who was
+shot down inside Japanese territory. He guided the pilot to friendly
+lines where Vouza met the Marines for the first time.
+
+Vouza then volunteered to scout behind enemy lines for the Marines.
+On 27 August he was captured by the Japanese while on a Marine Corps
+mission to locate suspected enemy lookout stations. Having found a
+small American flag in Vouza’s loincloth, the Japanese tied him to a
+tree and tried to force him to reveal information about Allied forces.
+Vouza was questioned for hours, but refused to talk. He was tortured
+and bayoneted about the arms, throat, shoulder, face, and stomach, and
+left to die.
+
+He managed to free himself after his captors departed, and made his way
+through the miles of jungle to American lines. There he gave valuable
+intelligence information to the Marines about an impending Japanese
+attack before accepting medical attention.
+
+After spending 12 days in the hospital, Vouza then returned to duty
+as the chief scout for the Marines. He accompanied Lieutenant Colonel
+Evans F. Carlson and the 2d Marine Raider Battalion when they made
+their 30-day raid behind enemy lines at Guadalcanal.
+
+Sergeant Major Vouza was highly decorated for his World War II service.
+The Silver Star was presented to him personally by Major General
+Alexander A. Vandegrift, commanding general of the 1st Marine Division,
+for refusing to give information under Japanese torture. He also was
+awarded the Legion of Merit for outstanding service with the 2d Raider
+Battalion during November and December 1942, and the British George
+Medal for gallant conduct and exceptional devotion to duty. He later
+received the Police Long Service Medal and, in 1957, was made a Member
+of the British Empire for long and faithful government service.
+
+After the war, Vouza continued to serve his fellow islanders. In 1949,
+he was appointed district headman, and president of the Guadalcanal
+Council, from 1952-1958. He served as a member of the British Solomon
+Islands Protectorate Advisory Council from 1950 to 1960.
+
+He made many friends during his long association with the U.S. Marine
+Corps and through the years was continually visited on Guadalcanal by
+Marines. During 1968, Vouza visited the United States, where he was
+the honored guest of the 1st Marine Division Association. In 1979,
+he was knighted by Britain’s Queen Elizabeth II. He died on 15 March
+1984.--_Ann A. Ferrante_
+]
+
+
+[Sidebar (page 23): M3A1 37mm Antitank Gun
+
+The M3 antitank gun, based on the successful German _Panzer Abwehr
+Kanone_ (PAK)-36, was developed by the U.S. Army in the late 1930s as
+a replacement for the French 37mm Puteaux gun, used in World War I but
+unable to destroy new tanks being produced.
+
+The M3 was adopted because of its accuracy, fire control, penetration,
+and mobility. Towed by its prime mover, the 4×4 quarter-ton truck,
+the gun would trail at 50 mph on roads. When traveling crosscountry,
+gullies, shell holes, mud holes, and slopes of 26 degrees were
+negotiated with ease. In 1941, the gun was redesignated the M3A1 when
+the muzzles were threaded to accept a muzzle brake that was rarely, if
+ever, used.
+
+At the time of its adoption, the M3 could destroy any tank then being
+produced in the world. However, by the time the United States entered
+the war, the M3 was outmatched by the tanks it would have met in
+Europe. The Japanese tanks were smaller and more vulnerable to the
+M3 throughout the war. In the Pacific, it was used against bunkers,
+pillboxes and, when loaded with canister, against banzai charges. It
+was employed throughout the war by Marine regimental weapons companies,
+but in reduced numbers as the fighting continued. It was replaced in
+the European Theater by the M1 57mm antitank gun.
+
+The 37mm antitank gun, manned by a crew of four who fired a 1.61-pound
+projectile with an effective range of 500 yards.--_Stephen L. Amos and
+Kenneth L. Smith-Christmas_
+
+[Illustration]
+]
+
+
+[Sidebar (page 29):
+
+    The President of the United States
+    takes pleasure in presenting
+    the Medal of Honor posthumously to
+    Douglas Albert Munro
+    Signalman First Class
+    United States Coast Guard
+    for service as set forth
+    in the following citation:
+
+[Illustration:
+
+    Painting by Bernard D’Andrea, Courtesy of U.S. Coast Guard
+    Historical Office
+]
+
+  For extraordinary heroism and conspicuous gallantry in action above
+  and beyond the call of duty as Officer in Charge of a group of
+  twenty-four Higgins boats engaged in the evacuation of a battalion
+  of Marines trapped by enemy Japanese forces at Point Cruz,
+  Guadalcanal, on September 27, 1942. After making preliminary plans
+  for the evacuation of nearly five hundred beleaguered Marines,
+  Munro, under constant strafing by enemy machine guns on the island
+  and at great risk of his life, daringly led five of his small craft
+  toward the shore. As he closed the beach, he signalled the others
+  to land and then in order to draw the enemy’s fire and protect the
+  heavily loaded boats, he valiantly placed his craft, with its two
+  small guns, as a shield between the beachhead and the Japanese.
+  When the perilous task of evacuation was nearly completed, Munro
+  was instantly killed by enemy fire, but his crew, two of whom
+  were wounded, carried on until the last boat had loaded and
+  cleared the beach. By his outstanding leadership, expert planning,
+  and dauntless devotion to duty, he and his courageous comrades
+  undoubtedly saved the lives of many who otherwise would have
+  perished. He gallantly gave up his life in defense of his country.
+  /s/ Franklin Roosevelt
+]
+
+
+
+
+_October and the Japanese Offensive_
+
+
+On 30 September, unexpectedly, a B-17 carrying Admiral Nimitz made an
+emergency landing at Henderson Field. The CinCPac made the most of the
+opportunity. He visited the front lines, saw Edson’s Ridge, and talked
+to a number of Marines. He reaffirmed to Vandegrift that his overriding
+mission was to hold the airfield. He promised all the support he could
+give and after awarding Navy Crosses to a number of Marines, including
+Vandegrift, left the next day visibly encouraged by what he had seen.
+
+[Illustration: _Visiting Guadalcanal on 30 September, Adm Chester W.
+Nimitz, CinCPac, took time to decorate LtCol Evans C. Carlson, CO, 2d
+Raider Battalion; MajGen Vandegrift, in rear; and, from left, BGen
+William H. Rupertus, ADC; Col Merritt A. Edson, CO, 5th Marines; LtCol
+Edwin A. Pollock, CO, 2d Battalion, 1st Marines; Maj John L. Smith, CO,
+VMF-223._
+
+    Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 50883
+]
+
+The next Marine move involved a punishing return to the Matanikau,
+this time with five infantry battalions and the Whaling group. Whaling
+commanded his men and the 3d Battalion, 2d Marines, in a thrust
+inland to clear the way for two battalions of the 7th Marines, the
+1st and 2d, to drive through and hook toward the coast, hitting the
+Japanese holding along the Matanikau. Edson’s 2d and 3d Battalions
+would attack across the river mouth. All the division’s artillery was
+positioned to fire in support.
+
+[Illustration:
+
+    Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 61534
+
+_A M1918 155mm howitzer is fired by artillery crewmen of the 11th
+Marines in support of ground forces attacking the enemy. Despite the
+lack of sound-flash equipment to locate hostile artillery, Col del
+Valle’s guns were able to quiet enemy fire._]
+
+On the 7th, Whaling’s force moved into the jungle about 2,000 yards
+upstream on the Matanikau, encountering Japanese troops that harassed
+his forward elements, but not in enough strength to stop the advance.
+He bypassed the enemy positions and dug in for the night. Behind him
+the 7th Marines followed suit, prepared to move through his lines,
+cross the river, and attack north toward the Japanese on the 8th. The
+5th Marines’ assault battalions moving toward the Matanikau on the
+7th ran into Japanese in strength about 400 yards from the river.
+Unwittingly, the Marines had run into strong advance elements of the
+Japanese _4th Regiment_, which had crossed the Matanikau in order
+to establish a base from which artillery could fire into the Marine
+perimeter. The fighting was intense and the 3d Battalion, 5th, could
+make little progress, although the 2d Battalion encountered slight
+opposition and won through to the river bank. It then turned north to
+hit the inland flank of the enemy troops. Vandegrift sent forward a
+company of raiders to reinforce the 5th, and it took a holding position
+on the right, towards the beach.
+
+Rain poured down on the 8th, all day long, virtually stopping all
+forward progress, but not halting the close-in fighting around the
+Japanese pocket. The enemy troops finally retreated, attempting to
+escape the gradually encircling Marines. They smashed into the raider’s
+position nearest to their escape route. A wild hand-to-hand battle
+ensued and a few Japanese broke through to reach and cross the river.
+The rest died fighting.
+
+[Illustration:
+
+    Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 50963
+
+_More than 200 Japanese soldiers alone were killed in a frenzied attack
+in the sandspit where the Tenaru River flows into Ironbottom Sound
+(Sealark Channel)._]
+
+On the 9th, Whaling’s force, flanked by the 2d and then the 1st
+Battalion, 7th Marines, crossed the Matanikau and then turned and
+followed ridge lines to the sea. Puller’s battalion discovered a
+number of Japanese in a ravine to his front, fired his mortars, and
+called in artillery, while his men used rifles and machine guns to pick
+off enemy troops trying to escape what proved to be a death trap. When
+his mortar ammunition began to run short, Puller moved on toward the
+beach, joining the rest of Whaling’s force, which had encountered no
+opposition. The Marines then recrossed the Mantanikau, joined Edson’s
+troops, and marched back to the perimeter, leaving a strong combat
+outpost at the Matanikau, now cleared of Japanese. General Vandegrift,
+apprised by intelligence sources that a major Japanese attack was
+coming from the west, decided to consolidate his positions, leaving no
+sizable Marine force more than a day’s march from the perimeter. The
+Marine advance on 7-9 October had thwarted Japanese plans for an early
+attack and cost the enemy more than 700 men. The Marines paid a price
+too, 65 dead and 125 wounded.
+
+There was another price that Guadalcanal was exacting from both sides.
+Disease was beginning to fell men in numbers that equalled the battle
+casualties. In addition to gastroenteritis, which greatly weakened
+those who suffered its crippling stomach cramps, there were all kinds
+of tropical fungus infections, collectively known as “jungle rot,”
+which produced uncomfortable rashes on men’s feet, armpits, elbows,
+and crotches, a product of seldom being dry. If it didn’t rain, sweat
+provided the moisture. On top of this came hundreds of cases of
+malaria. Atabrine tablets provided some relief, besides turning the
+skin yellow, but they were not effective enough to stop the spread of
+the mosquito-borne infection. Malaria attacks were so pervasive that
+nothing short of complete prostration, becoming a litter case, could
+earn a respite in the hospital. Naturally enough, all these diseases
+affected most strongly the men who had been on the island the longest,
+particularly those who experienced the early days of short rations.
+Vandegrift had already argued with his superiors that when his men
+eventually got relieved they should not be sent to another tropical
+island hospital, but rather to a place where there was a real change
+of atmosphere and climate. He asked that Auckland or Wellington, New
+Zealand, be considered.
+
+For the present, however, there was to be no relief for men starting
+their third month on Guadalcanal. The Japanese would not abandon their
+plan to seize back Guadalcanal and gave painful evidence of their
+intentions near mid-October. General Hyakutake himself landed on
+Guadalcanal on 7 October to oversee the coming offensive. Elements of
+Major General Masao Maruyama’s _Sendai Division_, already a factor in
+the fighting near the Matanikau, landed with him. More men were coming.
+And the Japanese, taking advantage of the fact that Cactus flyers had
+no night attack capability, planned to ensure that no planes at all
+would rise from Guadalcanal to meet them.
+
+[Illustration: _By October, malaria began to claim as many casualties
+as Japanese artillery, bombs, and naval gunfire. Shown here are the
+patients in the division hospital who are ministered to by physicians
+and corpsmen working under minimal conditions._]
+
+On 11 October, U.S. Navy surface ships took a hand in stopping
+the “Tokyo Express,” the nickname that had been given to Admiral
+Tanaka’s almost nightly reinforcement forays. A covering force of
+five cruisers and five destroyers, located near Rennell Island and
+commanded by Rear Admiral Norman Scott, got word that many ships were
+approaching Guadalcanal. Scott’s mission was to protect an approaching
+reinforcement convoy and he steamed toward Cactus at flank speed
+eager to engage. He encountered more ships than he had expected, a
+bombardment group of three heavy cruisers and two destroyers, as
+well as six destroyers escorting two seaplane carrier transports.
+Scott maneuvered between Savo Island and Cape Esperance, Guadalcanal’s
+western tip, and ran head-on into the bombardment group.
+
+Alerted by a scout plane from his flagship, _San Francisco_ (CA 38),
+spottings later confirmed by radar contacts on the _Helena_ (CL 50),
+the Americans opened fire before the Japanese, who had no radar,
+knew of their presence. One enemy destroyer sank immediately, two
+cruisers were badly damaged, one, the _Furutaka_, later foundered,
+and the remaining cruiser and destroyer turned away from the inferno
+of American fire. Scott’s own force was punished by enemy return fire
+which damaged two cruisers and two destroyers, one of which, the
+_Duncan_ (DD 485), sank the following day. On the 12th too, Cactus
+flyers spotted two of the reinforcement destroyer escorts retiring
+and sank them both. The Battle of Cape Esperance could be counted an
+American naval victory, one sorely needed at the time.
+
+[Illustration: _Maj Harold W. Bauer, VMF-212 commander, here a captain,
+was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor after being lost during a
+scramble with Japanese aircraft over Guadalcanal._
+
+    Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 410772
+]
+
+Its way cleared by Scott’s encounter with the Japanese, a really
+welcome reinforcement convoy arrived at the island on 13 October when
+the 164th Infantry of the Americal Division arrived. The soldiers,
+members of a National Guard outfit originally from North Dakota, were
+equipped with Garand M-1 rifles, a weapon of which most overseas
+Marines had only heard. In rate of fire, the semiautomatic Garand could
+easily outperform the single-shot, bolt-action Springfields the Marines
+carried and the bolt-action rifles the Japanese carried, but most 1st
+Division Marines of necessity touted the Springfield as inherently more
+accurate and a better weapon. This did not prevent some light-fingered
+Marines from acquiring Garands when the occasion presented itself. And
+such an occasion did present itself while the soldiers were landing and
+their supplies were being moved to dumps. Several flights of Japanese
+bombers arrived over Henderson Field, relatively unscathed by the
+defending fighters, and began dropping their bombs. The soldiers headed
+for cover and alert Marines, inured to the bombing, used the interval
+to “liberate” interesting cartons and crates. The news that the Army
+had arrived spread across the island like wildfire, for it meant to all
+Marines that they eventually would be relieved. There was hope.
+
+[Illustration:
+
+    Department of Defense (USMC) Photos 304183 and 302980
+
+_Two other Marine aviators awarded the Medal of Honor for heroism and
+intrepidity in the air were Capt Jefferson J. DeBlanc, left, and Maj
+Robert E. Galer, right._]
+
+As if the bombing was not enough grief, the Japanese opened on the
+airfield with their 150mm howitzers also. Altogether the men of the
+164th got a rude welcome to Guadalcanal. And on that night, 13-14
+October, they shared a terrifying experience with the Marines that no
+one would ever forget.
+
+Determined to knock out Henderson Field and protect their soldiers
+landing in strength west of Koli Point, the enemy commanders sent the
+battleships _Kongo_ and _Haruna_ into Ironbottom Sound to bombard
+the Marine positions. The usual Japanese flare planes heralded
+the bombardment, 80 minutes of sheer hell which had 14-inch shells
+exploding with such effect that the accompanying cruiser fire was
+scarcely noticed. No one was safe; no place was safe. No dugout had
+been built to withstand 14-inch shells. One witness, a seasoned veteran
+demonstrably cool under enemy fire, opined that there was nothing worse
+in war than helplessly being on the receiving end of naval gunfire.
+He remembered “huge trees being cut apart and flying about like
+toothpicks.” And he was on the frontlines, not the prime enemy target.
+The airfield and its environs were a shambles when dawn broke. The
+naval shelling, together with the night’s artillery fire and bombing,
+had left Cactus Air Force’s commander, General Geiger, with a handful
+of aircraft still flyable, an airfield thickly cratered by shells and
+bombs, and a death toll of 41. Still, from Henderson or Fighter One,
+which now became the main airstrip, the Cactus Flyers had to attack,
+for the morning also revealed a shore and sea full of inviting targets.
+
+The expected enemy convoy had gotten through and Japanese transports
+and landing craft were everywhere near Tassafaronga. At sea the
+escorting cruisers and destroyers provided a formidable antiaircraft
+screen. Every American plane that could fly did. General Geiger’s aide,
+Major Jack Cram, took off in the general’s PBY, hastily rigged to carry
+two torpedoes, and put one of them into the side of an enemy transport
+as it was unloading. He landed the lumbering flying boat with enemy
+aircraft hot on his tail. A new squadron of F4Fs, VMF-212, commanded
+by Major Harold W. Bauer, flew in during the day’s action, landed,
+refueled, and took off to join the fighting. An hour later, Bauer
+landed again, this time with four enemy bombers to his credit. Bauer,
+who added to his score of Japanese aircraft kills in later air battles,
+was subsequently lost in action. He was awarded the Medal of Honor, as
+were four other Marine pilots of the early Cactus Air Force: Captain
+Jefferson J. DeBlanc (VMF-112); Captain Joseph J. Foss (VMF-121); Major
+Robert E. Galer (VMF-224); and Major John L. Smith (VMF-223).
+
+The Japanese had landed more than enough troops to destroy the Marine
+beachhead and seize the airfield. At least General Hyakutake thought
+so, and he heartily approved General Maruyama’s plan to move most of
+the _Sendai Division_ through the jungle, out of sight and out of
+contact with the Marines, to strike from the south in the vicinity
+of Edson’s Ridge. Roughly 7,000 men, each carrying a mortar or
+artillery shell, started the trek along the Maruyama Trail which had
+been partially hacked out of the jungle well inland from the Marine
+positions. Maruyama, who had approved the trail’s name to indicate his
+confidence, intended to support this attack with heavy mortars and
+infantry guns (70mm pack howitzers). The men who had to lug, push, and
+drag these supporting arms over the miles of broken ground, across
+two major streams, the Mantanikau and the Lunga, and through heavy
+underbrush, might have had another name for their commander’s path to
+supposed glory.
+
+[Illustration: _A Marine examines a Japanese 70mm howitzer captured at
+the Battle of the Tenaru. Gen Maruyama’s troops “had to lug, push, and
+drag these supporting arms over the miles of broken ground, across two
+major streams and through heavy underbrush” to get them to the target
+area--but they never did. The trail behind them was littered with the
+supplies they carried._
+
+    Photo courtesy of Col James A. Donovan, Jr.
+]
+
+General Vandegrift knew the Japanese were going to attack. Patrols and
+reconnaissance flights had clearly indicated the push would be from the
+west, where the enemy reinforcements had landed. The American commander
+changed his dispositions accordingly. There were Japanese troops east
+of the perimeter, too, but not in any significant strength. The new
+infantry regiment, the 164th, reinforced by Marine special weapons
+units, was put into the line to hold the eastern flank along 6,600
+yards, curving inland to join up with 7th Marines near Edson’s Ridge.
+The 7th held 2,500 yards from the ridge to the Lunga. From the Lunga,
+the 1st Marines had a 3,500-yard sector of jungle running west to the
+point where the line curved back to the beach again in the 5th Marines’
+sector. Since the attack was expected from the west, the 3d Battalions
+of each of the 1st and 7th Marines held a strong outpost position
+forward of the 5th Marines’ lines along the east bank of the Matanikau.
+
+In the lull before the attack, if a time of patrol clashes, Japanese
+cruiser-destroyer bombardments, bomber attacks, and artillery
+harassment could properly be called a lull, Vandegrift was visited
+by the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Lieutenant General Thomas
+Holcomb. The Commandant flew in on 21 October to see for himself
+how his Marines were faring. It also proved to be an occasion for
+both senior Marines to meet the new ComSoPac, Vice Admiral William F.
+“Bull” Halsey. Admiral Nimitz had announced Halsey’s appointment on 18
+October and the news was welcome in Navy and Marine ranks throughout
+the Pacific. Halsey’s deserved reputation for elan and aggressiveness
+promised renewed attention to the situation on Guadalcanal. On the
+22d, Holcomb and Vandegrift flew to Noumea to meet with Halsey and to
+receive and give a round of briefings on the Allied situation. After
+Vandegrift had described his position, he argued strongly against the
+diversion of reinforcements intended for Cactus to any other South
+Pacific venue, a sometime factor of Admiral Turner’s strategic vision.
+He insisted that he needed all of the Americal Division and another 2d
+Marine Division regiment to beef up his forces, and that more than half
+of his veterans were worn out by three months’ fighting and the ravages
+of jungle-incurred diseases. Admiral Halsey told the Marine general:
+“You go back there, Vandegrift. I promise to get you everything I have.”
+
+[Illustration:
+
+    Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 13628
+
+_During a lull in the fight, a Marine machine gunner takes a break for
+coffee, with his sub-machine gun on his knee and his 30-caliber light
+machine gun in position._]
+
+When Vandegrift returned to Guadalcanal, Holcomb moved on to Pearl
+Harbor to meet with Nimitz, carrying Halsey’s recommendation that, in
+the future, landing force commanders once established ashore, would
+have equal command status with Navy amphibious force commanders. At
+Pearl, Nimitz approved Halsey’s recommendation--which Holcomb had
+drafted--and in Washington so did King. In effect, then, the command
+status of all future Pacific amphibious operations was determined by
+the events of Guadalcanal. Another piece of news Vandegrift received
+from Holcomb also boded well for the future of the Marine Corps.
+Holcomb indicated that if President Roosevelt did not reappoint him,
+unlikely in view of his age and two terms in office, he would recommend
+that Vandegrift be appointed the next Commandant.
+
+[Illustration:
+
+    Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 513191
+
+_On the occasion of the visit of the Commandant, MajGen Thomas Holcomb,
+some of Operation Watchtower’s major staff and command officers took
+time out from the fighting to pose with him. From left, front row:
+Col William J. Whaling (Whaling Group); Col Amor LeRoy Sims (CO, 7th
+Marines); Col Gerald C. Thomas (Division Chief of Staff); Col Pedro
+A. del Valle (CO, 11th Marines); Col William E. Riley (member of
+Gen Holcomb’s party); MajGen Roy S. Geiger (CG, 1st Marine Aircraft
+Wing); Gen Holcomb; MajGen Ralph J. Mitchell (Director of Aviation,
+Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps); BGen Bennet Puryear, Jr. (Assistant
+Quartermaster of the Marine Corps); Col Clifton B. Cates (CO, 1st
+Marines). Second row (between Whaling and Sims): LtCol Raymond P.
+Coffman (Division Supply Officer); Maj James C. Murray (Division
+Personnel Officer); (behind Gen Holcomb) LtCol Merrill B. Twining
+(Division Operations Officer)._]
+
+This news of future events had little chance of diverting Vandegrift’s
+attention when he flew back to Guadalcanal, for the Japanese were in
+the midst of their planned offensive. On the 20th, an enemy patrol
+accompanied by two tanks tried to find a way through the line held
+by Lieutenant Colonel William N. McKelvy, Jr.’s 3d Battalion, 1st
+Marines. A sharpshooting 37mm gun crew knocked out one tank and the
+enemy force fell back, meanwhile shelling the Marine positions with
+artillery. Near sunset the next day, the Japanese tried again, this
+time with more artillery fire and more tanks in the fore, but again
+a 37mm gun knocked out a lead tank and discouraged the attack. On 22
+October, the enemy paused, waiting for Maruyama’s force to get into
+position inland. On the 23d, planned as the day of the _Sendai_’s main
+attack, the Japanese dropped a heavy rain of artillery and mortar fire
+on McKelvy’s positions near the Matanikau River mouth. Near dusk, nine
+18-ton medium tanks clanked out of the trees onto the river’s sandbar
+and just as quickly eight of them were riddled by the 37s. One tank got
+across the river, a Marine blasted a track off with a grenade, and
+a 75mm halftrack finished it off in the ocean’s surf. The following
+enemy infantry was smothered by Marine artillery fire as all battalions
+of the augmented 11th Marines rained shells on the massed attackers.
+Hundreds of Japanese were casualties and three more tanks were
+destroyed. Later, an inland thrust further upstream was easily beaten
+back. The abortive coastal attack did almost nothing to aid Maruyama’s
+inland offensive, but did cause Vandegrift to shift one battalion, the
+2d Battalion, 7th Marines, out of the lines to the east and into the
+4,000-yard gap between the Matanikau position and the perimeter. This
+move proved providential since one of Maruyama’s planned attacks was
+headed right for this area.
+
+Although patrols had encountered no Japanese east or south of the
+jungled perimeter up to the 24th, the Matanikau attempts had alerted
+everyone. When General Maruyama finally was satisfied that his men had
+struggled through to appropriate assault positions, after delaying his
+day of attack three times, he was ready on 24 October. The Marines were
+waiting.
+
+An observer from the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, spotted an enemy
+officer surveying Edson’s Ridge on the 24th, and scout-snipers reported
+smoke from numerous rice fires rising from a valley about two miles
+south of Lieutenant Colonel Puller’s positions. Six battalions of the
+_Sendai Division_ were poised to attack, and near midnight the first
+elements of the enemy hit and bypassed a platoon-sized outpost forward
+of Puller’s barbed-wire entanglements. Warned by the outpost, Puller’s
+men waited, straining to see through a dark night and a driving rain.
+Suddenly, the Japanese charged out of the jungle, attacking in Puller’s
+area near the ridge and the flat ground to the east. The Marines
+replied with everything they had, calling in artillery, firing
+mortars, relying heavily on crossing fields of machine gun fire to cut
+down the enemy infantrymen. Thankfully, the enemy’s artillery, mortars,
+and other supporting arms were scattered back along the Maruyama Trail;
+they had proved too much of a burden for the infantrymen to carry
+forward.
+
+[Illustration:
+
+    Marine Corps Personal Papers Collection
+
+_Five Japanese tanks sit dead in the water, destroyed by Marine 37mm
+gunfire during the abortive attempt to force the Marine perimeter
+near the mouth of the Matanikau River in late October. Many Japanese
+soldiers lost their lives also._]
+
+A wedge was driven into the Marine lines, but eventually straightened
+out with repeated counterattacks. Puller soon realized his battalion
+was being hit by a strong Japanese force capable of repeated attacks.
+He called for reinforcements and the Army’s 3d Battalion, 164th
+Infantry (Lieutenant Colonel Robert K. Hall), was ordered forward, its
+men sliding and slipping in the rain as they trudged a mile south along
+Edson’s Ridge. Puller met Hall at the head of his column, and the two
+officers walked down the length of the Marine lines, peeling off an
+Army squad at a time to feed into the lines. When the Japanese attacked
+again as they did all night long, the soldiers and Marines fought back
+together. By 0330, the Army battalion was completely integrated into
+the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines’ lines and the enemy attacks were
+getting weaker and weaker. The American return fire--including flanking
+fire from machine guns and Weapons Company, 7th Marines’ 37mm guns
+remaining in the positions held by 2d Battalion, 164th Infantry, on
+Puller’s left--was just too much to take. Near dawn, Maruyama pulled
+his men back to regroup and prepare to attack again.
+
+With daylight, Puller and Hall reordered the lines, putting the 3d
+Battalion, 164th, into its own positions on Puller’s left, tying in
+with the rest of the Army regiment. The driving rains had turned
+Fighter One into a quagmire, effectively grounding Cactus flyers.
+Japanese planes used the “free ride” to bomb Marine positions. Their
+artillery fired incessantly and a pair of Japanese destroyers added
+their gunfire to the bombardment until they got too close to the shore
+and the 3d Defense Battalion’s 5-inch guns drove them off. As the sun
+bore down, the runways dried and afternoon enemy attacks were met by
+Cactus fighters, who downed 22 Japanese planes with a loss of three of
+their own.
+
+As night came on again, Maruyama tried more of the same, with the same
+result. The Army-Marine lines held and the Japanese were cut down in
+droves by rifle, machine gun, mortar, 37mm, and artillery fire. To the
+west, an enemy battalion mounted three determined attacks against the
+positions held by Lieutenant Colonel Herman H. Hanneken’s 2d Battalion,
+7th Marines, thinly tied in with Puller’s battalion on the left and the
+3d Battalion, 7th Marines, on the right. The enemy finally penetrated
+the positions held by Company F, but a counterattack led by Major Odell
+M. Conoley, the battalion’s executive officer, drove off the Japanese.
+Again at daylight the American positions were secure and the enemy had
+retreated. They would not come back; the grand Japanese offensive of
+the _Sendai Division_ was over.
+
+About 3,500 enemy troops had died during the attacks. General
+Maruyama’s proud boast that he “would exterminate the enemy around
+the airfield in one blow” proved an empty one. What was left of his
+force now straggled back over the Maruyama Trail, losing, as had the
+Kawaguchi force in the same situation, most of its seriously wounded
+men. The Americans, Marines and soldiers together, probably lost 300
+men killed and wounded; existing records are sketchy and incomplete.
+One result of the battle, however, was a warm welcome to the 164th
+Infantry from the 1st Marine Division. Vandegrift particularly
+commended Lieutenant Colonel Hall’s battalion, stating the “division
+was proud to have serving with it another unit which had stood the test
+of battle.” And Colonel Cates sent a message to the 164th’s Colonel
+Bryant Moore saying that the 1st Marines “were proud to serve with a
+unit such as yours.”
+
+Amidst all the heroics of the two nights’ fighting there were many men
+who were singled out for recognition and an equally large number who
+performed great deeds that were never recognized. Two men stood out
+above all others, and on succeeding nights, Sergeant John Basilone of
+the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, and Platoon Sergeant Mitchell Paige of
+the 2d Battalion, both machine gun section heads, were recognized as
+having performed “above and beyond the call of duty” in the inspiring
+words of their Medal of Honor citations.
+
+
+[Sidebar (page 37): Reising Gun
+
+The Reising gun was designed and developed by noted gun inventor Eugene
+Reising. It was patented in 1940 and manufactured by the old gun-making
+firm of Harrington and Richardson of Worcester, Massachusetts. It is
+said that it was made on existing machine tools, some dating back
+to the Civil War, and of ordinary steel rather than ordnance steel.
+With new machine tools and ordnance steel scarce and needed for more
+demanding weapons, the Reising met an immediate requirement for many
+sub-machine guns at a time when production of Thompson M1928 and M1
+sub-machine guns hadn’t caught up with demand and the stamped-out M3
+“grease gun” had not yet been invented. It was a wartime expedient.
+
+[Illustration:
+
+    Captain Donald L. Dickson, USMCR
+]
+
+The Reising was made in two different models, the 50 and the 55. The
+Model 50 had a full wooden stock and a Cutts compensator attached
+to the muzzle. The compensator, a device which reduced the upward
+muzzle climb from recoil, was invented by Richard M. Cutts, Sr., and
+his son, Richard M. Cutts, Jr., both of whom became Marine brigadier
+generals. The other version was dubbed the Model 55. It had a folding
+metal-wire shoulder stock which swivelled on the wooden pistol grip.
+It also had a shorter barrel and no compensator. It was intended for
+use by parachutists, tank crews, and others needing a compact weapon.
+Both versions of the Reising fired .45-caliber ammunition, the same
+cartridge as the Colt automatic pistol and the Thompson.
+
+In all, there were approximately 100,000 Reising sub-machine guns
+produced between 1940 and 1942. Small numbers of the weapons were
+acquired by both Great Britain and the Soviet Union. However, most
+were used by the U.S. Marine Corps in the Solomon Islands campaign.
+The Model 55 was issued to both Marine parachute battalions and Marine
+raiders, seeing service first on Guadalcanal. After its dubious debut
+in combat it was withdrawn from frontline service in 1943 due to
+several flaws in design and manufacture.
+
+The Reising’s major shortcoming was its propensity for jamming. This
+was due to both a design problem in the magazine lips and the fact
+that magazines were made of a soft sheet steel. The weapon’s safety
+mechanism didn’t always work and if the butt was slammed down on the
+deck, the hammer would set back against the mainspring and then fly
+forward, firing a chambered cartridge. The design allowed the entry of
+dirt into the mechanism and close tolerances caused it to jam. Finally,
+the steel used allowed excessive rust to form in the tropical humidity
+of the Solomons. Nevertheless, at six pounds, the Reising was handier
+than the 10-pound Thompson, more accurate, pleasanter to shoot, and
+reliable under other than combat conditions, but one always had to
+keep the muzzle pointed in a safe direction. The Model 50 was also
+issued to Marines for guard duty at posts and stations in the United
+States.--_John G. Griffiths_
+]
+
+
+
+
+_November and the Continuing Buildup_
+
+
+While the soldiers and Marines were battling the Japanese ashore,
+a patrol plane sighted a large Japanese fleet near the Santa Cruz
+Islands to the east of the Solomons. The enemy force was formidable, 4
+carriers and 4 battleships, 8 cruisers and 28 destroyers, all poised
+for a victorious attack when Maruyama’s capture of Henderson Field
+was signalled. Admiral Halsey’s reaction to the inviting targets was
+characteristic, he signaled Rear Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid, with the
+_Hornet_ and _Enterprise_ carrier groups located north of the New
+Hebrides: “Attack Repeat Attack.”
+
+[Illustration: _Heavy tropical downpours at Guadalcanal all but flood
+out a Marine camp near Henderson Field, and the field as well. Marines’
+damp clothing and bedding contributed to the heavy incidence of
+tormenting skin infections and fungal disorders._
+
+    Department of Defense (USMC) Photo
+]
+
+Early on 26 October, American SBDs located the Japanese carriers
+at about the same time Japanese scout planes spotted the American
+carriers. The Japanese _Zuiho_’s flight deck was holed by the scout
+bombers, cancelling flight operations, but the other three enemy
+carriers launched strikes. The two air armadas tangled as each strove
+to reach the other’s carriers. The _Hornet_ was hit repeatedly by bombs
+and torpedoes; two Japanese pilots also crashed their planes on board.
+The damage to the ship was so extensive, the _Hornet_ was abandoned
+and sunk. The _Enterprise_, the battleship _South Dakota_, the light
+cruiser _San Juan_ (CL 54), and the destroyer _Smith_ (DD 378) were
+also hit; the destroyer _Porter_ (DD 356) was sunk. On the Japanese
+side, no ships were sunk, but three carriers and two destroyers were
+damaged. One hundred Japanese planes were lost; 74 U.S. planes went
+down. Taken together, the results of the Battle of Santa Cruz were
+a standoff. The Japanese naval leaders might have continued their
+attacks, but instead, disheartened by the defeat of their ground
+forces on Guadalcanal, withdrew to attack another day.
+
+[Illustration:
+
+    Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 74093
+
+_Marine engineers repair a flood-damaged Lunga River bridge washed out
+during a period when 8 inches of rain fell in 24 hours and the river
+rose 7 feet above normal._]
+
+The departure of the enemy naval force marked a period in which
+substantial reinforcements reached the island. The headquarters of the
+2d Marines had finally found transport space to come up from Espiritu
+Santo and on 29 and 30 October, Colonel Arthur moved his regiment
+from Tulagi to Guadalcanal, exchanging his 1st and 2d Battalions for
+the well-blooded 3d, which took up the Tulagi duties. The 2d Marines’
+battalions at Tulagi had performed the very necessary task of scouting
+and securing all the small islands of the Florida group while they had
+camped, frustrated, watching the battles across Sealark Channel. The
+men now would no longer be spectators at the big show.
+
+On 2 November, planes from VMSB-132 and VMF-211 flew into the Cactus
+fields from New Caledonia. MAG-11 squadrons moved forward from New
+Caledonia to Espiritu Santo to be closer to the battle scene; the
+flight echelons now could operate forward to Guadalcanal and with
+relative ease. On the ground side, two batteries of 155mm guns, one
+Army and one Marine, landed on 2 November, providing Vandegrift with
+his first artillery units capable of matching the enemy’s long-range
+150mm guns. On the 4th and 5th, the 8th Marines (Colonel Richard H.
+Jeschke) arrived from American Samoa. The full-strength regiment,
+reinforced by the 75mm howitzers of the 1st Battalion, 10th Marines,
+added another 4,000 men to the defending forces. All the fresh troops
+reflected a renewed emphasis at all levels of command on making sure
+Guadalcanal would be held. The reinforcement-replacement pipeline was
+being filled. In the offing as part of the Guadalcanal defending force
+were the rest of the Americal Division, the remainder of the 2d Marine
+Division, and the Army’s 25th Infantry Division, then in Hawaii. More
+planes of every type and from Allied as well as American sources were
+slated to reinforce and replace the battered and battle-weary Cactus
+veterans.
+
+The impetus for the heightened pace of reinforcement had been provided
+by President Roosevelt. Cutting through the myriad demands for American
+forces worldwide, he had told each of the Joint Chiefs on 24 October
+that Guadalcanal must be reinforced, and without delay.
+
+On the island, the pace of operations did not slacken after the
+Maruyama offensive was beaten back. General Vandegrift wanted to clear
+the area immediately west of the Matanikau of all Japanese troops,
+forestalling, if he could, another buildup of attacking forces. Admiral
+Tanaka’s Tokyo Express was still operating and despite punishing
+attacks by Cactus aircraft and new and deadly opponents, American motor
+torpedo boats, now based at Tulagi.
+
+On 1 November, the 5th Marines, backed up by the newly arrived
+2d Marines, attacked across bridges engineers had laid over the
+Matanikau during the previous night. Inland, Colonel Whaling led
+his scout-snipers and the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, in a screening
+movement to protect the flank of the main attack. Opposition was fierce
+in the shore area where the 1st Battalion, 5th, drove forward toward
+Point Cruz, but inland the 2d Battalion and Whaling’s group encountered
+slight opposition. By nightfall, when the Marines dug in, it was clear
+that the only sizable enemy force was in the Point Cruz area. In the
+days bitter fighting, Corporal Anthony Casamento, a badly wounded
+machine gun squad leader in Edson’s 1st Battalion, had so distinguished
+himself that he was recommended for a Navy Cross; many years later, in
+August 1980, President Jimmy Carter approved the award of the Medal of
+Honor in its stead.
+
+[Illustration:
+
+    Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 56749
+
+_2dLt Mitchell Paige, third from left, and PltSgt John Basilone,
+extreme right, received the Medal of Honor at a parade at Camp
+Balcombe, Australia, on 21 May 1943. MajGen Vandegrift, left, received
+his medal in a White House ceremony the previous 5 February, while Col
+Merritt A. Edson was decorated 31 December 1943. Note the 1st Marine
+Division patches on the right shoulders of each participant._]
+
+On the 2d, the attack continued with the reserve 3d Battalion moving
+into the fight and all three 5th Marines units moving to surround
+the enemy defenders. On 3 November, the Japanese pocket just west
+of the base at Point Cruz was eliminated; well over 300 enemy had
+been killed. Elsewhere, the attacking Marines had encountered spotty
+resistance and advanced slowly across difficult terrain to a point
+about 1,000 yards beyond the 5th Marines’ action. There, just as the
+offensive’s objectives seemed well in hand, the advance was halted.
+Again, the intelligence that a massive enemy reinforcement attempt was
+pending forced Vandegrift to pull back most of his men to safeguard
+the all-important airfield perimeter. This time, however, he left a
+regiment to outpost the ground that had been gained, Colonel Arthur’s
+2d Marines, reinforced by the Army’s 1st Battalion, 164th Infantry.
+
+Emphasizing the need for caution in Vandegrift’s mind was the fact that
+the Japanese were again discovered in strength east of the perimeter.
+On 3 November, Lieutenant Colonel Hanneken’s 2d Battalion, 7th Marines,
+on a reconnaissance in force towards Koli Point, could see the
+Japanese ships clustered near Tetere, eight miles from the perimeter.
+His Marines encountered strong Japanese resistance from obviously
+fresh troops and he began to pull back. A regiment of the enemy’s
+_38th Division_ had landed, as Hyakutake experimented with a Japanese
+Navy-promoted scheme of attacking the perimeter from both flanks.
+
+[Illustration:
+
+    Marine Corps Historical Photo Collection
+
+_In a White House ceremony, former Cpl Anthony Casamento, a machine
+gun squad leader in the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, was decorated by
+President Jimmy Carter on 22 August 1980, 38 years after the battle for
+Guadalcanal. Looking on are Casarnento’s wife and daughters and Gen
+Robert H. Barrow, Marine Commandant._]
+
+[Illustration: _Sgt Clyde Thomason, who was killed in action
+participating in the Makin Island raid with the 2d Raider Battalion,
+was the first enlisted Marine in World War II to be awarded the Medal
+of Honor._
+
+    Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 310616
+]
+
+As Hanneken’s battalion executed a fighting withdrawal along the beach,
+it began to receive fire from the jungle inland, too. A rescue force
+was soon put together under General Rupertus: two tank companies,
+the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, and the 2d and 3d Battalions of the
+164th. The Japanese troops, members of the _38th Division_ regiment and
+remnants of Kawaguchi’s brigade, fought doggedly to hold their ground
+as the Marines drove forward along the coast and the soldiers attempted
+to outflank the enemy in the jungle. The running battle continued for
+days, supported by Cactus air, naval gunfire, and the newly landed
+155mm guns.
+
+The enemy commander received new orders as he was struggling to hold
+off the Americans. He was to break off the action, move inland, and
+march to rejoin the main Japanese forces west of the perimeter, a tall
+order to fulfill. The two-pronged attack scheme had been abandoned.
+The Japanese managed the first part; on the 11th the enemy force found
+a gap in the 164th’s line and broke through along a meandering jungle
+stream. Behind they left 450 dead over the course of a seven-day
+battle; the Marines and soldiers had lost 40 dead and 120 wounded.
+
+Essentially, the Japanese who broke out of the encircling Americans
+escaped from the frying pan only to fall into the fire. Admiral
+Turner finally had been able to effect one of his several schemes for
+alternative landings and beachheads, all of which General Vandegrift
+vehemently opposed. At Aola Bay, 40 miles east of the main perimeter,
+the Navy put an airfield construction and defense force ashore on 4
+November. Then, while the Japanese were still battling the Marines near
+Tetere, Vandegrift was able to persuade Turner to detach part of this
+landing force, the 2d Raider Battalion, to sweep west, to discover and
+destroy any enemy forces it encountered.
+
+Lieutenant Colonel Evans F. Carlson’s raider battalion already had seen
+action before it reached Guadalcanal. Two companies had reinforced the
+defenders of Midway Island when the Japanese attacked there in June.
+The rest of the battalion had landed from submarines on Makin Island
+in the Gilberts on 17-18 August, destroying the garrison there. For his
+part in the fighting on Makin, Sergeant Clyde Thomason had been awarded
+a Medal of Honor posthumously, the first Marine enlisted man to receive
+his country’s highest award in World War II.
+
+In its march from Aola Bay, the 2d Raider Battalion encountered the
+Japanese who were attempting to retreat to the west. On 12 November,
+the raiders beat off attacks by two enemy companies and then
+relentlessly pursued the Japanese, fighting a series of small actions
+over the next five days before they contacted the main Japanese body.
+From 17 November to 4 December, when the raiders finally came down out
+of the jungled ridges into the perimeter, Carlson’s men harried the
+retreating enemy. They killed nearly 500 Japanese. Their own losses
+were 16 killed and 18 wounded.
+
+The Aola Bay venture, which had provided the 2d Raider Battalion a
+starting point for its month-long jungle campaign, proved a bust. The
+site chosen for a new airfield was unsuitable, too wet and unstable,
+and the whole force moved to Koli Point in early December, where
+another airfield eventually was constructed.
+
+The buildup on Guadalcanal continued, by both sides. On 11 November,
+guarded by a cruiser-destroyer covering force, a convoy ran in carrying
+the 182d Infantry, another regiment of the Americal Division. The ships
+were pounded by enemy bombers and three transports were hit, but the
+men landed. General Vandegrift needed the new men badly. His veterans
+were truly ready for replacement; more than a thousand new cases of
+malaria and related diseases were reported each week. The Japanese who
+had been on the island any length of time were no better off; they
+were, in fact, in worse shape. Medical supplies and rations were in
+short supply. The whole thrust of the Japanese reinforcement effort
+continued to be to get troops and combat equipment ashore. The idea
+prevailed in Tokyo, despite all evidence to the contrary, that one
+overwhelming coordinated assault would crush the American resistance.
+The enemy drive to take Port Moresby on New Guinea was put on hold to
+concentrate all efforts on driving the Americans off of Guadalcanal.
+
+[Illustration:
+
+    Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 51728
+
+_Native guides lead 2d Raider Battalion Marines on a
+combat/reconnaissance patrol behind Japanese lines. The patrol lasted
+for less than a month, during which the Marines covered 150 miles and
+fought more than a dozen actions._]
+
+On 12 November, a multifaceted Japanese naval force converged on
+Guadalcanal to cover the landing of the main body of the _38th
+Division_. Rear Admiral Daniel J. Callaghan’s cruisers and destroyers,
+the close-in protection for the 182d’s transports, moved to stop
+the enemy. Coastwatcher and scout plane sightings and radio traffic
+intercepts had identified two battleships, two carriers, four cruisers,
+and a host of destroyers all headed toward Guadalcanal. A bombardment
+group led by the battleships _Hiei_ and _Kirishima_, with the light
+cruiser _Nagura_, and 15 destroyers spearheaded the attack. Shortly
+after midnight, near Savo Island, Callaghan’s cruisers picked up the
+Japanese on radar and continued to close. The battle was joined at
+such short range that each side fired at times on their own ships.
+Callaghan’s flagship, the _San Francisco_, was hit 15 times, Callaghan
+was killed, and the ship had to limp away. The cruiser _Atlanta_ (CL
+104) was also hit and set afire. Rear Admiral Norman Scott, who was
+on board, was killed. Despite the hammering by Japanese fire, the
+Americans held and continued fighting. The battleship _Hiei_, hit
+by more than 80 shells, retired and with it went the rest of the
+bombardment force. Three destroyers were sunk and four others damaged.
+
+[Illustration:
+
+    Department of Defense (Navy) Photos 80-G-20824 and 80-G-21099
+
+_In the great naval Battle of Guadalcanal, 12-15 November, RAdm Daniel
+J. Callaghan was killed when his flagship, the heavy cruiser_ San
+Francisco _(CA 38) took 15 major hits and was forced to limp away in
+the dark from the scene of action._]
+
+The Americans had accomplished their purpose; they had forced the
+Japanese to turn back. The cost was high. Two antiaircraft cruisers,
+the _Atlanta_ and the _Juneau_ (CL 52), were sunk; four destroyers, the
+_Barton_ (DD 599), _Cushing_ (DD 376), _Monssen_ (DD 436), and _Laffey_
+(DD 459), also went to the bottom. In addition to the _San Francisco_,
+the heavy cruiser _Portland_ (CA 33) and the destroyers _Sterret_ (DD
+407) and _Aaron Ward_ (DD 483) were damaged. Only one destroyer of the
+13 American ships engaged, the _Fletcher_ (DD 445), was unscathed when
+the survivors retired to the New Hebrides.
+
+With daylight came the Cactus bombers and fighters; they found the
+crippled _Hiei_ and pounded it mercilessly. On the 14th the Japanese
+were forced to scuttle it. Admiral Halsey ordered his only surviving
+carrier, the _Enterprise_, out of the Guadalcanal area to get it out of
+reach of Japanese aircraft and sent his battleships _Washington_ (BB
+56) and _South Dakota_ (BB 55) with four escorting destroyers north
+to meet the Japanese. Some of the _Enterprise_’s planes flew in to
+Henderson Field to help even the odds.
+
+On 14 November Cactus and _Enterprise_ flyers found a Japanese
+cruiser-destroyer force that had pounded the island on the night of 13
+November. They damaged four cruisers and a destroyer. After refueling
+and rearming they went after the approaching Japanese troop convoy.
+They hit several transports in one attack and sank one when they came
+back again. Army B-17s up from Espiritu Santo scored one hit and
+several near misses, bombing from 17,000 feet.
+
+Moving in a continuous pattern of attack, return, refuel, rearm, and
+attack again, the planes from Guadalcanal hit nine transports, sinking
+seven. Many of the 5,000 troops on the stricken ships were rescued
+by Tanaka’s destroyers, which were firing furiously and laying smoke
+screens in an attempt to protect the transports. The admiral later
+recalled that day as indelible in his mind, with memories of “bombs
+wobbling down from high-flying B-17s; of carrier bombers roaring
+towards targets as though to plunge full into the water, releasing
+bombs and pulling out barely in time, each miss sending up towering
+clouds of mist and spray, every hit raising clouds of smoke and fire.”
+Despite the intensive aerial attack, Tanaka continued on to Guadalcanal
+with four destroyers and four transports.
+
+Japanese intelligence had picked up the approaching American battleship
+force and warned Tanaka of its advent. In turn, the enemy admirals sent
+their own battleship-cruiser force to intercept. The Americans, led by
+Rear Admiral Willis A. Lee in the _Washington_, reached Sealark Channel
+about 2100 on the 14th. An hour later, a Japanese cruiser was picked up
+north of Savo. Battleship fire soon turned it away. The Japanese now
+learned that their opponents would not be the cruisers they expected.
+
+The resulting clash, fought in the glare of gunfire and Japanese
+searchlights, was perhaps the most significant fought at sea for
+Guadalcanal. When the melee was over, the American battleships’ 16-inch
+guns had more than matched the Japanese. Both the _South Dakota_ and
+the _Washington_ were damaged badly enough to force their retirement,
+but the _Kirishima_ was punished to its abandonment and death. One
+Japanese and three American destroyers, the _Benham_ (DD 796), the
+_Walke_ (DD 416), and the _Preston_ (DD 379), were sunk. When the
+Japanese attack force retired, Admiral Tanaka ran his four transports
+onto the beach, knowing they would be sitting targets at daylight.
+Most of the men on board, however, did manage to get ashore before the
+inevitable pounding by American planes, warships, and artillery.
+
+Ten thousand troops of the _38th Division_ had landed, but the Japanese
+were in no shape to ever again attempt a massive reinforcement. The
+horrific losses in the frequent naval clashes, which seemed at times
+to favor the Japanese, did not really represent a standoff. Every
+American ship lost or damaged could and would be replaced; every
+Japanese ship lost meant a steadily diminishing fleet. In the air, the
+losses on both sides were daunting, but the enemy naval air arm would
+never recover from its losses of experienced carrier pilots. Two years
+later, the Battle of the Philippine Sea between American and Japanese
+carriers would aptly be called the “Marianas Turkey Shoot” because of
+the ineptitude of the Japanese trainee pilots.
+
+[Illustration:
+
+    Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 53510
+
+_A Japanese troop transport and her landing craft were badly damaged
+by the numerous Marine air attacks and were forced to run aground on
+Kokumbona beach after the naval Battle of Guadalcanal. Many enemy
+troops were killed in the attacks._]
+
+The enemy troops who had been fortunate enough to reach land were
+not immediately ready to assault the American positions. The _38th
+Division_ and the remnants of the various Japanese units that had
+previously tried to penetrate the Marine lines needed to be shaped into
+a coherent attack force before General Hyakutake could again attempt to
+take Henderson Field.
+
+General Vandegrift now had enough fresh units to begin to replace his
+veteran troops along the front lines. The decision to replace the 1st
+Marine Division with the Army’s 25th Infantry Division had been made.
+Admiral Turner had told Vandegrift to leave all of his heavy equipment
+on the island when he did pull out “in hopes of getting your units
+re-equipped when you come out.” He also told the Marine general that
+the Army would command the final phases of the Guadalcanal operation
+since it would provide the majority of the combat forces once the 1st
+Division departed. Major General Alexander M. Patch, commander of
+the Americal Division, would relieve Vandegrift as senior American
+officer ashore. His air support would continue to be Marine-dominated
+as General Geiger, now located on Espiritu Santo with 1st Wing
+headquarters, fed his squadrons forward to maintain the offensive. And
+the air command on Guadalcanal itself would continue to be a mixed bag
+of Army, Navy, Marine, and Allied squadrons.
+
+The sick list of the 1st Marine Division in November included more than
+3,200 men with malaria. The men of the 1st still manning the frontline
+foxholes and the rear areas--if anyplace within Guadalcanal’s perimeter
+could properly be called a rear area--were plain worn out. They had
+done their part and they knew it.
+
+On 29 November, General Vandegrift was handed a message from the Joint
+Chiefs of Staff. The crux of it read: “1st MarDiv is to be relieved
+without delay ... and will proceed to Australia for rehabilitation and
+employment.” The word soon spread that the 1st was leaving and where it
+was going. Australia was not yet the cherished place it would become in
+the division’s future, but _any_ place was preferable to Guadalcanal.
+
+
+[Sidebar (page 41): 75mm Pack Howitzer--Workhorse of the Artillery
+
+[Illustration]
+
+During the summer of 1930, the Marine Corps began replacing its old
+French 75mm guns (Model 1897) with the 75mm Pack Howitzer Model
+1923-E2. This weapon was designed for use in the Army primarily as
+mountain artillery. Since it could be broken down and manhandled ashore
+in six loads from ships’ boats, the pack howitzer was an important
+supporting weapon of the Marine Corps landing forces in prewar landing
+exercises.
+
+The 75mm pack howitzer saw extensive service with the Marine Corps
+throughout World War II in almost every major landing in the Pacific.
+Crewed by five Marines, the howitzer could hurl a 16-pound shell nearly
+10,000 yards. In the D Series table of organization with which the
+1st Marine Division went to war, and through the following E and F
+series, there were three pack howitzer battalions for each artillery
+regiment.--_Anthony Wayne Tommell and Kenneth L. Smith-Christmas_
+]
+
+
+[Sidebar (page 45): The Japanese Model 89 (1929) 50mm Heavy Grenade
+Discharger
+
+[Illustration]
+
+Born out of the need to bridge the gap in range between hand grenades
+and mortars, the grenade discharger evolved in the Imperial Japanese
+Army from a special purpose weapon of infantry assault and defense to
+an essential item of standard equipment with all Japanese ground forces.
+
+Commonly called _Juteki_ by the Japanese, this weapon officially was
+designated _Hachikyu Shiki Jutekidarto_, or 1189 Model Heavy Grenade
+Discharger, the term “heavy” being justified by the powerful 1-pound,
+12-ounce high explosive shell it was designed to fire, although it also
+fired the standard Model 91 fragmentation grenade.
+
+To the American Marines and soldiers who first encountered this weapon
+and others of its kind in combat they were known as “knee mortars,”
+likely so named because they generally were fired from a kneeling
+position. Typically, the discharger’s concave baseplate was pressed
+firmly into the surface of the ground by the firer’s foot to support
+the heavy recoil of the fired shell, but unfortunately the term “knee
+mortar” suggested to some untutored captors of these weapons that they
+were to be fired with the baseplate resting against the knee or thigh.
+When a Marine fired one of these dischargers from his thigh and broke
+his upper leg bone, efforts were swiftly undertaken in the field to
+educate all combat troops in the safe and proper handling of these very
+useful weapons.
+
+The Model 89 (1929) 50mm Heavy Grenade Discharger is a muzzle-loaded,
+high-angle-of-fire weapon which weighs 10-1/4 pounds and is 24 inches
+in overall length. Its design is compact and simple. The discharger
+has three major components: the rifled barrel, the supporting barrel
+pedestal with firing mechanism, and the base plate. Operation of the
+Model 89 was easy and straightforward, and with practice its user could
+deliver accurate fire registered quickly on target.
+
+Encountered in all major battles in the Pacific War, the Model 89
+Grenade Discharger was an uncomplicated, very portable, and highly
+efficient weapon operated easily by one man. It was carried in a cloth
+or leather case with a sling, and its one-piece construction allowed
+it to be brought into action very quickly. This grenade discharger
+had the advantage over most mortars in that it could be aimed and
+fired mechanically after a projectile had been placed in the barrel,
+projectile firing not being dependent upon dropping down the barrel
+against a stationary firing pin as with most mortars, where barrel
+fouling sometimes caused dangerous hangfires. Although an instantaneous
+fuze employed on the Model 89 high explosive shell restricted this
+shell’s use to open areas, the Model 91 fragmentation grenade with its
+seven-second fuze made this discharger effective in a jungle or forest
+setting, with complete safety for the user from premature detonation
+of projectiles by overhanging foliage. Smoke and signal shells, and an
+incendiary grenade, were special types of ammunition used with this
+versatile and effective weapon which won the respect of all who came to
+know it.--_Edwin F. Libby_
+]
+
+
+
+
+_December and the Final Stages_
+
+
+On 7 December, one year after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor,
+General Vandegrift sent a message to all men under his command in the
+Guadalcanal area thanking them for their courage and steadfastness,
+commending particularly the pilots and “all who labored and sweated
+within the lines in all manner of prodigious and vital tasks.” He
+reminded them all that their “unbelievable achievements had made
+‘Guadalcanal’ a synonym for death and disaster in the language of our
+enemy.” On 9 December, he handed over his command to General Patch and
+flew out to Australia at the same time the first elements of the 5th
+Marines were boarding ship. The 1st, 11th, and 7th Marines would soon
+follow together with all the division’s supporting units. The men who
+were leaving were thin, tired, hollow-eyed, and apathetic; they were
+young men who had grown old in four months time. They left behind 681
+dead in the island’s cemetery.
+
+[Illustration: _As he tells it, “Too Many, Too Close, Too Long,” is
+Donald L. Dickson’s portrait of one of the “little guys, just plain
+worn out. His stamina and his spirit stretched beyond human endurance.
+He has had no real sleep for a long time.... And he probably hasn’t
+stopped ducking and fighting long enough to discover that he has
+malaria. He is going to discover it now, however. He is through.”_
+
+    Captain Donald L. Dickson, USMCR
+]
+
+[Illustration:
+
+    U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo SC164898
+
+_Americal Division commander, MajGen Alexander M. Patch, Jr., watches
+while his troops and supplies are staged on Guadalcanal’s beaches on 8
+December, the day before he relieved Gen Vandegrift and his wornout 1st
+Marine Division._]
+
+The final regiment of the Americal Division, the 132d Infantry, landed
+on 8 December as the 5th Marines was preparing to leave. The 2d Marine
+Division’s regiments already on the island, the 2d, 8th, and part
+of the 10th, knew that the 6th Marines was on its way to rejoin. It
+seemed to many of the men of the 2d Marines, who had landed on D-Day, 7
+August, that they, too, should be leaving. These took slim comfort in
+the thought that they, by all rights, should be the first of the 2d to
+depart the island whenever that hoped-for day came.
+
+General Patch received a steady stream of ground reinforcements
+and replacements in December. He was not ready yet to undertake a
+full-scale offensive until the 25th Division and the rest of the 2d
+Marine Division arrived, but he kept all frontline units active in
+combat and reconnaissance patrols, particularly toward the western
+flank.
+
+The island commander’s air defense capabilities also grew
+substantially. Cactus Air Force, organized into a fighter command and a
+strike (bomber) command, now operated from a newly redesignated Marine
+Corps Air Base. The Henderson Field complex included a new airstrip,
+Fighter Two, which replaced Fighter One, which had severe drainage
+problems. Brigadier General Louis Woods, who had taken over as senior
+aviator when Geiger returned to Espiritu Santo, was relieved on 26
+December by Brigadier General Francis P. Mulcahy, Commanding General,
+2d Marine Aircraft Wing. New fighter and bomber squadrons from both the
+1st and 2d Wings sent their flight echelons forward on a regular basis.
+The Army added three fighter squadrons and a medium bomber squadron
+of B-26s. The Royal New Zealand Air Force flew in a reconnaissance
+squadron of Lockheed Hudsons. And the U.S. Navy sent forward a squadron
+of Consolidated PBY Catalina patrol planes which had a much needed
+night-flying capability.
+
+The aerial buildup forced the Japanese to curtail all air attacks and
+made daylight naval reinforcement attempts an event of the past. The
+nighttime visits of the Tokyo Express destroyers now brought only
+supplies encased in metal drums which were rolled over the ships’ sides
+in hope they would float into shore. The men ashore desperately needed
+everything that could be sent, even by this method, but most of the
+drums never reached the beaches.
+
+Still, however desperate the enemy situation was becoming, he was
+prepared to fight. General Hyakutake continued to plan the seizure of
+the airfield. General Hitoshi Immamura, commander of the _Eighth Area
+Army_, arrived in Rabaul on 2 December with orders to continue the
+offensive. He had 50,000 men to add to the embattled Japanese troops on
+Guadalcanal.
+
+Before these new enemy units could be employed, the Americans were
+prepared to move out from the perimeter in their own offensive.
+Conscious that the Mt. Austen area was a continuing threat to his
+inland flank in any drive to the west, Patch committed the Americal’s
+132d Infantry to the task of clearing the mountain’s wooded slopes
+on 17 December. The Army regiment succeeded in isolating the major
+Japanese force in the area by early January. The 1st Battalion, 2d
+Marines, took up hill positions to the southeast of the 132d to
+increase flank protection.
+
+By this time, the 25th Infantry Division (Major General J. Lawton
+Collins) had arrived and so had the 6th Marines (6 January) and the
+rest of the 2d Division’s headquarters and support troops. Brigadier
+General Alphonse De Carre, the Marine division’s assistant commander,
+took charge of all Marine ground forces on the island. The 2d
+Division’s commander, Major General John Marston, remained in New
+Zealand because he was senior to General Patch.
+
+With three divisions under his command, General Patch was designated
+Commanding General, XIV Corps, on 2 January. His corps headquarters
+numbered less than a score of officers and men, almost all taken from
+the Americal’s staff. Brigadier General Edmund B. Sebree, who had
+already led both Army and Marine units in attacks on the Japanese,
+took command of the Americal Division. On 10 January, Patch gave the
+signal to start the strongest American offensive yet in the Guadalcanal
+campaign. The mission of the troops was simple and to the point:
+“Attack and destroy the Japanese forces remaining on Guadalcanal.”
+
+The initial objective of the corps’ attack was a line about 1,000 to
+1,500 yards west of jump-off positions. These ran inland from Point
+Cruz to the vicinity of Hill 66, about 3,000 yards from the beach.
+In order to reach Hill 66, the 25th Infantry Division attacked first
+with the 35th and 27th Infantry driving west and southwest across a
+scrambled series of ridges. The going was rough and the dug-in enemy,
+elements of two regiments of the _38th Division_, gave way reluctantly
+and slowly. By the 13th, however, the American soldiers, aided by
+Marines of the 1st Battalion, 2d Marines, had won through to positions
+on the southern flank of the 2d Marine Division.
+
+On 12 January, the Marines began their advance with the 8th Marines
+along the shore and 2d Marines inland. At the base of Point Cruz, in
+the 3d Battalion, 8th Marines’ sector, regimental weapons company
+halftracks ran over seven enemy machine gun nests. The attack was
+then held up by an extensive emplacement until the weapons company
+commander, Captain Henry P. “Jim” Crowe, took charge of a half-dozen
+Marine infantrymen taking cover from enemy fire with the classic
+remarks: “You’ll never get a Purple Heart hiding in a fox hole. Follow
+me!” The men did and they destroyed the emplacement.
+
+[Illustration: U.S. Halftrack Mounting a 75mm Pack Howitzer and a
+.50-Caliber Air-Cooled Machine Gun]
+
+All along the front of the advancing assault companies the going was
+rough. The Japanese, remnants of the _Sendai Division_, were dug
+into the sides of a series of cross compartments and their fire took
+the Marines in the flank as they advanced. Progress was slow despite
+massive artillery support and naval gunfire from four destroyers
+offshore. In two days of heavy fighting, flamethrowers were employed
+for the first time and tanks were brought into play. The 2d Marines
+was now relieved and the 6th Marines moved into the attack along the
+coast while the 8th Marines took up the advance inland. Naval gunfire
+support, spotted by naval officers ashore, improved measurably. On the
+15th, the Americans, both Army and Marine, reached the initial corps
+objective. In the Marine attack zone, 600 Japanese were dead.
+
+[Illustration: FINAL PHASE
+
+26 JANUARY-9 FEBRUARY 1943]
+
+The battle-weary 2d Marines had seen its last infantry action of
+Guadalcanal. A new unit now came into being, a composite Army-Marine
+division, or CAM division, formed from units of the Americal and
+2d Marine Divisions. The directing staff was from the 2d Division,
+since the Americal had responsibility for the main perimeter. Two of
+its regiments, the 147th and the 182d Infantry, moved up to attack
+in line with the 6th Marines still along the coast. The 8th Marines
+was essentially pinched out of the front lines by a narrowing attack
+corridor as the inland mountains and hills pressed closer to the
+coastal trail. The 25th Division, which was advancing across this
+rugged terrain, had the mission of outflanking the Japanese in the
+vicinity of Kokumbona, while the CAM division drove west. On the 23d,
+as the CAM troops approached Kokumbona, the 1st Battalion of the 27th
+Infantry struck north out of the hills and overran the village site
+and Japanese base. There was only slight but steady opposition to the
+American advance as the enemy withdrew west toward Cape Esperance.
+
+The Japanese had decided, reluctantly, to give up the attempt to retake
+Guadalcanal. The orders were sent in the name of the Emperor and senior
+staff officers were sent to Guadalcanal to ensure their acceptance. The
+Navy would make the final runs of the Tokyo Express, only this time
+in reverse, to evacuate the garrison so it could fight again in later
+battles to hold the Solomons.
+
+Receiving intelligence that enemy ships were massing again to the
+northwest, General Patch took steps, as Vandegrift had before him on
+many occasions, to guard against overextending his forces in the face
+of what appeared to be another enemy attempt at reinforcement. He
+pulled the 25th Division back to bolster the main perimeter defenses
+and ordered the CAM division to continue its attack. When the Marines
+and soldiers moved out on 26 January, they had a surprisingly easy time
+of it, gaining 1,000 yards the first day and 2,000 the following day.
+The Japanese were still contesting every attack, but not in strength.
+
+By 30 January, the sole frontline unit in the American advance was the
+147th Infantry; the 6th Marines held positions to its left rear.
+
+The Japanese destroyer transports made their first run to the island
+on the night of 1-2 February, taking out 2,300 men from evacuation
+positions near Cape Esperance. On the night of 4-5 February, they
+returned and took out most of the _Sendai_ survivors and General
+Hyakutake and his _Seventeenth Army_ staff. The final evacuation
+operation was carried out on the night of 7-8 February, when a
+3,000-man rear guard was embarked. In all, the Japanese withdrew about
+11,000 men in those three nights and evacuated about 13,000 soldiers
+from Guadalcanal overall. The Americans would meet many of these men
+again in later battles, but not the 600 evacuees who died, too worn and
+sick to survive their rescue.
+
+On 9 February, American soldiers advancing from east and west met at
+Tenaro village on Cape Esperance. The only Marine ground unit still
+in action was the 3d Battalion, 10th Marines, supporting the advance.
+General Patch could happily report the “complete and total defeat of
+Japanese forces on Guadalcanal.” No organized Japanese units remained.
+
+On 31 January, the 2d Marines and the 1st Battalion, 8th Marines,
+boarded ship to leave Guadalcanal. As was true with the 1st Marine
+Division, some of these men were so debilitated by malaria they had to
+be carried on board. All of them struck observers again as young men
+grown old “with their skins cracked and furrowed and wrinkled.” On 9
+February, the rest of the 8th Marines and a good part of the division
+supporting units boarded transports. The 6th Marines, thankfully
+only six weeks on the island, left on the 19th. All were headed for
+Wellington, New Zealand, the 2d Marines for the first time. Left behind
+on the island as a legacy of the 2d Marine Division were 263 dead.
+
+[Illustration: _President Franklin D. Roosevelt presents Gen Vandegrift
+the Medal of Honor for his heroic accomplishments against the Japanese
+in the Solomons. Looking on are Mrs. Vandegrift, and the general’s son,
+Maj Alexander A. Vandegrift, Jr._
+
+    National Archives Photo 208-PU-209V-4
+]
+
+The total cost of the Guadalcanal campaign to the American ground
+combat forces was 1,598 officers and men killed, 1,152 of them
+Marines. The wounded totaled 4,709, and 2,799 of these were Marines.
+Marine aviation casualties were 147 killed and 127 wounded. The
+Japanese in their turn lost close to 25,000 men on Guadalcanal, about
+half of whom were killed in action. The rest succumbed to illness,
+wounds, and starvation.
+
+[Illustration: _The temporary resting place of a Marine killed in the
+fighting at Lunga Point is shown here. The grave marker was erected by
+his friends. The Marine’s remains were later removed to the division
+cemetery on Guadalcanal, and further reburial at war’s end either in
+his hometown or the Punchbowl National Cemetery in Hawaii with the
+honors due a fallen hero._]
+
+At sea, the comparative losses were about equal, with each side
+losing about the same number of fighting ships. The enemy loss of
+2 battleships, 3 carriers, 12 cruisers, and 25 destroyers, was
+irreplaceable. The Allied ship losses, though costly, were not fatal;
+in essence, all ships lost were replaced. In the air, at least 600
+Japanese planes were shot down; even more costly was the death of
+2,300 experienced pilots and aircrewmen. The Allied plane losses were
+less than half the enemy’s number and the pilot and aircrew losses
+substantially lower.
+
+President Roosevelt, reflecting the thanks of a grateful nation,
+awarded General Vandegrift the Medal of Honor for “outstanding and
+heroic accomplishment” in his leadership of American forces on
+Guadalcanal from 7 August to 9 December 1942. And for the same period,
+he awarded the Presidential Unit Citation to the 1st Marine Division
+(Reinforced) for “outstanding gallantry” reflecting “courage and
+determination ... of an inspiring order.” Included in the division’s
+citation and award, besides the organic units of the 1st Division, were
+the 2d and 8th Marines and attached units of the 2d Marine Division,
+all of the Americal Division, the 1st Parachute and 1st and 2d Raider
+Battalions, elements of the 3d, 5th, and 14th Defense Battalions, the
+1st Aviation Engineer Battalion, the 6th Naval Construction Battalion,
+and two motor torpedo boat squadrons. The indispensable Cactus Air
+Force was included, also represented by 7 Marine headquarters and
+service squadrons, 16 Marine flying squadrons, 16 Navy flying
+squadrons, and 5 Army flying squadrons.
+
+The victory at Guadalcanal marked a crucial turning point in the
+Pacific War. No longer were the Japanese on the offensive. Some of the
+Japanese Emperor’s best infantrymen, pilots, and seamen had been bested
+in close combat by the Americans and their Allies. There were years of
+fierce fighting ahead, but there was now no question of its outcome.
+
+When the veterans of the 1st Marine Division were gathered in thankful
+reunion 20 years later, they received a poignant message from
+Guadalcanal. The sender was a legend to all “Canal” Marines, Honorary
+U.S. Marine Corps Sergeant Major Jacob C. Vouza. The Solomons native in
+his halting English said: “Tell them I love them all. Me old man now,
+and me no look good no more. But me never forget.”
+
+
+[Sidebar (page 48): The ‘George’ Medal
+
+
+The George Medal is legendary among 1st Marine Division veterans of
+Guadalcanal. Only about 50 were cast, in Australia, before the mold
+gave out.
+
+The medal commemorates the difficult situation of the division during
+the early days on Guadalcanal, when ammunition, food, and heavy
+equipment were short and the Japanese plentiful. When the issue was
+no longer in doubt, Marines had time to reflect on the D-plus-3 Navy
+withdrawal in the face of increasing Japanese air attacks and surface
+action which left the division in such a tight spot.
+
+In the recollection of then-Captain Donald L. Dickson, adjutant of
+the 5th Marines, the Division G-3, then-Lieutenant Colonel Merrill B.
+Twining, resolved to commemorate the occasion. Twining told artist
+Dickson in general terms what he had in mind. Dickson went to work
+designing an appropriate medal using a fifty-cent piece to draw a
+circle on a captured Japanese blank military postcard.
+
+Dickson’s design was approved and when the division got to Australia a
+mold was made by a local metal craftsman and a small number were cast
+before the mold became unserviceable. Those wanting a medal paid one
+Australian pound for it and received a certificate as well. The medals
+are now an even greater rarity than at the time. In recent years,
+reproductions have been cast, and can be identified by the different
+metal and a poor definition of details.
+
+The obverse design shows a hand and sleeve dropping a hot potato in
+the shape of Guadalcanal into the arms of a grateful Marine. In the
+original design the sleeve bore the stripes of a vice admiral intended
+to be either Vice Admiral Robert L. Ghormley, ComSoPac, or Vice Admiral
+Frank Jack Fletcher, Commander Joint Expeditionary Force, but the final
+medal diplomatically omitted this identification.
+
+Also on the obverse is a Saguaro cactus, indigenous to Arizona, not
+Guadalcanal, but representing the code name for the island, “Cactus.”
+The obverse inscription is _Facia Georgius_, “Let George Do It.” Thus
+it became known as the George Medal.
+
+The medal’s reverse pictures a cow (the original design showed a
+Japanese soldier with breeches down) and an electric fan, and is
+inscribed: “In fond remembrance of the happy days spent from Aug. 7th
+1942 to Jan. 5th 1943. U.S.M.C.”
+
+The suspension ribbon was made, appropriately, of the pale green
+herringbone twill from some Marine’s utility uniform. Legend has it
+that to be authentic the utilities from which the ribbons were made had
+to have been washed in the waters of Guadalcanal’s Lunga River. Some
+medals were provided with the oversized safety pin used to identify
+laundry bags in Navy shipboard laundries.
+
+Such unofficial commemorative mementoes are not uncommon in military
+circles and recall, among others, the Soochow Creek medals recognizing
+the defense of Shanghai’s International Settlement during the Japanese
+invasions of 1932 and 1937 which were inspired by the Military Order of
+the Dragon medals of veterans of the China Relief Expedition or Boxer
+Rebellion.--_Brooke Nihart_
+
+[Illustration]
+]
+
+
+
+
+_Sources_
+
+
+The basic source work for this booklet is the first volume in the
+series _History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II, Pearl
+Harbor to Guadalcanal_, written by LtCol Frank O. Hough, Maj Verle E.
+Ludwig, and Henry I. Shaw, Jr. (Washington: Historical Branch, G-3
+Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1958). Other books used in
+writing this narrative were: BGen Samuel B. Griffith II, _The Battle
+for Guadalcanal_ (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1963); Gen Alexander
+A. Vandegrift as told to Robert B. Asprey, _Once a Marine: The Memoirs
+of General A. A. Vandegrift, USMC_ (New York: W. W. Norton, 1964); Col
+Mitchell Paige, _A Marine Named Mitch_ (New York: Vantage Press, 1975);
+Burke Davis, _Marine: The Life of Chesty Puller_ (Boston: Little,
+Brown, 1962); George McMillan, _The Old Breed: A History of the 1st
+Marine Division in World War II_ (Washington: Infantry Journal Press,
+1949); and Richard W. Johnston, _Follow Me!: The Story of the Second
+Marine Division in World War II_ (New York: Random House, 1948).
+
+The correspondence of General Vandegrift with General Holcomb and
+other senior Marines, held at the Marine Corps Historical Center,
+was helpful. Equally of value were conversations that the author had
+had with General Vandegrift after his retirement. In the course of
+his career as a Marine historian, the author has talked with other
+Guadalcanal veterans of all ranks; hopefully, this has resulted in a
+“feel” for the campaign, essential in writing such an overview.
+
+The literature on the Guadalcanal operation is extensive. In addition
+to the books cited above, there are several which are personally
+recommended to the interested reader: Robert Leckie, _Helmet for My
+Pillow_ (New York: Random House, 1957); Herbert Merillat, _Guadalcanal
+Remembered_ (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1982); John Miller, Jr., _The United
+States Army in World War II: The War in the Pacific_; _Guadalcanal,
+The First Offensive_ (Washington: Historical Division, Department
+of the Army, 1949); T. Grady Gallant, _On Valor’s Side_ (New York:
+Doubleday, 1963); Robert Sherrod, _History of Marine Corps Aviation
+in World War II_ (Washington: Combat Forces Press, 1952); Maj John L.
+Zimmerman, _The Guadalcanal Campaign_ (Washington: Historical Division,
+Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1949); RAdm Samuel E. Morrison, _The
+Struggle for Guadalcanal: History of United States Naval Operations
+in World War II_, Vol V (Boston: Little, Brown, 1950); and a recent,
+comprehensive account, Richard B. Frank, _Guadalcanal_ (New York:
+Random House, 1990).
+
+
+
+
+_About the Author_
+
+
+[Illustration]
+
+Henry I. Shaw, Jr., former chief historian of the History and Museums
+Division, was a Marine Corps historian from 1951-1990. He attended The
+Citadel, 1943-1944, and was graduated with a bachelor of arts cum laude
+in history from Hope College, Holland, Michigan. He received a master
+of arts degree in history from Columbia University. Mr. Shaw served as
+a Marine in both World War II and the Korean War. He is the co-author
+of four of the five volumes of the official history of Marine Corps
+operations in World War II and was the senior editor of most of the
+official histories of Marines in Vietnam. In addition, he has written a
+number of brief Marine Corps histories. He has written many articles on
+military history and has had more than 50 signed book reviews.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+_The author gratefully acknowledges the permission granted by the
+Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company of America to use the maps
+from BGen Samuel B. Griffith II’s_ The Battle for Guadalcanal _and by
+Doubleday Books and Jack Coggins for use of the sketches from his_ The
+Campaign for Guadalcanal. _The author also wishes to thank Richard
+J. Frank and Herbert C. Merillat for permission to reproduce their
+photographs._
+
+
+
+
+[Illustration]
+
+=THIS PAMPHLET HISTORY=, one in a series devoted to U.S. Marines in
+the World War II era, is published for the education and training of
+Marines by the History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine
+Corps, Washington, D.C., as a part of the U.S. Department of Defense
+observance of the 50th anniversary of victory in that war.
+
+Editorial costs of preparing this pamphlet have been defrayed in part
+by a bequest from the estate of Emilie H. Watts, in memory of her late
+husband, Thomas M. Watts, who served as a Marine and was the recipient
+of a Purple Heart.
+
+    WORLD WAR II COMMEMORATIVE SERIES
+
+    _DIRECTOR OF MARINE CORPS HISTORY AND MUSEUMS_
+    =Brigadier General Edwin H. Simmons, USMC (Ret)=
+
+    _GENERAL EDITOR,
+    WORLD WAR II COMMEMORATIVE SERIES_
+    =Benis M. Frank=
+
+    _CARTOGRAPHIC CONSULTANT_
+    =George C. MacGillivray=
+
+    _EDITING AND DESIGN SECTION, HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISION_
+    =Robert E. Struder=, Senior Editor;
+    =W. Stephen Hill=, Visual Information Specialist;
+    =Catherine A. Kerns=, Composition Services Technician
+
+    Marine Corps Historical Center
+    Building 58, Washington Navy Yard
+    Washington, D.C. 20374-0580
+
+    1992
+
+    PCN 190 003117 00
+
+
+[Illustration (back cover)]
+
+
+
+
+Transcriber’s Notes
+
+
+Punctuation, hyphenation, and spelling were made consistent when a
+predominant preference was found in this book; otherwise they were not
+changed.
+
+Simple typographical errors were corrected; occasional unbalanced
+quotation marks retained.
+
+To make this eBook easier to read, particularly on handheld devices,
+some images have been made relatively larger than in the original
+pamphlet, and centered, rather than offset to one side or the other;
+and some were placed a little earlier or later than in the
+original. Sidebars in the original have been repositioned between
+chapters and identified as “[Sidebar (page nn):”, where the
+page reference is to the original location in the source book. In the
+Plain Text version, the matching closing right bracket follows the last
+line of the Sidebar’s text and is on a separate line to make it more
+noticeable. In the HTML versions, that bracket follows the colon, and
+each Sidebar is displayed within a box.
+
+Descriptions of the Cover and Frontispiece have been moved from page 1
+of the book to just below those illustrations, and text referring to
+the locations of those illustrations has been deleted.
+
+Page 3: “He spent most of his final years” was misprinted without the
+“of”.
+
+Page 21: “disgraced in his own” was misprinted without the “his”.
+
+
+
+
+
+End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of First Offensive: The Marine Campaign
+for Guadalcanal, by Henry I. Shaw
+
+*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 48807 ***
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-<pre>
-
-The Project Gutenberg EBook of First Offensive: The Marine Campaign for
-Guadalcanal, by Henry I. Shaw
-
-This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most
-other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions
-whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of
-the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at
-www.gutenberg.org.  If you are not located in the United States, you'll have
-to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook.
-
-Title: First Offensive: The Marine Campaign for Guadalcanal
-
-Author: Henry I. Shaw
-
-Release Date: April 27, 2015 [EBook #48807]
-
-Language: English
-
-Character set encoding: UTF-8
-
-*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK FIRST OFFENSIVE: GUADALCANAL ***
-
-
-
-
-Produced by Brian Coe, Charlie Howard, and the Online
-Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This
-file was produced from images generously made available
-by The Internet Archive)
-
-
-
-
-
-
-</pre>
-
-
-<div class="transnote">
-<p class="center">Transcriber’s note: Table of Contents added by Transcriber
-and placed into the Public Domain.</p>
-</div>
-
-<h2 class="nobreak">Contents</h2>
-
-<div class="center vspace"><div class="ilb">
-
-<ul>
-<li><a href="#First_Offensive_The_Marine">First Offensive: The Marine Campaign for Guadalcanal</a><br /></li>
-<li class="in2"><a href="#Sidebar_page_3_General_Alexander_A_Vandegrift">SIDEBAR: General Alexander A. Vandegrift</a><br /></li>
-<li><a href="#The_Landing_and_August_Battles">The Landing and August Battles</a><br /></li>
-<li class="in2"><a href="#Sidebar_page_5_First_Marine_Utility_Uniform_Issued_in_World_War_II">SIDEBAR: First Marine Utility Uniform Issued in World War II</a><br /></li>
-<li class="in2"><a href="#Sidebar_page_11_LVT_1_The_Amtrac">SIDEBAR: LVT (1)&mdash;The ‘Amtrac’</a><br /></li>
-<li class="in2"><a href="#Sidebar_page_14_General_Vandegrift_and_His_1st_Marine_Division_Staff">SIDEBAR: General Vandegrift and His 1st Marine Division Staff</a><br /></li>
-<li class="in2"><a href="#Sidebar_page_17_The_Coastwatchers">SIDEBAR: The Coastwatchers</a><br /></li>
-<li class="in2"><a href="#Sidebar_page_19_The_1st_Marine_Division_Patch">SIDEBAR: The 1st Marine Division Patch</a><br /></li>
-<li><a href="#September_and_the_Ridge">September and the Ridge</a><br /></li>
-<li class="in2"><a href="#Sidebar_page_22_Sergeant_Major_Sir_Jacob_Charles_Vouza">SIDEBAR: Sergeant Major Sir Jacob Charles Vouza</a><br /></li>
-<li class="in2"><a href="#Sidebar_page_23_M3A1_37mm_Antitank_Gun">SIDEBAR: M3A1 37mm Antitank Gun</a><br /></li>
-<li class="in2"><a href="#Sidebar_page_29">SIDEBAR: Douglas Albert Munro</a><br /></li>
-<li><a href="#October_and_the_Japanese_Offensive">October and the Japanese Offensive</a><br /></li>
-<li class="in2"><a href="#Sidebar_page_37_Reising_Gun">SIDEBAR: Reising Gun</a><br /></li>
-<li><a href="#November_and_the_Continuing_Buildup">November and the Continuing Buildup</a><br /></li>
-<li class="in2"><a href="#Sidebar_page_41_75mm_Pack_Howitzer_Workhorse_of_the_Artillery">SIDEBAR: 75mm Pack Howitzer&mdash;Workhorse of the Artillery</a><br /></li>
-<li class="in2"><a href="#Sidebar_page_45_The_Japanese_Model_89_1929_50mm_Heavy_Grenade_Discharger">SIDEBAR: The Japanese Model 89 (1929) 50mm Heavy Grenade Discharger</a><br /></li>
-<li><a href="#December_and_the_Final_Stages">December and the Final Stages</a><br /></li>
-<li class="in2"><a href="#Sidebar_page_48_The_George_Medal">SIDEBAR: The ‘George’ Medal</a><br /></li>
-<li><a href="#Sources">Sources</a><br /></li>
-<li><a href="#About_the_Author">About the Author</a><br /></li>
-<li><a href="#About_series">About this series of pamphlets</a><br /></li>
-<li><a href="#Transcribers_Notes">Transcriber’s Notes</a></li>
-</ul>
-</div></div>
-
-
-<h1 style="text-align: left; clear: none;">
-<span class="smcap">First Offensive:<br />
-The Marine Campaign<br />
-For Guadalcanal</span></h1>
-
-<p class="p2 in0 larger left"><span class="smcap">Marines in<br />
-World War II<br />
-Commemorative Series</span></p>
-
-<p class="p2 in0 larger left"><span class="smcap">By Henry I. Shaw, Jr.</span>
-</p>
-
-<div id="if_i_b_000" class="figcenter" style="width: 374px;">
-  <img src="images/i_b_000.jpg" width="374" height="500" alt="" />
-  <div class="captionl justify"><i>A Marine machine gunner
-and his Browning .30-caliber M1917
-heavy machine gun stand guard while
-1st Marine Division engineers clean up
-in the Lunga River.</i> (Department of
-Defense [USMC] Photo 588741)</div></div>
-
-<hr />
-<div id="if_i_b_001" class="figcenter" style="width: 433px;">
-  <img src="images/i_b_001.jpg" width="433" height="600" alt="" />
-  <div class="captionl justify"><i>It was from a Boeing B-17 Flying
-Fortress such as this that LtCol Merrill
-B. Twining and Maj William B.
-McKean reconnoitered the Watchtower
-target area and discovered the Japanese
-building an airfield on Guadalcanal.</i>
-(National Archives Photo 80-G-34887)</div></div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_1" id="Page_1">1</a></span></p>
-
-
-
-<div class="chapter"></div>
-<h2 style="text-align: left; margin-bottom: 0;"><a name="First_Offensive_The_Marine" id="First_Offensive_The_Marine"></a>First Offensive: The Marine<br />
-Campaign for Guadalcanal</h2>
-
-<p class="p0 in0" style="margin-bottom: 2em;"><i>by Henry I. Shaw, Jr.</i></p>
-
-<p class="drop-cap"><span class="smcap1">In</span> the early summer of
-1942, intelligence reports
-of the construction
-of a Japanese
-airfield near Lunga
-Point on Guadalcanal in the Solomon
-Islands triggered a demand for
-offensive action in the South Pacific.
-The leading offensive advocate in
-Washington was Admiral Ernest J.
-King, Chief of Naval Operations
-(CNO). In the Pacific, his view was
-shared by Admiral Chester A.
-Nimitz, Commander in Chief, Pacific
-Fleet (CinCPac), who had already
-proposed sending the 1st Marine
-Raider Battalion to Tulagi, an island
-20 miles north of Guadalcanal across
-Sealark Channel, to destroy a
-Japanese seaplane base there.
-Although the Battle of the Coral Sea
-had forestalled a Japanese amphibious
-assault on Port Moresby, the Allied
-base of supply in eastern New
-Guinea, completion of the Guadalcanal
-airfield might signal the beginning
-of a renewed enemy advance to
-the south and an increased threat to
-the lifeline of American aid to New
-Zealand and Australia. On 23 July
-1942, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)
-in Washington agreed that the line of
-communications in the South Pacific
-had to be secured. The Japanese
-advance had to be stopped. Thus,
-Operation Watchtower, the seizure of
-Guadalcanal and Tulagi, came into
-being.</p>
-
-<p>The islands of the Solomons lie
-nestled in the backwaters of the
-South Pacific. Spanish fortune-hunters
-discovered them in the mid-sixteenth
-century, but no European
-power foresaw any value in the islands
-until Germany sought to expand
-its budding colonial empire
-more than two centuries later. In
-1884, Germany proclaimed a protectorate
-over northern New Guinea, the
-Bismarck Archipelago, and the
-northern Solomons. Great Britain
-countered by establishing a protectorate
-over the southern Solomons
-and by annexing the remainder of
-New Guinea. In 1905, the British
-crown passed administrative control
-over all its territories in the region to
-Australia, and the Territory of
-Papua, with its capital at Port Moresby,
-came into being. Germany’s holdings
-in the region fell under the
-administrative control of the League
-of Nations following World War I,
-with the seat of the colonial government
-located at Rabaul on New Britain.
-The Solomons lay 10 degrees
-below the Equator&mdash;hot, humid, and
-buffeted by torrential rains. The
-celebrated adventure novelist, Jack
-London, supposedly muttered: “If I
-were king, the worst punishment I
-could inflict on my enemies would be
-to banish them to the Solomons.”</p>
-
-<p>On 23 January 1942, Japanese
-forces seized Rabaul and fortified it
-extensively. The site provided an excellent
-harbor and numerous positions
-for airfields. The devastating
-enemy carrier and plane losses at the
-Battle of Midway (3&ndash;6 June 1942) had
-caused <i>Imperial General Headquarters</i>
-to cancel orders for the invasion
-of Midway, New Caledonia, Fiji, and
-Samoa, but plans to construct a
-major seaplane base at Tulagi went
-forward. The location offered one of
-the best anchorages in the South Pacific
-and it was strategically located:
-560 miles from the New Hebrides,
-800 miles from New Caledonia, and
-1,000 miles from Fiji.</p>
-
-<p>The outposts at Tulagi and
-Guadalcanal were the forward evidences
-of a sizeable Japanese force in
-the region, beginning with the <i>Seventeenth
-Army</i>, headquartered at
-Rabaul. The enemy’s <i>Eighth Fleet</i>,
-<i>Eleventh Air Fleet</i>, and <i>1st</i>, <i>7th</i>, <i>8th</i>,
-and <i>14th Naval Base Forces</i> also were
-on New Britain. Beginning on 5 August
-1942, Japanese signal intelligence
-units began to pick up transmissions
-between Noumea on New Caledonia
-and Melbourne, Australia. Enemy
-analysts concluded that Vice Admiral
-Richard L. Ghormley, commanding
-the South Pacific Area (ComSoPac),
-was signalling a British or Australian
-force in preparation for an offensive in
-the Solomons or at New Guinea. The
-warnings were passed to Japanese
-headquarters at Rabaul and Truk, but
-were ignored.</p>
-
-<div id="ip_1" class="figcenter" style="width: 982px;">
-  <img src="images/i_b_002.jpg" width="982" height="774" alt="" />
-  <div class="caption"><p>THE PACIFIC AREAS</p>
-
-<p class="smaller">1 AUGUST 1942</p></div></div>
-
-<p>The invasion force was indeed on its
-way to its targets, Guadalcanal, Tulagi,
-and the tiny islets of Gavutu and
-Tanambogo close by Tulagi’s shore. The
-landing force was composed of Marines;
-the covering force and transport
-force were U.S. Navy with a reinforcement
-of Australian warships. There was
-not much mystery to the selection of
-the 1st Marine Division to make the
-landings. Five U.S. Army divisions were
-located in the South and Southwest Pacific:<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_2" id="Page_2">2</a></span>
-three in Australia, the 37th Infantry
-in Fiji, and the Americal
-Division on New Caledonia. None was
-amphibiously trained and all were considered
-vital parts of defensive garrisons.
-The 1st Marine Division, minus
-one of its infantry regiments, had begun
-arriving in New Zealand in mid-June
-when the division headquarters
-and the 5th Marines reached Wellington.
-At that time, the rest of the reinforced
-division’s major units were
-getting ready to embark. The 1st Marines
-were at San Francisco, the 1st
-Raider Battalion was on New Caledonia,
-and the 3d Defense Battalion was
-at Pearl Harbor. The 2d Marines of the
-2d Marine Division, a unit which
-would replace the 1st Division’s 7th
-Marines stationed in British Samoa,
-was loading out from San Diego. All
-three infantry regiments of the landing
-force had battalions of artillery attached,
-from the 11th Marines, in the
-case of the 5th and 1st; the 2d Marines
-drew its reinforcing 75mm howitzers
-from the 2d Division’s 10th Marines.</p>
-
-<p>The news that his division would
-be the landing force for Watchtower
-came as a surprise to Major General
-Alexander A. Vandegrift, who had
-anticipated that the 1st Division
-would have six months of training in
-the South Pacific before it saw action.
-The changeover from administrative
-loading of the various units’
-supplies to combat loading, where
-first-needed equipment, weapons,
-ammunition, and rations were positioned
-to come off ship first with the
-assault troops, occasioned a never-to-be-forgotten
-scene on Wellington’s
-docks. The combat troops took the
-place of civilian stevedores and unloaded
-and reloaded the cargo and
-passenger vessels in an increasing
-round of working parties, often during
-rainstorms which hampered the
-task, but the job was done. Succeeding
-echelons of the division’s forces
-all got their share of labor on the
-docks as various shipping groups arrived
-and the time grew shorter.
-General Vandegrift was able to convince
-Admiral Ghormley and the
-Joint Chiefs that he would not be
-able to meet a proposed D-Day of 1
-August, but the extended landing
-date, 7 August, did little to improve
-the situation.</p>
-
-<p>An amphibious operation is a
-vastly complicated affair, particularly
-when the forces involved are assembled
-on short notice from all over the
-Pacific. The pressure that Vandegrift
-felt was not unique to the landing
-force commander. The U.S. Navy’s
-ships were the key to success and they
-were scarce and invaluable. Although<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_4" id="Page_4">4</a></span>
-the Battles of Coral Sea and Midway
-had badly damaged the Japanese
-fleet’s offensive capabilities and crippled
-its carrier forces, enemy naval
-aircraft could fight as well ashore as
-afloat and enemy warships were still
-numerous and lethal. American losses
-at Pearl Harbor, Coral Sea, and
-Midway were considerable, and
-Navy admirals were well aware that
-the ships they commanded were in
-short supply. The day was coming
-when America’s shipyards and factories
-would fill the seas with warships
-of all types, but that day had not arrived
-in 1942. Calculated risk was the
-name of the game where the Navy
-was concerned, and if the risk seemed
-too great, the Watchtower landing
-force might be a casualty. As it happened,
-the Navy never ceased to risk
-its ships in the waters of the Solomons,
-but the naval lifeline to the
-troops ashore stretched mighty thin
-at times.</p>
-
-<p>Tactical command of the invasion
-force approaching Guadalcanal in
-early August was vested in Vice Admiral
-Frank J. Fletcher as Expeditionary
-Force Commander (Task Force
-61). His force consisted of the amphibious
-shipping carrying the 1st
-Marine Division, under Rear Admiral
-Richmond K. Turner, and the
-Air Support Force led by Rear Admiral
-Leigh Noyes. Admiral Ghormley
-contributed land-based air forces
-commanded by Rear Admiral John
-S. McCain. Fletcher’s support force
-consisted of three fleet carriers, the
-<i>Saratoga</i> (CV 3), <i>Enterprise</i> (CV 6),
-and <i>Wasp</i> (CV 7); the battleship
-<i>North Carolina</i> (BB 55), 6 cruisers,
-16 destroyers, and 3 oilers. Admiral
-Turner’s covering force included five
-cruisers and nine destroyers.</p>
-
-<div class="chapter"></div>
-<div class="sidebar">
-<p class="in0 small"><a name="Sidebar_page_3_General_Alexander_A_Vandegrift" id="Sidebar_page_3_General_Alexander_A_Vandegrift"></a>[Sidebar (<a href="#Page_4">page 3</a>):]</p>
-<h3 class="nobreak p0">General Alexander A. Vandegrift</h3>
-
-<div id="ip_52b" class="figcenter" style="width: 522px;">
-  <img src="images/i_b_003.jpg" width="522" height="224" alt="" /></div>
-
-<p class="drop-cap a"><span class="dkgreen">A</span> distinguished military analyst once noted that if
-titles were awarded in America as they are in England,
-the commanding general of Marine Corps
-forces at Guadalcanal would be known simply as “Vandegrift
-of Guadalcanal.” But America does not bestow
-aristocratic titles, and besides, such a formality would not
-be in keeping with the soft-spoken, modest demeanor of
-Alexander A. Vandegrift.</p>
-
-<p>The man destined to lead the 1st Marine Division in
-America’s first ground offensive operation of World War
-II was born in 1887 in Charlottesville, Virginia, where he
-grew up fascinated by his grandfather’s stories of life in the
-Confederate Army during the Civil War. It was axiomatic
-that young Alexander would settle on a military career.
-Commissioned a Marine lieutenant in 1909, Vandegrift
-received an early baptism of fire in 1912 during the bombardment,
-assault, and capture of Coyotepe in Nicaragua.
-Two years later he participated in the capture and occupation
-of Vera Cruz. Vandegrift would spend the greater part
-of the next decade in Haiti, where he fought Caco bandits,
-and served as an inspector of constabulary with the Gendarmerie
-d’Haiti. It was in Haiti that he met and was
-befriended by Marine Colonel Smedley D. Butler, who
-called him “Sunny Jim.” The lessons of these formative years
-fighting an elusive enemy in a hostile jungle environment
-were not lost upon the young Marine officer.</p>
-
-<p>He spent the next 18 years in various posts and stations
-in the United States, along with two tours of China duty
-at Peiping and Tientsin. Prior to Pearl Harbor, Vandegrift
-was appointed assistant to the Major General Commandant,
-and in April 1940 received the single star of a
-brigadier general. He was detached to the 1st Marine Division
-in November 1941, and in May 1942 sailed for the
-South Pacific as commanding general of the first Marine
-division ever to leave the United States. On 7 August 1942,
-after exhorting his Marines with the reminder that “God
-favors the bold and strong of heart,” he led the 1st Marine
-Division ashore in the Solomon Islands in the first large-scale
-offensive action against the Japanese.</p>
-
-<p>His triumph at Guadalcanal earned General Vandegrift
-the Medal of Honor, the Navy Cross, and the praise of a
-grateful nation. In July 1943 he took command of I Marine
-Amphibious Corps and planned the landing at Empress
-Augusta Bay, Bougainville, Northern Solomons, on
-1 November 1943. He then was recalled to Washington, to
-become the Eighteenth Commandant of the Marine Corps.</p>
-
-<p>On 1 January 1944, as a lieutenant general, Vandegrift
-was sworn in as Commandant. On 4 April 1945 he was
-promoted to general, and thus became the first Marine
-officer on active duty to attain four-star rank.</p>
-
-<p>In the final stages of the war, General Vandegrift directed
-an elite force approaching half-a-million men and women,
-with its own aviation force. Comparing his Marines
-with the Japanese, he noted that the Japanese soldier “was
-trained to go to a place, stay there, fight and die. We train
-our men to go to a place, fight to win, and to live. I can
-assure you, it is a better theory.”</p>
-
-<p>After the war, Vandegrift fought another battle, this time
-in the halls of Congress, with the stakes being the survival
-of the Marine Corps. His counter-testimony during Congressional
-hearings of the spring of 1946 was instrumental
-in defeating initial attempts to merge or “unify” the U.S.
-Armed Forces. Although his term as Commandant ended
-on 31 December 1947, General Vandegrift would live to see
-passage of Public Law 416, which preserved the Corps and
-its historic mission. His official retirement date of 1 April
-1949 ended just over 40 years of service.</p>
-
-<p>General Vandegrift outlived both his wife Mildred and
-their only son, Colonel Alexander A. Vandegrift, Jr., who
-fought in World War II and Korea. He spent most of his final
-years in Delray, Florida. He died on 8 May 1973.&mdash;<i>Robert
-V. Aquilina</i></p>
-</div>
-
-<hr />
-<div class="chapter"></div>
-<h2><a name="The_Landing_and_August_Battles" id="The_Landing_and_August_Battles"></a><i>The Landing and August Battles</i></h2>
-
-<p>On board the transports approaching
-the Solomons, the Marines were
-looking for a tough fight. They knew
-little about the targets, even less
-about their opponents. Those maps
-that were available were poor, constructions
-based upon outdated
-hydrographic charts and information
-provided by former island residents.
-While maps based on aerial photographs
-had been prepared they were
-misplaced by the Navy in Auckland,
-New Zealand, and never got to the
-Marines at Wellington.</p>
-
-<p>On 17 July, a couple of division
-staff officers, Lieutenant Colonel
-Merrill B. Twining and Major William
-McKean, had been able to join
-the crew of a B-17 flying from Port
-Moresby on a reconnaissance mission
-over Guadalcanal. They reported
-what they had seen, and their analysis,
-coupled with aerial photographs,
-indicated no extensive
-defenses along the beaches of
-Guadalcanal’s north shore.</p>
-
-<div id="ip_4" class="figcenter" style="width: 894px;">
-  <img src="images/i_b_004.jpg" width="894" height="620" alt="" />
-  <div class="caption"><p>GUADALCANAL<br />
-  TULAGI-GAVUTU<br />
-  and<br />
-  Florida Islands</p></div></div>
-
-<p>This news was indeed welcome.
-The division intelligence officer (G-2),
-Lieutenant Colonel Frank B. Goettge,
-had concluded that about 8,400<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_5" id="Page_5">5</a></span>
-Japanese occupied Guadalcanal and
-Tulagi. Admiral Turner’s staff figured
-that the Japanese amounted to 7,125
-men. Admiral Ghormley’s intelligence
-officer pegged the enemy
-strength at 3,100&mdash;closest to the
-3,457 actual total of Japanese troops;
-2,571 of these were stationed on
-Guadalcanal and were mostly
-laborers working on the airfield.</p>
-
-<p>To oppose the Japanese, the Marines
-had an overwhelming superiority
-of men. At the time, the tables of
-organization for a Marine Corps division
-indicated a total of 19,514
-officers and enlisted men, including
-naval medical and engineer (Seabee)
-units. Infantry regiments numbered
-3,168 and consisted of a headquarters
-company, a weapons company,
-and three battalions. Each infantry
-battalion (933 Marines) was organized
-into a headquarters company
-(89), a weapons company (273),
-and three rifle companies (183). The
-artillery regiment had 2,581 officers
-and men organized into three 75mm
-pack howitzer battalions and one
-105mm howitzer battalion. A light
-tank battalion, a special weapons
-battalion of antiaircraft and antitank
-guns, and a parachute battalion added
-combat power. An engineer regiment
-(2,452 Marines) with battalions
-of engineers, pioneers, and Seabees,
-provided a hefty combat and service
-element. The total was rounded
-out by division headquarters battalion’s
-headquarters, signal, and military
-police companies and the
-division’s service troops&mdash;service,
-motor transport, amphibian tractor,
-and medical battalions. For Watchtower,
-the 1st Raider Battalion and
-the 3d Defense Battalion had been
-added to Vandegrift’s command to
-provide more infantrymen and much
-needed coast defense and antiaircraft
-guns and crews.</p>
-
-<p>Unfortunately, the division’s heaviest
-ordnance had been left behind in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_6" id="Page_6">6</a></span>
-New Zealand. Limited ship space and
-time meant that the division’s big
-guns, a 155mm howitzer battalion,
-and all the motor transport battalion’s
-two-and-a-half-ton trucks were
-not loaded. Colonel Pedro A. del
-Valle, commanding the 11th Marines,
-was unhappy at the loss of his heavy
-howitzers and equally distressed that
-essential sound and flash-ranging
-equipment necessary for effective
-counterbattery fire was left behind.
-Also failing to make the cut in the
-battle for shipping space, were all
-spare clothing, bedding rolls, and
-supplies necessary to support the
-reinforced division beyond 60 days
-of combat. Ten days supply of ammunition
-for each of the division’s
-weapons remained in New Zealand.</p>
-
-<div id="ip_6" class="figright" style="width: 362px;">
-  <img src="images/i_b_006.jpg" width="362" height="267" alt="" />
-  <div class="captionr">
-  <p>Naval Historical Photographic Collection 880-CF-117-4-63</p></div>
-  <div class="captionl">
-<p class="justify"><i>Enroute to Guadalcanal RAdm Richmond Kelly Turner, commander of the Amphibious
-Force, and MajGen Alexander A. Vandegrift, 1st Marine Division commander,
-review the Operation Watchtower plan for landings in the Solomon Islands.</i></p></div></div>
-
-<p>In the opinion of the 1st Division’s
-historian and a veteran of the landing,
-the men on the approaching
-transports “thought they’d have a bad
-time getting ashore.” They were confident,
-certainly, and sure that they
-could not be defeated, but most of
-the men were entering combat for the
-first time. There were combat veteran
-officers and noncommissioned
-officers (NCOs) throughout the division,
-but the majority of the men
-were going into their initial battle.
-The commanding officer of the 1st
-Marines, Colonel Clifton B. Cates,
-estimated that 90 percent of his men
-had enlisted after Pearl Harbor. The
-fabled 1st Marine Division of later
-World War II, Korean War, Vietnam
-War, and Persian Gulf War fame, the
-most highly decorated division in the
-U.S. Armed Forces, had not yet established
-its reputation.</p>
-
-<p>The convoy of ships, with its outriding
-protective screen of carriers,
-reached Koro in the Fiji Islands on
-26 July. Practice landings did little
-more than exercise the transports’
-landing craft, since reefs precluded an
-actual beach landing. The rendezvous
-at Koro did give the senior commanders
-a chance to have a
-face-to-face meeting. Fletcher,
-McCain, Turner, and Vandegrift got
-together with Ghormley’s chief of
-staff, Rear Admiral Daniel J. Callaghan,
-who notified the conferees that
-ComSoPac had ordered the 7th Marines
-on Samoa to be prepared to embark
-on four days notice as a
-reinforcement for Watchtower. To
-this decidedly good news, Admiral
-Fletcher added some bad news. In
-view of the threat from enemy land-based
-air, he could not “keep the carriers
-in the area for more than 48
-hours after the landing.” Vandegrift
-protested that he needed at least four
-days to get the division’s gear ashore,
-and Fletcher reluctantly agreed to
-keep his carriers at risk another day.</p>
-
-<p>On the 28th the ships sailed from
-the Fijis, proceeding as if they were
-headed for Australia. At noon on 5
-August, the convoy and its escorts
-turned north for the Solomons. Undetected
-by the Japanese, the assault
-force reached its target during the
-night of 6&ndash;7 August and split into two
-landing groups, Transport Division
-X-Ray, 15 transports heading for the
-north shore of Guadalcanal east of
-Lunga Point, and Transport Division
-Yoke, eight transports headed for
-Tulagi, Gavutu, Tanambogo, and the
-nearby Florida Island, which loomed
-over the smaller islands.</p>
-
-<p>Vandegrift’s plans for the landings
-would put two of his infantry regiments
-(Colonel LeRoy P. Hunt’s 5th
-Marines and Colonel Cates’ 1st Marines)
-ashore on both sides of the
-Lunga River prepared to attack inland
-to seize the airfield. The 11th
-Marines, the 3d Defense Battalion,
-and most of the division’s supporting
-units would also land near the
-Lunga, prepared to exploit the beachhead.
-Across the 20 miles of Sealark
-Channel, the division’s assistant commander,
-Brigadier General William
-H. Rupertus, led the assault forces
-slated to take Tulagi, Gavutu, and
-Tanambogo: the 1st Raider Battalion
-(Lieutenant Colonel Merritt A. Edson);
-the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines
-(Lieutenant Colonel Harold E. Rosecrans);
-and the 1st Parachute Battalion
-(Major Robert H. Williams).
-Company A of the 2d Marines would
-reconnoiter the nearby shores of
-Florida Island and the rest of Colonel
-John A. Arthur’s regiment would
-stand by in reserve to land where
-needed.</p>
-
-<p>As the ships slipped through the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_7" id="Page_7">7</a></span>
-channels on either side of rugged
-Savo Island, which split Sealark near
-its western end, heavy clouds and
-dense rain blanketed the task force.
-Later the moon came out and silhouetted
-the islands. On board his
-command ship, Vandegrift wrote to
-his wife: “Tomorrow morning at
-dawn we land in our first major
-offensive of the war. Our plans have
-been made and God grant that our
-judgement has been sound ...
-whatever happens you’ll know I did
-my best. Let us hope that best will
-be good enough.”</p>
-
-<div id="ip_7" class="figcenter" style="width: 548px;">
-  <div class="captionl top"><p class="justify"><i>MajGen Alexander A. Vandegrift, CG, 1st Marine Division,
-confers with his staff on board the transport USS </i>McCawley<i> (APA-4)
-enroute to Guadalcanal. From left: Gen Vandegrift;
-LtCol Gerald C. Thomas, operations officer; LtCol Randolph
-McC. Pate, logistics officer; LtCol Frank B. Goettge, intelligence
-officer; and Col William Capers James, chief of staff.</i></p></div>
-
-<div class="captionr top">
-<p>National Archives Photo 80-G-17065</p>
-</div>
-  <img src="images/i_b_007.jpg" width="548" height="362" alt="" />
-</div>
-
-<p>At 0641 on 7 August, Turner signalled
-his ships to “land the landing
-force.” Just 28 minutes before, the
-heavy cruiser <i>Quincy</i> (CA 39) had
-begun shelling the landing beaches at
-Guadalcanal. The sun came up that
-fateful Friday at 0650, and the first
-landing craft carrying assault troops
-of the 5th Marines touched down at
-0909 on Red Beach. To the men’s surprise
-(and relief), no Japanese appeared
-to resist the landing. Hunt
-immediately moved his assault
-troops off the beach and into the surrounding
-jungle, waded the steep-banked
-Ilu River, and headed for the
-enemy airfield. The following 1st
-Marines were able to cross the Ilu on
-a bridge the engineers had hastily
-thrown up with an amphibian tractor
-bracing its middle. The silence
-was eerie and the absence of opposition
-was worrisome to the riflemen.
-The Japanese troops, most of whom
-were Korean laborers, had fled to the
-west, spooked by a week’s B-17 bombardment,
-the pre-assault naval gunfire,
-and the sight of the ships
-offshore. The situation was not the
-same across Sealark. The Marines on
-Guadalcanal could hear faint rumbles
-of a firefight across the waters.</p>
-
-<div id="ip_7b" class="figcenter" style="width: 548px;">
-  <img src="images/i_b_008.jpg" width="548" height="306" alt="" />
-  <div class="captionr">
-
-<p>
-National Archives Photo 80-CF-112-5-3
-</p></div>
-
-<div class="captionl">
-<p class="justify"><i>First Division Marines storm ashore across Guadalcanal’s
-beaches on D-Day, 7 August 1942, from the attack transport
-</i>Barnett<i> (AP-11) and attack cargo ship </i>Fomalhaut<i> (AK-22). The
-invaders were surprised at the lack of enemy opposition.</i></p></div></div>
-
-<div id="ip_7c" class="figcenter" style="width: 898px;">
-  <img src="images/i_b_008b.jpg" width="898" height="618" alt="" />
-  <div class="caption">
-
-<p>
-LANDING ON GUADALCANAL<br />
-and Capture of the Airfield<br />
-7&ndash;8 AUGUST 1942</p></div></div>
-
-<div id="ip_7d" class="figcenter" style="width: 548px;">
-  <img src="images/i_b_009.jpg" width="548" height="352" alt="" />
-  <div class="captionr">
-
-<p>
-Photo courtesy of Col James A. Donovan, Jr.
-</p></div>
-
-<div class="captionl">
-<p class="justify"><i>When the 5th Marines entered the jungle from the beachhead,
-and had to cross the steep banks of the Ilu River, 1st Marine
-Division engineers hastily constructed a bridge supported by
-amphibian tractors. Though heavily used, the bridge held up.</i></p></div></div>
-
-<div id="ip_7e" class="figcenter" style="width: 549px;">
-  <div class="captionl top"><p class="justify"><i>Photographed immediately after a prelanding strike by USS
-</i>Enterprise<i> aircraft flown by Navy pilots, Tanambogo and
-Gavutu Islands lie smoking and in ruins in the morning sun.
-Gavutu is at the left across the causeway from Tanambogo.</i></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="captionr top">
-<p>National Archives Photo 80-C-11034</p></div>
-  <img src="images/i_b_009b.jpg" width="549" height="308" alt="" />
-</div>
-
-<p>The Japanese on Tulagi were special
-naval landing force sailors and
-they had no intention of giving up
-what they held without a vicious, no-surrender
-battle. Edson’s men landed
-first, following by Rosecrans’ battalion,
-hitting Tulagi’s south coast
-and moving inland towards the ridge
-which ran lengthwise through the island.
-The battalions encountered
-pockets of resistance in the undergrowth
-of the islands thick vegetation
-and maneuvered to outflank and
-overrun the opposition. The advance
-of the Marines was steady but casualties
-were frequent. By nightfall, Edson
-had reached the former British
-residency overlooking Tulagi’s harbor
-and dug in for the night across a hill
-that overlooked the Japanese final
-position, a ravine on the islands
-southern tip. The 2d Battalion, 5th
-Marines, had driven through to the
-northern shore, cleaning its sector of
-enemy; Rosecrans moved into position<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_10" id="Page_10">10</a></span>
-to back up the raiders. By the
-end of its first day ashore, 2d Battalion
-had lost 56 men killed and
-wounded; 1st Raider Battalion
-casualties were 99 Marines.</p>
-
-<div id="ip_10" class="figcenter" style="width: 548px;">
-  <img src="images/i_b_010.jpg" width="548" height="426" alt="" />
-  <div class="captionr">
-
-<p>Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 52231</p></div>
-
-<div class="captionl">
-<p class="justify"><i>After the battle, almost all palm trees on Gavutu were shorn
-of their foliage. Despite naval gunfire and close air support
-hitting the enemy emplacements, Japanese opposition from
-caves proved to be serious obstacles for attacking Marines.</i></p></div></div>
-
-<p>Throughout the night, the
-Japanese swarmed from hillside caves
-in four separate attacks, trying to
-penetrate the raider lines. They were
-unsuccessful and most died in the attempts.
-At dawn, the 2d Battalion,
-2d Marines, landed to reinforce the
-attackers and by the afternoon of 8
-August, the mop-up was completed
-and the battle for Tulagi was over.</p>
-
-<p>The fight for tiny Gavutu and
-Tanambogo, both little more than
-small hills rising out of the sea, connected
-by a hundred-yard causeway,
-was every bit as intense as that on
-Tulagi. The area of combat was much
-smaller and the opportunities for fire
-support from offshore ships and carrier
-planes was severely limited once
-the Marines had landed. After naval
-gunfire from the light cruiser <i>San
-Juan</i> (CL 54) and two destroyers, and
-a strike by F4F Wildcats flying from
-the <i>Wasp</i>, the 1st Parachute Battalion
-landed near noon in three waves,
-395 men in all, on Gavutu. The
-Japanese, secure in cave positions,
-opened fire on the second and third
-waves, pinning down the first Marines
-ashore on the beach. Major
-Williams took a bullet in the lungs
-and was evacuated; 32 Marines were
-killed in the withering enemy fire.
-This time, 2d Marines reinforcements
-were really needed; the 1st Battalion’s
-Company B landed on Gavutu and
-attempted to take Tanambogo; the
-attackers were driven to ground and
-had to pull back to Gavutu.</p>
-
-<p>After a rough night of close-in
-fighting with the defenders of both
-islands, the 3d Battalion, 2d Marines,
-reinforced the men already ashore
-and mopped up on each island. The
-toll of Marines dead on the three islands
-was 144; the wounded numbered
-194. The few Japanese who
-survived the battles fled to Florida Island,
-which had been scouted by the
-2d Marines on D-Day and found
-clear of the enemy.</p>
-
-<p>The Marines’ landings and the
-concentration of shipping in Guadalcanal
-waters acted as a magnet to the
-Japanese at Rabaul. At Admiral
-Ghormley’s headquarters, Tulagi’s radio
-was heard on D-Day “frantically
-calling for [the] dispatch of surface<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_11" id="Page_11">11</a></span>
-forces to the scene” and designating
-transports and carriers as targets for
-heavy bombing. The messages were
-sent in plain language, emphasizing
-the plight of the threatened garrison.
-And the enemy response was prompt
-and characteristic of the months of
-naval air and surface attacks to come.</p>
-
-<p>At 1030 on 7 August, an Australian
-coastwatcher hidden in the
-hills of the islands north of Guadalcanal
-signalled that a Japanese air
-strike composed of heavy bombers,
-light bombers, and fighters was headed
-for the island. Fletcher’s pilots,
-whose carriers were positioned 100
-miles south of Guadalcanal, jumped
-the approaching planes 20 miles
-northwest of the landing areas before
-they could disrupt the operation. But
-the Japanese were not daunted by the
-setback; other planes and ships were
-enroute to the inviting target.</p>
-
-<p>On 8 August, the Marines consolidated
-their positions ashore, seizing
-the airfield on Guadalcanal and establishing
-a beachhead. Supplies
-were being unloaded as fast as landing
-craft could make the turnaround
-from ship to shore, but the shore<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_12" id="Page_12">12</a></span>
-party was woefully inadequate to
-handle the influx of ammunition, rations,
-tents, aviation gas, vehicles&mdash;all
-gear necessary to sustain the Marines.
-The beach itself became a
-dumpsite. And almost as soon as the
-initial supplies were landed, they had
-to be moved to positions nearer Kukum
-village and Lunga Point within
-the planned perimeter. Fortunately,
-the lack of Japanese ground opposition
-enabled Vandegrift to shift the
-supply beaches west to a new
-beachhead.</p>
-
-<div id="ip_12" class="figleft" style="width: 363px;">
-  <img src="images/i_b_012.jpg" width="363" height="274" alt="" />
-  <div class="captionr">
-
-<p>
-Marine Corps Personal Papers Collection
-</p></div>
-
-<div class="captionl">
-<p class="justify"><i>Immediately after assault troops cleared the beachhead and moved inland, supplies
-and equipment, inviting targets for enemy bombers, began to litter the beach.</i></p></div></div>
-
-<p>Japanese bombers did penetrate
-the American fighter screen on 8 August.
-Dropping their bombs from
-20,000 feet or more to escape antiaircraft
-fire, the enemy planes were not
-very accurate. They concentrated on
-the ships in the channel, hitting and
-damaging a number of them and
-sinking the destroyer <i>Jarvis</i> (DD
-393). In their battles to turn back the
-attacking planes, the carrier fighter
-squadrons lost 21 Wildcats on 7&ndash;8
-August.</p>
-
-<p>The primary Japanese targets were
-the Allied ships. At this time, and for
-a thankfully and unbelievably long
-time to come, the Japanese commanders
-at Rabaul grossly underestimated
-the strength of Vandegrift’s
-forces. They thought the Marine
-landings constituted a reconnaissance
-in force, perhaps 2,000 men, on
-Guadalcanal. By the evening of 8 August,
-Vandegrift had 10,900 troops
-ashore on Guadalcanal and another
-6,075 on Tulagi. Three infantry regiments
-had landed and each had a
-supporting 75mm pack howitzer
-battalion&mdash;the 2d and 3d Battalions,
-11th Marines on Guadalcanal, and
-the 3d Battalion, 10th Marines on
-Tulagi. The 5th Battalion, 11th Marines’
-105mm howitzers were in
-general support.</p>
-
-<p>That night a cruiser-destroyer
-force of the Imperial Japanese Navy
-reacted to the American invasion
-with a stinging response. Admiral
-Turner had positioned three cruiser-destroyer
-groups to bar the Tulagi-Guadalcanal
-approaches. At the Battle
-of Savo, the Japanese demonstrated
-their superiority in night fighting
-at this stage of the war, shattering
-two of Turners covering forces
-without loss to themselves. Four
-heavy cruisers went to the bottom&mdash;three
-American, one Australian&mdash;and
-another lost her bow. As the sun
-came up over what soon would be
-called “Ironbottom Sound,” Marines
-watched grimly as Higgins boats
-swarmed out to rescue survivors. Approximately
-1,300 sailors died that
-night and another 700 suffered
-wounds or were badly burned.
-Japanese casualties numbered less
-than 200 men.</p>
-
-<p>The Japanese suffered damage to
-only one ship in the encounter, the
-cruiser <i>Chokai</i>. The American cruisers
-<i>Vincennes</i> (CA 44), <i>Astoria</i> (CA
-34), and <i>Quincy</i> (CA 39) went to the
-bottom, as did the Australian Navy’s
-HMAS <i>Canberra</i>, so critically
-damaged that she had to be sunk by
-American torpedoes. Both the cruiser
-<i>Chicago</i> (CA 29) and destroyer <i>Talbot</i>
-(DD 114) were badly damaged.
-Fortunately for the Marines ashore,
-the Japanese force&mdash;five heavy cruisers,
-two light cruisers, and a
-destroyer&mdash;departed before dawn
-without attempting to disrupt the
-landing further.</p>
-
-<div id="ip_12b" class="figright" style="width: 178px;">
-  <img src="images/i_b_012b.jpg" width="178" height="155" alt="" />
-  <div class="captionr">U.S. 105mm Howitzer</div></div>
-
-<p>When the attack-force leader, Vice
-Admiral Gunichi Mikawa, returned
-to Rabaul, he expected to receive the
-accolades of his superiors. He did get
-those, but he also found himself the
-subject of criticism. Admiral Isoroku
-Yamamoto, the Japanese fleet commander,
-chided his subordinate for
-failing to attack the transports. Mikawa
-could only reply, somewhat lamely,
-that he did not know Fletcher’s
-aircraft carriers were so far away
-from Guadalcanal. Of equal significance
-to the Marines on the
-beach, the Japanese naval victory
-caused celebrating superiors in Tokyo
-to allow the event to overshadow the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_13" id="Page_13">13</a></span>
-importance of the amphibious
-operation.</p>
-
-<p>The disaster prompted the American
-admirals to reconsider Navy support
-for operations ashore. Fletcher
-feared for the safety of his carriers;
-he had already lost about a quarter
-of his fighter aircraft. The commander
-of the expeditionary force
-had lost a carrier at Coral Sea and
-another at Midway. He felt he could
-not risk the loss of a third, even if
-it meant leaving the Marines on their
-own. Before the Japanese cruiser attack,
-he obtained Admiral Ghormley’s
-permission to withdraw from
-the area.</p>
-
-<div id="ip_13" class="figleft" style="width: 362px;">
-  <div class="captionl top"><p class="justify"><i>When ships carrying barbed wire and engineering tools needed ashore were forced
-to leave the Guadalcanal area because of enemy air and surface threats, Marines
-had to prepare such hasty field expedients as this</i> <i>cheval de frise</i> <i>of sharpened stakes.</i></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="captionr top">
-<p>Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 5157</p>
-</div>
-  <img src="images/i_b_013.jpg" width="362" height="281" alt="" />
-</div>
-
-<p>At a conference on board Turner’s
-flagship transport, the <i>McCawley</i>,
-on the night of 8 August, the admiral
-told General Vandegrift that Fletcher’s
-impending withdrawal meant
-that he would have to pull out the
-amphibious force’s ships. The Battle
-of Savo Island reinforced the decision
-to get away before enemy aircraft,
-unchecked by American interceptors,
-struck. On 9 August, the transports
-withdrew to Noumea. The unloading
-of supplies ended abruptly, and
-ships still half-full steamed away. The
-forces ashore had 17 days’ rations&mdash;after
-counting captured Japanese
-food&mdash;and only four days’ supply of
-ammunition for all weapons. Not
-only did the ships take away the rest
-of the supplies, they also took the
-Marines still on board, including the
-2d Marines’ headquarters element.
-Dropped off at the island of Espiritu
-Santo in the New Hebrides, the infantry
-Marines and their commander,
-Colonel Arthur, were most
-unhappy and remained so until they
-finally reached Guadalcanal on 29
-October.</p>
-
-<p>Ashore in the Marine beachheads,
-General Vandegrift ordered rations
-reduced to two meals a day. The
-reduced food intake would last for
-six weeks, and the Marines would
-become very familiar with Japanese
-canned fish and rice. Most of the Marines
-smoked and they were soon disgustedly
-smoking Japanese-issue
-brands. They found that the separate
-paper filters that came with the
-cigarettes were necessary to keep the
-fast-burning tobacco from scorching
-their lips. The retreating ships had
-also hauled away empty sand bags
-and valuable engineer tools. So the
-Marines used Japanese shovels to fill
-Japanese rice bags with sand to
-strengthen their defensive positions.</p>
-
-<div id="ip_13b" class="figright" style="width: 175px;">
-  <img src="images/i_b_013b.jpg" width="175" height="165" alt="" />
-  <div class="captionr">U.S. 90mm Antiaircraft Gun</div></div>
-
-<p>The Marines dug in along the
-beaches between the Tenaru and the
-ridges west of Kukum. A Japanese
-counter-landing was a distinct possibility.
-Inland of the beaches, defensive
-gun pits and foxholes lined the
-west bank of the Tenaru and
-crowned the hills that faced west
-toward the Matanikau River and
-Point Cruz. South of the airfield
-where densely jungled ridges and ravines
-abounded, the beachhead
-perimeter was guarded by outposts
-and these were manned in large part
-by combat support troops. The engineer,
-pioneer, and amphibious tractor
-battalion all had their positions
-on the front line. In fact, any Marine
-with a rifle, and that was virtually
-every Marine, stood night defensive
-duty. There was no place within the
-perimeter that could be counted safe
-from enemy infiltration.</p>
-
-<div id="ip_16" class="figleft" style="width: 176px;">
-  <img src="images/i_b_016.jpg" width="176" height="215" alt="" />
-  <div class="captionr">
-
-<p>Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 150993</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="captionl">
-<p><i>Col Kiyono Ichiki, a battle-seasoned
-Japanese Army veteran, led his force in
-an impetuous and ill-fated attack on
-strong Marine positions in the Battle of
-the Tenaru on the night of 20&ndash;21 August.</i></p></div></div>
-
-<p>Almost as Turner’s transports
-sailed away, the Japanese began a
-pattern of harassing air attacks on
-the beachhead. Sometimes the raids
-came during the day, but the 3d
-Defense Battalion’s 90mm antiaircraft
-guns forced the bombers to fly too
-high for effective bombing. The erratic
-pattern of bombs, however,
-meant that no place was safe near the
-airfield, the preferred target, and no
-place could claim it was bomb-free.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_16" id="Page_16">16</a></span>
-The most disturbing aspect of
-Japanese air attacks soon became the
-nightly harassment by Japanese aircraft
-which singly, it seemed, roamed
-over the perimeter, dropping bombs
-and flares indiscriminately. The
-nightly visitors, whose planes’ engines
-were soon well known sounds,
-won the singular title “Washing
-Machine Charlie,” at first, and later,
-“Louie the Louse,” when their
-presence heralded Japanese shore
-bombardment. Technically, “Charlie”
-was a twin-engine night bomber
-from Rabaul. “Louie” was a cruiser
-float plane that signalled to the bombardment
-ships. But the harassed
-Marines used the names interchangeably.</p>
-
-<p>Even though most of the division’s
-heavy engineering equipment had
-disappeared with the Navy’s transports,
-the resourceful Marines soon
-completed the airfield’s runway with
-captured Japanese gear. On 12 August
-Admiral McCain’s aide piloted
-in a PBY-5 Catalina flying boat and
-bumped to a halt on what was now
-officially Henderson Field, named for
-a Marine pilot, Major Lofton R. Henderson,
-lost at Midway. The Navy
-officer pronounced the airfield fit for
-fighter use and took off with a load
-of wounded Marines, the first of
-2,879 to be evacuated. Henderson
-Field was the centerpiece of Vandegrift’s
-strategy; he would hold it at
-all costs.</p>
-
-<p>Although it was only 2,000 feet
-long and lacked a taxiway and adequate
-drainage, the tiny airstrip,
-often riddled with potholes and rendered<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_17" id="Page_17">17</a></span>
-unusable because of frequent,
-torrential downpours, was essential
-to the success of the landing force.
-With it operational, supplies could
-be flown in and wounded flown out.
-At least in the Marines’ minds, Navy
-ships ceased to be the only lifeline for
-the defenders.</p>
-
-<p>While Vandegrift’s Marines dug in
-east and west of Henderson Field,
-Japanese headquarters in Rabaul
-planned what it considered an effective
-response to the American offensive.
-Misled by intelligence estimates
-that the Marines numbered perhaps
-2,000 men, Japanese staff officers believed
-that a modest force quickly
-sent could overwhelm the invaders.</p>
-
-<p>On 12 August, CinCPac determined
-that a sizable Japanese force
-was massing at Truk to steam to the
-Solomons and attempt to eject the
-Americans. Ominously, the group included
-the heavy carriers <i>Shokaku</i>
-and <i>Zuikaku</i> and the light carrier
-<i>Ryujo</i>. Despite the painful losses at
-Savo Island, the only significant increases
-to American naval forces in
-the Solomons was the assignment of
-a new battleship, the <i>South Dakota</i>
-(BB 57).</p>
-
-<div id="ip_17" class="figcenter" style="width: 549px;">
-  <div class="captionl top"><p class="justify"><i>Of his watercolor painting “Instructions to a Patrol,” Capt
-Donald L. Dickson said that three men have volunteered to
-locate a Japanese bivouac. The one in the center is a clean-cut
-corporal with the bearing of a high-school athlete. The man
-on the right is “rough and ready.” To the one at left, it’s just
-another job; he may do it heroically, but it’s just another job.</i></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="captionr top">
-<p>
-Captain Donald L. Dickson, USMCR
-</p></div>
-  <img src="images/i_b_016b.jpg" width="549" height="401" alt="" />
-</div>
-
-<p>Imperial General Headquarters in
-Tokyo had ordered Lieutenant
-General Haruyoshi Hyakutake’s
-<i>Seventeenth Army</i> to attack the Marine
-perimeter. For his assault force,
-Hyakutake chose the <i>35th Infantry
-Brigade</i> (Reinforced), commanded by
-Major General Kiyotake Kawaguchi.
-At the time, Kawaguchi’s main force
-was in the Palaus. Hyakutake selected
-a crack infantry regiment&mdash;the
-<i>28th</i>&mdash;commanded by Colonel Kiyono
-Ichiki to land first. Alerted for its
-mission while it was at Guam, the
-Ichiki Detachment assault echelon,
-one battalion of 900 men, was transported
-to the Solomons on the only
-shipping available, six destroyers. As
-a result the troops carried just small
-amounts of ordnance and supplies.
-A follow-on echelon of 1,200 of
-Ichiki’s troops was to join the assault
-battalion on Guadalcanal.</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_18" id="Page_18">18</a></span></p>
-
-<div id="ip_18" class="figright" style="width: 362px;">
-  <img src="images/i_b_018.jpg" width="362" height="202" alt="" />
-  <div class="captionr">
-
-<p>
-National Archives Photo 80-G-37932
-</p></div>
-
-<div class="captionl">
-<p class="justify"><i>On 20 August, the first Marine Corps aircraft such as this F4F Grumman Wildcat
-landed on Henderson Field to begin combat air operations against the Japanese.</i></p></div></div>
-
-<p>While the Japanese landing force
-was headed for Guadalcanal, the
-Japanese already on the island
-provided an unpleasant reminder
-that they, too, were full of fight. A
-captured enemy naval rating, taken
-in the constant patrolling to the west
-of the perimeter, indicated that a
-Japanese group wanted to surrender
-near the village of Kokumbona,
-seven miles west of the Matanikau.
-This was the area that Lieutenant
-Colonel Goettge considered held
-most of the enemy troops who had
-fled the airfield. On the night of 12
-August, a reconnaissance patrol of 25
-men led by Goettge himself left the
-perimeter by landing craft. The
-patrol landed near its objective, was
-ambushed, and virtually wiped out.
-Only three men managed to swim
-and wade back to the Marine lines.
-The bodies of the other members of
-the patrol were never found. To this
-day, the fate of the Goettge patrol
-continues to intrigue researchers.</p>
-
-<p>After the loss of Goettge and his
-men, vigilance increased on the
-perimeter. On the 14th, a fabled
-character, the coastwatcher Martin
-Clemens, came strolling out of the
-jungle into the Marine lines. He had
-watched the landing from the hills
-south of the airfield and now
-brought his bodyguard of native
-policemen with him. A retired sergeant
-major of the British Solomon
-Islands Constabulary, Jacob C. Vouza,
-volunteered about this time to
-search out Japanese to the east of the
-perimeter, where patrol sightings and
-contacts had indicated the Japanese
-might have effected a landing.</p>
-
-<p>The ominous news of Japanese
-sightings to the east and west of the
-perimeter were balanced out by the
-joyous word that more Marines had
-landed. This time the Marines were
-aviators. On 20 August, two squadrons
-of Marine Aircraft Group
-(MAG)-23 were launched from the
-escort carrier <i>Long Island</i> (CVE-1) located
-200 miles southeast of Guadalcanal.
-Captain John L. Smith led 19
-Grumman F4F-4 Wildcats of Marine
-Fighting Squadron (VMF)-223 onto
-Henderson’s narrow runway. Smith’s
-fighters were followed by Major
-Richard C. Mangrum’s Marine Scout-Bombing
-Squadron (VMSB)-232
-with 12 Douglas SBD-3 Dauntless
-dive bombers.</p>
-
-<p>From this point of the campaign,
-the radio identification for Guadalcanal,
-Cactus, became increasingly
-synonymous with the island. The
-Marine planes became the first elements
-of what would informally be
-known as Cactus Air Force.</p>
-
-<div id="ip_18b" class="figleft" style="width: 360px;">
-  <div class="captionl top"><p class="justify"><i>The first Army Air Forces P-400 Bell Air Cobras arrived on Guadalcanal on 22 August,
-two days after the first Marine planes, and began operations immediately.</i></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="captionr top">
-<p>
-National Archives Photo 208-N-4932
-</p></div>
-  <img src="images/i_b_018b.jpg" width="360" height="154" alt="" />
-</div>
-
-<p>Wasting no time, the Marine pilots
-were soon in action against the
-Japanese naval aircraft which frequently
-attacked Guadalcanal. Smith
-shot down his first enemy Zero fighter
-on 21 August; three days later
-VMF-223’s Wildcats intercepted a
-strong Japanese aerial attack force
-and downed 16 enemy planes. In this
-action, Captain Marion E. Carl, a
-veteran of Midway, shot down three
-planes. On the 22d, coastwatchers
-alerted Cactus to an approaching air
-attack and 13 of 16 enemy bombers
-were destroyed. At the same time,
-Mangrum’s dive bombers damaged
-three enemy destroyer-transports attempting
-to reach Guadalcanal. On
-24 August, the American attacking
-aircraft, which now included Navy
-scout-bombers from the <i>Saratoga</i>’s
-Scouting Squadron (VS) 5, succeeded
-in turning back a Japanese reinforcement
-convoy of warships and
-destroyers.</p>
-
-<p>On 22 August, five Bell P-400 Air
-Cobras of the Army’s 67th Fighter
-Squadron had landed at Henderson,
-followed within the week by nine<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_20" id="Page_20">20</a></span>
-more Air Cobras. The Army planes,
-which had serious altitude and
-climb-rate deficiencies, were destined
-to see most action in ground combat
-support roles.</p>
-
-<p>The frenzied action in what became
-known as the Battle of the
-Eastern Solomons was matched
-ashore. Japanese destroyers had delivered
-the vanguard of the Ichiki force
-at Taivu Point, 25 miles east of the
-Marine perimeter. A long-range
-patrol of Marines from Company A,
-1st Battalion, 1st Marines ambushed
-a sizable Japanese force near Taivu
-on 19 August. The Japanese dead
-were readily identified as Army
-troops and the debris of their defeat
-included fresh uniforms and a large
-amount of communication gear.
-Clearly, a new phase of the fighting
-had begun. All Japanese encountered
-to this point had been naval troops.</p>
-
-<p>Alerted by patrols, the Marines
-now dug in along the Ilu River, often
-misnamed the Tenaru on Marine
-maps, were ready for Colonel Ichiki.
-The Japanese commander’s orders
-directed him to “quickly recapture
-and maintain the airfield at Guadalcanal,”
-and his own directive to his
-troops emphasized that they would
-fight “to the last breath of the last
-man.” And they did.</p>
-
-<div id="ip_20" class="figright" style="width: 371px;">
-  <img src="images/i_b_020.jpg" width="371" height="322" alt="" />
-  <div class="captionr">U.S. M-3 Light Tank</div>
-</div>
-
-<p>Too full of his mission to wait for
-the rest of his regiment and sure that
-he faced only a few thousand men
-overall, Ichiki marched from Taivu
-to the Marines’ lines. Before he attacked
-on the night of the 20th, a
-bloody figure stumbled out of the
-jungle with a warning that the
-Japanese were coming. It was Sergeant
-Major Vouza. Captured by the
-Japanese, who found a small American
-flag secreted in his loincloth, he
-was tortured in a failed attempt to
-gain information on the invasion
-force. Tied to a tree, bayonetted twice
-through the chest, and beaten with
-rifle butts, the resolute Vouza chewed
-through his bindings to escape. Taken
-to Lieutenant Colonel Edwin A. Pollock,
-whose 2d Battalion, 1st Marines
-held the Ilu mouth’s defenses,
-he gasped a warning that an estimated
-250&ndash;500 Japanese soldiers were
-coming behind him. The resolute
-Vouza, rushed immediately to an aid
-station and then to the division
-hospital, miraculously survived his
-ordeal and was awarded a Silver Star
-for his heroism by General Vandegrift,
-and later a Legion of Merit.
-Vandegrift also made Vouza an
-honorary sergeant major of U.S.
-Marines.</p>
-
-<p>At 0130 on 21 August, Ichiki’s
-troops stormed the Marines’ lines in
-a screaming, frenzied display of the
-“spiritual strength” which they had
-been assured would sweep aside their
-American enemy. As the Japanese
-charged across the sand bar astride
-the Ilu’s mouth, Pollock’s Marines cut
-them down. After a mortar preparation,
-the Japanese tried again to
-storm past the sand bar. A section of
-37mm guns sprayed the enemy force
-with deadly canister. Lieutenant
-Colonel Lenard B. Cresswell’s 1st Battalion,
-1st Marines moved upstream
-on the Ilu at daybreak, waded across
-the sluggish, 50-foot-wide stream,
-and moved on the flank of the
-Japanese. Wildcats from VMF-223
-strafed the beleagured enemy force.
-Five light tanks blasted the retreating
-Japanese. By 1700, as the sun was
-setting, the battle ended.</p>
-
-<p>Colonel Ichiki, disgraced in his own
-mind by his defeat, burned his
-regimental colors and shot himself.
-Close to 800 of his men joined him
-in death. The few survivors fled eastward
-towards Taivu Point. Rear Admiral
-Raizo Tanaka, whose
-reinforcement force of transports and
-destroyers was largely responsible for
-the subsequent Japanese troop buildup
-on Guadalcanal, recognized that
-the unsupported Japanese attack was
-sheer folly and reflected that “this
-tragedy should have taught us the
-hopelessness of bamboo spear tactics.”
-Fortunately for the Marines,
-Ichiki’s overconfidence was not
-unique among Japanese commanders.</p>
-
-<div id="ip_20b" class="figcenter" style="width: 549px;">
-  <img src="images/i_b_021.jpg" width="549" height="328" alt="" />
-  <div class="captionr">
-
-<p>Captain Donald L. Dickson, USMCR</p></div>
-
-<div class="captionl">
-<p class="justify"><i>Capt Donald L. Dickson said of his watercolor: “I wanted to
-catch on paper the feeling one has as a shell comes whistling
-over.... There is a sense of being alone, naked and unprotected.
-And time seems endless until the shell strikes somewhere.”</i></p></div></div>
-
-<p>Following the 1st Marines’ tangle
-with the Ichiki detachment, General
-Vandegrift was inspired to write the
-Marine Commandant, Lieutenant
-General Thomas Holcomb, and
-report: “These youngsters are the
-darndest people when they get started<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_21" id="Page_21">21</a></span>
-you ever saw.” And all the Marines
-on the island, young and old, tyro
-and veteran, were becoming accomplished
-jungle fighters. They were no
-longer “trigger happy” as many had
-been in their first days ashore, shooting
-at shadows and imagined enemy.
-They were waiting for targets,
-patrolling with enthusiasm, sure of
-themselves. The misnamed Battle of
-the Tenaru had cost Colonel Hunt’s
-regiment 34 killed in action and 75
-wounded. All the division’s Marines
-now felt they were bloodied. What
-the men on Tulagi, Gavutu, and
-Tanambogo and those of the Ilu had
-done was prove that the 1st Marine
-Division would hold fast to what it
-had won.</p>
-
-<div id="ip_21" class="figright" style="width: 276px;">
-  <div class="captionl top"><p class="justify"><i>Cactus Air Force commander, MajGen
-Roy S. Geiger, poses with Capt Joseph
-J. Foss, the leading ace at Guadalcanal
-with 26 Japanese aircraft downed. Capt
-Foss was later awarded the Medal of
-Honor for his heroic exploits in the air.</i></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="captionr top">
-<p>
-Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 52622
-</p></div>
-  <img src="images/i_b_021b.jpg" width="276" height="239" alt="" />
-</div>
-
-<p>While the division’s Marines and
-sailors had earned a breathing spell
-as the Japanese regrouped for
-another onslaught, the action in the
-air over the Solomons intensified.
-Almost every day, Japanese aircraft
-arrived around noon to bomb the
-perimeter. Marine fighter pilots
-found the twin-engine Betty bombers
-easy targets; Zero fighters were
-another story. Although the Wildcats
-were a much sturdier aircraft, the
-Japanese Zeros’ superior speed and
-better maneuverability gave them a
-distinct edge in a dogfight. The
-American planes, however, when
-warned by the coastwatchers of
-Japanese attacks, had time to climb
-above the oncoming enemy and
-preferably attacked by making firing
-runs during high speed dives. Their
-tactics made the air space over the
-Solomons dangerous for the
-Japanese. On 29 August, the carrier
-<i>Ryujo</i> launched aircraft for a strike
-against the airstrip. Smith’s Wildcats
-shot down 16, with a loss of four of
-their own. Still, the Japanese continued
-to strike at Henderson Field
-without letup. Two days after the
-<i>Ryujo</i> raid, enemy bombers inflicted
-heavy damage on the airfield, setting
-aviation fuel ablaze and
-incinerating parked aircraft.
-VMF-223’s retaliation was a further
-bag of 13 attackers.</p>
-
-<p>On 30 August, two more MAG-23
-squadrons, VMF-224 and
-VMSB-231, flew in to Henderson.
-The air reinforcements were more
-than welcome. Steady combat attrition,
-frequent damage in the air and
-on the ground, and scant repair facilities
-and parts kept the number of
-aircraft available a dwindling
-resource.</p>
-
-<p>Plainly, General Vandegrift needed<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_22" id="Page_22">22</a></span>
-infantry reinforcements as much
-as he did additional aircraft. He
-brought the now-combined raider
-and parachute battalions, both under
-Edson’s command, and the 2d
-Battalion, 5th Marines, over to
-Guadalcanal from Tulagi. This gave
-the division commander a chance to
-order out larger reconnaissance
-patrols to probe for the Japanese. On
-27 August, the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines,
-made a shore-to-shore landing
-near Kokumbona and marched back
-to the beachhead without any measurable
-results. If the Japanese were
-out there beyond the Matanikau&mdash;and
-they were&mdash;they watched the
-Marines and waited for a better opportunity
-to attack.</p>
-
-
-<div class="chapter"></div>
-<div class="sidebar">
-<p class="in0 small"><a name="Sidebar_page_5_First_Marine_Utility_Uniform_Issued_in_World_War_II" id="Sidebar_page_5_First_Marine_Utility_Uniform_Issued_in_World_War_II"></a>[Sidebar (<a href="#Page_5">page 5</a>):]</p>
-<h3 class="nobreak p0">First Marine Utility Uniform Issued in World War II</h3>
-
-<p class="drop-cap"><span class="smcap1">The</span> United States Marine Corps entered World War
-II wearing essentially the same summer field uniform
-that it had worn during the “Banana Wars.”
-The Marines defending America’s Pacific outposts on
-Guam, Wake Island, and in the Philippines in the late
-months of 1941 wore a summer field uniform consisting
-of a khaki cotton shirt and trousers, leggings, and a
-M1917A1 steel helmet. Plans to change this uniform had
-been underway for at least one year prior to the opening
-of hostilities.</p>
-
-<p>As had the Army, the Marine Corps had used a loose-fitting
-blue denim fatigue uniform for work details and some
-field exercises since the 1920s. This fatigue uniform was
-either a one-piece coverall or a two-piece bib overall and
-jacket, both with “USMC” metal buttons. In June 1940, it
-was replaced by a green cotton coverall. This uniform and
-the summer field uniform were replaced by what would
-become known as the utility uniform. Approved for general
-issue on the Marine Corps’ 166th birthday, 10 November
-1941, this new uniform was made of sage-green (although
-“olive drab” was called for in the specifications) herringbone
-twill cotton, then a popular material for civilian work
-clothing. The two-piece uniform consisted of a coat (often
-referred to as a “jacket” by Marines) and trousers. In 1943,
-a cap made of the same material would be issued.</p>
-
-<p>The loose-fitting coat was closed down the front by four
-two-piece rivetted bronze-finished steel buttons, each bearing
-the words “U.S. MARINE CORPS” in relief. The cuffs
-were closed by similar buttons. Two large patch pockets
-were sewn on the front skirts of the jacket and a single patch
-pocket was stitched to the left breast. This pocket had the
-Marine Corps eagle, globe, and anchor insignia and the
-letters “USMC” stencilled on it in black ink. The trousers,
-worn with and without the khaki canvas leggings, had two
-slashed front pockets and two rear patch pockets.</p>
-
-<div class="figright" style="width: 253px;">
-  <img src="images/i_b_005.jpg" width="253" height="216" alt="" /></div>
-
-<p>The new uniform was issued to the flood of new recruits
-crowding the recruit depots in the early months of 1942 and
-was first worn in combat during the landing on Guadalcanal
-in August 1942. This uniform was subsequently worn
-by Marines of all arms from the Solomons Campaign to
-the end of the war. Originally, the buttons on the coat and
-the trousers were all copper-plated, but an emergency alternate
-specification was approved on 15 August 1942, eight
-days after the landing on Guadalcanal, which allowed for
-a variety of finishes on the buttons. Towards the end of
-the war, a new “modified” utility uniform which had been
-developed after Tarawa was also issued, in addition to a
-variety of camouflage uniforms. All of these utility uniforms,
-along with Army-designed Ml helmets and Marine
-Corps-designed cord and rubber-soled rough-side-out
-leather “boondocker” shoes, would be worn throughout the
-war in the Pacific, during the postwar years, and into the
-Korean War.&mdash;<i>Kenneth L. Smith-Christmas</i></p>
-</div>
-
-
-<div class="chapter"></div>
-<div class="sidebar green">
-<p class="in0 small"><a name="Sidebar_page_11_LVT_1_The_Amtrac" id="Sidebar_page_11_LVT_1_The_Amtrac"></a>[Sidebar (<a href="#Page_11">page 11</a>):]</p>
-<h3 class="nobreak p0">LVT (1)&mdash;The ‘Amtrac’</h3>
-
-<p class="drop-cap"><span class="smcap1"><span class="dkgreen">W</span>hile</span> the Marine Corps was developing amphibious
-warfare doctrine during the 1920s and
-1930s, it was apparent that a motorized amphibian
-vehicle was needed to transport men and equipment
-from ships across fringing reefs and beaches into battle,
-particularly when the beach was defended.</p>
-
-<p>In 1940, the Marines adopted the Landing Vehicle,
-Tracked (1), designed by Donald Roebling. More commonly
-known as the “amtrac” (short for amphibian tractor), the
-LVT(1) had a driver’s cab in front and a small engine compartment
-in the rear, with the bulk of the body used for
-carrying space. During the next three years, 1,225 LVT(1)s
-were built, primarily by the Food Machinery Corporation.</p>
-
-<p>The LVT(1) was constructed of welded steel and was
-propelled on both land and water by paddle-type treads.
-Designed solely as a supply vehicle, it could carry 4,500
-pounds of cargo. In August 1942, the LVT(1) first saw combat
-on Guadalcanal with the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion,
-1st Marine Division. Throughout the Solomon
-Islands campaigns, the LVT(1) provided Marines all types
-of logistical support, moving thousands of tons of supplies
-to the front lines. At times they also were pressed into tactical
-use: moving artillery pieces, holding defensive positions,
-and occasionally supporting Marines in the attack
-with their machine guns. They also were used as pontoons
-to support bridges across Guadalcanal rivers.</p>
-
-<p>The LVT proved to be more seaworthy than a boat of
-comparable size; it was able to remain afloat with its entire
-cargo hold full of water. However, defects in the design
-soon became apparent. The paddle treads on the tracks
-and the rigid suspension system were both susceptible to
-damage when driven on land and did not provide the
-desired speeds on land or water. Although the LVT(1) performed
-admirably against undefended beachheads, its lack
-of armor made it unsuitable for assaults against the heavily
-defended islands of the central Pacific. This weakness
-was apparent during the fighting in the Solomon Islands,
-but LVT(1)s with improvised armor were still in use at the
-assault on Tarawa, where 75 percent of them were lost in
-three days.</p>
-
-<p>The LVT(1) proved its value and validated the amphibious
-vehicle concept through the great versatility and mobility
-it demonstrated throughout numerous campaigns in
-the Pacific. Although intended solely for supply purposes,
-it was thrust into combat use in early war engagements.
-In its initial role as a support vehicle, the LVT(1) delivered
-ammunition, supplies and reinforcements that made the
-difference between victory and defeat.&mdash;<i>Second Lieutenant
-Wesley L. Feight, USMC</i></p>
-
-<div class="figcenter" style="width: 525px;">
-  <img src="images/i_b_011.jpg" width="525" height="211" alt="" /></div>
-</div>
-
-
-
-<div class="chapter"></div>
-<div class="sidebar">
-<p class="in0 small"><a name="Sidebar_page_14_General_Vandegrift_and_His_1st_Marine_Division_Staff" id="Sidebar_page_14_General_Vandegrift_and_His_1st_Marine_Division_Staff"></a>[Sidebar (<a href="#Page_16">page 14</a>):]</p>
-<h2 class="nobreak dkgreen">General Vandegrift and His 1st Marine Division Staff</h2>
-
-<p class="drop-cap"><span class="smcap1">Whenever</span> a work about the Guadalcanal operation is
-published, one of the pictures always included is
-that of Major General Alexander A. Vandegrift,
-1st Marine Division commanding general, and his staff officers
-and commanders, who posed for the photograph on 11 August
-1942, just four days after the assault landings on the island.
-Besides General Vandegrift, there are 40 Marines and
-one naval officer in this picture, and each one deserves a page
-of his own in Marine Corps history.</p>
-
-<p>Among the Marines, 23 were promoted to general officer
-rank and three became Commandants of the Marine Corps:
-General Vandegrift and Colonels Cates and Pate. The naval
-officer, division surgeon Commander Warwick T. Brown, MC,
-USN, also made flag officer rank while on active duty and
-was promoted to vice admiral upon retirement.</p>
-
-<p>Four of the officers in the picture served in three wars. Lieutenant
-Colonels Gerald C. Thomas, division operations officer,
-and Randolph McC. Pate, division logistics officer, served in
-both World Wars I and II, and each commanded the 1st Marine
-Division in Korea. Colonel William J. Whaling similarly
-served in World Wars I and II, and was General Thomas’ assistant
-division commander in Korea. Major Henry W. Buse,
-Jr., assistant operations officer, served in World War II, Korea,
-and the Vietnam War. Others served in two wars&mdash;World
-Wars I and II, or World War II and Korea. Represented in the
-photograph is a total of nearly 700 years of cumulative experience
-on active Marine Corps service.</p>
-
-<p>Three key members of the division&mdash;the Assistant Division
-Commander, Brigadier General William H. Rupertus; the Assistant
-Chief of Staff, G-1, Colonel Robert C. Kilmartin, Jr.;
-and the commanding officer of the 1st Raider Battalion, Lieutenant
-Colonel Merritt A. Edson&mdash;were not in this picture for
-a good reason. They were on Tulagi, where Rupertus headed
-the Tulagi Command Group with Kilmartin as his chief of
-staff, and Edson commanded the combat troops. Also notably
-absent from this photograph was the commander of the
-7th Marines, Colonel James C. Webb, who had not joined the
-division from Samoa, where the regiment had been sent before
-the division deployed overseas.</p>
-
-<p>In his memoir, <i>Once a Marine</i>, General Vandegrift explained
-why this photograph was taken. The division’s morale was
-affected by the fact that Vice Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher was
-forced to withdraw his fleet from the area&mdash;with many of his
-ships not yet fully unloaded and holding more than half of
-the division’s supplies still needed ashore. Adding to the Marines’
-uneasiness at seeing their naval support disappear below
-the horizon, was the fact that they had been under almost
-constant enemy air attacks beginning shortly after their landing
-on Guadalcanal. In an effort to counter the adverse influence
-on morale of the day and night air attacks, Vandegrift
-began making tours of the division perimeter every morning
-to talk to as many of his Marines as possible, and to keep a
-personal eye on the command. As he noted:</p>
-
-<blockquote>
-
-<p>By August 11, the full impact of the vanished transports was
-permeating the command, so again I called a conference of my
-staff and command officers.... I ended the conference by
-posing with this fine group of officers, a morale device that
-worked because they thought if I went to the trouble of having
-the picture taken then I obviously planned to enjoy it in
-future years.</p></blockquote>
-
-<p>Recently, General Merrill B. “Bill” Twining, on Guadalcanal
-a lieutenant colonel and assistant D-3, recalled the circumstances
-of the photograph and philosophized about the men
-who appeared in it:</p>
-
-<blockquote>
-
-<p>The group is lined up on the slope of the coral ridge which
-provided a degree of protection from naval gunfire coming from
-the north and was therefore selected as division CP....</p>
-
-<p>There was no vital reason for the conclave. I think V[andegrift]
-just wanted to see who was in his outfit. Do you realize
-these people had never been together before? Some came
-from as far away as Iceland....</p>
-
-<p>V[andegrift] mainly introduced himself, gave a brief pep talk....
-I have often been asked how we could afford to congregate
-all this talent in the face of the enemy. We didn’t believe we
-(<i>at the moment</i>) faced any threat from the Japanese. The defense
-area was small and every responsible commander could reach
-his CP in 5 minutes and after all there were a lot of good people
-along those lines. Most of the fresh-caught second lieutenants
-were battalion commanders two years later. We believed in each
-other and trusted.</p></blockquote>
-
-<p class="sigright">
-&mdash;<i>Benis M. Frank</i>
-</p>
-
-<h3 class="dkgreen">The General and His Officers on Guadalcanal, According to the Chart</h3>
-
-<div class="figright" style="width: 553px;">
-  <img src="images/i_b_015.jpg" width="553" height="360" alt="" /></div>
-
-<div class="figright" style="width: 561px;">
-  <img src="images/i_b_015b.jpg" width="561" height="363" alt="" /></div>
-
-<ul>
-<li class="p1 figspace">1. Col George R. Rowan<br /></li>
-<li class="figspace">2. Col Pedro A. del Valle<br /></li>
-<li class="figspace">3. Col William C. James<br /></li>
-<li class="figspace">4. MajGen Alexander A. Vandegrift<br /></li>
-<li class="figspace">5. LtCol Gerald C. Thomas<br /></li>
-<li class="figspace">6. Col Clifton B. Cates<br /></li>
-<li class="figspace">7. Col Randolph McC. Pate<br /></li>
-<li class="figspace">8. Cdr Warwick T. Brown, USN<br /></li>
-<li class="figspace">9. Col William J. Whaling<br /></li>
-<li>10. Col Frank B. Goettge<br /></li>
-<li>11. Col LeRoy P. Hunt, Jr.<br /></li>
-<li>12. LtCol Frederick C. Biebush<br /></li>
-<li>13. LtCol Edwin A. Pollock<br /></li>
-<li>14. LtCol Edmund J. Buckley<br /></li>
-<li>15. LtCol Walter W. Barr<br /></li>
-<li>16. LtCol Raymond P. Coffman<br /></li>
-<li>17. LtCol Francis R. Geraci<br /></li>
-<li>18. LtCol William E. Maxwell<br /></li>
-<li>19. LtCol Edward G. Hagen<br /></li>
-<li>20. LtCol William N. McKelvy, Jr.<br /></li>
-<li>21. LtCol Julian N. Frisbie<br /></li>
-<li>22. Maj Milton V. O’Connell<br /></li>
-<li>23. Maj William Chalfant III<br /></li>
-<li>24. Maj Horace W. Fuller<br /></li>
-<li>25. Maj Forest C. Thompson<br /></li>
-<li>26. Maj Robert G. Ballance<br /></li>
-<li>27. Maj Henry C. Buse, Jr.<br /></li>
-<li>28. Maj James W. Frazer<br /></li>
-<li>29. Maj Henry H. Crockett<br /></li>
-<li>30. LtCol Lenard B. Cresswell<br /></li>
-<li>31. Maj Robert O. Brown<br /></li>
-<li>32. LtCol John A. Bemis<br /></li>
-<li>33. Col Kenneth W. Benner<br /></li>
-<li>34. Maj Robert B. Luckey<br /></li>
-<li>35. LtCol Samuel B. Taxis<br /></li>
-<li>36. LtCol Eugene H. Price<br /></li>
-<li>37. LtCol Merrill B. Twining<br /></li>
-<li>38. LtCol Walker A. Reaves<br /></li>
-<li>39. LtCol John D. Macklin<br /></li>
-<li>40. LtCol Hawley C. Waterman<br /></li>
-<li>41. Maj James C. Murray, Jr.</li>
-</ul>
-</div>
-
-
-<div class="chapter"></div>
-<div class="sidebar">
-<p class="in0 small"><a name="Sidebar_page_17_The_Coastwatchers" id="Sidebar_page_17_The_Coastwatchers"></a>[Sidebar (<a href="#Page_17">page 17</a>):]</p>
-<h3 class="nobreak p0">The Coastwatchers</h3>
-
-<p class="drop-cap a"><span class="smcap1"><span class="dkgreen">A</span></span> group of fewer than 1,500 native Coastwatchers
-served as the eyes and ears of Allied forces in
-reporting movements of Japanese units on the
-ground, in the air, and at sea.</p>
-
-<p>Often performing their jobs in remote jungle outposts,
-the Coastwatchers were possessed of both mental and physical
-courage. Their knowledge of the geography and peoples
-of the Pacific made them invaluable additions to the Allied
-war effort.</p>
-
-<p>The concept for this service originated in 1919 in a
-proposal by the Royal Australian Navy to form a civilian
-coastwatching organization to provide early warning in the
-event of an invasion. By the outbreak of war in September
-1939, approximately 800 persons were serving as coastwatchers,
-operating observation posts mainly on the Australian
-coast. They were, at the outset, government officials
-aided by missionaries and planters who, as war with Japan
-neared, were placed under the control of the intelligence
-section of the Australian Navy.</p>
-
-<div class="figright" style="width: 253px;">
-  <div class="captionl top"><p class="justify"><i>Coastwatcher Capt W.&nbsp;F. Martin Clemens, British Solomon
-Islands Defence Force, poses with some of his constabulary.</i></p></div>
-
-<div class="captionr top clear"><p>
-National Archives Photo 80-G-17080 courtesy of Richard Frank
-</p></div>
-  <img src="images/i_b_017.jpg" width="253" height="180" alt="" />
-</div>
-
-<p>By 1942, the system of coastwatchers and the accompanying
-intelligence network covered an area of 500,000 square
-miles, and was placed under the control of the Allied Intelligence
-Bureau (AIB). The AIB coordinated Allied intelligence
-activities in the southwest Pacific, and had as its
-initial principal mission the collection of all possible information
-about the enemy in the vicinity of Guadalcanal.</p>
-
-<p>Coastwatchers proved extremely useful to U.S. Marine
-forces in providing reports on the number and movement
-of Japanese troops. Officers from the 1st Marine Division
-obtained accurate information on the location of enemy
-forces in their objective areas, and were provided vital
-reports on approaching Japanese bombing raids. On 8 August
-1942, Coastwatcher Jack Reed on Bougainville alerted
-American forces to an upcoming raid by 40 Japanese
-bombers, which resulted in 36 of the enemy planes being
-destroyed. The “early warning system” provided by the
-Coastwatchers helped Marine forces on Guadalcanal to hold
-onto the Henderson Field airstrip.</p>
-
-<p>The Coastwatchers also rescued and sheltered 118 Allied
-pilots, including Marines, during the Solomons Campaign,
-often at the immediate risk of their own lives.
-Pipe-smoking Coastwatcher Reed also was responsible for
-coordinating the evacuation on Bougainville of four nuns
-and 25 civilians by the U.S. submarine <i>Nautilus</i>.</p>
-
-<p>It is unknown exactly how many Coastwatchers paid the
-ultimate sacrifice in the performance of their duties. Many
-died in anonymity, without knowledge of the contribution
-their services had made to final victory. Perhaps they would
-be gratified to know that no less an authority than Admiral
-William F. Halsey recorded that the Coastwatchers saved
-Guadalcanal, and Guadalcanal saved the Pacific.&mdash;<i>Robert
-V. Aquilina</i></p>
-</div>
-
-
-<div class="chapter"></div>
-<div class="sidebar green">
-<p class="in0 small"><a name="Sidebar_page_19_The_1st_Marine_Division_Patch" id="Sidebar_page_19_The_1st_Marine_Division_Patch"></a>[Sidebar (<a href="#Page_20">page 19</a>):]</p>
-<h3 class="nobreak p0">The 1st Marine Division Patch</h3>
-
-<div class="figright" style="width: 251px;">
-  <img src="images/i_b_019b.jpg" width="251" height="323" alt="" /></div>
-
-<p class="drop-cap"><span class="smcap1">T</span>he 1st Division shoulder patch originally was
-authorized for wear by members of units who
-were organic or attached to the division in its four
-landings in the Pacific War. It was the first unit patch to
-be authorized for wear in World War II and specifically
-commemorated the division’s sacrifices and victory in the
-battle for Guadalcanal.</p>
-
-<p>As recalled by General Merrill B. Twining, a lieutenant
-colonel and the division’s operations officer on Guadalcanal,
-for a short time before the 1st left Guadalcanal for
-Australia, there had been some discussion by the senior
-staff about uniforming the troops. It appeared that the Marines
-might have to wear Army uniforms, which meant that
-they would lose their identity and Twining came up with
-the idea for a division patch. A number of different designs
-were devised by both Lieutenant Colonel Twining and
-Captain Donald L. Dickson, adjutant of the 5th Marines,
-who had been an artist in civilian life. The one which Twining
-prepared on the flight out of Guadalcanal was approved
-by Major General Alexander A. Vandegrift, the division
-commander.</p>
-
-<p>General Twining further recalled that he drew a diamond
-in his notebook and “in the middle of the diamond I
-doodled a numeral one ... [and] I sketched in the word
-‘Guadalcanal’ down its length.... I got to thinking that
-the whole operation had been under the Southern Cross,
-so I drew that in, too.... About an hour later I took
-the drawing up to the front of the aircraft to General Vandegrift.
-He said, ‘Yes, that’s it!’ and wrote his initials, A.A.V.,
-on the bottom of the notebook page.”</p>
-
-<div class="figleft" style="width: 258px;">
-  <img src="images/i_b_019.jpg" width="258" height="147" alt="" />
-  <div class="captionl justify"><i>Designer of the patch, LtCol Merrill B. Twining (later Gen)
-sits in the 1st Marine Division operations bunker. Behind
-him is his assistant D-3, a very tired Maj Henry IV. Buse, Jr.</i></div></div>
-
-<p>After he arrived in Brisbane, Australia, Colonel Twining
-bought a child’s watercolor set and, while confined to
-his hotel room by a bout of malaria, drew a bunch of diamonds
-on a big sheet, coloring each one differently. He then
-took samples to General Vandegrift, who chose one which
-was colored a shade of blue that he liked. Then Twining
-took the sketch to the Australian Knitting Mills to have it
-reproduced, pledging the credit of the post exchange funds
-to pay for the patches’ manufacture. Within a week or two
-the patches began to roll off the knitting machines, and
-Colonel Twining was there to approve them. General Twining
-further recalled: “After they came off the machine, I
-picked up a sheet of them. They looked very good, and
-when they were cut, I picked up one of the patches. It was
-one of the first off the machine.”</p>
-
-<p>The division’s post exchanges began selling the patches
-almost immediately and they proved to be popular, with
-Marines buying extras to give away as souvenirs to Australian
-friends or to send home to families. Before long,
-newly established Marine divisions, as well as the raider
-and parachute units, and as the aircraft wings, sea-going
-Marines, Fleet Marine Force Pacific units, and others, were
-authorized to have their own distinctive patch, a total of
-33, following the lead of the 1st Marine Division. Marines
-returning to the United States for duty or on leave from
-a unit having a distinctive shoulder insignia were authorized
-to wear that insignia until they were assigned to
-another unit having a shoulder patch of its own. For many
-1st Marine Division men joining another unit and having
-to relinquish the wearing of the 1st Division patch, this
-rankled.</p>
-
-<p>Shortly after the end of the war, Colonel Twining went
-to now-Marine Commandant General Vandegrift saying
-that he “no longer thought Marines should wear anything
-on their uniforms to distinguish them from other Marines.
-He agreed and the patches came off for good.”&mdash;<i>Benis M.
-Frank</i></p>
-</div>
-
-<hr />
-<div class="chapter"></div>
-<h2><a name="September_and_the_Ridge" id="September_and_the_Ridge"></a><i>September and the Ridge</i></h2>
-
-<p>Admiral McCain visited Guadalcanal
-at the end of August, arriving
-in time to greet the aerial reinforcements
-he had ordered forward, and
-also in time for a taste of Japanese
-nightly bombing. He got to experience,
-too, what was becoming
-another unwanted feature of Cactus
-nights: bombardment by Japanese
-cruisers and destroyers. General Vandegrift
-noted that McCain had gotten
-a dose of the “normal ration of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_23" id="Page_23">23</a></span>
-shells.” The admiral saw enough to
-signal his superiors that increased
-support for Guadalcanal operations
-was imperative and that the “situation
-admits no delay whatsoever.” He
-also sent a prophetic message to Admirals
-King and Nimitz: “Cactus can
-be a sinkhole for enemy air power
-and can be consolidated, expanded,
-and exploited to the enemy’s mortal
-hurt.”</p>
-
-<p>On 3 September, the Commanding
-General, 1st Marine Aircraft
-Wing, Brigadier General Roy S.
-Geiger, and his assistant wing commander,
-Colonel Louis Woods,
-moved forward to Guadalcanal to
-take charge of air operations. The arrival
-of the veteran Marine aviators
-provided an instant lift to the morale
-of the pilots and ground crews. It
-reinforced their belief that they were
-at the leading edge of air combat,
-that they were setting the pace for the
-rest of Marine aviation. Vandegrift
-could thankfully turn over the day-to-day
-management of the aerial
-defenses of Cactus to the able and experienced
-Geiger. There was no
-shortage of targets for the mixed air
-force of Marine, Army, and Navy
-flyers. Daily air attacks by the
-Japanese, coupled with steady reinforcement<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_24" id="Page_24">24</a></span>
-attempts by Tanaka’s destroyers
-and transports, meant that
-every type of plane that could lift off
-Henderson’s runway was airborne as
-often as possible. Seabees had begun
-work on a second airstrip, Fighter
-One, which could relieve some of the
-pressure on the primary airfield.</p>
-
-<div id="ip_24" class="figcenter" style="width: 547px;">
-  <img src="images/i_b_024.jpg" width="547" height="295" alt="" />
-  <div class="captionr">
-
-<p>National Archives Photo 80-G-29536-413C</p></div>
-
-<div class="captionl">
-<p class="justify"><i>This is an oblique view of Henderson Field looking north with
-Ironbottom Sound (Sealark Channel) in the background. At
-the left center is the “Pagoda,” operations center of Cactus Air
-Force flyers throughout their first months of operations ashore.</i></p></div></div>
-
-<p>Most of General Kawaguchi’s
-brigade had reached Guadalcanal.
-Those who hadn’t, missed their landfall
-forever as a result of American
-air attacks. Kawaguchi had in mind
-a surprise attack on the heart of the
-Marine position, a thrust from the
-jungle directly at the airfield. To
-reach his jumpoff position, the
-Japanese general would have to move
-through difficult terrain unobserved,
-carving his way through the dense
-vegetation out of sight of Marine
-patrols. The rugged approach route
-would lead him to a prominent ridge
-topped by Kunai grass which wove
-snake-like through the jungle to within
-a mile of Henderson’s runway.
-Unknown to the Japanese, General
-Vandegrift planned on moving his
-headquarters to the shelter of a spot
-at the inland base of this ridge, a site
-better protected, it was hoped, from
-enemy bombing and shellfire.</p>
-
-<div id="ip_24b" class="figcenter" style="width: 360px;">
-  <div class="captionl top"><p class="justify"><i>Marine ground crewmen attempt to put out one of many fires occuring after a
-Japanese bombing raid on Henderson Field causing the loss of much-needed aircraft.</i></p></div>
-
-<div class="captionr top"><p>
-Marine Corps Personal Papers Collection
-</p></div>
-  <img src="images/i_b_024b.jpg" width="360" height="245" alt="" />
-</div>
-
-<p>The success of Kawaguchi’s plan
-depended upon the Marines keeping
-the inland perimeter thinly manned
-while they concentrated their forces
-on the east and west flanks. This was
-not to be. Available intelligence, including
-a captured enemy map,
-pointed to the likelihood of an attack
-on the airfield and Vandegrift moved
-his combined raider-parachute battalion
-to the most obvious enemy approach
-route, the ridge. Colonel
-Edson’s men, who scouted Savo Island
-after moving to Guadalcanal
-and destroyed a Japanese supply base<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_25" id="Page_25">25</a></span>
-at Tasimboko in another shore-to-shore
-raid, took up positions on the
-forward slopes of the ridge at the
-edge of the encroaching jungle on 10
-September. Their commander later
-said that he “was firmly convinced
-that we were in the path of the next
-Jap attack.” Earlier patrols had spotted
-a sizable Japanese force approaching.
-Accordingly, Edson
-patrolled extensively as his men dug
-in on the ridge and in the flanking
-jungle. On the 12th, the Marines
-made contact with enemy patrols
-confirming the fact that Japanese
-troops were definitely “out front.”
-Kawaguchi had about 2,000 of his
-men with him, enough he thought to
-punch through to the airfield.</p>
-
-<p>Japanese planes had dropped
-500-pound bombs along the ridge on
-the 11th and enemy ships began
-shelling the area after nightfall on the
-12th, once the threat of American air
-attacks subsided. The first Japanese
-thrust came at 2100 against Edson’s
-left flank. Boiling out of the jungle,
-the enemy soldiers attacked fearlessly
-into the face of rifle and machine gun
-fire, closing to bayonet range. They
-were thrown back. They came again,
-this time against the right flank,
-penetrating the Marines’ positions.
-Again they were thrown back. A
-third attack closed out the night’s action.
-Again it was a close affair, but
-by 0230 Edson told Vandegrift his
-men could hold. And they did.</p>
-
-<div id="ip_25" class="figcenter" style="width: 551px;">
-  <div class="captionl top"><p class="justify"><i>The raging battle of Edson’s Ridge is depicted in all its fury
-in this oil painting by the late Col Donald L. Dickson, who,
-as a captain, was adjutant of the 5th Marines on Guadalcanal.
-Dickson’s artwork later was shown widely in the United States.</i></p></div>
-
-<div class="captionr top"><p>
-Captain Donald L. Dickson, USMCR
-</p></div>
-  <img src="images/i_b_025.jpg" width="551" height="384" alt="" />
-</div>
-
-<p>On the morning of 13 September,
-Edson called his company commanders
-together and told them:
-“They were just testing, just testing.
-They’ll be back.” He ordered all positions
-improved and defenses consolidated
-and pulled his lines towards
-the airfield along the ridge’s center
-spine. The 2d Battalion, 5th Marines,
-his backup on Tulagi, moved into position
-to reinforce again.</p>
-
-<div id="ip_25b" class="figcenter" style="width: 746px;">
-  <img src="images/i_b_026.jpg" width="746" height="520" alt="" />
-  <div class="caption"><p>EDSON’S (BLOODY) RIDGE</p>
-
-<p class="smaller">12&ndash;14 SEPTEMBER 1942</p></div></div>
-
-<div id="ip_25c" class="figcenter" style="width: 548px;">
-  <div class="captionl top"><p class="justify"><i>Edson’s or Raider’s Ridge is calm after the fighting on the nights
-of 12&ndash;13 and 13&ndash;14 September, when it was the scene of a valiant
-and bloody defense crucial to safeguarding Henderson
-Field and the Marine perimeter on Guadalcanal. The knobs
-at left background were Col Edson’s final defensive position,
-while Henderson Field lies beyond the trees in the background.</i></p></div>
-
-<div class="captionr top"><p>
-Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 500007
-</p></div>
-  <img src="images/i_b_026b.jpg" width="548" height="308" alt="" />
-</div>
-
-<div id="ip_25d" class="figleft" style="width: 175px;">
-  <img src="images/i_b_027.jpg" width="175" height="233" alt="" />
-  <div class="captionr">
-
-<p>Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 310563</p></div>
-
-<div class="captionl">
-<p><i>Maj Kenneth D. Bailey, commander of
-Company C, 1st Raider Battalion, was
-awarded the Medal of Honor posthumously
-for heroic and inspiring leadership
-during the Battle of Edson’s Ridge.</i></p></div></div>
-
-<p>The next night’s attacks were as
-fierce as any man had seen. The
-Japanese were everywhere, fighting
-hand-to-hand in the Marines’ foxholes
-and gun pits and filtering past
-forward positions to attack from the
-rear. Division Sergeant Major
-Sheffield Banta shot one in the new
-command post. Colonel Edson appeared
-wherever the fighting was
-toughest, encouraging his men to
-their utmost efforts. The man-to-man
-battles lapped over into the jungle on
-either flank of the ridge, and engineer
-and pioneer positions were attacked.
-The reserve from the 5th Marines
-was fed into the fight. Artillerymen
-from the 5th Battalion, 11th Marines,
-as they had on the previous night,
-fired their 105mm howitzers at any
-called target. The range grew as short
-as 1,600 yards from tube to impact.
-The Japanese finally could take no
-more. They pulled back as dawn approached.
-On the slopes of the ridge
-and in the surrounding jungle they
-left more than 600 bodies; another
-600 men were wounded. The remnants
-of the Kawaguchi force staggered
-back toward their lines to the
-west, a grueling, hellish eight-day
-march that saw many more of the
-enemy perish.</p>
-
-<p>The cost to Edson’s force for its
-epic defense was also heavy. Fifty-nine
-men were dead, 10 were missing
-in action, and 194 were wounded.
-These losses, coupled with the
-casualties of Tulagi, Gavutu, and
-Tanambogo, meant the end of the 1st
-Parachute Battalion as an effective
-fighting unit. Only 89 men of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_27" id="Page_27">27</a></span>
-parachutists’ original strength could
-walk off the ridge, soon in legend to
-become “Bloody Ridge” or “Edson’s
-Ridge.” Both Colonel Edson and Captain
-Kenneth D. Bailey, commanding
-the raider’s Company C, were awarded
-the Medal of Honor for their
-heroic and inspirational actions.</p>
-
-<p>On 13 and 14 September, the
-Japanese attempted to support
-Kawaguchi’s attack on the ridge with
-thrusts against the flanks of the Marine
-perimeter. On the east, enemy
-troops attempting to penetrate the
-lines of the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines,
-were caught in the open on a grass
-plain and smothered by artillery fire;
-at least 200 died. On the west, the
-3d Battalion, 5th Marines, holding
-ridge positions covering the coastal
-road, fought off a determined attacking
-force that reached its front lines.</p>
-
-<div id="ip_27" class="figcenter" style="width: 551px;">
-  <div class="captionl top"><p class="justify"><i>The Pagoda at Henderson Field, served as headquarters for
-Cactus Air Force throughout the first months of air operations
-on Guadalcanal. From this building, Allied planes were sent
-against Japanese troops on other islands of the Solomons.</i></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="captionr top">
-<p>
-Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 50921
-</p></div>
-  <img src="images/i_b_027b.jpg" width="551" height="400" alt="" />
-</div>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_28" id="Page_28">28</a></span>
-The victory at the ridge gave a
-great boost to Allied homefront
-morale, and reinforced the opinion
-of the men ashore on Guadalcanal
-that they could take on anything the
-enemy could send against them. At
-upper command echelons, the leaders
-were not so sure that the ground
-Marines and their motley air force
-could hold. Intercepted Japanese dispatches
-revealed that the myth of the
-2,000-man defending force had been
-completely dispelled. Sizable naval
-forces and two divisions of Japanese
-troops were now committed to conquer
-the Americans on Guadalcanal.
-Cactus Air Force, augmented frequently
-by Navy carrier squadrons,
-made the planned reinforcement effort
-a high-risk venture. But it was
-a risk the Japanese were prepared to
-take.</p>
-
-<p>On 18 September, the long-awaited
-7th Marines, reinforced by
-the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, and
-other division troops, arrived at
-Guadalcanal. As the men from
-Samoa landed they were greeted with
-friendly derision by Marines already
-on the island. The 7th had been the
-first regiment of the 1st Division to
-go overseas; its men, many thought
-then, were likely to be the first to see
-combat. The division had been careful
-to send some of its best men to
-Samoa and now had them back. One
-of the new and salty combat veterans
-of the 5th Marines remarked to a
-friend in the 7th that he had waited
-a long time “to see our first team get
-into the game.” Providentially, a
-separate supply convoy reached the
-island at the same time as the 7th’s
-arrival, bringing with it badly needed
-aviation gas and the first resupply
-of ammunition since D-Day.</p>
-
-<p>The Navy covering force for the
-American reinforcement and supply
-convoys was hit hard by Japanese
-submarines. The carrier <i>Wasp</i> was
-torpedoed and sunk, the battleship
-<i>North Carolina</i> (BB 55) was
-damaged, and the destroyer <i>O’Brien</i>
-(DD 415) was hit so badly it broke
-up and sank on its way to drydock.
-The Navy had accomplished its mission,
-the 7th Marines had landed,
-but at a terrible cost. About the only
-good result of the devastating
-Japanese torpedo attacks was that the
-<i>Wasp</i>’s surviving aircraft joined Cactus
-Air Force, as the planes of the
-<i>Saratoga</i> and <i>Enterprise</i> had done
-when their carriers required combat
-repairs. Now, the <i>Hornet</i> (CV 8) was
-the only whole fleet carrier left in the
-South Pacific.</p>
-
-<p>As the ships that brought the 7th
-Marines withdrew, they took with
-them the survivors of the 1st
-Parachute Battalion and sick bays full
-of badly wounded men. General
-Vandegrift now had 10 infantry battalions,
-one understrength raider battalion,
-and five artillery battalions
-ashore; the 3d Battalion, 2d Marines,
-had come over from Tulagi also. He
-reorganized the defensive perimeter
-into 10 sectors for better control, giving
-the engineer, pioneer, and amphibian
-tractor battalions sectors
-along the beach. Infantry battalions
-manned the other sectors, including
-the inland perimeter in the jungle.
-Each infantry regiment had two battalions
-on line and one in reserve.
-Vandegrift also had the use of a select
-group of infantrymen who were
-training to be scouts and snipers under
-the leadership of Colonel William
-J. “Wild Bill” Whaling, an experienced
-jungle hand, marksman,
-and hunter, whom he had appointed
-to run a school to sharpen the division’s
-fighting skills. As men
-finished their training under Whaling
-and went back to their outfits,
-others took their place and the Whaling
-group was available to scout and
-spearhead operations.</p>
-
-<p>Vandegrift now had enough men
-ashore on Guadalcanal, 19,200, to
-expand his defensive scheme. He
-decided to seize a forward position
-along the east bank of the Matanikau
-River, in effect strongly outposting
-his west flank defenses against the
-probability of strong enemy attacks
-from the area where most Japanese
-troops were landing. First, however,
-he was going to test the Japanese
-reaction with a strong probing force.</p>
-
-<p>He chose the fresh 1st Battalion,
-7th Marines, commanded by Lieutenant
-Colonel Lewis B. “Chesty”
-Puller, to move inland along the
-slopes of Mt. Austen and patrol
-north towards the coast and the
-Japanese-held area. Puller’s battalion
-ran into Japanese troops bivouacked
-on the slopes of Austen on the 24th
-and in a sharp firefight had seven
-men killed and 25 wounded. Vandegrift
-sent the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines,
-forward to reinforce Puller and
-help provide the men needed to carry
-the casualties out of the jungle.
-Now reinforced, Puller continued his
-advance, moving down the east bank
-of the Matanikau. He reached the
-coast on the 26th as planned, where
-he drew intensive fire from enemy
-positions on the ridges west of the
-river. An attempt by the 2d Battalion,
-5th Marines, to cross was beaten
-back.</p>
-
-<p>About this time, the 1st Raider
-Battalion, its original mission one of
-establishing a patrol base west of the
-Matanikau, reached the vicinity of
-the firefight, and joined in. Vandegrift
-sent Colonel Edson, now the
-commander of the 5th Marines, forward
-to take charge of the expanded
-force. He was directed to attack on
-the 27th and decided to send the raiders
-inland to outflank the Japanese
-defenders. The battalion, commanded
-by Edson’s former executive
-officer, Lieutenant Colonel Samuel B.
-Griffith II, ran into a hornet’s nest of
-Japanese who had crossed the
-Matanikau during the night. A garbled
-message led Edson to believe
-that Griffith’s men were advancing
-according to plan, so he decided to
-land the companies of the 1st Battalion,
-7th Marines, behind the enemy’s
-Matanikau position and strike the
-Japanese from the rear while Rosecran’s
-men attacked across the river.</p>
-
-<p>The landing was made without incident<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_29" id="Page_29">29</a></span>
-and the 7th Marines’ companies
-moved inland only to be
-ambushed and cut off from the sea
-by the Japanese. A rescue force of
-landing craft moved with difficulty
-through Japanese fire, urged on by
-Puller who accompanied the boats
-on the destroyer <i>Ballard</i> (DD 660).
-The Marines were evacuated after
-fighting their way to the beach covered
-by the destroyer’s fire and the
-machine guns of a Marine SBD overhead.
-Once the 7th Marines companies
-got back to the perimeter,
-landing near Kukum, the raider and
-5th Marines battalions pulled back
-from the Matanikau. The confirmation
-that the Japanese would strongly
-contest any westward advance cost
-the Marines 60 men killed and 100
-wounded.</p>
-
-<div id="ip_29" class="figcenter" style="width: 363px;">
-  <div class="captionl top"><p class="justify"><i>Shortly after becoming Commander, South Pacific Area and Forces, VAdm William
-F. Halsey visited Guadalcanal and the 1st Marine Division. Here he is shown
-talking with Col Gerald C. Thomas, 1st Marine Division D-3 (Operations Officer).</i></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="captionr top">
-<p>
-Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 53523
-</p></div>
-  <img src="images/i_b_029b.jpg" width="363" height="241" alt="" />
-</div>
-
-<p>The Japanese the Marines had encountered
-were mainly men from the
-<i>4th Regiment</i> of the <i>2d (Sendai) Division</i>;
-prisoners confirmed that the
-division was landing on the island.
-Included in the enemy reinforcements
-were 150mm howitzers, guns capable
-of shelling the airfield from positions
-near Kokumbona. Clearly, a
-new and stronger enemy attack was
-pending.</p>
-
-<p>As September drew to a close, a
-flood of promotions had reached the
-division, nine lieutenant colonels put
-on their colonel’s eagles and there
-were 14 new lieutenant colonels also.
-Vandegrift made Colonel Gerald C.
-Thomas, his former operations<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_30" id="Page_30">30</a></span>
-officer, the new division chief of
-staff, and had a short time earlier
-given Edson the 5th Marines. Many
-of the older, senior officers, picked
-for the most part in the order they
-had joined the division, were now
-sent back to the States. There they
-would provide a new level of combat
-expertise in the training and organization
-of the many Marine units
-that were forming. The air wing was
-not quite ready yet to return its experienced
-pilots to rear areas, but the
-vital combat knowledge they possessed
-was much needed in the training
-pipeline. They, too&mdash;the
-survivors&mdash;would soon be rotating
-back to rear areas, some for a much-needed
-break before returning to
-combat and others to lead new squadrons
-into the fray.</p>
-
-<div id="ip_30" class="figcenter" style="width: 380px;">
-  <img src="images/i_b_030.jpg" width="380" height="152" alt="" />
-  <div class="captionl">Japanese Model 4 (1919) 150mm Howitzer</div></div>
-
-
-<div class="chapter"></div>
-<div class="sidebar">
-<p class="in0 small"><a name="Sidebar_page_22_Sergeant_Major_Sir_Jacob_Charles_Vouza" id="Sidebar_page_22_Sergeant_Major_Sir_Jacob_Charles_Vouza"></a>[Sidebar (<a href="#Page_22">page 22</a>):]</p>
-<h3 class="nobreak p0">Sergeant Major Sir Jacob Charles Vouza</h3>
-
-<div id="ip_gright" class="figright" style="width: 254px;">
-  <img src="images/i_b_022.jpg" width="254" height="309" alt="" /></div>
-
-<p class="drop-cap"><span class="smcap1">J</span>acob Charles Vouza was born in 1900 at Tasimboko,
-Guadalcanal, British Solomon Islands Protectorate,
-and educated at the South Seas Evangelical Mission
-School there. In 1916 he joined the Solomon Islands Protectorate
-Armed Constabulary, from which he retired at
-the rank of sergeant major in 1941 after 25 years of service.</p>
-
-<p>After the Japanese invaded his home island in World War
-II, he returned to active duty with the British forces and
-volunteered to work with the Coastwatchers. Vouza’s experience
-as a scout had already been established when the
-1st Marine Division landed on Guadalcanal. On 7 August
-1942 he rescued a downed naval pilot from the USS <i>Wasp</i>
-who was shot down inside Japanese territory. He guided
-the pilot to friendly lines where Vouza met the Marines for
-the first time.</p>
-
-<p>Vouza then volunteered to scout behind enemy lines for
-the Marines. On 27 August he was captured by the Japanese
-while on a Marine Corps mission to locate suspected enemy
-lookout stations. Having found a small American flag
-in Vouza’s loincloth, the Japanese tied him to a tree and
-tried to force him to reveal information about Allied forces.
-Vouza was questioned for hours, but refused to talk. He
-was tortured and bayoneted about the arms, throat, shoulder,
-face, and stomach, and left to die.</p>
-
-<p>He managed to free himself after his captors departed,
-and made his way through the miles of jungle to American
-lines. There he gave valuable intelligence information
-to the Marines about an impending Japanese attack before
-accepting medical attention.</p>
-
-<p>After spending 12 days in the hospital, Vouza then
-returned to duty as the chief scout for the Marines. He accompanied
-Lieutenant Colonel Evans F. Carlson and the
-2d Marine Raider Battalion when they made their 30-day
-raid behind enemy lines at Guadalcanal.</p>
-
-<p>Sergeant Major Vouza was highly decorated for his
-World War II service. The Silver Star was presented to him
-personally by Major General Alexander A. Vandegrift,
-commanding general of the 1st Marine Division, for refusing
-to give information under Japanese torture. He also was
-awarded the Legion of Merit for outstanding service with
-the 2d Raider Battalion during November and December
-1942, and the British George Medal for gallant conduct and
-exceptional devotion to duty. He later received the Police
-Long Service Medal and, in 1957, was made a Member of
-the British Empire for long and faithful government service.</p>
-
-<p>After the war, Vouza continued to serve his fellow islanders.
-In 1949, he was appointed district headman, and
-president of the Guadalcanal Council, from 1952&ndash;1958. He
-served as a member of the British Solomon Islands Protectorate
-Advisory Council from 1950 to 1960.</p>
-
-<p>He made many friends during his long association with
-the U.S. Marine Corps and through the years was continually
-visited on Guadalcanal by Marines. During 1968, Vouza
-visited the United States, where he was the honored guest
-of the 1st Marine Division Association. In 1979, he was
-knighted by Britain’s Queen Elizabeth II. He died on 15
-March 1984.&mdash;<i>Ann A. Ferrante</i></p>
-</div>
-
-
-<div class="chapter"></div>
-<div class="sidebar">
-<p class="in0 small"><a name="Sidebar_page_23_M3A1_37mm_Antitank_Gun" id="Sidebar_page_23_M3A1_37mm_Antitank_Gun"></a>[Sidebar (<a href="#Page_24">page 23</a>):]</p>
-<h3 class="nobreak p0">M3A1 37mm Antitank Gun</h3>
-
-<p class="drop-cap"><span class="smcap1"><span class="dkgreen">T</span>he</span> M3 antitank gun, based on the successful German
-<i>Panzer Abwehr Kanone</i> (PAK)-36, was developed
-by the U.S. Army in the late 1930s as a
-replacement for the French 37mm Puteaux gun, used in
-World War I but unable to destroy new tanks being
-produced.</p>
-
-<p>The M3 was adopted because of its accuracy, fire control,
-penetration, and mobility. Towed by its prime mover,
-the 4×4 quarter-ton truck, the gun would trail at 50 mph
-on roads. When traveling crosscountry, gullies, shell holes,
-mud holes, and slopes of 26 degrees were negotiated with
-ease. In 1941, the gun was redesignated the M3A1 when
-the muzzles were threaded to accept a muzzle brake that
-was rarely, if ever, used.</p>
-
-<p>At the time of its adoption, the M3 could destroy any
-tank then being produced in the world. However, by the
-time the United States entered the war, the M3 was outmatched
-by the tanks it would have met in Europe. The
-Japanese tanks were smaller and more vulnerable to the
-M3 throughout the war. In the Pacific, it was used against
-bunkers, pillboxes and, when loaded with canister, against
-banzai charges. It was employed throughout the war by
-Marine regimental weapons companies, but in reduced
-numbers as the fighting continued. It was replaced in the
-European Theater by the M1 57mm antitank gun.</p>
-
-<p>The 37mm antitank gun, manned by a crew of four who
-fired a 1.61-pound projectile with an effective range of 500
-yards.&mdash;<i>Stephen L. Amos and Kenneth L. Smith-Christmas</i></p>
-
-<div class="figcenter" style="width: 524px;">
-  <img src="images/i_b_023.jpg" width="524" height="339" alt="" /></div>
-</div>
-
-<div id="Sidebar_page_29" class="sidebar">
-<p class="in0 small">[Sidebar (<a href="#Page_29">page 29</a>):]</p>
-
-<p class="center">
-The President of the United States<br />
-takes pleasure in presenting<br />
-the Medal of Honor posthumously to<br />
-Douglas Albert Munro<br />
-Signalman First Class<br />
-United States Coast Guard<br />
-for service as set forth<br />
-in the following citation:
-</p>
-
-<div class="figright" style="width: 365px;">
-  <img src="images/i_b_029.jpg" width="365" height="285" alt="" />
-  <div class="captionr">
-
-<p>
-Painting by Bernard D’Andrea, Courtesy of U.S. Coast Guard Historical Office
-</p></div></div>
-
-<blockquote>
-
-<p>For extraordinary heroism and conspicuous
-gallantry in action above and beyond the call
-of duty as Officer in Charge of a group of
-twenty-four Higgins boats engaged in the
-evacuation of a battalion of Marines trapped
-by enemy Japanese forces at Point Cruz,
-Guadalcanal, on September 27, 1942. After
-making preliminary plans for the evacuation
-of nearly five hundred beleaguered Marines,
-Munro, under constant strafing by enemy
-machine guns on the island and at great risk
-of his life, daringly led five of his small craft
-toward the shore. As he closed the beach, he
-signalled the others to land and then in order
-to draw the enemy’s fire and protect the
-heavily loaded boats, he valiantly placed his
-craft, with its two small guns, as a shield between
-the beachhead and the Japanese. When
-the perilous task of evacuation was nearly
-completed, Munro was instantly killed by
-enemy fire, but his crew, two of whom were
-wounded, carried on until the last boat had
-loaded and cleared the beach. By his outstanding
-leadership, expert planning, and
-dauntless devotion to duty, he and his courageous
-comrades undoubtedly saved the
-lives of many who otherwise would have
-perished. He gallantly gave up his life in
-defense of his country. /s/ Franklin Roosevelt</p></blockquote>
-</div>
-
-<hr />
-<div class="chapter"></div>
-<h2><a name="October_and_the_Japanese_Offensive" id="October_and_the_Japanese_Offensive"></a><i>October and the Japanese Offensive</i></h2>
-
-<p>On 30 September, unexpectedly, a
-B-17 carrying Admiral Nimitz made
-an emergency landing at Henderson
-Field. The CinCPac made the most
-of the opportunity. He visited the
-front lines, saw Edson’s Ridge, and
-talked to a number of Marines. He
-reaffirmed to Vandegrift that his
-overriding mission was to hold the
-airfield. He promised all the support
-he could give and after awarding
-Navy Crosses to a number of Marines,
-including Vandegrift, left the
-next day visibly encouraged by what
-he had seen.</p>
-
-<div id="ip_30b" class="figcenter" style="width: 548px;">
-  <div class="captionl top"><p class="justify"><i>Visiting Guadalcanal on 30 September, Adm Chester W.
-Nimitz, CinCPac, took time to decorate LtCol Evans C. Carlson,
-CO, 2d Raider Battalion; MajGen Vandegrift, in rear;
-and, from left, BGen William H. Rupertus, ADC; Col Merritt
-A. Edson, CO, 5th Marines; LtCol Edwin A. Pollock, CO,
-2d Battalion, 1st Marines; Maj John L. Smith, CO, VMF-223.</i></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="captionr top"><p>
-Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 50883
-</p></div>
-  <img src="images/i_b_030b.jpg" width="548" height="363" alt="" />
-</div>
-
-<p>The next Marine move involved a
-punishing return to the Matanikau,
-this time with five infantry battalions
-and the Whaling group. Whaling
-commanded his men and the 3d Battalion,
-2d Marines, in a thrust inland
-to clear the way for two battalions
-of the 7th Marines, the 1st and 2d,
-to drive through and hook toward
-the coast, hitting the Japanese holding<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_31" id="Page_31">31</a></span>
-along the Matanikau. Edson’s 2d
-and 3d Battalions would attack
-across the river mouth. All the division’s
-artillery was positioned to fire
-in support.</p>
-
-<div id="ip_31" class="figcenter" style="width: 553px;">
-  <img src="images/i_b_031.jpg" width="553" height="330" alt="" />
-  <div class="captionr">
-
-<p>Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 61534</p></div>
-
-<div class="captionl">
-<p class="justify"><i>A M1918 155mm howitzer is fired by artillery crewmen of the
-11th Marines in support of ground forces attacking the enemy.
-Despite the lack of sound-flash equipment to locate hostile
-artillery, Col del Valle’s guns were able to quiet enemy fire.</i></p></div></div>
-
-<p>On the 7th, Whaling’s force moved
-into the jungle about 2,000 yards upstream
-on the Matanikau, encountering
-Japanese troops that harassed his
-forward elements, but not in enough
-strength to stop the advance. He
-bypassed the enemy positions and
-dug in for the night. Behind him the
-7th Marines followed suit, prepared
-to move through his lines, cross the
-river, and attack north toward the
-Japanese on the 8th. The 5th Marines’
-assault battalions moving
-toward the Matanikau on the 7th ran
-into Japanese in strength about 400
-yards from the river. Unwittingly, the
-Marines had run into strong advance
-elements of the Japanese <i>4th Regiment</i>,
-which had crossed the
-Matanikau in order to establish a
-base from which artillery could fire
-into the Marine perimeter. The fighting
-was intense and the 3d Battalion,
-5th, could make little progress,
-although the 2d Battalion encountered
-slight opposition and won
-through to the river bank. It then
-turned north to hit the inland flank
-of the enemy troops. Vandegrift sent
-forward a company of raiders to reinforce
-the 5th, and it took a holding
-position on the right, towards the
-beach.</p>
-
-<p>Rain poured down on the 8th, all
-day long, virtually stopping all forward
-progress, but not halting the
-close-in fighting around the Japanese
-pocket. The enemy troops finally
-retreated, attempting to escape the
-gradually encircling Marines. They
-smashed into the raider’s position
-nearest to their escape route. A wild
-hand-to-hand battle ensued and a
-few Japanese broke through to reach
-and cross the river. The rest died
-fighting.</p>
-
-<div id="ip_32" class="figright" style="width: 362px;">
-  <img src="images/i_b_032.jpg" width="362" height="187" alt="" />
-  <div class="captionr"><p>Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 50963</p></div>
-
-<div class="captionl">
-<p class="justify"><i>More than 200 Japanese soldiers alone were killed in a frenzied attack in the sandspit
-where the Tenaru River flows into Ironbottom Sound (Sealark Channel).</i></p></div></div>
-
-<p>On the 9th, Whaling’s force,
-flanked by the 2d and then the 1st
-Battalion, 7th Marines, crossed the
-Matanikau and then turned and followed
-ridge lines to the sea. Puller’s
-battalion discovered a number of
-Japanese in a ravine to his front, fired
-his mortars, and called in artillery,
-while his men used rifles and
-machine guns to pick off enemy
-troops trying to escape what proved
-to be a death trap. When his mortar
-ammunition began to run short,
-Puller moved on toward the beach,
-joining the rest of Whaling’s force,
-which had encountered no opposition.
-The Marines then recrossed the
-Mantanikau, joined Edson’s troops,
-and marched back to the perimeter,
-leaving a strong combat outpost at
-the Matanikau, now cleared of
-Japanese. General Vandegrift, apprised
-by intelligence sources that a
-major Japanese attack was coming
-from the west, decided to consolidate
-his positions, leaving no sizable Marine
-force more than a day’s march
-from the perimeter. The Marine advance
-on 7&ndash;9 October had thwarted
-Japanese plans for an early attack
-and cost the enemy more than 700
-men. The Marines paid a price too,
-65 dead and 125 wounded.</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_32" id="Page_32">32</a></span>
-There was another price that
-Guadalcanal was exacting from both
-sides. Disease was beginning to fell
-men in numbers that equalled the
-battle casualties. In addition to gastroenteritis,
-which greatly weakened
-those who suffered its crippling
-stomach cramps, there were all kinds
-of tropical fungus infections, collectively
-known as “jungle rot,” which
-produced uncomfortable rashes on
-men’s feet, armpits, elbows, and
-crotches, a product of seldom being
-dry. If it didn’t rain, sweat provided
-the moisture. On top of this came
-hundreds of cases of malaria.
-Atabrine tablets provided some
-relief, besides turning the skin yellow,
-but they were not effective enough
-to stop the spread of the mosquito-borne
-infection. Malaria attacks were
-so pervasive that nothing short of
-complete prostration, becoming a litter
-case, could earn a respite in the
-hospital. Naturally enough, all these
-diseases affected most strongly the
-men who had been on the island the
-longest, particularly those who experienced
-the early days of short rations.
-Vandegrift had already argued
-with his superiors that when his men
-eventually got relieved they should
-not be sent to another tropical island
-hospital, but rather to a place where
-there was a real change of atmosphere
-and climate. He asked that
-Auckland or Wellington, New
-Zealand, be considered.</p>
-
-<p>For the present, however, there
-was to be no relief for men starting
-their third month on Guadalcanal.
-The Japanese would not abandon
-their plan to seize back Guadalcanal
-and gave painful evidence of their intentions
-near mid-October. General
-Hyakutake himself landed on
-Guadalcanal on 7 October to oversee
-the coming offensive. Elements of
-Major General Masao Maruyama’s
-<i>Sendai Division</i>, already a factor in
-the fighting near the Matanikau,
-landed with him. More men were
-coming. And the Japanese, taking
-advantage of the fact that Cactus
-flyers had no night attack capability,
-planned to ensure that no planes
-at all would rise from Guadalcanal
-to meet them.</p>
-
-<div id="ip_32b" class="figcenter" style="width: 550px;">
-  <div class="captionl top justify"><i>By October, malaria began to claim as many casualties as
-Japanese artillery, bombs, and naval gunfire. Shown here are
-the patients in the division hospital who are ministered to by
-physicians and corpsmen working under minimal conditions.</i></div>
-  <img src="images/i_b_032b.jpg" width="550" height="220" alt="" />
-</div>
-
-<p>On 11 October, U.S. Navy surface
-ships took a hand in stopping the
-“Tokyo Express,” the nickname that
-had been given to Admiral Tanaka’s
-almost nightly reinforcement forays.
-A covering force of five cruisers and
-five destroyers, located near Rennell
-Island and commanded by Rear Admiral
-Norman Scott, got word that
-many ships were approaching
-Guadalcanal. Scott’s mission was to
-protect an approaching reinforcement
-convoy and he steamed toward
-Cactus at flank speed eager to engage.
-He encountered more ships
-than he had expected, a bombardment<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_33" id="Page_33">33</a></span>
-group of three heavy cruisers
-and two destroyers, as well as six destroyers
-escorting two seaplane carrier
-transports. Scott maneuvered between
-Savo Island and Cape Esperance,
-Guadalcanal’s western tip, and
-ran head-on into the bombardment
-group.</p>
-
-<p>Alerted by a scout plane from his
-flagship, <i>San Francisco</i> (CA 38),
-spottings later confirmed by radar
-contacts on the <i>Helena</i> (CL 50), the
-Americans opened fire before the
-Japanese, who had no radar, knew
-of their presence. One enemy destroyer
-sank immediately, two cruisers
-were badly damaged, one, the
-<i>Furutaka</i>, later foundered, and the
-remaining cruiser and destroyer
-turned away from the inferno of
-American fire. Scott’s own force was
-punished by enemy return fire which
-damaged two cruisers and two destroyers,
-one of which, the <i>Duncan</i>
-(DD 485), sank the following day.
-On the 12th too, Cactus flyers spotted
-two of the reinforcement destroyer
-escorts retiring and sank them
-both. The Battle of Cape Esperance
-could be counted an American naval
-victory, one sorely needed at the
-time.</p>
-
-<div id="ip_33" class="figleft" style="width: 173px;">
-  <div class="captionl top"><p class="justify"><i>Maj Harold W. Bauer, VMF-212 commander,
-here a captain, was posthumously
-awarded the Medal of Honor
-after being lost during a scramble with
-Japanese aircraft over Guadalcanal.</i></p></div>
-
-<div class="captionr top"><p>
-Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 410772
-</p></div>
-  <img src="images/i_b_033.jpg" width="173" height="225" alt="" />
-</div>
-
-<p>Its way cleared by Scott’s encounter
-with the Japanese, a really welcome
-reinforcement convoy arrived
-at the island on 13 October when the
-164th Infantry of the Americal Division
-arrived. The soldiers, members
-of a National Guard outfit
-originally from North Dakota, were
-equipped with Garand M-1 rifles, a
-weapon of which most overseas Marines
-had only heard. In rate of fire,
-the semiautomatic Garand could easily
-outperform the single-shot, bolt-action
-Springfields the Marines carried
-and the bolt-action rifles the
-Japanese carried, but most 1st Division
-Marines of necessity touted the
-Springfield as inherently more accurate
-and a better weapon. This did
-not prevent some light-fingered Marines
-from acquiring Garands when
-the occasion presented itself. And
-such an occasion did present itself
-while the soldiers were landing and
-their supplies were being moved to
-dumps. Several flights of Japanese
-bombers arrived over Henderson
-Field, relatively unscathed by the
-defending fighters, and began dropping
-their bombs. The soldiers headed
-for cover and alert Marines,
-inured to the bombing, used the interval
-to “liberate” interesting cartons
-and crates. The news that the Army
-had arrived spread across the island
-like wildfire, for it meant to all Marines
-that they eventually would be
-relieved. There was hope.</p>
-
-<div id="ip_34" class="figright" style="width: 361px;">
-  <img src="images/i_b_034.jpg" width="361" height="228" alt="" />
-  <div class="captionr">
-
-<p>Department of Defense (USMC) Photos 304183 and 302980</p></div>
-
-<div class="captionl"><p class="justify"><i>Two other Marine aviators awarded the Medal of Honor for heroism and intrepidity
-in the air were Capt Jefferson J. DeBlanc, left, and Maj Robert E. Galer, right.</i></p></div></div>
-
-<p>As if the bombing was not enough
-grief, the Japanese opened on the airfield
-with their 150mm howitzers
-also. Altogether the men of the 164th
-got a rude welcome to Guadalcanal.
-And on that night, 13&ndash;14 October,
-they shared a terrifying experience
-with the Marines that no one would
-ever forget.</p>
-
-<p>Determined to knock out Henderson
-Field and protect their soldiers
-landing in strength west of Koli
-Point, the enemy commanders sent
-the battleships <i>Kongo</i> and <i>Haruna</i>
-into Ironbottom Sound to bombard
-the Marine positions. The usual
-Japanese flare planes heralded the
-bombardment, 80 minutes of sheer
-hell which had 14-inch shells exploding
-with such effect that the accompanying
-cruiser fire was scarcely
-noticed. No one was safe; no place
-was safe. No dugout had been built
-to withstand 14-inch shells. One witness,
-a seasoned veteran demonstrably
-cool under enemy fire, opined
-that there was nothing worse in war
-than helplessly being on the receiving
-end of naval gunfire. He remembered
-“huge trees being cut apart and
-flying about like toothpicks.” And he
-was on the frontlines, not the prime
-enemy target. The airfield and its environs
-were a shambles when dawn
-broke. The naval shelling, together
-with the night’s artillery fire and
-bombing, had left Cactus Air Force’s
-commander, General Geiger, with a
-handful of aircraft still flyable, an airfield
-thickly cratered by shells and
-bombs, and a death toll of 41. Still,
-from Henderson or Fighter One,
-which now became the main airstrip,
-the Cactus Flyers had to attack, for
-the morning also revealed a shore
-and sea full of inviting targets.</p>
-
-<p>The expected enemy convoy had
-gotten through and Japanese transports
-and landing craft were everywhere
-near Tassafaronga. At sea the
-escorting cruisers and destroyers
-provided a formidable antiaircraft
-screen. Every American plane that
-could fly did. General Geiger’s aide,
-Major Jack Cram, took off in the
-general’s PBY, hastily rigged to carry
-two torpedoes, and put one of
-them into the side of an enemy transport
-as it was unloading. He landed
-the lumbering flying boat with enemy
-aircraft hot on his tail. A new
-squadron of F4Fs, VMF-212, commanded
-by Major Harold W. Bauer,
-flew in during the day’s action, landed,
-refueled, and took off to join the
-fighting. An hour later, Bauer landed
-again, this time with four enemy
-bombers to his credit. Bauer, who added
-to his score of Japanese aircraft
-kills in later air battles, was subsequently
-lost in action. He was awarded<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_34" id="Page_34">34</a></span>
-the Medal of Honor, as were four
-other Marine pilots of the early Cactus
-Air Force: Captain Jefferson J.
-DeBlanc (VMF-112); Captain Joseph
-J. Foss (VMF-121); Major Robert E.
-Galer (VMF-224); and Major John L.
-Smith (VMF-223).</p>
-
-<p>The Japanese had landed more
-than enough troops to destroy the
-Marine beachhead and seize the airfield.
-At least General Hyakutake
-thought so, and he heartily approved
-General Maruyama’s plan to move
-most of the <i>Sendai Division</i> through
-the jungle, out of sight and out of
-contact with the Marines, to strike
-from the south in the vicinity of Edson’s
-Ridge. Roughly 7,000 men, each
-carrying a mortar or artillery shell,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_35" id="Page_35">35</a></span>
-started the trek along the Maruyama
-Trail which had been partially
-hacked out of the jungle well inland
-from the Marine positions. Maruyama,
-who had approved the trail’s
-name to indicate his confidence, intended
-to support this attack with
-heavy mortars and infantry guns
-(70mm pack howitzers). The men
-who had to lug, push, and drag these
-supporting arms over the miles of
-broken ground, across two major
-streams, the Mantanikau and the
-Lunga, and through heavy underbrush,
-might have had another name
-for their commander’s path to supposed
-glory.</p>
-
-<div id="ip_35" class="figcenter" style="width: 550px;">
-  <div class="captionl top"><p class="justify"><i>A Marine examines a Japanese 70mm howitzer captured at
-the Battle of the Tenaru. Gen Maruyama’s troops “had to lug,
-push, and drag these supporting arms over the miles of broken
-ground, across two major streams and through heavy underbrush”
-to get them to the target area&mdash;but they never did. The
-trail behind them was littered with the supplies they carried.</i></p></div>
-
-<div class="captionr top"><p>
-Photo courtesy of Col James A. Donovan, Jr.
-</p></div>
-  <img src="images/i_b_034b.jpg" width="550" height="424" alt="" />
-</div>
-
-<p>General Vandegrift knew the
-Japanese were going to attack.
-Patrols and reconnaissance flights
-had clearly indicated the push would
-be from the west, where the enemy
-reinforcements had landed. The
-American commander changed his
-dispositions accordingly. There were
-Japanese troops east of the perimeter,
-too, but not in any significant
-strength. The new infantry regiment,
-the 164th, reinforced by Marine special
-weapons units, was put into the
-line to hold the eastern flank along
-6,600 yards, curving inland to join up
-with 7th Marines near Edson’s Ridge.
-The 7th held 2,500 yards from the
-ridge to the Lunga. From the Lunga,
-the 1st Marines had a 3,500-yard sector
-of jungle running west to the
-point where the line curved back to
-the beach again in the 5th Marines’
-sector. Since the attack was expected
-from the west, the 3d Battalions
-of each of the 1st and 7th Marines
-held a strong outpost position forward
-of the 5th Marines’ lines along
-the east bank of the Matanikau.</p>
-
-<p>In the lull before the attack, if a
-time of patrol clashes, Japanese
-cruiser-destroyer bombardments,
-bomber attacks, and artillery harassment
-could properly be called a
-lull, Vandegrift was visited by the
-Commandant of the Marine Corps,
-Lieutenant General Thomas Holcomb.
-The Commandant flew in on
-21 October to see for himself how his
-Marines were faring. It also proved
-to be an occasion for both senior Marines
-to meet the new ComSoPac,
-Vice Admiral William F. “Bull” Halsey.
-Admiral Nimitz had announced
-Halsey’s appointment on 18 October
-and the news was welcome in Navy
-and Marine ranks throughout the Pacific.
-Halsey’s deserved reputation for
-elan and aggressiveness promised
-renewed attention to the situation on
-Guadalcanal. On the 22d, Holcomb
-and Vandegrift flew to Noumea to
-meet with Halsey and to receive and
-give a round of briefings on the Allied
-situation. After Vandegrift had
-described his position, he argued
-strongly against the diversion of reinforcements
-intended for Cactus to
-any other South Pacific venue, a
-sometime factor of Admiral Turner’s
-strategic vision. He insisted that he
-needed all of the Americal Division
-and another 2d Marine Division regiment
-to beef up his forces, and that
-more than half of his veterans were
-worn out by three months’ fighting
-and the ravages of jungle-incurred
-diseases. Admiral Halsey told the
-Marine general: “You go back there,
-Vandegrift. I promise to get you
-everything I have.”</p>
-
-<div id="ip_35b" class="figcenter" style="width: 365px;">
-  <img src="images/i_b_035.jpg" width="365" height="354" alt="" />
-  <div class="captionr">
-
-<p>Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 13628</p></div>
-
-<div class="captionl">
-<p class="justify"><i>During a lull in the fight, a Marine machine gunner takes a break for coffee, with
-his sub-machine gun on his knee and his 30-caliber light machine gun in position.</i></p></div></div>
-
-<p>When Vandegrift returned to
-Guadalcanal, Holcomb moved on to
-Pearl Harbor to meet with Nimitz,
-carrying Halsey’s recommendation
-that, in the future, landing force commanders
-once established ashore,
-would have equal command status
-with Navy amphibious force commanders.
-At Pearl, Nimitz approved
-Halsey’s recommendation&mdash;which
-Holcomb had drafted&mdash;and in
-Washington so did King. In effect,
-then, the command status of all future
-Pacific amphibious operations
-was determined by the events of
-Guadalcanal. Another piece of news
-Vandegrift received from Holcomb
-also boded well for the future of the
-Marine Corps. Holcomb indicated<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_36" id="Page_36">36</a></span>
-that if President Roosevelt did not
-reappoint him, unlikely in view of his
-age and two terms in office, he would
-recommend that Vandegrift be appointed
-the next Commandant.</p>
-
-<div id="ip_36" class="figcenter" style="width: 546px;">
-  <img src="images/i_b_036.jpg" width="546" height="373" alt="" />
-  <div class="captionr">
-
-<p>Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 513191</p></div>
-
-<div class="captionl">
-<p class="justify"><i>On the occasion of the visit of the Commandant, MajGen
-Thomas Holcomb, some of Operation Watchtower’s major
-staff and command officers took time out from the fighting
-to pose with him. From left, front row: Col William J. Whaling
-(Whaling Group); Col Amor LeRoy Sims (CO, 7th Marines);
-Col Gerald C. Thomas (Division Chief of Staff); Col
-Pedro A. del Valle (CO, 11th Marines); Col William E. Riley
-(member of Gen Holcomb’s party); MajGen Roy S. Geiger
-(CG, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing); Gen Holcomb; MajGen
-Ralph J. Mitchell (Director of Aviation, Headquarters, U.S.
-Marine Corps); BGen Bennet Puryear, Jr. (Assistant Quartermaster
-of the Marine Corps); Col Clifton B. Cates (CO, 1st
-Marines). Second row (between Whaling and Sims): LtCol
-Raymond P. Coffman (Division Supply Officer); Maj James
-C. Murray (Division Personnel Officer); (behind Gen Holcomb)
-LtCol Merrill B. Twining (Division Operations Officer).</i></p></div></div>
-
-<p>This news of future events had little
-chance of diverting Vandegrift’s
-attention when he flew back to
-Guadalcanal, for the Japanese were
-in the midst of their planned offensive.
-On the 20th, an enemy patrol
-accompanied by two tanks tried to
-find a way through the line held by
-Lieutenant Colonel William N.
-McKelvy, Jr.’s 3d Battalion, 1st Marines.
-A sharpshooting 37mm gun
-crew knocked out one tank and the
-enemy force fell back, meanwhile
-shelling the Marine positions with artillery.
-Near sunset the next day, the
-Japanese tried again, this time with
-more artillery fire and more tanks in
-the fore, but again a 37mm gun
-knocked out a lead tank and discouraged
-the attack. On 22 October,
-the enemy paused, waiting for
-Maruyama’s force to get into position
-inland. On the 23d, planned as the
-day of the <i>Sendai</i>’s main attack, the
-Japanese dropped a heavy rain of artillery
-and mortar fire on McKelvy’s
-positions near the Matanikau River
-mouth. Near dusk, nine 18-ton medium
-tanks clanked out of the trees
-onto the river’s sandbar and just as
-quickly eight of them were riddled
-by the 37s. One tank got across the
-river, a Marine blasted a track off
-with a grenade, and a 75mm halftrack
-finished it off in the ocean’s
-surf. The following enemy infantry
-was smothered by Marine artillery
-fire as all battalions of the augmented
-11th Marines rained shells on the
-massed attackers. Hundreds of
-Japanese were casualties and three
-more tanks were destroyed. Later, an
-inland thrust further upstream was
-easily beaten back. The abortive
-coastal attack did almost nothing to
-aid Maruyama’s inland offensive, but
-did cause Vandegrift to shift one battalion,
-the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines,
-out of the lines to the east and into
-the 4,000-yard gap between the Matanikau
-position and the perimeter.
-This move proved providential since<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_37" id="Page_37">37</a></span>
-one of Maruyama’s planned attacks
-was headed right for this area.</p>
-
-<p>Although patrols had encountered
-no Japanese east or south of the jungled
-perimeter up to the 24th, the
-Matanikau attempts had alerted
-everyone. When General Maruyama
-finally was satisfied that his men had
-struggled through to appropriate assault
-positions, after delaying his day
-of attack three times, he was ready
-on 24 October. The Marines were
-waiting.</p>
-
-<p>An observer from the 1st Battalion,
-7th Marines, spotted an enemy
-officer surveying Edson’s Ridge on
-the 24th, and scout-snipers reported
-smoke from numerous rice fires rising
-from a valley about two miles
-south of Lieutenant Colonel Puller’s
-positions. Six battalions of the <i>Sendai
-Division</i> were poised to attack,
-and near midnight the first elements
-of the enemy hit and bypassed a
-platoon-sized outpost forward of
-Puller’s barbed-wire entanglements.
-Warned by the outpost, Puller’s men
-waited, straining to see through a
-dark night and a driving rain. Suddenly,
-the Japanese charged out of
-the jungle, attacking in Puller’s area
-near the ridge and the flat ground to
-the east. The Marines replied with<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_38" id="Page_38">38</a></span>
-everything they had, calling in artillery,
-firing mortars, relying heavily
-on crossing fields of machine gun
-fire to cut down the enemy infantrymen.
-Thankfully, the enemy’s artillery,
-mortars, and other supporting
-arms were scattered back along the
-Maruyama Trail; they had proved
-too much of a burden for the infantrymen
-to carry forward.</p>
-
-<div id="ip_38" class="figcenter" style="width: 550px;">
-  <img src="images/i_b_038.jpg" width="550" height="265" alt="" />
-  <div class="captionr">
-
-<p>Marine Corps Personal Papers Collection</p></div>
-
-<div class="captionl">
-<p class="justify"><i>Five Japanese tanks sit dead in the water, destroyed by Marine
-37mm gunfire during the abortive attempt to force the
-Marine perimeter near the mouth of the Matanikau River in
-late October. Many Japanese soldiers lost their lives also.</i></p></div></div>
-
-<p>A wedge was driven into the Marine
-lines, but eventually straightened
-out with repeated counterattacks.
-Puller soon realized his battalion was
-being hit by a strong Japanese force
-capable of repeated attacks. He called
-for reinforcements and the Army’s 3d
-Battalion, 164th Infantry (Lieutenant
-Colonel Robert K. Hall), was ordered
-forward, its men sliding and slipping
-in the rain as they trudged a mile
-south along Edson’s Ridge. Puller met
-Hall at the head of his column, and
-the two officers walked down the
-length of the Marine lines, peeling off
-an Army squad at a time to feed into
-the lines. When the Japanese attacked
-again as they did all night long, the
-soldiers and Marines fought back
-together. By 0330, the Army battalion
-was completely integrated into
-the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines’ lines
-and the enemy attacks were getting
-weaker and weaker. The American
-return fire&mdash;including flanking fire
-from machine guns and Weapons
-Company, 7th Marines’ 37mm guns
-remaining in the positions held by 2d
-Battalion, 164th Infantry, on Puller’s
-left&mdash;was just too much to take. Near
-dawn, Maruyama pulled his men
-back to regroup and prepare to attack
-again.</p>
-
-<p>With daylight, Puller and Hall reordered
-the lines, putting the 3d Battalion,
-164th, into its own positions
-on Puller’s left, tying in with the rest
-of the Army regiment. The driving
-rains had turned Fighter One into a
-quagmire, effectively grounding Cactus
-flyers. Japanese planes used the
-“free ride” to bomb Marine positions.
-Their artillery fired incessantly and
-a pair of Japanese destroyers added
-their gunfire to the bombardment until
-they got too close to the shore and
-the 3d Defense Battalion’s 5-inch
-guns drove them off. As the sun bore
-down, the runways dried and afternoon
-enemy attacks were met by
-Cactus fighters, who downed 22
-Japanese planes with a loss of three
-of their own.</p>
-
-<p>As night came on again, Maruyama
-tried more of the same, with the
-same result. The Army-Marine lines
-held and the Japanese were cut down
-in droves by rifle, machine gun, mortar,
-37mm, and artillery fire. To the
-west, an enemy battalion mounted
-three determined attacks against the
-positions held by Lieutenant Colonel
-Herman H. Hanneken’s 2d Battalion,
-7th Marines, thinly tied in with
-Puller’s battalion on the left and the
-3d Battalion, 7th Marines, on the
-right. The enemy finally penetrated
-the positions held by Company F, but
-a counterattack led by Major Odell
-M. Conoley, the battalion’s executive
-officer, drove off the Japanese. Again
-at daylight the American positions
-were secure and the enemy had
-retreated. They would not come
-back; the grand Japanese offensive of
-the <i>Sendai Division</i> was over.</p>
-
-<p>About 3,500 enemy troops had
-died during the attacks. General
-Maruyama’s proud boast that he
-“would exterminate the enemy
-around the airfield in one blow”
-proved an empty one. What was left
-of his force now straggled back over
-the Maruyama Trail, losing, as had
-the Kawaguchi force in the same situation,
-most of its seriously wounded<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_39" id="Page_39">39</a></span>
-men. The Americans, Marines
-and soldiers together, probably lost
-300 men killed and wounded; existing
-records are sketchy and incomplete.
-One result of the battle,
-however, was a warm welcome to the
-164th Infantry from the 1st Marine
-Division. Vandegrift particularly
-commended Lieutenant Colonel
-Hall’s battalion, stating the “division
-was proud to have serving with it
-another unit which had stood the test
-of battle.” And Colonel Cates sent a
-message to the 164th’s Colonel Bryant
-Moore saying that the 1st Marines
-“were proud to serve with a unit such
-as yours.”</p>
-
-<p>Amidst all the heroics of the two
-nights’ fighting there were many men
-who were singled out for recognition
-and an equally large number who
-performed great deeds that were
-never recognized. Two men stood out
-above all others, and on succeeding
-nights, Sergeant John Basilone of the
-1st Battalion, 7th Marines, and Platoon
-Sergeant Mitchell Paige of the
-2d Battalion, both machine gun section
-heads, were recognized as having
-performed “above and beyond the
-call of duty” in the inspiring words
-of their Medal of Honor citations.</p>
-
-<div class="chapter"></div>
-<div class="sidebar green">
-<p class="in0 small"><a name="Sidebar_page_37_Reising_Gun" id="Sidebar_page_37_Reising_Gun"></a>[Sidebar (<a href="#Page_37">page 37</a>):]</p>
-<h3 class="nobreak p0">Reising Gun</h3>
-
-<p class="drop-cap"><span class="smcap1"><span class="dkgreen">T</span>he</span> Reising gun was designed and developed by noted
-gun inventor Eugene Reising. It was patented in
-1940 and manufactured by the old gun-making firm
-of Harrington and Richardson of Worcester, Massachusetts.
-It is said that it was made on existing machine tools, some
-dating back to the Civil War, and of ordinary steel rather
-than ordnance steel. With new machine tools and ordnance
-steel scarce and needed for more demanding weapons, the
-Reising met an immediate requirement for many sub-machine
-guns at a time when production of Thompson
-M1928 and M1 sub-machine guns hadn’t caught up with
-demand and the stamped-out M3 “grease gun” had not yet
-been invented. It was a wartime expedient.</p>
-
-<div class="figright" style="width: 255px;">
-  <img src="images/i_b_037.jpg" width="255" height="339" alt="" />
-  <div class="captionr">
-
-<p>
-Captain Donald L. Dickson, USMCR
-</p></div></div>
-
-<p>The Reising was made in two different models, the 50
-and the 55. The Model 50 had a full wooden stock and
-a Cutts compensator attached to the muzzle. The compensator,
-a device which reduced the upward muzzle climb
-from recoil, was invented by Richard M. Cutts, Sr., and
-his son, Richard M. Cutts, Jr., both of whom became Marine
-brigadier generals. The other version was dubbed the
-Model 55. It had a folding metal-wire shoulder stock which
-swivelled on the wooden pistol grip. It also had a shorter
-barrel and no compensator. It was intended for use by
-parachutists, tank crews, and others needing a compact
-weapon. Both versions of the Reising fired .45-caliber ammunition,
-the same cartridge as the Colt automatic pistol
-and the Thompson.</p>
-
-<p>In all, there were approximately 100,000 Reising sub-machine
-guns produced between 1940 and 1942. Small
-numbers of the weapons were acquired by both Great Britain
-and the Soviet Union. However, most were used by
-the U.S. Marine Corps in the Solomon Islands campaign.
-The Model 55 was issued to both Marine parachute battalions
-and Marine raiders, seeing service first on Guadalcanal.
-After its dubious debut in combat it was withdrawn
-from frontline service in 1943 due to several flaws in design
-and manufacture.</p>
-
-<p>The Reising’s major shortcoming was its propensity for
-jamming. This was due to both a design problem in the
-magazine lips and the fact that magazines were made of
-a soft sheet steel. The weapon’s safety mechanism didn’t
-always work and if the butt was slammed down on the
-deck, the hammer would set back against the mainspring
-and then fly forward, firing a chambered cartridge. The
-design allowed the entry of dirt into the mechanism and
-close tolerances caused it to jam. Finally, the steel used allowed
-excessive rust to form in the tropical humidity of the
-Solomons. Nevertheless, at six pounds, the Reising was
-handier than the 10-pound Thompson, more accurate,
-pleasanter to shoot, and reliable under other than combat
-conditions, but one always had to keep the muzzle pointed
-in a safe direction. The Model 50 was also issued to Marines
-for guard duty at posts and stations in the United
-States.&mdash;<i>John G. Griffiths</i></p>
-</div>
-
-<hr />
-<div class="chapter"></div>
-<h2><a name="November_and_the_Continuing_Buildup" id="November_and_the_Continuing_Buildup"></a><i>November and the Continuing Buildup</i></h2>
-
-<p>While the soldiers and Marines
-were battling the Japanese ashore, a
-patrol plane sighted a large Japanese
-fleet near the Santa Cruz Islands to
-the east of the Solomons. The enemy
-force was formidable, 4 carriers
-and 4 battleships, 8 cruisers and 28
-destroyers, all poised for a victorious
-attack when Maruyama’s capture of
-Henderson Field was signalled. Admiral
-Halsey’s reaction to the inviting
-targets was characteristic, he
-signaled Rear Admiral Thomas C.
-Kinkaid, with the <i>Hornet</i> and <i>Enterprise</i>
-carrier groups located north of
-the New Hebrides: “Attack Repeat
-Attack.”</p>
-
-<div id="ip_39" class="figcenter" style="width: 551px;">
-  <div class="captionl top"><p class="justify"><i>Heavy tropical downpours at Guadalcanal all but flood out
-a Marine camp near Henderson Field, and the field as well.
-Marines’ damp clothing and bedding contributed to the heavy
-incidence of tormenting skin infections and fungal disorders.</i></p></div>
-
-<div class="captionr top"><p>
-Department of Defense (USMC) Photo
-</p></div>
-  <img src="images/i_b_039.jpg" width="551" height="324" alt="" />
-</div>
-
-<p>Early on 26 October, American
-SBDs located the Japanese carriers at
-about the same time Japanese scout
-planes spotted the American carriers.
-The Japanese <i>Zuiho</i>’s flight deck was
-holed by the scout bombers, cancelling
-flight operations, but the other
-three enemy carriers launched strikes.
-The two air armadas tangled as each
-strove to reach the other’s carriers.
-The <i>Hornet</i> was hit repeatedly by
-bombs and torpedoes; two Japanese
-pilots also crashed their planes on
-board. The damage to the ship was
-so extensive, the <i>Hornet</i> was abandoned
-and sunk. The <i>Enterprise</i>, the
-battleship <i>South Dakota</i>, the light
-cruiser <i>San Juan</i> (CL 54), and the
-destroyer <i>Smith</i> (DD 378) were also
-hit; the destroyer <i>Porter</i> (DD 356)
-was sunk. On the Japanese side, no
-ships were sunk, but three carriers
-and two destroyers were damaged.
-One hundred Japanese planes were
-lost; 74 U.S. planes went down.
-Taken together, the results of the Battle
-of Santa Cruz were a standoff.
-The Japanese naval leaders might
-have continued their attacks, but instead,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_40" id="Page_40">40</a></span>
-disheartened by the defeat of
-their ground forces on Guadalcanal,
-withdrew to attack another day.</p>
-
-<div id="ip_40" class="figleft" style="width: 362px;">
-  <img src="images/i_b_040.jpg" width="362" height="503" alt="" />
-  <div class="captionr">
-
-<p>Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 74093</p></div>
-
-<div class="captionl">
-<p class="justify"><i>Marine engineers repair a flood-damaged Lunga River bridge washed out during
-a period when 8 inches of rain fell in 24 hours and the river rose 7 feet above normal.</i></p></div></div>
-
-<p>The departure of the enemy naval
-force marked a period in which substantial
-reinforcements reached the
-island. The headquarters of the 2d
-Marines had finally found transport
-space to come up from Espiritu Santo
-and on 29 and 30 October, Colonel
-Arthur moved his regiment from
-Tulagi to Guadalcanal, exchanging
-his 1st and 2d Battalions for the well-blooded
-3d, which took up the Tulagi
-duties. The 2d Marines’ battalions at
-Tulagi had performed the very necessary
-task of scouting and securing all
-the small islands of the Florida group
-while they had camped, frustrated,
-watching the battles across Sealark
-Channel. The men now would no
-longer be spectators at the big show.</p>
-
-<p>On 2 November, planes from
-VMSB-132 and VMF-211 flew into
-the Cactus fields from New Caledonia.
-MAG-11 squadrons moved forward
-from New Caledonia to
-Espiritu Santo to be closer to the battle
-scene; the flight echelons now
-could operate forward to Guadalcanal
-and with relative ease. On the
-ground side, two batteries of 155mm
-guns, one Army and one Marine,
-landed on 2 November, providing
-Vandegrift with his first artillery
-units capable of matching the enemy’s
-long-range 150mm guns. On the
-4th and 5th, the 8th Marines
-(Colonel Richard H. Jeschke) arrived
-from American Samoa. The full-strength
-regiment, reinforced by the
-75mm howitzers of the 1st Battalion,
-10th Marines, added another 4,000
-men to the defending forces. All the
-fresh troops reflected a renewed emphasis
-at all levels of command on
-making sure Guadalcanal would be
-held. The reinforcement-replacement
-pipeline was being filled. In the offing
-as part of the Guadalcanal
-defending force were the rest of the
-Americal Division, the remainder of
-the 2d Marine Division, and the Army’s
-25th Infantry Division, then in
-Hawaii. More planes of every type
-and from Allied as well as American
-sources were slated to reinforce and
-replace the battered and battle-weary
-Cactus veterans.</p>
-
-<p>The impetus for the heightened
-pace of reinforcement had been
-provided by President Roosevelt.
-Cutting through the myriad demands
-for American forces worldwide, he
-had told each of the Joint Chiefs on
-24 October that Guadalcanal must be
-reinforced, and without delay.</p>
-
-<p>On the island, the pace of operations
-did not slacken after the
-Maruyama offensive was beaten
-back. General Vandegrift wanted to
-clear the area immediately west of
-the Matanikau of all Japanese troops,
-forestalling, if he could, another
-buildup of attacking forces. Admiral
-Tanaka’s Tokyo Express was still
-operating and despite punishing attacks
-by Cactus aircraft and new and
-deadly opponents, American motor
-torpedo boats, now based at Tulagi.</p>
-
-<p>On 1 November, the 5th Marines,
-backed up by the newly arrived 2d
-Marines, attacked across bridges engineers
-had laid over the Matanikau<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_41" id="Page_41">41</a></span>
-during the previous night. Inland,
-Colonel Whaling led his scout-snipers
-and the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, in
-a screening movement to protect the
-flank of the main attack. Opposition
-was fierce in the shore area where the
-1st Battalion, 5th, drove forward
-toward Point Cruz, but inland the 2d
-Battalion and Whaling’s group encountered
-slight opposition. By nightfall,
-when the Marines dug in, it was
-clear that the only sizable enemy
-force was in the Point Cruz area. In
-the days bitter fighting, Corporal
-Anthony Casamento, a badly
-wounded machine gun squad leader
-in Edson’s 1st Battalion, had so distinguished
-himself that he was
-recommended for a Navy Cross;
-many years later, in August 1980,
-President Jimmy Carter approved the
-award of the Medal of Honor in its
-stead.</p>
-
-<div id="ip_41" class="figcenter" style="width: 362px;">
-  <img src="images/i_b_041.jpg" width="362" height="184" alt="" />
-  <div class="captionr">
-
-<p>
-Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 56749
-</p></div>
-
-<div class="captionl">
-<p class="justify"><i>2dLt Mitchell Paige, third from left, and PltSgt John Basilone, extreme right, received
-the Medal of Honor at a parade at Camp Balcombe, Australia, on 21 May 1943.
-MajGen Vandegrift, left, received his medal in a White House ceremony the previous
-5 February, while Col Merritt A. Edson was decorated 31 December 1943. Note
-the 1st Marine Division patches on the right shoulders of each participant.</i></p></div></div>
-
-<p>On the 2d, the attack continued
-with the reserve 3d Battalion moving
-into the fight and all three 5th
-Marines units moving to surround
-the enemy defenders. On 3 November,
-the Japanese pocket just west of
-the base at Point Cruz was eliminated;
-well over 300 enemy had been
-killed. Elsewhere, the attacking Marines
-had encountered spotty
-resistance and advanced slowly
-across difficult terrain to a point
-about 1,000 yards beyond the 5th
-Marines’ action. There, just as the
-offensive’s objectives seemed well in
-hand, the advance was halted. Again,
-the intelligence that a massive enemy
-reinforcement attempt was pending
-forced Vandegrift to pull back
-most of his men to safeguard the all-important
-airfield perimeter. This
-time, however, he left a regiment to
-outpost the ground that had been
-gained, Colonel Arthur’s 2d Marines,
-reinforced by the Army’s 1st Battalion,
-164th Infantry.</p>
-
-<p>Emphasizing the need for caution
-in Vandegrift’s mind was the fact that
-the Japanese were again discovered
-in strength east of the perimeter. On
-3 November, Lieutenant Colonel
-Hanneken’s 2d Battalion, 7th Marines,
-on a reconnaissance in force
-towards Koli Point, could see the
-Japanese ships clustered near Tetere,
-eight miles from the perimeter. His
-Marines encountered strong Japanese
-resistance from obviously fresh<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_42" id="Page_42">42</a></span>
-troops and he began to pull back. A
-regiment of the enemy’s <i>38th Division</i>
-had landed, as Hyakutake experimented
-with a Japanese
-Navy-promoted scheme of attacking
-the perimeter from both flanks.</p>
-
-<div id="ip_42" class="figcenter" style="width: 372px;">
-  <img src="images/i_b_042.jpg" width="372" height="225" alt="" />
-  <div class="captionr">
-
-<p>
-Marine Corps Historical Photo Collection
-</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="captionl">
-<p class="justify"><i>In a White House ceremony, former Cpl Anthony Casamento, a machine gun squad
-leader in the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, was decorated by President Jimmy Carter
-on 22 August 1980, 38 years after the battle for Guadalcanal. Looking on are
-Casarnento’s wife and daughters and Gen Robert H. Barrow, Marine Commandant.</i></p></div></div>
-
-<div id="ip_42b" class="figright" style="width: 170px;">
-  <div class="captionl top"><p class="justify"><i>Sgt Clyde Thomason, who was killed in
-action participating in the Makin Island
-raid with the 2d Raider Battalion, was
-the first enlisted Marine in World War
-II to be awarded the Medal of Honor.</i></p></div>
-
-<div class="captionr top"><p>
-Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 310616
-</p></div>
-  <img src="images/i_b_042b.jpg" width="170" height="344" alt="" />
-</div>
-
-<p>As Hanneken’s battalion executed
-a fighting withdrawal along the
-beach, it began to receive fire from
-the jungle inland, too. A rescue force
-was soon put together under General
-Rupertus: two tank companies, the
-1st Battalion, 7th Marines, and the
-2d and 3d Battalions of the 164th.
-The Japanese troops, members of the
-<i>38th Division</i> regiment and remnants
-of Kawaguchi’s brigade, fought
-doggedly to hold their ground as the
-Marines drove forward along the
-coast and the soldiers attempted to
-outflank the enemy in the jungle. The
-running battle continued for days,
-supported by Cactus air, naval gunfire,
-and the newly landed 155mm
-guns.</p>
-
-<p>The enemy commander received
-new orders as he was struggling to
-hold off the Americans. He was to
-break off the action, move inland,
-and march to rejoin the main
-Japanese forces west of the perimeter,
-a tall order to fulfill. The two-pronged
-attack scheme had been
-abandoned. The Japanese managed
-the first part; on the 11th the enemy
-force found a gap in the 164th’s line
-and broke through along a meandering
-jungle stream. Behind they left
-450 dead over the course of a seven-day
-battle; the Marines and soldiers
-had lost 40 dead and 120 wounded.</p>
-
-<p>Essentially, the Japanese who
-broke out of the encircling Americans
-escaped from the frying pan
-only to fall into the fire. Admiral
-Turner finally had been able to effect
-one of his several schemes for alternative
-landings and beachheads, all
-of which General Vandegrift vehemently
-opposed. At Aola Bay, 40
-miles east of the main perimeter, the
-Navy put an airfield construction
-and defense force ashore on 4
-November. Then, while the Japanese
-were still battling the Marines near
-Tetere, Vandegrift was able to persuade
-Turner to detach part of this
-landing force, the 2d Raider Battalion,
-to sweep west, to discover and
-destroy any enemy forces it encountered.</p>
-
-<p>Lieutenant Colonel Evans F. Carlson’s
-raider battalion already had
-seen action before it reached Guadalcanal.
-Two companies had reinforced
-the defenders of Midway Island
-when the Japanese attacked there in
-June. The rest of the battalion had
-landed from submarines on Makin
-Island in the Gilberts on 17&ndash;18 August,
-destroying the garrison there.
-For his part in the fighting on Makin,
-Sergeant Clyde Thomason had been
-awarded a Medal of Honor posthumously,
-the first Marine enlisted man
-to receive his country’s highest award
-in World War II.</p>
-
-<p>In its march from Aola Bay, the 2d
-Raider Battalion encountered the
-Japanese who were attempting to
-retreat to the west. On 12 November,
-the raiders beat off attacks by two
-enemy companies and then relentlessly
-pursued the Japanese, fighting
-a series of small actions over the next
-five days before they contacted the
-main Japanese body. From 17
-November to 4 December, when the
-raiders finally came down out of the
-jungled ridges into the perimeter,
-Carlson’s men harried the retreating<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_43" id="Page_43">43</a></span>
-enemy. They killed nearly 500
-Japanese. Their own losses were 16
-killed and 18 wounded.</p>
-
-<p>The Aola Bay venture, which had
-provided the 2d Raider Battalion a
-starting point for its month-long jungle
-campaign, proved a bust. The site
-chosen for a new airfield was unsuitable,
-too wet and unstable, and
-the whole force moved to Koli Point
-in early December, where another
-airfield eventually was constructed.</p>
-
-<p>The buildup on Guadalcanal continued,
-by both sides. On 11 November,
-guarded by a cruiser-destroyer
-covering force, a convoy ran in carrying
-the 182d Infantry, another regiment
-of the Americal Division. The
-ships were pounded by enemy bombers
-and three transports were hit,
-but the men landed. General Vandegrift
-needed the new men badly.
-His veterans were truly ready for
-replacement; more than a thousand
-new cases of malaria and related diseases
-were reported each week. The
-Japanese who had been on the island
-any length of time were no better off;
-they were, in fact, in worse shape.
-Medical supplies and rations were in
-short supply. The whole thrust of the
-Japanese reinforcement effort continued
-to be to get troops and combat
-equipment ashore. The idea
-prevailed in Tokyo, despite all evidence
-to the contrary, that one overwhelming
-coordinated assault would
-crush the American resistance. The
-enemy drive to take Port Moresby on
-New Guinea was put on hold to concentrate
-all efforts on driving the
-Americans off of Guadalcanal.</p>
-
-<div id="ip_43" class="figcenter" style="width: 551px;">
-  <img src="images/i_b_043.jpg" width="551" height="339" alt="" />
-  <div class="captionr">
-
-<p>Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 51728</p></div>
-
-<div class="captionl">
-<p class="justify"><i>Native guides lead 2d Raider Battalion Marines on a combat/reconnaissance
-patrol behind Japanese lines. The patrol
-lasted for less than a month, during which the Marines covered
-150 miles and fought more than a dozen actions.</i></p></div></div>
-
-<p>On 12 November, a multifaceted
-Japanese naval force converged on
-Guadalcanal to cover the landing of
-the main body of the <i>38th Division</i>.
-Rear Admiral Daniel J. Callaghan’s
-cruisers and destroyers, the close-in
-protection for the 182d’s transports,
-moved to stop the enemy. Coastwatcher
-and scout plane sightings
-and radio traffic intercepts had identified
-two battleships, two carriers,
-four cruisers, and a host of destroyers
-all headed toward Guadalcanal.
-A bombardment group led by the
-battleships <i>Hiei</i> and <i>Kirishima</i>, with
-the light cruiser <i>Nagura</i>, and 15 destroyers
-spearheaded the attack.
-Shortly after midnight, near Savo Island,
-Callaghan’s cruisers picked up
-the Japanese on radar and continued
-to close. The battle was joined at
-such short range that each side fired
-at times on their own ships. Callaghan’s
-flagship, the <i>San Francisco</i>,
-was hit 15 times, Callaghan was
-killed, and the ship had to limp away.
-The cruiser <i>Atlanta</i> (CL 104) was
-also hit and set afire. Rear Admiral
-Norman Scott, who was on board,
-was killed. Despite the hammering
-by Japanese fire, the Americans held
-and continued fighting. The battleship
-<i>Hiei</i>, hit by more than 80 shells,
-retired and with it went the rest of
-the bombardment force. Three destroyers
-were sunk and four others
-damaged.</p>
-
-<div id="ip_43b" class="figcenter" style="width: 550px;">
-  <img src="images/i_b_044.jpg" width="550" height="276" alt="" />
-  <div class="captionr">
-
-<p>Department of Defense (Navy) Photos 80-G-20824 and 80-G-21099</p></div>
-
-<div class="captionl">
-<p class="justify"><i>In the great naval Battle of Guadalcanal, 12&ndash;15 November,
-RAdm Daniel J. Callaghan was killed when his flagship, the
-heavy cruiser</i> San Francisco <i>(CA 38) took 15 major hits and
-was forced to limp away in the dark from the scene of action.</i></p></div></div>
-
-<p>The Americans had accomplished
-their purpose; they had forced the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_44" id="Page_44">44</a></span>
-Japanese to turn back. The cost was
-high. Two antiaircraft cruisers, the
-<i>Atlanta</i> and the <i>Juneau</i> (CL 52), were
-sunk; four destroyers, the <i>Barton</i>
-(DD 599), <i>Cushing</i> (DD 376), <i>Monssen</i>
-(DD 436), and <i>Laffey</i> (DD 459),
-also went to the bottom. In addition
-to the <i>San Francisco</i>, the heavy cruiser
-<i>Portland</i> (CA 33) and the destroyers
-<i>Sterret</i> (DD 407) and <i>Aaron
-Ward</i> (DD 483) were damaged. Only
-one destroyer of the 13 American
-ships engaged, the <i>Fletcher</i> (DD 445),
-was unscathed when the survivors retired
-to the New Hebrides.</p>
-
-<p>With daylight came the Cactus
-bombers and fighters; they found the
-crippled <i>Hiei</i> and pounded it mercilessly.
-On the 14th the Japanese were
-forced to scuttle it. Admiral Halsey
-ordered his only surviving carrier,
-the <i>Enterprise</i>, out of the Guadalcanal
-area to get it out of reach of
-Japanese aircraft and sent his battleships
-<i>Washington</i> (BB 56) and <i>South
-Dakota</i> (BB 55) with four escorting
-destroyers north to meet the
-Japanese. Some of the <i>Enterprise</i>’s
-planes flew in to Henderson Field to
-help even the odds.</p>
-
-<p>On 14 November Cactus and <i>Enterprise</i>
-flyers found a Japanese
-cruiser-destroyer force that had
-pounded the island on the night of
-13 November. They damaged four
-cruisers and a destroyer. After refueling
-and rearming they went after the
-approaching Japanese troop convoy.
-They hit several transports in one attack
-and sank one when they came
-back again. Army B-17s up from Espiritu
-Santo scored one hit and several
-near misses, bombing from 17,000
-feet.</p>
-
-<p>Moving in a continuous pattern of
-attack, return, refuel, rearm, and attack
-again, the planes from Guadalcanal
-hit nine transports, sinking
-seven. Many of the 5,000 troops on
-the stricken ships were rescued by
-Tanaka’s destroyers, which were firing
-furiously and laying smoke
-screens in an attempt to protect the
-transports. The admiral later recalled
-that day as indelible in his mind,
-with memories of “bombs wobbling
-down from high-flying B-17s; of carrier
-bombers roaring towards targets
-as though to plunge full into the
-water, releasing bombs and pulling
-out barely in time, each miss sending
-up towering clouds of mist and
-spray, every hit raising clouds of
-smoke and fire.” Despite the intensive
-aerial attack, Tanaka continued on
-to Guadalcanal with four destroyers
-and four transports.</p>
-
-<p>Japanese intelligence had picked up
-the approaching American battleship
-force and warned Tanaka of its advent.
-In turn, the enemy admirals
-sent their own battleship-cruiser
-force to intercept. The Americans, led
-by Rear Admiral Willis A. Lee in the
-<i>Washington</i>, reached Sealark Channel
-about 2100 on the 14th. An hour
-later, a Japanese cruiser was picked
-up north of Savo. Battleship fire soon
-turned it away. The Japanese now
-learned that their opponents would
-not be the cruisers they expected.</p>
-
-<p>The resulting clash, fought in the
-glare of gunfire and Japanese searchlights,
-was perhaps the most significant
-fought at sea for Guadalcanal.
-When the melee was over, the American
-battleships’ 16-inch guns had
-more than matched the Japanese.
-Both the <i>South Dakota</i> and the
-<i>Washington</i> were damaged badly<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_45" id="Page_45">45</a></span>
-enough to force their retirement, but
-the <i>Kirishima</i> was punished to its
-abandonment and death. One
-Japanese and three American destroyers,
-the <i>Benham</i> (DD 796), the
-<i>Walke</i> (DD 416), and the <i>Preston</i>
-(DD 379), were sunk. When the
-Japanese attack force retired, Admiral
-Tanaka ran his four transports
-onto the beach, knowing they would
-be sitting targets at daylight. Most of
-the men on board, however, did
-manage to get ashore before the inevitable
-pounding by American
-planes, warships, and artillery.</p>
-
-<p>Ten thousand troops of the <i>38th
-Division</i> had landed, but the
-Japanese were in no shape to ever
-again attempt a massive reinforcement.
-The horrific losses in the frequent
-naval clashes, which seemed at<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_46" id="Page_46">46</a></span>
-times to favor the Japanese, did not
-really represent a standoff. Every
-American ship lost or damaged could
-and would be replaced; every
-Japanese ship lost meant a steadily
-diminishing fleet. In the air, the losses
-on both sides were daunting, but the
-enemy naval air arm would never
-recover from its losses of experienced
-carrier pilots. Two years later, the
-Battle of the Philippine Sea between
-American and Japanese carriers
-would aptly be called the “Marianas
-Turkey Shoot” because of the ineptitude
-of the Japanese trainee pilots.</p>
-
-<div id="ip_46" class="figcenter" style="width: 550px;">
-  <img src="images/i_b_046.jpg" width="550" height="273" alt="" />
-  <div class="captionr">
-
-<p>Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 53510</p></div>
-
-<div class="captionl">
-<p class="justify"><i>A Japanese troop transport and her landing craft were badly
-damaged by the numerous Marine air attacks and were forced
-to run aground on Kokumbona beach after the naval Battle
-of Guadalcanal. Many enemy troops were killed in the attacks.</i></p></div></div>
-
-<p>The enemy troops who had been
-fortunate enough to reach land were
-not immediately ready to assault the
-American positions. The <i>38th Division</i>
-and the remnants of the various
-Japanese units that had previously
-tried to penetrate the Marine lines
-needed to be shaped into a coherent
-attack force before General
-Hyakutake could again attempt to
-take Henderson Field.</p>
-
-<p>General Vandegrift now had
-enough fresh units to begin to replace
-his veteran troops along the front
-lines. The decision to replace the 1st
-Marine Division with the Army’s
-25th Infantry Division had been
-made. Admiral Turner had told Vandegrift
-to leave all of his heavy equipment
-on the island when he did pull
-out “in hopes of getting your units re-equipped
-when you come out.” He
-also told the Marine general that the
-Army would command the final
-phases of the Guadalcanal operation
-since it would provide the majority
-of the combat forces once the 1st Division
-departed. Major General Alexander
-M. Patch, commander of the
-Americal Division, would relieve
-Vandegrift as senior American officer
-ashore. His air support would continue
-to be Marine-dominated as
-General Geiger, now located on Espiritu
-Santo with 1st Wing headquarters,
-fed his squadrons forward
-to maintain the offensive. And the air
-command on Guadalcanal itself
-would continue to be a mixed bag of
-Army, Navy, Marine, and Allied
-squadrons.</p>
-
-<p>The sick list of the 1st Marine Division
-in November included more
-than 3,200 men with malaria. The
-men of the 1st still manning the
-frontline foxholes and the rear
-areas&mdash;if anyplace within Guadalcanal’s
-perimeter could properly be
-called a rear area&mdash;were plain worn
-out. They had done their part and
-they knew it.</p>
-
-<p>On 29 November, General Vandegrift
-was handed a message from
-the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The crux of
-it read: “1st MarDiv is to be relieved
-without delay ... and will proceed
-to Australia for rehabilitation and
-employment.” The word soon spread
-that the 1st was leaving and where
-it was going. Australia was not yet
-the cherished place it would become
-in the division’s future, but <i>any</i> place
-was preferable to Guadalcanal.</p>
-
-
-<div class="chapter"></div>
-<div class="sidebar green">
-<p class="in0 small"><a name="Sidebar_page_41_75mm_Pack_Howitzer_Workhorse_of_the_Artillery" id="Sidebar_page_41_75mm_Pack_Howitzer_Workhorse_of_the_Artillery"></a>[Sidebar (<a href="#Page_41">page 41</a>):]</p>
-<h3 class="nobreak p0">75mm Pack Howitzer&mdash;Workhorse of the Artillery</h3>
-
-<div class="figright" style="width: 255px;">
-  <img src="images/i_b_041b.jpg" width="255" height="212" alt="" /></div>
-
-<p class="drop-cap b"><span class="smcap1">During</span> the summer of 1930, the Marine Corps began
-replacing its old French 75mm guns (Model
-1897) with the 75mm Pack Howitzer Model
-1923-E2. This weapon was designed for use in the Army
-primarily as mountain artillery. Since it could be broken
-down and manhandled ashore in six loads from ships’
-boats, the pack howitzer was an important supporting
-weapon of the Marine Corps landing forces in prewar landing
-exercises.</p>
-
-<p>The 75mm pack howitzer saw extensive service with the
-Marine Corps throughout World War II in almost every
-major landing in the Pacific. Crewed by five Marines, the
-howitzer could hurl a 16-pound shell nearly 10,000 yards.
-In the D Series table of organization with which the 1st
-Marine Division went to war, and through the following
-E and F series, there were three pack howitzer battalions
-for each artillery regiment.&mdash;<i>Anthony Wayne Tommell and
-Kenneth L. Smith-Christmas</i></p>
-</div>
-
-
-<div class="chapter"></div>
-<div class="sidebar">
-<p class="in0 small"><a name="Sidebar_page_45_The_Japanese_Model_89_1929_50mm_Heavy_Grenade_Discharger" id="Sidebar_page_45_The_Japanese_Model_89_1929_50mm_Heavy_Grenade_Discharger"></a>[Sidebar (<a href="#Page_45">page 45</a>):]</p>
-<h3 class="nobreak p0">The Japanese Model 89 (1929) 50mm Heavy Grenade Discharger</h3>
-
-<div class="figright" style="width: 252px;">
-  <img src="images/i_b_045.jpg" width="252" height="370" alt="" /></div>
-
-<p class="drop-cap b"><span class="smcap1">Born</span> out of the need to bridge the gap in range between
-hand grenades and mortars, the grenade discharger
-evolved in the Imperial Japanese Army from
-a special purpose weapon of infantry assault and defense
-to an essential item of standard equipment with all Japanese
-ground forces.</p>
-
-<p>Commonly called <i>Juteki</i> by the Japanese, this weapon
-officially was designated <i>Hachikyu Shiki Jutekidarto</i>, or
-1189 Model Heavy Grenade Discharger, the term “heavy”
-being justified by the powerful 1-pound, 12-ounce high explosive
-shell it was designed to fire, although it also fired
-the standard Model 91 fragmentation grenade.</p>
-
-<p>To the American Marines and soldiers who first encountered
-this weapon and others of its kind in combat they
-were known as “knee mortars,” likely so named because they
-generally were fired from a kneeling position. Typically,
-the discharger’s concave baseplate was pressed firmly into
-the surface of the ground by the firer’s foot to support the
-heavy recoil of the fired shell, but unfortunately the term
-“knee mortar” suggested to some untutored captors of these
-weapons that they were to be fired with the baseplate resting
-against the knee or thigh. When a Marine fired one
-of these dischargers from his thigh and broke his upper leg
-bone, efforts were swiftly undertaken in the field to educate
-all combat troops in the safe and proper handling of
-these very useful weapons.</p>
-
-<p>The Model 89 (1929) 50mm Heavy Grenade Discharger
-is a muzzle-loaded, high-angle-of-fire weapon which weighs
-10-1/4 pounds and is 24 inches in overall length. Its design
-is compact and simple. The discharger has three major components:
-the rifled barrel, the supporting barrel pedestal
-with firing mechanism, and the base plate. Operation of
-the Model 89 was easy and straightforward, and with practice
-its user could deliver accurate fire registered quickly
-on target.</p>
-
-<p>Encountered in all major battles in the Pacific War, the
-Model 89 Grenade Discharger was an uncomplicated, very
-portable, and highly efficient weapon operated easily by
-one man. It was carried in a cloth or leather case with a
-sling, and its one-piece construction allowed it to be
-brought into action very quickly. This grenade discharger
-had the advantage over most mortars in that it could be
-aimed and fired mechanically after a projectile had been
-placed in the barrel, projectile firing not being dependent
-upon dropping down the barrel against a stationary firing
-pin as with most mortars, where barrel fouling sometimes
-caused dangerous hangfires. Although an instantaneous
-fuze employed on the Model 89 high explosive shell restricted
-this shell’s use to open areas, the Model 91 fragmentation
-grenade with its seven-second fuze made this discharger
-effective in a jungle or forest setting, with complete
-safety for the user from premature detonation of projectiles
-by overhanging foliage. Smoke and signal shells, and
-an incendiary grenade, were special types of ammunition
-used with this versatile and effective weapon which won
-the respect of all who came to know it.&mdash;<i>Edwin F. Libby</i></p>
-</div>
-
-<hr />
-<div class="chapter"></div>
-<h2><a name="December_and_the_Final_Stages" id="December_and_the_Final_Stages"></a><i>December and the Final Stages</i></h2>
-
-<p>On 7 December, one year after the
-Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor,
-General Vandegrift sent a message to
-all men under his command in the
-Guadalcanal area thanking them for
-their courage and steadfastness, commending
-particularly the pilots and
-“all who labored and sweated within
-the lines in all manner of prodigious
-and vital tasks.” He reminded them
-all that their “unbelievable achievements
-had made ‘Guadalcanal’ a synonym
-for death and disaster in the
-language of our enemy.” On 9 December,
-he handed over his command to
-General Patch and flew out to Australia<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_47" id="Page_47">47</a></span>
-at the same time the first elements
-of the 5th Marines were
-boarding ship. The 1st, 11th, and 7th
-Marines would soon follow together
-with all the division’s supporting
-units. The men who were leaving
-were thin, tired, hollow-eyed, and
-apathetic; they were young men who
-had grown old in four months time.
-They left behind 681 dead in the island’s
-cemetery.</p>
-
-<div id="ip_47" class="figleft" style="width: 177px;">
-  <div class="captionl top"><p class="justify"><i>As he tells it, “Too Many, Too Close, Too
-Long,” is Donald L. Dickson’s portrait of
-one of the “little guys, just plain worn
-out. His stamina and his spirit stretched
-beyond human endurance. He has had
-no real sleep for a long time....
-And he probably hasn’t stopped ducking
-and fighting long enough to discover
-that he has malaria. He is going to discover
-it now, however. He is through.”</i></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="captionr top">
-<p>
-Captain Donald L. Dickson, USMCR
-</p></div>
-  <img src="images/i_b_047b.jpg" width="177" height="383" alt="" />
-</div>
-
-<div id="ip_47b" class="figright" style="width: 359px;">
-  <img src="images/i_b_047.jpg" width="359" height="364" alt="" />
-  <div class="captionr">
-
-<p>U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo SC164898</p></div>
-
-<div class="captionl">
-<p class="justify"><i>Americal Division commander, MajGen Alexander M. Patch, Jr., watches while
-his troops and supplies are staged on Guadalcanal’s beaches on 8 December, the
-day before he relieved Gen Vandegrift and his wornout 1st Marine Division.</i></p></div></div>
-
-<p>The final regiment of the Americal
-Division, the 132d Infantry, landed
-on 8 December as the 5th Marines
-was preparing to leave. The 2d Marine
-Division’s regiments already on
-the island, the 2d, 8th, and part of
-the 10th, knew that the 6th Marines
-was on its way to rejoin. It seemed
-to many of the men of the 2d Marines,
-who had landed on D-Day, 7
-August, that they, too, should be
-leaving. These took slim comfort in
-the thought that they, by all rights,
-should be the first of the 2d to depart
-the island whenever that hoped-for
-day came.</p>
-
-<p>General Patch received a steady
-stream of ground reinforcements and
-replacements in December. He was
-not ready yet to undertake a full-scale
-offensive until the 25th Division and
-the rest of the 2d Marine Division arrived,
-but he kept all frontline units
-active in combat and reconnaissance
-patrols, particularly toward the
-western flank.</p>
-
-<p>The island commander’s air
-defense capabilities also grew substantially.
-Cactus Air Force, organized
-into a fighter command and
-a strike (bomber) command, now
-operated from a newly redesignated
-Marine Corps Air Base. The Henderson
-Field complex included a new
-airstrip, Fighter Two, which replaced
-Fighter One, which had severe
-drainage problems. Brigadier General
-Louis Woods, who had taken over as
-senior aviator when Geiger returned
-to Espiritu Santo, was relieved on 26
-December by Brigadier General Francis
-P. Mulcahy, Commanding General,
-2d Marine Aircraft Wing. New
-fighter and bomber squadrons from
-both the 1st and 2d Wings sent their
-flight echelons forward on a regular
-basis. The Army added three fighter
-squadrons and a medium bomber
-squadron of B-26s. The Royal New
-Zealand Air Force flew in a reconnaissance
-squadron of Lockheed
-Hudsons. And the U.S. Navy sent
-forward a squadron of Consolidated<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_49" id="Page_49">49</a></span>
-PBY Catalina patrol planes which
-had a much needed night-flying capability.</p>
-
-<p>The aerial buildup forced the
-Japanese to curtail all air attacks and
-made daylight naval reinforcement
-attempts an event of the past. The
-nighttime visits of the Tokyo Express
-destroyers now brought only supplies
-encased in metal drums which were
-rolled over the ships’ sides in hope
-they would float into shore. The men
-ashore desperately needed everything
-that could be sent, even by this
-method, but most of the drums never
-reached the beaches.</p>
-
-<p>Still, however desperate the enemy
-situation was becoming, he was
-prepared to fight. General Hyakutake
-continued to plan the seizure of the
-airfield. General Hitoshi Immamura,
-commander of the <i>Eighth Area
-Army</i>, arrived in Rabaul on 2 December
-with orders to continue the
-offensive. He had 50,000 men to add
-to the embattled Japanese troops on
-Guadalcanal.</p>
-
-<p>Before these new enemy units
-could be employed, the Americans
-were prepared to move out from the
-perimeter in their own offensive.
-Conscious that the Mt. Austen area
-was a continuing threat to his inland
-flank in any drive to the west, Patch
-committed the Americal’s 132d Infantry
-to the task of clearing the mountain’s
-wooded slopes on 17
-December. The Army regiment succeeded
-in isolating the major
-Japanese force in the area by early
-January. The 1st Battalion, 2d Marines,
-took up hill positions to the
-southeast of the 132d to increase
-flank protection.</p>
-
-<p>By this time, the 25th Infantry Division
-(Major General J. Lawton Collins)
-had arrived and so had the 6th
-Marines (6 January) and the rest of
-the 2d Division’s headquarters and
-support troops. Brigadier General
-Alphonse De Carre, the Marine division’s
-assistant commander, took
-charge of all Marine ground forces
-on the island. The 2d Division’s commander,
-Major General John Marston,
-remained in New Zealand
-because he was senior to General
-Patch.</p>
-
-<p>With three divisions under his
-command, General Patch was designated
-Commanding General, XIV
-Corps, on 2 January. His corps headquarters
-numbered less than a score
-of officers and men, almost all taken
-from the Americal’s staff. Brigadier
-General Edmund B. Sebree, who had
-already led both Army and Marine
-units in attacks on the Japanese, took
-command of the Americal Division.
-On 10 January, Patch gave the signal
-to start the strongest American
-offensive yet in the Guadalcanal campaign.
-The mission of the troops was
-simple and to the point: “Attack and
-destroy the Japanese forces remaining
-on Guadalcanal.”</p>
-
-<p>The initial objective of the corps’
-attack was a line about 1,000 to 1,500
-yards west of jump-off positions.
-These ran inland from Point Cruz to
-the vicinity of Hill 66, about 3,000
-yards from the beach. In order to
-reach Hill 66, the 25th Infantry Division
-attacked first with the 35th
-and 27th Infantry driving west and
-southwest across a scrambled series
-of ridges. The going was rough and
-the dug-in enemy, elements of two
-regiments of the <i>38th Division</i>, gave
-way reluctantly and slowly. By the
-13th, however, the American soldiers,
-aided by Marines of the 1st
-Battalion, 2d Marines, had won
-through to positions on the southern
-flank of the 2d Marine Division.</p>
-
-<p>On 12 January, the Marines began
-their advance with the 8th Marines
-along the shore and 2d Marines inland.
-At the base of Point Cruz, in
-the 3d Battalion, 8th Marines’ sector,
-regimental weapons company halftracks
-ran over seven enemy machine
-gun nests. The attack was then held
-up by an extensive emplacement until
-the weapons company commander,
-Captain Henry P. “Jim” Crowe, took
-charge of a half-dozen Marine infantrymen
-taking cover from enemy fire
-with the classic remarks: “You’ll never
-get a Purple Heart hiding in a fox
-hole. Follow me!” The men did and
-they destroyed the emplacement.</p>
-
-<div id="ip_49" class="figcenter" style="width: 377px;">
-  <img src="images/i_b_049.jpg" width="377" height="198" alt="" />
-  <div class="captionl">U.S. Halftrack Mounting a 75mm Pack Howitzer
-and a .50-Caliber Air-Cooled Machine Gun</div></div>
-
-<p>All along the front of the advancing
-assault companies the going was
-rough. The Japanese, remnants of the
-<i>Sendai Division</i>, were dug into the
-sides of a series of cross compartments
-and their fire took the Marines
-in the flank as they advanced.
-Progress was slow despite massive artillery
-support and naval gunfire
-from four destroyers offshore. In two
-days of heavy fighting, flamethrowers
-were employed for the first time
-and tanks were brought into play.
-The 2d Marines was now relieved
-and the 6th Marines moved into the
-attack along the coast while the 8th<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_50" id="Page_50">50</a></span>
-Marines took up the advance inland.
-Naval gunfire support, spotted by
-naval officers ashore, improved
-measurably. On the 15th, the Americans,
-both Army and Marine,
-reached the initial corps objective. In
-the Marine attack zone, 600 Japanese
-were dead.</p>
-
-<div id="ip_50" class="figcenter" style="width: 756px;">
-  <img src="images/i_b_050.jpg" width="756" height="598" alt="" />
-  <div class="caption"><p>FINAL PHASE</p>
-
-<p class="smaller">26 JANUARY&ndash;9 FEBRUARY 1943</p></div></div>
-
-<p>The battle-weary 2d Marines had
-seen its last infantry action of
-Guadalcanal. A new unit now came
-into being, a composite Army-Marine
-division, or CAM division,
-formed from units of the Americal
-and 2d Marine Divisions. The directing
-staff was from the 2d Division,
-since the Americal had responsibility
-for the main perimeter. Two of its
-regiments, the 147th and the 182d Infantry,
-moved up to attack in line
-with the 6th Marines still along the
-coast. The 8th Marines was essentially
-pinched out of the front lines by
-a narrowing attack corridor as the inland
-mountains and hills pressed
-closer to the coastal trail. The 25th
-Division, which was advancing
-across this rugged terrain, had the
-mission of outflanking the Japanese
-in the vicinity of Kokumbona, while
-the CAM division drove west. On
-the 23d, as the CAM troops approached
-Kokumbona, the 1st Battalion
-of the 27th Infantry struck
-north out of the hills and overran the
-village site and Japanese base. There
-was only slight but steady opposition
-to the American advance as the enemy
-withdrew west toward Cape Esperance.</p>
-
-<p>The Japanese had decided, reluctantly,
-to give up the attempt to
-retake Guadalcanal. The orders were
-sent in the name of the Emperor and
-senior staff officers were sent to
-Guadalcanal to ensure their acceptance.
-The Navy would make the final
-runs of the Tokyo Express, only
-this time in reverse, to evacuate the
-garrison so it could fight again in
-later battles to hold the Solomons.</p>
-
-<p>Receiving intelligence that enemy
-ships were massing again to the
-northwest, General Patch took steps,
-as Vandegrift had before him on
-many occasions, to guard against
-overextending his forces in the face
-of what appeared to be another enemy
-attempt at reinforcement. He
-pulled the 25th Division back to bolster
-the main perimeter defenses and
-ordered the CAM division to continue
-its attack. When the Marines
-and soldiers moved out on 26 January,
-they had a surprisingly easy time
-of it, gaining 1,000 yards the first day<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_51" id="Page_51">51</a></span>
-and 2,000 the following day. The
-Japanese were still contesting every
-attack, but not in strength.</p>
-
-<p>By 30 January, the sole frontline
-unit in the American advance was the
-147th Infantry; the 6th Marines held
-positions to its left rear.</p>
-
-<p>The Japanese destroyer transports
-made their first run to the island on
-the night of 1&ndash;2 February, taking out
-2,300 men from evacuation positions
-near Cape Esperance. On the night
-of 4&ndash;5 February, they returned and
-took out most of the <i>Sendai</i> survivors
-and General Hyakutake and
-his <i>Seventeenth Army</i> staff. The final
-evacuation operation was carried
-out on the night of 7&ndash;8 February,
-when a 3,000-man rear guard was
-embarked. In all, the Japanese withdrew
-about 11,000 men in those three
-nights and evacuated about 13,000
-soldiers from Guadalcanal overall.
-The Americans would meet many of
-these men again in later battles, but
-not the 600 evacuees who died, too
-worn and sick to survive their rescue.</p>
-
-<p>On 9 February, American soldiers
-advancing from east and west met at
-Tenaro village on Cape Esperance.
-The only Marine ground unit still in
-action was the 3d Battalion, 10th
-Marines, supporting the advance.
-General Patch could happily report
-the “complete and total defeat of Japanese
-forces on Guadalcanal.” No organized
-Japanese units remained.</p>
-
-<p>On 31 January, the 2d Marines and
-the 1st Battalion, 8th Marines,
-boarded ship to leave Guadalcanal.
-As was true with the 1st Marine Division,
-some of these men were so
-debilitated by malaria they had to be
-carried on board. All of them struck
-observers again as young men grown
-old “with their skins cracked and furrowed
-and wrinkled.” On 9 February,
-the rest of the 8th Marines and a
-good part of the division supporting
-units boarded transports. The 6th
-Marines, thankfully only six weeks
-on the island, left on the 19th. All
-were headed for Wellington, New
-Zealand, the 2d Marines for the first
-time. Left behind on the island as a
-legacy of the 2d Marine Division
-were 263 dead.</p>
-
-<div id="ip_51" class="figcenter" style="width: 549px;">
-  <div class="captionl top"><p class="justify"><i>President Franklin D. Roosevelt presents Gen Vandegrift the
-Medal of Honor for his heroic accomplishments against the
-Japanese in the Solomons. Looking on are Mrs. Vandegrift,
-and the general’s son, Maj Alexander A. Vandegrift, Jr.</i></p></div>
-
-<div class="captionr top">
-<p>
-National Archives Photo 208-PU-209V-4
-</p></div>
-  <img src="images/i_b_051.jpg" width="549" height="410" alt="" />
-</div>
-
-<p>The total cost of the Guadalcanal
-campaign to the American ground
-combat forces was 1,598 officers and
-men killed, 1,152 of them Marines.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_52" id="Page_52">52</a></span>
-The wounded totaled 4,709, and
-2,799 of these were Marines. Marine
-aviation casualties were 147 killed
-and 127 wounded. The Japanese in
-their turn lost close to 25,000 men on
-Guadalcanal, about half of whom
-were killed in action. The rest succumbed
-to illness, wounds, and starvation.</p>
-
-<div id="ip_52" class="figcenter" style="width: 548px;">
-  <img src="images/i_b_052.jpg" width="548" height="356" alt="" />
-  <div class="captionl justify"><i>The temporary resting place of a Marine killed in the fighting
-at Lunga Point is shown here. The grave marker was erected
-by his friends. The Marine’s remains were later removed to
-the division cemetery on Guadalcanal, and further reburial
-at war’s end either in his hometown or the Punchbowl National
-Cemetery in Hawaii with the honors due a fallen hero.</i></div></div>
-
-<p>At sea, the comparative losses
-were about equal, with each side losing
-about the same number of fighting
-ships. The enemy loss of 2
-battleships, 3 carriers, 12 cruisers,
-and 25 destroyers, was irreplaceable.
-The Allied ship losses, though costly,
-were not fatal; in essence, all ships
-lost were replaced. In the air, at least
-600 Japanese planes were shot down;
-even more costly was the death of
-2,300 experienced pilots and aircrewmen.
-The Allied plane losses were
-less than half the enemy’s number
-and the pilot and aircrew losses substantially
-lower.</p>
-
-<p>President Roosevelt, reflecting the
-thanks of a grateful nation, awarded
-General Vandegrift the Medal of
-Honor for “outstanding and heroic
-accomplishment” in his leadership of
-American forces on Guadalcanal
-from 7 August to 9 December 1942.
-And for the same period, he awarded
-the Presidential Unit Citation to
-the 1st Marine Division (Reinforced)
-for “outstanding gallantry” reflecting
-“courage and determination ... of
-an inspiring order.” Included in the
-division’s citation and award, besides
-the organic units of the 1st Division,
-were the 2d and 8th Marines and attached
-units of the 2d Marine Division,
-all of the Americal Division, the
-1st Parachute and 1st and 2d Raider
-Battalions, elements of the 3d, 5th,
-and 14th Defense Battalions, the 1st
-Aviation Engineer Battalion, the 6th
-Naval Construction Battalion, and
-two motor torpedo boat squadrons.
-The indispensable Cactus Air Force
-was included, also represented by 7
-Marine headquarters and service
-squadrons, 16 Marine flying squadrons,
-16 Navy flying squadrons,
-and 5 Army flying squadrons.</p>
-
-<p>The victory at Guadalcanal
-marked a crucial turning point in the
-Pacific War. No longer were the
-Japanese on the offensive. Some of
-the Japanese Emperor’s best infantrymen,
-pilots, and seamen had been
-bested in close combat by the Americans
-and their Allies. There were
-years of fierce fighting ahead, but
-there was now no question of its
-outcome.</p>
-
-<p>When the veterans of the 1st Marine
-Division were gathered in thankful
-reunion 20 years later, they
-received a poignant message from
-Guadalcanal. The sender was a
-legend to all “Canal” Marines,
-Honorary U.S. Marine Corps Sergeant
-Major Jacob C. Vouza. The
-Solomons native in his halting English
-said: “Tell them I love them all.
-Me old man now, and me no look
-good no more. But me never forget.”</p>
-
-<div class="chapter"></div>
-<div class="sidebar green">
-<p class="in0 small"><a name="Sidebar_page_48_The_George_Medal" id="Sidebar_page_48_The_George_Medal"></a>[Sidebar (<a href="#Page_49">page 48</a>):]</p>
-<h3 class="nobreak p0">The ‘George’ Medal</h3>
-
-<p class="drop-cap"><span class="smcap1"><span class="dkgreen">T</span>he</span> George Medal is legendary among 1st Marine
-Division veterans of Guadalcanal. Only
-about 50 were cast, in Australia, before the mold
-gave out.</p>
-
-<p>The medal commemorates the difficult situation of the
-division during the early days on Guadalcanal, when ammunition,
-food, and heavy equipment were short and the
-Japanese plentiful. When the issue was no longer in doubt,
-Marines had time to reflect on the D-plus-3 Navy withdrawal
-in the face of increasing Japanese air attacks and
-surface action which left the division in such a tight spot.</p>
-
-<p>In the recollection of then-Captain Donald L. Dickson,
-adjutant of the 5th Marines, the Division G-3, then-Lieutenant
-Colonel Merrill B. Twining, resolved to commemorate
-the occasion. Twining told artist Dickson in
-general terms what he had in mind. Dickson went to work
-designing an appropriate medal using a fifty-cent piece to
-draw a circle on a captured Japanese blank military
-postcard.</p>
-
-<p>Dickson’s design was approved and when the division
-got to Australia a mold was made by a local metal craftsman
-and a small number were cast before the mold became
-unserviceable. Those wanting a medal paid one Australian
-pound for it and received a certificate as well. The medals
-are now an even greater rarity than at the time. In recent
-years, reproductions have been cast, and can be identified
-by the different metal and a poor definition of details.</p>
-
-<p>The obverse design shows a hand and sleeve dropping
-a hot potato in the shape of Guadalcanal into the arms of
-a grateful Marine. In the original design the sleeve bore the
-stripes of a vice admiral intended to be either Vice Admiral
-Robert L. Ghormley, ComSoPac, or Vice Admiral Frank
-Jack Fletcher, Commander Joint Expeditionary Force, but
-the final medal diplomatically omitted this identification.</p>
-
-<p>Also on the obverse is a Saguaro cactus, indigenous to
-Arizona, not Guadalcanal, but representing the code name
-for the island, “Cactus.” The obverse inscription is <i>Facia Georgius</i>,
-“Let George Do It.” Thus it became known as the
-George Medal.</p>
-
-<p>The medal’s reverse pictures a cow (the original design
-showed a Japanese soldier with breeches down) and an electric
-fan, and is inscribed: “In fond remembrance of the happy
-days spent from Aug. 7th 1942 to Jan. 5th 1943.
-U.S.M.C.”</p>
-
-<p>The suspension ribbon was made, appropriately, of the
-pale green herringbone twill from some Marine’s utility uniform.
-Legend has it that to be authentic the utilities from
-which the ribbons were made had to have been washed in
-the waters of Guadalcanal’s Lunga River. Some medals were
-provided with the oversized safety pin used to identify laundry
-bags in Navy shipboard laundries.</p>
-
-<p>Such unofficial commemorative mementoes are not uncommon
-in military circles and recall, among others, the
-Soochow Creek medals recognizing the defense of Shanghai’s
-International Settlement during the Japanese invasions
-of 1932 and 1937 which were inspired by the Military
-Order of the Dragon medals of veterans of the China Relief
-Expedition or Boxer Rebellion.&mdash;<i>Brooke Nihart</i></p>
-
-<div class="figcenter" style="width: 691px;">
-  <img src="images/i_b_048.jpg" width="691" height="406" alt="" /></div>
-</div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter"></div>
-<h2><a name="Sources" id="Sources"></a><i>Sources</i></h2>
-
-<p>The basic source work for this booklet is
-the first volume in the series <i>History of U.S.
-Marine Corps Operations in World War II,
-Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal</i>, written by
-LtCol Frank O. Hough, Maj Verle E. Ludwig,
-and Henry I. Shaw, Jr. (Washington: Historical
-Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, U.S.
-Marine Corps, 1958). Other books used in
-writing this narrative were: BGen Samuel B.
-Griffith II, <i>The Battle for Guadalcanal</i>
-(Philadelphia: J.&nbsp;B. Lippincott, 1963); Gen
-Alexander A. Vandegrift as told to Robert B.
-Asprey, <i>Once a Marine: The Memoirs of
-General A.&nbsp;A. Vandegrift, USMC</i> (New York:
-W.&nbsp;W. Norton, 1964); Col Mitchell Paige, <i>A
-Marine Named Mitch</i> (New York: Vantage
-Press, 1975); Burke Davis, <i>Marine: The Life
-of Chesty Puller</i> (Boston: Little, Brown,
-1962); George McMillan, <i>The Old Breed: A
-History of the 1st Marine Division in World
-War II</i> (Washington: Infantry Journal Press,
-1949); and Richard W. Johnston, <i>Follow Me!:
-The Story of the Second Marine Division in
-World War II</i> (New York: Random House,
-1948).</p>
-
-<p>The correspondence of General Vandegrift
-with General Holcomb and other senior Marines,
-held at the Marine Corps Historical
-Center, was helpful. Equally of value were
-conversations that the author had had with
-General Vandegrift after his retirement. In the
-course of his career as a Marine historian, the
-author has talked with other Guadalcanal
-veterans of all ranks; hopefully, this has
-resulted in a “feel” for the campaign, essential
-in writing such an overview.</p>
-
-<p>The literature on the Guadalcanal operation
-is extensive. In addition to the books cited
-above, there are several which are
-personally recommended to the interested
-reader: Robert Leckie, <i>Helmet for My Pillow</i>
-(New York: Random House, 1957); Herbert
-Merillat, <i>Guadalcanal Remembered</i> (New
-York: Dodd, Mead, 1982); John Miller, Jr.,
-<i>The United States Army in World War II: The
-War in the Pacific</i>; <i>Guadalcanal, The First
-Offensive</i> (Washington: Historical Division,
-Department of the Army, 1949); T. Grady
-Gallant, <i>On Valor’s Side</i> (New York: Doubleday,
-1963); Robert Sherrod, <i>History of Marine
-Corps Aviation in World War II</i>
-(Washington: Combat Forces Press, 1952);
-Maj John L. Zimmerman, <i>The Guadalcanal
-Campaign</i> (Washington: Historical Division,
-Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1949);
-RAdm Samuel E. Morrison, <i>The Struggle for
-Guadalcanal: History of United States Naval
-Operations in World War II</i>, Vol V (Boston:
-Little, Brown, 1950); and a recent, comprehensive
-account, Richard B. Frank, <i>Guadalcanal</i>
-(New York: Random House, 1990).</p>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter"></div>
-<h2><a name="About_the_Author" id="About_the_Author"></a><i>About the Author</i></h2>
-
-<div class="figleft" style="width: 137px; margin-top: -1em;">
-  <img src="images/i_b_053.jpg" width="137" height="186" alt="" /></div>
-
-<p class="drop-cap"><span class="smcap1">Henry</span> I. Shaw, Jr., former chief historian of
-the History and Museums Division, was a
-Marine Corps historian from 1951&ndash;1990. He attended
-The Citadel, 1943&ndash;1944, and was graduated
-with a bachelor of arts cum laude in history
-from Hope College, Holland, Michigan. He
-received a master of arts degree in history from
-Columbia University. Mr. Shaw served as a Marine
-in both World War II and the Korean War.
-He is the co-author of four of the five volumes
-of the official history of Marine Corps operations
-in World War II and was the senior editor of most
-of the official histories of Marines in Vietnam.
-In addition, he has written a number of brief Marine Corps histories. He has written
-many articles on military history and has had more than 50 signed book reviews.</p>
-
-<div class="tb">* <span class="in2">* </span><span class="in2">* </span><span class="in2">* </span><span class="in2">*</span></div>
-
-<p><i>The author gratefully acknowledges the permission granted by the Nautical and
-Aviation Publishing Company of America to use the maps from BGen Samuel B.
-Griffith II’s</i> The Battle for Guadalcanal <i>and by Doubleday Books and Jack Coggins
-for use of the sketches from his</i> The Campaign for Guadalcanal. <i>The author
-also wishes to thank Richard J. Frank and Herbert C. Merillat for permission to
-reproduce their photographs.</i></p>
-
-
-<div class="chapter"></div>
-<div class="sidebar" id="About_series">
-
-<div class="figcenter" style="width: 274px;">
-  <img src="images/i_b_053b.jpg" width="274" height="103" alt="" /></div>
-
-<p><b>THIS PAMPHLET HISTORY</b>, one in a series devoted to U.S. Marines in the
-World War II era, is published for the education and training of Marines by
-the History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps,
-Washington, D.C., as a part of the U.S. Department of Defense observance
-of the 50th anniversary of victory in that war.</p>
-
-<p>Editorial costs of preparing this pamphlet have been defrayed in part by
-a bequest from the estate of Emilie H. Watts, in memory of her late husband,
-Thomas M. Watts, who served as a Marine and was the recipient of a Purple
-Heart.</p>
-
-<div class="center">
-<p class="p1 bold" style="font-family: sans-serif, serif;">WORLD WAR II COMMEMORATIVE SERIES</p>
-
-<p><i>DIRECTOR OF MARINE CORPS HISTORY AND MUSEUMS</i><br />
-<b>Brigadier General Edwin H. Simmons, USMC (Ret)</b></p>
-
-<p><i>GENERAL EDITOR,<br />
-WORLD WAR II COMMEMORATIVE SERIES</i><br />
-<b>Benis M. Frank</b></p>
-
-<p><i>CARTOGRAPHIC CONSULTANT</i><br />
-<b>George C. MacGillivray</b></p>
-
-<p><i>EDITING AND DESIGN SECTION, HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISION</i><br />
-<b>Robert E. Struder</b>, Senior Editor; <b>W. Stephen Hill</b>, Visual Information<br />
-Specialist; <b>Catherine A. Kerns</b>, Composition Services Technician</p>
-
-<p>Marine Corps Historical Center<br />
-Building 58, Washington Navy Yard<br />
-Washington, D.C. 20374-0580</p>
-
-<p>1992</p>
-
-<p>PCN 190 003117 00</p>
-</div>
-</div>
-
-<div class="figcenter" style="width: 291px;">
-  <img src="images/i_back_cover.jpg" width="291" height="400" alt="back cover" /></div>
-
-
-<div class="chapter"></div>
-<div class="transnote">
-<h2 class="nobreak p1"><a name="Transcribers_Notes" id="Transcribers_Notes"></a>Transcriber’s Notes</h2>
-
-<p>Punctuation, hyphenation, and spelling were made consistent when a
-predominant preference was found in this book; otherwise they were not
-changed.</p>
-
-<p>Simple typographical errors were corrected; occasional unbalanced
-quotation marks retained.</p>
-
-<p>To make this eBook easier to read, particularly on handheld devices,
-some images have been made relatively larger than in the original
-pamphlet, and centered, rather than offset to one side or the other;
-and some were placed a little earlier or later than in the
-original. Sidebars in the original have been repositioned between
-chapters and identified as “[Sidebar (page nn):”, where the
-page reference is to the original location in the source book. In the
-Plain Text version, the matching closing right bracket follows the last
-line of the Sidebar’s text and is on a separate line to make it more
-noticeable. In the HTML versions, that bracket follows the colon, and
-each Sidebar is displayed within a box.</p>
-
-<p>Descriptions of the Cover and Frontispiece have been moved from page 1
-of the book to just below those illustrations, and text referring to
-the locations of those illustrations has been deleted.</p>
-
-<p>Page <a href="#Sidebar_page_3_General_Alexander_A_Vandegrift">3</a>: “He spent most of his final years” was misprinted without
-the “of”.</p>
-
-<p>Page <a href="#Page_21">21</a>: “disgraced in his own” was misprinted without the “his”.</p>
-</div>
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-<pre>
-
-
-
-
-
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+<div>*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 48807 ***</div>
+
+<div class="transnote">
+<p class="center">Transcriber’s note: Table of Contents added by Transcriber
+and placed into the Public Domain.</p>
+</div>
+
+<h2 class="nobreak">Contents</h2>
+
+<div class="center vspace"><div class="ilb">
+
+<ul>
+<li><a href="#First_Offensive_The_Marine">First Offensive: The Marine Campaign for Guadalcanal</a><br /></li>
+<li class="in2"><a href="#Sidebar_page_3_General_Alexander_A_Vandegrift">SIDEBAR: General Alexander A. Vandegrift</a><br /></li>
+<li><a href="#The_Landing_and_August_Battles">The Landing and August Battles</a><br /></li>
+<li class="in2"><a href="#Sidebar_page_5_First_Marine_Utility_Uniform_Issued_in_World_War_II">SIDEBAR: First Marine Utility Uniform Issued in World War II</a><br /></li>
+<li class="in2"><a href="#Sidebar_page_11_LVT_1_The_Amtrac">SIDEBAR: LVT (1)&mdash;The ‘Amtrac’</a><br /></li>
+<li class="in2"><a href="#Sidebar_page_14_General_Vandegrift_and_His_1st_Marine_Division_Staff">SIDEBAR: General Vandegrift and His 1st Marine Division Staff</a><br /></li>
+<li class="in2"><a href="#Sidebar_page_17_The_Coastwatchers">SIDEBAR: The Coastwatchers</a><br /></li>
+<li class="in2"><a href="#Sidebar_page_19_The_1st_Marine_Division_Patch">SIDEBAR: The 1st Marine Division Patch</a><br /></li>
+<li><a href="#September_and_the_Ridge">September and the Ridge</a><br /></li>
+<li class="in2"><a href="#Sidebar_page_22_Sergeant_Major_Sir_Jacob_Charles_Vouza">SIDEBAR: Sergeant Major Sir Jacob Charles Vouza</a><br /></li>
+<li class="in2"><a href="#Sidebar_page_23_M3A1_37mm_Antitank_Gun">SIDEBAR: M3A1 37mm Antitank Gun</a><br /></li>
+<li class="in2"><a href="#Sidebar_page_29">SIDEBAR: Douglas Albert Munro</a><br /></li>
+<li><a href="#October_and_the_Japanese_Offensive">October and the Japanese Offensive</a><br /></li>
+<li class="in2"><a href="#Sidebar_page_37_Reising_Gun">SIDEBAR: Reising Gun</a><br /></li>
+<li><a href="#November_and_the_Continuing_Buildup">November and the Continuing Buildup</a><br /></li>
+<li class="in2"><a href="#Sidebar_page_41_75mm_Pack_Howitzer_Workhorse_of_the_Artillery">SIDEBAR: 75mm Pack Howitzer&mdash;Workhorse of the Artillery</a><br /></li>
+<li class="in2"><a href="#Sidebar_page_45_The_Japanese_Model_89_1929_50mm_Heavy_Grenade_Discharger">SIDEBAR: The Japanese Model 89 (1929) 50mm Heavy Grenade Discharger</a><br /></li>
+<li><a href="#December_and_the_Final_Stages">December and the Final Stages</a><br /></li>
+<li class="in2"><a href="#Sidebar_page_48_The_George_Medal">SIDEBAR: The ‘George’ Medal</a><br /></li>
+<li><a href="#Sources">Sources</a><br /></li>
+<li><a href="#About_the_Author">About the Author</a><br /></li>
+<li><a href="#About_series">About this series of pamphlets</a><br /></li>
+<li><a href="#Transcribers_Notes">Transcriber’s Notes</a></li>
+</ul>
+</div></div>
+
+
+<h1 style="text-align: left; clear: none;">
+<span class="smcap">First Offensive:<br />
+The Marine Campaign<br />
+For Guadalcanal</span></h1>
+
+<p class="p2 in0 larger left"><span class="smcap">Marines in<br />
+World War II<br />
+Commemorative Series</span></p>
+
+<p class="p2 in0 larger left"><span class="smcap">By Henry I. Shaw, Jr.</span>
+</p>
+
+<div id="if_i_b_000" class="figcenter" style="width: 374px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_000.jpg" width="374" height="500" alt="" />
+  <div class="captionl justify"><i>A Marine machine gunner
+and his Browning .30-caliber M1917
+heavy machine gun stand guard while
+1st Marine Division engineers clean up
+in the Lunga River.</i> (Department of
+Defense [USMC] Photo 588741)</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+<div id="if_i_b_001" class="figcenter" style="width: 433px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_001.jpg" width="433" height="600" alt="" />
+  <div class="captionl justify"><i>It was from a Boeing B-17 Flying
+Fortress such as this that LtCol Merrill
+B. Twining and Maj William B.
+McKean reconnoitered the Watchtower
+target area and discovered the Japanese
+building an airfield on Guadalcanal.</i>
+(National Archives Photo 80-G-34887)</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_1" id="Page_1">1</a></span></p>
+
+
+
+<div class="chapter"></div>
+<h2 style="text-align: left; margin-bottom: 0;"><a name="First_Offensive_The_Marine" id="First_Offensive_The_Marine"></a>First Offensive: The Marine<br />
+Campaign for Guadalcanal</h2>
+
+<p class="p0 in0" style="margin-bottom: 2em;"><i>by Henry I. Shaw, Jr.</i></p>
+
+<p class="drop-cap"><span class="smcap1">In</span> the early summer of
+1942, intelligence reports
+of the construction
+of a Japanese
+airfield near Lunga
+Point on Guadalcanal in the Solomon
+Islands triggered a demand for
+offensive action in the South Pacific.
+The leading offensive advocate in
+Washington was Admiral Ernest J.
+King, Chief of Naval Operations
+(CNO). In the Pacific, his view was
+shared by Admiral Chester A.
+Nimitz, Commander in Chief, Pacific
+Fleet (CinCPac), who had already
+proposed sending the 1st Marine
+Raider Battalion to Tulagi, an island
+20 miles north of Guadalcanal across
+Sealark Channel, to destroy a
+Japanese seaplane base there.
+Although the Battle of the Coral Sea
+had forestalled a Japanese amphibious
+assault on Port Moresby, the Allied
+base of supply in eastern New
+Guinea, completion of the Guadalcanal
+airfield might signal the beginning
+of a renewed enemy advance to
+the south and an increased threat to
+the lifeline of American aid to New
+Zealand and Australia. On 23 July
+1942, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)
+in Washington agreed that the line of
+communications in the South Pacific
+had to be secured. The Japanese
+advance had to be stopped. Thus,
+Operation Watchtower, the seizure of
+Guadalcanal and Tulagi, came into
+being.</p>
+
+<p>The islands of the Solomons lie
+nestled in the backwaters of the
+South Pacific. Spanish fortune-hunters
+discovered them in the mid-sixteenth
+century, but no European
+power foresaw any value in the islands
+until Germany sought to expand
+its budding colonial empire
+more than two centuries later. In
+1884, Germany proclaimed a protectorate
+over northern New Guinea, the
+Bismarck Archipelago, and the
+northern Solomons. Great Britain
+countered by establishing a protectorate
+over the southern Solomons
+and by annexing the remainder of
+New Guinea. In 1905, the British
+crown passed administrative control
+over all its territories in the region to
+Australia, and the Territory of
+Papua, with its capital at Port Moresby,
+came into being. Germany’s holdings
+in the region fell under the
+administrative control of the League
+of Nations following World War I,
+with the seat of the colonial government
+located at Rabaul on New Britain.
+The Solomons lay 10 degrees
+below the Equator&mdash;hot, humid, and
+buffeted by torrential rains. The
+celebrated adventure novelist, Jack
+London, supposedly muttered: “If I
+were king, the worst punishment I
+could inflict on my enemies would be
+to banish them to the Solomons.”</p>
+
+<p>On 23 January 1942, Japanese
+forces seized Rabaul and fortified it
+extensively. The site provided an excellent
+harbor and numerous positions
+for airfields. The devastating
+enemy carrier and plane losses at the
+Battle of Midway (3&ndash;6 June 1942) had
+caused <i>Imperial General Headquarters</i>
+to cancel orders for the invasion
+of Midway, New Caledonia, Fiji, and
+Samoa, but plans to construct a
+major seaplane base at Tulagi went
+forward. The location offered one of
+the best anchorages in the South Pacific
+and it was strategically located:
+560 miles from the New Hebrides,
+800 miles from New Caledonia, and
+1,000 miles from Fiji.</p>
+
+<p>The outposts at Tulagi and
+Guadalcanal were the forward evidences
+of a sizeable Japanese force in
+the region, beginning with the <i>Seventeenth
+Army</i>, headquartered at
+Rabaul. The enemy’s <i>Eighth Fleet</i>,
+<i>Eleventh Air Fleet</i>, and <i>1st</i>, <i>7th</i>, <i>8th</i>,
+and <i>14th Naval Base Forces</i> also were
+on New Britain. Beginning on 5 August
+1942, Japanese signal intelligence
+units began to pick up transmissions
+between Noumea on New Caledonia
+and Melbourne, Australia. Enemy
+analysts concluded that Vice Admiral
+Richard L. Ghormley, commanding
+the South Pacific Area (ComSoPac),
+was signalling a British or Australian
+force in preparation for an offensive in
+the Solomons or at New Guinea. The
+warnings were passed to Japanese
+headquarters at Rabaul and Truk, but
+were ignored.</p>
+
+<div id="ip_1" class="figcenter" style="width: 982px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_002.jpg" width="982" height="774" alt="" />
+  <div class="caption"><p>THE PACIFIC AREAS</p>
+
+<p class="smaller">1 AUGUST 1942</p></div></div>
+
+<p>The invasion force was indeed on its
+way to its targets, Guadalcanal, Tulagi,
+and the tiny islets of Gavutu and
+Tanambogo close by Tulagi’s shore. The
+landing force was composed of Marines;
+the covering force and transport
+force were U.S. Navy with a reinforcement
+of Australian warships. There was
+not much mystery to the selection of
+the 1st Marine Division to make the
+landings. Five U.S. Army divisions were
+located in the South and Southwest Pacific:<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_2" id="Page_2">2</a></span>
+three in Australia, the 37th Infantry
+in Fiji, and the Americal
+Division on New Caledonia. None was
+amphibiously trained and all were considered
+vital parts of defensive garrisons.
+The 1st Marine Division, minus
+one of its infantry regiments, had begun
+arriving in New Zealand in mid-June
+when the division headquarters
+and the 5th Marines reached Wellington.
+At that time, the rest of the reinforced
+division’s major units were
+getting ready to embark. The 1st Marines
+were at San Francisco, the 1st
+Raider Battalion was on New Caledonia,
+and the 3d Defense Battalion was
+at Pearl Harbor. The 2d Marines of the
+2d Marine Division, a unit which
+would replace the 1st Division’s 7th
+Marines stationed in British Samoa,
+was loading out from San Diego. All
+three infantry regiments of the landing
+force had battalions of artillery attached,
+from the 11th Marines, in the
+case of the 5th and 1st; the 2d Marines
+drew its reinforcing 75mm howitzers
+from the 2d Division’s 10th Marines.</p>
+
+<p>The news that his division would
+be the landing force for Watchtower
+came as a surprise to Major General
+Alexander A. Vandegrift, who had
+anticipated that the 1st Division
+would have six months of training in
+the South Pacific before it saw action.
+The changeover from administrative
+loading of the various units’
+supplies to combat loading, where
+first-needed equipment, weapons,
+ammunition, and rations were positioned
+to come off ship first with the
+assault troops, occasioned a never-to-be-forgotten
+scene on Wellington’s
+docks. The combat troops took the
+place of civilian stevedores and unloaded
+and reloaded the cargo and
+passenger vessels in an increasing
+round of working parties, often during
+rainstorms which hampered the
+task, but the job was done. Succeeding
+echelons of the division’s forces
+all got their share of labor on the
+docks as various shipping groups arrived
+and the time grew shorter.
+General Vandegrift was able to convince
+Admiral Ghormley and the
+Joint Chiefs that he would not be
+able to meet a proposed D-Day of 1
+August, but the extended landing
+date, 7 August, did little to improve
+the situation.</p>
+
+<p>An amphibious operation is a
+vastly complicated affair, particularly
+when the forces involved are assembled
+on short notice from all over the
+Pacific. The pressure that Vandegrift
+felt was not unique to the landing
+force commander. The U.S. Navy’s
+ships were the key to success and they
+were scarce and invaluable. Although<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_4" id="Page_4">4</a></span>
+the Battles of Coral Sea and Midway
+had badly damaged the Japanese
+fleet’s offensive capabilities and crippled
+its carrier forces, enemy naval
+aircraft could fight as well ashore as
+afloat and enemy warships were still
+numerous and lethal. American losses
+at Pearl Harbor, Coral Sea, and
+Midway were considerable, and
+Navy admirals were well aware that
+the ships they commanded were in
+short supply. The day was coming
+when America’s shipyards and factories
+would fill the seas with warships
+of all types, but that day had not arrived
+in 1942. Calculated risk was the
+name of the game where the Navy
+was concerned, and if the risk seemed
+too great, the Watchtower landing
+force might be a casualty. As it happened,
+the Navy never ceased to risk
+its ships in the waters of the Solomons,
+but the naval lifeline to the
+troops ashore stretched mighty thin
+at times.</p>
+
+<p>Tactical command of the invasion
+force approaching Guadalcanal in
+early August was vested in Vice Admiral
+Frank J. Fletcher as Expeditionary
+Force Commander (Task Force
+61). His force consisted of the amphibious
+shipping carrying the 1st
+Marine Division, under Rear Admiral
+Richmond K. Turner, and the
+Air Support Force led by Rear Admiral
+Leigh Noyes. Admiral Ghormley
+contributed land-based air forces
+commanded by Rear Admiral John
+S. McCain. Fletcher’s support force
+consisted of three fleet carriers, the
+<i>Saratoga</i> (CV 3), <i>Enterprise</i> (CV 6),
+and <i>Wasp</i> (CV 7); the battleship
+<i>North Carolina</i> (BB 55), 6 cruisers,
+16 destroyers, and 3 oilers. Admiral
+Turner’s covering force included five
+cruisers and nine destroyers.</p>
+
+<div class="chapter"></div>
+<div class="sidebar">
+<p class="in0 small"><a name="Sidebar_page_3_General_Alexander_A_Vandegrift" id="Sidebar_page_3_General_Alexander_A_Vandegrift"></a>[Sidebar (<a href="#Page_4">page 3</a>):]</p>
+<h3 class="nobreak p0">General Alexander A. Vandegrift</h3>
+
+<div id="ip_52b" class="figcenter" style="width: 522px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_003.jpg" width="522" height="224" alt="" /></div>
+
+<p class="drop-cap a"><span class="dkgreen">A</span> distinguished military analyst once noted that if
+titles were awarded in America as they are in England,
+the commanding general of Marine Corps
+forces at Guadalcanal would be known simply as “Vandegrift
+of Guadalcanal.” But America does not bestow
+aristocratic titles, and besides, such a formality would not
+be in keeping with the soft-spoken, modest demeanor of
+Alexander A. Vandegrift.</p>
+
+<p>The man destined to lead the 1st Marine Division in
+America’s first ground offensive operation of World War
+II was born in 1887 in Charlottesville, Virginia, where he
+grew up fascinated by his grandfather’s stories of life in the
+Confederate Army during the Civil War. It was axiomatic
+that young Alexander would settle on a military career.
+Commissioned a Marine lieutenant in 1909, Vandegrift
+received an early baptism of fire in 1912 during the bombardment,
+assault, and capture of Coyotepe in Nicaragua.
+Two years later he participated in the capture and occupation
+of Vera Cruz. Vandegrift would spend the greater part
+of the next decade in Haiti, where he fought Caco bandits,
+and served as an inspector of constabulary with the Gendarmerie
+d’Haiti. It was in Haiti that he met and was
+befriended by Marine Colonel Smedley D. Butler, who
+called him “Sunny Jim.” The lessons of these formative years
+fighting an elusive enemy in a hostile jungle environment
+were not lost upon the young Marine officer.</p>
+
+<p>He spent the next 18 years in various posts and stations
+in the United States, along with two tours of China duty
+at Peiping and Tientsin. Prior to Pearl Harbor, Vandegrift
+was appointed assistant to the Major General Commandant,
+and in April 1940 received the single star of a
+brigadier general. He was detached to the 1st Marine Division
+in November 1941, and in May 1942 sailed for the
+South Pacific as commanding general of the first Marine
+division ever to leave the United States. On 7 August 1942,
+after exhorting his Marines with the reminder that “God
+favors the bold and strong of heart,” he led the 1st Marine
+Division ashore in the Solomon Islands in the first large-scale
+offensive action against the Japanese.</p>
+
+<p>His triumph at Guadalcanal earned General Vandegrift
+the Medal of Honor, the Navy Cross, and the praise of a
+grateful nation. In July 1943 he took command of I Marine
+Amphibious Corps and planned the landing at Empress
+Augusta Bay, Bougainville, Northern Solomons, on
+1 November 1943. He then was recalled to Washington, to
+become the Eighteenth Commandant of the Marine Corps.</p>
+
+<p>On 1 January 1944, as a lieutenant general, Vandegrift
+was sworn in as Commandant. On 4 April 1945 he was
+promoted to general, and thus became the first Marine
+officer on active duty to attain four-star rank.</p>
+
+<p>In the final stages of the war, General Vandegrift directed
+an elite force approaching half-a-million men and women,
+with its own aviation force. Comparing his Marines
+with the Japanese, he noted that the Japanese soldier “was
+trained to go to a place, stay there, fight and die. We train
+our men to go to a place, fight to win, and to live. I can
+assure you, it is a better theory.”</p>
+
+<p>After the war, Vandegrift fought another battle, this time
+in the halls of Congress, with the stakes being the survival
+of the Marine Corps. His counter-testimony during Congressional
+hearings of the spring of 1946 was instrumental
+in defeating initial attempts to merge or “unify” the U.S.
+Armed Forces. Although his term as Commandant ended
+on 31 December 1947, General Vandegrift would live to see
+passage of Public Law 416, which preserved the Corps and
+its historic mission. His official retirement date of 1 April
+1949 ended just over 40 years of service.</p>
+
+<p>General Vandegrift outlived both his wife Mildred and
+their only son, Colonel Alexander A. Vandegrift, Jr., who
+fought in World War II and Korea. He spent most of his final
+years in Delray, Florida. He died on 8 May 1973.&mdash;<i>Robert
+V. Aquilina</i></p>
+</div>
+
+<hr />
+<div class="chapter"></div>
+<h2><a name="The_Landing_and_August_Battles" id="The_Landing_and_August_Battles"></a><i>The Landing and August Battles</i></h2>
+
+<p>On board the transports approaching
+the Solomons, the Marines were
+looking for a tough fight. They knew
+little about the targets, even less
+about their opponents. Those maps
+that were available were poor, constructions
+based upon outdated
+hydrographic charts and information
+provided by former island residents.
+While maps based on aerial photographs
+had been prepared they were
+misplaced by the Navy in Auckland,
+New Zealand, and never got to the
+Marines at Wellington.</p>
+
+<p>On 17 July, a couple of division
+staff officers, Lieutenant Colonel
+Merrill B. Twining and Major William
+McKean, had been able to join
+the crew of a B-17 flying from Port
+Moresby on a reconnaissance mission
+over Guadalcanal. They reported
+what they had seen, and their analysis,
+coupled with aerial photographs,
+indicated no extensive
+defenses along the beaches of
+Guadalcanal’s north shore.</p>
+
+<div id="ip_4" class="figcenter" style="width: 894px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_004.jpg" width="894" height="620" alt="" />
+  <div class="caption"><p>GUADALCANAL<br />
+  TULAGI-GAVUTU<br />
+  and<br />
+  Florida Islands</p></div></div>
+
+<p>This news was indeed welcome.
+The division intelligence officer (G-2),
+Lieutenant Colonel Frank B. Goettge,
+had concluded that about 8,400<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_5" id="Page_5">5</a></span>
+Japanese occupied Guadalcanal and
+Tulagi. Admiral Turner’s staff figured
+that the Japanese amounted to 7,125
+men. Admiral Ghormley’s intelligence
+officer pegged the enemy
+strength at 3,100&mdash;closest to the
+3,457 actual total of Japanese troops;
+2,571 of these were stationed on
+Guadalcanal and were mostly
+laborers working on the airfield.</p>
+
+<p>To oppose the Japanese, the Marines
+had an overwhelming superiority
+of men. At the time, the tables of
+organization for a Marine Corps division
+indicated a total of 19,514
+officers and enlisted men, including
+naval medical and engineer (Seabee)
+units. Infantry regiments numbered
+3,168 and consisted of a headquarters
+company, a weapons company,
+and three battalions. Each infantry
+battalion (933 Marines) was organized
+into a headquarters company
+(89), a weapons company (273),
+and three rifle companies (183). The
+artillery regiment had 2,581 officers
+and men organized into three 75mm
+pack howitzer battalions and one
+105mm howitzer battalion. A light
+tank battalion, a special weapons
+battalion of antiaircraft and antitank
+guns, and a parachute battalion added
+combat power. An engineer regiment
+(2,452 Marines) with battalions
+of engineers, pioneers, and Seabees,
+provided a hefty combat and service
+element. The total was rounded
+out by division headquarters battalion’s
+headquarters, signal, and military
+police companies and the
+division’s service troops&mdash;service,
+motor transport, amphibian tractor,
+and medical battalions. For Watchtower,
+the 1st Raider Battalion and
+the 3d Defense Battalion had been
+added to Vandegrift’s command to
+provide more infantrymen and much
+needed coast defense and antiaircraft
+guns and crews.</p>
+
+<p>Unfortunately, the division’s heaviest
+ordnance had been left behind in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_6" id="Page_6">6</a></span>
+New Zealand. Limited ship space and
+time meant that the division’s big
+guns, a 155mm howitzer battalion,
+and all the motor transport battalion’s
+two-and-a-half-ton trucks were
+not loaded. Colonel Pedro A. del
+Valle, commanding the 11th Marines,
+was unhappy at the loss of his heavy
+howitzers and equally distressed that
+essential sound and flash-ranging
+equipment necessary for effective
+counterbattery fire was left behind.
+Also failing to make the cut in the
+battle for shipping space, were all
+spare clothing, bedding rolls, and
+supplies necessary to support the
+reinforced division beyond 60 days
+of combat. Ten days supply of ammunition
+for each of the division’s
+weapons remained in New Zealand.</p>
+
+<div id="ip_6" class="figright" style="width: 362px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_006.jpg" width="362" height="267" alt="" />
+  <div class="captionr">
+  <p>Naval Historical Photographic Collection 880-CF-117-4-63</p></div>
+  <div class="captionl">
+<p class="justify"><i>Enroute to Guadalcanal RAdm Richmond Kelly Turner, commander of the Amphibious
+Force, and MajGen Alexander A. Vandegrift, 1st Marine Division commander,
+review the Operation Watchtower plan for landings in the Solomon Islands.</i></p></div></div>
+
+<p>In the opinion of the 1st Division’s
+historian and a veteran of the landing,
+the men on the approaching
+transports “thought they’d have a bad
+time getting ashore.” They were confident,
+certainly, and sure that they
+could not be defeated, but most of
+the men were entering combat for the
+first time. There were combat veteran
+officers and noncommissioned
+officers (NCOs) throughout the division,
+but the majority of the men
+were going into their initial battle.
+The commanding officer of the 1st
+Marines, Colonel Clifton B. Cates,
+estimated that 90 percent of his men
+had enlisted after Pearl Harbor. The
+fabled 1st Marine Division of later
+World War II, Korean War, Vietnam
+War, and Persian Gulf War fame, the
+most highly decorated division in the
+U.S. Armed Forces, had not yet established
+its reputation.</p>
+
+<p>The convoy of ships, with its outriding
+protective screen of carriers,
+reached Koro in the Fiji Islands on
+26 July. Practice landings did little
+more than exercise the transports’
+landing craft, since reefs precluded an
+actual beach landing. The rendezvous
+at Koro did give the senior commanders
+a chance to have a
+face-to-face meeting. Fletcher,
+McCain, Turner, and Vandegrift got
+together with Ghormley’s chief of
+staff, Rear Admiral Daniel J. Callaghan,
+who notified the conferees that
+ComSoPac had ordered the 7th Marines
+on Samoa to be prepared to embark
+on four days notice as a
+reinforcement for Watchtower. To
+this decidedly good news, Admiral
+Fletcher added some bad news. In
+view of the threat from enemy land-based
+air, he could not “keep the carriers
+in the area for more than 48
+hours after the landing.” Vandegrift
+protested that he needed at least four
+days to get the division’s gear ashore,
+and Fletcher reluctantly agreed to
+keep his carriers at risk another day.</p>
+
+<p>On the 28th the ships sailed from
+the Fijis, proceeding as if they were
+headed for Australia. At noon on 5
+August, the convoy and its escorts
+turned north for the Solomons. Undetected
+by the Japanese, the assault
+force reached its target during the
+night of 6&ndash;7 August and split into two
+landing groups, Transport Division
+X-Ray, 15 transports heading for the
+north shore of Guadalcanal east of
+Lunga Point, and Transport Division
+Yoke, eight transports headed for
+Tulagi, Gavutu, Tanambogo, and the
+nearby Florida Island, which loomed
+over the smaller islands.</p>
+
+<p>Vandegrift’s plans for the landings
+would put two of his infantry regiments
+(Colonel LeRoy P. Hunt’s 5th
+Marines and Colonel Cates’ 1st Marines)
+ashore on both sides of the
+Lunga River prepared to attack inland
+to seize the airfield. The 11th
+Marines, the 3d Defense Battalion,
+and most of the division’s supporting
+units would also land near the
+Lunga, prepared to exploit the beachhead.
+Across the 20 miles of Sealark
+Channel, the division’s assistant commander,
+Brigadier General William
+H. Rupertus, led the assault forces
+slated to take Tulagi, Gavutu, and
+Tanambogo: the 1st Raider Battalion
+(Lieutenant Colonel Merritt A. Edson);
+the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines
+(Lieutenant Colonel Harold E. Rosecrans);
+and the 1st Parachute Battalion
+(Major Robert H. Williams).
+Company A of the 2d Marines would
+reconnoiter the nearby shores of
+Florida Island and the rest of Colonel
+John A. Arthur’s regiment would
+stand by in reserve to land where
+needed.</p>
+
+<p>As the ships slipped through the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_7" id="Page_7">7</a></span>
+channels on either side of rugged
+Savo Island, which split Sealark near
+its western end, heavy clouds and
+dense rain blanketed the task force.
+Later the moon came out and silhouetted
+the islands. On board his
+command ship, Vandegrift wrote to
+his wife: “Tomorrow morning at
+dawn we land in our first major
+offensive of the war. Our plans have
+been made and God grant that our
+judgement has been sound ...
+whatever happens you’ll know I did
+my best. Let us hope that best will
+be good enough.”</p>
+
+<div id="ip_7" class="figcenter" style="width: 548px;">
+  <div class="captionl top"><p class="justify"><i>MajGen Alexander A. Vandegrift, CG, 1st Marine Division,
+confers with his staff on board the transport USS </i>McCawley<i> (APA-4)
+enroute to Guadalcanal. From left: Gen Vandegrift;
+LtCol Gerald C. Thomas, operations officer; LtCol Randolph
+McC. Pate, logistics officer; LtCol Frank B. Goettge, intelligence
+officer; and Col William Capers James, chief of staff.</i></p></div>
+
+<div class="captionr top">
+<p>National Archives Photo 80-G-17065</p>
+</div>
+  <img src="images/i_b_007.jpg" width="548" height="362" alt="" />
+</div>
+
+<p>At 0641 on 7 August, Turner signalled
+his ships to “land the landing
+force.” Just 28 minutes before, the
+heavy cruiser <i>Quincy</i> (CA 39) had
+begun shelling the landing beaches at
+Guadalcanal. The sun came up that
+fateful Friday at 0650, and the first
+landing craft carrying assault troops
+of the 5th Marines touched down at
+0909 on Red Beach. To the men’s surprise
+(and relief), no Japanese appeared
+to resist the landing. Hunt
+immediately moved his assault
+troops off the beach and into the surrounding
+jungle, waded the steep-banked
+Ilu River, and headed for the
+enemy airfield. The following 1st
+Marines were able to cross the Ilu on
+a bridge the engineers had hastily
+thrown up with an amphibian tractor
+bracing its middle. The silence
+was eerie and the absence of opposition
+was worrisome to the riflemen.
+The Japanese troops, most of whom
+were Korean laborers, had fled to the
+west, spooked by a week’s B-17 bombardment,
+the pre-assault naval gunfire,
+and the sight of the ships
+offshore. The situation was not the
+same across Sealark. The Marines on
+Guadalcanal could hear faint rumbles
+of a firefight across the waters.</p>
+
+<div id="ip_7b" class="figcenter" style="width: 548px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_008.jpg" width="548" height="306" alt="" />
+  <div class="captionr">
+
+<p>
+National Archives Photo 80-CF-112-5-3
+</p></div>
+
+<div class="captionl">
+<p class="justify"><i>First Division Marines storm ashore across Guadalcanal’s
+beaches on D-Day, 7 August 1942, from the attack transport
+</i>Barnett<i> (AP-11) and attack cargo ship </i>Fomalhaut<i> (AK-22). The
+invaders were surprised at the lack of enemy opposition.</i></p></div></div>
+
+<div id="ip_7c" class="figcenter" style="width: 898px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_008b.jpg" width="898" height="618" alt="" />
+  <div class="caption">
+
+<p>
+LANDING ON GUADALCANAL<br />
+and Capture of the Airfield<br />
+7&ndash;8 AUGUST 1942</p></div></div>
+
+<div id="ip_7d" class="figcenter" style="width: 548px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_009.jpg" width="548" height="352" alt="" />
+  <div class="captionr">
+
+<p>
+Photo courtesy of Col James A. Donovan, Jr.
+</p></div>
+
+<div class="captionl">
+<p class="justify"><i>When the 5th Marines entered the jungle from the beachhead,
+and had to cross the steep banks of the Ilu River, 1st Marine
+Division engineers hastily constructed a bridge supported by
+amphibian tractors. Though heavily used, the bridge held up.</i></p></div></div>
+
+<div id="ip_7e" class="figcenter" style="width: 549px;">
+  <div class="captionl top"><p class="justify"><i>Photographed immediately after a prelanding strike by USS
+</i>Enterprise<i> aircraft flown by Navy pilots, Tanambogo and
+Gavutu Islands lie smoking and in ruins in the morning sun.
+Gavutu is at the left across the causeway from Tanambogo.</i></p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="captionr top">
+<p>National Archives Photo 80-C-11034</p></div>
+  <img src="images/i_b_009b.jpg" width="549" height="308" alt="" />
+</div>
+
+<p>The Japanese on Tulagi were special
+naval landing force sailors and
+they had no intention of giving up
+what they held without a vicious, no-surrender
+battle. Edson’s men landed
+first, following by Rosecrans’ battalion,
+hitting Tulagi’s south coast
+and moving inland towards the ridge
+which ran lengthwise through the island.
+The battalions encountered
+pockets of resistance in the undergrowth
+of the islands thick vegetation
+and maneuvered to outflank and
+overrun the opposition. The advance
+of the Marines was steady but casualties
+were frequent. By nightfall, Edson
+had reached the former British
+residency overlooking Tulagi’s harbor
+and dug in for the night across a hill
+that overlooked the Japanese final
+position, a ravine on the islands
+southern tip. The 2d Battalion, 5th
+Marines, had driven through to the
+northern shore, cleaning its sector of
+enemy; Rosecrans moved into position<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_10" id="Page_10">10</a></span>
+to back up the raiders. By the
+end of its first day ashore, 2d Battalion
+had lost 56 men killed and
+wounded; 1st Raider Battalion
+casualties were 99 Marines.</p>
+
+<div id="ip_10" class="figcenter" style="width: 548px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_010.jpg" width="548" height="426" alt="" />
+  <div class="captionr">
+
+<p>Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 52231</p></div>
+
+<div class="captionl">
+<p class="justify"><i>After the battle, almost all palm trees on Gavutu were shorn
+of their foliage. Despite naval gunfire and close air support
+hitting the enemy emplacements, Japanese opposition from
+caves proved to be serious obstacles for attacking Marines.</i></p></div></div>
+
+<p>Throughout the night, the
+Japanese swarmed from hillside caves
+in four separate attacks, trying to
+penetrate the raider lines. They were
+unsuccessful and most died in the attempts.
+At dawn, the 2d Battalion,
+2d Marines, landed to reinforce the
+attackers and by the afternoon of 8
+August, the mop-up was completed
+and the battle for Tulagi was over.</p>
+
+<p>The fight for tiny Gavutu and
+Tanambogo, both little more than
+small hills rising out of the sea, connected
+by a hundred-yard causeway,
+was every bit as intense as that on
+Tulagi. The area of combat was much
+smaller and the opportunities for fire
+support from offshore ships and carrier
+planes was severely limited once
+the Marines had landed. After naval
+gunfire from the light cruiser <i>San
+Juan</i> (CL 54) and two destroyers, and
+a strike by F4F Wildcats flying from
+the <i>Wasp</i>, the 1st Parachute Battalion
+landed near noon in three waves,
+395 men in all, on Gavutu. The
+Japanese, secure in cave positions,
+opened fire on the second and third
+waves, pinning down the first Marines
+ashore on the beach. Major
+Williams took a bullet in the lungs
+and was evacuated; 32 Marines were
+killed in the withering enemy fire.
+This time, 2d Marines reinforcements
+were really needed; the 1st Battalion’s
+Company B landed on Gavutu and
+attempted to take Tanambogo; the
+attackers were driven to ground and
+had to pull back to Gavutu.</p>
+
+<p>After a rough night of close-in
+fighting with the defenders of both
+islands, the 3d Battalion, 2d Marines,
+reinforced the men already ashore
+and mopped up on each island. The
+toll of Marines dead on the three islands
+was 144; the wounded numbered
+194. The few Japanese who
+survived the battles fled to Florida Island,
+which had been scouted by the
+2d Marines on D-Day and found
+clear of the enemy.</p>
+
+<p>The Marines’ landings and the
+concentration of shipping in Guadalcanal
+waters acted as a magnet to the
+Japanese at Rabaul. At Admiral
+Ghormley’s headquarters, Tulagi’s radio
+was heard on D-Day “frantically
+calling for [the] dispatch of surface<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_11" id="Page_11">11</a></span>
+forces to the scene” and designating
+transports and carriers as targets for
+heavy bombing. The messages were
+sent in plain language, emphasizing
+the plight of the threatened garrison.
+And the enemy response was prompt
+and characteristic of the months of
+naval air and surface attacks to come.</p>
+
+<p>At 1030 on 7 August, an Australian
+coastwatcher hidden in the
+hills of the islands north of Guadalcanal
+signalled that a Japanese air
+strike composed of heavy bombers,
+light bombers, and fighters was headed
+for the island. Fletcher’s pilots,
+whose carriers were positioned 100
+miles south of Guadalcanal, jumped
+the approaching planes 20 miles
+northwest of the landing areas before
+they could disrupt the operation. But
+the Japanese were not daunted by the
+setback; other planes and ships were
+enroute to the inviting target.</p>
+
+<p>On 8 August, the Marines consolidated
+their positions ashore, seizing
+the airfield on Guadalcanal and establishing
+a beachhead. Supplies
+were being unloaded as fast as landing
+craft could make the turnaround
+from ship to shore, but the shore<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_12" id="Page_12">12</a></span>
+party was woefully inadequate to
+handle the influx of ammunition, rations,
+tents, aviation gas, vehicles&mdash;all
+gear necessary to sustain the Marines.
+The beach itself became a
+dumpsite. And almost as soon as the
+initial supplies were landed, they had
+to be moved to positions nearer Kukum
+village and Lunga Point within
+the planned perimeter. Fortunately,
+the lack of Japanese ground opposition
+enabled Vandegrift to shift the
+supply beaches west to a new
+beachhead.</p>
+
+<div id="ip_12" class="figleft" style="width: 363px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_012.jpg" width="363" height="274" alt="" />
+  <div class="captionr">
+
+<p>
+Marine Corps Personal Papers Collection
+</p></div>
+
+<div class="captionl">
+<p class="justify"><i>Immediately after assault troops cleared the beachhead and moved inland, supplies
+and equipment, inviting targets for enemy bombers, began to litter the beach.</i></p></div></div>
+
+<p>Japanese bombers did penetrate
+the American fighter screen on 8 August.
+Dropping their bombs from
+20,000 feet or more to escape antiaircraft
+fire, the enemy planes were not
+very accurate. They concentrated on
+the ships in the channel, hitting and
+damaging a number of them and
+sinking the destroyer <i>Jarvis</i> (DD
+393). In their battles to turn back the
+attacking planes, the carrier fighter
+squadrons lost 21 Wildcats on 7&ndash;8
+August.</p>
+
+<p>The primary Japanese targets were
+the Allied ships. At this time, and for
+a thankfully and unbelievably long
+time to come, the Japanese commanders
+at Rabaul grossly underestimated
+the strength of Vandegrift’s
+forces. They thought the Marine
+landings constituted a reconnaissance
+in force, perhaps 2,000 men, on
+Guadalcanal. By the evening of 8 August,
+Vandegrift had 10,900 troops
+ashore on Guadalcanal and another
+6,075 on Tulagi. Three infantry regiments
+had landed and each had a
+supporting 75mm pack howitzer
+battalion&mdash;the 2d and 3d Battalions,
+11th Marines on Guadalcanal, and
+the 3d Battalion, 10th Marines on
+Tulagi. The 5th Battalion, 11th Marines’
+105mm howitzers were in
+general support.</p>
+
+<p>That night a cruiser-destroyer
+force of the Imperial Japanese Navy
+reacted to the American invasion
+with a stinging response. Admiral
+Turner had positioned three cruiser-destroyer
+groups to bar the Tulagi-Guadalcanal
+approaches. At the Battle
+of Savo, the Japanese demonstrated
+their superiority in night fighting
+at this stage of the war, shattering
+two of Turners covering forces
+without loss to themselves. Four
+heavy cruisers went to the bottom&mdash;three
+American, one Australian&mdash;and
+another lost her bow. As the sun
+came up over what soon would be
+called “Ironbottom Sound,” Marines
+watched grimly as Higgins boats
+swarmed out to rescue survivors. Approximately
+1,300 sailors died that
+night and another 700 suffered
+wounds or were badly burned.
+Japanese casualties numbered less
+than 200 men.</p>
+
+<p>The Japanese suffered damage to
+only one ship in the encounter, the
+cruiser <i>Chokai</i>. The American cruisers
+<i>Vincennes</i> (CA 44), <i>Astoria</i> (CA
+34), and <i>Quincy</i> (CA 39) went to the
+bottom, as did the Australian Navy’s
+HMAS <i>Canberra</i>, so critically
+damaged that she had to be sunk by
+American torpedoes. Both the cruiser
+<i>Chicago</i> (CA 29) and destroyer <i>Talbot</i>
+(DD 114) were badly damaged.
+Fortunately for the Marines ashore,
+the Japanese force&mdash;five heavy cruisers,
+two light cruisers, and a
+destroyer&mdash;departed before dawn
+without attempting to disrupt the
+landing further.</p>
+
+<div id="ip_12b" class="figright" style="width: 178px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_012b.jpg" width="178" height="155" alt="" />
+  <div class="captionr">U.S. 105mm Howitzer</div></div>
+
+<p>When the attack-force leader, Vice
+Admiral Gunichi Mikawa, returned
+to Rabaul, he expected to receive the
+accolades of his superiors. He did get
+those, but he also found himself the
+subject of criticism. Admiral Isoroku
+Yamamoto, the Japanese fleet commander,
+chided his subordinate for
+failing to attack the transports. Mikawa
+could only reply, somewhat lamely,
+that he did not know Fletcher’s
+aircraft carriers were so far away
+from Guadalcanal. Of equal significance
+to the Marines on the
+beach, the Japanese naval victory
+caused celebrating superiors in Tokyo
+to allow the event to overshadow the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_13" id="Page_13">13</a></span>
+importance of the amphibious
+operation.</p>
+
+<p>The disaster prompted the American
+admirals to reconsider Navy support
+for operations ashore. Fletcher
+feared for the safety of his carriers;
+he had already lost about a quarter
+of his fighter aircraft. The commander
+of the expeditionary force
+had lost a carrier at Coral Sea and
+another at Midway. He felt he could
+not risk the loss of a third, even if
+it meant leaving the Marines on their
+own. Before the Japanese cruiser attack,
+he obtained Admiral Ghormley’s
+permission to withdraw from
+the area.</p>
+
+<div id="ip_13" class="figleft" style="width: 362px;">
+  <div class="captionl top"><p class="justify"><i>When ships carrying barbed wire and engineering tools needed ashore were forced
+to leave the Guadalcanal area because of enemy air and surface threats, Marines
+had to prepare such hasty field expedients as this</i> <i>cheval de frise</i> <i>of sharpened stakes.</i></p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="captionr top">
+<p>Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 5157</p>
+</div>
+  <img src="images/i_b_013.jpg" width="362" height="281" alt="" />
+</div>
+
+<p>At a conference on board Turner’s
+flagship transport, the <i>McCawley</i>,
+on the night of 8 August, the admiral
+told General Vandegrift that Fletcher’s
+impending withdrawal meant
+that he would have to pull out the
+amphibious force’s ships. The Battle
+of Savo Island reinforced the decision
+to get away before enemy aircraft,
+unchecked by American interceptors,
+struck. On 9 August, the transports
+withdrew to Noumea. The unloading
+of supplies ended abruptly, and
+ships still half-full steamed away. The
+forces ashore had 17 days’ rations&mdash;after
+counting captured Japanese
+food&mdash;and only four days’ supply of
+ammunition for all weapons. Not
+only did the ships take away the rest
+of the supplies, they also took the
+Marines still on board, including the
+2d Marines’ headquarters element.
+Dropped off at the island of Espiritu
+Santo in the New Hebrides, the infantry
+Marines and their commander,
+Colonel Arthur, were most
+unhappy and remained so until they
+finally reached Guadalcanal on 29
+October.</p>
+
+<p>Ashore in the Marine beachheads,
+General Vandegrift ordered rations
+reduced to two meals a day. The
+reduced food intake would last for
+six weeks, and the Marines would
+become very familiar with Japanese
+canned fish and rice. Most of the Marines
+smoked and they were soon disgustedly
+smoking Japanese-issue
+brands. They found that the separate
+paper filters that came with the
+cigarettes were necessary to keep the
+fast-burning tobacco from scorching
+their lips. The retreating ships had
+also hauled away empty sand bags
+and valuable engineer tools. So the
+Marines used Japanese shovels to fill
+Japanese rice bags with sand to
+strengthen their defensive positions.</p>
+
+<div id="ip_13b" class="figright" style="width: 175px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_013b.jpg" width="175" height="165" alt="" />
+  <div class="captionr">U.S. 90mm Antiaircraft Gun</div></div>
+
+<p>The Marines dug in along the
+beaches between the Tenaru and the
+ridges west of Kukum. A Japanese
+counter-landing was a distinct possibility.
+Inland of the beaches, defensive
+gun pits and foxholes lined the
+west bank of the Tenaru and
+crowned the hills that faced west
+toward the Matanikau River and
+Point Cruz. South of the airfield
+where densely jungled ridges and ravines
+abounded, the beachhead
+perimeter was guarded by outposts
+and these were manned in large part
+by combat support troops. The engineer,
+pioneer, and amphibious tractor
+battalion all had their positions
+on the front line. In fact, any Marine
+with a rifle, and that was virtually
+every Marine, stood night defensive
+duty. There was no place within the
+perimeter that could be counted safe
+from enemy infiltration.</p>
+
+<div id="ip_16" class="figleft" style="width: 176px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_016.jpg" width="176" height="215" alt="" />
+  <div class="captionr">
+
+<p>Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 150993</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="captionl">
+<p><i>Col Kiyono Ichiki, a battle-seasoned
+Japanese Army veteran, led his force in
+an impetuous and ill-fated attack on
+strong Marine positions in the Battle of
+the Tenaru on the night of 20&ndash;21 August.</i></p></div></div>
+
+<p>Almost as Turner’s transports
+sailed away, the Japanese began a
+pattern of harassing air attacks on
+the beachhead. Sometimes the raids
+came during the day, but the 3d
+Defense Battalion’s 90mm antiaircraft
+guns forced the bombers to fly too
+high for effective bombing. The erratic
+pattern of bombs, however,
+meant that no place was safe near the
+airfield, the preferred target, and no
+place could claim it was bomb-free.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_16" id="Page_16">16</a></span>
+The most disturbing aspect of
+Japanese air attacks soon became the
+nightly harassment by Japanese aircraft
+which singly, it seemed, roamed
+over the perimeter, dropping bombs
+and flares indiscriminately. The
+nightly visitors, whose planes’ engines
+were soon well known sounds,
+won the singular title “Washing
+Machine Charlie,” at first, and later,
+“Louie the Louse,” when their
+presence heralded Japanese shore
+bombardment. Technically, “Charlie”
+was a twin-engine night bomber
+from Rabaul. “Louie” was a cruiser
+float plane that signalled to the bombardment
+ships. But the harassed
+Marines used the names interchangeably.</p>
+
+<p>Even though most of the division’s
+heavy engineering equipment had
+disappeared with the Navy’s transports,
+the resourceful Marines soon
+completed the airfield’s runway with
+captured Japanese gear. On 12 August
+Admiral McCain’s aide piloted
+in a PBY-5 Catalina flying boat and
+bumped to a halt on what was now
+officially Henderson Field, named for
+a Marine pilot, Major Lofton R. Henderson,
+lost at Midway. The Navy
+officer pronounced the airfield fit for
+fighter use and took off with a load
+of wounded Marines, the first of
+2,879 to be evacuated. Henderson
+Field was the centerpiece of Vandegrift’s
+strategy; he would hold it at
+all costs.</p>
+
+<p>Although it was only 2,000 feet
+long and lacked a taxiway and adequate
+drainage, the tiny airstrip,
+often riddled with potholes and rendered<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_17" id="Page_17">17</a></span>
+unusable because of frequent,
+torrential downpours, was essential
+to the success of the landing force.
+With it operational, supplies could
+be flown in and wounded flown out.
+At least in the Marines’ minds, Navy
+ships ceased to be the only lifeline for
+the defenders.</p>
+
+<p>While Vandegrift’s Marines dug in
+east and west of Henderson Field,
+Japanese headquarters in Rabaul
+planned what it considered an effective
+response to the American offensive.
+Misled by intelligence estimates
+that the Marines numbered perhaps
+2,000 men, Japanese staff officers believed
+that a modest force quickly
+sent could overwhelm the invaders.</p>
+
+<p>On 12 August, CinCPac determined
+that a sizable Japanese force
+was massing at Truk to steam to the
+Solomons and attempt to eject the
+Americans. Ominously, the group included
+the heavy carriers <i>Shokaku</i>
+and <i>Zuikaku</i> and the light carrier
+<i>Ryujo</i>. Despite the painful losses at
+Savo Island, the only significant increases
+to American naval forces in
+the Solomons was the assignment of
+a new battleship, the <i>South Dakota</i>
+(BB 57).</p>
+
+<div id="ip_17" class="figcenter" style="width: 549px;">
+  <div class="captionl top"><p class="justify"><i>Of his watercolor painting “Instructions to a Patrol,” Capt
+Donald L. Dickson said that three men have volunteered to
+locate a Japanese bivouac. The one in the center is a clean-cut
+corporal with the bearing of a high-school athlete. The man
+on the right is “rough and ready.” To the one at left, it’s just
+another job; he may do it heroically, but it’s just another job.</i></p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="captionr top">
+<p>
+Captain Donald L. Dickson, USMCR
+</p></div>
+  <img src="images/i_b_016b.jpg" width="549" height="401" alt="" />
+</div>
+
+<p>Imperial General Headquarters in
+Tokyo had ordered Lieutenant
+General Haruyoshi Hyakutake’s
+<i>Seventeenth Army</i> to attack the Marine
+perimeter. For his assault force,
+Hyakutake chose the <i>35th Infantry
+Brigade</i> (Reinforced), commanded by
+Major General Kiyotake Kawaguchi.
+At the time, Kawaguchi’s main force
+was in the Palaus. Hyakutake selected
+a crack infantry regiment&mdash;the
+<i>28th</i>&mdash;commanded by Colonel Kiyono
+Ichiki to land first. Alerted for its
+mission while it was at Guam, the
+Ichiki Detachment assault echelon,
+one battalion of 900 men, was transported
+to the Solomons on the only
+shipping available, six destroyers. As
+a result the troops carried just small
+amounts of ordnance and supplies.
+A follow-on echelon of 1,200 of
+Ichiki’s troops was to join the assault
+battalion on Guadalcanal.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_18" id="Page_18">18</a></span></p>
+
+<div id="ip_18" class="figright" style="width: 362px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_018.jpg" width="362" height="202" alt="" />
+  <div class="captionr">
+
+<p>
+National Archives Photo 80-G-37932
+</p></div>
+
+<div class="captionl">
+<p class="justify"><i>On 20 August, the first Marine Corps aircraft such as this F4F Grumman Wildcat
+landed on Henderson Field to begin combat air operations against the Japanese.</i></p></div></div>
+
+<p>While the Japanese landing force
+was headed for Guadalcanal, the
+Japanese already on the island
+provided an unpleasant reminder
+that they, too, were full of fight. A
+captured enemy naval rating, taken
+in the constant patrolling to the west
+of the perimeter, indicated that a
+Japanese group wanted to surrender
+near the village of Kokumbona,
+seven miles west of the Matanikau.
+This was the area that Lieutenant
+Colonel Goettge considered held
+most of the enemy troops who had
+fled the airfield. On the night of 12
+August, a reconnaissance patrol of 25
+men led by Goettge himself left the
+perimeter by landing craft. The
+patrol landed near its objective, was
+ambushed, and virtually wiped out.
+Only three men managed to swim
+and wade back to the Marine lines.
+The bodies of the other members of
+the patrol were never found. To this
+day, the fate of the Goettge patrol
+continues to intrigue researchers.</p>
+
+<p>After the loss of Goettge and his
+men, vigilance increased on the
+perimeter. On the 14th, a fabled
+character, the coastwatcher Martin
+Clemens, came strolling out of the
+jungle into the Marine lines. He had
+watched the landing from the hills
+south of the airfield and now
+brought his bodyguard of native
+policemen with him. A retired sergeant
+major of the British Solomon
+Islands Constabulary, Jacob C. Vouza,
+volunteered about this time to
+search out Japanese to the east of the
+perimeter, where patrol sightings and
+contacts had indicated the Japanese
+might have effected a landing.</p>
+
+<p>The ominous news of Japanese
+sightings to the east and west of the
+perimeter were balanced out by the
+joyous word that more Marines had
+landed. This time the Marines were
+aviators. On 20 August, two squadrons
+of Marine Aircraft Group
+(MAG)-23 were launched from the
+escort carrier <i>Long Island</i> (CVE-1) located
+200 miles southeast of Guadalcanal.
+Captain John L. Smith led 19
+Grumman F4F-4 Wildcats of Marine
+Fighting Squadron (VMF)-223 onto
+Henderson’s narrow runway. Smith’s
+fighters were followed by Major
+Richard C. Mangrum’s Marine Scout-Bombing
+Squadron (VMSB)-232
+with 12 Douglas SBD-3 Dauntless
+dive bombers.</p>
+
+<p>From this point of the campaign,
+the radio identification for Guadalcanal,
+Cactus, became increasingly
+synonymous with the island. The
+Marine planes became the first elements
+of what would informally be
+known as Cactus Air Force.</p>
+
+<div id="ip_18b" class="figleft" style="width: 360px;">
+  <div class="captionl top"><p class="justify"><i>The first Army Air Forces P-400 Bell Air Cobras arrived on Guadalcanal on 22 August,
+two days after the first Marine planes, and began operations immediately.</i></p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="captionr top">
+<p>
+National Archives Photo 208-N-4932
+</p></div>
+  <img src="images/i_b_018b.jpg" width="360" height="154" alt="" />
+</div>
+
+<p>Wasting no time, the Marine pilots
+were soon in action against the
+Japanese naval aircraft which frequently
+attacked Guadalcanal. Smith
+shot down his first enemy Zero fighter
+on 21 August; three days later
+VMF-223’s Wildcats intercepted a
+strong Japanese aerial attack force
+and downed 16 enemy planes. In this
+action, Captain Marion E. Carl, a
+veteran of Midway, shot down three
+planes. On the 22d, coastwatchers
+alerted Cactus to an approaching air
+attack and 13 of 16 enemy bombers
+were destroyed. At the same time,
+Mangrum’s dive bombers damaged
+three enemy destroyer-transports attempting
+to reach Guadalcanal. On
+24 August, the American attacking
+aircraft, which now included Navy
+scout-bombers from the <i>Saratoga</i>’s
+Scouting Squadron (VS) 5, succeeded
+in turning back a Japanese reinforcement
+convoy of warships and
+destroyers.</p>
+
+<p>On 22 August, five Bell P-400 Air
+Cobras of the Army’s 67th Fighter
+Squadron had landed at Henderson,
+followed within the week by nine<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_20" id="Page_20">20</a></span>
+more Air Cobras. The Army planes,
+which had serious altitude and
+climb-rate deficiencies, were destined
+to see most action in ground combat
+support roles.</p>
+
+<p>The frenzied action in what became
+known as the Battle of the
+Eastern Solomons was matched
+ashore. Japanese destroyers had delivered
+the vanguard of the Ichiki force
+at Taivu Point, 25 miles east of the
+Marine perimeter. A long-range
+patrol of Marines from Company A,
+1st Battalion, 1st Marines ambushed
+a sizable Japanese force near Taivu
+on 19 August. The Japanese dead
+were readily identified as Army
+troops and the debris of their defeat
+included fresh uniforms and a large
+amount of communication gear.
+Clearly, a new phase of the fighting
+had begun. All Japanese encountered
+to this point had been naval troops.</p>
+
+<p>Alerted by patrols, the Marines
+now dug in along the Ilu River, often
+misnamed the Tenaru on Marine
+maps, were ready for Colonel Ichiki.
+The Japanese commander’s orders
+directed him to “quickly recapture
+and maintain the airfield at Guadalcanal,”
+and his own directive to his
+troops emphasized that they would
+fight “to the last breath of the last
+man.” And they did.</p>
+
+<div id="ip_20" class="figright" style="width: 371px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_020.jpg" width="371" height="322" alt="" />
+  <div class="captionr">U.S. M-3 Light Tank</div>
+</div>
+
+<p>Too full of his mission to wait for
+the rest of his regiment and sure that
+he faced only a few thousand men
+overall, Ichiki marched from Taivu
+to the Marines’ lines. Before he attacked
+on the night of the 20th, a
+bloody figure stumbled out of the
+jungle with a warning that the
+Japanese were coming. It was Sergeant
+Major Vouza. Captured by the
+Japanese, who found a small American
+flag secreted in his loincloth, he
+was tortured in a failed attempt to
+gain information on the invasion
+force. Tied to a tree, bayonetted twice
+through the chest, and beaten with
+rifle butts, the resolute Vouza chewed
+through his bindings to escape. Taken
+to Lieutenant Colonel Edwin A. Pollock,
+whose 2d Battalion, 1st Marines
+held the Ilu mouth’s defenses,
+he gasped a warning that an estimated
+250&ndash;500 Japanese soldiers were
+coming behind him. The resolute
+Vouza, rushed immediately to an aid
+station and then to the division
+hospital, miraculously survived his
+ordeal and was awarded a Silver Star
+for his heroism by General Vandegrift,
+and later a Legion of Merit.
+Vandegrift also made Vouza an
+honorary sergeant major of U.S.
+Marines.</p>
+
+<p>At 0130 on 21 August, Ichiki’s
+troops stormed the Marines’ lines in
+a screaming, frenzied display of the
+“spiritual strength” which they had
+been assured would sweep aside their
+American enemy. As the Japanese
+charged across the sand bar astride
+the Ilu’s mouth, Pollock’s Marines cut
+them down. After a mortar preparation,
+the Japanese tried again to
+storm past the sand bar. A section of
+37mm guns sprayed the enemy force
+with deadly canister. Lieutenant
+Colonel Lenard B. Cresswell’s 1st Battalion,
+1st Marines moved upstream
+on the Ilu at daybreak, waded across
+the sluggish, 50-foot-wide stream,
+and moved on the flank of the
+Japanese. Wildcats from VMF-223
+strafed the beleagured enemy force.
+Five light tanks blasted the retreating
+Japanese. By 1700, as the sun was
+setting, the battle ended.</p>
+
+<p>Colonel Ichiki, disgraced in his own
+mind by his defeat, burned his
+regimental colors and shot himself.
+Close to 800 of his men joined him
+in death. The few survivors fled eastward
+towards Taivu Point. Rear Admiral
+Raizo Tanaka, whose
+reinforcement force of transports and
+destroyers was largely responsible for
+the subsequent Japanese troop buildup
+on Guadalcanal, recognized that
+the unsupported Japanese attack was
+sheer folly and reflected that “this
+tragedy should have taught us the
+hopelessness of bamboo spear tactics.”
+Fortunately for the Marines,
+Ichiki’s overconfidence was not
+unique among Japanese commanders.</p>
+
+<div id="ip_20b" class="figcenter" style="width: 549px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_021.jpg" width="549" height="328" alt="" />
+  <div class="captionr">
+
+<p>Captain Donald L. Dickson, USMCR</p></div>
+
+<div class="captionl">
+<p class="justify"><i>Capt Donald L. Dickson said of his watercolor: “I wanted to
+catch on paper the feeling one has as a shell comes whistling
+over.... There is a sense of being alone, naked and unprotected.
+And time seems endless until the shell strikes somewhere.”</i></p></div></div>
+
+<p>Following the 1st Marines’ tangle
+with the Ichiki detachment, General
+Vandegrift was inspired to write the
+Marine Commandant, Lieutenant
+General Thomas Holcomb, and
+report: “These youngsters are the
+darndest people when they get started<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_21" id="Page_21">21</a></span>
+you ever saw.” And all the Marines
+on the island, young and old, tyro
+and veteran, were becoming accomplished
+jungle fighters. They were no
+longer “trigger happy” as many had
+been in their first days ashore, shooting
+at shadows and imagined enemy.
+They were waiting for targets,
+patrolling with enthusiasm, sure of
+themselves. The misnamed Battle of
+the Tenaru had cost Colonel Hunt’s
+regiment 34 killed in action and 75
+wounded. All the division’s Marines
+now felt they were bloodied. What
+the men on Tulagi, Gavutu, and
+Tanambogo and those of the Ilu had
+done was prove that the 1st Marine
+Division would hold fast to what it
+had won.</p>
+
+<div id="ip_21" class="figright" style="width: 276px;">
+  <div class="captionl top"><p class="justify"><i>Cactus Air Force commander, MajGen
+Roy S. Geiger, poses with Capt Joseph
+J. Foss, the leading ace at Guadalcanal
+with 26 Japanese aircraft downed. Capt
+Foss was later awarded the Medal of
+Honor for his heroic exploits in the air.</i></p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="captionr top">
+<p>
+Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 52622
+</p></div>
+  <img src="images/i_b_021b.jpg" width="276" height="239" alt="" />
+</div>
+
+<p>While the division’s Marines and
+sailors had earned a breathing spell
+as the Japanese regrouped for
+another onslaught, the action in the
+air over the Solomons intensified.
+Almost every day, Japanese aircraft
+arrived around noon to bomb the
+perimeter. Marine fighter pilots
+found the twin-engine Betty bombers
+easy targets; Zero fighters were
+another story. Although the Wildcats
+were a much sturdier aircraft, the
+Japanese Zeros’ superior speed and
+better maneuverability gave them a
+distinct edge in a dogfight. The
+American planes, however, when
+warned by the coastwatchers of
+Japanese attacks, had time to climb
+above the oncoming enemy and
+preferably attacked by making firing
+runs during high speed dives. Their
+tactics made the air space over the
+Solomons dangerous for the
+Japanese. On 29 August, the carrier
+<i>Ryujo</i> launched aircraft for a strike
+against the airstrip. Smith’s Wildcats
+shot down 16, with a loss of four of
+their own. Still, the Japanese continued
+to strike at Henderson Field
+without letup. Two days after the
+<i>Ryujo</i> raid, enemy bombers inflicted
+heavy damage on the airfield, setting
+aviation fuel ablaze and
+incinerating parked aircraft.
+VMF-223’s retaliation was a further
+bag of 13 attackers.</p>
+
+<p>On 30 August, two more MAG-23
+squadrons, VMF-224 and
+VMSB-231, flew in to Henderson.
+The air reinforcements were more
+than welcome. Steady combat attrition,
+frequent damage in the air and
+on the ground, and scant repair facilities
+and parts kept the number of
+aircraft available a dwindling
+resource.</p>
+
+<p>Plainly, General Vandegrift needed<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_22" id="Page_22">22</a></span>
+infantry reinforcements as much
+as he did additional aircraft. He
+brought the now-combined raider
+and parachute battalions, both under
+Edson’s command, and the 2d
+Battalion, 5th Marines, over to
+Guadalcanal from Tulagi. This gave
+the division commander a chance to
+order out larger reconnaissance
+patrols to probe for the Japanese. On
+27 August, the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines,
+made a shore-to-shore landing
+near Kokumbona and marched back
+to the beachhead without any measurable
+results. If the Japanese were
+out there beyond the Matanikau&mdash;and
+they were&mdash;they watched the
+Marines and waited for a better opportunity
+to attack.</p>
+
+
+<div class="chapter"></div>
+<div class="sidebar">
+<p class="in0 small"><a name="Sidebar_page_5_First_Marine_Utility_Uniform_Issued_in_World_War_II" id="Sidebar_page_5_First_Marine_Utility_Uniform_Issued_in_World_War_II"></a>[Sidebar (<a href="#Page_5">page 5</a>):]</p>
+<h3 class="nobreak p0">First Marine Utility Uniform Issued in World War II</h3>
+
+<p class="drop-cap"><span class="smcap1">The</span> United States Marine Corps entered World War
+II wearing essentially the same summer field uniform
+that it had worn during the “Banana Wars.”
+The Marines defending America’s Pacific outposts on
+Guam, Wake Island, and in the Philippines in the late
+months of 1941 wore a summer field uniform consisting
+of a khaki cotton shirt and trousers, leggings, and a
+M1917A1 steel helmet. Plans to change this uniform had
+been underway for at least one year prior to the opening
+of hostilities.</p>
+
+<p>As had the Army, the Marine Corps had used a loose-fitting
+blue denim fatigue uniform for work details and some
+field exercises since the 1920s. This fatigue uniform was
+either a one-piece coverall or a two-piece bib overall and
+jacket, both with “USMC” metal buttons. In June 1940, it
+was replaced by a green cotton coverall. This uniform and
+the summer field uniform were replaced by what would
+become known as the utility uniform. Approved for general
+issue on the Marine Corps’ 166th birthday, 10 November
+1941, this new uniform was made of sage-green (although
+“olive drab” was called for in the specifications) herringbone
+twill cotton, then a popular material for civilian work
+clothing. The two-piece uniform consisted of a coat (often
+referred to as a “jacket” by Marines) and trousers. In 1943,
+a cap made of the same material would be issued.</p>
+
+<p>The loose-fitting coat was closed down the front by four
+two-piece rivetted bronze-finished steel buttons, each bearing
+the words “U.S. MARINE CORPS” in relief. The cuffs
+were closed by similar buttons. Two large patch pockets
+were sewn on the front skirts of the jacket and a single patch
+pocket was stitched to the left breast. This pocket had the
+Marine Corps eagle, globe, and anchor insignia and the
+letters “USMC” stencilled on it in black ink. The trousers,
+worn with and without the khaki canvas leggings, had two
+slashed front pockets and two rear patch pockets.</p>
+
+<div class="figright" style="width: 253px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_005.jpg" width="253" height="216" alt="" /></div>
+
+<p>The new uniform was issued to the flood of new recruits
+crowding the recruit depots in the early months of 1942 and
+was first worn in combat during the landing on Guadalcanal
+in August 1942. This uniform was subsequently worn
+by Marines of all arms from the Solomons Campaign to
+the end of the war. Originally, the buttons on the coat and
+the trousers were all copper-plated, but an emergency alternate
+specification was approved on 15 August 1942, eight
+days after the landing on Guadalcanal, which allowed for
+a variety of finishes on the buttons. Towards the end of
+the war, a new “modified” utility uniform which had been
+developed after Tarawa was also issued, in addition to a
+variety of camouflage uniforms. All of these utility uniforms,
+along with Army-designed Ml helmets and Marine
+Corps-designed cord and rubber-soled rough-side-out
+leather “boondocker” shoes, would be worn throughout the
+war in the Pacific, during the postwar years, and into the
+Korean War.&mdash;<i>Kenneth L. Smith-Christmas</i></p>
+</div>
+
+
+<div class="chapter"></div>
+<div class="sidebar green">
+<p class="in0 small"><a name="Sidebar_page_11_LVT_1_The_Amtrac" id="Sidebar_page_11_LVT_1_The_Amtrac"></a>[Sidebar (<a href="#Page_11">page 11</a>):]</p>
+<h3 class="nobreak p0">LVT (1)&mdash;The ‘Amtrac’</h3>
+
+<p class="drop-cap"><span class="smcap1"><span class="dkgreen">W</span>hile</span> the Marine Corps was developing amphibious
+warfare doctrine during the 1920s and
+1930s, it was apparent that a motorized amphibian
+vehicle was needed to transport men and equipment
+from ships across fringing reefs and beaches into battle,
+particularly when the beach was defended.</p>
+
+<p>In 1940, the Marines adopted the Landing Vehicle,
+Tracked (1), designed by Donald Roebling. More commonly
+known as the “amtrac” (short for amphibian tractor), the
+LVT(1) had a driver’s cab in front and a small engine compartment
+in the rear, with the bulk of the body used for
+carrying space. During the next three years, 1,225 LVT(1)s
+were built, primarily by the Food Machinery Corporation.</p>
+
+<p>The LVT(1) was constructed of welded steel and was
+propelled on both land and water by paddle-type treads.
+Designed solely as a supply vehicle, it could carry 4,500
+pounds of cargo. In August 1942, the LVT(1) first saw combat
+on Guadalcanal with the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion,
+1st Marine Division. Throughout the Solomon
+Islands campaigns, the LVT(1) provided Marines all types
+of logistical support, moving thousands of tons of supplies
+to the front lines. At times they also were pressed into tactical
+use: moving artillery pieces, holding defensive positions,
+and occasionally supporting Marines in the attack
+with their machine guns. They also were used as pontoons
+to support bridges across Guadalcanal rivers.</p>
+
+<p>The LVT proved to be more seaworthy than a boat of
+comparable size; it was able to remain afloat with its entire
+cargo hold full of water. However, defects in the design
+soon became apparent. The paddle treads on the tracks
+and the rigid suspension system were both susceptible to
+damage when driven on land and did not provide the
+desired speeds on land or water. Although the LVT(1) performed
+admirably against undefended beachheads, its lack
+of armor made it unsuitable for assaults against the heavily
+defended islands of the central Pacific. This weakness
+was apparent during the fighting in the Solomon Islands,
+but LVT(1)s with improvised armor were still in use at the
+assault on Tarawa, where 75 percent of them were lost in
+three days.</p>
+
+<p>The LVT(1) proved its value and validated the amphibious
+vehicle concept through the great versatility and mobility
+it demonstrated throughout numerous campaigns in
+the Pacific. Although intended solely for supply purposes,
+it was thrust into combat use in early war engagements.
+In its initial role as a support vehicle, the LVT(1) delivered
+ammunition, supplies and reinforcements that made the
+difference between victory and defeat.&mdash;<i>Second Lieutenant
+Wesley L. Feight, USMC</i></p>
+
+<div class="figcenter" style="width: 525px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_011.jpg" width="525" height="211" alt="" /></div>
+</div>
+
+
+
+<div class="chapter"></div>
+<div class="sidebar">
+<p class="in0 small"><a name="Sidebar_page_14_General_Vandegrift_and_His_1st_Marine_Division_Staff" id="Sidebar_page_14_General_Vandegrift_and_His_1st_Marine_Division_Staff"></a>[Sidebar (<a href="#Page_16">page 14</a>):]</p>
+<h2 class="nobreak dkgreen">General Vandegrift and His 1st Marine Division Staff</h2>
+
+<p class="drop-cap"><span class="smcap1">Whenever</span> a work about the Guadalcanal operation is
+published, one of the pictures always included is
+that of Major General Alexander A. Vandegrift,
+1st Marine Division commanding general, and his staff officers
+and commanders, who posed for the photograph on 11 August
+1942, just four days after the assault landings on the island.
+Besides General Vandegrift, there are 40 Marines and
+one naval officer in this picture, and each one deserves a page
+of his own in Marine Corps history.</p>
+
+<p>Among the Marines, 23 were promoted to general officer
+rank and three became Commandants of the Marine Corps:
+General Vandegrift and Colonels Cates and Pate. The naval
+officer, division surgeon Commander Warwick T. Brown, MC,
+USN, also made flag officer rank while on active duty and
+was promoted to vice admiral upon retirement.</p>
+
+<p>Four of the officers in the picture served in three wars. Lieutenant
+Colonels Gerald C. Thomas, division operations officer,
+and Randolph McC. Pate, division logistics officer, served in
+both World Wars I and II, and each commanded the 1st Marine
+Division in Korea. Colonel William J. Whaling similarly
+served in World Wars I and II, and was General Thomas’ assistant
+division commander in Korea. Major Henry W. Buse,
+Jr., assistant operations officer, served in World War II, Korea,
+and the Vietnam War. Others served in two wars&mdash;World
+Wars I and II, or World War II and Korea. Represented in the
+photograph is a total of nearly 700 years of cumulative experience
+on active Marine Corps service.</p>
+
+<p>Three key members of the division&mdash;the Assistant Division
+Commander, Brigadier General William H. Rupertus; the Assistant
+Chief of Staff, G-1, Colonel Robert C. Kilmartin, Jr.;
+and the commanding officer of the 1st Raider Battalion, Lieutenant
+Colonel Merritt A. Edson&mdash;were not in this picture for
+a good reason. They were on Tulagi, where Rupertus headed
+the Tulagi Command Group with Kilmartin as his chief of
+staff, and Edson commanded the combat troops. Also notably
+absent from this photograph was the commander of the
+7th Marines, Colonel James C. Webb, who had not joined the
+division from Samoa, where the regiment had been sent before
+the division deployed overseas.</p>
+
+<p>In his memoir, <i>Once a Marine</i>, General Vandegrift explained
+why this photograph was taken. The division’s morale was
+affected by the fact that Vice Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher was
+forced to withdraw his fleet from the area&mdash;with many of his
+ships not yet fully unloaded and holding more than half of
+the division’s supplies still needed ashore. Adding to the Marines’
+uneasiness at seeing their naval support disappear below
+the horizon, was the fact that they had been under almost
+constant enemy air attacks beginning shortly after their landing
+on Guadalcanal. In an effort to counter the adverse influence
+on morale of the day and night air attacks, Vandegrift
+began making tours of the division perimeter every morning
+to talk to as many of his Marines as possible, and to keep a
+personal eye on the command. As he noted:</p>
+
+<blockquote>
+
+<p>By August 11, the full impact of the vanished transports was
+permeating the command, so again I called a conference of my
+staff and command officers.... I ended the conference by
+posing with this fine group of officers, a morale device that
+worked because they thought if I went to the trouble of having
+the picture taken then I obviously planned to enjoy it in
+future years.</p></blockquote>
+
+<p>Recently, General Merrill B. “Bill” Twining, on Guadalcanal
+a lieutenant colonel and assistant D-3, recalled the circumstances
+of the photograph and philosophized about the men
+who appeared in it:</p>
+
+<blockquote>
+
+<p>The group is lined up on the slope of the coral ridge which
+provided a degree of protection from naval gunfire coming from
+the north and was therefore selected as division CP....</p>
+
+<p>There was no vital reason for the conclave. I think V[andegrift]
+just wanted to see who was in his outfit. Do you realize
+these people had never been together before? Some came
+from as far away as Iceland....</p>
+
+<p>V[andegrift] mainly introduced himself, gave a brief pep talk....
+I have often been asked how we could afford to congregate
+all this talent in the face of the enemy. We didn’t believe we
+(<i>at the moment</i>) faced any threat from the Japanese. The defense
+area was small and every responsible commander could reach
+his CP in 5 minutes and after all there were a lot of good people
+along those lines. Most of the fresh-caught second lieutenants
+were battalion commanders two years later. We believed in each
+other and trusted.</p></blockquote>
+
+<p class="sigright">
+&mdash;<i>Benis M. Frank</i>
+</p>
+
+<h3 class="dkgreen">The General and His Officers on Guadalcanal, According to the Chart</h3>
+
+<div class="figright" style="width: 553px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_015.jpg" width="553" height="360" alt="" /></div>
+
+<div class="figright" style="width: 561px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_015b.jpg" width="561" height="363" alt="" /></div>
+
+<ul>
+<li class="p1 figspace">1. Col George R. Rowan<br /></li>
+<li class="figspace">2. Col Pedro A. del Valle<br /></li>
+<li class="figspace">3. Col William C. James<br /></li>
+<li class="figspace">4. MajGen Alexander A. Vandegrift<br /></li>
+<li class="figspace">5. LtCol Gerald C. Thomas<br /></li>
+<li class="figspace">6. Col Clifton B. Cates<br /></li>
+<li class="figspace">7. Col Randolph McC. Pate<br /></li>
+<li class="figspace">8. Cdr Warwick T. Brown, USN<br /></li>
+<li class="figspace">9. Col William J. Whaling<br /></li>
+<li>10. Col Frank B. Goettge<br /></li>
+<li>11. Col LeRoy P. Hunt, Jr.<br /></li>
+<li>12. LtCol Frederick C. Biebush<br /></li>
+<li>13. LtCol Edwin A. Pollock<br /></li>
+<li>14. LtCol Edmund J. Buckley<br /></li>
+<li>15. LtCol Walter W. Barr<br /></li>
+<li>16. LtCol Raymond P. Coffman<br /></li>
+<li>17. LtCol Francis R. Geraci<br /></li>
+<li>18. LtCol William E. Maxwell<br /></li>
+<li>19. LtCol Edward G. Hagen<br /></li>
+<li>20. LtCol William N. McKelvy, Jr.<br /></li>
+<li>21. LtCol Julian N. Frisbie<br /></li>
+<li>22. Maj Milton V. O’Connell<br /></li>
+<li>23. Maj William Chalfant III<br /></li>
+<li>24. Maj Horace W. Fuller<br /></li>
+<li>25. Maj Forest C. Thompson<br /></li>
+<li>26. Maj Robert G. Ballance<br /></li>
+<li>27. Maj Henry C. Buse, Jr.<br /></li>
+<li>28. Maj James W. Frazer<br /></li>
+<li>29. Maj Henry H. Crockett<br /></li>
+<li>30. LtCol Lenard B. Cresswell<br /></li>
+<li>31. Maj Robert O. Brown<br /></li>
+<li>32. LtCol John A. Bemis<br /></li>
+<li>33. Col Kenneth W. Benner<br /></li>
+<li>34. Maj Robert B. Luckey<br /></li>
+<li>35. LtCol Samuel B. Taxis<br /></li>
+<li>36. LtCol Eugene H. Price<br /></li>
+<li>37. LtCol Merrill B. Twining<br /></li>
+<li>38. LtCol Walker A. Reaves<br /></li>
+<li>39. LtCol John D. Macklin<br /></li>
+<li>40. LtCol Hawley C. Waterman<br /></li>
+<li>41. Maj James C. Murray, Jr.</li>
+</ul>
+</div>
+
+
+<div class="chapter"></div>
+<div class="sidebar">
+<p class="in0 small"><a name="Sidebar_page_17_The_Coastwatchers" id="Sidebar_page_17_The_Coastwatchers"></a>[Sidebar (<a href="#Page_17">page 17</a>):]</p>
+<h3 class="nobreak p0">The Coastwatchers</h3>
+
+<p class="drop-cap a"><span class="smcap1"><span class="dkgreen">A</span></span> group of fewer than 1,500 native Coastwatchers
+served as the eyes and ears of Allied forces in
+reporting movements of Japanese units on the
+ground, in the air, and at sea.</p>
+
+<p>Often performing their jobs in remote jungle outposts,
+the Coastwatchers were possessed of both mental and physical
+courage. Their knowledge of the geography and peoples
+of the Pacific made them invaluable additions to the Allied
+war effort.</p>
+
+<p>The concept for this service originated in 1919 in a
+proposal by the Royal Australian Navy to form a civilian
+coastwatching organization to provide early warning in the
+event of an invasion. By the outbreak of war in September
+1939, approximately 800 persons were serving as coastwatchers,
+operating observation posts mainly on the Australian
+coast. They were, at the outset, government officials
+aided by missionaries and planters who, as war with Japan
+neared, were placed under the control of the intelligence
+section of the Australian Navy.</p>
+
+<div class="figright" style="width: 253px;">
+  <div class="captionl top"><p class="justify"><i>Coastwatcher Capt W.&nbsp;F. Martin Clemens, British Solomon
+Islands Defence Force, poses with some of his constabulary.</i></p></div>
+
+<div class="captionr top clear"><p>
+National Archives Photo 80-G-17080 courtesy of Richard Frank
+</p></div>
+  <img src="images/i_b_017.jpg" width="253" height="180" alt="" />
+</div>
+
+<p>By 1942, the system of coastwatchers and the accompanying
+intelligence network covered an area of 500,000 square
+miles, and was placed under the control of the Allied Intelligence
+Bureau (AIB). The AIB coordinated Allied intelligence
+activities in the southwest Pacific, and had as its
+initial principal mission the collection of all possible information
+about the enemy in the vicinity of Guadalcanal.</p>
+
+<p>Coastwatchers proved extremely useful to U.S. Marine
+forces in providing reports on the number and movement
+of Japanese troops. Officers from the 1st Marine Division
+obtained accurate information on the location of enemy
+forces in their objective areas, and were provided vital
+reports on approaching Japanese bombing raids. On 8 August
+1942, Coastwatcher Jack Reed on Bougainville alerted
+American forces to an upcoming raid by 40 Japanese
+bombers, which resulted in 36 of the enemy planes being
+destroyed. The “early warning system” provided by the
+Coastwatchers helped Marine forces on Guadalcanal to hold
+onto the Henderson Field airstrip.</p>
+
+<p>The Coastwatchers also rescued and sheltered 118 Allied
+pilots, including Marines, during the Solomons Campaign,
+often at the immediate risk of their own lives.
+Pipe-smoking Coastwatcher Reed also was responsible for
+coordinating the evacuation on Bougainville of four nuns
+and 25 civilians by the U.S. submarine <i>Nautilus</i>.</p>
+
+<p>It is unknown exactly how many Coastwatchers paid the
+ultimate sacrifice in the performance of their duties. Many
+died in anonymity, without knowledge of the contribution
+their services had made to final victory. Perhaps they would
+be gratified to know that no less an authority than Admiral
+William F. Halsey recorded that the Coastwatchers saved
+Guadalcanal, and Guadalcanal saved the Pacific.&mdash;<i>Robert
+V. Aquilina</i></p>
+</div>
+
+
+<div class="chapter"></div>
+<div class="sidebar green">
+<p class="in0 small"><a name="Sidebar_page_19_The_1st_Marine_Division_Patch" id="Sidebar_page_19_The_1st_Marine_Division_Patch"></a>[Sidebar (<a href="#Page_20">page 19</a>):]</p>
+<h3 class="nobreak p0">The 1st Marine Division Patch</h3>
+
+<div class="figright" style="width: 251px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_019b.jpg" width="251" height="323" alt="" /></div>
+
+<p class="drop-cap"><span class="smcap1">T</span>he 1st Division shoulder patch originally was
+authorized for wear by members of units who
+were organic or attached to the division in its four
+landings in the Pacific War. It was the first unit patch to
+be authorized for wear in World War II and specifically
+commemorated the division’s sacrifices and victory in the
+battle for Guadalcanal.</p>
+
+<p>As recalled by General Merrill B. Twining, a lieutenant
+colonel and the division’s operations officer on Guadalcanal,
+for a short time before the 1st left Guadalcanal for
+Australia, there had been some discussion by the senior
+staff about uniforming the troops. It appeared that the Marines
+might have to wear Army uniforms, which meant that
+they would lose their identity and Twining came up with
+the idea for a division patch. A number of different designs
+were devised by both Lieutenant Colonel Twining and
+Captain Donald L. Dickson, adjutant of the 5th Marines,
+who had been an artist in civilian life. The one which Twining
+prepared on the flight out of Guadalcanal was approved
+by Major General Alexander A. Vandegrift, the division
+commander.</p>
+
+<p>General Twining further recalled that he drew a diamond
+in his notebook and “in the middle of the diamond I
+doodled a numeral one ... [and] I sketched in the word
+‘Guadalcanal’ down its length.... I got to thinking that
+the whole operation had been under the Southern Cross,
+so I drew that in, too.... About an hour later I took
+the drawing up to the front of the aircraft to General Vandegrift.
+He said, ‘Yes, that’s it!’ and wrote his initials, A.A.V.,
+on the bottom of the notebook page.”</p>
+
+<div class="figleft" style="width: 258px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_019.jpg" width="258" height="147" alt="" />
+  <div class="captionl justify"><i>Designer of the patch, LtCol Merrill B. Twining (later Gen)
+sits in the 1st Marine Division operations bunker. Behind
+him is his assistant D-3, a very tired Maj Henry IV. Buse, Jr.</i></div></div>
+
+<p>After he arrived in Brisbane, Australia, Colonel Twining
+bought a child’s watercolor set and, while confined to
+his hotel room by a bout of malaria, drew a bunch of diamonds
+on a big sheet, coloring each one differently. He then
+took samples to General Vandegrift, who chose one which
+was colored a shade of blue that he liked. Then Twining
+took the sketch to the Australian Knitting Mills to have it
+reproduced, pledging the credit of the post exchange funds
+to pay for the patches’ manufacture. Within a week or two
+the patches began to roll off the knitting machines, and
+Colonel Twining was there to approve them. General Twining
+further recalled: “After they came off the machine, I
+picked up a sheet of them. They looked very good, and
+when they were cut, I picked up one of the patches. It was
+one of the first off the machine.”</p>
+
+<p>The division’s post exchanges began selling the patches
+almost immediately and they proved to be popular, with
+Marines buying extras to give away as souvenirs to Australian
+friends or to send home to families. Before long,
+newly established Marine divisions, as well as the raider
+and parachute units, and as the aircraft wings, sea-going
+Marines, Fleet Marine Force Pacific units, and others, were
+authorized to have their own distinctive patch, a total of
+33, following the lead of the 1st Marine Division. Marines
+returning to the United States for duty or on leave from
+a unit having a distinctive shoulder insignia were authorized
+to wear that insignia until they were assigned to
+another unit having a shoulder patch of its own. For many
+1st Marine Division men joining another unit and having
+to relinquish the wearing of the 1st Division patch, this
+rankled.</p>
+
+<p>Shortly after the end of the war, Colonel Twining went
+to now-Marine Commandant General Vandegrift saying
+that he “no longer thought Marines should wear anything
+on their uniforms to distinguish them from other Marines.
+He agreed and the patches came off for good.”&mdash;<i>Benis M.
+Frank</i></p>
+</div>
+
+<hr />
+<div class="chapter"></div>
+<h2><a name="September_and_the_Ridge" id="September_and_the_Ridge"></a><i>September and the Ridge</i></h2>
+
+<p>Admiral McCain visited Guadalcanal
+at the end of August, arriving
+in time to greet the aerial reinforcements
+he had ordered forward, and
+also in time for a taste of Japanese
+nightly bombing. He got to experience,
+too, what was becoming
+another unwanted feature of Cactus
+nights: bombardment by Japanese
+cruisers and destroyers. General Vandegrift
+noted that McCain had gotten
+a dose of the “normal ration of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_23" id="Page_23">23</a></span>
+shells.” The admiral saw enough to
+signal his superiors that increased
+support for Guadalcanal operations
+was imperative and that the “situation
+admits no delay whatsoever.” He
+also sent a prophetic message to Admirals
+King and Nimitz: “Cactus can
+be a sinkhole for enemy air power
+and can be consolidated, expanded,
+and exploited to the enemy’s mortal
+hurt.”</p>
+
+<p>On 3 September, the Commanding
+General, 1st Marine Aircraft
+Wing, Brigadier General Roy S.
+Geiger, and his assistant wing commander,
+Colonel Louis Woods,
+moved forward to Guadalcanal to
+take charge of air operations. The arrival
+of the veteran Marine aviators
+provided an instant lift to the morale
+of the pilots and ground crews. It
+reinforced their belief that they were
+at the leading edge of air combat,
+that they were setting the pace for the
+rest of Marine aviation. Vandegrift
+could thankfully turn over the day-to-day
+management of the aerial
+defenses of Cactus to the able and experienced
+Geiger. There was no
+shortage of targets for the mixed air
+force of Marine, Army, and Navy
+flyers. Daily air attacks by the
+Japanese, coupled with steady reinforcement<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_24" id="Page_24">24</a></span>
+attempts by Tanaka’s destroyers
+and transports, meant that
+every type of plane that could lift off
+Henderson’s runway was airborne as
+often as possible. Seabees had begun
+work on a second airstrip, Fighter
+One, which could relieve some of the
+pressure on the primary airfield.</p>
+
+<div id="ip_24" class="figcenter" style="width: 547px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_024.jpg" width="547" height="295" alt="" />
+  <div class="captionr">
+
+<p>National Archives Photo 80-G-29536-413C</p></div>
+
+<div class="captionl">
+<p class="justify"><i>This is an oblique view of Henderson Field looking north with
+Ironbottom Sound (Sealark Channel) in the background. At
+the left center is the “Pagoda,” operations center of Cactus Air
+Force flyers throughout their first months of operations ashore.</i></p></div></div>
+
+<p>Most of General Kawaguchi’s
+brigade had reached Guadalcanal.
+Those who hadn’t, missed their landfall
+forever as a result of American
+air attacks. Kawaguchi had in mind
+a surprise attack on the heart of the
+Marine position, a thrust from the
+jungle directly at the airfield. To
+reach his jumpoff position, the
+Japanese general would have to move
+through difficult terrain unobserved,
+carving his way through the dense
+vegetation out of sight of Marine
+patrols. The rugged approach route
+would lead him to a prominent ridge
+topped by Kunai grass which wove
+snake-like through the jungle to within
+a mile of Henderson’s runway.
+Unknown to the Japanese, General
+Vandegrift planned on moving his
+headquarters to the shelter of a spot
+at the inland base of this ridge, a site
+better protected, it was hoped, from
+enemy bombing and shellfire.</p>
+
+<div id="ip_24b" class="figcenter" style="width: 360px;">
+  <div class="captionl top"><p class="justify"><i>Marine ground crewmen attempt to put out one of many fires occuring after a
+Japanese bombing raid on Henderson Field causing the loss of much-needed aircraft.</i></p></div>
+
+<div class="captionr top"><p>
+Marine Corps Personal Papers Collection
+</p></div>
+  <img src="images/i_b_024b.jpg" width="360" height="245" alt="" />
+</div>
+
+<p>The success of Kawaguchi’s plan
+depended upon the Marines keeping
+the inland perimeter thinly manned
+while they concentrated their forces
+on the east and west flanks. This was
+not to be. Available intelligence, including
+a captured enemy map,
+pointed to the likelihood of an attack
+on the airfield and Vandegrift moved
+his combined raider-parachute battalion
+to the most obvious enemy approach
+route, the ridge. Colonel
+Edson’s men, who scouted Savo Island
+after moving to Guadalcanal
+and destroyed a Japanese supply base<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_25" id="Page_25">25</a></span>
+at Tasimboko in another shore-to-shore
+raid, took up positions on the
+forward slopes of the ridge at the
+edge of the encroaching jungle on 10
+September. Their commander later
+said that he “was firmly convinced
+that we were in the path of the next
+Jap attack.” Earlier patrols had spotted
+a sizable Japanese force approaching.
+Accordingly, Edson
+patrolled extensively as his men dug
+in on the ridge and in the flanking
+jungle. On the 12th, the Marines
+made contact with enemy patrols
+confirming the fact that Japanese
+troops were definitely “out front.”
+Kawaguchi had about 2,000 of his
+men with him, enough he thought to
+punch through to the airfield.</p>
+
+<p>Japanese planes had dropped
+500-pound bombs along the ridge on
+the 11th and enemy ships began
+shelling the area after nightfall on the
+12th, once the threat of American air
+attacks subsided. The first Japanese
+thrust came at 2100 against Edson’s
+left flank. Boiling out of the jungle,
+the enemy soldiers attacked fearlessly
+into the face of rifle and machine gun
+fire, closing to bayonet range. They
+were thrown back. They came again,
+this time against the right flank,
+penetrating the Marines’ positions.
+Again they were thrown back. A
+third attack closed out the night’s action.
+Again it was a close affair, but
+by 0230 Edson told Vandegrift his
+men could hold. And they did.</p>
+
+<div id="ip_25" class="figcenter" style="width: 551px;">
+  <div class="captionl top"><p class="justify"><i>The raging battle of Edson’s Ridge is depicted in all its fury
+in this oil painting by the late Col Donald L. Dickson, who,
+as a captain, was adjutant of the 5th Marines on Guadalcanal.
+Dickson’s artwork later was shown widely in the United States.</i></p></div>
+
+<div class="captionr top"><p>
+Captain Donald L. Dickson, USMCR
+</p></div>
+  <img src="images/i_b_025.jpg" width="551" height="384" alt="" />
+</div>
+
+<p>On the morning of 13 September,
+Edson called his company commanders
+together and told them:
+“They were just testing, just testing.
+They’ll be back.” He ordered all positions
+improved and defenses consolidated
+and pulled his lines towards
+the airfield along the ridge’s center
+spine. The 2d Battalion, 5th Marines,
+his backup on Tulagi, moved into position
+to reinforce again.</p>
+
+<div id="ip_25b" class="figcenter" style="width: 746px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_026.jpg" width="746" height="520" alt="" />
+  <div class="caption"><p>EDSON’S (BLOODY) RIDGE</p>
+
+<p class="smaller">12&ndash;14 SEPTEMBER 1942</p></div></div>
+
+<div id="ip_25c" class="figcenter" style="width: 548px;">
+  <div class="captionl top"><p class="justify"><i>Edson’s or Raider’s Ridge is calm after the fighting on the nights
+of 12&ndash;13 and 13&ndash;14 September, when it was the scene of a valiant
+and bloody defense crucial to safeguarding Henderson
+Field and the Marine perimeter on Guadalcanal. The knobs
+at left background were Col Edson’s final defensive position,
+while Henderson Field lies beyond the trees in the background.</i></p></div>
+
+<div class="captionr top"><p>
+Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 500007
+</p></div>
+  <img src="images/i_b_026b.jpg" width="548" height="308" alt="" />
+</div>
+
+<div id="ip_25d" class="figleft" style="width: 175px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_027.jpg" width="175" height="233" alt="" />
+  <div class="captionr">
+
+<p>Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 310563</p></div>
+
+<div class="captionl">
+<p><i>Maj Kenneth D. Bailey, commander of
+Company C, 1st Raider Battalion, was
+awarded the Medal of Honor posthumously
+for heroic and inspiring leadership
+during the Battle of Edson’s Ridge.</i></p></div></div>
+
+<p>The next night’s attacks were as
+fierce as any man had seen. The
+Japanese were everywhere, fighting
+hand-to-hand in the Marines’ foxholes
+and gun pits and filtering past
+forward positions to attack from the
+rear. Division Sergeant Major
+Sheffield Banta shot one in the new
+command post. Colonel Edson appeared
+wherever the fighting was
+toughest, encouraging his men to
+their utmost efforts. The man-to-man
+battles lapped over into the jungle on
+either flank of the ridge, and engineer
+and pioneer positions were attacked.
+The reserve from the 5th Marines
+was fed into the fight. Artillerymen
+from the 5th Battalion, 11th Marines,
+as they had on the previous night,
+fired their 105mm howitzers at any
+called target. The range grew as short
+as 1,600 yards from tube to impact.
+The Japanese finally could take no
+more. They pulled back as dawn approached.
+On the slopes of the ridge
+and in the surrounding jungle they
+left more than 600 bodies; another
+600 men were wounded. The remnants
+of the Kawaguchi force staggered
+back toward their lines to the
+west, a grueling, hellish eight-day
+march that saw many more of the
+enemy perish.</p>
+
+<p>The cost to Edson’s force for its
+epic defense was also heavy. Fifty-nine
+men were dead, 10 were missing
+in action, and 194 were wounded.
+These losses, coupled with the
+casualties of Tulagi, Gavutu, and
+Tanambogo, meant the end of the 1st
+Parachute Battalion as an effective
+fighting unit. Only 89 men of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_27" id="Page_27">27</a></span>
+parachutists’ original strength could
+walk off the ridge, soon in legend to
+become “Bloody Ridge” or “Edson’s
+Ridge.” Both Colonel Edson and Captain
+Kenneth D. Bailey, commanding
+the raider’s Company C, were awarded
+the Medal of Honor for their
+heroic and inspirational actions.</p>
+
+<p>On 13 and 14 September, the
+Japanese attempted to support
+Kawaguchi’s attack on the ridge with
+thrusts against the flanks of the Marine
+perimeter. On the east, enemy
+troops attempting to penetrate the
+lines of the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines,
+were caught in the open on a grass
+plain and smothered by artillery fire;
+at least 200 died. On the west, the
+3d Battalion, 5th Marines, holding
+ridge positions covering the coastal
+road, fought off a determined attacking
+force that reached its front lines.</p>
+
+<div id="ip_27" class="figcenter" style="width: 551px;">
+  <div class="captionl top"><p class="justify"><i>The Pagoda at Henderson Field, served as headquarters for
+Cactus Air Force throughout the first months of air operations
+on Guadalcanal. From this building, Allied planes were sent
+against Japanese troops on other islands of the Solomons.</i></p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="captionr top">
+<p>
+Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 50921
+</p></div>
+  <img src="images/i_b_027b.jpg" width="551" height="400" alt="" />
+</div>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_28" id="Page_28">28</a></span>
+The victory at the ridge gave a
+great boost to Allied homefront
+morale, and reinforced the opinion
+of the men ashore on Guadalcanal
+that they could take on anything the
+enemy could send against them. At
+upper command echelons, the leaders
+were not so sure that the ground
+Marines and their motley air force
+could hold. Intercepted Japanese dispatches
+revealed that the myth of the
+2,000-man defending force had been
+completely dispelled. Sizable naval
+forces and two divisions of Japanese
+troops were now committed to conquer
+the Americans on Guadalcanal.
+Cactus Air Force, augmented frequently
+by Navy carrier squadrons,
+made the planned reinforcement effort
+a high-risk venture. But it was
+a risk the Japanese were prepared to
+take.</p>
+
+<p>On 18 September, the long-awaited
+7th Marines, reinforced by
+the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, and
+other division troops, arrived at
+Guadalcanal. As the men from
+Samoa landed they were greeted with
+friendly derision by Marines already
+on the island. The 7th had been the
+first regiment of the 1st Division to
+go overseas; its men, many thought
+then, were likely to be the first to see
+combat. The division had been careful
+to send some of its best men to
+Samoa and now had them back. One
+of the new and salty combat veterans
+of the 5th Marines remarked to a
+friend in the 7th that he had waited
+a long time “to see our first team get
+into the game.” Providentially, a
+separate supply convoy reached the
+island at the same time as the 7th’s
+arrival, bringing with it badly needed
+aviation gas and the first resupply
+of ammunition since D-Day.</p>
+
+<p>The Navy covering force for the
+American reinforcement and supply
+convoys was hit hard by Japanese
+submarines. The carrier <i>Wasp</i> was
+torpedoed and sunk, the battleship
+<i>North Carolina</i> (BB 55) was
+damaged, and the destroyer <i>O’Brien</i>
+(DD 415) was hit so badly it broke
+up and sank on its way to drydock.
+The Navy had accomplished its mission,
+the 7th Marines had landed,
+but at a terrible cost. About the only
+good result of the devastating
+Japanese torpedo attacks was that the
+<i>Wasp</i>’s surviving aircraft joined Cactus
+Air Force, as the planes of the
+<i>Saratoga</i> and <i>Enterprise</i> had done
+when their carriers required combat
+repairs. Now, the <i>Hornet</i> (CV 8) was
+the only whole fleet carrier left in the
+South Pacific.</p>
+
+<p>As the ships that brought the 7th
+Marines withdrew, they took with
+them the survivors of the 1st
+Parachute Battalion and sick bays full
+of badly wounded men. General
+Vandegrift now had 10 infantry battalions,
+one understrength raider battalion,
+and five artillery battalions
+ashore; the 3d Battalion, 2d Marines,
+had come over from Tulagi also. He
+reorganized the defensive perimeter
+into 10 sectors for better control, giving
+the engineer, pioneer, and amphibian
+tractor battalions sectors
+along the beach. Infantry battalions
+manned the other sectors, including
+the inland perimeter in the jungle.
+Each infantry regiment had two battalions
+on line and one in reserve.
+Vandegrift also had the use of a select
+group of infantrymen who were
+training to be scouts and snipers under
+the leadership of Colonel William
+J. “Wild Bill” Whaling, an experienced
+jungle hand, marksman,
+and hunter, whom he had appointed
+to run a school to sharpen the division’s
+fighting skills. As men
+finished their training under Whaling
+and went back to their outfits,
+others took their place and the Whaling
+group was available to scout and
+spearhead operations.</p>
+
+<p>Vandegrift now had enough men
+ashore on Guadalcanal, 19,200, to
+expand his defensive scheme. He
+decided to seize a forward position
+along the east bank of the Matanikau
+River, in effect strongly outposting
+his west flank defenses against the
+probability of strong enemy attacks
+from the area where most Japanese
+troops were landing. First, however,
+he was going to test the Japanese
+reaction with a strong probing force.</p>
+
+<p>He chose the fresh 1st Battalion,
+7th Marines, commanded by Lieutenant
+Colonel Lewis B. “Chesty”
+Puller, to move inland along the
+slopes of Mt. Austen and patrol
+north towards the coast and the
+Japanese-held area. Puller’s battalion
+ran into Japanese troops bivouacked
+on the slopes of Austen on the 24th
+and in a sharp firefight had seven
+men killed and 25 wounded. Vandegrift
+sent the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines,
+forward to reinforce Puller and
+help provide the men needed to carry
+the casualties out of the jungle.
+Now reinforced, Puller continued his
+advance, moving down the east bank
+of the Matanikau. He reached the
+coast on the 26th as planned, where
+he drew intensive fire from enemy
+positions on the ridges west of the
+river. An attempt by the 2d Battalion,
+5th Marines, to cross was beaten
+back.</p>
+
+<p>About this time, the 1st Raider
+Battalion, its original mission one of
+establishing a patrol base west of the
+Matanikau, reached the vicinity of
+the firefight, and joined in. Vandegrift
+sent Colonel Edson, now the
+commander of the 5th Marines, forward
+to take charge of the expanded
+force. He was directed to attack on
+the 27th and decided to send the raiders
+inland to outflank the Japanese
+defenders. The battalion, commanded
+by Edson’s former executive
+officer, Lieutenant Colonel Samuel B.
+Griffith II, ran into a hornet’s nest of
+Japanese who had crossed the
+Matanikau during the night. A garbled
+message led Edson to believe
+that Griffith’s men were advancing
+according to plan, so he decided to
+land the companies of the 1st Battalion,
+7th Marines, behind the enemy’s
+Matanikau position and strike the
+Japanese from the rear while Rosecran’s
+men attacked across the river.</p>
+
+<p>The landing was made without incident<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_29" id="Page_29">29</a></span>
+and the 7th Marines’ companies
+moved inland only to be
+ambushed and cut off from the sea
+by the Japanese. A rescue force of
+landing craft moved with difficulty
+through Japanese fire, urged on by
+Puller who accompanied the boats
+on the destroyer <i>Ballard</i> (DD 660).
+The Marines were evacuated after
+fighting their way to the beach covered
+by the destroyer’s fire and the
+machine guns of a Marine SBD overhead.
+Once the 7th Marines companies
+got back to the perimeter,
+landing near Kukum, the raider and
+5th Marines battalions pulled back
+from the Matanikau. The confirmation
+that the Japanese would strongly
+contest any westward advance cost
+the Marines 60 men killed and 100
+wounded.</p>
+
+<div id="ip_29" class="figcenter" style="width: 363px;">
+  <div class="captionl top"><p class="justify"><i>Shortly after becoming Commander, South Pacific Area and Forces, VAdm William
+F. Halsey visited Guadalcanal and the 1st Marine Division. Here he is shown
+talking with Col Gerald C. Thomas, 1st Marine Division D-3 (Operations Officer).</i></p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="captionr top">
+<p>
+Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 53523
+</p></div>
+  <img src="images/i_b_029b.jpg" width="363" height="241" alt="" />
+</div>
+
+<p>The Japanese the Marines had encountered
+were mainly men from the
+<i>4th Regiment</i> of the <i>2d (Sendai) Division</i>;
+prisoners confirmed that the
+division was landing on the island.
+Included in the enemy reinforcements
+were 150mm howitzers, guns capable
+of shelling the airfield from positions
+near Kokumbona. Clearly, a
+new and stronger enemy attack was
+pending.</p>
+
+<p>As September drew to a close, a
+flood of promotions had reached the
+division, nine lieutenant colonels put
+on their colonel’s eagles and there
+were 14 new lieutenant colonels also.
+Vandegrift made Colonel Gerald C.
+Thomas, his former operations<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_30" id="Page_30">30</a></span>
+officer, the new division chief of
+staff, and had a short time earlier
+given Edson the 5th Marines. Many
+of the older, senior officers, picked
+for the most part in the order they
+had joined the division, were now
+sent back to the States. There they
+would provide a new level of combat
+expertise in the training and organization
+of the many Marine units
+that were forming. The air wing was
+not quite ready yet to return its experienced
+pilots to rear areas, but the
+vital combat knowledge they possessed
+was much needed in the training
+pipeline. They, too&mdash;the
+survivors&mdash;would soon be rotating
+back to rear areas, some for a much-needed
+break before returning to
+combat and others to lead new squadrons
+into the fray.</p>
+
+<div id="ip_30" class="figcenter" style="width: 380px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_030.jpg" width="380" height="152" alt="" />
+  <div class="captionl">Japanese Model 4 (1919) 150mm Howitzer</div></div>
+
+
+<div class="chapter"></div>
+<div class="sidebar">
+<p class="in0 small"><a name="Sidebar_page_22_Sergeant_Major_Sir_Jacob_Charles_Vouza" id="Sidebar_page_22_Sergeant_Major_Sir_Jacob_Charles_Vouza"></a>[Sidebar (<a href="#Page_22">page 22</a>):]</p>
+<h3 class="nobreak p0">Sergeant Major Sir Jacob Charles Vouza</h3>
+
+<div id="ip_gright" class="figright" style="width: 254px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_022.jpg" width="254" height="309" alt="" /></div>
+
+<p class="drop-cap"><span class="smcap1">J</span>acob Charles Vouza was born in 1900 at Tasimboko,
+Guadalcanal, British Solomon Islands Protectorate,
+and educated at the South Seas Evangelical Mission
+School there. In 1916 he joined the Solomon Islands Protectorate
+Armed Constabulary, from which he retired at
+the rank of sergeant major in 1941 after 25 years of service.</p>
+
+<p>After the Japanese invaded his home island in World War
+II, he returned to active duty with the British forces and
+volunteered to work with the Coastwatchers. Vouza’s experience
+as a scout had already been established when the
+1st Marine Division landed on Guadalcanal. On 7 August
+1942 he rescued a downed naval pilot from the USS <i>Wasp</i>
+who was shot down inside Japanese territory. He guided
+the pilot to friendly lines where Vouza met the Marines for
+the first time.</p>
+
+<p>Vouza then volunteered to scout behind enemy lines for
+the Marines. On 27 August he was captured by the Japanese
+while on a Marine Corps mission to locate suspected enemy
+lookout stations. Having found a small American flag
+in Vouza’s loincloth, the Japanese tied him to a tree and
+tried to force him to reveal information about Allied forces.
+Vouza was questioned for hours, but refused to talk. He
+was tortured and bayoneted about the arms, throat, shoulder,
+face, and stomach, and left to die.</p>
+
+<p>He managed to free himself after his captors departed,
+and made his way through the miles of jungle to American
+lines. There he gave valuable intelligence information
+to the Marines about an impending Japanese attack before
+accepting medical attention.</p>
+
+<p>After spending 12 days in the hospital, Vouza then
+returned to duty as the chief scout for the Marines. He accompanied
+Lieutenant Colonel Evans F. Carlson and the
+2d Marine Raider Battalion when they made their 30-day
+raid behind enemy lines at Guadalcanal.</p>
+
+<p>Sergeant Major Vouza was highly decorated for his
+World War II service. The Silver Star was presented to him
+personally by Major General Alexander A. Vandegrift,
+commanding general of the 1st Marine Division, for refusing
+to give information under Japanese torture. He also was
+awarded the Legion of Merit for outstanding service with
+the 2d Raider Battalion during November and December
+1942, and the British George Medal for gallant conduct and
+exceptional devotion to duty. He later received the Police
+Long Service Medal and, in 1957, was made a Member of
+the British Empire for long and faithful government service.</p>
+
+<p>After the war, Vouza continued to serve his fellow islanders.
+In 1949, he was appointed district headman, and
+president of the Guadalcanal Council, from 1952&ndash;1958. He
+served as a member of the British Solomon Islands Protectorate
+Advisory Council from 1950 to 1960.</p>
+
+<p>He made many friends during his long association with
+the U.S. Marine Corps and through the years was continually
+visited on Guadalcanal by Marines. During 1968, Vouza
+visited the United States, where he was the honored guest
+of the 1st Marine Division Association. In 1979, he was
+knighted by Britain’s Queen Elizabeth II. He died on 15
+March 1984.&mdash;<i>Ann A. Ferrante</i></p>
+</div>
+
+
+<div class="chapter"></div>
+<div class="sidebar">
+<p class="in0 small"><a name="Sidebar_page_23_M3A1_37mm_Antitank_Gun" id="Sidebar_page_23_M3A1_37mm_Antitank_Gun"></a>[Sidebar (<a href="#Page_24">page 23</a>):]</p>
+<h3 class="nobreak p0">M3A1 37mm Antitank Gun</h3>
+
+<p class="drop-cap"><span class="smcap1"><span class="dkgreen">T</span>he</span> M3 antitank gun, based on the successful German
+<i>Panzer Abwehr Kanone</i> (PAK)-36, was developed
+by the U.S. Army in the late 1930s as a
+replacement for the French 37mm Puteaux gun, used in
+World War I but unable to destroy new tanks being
+produced.</p>
+
+<p>The M3 was adopted because of its accuracy, fire control,
+penetration, and mobility. Towed by its prime mover,
+the 4×4 quarter-ton truck, the gun would trail at 50 mph
+on roads. When traveling crosscountry, gullies, shell holes,
+mud holes, and slopes of 26 degrees were negotiated with
+ease. In 1941, the gun was redesignated the M3A1 when
+the muzzles were threaded to accept a muzzle brake that
+was rarely, if ever, used.</p>
+
+<p>At the time of its adoption, the M3 could destroy any
+tank then being produced in the world. However, by the
+time the United States entered the war, the M3 was outmatched
+by the tanks it would have met in Europe. The
+Japanese tanks were smaller and more vulnerable to the
+M3 throughout the war. In the Pacific, it was used against
+bunkers, pillboxes and, when loaded with canister, against
+banzai charges. It was employed throughout the war by
+Marine regimental weapons companies, but in reduced
+numbers as the fighting continued. It was replaced in the
+European Theater by the M1 57mm antitank gun.</p>
+
+<p>The 37mm antitank gun, manned by a crew of four who
+fired a 1.61-pound projectile with an effective range of 500
+yards.&mdash;<i>Stephen L. Amos and Kenneth L. Smith-Christmas</i></p>
+
+<div class="figcenter" style="width: 524px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_023.jpg" width="524" height="339" alt="" /></div>
+</div>
+
+<div id="Sidebar_page_29" class="sidebar">
+<p class="in0 small">[Sidebar (<a href="#Page_29">page 29</a>):]</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+The President of the United States<br />
+takes pleasure in presenting<br />
+the Medal of Honor posthumously to<br />
+Douglas Albert Munro<br />
+Signalman First Class<br />
+United States Coast Guard<br />
+for service as set forth<br />
+in the following citation:
+</p>
+
+<div class="figright" style="width: 365px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_029.jpg" width="365" height="285" alt="" />
+  <div class="captionr">
+
+<p>
+Painting by Bernard D’Andrea, Courtesy of U.S. Coast Guard Historical Office
+</p></div></div>
+
+<blockquote>
+
+<p>For extraordinary heroism and conspicuous
+gallantry in action above and beyond the call
+of duty as Officer in Charge of a group of
+twenty-four Higgins boats engaged in the
+evacuation of a battalion of Marines trapped
+by enemy Japanese forces at Point Cruz,
+Guadalcanal, on September 27, 1942. After
+making preliminary plans for the evacuation
+of nearly five hundred beleaguered Marines,
+Munro, under constant strafing by enemy
+machine guns on the island and at great risk
+of his life, daringly led five of his small craft
+toward the shore. As he closed the beach, he
+signalled the others to land and then in order
+to draw the enemy’s fire and protect the
+heavily loaded boats, he valiantly placed his
+craft, with its two small guns, as a shield between
+the beachhead and the Japanese. When
+the perilous task of evacuation was nearly
+completed, Munro was instantly killed by
+enemy fire, but his crew, two of whom were
+wounded, carried on until the last boat had
+loaded and cleared the beach. By his outstanding
+leadership, expert planning, and
+dauntless devotion to duty, he and his courageous
+comrades undoubtedly saved the
+lives of many who otherwise would have
+perished. He gallantly gave up his life in
+defense of his country. /s/ Franklin Roosevelt</p></blockquote>
+</div>
+
+<hr />
+<div class="chapter"></div>
+<h2><a name="October_and_the_Japanese_Offensive" id="October_and_the_Japanese_Offensive"></a><i>October and the Japanese Offensive</i></h2>
+
+<p>On 30 September, unexpectedly, a
+B-17 carrying Admiral Nimitz made
+an emergency landing at Henderson
+Field. The CinCPac made the most
+of the opportunity. He visited the
+front lines, saw Edson’s Ridge, and
+talked to a number of Marines. He
+reaffirmed to Vandegrift that his
+overriding mission was to hold the
+airfield. He promised all the support
+he could give and after awarding
+Navy Crosses to a number of Marines,
+including Vandegrift, left the
+next day visibly encouraged by what
+he had seen.</p>
+
+<div id="ip_30b" class="figcenter" style="width: 548px;">
+  <div class="captionl top"><p class="justify"><i>Visiting Guadalcanal on 30 September, Adm Chester W.
+Nimitz, CinCPac, took time to decorate LtCol Evans C. Carlson,
+CO, 2d Raider Battalion; MajGen Vandegrift, in rear;
+and, from left, BGen William H. Rupertus, ADC; Col Merritt
+A. Edson, CO, 5th Marines; LtCol Edwin A. Pollock, CO,
+2d Battalion, 1st Marines; Maj John L. Smith, CO, VMF-223.</i></p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="captionr top"><p>
+Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 50883
+</p></div>
+  <img src="images/i_b_030b.jpg" width="548" height="363" alt="" />
+</div>
+
+<p>The next Marine move involved a
+punishing return to the Matanikau,
+this time with five infantry battalions
+and the Whaling group. Whaling
+commanded his men and the 3d Battalion,
+2d Marines, in a thrust inland
+to clear the way for two battalions
+of the 7th Marines, the 1st and 2d,
+to drive through and hook toward
+the coast, hitting the Japanese holding<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_31" id="Page_31">31</a></span>
+along the Matanikau. Edson’s 2d
+and 3d Battalions would attack
+across the river mouth. All the division’s
+artillery was positioned to fire
+in support.</p>
+
+<div id="ip_31" class="figcenter" style="width: 553px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_031.jpg" width="553" height="330" alt="" />
+  <div class="captionr">
+
+<p>Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 61534</p></div>
+
+<div class="captionl">
+<p class="justify"><i>A M1918 155mm howitzer is fired by artillery crewmen of the
+11th Marines in support of ground forces attacking the enemy.
+Despite the lack of sound-flash equipment to locate hostile
+artillery, Col del Valle’s guns were able to quiet enemy fire.</i></p></div></div>
+
+<p>On the 7th, Whaling’s force moved
+into the jungle about 2,000 yards upstream
+on the Matanikau, encountering
+Japanese troops that harassed his
+forward elements, but not in enough
+strength to stop the advance. He
+bypassed the enemy positions and
+dug in for the night. Behind him the
+7th Marines followed suit, prepared
+to move through his lines, cross the
+river, and attack north toward the
+Japanese on the 8th. The 5th Marines’
+assault battalions moving
+toward the Matanikau on the 7th ran
+into Japanese in strength about 400
+yards from the river. Unwittingly, the
+Marines had run into strong advance
+elements of the Japanese <i>4th Regiment</i>,
+which had crossed the
+Matanikau in order to establish a
+base from which artillery could fire
+into the Marine perimeter. The fighting
+was intense and the 3d Battalion,
+5th, could make little progress,
+although the 2d Battalion encountered
+slight opposition and won
+through to the river bank. It then
+turned north to hit the inland flank
+of the enemy troops. Vandegrift sent
+forward a company of raiders to reinforce
+the 5th, and it took a holding
+position on the right, towards the
+beach.</p>
+
+<p>Rain poured down on the 8th, all
+day long, virtually stopping all forward
+progress, but not halting the
+close-in fighting around the Japanese
+pocket. The enemy troops finally
+retreated, attempting to escape the
+gradually encircling Marines. They
+smashed into the raider’s position
+nearest to their escape route. A wild
+hand-to-hand battle ensued and a
+few Japanese broke through to reach
+and cross the river. The rest died
+fighting.</p>
+
+<div id="ip_32" class="figright" style="width: 362px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_032.jpg" width="362" height="187" alt="" />
+  <div class="captionr"><p>Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 50963</p></div>
+
+<div class="captionl">
+<p class="justify"><i>More than 200 Japanese soldiers alone were killed in a frenzied attack in the sandspit
+where the Tenaru River flows into Ironbottom Sound (Sealark Channel).</i></p></div></div>
+
+<p>On the 9th, Whaling’s force,
+flanked by the 2d and then the 1st
+Battalion, 7th Marines, crossed the
+Matanikau and then turned and followed
+ridge lines to the sea. Puller’s
+battalion discovered a number of
+Japanese in a ravine to his front, fired
+his mortars, and called in artillery,
+while his men used rifles and
+machine guns to pick off enemy
+troops trying to escape what proved
+to be a death trap. When his mortar
+ammunition began to run short,
+Puller moved on toward the beach,
+joining the rest of Whaling’s force,
+which had encountered no opposition.
+The Marines then recrossed the
+Mantanikau, joined Edson’s troops,
+and marched back to the perimeter,
+leaving a strong combat outpost at
+the Matanikau, now cleared of
+Japanese. General Vandegrift, apprised
+by intelligence sources that a
+major Japanese attack was coming
+from the west, decided to consolidate
+his positions, leaving no sizable Marine
+force more than a day’s march
+from the perimeter. The Marine advance
+on 7&ndash;9 October had thwarted
+Japanese plans for an early attack
+and cost the enemy more than 700
+men. The Marines paid a price too,
+65 dead and 125 wounded.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_32" id="Page_32">32</a></span>
+There was another price that
+Guadalcanal was exacting from both
+sides. Disease was beginning to fell
+men in numbers that equalled the
+battle casualties. In addition to gastroenteritis,
+which greatly weakened
+those who suffered its crippling
+stomach cramps, there were all kinds
+of tropical fungus infections, collectively
+known as “jungle rot,” which
+produced uncomfortable rashes on
+men’s feet, armpits, elbows, and
+crotches, a product of seldom being
+dry. If it didn’t rain, sweat provided
+the moisture. On top of this came
+hundreds of cases of malaria.
+Atabrine tablets provided some
+relief, besides turning the skin yellow,
+but they were not effective enough
+to stop the spread of the mosquito-borne
+infection. Malaria attacks were
+so pervasive that nothing short of
+complete prostration, becoming a litter
+case, could earn a respite in the
+hospital. Naturally enough, all these
+diseases affected most strongly the
+men who had been on the island the
+longest, particularly those who experienced
+the early days of short rations.
+Vandegrift had already argued
+with his superiors that when his men
+eventually got relieved they should
+not be sent to another tropical island
+hospital, but rather to a place where
+there was a real change of atmosphere
+and climate. He asked that
+Auckland or Wellington, New
+Zealand, be considered.</p>
+
+<p>For the present, however, there
+was to be no relief for men starting
+their third month on Guadalcanal.
+The Japanese would not abandon
+their plan to seize back Guadalcanal
+and gave painful evidence of their intentions
+near mid-October. General
+Hyakutake himself landed on
+Guadalcanal on 7 October to oversee
+the coming offensive. Elements of
+Major General Masao Maruyama’s
+<i>Sendai Division</i>, already a factor in
+the fighting near the Matanikau,
+landed with him. More men were
+coming. And the Japanese, taking
+advantage of the fact that Cactus
+flyers had no night attack capability,
+planned to ensure that no planes
+at all would rise from Guadalcanal
+to meet them.</p>
+
+<div id="ip_32b" class="figcenter" style="width: 550px;">
+  <div class="captionl top justify"><i>By October, malaria began to claim as many casualties as
+Japanese artillery, bombs, and naval gunfire. Shown here are
+the patients in the division hospital who are ministered to by
+physicians and corpsmen working under minimal conditions.</i></div>
+  <img src="images/i_b_032b.jpg" width="550" height="220" alt="" />
+</div>
+
+<p>On 11 October, U.S. Navy surface
+ships took a hand in stopping the
+“Tokyo Express,” the nickname that
+had been given to Admiral Tanaka’s
+almost nightly reinforcement forays.
+A covering force of five cruisers and
+five destroyers, located near Rennell
+Island and commanded by Rear Admiral
+Norman Scott, got word that
+many ships were approaching
+Guadalcanal. Scott’s mission was to
+protect an approaching reinforcement
+convoy and he steamed toward
+Cactus at flank speed eager to engage.
+He encountered more ships
+than he had expected, a bombardment<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_33" id="Page_33">33</a></span>
+group of three heavy cruisers
+and two destroyers, as well as six destroyers
+escorting two seaplane carrier
+transports. Scott maneuvered between
+Savo Island and Cape Esperance,
+Guadalcanal’s western tip, and
+ran head-on into the bombardment
+group.</p>
+
+<p>Alerted by a scout plane from his
+flagship, <i>San Francisco</i> (CA 38),
+spottings later confirmed by radar
+contacts on the <i>Helena</i> (CL 50), the
+Americans opened fire before the
+Japanese, who had no radar, knew
+of their presence. One enemy destroyer
+sank immediately, two cruisers
+were badly damaged, one, the
+<i>Furutaka</i>, later foundered, and the
+remaining cruiser and destroyer
+turned away from the inferno of
+American fire. Scott’s own force was
+punished by enemy return fire which
+damaged two cruisers and two destroyers,
+one of which, the <i>Duncan</i>
+(DD 485), sank the following day.
+On the 12th too, Cactus flyers spotted
+two of the reinforcement destroyer
+escorts retiring and sank them
+both. The Battle of Cape Esperance
+could be counted an American naval
+victory, one sorely needed at the
+time.</p>
+
+<div id="ip_33" class="figleft" style="width: 173px;">
+  <div class="captionl top"><p class="justify"><i>Maj Harold W. Bauer, VMF-212 commander,
+here a captain, was posthumously
+awarded the Medal of Honor
+after being lost during a scramble with
+Japanese aircraft over Guadalcanal.</i></p></div>
+
+<div class="captionr top"><p>
+Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 410772
+</p></div>
+  <img src="images/i_b_033.jpg" width="173" height="225" alt="" />
+</div>
+
+<p>Its way cleared by Scott’s encounter
+with the Japanese, a really welcome
+reinforcement convoy arrived
+at the island on 13 October when the
+164th Infantry of the Americal Division
+arrived. The soldiers, members
+of a National Guard outfit
+originally from North Dakota, were
+equipped with Garand M-1 rifles, a
+weapon of which most overseas Marines
+had only heard. In rate of fire,
+the semiautomatic Garand could easily
+outperform the single-shot, bolt-action
+Springfields the Marines carried
+and the bolt-action rifles the
+Japanese carried, but most 1st Division
+Marines of necessity touted the
+Springfield as inherently more accurate
+and a better weapon. This did
+not prevent some light-fingered Marines
+from acquiring Garands when
+the occasion presented itself. And
+such an occasion did present itself
+while the soldiers were landing and
+their supplies were being moved to
+dumps. Several flights of Japanese
+bombers arrived over Henderson
+Field, relatively unscathed by the
+defending fighters, and began dropping
+their bombs. The soldiers headed
+for cover and alert Marines,
+inured to the bombing, used the interval
+to “liberate” interesting cartons
+and crates. The news that the Army
+had arrived spread across the island
+like wildfire, for it meant to all Marines
+that they eventually would be
+relieved. There was hope.</p>
+
+<div id="ip_34" class="figright" style="width: 361px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_034.jpg" width="361" height="228" alt="" />
+  <div class="captionr">
+
+<p>Department of Defense (USMC) Photos 304183 and 302980</p></div>
+
+<div class="captionl"><p class="justify"><i>Two other Marine aviators awarded the Medal of Honor for heroism and intrepidity
+in the air were Capt Jefferson J. DeBlanc, left, and Maj Robert E. Galer, right.</i></p></div></div>
+
+<p>As if the bombing was not enough
+grief, the Japanese opened on the airfield
+with their 150mm howitzers
+also. Altogether the men of the 164th
+got a rude welcome to Guadalcanal.
+And on that night, 13&ndash;14 October,
+they shared a terrifying experience
+with the Marines that no one would
+ever forget.</p>
+
+<p>Determined to knock out Henderson
+Field and protect their soldiers
+landing in strength west of Koli
+Point, the enemy commanders sent
+the battleships <i>Kongo</i> and <i>Haruna</i>
+into Ironbottom Sound to bombard
+the Marine positions. The usual
+Japanese flare planes heralded the
+bombardment, 80 minutes of sheer
+hell which had 14-inch shells exploding
+with such effect that the accompanying
+cruiser fire was scarcely
+noticed. No one was safe; no place
+was safe. No dugout had been built
+to withstand 14-inch shells. One witness,
+a seasoned veteran demonstrably
+cool under enemy fire, opined
+that there was nothing worse in war
+than helplessly being on the receiving
+end of naval gunfire. He remembered
+“huge trees being cut apart and
+flying about like toothpicks.” And he
+was on the frontlines, not the prime
+enemy target. The airfield and its environs
+were a shambles when dawn
+broke. The naval shelling, together
+with the night’s artillery fire and
+bombing, had left Cactus Air Force’s
+commander, General Geiger, with a
+handful of aircraft still flyable, an airfield
+thickly cratered by shells and
+bombs, and a death toll of 41. Still,
+from Henderson or Fighter One,
+which now became the main airstrip,
+the Cactus Flyers had to attack, for
+the morning also revealed a shore
+and sea full of inviting targets.</p>
+
+<p>The expected enemy convoy had
+gotten through and Japanese transports
+and landing craft were everywhere
+near Tassafaronga. At sea the
+escorting cruisers and destroyers
+provided a formidable antiaircraft
+screen. Every American plane that
+could fly did. General Geiger’s aide,
+Major Jack Cram, took off in the
+general’s PBY, hastily rigged to carry
+two torpedoes, and put one of
+them into the side of an enemy transport
+as it was unloading. He landed
+the lumbering flying boat with enemy
+aircraft hot on his tail. A new
+squadron of F4Fs, VMF-212, commanded
+by Major Harold W. Bauer,
+flew in during the day’s action, landed,
+refueled, and took off to join the
+fighting. An hour later, Bauer landed
+again, this time with four enemy
+bombers to his credit. Bauer, who added
+to his score of Japanese aircraft
+kills in later air battles, was subsequently
+lost in action. He was awarded<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_34" id="Page_34">34</a></span>
+the Medal of Honor, as were four
+other Marine pilots of the early Cactus
+Air Force: Captain Jefferson J.
+DeBlanc (VMF-112); Captain Joseph
+J. Foss (VMF-121); Major Robert E.
+Galer (VMF-224); and Major John L.
+Smith (VMF-223).</p>
+
+<p>The Japanese had landed more
+than enough troops to destroy the
+Marine beachhead and seize the airfield.
+At least General Hyakutake
+thought so, and he heartily approved
+General Maruyama’s plan to move
+most of the <i>Sendai Division</i> through
+the jungle, out of sight and out of
+contact with the Marines, to strike
+from the south in the vicinity of Edson’s
+Ridge. Roughly 7,000 men, each
+carrying a mortar or artillery shell,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_35" id="Page_35">35</a></span>
+started the trek along the Maruyama
+Trail which had been partially
+hacked out of the jungle well inland
+from the Marine positions. Maruyama,
+who had approved the trail’s
+name to indicate his confidence, intended
+to support this attack with
+heavy mortars and infantry guns
+(70mm pack howitzers). The men
+who had to lug, push, and drag these
+supporting arms over the miles of
+broken ground, across two major
+streams, the Mantanikau and the
+Lunga, and through heavy underbrush,
+might have had another name
+for their commander’s path to supposed
+glory.</p>
+
+<div id="ip_35" class="figcenter" style="width: 550px;">
+  <div class="captionl top"><p class="justify"><i>A Marine examines a Japanese 70mm howitzer captured at
+the Battle of the Tenaru. Gen Maruyama’s troops “had to lug,
+push, and drag these supporting arms over the miles of broken
+ground, across two major streams and through heavy underbrush”
+to get them to the target area&mdash;but they never did. The
+trail behind them was littered with the supplies they carried.</i></p></div>
+
+<div class="captionr top"><p>
+Photo courtesy of Col James A. Donovan, Jr.
+</p></div>
+  <img src="images/i_b_034b.jpg" width="550" height="424" alt="" />
+</div>
+
+<p>General Vandegrift knew the
+Japanese were going to attack.
+Patrols and reconnaissance flights
+had clearly indicated the push would
+be from the west, where the enemy
+reinforcements had landed. The
+American commander changed his
+dispositions accordingly. There were
+Japanese troops east of the perimeter,
+too, but not in any significant
+strength. The new infantry regiment,
+the 164th, reinforced by Marine special
+weapons units, was put into the
+line to hold the eastern flank along
+6,600 yards, curving inland to join up
+with 7th Marines near Edson’s Ridge.
+The 7th held 2,500 yards from the
+ridge to the Lunga. From the Lunga,
+the 1st Marines had a 3,500-yard sector
+of jungle running west to the
+point where the line curved back to
+the beach again in the 5th Marines’
+sector. Since the attack was expected
+from the west, the 3d Battalions
+of each of the 1st and 7th Marines
+held a strong outpost position forward
+of the 5th Marines’ lines along
+the east bank of the Matanikau.</p>
+
+<p>In the lull before the attack, if a
+time of patrol clashes, Japanese
+cruiser-destroyer bombardments,
+bomber attacks, and artillery harassment
+could properly be called a
+lull, Vandegrift was visited by the
+Commandant of the Marine Corps,
+Lieutenant General Thomas Holcomb.
+The Commandant flew in on
+21 October to see for himself how his
+Marines were faring. It also proved
+to be an occasion for both senior Marines
+to meet the new ComSoPac,
+Vice Admiral William F. “Bull” Halsey.
+Admiral Nimitz had announced
+Halsey’s appointment on 18 October
+and the news was welcome in Navy
+and Marine ranks throughout the Pacific.
+Halsey’s deserved reputation for
+elan and aggressiveness promised
+renewed attention to the situation on
+Guadalcanal. On the 22d, Holcomb
+and Vandegrift flew to Noumea to
+meet with Halsey and to receive and
+give a round of briefings on the Allied
+situation. After Vandegrift had
+described his position, he argued
+strongly against the diversion of reinforcements
+intended for Cactus to
+any other South Pacific venue, a
+sometime factor of Admiral Turner’s
+strategic vision. He insisted that he
+needed all of the Americal Division
+and another 2d Marine Division regiment
+to beef up his forces, and that
+more than half of his veterans were
+worn out by three months’ fighting
+and the ravages of jungle-incurred
+diseases. Admiral Halsey told the
+Marine general: “You go back there,
+Vandegrift. I promise to get you
+everything I have.”</p>
+
+<div id="ip_35b" class="figcenter" style="width: 365px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_035.jpg" width="365" height="354" alt="" />
+  <div class="captionr">
+
+<p>Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 13628</p></div>
+
+<div class="captionl">
+<p class="justify"><i>During a lull in the fight, a Marine machine gunner takes a break for coffee, with
+his sub-machine gun on his knee and his 30-caliber light machine gun in position.</i></p></div></div>
+
+<p>When Vandegrift returned to
+Guadalcanal, Holcomb moved on to
+Pearl Harbor to meet with Nimitz,
+carrying Halsey’s recommendation
+that, in the future, landing force commanders
+once established ashore,
+would have equal command status
+with Navy amphibious force commanders.
+At Pearl, Nimitz approved
+Halsey’s recommendation&mdash;which
+Holcomb had drafted&mdash;and in
+Washington so did King. In effect,
+then, the command status of all future
+Pacific amphibious operations
+was determined by the events of
+Guadalcanal. Another piece of news
+Vandegrift received from Holcomb
+also boded well for the future of the
+Marine Corps. Holcomb indicated<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_36" id="Page_36">36</a></span>
+that if President Roosevelt did not
+reappoint him, unlikely in view of his
+age and two terms in office, he would
+recommend that Vandegrift be appointed
+the next Commandant.</p>
+
+<div id="ip_36" class="figcenter" style="width: 546px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_036.jpg" width="546" height="373" alt="" />
+  <div class="captionr">
+
+<p>Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 513191</p></div>
+
+<div class="captionl">
+<p class="justify"><i>On the occasion of the visit of the Commandant, MajGen
+Thomas Holcomb, some of Operation Watchtower’s major
+staff and command officers took time out from the fighting
+to pose with him. From left, front row: Col William J. Whaling
+(Whaling Group); Col Amor LeRoy Sims (CO, 7th Marines);
+Col Gerald C. Thomas (Division Chief of Staff); Col
+Pedro A. del Valle (CO, 11th Marines); Col William E. Riley
+(member of Gen Holcomb’s party); MajGen Roy S. Geiger
+(CG, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing); Gen Holcomb; MajGen
+Ralph J. Mitchell (Director of Aviation, Headquarters, U.S.
+Marine Corps); BGen Bennet Puryear, Jr. (Assistant Quartermaster
+of the Marine Corps); Col Clifton B. Cates (CO, 1st
+Marines). Second row (between Whaling and Sims): LtCol
+Raymond P. Coffman (Division Supply Officer); Maj James
+C. Murray (Division Personnel Officer); (behind Gen Holcomb)
+LtCol Merrill B. Twining (Division Operations Officer).</i></p></div></div>
+
+<p>This news of future events had little
+chance of diverting Vandegrift’s
+attention when he flew back to
+Guadalcanal, for the Japanese were
+in the midst of their planned offensive.
+On the 20th, an enemy patrol
+accompanied by two tanks tried to
+find a way through the line held by
+Lieutenant Colonel William N.
+McKelvy, Jr.’s 3d Battalion, 1st Marines.
+A sharpshooting 37mm gun
+crew knocked out one tank and the
+enemy force fell back, meanwhile
+shelling the Marine positions with artillery.
+Near sunset the next day, the
+Japanese tried again, this time with
+more artillery fire and more tanks in
+the fore, but again a 37mm gun
+knocked out a lead tank and discouraged
+the attack. On 22 October,
+the enemy paused, waiting for
+Maruyama’s force to get into position
+inland. On the 23d, planned as the
+day of the <i>Sendai</i>’s main attack, the
+Japanese dropped a heavy rain of artillery
+and mortar fire on McKelvy’s
+positions near the Matanikau River
+mouth. Near dusk, nine 18-ton medium
+tanks clanked out of the trees
+onto the river’s sandbar and just as
+quickly eight of them were riddled
+by the 37s. One tank got across the
+river, a Marine blasted a track off
+with a grenade, and a 75mm halftrack
+finished it off in the ocean’s
+surf. The following enemy infantry
+was smothered by Marine artillery
+fire as all battalions of the augmented
+11th Marines rained shells on the
+massed attackers. Hundreds of
+Japanese were casualties and three
+more tanks were destroyed. Later, an
+inland thrust further upstream was
+easily beaten back. The abortive
+coastal attack did almost nothing to
+aid Maruyama’s inland offensive, but
+did cause Vandegrift to shift one battalion,
+the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines,
+out of the lines to the east and into
+the 4,000-yard gap between the Matanikau
+position and the perimeter.
+This move proved providential since<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_37" id="Page_37">37</a></span>
+one of Maruyama’s planned attacks
+was headed right for this area.</p>
+
+<p>Although patrols had encountered
+no Japanese east or south of the jungled
+perimeter up to the 24th, the
+Matanikau attempts had alerted
+everyone. When General Maruyama
+finally was satisfied that his men had
+struggled through to appropriate assault
+positions, after delaying his day
+of attack three times, he was ready
+on 24 October. The Marines were
+waiting.</p>
+
+<p>An observer from the 1st Battalion,
+7th Marines, spotted an enemy
+officer surveying Edson’s Ridge on
+the 24th, and scout-snipers reported
+smoke from numerous rice fires rising
+from a valley about two miles
+south of Lieutenant Colonel Puller’s
+positions. Six battalions of the <i>Sendai
+Division</i> were poised to attack,
+and near midnight the first elements
+of the enemy hit and bypassed a
+platoon-sized outpost forward of
+Puller’s barbed-wire entanglements.
+Warned by the outpost, Puller’s men
+waited, straining to see through a
+dark night and a driving rain. Suddenly,
+the Japanese charged out of
+the jungle, attacking in Puller’s area
+near the ridge and the flat ground to
+the east. The Marines replied with<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_38" id="Page_38">38</a></span>
+everything they had, calling in artillery,
+firing mortars, relying heavily
+on crossing fields of machine gun
+fire to cut down the enemy infantrymen.
+Thankfully, the enemy’s artillery,
+mortars, and other supporting
+arms were scattered back along the
+Maruyama Trail; they had proved
+too much of a burden for the infantrymen
+to carry forward.</p>
+
+<div id="ip_38" class="figcenter" style="width: 550px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_038.jpg" width="550" height="265" alt="" />
+  <div class="captionr">
+
+<p>Marine Corps Personal Papers Collection</p></div>
+
+<div class="captionl">
+<p class="justify"><i>Five Japanese tanks sit dead in the water, destroyed by Marine
+37mm gunfire during the abortive attempt to force the
+Marine perimeter near the mouth of the Matanikau River in
+late October. Many Japanese soldiers lost their lives also.</i></p></div></div>
+
+<p>A wedge was driven into the Marine
+lines, but eventually straightened
+out with repeated counterattacks.
+Puller soon realized his battalion was
+being hit by a strong Japanese force
+capable of repeated attacks. He called
+for reinforcements and the Army’s 3d
+Battalion, 164th Infantry (Lieutenant
+Colonel Robert K. Hall), was ordered
+forward, its men sliding and slipping
+in the rain as they trudged a mile
+south along Edson’s Ridge. Puller met
+Hall at the head of his column, and
+the two officers walked down the
+length of the Marine lines, peeling off
+an Army squad at a time to feed into
+the lines. When the Japanese attacked
+again as they did all night long, the
+soldiers and Marines fought back
+together. By 0330, the Army battalion
+was completely integrated into
+the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines’ lines
+and the enemy attacks were getting
+weaker and weaker. The American
+return fire&mdash;including flanking fire
+from machine guns and Weapons
+Company, 7th Marines’ 37mm guns
+remaining in the positions held by 2d
+Battalion, 164th Infantry, on Puller’s
+left&mdash;was just too much to take. Near
+dawn, Maruyama pulled his men
+back to regroup and prepare to attack
+again.</p>
+
+<p>With daylight, Puller and Hall reordered
+the lines, putting the 3d Battalion,
+164th, into its own positions
+on Puller’s left, tying in with the rest
+of the Army regiment. The driving
+rains had turned Fighter One into a
+quagmire, effectively grounding Cactus
+flyers. Japanese planes used the
+“free ride” to bomb Marine positions.
+Their artillery fired incessantly and
+a pair of Japanese destroyers added
+their gunfire to the bombardment until
+they got too close to the shore and
+the 3d Defense Battalion’s 5-inch
+guns drove them off. As the sun bore
+down, the runways dried and afternoon
+enemy attacks were met by
+Cactus fighters, who downed 22
+Japanese planes with a loss of three
+of their own.</p>
+
+<p>As night came on again, Maruyama
+tried more of the same, with the
+same result. The Army-Marine lines
+held and the Japanese were cut down
+in droves by rifle, machine gun, mortar,
+37mm, and artillery fire. To the
+west, an enemy battalion mounted
+three determined attacks against the
+positions held by Lieutenant Colonel
+Herman H. Hanneken’s 2d Battalion,
+7th Marines, thinly tied in with
+Puller’s battalion on the left and the
+3d Battalion, 7th Marines, on the
+right. The enemy finally penetrated
+the positions held by Company F, but
+a counterattack led by Major Odell
+M. Conoley, the battalion’s executive
+officer, drove off the Japanese. Again
+at daylight the American positions
+were secure and the enemy had
+retreated. They would not come
+back; the grand Japanese offensive of
+the <i>Sendai Division</i> was over.</p>
+
+<p>About 3,500 enemy troops had
+died during the attacks. General
+Maruyama’s proud boast that he
+“would exterminate the enemy
+around the airfield in one blow”
+proved an empty one. What was left
+of his force now straggled back over
+the Maruyama Trail, losing, as had
+the Kawaguchi force in the same situation,
+most of its seriously wounded<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_39" id="Page_39">39</a></span>
+men. The Americans, Marines
+and soldiers together, probably lost
+300 men killed and wounded; existing
+records are sketchy and incomplete.
+One result of the battle,
+however, was a warm welcome to the
+164th Infantry from the 1st Marine
+Division. Vandegrift particularly
+commended Lieutenant Colonel
+Hall’s battalion, stating the “division
+was proud to have serving with it
+another unit which had stood the test
+of battle.” And Colonel Cates sent a
+message to the 164th’s Colonel Bryant
+Moore saying that the 1st Marines
+“were proud to serve with a unit such
+as yours.”</p>
+
+<p>Amidst all the heroics of the two
+nights’ fighting there were many men
+who were singled out for recognition
+and an equally large number who
+performed great deeds that were
+never recognized. Two men stood out
+above all others, and on succeeding
+nights, Sergeant John Basilone of the
+1st Battalion, 7th Marines, and Platoon
+Sergeant Mitchell Paige of the
+2d Battalion, both machine gun section
+heads, were recognized as having
+performed “above and beyond the
+call of duty” in the inspiring words
+of their Medal of Honor citations.</p>
+
+<div class="chapter"></div>
+<div class="sidebar green">
+<p class="in0 small"><a name="Sidebar_page_37_Reising_Gun" id="Sidebar_page_37_Reising_Gun"></a>[Sidebar (<a href="#Page_37">page 37</a>):]</p>
+<h3 class="nobreak p0">Reising Gun</h3>
+
+<p class="drop-cap"><span class="smcap1"><span class="dkgreen">T</span>he</span> Reising gun was designed and developed by noted
+gun inventor Eugene Reising. It was patented in
+1940 and manufactured by the old gun-making firm
+of Harrington and Richardson of Worcester, Massachusetts.
+It is said that it was made on existing machine tools, some
+dating back to the Civil War, and of ordinary steel rather
+than ordnance steel. With new machine tools and ordnance
+steel scarce and needed for more demanding weapons, the
+Reising met an immediate requirement for many sub-machine
+guns at a time when production of Thompson
+M1928 and M1 sub-machine guns hadn’t caught up with
+demand and the stamped-out M3 “grease gun” had not yet
+been invented. It was a wartime expedient.</p>
+
+<div class="figright" style="width: 255px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_037.jpg" width="255" height="339" alt="" />
+  <div class="captionr">
+
+<p>
+Captain Donald L. Dickson, USMCR
+</p></div></div>
+
+<p>The Reising was made in two different models, the 50
+and the 55. The Model 50 had a full wooden stock and
+a Cutts compensator attached to the muzzle. The compensator,
+a device which reduced the upward muzzle climb
+from recoil, was invented by Richard M. Cutts, Sr., and
+his son, Richard M. Cutts, Jr., both of whom became Marine
+brigadier generals. The other version was dubbed the
+Model 55. It had a folding metal-wire shoulder stock which
+swivelled on the wooden pistol grip. It also had a shorter
+barrel and no compensator. It was intended for use by
+parachutists, tank crews, and others needing a compact
+weapon. Both versions of the Reising fired .45-caliber ammunition,
+the same cartridge as the Colt automatic pistol
+and the Thompson.</p>
+
+<p>In all, there were approximately 100,000 Reising sub-machine
+guns produced between 1940 and 1942. Small
+numbers of the weapons were acquired by both Great Britain
+and the Soviet Union. However, most were used by
+the U.S. Marine Corps in the Solomon Islands campaign.
+The Model 55 was issued to both Marine parachute battalions
+and Marine raiders, seeing service first on Guadalcanal.
+After its dubious debut in combat it was withdrawn
+from frontline service in 1943 due to several flaws in design
+and manufacture.</p>
+
+<p>The Reising’s major shortcoming was its propensity for
+jamming. This was due to both a design problem in the
+magazine lips and the fact that magazines were made of
+a soft sheet steel. The weapon’s safety mechanism didn’t
+always work and if the butt was slammed down on the
+deck, the hammer would set back against the mainspring
+and then fly forward, firing a chambered cartridge. The
+design allowed the entry of dirt into the mechanism and
+close tolerances caused it to jam. Finally, the steel used allowed
+excessive rust to form in the tropical humidity of the
+Solomons. Nevertheless, at six pounds, the Reising was
+handier than the 10-pound Thompson, more accurate,
+pleasanter to shoot, and reliable under other than combat
+conditions, but one always had to keep the muzzle pointed
+in a safe direction. The Model 50 was also issued to Marines
+for guard duty at posts and stations in the United
+States.&mdash;<i>John G. Griffiths</i></p>
+</div>
+
+<hr />
+<div class="chapter"></div>
+<h2><a name="November_and_the_Continuing_Buildup" id="November_and_the_Continuing_Buildup"></a><i>November and the Continuing Buildup</i></h2>
+
+<p>While the soldiers and Marines
+were battling the Japanese ashore, a
+patrol plane sighted a large Japanese
+fleet near the Santa Cruz Islands to
+the east of the Solomons. The enemy
+force was formidable, 4 carriers
+and 4 battleships, 8 cruisers and 28
+destroyers, all poised for a victorious
+attack when Maruyama’s capture of
+Henderson Field was signalled. Admiral
+Halsey’s reaction to the inviting
+targets was characteristic, he
+signaled Rear Admiral Thomas C.
+Kinkaid, with the <i>Hornet</i> and <i>Enterprise</i>
+carrier groups located north of
+the New Hebrides: “Attack Repeat
+Attack.”</p>
+
+<div id="ip_39" class="figcenter" style="width: 551px;">
+  <div class="captionl top"><p class="justify"><i>Heavy tropical downpours at Guadalcanal all but flood out
+a Marine camp near Henderson Field, and the field as well.
+Marines’ damp clothing and bedding contributed to the heavy
+incidence of tormenting skin infections and fungal disorders.</i></p></div>
+
+<div class="captionr top"><p>
+Department of Defense (USMC) Photo
+</p></div>
+  <img src="images/i_b_039.jpg" width="551" height="324" alt="" />
+</div>
+
+<p>Early on 26 October, American
+SBDs located the Japanese carriers at
+about the same time Japanese scout
+planes spotted the American carriers.
+The Japanese <i>Zuiho</i>’s flight deck was
+holed by the scout bombers, cancelling
+flight operations, but the other
+three enemy carriers launched strikes.
+The two air armadas tangled as each
+strove to reach the other’s carriers.
+The <i>Hornet</i> was hit repeatedly by
+bombs and torpedoes; two Japanese
+pilots also crashed their planes on
+board. The damage to the ship was
+so extensive, the <i>Hornet</i> was abandoned
+and sunk. The <i>Enterprise</i>, the
+battleship <i>South Dakota</i>, the light
+cruiser <i>San Juan</i> (CL 54), and the
+destroyer <i>Smith</i> (DD 378) were also
+hit; the destroyer <i>Porter</i> (DD 356)
+was sunk. On the Japanese side, no
+ships were sunk, but three carriers
+and two destroyers were damaged.
+One hundred Japanese planes were
+lost; 74 U.S. planes went down.
+Taken together, the results of the Battle
+of Santa Cruz were a standoff.
+The Japanese naval leaders might
+have continued their attacks, but instead,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_40" id="Page_40">40</a></span>
+disheartened by the defeat of
+their ground forces on Guadalcanal,
+withdrew to attack another day.</p>
+
+<div id="ip_40" class="figleft" style="width: 362px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_040.jpg" width="362" height="503" alt="" />
+  <div class="captionr">
+
+<p>Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 74093</p></div>
+
+<div class="captionl">
+<p class="justify"><i>Marine engineers repair a flood-damaged Lunga River bridge washed out during
+a period when 8 inches of rain fell in 24 hours and the river rose 7 feet above normal.</i></p></div></div>
+
+<p>The departure of the enemy naval
+force marked a period in which substantial
+reinforcements reached the
+island. The headquarters of the 2d
+Marines had finally found transport
+space to come up from Espiritu Santo
+and on 29 and 30 October, Colonel
+Arthur moved his regiment from
+Tulagi to Guadalcanal, exchanging
+his 1st and 2d Battalions for the well-blooded
+3d, which took up the Tulagi
+duties. The 2d Marines’ battalions at
+Tulagi had performed the very necessary
+task of scouting and securing all
+the small islands of the Florida group
+while they had camped, frustrated,
+watching the battles across Sealark
+Channel. The men now would no
+longer be spectators at the big show.</p>
+
+<p>On 2 November, planes from
+VMSB-132 and VMF-211 flew into
+the Cactus fields from New Caledonia.
+MAG-11 squadrons moved forward
+from New Caledonia to
+Espiritu Santo to be closer to the battle
+scene; the flight echelons now
+could operate forward to Guadalcanal
+and with relative ease. On the
+ground side, two batteries of 155mm
+guns, one Army and one Marine,
+landed on 2 November, providing
+Vandegrift with his first artillery
+units capable of matching the enemy’s
+long-range 150mm guns. On the
+4th and 5th, the 8th Marines
+(Colonel Richard H. Jeschke) arrived
+from American Samoa. The full-strength
+regiment, reinforced by the
+75mm howitzers of the 1st Battalion,
+10th Marines, added another 4,000
+men to the defending forces. All the
+fresh troops reflected a renewed emphasis
+at all levels of command on
+making sure Guadalcanal would be
+held. The reinforcement-replacement
+pipeline was being filled. In the offing
+as part of the Guadalcanal
+defending force were the rest of the
+Americal Division, the remainder of
+the 2d Marine Division, and the Army’s
+25th Infantry Division, then in
+Hawaii. More planes of every type
+and from Allied as well as American
+sources were slated to reinforce and
+replace the battered and battle-weary
+Cactus veterans.</p>
+
+<p>The impetus for the heightened
+pace of reinforcement had been
+provided by President Roosevelt.
+Cutting through the myriad demands
+for American forces worldwide, he
+had told each of the Joint Chiefs on
+24 October that Guadalcanal must be
+reinforced, and without delay.</p>
+
+<p>On the island, the pace of operations
+did not slacken after the
+Maruyama offensive was beaten
+back. General Vandegrift wanted to
+clear the area immediately west of
+the Matanikau of all Japanese troops,
+forestalling, if he could, another
+buildup of attacking forces. Admiral
+Tanaka’s Tokyo Express was still
+operating and despite punishing attacks
+by Cactus aircraft and new and
+deadly opponents, American motor
+torpedo boats, now based at Tulagi.</p>
+
+<p>On 1 November, the 5th Marines,
+backed up by the newly arrived 2d
+Marines, attacked across bridges engineers
+had laid over the Matanikau<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_41" id="Page_41">41</a></span>
+during the previous night. Inland,
+Colonel Whaling led his scout-snipers
+and the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, in
+a screening movement to protect the
+flank of the main attack. Opposition
+was fierce in the shore area where the
+1st Battalion, 5th, drove forward
+toward Point Cruz, but inland the 2d
+Battalion and Whaling’s group encountered
+slight opposition. By nightfall,
+when the Marines dug in, it was
+clear that the only sizable enemy
+force was in the Point Cruz area. In
+the days bitter fighting, Corporal
+Anthony Casamento, a badly
+wounded machine gun squad leader
+in Edson’s 1st Battalion, had so distinguished
+himself that he was
+recommended for a Navy Cross;
+many years later, in August 1980,
+President Jimmy Carter approved the
+award of the Medal of Honor in its
+stead.</p>
+
+<div id="ip_41" class="figcenter" style="width: 362px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_041.jpg" width="362" height="184" alt="" />
+  <div class="captionr">
+
+<p>
+Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 56749
+</p></div>
+
+<div class="captionl">
+<p class="justify"><i>2dLt Mitchell Paige, third from left, and PltSgt John Basilone, extreme right, received
+the Medal of Honor at a parade at Camp Balcombe, Australia, on 21 May 1943.
+MajGen Vandegrift, left, received his medal in a White House ceremony the previous
+5 February, while Col Merritt A. Edson was decorated 31 December 1943. Note
+the 1st Marine Division patches on the right shoulders of each participant.</i></p></div></div>
+
+<p>On the 2d, the attack continued
+with the reserve 3d Battalion moving
+into the fight and all three 5th
+Marines units moving to surround
+the enemy defenders. On 3 November,
+the Japanese pocket just west of
+the base at Point Cruz was eliminated;
+well over 300 enemy had been
+killed. Elsewhere, the attacking Marines
+had encountered spotty
+resistance and advanced slowly
+across difficult terrain to a point
+about 1,000 yards beyond the 5th
+Marines’ action. There, just as the
+offensive’s objectives seemed well in
+hand, the advance was halted. Again,
+the intelligence that a massive enemy
+reinforcement attempt was pending
+forced Vandegrift to pull back
+most of his men to safeguard the all-important
+airfield perimeter. This
+time, however, he left a regiment to
+outpost the ground that had been
+gained, Colonel Arthur’s 2d Marines,
+reinforced by the Army’s 1st Battalion,
+164th Infantry.</p>
+
+<p>Emphasizing the need for caution
+in Vandegrift’s mind was the fact that
+the Japanese were again discovered
+in strength east of the perimeter. On
+3 November, Lieutenant Colonel
+Hanneken’s 2d Battalion, 7th Marines,
+on a reconnaissance in force
+towards Koli Point, could see the
+Japanese ships clustered near Tetere,
+eight miles from the perimeter. His
+Marines encountered strong Japanese
+resistance from obviously fresh<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_42" id="Page_42">42</a></span>
+troops and he began to pull back. A
+regiment of the enemy’s <i>38th Division</i>
+had landed, as Hyakutake experimented
+with a Japanese
+Navy-promoted scheme of attacking
+the perimeter from both flanks.</p>
+
+<div id="ip_42" class="figcenter" style="width: 372px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_042.jpg" width="372" height="225" alt="" />
+  <div class="captionr">
+
+<p>
+Marine Corps Historical Photo Collection
+</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="captionl">
+<p class="justify"><i>In a White House ceremony, former Cpl Anthony Casamento, a machine gun squad
+leader in the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, was decorated by President Jimmy Carter
+on 22 August 1980, 38 years after the battle for Guadalcanal. Looking on are
+Casarnento’s wife and daughters and Gen Robert H. Barrow, Marine Commandant.</i></p></div></div>
+
+<div id="ip_42b" class="figright" style="width: 170px;">
+  <div class="captionl top"><p class="justify"><i>Sgt Clyde Thomason, who was killed in
+action participating in the Makin Island
+raid with the 2d Raider Battalion, was
+the first enlisted Marine in World War
+II to be awarded the Medal of Honor.</i></p></div>
+
+<div class="captionr top"><p>
+Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 310616
+</p></div>
+  <img src="images/i_b_042b.jpg" width="170" height="344" alt="" />
+</div>
+
+<p>As Hanneken’s battalion executed
+a fighting withdrawal along the
+beach, it began to receive fire from
+the jungle inland, too. A rescue force
+was soon put together under General
+Rupertus: two tank companies, the
+1st Battalion, 7th Marines, and the
+2d and 3d Battalions of the 164th.
+The Japanese troops, members of the
+<i>38th Division</i> regiment and remnants
+of Kawaguchi’s brigade, fought
+doggedly to hold their ground as the
+Marines drove forward along the
+coast and the soldiers attempted to
+outflank the enemy in the jungle. The
+running battle continued for days,
+supported by Cactus air, naval gunfire,
+and the newly landed 155mm
+guns.</p>
+
+<p>The enemy commander received
+new orders as he was struggling to
+hold off the Americans. He was to
+break off the action, move inland,
+and march to rejoin the main
+Japanese forces west of the perimeter,
+a tall order to fulfill. The two-pronged
+attack scheme had been
+abandoned. The Japanese managed
+the first part; on the 11th the enemy
+force found a gap in the 164th’s line
+and broke through along a meandering
+jungle stream. Behind they left
+450 dead over the course of a seven-day
+battle; the Marines and soldiers
+had lost 40 dead and 120 wounded.</p>
+
+<p>Essentially, the Japanese who
+broke out of the encircling Americans
+escaped from the frying pan
+only to fall into the fire. Admiral
+Turner finally had been able to effect
+one of his several schemes for alternative
+landings and beachheads, all
+of which General Vandegrift vehemently
+opposed. At Aola Bay, 40
+miles east of the main perimeter, the
+Navy put an airfield construction
+and defense force ashore on 4
+November. Then, while the Japanese
+were still battling the Marines near
+Tetere, Vandegrift was able to persuade
+Turner to detach part of this
+landing force, the 2d Raider Battalion,
+to sweep west, to discover and
+destroy any enemy forces it encountered.</p>
+
+<p>Lieutenant Colonel Evans F. Carlson’s
+raider battalion already had
+seen action before it reached Guadalcanal.
+Two companies had reinforced
+the defenders of Midway Island
+when the Japanese attacked there in
+June. The rest of the battalion had
+landed from submarines on Makin
+Island in the Gilberts on 17&ndash;18 August,
+destroying the garrison there.
+For his part in the fighting on Makin,
+Sergeant Clyde Thomason had been
+awarded a Medal of Honor posthumously,
+the first Marine enlisted man
+to receive his country’s highest award
+in World War II.</p>
+
+<p>In its march from Aola Bay, the 2d
+Raider Battalion encountered the
+Japanese who were attempting to
+retreat to the west. On 12 November,
+the raiders beat off attacks by two
+enemy companies and then relentlessly
+pursued the Japanese, fighting
+a series of small actions over the next
+five days before they contacted the
+main Japanese body. From 17
+November to 4 December, when the
+raiders finally came down out of the
+jungled ridges into the perimeter,
+Carlson’s men harried the retreating<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_43" id="Page_43">43</a></span>
+enemy. They killed nearly 500
+Japanese. Their own losses were 16
+killed and 18 wounded.</p>
+
+<p>The Aola Bay venture, which had
+provided the 2d Raider Battalion a
+starting point for its month-long jungle
+campaign, proved a bust. The site
+chosen for a new airfield was unsuitable,
+too wet and unstable, and
+the whole force moved to Koli Point
+in early December, where another
+airfield eventually was constructed.</p>
+
+<p>The buildup on Guadalcanal continued,
+by both sides. On 11 November,
+guarded by a cruiser-destroyer
+covering force, a convoy ran in carrying
+the 182d Infantry, another regiment
+of the Americal Division. The
+ships were pounded by enemy bombers
+and three transports were hit,
+but the men landed. General Vandegrift
+needed the new men badly.
+His veterans were truly ready for
+replacement; more than a thousand
+new cases of malaria and related diseases
+were reported each week. The
+Japanese who had been on the island
+any length of time were no better off;
+they were, in fact, in worse shape.
+Medical supplies and rations were in
+short supply. The whole thrust of the
+Japanese reinforcement effort continued
+to be to get troops and combat
+equipment ashore. The idea
+prevailed in Tokyo, despite all evidence
+to the contrary, that one overwhelming
+coordinated assault would
+crush the American resistance. The
+enemy drive to take Port Moresby on
+New Guinea was put on hold to concentrate
+all efforts on driving the
+Americans off of Guadalcanal.</p>
+
+<div id="ip_43" class="figcenter" style="width: 551px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_043.jpg" width="551" height="339" alt="" />
+  <div class="captionr">
+
+<p>Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 51728</p></div>
+
+<div class="captionl">
+<p class="justify"><i>Native guides lead 2d Raider Battalion Marines on a combat/reconnaissance
+patrol behind Japanese lines. The patrol
+lasted for less than a month, during which the Marines covered
+150 miles and fought more than a dozen actions.</i></p></div></div>
+
+<p>On 12 November, a multifaceted
+Japanese naval force converged on
+Guadalcanal to cover the landing of
+the main body of the <i>38th Division</i>.
+Rear Admiral Daniel J. Callaghan’s
+cruisers and destroyers, the close-in
+protection for the 182d’s transports,
+moved to stop the enemy. Coastwatcher
+and scout plane sightings
+and radio traffic intercepts had identified
+two battleships, two carriers,
+four cruisers, and a host of destroyers
+all headed toward Guadalcanal.
+A bombardment group led by the
+battleships <i>Hiei</i> and <i>Kirishima</i>, with
+the light cruiser <i>Nagura</i>, and 15 destroyers
+spearheaded the attack.
+Shortly after midnight, near Savo Island,
+Callaghan’s cruisers picked up
+the Japanese on radar and continued
+to close. The battle was joined at
+such short range that each side fired
+at times on their own ships. Callaghan’s
+flagship, the <i>San Francisco</i>,
+was hit 15 times, Callaghan was
+killed, and the ship had to limp away.
+The cruiser <i>Atlanta</i> (CL 104) was
+also hit and set afire. Rear Admiral
+Norman Scott, who was on board,
+was killed. Despite the hammering
+by Japanese fire, the Americans held
+and continued fighting. The battleship
+<i>Hiei</i>, hit by more than 80 shells,
+retired and with it went the rest of
+the bombardment force. Three destroyers
+were sunk and four others
+damaged.</p>
+
+<div id="ip_43b" class="figcenter" style="width: 550px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_044.jpg" width="550" height="276" alt="" />
+  <div class="captionr">
+
+<p>Department of Defense (Navy) Photos 80-G-20824 and 80-G-21099</p></div>
+
+<div class="captionl">
+<p class="justify"><i>In the great naval Battle of Guadalcanal, 12&ndash;15 November,
+RAdm Daniel J. Callaghan was killed when his flagship, the
+heavy cruiser</i> San Francisco <i>(CA 38) took 15 major hits and
+was forced to limp away in the dark from the scene of action.</i></p></div></div>
+
+<p>The Americans had accomplished
+their purpose; they had forced the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_44" id="Page_44">44</a></span>
+Japanese to turn back. The cost was
+high. Two antiaircraft cruisers, the
+<i>Atlanta</i> and the <i>Juneau</i> (CL 52), were
+sunk; four destroyers, the <i>Barton</i>
+(DD 599), <i>Cushing</i> (DD 376), <i>Monssen</i>
+(DD 436), and <i>Laffey</i> (DD 459),
+also went to the bottom. In addition
+to the <i>San Francisco</i>, the heavy cruiser
+<i>Portland</i> (CA 33) and the destroyers
+<i>Sterret</i> (DD 407) and <i>Aaron
+Ward</i> (DD 483) were damaged. Only
+one destroyer of the 13 American
+ships engaged, the <i>Fletcher</i> (DD 445),
+was unscathed when the survivors retired
+to the New Hebrides.</p>
+
+<p>With daylight came the Cactus
+bombers and fighters; they found the
+crippled <i>Hiei</i> and pounded it mercilessly.
+On the 14th the Japanese were
+forced to scuttle it. Admiral Halsey
+ordered his only surviving carrier,
+the <i>Enterprise</i>, out of the Guadalcanal
+area to get it out of reach of
+Japanese aircraft and sent his battleships
+<i>Washington</i> (BB 56) and <i>South
+Dakota</i> (BB 55) with four escorting
+destroyers north to meet the
+Japanese. Some of the <i>Enterprise</i>’s
+planes flew in to Henderson Field to
+help even the odds.</p>
+
+<p>On 14 November Cactus and <i>Enterprise</i>
+flyers found a Japanese
+cruiser-destroyer force that had
+pounded the island on the night of
+13 November. They damaged four
+cruisers and a destroyer. After refueling
+and rearming they went after the
+approaching Japanese troop convoy.
+They hit several transports in one attack
+and sank one when they came
+back again. Army B-17s up from Espiritu
+Santo scored one hit and several
+near misses, bombing from 17,000
+feet.</p>
+
+<p>Moving in a continuous pattern of
+attack, return, refuel, rearm, and attack
+again, the planes from Guadalcanal
+hit nine transports, sinking
+seven. Many of the 5,000 troops on
+the stricken ships were rescued by
+Tanaka’s destroyers, which were firing
+furiously and laying smoke
+screens in an attempt to protect the
+transports. The admiral later recalled
+that day as indelible in his mind,
+with memories of “bombs wobbling
+down from high-flying B-17s; of carrier
+bombers roaring towards targets
+as though to plunge full into the
+water, releasing bombs and pulling
+out barely in time, each miss sending
+up towering clouds of mist and
+spray, every hit raising clouds of
+smoke and fire.” Despite the intensive
+aerial attack, Tanaka continued on
+to Guadalcanal with four destroyers
+and four transports.</p>
+
+<p>Japanese intelligence had picked up
+the approaching American battleship
+force and warned Tanaka of its advent.
+In turn, the enemy admirals
+sent their own battleship-cruiser
+force to intercept. The Americans, led
+by Rear Admiral Willis A. Lee in the
+<i>Washington</i>, reached Sealark Channel
+about 2100 on the 14th. An hour
+later, a Japanese cruiser was picked
+up north of Savo. Battleship fire soon
+turned it away. The Japanese now
+learned that their opponents would
+not be the cruisers they expected.</p>
+
+<p>The resulting clash, fought in the
+glare of gunfire and Japanese searchlights,
+was perhaps the most significant
+fought at sea for Guadalcanal.
+When the melee was over, the American
+battleships’ 16-inch guns had
+more than matched the Japanese.
+Both the <i>South Dakota</i> and the
+<i>Washington</i> were damaged badly<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_45" id="Page_45">45</a></span>
+enough to force their retirement, but
+the <i>Kirishima</i> was punished to its
+abandonment and death. One
+Japanese and three American destroyers,
+the <i>Benham</i> (DD 796), the
+<i>Walke</i> (DD 416), and the <i>Preston</i>
+(DD 379), were sunk. When the
+Japanese attack force retired, Admiral
+Tanaka ran his four transports
+onto the beach, knowing they would
+be sitting targets at daylight. Most of
+the men on board, however, did
+manage to get ashore before the inevitable
+pounding by American
+planes, warships, and artillery.</p>
+
+<p>Ten thousand troops of the <i>38th
+Division</i> had landed, but the
+Japanese were in no shape to ever
+again attempt a massive reinforcement.
+The horrific losses in the frequent
+naval clashes, which seemed at<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_46" id="Page_46">46</a></span>
+times to favor the Japanese, did not
+really represent a standoff. Every
+American ship lost or damaged could
+and would be replaced; every
+Japanese ship lost meant a steadily
+diminishing fleet. In the air, the losses
+on both sides were daunting, but the
+enemy naval air arm would never
+recover from its losses of experienced
+carrier pilots. Two years later, the
+Battle of the Philippine Sea between
+American and Japanese carriers
+would aptly be called the “Marianas
+Turkey Shoot” because of the ineptitude
+of the Japanese trainee pilots.</p>
+
+<div id="ip_46" class="figcenter" style="width: 550px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_046.jpg" width="550" height="273" alt="" />
+  <div class="captionr">
+
+<p>Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 53510</p></div>
+
+<div class="captionl">
+<p class="justify"><i>A Japanese troop transport and her landing craft were badly
+damaged by the numerous Marine air attacks and were forced
+to run aground on Kokumbona beach after the naval Battle
+of Guadalcanal. Many enemy troops were killed in the attacks.</i></p></div></div>
+
+<p>The enemy troops who had been
+fortunate enough to reach land were
+not immediately ready to assault the
+American positions. The <i>38th Division</i>
+and the remnants of the various
+Japanese units that had previously
+tried to penetrate the Marine lines
+needed to be shaped into a coherent
+attack force before General
+Hyakutake could again attempt to
+take Henderson Field.</p>
+
+<p>General Vandegrift now had
+enough fresh units to begin to replace
+his veteran troops along the front
+lines. The decision to replace the 1st
+Marine Division with the Army’s
+25th Infantry Division had been
+made. Admiral Turner had told Vandegrift
+to leave all of his heavy equipment
+on the island when he did pull
+out “in hopes of getting your units re-equipped
+when you come out.” He
+also told the Marine general that the
+Army would command the final
+phases of the Guadalcanal operation
+since it would provide the majority
+of the combat forces once the 1st Division
+departed. Major General Alexander
+M. Patch, commander of the
+Americal Division, would relieve
+Vandegrift as senior American officer
+ashore. His air support would continue
+to be Marine-dominated as
+General Geiger, now located on Espiritu
+Santo with 1st Wing headquarters,
+fed his squadrons forward
+to maintain the offensive. And the air
+command on Guadalcanal itself
+would continue to be a mixed bag of
+Army, Navy, Marine, and Allied
+squadrons.</p>
+
+<p>The sick list of the 1st Marine Division
+in November included more
+than 3,200 men with malaria. The
+men of the 1st still manning the
+frontline foxholes and the rear
+areas&mdash;if anyplace within Guadalcanal’s
+perimeter could properly be
+called a rear area&mdash;were plain worn
+out. They had done their part and
+they knew it.</p>
+
+<p>On 29 November, General Vandegrift
+was handed a message from
+the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The crux of
+it read: “1st MarDiv is to be relieved
+without delay ... and will proceed
+to Australia for rehabilitation and
+employment.” The word soon spread
+that the 1st was leaving and where
+it was going. Australia was not yet
+the cherished place it would become
+in the division’s future, but <i>any</i> place
+was preferable to Guadalcanal.</p>
+
+
+<div class="chapter"></div>
+<div class="sidebar green">
+<p class="in0 small"><a name="Sidebar_page_41_75mm_Pack_Howitzer_Workhorse_of_the_Artillery" id="Sidebar_page_41_75mm_Pack_Howitzer_Workhorse_of_the_Artillery"></a>[Sidebar (<a href="#Page_41">page 41</a>):]</p>
+<h3 class="nobreak p0">75mm Pack Howitzer&mdash;Workhorse of the Artillery</h3>
+
+<div class="figright" style="width: 255px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_041b.jpg" width="255" height="212" alt="" /></div>
+
+<p class="drop-cap b"><span class="smcap1">During</span> the summer of 1930, the Marine Corps began
+replacing its old French 75mm guns (Model
+1897) with the 75mm Pack Howitzer Model
+1923-E2. This weapon was designed for use in the Army
+primarily as mountain artillery. Since it could be broken
+down and manhandled ashore in six loads from ships’
+boats, the pack howitzer was an important supporting
+weapon of the Marine Corps landing forces in prewar landing
+exercises.</p>
+
+<p>The 75mm pack howitzer saw extensive service with the
+Marine Corps throughout World War II in almost every
+major landing in the Pacific. Crewed by five Marines, the
+howitzer could hurl a 16-pound shell nearly 10,000 yards.
+In the D Series table of organization with which the 1st
+Marine Division went to war, and through the following
+E and F series, there were three pack howitzer battalions
+for each artillery regiment.&mdash;<i>Anthony Wayne Tommell and
+Kenneth L. Smith-Christmas</i></p>
+</div>
+
+
+<div class="chapter"></div>
+<div class="sidebar">
+<p class="in0 small"><a name="Sidebar_page_45_The_Japanese_Model_89_1929_50mm_Heavy_Grenade_Discharger" id="Sidebar_page_45_The_Japanese_Model_89_1929_50mm_Heavy_Grenade_Discharger"></a>[Sidebar (<a href="#Page_45">page 45</a>):]</p>
+<h3 class="nobreak p0">The Japanese Model 89 (1929) 50mm Heavy Grenade Discharger</h3>
+
+<div class="figright" style="width: 252px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_045.jpg" width="252" height="370" alt="" /></div>
+
+<p class="drop-cap b"><span class="smcap1">Born</span> out of the need to bridge the gap in range between
+hand grenades and mortars, the grenade discharger
+evolved in the Imperial Japanese Army from
+a special purpose weapon of infantry assault and defense
+to an essential item of standard equipment with all Japanese
+ground forces.</p>
+
+<p>Commonly called <i>Juteki</i> by the Japanese, this weapon
+officially was designated <i>Hachikyu Shiki Jutekidarto</i>, or
+1189 Model Heavy Grenade Discharger, the term “heavy”
+being justified by the powerful 1-pound, 12-ounce high explosive
+shell it was designed to fire, although it also fired
+the standard Model 91 fragmentation grenade.</p>
+
+<p>To the American Marines and soldiers who first encountered
+this weapon and others of its kind in combat they
+were known as “knee mortars,” likely so named because they
+generally were fired from a kneeling position. Typically,
+the discharger’s concave baseplate was pressed firmly into
+the surface of the ground by the firer’s foot to support the
+heavy recoil of the fired shell, but unfortunately the term
+“knee mortar” suggested to some untutored captors of these
+weapons that they were to be fired with the baseplate resting
+against the knee or thigh. When a Marine fired one
+of these dischargers from his thigh and broke his upper leg
+bone, efforts were swiftly undertaken in the field to educate
+all combat troops in the safe and proper handling of
+these very useful weapons.</p>
+
+<p>The Model 89 (1929) 50mm Heavy Grenade Discharger
+is a muzzle-loaded, high-angle-of-fire weapon which weighs
+10-1/4 pounds and is 24 inches in overall length. Its design
+is compact and simple. The discharger has three major components:
+the rifled barrel, the supporting barrel pedestal
+with firing mechanism, and the base plate. Operation of
+the Model 89 was easy and straightforward, and with practice
+its user could deliver accurate fire registered quickly
+on target.</p>
+
+<p>Encountered in all major battles in the Pacific War, the
+Model 89 Grenade Discharger was an uncomplicated, very
+portable, and highly efficient weapon operated easily by
+one man. It was carried in a cloth or leather case with a
+sling, and its one-piece construction allowed it to be
+brought into action very quickly. This grenade discharger
+had the advantage over most mortars in that it could be
+aimed and fired mechanically after a projectile had been
+placed in the barrel, projectile firing not being dependent
+upon dropping down the barrel against a stationary firing
+pin as with most mortars, where barrel fouling sometimes
+caused dangerous hangfires. Although an instantaneous
+fuze employed on the Model 89 high explosive shell restricted
+this shell’s use to open areas, the Model 91 fragmentation
+grenade with its seven-second fuze made this discharger
+effective in a jungle or forest setting, with complete
+safety for the user from premature detonation of projectiles
+by overhanging foliage. Smoke and signal shells, and
+an incendiary grenade, were special types of ammunition
+used with this versatile and effective weapon which won
+the respect of all who came to know it.&mdash;<i>Edwin F. Libby</i></p>
+</div>
+
+<hr />
+<div class="chapter"></div>
+<h2><a name="December_and_the_Final_Stages" id="December_and_the_Final_Stages"></a><i>December and the Final Stages</i></h2>
+
+<p>On 7 December, one year after the
+Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor,
+General Vandegrift sent a message to
+all men under his command in the
+Guadalcanal area thanking them for
+their courage and steadfastness, commending
+particularly the pilots and
+“all who labored and sweated within
+the lines in all manner of prodigious
+and vital tasks.” He reminded them
+all that their “unbelievable achievements
+had made ‘Guadalcanal’ a synonym
+for death and disaster in the
+language of our enemy.” On 9 December,
+he handed over his command to
+General Patch and flew out to Australia<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_47" id="Page_47">47</a></span>
+at the same time the first elements
+of the 5th Marines were
+boarding ship. The 1st, 11th, and 7th
+Marines would soon follow together
+with all the division’s supporting
+units. The men who were leaving
+were thin, tired, hollow-eyed, and
+apathetic; they were young men who
+had grown old in four months time.
+They left behind 681 dead in the island’s
+cemetery.</p>
+
+<div id="ip_47" class="figleft" style="width: 177px;">
+  <div class="captionl top"><p class="justify"><i>As he tells it, “Too Many, Too Close, Too
+Long,” is Donald L. Dickson’s portrait of
+one of the “little guys, just plain worn
+out. His stamina and his spirit stretched
+beyond human endurance. He has had
+no real sleep for a long time....
+And he probably hasn’t stopped ducking
+and fighting long enough to discover
+that he has malaria. He is going to discover
+it now, however. He is through.”</i></p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="captionr top">
+<p>
+Captain Donald L. Dickson, USMCR
+</p></div>
+  <img src="images/i_b_047b.jpg" width="177" height="383" alt="" />
+</div>
+
+<div id="ip_47b" class="figright" style="width: 359px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_047.jpg" width="359" height="364" alt="" />
+  <div class="captionr">
+
+<p>U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo SC164898</p></div>
+
+<div class="captionl">
+<p class="justify"><i>Americal Division commander, MajGen Alexander M. Patch, Jr., watches while
+his troops and supplies are staged on Guadalcanal’s beaches on 8 December, the
+day before he relieved Gen Vandegrift and his wornout 1st Marine Division.</i></p></div></div>
+
+<p>The final regiment of the Americal
+Division, the 132d Infantry, landed
+on 8 December as the 5th Marines
+was preparing to leave. The 2d Marine
+Division’s regiments already on
+the island, the 2d, 8th, and part of
+the 10th, knew that the 6th Marines
+was on its way to rejoin. It seemed
+to many of the men of the 2d Marines,
+who had landed on D-Day, 7
+August, that they, too, should be
+leaving. These took slim comfort in
+the thought that they, by all rights,
+should be the first of the 2d to depart
+the island whenever that hoped-for
+day came.</p>
+
+<p>General Patch received a steady
+stream of ground reinforcements and
+replacements in December. He was
+not ready yet to undertake a full-scale
+offensive until the 25th Division and
+the rest of the 2d Marine Division arrived,
+but he kept all frontline units
+active in combat and reconnaissance
+patrols, particularly toward the
+western flank.</p>
+
+<p>The island commander’s air
+defense capabilities also grew substantially.
+Cactus Air Force, organized
+into a fighter command and
+a strike (bomber) command, now
+operated from a newly redesignated
+Marine Corps Air Base. The Henderson
+Field complex included a new
+airstrip, Fighter Two, which replaced
+Fighter One, which had severe
+drainage problems. Brigadier General
+Louis Woods, who had taken over as
+senior aviator when Geiger returned
+to Espiritu Santo, was relieved on 26
+December by Brigadier General Francis
+P. Mulcahy, Commanding General,
+2d Marine Aircraft Wing. New
+fighter and bomber squadrons from
+both the 1st and 2d Wings sent their
+flight echelons forward on a regular
+basis. The Army added three fighter
+squadrons and a medium bomber
+squadron of B-26s. The Royal New
+Zealand Air Force flew in a reconnaissance
+squadron of Lockheed
+Hudsons. And the U.S. Navy sent
+forward a squadron of Consolidated<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_49" id="Page_49">49</a></span>
+PBY Catalina patrol planes which
+had a much needed night-flying capability.</p>
+
+<p>The aerial buildup forced the
+Japanese to curtail all air attacks and
+made daylight naval reinforcement
+attempts an event of the past. The
+nighttime visits of the Tokyo Express
+destroyers now brought only supplies
+encased in metal drums which were
+rolled over the ships’ sides in hope
+they would float into shore. The men
+ashore desperately needed everything
+that could be sent, even by this
+method, but most of the drums never
+reached the beaches.</p>
+
+<p>Still, however desperate the enemy
+situation was becoming, he was
+prepared to fight. General Hyakutake
+continued to plan the seizure of the
+airfield. General Hitoshi Immamura,
+commander of the <i>Eighth Area
+Army</i>, arrived in Rabaul on 2 December
+with orders to continue the
+offensive. He had 50,000 men to add
+to the embattled Japanese troops on
+Guadalcanal.</p>
+
+<p>Before these new enemy units
+could be employed, the Americans
+were prepared to move out from the
+perimeter in their own offensive.
+Conscious that the Mt. Austen area
+was a continuing threat to his inland
+flank in any drive to the west, Patch
+committed the Americal’s 132d Infantry
+to the task of clearing the mountain’s
+wooded slopes on 17
+December. The Army regiment succeeded
+in isolating the major
+Japanese force in the area by early
+January. The 1st Battalion, 2d Marines,
+took up hill positions to the
+southeast of the 132d to increase
+flank protection.</p>
+
+<p>By this time, the 25th Infantry Division
+(Major General J. Lawton Collins)
+had arrived and so had the 6th
+Marines (6 January) and the rest of
+the 2d Division’s headquarters and
+support troops. Brigadier General
+Alphonse De Carre, the Marine division’s
+assistant commander, took
+charge of all Marine ground forces
+on the island. The 2d Division’s commander,
+Major General John Marston,
+remained in New Zealand
+because he was senior to General
+Patch.</p>
+
+<p>With three divisions under his
+command, General Patch was designated
+Commanding General, XIV
+Corps, on 2 January. His corps headquarters
+numbered less than a score
+of officers and men, almost all taken
+from the Americal’s staff. Brigadier
+General Edmund B. Sebree, who had
+already led both Army and Marine
+units in attacks on the Japanese, took
+command of the Americal Division.
+On 10 January, Patch gave the signal
+to start the strongest American
+offensive yet in the Guadalcanal campaign.
+The mission of the troops was
+simple and to the point: “Attack and
+destroy the Japanese forces remaining
+on Guadalcanal.”</p>
+
+<p>The initial objective of the corps’
+attack was a line about 1,000 to 1,500
+yards west of jump-off positions.
+These ran inland from Point Cruz to
+the vicinity of Hill 66, about 3,000
+yards from the beach. In order to
+reach Hill 66, the 25th Infantry Division
+attacked first with the 35th
+and 27th Infantry driving west and
+southwest across a scrambled series
+of ridges. The going was rough and
+the dug-in enemy, elements of two
+regiments of the <i>38th Division</i>, gave
+way reluctantly and slowly. By the
+13th, however, the American soldiers,
+aided by Marines of the 1st
+Battalion, 2d Marines, had won
+through to positions on the southern
+flank of the 2d Marine Division.</p>
+
+<p>On 12 January, the Marines began
+their advance with the 8th Marines
+along the shore and 2d Marines inland.
+At the base of Point Cruz, in
+the 3d Battalion, 8th Marines’ sector,
+regimental weapons company halftracks
+ran over seven enemy machine
+gun nests. The attack was then held
+up by an extensive emplacement until
+the weapons company commander,
+Captain Henry P. “Jim” Crowe, took
+charge of a half-dozen Marine infantrymen
+taking cover from enemy fire
+with the classic remarks: “You’ll never
+get a Purple Heart hiding in a fox
+hole. Follow me!” The men did and
+they destroyed the emplacement.</p>
+
+<div id="ip_49" class="figcenter" style="width: 377px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_049.jpg" width="377" height="198" alt="" />
+  <div class="captionl">U.S. Halftrack Mounting a 75mm Pack Howitzer
+and a .50-Caliber Air-Cooled Machine Gun</div></div>
+
+<p>All along the front of the advancing
+assault companies the going was
+rough. The Japanese, remnants of the
+<i>Sendai Division</i>, were dug into the
+sides of a series of cross compartments
+and their fire took the Marines
+in the flank as they advanced.
+Progress was slow despite massive artillery
+support and naval gunfire
+from four destroyers offshore. In two
+days of heavy fighting, flamethrowers
+were employed for the first time
+and tanks were brought into play.
+The 2d Marines was now relieved
+and the 6th Marines moved into the
+attack along the coast while the 8th<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_50" id="Page_50">50</a></span>
+Marines took up the advance inland.
+Naval gunfire support, spotted by
+naval officers ashore, improved
+measurably. On the 15th, the Americans,
+both Army and Marine,
+reached the initial corps objective. In
+the Marine attack zone, 600 Japanese
+were dead.</p>
+
+<div id="ip_50" class="figcenter" style="width: 756px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_050.jpg" width="756" height="598" alt="" />
+  <div class="caption"><p>FINAL PHASE</p>
+
+<p class="smaller">26 JANUARY&ndash;9 FEBRUARY 1943</p></div></div>
+
+<p>The battle-weary 2d Marines had
+seen its last infantry action of
+Guadalcanal. A new unit now came
+into being, a composite Army-Marine
+division, or CAM division,
+formed from units of the Americal
+and 2d Marine Divisions. The directing
+staff was from the 2d Division,
+since the Americal had responsibility
+for the main perimeter. Two of its
+regiments, the 147th and the 182d Infantry,
+moved up to attack in line
+with the 6th Marines still along the
+coast. The 8th Marines was essentially
+pinched out of the front lines by
+a narrowing attack corridor as the inland
+mountains and hills pressed
+closer to the coastal trail. The 25th
+Division, which was advancing
+across this rugged terrain, had the
+mission of outflanking the Japanese
+in the vicinity of Kokumbona, while
+the CAM division drove west. On
+the 23d, as the CAM troops approached
+Kokumbona, the 1st Battalion
+of the 27th Infantry struck
+north out of the hills and overran the
+village site and Japanese base. There
+was only slight but steady opposition
+to the American advance as the enemy
+withdrew west toward Cape Esperance.</p>
+
+<p>The Japanese had decided, reluctantly,
+to give up the attempt to
+retake Guadalcanal. The orders were
+sent in the name of the Emperor and
+senior staff officers were sent to
+Guadalcanal to ensure their acceptance.
+The Navy would make the final
+runs of the Tokyo Express, only
+this time in reverse, to evacuate the
+garrison so it could fight again in
+later battles to hold the Solomons.</p>
+
+<p>Receiving intelligence that enemy
+ships were massing again to the
+northwest, General Patch took steps,
+as Vandegrift had before him on
+many occasions, to guard against
+overextending his forces in the face
+of what appeared to be another enemy
+attempt at reinforcement. He
+pulled the 25th Division back to bolster
+the main perimeter defenses and
+ordered the CAM division to continue
+its attack. When the Marines
+and soldiers moved out on 26 January,
+they had a surprisingly easy time
+of it, gaining 1,000 yards the first day<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_51" id="Page_51">51</a></span>
+and 2,000 the following day. The
+Japanese were still contesting every
+attack, but not in strength.</p>
+
+<p>By 30 January, the sole frontline
+unit in the American advance was the
+147th Infantry; the 6th Marines held
+positions to its left rear.</p>
+
+<p>The Japanese destroyer transports
+made their first run to the island on
+the night of 1&ndash;2 February, taking out
+2,300 men from evacuation positions
+near Cape Esperance. On the night
+of 4&ndash;5 February, they returned and
+took out most of the <i>Sendai</i> survivors
+and General Hyakutake and
+his <i>Seventeenth Army</i> staff. The final
+evacuation operation was carried
+out on the night of 7&ndash;8 February,
+when a 3,000-man rear guard was
+embarked. In all, the Japanese withdrew
+about 11,000 men in those three
+nights and evacuated about 13,000
+soldiers from Guadalcanal overall.
+The Americans would meet many of
+these men again in later battles, but
+not the 600 evacuees who died, too
+worn and sick to survive their rescue.</p>
+
+<p>On 9 February, American soldiers
+advancing from east and west met at
+Tenaro village on Cape Esperance.
+The only Marine ground unit still in
+action was the 3d Battalion, 10th
+Marines, supporting the advance.
+General Patch could happily report
+the “complete and total defeat of Japanese
+forces on Guadalcanal.” No organized
+Japanese units remained.</p>
+
+<p>On 31 January, the 2d Marines and
+the 1st Battalion, 8th Marines,
+boarded ship to leave Guadalcanal.
+As was true with the 1st Marine Division,
+some of these men were so
+debilitated by malaria they had to be
+carried on board. All of them struck
+observers again as young men grown
+old “with their skins cracked and furrowed
+and wrinkled.” On 9 February,
+the rest of the 8th Marines and a
+good part of the division supporting
+units boarded transports. The 6th
+Marines, thankfully only six weeks
+on the island, left on the 19th. All
+were headed for Wellington, New
+Zealand, the 2d Marines for the first
+time. Left behind on the island as a
+legacy of the 2d Marine Division
+were 263 dead.</p>
+
+<div id="ip_51" class="figcenter" style="width: 549px;">
+  <div class="captionl top"><p class="justify"><i>President Franklin D. Roosevelt presents Gen Vandegrift the
+Medal of Honor for his heroic accomplishments against the
+Japanese in the Solomons. Looking on are Mrs. Vandegrift,
+and the general’s son, Maj Alexander A. Vandegrift, Jr.</i></p></div>
+
+<div class="captionr top">
+<p>
+National Archives Photo 208-PU-209V-4
+</p></div>
+  <img src="images/i_b_051.jpg" width="549" height="410" alt="" />
+</div>
+
+<p>The total cost of the Guadalcanal
+campaign to the American ground
+combat forces was 1,598 officers and
+men killed, 1,152 of them Marines.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_52" id="Page_52">52</a></span>
+The wounded totaled 4,709, and
+2,799 of these were Marines. Marine
+aviation casualties were 147 killed
+and 127 wounded. The Japanese in
+their turn lost close to 25,000 men on
+Guadalcanal, about half of whom
+were killed in action. The rest succumbed
+to illness, wounds, and starvation.</p>
+
+<div id="ip_52" class="figcenter" style="width: 548px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_052.jpg" width="548" height="356" alt="" />
+  <div class="captionl justify"><i>The temporary resting place of a Marine killed in the fighting
+at Lunga Point is shown here. The grave marker was erected
+by his friends. The Marine’s remains were later removed to
+the division cemetery on Guadalcanal, and further reburial
+at war’s end either in his hometown or the Punchbowl National
+Cemetery in Hawaii with the honors due a fallen hero.</i></div></div>
+
+<p>At sea, the comparative losses
+were about equal, with each side losing
+about the same number of fighting
+ships. The enemy loss of 2
+battleships, 3 carriers, 12 cruisers,
+and 25 destroyers, was irreplaceable.
+The Allied ship losses, though costly,
+were not fatal; in essence, all ships
+lost were replaced. In the air, at least
+600 Japanese planes were shot down;
+even more costly was the death of
+2,300 experienced pilots and aircrewmen.
+The Allied plane losses were
+less than half the enemy’s number
+and the pilot and aircrew losses substantially
+lower.</p>
+
+<p>President Roosevelt, reflecting the
+thanks of a grateful nation, awarded
+General Vandegrift the Medal of
+Honor for “outstanding and heroic
+accomplishment” in his leadership of
+American forces on Guadalcanal
+from 7 August to 9 December 1942.
+And for the same period, he awarded
+the Presidential Unit Citation to
+the 1st Marine Division (Reinforced)
+for “outstanding gallantry” reflecting
+“courage and determination ... of
+an inspiring order.” Included in the
+division’s citation and award, besides
+the organic units of the 1st Division,
+were the 2d and 8th Marines and attached
+units of the 2d Marine Division,
+all of the Americal Division, the
+1st Parachute and 1st and 2d Raider
+Battalions, elements of the 3d, 5th,
+and 14th Defense Battalions, the 1st
+Aviation Engineer Battalion, the 6th
+Naval Construction Battalion, and
+two motor torpedo boat squadrons.
+The indispensable Cactus Air Force
+was included, also represented by 7
+Marine headquarters and service
+squadrons, 16 Marine flying squadrons,
+16 Navy flying squadrons,
+and 5 Army flying squadrons.</p>
+
+<p>The victory at Guadalcanal
+marked a crucial turning point in the
+Pacific War. No longer were the
+Japanese on the offensive. Some of
+the Japanese Emperor’s best infantrymen,
+pilots, and seamen had been
+bested in close combat by the Americans
+and their Allies. There were
+years of fierce fighting ahead, but
+there was now no question of its
+outcome.</p>
+
+<p>When the veterans of the 1st Marine
+Division were gathered in thankful
+reunion 20 years later, they
+received a poignant message from
+Guadalcanal. The sender was a
+legend to all “Canal” Marines,
+Honorary U.S. Marine Corps Sergeant
+Major Jacob C. Vouza. The
+Solomons native in his halting English
+said: “Tell them I love them all.
+Me old man now, and me no look
+good no more. But me never forget.”</p>
+
+<div class="chapter"></div>
+<div class="sidebar green">
+<p class="in0 small"><a name="Sidebar_page_48_The_George_Medal" id="Sidebar_page_48_The_George_Medal"></a>[Sidebar (<a href="#Page_49">page 48</a>):]</p>
+<h3 class="nobreak p0">The ‘George’ Medal</h3>
+
+<p class="drop-cap"><span class="smcap1"><span class="dkgreen">T</span>he</span> George Medal is legendary among 1st Marine
+Division veterans of Guadalcanal. Only
+about 50 were cast, in Australia, before the mold
+gave out.</p>
+
+<p>The medal commemorates the difficult situation of the
+division during the early days on Guadalcanal, when ammunition,
+food, and heavy equipment were short and the
+Japanese plentiful. When the issue was no longer in doubt,
+Marines had time to reflect on the D-plus-3 Navy withdrawal
+in the face of increasing Japanese air attacks and
+surface action which left the division in such a tight spot.</p>
+
+<p>In the recollection of then-Captain Donald L. Dickson,
+adjutant of the 5th Marines, the Division G-3, then-Lieutenant
+Colonel Merrill B. Twining, resolved to commemorate
+the occasion. Twining told artist Dickson in
+general terms what he had in mind. Dickson went to work
+designing an appropriate medal using a fifty-cent piece to
+draw a circle on a captured Japanese blank military
+postcard.</p>
+
+<p>Dickson’s design was approved and when the division
+got to Australia a mold was made by a local metal craftsman
+and a small number were cast before the mold became
+unserviceable. Those wanting a medal paid one Australian
+pound for it and received a certificate as well. The medals
+are now an even greater rarity than at the time. In recent
+years, reproductions have been cast, and can be identified
+by the different metal and a poor definition of details.</p>
+
+<p>The obverse design shows a hand and sleeve dropping
+a hot potato in the shape of Guadalcanal into the arms of
+a grateful Marine. In the original design the sleeve bore the
+stripes of a vice admiral intended to be either Vice Admiral
+Robert L. Ghormley, ComSoPac, or Vice Admiral Frank
+Jack Fletcher, Commander Joint Expeditionary Force, but
+the final medal diplomatically omitted this identification.</p>
+
+<p>Also on the obverse is a Saguaro cactus, indigenous to
+Arizona, not Guadalcanal, but representing the code name
+for the island, “Cactus.” The obverse inscription is <i>Facia Georgius</i>,
+“Let George Do It.” Thus it became known as the
+George Medal.</p>
+
+<p>The medal’s reverse pictures a cow (the original design
+showed a Japanese soldier with breeches down) and an electric
+fan, and is inscribed: “In fond remembrance of the happy
+days spent from Aug. 7th 1942 to Jan. 5th 1943.
+U.S.M.C.”</p>
+
+<p>The suspension ribbon was made, appropriately, of the
+pale green herringbone twill from some Marine’s utility uniform.
+Legend has it that to be authentic the utilities from
+which the ribbons were made had to have been washed in
+the waters of Guadalcanal’s Lunga River. Some medals were
+provided with the oversized safety pin used to identify laundry
+bags in Navy shipboard laundries.</p>
+
+<p>Such unofficial commemorative mementoes are not uncommon
+in military circles and recall, among others, the
+Soochow Creek medals recognizing the defense of Shanghai’s
+International Settlement during the Japanese invasions
+of 1932 and 1937 which were inspired by the Military
+Order of the Dragon medals of veterans of the China Relief
+Expedition or Boxer Rebellion.&mdash;<i>Brooke Nihart</i></p>
+
+<div class="figcenter" style="width: 691px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_048.jpg" width="691" height="406" alt="" /></div>
+</div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter"></div>
+<h2><a name="Sources" id="Sources"></a><i>Sources</i></h2>
+
+<p>The basic source work for this booklet is
+the first volume in the series <i>History of U.S.
+Marine Corps Operations in World War II,
+Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal</i>, written by
+LtCol Frank O. Hough, Maj Verle E. Ludwig,
+and Henry I. Shaw, Jr. (Washington: Historical
+Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, U.S.
+Marine Corps, 1958). Other books used in
+writing this narrative were: BGen Samuel B.
+Griffith II, <i>The Battle for Guadalcanal</i>
+(Philadelphia: J.&nbsp;B. Lippincott, 1963); Gen
+Alexander A. Vandegrift as told to Robert B.
+Asprey, <i>Once a Marine: The Memoirs of
+General A.&nbsp;A. Vandegrift, USMC</i> (New York:
+W.&nbsp;W. Norton, 1964); Col Mitchell Paige, <i>A
+Marine Named Mitch</i> (New York: Vantage
+Press, 1975); Burke Davis, <i>Marine: The Life
+of Chesty Puller</i> (Boston: Little, Brown,
+1962); George McMillan, <i>The Old Breed: A
+History of the 1st Marine Division in World
+War II</i> (Washington: Infantry Journal Press,
+1949); and Richard W. Johnston, <i>Follow Me!:
+The Story of the Second Marine Division in
+World War II</i> (New York: Random House,
+1948).</p>
+
+<p>The correspondence of General Vandegrift
+with General Holcomb and other senior Marines,
+held at the Marine Corps Historical
+Center, was helpful. Equally of value were
+conversations that the author had had with
+General Vandegrift after his retirement. In the
+course of his career as a Marine historian, the
+author has talked with other Guadalcanal
+veterans of all ranks; hopefully, this has
+resulted in a “feel” for the campaign, essential
+in writing such an overview.</p>
+
+<p>The literature on the Guadalcanal operation
+is extensive. In addition to the books cited
+above, there are several which are
+personally recommended to the interested
+reader: Robert Leckie, <i>Helmet for My Pillow</i>
+(New York: Random House, 1957); Herbert
+Merillat, <i>Guadalcanal Remembered</i> (New
+York: Dodd, Mead, 1982); John Miller, Jr.,
+<i>The United States Army in World War II: The
+War in the Pacific</i>; <i>Guadalcanal, The First
+Offensive</i> (Washington: Historical Division,
+Department of the Army, 1949); T. Grady
+Gallant, <i>On Valor’s Side</i> (New York: Doubleday,
+1963); Robert Sherrod, <i>History of Marine
+Corps Aviation in World War II</i>
+(Washington: Combat Forces Press, 1952);
+Maj John L. Zimmerman, <i>The Guadalcanal
+Campaign</i> (Washington: Historical Division,
+Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1949);
+RAdm Samuel E. Morrison, <i>The Struggle for
+Guadalcanal: History of United States Naval
+Operations in World War II</i>, Vol V (Boston:
+Little, Brown, 1950); and a recent, comprehensive
+account, Richard B. Frank, <i>Guadalcanal</i>
+(New York: Random House, 1990).</p>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter"></div>
+<h2><a name="About_the_Author" id="About_the_Author"></a><i>About the Author</i></h2>
+
+<div class="figleft" style="width: 137px; margin-top: -1em;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_053.jpg" width="137" height="186" alt="" /></div>
+
+<p class="drop-cap"><span class="smcap1">Henry</span> I. Shaw, Jr., former chief historian of
+the History and Museums Division, was a
+Marine Corps historian from 1951&ndash;1990. He attended
+The Citadel, 1943&ndash;1944, and was graduated
+with a bachelor of arts cum laude in history
+from Hope College, Holland, Michigan. He
+received a master of arts degree in history from
+Columbia University. Mr. Shaw served as a Marine
+in both World War II and the Korean War.
+He is the co-author of four of the five volumes
+of the official history of Marine Corps operations
+in World War II and was the senior editor of most
+of the official histories of Marines in Vietnam.
+In addition, he has written a number of brief Marine Corps histories. He has written
+many articles on military history and has had more than 50 signed book reviews.</p>
+
+<div class="tb">* <span class="in2">* </span><span class="in2">* </span><span class="in2">* </span><span class="in2">*</span></div>
+
+<p><i>The author gratefully acknowledges the permission granted by the Nautical and
+Aviation Publishing Company of America to use the maps from BGen Samuel B.
+Griffith II’s</i> The Battle for Guadalcanal <i>and by Doubleday Books and Jack Coggins
+for use of the sketches from his</i> The Campaign for Guadalcanal. <i>The author
+also wishes to thank Richard J. Frank and Herbert C. Merillat for permission to
+reproduce their photographs.</i></p>
+
+
+<div class="chapter"></div>
+<div class="sidebar" id="About_series">
+
+<div class="figcenter" style="width: 274px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_053b.jpg" width="274" height="103" alt="" /></div>
+
+<p><b>THIS PAMPHLET HISTORY</b>, one in a series devoted to U.S. Marines in the
+World War II era, is published for the education and training of Marines by
+the History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps,
+Washington, D.C., as a part of the U.S. Department of Defense observance
+of the 50th anniversary of victory in that war.</p>
+
+<p>Editorial costs of preparing this pamphlet have been defrayed in part by
+a bequest from the estate of Emilie H. Watts, in memory of her late husband,
+Thomas M. Watts, who served as a Marine and was the recipient of a Purple
+Heart.</p>
+
+<div class="center">
+<p class="p1 bold" style="font-family: sans-serif, serif;">WORLD WAR II COMMEMORATIVE SERIES</p>
+
+<p><i>DIRECTOR OF MARINE CORPS HISTORY AND MUSEUMS</i><br />
+<b>Brigadier General Edwin H. Simmons, USMC (Ret)</b></p>
+
+<p><i>GENERAL EDITOR,<br />
+WORLD WAR II COMMEMORATIVE SERIES</i><br />
+<b>Benis M. Frank</b></p>
+
+<p><i>CARTOGRAPHIC CONSULTANT</i><br />
+<b>George C. MacGillivray</b></p>
+
+<p><i>EDITING AND DESIGN SECTION, HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISION</i><br />
+<b>Robert E. Struder</b>, Senior Editor; <b>W. Stephen Hill</b>, Visual Information<br />
+Specialist; <b>Catherine A. Kerns</b>, Composition Services Technician</p>
+
+<p>Marine Corps Historical Center<br />
+Building 58, Washington Navy Yard<br />
+Washington, D.C. 20374-0580</p>
+
+<p>1992</p>
+
+<p>PCN 190 003117 00</p>
+</div>
+</div>
+
+<div class="figcenter" style="width: 291px;">
+  <img src="images/i_back_cover.jpg" width="291" height="400" alt="back cover" /></div>
+
+
+<div class="chapter"></div>
+<div class="transnote">
+<h2 class="nobreak p1"><a name="Transcribers_Notes" id="Transcribers_Notes"></a>Transcriber’s Notes</h2>
+
+<p>Punctuation, hyphenation, and spelling were made consistent when a
+predominant preference was found in this book; otherwise they were not
+changed.</p>
+
+<p>Simple typographical errors were corrected; occasional unbalanced
+quotation marks retained.</p>
+
+<p>To make this eBook easier to read, particularly on handheld devices,
+some images have been made relatively larger than in the original
+pamphlet, and centered, rather than offset to one side or the other;
+and some were placed a little earlier or later than in the
+original. Sidebars in the original have been repositioned between
+chapters and identified as “[Sidebar (page nn):”, where the
+page reference is to the original location in the source book. In the
+Plain Text version, the matching closing right bracket follows the last
+line of the Sidebar’s text and is on a separate line to make it more
+noticeable. In the HTML versions, that bracket follows the colon, and
+each Sidebar is displayed within a box.</p>
+
+<p>Descriptions of the Cover and Frontispiece have been moved from page 1
+of the book to just below those illustrations, and text referring to
+the locations of those illustrations has been deleted.</p>
+
+<p>Page <a href="#Sidebar_page_3_General_Alexander_A_Vandegrift">3</a>: “He spent most of his final years” was misprinted without
+the “of”.</p>
+
+<p>Page <a href="#Page_21">21</a>: “disgraced in his own” was misprinted without the “his”.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div>*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 48807 ***</div>
+</body>
+</html>
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