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-The Project Gutenberg EBook of First Offensive: The Marine Campaign for

-Guadalcanal, by Henry I. Shaw

-

-This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most

-other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions

-whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of

-the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at

-www.gutenberg.org.  If you are not located in the United States, you'll have

-to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook.

-

-Title: First Offensive: The Marine Campaign for Guadalcanal

-

-Author: Henry I. Shaw

-

-Release Date: April 27, 2015 [EBook #48807]

-

-Language: English

-

-Character set encoding: UTF-8

-

-*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK FIRST OFFENSIVE: GUADALCANAL ***

-

-

-

-

-Produced by Brian Coe, Charlie Howard, and the Online

-Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This

-file was produced from images generously made available

-by The Internet Archive)

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-Transcriber’s note: Table of Contents added by Transcriber and placed

-into the public domain. Boldface text is indicated by =equals signs=.

-

-Contents

-

-  First Offensive: The Marine Campaign for Guadalcanal

-    SIDEBAR: General Alexander A. Vandegrift

-  The Landing and August Battles

-    SIDEBAR: First Marine Utility Uniform Issued in World War II

-    SIDEBAR: LVT (1)--The ‘Amtrac’

-    SIDEBAR: General Vandegrift and His 1st Marine Division Staff

-    SIDEBAR: The Coastwatchers

-    SIDEBAR: The 1st Marine Division Patch

-  September and the Ridge

-    SIDEBAR: Sergeant Major Sir Jacob Charles Vouza

-    SIDEBAR: M3A1 37mm Antitank Gun

-    SIDEBAR: Douglas Albert Munro

-  October and the Japanese Offensive

-    SIDEBAR: Reising Gun

-  November and the Continuing Buildup

-    SIDEBAR: 75mm Pack Howitzer--Workhorse of the Artillery

-    SIDEBAR: The Japanese Model 89 (1929) 50mm Heavy Grenade Discharger

-  December and the Final Stages

-    SIDEBAR: The ‘George’ Medal

-  Sources

-  About the Author

-  About this series of pamphlets

-  Transcriber’s Notes

-

-

-

-

-    FIRST OFFENSIVE:

-    THE MARINE CAMPAIGN

-    FOR GUADALCANAL

-

-

-    MARINES IN

-    WORLD WAR II

-    COMMEMORATIVE SERIES

-

-    BY HENRY I. SHAW, JR.

-

-[Illustration: _A Marine machine gunner and his Browning .30-caliber

-M1917 heavy machine gun stand guard while 1st Marine Division engineers

-clean up in the Lunga River._ (Department of Defense [USMC] Photo

-588741)]

-

-[Illustration: _It was from a Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress such as this

-that LtCol Merrill B. Twining and Maj William B. McKean reconnoitered

-the Watchtower target area and discovered the Japanese building an

-airfield on Guadalcanal._ (National Archives Photo 80-G-34887)]

-

-

-

-

-First Offensive: The Marine Campaign for Guadalcanal

-

-_by Henry I. Shaw, Jr._

-

-

-In the early summer of 1942, intelligence reports of the construction

-of a Japanese airfield near Lunga Point on Guadalcanal in the Solomon

-Islands triggered a demand for offensive action in the South Pacific.

-The leading offensive advocate in Washington was Admiral Ernest J.

-King, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). In the Pacific, his view was

-shared by Admiral Chester A. Nimitz, Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet

-(CinCPac), who had already proposed sending the 1st Marine Raider

-Battalion to Tulagi, an island 20 miles north of Guadalcanal across

-Sealark Channel, to destroy a Japanese seaplane base there. Although

-the Battle of the Coral Sea had forestalled a Japanese amphibious

-assault on Port Moresby, the Allied base of supply in eastern New

-Guinea, completion of the Guadalcanal airfield might signal the

-beginning of a renewed enemy advance to the south and an increased

-threat to the lifeline of American aid to New Zealand and Australia. On

-23 July 1942, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in Washington agreed that

-the line of communications in the South Pacific had to be secured. The

-Japanese advance had to be stopped. Thus, Operation Watchtower, the

-seizure of Guadalcanal and Tulagi, came into being.

-

-The islands of the Solomons lie nestled in the backwaters of the South

-Pacific. Spanish fortune-hunters discovered them in the mid-sixteenth

-century, but no European power foresaw any value in the islands until

-Germany sought to expand its budding colonial empire more than two

-centuries later. In 1884, Germany proclaimed a protectorate over

-northern New Guinea, the Bismarck Archipelago, and the northern

-Solomons. Great Britain countered by establishing a protectorate over

-the southern Solomons and by annexing the remainder of New Guinea. In

-1905, the British crown passed administrative control over all its

-territories in the region to Australia, and the Territory of Papua,

-with its capital at Port Moresby, came into being. Germany’s holdings

-in the region fell under the administrative control of the League of

-Nations following World War I, with the seat of the colonial government

-located at Rabaul on New Britain. The Solomons lay 10 degrees below the

-Equator--hot, humid, and buffeted by torrential rains. The celebrated

-adventure novelist, Jack London, supposedly muttered: “If I were king,

-the worst punishment I could inflict on my enemies would be to banish

-them to the Solomons.”

-

-On 23 January 1942, Japanese forces seized Rabaul and fortified it

-extensively. The site provided an excellent harbor and numerous

-positions for airfields. The devastating enemy carrier and plane

-losses at the Battle of Midway (3-6 June 1942) had caused _Imperial

-General Headquarters_ to cancel orders for the invasion of Midway, New

-Caledonia, Fiji, and Samoa, but plans to construct a major seaplane

-base at Tulagi went forward. The location offered one of the best

-anchorages in the South Pacific and it was strategically located: 560

-miles from the New Hebrides, 800 miles from New Caledonia, and 1,000

-miles from Fiji.

-

-The outposts at Tulagi and Guadalcanal were the forward evidences of a

-sizeable Japanese force in the region, beginning with the _Seventeenth

-Army_, headquartered at Rabaul. The enemy’s _Eighth Fleet_, _Eleventh

-Air Fleet_, and _1st_, _7th_, _8th_, and _14th Naval Base Forces_

-also were on New Britain. Beginning on 5 August 1942, Japanese signal

-intelligence units began to pick up transmissions between Noumea on

-New Caledonia and Melbourne, Australia. Enemy analysts concluded that

-Vice Admiral Richard L. Ghormley, commanding the South Pacific Area

-(ComSoPac), was signalling a British or Australian force in preparation

-for an offensive in the Solomons or at New Guinea. The warnings were

-passed to Japanese headquarters at Rabaul and Truk, but were ignored.

-

-[Illustration: THE PACIFIC AREAS

-

-1 AUGUST 1942]

-

-The invasion force was indeed on its way to its targets, Guadalcanal,

-Tulagi, and the tiny islets of Gavutu and Tanambogo close by Tulagi’s

-shore. The landing force was composed of Marines; the covering force

-and transport force were U.S. Navy with a reinforcement of Australian

-warships. There was not much mystery to the selection of the 1st

-Marine Division to make the landings. Five U.S. Army divisions were

-located in the South and Southwest Pacific: three in Australia, the

-37th Infantry in Fiji, and the Americal Division on New Caledonia.

-None was amphibiously trained and all were considered vital parts of

-defensive garrisons. The 1st Marine Division, minus one of its infantry

-regiments, had begun arriving in New Zealand in mid-June when the

-division headquarters and the 5th Marines reached Wellington. At that

-time, the rest of the reinforced division’s major units were getting

-ready to embark. The 1st Marines were at San Francisco, the 1st Raider

-Battalion was on New Caledonia, and the 3d Defense Battalion was at

-Pearl Harbor. The 2d Marines of the 2d Marine Division, a unit which

-would replace the 1st Division’s 7th Marines stationed in British

-Samoa, was loading out from San Diego. All three infantry regiments

-of the landing force had battalions of artillery attached, from the

-11th Marines, in the case of the 5th and 1st; the 2d Marines drew its

-reinforcing 75mm howitzers from the 2d Division’s 10th Marines.

-

-The news that his division would be the landing force for Watchtower

-came as a surprise to Major General Alexander A. Vandegrift, who

-had anticipated that the 1st Division would have six months of

-training in the South Pacific before it saw action. The changeover

-from administrative loading of the various units’ supplies to combat

-loading, where first-needed equipment, weapons, ammunition, and rations

-were positioned to come off ship first with the assault troops,

-occasioned a never-to-be-forgotten scene on Wellington’s docks. The

-combat troops took the place of civilian stevedores and unloaded and

-reloaded the cargo and passenger vessels in an increasing round of

-working parties, often during rainstorms which hampered the task, but

-the job was done. Succeeding echelons of the division’s forces all got

-their share of labor on the docks as various shipping groups arrived

-and the time grew shorter. General Vandegrift was able to convince

-Admiral Ghormley and the Joint Chiefs that he would not be able to meet

-a proposed D-Day of 1 August, but the extended landing date, 7 August,

-did little to improve the situation.

-

-An amphibious operation is a vastly complicated affair, particularly

-when the forces involved are assembled on short notice from all over

-the Pacific. The pressure that Vandegrift felt was not unique to

-the landing force commander. The U.S. Navy’s ships were the key to

-success and they were scarce and invaluable. Although the Battles of

-Coral Sea and Midway had badly damaged the Japanese fleet’s offensive

-capabilities and crippled its carrier forces, enemy naval aircraft

-could fight as well ashore as afloat and enemy warships were still

-numerous and lethal. American losses at Pearl Harbor, Coral Sea, and

-Midway were considerable, and Navy admirals were well aware that the

-ships they commanded were in short supply. The day was coming when

-America’s shipyards and factories would fill the seas with warships

-of all types, but that day had not arrived in 1942. Calculated risk

-was the name of the game where the Navy was concerned, and if the risk

-seemed too great, the Watchtower landing force might be a casualty. As

-it happened, the Navy never ceased to risk its ships in the waters of

-the Solomons, but the naval lifeline to the troops ashore stretched

-mighty thin at times.

-

-Tactical command of the invasion force approaching Guadalcanal in early

-August was vested in Vice Admiral Frank J. Fletcher as Expeditionary

-Force Commander (Task Force 61). His force consisted of the amphibious

-shipping carrying the 1st Marine Division, under Rear Admiral Richmond

-K. Turner, and the Air Support Force led by Rear Admiral Leigh Noyes.

-Admiral Ghormley contributed land-based air forces commanded by Rear

-Admiral John S. McCain. Fletcher’s support force consisted of three

-fleet carriers, the _Saratoga_ (CV 3), _Enterprise_ (CV 6), and _Wasp_

-(CV 7); the battleship _North Carolina_ (BB 55), 6 cruisers, 16

-destroyers, and 3 oilers. Admiral Turner’s covering force included five

-cruisers and nine destroyers.

-

-

-[Sidebar (page 3): General Alexander A. Vandegrift

-

-[Illustration]

-

-A distinguished military analyst once noted that if titles were awarded

-in America as they are in England, the commanding general of Marine

-Corps forces at Guadalcanal would be known simply as “Vandegrift of

-Guadalcanal.” But America does not bestow aristocratic titles, and

-besides, such a formality would not be in keeping with the soft-spoken,

-modest demeanor of Alexander A. Vandegrift.

-

-The man destined to lead the 1st Marine Division in America’s

-first ground offensive operation of World War II was born in 1887

-in Charlottesville, Virginia, where he grew up fascinated by his

-grandfather’s stories of life in the Confederate Army during the Civil

-War. It was axiomatic that young Alexander would settle on a military

-career. Commissioned a Marine lieutenant in 1909, Vandegrift received

-an early baptism of fire in 1912 during the bombardment, assault, and

-capture of Coyotepe in Nicaragua. Two years later he participated in

-the capture and occupation of Vera Cruz. Vandegrift would spend the

-greater part of the next decade in Haiti, where he fought Caco bandits,

-and served as an inspector of constabulary with the Gendarmerie

-d’Haiti. It was in Haiti that he met and was befriended by Marine

-Colonel Smedley D. Butler, who called him “Sunny Jim.” The lessons of

-these formative years fighting an elusive enemy in a hostile jungle

-environment were not lost upon the young Marine officer.

-

-He spent the next 18 years in various posts and stations in the United

-States, along with two tours of China duty at Peiping and Tientsin.

-Prior to Pearl Harbor, Vandegrift was appointed assistant to the

-Major General Commandant, and in April 1940 received the single star

-of a brigadier general. He was detached to the 1st Marine Division

-in November 1941, and in May 1942 sailed for the South Pacific as

-commanding general of the first Marine division ever to leave the

-United States. On 7 August 1942, after exhorting his Marines with the

-reminder that “God favors the bold and strong of heart,” he led the 1st

-Marine Division ashore in the Solomon Islands in the first large-scale

-offensive action against the Japanese.

-

-His triumph at Guadalcanal earned General Vandegrift the Medal of

-Honor, the Navy Cross, and the praise of a grateful nation. In July

-1943 he took command of I Marine Amphibious Corps and planned the

-landing at Empress Augusta Bay, Bougainville, Northern Solomons, on

-1 November 1943. He then was recalled to Washington, to become the

-Eighteenth Commandant of the Marine Corps.

-

-On 1 January 1944, as a lieutenant general, Vandegrift was sworn in as

-Commandant. On 4 April 1945 he was promoted to general, and thus became

-the first Marine officer on active duty to attain four-star rank.

-

-In the final stages of the war, General Vandegrift directed an elite

-force approaching half-a-million men and women, with its own aviation

-force. Comparing his Marines with the Japanese, he noted that the

-Japanese soldier “was trained to go to a place, stay there, fight and

-die. We train our men to go to a place, fight to win, and to live. I

-can assure you, it is a better theory.”

-

-After the war, Vandegrift fought another battle, this time in the halls

-of Congress, with the stakes being the survival of the Marine Corps.

-His counter-testimony during Congressional hearings of the spring

-of 1946 was instrumental in defeating initial attempts to merge or

-“unify” the U.S. Armed Forces. Although his term as Commandant ended

-on 31 December 1947, General Vandegrift would live to see passage of

-Public Law 416, which preserved the Corps and its historic mission. His

-official retirement date of 1 April 1949 ended just over 40 years of

-service.

-

-General Vandegrift outlived both his wife Mildred and their only son,

-Colonel Alexander A. Vandegrift, Jr., who fought in World War II and

-Korea. He spent most of his final years in Delray, Florida. He died on

-8 May 1973.--_Robert V. Aquilina_

-]

-

-

-

-

-_The Landing and August Battles_

-

-

-On board the transports approaching the Solomons, the Marines were

-looking for a tough fight. They knew little about the targets, even

-less about their opponents. Those maps that were available were poor,

-constructions based upon outdated hydrographic charts and information

-provided by former island residents. While maps based on aerial

-photographs had been prepared they were misplaced by the Navy in

-Auckland, New Zealand, and never got to the Marines at Wellington.

-

-On 17 July, a couple of division staff officers, Lieutenant Colonel

-Merrill B. Twining and Major William McKean, had been able to join the

-crew of a B-17 flying from Port Moresby on a reconnaissance mission

-over Guadalcanal. They reported what they had seen, and their analysis,

-coupled with aerial photographs, indicated no extensive defenses along

-the beaches of Guadalcanal’s north shore.

-

-[Illustration: GUADALCANAL

-

-TULAGI-GAVUTU

-

-and

-

-Florida Islands]

-

-This news was indeed welcome. The division intelligence officer (G-2),

-Lieutenant Colonel Frank B. Goettge, had concluded that about 8,400

-Japanese occupied Guadalcanal and Tulagi. Admiral Turner’s staff

-figured that the Japanese amounted to 7,125 men. Admiral Ghormley’s

-intelligence officer pegged the enemy strength at 3,100--closest to the

-3,457 actual total of Japanese troops; 2,571 of these were stationed on

-Guadalcanal and were mostly laborers working on the airfield.

-

-To oppose the Japanese, the Marines had an overwhelming superiority

-of men. At the time, the tables of organization for a Marine Corps

-division indicated a total of 19,514 officers and enlisted men,

-including naval medical and engineer (Seabee) units. Infantry

-regiments numbered 3,168 and consisted of a headquarters company, a

-weapons company, and three battalions. Each infantry battalion (933

-Marines) was organized into a headquarters company (89), a weapons

-company (273), and three rifle companies (183). The artillery regiment

-had 2,581 officers and men organized into three 75mm pack howitzer

-battalions and one 105mm howitzer battalion. A light tank battalion,

-a special weapons battalion of antiaircraft and antitank guns, and a

-parachute battalion added combat power. An engineer regiment (2,452

-Marines) with battalions of engineers, pioneers, and Seabees, provided

-a hefty combat and service element. The total was rounded out by

-division headquarters battalion’s headquarters, signal, and military

-police companies and the division’s service troops--service, motor

-transport, amphibian tractor, and medical battalions. For Watchtower,

-the 1st Raider Battalion and the 3d Defense Battalion had been added to

-Vandegrift’s command to provide more infantrymen and much needed coast

-defense and antiaircraft guns and crews.

-

-Unfortunately, the division’s heaviest ordnance had been left behind

-in New Zealand. Limited ship space and time meant that the division’s

-big guns, a 155mm howitzer battalion, and all the motor transport

-battalion’s two-and-a-half-ton trucks were not loaded. Colonel Pedro

-A. del Valle, commanding the 11th Marines, was unhappy at the loss of

-his heavy howitzers and equally distressed that essential sound and

-flash-ranging equipment necessary for effective counterbattery fire was

-left behind. Also failing to make the cut in the battle for shipping

-space, were all spare clothing, bedding rolls, and supplies necessary

-to support the reinforced division beyond 60 days of combat. Ten days

-supply of ammunition for each of the division’s weapons remained in New

-Zealand.

-

-[Illustration:

-

-    Naval Historical Photographic Collection 880-CF-117-4-63

-

-_Enroute to Guadalcanal RAdm Richmond Kelly Turner, commander of the

-Amphibious Force, and MajGen Alexander A. Vandegrift, 1st Marine

-Division commander, review the Operation Watchtower plan for landings

-in the Solomon Islands._]

-

-In the opinion of the 1st Division’s historian and a veteran of

-the landing, the men on the approaching transports “thought they’d

-have a bad time getting ashore.” They were confident, certainly,

-and sure that they could not be defeated, but most of the men were

-entering combat for the first time. There were combat veteran officers

-and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) throughout the division, but

-the majority of the men were going into their initial battle. The

-commanding officer of the 1st Marines, Colonel Clifton B. Cates,

-estimated that 90 percent of his men had enlisted after Pearl Harbor.

-The fabled 1st Marine Division of later World War II, Korean War,

-Vietnam War, and Persian Gulf War fame, the most highly decorated

-division in the U.S. Armed Forces, had not yet established its

-reputation.

-

-The convoy of ships, with its outriding protective screen of carriers,

-reached Koro in the Fiji Islands on 26 July. Practice landings did

-little more than exercise the transports’ landing craft, since reefs

-precluded an actual beach landing. The rendezvous at Koro did give the

-senior commanders a chance to have a face-to-face meeting. Fletcher,

-McCain, Turner, and Vandegrift got together with Ghormley’s chief of

-staff, Rear Admiral Daniel J. Callaghan, who notified the conferees

-that ComSoPac had ordered the 7th Marines on Samoa to be prepared to

-embark on four days notice as a reinforcement for Watchtower. To this

-decidedly good news, Admiral Fletcher added some bad news. In view of

-the threat from enemy land-based air, he could not “keep the carriers

-in the area for more than 48 hours after the landing.” Vandegrift

-protested that he needed at least four days to get the division’s gear

-ashore, and Fletcher reluctantly agreed to keep his carriers at risk

-another day.

-

-On the 28th the ships sailed from the Fijis, proceeding as if they were

-headed for Australia. At noon on 5 August, the convoy and its escorts

-turned north for the Solomons. Undetected by the Japanese, the assault

-force reached its target during the night of 6-7 August and split into

-two landing groups, Transport Division X-Ray, 15 transports heading

-for the north shore of Guadalcanal east of Lunga Point, and Transport

-Division Yoke, eight transports headed for Tulagi, Gavutu, Tanambogo,

-and the nearby Florida Island, which loomed over the smaller islands.

-

-Vandegrift’s plans for the landings would put two of his infantry

-regiments (Colonel LeRoy P. Hunt’s 5th Marines and Colonel Cates’

-1st Marines) ashore on both sides of the Lunga River prepared to

-attack inland to seize the airfield. The 11th Marines, the 3d Defense

-Battalion, and most of the division’s supporting units would also land

-near the Lunga, prepared to exploit the beachhead. Across the 20 miles

-of Sealark Channel, the division’s assistant commander, Brigadier

-General William H. Rupertus, led the assault forces slated to take

-Tulagi, Gavutu, and Tanambogo: the 1st Raider Battalion (Lieutenant

-Colonel Merritt A. Edson); the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines (Lieutenant

-Colonel Harold E. Rosecrans); and the 1st Parachute Battalion (Major

-Robert H. Williams). Company A of the 2d Marines would reconnoiter

-the nearby shores of Florida Island and the rest of Colonel John A.

-Arthur’s regiment would stand by in reserve to land where needed.

-

-As the ships slipped through the channels on either side of rugged

-Savo Island, which split Sealark near its western end, heavy clouds

-and dense rain blanketed the task force. Later the moon came out and

-silhouetted the islands. On board his command ship, Vandegrift wrote

-to his wife: “Tomorrow morning at dawn we land in our first major

-offensive of the war. Our plans have been made and God grant that our

-judgement has been sound ... whatever happens you’ll know I did my

-best. Let us hope that best will be good enough.”

-

-[Illustration: _MajGen Alexander A. Vandegrift, CG, 1st Marine

-Division, confers with his staff on board the transport USS _McCawley_

-(APA-4) enroute to Guadalcanal. From left: Gen Vandegrift; LtCol

-Gerald C. Thomas, operations officer; LtCol Randolph McC. Pate,

-logistics officer; LtCol Frank B. Goettge, intelligence officer; and

-Col William Capers James, chief of staff._

-

-    National Archives Photo 80-G-17065

-]

-

-At 0641 on 7 August, Turner signalled his ships to “land the landing

-force.” Just 28 minutes before, the heavy cruiser _Quincy_ (CA 39)

-had begun shelling the landing beaches at Guadalcanal. The sun came

-up that fateful Friday at 0650, and the first landing craft carrying

-assault troops of the 5th Marines touched down at 0909 on Red Beach.

-To the men’s surprise (and relief), no Japanese appeared to resist the

-landing. Hunt immediately moved his assault troops off the beach and

-into the surrounding jungle, waded the steep-banked Ilu River, and

-headed for the enemy airfield. The following 1st Marines were able to

-cross the Ilu on a bridge the engineers had hastily thrown up with

-an amphibian tractor bracing its middle. The silence was eerie and

-the absence of opposition was worrisome to the riflemen. The Japanese

-troops, most of whom were Korean laborers, had fled to the west,

-spooked by a week’s B-17 bombardment, the pre-assault naval gunfire,

-and the sight of the ships offshore. The situation was not the same

-across Sealark. The Marines on Guadalcanal could hear faint rumbles of

-a firefight across the waters.

-

-[Illustration:

-

-    National Archives Photo 80-CF-112-5-3

-

-_First Division Marines storm ashore across Guadalcanal’s beaches on

-D-Day, 7 August 1942, from the attack transport _Barnett_ (AP-11) and

-attack cargo ship _Fomalhaut_ (AK-22). The invaders were surprised at

-the lack of enemy opposition._]

-

-[Illustration:

-

-    LANDING ON GUADALCANAL

-    and Capture of the Airfield

-    7-8 AUGUST 1942

-]

-

-[Illustration:

-

-    Photo courtesy of Col James A. Donovan, Jr.

-

-_When the 5th Marines entered the jungle from the beachhead, and had to

-cross the steep banks of the Ilu River, 1st Marine Division engineers

-hastily constructed a bridge supported by amphibian tractors. Though

-heavily used, the bridge held up._]

-

-[Illustration: _Photographed immediately after a prelanding strike by

-USS _Enterprise_ aircraft flown by Navy pilots, Tanambogo and Gavutu

-Islands lie smoking and in ruins in the morning sun. Gavutu is at the

-left across the causeway from Tanambogo._

-

-    National Archives Photo 80-C-11034

-]

-

-The Japanese on Tulagi were special naval landing force sailors and

-they had no intention of giving up what they held without a vicious,

-no-surrender battle. Edson’s men landed first, following by Rosecrans’

-battalion, hitting Tulagi’s south coast and moving inland towards

-the ridge which ran lengthwise through the island. The battalions

-encountered pockets of resistance in the undergrowth of the islands

-thick vegetation and maneuvered to outflank and overrun the opposition.

-The advance of the Marines was steady but casualties were frequent. By

-nightfall, Edson had reached the former British residency overlooking

-Tulagi’s harbor and dug in for the night across a hill that overlooked

-the Japanese final position, a ravine on the islands southern tip. The

-2d Battalion, 5th Marines, had driven through to the northern shore,

-cleaning its sector of enemy; Rosecrans moved into position to back

-up the raiders. By the end of its first day ashore, 2d Battalion had

-lost 56 men killed and wounded; 1st Raider Battalion casualties were 99

-Marines.

-

-[Illustration:

-

-    Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 52231

-

-_After the battle, almost all palm trees on Gavutu were shorn of their

-foliage. Despite naval gunfire and close air support hitting the enemy

-emplacements, Japanese opposition from caves proved to be serious

-obstacles for attacking Marines._]

-

-Throughout the night, the Japanese swarmed from hillside caves in four

-separate attacks, trying to penetrate the raider lines. They were

-unsuccessful and most died in the attempts. At dawn, the 2d Battalion,

-2d Marines, landed to reinforce the attackers and by the afternoon of 8

-August, the mop-up was completed and the battle for Tulagi was over.

-

-The fight for tiny Gavutu and Tanambogo, both little more than small

-hills rising out of the sea, connected by a hundred-yard causeway, was

-every bit as intense as that on Tulagi. The area of combat was much

-smaller and the opportunities for fire support from offshore ships

-and carrier planes was severely limited once the Marines had landed.

-After naval gunfire from the light cruiser _San Juan_ (CL 54) and two

-destroyers, and a strike by F4F Wildcats flying from the _Wasp_, the

-1st Parachute Battalion landed near noon in three waves, 395 men in

-all, on Gavutu. The Japanese, secure in cave positions, opened fire on

-the second and third waves, pinning down the first Marines ashore on

-the beach. Major Williams took a bullet in the lungs and was evacuated;

-32 Marines were killed in the withering enemy fire. This time, 2d

-Marines reinforcements were really needed; the 1st Battalion’s Company

-B landed on Gavutu and attempted to take Tanambogo; the attackers were

-driven to ground and had to pull back to Gavutu.

-

-After a rough night of close-in fighting with the defenders of both

-islands, the 3d Battalion, 2d Marines, reinforced the men already

-ashore and mopped up on each island. The toll of Marines dead on the

-three islands was 144; the wounded numbered 194. The few Japanese who

-survived the battles fled to Florida Island, which had been scouted by

-the 2d Marines on D-Day and found clear of the enemy.

-

-The Marines’ landings and the concentration of shipping in Guadalcanal

-waters acted as a magnet to the Japanese at Rabaul. At Admiral

-Ghormley’s headquarters, Tulagi’s radio was heard on D-Day “frantically

-calling for [the] dispatch of surface forces to the scene” and

-designating transports and carriers as targets for heavy bombing.

-The messages were sent in plain language, emphasizing the plight

-of the threatened garrison. And the enemy response was prompt and

-characteristic of the months of naval air and surface attacks to come.

-

-At 1030 on 7 August, an Australian coastwatcher hidden in the hills of

-the islands north of Guadalcanal signalled that a Japanese air strike

-composed of heavy bombers, light bombers, and fighters was headed for

-the island. Fletcher’s pilots, whose carriers were positioned 100 miles

-south of Guadalcanal, jumped the approaching planes 20 miles northwest

-of the landing areas before they could disrupt the operation. But the

-Japanese were not daunted by the setback; other planes and ships were

-enroute to the inviting target.

-

-On 8 August, the Marines consolidated their positions ashore, seizing

-the airfield on Guadalcanal and establishing a beachhead. Supplies were

-being unloaded as fast as landing craft could make the turnaround from

-ship to shore, but the shore party was woefully inadequate to handle

-the influx of ammunition, rations, tents, aviation gas, vehicles--all

-gear necessary to sustain the Marines. The beach itself became a

-dumpsite. And almost as soon as the initial supplies were landed, they

-had to be moved to positions nearer Kukum village and Lunga Point

-within the planned perimeter. Fortunately, the lack of Japanese ground

-opposition enabled Vandegrift to shift the supply beaches west to a new

-beachhead.

-

-[Illustration:

-

-    Marine Corps Personal Papers Collection

-

-_Immediately after assault troops cleared the beachhead and moved

-inland, supplies and equipment, inviting targets for enemy bombers,

-began to litter the beach._]

-

-Japanese bombers did penetrate the American fighter screen on 8 August.

-Dropping their bombs from 20,000 feet or more to escape antiaircraft

-fire, the enemy planes were not very accurate. They concentrated on the

-ships in the channel, hitting and damaging a number of them and sinking

-the destroyer _Jarvis_ (DD 393). In their battles to turn back the

-attacking planes, the carrier fighter squadrons lost 21 Wildcats on 7-8

-August.

-

-The primary Japanese targets were the Allied ships. At this time,

-and for a thankfully and unbelievably long time to come, the

-Japanese commanders at Rabaul grossly underestimated the strength of

-Vandegrift’s forces. They thought the Marine landings constituted a

-reconnaissance in force, perhaps 2,000 men, on Guadalcanal. By the

-evening of 8 August, Vandegrift had 10,900 troops ashore on Guadalcanal

-and another 6,075 on Tulagi. Three infantry regiments had landed and

-each had a supporting 75mm pack howitzer battalion--the 2d and 3d

-Battalions, 11th Marines on Guadalcanal, and the 3d Battalion, 10th

-Marines on Tulagi. The 5th Battalion, 11th Marines’ 105mm howitzers

-were in general support.

-

-That night a cruiser-destroyer force of the Imperial Japanese Navy

-reacted to the American invasion with a stinging response. Admiral

-Turner had positioned three cruiser-destroyer groups to bar the

-Tulagi-Guadalcanal approaches. At the Battle of Savo, the Japanese

-demonstrated their superiority in night fighting at this stage of

-the war, shattering two of Turners covering forces without loss to

-themselves. Four heavy cruisers went to the bottom--three American, one

-Australian--and another lost her bow. As the sun came up over what soon

-would be called “Ironbottom Sound,” Marines watched grimly as Higgins

-boats swarmed out to rescue survivors. Approximately 1,300 sailors

-died that night and another 700 suffered wounds or were badly burned.

-Japanese casualties numbered less than 200 men.

-

-The Japanese suffered damage to only one ship in the encounter, the

-cruiser _Chokai_. The American cruisers _Vincennes_ (CA 44), _Astoria_

-(CA 34), and _Quincy_ (CA 39) went to the bottom, as did the Australian

-Navy’s HMAS _Canberra_, so critically damaged that she had to be sunk

-by American torpedoes. Both the cruiser _Chicago_ (CA 29) and destroyer

-_Talbot_ (DD 114) were badly damaged. Fortunately for the Marines

-ashore, the Japanese force--five heavy cruisers, two light cruisers,

-and a destroyer--departed before dawn without attempting to disrupt the

-landing further.

-

-[Illustration: U.S. 105mm Howitzer]

-

-When the attack-force leader, Vice Admiral Gunichi Mikawa, returned to

-Rabaul, he expected to receive the accolades of his superiors. He did

-get those, but he also found himself the subject of criticism. Admiral

-Isoroku Yamamoto, the Japanese fleet commander, chided his subordinate

-for failing to attack the transports. Mikawa could only reply, somewhat

-lamely, that he did not know Fletcher’s aircraft carriers were so far

-away from Guadalcanal. Of equal significance to the Marines on the

-beach, the Japanese naval victory caused celebrating superiors in Tokyo

-to allow the event to overshadow the importance of the amphibious

-operation.

-

-The disaster prompted the American admirals to reconsider Navy support

-for operations ashore. Fletcher feared for the safety of his carriers;

-he had already lost about a quarter of his fighter aircraft. The

-commander of the expeditionary force had lost a carrier at Coral Sea

-and another at Midway. He felt he could not risk the loss of a third,

-even if it meant leaving the Marines on their own. Before the Japanese

-cruiser attack, he obtained Admiral Ghormley’s permission to withdraw

-from the area.

-

-[Illustration: _When ships carrying barbed wire and engineering tools

-needed ashore were forced to leave the Guadalcanal area because of

-enemy air and surface threats, Marines had to prepare such hasty field

-expedients as this_ _cheval de frise_ _of sharpened stakes._

-

-    Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 5157

-]

-

-At a conference on board Turner’s flagship transport, the _McCawley_,

-on the night of 8 August, the admiral told General Vandegrift that

-Fletcher’s impending withdrawal meant that he would have to pull out

-the amphibious force’s ships. The Battle of Savo Island reinforced

-the decision to get away before enemy aircraft, unchecked by American

-interceptors, struck. On 9 August, the transports withdrew to Noumea.

-The unloading of supplies ended abruptly, and ships still half-full

-steamed away. The forces ashore had 17 days’ rations--after counting

-captured Japanese food--and only four days’ supply of ammunition for

-all weapons. Not only did the ships take away the rest of the supplies,

-they also took the Marines still on board, including the 2d Marines’

-headquarters element. Dropped off at the island of Espiritu Santo in

-the New Hebrides, the infantry Marines and their commander, Colonel

-Arthur, were most unhappy and remained so until they finally reached

-Guadalcanal on 29 October.

-

-Ashore in the Marine beachheads, General Vandegrift ordered rations

-reduced to two meals a day. The reduced food intake would last for

-six weeks, and the Marines would become very familiar with Japanese

-canned fish and rice. Most of the Marines smoked and they were soon

-disgustedly smoking Japanese-issue brands. They found that the separate

-paper filters that came with the cigarettes were necessary to keep the

-fast-burning tobacco from scorching their lips. The retreating ships

-had also hauled away empty sand bags and valuable engineer tools. So

-the Marines used Japanese shovels to fill Japanese rice bags with sand

-to strengthen their defensive positions.

-

-[Illustration: U.S. 90mm Antiaircraft Gun]

-

-The Marines dug in along the beaches between the Tenaru and the ridges

-west of Kukum. A Japanese counter-landing was a distinct possibility.

-Inland of the beaches, defensive gun pits and foxholes lined the west

-bank of the Tenaru and crowned the hills that faced west toward the

-Matanikau River and Point Cruz. South of the airfield where densely

-jungled ridges and ravines abounded, the beachhead perimeter was

-guarded by outposts and these were manned in large part by combat

-support troops. The engineer, pioneer, and amphibious tractor battalion

-all had their positions on the front line. In fact, any Marine with a

-rifle, and that was virtually every Marine, stood night defensive duty.

-There was no place within the perimeter that could be counted safe from

-enemy infiltration.

-

-[Illustration:

-

-    Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 150993

-

-_Col Kiyono Ichiki, a battle-seasoned Japanese Army veteran, led his

-force in an impetuous and ill-fated attack on strong Marine positions

-in the Battle of the Tenaru on the night of 20-21 August._]

-

-Almost as Turner’s transports sailed away, the Japanese began a

-pattern of harassing air attacks on the beachhead. Sometimes the raids

-came during the day, but the 3d Defense Battalion’s 90mm antiaircraft

-guns forced the bombers to fly too high for effective bombing. The

-erratic pattern of bombs, however, meant that no place was safe near

-the airfield, the preferred target, and no place could claim it was

-bomb-free. The most disturbing aspect of Japanese air attacks soon

-became the nightly harassment by Japanese aircraft which singly,

-it seemed, roamed over the perimeter, dropping bombs and flares

-indiscriminately. The nightly visitors, whose planes’ engines were soon

-well known sounds, won the singular title “Washing Machine Charlie,”

-at first, and later, “Louie the Louse,” when their presence heralded

-Japanese shore bombardment. Technically, “Charlie” was a twin-engine

-night bomber from Rabaul. “Louie” was a cruiser float plane that

-signalled to the bombardment ships. But the harassed Marines used the

-names interchangeably.

-

-Even though most of the division’s heavy engineering equipment had

-disappeared with the Navy’s transports, the resourceful Marines soon

-completed the airfield’s runway with captured Japanese gear. On 12

-August Admiral McCain’s aide piloted in a PBY-5 Catalina flying boat

-and bumped to a halt on what was now officially Henderson Field, named

-for a Marine pilot, Major Lofton R. Henderson, lost at Midway. The Navy

-officer pronounced the airfield fit for fighter use and took off with a

-load of wounded Marines, the first of 2,879 to be evacuated. Henderson

-Field was the centerpiece of Vandegrift’s strategy; he would hold it at

-all costs.

-

-Although it was only 2,000 feet long and lacked a taxiway and adequate

-drainage, the tiny airstrip, often riddled with potholes and rendered

-unusable because of frequent, torrential downpours, was essential to

-the success of the landing force. With it operational, supplies could

-be flown in and wounded flown out. At least in the Marines’ minds, Navy

-ships ceased to be the only lifeline for the defenders.

-

-While Vandegrift’s Marines dug in east and west of Henderson Field,

-Japanese headquarters in Rabaul planned what it considered an effective

-response to the American offensive. Misled by intelligence estimates

-that the Marines numbered perhaps 2,000 men, Japanese staff officers

-believed that a modest force quickly sent could overwhelm the invaders.

-

-On 12 August, CinCPac determined that a sizable Japanese force was

-massing at Truk to steam to the Solomons and attempt to eject the

-Americans. Ominously, the group included the heavy carriers _Shokaku_

-and _Zuikaku_ and the light carrier _Ryujo_. Despite the painful losses

-at Savo Island, the only significant increases to American naval forces

-in the Solomons was the assignment of a new battleship, the _South

-Dakota_ (BB 57).

-

-[Illustration: _Of his watercolor painting “Instructions to a Patrol,”

-Capt Donald L. Dickson said that three men have volunteered to locate

-a Japanese bivouac. The one in the center is a clean-cut corporal with

-the bearing of a high-school athlete. The man on the right is “rough

-and ready.” To the one at left, it’s just another job; he may do it

-heroically, but it’s just another job._

-

-    Captain Donald L. Dickson, USMCR

-]

-

-Imperial General Headquarters in Tokyo had ordered Lieutenant General

-Haruyoshi Hyakutake’s _Seventeenth Army_ to attack the Marine

-perimeter. For his assault force, Hyakutake chose the _35th Infantry

-Brigade_ (Reinforced), commanded by Major General Kiyotake Kawaguchi.

-At the time, Kawaguchi’s main force was in the Palaus. Hyakutake

-selected a crack infantry regiment--the _28th_--commanded by Colonel

-Kiyono Ichiki to land first. Alerted for its mission while it was at

-Guam, the Ichiki Detachment assault echelon, one battalion of 900

-men, was transported to the Solomons on the only shipping available,

-six destroyers. As a result the troops carried just small amounts of

-ordnance and supplies. A follow-on echelon of 1,200 of Ichiki’s troops

-was to join the assault battalion on Guadalcanal.

-

-[Illustration:

-

-    National Archives Photo 80-G-37932

-

-_On 20 August, the first Marine Corps aircraft such as this F4F Grumman

-Wildcat landed on Henderson Field to begin combat air operations

-against the Japanese._]

-

-While the Japanese landing force was headed for Guadalcanal, the

-Japanese already on the island provided an unpleasant reminder that

-they, too, were full of fight. A captured enemy naval rating, taken in

-the constant patrolling to the west of the perimeter, indicated that a

-Japanese group wanted to surrender near the village of Kokumbona, seven

-miles west of the Matanikau. This was the area that Lieutenant Colonel

-Goettge considered held most of the enemy troops who had fled the

-airfield. On the night of 12 August, a reconnaissance patrol of 25 men

-led by Goettge himself left the perimeter by landing craft. The patrol

-landed near its objective, was ambushed, and virtually wiped out. Only

-three men managed to swim and wade back to the Marine lines. The bodies

-of the other members of the patrol were never found. To this day, the

-fate of the Goettge patrol continues to intrigue researchers.

-

-After the loss of Goettge and his men, vigilance increased on the

-perimeter. On the 14th, a fabled character, the coastwatcher Martin

-Clemens, came strolling out of the jungle into the Marine lines. He

-had watched the landing from the hills south of the airfield and now

-brought his bodyguard of native policemen with him. A retired sergeant

-major of the British Solomon Islands Constabulary, Jacob C. Vouza,

-volunteered about this time to search out Japanese to the east of

-the perimeter, where patrol sightings and contacts had indicated the

-Japanese might have effected a landing.

-

-The ominous news of Japanese sightings to the east and west of the

-perimeter were balanced out by the joyous word that more Marines

-had landed. This time the Marines were aviators. On 20 August, two

-squadrons of Marine Aircraft Group (MAG)-23 were launched from the

-escort carrier _Long Island_ (CVE-1) located 200 miles southeast of

-Guadalcanal. Captain John L. Smith led 19 Grumman F4F-4 Wildcats of

-Marine Fighting Squadron (VMF)-223 onto Henderson’s narrow runway.

-Smith’s fighters were followed by Major Richard C. Mangrum’s Marine

-Scout-Bombing Squadron (VMSB)-232 with 12 Douglas SBD-3 Dauntless dive

-bombers.

-

-From this point of the campaign, the radio identification for

-Guadalcanal, Cactus, became increasingly synonymous with the island.

-The Marine planes became the first elements of what would informally be

-known as Cactus Air Force.

-

-[Illustration: _The first Army Air Forces P-400 Bell Air Cobras arrived

-on Guadalcanal on 22 August, two days after the first Marine planes,

-and began operations immediately._

-

-    National Archives Photo 208-N-4932

-]

-

-Wasting no time, the Marine pilots were soon in action against the

-Japanese naval aircraft which frequently attacked Guadalcanal. Smith

-shot down his first enemy Zero fighter on 21 August; three days later

-VMF-223’s Wildcats intercepted a strong Japanese aerial attack force

-and downed 16 enemy planes. In this action, Captain Marion E. Carl, a

-veteran of Midway, shot down three planes. On the 22d, coastwatchers

-alerted Cactus to an approaching air attack and 13 of 16 enemy bombers

-were destroyed. At the same time, Mangrum’s dive bombers damaged

-three enemy destroyer-transports attempting to reach Guadalcanal. On

-24 August, the American attacking aircraft, which now included Navy

-scout-bombers from the _Saratoga_’s Scouting Squadron (VS) 5, succeeded

-in turning back a Japanese reinforcement convoy of warships and

-destroyers.

-

-On 22 August, five Bell P-400 Air Cobras of the Army’s 67th Fighter

-Squadron had landed at Henderson, followed within the week by nine more

-Air Cobras. The Army planes, which had serious altitude and climb-rate

-deficiencies, were destined to see most action in ground combat support

-roles.

-

-The frenzied action in what became known as the Battle of the Eastern

-Solomons was matched ashore. Japanese destroyers had delivered the

-vanguard of the Ichiki force at Taivu Point, 25 miles east of the

-Marine perimeter. A long-range patrol of Marines from Company A, 1st

-Battalion, 1st Marines ambushed a sizable Japanese force near Taivu on

-19 August. The Japanese dead were readily identified as Army troops and

-the debris of their defeat included fresh uniforms and a large amount

-of communication gear. Clearly, a new phase of the fighting had begun.

-All Japanese encountered to this point had been naval troops.

-

-Alerted by patrols, the Marines now dug in along the Ilu River, often

-misnamed the Tenaru on Marine maps, were ready for Colonel Ichiki. The

-Japanese commander’s orders directed him to “quickly recapture and

-maintain the airfield at Guadalcanal,” and his own directive to his

-troops emphasized that they would fight “to the last breath of the last

-man.” And they did.

-

-[Illustration: U.S. M-3 Light Tank]

-

-Too full of his mission to wait for the rest of his regiment and sure

-that he faced only a few thousand men overall, Ichiki marched from

-Taivu to the Marines’ lines. Before he attacked on the night of the

-20th, a bloody figure stumbled out of the jungle with a warning that

-the Japanese were coming. It was Sergeant Major Vouza. Captured by the

-Japanese, who found a small American flag secreted in his loincloth, he

-was tortured in a failed attempt to gain information on the invasion

-force. Tied to a tree, bayonetted twice through the chest, and beaten

-with rifle butts, the resolute Vouza chewed through his bindings

-to escape. Taken to Lieutenant Colonel Edwin A. Pollock, whose 2d

-Battalion, 1st Marines held the Ilu mouth’s defenses, he gasped a

-warning that an estimated 250-500 Japanese soldiers were coming behind

-him. The resolute Vouza, rushed immediately to an aid station and then

-to the division hospital, miraculously survived his ordeal and was

-awarded a Silver Star for his heroism by General Vandegrift, and later

-a Legion of Merit. Vandegrift also made Vouza an honorary sergeant

-major of U.S. Marines.

-

-At 0130 on 21 August, Ichiki’s troops stormed the Marines’ lines in a

-screaming, frenzied display of the “spiritual strength” which they had

-been assured would sweep aside their American enemy. As the Japanese

-charged across the sand bar astride the Ilu’s mouth, Pollock’s Marines

-cut them down. After a mortar preparation, the Japanese tried again

-to storm past the sand bar. A section of 37mm guns sprayed the enemy

-force with deadly canister. Lieutenant Colonel Lenard B. Cresswell’s

-1st Battalion, 1st Marines moved upstream on the Ilu at daybreak, waded

-across the sluggish, 50-foot-wide stream, and moved on the flank of the

-Japanese. Wildcats from VMF-223 strafed the beleagured enemy force.

-Five light tanks blasted the retreating Japanese. By 1700, as the sun

-was setting, the battle ended.

-

-Colonel Ichiki, disgraced in his own mind by his defeat, burned his

-regimental colors and shot himself. Close to 800 of his men joined

-him in death. The few survivors fled eastward towards Taivu Point.

-Rear Admiral Raizo Tanaka, whose reinforcement force of transports and

-destroyers was largely responsible for the subsequent Japanese troop

-buildup on Guadalcanal, recognized that the unsupported Japanese attack

-was sheer folly and reflected that “this tragedy should have taught us

-the hopelessness of bamboo spear tactics.” Fortunately for the Marines,

-Ichiki’s overconfidence was not unique among Japanese commanders.

-

-[Illustration:

-

-    Captain Donald L. Dickson, USMCR

-

-_Capt Donald L. Dickson said of his watercolor: “I wanted to catch on

-paper the feeling one has as a shell comes whistling over.... There is

-a sense of being alone, naked and unprotected. And time seems endless

-until the shell strikes somewhere.”_]

-

-Following the 1st Marines’ tangle with the Ichiki detachment, General

-Vandegrift was inspired to write the Marine Commandant, Lieutenant

-General Thomas Holcomb, and report: “These youngsters are the darndest

-people when they get started you ever saw.” And all the Marines on

-the island, young and old, tyro and veteran, were becoming accomplished

-jungle fighters. They were no longer “trigger happy” as many had been

-in their first days ashore, shooting at shadows and imagined enemy.

-They were waiting for targets, patrolling with enthusiasm, sure of

-themselves. The misnamed Battle of the Tenaru had cost Colonel Hunt’s

-regiment 34 killed in action and 75 wounded. All the division’s Marines

-now felt they were bloodied. What the men on Tulagi, Gavutu, and

-Tanambogo and those of the Ilu had done was prove that the 1st Marine

-Division would hold fast to what it had won.

-

-[Illustration: _Cactus Air Force commander, MajGen Roy S. Geiger,

-poses with Capt Joseph J. Foss, the leading ace at Guadalcanal with

-26 Japanese aircraft downed. Capt Foss was later awarded the Medal of

-Honor for his heroic exploits in the air._

-

-    Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 52622

-]

-

-While the division’s Marines and sailors had earned a breathing spell

-as the Japanese regrouped for another onslaught, the action in the air

-over the Solomons intensified. Almost every day, Japanese aircraft

-arrived around noon to bomb the perimeter. Marine fighter pilots

-found the twin-engine Betty bombers easy targets; Zero fighters were

-another story. Although the Wildcats were a much sturdier aircraft, the

-Japanese Zeros’ superior speed and better maneuverability gave them a

-distinct edge in a dogfight. The American planes, however, when warned

-by the coastwatchers of Japanese attacks, had time to climb above the

-oncoming enemy and preferably attacked by making firing runs during

-high speed dives. Their tactics made the air space over the Solomons

-dangerous for the Japanese. On 29 August, the carrier _Ryujo_ launched

-aircraft for a strike against the airstrip. Smith’s Wildcats shot down

-16, with a loss of four of their own. Still, the Japanese continued to

-strike at Henderson Field without letup. Two days after the _Ryujo_

-raid, enemy bombers inflicted heavy damage on the airfield, setting

-aviation fuel ablaze and incinerating parked aircraft. VMF-223’s

-retaliation was a further bag of 13 attackers.

-

-On 30 August, two more MAG-23 squadrons, VMF-224 and VMSB-231, flew in

-to Henderson. The air reinforcements were more than welcome. Steady

-combat attrition, frequent damage in the air and on the ground, and

-scant repair facilities and parts kept the number of aircraft available

-a dwindling resource.

-

-Plainly, General Vandegrift needed infantry reinforcements as much

-as he did additional aircraft. He brought the now-combined raider and

-parachute battalions, both under Edson’s command, and the 2d Battalion,

-5th Marines, over to Guadalcanal from Tulagi. This gave the division

-commander a chance to order out larger reconnaissance patrols to probe

-for the Japanese. On 27 August, the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, made a

-shore-to-shore landing near Kokumbona and marched back to the beachhead

-without any measurable results. If the Japanese were out there beyond

-the Matanikau--and they were--they watched the Marines and waited for a

-better opportunity to attack.

-

-

-[Sidebar (page 5): First Marine Utility Uniform Issued in World War II

-

-The United States Marine Corps entered World War II wearing essentially

-the same summer field uniform that it had worn during the “Banana

-Wars.” The Marines defending America’s Pacific outposts on Guam, Wake

-Island, and in the Philippines in the late months of 1941 wore a

-summer field uniform consisting of a khaki cotton shirt and trousers,

-leggings, and a M1917A1 steel helmet. Plans to change this uniform had

-been underway for at least one year prior to the opening of hostilities.

-

-As had the Army, the Marine Corps had used a loose-fitting blue denim

-fatigue uniform for work details and some field exercises since the

-1920s. This fatigue uniform was either a one-piece coverall or a

-two-piece bib overall and jacket, both with “USMC” metal buttons. In

-June 1940, it was replaced by a green cotton coverall. This uniform

-and the summer field uniform were replaced by what would become known

-as the utility uniform. Approved for general issue on the Marine

-Corps’ 166th birthday, 10 November 1941, this new uniform was made of

-sage-green (although “olive drab” was called for in the specifications)

-herringbone twill cotton, then a popular material for civilian work

-clothing. The two-piece uniform consisted of a coat (often referred to

-as a “jacket” by Marines) and trousers. In 1943, a cap made of the same

-material would be issued.

-

-The loose-fitting coat was closed down the front by four two-piece

-rivetted bronze-finished steel buttons, each bearing the words “U.S.

-MARINE CORPS” in relief. The cuffs were closed by similar buttons. Two

-large patch pockets were sewn on the front skirts of the jacket and a

-single patch pocket was stitched to the left breast. This pocket had

-the Marine Corps eagle, globe, and anchor insignia and the letters

-“USMC” stencilled on it in black ink. The trousers, worn with and

-without the khaki canvas leggings, had two slashed front pockets and

-two rear patch pockets.

-

-[Illustration]

-

-The new uniform was issued to the flood of new recruits crowding

-the recruit depots in the early months of 1942 and was first worn

-in combat during the landing on Guadalcanal in August 1942. This

-uniform was subsequently worn by Marines of all arms from the Solomons

-Campaign to the end of the war. Originally, the buttons on the coat

-and the trousers were all copper-plated, but an emergency alternate

-specification was approved on 15 August 1942, eight days after the

-landing on Guadalcanal, which allowed for a variety of finishes on the

-buttons. Towards the end of the war, a new “modified” utility uniform

-which had been developed after Tarawa was also issued, in addition

-to a variety of camouflage uniforms. All of these utility uniforms,

-along with Army-designed Ml helmets and Marine Corps-designed cord and

-rubber-soled rough-side-out leather “boondocker” shoes, would be worn

-throughout the war in the Pacific, during the postwar years, and into

-the Korean War.--_Kenneth L. Smith-Christmas_

-]

-

-

-[Sidebar (page 11): LVT (1)--The ‘Amtrac’

-

-While the Marine Corps was developing amphibious warfare doctrine

-during the 1920s and 1930s, it was apparent that a motorized amphibian

-vehicle was needed to transport men and equipment from ships across

-fringing reefs and beaches into battle, particularly when the beach was

-defended.

-

-In 1940, the Marines adopted the Landing Vehicle, Tracked (1), designed

-by Donald Roebling. More commonly known as the “amtrac” (short for

-amphibian tractor), the LVT(1) had a driver’s cab in front and a small

-engine compartment in the rear, with the bulk of the body used for

-carrying space. During the next three years, 1,225 LVT(1)s were built,

-primarily by the Food Machinery Corporation.

-

-The LVT(1) was constructed of welded steel and was propelled on both

-land and water by paddle-type treads. Designed solely as a supply

-vehicle, it could carry 4,500 pounds of cargo. In August 1942, the

-LVT(1) first saw combat on Guadalcanal with the 1st Amphibian Tractor

-Battalion, 1st Marine Division. Throughout the Solomon Islands

-campaigns, the LVT(1) provided Marines all types of logistical support,

-moving thousands of tons of supplies to the front lines. At times they

-also were pressed into tactical use: moving artillery pieces, holding

-defensive positions, and occasionally supporting Marines in the attack

-with their machine guns. They also were used as pontoons to support

-bridges across Guadalcanal rivers.

-

-The LVT proved to be more seaworthy than a boat of comparable size; it

-was able to remain afloat with its entire cargo hold full of water.

-However, defects in the design soon became apparent. The paddle treads

-on the tracks and the rigid suspension system were both susceptible

-to damage when driven on land and did not provide the desired speeds

-on land or water. Although the LVT(1) performed admirably against

-undefended beachheads, its lack of armor made it unsuitable for

-assaults against the heavily defended islands of the central Pacific.

-This weakness was apparent during the fighting in the Solomon Islands,

-but LVT(1)s with improvised armor were still in use at the assault on

-Tarawa, where 75 percent of them were lost in three days.

-

-The LVT(1) proved its value and validated the amphibious vehicle

-concept through the great versatility and mobility it demonstrated

-throughout numerous campaigns in the Pacific. Although intended

-solely for supply purposes, it was thrust into combat use in early

-war engagements. In its initial role as a support vehicle, the LVT(1)

-delivered ammunition, supplies and reinforcements that made the

-difference between victory and defeat.--_Second Lieutenant Wesley L.

-Feight, USMC_

-

-[Illustration]

-]

-

-

-[Sidebar (page 14): General Vandegrift and His 1st Marine Division

-Staff

-

-Whenever a work about the Guadalcanal operation is published, one of

-the pictures always included is that of Major General Alexander A.

-Vandegrift, 1st Marine Division commanding general, and his staff

-officers and commanders, who posed for the photograph on 11 August

-1942, just four days after the assault landings on the island. Besides

-General Vandegrift, there are 40 Marines and one naval officer in

-this picture, and each one deserves a page of his own in Marine Corps

-history.

-

-Among the Marines, 23 were promoted to general officer rank and three

-became Commandants of the Marine Corps: General Vandegrift and Colonels

-Cates and Pate. The naval officer, division surgeon Commander Warwick

-T. Brown, MC, USN, also made flag officer rank while on active duty and

-was promoted to vice admiral upon retirement.

-

-Four of the officers in the picture served in three wars. Lieutenant

-Colonels Gerald C. Thomas, division operations officer, and Randolph

-McC. Pate, division logistics officer, served in both World Wars I

-and II, and each commanded the 1st Marine Division in Korea. Colonel

-William J. Whaling similarly served in World Wars I and II, and was

-General Thomas’ assistant division commander in Korea. Major Henry W.

-Buse, Jr., assistant operations officer, served in World War II, Korea,

-and the Vietnam War. Others served in two wars--World Wars I and II,

-or World War II and Korea. Represented in the photograph is a total

-of nearly 700 years of cumulative experience on active Marine Corps

-service.

-

-Three key members of the division--the Assistant Division Commander,

-Brigadier General William H. Rupertus; the Assistant Chief of Staff,

-G-1, Colonel Robert C. Kilmartin, Jr.; and the commanding officer of

-the 1st Raider Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Merritt A. Edson--were not

-in this picture for a good reason. They were on Tulagi, where Rupertus

-headed the Tulagi Command Group with Kilmartin as his chief of staff,

-and Edson commanded the combat troops. Also notably absent from this

-photograph was the commander of the 7th Marines, Colonel James C. Webb,

-who had not joined the division from Samoa, where the regiment had been

-sent before the division deployed overseas.

-

-In his memoir, _Once a Marine_, General Vandegrift explained why this

-photograph was taken. The division’s morale was affected by the fact

-that Vice Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher was forced to withdraw his

-fleet from the area--with many of his ships not yet fully unloaded

-and holding more than half of the division’s supplies still needed

-ashore. Adding to the Marines’ uneasiness at seeing their naval support

-disappear below the horizon, was the fact that they had been under

-almost constant enemy air attacks beginning shortly after their landing

-on Guadalcanal. In an effort to counter the adverse influence on morale

-of the day and night air attacks, Vandegrift began making tours of the

-division perimeter every morning to talk to as many of his Marines as

-possible, and to keep a personal eye on the command. As he noted:

-

-  By August 11, the full impact of the vanished transports was

-  permeating the command, so again I called a conference of my staff

-  and command officers.... I ended the conference by posing with this

-  fine group of officers, a morale device that worked because they

-  thought if I went to the trouble of having the picture taken then I

-  obviously planned to enjoy it in future years.

-

-Recently, General Merrill B. “Bill” Twining, on Guadalcanal a

-lieutenant colonel and assistant D-3, recalled the circumstances of the

-photograph and philosophized about the men who appeared in it:

-

-  The group is lined up on the slope of the coral ridge which

-  provided a degree of protection from naval gunfire coming from the

-  north and was therefore selected as division CP....

-

-  There was no vital reason for the conclave. I think V[andegrift]

-  just wanted to see who was in his outfit. Do you realize these

-  people had never been together before? Some came from as far away

-  as Iceland....

-

-  V[andegrift] mainly introduced himself, gave a brief pep talk....

-  I have often been asked how we could afford to congregate all

-  this talent in the face of the enemy. We didn’t believe we (_at

-  the moment_) faced any threat from the Japanese. The defense area

-  was small and every responsible commander could reach his CP in 5

-  minutes and after all there were a lot of good people along those

-  lines. Most of the fresh-caught second lieutenants were battalion

-  commanders two years later. We believed in each other and trusted.

-

-            --_Benis M. Frank_

-

-The General and His Officers on Guadalcanal, According to the Chart

-

-[Illustration]

-

-[Illustration]

-

-     1. Col George R. Rowan

-     2. Col Pedro A. del Valle

-     3. Col William C. James

-     4. MajGen Alexander A. Vandegrift

-     5. LtCol Gerald C. Thomas

-     6. Col Clifton B. Cates

-     7. Col Randolph McC. Pate

-     8. Cdr Warwick T. Brown, USN

-     9. Col William J. Whaling

-    10. Col Frank B. Goettge

-    11. Col LeRoy P. Hunt, Jr.

-    12. LtCol Frederick C. Biebush

-    13. LtCol Edwin A. Pollock

-    14. LtCol Edmund J. Buckley

-    15. LtCol Walter W. Barr

-    16. LtCol Raymond P. Coffman

-    17. LtCol Francis R. Geraci

-    18. LtCol William E. Maxwell

-    19. LtCol Edward G. Hagen

-    20. LtCol William N. McKelvy, Jr.

-    21. LtCol Julian N. Frisbie

-    22. Maj Milton V. O’Connell

-    23. Maj William Chalfant III

-    24. Maj Horace W. Fuller

-    25. Maj Forest C. Thompson

-    26. Maj Robert G. Ballance

-    27. Maj Henry C. Buse, Jr.

-    28. Maj James W. Frazer

-    29. Maj Henry H. Crockett

-    30. LtCol Lenard B. Cresswell

-    31. Maj Robert O. Brown

-    32. LtCol John A. Bemis

-    33. Col Kenneth W. Benner

-    34. Maj Robert B. Luckey

-    35. LtCol Samuel B. Taxis

-    36. LtCol Eugene H. Price

-    37. LtCol Merrill B. Twining

-    38. LtCol Walker A. Reaves

-    39. LtCol John D. Macklin

-    40. LtCol Hawley C. Waterman

-    41. Maj James C. Murray, Jr.

-]

-

-

-[Sidebar (page 17): The Coastwatchers

-

-A group of fewer than 1,500 native Coastwatchers served as the eyes and

-ears of Allied forces in reporting movements of Japanese units on the

-ground, in the air, and at sea.

-

-Often performing their jobs in remote jungle outposts, the

-Coastwatchers were possessed of both mental and physical courage.

-Their knowledge of the geography and peoples of the Pacific made them

-invaluable additions to the Allied war effort.

-

-The concept for this service originated in 1919 in a proposal by the

-Royal Australian Navy to form a civilian coastwatching organization

-to provide early warning in the event of an invasion. By the outbreak

-of war in September 1939, approximately 800 persons were serving as

-coastwatchers, operating observation posts mainly on the Australian

-coast. They were, at the outset, government officials aided by

-missionaries and planters who, as war with Japan neared, were placed

-under the control of the intelligence section of the Australian Navy.

-

-[Illustration: _Coastwatcher Capt W. F. Martin Clemens, British Solomon

-Islands Defence Force, poses with some of his constabulary._

-

-    National Archives Photo 80-G-17080 courtesy of Richard Frank

-]

-

-By 1942, the system of coastwatchers and the accompanying intelligence

-network covered an area of 500,000 square miles, and was placed

-under the control of the Allied Intelligence Bureau (AIB). The AIB

-coordinated Allied intelligence activities in the southwest Pacific,

-and had as its initial principal mission the collection of all possible

-information about the enemy in the vicinity of Guadalcanal.

-

-Coastwatchers proved extremely useful to U.S. Marine forces in

-providing reports on the number and movement of Japanese troops.

-Officers from the 1st Marine Division obtained accurate information

-on the location of enemy forces in their objective areas, and were

-provided vital reports on approaching Japanese bombing raids. On 8

-August 1942, Coastwatcher Jack Reed on Bougainville alerted American

-forces to an upcoming raid by 40 Japanese bombers, which resulted in

-36 of the enemy planes being destroyed. The “early warning system”

-provided by the Coastwatchers helped Marine forces on Guadalcanal to

-hold onto the Henderson Field airstrip.

-

-The Coastwatchers also rescued and sheltered 118 Allied pilots,

-including Marines, during the Solomons Campaign, often at the immediate

-risk of their own lives. Pipe-smoking Coastwatcher Reed also was

-responsible for coordinating the evacuation on Bougainville of four

-nuns and 25 civilians by the U.S. submarine _Nautilus_.

-

-It is unknown exactly how many Coastwatchers paid the ultimate

-sacrifice in the performance of their duties. Many died in anonymity,

-without knowledge of the contribution their services had made to

-final victory. Perhaps they would be gratified to know that no

-less an authority than Admiral William F. Halsey recorded that

-the Coastwatchers saved Guadalcanal, and Guadalcanal saved the

-Pacific.--_Robert V. Aquilina_

-]

-

-

-[Sidebar (page 19): The 1st Marine Division Patch

-

-[Illustration]

-

-The 1st Division shoulder patch originally was authorized for wear by

-members of units who were organic or attached to the division in its

-four landings in the Pacific War. It was the first unit patch to be

-authorized for wear in World War II and specifically commemorated the

-division’s sacrifices and victory in the battle for Guadalcanal.

-

-As recalled by General Merrill B. Twining, a lieutenant colonel and the

-division’s operations officer on Guadalcanal, for a short time before

-the 1st left Guadalcanal for Australia, there had been some discussion

-by the senior staff about uniforming the troops. It appeared that the

-Marines might have to wear Army uniforms, which meant that they would

-lose their identity and Twining came up with the idea for a division

-patch. A number of different designs were devised by both Lieutenant

-Colonel Twining and Captain Donald L. Dickson, adjutant of the 5th

-Marines, who had been an artist in civilian life. The one which Twining

-prepared on the flight out of Guadalcanal was approved by Major General

-Alexander A. Vandegrift, the division commander.

-

-General Twining further recalled that he drew a diamond in his notebook

-and “in the middle of the diamond I doodled a numeral one ... [and]

-I sketched in the word ‘Guadalcanal’ down its length.... I got to

-thinking that the whole operation had been under the Southern Cross, so

-I drew that in, too.... About an hour later I took the drawing up to

-the front of the aircraft to General Vandegrift. He said, ‘Yes, that’s

-it!’ and wrote his initials, A.A.V., on the bottom of the notebook

-page.”

-

-[Illustration: _Designer of the patch, LtCol Merrill B. Twining (later

-Gen) sits in the 1st Marine Division operations bunker. Behind him is

-his assistant D-3, a very tired Maj Henry IV. Buse, Jr._]

-

-After he arrived in Brisbane, Australia, Colonel Twining bought a

-child’s watercolor set and, while confined to his hotel room by a bout

-of malaria, drew a bunch of diamonds on a big sheet, coloring each one

-differently. He then took samples to General Vandegrift, who chose one

-which was colored a shade of blue that he liked. Then Twining took

-the sketch to the Australian Knitting Mills to have it reproduced,

-pledging the credit of the post exchange funds to pay for the patches’

-manufacture. Within a week or two the patches began to roll off the

-knitting machines, and Colonel Twining was there to approve them.

-General Twining further recalled: “After they came off the machine, I

-picked up a sheet of them. They looked very good, and when they were

-cut, I picked up one of the patches. It was one of the first off the

-machine.”

-

-The division’s post exchanges began selling the patches almost

-immediately and they proved to be popular, with Marines buying extras

-to give away as souvenirs to Australian friends or to send home to

-families. Before long, newly established Marine divisions, as well as

-the raider and parachute units, and as the aircraft wings, sea-going

-Marines, Fleet Marine Force Pacific units, and others, were authorized

-to have their own distinctive patch, a total of 33, following the lead

-of the 1st Marine Division. Marines returning to the United States for

-duty or on leave from a unit having a distinctive shoulder insignia

-were authorized to wear that insignia until they were assigned to

-another unit having a shoulder patch of its own. For many 1st Marine

-Division men joining another unit and having to relinquish the wearing

-of the 1st Division patch, this rankled.

-

-Shortly after the end of the war, Colonel Twining went to now-Marine

-Commandant General Vandegrift saying that he “no longer thought Marines

-should wear anything on their uniforms to distinguish them from other

-Marines. He agreed and the patches came off for good.”--_Benis M. Frank_

-]

-

-

-

-

-_September and the Ridge_

-

-

-Admiral McCain visited Guadalcanal at the end of August, arriving

-in time to greet the aerial reinforcements he had ordered forward,

-and also in time for a taste of Japanese nightly bombing. He got to

-experience, too, what was becoming another unwanted feature of Cactus

-nights: bombardment by Japanese cruisers and destroyers. General

-Vandegrift noted that McCain had gotten a dose of the “normal ration

-of shells.” The admiral saw enough to signal his superiors that

-increased support for Guadalcanal operations was imperative and that

-the “situation admits no delay whatsoever.” He also sent a prophetic

-message to Admirals King and Nimitz: “Cactus can be a sinkhole for

-enemy air power and can be consolidated, expanded, and exploited to the

-enemy’s mortal hurt.”

-

-On 3 September, the Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing,

-Brigadier General Roy S. Geiger, and his assistant wing commander,

-Colonel Louis Woods, moved forward to Guadalcanal to take charge of

-air operations. The arrival of the veteran Marine aviators provided

-an instant lift to the morale of the pilots and ground crews. It

-reinforced their belief that they were at the leading edge of air

-combat, that they were setting the pace for the rest of Marine

-aviation. Vandegrift could thankfully turn over the day-to-day

-management of the aerial defenses of Cactus to the able and experienced

-Geiger. There was no shortage of targets for the mixed air force of

-Marine, Army, and Navy flyers. Daily air attacks by the Japanese,

-coupled with steady reinforcement attempts by Tanaka’s destroyers

-and transports, meant that every type of plane that could lift off

-Henderson’s runway was airborne as often as possible. Seabees had begun

-work on a second airstrip, Fighter One, which could relieve some of the

-pressure on the primary airfield.

-

-[Illustration:

-

-    National Archives Photo 80-G-29536-413C

-

-_This is an oblique view of Henderson Field looking north with

-Ironbottom Sound (Sealark Channel) in the background. At the left

-center is the “Pagoda,” operations center of Cactus Air Force flyers

-throughout their first months of operations ashore._]

-

-Most of General Kawaguchi’s brigade had reached Guadalcanal. Those

-who hadn’t, missed their landfall forever as a result of American air

-attacks. Kawaguchi had in mind a surprise attack on the heart of the

-Marine position, a thrust from the jungle directly at the airfield. To

-reach his jumpoff position, the Japanese general would have to move

-through difficult terrain unobserved, carving his way through the dense

-vegetation out of sight of Marine patrols. The rugged approach route

-would lead him to a prominent ridge topped by Kunai grass which wove

-snake-like through the jungle to within a mile of Henderson’s runway.

-Unknown to the Japanese, General Vandegrift planned on moving his

-headquarters to the shelter of a spot at the inland base of this ridge,

-a site better protected, it was hoped, from enemy bombing and shellfire.

-

-[Illustration: _Marine ground crewmen attempt to put out one of many

-fires occuring after a Japanese bombing raid on Henderson Field causing

-the loss of much-needed aircraft._

-

-    Marine Corps Personal Papers Collection

-]

-

-The success of Kawaguchi’s plan depended upon the Marines keeping the

-inland perimeter thinly manned while they concentrated their forces on

-the east and west flanks. This was not to be. Available intelligence,

-including a captured enemy map, pointed to the likelihood of an attack

-on the airfield and Vandegrift moved his combined raider-parachute

-battalion to the most obvious enemy approach route, the ridge. Colonel

-Edson’s men, who scouted Savo Island after moving to Guadalcanal

-and destroyed a Japanese supply base at Tasimboko in another

-shore-to-shore raid, took up positions on the forward slopes of the

-ridge at the edge of the encroaching jungle on 10 September. Their

-commander later said that he “was firmly convinced that we were in the

-path of the next Jap attack.” Earlier patrols had spotted a sizable

-Japanese force approaching. Accordingly, Edson patrolled extensively as

-his men dug in on the ridge and in the flanking jungle. On the 12th,

-the Marines made contact with enemy patrols confirming the fact that

-Japanese troops were definitely “out front.” Kawaguchi had about 2,000

-of his men with him, enough he thought to punch through to the airfield.

-

-Japanese planes had dropped 500-pound bombs along the ridge on the 11th

-and enemy ships began shelling the area after nightfall on the 12th,

-once the threat of American air attacks subsided. The first Japanese

-thrust came at 2100 against Edson’s left flank. Boiling out of the

-jungle, the enemy soldiers attacked fearlessly into the face of rifle

-and machine gun fire, closing to bayonet range. They were thrown back.

-They came again, this time against the right flank, penetrating the

-Marines’ positions. Again they were thrown back. A third attack closed

-out the night’s action. Again it was a close affair, but by 0230 Edson

-told Vandegrift his men could hold. And they did.

-

-[Illustration: _The raging battle of Edson’s Ridge is depicted in all

-its fury in this oil painting by the late Col Donald L. Dickson, who,

-as a captain, was adjutant of the 5th Marines on Guadalcanal. Dickson’s

-artwork later was shown widely in the United States._

-

-    Captain Donald L. Dickson, USMCR

-]

-

-On the morning of 13 September, Edson called his company commanders

-together and told them: “They were just testing, just testing. They’ll

-be back.” He ordered all positions improved and defenses consolidated

-and pulled his lines towards the airfield along the ridge’s center

-spine. The 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, his backup on Tulagi, moved into

-position to reinforce again.

-

-[Illustration: EDSON’S (BLOODY) RIDGE

-

-12-14 SEPTEMBER 1942]

-

-[Illustration: _Edson’s or Raider’s Ridge is calm after the fighting

-on the nights of 12-13 and 13-14 September, when it was the scene of a

-valiant and bloody defense crucial to safeguarding Henderson Field and

-the Marine perimeter on Guadalcanal. The knobs at left background were

-Col Edson’s final defensive position, while Henderson Field lies beyond

-the trees in the background._

-

-    Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 500007

-]

-

-[Illustration:

-

-    Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 310563

-

-_Maj Kenneth D. Bailey, commander of Company C, 1st Raider Battalion,

-was awarded the Medal of Honor posthumously for heroic and inspiring

-leadership during the Battle of Edson’s Ridge._]

-

-The next night’s attacks were as fierce as any man had seen. The

-Japanese were everywhere, fighting hand-to-hand in the Marines’

-foxholes and gun pits and filtering past forward positions to attack

-from the rear. Division Sergeant Major Sheffield Banta shot one in the

-new command post. Colonel Edson appeared wherever the fighting was

-toughest, encouraging his men to their utmost efforts. The man-to-man

-battles lapped over into the jungle on either flank of the ridge, and

-engineer and pioneer positions were attacked. The reserve from the 5th

-Marines was fed into the fight. Artillerymen from the 5th Battalion,

-11th Marines, as they had on the previous night, fired their 105mm

-howitzers at any called target. The range grew as short as 1,600

-yards from tube to impact. The Japanese finally could take no more.

-They pulled back as dawn approached. On the slopes of the ridge and in

-the surrounding jungle they left more than 600 bodies; another 600 men

-were wounded. The remnants of the Kawaguchi force staggered back toward

-their lines to the west, a grueling, hellish eight-day march that saw

-many more of the enemy perish.

-

-The cost to Edson’s force for its epic defense was also heavy.

-Fifty-nine men were dead, 10 were missing in action, and 194 were

-wounded. These losses, coupled with the casualties of Tulagi, Gavutu,

-and Tanambogo, meant the end of the 1st Parachute Battalion as an

-effective fighting unit. Only 89 men of the parachutists’ original

-strength could walk off the ridge, soon in legend to become “Bloody

-Ridge” or “Edson’s Ridge.” Both Colonel Edson and Captain Kenneth D.

-Bailey, commanding the raider’s Company C, were awarded the Medal of

-Honor for their heroic and inspirational actions.

-

-On 13 and 14 September, the Japanese attempted to support Kawaguchi’s

-attack on the ridge with thrusts against the flanks of the Marine

-perimeter. On the east, enemy troops attempting to penetrate the lines

-of the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, were caught in the open on a grass

-plain and smothered by artillery fire; at least 200 died. On the west,

-the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, holding ridge positions covering the

-coastal road, fought off a determined attacking force that reached its

-front lines.

-

-[Illustration: _The Pagoda at Henderson Field, served as headquarters

-for Cactus Air Force throughout the first months of air operations

-on Guadalcanal. From this building, Allied planes were sent against

-Japanese troops on other islands of the Solomons._

-

-    Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 50921

-]

-

-The victory at the ridge gave a great boost to Allied homefront

-morale, and reinforced the opinion of the men ashore on Guadalcanal

-that they could take on anything the enemy could send against them. At

-upper command echelons, the leaders were not so sure that the ground

-Marines and their motley air force could hold. Intercepted Japanese

-dispatches revealed that the myth of the 2,000-man defending force

-had been completely dispelled. Sizable naval forces and two divisions

-of Japanese troops were now committed to conquer the Americans on

-Guadalcanal. Cactus Air Force, augmented frequently by Navy carrier

-squadrons, made the planned reinforcement effort a high-risk venture.

-But it was a risk the Japanese were prepared to take.

-

-On 18 September, the long-awaited 7th Marines, reinforced by the

-1st Battalion, 11th Marines, and other division troops, arrived at

-Guadalcanal. As the men from Samoa landed they were greeted with

-friendly derision by Marines already on the island. The 7th had been

-the first regiment of the 1st Division to go overseas; its men, many

-thought then, were likely to be the first to see combat. The division

-had been careful to send some of its best men to Samoa and now had

-them back. One of the new and salty combat veterans of the 5th Marines

-remarked to a friend in the 7th that he had waited a long time “to see

-our first team get into the game.” Providentially, a separate supply

-convoy reached the island at the same time as the 7th’s arrival,

-bringing with it badly needed aviation gas and the first resupply of

-ammunition since D-Day.

-

-The Navy covering force for the American reinforcement and supply

-convoys was hit hard by Japanese submarines. The carrier _Wasp_ was

-torpedoed and sunk, the battleship _North Carolina_ (BB 55) was

-damaged, and the destroyer _O’Brien_ (DD 415) was hit so badly it

-broke up and sank on its way to drydock. The Navy had accomplished

-its mission, the 7th Marines had landed, but at a terrible cost. About

-the only good result of the devastating Japanese torpedo attacks was

-that the _Wasp_’s surviving aircraft joined Cactus Air Force, as the

-planes of the _Saratoga_ and _Enterprise_ had done when their carriers

-required combat repairs. Now, the _Hornet_ (CV 8) was the only whole

-fleet carrier left in the South Pacific.

-

-As the ships that brought the 7th Marines withdrew, they took with them

-the survivors of the 1st Parachute Battalion and sick bays full of

-badly wounded men. General Vandegrift now had 10 infantry battalions,

-one understrength raider battalion, and five artillery battalions

-ashore; the 3d Battalion, 2d Marines, had come over from Tulagi also.

-He reorganized the defensive perimeter into 10 sectors for better

-control, giving the engineer, pioneer, and amphibian tractor battalions

-sectors along the beach. Infantry battalions manned the other sectors,

-including the inland perimeter in the jungle. Each infantry regiment

-had two battalions on line and one in reserve. Vandegrift also had the

-use of a select group of infantrymen who were training to be scouts and

-snipers under the leadership of Colonel William J. “Wild Bill” Whaling,

-an experienced jungle hand, marksman, and hunter, whom he had appointed

-to run a school to sharpen the division’s fighting skills. As men

-finished their training under Whaling and went back to their outfits,

-others took their place and the Whaling group was available to scout

-and spearhead operations.

-

-Vandegrift now had enough men ashore on Guadalcanal, 19,200, to expand

-his defensive scheme. He decided to seize a forward position along the

-east bank of the Matanikau River, in effect strongly outposting his

-west flank defenses against the probability of strong enemy attacks

-from the area where most Japanese troops were landing. First, however,

-he was going to test the Japanese reaction with a strong probing force.

-

-He chose the fresh 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, commanded by Lieutenant

-Colonel Lewis B. “Chesty” Puller, to move inland along the slopes of

-Mt. Austen and patrol north towards the coast and the Japanese-held

-area. Puller’s battalion ran into Japanese troops bivouacked on the

-slopes of Austen on the 24th and in a sharp firefight had seven men

-killed and 25 wounded. Vandegrift sent the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines,

-forward to reinforce Puller and help provide the men needed to carry

-the casualties out of the jungle. Now reinforced, Puller continued

-his advance, moving down the east bank of the Matanikau. He reached

-the coast on the 26th as planned, where he drew intensive fire from

-enemy positions on the ridges west of the river. An attempt by the 2d

-Battalion, 5th Marines, to cross was beaten back.

-

-About this time, the 1st Raider Battalion, its original mission one of

-establishing a patrol base west of the Matanikau, reached the vicinity

-of the firefight, and joined in. Vandegrift sent Colonel Edson, now the

-commander of the 5th Marines, forward to take charge of the expanded

-force. He was directed to attack on the 27th and decided to send the

-raiders inland to outflank the Japanese defenders. The battalion,

-commanded by Edson’s former executive officer, Lieutenant Colonel

-Samuel B. Griffith II, ran into a hornet’s nest of Japanese who had

-crossed the Matanikau during the night. A garbled message led Edson to

-believe that Griffith’s men were advancing according to plan, so he

-decided to land the companies of the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, behind

-the enemy’s Matanikau position and strike the Japanese from the rear

-while Rosecran’s men attacked across the river.

-

-The landing was made without incident and the 7th Marines’ companies

-moved inland only to be ambushed and cut off from the sea by the

-Japanese. A rescue force of landing craft moved with difficulty through

-Japanese fire, urged on by Puller who accompanied the boats on the

-destroyer _Ballard_ (DD 660). The Marines were evacuated after fighting

-their way to the beach covered by the destroyer’s fire and the machine

-guns of a Marine SBD overhead. Once the 7th Marines companies got

-back to the perimeter, landing near Kukum, the raider and 5th Marines

-battalions pulled back from the Matanikau. The confirmation that the

-Japanese would strongly contest any westward advance cost the Marines

-60 men killed and 100 wounded.

-

-[Illustration: _Shortly after becoming Commander, South Pacific Area

-and Forces, VAdm William F. Halsey visited Guadalcanal and the 1st

-Marine Division. Here he is shown talking with Col Gerald C. Thomas,

-1st Marine Division D-3 (Operations Officer)._

-

-    Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 53523

-]

-

-The Japanese the Marines had encountered were mainly men from the

-_4th Regiment_ of the _2d (Sendai) Division_; prisoners confirmed

-that the division was landing on the island. Included in the enemy

-reinforcements were 150mm howitzers, guns capable of shelling the

-airfield from positions near Kokumbona. Clearly, a new and stronger

-enemy attack was pending.

-

-As September drew to a close, a flood of promotions had reached the

-division, nine lieutenant colonels put on their colonel’s eagles and

-there were 14 new lieutenant colonels also. Vandegrift made Colonel

-Gerald C. Thomas, his former operations officer, the new division

-chief of staff, and had a short time earlier given Edson the 5th

-Marines. Many of the older, senior officers, picked for the most part

-in the order they had joined the division, were now sent back to the

-States. There they would provide a new level of combat expertise in the

-training and organization of the many Marine units that were forming.

-The air wing was not quite ready yet to return its experienced pilots

-to rear areas, but the vital combat knowledge they possessed was much

-needed in the training pipeline. They, too--the survivors--would soon

-be rotating back to rear areas, some for a much-needed break before

-returning to combat and others to lead new squadrons into the fray.

-

-[Illustration: Japanese Model 4 (1919) 150mm Howitzer]

-

-

-[Sidebar (page 22): Sergeant Major Sir Jacob Charles Vouza

-

-[Illustration]

-

-Jacob Charles Vouza was born in 1900 at Tasimboko, Guadalcanal,

-British Solomon Islands Protectorate, and educated at the South Seas

-Evangelical Mission School there. In 1916 he joined the Solomon Islands

-Protectorate Armed Constabulary, from which he retired at the rank of

-sergeant major in 1941 after 25 years of service.

-

-After the Japanese invaded his home island in World War II, he returned

-to active duty with the British forces and volunteered to work with

-the Coastwatchers. Vouza’s experience as a scout had already been

-established when the 1st Marine Division landed on Guadalcanal. On 7

-August 1942 he rescued a downed naval pilot from the USS _Wasp_ who was

-shot down inside Japanese territory. He guided the pilot to friendly

-lines where Vouza met the Marines for the first time.

-

-Vouza then volunteered to scout behind enemy lines for the Marines.

-On 27 August he was captured by the Japanese while on a Marine Corps

-mission to locate suspected enemy lookout stations. Having found a

-small American flag in Vouza’s loincloth, the Japanese tied him to a

-tree and tried to force him to reveal information about Allied forces.

-Vouza was questioned for hours, but refused to talk. He was tortured

-and bayoneted about the arms, throat, shoulder, face, and stomach, and

-left to die.

-

-He managed to free himself after his captors departed, and made his way

-through the miles of jungle to American lines. There he gave valuable

-intelligence information to the Marines about an impending Japanese

-attack before accepting medical attention.

-

-After spending 12 days in the hospital, Vouza then returned to duty

-as the chief scout for the Marines. He accompanied Lieutenant Colonel

-Evans F. Carlson and the 2d Marine Raider Battalion when they made

-their 30-day raid behind enemy lines at Guadalcanal.

-

-Sergeant Major Vouza was highly decorated for his World War II service.

-The Silver Star was presented to him personally by Major General

-Alexander A. Vandegrift, commanding general of the 1st Marine Division,

-for refusing to give information under Japanese torture. He also was

-awarded the Legion of Merit for outstanding service with the 2d Raider

-Battalion during November and December 1942, and the British George

-Medal for gallant conduct and exceptional devotion to duty. He later

-received the Police Long Service Medal and, in 1957, was made a Member

-of the British Empire for long and faithful government service.

-

-After the war, Vouza continued to serve his fellow islanders. In 1949,

-he was appointed district headman, and president of the Guadalcanal

-Council, from 1952-1958. He served as a member of the British Solomon

-Islands Protectorate Advisory Council from 1950 to 1960.

-

-He made many friends during his long association with the U.S. Marine

-Corps and through the years was continually visited on Guadalcanal by

-Marines. During 1968, Vouza visited the United States, where he was

-the honored guest of the 1st Marine Division Association. In 1979,

-he was knighted by Britain’s Queen Elizabeth II. He died on 15 March

-1984.--_Ann A. Ferrante_

-]

-

-

-[Sidebar (page 23): M3A1 37mm Antitank Gun

-

-The M3 antitank gun, based on the successful German _Panzer Abwehr

-Kanone_ (PAK)-36, was developed by the U.S. Army in the late 1930s as

-a replacement for the French 37mm Puteaux gun, used in World War I but

-unable to destroy new tanks being produced.

-

-The M3 was adopted because of its accuracy, fire control, penetration,

-and mobility. Towed by its prime mover, the 4×4 quarter-ton truck,

-the gun would trail at 50 mph on roads. When traveling crosscountry,

-gullies, shell holes, mud holes, and slopes of 26 degrees were

-negotiated with ease. In 1941, the gun was redesignated the M3A1 when

-the muzzles were threaded to accept a muzzle brake that was rarely, if

-ever, used.

-

-At the time of its adoption, the M3 could destroy any tank then being

-produced in the world. However, by the time the United States entered

-the war, the M3 was outmatched by the tanks it would have met in

-Europe. The Japanese tanks were smaller and more vulnerable to the

-M3 throughout the war. In the Pacific, it was used against bunkers,

-pillboxes and, when loaded with canister, against banzai charges. It

-was employed throughout the war by Marine regimental weapons companies,

-but in reduced numbers as the fighting continued. It was replaced in

-the European Theater by the M1 57mm antitank gun.

-

-The 37mm antitank gun, manned by a crew of four who fired a 1.61-pound

-projectile with an effective range of 500 yards.--_Stephen L. Amos and

-Kenneth L. Smith-Christmas_

-

-[Illustration]

-]

-

-

-[Sidebar (page 29):

-

-    The President of the United States

-    takes pleasure in presenting

-    the Medal of Honor posthumously to

-    Douglas Albert Munro

-    Signalman First Class

-    United States Coast Guard

-    for service as set forth

-    in the following citation:

-

-[Illustration:

-

-    Painting by Bernard D’Andrea, Courtesy of U.S. Coast Guard

-    Historical Office

-]

-

-  For extraordinary heroism and conspicuous gallantry in action above

-  and beyond the call of duty as Officer in Charge of a group of

-  twenty-four Higgins boats engaged in the evacuation of a battalion

-  of Marines trapped by enemy Japanese forces at Point Cruz,

-  Guadalcanal, on September 27, 1942. After making preliminary plans

-  for the evacuation of nearly five hundred beleaguered Marines,

-  Munro, under constant strafing by enemy machine guns on the island

-  and at great risk of his life, daringly led five of his small craft

-  toward the shore. As he closed the beach, he signalled the others

-  to land and then in order to draw the enemy’s fire and protect the

-  heavily loaded boats, he valiantly placed his craft, with its two

-  small guns, as a shield between the beachhead and the Japanese.

-  When the perilous task of evacuation was nearly completed, Munro

-  was instantly killed by enemy fire, but his crew, two of whom

-  were wounded, carried on until the last boat had loaded and

-  cleared the beach. By his outstanding leadership, expert planning,

-  and dauntless devotion to duty, he and his courageous comrades

-  undoubtedly saved the lives of many who otherwise would have

-  perished. He gallantly gave up his life in defense of his country.

-  /s/ Franklin Roosevelt

-]

-

-

-

-

-_October and the Japanese Offensive_

-

-

-On 30 September, unexpectedly, a B-17 carrying Admiral Nimitz made an

-emergency landing at Henderson Field. The CinCPac made the most of the

-opportunity. He visited the front lines, saw Edson’s Ridge, and talked

-to a number of Marines. He reaffirmed to Vandegrift that his overriding

-mission was to hold the airfield. He promised all the support he could

-give and after awarding Navy Crosses to a number of Marines, including

-Vandegrift, left the next day visibly encouraged by what he had seen.

-

-[Illustration: _Visiting Guadalcanal on 30 September, Adm Chester W.

-Nimitz, CinCPac, took time to decorate LtCol Evans C. Carlson, CO, 2d

-Raider Battalion; MajGen Vandegrift, in rear; and, from left, BGen

-William H. Rupertus, ADC; Col Merritt A. Edson, CO, 5th Marines; LtCol

-Edwin A. Pollock, CO, 2d Battalion, 1st Marines; Maj John L. Smith, CO,

-VMF-223._

-

-    Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 50883

-]

-

-The next Marine move involved a punishing return to the Matanikau,

-this time with five infantry battalions and the Whaling group. Whaling

-commanded his men and the 3d Battalion, 2d Marines, in a thrust

-inland to clear the way for two battalions of the 7th Marines, the

-1st and 2d, to drive through and hook toward the coast, hitting the

-Japanese holding along the Matanikau. Edson’s 2d and 3d Battalions

-would attack across the river mouth. All the division’s artillery was

-positioned to fire in support.

-

-[Illustration:

-

-    Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 61534

-

-_A M1918 155mm howitzer is fired by artillery crewmen of the 11th

-Marines in support of ground forces attacking the enemy. Despite the

-lack of sound-flash equipment to locate hostile artillery, Col del

-Valle’s guns were able to quiet enemy fire._]

-

-On the 7th, Whaling’s force moved into the jungle about 2,000 yards

-upstream on the Matanikau, encountering Japanese troops that harassed

-his forward elements, but not in enough strength to stop the advance.

-He bypassed the enemy positions and dug in for the night. Behind him

-the 7th Marines followed suit, prepared to move through his lines,

-cross the river, and attack north toward the Japanese on the 8th. The

-5th Marines’ assault battalions moving toward the Matanikau on the

-7th ran into Japanese in strength about 400 yards from the river.

-Unwittingly, the Marines had run into strong advance elements of the

-Japanese _4th Regiment_, which had crossed the Matanikau in order

-to establish a base from which artillery could fire into the Marine

-perimeter. The fighting was intense and the 3d Battalion, 5th, could

-make little progress, although the 2d Battalion encountered slight

-opposition and won through to the river bank. It then turned north to

-hit the inland flank of the enemy troops. Vandegrift sent forward a

-company of raiders to reinforce the 5th, and it took a holding position

-on the right, towards the beach.

-

-Rain poured down on the 8th, all day long, virtually stopping all

-forward progress, but not halting the close-in fighting around the

-Japanese pocket. The enemy troops finally retreated, attempting to

-escape the gradually encircling Marines. They smashed into the raider’s

-position nearest to their escape route. A wild hand-to-hand battle

-ensued and a few Japanese broke through to reach and cross the river.

-The rest died fighting.

-

-[Illustration:

-

-    Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 50963

-

-_More than 200 Japanese soldiers alone were killed in a frenzied attack

-in the sandspit where the Tenaru River flows into Ironbottom Sound

-(Sealark Channel)._]

-

-On the 9th, Whaling’s force, flanked by the 2d and then the 1st

-Battalion, 7th Marines, crossed the Matanikau and then turned and

-followed ridge lines to the sea. Puller’s battalion discovered a

-number of Japanese in a ravine to his front, fired his mortars, and

-called in artillery, while his men used rifles and machine guns to pick

-off enemy troops trying to escape what proved to be a death trap. When

-his mortar ammunition began to run short, Puller moved on toward the

-beach, joining the rest of Whaling’s force, which had encountered no

-opposition. The Marines then recrossed the Mantanikau, joined Edson’s

-troops, and marched back to the perimeter, leaving a strong combat

-outpost at the Matanikau, now cleared of Japanese. General Vandegrift,

-apprised by intelligence sources that a major Japanese attack was

-coming from the west, decided to consolidate his positions, leaving no

-sizable Marine force more than a day’s march from the perimeter. The

-Marine advance on 7-9 October had thwarted Japanese plans for an early

-attack and cost the enemy more than 700 men. The Marines paid a price

-too, 65 dead and 125 wounded.

-

-There was another price that Guadalcanal was exacting from both sides.

-Disease was beginning to fell men in numbers that equalled the battle

-casualties. In addition to gastroenteritis, which greatly weakened

-those who suffered its crippling stomach cramps, there were all kinds

-of tropical fungus infections, collectively known as “jungle rot,”

-which produced uncomfortable rashes on men’s feet, armpits, elbows,

-and crotches, a product of seldom being dry. If it didn’t rain, sweat

-provided the moisture. On top of this came hundreds of cases of

-malaria. Atabrine tablets provided some relief, besides turning the

-skin yellow, but they were not effective enough to stop the spread of

-the mosquito-borne infection. Malaria attacks were so pervasive that

-nothing short of complete prostration, becoming a litter case, could

-earn a respite in the hospital. Naturally enough, all these diseases

-affected most strongly the men who had been on the island the longest,

-particularly those who experienced the early days of short rations.

-Vandegrift had already argued with his superiors that when his men

-eventually got relieved they should not be sent to another tropical

-island hospital, but rather to a place where there was a real change

-of atmosphere and climate. He asked that Auckland or Wellington, New

-Zealand, be considered.

-

-For the present, however, there was to be no relief for men starting

-their third month on Guadalcanal. The Japanese would not abandon their

-plan to seize back Guadalcanal and gave painful evidence of their

-intentions near mid-October. General Hyakutake himself landed on

-Guadalcanal on 7 October to oversee the coming offensive. Elements of

-Major General Masao Maruyama’s _Sendai Division_, already a factor in

-the fighting near the Matanikau, landed with him. More men were coming.

-And the Japanese, taking advantage of the fact that Cactus flyers had

-no night attack capability, planned to ensure that no planes at all

-would rise from Guadalcanal to meet them.

-

-[Illustration: _By October, malaria began to claim as many casualties

-as Japanese artillery, bombs, and naval gunfire. Shown here are the

-patients in the division hospital who are ministered to by physicians

-and corpsmen working under minimal conditions._]

-

-On 11 October, U.S. Navy surface ships took a hand in stopping

-the “Tokyo Express,” the nickname that had been given to Admiral

-Tanaka’s almost nightly reinforcement forays. A covering force of

-five cruisers and five destroyers, located near Rennell Island and

-commanded by Rear Admiral Norman Scott, got word that many ships were

-approaching Guadalcanal. Scott’s mission was to protect an approaching

-reinforcement convoy and he steamed toward Cactus at flank speed

-eager to engage. He encountered more ships than he had expected, a

-bombardment group of three heavy cruisers and two destroyers, as

-well as six destroyers escorting two seaplane carrier transports.

-Scott maneuvered between Savo Island and Cape Esperance, Guadalcanal’s

-western tip, and ran head-on into the bombardment group.

-

-Alerted by a scout plane from his flagship, _San Francisco_ (CA 38),

-spottings later confirmed by radar contacts on the _Helena_ (CL 50),

-the Americans opened fire before the Japanese, who had no radar,

-knew of their presence. One enemy destroyer sank immediately, two

-cruisers were badly damaged, one, the _Furutaka_, later foundered,

-and the remaining cruiser and destroyer turned away from the inferno

-of American fire. Scott’s own force was punished by enemy return fire

-which damaged two cruisers and two destroyers, one of which, the

-_Duncan_ (DD 485), sank the following day. On the 12th too, Cactus

-flyers spotted two of the reinforcement destroyer escorts retiring

-and sank them both. The Battle of Cape Esperance could be counted an

-American naval victory, one sorely needed at the time.

-

-[Illustration: _Maj Harold W. Bauer, VMF-212 commander, here a captain,

-was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor after being lost during a

-scramble with Japanese aircraft over Guadalcanal._

-

-    Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 410772

-]

-

-Its way cleared by Scott’s encounter with the Japanese, a really

-welcome reinforcement convoy arrived at the island on 13 October when

-the 164th Infantry of the Americal Division arrived. The soldiers,

-members of a National Guard outfit originally from North Dakota, were

-equipped with Garand M-1 rifles, a weapon of which most overseas

-Marines had only heard. In rate of fire, the semiautomatic Garand could

-easily outperform the single-shot, bolt-action Springfields the Marines

-carried and the bolt-action rifles the Japanese carried, but most 1st

-Division Marines of necessity touted the Springfield as inherently more

-accurate and a better weapon. This did not prevent some light-fingered

-Marines from acquiring Garands when the occasion presented itself. And

-such an occasion did present itself while the soldiers were landing and

-their supplies were being moved to dumps. Several flights of Japanese

-bombers arrived over Henderson Field, relatively unscathed by the

-defending fighters, and began dropping their bombs. The soldiers headed

-for cover and alert Marines, inured to the bombing, used the interval

-to “liberate” interesting cartons and crates. The news that the Army

-had arrived spread across the island like wildfire, for it meant to all

-Marines that they eventually would be relieved. There was hope.

-

-[Illustration:

-

-    Department of Defense (USMC) Photos 304183 and 302980

-

-_Two other Marine aviators awarded the Medal of Honor for heroism and

-intrepidity in the air were Capt Jefferson J. DeBlanc, left, and Maj

-Robert E. Galer, right._]

-

-As if the bombing was not enough grief, the Japanese opened on the

-airfield with their 150mm howitzers also. Altogether the men of the

-164th got a rude welcome to Guadalcanal. And on that night, 13-14

-October, they shared a terrifying experience with the Marines that no

-one would ever forget.

-

-Determined to knock out Henderson Field and protect their soldiers

-landing in strength west of Koli Point, the enemy commanders sent the

-battleships _Kongo_ and _Haruna_ into Ironbottom Sound to bombard

-the Marine positions. The usual Japanese flare planes heralded

-the bombardment, 80 minutes of sheer hell which had 14-inch shells

-exploding with such effect that the accompanying cruiser fire was

-scarcely noticed. No one was safe; no place was safe. No dugout had

-been built to withstand 14-inch shells. One witness, a seasoned veteran

-demonstrably cool under enemy fire, opined that there was nothing worse

-in war than helplessly being on the receiving end of naval gunfire.

-He remembered “huge trees being cut apart and flying about like

-toothpicks.” And he was on the frontlines, not the prime enemy target.

-The airfield and its environs were a shambles when dawn broke. The

-naval shelling, together with the night’s artillery fire and bombing,

-had left Cactus Air Force’s commander, General Geiger, with a handful

-of aircraft still flyable, an airfield thickly cratered by shells and

-bombs, and a death toll of 41. Still, from Henderson or Fighter One,

-which now became the main airstrip, the Cactus Flyers had to attack,

-for the morning also revealed a shore and sea full of inviting targets.

-

-The expected enemy convoy had gotten through and Japanese transports

-and landing craft were everywhere near Tassafaronga. At sea the

-escorting cruisers and destroyers provided a formidable antiaircraft

-screen. Every American plane that could fly did. General Geiger’s aide,

-Major Jack Cram, took off in the general’s PBY, hastily rigged to carry

-two torpedoes, and put one of them into the side of an enemy transport

-as it was unloading. He landed the lumbering flying boat with enemy

-aircraft hot on his tail. A new squadron of F4Fs, VMF-212, commanded

-by Major Harold W. Bauer, flew in during the day’s action, landed,

-refueled, and took off to join the fighting. An hour later, Bauer

-landed again, this time with four enemy bombers to his credit. Bauer,

-who added to his score of Japanese aircraft kills in later air battles,

-was subsequently lost in action. He was awarded the Medal of Honor, as

-were four other Marine pilots of the early Cactus Air Force: Captain

-Jefferson J. DeBlanc (VMF-112); Captain Joseph J. Foss (VMF-121); Major

-Robert E. Galer (VMF-224); and Major John L. Smith (VMF-223).

-

-The Japanese had landed more than enough troops to destroy the Marine

-beachhead and seize the airfield. At least General Hyakutake thought

-so, and he heartily approved General Maruyama’s plan to move most of

-the _Sendai Division_ through the jungle, out of sight and out of

-contact with the Marines, to strike from the south in the vicinity

-of Edson’s Ridge. Roughly 7,000 men, each carrying a mortar or

-artillery shell, started the trek along the Maruyama Trail which had

-been partially hacked out of the jungle well inland from the Marine

-positions. Maruyama, who had approved the trail’s name to indicate his

-confidence, intended to support this attack with heavy mortars and

-infantry guns (70mm pack howitzers). The men who had to lug, push, and

-drag these supporting arms over the miles of broken ground, across

-two major streams, the Mantanikau and the Lunga, and through heavy

-underbrush, might have had another name for their commander’s path to

-supposed glory.

-

-[Illustration: _A Marine examines a Japanese 70mm howitzer captured at

-the Battle of the Tenaru. Gen Maruyama’s troops “had to lug, push, and

-drag these supporting arms over the miles of broken ground, across two

-major streams and through heavy underbrush” to get them to the target

-area--but they never did. The trail behind them was littered with the

-supplies they carried._

-

-    Photo courtesy of Col James A. Donovan, Jr.

-]

-

-General Vandegrift knew the Japanese were going to attack. Patrols and

-reconnaissance flights had clearly indicated the push would be from the

-west, where the enemy reinforcements had landed. The American commander

-changed his dispositions accordingly. There were Japanese troops east

-of the perimeter, too, but not in any significant strength. The new

-infantry regiment, the 164th, reinforced by Marine special weapons

-units, was put into the line to hold the eastern flank along 6,600

-yards, curving inland to join up with 7th Marines near Edson’s Ridge.

-The 7th held 2,500 yards from the ridge to the Lunga. From the Lunga,

-the 1st Marines had a 3,500-yard sector of jungle running west to the

-point where the line curved back to the beach again in the 5th Marines’

-sector. Since the attack was expected from the west, the 3d Battalions

-of each of the 1st and 7th Marines held a strong outpost position

-forward of the 5th Marines’ lines along the east bank of the Matanikau.

-

-In the lull before the attack, if a time of patrol clashes, Japanese

-cruiser-destroyer bombardments, bomber attacks, and artillery

-harassment could properly be called a lull, Vandegrift was visited

-by the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Lieutenant General Thomas

-Holcomb. The Commandant flew in on 21 October to see for himself

-how his Marines were faring. It also proved to be an occasion for

-both senior Marines to meet the new ComSoPac, Vice Admiral William F.

-“Bull” Halsey. Admiral Nimitz had announced Halsey’s appointment on 18

-October and the news was welcome in Navy and Marine ranks throughout

-the Pacific. Halsey’s deserved reputation for elan and aggressiveness

-promised renewed attention to the situation on Guadalcanal. On the

-22d, Holcomb and Vandegrift flew to Noumea to meet with Halsey and to

-receive and give a round of briefings on the Allied situation. After

-Vandegrift had described his position, he argued strongly against the

-diversion of reinforcements intended for Cactus to any other South

-Pacific venue, a sometime factor of Admiral Turner’s strategic vision.

-He insisted that he needed all of the Americal Division and another 2d

-Marine Division regiment to beef up his forces, and that more than half

-of his veterans were worn out by three months’ fighting and the ravages

-of jungle-incurred diseases. Admiral Halsey told the Marine general:

-“You go back there, Vandegrift. I promise to get you everything I have.”

-

-[Illustration:

-

-    Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 13628

-

-_During a lull in the fight, a Marine machine gunner takes a break for

-coffee, with his sub-machine gun on his knee and his 30-caliber light

-machine gun in position._]

-

-When Vandegrift returned to Guadalcanal, Holcomb moved on to Pearl

-Harbor to meet with Nimitz, carrying Halsey’s recommendation that, in

-the future, landing force commanders once established ashore, would

-have equal command status with Navy amphibious force commanders. At

-Pearl, Nimitz approved Halsey’s recommendation--which Holcomb had

-drafted--and in Washington so did King. In effect, then, the command

-status of all future Pacific amphibious operations was determined by

-the events of Guadalcanal. Another piece of news Vandegrift received

-from Holcomb also boded well for the future of the Marine Corps.

-Holcomb indicated that if President Roosevelt did not reappoint him,

-unlikely in view of his age and two terms in office, he would recommend

-that Vandegrift be appointed the next Commandant.

-

-[Illustration:

-

-    Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 513191

-

-_On the occasion of the visit of the Commandant, MajGen Thomas Holcomb,

-some of Operation Watchtower’s major staff and command officers took

-time out from the fighting to pose with him. From left, front row:

-Col William J. Whaling (Whaling Group); Col Amor LeRoy Sims (CO, 7th

-Marines); Col Gerald C. Thomas (Division Chief of Staff); Col Pedro

-A. del Valle (CO, 11th Marines); Col William E. Riley (member of

-Gen Holcomb’s party); MajGen Roy S. Geiger (CG, 1st Marine Aircraft

-Wing); Gen Holcomb; MajGen Ralph J. Mitchell (Director of Aviation,

-Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps); BGen Bennet Puryear, Jr. (Assistant

-Quartermaster of the Marine Corps); Col Clifton B. Cates (CO, 1st

-Marines). Second row (between Whaling and Sims): LtCol Raymond P.

-Coffman (Division Supply Officer); Maj James C. Murray (Division

-Personnel Officer); (behind Gen Holcomb) LtCol Merrill B. Twining

-(Division Operations Officer)._]

-

-This news of future events had little chance of diverting Vandegrift’s

-attention when he flew back to Guadalcanal, for the Japanese were in

-the midst of their planned offensive. On the 20th, an enemy patrol

-accompanied by two tanks tried to find a way through the line held

-by Lieutenant Colonel William N. McKelvy, Jr.’s 3d Battalion, 1st

-Marines. A sharpshooting 37mm gun crew knocked out one tank and the

-enemy force fell back, meanwhile shelling the Marine positions with

-artillery. Near sunset the next day, the Japanese tried again, this

-time with more artillery fire and more tanks in the fore, but again

-a 37mm gun knocked out a lead tank and discouraged the attack. On 22

-October, the enemy paused, waiting for Maruyama’s force to get into

-position inland. On the 23d, planned as the day of the _Sendai_’s main

-attack, the Japanese dropped a heavy rain of artillery and mortar fire

-on McKelvy’s positions near the Matanikau River mouth. Near dusk, nine

-18-ton medium tanks clanked out of the trees onto the river’s sandbar

-and just as quickly eight of them were riddled by the 37s. One tank got

-across the river, a Marine blasted a track off with a grenade, and

-a 75mm halftrack finished it off in the ocean’s surf. The following

-enemy infantry was smothered by Marine artillery fire as all battalions

-of the augmented 11th Marines rained shells on the massed attackers.

-Hundreds of Japanese were casualties and three more tanks were

-destroyed. Later, an inland thrust further upstream was easily beaten

-back. The abortive coastal attack did almost nothing to aid Maruyama’s

-inland offensive, but did cause Vandegrift to shift one battalion, the

-2d Battalion, 7th Marines, out of the lines to the east and into the

-4,000-yard gap between the Matanikau position and the perimeter. This

-move proved providential since one of Maruyama’s planned attacks was

-headed right for this area.

-

-Although patrols had encountered no Japanese east or south of the

-jungled perimeter up to the 24th, the Matanikau attempts had alerted

-everyone. When General Maruyama finally was satisfied that his men had

-struggled through to appropriate assault positions, after delaying his

-day of attack three times, he was ready on 24 October. The Marines were

-waiting.

-

-An observer from the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, spotted an enemy

-officer surveying Edson’s Ridge on the 24th, and scout-snipers reported

-smoke from numerous rice fires rising from a valley about two miles

-south of Lieutenant Colonel Puller’s positions. Six battalions of the

-_Sendai Division_ were poised to attack, and near midnight the first

-elements of the enemy hit and bypassed a platoon-sized outpost forward

-of Puller’s barbed-wire entanglements. Warned by the outpost, Puller’s

-men waited, straining to see through a dark night and a driving rain.

-Suddenly, the Japanese charged out of the jungle, attacking in Puller’s

-area near the ridge and the flat ground to the east. The Marines

-replied with everything they had, calling in artillery, firing

-mortars, relying heavily on crossing fields of machine gun fire to cut

-down the enemy infantrymen. Thankfully, the enemy’s artillery, mortars,

-and other supporting arms were scattered back along the Maruyama Trail;

-they had proved too much of a burden for the infantrymen to carry

-forward.

-

-[Illustration:

-

-    Marine Corps Personal Papers Collection

-

-_Five Japanese tanks sit dead in the water, destroyed by Marine 37mm

-gunfire during the abortive attempt to force the Marine perimeter

-near the mouth of the Matanikau River in late October. Many Japanese

-soldiers lost their lives also._]

-

-A wedge was driven into the Marine lines, but eventually straightened

-out with repeated counterattacks. Puller soon realized his battalion

-was being hit by a strong Japanese force capable of repeated attacks.

-He called for reinforcements and the Army’s 3d Battalion, 164th

-Infantry (Lieutenant Colonel Robert K. Hall), was ordered forward, its

-men sliding and slipping in the rain as they trudged a mile south along

-Edson’s Ridge. Puller met Hall at the head of his column, and the two

-officers walked down the length of the Marine lines, peeling off an

-Army squad at a time to feed into the lines. When the Japanese attacked

-again as they did all night long, the soldiers and Marines fought back

-together. By 0330, the Army battalion was completely integrated into

-the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines’ lines and the enemy attacks were

-getting weaker and weaker. The American return fire--including flanking

-fire from machine guns and Weapons Company, 7th Marines’ 37mm guns

-remaining in the positions held by 2d Battalion, 164th Infantry, on

-Puller’s left--was just too much to take. Near dawn, Maruyama pulled

-his men back to regroup and prepare to attack again.

-

-With daylight, Puller and Hall reordered the lines, putting the 3d

-Battalion, 164th, into its own positions on Puller’s left, tying in

-with the rest of the Army regiment. The driving rains had turned

-Fighter One into a quagmire, effectively grounding Cactus flyers.

-Japanese planes used the “free ride” to bomb Marine positions. Their

-artillery fired incessantly and a pair of Japanese destroyers added

-their gunfire to the bombardment until they got too close to the shore

-and the 3d Defense Battalion’s 5-inch guns drove them off. As the sun

-bore down, the runways dried and afternoon enemy attacks were met by

-Cactus fighters, who downed 22 Japanese planes with a loss of three of

-their own.

-

-As night came on again, Maruyama tried more of the same, with the same

-result. The Army-Marine lines held and the Japanese were cut down in

-droves by rifle, machine gun, mortar, 37mm, and artillery fire. To the

-west, an enemy battalion mounted three determined attacks against the

-positions held by Lieutenant Colonel Herman H. Hanneken’s 2d Battalion,

-7th Marines, thinly tied in with Puller’s battalion on the left and the

-3d Battalion, 7th Marines, on the right. The enemy finally penetrated

-the positions held by Company F, but a counterattack led by Major Odell

-M. Conoley, the battalion’s executive officer, drove off the Japanese.

-Again at daylight the American positions were secure and the enemy had

-retreated. They would not come back; the grand Japanese offensive of

-the _Sendai Division_ was over.

-

-About 3,500 enemy troops had died during the attacks. General

-Maruyama’s proud boast that he “would exterminate the enemy around

-the airfield in one blow” proved an empty one. What was left of his

-force now straggled back over the Maruyama Trail, losing, as had the

-Kawaguchi force in the same situation, most of its seriously wounded

-men. The Americans, Marines and soldiers together, probably lost 300

-men killed and wounded; existing records are sketchy and incomplete.

-One result of the battle, however, was a warm welcome to the 164th

-Infantry from the 1st Marine Division. Vandegrift particularly

-commended Lieutenant Colonel Hall’s battalion, stating the “division

-was proud to have serving with it another unit which had stood the test

-of battle.” And Colonel Cates sent a message to the 164th’s Colonel

-Bryant Moore saying that the 1st Marines “were proud to serve with a

-unit such as yours.”

-

-Amidst all the heroics of the two nights’ fighting there were many men

-who were singled out for recognition and an equally large number who

-performed great deeds that were never recognized. Two men stood out

-above all others, and on succeeding nights, Sergeant John Basilone of

-the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, and Platoon Sergeant Mitchell Paige of

-the 2d Battalion, both machine gun section heads, were recognized as

-having performed “above and beyond the call of duty” in the inspiring

-words of their Medal of Honor citations.

-

-

-[Sidebar (page 37): Reising Gun

-

-The Reising gun was designed and developed by noted gun inventor Eugene

-Reising. It was patented in 1940 and manufactured by the old gun-making

-firm of Harrington and Richardson of Worcester, Massachusetts. It is

-said that it was made on existing machine tools, some dating back

-to the Civil War, and of ordinary steel rather than ordnance steel.

-With new machine tools and ordnance steel scarce and needed for more

-demanding weapons, the Reising met an immediate requirement for many

-sub-machine guns at a time when production of Thompson M1928 and M1

-sub-machine guns hadn’t caught up with demand and the stamped-out M3

-“grease gun” had not yet been invented. It was a wartime expedient.

-

-[Illustration:

-

-    Captain Donald L. Dickson, USMCR

-]

-

-The Reising was made in two different models, the 50 and the 55. The

-Model 50 had a full wooden stock and a Cutts compensator attached

-to the muzzle. The compensator, a device which reduced the upward

-muzzle climb from recoil, was invented by Richard M. Cutts, Sr., and

-his son, Richard M. Cutts, Jr., both of whom became Marine brigadier

-generals. The other version was dubbed the Model 55. It had a folding

-metal-wire shoulder stock which swivelled on the wooden pistol grip.

-It also had a shorter barrel and no compensator. It was intended for

-use by parachutists, tank crews, and others needing a compact weapon.

-Both versions of the Reising fired .45-caliber ammunition, the same

-cartridge as the Colt automatic pistol and the Thompson.

-

-In all, there were approximately 100,000 Reising sub-machine guns

-produced between 1940 and 1942. Small numbers of the weapons were

-acquired by both Great Britain and the Soviet Union. However, most

-were used by the U.S. Marine Corps in the Solomon Islands campaign.

-The Model 55 was issued to both Marine parachute battalions and Marine

-raiders, seeing service first on Guadalcanal. After its dubious debut

-in combat it was withdrawn from frontline service in 1943 due to

-several flaws in design and manufacture.

-

-The Reising’s major shortcoming was its propensity for jamming. This

-was due to both a design problem in the magazine lips and the fact

-that magazines were made of a soft sheet steel. The weapon’s safety

-mechanism didn’t always work and if the butt was slammed down on the

-deck, the hammer would set back against the mainspring and then fly

-forward, firing a chambered cartridge. The design allowed the entry of

-dirt into the mechanism and close tolerances caused it to jam. Finally,

-the steel used allowed excessive rust to form in the tropical humidity

-of the Solomons. Nevertheless, at six pounds, the Reising was handier

-than the 10-pound Thompson, more accurate, pleasanter to shoot, and

-reliable under other than combat conditions, but one always had to

-keep the muzzle pointed in a safe direction. The Model 50 was also

-issued to Marines for guard duty at posts and stations in the United

-States.--_John G. Griffiths_

-]

-

-

-

-

-_November and the Continuing Buildup_

-

-

-While the soldiers and Marines were battling the Japanese ashore,

-a patrol plane sighted a large Japanese fleet near the Santa Cruz

-Islands to the east of the Solomons. The enemy force was formidable, 4

-carriers and 4 battleships, 8 cruisers and 28 destroyers, all poised

-for a victorious attack when Maruyama’s capture of Henderson Field

-was signalled. Admiral Halsey’s reaction to the inviting targets was

-characteristic, he signaled Rear Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid, with the

-_Hornet_ and _Enterprise_ carrier groups located north of the New

-Hebrides: “Attack Repeat Attack.”

-

-[Illustration: _Heavy tropical downpours at Guadalcanal all but flood

-out a Marine camp near Henderson Field, and the field as well. Marines’

-damp clothing and bedding contributed to the heavy incidence of

-tormenting skin infections and fungal disorders._

-

-    Department of Defense (USMC) Photo

-]

-

-Early on 26 October, American SBDs located the Japanese carriers

-at about the same time Japanese scout planes spotted the American

-carriers. The Japanese _Zuiho_’s flight deck was holed by the scout

-bombers, cancelling flight operations, but the other three enemy

-carriers launched strikes. The two air armadas tangled as each strove

-to reach the other’s carriers. The _Hornet_ was hit repeatedly by bombs

-and torpedoes; two Japanese pilots also crashed their planes on board.

-The damage to the ship was so extensive, the _Hornet_ was abandoned

-and sunk. The _Enterprise_, the battleship _South Dakota_, the light

-cruiser _San Juan_ (CL 54), and the destroyer _Smith_ (DD 378) were

-also hit; the destroyer _Porter_ (DD 356) was sunk. On the Japanese

-side, no ships were sunk, but three carriers and two destroyers were

-damaged. One hundred Japanese planes were lost; 74 U.S. planes went

-down. Taken together, the results of the Battle of Santa Cruz were

-a standoff. The Japanese naval leaders might have continued their

-attacks, but instead, disheartened by the defeat of their ground

-forces on Guadalcanal, withdrew to attack another day.

-

-[Illustration:

-

-    Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 74093

-

-_Marine engineers repair a flood-damaged Lunga River bridge washed out

-during a period when 8 inches of rain fell in 24 hours and the river

-rose 7 feet above normal._]

-

-The departure of the enemy naval force marked a period in which

-substantial reinforcements reached the island. The headquarters of the

-2d Marines had finally found transport space to come up from Espiritu

-Santo and on 29 and 30 October, Colonel Arthur moved his regiment

-from Tulagi to Guadalcanal, exchanging his 1st and 2d Battalions for

-the well-blooded 3d, which took up the Tulagi duties. The 2d Marines’

-battalions at Tulagi had performed the very necessary task of scouting

-and securing all the small islands of the Florida group while they had

-camped, frustrated, watching the battles across Sealark Channel. The

-men now would no longer be spectators at the big show.

-

-On 2 November, planes from VMSB-132 and VMF-211 flew into the Cactus

-fields from New Caledonia. MAG-11 squadrons moved forward from New

-Caledonia to Espiritu Santo to be closer to the battle scene; the

-flight echelons now could operate forward to Guadalcanal and with

-relative ease. On the ground side, two batteries of 155mm guns, one

-Army and one Marine, landed on 2 November, providing Vandegrift with

-his first artillery units capable of matching the enemy’s long-range

-150mm guns. On the 4th and 5th, the 8th Marines (Colonel Richard H.

-Jeschke) arrived from American Samoa. The full-strength regiment,

-reinforced by the 75mm howitzers of the 1st Battalion, 10th Marines,

-added another 4,000 men to the defending forces. All the fresh troops

-reflected a renewed emphasis at all levels of command on making sure

-Guadalcanal would be held. The reinforcement-replacement pipeline was

-being filled. In the offing as part of the Guadalcanal defending force

-were the rest of the Americal Division, the remainder of the 2d Marine

-Division, and the Army’s 25th Infantry Division, then in Hawaii. More

-planes of every type and from Allied as well as American sources were

-slated to reinforce and replace the battered and battle-weary Cactus

-veterans.

-

-The impetus for the heightened pace of reinforcement had been provided

-by President Roosevelt. Cutting through the myriad demands for American

-forces worldwide, he had told each of the Joint Chiefs on 24 October

-that Guadalcanal must be reinforced, and without delay.

-

-On the island, the pace of operations did not slacken after the

-Maruyama offensive was beaten back. General Vandegrift wanted to clear

-the area immediately west of the Matanikau of all Japanese troops,

-forestalling, if he could, another buildup of attacking forces. Admiral

-Tanaka’s Tokyo Express was still operating and despite punishing

-attacks by Cactus aircraft and new and deadly opponents, American motor

-torpedo boats, now based at Tulagi.

-

-On 1 November, the 5th Marines, backed up by the newly arrived

-2d Marines, attacked across bridges engineers had laid over the

-Matanikau during the previous night. Inland, Colonel Whaling led

-his scout-snipers and the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, in a screening

-movement to protect the flank of the main attack. Opposition was fierce

-in the shore area where the 1st Battalion, 5th, drove forward toward

-Point Cruz, but inland the 2d Battalion and Whaling’s group encountered

-slight opposition. By nightfall, when the Marines dug in, it was clear

-that the only sizable enemy force was in the Point Cruz area. In the

-days bitter fighting, Corporal Anthony Casamento, a badly wounded

-machine gun squad leader in Edson’s 1st Battalion, had so distinguished

-himself that he was recommended for a Navy Cross; many years later, in

-August 1980, President Jimmy Carter approved the award of the Medal of

-Honor in its stead.

-

-[Illustration:

-

-    Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 56749

-

-_2dLt Mitchell Paige, third from left, and PltSgt John Basilone,

-extreme right, received the Medal of Honor at a parade at Camp

-Balcombe, Australia, on 21 May 1943. MajGen Vandegrift, left, received

-his medal in a White House ceremony the previous 5 February, while Col

-Merritt A. Edson was decorated 31 December 1943. Note the 1st Marine

-Division patches on the right shoulders of each participant._]

-

-On the 2d, the attack continued with the reserve 3d Battalion moving

-into the fight and all three 5th Marines units moving to surround

-the enemy defenders. On 3 November, the Japanese pocket just west

-of the base at Point Cruz was eliminated; well over 300 enemy had

-been killed. Elsewhere, the attacking Marines had encountered spotty

-resistance and advanced slowly across difficult terrain to a point

-about 1,000 yards beyond the 5th Marines’ action. There, just as the

-offensive’s objectives seemed well in hand, the advance was halted.

-Again, the intelligence that a massive enemy reinforcement attempt was

-pending forced Vandegrift to pull back most of his men to safeguard

-the all-important airfield perimeter. This time, however, he left a

-regiment to outpost the ground that had been gained, Colonel Arthur’s

-2d Marines, reinforced by the Army’s 1st Battalion, 164th Infantry.

-

-Emphasizing the need for caution in Vandegrift’s mind was the fact that

-the Japanese were again discovered in strength east of the perimeter.

-On 3 November, Lieutenant Colonel Hanneken’s 2d Battalion, 7th Marines,

-on a reconnaissance in force towards Koli Point, could see the

-Japanese ships clustered near Tetere, eight miles from the perimeter.

-His Marines encountered strong Japanese resistance from obviously

-fresh troops and he began to pull back. A regiment of the enemy’s

-_38th Division_ had landed, as Hyakutake experimented with a Japanese

-Navy-promoted scheme of attacking the perimeter from both flanks.

-

-[Illustration:

-

-    Marine Corps Historical Photo Collection

-

-_In a White House ceremony, former Cpl Anthony Casamento, a machine

-gun squad leader in the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, was decorated by

-President Jimmy Carter on 22 August 1980, 38 years after the battle for

-Guadalcanal. Looking on are Casarnento’s wife and daughters and Gen

-Robert H. Barrow, Marine Commandant._]

-

-[Illustration: _Sgt Clyde Thomason, who was killed in action

-participating in the Makin Island raid with the 2d Raider Battalion,

-was the first enlisted Marine in World War II to be awarded the Medal

-of Honor._

-

-    Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 310616

-]

-

-As Hanneken’s battalion executed a fighting withdrawal along the beach,

-it began to receive fire from the jungle inland, too. A rescue force

-was soon put together under General Rupertus: two tank companies,

-the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, and the 2d and 3d Battalions of the

-164th. The Japanese troops, members of the _38th Division_ regiment and

-remnants of Kawaguchi’s brigade, fought doggedly to hold their ground

-as the Marines drove forward along the coast and the soldiers attempted

-to outflank the enemy in the jungle. The running battle continued for

-days, supported by Cactus air, naval gunfire, and the newly landed

-155mm guns.

-

-The enemy commander received new orders as he was struggling to hold

-off the Americans. He was to break off the action, move inland, and

-march to rejoin the main Japanese forces west of the perimeter, a tall

-order to fulfill. The two-pronged attack scheme had been abandoned.

-The Japanese managed the first part; on the 11th the enemy force found

-a gap in the 164th’s line and broke through along a meandering jungle

-stream. Behind they left 450 dead over the course of a seven-day

-battle; the Marines and soldiers had lost 40 dead and 120 wounded.

-

-Essentially, the Japanese who broke out of the encircling Americans

-escaped from the frying pan only to fall into the fire. Admiral

-Turner finally had been able to effect one of his several schemes for

-alternative landings and beachheads, all of which General Vandegrift

-vehemently opposed. At Aola Bay, 40 miles east of the main perimeter,

-the Navy put an airfield construction and defense force ashore on 4

-November. Then, while the Japanese were still battling the Marines near

-Tetere, Vandegrift was able to persuade Turner to detach part of this

-landing force, the 2d Raider Battalion, to sweep west, to discover and

-destroy any enemy forces it encountered.

-

-Lieutenant Colonel Evans F. Carlson’s raider battalion already had seen

-action before it reached Guadalcanal. Two companies had reinforced the

-defenders of Midway Island when the Japanese attacked there in June.

-The rest of the battalion had landed from submarines on Makin Island

-in the Gilberts on 17-18 August, destroying the garrison there. For his

-part in the fighting on Makin, Sergeant Clyde Thomason had been awarded

-a Medal of Honor posthumously, the first Marine enlisted man to receive

-his country’s highest award in World War II.

-

-In its march from Aola Bay, the 2d Raider Battalion encountered the

-Japanese who were attempting to retreat to the west. On 12 November,

-the raiders beat off attacks by two enemy companies and then

-relentlessly pursued the Japanese, fighting a series of small actions

-over the next five days before they contacted the main Japanese body.

-From 17 November to 4 December, when the raiders finally came down out

-of the jungled ridges into the perimeter, Carlson’s men harried the

-retreating enemy. They killed nearly 500 Japanese. Their own losses

-were 16 killed and 18 wounded.

-

-The Aola Bay venture, which had provided the 2d Raider Battalion a

-starting point for its month-long jungle campaign, proved a bust. The

-site chosen for a new airfield was unsuitable, too wet and unstable,

-and the whole force moved to Koli Point in early December, where

-another airfield eventually was constructed.

-

-The buildup on Guadalcanal continued, by both sides. On 11 November,

-guarded by a cruiser-destroyer covering force, a convoy ran in carrying

-the 182d Infantry, another regiment of the Americal Division. The ships

-were pounded by enemy bombers and three transports were hit, but the

-men landed. General Vandegrift needed the new men badly. His veterans

-were truly ready for replacement; more than a thousand new cases of

-malaria and related diseases were reported each week. The Japanese who

-had been on the island any length of time were no better off; they

-were, in fact, in worse shape. Medical supplies and rations were in

-short supply. The whole thrust of the Japanese reinforcement effort

-continued to be to get troops and combat equipment ashore. The idea

-prevailed in Tokyo, despite all evidence to the contrary, that one

-overwhelming coordinated assault would crush the American resistance.

-The enemy drive to take Port Moresby on New Guinea was put on hold to

-concentrate all efforts on driving the Americans off of Guadalcanal.

-

-[Illustration:

-

-    Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 51728

-

-_Native guides lead 2d Raider Battalion Marines on a

-combat/reconnaissance patrol behind Japanese lines. The patrol lasted

-for less than a month, during which the Marines covered 150 miles and

-fought more than a dozen actions._]

-

-On 12 November, a multifaceted Japanese naval force converged on

-Guadalcanal to cover the landing of the main body of the _38th

-Division_. Rear Admiral Daniel J. Callaghan’s cruisers and destroyers,

-the close-in protection for the 182d’s transports, moved to stop

-the enemy. Coastwatcher and scout plane sightings and radio traffic

-intercepts had identified two battleships, two carriers, four cruisers,

-and a host of destroyers all headed toward Guadalcanal. A bombardment

-group led by the battleships _Hiei_ and _Kirishima_, with the light

-cruiser _Nagura_, and 15 destroyers spearheaded the attack. Shortly

-after midnight, near Savo Island, Callaghan’s cruisers picked up the

-Japanese on radar and continued to close. The battle was joined at

-such short range that each side fired at times on their own ships.

-Callaghan’s flagship, the _San Francisco_, was hit 15 times, Callaghan

-was killed, and the ship had to limp away. The cruiser _Atlanta_ (CL

-104) was also hit and set afire. Rear Admiral Norman Scott, who was

-on board, was killed. Despite the hammering by Japanese fire, the

-Americans held and continued fighting. The battleship _Hiei_, hit

-by more than 80 shells, retired and with it went the rest of the

-bombardment force. Three destroyers were sunk and four others damaged.

-

-[Illustration:

-

-    Department of Defense (Navy) Photos 80-G-20824 and 80-G-21099

-

-_In the great naval Battle of Guadalcanal, 12-15 November, RAdm Daniel

-J. Callaghan was killed when his flagship, the heavy cruiser_ San

-Francisco _(CA 38) took 15 major hits and was forced to limp away in

-the dark from the scene of action._]

-

-The Americans had accomplished their purpose; they had forced the

-Japanese to turn back. The cost was high. Two antiaircraft cruisers,

-the _Atlanta_ and the _Juneau_ (CL 52), were sunk; four destroyers, the

-_Barton_ (DD 599), _Cushing_ (DD 376), _Monssen_ (DD 436), and _Laffey_

-(DD 459), also went to the bottom. In addition to the _San Francisco_,

-the heavy cruiser _Portland_ (CA 33) and the destroyers _Sterret_ (DD

-407) and _Aaron Ward_ (DD 483) were damaged. Only one destroyer of the

-13 American ships engaged, the _Fletcher_ (DD 445), was unscathed when

-the survivors retired to the New Hebrides.

-

-With daylight came the Cactus bombers and fighters; they found the

-crippled _Hiei_ and pounded it mercilessly. On the 14th the Japanese

-were forced to scuttle it. Admiral Halsey ordered his only surviving

-carrier, the _Enterprise_, out of the Guadalcanal area to get it out of

-reach of Japanese aircraft and sent his battleships _Washington_ (BB

-56) and _South Dakota_ (BB 55) with four escorting destroyers north

-to meet the Japanese. Some of the _Enterprise_’s planes flew in to

-Henderson Field to help even the odds.

-

-On 14 November Cactus and _Enterprise_ flyers found a Japanese

-cruiser-destroyer force that had pounded the island on the night of 13

-November. They damaged four cruisers and a destroyer. After refueling

-and rearming they went after the approaching Japanese troop convoy.

-They hit several transports in one attack and sank one when they came

-back again. Army B-17s up from Espiritu Santo scored one hit and

-several near misses, bombing from 17,000 feet.

-

-Moving in a continuous pattern of attack, return, refuel, rearm, and

-attack again, the planes from Guadalcanal hit nine transports, sinking

-seven. Many of the 5,000 troops on the stricken ships were rescued

-by Tanaka’s destroyers, which were firing furiously and laying smoke

-screens in an attempt to protect the transports. The admiral later

-recalled that day as indelible in his mind, with memories of “bombs

-wobbling down from high-flying B-17s; of carrier bombers roaring

-towards targets as though to plunge full into the water, releasing

-bombs and pulling out barely in time, each miss sending up towering

-clouds of mist and spray, every hit raising clouds of smoke and fire.”

-Despite the intensive aerial attack, Tanaka continued on to Guadalcanal

-with four destroyers and four transports.

-

-Japanese intelligence had picked up the approaching American battleship

-force and warned Tanaka of its advent. In turn, the enemy admirals sent

-their own battleship-cruiser force to intercept. The Americans, led by

-Rear Admiral Willis A. Lee in the _Washington_, reached Sealark Channel

-about 2100 on the 14th. An hour later, a Japanese cruiser was picked up

-north of Savo. Battleship fire soon turned it away. The Japanese now

-learned that their opponents would not be the cruisers they expected.

-

-The resulting clash, fought in the glare of gunfire and Japanese

-searchlights, was perhaps the most significant fought at sea for

-Guadalcanal. When the melee was over, the American battleships’ 16-inch

-guns had more than matched the Japanese. Both the _South Dakota_ and

-the _Washington_ were damaged badly enough to force their retirement,

-but the _Kirishima_ was punished to its abandonment and death. One

-Japanese and three American destroyers, the _Benham_ (DD 796), the

-_Walke_ (DD 416), and the _Preston_ (DD 379), were sunk. When the

-Japanese attack force retired, Admiral Tanaka ran his four transports

-onto the beach, knowing they would be sitting targets at daylight.

-Most of the men on board, however, did manage to get ashore before the

-inevitable pounding by American planes, warships, and artillery.

-

-Ten thousand troops of the _38th Division_ had landed, but the Japanese

-were in no shape to ever again attempt a massive reinforcement. The

-horrific losses in the frequent naval clashes, which seemed at times

-to favor the Japanese, did not really represent a standoff. Every

-American ship lost or damaged could and would be replaced; every

-Japanese ship lost meant a steadily diminishing fleet. In the air, the

-losses on both sides were daunting, but the enemy naval air arm would

-never recover from its losses of experienced carrier pilots. Two years

-later, the Battle of the Philippine Sea between American and Japanese

-carriers would aptly be called the “Marianas Turkey Shoot” because of

-the ineptitude of the Japanese trainee pilots.

-

-[Illustration:

-

-    Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 53510

-

-_A Japanese troop transport and her landing craft were badly damaged

-by the numerous Marine air attacks and were forced to run aground on

-Kokumbona beach after the naval Battle of Guadalcanal. Many enemy

-troops were killed in the attacks._]

-

-The enemy troops who had been fortunate enough to reach land were

-not immediately ready to assault the American positions. The _38th

-Division_ and the remnants of the various Japanese units that had

-previously tried to penetrate the Marine lines needed to be shaped into

-a coherent attack force before General Hyakutake could again attempt to

-take Henderson Field.

-

-General Vandegrift now had enough fresh units to begin to replace his

-veteran troops along the front lines. The decision to replace the 1st

-Marine Division with the Army’s 25th Infantry Division had been made.

-Admiral Turner had told Vandegrift to leave all of his heavy equipment

-on the island when he did pull out “in hopes of getting your units

-re-equipped when you come out.” He also told the Marine general that

-the Army would command the final phases of the Guadalcanal operation

-since it would provide the majority of the combat forces once the 1st

-Division departed. Major General Alexander M. Patch, commander of

-the Americal Division, would relieve Vandegrift as senior American

-officer ashore. His air support would continue to be Marine-dominated

-as General Geiger, now located on Espiritu Santo with 1st Wing

-headquarters, fed his squadrons forward to maintain the offensive. And

-the air command on Guadalcanal itself would continue to be a mixed bag

-of Army, Navy, Marine, and Allied squadrons.

-

-The sick list of the 1st Marine Division in November included more than

-3,200 men with malaria. The men of the 1st still manning the frontline

-foxholes and the rear areas--if anyplace within Guadalcanal’s perimeter

-could properly be called a rear area--were plain worn out. They had

-done their part and they knew it.

-

-On 29 November, General Vandegrift was handed a message from the Joint

-Chiefs of Staff. The crux of it read: “1st MarDiv is to be relieved

-without delay ... and will proceed to Australia for rehabilitation and

-employment.” The word soon spread that the 1st was leaving and where it

-was going. Australia was not yet the cherished place it would become in

-the division’s future, but _any_ place was preferable to Guadalcanal.

-

-

-[Sidebar (page 41): 75mm Pack Howitzer--Workhorse of the Artillery

-

-[Illustration]

-

-During the summer of 1930, the Marine Corps began replacing its old

-French 75mm guns (Model 1897) with the 75mm Pack Howitzer Model

-1923-E2. This weapon was designed for use in the Army primarily as

-mountain artillery. Since it could be broken down and manhandled ashore

-in six loads from ships’ boats, the pack howitzer was an important

-supporting weapon of the Marine Corps landing forces in prewar landing

-exercises.

-

-The 75mm pack howitzer saw extensive service with the Marine Corps

-throughout World War II in almost every major landing in the Pacific.

-Crewed by five Marines, the howitzer could hurl a 16-pound shell nearly

-10,000 yards. In the D Series table of organization with which the

-1st Marine Division went to war, and through the following E and F

-series, there were three pack howitzer battalions for each artillery

-regiment.--_Anthony Wayne Tommell and Kenneth L. Smith-Christmas_

-]

-

-

-[Sidebar (page 45): The Japanese Model 89 (1929) 50mm Heavy Grenade

-Discharger

-

-[Illustration]

-

-Born out of the need to bridge the gap in range between hand grenades

-and mortars, the grenade discharger evolved in the Imperial Japanese

-Army from a special purpose weapon of infantry assault and defense to

-an essential item of standard equipment with all Japanese ground forces.

-

-Commonly called _Juteki_ by the Japanese, this weapon officially was

-designated _Hachikyu Shiki Jutekidarto_, or 1189 Model Heavy Grenade

-Discharger, the term “heavy” being justified by the powerful 1-pound,

-12-ounce high explosive shell it was designed to fire, although it also

-fired the standard Model 91 fragmentation grenade.

-

-To the American Marines and soldiers who first encountered this weapon

-and others of its kind in combat they were known as “knee mortars,”

-likely so named because they generally were fired from a kneeling

-position. Typically, the discharger’s concave baseplate was pressed

-firmly into the surface of the ground by the firer’s foot to support

-the heavy recoil of the fired shell, but unfortunately the term “knee

-mortar” suggested to some untutored captors of these weapons that they

-were to be fired with the baseplate resting against the knee or thigh.

-When a Marine fired one of these dischargers from his thigh and broke

-his upper leg bone, efforts were swiftly undertaken in the field to

-educate all combat troops in the safe and proper handling of these very

-useful weapons.

-

-The Model 89 (1929) 50mm Heavy Grenade Discharger is a muzzle-loaded,

-high-angle-of-fire weapon which weighs 10-1/4 pounds and is 24 inches

-in overall length. Its design is compact and simple. The discharger

-has three major components: the rifled barrel, the supporting barrel

-pedestal with firing mechanism, and the base plate. Operation of the

-Model 89 was easy and straightforward, and with practice its user could

-deliver accurate fire registered quickly on target.

-

-Encountered in all major battles in the Pacific War, the Model 89

-Grenade Discharger was an uncomplicated, very portable, and highly

-efficient weapon operated easily by one man. It was carried in a cloth

-or leather case with a sling, and its one-piece construction allowed

-it to be brought into action very quickly. This grenade discharger

-had the advantage over most mortars in that it could be aimed and

-fired mechanically after a projectile had been placed in the barrel,

-projectile firing not being dependent upon dropping down the barrel

-against a stationary firing pin as with most mortars, where barrel

-fouling sometimes caused dangerous hangfires. Although an instantaneous

-fuze employed on the Model 89 high explosive shell restricted this

-shell’s use to open areas, the Model 91 fragmentation grenade with its

-seven-second fuze made this discharger effective in a jungle or forest

-setting, with complete safety for the user from premature detonation

-of projectiles by overhanging foliage. Smoke and signal shells, and an

-incendiary grenade, were special types of ammunition used with this

-versatile and effective weapon which won the respect of all who came to

-know it.--_Edwin F. Libby_

-]

-

-

-

-

-_December and the Final Stages_

-

-

-On 7 December, one year after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor,

-General Vandegrift sent a message to all men under his command in the

-Guadalcanal area thanking them for their courage and steadfastness,

-commending particularly the pilots and “all who labored and sweated

-within the lines in all manner of prodigious and vital tasks.” He

-reminded them all that their “unbelievable achievements had made

-‘Guadalcanal’ a synonym for death and disaster in the language of our

-enemy.” On 9 December, he handed over his command to General Patch and

-flew out to Australia at the same time the first elements of the 5th

-Marines were boarding ship. The 1st, 11th, and 7th Marines would soon

-follow together with all the division’s supporting units. The men who

-were leaving were thin, tired, hollow-eyed, and apathetic; they were

-young men who had grown old in four months time. They left behind 681

-dead in the island’s cemetery.

-

-[Illustration: _As he tells it, “Too Many, Too Close, Too Long,” is

-Donald L. Dickson’s portrait of one of the “little guys, just plain

-worn out. His stamina and his spirit stretched beyond human endurance.

-He has had no real sleep for a long time.... And he probably hasn’t

-stopped ducking and fighting long enough to discover that he has

-malaria. He is going to discover it now, however. He is through.”_

-

-    Captain Donald L. Dickson, USMCR

-]

-

-[Illustration:

-

-    U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo SC164898

-

-_Americal Division commander, MajGen Alexander M. Patch, Jr., watches

-while his troops and supplies are staged on Guadalcanal’s beaches on 8

-December, the day before he relieved Gen Vandegrift and his wornout 1st

-Marine Division._]

-

-The final regiment of the Americal Division, the 132d Infantry, landed

-on 8 December as the 5th Marines was preparing to leave. The 2d Marine

-Division’s regiments already on the island, the 2d, 8th, and part

-of the 10th, knew that the 6th Marines was on its way to rejoin. It

-seemed to many of the men of the 2d Marines, who had landed on D-Day, 7

-August, that they, too, should be leaving. These took slim comfort in

-the thought that they, by all rights, should be the first of the 2d to

-depart the island whenever that hoped-for day came.

-

-General Patch received a steady stream of ground reinforcements

-and replacements in December. He was not ready yet to undertake a

-full-scale offensive until the 25th Division and the rest of the 2d

-Marine Division arrived, but he kept all frontline units active in

-combat and reconnaissance patrols, particularly toward the western

-flank.

-

-The island commander’s air defense capabilities also grew

-substantially. Cactus Air Force, organized into a fighter command and a

-strike (bomber) command, now operated from a newly redesignated Marine

-Corps Air Base. The Henderson Field complex included a new airstrip,

-Fighter Two, which replaced Fighter One, which had severe drainage

-problems. Brigadier General Louis Woods, who had taken over as senior

-aviator when Geiger returned to Espiritu Santo, was relieved on 26

-December by Brigadier General Francis P. Mulcahy, Commanding General,

-2d Marine Aircraft Wing. New fighter and bomber squadrons from both the

-1st and 2d Wings sent their flight echelons forward on a regular basis.

-The Army added three fighter squadrons and a medium bomber squadron

-of B-26s. The Royal New Zealand Air Force flew in a reconnaissance

-squadron of Lockheed Hudsons. And the U.S. Navy sent forward a squadron

-of Consolidated PBY Catalina patrol planes which had a much needed

-night-flying capability.

-

-The aerial buildup forced the Japanese to curtail all air attacks and

-made daylight naval reinforcement attempts an event of the past. The

-nighttime visits of the Tokyo Express destroyers now brought only

-supplies encased in metal drums which were rolled over the ships’ sides

-in hope they would float into shore. The men ashore desperately needed

-everything that could be sent, even by this method, but most of the

-drums never reached the beaches.

-

-Still, however desperate the enemy situation was becoming, he was

-prepared to fight. General Hyakutake continued to plan the seizure of

-the airfield. General Hitoshi Immamura, commander of the _Eighth Area

-Army_, arrived in Rabaul on 2 December with orders to continue the

-offensive. He had 50,000 men to add to the embattled Japanese troops on

-Guadalcanal.

-

-Before these new enemy units could be employed, the Americans were

-prepared to move out from the perimeter in their own offensive.

-Conscious that the Mt. Austen area was a continuing threat to his

-inland flank in any drive to the west, Patch committed the Americal’s

-132d Infantry to the task of clearing the mountain’s wooded slopes

-on 17 December. The Army regiment succeeded in isolating the major

-Japanese force in the area by early January. The 1st Battalion, 2d

-Marines, took up hill positions to the southeast of the 132d to

-increase flank protection.

-

-By this time, the 25th Infantry Division (Major General J. Lawton

-Collins) had arrived and so had the 6th Marines (6 January) and the

-rest of the 2d Division’s headquarters and support troops. Brigadier

-General Alphonse De Carre, the Marine division’s assistant commander,

-took charge of all Marine ground forces on the island. The 2d

-Division’s commander, Major General John Marston, remained in New

-Zealand because he was senior to General Patch.

-

-With three divisions under his command, General Patch was designated

-Commanding General, XIV Corps, on 2 January. His corps headquarters

-numbered less than a score of officers and men, almost all taken from

-the Americal’s staff. Brigadier General Edmund B. Sebree, who had

-already led both Army and Marine units in attacks on the Japanese,

-took command of the Americal Division. On 10 January, Patch gave the

-signal to start the strongest American offensive yet in the Guadalcanal

-campaign. The mission of the troops was simple and to the point:

-“Attack and destroy the Japanese forces remaining on Guadalcanal.”

-

-The initial objective of the corps’ attack was a line about 1,000 to

-1,500 yards west of jump-off positions. These ran inland from Point

-Cruz to the vicinity of Hill 66, about 3,000 yards from the beach.

-In order to reach Hill 66, the 25th Infantry Division attacked first

-with the 35th and 27th Infantry driving west and southwest across a

-scrambled series of ridges. The going was rough and the dug-in enemy,

-elements of two regiments of the _38th Division_, gave way reluctantly

-and slowly. By the 13th, however, the American soldiers, aided by

-Marines of the 1st Battalion, 2d Marines, had won through to positions

-on the southern flank of the 2d Marine Division.

-

-On 12 January, the Marines began their advance with the 8th Marines

-along the shore and 2d Marines inland. At the base of Point Cruz, in

-the 3d Battalion, 8th Marines’ sector, regimental weapons company

-halftracks ran over seven enemy machine gun nests. The attack was

-then held up by an extensive emplacement until the weapons company

-commander, Captain Henry P. “Jim” Crowe, took charge of a half-dozen

-Marine infantrymen taking cover from enemy fire with the classic

-remarks: “You’ll never get a Purple Heart hiding in a fox hole. Follow

-me!” The men did and they destroyed the emplacement.

-

-[Illustration: U.S. Halftrack Mounting a 75mm Pack Howitzer and a

-.50-Caliber Air-Cooled Machine Gun]

-

-All along the front of the advancing assault companies the going was

-rough. The Japanese, remnants of the _Sendai Division_, were dug

-into the sides of a series of cross compartments and their fire took

-the Marines in the flank as they advanced. Progress was slow despite

-massive artillery support and naval gunfire from four destroyers

-offshore. In two days of heavy fighting, flamethrowers were employed

-for the first time and tanks were brought into play. The 2d Marines

-was now relieved and the 6th Marines moved into the attack along the

-coast while the 8th Marines took up the advance inland. Naval gunfire

-support, spotted by naval officers ashore, improved measurably. On the

-15th, the Americans, both Army and Marine, reached the initial corps

-objective. In the Marine attack zone, 600 Japanese were dead.

-

-[Illustration: FINAL PHASE

-

-26 JANUARY-9 FEBRUARY 1943]

-

-The battle-weary 2d Marines had seen its last infantry action of

-Guadalcanal. A new unit now came into being, a composite Army-Marine

-division, or CAM division, formed from units of the Americal and

-2d Marine Divisions. The directing staff was from the 2d Division,

-since the Americal had responsibility for the main perimeter. Two of

-its regiments, the 147th and the 182d Infantry, moved up to attack

-in line with the 6th Marines still along the coast. The 8th Marines

-was essentially pinched out of the front lines by a narrowing attack

-corridor as the inland mountains and hills pressed closer to the

-coastal trail. The 25th Division, which was advancing across this

-rugged terrain, had the mission of outflanking the Japanese in the

-vicinity of Kokumbona, while the CAM division drove west. On the 23d,

-as the CAM troops approached Kokumbona, the 1st Battalion of the 27th

-Infantry struck north out of the hills and overran the village site

-and Japanese base. There was only slight but steady opposition to the

-American advance as the enemy withdrew west toward Cape Esperance.

-

-The Japanese had decided, reluctantly, to give up the attempt to retake

-Guadalcanal. The orders were sent in the name of the Emperor and senior

-staff officers were sent to Guadalcanal to ensure their acceptance. The

-Navy would make the final runs of the Tokyo Express, only this time

-in reverse, to evacuate the garrison so it could fight again in later

-battles to hold the Solomons.

-

-Receiving intelligence that enemy ships were massing again to the

-northwest, General Patch took steps, as Vandegrift had before him on

-many occasions, to guard against overextending his forces in the face

-of what appeared to be another enemy attempt at reinforcement. He

-pulled the 25th Division back to bolster the main perimeter defenses

-and ordered the CAM division to continue its attack. When the Marines

-and soldiers moved out on 26 January, they had a surprisingly easy time

-of it, gaining 1,000 yards the first day and 2,000 the following day.

-The Japanese were still contesting every attack, but not in strength.

-

-By 30 January, the sole frontline unit in the American advance was the

-147th Infantry; the 6th Marines held positions to its left rear.

-

-The Japanese destroyer transports made their first run to the island

-on the night of 1-2 February, taking out 2,300 men from evacuation

-positions near Cape Esperance. On the night of 4-5 February, they

-returned and took out most of the _Sendai_ survivors and General

-Hyakutake and his _Seventeenth Army_ staff. The final evacuation

-operation was carried out on the night of 7-8 February, when a

-3,000-man rear guard was embarked. In all, the Japanese withdrew about

-11,000 men in those three nights and evacuated about 13,000 soldiers

-from Guadalcanal overall. The Americans would meet many of these men

-again in later battles, but not the 600 evacuees who died, too worn and

-sick to survive their rescue.

-

-On 9 February, American soldiers advancing from east and west met at

-Tenaro village on Cape Esperance. The only Marine ground unit still

-in action was the 3d Battalion, 10th Marines, supporting the advance.

-General Patch could happily report the “complete and total defeat of

-Japanese forces on Guadalcanal.” No organized Japanese units remained.

-

-On 31 January, the 2d Marines and the 1st Battalion, 8th Marines,

-boarded ship to leave Guadalcanal. As was true with the 1st Marine

-Division, some of these men were so debilitated by malaria they had to

-be carried on board. All of them struck observers again as young men

-grown old “with their skins cracked and furrowed and wrinkled.” On 9

-February, the rest of the 8th Marines and a good part of the division

-supporting units boarded transports. The 6th Marines, thankfully

-only six weeks on the island, left on the 19th. All were headed for

-Wellington, New Zealand, the 2d Marines for the first time. Left behind

-on the island as a legacy of the 2d Marine Division were 263 dead.

-

-[Illustration: _President Franklin D. Roosevelt presents Gen Vandegrift

-the Medal of Honor for his heroic accomplishments against the Japanese

-in the Solomons. Looking on are Mrs. Vandegrift, and the general’s son,

-Maj Alexander A. Vandegrift, Jr._

-

-    National Archives Photo 208-PU-209V-4

-]

-

-The total cost of the Guadalcanal campaign to the American ground

-combat forces was 1,598 officers and men killed, 1,152 of them

-Marines. The wounded totaled 4,709, and 2,799 of these were Marines.

-Marine aviation casualties were 147 killed and 127 wounded. The

-Japanese in their turn lost close to 25,000 men on Guadalcanal, about

-half of whom were killed in action. The rest succumbed to illness,

-wounds, and starvation.

-

-[Illustration: _The temporary resting place of a Marine killed in the

-fighting at Lunga Point is shown here. The grave marker was erected by

-his friends. The Marine’s remains were later removed to the division

-cemetery on Guadalcanal, and further reburial at war’s end either in

-his hometown or the Punchbowl National Cemetery in Hawaii with the

-honors due a fallen hero._]

-

-At sea, the comparative losses were about equal, with each side

-losing about the same number of fighting ships. The enemy loss of

-2 battleships, 3 carriers, 12 cruisers, and 25 destroyers, was

-irreplaceable. The Allied ship losses, though costly, were not fatal;

-in essence, all ships lost were replaced. In the air, at least 600

-Japanese planes were shot down; even more costly was the death of

-2,300 experienced pilots and aircrewmen. The Allied plane losses were

-less than half the enemy’s number and the pilot and aircrew losses

-substantially lower.

-

-President Roosevelt, reflecting the thanks of a grateful nation,

-awarded General Vandegrift the Medal of Honor for “outstanding and

-heroic accomplishment” in his leadership of American forces on

-Guadalcanal from 7 August to 9 December 1942. And for the same period,

-he awarded the Presidential Unit Citation to the 1st Marine Division

-(Reinforced) for “outstanding gallantry” reflecting “courage and

-determination ... of an inspiring order.” Included in the division’s

-citation and award, besides the organic units of the 1st Division, were

-the 2d and 8th Marines and attached units of the 2d Marine Division,

-all of the Americal Division, the 1st Parachute and 1st and 2d Raider

-Battalions, elements of the 3d, 5th, and 14th Defense Battalions, the

-1st Aviation Engineer Battalion, the 6th Naval Construction Battalion,

-and two motor torpedo boat squadrons. The indispensable Cactus Air

-Force was included, also represented by 7 Marine headquarters and

-service squadrons, 16 Marine flying squadrons, 16 Navy flying

-squadrons, and 5 Army flying squadrons.

-

-The victory at Guadalcanal marked a crucial turning point in the

-Pacific War. No longer were the Japanese on the offensive. Some of the

-Japanese Emperor’s best infantrymen, pilots, and seamen had been bested

-in close combat by the Americans and their Allies. There were years of

-fierce fighting ahead, but there was now no question of its outcome.

-

-When the veterans of the 1st Marine Division were gathered in thankful

-reunion 20 years later, they received a poignant message from

-Guadalcanal. The sender was a legend to all “Canal” Marines, Honorary

-U.S. Marine Corps Sergeant Major Jacob C. Vouza. The Solomons native in

-his halting English said: “Tell them I love them all. Me old man now,

-and me no look good no more. But me never forget.”

-

-

-[Sidebar (page 48): The ‘George’ Medal

-

-

-The George Medal is legendary among 1st Marine Division veterans of

-Guadalcanal. Only about 50 were cast, in Australia, before the mold

-gave out.

-

-The medal commemorates the difficult situation of the division during

-the early days on Guadalcanal, when ammunition, food, and heavy

-equipment were short and the Japanese plentiful. When the issue was

-no longer in doubt, Marines had time to reflect on the D-plus-3 Navy

-withdrawal in the face of increasing Japanese air attacks and surface

-action which left the division in such a tight spot.

-

-In the recollection of then-Captain Donald L. Dickson, adjutant of

-the 5th Marines, the Division G-3, then-Lieutenant Colonel Merrill B.

-Twining, resolved to commemorate the occasion. Twining told artist

-Dickson in general terms what he had in mind. Dickson went to work

-designing an appropriate medal using a fifty-cent piece to draw a

-circle on a captured Japanese blank military postcard.

-

-Dickson’s design was approved and when the division got to Australia a

-mold was made by a local metal craftsman and a small number were cast

-before the mold became unserviceable. Those wanting a medal paid one

-Australian pound for it and received a certificate as well. The medals

-are now an even greater rarity than at the time. In recent years,

-reproductions have been cast, and can be identified by the different

-metal and a poor definition of details.

-

-The obverse design shows a hand and sleeve dropping a hot potato in

-the shape of Guadalcanal into the arms of a grateful Marine. In the

-original design the sleeve bore the stripes of a vice admiral intended

-to be either Vice Admiral Robert L. Ghormley, ComSoPac, or Vice Admiral

-Frank Jack Fletcher, Commander Joint Expeditionary Force, but the final

-medal diplomatically omitted this identification.

-

-Also on the obverse is a Saguaro cactus, indigenous to Arizona, not

-Guadalcanal, but representing the code name for the island, “Cactus.”

-The obverse inscription is _Facia Georgius_, “Let George Do It.” Thus

-it became known as the George Medal.

-

-The medal’s reverse pictures a cow (the original design showed a

-Japanese soldier with breeches down) and an electric fan, and is

-inscribed: “In fond remembrance of the happy days spent from Aug. 7th

-1942 to Jan. 5th 1943. U.S.M.C.”

-

-The suspension ribbon was made, appropriately, of the pale green

-herringbone twill from some Marine’s utility uniform. Legend has it

-that to be authentic the utilities from which the ribbons were made had

-to have been washed in the waters of Guadalcanal’s Lunga River. Some

-medals were provided with the oversized safety pin used to identify

-laundry bags in Navy shipboard laundries.

-

-Such unofficial commemorative mementoes are not uncommon in military

-circles and recall, among others, the Soochow Creek medals recognizing

-the defense of Shanghai’s International Settlement during the Japanese

-invasions of 1932 and 1937 which were inspired by the Military Order of

-the Dragon medals of veterans of the China Relief Expedition or Boxer

-Rebellion.--_Brooke Nihart_

-

-[Illustration]

-]

-

-

-

-

-_Sources_

-

-

-The basic source work for this booklet is the first volume in the

-series _History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II, Pearl

-Harbor to Guadalcanal_, written by LtCol Frank O. Hough, Maj Verle E.

-Ludwig, and Henry I. Shaw, Jr. (Washington: Historical Branch, G-3

-Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1958). Other books used in

-writing this narrative were: BGen Samuel B. Griffith II, _The Battle

-for Guadalcanal_ (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1963); Gen Alexander

-A. Vandegrift as told to Robert B. Asprey, _Once a Marine: The Memoirs

-of General A. A. Vandegrift, USMC_ (New York: W. W. Norton, 1964); Col

-Mitchell Paige, _A Marine Named Mitch_ (New York: Vantage Press, 1975);

-Burke Davis, _Marine: The Life of Chesty Puller_ (Boston: Little,

-Brown, 1962); George McMillan, _The Old Breed: A History of the 1st

-Marine Division in World War II_ (Washington: Infantry Journal Press,

-1949); and Richard W. Johnston, _Follow Me!: The Story of the Second

-Marine Division in World War II_ (New York: Random House, 1948).

-

-The correspondence of General Vandegrift with General Holcomb and

-other senior Marines, held at the Marine Corps Historical Center,

-was helpful. Equally of value were conversations that the author had

-had with General Vandegrift after his retirement. In the course of

-his career as a Marine historian, the author has talked with other

-Guadalcanal veterans of all ranks; hopefully, this has resulted in a

-“feel” for the campaign, essential in writing such an overview.

-

-The literature on the Guadalcanal operation is extensive. In addition

-to the books cited above, there are several which are personally

-recommended to the interested reader: Robert Leckie, _Helmet for My

-Pillow_ (New York: Random House, 1957); Herbert Merillat, _Guadalcanal

-Remembered_ (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1982); John Miller, Jr., _The United

-States Army in World War II: The War in the Pacific_; _Guadalcanal,

-The First Offensive_ (Washington: Historical Division, Department

-of the Army, 1949); T. Grady Gallant, _On Valor’s Side_ (New York:

-Doubleday, 1963); Robert Sherrod, _History of Marine Corps Aviation

-in World War II_ (Washington: Combat Forces Press, 1952); Maj John L.

-Zimmerman, _The Guadalcanal Campaign_ (Washington: Historical Division,

-Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1949); RAdm Samuel E. Morrison, _The

-Struggle for Guadalcanal: History of United States Naval Operations

-in World War II_, Vol V (Boston: Little, Brown, 1950); and a recent,

-comprehensive account, Richard B. Frank, _Guadalcanal_ (New York:

-Random House, 1990).

-

-

-

-

-_About the Author_

-

-

-[Illustration]

-

-Henry I. Shaw, Jr., former chief historian of the History and Museums

-Division, was a Marine Corps historian from 1951-1990. He attended The

-Citadel, 1943-1944, and was graduated with a bachelor of arts cum laude

-in history from Hope College, Holland, Michigan. He received a master

-of arts degree in history from Columbia University. Mr. Shaw served as

-a Marine in both World War II and the Korean War. He is the co-author

-of four of the five volumes of the official history of Marine Corps

-operations in World War II and was the senior editor of most of the

-official histories of Marines in Vietnam. In addition, he has written a

-number of brief Marine Corps histories. He has written many articles on

-military history and has had more than 50 signed book reviews.

-

-       *       *       *       *       *

-

-_The author gratefully acknowledges the permission granted by the

-Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company of America to use the maps

-from BGen Samuel B. Griffith II’s_ The Battle for Guadalcanal _and by

-Doubleday Books and Jack Coggins for use of the sketches from his_ The

-Campaign for Guadalcanal. _The author also wishes to thank Richard

-J. Frank and Herbert C. Merillat for permission to reproduce their

-photographs._

-

-

-

-

-[Illustration]

-

-=THIS PAMPHLET HISTORY=, one in a series devoted to U.S. Marines in

-the World War II era, is published for the education and training of

-Marines by the History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine

-Corps, Washington, D.C., as a part of the U.S. Department of Defense

-observance of the 50th anniversary of victory in that war.

-

-Editorial costs of preparing this pamphlet have been defrayed in part

-by a bequest from the estate of Emilie H. Watts, in memory of her late

-husband, Thomas M. Watts, who served as a Marine and was the recipient

-of a Purple Heart.

-

-    WORLD WAR II COMMEMORATIVE SERIES

-

-    _DIRECTOR OF MARINE CORPS HISTORY AND MUSEUMS_

-    =Brigadier General Edwin H. Simmons, USMC (Ret)=

-

-    _GENERAL EDITOR,

-    WORLD WAR II COMMEMORATIVE SERIES_

-    =Benis M. Frank=

-

-    _CARTOGRAPHIC CONSULTANT_

-    =George C. MacGillivray=

-

-    _EDITING AND DESIGN SECTION, HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISION_

-    =Robert E. Struder=, Senior Editor;

-    =W. Stephen Hill=, Visual Information Specialist;

-    =Catherine A. Kerns=, Composition Services Technician

-

-    Marine Corps Historical Center

-    Building 58, Washington Navy Yard

-    Washington, D.C. 20374-0580

-

-    1992

-

-    PCN 190 003117 00

-

-

-[Illustration (back cover)]

-

-

-

-

-Transcriber’s Notes

-

-

-Punctuation, hyphenation, and spelling were made consistent when a

-predominant preference was found in this book; otherwise they were not

-changed.

-

-Simple typographical errors were corrected; occasional unbalanced

-quotation marks retained.

-

-To make this eBook easier to read, particularly on handheld devices,

-some images have been made relatively larger than in the original

-pamphlet, and centered, rather than offset to one side or the other;

-and some were placed a little earlier or later than in the

-original. Sidebars in the original have been repositioned between

-chapters and identified as “[Sidebar (page nn):”, where the

-page reference is to the original location in the source book. In the

-Plain Text version, the matching closing right bracket follows the last

-line of the Sidebar’s text and is on a separate line to make it more

-noticeable. In the HTML versions, that bracket follows the colon, and

-each Sidebar is displayed within a box.

-

-Descriptions of the Cover and Frontispiece have been moved from page 1

-of the book to just below those illustrations, and text referring to

-the locations of those illustrations has been deleted.

-

-Page 3: “He spent most of his final years” was misprinted without the

-“of”.

-

-Page 21: “disgraced in his own” was misprinted without the “his”.

-

-

-

-

-

-End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of First Offensive: The Marine Campaign

-for Guadalcanal, by Henry I. Shaw

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+*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 48807 ***
+
+Transcriber’s note: Table of Contents added by Transcriber and placed
+into the public domain. Boldface text is indicated by =equals signs=.
+
+Contents
+
+  First Offensive: The Marine Campaign for Guadalcanal
+    SIDEBAR: General Alexander A. Vandegrift
+  The Landing and August Battles
+    SIDEBAR: First Marine Utility Uniform Issued in World War II
+    SIDEBAR: LVT (1)--The ‘Amtrac’
+    SIDEBAR: General Vandegrift and His 1st Marine Division Staff
+    SIDEBAR: The Coastwatchers
+    SIDEBAR: The 1st Marine Division Patch
+  September and the Ridge
+    SIDEBAR: Sergeant Major Sir Jacob Charles Vouza
+    SIDEBAR: M3A1 37mm Antitank Gun
+    SIDEBAR: Douglas Albert Munro
+  October and the Japanese Offensive
+    SIDEBAR: Reising Gun
+  November and the Continuing Buildup
+    SIDEBAR: 75mm Pack Howitzer--Workhorse of the Artillery
+    SIDEBAR: The Japanese Model 89 (1929) 50mm Heavy Grenade Discharger
+  December and the Final Stages
+    SIDEBAR: The ‘George’ Medal
+  Sources
+  About the Author
+  About this series of pamphlets
+  Transcriber’s Notes
+
+
+
+
+    FIRST OFFENSIVE:
+    THE MARINE CAMPAIGN
+    FOR GUADALCANAL
+
+
+    MARINES IN
+    WORLD WAR II
+    COMMEMORATIVE SERIES
+
+    BY HENRY I. SHAW, JR.
+
+[Illustration: _A Marine machine gunner and his Browning .30-caliber
+M1917 heavy machine gun stand guard while 1st Marine Division engineers
+clean up in the Lunga River._ (Department of Defense [USMC] Photo
+588741)]
+
+[Illustration: _It was from a Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress such as this
+that LtCol Merrill B. Twining and Maj William B. McKean reconnoitered
+the Watchtower target area and discovered the Japanese building an
+airfield on Guadalcanal._ (National Archives Photo 80-G-34887)]
+
+
+
+
+First Offensive: The Marine Campaign for Guadalcanal
+
+_by Henry I. Shaw, Jr._
+
+
+In the early summer of 1942, intelligence reports of the construction
+of a Japanese airfield near Lunga Point on Guadalcanal in the Solomon
+Islands triggered a demand for offensive action in the South Pacific.
+The leading offensive advocate in Washington was Admiral Ernest J.
+King, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). In the Pacific, his view was
+shared by Admiral Chester A. Nimitz, Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet
+(CinCPac), who had already proposed sending the 1st Marine Raider
+Battalion to Tulagi, an island 20 miles north of Guadalcanal across
+Sealark Channel, to destroy a Japanese seaplane base there. Although
+the Battle of the Coral Sea had forestalled a Japanese amphibious
+assault on Port Moresby, the Allied base of supply in eastern New
+Guinea, completion of the Guadalcanal airfield might signal the
+beginning of a renewed enemy advance to the south and an increased
+threat to the lifeline of American aid to New Zealand and Australia. On
+23 July 1942, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in Washington agreed that
+the line of communications in the South Pacific had to be secured. The
+Japanese advance had to be stopped. Thus, Operation Watchtower, the
+seizure of Guadalcanal and Tulagi, came into being.
+
+The islands of the Solomons lie nestled in the backwaters of the South
+Pacific. Spanish fortune-hunters discovered them in the mid-sixteenth
+century, but no European power foresaw any value in the islands until
+Germany sought to expand its budding colonial empire more than two
+centuries later. In 1884, Germany proclaimed a protectorate over
+northern New Guinea, the Bismarck Archipelago, and the northern
+Solomons. Great Britain countered by establishing a protectorate over
+the southern Solomons and by annexing the remainder of New Guinea. In
+1905, the British crown passed administrative control over all its
+territories in the region to Australia, and the Territory of Papua,
+with its capital at Port Moresby, came into being. Germany’s holdings
+in the region fell under the administrative control of the League of
+Nations following World War I, with the seat of the colonial government
+located at Rabaul on New Britain. The Solomons lay 10 degrees below the
+Equator--hot, humid, and buffeted by torrential rains. The celebrated
+adventure novelist, Jack London, supposedly muttered: “If I were king,
+the worst punishment I could inflict on my enemies would be to banish
+them to the Solomons.”
+
+On 23 January 1942, Japanese forces seized Rabaul and fortified it
+extensively. The site provided an excellent harbor and numerous
+positions for airfields. The devastating enemy carrier and plane
+losses at the Battle of Midway (3-6 June 1942) had caused _Imperial
+General Headquarters_ to cancel orders for the invasion of Midway, New
+Caledonia, Fiji, and Samoa, but plans to construct a major seaplane
+base at Tulagi went forward. The location offered one of the best
+anchorages in the South Pacific and it was strategically located: 560
+miles from the New Hebrides, 800 miles from New Caledonia, and 1,000
+miles from Fiji.
+
+The outposts at Tulagi and Guadalcanal were the forward evidences of a
+sizeable Japanese force in the region, beginning with the _Seventeenth
+Army_, headquartered at Rabaul. The enemy’s _Eighth Fleet_, _Eleventh
+Air Fleet_, and _1st_, _7th_, _8th_, and _14th Naval Base Forces_
+also were on New Britain. Beginning on 5 August 1942, Japanese signal
+intelligence units began to pick up transmissions between Noumea on
+New Caledonia and Melbourne, Australia. Enemy analysts concluded that
+Vice Admiral Richard L. Ghormley, commanding the South Pacific Area
+(ComSoPac), was signalling a British or Australian force in preparation
+for an offensive in the Solomons or at New Guinea. The warnings were
+passed to Japanese headquarters at Rabaul and Truk, but were ignored.
+
+[Illustration: THE PACIFIC AREAS
+
+1 AUGUST 1942]
+
+The invasion force was indeed on its way to its targets, Guadalcanal,
+Tulagi, and the tiny islets of Gavutu and Tanambogo close by Tulagi’s
+shore. The landing force was composed of Marines; the covering force
+and transport force were U.S. Navy with a reinforcement of Australian
+warships. There was not much mystery to the selection of the 1st
+Marine Division to make the landings. Five U.S. Army divisions were
+located in the South and Southwest Pacific: three in Australia, the
+37th Infantry in Fiji, and the Americal Division on New Caledonia.
+None was amphibiously trained and all were considered vital parts of
+defensive garrisons. The 1st Marine Division, minus one of its infantry
+regiments, had begun arriving in New Zealand in mid-June when the
+division headquarters and the 5th Marines reached Wellington. At that
+time, the rest of the reinforced division’s major units were getting
+ready to embark. The 1st Marines were at San Francisco, the 1st Raider
+Battalion was on New Caledonia, and the 3d Defense Battalion was at
+Pearl Harbor. The 2d Marines of the 2d Marine Division, a unit which
+would replace the 1st Division’s 7th Marines stationed in British
+Samoa, was loading out from San Diego. All three infantry regiments
+of the landing force had battalions of artillery attached, from the
+11th Marines, in the case of the 5th and 1st; the 2d Marines drew its
+reinforcing 75mm howitzers from the 2d Division’s 10th Marines.
+
+The news that his division would be the landing force for Watchtower
+came as a surprise to Major General Alexander A. Vandegrift, who
+had anticipated that the 1st Division would have six months of
+training in the South Pacific before it saw action. The changeover
+from administrative loading of the various units’ supplies to combat
+loading, where first-needed equipment, weapons, ammunition, and rations
+were positioned to come off ship first with the assault troops,
+occasioned a never-to-be-forgotten scene on Wellington’s docks. The
+combat troops took the place of civilian stevedores and unloaded and
+reloaded the cargo and passenger vessels in an increasing round of
+working parties, often during rainstorms which hampered the task, but
+the job was done. Succeeding echelons of the division’s forces all got
+their share of labor on the docks as various shipping groups arrived
+and the time grew shorter. General Vandegrift was able to convince
+Admiral Ghormley and the Joint Chiefs that he would not be able to meet
+a proposed D-Day of 1 August, but the extended landing date, 7 August,
+did little to improve the situation.
+
+An amphibious operation is a vastly complicated affair, particularly
+when the forces involved are assembled on short notice from all over
+the Pacific. The pressure that Vandegrift felt was not unique to
+the landing force commander. The U.S. Navy’s ships were the key to
+success and they were scarce and invaluable. Although the Battles of
+Coral Sea and Midway had badly damaged the Japanese fleet’s offensive
+capabilities and crippled its carrier forces, enemy naval aircraft
+could fight as well ashore as afloat and enemy warships were still
+numerous and lethal. American losses at Pearl Harbor, Coral Sea, and
+Midway were considerable, and Navy admirals were well aware that the
+ships they commanded were in short supply. The day was coming when
+America’s shipyards and factories would fill the seas with warships
+of all types, but that day had not arrived in 1942. Calculated risk
+was the name of the game where the Navy was concerned, and if the risk
+seemed too great, the Watchtower landing force might be a casualty. As
+it happened, the Navy never ceased to risk its ships in the waters of
+the Solomons, but the naval lifeline to the troops ashore stretched
+mighty thin at times.
+
+Tactical command of the invasion force approaching Guadalcanal in early
+August was vested in Vice Admiral Frank J. Fletcher as Expeditionary
+Force Commander (Task Force 61). His force consisted of the amphibious
+shipping carrying the 1st Marine Division, under Rear Admiral Richmond
+K. Turner, and the Air Support Force led by Rear Admiral Leigh Noyes.
+Admiral Ghormley contributed land-based air forces commanded by Rear
+Admiral John S. McCain. Fletcher’s support force consisted of three
+fleet carriers, the _Saratoga_ (CV 3), _Enterprise_ (CV 6), and _Wasp_
+(CV 7); the battleship _North Carolina_ (BB 55), 6 cruisers, 16
+destroyers, and 3 oilers. Admiral Turner’s covering force included five
+cruisers and nine destroyers.
+
+
+[Sidebar (page 3): General Alexander A. Vandegrift
+
+[Illustration]
+
+A distinguished military analyst once noted that if titles were awarded
+in America as they are in England, the commanding general of Marine
+Corps forces at Guadalcanal would be known simply as “Vandegrift of
+Guadalcanal.” But America does not bestow aristocratic titles, and
+besides, such a formality would not be in keeping with the soft-spoken,
+modest demeanor of Alexander A. Vandegrift.
+
+The man destined to lead the 1st Marine Division in America’s
+first ground offensive operation of World War II was born in 1887
+in Charlottesville, Virginia, where he grew up fascinated by his
+grandfather’s stories of life in the Confederate Army during the Civil
+War. It was axiomatic that young Alexander would settle on a military
+career. Commissioned a Marine lieutenant in 1909, Vandegrift received
+an early baptism of fire in 1912 during the bombardment, assault, and
+capture of Coyotepe in Nicaragua. Two years later he participated in
+the capture and occupation of Vera Cruz. Vandegrift would spend the
+greater part of the next decade in Haiti, where he fought Caco bandits,
+and served as an inspector of constabulary with the Gendarmerie
+d’Haiti. It was in Haiti that he met and was befriended by Marine
+Colonel Smedley D. Butler, who called him “Sunny Jim.” The lessons of
+these formative years fighting an elusive enemy in a hostile jungle
+environment were not lost upon the young Marine officer.
+
+He spent the next 18 years in various posts and stations in the United
+States, along with two tours of China duty at Peiping and Tientsin.
+Prior to Pearl Harbor, Vandegrift was appointed assistant to the
+Major General Commandant, and in April 1940 received the single star
+of a brigadier general. He was detached to the 1st Marine Division
+in November 1941, and in May 1942 sailed for the South Pacific as
+commanding general of the first Marine division ever to leave the
+United States. On 7 August 1942, after exhorting his Marines with the
+reminder that “God favors the bold and strong of heart,” he led the 1st
+Marine Division ashore in the Solomon Islands in the first large-scale
+offensive action against the Japanese.
+
+His triumph at Guadalcanal earned General Vandegrift the Medal of
+Honor, the Navy Cross, and the praise of a grateful nation. In July
+1943 he took command of I Marine Amphibious Corps and planned the
+landing at Empress Augusta Bay, Bougainville, Northern Solomons, on
+1 November 1943. He then was recalled to Washington, to become the
+Eighteenth Commandant of the Marine Corps.
+
+On 1 January 1944, as a lieutenant general, Vandegrift was sworn in as
+Commandant. On 4 April 1945 he was promoted to general, and thus became
+the first Marine officer on active duty to attain four-star rank.
+
+In the final stages of the war, General Vandegrift directed an elite
+force approaching half-a-million men and women, with its own aviation
+force. Comparing his Marines with the Japanese, he noted that the
+Japanese soldier “was trained to go to a place, stay there, fight and
+die. We train our men to go to a place, fight to win, and to live. I
+can assure you, it is a better theory.”
+
+After the war, Vandegrift fought another battle, this time in the halls
+of Congress, with the stakes being the survival of the Marine Corps.
+His counter-testimony during Congressional hearings of the spring
+of 1946 was instrumental in defeating initial attempts to merge or
+“unify” the U.S. Armed Forces. Although his term as Commandant ended
+on 31 December 1947, General Vandegrift would live to see passage of
+Public Law 416, which preserved the Corps and its historic mission. His
+official retirement date of 1 April 1949 ended just over 40 years of
+service.
+
+General Vandegrift outlived both his wife Mildred and their only son,
+Colonel Alexander A. Vandegrift, Jr., who fought in World War II and
+Korea. He spent most of his final years in Delray, Florida. He died on
+8 May 1973.--_Robert V. Aquilina_
+]
+
+
+
+
+_The Landing and August Battles_
+
+
+On board the transports approaching the Solomons, the Marines were
+looking for a tough fight. They knew little about the targets, even
+less about their opponents. Those maps that were available were poor,
+constructions based upon outdated hydrographic charts and information
+provided by former island residents. While maps based on aerial
+photographs had been prepared they were misplaced by the Navy in
+Auckland, New Zealand, and never got to the Marines at Wellington.
+
+On 17 July, a couple of division staff officers, Lieutenant Colonel
+Merrill B. Twining and Major William McKean, had been able to join the
+crew of a B-17 flying from Port Moresby on a reconnaissance mission
+over Guadalcanal. They reported what they had seen, and their analysis,
+coupled with aerial photographs, indicated no extensive defenses along
+the beaches of Guadalcanal’s north shore.
+
+[Illustration: GUADALCANAL
+
+TULAGI-GAVUTU
+
+and
+
+Florida Islands]
+
+This news was indeed welcome. The division intelligence officer (G-2),
+Lieutenant Colonel Frank B. Goettge, had concluded that about 8,400
+Japanese occupied Guadalcanal and Tulagi. Admiral Turner’s staff
+figured that the Japanese amounted to 7,125 men. Admiral Ghormley’s
+intelligence officer pegged the enemy strength at 3,100--closest to the
+3,457 actual total of Japanese troops; 2,571 of these were stationed on
+Guadalcanal and were mostly laborers working on the airfield.
+
+To oppose the Japanese, the Marines had an overwhelming superiority
+of men. At the time, the tables of organization for a Marine Corps
+division indicated a total of 19,514 officers and enlisted men,
+including naval medical and engineer (Seabee) units. Infantry
+regiments numbered 3,168 and consisted of a headquarters company, a
+weapons company, and three battalions. Each infantry battalion (933
+Marines) was organized into a headquarters company (89), a weapons
+company (273), and three rifle companies (183). The artillery regiment
+had 2,581 officers and men organized into three 75mm pack howitzer
+battalions and one 105mm howitzer battalion. A light tank battalion,
+a special weapons battalion of antiaircraft and antitank guns, and a
+parachute battalion added combat power. An engineer regiment (2,452
+Marines) with battalions of engineers, pioneers, and Seabees, provided
+a hefty combat and service element. The total was rounded out by
+division headquarters battalion’s headquarters, signal, and military
+police companies and the division’s service troops--service, motor
+transport, amphibian tractor, and medical battalions. For Watchtower,
+the 1st Raider Battalion and the 3d Defense Battalion had been added to
+Vandegrift’s command to provide more infantrymen and much needed coast
+defense and antiaircraft guns and crews.
+
+Unfortunately, the division’s heaviest ordnance had been left behind
+in New Zealand. Limited ship space and time meant that the division’s
+big guns, a 155mm howitzer battalion, and all the motor transport
+battalion’s two-and-a-half-ton trucks were not loaded. Colonel Pedro
+A. del Valle, commanding the 11th Marines, was unhappy at the loss of
+his heavy howitzers and equally distressed that essential sound and
+flash-ranging equipment necessary for effective counterbattery fire was
+left behind. Also failing to make the cut in the battle for shipping
+space, were all spare clothing, bedding rolls, and supplies necessary
+to support the reinforced division beyond 60 days of combat. Ten days
+supply of ammunition for each of the division’s weapons remained in New
+Zealand.
+
+[Illustration:
+
+    Naval Historical Photographic Collection 880-CF-117-4-63
+
+_Enroute to Guadalcanal RAdm Richmond Kelly Turner, commander of the
+Amphibious Force, and MajGen Alexander A. Vandegrift, 1st Marine
+Division commander, review the Operation Watchtower plan for landings
+in the Solomon Islands._]
+
+In the opinion of the 1st Division’s historian and a veteran of
+the landing, the men on the approaching transports “thought they’d
+have a bad time getting ashore.” They were confident, certainly,
+and sure that they could not be defeated, but most of the men were
+entering combat for the first time. There were combat veteran officers
+and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) throughout the division, but
+the majority of the men were going into their initial battle. The
+commanding officer of the 1st Marines, Colonel Clifton B. Cates,
+estimated that 90 percent of his men had enlisted after Pearl Harbor.
+The fabled 1st Marine Division of later World War II, Korean War,
+Vietnam War, and Persian Gulf War fame, the most highly decorated
+division in the U.S. Armed Forces, had not yet established its
+reputation.
+
+The convoy of ships, with its outriding protective screen of carriers,
+reached Koro in the Fiji Islands on 26 July. Practice landings did
+little more than exercise the transports’ landing craft, since reefs
+precluded an actual beach landing. The rendezvous at Koro did give the
+senior commanders a chance to have a face-to-face meeting. Fletcher,
+McCain, Turner, and Vandegrift got together with Ghormley’s chief of
+staff, Rear Admiral Daniel J. Callaghan, who notified the conferees
+that ComSoPac had ordered the 7th Marines on Samoa to be prepared to
+embark on four days notice as a reinforcement for Watchtower. To this
+decidedly good news, Admiral Fletcher added some bad news. In view of
+the threat from enemy land-based air, he could not “keep the carriers
+in the area for more than 48 hours after the landing.” Vandegrift
+protested that he needed at least four days to get the division’s gear
+ashore, and Fletcher reluctantly agreed to keep his carriers at risk
+another day.
+
+On the 28th the ships sailed from the Fijis, proceeding as if they were
+headed for Australia. At noon on 5 August, the convoy and its escorts
+turned north for the Solomons. Undetected by the Japanese, the assault
+force reached its target during the night of 6-7 August and split into
+two landing groups, Transport Division X-Ray, 15 transports heading
+for the north shore of Guadalcanal east of Lunga Point, and Transport
+Division Yoke, eight transports headed for Tulagi, Gavutu, Tanambogo,
+and the nearby Florida Island, which loomed over the smaller islands.
+
+Vandegrift’s plans for the landings would put two of his infantry
+regiments (Colonel LeRoy P. Hunt’s 5th Marines and Colonel Cates’
+1st Marines) ashore on both sides of the Lunga River prepared to
+attack inland to seize the airfield. The 11th Marines, the 3d Defense
+Battalion, and most of the division’s supporting units would also land
+near the Lunga, prepared to exploit the beachhead. Across the 20 miles
+of Sealark Channel, the division’s assistant commander, Brigadier
+General William H. Rupertus, led the assault forces slated to take
+Tulagi, Gavutu, and Tanambogo: the 1st Raider Battalion (Lieutenant
+Colonel Merritt A. Edson); the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines (Lieutenant
+Colonel Harold E. Rosecrans); and the 1st Parachute Battalion (Major
+Robert H. Williams). Company A of the 2d Marines would reconnoiter
+the nearby shores of Florida Island and the rest of Colonel John A.
+Arthur’s regiment would stand by in reserve to land where needed.
+
+As the ships slipped through the channels on either side of rugged
+Savo Island, which split Sealark near its western end, heavy clouds
+and dense rain blanketed the task force. Later the moon came out and
+silhouetted the islands. On board his command ship, Vandegrift wrote
+to his wife: “Tomorrow morning at dawn we land in our first major
+offensive of the war. Our plans have been made and God grant that our
+judgement has been sound ... whatever happens you’ll know I did my
+best. Let us hope that best will be good enough.”
+
+[Illustration: _MajGen Alexander A. Vandegrift, CG, 1st Marine
+Division, confers with his staff on board the transport USS _McCawley_
+(APA-4) enroute to Guadalcanal. From left: Gen Vandegrift; LtCol
+Gerald C. Thomas, operations officer; LtCol Randolph McC. Pate,
+logistics officer; LtCol Frank B. Goettge, intelligence officer; and
+Col William Capers James, chief of staff._
+
+    National Archives Photo 80-G-17065
+]
+
+At 0641 on 7 August, Turner signalled his ships to “land the landing
+force.” Just 28 minutes before, the heavy cruiser _Quincy_ (CA 39)
+had begun shelling the landing beaches at Guadalcanal. The sun came
+up that fateful Friday at 0650, and the first landing craft carrying
+assault troops of the 5th Marines touched down at 0909 on Red Beach.
+To the men’s surprise (and relief), no Japanese appeared to resist the
+landing. Hunt immediately moved his assault troops off the beach and
+into the surrounding jungle, waded the steep-banked Ilu River, and
+headed for the enemy airfield. The following 1st Marines were able to
+cross the Ilu on a bridge the engineers had hastily thrown up with
+an amphibian tractor bracing its middle. The silence was eerie and
+the absence of opposition was worrisome to the riflemen. The Japanese
+troops, most of whom were Korean laborers, had fled to the west,
+spooked by a week’s B-17 bombardment, the pre-assault naval gunfire,
+and the sight of the ships offshore. The situation was not the same
+across Sealark. The Marines on Guadalcanal could hear faint rumbles of
+a firefight across the waters.
+
+[Illustration:
+
+    National Archives Photo 80-CF-112-5-3
+
+_First Division Marines storm ashore across Guadalcanal’s beaches on
+D-Day, 7 August 1942, from the attack transport _Barnett_ (AP-11) and
+attack cargo ship _Fomalhaut_ (AK-22). The invaders were surprised at
+the lack of enemy opposition._]
+
+[Illustration:
+
+    LANDING ON GUADALCANAL
+    and Capture of the Airfield
+    7-8 AUGUST 1942
+]
+
+[Illustration:
+
+    Photo courtesy of Col James A. Donovan, Jr.
+
+_When the 5th Marines entered the jungle from the beachhead, and had to
+cross the steep banks of the Ilu River, 1st Marine Division engineers
+hastily constructed a bridge supported by amphibian tractors. Though
+heavily used, the bridge held up._]
+
+[Illustration: _Photographed immediately after a prelanding strike by
+USS _Enterprise_ aircraft flown by Navy pilots, Tanambogo and Gavutu
+Islands lie smoking and in ruins in the morning sun. Gavutu is at the
+left across the causeway from Tanambogo._
+
+    National Archives Photo 80-C-11034
+]
+
+The Japanese on Tulagi were special naval landing force sailors and
+they had no intention of giving up what they held without a vicious,
+no-surrender battle. Edson’s men landed first, following by Rosecrans’
+battalion, hitting Tulagi’s south coast and moving inland towards
+the ridge which ran lengthwise through the island. The battalions
+encountered pockets of resistance in the undergrowth of the islands
+thick vegetation and maneuvered to outflank and overrun the opposition.
+The advance of the Marines was steady but casualties were frequent. By
+nightfall, Edson had reached the former British residency overlooking
+Tulagi’s harbor and dug in for the night across a hill that overlooked
+the Japanese final position, a ravine on the islands southern tip. The
+2d Battalion, 5th Marines, had driven through to the northern shore,
+cleaning its sector of enemy; Rosecrans moved into position to back
+up the raiders. By the end of its first day ashore, 2d Battalion had
+lost 56 men killed and wounded; 1st Raider Battalion casualties were 99
+Marines.
+
+[Illustration:
+
+    Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 52231
+
+_After the battle, almost all palm trees on Gavutu were shorn of their
+foliage. Despite naval gunfire and close air support hitting the enemy
+emplacements, Japanese opposition from caves proved to be serious
+obstacles for attacking Marines._]
+
+Throughout the night, the Japanese swarmed from hillside caves in four
+separate attacks, trying to penetrate the raider lines. They were
+unsuccessful and most died in the attempts. At dawn, the 2d Battalion,
+2d Marines, landed to reinforce the attackers and by the afternoon of 8
+August, the mop-up was completed and the battle for Tulagi was over.
+
+The fight for tiny Gavutu and Tanambogo, both little more than small
+hills rising out of the sea, connected by a hundred-yard causeway, was
+every bit as intense as that on Tulagi. The area of combat was much
+smaller and the opportunities for fire support from offshore ships
+and carrier planes was severely limited once the Marines had landed.
+After naval gunfire from the light cruiser _San Juan_ (CL 54) and two
+destroyers, and a strike by F4F Wildcats flying from the _Wasp_, the
+1st Parachute Battalion landed near noon in three waves, 395 men in
+all, on Gavutu. The Japanese, secure in cave positions, opened fire on
+the second and third waves, pinning down the first Marines ashore on
+the beach. Major Williams took a bullet in the lungs and was evacuated;
+32 Marines were killed in the withering enemy fire. This time, 2d
+Marines reinforcements were really needed; the 1st Battalion’s Company
+B landed on Gavutu and attempted to take Tanambogo; the attackers were
+driven to ground and had to pull back to Gavutu.
+
+After a rough night of close-in fighting with the defenders of both
+islands, the 3d Battalion, 2d Marines, reinforced the men already
+ashore and mopped up on each island. The toll of Marines dead on the
+three islands was 144; the wounded numbered 194. The few Japanese who
+survived the battles fled to Florida Island, which had been scouted by
+the 2d Marines on D-Day and found clear of the enemy.
+
+The Marines’ landings and the concentration of shipping in Guadalcanal
+waters acted as a magnet to the Japanese at Rabaul. At Admiral
+Ghormley’s headquarters, Tulagi’s radio was heard on D-Day “frantically
+calling for [the] dispatch of surface forces to the scene” and
+designating transports and carriers as targets for heavy bombing.
+The messages were sent in plain language, emphasizing the plight
+of the threatened garrison. And the enemy response was prompt and
+characteristic of the months of naval air and surface attacks to come.
+
+At 1030 on 7 August, an Australian coastwatcher hidden in the hills of
+the islands north of Guadalcanal signalled that a Japanese air strike
+composed of heavy bombers, light bombers, and fighters was headed for
+the island. Fletcher’s pilots, whose carriers were positioned 100 miles
+south of Guadalcanal, jumped the approaching planes 20 miles northwest
+of the landing areas before they could disrupt the operation. But the
+Japanese were not daunted by the setback; other planes and ships were
+enroute to the inviting target.
+
+On 8 August, the Marines consolidated their positions ashore, seizing
+the airfield on Guadalcanal and establishing a beachhead. Supplies were
+being unloaded as fast as landing craft could make the turnaround from
+ship to shore, but the shore party was woefully inadequate to handle
+the influx of ammunition, rations, tents, aviation gas, vehicles--all
+gear necessary to sustain the Marines. The beach itself became a
+dumpsite. And almost as soon as the initial supplies were landed, they
+had to be moved to positions nearer Kukum village and Lunga Point
+within the planned perimeter. Fortunately, the lack of Japanese ground
+opposition enabled Vandegrift to shift the supply beaches west to a new
+beachhead.
+
+[Illustration:
+
+    Marine Corps Personal Papers Collection
+
+_Immediately after assault troops cleared the beachhead and moved
+inland, supplies and equipment, inviting targets for enemy bombers,
+began to litter the beach._]
+
+Japanese bombers did penetrate the American fighter screen on 8 August.
+Dropping their bombs from 20,000 feet or more to escape antiaircraft
+fire, the enemy planes were not very accurate. They concentrated on the
+ships in the channel, hitting and damaging a number of them and sinking
+the destroyer _Jarvis_ (DD 393). In their battles to turn back the
+attacking planes, the carrier fighter squadrons lost 21 Wildcats on 7-8
+August.
+
+The primary Japanese targets were the Allied ships. At this time,
+and for a thankfully and unbelievably long time to come, the
+Japanese commanders at Rabaul grossly underestimated the strength of
+Vandegrift’s forces. They thought the Marine landings constituted a
+reconnaissance in force, perhaps 2,000 men, on Guadalcanal. By the
+evening of 8 August, Vandegrift had 10,900 troops ashore on Guadalcanal
+and another 6,075 on Tulagi. Three infantry regiments had landed and
+each had a supporting 75mm pack howitzer battalion--the 2d and 3d
+Battalions, 11th Marines on Guadalcanal, and the 3d Battalion, 10th
+Marines on Tulagi. The 5th Battalion, 11th Marines’ 105mm howitzers
+were in general support.
+
+That night a cruiser-destroyer force of the Imperial Japanese Navy
+reacted to the American invasion with a stinging response. Admiral
+Turner had positioned three cruiser-destroyer groups to bar the
+Tulagi-Guadalcanal approaches. At the Battle of Savo, the Japanese
+demonstrated their superiority in night fighting at this stage of
+the war, shattering two of Turners covering forces without loss to
+themselves. Four heavy cruisers went to the bottom--three American, one
+Australian--and another lost her bow. As the sun came up over what soon
+would be called “Ironbottom Sound,” Marines watched grimly as Higgins
+boats swarmed out to rescue survivors. Approximately 1,300 sailors
+died that night and another 700 suffered wounds or were badly burned.
+Japanese casualties numbered less than 200 men.
+
+The Japanese suffered damage to only one ship in the encounter, the
+cruiser _Chokai_. The American cruisers _Vincennes_ (CA 44), _Astoria_
+(CA 34), and _Quincy_ (CA 39) went to the bottom, as did the Australian
+Navy’s HMAS _Canberra_, so critically damaged that she had to be sunk
+by American torpedoes. Both the cruiser _Chicago_ (CA 29) and destroyer
+_Talbot_ (DD 114) were badly damaged. Fortunately for the Marines
+ashore, the Japanese force--five heavy cruisers, two light cruisers,
+and a destroyer--departed before dawn without attempting to disrupt the
+landing further.
+
+[Illustration: U.S. 105mm Howitzer]
+
+When the attack-force leader, Vice Admiral Gunichi Mikawa, returned to
+Rabaul, he expected to receive the accolades of his superiors. He did
+get those, but he also found himself the subject of criticism. Admiral
+Isoroku Yamamoto, the Japanese fleet commander, chided his subordinate
+for failing to attack the transports. Mikawa could only reply, somewhat
+lamely, that he did not know Fletcher’s aircraft carriers were so far
+away from Guadalcanal. Of equal significance to the Marines on the
+beach, the Japanese naval victory caused celebrating superiors in Tokyo
+to allow the event to overshadow the importance of the amphibious
+operation.
+
+The disaster prompted the American admirals to reconsider Navy support
+for operations ashore. Fletcher feared for the safety of his carriers;
+he had already lost about a quarter of his fighter aircraft. The
+commander of the expeditionary force had lost a carrier at Coral Sea
+and another at Midway. He felt he could not risk the loss of a third,
+even if it meant leaving the Marines on their own. Before the Japanese
+cruiser attack, he obtained Admiral Ghormley’s permission to withdraw
+from the area.
+
+[Illustration: _When ships carrying barbed wire and engineering tools
+needed ashore were forced to leave the Guadalcanal area because of
+enemy air and surface threats, Marines had to prepare such hasty field
+expedients as this_ _cheval de frise_ _of sharpened stakes._
+
+    Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 5157
+]
+
+At a conference on board Turner’s flagship transport, the _McCawley_,
+on the night of 8 August, the admiral told General Vandegrift that
+Fletcher’s impending withdrawal meant that he would have to pull out
+the amphibious force’s ships. The Battle of Savo Island reinforced
+the decision to get away before enemy aircraft, unchecked by American
+interceptors, struck. On 9 August, the transports withdrew to Noumea.
+The unloading of supplies ended abruptly, and ships still half-full
+steamed away. The forces ashore had 17 days’ rations--after counting
+captured Japanese food--and only four days’ supply of ammunition for
+all weapons. Not only did the ships take away the rest of the supplies,
+they also took the Marines still on board, including the 2d Marines’
+headquarters element. Dropped off at the island of Espiritu Santo in
+the New Hebrides, the infantry Marines and their commander, Colonel
+Arthur, were most unhappy and remained so until they finally reached
+Guadalcanal on 29 October.
+
+Ashore in the Marine beachheads, General Vandegrift ordered rations
+reduced to two meals a day. The reduced food intake would last for
+six weeks, and the Marines would become very familiar with Japanese
+canned fish and rice. Most of the Marines smoked and they were soon
+disgustedly smoking Japanese-issue brands. They found that the separate
+paper filters that came with the cigarettes were necessary to keep the
+fast-burning tobacco from scorching their lips. The retreating ships
+had also hauled away empty sand bags and valuable engineer tools. So
+the Marines used Japanese shovels to fill Japanese rice bags with sand
+to strengthen their defensive positions.
+
+[Illustration: U.S. 90mm Antiaircraft Gun]
+
+The Marines dug in along the beaches between the Tenaru and the ridges
+west of Kukum. A Japanese counter-landing was a distinct possibility.
+Inland of the beaches, defensive gun pits and foxholes lined the west
+bank of the Tenaru and crowned the hills that faced west toward the
+Matanikau River and Point Cruz. South of the airfield where densely
+jungled ridges and ravines abounded, the beachhead perimeter was
+guarded by outposts and these were manned in large part by combat
+support troops. The engineer, pioneer, and amphibious tractor battalion
+all had their positions on the front line. In fact, any Marine with a
+rifle, and that was virtually every Marine, stood night defensive duty.
+There was no place within the perimeter that could be counted safe from
+enemy infiltration.
+
+[Illustration:
+
+    Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 150993
+
+_Col Kiyono Ichiki, a battle-seasoned Japanese Army veteran, led his
+force in an impetuous and ill-fated attack on strong Marine positions
+in the Battle of the Tenaru on the night of 20-21 August._]
+
+Almost as Turner’s transports sailed away, the Japanese began a
+pattern of harassing air attacks on the beachhead. Sometimes the raids
+came during the day, but the 3d Defense Battalion’s 90mm antiaircraft
+guns forced the bombers to fly too high for effective bombing. The
+erratic pattern of bombs, however, meant that no place was safe near
+the airfield, the preferred target, and no place could claim it was
+bomb-free. The most disturbing aspect of Japanese air attacks soon
+became the nightly harassment by Japanese aircraft which singly,
+it seemed, roamed over the perimeter, dropping bombs and flares
+indiscriminately. The nightly visitors, whose planes’ engines were soon
+well known sounds, won the singular title “Washing Machine Charlie,”
+at first, and later, “Louie the Louse,” when their presence heralded
+Japanese shore bombardment. Technically, “Charlie” was a twin-engine
+night bomber from Rabaul. “Louie” was a cruiser float plane that
+signalled to the bombardment ships. But the harassed Marines used the
+names interchangeably.
+
+Even though most of the division’s heavy engineering equipment had
+disappeared with the Navy’s transports, the resourceful Marines soon
+completed the airfield’s runway with captured Japanese gear. On 12
+August Admiral McCain’s aide piloted in a PBY-5 Catalina flying boat
+and bumped to a halt on what was now officially Henderson Field, named
+for a Marine pilot, Major Lofton R. Henderson, lost at Midway. The Navy
+officer pronounced the airfield fit for fighter use and took off with a
+load of wounded Marines, the first of 2,879 to be evacuated. Henderson
+Field was the centerpiece of Vandegrift’s strategy; he would hold it at
+all costs.
+
+Although it was only 2,000 feet long and lacked a taxiway and adequate
+drainage, the tiny airstrip, often riddled with potholes and rendered
+unusable because of frequent, torrential downpours, was essential to
+the success of the landing force. With it operational, supplies could
+be flown in and wounded flown out. At least in the Marines’ minds, Navy
+ships ceased to be the only lifeline for the defenders.
+
+While Vandegrift’s Marines dug in east and west of Henderson Field,
+Japanese headquarters in Rabaul planned what it considered an effective
+response to the American offensive. Misled by intelligence estimates
+that the Marines numbered perhaps 2,000 men, Japanese staff officers
+believed that a modest force quickly sent could overwhelm the invaders.
+
+On 12 August, CinCPac determined that a sizable Japanese force was
+massing at Truk to steam to the Solomons and attempt to eject the
+Americans. Ominously, the group included the heavy carriers _Shokaku_
+and _Zuikaku_ and the light carrier _Ryujo_. Despite the painful losses
+at Savo Island, the only significant increases to American naval forces
+in the Solomons was the assignment of a new battleship, the _South
+Dakota_ (BB 57).
+
+[Illustration: _Of his watercolor painting “Instructions to a Patrol,”
+Capt Donald L. Dickson said that three men have volunteered to locate
+a Japanese bivouac. The one in the center is a clean-cut corporal with
+the bearing of a high-school athlete. The man on the right is “rough
+and ready.” To the one at left, it’s just another job; he may do it
+heroically, but it’s just another job._
+
+    Captain Donald L. Dickson, USMCR
+]
+
+Imperial General Headquarters in Tokyo had ordered Lieutenant General
+Haruyoshi Hyakutake’s _Seventeenth Army_ to attack the Marine
+perimeter. For his assault force, Hyakutake chose the _35th Infantry
+Brigade_ (Reinforced), commanded by Major General Kiyotake Kawaguchi.
+At the time, Kawaguchi’s main force was in the Palaus. Hyakutake
+selected a crack infantry regiment--the _28th_--commanded by Colonel
+Kiyono Ichiki to land first. Alerted for its mission while it was at
+Guam, the Ichiki Detachment assault echelon, one battalion of 900
+men, was transported to the Solomons on the only shipping available,
+six destroyers. As a result the troops carried just small amounts of
+ordnance and supplies. A follow-on echelon of 1,200 of Ichiki’s troops
+was to join the assault battalion on Guadalcanal.
+
+[Illustration:
+
+    National Archives Photo 80-G-37932
+
+_On 20 August, the first Marine Corps aircraft such as this F4F Grumman
+Wildcat landed on Henderson Field to begin combat air operations
+against the Japanese._]
+
+While the Japanese landing force was headed for Guadalcanal, the
+Japanese already on the island provided an unpleasant reminder that
+they, too, were full of fight. A captured enemy naval rating, taken in
+the constant patrolling to the west of the perimeter, indicated that a
+Japanese group wanted to surrender near the village of Kokumbona, seven
+miles west of the Matanikau. This was the area that Lieutenant Colonel
+Goettge considered held most of the enemy troops who had fled the
+airfield. On the night of 12 August, a reconnaissance patrol of 25 men
+led by Goettge himself left the perimeter by landing craft. The patrol
+landed near its objective, was ambushed, and virtually wiped out. Only
+three men managed to swim and wade back to the Marine lines. The bodies
+of the other members of the patrol were never found. To this day, the
+fate of the Goettge patrol continues to intrigue researchers.
+
+After the loss of Goettge and his men, vigilance increased on the
+perimeter. On the 14th, a fabled character, the coastwatcher Martin
+Clemens, came strolling out of the jungle into the Marine lines. He
+had watched the landing from the hills south of the airfield and now
+brought his bodyguard of native policemen with him. A retired sergeant
+major of the British Solomon Islands Constabulary, Jacob C. Vouza,
+volunteered about this time to search out Japanese to the east of
+the perimeter, where patrol sightings and contacts had indicated the
+Japanese might have effected a landing.
+
+The ominous news of Japanese sightings to the east and west of the
+perimeter were balanced out by the joyous word that more Marines
+had landed. This time the Marines were aviators. On 20 August, two
+squadrons of Marine Aircraft Group (MAG)-23 were launched from the
+escort carrier _Long Island_ (CVE-1) located 200 miles southeast of
+Guadalcanal. Captain John L. Smith led 19 Grumman F4F-4 Wildcats of
+Marine Fighting Squadron (VMF)-223 onto Henderson’s narrow runway.
+Smith’s fighters were followed by Major Richard C. Mangrum’s Marine
+Scout-Bombing Squadron (VMSB)-232 with 12 Douglas SBD-3 Dauntless dive
+bombers.
+
+From this point of the campaign, the radio identification for
+Guadalcanal, Cactus, became increasingly synonymous with the island.
+The Marine planes became the first elements of what would informally be
+known as Cactus Air Force.
+
+[Illustration: _The first Army Air Forces P-400 Bell Air Cobras arrived
+on Guadalcanal on 22 August, two days after the first Marine planes,
+and began operations immediately._
+
+    National Archives Photo 208-N-4932
+]
+
+Wasting no time, the Marine pilots were soon in action against the
+Japanese naval aircraft which frequently attacked Guadalcanal. Smith
+shot down his first enemy Zero fighter on 21 August; three days later
+VMF-223’s Wildcats intercepted a strong Japanese aerial attack force
+and downed 16 enemy planes. In this action, Captain Marion E. Carl, a
+veteran of Midway, shot down three planes. On the 22d, coastwatchers
+alerted Cactus to an approaching air attack and 13 of 16 enemy bombers
+were destroyed. At the same time, Mangrum’s dive bombers damaged
+three enemy destroyer-transports attempting to reach Guadalcanal. On
+24 August, the American attacking aircraft, which now included Navy
+scout-bombers from the _Saratoga_’s Scouting Squadron (VS) 5, succeeded
+in turning back a Japanese reinforcement convoy of warships and
+destroyers.
+
+On 22 August, five Bell P-400 Air Cobras of the Army’s 67th Fighter
+Squadron had landed at Henderson, followed within the week by nine more
+Air Cobras. The Army planes, which had serious altitude and climb-rate
+deficiencies, were destined to see most action in ground combat support
+roles.
+
+The frenzied action in what became known as the Battle of the Eastern
+Solomons was matched ashore. Japanese destroyers had delivered the
+vanguard of the Ichiki force at Taivu Point, 25 miles east of the
+Marine perimeter. A long-range patrol of Marines from Company A, 1st
+Battalion, 1st Marines ambushed a sizable Japanese force near Taivu on
+19 August. The Japanese dead were readily identified as Army troops and
+the debris of their defeat included fresh uniforms and a large amount
+of communication gear. Clearly, a new phase of the fighting had begun.
+All Japanese encountered to this point had been naval troops.
+
+Alerted by patrols, the Marines now dug in along the Ilu River, often
+misnamed the Tenaru on Marine maps, were ready for Colonel Ichiki. The
+Japanese commander’s orders directed him to “quickly recapture and
+maintain the airfield at Guadalcanal,” and his own directive to his
+troops emphasized that they would fight “to the last breath of the last
+man.” And they did.
+
+[Illustration: U.S. M-3 Light Tank]
+
+Too full of his mission to wait for the rest of his regiment and sure
+that he faced only a few thousand men overall, Ichiki marched from
+Taivu to the Marines’ lines. Before he attacked on the night of the
+20th, a bloody figure stumbled out of the jungle with a warning that
+the Japanese were coming. It was Sergeant Major Vouza. Captured by the
+Japanese, who found a small American flag secreted in his loincloth, he
+was tortured in a failed attempt to gain information on the invasion
+force. Tied to a tree, bayonetted twice through the chest, and beaten
+with rifle butts, the resolute Vouza chewed through his bindings
+to escape. Taken to Lieutenant Colonel Edwin A. Pollock, whose 2d
+Battalion, 1st Marines held the Ilu mouth’s defenses, he gasped a
+warning that an estimated 250-500 Japanese soldiers were coming behind
+him. The resolute Vouza, rushed immediately to an aid station and then
+to the division hospital, miraculously survived his ordeal and was
+awarded a Silver Star for his heroism by General Vandegrift, and later
+a Legion of Merit. Vandegrift also made Vouza an honorary sergeant
+major of U.S. Marines.
+
+At 0130 on 21 August, Ichiki’s troops stormed the Marines’ lines in a
+screaming, frenzied display of the “spiritual strength” which they had
+been assured would sweep aside their American enemy. As the Japanese
+charged across the sand bar astride the Ilu’s mouth, Pollock’s Marines
+cut them down. After a mortar preparation, the Japanese tried again
+to storm past the sand bar. A section of 37mm guns sprayed the enemy
+force with deadly canister. Lieutenant Colonel Lenard B. Cresswell’s
+1st Battalion, 1st Marines moved upstream on the Ilu at daybreak, waded
+across the sluggish, 50-foot-wide stream, and moved on the flank of the
+Japanese. Wildcats from VMF-223 strafed the beleagured enemy force.
+Five light tanks blasted the retreating Japanese. By 1700, as the sun
+was setting, the battle ended.
+
+Colonel Ichiki, disgraced in his own mind by his defeat, burned his
+regimental colors and shot himself. Close to 800 of his men joined
+him in death. The few survivors fled eastward towards Taivu Point.
+Rear Admiral Raizo Tanaka, whose reinforcement force of transports and
+destroyers was largely responsible for the subsequent Japanese troop
+buildup on Guadalcanal, recognized that the unsupported Japanese attack
+was sheer folly and reflected that “this tragedy should have taught us
+the hopelessness of bamboo spear tactics.” Fortunately for the Marines,
+Ichiki’s overconfidence was not unique among Japanese commanders.
+
+[Illustration:
+
+    Captain Donald L. Dickson, USMCR
+
+_Capt Donald L. Dickson said of his watercolor: “I wanted to catch on
+paper the feeling one has as a shell comes whistling over.... There is
+a sense of being alone, naked and unprotected. And time seems endless
+until the shell strikes somewhere.”_]
+
+Following the 1st Marines’ tangle with the Ichiki detachment, General
+Vandegrift was inspired to write the Marine Commandant, Lieutenant
+General Thomas Holcomb, and report: “These youngsters are the darndest
+people when they get started you ever saw.” And all the Marines on
+the island, young and old, tyro and veteran, were becoming accomplished
+jungle fighters. They were no longer “trigger happy” as many had been
+in their first days ashore, shooting at shadows and imagined enemy.
+They were waiting for targets, patrolling with enthusiasm, sure of
+themselves. The misnamed Battle of the Tenaru had cost Colonel Hunt’s
+regiment 34 killed in action and 75 wounded. All the division’s Marines
+now felt they were bloodied. What the men on Tulagi, Gavutu, and
+Tanambogo and those of the Ilu had done was prove that the 1st Marine
+Division would hold fast to what it had won.
+
+[Illustration: _Cactus Air Force commander, MajGen Roy S. Geiger,
+poses with Capt Joseph J. Foss, the leading ace at Guadalcanal with
+26 Japanese aircraft downed. Capt Foss was later awarded the Medal of
+Honor for his heroic exploits in the air._
+
+    Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 52622
+]
+
+While the division’s Marines and sailors had earned a breathing spell
+as the Japanese regrouped for another onslaught, the action in the air
+over the Solomons intensified. Almost every day, Japanese aircraft
+arrived around noon to bomb the perimeter. Marine fighter pilots
+found the twin-engine Betty bombers easy targets; Zero fighters were
+another story. Although the Wildcats were a much sturdier aircraft, the
+Japanese Zeros’ superior speed and better maneuverability gave them a
+distinct edge in a dogfight. The American planes, however, when warned
+by the coastwatchers of Japanese attacks, had time to climb above the
+oncoming enemy and preferably attacked by making firing runs during
+high speed dives. Their tactics made the air space over the Solomons
+dangerous for the Japanese. On 29 August, the carrier _Ryujo_ launched
+aircraft for a strike against the airstrip. Smith’s Wildcats shot down
+16, with a loss of four of their own. Still, the Japanese continued to
+strike at Henderson Field without letup. Two days after the _Ryujo_
+raid, enemy bombers inflicted heavy damage on the airfield, setting
+aviation fuel ablaze and incinerating parked aircraft. VMF-223’s
+retaliation was a further bag of 13 attackers.
+
+On 30 August, two more MAG-23 squadrons, VMF-224 and VMSB-231, flew in
+to Henderson. The air reinforcements were more than welcome. Steady
+combat attrition, frequent damage in the air and on the ground, and
+scant repair facilities and parts kept the number of aircraft available
+a dwindling resource.
+
+Plainly, General Vandegrift needed infantry reinforcements as much
+as he did additional aircraft. He brought the now-combined raider and
+parachute battalions, both under Edson’s command, and the 2d Battalion,
+5th Marines, over to Guadalcanal from Tulagi. This gave the division
+commander a chance to order out larger reconnaissance patrols to probe
+for the Japanese. On 27 August, the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, made a
+shore-to-shore landing near Kokumbona and marched back to the beachhead
+without any measurable results. If the Japanese were out there beyond
+the Matanikau--and they were--they watched the Marines and waited for a
+better opportunity to attack.
+
+
+[Sidebar (page 5): First Marine Utility Uniform Issued in World War II
+
+The United States Marine Corps entered World War II wearing essentially
+the same summer field uniform that it had worn during the “Banana
+Wars.” The Marines defending America’s Pacific outposts on Guam, Wake
+Island, and in the Philippines in the late months of 1941 wore a
+summer field uniform consisting of a khaki cotton shirt and trousers,
+leggings, and a M1917A1 steel helmet. Plans to change this uniform had
+been underway for at least one year prior to the opening of hostilities.
+
+As had the Army, the Marine Corps had used a loose-fitting blue denim
+fatigue uniform for work details and some field exercises since the
+1920s. This fatigue uniform was either a one-piece coverall or a
+two-piece bib overall and jacket, both with “USMC” metal buttons. In
+June 1940, it was replaced by a green cotton coverall. This uniform
+and the summer field uniform were replaced by what would become known
+as the utility uniform. Approved for general issue on the Marine
+Corps’ 166th birthday, 10 November 1941, this new uniform was made of
+sage-green (although “olive drab” was called for in the specifications)
+herringbone twill cotton, then a popular material for civilian work
+clothing. The two-piece uniform consisted of a coat (often referred to
+as a “jacket” by Marines) and trousers. In 1943, a cap made of the same
+material would be issued.
+
+The loose-fitting coat was closed down the front by four two-piece
+rivetted bronze-finished steel buttons, each bearing the words “U.S.
+MARINE CORPS” in relief. The cuffs were closed by similar buttons. Two
+large patch pockets were sewn on the front skirts of the jacket and a
+single patch pocket was stitched to the left breast. This pocket had
+the Marine Corps eagle, globe, and anchor insignia and the letters
+“USMC” stencilled on it in black ink. The trousers, worn with and
+without the khaki canvas leggings, had two slashed front pockets and
+two rear patch pockets.
+
+[Illustration]
+
+The new uniform was issued to the flood of new recruits crowding
+the recruit depots in the early months of 1942 and was first worn
+in combat during the landing on Guadalcanal in August 1942. This
+uniform was subsequently worn by Marines of all arms from the Solomons
+Campaign to the end of the war. Originally, the buttons on the coat
+and the trousers were all copper-plated, but an emergency alternate
+specification was approved on 15 August 1942, eight days after the
+landing on Guadalcanal, which allowed for a variety of finishes on the
+buttons. Towards the end of the war, a new “modified” utility uniform
+which had been developed after Tarawa was also issued, in addition
+to a variety of camouflage uniforms. All of these utility uniforms,
+along with Army-designed Ml helmets and Marine Corps-designed cord and
+rubber-soled rough-side-out leather “boondocker” shoes, would be worn
+throughout the war in the Pacific, during the postwar years, and into
+the Korean War.--_Kenneth L. Smith-Christmas_
+]
+
+
+[Sidebar (page 11): LVT (1)--The ‘Amtrac’
+
+While the Marine Corps was developing amphibious warfare doctrine
+during the 1920s and 1930s, it was apparent that a motorized amphibian
+vehicle was needed to transport men and equipment from ships across
+fringing reefs and beaches into battle, particularly when the beach was
+defended.
+
+In 1940, the Marines adopted the Landing Vehicle, Tracked (1), designed
+by Donald Roebling. More commonly known as the “amtrac” (short for
+amphibian tractor), the LVT(1) had a driver’s cab in front and a small
+engine compartment in the rear, with the bulk of the body used for
+carrying space. During the next three years, 1,225 LVT(1)s were built,
+primarily by the Food Machinery Corporation.
+
+The LVT(1) was constructed of welded steel and was propelled on both
+land and water by paddle-type treads. Designed solely as a supply
+vehicle, it could carry 4,500 pounds of cargo. In August 1942, the
+LVT(1) first saw combat on Guadalcanal with the 1st Amphibian Tractor
+Battalion, 1st Marine Division. Throughout the Solomon Islands
+campaigns, the LVT(1) provided Marines all types of logistical support,
+moving thousands of tons of supplies to the front lines. At times they
+also were pressed into tactical use: moving artillery pieces, holding
+defensive positions, and occasionally supporting Marines in the attack
+with their machine guns. They also were used as pontoons to support
+bridges across Guadalcanal rivers.
+
+The LVT proved to be more seaworthy than a boat of comparable size; it
+was able to remain afloat with its entire cargo hold full of water.
+However, defects in the design soon became apparent. The paddle treads
+on the tracks and the rigid suspension system were both susceptible
+to damage when driven on land and did not provide the desired speeds
+on land or water. Although the LVT(1) performed admirably against
+undefended beachheads, its lack of armor made it unsuitable for
+assaults against the heavily defended islands of the central Pacific.
+This weakness was apparent during the fighting in the Solomon Islands,
+but LVT(1)s with improvised armor were still in use at the assault on
+Tarawa, where 75 percent of them were lost in three days.
+
+The LVT(1) proved its value and validated the amphibious vehicle
+concept through the great versatility and mobility it demonstrated
+throughout numerous campaigns in the Pacific. Although intended
+solely for supply purposes, it was thrust into combat use in early
+war engagements. In its initial role as a support vehicle, the LVT(1)
+delivered ammunition, supplies and reinforcements that made the
+difference between victory and defeat.--_Second Lieutenant Wesley L.
+Feight, USMC_
+
+[Illustration]
+]
+
+
+[Sidebar (page 14): General Vandegrift and His 1st Marine Division
+Staff
+
+Whenever a work about the Guadalcanal operation is published, one of
+the pictures always included is that of Major General Alexander A.
+Vandegrift, 1st Marine Division commanding general, and his staff
+officers and commanders, who posed for the photograph on 11 August
+1942, just four days after the assault landings on the island. Besides
+General Vandegrift, there are 40 Marines and one naval officer in
+this picture, and each one deserves a page of his own in Marine Corps
+history.
+
+Among the Marines, 23 were promoted to general officer rank and three
+became Commandants of the Marine Corps: General Vandegrift and Colonels
+Cates and Pate. The naval officer, division surgeon Commander Warwick
+T. Brown, MC, USN, also made flag officer rank while on active duty and
+was promoted to vice admiral upon retirement.
+
+Four of the officers in the picture served in three wars. Lieutenant
+Colonels Gerald C. Thomas, division operations officer, and Randolph
+McC. Pate, division logistics officer, served in both World Wars I
+and II, and each commanded the 1st Marine Division in Korea. Colonel
+William J. Whaling similarly served in World Wars I and II, and was
+General Thomas’ assistant division commander in Korea. Major Henry W.
+Buse, Jr., assistant operations officer, served in World War II, Korea,
+and the Vietnam War. Others served in two wars--World Wars I and II,
+or World War II and Korea. Represented in the photograph is a total
+of nearly 700 years of cumulative experience on active Marine Corps
+service.
+
+Three key members of the division--the Assistant Division Commander,
+Brigadier General William H. Rupertus; the Assistant Chief of Staff,
+G-1, Colonel Robert C. Kilmartin, Jr.; and the commanding officer of
+the 1st Raider Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Merritt A. Edson--were not
+in this picture for a good reason. They were on Tulagi, where Rupertus
+headed the Tulagi Command Group with Kilmartin as his chief of staff,
+and Edson commanded the combat troops. Also notably absent from this
+photograph was the commander of the 7th Marines, Colonel James C. Webb,
+who had not joined the division from Samoa, where the regiment had been
+sent before the division deployed overseas.
+
+In his memoir, _Once a Marine_, General Vandegrift explained why this
+photograph was taken. The division’s morale was affected by the fact
+that Vice Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher was forced to withdraw his
+fleet from the area--with many of his ships not yet fully unloaded
+and holding more than half of the division’s supplies still needed
+ashore. Adding to the Marines’ uneasiness at seeing their naval support
+disappear below the horizon, was the fact that they had been under
+almost constant enemy air attacks beginning shortly after their landing
+on Guadalcanal. In an effort to counter the adverse influence on morale
+of the day and night air attacks, Vandegrift began making tours of the
+division perimeter every morning to talk to as many of his Marines as
+possible, and to keep a personal eye on the command. As he noted:
+
+  By August 11, the full impact of the vanished transports was
+  permeating the command, so again I called a conference of my staff
+  and command officers.... I ended the conference by posing with this
+  fine group of officers, a morale device that worked because they
+  thought if I went to the trouble of having the picture taken then I
+  obviously planned to enjoy it in future years.
+
+Recently, General Merrill B. “Bill” Twining, on Guadalcanal a
+lieutenant colonel and assistant D-3, recalled the circumstances of the
+photograph and philosophized about the men who appeared in it:
+
+  The group is lined up on the slope of the coral ridge which
+  provided a degree of protection from naval gunfire coming from the
+  north and was therefore selected as division CP....
+
+  There was no vital reason for the conclave. I think V[andegrift]
+  just wanted to see who was in his outfit. Do you realize these
+  people had never been together before? Some came from as far away
+  as Iceland....
+
+  V[andegrift] mainly introduced himself, gave a brief pep talk....
+  I have often been asked how we could afford to congregate all
+  this talent in the face of the enemy. We didn’t believe we (_at
+  the moment_) faced any threat from the Japanese. The defense area
+  was small and every responsible commander could reach his CP in 5
+  minutes and after all there were a lot of good people along those
+  lines. Most of the fresh-caught second lieutenants were battalion
+  commanders two years later. We believed in each other and trusted.
+
+            --_Benis M. Frank_
+
+The General and His Officers on Guadalcanal, According to the Chart
+
+[Illustration]
+
+[Illustration]
+
+     1. Col George R. Rowan
+     2. Col Pedro A. del Valle
+     3. Col William C. James
+     4. MajGen Alexander A. Vandegrift
+     5. LtCol Gerald C. Thomas
+     6. Col Clifton B. Cates
+     7. Col Randolph McC. Pate
+     8. Cdr Warwick T. Brown, USN
+     9. Col William J. Whaling
+    10. Col Frank B. Goettge
+    11. Col LeRoy P. Hunt, Jr.
+    12. LtCol Frederick C. Biebush
+    13. LtCol Edwin A. Pollock
+    14. LtCol Edmund J. Buckley
+    15. LtCol Walter W. Barr
+    16. LtCol Raymond P. Coffman
+    17. LtCol Francis R. Geraci
+    18. LtCol William E. Maxwell
+    19. LtCol Edward G. Hagen
+    20. LtCol William N. McKelvy, Jr.
+    21. LtCol Julian N. Frisbie
+    22. Maj Milton V. O’Connell
+    23. Maj William Chalfant III
+    24. Maj Horace W. Fuller
+    25. Maj Forest C. Thompson
+    26. Maj Robert G. Ballance
+    27. Maj Henry C. Buse, Jr.
+    28. Maj James W. Frazer
+    29. Maj Henry H. Crockett
+    30. LtCol Lenard B. Cresswell
+    31. Maj Robert O. Brown
+    32. LtCol John A. Bemis
+    33. Col Kenneth W. Benner
+    34. Maj Robert B. Luckey
+    35. LtCol Samuel B. Taxis
+    36. LtCol Eugene H. Price
+    37. LtCol Merrill B. Twining
+    38. LtCol Walker A. Reaves
+    39. LtCol John D. Macklin
+    40. LtCol Hawley C. Waterman
+    41. Maj James C. Murray, Jr.
+]
+
+
+[Sidebar (page 17): The Coastwatchers
+
+A group of fewer than 1,500 native Coastwatchers served as the eyes and
+ears of Allied forces in reporting movements of Japanese units on the
+ground, in the air, and at sea.
+
+Often performing their jobs in remote jungle outposts, the
+Coastwatchers were possessed of both mental and physical courage.
+Their knowledge of the geography and peoples of the Pacific made them
+invaluable additions to the Allied war effort.
+
+The concept for this service originated in 1919 in a proposal by the
+Royal Australian Navy to form a civilian coastwatching organization
+to provide early warning in the event of an invasion. By the outbreak
+of war in September 1939, approximately 800 persons were serving as
+coastwatchers, operating observation posts mainly on the Australian
+coast. They were, at the outset, government officials aided by
+missionaries and planters who, as war with Japan neared, were placed
+under the control of the intelligence section of the Australian Navy.
+
+[Illustration: _Coastwatcher Capt W. F. Martin Clemens, British Solomon
+Islands Defence Force, poses with some of his constabulary._
+
+    National Archives Photo 80-G-17080 courtesy of Richard Frank
+]
+
+By 1942, the system of coastwatchers and the accompanying intelligence
+network covered an area of 500,000 square miles, and was placed
+under the control of the Allied Intelligence Bureau (AIB). The AIB
+coordinated Allied intelligence activities in the southwest Pacific,
+and had as its initial principal mission the collection of all possible
+information about the enemy in the vicinity of Guadalcanal.
+
+Coastwatchers proved extremely useful to U.S. Marine forces in
+providing reports on the number and movement of Japanese troops.
+Officers from the 1st Marine Division obtained accurate information
+on the location of enemy forces in their objective areas, and were
+provided vital reports on approaching Japanese bombing raids. On 8
+August 1942, Coastwatcher Jack Reed on Bougainville alerted American
+forces to an upcoming raid by 40 Japanese bombers, which resulted in
+36 of the enemy planes being destroyed. The “early warning system”
+provided by the Coastwatchers helped Marine forces on Guadalcanal to
+hold onto the Henderson Field airstrip.
+
+The Coastwatchers also rescued and sheltered 118 Allied pilots,
+including Marines, during the Solomons Campaign, often at the immediate
+risk of their own lives. Pipe-smoking Coastwatcher Reed also was
+responsible for coordinating the evacuation on Bougainville of four
+nuns and 25 civilians by the U.S. submarine _Nautilus_.
+
+It is unknown exactly how many Coastwatchers paid the ultimate
+sacrifice in the performance of their duties. Many died in anonymity,
+without knowledge of the contribution their services had made to
+final victory. Perhaps they would be gratified to know that no
+less an authority than Admiral William F. Halsey recorded that
+the Coastwatchers saved Guadalcanal, and Guadalcanal saved the
+Pacific.--_Robert V. Aquilina_
+]
+
+
+[Sidebar (page 19): The 1st Marine Division Patch
+
+[Illustration]
+
+The 1st Division shoulder patch originally was authorized for wear by
+members of units who were organic or attached to the division in its
+four landings in the Pacific War. It was the first unit patch to be
+authorized for wear in World War II and specifically commemorated the
+division’s sacrifices and victory in the battle for Guadalcanal.
+
+As recalled by General Merrill B. Twining, a lieutenant colonel and the
+division’s operations officer on Guadalcanal, for a short time before
+the 1st left Guadalcanal for Australia, there had been some discussion
+by the senior staff about uniforming the troops. It appeared that the
+Marines might have to wear Army uniforms, which meant that they would
+lose their identity and Twining came up with the idea for a division
+patch. A number of different designs were devised by both Lieutenant
+Colonel Twining and Captain Donald L. Dickson, adjutant of the 5th
+Marines, who had been an artist in civilian life. The one which Twining
+prepared on the flight out of Guadalcanal was approved by Major General
+Alexander A. Vandegrift, the division commander.
+
+General Twining further recalled that he drew a diamond in his notebook
+and “in the middle of the diamond I doodled a numeral one ... [and]
+I sketched in the word ‘Guadalcanal’ down its length.... I got to
+thinking that the whole operation had been under the Southern Cross, so
+I drew that in, too.... About an hour later I took the drawing up to
+the front of the aircraft to General Vandegrift. He said, ‘Yes, that’s
+it!’ and wrote his initials, A.A.V., on the bottom of the notebook
+page.”
+
+[Illustration: _Designer of the patch, LtCol Merrill B. Twining (later
+Gen) sits in the 1st Marine Division operations bunker. Behind him is
+his assistant D-3, a very tired Maj Henry IV. Buse, Jr._]
+
+After he arrived in Brisbane, Australia, Colonel Twining bought a
+child’s watercolor set and, while confined to his hotel room by a bout
+of malaria, drew a bunch of diamonds on a big sheet, coloring each one
+differently. He then took samples to General Vandegrift, who chose one
+which was colored a shade of blue that he liked. Then Twining took
+the sketch to the Australian Knitting Mills to have it reproduced,
+pledging the credit of the post exchange funds to pay for the patches’
+manufacture. Within a week or two the patches began to roll off the
+knitting machines, and Colonel Twining was there to approve them.
+General Twining further recalled: “After they came off the machine, I
+picked up a sheet of them. They looked very good, and when they were
+cut, I picked up one of the patches. It was one of the first off the
+machine.”
+
+The division’s post exchanges began selling the patches almost
+immediately and they proved to be popular, with Marines buying extras
+to give away as souvenirs to Australian friends or to send home to
+families. Before long, newly established Marine divisions, as well as
+the raider and parachute units, and as the aircraft wings, sea-going
+Marines, Fleet Marine Force Pacific units, and others, were authorized
+to have their own distinctive patch, a total of 33, following the lead
+of the 1st Marine Division. Marines returning to the United States for
+duty or on leave from a unit having a distinctive shoulder insignia
+were authorized to wear that insignia until they were assigned to
+another unit having a shoulder patch of its own. For many 1st Marine
+Division men joining another unit and having to relinquish the wearing
+of the 1st Division patch, this rankled.
+
+Shortly after the end of the war, Colonel Twining went to now-Marine
+Commandant General Vandegrift saying that he “no longer thought Marines
+should wear anything on their uniforms to distinguish them from other
+Marines. He agreed and the patches came off for good.”--_Benis M. Frank_
+]
+
+
+
+
+_September and the Ridge_
+
+
+Admiral McCain visited Guadalcanal at the end of August, arriving
+in time to greet the aerial reinforcements he had ordered forward,
+and also in time for a taste of Japanese nightly bombing. He got to
+experience, too, what was becoming another unwanted feature of Cactus
+nights: bombardment by Japanese cruisers and destroyers. General
+Vandegrift noted that McCain had gotten a dose of the “normal ration
+of shells.” The admiral saw enough to signal his superiors that
+increased support for Guadalcanal operations was imperative and that
+the “situation admits no delay whatsoever.” He also sent a prophetic
+message to Admirals King and Nimitz: “Cactus can be a sinkhole for
+enemy air power and can be consolidated, expanded, and exploited to the
+enemy’s mortal hurt.”
+
+On 3 September, the Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing,
+Brigadier General Roy S. Geiger, and his assistant wing commander,
+Colonel Louis Woods, moved forward to Guadalcanal to take charge of
+air operations. The arrival of the veteran Marine aviators provided
+an instant lift to the morale of the pilots and ground crews. It
+reinforced their belief that they were at the leading edge of air
+combat, that they were setting the pace for the rest of Marine
+aviation. Vandegrift could thankfully turn over the day-to-day
+management of the aerial defenses of Cactus to the able and experienced
+Geiger. There was no shortage of targets for the mixed air force of
+Marine, Army, and Navy flyers. Daily air attacks by the Japanese,
+coupled with steady reinforcement attempts by Tanaka’s destroyers
+and transports, meant that every type of plane that could lift off
+Henderson’s runway was airborne as often as possible. Seabees had begun
+work on a second airstrip, Fighter One, which could relieve some of the
+pressure on the primary airfield.
+
+[Illustration:
+
+    National Archives Photo 80-G-29536-413C
+
+_This is an oblique view of Henderson Field looking north with
+Ironbottom Sound (Sealark Channel) in the background. At the left
+center is the “Pagoda,” operations center of Cactus Air Force flyers
+throughout their first months of operations ashore._]
+
+Most of General Kawaguchi’s brigade had reached Guadalcanal. Those
+who hadn’t, missed their landfall forever as a result of American air
+attacks. Kawaguchi had in mind a surprise attack on the heart of the
+Marine position, a thrust from the jungle directly at the airfield. To
+reach his jumpoff position, the Japanese general would have to move
+through difficult terrain unobserved, carving his way through the dense
+vegetation out of sight of Marine patrols. The rugged approach route
+would lead him to a prominent ridge topped by Kunai grass which wove
+snake-like through the jungle to within a mile of Henderson’s runway.
+Unknown to the Japanese, General Vandegrift planned on moving his
+headquarters to the shelter of a spot at the inland base of this ridge,
+a site better protected, it was hoped, from enemy bombing and shellfire.
+
+[Illustration: _Marine ground crewmen attempt to put out one of many
+fires occuring after a Japanese bombing raid on Henderson Field causing
+the loss of much-needed aircraft._
+
+    Marine Corps Personal Papers Collection
+]
+
+The success of Kawaguchi’s plan depended upon the Marines keeping the
+inland perimeter thinly manned while they concentrated their forces on
+the east and west flanks. This was not to be. Available intelligence,
+including a captured enemy map, pointed to the likelihood of an attack
+on the airfield and Vandegrift moved his combined raider-parachute
+battalion to the most obvious enemy approach route, the ridge. Colonel
+Edson’s men, who scouted Savo Island after moving to Guadalcanal
+and destroyed a Japanese supply base at Tasimboko in another
+shore-to-shore raid, took up positions on the forward slopes of the
+ridge at the edge of the encroaching jungle on 10 September. Their
+commander later said that he “was firmly convinced that we were in the
+path of the next Jap attack.” Earlier patrols had spotted a sizable
+Japanese force approaching. Accordingly, Edson patrolled extensively as
+his men dug in on the ridge and in the flanking jungle. On the 12th,
+the Marines made contact with enemy patrols confirming the fact that
+Japanese troops were definitely “out front.” Kawaguchi had about 2,000
+of his men with him, enough he thought to punch through to the airfield.
+
+Japanese planes had dropped 500-pound bombs along the ridge on the 11th
+and enemy ships began shelling the area after nightfall on the 12th,
+once the threat of American air attacks subsided. The first Japanese
+thrust came at 2100 against Edson’s left flank. Boiling out of the
+jungle, the enemy soldiers attacked fearlessly into the face of rifle
+and machine gun fire, closing to bayonet range. They were thrown back.
+They came again, this time against the right flank, penetrating the
+Marines’ positions. Again they were thrown back. A third attack closed
+out the night’s action. Again it was a close affair, but by 0230 Edson
+told Vandegrift his men could hold. And they did.
+
+[Illustration: _The raging battle of Edson’s Ridge is depicted in all
+its fury in this oil painting by the late Col Donald L. Dickson, who,
+as a captain, was adjutant of the 5th Marines on Guadalcanal. Dickson’s
+artwork later was shown widely in the United States._
+
+    Captain Donald L. Dickson, USMCR
+]
+
+On the morning of 13 September, Edson called his company commanders
+together and told them: “They were just testing, just testing. They’ll
+be back.” He ordered all positions improved and defenses consolidated
+and pulled his lines towards the airfield along the ridge’s center
+spine. The 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, his backup on Tulagi, moved into
+position to reinforce again.
+
+[Illustration: EDSON’S (BLOODY) RIDGE
+
+12-14 SEPTEMBER 1942]
+
+[Illustration: _Edson’s or Raider’s Ridge is calm after the fighting
+on the nights of 12-13 and 13-14 September, when it was the scene of a
+valiant and bloody defense crucial to safeguarding Henderson Field and
+the Marine perimeter on Guadalcanal. The knobs at left background were
+Col Edson’s final defensive position, while Henderson Field lies beyond
+the trees in the background._
+
+    Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 500007
+]
+
+[Illustration:
+
+    Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 310563
+
+_Maj Kenneth D. Bailey, commander of Company C, 1st Raider Battalion,
+was awarded the Medal of Honor posthumously for heroic and inspiring
+leadership during the Battle of Edson’s Ridge._]
+
+The next night’s attacks were as fierce as any man had seen. The
+Japanese were everywhere, fighting hand-to-hand in the Marines’
+foxholes and gun pits and filtering past forward positions to attack
+from the rear. Division Sergeant Major Sheffield Banta shot one in the
+new command post. Colonel Edson appeared wherever the fighting was
+toughest, encouraging his men to their utmost efforts. The man-to-man
+battles lapped over into the jungle on either flank of the ridge, and
+engineer and pioneer positions were attacked. The reserve from the 5th
+Marines was fed into the fight. Artillerymen from the 5th Battalion,
+11th Marines, as they had on the previous night, fired their 105mm
+howitzers at any called target. The range grew as short as 1,600
+yards from tube to impact. The Japanese finally could take no more.
+They pulled back as dawn approached. On the slopes of the ridge and in
+the surrounding jungle they left more than 600 bodies; another 600 men
+were wounded. The remnants of the Kawaguchi force staggered back toward
+their lines to the west, a grueling, hellish eight-day march that saw
+many more of the enemy perish.
+
+The cost to Edson’s force for its epic defense was also heavy.
+Fifty-nine men were dead, 10 were missing in action, and 194 were
+wounded. These losses, coupled with the casualties of Tulagi, Gavutu,
+and Tanambogo, meant the end of the 1st Parachute Battalion as an
+effective fighting unit. Only 89 men of the parachutists’ original
+strength could walk off the ridge, soon in legend to become “Bloody
+Ridge” or “Edson’s Ridge.” Both Colonel Edson and Captain Kenneth D.
+Bailey, commanding the raider’s Company C, were awarded the Medal of
+Honor for their heroic and inspirational actions.
+
+On 13 and 14 September, the Japanese attempted to support Kawaguchi’s
+attack on the ridge with thrusts against the flanks of the Marine
+perimeter. On the east, enemy troops attempting to penetrate the lines
+of the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, were caught in the open on a grass
+plain and smothered by artillery fire; at least 200 died. On the west,
+the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, holding ridge positions covering the
+coastal road, fought off a determined attacking force that reached its
+front lines.
+
+[Illustration: _The Pagoda at Henderson Field, served as headquarters
+for Cactus Air Force throughout the first months of air operations
+on Guadalcanal. From this building, Allied planes were sent against
+Japanese troops on other islands of the Solomons._
+
+    Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 50921
+]
+
+The victory at the ridge gave a great boost to Allied homefront
+morale, and reinforced the opinion of the men ashore on Guadalcanal
+that they could take on anything the enemy could send against them. At
+upper command echelons, the leaders were not so sure that the ground
+Marines and their motley air force could hold. Intercepted Japanese
+dispatches revealed that the myth of the 2,000-man defending force
+had been completely dispelled. Sizable naval forces and two divisions
+of Japanese troops were now committed to conquer the Americans on
+Guadalcanal. Cactus Air Force, augmented frequently by Navy carrier
+squadrons, made the planned reinforcement effort a high-risk venture.
+But it was a risk the Japanese were prepared to take.
+
+On 18 September, the long-awaited 7th Marines, reinforced by the
+1st Battalion, 11th Marines, and other division troops, arrived at
+Guadalcanal. As the men from Samoa landed they were greeted with
+friendly derision by Marines already on the island. The 7th had been
+the first regiment of the 1st Division to go overseas; its men, many
+thought then, were likely to be the first to see combat. The division
+had been careful to send some of its best men to Samoa and now had
+them back. One of the new and salty combat veterans of the 5th Marines
+remarked to a friend in the 7th that he had waited a long time “to see
+our first team get into the game.” Providentially, a separate supply
+convoy reached the island at the same time as the 7th’s arrival,
+bringing with it badly needed aviation gas and the first resupply of
+ammunition since D-Day.
+
+The Navy covering force for the American reinforcement and supply
+convoys was hit hard by Japanese submarines. The carrier _Wasp_ was
+torpedoed and sunk, the battleship _North Carolina_ (BB 55) was
+damaged, and the destroyer _O’Brien_ (DD 415) was hit so badly it
+broke up and sank on its way to drydock. The Navy had accomplished
+its mission, the 7th Marines had landed, but at a terrible cost. About
+the only good result of the devastating Japanese torpedo attacks was
+that the _Wasp_’s surviving aircraft joined Cactus Air Force, as the
+planes of the _Saratoga_ and _Enterprise_ had done when their carriers
+required combat repairs. Now, the _Hornet_ (CV 8) was the only whole
+fleet carrier left in the South Pacific.
+
+As the ships that brought the 7th Marines withdrew, they took with them
+the survivors of the 1st Parachute Battalion and sick bays full of
+badly wounded men. General Vandegrift now had 10 infantry battalions,
+one understrength raider battalion, and five artillery battalions
+ashore; the 3d Battalion, 2d Marines, had come over from Tulagi also.
+He reorganized the defensive perimeter into 10 sectors for better
+control, giving the engineer, pioneer, and amphibian tractor battalions
+sectors along the beach. Infantry battalions manned the other sectors,
+including the inland perimeter in the jungle. Each infantry regiment
+had two battalions on line and one in reserve. Vandegrift also had the
+use of a select group of infantrymen who were training to be scouts and
+snipers under the leadership of Colonel William J. “Wild Bill” Whaling,
+an experienced jungle hand, marksman, and hunter, whom he had appointed
+to run a school to sharpen the division’s fighting skills. As men
+finished their training under Whaling and went back to their outfits,
+others took their place and the Whaling group was available to scout
+and spearhead operations.
+
+Vandegrift now had enough men ashore on Guadalcanal, 19,200, to expand
+his defensive scheme. He decided to seize a forward position along the
+east bank of the Matanikau River, in effect strongly outposting his
+west flank defenses against the probability of strong enemy attacks
+from the area where most Japanese troops were landing. First, however,
+he was going to test the Japanese reaction with a strong probing force.
+
+He chose the fresh 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, commanded by Lieutenant
+Colonel Lewis B. “Chesty” Puller, to move inland along the slopes of
+Mt. Austen and patrol north towards the coast and the Japanese-held
+area. Puller’s battalion ran into Japanese troops bivouacked on the
+slopes of Austen on the 24th and in a sharp firefight had seven men
+killed and 25 wounded. Vandegrift sent the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines,
+forward to reinforce Puller and help provide the men needed to carry
+the casualties out of the jungle. Now reinforced, Puller continued
+his advance, moving down the east bank of the Matanikau. He reached
+the coast on the 26th as planned, where he drew intensive fire from
+enemy positions on the ridges west of the river. An attempt by the 2d
+Battalion, 5th Marines, to cross was beaten back.
+
+About this time, the 1st Raider Battalion, its original mission one of
+establishing a patrol base west of the Matanikau, reached the vicinity
+of the firefight, and joined in. Vandegrift sent Colonel Edson, now the
+commander of the 5th Marines, forward to take charge of the expanded
+force. He was directed to attack on the 27th and decided to send the
+raiders inland to outflank the Japanese defenders. The battalion,
+commanded by Edson’s former executive officer, Lieutenant Colonel
+Samuel B. Griffith II, ran into a hornet’s nest of Japanese who had
+crossed the Matanikau during the night. A garbled message led Edson to
+believe that Griffith’s men were advancing according to plan, so he
+decided to land the companies of the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, behind
+the enemy’s Matanikau position and strike the Japanese from the rear
+while Rosecran’s men attacked across the river.
+
+The landing was made without incident and the 7th Marines’ companies
+moved inland only to be ambushed and cut off from the sea by the
+Japanese. A rescue force of landing craft moved with difficulty through
+Japanese fire, urged on by Puller who accompanied the boats on the
+destroyer _Ballard_ (DD 660). The Marines were evacuated after fighting
+their way to the beach covered by the destroyer’s fire and the machine
+guns of a Marine SBD overhead. Once the 7th Marines companies got
+back to the perimeter, landing near Kukum, the raider and 5th Marines
+battalions pulled back from the Matanikau. The confirmation that the
+Japanese would strongly contest any westward advance cost the Marines
+60 men killed and 100 wounded.
+
+[Illustration: _Shortly after becoming Commander, South Pacific Area
+and Forces, VAdm William F. Halsey visited Guadalcanal and the 1st
+Marine Division. Here he is shown talking with Col Gerald C. Thomas,
+1st Marine Division D-3 (Operations Officer)._
+
+    Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 53523
+]
+
+The Japanese the Marines had encountered were mainly men from the
+_4th Regiment_ of the _2d (Sendai) Division_; prisoners confirmed
+that the division was landing on the island. Included in the enemy
+reinforcements were 150mm howitzers, guns capable of shelling the
+airfield from positions near Kokumbona. Clearly, a new and stronger
+enemy attack was pending.
+
+As September drew to a close, a flood of promotions had reached the
+division, nine lieutenant colonels put on their colonel’s eagles and
+there were 14 new lieutenant colonels also. Vandegrift made Colonel
+Gerald C. Thomas, his former operations officer, the new division
+chief of staff, and had a short time earlier given Edson the 5th
+Marines. Many of the older, senior officers, picked for the most part
+in the order they had joined the division, were now sent back to the
+States. There they would provide a new level of combat expertise in the
+training and organization of the many Marine units that were forming.
+The air wing was not quite ready yet to return its experienced pilots
+to rear areas, but the vital combat knowledge they possessed was much
+needed in the training pipeline. They, too--the survivors--would soon
+be rotating back to rear areas, some for a much-needed break before
+returning to combat and others to lead new squadrons into the fray.
+
+[Illustration: Japanese Model 4 (1919) 150mm Howitzer]
+
+
+[Sidebar (page 22): Sergeant Major Sir Jacob Charles Vouza
+
+[Illustration]
+
+Jacob Charles Vouza was born in 1900 at Tasimboko, Guadalcanal,
+British Solomon Islands Protectorate, and educated at the South Seas
+Evangelical Mission School there. In 1916 he joined the Solomon Islands
+Protectorate Armed Constabulary, from which he retired at the rank of
+sergeant major in 1941 after 25 years of service.
+
+After the Japanese invaded his home island in World War II, he returned
+to active duty with the British forces and volunteered to work with
+the Coastwatchers. Vouza’s experience as a scout had already been
+established when the 1st Marine Division landed on Guadalcanal. On 7
+August 1942 he rescued a downed naval pilot from the USS _Wasp_ who was
+shot down inside Japanese territory. He guided the pilot to friendly
+lines where Vouza met the Marines for the first time.
+
+Vouza then volunteered to scout behind enemy lines for the Marines.
+On 27 August he was captured by the Japanese while on a Marine Corps
+mission to locate suspected enemy lookout stations. Having found a
+small American flag in Vouza’s loincloth, the Japanese tied him to a
+tree and tried to force him to reveal information about Allied forces.
+Vouza was questioned for hours, but refused to talk. He was tortured
+and bayoneted about the arms, throat, shoulder, face, and stomach, and
+left to die.
+
+He managed to free himself after his captors departed, and made his way
+through the miles of jungle to American lines. There he gave valuable
+intelligence information to the Marines about an impending Japanese
+attack before accepting medical attention.
+
+After spending 12 days in the hospital, Vouza then returned to duty
+as the chief scout for the Marines. He accompanied Lieutenant Colonel
+Evans F. Carlson and the 2d Marine Raider Battalion when they made
+their 30-day raid behind enemy lines at Guadalcanal.
+
+Sergeant Major Vouza was highly decorated for his World War II service.
+The Silver Star was presented to him personally by Major General
+Alexander A. Vandegrift, commanding general of the 1st Marine Division,
+for refusing to give information under Japanese torture. He also was
+awarded the Legion of Merit for outstanding service with the 2d Raider
+Battalion during November and December 1942, and the British George
+Medal for gallant conduct and exceptional devotion to duty. He later
+received the Police Long Service Medal and, in 1957, was made a Member
+of the British Empire for long and faithful government service.
+
+After the war, Vouza continued to serve his fellow islanders. In 1949,
+he was appointed district headman, and president of the Guadalcanal
+Council, from 1952-1958. He served as a member of the British Solomon
+Islands Protectorate Advisory Council from 1950 to 1960.
+
+He made many friends during his long association with the U.S. Marine
+Corps and through the years was continually visited on Guadalcanal by
+Marines. During 1968, Vouza visited the United States, where he was
+the honored guest of the 1st Marine Division Association. In 1979,
+he was knighted by Britain’s Queen Elizabeth II. He died on 15 March
+1984.--_Ann A. Ferrante_
+]
+
+
+[Sidebar (page 23): M3A1 37mm Antitank Gun
+
+The M3 antitank gun, based on the successful German _Panzer Abwehr
+Kanone_ (PAK)-36, was developed by the U.S. Army in the late 1930s as
+a replacement for the French 37mm Puteaux gun, used in World War I but
+unable to destroy new tanks being produced.
+
+The M3 was adopted because of its accuracy, fire control, penetration,
+and mobility. Towed by its prime mover, the 4×4 quarter-ton truck,
+the gun would trail at 50 mph on roads. When traveling crosscountry,
+gullies, shell holes, mud holes, and slopes of 26 degrees were
+negotiated with ease. In 1941, the gun was redesignated the M3A1 when
+the muzzles were threaded to accept a muzzle brake that was rarely, if
+ever, used.
+
+At the time of its adoption, the M3 could destroy any tank then being
+produced in the world. However, by the time the United States entered
+the war, the M3 was outmatched by the tanks it would have met in
+Europe. The Japanese tanks were smaller and more vulnerable to the
+M3 throughout the war. In the Pacific, it was used against bunkers,
+pillboxes and, when loaded with canister, against banzai charges. It
+was employed throughout the war by Marine regimental weapons companies,
+but in reduced numbers as the fighting continued. It was replaced in
+the European Theater by the M1 57mm antitank gun.
+
+The 37mm antitank gun, manned by a crew of four who fired a 1.61-pound
+projectile with an effective range of 500 yards.--_Stephen L. Amos and
+Kenneth L. Smith-Christmas_
+
+[Illustration]
+]
+
+
+[Sidebar (page 29):
+
+    The President of the United States
+    takes pleasure in presenting
+    the Medal of Honor posthumously to
+    Douglas Albert Munro
+    Signalman First Class
+    United States Coast Guard
+    for service as set forth
+    in the following citation:
+
+[Illustration:
+
+    Painting by Bernard D’Andrea, Courtesy of U.S. Coast Guard
+    Historical Office
+]
+
+  For extraordinary heroism and conspicuous gallantry in action above
+  and beyond the call of duty as Officer in Charge of a group of
+  twenty-four Higgins boats engaged in the evacuation of a battalion
+  of Marines trapped by enemy Japanese forces at Point Cruz,
+  Guadalcanal, on September 27, 1942. After making preliminary plans
+  for the evacuation of nearly five hundred beleaguered Marines,
+  Munro, under constant strafing by enemy machine guns on the island
+  and at great risk of his life, daringly led five of his small craft
+  toward the shore. As he closed the beach, he signalled the others
+  to land and then in order to draw the enemy’s fire and protect the
+  heavily loaded boats, he valiantly placed his craft, with its two
+  small guns, as a shield between the beachhead and the Japanese.
+  When the perilous task of evacuation was nearly completed, Munro
+  was instantly killed by enemy fire, but his crew, two of whom
+  were wounded, carried on until the last boat had loaded and
+  cleared the beach. By his outstanding leadership, expert planning,
+  and dauntless devotion to duty, he and his courageous comrades
+  undoubtedly saved the lives of many who otherwise would have
+  perished. He gallantly gave up his life in defense of his country.
+  /s/ Franklin Roosevelt
+]
+
+
+
+
+_October and the Japanese Offensive_
+
+
+On 30 September, unexpectedly, a B-17 carrying Admiral Nimitz made an
+emergency landing at Henderson Field. The CinCPac made the most of the
+opportunity. He visited the front lines, saw Edson’s Ridge, and talked
+to a number of Marines. He reaffirmed to Vandegrift that his overriding
+mission was to hold the airfield. He promised all the support he could
+give and after awarding Navy Crosses to a number of Marines, including
+Vandegrift, left the next day visibly encouraged by what he had seen.
+
+[Illustration: _Visiting Guadalcanal on 30 September, Adm Chester W.
+Nimitz, CinCPac, took time to decorate LtCol Evans C. Carlson, CO, 2d
+Raider Battalion; MajGen Vandegrift, in rear; and, from left, BGen
+William H. Rupertus, ADC; Col Merritt A. Edson, CO, 5th Marines; LtCol
+Edwin A. Pollock, CO, 2d Battalion, 1st Marines; Maj John L. Smith, CO,
+VMF-223._
+
+    Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 50883
+]
+
+The next Marine move involved a punishing return to the Matanikau,
+this time with five infantry battalions and the Whaling group. Whaling
+commanded his men and the 3d Battalion, 2d Marines, in a thrust
+inland to clear the way for two battalions of the 7th Marines, the
+1st and 2d, to drive through and hook toward the coast, hitting the
+Japanese holding along the Matanikau. Edson’s 2d and 3d Battalions
+would attack across the river mouth. All the division’s artillery was
+positioned to fire in support.
+
+[Illustration:
+
+    Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 61534
+
+_A M1918 155mm howitzer is fired by artillery crewmen of the 11th
+Marines in support of ground forces attacking the enemy. Despite the
+lack of sound-flash equipment to locate hostile artillery, Col del
+Valle’s guns were able to quiet enemy fire._]
+
+On the 7th, Whaling’s force moved into the jungle about 2,000 yards
+upstream on the Matanikau, encountering Japanese troops that harassed
+his forward elements, but not in enough strength to stop the advance.
+He bypassed the enemy positions and dug in for the night. Behind him
+the 7th Marines followed suit, prepared to move through his lines,
+cross the river, and attack north toward the Japanese on the 8th. The
+5th Marines’ assault battalions moving toward the Matanikau on the
+7th ran into Japanese in strength about 400 yards from the river.
+Unwittingly, the Marines had run into strong advance elements of the
+Japanese _4th Regiment_, which had crossed the Matanikau in order
+to establish a base from which artillery could fire into the Marine
+perimeter. The fighting was intense and the 3d Battalion, 5th, could
+make little progress, although the 2d Battalion encountered slight
+opposition and won through to the river bank. It then turned north to
+hit the inland flank of the enemy troops. Vandegrift sent forward a
+company of raiders to reinforce the 5th, and it took a holding position
+on the right, towards the beach.
+
+Rain poured down on the 8th, all day long, virtually stopping all
+forward progress, but not halting the close-in fighting around the
+Japanese pocket. The enemy troops finally retreated, attempting to
+escape the gradually encircling Marines. They smashed into the raider’s
+position nearest to their escape route. A wild hand-to-hand battle
+ensued and a few Japanese broke through to reach and cross the river.
+The rest died fighting.
+
+[Illustration:
+
+    Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 50963
+
+_More than 200 Japanese soldiers alone were killed in a frenzied attack
+in the sandspit where the Tenaru River flows into Ironbottom Sound
+(Sealark Channel)._]
+
+On the 9th, Whaling’s force, flanked by the 2d and then the 1st
+Battalion, 7th Marines, crossed the Matanikau and then turned and
+followed ridge lines to the sea. Puller’s battalion discovered a
+number of Japanese in a ravine to his front, fired his mortars, and
+called in artillery, while his men used rifles and machine guns to pick
+off enemy troops trying to escape what proved to be a death trap. When
+his mortar ammunition began to run short, Puller moved on toward the
+beach, joining the rest of Whaling’s force, which had encountered no
+opposition. The Marines then recrossed the Mantanikau, joined Edson’s
+troops, and marched back to the perimeter, leaving a strong combat
+outpost at the Matanikau, now cleared of Japanese. General Vandegrift,
+apprised by intelligence sources that a major Japanese attack was
+coming from the west, decided to consolidate his positions, leaving no
+sizable Marine force more than a day’s march from the perimeter. The
+Marine advance on 7-9 October had thwarted Japanese plans for an early
+attack and cost the enemy more than 700 men. The Marines paid a price
+too, 65 dead and 125 wounded.
+
+There was another price that Guadalcanal was exacting from both sides.
+Disease was beginning to fell men in numbers that equalled the battle
+casualties. In addition to gastroenteritis, which greatly weakened
+those who suffered its crippling stomach cramps, there were all kinds
+of tropical fungus infections, collectively known as “jungle rot,”
+which produced uncomfortable rashes on men’s feet, armpits, elbows,
+and crotches, a product of seldom being dry. If it didn’t rain, sweat
+provided the moisture. On top of this came hundreds of cases of
+malaria. Atabrine tablets provided some relief, besides turning the
+skin yellow, but they were not effective enough to stop the spread of
+the mosquito-borne infection. Malaria attacks were so pervasive that
+nothing short of complete prostration, becoming a litter case, could
+earn a respite in the hospital. Naturally enough, all these diseases
+affected most strongly the men who had been on the island the longest,
+particularly those who experienced the early days of short rations.
+Vandegrift had already argued with his superiors that when his men
+eventually got relieved they should not be sent to another tropical
+island hospital, but rather to a place where there was a real change
+of atmosphere and climate. He asked that Auckland or Wellington, New
+Zealand, be considered.
+
+For the present, however, there was to be no relief for men starting
+their third month on Guadalcanal. The Japanese would not abandon their
+plan to seize back Guadalcanal and gave painful evidence of their
+intentions near mid-October. General Hyakutake himself landed on
+Guadalcanal on 7 October to oversee the coming offensive. Elements of
+Major General Masao Maruyama’s _Sendai Division_, already a factor in
+the fighting near the Matanikau, landed with him. More men were coming.
+And the Japanese, taking advantage of the fact that Cactus flyers had
+no night attack capability, planned to ensure that no planes at all
+would rise from Guadalcanal to meet them.
+
+[Illustration: _By October, malaria began to claim as many casualties
+as Japanese artillery, bombs, and naval gunfire. Shown here are the
+patients in the division hospital who are ministered to by physicians
+and corpsmen working under minimal conditions._]
+
+On 11 October, U.S. Navy surface ships took a hand in stopping
+the “Tokyo Express,” the nickname that had been given to Admiral
+Tanaka’s almost nightly reinforcement forays. A covering force of
+five cruisers and five destroyers, located near Rennell Island and
+commanded by Rear Admiral Norman Scott, got word that many ships were
+approaching Guadalcanal. Scott’s mission was to protect an approaching
+reinforcement convoy and he steamed toward Cactus at flank speed
+eager to engage. He encountered more ships than he had expected, a
+bombardment group of three heavy cruisers and two destroyers, as
+well as six destroyers escorting two seaplane carrier transports.
+Scott maneuvered between Savo Island and Cape Esperance, Guadalcanal’s
+western tip, and ran head-on into the bombardment group.
+
+Alerted by a scout plane from his flagship, _San Francisco_ (CA 38),
+spottings later confirmed by radar contacts on the _Helena_ (CL 50),
+the Americans opened fire before the Japanese, who had no radar,
+knew of their presence. One enemy destroyer sank immediately, two
+cruisers were badly damaged, one, the _Furutaka_, later foundered,
+and the remaining cruiser and destroyer turned away from the inferno
+of American fire. Scott’s own force was punished by enemy return fire
+which damaged two cruisers and two destroyers, one of which, the
+_Duncan_ (DD 485), sank the following day. On the 12th too, Cactus
+flyers spotted two of the reinforcement destroyer escorts retiring
+and sank them both. The Battle of Cape Esperance could be counted an
+American naval victory, one sorely needed at the time.
+
+[Illustration: _Maj Harold W. Bauer, VMF-212 commander, here a captain,
+was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor after being lost during a
+scramble with Japanese aircraft over Guadalcanal._
+
+    Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 410772
+]
+
+Its way cleared by Scott’s encounter with the Japanese, a really
+welcome reinforcement convoy arrived at the island on 13 October when
+the 164th Infantry of the Americal Division arrived. The soldiers,
+members of a National Guard outfit originally from North Dakota, were
+equipped with Garand M-1 rifles, a weapon of which most overseas
+Marines had only heard. In rate of fire, the semiautomatic Garand could
+easily outperform the single-shot, bolt-action Springfields the Marines
+carried and the bolt-action rifles the Japanese carried, but most 1st
+Division Marines of necessity touted the Springfield as inherently more
+accurate and a better weapon. This did not prevent some light-fingered
+Marines from acquiring Garands when the occasion presented itself. And
+such an occasion did present itself while the soldiers were landing and
+their supplies were being moved to dumps. Several flights of Japanese
+bombers arrived over Henderson Field, relatively unscathed by the
+defending fighters, and began dropping their bombs. The soldiers headed
+for cover and alert Marines, inured to the bombing, used the interval
+to “liberate” interesting cartons and crates. The news that the Army
+had arrived spread across the island like wildfire, for it meant to all
+Marines that they eventually would be relieved. There was hope.
+
+[Illustration:
+
+    Department of Defense (USMC) Photos 304183 and 302980
+
+_Two other Marine aviators awarded the Medal of Honor for heroism and
+intrepidity in the air were Capt Jefferson J. DeBlanc, left, and Maj
+Robert E. Galer, right._]
+
+As if the bombing was not enough grief, the Japanese opened on the
+airfield with their 150mm howitzers also. Altogether the men of the
+164th got a rude welcome to Guadalcanal. And on that night, 13-14
+October, they shared a terrifying experience with the Marines that no
+one would ever forget.
+
+Determined to knock out Henderson Field and protect their soldiers
+landing in strength west of Koli Point, the enemy commanders sent the
+battleships _Kongo_ and _Haruna_ into Ironbottom Sound to bombard
+the Marine positions. The usual Japanese flare planes heralded
+the bombardment, 80 minutes of sheer hell which had 14-inch shells
+exploding with such effect that the accompanying cruiser fire was
+scarcely noticed. No one was safe; no place was safe. No dugout had
+been built to withstand 14-inch shells. One witness, a seasoned veteran
+demonstrably cool under enemy fire, opined that there was nothing worse
+in war than helplessly being on the receiving end of naval gunfire.
+He remembered “huge trees being cut apart and flying about like
+toothpicks.” And he was on the frontlines, not the prime enemy target.
+The airfield and its environs were a shambles when dawn broke. The
+naval shelling, together with the night’s artillery fire and bombing,
+had left Cactus Air Force’s commander, General Geiger, with a handful
+of aircraft still flyable, an airfield thickly cratered by shells and
+bombs, and a death toll of 41. Still, from Henderson or Fighter One,
+which now became the main airstrip, the Cactus Flyers had to attack,
+for the morning also revealed a shore and sea full of inviting targets.
+
+The expected enemy convoy had gotten through and Japanese transports
+and landing craft were everywhere near Tassafaronga. At sea the
+escorting cruisers and destroyers provided a formidable antiaircraft
+screen. Every American plane that could fly did. General Geiger’s aide,
+Major Jack Cram, took off in the general’s PBY, hastily rigged to carry
+two torpedoes, and put one of them into the side of an enemy transport
+as it was unloading. He landed the lumbering flying boat with enemy
+aircraft hot on his tail. A new squadron of F4Fs, VMF-212, commanded
+by Major Harold W. Bauer, flew in during the day’s action, landed,
+refueled, and took off to join the fighting. An hour later, Bauer
+landed again, this time with four enemy bombers to his credit. Bauer,
+who added to his score of Japanese aircraft kills in later air battles,
+was subsequently lost in action. He was awarded the Medal of Honor, as
+were four other Marine pilots of the early Cactus Air Force: Captain
+Jefferson J. DeBlanc (VMF-112); Captain Joseph J. Foss (VMF-121); Major
+Robert E. Galer (VMF-224); and Major John L. Smith (VMF-223).
+
+The Japanese had landed more than enough troops to destroy the Marine
+beachhead and seize the airfield. At least General Hyakutake thought
+so, and he heartily approved General Maruyama’s plan to move most of
+the _Sendai Division_ through the jungle, out of sight and out of
+contact with the Marines, to strike from the south in the vicinity
+of Edson’s Ridge. Roughly 7,000 men, each carrying a mortar or
+artillery shell, started the trek along the Maruyama Trail which had
+been partially hacked out of the jungle well inland from the Marine
+positions. Maruyama, who had approved the trail’s name to indicate his
+confidence, intended to support this attack with heavy mortars and
+infantry guns (70mm pack howitzers). The men who had to lug, push, and
+drag these supporting arms over the miles of broken ground, across
+two major streams, the Mantanikau and the Lunga, and through heavy
+underbrush, might have had another name for their commander’s path to
+supposed glory.
+
+[Illustration: _A Marine examines a Japanese 70mm howitzer captured at
+the Battle of the Tenaru. Gen Maruyama’s troops “had to lug, push, and
+drag these supporting arms over the miles of broken ground, across two
+major streams and through heavy underbrush” to get them to the target
+area--but they never did. The trail behind them was littered with the
+supplies they carried._
+
+    Photo courtesy of Col James A. Donovan, Jr.
+]
+
+General Vandegrift knew the Japanese were going to attack. Patrols and
+reconnaissance flights had clearly indicated the push would be from the
+west, where the enemy reinforcements had landed. The American commander
+changed his dispositions accordingly. There were Japanese troops east
+of the perimeter, too, but not in any significant strength. The new
+infantry regiment, the 164th, reinforced by Marine special weapons
+units, was put into the line to hold the eastern flank along 6,600
+yards, curving inland to join up with 7th Marines near Edson’s Ridge.
+The 7th held 2,500 yards from the ridge to the Lunga. From the Lunga,
+the 1st Marines had a 3,500-yard sector of jungle running west to the
+point where the line curved back to the beach again in the 5th Marines’
+sector. Since the attack was expected from the west, the 3d Battalions
+of each of the 1st and 7th Marines held a strong outpost position
+forward of the 5th Marines’ lines along the east bank of the Matanikau.
+
+In the lull before the attack, if a time of patrol clashes, Japanese
+cruiser-destroyer bombardments, bomber attacks, and artillery
+harassment could properly be called a lull, Vandegrift was visited
+by the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Lieutenant General Thomas
+Holcomb. The Commandant flew in on 21 October to see for himself
+how his Marines were faring. It also proved to be an occasion for
+both senior Marines to meet the new ComSoPac, Vice Admiral William F.
+“Bull” Halsey. Admiral Nimitz had announced Halsey’s appointment on 18
+October and the news was welcome in Navy and Marine ranks throughout
+the Pacific. Halsey’s deserved reputation for elan and aggressiveness
+promised renewed attention to the situation on Guadalcanal. On the
+22d, Holcomb and Vandegrift flew to Noumea to meet with Halsey and to
+receive and give a round of briefings on the Allied situation. After
+Vandegrift had described his position, he argued strongly against the
+diversion of reinforcements intended for Cactus to any other South
+Pacific venue, a sometime factor of Admiral Turner’s strategic vision.
+He insisted that he needed all of the Americal Division and another 2d
+Marine Division regiment to beef up his forces, and that more than half
+of his veterans were worn out by three months’ fighting and the ravages
+of jungle-incurred diseases. Admiral Halsey told the Marine general:
+“You go back there, Vandegrift. I promise to get you everything I have.”
+
+[Illustration:
+
+    Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 13628
+
+_During a lull in the fight, a Marine machine gunner takes a break for
+coffee, with his sub-machine gun on his knee and his 30-caliber light
+machine gun in position._]
+
+When Vandegrift returned to Guadalcanal, Holcomb moved on to Pearl
+Harbor to meet with Nimitz, carrying Halsey’s recommendation that, in
+the future, landing force commanders once established ashore, would
+have equal command status with Navy amphibious force commanders. At
+Pearl, Nimitz approved Halsey’s recommendation--which Holcomb had
+drafted--and in Washington so did King. In effect, then, the command
+status of all future Pacific amphibious operations was determined by
+the events of Guadalcanal. Another piece of news Vandegrift received
+from Holcomb also boded well for the future of the Marine Corps.
+Holcomb indicated that if President Roosevelt did not reappoint him,
+unlikely in view of his age and two terms in office, he would recommend
+that Vandegrift be appointed the next Commandant.
+
+[Illustration:
+
+    Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 513191
+
+_On the occasion of the visit of the Commandant, MajGen Thomas Holcomb,
+some of Operation Watchtower’s major staff and command officers took
+time out from the fighting to pose with him. From left, front row:
+Col William J. Whaling (Whaling Group); Col Amor LeRoy Sims (CO, 7th
+Marines); Col Gerald C. Thomas (Division Chief of Staff); Col Pedro
+A. del Valle (CO, 11th Marines); Col William E. Riley (member of
+Gen Holcomb’s party); MajGen Roy S. Geiger (CG, 1st Marine Aircraft
+Wing); Gen Holcomb; MajGen Ralph J. Mitchell (Director of Aviation,
+Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps); BGen Bennet Puryear, Jr. (Assistant
+Quartermaster of the Marine Corps); Col Clifton B. Cates (CO, 1st
+Marines). Second row (between Whaling and Sims): LtCol Raymond P.
+Coffman (Division Supply Officer); Maj James C. Murray (Division
+Personnel Officer); (behind Gen Holcomb) LtCol Merrill B. Twining
+(Division Operations Officer)._]
+
+This news of future events had little chance of diverting Vandegrift’s
+attention when he flew back to Guadalcanal, for the Japanese were in
+the midst of their planned offensive. On the 20th, an enemy patrol
+accompanied by two tanks tried to find a way through the line held
+by Lieutenant Colonel William N. McKelvy, Jr.’s 3d Battalion, 1st
+Marines. A sharpshooting 37mm gun crew knocked out one tank and the
+enemy force fell back, meanwhile shelling the Marine positions with
+artillery. Near sunset the next day, the Japanese tried again, this
+time with more artillery fire and more tanks in the fore, but again
+a 37mm gun knocked out a lead tank and discouraged the attack. On 22
+October, the enemy paused, waiting for Maruyama’s force to get into
+position inland. On the 23d, planned as the day of the _Sendai_’s main
+attack, the Japanese dropped a heavy rain of artillery and mortar fire
+on McKelvy’s positions near the Matanikau River mouth. Near dusk, nine
+18-ton medium tanks clanked out of the trees onto the river’s sandbar
+and just as quickly eight of them were riddled by the 37s. One tank got
+across the river, a Marine blasted a track off with a grenade, and
+a 75mm halftrack finished it off in the ocean’s surf. The following
+enemy infantry was smothered by Marine artillery fire as all battalions
+of the augmented 11th Marines rained shells on the massed attackers.
+Hundreds of Japanese were casualties and three more tanks were
+destroyed. Later, an inland thrust further upstream was easily beaten
+back. The abortive coastal attack did almost nothing to aid Maruyama’s
+inland offensive, but did cause Vandegrift to shift one battalion, the
+2d Battalion, 7th Marines, out of the lines to the east and into the
+4,000-yard gap between the Matanikau position and the perimeter. This
+move proved providential since one of Maruyama’s planned attacks was
+headed right for this area.
+
+Although patrols had encountered no Japanese east or south of the
+jungled perimeter up to the 24th, the Matanikau attempts had alerted
+everyone. When General Maruyama finally was satisfied that his men had
+struggled through to appropriate assault positions, after delaying his
+day of attack three times, he was ready on 24 October. The Marines were
+waiting.
+
+An observer from the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, spotted an enemy
+officer surveying Edson’s Ridge on the 24th, and scout-snipers reported
+smoke from numerous rice fires rising from a valley about two miles
+south of Lieutenant Colonel Puller’s positions. Six battalions of the
+_Sendai Division_ were poised to attack, and near midnight the first
+elements of the enemy hit and bypassed a platoon-sized outpost forward
+of Puller’s barbed-wire entanglements. Warned by the outpost, Puller’s
+men waited, straining to see through a dark night and a driving rain.
+Suddenly, the Japanese charged out of the jungle, attacking in Puller’s
+area near the ridge and the flat ground to the east. The Marines
+replied with everything they had, calling in artillery, firing
+mortars, relying heavily on crossing fields of machine gun fire to cut
+down the enemy infantrymen. Thankfully, the enemy’s artillery, mortars,
+and other supporting arms were scattered back along the Maruyama Trail;
+they had proved too much of a burden for the infantrymen to carry
+forward.
+
+[Illustration:
+
+    Marine Corps Personal Papers Collection
+
+_Five Japanese tanks sit dead in the water, destroyed by Marine 37mm
+gunfire during the abortive attempt to force the Marine perimeter
+near the mouth of the Matanikau River in late October. Many Japanese
+soldiers lost their lives also._]
+
+A wedge was driven into the Marine lines, but eventually straightened
+out with repeated counterattacks. Puller soon realized his battalion
+was being hit by a strong Japanese force capable of repeated attacks.
+He called for reinforcements and the Army’s 3d Battalion, 164th
+Infantry (Lieutenant Colonel Robert K. Hall), was ordered forward, its
+men sliding and slipping in the rain as they trudged a mile south along
+Edson’s Ridge. Puller met Hall at the head of his column, and the two
+officers walked down the length of the Marine lines, peeling off an
+Army squad at a time to feed into the lines. When the Japanese attacked
+again as they did all night long, the soldiers and Marines fought back
+together. By 0330, the Army battalion was completely integrated into
+the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines’ lines and the enemy attacks were
+getting weaker and weaker. The American return fire--including flanking
+fire from machine guns and Weapons Company, 7th Marines’ 37mm guns
+remaining in the positions held by 2d Battalion, 164th Infantry, on
+Puller’s left--was just too much to take. Near dawn, Maruyama pulled
+his men back to regroup and prepare to attack again.
+
+With daylight, Puller and Hall reordered the lines, putting the 3d
+Battalion, 164th, into its own positions on Puller’s left, tying in
+with the rest of the Army regiment. The driving rains had turned
+Fighter One into a quagmire, effectively grounding Cactus flyers.
+Japanese planes used the “free ride” to bomb Marine positions. Their
+artillery fired incessantly and a pair of Japanese destroyers added
+their gunfire to the bombardment until they got too close to the shore
+and the 3d Defense Battalion’s 5-inch guns drove them off. As the sun
+bore down, the runways dried and afternoon enemy attacks were met by
+Cactus fighters, who downed 22 Japanese planes with a loss of three of
+their own.
+
+As night came on again, Maruyama tried more of the same, with the same
+result. The Army-Marine lines held and the Japanese were cut down in
+droves by rifle, machine gun, mortar, 37mm, and artillery fire. To the
+west, an enemy battalion mounted three determined attacks against the
+positions held by Lieutenant Colonel Herman H. Hanneken’s 2d Battalion,
+7th Marines, thinly tied in with Puller’s battalion on the left and the
+3d Battalion, 7th Marines, on the right. The enemy finally penetrated
+the positions held by Company F, but a counterattack led by Major Odell
+M. Conoley, the battalion’s executive officer, drove off the Japanese.
+Again at daylight the American positions were secure and the enemy had
+retreated. They would not come back; the grand Japanese offensive of
+the _Sendai Division_ was over.
+
+About 3,500 enemy troops had died during the attacks. General
+Maruyama’s proud boast that he “would exterminate the enemy around
+the airfield in one blow” proved an empty one. What was left of his
+force now straggled back over the Maruyama Trail, losing, as had the
+Kawaguchi force in the same situation, most of its seriously wounded
+men. The Americans, Marines and soldiers together, probably lost 300
+men killed and wounded; existing records are sketchy and incomplete.
+One result of the battle, however, was a warm welcome to the 164th
+Infantry from the 1st Marine Division. Vandegrift particularly
+commended Lieutenant Colonel Hall’s battalion, stating the “division
+was proud to have serving with it another unit which had stood the test
+of battle.” And Colonel Cates sent a message to the 164th’s Colonel
+Bryant Moore saying that the 1st Marines “were proud to serve with a
+unit such as yours.”
+
+Amidst all the heroics of the two nights’ fighting there were many men
+who were singled out for recognition and an equally large number who
+performed great deeds that were never recognized. Two men stood out
+above all others, and on succeeding nights, Sergeant John Basilone of
+the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, and Platoon Sergeant Mitchell Paige of
+the 2d Battalion, both machine gun section heads, were recognized as
+having performed “above and beyond the call of duty” in the inspiring
+words of their Medal of Honor citations.
+
+
+[Sidebar (page 37): Reising Gun
+
+The Reising gun was designed and developed by noted gun inventor Eugene
+Reising. It was patented in 1940 and manufactured by the old gun-making
+firm of Harrington and Richardson of Worcester, Massachusetts. It is
+said that it was made on existing machine tools, some dating back
+to the Civil War, and of ordinary steel rather than ordnance steel.
+With new machine tools and ordnance steel scarce and needed for more
+demanding weapons, the Reising met an immediate requirement for many
+sub-machine guns at a time when production of Thompson M1928 and M1
+sub-machine guns hadn’t caught up with demand and the stamped-out M3
+“grease gun” had not yet been invented. It was a wartime expedient.
+
+[Illustration:
+
+    Captain Donald L. Dickson, USMCR
+]
+
+The Reising was made in two different models, the 50 and the 55. The
+Model 50 had a full wooden stock and a Cutts compensator attached
+to the muzzle. The compensator, a device which reduced the upward
+muzzle climb from recoil, was invented by Richard M. Cutts, Sr., and
+his son, Richard M. Cutts, Jr., both of whom became Marine brigadier
+generals. The other version was dubbed the Model 55. It had a folding
+metal-wire shoulder stock which swivelled on the wooden pistol grip.
+It also had a shorter barrel and no compensator. It was intended for
+use by parachutists, tank crews, and others needing a compact weapon.
+Both versions of the Reising fired .45-caliber ammunition, the same
+cartridge as the Colt automatic pistol and the Thompson.
+
+In all, there were approximately 100,000 Reising sub-machine guns
+produced between 1940 and 1942. Small numbers of the weapons were
+acquired by both Great Britain and the Soviet Union. However, most
+were used by the U.S. Marine Corps in the Solomon Islands campaign.
+The Model 55 was issued to both Marine parachute battalions and Marine
+raiders, seeing service first on Guadalcanal. After its dubious debut
+in combat it was withdrawn from frontline service in 1943 due to
+several flaws in design and manufacture.
+
+The Reising’s major shortcoming was its propensity for jamming. This
+was due to both a design problem in the magazine lips and the fact
+that magazines were made of a soft sheet steel. The weapon’s safety
+mechanism didn’t always work and if the butt was slammed down on the
+deck, the hammer would set back against the mainspring and then fly
+forward, firing a chambered cartridge. The design allowed the entry of
+dirt into the mechanism and close tolerances caused it to jam. Finally,
+the steel used allowed excessive rust to form in the tropical humidity
+of the Solomons. Nevertheless, at six pounds, the Reising was handier
+than the 10-pound Thompson, more accurate, pleasanter to shoot, and
+reliable under other than combat conditions, but one always had to
+keep the muzzle pointed in a safe direction. The Model 50 was also
+issued to Marines for guard duty at posts and stations in the United
+States.--_John G. Griffiths_
+]
+
+
+
+
+_November and the Continuing Buildup_
+
+
+While the soldiers and Marines were battling the Japanese ashore,
+a patrol plane sighted a large Japanese fleet near the Santa Cruz
+Islands to the east of the Solomons. The enemy force was formidable, 4
+carriers and 4 battleships, 8 cruisers and 28 destroyers, all poised
+for a victorious attack when Maruyama’s capture of Henderson Field
+was signalled. Admiral Halsey’s reaction to the inviting targets was
+characteristic, he signaled Rear Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid, with the
+_Hornet_ and _Enterprise_ carrier groups located north of the New
+Hebrides: “Attack Repeat Attack.”
+
+[Illustration: _Heavy tropical downpours at Guadalcanal all but flood
+out a Marine camp near Henderson Field, and the field as well. Marines’
+damp clothing and bedding contributed to the heavy incidence of
+tormenting skin infections and fungal disorders._
+
+    Department of Defense (USMC) Photo
+]
+
+Early on 26 October, American SBDs located the Japanese carriers
+at about the same time Japanese scout planes spotted the American
+carriers. The Japanese _Zuiho_’s flight deck was holed by the scout
+bombers, cancelling flight operations, but the other three enemy
+carriers launched strikes. The two air armadas tangled as each strove
+to reach the other’s carriers. The _Hornet_ was hit repeatedly by bombs
+and torpedoes; two Japanese pilots also crashed their planes on board.
+The damage to the ship was so extensive, the _Hornet_ was abandoned
+and sunk. The _Enterprise_, the battleship _South Dakota_, the light
+cruiser _San Juan_ (CL 54), and the destroyer _Smith_ (DD 378) were
+also hit; the destroyer _Porter_ (DD 356) was sunk. On the Japanese
+side, no ships were sunk, but three carriers and two destroyers were
+damaged. One hundred Japanese planes were lost; 74 U.S. planes went
+down. Taken together, the results of the Battle of Santa Cruz were
+a standoff. The Japanese naval leaders might have continued their
+attacks, but instead, disheartened by the defeat of their ground
+forces on Guadalcanal, withdrew to attack another day.
+
+[Illustration:
+
+    Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 74093
+
+_Marine engineers repair a flood-damaged Lunga River bridge washed out
+during a period when 8 inches of rain fell in 24 hours and the river
+rose 7 feet above normal._]
+
+The departure of the enemy naval force marked a period in which
+substantial reinforcements reached the island. The headquarters of the
+2d Marines had finally found transport space to come up from Espiritu
+Santo and on 29 and 30 October, Colonel Arthur moved his regiment
+from Tulagi to Guadalcanal, exchanging his 1st and 2d Battalions for
+the well-blooded 3d, which took up the Tulagi duties. The 2d Marines’
+battalions at Tulagi had performed the very necessary task of scouting
+and securing all the small islands of the Florida group while they had
+camped, frustrated, watching the battles across Sealark Channel. The
+men now would no longer be spectators at the big show.
+
+On 2 November, planes from VMSB-132 and VMF-211 flew into the Cactus
+fields from New Caledonia. MAG-11 squadrons moved forward from New
+Caledonia to Espiritu Santo to be closer to the battle scene; the
+flight echelons now could operate forward to Guadalcanal and with
+relative ease. On the ground side, two batteries of 155mm guns, one
+Army and one Marine, landed on 2 November, providing Vandegrift with
+his first artillery units capable of matching the enemy’s long-range
+150mm guns. On the 4th and 5th, the 8th Marines (Colonel Richard H.
+Jeschke) arrived from American Samoa. The full-strength regiment,
+reinforced by the 75mm howitzers of the 1st Battalion, 10th Marines,
+added another 4,000 men to the defending forces. All the fresh troops
+reflected a renewed emphasis at all levels of command on making sure
+Guadalcanal would be held. The reinforcement-replacement pipeline was
+being filled. In the offing as part of the Guadalcanal defending force
+were the rest of the Americal Division, the remainder of the 2d Marine
+Division, and the Army’s 25th Infantry Division, then in Hawaii. More
+planes of every type and from Allied as well as American sources were
+slated to reinforce and replace the battered and battle-weary Cactus
+veterans.
+
+The impetus for the heightened pace of reinforcement had been provided
+by President Roosevelt. Cutting through the myriad demands for American
+forces worldwide, he had told each of the Joint Chiefs on 24 October
+that Guadalcanal must be reinforced, and without delay.
+
+On the island, the pace of operations did not slacken after the
+Maruyama offensive was beaten back. General Vandegrift wanted to clear
+the area immediately west of the Matanikau of all Japanese troops,
+forestalling, if he could, another buildup of attacking forces. Admiral
+Tanaka’s Tokyo Express was still operating and despite punishing
+attacks by Cactus aircraft and new and deadly opponents, American motor
+torpedo boats, now based at Tulagi.
+
+On 1 November, the 5th Marines, backed up by the newly arrived
+2d Marines, attacked across bridges engineers had laid over the
+Matanikau during the previous night. Inland, Colonel Whaling led
+his scout-snipers and the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, in a screening
+movement to protect the flank of the main attack. Opposition was fierce
+in the shore area where the 1st Battalion, 5th, drove forward toward
+Point Cruz, but inland the 2d Battalion and Whaling’s group encountered
+slight opposition. By nightfall, when the Marines dug in, it was clear
+that the only sizable enemy force was in the Point Cruz area. In the
+days bitter fighting, Corporal Anthony Casamento, a badly wounded
+machine gun squad leader in Edson’s 1st Battalion, had so distinguished
+himself that he was recommended for a Navy Cross; many years later, in
+August 1980, President Jimmy Carter approved the award of the Medal of
+Honor in its stead.
+
+[Illustration:
+
+    Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 56749
+
+_2dLt Mitchell Paige, third from left, and PltSgt John Basilone,
+extreme right, received the Medal of Honor at a parade at Camp
+Balcombe, Australia, on 21 May 1943. MajGen Vandegrift, left, received
+his medal in a White House ceremony the previous 5 February, while Col
+Merritt A. Edson was decorated 31 December 1943. Note the 1st Marine
+Division patches on the right shoulders of each participant._]
+
+On the 2d, the attack continued with the reserve 3d Battalion moving
+into the fight and all three 5th Marines units moving to surround
+the enemy defenders. On 3 November, the Japanese pocket just west
+of the base at Point Cruz was eliminated; well over 300 enemy had
+been killed. Elsewhere, the attacking Marines had encountered spotty
+resistance and advanced slowly across difficult terrain to a point
+about 1,000 yards beyond the 5th Marines’ action. There, just as the
+offensive’s objectives seemed well in hand, the advance was halted.
+Again, the intelligence that a massive enemy reinforcement attempt was
+pending forced Vandegrift to pull back most of his men to safeguard
+the all-important airfield perimeter. This time, however, he left a
+regiment to outpost the ground that had been gained, Colonel Arthur’s
+2d Marines, reinforced by the Army’s 1st Battalion, 164th Infantry.
+
+Emphasizing the need for caution in Vandegrift’s mind was the fact that
+the Japanese were again discovered in strength east of the perimeter.
+On 3 November, Lieutenant Colonel Hanneken’s 2d Battalion, 7th Marines,
+on a reconnaissance in force towards Koli Point, could see the
+Japanese ships clustered near Tetere, eight miles from the perimeter.
+His Marines encountered strong Japanese resistance from obviously
+fresh troops and he began to pull back. A regiment of the enemy’s
+_38th Division_ had landed, as Hyakutake experimented with a Japanese
+Navy-promoted scheme of attacking the perimeter from both flanks.
+
+[Illustration:
+
+    Marine Corps Historical Photo Collection
+
+_In a White House ceremony, former Cpl Anthony Casamento, a machine
+gun squad leader in the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, was decorated by
+President Jimmy Carter on 22 August 1980, 38 years after the battle for
+Guadalcanal. Looking on are Casarnento’s wife and daughters and Gen
+Robert H. Barrow, Marine Commandant._]
+
+[Illustration: _Sgt Clyde Thomason, who was killed in action
+participating in the Makin Island raid with the 2d Raider Battalion,
+was the first enlisted Marine in World War II to be awarded the Medal
+of Honor._
+
+    Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 310616
+]
+
+As Hanneken’s battalion executed a fighting withdrawal along the beach,
+it began to receive fire from the jungle inland, too. A rescue force
+was soon put together under General Rupertus: two tank companies,
+the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, and the 2d and 3d Battalions of the
+164th. The Japanese troops, members of the _38th Division_ regiment and
+remnants of Kawaguchi’s brigade, fought doggedly to hold their ground
+as the Marines drove forward along the coast and the soldiers attempted
+to outflank the enemy in the jungle. The running battle continued for
+days, supported by Cactus air, naval gunfire, and the newly landed
+155mm guns.
+
+The enemy commander received new orders as he was struggling to hold
+off the Americans. He was to break off the action, move inland, and
+march to rejoin the main Japanese forces west of the perimeter, a tall
+order to fulfill. The two-pronged attack scheme had been abandoned.
+The Japanese managed the first part; on the 11th the enemy force found
+a gap in the 164th’s line and broke through along a meandering jungle
+stream. Behind they left 450 dead over the course of a seven-day
+battle; the Marines and soldiers had lost 40 dead and 120 wounded.
+
+Essentially, the Japanese who broke out of the encircling Americans
+escaped from the frying pan only to fall into the fire. Admiral
+Turner finally had been able to effect one of his several schemes for
+alternative landings and beachheads, all of which General Vandegrift
+vehemently opposed. At Aola Bay, 40 miles east of the main perimeter,
+the Navy put an airfield construction and defense force ashore on 4
+November. Then, while the Japanese were still battling the Marines near
+Tetere, Vandegrift was able to persuade Turner to detach part of this
+landing force, the 2d Raider Battalion, to sweep west, to discover and
+destroy any enemy forces it encountered.
+
+Lieutenant Colonel Evans F. Carlson’s raider battalion already had seen
+action before it reached Guadalcanal. Two companies had reinforced the
+defenders of Midway Island when the Japanese attacked there in June.
+The rest of the battalion had landed from submarines on Makin Island
+in the Gilberts on 17-18 August, destroying the garrison there. For his
+part in the fighting on Makin, Sergeant Clyde Thomason had been awarded
+a Medal of Honor posthumously, the first Marine enlisted man to receive
+his country’s highest award in World War II.
+
+In its march from Aola Bay, the 2d Raider Battalion encountered the
+Japanese who were attempting to retreat to the west. On 12 November,
+the raiders beat off attacks by two enemy companies and then
+relentlessly pursued the Japanese, fighting a series of small actions
+over the next five days before they contacted the main Japanese body.
+From 17 November to 4 December, when the raiders finally came down out
+of the jungled ridges into the perimeter, Carlson’s men harried the
+retreating enemy. They killed nearly 500 Japanese. Their own losses
+were 16 killed and 18 wounded.
+
+The Aola Bay venture, which had provided the 2d Raider Battalion a
+starting point for its month-long jungle campaign, proved a bust. The
+site chosen for a new airfield was unsuitable, too wet and unstable,
+and the whole force moved to Koli Point in early December, where
+another airfield eventually was constructed.
+
+The buildup on Guadalcanal continued, by both sides. On 11 November,
+guarded by a cruiser-destroyer covering force, a convoy ran in carrying
+the 182d Infantry, another regiment of the Americal Division. The ships
+were pounded by enemy bombers and three transports were hit, but the
+men landed. General Vandegrift needed the new men badly. His veterans
+were truly ready for replacement; more than a thousand new cases of
+malaria and related diseases were reported each week. The Japanese who
+had been on the island any length of time were no better off; they
+were, in fact, in worse shape. Medical supplies and rations were in
+short supply. The whole thrust of the Japanese reinforcement effort
+continued to be to get troops and combat equipment ashore. The idea
+prevailed in Tokyo, despite all evidence to the contrary, that one
+overwhelming coordinated assault would crush the American resistance.
+The enemy drive to take Port Moresby on New Guinea was put on hold to
+concentrate all efforts on driving the Americans off of Guadalcanal.
+
+[Illustration:
+
+    Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 51728
+
+_Native guides lead 2d Raider Battalion Marines on a
+combat/reconnaissance patrol behind Japanese lines. The patrol lasted
+for less than a month, during which the Marines covered 150 miles and
+fought more than a dozen actions._]
+
+On 12 November, a multifaceted Japanese naval force converged on
+Guadalcanal to cover the landing of the main body of the _38th
+Division_. Rear Admiral Daniel J. Callaghan’s cruisers and destroyers,
+the close-in protection for the 182d’s transports, moved to stop
+the enemy. Coastwatcher and scout plane sightings and radio traffic
+intercepts had identified two battleships, two carriers, four cruisers,
+and a host of destroyers all headed toward Guadalcanal. A bombardment
+group led by the battleships _Hiei_ and _Kirishima_, with the light
+cruiser _Nagura_, and 15 destroyers spearheaded the attack. Shortly
+after midnight, near Savo Island, Callaghan’s cruisers picked up the
+Japanese on radar and continued to close. The battle was joined at
+such short range that each side fired at times on their own ships.
+Callaghan’s flagship, the _San Francisco_, was hit 15 times, Callaghan
+was killed, and the ship had to limp away. The cruiser _Atlanta_ (CL
+104) was also hit and set afire. Rear Admiral Norman Scott, who was
+on board, was killed. Despite the hammering by Japanese fire, the
+Americans held and continued fighting. The battleship _Hiei_, hit
+by more than 80 shells, retired and with it went the rest of the
+bombardment force. Three destroyers were sunk and four others damaged.
+
+[Illustration:
+
+    Department of Defense (Navy) Photos 80-G-20824 and 80-G-21099
+
+_In the great naval Battle of Guadalcanal, 12-15 November, RAdm Daniel
+J. Callaghan was killed when his flagship, the heavy cruiser_ San
+Francisco _(CA 38) took 15 major hits and was forced to limp away in
+the dark from the scene of action._]
+
+The Americans had accomplished their purpose; they had forced the
+Japanese to turn back. The cost was high. Two antiaircraft cruisers,
+the _Atlanta_ and the _Juneau_ (CL 52), were sunk; four destroyers, the
+_Barton_ (DD 599), _Cushing_ (DD 376), _Monssen_ (DD 436), and _Laffey_
+(DD 459), also went to the bottom. In addition to the _San Francisco_,
+the heavy cruiser _Portland_ (CA 33) and the destroyers _Sterret_ (DD
+407) and _Aaron Ward_ (DD 483) were damaged. Only one destroyer of the
+13 American ships engaged, the _Fletcher_ (DD 445), was unscathed when
+the survivors retired to the New Hebrides.
+
+With daylight came the Cactus bombers and fighters; they found the
+crippled _Hiei_ and pounded it mercilessly. On the 14th the Japanese
+were forced to scuttle it. Admiral Halsey ordered his only surviving
+carrier, the _Enterprise_, out of the Guadalcanal area to get it out of
+reach of Japanese aircraft and sent his battleships _Washington_ (BB
+56) and _South Dakota_ (BB 55) with four escorting destroyers north
+to meet the Japanese. Some of the _Enterprise_’s planes flew in to
+Henderson Field to help even the odds.
+
+On 14 November Cactus and _Enterprise_ flyers found a Japanese
+cruiser-destroyer force that had pounded the island on the night of 13
+November. They damaged four cruisers and a destroyer. After refueling
+and rearming they went after the approaching Japanese troop convoy.
+They hit several transports in one attack and sank one when they came
+back again. Army B-17s up from Espiritu Santo scored one hit and
+several near misses, bombing from 17,000 feet.
+
+Moving in a continuous pattern of attack, return, refuel, rearm, and
+attack again, the planes from Guadalcanal hit nine transports, sinking
+seven. Many of the 5,000 troops on the stricken ships were rescued
+by Tanaka’s destroyers, which were firing furiously and laying smoke
+screens in an attempt to protect the transports. The admiral later
+recalled that day as indelible in his mind, with memories of “bombs
+wobbling down from high-flying B-17s; of carrier bombers roaring
+towards targets as though to plunge full into the water, releasing
+bombs and pulling out barely in time, each miss sending up towering
+clouds of mist and spray, every hit raising clouds of smoke and fire.”
+Despite the intensive aerial attack, Tanaka continued on to Guadalcanal
+with four destroyers and four transports.
+
+Japanese intelligence had picked up the approaching American battleship
+force and warned Tanaka of its advent. In turn, the enemy admirals sent
+their own battleship-cruiser force to intercept. The Americans, led by
+Rear Admiral Willis A. Lee in the _Washington_, reached Sealark Channel
+about 2100 on the 14th. An hour later, a Japanese cruiser was picked up
+north of Savo. Battleship fire soon turned it away. The Japanese now
+learned that their opponents would not be the cruisers they expected.
+
+The resulting clash, fought in the glare of gunfire and Japanese
+searchlights, was perhaps the most significant fought at sea for
+Guadalcanal. When the melee was over, the American battleships’ 16-inch
+guns had more than matched the Japanese. Both the _South Dakota_ and
+the _Washington_ were damaged badly enough to force their retirement,
+but the _Kirishima_ was punished to its abandonment and death. One
+Japanese and three American destroyers, the _Benham_ (DD 796), the
+_Walke_ (DD 416), and the _Preston_ (DD 379), were sunk. When the
+Japanese attack force retired, Admiral Tanaka ran his four transports
+onto the beach, knowing they would be sitting targets at daylight.
+Most of the men on board, however, did manage to get ashore before the
+inevitable pounding by American planes, warships, and artillery.
+
+Ten thousand troops of the _38th Division_ had landed, but the Japanese
+were in no shape to ever again attempt a massive reinforcement. The
+horrific losses in the frequent naval clashes, which seemed at times
+to favor the Japanese, did not really represent a standoff. Every
+American ship lost or damaged could and would be replaced; every
+Japanese ship lost meant a steadily diminishing fleet. In the air, the
+losses on both sides were daunting, but the enemy naval air arm would
+never recover from its losses of experienced carrier pilots. Two years
+later, the Battle of the Philippine Sea between American and Japanese
+carriers would aptly be called the “Marianas Turkey Shoot” because of
+the ineptitude of the Japanese trainee pilots.
+
+[Illustration:
+
+    Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 53510
+
+_A Japanese troop transport and her landing craft were badly damaged
+by the numerous Marine air attacks and were forced to run aground on
+Kokumbona beach after the naval Battle of Guadalcanal. Many enemy
+troops were killed in the attacks._]
+
+The enemy troops who had been fortunate enough to reach land were
+not immediately ready to assault the American positions. The _38th
+Division_ and the remnants of the various Japanese units that had
+previously tried to penetrate the Marine lines needed to be shaped into
+a coherent attack force before General Hyakutake could again attempt to
+take Henderson Field.
+
+General Vandegrift now had enough fresh units to begin to replace his
+veteran troops along the front lines. The decision to replace the 1st
+Marine Division with the Army’s 25th Infantry Division had been made.
+Admiral Turner had told Vandegrift to leave all of his heavy equipment
+on the island when he did pull out “in hopes of getting your units
+re-equipped when you come out.” He also told the Marine general that
+the Army would command the final phases of the Guadalcanal operation
+since it would provide the majority of the combat forces once the 1st
+Division departed. Major General Alexander M. Patch, commander of
+the Americal Division, would relieve Vandegrift as senior American
+officer ashore. His air support would continue to be Marine-dominated
+as General Geiger, now located on Espiritu Santo with 1st Wing
+headquarters, fed his squadrons forward to maintain the offensive. And
+the air command on Guadalcanal itself would continue to be a mixed bag
+of Army, Navy, Marine, and Allied squadrons.
+
+The sick list of the 1st Marine Division in November included more than
+3,200 men with malaria. The men of the 1st still manning the frontline
+foxholes and the rear areas--if anyplace within Guadalcanal’s perimeter
+could properly be called a rear area--were plain worn out. They had
+done their part and they knew it.
+
+On 29 November, General Vandegrift was handed a message from the Joint
+Chiefs of Staff. The crux of it read: “1st MarDiv is to be relieved
+without delay ... and will proceed to Australia for rehabilitation and
+employment.” The word soon spread that the 1st was leaving and where it
+was going. Australia was not yet the cherished place it would become in
+the division’s future, but _any_ place was preferable to Guadalcanal.
+
+
+[Sidebar (page 41): 75mm Pack Howitzer--Workhorse of the Artillery
+
+[Illustration]
+
+During the summer of 1930, the Marine Corps began replacing its old
+French 75mm guns (Model 1897) with the 75mm Pack Howitzer Model
+1923-E2. This weapon was designed for use in the Army primarily as
+mountain artillery. Since it could be broken down and manhandled ashore
+in six loads from ships’ boats, the pack howitzer was an important
+supporting weapon of the Marine Corps landing forces in prewar landing
+exercises.
+
+The 75mm pack howitzer saw extensive service with the Marine Corps
+throughout World War II in almost every major landing in the Pacific.
+Crewed by five Marines, the howitzer could hurl a 16-pound shell nearly
+10,000 yards. In the D Series table of organization with which the
+1st Marine Division went to war, and through the following E and F
+series, there were three pack howitzer battalions for each artillery
+regiment.--_Anthony Wayne Tommell and Kenneth L. Smith-Christmas_
+]
+
+
+[Sidebar (page 45): The Japanese Model 89 (1929) 50mm Heavy Grenade
+Discharger
+
+[Illustration]
+
+Born out of the need to bridge the gap in range between hand grenades
+and mortars, the grenade discharger evolved in the Imperial Japanese
+Army from a special purpose weapon of infantry assault and defense to
+an essential item of standard equipment with all Japanese ground forces.
+
+Commonly called _Juteki_ by the Japanese, this weapon officially was
+designated _Hachikyu Shiki Jutekidarto_, or 1189 Model Heavy Grenade
+Discharger, the term “heavy” being justified by the powerful 1-pound,
+12-ounce high explosive shell it was designed to fire, although it also
+fired the standard Model 91 fragmentation grenade.
+
+To the American Marines and soldiers who first encountered this weapon
+and others of its kind in combat they were known as “knee mortars,”
+likely so named because they generally were fired from a kneeling
+position. Typically, the discharger’s concave baseplate was pressed
+firmly into the surface of the ground by the firer’s foot to support
+the heavy recoil of the fired shell, but unfortunately the term “knee
+mortar” suggested to some untutored captors of these weapons that they
+were to be fired with the baseplate resting against the knee or thigh.
+When a Marine fired one of these dischargers from his thigh and broke
+his upper leg bone, efforts were swiftly undertaken in the field to
+educate all combat troops in the safe and proper handling of these very
+useful weapons.
+
+The Model 89 (1929) 50mm Heavy Grenade Discharger is a muzzle-loaded,
+high-angle-of-fire weapon which weighs 10-1/4 pounds and is 24 inches
+in overall length. Its design is compact and simple. The discharger
+has three major components: the rifled barrel, the supporting barrel
+pedestal with firing mechanism, and the base plate. Operation of the
+Model 89 was easy and straightforward, and with practice its user could
+deliver accurate fire registered quickly on target.
+
+Encountered in all major battles in the Pacific War, the Model 89
+Grenade Discharger was an uncomplicated, very portable, and highly
+efficient weapon operated easily by one man. It was carried in a cloth
+or leather case with a sling, and its one-piece construction allowed
+it to be brought into action very quickly. This grenade discharger
+had the advantage over most mortars in that it could be aimed and
+fired mechanically after a projectile had been placed in the barrel,
+projectile firing not being dependent upon dropping down the barrel
+against a stationary firing pin as with most mortars, where barrel
+fouling sometimes caused dangerous hangfires. Although an instantaneous
+fuze employed on the Model 89 high explosive shell restricted this
+shell’s use to open areas, the Model 91 fragmentation grenade with its
+seven-second fuze made this discharger effective in a jungle or forest
+setting, with complete safety for the user from premature detonation
+of projectiles by overhanging foliage. Smoke and signal shells, and an
+incendiary grenade, were special types of ammunition used with this
+versatile and effective weapon which won the respect of all who came to
+know it.--_Edwin F. Libby_
+]
+
+
+
+
+_December and the Final Stages_
+
+
+On 7 December, one year after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor,
+General Vandegrift sent a message to all men under his command in the
+Guadalcanal area thanking them for their courage and steadfastness,
+commending particularly the pilots and “all who labored and sweated
+within the lines in all manner of prodigious and vital tasks.” He
+reminded them all that their “unbelievable achievements had made
+‘Guadalcanal’ a synonym for death and disaster in the language of our
+enemy.” On 9 December, he handed over his command to General Patch and
+flew out to Australia at the same time the first elements of the 5th
+Marines were boarding ship. The 1st, 11th, and 7th Marines would soon
+follow together with all the division’s supporting units. The men who
+were leaving were thin, tired, hollow-eyed, and apathetic; they were
+young men who had grown old in four months time. They left behind 681
+dead in the island’s cemetery.
+
+[Illustration: _As he tells it, “Too Many, Too Close, Too Long,” is
+Donald L. Dickson’s portrait of one of the “little guys, just plain
+worn out. His stamina and his spirit stretched beyond human endurance.
+He has had no real sleep for a long time.... And he probably hasn’t
+stopped ducking and fighting long enough to discover that he has
+malaria. He is going to discover it now, however. He is through.”_
+
+    Captain Donald L. Dickson, USMCR
+]
+
+[Illustration:
+
+    U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo SC164898
+
+_Americal Division commander, MajGen Alexander M. Patch, Jr., watches
+while his troops and supplies are staged on Guadalcanal’s beaches on 8
+December, the day before he relieved Gen Vandegrift and his wornout 1st
+Marine Division._]
+
+The final regiment of the Americal Division, the 132d Infantry, landed
+on 8 December as the 5th Marines was preparing to leave. The 2d Marine
+Division’s regiments already on the island, the 2d, 8th, and part
+of the 10th, knew that the 6th Marines was on its way to rejoin. It
+seemed to many of the men of the 2d Marines, who had landed on D-Day, 7
+August, that they, too, should be leaving. These took slim comfort in
+the thought that they, by all rights, should be the first of the 2d to
+depart the island whenever that hoped-for day came.
+
+General Patch received a steady stream of ground reinforcements
+and replacements in December. He was not ready yet to undertake a
+full-scale offensive until the 25th Division and the rest of the 2d
+Marine Division arrived, but he kept all frontline units active in
+combat and reconnaissance patrols, particularly toward the western
+flank.
+
+The island commander’s air defense capabilities also grew
+substantially. Cactus Air Force, organized into a fighter command and a
+strike (bomber) command, now operated from a newly redesignated Marine
+Corps Air Base. The Henderson Field complex included a new airstrip,
+Fighter Two, which replaced Fighter One, which had severe drainage
+problems. Brigadier General Louis Woods, who had taken over as senior
+aviator when Geiger returned to Espiritu Santo, was relieved on 26
+December by Brigadier General Francis P. Mulcahy, Commanding General,
+2d Marine Aircraft Wing. New fighter and bomber squadrons from both the
+1st and 2d Wings sent their flight echelons forward on a regular basis.
+The Army added three fighter squadrons and a medium bomber squadron
+of B-26s. The Royal New Zealand Air Force flew in a reconnaissance
+squadron of Lockheed Hudsons. And the U.S. Navy sent forward a squadron
+of Consolidated PBY Catalina patrol planes which had a much needed
+night-flying capability.
+
+The aerial buildup forced the Japanese to curtail all air attacks and
+made daylight naval reinforcement attempts an event of the past. The
+nighttime visits of the Tokyo Express destroyers now brought only
+supplies encased in metal drums which were rolled over the ships’ sides
+in hope they would float into shore. The men ashore desperately needed
+everything that could be sent, even by this method, but most of the
+drums never reached the beaches.
+
+Still, however desperate the enemy situation was becoming, he was
+prepared to fight. General Hyakutake continued to plan the seizure of
+the airfield. General Hitoshi Immamura, commander of the _Eighth Area
+Army_, arrived in Rabaul on 2 December with orders to continue the
+offensive. He had 50,000 men to add to the embattled Japanese troops on
+Guadalcanal.
+
+Before these new enemy units could be employed, the Americans were
+prepared to move out from the perimeter in their own offensive.
+Conscious that the Mt. Austen area was a continuing threat to his
+inland flank in any drive to the west, Patch committed the Americal’s
+132d Infantry to the task of clearing the mountain’s wooded slopes
+on 17 December. The Army regiment succeeded in isolating the major
+Japanese force in the area by early January. The 1st Battalion, 2d
+Marines, took up hill positions to the southeast of the 132d to
+increase flank protection.
+
+By this time, the 25th Infantry Division (Major General J. Lawton
+Collins) had arrived and so had the 6th Marines (6 January) and the
+rest of the 2d Division’s headquarters and support troops. Brigadier
+General Alphonse De Carre, the Marine division’s assistant commander,
+took charge of all Marine ground forces on the island. The 2d
+Division’s commander, Major General John Marston, remained in New
+Zealand because he was senior to General Patch.
+
+With three divisions under his command, General Patch was designated
+Commanding General, XIV Corps, on 2 January. His corps headquarters
+numbered less than a score of officers and men, almost all taken from
+the Americal’s staff. Brigadier General Edmund B. Sebree, who had
+already led both Army and Marine units in attacks on the Japanese,
+took command of the Americal Division. On 10 January, Patch gave the
+signal to start the strongest American offensive yet in the Guadalcanal
+campaign. The mission of the troops was simple and to the point:
+“Attack and destroy the Japanese forces remaining on Guadalcanal.”
+
+The initial objective of the corps’ attack was a line about 1,000 to
+1,500 yards west of jump-off positions. These ran inland from Point
+Cruz to the vicinity of Hill 66, about 3,000 yards from the beach.
+In order to reach Hill 66, the 25th Infantry Division attacked first
+with the 35th and 27th Infantry driving west and southwest across a
+scrambled series of ridges. The going was rough and the dug-in enemy,
+elements of two regiments of the _38th Division_, gave way reluctantly
+and slowly. By the 13th, however, the American soldiers, aided by
+Marines of the 1st Battalion, 2d Marines, had won through to positions
+on the southern flank of the 2d Marine Division.
+
+On 12 January, the Marines began their advance with the 8th Marines
+along the shore and 2d Marines inland. At the base of Point Cruz, in
+the 3d Battalion, 8th Marines’ sector, regimental weapons company
+halftracks ran over seven enemy machine gun nests. The attack was
+then held up by an extensive emplacement until the weapons company
+commander, Captain Henry P. “Jim” Crowe, took charge of a half-dozen
+Marine infantrymen taking cover from enemy fire with the classic
+remarks: “You’ll never get a Purple Heart hiding in a fox hole. Follow
+me!” The men did and they destroyed the emplacement.
+
+[Illustration: U.S. Halftrack Mounting a 75mm Pack Howitzer and a
+.50-Caliber Air-Cooled Machine Gun]
+
+All along the front of the advancing assault companies the going was
+rough. The Japanese, remnants of the _Sendai Division_, were dug
+into the sides of a series of cross compartments and their fire took
+the Marines in the flank as they advanced. Progress was slow despite
+massive artillery support and naval gunfire from four destroyers
+offshore. In two days of heavy fighting, flamethrowers were employed
+for the first time and tanks were brought into play. The 2d Marines
+was now relieved and the 6th Marines moved into the attack along the
+coast while the 8th Marines took up the advance inland. Naval gunfire
+support, spotted by naval officers ashore, improved measurably. On the
+15th, the Americans, both Army and Marine, reached the initial corps
+objective. In the Marine attack zone, 600 Japanese were dead.
+
+[Illustration: FINAL PHASE
+
+26 JANUARY-9 FEBRUARY 1943]
+
+The battle-weary 2d Marines had seen its last infantry action of
+Guadalcanal. A new unit now came into being, a composite Army-Marine
+division, or CAM division, formed from units of the Americal and
+2d Marine Divisions. The directing staff was from the 2d Division,
+since the Americal had responsibility for the main perimeter. Two of
+its regiments, the 147th and the 182d Infantry, moved up to attack
+in line with the 6th Marines still along the coast. The 8th Marines
+was essentially pinched out of the front lines by a narrowing attack
+corridor as the inland mountains and hills pressed closer to the
+coastal trail. The 25th Division, which was advancing across this
+rugged terrain, had the mission of outflanking the Japanese in the
+vicinity of Kokumbona, while the CAM division drove west. On the 23d,
+as the CAM troops approached Kokumbona, the 1st Battalion of the 27th
+Infantry struck north out of the hills and overran the village site
+and Japanese base. There was only slight but steady opposition to the
+American advance as the enemy withdrew west toward Cape Esperance.
+
+The Japanese had decided, reluctantly, to give up the attempt to retake
+Guadalcanal. The orders were sent in the name of the Emperor and senior
+staff officers were sent to Guadalcanal to ensure their acceptance. The
+Navy would make the final runs of the Tokyo Express, only this time
+in reverse, to evacuate the garrison so it could fight again in later
+battles to hold the Solomons.
+
+Receiving intelligence that enemy ships were massing again to the
+northwest, General Patch took steps, as Vandegrift had before him on
+many occasions, to guard against overextending his forces in the face
+of what appeared to be another enemy attempt at reinforcement. He
+pulled the 25th Division back to bolster the main perimeter defenses
+and ordered the CAM division to continue its attack. When the Marines
+and soldiers moved out on 26 January, they had a surprisingly easy time
+of it, gaining 1,000 yards the first day and 2,000 the following day.
+The Japanese were still contesting every attack, but not in strength.
+
+By 30 January, the sole frontline unit in the American advance was the
+147th Infantry; the 6th Marines held positions to its left rear.
+
+The Japanese destroyer transports made their first run to the island
+on the night of 1-2 February, taking out 2,300 men from evacuation
+positions near Cape Esperance. On the night of 4-5 February, they
+returned and took out most of the _Sendai_ survivors and General
+Hyakutake and his _Seventeenth Army_ staff. The final evacuation
+operation was carried out on the night of 7-8 February, when a
+3,000-man rear guard was embarked. In all, the Japanese withdrew about
+11,000 men in those three nights and evacuated about 13,000 soldiers
+from Guadalcanal overall. The Americans would meet many of these men
+again in later battles, but not the 600 evacuees who died, too worn and
+sick to survive their rescue.
+
+On 9 February, American soldiers advancing from east and west met at
+Tenaro village on Cape Esperance. The only Marine ground unit still
+in action was the 3d Battalion, 10th Marines, supporting the advance.
+General Patch could happily report the “complete and total defeat of
+Japanese forces on Guadalcanal.” No organized Japanese units remained.
+
+On 31 January, the 2d Marines and the 1st Battalion, 8th Marines,
+boarded ship to leave Guadalcanal. As was true with the 1st Marine
+Division, some of these men were so debilitated by malaria they had to
+be carried on board. All of them struck observers again as young men
+grown old “with their skins cracked and furrowed and wrinkled.” On 9
+February, the rest of the 8th Marines and a good part of the division
+supporting units boarded transports. The 6th Marines, thankfully
+only six weeks on the island, left on the 19th. All were headed for
+Wellington, New Zealand, the 2d Marines for the first time. Left behind
+on the island as a legacy of the 2d Marine Division were 263 dead.
+
+[Illustration: _President Franklin D. Roosevelt presents Gen Vandegrift
+the Medal of Honor for his heroic accomplishments against the Japanese
+in the Solomons. Looking on are Mrs. Vandegrift, and the general’s son,
+Maj Alexander A. Vandegrift, Jr._
+
+    National Archives Photo 208-PU-209V-4
+]
+
+The total cost of the Guadalcanal campaign to the American ground
+combat forces was 1,598 officers and men killed, 1,152 of them
+Marines. The wounded totaled 4,709, and 2,799 of these were Marines.
+Marine aviation casualties were 147 killed and 127 wounded. The
+Japanese in their turn lost close to 25,000 men on Guadalcanal, about
+half of whom were killed in action. The rest succumbed to illness,
+wounds, and starvation.
+
+[Illustration: _The temporary resting place of a Marine killed in the
+fighting at Lunga Point is shown here. The grave marker was erected by
+his friends. The Marine’s remains were later removed to the division
+cemetery on Guadalcanal, and further reburial at war’s end either in
+his hometown or the Punchbowl National Cemetery in Hawaii with the
+honors due a fallen hero._]
+
+At sea, the comparative losses were about equal, with each side
+losing about the same number of fighting ships. The enemy loss of
+2 battleships, 3 carriers, 12 cruisers, and 25 destroyers, was
+irreplaceable. The Allied ship losses, though costly, were not fatal;
+in essence, all ships lost were replaced. In the air, at least 600
+Japanese planes were shot down; even more costly was the death of
+2,300 experienced pilots and aircrewmen. The Allied plane losses were
+less than half the enemy’s number and the pilot and aircrew losses
+substantially lower.
+
+President Roosevelt, reflecting the thanks of a grateful nation,
+awarded General Vandegrift the Medal of Honor for “outstanding and
+heroic accomplishment” in his leadership of American forces on
+Guadalcanal from 7 August to 9 December 1942. And for the same period,
+he awarded the Presidential Unit Citation to the 1st Marine Division
+(Reinforced) for “outstanding gallantry” reflecting “courage and
+determination ... of an inspiring order.” Included in the division’s
+citation and award, besides the organic units of the 1st Division, were
+the 2d and 8th Marines and attached units of the 2d Marine Division,
+all of the Americal Division, the 1st Parachute and 1st and 2d Raider
+Battalions, elements of the 3d, 5th, and 14th Defense Battalions, the
+1st Aviation Engineer Battalion, the 6th Naval Construction Battalion,
+and two motor torpedo boat squadrons. The indispensable Cactus Air
+Force was included, also represented by 7 Marine headquarters and
+service squadrons, 16 Marine flying squadrons, 16 Navy flying
+squadrons, and 5 Army flying squadrons.
+
+The victory at Guadalcanal marked a crucial turning point in the
+Pacific War. No longer were the Japanese on the offensive. Some of the
+Japanese Emperor’s best infantrymen, pilots, and seamen had been bested
+in close combat by the Americans and their Allies. There were years of
+fierce fighting ahead, but there was now no question of its outcome.
+
+When the veterans of the 1st Marine Division were gathered in thankful
+reunion 20 years later, they received a poignant message from
+Guadalcanal. The sender was a legend to all “Canal” Marines, Honorary
+U.S. Marine Corps Sergeant Major Jacob C. Vouza. The Solomons native in
+his halting English said: “Tell them I love them all. Me old man now,
+and me no look good no more. But me never forget.”
+
+
+[Sidebar (page 48): The ‘George’ Medal
+
+
+The George Medal is legendary among 1st Marine Division veterans of
+Guadalcanal. Only about 50 were cast, in Australia, before the mold
+gave out.
+
+The medal commemorates the difficult situation of the division during
+the early days on Guadalcanal, when ammunition, food, and heavy
+equipment were short and the Japanese plentiful. When the issue was
+no longer in doubt, Marines had time to reflect on the D-plus-3 Navy
+withdrawal in the face of increasing Japanese air attacks and surface
+action which left the division in such a tight spot.
+
+In the recollection of then-Captain Donald L. Dickson, adjutant of
+the 5th Marines, the Division G-3, then-Lieutenant Colonel Merrill B.
+Twining, resolved to commemorate the occasion. Twining told artist
+Dickson in general terms what he had in mind. Dickson went to work
+designing an appropriate medal using a fifty-cent piece to draw a
+circle on a captured Japanese blank military postcard.
+
+Dickson’s design was approved and when the division got to Australia a
+mold was made by a local metal craftsman and a small number were cast
+before the mold became unserviceable. Those wanting a medal paid one
+Australian pound for it and received a certificate as well. The medals
+are now an even greater rarity than at the time. In recent years,
+reproductions have been cast, and can be identified by the different
+metal and a poor definition of details.
+
+The obverse design shows a hand and sleeve dropping a hot potato in
+the shape of Guadalcanal into the arms of a grateful Marine. In the
+original design the sleeve bore the stripes of a vice admiral intended
+to be either Vice Admiral Robert L. Ghormley, ComSoPac, or Vice Admiral
+Frank Jack Fletcher, Commander Joint Expeditionary Force, but the final
+medal diplomatically omitted this identification.
+
+Also on the obverse is a Saguaro cactus, indigenous to Arizona, not
+Guadalcanal, but representing the code name for the island, “Cactus.”
+The obverse inscription is _Facia Georgius_, “Let George Do It.” Thus
+it became known as the George Medal.
+
+The medal’s reverse pictures a cow (the original design showed a
+Japanese soldier with breeches down) and an electric fan, and is
+inscribed: “In fond remembrance of the happy days spent from Aug. 7th
+1942 to Jan. 5th 1943. U.S.M.C.”
+
+The suspension ribbon was made, appropriately, of the pale green
+herringbone twill from some Marine’s utility uniform. Legend has it
+that to be authentic the utilities from which the ribbons were made had
+to have been washed in the waters of Guadalcanal’s Lunga River. Some
+medals were provided with the oversized safety pin used to identify
+laundry bags in Navy shipboard laundries.
+
+Such unofficial commemorative mementoes are not uncommon in military
+circles and recall, among others, the Soochow Creek medals recognizing
+the defense of Shanghai’s International Settlement during the Japanese
+invasions of 1932 and 1937 which were inspired by the Military Order of
+the Dragon medals of veterans of the China Relief Expedition or Boxer
+Rebellion.--_Brooke Nihart_
+
+[Illustration]
+]
+
+
+
+
+_Sources_
+
+
+The basic source work for this booklet is the first volume in the
+series _History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II, Pearl
+Harbor to Guadalcanal_, written by LtCol Frank O. Hough, Maj Verle E.
+Ludwig, and Henry I. Shaw, Jr. (Washington: Historical Branch, G-3
+Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1958). Other books used in
+writing this narrative were: BGen Samuel B. Griffith II, _The Battle
+for Guadalcanal_ (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1963); Gen Alexander
+A. Vandegrift as told to Robert B. Asprey, _Once a Marine: The Memoirs
+of General A. A. Vandegrift, USMC_ (New York: W. W. Norton, 1964); Col
+Mitchell Paige, _A Marine Named Mitch_ (New York: Vantage Press, 1975);
+Burke Davis, _Marine: The Life of Chesty Puller_ (Boston: Little,
+Brown, 1962); George McMillan, _The Old Breed: A History of the 1st
+Marine Division in World War II_ (Washington: Infantry Journal Press,
+1949); and Richard W. Johnston, _Follow Me!: The Story of the Second
+Marine Division in World War II_ (New York: Random House, 1948).
+
+The correspondence of General Vandegrift with General Holcomb and
+other senior Marines, held at the Marine Corps Historical Center,
+was helpful. Equally of value were conversations that the author had
+had with General Vandegrift after his retirement. In the course of
+his career as a Marine historian, the author has talked with other
+Guadalcanal veterans of all ranks; hopefully, this has resulted in a
+“feel” for the campaign, essential in writing such an overview.
+
+The literature on the Guadalcanal operation is extensive. In addition
+to the books cited above, there are several which are personally
+recommended to the interested reader: Robert Leckie, _Helmet for My
+Pillow_ (New York: Random House, 1957); Herbert Merillat, _Guadalcanal
+Remembered_ (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1982); John Miller, Jr., _The United
+States Army in World War II: The War in the Pacific_; _Guadalcanal,
+The First Offensive_ (Washington: Historical Division, Department
+of the Army, 1949); T. Grady Gallant, _On Valor’s Side_ (New York:
+Doubleday, 1963); Robert Sherrod, _History of Marine Corps Aviation
+in World War II_ (Washington: Combat Forces Press, 1952); Maj John L.
+Zimmerman, _The Guadalcanal Campaign_ (Washington: Historical Division,
+Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1949); RAdm Samuel E. Morrison, _The
+Struggle for Guadalcanal: History of United States Naval Operations
+in World War II_, Vol V (Boston: Little, Brown, 1950); and a recent,
+comprehensive account, Richard B. Frank, _Guadalcanal_ (New York:
+Random House, 1990).
+
+
+
+
+_About the Author_
+
+
+[Illustration]
+
+Henry I. Shaw, Jr., former chief historian of the History and Museums
+Division, was a Marine Corps historian from 1951-1990. He attended The
+Citadel, 1943-1944, and was graduated with a bachelor of arts cum laude
+in history from Hope College, Holland, Michigan. He received a master
+of arts degree in history from Columbia University. Mr. Shaw served as
+a Marine in both World War II and the Korean War. He is the co-author
+of four of the five volumes of the official history of Marine Corps
+operations in World War II and was the senior editor of most of the
+official histories of Marines in Vietnam. In addition, he has written a
+number of brief Marine Corps histories. He has written many articles on
+military history and has had more than 50 signed book reviews.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+_The author gratefully acknowledges the permission granted by the
+Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company of America to use the maps
+from BGen Samuel B. Griffith II’s_ The Battle for Guadalcanal _and by
+Doubleday Books and Jack Coggins for use of the sketches from his_ The
+Campaign for Guadalcanal. _The author also wishes to thank Richard
+J. Frank and Herbert C. Merillat for permission to reproduce their
+photographs._
+
+
+
+
+[Illustration]
+
+=THIS PAMPHLET HISTORY=, one in a series devoted to U.S. Marines in
+the World War II era, is published for the education and training of
+Marines by the History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine
+Corps, Washington, D.C., as a part of the U.S. Department of Defense
+observance of the 50th anniversary of victory in that war.
+
+Editorial costs of preparing this pamphlet have been defrayed in part
+by a bequest from the estate of Emilie H. Watts, in memory of her late
+husband, Thomas M. Watts, who served as a Marine and was the recipient
+of a Purple Heart.
+
+    WORLD WAR II COMMEMORATIVE SERIES
+
+    _DIRECTOR OF MARINE CORPS HISTORY AND MUSEUMS_
+    =Brigadier General Edwin H. Simmons, USMC (Ret)=
+
+    _GENERAL EDITOR,
+    WORLD WAR II COMMEMORATIVE SERIES_
+    =Benis M. Frank=
+
+    _CARTOGRAPHIC CONSULTANT_
+    =George C. MacGillivray=
+
+    _EDITING AND DESIGN SECTION, HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISION_
+    =Robert E. Struder=, Senior Editor;
+    =W. Stephen Hill=, Visual Information Specialist;
+    =Catherine A. Kerns=, Composition Services Technician
+
+    Marine Corps Historical Center
+    Building 58, Washington Navy Yard
+    Washington, D.C. 20374-0580
+
+    1992
+
+    PCN 190 003117 00
+
+
+[Illustration (back cover)]
+
+
+
+
+Transcriber’s Notes
+
+
+Punctuation, hyphenation, and spelling were made consistent when a
+predominant preference was found in this book; otherwise they were not
+changed.
+
+Simple typographical errors were corrected; occasional unbalanced
+quotation marks retained.
+
+To make this eBook easier to read, particularly on handheld devices,
+some images have been made relatively larger than in the original
+pamphlet, and centered, rather than offset to one side or the other;
+and some were placed a little earlier or later than in the
+original. Sidebars in the original have been repositioned between
+chapters and identified as “[Sidebar (page nn):”, where the
+page reference is to the original location in the source book. In the
+Plain Text version, the matching closing right bracket follows the last
+line of the Sidebar’s text and is on a separate line to make it more
+noticeable. In the HTML versions, that bracket follows the colon, and
+each Sidebar is displayed within a box.
+
+Descriptions of the Cover and Frontispiece have been moved from page 1
+of the book to just below those illustrations, and text referring to
+the locations of those illustrations has been deleted.
+
+Page 3: “He spent most of his final years” was misprinted without the
+“of”.
+
+Page 21: “disgraced in his own” was misprinted without the “his”.
+
+
+
+
+
+End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of First Offensive: The Marine Campaign
+for Guadalcanal, by Henry I. Shaw
+
+*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 48807 ***
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-<pre>

-

-The Project Gutenberg EBook of First Offensive: The Marine Campaign for

-Guadalcanal, by Henry I. Shaw

-

-This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most

-other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions

-whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of

-the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at

-www.gutenberg.org.  If you are not located in the United States, you'll have

-to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook.

-

-Title: First Offensive: The Marine Campaign for Guadalcanal

-

-Author: Henry I. Shaw

-

-Release Date: April 27, 2015 [EBook #48807]

-

-Language: English

-

-Character set encoding: UTF-8

-

-*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK FIRST OFFENSIVE: GUADALCANAL ***

-

-

-

-

-Produced by Brian Coe, Charlie Howard, and the Online

-Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This

-file was produced from images generously made available

-by The Internet Archive)

-

-

-

-

-

-

-</pre>

-

-

-<div class="transnote">

-<p class="center">Transcriber’s note: Table of Contents added by Transcriber

-and placed into the Public Domain.</p>

-</div>

-

-<h2 class="nobreak">Contents</h2>

-

-<div class="center vspace"><div class="ilb">

-

-<ul>

-<li><a href="#First_Offensive_The_Marine">First Offensive: The Marine Campaign for Guadalcanal</a><br /></li>

-<li class="in2"><a href="#Sidebar_page_3_General_Alexander_A_Vandegrift">SIDEBAR: General Alexander A. Vandegrift</a><br /></li>

-<li><a href="#The_Landing_and_August_Battles">The Landing and August Battles</a><br /></li>

-<li class="in2"><a href="#Sidebar_page_5_First_Marine_Utility_Uniform_Issued_in_World_War_II">SIDEBAR: First Marine Utility Uniform Issued in World War II</a><br /></li>

-<li class="in2"><a href="#Sidebar_page_11_LVT_1_The_Amtrac">SIDEBAR: LVT (1)&mdash;The ‘Amtrac’</a><br /></li>

-<li class="in2"><a href="#Sidebar_page_14_General_Vandegrift_and_His_1st_Marine_Division_Staff">SIDEBAR: General Vandegrift and His 1st Marine Division Staff</a><br /></li>

-<li class="in2"><a href="#Sidebar_page_17_The_Coastwatchers">SIDEBAR: The Coastwatchers</a><br /></li>

-<li class="in2"><a href="#Sidebar_page_19_The_1st_Marine_Division_Patch">SIDEBAR: The 1st Marine Division Patch</a><br /></li>

-<li><a href="#September_and_the_Ridge">September and the Ridge</a><br /></li>

-<li class="in2"><a href="#Sidebar_page_22_Sergeant_Major_Sir_Jacob_Charles_Vouza">SIDEBAR: Sergeant Major Sir Jacob Charles Vouza</a><br /></li>

-<li class="in2"><a href="#Sidebar_page_23_M3A1_37mm_Antitank_Gun">SIDEBAR: M3A1 37mm Antitank Gun</a><br /></li>

-<li class="in2"><a href="#Sidebar_page_29">SIDEBAR: Douglas Albert Munro</a><br /></li>

-<li><a href="#October_and_the_Japanese_Offensive">October and the Japanese Offensive</a><br /></li>

-<li class="in2"><a href="#Sidebar_page_37_Reising_Gun">SIDEBAR: Reising Gun</a><br /></li>

-<li><a href="#November_and_the_Continuing_Buildup">November and the Continuing Buildup</a><br /></li>

-<li class="in2"><a href="#Sidebar_page_41_75mm_Pack_Howitzer_Workhorse_of_the_Artillery">SIDEBAR: 75mm Pack Howitzer&mdash;Workhorse of the Artillery</a><br /></li>

-<li class="in2"><a href="#Sidebar_page_45_The_Japanese_Model_89_1929_50mm_Heavy_Grenade_Discharger">SIDEBAR: The Japanese Model 89 (1929) 50mm Heavy Grenade Discharger</a><br /></li>

-<li><a href="#December_and_the_Final_Stages">December and the Final Stages</a><br /></li>

-<li class="in2"><a href="#Sidebar_page_48_The_George_Medal">SIDEBAR: The ‘George’ Medal</a><br /></li>

-<li><a href="#Sources">Sources</a><br /></li>

-<li><a href="#About_the_Author">About the Author</a><br /></li>

-<li><a href="#About_series">About this series of pamphlets</a><br /></li>

-<li><a href="#Transcribers_Notes">Transcriber’s Notes</a></li>

-</ul>

-</div></div>

-

-

-<h1 style="text-align: left; clear: none;">

-<span class="smcap">First Offensive:<br />

-The Marine Campaign<br />

-For Guadalcanal</span></h1>

-

-<p class="p2 in0 larger left"><span class="smcap">Marines in<br />

-World War II<br />

-Commemorative Series</span></p>

-

-<p class="p2 in0 larger left"><span class="smcap">By Henry I. Shaw, Jr.</span>

-</p>

-

-<div id="if_i_b_000" class="figcenter" style="width: 374px;">

-  <img src="images/i_b_000.jpg" width="374" height="500" alt="" />

-  <div class="captionl justify"><i>A Marine machine gunner

-and his Browning .30-caliber M1917

-heavy machine gun stand guard while

-1st Marine Division engineers clean up

-in the Lunga River.</i> (Department of

-Defense [USMC] Photo 588741)</div></div>

-

-<hr />

-<div id="if_i_b_001" class="figcenter" style="width: 433px;">

-  <img src="images/i_b_001.jpg" width="433" height="600" alt="" />

-  <div class="captionl justify"><i>It was from a Boeing B-17 Flying

-Fortress such as this that LtCol Merrill

-B. Twining and Maj William B.

-McKean reconnoitered the Watchtower

-target area and discovered the Japanese

-building an airfield on Guadalcanal.</i>

-(National Archives Photo 80-G-34887)</div></div>

-

-<hr />

-

-<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_1" id="Page_1">1</a></span></p>

-

-

-

-<div class="chapter"></div>

-<h2 style="text-align: left; margin-bottom: 0;"><a name="First_Offensive_The_Marine" id="First_Offensive_The_Marine"></a>First Offensive: The Marine<br />

-Campaign for Guadalcanal</h2>

-

-<p class="p0 in0" style="margin-bottom: 2em;"><i>by Henry I. Shaw, Jr.</i></p>

-

-<p class="drop-cap"><span class="smcap1">In</span> the early summer of

-1942, intelligence reports

-of the construction

-of a Japanese

-airfield near Lunga

-Point on Guadalcanal in the Solomon

-Islands triggered a demand for

-offensive action in the South Pacific.

-The leading offensive advocate in

-Washington was Admiral Ernest J.

-King, Chief of Naval Operations

-(CNO). In the Pacific, his view was

-shared by Admiral Chester A.

-Nimitz, Commander in Chief, Pacific

-Fleet (CinCPac), who had already

-proposed sending the 1st Marine

-Raider Battalion to Tulagi, an island

-20 miles north of Guadalcanal across

-Sealark Channel, to destroy a

-Japanese seaplane base there.

-Although the Battle of the Coral Sea

-had forestalled a Japanese amphibious

-assault on Port Moresby, the Allied

-base of supply in eastern New

-Guinea, completion of the Guadalcanal

-airfield might signal the beginning

-of a renewed enemy advance to

-the south and an increased threat to

-the lifeline of American aid to New

-Zealand and Australia. On 23 July

-1942, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)

-in Washington agreed that the line of

-communications in the South Pacific

-had to be secured. The Japanese

-advance had to be stopped. Thus,

-Operation Watchtower, the seizure of

-Guadalcanal and Tulagi, came into

-being.</p>

-

-<p>The islands of the Solomons lie

-nestled in the backwaters of the

-South Pacific. Spanish fortune-hunters

-discovered them in the mid-sixteenth

-century, but no European

-power foresaw any value in the islands

-until Germany sought to expand

-its budding colonial empire

-more than two centuries later. In

-1884, Germany proclaimed a protectorate

-over northern New Guinea, the

-Bismarck Archipelago, and the

-northern Solomons. Great Britain

-countered by establishing a protectorate

-over the southern Solomons

-and by annexing the remainder of

-New Guinea. In 1905, the British

-crown passed administrative control

-over all its territories in the region to

-Australia, and the Territory of

-Papua, with its capital at Port Moresby,

-came into being. Germany’s holdings

-in the region fell under the

-administrative control of the League

-of Nations following World War I,

-with the seat of the colonial government

-located at Rabaul on New Britain.

-The Solomons lay 10 degrees

-below the Equator&mdash;hot, humid, and

-buffeted by torrential rains. The

-celebrated adventure novelist, Jack

-London, supposedly muttered: “If I

-were king, the worst punishment I

-could inflict on my enemies would be

-to banish them to the Solomons.”</p>

-

-<p>On 23 January 1942, Japanese

-forces seized Rabaul and fortified it

-extensively. The site provided an excellent

-harbor and numerous positions

-for airfields. The devastating

-enemy carrier and plane losses at the

-Battle of Midway (3&ndash;6 June 1942) had

-caused <i>Imperial General Headquarters</i>

-to cancel orders for the invasion

-of Midway, New Caledonia, Fiji, and

-Samoa, but plans to construct a

-major seaplane base at Tulagi went

-forward. The location offered one of

-the best anchorages in the South Pacific

-and it was strategically located:

-560 miles from the New Hebrides,

-800 miles from New Caledonia, and

-1,000 miles from Fiji.</p>

-

-<p>The outposts at Tulagi and

-Guadalcanal were the forward evidences

-of a sizeable Japanese force in

-the region, beginning with the <i>Seventeenth

-Army</i>, headquartered at

-Rabaul. The enemy’s <i>Eighth Fleet</i>,

-<i>Eleventh Air Fleet</i>, and <i>1st</i>, <i>7th</i>, <i>8th</i>,

-and <i>14th Naval Base Forces</i> also were

-on New Britain. Beginning on 5 August

-1942, Japanese signal intelligence

-units began to pick up transmissions

-between Noumea on New Caledonia

-and Melbourne, Australia. Enemy

-analysts concluded that Vice Admiral

-Richard L. Ghormley, commanding

-the South Pacific Area (ComSoPac),

-was signalling a British or Australian

-force in preparation for an offensive in

-the Solomons or at New Guinea. The

-warnings were passed to Japanese

-headquarters at Rabaul and Truk, but

-were ignored.</p>

-

-<div id="ip_1" class="figcenter" style="width: 982px;">

-  <img src="images/i_b_002.jpg" width="982" height="774" alt="" />

-  <div class="caption"><p>THE PACIFIC AREAS</p>

-

-<p class="smaller">1 AUGUST 1942</p></div></div>

-

-<p>The invasion force was indeed on its

-way to its targets, Guadalcanal, Tulagi,

-and the tiny islets of Gavutu and

-Tanambogo close by Tulagi’s shore. The

-landing force was composed of Marines;

-the covering force and transport

-force were U.S. Navy with a reinforcement

-of Australian warships. There was

-not much mystery to the selection of

-the 1st Marine Division to make the

-landings. Five U.S. Army divisions were

-located in the South and Southwest Pacific:<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_2" id="Page_2">2</a></span>

-three in Australia, the 37th Infantry

-in Fiji, and the Americal

-Division on New Caledonia. None was

-amphibiously trained and all were considered

-vital parts of defensive garrisons.

-The 1st Marine Division, minus

-one of its infantry regiments, had begun

-arriving in New Zealand in mid-June

-when the division headquarters

-and the 5th Marines reached Wellington.

-At that time, the rest of the reinforced

-division’s major units were

-getting ready to embark. The 1st Marines

-were at San Francisco, the 1st

-Raider Battalion was on New Caledonia,

-and the 3d Defense Battalion was

-at Pearl Harbor. The 2d Marines of the

-2d Marine Division, a unit which

-would replace the 1st Division’s 7th

-Marines stationed in British Samoa,

-was loading out from San Diego. All

-three infantry regiments of the landing

-force had battalions of artillery attached,

-from the 11th Marines, in the

-case of the 5th and 1st; the 2d Marines

-drew its reinforcing 75mm howitzers

-from the 2d Division’s 10th Marines.</p>

-

-<p>The news that his division would

-be the landing force for Watchtower

-came as a surprise to Major General

-Alexander A. Vandegrift, who had

-anticipated that the 1st Division

-would have six months of training in

-the South Pacific before it saw action.

-The changeover from administrative

-loading of the various units’

-supplies to combat loading, where

-first-needed equipment, weapons,

-ammunition, and rations were positioned

-to come off ship first with the

-assault troops, occasioned a never-to-be-forgotten

-scene on Wellington’s

-docks. The combat troops took the

-place of civilian stevedores and unloaded

-and reloaded the cargo and

-passenger vessels in an increasing

-round of working parties, often during

-rainstorms which hampered the

-task, but the job was done. Succeeding

-echelons of the division’s forces

-all got their share of labor on the

-docks as various shipping groups arrived

-and the time grew shorter.

-General Vandegrift was able to convince

-Admiral Ghormley and the

-Joint Chiefs that he would not be

-able to meet a proposed D-Day of 1

-August, but the extended landing

-date, 7 August, did little to improve

-the situation.</p>

-

-<p>An amphibious operation is a

-vastly complicated affair, particularly

-when the forces involved are assembled

-on short notice from all over the

-Pacific. The pressure that Vandegrift

-felt was not unique to the landing

-force commander. The U.S. Navy’s

-ships were the key to success and they

-were scarce and invaluable. Although<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_4" id="Page_4">4</a></span>

-the Battles of Coral Sea and Midway

-had badly damaged the Japanese

-fleet’s offensive capabilities and crippled

-its carrier forces, enemy naval

-aircraft could fight as well ashore as

-afloat and enemy warships were still

-numerous and lethal. American losses

-at Pearl Harbor, Coral Sea, and

-Midway were considerable, and

-Navy admirals were well aware that

-the ships they commanded were in

-short supply. The day was coming

-when America’s shipyards and factories

-would fill the seas with warships

-of all types, but that day had not arrived

-in 1942. Calculated risk was the

-name of the game where the Navy

-was concerned, and if the risk seemed

-too great, the Watchtower landing

-force might be a casualty. As it happened,

-the Navy never ceased to risk

-its ships in the waters of the Solomons,

-but the naval lifeline to the

-troops ashore stretched mighty thin

-at times.</p>

-

-<p>Tactical command of the invasion

-force approaching Guadalcanal in

-early August was vested in Vice Admiral

-Frank J. Fletcher as Expeditionary

-Force Commander (Task Force

-61). His force consisted of the amphibious

-shipping carrying the 1st

-Marine Division, under Rear Admiral

-Richmond K. Turner, and the

-Air Support Force led by Rear Admiral

-Leigh Noyes. Admiral Ghormley

-contributed land-based air forces

-commanded by Rear Admiral John

-S. McCain. Fletcher’s support force

-consisted of three fleet carriers, the

-<i>Saratoga</i> (CV 3), <i>Enterprise</i> (CV 6),

-and <i>Wasp</i> (CV 7); the battleship

-<i>North Carolina</i> (BB 55), 6 cruisers,

-16 destroyers, and 3 oilers. Admiral

-Turner’s covering force included five

-cruisers and nine destroyers.</p>

-

-<div class="chapter"></div>

-<div class="sidebar">

-<p class="in0 small"><a name="Sidebar_page_3_General_Alexander_A_Vandegrift" id="Sidebar_page_3_General_Alexander_A_Vandegrift"></a>[Sidebar (<a href="#Page_4">page 3</a>):]</p>

-<h3 class="nobreak p0">General Alexander A. Vandegrift</h3>

-

-<div id="ip_52b" class="figcenter" style="width: 522px;">

-  <img src="images/i_b_003.jpg" width="522" height="224" alt="" /></div>

-

-<p class="drop-cap a"><span class="dkgreen">A</span> distinguished military analyst once noted that if

-titles were awarded in America as they are in England,

-the commanding general of Marine Corps

-forces at Guadalcanal would be known simply as “Vandegrift

-of Guadalcanal.” But America does not bestow

-aristocratic titles, and besides, such a formality would not

-be in keeping with the soft-spoken, modest demeanor of

-Alexander A. Vandegrift.</p>

-

-<p>The man destined to lead the 1st Marine Division in

-America’s first ground offensive operation of World War

-II was born in 1887 in Charlottesville, Virginia, where he

-grew up fascinated by his grandfather’s stories of life in the

-Confederate Army during the Civil War. It was axiomatic

-that young Alexander would settle on a military career.

-Commissioned a Marine lieutenant in 1909, Vandegrift

-received an early baptism of fire in 1912 during the bombardment,

-assault, and capture of Coyotepe in Nicaragua.

-Two years later he participated in the capture and occupation

-of Vera Cruz. Vandegrift would spend the greater part

-of the next decade in Haiti, where he fought Caco bandits,

-and served as an inspector of constabulary with the Gendarmerie

-d’Haiti. It was in Haiti that he met and was

-befriended by Marine Colonel Smedley D. Butler, who

-called him “Sunny Jim.” The lessons of these formative years

-fighting an elusive enemy in a hostile jungle environment

-were not lost upon the young Marine officer.</p>

-

-<p>He spent the next 18 years in various posts and stations

-in the United States, along with two tours of China duty

-at Peiping and Tientsin. Prior to Pearl Harbor, Vandegrift

-was appointed assistant to the Major General Commandant,

-and in April 1940 received the single star of a

-brigadier general. He was detached to the 1st Marine Division

-in November 1941, and in May 1942 sailed for the

-South Pacific as commanding general of the first Marine

-division ever to leave the United States. On 7 August 1942,

-after exhorting his Marines with the reminder that “God

-favors the bold and strong of heart,” he led the 1st Marine

-Division ashore in the Solomon Islands in the first large-scale

-offensive action against the Japanese.</p>

-

-<p>His triumph at Guadalcanal earned General Vandegrift

-the Medal of Honor, the Navy Cross, and the praise of a

-grateful nation. In July 1943 he took command of I Marine

-Amphibious Corps and planned the landing at Empress

-Augusta Bay, Bougainville, Northern Solomons, on

-1 November 1943. He then was recalled to Washington, to

-become the Eighteenth Commandant of the Marine Corps.</p>

-

-<p>On 1 January 1944, as a lieutenant general, Vandegrift

-was sworn in as Commandant. On 4 April 1945 he was

-promoted to general, and thus became the first Marine

-officer on active duty to attain four-star rank.</p>

-

-<p>In the final stages of the war, General Vandegrift directed

-an elite force approaching half-a-million men and women,

-with its own aviation force. Comparing his Marines

-with the Japanese, he noted that the Japanese soldier “was

-trained to go to a place, stay there, fight and die. We train

-our men to go to a place, fight to win, and to live. I can

-assure you, it is a better theory.”</p>

-

-<p>After the war, Vandegrift fought another battle, this time

-in the halls of Congress, with the stakes being the survival

-of the Marine Corps. His counter-testimony during Congressional

-hearings of the spring of 1946 was instrumental

-in defeating initial attempts to merge or “unify” the U.S.

-Armed Forces. Although his term as Commandant ended

-on 31 December 1947, General Vandegrift would live to see

-passage of Public Law 416, which preserved the Corps and

-its historic mission. His official retirement date of 1 April

-1949 ended just over 40 years of service.</p>

-

-<p>General Vandegrift outlived both his wife Mildred and

-their only son, Colonel Alexander A. Vandegrift, Jr., who

-fought in World War II and Korea. He spent most of his final

-years in Delray, Florida. He died on 8 May 1973.&mdash;<i>Robert

-V. Aquilina</i></p>

-</div>

-

-<hr />

-<div class="chapter"></div>

-<h2><a name="The_Landing_and_August_Battles" id="The_Landing_and_August_Battles"></a><i>The Landing and August Battles</i></h2>

-

-<p>On board the transports approaching

-the Solomons, the Marines were

-looking for a tough fight. They knew

-little about the targets, even less

-about their opponents. Those maps

-that were available were poor, constructions

-based upon outdated

-hydrographic charts and information

-provided by former island residents.

-While maps based on aerial photographs

-had been prepared they were

-misplaced by the Navy in Auckland,

-New Zealand, and never got to the

-Marines at Wellington.</p>

-

-<p>On 17 July, a couple of division

-staff officers, Lieutenant Colonel

-Merrill B. Twining and Major William

-McKean, had been able to join

-the crew of a B-17 flying from Port

-Moresby on a reconnaissance mission

-over Guadalcanal. They reported

-what they had seen, and their analysis,

-coupled with aerial photographs,

-indicated no extensive

-defenses along the beaches of

-Guadalcanal’s north shore.</p>

-

-<div id="ip_4" class="figcenter" style="width: 894px;">

-  <img src="images/i_b_004.jpg" width="894" height="620" alt="" />

-  <div class="caption"><p>GUADALCANAL<br />

-  TULAGI-GAVUTU<br />

-  and<br />

-  Florida Islands</p></div></div>

-

-<p>This news was indeed welcome.

-The division intelligence officer (G-2),

-Lieutenant Colonel Frank B. Goettge,

-had concluded that about 8,400<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_5" id="Page_5">5</a></span>

-Japanese occupied Guadalcanal and

-Tulagi. Admiral Turner’s staff figured

-that the Japanese amounted to 7,125

-men. Admiral Ghormley’s intelligence

-officer pegged the enemy

-strength at 3,100&mdash;closest to the

-3,457 actual total of Japanese troops;

-2,571 of these were stationed on

-Guadalcanal and were mostly

-laborers working on the airfield.</p>

-

-<p>To oppose the Japanese, the Marines

-had an overwhelming superiority

-of men. At the time, the tables of

-organization for a Marine Corps division

-indicated a total of 19,514

-officers and enlisted men, including

-naval medical and engineer (Seabee)

-units. Infantry regiments numbered

-3,168 and consisted of a headquarters

-company, a weapons company,

-and three battalions. Each infantry

-battalion (933 Marines) was organized

-into a headquarters company

-(89), a weapons company (273),

-and three rifle companies (183). The

-artillery regiment had 2,581 officers

-and men organized into three 75mm

-pack howitzer battalions and one

-105mm howitzer battalion. A light

-tank battalion, a special weapons

-battalion of antiaircraft and antitank

-guns, and a parachute battalion added

-combat power. An engineer regiment

-(2,452 Marines) with battalions

-of engineers, pioneers, and Seabees,

-provided a hefty combat and service

-element. The total was rounded

-out by division headquarters battalion’s

-headquarters, signal, and military

-police companies and the

-division’s service troops&mdash;service,

-motor transport, amphibian tractor,

-and medical battalions. For Watchtower,

-the 1st Raider Battalion and

-the 3d Defense Battalion had been

-added to Vandegrift’s command to

-provide more infantrymen and much

-needed coast defense and antiaircraft

-guns and crews.</p>

-

-<p>Unfortunately, the division’s heaviest

-ordnance had been left behind in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_6" id="Page_6">6</a></span>

-New Zealand. Limited ship space and

-time meant that the division’s big

-guns, a 155mm howitzer battalion,

-and all the motor transport battalion’s

-two-and-a-half-ton trucks were

-not loaded. Colonel Pedro A. del

-Valle, commanding the 11th Marines,

-was unhappy at the loss of his heavy

-howitzers and equally distressed that

-essential sound and flash-ranging

-equipment necessary for effective

-counterbattery fire was left behind.

-Also failing to make the cut in the

-battle for shipping space, were all

-spare clothing, bedding rolls, and

-supplies necessary to support the

-reinforced division beyond 60 days

-of combat. Ten days supply of ammunition

-for each of the division’s

-weapons remained in New Zealand.</p>

-

-<div id="ip_6" class="figright" style="width: 362px;">

-  <img src="images/i_b_006.jpg" width="362" height="267" alt="" />

-  <div class="captionr">

-  <p>Naval Historical Photographic Collection 880-CF-117-4-63</p></div>

-  <div class="captionl">

-<p class="justify"><i>Enroute to Guadalcanal RAdm Richmond Kelly Turner, commander of the Amphibious

-Force, and MajGen Alexander A. Vandegrift, 1st Marine Division commander,

-review the Operation Watchtower plan for landings in the Solomon Islands.</i></p></div></div>

-

-<p>In the opinion of the 1st Division’s

-historian and a veteran of the landing,

-the men on the approaching

-transports “thought they’d have a bad

-time getting ashore.” They were confident,

-certainly, and sure that they

-could not be defeated, but most of

-the men were entering combat for the

-first time. There were combat veteran

-officers and noncommissioned

-officers (NCOs) throughout the division,

-but the majority of the men

-were going into their initial battle.

-The commanding officer of the 1st

-Marines, Colonel Clifton B. Cates,

-estimated that 90 percent of his men

-had enlisted after Pearl Harbor. The

-fabled 1st Marine Division of later

-World War II, Korean War, Vietnam

-War, and Persian Gulf War fame, the

-most highly decorated division in the

-U.S. Armed Forces, had not yet established

-its reputation.</p>

-

-<p>The convoy of ships, with its outriding

-protective screen of carriers,

-reached Koro in the Fiji Islands on

-26 July. Practice landings did little

-more than exercise the transports’

-landing craft, since reefs precluded an

-actual beach landing. The rendezvous

-at Koro did give the senior commanders

-a chance to have a

-face-to-face meeting. Fletcher,

-McCain, Turner, and Vandegrift got

-together with Ghormley’s chief of

-staff, Rear Admiral Daniel J. Callaghan,

-who notified the conferees that

-ComSoPac had ordered the 7th Marines

-on Samoa to be prepared to embark

-on four days notice as a

-reinforcement for Watchtower. To

-this decidedly good news, Admiral

-Fletcher added some bad news. In

-view of the threat from enemy land-based

-air, he could not “keep the carriers

-in the area for more than 48

-hours after the landing.” Vandegrift

-protested that he needed at least four

-days to get the division’s gear ashore,

-and Fletcher reluctantly agreed to

-keep his carriers at risk another day.</p>

-

-<p>On the 28th the ships sailed from

-the Fijis, proceeding as if they were

-headed for Australia. At noon on 5

-August, the convoy and its escorts

-turned north for the Solomons. Undetected

-by the Japanese, the assault

-force reached its target during the

-night of 6&ndash;7 August and split into two

-landing groups, Transport Division

-X-Ray, 15 transports heading for the

-north shore of Guadalcanal east of

-Lunga Point, and Transport Division

-Yoke, eight transports headed for

-Tulagi, Gavutu, Tanambogo, and the

-nearby Florida Island, which loomed

-over the smaller islands.</p>

-

-<p>Vandegrift’s plans for the landings

-would put two of his infantry regiments

-(Colonel LeRoy P. Hunt’s 5th

-Marines and Colonel Cates’ 1st Marines)

-ashore on both sides of the

-Lunga River prepared to attack inland

-to seize the airfield. The 11th

-Marines, the 3d Defense Battalion,

-and most of the division’s supporting

-units would also land near the

-Lunga, prepared to exploit the beachhead.

-Across the 20 miles of Sealark

-Channel, the division’s assistant commander,

-Brigadier General William

-H. Rupertus, led the assault forces

-slated to take Tulagi, Gavutu, and

-Tanambogo: the 1st Raider Battalion

-(Lieutenant Colonel Merritt A. Edson);

-the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines

-(Lieutenant Colonel Harold E. Rosecrans);

-and the 1st Parachute Battalion

-(Major Robert H. Williams).

-Company A of the 2d Marines would

-reconnoiter the nearby shores of

-Florida Island and the rest of Colonel

-John A. Arthur’s regiment would

-stand by in reserve to land where

-needed.</p>

-

-<p>As the ships slipped through the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_7" id="Page_7">7</a></span>

-channels on either side of rugged

-Savo Island, which split Sealark near

-its western end, heavy clouds and

-dense rain blanketed the task force.

-Later the moon came out and silhouetted

-the islands. On board his

-command ship, Vandegrift wrote to

-his wife: “Tomorrow morning at

-dawn we land in our first major

-offensive of the war. Our plans have

-been made and God grant that our

-judgement has been sound ...

-whatever happens you’ll know I did

-my best. Let us hope that best will

-be good enough.”</p>

-

-<div id="ip_7" class="figcenter" style="width: 548px;">

-  <div class="captionl top"><p class="justify"><i>MajGen Alexander A. Vandegrift, CG, 1st Marine Division,

-confers with his staff on board the transport USS </i>McCawley<i> (APA-4)

-enroute to Guadalcanal. From left: Gen Vandegrift;

-LtCol Gerald C. Thomas, operations officer; LtCol Randolph

-McC. Pate, logistics officer; LtCol Frank B. Goettge, intelligence

-officer; and Col William Capers James, chief of staff.</i></p></div>

-

-<div class="captionr top">

-<p>National Archives Photo 80-G-17065</p>

-</div>

-  <img src="images/i_b_007.jpg" width="548" height="362" alt="" />

-</div>

-

-<p>At 0641 on 7 August, Turner signalled

-his ships to “land the landing

-force.” Just 28 minutes before, the

-heavy cruiser <i>Quincy</i> (CA 39) had

-begun shelling the landing beaches at

-Guadalcanal. The sun came up that

-fateful Friday at 0650, and the first

-landing craft carrying assault troops

-of the 5th Marines touched down at

-0909 on Red Beach. To the men’s surprise

-(and relief), no Japanese appeared

-to resist the landing. Hunt

-immediately moved his assault

-troops off the beach and into the surrounding

-jungle, waded the steep-banked

-Ilu River, and headed for the

-enemy airfield. The following 1st

-Marines were able to cross the Ilu on

-a bridge the engineers had hastily

-thrown up with an amphibian tractor

-bracing its middle. The silence

-was eerie and the absence of opposition

-was worrisome to the riflemen.

-The Japanese troops, most of whom

-were Korean laborers, had fled to the

-west, spooked by a week’s B-17 bombardment,

-the pre-assault naval gunfire,

-and the sight of the ships

-offshore. The situation was not the

-same across Sealark. The Marines on

-Guadalcanal could hear faint rumbles

-of a firefight across the waters.</p>

-

-<div id="ip_7b" class="figcenter" style="width: 548px;">

-  <img src="images/i_b_008.jpg" width="548" height="306" alt="" />

-  <div class="captionr">

-

-<p>

-National Archives Photo 80-CF-112-5-3

-</p></div>

-

-<div class="captionl">

-<p class="justify"><i>First Division Marines storm ashore across Guadalcanal’s

-beaches on D-Day, 7 August 1942, from the attack transport

-</i>Barnett<i> (AP-11) and attack cargo ship </i>Fomalhaut<i> (AK-22). The

-invaders were surprised at the lack of enemy opposition.</i></p></div></div>

-

-<div id="ip_7c" class="figcenter" style="width: 898px;">

-  <img src="images/i_b_008b.jpg" width="898" height="618" alt="" />

-  <div class="caption">

-

-<p>

-LANDING ON GUADALCANAL<br />

-and Capture of the Airfield<br />

-7&ndash;8 AUGUST 1942</p></div></div>

-

-<div id="ip_7d" class="figcenter" style="width: 548px;">

-  <img src="images/i_b_009.jpg" width="548" height="352" alt="" />

-  <div class="captionr">

-

-<p>

-Photo courtesy of Col James A. Donovan, Jr.

-</p></div>

-

-<div class="captionl">

-<p class="justify"><i>When the 5th Marines entered the jungle from the beachhead,

-and had to cross the steep banks of the Ilu River, 1st Marine

-Division engineers hastily constructed a bridge supported by

-amphibian tractors. Though heavily used, the bridge held up.</i></p></div></div>

-

-<div id="ip_7e" class="figcenter" style="width: 549px;">

-  <div class="captionl top"><p class="justify"><i>Photographed immediately after a prelanding strike by USS

-</i>Enterprise<i> aircraft flown by Navy pilots, Tanambogo and

-Gavutu Islands lie smoking and in ruins in the morning sun.

-Gavutu is at the left across the causeway from Tanambogo.</i></p>

-</div>

-

-<div class="captionr top">

-<p>National Archives Photo 80-C-11034</p></div>

-  <img src="images/i_b_009b.jpg" width="549" height="308" alt="" />

-</div>

-

-<p>The Japanese on Tulagi were special

-naval landing force sailors and

-they had no intention of giving up

-what they held without a vicious, no-surrender

-battle. Edson’s men landed

-first, following by Rosecrans’ battalion,

-hitting Tulagi’s south coast

-and moving inland towards the ridge

-which ran lengthwise through the island.

-The battalions encountered

-pockets of resistance in the undergrowth

-of the islands thick vegetation

-and maneuvered to outflank and

-overrun the opposition. The advance

-of the Marines was steady but casualties

-were frequent. By nightfall, Edson

-had reached the former British

-residency overlooking Tulagi’s harbor

-and dug in for the night across a hill

-that overlooked the Japanese final

-position, a ravine on the islands

-southern tip. The 2d Battalion, 5th

-Marines, had driven through to the

-northern shore, cleaning its sector of

-enemy; Rosecrans moved into position<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_10" id="Page_10">10</a></span>

-to back up the raiders. By the

-end of its first day ashore, 2d Battalion

-had lost 56 men killed and

-wounded; 1st Raider Battalion

-casualties were 99 Marines.</p>

-

-<div id="ip_10" class="figcenter" style="width: 548px;">

-  <img src="images/i_b_010.jpg" width="548" height="426" alt="" />

-  <div class="captionr">

-

-<p>Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 52231</p></div>

-

-<div class="captionl">

-<p class="justify"><i>After the battle, almost all palm trees on Gavutu were shorn

-of their foliage. Despite naval gunfire and close air support

-hitting the enemy emplacements, Japanese opposition from

-caves proved to be serious obstacles for attacking Marines.</i></p></div></div>

-

-<p>Throughout the night, the

-Japanese swarmed from hillside caves

-in four separate attacks, trying to

-penetrate the raider lines. They were

-unsuccessful and most died in the attempts.

-At dawn, the 2d Battalion,

-2d Marines, landed to reinforce the

-attackers and by the afternoon of 8

-August, the mop-up was completed

-and the battle for Tulagi was over.</p>

-

-<p>The fight for tiny Gavutu and

-Tanambogo, both little more than

-small hills rising out of the sea, connected

-by a hundred-yard causeway,

-was every bit as intense as that on

-Tulagi. The area of combat was much

-smaller and the opportunities for fire

-support from offshore ships and carrier

-planes was severely limited once

-the Marines had landed. After naval

-gunfire from the light cruiser <i>San

-Juan</i> (CL 54) and two destroyers, and

-a strike by F4F Wildcats flying from

-the <i>Wasp</i>, the 1st Parachute Battalion

-landed near noon in three waves,

-395 men in all, on Gavutu. The

-Japanese, secure in cave positions,

-opened fire on the second and third

-waves, pinning down the first Marines

-ashore on the beach. Major

-Williams took a bullet in the lungs

-and was evacuated; 32 Marines were

-killed in the withering enemy fire.

-This time, 2d Marines reinforcements

-were really needed; the 1st Battalion’s

-Company B landed on Gavutu and

-attempted to take Tanambogo; the

-attackers were driven to ground and

-had to pull back to Gavutu.</p>

-

-<p>After a rough night of close-in

-fighting with the defenders of both

-islands, the 3d Battalion, 2d Marines,

-reinforced the men already ashore

-and mopped up on each island. The

-toll of Marines dead on the three islands

-was 144; the wounded numbered

-194. The few Japanese who

-survived the battles fled to Florida Island,

-which had been scouted by the

-2d Marines on D-Day and found

-clear of the enemy.</p>

-

-<p>The Marines’ landings and the

-concentration of shipping in Guadalcanal

-waters acted as a magnet to the

-Japanese at Rabaul. At Admiral

-Ghormley’s headquarters, Tulagi’s radio

-was heard on D-Day “frantically

-calling for [the] dispatch of surface<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_11" id="Page_11">11</a></span>

-forces to the scene” and designating

-transports and carriers as targets for

-heavy bombing. The messages were

-sent in plain language, emphasizing

-the plight of the threatened garrison.

-And the enemy response was prompt

-and characteristic of the months of

-naval air and surface attacks to come.</p>

-

-<p>At 1030 on 7 August, an Australian

-coastwatcher hidden in the

-hills of the islands north of Guadalcanal

-signalled that a Japanese air

-strike composed of heavy bombers,

-light bombers, and fighters was headed

-for the island. Fletcher’s pilots,

-whose carriers were positioned 100

-miles south of Guadalcanal, jumped

-the approaching planes 20 miles

-northwest of the landing areas before

-they could disrupt the operation. But

-the Japanese were not daunted by the

-setback; other planes and ships were

-enroute to the inviting target.</p>

-

-<p>On 8 August, the Marines consolidated

-their positions ashore, seizing

-the airfield on Guadalcanal and establishing

-a beachhead. Supplies

-were being unloaded as fast as landing

-craft could make the turnaround

-from ship to shore, but the shore<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_12" id="Page_12">12</a></span>

-party was woefully inadequate to

-handle the influx of ammunition, rations,

-tents, aviation gas, vehicles&mdash;all

-gear necessary to sustain the Marines.

-The beach itself became a

-dumpsite. And almost as soon as the

-initial supplies were landed, they had

-to be moved to positions nearer Kukum

-village and Lunga Point within

-the planned perimeter. Fortunately,

-the lack of Japanese ground opposition

-enabled Vandegrift to shift the

-supply beaches west to a new

-beachhead.</p>

-

-<div id="ip_12" class="figleft" style="width: 363px;">

-  <img src="images/i_b_012.jpg" width="363" height="274" alt="" />

-  <div class="captionr">

-

-<p>

-Marine Corps Personal Papers Collection

-</p></div>

-

-<div class="captionl">

-<p class="justify"><i>Immediately after assault troops cleared the beachhead and moved inland, supplies

-and equipment, inviting targets for enemy bombers, began to litter the beach.</i></p></div></div>

-

-<p>Japanese bombers did penetrate

-the American fighter screen on 8 August.

-Dropping their bombs from

-20,000 feet or more to escape antiaircraft

-fire, the enemy planes were not

-very accurate. They concentrated on

-the ships in the channel, hitting and

-damaging a number of them and

-sinking the destroyer <i>Jarvis</i> (DD

-393). In their battles to turn back the

-attacking planes, the carrier fighter

-squadrons lost 21 Wildcats on 7&ndash;8

-August.</p>

-

-<p>The primary Japanese targets were

-the Allied ships. At this time, and for

-a thankfully and unbelievably long

-time to come, the Japanese commanders

-at Rabaul grossly underestimated

-the strength of Vandegrift’s

-forces. They thought the Marine

-landings constituted a reconnaissance

-in force, perhaps 2,000 men, on

-Guadalcanal. By the evening of 8 August,

-Vandegrift had 10,900 troops

-ashore on Guadalcanal and another

-6,075 on Tulagi. Three infantry regiments

-had landed and each had a

-supporting 75mm pack howitzer

-battalion&mdash;the 2d and 3d Battalions,

-11th Marines on Guadalcanal, and

-the 3d Battalion, 10th Marines on

-Tulagi. The 5th Battalion, 11th Marines’

-105mm howitzers were in

-general support.</p>

-

-<p>That night a cruiser-destroyer

-force of the Imperial Japanese Navy

-reacted to the American invasion

-with a stinging response. Admiral

-Turner had positioned three cruiser-destroyer

-groups to bar the Tulagi-Guadalcanal

-approaches. At the Battle

-of Savo, the Japanese demonstrated

-their superiority in night fighting

-at this stage of the war, shattering

-two of Turners covering forces

-without loss to themselves. Four

-heavy cruisers went to the bottom&mdash;three

-American, one Australian&mdash;and

-another lost her bow. As the sun

-came up over what soon would be

-called “Ironbottom Sound,” Marines

-watched grimly as Higgins boats

-swarmed out to rescue survivors. Approximately

-1,300 sailors died that

-night and another 700 suffered

-wounds or were badly burned.

-Japanese casualties numbered less

-than 200 men.</p>

-

-<p>The Japanese suffered damage to

-only one ship in the encounter, the

-cruiser <i>Chokai</i>. The American cruisers

-<i>Vincennes</i> (CA 44), <i>Astoria</i> (CA

-34), and <i>Quincy</i> (CA 39) went to the

-bottom, as did the Australian Navy’s

-HMAS <i>Canberra</i>, so critically

-damaged that she had to be sunk by

-American torpedoes. Both the cruiser

-<i>Chicago</i> (CA 29) and destroyer <i>Talbot</i>

-(DD 114) were badly damaged.

-Fortunately for the Marines ashore,

-the Japanese force&mdash;five heavy cruisers,

-two light cruisers, and a

-destroyer&mdash;departed before dawn

-without attempting to disrupt the

-landing further.</p>

-

-<div id="ip_12b" class="figright" style="width: 178px;">

-  <img src="images/i_b_012b.jpg" width="178" height="155" alt="" />

-  <div class="captionr">U.S. 105mm Howitzer</div></div>

-

-<p>When the attack-force leader, Vice

-Admiral Gunichi Mikawa, returned

-to Rabaul, he expected to receive the

-accolades of his superiors. He did get

-those, but he also found himself the

-subject of criticism. Admiral Isoroku

-Yamamoto, the Japanese fleet commander,

-chided his subordinate for

-failing to attack the transports. Mikawa

-could only reply, somewhat lamely,

-that he did not know Fletcher’s

-aircraft carriers were so far away

-from Guadalcanal. Of equal significance

-to the Marines on the

-beach, the Japanese naval victory

-caused celebrating superiors in Tokyo

-to allow the event to overshadow the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_13" id="Page_13">13</a></span>

-importance of the amphibious

-operation.</p>

-

-<p>The disaster prompted the American

-admirals to reconsider Navy support

-for operations ashore. Fletcher

-feared for the safety of his carriers;

-he had already lost about a quarter

-of his fighter aircraft. The commander

-of the expeditionary force

-had lost a carrier at Coral Sea and

-another at Midway. He felt he could

-not risk the loss of a third, even if

-it meant leaving the Marines on their

-own. Before the Japanese cruiser attack,

-he obtained Admiral Ghormley’s

-permission to withdraw from

-the area.</p>

-

-<div id="ip_13" class="figleft" style="width: 362px;">

-  <div class="captionl top"><p class="justify"><i>When ships carrying barbed wire and engineering tools needed ashore were forced

-to leave the Guadalcanal area because of enemy air and surface threats, Marines

-had to prepare such hasty field expedients as this</i> <i>cheval de frise</i> <i>of sharpened stakes.</i></p>

-</div>

-

-<div class="captionr top">

-<p>Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 5157</p>

-</div>

-  <img src="images/i_b_013.jpg" width="362" height="281" alt="" />

-</div>

-

-<p>At a conference on board Turner’s

-flagship transport, the <i>McCawley</i>,

-on the night of 8 August, the admiral

-told General Vandegrift that Fletcher’s

-impending withdrawal meant

-that he would have to pull out the

-amphibious force’s ships. The Battle

-of Savo Island reinforced the decision

-to get away before enemy aircraft,

-unchecked by American interceptors,

-struck. On 9 August, the transports

-withdrew to Noumea. The unloading

-of supplies ended abruptly, and

-ships still half-full steamed away. The

-forces ashore had 17 days’ rations&mdash;after

-counting captured Japanese

-food&mdash;and only four days’ supply of

-ammunition for all weapons. Not

-only did the ships take away the rest

-of the supplies, they also took the

-Marines still on board, including the

-2d Marines’ headquarters element.

-Dropped off at the island of Espiritu

-Santo in the New Hebrides, the infantry

-Marines and their commander,

-Colonel Arthur, were most

-unhappy and remained so until they

-finally reached Guadalcanal on 29

-October.</p>

-

-<p>Ashore in the Marine beachheads,

-General Vandegrift ordered rations

-reduced to two meals a day. The

-reduced food intake would last for

-six weeks, and the Marines would

-become very familiar with Japanese

-canned fish and rice. Most of the Marines

-smoked and they were soon disgustedly

-smoking Japanese-issue

-brands. They found that the separate

-paper filters that came with the

-cigarettes were necessary to keep the

-fast-burning tobacco from scorching

-their lips. The retreating ships had

-also hauled away empty sand bags

-and valuable engineer tools. So the

-Marines used Japanese shovels to fill

-Japanese rice bags with sand to

-strengthen their defensive positions.</p>

-

-<div id="ip_13b" class="figright" style="width: 175px;">

-  <img src="images/i_b_013b.jpg" width="175" height="165" alt="" />

-  <div class="captionr">U.S. 90mm Antiaircraft Gun</div></div>

-

-<p>The Marines dug in along the

-beaches between the Tenaru and the

-ridges west of Kukum. A Japanese

-counter-landing was a distinct possibility.

-Inland of the beaches, defensive

-gun pits and foxholes lined the

-west bank of the Tenaru and

-crowned the hills that faced west

-toward the Matanikau River and

-Point Cruz. South of the airfield

-where densely jungled ridges and ravines

-abounded, the beachhead

-perimeter was guarded by outposts

-and these were manned in large part

-by combat support troops. The engineer,

-pioneer, and amphibious tractor

-battalion all had their positions

-on the front line. In fact, any Marine

-with a rifle, and that was virtually

-every Marine, stood night defensive

-duty. There was no place within the

-perimeter that could be counted safe

-from enemy infiltration.</p>

-

-<div id="ip_16" class="figleft" style="width: 176px;">

-  <img src="images/i_b_016.jpg" width="176" height="215" alt="" />

-  <div class="captionr">

-

-<p>Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 150993</p>

-</div>

-

-<div class="captionl">

-<p><i>Col Kiyono Ichiki, a battle-seasoned

-Japanese Army veteran, led his force in

-an impetuous and ill-fated attack on

-strong Marine positions in the Battle of

-the Tenaru on the night of 20&ndash;21 August.</i></p></div></div>

-

-<p>Almost as Turner’s transports

-sailed away, the Japanese began a

-pattern of harassing air attacks on

-the beachhead. Sometimes the raids

-came during the day, but the 3d

-Defense Battalion’s 90mm antiaircraft

-guns forced the bombers to fly too

-high for effective bombing. The erratic

-pattern of bombs, however,

-meant that no place was safe near the

-airfield, the preferred target, and no

-place could claim it was bomb-free.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_16" id="Page_16">16</a></span>

-The most disturbing aspect of

-Japanese air attacks soon became the

-nightly harassment by Japanese aircraft

-which singly, it seemed, roamed

-over the perimeter, dropping bombs

-and flares indiscriminately. The

-nightly visitors, whose planes’ engines

-were soon well known sounds,

-won the singular title “Washing

-Machine Charlie,” at first, and later,

-“Louie the Louse,” when their

-presence heralded Japanese shore

-bombardment. Technically, “Charlie”

-was a twin-engine night bomber

-from Rabaul. “Louie” was a cruiser

-float plane that signalled to the bombardment

-ships. But the harassed

-Marines used the names interchangeably.</p>

-

-<p>Even though most of the division’s

-heavy engineering equipment had

-disappeared with the Navy’s transports,

-the resourceful Marines soon

-completed the airfield’s runway with

-captured Japanese gear. On 12 August

-Admiral McCain’s aide piloted

-in a PBY-5 Catalina flying boat and

-bumped to a halt on what was now

-officially Henderson Field, named for

-a Marine pilot, Major Lofton R. Henderson,

-lost at Midway. The Navy

-officer pronounced the airfield fit for

-fighter use and took off with a load

-of wounded Marines, the first of

-2,879 to be evacuated. Henderson

-Field was the centerpiece of Vandegrift’s

-strategy; he would hold it at

-all costs.</p>

-

-<p>Although it was only 2,000 feet

-long and lacked a taxiway and adequate

-drainage, the tiny airstrip,

-often riddled with potholes and rendered<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_17" id="Page_17">17</a></span>

-unusable because of frequent,

-torrential downpours, was essential

-to the success of the landing force.

-With it operational, supplies could

-be flown in and wounded flown out.

-At least in the Marines’ minds, Navy

-ships ceased to be the only lifeline for

-the defenders.</p>

-

-<p>While Vandegrift’s Marines dug in

-east and west of Henderson Field,

-Japanese headquarters in Rabaul

-planned what it considered an effective

-response to the American offensive.

-Misled by intelligence estimates

-that the Marines numbered perhaps

-2,000 men, Japanese staff officers believed

-that a modest force quickly

-sent could overwhelm the invaders.</p>

-

-<p>On 12 August, CinCPac determined

-that a sizable Japanese force

-was massing at Truk to steam to the

-Solomons and attempt to eject the

-Americans. Ominously, the group included

-the heavy carriers <i>Shokaku</i>

-and <i>Zuikaku</i> and the light carrier

-<i>Ryujo</i>. Despite the painful losses at

-Savo Island, the only significant increases

-to American naval forces in

-the Solomons was the assignment of

-a new battleship, the <i>South Dakota</i>

-(BB 57).</p>

-

-<div id="ip_17" class="figcenter" style="width: 549px;">

-  <div class="captionl top"><p class="justify"><i>Of his watercolor painting “Instructions to a Patrol,” Capt

-Donald L. Dickson said that three men have volunteered to

-locate a Japanese bivouac. The one in the center is a clean-cut

-corporal with the bearing of a high-school athlete. The man

-on the right is “rough and ready.” To the one at left, it’s just

-another job; he may do it heroically, but it’s just another job.</i></p>

-</div>

-

-<div class="captionr top">

-<p>

-Captain Donald L. Dickson, USMCR

-</p></div>

-  <img src="images/i_b_016b.jpg" width="549" height="401" alt="" />

-</div>

-

-<p>Imperial General Headquarters in

-Tokyo had ordered Lieutenant

-General Haruyoshi Hyakutake’s

-<i>Seventeenth Army</i> to attack the Marine

-perimeter. For his assault force,

-Hyakutake chose the <i>35th Infantry

-Brigade</i> (Reinforced), commanded by

-Major General Kiyotake Kawaguchi.

-At the time, Kawaguchi’s main force

-was in the Palaus. Hyakutake selected

-a crack infantry regiment&mdash;the

-<i>28th</i>&mdash;commanded by Colonel Kiyono

-Ichiki to land first. Alerted for its

-mission while it was at Guam, the

-Ichiki Detachment assault echelon,

-one battalion of 900 men, was transported

-to the Solomons on the only

-shipping available, six destroyers. As

-a result the troops carried just small

-amounts of ordnance and supplies.

-A follow-on echelon of 1,200 of

-Ichiki’s troops was to join the assault

-battalion on Guadalcanal.</p>

-

-<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_18" id="Page_18">18</a></span></p>

-

-<div id="ip_18" class="figright" style="width: 362px;">

-  <img src="images/i_b_018.jpg" width="362" height="202" alt="" />

-  <div class="captionr">

-

-<p>

-National Archives Photo 80-G-37932

-</p></div>

-

-<div class="captionl">

-<p class="justify"><i>On 20 August, the first Marine Corps aircraft such as this F4F Grumman Wildcat

-landed on Henderson Field to begin combat air operations against the Japanese.</i></p></div></div>

-

-<p>While the Japanese landing force

-was headed for Guadalcanal, the

-Japanese already on the island

-provided an unpleasant reminder

-that they, too, were full of fight. A

-captured enemy naval rating, taken

-in the constant patrolling to the west

-of the perimeter, indicated that a

-Japanese group wanted to surrender

-near the village of Kokumbona,

-seven miles west of the Matanikau.

-This was the area that Lieutenant

-Colonel Goettge considered held

-most of the enemy troops who had

-fled the airfield. On the night of 12

-August, a reconnaissance patrol of 25

-men led by Goettge himself left the

-perimeter by landing craft. The

-patrol landed near its objective, was

-ambushed, and virtually wiped out.

-Only three men managed to swim

-and wade back to the Marine lines.

-The bodies of the other members of

-the patrol were never found. To this

-day, the fate of the Goettge patrol

-continues to intrigue researchers.</p>

-

-<p>After the loss of Goettge and his

-men, vigilance increased on the

-perimeter. On the 14th, a fabled

-character, the coastwatcher Martin

-Clemens, came strolling out of the

-jungle into the Marine lines. He had

-watched the landing from the hills

-south of the airfield and now

-brought his bodyguard of native

-policemen with him. A retired sergeant

-major of the British Solomon

-Islands Constabulary, Jacob C. Vouza,

-volunteered about this time to

-search out Japanese to the east of the

-perimeter, where patrol sightings and

-contacts had indicated the Japanese

-might have effected a landing.</p>

-

-<p>The ominous news of Japanese

-sightings to the east and west of the

-perimeter were balanced out by the

-joyous word that more Marines had

-landed. This time the Marines were

-aviators. On 20 August, two squadrons

-of Marine Aircraft Group

-(MAG)-23 were launched from the

-escort carrier <i>Long Island</i> (CVE-1) located

-200 miles southeast of Guadalcanal.

-Captain John L. Smith led 19

-Grumman F4F-4 Wildcats of Marine

-Fighting Squadron (VMF)-223 onto

-Henderson’s narrow runway. Smith’s

-fighters were followed by Major

-Richard C. Mangrum’s Marine Scout-Bombing

-Squadron (VMSB)-232

-with 12 Douglas SBD-3 Dauntless

-dive bombers.</p>

-

-<p>From this point of the campaign,

-the radio identification for Guadalcanal,

-Cactus, became increasingly

-synonymous with the island. The

-Marine planes became the first elements

-of what would informally be

-known as Cactus Air Force.</p>

-

-<div id="ip_18b" class="figleft" style="width: 360px;">

-  <div class="captionl top"><p class="justify"><i>The first Army Air Forces P-400 Bell Air Cobras arrived on Guadalcanal on 22 August,

-two days after the first Marine planes, and began operations immediately.</i></p>

-</div>

-

-<div class="captionr top">

-<p>

-National Archives Photo 208-N-4932

-</p></div>

-  <img src="images/i_b_018b.jpg" width="360" height="154" alt="" />

-</div>

-

-<p>Wasting no time, the Marine pilots

-were soon in action against the

-Japanese naval aircraft which frequently

-attacked Guadalcanal. Smith

-shot down his first enemy Zero fighter

-on 21 August; three days later

-VMF-223’s Wildcats intercepted a

-strong Japanese aerial attack force

-and downed 16 enemy planes. In this

-action, Captain Marion E. Carl, a

-veteran of Midway, shot down three

-planes. On the 22d, coastwatchers

-alerted Cactus to an approaching air

-attack and 13 of 16 enemy bombers

-were destroyed. At the same time,

-Mangrum’s dive bombers damaged

-three enemy destroyer-transports attempting

-to reach Guadalcanal. On

-24 August, the American attacking

-aircraft, which now included Navy

-scout-bombers from the <i>Saratoga</i>’s

-Scouting Squadron (VS) 5, succeeded

-in turning back a Japanese reinforcement

-convoy of warships and

-destroyers.</p>

-

-<p>On 22 August, five Bell P-400 Air

-Cobras of the Army’s 67th Fighter

-Squadron had landed at Henderson,

-followed within the week by nine<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_20" id="Page_20">20</a></span>

-more Air Cobras. The Army planes,

-which had serious altitude and

-climb-rate deficiencies, were destined

-to see most action in ground combat

-support roles.</p>

-

-<p>The frenzied action in what became

-known as the Battle of the

-Eastern Solomons was matched

-ashore. Japanese destroyers had delivered

-the vanguard of the Ichiki force

-at Taivu Point, 25 miles east of the

-Marine perimeter. A long-range

-patrol of Marines from Company A,

-1st Battalion, 1st Marines ambushed

-a sizable Japanese force near Taivu

-on 19 August. The Japanese dead

-were readily identified as Army

-troops and the debris of their defeat

-included fresh uniforms and a large

-amount of communication gear.

-Clearly, a new phase of the fighting

-had begun. All Japanese encountered

-to this point had been naval troops.</p>

-

-<p>Alerted by patrols, the Marines

-now dug in along the Ilu River, often

-misnamed the Tenaru on Marine

-maps, were ready for Colonel Ichiki.

-The Japanese commander’s orders

-directed him to “quickly recapture

-and maintain the airfield at Guadalcanal,”

-and his own directive to his

-troops emphasized that they would

-fight “to the last breath of the last

-man.” And they did.</p>

-

-<div id="ip_20" class="figright" style="width: 371px;">

-  <img src="images/i_b_020.jpg" width="371" height="322" alt="" />

-  <div class="captionr">U.S. M-3 Light Tank</div>

-</div>

-

-<p>Too full of his mission to wait for

-the rest of his regiment and sure that

-he faced only a few thousand men

-overall, Ichiki marched from Taivu

-to the Marines’ lines. Before he attacked

-on the night of the 20th, a

-bloody figure stumbled out of the

-jungle with a warning that the

-Japanese were coming. It was Sergeant

-Major Vouza. Captured by the

-Japanese, who found a small American

-flag secreted in his loincloth, he

-was tortured in a failed attempt to

-gain information on the invasion

-force. Tied to a tree, bayonetted twice

-through the chest, and beaten with

-rifle butts, the resolute Vouza chewed

-through his bindings to escape. Taken

-to Lieutenant Colonel Edwin A. Pollock,

-whose 2d Battalion, 1st Marines

-held the Ilu mouth’s defenses,

-he gasped a warning that an estimated

-250&ndash;500 Japanese soldiers were

-coming behind him. The resolute

-Vouza, rushed immediately to an aid

-station and then to the division

-hospital, miraculously survived his

-ordeal and was awarded a Silver Star

-for his heroism by General Vandegrift,

-and later a Legion of Merit.

-Vandegrift also made Vouza an

-honorary sergeant major of U.S.

-Marines.</p>

-

-<p>At 0130 on 21 August, Ichiki’s

-troops stormed the Marines’ lines in

-a screaming, frenzied display of the

-“spiritual strength” which they had

-been assured would sweep aside their

-American enemy. As the Japanese

-charged across the sand bar astride

-the Ilu’s mouth, Pollock’s Marines cut

-them down. After a mortar preparation,

-the Japanese tried again to

-storm past the sand bar. A section of

-37mm guns sprayed the enemy force

-with deadly canister. Lieutenant

-Colonel Lenard B. Cresswell’s 1st Battalion,

-1st Marines moved upstream

-on the Ilu at daybreak, waded across

-the sluggish, 50-foot-wide stream,

-and moved on the flank of the

-Japanese. Wildcats from VMF-223

-strafed the beleagured enemy force.

-Five light tanks blasted the retreating

-Japanese. By 1700, as the sun was

-setting, the battle ended.</p>

-

-<p>Colonel Ichiki, disgraced in his own

-mind by his defeat, burned his

-regimental colors and shot himself.

-Close to 800 of his men joined him

-in death. The few survivors fled eastward

-towards Taivu Point. Rear Admiral

-Raizo Tanaka, whose

-reinforcement force of transports and

-destroyers was largely responsible for

-the subsequent Japanese troop buildup

-on Guadalcanal, recognized that

-the unsupported Japanese attack was

-sheer folly and reflected that “this

-tragedy should have taught us the

-hopelessness of bamboo spear tactics.”

-Fortunately for the Marines,

-Ichiki’s overconfidence was not

-unique among Japanese commanders.</p>

-

-<div id="ip_20b" class="figcenter" style="width: 549px;">

-  <img src="images/i_b_021.jpg" width="549" height="328" alt="" />

-  <div class="captionr">

-

-<p>Captain Donald L. Dickson, USMCR</p></div>

-

-<div class="captionl">

-<p class="justify"><i>Capt Donald L. Dickson said of his watercolor: “I wanted to

-catch on paper the feeling one has as a shell comes whistling

-over.... There is a sense of being alone, naked and unprotected.

-And time seems endless until the shell strikes somewhere.”</i></p></div></div>

-

-<p>Following the 1st Marines’ tangle

-with the Ichiki detachment, General

-Vandegrift was inspired to write the

-Marine Commandant, Lieutenant

-General Thomas Holcomb, and

-report: “These youngsters are the

-darndest people when they get started<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_21" id="Page_21">21</a></span>

-you ever saw.” And all the Marines

-on the island, young and old, tyro

-and veteran, were becoming accomplished

-jungle fighters. They were no

-longer “trigger happy” as many had

-been in their first days ashore, shooting

-at shadows and imagined enemy.

-They were waiting for targets,

-patrolling with enthusiasm, sure of

-themselves. The misnamed Battle of

-the Tenaru had cost Colonel Hunt’s

-regiment 34 killed in action and 75

-wounded. All the division’s Marines

-now felt they were bloodied. What

-the men on Tulagi, Gavutu, and

-Tanambogo and those of the Ilu had

-done was prove that the 1st Marine

-Division would hold fast to what it

-had won.</p>

-

-<div id="ip_21" class="figright" style="width: 276px;">

-  <div class="captionl top"><p class="justify"><i>Cactus Air Force commander, MajGen

-Roy S. Geiger, poses with Capt Joseph

-J. Foss, the leading ace at Guadalcanal

-with 26 Japanese aircraft downed. Capt

-Foss was later awarded the Medal of

-Honor for his heroic exploits in the air.</i></p>

-</div>

-

-<div class="captionr top">

-<p>

-Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 52622

-</p></div>

-  <img src="images/i_b_021b.jpg" width="276" height="239" alt="" />

-</div>

-

-<p>While the division’s Marines and

-sailors had earned a breathing spell

-as the Japanese regrouped for

-another onslaught, the action in the

-air over the Solomons intensified.

-Almost every day, Japanese aircraft

-arrived around noon to bomb the

-perimeter. Marine fighter pilots

-found the twin-engine Betty bombers

-easy targets; Zero fighters were

-another story. Although the Wildcats

-were a much sturdier aircraft, the

-Japanese Zeros’ superior speed and

-better maneuverability gave them a

-distinct edge in a dogfight. The

-American planes, however, when

-warned by the coastwatchers of

-Japanese attacks, had time to climb

-above the oncoming enemy and

-preferably attacked by making firing

-runs during high speed dives. Their

-tactics made the air space over the

-Solomons dangerous for the

-Japanese. On 29 August, the carrier

-<i>Ryujo</i> launched aircraft for a strike

-against the airstrip. Smith’s Wildcats

-shot down 16, with a loss of four of

-their own. Still, the Japanese continued

-to strike at Henderson Field

-without letup. Two days after the

-<i>Ryujo</i> raid, enemy bombers inflicted

-heavy damage on the airfield, setting

-aviation fuel ablaze and

-incinerating parked aircraft.

-VMF-223’s retaliation was a further

-bag of 13 attackers.</p>

-

-<p>On 30 August, two more MAG-23

-squadrons, VMF-224 and

-VMSB-231, flew in to Henderson.

-The air reinforcements were more

-than welcome. Steady combat attrition,

-frequent damage in the air and

-on the ground, and scant repair facilities

-and parts kept the number of

-aircraft available a dwindling

-resource.</p>

-

-<p>Plainly, General Vandegrift needed<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_22" id="Page_22">22</a></span>

-infantry reinforcements as much

-as he did additional aircraft. He

-brought the now-combined raider

-and parachute battalions, both under

-Edson’s command, and the 2d

-Battalion, 5th Marines, over to

-Guadalcanal from Tulagi. This gave

-the division commander a chance to

-order out larger reconnaissance

-patrols to probe for the Japanese. On

-27 August, the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines,

-made a shore-to-shore landing

-near Kokumbona and marched back

-to the beachhead without any measurable

-results. If the Japanese were

-out there beyond the Matanikau&mdash;and

-they were&mdash;they watched the

-Marines and waited for a better opportunity

-to attack.</p>

-

-

-<div class="chapter"></div>

-<div class="sidebar">

-<p class="in0 small"><a name="Sidebar_page_5_First_Marine_Utility_Uniform_Issued_in_World_War_II" id="Sidebar_page_5_First_Marine_Utility_Uniform_Issued_in_World_War_II"></a>[Sidebar (<a href="#Page_5">page 5</a>):]</p>

-<h3 class="nobreak p0">First Marine Utility Uniform Issued in World War II</h3>

-

-<p class="drop-cap"><span class="smcap1">The</span> United States Marine Corps entered World War

-II wearing essentially the same summer field uniform

-that it had worn during the “Banana Wars.”

-The Marines defending America’s Pacific outposts on

-Guam, Wake Island, and in the Philippines in the late

-months of 1941 wore a summer field uniform consisting

-of a khaki cotton shirt and trousers, leggings, and a

-M1917A1 steel helmet. Plans to change this uniform had

-been underway for at least one year prior to the opening

-of hostilities.</p>

-

-<p>As had the Army, the Marine Corps had used a loose-fitting

-blue denim fatigue uniform for work details and some

-field exercises since the 1920s. This fatigue uniform was

-either a one-piece coverall or a two-piece bib overall and

-jacket, both with “USMC” metal buttons. In June 1940, it

-was replaced by a green cotton coverall. This uniform and

-the summer field uniform were replaced by what would

-become known as the utility uniform. Approved for general

-issue on the Marine Corps’ 166th birthday, 10 November

-1941, this new uniform was made of sage-green (although

-“olive drab” was called for in the specifications) herringbone

-twill cotton, then a popular material for civilian work

-clothing. The two-piece uniform consisted of a coat (often

-referred to as a “jacket” by Marines) and trousers. In 1943,

-a cap made of the same material would be issued.</p>

-

-<p>The loose-fitting coat was closed down the front by four

-two-piece rivetted bronze-finished steel buttons, each bearing

-the words “U.S. MARINE CORPS” in relief. The cuffs

-were closed by similar buttons. Two large patch pockets

-were sewn on the front skirts of the jacket and a single patch

-pocket was stitched to the left breast. This pocket had the

-Marine Corps eagle, globe, and anchor insignia and the

-letters “USMC” stencilled on it in black ink. The trousers,

-worn with and without the khaki canvas leggings, had two

-slashed front pockets and two rear patch pockets.</p>

-

-<div class="figright" style="width: 253px;">

-  <img src="images/i_b_005.jpg" width="253" height="216" alt="" /></div>

-

-<p>The new uniform was issued to the flood of new recruits

-crowding the recruit depots in the early months of 1942 and

-was first worn in combat during the landing on Guadalcanal

-in August 1942. This uniform was subsequently worn

-by Marines of all arms from the Solomons Campaign to

-the end of the war. Originally, the buttons on the coat and

-the trousers were all copper-plated, but an emergency alternate

-specification was approved on 15 August 1942, eight

-days after the landing on Guadalcanal, which allowed for

-a variety of finishes on the buttons. Towards the end of

-the war, a new “modified” utility uniform which had been

-developed after Tarawa was also issued, in addition to a

-variety of camouflage uniforms. All of these utility uniforms,

-along with Army-designed Ml helmets and Marine

-Corps-designed cord and rubber-soled rough-side-out

-leather “boondocker” shoes, would be worn throughout the

-war in the Pacific, during the postwar years, and into the

-Korean War.&mdash;<i>Kenneth L. Smith-Christmas</i></p>

-</div>

-

-

-<div class="chapter"></div>

-<div class="sidebar green">

-<p class="in0 small"><a name="Sidebar_page_11_LVT_1_The_Amtrac" id="Sidebar_page_11_LVT_1_The_Amtrac"></a>[Sidebar (<a href="#Page_11">page 11</a>):]</p>

-<h3 class="nobreak p0">LVT (1)&mdash;The ‘Amtrac’</h3>

-

-<p class="drop-cap"><span class="smcap1"><span class="dkgreen">W</span>hile</span> the Marine Corps was developing amphibious

-warfare doctrine during the 1920s and

-1930s, it was apparent that a motorized amphibian

-vehicle was needed to transport men and equipment

-from ships across fringing reefs and beaches into battle,

-particularly when the beach was defended.</p>

-

-<p>In 1940, the Marines adopted the Landing Vehicle,

-Tracked (1), designed by Donald Roebling. More commonly

-known as the “amtrac” (short for amphibian tractor), the

-LVT(1) had a driver’s cab in front and a small engine compartment

-in the rear, with the bulk of the body used for

-carrying space. During the next three years, 1,225 LVT(1)s

-were built, primarily by the Food Machinery Corporation.</p>

-

-<p>The LVT(1) was constructed of welded steel and was

-propelled on both land and water by paddle-type treads.

-Designed solely as a supply vehicle, it could carry 4,500

-pounds of cargo. In August 1942, the LVT(1) first saw combat

-on Guadalcanal with the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion,

-1st Marine Division. Throughout the Solomon

-Islands campaigns, the LVT(1) provided Marines all types

-of logistical support, moving thousands of tons of supplies

-to the front lines. At times they also were pressed into tactical

-use: moving artillery pieces, holding defensive positions,

-and occasionally supporting Marines in the attack

-with their machine guns. They also were used as pontoons

-to support bridges across Guadalcanal rivers.</p>

-

-<p>The LVT proved to be more seaworthy than a boat of

-comparable size; it was able to remain afloat with its entire

-cargo hold full of water. However, defects in the design

-soon became apparent. The paddle treads on the tracks

-and the rigid suspension system were both susceptible to

-damage when driven on land and did not provide the

-desired speeds on land or water. Although the LVT(1) performed

-admirably against undefended beachheads, its lack

-of armor made it unsuitable for assaults against the heavily

-defended islands of the central Pacific. This weakness

-was apparent during the fighting in the Solomon Islands,

-but LVT(1)s with improvised armor were still in use at the

-assault on Tarawa, where 75 percent of them were lost in

-three days.</p>

-

-<p>The LVT(1) proved its value and validated the amphibious

-vehicle concept through the great versatility and mobility

-it demonstrated throughout numerous campaigns in

-the Pacific. Although intended solely for supply purposes,

-it was thrust into combat use in early war engagements.

-In its initial role as a support vehicle, the LVT(1) delivered

-ammunition, supplies and reinforcements that made the

-difference between victory and defeat.&mdash;<i>Second Lieutenant

-Wesley L. Feight, USMC</i></p>

-

-<div class="figcenter" style="width: 525px;">

-  <img src="images/i_b_011.jpg" width="525" height="211" alt="" /></div>

-</div>

-

-

-

-<div class="chapter"></div>

-<div class="sidebar">

-<p class="in0 small"><a name="Sidebar_page_14_General_Vandegrift_and_His_1st_Marine_Division_Staff" id="Sidebar_page_14_General_Vandegrift_and_His_1st_Marine_Division_Staff"></a>[Sidebar (<a href="#Page_16">page 14</a>):]</p>

-<h2 class="nobreak dkgreen">General Vandegrift and His 1st Marine Division Staff</h2>

-

-<p class="drop-cap"><span class="smcap1">Whenever</span> a work about the Guadalcanal operation is

-published, one of the pictures always included is

-that of Major General Alexander A. Vandegrift,

-1st Marine Division commanding general, and his staff officers

-and commanders, who posed for the photograph on 11 August

-1942, just four days after the assault landings on the island.

-Besides General Vandegrift, there are 40 Marines and

-one naval officer in this picture, and each one deserves a page

-of his own in Marine Corps history.</p>

-

-<p>Among the Marines, 23 were promoted to general officer

-rank and three became Commandants of the Marine Corps:

-General Vandegrift and Colonels Cates and Pate. The naval

-officer, division surgeon Commander Warwick T. Brown, MC,

-USN, also made flag officer rank while on active duty and

-was promoted to vice admiral upon retirement.</p>

-

-<p>Four of the officers in the picture served in three wars. Lieutenant

-Colonels Gerald C. Thomas, division operations officer,

-and Randolph McC. Pate, division logistics officer, served in

-both World Wars I and II, and each commanded the 1st Marine

-Division in Korea. Colonel William J. Whaling similarly

-served in World Wars I and II, and was General Thomas’ assistant

-division commander in Korea. Major Henry W. Buse,

-Jr., assistant operations officer, served in World War II, Korea,

-and the Vietnam War. Others served in two wars&mdash;World

-Wars I and II, or World War II and Korea. Represented in the

-photograph is a total of nearly 700 years of cumulative experience

-on active Marine Corps service.</p>

-

-<p>Three key members of the division&mdash;the Assistant Division

-Commander, Brigadier General William H. Rupertus; the Assistant

-Chief of Staff, G-1, Colonel Robert C. Kilmartin, Jr.;

-and the commanding officer of the 1st Raider Battalion, Lieutenant

-Colonel Merritt A. Edson&mdash;were not in this picture for

-a good reason. They were on Tulagi, where Rupertus headed

-the Tulagi Command Group with Kilmartin as his chief of

-staff, and Edson commanded the combat troops. Also notably

-absent from this photograph was the commander of the

-7th Marines, Colonel James C. Webb, who had not joined the

-division from Samoa, where the regiment had been sent before

-the division deployed overseas.</p>

-

-<p>In his memoir, <i>Once a Marine</i>, General Vandegrift explained

-why this photograph was taken. The division’s morale was

-affected by the fact that Vice Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher was

-forced to withdraw his fleet from the area&mdash;with many of his

-ships not yet fully unloaded and holding more than half of

-the division’s supplies still needed ashore. Adding to the Marines’

-uneasiness at seeing their naval support disappear below

-the horizon, was the fact that they had been under almost

-constant enemy air attacks beginning shortly after their landing

-on Guadalcanal. In an effort to counter the adverse influence

-on morale of the day and night air attacks, Vandegrift

-began making tours of the division perimeter every morning

-to talk to as many of his Marines as possible, and to keep a

-personal eye on the command. As he noted:</p>

-

-<blockquote>

-

-<p>By August 11, the full impact of the vanished transports was

-permeating the command, so again I called a conference of my

-staff and command officers.... I ended the conference by

-posing with this fine group of officers, a morale device that

-worked because they thought if I went to the trouble of having

-the picture taken then I obviously planned to enjoy it in

-future years.</p></blockquote>

-

-<p>Recently, General Merrill B. “Bill” Twining, on Guadalcanal

-a lieutenant colonel and assistant D-3, recalled the circumstances

-of the photograph and philosophized about the men

-who appeared in it:</p>

-

-<blockquote>

-

-<p>The group is lined up on the slope of the coral ridge which

-provided a degree of protection from naval gunfire coming from

-the north and was therefore selected as division CP....</p>

-

-<p>There was no vital reason for the conclave. I think V[andegrift]

-just wanted to see who was in his outfit. Do you realize

-these people had never been together before? Some came

-from as far away as Iceland....</p>

-

-<p>V[andegrift] mainly introduced himself, gave a brief pep talk....

-I have often been asked how we could afford to congregate

-all this talent in the face of the enemy. We didn’t believe we

-(<i>at the moment</i>) faced any threat from the Japanese. The defense

-area was small and every responsible commander could reach

-his CP in 5 minutes and after all there were a lot of good people

-along those lines. Most of the fresh-caught second lieutenants

-were battalion commanders two years later. We believed in each

-other and trusted.</p></blockquote>

-

-<p class="sigright">

-&mdash;<i>Benis M. Frank</i>

-</p>

-

-<h3 class="dkgreen">The General and His Officers on Guadalcanal, According to the Chart</h3>

-

-<div class="figright" style="width: 553px;">

-  <img src="images/i_b_015.jpg" width="553" height="360" alt="" /></div>

-

-<div class="figright" style="width: 561px;">

-  <img src="images/i_b_015b.jpg" width="561" height="363" alt="" /></div>

-

-<ul>

-<li class="p1 figspace">1. Col George R. Rowan<br /></li>

-<li class="figspace">2. Col Pedro A. del Valle<br /></li>

-<li class="figspace">3. Col William C. James<br /></li>

-<li class="figspace">4. MajGen Alexander A. Vandegrift<br /></li>

-<li class="figspace">5. LtCol Gerald C. Thomas<br /></li>

-<li class="figspace">6. Col Clifton B. Cates<br /></li>

-<li class="figspace">7. Col Randolph McC. Pate<br /></li>

-<li class="figspace">8. Cdr Warwick T. Brown, USN<br /></li>

-<li class="figspace">9. Col William J. Whaling<br /></li>

-<li>10. Col Frank B. Goettge<br /></li>

-<li>11. Col LeRoy P. Hunt, Jr.<br /></li>

-<li>12. LtCol Frederick C. Biebush<br /></li>

-<li>13. LtCol Edwin A. Pollock<br /></li>

-<li>14. LtCol Edmund J. Buckley<br /></li>

-<li>15. LtCol Walter W. Barr<br /></li>

-<li>16. LtCol Raymond P. Coffman<br /></li>

-<li>17. LtCol Francis R. Geraci<br /></li>

-<li>18. LtCol William E. Maxwell<br /></li>

-<li>19. LtCol Edward G. Hagen<br /></li>

-<li>20. LtCol William N. McKelvy, Jr.<br /></li>

-<li>21. LtCol Julian N. Frisbie<br /></li>

-<li>22. Maj Milton V. O’Connell<br /></li>

-<li>23. Maj William Chalfant III<br /></li>

-<li>24. Maj Horace W. Fuller<br /></li>

-<li>25. Maj Forest C. Thompson<br /></li>

-<li>26. Maj Robert G. Ballance<br /></li>

-<li>27. Maj Henry C. Buse, Jr.<br /></li>

-<li>28. Maj James W. Frazer<br /></li>

-<li>29. Maj Henry H. Crockett<br /></li>

-<li>30. LtCol Lenard B. Cresswell<br /></li>

-<li>31. Maj Robert O. Brown<br /></li>

-<li>32. LtCol John A. Bemis<br /></li>

-<li>33. Col Kenneth W. Benner<br /></li>

-<li>34. Maj Robert B. Luckey<br /></li>

-<li>35. LtCol Samuel B. Taxis<br /></li>

-<li>36. LtCol Eugene H. Price<br /></li>

-<li>37. LtCol Merrill B. Twining<br /></li>

-<li>38. LtCol Walker A. Reaves<br /></li>

-<li>39. LtCol John D. Macklin<br /></li>

-<li>40. LtCol Hawley C. Waterman<br /></li>

-<li>41. Maj James C. Murray, Jr.</li>

-</ul>

-</div>

-

-

-<div class="chapter"></div>

-<div class="sidebar">

-<p class="in0 small"><a name="Sidebar_page_17_The_Coastwatchers" id="Sidebar_page_17_The_Coastwatchers"></a>[Sidebar (<a href="#Page_17">page 17</a>):]</p>

-<h3 class="nobreak p0">The Coastwatchers</h3>

-

-<p class="drop-cap a"><span class="smcap1"><span class="dkgreen">A</span></span> group of fewer than 1,500 native Coastwatchers

-served as the eyes and ears of Allied forces in

-reporting movements of Japanese units on the

-ground, in the air, and at sea.</p>

-

-<p>Often performing their jobs in remote jungle outposts,

-the Coastwatchers were possessed of both mental and physical

-courage. Their knowledge of the geography and peoples

-of the Pacific made them invaluable additions to the Allied

-war effort.</p>

-

-<p>The concept for this service originated in 1919 in a

-proposal by the Royal Australian Navy to form a civilian

-coastwatching organization to provide early warning in the

-event of an invasion. By the outbreak of war in September

-1939, approximately 800 persons were serving as coastwatchers,

-operating observation posts mainly on the Australian

-coast. They were, at the outset, government officials

-aided by missionaries and planters who, as war with Japan

-neared, were placed under the control of the intelligence

-section of the Australian Navy.</p>

-

-<div class="figright" style="width: 253px;">

-  <div class="captionl top"><p class="justify"><i>Coastwatcher Capt W.&nbsp;F. Martin Clemens, British Solomon

-Islands Defence Force, poses with some of his constabulary.</i></p></div>

-

-<div class="captionr top clear"><p>

-National Archives Photo 80-G-17080 courtesy of Richard Frank

-</p></div>

-  <img src="images/i_b_017.jpg" width="253" height="180" alt="" />

-</div>

-

-<p>By 1942, the system of coastwatchers and the accompanying

-intelligence network covered an area of 500,000 square

-miles, and was placed under the control of the Allied Intelligence

-Bureau (AIB). The AIB coordinated Allied intelligence

-activities in the southwest Pacific, and had as its

-initial principal mission the collection of all possible information

-about the enemy in the vicinity of Guadalcanal.</p>

-

-<p>Coastwatchers proved extremely useful to U.S. Marine

-forces in providing reports on the number and movement

-of Japanese troops. Officers from the 1st Marine Division

-obtained accurate information on the location of enemy

-forces in their objective areas, and were provided vital

-reports on approaching Japanese bombing raids. On 8 August

-1942, Coastwatcher Jack Reed on Bougainville alerted

-American forces to an upcoming raid by 40 Japanese

-bombers, which resulted in 36 of the enemy planes being

-destroyed. The “early warning system” provided by the

-Coastwatchers helped Marine forces on Guadalcanal to hold

-onto the Henderson Field airstrip.</p>

-

-<p>The Coastwatchers also rescued and sheltered 118 Allied

-pilots, including Marines, during the Solomons Campaign,

-often at the immediate risk of their own lives.

-Pipe-smoking Coastwatcher Reed also was responsible for

-coordinating the evacuation on Bougainville of four nuns

-and 25 civilians by the U.S. submarine <i>Nautilus</i>.</p>

-

-<p>It is unknown exactly how many Coastwatchers paid the

-ultimate sacrifice in the performance of their duties. Many

-died in anonymity, without knowledge of the contribution

-their services had made to final victory. Perhaps they would

-be gratified to know that no less an authority than Admiral

-William F. Halsey recorded that the Coastwatchers saved

-Guadalcanal, and Guadalcanal saved the Pacific.&mdash;<i>Robert

-V. Aquilina</i></p>

-</div>

-

-

-<div class="chapter"></div>

-<div class="sidebar green">

-<p class="in0 small"><a name="Sidebar_page_19_The_1st_Marine_Division_Patch" id="Sidebar_page_19_The_1st_Marine_Division_Patch"></a>[Sidebar (<a href="#Page_20">page 19</a>):]</p>

-<h3 class="nobreak p0">The 1st Marine Division Patch</h3>

-

-<div class="figright" style="width: 251px;">

-  <img src="images/i_b_019b.jpg" width="251" height="323" alt="" /></div>

-

-<p class="drop-cap"><span class="smcap1">T</span>he 1st Division shoulder patch originally was

-authorized for wear by members of units who

-were organic or attached to the division in its four

-landings in the Pacific War. It was the first unit patch to

-be authorized for wear in World War II and specifically

-commemorated the division’s sacrifices and victory in the

-battle for Guadalcanal.</p>

-

-<p>As recalled by General Merrill B. Twining, a lieutenant

-colonel and the division’s operations officer on Guadalcanal,

-for a short time before the 1st left Guadalcanal for

-Australia, there had been some discussion by the senior

-staff about uniforming the troops. It appeared that the Marines

-might have to wear Army uniforms, which meant that

-they would lose their identity and Twining came up with

-the idea for a division patch. A number of different designs

-were devised by both Lieutenant Colonel Twining and

-Captain Donald L. Dickson, adjutant of the 5th Marines,

-who had been an artist in civilian life. The one which Twining

-prepared on the flight out of Guadalcanal was approved

-by Major General Alexander A. Vandegrift, the division

-commander.</p>

-

-<p>General Twining further recalled that he drew a diamond

-in his notebook and “in the middle of the diamond I

-doodled a numeral one ... [and] I sketched in the word

-‘Guadalcanal’ down its length.... I got to thinking that

-the whole operation had been under the Southern Cross,

-so I drew that in, too.... About an hour later I took

-the drawing up to the front of the aircraft to General Vandegrift.

-He said, ‘Yes, that’s it!’ and wrote his initials, A.A.V.,

-on the bottom of the notebook page.”</p>

-

-<div class="figleft" style="width: 258px;">

-  <img src="images/i_b_019.jpg" width="258" height="147" alt="" />

-  <div class="captionl justify"><i>Designer of the patch, LtCol Merrill B. Twining (later Gen)

-sits in the 1st Marine Division operations bunker. Behind

-him is his assistant D-3, a very tired Maj Henry IV. Buse, Jr.</i></div></div>

-

-<p>After he arrived in Brisbane, Australia, Colonel Twining

-bought a child’s watercolor set and, while confined to

-his hotel room by a bout of malaria, drew a bunch of diamonds

-on a big sheet, coloring each one differently. He then

-took samples to General Vandegrift, who chose one which

-was colored a shade of blue that he liked. Then Twining

-took the sketch to the Australian Knitting Mills to have it

-reproduced, pledging the credit of the post exchange funds

-to pay for the patches’ manufacture. Within a week or two

-the patches began to roll off the knitting machines, and

-Colonel Twining was there to approve them. General Twining

-further recalled: “After they came off the machine, I

-picked up a sheet of them. They looked very good, and

-when they were cut, I picked up one of the patches. It was

-one of the first off the machine.”</p>

-

-<p>The division’s post exchanges began selling the patches

-almost immediately and they proved to be popular, with

-Marines buying extras to give away as souvenirs to Australian

-friends or to send home to families. Before long,

-newly established Marine divisions, as well as the raider

-and parachute units, and as the aircraft wings, sea-going

-Marines, Fleet Marine Force Pacific units, and others, were

-authorized to have their own distinctive patch, a total of

-33, following the lead of the 1st Marine Division. Marines

-returning to the United States for duty or on leave from

-a unit having a distinctive shoulder insignia were authorized

-to wear that insignia until they were assigned to

-another unit having a shoulder patch of its own. For many

-1st Marine Division men joining another unit and having

-to relinquish the wearing of the 1st Division patch, this

-rankled.</p>

-

-<p>Shortly after the end of the war, Colonel Twining went

-to now-Marine Commandant General Vandegrift saying

-that he “no longer thought Marines should wear anything

-on their uniforms to distinguish them from other Marines.

-He agreed and the patches came off for good.”&mdash;<i>Benis M.

-Frank</i></p>

-</div>

-

-<hr />

-<div class="chapter"></div>

-<h2><a name="September_and_the_Ridge" id="September_and_the_Ridge"></a><i>September and the Ridge</i></h2>

-

-<p>Admiral McCain visited Guadalcanal

-at the end of August, arriving

-in time to greet the aerial reinforcements

-he had ordered forward, and

-also in time for a taste of Japanese

-nightly bombing. He got to experience,

-too, what was becoming

-another unwanted feature of Cactus

-nights: bombardment by Japanese

-cruisers and destroyers. General Vandegrift

-noted that McCain had gotten

-a dose of the “normal ration of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_23" id="Page_23">23</a></span>

-shells.” The admiral saw enough to

-signal his superiors that increased

-support for Guadalcanal operations

-was imperative and that the “situation

-admits no delay whatsoever.” He

-also sent a prophetic message to Admirals

-King and Nimitz: “Cactus can

-be a sinkhole for enemy air power

-and can be consolidated, expanded,

-and exploited to the enemy’s mortal

-hurt.”</p>

-

-<p>On 3 September, the Commanding

-General, 1st Marine Aircraft

-Wing, Brigadier General Roy S.

-Geiger, and his assistant wing commander,

-Colonel Louis Woods,

-moved forward to Guadalcanal to

-take charge of air operations. The arrival

-of the veteran Marine aviators

-provided an instant lift to the morale

-of the pilots and ground crews. It

-reinforced their belief that they were

-at the leading edge of air combat,

-that they were setting the pace for the

-rest of Marine aviation. Vandegrift

-could thankfully turn over the day-to-day

-management of the aerial

-defenses of Cactus to the able and experienced

-Geiger. There was no

-shortage of targets for the mixed air

-force of Marine, Army, and Navy

-flyers. Daily air attacks by the

-Japanese, coupled with steady reinforcement<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_24" id="Page_24">24</a></span>

-attempts by Tanaka’s destroyers

-and transports, meant that

-every type of plane that could lift off

-Henderson’s runway was airborne as

-often as possible. Seabees had begun

-work on a second airstrip, Fighter

-One, which could relieve some of the

-pressure on the primary airfield.</p>

-

-<div id="ip_24" class="figcenter" style="width: 547px;">

-  <img src="images/i_b_024.jpg" width="547" height="295" alt="" />

-  <div class="captionr">

-

-<p>National Archives Photo 80-G-29536-413C</p></div>

-

-<div class="captionl">

-<p class="justify"><i>This is an oblique view of Henderson Field looking north with

-Ironbottom Sound (Sealark Channel) in the background. At

-the left center is the “Pagoda,” operations center of Cactus Air

-Force flyers throughout their first months of operations ashore.</i></p></div></div>

-

-<p>Most of General Kawaguchi’s

-brigade had reached Guadalcanal.

-Those who hadn’t, missed their landfall

-forever as a result of American

-air attacks. Kawaguchi had in mind

-a surprise attack on the heart of the

-Marine position, a thrust from the

-jungle directly at the airfield. To

-reach his jumpoff position, the

-Japanese general would have to move

-through difficult terrain unobserved,

-carving his way through the dense

-vegetation out of sight of Marine

-patrols. The rugged approach route

-would lead him to a prominent ridge

-topped by Kunai grass which wove

-snake-like through the jungle to within

-a mile of Henderson’s runway.

-Unknown to the Japanese, General

-Vandegrift planned on moving his

-headquarters to the shelter of a spot

-at the inland base of this ridge, a site

-better protected, it was hoped, from

-enemy bombing and shellfire.</p>

-

-<div id="ip_24b" class="figcenter" style="width: 360px;">

-  <div class="captionl top"><p class="justify"><i>Marine ground crewmen attempt to put out one of many fires occuring after a

-Japanese bombing raid on Henderson Field causing the loss of much-needed aircraft.</i></p></div>

-

-<div class="captionr top"><p>

-Marine Corps Personal Papers Collection

-</p></div>

-  <img src="images/i_b_024b.jpg" width="360" height="245" alt="" />

-</div>

-

-<p>The success of Kawaguchi’s plan

-depended upon the Marines keeping

-the inland perimeter thinly manned

-while they concentrated their forces

-on the east and west flanks. This was

-not to be. Available intelligence, including

-a captured enemy map,

-pointed to the likelihood of an attack

-on the airfield and Vandegrift moved

-his combined raider-parachute battalion

-to the most obvious enemy approach

-route, the ridge. Colonel

-Edson’s men, who scouted Savo Island

-after moving to Guadalcanal

-and destroyed a Japanese supply base<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_25" id="Page_25">25</a></span>

-at Tasimboko in another shore-to-shore

-raid, took up positions on the

-forward slopes of the ridge at the

-edge of the encroaching jungle on 10

-September. Their commander later

-said that he “was firmly convinced

-that we were in the path of the next

-Jap attack.” Earlier patrols had spotted

-a sizable Japanese force approaching.

-Accordingly, Edson

-patrolled extensively as his men dug

-in on the ridge and in the flanking

-jungle. On the 12th, the Marines

-made contact with enemy patrols

-confirming the fact that Japanese

-troops were definitely “out front.”

-Kawaguchi had about 2,000 of his

-men with him, enough he thought to

-punch through to the airfield.</p>

-

-<p>Japanese planes had dropped

-500-pound bombs along the ridge on

-the 11th and enemy ships began

-shelling the area after nightfall on the

-12th, once the threat of American air

-attacks subsided. The first Japanese

-thrust came at 2100 against Edson’s

-left flank. Boiling out of the jungle,

-the enemy soldiers attacked fearlessly

-into the face of rifle and machine gun

-fire, closing to bayonet range. They

-were thrown back. They came again,

-this time against the right flank,

-penetrating the Marines’ positions.

-Again they were thrown back. A

-third attack closed out the night’s action.

-Again it was a close affair, but

-by 0230 Edson told Vandegrift his

-men could hold. And they did.</p>

-

-<div id="ip_25" class="figcenter" style="width: 551px;">

-  <div class="captionl top"><p class="justify"><i>The raging battle of Edson’s Ridge is depicted in all its fury

-in this oil painting by the late Col Donald L. Dickson, who,

-as a captain, was adjutant of the 5th Marines on Guadalcanal.

-Dickson’s artwork later was shown widely in the United States.</i></p></div>

-

-<div class="captionr top"><p>

-Captain Donald L. Dickson, USMCR

-</p></div>

-  <img src="images/i_b_025.jpg" width="551" height="384" alt="" />

-</div>

-

-<p>On the morning of 13 September,

-Edson called his company commanders

-together and told them:

-“They were just testing, just testing.

-They’ll be back.” He ordered all positions

-improved and defenses consolidated

-and pulled his lines towards

-the airfield along the ridge’s center

-spine. The 2d Battalion, 5th Marines,

-his backup on Tulagi, moved into position

-to reinforce again.</p>

-

-<div id="ip_25b" class="figcenter" style="width: 746px;">

-  <img src="images/i_b_026.jpg" width="746" height="520" alt="" />

-  <div class="caption"><p>EDSON’S (BLOODY) RIDGE</p>

-

-<p class="smaller">12&ndash;14 SEPTEMBER 1942</p></div></div>

-

-<div id="ip_25c" class="figcenter" style="width: 548px;">

-  <div class="captionl top"><p class="justify"><i>Edson’s or Raider’s Ridge is calm after the fighting on the nights

-of 12&ndash;13 and 13&ndash;14 September, when it was the scene of a valiant

-and bloody defense crucial to safeguarding Henderson

-Field and the Marine perimeter on Guadalcanal. The knobs

-at left background were Col Edson’s final defensive position,

-while Henderson Field lies beyond the trees in the background.</i></p></div>

-

-<div class="captionr top"><p>

-Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 500007

-</p></div>

-  <img src="images/i_b_026b.jpg" width="548" height="308" alt="" />

-</div>

-

-<div id="ip_25d" class="figleft" style="width: 175px;">

-  <img src="images/i_b_027.jpg" width="175" height="233" alt="" />

-  <div class="captionr">

-

-<p>Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 310563</p></div>

-

-<div class="captionl">

-<p><i>Maj Kenneth D. Bailey, commander of

-Company C, 1st Raider Battalion, was

-awarded the Medal of Honor posthumously

-for heroic and inspiring leadership

-during the Battle of Edson’s Ridge.</i></p></div></div>

-

-<p>The next night’s attacks were as

-fierce as any man had seen. The

-Japanese were everywhere, fighting

-hand-to-hand in the Marines’ foxholes

-and gun pits and filtering past

-forward positions to attack from the

-rear. Division Sergeant Major

-Sheffield Banta shot one in the new

-command post. Colonel Edson appeared

-wherever the fighting was

-toughest, encouraging his men to

-their utmost efforts. The man-to-man

-battles lapped over into the jungle on

-either flank of the ridge, and engineer

-and pioneer positions were attacked.

-The reserve from the 5th Marines

-was fed into the fight. Artillerymen

-from the 5th Battalion, 11th Marines,

-as they had on the previous night,

-fired their 105mm howitzers at any

-called target. The range grew as short

-as 1,600 yards from tube to impact.

-The Japanese finally could take no

-more. They pulled back as dawn approached.

-On the slopes of the ridge

-and in the surrounding jungle they

-left more than 600 bodies; another

-600 men were wounded. The remnants

-of the Kawaguchi force staggered

-back toward their lines to the

-west, a grueling, hellish eight-day

-march that saw many more of the

-enemy perish.</p>

-

-<p>The cost to Edson’s force for its

-epic defense was also heavy. Fifty-nine

-men were dead, 10 were missing

-in action, and 194 were wounded.

-These losses, coupled with the

-casualties of Tulagi, Gavutu, and

-Tanambogo, meant the end of the 1st

-Parachute Battalion as an effective

-fighting unit. Only 89 men of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_27" id="Page_27">27</a></span>

-parachutists’ original strength could

-walk off the ridge, soon in legend to

-become “Bloody Ridge” or “Edson’s

-Ridge.” Both Colonel Edson and Captain

-Kenneth D. Bailey, commanding

-the raider’s Company C, were awarded

-the Medal of Honor for their

-heroic and inspirational actions.</p>

-

-<p>On 13 and 14 September, the

-Japanese attempted to support

-Kawaguchi’s attack on the ridge with

-thrusts against the flanks of the Marine

-perimeter. On the east, enemy

-troops attempting to penetrate the

-lines of the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines,

-were caught in the open on a grass

-plain and smothered by artillery fire;

-at least 200 died. On the west, the

-3d Battalion, 5th Marines, holding

-ridge positions covering the coastal

-road, fought off a determined attacking

-force that reached its front lines.</p>

-

-<div id="ip_27" class="figcenter" style="width: 551px;">

-  <div class="captionl top"><p class="justify"><i>The Pagoda at Henderson Field, served as headquarters for

-Cactus Air Force throughout the first months of air operations

-on Guadalcanal. From this building, Allied planes were sent

-against Japanese troops on other islands of the Solomons.</i></p>

-</div>

-

-<div class="captionr top">

-<p>

-Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 50921

-</p></div>

-  <img src="images/i_b_027b.jpg" width="551" height="400" alt="" />

-</div>

-

-<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_28" id="Page_28">28</a></span>

-The victory at the ridge gave a

-great boost to Allied homefront

-morale, and reinforced the opinion

-of the men ashore on Guadalcanal

-that they could take on anything the

-enemy could send against them. At

-upper command echelons, the leaders

-were not so sure that the ground

-Marines and their motley air force

-could hold. Intercepted Japanese dispatches

-revealed that the myth of the

-2,000-man defending force had been

-completely dispelled. Sizable naval

-forces and two divisions of Japanese

-troops were now committed to conquer

-the Americans on Guadalcanal.

-Cactus Air Force, augmented frequently

-by Navy carrier squadrons,

-made the planned reinforcement effort

-a high-risk venture. But it was

-a risk the Japanese were prepared to

-take.</p>

-

-<p>On 18 September, the long-awaited

-7th Marines, reinforced by

-the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, and

-other division troops, arrived at

-Guadalcanal. As the men from

-Samoa landed they were greeted with

-friendly derision by Marines already

-on the island. The 7th had been the

-first regiment of the 1st Division to

-go overseas; its men, many thought

-then, were likely to be the first to see

-combat. The division had been careful

-to send some of its best men to

-Samoa and now had them back. One

-of the new and salty combat veterans

-of the 5th Marines remarked to a

-friend in the 7th that he had waited

-a long time “to see our first team get

-into the game.” Providentially, a

-separate supply convoy reached the

-island at the same time as the 7th’s

-arrival, bringing with it badly needed

-aviation gas and the first resupply

-of ammunition since D-Day.</p>

-

-<p>The Navy covering force for the

-American reinforcement and supply

-convoys was hit hard by Japanese

-submarines. The carrier <i>Wasp</i> was

-torpedoed and sunk, the battleship

-<i>North Carolina</i> (BB 55) was

-damaged, and the destroyer <i>O’Brien</i>

-(DD 415) was hit so badly it broke

-up and sank on its way to drydock.

-The Navy had accomplished its mission,

-the 7th Marines had landed,

-but at a terrible cost. About the only

-good result of the devastating

-Japanese torpedo attacks was that the

-<i>Wasp</i>’s surviving aircraft joined Cactus

-Air Force, as the planes of the

-<i>Saratoga</i> and <i>Enterprise</i> had done

-when their carriers required combat

-repairs. Now, the <i>Hornet</i> (CV 8) was

-the only whole fleet carrier left in the

-South Pacific.</p>

-

-<p>As the ships that brought the 7th

-Marines withdrew, they took with

-them the survivors of the 1st

-Parachute Battalion and sick bays full

-of badly wounded men. General

-Vandegrift now had 10 infantry battalions,

-one understrength raider battalion,

-and five artillery battalions

-ashore; the 3d Battalion, 2d Marines,

-had come over from Tulagi also. He

-reorganized the defensive perimeter

-into 10 sectors for better control, giving

-the engineer, pioneer, and amphibian

-tractor battalions sectors

-along the beach. Infantry battalions

-manned the other sectors, including

-the inland perimeter in the jungle.

-Each infantry regiment had two battalions

-on line and one in reserve.

-Vandegrift also had the use of a select

-group of infantrymen who were

-training to be scouts and snipers under

-the leadership of Colonel William

-J. “Wild Bill” Whaling, an experienced

-jungle hand, marksman,

-and hunter, whom he had appointed

-to run a school to sharpen the division’s

-fighting skills. As men

-finished their training under Whaling

-and went back to their outfits,

-others took their place and the Whaling

-group was available to scout and

-spearhead operations.</p>

-

-<p>Vandegrift now had enough men

-ashore on Guadalcanal, 19,200, to

-expand his defensive scheme. He

-decided to seize a forward position

-along the east bank of the Matanikau

-River, in effect strongly outposting

-his west flank defenses against the

-probability of strong enemy attacks

-from the area where most Japanese

-troops were landing. First, however,

-he was going to test the Japanese

-reaction with a strong probing force.</p>

-

-<p>He chose the fresh 1st Battalion,

-7th Marines, commanded by Lieutenant

-Colonel Lewis B. “Chesty”

-Puller, to move inland along the

-slopes of Mt. Austen and patrol

-north towards the coast and the

-Japanese-held area. Puller’s battalion

-ran into Japanese troops bivouacked

-on the slopes of Austen on the 24th

-and in a sharp firefight had seven

-men killed and 25 wounded. Vandegrift

-sent the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines,

-forward to reinforce Puller and

-help provide the men needed to carry

-the casualties out of the jungle.

-Now reinforced, Puller continued his

-advance, moving down the east bank

-of the Matanikau. He reached the

-coast on the 26th as planned, where

-he drew intensive fire from enemy

-positions on the ridges west of the

-river. An attempt by the 2d Battalion,

-5th Marines, to cross was beaten

-back.</p>

-

-<p>About this time, the 1st Raider

-Battalion, its original mission one of

-establishing a patrol base west of the

-Matanikau, reached the vicinity of

-the firefight, and joined in. Vandegrift

-sent Colonel Edson, now the

-commander of the 5th Marines, forward

-to take charge of the expanded

-force. He was directed to attack on

-the 27th and decided to send the raiders

-inland to outflank the Japanese

-defenders. The battalion, commanded

-by Edson’s former executive

-officer, Lieutenant Colonel Samuel B.

-Griffith II, ran into a hornet’s nest of

-Japanese who had crossed the

-Matanikau during the night. A garbled

-message led Edson to believe

-that Griffith’s men were advancing

-according to plan, so he decided to

-land the companies of the 1st Battalion,

-7th Marines, behind the enemy’s

-Matanikau position and strike the

-Japanese from the rear while Rosecran’s

-men attacked across the river.</p>

-

-<p>The landing was made without incident<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_29" id="Page_29">29</a></span>

-and the 7th Marines’ companies

-moved inland only to be

-ambushed and cut off from the sea

-by the Japanese. A rescue force of

-landing craft moved with difficulty

-through Japanese fire, urged on by

-Puller who accompanied the boats

-on the destroyer <i>Ballard</i> (DD 660).

-The Marines were evacuated after

-fighting their way to the beach covered

-by the destroyer’s fire and the

-machine guns of a Marine SBD overhead.

-Once the 7th Marines companies

-got back to the perimeter,

-landing near Kukum, the raider and

-5th Marines battalions pulled back

-from the Matanikau. The confirmation

-that the Japanese would strongly

-contest any westward advance cost

-the Marines 60 men killed and 100

-wounded.</p>

-

-<div id="ip_29" class="figcenter" style="width: 363px;">

-  <div class="captionl top"><p class="justify"><i>Shortly after becoming Commander, South Pacific Area and Forces, VAdm William

-F. Halsey visited Guadalcanal and the 1st Marine Division. Here he is shown

-talking with Col Gerald C. Thomas, 1st Marine Division D-3 (Operations Officer).</i></p>

-</div>

-

-<div class="captionr top">

-<p>

-Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 53523

-</p></div>

-  <img src="images/i_b_029b.jpg" width="363" height="241" alt="" />

-</div>

-

-<p>The Japanese the Marines had encountered

-were mainly men from the

-<i>4th Regiment</i> of the <i>2d (Sendai) Division</i>;

-prisoners confirmed that the

-division was landing on the island.

-Included in the enemy reinforcements

-were 150mm howitzers, guns capable

-of shelling the airfield from positions

-near Kokumbona. Clearly, a

-new and stronger enemy attack was

-pending.</p>

-

-<p>As September drew to a close, a

-flood of promotions had reached the

-division, nine lieutenant colonels put

-on their colonel’s eagles and there

-were 14 new lieutenant colonels also.

-Vandegrift made Colonel Gerald C.

-Thomas, his former operations<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_30" id="Page_30">30</a></span>

-officer, the new division chief of

-staff, and had a short time earlier

-given Edson the 5th Marines. Many

-of the older, senior officers, picked

-for the most part in the order they

-had joined the division, were now

-sent back to the States. There they

-would provide a new level of combat

-expertise in the training and organization

-of the many Marine units

-that were forming. The air wing was

-not quite ready yet to return its experienced

-pilots to rear areas, but the

-vital combat knowledge they possessed

-was much needed in the training

-pipeline. They, too&mdash;the

-survivors&mdash;would soon be rotating

-back to rear areas, some for a much-needed

-break before returning to

-combat and others to lead new squadrons

-into the fray.</p>

-

-<div id="ip_30" class="figcenter" style="width: 380px;">

-  <img src="images/i_b_030.jpg" width="380" height="152" alt="" />

-  <div class="captionl">Japanese Model 4 (1919) 150mm Howitzer</div></div>

-

-

-<div class="chapter"></div>

-<div class="sidebar">

-<p class="in0 small"><a name="Sidebar_page_22_Sergeant_Major_Sir_Jacob_Charles_Vouza" id="Sidebar_page_22_Sergeant_Major_Sir_Jacob_Charles_Vouza"></a>[Sidebar (<a href="#Page_22">page 22</a>):]</p>

-<h3 class="nobreak p0">Sergeant Major Sir Jacob Charles Vouza</h3>

-

-<div id="ip_gright" class="figright" style="width: 254px;">

-  <img src="images/i_b_022.jpg" width="254" height="309" alt="" /></div>

-

-<p class="drop-cap"><span class="smcap1">J</span>acob Charles Vouza was born in 1900 at Tasimboko,

-Guadalcanal, British Solomon Islands Protectorate,

-and educated at the South Seas Evangelical Mission

-School there. In 1916 he joined the Solomon Islands Protectorate

-Armed Constabulary, from which he retired at

-the rank of sergeant major in 1941 after 25 years of service.</p>

-

-<p>After the Japanese invaded his home island in World War

-II, he returned to active duty with the British forces and

-volunteered to work with the Coastwatchers. Vouza’s experience

-as a scout had already been established when the

-1st Marine Division landed on Guadalcanal. On 7 August

-1942 he rescued a downed naval pilot from the USS <i>Wasp</i>

-who was shot down inside Japanese territory. He guided

-the pilot to friendly lines where Vouza met the Marines for

-the first time.</p>

-

-<p>Vouza then volunteered to scout behind enemy lines for

-the Marines. On 27 August he was captured by the Japanese

-while on a Marine Corps mission to locate suspected enemy

-lookout stations. Having found a small American flag

-in Vouza’s loincloth, the Japanese tied him to a tree and

-tried to force him to reveal information about Allied forces.

-Vouza was questioned for hours, but refused to talk. He

-was tortured and bayoneted about the arms, throat, shoulder,

-face, and stomach, and left to die.</p>

-

-<p>He managed to free himself after his captors departed,

-and made his way through the miles of jungle to American

-lines. There he gave valuable intelligence information

-to the Marines about an impending Japanese attack before

-accepting medical attention.</p>

-

-<p>After spending 12 days in the hospital, Vouza then

-returned to duty as the chief scout for the Marines. He accompanied

-Lieutenant Colonel Evans F. Carlson and the

-2d Marine Raider Battalion when they made their 30-day

-raid behind enemy lines at Guadalcanal.</p>

-

-<p>Sergeant Major Vouza was highly decorated for his

-World War II service. The Silver Star was presented to him

-personally by Major General Alexander A. Vandegrift,

-commanding general of the 1st Marine Division, for refusing

-to give information under Japanese torture. He also was

-awarded the Legion of Merit for outstanding service with

-the 2d Raider Battalion during November and December

-1942, and the British George Medal for gallant conduct and

-exceptional devotion to duty. He later received the Police

-Long Service Medal and, in 1957, was made a Member of

-the British Empire for long and faithful government service.</p>

-

-<p>After the war, Vouza continued to serve his fellow islanders.

-In 1949, he was appointed district headman, and

-president of the Guadalcanal Council, from 1952&ndash;1958. He

-served as a member of the British Solomon Islands Protectorate

-Advisory Council from 1950 to 1960.</p>

-

-<p>He made many friends during his long association with

-the U.S. Marine Corps and through the years was continually

-visited on Guadalcanal by Marines. During 1968, Vouza

-visited the United States, where he was the honored guest

-of the 1st Marine Division Association. In 1979, he was

-knighted by Britain’s Queen Elizabeth II. He died on 15

-March 1984.&mdash;<i>Ann A. Ferrante</i></p>

-</div>

-

-

-<div class="chapter"></div>

-<div class="sidebar">

-<p class="in0 small"><a name="Sidebar_page_23_M3A1_37mm_Antitank_Gun" id="Sidebar_page_23_M3A1_37mm_Antitank_Gun"></a>[Sidebar (<a href="#Page_24">page 23</a>):]</p>

-<h3 class="nobreak p0">M3A1 37mm Antitank Gun</h3>

-

-<p class="drop-cap"><span class="smcap1"><span class="dkgreen">T</span>he</span> M3 antitank gun, based on the successful German

-<i>Panzer Abwehr Kanone</i> (PAK)-36, was developed

-by the U.S. Army in the late 1930s as a

-replacement for the French 37mm Puteaux gun, used in

-World War I but unable to destroy new tanks being

-produced.</p>

-

-<p>The M3 was adopted because of its accuracy, fire control,

-penetration, and mobility. Towed by its prime mover,

-the 4×4 quarter-ton truck, the gun would trail at 50 mph

-on roads. When traveling crosscountry, gullies, shell holes,

-mud holes, and slopes of 26 degrees were negotiated with

-ease. In 1941, the gun was redesignated the M3A1 when

-the muzzles were threaded to accept a muzzle brake that

-was rarely, if ever, used.</p>

-

-<p>At the time of its adoption, the M3 could destroy any

-tank then being produced in the world. However, by the

-time the United States entered the war, the M3 was outmatched

-by the tanks it would have met in Europe. The

-Japanese tanks were smaller and more vulnerable to the

-M3 throughout the war. In the Pacific, it was used against

-bunkers, pillboxes and, when loaded with canister, against

-banzai charges. It was employed throughout the war by

-Marine regimental weapons companies, but in reduced

-numbers as the fighting continued. It was replaced in the

-European Theater by the M1 57mm antitank gun.</p>

-

-<p>The 37mm antitank gun, manned by a crew of four who

-fired a 1.61-pound projectile with an effective range of 500

-yards.&mdash;<i>Stephen L. Amos and Kenneth L. Smith-Christmas</i></p>

-

-<div class="figcenter" style="width: 524px;">

-  <img src="images/i_b_023.jpg" width="524" height="339" alt="" /></div>

-</div>

-

-<div id="Sidebar_page_29" class="sidebar">

-<p class="in0 small">[Sidebar (<a href="#Page_29">page 29</a>):]</p>

-

-<p class="center">

-The President of the United States<br />

-takes pleasure in presenting<br />

-the Medal of Honor posthumously to<br />

-Douglas Albert Munro<br />

-Signalman First Class<br />

-United States Coast Guard<br />

-for service as set forth<br />

-in the following citation:

-</p>

-

-<div class="figright" style="width: 365px;">

-  <img src="images/i_b_029.jpg" width="365" height="285" alt="" />

-  <div class="captionr">

-

-<p>

-Painting by Bernard D’Andrea, Courtesy of U.S. Coast Guard Historical Office

-</p></div></div>

-

-<blockquote>

-

-<p>For extraordinary heroism and conspicuous

-gallantry in action above and beyond the call

-of duty as Officer in Charge of a group of

-twenty-four Higgins boats engaged in the

-evacuation of a battalion of Marines trapped

-by enemy Japanese forces at Point Cruz,

-Guadalcanal, on September 27, 1942. After

-making preliminary plans for the evacuation

-of nearly five hundred beleaguered Marines,

-Munro, under constant strafing by enemy

-machine guns on the island and at great risk

-of his life, daringly led five of his small craft

-toward the shore. As he closed the beach, he

-signalled the others to land and then in order

-to draw the enemy’s fire and protect the

-heavily loaded boats, he valiantly placed his

-craft, with its two small guns, as a shield between

-the beachhead and the Japanese. When

-the perilous task of evacuation was nearly

-completed, Munro was instantly killed by

-enemy fire, but his crew, two of whom were

-wounded, carried on until the last boat had

-loaded and cleared the beach. By his outstanding

-leadership, expert planning, and

-dauntless devotion to duty, he and his courageous

-comrades undoubtedly saved the

-lives of many who otherwise would have

-perished. He gallantly gave up his life in

-defense of his country. /s/ Franklin Roosevelt</p></blockquote>

-</div>

-

-<hr />

-<div class="chapter"></div>

-<h2><a name="October_and_the_Japanese_Offensive" id="October_and_the_Japanese_Offensive"></a><i>October and the Japanese Offensive</i></h2>

-

-<p>On 30 September, unexpectedly, a

-B-17 carrying Admiral Nimitz made

-an emergency landing at Henderson

-Field. The CinCPac made the most

-of the opportunity. He visited the

-front lines, saw Edson’s Ridge, and

-talked to a number of Marines. He

-reaffirmed to Vandegrift that his

-overriding mission was to hold the

-airfield. He promised all the support

-he could give and after awarding

-Navy Crosses to a number of Marines,

-including Vandegrift, left the

-next day visibly encouraged by what

-he had seen.</p>

-

-<div id="ip_30b" class="figcenter" style="width: 548px;">

-  <div class="captionl top"><p class="justify"><i>Visiting Guadalcanal on 30 September, Adm Chester W.

-Nimitz, CinCPac, took time to decorate LtCol Evans C. Carlson,

-CO, 2d Raider Battalion; MajGen Vandegrift, in rear;

-and, from left, BGen William H. Rupertus, ADC; Col Merritt

-A. Edson, CO, 5th Marines; LtCol Edwin A. Pollock, CO,

-2d Battalion, 1st Marines; Maj John L. Smith, CO, VMF-223.</i></p>

-</div>

-

-<div class="captionr top"><p>

-Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 50883

-</p></div>

-  <img src="images/i_b_030b.jpg" width="548" height="363" alt="" />

-</div>

-

-<p>The next Marine move involved a

-punishing return to the Matanikau,

-this time with five infantry battalions

-and the Whaling group. Whaling

-commanded his men and the 3d Battalion,

-2d Marines, in a thrust inland

-to clear the way for two battalions

-of the 7th Marines, the 1st and 2d,

-to drive through and hook toward

-the coast, hitting the Japanese holding<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_31" id="Page_31">31</a></span>

-along the Matanikau. Edson’s 2d

-and 3d Battalions would attack

-across the river mouth. All the division’s

-artillery was positioned to fire

-in support.</p>

-

-<div id="ip_31" class="figcenter" style="width: 553px;">

-  <img src="images/i_b_031.jpg" width="553" height="330" alt="" />

-  <div class="captionr">

-

-<p>Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 61534</p></div>

-

-<div class="captionl">

-<p class="justify"><i>A M1918 155mm howitzer is fired by artillery crewmen of the

-11th Marines in support of ground forces attacking the enemy.

-Despite the lack of sound-flash equipment to locate hostile

-artillery, Col del Valle’s guns were able to quiet enemy fire.</i></p></div></div>

-

-<p>On the 7th, Whaling’s force moved

-into the jungle about 2,000 yards upstream

-on the Matanikau, encountering

-Japanese troops that harassed his

-forward elements, but not in enough

-strength to stop the advance. He

-bypassed the enemy positions and

-dug in for the night. Behind him the

-7th Marines followed suit, prepared

-to move through his lines, cross the

-river, and attack north toward the

-Japanese on the 8th. The 5th Marines’

-assault battalions moving

-toward the Matanikau on the 7th ran

-into Japanese in strength about 400

-yards from the river. Unwittingly, the

-Marines had run into strong advance

-elements of the Japanese <i>4th Regiment</i>,

-which had crossed the

-Matanikau in order to establish a

-base from which artillery could fire

-into the Marine perimeter. The fighting

-was intense and the 3d Battalion,

-5th, could make little progress,

-although the 2d Battalion encountered

-slight opposition and won

-through to the river bank. It then

-turned north to hit the inland flank

-of the enemy troops. Vandegrift sent

-forward a company of raiders to reinforce

-the 5th, and it took a holding

-position on the right, towards the

-beach.</p>

-

-<p>Rain poured down on the 8th, all

-day long, virtually stopping all forward

-progress, but not halting the

-close-in fighting around the Japanese

-pocket. The enemy troops finally

-retreated, attempting to escape the

-gradually encircling Marines. They

-smashed into the raider’s position

-nearest to their escape route. A wild

-hand-to-hand battle ensued and a

-few Japanese broke through to reach

-and cross the river. The rest died

-fighting.</p>

-

-<div id="ip_32" class="figright" style="width: 362px;">

-  <img src="images/i_b_032.jpg" width="362" height="187" alt="" />

-  <div class="captionr"><p>Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 50963</p></div>

-

-<div class="captionl">

-<p class="justify"><i>More than 200 Japanese soldiers alone were killed in a frenzied attack in the sandspit

-where the Tenaru River flows into Ironbottom Sound (Sealark Channel).</i></p></div></div>

-

-<p>On the 9th, Whaling’s force,

-flanked by the 2d and then the 1st

-Battalion, 7th Marines, crossed the

-Matanikau and then turned and followed

-ridge lines to the sea. Puller’s

-battalion discovered a number of

-Japanese in a ravine to his front, fired

-his mortars, and called in artillery,

-while his men used rifles and

-machine guns to pick off enemy

-troops trying to escape what proved

-to be a death trap. When his mortar

-ammunition began to run short,

-Puller moved on toward the beach,

-joining the rest of Whaling’s force,

-which had encountered no opposition.

-The Marines then recrossed the

-Mantanikau, joined Edson’s troops,

-and marched back to the perimeter,

-leaving a strong combat outpost at

-the Matanikau, now cleared of

-Japanese. General Vandegrift, apprised

-by intelligence sources that a

-major Japanese attack was coming

-from the west, decided to consolidate

-his positions, leaving no sizable Marine

-force more than a day’s march

-from the perimeter. The Marine advance

-on 7&ndash;9 October had thwarted

-Japanese plans for an early attack

-and cost the enemy more than 700

-men. The Marines paid a price too,

-65 dead and 125 wounded.</p>

-

-<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_32" id="Page_32">32</a></span>

-There was another price that

-Guadalcanal was exacting from both

-sides. Disease was beginning to fell

-men in numbers that equalled the

-battle casualties. In addition to gastroenteritis,

-which greatly weakened

-those who suffered its crippling

-stomach cramps, there were all kinds

-of tropical fungus infections, collectively

-known as “jungle rot,” which

-produced uncomfortable rashes on

-men’s feet, armpits, elbows, and

-crotches, a product of seldom being

-dry. If it didn’t rain, sweat provided

-the moisture. On top of this came

-hundreds of cases of malaria.

-Atabrine tablets provided some

-relief, besides turning the skin yellow,

-but they were not effective enough

-to stop the spread of the mosquito-borne

-infection. Malaria attacks were

-so pervasive that nothing short of

-complete prostration, becoming a litter

-case, could earn a respite in the

-hospital. Naturally enough, all these

-diseases affected most strongly the

-men who had been on the island the

-longest, particularly those who experienced

-the early days of short rations.

-Vandegrift had already argued

-with his superiors that when his men

-eventually got relieved they should

-not be sent to another tropical island

-hospital, but rather to a place where

-there was a real change of atmosphere

-and climate. He asked that

-Auckland or Wellington, New

-Zealand, be considered.</p>

-

-<p>For the present, however, there

-was to be no relief for men starting

-their third month on Guadalcanal.

-The Japanese would not abandon

-their plan to seize back Guadalcanal

-and gave painful evidence of their intentions

-near mid-October. General

-Hyakutake himself landed on

-Guadalcanal on 7 October to oversee

-the coming offensive. Elements of

-Major General Masao Maruyama’s

-<i>Sendai Division</i>, already a factor in

-the fighting near the Matanikau,

-landed with him. More men were

-coming. And the Japanese, taking

-advantage of the fact that Cactus

-flyers had no night attack capability,

-planned to ensure that no planes

-at all would rise from Guadalcanal

-to meet them.</p>

-

-<div id="ip_32b" class="figcenter" style="width: 550px;">

-  <div class="captionl top justify"><i>By October, malaria began to claim as many casualties as

-Japanese artillery, bombs, and naval gunfire. Shown here are

-the patients in the division hospital who are ministered to by

-physicians and corpsmen working under minimal conditions.</i></div>

-  <img src="images/i_b_032b.jpg" width="550" height="220" alt="" />

-</div>

-

-<p>On 11 October, U.S. Navy surface

-ships took a hand in stopping the

-“Tokyo Express,” the nickname that

-had been given to Admiral Tanaka’s

-almost nightly reinforcement forays.

-A covering force of five cruisers and

-five destroyers, located near Rennell

-Island and commanded by Rear Admiral

-Norman Scott, got word that

-many ships were approaching

-Guadalcanal. Scott’s mission was to

-protect an approaching reinforcement

-convoy and he steamed toward

-Cactus at flank speed eager to engage.

-He encountered more ships

-than he had expected, a bombardment<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_33" id="Page_33">33</a></span>

-group of three heavy cruisers

-and two destroyers, as well as six destroyers

-escorting two seaplane carrier

-transports. Scott maneuvered between

-Savo Island and Cape Esperance,

-Guadalcanal’s western tip, and

-ran head-on into the bombardment

-group.</p>

-

-<p>Alerted by a scout plane from his

-flagship, <i>San Francisco</i> (CA 38),

-spottings later confirmed by radar

-contacts on the <i>Helena</i> (CL 50), the

-Americans opened fire before the

-Japanese, who had no radar, knew

-of their presence. One enemy destroyer

-sank immediately, two cruisers

-were badly damaged, one, the

-<i>Furutaka</i>, later foundered, and the

-remaining cruiser and destroyer

-turned away from the inferno of

-American fire. Scott’s own force was

-punished by enemy return fire which

-damaged two cruisers and two destroyers,

-one of which, the <i>Duncan</i>

-(DD 485), sank the following day.

-On the 12th too, Cactus flyers spotted

-two of the reinforcement destroyer

-escorts retiring and sank them

-both. The Battle of Cape Esperance

-could be counted an American naval

-victory, one sorely needed at the

-time.</p>

-

-<div id="ip_33" class="figleft" style="width: 173px;">

-  <div class="captionl top"><p class="justify"><i>Maj Harold W. Bauer, VMF-212 commander,

-here a captain, was posthumously

-awarded the Medal of Honor

-after being lost during a scramble with

-Japanese aircraft over Guadalcanal.</i></p></div>

-

-<div class="captionr top"><p>

-Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 410772

-</p></div>

-  <img src="images/i_b_033.jpg" width="173" height="225" alt="" />

-</div>

-

-<p>Its way cleared by Scott’s encounter

-with the Japanese, a really welcome

-reinforcement convoy arrived

-at the island on 13 October when the

-164th Infantry of the Americal Division

-arrived. The soldiers, members

-of a National Guard outfit

-originally from North Dakota, were

-equipped with Garand M-1 rifles, a

-weapon of which most overseas Marines

-had only heard. In rate of fire,

-the semiautomatic Garand could easily

-outperform the single-shot, bolt-action

-Springfields the Marines carried

-and the bolt-action rifles the

-Japanese carried, but most 1st Division

-Marines of necessity touted the

-Springfield as inherently more accurate

-and a better weapon. This did

-not prevent some light-fingered Marines

-from acquiring Garands when

-the occasion presented itself. And

-such an occasion did present itself

-while the soldiers were landing and

-their supplies were being moved to

-dumps. Several flights of Japanese

-bombers arrived over Henderson

-Field, relatively unscathed by the

-defending fighters, and began dropping

-their bombs. The soldiers headed

-for cover and alert Marines,

-inured to the bombing, used the interval

-to “liberate” interesting cartons

-and crates. The news that the Army

-had arrived spread across the island

-like wildfire, for it meant to all Marines

-that they eventually would be

-relieved. There was hope.</p>

-

-<div id="ip_34" class="figright" style="width: 361px;">

-  <img src="images/i_b_034.jpg" width="361" height="228" alt="" />

-  <div class="captionr">

-

-<p>Department of Defense (USMC) Photos 304183 and 302980</p></div>

-

-<div class="captionl"><p class="justify"><i>Two other Marine aviators awarded the Medal of Honor for heroism and intrepidity

-in the air were Capt Jefferson J. DeBlanc, left, and Maj Robert E. Galer, right.</i></p></div></div>

-

-<p>As if the bombing was not enough

-grief, the Japanese opened on the airfield

-with their 150mm howitzers

-also. Altogether the men of the 164th

-got a rude welcome to Guadalcanal.

-And on that night, 13&ndash;14 October,

-they shared a terrifying experience

-with the Marines that no one would

-ever forget.</p>

-

-<p>Determined to knock out Henderson

-Field and protect their soldiers

-landing in strength west of Koli

-Point, the enemy commanders sent

-the battleships <i>Kongo</i> and <i>Haruna</i>

-into Ironbottom Sound to bombard

-the Marine positions. The usual

-Japanese flare planes heralded the

-bombardment, 80 minutes of sheer

-hell which had 14-inch shells exploding

-with such effect that the accompanying

-cruiser fire was scarcely

-noticed. No one was safe; no place

-was safe. No dugout had been built

-to withstand 14-inch shells. One witness,

-a seasoned veteran demonstrably

-cool under enemy fire, opined

-that there was nothing worse in war

-than helplessly being on the receiving

-end of naval gunfire. He remembered

-“huge trees being cut apart and

-flying about like toothpicks.” And he

-was on the frontlines, not the prime

-enemy target. The airfield and its environs

-were a shambles when dawn

-broke. The naval shelling, together

-with the night’s artillery fire and

-bombing, had left Cactus Air Force’s

-commander, General Geiger, with a

-handful of aircraft still flyable, an airfield

-thickly cratered by shells and

-bombs, and a death toll of 41. Still,

-from Henderson or Fighter One,

-which now became the main airstrip,

-the Cactus Flyers had to attack, for

-the morning also revealed a shore

-and sea full of inviting targets.</p>

-

-<p>The expected enemy convoy had

-gotten through and Japanese transports

-and landing craft were everywhere

-near Tassafaronga. At sea the

-escorting cruisers and destroyers

-provided a formidable antiaircraft

-screen. Every American plane that

-could fly did. General Geiger’s aide,

-Major Jack Cram, took off in the

-general’s PBY, hastily rigged to carry

-two torpedoes, and put one of

-them into the side of an enemy transport

-as it was unloading. He landed

-the lumbering flying boat with enemy

-aircraft hot on his tail. A new

-squadron of F4Fs, VMF-212, commanded

-by Major Harold W. Bauer,

-flew in during the day’s action, landed,

-refueled, and took off to join the

-fighting. An hour later, Bauer landed

-again, this time with four enemy

-bombers to his credit. Bauer, who added

-to his score of Japanese aircraft

-kills in later air battles, was subsequently

-lost in action. He was awarded<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_34" id="Page_34">34</a></span>

-the Medal of Honor, as were four

-other Marine pilots of the early Cactus

-Air Force: Captain Jefferson J.

-DeBlanc (VMF-112); Captain Joseph

-J. Foss (VMF-121); Major Robert E.

-Galer (VMF-224); and Major John L.

-Smith (VMF-223).</p>

-

-<p>The Japanese had landed more

-than enough troops to destroy the

-Marine beachhead and seize the airfield.

-At least General Hyakutake

-thought so, and he heartily approved

-General Maruyama’s plan to move

-most of the <i>Sendai Division</i> through

-the jungle, out of sight and out of

-contact with the Marines, to strike

-from the south in the vicinity of Edson’s

-Ridge. Roughly 7,000 men, each

-carrying a mortar or artillery shell,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_35" id="Page_35">35</a></span>

-started the trek along the Maruyama

-Trail which had been partially

-hacked out of the jungle well inland

-from the Marine positions. Maruyama,

-who had approved the trail’s

-name to indicate his confidence, intended

-to support this attack with

-heavy mortars and infantry guns

-(70mm pack howitzers). The men

-who had to lug, push, and drag these

-supporting arms over the miles of

-broken ground, across two major

-streams, the Mantanikau and the

-Lunga, and through heavy underbrush,

-might have had another name

-for their commander’s path to supposed

-glory.</p>

-

-<div id="ip_35" class="figcenter" style="width: 550px;">

-  <div class="captionl top"><p class="justify"><i>A Marine examines a Japanese 70mm howitzer captured at

-the Battle of the Tenaru. Gen Maruyama’s troops “had to lug,

-push, and drag these supporting arms over the miles of broken

-ground, across two major streams and through heavy underbrush”

-to get them to the target area&mdash;but they never did. The

-trail behind them was littered with the supplies they carried.</i></p></div>

-

-<div class="captionr top"><p>

-Photo courtesy of Col James A. Donovan, Jr.

-</p></div>

-  <img src="images/i_b_034b.jpg" width="550" height="424" alt="" />

-</div>

-

-<p>General Vandegrift knew the

-Japanese were going to attack.

-Patrols and reconnaissance flights

-had clearly indicated the push would

-be from the west, where the enemy

-reinforcements had landed. The

-American commander changed his

-dispositions accordingly. There were

-Japanese troops east of the perimeter,

-too, but not in any significant

-strength. The new infantry regiment,

-the 164th, reinforced by Marine special

-weapons units, was put into the

-line to hold the eastern flank along

-6,600 yards, curving inland to join up

-with 7th Marines near Edson’s Ridge.

-The 7th held 2,500 yards from the

-ridge to the Lunga. From the Lunga,

-the 1st Marines had a 3,500-yard sector

-of jungle running west to the

-point where the line curved back to

-the beach again in the 5th Marines’

-sector. Since the attack was expected

-from the west, the 3d Battalions

-of each of the 1st and 7th Marines

-held a strong outpost position forward

-of the 5th Marines’ lines along

-the east bank of the Matanikau.</p>

-

-<p>In the lull before the attack, if a

-time of patrol clashes, Japanese

-cruiser-destroyer bombardments,

-bomber attacks, and artillery harassment

-could properly be called a

-lull, Vandegrift was visited by the

-Commandant of the Marine Corps,

-Lieutenant General Thomas Holcomb.

-The Commandant flew in on

-21 October to see for himself how his

-Marines were faring. It also proved

-to be an occasion for both senior Marines

-to meet the new ComSoPac,

-Vice Admiral William F. “Bull” Halsey.

-Admiral Nimitz had announced

-Halsey’s appointment on 18 October

-and the news was welcome in Navy

-and Marine ranks throughout the Pacific.

-Halsey’s deserved reputation for

-elan and aggressiveness promised

-renewed attention to the situation on

-Guadalcanal. On the 22d, Holcomb

-and Vandegrift flew to Noumea to

-meet with Halsey and to receive and

-give a round of briefings on the Allied

-situation. After Vandegrift had

-described his position, he argued

-strongly against the diversion of reinforcements

-intended for Cactus to

-any other South Pacific venue, a

-sometime factor of Admiral Turner’s

-strategic vision. He insisted that he

-needed all of the Americal Division

-and another 2d Marine Division regiment

-to beef up his forces, and that

-more than half of his veterans were

-worn out by three months’ fighting

-and the ravages of jungle-incurred

-diseases. Admiral Halsey told the

-Marine general: “You go back there,

-Vandegrift. I promise to get you

-everything I have.”</p>

-

-<div id="ip_35b" class="figcenter" style="width: 365px;">

-  <img src="images/i_b_035.jpg" width="365" height="354" alt="" />

-  <div class="captionr">

-

-<p>Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 13628</p></div>

-

-<div class="captionl">

-<p class="justify"><i>During a lull in the fight, a Marine machine gunner takes a break for coffee, with

-his sub-machine gun on his knee and his 30-caliber light machine gun in position.</i></p></div></div>

-

-<p>When Vandegrift returned to

-Guadalcanal, Holcomb moved on to

-Pearl Harbor to meet with Nimitz,

-carrying Halsey’s recommendation

-that, in the future, landing force commanders

-once established ashore,

-would have equal command status

-with Navy amphibious force commanders.

-At Pearl, Nimitz approved

-Halsey’s recommendation&mdash;which

-Holcomb had drafted&mdash;and in

-Washington so did King. In effect,

-then, the command status of all future

-Pacific amphibious operations

-was determined by the events of

-Guadalcanal. Another piece of news

-Vandegrift received from Holcomb

-also boded well for the future of the

-Marine Corps. Holcomb indicated<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_36" id="Page_36">36</a></span>

-that if President Roosevelt did not

-reappoint him, unlikely in view of his

-age and two terms in office, he would

-recommend that Vandegrift be appointed

-the next Commandant.</p>

-

-<div id="ip_36" class="figcenter" style="width: 546px;">

-  <img src="images/i_b_036.jpg" width="546" height="373" alt="" />

-  <div class="captionr">

-

-<p>Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 513191</p></div>

-

-<div class="captionl">

-<p class="justify"><i>On the occasion of the visit of the Commandant, MajGen

-Thomas Holcomb, some of Operation Watchtower’s major

-staff and command officers took time out from the fighting

-to pose with him. From left, front row: Col William J. Whaling

-(Whaling Group); Col Amor LeRoy Sims (CO, 7th Marines);

-Col Gerald C. Thomas (Division Chief of Staff); Col

-Pedro A. del Valle (CO, 11th Marines); Col William E. Riley

-(member of Gen Holcomb’s party); MajGen Roy S. Geiger

-(CG, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing); Gen Holcomb; MajGen

-Ralph J. Mitchell (Director of Aviation, Headquarters, U.S.

-Marine Corps); BGen Bennet Puryear, Jr. (Assistant Quartermaster

-of the Marine Corps); Col Clifton B. Cates (CO, 1st

-Marines). Second row (between Whaling and Sims): LtCol

-Raymond P. Coffman (Division Supply Officer); Maj James

-C. Murray (Division Personnel Officer); (behind Gen Holcomb)

-LtCol Merrill B. Twining (Division Operations Officer).</i></p></div></div>

-

-<p>This news of future events had little

-chance of diverting Vandegrift’s

-attention when he flew back to

-Guadalcanal, for the Japanese were

-in the midst of their planned offensive.

-On the 20th, an enemy patrol

-accompanied by two tanks tried to

-find a way through the line held by

-Lieutenant Colonel William N.

-McKelvy, Jr.’s 3d Battalion, 1st Marines.

-A sharpshooting 37mm gun

-crew knocked out one tank and the

-enemy force fell back, meanwhile

-shelling the Marine positions with artillery.

-Near sunset the next day, the

-Japanese tried again, this time with

-more artillery fire and more tanks in

-the fore, but again a 37mm gun

-knocked out a lead tank and discouraged

-the attack. On 22 October,

-the enemy paused, waiting for

-Maruyama’s force to get into position

-inland. On the 23d, planned as the

-day of the <i>Sendai</i>’s main attack, the

-Japanese dropped a heavy rain of artillery

-and mortar fire on McKelvy’s

-positions near the Matanikau River

-mouth. Near dusk, nine 18-ton medium

-tanks clanked out of the trees

-onto the river’s sandbar and just as

-quickly eight of them were riddled

-by the 37s. One tank got across the

-river, a Marine blasted a track off

-with a grenade, and a 75mm halftrack

-finished it off in the ocean’s

-surf. The following enemy infantry

-was smothered by Marine artillery

-fire as all battalions of the augmented

-11th Marines rained shells on the

-massed attackers. Hundreds of

-Japanese were casualties and three

-more tanks were destroyed. Later, an

-inland thrust further upstream was

-easily beaten back. The abortive

-coastal attack did almost nothing to

-aid Maruyama’s inland offensive, but

-did cause Vandegrift to shift one battalion,

-the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines,

-out of the lines to the east and into

-the 4,000-yard gap between the Matanikau

-position and the perimeter.

-This move proved providential since<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_37" id="Page_37">37</a></span>

-one of Maruyama’s planned attacks

-was headed right for this area.</p>

-

-<p>Although patrols had encountered

-no Japanese east or south of the jungled

-perimeter up to the 24th, the

-Matanikau attempts had alerted

-everyone. When General Maruyama

-finally was satisfied that his men had

-struggled through to appropriate assault

-positions, after delaying his day

-of attack three times, he was ready

-on 24 October. The Marines were

-waiting.</p>

-

-<p>An observer from the 1st Battalion,

-7th Marines, spotted an enemy

-officer surveying Edson’s Ridge on

-the 24th, and scout-snipers reported

-smoke from numerous rice fires rising

-from a valley about two miles

-south of Lieutenant Colonel Puller’s

-positions. Six battalions of the <i>Sendai

-Division</i> were poised to attack,

-and near midnight the first elements

-of the enemy hit and bypassed a

-platoon-sized outpost forward of

-Puller’s barbed-wire entanglements.

-Warned by the outpost, Puller’s men

-waited, straining to see through a

-dark night and a driving rain. Suddenly,

-the Japanese charged out of

-the jungle, attacking in Puller’s area

-near the ridge and the flat ground to

-the east. The Marines replied with<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_38" id="Page_38">38</a></span>

-everything they had, calling in artillery,

-firing mortars, relying heavily

-on crossing fields of machine gun

-fire to cut down the enemy infantrymen.

-Thankfully, the enemy’s artillery,

-mortars, and other supporting

-arms were scattered back along the

-Maruyama Trail; they had proved

-too much of a burden for the infantrymen

-to carry forward.</p>

-

-<div id="ip_38" class="figcenter" style="width: 550px;">

-  <img src="images/i_b_038.jpg" width="550" height="265" alt="" />

-  <div class="captionr">

-

-<p>Marine Corps Personal Papers Collection</p></div>

-

-<div class="captionl">

-<p class="justify"><i>Five Japanese tanks sit dead in the water, destroyed by Marine

-37mm gunfire during the abortive attempt to force the

-Marine perimeter near the mouth of the Matanikau River in

-late October. Many Japanese soldiers lost their lives also.</i></p></div></div>

-

-<p>A wedge was driven into the Marine

-lines, but eventually straightened

-out with repeated counterattacks.

-Puller soon realized his battalion was

-being hit by a strong Japanese force

-capable of repeated attacks. He called

-for reinforcements and the Army’s 3d

-Battalion, 164th Infantry (Lieutenant

-Colonel Robert K. Hall), was ordered

-forward, its men sliding and slipping

-in the rain as they trudged a mile

-south along Edson’s Ridge. Puller met

-Hall at the head of his column, and

-the two officers walked down the

-length of the Marine lines, peeling off

-an Army squad at a time to feed into

-the lines. When the Japanese attacked

-again as they did all night long, the

-soldiers and Marines fought back

-together. By 0330, the Army battalion

-was completely integrated into

-the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines’ lines

-and the enemy attacks were getting

-weaker and weaker. The American

-return fire&mdash;including flanking fire

-from machine guns and Weapons

-Company, 7th Marines’ 37mm guns

-remaining in the positions held by 2d

-Battalion, 164th Infantry, on Puller’s

-left&mdash;was just too much to take. Near

-dawn, Maruyama pulled his men

-back to regroup and prepare to attack

-again.</p>

-

-<p>With daylight, Puller and Hall reordered

-the lines, putting the 3d Battalion,

-164th, into its own positions

-on Puller’s left, tying in with the rest

-of the Army regiment. The driving

-rains had turned Fighter One into a

-quagmire, effectively grounding Cactus

-flyers. Japanese planes used the

-“free ride” to bomb Marine positions.

-Their artillery fired incessantly and

-a pair of Japanese destroyers added

-their gunfire to the bombardment until

-they got too close to the shore and

-the 3d Defense Battalion’s 5-inch

-guns drove them off. As the sun bore

-down, the runways dried and afternoon

-enemy attacks were met by

-Cactus fighters, who downed 22

-Japanese planes with a loss of three

-of their own.</p>

-

-<p>As night came on again, Maruyama

-tried more of the same, with the

-same result. The Army-Marine lines

-held and the Japanese were cut down

-in droves by rifle, machine gun, mortar,

-37mm, and artillery fire. To the

-west, an enemy battalion mounted

-three determined attacks against the

-positions held by Lieutenant Colonel

-Herman H. Hanneken’s 2d Battalion,

-7th Marines, thinly tied in with

-Puller’s battalion on the left and the

-3d Battalion, 7th Marines, on the

-right. The enemy finally penetrated

-the positions held by Company F, but

-a counterattack led by Major Odell

-M. Conoley, the battalion’s executive

-officer, drove off the Japanese. Again

-at daylight the American positions

-were secure and the enemy had

-retreated. They would not come

-back; the grand Japanese offensive of

-the <i>Sendai Division</i> was over.</p>

-

-<p>About 3,500 enemy troops had

-died during the attacks. General

-Maruyama’s proud boast that he

-“would exterminate the enemy

-around the airfield in one blow”

-proved an empty one. What was left

-of his force now straggled back over

-the Maruyama Trail, losing, as had

-the Kawaguchi force in the same situation,

-most of its seriously wounded<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_39" id="Page_39">39</a></span>

-men. The Americans, Marines

-and soldiers together, probably lost

-300 men killed and wounded; existing

-records are sketchy and incomplete.

-One result of the battle,

-however, was a warm welcome to the

-164th Infantry from the 1st Marine

-Division. Vandegrift particularly

-commended Lieutenant Colonel

-Hall’s battalion, stating the “division

-was proud to have serving with it

-another unit which had stood the test

-of battle.” And Colonel Cates sent a

-message to the 164th’s Colonel Bryant

-Moore saying that the 1st Marines

-“were proud to serve with a unit such

-as yours.”</p>

-

-<p>Amidst all the heroics of the two

-nights’ fighting there were many men

-who were singled out for recognition

-and an equally large number who

-performed great deeds that were

-never recognized. Two men stood out

-above all others, and on succeeding

-nights, Sergeant John Basilone of the

-1st Battalion, 7th Marines, and Platoon

-Sergeant Mitchell Paige of the

-2d Battalion, both machine gun section

-heads, were recognized as having

-performed “above and beyond the

-call of duty” in the inspiring words

-of their Medal of Honor citations.</p>

-

-<div class="chapter"></div>

-<div class="sidebar green">

-<p class="in0 small"><a name="Sidebar_page_37_Reising_Gun" id="Sidebar_page_37_Reising_Gun"></a>[Sidebar (<a href="#Page_37">page 37</a>):]</p>

-<h3 class="nobreak p0">Reising Gun</h3>

-

-<p class="drop-cap"><span class="smcap1"><span class="dkgreen">T</span>he</span> Reising gun was designed and developed by noted

-gun inventor Eugene Reising. It was patented in

-1940 and manufactured by the old gun-making firm

-of Harrington and Richardson of Worcester, Massachusetts.

-It is said that it was made on existing machine tools, some

-dating back to the Civil War, and of ordinary steel rather

-than ordnance steel. With new machine tools and ordnance

-steel scarce and needed for more demanding weapons, the

-Reising met an immediate requirement for many sub-machine

-guns at a time when production of Thompson

-M1928 and M1 sub-machine guns hadn’t caught up with

-demand and the stamped-out M3 “grease gun” had not yet

-been invented. It was a wartime expedient.</p>

-

-<div class="figright" style="width: 255px;">

-  <img src="images/i_b_037.jpg" width="255" height="339" alt="" />

-  <div class="captionr">

-

-<p>

-Captain Donald L. Dickson, USMCR

-</p></div></div>

-

-<p>The Reising was made in two different models, the 50

-and the 55. The Model 50 had a full wooden stock and

-a Cutts compensator attached to the muzzle. The compensator,

-a device which reduced the upward muzzle climb

-from recoil, was invented by Richard M. Cutts, Sr., and

-his son, Richard M. Cutts, Jr., both of whom became Marine

-brigadier generals. The other version was dubbed the

-Model 55. It had a folding metal-wire shoulder stock which

-swivelled on the wooden pistol grip. It also had a shorter

-barrel and no compensator. It was intended for use by

-parachutists, tank crews, and others needing a compact

-weapon. Both versions of the Reising fired .45-caliber ammunition,

-the same cartridge as the Colt automatic pistol

-and the Thompson.</p>

-

-<p>In all, there were approximately 100,000 Reising sub-machine

-guns produced between 1940 and 1942. Small

-numbers of the weapons were acquired by both Great Britain

-and the Soviet Union. However, most were used by

-the U.S. Marine Corps in the Solomon Islands campaign.

-The Model 55 was issued to both Marine parachute battalions

-and Marine raiders, seeing service first on Guadalcanal.

-After its dubious debut in combat it was withdrawn

-from frontline service in 1943 due to several flaws in design

-and manufacture.</p>

-

-<p>The Reising’s major shortcoming was its propensity for

-jamming. This was due to both a design problem in the

-magazine lips and the fact that magazines were made of

-a soft sheet steel. The weapon’s safety mechanism didn’t

-always work and if the butt was slammed down on the

-deck, the hammer would set back against the mainspring

-and then fly forward, firing a chambered cartridge. The

-design allowed the entry of dirt into the mechanism and

-close tolerances caused it to jam. Finally, the steel used allowed

-excessive rust to form in the tropical humidity of the

-Solomons. Nevertheless, at six pounds, the Reising was

-handier than the 10-pound Thompson, more accurate,

-pleasanter to shoot, and reliable under other than combat

-conditions, but one always had to keep the muzzle pointed

-in a safe direction. The Model 50 was also issued to Marines

-for guard duty at posts and stations in the United

-States.&mdash;<i>John G. Griffiths</i></p>

-</div>

-

-<hr />

-<div class="chapter"></div>

-<h2><a name="November_and_the_Continuing_Buildup" id="November_and_the_Continuing_Buildup"></a><i>November and the Continuing Buildup</i></h2>

-

-<p>While the soldiers and Marines

-were battling the Japanese ashore, a

-patrol plane sighted a large Japanese

-fleet near the Santa Cruz Islands to

-the east of the Solomons. The enemy

-force was formidable, 4 carriers

-and 4 battleships, 8 cruisers and 28

-destroyers, all poised for a victorious

-attack when Maruyama’s capture of

-Henderson Field was signalled. Admiral

-Halsey’s reaction to the inviting

-targets was characteristic, he

-signaled Rear Admiral Thomas C.

-Kinkaid, with the <i>Hornet</i> and <i>Enterprise</i>

-carrier groups located north of

-the New Hebrides: “Attack Repeat

-Attack.”</p>

-

-<div id="ip_39" class="figcenter" style="width: 551px;">

-  <div class="captionl top"><p class="justify"><i>Heavy tropical downpours at Guadalcanal all but flood out

-a Marine camp near Henderson Field, and the field as well.

-Marines’ damp clothing and bedding contributed to the heavy

-incidence of tormenting skin infections and fungal disorders.</i></p></div>

-

-<div class="captionr top"><p>

-Department of Defense (USMC) Photo

-</p></div>

-  <img src="images/i_b_039.jpg" width="551" height="324" alt="" />

-</div>

-

-<p>Early on 26 October, American

-SBDs located the Japanese carriers at

-about the same time Japanese scout

-planes spotted the American carriers.

-The Japanese <i>Zuiho</i>’s flight deck was

-holed by the scout bombers, cancelling

-flight operations, but the other

-three enemy carriers launched strikes.

-The two air armadas tangled as each

-strove to reach the other’s carriers.

-The <i>Hornet</i> was hit repeatedly by

-bombs and torpedoes; two Japanese

-pilots also crashed their planes on

-board. The damage to the ship was

-so extensive, the <i>Hornet</i> was abandoned

-and sunk. The <i>Enterprise</i>, the

-battleship <i>South Dakota</i>, the light

-cruiser <i>San Juan</i> (CL 54), and the

-destroyer <i>Smith</i> (DD 378) were also

-hit; the destroyer <i>Porter</i> (DD 356)

-was sunk. On the Japanese side, no

-ships were sunk, but three carriers

-and two destroyers were damaged.

-One hundred Japanese planes were

-lost; 74 U.S. planes went down.

-Taken together, the results of the Battle

-of Santa Cruz were a standoff.

-The Japanese naval leaders might

-have continued their attacks, but instead,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_40" id="Page_40">40</a></span>

-disheartened by the defeat of

-their ground forces on Guadalcanal,

-withdrew to attack another day.</p>

-

-<div id="ip_40" class="figleft" style="width: 362px;">

-  <img src="images/i_b_040.jpg" width="362" height="503" alt="" />

-  <div class="captionr">

-

-<p>Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 74093</p></div>

-

-<div class="captionl">

-<p class="justify"><i>Marine engineers repair a flood-damaged Lunga River bridge washed out during

-a period when 8 inches of rain fell in 24 hours and the river rose 7 feet above normal.</i></p></div></div>

-

-<p>The departure of the enemy naval

-force marked a period in which substantial

-reinforcements reached the

-island. The headquarters of the 2d

-Marines had finally found transport

-space to come up from Espiritu Santo

-and on 29 and 30 October, Colonel

-Arthur moved his regiment from

-Tulagi to Guadalcanal, exchanging

-his 1st and 2d Battalions for the well-blooded

-3d, which took up the Tulagi

-duties. The 2d Marines’ battalions at

-Tulagi had performed the very necessary

-task of scouting and securing all

-the small islands of the Florida group

-while they had camped, frustrated,

-watching the battles across Sealark

-Channel. The men now would no

-longer be spectators at the big show.</p>

-

-<p>On 2 November, planes from

-VMSB-132 and VMF-211 flew into

-the Cactus fields from New Caledonia.

-MAG-11 squadrons moved forward

-from New Caledonia to

-Espiritu Santo to be closer to the battle

-scene; the flight echelons now

-could operate forward to Guadalcanal

-and with relative ease. On the

-ground side, two batteries of 155mm

-guns, one Army and one Marine,

-landed on 2 November, providing

-Vandegrift with his first artillery

-units capable of matching the enemy’s

-long-range 150mm guns. On the

-4th and 5th, the 8th Marines

-(Colonel Richard H. Jeschke) arrived

-from American Samoa. The full-strength

-regiment, reinforced by the

-75mm howitzers of the 1st Battalion,

-10th Marines, added another 4,000

-men to the defending forces. All the

-fresh troops reflected a renewed emphasis

-at all levels of command on

-making sure Guadalcanal would be

-held. The reinforcement-replacement

-pipeline was being filled. In the offing

-as part of the Guadalcanal

-defending force were the rest of the

-Americal Division, the remainder of

-the 2d Marine Division, and the Army’s

-25th Infantry Division, then in

-Hawaii. More planes of every type

-and from Allied as well as American

-sources were slated to reinforce and

-replace the battered and battle-weary

-Cactus veterans.</p>

-

-<p>The impetus for the heightened

-pace of reinforcement had been

-provided by President Roosevelt.

-Cutting through the myriad demands

-for American forces worldwide, he

-had told each of the Joint Chiefs on

-24 October that Guadalcanal must be

-reinforced, and without delay.</p>

-

-<p>On the island, the pace of operations

-did not slacken after the

-Maruyama offensive was beaten

-back. General Vandegrift wanted to

-clear the area immediately west of

-the Matanikau of all Japanese troops,

-forestalling, if he could, another

-buildup of attacking forces. Admiral

-Tanaka’s Tokyo Express was still

-operating and despite punishing attacks

-by Cactus aircraft and new and

-deadly opponents, American motor

-torpedo boats, now based at Tulagi.</p>

-

-<p>On 1 November, the 5th Marines,

-backed up by the newly arrived 2d

-Marines, attacked across bridges engineers

-had laid over the Matanikau<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_41" id="Page_41">41</a></span>

-during the previous night. Inland,

-Colonel Whaling led his scout-snipers

-and the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, in

-a screening movement to protect the

-flank of the main attack. Opposition

-was fierce in the shore area where the

-1st Battalion, 5th, drove forward

-toward Point Cruz, but inland the 2d

-Battalion and Whaling’s group encountered

-slight opposition. By nightfall,

-when the Marines dug in, it was

-clear that the only sizable enemy

-force was in the Point Cruz area. In

-the days bitter fighting, Corporal

-Anthony Casamento, a badly

-wounded machine gun squad leader

-in Edson’s 1st Battalion, had so distinguished

-himself that he was

-recommended for a Navy Cross;

-many years later, in August 1980,

-President Jimmy Carter approved the

-award of the Medal of Honor in its

-stead.</p>

-

-<div id="ip_41" class="figcenter" style="width: 362px;">

-  <img src="images/i_b_041.jpg" width="362" height="184" alt="" />

-  <div class="captionr">

-

-<p>

-Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 56749

-</p></div>

-

-<div class="captionl">

-<p class="justify"><i>2dLt Mitchell Paige, third from left, and PltSgt John Basilone, extreme right, received

-the Medal of Honor at a parade at Camp Balcombe, Australia, on 21 May 1943.

-MajGen Vandegrift, left, received his medal in a White House ceremony the previous

-5 February, while Col Merritt A. Edson was decorated 31 December 1943. Note

-the 1st Marine Division patches on the right shoulders of each participant.</i></p></div></div>

-

-<p>On the 2d, the attack continued

-with the reserve 3d Battalion moving

-into the fight and all three 5th

-Marines units moving to surround

-the enemy defenders. On 3 November,

-the Japanese pocket just west of

-the base at Point Cruz was eliminated;

-well over 300 enemy had been

-killed. Elsewhere, the attacking Marines

-had encountered spotty

-resistance and advanced slowly

-across difficult terrain to a point

-about 1,000 yards beyond the 5th

-Marines’ action. There, just as the

-offensive’s objectives seemed well in

-hand, the advance was halted. Again,

-the intelligence that a massive enemy

-reinforcement attempt was pending

-forced Vandegrift to pull back

-most of his men to safeguard the all-important

-airfield perimeter. This

-time, however, he left a regiment to

-outpost the ground that had been

-gained, Colonel Arthur’s 2d Marines,

-reinforced by the Army’s 1st Battalion,

-164th Infantry.</p>

-

-<p>Emphasizing the need for caution

-in Vandegrift’s mind was the fact that

-the Japanese were again discovered

-in strength east of the perimeter. On

-3 November, Lieutenant Colonel

-Hanneken’s 2d Battalion, 7th Marines,

-on a reconnaissance in force

-towards Koli Point, could see the

-Japanese ships clustered near Tetere,

-eight miles from the perimeter. His

-Marines encountered strong Japanese

-resistance from obviously fresh<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_42" id="Page_42">42</a></span>

-troops and he began to pull back. A

-regiment of the enemy’s <i>38th Division</i>

-had landed, as Hyakutake experimented

-with a Japanese

-Navy-promoted scheme of attacking

-the perimeter from both flanks.</p>

-

-<div id="ip_42" class="figcenter" style="width: 372px;">

-  <img src="images/i_b_042.jpg" width="372" height="225" alt="" />

-  <div class="captionr">

-

-<p>

-Marine Corps Historical Photo Collection

-</p>

-</div>

-

-<div class="captionl">

-<p class="justify"><i>In a White House ceremony, former Cpl Anthony Casamento, a machine gun squad

-leader in the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, was decorated by President Jimmy Carter

-on 22 August 1980, 38 years after the battle for Guadalcanal. Looking on are

-Casarnento’s wife and daughters and Gen Robert H. Barrow, Marine Commandant.</i></p></div></div>

-

-<div id="ip_42b" class="figright" style="width: 170px;">

-  <div class="captionl top"><p class="justify"><i>Sgt Clyde Thomason, who was killed in

-action participating in the Makin Island

-raid with the 2d Raider Battalion, was

-the first enlisted Marine in World War

-II to be awarded the Medal of Honor.</i></p></div>

-

-<div class="captionr top"><p>

-Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 310616

-</p></div>

-  <img src="images/i_b_042b.jpg" width="170" height="344" alt="" />

-</div>

-

-<p>As Hanneken’s battalion executed

-a fighting withdrawal along the

-beach, it began to receive fire from

-the jungle inland, too. A rescue force

-was soon put together under General

-Rupertus: two tank companies, the

-1st Battalion, 7th Marines, and the

-2d and 3d Battalions of the 164th.

-The Japanese troops, members of the

-<i>38th Division</i> regiment and remnants

-of Kawaguchi’s brigade, fought

-doggedly to hold their ground as the

-Marines drove forward along the

-coast and the soldiers attempted to

-outflank the enemy in the jungle. The

-running battle continued for days,

-supported by Cactus air, naval gunfire,

-and the newly landed 155mm

-guns.</p>

-

-<p>The enemy commander received

-new orders as he was struggling to

-hold off the Americans. He was to

-break off the action, move inland,

-and march to rejoin the main

-Japanese forces west of the perimeter,

-a tall order to fulfill. The two-pronged

-attack scheme had been

-abandoned. The Japanese managed

-the first part; on the 11th the enemy

-force found a gap in the 164th’s line

-and broke through along a meandering

-jungle stream. Behind they left

-450 dead over the course of a seven-day

-battle; the Marines and soldiers

-had lost 40 dead and 120 wounded.</p>

-

-<p>Essentially, the Japanese who

-broke out of the encircling Americans

-escaped from the frying pan

-only to fall into the fire. Admiral

-Turner finally had been able to effect

-one of his several schemes for alternative

-landings and beachheads, all

-of which General Vandegrift vehemently

-opposed. At Aola Bay, 40

-miles east of the main perimeter, the

-Navy put an airfield construction

-and defense force ashore on 4

-November. Then, while the Japanese

-were still battling the Marines near

-Tetere, Vandegrift was able to persuade

-Turner to detach part of this

-landing force, the 2d Raider Battalion,

-to sweep west, to discover and

-destroy any enemy forces it encountered.</p>

-

-<p>Lieutenant Colonel Evans F. Carlson’s

-raider battalion already had

-seen action before it reached Guadalcanal.

-Two companies had reinforced

-the defenders of Midway Island

-when the Japanese attacked there in

-June. The rest of the battalion had

-landed from submarines on Makin

-Island in the Gilberts on 17&ndash;18 August,

-destroying the garrison there.

-For his part in the fighting on Makin,

-Sergeant Clyde Thomason had been

-awarded a Medal of Honor posthumously,

-the first Marine enlisted man

-to receive his country’s highest award

-in World War II.</p>

-

-<p>In its march from Aola Bay, the 2d

-Raider Battalion encountered the

-Japanese who were attempting to

-retreat to the west. On 12 November,

-the raiders beat off attacks by two

-enemy companies and then relentlessly

-pursued the Japanese, fighting

-a series of small actions over the next

-five days before they contacted the

-main Japanese body. From 17

-November to 4 December, when the

-raiders finally came down out of the

-jungled ridges into the perimeter,

-Carlson’s men harried the retreating<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_43" id="Page_43">43</a></span>

-enemy. They killed nearly 500

-Japanese. Their own losses were 16

-killed and 18 wounded.</p>

-

-<p>The Aola Bay venture, which had

-provided the 2d Raider Battalion a

-starting point for its month-long jungle

-campaign, proved a bust. The site

-chosen for a new airfield was unsuitable,

-too wet and unstable, and

-the whole force moved to Koli Point

-in early December, where another

-airfield eventually was constructed.</p>

-

-<p>The buildup on Guadalcanal continued,

-by both sides. On 11 November,

-guarded by a cruiser-destroyer

-covering force, a convoy ran in carrying

-the 182d Infantry, another regiment

-of the Americal Division. The

-ships were pounded by enemy bombers

-and three transports were hit,

-but the men landed. General Vandegrift

-needed the new men badly.

-His veterans were truly ready for

-replacement; more than a thousand

-new cases of malaria and related diseases

-were reported each week. The

-Japanese who had been on the island

-any length of time were no better off;

-they were, in fact, in worse shape.

-Medical supplies and rations were in

-short supply. The whole thrust of the

-Japanese reinforcement effort continued

-to be to get troops and combat

-equipment ashore. The idea

-prevailed in Tokyo, despite all evidence

-to the contrary, that one overwhelming

-coordinated assault would

-crush the American resistance. The

-enemy drive to take Port Moresby on

-New Guinea was put on hold to concentrate

-all efforts on driving the

-Americans off of Guadalcanal.</p>

-

-<div id="ip_43" class="figcenter" style="width: 551px;">

-  <img src="images/i_b_043.jpg" width="551" height="339" alt="" />

-  <div class="captionr">

-

-<p>Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 51728</p></div>

-

-<div class="captionl">

-<p class="justify"><i>Native guides lead 2d Raider Battalion Marines on a combat/reconnaissance

-patrol behind Japanese lines. The patrol

-lasted for less than a month, during which the Marines covered

-150 miles and fought more than a dozen actions.</i></p></div></div>

-

-<p>On 12 November, a multifaceted

-Japanese naval force converged on

-Guadalcanal to cover the landing of

-the main body of the <i>38th Division</i>.

-Rear Admiral Daniel J. Callaghan’s

-cruisers and destroyers, the close-in

-protection for the 182d’s transports,

-moved to stop the enemy. Coastwatcher

-and scout plane sightings

-and radio traffic intercepts had identified

-two battleships, two carriers,

-four cruisers, and a host of destroyers

-all headed toward Guadalcanal.

-A bombardment group led by the

-battleships <i>Hiei</i> and <i>Kirishima</i>, with

-the light cruiser <i>Nagura</i>, and 15 destroyers

-spearheaded the attack.

-Shortly after midnight, near Savo Island,

-Callaghan’s cruisers picked up

-the Japanese on radar and continued

-to close. The battle was joined at

-such short range that each side fired

-at times on their own ships. Callaghan’s

-flagship, the <i>San Francisco</i>,

-was hit 15 times, Callaghan was

-killed, and the ship had to limp away.

-The cruiser <i>Atlanta</i> (CL 104) was

-also hit and set afire. Rear Admiral

-Norman Scott, who was on board,

-was killed. Despite the hammering

-by Japanese fire, the Americans held

-and continued fighting. The battleship

-<i>Hiei</i>, hit by more than 80 shells,

-retired and with it went the rest of

-the bombardment force. Three destroyers

-were sunk and four others

-damaged.</p>

-

-<div id="ip_43b" class="figcenter" style="width: 550px;">

-  <img src="images/i_b_044.jpg" width="550" height="276" alt="" />

-  <div class="captionr">

-

-<p>Department of Defense (Navy) Photos 80-G-20824 and 80-G-21099</p></div>

-

-<div class="captionl">

-<p class="justify"><i>In the great naval Battle of Guadalcanal, 12&ndash;15 November,

-RAdm Daniel J. Callaghan was killed when his flagship, the

-heavy cruiser</i> San Francisco <i>(CA 38) took 15 major hits and

-was forced to limp away in the dark from the scene of action.</i></p></div></div>

-

-<p>The Americans had accomplished

-their purpose; they had forced the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_44" id="Page_44">44</a></span>

-Japanese to turn back. The cost was

-high. Two antiaircraft cruisers, the

-<i>Atlanta</i> and the <i>Juneau</i> (CL 52), were

-sunk; four destroyers, the <i>Barton</i>

-(DD 599), <i>Cushing</i> (DD 376), <i>Monssen</i>

-(DD 436), and <i>Laffey</i> (DD 459),

-also went to the bottom. In addition

-to the <i>San Francisco</i>, the heavy cruiser

-<i>Portland</i> (CA 33) and the destroyers

-<i>Sterret</i> (DD 407) and <i>Aaron

-Ward</i> (DD 483) were damaged. Only

-one destroyer of the 13 American

-ships engaged, the <i>Fletcher</i> (DD 445),

-was unscathed when the survivors retired

-to the New Hebrides.</p>

-

-<p>With daylight came the Cactus

-bombers and fighters; they found the

-crippled <i>Hiei</i> and pounded it mercilessly.

-On the 14th the Japanese were

-forced to scuttle it. Admiral Halsey

-ordered his only surviving carrier,

-the <i>Enterprise</i>, out of the Guadalcanal

-area to get it out of reach of

-Japanese aircraft and sent his battleships

-<i>Washington</i> (BB 56) and <i>South

-Dakota</i> (BB 55) with four escorting

-destroyers north to meet the

-Japanese. Some of the <i>Enterprise</i>’s

-planes flew in to Henderson Field to

-help even the odds.</p>

-

-<p>On 14 November Cactus and <i>Enterprise</i>

-flyers found a Japanese

-cruiser-destroyer force that had

-pounded the island on the night of

-13 November. They damaged four

-cruisers and a destroyer. After refueling

-and rearming they went after the

-approaching Japanese troop convoy.

-They hit several transports in one attack

-and sank one when they came

-back again. Army B-17s up from Espiritu

-Santo scored one hit and several

-near misses, bombing from 17,000

-feet.</p>

-

-<p>Moving in a continuous pattern of

-attack, return, refuel, rearm, and attack

-again, the planes from Guadalcanal

-hit nine transports, sinking

-seven. Many of the 5,000 troops on

-the stricken ships were rescued by

-Tanaka’s destroyers, which were firing

-furiously and laying smoke

-screens in an attempt to protect the

-transports. The admiral later recalled

-that day as indelible in his mind,

-with memories of “bombs wobbling

-down from high-flying B-17s; of carrier

-bombers roaring towards targets

-as though to plunge full into the

-water, releasing bombs and pulling

-out barely in time, each miss sending

-up towering clouds of mist and

-spray, every hit raising clouds of

-smoke and fire.” Despite the intensive

-aerial attack, Tanaka continued on

-to Guadalcanal with four destroyers

-and four transports.</p>

-

-<p>Japanese intelligence had picked up

-the approaching American battleship

-force and warned Tanaka of its advent.

-In turn, the enemy admirals

-sent their own battleship-cruiser

-force to intercept. The Americans, led

-by Rear Admiral Willis A. Lee in the

-<i>Washington</i>, reached Sealark Channel

-about 2100 on the 14th. An hour

-later, a Japanese cruiser was picked

-up north of Savo. Battleship fire soon

-turned it away. The Japanese now

-learned that their opponents would

-not be the cruisers they expected.</p>

-

-<p>The resulting clash, fought in the

-glare of gunfire and Japanese searchlights,

-was perhaps the most significant

-fought at sea for Guadalcanal.

-When the melee was over, the American

-battleships’ 16-inch guns had

-more than matched the Japanese.

-Both the <i>South Dakota</i> and the

-<i>Washington</i> were damaged badly<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_45" id="Page_45">45</a></span>

-enough to force their retirement, but

-the <i>Kirishima</i> was punished to its

-abandonment and death. One

-Japanese and three American destroyers,

-the <i>Benham</i> (DD 796), the

-<i>Walke</i> (DD 416), and the <i>Preston</i>

-(DD 379), were sunk. When the

-Japanese attack force retired, Admiral

-Tanaka ran his four transports

-onto the beach, knowing they would

-be sitting targets at daylight. Most of

-the men on board, however, did

-manage to get ashore before the inevitable

-pounding by American

-planes, warships, and artillery.</p>

-

-<p>Ten thousand troops of the <i>38th

-Division</i> had landed, but the

-Japanese were in no shape to ever

-again attempt a massive reinforcement.

-The horrific losses in the frequent

-naval clashes, which seemed at<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_46" id="Page_46">46</a></span>

-times to favor the Japanese, did not

-really represent a standoff. Every

-American ship lost or damaged could

-and would be replaced; every

-Japanese ship lost meant a steadily

-diminishing fleet. In the air, the losses

-on both sides were daunting, but the

-enemy naval air arm would never

-recover from its losses of experienced

-carrier pilots. Two years later, the

-Battle of the Philippine Sea between

-American and Japanese carriers

-would aptly be called the “Marianas

-Turkey Shoot” because of the ineptitude

-of the Japanese trainee pilots.</p>

-

-<div id="ip_46" class="figcenter" style="width: 550px;">

-  <img src="images/i_b_046.jpg" width="550" height="273" alt="" />

-  <div class="captionr">

-

-<p>Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 53510</p></div>

-

-<div class="captionl">

-<p class="justify"><i>A Japanese troop transport and her landing craft were badly

-damaged by the numerous Marine air attacks and were forced

-to run aground on Kokumbona beach after the naval Battle

-of Guadalcanal. Many enemy troops were killed in the attacks.</i></p></div></div>

-

-<p>The enemy troops who had been

-fortunate enough to reach land were

-not immediately ready to assault the

-American positions. The <i>38th Division</i>

-and the remnants of the various

-Japanese units that had previously

-tried to penetrate the Marine lines

-needed to be shaped into a coherent

-attack force before General

-Hyakutake could again attempt to

-take Henderson Field.</p>

-

-<p>General Vandegrift now had

-enough fresh units to begin to replace

-his veteran troops along the front

-lines. The decision to replace the 1st

-Marine Division with the Army’s

-25th Infantry Division had been

-made. Admiral Turner had told Vandegrift

-to leave all of his heavy equipment

-on the island when he did pull

-out “in hopes of getting your units re-equipped

-when you come out.” He

-also told the Marine general that the

-Army would command the final

-phases of the Guadalcanal operation

-since it would provide the majority

-of the combat forces once the 1st Division

-departed. Major General Alexander

-M. Patch, commander of the

-Americal Division, would relieve

-Vandegrift as senior American officer

-ashore. His air support would continue

-to be Marine-dominated as

-General Geiger, now located on Espiritu

-Santo with 1st Wing headquarters,

-fed his squadrons forward

-to maintain the offensive. And the air

-command on Guadalcanal itself

-would continue to be a mixed bag of

-Army, Navy, Marine, and Allied

-squadrons.</p>

-

-<p>The sick list of the 1st Marine Division

-in November included more

-than 3,200 men with malaria. The

-men of the 1st still manning the

-frontline foxholes and the rear

-areas&mdash;if anyplace within Guadalcanal’s

-perimeter could properly be

-called a rear area&mdash;were plain worn

-out. They had done their part and

-they knew it.</p>

-

-<p>On 29 November, General Vandegrift

-was handed a message from

-the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The crux of

-it read: “1st MarDiv is to be relieved

-without delay ... and will proceed

-to Australia for rehabilitation and

-employment.” The word soon spread

-that the 1st was leaving and where

-it was going. Australia was not yet

-the cherished place it would become

-in the division’s future, but <i>any</i> place

-was preferable to Guadalcanal.</p>

-

-

-<div class="chapter"></div>

-<div class="sidebar green">

-<p class="in0 small"><a name="Sidebar_page_41_75mm_Pack_Howitzer_Workhorse_of_the_Artillery" id="Sidebar_page_41_75mm_Pack_Howitzer_Workhorse_of_the_Artillery"></a>[Sidebar (<a href="#Page_41">page 41</a>):]</p>

-<h3 class="nobreak p0">75mm Pack Howitzer&mdash;Workhorse of the Artillery</h3>

-

-<div class="figright" style="width: 255px;">

-  <img src="images/i_b_041b.jpg" width="255" height="212" alt="" /></div>

-

-<p class="drop-cap b"><span class="smcap1">During</span> the summer of 1930, the Marine Corps began

-replacing its old French 75mm guns (Model

-1897) with the 75mm Pack Howitzer Model

-1923-E2. This weapon was designed for use in the Army

-primarily as mountain artillery. Since it could be broken

-down and manhandled ashore in six loads from ships’

-boats, the pack howitzer was an important supporting

-weapon of the Marine Corps landing forces in prewar landing

-exercises.</p>

-

-<p>The 75mm pack howitzer saw extensive service with the

-Marine Corps throughout World War II in almost every

-major landing in the Pacific. Crewed by five Marines, the

-howitzer could hurl a 16-pound shell nearly 10,000 yards.

-In the D Series table of organization with which the 1st

-Marine Division went to war, and through the following

-E and F series, there were three pack howitzer battalions

-for each artillery regiment.&mdash;<i>Anthony Wayne Tommell and

-Kenneth L. Smith-Christmas</i></p>

-</div>

-

-

-<div class="chapter"></div>

-<div class="sidebar">

-<p class="in0 small"><a name="Sidebar_page_45_The_Japanese_Model_89_1929_50mm_Heavy_Grenade_Discharger" id="Sidebar_page_45_The_Japanese_Model_89_1929_50mm_Heavy_Grenade_Discharger"></a>[Sidebar (<a href="#Page_45">page 45</a>):]</p>

-<h3 class="nobreak p0">The Japanese Model 89 (1929) 50mm Heavy Grenade Discharger</h3>

-

-<div class="figright" style="width: 252px;">

-  <img src="images/i_b_045.jpg" width="252" height="370" alt="" /></div>

-

-<p class="drop-cap b"><span class="smcap1">Born</span> out of the need to bridge the gap in range between

-hand grenades and mortars, the grenade discharger

-evolved in the Imperial Japanese Army from

-a special purpose weapon of infantry assault and defense

-to an essential item of standard equipment with all Japanese

-ground forces.</p>

-

-<p>Commonly called <i>Juteki</i> by the Japanese, this weapon

-officially was designated <i>Hachikyu Shiki Jutekidarto</i>, or

-1189 Model Heavy Grenade Discharger, the term “heavy”

-being justified by the powerful 1-pound, 12-ounce high explosive

-shell it was designed to fire, although it also fired

-the standard Model 91 fragmentation grenade.</p>

-

-<p>To the American Marines and soldiers who first encountered

-this weapon and others of its kind in combat they

-were known as “knee mortars,” likely so named because they

-generally were fired from a kneeling position. Typically,

-the discharger’s concave baseplate was pressed firmly into

-the surface of the ground by the firer’s foot to support the

-heavy recoil of the fired shell, but unfortunately the term

-“knee mortar” suggested to some untutored captors of these

-weapons that they were to be fired with the baseplate resting

-against the knee or thigh. When a Marine fired one

-of these dischargers from his thigh and broke his upper leg

-bone, efforts were swiftly undertaken in the field to educate

-all combat troops in the safe and proper handling of

-these very useful weapons.</p>

-

-<p>The Model 89 (1929) 50mm Heavy Grenade Discharger

-is a muzzle-loaded, high-angle-of-fire weapon which weighs

-10-1/4 pounds and is 24 inches in overall length. Its design

-is compact and simple. The discharger has three major components:

-the rifled barrel, the supporting barrel pedestal

-with firing mechanism, and the base plate. Operation of

-the Model 89 was easy and straightforward, and with practice

-its user could deliver accurate fire registered quickly

-on target.</p>

-

-<p>Encountered in all major battles in the Pacific War, the

-Model 89 Grenade Discharger was an uncomplicated, very

-portable, and highly efficient weapon operated easily by

-one man. It was carried in a cloth or leather case with a

-sling, and its one-piece construction allowed it to be

-brought into action very quickly. This grenade discharger

-had the advantage over most mortars in that it could be

-aimed and fired mechanically after a projectile had been

-placed in the barrel, projectile firing not being dependent

-upon dropping down the barrel against a stationary firing

-pin as with most mortars, where barrel fouling sometimes

-caused dangerous hangfires. Although an instantaneous

-fuze employed on the Model 89 high explosive shell restricted

-this shell’s use to open areas, the Model 91 fragmentation

-grenade with its seven-second fuze made this discharger

-effective in a jungle or forest setting, with complete

-safety for the user from premature detonation of projectiles

-by overhanging foliage. Smoke and signal shells, and

-an incendiary grenade, were special types of ammunition

-used with this versatile and effective weapon which won

-the respect of all who came to know it.&mdash;<i>Edwin F. Libby</i></p>

-</div>

-

-<hr />

-<div class="chapter"></div>

-<h2><a name="December_and_the_Final_Stages" id="December_and_the_Final_Stages"></a><i>December and the Final Stages</i></h2>

-

-<p>On 7 December, one year after the

-Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor,

-General Vandegrift sent a message to

-all men under his command in the

-Guadalcanal area thanking them for

-their courage and steadfastness, commending

-particularly the pilots and

-“all who labored and sweated within

-the lines in all manner of prodigious

-and vital tasks.” He reminded them

-all that their “unbelievable achievements

-had made ‘Guadalcanal’ a synonym

-for death and disaster in the

-language of our enemy.” On 9 December,

-he handed over his command to

-General Patch and flew out to Australia<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_47" id="Page_47">47</a></span>

-at the same time the first elements

-of the 5th Marines were

-boarding ship. The 1st, 11th, and 7th

-Marines would soon follow together

-with all the division’s supporting

-units. The men who were leaving

-were thin, tired, hollow-eyed, and

-apathetic; they were young men who

-had grown old in four months time.

-They left behind 681 dead in the island’s

-cemetery.</p>

-

-<div id="ip_47" class="figleft" style="width: 177px;">

-  <div class="captionl top"><p class="justify"><i>As he tells it, “Too Many, Too Close, Too

-Long,” is Donald L. Dickson’s portrait of

-one of the “little guys, just plain worn

-out. His stamina and his spirit stretched

-beyond human endurance. He has had

-no real sleep for a long time....

-And he probably hasn’t stopped ducking

-and fighting long enough to discover

-that he has malaria. He is going to discover

-it now, however. He is through.”</i></p>

-</div>

-

-<div class="captionr top">

-<p>

-Captain Donald L. Dickson, USMCR

-</p></div>

-  <img src="images/i_b_047b.jpg" width="177" height="383" alt="" />

-</div>

-

-<div id="ip_47b" class="figright" style="width: 359px;">

-  <img src="images/i_b_047.jpg" width="359" height="364" alt="" />

-  <div class="captionr">

-

-<p>U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo SC164898</p></div>

-

-<div class="captionl">

-<p class="justify"><i>Americal Division commander, MajGen Alexander M. Patch, Jr., watches while

-his troops and supplies are staged on Guadalcanal’s beaches on 8 December, the

-day before he relieved Gen Vandegrift and his wornout 1st Marine Division.</i></p></div></div>

-

-<p>The final regiment of the Americal

-Division, the 132d Infantry, landed

-on 8 December as the 5th Marines

-was preparing to leave. The 2d Marine

-Division’s regiments already on

-the island, the 2d, 8th, and part of

-the 10th, knew that the 6th Marines

-was on its way to rejoin. It seemed

-to many of the men of the 2d Marines,

-who had landed on D-Day, 7

-August, that they, too, should be

-leaving. These took slim comfort in

-the thought that they, by all rights,

-should be the first of the 2d to depart

-the island whenever that hoped-for

-day came.</p>

-

-<p>General Patch received a steady

-stream of ground reinforcements and

-replacements in December. He was

-not ready yet to undertake a full-scale

-offensive until the 25th Division and

-the rest of the 2d Marine Division arrived,

-but he kept all frontline units

-active in combat and reconnaissance

-patrols, particularly toward the

-western flank.</p>

-

-<p>The island commander’s air

-defense capabilities also grew substantially.

-Cactus Air Force, organized

-into a fighter command and

-a strike (bomber) command, now

-operated from a newly redesignated

-Marine Corps Air Base. The Henderson

-Field complex included a new

-airstrip, Fighter Two, which replaced

-Fighter One, which had severe

-drainage problems. Brigadier General

-Louis Woods, who had taken over as

-senior aviator when Geiger returned

-to Espiritu Santo, was relieved on 26

-December by Brigadier General Francis

-P. Mulcahy, Commanding General,

-2d Marine Aircraft Wing. New

-fighter and bomber squadrons from

-both the 1st and 2d Wings sent their

-flight echelons forward on a regular

-basis. The Army added three fighter

-squadrons and a medium bomber

-squadron of B-26s. The Royal New

-Zealand Air Force flew in a reconnaissance

-squadron of Lockheed

-Hudsons. And the U.S. Navy sent

-forward a squadron of Consolidated<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_49" id="Page_49">49</a></span>

-PBY Catalina patrol planes which

-had a much needed night-flying capability.</p>

-

-<p>The aerial buildup forced the

-Japanese to curtail all air attacks and

-made daylight naval reinforcement

-attempts an event of the past. The

-nighttime visits of the Tokyo Express

-destroyers now brought only supplies

-encased in metal drums which were

-rolled over the ships’ sides in hope

-they would float into shore. The men

-ashore desperately needed everything

-that could be sent, even by this

-method, but most of the drums never

-reached the beaches.</p>

-

-<p>Still, however desperate the enemy

-situation was becoming, he was

-prepared to fight. General Hyakutake

-continued to plan the seizure of the

-airfield. General Hitoshi Immamura,

-commander of the <i>Eighth Area

-Army</i>, arrived in Rabaul on 2 December

-with orders to continue the

-offensive. He had 50,000 men to add

-to the embattled Japanese troops on

-Guadalcanal.</p>

-

-<p>Before these new enemy units

-could be employed, the Americans

-were prepared to move out from the

-perimeter in their own offensive.

-Conscious that the Mt. Austen area

-was a continuing threat to his inland

-flank in any drive to the west, Patch

-committed the Americal’s 132d Infantry

-to the task of clearing the mountain’s

-wooded slopes on 17

-December. The Army regiment succeeded

-in isolating the major

-Japanese force in the area by early

-January. The 1st Battalion, 2d Marines,

-took up hill positions to the

-southeast of the 132d to increase

-flank protection.</p>

-

-<p>By this time, the 25th Infantry Division

-(Major General J. Lawton Collins)

-had arrived and so had the 6th

-Marines (6 January) and the rest of

-the 2d Division’s headquarters and

-support troops. Brigadier General

-Alphonse De Carre, the Marine division’s

-assistant commander, took

-charge of all Marine ground forces

-on the island. The 2d Division’s commander,

-Major General John Marston,

-remained in New Zealand

-because he was senior to General

-Patch.</p>

-

-<p>With three divisions under his

-command, General Patch was designated

-Commanding General, XIV

-Corps, on 2 January. His corps headquarters

-numbered less than a score

-of officers and men, almost all taken

-from the Americal’s staff. Brigadier

-General Edmund B. Sebree, who had

-already led both Army and Marine

-units in attacks on the Japanese, took

-command of the Americal Division.

-On 10 January, Patch gave the signal

-to start the strongest American

-offensive yet in the Guadalcanal campaign.

-The mission of the troops was

-simple and to the point: “Attack and

-destroy the Japanese forces remaining

-on Guadalcanal.”</p>

-

-<p>The initial objective of the corps’

-attack was a line about 1,000 to 1,500

-yards west of jump-off positions.

-These ran inland from Point Cruz to

-the vicinity of Hill 66, about 3,000

-yards from the beach. In order to

-reach Hill 66, the 25th Infantry Division

-attacked first with the 35th

-and 27th Infantry driving west and

-southwest across a scrambled series

-of ridges. The going was rough and

-the dug-in enemy, elements of two

-regiments of the <i>38th Division</i>, gave

-way reluctantly and slowly. By the

-13th, however, the American soldiers,

-aided by Marines of the 1st

-Battalion, 2d Marines, had won

-through to positions on the southern

-flank of the 2d Marine Division.</p>

-

-<p>On 12 January, the Marines began

-their advance with the 8th Marines

-along the shore and 2d Marines inland.

-At the base of Point Cruz, in

-the 3d Battalion, 8th Marines’ sector,

-regimental weapons company halftracks

-ran over seven enemy machine

-gun nests. The attack was then held

-up by an extensive emplacement until

-the weapons company commander,

-Captain Henry P. “Jim” Crowe, took

-charge of a half-dozen Marine infantrymen

-taking cover from enemy fire

-with the classic remarks: “You’ll never

-get a Purple Heart hiding in a fox

-hole. Follow me!” The men did and

-they destroyed the emplacement.</p>

-

-<div id="ip_49" class="figcenter" style="width: 377px;">

-  <img src="images/i_b_049.jpg" width="377" height="198" alt="" />

-  <div class="captionl">U.S. Halftrack Mounting a 75mm Pack Howitzer

-and a .50-Caliber Air-Cooled Machine Gun</div></div>

-

-<p>All along the front of the advancing

-assault companies the going was

-rough. The Japanese, remnants of the

-<i>Sendai Division</i>, were dug into the

-sides of a series of cross compartments

-and their fire took the Marines

-in the flank as they advanced.

-Progress was slow despite massive artillery

-support and naval gunfire

-from four destroyers offshore. In two

-days of heavy fighting, flamethrowers

-were employed for the first time

-and tanks were brought into play.

-The 2d Marines was now relieved

-and the 6th Marines moved into the

-attack along the coast while the 8th<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_50" id="Page_50">50</a></span>

-Marines took up the advance inland.

-Naval gunfire support, spotted by

-naval officers ashore, improved

-measurably. On the 15th, the Americans,

-both Army and Marine,

-reached the initial corps objective. In

-the Marine attack zone, 600 Japanese

-were dead.</p>

-

-<div id="ip_50" class="figcenter" style="width: 756px;">

-  <img src="images/i_b_050.jpg" width="756" height="598" alt="" />

-  <div class="caption"><p>FINAL PHASE</p>

-

-<p class="smaller">26 JANUARY&ndash;9 FEBRUARY 1943</p></div></div>

-

-<p>The battle-weary 2d Marines had

-seen its last infantry action of

-Guadalcanal. A new unit now came

-into being, a composite Army-Marine

-division, or CAM division,

-formed from units of the Americal

-and 2d Marine Divisions. The directing

-staff was from the 2d Division,

-since the Americal had responsibility

-for the main perimeter. Two of its

-regiments, the 147th and the 182d Infantry,

-moved up to attack in line

-with the 6th Marines still along the

-coast. The 8th Marines was essentially

-pinched out of the front lines by

-a narrowing attack corridor as the inland

-mountains and hills pressed

-closer to the coastal trail. The 25th

-Division, which was advancing

-across this rugged terrain, had the

-mission of outflanking the Japanese

-in the vicinity of Kokumbona, while

-the CAM division drove west. On

-the 23d, as the CAM troops approached

-Kokumbona, the 1st Battalion

-of the 27th Infantry struck

-north out of the hills and overran the

-village site and Japanese base. There

-was only slight but steady opposition

-to the American advance as the enemy

-withdrew west toward Cape Esperance.</p>

-

-<p>The Japanese had decided, reluctantly,

-to give up the attempt to

-retake Guadalcanal. The orders were

-sent in the name of the Emperor and

-senior staff officers were sent to

-Guadalcanal to ensure their acceptance.

-The Navy would make the final

-runs of the Tokyo Express, only

-this time in reverse, to evacuate the

-garrison so it could fight again in

-later battles to hold the Solomons.</p>

-

-<p>Receiving intelligence that enemy

-ships were massing again to the

-northwest, General Patch took steps,

-as Vandegrift had before him on

-many occasions, to guard against

-overextending his forces in the face

-of what appeared to be another enemy

-attempt at reinforcement. He

-pulled the 25th Division back to bolster

-the main perimeter defenses and

-ordered the CAM division to continue

-its attack. When the Marines

-and soldiers moved out on 26 January,

-they had a surprisingly easy time

-of it, gaining 1,000 yards the first day<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_51" id="Page_51">51</a></span>

-and 2,000 the following day. The

-Japanese were still contesting every

-attack, but not in strength.</p>

-

-<p>By 30 January, the sole frontline

-unit in the American advance was the

-147th Infantry; the 6th Marines held

-positions to its left rear.</p>

-

-<p>The Japanese destroyer transports

-made their first run to the island on

-the night of 1&ndash;2 February, taking out

-2,300 men from evacuation positions

-near Cape Esperance. On the night

-of 4&ndash;5 February, they returned and

-took out most of the <i>Sendai</i> survivors

-and General Hyakutake and

-his <i>Seventeenth Army</i> staff. The final

-evacuation operation was carried

-out on the night of 7&ndash;8 February,

-when a 3,000-man rear guard was

-embarked. In all, the Japanese withdrew

-about 11,000 men in those three

-nights and evacuated about 13,000

-soldiers from Guadalcanal overall.

-The Americans would meet many of

-these men again in later battles, but

-not the 600 evacuees who died, too

-worn and sick to survive their rescue.</p>

-

-<p>On 9 February, American soldiers

-advancing from east and west met at

-Tenaro village on Cape Esperance.

-The only Marine ground unit still in

-action was the 3d Battalion, 10th

-Marines, supporting the advance.

-General Patch could happily report

-the “complete and total defeat of Japanese

-forces on Guadalcanal.” No organized

-Japanese units remained.</p>

-

-<p>On 31 January, the 2d Marines and

-the 1st Battalion, 8th Marines,

-boarded ship to leave Guadalcanal.

-As was true with the 1st Marine Division,

-some of these men were so

-debilitated by malaria they had to be

-carried on board. All of them struck

-observers again as young men grown

-old “with their skins cracked and furrowed

-and wrinkled.” On 9 February,

-the rest of the 8th Marines and a

-good part of the division supporting

-units boarded transports. The 6th

-Marines, thankfully only six weeks

-on the island, left on the 19th. All

-were headed for Wellington, New

-Zealand, the 2d Marines for the first

-time. Left behind on the island as a

-legacy of the 2d Marine Division

-were 263 dead.</p>

-

-<div id="ip_51" class="figcenter" style="width: 549px;">

-  <div class="captionl top"><p class="justify"><i>President Franklin D. Roosevelt presents Gen Vandegrift the

-Medal of Honor for his heroic accomplishments against the

-Japanese in the Solomons. Looking on are Mrs. Vandegrift,

-and the general’s son, Maj Alexander A. Vandegrift, Jr.</i></p></div>

-

-<div class="captionr top">

-<p>

-National Archives Photo 208-PU-209V-4

-</p></div>

-  <img src="images/i_b_051.jpg" width="549" height="410" alt="" />

-</div>

-

-<p>The total cost of the Guadalcanal

-campaign to the American ground

-combat forces was 1,598 officers and

-men killed, 1,152 of them Marines.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_52" id="Page_52">52</a></span>

-The wounded totaled 4,709, and

-2,799 of these were Marines. Marine

-aviation casualties were 147 killed

-and 127 wounded. The Japanese in

-their turn lost close to 25,000 men on

-Guadalcanal, about half of whom

-were killed in action. The rest succumbed

-to illness, wounds, and starvation.</p>

-

-<div id="ip_52" class="figcenter" style="width: 548px;">

-  <img src="images/i_b_052.jpg" width="548" height="356" alt="" />

-  <div class="captionl justify"><i>The temporary resting place of a Marine killed in the fighting

-at Lunga Point is shown here. The grave marker was erected

-by his friends. The Marine’s remains were later removed to

-the division cemetery on Guadalcanal, and further reburial

-at war’s end either in his hometown or the Punchbowl National

-Cemetery in Hawaii with the honors due a fallen hero.</i></div></div>

-

-<p>At sea, the comparative losses

-were about equal, with each side losing

-about the same number of fighting

-ships. The enemy loss of 2

-battleships, 3 carriers, 12 cruisers,

-and 25 destroyers, was irreplaceable.

-The Allied ship losses, though costly,

-were not fatal; in essence, all ships

-lost were replaced. In the air, at least

-600 Japanese planes were shot down;

-even more costly was the death of

-2,300 experienced pilots and aircrewmen.

-The Allied plane losses were

-less than half the enemy’s number

-and the pilot and aircrew losses substantially

-lower.</p>

-

-<p>President Roosevelt, reflecting the

-thanks of a grateful nation, awarded

-General Vandegrift the Medal of

-Honor for “outstanding and heroic

-accomplishment” in his leadership of

-American forces on Guadalcanal

-from 7 August to 9 December 1942.

-And for the same period, he awarded

-the Presidential Unit Citation to

-the 1st Marine Division (Reinforced)

-for “outstanding gallantry” reflecting

-“courage and determination ... of

-an inspiring order.” Included in the

-division’s citation and award, besides

-the organic units of the 1st Division,

-were the 2d and 8th Marines and attached

-units of the 2d Marine Division,

-all of the Americal Division, the

-1st Parachute and 1st and 2d Raider

-Battalions, elements of the 3d, 5th,

-and 14th Defense Battalions, the 1st

-Aviation Engineer Battalion, the 6th

-Naval Construction Battalion, and

-two motor torpedo boat squadrons.

-The indispensable Cactus Air Force

-was included, also represented by 7

-Marine headquarters and service

-squadrons, 16 Marine flying squadrons,

-16 Navy flying squadrons,

-and 5 Army flying squadrons.</p>

-

-<p>The victory at Guadalcanal

-marked a crucial turning point in the

-Pacific War. No longer were the

-Japanese on the offensive. Some of

-the Japanese Emperor’s best infantrymen,

-pilots, and seamen had been

-bested in close combat by the Americans

-and their Allies. There were

-years of fierce fighting ahead, but

-there was now no question of its

-outcome.</p>

-

-<p>When the veterans of the 1st Marine

-Division were gathered in thankful

-reunion 20 years later, they

-received a poignant message from

-Guadalcanal. The sender was a

-legend to all “Canal” Marines,

-Honorary U.S. Marine Corps Sergeant

-Major Jacob C. Vouza. The

-Solomons native in his halting English

-said: “Tell them I love them all.

-Me old man now, and me no look

-good no more. But me never forget.”</p>

-

-<div class="chapter"></div>

-<div class="sidebar green">

-<p class="in0 small"><a name="Sidebar_page_48_The_George_Medal" id="Sidebar_page_48_The_George_Medal"></a>[Sidebar (<a href="#Page_49">page 48</a>):]</p>

-<h3 class="nobreak p0">The ‘George’ Medal</h3>

-

-<p class="drop-cap"><span class="smcap1"><span class="dkgreen">T</span>he</span> George Medal is legendary among 1st Marine

-Division veterans of Guadalcanal. Only

-about 50 were cast, in Australia, before the mold

-gave out.</p>

-

-<p>The medal commemorates the difficult situation of the

-division during the early days on Guadalcanal, when ammunition,

-food, and heavy equipment were short and the

-Japanese plentiful. When the issue was no longer in doubt,

-Marines had time to reflect on the D-plus-3 Navy withdrawal

-in the face of increasing Japanese air attacks and

-surface action which left the division in such a tight spot.</p>

-

-<p>In the recollection of then-Captain Donald L. Dickson,

-adjutant of the 5th Marines, the Division G-3, then-Lieutenant

-Colonel Merrill B. Twining, resolved to commemorate

-the occasion. Twining told artist Dickson in

-general terms what he had in mind. Dickson went to work

-designing an appropriate medal using a fifty-cent piece to

-draw a circle on a captured Japanese blank military

-postcard.</p>

-

-<p>Dickson’s design was approved and when the division

-got to Australia a mold was made by a local metal craftsman

-and a small number were cast before the mold became

-unserviceable. Those wanting a medal paid one Australian

-pound for it and received a certificate as well. The medals

-are now an even greater rarity than at the time. In recent

-years, reproductions have been cast, and can be identified

-by the different metal and a poor definition of details.</p>

-

-<p>The obverse design shows a hand and sleeve dropping

-a hot potato in the shape of Guadalcanal into the arms of

-a grateful Marine. In the original design the sleeve bore the

-stripes of a vice admiral intended to be either Vice Admiral

-Robert L. Ghormley, ComSoPac, or Vice Admiral Frank

-Jack Fletcher, Commander Joint Expeditionary Force, but

-the final medal diplomatically omitted this identification.</p>

-

-<p>Also on the obverse is a Saguaro cactus, indigenous to

-Arizona, not Guadalcanal, but representing the code name

-for the island, “Cactus.” The obverse inscription is <i>Facia Georgius</i>,

-“Let George Do It.” Thus it became known as the

-George Medal.</p>

-

-<p>The medal’s reverse pictures a cow (the original design

-showed a Japanese soldier with breeches down) and an electric

-fan, and is inscribed: “In fond remembrance of the happy

-days spent from Aug. 7th 1942 to Jan. 5th 1943.

-U.S.M.C.”</p>

-

-<p>The suspension ribbon was made, appropriately, of the

-pale green herringbone twill from some Marine’s utility uniform.

-Legend has it that to be authentic the utilities from

-which the ribbons were made had to have been washed in

-the waters of Guadalcanal’s Lunga River. Some medals were

-provided with the oversized safety pin used to identify laundry

-bags in Navy shipboard laundries.</p>

-

-<p>Such unofficial commemorative mementoes are not uncommon

-in military circles and recall, among others, the

-Soochow Creek medals recognizing the defense of Shanghai’s

-International Settlement during the Japanese invasions

-of 1932 and 1937 which were inspired by the Military

-Order of the Dragon medals of veterans of the China Relief

-Expedition or Boxer Rebellion.&mdash;<i>Brooke Nihart</i></p>

-

-<div class="figcenter" style="width: 691px;">

-  <img src="images/i_b_048.jpg" width="691" height="406" alt="" /></div>

-</div>

-

-<hr />

-

-<div class="chapter"></div>

-<h2><a name="Sources" id="Sources"></a><i>Sources</i></h2>

-

-<p>The basic source work for this booklet is

-the first volume in the series <i>History of U.S.

-Marine Corps Operations in World War II,

-Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal</i>, written by

-LtCol Frank O. Hough, Maj Verle E. Ludwig,

-and Henry I. Shaw, Jr. (Washington: Historical

-Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, U.S.

-Marine Corps, 1958). Other books used in

-writing this narrative were: BGen Samuel B.

-Griffith II, <i>The Battle for Guadalcanal</i>

-(Philadelphia: J.&nbsp;B. Lippincott, 1963); Gen

-Alexander A. Vandegrift as told to Robert B.

-Asprey, <i>Once a Marine: The Memoirs of

-General A.&nbsp;A. Vandegrift, USMC</i> (New York:

-W.&nbsp;W. Norton, 1964); Col Mitchell Paige, <i>A

-Marine Named Mitch</i> (New York: Vantage

-Press, 1975); Burke Davis, <i>Marine: The Life

-of Chesty Puller</i> (Boston: Little, Brown,

-1962); George McMillan, <i>The Old Breed: A

-History of the 1st Marine Division in World

-War II</i> (Washington: Infantry Journal Press,

-1949); and Richard W. Johnston, <i>Follow Me!:

-The Story of the Second Marine Division in

-World War II</i> (New York: Random House,

-1948).</p>

-

-<p>The correspondence of General Vandegrift

-with General Holcomb and other senior Marines,

-held at the Marine Corps Historical

-Center, was helpful. Equally of value were

-conversations that the author had had with

-General Vandegrift after his retirement. In the

-course of his career as a Marine historian, the

-author has talked with other Guadalcanal

-veterans of all ranks; hopefully, this has

-resulted in a “feel” for the campaign, essential

-in writing such an overview.</p>

-

-<p>The literature on the Guadalcanal operation

-is extensive. In addition to the books cited

-above, there are several which are

-personally recommended to the interested

-reader: Robert Leckie, <i>Helmet for My Pillow</i>

-(New York: Random House, 1957); Herbert

-Merillat, <i>Guadalcanal Remembered</i> (New

-York: Dodd, Mead, 1982); John Miller, Jr.,

-<i>The United States Army in World War II: The

-War in the Pacific</i>; <i>Guadalcanal, The First

-Offensive</i> (Washington: Historical Division,

-Department of the Army, 1949); T. Grady

-Gallant, <i>On Valor’s Side</i> (New York: Doubleday,

-1963); Robert Sherrod, <i>History of Marine

-Corps Aviation in World War II</i>

-(Washington: Combat Forces Press, 1952);

-Maj John L. Zimmerman, <i>The Guadalcanal

-Campaign</i> (Washington: Historical Division,

-Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1949);

-RAdm Samuel E. Morrison, <i>The Struggle for

-Guadalcanal: History of United States Naval

-Operations in World War II</i>, Vol V (Boston:

-Little, Brown, 1950); and a recent, comprehensive

-account, Richard B. Frank, <i>Guadalcanal</i>

-(New York: Random House, 1990).</p>

-

-<hr />

-

-<div class="chapter"></div>

-<h2><a name="About_the_Author" id="About_the_Author"></a><i>About the Author</i></h2>

-

-<div class="figleft" style="width: 137px; margin-top: -1em;">

-  <img src="images/i_b_053.jpg" width="137" height="186" alt="" /></div>

-

-<p class="drop-cap"><span class="smcap1">Henry</span> I. Shaw, Jr., former chief historian of

-the History and Museums Division, was a

-Marine Corps historian from 1951&ndash;1990. He attended

-The Citadel, 1943&ndash;1944, and was graduated

-with a bachelor of arts cum laude in history

-from Hope College, Holland, Michigan. He

-received a master of arts degree in history from

-Columbia University. Mr. Shaw served as a Marine

-in both World War II and the Korean War.

-He is the co-author of four of the five volumes

-of the official history of Marine Corps operations

-in World War II and was the senior editor of most

-of the official histories of Marines in Vietnam.

-In addition, he has written a number of brief Marine Corps histories. He has written

-many articles on military history and has had more than 50 signed book reviews.</p>

-

-<div class="tb">* <span class="in2">* </span><span class="in2">* </span><span class="in2">* </span><span class="in2">*</span></div>

-

-<p><i>The author gratefully acknowledges the permission granted by the Nautical and

-Aviation Publishing Company of America to use the maps from BGen Samuel B.

-Griffith II’s</i> The Battle for Guadalcanal <i>and by Doubleday Books and Jack Coggins

-for use of the sketches from his</i> The Campaign for Guadalcanal. <i>The author

-also wishes to thank Richard J. Frank and Herbert C. Merillat for permission to

-reproduce their photographs.</i></p>

-

-

-<div class="chapter"></div>

-<div class="sidebar" id="About_series">

-

-<div class="figcenter" style="width: 274px;">

-  <img src="images/i_b_053b.jpg" width="274" height="103" alt="" /></div>

-

-<p><b>THIS PAMPHLET HISTORY</b>, one in a series devoted to U.S. Marines in the

-World War II era, is published for the education and training of Marines by

-the History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps,

-Washington, D.C., as a part of the U.S. Department of Defense observance

-of the 50th anniversary of victory in that war.</p>

-

-<p>Editorial costs of preparing this pamphlet have been defrayed in part by

-a bequest from the estate of Emilie H. Watts, in memory of her late husband,

-Thomas M. Watts, who served as a Marine and was the recipient of a Purple

-Heart.</p>

-

-<div class="center">

-<p class="p1 bold" style="font-family: sans-serif, serif;">WORLD WAR II COMMEMORATIVE SERIES</p>

-

-<p><i>DIRECTOR OF MARINE CORPS HISTORY AND MUSEUMS</i><br />

-<b>Brigadier General Edwin H. Simmons, USMC (Ret)</b></p>

-

-<p><i>GENERAL EDITOR,<br />

-WORLD WAR II COMMEMORATIVE SERIES</i><br />

-<b>Benis M. Frank</b></p>

-

-<p><i>CARTOGRAPHIC CONSULTANT</i><br />

-<b>George C. MacGillivray</b></p>

-

-<p><i>EDITING AND DESIGN SECTION, HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISION</i><br />

-<b>Robert E. Struder</b>, Senior Editor; <b>W. Stephen Hill</b>, Visual Information<br />

-Specialist; <b>Catherine A. Kerns</b>, Composition Services Technician</p>

-

-<p>Marine Corps Historical Center<br />

-Building 58, Washington Navy Yard<br />

-Washington, D.C. 20374-0580</p>

-

-<p>1992</p>

-

-<p>PCN 190 003117 00</p>

-</div>

-</div>

-

-<div class="figcenter" style="width: 291px;">

-  <img src="images/i_back_cover.jpg" width="291" height="400" alt="back cover" /></div>

-

-

-<div class="chapter"></div>

-<div class="transnote">

-<h2 class="nobreak p1"><a name="Transcribers_Notes" id="Transcribers_Notes"></a>Transcriber’s Notes</h2>

-

-<p>Punctuation, hyphenation, and spelling were made consistent when a

-predominant preference was found in this book; otherwise they were not

-changed.</p>

-

-<p>Simple typographical errors were corrected; occasional unbalanced

-quotation marks retained.</p>

-

-<p>To make this eBook easier to read, particularly on handheld devices,

-some images have been made relatively larger than in the original

-pamphlet, and centered, rather than offset to one side or the other;

-and some were placed a little earlier or later than in the

-original. Sidebars in the original have been repositioned between

-chapters and identified as “[Sidebar (page nn):”, where the

-page reference is to the original location in the source book. In the

-Plain Text version, the matching closing right bracket follows the last

-line of the Sidebar’s text and is on a separate line to make it more

-noticeable. In the HTML versions, that bracket follows the colon, and

-each Sidebar is displayed within a box.</p>

-

-<p>Descriptions of the Cover and Frontispiece have been moved from page 1

-of the book to just below those illustrations, and text referring to

-the locations of those illustrations has been deleted.</p>

-

-<p>Page <a href="#Sidebar_page_3_General_Alexander_A_Vandegrift">3</a>: “He spent most of his final years” was misprinted without

-the “of”.</p>

-

-<p>Page <a href="#Page_21">21</a>: “disgraced in his own” was misprinted without the “his”.</p>

-</div>

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-<pre>

-

-

-

-

-

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-for Guadalcanal, by Henry I. Shaw

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+<div>*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 48807 ***</div>
+
+<div class="transnote">
+<p class="center">Transcriber’s note: Table of Contents added by Transcriber
+and placed into the Public Domain.</p>
+</div>
+
+<h2 class="nobreak">Contents</h2>
+
+<div class="center vspace"><div class="ilb">
+
+<ul>
+<li><a href="#First_Offensive_The_Marine">First Offensive: The Marine Campaign for Guadalcanal</a><br /></li>
+<li class="in2"><a href="#Sidebar_page_3_General_Alexander_A_Vandegrift">SIDEBAR: General Alexander A. Vandegrift</a><br /></li>
+<li><a href="#The_Landing_and_August_Battles">The Landing and August Battles</a><br /></li>
+<li class="in2"><a href="#Sidebar_page_5_First_Marine_Utility_Uniform_Issued_in_World_War_II">SIDEBAR: First Marine Utility Uniform Issued in World War II</a><br /></li>
+<li class="in2"><a href="#Sidebar_page_11_LVT_1_The_Amtrac">SIDEBAR: LVT (1)&mdash;The ‘Amtrac’</a><br /></li>
+<li class="in2"><a href="#Sidebar_page_14_General_Vandegrift_and_His_1st_Marine_Division_Staff">SIDEBAR: General Vandegrift and His 1st Marine Division Staff</a><br /></li>
+<li class="in2"><a href="#Sidebar_page_17_The_Coastwatchers">SIDEBAR: The Coastwatchers</a><br /></li>
+<li class="in2"><a href="#Sidebar_page_19_The_1st_Marine_Division_Patch">SIDEBAR: The 1st Marine Division Patch</a><br /></li>
+<li><a href="#September_and_the_Ridge">September and the Ridge</a><br /></li>
+<li class="in2"><a href="#Sidebar_page_22_Sergeant_Major_Sir_Jacob_Charles_Vouza">SIDEBAR: Sergeant Major Sir Jacob Charles Vouza</a><br /></li>
+<li class="in2"><a href="#Sidebar_page_23_M3A1_37mm_Antitank_Gun">SIDEBAR: M3A1 37mm Antitank Gun</a><br /></li>
+<li class="in2"><a href="#Sidebar_page_29">SIDEBAR: Douglas Albert Munro</a><br /></li>
+<li><a href="#October_and_the_Japanese_Offensive">October and the Japanese Offensive</a><br /></li>
+<li class="in2"><a href="#Sidebar_page_37_Reising_Gun">SIDEBAR: Reising Gun</a><br /></li>
+<li><a href="#November_and_the_Continuing_Buildup">November and the Continuing Buildup</a><br /></li>
+<li class="in2"><a href="#Sidebar_page_41_75mm_Pack_Howitzer_Workhorse_of_the_Artillery">SIDEBAR: 75mm Pack Howitzer&mdash;Workhorse of the Artillery</a><br /></li>
+<li class="in2"><a href="#Sidebar_page_45_The_Japanese_Model_89_1929_50mm_Heavy_Grenade_Discharger">SIDEBAR: The Japanese Model 89 (1929) 50mm Heavy Grenade Discharger</a><br /></li>
+<li><a href="#December_and_the_Final_Stages">December and the Final Stages</a><br /></li>
+<li class="in2"><a href="#Sidebar_page_48_The_George_Medal">SIDEBAR: The ‘George’ Medal</a><br /></li>
+<li><a href="#Sources">Sources</a><br /></li>
+<li><a href="#About_the_Author">About the Author</a><br /></li>
+<li><a href="#About_series">About this series of pamphlets</a><br /></li>
+<li><a href="#Transcribers_Notes">Transcriber’s Notes</a></li>
+</ul>
+</div></div>
+
+
+<h1 style="text-align: left; clear: none;">
+<span class="smcap">First Offensive:<br />
+The Marine Campaign<br />
+For Guadalcanal</span></h1>
+
+<p class="p2 in0 larger left"><span class="smcap">Marines in<br />
+World War II<br />
+Commemorative Series</span></p>
+
+<p class="p2 in0 larger left"><span class="smcap">By Henry I. Shaw, Jr.</span>
+</p>
+
+<div id="if_i_b_000" class="figcenter" style="width: 374px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_000.jpg" width="374" height="500" alt="" />
+  <div class="captionl justify"><i>A Marine machine gunner
+and his Browning .30-caliber M1917
+heavy machine gun stand guard while
+1st Marine Division engineers clean up
+in the Lunga River.</i> (Department of
+Defense [USMC] Photo 588741)</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+<div id="if_i_b_001" class="figcenter" style="width: 433px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_001.jpg" width="433" height="600" alt="" />
+  <div class="captionl justify"><i>It was from a Boeing B-17 Flying
+Fortress such as this that LtCol Merrill
+B. Twining and Maj William B.
+McKean reconnoitered the Watchtower
+target area and discovered the Japanese
+building an airfield on Guadalcanal.</i>
+(National Archives Photo 80-G-34887)</div></div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_1" id="Page_1">1</a></span></p>
+
+
+
+<div class="chapter"></div>
+<h2 style="text-align: left; margin-bottom: 0;"><a name="First_Offensive_The_Marine" id="First_Offensive_The_Marine"></a>First Offensive: The Marine<br />
+Campaign for Guadalcanal</h2>
+
+<p class="p0 in0" style="margin-bottom: 2em;"><i>by Henry I. Shaw, Jr.</i></p>
+
+<p class="drop-cap"><span class="smcap1">In</span> the early summer of
+1942, intelligence reports
+of the construction
+of a Japanese
+airfield near Lunga
+Point on Guadalcanal in the Solomon
+Islands triggered a demand for
+offensive action in the South Pacific.
+The leading offensive advocate in
+Washington was Admiral Ernest J.
+King, Chief of Naval Operations
+(CNO). In the Pacific, his view was
+shared by Admiral Chester A.
+Nimitz, Commander in Chief, Pacific
+Fleet (CinCPac), who had already
+proposed sending the 1st Marine
+Raider Battalion to Tulagi, an island
+20 miles north of Guadalcanal across
+Sealark Channel, to destroy a
+Japanese seaplane base there.
+Although the Battle of the Coral Sea
+had forestalled a Japanese amphibious
+assault on Port Moresby, the Allied
+base of supply in eastern New
+Guinea, completion of the Guadalcanal
+airfield might signal the beginning
+of a renewed enemy advance to
+the south and an increased threat to
+the lifeline of American aid to New
+Zealand and Australia. On 23 July
+1942, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)
+in Washington agreed that the line of
+communications in the South Pacific
+had to be secured. The Japanese
+advance had to be stopped. Thus,
+Operation Watchtower, the seizure of
+Guadalcanal and Tulagi, came into
+being.</p>
+
+<p>The islands of the Solomons lie
+nestled in the backwaters of the
+South Pacific. Spanish fortune-hunters
+discovered them in the mid-sixteenth
+century, but no European
+power foresaw any value in the islands
+until Germany sought to expand
+its budding colonial empire
+more than two centuries later. In
+1884, Germany proclaimed a protectorate
+over northern New Guinea, the
+Bismarck Archipelago, and the
+northern Solomons. Great Britain
+countered by establishing a protectorate
+over the southern Solomons
+and by annexing the remainder of
+New Guinea. In 1905, the British
+crown passed administrative control
+over all its territories in the region to
+Australia, and the Territory of
+Papua, with its capital at Port Moresby,
+came into being. Germany’s holdings
+in the region fell under the
+administrative control of the League
+of Nations following World War I,
+with the seat of the colonial government
+located at Rabaul on New Britain.
+The Solomons lay 10 degrees
+below the Equator&mdash;hot, humid, and
+buffeted by torrential rains. The
+celebrated adventure novelist, Jack
+London, supposedly muttered: “If I
+were king, the worst punishment I
+could inflict on my enemies would be
+to banish them to the Solomons.”</p>
+
+<p>On 23 January 1942, Japanese
+forces seized Rabaul and fortified it
+extensively. The site provided an excellent
+harbor and numerous positions
+for airfields. The devastating
+enemy carrier and plane losses at the
+Battle of Midway (3&ndash;6 June 1942) had
+caused <i>Imperial General Headquarters</i>
+to cancel orders for the invasion
+of Midway, New Caledonia, Fiji, and
+Samoa, but plans to construct a
+major seaplane base at Tulagi went
+forward. The location offered one of
+the best anchorages in the South Pacific
+and it was strategically located:
+560 miles from the New Hebrides,
+800 miles from New Caledonia, and
+1,000 miles from Fiji.</p>
+
+<p>The outposts at Tulagi and
+Guadalcanal were the forward evidences
+of a sizeable Japanese force in
+the region, beginning with the <i>Seventeenth
+Army</i>, headquartered at
+Rabaul. The enemy’s <i>Eighth Fleet</i>,
+<i>Eleventh Air Fleet</i>, and <i>1st</i>, <i>7th</i>, <i>8th</i>,
+and <i>14th Naval Base Forces</i> also were
+on New Britain. Beginning on 5 August
+1942, Japanese signal intelligence
+units began to pick up transmissions
+between Noumea on New Caledonia
+and Melbourne, Australia. Enemy
+analysts concluded that Vice Admiral
+Richard L. Ghormley, commanding
+the South Pacific Area (ComSoPac),
+was signalling a British or Australian
+force in preparation for an offensive in
+the Solomons or at New Guinea. The
+warnings were passed to Japanese
+headquarters at Rabaul and Truk, but
+were ignored.</p>
+
+<div id="ip_1" class="figcenter" style="width: 982px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_002.jpg" width="982" height="774" alt="" />
+  <div class="caption"><p>THE PACIFIC AREAS</p>
+
+<p class="smaller">1 AUGUST 1942</p></div></div>
+
+<p>The invasion force was indeed on its
+way to its targets, Guadalcanal, Tulagi,
+and the tiny islets of Gavutu and
+Tanambogo close by Tulagi’s shore. The
+landing force was composed of Marines;
+the covering force and transport
+force were U.S. Navy with a reinforcement
+of Australian warships. There was
+not much mystery to the selection of
+the 1st Marine Division to make the
+landings. Five U.S. Army divisions were
+located in the South and Southwest Pacific:<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_2" id="Page_2">2</a></span>
+three in Australia, the 37th Infantry
+in Fiji, and the Americal
+Division on New Caledonia. None was
+amphibiously trained and all were considered
+vital parts of defensive garrisons.
+The 1st Marine Division, minus
+one of its infantry regiments, had begun
+arriving in New Zealand in mid-June
+when the division headquarters
+and the 5th Marines reached Wellington.
+At that time, the rest of the reinforced
+division’s major units were
+getting ready to embark. The 1st Marines
+were at San Francisco, the 1st
+Raider Battalion was on New Caledonia,
+and the 3d Defense Battalion was
+at Pearl Harbor. The 2d Marines of the
+2d Marine Division, a unit which
+would replace the 1st Division’s 7th
+Marines stationed in British Samoa,
+was loading out from San Diego. All
+three infantry regiments of the landing
+force had battalions of artillery attached,
+from the 11th Marines, in the
+case of the 5th and 1st; the 2d Marines
+drew its reinforcing 75mm howitzers
+from the 2d Division’s 10th Marines.</p>
+
+<p>The news that his division would
+be the landing force for Watchtower
+came as a surprise to Major General
+Alexander A. Vandegrift, who had
+anticipated that the 1st Division
+would have six months of training in
+the South Pacific before it saw action.
+The changeover from administrative
+loading of the various units’
+supplies to combat loading, where
+first-needed equipment, weapons,
+ammunition, and rations were positioned
+to come off ship first with the
+assault troops, occasioned a never-to-be-forgotten
+scene on Wellington’s
+docks. The combat troops took the
+place of civilian stevedores and unloaded
+and reloaded the cargo and
+passenger vessels in an increasing
+round of working parties, often during
+rainstorms which hampered the
+task, but the job was done. Succeeding
+echelons of the division’s forces
+all got their share of labor on the
+docks as various shipping groups arrived
+and the time grew shorter.
+General Vandegrift was able to convince
+Admiral Ghormley and the
+Joint Chiefs that he would not be
+able to meet a proposed D-Day of 1
+August, but the extended landing
+date, 7 August, did little to improve
+the situation.</p>
+
+<p>An amphibious operation is a
+vastly complicated affair, particularly
+when the forces involved are assembled
+on short notice from all over the
+Pacific. The pressure that Vandegrift
+felt was not unique to the landing
+force commander. The U.S. Navy’s
+ships were the key to success and they
+were scarce and invaluable. Although<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_4" id="Page_4">4</a></span>
+the Battles of Coral Sea and Midway
+had badly damaged the Japanese
+fleet’s offensive capabilities and crippled
+its carrier forces, enemy naval
+aircraft could fight as well ashore as
+afloat and enemy warships were still
+numerous and lethal. American losses
+at Pearl Harbor, Coral Sea, and
+Midway were considerable, and
+Navy admirals were well aware that
+the ships they commanded were in
+short supply. The day was coming
+when America’s shipyards and factories
+would fill the seas with warships
+of all types, but that day had not arrived
+in 1942. Calculated risk was the
+name of the game where the Navy
+was concerned, and if the risk seemed
+too great, the Watchtower landing
+force might be a casualty. As it happened,
+the Navy never ceased to risk
+its ships in the waters of the Solomons,
+but the naval lifeline to the
+troops ashore stretched mighty thin
+at times.</p>
+
+<p>Tactical command of the invasion
+force approaching Guadalcanal in
+early August was vested in Vice Admiral
+Frank J. Fletcher as Expeditionary
+Force Commander (Task Force
+61). His force consisted of the amphibious
+shipping carrying the 1st
+Marine Division, under Rear Admiral
+Richmond K. Turner, and the
+Air Support Force led by Rear Admiral
+Leigh Noyes. Admiral Ghormley
+contributed land-based air forces
+commanded by Rear Admiral John
+S. McCain. Fletcher’s support force
+consisted of three fleet carriers, the
+<i>Saratoga</i> (CV 3), <i>Enterprise</i> (CV 6),
+and <i>Wasp</i> (CV 7); the battleship
+<i>North Carolina</i> (BB 55), 6 cruisers,
+16 destroyers, and 3 oilers. Admiral
+Turner’s covering force included five
+cruisers and nine destroyers.</p>
+
+<div class="chapter"></div>
+<div class="sidebar">
+<p class="in0 small"><a name="Sidebar_page_3_General_Alexander_A_Vandegrift" id="Sidebar_page_3_General_Alexander_A_Vandegrift"></a>[Sidebar (<a href="#Page_4">page 3</a>):]</p>
+<h3 class="nobreak p0">General Alexander A. Vandegrift</h3>
+
+<div id="ip_52b" class="figcenter" style="width: 522px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_003.jpg" width="522" height="224" alt="" /></div>
+
+<p class="drop-cap a"><span class="dkgreen">A</span> distinguished military analyst once noted that if
+titles were awarded in America as they are in England,
+the commanding general of Marine Corps
+forces at Guadalcanal would be known simply as “Vandegrift
+of Guadalcanal.” But America does not bestow
+aristocratic titles, and besides, such a formality would not
+be in keeping with the soft-spoken, modest demeanor of
+Alexander A. Vandegrift.</p>
+
+<p>The man destined to lead the 1st Marine Division in
+America’s first ground offensive operation of World War
+II was born in 1887 in Charlottesville, Virginia, where he
+grew up fascinated by his grandfather’s stories of life in the
+Confederate Army during the Civil War. It was axiomatic
+that young Alexander would settle on a military career.
+Commissioned a Marine lieutenant in 1909, Vandegrift
+received an early baptism of fire in 1912 during the bombardment,
+assault, and capture of Coyotepe in Nicaragua.
+Two years later he participated in the capture and occupation
+of Vera Cruz. Vandegrift would spend the greater part
+of the next decade in Haiti, where he fought Caco bandits,
+and served as an inspector of constabulary with the Gendarmerie
+d’Haiti. It was in Haiti that he met and was
+befriended by Marine Colonel Smedley D. Butler, who
+called him “Sunny Jim.” The lessons of these formative years
+fighting an elusive enemy in a hostile jungle environment
+were not lost upon the young Marine officer.</p>
+
+<p>He spent the next 18 years in various posts and stations
+in the United States, along with two tours of China duty
+at Peiping and Tientsin. Prior to Pearl Harbor, Vandegrift
+was appointed assistant to the Major General Commandant,
+and in April 1940 received the single star of a
+brigadier general. He was detached to the 1st Marine Division
+in November 1941, and in May 1942 sailed for the
+South Pacific as commanding general of the first Marine
+division ever to leave the United States. On 7 August 1942,
+after exhorting his Marines with the reminder that “God
+favors the bold and strong of heart,” he led the 1st Marine
+Division ashore in the Solomon Islands in the first large-scale
+offensive action against the Japanese.</p>
+
+<p>His triumph at Guadalcanal earned General Vandegrift
+the Medal of Honor, the Navy Cross, and the praise of a
+grateful nation. In July 1943 he took command of I Marine
+Amphibious Corps and planned the landing at Empress
+Augusta Bay, Bougainville, Northern Solomons, on
+1 November 1943. He then was recalled to Washington, to
+become the Eighteenth Commandant of the Marine Corps.</p>
+
+<p>On 1 January 1944, as a lieutenant general, Vandegrift
+was sworn in as Commandant. On 4 April 1945 he was
+promoted to general, and thus became the first Marine
+officer on active duty to attain four-star rank.</p>
+
+<p>In the final stages of the war, General Vandegrift directed
+an elite force approaching half-a-million men and women,
+with its own aviation force. Comparing his Marines
+with the Japanese, he noted that the Japanese soldier “was
+trained to go to a place, stay there, fight and die. We train
+our men to go to a place, fight to win, and to live. I can
+assure you, it is a better theory.”</p>
+
+<p>After the war, Vandegrift fought another battle, this time
+in the halls of Congress, with the stakes being the survival
+of the Marine Corps. His counter-testimony during Congressional
+hearings of the spring of 1946 was instrumental
+in defeating initial attempts to merge or “unify” the U.S.
+Armed Forces. Although his term as Commandant ended
+on 31 December 1947, General Vandegrift would live to see
+passage of Public Law 416, which preserved the Corps and
+its historic mission. His official retirement date of 1 April
+1949 ended just over 40 years of service.</p>
+
+<p>General Vandegrift outlived both his wife Mildred and
+their only son, Colonel Alexander A. Vandegrift, Jr., who
+fought in World War II and Korea. He spent most of his final
+years in Delray, Florida. He died on 8 May 1973.&mdash;<i>Robert
+V. Aquilina</i></p>
+</div>
+
+<hr />
+<div class="chapter"></div>
+<h2><a name="The_Landing_and_August_Battles" id="The_Landing_and_August_Battles"></a><i>The Landing and August Battles</i></h2>
+
+<p>On board the transports approaching
+the Solomons, the Marines were
+looking for a tough fight. They knew
+little about the targets, even less
+about their opponents. Those maps
+that were available were poor, constructions
+based upon outdated
+hydrographic charts and information
+provided by former island residents.
+While maps based on aerial photographs
+had been prepared they were
+misplaced by the Navy in Auckland,
+New Zealand, and never got to the
+Marines at Wellington.</p>
+
+<p>On 17 July, a couple of division
+staff officers, Lieutenant Colonel
+Merrill B. Twining and Major William
+McKean, had been able to join
+the crew of a B-17 flying from Port
+Moresby on a reconnaissance mission
+over Guadalcanal. They reported
+what they had seen, and their analysis,
+coupled with aerial photographs,
+indicated no extensive
+defenses along the beaches of
+Guadalcanal’s north shore.</p>
+
+<div id="ip_4" class="figcenter" style="width: 894px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_004.jpg" width="894" height="620" alt="" />
+  <div class="caption"><p>GUADALCANAL<br />
+  TULAGI-GAVUTU<br />
+  and<br />
+  Florida Islands</p></div></div>
+
+<p>This news was indeed welcome.
+The division intelligence officer (G-2),
+Lieutenant Colonel Frank B. Goettge,
+had concluded that about 8,400<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_5" id="Page_5">5</a></span>
+Japanese occupied Guadalcanal and
+Tulagi. Admiral Turner’s staff figured
+that the Japanese amounted to 7,125
+men. Admiral Ghormley’s intelligence
+officer pegged the enemy
+strength at 3,100&mdash;closest to the
+3,457 actual total of Japanese troops;
+2,571 of these were stationed on
+Guadalcanal and were mostly
+laborers working on the airfield.</p>
+
+<p>To oppose the Japanese, the Marines
+had an overwhelming superiority
+of men. At the time, the tables of
+organization for a Marine Corps division
+indicated a total of 19,514
+officers and enlisted men, including
+naval medical and engineer (Seabee)
+units. Infantry regiments numbered
+3,168 and consisted of a headquarters
+company, a weapons company,
+and three battalions. Each infantry
+battalion (933 Marines) was organized
+into a headquarters company
+(89), a weapons company (273),
+and three rifle companies (183). The
+artillery regiment had 2,581 officers
+and men organized into three 75mm
+pack howitzer battalions and one
+105mm howitzer battalion. A light
+tank battalion, a special weapons
+battalion of antiaircraft and antitank
+guns, and a parachute battalion added
+combat power. An engineer regiment
+(2,452 Marines) with battalions
+of engineers, pioneers, and Seabees,
+provided a hefty combat and service
+element. The total was rounded
+out by division headquarters battalion’s
+headquarters, signal, and military
+police companies and the
+division’s service troops&mdash;service,
+motor transport, amphibian tractor,
+and medical battalions. For Watchtower,
+the 1st Raider Battalion and
+the 3d Defense Battalion had been
+added to Vandegrift’s command to
+provide more infantrymen and much
+needed coast defense and antiaircraft
+guns and crews.</p>
+
+<p>Unfortunately, the division’s heaviest
+ordnance had been left behind in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_6" id="Page_6">6</a></span>
+New Zealand. Limited ship space and
+time meant that the division’s big
+guns, a 155mm howitzer battalion,
+and all the motor transport battalion’s
+two-and-a-half-ton trucks were
+not loaded. Colonel Pedro A. del
+Valle, commanding the 11th Marines,
+was unhappy at the loss of his heavy
+howitzers and equally distressed that
+essential sound and flash-ranging
+equipment necessary for effective
+counterbattery fire was left behind.
+Also failing to make the cut in the
+battle for shipping space, were all
+spare clothing, bedding rolls, and
+supplies necessary to support the
+reinforced division beyond 60 days
+of combat. Ten days supply of ammunition
+for each of the division’s
+weapons remained in New Zealand.</p>
+
+<div id="ip_6" class="figright" style="width: 362px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_006.jpg" width="362" height="267" alt="" />
+  <div class="captionr">
+  <p>Naval Historical Photographic Collection 880-CF-117-4-63</p></div>
+  <div class="captionl">
+<p class="justify"><i>Enroute to Guadalcanal RAdm Richmond Kelly Turner, commander of the Amphibious
+Force, and MajGen Alexander A. Vandegrift, 1st Marine Division commander,
+review the Operation Watchtower plan for landings in the Solomon Islands.</i></p></div></div>
+
+<p>In the opinion of the 1st Division’s
+historian and a veteran of the landing,
+the men on the approaching
+transports “thought they’d have a bad
+time getting ashore.” They were confident,
+certainly, and sure that they
+could not be defeated, but most of
+the men were entering combat for the
+first time. There were combat veteran
+officers and noncommissioned
+officers (NCOs) throughout the division,
+but the majority of the men
+were going into their initial battle.
+The commanding officer of the 1st
+Marines, Colonel Clifton B. Cates,
+estimated that 90 percent of his men
+had enlisted after Pearl Harbor. The
+fabled 1st Marine Division of later
+World War II, Korean War, Vietnam
+War, and Persian Gulf War fame, the
+most highly decorated division in the
+U.S. Armed Forces, had not yet established
+its reputation.</p>
+
+<p>The convoy of ships, with its outriding
+protective screen of carriers,
+reached Koro in the Fiji Islands on
+26 July. Practice landings did little
+more than exercise the transports’
+landing craft, since reefs precluded an
+actual beach landing. The rendezvous
+at Koro did give the senior commanders
+a chance to have a
+face-to-face meeting. Fletcher,
+McCain, Turner, and Vandegrift got
+together with Ghormley’s chief of
+staff, Rear Admiral Daniel J. Callaghan,
+who notified the conferees that
+ComSoPac had ordered the 7th Marines
+on Samoa to be prepared to embark
+on four days notice as a
+reinforcement for Watchtower. To
+this decidedly good news, Admiral
+Fletcher added some bad news. In
+view of the threat from enemy land-based
+air, he could not “keep the carriers
+in the area for more than 48
+hours after the landing.” Vandegrift
+protested that he needed at least four
+days to get the division’s gear ashore,
+and Fletcher reluctantly agreed to
+keep his carriers at risk another day.</p>
+
+<p>On the 28th the ships sailed from
+the Fijis, proceeding as if they were
+headed for Australia. At noon on 5
+August, the convoy and its escorts
+turned north for the Solomons. Undetected
+by the Japanese, the assault
+force reached its target during the
+night of 6&ndash;7 August and split into two
+landing groups, Transport Division
+X-Ray, 15 transports heading for the
+north shore of Guadalcanal east of
+Lunga Point, and Transport Division
+Yoke, eight transports headed for
+Tulagi, Gavutu, Tanambogo, and the
+nearby Florida Island, which loomed
+over the smaller islands.</p>
+
+<p>Vandegrift’s plans for the landings
+would put two of his infantry regiments
+(Colonel LeRoy P. Hunt’s 5th
+Marines and Colonel Cates’ 1st Marines)
+ashore on both sides of the
+Lunga River prepared to attack inland
+to seize the airfield. The 11th
+Marines, the 3d Defense Battalion,
+and most of the division’s supporting
+units would also land near the
+Lunga, prepared to exploit the beachhead.
+Across the 20 miles of Sealark
+Channel, the division’s assistant commander,
+Brigadier General William
+H. Rupertus, led the assault forces
+slated to take Tulagi, Gavutu, and
+Tanambogo: the 1st Raider Battalion
+(Lieutenant Colonel Merritt A. Edson);
+the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines
+(Lieutenant Colonel Harold E. Rosecrans);
+and the 1st Parachute Battalion
+(Major Robert H. Williams).
+Company A of the 2d Marines would
+reconnoiter the nearby shores of
+Florida Island and the rest of Colonel
+John A. Arthur’s regiment would
+stand by in reserve to land where
+needed.</p>
+
+<p>As the ships slipped through the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_7" id="Page_7">7</a></span>
+channels on either side of rugged
+Savo Island, which split Sealark near
+its western end, heavy clouds and
+dense rain blanketed the task force.
+Later the moon came out and silhouetted
+the islands. On board his
+command ship, Vandegrift wrote to
+his wife: “Tomorrow morning at
+dawn we land in our first major
+offensive of the war. Our plans have
+been made and God grant that our
+judgement has been sound ...
+whatever happens you’ll know I did
+my best. Let us hope that best will
+be good enough.”</p>
+
+<div id="ip_7" class="figcenter" style="width: 548px;">
+  <div class="captionl top"><p class="justify"><i>MajGen Alexander A. Vandegrift, CG, 1st Marine Division,
+confers with his staff on board the transport USS </i>McCawley<i> (APA-4)
+enroute to Guadalcanal. From left: Gen Vandegrift;
+LtCol Gerald C. Thomas, operations officer; LtCol Randolph
+McC. Pate, logistics officer; LtCol Frank B. Goettge, intelligence
+officer; and Col William Capers James, chief of staff.</i></p></div>
+
+<div class="captionr top">
+<p>National Archives Photo 80-G-17065</p>
+</div>
+  <img src="images/i_b_007.jpg" width="548" height="362" alt="" />
+</div>
+
+<p>At 0641 on 7 August, Turner signalled
+his ships to “land the landing
+force.” Just 28 minutes before, the
+heavy cruiser <i>Quincy</i> (CA 39) had
+begun shelling the landing beaches at
+Guadalcanal. The sun came up that
+fateful Friday at 0650, and the first
+landing craft carrying assault troops
+of the 5th Marines touched down at
+0909 on Red Beach. To the men’s surprise
+(and relief), no Japanese appeared
+to resist the landing. Hunt
+immediately moved his assault
+troops off the beach and into the surrounding
+jungle, waded the steep-banked
+Ilu River, and headed for the
+enemy airfield. The following 1st
+Marines were able to cross the Ilu on
+a bridge the engineers had hastily
+thrown up with an amphibian tractor
+bracing its middle. The silence
+was eerie and the absence of opposition
+was worrisome to the riflemen.
+The Japanese troops, most of whom
+were Korean laborers, had fled to the
+west, spooked by a week’s B-17 bombardment,
+the pre-assault naval gunfire,
+and the sight of the ships
+offshore. The situation was not the
+same across Sealark. The Marines on
+Guadalcanal could hear faint rumbles
+of a firefight across the waters.</p>
+
+<div id="ip_7b" class="figcenter" style="width: 548px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_008.jpg" width="548" height="306" alt="" />
+  <div class="captionr">
+
+<p>
+National Archives Photo 80-CF-112-5-3
+</p></div>
+
+<div class="captionl">
+<p class="justify"><i>First Division Marines storm ashore across Guadalcanal’s
+beaches on D-Day, 7 August 1942, from the attack transport
+</i>Barnett<i> (AP-11) and attack cargo ship </i>Fomalhaut<i> (AK-22). The
+invaders were surprised at the lack of enemy opposition.</i></p></div></div>
+
+<div id="ip_7c" class="figcenter" style="width: 898px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_008b.jpg" width="898" height="618" alt="" />
+  <div class="caption">
+
+<p>
+LANDING ON GUADALCANAL<br />
+and Capture of the Airfield<br />
+7&ndash;8 AUGUST 1942</p></div></div>
+
+<div id="ip_7d" class="figcenter" style="width: 548px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_009.jpg" width="548" height="352" alt="" />
+  <div class="captionr">
+
+<p>
+Photo courtesy of Col James A. Donovan, Jr.
+</p></div>
+
+<div class="captionl">
+<p class="justify"><i>When the 5th Marines entered the jungle from the beachhead,
+and had to cross the steep banks of the Ilu River, 1st Marine
+Division engineers hastily constructed a bridge supported by
+amphibian tractors. Though heavily used, the bridge held up.</i></p></div></div>
+
+<div id="ip_7e" class="figcenter" style="width: 549px;">
+  <div class="captionl top"><p class="justify"><i>Photographed immediately after a prelanding strike by USS
+</i>Enterprise<i> aircraft flown by Navy pilots, Tanambogo and
+Gavutu Islands lie smoking and in ruins in the morning sun.
+Gavutu is at the left across the causeway from Tanambogo.</i></p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="captionr top">
+<p>National Archives Photo 80-C-11034</p></div>
+  <img src="images/i_b_009b.jpg" width="549" height="308" alt="" />
+</div>
+
+<p>The Japanese on Tulagi were special
+naval landing force sailors and
+they had no intention of giving up
+what they held without a vicious, no-surrender
+battle. Edson’s men landed
+first, following by Rosecrans’ battalion,
+hitting Tulagi’s south coast
+and moving inland towards the ridge
+which ran lengthwise through the island.
+The battalions encountered
+pockets of resistance in the undergrowth
+of the islands thick vegetation
+and maneuvered to outflank and
+overrun the opposition. The advance
+of the Marines was steady but casualties
+were frequent. By nightfall, Edson
+had reached the former British
+residency overlooking Tulagi’s harbor
+and dug in for the night across a hill
+that overlooked the Japanese final
+position, a ravine on the islands
+southern tip. The 2d Battalion, 5th
+Marines, had driven through to the
+northern shore, cleaning its sector of
+enemy; Rosecrans moved into position<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_10" id="Page_10">10</a></span>
+to back up the raiders. By the
+end of its first day ashore, 2d Battalion
+had lost 56 men killed and
+wounded; 1st Raider Battalion
+casualties were 99 Marines.</p>
+
+<div id="ip_10" class="figcenter" style="width: 548px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_010.jpg" width="548" height="426" alt="" />
+  <div class="captionr">
+
+<p>Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 52231</p></div>
+
+<div class="captionl">
+<p class="justify"><i>After the battle, almost all palm trees on Gavutu were shorn
+of their foliage. Despite naval gunfire and close air support
+hitting the enemy emplacements, Japanese opposition from
+caves proved to be serious obstacles for attacking Marines.</i></p></div></div>
+
+<p>Throughout the night, the
+Japanese swarmed from hillside caves
+in four separate attacks, trying to
+penetrate the raider lines. They were
+unsuccessful and most died in the attempts.
+At dawn, the 2d Battalion,
+2d Marines, landed to reinforce the
+attackers and by the afternoon of 8
+August, the mop-up was completed
+and the battle for Tulagi was over.</p>
+
+<p>The fight for tiny Gavutu and
+Tanambogo, both little more than
+small hills rising out of the sea, connected
+by a hundred-yard causeway,
+was every bit as intense as that on
+Tulagi. The area of combat was much
+smaller and the opportunities for fire
+support from offshore ships and carrier
+planes was severely limited once
+the Marines had landed. After naval
+gunfire from the light cruiser <i>San
+Juan</i> (CL 54) and two destroyers, and
+a strike by F4F Wildcats flying from
+the <i>Wasp</i>, the 1st Parachute Battalion
+landed near noon in three waves,
+395 men in all, on Gavutu. The
+Japanese, secure in cave positions,
+opened fire on the second and third
+waves, pinning down the first Marines
+ashore on the beach. Major
+Williams took a bullet in the lungs
+and was evacuated; 32 Marines were
+killed in the withering enemy fire.
+This time, 2d Marines reinforcements
+were really needed; the 1st Battalion’s
+Company B landed on Gavutu and
+attempted to take Tanambogo; the
+attackers were driven to ground and
+had to pull back to Gavutu.</p>
+
+<p>After a rough night of close-in
+fighting with the defenders of both
+islands, the 3d Battalion, 2d Marines,
+reinforced the men already ashore
+and mopped up on each island. The
+toll of Marines dead on the three islands
+was 144; the wounded numbered
+194. The few Japanese who
+survived the battles fled to Florida Island,
+which had been scouted by the
+2d Marines on D-Day and found
+clear of the enemy.</p>
+
+<p>The Marines’ landings and the
+concentration of shipping in Guadalcanal
+waters acted as a magnet to the
+Japanese at Rabaul. At Admiral
+Ghormley’s headquarters, Tulagi’s radio
+was heard on D-Day “frantically
+calling for [the] dispatch of surface<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_11" id="Page_11">11</a></span>
+forces to the scene” and designating
+transports and carriers as targets for
+heavy bombing. The messages were
+sent in plain language, emphasizing
+the plight of the threatened garrison.
+And the enemy response was prompt
+and characteristic of the months of
+naval air and surface attacks to come.</p>
+
+<p>At 1030 on 7 August, an Australian
+coastwatcher hidden in the
+hills of the islands north of Guadalcanal
+signalled that a Japanese air
+strike composed of heavy bombers,
+light bombers, and fighters was headed
+for the island. Fletcher’s pilots,
+whose carriers were positioned 100
+miles south of Guadalcanal, jumped
+the approaching planes 20 miles
+northwest of the landing areas before
+they could disrupt the operation. But
+the Japanese were not daunted by the
+setback; other planes and ships were
+enroute to the inviting target.</p>
+
+<p>On 8 August, the Marines consolidated
+their positions ashore, seizing
+the airfield on Guadalcanal and establishing
+a beachhead. Supplies
+were being unloaded as fast as landing
+craft could make the turnaround
+from ship to shore, but the shore<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_12" id="Page_12">12</a></span>
+party was woefully inadequate to
+handle the influx of ammunition, rations,
+tents, aviation gas, vehicles&mdash;all
+gear necessary to sustain the Marines.
+The beach itself became a
+dumpsite. And almost as soon as the
+initial supplies were landed, they had
+to be moved to positions nearer Kukum
+village and Lunga Point within
+the planned perimeter. Fortunately,
+the lack of Japanese ground opposition
+enabled Vandegrift to shift the
+supply beaches west to a new
+beachhead.</p>
+
+<div id="ip_12" class="figleft" style="width: 363px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_012.jpg" width="363" height="274" alt="" />
+  <div class="captionr">
+
+<p>
+Marine Corps Personal Papers Collection
+</p></div>
+
+<div class="captionl">
+<p class="justify"><i>Immediately after assault troops cleared the beachhead and moved inland, supplies
+and equipment, inviting targets for enemy bombers, began to litter the beach.</i></p></div></div>
+
+<p>Japanese bombers did penetrate
+the American fighter screen on 8 August.
+Dropping their bombs from
+20,000 feet or more to escape antiaircraft
+fire, the enemy planes were not
+very accurate. They concentrated on
+the ships in the channel, hitting and
+damaging a number of them and
+sinking the destroyer <i>Jarvis</i> (DD
+393). In their battles to turn back the
+attacking planes, the carrier fighter
+squadrons lost 21 Wildcats on 7&ndash;8
+August.</p>
+
+<p>The primary Japanese targets were
+the Allied ships. At this time, and for
+a thankfully and unbelievably long
+time to come, the Japanese commanders
+at Rabaul grossly underestimated
+the strength of Vandegrift’s
+forces. They thought the Marine
+landings constituted a reconnaissance
+in force, perhaps 2,000 men, on
+Guadalcanal. By the evening of 8 August,
+Vandegrift had 10,900 troops
+ashore on Guadalcanal and another
+6,075 on Tulagi. Three infantry regiments
+had landed and each had a
+supporting 75mm pack howitzer
+battalion&mdash;the 2d and 3d Battalions,
+11th Marines on Guadalcanal, and
+the 3d Battalion, 10th Marines on
+Tulagi. The 5th Battalion, 11th Marines’
+105mm howitzers were in
+general support.</p>
+
+<p>That night a cruiser-destroyer
+force of the Imperial Japanese Navy
+reacted to the American invasion
+with a stinging response. Admiral
+Turner had positioned three cruiser-destroyer
+groups to bar the Tulagi-Guadalcanal
+approaches. At the Battle
+of Savo, the Japanese demonstrated
+their superiority in night fighting
+at this stage of the war, shattering
+two of Turners covering forces
+without loss to themselves. Four
+heavy cruisers went to the bottom&mdash;three
+American, one Australian&mdash;and
+another lost her bow. As the sun
+came up over what soon would be
+called “Ironbottom Sound,” Marines
+watched grimly as Higgins boats
+swarmed out to rescue survivors. Approximately
+1,300 sailors died that
+night and another 700 suffered
+wounds or were badly burned.
+Japanese casualties numbered less
+than 200 men.</p>
+
+<p>The Japanese suffered damage to
+only one ship in the encounter, the
+cruiser <i>Chokai</i>. The American cruisers
+<i>Vincennes</i> (CA 44), <i>Astoria</i> (CA
+34), and <i>Quincy</i> (CA 39) went to the
+bottom, as did the Australian Navy’s
+HMAS <i>Canberra</i>, so critically
+damaged that she had to be sunk by
+American torpedoes. Both the cruiser
+<i>Chicago</i> (CA 29) and destroyer <i>Talbot</i>
+(DD 114) were badly damaged.
+Fortunately for the Marines ashore,
+the Japanese force&mdash;five heavy cruisers,
+two light cruisers, and a
+destroyer&mdash;departed before dawn
+without attempting to disrupt the
+landing further.</p>
+
+<div id="ip_12b" class="figright" style="width: 178px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_012b.jpg" width="178" height="155" alt="" />
+  <div class="captionr">U.S. 105mm Howitzer</div></div>
+
+<p>When the attack-force leader, Vice
+Admiral Gunichi Mikawa, returned
+to Rabaul, he expected to receive the
+accolades of his superiors. He did get
+those, but he also found himself the
+subject of criticism. Admiral Isoroku
+Yamamoto, the Japanese fleet commander,
+chided his subordinate for
+failing to attack the transports. Mikawa
+could only reply, somewhat lamely,
+that he did not know Fletcher’s
+aircraft carriers were so far away
+from Guadalcanal. Of equal significance
+to the Marines on the
+beach, the Japanese naval victory
+caused celebrating superiors in Tokyo
+to allow the event to overshadow the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_13" id="Page_13">13</a></span>
+importance of the amphibious
+operation.</p>
+
+<p>The disaster prompted the American
+admirals to reconsider Navy support
+for operations ashore. Fletcher
+feared for the safety of his carriers;
+he had already lost about a quarter
+of his fighter aircraft. The commander
+of the expeditionary force
+had lost a carrier at Coral Sea and
+another at Midway. He felt he could
+not risk the loss of a third, even if
+it meant leaving the Marines on their
+own. Before the Japanese cruiser attack,
+he obtained Admiral Ghormley’s
+permission to withdraw from
+the area.</p>
+
+<div id="ip_13" class="figleft" style="width: 362px;">
+  <div class="captionl top"><p class="justify"><i>When ships carrying barbed wire and engineering tools needed ashore were forced
+to leave the Guadalcanal area because of enemy air and surface threats, Marines
+had to prepare such hasty field expedients as this</i> <i>cheval de frise</i> <i>of sharpened stakes.</i></p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="captionr top">
+<p>Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 5157</p>
+</div>
+  <img src="images/i_b_013.jpg" width="362" height="281" alt="" />
+</div>
+
+<p>At a conference on board Turner’s
+flagship transport, the <i>McCawley</i>,
+on the night of 8 August, the admiral
+told General Vandegrift that Fletcher’s
+impending withdrawal meant
+that he would have to pull out the
+amphibious force’s ships. The Battle
+of Savo Island reinforced the decision
+to get away before enemy aircraft,
+unchecked by American interceptors,
+struck. On 9 August, the transports
+withdrew to Noumea. The unloading
+of supplies ended abruptly, and
+ships still half-full steamed away. The
+forces ashore had 17 days’ rations&mdash;after
+counting captured Japanese
+food&mdash;and only four days’ supply of
+ammunition for all weapons. Not
+only did the ships take away the rest
+of the supplies, they also took the
+Marines still on board, including the
+2d Marines’ headquarters element.
+Dropped off at the island of Espiritu
+Santo in the New Hebrides, the infantry
+Marines and their commander,
+Colonel Arthur, were most
+unhappy and remained so until they
+finally reached Guadalcanal on 29
+October.</p>
+
+<p>Ashore in the Marine beachheads,
+General Vandegrift ordered rations
+reduced to two meals a day. The
+reduced food intake would last for
+six weeks, and the Marines would
+become very familiar with Japanese
+canned fish and rice. Most of the Marines
+smoked and they were soon disgustedly
+smoking Japanese-issue
+brands. They found that the separate
+paper filters that came with the
+cigarettes were necessary to keep the
+fast-burning tobacco from scorching
+their lips. The retreating ships had
+also hauled away empty sand bags
+and valuable engineer tools. So the
+Marines used Japanese shovels to fill
+Japanese rice bags with sand to
+strengthen their defensive positions.</p>
+
+<div id="ip_13b" class="figright" style="width: 175px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_013b.jpg" width="175" height="165" alt="" />
+  <div class="captionr">U.S. 90mm Antiaircraft Gun</div></div>
+
+<p>The Marines dug in along the
+beaches between the Tenaru and the
+ridges west of Kukum. A Japanese
+counter-landing was a distinct possibility.
+Inland of the beaches, defensive
+gun pits and foxholes lined the
+west bank of the Tenaru and
+crowned the hills that faced west
+toward the Matanikau River and
+Point Cruz. South of the airfield
+where densely jungled ridges and ravines
+abounded, the beachhead
+perimeter was guarded by outposts
+and these were manned in large part
+by combat support troops. The engineer,
+pioneer, and amphibious tractor
+battalion all had their positions
+on the front line. In fact, any Marine
+with a rifle, and that was virtually
+every Marine, stood night defensive
+duty. There was no place within the
+perimeter that could be counted safe
+from enemy infiltration.</p>
+
+<div id="ip_16" class="figleft" style="width: 176px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_016.jpg" width="176" height="215" alt="" />
+  <div class="captionr">
+
+<p>Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 150993</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="captionl">
+<p><i>Col Kiyono Ichiki, a battle-seasoned
+Japanese Army veteran, led his force in
+an impetuous and ill-fated attack on
+strong Marine positions in the Battle of
+the Tenaru on the night of 20&ndash;21 August.</i></p></div></div>
+
+<p>Almost as Turner’s transports
+sailed away, the Japanese began a
+pattern of harassing air attacks on
+the beachhead. Sometimes the raids
+came during the day, but the 3d
+Defense Battalion’s 90mm antiaircraft
+guns forced the bombers to fly too
+high for effective bombing. The erratic
+pattern of bombs, however,
+meant that no place was safe near the
+airfield, the preferred target, and no
+place could claim it was bomb-free.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_16" id="Page_16">16</a></span>
+The most disturbing aspect of
+Japanese air attacks soon became the
+nightly harassment by Japanese aircraft
+which singly, it seemed, roamed
+over the perimeter, dropping bombs
+and flares indiscriminately. The
+nightly visitors, whose planes’ engines
+were soon well known sounds,
+won the singular title “Washing
+Machine Charlie,” at first, and later,
+“Louie the Louse,” when their
+presence heralded Japanese shore
+bombardment. Technically, “Charlie”
+was a twin-engine night bomber
+from Rabaul. “Louie” was a cruiser
+float plane that signalled to the bombardment
+ships. But the harassed
+Marines used the names interchangeably.</p>
+
+<p>Even though most of the division’s
+heavy engineering equipment had
+disappeared with the Navy’s transports,
+the resourceful Marines soon
+completed the airfield’s runway with
+captured Japanese gear. On 12 August
+Admiral McCain’s aide piloted
+in a PBY-5 Catalina flying boat and
+bumped to a halt on what was now
+officially Henderson Field, named for
+a Marine pilot, Major Lofton R. Henderson,
+lost at Midway. The Navy
+officer pronounced the airfield fit for
+fighter use and took off with a load
+of wounded Marines, the first of
+2,879 to be evacuated. Henderson
+Field was the centerpiece of Vandegrift’s
+strategy; he would hold it at
+all costs.</p>
+
+<p>Although it was only 2,000 feet
+long and lacked a taxiway and adequate
+drainage, the tiny airstrip,
+often riddled with potholes and rendered<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_17" id="Page_17">17</a></span>
+unusable because of frequent,
+torrential downpours, was essential
+to the success of the landing force.
+With it operational, supplies could
+be flown in and wounded flown out.
+At least in the Marines’ minds, Navy
+ships ceased to be the only lifeline for
+the defenders.</p>
+
+<p>While Vandegrift’s Marines dug in
+east and west of Henderson Field,
+Japanese headquarters in Rabaul
+planned what it considered an effective
+response to the American offensive.
+Misled by intelligence estimates
+that the Marines numbered perhaps
+2,000 men, Japanese staff officers believed
+that a modest force quickly
+sent could overwhelm the invaders.</p>
+
+<p>On 12 August, CinCPac determined
+that a sizable Japanese force
+was massing at Truk to steam to the
+Solomons and attempt to eject the
+Americans. Ominously, the group included
+the heavy carriers <i>Shokaku</i>
+and <i>Zuikaku</i> and the light carrier
+<i>Ryujo</i>. Despite the painful losses at
+Savo Island, the only significant increases
+to American naval forces in
+the Solomons was the assignment of
+a new battleship, the <i>South Dakota</i>
+(BB 57).</p>
+
+<div id="ip_17" class="figcenter" style="width: 549px;">
+  <div class="captionl top"><p class="justify"><i>Of his watercolor painting “Instructions to a Patrol,” Capt
+Donald L. Dickson said that three men have volunteered to
+locate a Japanese bivouac. The one in the center is a clean-cut
+corporal with the bearing of a high-school athlete. The man
+on the right is “rough and ready.” To the one at left, it’s just
+another job; he may do it heroically, but it’s just another job.</i></p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="captionr top">
+<p>
+Captain Donald L. Dickson, USMCR
+</p></div>
+  <img src="images/i_b_016b.jpg" width="549" height="401" alt="" />
+</div>
+
+<p>Imperial General Headquarters in
+Tokyo had ordered Lieutenant
+General Haruyoshi Hyakutake’s
+<i>Seventeenth Army</i> to attack the Marine
+perimeter. For his assault force,
+Hyakutake chose the <i>35th Infantry
+Brigade</i> (Reinforced), commanded by
+Major General Kiyotake Kawaguchi.
+At the time, Kawaguchi’s main force
+was in the Palaus. Hyakutake selected
+a crack infantry regiment&mdash;the
+<i>28th</i>&mdash;commanded by Colonel Kiyono
+Ichiki to land first. Alerted for its
+mission while it was at Guam, the
+Ichiki Detachment assault echelon,
+one battalion of 900 men, was transported
+to the Solomons on the only
+shipping available, six destroyers. As
+a result the troops carried just small
+amounts of ordnance and supplies.
+A follow-on echelon of 1,200 of
+Ichiki’s troops was to join the assault
+battalion on Guadalcanal.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_18" id="Page_18">18</a></span></p>
+
+<div id="ip_18" class="figright" style="width: 362px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_018.jpg" width="362" height="202" alt="" />
+  <div class="captionr">
+
+<p>
+National Archives Photo 80-G-37932
+</p></div>
+
+<div class="captionl">
+<p class="justify"><i>On 20 August, the first Marine Corps aircraft such as this F4F Grumman Wildcat
+landed on Henderson Field to begin combat air operations against the Japanese.</i></p></div></div>
+
+<p>While the Japanese landing force
+was headed for Guadalcanal, the
+Japanese already on the island
+provided an unpleasant reminder
+that they, too, were full of fight. A
+captured enemy naval rating, taken
+in the constant patrolling to the west
+of the perimeter, indicated that a
+Japanese group wanted to surrender
+near the village of Kokumbona,
+seven miles west of the Matanikau.
+This was the area that Lieutenant
+Colonel Goettge considered held
+most of the enemy troops who had
+fled the airfield. On the night of 12
+August, a reconnaissance patrol of 25
+men led by Goettge himself left the
+perimeter by landing craft. The
+patrol landed near its objective, was
+ambushed, and virtually wiped out.
+Only three men managed to swim
+and wade back to the Marine lines.
+The bodies of the other members of
+the patrol were never found. To this
+day, the fate of the Goettge patrol
+continues to intrigue researchers.</p>
+
+<p>After the loss of Goettge and his
+men, vigilance increased on the
+perimeter. On the 14th, a fabled
+character, the coastwatcher Martin
+Clemens, came strolling out of the
+jungle into the Marine lines. He had
+watched the landing from the hills
+south of the airfield and now
+brought his bodyguard of native
+policemen with him. A retired sergeant
+major of the British Solomon
+Islands Constabulary, Jacob C. Vouza,
+volunteered about this time to
+search out Japanese to the east of the
+perimeter, where patrol sightings and
+contacts had indicated the Japanese
+might have effected a landing.</p>
+
+<p>The ominous news of Japanese
+sightings to the east and west of the
+perimeter were balanced out by the
+joyous word that more Marines had
+landed. This time the Marines were
+aviators. On 20 August, two squadrons
+of Marine Aircraft Group
+(MAG)-23 were launched from the
+escort carrier <i>Long Island</i> (CVE-1) located
+200 miles southeast of Guadalcanal.
+Captain John L. Smith led 19
+Grumman F4F-4 Wildcats of Marine
+Fighting Squadron (VMF)-223 onto
+Henderson’s narrow runway. Smith’s
+fighters were followed by Major
+Richard C. Mangrum’s Marine Scout-Bombing
+Squadron (VMSB)-232
+with 12 Douglas SBD-3 Dauntless
+dive bombers.</p>
+
+<p>From this point of the campaign,
+the radio identification for Guadalcanal,
+Cactus, became increasingly
+synonymous with the island. The
+Marine planes became the first elements
+of what would informally be
+known as Cactus Air Force.</p>
+
+<div id="ip_18b" class="figleft" style="width: 360px;">
+  <div class="captionl top"><p class="justify"><i>The first Army Air Forces P-400 Bell Air Cobras arrived on Guadalcanal on 22 August,
+two days after the first Marine planes, and began operations immediately.</i></p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="captionr top">
+<p>
+National Archives Photo 208-N-4932
+</p></div>
+  <img src="images/i_b_018b.jpg" width="360" height="154" alt="" />
+</div>
+
+<p>Wasting no time, the Marine pilots
+were soon in action against the
+Japanese naval aircraft which frequently
+attacked Guadalcanal. Smith
+shot down his first enemy Zero fighter
+on 21 August; three days later
+VMF-223’s Wildcats intercepted a
+strong Japanese aerial attack force
+and downed 16 enemy planes. In this
+action, Captain Marion E. Carl, a
+veteran of Midway, shot down three
+planes. On the 22d, coastwatchers
+alerted Cactus to an approaching air
+attack and 13 of 16 enemy bombers
+were destroyed. At the same time,
+Mangrum’s dive bombers damaged
+three enemy destroyer-transports attempting
+to reach Guadalcanal. On
+24 August, the American attacking
+aircraft, which now included Navy
+scout-bombers from the <i>Saratoga</i>’s
+Scouting Squadron (VS) 5, succeeded
+in turning back a Japanese reinforcement
+convoy of warships and
+destroyers.</p>
+
+<p>On 22 August, five Bell P-400 Air
+Cobras of the Army’s 67th Fighter
+Squadron had landed at Henderson,
+followed within the week by nine<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_20" id="Page_20">20</a></span>
+more Air Cobras. The Army planes,
+which had serious altitude and
+climb-rate deficiencies, were destined
+to see most action in ground combat
+support roles.</p>
+
+<p>The frenzied action in what became
+known as the Battle of the
+Eastern Solomons was matched
+ashore. Japanese destroyers had delivered
+the vanguard of the Ichiki force
+at Taivu Point, 25 miles east of the
+Marine perimeter. A long-range
+patrol of Marines from Company A,
+1st Battalion, 1st Marines ambushed
+a sizable Japanese force near Taivu
+on 19 August. The Japanese dead
+were readily identified as Army
+troops and the debris of their defeat
+included fresh uniforms and a large
+amount of communication gear.
+Clearly, a new phase of the fighting
+had begun. All Japanese encountered
+to this point had been naval troops.</p>
+
+<p>Alerted by patrols, the Marines
+now dug in along the Ilu River, often
+misnamed the Tenaru on Marine
+maps, were ready for Colonel Ichiki.
+The Japanese commander’s orders
+directed him to “quickly recapture
+and maintain the airfield at Guadalcanal,”
+and his own directive to his
+troops emphasized that they would
+fight “to the last breath of the last
+man.” And they did.</p>
+
+<div id="ip_20" class="figright" style="width: 371px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_020.jpg" width="371" height="322" alt="" />
+  <div class="captionr">U.S. M-3 Light Tank</div>
+</div>
+
+<p>Too full of his mission to wait for
+the rest of his regiment and sure that
+he faced only a few thousand men
+overall, Ichiki marched from Taivu
+to the Marines’ lines. Before he attacked
+on the night of the 20th, a
+bloody figure stumbled out of the
+jungle with a warning that the
+Japanese were coming. It was Sergeant
+Major Vouza. Captured by the
+Japanese, who found a small American
+flag secreted in his loincloth, he
+was tortured in a failed attempt to
+gain information on the invasion
+force. Tied to a tree, bayonetted twice
+through the chest, and beaten with
+rifle butts, the resolute Vouza chewed
+through his bindings to escape. Taken
+to Lieutenant Colonel Edwin A. Pollock,
+whose 2d Battalion, 1st Marines
+held the Ilu mouth’s defenses,
+he gasped a warning that an estimated
+250&ndash;500 Japanese soldiers were
+coming behind him. The resolute
+Vouza, rushed immediately to an aid
+station and then to the division
+hospital, miraculously survived his
+ordeal and was awarded a Silver Star
+for his heroism by General Vandegrift,
+and later a Legion of Merit.
+Vandegrift also made Vouza an
+honorary sergeant major of U.S.
+Marines.</p>
+
+<p>At 0130 on 21 August, Ichiki’s
+troops stormed the Marines’ lines in
+a screaming, frenzied display of the
+“spiritual strength” which they had
+been assured would sweep aside their
+American enemy. As the Japanese
+charged across the sand bar astride
+the Ilu’s mouth, Pollock’s Marines cut
+them down. After a mortar preparation,
+the Japanese tried again to
+storm past the sand bar. A section of
+37mm guns sprayed the enemy force
+with deadly canister. Lieutenant
+Colonel Lenard B. Cresswell’s 1st Battalion,
+1st Marines moved upstream
+on the Ilu at daybreak, waded across
+the sluggish, 50-foot-wide stream,
+and moved on the flank of the
+Japanese. Wildcats from VMF-223
+strafed the beleagured enemy force.
+Five light tanks blasted the retreating
+Japanese. By 1700, as the sun was
+setting, the battle ended.</p>
+
+<p>Colonel Ichiki, disgraced in his own
+mind by his defeat, burned his
+regimental colors and shot himself.
+Close to 800 of his men joined him
+in death. The few survivors fled eastward
+towards Taivu Point. Rear Admiral
+Raizo Tanaka, whose
+reinforcement force of transports and
+destroyers was largely responsible for
+the subsequent Japanese troop buildup
+on Guadalcanal, recognized that
+the unsupported Japanese attack was
+sheer folly and reflected that “this
+tragedy should have taught us the
+hopelessness of bamboo spear tactics.”
+Fortunately for the Marines,
+Ichiki’s overconfidence was not
+unique among Japanese commanders.</p>
+
+<div id="ip_20b" class="figcenter" style="width: 549px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_021.jpg" width="549" height="328" alt="" />
+  <div class="captionr">
+
+<p>Captain Donald L. Dickson, USMCR</p></div>
+
+<div class="captionl">
+<p class="justify"><i>Capt Donald L. Dickson said of his watercolor: “I wanted to
+catch on paper the feeling one has as a shell comes whistling
+over.... There is a sense of being alone, naked and unprotected.
+And time seems endless until the shell strikes somewhere.”</i></p></div></div>
+
+<p>Following the 1st Marines’ tangle
+with the Ichiki detachment, General
+Vandegrift was inspired to write the
+Marine Commandant, Lieutenant
+General Thomas Holcomb, and
+report: “These youngsters are the
+darndest people when they get started<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_21" id="Page_21">21</a></span>
+you ever saw.” And all the Marines
+on the island, young and old, tyro
+and veteran, were becoming accomplished
+jungle fighters. They were no
+longer “trigger happy” as many had
+been in their first days ashore, shooting
+at shadows and imagined enemy.
+They were waiting for targets,
+patrolling with enthusiasm, sure of
+themselves. The misnamed Battle of
+the Tenaru had cost Colonel Hunt’s
+regiment 34 killed in action and 75
+wounded. All the division’s Marines
+now felt they were bloodied. What
+the men on Tulagi, Gavutu, and
+Tanambogo and those of the Ilu had
+done was prove that the 1st Marine
+Division would hold fast to what it
+had won.</p>
+
+<div id="ip_21" class="figright" style="width: 276px;">
+  <div class="captionl top"><p class="justify"><i>Cactus Air Force commander, MajGen
+Roy S. Geiger, poses with Capt Joseph
+J. Foss, the leading ace at Guadalcanal
+with 26 Japanese aircraft downed. Capt
+Foss was later awarded the Medal of
+Honor for his heroic exploits in the air.</i></p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="captionr top">
+<p>
+Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 52622
+</p></div>
+  <img src="images/i_b_021b.jpg" width="276" height="239" alt="" />
+</div>
+
+<p>While the division’s Marines and
+sailors had earned a breathing spell
+as the Japanese regrouped for
+another onslaught, the action in the
+air over the Solomons intensified.
+Almost every day, Japanese aircraft
+arrived around noon to bomb the
+perimeter. Marine fighter pilots
+found the twin-engine Betty bombers
+easy targets; Zero fighters were
+another story. Although the Wildcats
+were a much sturdier aircraft, the
+Japanese Zeros’ superior speed and
+better maneuverability gave them a
+distinct edge in a dogfight. The
+American planes, however, when
+warned by the coastwatchers of
+Japanese attacks, had time to climb
+above the oncoming enemy and
+preferably attacked by making firing
+runs during high speed dives. Their
+tactics made the air space over the
+Solomons dangerous for the
+Japanese. On 29 August, the carrier
+<i>Ryujo</i> launched aircraft for a strike
+against the airstrip. Smith’s Wildcats
+shot down 16, with a loss of four of
+their own. Still, the Japanese continued
+to strike at Henderson Field
+without letup. Two days after the
+<i>Ryujo</i> raid, enemy bombers inflicted
+heavy damage on the airfield, setting
+aviation fuel ablaze and
+incinerating parked aircraft.
+VMF-223’s retaliation was a further
+bag of 13 attackers.</p>
+
+<p>On 30 August, two more MAG-23
+squadrons, VMF-224 and
+VMSB-231, flew in to Henderson.
+The air reinforcements were more
+than welcome. Steady combat attrition,
+frequent damage in the air and
+on the ground, and scant repair facilities
+and parts kept the number of
+aircraft available a dwindling
+resource.</p>
+
+<p>Plainly, General Vandegrift needed<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_22" id="Page_22">22</a></span>
+infantry reinforcements as much
+as he did additional aircraft. He
+brought the now-combined raider
+and parachute battalions, both under
+Edson’s command, and the 2d
+Battalion, 5th Marines, over to
+Guadalcanal from Tulagi. This gave
+the division commander a chance to
+order out larger reconnaissance
+patrols to probe for the Japanese. On
+27 August, the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines,
+made a shore-to-shore landing
+near Kokumbona and marched back
+to the beachhead without any measurable
+results. If the Japanese were
+out there beyond the Matanikau&mdash;and
+they were&mdash;they watched the
+Marines and waited for a better opportunity
+to attack.</p>
+
+
+<div class="chapter"></div>
+<div class="sidebar">
+<p class="in0 small"><a name="Sidebar_page_5_First_Marine_Utility_Uniform_Issued_in_World_War_II" id="Sidebar_page_5_First_Marine_Utility_Uniform_Issued_in_World_War_II"></a>[Sidebar (<a href="#Page_5">page 5</a>):]</p>
+<h3 class="nobreak p0">First Marine Utility Uniform Issued in World War II</h3>
+
+<p class="drop-cap"><span class="smcap1">The</span> United States Marine Corps entered World War
+II wearing essentially the same summer field uniform
+that it had worn during the “Banana Wars.”
+The Marines defending America’s Pacific outposts on
+Guam, Wake Island, and in the Philippines in the late
+months of 1941 wore a summer field uniform consisting
+of a khaki cotton shirt and trousers, leggings, and a
+M1917A1 steel helmet. Plans to change this uniform had
+been underway for at least one year prior to the opening
+of hostilities.</p>
+
+<p>As had the Army, the Marine Corps had used a loose-fitting
+blue denim fatigue uniform for work details and some
+field exercises since the 1920s. This fatigue uniform was
+either a one-piece coverall or a two-piece bib overall and
+jacket, both with “USMC” metal buttons. In June 1940, it
+was replaced by a green cotton coverall. This uniform and
+the summer field uniform were replaced by what would
+become known as the utility uniform. Approved for general
+issue on the Marine Corps’ 166th birthday, 10 November
+1941, this new uniform was made of sage-green (although
+“olive drab” was called for in the specifications) herringbone
+twill cotton, then a popular material for civilian work
+clothing. The two-piece uniform consisted of a coat (often
+referred to as a “jacket” by Marines) and trousers. In 1943,
+a cap made of the same material would be issued.</p>
+
+<p>The loose-fitting coat was closed down the front by four
+two-piece rivetted bronze-finished steel buttons, each bearing
+the words “U.S. MARINE CORPS” in relief. The cuffs
+were closed by similar buttons. Two large patch pockets
+were sewn on the front skirts of the jacket and a single patch
+pocket was stitched to the left breast. This pocket had the
+Marine Corps eagle, globe, and anchor insignia and the
+letters “USMC” stencilled on it in black ink. The trousers,
+worn with and without the khaki canvas leggings, had two
+slashed front pockets and two rear patch pockets.</p>
+
+<div class="figright" style="width: 253px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_005.jpg" width="253" height="216" alt="" /></div>
+
+<p>The new uniform was issued to the flood of new recruits
+crowding the recruit depots in the early months of 1942 and
+was first worn in combat during the landing on Guadalcanal
+in August 1942. This uniform was subsequently worn
+by Marines of all arms from the Solomons Campaign to
+the end of the war. Originally, the buttons on the coat and
+the trousers were all copper-plated, but an emergency alternate
+specification was approved on 15 August 1942, eight
+days after the landing on Guadalcanal, which allowed for
+a variety of finishes on the buttons. Towards the end of
+the war, a new “modified” utility uniform which had been
+developed after Tarawa was also issued, in addition to a
+variety of camouflage uniforms. All of these utility uniforms,
+along with Army-designed Ml helmets and Marine
+Corps-designed cord and rubber-soled rough-side-out
+leather “boondocker” shoes, would be worn throughout the
+war in the Pacific, during the postwar years, and into the
+Korean War.&mdash;<i>Kenneth L. Smith-Christmas</i></p>
+</div>
+
+
+<div class="chapter"></div>
+<div class="sidebar green">
+<p class="in0 small"><a name="Sidebar_page_11_LVT_1_The_Amtrac" id="Sidebar_page_11_LVT_1_The_Amtrac"></a>[Sidebar (<a href="#Page_11">page 11</a>):]</p>
+<h3 class="nobreak p0">LVT (1)&mdash;The ‘Amtrac’</h3>
+
+<p class="drop-cap"><span class="smcap1"><span class="dkgreen">W</span>hile</span> the Marine Corps was developing amphibious
+warfare doctrine during the 1920s and
+1930s, it was apparent that a motorized amphibian
+vehicle was needed to transport men and equipment
+from ships across fringing reefs and beaches into battle,
+particularly when the beach was defended.</p>
+
+<p>In 1940, the Marines adopted the Landing Vehicle,
+Tracked (1), designed by Donald Roebling. More commonly
+known as the “amtrac” (short for amphibian tractor), the
+LVT(1) had a driver’s cab in front and a small engine compartment
+in the rear, with the bulk of the body used for
+carrying space. During the next three years, 1,225 LVT(1)s
+were built, primarily by the Food Machinery Corporation.</p>
+
+<p>The LVT(1) was constructed of welded steel and was
+propelled on both land and water by paddle-type treads.
+Designed solely as a supply vehicle, it could carry 4,500
+pounds of cargo. In August 1942, the LVT(1) first saw combat
+on Guadalcanal with the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion,
+1st Marine Division. Throughout the Solomon
+Islands campaigns, the LVT(1) provided Marines all types
+of logistical support, moving thousands of tons of supplies
+to the front lines. At times they also were pressed into tactical
+use: moving artillery pieces, holding defensive positions,
+and occasionally supporting Marines in the attack
+with their machine guns. They also were used as pontoons
+to support bridges across Guadalcanal rivers.</p>
+
+<p>The LVT proved to be more seaworthy than a boat of
+comparable size; it was able to remain afloat with its entire
+cargo hold full of water. However, defects in the design
+soon became apparent. The paddle treads on the tracks
+and the rigid suspension system were both susceptible to
+damage when driven on land and did not provide the
+desired speeds on land or water. Although the LVT(1) performed
+admirably against undefended beachheads, its lack
+of armor made it unsuitable for assaults against the heavily
+defended islands of the central Pacific. This weakness
+was apparent during the fighting in the Solomon Islands,
+but LVT(1)s with improvised armor were still in use at the
+assault on Tarawa, where 75 percent of them were lost in
+three days.</p>
+
+<p>The LVT(1) proved its value and validated the amphibious
+vehicle concept through the great versatility and mobility
+it demonstrated throughout numerous campaigns in
+the Pacific. Although intended solely for supply purposes,
+it was thrust into combat use in early war engagements.
+In its initial role as a support vehicle, the LVT(1) delivered
+ammunition, supplies and reinforcements that made the
+difference between victory and defeat.&mdash;<i>Second Lieutenant
+Wesley L. Feight, USMC</i></p>
+
+<div class="figcenter" style="width: 525px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_011.jpg" width="525" height="211" alt="" /></div>
+</div>
+
+
+
+<div class="chapter"></div>
+<div class="sidebar">
+<p class="in0 small"><a name="Sidebar_page_14_General_Vandegrift_and_His_1st_Marine_Division_Staff" id="Sidebar_page_14_General_Vandegrift_and_His_1st_Marine_Division_Staff"></a>[Sidebar (<a href="#Page_16">page 14</a>):]</p>
+<h2 class="nobreak dkgreen">General Vandegrift and His 1st Marine Division Staff</h2>
+
+<p class="drop-cap"><span class="smcap1">Whenever</span> a work about the Guadalcanal operation is
+published, one of the pictures always included is
+that of Major General Alexander A. Vandegrift,
+1st Marine Division commanding general, and his staff officers
+and commanders, who posed for the photograph on 11 August
+1942, just four days after the assault landings on the island.
+Besides General Vandegrift, there are 40 Marines and
+one naval officer in this picture, and each one deserves a page
+of his own in Marine Corps history.</p>
+
+<p>Among the Marines, 23 were promoted to general officer
+rank and three became Commandants of the Marine Corps:
+General Vandegrift and Colonels Cates and Pate. The naval
+officer, division surgeon Commander Warwick T. Brown, MC,
+USN, also made flag officer rank while on active duty and
+was promoted to vice admiral upon retirement.</p>
+
+<p>Four of the officers in the picture served in three wars. Lieutenant
+Colonels Gerald C. Thomas, division operations officer,
+and Randolph McC. Pate, division logistics officer, served in
+both World Wars I and II, and each commanded the 1st Marine
+Division in Korea. Colonel William J. Whaling similarly
+served in World Wars I and II, and was General Thomas’ assistant
+division commander in Korea. Major Henry W. Buse,
+Jr., assistant operations officer, served in World War II, Korea,
+and the Vietnam War. Others served in two wars&mdash;World
+Wars I and II, or World War II and Korea. Represented in the
+photograph is a total of nearly 700 years of cumulative experience
+on active Marine Corps service.</p>
+
+<p>Three key members of the division&mdash;the Assistant Division
+Commander, Brigadier General William H. Rupertus; the Assistant
+Chief of Staff, G-1, Colonel Robert C. Kilmartin, Jr.;
+and the commanding officer of the 1st Raider Battalion, Lieutenant
+Colonel Merritt A. Edson&mdash;were not in this picture for
+a good reason. They were on Tulagi, where Rupertus headed
+the Tulagi Command Group with Kilmartin as his chief of
+staff, and Edson commanded the combat troops. Also notably
+absent from this photograph was the commander of the
+7th Marines, Colonel James C. Webb, who had not joined the
+division from Samoa, where the regiment had been sent before
+the division deployed overseas.</p>
+
+<p>In his memoir, <i>Once a Marine</i>, General Vandegrift explained
+why this photograph was taken. The division’s morale was
+affected by the fact that Vice Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher was
+forced to withdraw his fleet from the area&mdash;with many of his
+ships not yet fully unloaded and holding more than half of
+the division’s supplies still needed ashore. Adding to the Marines’
+uneasiness at seeing their naval support disappear below
+the horizon, was the fact that they had been under almost
+constant enemy air attacks beginning shortly after their landing
+on Guadalcanal. In an effort to counter the adverse influence
+on morale of the day and night air attacks, Vandegrift
+began making tours of the division perimeter every morning
+to talk to as many of his Marines as possible, and to keep a
+personal eye on the command. As he noted:</p>
+
+<blockquote>
+
+<p>By August 11, the full impact of the vanished transports was
+permeating the command, so again I called a conference of my
+staff and command officers.... I ended the conference by
+posing with this fine group of officers, a morale device that
+worked because they thought if I went to the trouble of having
+the picture taken then I obviously planned to enjoy it in
+future years.</p></blockquote>
+
+<p>Recently, General Merrill B. “Bill” Twining, on Guadalcanal
+a lieutenant colonel and assistant D-3, recalled the circumstances
+of the photograph and philosophized about the men
+who appeared in it:</p>
+
+<blockquote>
+
+<p>The group is lined up on the slope of the coral ridge which
+provided a degree of protection from naval gunfire coming from
+the north and was therefore selected as division CP....</p>
+
+<p>There was no vital reason for the conclave. I think V[andegrift]
+just wanted to see who was in his outfit. Do you realize
+these people had never been together before? Some came
+from as far away as Iceland....</p>
+
+<p>V[andegrift] mainly introduced himself, gave a brief pep talk....
+I have often been asked how we could afford to congregate
+all this talent in the face of the enemy. We didn’t believe we
+(<i>at the moment</i>) faced any threat from the Japanese. The defense
+area was small and every responsible commander could reach
+his CP in 5 minutes and after all there were a lot of good people
+along those lines. Most of the fresh-caught second lieutenants
+were battalion commanders two years later. We believed in each
+other and trusted.</p></blockquote>
+
+<p class="sigright">
+&mdash;<i>Benis M. Frank</i>
+</p>
+
+<h3 class="dkgreen">The General and His Officers on Guadalcanal, According to the Chart</h3>
+
+<div class="figright" style="width: 553px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_015.jpg" width="553" height="360" alt="" /></div>
+
+<div class="figright" style="width: 561px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_015b.jpg" width="561" height="363" alt="" /></div>
+
+<ul>
+<li class="p1 figspace">1. Col George R. Rowan<br /></li>
+<li class="figspace">2. Col Pedro A. del Valle<br /></li>
+<li class="figspace">3. Col William C. James<br /></li>
+<li class="figspace">4. MajGen Alexander A. Vandegrift<br /></li>
+<li class="figspace">5. LtCol Gerald C. Thomas<br /></li>
+<li class="figspace">6. Col Clifton B. Cates<br /></li>
+<li class="figspace">7. Col Randolph McC. Pate<br /></li>
+<li class="figspace">8. Cdr Warwick T. Brown, USN<br /></li>
+<li class="figspace">9. Col William J. Whaling<br /></li>
+<li>10. Col Frank B. Goettge<br /></li>
+<li>11. Col LeRoy P. Hunt, Jr.<br /></li>
+<li>12. LtCol Frederick C. Biebush<br /></li>
+<li>13. LtCol Edwin A. Pollock<br /></li>
+<li>14. LtCol Edmund J. Buckley<br /></li>
+<li>15. LtCol Walter W. Barr<br /></li>
+<li>16. LtCol Raymond P. Coffman<br /></li>
+<li>17. LtCol Francis R. Geraci<br /></li>
+<li>18. LtCol William E. Maxwell<br /></li>
+<li>19. LtCol Edward G. Hagen<br /></li>
+<li>20. LtCol William N. McKelvy, Jr.<br /></li>
+<li>21. LtCol Julian N. Frisbie<br /></li>
+<li>22. Maj Milton V. O’Connell<br /></li>
+<li>23. Maj William Chalfant III<br /></li>
+<li>24. Maj Horace W. Fuller<br /></li>
+<li>25. Maj Forest C. Thompson<br /></li>
+<li>26. Maj Robert G. Ballance<br /></li>
+<li>27. Maj Henry C. Buse, Jr.<br /></li>
+<li>28. Maj James W. Frazer<br /></li>
+<li>29. Maj Henry H. Crockett<br /></li>
+<li>30. LtCol Lenard B. Cresswell<br /></li>
+<li>31. Maj Robert O. Brown<br /></li>
+<li>32. LtCol John A. Bemis<br /></li>
+<li>33. Col Kenneth W. Benner<br /></li>
+<li>34. Maj Robert B. Luckey<br /></li>
+<li>35. LtCol Samuel B. Taxis<br /></li>
+<li>36. LtCol Eugene H. Price<br /></li>
+<li>37. LtCol Merrill B. Twining<br /></li>
+<li>38. LtCol Walker A. Reaves<br /></li>
+<li>39. LtCol John D. Macklin<br /></li>
+<li>40. LtCol Hawley C. Waterman<br /></li>
+<li>41. Maj James C. Murray, Jr.</li>
+</ul>
+</div>
+
+
+<div class="chapter"></div>
+<div class="sidebar">
+<p class="in0 small"><a name="Sidebar_page_17_The_Coastwatchers" id="Sidebar_page_17_The_Coastwatchers"></a>[Sidebar (<a href="#Page_17">page 17</a>):]</p>
+<h3 class="nobreak p0">The Coastwatchers</h3>
+
+<p class="drop-cap a"><span class="smcap1"><span class="dkgreen">A</span></span> group of fewer than 1,500 native Coastwatchers
+served as the eyes and ears of Allied forces in
+reporting movements of Japanese units on the
+ground, in the air, and at sea.</p>
+
+<p>Often performing their jobs in remote jungle outposts,
+the Coastwatchers were possessed of both mental and physical
+courage. Their knowledge of the geography and peoples
+of the Pacific made them invaluable additions to the Allied
+war effort.</p>
+
+<p>The concept for this service originated in 1919 in a
+proposal by the Royal Australian Navy to form a civilian
+coastwatching organization to provide early warning in the
+event of an invasion. By the outbreak of war in September
+1939, approximately 800 persons were serving as coastwatchers,
+operating observation posts mainly on the Australian
+coast. They were, at the outset, government officials
+aided by missionaries and planters who, as war with Japan
+neared, were placed under the control of the intelligence
+section of the Australian Navy.</p>
+
+<div class="figright" style="width: 253px;">
+  <div class="captionl top"><p class="justify"><i>Coastwatcher Capt W.&nbsp;F. Martin Clemens, British Solomon
+Islands Defence Force, poses with some of his constabulary.</i></p></div>
+
+<div class="captionr top clear"><p>
+National Archives Photo 80-G-17080 courtesy of Richard Frank
+</p></div>
+  <img src="images/i_b_017.jpg" width="253" height="180" alt="" />
+</div>
+
+<p>By 1942, the system of coastwatchers and the accompanying
+intelligence network covered an area of 500,000 square
+miles, and was placed under the control of the Allied Intelligence
+Bureau (AIB). The AIB coordinated Allied intelligence
+activities in the southwest Pacific, and had as its
+initial principal mission the collection of all possible information
+about the enemy in the vicinity of Guadalcanal.</p>
+
+<p>Coastwatchers proved extremely useful to U.S. Marine
+forces in providing reports on the number and movement
+of Japanese troops. Officers from the 1st Marine Division
+obtained accurate information on the location of enemy
+forces in their objective areas, and were provided vital
+reports on approaching Japanese bombing raids. On 8 August
+1942, Coastwatcher Jack Reed on Bougainville alerted
+American forces to an upcoming raid by 40 Japanese
+bombers, which resulted in 36 of the enemy planes being
+destroyed. The “early warning system” provided by the
+Coastwatchers helped Marine forces on Guadalcanal to hold
+onto the Henderson Field airstrip.</p>
+
+<p>The Coastwatchers also rescued and sheltered 118 Allied
+pilots, including Marines, during the Solomons Campaign,
+often at the immediate risk of their own lives.
+Pipe-smoking Coastwatcher Reed also was responsible for
+coordinating the evacuation on Bougainville of four nuns
+and 25 civilians by the U.S. submarine <i>Nautilus</i>.</p>
+
+<p>It is unknown exactly how many Coastwatchers paid the
+ultimate sacrifice in the performance of their duties. Many
+died in anonymity, without knowledge of the contribution
+their services had made to final victory. Perhaps they would
+be gratified to know that no less an authority than Admiral
+William F. Halsey recorded that the Coastwatchers saved
+Guadalcanal, and Guadalcanal saved the Pacific.&mdash;<i>Robert
+V. Aquilina</i></p>
+</div>
+
+
+<div class="chapter"></div>
+<div class="sidebar green">
+<p class="in0 small"><a name="Sidebar_page_19_The_1st_Marine_Division_Patch" id="Sidebar_page_19_The_1st_Marine_Division_Patch"></a>[Sidebar (<a href="#Page_20">page 19</a>):]</p>
+<h3 class="nobreak p0">The 1st Marine Division Patch</h3>
+
+<div class="figright" style="width: 251px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_019b.jpg" width="251" height="323" alt="" /></div>
+
+<p class="drop-cap"><span class="smcap1">T</span>he 1st Division shoulder patch originally was
+authorized for wear by members of units who
+were organic or attached to the division in its four
+landings in the Pacific War. It was the first unit patch to
+be authorized for wear in World War II and specifically
+commemorated the division’s sacrifices and victory in the
+battle for Guadalcanal.</p>
+
+<p>As recalled by General Merrill B. Twining, a lieutenant
+colonel and the division’s operations officer on Guadalcanal,
+for a short time before the 1st left Guadalcanal for
+Australia, there had been some discussion by the senior
+staff about uniforming the troops. It appeared that the Marines
+might have to wear Army uniforms, which meant that
+they would lose their identity and Twining came up with
+the idea for a division patch. A number of different designs
+were devised by both Lieutenant Colonel Twining and
+Captain Donald L. Dickson, adjutant of the 5th Marines,
+who had been an artist in civilian life. The one which Twining
+prepared on the flight out of Guadalcanal was approved
+by Major General Alexander A. Vandegrift, the division
+commander.</p>
+
+<p>General Twining further recalled that he drew a diamond
+in his notebook and “in the middle of the diamond I
+doodled a numeral one ... [and] I sketched in the word
+‘Guadalcanal’ down its length.... I got to thinking that
+the whole operation had been under the Southern Cross,
+so I drew that in, too.... About an hour later I took
+the drawing up to the front of the aircraft to General Vandegrift.
+He said, ‘Yes, that’s it!’ and wrote his initials, A.A.V.,
+on the bottom of the notebook page.”</p>
+
+<div class="figleft" style="width: 258px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_019.jpg" width="258" height="147" alt="" />
+  <div class="captionl justify"><i>Designer of the patch, LtCol Merrill B. Twining (later Gen)
+sits in the 1st Marine Division operations bunker. Behind
+him is his assistant D-3, a very tired Maj Henry IV. Buse, Jr.</i></div></div>
+
+<p>After he arrived in Brisbane, Australia, Colonel Twining
+bought a child’s watercolor set and, while confined to
+his hotel room by a bout of malaria, drew a bunch of diamonds
+on a big sheet, coloring each one differently. He then
+took samples to General Vandegrift, who chose one which
+was colored a shade of blue that he liked. Then Twining
+took the sketch to the Australian Knitting Mills to have it
+reproduced, pledging the credit of the post exchange funds
+to pay for the patches’ manufacture. Within a week or two
+the patches began to roll off the knitting machines, and
+Colonel Twining was there to approve them. General Twining
+further recalled: “After they came off the machine, I
+picked up a sheet of them. They looked very good, and
+when they were cut, I picked up one of the patches. It was
+one of the first off the machine.”</p>
+
+<p>The division’s post exchanges began selling the patches
+almost immediately and they proved to be popular, with
+Marines buying extras to give away as souvenirs to Australian
+friends or to send home to families. Before long,
+newly established Marine divisions, as well as the raider
+and parachute units, and as the aircraft wings, sea-going
+Marines, Fleet Marine Force Pacific units, and others, were
+authorized to have their own distinctive patch, a total of
+33, following the lead of the 1st Marine Division. Marines
+returning to the United States for duty or on leave from
+a unit having a distinctive shoulder insignia were authorized
+to wear that insignia until they were assigned to
+another unit having a shoulder patch of its own. For many
+1st Marine Division men joining another unit and having
+to relinquish the wearing of the 1st Division patch, this
+rankled.</p>
+
+<p>Shortly after the end of the war, Colonel Twining went
+to now-Marine Commandant General Vandegrift saying
+that he “no longer thought Marines should wear anything
+on their uniforms to distinguish them from other Marines.
+He agreed and the patches came off for good.”&mdash;<i>Benis M.
+Frank</i></p>
+</div>
+
+<hr />
+<div class="chapter"></div>
+<h2><a name="September_and_the_Ridge" id="September_and_the_Ridge"></a><i>September and the Ridge</i></h2>
+
+<p>Admiral McCain visited Guadalcanal
+at the end of August, arriving
+in time to greet the aerial reinforcements
+he had ordered forward, and
+also in time for a taste of Japanese
+nightly bombing. He got to experience,
+too, what was becoming
+another unwanted feature of Cactus
+nights: bombardment by Japanese
+cruisers and destroyers. General Vandegrift
+noted that McCain had gotten
+a dose of the “normal ration of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_23" id="Page_23">23</a></span>
+shells.” The admiral saw enough to
+signal his superiors that increased
+support for Guadalcanal operations
+was imperative and that the “situation
+admits no delay whatsoever.” He
+also sent a prophetic message to Admirals
+King and Nimitz: “Cactus can
+be a sinkhole for enemy air power
+and can be consolidated, expanded,
+and exploited to the enemy’s mortal
+hurt.”</p>
+
+<p>On 3 September, the Commanding
+General, 1st Marine Aircraft
+Wing, Brigadier General Roy S.
+Geiger, and his assistant wing commander,
+Colonel Louis Woods,
+moved forward to Guadalcanal to
+take charge of air operations. The arrival
+of the veteran Marine aviators
+provided an instant lift to the morale
+of the pilots and ground crews. It
+reinforced their belief that they were
+at the leading edge of air combat,
+that they were setting the pace for the
+rest of Marine aviation. Vandegrift
+could thankfully turn over the day-to-day
+management of the aerial
+defenses of Cactus to the able and experienced
+Geiger. There was no
+shortage of targets for the mixed air
+force of Marine, Army, and Navy
+flyers. Daily air attacks by the
+Japanese, coupled with steady reinforcement<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_24" id="Page_24">24</a></span>
+attempts by Tanaka’s destroyers
+and transports, meant that
+every type of plane that could lift off
+Henderson’s runway was airborne as
+often as possible. Seabees had begun
+work on a second airstrip, Fighter
+One, which could relieve some of the
+pressure on the primary airfield.</p>
+
+<div id="ip_24" class="figcenter" style="width: 547px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_024.jpg" width="547" height="295" alt="" />
+  <div class="captionr">
+
+<p>National Archives Photo 80-G-29536-413C</p></div>
+
+<div class="captionl">
+<p class="justify"><i>This is an oblique view of Henderson Field looking north with
+Ironbottom Sound (Sealark Channel) in the background. At
+the left center is the “Pagoda,” operations center of Cactus Air
+Force flyers throughout their first months of operations ashore.</i></p></div></div>
+
+<p>Most of General Kawaguchi’s
+brigade had reached Guadalcanal.
+Those who hadn’t, missed their landfall
+forever as a result of American
+air attacks. Kawaguchi had in mind
+a surprise attack on the heart of the
+Marine position, a thrust from the
+jungle directly at the airfield. To
+reach his jumpoff position, the
+Japanese general would have to move
+through difficult terrain unobserved,
+carving his way through the dense
+vegetation out of sight of Marine
+patrols. The rugged approach route
+would lead him to a prominent ridge
+topped by Kunai grass which wove
+snake-like through the jungle to within
+a mile of Henderson’s runway.
+Unknown to the Japanese, General
+Vandegrift planned on moving his
+headquarters to the shelter of a spot
+at the inland base of this ridge, a site
+better protected, it was hoped, from
+enemy bombing and shellfire.</p>
+
+<div id="ip_24b" class="figcenter" style="width: 360px;">
+  <div class="captionl top"><p class="justify"><i>Marine ground crewmen attempt to put out one of many fires occuring after a
+Japanese bombing raid on Henderson Field causing the loss of much-needed aircraft.</i></p></div>
+
+<div class="captionr top"><p>
+Marine Corps Personal Papers Collection
+</p></div>
+  <img src="images/i_b_024b.jpg" width="360" height="245" alt="" />
+</div>
+
+<p>The success of Kawaguchi’s plan
+depended upon the Marines keeping
+the inland perimeter thinly manned
+while they concentrated their forces
+on the east and west flanks. This was
+not to be. Available intelligence, including
+a captured enemy map,
+pointed to the likelihood of an attack
+on the airfield and Vandegrift moved
+his combined raider-parachute battalion
+to the most obvious enemy approach
+route, the ridge. Colonel
+Edson’s men, who scouted Savo Island
+after moving to Guadalcanal
+and destroyed a Japanese supply base<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_25" id="Page_25">25</a></span>
+at Tasimboko in another shore-to-shore
+raid, took up positions on the
+forward slopes of the ridge at the
+edge of the encroaching jungle on 10
+September. Their commander later
+said that he “was firmly convinced
+that we were in the path of the next
+Jap attack.” Earlier patrols had spotted
+a sizable Japanese force approaching.
+Accordingly, Edson
+patrolled extensively as his men dug
+in on the ridge and in the flanking
+jungle. On the 12th, the Marines
+made contact with enemy patrols
+confirming the fact that Japanese
+troops were definitely “out front.”
+Kawaguchi had about 2,000 of his
+men with him, enough he thought to
+punch through to the airfield.</p>
+
+<p>Japanese planes had dropped
+500-pound bombs along the ridge on
+the 11th and enemy ships began
+shelling the area after nightfall on the
+12th, once the threat of American air
+attacks subsided. The first Japanese
+thrust came at 2100 against Edson’s
+left flank. Boiling out of the jungle,
+the enemy soldiers attacked fearlessly
+into the face of rifle and machine gun
+fire, closing to bayonet range. They
+were thrown back. They came again,
+this time against the right flank,
+penetrating the Marines’ positions.
+Again they were thrown back. A
+third attack closed out the night’s action.
+Again it was a close affair, but
+by 0230 Edson told Vandegrift his
+men could hold. And they did.</p>
+
+<div id="ip_25" class="figcenter" style="width: 551px;">
+  <div class="captionl top"><p class="justify"><i>The raging battle of Edson’s Ridge is depicted in all its fury
+in this oil painting by the late Col Donald L. Dickson, who,
+as a captain, was adjutant of the 5th Marines on Guadalcanal.
+Dickson’s artwork later was shown widely in the United States.</i></p></div>
+
+<div class="captionr top"><p>
+Captain Donald L. Dickson, USMCR
+</p></div>
+  <img src="images/i_b_025.jpg" width="551" height="384" alt="" />
+</div>
+
+<p>On the morning of 13 September,
+Edson called his company commanders
+together and told them:
+“They were just testing, just testing.
+They’ll be back.” He ordered all positions
+improved and defenses consolidated
+and pulled his lines towards
+the airfield along the ridge’s center
+spine. The 2d Battalion, 5th Marines,
+his backup on Tulagi, moved into position
+to reinforce again.</p>
+
+<div id="ip_25b" class="figcenter" style="width: 746px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_026.jpg" width="746" height="520" alt="" />
+  <div class="caption"><p>EDSON’S (BLOODY) RIDGE</p>
+
+<p class="smaller">12&ndash;14 SEPTEMBER 1942</p></div></div>
+
+<div id="ip_25c" class="figcenter" style="width: 548px;">
+  <div class="captionl top"><p class="justify"><i>Edson’s or Raider’s Ridge is calm after the fighting on the nights
+of 12&ndash;13 and 13&ndash;14 September, when it was the scene of a valiant
+and bloody defense crucial to safeguarding Henderson
+Field and the Marine perimeter on Guadalcanal. The knobs
+at left background were Col Edson’s final defensive position,
+while Henderson Field lies beyond the trees in the background.</i></p></div>
+
+<div class="captionr top"><p>
+Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 500007
+</p></div>
+  <img src="images/i_b_026b.jpg" width="548" height="308" alt="" />
+</div>
+
+<div id="ip_25d" class="figleft" style="width: 175px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_027.jpg" width="175" height="233" alt="" />
+  <div class="captionr">
+
+<p>Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 310563</p></div>
+
+<div class="captionl">
+<p><i>Maj Kenneth D. Bailey, commander of
+Company C, 1st Raider Battalion, was
+awarded the Medal of Honor posthumously
+for heroic and inspiring leadership
+during the Battle of Edson’s Ridge.</i></p></div></div>
+
+<p>The next night’s attacks were as
+fierce as any man had seen. The
+Japanese were everywhere, fighting
+hand-to-hand in the Marines’ foxholes
+and gun pits and filtering past
+forward positions to attack from the
+rear. Division Sergeant Major
+Sheffield Banta shot one in the new
+command post. Colonel Edson appeared
+wherever the fighting was
+toughest, encouraging his men to
+their utmost efforts. The man-to-man
+battles lapped over into the jungle on
+either flank of the ridge, and engineer
+and pioneer positions were attacked.
+The reserve from the 5th Marines
+was fed into the fight. Artillerymen
+from the 5th Battalion, 11th Marines,
+as they had on the previous night,
+fired their 105mm howitzers at any
+called target. The range grew as short
+as 1,600 yards from tube to impact.
+The Japanese finally could take no
+more. They pulled back as dawn approached.
+On the slopes of the ridge
+and in the surrounding jungle they
+left more than 600 bodies; another
+600 men were wounded. The remnants
+of the Kawaguchi force staggered
+back toward their lines to the
+west, a grueling, hellish eight-day
+march that saw many more of the
+enemy perish.</p>
+
+<p>The cost to Edson’s force for its
+epic defense was also heavy. Fifty-nine
+men were dead, 10 were missing
+in action, and 194 were wounded.
+These losses, coupled with the
+casualties of Tulagi, Gavutu, and
+Tanambogo, meant the end of the 1st
+Parachute Battalion as an effective
+fighting unit. Only 89 men of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_27" id="Page_27">27</a></span>
+parachutists’ original strength could
+walk off the ridge, soon in legend to
+become “Bloody Ridge” or “Edson’s
+Ridge.” Both Colonel Edson and Captain
+Kenneth D. Bailey, commanding
+the raider’s Company C, were awarded
+the Medal of Honor for their
+heroic and inspirational actions.</p>
+
+<p>On 13 and 14 September, the
+Japanese attempted to support
+Kawaguchi’s attack on the ridge with
+thrusts against the flanks of the Marine
+perimeter. On the east, enemy
+troops attempting to penetrate the
+lines of the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines,
+were caught in the open on a grass
+plain and smothered by artillery fire;
+at least 200 died. On the west, the
+3d Battalion, 5th Marines, holding
+ridge positions covering the coastal
+road, fought off a determined attacking
+force that reached its front lines.</p>
+
+<div id="ip_27" class="figcenter" style="width: 551px;">
+  <div class="captionl top"><p class="justify"><i>The Pagoda at Henderson Field, served as headquarters for
+Cactus Air Force throughout the first months of air operations
+on Guadalcanal. From this building, Allied planes were sent
+against Japanese troops on other islands of the Solomons.</i></p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="captionr top">
+<p>
+Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 50921
+</p></div>
+  <img src="images/i_b_027b.jpg" width="551" height="400" alt="" />
+</div>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_28" id="Page_28">28</a></span>
+The victory at the ridge gave a
+great boost to Allied homefront
+morale, and reinforced the opinion
+of the men ashore on Guadalcanal
+that they could take on anything the
+enemy could send against them. At
+upper command echelons, the leaders
+were not so sure that the ground
+Marines and their motley air force
+could hold. Intercepted Japanese dispatches
+revealed that the myth of the
+2,000-man defending force had been
+completely dispelled. Sizable naval
+forces and two divisions of Japanese
+troops were now committed to conquer
+the Americans on Guadalcanal.
+Cactus Air Force, augmented frequently
+by Navy carrier squadrons,
+made the planned reinforcement effort
+a high-risk venture. But it was
+a risk the Japanese were prepared to
+take.</p>
+
+<p>On 18 September, the long-awaited
+7th Marines, reinforced by
+the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, and
+other division troops, arrived at
+Guadalcanal. As the men from
+Samoa landed they were greeted with
+friendly derision by Marines already
+on the island. The 7th had been the
+first regiment of the 1st Division to
+go overseas; its men, many thought
+then, were likely to be the first to see
+combat. The division had been careful
+to send some of its best men to
+Samoa and now had them back. One
+of the new and salty combat veterans
+of the 5th Marines remarked to a
+friend in the 7th that he had waited
+a long time “to see our first team get
+into the game.” Providentially, a
+separate supply convoy reached the
+island at the same time as the 7th’s
+arrival, bringing with it badly needed
+aviation gas and the first resupply
+of ammunition since D-Day.</p>
+
+<p>The Navy covering force for the
+American reinforcement and supply
+convoys was hit hard by Japanese
+submarines. The carrier <i>Wasp</i> was
+torpedoed and sunk, the battleship
+<i>North Carolina</i> (BB 55) was
+damaged, and the destroyer <i>O’Brien</i>
+(DD 415) was hit so badly it broke
+up and sank on its way to drydock.
+The Navy had accomplished its mission,
+the 7th Marines had landed,
+but at a terrible cost. About the only
+good result of the devastating
+Japanese torpedo attacks was that the
+<i>Wasp</i>’s surviving aircraft joined Cactus
+Air Force, as the planes of the
+<i>Saratoga</i> and <i>Enterprise</i> had done
+when their carriers required combat
+repairs. Now, the <i>Hornet</i> (CV 8) was
+the only whole fleet carrier left in the
+South Pacific.</p>
+
+<p>As the ships that brought the 7th
+Marines withdrew, they took with
+them the survivors of the 1st
+Parachute Battalion and sick bays full
+of badly wounded men. General
+Vandegrift now had 10 infantry battalions,
+one understrength raider battalion,
+and five artillery battalions
+ashore; the 3d Battalion, 2d Marines,
+had come over from Tulagi also. He
+reorganized the defensive perimeter
+into 10 sectors for better control, giving
+the engineer, pioneer, and amphibian
+tractor battalions sectors
+along the beach. Infantry battalions
+manned the other sectors, including
+the inland perimeter in the jungle.
+Each infantry regiment had two battalions
+on line and one in reserve.
+Vandegrift also had the use of a select
+group of infantrymen who were
+training to be scouts and snipers under
+the leadership of Colonel William
+J. “Wild Bill” Whaling, an experienced
+jungle hand, marksman,
+and hunter, whom he had appointed
+to run a school to sharpen the division’s
+fighting skills. As men
+finished their training under Whaling
+and went back to their outfits,
+others took their place and the Whaling
+group was available to scout and
+spearhead operations.</p>
+
+<p>Vandegrift now had enough men
+ashore on Guadalcanal, 19,200, to
+expand his defensive scheme. He
+decided to seize a forward position
+along the east bank of the Matanikau
+River, in effect strongly outposting
+his west flank defenses against the
+probability of strong enemy attacks
+from the area where most Japanese
+troops were landing. First, however,
+he was going to test the Japanese
+reaction with a strong probing force.</p>
+
+<p>He chose the fresh 1st Battalion,
+7th Marines, commanded by Lieutenant
+Colonel Lewis B. “Chesty”
+Puller, to move inland along the
+slopes of Mt. Austen and patrol
+north towards the coast and the
+Japanese-held area. Puller’s battalion
+ran into Japanese troops bivouacked
+on the slopes of Austen on the 24th
+and in a sharp firefight had seven
+men killed and 25 wounded. Vandegrift
+sent the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines,
+forward to reinforce Puller and
+help provide the men needed to carry
+the casualties out of the jungle.
+Now reinforced, Puller continued his
+advance, moving down the east bank
+of the Matanikau. He reached the
+coast on the 26th as planned, where
+he drew intensive fire from enemy
+positions on the ridges west of the
+river. An attempt by the 2d Battalion,
+5th Marines, to cross was beaten
+back.</p>
+
+<p>About this time, the 1st Raider
+Battalion, its original mission one of
+establishing a patrol base west of the
+Matanikau, reached the vicinity of
+the firefight, and joined in. Vandegrift
+sent Colonel Edson, now the
+commander of the 5th Marines, forward
+to take charge of the expanded
+force. He was directed to attack on
+the 27th and decided to send the raiders
+inland to outflank the Japanese
+defenders. The battalion, commanded
+by Edson’s former executive
+officer, Lieutenant Colonel Samuel B.
+Griffith II, ran into a hornet’s nest of
+Japanese who had crossed the
+Matanikau during the night. A garbled
+message led Edson to believe
+that Griffith’s men were advancing
+according to plan, so he decided to
+land the companies of the 1st Battalion,
+7th Marines, behind the enemy’s
+Matanikau position and strike the
+Japanese from the rear while Rosecran’s
+men attacked across the river.</p>
+
+<p>The landing was made without incident<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_29" id="Page_29">29</a></span>
+and the 7th Marines’ companies
+moved inland only to be
+ambushed and cut off from the sea
+by the Japanese. A rescue force of
+landing craft moved with difficulty
+through Japanese fire, urged on by
+Puller who accompanied the boats
+on the destroyer <i>Ballard</i> (DD 660).
+The Marines were evacuated after
+fighting their way to the beach covered
+by the destroyer’s fire and the
+machine guns of a Marine SBD overhead.
+Once the 7th Marines companies
+got back to the perimeter,
+landing near Kukum, the raider and
+5th Marines battalions pulled back
+from the Matanikau. The confirmation
+that the Japanese would strongly
+contest any westward advance cost
+the Marines 60 men killed and 100
+wounded.</p>
+
+<div id="ip_29" class="figcenter" style="width: 363px;">
+  <div class="captionl top"><p class="justify"><i>Shortly after becoming Commander, South Pacific Area and Forces, VAdm William
+F. Halsey visited Guadalcanal and the 1st Marine Division. Here he is shown
+talking with Col Gerald C. Thomas, 1st Marine Division D-3 (Operations Officer).</i></p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="captionr top">
+<p>
+Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 53523
+</p></div>
+  <img src="images/i_b_029b.jpg" width="363" height="241" alt="" />
+</div>
+
+<p>The Japanese the Marines had encountered
+were mainly men from the
+<i>4th Regiment</i> of the <i>2d (Sendai) Division</i>;
+prisoners confirmed that the
+division was landing on the island.
+Included in the enemy reinforcements
+were 150mm howitzers, guns capable
+of shelling the airfield from positions
+near Kokumbona. Clearly, a
+new and stronger enemy attack was
+pending.</p>
+
+<p>As September drew to a close, a
+flood of promotions had reached the
+division, nine lieutenant colonels put
+on their colonel’s eagles and there
+were 14 new lieutenant colonels also.
+Vandegrift made Colonel Gerald C.
+Thomas, his former operations<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_30" id="Page_30">30</a></span>
+officer, the new division chief of
+staff, and had a short time earlier
+given Edson the 5th Marines. Many
+of the older, senior officers, picked
+for the most part in the order they
+had joined the division, were now
+sent back to the States. There they
+would provide a new level of combat
+expertise in the training and organization
+of the many Marine units
+that were forming. The air wing was
+not quite ready yet to return its experienced
+pilots to rear areas, but the
+vital combat knowledge they possessed
+was much needed in the training
+pipeline. They, too&mdash;the
+survivors&mdash;would soon be rotating
+back to rear areas, some for a much-needed
+break before returning to
+combat and others to lead new squadrons
+into the fray.</p>
+
+<div id="ip_30" class="figcenter" style="width: 380px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_030.jpg" width="380" height="152" alt="" />
+  <div class="captionl">Japanese Model 4 (1919) 150mm Howitzer</div></div>
+
+
+<div class="chapter"></div>
+<div class="sidebar">
+<p class="in0 small"><a name="Sidebar_page_22_Sergeant_Major_Sir_Jacob_Charles_Vouza" id="Sidebar_page_22_Sergeant_Major_Sir_Jacob_Charles_Vouza"></a>[Sidebar (<a href="#Page_22">page 22</a>):]</p>
+<h3 class="nobreak p0">Sergeant Major Sir Jacob Charles Vouza</h3>
+
+<div id="ip_gright" class="figright" style="width: 254px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_022.jpg" width="254" height="309" alt="" /></div>
+
+<p class="drop-cap"><span class="smcap1">J</span>acob Charles Vouza was born in 1900 at Tasimboko,
+Guadalcanal, British Solomon Islands Protectorate,
+and educated at the South Seas Evangelical Mission
+School there. In 1916 he joined the Solomon Islands Protectorate
+Armed Constabulary, from which he retired at
+the rank of sergeant major in 1941 after 25 years of service.</p>
+
+<p>After the Japanese invaded his home island in World War
+II, he returned to active duty with the British forces and
+volunteered to work with the Coastwatchers. Vouza’s experience
+as a scout had already been established when the
+1st Marine Division landed on Guadalcanal. On 7 August
+1942 he rescued a downed naval pilot from the USS <i>Wasp</i>
+who was shot down inside Japanese territory. He guided
+the pilot to friendly lines where Vouza met the Marines for
+the first time.</p>
+
+<p>Vouza then volunteered to scout behind enemy lines for
+the Marines. On 27 August he was captured by the Japanese
+while on a Marine Corps mission to locate suspected enemy
+lookout stations. Having found a small American flag
+in Vouza’s loincloth, the Japanese tied him to a tree and
+tried to force him to reveal information about Allied forces.
+Vouza was questioned for hours, but refused to talk. He
+was tortured and bayoneted about the arms, throat, shoulder,
+face, and stomach, and left to die.</p>
+
+<p>He managed to free himself after his captors departed,
+and made his way through the miles of jungle to American
+lines. There he gave valuable intelligence information
+to the Marines about an impending Japanese attack before
+accepting medical attention.</p>
+
+<p>After spending 12 days in the hospital, Vouza then
+returned to duty as the chief scout for the Marines. He accompanied
+Lieutenant Colonel Evans F. Carlson and the
+2d Marine Raider Battalion when they made their 30-day
+raid behind enemy lines at Guadalcanal.</p>
+
+<p>Sergeant Major Vouza was highly decorated for his
+World War II service. The Silver Star was presented to him
+personally by Major General Alexander A. Vandegrift,
+commanding general of the 1st Marine Division, for refusing
+to give information under Japanese torture. He also was
+awarded the Legion of Merit for outstanding service with
+the 2d Raider Battalion during November and December
+1942, and the British George Medal for gallant conduct and
+exceptional devotion to duty. He later received the Police
+Long Service Medal and, in 1957, was made a Member of
+the British Empire for long and faithful government service.</p>
+
+<p>After the war, Vouza continued to serve his fellow islanders.
+In 1949, he was appointed district headman, and
+president of the Guadalcanal Council, from 1952&ndash;1958. He
+served as a member of the British Solomon Islands Protectorate
+Advisory Council from 1950 to 1960.</p>
+
+<p>He made many friends during his long association with
+the U.S. Marine Corps and through the years was continually
+visited on Guadalcanal by Marines. During 1968, Vouza
+visited the United States, where he was the honored guest
+of the 1st Marine Division Association. In 1979, he was
+knighted by Britain’s Queen Elizabeth II. He died on 15
+March 1984.&mdash;<i>Ann A. Ferrante</i></p>
+</div>
+
+
+<div class="chapter"></div>
+<div class="sidebar">
+<p class="in0 small"><a name="Sidebar_page_23_M3A1_37mm_Antitank_Gun" id="Sidebar_page_23_M3A1_37mm_Antitank_Gun"></a>[Sidebar (<a href="#Page_24">page 23</a>):]</p>
+<h3 class="nobreak p0">M3A1 37mm Antitank Gun</h3>
+
+<p class="drop-cap"><span class="smcap1"><span class="dkgreen">T</span>he</span> M3 antitank gun, based on the successful German
+<i>Panzer Abwehr Kanone</i> (PAK)-36, was developed
+by the U.S. Army in the late 1930s as a
+replacement for the French 37mm Puteaux gun, used in
+World War I but unable to destroy new tanks being
+produced.</p>
+
+<p>The M3 was adopted because of its accuracy, fire control,
+penetration, and mobility. Towed by its prime mover,
+the 4×4 quarter-ton truck, the gun would trail at 50 mph
+on roads. When traveling crosscountry, gullies, shell holes,
+mud holes, and slopes of 26 degrees were negotiated with
+ease. In 1941, the gun was redesignated the M3A1 when
+the muzzles were threaded to accept a muzzle brake that
+was rarely, if ever, used.</p>
+
+<p>At the time of its adoption, the M3 could destroy any
+tank then being produced in the world. However, by the
+time the United States entered the war, the M3 was outmatched
+by the tanks it would have met in Europe. The
+Japanese tanks were smaller and more vulnerable to the
+M3 throughout the war. In the Pacific, it was used against
+bunkers, pillboxes and, when loaded with canister, against
+banzai charges. It was employed throughout the war by
+Marine regimental weapons companies, but in reduced
+numbers as the fighting continued. It was replaced in the
+European Theater by the M1 57mm antitank gun.</p>
+
+<p>The 37mm antitank gun, manned by a crew of four who
+fired a 1.61-pound projectile with an effective range of 500
+yards.&mdash;<i>Stephen L. Amos and Kenneth L. Smith-Christmas</i></p>
+
+<div class="figcenter" style="width: 524px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_023.jpg" width="524" height="339" alt="" /></div>
+</div>
+
+<div id="Sidebar_page_29" class="sidebar">
+<p class="in0 small">[Sidebar (<a href="#Page_29">page 29</a>):]</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+The President of the United States<br />
+takes pleasure in presenting<br />
+the Medal of Honor posthumously to<br />
+Douglas Albert Munro<br />
+Signalman First Class<br />
+United States Coast Guard<br />
+for service as set forth<br />
+in the following citation:
+</p>
+
+<div class="figright" style="width: 365px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_029.jpg" width="365" height="285" alt="" />
+  <div class="captionr">
+
+<p>
+Painting by Bernard D’Andrea, Courtesy of U.S. Coast Guard Historical Office
+</p></div></div>
+
+<blockquote>
+
+<p>For extraordinary heroism and conspicuous
+gallantry in action above and beyond the call
+of duty as Officer in Charge of a group of
+twenty-four Higgins boats engaged in the
+evacuation of a battalion of Marines trapped
+by enemy Japanese forces at Point Cruz,
+Guadalcanal, on September 27, 1942. After
+making preliminary plans for the evacuation
+of nearly five hundred beleaguered Marines,
+Munro, under constant strafing by enemy
+machine guns on the island and at great risk
+of his life, daringly led five of his small craft
+toward the shore. As he closed the beach, he
+signalled the others to land and then in order
+to draw the enemy’s fire and protect the
+heavily loaded boats, he valiantly placed his
+craft, with its two small guns, as a shield between
+the beachhead and the Japanese. When
+the perilous task of evacuation was nearly
+completed, Munro was instantly killed by
+enemy fire, but his crew, two of whom were
+wounded, carried on until the last boat had
+loaded and cleared the beach. By his outstanding
+leadership, expert planning, and
+dauntless devotion to duty, he and his courageous
+comrades undoubtedly saved the
+lives of many who otherwise would have
+perished. He gallantly gave up his life in
+defense of his country. /s/ Franklin Roosevelt</p></blockquote>
+</div>
+
+<hr />
+<div class="chapter"></div>
+<h2><a name="October_and_the_Japanese_Offensive" id="October_and_the_Japanese_Offensive"></a><i>October and the Japanese Offensive</i></h2>
+
+<p>On 30 September, unexpectedly, a
+B-17 carrying Admiral Nimitz made
+an emergency landing at Henderson
+Field. The CinCPac made the most
+of the opportunity. He visited the
+front lines, saw Edson’s Ridge, and
+talked to a number of Marines. He
+reaffirmed to Vandegrift that his
+overriding mission was to hold the
+airfield. He promised all the support
+he could give and after awarding
+Navy Crosses to a number of Marines,
+including Vandegrift, left the
+next day visibly encouraged by what
+he had seen.</p>
+
+<div id="ip_30b" class="figcenter" style="width: 548px;">
+  <div class="captionl top"><p class="justify"><i>Visiting Guadalcanal on 30 September, Adm Chester W.
+Nimitz, CinCPac, took time to decorate LtCol Evans C. Carlson,
+CO, 2d Raider Battalion; MajGen Vandegrift, in rear;
+and, from left, BGen William H. Rupertus, ADC; Col Merritt
+A. Edson, CO, 5th Marines; LtCol Edwin A. Pollock, CO,
+2d Battalion, 1st Marines; Maj John L. Smith, CO, VMF-223.</i></p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="captionr top"><p>
+Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 50883
+</p></div>
+  <img src="images/i_b_030b.jpg" width="548" height="363" alt="" />
+</div>
+
+<p>The next Marine move involved a
+punishing return to the Matanikau,
+this time with five infantry battalions
+and the Whaling group. Whaling
+commanded his men and the 3d Battalion,
+2d Marines, in a thrust inland
+to clear the way for two battalions
+of the 7th Marines, the 1st and 2d,
+to drive through and hook toward
+the coast, hitting the Japanese holding<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_31" id="Page_31">31</a></span>
+along the Matanikau. Edson’s 2d
+and 3d Battalions would attack
+across the river mouth. All the division’s
+artillery was positioned to fire
+in support.</p>
+
+<div id="ip_31" class="figcenter" style="width: 553px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_031.jpg" width="553" height="330" alt="" />
+  <div class="captionr">
+
+<p>Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 61534</p></div>
+
+<div class="captionl">
+<p class="justify"><i>A M1918 155mm howitzer is fired by artillery crewmen of the
+11th Marines in support of ground forces attacking the enemy.
+Despite the lack of sound-flash equipment to locate hostile
+artillery, Col del Valle’s guns were able to quiet enemy fire.</i></p></div></div>
+
+<p>On the 7th, Whaling’s force moved
+into the jungle about 2,000 yards upstream
+on the Matanikau, encountering
+Japanese troops that harassed his
+forward elements, but not in enough
+strength to stop the advance. He
+bypassed the enemy positions and
+dug in for the night. Behind him the
+7th Marines followed suit, prepared
+to move through his lines, cross the
+river, and attack north toward the
+Japanese on the 8th. The 5th Marines’
+assault battalions moving
+toward the Matanikau on the 7th ran
+into Japanese in strength about 400
+yards from the river. Unwittingly, the
+Marines had run into strong advance
+elements of the Japanese <i>4th Regiment</i>,
+which had crossed the
+Matanikau in order to establish a
+base from which artillery could fire
+into the Marine perimeter. The fighting
+was intense and the 3d Battalion,
+5th, could make little progress,
+although the 2d Battalion encountered
+slight opposition and won
+through to the river bank. It then
+turned north to hit the inland flank
+of the enemy troops. Vandegrift sent
+forward a company of raiders to reinforce
+the 5th, and it took a holding
+position on the right, towards the
+beach.</p>
+
+<p>Rain poured down on the 8th, all
+day long, virtually stopping all forward
+progress, but not halting the
+close-in fighting around the Japanese
+pocket. The enemy troops finally
+retreated, attempting to escape the
+gradually encircling Marines. They
+smashed into the raider’s position
+nearest to their escape route. A wild
+hand-to-hand battle ensued and a
+few Japanese broke through to reach
+and cross the river. The rest died
+fighting.</p>
+
+<div id="ip_32" class="figright" style="width: 362px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_032.jpg" width="362" height="187" alt="" />
+  <div class="captionr"><p>Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 50963</p></div>
+
+<div class="captionl">
+<p class="justify"><i>More than 200 Japanese soldiers alone were killed in a frenzied attack in the sandspit
+where the Tenaru River flows into Ironbottom Sound (Sealark Channel).</i></p></div></div>
+
+<p>On the 9th, Whaling’s force,
+flanked by the 2d and then the 1st
+Battalion, 7th Marines, crossed the
+Matanikau and then turned and followed
+ridge lines to the sea. Puller’s
+battalion discovered a number of
+Japanese in a ravine to his front, fired
+his mortars, and called in artillery,
+while his men used rifles and
+machine guns to pick off enemy
+troops trying to escape what proved
+to be a death trap. When his mortar
+ammunition began to run short,
+Puller moved on toward the beach,
+joining the rest of Whaling’s force,
+which had encountered no opposition.
+The Marines then recrossed the
+Mantanikau, joined Edson’s troops,
+and marched back to the perimeter,
+leaving a strong combat outpost at
+the Matanikau, now cleared of
+Japanese. General Vandegrift, apprised
+by intelligence sources that a
+major Japanese attack was coming
+from the west, decided to consolidate
+his positions, leaving no sizable Marine
+force more than a day’s march
+from the perimeter. The Marine advance
+on 7&ndash;9 October had thwarted
+Japanese plans for an early attack
+and cost the enemy more than 700
+men. The Marines paid a price too,
+65 dead and 125 wounded.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_32" id="Page_32">32</a></span>
+There was another price that
+Guadalcanal was exacting from both
+sides. Disease was beginning to fell
+men in numbers that equalled the
+battle casualties. In addition to gastroenteritis,
+which greatly weakened
+those who suffered its crippling
+stomach cramps, there were all kinds
+of tropical fungus infections, collectively
+known as “jungle rot,” which
+produced uncomfortable rashes on
+men’s feet, armpits, elbows, and
+crotches, a product of seldom being
+dry. If it didn’t rain, sweat provided
+the moisture. On top of this came
+hundreds of cases of malaria.
+Atabrine tablets provided some
+relief, besides turning the skin yellow,
+but they were not effective enough
+to stop the spread of the mosquito-borne
+infection. Malaria attacks were
+so pervasive that nothing short of
+complete prostration, becoming a litter
+case, could earn a respite in the
+hospital. Naturally enough, all these
+diseases affected most strongly the
+men who had been on the island the
+longest, particularly those who experienced
+the early days of short rations.
+Vandegrift had already argued
+with his superiors that when his men
+eventually got relieved they should
+not be sent to another tropical island
+hospital, but rather to a place where
+there was a real change of atmosphere
+and climate. He asked that
+Auckland or Wellington, New
+Zealand, be considered.</p>
+
+<p>For the present, however, there
+was to be no relief for men starting
+their third month on Guadalcanal.
+The Japanese would not abandon
+their plan to seize back Guadalcanal
+and gave painful evidence of their intentions
+near mid-October. General
+Hyakutake himself landed on
+Guadalcanal on 7 October to oversee
+the coming offensive. Elements of
+Major General Masao Maruyama’s
+<i>Sendai Division</i>, already a factor in
+the fighting near the Matanikau,
+landed with him. More men were
+coming. And the Japanese, taking
+advantage of the fact that Cactus
+flyers had no night attack capability,
+planned to ensure that no planes
+at all would rise from Guadalcanal
+to meet them.</p>
+
+<div id="ip_32b" class="figcenter" style="width: 550px;">
+  <div class="captionl top justify"><i>By October, malaria began to claim as many casualties as
+Japanese artillery, bombs, and naval gunfire. Shown here are
+the patients in the division hospital who are ministered to by
+physicians and corpsmen working under minimal conditions.</i></div>
+  <img src="images/i_b_032b.jpg" width="550" height="220" alt="" />
+</div>
+
+<p>On 11 October, U.S. Navy surface
+ships took a hand in stopping the
+“Tokyo Express,” the nickname that
+had been given to Admiral Tanaka’s
+almost nightly reinforcement forays.
+A covering force of five cruisers and
+five destroyers, located near Rennell
+Island and commanded by Rear Admiral
+Norman Scott, got word that
+many ships were approaching
+Guadalcanal. Scott’s mission was to
+protect an approaching reinforcement
+convoy and he steamed toward
+Cactus at flank speed eager to engage.
+He encountered more ships
+than he had expected, a bombardment<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_33" id="Page_33">33</a></span>
+group of three heavy cruisers
+and two destroyers, as well as six destroyers
+escorting two seaplane carrier
+transports. Scott maneuvered between
+Savo Island and Cape Esperance,
+Guadalcanal’s western tip, and
+ran head-on into the bombardment
+group.</p>
+
+<p>Alerted by a scout plane from his
+flagship, <i>San Francisco</i> (CA 38),
+spottings later confirmed by radar
+contacts on the <i>Helena</i> (CL 50), the
+Americans opened fire before the
+Japanese, who had no radar, knew
+of their presence. One enemy destroyer
+sank immediately, two cruisers
+were badly damaged, one, the
+<i>Furutaka</i>, later foundered, and the
+remaining cruiser and destroyer
+turned away from the inferno of
+American fire. Scott’s own force was
+punished by enemy return fire which
+damaged two cruisers and two destroyers,
+one of which, the <i>Duncan</i>
+(DD 485), sank the following day.
+On the 12th too, Cactus flyers spotted
+two of the reinforcement destroyer
+escorts retiring and sank them
+both. The Battle of Cape Esperance
+could be counted an American naval
+victory, one sorely needed at the
+time.</p>
+
+<div id="ip_33" class="figleft" style="width: 173px;">
+  <div class="captionl top"><p class="justify"><i>Maj Harold W. Bauer, VMF-212 commander,
+here a captain, was posthumously
+awarded the Medal of Honor
+after being lost during a scramble with
+Japanese aircraft over Guadalcanal.</i></p></div>
+
+<div class="captionr top"><p>
+Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 410772
+</p></div>
+  <img src="images/i_b_033.jpg" width="173" height="225" alt="" />
+</div>
+
+<p>Its way cleared by Scott’s encounter
+with the Japanese, a really welcome
+reinforcement convoy arrived
+at the island on 13 October when the
+164th Infantry of the Americal Division
+arrived. The soldiers, members
+of a National Guard outfit
+originally from North Dakota, were
+equipped with Garand M-1 rifles, a
+weapon of which most overseas Marines
+had only heard. In rate of fire,
+the semiautomatic Garand could easily
+outperform the single-shot, bolt-action
+Springfields the Marines carried
+and the bolt-action rifles the
+Japanese carried, but most 1st Division
+Marines of necessity touted the
+Springfield as inherently more accurate
+and a better weapon. This did
+not prevent some light-fingered Marines
+from acquiring Garands when
+the occasion presented itself. And
+such an occasion did present itself
+while the soldiers were landing and
+their supplies were being moved to
+dumps. Several flights of Japanese
+bombers arrived over Henderson
+Field, relatively unscathed by the
+defending fighters, and began dropping
+their bombs. The soldiers headed
+for cover and alert Marines,
+inured to the bombing, used the interval
+to “liberate” interesting cartons
+and crates. The news that the Army
+had arrived spread across the island
+like wildfire, for it meant to all Marines
+that they eventually would be
+relieved. There was hope.</p>
+
+<div id="ip_34" class="figright" style="width: 361px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_034.jpg" width="361" height="228" alt="" />
+  <div class="captionr">
+
+<p>Department of Defense (USMC) Photos 304183 and 302980</p></div>
+
+<div class="captionl"><p class="justify"><i>Two other Marine aviators awarded the Medal of Honor for heroism and intrepidity
+in the air were Capt Jefferson J. DeBlanc, left, and Maj Robert E. Galer, right.</i></p></div></div>
+
+<p>As if the bombing was not enough
+grief, the Japanese opened on the airfield
+with their 150mm howitzers
+also. Altogether the men of the 164th
+got a rude welcome to Guadalcanal.
+And on that night, 13&ndash;14 October,
+they shared a terrifying experience
+with the Marines that no one would
+ever forget.</p>
+
+<p>Determined to knock out Henderson
+Field and protect their soldiers
+landing in strength west of Koli
+Point, the enemy commanders sent
+the battleships <i>Kongo</i> and <i>Haruna</i>
+into Ironbottom Sound to bombard
+the Marine positions. The usual
+Japanese flare planes heralded the
+bombardment, 80 minutes of sheer
+hell which had 14-inch shells exploding
+with such effect that the accompanying
+cruiser fire was scarcely
+noticed. No one was safe; no place
+was safe. No dugout had been built
+to withstand 14-inch shells. One witness,
+a seasoned veteran demonstrably
+cool under enemy fire, opined
+that there was nothing worse in war
+than helplessly being on the receiving
+end of naval gunfire. He remembered
+“huge trees being cut apart and
+flying about like toothpicks.” And he
+was on the frontlines, not the prime
+enemy target. The airfield and its environs
+were a shambles when dawn
+broke. The naval shelling, together
+with the night’s artillery fire and
+bombing, had left Cactus Air Force’s
+commander, General Geiger, with a
+handful of aircraft still flyable, an airfield
+thickly cratered by shells and
+bombs, and a death toll of 41. Still,
+from Henderson or Fighter One,
+which now became the main airstrip,
+the Cactus Flyers had to attack, for
+the morning also revealed a shore
+and sea full of inviting targets.</p>
+
+<p>The expected enemy convoy had
+gotten through and Japanese transports
+and landing craft were everywhere
+near Tassafaronga. At sea the
+escorting cruisers and destroyers
+provided a formidable antiaircraft
+screen. Every American plane that
+could fly did. General Geiger’s aide,
+Major Jack Cram, took off in the
+general’s PBY, hastily rigged to carry
+two torpedoes, and put one of
+them into the side of an enemy transport
+as it was unloading. He landed
+the lumbering flying boat with enemy
+aircraft hot on his tail. A new
+squadron of F4Fs, VMF-212, commanded
+by Major Harold W. Bauer,
+flew in during the day’s action, landed,
+refueled, and took off to join the
+fighting. An hour later, Bauer landed
+again, this time with four enemy
+bombers to his credit. Bauer, who added
+to his score of Japanese aircraft
+kills in later air battles, was subsequently
+lost in action. He was awarded<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_34" id="Page_34">34</a></span>
+the Medal of Honor, as were four
+other Marine pilots of the early Cactus
+Air Force: Captain Jefferson J.
+DeBlanc (VMF-112); Captain Joseph
+J. Foss (VMF-121); Major Robert E.
+Galer (VMF-224); and Major John L.
+Smith (VMF-223).</p>
+
+<p>The Japanese had landed more
+than enough troops to destroy the
+Marine beachhead and seize the airfield.
+At least General Hyakutake
+thought so, and he heartily approved
+General Maruyama’s plan to move
+most of the <i>Sendai Division</i> through
+the jungle, out of sight and out of
+contact with the Marines, to strike
+from the south in the vicinity of Edson’s
+Ridge. Roughly 7,000 men, each
+carrying a mortar or artillery shell,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_35" id="Page_35">35</a></span>
+started the trek along the Maruyama
+Trail which had been partially
+hacked out of the jungle well inland
+from the Marine positions. Maruyama,
+who had approved the trail’s
+name to indicate his confidence, intended
+to support this attack with
+heavy mortars and infantry guns
+(70mm pack howitzers). The men
+who had to lug, push, and drag these
+supporting arms over the miles of
+broken ground, across two major
+streams, the Mantanikau and the
+Lunga, and through heavy underbrush,
+might have had another name
+for their commander’s path to supposed
+glory.</p>
+
+<div id="ip_35" class="figcenter" style="width: 550px;">
+  <div class="captionl top"><p class="justify"><i>A Marine examines a Japanese 70mm howitzer captured at
+the Battle of the Tenaru. Gen Maruyama’s troops “had to lug,
+push, and drag these supporting arms over the miles of broken
+ground, across two major streams and through heavy underbrush”
+to get them to the target area&mdash;but they never did. The
+trail behind them was littered with the supplies they carried.</i></p></div>
+
+<div class="captionr top"><p>
+Photo courtesy of Col James A. Donovan, Jr.
+</p></div>
+  <img src="images/i_b_034b.jpg" width="550" height="424" alt="" />
+</div>
+
+<p>General Vandegrift knew the
+Japanese were going to attack.
+Patrols and reconnaissance flights
+had clearly indicated the push would
+be from the west, where the enemy
+reinforcements had landed. The
+American commander changed his
+dispositions accordingly. There were
+Japanese troops east of the perimeter,
+too, but not in any significant
+strength. The new infantry regiment,
+the 164th, reinforced by Marine special
+weapons units, was put into the
+line to hold the eastern flank along
+6,600 yards, curving inland to join up
+with 7th Marines near Edson’s Ridge.
+The 7th held 2,500 yards from the
+ridge to the Lunga. From the Lunga,
+the 1st Marines had a 3,500-yard sector
+of jungle running west to the
+point where the line curved back to
+the beach again in the 5th Marines’
+sector. Since the attack was expected
+from the west, the 3d Battalions
+of each of the 1st and 7th Marines
+held a strong outpost position forward
+of the 5th Marines’ lines along
+the east bank of the Matanikau.</p>
+
+<p>In the lull before the attack, if a
+time of patrol clashes, Japanese
+cruiser-destroyer bombardments,
+bomber attacks, and artillery harassment
+could properly be called a
+lull, Vandegrift was visited by the
+Commandant of the Marine Corps,
+Lieutenant General Thomas Holcomb.
+The Commandant flew in on
+21 October to see for himself how his
+Marines were faring. It also proved
+to be an occasion for both senior Marines
+to meet the new ComSoPac,
+Vice Admiral William F. “Bull” Halsey.
+Admiral Nimitz had announced
+Halsey’s appointment on 18 October
+and the news was welcome in Navy
+and Marine ranks throughout the Pacific.
+Halsey’s deserved reputation for
+elan and aggressiveness promised
+renewed attention to the situation on
+Guadalcanal. On the 22d, Holcomb
+and Vandegrift flew to Noumea to
+meet with Halsey and to receive and
+give a round of briefings on the Allied
+situation. After Vandegrift had
+described his position, he argued
+strongly against the diversion of reinforcements
+intended for Cactus to
+any other South Pacific venue, a
+sometime factor of Admiral Turner’s
+strategic vision. He insisted that he
+needed all of the Americal Division
+and another 2d Marine Division regiment
+to beef up his forces, and that
+more than half of his veterans were
+worn out by three months’ fighting
+and the ravages of jungle-incurred
+diseases. Admiral Halsey told the
+Marine general: “You go back there,
+Vandegrift. I promise to get you
+everything I have.”</p>
+
+<div id="ip_35b" class="figcenter" style="width: 365px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_035.jpg" width="365" height="354" alt="" />
+  <div class="captionr">
+
+<p>Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 13628</p></div>
+
+<div class="captionl">
+<p class="justify"><i>During a lull in the fight, a Marine machine gunner takes a break for coffee, with
+his sub-machine gun on his knee and his 30-caliber light machine gun in position.</i></p></div></div>
+
+<p>When Vandegrift returned to
+Guadalcanal, Holcomb moved on to
+Pearl Harbor to meet with Nimitz,
+carrying Halsey’s recommendation
+that, in the future, landing force commanders
+once established ashore,
+would have equal command status
+with Navy amphibious force commanders.
+At Pearl, Nimitz approved
+Halsey’s recommendation&mdash;which
+Holcomb had drafted&mdash;and in
+Washington so did King. In effect,
+then, the command status of all future
+Pacific amphibious operations
+was determined by the events of
+Guadalcanal. Another piece of news
+Vandegrift received from Holcomb
+also boded well for the future of the
+Marine Corps. Holcomb indicated<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_36" id="Page_36">36</a></span>
+that if President Roosevelt did not
+reappoint him, unlikely in view of his
+age and two terms in office, he would
+recommend that Vandegrift be appointed
+the next Commandant.</p>
+
+<div id="ip_36" class="figcenter" style="width: 546px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_036.jpg" width="546" height="373" alt="" />
+  <div class="captionr">
+
+<p>Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 513191</p></div>
+
+<div class="captionl">
+<p class="justify"><i>On the occasion of the visit of the Commandant, MajGen
+Thomas Holcomb, some of Operation Watchtower’s major
+staff and command officers took time out from the fighting
+to pose with him. From left, front row: Col William J. Whaling
+(Whaling Group); Col Amor LeRoy Sims (CO, 7th Marines);
+Col Gerald C. Thomas (Division Chief of Staff); Col
+Pedro A. del Valle (CO, 11th Marines); Col William E. Riley
+(member of Gen Holcomb’s party); MajGen Roy S. Geiger
+(CG, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing); Gen Holcomb; MajGen
+Ralph J. Mitchell (Director of Aviation, Headquarters, U.S.
+Marine Corps); BGen Bennet Puryear, Jr. (Assistant Quartermaster
+of the Marine Corps); Col Clifton B. Cates (CO, 1st
+Marines). Second row (between Whaling and Sims): LtCol
+Raymond P. Coffman (Division Supply Officer); Maj James
+C. Murray (Division Personnel Officer); (behind Gen Holcomb)
+LtCol Merrill B. Twining (Division Operations Officer).</i></p></div></div>
+
+<p>This news of future events had little
+chance of diverting Vandegrift’s
+attention when he flew back to
+Guadalcanal, for the Japanese were
+in the midst of their planned offensive.
+On the 20th, an enemy patrol
+accompanied by two tanks tried to
+find a way through the line held by
+Lieutenant Colonel William N.
+McKelvy, Jr.’s 3d Battalion, 1st Marines.
+A sharpshooting 37mm gun
+crew knocked out one tank and the
+enemy force fell back, meanwhile
+shelling the Marine positions with artillery.
+Near sunset the next day, the
+Japanese tried again, this time with
+more artillery fire and more tanks in
+the fore, but again a 37mm gun
+knocked out a lead tank and discouraged
+the attack. On 22 October,
+the enemy paused, waiting for
+Maruyama’s force to get into position
+inland. On the 23d, planned as the
+day of the <i>Sendai</i>’s main attack, the
+Japanese dropped a heavy rain of artillery
+and mortar fire on McKelvy’s
+positions near the Matanikau River
+mouth. Near dusk, nine 18-ton medium
+tanks clanked out of the trees
+onto the river’s sandbar and just as
+quickly eight of them were riddled
+by the 37s. One tank got across the
+river, a Marine blasted a track off
+with a grenade, and a 75mm halftrack
+finished it off in the ocean’s
+surf. The following enemy infantry
+was smothered by Marine artillery
+fire as all battalions of the augmented
+11th Marines rained shells on the
+massed attackers. Hundreds of
+Japanese were casualties and three
+more tanks were destroyed. Later, an
+inland thrust further upstream was
+easily beaten back. The abortive
+coastal attack did almost nothing to
+aid Maruyama’s inland offensive, but
+did cause Vandegrift to shift one battalion,
+the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines,
+out of the lines to the east and into
+the 4,000-yard gap between the Matanikau
+position and the perimeter.
+This move proved providential since<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_37" id="Page_37">37</a></span>
+one of Maruyama’s planned attacks
+was headed right for this area.</p>
+
+<p>Although patrols had encountered
+no Japanese east or south of the jungled
+perimeter up to the 24th, the
+Matanikau attempts had alerted
+everyone. When General Maruyama
+finally was satisfied that his men had
+struggled through to appropriate assault
+positions, after delaying his day
+of attack three times, he was ready
+on 24 October. The Marines were
+waiting.</p>
+
+<p>An observer from the 1st Battalion,
+7th Marines, spotted an enemy
+officer surveying Edson’s Ridge on
+the 24th, and scout-snipers reported
+smoke from numerous rice fires rising
+from a valley about two miles
+south of Lieutenant Colonel Puller’s
+positions. Six battalions of the <i>Sendai
+Division</i> were poised to attack,
+and near midnight the first elements
+of the enemy hit and bypassed a
+platoon-sized outpost forward of
+Puller’s barbed-wire entanglements.
+Warned by the outpost, Puller’s men
+waited, straining to see through a
+dark night and a driving rain. Suddenly,
+the Japanese charged out of
+the jungle, attacking in Puller’s area
+near the ridge and the flat ground to
+the east. The Marines replied with<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_38" id="Page_38">38</a></span>
+everything they had, calling in artillery,
+firing mortars, relying heavily
+on crossing fields of machine gun
+fire to cut down the enemy infantrymen.
+Thankfully, the enemy’s artillery,
+mortars, and other supporting
+arms were scattered back along the
+Maruyama Trail; they had proved
+too much of a burden for the infantrymen
+to carry forward.</p>
+
+<div id="ip_38" class="figcenter" style="width: 550px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_038.jpg" width="550" height="265" alt="" />
+  <div class="captionr">
+
+<p>Marine Corps Personal Papers Collection</p></div>
+
+<div class="captionl">
+<p class="justify"><i>Five Japanese tanks sit dead in the water, destroyed by Marine
+37mm gunfire during the abortive attempt to force the
+Marine perimeter near the mouth of the Matanikau River in
+late October. Many Japanese soldiers lost their lives also.</i></p></div></div>
+
+<p>A wedge was driven into the Marine
+lines, but eventually straightened
+out with repeated counterattacks.
+Puller soon realized his battalion was
+being hit by a strong Japanese force
+capable of repeated attacks. He called
+for reinforcements and the Army’s 3d
+Battalion, 164th Infantry (Lieutenant
+Colonel Robert K. Hall), was ordered
+forward, its men sliding and slipping
+in the rain as they trudged a mile
+south along Edson’s Ridge. Puller met
+Hall at the head of his column, and
+the two officers walked down the
+length of the Marine lines, peeling off
+an Army squad at a time to feed into
+the lines. When the Japanese attacked
+again as they did all night long, the
+soldiers and Marines fought back
+together. By 0330, the Army battalion
+was completely integrated into
+the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines’ lines
+and the enemy attacks were getting
+weaker and weaker. The American
+return fire&mdash;including flanking fire
+from machine guns and Weapons
+Company, 7th Marines’ 37mm guns
+remaining in the positions held by 2d
+Battalion, 164th Infantry, on Puller’s
+left&mdash;was just too much to take. Near
+dawn, Maruyama pulled his men
+back to regroup and prepare to attack
+again.</p>
+
+<p>With daylight, Puller and Hall reordered
+the lines, putting the 3d Battalion,
+164th, into its own positions
+on Puller’s left, tying in with the rest
+of the Army regiment. The driving
+rains had turned Fighter One into a
+quagmire, effectively grounding Cactus
+flyers. Japanese planes used the
+“free ride” to bomb Marine positions.
+Their artillery fired incessantly and
+a pair of Japanese destroyers added
+their gunfire to the bombardment until
+they got too close to the shore and
+the 3d Defense Battalion’s 5-inch
+guns drove them off. As the sun bore
+down, the runways dried and afternoon
+enemy attacks were met by
+Cactus fighters, who downed 22
+Japanese planes with a loss of three
+of their own.</p>
+
+<p>As night came on again, Maruyama
+tried more of the same, with the
+same result. The Army-Marine lines
+held and the Japanese were cut down
+in droves by rifle, machine gun, mortar,
+37mm, and artillery fire. To the
+west, an enemy battalion mounted
+three determined attacks against the
+positions held by Lieutenant Colonel
+Herman H. Hanneken’s 2d Battalion,
+7th Marines, thinly tied in with
+Puller’s battalion on the left and the
+3d Battalion, 7th Marines, on the
+right. The enemy finally penetrated
+the positions held by Company F, but
+a counterattack led by Major Odell
+M. Conoley, the battalion’s executive
+officer, drove off the Japanese. Again
+at daylight the American positions
+were secure and the enemy had
+retreated. They would not come
+back; the grand Japanese offensive of
+the <i>Sendai Division</i> was over.</p>
+
+<p>About 3,500 enemy troops had
+died during the attacks. General
+Maruyama’s proud boast that he
+“would exterminate the enemy
+around the airfield in one blow”
+proved an empty one. What was left
+of his force now straggled back over
+the Maruyama Trail, losing, as had
+the Kawaguchi force in the same situation,
+most of its seriously wounded<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_39" id="Page_39">39</a></span>
+men. The Americans, Marines
+and soldiers together, probably lost
+300 men killed and wounded; existing
+records are sketchy and incomplete.
+One result of the battle,
+however, was a warm welcome to the
+164th Infantry from the 1st Marine
+Division. Vandegrift particularly
+commended Lieutenant Colonel
+Hall’s battalion, stating the “division
+was proud to have serving with it
+another unit which had stood the test
+of battle.” And Colonel Cates sent a
+message to the 164th’s Colonel Bryant
+Moore saying that the 1st Marines
+“were proud to serve with a unit such
+as yours.”</p>
+
+<p>Amidst all the heroics of the two
+nights’ fighting there were many men
+who were singled out for recognition
+and an equally large number who
+performed great deeds that were
+never recognized. Two men stood out
+above all others, and on succeeding
+nights, Sergeant John Basilone of the
+1st Battalion, 7th Marines, and Platoon
+Sergeant Mitchell Paige of the
+2d Battalion, both machine gun section
+heads, were recognized as having
+performed “above and beyond the
+call of duty” in the inspiring words
+of their Medal of Honor citations.</p>
+
+<div class="chapter"></div>
+<div class="sidebar green">
+<p class="in0 small"><a name="Sidebar_page_37_Reising_Gun" id="Sidebar_page_37_Reising_Gun"></a>[Sidebar (<a href="#Page_37">page 37</a>):]</p>
+<h3 class="nobreak p0">Reising Gun</h3>
+
+<p class="drop-cap"><span class="smcap1"><span class="dkgreen">T</span>he</span> Reising gun was designed and developed by noted
+gun inventor Eugene Reising. It was patented in
+1940 and manufactured by the old gun-making firm
+of Harrington and Richardson of Worcester, Massachusetts.
+It is said that it was made on existing machine tools, some
+dating back to the Civil War, and of ordinary steel rather
+than ordnance steel. With new machine tools and ordnance
+steel scarce and needed for more demanding weapons, the
+Reising met an immediate requirement for many sub-machine
+guns at a time when production of Thompson
+M1928 and M1 sub-machine guns hadn’t caught up with
+demand and the stamped-out M3 “grease gun” had not yet
+been invented. It was a wartime expedient.</p>
+
+<div class="figright" style="width: 255px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_037.jpg" width="255" height="339" alt="" />
+  <div class="captionr">
+
+<p>
+Captain Donald L. Dickson, USMCR
+</p></div></div>
+
+<p>The Reising was made in two different models, the 50
+and the 55. The Model 50 had a full wooden stock and
+a Cutts compensator attached to the muzzle. The compensator,
+a device which reduced the upward muzzle climb
+from recoil, was invented by Richard M. Cutts, Sr., and
+his son, Richard M. Cutts, Jr., both of whom became Marine
+brigadier generals. The other version was dubbed the
+Model 55. It had a folding metal-wire shoulder stock which
+swivelled on the wooden pistol grip. It also had a shorter
+barrel and no compensator. It was intended for use by
+parachutists, tank crews, and others needing a compact
+weapon. Both versions of the Reising fired .45-caliber ammunition,
+the same cartridge as the Colt automatic pistol
+and the Thompson.</p>
+
+<p>In all, there were approximately 100,000 Reising sub-machine
+guns produced between 1940 and 1942. Small
+numbers of the weapons were acquired by both Great Britain
+and the Soviet Union. However, most were used by
+the U.S. Marine Corps in the Solomon Islands campaign.
+The Model 55 was issued to both Marine parachute battalions
+and Marine raiders, seeing service first on Guadalcanal.
+After its dubious debut in combat it was withdrawn
+from frontline service in 1943 due to several flaws in design
+and manufacture.</p>
+
+<p>The Reising’s major shortcoming was its propensity for
+jamming. This was due to both a design problem in the
+magazine lips and the fact that magazines were made of
+a soft sheet steel. The weapon’s safety mechanism didn’t
+always work and if the butt was slammed down on the
+deck, the hammer would set back against the mainspring
+and then fly forward, firing a chambered cartridge. The
+design allowed the entry of dirt into the mechanism and
+close tolerances caused it to jam. Finally, the steel used allowed
+excessive rust to form in the tropical humidity of the
+Solomons. Nevertheless, at six pounds, the Reising was
+handier than the 10-pound Thompson, more accurate,
+pleasanter to shoot, and reliable under other than combat
+conditions, but one always had to keep the muzzle pointed
+in a safe direction. The Model 50 was also issued to Marines
+for guard duty at posts and stations in the United
+States.&mdash;<i>John G. Griffiths</i></p>
+</div>
+
+<hr />
+<div class="chapter"></div>
+<h2><a name="November_and_the_Continuing_Buildup" id="November_and_the_Continuing_Buildup"></a><i>November and the Continuing Buildup</i></h2>
+
+<p>While the soldiers and Marines
+were battling the Japanese ashore, a
+patrol plane sighted a large Japanese
+fleet near the Santa Cruz Islands to
+the east of the Solomons. The enemy
+force was formidable, 4 carriers
+and 4 battleships, 8 cruisers and 28
+destroyers, all poised for a victorious
+attack when Maruyama’s capture of
+Henderson Field was signalled. Admiral
+Halsey’s reaction to the inviting
+targets was characteristic, he
+signaled Rear Admiral Thomas C.
+Kinkaid, with the <i>Hornet</i> and <i>Enterprise</i>
+carrier groups located north of
+the New Hebrides: “Attack Repeat
+Attack.”</p>
+
+<div id="ip_39" class="figcenter" style="width: 551px;">
+  <div class="captionl top"><p class="justify"><i>Heavy tropical downpours at Guadalcanal all but flood out
+a Marine camp near Henderson Field, and the field as well.
+Marines’ damp clothing and bedding contributed to the heavy
+incidence of tormenting skin infections and fungal disorders.</i></p></div>
+
+<div class="captionr top"><p>
+Department of Defense (USMC) Photo
+</p></div>
+  <img src="images/i_b_039.jpg" width="551" height="324" alt="" />
+</div>
+
+<p>Early on 26 October, American
+SBDs located the Japanese carriers at
+about the same time Japanese scout
+planes spotted the American carriers.
+The Japanese <i>Zuiho</i>’s flight deck was
+holed by the scout bombers, cancelling
+flight operations, but the other
+three enemy carriers launched strikes.
+The two air armadas tangled as each
+strove to reach the other’s carriers.
+The <i>Hornet</i> was hit repeatedly by
+bombs and torpedoes; two Japanese
+pilots also crashed their planes on
+board. The damage to the ship was
+so extensive, the <i>Hornet</i> was abandoned
+and sunk. The <i>Enterprise</i>, the
+battleship <i>South Dakota</i>, the light
+cruiser <i>San Juan</i> (CL 54), and the
+destroyer <i>Smith</i> (DD 378) were also
+hit; the destroyer <i>Porter</i> (DD 356)
+was sunk. On the Japanese side, no
+ships were sunk, but three carriers
+and two destroyers were damaged.
+One hundred Japanese planes were
+lost; 74 U.S. planes went down.
+Taken together, the results of the Battle
+of Santa Cruz were a standoff.
+The Japanese naval leaders might
+have continued their attacks, but instead,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_40" id="Page_40">40</a></span>
+disheartened by the defeat of
+their ground forces on Guadalcanal,
+withdrew to attack another day.</p>
+
+<div id="ip_40" class="figleft" style="width: 362px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_040.jpg" width="362" height="503" alt="" />
+  <div class="captionr">
+
+<p>Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 74093</p></div>
+
+<div class="captionl">
+<p class="justify"><i>Marine engineers repair a flood-damaged Lunga River bridge washed out during
+a period when 8 inches of rain fell in 24 hours and the river rose 7 feet above normal.</i></p></div></div>
+
+<p>The departure of the enemy naval
+force marked a period in which substantial
+reinforcements reached the
+island. The headquarters of the 2d
+Marines had finally found transport
+space to come up from Espiritu Santo
+and on 29 and 30 October, Colonel
+Arthur moved his regiment from
+Tulagi to Guadalcanal, exchanging
+his 1st and 2d Battalions for the well-blooded
+3d, which took up the Tulagi
+duties. The 2d Marines’ battalions at
+Tulagi had performed the very necessary
+task of scouting and securing all
+the small islands of the Florida group
+while they had camped, frustrated,
+watching the battles across Sealark
+Channel. The men now would no
+longer be spectators at the big show.</p>
+
+<p>On 2 November, planes from
+VMSB-132 and VMF-211 flew into
+the Cactus fields from New Caledonia.
+MAG-11 squadrons moved forward
+from New Caledonia to
+Espiritu Santo to be closer to the battle
+scene; the flight echelons now
+could operate forward to Guadalcanal
+and with relative ease. On the
+ground side, two batteries of 155mm
+guns, one Army and one Marine,
+landed on 2 November, providing
+Vandegrift with his first artillery
+units capable of matching the enemy’s
+long-range 150mm guns. On the
+4th and 5th, the 8th Marines
+(Colonel Richard H. Jeschke) arrived
+from American Samoa. The full-strength
+regiment, reinforced by the
+75mm howitzers of the 1st Battalion,
+10th Marines, added another 4,000
+men to the defending forces. All the
+fresh troops reflected a renewed emphasis
+at all levels of command on
+making sure Guadalcanal would be
+held. The reinforcement-replacement
+pipeline was being filled. In the offing
+as part of the Guadalcanal
+defending force were the rest of the
+Americal Division, the remainder of
+the 2d Marine Division, and the Army’s
+25th Infantry Division, then in
+Hawaii. More planes of every type
+and from Allied as well as American
+sources were slated to reinforce and
+replace the battered and battle-weary
+Cactus veterans.</p>
+
+<p>The impetus for the heightened
+pace of reinforcement had been
+provided by President Roosevelt.
+Cutting through the myriad demands
+for American forces worldwide, he
+had told each of the Joint Chiefs on
+24 October that Guadalcanal must be
+reinforced, and without delay.</p>
+
+<p>On the island, the pace of operations
+did not slacken after the
+Maruyama offensive was beaten
+back. General Vandegrift wanted to
+clear the area immediately west of
+the Matanikau of all Japanese troops,
+forestalling, if he could, another
+buildup of attacking forces. Admiral
+Tanaka’s Tokyo Express was still
+operating and despite punishing attacks
+by Cactus aircraft and new and
+deadly opponents, American motor
+torpedo boats, now based at Tulagi.</p>
+
+<p>On 1 November, the 5th Marines,
+backed up by the newly arrived 2d
+Marines, attacked across bridges engineers
+had laid over the Matanikau<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_41" id="Page_41">41</a></span>
+during the previous night. Inland,
+Colonel Whaling led his scout-snipers
+and the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, in
+a screening movement to protect the
+flank of the main attack. Opposition
+was fierce in the shore area where the
+1st Battalion, 5th, drove forward
+toward Point Cruz, but inland the 2d
+Battalion and Whaling’s group encountered
+slight opposition. By nightfall,
+when the Marines dug in, it was
+clear that the only sizable enemy
+force was in the Point Cruz area. In
+the days bitter fighting, Corporal
+Anthony Casamento, a badly
+wounded machine gun squad leader
+in Edson’s 1st Battalion, had so distinguished
+himself that he was
+recommended for a Navy Cross;
+many years later, in August 1980,
+President Jimmy Carter approved the
+award of the Medal of Honor in its
+stead.</p>
+
+<div id="ip_41" class="figcenter" style="width: 362px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_041.jpg" width="362" height="184" alt="" />
+  <div class="captionr">
+
+<p>
+Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 56749
+</p></div>
+
+<div class="captionl">
+<p class="justify"><i>2dLt Mitchell Paige, third from left, and PltSgt John Basilone, extreme right, received
+the Medal of Honor at a parade at Camp Balcombe, Australia, on 21 May 1943.
+MajGen Vandegrift, left, received his medal in a White House ceremony the previous
+5 February, while Col Merritt A. Edson was decorated 31 December 1943. Note
+the 1st Marine Division patches on the right shoulders of each participant.</i></p></div></div>
+
+<p>On the 2d, the attack continued
+with the reserve 3d Battalion moving
+into the fight and all three 5th
+Marines units moving to surround
+the enemy defenders. On 3 November,
+the Japanese pocket just west of
+the base at Point Cruz was eliminated;
+well over 300 enemy had been
+killed. Elsewhere, the attacking Marines
+had encountered spotty
+resistance and advanced slowly
+across difficult terrain to a point
+about 1,000 yards beyond the 5th
+Marines’ action. There, just as the
+offensive’s objectives seemed well in
+hand, the advance was halted. Again,
+the intelligence that a massive enemy
+reinforcement attempt was pending
+forced Vandegrift to pull back
+most of his men to safeguard the all-important
+airfield perimeter. This
+time, however, he left a regiment to
+outpost the ground that had been
+gained, Colonel Arthur’s 2d Marines,
+reinforced by the Army’s 1st Battalion,
+164th Infantry.</p>
+
+<p>Emphasizing the need for caution
+in Vandegrift’s mind was the fact that
+the Japanese were again discovered
+in strength east of the perimeter. On
+3 November, Lieutenant Colonel
+Hanneken’s 2d Battalion, 7th Marines,
+on a reconnaissance in force
+towards Koli Point, could see the
+Japanese ships clustered near Tetere,
+eight miles from the perimeter. His
+Marines encountered strong Japanese
+resistance from obviously fresh<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_42" id="Page_42">42</a></span>
+troops and he began to pull back. A
+regiment of the enemy’s <i>38th Division</i>
+had landed, as Hyakutake experimented
+with a Japanese
+Navy-promoted scheme of attacking
+the perimeter from both flanks.</p>
+
+<div id="ip_42" class="figcenter" style="width: 372px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_042.jpg" width="372" height="225" alt="" />
+  <div class="captionr">
+
+<p>
+Marine Corps Historical Photo Collection
+</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="captionl">
+<p class="justify"><i>In a White House ceremony, former Cpl Anthony Casamento, a machine gun squad
+leader in the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, was decorated by President Jimmy Carter
+on 22 August 1980, 38 years after the battle for Guadalcanal. Looking on are
+Casarnento’s wife and daughters and Gen Robert H. Barrow, Marine Commandant.</i></p></div></div>
+
+<div id="ip_42b" class="figright" style="width: 170px;">
+  <div class="captionl top"><p class="justify"><i>Sgt Clyde Thomason, who was killed in
+action participating in the Makin Island
+raid with the 2d Raider Battalion, was
+the first enlisted Marine in World War
+II to be awarded the Medal of Honor.</i></p></div>
+
+<div class="captionr top"><p>
+Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 310616
+</p></div>
+  <img src="images/i_b_042b.jpg" width="170" height="344" alt="" />
+</div>
+
+<p>As Hanneken’s battalion executed
+a fighting withdrawal along the
+beach, it began to receive fire from
+the jungle inland, too. A rescue force
+was soon put together under General
+Rupertus: two tank companies, the
+1st Battalion, 7th Marines, and the
+2d and 3d Battalions of the 164th.
+The Japanese troops, members of the
+<i>38th Division</i> regiment and remnants
+of Kawaguchi’s brigade, fought
+doggedly to hold their ground as the
+Marines drove forward along the
+coast and the soldiers attempted to
+outflank the enemy in the jungle. The
+running battle continued for days,
+supported by Cactus air, naval gunfire,
+and the newly landed 155mm
+guns.</p>
+
+<p>The enemy commander received
+new orders as he was struggling to
+hold off the Americans. He was to
+break off the action, move inland,
+and march to rejoin the main
+Japanese forces west of the perimeter,
+a tall order to fulfill. The two-pronged
+attack scheme had been
+abandoned. The Japanese managed
+the first part; on the 11th the enemy
+force found a gap in the 164th’s line
+and broke through along a meandering
+jungle stream. Behind they left
+450 dead over the course of a seven-day
+battle; the Marines and soldiers
+had lost 40 dead and 120 wounded.</p>
+
+<p>Essentially, the Japanese who
+broke out of the encircling Americans
+escaped from the frying pan
+only to fall into the fire. Admiral
+Turner finally had been able to effect
+one of his several schemes for alternative
+landings and beachheads, all
+of which General Vandegrift vehemently
+opposed. At Aola Bay, 40
+miles east of the main perimeter, the
+Navy put an airfield construction
+and defense force ashore on 4
+November. Then, while the Japanese
+were still battling the Marines near
+Tetere, Vandegrift was able to persuade
+Turner to detach part of this
+landing force, the 2d Raider Battalion,
+to sweep west, to discover and
+destroy any enemy forces it encountered.</p>
+
+<p>Lieutenant Colonel Evans F. Carlson’s
+raider battalion already had
+seen action before it reached Guadalcanal.
+Two companies had reinforced
+the defenders of Midway Island
+when the Japanese attacked there in
+June. The rest of the battalion had
+landed from submarines on Makin
+Island in the Gilberts on 17&ndash;18 August,
+destroying the garrison there.
+For his part in the fighting on Makin,
+Sergeant Clyde Thomason had been
+awarded a Medal of Honor posthumously,
+the first Marine enlisted man
+to receive his country’s highest award
+in World War II.</p>
+
+<p>In its march from Aola Bay, the 2d
+Raider Battalion encountered the
+Japanese who were attempting to
+retreat to the west. On 12 November,
+the raiders beat off attacks by two
+enemy companies and then relentlessly
+pursued the Japanese, fighting
+a series of small actions over the next
+five days before they contacted the
+main Japanese body. From 17
+November to 4 December, when the
+raiders finally came down out of the
+jungled ridges into the perimeter,
+Carlson’s men harried the retreating<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_43" id="Page_43">43</a></span>
+enemy. They killed nearly 500
+Japanese. Their own losses were 16
+killed and 18 wounded.</p>
+
+<p>The Aola Bay venture, which had
+provided the 2d Raider Battalion a
+starting point for its month-long jungle
+campaign, proved a bust. The site
+chosen for a new airfield was unsuitable,
+too wet and unstable, and
+the whole force moved to Koli Point
+in early December, where another
+airfield eventually was constructed.</p>
+
+<p>The buildup on Guadalcanal continued,
+by both sides. On 11 November,
+guarded by a cruiser-destroyer
+covering force, a convoy ran in carrying
+the 182d Infantry, another regiment
+of the Americal Division. The
+ships were pounded by enemy bombers
+and three transports were hit,
+but the men landed. General Vandegrift
+needed the new men badly.
+His veterans were truly ready for
+replacement; more than a thousand
+new cases of malaria and related diseases
+were reported each week. The
+Japanese who had been on the island
+any length of time were no better off;
+they were, in fact, in worse shape.
+Medical supplies and rations were in
+short supply. The whole thrust of the
+Japanese reinforcement effort continued
+to be to get troops and combat
+equipment ashore. The idea
+prevailed in Tokyo, despite all evidence
+to the contrary, that one overwhelming
+coordinated assault would
+crush the American resistance. The
+enemy drive to take Port Moresby on
+New Guinea was put on hold to concentrate
+all efforts on driving the
+Americans off of Guadalcanal.</p>
+
+<div id="ip_43" class="figcenter" style="width: 551px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_043.jpg" width="551" height="339" alt="" />
+  <div class="captionr">
+
+<p>Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 51728</p></div>
+
+<div class="captionl">
+<p class="justify"><i>Native guides lead 2d Raider Battalion Marines on a combat/reconnaissance
+patrol behind Japanese lines. The patrol
+lasted for less than a month, during which the Marines covered
+150 miles and fought more than a dozen actions.</i></p></div></div>
+
+<p>On 12 November, a multifaceted
+Japanese naval force converged on
+Guadalcanal to cover the landing of
+the main body of the <i>38th Division</i>.
+Rear Admiral Daniel J. Callaghan’s
+cruisers and destroyers, the close-in
+protection for the 182d’s transports,
+moved to stop the enemy. Coastwatcher
+and scout plane sightings
+and radio traffic intercepts had identified
+two battleships, two carriers,
+four cruisers, and a host of destroyers
+all headed toward Guadalcanal.
+A bombardment group led by the
+battleships <i>Hiei</i> and <i>Kirishima</i>, with
+the light cruiser <i>Nagura</i>, and 15 destroyers
+spearheaded the attack.
+Shortly after midnight, near Savo Island,
+Callaghan’s cruisers picked up
+the Japanese on radar and continued
+to close. The battle was joined at
+such short range that each side fired
+at times on their own ships. Callaghan’s
+flagship, the <i>San Francisco</i>,
+was hit 15 times, Callaghan was
+killed, and the ship had to limp away.
+The cruiser <i>Atlanta</i> (CL 104) was
+also hit and set afire. Rear Admiral
+Norman Scott, who was on board,
+was killed. Despite the hammering
+by Japanese fire, the Americans held
+and continued fighting. The battleship
+<i>Hiei</i>, hit by more than 80 shells,
+retired and with it went the rest of
+the bombardment force. Three destroyers
+were sunk and four others
+damaged.</p>
+
+<div id="ip_43b" class="figcenter" style="width: 550px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_044.jpg" width="550" height="276" alt="" />
+  <div class="captionr">
+
+<p>Department of Defense (Navy) Photos 80-G-20824 and 80-G-21099</p></div>
+
+<div class="captionl">
+<p class="justify"><i>In the great naval Battle of Guadalcanal, 12&ndash;15 November,
+RAdm Daniel J. Callaghan was killed when his flagship, the
+heavy cruiser</i> San Francisco <i>(CA 38) took 15 major hits and
+was forced to limp away in the dark from the scene of action.</i></p></div></div>
+
+<p>The Americans had accomplished
+their purpose; they had forced the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_44" id="Page_44">44</a></span>
+Japanese to turn back. The cost was
+high. Two antiaircraft cruisers, the
+<i>Atlanta</i> and the <i>Juneau</i> (CL 52), were
+sunk; four destroyers, the <i>Barton</i>
+(DD 599), <i>Cushing</i> (DD 376), <i>Monssen</i>
+(DD 436), and <i>Laffey</i> (DD 459),
+also went to the bottom. In addition
+to the <i>San Francisco</i>, the heavy cruiser
+<i>Portland</i> (CA 33) and the destroyers
+<i>Sterret</i> (DD 407) and <i>Aaron
+Ward</i> (DD 483) were damaged. Only
+one destroyer of the 13 American
+ships engaged, the <i>Fletcher</i> (DD 445),
+was unscathed when the survivors retired
+to the New Hebrides.</p>
+
+<p>With daylight came the Cactus
+bombers and fighters; they found the
+crippled <i>Hiei</i> and pounded it mercilessly.
+On the 14th the Japanese were
+forced to scuttle it. Admiral Halsey
+ordered his only surviving carrier,
+the <i>Enterprise</i>, out of the Guadalcanal
+area to get it out of reach of
+Japanese aircraft and sent his battleships
+<i>Washington</i> (BB 56) and <i>South
+Dakota</i> (BB 55) with four escorting
+destroyers north to meet the
+Japanese. Some of the <i>Enterprise</i>’s
+planes flew in to Henderson Field to
+help even the odds.</p>
+
+<p>On 14 November Cactus and <i>Enterprise</i>
+flyers found a Japanese
+cruiser-destroyer force that had
+pounded the island on the night of
+13 November. They damaged four
+cruisers and a destroyer. After refueling
+and rearming they went after the
+approaching Japanese troop convoy.
+They hit several transports in one attack
+and sank one when they came
+back again. Army B-17s up from Espiritu
+Santo scored one hit and several
+near misses, bombing from 17,000
+feet.</p>
+
+<p>Moving in a continuous pattern of
+attack, return, refuel, rearm, and attack
+again, the planes from Guadalcanal
+hit nine transports, sinking
+seven. Many of the 5,000 troops on
+the stricken ships were rescued by
+Tanaka’s destroyers, which were firing
+furiously and laying smoke
+screens in an attempt to protect the
+transports. The admiral later recalled
+that day as indelible in his mind,
+with memories of “bombs wobbling
+down from high-flying B-17s; of carrier
+bombers roaring towards targets
+as though to plunge full into the
+water, releasing bombs and pulling
+out barely in time, each miss sending
+up towering clouds of mist and
+spray, every hit raising clouds of
+smoke and fire.” Despite the intensive
+aerial attack, Tanaka continued on
+to Guadalcanal with four destroyers
+and four transports.</p>
+
+<p>Japanese intelligence had picked up
+the approaching American battleship
+force and warned Tanaka of its advent.
+In turn, the enemy admirals
+sent their own battleship-cruiser
+force to intercept. The Americans, led
+by Rear Admiral Willis A. Lee in the
+<i>Washington</i>, reached Sealark Channel
+about 2100 on the 14th. An hour
+later, a Japanese cruiser was picked
+up north of Savo. Battleship fire soon
+turned it away. The Japanese now
+learned that their opponents would
+not be the cruisers they expected.</p>
+
+<p>The resulting clash, fought in the
+glare of gunfire and Japanese searchlights,
+was perhaps the most significant
+fought at sea for Guadalcanal.
+When the melee was over, the American
+battleships’ 16-inch guns had
+more than matched the Japanese.
+Both the <i>South Dakota</i> and the
+<i>Washington</i> were damaged badly<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_45" id="Page_45">45</a></span>
+enough to force their retirement, but
+the <i>Kirishima</i> was punished to its
+abandonment and death. One
+Japanese and three American destroyers,
+the <i>Benham</i> (DD 796), the
+<i>Walke</i> (DD 416), and the <i>Preston</i>
+(DD 379), were sunk. When the
+Japanese attack force retired, Admiral
+Tanaka ran his four transports
+onto the beach, knowing they would
+be sitting targets at daylight. Most of
+the men on board, however, did
+manage to get ashore before the inevitable
+pounding by American
+planes, warships, and artillery.</p>
+
+<p>Ten thousand troops of the <i>38th
+Division</i> had landed, but the
+Japanese were in no shape to ever
+again attempt a massive reinforcement.
+The horrific losses in the frequent
+naval clashes, which seemed at<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_46" id="Page_46">46</a></span>
+times to favor the Japanese, did not
+really represent a standoff. Every
+American ship lost or damaged could
+and would be replaced; every
+Japanese ship lost meant a steadily
+diminishing fleet. In the air, the losses
+on both sides were daunting, but the
+enemy naval air arm would never
+recover from its losses of experienced
+carrier pilots. Two years later, the
+Battle of the Philippine Sea between
+American and Japanese carriers
+would aptly be called the “Marianas
+Turkey Shoot” because of the ineptitude
+of the Japanese trainee pilots.</p>
+
+<div id="ip_46" class="figcenter" style="width: 550px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_046.jpg" width="550" height="273" alt="" />
+  <div class="captionr">
+
+<p>Department of Defense (USMC) Photo 53510</p></div>
+
+<div class="captionl">
+<p class="justify"><i>A Japanese troop transport and her landing craft were badly
+damaged by the numerous Marine air attacks and were forced
+to run aground on Kokumbona beach after the naval Battle
+of Guadalcanal. Many enemy troops were killed in the attacks.</i></p></div></div>
+
+<p>The enemy troops who had been
+fortunate enough to reach land were
+not immediately ready to assault the
+American positions. The <i>38th Division</i>
+and the remnants of the various
+Japanese units that had previously
+tried to penetrate the Marine lines
+needed to be shaped into a coherent
+attack force before General
+Hyakutake could again attempt to
+take Henderson Field.</p>
+
+<p>General Vandegrift now had
+enough fresh units to begin to replace
+his veteran troops along the front
+lines. The decision to replace the 1st
+Marine Division with the Army’s
+25th Infantry Division had been
+made. Admiral Turner had told Vandegrift
+to leave all of his heavy equipment
+on the island when he did pull
+out “in hopes of getting your units re-equipped
+when you come out.” He
+also told the Marine general that the
+Army would command the final
+phases of the Guadalcanal operation
+since it would provide the majority
+of the combat forces once the 1st Division
+departed. Major General Alexander
+M. Patch, commander of the
+Americal Division, would relieve
+Vandegrift as senior American officer
+ashore. His air support would continue
+to be Marine-dominated as
+General Geiger, now located on Espiritu
+Santo with 1st Wing headquarters,
+fed his squadrons forward
+to maintain the offensive. And the air
+command on Guadalcanal itself
+would continue to be a mixed bag of
+Army, Navy, Marine, and Allied
+squadrons.</p>
+
+<p>The sick list of the 1st Marine Division
+in November included more
+than 3,200 men with malaria. The
+men of the 1st still manning the
+frontline foxholes and the rear
+areas&mdash;if anyplace within Guadalcanal’s
+perimeter could properly be
+called a rear area&mdash;were plain worn
+out. They had done their part and
+they knew it.</p>
+
+<p>On 29 November, General Vandegrift
+was handed a message from
+the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The crux of
+it read: “1st MarDiv is to be relieved
+without delay ... and will proceed
+to Australia for rehabilitation and
+employment.” The word soon spread
+that the 1st was leaving and where
+it was going. Australia was not yet
+the cherished place it would become
+in the division’s future, but <i>any</i> place
+was preferable to Guadalcanal.</p>
+
+
+<div class="chapter"></div>
+<div class="sidebar green">
+<p class="in0 small"><a name="Sidebar_page_41_75mm_Pack_Howitzer_Workhorse_of_the_Artillery" id="Sidebar_page_41_75mm_Pack_Howitzer_Workhorse_of_the_Artillery"></a>[Sidebar (<a href="#Page_41">page 41</a>):]</p>
+<h3 class="nobreak p0">75mm Pack Howitzer&mdash;Workhorse of the Artillery</h3>
+
+<div class="figright" style="width: 255px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_041b.jpg" width="255" height="212" alt="" /></div>
+
+<p class="drop-cap b"><span class="smcap1">During</span> the summer of 1930, the Marine Corps began
+replacing its old French 75mm guns (Model
+1897) with the 75mm Pack Howitzer Model
+1923-E2. This weapon was designed for use in the Army
+primarily as mountain artillery. Since it could be broken
+down and manhandled ashore in six loads from ships’
+boats, the pack howitzer was an important supporting
+weapon of the Marine Corps landing forces in prewar landing
+exercises.</p>
+
+<p>The 75mm pack howitzer saw extensive service with the
+Marine Corps throughout World War II in almost every
+major landing in the Pacific. Crewed by five Marines, the
+howitzer could hurl a 16-pound shell nearly 10,000 yards.
+In the D Series table of organization with which the 1st
+Marine Division went to war, and through the following
+E and F series, there were three pack howitzer battalions
+for each artillery regiment.&mdash;<i>Anthony Wayne Tommell and
+Kenneth L. Smith-Christmas</i></p>
+</div>
+
+
+<div class="chapter"></div>
+<div class="sidebar">
+<p class="in0 small"><a name="Sidebar_page_45_The_Japanese_Model_89_1929_50mm_Heavy_Grenade_Discharger" id="Sidebar_page_45_The_Japanese_Model_89_1929_50mm_Heavy_Grenade_Discharger"></a>[Sidebar (<a href="#Page_45">page 45</a>):]</p>
+<h3 class="nobreak p0">The Japanese Model 89 (1929) 50mm Heavy Grenade Discharger</h3>
+
+<div class="figright" style="width: 252px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_045.jpg" width="252" height="370" alt="" /></div>
+
+<p class="drop-cap b"><span class="smcap1">Born</span> out of the need to bridge the gap in range between
+hand grenades and mortars, the grenade discharger
+evolved in the Imperial Japanese Army from
+a special purpose weapon of infantry assault and defense
+to an essential item of standard equipment with all Japanese
+ground forces.</p>
+
+<p>Commonly called <i>Juteki</i> by the Japanese, this weapon
+officially was designated <i>Hachikyu Shiki Jutekidarto</i>, or
+1189 Model Heavy Grenade Discharger, the term “heavy”
+being justified by the powerful 1-pound, 12-ounce high explosive
+shell it was designed to fire, although it also fired
+the standard Model 91 fragmentation grenade.</p>
+
+<p>To the American Marines and soldiers who first encountered
+this weapon and others of its kind in combat they
+were known as “knee mortars,” likely so named because they
+generally were fired from a kneeling position. Typically,
+the discharger’s concave baseplate was pressed firmly into
+the surface of the ground by the firer’s foot to support the
+heavy recoil of the fired shell, but unfortunately the term
+“knee mortar” suggested to some untutored captors of these
+weapons that they were to be fired with the baseplate resting
+against the knee or thigh. When a Marine fired one
+of these dischargers from his thigh and broke his upper leg
+bone, efforts were swiftly undertaken in the field to educate
+all combat troops in the safe and proper handling of
+these very useful weapons.</p>
+
+<p>The Model 89 (1929) 50mm Heavy Grenade Discharger
+is a muzzle-loaded, high-angle-of-fire weapon which weighs
+10-1/4 pounds and is 24 inches in overall length. Its design
+is compact and simple. The discharger has three major components:
+the rifled barrel, the supporting barrel pedestal
+with firing mechanism, and the base plate. Operation of
+the Model 89 was easy and straightforward, and with practice
+its user could deliver accurate fire registered quickly
+on target.</p>
+
+<p>Encountered in all major battles in the Pacific War, the
+Model 89 Grenade Discharger was an uncomplicated, very
+portable, and highly efficient weapon operated easily by
+one man. It was carried in a cloth or leather case with a
+sling, and its one-piece construction allowed it to be
+brought into action very quickly. This grenade discharger
+had the advantage over most mortars in that it could be
+aimed and fired mechanically after a projectile had been
+placed in the barrel, projectile firing not being dependent
+upon dropping down the barrel against a stationary firing
+pin as with most mortars, where barrel fouling sometimes
+caused dangerous hangfires. Although an instantaneous
+fuze employed on the Model 89 high explosive shell restricted
+this shell’s use to open areas, the Model 91 fragmentation
+grenade with its seven-second fuze made this discharger
+effective in a jungle or forest setting, with complete
+safety for the user from premature detonation of projectiles
+by overhanging foliage. Smoke and signal shells, and
+an incendiary grenade, were special types of ammunition
+used with this versatile and effective weapon which won
+the respect of all who came to know it.&mdash;<i>Edwin F. Libby</i></p>
+</div>
+
+<hr />
+<div class="chapter"></div>
+<h2><a name="December_and_the_Final_Stages" id="December_and_the_Final_Stages"></a><i>December and the Final Stages</i></h2>
+
+<p>On 7 December, one year after the
+Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor,
+General Vandegrift sent a message to
+all men under his command in the
+Guadalcanal area thanking them for
+their courage and steadfastness, commending
+particularly the pilots and
+“all who labored and sweated within
+the lines in all manner of prodigious
+and vital tasks.” He reminded them
+all that their “unbelievable achievements
+had made ‘Guadalcanal’ a synonym
+for death and disaster in the
+language of our enemy.” On 9 December,
+he handed over his command to
+General Patch and flew out to Australia<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_47" id="Page_47">47</a></span>
+at the same time the first elements
+of the 5th Marines were
+boarding ship. The 1st, 11th, and 7th
+Marines would soon follow together
+with all the division’s supporting
+units. The men who were leaving
+were thin, tired, hollow-eyed, and
+apathetic; they were young men who
+had grown old in four months time.
+They left behind 681 dead in the island’s
+cemetery.</p>
+
+<div id="ip_47" class="figleft" style="width: 177px;">
+  <div class="captionl top"><p class="justify"><i>As he tells it, “Too Many, Too Close, Too
+Long,” is Donald L. Dickson’s portrait of
+one of the “little guys, just plain worn
+out. His stamina and his spirit stretched
+beyond human endurance. He has had
+no real sleep for a long time....
+And he probably hasn’t stopped ducking
+and fighting long enough to discover
+that he has malaria. He is going to discover
+it now, however. He is through.”</i></p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="captionr top">
+<p>
+Captain Donald L. Dickson, USMCR
+</p></div>
+  <img src="images/i_b_047b.jpg" width="177" height="383" alt="" />
+</div>
+
+<div id="ip_47b" class="figright" style="width: 359px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_047.jpg" width="359" height="364" alt="" />
+  <div class="captionr">
+
+<p>U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo SC164898</p></div>
+
+<div class="captionl">
+<p class="justify"><i>Americal Division commander, MajGen Alexander M. Patch, Jr., watches while
+his troops and supplies are staged on Guadalcanal’s beaches on 8 December, the
+day before he relieved Gen Vandegrift and his wornout 1st Marine Division.</i></p></div></div>
+
+<p>The final regiment of the Americal
+Division, the 132d Infantry, landed
+on 8 December as the 5th Marines
+was preparing to leave. The 2d Marine
+Division’s regiments already on
+the island, the 2d, 8th, and part of
+the 10th, knew that the 6th Marines
+was on its way to rejoin. It seemed
+to many of the men of the 2d Marines,
+who had landed on D-Day, 7
+August, that they, too, should be
+leaving. These took slim comfort in
+the thought that they, by all rights,
+should be the first of the 2d to depart
+the island whenever that hoped-for
+day came.</p>
+
+<p>General Patch received a steady
+stream of ground reinforcements and
+replacements in December. He was
+not ready yet to undertake a full-scale
+offensive until the 25th Division and
+the rest of the 2d Marine Division arrived,
+but he kept all frontline units
+active in combat and reconnaissance
+patrols, particularly toward the
+western flank.</p>
+
+<p>The island commander’s air
+defense capabilities also grew substantially.
+Cactus Air Force, organized
+into a fighter command and
+a strike (bomber) command, now
+operated from a newly redesignated
+Marine Corps Air Base. The Henderson
+Field complex included a new
+airstrip, Fighter Two, which replaced
+Fighter One, which had severe
+drainage problems. Brigadier General
+Louis Woods, who had taken over as
+senior aviator when Geiger returned
+to Espiritu Santo, was relieved on 26
+December by Brigadier General Francis
+P. Mulcahy, Commanding General,
+2d Marine Aircraft Wing. New
+fighter and bomber squadrons from
+both the 1st and 2d Wings sent their
+flight echelons forward on a regular
+basis. The Army added three fighter
+squadrons and a medium bomber
+squadron of B-26s. The Royal New
+Zealand Air Force flew in a reconnaissance
+squadron of Lockheed
+Hudsons. And the U.S. Navy sent
+forward a squadron of Consolidated<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_49" id="Page_49">49</a></span>
+PBY Catalina patrol planes which
+had a much needed night-flying capability.</p>
+
+<p>The aerial buildup forced the
+Japanese to curtail all air attacks and
+made daylight naval reinforcement
+attempts an event of the past. The
+nighttime visits of the Tokyo Express
+destroyers now brought only supplies
+encased in metal drums which were
+rolled over the ships’ sides in hope
+they would float into shore. The men
+ashore desperately needed everything
+that could be sent, even by this
+method, but most of the drums never
+reached the beaches.</p>
+
+<p>Still, however desperate the enemy
+situation was becoming, he was
+prepared to fight. General Hyakutake
+continued to plan the seizure of the
+airfield. General Hitoshi Immamura,
+commander of the <i>Eighth Area
+Army</i>, arrived in Rabaul on 2 December
+with orders to continue the
+offensive. He had 50,000 men to add
+to the embattled Japanese troops on
+Guadalcanal.</p>
+
+<p>Before these new enemy units
+could be employed, the Americans
+were prepared to move out from the
+perimeter in their own offensive.
+Conscious that the Mt. Austen area
+was a continuing threat to his inland
+flank in any drive to the west, Patch
+committed the Americal’s 132d Infantry
+to the task of clearing the mountain’s
+wooded slopes on 17
+December. The Army regiment succeeded
+in isolating the major
+Japanese force in the area by early
+January. The 1st Battalion, 2d Marines,
+took up hill positions to the
+southeast of the 132d to increase
+flank protection.</p>
+
+<p>By this time, the 25th Infantry Division
+(Major General J. Lawton Collins)
+had arrived and so had the 6th
+Marines (6 January) and the rest of
+the 2d Division’s headquarters and
+support troops. Brigadier General
+Alphonse De Carre, the Marine division’s
+assistant commander, took
+charge of all Marine ground forces
+on the island. The 2d Division’s commander,
+Major General John Marston,
+remained in New Zealand
+because he was senior to General
+Patch.</p>
+
+<p>With three divisions under his
+command, General Patch was designated
+Commanding General, XIV
+Corps, on 2 January. His corps headquarters
+numbered less than a score
+of officers and men, almost all taken
+from the Americal’s staff. Brigadier
+General Edmund B. Sebree, who had
+already led both Army and Marine
+units in attacks on the Japanese, took
+command of the Americal Division.
+On 10 January, Patch gave the signal
+to start the strongest American
+offensive yet in the Guadalcanal campaign.
+The mission of the troops was
+simple and to the point: “Attack and
+destroy the Japanese forces remaining
+on Guadalcanal.”</p>
+
+<p>The initial objective of the corps’
+attack was a line about 1,000 to 1,500
+yards west of jump-off positions.
+These ran inland from Point Cruz to
+the vicinity of Hill 66, about 3,000
+yards from the beach. In order to
+reach Hill 66, the 25th Infantry Division
+attacked first with the 35th
+and 27th Infantry driving west and
+southwest across a scrambled series
+of ridges. The going was rough and
+the dug-in enemy, elements of two
+regiments of the <i>38th Division</i>, gave
+way reluctantly and slowly. By the
+13th, however, the American soldiers,
+aided by Marines of the 1st
+Battalion, 2d Marines, had won
+through to positions on the southern
+flank of the 2d Marine Division.</p>
+
+<p>On 12 January, the Marines began
+their advance with the 8th Marines
+along the shore and 2d Marines inland.
+At the base of Point Cruz, in
+the 3d Battalion, 8th Marines’ sector,
+regimental weapons company halftracks
+ran over seven enemy machine
+gun nests. The attack was then held
+up by an extensive emplacement until
+the weapons company commander,
+Captain Henry P. “Jim” Crowe, took
+charge of a half-dozen Marine infantrymen
+taking cover from enemy fire
+with the classic remarks: “You’ll never
+get a Purple Heart hiding in a fox
+hole. Follow me!” The men did and
+they destroyed the emplacement.</p>
+
+<div id="ip_49" class="figcenter" style="width: 377px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_049.jpg" width="377" height="198" alt="" />
+  <div class="captionl">U.S. Halftrack Mounting a 75mm Pack Howitzer
+and a .50-Caliber Air-Cooled Machine Gun</div></div>
+
+<p>All along the front of the advancing
+assault companies the going was
+rough. The Japanese, remnants of the
+<i>Sendai Division</i>, were dug into the
+sides of a series of cross compartments
+and their fire took the Marines
+in the flank as they advanced.
+Progress was slow despite massive artillery
+support and naval gunfire
+from four destroyers offshore. In two
+days of heavy fighting, flamethrowers
+were employed for the first time
+and tanks were brought into play.
+The 2d Marines was now relieved
+and the 6th Marines moved into the
+attack along the coast while the 8th<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_50" id="Page_50">50</a></span>
+Marines took up the advance inland.
+Naval gunfire support, spotted by
+naval officers ashore, improved
+measurably. On the 15th, the Americans,
+both Army and Marine,
+reached the initial corps objective. In
+the Marine attack zone, 600 Japanese
+were dead.</p>
+
+<div id="ip_50" class="figcenter" style="width: 756px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_050.jpg" width="756" height="598" alt="" />
+  <div class="caption"><p>FINAL PHASE</p>
+
+<p class="smaller">26 JANUARY&ndash;9 FEBRUARY 1943</p></div></div>
+
+<p>The battle-weary 2d Marines had
+seen its last infantry action of
+Guadalcanal. A new unit now came
+into being, a composite Army-Marine
+division, or CAM division,
+formed from units of the Americal
+and 2d Marine Divisions. The directing
+staff was from the 2d Division,
+since the Americal had responsibility
+for the main perimeter. Two of its
+regiments, the 147th and the 182d Infantry,
+moved up to attack in line
+with the 6th Marines still along the
+coast. The 8th Marines was essentially
+pinched out of the front lines by
+a narrowing attack corridor as the inland
+mountains and hills pressed
+closer to the coastal trail. The 25th
+Division, which was advancing
+across this rugged terrain, had the
+mission of outflanking the Japanese
+in the vicinity of Kokumbona, while
+the CAM division drove west. On
+the 23d, as the CAM troops approached
+Kokumbona, the 1st Battalion
+of the 27th Infantry struck
+north out of the hills and overran the
+village site and Japanese base. There
+was only slight but steady opposition
+to the American advance as the enemy
+withdrew west toward Cape Esperance.</p>
+
+<p>The Japanese had decided, reluctantly,
+to give up the attempt to
+retake Guadalcanal. The orders were
+sent in the name of the Emperor and
+senior staff officers were sent to
+Guadalcanal to ensure their acceptance.
+The Navy would make the final
+runs of the Tokyo Express, only
+this time in reverse, to evacuate the
+garrison so it could fight again in
+later battles to hold the Solomons.</p>
+
+<p>Receiving intelligence that enemy
+ships were massing again to the
+northwest, General Patch took steps,
+as Vandegrift had before him on
+many occasions, to guard against
+overextending his forces in the face
+of what appeared to be another enemy
+attempt at reinforcement. He
+pulled the 25th Division back to bolster
+the main perimeter defenses and
+ordered the CAM division to continue
+its attack. When the Marines
+and soldiers moved out on 26 January,
+they had a surprisingly easy time
+of it, gaining 1,000 yards the first day<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_51" id="Page_51">51</a></span>
+and 2,000 the following day. The
+Japanese were still contesting every
+attack, but not in strength.</p>
+
+<p>By 30 January, the sole frontline
+unit in the American advance was the
+147th Infantry; the 6th Marines held
+positions to its left rear.</p>
+
+<p>The Japanese destroyer transports
+made their first run to the island on
+the night of 1&ndash;2 February, taking out
+2,300 men from evacuation positions
+near Cape Esperance. On the night
+of 4&ndash;5 February, they returned and
+took out most of the <i>Sendai</i> survivors
+and General Hyakutake and
+his <i>Seventeenth Army</i> staff. The final
+evacuation operation was carried
+out on the night of 7&ndash;8 February,
+when a 3,000-man rear guard was
+embarked. In all, the Japanese withdrew
+about 11,000 men in those three
+nights and evacuated about 13,000
+soldiers from Guadalcanal overall.
+The Americans would meet many of
+these men again in later battles, but
+not the 600 evacuees who died, too
+worn and sick to survive their rescue.</p>
+
+<p>On 9 February, American soldiers
+advancing from east and west met at
+Tenaro village on Cape Esperance.
+The only Marine ground unit still in
+action was the 3d Battalion, 10th
+Marines, supporting the advance.
+General Patch could happily report
+the “complete and total defeat of Japanese
+forces on Guadalcanal.” No organized
+Japanese units remained.</p>
+
+<p>On 31 January, the 2d Marines and
+the 1st Battalion, 8th Marines,
+boarded ship to leave Guadalcanal.
+As was true with the 1st Marine Division,
+some of these men were so
+debilitated by malaria they had to be
+carried on board. All of them struck
+observers again as young men grown
+old “with their skins cracked and furrowed
+and wrinkled.” On 9 February,
+the rest of the 8th Marines and a
+good part of the division supporting
+units boarded transports. The 6th
+Marines, thankfully only six weeks
+on the island, left on the 19th. All
+were headed for Wellington, New
+Zealand, the 2d Marines for the first
+time. Left behind on the island as a
+legacy of the 2d Marine Division
+were 263 dead.</p>
+
+<div id="ip_51" class="figcenter" style="width: 549px;">
+  <div class="captionl top"><p class="justify"><i>President Franklin D. Roosevelt presents Gen Vandegrift the
+Medal of Honor for his heroic accomplishments against the
+Japanese in the Solomons. Looking on are Mrs. Vandegrift,
+and the general’s son, Maj Alexander A. Vandegrift, Jr.</i></p></div>
+
+<div class="captionr top">
+<p>
+National Archives Photo 208-PU-209V-4
+</p></div>
+  <img src="images/i_b_051.jpg" width="549" height="410" alt="" />
+</div>
+
+<p>The total cost of the Guadalcanal
+campaign to the American ground
+combat forces was 1,598 officers and
+men killed, 1,152 of them Marines.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_52" id="Page_52">52</a></span>
+The wounded totaled 4,709, and
+2,799 of these were Marines. Marine
+aviation casualties were 147 killed
+and 127 wounded. The Japanese in
+their turn lost close to 25,000 men on
+Guadalcanal, about half of whom
+were killed in action. The rest succumbed
+to illness, wounds, and starvation.</p>
+
+<div id="ip_52" class="figcenter" style="width: 548px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_052.jpg" width="548" height="356" alt="" />
+  <div class="captionl justify"><i>The temporary resting place of a Marine killed in the fighting
+at Lunga Point is shown here. The grave marker was erected
+by his friends. The Marine’s remains were later removed to
+the division cemetery on Guadalcanal, and further reburial
+at war’s end either in his hometown or the Punchbowl National
+Cemetery in Hawaii with the honors due a fallen hero.</i></div></div>
+
+<p>At sea, the comparative losses
+were about equal, with each side losing
+about the same number of fighting
+ships. The enemy loss of 2
+battleships, 3 carriers, 12 cruisers,
+and 25 destroyers, was irreplaceable.
+The Allied ship losses, though costly,
+were not fatal; in essence, all ships
+lost were replaced. In the air, at least
+600 Japanese planes were shot down;
+even more costly was the death of
+2,300 experienced pilots and aircrewmen.
+The Allied plane losses were
+less than half the enemy’s number
+and the pilot and aircrew losses substantially
+lower.</p>
+
+<p>President Roosevelt, reflecting the
+thanks of a grateful nation, awarded
+General Vandegrift the Medal of
+Honor for “outstanding and heroic
+accomplishment” in his leadership of
+American forces on Guadalcanal
+from 7 August to 9 December 1942.
+And for the same period, he awarded
+the Presidential Unit Citation to
+the 1st Marine Division (Reinforced)
+for “outstanding gallantry” reflecting
+“courage and determination ... of
+an inspiring order.” Included in the
+division’s citation and award, besides
+the organic units of the 1st Division,
+were the 2d and 8th Marines and attached
+units of the 2d Marine Division,
+all of the Americal Division, the
+1st Parachute and 1st and 2d Raider
+Battalions, elements of the 3d, 5th,
+and 14th Defense Battalions, the 1st
+Aviation Engineer Battalion, the 6th
+Naval Construction Battalion, and
+two motor torpedo boat squadrons.
+The indispensable Cactus Air Force
+was included, also represented by 7
+Marine headquarters and service
+squadrons, 16 Marine flying squadrons,
+16 Navy flying squadrons,
+and 5 Army flying squadrons.</p>
+
+<p>The victory at Guadalcanal
+marked a crucial turning point in the
+Pacific War. No longer were the
+Japanese on the offensive. Some of
+the Japanese Emperor’s best infantrymen,
+pilots, and seamen had been
+bested in close combat by the Americans
+and their Allies. There were
+years of fierce fighting ahead, but
+there was now no question of its
+outcome.</p>
+
+<p>When the veterans of the 1st Marine
+Division were gathered in thankful
+reunion 20 years later, they
+received a poignant message from
+Guadalcanal. The sender was a
+legend to all “Canal” Marines,
+Honorary U.S. Marine Corps Sergeant
+Major Jacob C. Vouza. The
+Solomons native in his halting English
+said: “Tell them I love them all.
+Me old man now, and me no look
+good no more. But me never forget.”</p>
+
+<div class="chapter"></div>
+<div class="sidebar green">
+<p class="in0 small"><a name="Sidebar_page_48_The_George_Medal" id="Sidebar_page_48_The_George_Medal"></a>[Sidebar (<a href="#Page_49">page 48</a>):]</p>
+<h3 class="nobreak p0">The ‘George’ Medal</h3>
+
+<p class="drop-cap"><span class="smcap1"><span class="dkgreen">T</span>he</span> George Medal is legendary among 1st Marine
+Division veterans of Guadalcanal. Only
+about 50 were cast, in Australia, before the mold
+gave out.</p>
+
+<p>The medal commemorates the difficult situation of the
+division during the early days on Guadalcanal, when ammunition,
+food, and heavy equipment were short and the
+Japanese plentiful. When the issue was no longer in doubt,
+Marines had time to reflect on the D-plus-3 Navy withdrawal
+in the face of increasing Japanese air attacks and
+surface action which left the division in such a tight spot.</p>
+
+<p>In the recollection of then-Captain Donald L. Dickson,
+adjutant of the 5th Marines, the Division G-3, then-Lieutenant
+Colonel Merrill B. Twining, resolved to commemorate
+the occasion. Twining told artist Dickson in
+general terms what he had in mind. Dickson went to work
+designing an appropriate medal using a fifty-cent piece to
+draw a circle on a captured Japanese blank military
+postcard.</p>
+
+<p>Dickson’s design was approved and when the division
+got to Australia a mold was made by a local metal craftsman
+and a small number were cast before the mold became
+unserviceable. Those wanting a medal paid one Australian
+pound for it and received a certificate as well. The medals
+are now an even greater rarity than at the time. In recent
+years, reproductions have been cast, and can be identified
+by the different metal and a poor definition of details.</p>
+
+<p>The obverse design shows a hand and sleeve dropping
+a hot potato in the shape of Guadalcanal into the arms of
+a grateful Marine. In the original design the sleeve bore the
+stripes of a vice admiral intended to be either Vice Admiral
+Robert L. Ghormley, ComSoPac, or Vice Admiral Frank
+Jack Fletcher, Commander Joint Expeditionary Force, but
+the final medal diplomatically omitted this identification.</p>
+
+<p>Also on the obverse is a Saguaro cactus, indigenous to
+Arizona, not Guadalcanal, but representing the code name
+for the island, “Cactus.” The obverse inscription is <i>Facia Georgius</i>,
+“Let George Do It.” Thus it became known as the
+George Medal.</p>
+
+<p>The medal’s reverse pictures a cow (the original design
+showed a Japanese soldier with breeches down) and an electric
+fan, and is inscribed: “In fond remembrance of the happy
+days spent from Aug. 7th 1942 to Jan. 5th 1943.
+U.S.M.C.”</p>
+
+<p>The suspension ribbon was made, appropriately, of the
+pale green herringbone twill from some Marine’s utility uniform.
+Legend has it that to be authentic the utilities from
+which the ribbons were made had to have been washed in
+the waters of Guadalcanal’s Lunga River. Some medals were
+provided with the oversized safety pin used to identify laundry
+bags in Navy shipboard laundries.</p>
+
+<p>Such unofficial commemorative mementoes are not uncommon
+in military circles and recall, among others, the
+Soochow Creek medals recognizing the defense of Shanghai’s
+International Settlement during the Japanese invasions
+of 1932 and 1937 which were inspired by the Military
+Order of the Dragon medals of veterans of the China Relief
+Expedition or Boxer Rebellion.&mdash;<i>Brooke Nihart</i></p>
+
+<div class="figcenter" style="width: 691px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_048.jpg" width="691" height="406" alt="" /></div>
+</div>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter"></div>
+<h2><a name="Sources" id="Sources"></a><i>Sources</i></h2>
+
+<p>The basic source work for this booklet is
+the first volume in the series <i>History of U.S.
+Marine Corps Operations in World War II,
+Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal</i>, written by
+LtCol Frank O. Hough, Maj Verle E. Ludwig,
+and Henry I. Shaw, Jr. (Washington: Historical
+Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, U.S.
+Marine Corps, 1958). Other books used in
+writing this narrative were: BGen Samuel B.
+Griffith II, <i>The Battle for Guadalcanal</i>
+(Philadelphia: J.&nbsp;B. Lippincott, 1963); Gen
+Alexander A. Vandegrift as told to Robert B.
+Asprey, <i>Once a Marine: The Memoirs of
+General A.&nbsp;A. Vandegrift, USMC</i> (New York:
+W.&nbsp;W. Norton, 1964); Col Mitchell Paige, <i>A
+Marine Named Mitch</i> (New York: Vantage
+Press, 1975); Burke Davis, <i>Marine: The Life
+of Chesty Puller</i> (Boston: Little, Brown,
+1962); George McMillan, <i>The Old Breed: A
+History of the 1st Marine Division in World
+War II</i> (Washington: Infantry Journal Press,
+1949); and Richard W. Johnston, <i>Follow Me!:
+The Story of the Second Marine Division in
+World War II</i> (New York: Random House,
+1948).</p>
+
+<p>The correspondence of General Vandegrift
+with General Holcomb and other senior Marines,
+held at the Marine Corps Historical
+Center, was helpful. Equally of value were
+conversations that the author had had with
+General Vandegrift after his retirement. In the
+course of his career as a Marine historian, the
+author has talked with other Guadalcanal
+veterans of all ranks; hopefully, this has
+resulted in a “feel” for the campaign, essential
+in writing such an overview.</p>
+
+<p>The literature on the Guadalcanal operation
+is extensive. In addition to the books cited
+above, there are several which are
+personally recommended to the interested
+reader: Robert Leckie, <i>Helmet for My Pillow</i>
+(New York: Random House, 1957); Herbert
+Merillat, <i>Guadalcanal Remembered</i> (New
+York: Dodd, Mead, 1982); John Miller, Jr.,
+<i>The United States Army in World War II: The
+War in the Pacific</i>; <i>Guadalcanal, The First
+Offensive</i> (Washington: Historical Division,
+Department of the Army, 1949); T. Grady
+Gallant, <i>On Valor’s Side</i> (New York: Doubleday,
+1963); Robert Sherrod, <i>History of Marine
+Corps Aviation in World War II</i>
+(Washington: Combat Forces Press, 1952);
+Maj John L. Zimmerman, <i>The Guadalcanal
+Campaign</i> (Washington: Historical Division,
+Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1949);
+RAdm Samuel E. Morrison, <i>The Struggle for
+Guadalcanal: History of United States Naval
+Operations in World War II</i>, Vol V (Boston:
+Little, Brown, 1950); and a recent, comprehensive
+account, Richard B. Frank, <i>Guadalcanal</i>
+(New York: Random House, 1990).</p>
+
+<hr />
+
+<div class="chapter"></div>
+<h2><a name="About_the_Author" id="About_the_Author"></a><i>About the Author</i></h2>
+
+<div class="figleft" style="width: 137px; margin-top: -1em;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_053.jpg" width="137" height="186" alt="" /></div>
+
+<p class="drop-cap"><span class="smcap1">Henry</span> I. Shaw, Jr., former chief historian of
+the History and Museums Division, was a
+Marine Corps historian from 1951&ndash;1990. He attended
+The Citadel, 1943&ndash;1944, and was graduated
+with a bachelor of arts cum laude in history
+from Hope College, Holland, Michigan. He
+received a master of arts degree in history from
+Columbia University. Mr. Shaw served as a Marine
+in both World War II and the Korean War.
+He is the co-author of four of the five volumes
+of the official history of Marine Corps operations
+in World War II and was the senior editor of most
+of the official histories of Marines in Vietnam.
+In addition, he has written a number of brief Marine Corps histories. He has written
+many articles on military history and has had more than 50 signed book reviews.</p>
+
+<div class="tb">* <span class="in2">* </span><span class="in2">* </span><span class="in2">* </span><span class="in2">*</span></div>
+
+<p><i>The author gratefully acknowledges the permission granted by the Nautical and
+Aviation Publishing Company of America to use the maps from BGen Samuel B.
+Griffith II’s</i> The Battle for Guadalcanal <i>and by Doubleday Books and Jack Coggins
+for use of the sketches from his</i> The Campaign for Guadalcanal. <i>The author
+also wishes to thank Richard J. Frank and Herbert C. Merillat for permission to
+reproduce their photographs.</i></p>
+
+
+<div class="chapter"></div>
+<div class="sidebar" id="About_series">
+
+<div class="figcenter" style="width: 274px;">
+  <img src="images/i_b_053b.jpg" width="274" height="103" alt="" /></div>
+
+<p><b>THIS PAMPHLET HISTORY</b>, one in a series devoted to U.S. Marines in the
+World War II era, is published for the education and training of Marines by
+the History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps,
+Washington, D.C., as a part of the U.S. Department of Defense observance
+of the 50th anniversary of victory in that war.</p>
+
+<p>Editorial costs of preparing this pamphlet have been defrayed in part by
+a bequest from the estate of Emilie H. Watts, in memory of her late husband,
+Thomas M. Watts, who served as a Marine and was the recipient of a Purple
+Heart.</p>
+
+<div class="center">
+<p class="p1 bold" style="font-family: sans-serif, serif;">WORLD WAR II COMMEMORATIVE SERIES</p>
+
+<p><i>DIRECTOR OF MARINE CORPS HISTORY AND MUSEUMS</i><br />
+<b>Brigadier General Edwin H. Simmons, USMC (Ret)</b></p>
+
+<p><i>GENERAL EDITOR,<br />
+WORLD WAR II COMMEMORATIVE SERIES</i><br />
+<b>Benis M. Frank</b></p>
+
+<p><i>CARTOGRAPHIC CONSULTANT</i><br />
+<b>George C. MacGillivray</b></p>
+
+<p><i>EDITING AND DESIGN SECTION, HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISION</i><br />
+<b>Robert E. Struder</b>, Senior Editor; <b>W. Stephen Hill</b>, Visual Information<br />
+Specialist; <b>Catherine A. Kerns</b>, Composition Services Technician</p>
+
+<p>Marine Corps Historical Center<br />
+Building 58, Washington Navy Yard<br />
+Washington, D.C. 20374-0580</p>
+
+<p>1992</p>
+
+<p>PCN 190 003117 00</p>
+</div>
+</div>
+
+<div class="figcenter" style="width: 291px;">
+  <img src="images/i_back_cover.jpg" width="291" height="400" alt="back cover" /></div>
+
+
+<div class="chapter"></div>
+<div class="transnote">
+<h2 class="nobreak p1"><a name="Transcribers_Notes" id="Transcribers_Notes"></a>Transcriber’s Notes</h2>
+
+<p>Punctuation, hyphenation, and spelling were made consistent when a
+predominant preference was found in this book; otherwise they were not
+changed.</p>
+
+<p>Simple typographical errors were corrected; occasional unbalanced
+quotation marks retained.</p>
+
+<p>To make this eBook easier to read, particularly on handheld devices,
+some images have been made relatively larger than in the original
+pamphlet, and centered, rather than offset to one side or the other;
+and some were placed a little earlier or later than in the
+original. Sidebars in the original have been repositioned between
+chapters and identified as “[Sidebar (page nn):”, where the
+page reference is to the original location in the source book. In the
+Plain Text version, the matching closing right bracket follows the last
+line of the Sidebar’s text and is on a separate line to make it more
+noticeable. In the HTML versions, that bracket follows the colon, and
+each Sidebar is displayed within a box.</p>
+
+<p>Descriptions of the Cover and Frontispiece have been moved from page 1
+of the book to just below those illustrations, and text referring to
+the locations of those illustrations has been deleted.</p>
+
+<p>Page <a href="#Sidebar_page_3_General_Alexander_A_Vandegrift">3</a>: “He spent most of his final years” was misprinted without
+the “of”.</p>
+
+<p>Page <a href="#Page_21">21</a>: “disgraced in his own” was misprinted without the “his”.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div>*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 48807 ***</div>
+</body>
+</html>
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