diff options
Diffstat (limited to '42932-0.txt')
| -rw-r--r-- | 42932-0.txt | 12384 |
1 files changed, 12384 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/42932-0.txt b/42932-0.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3d5eee7 --- /dev/null +++ b/42932-0.txt @@ -0,0 +1,12384 @@ +*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 42932 *** + +VOLUME III. + +WORKS OF PLOTINOS + + + + + PLOTINOS + Complete Works + + In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four Periods; + + With + BIOGRAPHY by PORPHYRY, EUNAPIUS, & SUIDAS, + COMMENTARY by PORPHYRY, + ILLUSTRATIONS by JAMBLICHUS & AMMONIUS, + STUDIES in Sources, Development, Influence; + INDEX of Subjects, Thoughts and Words. + + by + KENNETH SYLVAN GUTHRIE, + + Professor in Extension, University of the South, Sewanee; + A.M., Sewanee, and Harvard; Ph.D., Tulane, and Columbia. + M.D., Medico-Chirurgical College, Philadelphia. + + VOL. III + Porphyrian Books, 34-45. + + COMPARATIVE LITERATURE PRESS + P. O. Box 42, ALPINE, N.J., U.S.A. + + + + + Copyright, 1918, by Kenneth Sylvan Guthrie. + All Rights, including that of Translation, Reserved. + + Entered at Stationers' Hall, by + George Bell and Sons, Portugal Street, Lincoln's Inn, London. + + + + +SIXTH ENNEAD, BOOK SIX. + +Of Numbers. + + +MANIFOLDNESS IS DISTANCE FROM UNITY, AND EVIL. + +1. Does manifoldness consist in distance from unity? Is infinity +this distance carried to the extreme, because it is an innumerable +manifoldness? Is then infinity an evil, and are we ourselves evil when +we are manifold? (That is probable); or every being becomes manifold +when, not being able to remain turned towards itself, it blossoms out; +it extends while dividing; and thus losing all unity in its expansion, +it becomes manifoldness, because there is nothing that holds its parts +mutually united. If, nevertheless, there still remain something that +holds its parts mutually united, then, though blossoming out, (the +essence) remains, and becomes manifoldness. + + +HOW MANIFOLDNESS IS AN EVIL. + +But what is there to be feared in magnitude? If (the essence) that has +increased could feel (it would feel that which in itself has become +evil; for) it would feel that it had issued from itself, and had even +gone to a great distance (from itself). No (essence), indeed, seeks +that which is other than itself; every (essence) seeks itself. The +movement by which (an essence) issues from itself is caused either by +"audacity," or necessity. Every (being) exists in the highest degree +not when it becomes manifold or great, but when it belongs to itself; +now this occurs when it concentrates upon itself. That which desires to +become great in some other manner is ignorant of that in which true +greatness consists; instead of proceeding towards its legitimate goal, +it turns towards the outside. Now, on the contrary, to turn towards +oneself, is to remain in oneself. The demonstration of this may be seen +in that which participates in greatness; if (the being) develop itself +so that each of its parts exist apart, each part will indeed exist, but +(the being) will no longer be what it originally was. To remain what it +is, all its parts must converge towards unity; so that, to be what it +was in its being, it should not be large, but single. When it possesses +magnitude, and quantity inheres in it, it is destroyed, while when it +possesses unity, it possesses itself. Doubtless the universe is both +great and beautiful; but it is beautiful only so far as the unity holds +it in from dissipating into infinity. Besides, if it be beautiful, it +is not because it is great, but because it participates in beauty; now, +if it need participation in beauty, it is only because it has become so +large. Indeed, isolated from beauty, and considered in itself as great, +it is ugly. From this point of view, what is great is with beauty in +the relation obtaining between matter and form, because what needs +adornment is manifold; consequently, what is great has so much more +need of being adorned and is so much more ugly (as it is great). + + +WHAT IS THE NUMBER OF THE INFINITE. + +2. What opinion should we hold of that which is called the number of +infinity? We must begin by examining how it can be a number, if it be +infinite. Indeed, sense-objects are not infinite; consequently, the +number which inheres in them could not be infinite, and he who numbers +them, does not number infinity. Even if they were multiplied by two, or +by more, they still could always be determined; if they were multiplied +in respect of the past or the future, they would still be determined. +It might be objected that number is not infinite in an absolute manner, +but only (in a relative manner) in this sense, that it is always +possible to add thereto. But he who numbers does not create numbers; +they were already determined, and they existed (before being conceived +by him who was numbering them). As beings in the intelligible world are +determined, their number is also determined by the quantity of beings. +Just as we make man manifold by adding to him the beautiful, and other +things of the kind, we can make an image of number correspond to the +image of every intelligible being. Just as, in thought, we can multiply +a town that does not exist, so can we multiply numbers. When we number +the parts of time, we limit ourselves to applying to them the numbers +that we have in ourselves, and which, merely on that account, do not +cease remaining in us. + + +HOW THE INFINITE REACHED EXISTENCE. + +3. How did the infinite, in spite of its infiniteness, reach existence? +For the things which have arrived at existence, and which subsist, +have been preparatorily contained in a number. Before answering this +question, we must examine whether, when it forms part of veritable +essences, multitude can be evil. On high, the manifoldness remains +united, and is hindered from completely being manifoldness, because +it is the one essence; but this is inferior to unity by this very +condition that it is manifoldness, and thus, is imperfect in respect +to unity. Therefore, though not having the same nature as the One, but +a nature somewhat degraded (in comparison with unity), manifoldness is +inferior to unity; but, by the effect of the unity which it derives +from the One (since it is the one essence), it still possesses a +venerable character, reduces to unity the manifold it contains, and +makes it subsist in an immutable manner. + + +HOW INFINITY CAN SUBSIST IN THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD. + +How can infinity subsist in the intelligible world? Either it exists +among the genuine essences, and then is determined; or it is not +determined, and then it does not exist among the veritable essences, +but it must be classified among the things which exist in perpetual +becoming, such as time.[1] The infinite is determinate, but it is not +any the less infinite; for it is not the limit[2] which receives the +determination, but the infinite[3]; and between the boundary and the +infinite there is no intermediary that could receive the determination. +This infinite acts as if it were the idea of the boundary, but it is +contained by what embraces it exteriorly. When I say that it flees, I +do not mean that it passes from one locality to another, for it has no +locality; but I mean that space has existed from the very moment that +this infinite was embraced.[4] We must not imagine that what is called +the movement of the infinite consists in a displacement, nor admit that +the infinite by itself possesses any other of the things that could be +named; thus the infinite could neither move, nor remain still. Where +indeed would it halt, since the place indicated by the word "where" +is posterior to infinity? Movement is attributed to infinity only to +explain that the infinite has no permanency. Should we believe that the +infinite exists on high in one only and single place, or that it arises +there, and descends here below? No: for it is in respect to one only +and single place that we are enabled to conceive both what has risen +and does not descend, as well as that which descends.[5] + + +INFINITE IS CONCEIVED BY THE THOUGHT'S MAKING ABSTRACTION OF THE FORM. + +How then can we conceive the infinite? By making abstraction of form +by thought. How will it be conceived? We may conceive of the infinite +as simultaneously being the contraries, and not being them. It will +have to be conceived as being simultaneously great and small; for the +infinite becomes both of these.[6] It may also be conceived as both +being moved, and being stable[7]; for the infinite becomes these two +things also. But before the infinite becomes these two contraries, +it is neither of them in any determinate manner; otherwise, you +would have determined it. By virtue of its nature, the infinite is +these things therefore in an indeterminate and infinite manner; +only on this condition will it appear to be these contrary things. +If, by applying your thought to the infinite, you do not entice +it into a determination, as into a net, you will see the infinite +escaping you, and you will not find anything in it that would be a +unity; otherwise, you would have determined it. If you represented +to yourself the infinite as a unity, it would seem to you manifold; +if you say that it is manifold, it will again make game of you; for, +all things do not form a manifold where no one thing is one. From +still another standpoint, the nature of the infinite is movement, and +according to another nature, stability; for its property of being +invisible by itself constitutes a movement which distinguishes it from +intelligence[8]; its property of not being able to escape, of being +exteriorly embraced, of being circumscribed within an unescapable +circle constitutes a sort of stability. Movement therefore cannot be +predicated of infinity, without also attributing stability to it. + + +HOW OTHER NUMBERS FORM PART OF THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD. + +4. Let us now examine how the numbers form part of the intelligible +world. Are they inherent in the other forms? Or are they, since all +eternity, the consequences of the existence of these forms? In the +latter case, as the very essence possessed primary existence, we would +first conceive the monad; then, as movement and stability emanated from +it, we would have the triad; and each one of the remaining intelligible +entities would lead to the conception of some of the other numbers. If +it were not so, if a unity were inherent in each intelligible entity, +the unity inherent in the first Essence would be the monad; the unity +inherent in what followed it, if there be an order in the intelligible +entities, would be the "pair"; last, the unity inhering in some other +intelligible entity, such as, for instance, in ten, would be the decad. +Nevertheless this could not yet be so, each number being conceived as +existing in itself. In this case, will we be compelled to admit that +number is anterior to the other intelligible entities, or posterior +thereto? On this subject Plato[9] says that men have arrived to the +notion of number by the succession of days and nights, and he thus +refers the conception of number to the diversity of (objective) things. +He therefore seems to teach that it is first the numbered objects that +by their diversity produce numbers, that number results from movement +of the soul, which passes from one object to another, and that it is +thus begotten when the soul enumerates; that is, when she says to +herself, Here is one object, and there is another; while, so long as +she thinks of one and the same object, she affirms nothing but unity. +But when Plato says that being is in the veritable number, and that the +number is in the being,[10] he intends to teach that by itself number +possesses a hypostatic substantial existence, that it is not begotten +in the soul which enumerates, but that the variety of sense-objects +merely recalls to the soul the notion of number. + + +PYTHAGOREAN INTELLIGIBLE NUMBERS DISCUSSED. + +5. What then is the nature of number? Is it a consequence, and +partially an aspect of each being, like man and one-man, essence and +one-essence? Can the same be said for all the intelligibles, and +is that the origin of all numbers? If so, how is it that on high +(in the intelligible world) the pair and triad exist? How are all +things considered within unity, and how will it be possible to reduce +number to unity, since it has a similar nature? There would thus be a +multitude of unities, but no other number would be reduced to unity, +except the absolute One. It might be objected that a pair is the +thing, or rather the aspect of the thing which possesses two powers +joined together, such as is a composite reduced to unity, or such as +the Pythagoreans conceived the numbers,[11] which they seem to have +predicated of other objects, by analogy. For instance, they referred +to justice as the (Tetrad, or) group-of-four,[12] and likewise for +everything else. Thus a number, as for instance a group-of-ten, would +be considered as a single (group of) unity, and would be connected +with the manifold contained in the single object. This, however, is an +inadequate account of our conception of "ten"; we speak of the objects +after gathering (ten) separate objects. Later, indeed, if these ten +objects constitute a new unity, we call the group a "decad." The same +state of affairs must obtain with intelligible Numbers. If such were +the state of affairs (answers Plotinos), if number were considered only +within objects, would it possess hypostatic existence? It might be +objected, What then would hinder that, though we consider white within +things, that nevertheless the White should (besides) have a hypostatic +substantial existence? For movement is indeed considered within +essence, and yet (it is agreed that) movement possesses a "hypostatic" +substantial existence within essence. The case of number, however, +is not similar to that of movement; for we have demonstrated that +movement thus considered in itself is something unitary.[13] Moreover, +if no more than such a hypostatic substantial existence be predicated +of number, it ceases to be a being, and becomes an accident, though +it would not even then be a pure accident; for what is an accident +must be something before becoming the accident (of some substance). +Though being inseparable therefrom, it must possess its own individual +nature in itself, like whiteness; and before being predicated of +something else, it already is what it is posited. Consequently, if +one be in every (being), one man is not identical with man; if "one" +be something different from "man"[14] and from every other (being), +if it be something common to all (beings), one must be anterior to +all men and to all other (beings), so that man and all other beings +may be one. The one is therefore anterior to movement, since movement +is one, and likewise anterior to essence, to allow for essence also +being one. This of course does not refer to the absolute Unity that is +recognized as superior to essence, but of the unity which is predicated +of every intelligible form. Likewise, above that of which the decad is +predicated subsists the "Decad in itself," for that in which the decad +is recognized could not be the Decad in itself. + + +THE INTELLIGIBLE UNITY AND DECAD EXIST BEFORE ALL NUMBERS ONE OR TEN. + +Does unity therefore inhere in essences, and does it subsist with +them? If it inhere in essences, or if it be an accident, as health is +an accident of man, it must be something individual (like health). If +unity be an element of the composite, it will first have to exist +(individually), and be an unity in itself, so as to be able to unify +itself to something else; then, being blended with this other thing +that it has unified, it will not longer remain really one, and will +thereby even become double. Besides, how would that apply to the decad? +What need of the (intelligible) Decad has that which is already a +decad, by virtue of the power it possesses? Will it receive its form +from that Decad? If it be its matter, if it be ten and decad only +because of the presence of the Decad, the Decad will have first to +exist in itself, in the pure and simple state of (being a) Decad. + + +WHAT IS THE NATURE OF THESE INTELLIGIBLE NUMBERS? + +6. But if, independently of the things themselves, there be an One +in itself, and a Decad in itself; and if the intelligible entities +be unities, pairs, or triads, independently of what they are by +their being, what then is the nature of these Numbers? What is their +constitution? It must be admitted that a certain Reason presides over +the generation of these Numbers. It is therefore necessary clearly to +understand that in general, if intelligible forms at all exist, it is +not because the thinking principle first thought each of them, and +thereby gave them hypostatic existence. Justice, for instance, was +not born because the thinking principle thought what justice was; nor +movement, because it thought what movement was. Thus thought had to be +posterior to the thing thought, and the thought of justice to justice +itself. On the other hand, thought is anterior to the thing that owes +its existence to thought, since this thing exists only because it is +thought. If then justice were identical with such a thought, it would +be absurd that justice should be nothing else than its definition; for +in this case, the thinking of justice or movement, would amount to +a conception of these objects (by a definition). Now this would be +tantamount to conceiving the definition of a thing that did not exist, +which is impossible. + + +JUSTICE, LIKE AN INTELLECTUAL STATUE, WAS BORN OF ITSELF. + +The statement that in what is immaterial, knowledge and the known thing +coincide,[15] must not be understood to mean that it is the knowledge +of the thing which is the thing itself, nor that the reason which +contemplates an object is this object itself, but rather, conversely, +that it is the thing which, existing without matter, is purely +intelligible and intellection. I do not here mean the intellection +which is neither a definition nor an intuition of a thing; but I say +that the thing itself, such as it exists in the intelligible world, +is exclusively intelligence and knowledge. It is not (the kind of) +knowledge that applies itself to the intelligible, it is the (actual) +thing itself which keeps that knowledge (thereof possessed by reason) +from remaining different from it, just as the knowledge of a material +object remains different from that object; but it is a veritable (kind +of) knowledge, that is, a knowledge which is not merely a simple +image of the known thing, but really is the thing itself. It is not +therefore the thought of the movement which produced movement in +itself, but the movement in itself which produced the thought, so that +the thought thinks itself as movement, and as thought. On the one hand, +intelligible movement is thought by the intelligible Essence; on the +other hand, it is movement in itself because it is first--for there +is no movement anterior thereto; it is real movement, because it is +not the accident of a subject, but because it is the actualization of +the essence which moves, and possesses actualized (existence); it is +therefore "being," though it be conceived as different from essence. +Justice, for instance, is not the simple thought of justice; it is a +certain disposition of Intelligence, or rather it is an actualization +of a determinate nature. The face of Justice is more beautiful than the +evening or morning stars, and than all visible beauty.[16] Justice may +be imagined as an intellectual statue which has issued from itself and +which has manifested itself such as it is in itself; or rather, which +subsists essentially in itself. + + +INTELLIGENCE THINKS THINGS NOT BECAUSE THEY EXIST, BUT BECAUSE IT +POSSESSES THEM. + +7. We must, in fact, conceive intelligible essences as subsisting in +one nature, and one single nature as possessing and embracing all +(things). There no one thing is separated from the others, as in the +sense-world, where the sun, moon, and other objects each occupy a +different locality; but all things exist together in one unity; such +is the nature of intelligence. The (universal) Soul imitates it, +in this respect, as does also the power called Nature, conformably +to which, and by virtue of which individuals are begotten each in +a different place, while she remains in herself. But, although all +things exist together (in the unity of Intelligence), each of them +is none the less different from the others. Now, these things which +subsist in Intelligence and "being," are seen by the Intelligence that +possesses them, not because it observes them, but because it possesses +them without feeling the need of distinguishing them from each other; +because from all eternity they have dwelt within it distinct from each +other. We believe in the existence of these things on the faith of +those who admire them, because they have participated therein. As to +the magnitude and beauty of the intelligible world, we can judge of +it by the love which the Soul feels for it, and if other things feel +love for the Soul, it is because she herself possesses an intellectual +nature, and that by her the other things can, to some extent, become +assimilated to Intelligence. How indeed could we admit that here below +was some organism gifted with beauty, without recognizing that the +Organism itself (the intelligible world[17]) possesses an admirable and +really unspeakable beauty? Further, the perfect Organism is composed of +all the organisms; or rather it embraces all the organisms; just as our +Universe is one, yet simultaneously is visible, because it contains all +the things which are in the visible universe. + + +WHAT AND HOW IS EVERY INTELLIGIBLE ENTITY. + +8. Since then the (universal) Organism possesses primary existence, +since it is simultaneously organism, intelligence, and veritable +"Being"; and as we state that it contains all organisms, numbers, +justice, beauty, and the other similar beings--for we mean something +different by the Man himself, and Number itself, and Justice itself--we +have to determine, so far as it is possible in such things, what is the +condition and nature of each intelligible entity. + + +NUMBER MUST EXIST IN THE PRIMARY ESSENCE. + +(To solve this problem) let us begin by setting aside sensation, and +let us contemplate Intelligence by our intelligence exclusively. Above +all, let us clearly understand that, as in us life and intelligence +do not consist of a corporeal mass, but in a power without mass, +likewise veritable "Being" is deprived of all corporeal extension, +and constitutes a power founded on itself. It does not indeed consist +in something without force, but in a power sovereignly vital and +intellectual, which possesses life in the highest degree, intelligence, +and being. Consequently, whatever touches this power participates in +the same characteristics according to the manner of its touch; in a +higher degree, if the touch be close; in a lower degree, if the touch +be distant. If existence be desirable, the completest existence (or, +essence) is more desirable still. Likewise, if intelligence deserve +to be desired, perfect Intelligence deserves to be desired above +everything; and the same state of affairs prevails in respect to life. +If then we must grant that the Essence is the first, and if we must +assign the first rank to Essence, the second to Intelligence, and the +third to the Organism,[18] as the latter seems already to contain all +things, and Intelligence justly occupies the second rank, because it +is the actualization of "Being"--then number could not enter into the +Organism, for before the organism already existed one and two ("Being" +and Intelligence). Nor could number exist in Intelligence, for before +Intelligence was "Being," which is both one and manifold. (Number +therefore must exist, or originate, in the primary Being.) + + +NUMBER FOLLOWS AND PROCEEDS FROM ESSENCE. + +9. It remains for us to discover whether it were "Being," in the +process of division, that begat number, or whether it be the number +that divided "Being." (This is the alternative:) either "being," +movement, stability, difference and identity produced number, or it is +number that produced all these (categories, or) genera. Our discussion +must start thus. Is it possible that number should exist in itself, or +must we contemplate two in two objects, three in three objects, and +so forth? The same question arises about unity as considered within +numbers; for if number can exist in itself independently of numbered +things,[19] it can also exist previously to the essences. Can number +therefore exist before the essences? It might be well preliminarily to +assert that number is posterior to the Essence, and proceeds therefrom. +But then if essence be one essence, and if two essences be two +essences, one will precede essence, and the other numbers will precede +the essences. (Would number then precede the essences) only in thought +and conception, or also in the hypostatic existence? We should think +as follows. When you think of a man as being one, or the beautiful as +being one, the one that is thus conceived in both (beings) is something +that is thought only afterward. Likewise, when you simultaneously +consider a dog and a horse, here also two is evidently something +posterior. But if you beget the man, if you beget the horse or the dog, +or if you produce them outside when they already exist in you, without +begetting them, nor producing them by mere chance (of seeing them), you +will say, "We should go towards one (being), then pass to another, and +thus get two; then make one more being, by adding my person." Likewise, +(beings) were not numbered after they were created, but before they +were created, when (the creator) decided how many should be created. + + +NUMBER SPLIT THE UNITY INTO PLURALITY; PYTHAGOREAN IDENTIFICATION OF +IDEAS AND NUMBERS. + +The universal Number therefore existed before the essences (were +created); consequently, Number was not the essences. Doubtless, Number +was in Essence; but it was not yet the number of Essence; for Essence +still was one. But the power of Number, hypostatically existing within +it, divided it, and made it beget the manifold. Number is either the +being or actualization (of Essence); the very Organism and Intelligence +are number. Essence is therefore the unified number, while the essences +are developed number; Intelligence is the number which moves itself, +and the Organism is the number that contains. Since therefore Essence +was born from Unity, Essence, as it existed within Unity, must be +Number. That is why (the Pythagoreans[20]) called the ideas unities and +numbers. + + +TWO KINDS OF NUMBER: ESSENTIAL AND UNITARY. + +Such then is "essential" Number (number that is "Being"). The other +kind of number, which is called a number composed of digits, or +"unities," is only an image of the former. The essential Number is +contemplated in the intelligible forms, and assists in producing them; +on the other hand, it exists primitively in essence, with essence, and +before the essences. The latter find therein their foundation, source, +root and principle.[21] Indeed, Number is the principle of Essence, +and rests in it, otherwise it would split up. On the contrary, the +One does not rest upon essence; otherwise essence would be one before +participating in the One; likewise, what participates in the decad +would be the decad already before participating in the decad. + + +ESSENCE IS A LOCATION FOR THE THINGS YET TO BE PRODUCED. + +10. Subsisting therefore in the manifold, Essence therefore became +Number when it was aroused to multiplicity, because it already +contained within itself a sort of preformation or representation of +the essences which it was ready to produce, offering the essences, as +it were, a locality for the things whose foundation they were to be. +When we say, "so much gold," or, "so many other objects," gold is one, +and one does not thereby intend to make gold out of the number, but +to make a number out of the gold; it is because one already possesses +the number that one seeks to apply it to gold, so as to determine +its quality. If essences were anterior to Number, and if Number were +contemplated in them when the enumerating power enumerates the objects, +the number of the (beings), whatever it is, would be accidental, +instead of being determined in advance. If this be not the case, then +must number, preceding (the beings) determine how many of them must +exist; which means that, by the mere fact of the primitive existence of +the Number, the (beings) which are produced undergo the condition of +being so many, and each of them participates in unity whenever they are +one. Now every essence comes from Essence because essence, by itself, +is Essence; likewise, the One is one by itself. If every (being) be +one, and if the multitude of (beings) taken together form the unity +that is in them, they are one as the triad is one, and all beings also +are one; not as is the Monad (or Unity), but as is a thousand, or any +other number. He who, while enumerating, produced things, proclaims +that there are a thousand of them, claims to do no more than to tell +out what he learns from the things, as if he was indicating their +colors, while really he is only expressing a condition of his reason; +without which, he would not know how much of a multitude was present +there. Why then does he speak so? Because he knows how to enumerate; +which indeed he knows if he know the number, and this he can know only +if the number exist. But not to know what is the number, at least under +the respect of quantity, would be ridiculous, and even impossible. + + +AN OBJECT'S EXISTENCE IMPLIES A PREVIOUS MODEL IN ITSELF. + +When one speaks of good things, one either designates objects which are +such by themselves, or asserts that the good is their attribute. If +one designate the goods of the first order,[22] one is speaking of the +first Hypostasis, or rank of existence; if one designate the things of +which the good is the attribute, this implies the existence of a nature +of the good which has been attributed to them, or which produces this +characteristic within them, or which is the Good in itself, or which, +producing the good, nevertheless dwells in its own nature. Likewise, +when, in connection with (beings), we speak of a decad, (or, group of +ten), one is either referring to the Decad in itself, or, referring +to the things of which the decad is an attribute, one is forced to +recognize the existence of a Decad in itself, whose being is that of a +decad. Consequently, the conferring of the name "decad" implies either +that these (beings) are the Decad in itself, or above them in another +Decad whose being is that of being a Decad in itself. + + +UNITY AND NUMBER PRECEDE THE ONE AND THE MANY BEINGS. + +In general, everything which is predicated of an object either comes +to it from without, or is its actualization. Unless by nature it +be inconstant, being present now, and absent then, if it be always +present, it is a being when the object is a being. If it be denied that +its nature were that of a being, it will surely be granted that it is a +part of the essences, and that it is an essence. Now, if the object can +be conceived without the thing which is its actualization, this thing +nevertheless exists contemporaneously with it, even though in thought +it be conceived posteriorily. If the object cannot be conceived without +this thing, as man cannot be conceived of without one, in this case +one is not posterior to man, but is simultaneous, or even anterior, +since the man's subsistence is entirely dependent thereon. As to us, we +recognize that Unity and Number precede (Essence and the essences). + + +UNITY MUST EXIST IN THE INTELLIGIBLE BEFORE BEING APPLIED TO MULTIPLE +BEINGS. + +11. It may be objected that the decad is nothing else than ten unities. +If the existence of the One be granted, why should we not also grant +the existence of ten unities? Since the supreme Unity (the unity of the +first Essence), possesses hypostatic existence, why should the case +not be the same with the other unities (the complex unities contained +within each of the essences)? It must not be supposed that the supreme +Unity is bound up with a single essence; for in this case each of the +other (beings) would no longer be one. If each of the other (beings) +must be one, then unity is common to all the (beings); that is that +single nature which may be predicated of the multiple (beings), and +which must, as we have explained it, subsist in itself (in the primary +essence) before the unity which resides in the multiple (beings). + + +THE SUPREME UNITY ADJUSTS ALL LOWER GROUP UNITIES. + +As unity is seen in some one (being), and then in some other, if the +second unity possess hypostatic existence also, then the supreme Unity +(of the first Essence) will not alone possess hypostatic existence, +and there will be thus a multitude of unities (as there is a multitude +of beings). If the hypostatic existence of the first Unity be alone +acknowledged, this will exist either in the Essence in itself, or in +the One in itself. If it exist in the Essence in itself, the other +unities (which exist in the other beings) will then be such merely by +figure of speech, and will no longer be subordinated to the primary +unity; or number will be composed of dissimilar unities, and the +unities will differ from each other in so far as they are unities. +If the primary unity exist already in the Unity in itself, what need +would that Unity in itself have of that unity to be one? If all that be +impossible, we shall have to recognize the existence of the One which +is purely and simply one, which, by its "being" is entirely independent +of all the other beings, which is named the chief Unity, and is +conceived of as such. If unity exist on high (in the intelligible +world) without any object that may be called one, why might not another +One (the one of the first Being) subsist on high also? Why would +not all the (beings), each being a separate unity, not constitute a +multitude of unities, which might be the "multiple unity"? As the +nature (of the first Being) begets, or rather, as it has begotten (from +all eternity); or at least, as it has not limited itself to one of the +things it has begotten, thus rendering the unity (of the first Being) +somewhat continuous; if it circumscribe (what it produces) and promptly +ceases in its procession, it begets small numbers; if it advance +further, moving alone not in foreign matters, but in itself, it begets +large numbers. It thus harmonizes every plurality and every being with +every number, knowing well that, if each of the (beings) were not in +harmony with some number, either they would not exist, or they would +bear neither proportion, measure, nor reason. + + +ONE AND UNITY ARE WITHIN US; INDEPENDENTLY OF THE ONE OUTSIDE. + +12. (Aristotle[23]) objects that "One" and "Unity" have no hypostatic +(or, genuine) existence. Everywhere the One is something that is one. +That is nothing but a simple modification experienced in our soul in +presence of each essence. We might as easily affirm that when we assert +"essence," this is but a simple modification of our soul, Essence (in +itself) being absolutely nothing. If it be insisted that Essence exists +because it excites and strikes our soul, which then represents it to +herself, we see that the soul is equally impressed by the One, and +represents Him to herself. Besides, we should ask (Aristotle) if this +modification or conception of our soul do not bear to us the aspect of +unity or the manifold? So much the more, we often say that an object +is not one; evidently we then are not deriving the notion of unity from +the object, because we are affirming that there is no unity in it. +Unity therefore dwells within us, and it is in us without the object of +which we predicate that it is some one thing. + + +THERE IS INDEED A UNITARY MODE OF EXISTENCE IN OUTSIDE OBJECTS. + +It may be objected that having this unity in our soul depends on +receiving from the exterior object a notion and an image, which is a +conception furnished by this object. As the philosophers who profess +this opinion do not differentiate the species of one and of number, +and as they allow them no other hypostatic existence (than to be +conceived by our soul), if they (practically do) allow them any sort +of hypostatic existence, it will be very interesting to scrutinize the +opinions of these.[24] They then say that the notion or conception +that we have of the one or of the number derives from the objects +themselves, is a notion as much "a posteriori" as those of "that,"[25] +"something," "crowd," "festival," "army," or of "multitude"; for, just +as the manifold is nothing without the multiple objects, nor a festival +without the men gathered to celebrate the religious ceremony, thus +"the One" is nothing without the one object, when we posit the one, +conceiving it alone, having made an abstraction of everything else. The +partisans of this opinion will cite many examples of the same kind, as +the "right hand side," "the upper part," and their contraries. What +reality indeed (to speak as they do), can the "right hand side" possess +outside of a person who stands or sits here or there[26]? The case is +similar with "the upper side," which refers to a certain part of the +universe, and the "lower side" to another.[27] Our first answer to +this argument is that we will allow that there is a certain kind of +existence in the things themselves of which we have just spoken; but +that this mode of existence is not identical in all things, considered +either in respect to each other, or each in respect to the One which is +in all. Further, we intend to refute one by one these arguments that +have been opposed to us. + + +THE NOTION OF THE SUBJECT ONE DOES NOT COME FROM THE SUBJECT ITSELF. + +13. To begin with, it is unreasonable to insist that the notion of +the subject one comes to us from the subject itself (which is one), +from the visible man, for instance, or from some other animal, or +even some stone. Evidently the visible man and the One are things +entirely different, which could not be identified[28]; otherwise, +our judgment would not be able (as it is) to predicate unity of the +non-man. Besides, as the judgment does not operate on emptiness for +the right side, and other such things, seeing a difference of position +when it tells us that an object is here, or there; likewise, it also +sees something when it says that an object is one; for it does not +experience there an affection that is vain, and it does not affirm +unity without some foundation. It cannot be believed that the judgment +says that an object is one because it sees that it is alone, and that +there is no other; for, while saying that there is no other, the +judgment implicitly asserts that the other is one. Further, the notions +of "other" and "different" are notions posterior to that of unity; +if the judgment did not rise to unity, it would not assert either +the "other" nor the "different"; when it affirms that an object is +alone, it says, "there is one only object"; and therefore predicates +unity before "only." Besides, the judgment which affirms is itself a +substantial (being) before affirming unity of some other (being); and +the (being) of which it speaks is one likewise before the judgment +either asserts or conceives anything about it. Thus (being) must be one +or many; if it be many, the one is necessarily anterior, since, when +the judgment asserts that plurality is present, it evidently asserts +that there is more than one; likewise, when it says that an army is +a multitude, it conceives of the soldiers as arranged in one single +corps. By this last example, it is plain that the judgment (in saying +one body), does not let the multitude remain multitude, and that it +thus reveals the existence of unity; for, whether by giving to the +multitude a unity which it does not possess, or by rapidly revealing +unity in the arrangement (which makes the body of the multitude), the +judgment reduces multitude to unity. It does not err here about unity, +any more than when it says of a building formed by a multitude of +stones that it is a unity; for, besides, a building is more unified +than an army.[29] If, further, unity inhere in a still higher degree in +that which is continuous, and in a degree still higher in what is not +divisible,[30] evidently that occurs only because the unity has a real +nature, and possesses existence; for there is no greater or less in +that which does not exist. + + +UNITY, THOUGH BY PARTICIPATION EXISTING IN SENSE-OBJECTS, IS +INTELLIGIBLE. + +Just as we predicate being of every sense-thing, as well as of every +intelligible thing, we predicate it in a higher degree of intelligible +things, attributing a higher degree (of substantiality) to the (beings +that are veritable than to sense-objects), and to sense-objects than +to other genera (of physical objects); likewise, clearly seeing +unity in sense-objects in a degree higher than in the intelligible +(essences), we recognize the existence of unity in all its modes, and +we refer them all to Unity in itself. Besides, just as "being and +essence"[31] are nothing sensual, though sense-objects participate +therein, so unity, though by participation it inhere in sense-objects, +is not any the less an intelligible Unity. Judgment grasps it by an +intellectual conception; by seeing one thing (which is sensual) it also +conceives another which it does not see (because it is intelligible); +it therefore knew this thing in advance; and if judgment knew it in +advance, judgment was this thing, and was identical with that whose +existence it asserted. When it says, "a certain" object, it asserts the +unity, as, when it speaks of "certain" objects, it says that they are +two or more. If then one cannot conceive of any object whatever without +"one," "two," or some other number, it becomes possible to insist that +the thing without which nothing can be asserted or conceived, does not +at all exist. We cannot indeed deny existence to the thing without +whose existence we could not assert or conceive anything. Now that +which is everywhere necessary to speak and to conceive must be anterior +to speech and conception, so as to contribute to their production. If, +besides, this thing be necessary to the hypostatic existence of every +essence--for there is no essence that lacks unity--it must be anterior +to being, and being must be begotten by it. That is why we say "an +essence" instead of first positing "essence," and "a" only thereafter, +for there must be "one" in essence, to make "several" possible; but +(the converse is not true; for) unity does not contain essence, unless +unity itself produce it by applying itself to the begetting of it. +Likewise, the word "that" (when employed to designate an object) is +not meaningless; for instead of naming the object, it proclaims its +existence, its presence, its "being," or some other of its kinds of +"essence." The word "that" does not therefore express something without +reality, it does not proclaim an empty conception, but it designates an +object as definitely as some proper name. + + +UNITY ONLY AN ACCIDENT IN SENSE-THINGS, BUT SOMETHING IN ITSELF IN THE +INTELLIGIBLE. + +14. As to those who consider unity as relative, they might be told +that unity could not lose its proper nature merely as a result of +the affection experienced by some other being without itself being +affected. It cannot cease being one without experiencing the privation +of unity by division into two or three. If, on being divided, a mass +become double without being destroyed in respect to its being a mass, +evidently, besides the subject, there existed unity; and the mass lost +it because the unity was destroyed by the division. So this same thing +which now is present, and now disappears, should be classified among +essences wherever it be found; and we must recognize that, though it +may be an accident of other objects, it nevertheless exists by itself, +whether it manifest in sense-objects, or whether it be present in +intelligent entities; it is only an accident in posterior (beings, +namely, the sense-objects); but it exists in itself in the intelligible +entities, especially in the first Essence, which is One primarily, and +only secondarily essence. + + +TWO IS NOT AN ADDITION TO ONE, BUT A CHANGE (REFUTATION OF ARISTOTLE). + +The objection that unity, without itself experiencing anything, by the +mere addition of something else, is no longer one, but becomes double, +is a mistake.[32] The one has not become two, and is not that which +has been added to it, nor that to which something has been added. Each +of them remains one, such as it was; but two can be asserted of their +totality, and one of each of them separately. Two therefore, not any +more than "pair," is by nature a relation. If the pair consisted in +the union (of two objects), and if "being united" were identical with +"to duplicate," in this case the union, as well as the pair, would +constitute two. Now a "pair" appears likewise in a state contrary (to +that of the reunion of two objects); for two may be produced by the +division of a single object. Two, therefore, is neither reunion nor +division, as it would have to be in order to constitute a relation. + + +OBJECTS PARTICIPATE IN NUMBERS JUST AS THEY PARTICIPATE IN ALL +INTELLIGIBLE ENTITIES. + +What then is the principal cause (by virtue of which objects +participate in numbers)? A being is one by the presence of one; double, +because of the presence of the pair; just as it is white because of the +presence of whiteness; beautiful, because of the presence of beauty; +and just by that of justice. If that be not admitted, we shall be +reduced to asserting that whiteness, beauty and justice are nothing +real, and that their only causes are simple relations; that justice +consists in some particular relation with some particular being; that +beauty has no foundation other than the affection that we feel; that +the object which seems beautiful possesses nothing capable of exciting +this affection either by nature, or by acquirement. When you see an +object that is one, and that you call single, it is simultaneously +great, beautiful, and susceptible of receiving a number of other +qualifications. Now why should unity not inhere in the object as +well as greatness and magnitude, sweetness and bitterness, and other +qualities? We have no right to admit that quality, whatever it be, +forms part of the number of beings, whilst quantity is excluded; nor +to limit quantity to continuous quantity, while discrete quantity is +excluded from the conception of quantity; and that so much the less as +continuous quantity is measured by discrete quantity. Thus, just as +an object is great because of the presence of magnitude, as it is one +by the presence of unity; so is it double because of the presence of +being a pair, and so forth.[33] + + +THE VERITABLE NUMBERS ARE INTELLIGIBLE ENTITIES. + +Should we be asked to describe the operation of the participation of +objects in unity and in numbers, we shall answer that this question +connects with the more general problem of the participation of objects +in intelligible forms. Besides, we shall have to admit that the decad +presents itself under different aspects, according as it is considered +to exist either in discrete quantities, or in continuous quantities, +or in the reduction of many great forces to unity, or, last, into +the intelligible entities to which we are later raised. It is among +them, indeed, that are found the veritable Numbers (spoken of by +Plato,[10]) which, instead of being considered as discovered in other +(beings), exist within themselves; such is the Decad-in-itself, which +exists by itself, instead of simply being a decad[34] composed of some +intelligible entities. + + +NUMBER EXISTS BEFORE EVERY ANIMAL, AND THE UNIVERSAL ANIMAL. + +15. (From the above discussion about the intelligibility of numbers) +let us now return to what we said in the beginning. The universal +(Being) is veritable Essence, Intelligence, and perfect living +Organism; and at the same time contains also all the living organisms. +Our universe, which also is an organism, by its unity imitates so +far as it can the unity of the perfect living Organism. I say, to +the extent of its capacity, because, by its nature, the sense-world +has departed from the unity of the intelligible world; otherwise, it +would not be the sense-world. Moreover, the universal living Organism +must be the universal Number; for if it were not a perfect number, +it would lack some number; and if it did not contain the total number +of living organisms, it would not be the perfect living Organism. +Number therefore exists before every living organism, and before the +universal living Organism. Man and the other living organisms are in +the intelligible world; so far as they are living organisms, and so far +as the intelligible world is the universal living Organism; for man, +even here below, is a part of the living Organism, so far as itself is +a living organism, and as the living Organism is universal; the other +living organisms are also in the living Organism, so far as each of +them is a living organism. + + +THE INTELLIGIBLE AS POTENTIAL AND ACTUALIZED IN THE SOUL. + +Likewise, Intelligence, as such, contains all the individual +intelligences as its parts.[35] These, however, form a number. +Consequently, the number which is in the Intelligence does not occupy +the first degree. So far as the number is in Intelligence, it is equal +to the quantity of the actualizations of Intelligence. Now, these +actualizations are wisdom, justice, and the other virtues, science, +and all the (ideas) whose possession characterizes it as veritable +Intelligence. (If then science exist in the Intelligence) how does it +happen that it is not there in some principle other than itself? In +Intelligence the knower, the known, and science are one and the same +thing; and with everything else within it. That is why every (entity) +exists in the intelligible world in its highest degree. For instance, +within it, Justice is no accident, though it be one in the soul, as +such; for intelligible entities are in the soul (only in) potential +condition (so long as she remains no more than soul); and they are +actualized when the soul rises to Intelligence and dwells with it.[36] + + +NUMBER AS THE UNIVERSAL BOND OF THE UNIVERSE. + +Besides Intelligence, and anterior thereto, exists Essence. It contains +Number, with which it begets (beings); for it begets them by moving +according to number, determining upon the numbers before giving +hypostatic existence to the (beings), just as the unity (of essence) +precedes its (existence), and interrelates it with the First (or, +absolute Unity). Numbers interrelate nothing else to the First; it +suffices for Essence to be interrelated with Him, because Essence, on +becoming Number, attaches all (beings) to itself. Essence is divided +not so far as it is a unity (for its unity is permanent); but having +divided itself conformably to its nature in as many things as it +decided on, it saw into how many things it had divided itself; and +through this (process) it begat the number that exists within itself; +for it divided itself by virtue of the potentialities of number, and it +begat as many (beings) as number comported. + + +THE GENERATION OF EVERYTHING REGULATED BY NUMBER. + +The first and veritable Number is therefore the source and +principle[21] of hypostatic existence for beings. That is the reason +that even here below, the classified both discrete and continuous +quantity[38] and, with a different number, it is some other thing that +is begotten, or nothing more can be begotten. Such are the primary +Numbers, so far as they can be numbered. The numbers that subsist in +other things play two parts. So far as they proceed from the First, +they can be numbered; so far as they are below them, they measure other +things, they serve to enumerate both numbers and things which can be +enumerated. How indeed could you even say "ten" without the aid of +numbers within yourself? + + +DIFFICULTIES CONNECTED WITH THESE INTELLIGIBLE NUMBERS. + +16. The first objection might be, Where do you locate, or how do you +classify these primary and veritable Numbers? All the philosophers (who +follow Aristotle) classify numbers in the genus of quantity. It seems +that we have above treated of quantity, and classified both discrete +and continuous quantity[38] among other "beings." Here however we +seem to say that these Numbers form part of the primary Essences, and +add that there are, in addition, numbers that serve for enumerations. +We are now asked how we make these statements agree, for they seem +to give rise to several questions. Is the unity which is found among +sense-beings a quantity? Or is unity a quantity when repeated, while, +when considered alone and in itself, it is the principle of quantity, +but not a quantity itself? Besides, if unity be the principle of +quantity, does it share the nature of quantity, or has it a different +nature? Here are a number of points we ought to expound. We shall +answer these questions, and here is what we consider our starting-point. + + +UNITY CONTAINED IN SENSE-OBJECTS IS NOT UNITY IN ITSELF. + +When, considering visible objects, by which we ought to begin, we +combine one (being) with another, as for instance, a horse and a dog, +or two men, and say that they form two; or, when considering a greater +number of men we say they are ten, and form a group of ten, this number +does not constitute being, nor an (accident) among sense-objects; it is +purely and simply a quantity. Dividing this group of ten by unity, and +making unity of its parts, you obtain and constitute the principle of +quantity (unity) for a unity thus derived from a group of ten. + + +NUMERALS PREDICATED OF THE MAN IN HIMSELF ARE ESSENTIAL. + +But when you say that the Man considered in himself is a number, as, +for instance, a pair, because he is both animal and reasonable, we +have here no more than a simple modality. For, while reasoning and +enumerating we produce a quantity; but so far as there are here two +things (animal and reasonable), and as each of them is one, as each +completes the being of the man, and possesses unity; we are here using +and proclaiming another kind of number, the essential Number. Here the +pair is not posterior to things; it does not limit itself to expressing +a quantity which is exterior to essence; it expresses what is in the +very being of this essence, and contains its nature. + + +COLLECTIVE NOUNS USED AS PROOF OF INDEPENDENT EXISTENCE. + +Indeed, it is not you who here below produce number when you by +discursive reason range through things that exist by themselves, and +which do not depend for their existence on your enumeration; for you +add nothing to the being of a man by enumerating him with another. That +is no unity, as in a "choric ballet." When you say, ten men, "ten" +exists only in you who are enumerating. We could not assert that "ten" +exists in the ten men you are enumerating, because these men are not +co-ordinated so as to form a unity; it is you yourself who produce ten +by enumerating this group of ten, and by making up a quantity. But +when you say, a "choric ballet," an "army," there is something which +exists outside of these objects, and within yourself.[39] How are we +to understand that the number exists in you? The number which existed +in you before you made the enumeration has another mode (of existence) +(than the number that you produce by enumeration). As to the number +which manifests itself in exterior objects and refers to the number +within yourself, it constitutes an actualization of the essential +numbers, or, is conformable to the essential Numbers; for, while +enumerating you produce a number, and by this actualization you give +hypostatic existence to quantity, as in walking you did to movement. + + +THE NUMBER WITHIN IS THE NUMBER CONSTITUTIVE OF OUR BEING. + +In what sense does the number which is within us (before we enumerate) +have a mode (of existence) other (than the one we produce in +enumeration)? Because it is the number constitutive of our being, +which, as Plato says,[40] participates in number and harmony, and is a +number and harmony; for the soul is said to be neither a body nor an +extension; she therefore is a number, since she is a being. The number +of the body is a being of the same nature as the body; the number of +the soul consists in the beings which are incorporeal like souls. Then, +for the intelligible entities, if the animal itself be plurality, if +it be a triad, the triad that exists in the animal is essential. As to +the triad which subsists, not in the animal, but in essence, it is the +principle of being. If you enumerate the animal and the beautiful, each +of these two in itself is a unity; but (in enumerating them), you beget +number in yourself, and you conceive a certain quantity, the pair. If +(like the Pythagoreans) you say that virtue is a group of four, or +tetrad, it is one so far as its parts (justice, prudence, courage, and +temperance) contribute to the formation of a unity; you may add that +this group of four, or tetrad, is a unity, so far as it is a kind of +substrate; as to you, you connect this tetrad with the one that is +inside of you.[41] + + +HOW A NUMBER MAY BE CALLED INFINITE.[42] + +17. As the reasons here advanced would seem to imply that every number +is limited, we may ask in which sense may a number be said to be +infinite? This conclusion is right, for it is against the nature of +number to be infinite. Why do people then often speak of a number as +infinite? Is it in the same sense that one calls a line infinite? A +line is said to be infinite, not that there really exists an infinite +line of this kind, but to imply the conception of a line as great as +possible, greater than any given line. Similarly with number. When +we know which is the number (of certain objects), we can double it +by thought, without, on that account, adding any other number to the +first. How indeed would it be possible to add to exterior objects the +conception of our imagination, a conception that exists in ourselves +exclusively? We shall therefore say that, among intelligible entities, +a line is infinite; otherwise, the intelligible line would be a simple +quantative expression. If however the intelligible line be not this, it +must be infinite in number; but we then understand the word "infinite" +in a sense other than that of having no limits that could not be +transcended. In what sense then is the word "infinite" here used? In +the sense that the conception of a limit is not implied in the being of +a line in itself. + + +INTELLIGIBLE LINE POSTERIOR TO NUMBER, AND EXISTS IN THE INTELLIGIBLE. + +What then is the intelligible line, and where does it exist? It is +posterior to number[43]; for unity appears in the line, since this +starts from the unity (of the point), and because it has but one +dimension (length); now the measure of dimension is not a quantative +(entity). Where then does the intelligible Line exist? It exists only +in the intelligence that defines it; or, if it be a thing, it is but +something intellectual. In the intelligible world, in fact, everything +is intellectual, and such as the thing itself is. It is in this same +world, likewise, where is made the decision where and how the plane, +the solid, and all other figures are to be disposed. For it is not +we who create the figures by conceiving them. This is so because the +figure of the world is anterior to us, and because the natural figures +which are suitable to the productions of nature, are necessarily +anterior to the bodies, and in the intelligible world exist in the +state of primary figures, without determining limits, for these forms +exist in no other subjects; they subsist by themselves, and have no +need of extension, because the extension is the attribute of a subject. + + +THE INTELLIGIBLE SPHERICAL FIGURE THE PRIMITIVE ONE. + +Everywhere, therefore, in essence, is a single (spherical) figure,[44] +and each of these figures (which this single figure implicitly +contained) has become distinct, either in, or before the animal. When +I say that each figure has become distinct, I do not mean that it has +become an extension, but that it has been assigned to some particular +animal; thus, in the intelligible world, each body has been assigned +its own characteristic figure, as, for instance, the pyramid to the +fire.[45] Our world seeks to imitate this figure, although it cannot +accomplish this, because of matter. There are other figures here below +that are analogous to the intelligible figures. + + +FIGURES PRE-EXIST IN THE INTELLIGIBLE. + +But are the figures in the living Organism as such, or, if it cannot +be doubted that they are in the living Organism, do they anteriorly +exist in the Intelligence? If the Organism contained Intelligence, +the figures would be in the first degree in the Organism. But as it +is the Intelligence that contains the Organism, they are in the first +degree in Intelligence. Besides, as the souls are contained in the +perfect living Organism, it is one reason more for the priority of +the Intelligence. But Plato says,[46] "Intelligence sees the Ideas +comprised within the perfect living Organism." Now, if it see the +Ideas contained in the perfect living Organism, Intelligence must be +posterior to the latter. By the words "it sees" it should be understood +that the existence of the living Organism itself is realized in this +vision. Indeed, the Intelligence which sees is not something different +from the Organism which is seen; but (in Intelligence) all things form +but one. Only, thought has a pure and simple sphere, while the Organism +has an animated sphere.[47] + + +INFINITY IN NUMBER ARISES FROM POSSIBILITY OF INCREASING GREATEST +IMAGINABLE PHYSICAL NUMBER. + +18. Thus, in the intelligible world, every number is finite. But we +can conceive of a number greater than any assigned number, and thus it +is that our mind, while considering the numbers, produces the (notion +of the) infinite. On the contrary, in the intelligible world, it is +impossible to conceive a number greater than the Number conceived (by +divine Intelligence); for on high Number exists eternally; no Number +is lacking, or could ever lack, so that one could never add anything +thereto. + + +AS UNMEASURED THE INTELLIGIBLE NUMBER MIGHT BE CALLED INFINITE. + +Nevertheless, the intelligible Number might be called infinite in the +sense that it is unmeasured. By what, indeed, could it be measured? +The Number that exists on high is universal, simultaneous one and +manifold, constituting a whole circumscribed by no limit (a whole that +is infinite); it is what it is by itself. None of the intelligible +beings, indeed, is circumscribed by any limit. What is really limited +and measured is what is hindered from losing itself in the infinite, +and demands measure. But all of the intelligible (beings) are measures; +whence it results that they are all beautiful. So far as it is a living +organism, the living Organism in itself is beautiful, possessing an +excellent life, and lacking no kind of life; it does not have a life +mingled with death, it contains nothing mortal nor perishable. The +life of the living Organism in itself has no fault; it is the first +Life, full of vigor and energy, a primary Light whose rays vivify +both the souls that dwell on high, and those that descend here below. +This Life knows why it lives; it knows its principle and its goal; +for its principle is simultaneously its goal. Besides, universal +Wisdom, the universal Intelligence, which is intimately united to the +living Organism, which subsists in it and with it, still improves it; +heightening its hues as it were by the splendor of its wisdom, and +rendering its beauty more venerable. Even here below, a life full of +wisdom is that which is most venerable and beautiful, though we can +hardly catch a glimpse of such a life. On high, however, the vision of +life is perfectly clear; the (favored initiate) receives from Life both +capacity to behold and increased vitality; so that, thanks to a more +energetic life, the beholder receives a clearer vision, and he becomes +what he sees. Here below, our glance often rests on inanimate things, +and even when it turns towards living beings, it first notices in them +that which lacks life. Besides, the life which is hidden in them is +already mingled with other things. On high, on the contrary, all the +(beings) are alive, entirely alive, and their life is pure. If at the +first aspect you should look on something as deprived of life, soon the +life within it would burst out before your eyes. + + +ESSENCE ALONE POSSESSES SELF-EXISTENCE. + +Contemplate therefore the Being that penetrates the intelligibles, and +which communicates to them an immutable life; contemplate the Wisdom +and Knowledge that resides within them, and you will not be able to +keep from deriding this inferior nature to which the vulgar human +beings attribute genuine "being." It is in this supreme "Being" that +dwell life and intelligence, and that the essences subsist in eternity. +There, nothing issues (from Essence), nothing changes or agitates it; +for there is nothing outside of it that could reach it; if a single +thing existed outside of ("being"), ("being") would be dependent on it. +If anything opposed to (essence) existed, this thing would escape the +action of ("being"); it would no longer owe its existence to ("being"), +but would constitute a common principle anterior to it, and would be +essence. Parmenides[48] therefore was right in saying that the Essence +was one; that it was immutable, not because there was nothing else +(that could modify it), but because it was essence. Alone, therefore, +does Essence possess self-existence. How then could one, to Essence, +refuse to attribute existence, or any of the things of which it is an +actualization, and which it constitutes? So long as it exists, it gives +them to itself; and since it exists always, these things therefore +eternally subsist within it. + + +THE POWER AND BEAUTY OF ESSENCE IS TO ATTRACT ALL THINGS. + +Such are the power and beauty of Essence that it (charms and) attracts +all things, holding them as it were suspended, so that these are +delighted to possess even a trace of its perfection, and seek nothing +beyond, except the Good. For Essence is anterior to the Good in respect +to us (when we climb up from here below to the intelligible world). +The entire intelligible world aspires to the Life and Wisdom so as to +possess existence; all the souls, all the intelligences likewise aspire +to possess it; Essence alone is fully self-sufficient. + + + + +SECOND ENNEAD, BOOK EIGHT. + +Of Sight; or of Why Distant Objects Seem Small.[49] + +(OF PERSPECTIVE.) + + +VARIOUS THEORIES OF PERSPECTIVE. + +1. What is the cause that when distant visible objects seem smaller, +and that, though separated by a great space, they seem to be close to +each other, while if close, we see them in their true size, and their +true distance? The cause of objects seeming smaller at a distance might +be that light needs to be focussed near the eye, and to be accommodated +to the size of the pupils[50]; that the greater the distance of the +matter of the visible object, the more does its form seem to separate +from it during its transit to the eyes; and that, as there is a form +of quantity as well as of quality, it is the reason (or, form) of the +latter which alone reaches the eye. On the other hand, (Epicurus) +thinks that we feel magnitude only by the passage and the successive +introduction of its parts, one by one; and that, consequently, +magnitude must be brought within our reach, and near us, for us to +determine its quantity. + + +QUALITY IS MORE ESSENTIAL THAN QUANTITY. + +(Do objects at a distance seem smaller) because we perceive magnitude +only by accident, and because color is perceived first? In this case, +when an object is near, we perceive its colored magnitude; when at a +distance, we perceive first its color, not well enough distinguishing +its parts to gather exact knowledge of its quantity, because its +colors are less lively. Why should we be surprised at magnitudes +being similar to sounds, which grow weaker as their form decreases +in distinctness? As to sounds, indeed, it is the form that is sought +by the sense of hearing, and here intensity is noticed only as an +accident. But if hearing perceive magnitude only by accident, to what +faculty shall we attribute the primitive perception of intensity +in sound, just as primitive perception of magnitude in the visible +object is referable to the sense of touch? Hearing perceives apparent +magnitude by determining not the quantity but the intensity of sounds; +this very intensity of sounds, however, is perceived only by accident +(because it is its proper object). Likewise, taste does not by accident +feel the intensity of a sweet savor. Speaking strictly, the magnitude +of a sound is its extent. Now the intensity of a sound indicates its +extent only by accident, and therefore in an inexact manner. Indeed a +thing's intensity is identical with the thing itself. The multitude of +a thing's parts is known only by the extent of space occupied by the +object. + + +DIFFERENCES OF COLOR AID IN THE PERCEPTION OF MAGNITUDE. + +It may be objected that a color cannot be less large, and that it +can only be less vivid. However, there is a common characteristic in +something smaller and less vivid; namely, that it is less than what +it is its being to be. As to color, diminution implies weakness; +as to size, smallness. Magnitude connected with color diminishes +proportionally with it. This is evident in the perception of a varied +object, as, for instance, in the perception of mountains covered with +houses, forests, and many other objects; here the distinctness of +detail affords a standard by which to judge of the whole. But when the +view of the details does not impress itself on the eye, the latter +no longer grasps the extent of the whole through measurement of the +extent offered to its contemplation by the details. Even in the case +where the objects are near and varied, if we include them all in one +glance without distinguishing all their parts, the more parts our +glance loses, the smaller do the objects seem. On the contrary, if we +distinguish all their details, the more exactly do we measure them, +and learn their real size. Magnitudes of uniform color deceive the eye +because the latter can no longer measure their extent by its parts; and +because, even if the eye attempt to do so, it loses itself, not knowing +where to stop, for lack of difference between the parts. + + +DISAPPEARANCE OF THE FORM IMPLIES THAT OF THE SIZE. + +The distant object seems to us close because our inability to +distinguish the parts of the intervening space does not permit us to +determine exactly its magnitude. When sight can no longer traverse the +length of an interval by determining its quality, in respect to its +form, neither can it any longer determine its quantity in respect to +magnitude. + + +REFUTATION OF ARISTOTLE'S "VISUAL ANGLE" THEORY. + +2. Some[51] hold that distant objects seem to us lesser only because +they are seen under a smaller visual angle. Elsewhere[52] we have shown +that this is wrong; and here we shall limit ourselves to the following +considerations. The assertion that a distant object seems less because +it is perceived under a smaller visual angle supposes that the rest +of the eye still sees something outside of this object, whether this +be some other object, or something external, such as the air. But if +we suppose that the eye sees nothing outside of this object, whether +this object, as would a great mountain, occupy the whole extent of the +glance, and permit nothing beyond it to be seen; or whether it even +extend beyond the sweep of the glance on both sides, then this object +should not, as it actually does, seem smaller than it really is, even +though it fill the whole extension of the glance. The truth of this +observation can be verified by a mere glance at the sky. Not in a +single glance can the whole hemisphere be perceived, for the glance +could not be extended widely enough to embrace so vast an expanse. Even +if we grant the possibility of this, and that the whole glance embraces +the whole hemisphere; still the real magnitude of the heaven is greater +than its apparent magnitude. How then by the diminution of the visual +angle could we explain the smallness of the apparent magnitude of the +sky, on the hypothesis that it is the diminution of the visual angle +which makes distant objects appear smaller? + + + + +FIRST ENNEAD, BOOK FIVE. + +Does Happiness Increase With Time?[53] + + +HAPPINESS HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH DURATION OF TIME. + +1. Does happiness increase with duration of time? No: for the feeling +of happiness exists only in the present. The memory of past happiness +could not add anything to happiness itself. Happiness is not a word, +but a state of soul. But a state of soul is a present (experience), +such as, for instance, the actualization of life. + + +HAPPINESS IS NOT THE SATISFACTION OF THE DESIRE TO LIVE. + +2. Might happiness not be the satisfaction of the desire of living and +activity, inasmuch as this desire is ever present with us? (Hardly). +First, according to this hypothesis, the happiness of to-morrow would +ever be greater than that of to-day, and that of the following day +than that of the day before, and so on to infinity. In this case, the +measure of happiness would no longer be virtue (but duration). Then, +the beatitude of the divinities will also have to become greater from +day to day; it would no longer be perfect, and could never become +so.[54] Besides, desire finds its satisfaction in the possession of +what is present, both now, and in the future. So long as these present +circumstances exist, their possession constitutes happiness. Further, +as the desire of living can be no more than the desire to exist, the +latter desire can refer to the present only, inasmuch as real existence +(essence) inheres only in the present. Desire for a future time, or +for some later event, means no more than a desire to preserve what +one already possesses. Desire refers neither to the future nor the +past, but to what exists at present. What is sought is not a perpetual +progression in the future, but the enjoyment of what exists from the +present moment onward. + + +INCREASED HAPPINESS WOULD RESULT ONLY FROM MORE PERFECT GRASP. + +3. What shall be said of him who lived happily during a longer period, +who has longer contemplated the same spectacle? If such longer +contemplation resulted in a clearer idea thereof, the length of time +has served some useful purpose; but if the agent contemplated it in the +same manner for the whole extent of time, he possesses no advantage +over him who contemplated it only once. + + +PLEASURE IS UNCONNECTED WITH HAPPINESS. + +4. It might be objected that the former of these men enjoyed pleasure +longer than the other. This consideration has nothing to do with +happiness. If by this (enjoyed) pleasure we mean the free exercise +(of intelligence), the pleasure referred to is then identical with +the happiness here meant. This higher pleasure referred to is only to +possess what is here ever present; what of it is past is of no further +value. + + +LENGTH OF HAPPINESS DOES NOT AFFECT ITS QUALITY. + +5. Would equal happiness be predicated of three men, one who had been +happy from his life's beginning to its end, the other only at its end, +and the third, who had been happy, but who ceased being such.[55] This +comparison is not between three men who are happy, but between one man +who is happy, with two who are deprived of happiness, and that at the +(present moment) when happiness (counts most). If then one of them have +any advantage, he possesses it as a man actually happy compared with +such as are not; he therefore surpasses the two others by the actual +possession of happiness. + + +IF UNHAPPINESS INCREASE WITH TIME, WHY SHOULD NOT HAPPINESS DO SO? + +6. (It is generally agreed that) all calamities, sufferings, griefs +and similar evils are aggravated in proportion to their duration. If +then, in all these cases, evil be increased with time, why should not +the same circumstance obtain in the contrary case? Why should happiness +also not be increased?[56] Referring to griefs and sufferings, it might +reasonably be said that they are increased by duration. When, for +example, sickness is prolonged, and becomes a habitual condition, the +body suffers more and more profoundly as time goes on. If, however, +evil ever remain at the same degree, it does not grow worse, and +there is no need of complaining but of the present. Consideration of +the past evil amounts to considering the traces left by evil, the +morbid disposition whose intensity is increased by time, because its +seriousness is proportionate to its duration. In this case it is not +the length of time, but the aggravation of the evil which adds to +the misfortune. But the new degree (of intensity) does not subsist +simultaneously with the old, and it is unreasonable to predicate +an increase as summation of what is no more to what now is. On the +contrary, it is the fixed characteristic of happiness to have a fixed +term, to remain ever the same. Here also the only increase possibly +due to duration of time depends on the relation between an increase +in virtue and one in happiness; and the element to be reckoned with +here is not the number of years of happiness, but the degree of virtue +finally acquired. + + +AS ADDITION IS POSSIBLE WITH TIME, WHY CANNOT HAPPINESS INCREASE? + +7. It might be objected that it is inconsistent to consider the present +only, exclusive of the past (as in the case of happiness), when we +do not do so in respect of time. For the addition of past to present +unquestionably lengthens time. If then we may properly say that time +becomes longer, why may we not say the same of happiness?--Were we to +do so, we would be applying happiness to divisions of time, while it +is precisely to bring out the indivisibility of happiness that it is +considered to be measured by the present exclusively. While considering +time, in respect of things that have vanished, such as, for instance, +the dead, it is perfectly reasonable to reckon the past; but it would +be unreasonable to compare past happiness with present happiness +in respect to duration, because it would be treating happiness as +something accidental and temporary. Whatever might be the length of +time that preceded the present, all that can be said of it is, that +it is no more. To regard duration while considering happiness is to +try to disperse and fraction something that is one and indivisible, +something that exists only in the present. That is why time is called +an image of eternity, inasmuch as it tends to destroy eternity's +permanence through its own dispersion.[57] By abstracting permanence +from eternity, and appropriating it, time destroys eternity; for a +short period, permanence may survive in association with time; but as +soon as it becomes fused with it, eternity perishes. Now as happiness +consists in the enjoyment of a life that is good, namely in that which +is proper to Essence (in itself), because none better exists, it must, +instead of time, have, as a measure, eternity itself, a principle +which admits neither increase nor diminution, which cannot be compared +to any length, whose nature it is to be indivisible, and superior to +time. No comparison, therefore, should be instituted between essence +and non-essence, eternity and time, the perpetual and the eternal; +nor should extension be predicated of the indivisible. If we regard +existence of Essence in itself, it will be necessary to regard it +entire; to consider it, not as the perpetuity of time, but as the very +life of eternity, a life which instead of consisting of a series of +centuries, exists entire since all centuries. + + +NOT EVEN MEMORIES OF THE PAST INCREASE HAPPINESS. + +8. Somebody might object that by subsisting till the present, the +memory of the past adds something more to him who has long lived +happily. In this case it will be necessary to examine what is meant by +this memory. If it mean the memory of former wisdom, and if it mean +that he who would possess this memory would become wiser on account +of it, then this memory differs from our question (which studies +happiness, and not wisdom). If it mean the memory of pleasure, it +would imply that the happy man has need of much pleasure, and cannot +remain satisfied with what is present. Besides, there is no proof that +the memory of a past pleasure is at all pleasant; on the contrary, it +would be entirely ridiculous to remember with delight having tasted a +delicious dish the day before, and still more ridiculous remembering +such an enjoyment ten years ago. It would be just as ridiculous to +pride one self on having been a wise man last year. + + +NOT EVEN THE MEMORY OF VIRTUE INCREASES HAPPINESS. + +9. Could not the memory of virtuous actions contribute to happiness? +No: for such a memory cannot exist in a man who has no virtue at +present, and who thereby is driven to seek out the memory of past +virtues. + + +LENGTH OF TIME IS OF NO IMPORTANCE, NOT EVEN AS OPPORTUNITY OF VIRTUE. + +10. Another objection is that length of time would give opportunity +for doing many beautiful deeds; while this opportunity is denied him +who lives happily only a short period. This may be answered by denying +happiness to a man on the grounds of having done many beautiful +deeds. If several parts of time and several actions are to constitute +happiness, then it would be constituted by things that are no more, +that are past, and by present things; whereas our definition of +happiness limits it exclusively to the present. Then we considered +whether length of time add to happiness. There remains only to examine +whether happiness of long duration be superior because of yielding +opportunities of doing more beautiful deeds. To begin with, the man +who is inactive may be just as happy, if not more happy than he who is +active. Besides, it is not actions themselves which yield happiness; +(the sources of happiness) are states of mind, which are the principles +of beautiful actions. The wise man enjoys welfare while active, but not +because of this activity; he derives (this welfare) not from contingent +things, but from what he possesses in himself. For it might happen even +to a vicious man to save his fatherland, or to feel pleasure in seeing +it saved by some other. It is not then these activities which are the +causes of the enjoyment of happiness. True beatitude and the joys it +yields must be derived from the constant disposition of the soul. To +predicate it of activity, would be to make it depend on things alien to +virtue and the soul. The soul's actualization consists in being wise, +and in exercising her self-activity; this is true happiness. + + + + +SECOND ENNEAD, BOOK SEVEN. + +About Mixture to the Point of Total Penetration. + + +REFUTATION OF ANAXAGORAS AND DEMOCRITUS. + +1. The subject of the present consideration is mixture to the point +of total penetration of the different bodies. This has been explained +in two ways: that the two liquids are mingled so as mutually to +interpenetrate each other totally, or that only one of them penetrates +the other. The difference between these two theories is of small +importance. First we must set aside the opinion of (Anaxagoras and +Democritus[58]), who explain mixture as a juxtaposition, because this +is a crude combination, rather than a mixture.[59] Mixture should +render the whole homogeneous, so that even the smallest molecules might +each be composed of the various elements of the mixture. + + +REFUTATION OF ARISTOTLE AND ALEXANDER OF APHRODISIAS. + +As to the (Peripatetic) philosophers who assert that in a mixture only +the qualities mingle, while the material extension of both bodies are +only in juxtaposition, so long as the qualities proper to each of +them are spread throughout the whole mass, they seem to establish the +rightness of their opinion by attacking the doctrine which asserts that +the two bodies mutually interpenetrate in mixture.[60] (They object) +that the molecules of both bodies will finally lose all magnitude +by this continuous division which will leave no interval between the +parts of either of the two bodies; for if the two bodies mutually +interpenetrate each other in every part, their division must become +continuous. Besides, the mixture often occupies an extent greater than +each body taken separately, and as great as if mere juxtaposition +had occurred. Now if two bodies mutually interpenetrate totally, the +resulting mixture would occupy no more place than any one of them +taken separately. The case where two bodies occupy no more space than +a single one of them is by these philosophers explained by the air's +expulsion, which permits one of the bodies to penetrate into the +pores of the other. Besides, in the case of the mixture of two bodies +of unequal extent, how could the body of the smaller extend itself +sufficiently to spread into all the parts of the greater? There are +many other such reasons. + + +REFUTATION OF THE STOICS. + +We now pass to the opinions of (Zeno and the other Stoic) +philosophers,[61] who assert that two bodies which make up a mixture +mutually interpenetrate each other totally. They support this view +by observing that when the bodies interpenetrate totally, they are +divided without the occurrence of a continuous division (which would +make their molecules lose their magnitude). Indeed, perspiration +issues from the human body without its being divided or riddled with +holes. To this it may be objected that nature may have endowed our +body with a disposition to permit perspiration to issue easily. To +this (the Stoics) answer that certain substances (like ivory[62]), +which when worked into thin sheets, admit, in all their parts, a liquid +(oat-gruel) which passes from one surface to the other. As these +substances are bodies, it is not easy to understand how one element +can penetrate into another without separating its molecules. On the +other hand, total division must imply mutual destruction (because +their molecules would lose all magnitude whatever). When, however, two +mingled bodies do not together occupy more space than either of them +separately (the Stoics) seem forced to admit to their adversaries that +this phenomenon is caused by the displacement of air. + + +EXPLANATION OF MIXTURE THAT OCCUPIES MORE SPACE THAN ITS ELEMENTS. + +In the case where the compound occupies more space than each element +separately, it might (though with little probability), be asserted, +that, since every body, along with its other qualities, implies size, a +local extension must take place. No more than the other qualities could +this increase perish. Since, out of both qualities, arises a new form, +as a compound of the mixture of both qualities; so also must another +size arise, the mixture combining the size out of both. Here (the +Peripatetics) might answer (the Stoics): "If you assert a juxtaposition +of substances, as well as of the masses which possess extension, you +are actually adopting our opinions. If however one of the masses, with +its former extension, penetrate the entire mass of the other, the +extension, instead of increasing, as in the case where one line is +added to another by joining their extremities, will not increase any +more than when two straight lines are made to coincide by superimposing +one on the other." + + +CASE OF MIXTURE OF UNEQUAL QUANTITIES. + +The case of the mixture of a smaller quantity with a greater one, such +as of a large body with a very small one, leads (the Peripatetics) +to consider it impossible that the great body should spread in all +the parts of the small one. Where the mixture is not evident, the +(Peripatetics) might claim that the smaller body does not unite with +all the parts of the greater. When however the mixture is evident, +they can explain it by the extension of the masses, although it be +very doubtful that a small mass would assume so great an extension, +especially when we attribute to the composite body a greater extent, +without nevertheless admitting its transformation, as when water +transforms itself into air. + + +EVAPORATION MAY LEAD TO A THIRD THEORY OF MIXTURE. + +2. What happens when a mass of water transforms itself into air? This +question demands particular treatment; for how can the transformed +element occupy a greater extension? (We shall not try to explain +it on either the Peripatetic or Stoic principles) because we have +sufficiently developed above the numerous reasons advanced by both +those schools. We had better now consider which of the two systems +we ourselves might adopt, and on which side lies reason. Besides, we +should consider whether, besides these both, there be not place for a +third opinion. + + +REFUTATION OF STOIC EXPLANATION OF EVAPORATION. + +When water flows through wool, or when paper allows water to filter +through it, why does not the whole of the water pass through these +substances (without partly remaining within them)? If the water remain +therein partially, we shall not be able to unite the two substances +or masses. Shall we say that the qualities alone are confused (or, +mingled)? Water is not in juxtaposition with the paper, nor is lodged +in its pores; for the whole paper is penetrated thereby, and no +portion of the matter lacks that quality. If matter be united to +quality everywhere, water must everywhere be present in the paper. +If it be not water that everywhere is present in the paper, but only +(humidity which is) the quality of the water, where then is the water +itself? Why is not the mass the same? The matter that has insinuated +itself into the paper extends it, and increases its volume. Now this +augmentation of volume implies augmentation of mass; and the latter +implies that the water has not been absorbed by the book, and that the +two substances occupy different places (and do not interpenetrate each +other). Since one body causes another to participate in its quality, +why would it not also make it participate in its extension? By virtue +of this union with a different quality, one quality, united with a +different one, cannot, either remain pure, or preserve its earlier +nature; it necessarily becomes weaker. But one extension, added to +another extension, does not vanish. + + +REFUTATION OF PERIPATETIC EXPLANATION OF EVAPORATION. + +One body is said to divide another, by penetrating it. This +assertion, however, demands demonstration, for it is more reasonable +to suppose that qualities may penetrate a body without dividing +it. Such demonstration is attempted by the claim that qualities +are incorporeal.[63] But if matter itself be as incorporeal as the +qualities, why could not some qualities along with the matter penetrate +into some other body? That some solids do not penetrate other bodies, +is due to their possession of qualities incompatible with that of +penetration. The objection that many qualities could not, along with +matter, penetrate some body, would be justified only if it were the +multitude of qualities that produced density; but if density be as much +of a quality as corporeity, the qualities will constitute the mixture +not in themselves alone, but only as they happen to be determined. +On the other hand, when matter does not lend itself to mixture, this +occurs not by virtue of its being matter, but as matter united to some +determinative quality. That is all the truer as matter is receptive to +any magnitude, not having any of its own. But enough of this. + + +THE BODY IS RATIONALIZED MATTER. + +3. Since we have spoken of corporeity, it must be analyzed. Is it a +composite of all qualities, or does it constitute a form, a "reason," +which produces the body by presence in matter? If the body be the +composite of all the qualities together with matter, this totality of +qualities will constitute corporeity. But if corporeity be a reason +which produces the body by approaching matter, doubtless it is a reason +which contains all the qualities. Now, if this reason be not at all a +definition of being, if it be a reason productive of the object, it +will not contain any matter. It is the reason which applies itself to +matter, and which, by its presence, produces the body there. Body is +matter with indwelling "reason." This "reason," being a form, may be +considered separately from matter, even if it were entirely inseparable +therefrom. Indeed, "reason" separated (from matter), and residing +in intelligence, is different (from "reason" united to matter); the +"Reason" which abides within Intelligence is Intelligence itself. But +this subject (I shall) refer to elsewhere.[64] + + + + +SIXTH ENNEAD, BOOK SEVEN. + +How Ideas Multiplied, and the Good.[65] + + +A. HOW IDEAS MULTIPLY. + + +THE EYES WERE IMPLANTED IN MAN BY DIVINE FORESIGHT. + +1. When the (higher) Divinity, or (some lower) divinity,[66] sent +souls down into generation, He gave to the face of man eyes suitable +to enlighten him,[67] and placed in the body the other organs suited +to the senses, foreseeing that (a living organism) would be able to +preserve itself only on condition of seeing, hearing and touching +contiguous objects, to enable it to select some, and to avoid others. + + +SENSES NOT GIVEN TO MAN BECAUSE OF EXPERIENCE OF MISFORTUNES. + +But can you explain this divine foresight? You must not believe that He +would have begun by making (animals) who perished for lack of senses, +and that later (the divinity) gave senses to man and other animals so +that they could preserve themselves from death.[68] + + +NOR BECAUSE OF GOD'S FORESIGHT OF THESE MISFORTUNES. + +It might, indeed, be objected that (the divinity) knew that the living +organism would be exposed to heat, cold, and other physical conditions; +and that as a result of this knowledge, to keep them from perishing, +He granted them, as tools, senses and organs. In our turn we shall +ask whether the divinity gave the organs to the living organisms +that already possessed the senses, or whether, He endowed souls with +senses and organs simultaneously. In the latter case, though they were +souls, they did not previously possess the sensitive faculties. But if +the souls possessed the sensitive faculties since the time they were +produced, and if they were produced (with these faculties) in order +to descend into generation, then it was natural for them to do so. In +this case it seems that it must be contrary to their nature to avoid +generation, and to dwell in the intelligible world. They would seem +made to belong to the body, and to live in evil. Thus divine Providence +would retain them in evil, and the divinity would arrive at this result +by reasoning; in any case, He would have reasoned. + + +FORESIGHT OF CREATION IS NOT THE RESULT OF REASONING. + +If the divinity reason, we are forced to wonder what are the principles +of this reasoning; for, if it were objected that these principles are +derived from some other reasoning, we shall, nevertheless, in the +process of ascending, have to find something anterior to all reasoning; +namely, a point of departure. Now from whence are the principles of +reasoning derived? Either from the senses or the intelligence. (Could +the divinity have made use of principles derived from the senses?) +(When God created) there were no senses in existence yet; therefore +(the divinity must have reasoned) from principles derived from +Intelligence. But if the premises were conceptions of Intelligence, +then it was impossible for knowledge and reasoning to have some +sense-thing as object, as reasoning that has intelligible principles +and conclusion could not result in producing a conception of the +sense-(world). Therefore the foresight which presided over the creation +of a living being or of a whole world could not have been the result of +reasoning.[69] + + +BOTH REASONING AND FORESIGHT ARE ONLY FIGURATIVE EXPRESSIONS. + +There is indeed no reasoning in the divinity. When we speak of it, +in connection with the divinity, it is only to explain that He has +regulated everything as might have been done by some wise man, who +would have reasoned about results. Attributing foresight to the +divinity indicates merely that He has disposed everything as might have +been done by some wise man who had foreseen results.[70] Indeed the +only use of reasoning is to put in order things whose existence is not +anterior to that of reasoning, every time that that (Intelligence), +the power superior to reasoning, is not strong enough. Likewise, +prevision is necessary in this case, because he who makes use of it +does not possess a power that would enable him to forego or do without +it. Prevision proposes to effect some one thing instead of another, +and seems to fear that that which it desires might not occur. But, +for a (being) which can do but one thing, both foresight and the +reasoning that decides between contraries, are useless; for there is +no need of reasoning when, of two contrary courses of action, one only +is possible. How would the Principle which is single, unitary and +simple, have need to reflect that He must do one thing, so that some +other might not take place, or to judge that the second would occur as +alternative to the first? How could He say that experience has already +demonstrated the utility of some one thing, and that it is well to make +use of it? If the divinity acted thus, then indeed would He have had +recourse to prevision, and consequently, to reasoning. It is on this +hypothesis that we said above that the divinity gave animals senses +and faculties; but it is quite a problem to know what and how He really +gave them. + + +IN GOD ALL THINGS WERE SIMULTANEOUS, THOUGH WHEN REALIZED THEY +DEVELOPED. + +Indeed, if it be admitted that in the divinity no actualization is +imperfect, if it be impossible to conceive in Him anything that is not +total or universal, each one of the things that He contains comprises +within Himself all things. Thus as, to the divinity, the future is +already present, there could not be anything posterior to Him; but what +is already present in Him becomes posterior in some other (being). Now +if the future be already present in the divinity, it must be present +in Him as if what will happen were already known; that is, it must be +so disposed as to find itself sufficiently provided for, so as not to +stand in need of anything. Therefore, as all things existed already +within the divinity (when living beings were created), they had been +there from all eternity; and that in a manner such that it would later +be possible to say, "this occurred after that." Indeed, when the things +that are in the divinity later develop and reveal themselves, then one +sees that the one is after the other; but, so far as they exist all +together, they constitute the universal (Being), that is, the principle +which includes its own cause. + + +IN THE INTELLIGIBLE, EVERYTHING POSSESSES ITS REASON AS WELL AS ITS +FORM. + +2. (By this process) we also know the nature of Intelligence, which +we see still better than the other things, though we cannot grasp +its magnitude. We admit, in fact, that it possesses the whatness +(essence[71]), of everything, but not its "whyness" (its cause); or, +if we grant (that this "cause" be in Intelligence), we do not think +that it is separated (from its "whatness" (or, essence[72]). Let +us suppose that, for instance, the man, or, if possible, the eye, +should offer itself to our contemplation (in the intelligible world) +as a statue, or as a part of it, would do. The man that we see on +high is both essence[73] and cause. As well as the eye, he must be +intellectual, and contain his cause. Otherwise, he could not exist in +the intelligible world. Here below, just as each part is separated from +the others, so is the cause separated (from the essence). On high, on +the contrary, all things exist in unity, and each thing is identical +with its cause. This identity may often be noticed even here below, as +for instance, in eclipses.[74] It would therefore seem probable that +in the intelligible world everything would, besides the rest, possess +its cause, and that its cause constitutes its essence. This must be +admitted; and that is the reason why those who apply themselves to +grasp the characteristic[75] of each being succeed (in also grasping +its cause). Indeed that which each (being) is, depends on the "cause of +such a form."[76] To repeat: not only is a (being's) form its cause, +(which is incontestable), but yet, if one analyses each form considered +in itself, its cause will be found. The only things which do not +contain their causes are those whose life is without reality, and whose +existence is shadowy. + + +INTELLIGENCE CONTAINS THE CAUSE OF ALL ITS FORMS. + +What is the origin of the cause of what is a form, which is +characteristic of Intelligence? It is not from Intelligence, because +the form is not separable from Intelligence, combining with it to form +one single and same thing. If then Intelligence possess the forms +in their fulness, this fulness of forms implies that they contain +their cause. Intelligence contains the cause of each of the forms it +contains. It consists of all these forms taken together, or separately. +None of them needs discovery of the cause of its production, for +simultaneously with its production, it has contained the cause of its +hypostatic existence. As it was not produced by chance, it contains all +that belongs to its cause; consequently, it also possesses the whole +perfection of its cause. Sense-things which participate in form do not +only receive their nature from it, but also the cause of this nature. +If all the things of which this universe is composed be intimately +concatenated; and if the universe, containing all things, also contain +the cause of each of them; if its relation with them be the same as +that of the body with its organs, which do not mature successively, but +which, towards each other, are mutually related as cause and effect; +so much the more, in the intelligible world, must things have their +"causes," all of them in general in respect to the totality, and each +independently in respect to itself. + + +IN THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD EACH BEING IS ACCOMPANIED BY ITS WHYNESS. + +Since all intelligible (entities) have a hypostatic consubstantial +existence affording no room for chance; and as they are not separated +from each other, things that are caused must bear these their causes +within themselves, and each of them has some sort of a cause, though +without really possessing one. If there be no cause for the existence +of the intelligibles; and if, though isolated from all causes, they be +self-sufficient; it can only be because they carry their cause along +with them, when they are considered in themselves. As they contain +nothing fortuitous, and as each of them is manifold, and as its cause +is all that they contain, we might assign this cause to themselves. +Thus in the intelligible world "being" is preceded, or rather +accompanied by its cause, which is still more "being" than cause, +or rather which becomes identified with it. What superfluousness, +indeed, could there be in intelligence, unless its conceptions +resemble imperfect productions? If its conceptions be perfect, one +could neither discover what they lack, nor define their cause, and, +since they possess everything, they also possess their cause. There, +"being" and cause are united; the presence of both is recognized +in each conception, in each actualization of intelligence. Let us, +for instance, consider the intelligible Man; he seems complete, in +his totality; all his attributes were his simultaneously from the +beginning; he was always entirely complete. It is the characteristic +of that which is generated not always to be what it ought to be, and +to need to acquire something. The intelligible Man is eternal; he is +therefore always complete; but that which becomes man must be generated +(being). + + +INTELLIGENCE DID NOT DELIBERATE BEFORE MAKING SENSE-MAN. + +3. But why could Intelligence not have deliberated before producing +the sense-man? The (man we know by our senses) was (created) by +similitude to the (intelligible Man), nothing can be added to him, +nothing subtracted. It is a mere supposition to say that Intelligence +deliberates and reasons. The theory that things were created, implies +preliminary deliberation and reasoning; but (the latter becomes +impossible) in the case of eternal generation, for that which +originates eternally,[77] cannot be the object of a deliberation. +Intelligence could not deliberate without having forgotten the course +it had followed before; it cannot improve later on without implying +that its beginnings were not perfectly beautiful; had they been this, +they would have remained so. If things be beautiful, it is that they +represent their cause well; for even here below an object is beautiful +only if it possess all its legitimate possessions; that is, if it +possess its proper form. It is the form that contains everything; +the form contains the matter, in the sense that it fashions matter, +and leaves nothing formless therein. But it would contain something +formless if a man lacked some part, as, for instance, an organ such as +the eye. + + +BEING CONTAINS ITS CAUSE. + +Thus, a thing is fully explained by the clearing up of its cause. Why +should there be eyebrows above the eye? That it may possess all that +is implied in its being. Were these parts of the body given to man to +protect him from dangers? That would be to establish within being a +principle charged to watch over being. The things of which we speak +are implied in the being that existed before them. Consequently, being +contains within itself the cause which, if distinct from being, is +nevertheless inseparable therefrom. All things are implied in each +other[100]; taken together, they form the total, perfect and universal +Being; their perfection is bound up with, and is inherent in their +cause; thus a (creature's) "being," its "characteristic" (to ti ên +einai), and its "cause" (why-ness) fall together. (Before asking an +important question we must premiss that) in the intelligible world +the cause that is complementary to a being is ultimately united to +it. We must also premiss that, by virtue of its perfection, divine +Intelligence contains the causes (as well as the beings[78]), so +that it is only "a posteriori" that we observe that things are well +regulated. If then the possession of senses, and indeed of particular +ones, be implied in the form of man by the eternal necessity and +perfection of divine Intelligence, then the intelligible Man was by +no means mere intelligence, receiving the senses when descending into +generation. (If then having senses be implied in the form of man), does +not Intelligence incline towards the things here below? In what do +these senses (which are attributed to the intelligible Man) consist? +Are these senses the potentiality of perceiving sense-objects? But it +would be absurd that, on high, man should from all eternity possess +the potentiality of feeling, yet feel only here below, and that this +potentiality should pass to actualization only when the soul became +less good (by its union to the body). + + +SUCH QUESTIONS DEMAND SCRUTINY OF THE INTELLIGIBLE MAN. + +4. To answer these questions, we would have to go back to the nature +of the intelligible Man. Before defining the latter, however, it +would indeed be far better to begin by determining the nature of the +sense-man, on the supposition that we know the latter very well, while +perhaps of the former, we have only a very inexact notion. + + +DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE MAN KNOWN BY THE SENSES AND THE INTELLIGIBLE MAN. + +But there are some (Aristotelians or Peripatetics) who might think +that the intelligible Man and the sense-man form but one. Let us first +discuss this point. Does the sense-man have a being different from the +soul which produces him, and makes him live and reason? Is he the soul +that is disposed in some special manner? Is he the soul that uses the +body in some particular way? If man be a reasonable living organism, +and if the latter be composed of soul and body, this definition of man +will not be identical with that of the soul. If the man be defined as +being the composite of the reasonable soul and the body, how can he be +an immortal hypostatic existence? This definition suits the sense-man +only from the moment that the union of the soul and the body has +occurred; it expresses what will be, instead of setting forth what we +call the Man-in-himself; rather than being a real determination of his +characteristics, it would be only a description which would not reveal +the original being. Instead of defining form engaged in matter, it +indicates what is the composite of soul and body, after the union has +occurred. In this case, we do not yet know what is man considered in +his being, which is intelligible. To the claim that the definition of +sense-things should express something composite, it might be answered, +that we do acknowledge that we must not determine the consistence of +each thing. Now if it be absolutely necessary to define the forms +engaged in matter, we must also define the being that constitutes the +man; that is necessary especially for those (Peripateticians) who, by a +definition, mean a statement of a being's original "characteristics." + + +MAN DEFINED AS A REASONABLE SOUL. + +What then is the "being" of man? This really is asking for the +"man-ness" of a man, something characteristic of him, and inseparable +from him. Is the genuine definition of a man that "he is a reasonable +animal"? Would not this rather be the definition of the composite +man? What is the being that produces the reasonable animal? In the +above definition of man, "reasonable animal" means "reasonable life"; +consequently, man may be called the "reasonable life." But can life +exist without a soul? (No), for the soul will give the man reasonable +life; and in this case, instead of being a substance, man will be +only an actualization of the soul; or even, the man will be the soul +herself. But if man be the reasonable soul, what objection will there +be to his remaining man even when his soul should happen to pass into a +different body (as that of a brute animal)? + + +MAN AS A SOUL SUBSISTING IN A SPECIAL REASON. + +5. Man must therefore have as "reason" (or, as essence), something else +than the soul. Still, in this case, man might be something composite; +that is, the soul would subsist in a particular "reason," admitting +that this "reason" was a certain actualization of the soul, though this +actualization could not exist without its producing principle. Now such +is the nature of the "seminal reasons." They do not exist without the +soul; for the generating reasons are not inanimate; and nevertheless +they are not the soul purely and simply. There is therefore nothing +surprising in the statement that these (human) beings are ("seminal) +reasons." + + +THESE REASONS ARE THE ACTUALIZATIONS OF THE SOUL WHICH BEGETS THE +ANIMAL. + +Of which soul are these reasons,[79] which do not beget the man +(though they do beget the animal), then the actualization? Not of the +vegetative soul; they are the actualizations of the (reasonable) soul +which begets the animal,[80] which is a more powerful, and therefore +a more living soul. Man is constituted[81] by the soul disposed in +some manner, when present to matter disposed in some particular +fashion--since the soul is some particular thing, according as she is +in some particular disposition--even in the body. In the bodies, she +fashions a resembling form. So far as the nature of the body allows +it, she thus produces an image of the man, as the painter himself +makes an image of the body; she produces, I repeat, an inferior man +(the sense-man, the animal), which possesses the form of man, his +reasons, morals, dispositions, faculties, although in an imperfect +manner, because he is not the first man (the intellectual man). He has +sensations of another kind; sensations which, though they seem clear, +are obscure, if they be compared to the superior sensations of which +they are the images. The superior man (the reasonable man) is better, +has a diviner soul, and clearer sensations. It is he doubtless to whom +Plato refers (when he says, Man is the soul[82]); in his definition he +adds, "which makes use of the body," because the diviner man dominates +the soul which uses the body, and thus uses the body only in an +indirect manner.[83] + + +NATURE OF THE COMBINATION BEGOTTEN BY THE SOUL. + +In fact, the soul attaches herself to the thing begotten by the soul, +because she was capable of feeling. The soul does this by vivifying it +more; or rather, the soul does not attach herself thereto, but draws it +to herself. She does not depart from the intelligible world, but even +while remaining in contact with it, she holds the inferior soul (which +constitutes the sense-man) suspended to herself; and by her reason she +blends herself with this reason (or, she unites herself to this being +by her "being"). That is why this man (known by the senses), who by +himself is obscure, is enlightened by this illumination. + + +THE THREE MEN IN EACH OF US. + +6. What is the relation of the sense-power within the superior +Soul (or, in the rational soul)? Intelligible sensation perceives +(intelligible) objects that, speaking strictly, are not sensible, +and corresponds to the (intelligible) manner in which they are +perceivable. Thus (by this intelligible sense-power) the Soul perceives +the supersensual harmony and also the sensual, but in a manner such +as the sense-man perceives it, relating it so far as possible to the +superior harmony,[99] just as he relates the earthly fire to the +intelligible Fire, which is above, and which the superior Soul felt in +a manner suitable to the nature of this fire. If the bodies which are +here below were up there also, the superior Soul would feel them and +perceive them. The man who exists on high is a Soul disposed in some +particular manner, capable of perceiving these objects; hence the man +of the last degree (the sense-man) being the image of the intelligible +Man, has reasons (faculties) which are also images (faculties possessed +by the superior Man). The man who exists in the divine Intelligence +constitutes the Man superior to all men. He illuminates the second +(the reasonable man), who in his turn illuminates the third (the +sense-man). The man of this last degree somewhat possesses the two +others; he is not produced by them, he is rather united to them. The +man who constitutes us actualizes himself as the man of the last +degree. The third receives something of the second; and the second is +the actualization of the first.[84] Each man's nature depends on the +"man" according to whom he acts (the man is intellectual, reasonable, +or sensual according as he exercises intelligence, discursive reason, +or sensibility). Each one of us possesses the three men in one sense +(potentially); and does not possess them in another (in actualization; +that is, he does not simultaneously exercise intellect, reason, or +sense). + + +FATE OF THESE THREE MEN, IN BRUTALIZATION AND IN DIVINIZATION. + +When the third life (the sense-power) which constitutes the third +man, is separated from the body, if the life that precedes it (the +discursive reason) accompany it without nevertheless being separated +from the intelligible world, then one may say that the second is +everywhere the third is. It might seem surprising that the latter, when +passing into the body of a brute, should drag along that part which +is the being of man. This being was all beings (potentially); only, at +different times, it acts through different faculties. So far as it is +pure, and is not yet depraved, it wishes to constitute a man, and it +is indeed a man that it constitutes; for to form a man is better (than +to form a brute), and it does what is best. It also forms guardians +of the superior order, but such as are still conformable to the being +constituent of manhood. The (intellectual) Man, who is anterior to this +being, is of a nature still more like that of the guardians, or rather, +he is already a divinity. The guardian attached to a divinity is an +image of him, as the sense-man is the image of the intellectual man +from whom he depends; for the principle to which man directly attaches +himself must not be considered as his divinity. There is a difference +here, similar to that existing between the souls, though they all +belong to the same order.[86] Besides, those guardians whom Plato +simply calls "guardians" (demons), should be called guardian-like, or +"demonic" beings.[87] Last, when the superior Soul accompanies the +inferior soul which has chosen the condition of a brute, the inferior +soul which was bound to the superior soul--even when she constituted +a man--develops the ("seminal) reason" of the animal (whose condition +she has chosen); for she possesses that "reason" in herself; it is her +inferior actualization. + + +ANIMAL SEMINAL REASONS MAY BE CONTRARY TO SOUL'S NATURE; THOUGH NOT TO +THE SOUL HERSELF. + +7. It may however be objected that if the soul produce the nature of a +brute only when she is depraved and degraded, she was not originally +destined to produce an ox or a horse; then the ("seminal) reason" of +the horse, as well as the horse itself, will be contrary to the nature +(of the soul). No: they are inferior to her nature, but they are not +contrary to her. From her very origin, the soul was (potentially) the +("seminal) reason" of a horse or a dog. When permitted, the soul which +was to beget an animal, produces something better; when hindered, she +(only) produces what accords with the circumstances. She resembles the +artists who, knowing how to produce several figures, create either +the one they have received the order to create, or the one that is +most suited to the material at hand. What hinders the (natural and +generative) power of the universal Soul, in her quality of universal +("seminal) Reason," from sketching out the outlines of the body, before +the soul powers (or, individual souls) should descend from her into +matter? What hinders this sketch from being a kind of preliminary +illumination of matter? What would hinder the individual soul from +finishing (fashioning the body sketched by the universal Soul), +following the lines already traced, and organizing the members pictured +by them, and becoming that which she approached by giving herself some +particular figure, just as, in a choric ballet, the dancer confines +himself to the part assigned to him? + + +THE SENSE-WORLD AND THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD ARE CONNECTED BY THE +MANIFOLD TRIPLE NATURE OF MAN. + +Such considerations have been arrived at merely as result of +scrutiny of the consequences of the principles laid down. Our +purpose was to discover how sensibility occurs in the man himself, +without intelligible things falling into generation. We recognized +and demonstrated that intelligible things do not incline towards +sense-things, but that, on the contrary, it is the latter that aspire +and rise to the former, and imitate them; that the sense-man derives +from the intellectual man the power of contemplating intelligible +entities, though the sense-man remain united to sense-things, as the +intellectual man remains united to the intelligible entities. Indeed, +intelligible things are in some respects sensual; and we may call them +such because (ideally) they are Bodies, but they are perceived in a +manner different from bodies. Likewise, our sensations are less clear +than the perception which occurs in the intelligible world, and that +we also call Sensation, because it refers to Bodies (which exist on +high only in an ideal manner). Consequently, we call the man here below +sensual because he perceives less well things which themselves are less +good; that is, which are only images of intelligible things. We might +therefore say that sensations here below are obscure thoughts, and that +the Thoughts on high are distinct Sensations. Such are our views about +sensibility. + + +INTELLIGIBLE ANIMALS DO NOT INCLINE TOWARDS THE SENSE-WORLD FOR THEY +ARE PRE-EXISTING, AND ARE DISTINCT FROM THEIR CREATING IMAGE. + +8. (Now let us pass to the other question we asked). How does it +happen that all the Animals who, like the Horse itself, are contained +in divine Intelligence, do not incline towards the things here below +(by generating them)? Doubtless, to beget a horse, or any other animal +here below, divine Intelligence must hold its conception; nevertheless +it must not be believed that it first had the volition of producing +the horse, and only later its conception. Evidently, it could not have +wished to produce the horse, but because it already had the conception +thereof; and it could not have had the conception thereof but because +it had to produce the horse. Consequently, the Horse who was not +begotten preceded the horse who later was to be begotten. Since the +first Horse has been anterior to all generation, and was not conceived +to be begotten, it is not because the divine Intelligence inclines +towards the things here below, nor because it produces them, that it +contains the intelligible Horse and the other beings. The intelligible +entities existed already in Intelligence (before it begat) and the +sense-things were later begotten by necessary consequence; for it was +impossible that the procession should cease with the intelligibles. Who +indeed could have stopped this power of the (Intelligence) which is +capable of simultaneous procession, and of remaining within itself? + + +IRRATIONAL ANIMALS MUST EXIST WITHIN INTELLIGENCE, UNLESS MAN ALONE WAS +TO EXIST. + +But why should these Animals (devoid of reason) exist in the divine +Intelligence? We might understand that animals endowed with reason +might be found within it; but does this multitude of irrational animals +seem at all admirable? Does it not rather seem something unworthy of +the divine Intelligence? Evidently the essence which is one must be +also manifold, since it is posterior to the Unity which is absolutely +simple; otherwise, instead of being inferior to it, it would fuse +with it. Being posterior to that Unity, it could not be more simple, +and must therefore be less so. Now as the unity was the One who is +excellent, essence had to be less unitary, since multiplicity is the +characteristic of inferiority. But why should essence not be merely +the "pair" (instead of the manifold)? Neither of the elements of the +Pair could any longer be absolutely one, and each would itself become a +further pair; and we might point out the same thing of each of the new +elements (in which each element of the primary Pair would have split +up). Besides, the first Pair contains both movement and stability; it +is also intelligence and perfect life. The character of Intelligence +is not to be one, but to be universal; it therefore contains all the +particular intelligences; it is all the intelligences, and at the +same time it is something greater than all. It possesses life not as +a single soul, but as a universal Soul, having the superior power of +producing individual souls. It is besides the universal living Organism +(or, Animal); consequently, it should not contain man alone (but also +all the other kinds of animals); otherwise, man alone would exist upon +the earth. + + +MANY ANIMALS ARE NOT SO IRRATIONAL AS DIFFERENT. + +9. It may be objected that Intelligence might (well) contain the +ideas of animals of a higher order. But how can it contain the ideas +of animals that are vile, or entirely without reason? For we should +consider vile every animal devoid of reason and intelligence, since it +is to these faculties that those who possess them owe their nobility. +It is doubtless difficult to understand how things devoid of reason +and intelligence can exist in the divine Intelligence, in which are +all beings, and from which they all proceed. But before beginning the +discussion of this question, let us assume the following verities as +granted: Man here below is not what is man in the divine Intelligence, +any more than the other animals. Like them, in a higher form, he dwells +within (the divine Intelligence); besides, no being called reasonable +may be found within it, for it is only here below that reason is +employed; on high the only acts are those superior to discursive +reason.[88] + +Why then is man here below the only animal who makes use of reason? +Because the intelligence of Man, in the intelligible world, is +different from that of other animals, and so his reason here below must +differ from their reason; for it can be seen that many actions of other +animals imply the use of judgment. + +(In reply, it might be asked) why are not all animals equally +rational? And why are not all men also equally rational? Let us +reflect: all these lives, which represent as many movements; all +these intelligences, which form a plurality; could not be identical. +Therefore they had to differ among each other, and their difference +had to consist in manifesting more or less clearly life and +intelligence; those that occupy the first rank are distinguished by +primary differences; those that occupy the second rank, by secondary +differences; and so forth. Thus, amidst intelligences, some constitute +the divinities, others the beings placed in the second rank, and +gifted with reason; further, other beings that we here call deprived +of reason and intelligence really were reason and intelligence in the +intelligible world. Indeed, he who thinks the intelligible Horse, for +instance, is Intelligence, just as is the very thought of the horse. +If nothing but thought existed, there would be nothing absurd in that +this thought, while being intellectual, might, as object, have a being +devoid of intelligence. But since thought and the object thought fuse, +how could thought be intellectual unless the object thought were so +likewise? To effect this, Intelligence would, so to speak, have to +render itself unintelligent. But it is not so. The thing thought is +a determinate intelligence, just as it is a determinate life. Now, +just as no life, whatever it be, can be deprived of vitality, so no +determinate intelligence can be deprived of intellectuality. The very +intelligence which is proper to an animal, such as, for instance, man, +does not cease being intelligence of all things; whichever of its +parts you choose to consider, it is all things, only in a different +manner; while it is a single thing in actualization, it is all things +in potentiality. However, in any one particular thing, we grasp only +what it is in actualization. Now what is in actualization (that is, a +particular thing), occupies the last rank. Such, in Intelligence, for +instance, is the idea of the Horse. In its procession, Intelligence +continues towards a less perfect life, and at a certain degree +constitutes a horse, and at some inferior degree, constitutes some +animal still inferior; for the greater the development of the powers of +Intelligence, the more imperfect these become. At each degree in their +procession they lose something; and as it is a lower degree of essence +that constitutes some particular animal, its inferiority is redeemed +by something new. Thus, in the measure that life is less complete in +the animal, appear nails, claws, or horns, or teeth. Everywhere that +Intelligence diminishes on one side, it rises on another side by the +fulness of its nature, and it finds in itself the resources by which to +compensate for whatever it may lack. + + +APPARENT IMPERFECTIONS ARE ONLY LOWER FORMS OF PERFECTION. + +10. But how can there be anything imperfect in the intelligible world? +Why does the intelligible Animal have horns? Is it for its defense?[89] +To be perfect and complete. It is to be perfect as an animal, perfect +as intelligence, and perfect as life; so that, if it lack one quality, +it may have a substitute. The cause of the differences, is that +what belongs to one being finds itself replaced in another being by +something else; so that the totality (of the beings) may result in the +most perfect Life, and Intelligence, while all the particular beings +which are thus found in the intelligible essence are perfect so far as +they are particular. + + +CO-EXISTENCE OF UNITY AND MULTIPLICITY DEMANDS ORGANIZATION IN SYSTEM. + +The essence must be simultaneously one and manifold. Now it cannot be +manifold if all the things that exist within it be equal; it would +then be an absolute unity. Since therefore (essence) forms a composite +unity, it must be constituted by things which bear to each other +specific differences, such that its unity shall allow the existence of +particular things, such as forms and reasons (beings). The forms, such +as those of man, must contain all the differences that are essential +to them. Though there be a unity in all these forms, there are also +things more or less delicate (or highly organized), such as the eye or +the finger. All these organs, however, are implied in the unity of the +animal, and they are inferior only relatively to the totality. It was +better that things should be such. Reason (the essence of the animal) +is animal, and besides, is something different from the animal. Virtue +also bears a general character, and an individual one. The totality (of +the intelligible world) is beautiful, because what is common (to all +beings), does not offer any differences. + + +BUT HOW COULD THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD CONTAIN VEGETABLES OR METALS? + +11. (The Timaeus of Plato[90]) states that heaven has not scorned to +receive any of the forms of the animals, of which we see so great +a number. The cause must be that this universe was to contain the +universality of things. Whence does it derive all the things it +contains? From on high? Yes, it received from above all the things that +were produced by reason, according to an intelligible form. But, just +as it contains fire and water, it must also contain plant-life. Now, +how could there be plant-life in the intelligible world? Are earth and +fire living entities within it? For they must be either living or dead +entities; in the latter case, not everything would be alive in the +intelligible world. In what state then do the above-mentioned objects +find themselves on high (in the intelligible world)? + +First it can be demonstrated that plants contain nothing opposed to +reason; since, even here below, a plant contains a "reason" which +constitutes its life.[91] But if the essential "reason" of the plant, +which constitutes it, is a life of a particular kind, and a kind of +soul, and if this "reason" itself be a unity, is it the primary Plant? +No: the primary Plant, from which the particular plant is derived, is +above that "reason." The primary Plant is unity; the other is multiple, +and necessarily derives from this unity. If so, the primary Plant must +possess life in a still higher degree, and be the Plant itself from +which the plants here below proceed, which occupy the second or third +rank, and which derive from the primary Plant the traces of the life +they reveal. + + +HOW THE EARTH EXISTS IN THE INTELLIGIBLE. + +But how does the earth exist in the intelligible world? What is its +essence? How can the earth in the intelligible world be alive there? +Let us first examine our earth, that is, inquire what is its essence? +It must be some sort of a shape, and a reason; for the reason of the +plant is alive, even here below. Is there then a living ("seminal) +reason" in the earth also? To discover the nature of the earth, +let us take essentially terrestrial objects, which are begotten or +fashioned by it. The birth of the stones, and their increase, the +interior formation of mountains, could not exist unless an animated +reason produced them by an intimate and secret work. This reason is +the "form of the earth,"[92] a form that is analogous to what is +called nature in trees. The earth might be compared to the trunk of a +tree, and the stone that can be detached therefrom to the branch that +can be separated from the trunk. Consideration of the stone which is +not yet dug out of the earth, and which is united to it as the uncut +branch is united to the tree, shows that the earth's nature, which +is a productive force, constitutes a life endowed with reason; and +it must be evident that the intelligible earth must possess life at +a still higher degree, that the rational life of the earth is the +Earth-in-itself, the primary Earth, from which proceeds the earth here +below. + + +THE FIRE AS IT IS IN THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD. + +If fire also be a reason engaged in matter, and in this respect +resemble the earth, it was not born by chance. Whence would it +come?[93] Lucretius thought it came from rubbing (sticks or stones). +But fire existed in the universe before one body rubbed another; +bodies already possess fire when they rub up against one another; for +it must not be believed that matter possesses fire potentially, so +that it is capable of producing it spontaneously. But what is fire, +since the principle which produces the fire, giving it a form, must +be a "reason"? It is a soul capable of producing the fire, that is, a +"reason" and a life, which (fuse) into one thing. That is why Plato +says that in every object there is a soul[94]; that is, a power capable +of producing the sense-fire. Thus the principle which produces the fire +in our world is a "fiery life," a fire that is more real than ours. +Since then the intelligible Fire is a fire more real than ours, it also +possesses a moral life. The Fire-in-itself therefore possesses life. +There is a similar "reason" in the other elements, air and water. Why +should not these things be as animated as earth is? They are evidently +contained in the universal living Organism, and they constitute parts +thereof. Doubtless life is not manifest in them, any more than in the +earth; but it can be recognized in them, as it is recognized in the +earth, by its productions; for living beings are born in the fire, and +still more in the water, as is better known; others also are formed +in the air. The flames that we daily see lit and extinguished do not +manifest in the universal Soul (because of the shortness of their +duration); her presence is not revealed in the fire, because she does +not here below succeed in reaching a mass of sufficient permanency. + + +WATER AND AIR AS INTELLIGIBLE ENTITIES. + +It is not otherwise with water and air. If by their nature these +elements were more consistent, they would reveal the universal Soul; +but as their essence is dispersed, they do not reveal the power that +animates them. In a similar case are the fluids occurring in our body, +as, for instance, the blood; the flesh, which seems animated, is formed +at the expense of the blood.[95] The latter must therefore enjoy the +presence of the soul, though it seem deprived of the (soul) because +(the blood) manifests no sensibility, opposes no resistance, and by its +fluidity easily separates itself from the soul that vivifies it, as +happens to the three elements already mentioned. Likewise the animals +which Nature forms out of condensed air feel without suffering.[96] As +fixed and permanent light penetrates the air so long as the air itself +is permanent, the soul also penetrates the atmosphere surrounding her +without being absorbed by it. Other elements are in the same case. + + +THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD IS A COMPLETE MODEL OF THIS OUR UNIVERSE. + +12. We therefore repeat that since we admit that our universe is +modeled on the intelligible World, we should so much the more recognize +that the latter is the universal living Organism, which constitutes +all things because it consists of perfect essence. Consequently in the +intelligible world, the heavens also are an animated being, not even +lacking what here below are called the stars; indeed the latter are +what constitutes the heavens' essence. Neither is the Earth on high +something dead; for it is alive, containing all the Animals that walk +on the ground, and that are named terrestrial, as well as Vegetation +whose foundation is life. On high exist also the Sea and the Water in +universal condition, in permanent fluidity and animation, containing +all the Animals that dwell in the water. Air also forms part of the +intelligible world, with the Animals that inhabit the air, and which on +high possess a nature in harmony with it. How indeed could the things +contained in a living being not also themselves be living beings? +Consequently they are also such here below. Why indeed should not all +the animals necessarily exist in the intelligible World? The nature of +the great parts of this world indeed necessarily determines the nature +of the animals that these parts contain. Thus from the "having" and +"being" (existence and nature) of the intelligible world is derived +that of all the beings contained therein. These things imply each +other. To ask the reason for the existence of the Animals contained in +the intelligible world, is to ask why exists this very world itself, +or the universal living Organism, or, what amounts to the same thing, +why exist the universal Life, the universal Soul, in which are found no +fault, no imperfection, and from which everywhere overflows the fulness +of life. + + +ALL THINGS UNITED BY A COMMON SOURCE. + +All these things derive from one and the same source; it is neither a +breath nor a single heat; but rather a single quality, which contains +and preserves within itself all the qualities, the sweetness of the +most fragrant perfumes, the flavor of the wine, and of the finest tasty +juices, the gleam of the most flashing colors, the softness of the +objects which flatter touch with the greatest delicacy, the rhythm and +harmony of all the kinds of sounds which can charm the hearing. + + +SIMPLICITY OF THE INTELLIGIBLE DOES NOT DENY COMPOSITENESS, BUT INFERS +HEIGHT OF SOURCE. + +13. Neither Intelligence, nor the Soul that proceeds therefrom, are +simple; both contain the universality of things with their infinite +variety, so far as these are simple, meaning that they are not +composite, but that they are principles and actualizations; for, in +the intelligible world, the actualization of what occupies the last +rank is simple; the actualization of what occupies the first rank is +universal. Intelligence, in its uniform movement, always trends towards +similar and identical things; nevertheless, each of them is identical +and single, without being a part; it is on the contrary universal, +because what, in the intelligible world, is a part, is not a simple +unit, but a unity that is infinitely divisible. In this movement, +Intelligence starts from one object, and goes to another object which +is its goal. But does all that is intermediary resemble a straight +line, or to a uniform and homogeneous body? There would be nothing +remarkable about that; for if Intelligence did not contain differences, +if no diversity awoke it to life, it would not be an actualization; its +state would not differ from inactivity. If its movement were determined +in a single manner, it would possess but a single kind of (restricted) +life, instead of possessing the universal Life. Now it should contain +an universal and omnipresent Life; consequently, it must move, or +rather have been moved towards all (beings). If it were to move in a +simple and uniform manner, it would possess but a single thing, would +be identical with it, and no longer proceed towards anything different. +If however it should move towards something different, it would have +to become something different, and be two things. If these two things +were then to be identical, Intelligence would still remain one, and +there would be no progress left; if, on the contrary, these two things +were to be different, it would be proceeding with this difference, and +it would, by virtue of this difference joined to its divinity, beget +some third thing. By its origin, the latter is simultaneously identical +and different; not of some particular difference, but of all kinds +of difference, because the identity it contains is itself universal. +Thus being universal difference as well as universal identity, this +thing possesses all that is said to be different; for its nature +is to be universal differentiation (to spread over everything, to +become everything else). If all these differences preceded this +(Intelligence), the latter would be modified by them. If this be not +the case, Intelligence must have begotten all the differences, or +rather, be their universality. + + +INTELLIGENCE EVOLVES OVER THE FIELD OF TRUTH. + +Essences ("beings") therefore cannot exist without an actualization +of Intelligence. By this actualization, after having produced some +("being"), Intelligence always produces some other one, somehow +carrying out the career which it is natural for veritable Intelligence +to carry out within itself; this career is that of the beings, of +which each corresponds to one of its evolutions, (or, it roams around +among beings, so that through its roaming around these beings unite +and form.) Since Intelligence is everywhere identical, its evolutions +imply permanence, and they make it move around the "field of truth"[97] +without ever issuing therefrom. It occupies this whole field, because +Intelligence has made itself the locality where its evolutions +operate, a locality which is identical with what it contains. This +field is varied enough to offer a career to be fulfilled; if it were +not universally and eternally varied, there would be a stopping-place +where variety would cease; and, were Intelligence to stop, it would +not think; and if it had never stopped, it would have existed without +thought (or, it would not exist). This however, is not the case; +therefore thought exists, and its universal movement produces the +fulness of universal "Being." Universal "Being," however, is the +thought that embraces universal Life, and which, after each thing, ever +conceives some other; because, since that which within it is identical +is all so different. It continually divides and ever finds something +different from the others. In its march, Intelligence ever progresses +from life to life, from animated (beings) to animated (beings); just +as some traveller, advancing on the earth, finds all that he travels +through to be earth, whatever variations thereof there may have been. +In the intelligible world, the life whose field one traverses is always +self-identical, but it is also always different. The result is that +(this sphere of operations) does not seem the same to us, because in +its evolution, which is identical, life experiences (or, traverses) +things which are not the same. That however does not change this life, +for it passes through different things in a uniform and identical +manner. If this uniformity and identity of Intelligence were not +applied to different things, Intelligence would remain idle; it would +no longer exist in actualization, and no more be actualization. Now +these different things constitute Intelligence itself. Intelligence is +therefore universal, because this universality forms its very nature. +Being thus universal, Intelligence is all things; there is nothing in +it which does not contribute to its universality; and everything is +different, so as to be able still to contribute to totality, by its +very difference. If there were no difference, if everything in it were +identical, the being of Intelligence would be diminished, inasmuch as +its nature would no more co-operate towards its harmonic consummation. + + +INTELLIGENCE CONTAINS THE INFINITE AS SIMULTANEOUSNESS OF ONE AND MANY +AND AS FRIENDSHIP. + +14. By intellectual examples we can understand the nature of +Intelligence, and see that it could not be a unity which does not admit +any kind of difference. As example, consider the ("seminal) reason" of +a plant, and that of an animal. If it be only a unity, without any kind +of variety, it is not even a "reason," and what is born will be no more +than matter. This "reason" must therefore contain all the organs; and, +while embracing all matter, it must not leave any part of it to remain +identical with any other. For instance, the face does not form a single +mass; it contains the nose and the eyes. Nor is even the nose something +simple; it contains different parts whose variety make of it an organ; +if it were reduced to a state of absolute simplicity, it would be no +more than a mass. Thus Intelligence contains the infinite, because +it is simultaneously one and manifold; not indeed like a house, but +as is a ("seminal) reason" which is manifold interiorly. It contains +within, therefore, a sort of figure (or scheme) or even a picture, on +which are interiorly drawn or inscribed its powers and thoughts; their +division does not take place exteriorly, for it is entirely interior. +Thus the universal living Organism embraces other living beings, +within which may be discovered still smaller living beings, and still +smaller powers, and so on till we arrive at the "atomic form."[98] +All these forms are distinguished from each other by their division, +without ever having been confounded together, though they all occur in +the constitution of a single unity. Thus exists in the intelligible +world that union (by Empedocles) called "friendship"; but such union +is very different from that which exists in the sense-world.[163] In +fact, the latter is only the image of the first, because it is formed +of completely disparate elements. Veritable union however consists +in forming but a single (thing) without admitting of any separation +between (elements). Here below, however, objects are separated from +each other. + + +B. A STUDY OF THE GOOD. + + +ALL SOULS ARE UNITED BY THEIR HIGHEST, WITH INTELLIGENCE SHINING DOWN +FROM THE PEAK THEY FORM. + +15. Who then will be able to contemplate this multiple and universal +Life, primary and one, without being charmed therewith, and without +scorning every other kind of life? For our lives here below, that +are so weak, impotent, incomplete, whose impurity soils other lives, +can be considered as nothing but tenebrous. As soon as you consider +these lives, you no longer see the others, you no longer live with +these other lives in which everything is living; which are relieved +of all impurity, and of all contact with evil. Indeed, evil reigns +here below only[164]; here where we have but a trace of Intelligence +and of the intelligible life. On the contrary, in the intelligible +world exists "that archetype which is beneficent (which possesses the +form of Good"), as says Plato,[101] because it possesses good by the +forms (that is, by the ideas). Indeed, the absolute Good is something +different from the Intelligence which is good only because its life +is passed in contemplating the Good. The objects contemplated by +Intelligence are the essences which have the form of Good, and which +it possesses from the moment it contemplates the Good. Intelligence +receives the Good, not such as the Good is in itself, but such as +Intelligence is capable of receiving it. The Good is indeed the +supreme principle. From the Good therefore, Intelligence derives its +perfection; to the Good Intelligence owes its begetting of all the +intelligible entities; on the one hand, Intelligence could not consider +the Good without thinking it; on the other, it must not have seen in +the Good the intelligible entities, otherwise, Intelligence itself +could not have begotten them. Thus Intelligence has, from the Good, +received the power to beget, and to fill itself with that which it has +begotten.[102] The Good does not Himself possess the things which He +thus donates; for He is absolutely one, and that which has been given +to Intelligence is manifold. Incapable in its plenitude to embrace, and +in its unity to possess the power it was receiving, Intelligence split +it up, thus rendering it manifold, so as to possess it at least in +fragments. Thus everything begotten by Intelligence proceeds from the +power derived from the Good, and bears its form; as intelligence itself +is good, and as it is composed of things that bear the form of Good, it +is a varied good. The reader may be assisted in forming a conception of +it by imagining a variegated living sphere, or a composite of animated +and brilliant faces. Or again, imagine pure souls, pure and complete +(in their essence), all united by their highest (faculties), and then +universal Intelligence seated on this summit, and illuminating the +whole intelligible region. In this simile, the reader who imagines +it considers it as something outside of himself; but (to contemplate +Intelligence) one has to become Intelligence, and then give oneself a +panorama of oneself. + + +INTELLIGENCE CONTAINS ALL THINGS THAT ARE CONFORMED TO THE GOOD. + +16. Instead of stopping at this multiple beauty, it must be abandoned +to rise (to the Good), the supreme principle. By reasoning not +according to the nature of our world, but according to that of the +universal Intelligence, we should with astonishment ask ourselves +which is the principle that has begotten it, and how it did so.[103] +Each one (of the essences contained in the Intelligence) is a +(particular) form, and somehow has its own type. As their common +characteristic is to be assimilated to the Good, the consequence is +that Intelligence contains all the things conformable to the Good. It +possesses therefore the essence which is in all things; it contains all +the animals, as well as the universal Life within them, and all the +rest. + + +THE GOOD IS NOT ONLY THE CAUSE OF BEING, BUT ITS INTUITION AS WELL. + +Why must these things be considered as goods, when considered from +this point of view? The solution of this problem may be arrived at +from the following consideration. When for the first time Intelligence +contemplated the Good, this its contemplation split the Good's unity +into multiplicity. Though itself were a single being, this its thought +divided the unity because of its inability to grasp it in its entirety. +To this it may be answered that Intelligence was not yet such the first +time it contemplated the Good. Did it then contemplate the Good without +intelligence? Intelligence did not yet see the Good; but Intelligence +dwelt near it, was dependent on it, and was turned towards it.[104] +Having arrived at its fulness, because it was operating on high, and +was trending towards the Good, the movement of Intelligence itself led +it to its fulness; since then it was, no longer a single movement, but +a movement perfect and complete. It became all things, and possessing +self-consciousness, it recognized that itself was all things. It thus +became intelligence, which possesses its fulness so as to contain what +it should see, and which sees by the light that it receives from Him +from whom it derives what it sees. That is why the Good is said to be +not only the cause of "being," but rather the cause of the vision of +"being." As for sense-objects, the sun is the cause that makes them +exist, and renders them visible, as it is also the cause of vision, +and as however the sun is neither the vision nor the visible objects, +likewise the Good is the cause of being and of intelligence,[105] it +is a light in respect of the beings that are seen and the Intelligence +that sees them; but it is neither the beings nor the Intelligence; it +is only their cause; it produces thought by shedding its light on the +beings and on Intelligence. It is thus that Intelligence has arrived +to fulness, and that on arriving at fulness it has become perfect and +has seen. That which preceded its fulness is its principle. But it has +another principle (which is the Good), which is somewhat exterior to +it, and which gave it its fulness, and while giving it this fulness +impressed on it the form (of itself, the Good). + + +ALL IS INTELLIGENCE; BUT THIS IS DIFFERENTIATED INTO UNIVERSAL AND +INDIVIDUAL. + +17. How can (these beings) exist within Intelligence, and constitute +it, if they were neither in that which has given, nor in that which +has received this fulness, since, before receiving its fulness from +the Good, Intelligence had not yet received (these beings)? It is +not necessary that a principle should itself possess what it gives; +in intelligible things, it suffices to consider the giver superior, +and the receiver inferior; that (giving and receiving) is the content +of generation in the order of veritable beings.[106] What occupies +the front rank must be in actualization; posterior things must be +in potentiality of what precedes them. What occupies the front rank +is superior to what occupies the second rank; the giver, likewise +is superior to the gift, because it is better. If then there be a +Principle anterior to actualization, it must be superior both to +actualization and to life; and because it gave life to Intelligence it +is more beautiful, still more venerable than Life. Thus Intelligence +received life, without necessity for the principle from which it +received life having had to contain any variety. Life is the impress +of Him who gave it, but it is not his life. When Intelligence +glanced towards Him, it was indeterminate; as soon as it fixed its +glance on Him, it was determined by Him, although He himself had no +determination. As soon indeed as Intelligence contemplated the One, +Intelligence was determined by Him, and from Him it received its +determination, limit and form. The form exists in the receiver; the +giver has none of it. This determination has not been imposed from +without on Intelligence as is the case for the limit imposed on some +magnitude; it is the determination characteristic of that Life, which +is universal, multiple and infinite, because it has radiated from +the supreme Nature. That Life was not yet the life of any particular +principle; otherwise, it would have been determined as an individual +life. Nevertheless it has been determined, and by virtue of that +determination it is the life of a multiple unity. Each one of the +things that constitute its multiplicity has likewise been determined. +Indeed, life has been determined as multiplicity (of beings) because of +its own multiplicity; as unity, because of the very determination it +has received. What has been determined as unity? Intelligence, because +it is the determined life. What was determined as multiplicity? The +multiplicity of intelligences. Everything therefore is intelligence; +only, the Intelligence that is one is universal; while the +intelligences which form multiplicity are individual. + + +MULTIPLICITY OF INTELLIGENCES IMPLIES THEIR MUTUAL DIFFERENCES. + +If universal Intelligence comprises all the individual intelligences, +might not the latter all be identical? No, for then there would be but +one of them. The multiplicity of the intelligences implies therefore a +difference between them.[107] But how does each differ from the others? +Its difference resides in its being one; for there is no identity +between the universal Intelligence, and any particular intelligence. +Thus, in Intelligence, life is universal power; the vision which +emanates from it is the power of all things; and then Intelligence +itself, when it is formed, manifests all these things to us. He who +is seated above all of them is their principle, though they do not +serve Him as foundation; for, on the contrary, He is the foundation +of the form of the first forms, without Himself having any forms. In +respect to the Soul, Intelligence plays the part that the First plays +in respect to Intelligence; Intelligence sheds its light on the Soul, +and, to determine her, rationalizes her by communicating that of which +itself is the trace. The Intellect, therefore, is the trace of the +First; and while it is a form which develops in plurality, the First +has no shape nor form, so as to give form to all the rest. If itself +were a form, Intelligence would be nothing more than the "reason" +(the soul).[108] That is why the First could not have contained any +multiplicity; otherwise, its multiplicity itself would have had to be +traced to some superior principle. + + +LIFE, INTELLIGENCE, AND IDEA BEAR THE FORM OF THE GOOD. + +18. In what respects do the (entities) which are contained by +Intelligence seem to bear the form of the Good? Is it because each of +them is a form, or because each is beautiful, or perhaps for some other +reason? All that proceeds from the Good bears its characteristics or +impressions, or at least bears something derived from it, just as that +which is derived from the fire bears a trace of the fire,[109] and as +that which is derived from sweetness somehow betrays it. Now that, +which, in Intelligence, is derived from the Good is life, for life is +born from the actualization of the Good, and from Him again is derived +the beauty of forms. Therefore all these things, life, intelligence, +and idea will bear the form of Good. + + +THIS FORM OF THE GOOD MAY, HOWEVER, EXIST AT VARYING DEGREES. + +But what element is common to them? It does not suffice for them to +proceed from the Good to have something identical; they must also have +some common characteristic; for a same principle may give rise to +different things; or again, one and the same thing may become different +while passing from the giving principle into the receivers; for there +is a difference between that which constitutes the first actualization, +and that which is given thereby. Thus, that which is in the things of +which we speak is already different. Nothing hinders the characteristic +of all these things (in life, intelligence and idea) from being the +form of Good, but this form exists at different degrees in each of them. + + +INTELLIGENCE AND LIFE ARE ONLY DIFFERENT DEGREES OF THE SAME REALITY. + +In which of these things does the form of the Good inhere in the +highest degree? The solution of this problem depends on the following +one. Is life a good merely as such, even if it were life pure and +simple? Should we not rather limit that word "life" to the life which +derives from the Good, so that mere proceeding from the Good be a +sufficient characterization of life? What is the nature of this life? +Is it the life of the Good? No: life does not belong to the Good; it +only proceeds therefrom. If the characteristic of life be proceeding +from the Good, and if it be real life, evidently the result would be +that nothing that proceeds from the Good would deserve scorn, that +life as life should be considered good, that the same condition of +affairs obtains with the primary and veritable Intelligence, and that +finally each form is good and bears the form of Good. In this case, +each of these (life, intelligence and idea) possess a good which is +either common, or different, or which is of a different degree. Since +we have admitted that each of the above-mentioned things contains a +good in its being, then it is good chiefly because of this good. Thus +life is a good, not in so far as it is merely life, but in so far as +it is real life and proceeds from the Good. Intelligence likewise is +a good so far as it essentially is intelligence; there is therefore +some common element in life and intelligence. Indeed, when one and the +same attribute is predicated of different beings, although it form +an integral part of their being, it may be abstracted therefrom by +thought; thus from "man" and "horse" may be abstracted "animal"; from +"water" and "fire," "heat"; but what is common in these beings is a +genus, while what is common in intelligence and life, is one and the +same thing which inheres in one in the first degree, and in the other +in the second. + + +IS THE WORD GOOD A COMMON LABEL OR A COMMON QUALITY? + +Is it by a mere play on words that life, intelligence and ideas are +called good? Does the good constitute their being, or is each good +taken in its totality? Good could not constitute the being of each +of them. Are they then parts of the Good? The Good, however, is +indivisible. The things that are beneath it are good for different +reasons. The primary actualization (that proceeds from the Good) is +good; likewise, the determination it receives is good, and the totality +of both things is good. The actualization is good because it proceeds +from the Good; the determination, because it is a perfection that +has emanated from the Good; and the combination of actualization and +determination because it is their totality. All these things thus are +derived from one and the same principle, but nevertheless they are +different. Thus (in a choric ballet) the voice and the step proceed +from one and the same person, in that they are all perfectly regulated. +Now they are well regulated because they contain order and rhythm. +What then is the content in the above-mentioned things that would make +them good? But perhaps it may be objected that if the voice and step +are well regulated, each one of them entirely owes it to some external +principle, since the order is here applied to the things that differ +from each other. On the contrary, the things of which we speak are each +of them good in itself. And why are they good? It does not suffice to +say that they are good because they proceed from the Good. Doubtless we +shall have to grant that they are precious from the moment that they +proceed from the Good, but reason demands that we shall determine that +of which their goodness consists. + + +GOOD CANNOT BE A DESIRE OF THE SOUL. + +19. Shall the decision of what is good be entrusted to the desire +of the soul?[110] If we are to trust this affection of the soul, we +shall be declaring that whatever is desirable for her is good; but +we would not be seeking why the Good is desired. Thus, while we use +demonstrations to explain the nature of every entity, we would be +trusting to desire for the determination of the Good. Such a proceeding +would land us in several absurdities. First, the Good would only be an +attribute. Then, since our soul has several desires, and each of the +latter has different objects, we would not be able to decide which +of these objects would be the best, according to desire. It would be +impossible to decide what would be better before we know what is good. + + +NO NEED TO SEEK THE CAUSE OF GOOD AS IN THE INTELLIGIBLE THE CAUSE +COINCIDES WITH THE NATURE. + +Shall we then define the good as the virtue characteristic of each +being (as say the Stoics)? In this case, by strictly following (the +course of dialectics) we would reduce the Good to being a form and a +reason. But, having arrived there, what should we answer if we were +asked on what grounds these things themselves are good? In imperfect +things, it seems easy to distinguish the good, even though it be not +pure; but in intelligible things we may not immediately succeed in +discovering the Good by comparison with the inferior things. As there +is no evil on high (in the intelligible world), and as excellent +things exist in themselves, we find ourselves embarrassed. Perhaps we +are embarrassed only because we seek the cause ("whyness") (of the +good), whereas the cause ("whyness") is here identical with the nature +("whatness"), as intelligible entities are good in themselves. Nor +would we have solved the problem if we were to assign some other cause +(of the Good), such as the divinity, to which our reason has not yet +forced us to repair. However, we cannot retire, and we must seek to +arrive by some other road to something satisfactory. + + +PYTHAGOREAN OPPOSITIONS ARE ALSO WORTHLESS AS EXPLANATIONS OF GOOD. + +20. Since therefore we have given up desires as forms in the +determination of the nature and quality (of the good), shall we have +recourse to other rules, such as, for instance (the Pythagorean[104]) +"oppositions," such as order and disorder, proportion and +disproportion, health and sickness, form and formlessness, being and +destruction, consistence and its lack? Who indeed would hesitate to +attribute to the form of good those characteristics which constitute +the first member of each of these opposition-pairs? If so, the +efficient causes of these characteristics will also have to be traced +to the good; for virtue, life, intelligence and wisdom are comprised +within the form of good, as being things desired by the soul that is +wise. + + +GOOD NOT DEFINED BY INTELLIGENCE, AS THE SOUL HAS OTHER ASPIRATIONS. + +It will further be suggested (by followers of Aristotle) that we +stop at Intelligence, predicating goodness of it. For life and soul +are images of Intelligence. It is to Intelligence that the soul +aspires, it is according to Intelligence that the soul judges, it is +on Intelligence that the soul regulates herself, when she pronounces +that justice is better than injustice, in preferring every kind of +virtue to every kind of vice, and in holding in high estimation what +she considers preferable. Unfortunately, the soul does not aspire +to Intelligence exclusively. As might be demonstrated in a long +discussion, Intelligence is not the supreme goal to which we aspire, +and not everything aspires to Intelligence, whilst everything aspires +to the Good. The (beings) which do not possess intelligence do not +all seek to possess it, while those who do possess it, do not limit +themselves to it. Intelligence is sought only as the result of a train +of reasoning, whilst Good is desired even before reason comes into +play. If the object of desire be to live, to exist always, and to be +active, this object is not desired because of Intelligence, but because +of its being good, inasmuch as the Good is its principle and its goal. +It is only in this respect that life is desirable. + + +THE GOOD IS INTELLIGENCE AND PRIMARY LIFE. + +21. What then is the one and only cause to whose presence is due the +goodness (of life, intelligence and idea)? Let us not hesitate to say: +Intelligence and primary Life bear the form of Good; it is on this +account alone that they are desirable; they bear the form of Good in +this respect, that the primary Life is the actualization of the Good, +or rather the actualization that proceeds from the Good, and that +intelligence is determination of this actualization. (Intelligence and +primary Life) are fascinating, and the soul seeks them because they +proceed from the Good; nevertheless the soul aspires to them (only) +because they fit her, and not because they are good in themselves. On +the other hand, the soul could not disdain them because they bear the +form of good; though[112] we can disdain something even though it be +suitable to us, if it be not a good besides.[112] It is true that we +permit ourselves to be allured by distant and inferior objects, and +may even feel for them a passionate love; but that occurs only when +they have something more than their natural condition, and when some +perfection descends on them from on high. Just as the bodies, while +containing a light mingled with their (substance), nevertheless need +illumination by some other light to bring out their colors,[113] so the +intelligible entities, in spite of the light that they contain, need to +receive some other more powerful light, so as to become visible, both +for themselves, and for others. + + +GOOD CONSISTS IN ILLUMINATION BY THE EXTREME. + +22. When the soul perceives the light thus shed by the Good on +the intelligible entities, she flies towards them, tasting an +indescribable bliss in the contemplation of the light that illuminates +them. Likewise here below, we do not like the bodies for themselves, +but for the beauty that shimmers in them.[114] Each intelligible entity +owes its nature to none but to itself; but it only becomes desirable +when the Good, so to speak, illuminates and colors it, breathing +grace into the desired object, and inspiring love into the desiring +heart. As soon as the soul reacts to the influence of the Good, she +feels emotion, swells with fancy, is stung by desire, and love is born +within her.[115] Before reacting to the influence of good she feels no +transports when facing the beauty of Intelligence; for this beauty is +dead so long as it is not irradiated by the Good. Consequently the soul +still remains depressed and bowed down, cold and torpid, in front of +Intelligence. But as soon as she feels the gentle warmth of the Good, +she is refreshed, she awakes, and spreads her wings; and instead of +stopping to admire the Intelligence in front of her, she rises by the +aid of reminiscence to a still higher principle (the First). So long as +there is anything superior to what she possesses, she rises, allured +by her natural leaning for the Inspirer of love; so she passes through +the region of Intelligence, and stops at the Good because there is +nothing beyond. So long as she contemplates Intelligence, she surely +enjoys a noble and magnificent spectacle, but she does not yet fully +possess the object of her search. Such would be a human countenance, +which, in spite of its beauty, is not attractive, for lack of the +charm of grace. Beauty is, indeed, rather the splendor that enhalos +proportion, than proportion itself; and it is properly this splendor +which challenges love. Why indeed does beauty shine radiantly on the +face of a living person, and yet leave hardly a trace after death, +even when the complexion and features are not yet marred? Why, among +different statues, do the most life-like ones seem more beautiful than +others that may be better proportioned? Why is a living being, though +ugly, more beautiful than a pictured one, even though the latter were +the most handsome imaginable? The secret is that the living form seems +to us most desirable, because it possesses a living soul, because it is +most assimilated to the Good; because the soul is colored by the light +of the Good, and because, enlightened by the Good she is more wakeful +and lighter, and because in her turn she lightens the burdens, awakes, +and causes participation of the Good, so far as she may be able, in the +body within which she resides. + + +THE SUPREME IS THE GOOD BECAUSE OF HIS SUPREMACY. + +23. Since it is this Principle which the soul pursues, which +illuminates Intelligence, and whose least trace arouses in us so great +an emotion, there is no ground for astonishment if it possess the power +of exerting its fascination on all beings, and if all rest in Him +without seeking anything beyond. If indeed everything proceeds from +this principle, then there is nothing better, and everything else is +below Him. Now, how could the best of beings fail to be the Good? If +the Good be entirely self-sufficient, and have need of nothing else, +what could it be except the One who was what He is before all other +things, when evil did not yet exist? If all evils be posterior to +Him, if they exist only in the objects that in no way participate in +the Good, and which occupy the last rank, if no evil exist among the +intelligibles, and if there be nothing worse than evil (just as there +is nothing better than the Good), then evils are in complete opposition +to this principle, and it could be nothing else. To deny the existence +of the Good, we would also have to deny the existence of evil; and +the result would be a complete indifference of choice between any two +particular things; which is absurd. All other things called good refer +to Him, while He refers to nothing else. + + +THE GOOD AS CREATOR AND PRESERVER. + +But if this be the nature of the Good, what does He do? He made +Intelligence, and life. By the intermediation of Intelligence, He made +the souls and all the other beings that participate in Intelligence, +in Reason, or in Life. Moreover, who could express the goodness of Him +who is their source and principle? But what is He doing at the present +time? He preserves what He has begotten, He inspires the thought in +those who think, He vivifies the living, by His spirit,[116] He imparts +to all (beings) intelligence and life, and to those who are unable to +receive life, at least existence. + + +MANY FURTHER QUESTIONS ABOUT THE GOOD; FOR THE INDIVIDUAL IT IS +ILLUMINATION. + +24. And what is He doing for us? To answer this question, we would +still have to explain the light by which Intelligence is illuminated, +and in which the Soul participates. But we shall have to postpone this +discussion, and mention various other questions which may be asked. +Is the Good goodness, and does it receive this name because it is +desirable for some being? Is that which is desirable for some being the +good of this being, and do we call the Good that which is desirable +for all beings? Is being desirable not rather a simple characteristic +of the Good, and must not that which is desirable have a nature such +that it would deserve the name of Good?[117] Besides, do the beings +that desire the Good desire it because they receive from it something, +or merely because possession thereof causes bliss? If they do receive +something from it, what does it consist of? If the possession of the +Good give them joy, why should their joy come from possession of the +Good, rather than from possession of anything else? ls the Good such +by what is characteristic of it, or by something else? Is the Good an +attribute of some other being, or is the Good good for itself? Must not +the Good rather be good for others, without being good for itself? For +whom anyway is the Good good? For there is a certain nature (matter) +for which nothing is good. + + +ATTRIBUTING GOOD TO LIFE IS ONLY THE RESULT OF FEAR OF DEATH. + +Nor can we ignore an objection raised by an opponent who is difficult +to convince (Plato's Philebus): "Well, my friends, what then is this +entity that you celebrate in such pompous terms, ceaselessly repeating +that life and intelligence are goods, although you said that the +Good is above them? What sort of a good might the Intellect be? What +sort of a good should (a man) have, who thinks the Ideas themselves, +contemplating everything in itself? Perhaps, indeed, a man, when he +enjoys these (Ideas and contemplations), might be deceived into calling +them a good merely because he happened to be in pleasant circumstances; +but should these circumstances become unpleasant, on what grounds would +he call them a good? Merely because they (possess) existence? But what +pleasure or benefit could this afford him? If he did not consider +self-love as the foundation thereof, what difference could there be +for him between existence and non-existence? It is therefore to this +natural physical error (of self-love), and to the fear of death, that +we must trace the cause of the ascription of good to intelligence and +life."[118] + + +PLATO'S ANSWER TO PHILEBUS: THERE ARE TWO GOODS, THE HUMAN AND THE +UNIVERSAL. + +25. Plato therefore mingled the Good with pleasure, and did not +posit the Good exclusively in Intelligence, as he wrote in the +Philebus.[119] Appreciating this difficulty, he very rightly decided +on one hand that good did not consist in pleasure alone, and on the +other, that it did not consist in intelligence alone, inasmuch as he +failed to discover in it anything to arouse our desire. Perhaps Plato +had still another motive (in calling the Good a mixture), because he +thought that, with such a nature, the Good is necessarily full of +charm, desirable both for the seeker and the finder; whence it would +result that he who is not charmed has not found the Good, and that, +if he who desires be not happy, he evidently does not yet possess the +Good. It is not without a reason (that Plato formed this conception of +the Good); for he was not seeking to determine the universal Good, but +the good of man; and as such human good refers to (man, who is) a being +different from the absolute Good, then it becomes for him something +different from the Good in itself; and would therefore be defective and +composite. That is why (according to Plato), that which is alone and +single has no good, but is good in another and a higher sense. + + +THE ARISTOTELIAN SUPREME GOOD.[120] + +The good must then be desirable; but it is good not because it is +desirable, but it is desirable because it is good.[121] Thus in the +order of beings, rising from the last to the First, it will be found +that the good of each of them is in the one immediately preceding, +so long as this ascending scale remain proportionate and increasing. +Then we will stop at Him who occupies the supreme rank, beyond which +there is nothing more to seek. That is the First, the veritable, the +sovereign Good, the author of all goodness in other beings. The good +of matter is form; for if matter became capable of sensation it would +receive it with pleasure. The good of the body is the soul; for without +her it could neither exist nor last. The good of the soul is virtue; +and then higher (waits), Intelligence. Last, the good of Intelligence +is the principle called the Primary nature. Each of these goods +produces something within the object whose good it is. It confers order +and beauty (as form does on matter); or life (as the soul does on the +body); or wisdom and happiness (as intelligence does on soul). Last, +the Good communicates to Intelligence its influx, and actualization +emanating from the Good, and shedding on Intelligence what has been +called the light of the Good. The nature of this we shall study later. + + +THE TRUE GOOD IMPLIES A COUNTERFEIT GOOD. + +26. Recognition of goodness and so-called "possession" thereof consist +of enjoyment of the presence of good by the being who has received from +nature the faculty of sensation. How could it make a mistake about the +matter? The possibility of its being deceived implies the existence +of some counterfeit; in this case, the error of this being was caused +by that which resembled its good; for this being withdraws from what +had deceived it as soon as the Good presents itself. The existence of +a particular good for each being is demonstrated by its desire and +inclination. Doubtless, the inanimate being receives its good from +without; but, in the animated being, the desire spontaneously starts +to pursue the Good. That is why lifeless bodies are the objects of +solicitude and care of living beings, while the living beings watch +over themselves. + + +THE GOOD CANNOT BE PLEASURE WHICH IS CHANGEABLE AND RESTLESS. + +Now when a being has attained the good it was pursuing it is sure of +possessing it as soon as it feels that it is better, feels no regret, +is satisfied, takes pleasure therein, and seeks nothing beyond. What +shows the insufficiency of pleasure is that one does not always like +the same thing; doubtless pleasure ever charms, but the object which +produces it is not the same; it is always the newest object that +pleases most. Now the good to which we aspire must not be a simple +affection, existing only in him who feels it; for he who mistakes +this affection for the Good remains unsatisfied, he has nothing but +an affection that somebody else might equally feel in presence of +the Good. Consequently no one will succeed in making himself enjoy a +pleasure he has not achieved[122]; such as, for instance, rejoicing in +the presence of an absent son; or, for a glutton to relish imaginary +food; or, for a lover, to tremble at the touch of his absent mistress, +or (to thrill in a theoretic) orgasm. + + +A THING'S GOOD IS ITS FORM; OR, ITS INTIMACY WITH ITSELF. + +27. What is the essential of a being's nature? Form. Matter achieves +(recognition) through its form; and a soul's destiny is realized by the +virtue which is its form. Next we may ask whether this form be a good +for a being merely because it suits its (nature)? Does desire pursue +that which is suitable to it, or not? No: a being is suited by its +like; now, though a being seek and love its like, its possession does +not imply the possession of its good. Are we then not implying that +something is suitable to a being, on the strength of its being the good +of that being? The determination of what is suitable to a being belongs +to the superior Being of whom the lower being is a potentiality. When +a being is the potentiality of some other, the being needs the other; +now the Being which it needs because it is superior is, by that very +fact, its good. Of all things matter is the most indigent, and the form +suitable to it is the last of all; but, above it, one may gradually +ascend. Consequently, if a being be good for itself, so much the more +will it consider good what is its perfection and form, namely, the +being that is better than it, because of a superior nature, and of +supplying the good (of the lower being). But why should that which +a being receives from a superior Being be its good? Is it not this +because it is eminently suited to it? No: It is so merely because it is +a portion of the Good. That is why the purest and best Beings are those +that have most intimacy with themselves.[124] Besides it is absurd to +seek the cause why what is good, is good for itself; as if, by the mere +fact of its being good, it should betray its own nature and not love +itself. Nevertheless, speaking of simple beings, it might be asked +whether a being which does not contain several things different from +each other either possesses intimacy with itself, or can be good for +itself. + + +PLEASURE MAY ACCOMPANY THE GOOD, BUT THE GOOD IS INDEPENDENT THEREOF. + +Now, if all that has been said be right, it is only a gradual upward +analysis that reveals the good that is suitable to the nature of +any being. Desire does not constitute the good, but is born from +its presence. Those who acquire the good receive something from it. +Pleasure accompanies the acquirement of good; but even should pleasure +not accompany the good, the good should, none the less be chosen, and +sought for its own sake. + + +MATTER IS IMPROVED BY FORM, THE DREAM OF THE GOOD. + +28. Let us consider the implications of the principles we have studied. +If that which a being receives as good be everywhere a form, if the +good of matter be a form, we might ask ourselves whether matter, +granting it here the faculty of volition, would even wish to be a +form? Such a wish would be tantamount to a wish to be destroyed. (But +matter could not wish this), for every being seeks its own good. But +perhaps matter might not wish to be matter, but simply to be essence; +possessing which, matter would wish to free itself from all the evil +within it. But how can that which is evil (for such is the nature of +matter) desire the good?[125] Besides, we are not attributing desire +to matter itself. It was only to meet the exigencies of the discussion +that we employed the hypothesis which accorded sensibility to matter, +if indeed it can be granted to matter without destroying its nature. +We have at least shown that when form has come, as a dream of the +Good,[126] to unite itself to matter, the latter found itself in a +better condition. + + +MATTER IS NOT WICKEDNESS, BUT NEUTRAL EVIL. + +All we have said above goes on the assumption that matter is the evil. +But if it were something else, as, for instance, malice, and if the +essence of matter were to receive sensation, would intimacy with what +is better still be the good of matter? But if it were not the malice +itself of matter which choose the good, it was what had become evil in +matter. If the essence (of matter) were identical with evil, how could +matter wish to possess this good? Would evil love itself, if it had +self-consciousness? But how could that which is not lovable be loved? +For we have demonstrated that a being's good does not consist in that +which is suitable to it. Enough about this, however. + + +THE GOOD IS A NATURE WHICH POSSESSES NO KIND OF FORM ITSELF. + +But if the good be everywhere a form; if, in the measure that one +rises (along the ladder of beings), there is a progression in the +form--for the soul is more of a form than the form of the body; in the +soul herself there are graduated forms, and intelligence is more of a +form than the soul--the good follows a progression evidently inverse +to that of matter; the Good exists in that which is purified and +freed from matter, and exists there in proportion to its purity (from +matter); so it exists in the highest degree in that which lays aside +all materiality. Finally, the Good in itself, being entirely separated +from all matter; or rather, never having had any contact with it, +constitutes a nature which has no kind of form, and from which proceeds +the first form (Intelligence). But of this more later.[127] + + +THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE GOOD FROM PLEASURE PROVED BY THE TEMPERATE MAN. + +29. Supposing then that the pleasure does not accompany the good, but +that anterior to pleasure there have existed something which would +have naturally given rise to it (because of its goodness); why then +might not the good be considered lovable? But the mere assertion that +good is lovable, already implies that it is accompanied by pleasure. +But supposing now that the good could exist without being lovable +(and consequently not accompanied by pleasure). In that case, even in +presence of the good, the being that possesses sensibility will not +know that the good is present. What would however hinder a being from +knowing the presence of the good without feeling any emotion at its +possession, which would exactly represent the case of the temperate +man who lacks nothing? The result would be that pleasure could not be +suitable to the First (being), not only because He is simple, but also +because pleasure results from the acquisition of what is lacking (and +the First lacks nothing, therefore could not feel pleasure). + + +EVEN SCORN OF LIFE IMPLIES THE EXISTENCE OF THE GOOD. + +But, in order that this truth may appear in its full light, we shall +first have to clear away all the other opinions, and especially have +to refute the teaching opposite to ours. This is the question asked of +us: "What will be the fruit gathered by him who has the intelligence +necessary to acquire one of these goods (such as existence and life), +if on hearing them named, he be not impressed thereby, because he +does not understand them, either because they seem to him no more +than words, or because his conception of each of these things should +differ (from our view of them), or because in his search for the Good +he seeks some sense-object, such as wealth, or the like?" The person +who thus scorns these things (existence and life), thereby implicitly +recognizes that there is within him a certain good, but that, without +knowing in what it consists, he nevertheless values these things +according to his own notion of the Good; for it is impossible to say, +"that is not the good," without having some sort of knowledge of the +good,[128] or acquaintance therewith. The above speaker seems to betray +a suspicion that the Good in itself is above Intelligence. Besides, if +in considering the Good in itself, or the good which most approaches +it, he do not discern it, he will nevertheless succeed in getting a +conception of it by its contraries; otherwise, he would not even know +that the lack of intelligence is an evil, though every man desire to +be intelligent, and glory in being such, as is seen by the sensations +which aspire to become notions. If intelligence, and especially primary +Intelligence, be beautiful and venerable, what admiration might not +then be felt by him who could contemplate the generating principle, +the Father of Intelligence?[129] Consequently, he who affects to scorn +existence and life receives a refutation from himself and from all +the affections he feels. They who are disgusted of life are those who +consider not the true life, but the life which is mingled with death. + + +TWO INTERPRETATIONS OF PLATO'S OPINION ABOUT THE GOOD. + +30. Now, rising in thought to the Good, we must examine whether +pleasure must be mingled with the Good to keep life from remaining +imperfect, even if we should, besides, contemplate the divine things, +and even Him who is their principle. When (Plato[119]) seems to +believe that the good is composed of intelligence, as subject, and +also of affection which wisdom makes the soul experience, he is not +asserting that this blend (of intelligence and pleasure) is either +the goal (of the soul), or the Good in itself. He only means that +intelligence is the good, and that we enjoy its possession. This is +a first interpretation of (Plato's) opinion about the Good. Another +interpretation is that to mingle intelligence with pleasure is to +make a single subject of both of them, so that in acquiring or in +contemplating such an intelligence we possess the good; for (according +to the partisans of this opinion), one of these things could not exist +in isolation, nor, supposing that it could so exist, it would not be +desirable as a good. But (shall we ask them), how can intelligence be +mingled with pleasure so as to form a perfect fusion therewith? Nobody +could be made to believe that the pleasure of the body could be mingled +with Intelligence; such pleasure is incompatible even with the joys of +the soul. + + +PLEASURE IS INDEED AN ACCESSORY TO ALL GOODS OF THE SOUL. + +The element of truth in all this, however, is that every action, +disposition and life is joined by some accessory (pleasure or pain) +that unites with it. Indeed, sometimes action meets an obstacle to its +natural accomplishment, and life is affected by the mixture of a little +of its contrary, which limits its independence; sometimes, however, +action is produced without anything troubling its purity and serenity, +and then life flows along a tranquil course. Those who consider that +this state of intelligence is desirable, and preferable to everything +else, in their inability to express their thoughts more definitely, +say that it is mingled with pleasure. Such likewise is the meaning of +expressions used by those who apply to divine things terms intended +to express joy here below, and who say, "He is intoxicated with +nectar! Let us to the banquet! Jupiter smiles!"[130] This happy state +of intelligence is that which is the most agreeable, the most worthy +of our wishes, and of our love; nor is it transitory, and does not +consist in a movement; its principle is that which colors intelligence, +illumines it, and makes it enjoy a sweet serenity. That is why +Plato[131] adds to the mixture truth, and puts above it that which +gives measure. He also adds that the proportion and the beauty which +are in the mixture pass from there into the beautiful. That is the +good that belongs to us, that is the fate that awaits us. That is the +supreme object of desire, an object that we will achieve on condition +of drawing ourselves up to that which is best in us. Now this thing +full of proportion and beauty, this form composed (of the elements of +which we have spoken), is nothing else but a life full of radiance, +intelligence and beauty. + + +THE SOUL SCORNING ALL THINGS BELOW RISES TO THE GOOD. + +31. Since all things have been embellished by Him who is above them, +and have received their light from Him; since Intelligence derives +from Him the splendor of its intellectual actualization; by which +splendor it illuminates nature; since from Him also the soul derives +her vital power, because she finds in Him an abundant source of life; +consequently, Intelligence has risen to Him, and has remained attached +to Him, satisfied in the bliss of His presence; consequently also the +soul, to the utmost of her ability, turned towards Him, for, as soon as +she has known Him and seen Him, she was, by her contemplation, filled +with bliss; and, so far as she could see Him, she was overwhelmed +with reverence. She could not see Him without being impressed with +the feeling that she had within herself something of Him; it was this +disposition of hers that led her to desire to see Him, as the image +of some lovable object makes one wish to be able to contemplate it +oneself. Here below, lovers try to resemble the beloved object, to +render their body more gracious, to conform their soul to their model, +by temperance and the other virtues to remain as little inferior as +possible to Him whom they love, for fear of being scorned by Him; +and thus they succeed in enjoying intimacy with Him.[132] Likewise, +the soul loves the Good, because, from the very beginning she is +provoked to love Him. When she is ready to love, she does not wait +for the beauties here below to give her the reminiscence of the Good; +full of love, even when she does not know what she possesses, she is +ever seeking; and inflamed with the desire to rise to the Good, she +scorns the things here below. Considering the beauties presented by +our universe, she suspects that they are deceptive, because she sees +them clothed upon with flesh, and united to our bodies, soiled by +the matter where they reside, divided by extension, and she does not +recognize them as real beauties, for she cannot believe that the latter +could plunge into the mire of these bodies, soiling and obscuring +themselves.[133] Last, when the soul observes that the beauties here +below are in a perpetual flux, she clearly recognizes that they derive +this splendor with which they shine, from elsewhere.[134] Then she +rises to the intelligible world; being capable of discovering what she +loves, she does not stop before having found it, unless she be made +to lose her love. Having arrived there, she contemplates all the true +beauties, the true realities[135]; she refreshes herself by filling +herself up with the life proper to essence. She herself becomes genuine +essence. She fuses with the Intelligible which she really possesses, +and in its presence she has the feeling (of having found) what she was +seeking so long. + + +THE AUTHOR OF THIS PERFECTION MUST BE ABOVE IT. + +32. Where then is He who has created this venerable beauty, and this +perfect life? Where is He who has begotten "being"? Do you see the +beauty that shines in all these forms so various? It is well to dwell +there; but when one has thus arrived at beauty, one is forced to seek +the source of these essences and of their beauty. Their author Himself +cannot be any of them; for then He would be no more than some among +them, and a part of the whole. He is therefore none of the particular +forms, nor a particular power, nor all of the forms, nor all the powers +that are, or are becoming, in the universe; He must be superior to all +the forms and all the powers. The supreme Principle therefore has no +form; not indeed that He lacks any; but because He is the principle +from which all intellectual shapes are derived. Whatever is born--that +is, if there be anything such as birth--must, at birth, have been some +particular being, and have had its particular shape; but who could have +made that which was not made by anybody? He therefore is all beings, +without being any of them; He is none of the other beings because He is +anterior to all of them; He is all other beings because He is their +author. What greatness shall be attributed to the Principle who can do +all things? Will He be considered infinite? Even if He be infinite, +He will have no greatness, for magnitude occurs only among beings +of the lowest rank. The creator of magnitude could not himself have +any magnitude; and even what is called magnitude in "being" is not a +quantity. Magnitude can be found only in something posterior to being. +The magnitude of the Good is that there be nothing more powerful than +He, nothing that even equals Him. How indeed could any of the beings +dependent on Him ever equal Him, not having a nature identical with +His? Even the statement that God is always and everywhere does not +attribute to Him any measure, nor even, a lack of measure--otherwise, +He might be considered as measuring the rest; nor does it attribute to +Him any figure (or, outward appearance). + + +THE SUPREME IS LIMITLESS. + +Thus the Divinity, being the object of desire, must be the most desired +and the most loved, precisely because He has no figure nor shape. The +love He inspires is immense; this love is limitless, because of the +limitlessness of its object. He is infinite, because the beauty of its +object surpasses all beauty. Not being any essence, how indeed could +the (divinity) have any determinate beauty? As supreme object of love, +He is the creator of beauty.[136] Being the generating power of all +that is beautiful, He is at the same time the flower in which beauty +blooms[137]: for He produces it, and makes it more beautiful still by +the superabundance of beauty which He sheds on her. He is therefore +simultaneously the principle and goal of beauty.[138] As principle of +beauty, He beautifies all that of which He is the principle. It is not +however by shape that He beautifies; what He produces has no shape, or, +to speak more accurately, He has a shape in a sense different from the +habitual meaning of this term. The shape which is no more than a shape +is a simple attribute of some substance, while the Shape that subsists +in itself is superior to shape. Thus, that which participates in beauty +was a shape; but beauty itself has none. + + +ABSOLUTE BEAUTY IS A FORMLESS SHAPE. + +33. When we speak of absolute Beauty, we must therefore withdraw from +all determinate shape, setting none before the eyes (of our mind); +otherwise, we would expose ourselves to descending from absolute +beauty to something which does not deserve the name of beauty but by +virtue of an obscure and feeble participation[139]; while absolute +Beauty is a shapeless form, if it be at all allowed to be an idea (or +form). Thus you may approach the universal Shape only by abstraction. +Abstract even the form found in the reason (that is, the essence), by +which we distinguish one action from another. Abstract, for instance, +the difference that separates temperance from justice, though both be +beautiful. For by the mere fact that intelligence conceives an object +as something proper, the object that it conceives is diminished, even +though this object were the totality of intelligible entities; and, +on the other hand, if each of them, taken apart, have a single form, +nevertheless all taken together will offer a certain variety. + + +THE SUPREME IS ESSENTIAL BEAUTY; THE SHAPELESS SHAPER; TRANSCENDENT. + +We still have to study the proper conception of Him who is superior +to the Intelligence that is so universally beautiful and varied, but +who Himself is not varied. To Him the soul aspires without knowing +why she wishes to possess Him; but reason tells us He is essential +beauty, since the nature of Him who is excellent and sovereignly +lovable cannot absolutely have any form. That is why the soul, whatever +object you may show her in your process of reducing an object to a +form, ever seeks beyond the shaping principle. Now reason tells us +in respect to anything that has a shape, that as a shape or form is +something measured (or limited), (anything shaped) cannot be genuinely +universal, absolute, and beautiful in itself, and that its beauty is +a mixture. Therefore though the intelligible entities be beautiful +(they are limited); while He who is essential beauty, or rather the +super-beautiful, must be unlimited, and consequently have no shape or +form. He who then is beauty in the first degree, and primary Beauty, is +superior to form, and the splendor of the intelligible (world) is only +a reflection of the nature of the Good. + + +THUS LOVE BEGINS PHYSICALLY BUT BECOMES SPIRITUAL. + +This is proved by what happens to lovers; so far as their eyes remain +fixed on a sense-object, they do not yet love genuinely. Love is born +only when they rise above the sense-object, and arrive at representing +in their indivisible soul an image which has nothing more of sensation. +To calm the ardor that devours them they do indeed still desire to +contemplate the beloved object; but as soon as they come to understand +that they have to rise to something beyond the form, they desire the +latter; for since the very beginning they felt within themselves the +love for a great light inspired by a feeble glow. The Shape indeed is +the trace of the shapeless. Without himself having any shape, He begets +shape whenever matter approaches Him. Now matter must necessarily be +very distant from Him, because matter does not possess forms of even +the last degree. Since form inherent in matter is derived from the +soul, not even mere form-fashioned matter is lovable in itself, as +matter; and as the soul herself is a still higher form, but yet is +inferior to and less lovable than intelligence, there is no escape from +the conclusion that the primary nature of the Beautiful is superior to +form. + + +THE FORMLESSNESS OF THE SUPREME IS PROVED BY THE FACT THAT THE SOUL +WHEN APPROACHING HIM SPONTANEOUSLY RIDS HERSELF OF FORMS. + +34. We shall not be surprised that the soul's liveliest transports of +love are aroused by Him, who has no form, not even an intelligible one, +when we observe that the soul herself, as soon as she burns with love +for Him, lays aside all forms soever, even if intelligible; for it is +impossible to approach Him so long as one considers anything else. The +soul must therefore put aside all evil, and even all good; in a word, +everything, of whatever nature, to receive the divinity, alone with the +alone. When the soul obtains this happiness, and when (the divinity) +comes to her, or rather, when He manifests His presence, because the +soul has detached herself from other present things, when she has +embellished herself as far as possible, when she has become assimilated +to Him by means known only to the initiated, she suddenly sees Him +appear in her. No more interval between them, no more doubleness; the +two fuse in one. It is impossible to distinguish the soul from the +divinity, so much does she enjoy His presence; and it is the intimacy +of this union that is here below imitated by those who love and are +loved, when they consummate union. In this condition the soul no longer +feels (her body); she no more feels whether she be alive, human, +essence, universality, or anything else. Consideration of objects +would be a degradation, and the soul then has neither the leisure nor +the desire to busy herself with them. When, after having sought the +divinity, she finds herself in His presence, she rushes towards Him, +and contemplates Him instead of herself.[140] What is her condition at +the time? She has not the leisure to consider it; but she would not +exchange it for anything whatever, not even for the whole heaven; for +there is nothing superior or better; she could not rise any higher. +As to other things, however elevated they be, she cannot at that time +stoop to consider them. It is at this moment that the soul starts to +move, and recognizes that she really possesses what she desired; she at +last affirms that there is nothing better than Him. No illusion could +occur there; for where could she find anything truer than truth itself? +The soul then is what she affirms; (or rather), she asserts it (only), +later, and then she asserts it by keeping silence. While tasting this +beatitude she could not err in the assertion that she tastes it. If +she assert that she tastes it, it is not that her body experiences an +agreeable titillation, for she has only become again what she formerly +used to be when she became happy. All the things that formerly charmed +her, such as commanding others, power, wealth, beauty, science, now +seem to her despicable; she could not scorn them earlier, for she had +not met anything better. Now she fears nothing, so long as she is with +Him, and contemplates Him. Even with pleasure would she witness the +destruction of everything, for she would remain alone with Him; so +great is her felicity. + + +THE SOUL SCORNS EVEN THOUGHT: SHE IS INTELLECTUALIZED AND ENNOBLED. + +35. Such, then, is the state of the soul that she no longer values +even thought, which formerly excited her admiration; for thought is a +movement, and the soul would prefer none. She does not even assert +that it is Intelligence that she sees, though she contemplate only +because she has become intelligence, and has, so to speak, become +intellectualized, by being established in the intelligible place. +Having arrived to Intelligence, and having become established therein, +the soul possesses the intelligible, and thinks; but as soon as she +achieves the vision of the supreme Divinity, she abandons everything +else. She behaves as does the visitor who, on entering into a palace, +would first admire the different beauties that adorn its interior, +but who regards them no longer as soon as she perceives the master; +for the master, by his (living) nature, which is superior to all the +statues that adorn the palace, monopolizes the consideration, and +alone deserves to be contemplated; consequently the spectator, with +his glance fixed on Him, henceforward observes Him alone. By dint of +continual contemplation of the spectacle in front of him, the spectator +sees the master no longer; in the spectator, vision confuses with the +visible object. What for the spectator first was a visible object, +in him becomes vision, and makes him forget all that he saw around +himself. To complete this illustration, the master here presenting +himself to the visitor must be no man, but a divinity; and this +divinity must not content Himself with appearing to the eyes of him who +contemplates Him, but He must penetrate within the human soul, and fill +her entirely. + + +INTELLIGENCE HAS THE TWO POWERS OF INTELLIGENCE AND LOVE. + +Intelligence has two powers: by the first, which is her own power of +thinking, she sees what is within her. By the other she perceives +what is above her by the aid of a kind of vision and perception; +by the vision, she first saw simply; then, by (perceptive) seeing, +she received intellection and fused with the One. The first kind of +contemplation is suitable to the intelligence which still possesses +reason; the second is intelligence transported by love. Now, it is +when the nectar intoxicates her,[141] and deprives her of reason, +that the soul is transported with love, and that she blossoms into a +felicity that fulfils all her desires. It is better for her to abandon +herself to this intoxication than to remain wise. In this state +does intelligence successively see one thing, and then another? No: +methods of instruction (or, constructive speech) give out everything +successively; but it is eternally that intelligence possesses the +power of thought, as well as the power not to think; that is, to see +the divinity otherwise than by thought. Indeed, while contemplating +Him, she received within herself germs, she felt them when they were +produced and deposited within her breast; when she sees them, she is +said to think; but when she sees the divinity, it is by that superior +power by virtue of which she was to think later. + + +THE SOUL DOES NOT THINK GOD, FOR IN THAT CONDITION SHE DOES NOT THINK. + +As to the soul, she sees the divinity only by growing confused, as it +were by exhausting the intelligence which resides in her; or rather, +it is her first intelligence that sees; but the vision the latter +has of the divinity reaches down to the soul, which then fuses with +intelligence. It is the Good, extending over intelligence and the soul, +and condescending to their level, which spreads over them, and fuses +them; hovering above them, it bestows on them the happy vision, and the +ineffable feeling of itself. It raises them so high that they are no +more in any place, nor within anything whatever, in any of the senses +in which one thing is said to be within another. For the Good is not +within anything; the intelligible location is within it, but it is not +in anything else. Then the soul moves no more, because the divinity is +not in motion. To speak accurately, she is no longer soul, because the +divinity does not live, but is above life; neither is she intelligence, +because the divinity is above intelligence; because there must be +complete assimilation (between the soul and the divinity). Finally, the +soul does not think even the divinity, because in this condition she +does not think at all. + + +THE TOUCH WITH THE GOOD IS THE GREATEST OF SCIENCES. + +36. The remainder is plain. As to the last point, it has already been +discussed. Still it may be well to add something thereto, starting from +the point reached, and proceeding by arguments. Knowledge, or, if it +may be so expressed, the "touch of the Good," is the greatest thing +in the world. Plato[142] calls it the greatest of sciences, and even +so he here applies this designation not to the vision itself of the +Good, but to the science of the Good that may be had before the vision. +This science is attained by the use of analogies,[143] by negations +(made about the Good), by the knowledge of things that proceed from +it, and last by the degrees that must be taken (or, upward steps that +must be climbed to reach up to Him.[165]) (These then are the degrees) +that lead up (to the divinity): purifications, virtues that adorn the +soul, elevation to the intelligible, settling in the intelligible, and +then the banquet at which nectar feeds him who becomes simultaneously +spectator and spectacle, either for himself, or for others.[144] +Having become Being, Intelligence, and universal living Organism, (the +initiate) no longer considers these things as being outside of him; +having arrived at that condition, she approaches Him who is immediately +above all the intelligible entities, and who already sheds His radiance +over them. (The initiate) then leaves aside all the science that has +led him till there; settled in the beautiful, he thinks, so long as he +does not go beyond that (sphere of) being. But there, as it were raised +by the very flood of intelligence, and carried away by the wave that +swells, without knowing how, he suddenly sees. The contemplation which +fills his eye with light does not reveal to him anything exterior; +it is the light itself that he sees. It is not an opposition between +light on one side, and the visible object on the other; nor is there +on one side intelligence, and on the other the intelligible entity; +there is only the (radiation) which later begets these entities, and +permits them to exist within it. (The divinity) is no more than the +radiation that begets intelligence, begetting without being consumed, +and remaining within itself. This radiation exists, and this existence +alone begets something else. If this radiation were not what it was, +neither would the latter thing subsist. + + +GOD BEING ABOVE THOUGHT IGNORES EVERYTHING. + +37. They who attributed thought to the First Principle have at least +not attributed to Him the thought of things that are inferior to Him, +or which proceed from Him.[145] Nevertheless some of them claimed that +it was absurd to believe that the divinity ignored other things. As +to the former, finding nothing greater than the Good, they attributed +to (the divinity) the thought of Himself,[146] as if this could add +to His majesty, as if even for Him, thinking were more than being +what He is, and it were not the Good Himself which communicates His +sublimity to intelligence. But from whom then will the Good derive +His greatness? Would it come from thought, or from Himself? If He +derive it from thought, He is not great by himself; or at least, He +is no more sovereignly great. If it be from Himself that He derives +His greatness, He is perfectly anterior to thought, and it is not +thought that renders Him perfect. Is He forced to think because He is +actualization, and not merely potentiality? If He is a being that ever +thinks, and if this be the meaning of actualization,[147] we would be +attributing to the Good two things simultaneously: "being" and thought; +instead of conceiving of Him as a simple Principle, something foreign +is added to Him, as to eyes is added the actualization of sight,[148] +even admitting that they see continually. (The divinity) is in +actualization, in the sense that He is both actualization and thought, +is He not? No, for being thought itself, He must not be thinking, as +movement itself does not move.[149] But do not you yourselves say that +(the divinity) is both being and actualization? We think that being +and actualization are multiple and different things, whilst the First +is simple. To the principle that proceeds from the First alone belongs +thought, a certain seeking out of its being, of itself, and of its +origin. It deserves the name of intelligence only by turning towards +(the First) in contemplation, and in knowing Him. As to the unbegotten +Principle, who has nothing above Him, who is eternally what He is, what +reason might He have to think? + + +THE FIRST PRINCIPLE HAS NO FUNCTION. + +That is why Plato rightly says that the Good is above Intelligence. To +speak of an "unthinking" intelligence would be a self-contradiction; +for the principle whose nature it is to think necessarily ceases to be +intelligent if it does not think. But no function can be assigned to a +principle that has none, and we cannot blame it for idleness because it +does not fulfil some function; this would be as silly as to reproach +it for not possessing the art of healing. To the first Principle then +should be assigned no function, because there is none that would suit +Him. He is (self) sufficient, and there is nothing outside of Him +who is above all; for, in being what He is, He suffices Himself and +everything else. + + +OF THE FIRST PRINCIPLE WE MAY NOT EVEN SAY THAT IT IS. + +38. Of the First we may not even say, "He is." (He does not need this), +since we do not either say of Him, "He is good." "He is good" is said +of the same principle to which "He is" applies. Now "He is" suits +the (divinity) only on the condition that He be given no attribute, +limiting oneself to the assertion of His existence. He is spoken of +as the Good, not as predicating an attribute or quality of Him, but +to indicate that He is the Good itself. We do not even approve of +this expression, "He is the Good," because we think that not even the +article should be prefixed thereto; but inasmuch as our language would +fail to express an entire negation or deprivation, then, to avoid +introducing some diversity in it, we are forced to name it, but there +is no need to say "it is," we simply call it, "the Good." + + +THE SELF-SUFFICIENT GOOD DOES NOT NEED SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS THEREOF. + +But how could we admit (the existence of) a nature without feeling +or consciousness of itself? We might answer this, What consciousness +of self can (the divinity) have? Can He say, "I am?" But (in the +above-mentioned sense), He is not. Can He say, "I am the Good"? Then +He would still be saying of Himself "I am" (whereas we have just +explained that this He cannot do[150]). What then will He add (to +his simplicity) by limiting Himself to saying, "The Good"? For it is +possible to think "the Good" apart from "He is" so long as the Good +is not, as an attribute, applied to some other being. But whoever +thinks himself good will surely say "I am the good"; if not, he will +think the predicate "good," but he will not be enabled to think that +he is so himself. Thus, the thought of good will imply this thought, +"I am the good." If this thought itself be the Good, it will not be +the thought of Him, but of the good, and he will not be the Good, but +the thought.[151] If the thought of good is different from the Good +itself, the Good will be prior to the thought of the good. If the Good +be self-sufficient before the thought, it suffices to itself to be the +Good; and in this respect has no need of the thought that it is the +Good. + + +THE GOOD IS A SIMPLE PERCEPTION OF ITSELF; A TOUCH. + +39. Consequently, the Good does not think itself either as good, nor +as anything else; for it possesses nothing different from itself. It +only has "a simple perception of itself in respect to itself"; but as +there is no distance or difference in this perception it has of itself, +what could this perception be but itself? That is why it perceives a +difference where being and intelligence appear. In order to think, +intelligence must admit identity and difference simultaneously. On the +one hand, without the relation between the Intelligible and itself, +the (mind) will not distinguish itself from (the intelligible); and on +the other, without the arising of an "otherness" which would enable +it to be everything, it would not contemplate all (earthly) entities. +(Without this difference), intelligence would not even be a "pair." +Then, since intelligence thinks, if it think really, it will not think +itself alone, for why should it not think all things? (Would it not do +so) because it was impotent to do so? In short, the principle which +thinks itself ceases to be simple, because in thinking itself it must +think itself as something different, which is the necessary condition +of thinking itself.[152] We have already said that intelligence cannot +think itself without contemplating itself as something different. +Now in thinking, intelligence becomes manifold (that is, fourfold): +intelligible object (thing thought) and intelligent subject (thinker); +movement (or, moved[153]), and everything else that belongs to +intelligence. Besides, it must be noticed, as we have pointed out +elsewhere, that, to be thought, any thought, must offer variety[154]; +but (in the divinity) this movement is so simple and identical that +it may be compared to some sort of touch, and partakes in nothing of +intellectual actualization (therefore, thought cannot be attributed +to the divinity). What? Will (the divinity) know neither others nor +Himself, and will He remain immovable in His majesty? (Surely). All +things are posterior to Him; He was what He is before them. The thought +of these things is adventitious, changeable, and does not apply to +permanent objects. Even if it did apply to permanent objects, it would +still be multiple, for we could not grant that in inferior beings +thought was joined to being, while the thoughts of intelligence would +be empty notions. The existence of Providence is sufficiently accounted +for by its being that from which proceed all (beings). How then (in +regard to all the beings that refer to Him) could (the divinity) think +them, since He does not even think Himself, but remains immovable in +His majesty? That is why Plato,[149] speaking of "being," says that it +doubtless thinks, but that it does not remain immovable in its majesty. +By that he means that, no doubt, "being" thinks, but that that which +does not think remains immovable in its majesty; using this expression +for lack of a better one. Thus Plato considers the Principle which is +superior to thought as possessing more majesty, nay, sovereign majesty. + + +THE FIRST PRINCIPLE HAS NO THOUGHT AS THE FIRST ACTUALIZATION OF A +HYPOSTASIS. + +40. That thought is incompatible with the first Principle is something +well known by all those who have (in ecstasy) risen to Him.[155] To +what we have already said, we shall however add several arguments, if +indeed we succeed in expressing thought comprehensibly; for conviction +should be fortified by demonstration.[156] In the first place, observe +that all thought exists within a subject, and proceeds from some +object. Thought that is connected with the object from which it is +derived, has the being to which it belongs, as subject. It inheres in +him because it is his actualization, and completes his potentiality, +without, itself, producing anything; for it belongs exclusively to the +subject whose complement it is. Thought that is hypostatically united +with "being," and which underlies its existence, could not inhere in +the object from which it proceeds; for, had it remained in him, it +would not have produced anything. Now, having the potentiality of +producing, it produced within itself; its actualization was "being," +and it was united thereto. Thus thought is not something different +from "being"; so far as this nature thinks itself, it does not think +itself as being something different; for the only multiplicity therein +is that which results from the logical distinction of intelligent +subject (thinker) and intelligible object (the being thought), as we +have often pointed out. That is the first actualization which produced +a hypostasis (or, form of existence), while constituting "being"; +and this actualization is the image of a Principle so great that +itself has become "being." If thought belonged to the Good, instead +of proceeding therefrom, it would be no more than an attribute; it +would not, in itself, be a hypostatic form of existence. Being the +first actualization and the first thought, this thought has neither +actualization nor thought above it. Therefore, by rising above this +"being" and this thought, neither further "being" nor thought will be +met with; we would arrive to the Principle superior to "being," and +thought, an admirable principle, which contains neither thought nor +being, which in solitary guise dwells within itself, and which has no +need of the things which proceed from Him. He did not first act, and +then produce an actualization (he did not begin by thinking in order +later to produce thought); otherwise, he would have thought before +thought was born. In short, thought, being the thought of good, is +beneath Him, and consequently does not belong to Him. I say: "does not +belong to Him," not denying that the Good can be thought (for this, I +admit); but because thought could not exist in the Good; otherwise, the +Good and that which is beneath it--namely, the thought of Good--would +fuse. Now, if the good be something inferior, it will simultaneously be +thought and being; if, on the contrary, good be superior to thought, it +must likewise belong to the Intelligible.[157] + + +EVEN IF THE GOOD THOUGHT, THERE WOULD BE NEED OF SOMETHING SUPERIOR. + +Since therefore thought does not exist in the Good, and since, on +the contrary, it is inferior to the Good, and since it must thus +worship its majesty, (thought) must constitute a different principle, +and leaves the Good pure and disengaged from it, as well as from +other things. Independent of thought, the Good is what it is without +admixture. The presence of the Good does not hinder it from being pure +and single. If we were to suppose that Good is both thinking subject +and thought object (thinker and thought) or "being," and thought +connected with "being," if thus we make it think itself,[158] it will +need something else, and thus things will be above it. As actualization +and thought are the complement or the consubstantial hypostasis (or, +form of existence) of another subject, thought implies above it another +nature to which it owes the power of thinking; for thought cannot think +anything without something above it. When thought knows itself, it +knows what it received by the contemplation of this other nature. As +to Him who has nothing above Him, who derives nothing from any other +principle, what could He think, and how could He think himself? What +would He seek, and what would He desire? Would He desire to know the +greatness of His power? But by the mere fact of His thinking it, it +would have become external to Him; I call it exterior, if the cognizing +power within Him differed from that which would be known; if on the +contrary they fuse, what would He seek? + + +THOUGHT IS A HELP FOR SUB-DIVINE NATURES. + +41. It would seem that thought was only a help granted to natures +which, though divine, nevertheless do not occupy the first rank; +it is like an eye given to the blind.[159] But what need would the +eye have to see essence, if itself were light? To seek light is the +characteristic of him who needs it, because he finds in himself nothing +but darkness.[159] Since thought seeks light, while the light does not +seek the light, the primary Nature, not seeking the light (since it is +light itself), could not any more seek thought (since it is thought +that seeks light); thinking could not suit it, therefore. What utility +or advantage would thought bring him, inasmuch as thought itself needs +aid to think? The Good therefore has not self-consciousness, not having +need thereof; it is not doubleness; or rather, it is not double as is +thought which implies (besides intelligence) a third term, namely, the +intelligible (world). If thought, the thinking subject (the thinker) +and the thought object (the thought) be absolutely identical, they form +but one, and are absolutely indistinguishable; if they be distinct, +they differ, and can no more be the Good. Thus we must put everything +aside when we think of this "best Nature," which stands in need of no +assistance. Whatever you may attribute to this Nature, you diminish +it by that amount, since it stands in need of nothing. For us, on the +contrary, thought is a beautiful thing, because our soul has need of +intelligence. It is similarly a beautiful thing for intelligence, +because thought is identical with essence, and it is thought that gave +existence to intelligence. + + +THE GOOD IS NOT GOOD FOR ITSELF, BUT ONLY FOR THE NATURES BELOW IT. + +Intelligence must therefore fuse with thought, and must always be +conscious of itself, knowing that each of the two elements that +constitute it is identical with the other, and that both form but a +single one. If it were only unity, it would be self-sufficient, and +would have no further need of receiving anything. The precept "know +thyself" applies only to natures which, because of their multiplicity, +need to give an account of themselves, to know the number and the +quality of their component elements, because they either do not know +them entirely, or even not at all; not knowing what power in them +occupies the first rank, and constitutes their being.[160] But if +there be a Principle which is one by itself, it is too great to know +itself, to think itself, to be self-conscious, because it is nothing +determinate for itself. It receives nothing within itself, sufficing +itself. It is therefore the Good not for itself, but for other natures; +these indeed need the Good, but the Good has no need of itself; it +would be ridiculous, and would fail to stand up to itself. Nor does it +view itself; for, from this look something would arise, or exist for +Him. All such things He left to the inferior natures, and nothing that +exists in them is found in Him; thus (the Good) is not even "being." +Nor does (the Good) possess thought, since thought is united to being, +and as primary and supreme thought coexisted with essence. Therefore, +one can not (as says Plato[150]), express (the divinity) by speech, +nor have perception nor science of Him, since no attribute can be +predicated of Him. + + +THE BEAUTIFUL THE SUPREME OF THREE RANKS OF EXISTENCE. + +42. When you are in doubt about this matter, and when you wonder how +you should classify these attributes to which reasoning has brought +you, reject from among the things of the second order what seems +venerable; attribute to the First none of the things that belong to the +second order; neither attribute to those of the second order (that is, +to Intelligence), what belongs to those of the third (that is, to the +Soul); but subsume under the first Principle the things of the second +order, and under the second principle the things of the third. That +is the true means of allowing each being to preserve its nature, and +at the same time to point out the bond that connects the lower things +with the higher, and showing thus that the inferior things depend on +the superior ones, while the superior ones remain in themselves. That +is why (Plato) was right in saying,[161] "All things surround the King +of all, and exist on his account." "All things" means "all beings." +"All things exist on his account" means that He is the cause of their +existence, and the object of their desire, because His nature is +different from theirs, because in Him is nothing that is in them, since +they could not exist if the First possessed some attribute of what is +inferior to Him. Therefore, if Intelligence be comprised within what +is meant by "all things," it could not belong to the First. When (in +the same place Plato calls the divinity) "the cause of all beauty," +he seems to classify beauty among the Ideas, and the Good above the +universal beauty.[162] After thus having assigned the intelligible +(entities) to the second rank, he classifies, as dependent on them, +the things of the third order, which follow them. Last, to that which +occupies the third rank, to the universal Soul, he subsumes the world +that is derived therefrom. As the Soul depends on the Intelligence, and +as Intelligence depends on the Good, all things thus depend from the +Good in different degrees, mediately or immediately. In this respect, +the things which are the most distant from the Good are the objects of +sense, which are subsumed under the Soul. + + + + +SIXTH ENNEAD, BOOK EIGHT. + +Of the Will of the One. + + +A. OF HUMAN FREE WILL. + + +DOES FREE WILL BELONG TO GOD ONLY, OR TO OTHERS ONLY? + +1. Do the divinities themselves possess free will, or is this limited +to human beings, because of their many weaknesses and uncertainties? +(For we assume that) the divinities possess omnipotence, so that it +would seem likely that their actions were free and absolutely without +petty restrictions. Or must we hold that the (supreme) One alone +possesses omnipotence, and unhampered free will, while in other beings +(free will and opportunity) either ignore each other, or conflict? We +shall therefore have to determine the nature of free will in first +rank beings (the divinities) and also the supreme Principle (the One), +although we acknowledge that both of them are omnipotent. Besides, in +respect to this omnipotence, we shall have to distinguish possibility +from actualization, present or future. + + +FREE WILL MUST BE FOR MEN, IF IT IS TO BE FOR THE DIVINITIES. + +Before attacking these questions, we must, as is usual, begin by +examining whether we ourselves possess freedom of will.[166] First +then, in what sense do we possess free will (or, responsibility, "that +something depends on us"); or rather, what conception we should form +of it? To answer this question will be the only means of arriving at +a conclusion about whether or not freedom of will should be ascribed +to the divinities, let alone (the supreme) Divinity. Besides, while +attributing to them freedom of will, we shall have to inquire to what +it applies, either in the other beings, or in the Beings of the first +rank. + + +RESPONSIBILITY DEPENDS ON VOLUNTARINESS. + +What are our thoughts when we inquire whether something depends on us? +Under what circumstances do we question this responsibility? We ask +ourselves whether we are anything, and whether really anything depends +on us when undergoing the buffets of fortune, of necessity, of violent +passions that dominate our souls, till we consider ourselves mastered, +enslaved, and carried away by them? Therefore we consider as dependent +on ourselves what we do without the constraint of circumstances, +necessity, or violence of passions--that is, voluntarily, and without +an obstacle to our will.[167] Hence the following definition: We are +responsible for that which depends on our will, which happens or which +is omitted according to our volition.[168] We indeed call voluntary +what we unconstrainedly do and consciously.[169] On us depends only +that of which we are the masters to do or not to do. These two notions +are usually connected, though they differ theoretically. There are +cases when one of them is lacking; one might, for instance, have the +power to commit a murder; and nevertheless if it were one's own father +that he had ignorantly killed, it would not be a voluntary act.[170] In +this case, the action was free, but not voluntary. The voluntariness of +an action depends on the knowledge, not only of the details, but also +of the total relations of the act.[171] Otherwise, why should killing a +friend, without knowing it, be called a voluntary action? Would not the +murder be equally involuntary if one did not know that he was to commit +it? On the contrary hypothesis, it may be answered that one had been +responsible for providing oneself with the necessary information[172]; +but nevertheless it is not voluntarily that one is ignorant, or that +one was prevented from informing oneself about it.[173] + + +ON WHICH PSYCHOLOGICAL FACULTY IS THE FREEDOM OF WILL BASED? + +2. But to which part of ourselves should we refer free will? To +appetite or desire, to anger or sex passion, for instance? Or shall it +be to the reason, engaged in search after utility, and accompanied by +desire? If to anger or sex passion,[174] we should be supposed to grant +freedom of will to brutes, to children, to the angry, to the insane, +to those misled by magic charms, or suggestions of the imagination, +though none of such persons be master of himself? If again (we are to +ascribe freedom of will) to reason accompanied by desire, does this +mean to reason even when misled, or only to right reason, and right +desire?[175] One might even ask whether reason be moved by desire, or +desire by reason.[176] For, admitting that desires arise naturally, a +distinction will nevertheless have to be established: if they belong +to the animal part, and to the combination (of soul and body), the +soul will obey the necessity of nature; if they belong to the soul +alone, many things which are generally attributed to the domain of our +free will will have to be withdrawn therefrom. Besides, passions are +always preceded by some sort of abstract reasoning. Further, how can +imagination itself--which constrains us; and desire--which drags us +whither Necessity compels, make us "masters of ourselves"[177] under +these circumstances? Besides, how can we be "masters of ourselves" +in general when we are carried away? That faculty of ours which +necessarily seeks to satisfy its needs, is not mistress of the things +towards which it is compelled to move.[177] How should we attribute +freedom of will to (a soul) that depends on something else? (To a soul) +which, in this thing, holds the principle of her own determinations? +(To a soul) that regulates her life thereby, and derives therefrom her +nature? (To a soul) that lives according to the instructions received +therefrom? Freedom of will would then have to be acknowledged even in +inanimate things; for even fire acts according to its inborn nature. + + +PRELIMINARY KNOWLEDGE DOES NOT SETTLE THE LIBERTARIAN PROBLEM. + +Some person might try to establish a distinction founded on the fact +that the animal and the soul do not act unconsciously. If they know +it by mere sensation, how far does that sensation contribute to the +freedom of will? For sensation, limiting itself to perception, does not +yield the percipient mastery over anything.[179] If they know it by +knowledge, and if this knowledge contain only the accomplished fact, +their actions are then determined by some other principle. If, even +independently of desire, reason or knowledge make us perform certain +actions, or dominate us,[180] to what faculty shall the action be +ascribed, and how does it occur? If reason produce another desire, how +does it do so? If reason manifest itself and liberate us by the process +of calming our desires, the free will lies no longer in the action, but +in intelligence; for every action, however much directed by reason, +would then be something mixed, not revealing an unconfused free will. + + +LIBERTY REFERRED TO THE ACTION OF INTELLIGENCE. + +3. The question must be examined carefully, for it will later be +applied to the divinities. Responsibility has been traced to the +will, and this to reason first, and later to right reason. Better, to +reason enlightened by knowledge; for freedom of will is not possessed +incontestably if one be ignorant of why his decision or action is +good, if one have been led to do the right thing by chance, or by some +sensible representation. Since the latter is not within our power, we +could not impute to free will the actions it inspired. By "sensible +representation," or, "phantasy,"[181] we mean the imagination excited +within us by the passions of the body; for it offers us different +images according as the body has need of food, of drink, or of sensual +pleasures. Those who act according to the "sensible representations" +excited within them by divers qualities of the humors of the body are +not wholly responsible for their actions. That is why depraved men, who +usually act according to these images, do not, according to us, perform +actions that are free and voluntary. We ascribe free will only to him +who, enfranchised from the passions of the body, performs actions +determined solely by intelligence. We refer liberty, therefore, to the +noblest principle, to the action of the intelligence[182]; we regard +as free only the decisions whose principle it is, and as voluntary, +only the desires it inspires. This freedom is that which we ascribe to +the divinities, who live in conformity with Intelligence, and with the +Desire of which it is the principle.[183] + + +INTELLIGENCE HAS CONVERSION TO GOOD AND "BEING IN ITSELF." + +4. We might ask how that which is produced by a desire could be +autocratically free, since the desire implies a need, and drags us +towards something exterior; for whoever desires really yields to an +inclination, even though the latter should lead him to the Good. We +might further ask whether intelligence, doing that which is in its +nature to do, in a manner conformable to its nature, is free and +independent, since it could have done the opposite. Further, we may ask +whether we have the right to attribute free will to that which does not +do any deeds; last, whether that which does a deed, is not, by the mere +fact that every action has a purpose, subject to an external necessity. +How indeed could one attribute freedom to a being that obeys its nature? + +We (might answer), how can one say of this being that it obeys, if it +be not constrained to follow something external? How would the being +that directs itself towards the Good be constrained, if its desire be +voluntary, if it direct itself towards the Good, knowing that it is +such? Only involuntarily does a being depart from the Good, only by +constraint does it direct itself towards that which is not its good; +that is the very nature of servitude, not to be able to reach one's +own good, and to be thwarted by a superior power to which obedience +is compulsory. Servitude displeases us, not because it deprives us of +the liberty to do evil, but because it hinders us going towards our +own, from ensuing our own good, forced as we are to work at the good +of someone else. When we speak of "obeying our nature," we distinguish +(in the being that obeys its nature) two principles, the one which +commands, and the other which obeys.[182] + +But when a principle has a simple nature, when it is a single +actualization, when it is not other in potentiality than it is in +actualization, how would it not be free? It cannot be said to be acting +conformably to its nature, because its actualization is not different +from its being, and because, within it, essence and action coincide. +It surely is free, if it act neither for another, nor in dependence on +another. If the word "independent" be not suitable here, if it be too +weak, we must at least understand that this Principle does not depend +on any other, does not recognize it as the ruler of its actions, any +more than of its being, since it itself is principle. + +Indeed, if Intelligence depend upon a further principle, at least this +one is not external, but is the Good itself. If then it be in the Good +itself that it finds its welfare, so much the more does it itself +possess independence and liberty, since it seeks them only in view +of the Good. When therefore Intelligence acts in conformity with the +Good, it has a higher degree of independence; for it possesses already +the "conversion to the Good," inasmuch as it proceeds from the Good, +and the privilege of being in itself, because Intelligence is turned +towards the Good; now it is better for Intelligence to remain within +itself, since it is thus turned towards the Good. + + +FREEDOM OF WILL AND VIRTUE ARE INDEPENDENT OF THE ACTIONS. + +5. Do autocratic freedom and independence inhere in pure and thinking +Intelligence exclusively, or are they also found in the soul which +applies its contemplative activity to intelligence, and its practical +activity to virtue? If we grant liberty to the practical activity of +the soul, we will not extend it to its results; for of this we are not +always masters. But if liberty is attributed to the soul which does +good, and which, in everything acts by herself, we are near the truth. + +How would that depend on us? As it depends on us to be courageous when +there is a war. Nevertheless, admitting that it then depends on us +to be courageous, I observe that, if there were no war, we could not +perform any action of this nature. Likewise, in all other virtuous +deeds, virtue always depends on accidental circumstances which force +us to do some particular thing.[182] Now if we were to give virtue +the liberty of deciding whether it desired a war, so as to be able to +offer a proof of courage; or desired injustices, as opportunities to +define and to respect rights; or wished that people might be poor to be +able to show forth its liberality; or whether it preferred to remain +at rest, because everything was in order; might virtue not prefer to +remain inactive in case nobody needed her services.[183] Similarly a +good physician, such as Hippocrates, for instance, would wish that his +professional services should not be needed by anybody. If then virtue +when applied to actions be forced to engage in such activities, how +could it possess independence in all its purity? Should we not say +that actions are subject to Necessity, whilst the preliminary volition +and reasoning are independent? If this be so, and since we locate free +will in that which precedes its execution, we shall also have to locate +autocratic freedom and independence of virtue outside of the (actual) +deed. + + +VIRTUE AS INTELLECTUALIZING HABIT LIBERATES THE SOUL. + +What shall we now say of virtue considered as "habit" or disposition? +Does it not occupy itself with regulating and moderating the passions +and desires when the soul is not healthy? In what sense do we then say +that it depends on us to be good, and that "virtue has no master?"[184] +In this sense, that it is we who will and choose; more, in the sense +that virtue, by its assistance, yields us liberty and independence, +and releases us from servitude. If then virtue be another kind of +intelligence, "a habit that intellectualizes the soul," even in this +respect must liberty be sought not in practical activity, but in the +intelligence divorced from activity. + + +LIBERTY REFERS TO THE INTERIOR LIFE, RATHER THAN TO THE EXTERIOR. + +6. How then did we previously refer liberty to volition, saying that +"that which depends on us, our responsibility, is that which occurs +according to our will"? Yes, but we added, "or does not occur." If +indeed we be right, and if we continue to support our former opinion, +we shall have to recognize that virtue and intelligence are their +own mistresses, and that it is to them that we must refer our free +will and independence. Since they have no master, we shall admit that +(our) intelligence remains within itself, that virtue must equally +remain calm in itself, regulating the soul so as to make her good, +and that in this respect it itself is both free, and enfranchises the +soul. If passions or necessary actions arise, (virtue) directs them +automatically; nevertheless she still preserves her independence (or, +freedom) by getting into relations with everything. For instance, +(virtue) does not engage in exterior things to save the body in times +of danger; on the contrary, she abandons it, if it seem advisable; +she orders the man to renounce even life, wealth, children, and +fatherland; for her object is to be honorable, relinquishing anything +beneath her dignity. This evidently shows that our liberty of action +and independence do not refer to practical matters, nor to external +occupations, but to interior activity, to thought, to the contemplation +of virtue itself. This virtue must be considered as a kind of +intelligence, and must not be confused with the passions that dominate +and govern reason; for these, as (Plato[185]) says, seem to derive +something from the body, though trained by exercise and habit. + + +LIBERTY DEPENDS ON THE HIGHEST INTELLIGENCE. + +Liberty therefore belongs to the immaterial principle, and to this +should be traced our free will. This principle is the volition which +rules itself, and which remains within itself; even when by necessity +compelled to take some resolution affecting external affairs. All that +proceeds from (the immaterial principle) and exists by it, depends on +us, and is free; what is outside of it, and with it; what it itself +wills and carries out unhindered, also constitutes what primarily +depends on us. The contemplative and primary Intelligence therefore +possesses independence, because in the accomplishment of its function +it depends on no other being, because fulfilling (its function, +Intelligence) remains entirely turned towards itself, exclusively +engaged with itself, resting in the Good, living according to its +will, satisfied, and without needs. Besides, will is nothing more +than thought; but it was called "will" because it was conformed to +intelligence; for will imitates what conforms to intelligence. On +the one hand, will desires the Good; on the other, for Intelligence +to think truly, is to abide within the Good. Intelligence therefore +possesses what the will desires, and, in attaining these its desires, +will becomes thought. Since, therefore, we define liberty as the will's +achievement of the Good, why should not liberty also be predicated of +the Intelligence which is founded on (the Good) that is the object of +the desire of our will? If, however, there should still be objection +to ascribing liberty to intelligence, this could be the case only by +ascribing it to something still higher (namely, super-Intelligence). + + +THE SOUL IS FREE BY INTELLIGENCE, WHICH IS FREE BY ITSELF. + +7. The soul therefore becomes free when, by the aid of intelligence, +she defies all obstacles in her ascent to the Good; and whatever she +does for the sake of the Good is responsible action. Intelligence, +however, is free by itself. + + +B. OF THE FREE WILL OF THE SUPREME. + +(_Let us now consider the free will of the Good._) + + +THE GOOD IS THE DESIRABLE IN ITSELF. + +8. The nature of the Good is that which is desirable for its own sake. +It is by the Good that the Soul and Intelligence exercise liberty when +the Soul can attain the Good without obstacle, and when Intelligence +can enjoy its possession. Now since the Good's empire extends over all +lower treasures; since He occupies the front rank; since He is the +Principle to which all beings wish to rise, on whom they all depend, +and from whom all derive their power and liberty; it would be difficult +to attribute to Him a liberty similar to our human freedom of will, +when we can hardly, with propriety, predicate such a human liberty of +Intelligence. + + +THE GOOD IS FREE, BUT NOT MERELY BY CHANCE. + +Here some rash person,[186] drawing his arguments from some other +school of thought, may object that, "If the Good be indeed good, this +occurs only by chance. A man is not master of what he is (that is, +of his own nature), because his own nature does not depend on himself +(that is, is not due to self-determination). Consequently, he enjoys +neither freedom nor independence, as he acts or withholds action as +he is forced by necessity." Such an assertion is gratuitous, and even +self-contradictory. It destroys all conception of will, liberty and +independence, reducing these terms to being labels, and illusions. He +who advances such an opinion is forced to maintain not only that it +is not within the power of anybody to do or not to do some thing, but +also that the word "liberty" arouses no conception in his mind, and is +meaningless. If however he insist that he does understand it, he will +soon be forced to acknowledge that the conception of liberty bears a +conformity with the reality which he at first denied. The conception +of a thing exerts no interference on its substance ("being"); it can +do nothing by itself, nor can it lead to hypostatic existence. It is +limited to pointing out to us which being obeys others, which being +possesses free will, which being depends on no other, but is master of +its own action, a privilege characteristic of eternal beings so far as +they are eternal, or to beings which attain the Good without obstacle +(like the Soul), or possess it (like Intelligence). It is therefore +absurd to say that the Good, which is above them, seeks other higher +good beyond itself. + + +BEING AND ACTUALIZATION CONSTITUTE ONE SELF-EXISTENT PRINCIPLE. + +Nor is it any more accurate to insist that the Good exists by chance. +Chance occurs only in the lower and multiple things. We on the contrary +insist that the First does not exist by chance, and that one cannot +say that He is not master of His birth, since He was not born.[187] +It is not any less absurd to assert that He is not free because He +acts according to His nature; for such an assertion would seem to +imply that freedom consists in actions contrary to one's nature. Last, +His solitariness (or, unity) does not deprive Him of liberty, because +this unity does not result from His being hindered by anybody else +(from having anything else), but from His being what He is, from His +satisfying (or, pleasing) Himself, as He could not be any better; +otherwise, it would be implied that one would lose one's liberty on +attaining the Good. If such an assertion be absurd, is it not the +summit of absurdity to refuse to predicate autocratic liberty of the +Good because of His being good, because He remains within Himself and +because since all beings aspire towards Him, He Himself aspires to +nothing else than Himself, and has no need of anything? As His higher +hypostatic existence is simultaneously His higher actualization--for +in Him these two aspects fuse into one, since they do so even in +Intelligence--His essence is no more conformed to His actualization, +than His actualization to His essence. He cannot be said to actualize +according to His nature, nor that His actualization and His higher life +are traced up into His higher being (so to speak). But as His higher +being and His higher (actualization) are intimately united, and coexist +since all eternity, the result is that these two entities constitute a +single Principle, which depends on itself, and nothing else. + + +PHYSICAL QUALITIES USED OF THE SUPREME ONLY BY ANALOGY. + +8. We conceive of the self-rule as no accident of the Good; but, from +the self-rule proper to (all) beings, we rise, by abstraction of the +contraries, to Him who Himself is liberty and independence, thus +applying to this Principle the lower attributes that we borrow from +inferior beings (that is, the Soul and Intelligence), because of our +impotence to speak properly of Him. Such indeed are the terms that we +could use in referring to Him, though it would be absolutely impossible +to find the proper expression, not only to predicate anything of Him, +but even to say anything whatever about Him. For the most beautiful and +venerable things do no more than imitate Him, who is their principle. +Nevertheless, from another standpoint, He is not their principle, since +this their imitation must be denied, and we must withdraw, as too +inferior, even the terms "liberty" and "self-rule," for these terms +seem to imply a tendency towards something else, an obstacle, even if +only to avoid it; the coexistence of other beings, even if only to +imitate Him uninterruptedly. Now no tendency should be attributed to +the Good. He is what He is before all other things, since we do not +even say of Him, "He is," so as not to establish any connection between +Him and "beings." Neither can we say of Him, "according to His nature"; +for this expression indicates some later relation. It is indeed applied +to intelligible entities, but only so far as they proceed from some +other principle; that is why it is applied to "being," because it +is born of the (Good). But if we refer "nature" to temporal things, +it could not be predicated of "being"; for to say that "being" does +not exist by itself would be to affect its existence; to say that it +derives its existence from something else is equivalent to asserting +that it does not exist by itself. Nor should we say of the Good that +"His nature is accidental," nor speak of contingency in connection with +(the Divinity); for He is contingent neither for Himself nor for other +beings; contingency is found only in the multiple beings which, already +being one thing, have accidentally become some other. How indeed +could the First exist accidentally? for He did not reach His present +condition fortuitously enough to enable us even to ask, "How did He +become what He is?" No chance led Him (to become His present self), +nor led Him to hypostatic existence; for chance and luck did not exist +anteriorly to Him, since even they proceed from a cause, and exist only +in things that grow[188] (or, "become"). + + +"CONTINGENCE" MIGHT BE APPLIED TO THE SUPREME, IF THE WORD BE +RE-DEFINED. + +9. If however anybody applied the term "contingency" to the Divinity, +we should not dispute about the word, but go back of it to its +underlying meaning. Do you, by it, mean that the First is a principle +of particular nature and power; and that if He had had a different +nature, He would still, as principle, have conformed to the nature He +would have had? Also, that if He had been less perfect, He would still +have actualized in conformity with His being? We should answer such +an assertion thus: it was impossible for the higher Principle of all +things to be contingent; or to be less perfect accidentally, or good +in some other manner, as some higher thing that was less complete. +As the principle of all things must be better than they, He must be +determinate; and by this is here meant that He exists in an unique +manner. This, however, not by necessity; for necessity did not exist +before Him. Necessity exists only in the beings that follow the first +Principle, though the latter impose no constraint upon them. It is by +Himself that the First exists uniquely. He could not be anything but +what He is; He is what He ought to have been; and not by accident. +He is that; He had to be what He was. So "He who is what He ought to +have been" is the principle of the things that ought to exist. Not by +accident, nor contingently, therefore, is He what He is; He is what He +had to be; though here the term "had to be" is improper. (If we be +permitted to explain what we mean by an illustration, we may say that) +the other beings have to await the appearance of their king--which +means, that He shall posit Himself as what He really is, the true King, +the true Principle, the true Good. Of Him it must not even be said +that He actualizes in conformity with the Good, for then He would seem +subordinate to some other principle; we must say only that He is what +He is. He is not conformed to the Good, because He is the Good itself. + + +NOT EVEN ESSENCE IS CONTINGENT, LET ALONE SUPER-ESSENCE. + +Besides, there is nothing contingent, even in (that which is beneath +the First), namely, Essence-in-itself; for if any contingency +inhered in it, it itself would be contingent. But Essence cannot +be contingent, for not fortuitously is it what it is; nor does it +derive what it is from anything else, because the very nature of +Essence is to be Essence. This being the case, how could "He who is +above Essence" be considered as being what He is fortuitously? For He +begat Essence, and Essence is not what it is fortuitously, since it +exists in the same manner as "Being," which is what is "Being" and +Intelligence--otherwise, one might even say that Intelligence was +contingent, as if it could have been anything but what is its nature. +Thus He who does not issue from Himself, and does not incline towards +anything whatever, is what He is in the most special sense. + + +THE SUPREME IS THE POWER REALLY MASTER OF HIMSELF. + +What now could be said (to look down) from some (peak) overhanging +(Essence and Intelligence), upon (their principle)? Could you +describe what you saw from there as being what it is fortuitously? +Certainly not! Neither His nature nor His manner would be contingent. +He is merely (an absolute, unexplainable) existence (a "thus"). Even +this term "thus," however, would be improper, for, on applying it to +the First, it would become determinate, and become "such a thing." +Whoever has seen the First would not say He was, or was not that; +otherwise, you would be reducing Him to the class of things which may +be designated as this or that; but the First is above all these things. +When you shall have seen Him who is infinite ("indefinite"), you will +be able to name all the things that are after Him (you will be able to +name Him whom all things follow); but you must not classify Him among +these. Consider Him as the universal Power essentially master (of +himself), which is what He wishes; or rather, who has imposed His will +upon (all) beings, but who Himself is greater than all volition, and +who classifies volition as below Himself. (To speak strictly therefore) +He did not even will to be what He is (he did not even say, I shall be +that); and no other principle made Him be what He is. + + +THE SUPREME BANISHES ALL CHANCE BY ASSIGNING LIMIT AND SHAPE TO EACH +FORM. + +10. He (Strato the Peripatetic?) who insists that the Good is what it +is by chance, should be asked how he would like to have it demonstrated +to him that the hypothesis of chance is false--in case it be false--and +how chance could be made to disappear from the universe? If there be +a nature (such as the nature of the one Unity), which makes (chance) +disappear, it itself could not be subject to chance. If we subject +to chance the nature which causes other beings not to be what they +are by chance, nothing will be left that could have been derived +from chance. But the principle of all beings banishes chance from the +universe by giving to each (being) a form, a limitation, and a shape; +and it is impossible to attribute to chance the production of beings +thus begotten in a manner conforming to reason. A cause exists there. +Chance reigns only in things that do not result from a plan, which are +not concatenated, which are accidental. How indeed could we attribute +to chance the existence of the principle of all reason, order, and +determination? Chance no doubt sways many things[188]; but it could +not control the production of intelligence, reason, and order. Chance, +in fact, is the contrary of reason; how then could (chance) produce +(reason)? If chance do not beget Intelligence, so much the more could +it not have begotten the still superior and better Principle; for +chance had no resources from which to produce this principle; chance +itself did not exist; and it would not have been in any manner able +to impart eternal (qualities). Thus, since there is nothing anterior +to the (Divinity), and as He is the First, we shall have to halt our +inquiry about this Principle, and say nothing more about Him, rather +examining the production of the beings posterior to Him. As to Him +himself, there is no use considering how He was produced, as He really +was not produced. + + +THE SUPREME AS MASTER OF HIS OWN BEING. + +Since He was not produced, we must suppose that He is the master of +His own being. Even if He were not master of His own being, and if, +being what He is, He did not endow Himself with "hypostatic" form +of existence, and limited Himself to utilizing His resources, the +consequence is that He is what He is necessarily, and that He could +not have been different from what He is. He is what He is, not because +He could have been otherwise, but because His nature is excellent. +Indeed, even if one be sometimes hindered from becoming better, no one +is ever hindered by any other person from becoming worse. Therefore, if +He did not issue from Himself, He owes it to Himself, and not to any +outside hindrance; He must essentially be that which has not issued +from itself. The impossibility of becoming worse is not a mark of +impotence, because, if (the Divinity) do not degenerate, He owes it to +Himself, (and derives it) from Himself. His not aspiring to anything +other than Himself constitutes the highest degree of power, since He is +not subjected to necessity, but constitutes the law and necessity of +other beings. Has necessity then caused its own (hypostatic) existence? +No, it has not even reached there, inasmuch as all that is after the +First achieved (hypostatic) existence on His account. How then could +He who is before (hypostatic) existence (or, which has achieved a form +of existence), have derived His existence from any other principle, or +even from Himself? + + +IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO TRANSCEND THE FIRST. + +11. What then is the Principle which one cannot even say that it is +(hypostatically) existent? This point will have to be conceded without +discussion, however, for we cannot prosecute this inquiry. What +indeed would we be seeking, when it is impossible to go beyond, every +inquiry leading to some one principle, and ceasing there? Besides, all +questions refer to one of four things: existence, quality, cause and +essence. From the beings that follow Him, we conclude to the essence +of the First, in that sense in which we say He exists. Seeking the +cause of His existence, however, would amount to seeking an (ulterior) +principle, and the Principle of all things cannot Himself have a +principle. An effort to determine His quality would amount to seeking +what accident inheres in Him in whom is nothing contingent; and there +is still more clearly no possible inquiry as to His existence, as +we have to grasp it the best we know how, striving not to attribute +anything to Him. + + +THE ORIGIN OF GOD PUZZLES US ONLY BECAUSE WE HABITUALLY START FROM SOME +PRE-EXISTENT CHAOS. + +(Habitually) we are led to ask these questions about the nature (of +the divinity) chiefly because we conceive of space and location as +a chaos, into which space and location, that is either presented to +us by our imagination, or that really exists, we later introduce the +first Principle. This introduction amounts to a question whence and +how He came. We then treat Him as a stranger, and we wonder why He is +present there, and what is His being; we usually assume He came up +out of an abyss, or that He fell from above. In order to evade these +questions, therefore, we shall have to remove from our conception +(of the divinity) all notion of locality, and not posit Him within +anything, neither conceiving of Him as eternally resting, and founded +within Himself, nor as if come from somewhere. We shall have to content +ourselves with thinking that He exists in the sense in which reasoning +forces us to admit His existence, or with persuading ourselves that +location, like everything else, is posterior to the Divinity, and that +it is even posterior to all things. Thus conceiving (of the Divinity) +as outside of all place, so far as we can conceive of Him, we are not +surrounding Him as it were within a circle, nor are we undertaking to +measure His greatness, nor are we attributing to Him either quantity +or quality; for He has no shape, not even an intelligible one; He is +not relative to anything, since His hypostatic form of existence is +contained within Himself, and before all else. + + +THE SUPREME, BEING WHAT HE IS, IS NOT PRODUCED BY CHANCE. + +Since (the Divinity) is such, we certainly could not say that He is +what He is by chance. Such an assertion about Him is impossible, +inasmuch as we can speak of Him only by negations.[189] We shall +therefore have to say, not that He is what He is by chance; but that, +being what He is, He is not that by chance, since there is within Him +absolutely nothing contingent. + + +EVEN WE MAY BE SAID TO BE MASTERS OF OURSELVES; HOW MUCH MORE THE +SUPREME! + +12. Shall we not even refuse to say that (the divinity) is what He is, +and is the master of what He is, or of that which is still superior? +Our soul still moots this problem, because she is not yet entirely +convinced by what we have said. Our considerations thereof are as +follows. By his body, each one of us is far separated from "being"; but +by his soul, by which he is principally constituted, he participates +in "being," and is a certain being; that is, he is a combination +of "difference" and "being." Fundamentally, we are therefore not a +"being"; we are not even "being"; consequently, we are not masters of +our "being"; "being" itself rather is master of us, since it furnishes +us with "difference" (which, joined with "being," constitutes our +nature). As, in a certain degree, we are nevertheless the "being" that +is master of us, we may, in this respect, even here below, be called +masters of ourselves. As to the Principle which absolutely is what +He is, which is "Being" itself, so that He and His being fuse, He is +master of Himself, and depends on nothing, either in His existence or +"being." He does not even need to be master of Himself since (He is +being), and since all that occupies the first rank in the intelligible +world is classified as "being." + + +HOW THE SUPREME IS EVEN BEYOND HIS OWN MASTER. + +As to Him who made "being" (equivalent to) freedom, whose nature it is +to make free beings, and who (therefore) might be called the "author of +liberty"--excuse the expression--to what could He be enslaved? It is +His being (or, nature) to be free; or rather, it is from Him that being +derives its freedom; for (we must not forget that) "being" is posterior +to Him, who Himself (being beyond it), "has" none. If then there be any +actualization in Him, if we were to consider that He was constituted +by an actualization, He would nevertheless contain no difference, +He will be master of His own self that produces the actualization, +because He Himself and the actualization fuse (and are identical). +But if we acknowledge no actualization whatever (in the Divinity), if +we predicate actualization only of the things that tend towards Him, +and from Him derive their hypostatic existence, we should still less +recognize in Him any element that is master, or that masters. We should +not even say that He was master of Himself, nor that He had a master, +but because we have already predicated of "being" what is meant by +being master of oneself. We therefore classify (the Divinity) in a rank +higher still. + +But how can there be a principle higher than the one that is master +of Himself? In the Principle which is master of Himself, as being and +actualization are two (separate) entities, it is actualization that +furnishes the notion of being master of oneself. As however we saw that +actualization was identical with "being," in order to be called master +of itself, actualization must have differentiated itself from being. +Therefore (the Divinity), which is not constituted by two things fused +into unity, but by absolute Unity, being either only actualization, or +not even mere actualization, could not be called "master of Himself." + + +ALL SUCH LANGUAGE ABOUT THE DIVINITY IS METAPHORICAL. + +13. Although the above expressions, when applied to the (divinity), are +really not exact, we are nevertheless forced to use them in connection +with this disquisition. We therefore repeat what was above rightly +stated, that no doubleness, not even if merely logical, should be +admitted to our idea of the Divinity. Nevertheless, that we may be +better understood, we shall for a moment lay aside the strictness of +language demanded by reason. + + +THE SUPREME IS MASTER OF HIMSELF BECAUSE HIS VERY ESSENCE DEPENDS ON +HIMSELF. + +Now supposing the existence of actualizations in the divinity, and that +these actualizations depend on His will--for he could not actualize +involuntarily--and that simultaneously they constitute His being; in +this case, His will and His being will be identical (that is, will +fuse). Such as He wished to be, He is. That He wills and actualizes in +conformity to His nature, will not be said in preference to this, that +His being conforms to His will and His actualization. He is absolutely +master of Himself, because His very essence depends on Himself. + + +THE SUPREME IS A UNITY OF WILL, BEING AND ACTUALIZATION. + +Here arises another consideration. Every being, that aspires to the +Good, wishes to be the Good far more than to be what it is; and thinks +itself as existing most, the more it participates in the Good. Its +preference is to be in such a state, to participate in the Good as much +as possible, because the nature of the Good is doubtless preferable in +itself. The greater the portion of good possessed by a being, the freer +and more conformable to its will is its nature (being); then it forms +but one and the same thing with its will, and by its will achieves +hypostatic existence (or, a form of existence). So long as a being +does not possess the Good, it wishes to be different from what it is; +so soon as the being possesses it, the being wishes to be what it is. +This union, or presence of the Good in a being, is not fortuitous; its +"being" is not outside of the Will (of the Good); by this presence of +the Good it is determined, and on that account, belongs to itself. If +then this presence of the Good cause every being to make and determine +itself, then evidently (the Divinity) is primarily and particularly +the principle through which the rest may be itself. The "being" (of +the Good) is intimately united with the will (the Divinity) has to be +such as He is--if I may be permitted to speak thus--and He cannot be +understood unless He wishes to be what He is. As in Him everything +concurs (in a consummation), He wishes to be, and is what He wishes; +His will and Himself form but one (are identical, or, fuse). He is not +any the less one, for He finds that He is precisely what He may have +wished to be. What indeed could He have wished to be, if not what He is? + + +THE SUPREME WOULD WISH TO BE WHAT HE IS. + +Now supposing that (the divinity) were given the chance to choose what +He would like to be, and that He were permitted to change His nature, +He would not desire to become different from what He is; He would not +find in Himself anything that displeased Him, as if He had been forced +to be what He is; for He as ever willed, and still wills to be what +He is. The nature of Good is really His will; He has neither yielded +to a lure, nor (blindly) followed his own nature, but He preferred +Himself, because there was nothing different that He could have wished +to be. With this, contrast that other beings do not find implied in +their own being the reason of pleasing themselves, and that some of +them are even dissatisfied with themselves. In the hypostatic existence +of the Good, however, is necessarily contained self-choice, and +self-desire; otherwise, there would be nothing in the whole universe +that could please itself, since one pleases himself only inasmuch as he +participates in the Good, and possesses an image of it within oneself. + + +EVERY TERM, WHEN APPLIED TO THE DIVINITY, SHOULD BE PRECEDED BY A +PARTICLE REMINDING IT IS ONLY USED METAPHORICALLY. + +We must, however, ask indulgence for our language; when speaking of the +(divinity) we are, by the necessity of being understood, obliged to +make use of words which a meticulous accuracy would question. Each of +them should be prefixed by a (warning) particle, (meaning "somewhat," +or) "higher." + + +THE SUPREME IS CHOICE, BEING, WILL, SELF-DIRECTION, AND SELF-EXISTENCE. + +The subsistence of the Good implies that of choice and will, because +He could not exist without these two. But (in the Divinity) (these +three, choice, being and will) do not form a multiplicity; they must +be considered as having fused. Since He is the author of will, He must +evidently also be the author of what is called self-direction ("being +for oneself"). This leads us to say that He made Himself; for, since He +is the author of will, and as this will is more or less His work, and +as it is identical with His essence, (we may say that) He gave himself +the form of (hypostatic) existence. Not by chance therefore is He what +He is; He is what He is because He wished to be such. + + +IN ANALYSIS CONTINGENCY IS ELIMINATED. + +14. Here is still another point of view from which the subject under +discussion may be regarded. Each one of the beings that are said to +be existent, is either identical with its essence, or differs from +it. Thus, some particular man differs from the Man-essence, only +participating therein. On the contrary, the soul is identical with +the Soul-essence, when she is simple, and when she is not predicated +of anything else. Likewise, the Man-in-himself is identical with the +Man-essence. The man who is other than the Man-essence is contingent; +but the Man-essence is not contingent; the Man-in-himself exists in +himself. If then the essence of man exist by itself, if it be neither +fortuitous nor contingent, how could contingency be predicated of Him +who is superior to Man in himself, and who begat him, from whom all +beings are derived, since His is a nature simpler than the Man-essence, +and even of essence in general? If, in ascending towards greater +simplicity, contingency decreases, so much the more impossible is +it that contingency could extend to the Nature that is the simplest +(namely, the Good). + + +THE SUPREME IS BOTH BEING AND CAUSE. + +Let us also remember that each of the beings which exist genuinely, +as we have said, and which have received their form of hypostatic +existence from the Good, likewise owe it to Him that they are +individual, as are the similarly situated sense-beings. By such +individual beings is here meant having in one's own being the cause +of his hypostatic existence. Consequently, He who then contemplates +things can give an account of each of their details, to give the +cause of the individuality of eyes or feet, to show that the cause of +the generation of each part is found in its relations with the other +parts, and that they have all been made for each other. Why are the +feet of a particular length? Because some other organ is "such"; for +instance, the face being such, the feet themselves must be such. In +one word, the universal harmony[190] is the cause on account of which +all things were made for each other.[191] Why is the individual such +a thing? Because of the Man-essence. Therefore the essence and the +cause coincide. They issued from the same source, from the Principle +which, without having need of reasoning, produced together the essence +and the cause. Thus the source of the essence and the cause produces +them both simultaneously. Such then are begotten things, such is their +principle, but in a much superior and truer manner; for in respect of +excellence, it possesses an immense superiority over them. Now since +it is not fortuitously, neither by chance, nor contingently, that +the things which bear their cause in themselves, are what they are; +since, on the other hand, (the Divinity) possesses all the entities of +which He is the principle, evidently, being the Father of reason, of +cause, and of causal being--all of them entities entirely free from +contingence--he is the Principle and type of all things that are not +contingent, the Principle which is really and in the highest degree +independent of chance, of fortune, and of contingency; He is the cause +of Himself, He is He by virtue of Himself; for He is Self in a primary +and transcendent manner. + + +THE SUPREME CO-EXISTS WITH HIMSELF, AND IS SUCH AS HE WISHES TO BE. + +15. He is simultaneously the lovable and love; He is love of himself; +for He is beautiful only by and in Himself. He coexists with Himself +only on condition that the thing, which exists in Himself, is identical +with Him. Now as in Him the thing that coexists is identical with Him, +and as in Him also that which desires, and that which is desirable play +the part of hypostasis and subject, here once more appears the identity +of desire and "being." If this be so, it is evidently again He who is +the author of Himself, and the master of Himself; consequently, He was +made not such as some other being desired it, but He is such as He +Himself desires. + + +MEN ESCAPE CHANCE BY INFERIOR ISOLATION; THEREFORE THE SUPREME MUST BE +FREE. + +When we assert that (the Divinity) Himself receives nothing, and is +received by no other being, we thereby in another way prove that He +is what He is, not by chance. This is the case because He isolates +Himself, and preserves Himself uninfected from all things. Besides, +we sometimes see that our nature possesses something similar, when it +finds itself disengaged from all that is attached to us, and subjects +us to the sway of fortune and fatality--for all the things that we call +ours are dependent, and undergo the law of fortune, happening to us +fortuitously. Only in this manner is one master of himself, possessing +free will, by virtue of an actualization of the light which has the +form of the Good, of an actualization of the Good, which is superior to +intelligence; of an actualization which is not adventitious, and which +is above all thought. When we shall have risen thither, when we shall +have become that alone, leaving all the rest, shall we not say that we +are then above even liberty and free will? Who then could subject us +to chance, to fortune, to contingency, since we shall have become the +genuine life, or rather, since we shall be in Him who derives nothing +from any other being, who is solely himself? When other beings are +isolated, they do not suffice themselves; but He is what He is, even +when isolated. + + +THE ASCENT OF LIFE WITNESS TO THE DISAPPEARANCE OF CONTINGENCY. + +The first hypostatic form of existence does not consist in an inanimate +entity or in an irrational life; for an irrational life is but weak in +essence, being a dispersion of reason, and something indeterminate. On +the contrary, the closer life approaches reason, the further is it from +contingency, for that which is rational has nothing to do with chance. +Ascending then (to the Divinity) He does not seem to us to be Reason, +but what is still more beautiful than Reason; so far is He from having +arisen by chance! Indeed, He is the very root of Reason, for it is the +goal at which all things find their consummation. He is the principle +and foundation of an immense Tree which lives by reason; He remains in +Himself, and imparts essence to the Tree by the reason He communicates. + + +THE SUPREME AS EVERYWHERE AND NOWHERE; AS INCLINATION AND IMMANENCE. + +16. As we assert, and as it seems evident that (the Divinity) is +everywhere and nowhere, it is necessary thoroughly to grasp and +understand this conception, as it applies to the subject of our +studies. Since (the Divinity) is nowhere, He is nowhere fortuitously; +since He is everywhere, He is everywhere what He is. He himself is +therefore what is named omnipresence, and universality. He is not +contained within omnipresence, but is omnipresence itself, and He +imparts essence to all the other beings because they are all contained +within Him who is everywhere. Possessing the supreme rank, or rather +Himself being supreme, He holds all things in obedience to Himself. For +them He is not contingent; it is they that are contingent to Him, or +rather, that connect with Him; for it is not He who contemplates them, +but they who look at Him. On His part, He, as it were, moves towards +the most intimate depths within Himself, loving Himself, loving the +pure radiance of which He is formed, Himself being what He loves, that +is, giving Himself a hypostatic form of existence, because He is an +immanent actualization, and what is most lovable in Him constitutes the +higher Intelligence. This Intelligence being an operation, He himself +is an operation; but as He is not the operation of any other principle, +He is the operation of Himself; He therefore is not what chance makes +of Him, but what He actualizes. He is the author of Himself, inasmuch +as He exists particularly because He is His own foundation, because He +contemplates Himself, because, so to speak, He passes His existence +in contemplating Himself. He therefore is, not what He fortuitously +found Himself to be, but what He himself wishes to be, and as His will +contains nothing fortuitous, He is even in this respect independent +of contingency. For, since His will is the will of the Best that is +in the universe, it could not be fortuitous. If one were to imagine +an opposite movement, one will easily recognize that His inclination +towards Himself, which is His actualization, and His immanence in +Himself make of Him what He is. Indeed, should (the divinity) incline +towards what is outside of Himself, He would cease being what He +is. His actualization, in respect to Himself, is to be what He is; +for He and that actualization coincide. He therefore gives Himself +a hypostatic form of existence, because the actualization that He +produces is inseparable from Himself. If then the actualization of (the +divinity) did not merely commence, but if, on the contrary, it dated +from all eternity; if it consist in an exciting action,[192] identical +to Him who is excited; and if, besides this exciting action, He be +ever-being super-intellection, then (the divinity) is what He makes +himself by His exciting action. The latter is superior to "Being," to +Intelligence, and to the Life of Wisdom; it is Himself. He therefore +is an actualization superior to Life, Intelligence and Wisdom; these +proceed from Him, and from Him alone. He therefore derives essence from +Himself, and by Himself; consequently, He is, not what He fortuitously +found Himself to be, but what He willed to be. + + +PROVIDENCE, THE PLAN OF THE UNIVERSE, IS FROM ETERNITY. + +17. Here is another proof of it. We have stated that the world and the +"being" it contains are what they would be if their production had been +the result of a voluntary determination of their author, what they +would still be if the divinity exercising a prevision and prescience +based on reasoning, had done His work according to Providence. But +as (these beings) are or become what they are from all eternity, +there must also, from eternity--within the coexistent beings, exist +("seminal) reasons" which subsist in a plan more perfect (than that +of our universe); consequently, the intelligible entities are above +Providence, and choice; and all the things which exist in Essence +subsist eternally there, in an entirely intellectual existence. If the +name "Providence" be applied to the plan of the universe, then immanent +Intelligence certainly is anterior to the plan of the universe, and the +latter proceeds from immanent Intelligence, and conforms thereto.[193] + + +THE SUPREME, ASSISTED BY INTELLIGENCE, WOULD HAVE NO ROOM FOR CHANCE. + +Since Intelligence is thus anterior to all things, and since all +things are (rooted) in such an Intelligence as principle, Intelligence +cannot be what it is as a matter of chance. For, if on one hand, +Intelligence be multiple, on the other hand it is in perfect agreement +with itself, so that, by co-ordination of the elements it contains, it +forms a unity. Once more, such a principle that is both multiple and +co-ordinated manifoldness, which contains all ("seminal) reasons" by +embracing them within its own universality, could not be what it is as +a result of fortune or chance. This principle must have an entirely +opposite nature, as much differing from contingency, as reason from +chance, which consists in the lack of reason. If the above Intelligence +be the (supreme) Principle, then Intelligence, such as it has been here +described, is similar to this Principle, conforms to it, participates +in it, and is such as is wished by it and its power. (The Divinity) +being indivisible, is therefore a (single) Reason that embraces +everything, a single (unitary) Number, and a single (Divinity) that is +greater and more powerful than the generated (universe); than He, none +is greater or better. From none other, therefore, can He have derived +His essence or qualities. What He is for and in Himself, is therefore +derived from Himself; without any relation with the outside, nor with +any other being, but entirely turned towards Himself. + + +CHANCE COULD NOT CAUSE THE ONE THAT IS THE CENTRE OF THE CIRCULAR +INTELLIGENCE. + +18. If then you seek this (Principle), do not expect to find anything +on the outside of Him; in Him seek all that is after Him, but do +not seek to penetrate within Him; for He is what is outside (of +everything), the comprehension of all things, and their measure.[194] +Simultaneously, He is the internal, being the most intimate depth of +all things; (in which case) the external would be (represented by) +Reason and Intelligence, which like a circumference fit around Him and +depend from Him. Indeed, Intelligence is such only because it touches +Him, and so far as it touches Him, and depends from Him[195]; for it is +its dependence from Him that constitutes its intelligence. It resembles +a circle which is in contact with its centre. It would be universally +acknowledged that such a circle would derive all its power from the +centre, and would, in a higher sense, be centriform. Thus the radii +of such a circle unite in a single centre by extremities similar to +the distal and originating (extremities). These (distal) extremities, +though they be similar to the centric ones, are nevertheless but faint +traces thereof; for the latter's potentiality includes both the radii +and their (distal) extremities; it is everywhere present in the radii, +manifests its nature therein, as an immature development. This is an +illustration how Intelligence and Essence were born from (the divinity) +as by effusion or development; and by remaining dependent from the +intellectual nature of the Unity, it thereby manifests an inherent +higher Intelligence, which (speaking strictly), is not intelligence, +since it is the absolute Unity. A centre, even without radii or +circumference, is nevertheless the "father" of the circumference and +the radii, for it reveals traces of its nature, and by virtue of an +immanent potency, and individual force, it begets the circumference +and the radii which never separate from it. Similarly, the One is the +higher archetype of the intellectual power which moves around Him, +being His image. For in the Unity there is a higher Intelligence which, +so to speak, moving in all directions and manners, thereby becomes +Intelligence; while the Unity, dwelling above Intelligence, begets it +by its power. How then could fortune, contingency and chance approach +this intelligence-begetting Power, a power that is genuinely and +essentially creative? Such then is what is in Intelligence, and such is +what is in Unity, though that which is in Him is far superior. + + +AS CAUSE, SUITABILITY, AND OPPORTUNITY, THE SUPREME IS BEYOND CHANCE. + +(As illustration), consider the radiance shed afar by some luminous +source that remains within itself; the radiation would represent +the image, while the source from which it issues would be the +genuine light.[196] Nevertheless, the radiation, which represents +the intelligence, is not an image that has a form foreign (to its +principle), for it does not exist by chance, being reason and cause +in each of its parts. Unity then is the cause of the cause; He is, in +the truest sense, supreme causality, simultaneously containing all the +intellectual causes He is to produce; this, His offspring, is begotten +not as a result of chance, but according to His own volition. His +volition, however, was not irrational, fortuitous, nor accidental; +and as nothing is fortuitous in Him, His will was exactly suitable. +Therefore Plato[197] called it the "suitable," and the "timely," to +express as clearly as possible that the (Divinity) is foreign to all +chance, and that He is that which is exactly suitable. Now if He be +exactly suitable, He is so not irrationally. If He be timely, He must +(by a Greek pun), also be "supremely sovereign" over the (beings) +beneath Him. So much the more will He be timely for Himself. Not by +chance therefore is He what He is, for He willed to be what He is; +He wills suitable things, and in Him that which is suitable, and the +actualization thereof, coincide. He is the suitable, not as a subject, +but as primary actualization manifesting Him such as it was suitable +for Him to be. That is the best description we can give of Him, in our +impotence to express ourselves about Him as we should like.[198] + + +NO PERSON WHO HAS SEEN THE SUPREME COULD POSSIBLY CALL HIM CHANCE. + +19. By the use of the above indications (it is possible), to ascend to +Him. Having done so, grasp Him. Then you will be able to contemplate +Him, and you will find no terms to describe His (greatness). When you +shall see Him, and resign any attempt at spoken description, you will +proclaim that He exists by Himself in a way such that, if He had any +being, it would be His servant, and would be derived from Him. No one +who has ever seen Him would have the audacity to maintain that He is +what He is by chance; nor even to utter such a blasphemy, for He would +be confounded by his own temerity. Having ascended to Him, the (human +observer) could not even locate His presence, as it were rising up +everywhere before the eyes of his soul. Whichever way the soul directs +her glances, she sees Him, unless, on considering some other object, +she abandons the divinity by ceasing to think of Him. + + +THE SUPREME IS ABOVE BEING BECAUSE NOT DEPENDENT THEREON. + +The ancient (philosophers), in enigmatical utterances, said that (the +divinity) is above "being."[199] This must be understood to mean not +only that He begets being, but because He is not dependent on "being" +or on Himself. Not even His own "being" is to Him a principle; for He +himself is the principle of "being." Not for Himself did he make it; +but, having made it, He left it outside of Himself, because He has no +need of essence, since He himself made it. Thus, even though He exist, +He does not produce that which is meant by that verb. + + +HAVING MADE HIMSELF DOES NOT IMPLY ANY PRIORITY IN THE DIVINITY. + +20. It will be objected that the above implies the existence (of the +Divinity) before He existed; for, if He made Himself, on the one hand, +He did not yet exist, if it was Himself that He made; and on the other, +so far as it was He who made, He already existed before Himself, since +what has been made was Himself. However, (the Divinity) should be +considered not so much as "being made" but as "making," and we should +realize that the actualization by which He created Himself is absolute; +for His actualization does not result in the production of any other +"being." He produces nothing but Himself, He is entirely Himself; +we are not dealing here with two things, but with a single entity. +Neither need we hesitate to admit that the primary actualization has no +"being"; but that actualization should be considered as constituting +His hypostatic form of existence. If within Him these two were to be +distinguished, the superlatively perfect Principle would be incomplete +and imperfect. To add actualization to Him would be to destroy His +unity. Thus, since the actualization is more perfect than His being, +and since that which is primary is the most perfect, that which is +primary must necessarily be actualization. He is what He is as soon +as He actualizes. He cannot be said to have existed before He made +Himself; for before He made Himself He did not exist; but (from the +first actualization) He already existed in entirety. He therefore is an +actualization which does not depend on being, (an actualization) that +is clearly free; and thus He (originates) from Himself. If, as to His +essence, He were preserved by some other principle, He himself would +not be the first proceeding from Himself. He is said to contain Himself +because He produces (and parades) Himself; since it is from the very +beginning that He caused the existence of what He naturally contains. +Strictly, we might indeed say, that He made Himself, if there existed a +time when He himself began to exist. But since He was what He is before +all times, the statement that He made Himself means merely that "having +made" and "himself" are inseparable; for His essence coincides with +His creative act, and, if I may be permitted to speak thus, with his +"eternal generation." + + +HOW THE SUPREME MAY BE SAID TO COMMAND HIMSELF. + +Likewise, the statement that the (divinity) commands Himself may be +taken strictly, if in Him be two entities (the commander and the +commanded); but if (we may not distinguish such a pair of entities) +there is only one entity within Him, and He is only the commander, +containing nothing that obeys. How then, if He contain nothing that was +commanded, could He command Himself? The statement that He commands +Himself means that, in this sense, there is nothing above Him; in which +case He is the First, not on account of the numerical order, but by His +authority and perfectly free power. If He be perfectly free, He cannot +contain anything that is not free; He must therefore be entirely free +within Himself. Does He contain anything that is not Himself, that He +does not do, that is not His work? If indeed He contained anything that +was not His work, He would be neither perfectly free nor omnipotent; He +would not be free, because He would not dominate this thing; nor would +He be omnipotent, because the thing whose making would not be in His +power would even thereby evade His dominion. + + +FURTHER OBJECTIONS TO THE SELF-AUTOCRACY OF THE DIVINITY. + +21. Could (the divinity) have made Himself different from what He made +Himself? (If he could not, He would not have been omnipotent). If you +remove from Him the power of doing evil, you thereby also remove the +power of doing good. (In the divinity), power does not consist in the +ability to make contraries; it is a constant and immutable power whose +perfection consisted precisely in not departing from unity; for the +power to make contraries is a characteristic of a being incapable of +continuously persisting in the best. Self-creation (the actualization +by which the divinity created Himself) exists once for all, for it +is perfect. Who indeed could change an actualization produced by the +will of the Divinity, an actualization that constitutes His very will? +But how then was this actualization produced by the volition (of the +divinity) which did not yet exist? + +What could be meant by the "volition of (the Divinity") if He had not +yet willed hypostatic form of existence (for Himself)? Whence then +came His will? Would it have come from His being (which, according to +the above objection) was not yet actualized? But His will was already +within His "being." In the (Divinity), therefore, there is nothing +which differs from His "being." Otherwise, there would have been in +Him something that would not have been His will. Thus, everything in +Him was will; there was in Him nothing that did not exercise volition; +nothing which, therefore, was anterior to His volition. Therefore, +from the very beginning, the will was He; therefore, the (Divinity) +is as and such as He willed it to be. When we speak of what was the +consequence of the will (of the Divinity), of what His will has +produced, (we must indeed conclude that) His will produced nothing that +He was not already. The statement that (the Divinity) contains Himself +means (no more than that) all the other beings that proceed from Him +are by Him sustained. They indeed exist by a sort of participation in +Him, and they relate back to Him. (The Divinity) Himself does not need +to be contained or to participate; He is all things for Himself; or +rather, He is nothing for Himself, because He has no need of all the +other things in respect to Himself. + + +THE OBSTACLE TO THE DIVINITY IS FAILURE TO ABSTRACT ENOUGH FROM HIM. + +Thus, whenever you wish to speak of (the Divinity), or to gain a +conception of Him, put aside all the rest. When you will have made +abstraction of all the rest, and when you will thus have isolated +(the Divinity), do not seek to add anything to Him; rather examine +whether, in your thought, you have not omitted to abstract something +from Him. Thus you can rise to a Principle of whom you could not later +either assert or conceive anything else. Classify in the supreme rank, +therefore, none but He who really is free, because He is not even +dependence on Himself; and because he merely is Himself, essentially +Himself, while each of the other beings is itself, and something else +besides. + + + + +SECOND ENNEAD, BOOK ONE. + +Of the Heaven.[200] + + +HEAVEN, THOUGH IN FLUX, PERPETUATES ITSELF BY FORM. + +1. Nothing will be explained by the perfectly true (Stoic) statement +that the world, as corporeal being that ever existed and that will ever +exist, is indebted for the cause of its perpetuity to the volition +of the divinity. We might find an analogy between the change of the +elements, and the death of animals without the perishing of the form of +the species here below, and the universe above, whose body is subject +to a perpetual flux and flow. Thus the divine volition could preserve +for it the same specific form in spite of successive alterations, so +that, without perpetually retaining numerical unity, it would ever +preserve the specific unity of form. It would indeed be a remarkable +discrepancy in the methods of nature that here below in animals the +form alone should be perpetual, while in the heaven and the stars their +individuality should be considered as perpetual as their form. + + +THERE MUST INEVITABLY BE CHANGE IN HEAVEN. + +The incorruptibility of the heaven has been ascribed to its containing +within its breast all things,[201] and to the non-existence of any +other thing into which it could change, as well as to the impossibility +of its meeting anything exterior that could destroy it. These theories +would indeed, in a reasonable manner, explain the incorruptibility +of heaven considered as totality, and universe; but would fail to +explain the perpetuity of the sun and of the other stars which are +parts of heaven, instead of being the whole universe, as is the heaven. +It would seem more reasonable that, just like the fire and similar +things, the stars, and the world considered as universe would possess +a perpetuity chiefly of form. It is quite possible that the heaven, +without meeting any destructive exterior thing, should be subjected to +a perpetual destruction such that it would preserve nothing identical +but the form, from the mere mutual destruction of its parts. In this +case its substrate, being in a perpetual flux, would receive its form +from some other principle; and we would be driven to recognize in the +universal living Organism what occurs in man, in the horse, and in +other animals; namely, that the man or horse (considered as species) +lasts forever, while the individual changes. (According to this view, +then) the universe will not be constituted by one ever permanent +part, the heaven, and another ceaselessly changing one, composed of +terrestrial things. All these things will then be subject to the same +condition though they might differ by longer or shorter duration, since +celestial bodies are more durable. Such a conception of the perpetuity +characteristic of the universe and its parts contains less ambiguity +(than the popular notion), and would be freed from all doubt if we +were to demonstrate that the divine power is capable of containing the +universe in this manner. The theory that the world contains something +perpetual in its individuality would demand not only a demonstration +that the divine volition can produce such an effect, but also an +explanation why certain things (according to that theory) are always +identical (in form and individuality), while other things are identical +only by their form. If the parts of the heaven alone remained +identical (by their individuality), all other things also should +logically remain (individually) identical. + + +REJECTION OF THE OPINION OF HERACLITUS. + +2. An admission that the heaven and the stars are perpetual in their +individuality, while sublunary things are perpetual only in their form, +would demand demonstration that a corporeal being can preserve its +individuality as well as its form, even though the nature of bodies +were a continual fluctuation. Such is the nature that the physical +philosophers,[202] and even Plato himself, attribute not only to +sublunar bodies, but even to celestial ones. "For," asks (Plato[203]), +"how could corporeal and visible objects subsist ever immutable and +identical with themselves?" (Plato) therefore admits the opinion of +Heraclitus that "the sun itself is in a state of perpetual becoming +(or, growth)."[204] + + +ARISTOTLE HAS TO DEPEND ON QUINTESSENCE. + +On the contrary, in the system of Aristotle, the immutability of the +stars is easily explained, but only after accepting his theory of a +fifth element (the quintessence[205]). If, however, it be rejected, +it would be impossible to demonstrate that the heaven, let alone its +parts, the sun and the stars, do not perish, while (as Aristotle does) +we regard the body of the heaven as being composed of the same elements +as terrestrial animals. + + +PLOTINOS'S VIEWS SUPPORTED BY THE HEAVEN'S POSSESSION OF THE SOUL AND +BODY. + +As every animal is composed of soul and body, the heaven must owe the +permanence of its individuality to the nature either of its soul, or +of its body; or again, to that of both. On the hypothesis that its +incorruptibility is due to the nature of its body, the Soul's only +function will be to animate it (by uniting with the body of the world). +On the contrary hypothesis that the body, by nature corruptible, +owes its incorruptibility exclusively to the Soul, there is need of +demonstration that the state of the body does not naturally oppose +this constitution and permanence (for, naturally constituted objects +admit of no disharmony); but that, on the contrary, here matter, by +its predisposition, contributes to the accomplishment of the divine +volition. + + +FLUCTUATION NEED NOT INTERFERE WITH CONTINUANCE. + +3. (It might however be objected) that the body of the world could +not contribute to the immortality of the world, since the body itself +fluctuates perpetually. But this fluctuation does not take place in +an outward direction, while the body (of the world) remains ever the +same because this fluctuation occurs so entirely within the world that +nothing issues therefrom. The world therefore could neither increase +nor diminish, nor further grow old. (As proof of this we may) consider +how, from all eternity, the earth constantly preserves the same shape +and mass; similarly, the air never diminishes, any more than the water. +The changes within them do not affect the universal living Organism. +Even we human beings subsist a long while, in spite of the perpetual +change of our constituent parts, and though some of these parts even +issue from the body. So much the more will the world's nature, from +which nothing issues, sufficiently harmonize with the nature of the +universal Soul to form along with her an organism which ever remains +the same, and subsists for ever. + + +FIRE, THOUGH AN APPARENT EXCEPTION, STILL CONFORMS TO THIS PROCEDURE. + +For example, fire (as the principal element of the heaven), is both +lively and swift, and cannot remain in the inferior regions, any more +than the earth can abide in the superior regions. When it has reached +these regions where it is to remain, it becomes established in the most +suitable place. But even so, like all other bodies, it still seeks to +extend in all directions. However, it cannot ascend, since there is no +place higher than the one it occupies; nor can it descend, because of +the opposition of its own nature. The only thing left for it to do is +to yield to the guidance and natural impulsion of the life-imparting +universal Soul, that is, to move into the most beautiful place, in the +universal Soul. Its falling from here is prevented by the universal +Soul's circular movement which dominates and supports it, as well as +by its innate indisposition to descend, so that its continuance in +the higher regions is unopposed. (The fire has no similarity with) +the constitutive parts of our body which are forced to derive their +suitable form from elsewhere. If unaided, they are not even capable of +preserving their organization. Merely to subsist, they are forced to +borrow parts from other objects. The case is entirely different with +the fire of the heaven, which needs no food because it loses nothing. +If indeed it allowed anything to escape, we might indeed be forced to +state that when in the heaven a fire is extinguished, a substitute must +be lit. But in such a case the universal living Organism would no more +remain identical. + + +THE IMMORTALITY OF THE HEAVEN IS DUE TO RESIDENCE THERE OF THE +UNIVERSAL SOUL. + +4. Apart from the exigencies of our argument, it may be interesting to +consider whether there be any wastage off from heaven, so as to create +a need of being (replenished or) fed, so to speak; or whether all its +contents, being once for all established, subsist there naturally, +without allowing any of their substance to escape. In the latter case +we would be driven further to inquire whether the heaven be composed +of fire exclusively or principally[213]; and whether, while dominating +the other elements, the fire engages them in its course. Were we to +associate (with fire) the Soul, which is the most powerful of all +causes, so as to unite her with elements so pure and excellent (just +as, in other animals, the soul chooses the best parts of the body +as dwelling-place), we would have produced a solid argument for the +immortality of the heaven. Aristotle indeed says that the flame surges, +and that the fire devours everything with an insatiable avidity[206]; +but he was evidently speaking only of the terrestrial fire, for the +celestial fire is calm, immovable, and in harmony with the nature of +the stars. + + +THE HEAVEN'S IMMORTALITY ALSO DUE TO THE UNIVERSAL SOUL'S SPONTANEOUS +MOTION. + +A still more important reason for the immortality of the heaven +is that the universal Soul, moving with remarkable spontaneity, +immediately succeeds the most perfect principles (such as the Good, +and Intelligence). She could not therefore allow the annihilation of +anything which had once been posited within her. Ignorance of the cause +that contains the universe could alone permit denial that the universal +Soul which emanates from the divinity excels all other bonds in +strength. It is absurd to believe that after having contained something +during a certain period, she could ever cease doing so. This would +imply that she had done so till now by some violence; which would again +infer the existence of some plan more natural than the actual state, +and actual admirable disposition of beings within the very constitution +of the universe; which would lastly suggest a force capable of +destroying the organization of the universe, and of undermining the +sovereignty of the governing Soul. + + +THE IMMORTALITY OF THE HEAVEN PROVED BY ITS NEVER HAVING HAD TO BEGIN. + +We have elsewhere[207] shown that it would be absurd to suppose that +the world ever had a beginning. This however implies that it will +never cease to exist. Why indeed should it not continue to do so? Its +component elements are not, like wood, and similar things, exposed +to wastage. Their continued subsistence, however, implies that the +universe that they form must also ever subsist. On the other hand, even +if they were subject to a perpetual change, the universe must still +subsist because the principle of this change subsists continually. +Moreover, it has elsewhere been shown[224] that the universal Soul is +not subject to repentance, because she governs the universe without +difficulties or fatigue, and that even in the impossible case that the +body of the universe should happen to perish, she would not thereby be +altered. + + +WHY CELESTIAL THINGS LAST LONGER THAN TERRESTRIAL ONES. + +5. The reason why celestial things endure beyond terrestrial +animals and elements has been thus stated by Plato[225]: "Divine +animals were formed by the divinity Himself, while the animals +here below were formed by the divinities, His offspring." What the +divinity (Himself) does could not possibly perish. This implies the +existence, below the demiurge (Intelligence), of the celestial Soul, +with our souls.[208] From the celestial Soul derives and flows an +apparent-form-of-an-image,[209] which forms terrestrial animals. This +inferior soul imitates her intelligible principle (the celestial Soul), +without, however, being able to resemble her completely--because she +employs elements which are less good (than the celestial elements); +because the place where she operates with them is less good (than +heaven)--and because the materials that she organizes could not remain +united. Consequently, terrestrial animals could not last for ever. For +the same reason this soul does not dominate terrestrial bodies with as +much power (as the celestial Soul dominates celestial things), because +each of them is governed by another (human) soul. + + +IMMORTALITY DOES NOT EXTEND TO THE SUB-LUNAR SPHERE. + +If we be right in attributing immortality to the heaven, we shall have +to extend that conception to the stars it contains; for unless its +parts endured, neither could the heaven. However, the things beneath +the heaven do not form part of it. The region which constitutes the +heaven does not extend further down than the moon. As to us, having +our organs formed by the (vegetative) soul which was given us by the +celestial divinities (the stars), and even the heaven itself,[210] +we are united to the body by that soul. Indeed, the other soul (the +reasonable soul), which constitutes our person, our "me,"[211] is not +the cause of our being,[212] but of our well-being (which consists in +our intellectual life). She comes to join our body when it is already +formed (by the vegetative soul), and contributes to our being only by +one part, by giving us reason (in making of us reasonable beings, and +men). + + +THE STARS CONTAIN NOT ONLY FIRE, BUT TANGIBLE EARTH. + +6. Is the heaven composed exclusively of fire? Does the fire allow +any of its substance to flow off, or escape? Does it, therefore, need +being fed? (Plato[213]) thinks the body of the universe is composed of +earth and fire; fire to explain its being visible, and earth to explain +its being tangible. This would lead us to suppose that the stars are +composed of fire not exclusively, but predominatingly, since they seem +to possess a tangible element. This opinion is plausible because Plato +supports it with reasonable grounds. Sense, sight and touch would lead +us to believe that the greater part, if not the whole, of the heaven, +is fire. But reason suggests that the heaven also contains earth, +because without earth it could not be tangible.[214] This however does +not imply that it contains also air and water. It would seem absurd +to think that water could subsist in so great a fire; nor could air +survive therein without immediately being transformed to steam. It +might be objected that two solids which play the parts of extremes in +a proportion, cannot be united without two means.[213] This objection, +however, might have no cogency, for this mathematical relation might +not apply to natural things, as indeed we are led to surmise by the +possibility of mingling earth and water without any intermediary. +To this it may be answered that earth and water already contain the +other elements. Some persons might think that the latter could not +effectually unite earth and water; but this would not disturb our +contention that the earth and water are related because each of these +two elements contains all the others. + + +EARTH CONTAINS ALL THE OTHER ELEMENTS. + +Besides, we shall have to examine whether the earth be invisible +without fire, and the fire intangible without the earth. Were this the +case, nothing would possess its own proper being. All things would be +mixed; each would reclaim its name only by the element preponderating +in it; for it has been claimed that the earth could not exist without +the humidity of water, which alone keeps all its parts united. Even +were this granted, it would, none the less, remain absurd to say that +each of these elements is something, while claiming that it does not +possess any characteristically individual constitution, except by its +union with the other elements, which, nevertheless, would not, any +the more, exist individually, each in itself. What reality, indeed, +would inhere in the nature or being of the earth, if none of its parts +were earth except because the water that operated as a bond? Besides, +with what could water unite without the preliminary existence of an +extension whose parts were to be bound together for the formation of +a continuous whole? The existence of an extension, however small it +be, will imply the self-existence of earth, without the assistance of +water; otherwise, there would be nothing for water to bind together. +Nor would the earth have any need of air, since the air exists before +the observation of any change within it. Nor is fire any more necessary +to the constitution of the earth; fire only serves in making it +visible, like all other objects. It is indeed reasonable to assert that +it is fire which renders objects visible, and it is a mistake[215] to +state that "one sees darkness," which cannot be seen any more than +silence can be heard. Besides, there is no necessity for fire to be in +earth; light suffices (to make it visible). Snow, and many other very +cold substances are, without any fire, very brilliant--that is, unless +we say that the fire approached them, and colored them before leaving +them. + + +ELEMENTS ARE NEVERTHELESS INDIVIDUAL. + +As to the other elements, could not water exist without participating +in the earth? Air could certainly not be said to participate in earth, +because of its penetrability. It is very doubtful that the fire +contains any earth, because it does not seem continuous, and does not, +by itself, seem to be tri-dimensional. True, fire does seem to contain +solidity, but not of a tri-dimensional kind; it seems rather to be a +sort of resistance corporeal nature[214]). Only of earth may hardness +be predicated; indeed, gold, in liquid state, is dense; not because it +is earth, but because it possesses density, and is solidified. It would +therefore not be unreasonable that fire, apart by itself, could subsist +by the power of the Soul which sustains it by her presence. The bodies +of (certain among) the guardian spirits consist of fire.[216] + + +TERRESTRIAL ELEMENTS, HOWEVER, DO NOT DEGRADE THE HEAVEN. + +It is unlikely that the universal Organism is composed of universal +elements. That terrestrial animals are thus composed is certain; but +to introduce the terrestrial element into the composition of the +heaven would be to admit something contrary to nature, and to the +order thereby established. (Epicurus's opinion that) the stars carry +terrestrial bodies along in their rapid flight is undemonstrable. +Besides, the presence of the earth would be an obstacle to the shine +and splendor of the celestial fire. + + +PLATO POSTULATED THE EXISTENCE OF EARTH AS BASIS OF LIFE. + +7. Plato's view[217] is to be accepted. The universe must contain +something solid, impenetrable, so that the earth, when established in +the middle of the universe, might offer a firm foundation for all the +animals that walk on it, and that these animals might possess a certain +solidity by the very fact of their terrestriality; so that the earth +might, by itself, possess the property of continuousness; that it might +be illuminated by fire, might also participate in water, so as not to +be desiccated, and so that its parts might unite, and that the air +might somewhat lighten its mass. + + +ELEMENTS ARE KINDRED THROUGH THEIR COMMON GROUND, THE UNIVERSE-BODY. + +The earth was mingled with the upper fire not to produce the stars, +but because fire has something terrestrial, as earth has something +igneous, as a result of all the bodies being contained within the +body of the universe. In short, every one of the elements includes +mixture of itself and of the other with which it participates. This +results from the interrelating community existing within the universe +(the "sympathy"). So each element, without combining with any other, +borrows some of its properties. For example, water participates in the +fluidity of the air, without however mingling therewith; so the earth +does not possess the fire, but derives its brightness from it. On +the other hand, a mixture would render all properties common to both +elements, confounding them together,[218] and would not limit itself +to merely approximating earth and fire, that is, a certain solidity +with a certain density. On this subject we can invoke the authority of +(Plato[219]), "The divinity lit this light in the second circle above +the earth," thereby referring to the sun, which he elsewhere calls "the +most brilliant star." + +By these words he hinders us from admitting that the sun is anything +else than fire. He also indicates that fire has no quality other than +light, which he considers as distinct from flame, and as possessing +only a gentle heat. This light is a body. From it emanates another +being that we, by verbal similarity, also call light, and which we +acknowledge to be incorporeal. This second kind of light derives from +the former, being its flower and brightness, and constitutes the +essentially white (that is, brilliant) body (of lightning, or comets). +(Unfortunately, however), the word "terrestrial" (which designates the +element allied to the fire, as we have said above), we are wont to +regard unfavorably because Plato makes the earth consist of solidity, +while we speak of the earth as a unity, though (Plato) distinguishes +several qualities within this element. + + +NATURE OF THE CELESTIAL FIRE AND LIGHT. + +The fire of which we speak above emits the purest light, and resides +in the highest region, by virtue of its nature. These celestial flames +are entirely distinct from the earthly flame, which after ascending +to a certain height, and meeting a greater quantity of air, becomes +extinguished. After ascending, it falls back on to the earth, because +(as a comet) it cannot rise any further; it stops in the sublunar +regions, though rendering the ambient air lighter. In those cases in +which it continues to subsist in higher regions, it becomes weaker, +gentler, and acquires a heatless glow, which is but a reflection of the +celestial light. The latter, on the other hand, is divided partly among +the stars in which it reveals great contrasts of magnitude and color, +and partly in the atmosphere. Its invisibility to our eyes is caused +both by its tenuity, and transparence, which causes it to become as +tangible as pure air, and also because of its distance from the earth. + + +CELESTIAL LIGHT IS NOT EXPOSED TO ANY WASTAGE. + +8. Since this light subsists in elevated regions, because the purity of +its nature forces it to remain in pure regions, it cannot be subject +to any wastage (or, leakage). Such a nature could not allow any escape +either downwards or upwards, nor could it meet anything that would +force it to descend. Moreover, it will be remembered that there is a +great difference of condition in a body united to, or separated from a +soul; and in this case the body of the heaven is everywhere united to +the (universal) Soul. + + +THE HEAVEN DOES NOT NEED THE ACTION OF EITHER AIR OR FIRE. + +Besides, all that approaches the heaven is either air or fire. What +of it is air cannot affect the heaven. What of it is fire can neither +influence the heaven, nor touch it, to act on it. Before acting on the +heaven, it would have to assume its nature; besides, fire is less great +or powerful than the heaven. Moreover, the action of fire consists in +heating; whereas, 1, that which is to be heated cannot have been hot by +itself; and as, 2, that which is to be dissolved by fire must first be +heated, inasmuch as it is this heating which causes a change of nature. +No other body is needed for either the subsistence of the heaven, or +for the functioning of its natural revolutions.[220] Moreover, the +heaven does not move in a straight line, because it is in the nature of +celestial things to remain immovable, or to move in a circular orbit, +and not to assume any other kind of movement without compulsion by some +superior force. + + +THE STARS ARE INEXHAUSTIBLE. AND NEED NO REFRESHMENT. + +Stars, therefore, stand in need of no feeding,[221] and we should not +judge them according to our own circumstances. Indeed, our (human) +soul, which contains our bodies, is not identical with the Soul that +contains the heaven; our soul does not reside in the same place, while +the world-Soul does not, like our composite bodies lose (excreta). Not +as our bodies do the stars need continual metabolic replacing food. +From our conception of celestial bodies we should remove all ideas of +a change that could modify their constitution. Terrestrial bodies are +animated by an entirely different nature[222]; which though because +of its weakness is incapable of insuring them a durable existence, +nevertheless imitates the superior nature (of the celestial Soul) by +birth and generation. Elsewhere[223] we have shown that even this +very celestial Soul cannot partake of the perfect immutability of +intelligible things. + + + + +FOURTH ENNEAD, BOOK SIX. + +Of Sensation and Memory. + + +STOIC DOCTRINES OF SENSATIONS AND MEMORIES HANG TOGETHER. + +If we deny that sensations are images impressed on the soul, similar +to the impression of a seal,[226] we shall also, for the sake of +consistency, have to deny that memories are notions or sensations +preserved in the soul by the permanence of the impression, inasmuch +as, according to our opinion, the soul did not originally receive any +impression. The two questions, therefore, hang together. Either we +shall have to insist that sensation consists in an image impressed on +the soul, and memory, in its preservation; or, if either one of these +opinions be rejected, the other will have to be rejected also. However, +since we regard both of them as false, we shall have to consider the +true operation of both sensation and memory; for we declare that +sensation is as little the impression of an image as memory is its +permanence. The true solution of the question, on the contrary, will +be disclosed by an examination of the most penetrating sense,[227] and +then by induction transferring the same laws to the other senses. + + +A. OF SENSATION. + + +THE SENSE OF SIGHT DOES NOT POSSESS THE IMAGE SEEN WITHIN ITSELF. + +In general the sensation of sight consists of perception of the visible +object, and by sight we attain it in the place where the object is +placed before our eyes, as if the perception operated in that very +place, and as if the soul saw outside of herself. This occurs, I +think, without any image being produced nor producing itself outside +of the soul, without the soul receiving any impression similar to that +imparted by the seal to the wax. Indeed, if the soul already in herself +possessed the image of the visible object, the mere possession of this +image (or type) would free her from the necessity of looking outside +of herself. The calculation of the distance of the object's location, +and visibility proves that the soul does not within herself contain +the image of the object. In this case, as the object would not be +distant from her, the soul would not see it as located at a distance. +Besides, from the image she would receive from within herself, the soul +could not judge of the size of the object, or even determine whether +it possessed any magnitude at all. For instance, taking as an example +the sky, the image which the soul would develop of it would not be +so great (as it is, when the soul is surprised at the sky's extent). +Besides, there is a further objection, which is the most important of +all. If we perceive only the images of the objects we see, instead of +seeing the objects themselves, we would see only their appearances or +adumbrations. Then the realities would differ from the things that we +see. The true observation that we cannot discern an object placed upon +the pupil, though we can see it at some little distance, applies with +greater cogency to the soul. If the image of the visible object be +located within her, she will not see the object that yields her this +image. We have to distinguish two things, the object seen, and the +seeing subject; consequently, the subject that sees the visible object +must be distinct from it, and see it as located elsewhere than within +itself. The primary condition of the act of vision therefore is, not +that the image of the object be located in the soul, but that it be +located outside of the soul. + + +SENSATIONS ARE NOT EXPERIENCES, BUT RELATIVE ACTUALIZATIONS. + +2. After denying that sensation consists of such an operation, it is +our duty to point out the true state of affairs. Though it be objected +that thus the soul would be considered as judging of things she does +not possess, it is nevertheless plain that it is the characteristic +of a power, not to experience or suffer, but to develop its force, +to carry out the function to which it is destined. If the soul is to +discern a visible or audible object the latter must consist of neither +images nor experiences, but actualizations relative to the objects +which naturally belong to the domain of these actualizations of the +soul. Those who deny that any faculty can know its object without +receiving some impulsion from it imply that the faculty suffers, +without really cognizing the object before it; for this soul-faculty +should dominate the object instead of being thereby dominated. + + +THIS IS TRUE NOT ONLY OF SIGHT BUT OF HEARING, TASTE AND SMELL. + +The case of hearing is similar to that of sight. The impression is +in the air; the sounds consist in a series of distinct vibrations, +similar to letters traced by some person who is speaking. By virtue +of her power and her being, the soul reads the characters traced in +the air, when they present themselves to the faculty which is suitable +to reception of them. As to taste and smell also, we must distinguish +between the experience and the cognition of it; this latter cognition +constitutes sensation, or a judgment of the experience, and differs +therefrom entirely.[228] + + +COGNITION OF INTELLIGIBLE OBJECTS STILL LESS ADMITS OF AN IMPRESSION. + +The cognition of intelligible things still less admits of an +experience or impression; for the soul finds the intelligible things +within herself, while it is outside of herself that she contemplates +sense-objects. Consequently the soul's notions of intelligible entities +are actualizations of a nature superior to those of sense-objects, +being the actualizations of the soul herself, that is, spontaneous +actualizations. We shall however have to relegate to another +place[229] the question whether the soul sees herself as double, +contemplating herself as another object, so to speak, and whether she +sees intelligence as single in a manner such that both herself and +intelligence seem but one. + + +B. OF MEMORY. + + +MEMORY ACTS THROUGH THE SYMPATHY OF THE SOUL'S HIGHEST SELF. + +3. Treating of memory, we must begin by attributing to the soul a +power which, though surprising, is perhaps really neither strange +nor incredible. The soul, without receiving anything, nevertheless +perceives the things she does not have. The (secret of this) is that +by nature the soul is the reason of all things, the last reason of +intelligible entities, and the first reason of sense-objects.[230] +Consequently the soul is in relation with both (spheres); by the +intelligible things the soul is improved and vivified; but she is +deceived by the resemblance which sense-objects bear to intelligible +entities, and the soul descends here below as if drawn by her +alluring charm. Because she occupies a position intermediary between +intelligible entities and sense-objects, the soul occupies a position +intermediary between them. She is said to think intelligible entities +when, by applying herself to them, she recalls them. She cognizes them +because, in a certain manner, she actually constitutes these entities; +she cognizes them, not because she posits them within herself, but +because she somehow possesses them, and has an intuition of them; +because, obscurely constituting these things, she awakes, passing +from obscurity to clearness, and from potentiality to actualization. +For sense-objects she acts in the same way. By relating them to what +she possesses within herself, she makes them luminous, and has an +intuition of them, possessing as she does a potentiality suitable to +(a perception of) them; and, so to speak, to begetting them. When the +soul has applied the whole force of her attention to one of the objects +that offer themselves to her, she, for a long while, thereby remains +affected as if this object were present; and the more attentively she +considers it, the longer she sees it.[231] That is why children have a +stronger memory; they do not quickly abandon an object, but lingeringly +fix their gaze upon it; instead of allowing themselves to be distracted +by a crowd of objects, they direct their attention exclusively to some +one of them. On the contrary, those whose thought and faculties are +absorbed by a variety of objects, do not rest with any one, and do no +more than look them over. + + +MEMORY IS NOT AN IMAGE, BUT THE REAWAKENING OF A FACULTY. + +If memory consisted in the preservation of images,[232] their +numerousness would not weaken memory. If memory kept these images +stored within itself, it would have no need of reflection to recall +them, nor could memory recall them suddenly after having forgotten +them. Further, exercise does not weaken, but increases the energy +and force of memory, just as the purpose of exercise of our feet or +hands is only to put ourselves in a better condition more easily to +accomplish certain things which are neither in our feet nor our hands, +but to which these members become better adapted by habit. + +Besides (if memory be only storage of images), why then does one not +remember a thing when it has been heard but once or twice? Why, when +it has been heard often, is it long remembered, although it was not +retained at first? This can surely not be because at first only some +part of the images had been retained; for in that case those parts +would be easily recalled. On the contrary, memory is produced suddenly +as a result of the last hearing or reflexion. This clearly proves that, +in the soul, we are only awaking the faculty of memory, only imparting +to it new energy, either for all things in general, or for one in +particular. + +Again, memory does not bring back to us only the things about which +we have reflected; (by association of ideas) memory suggests to us +besides a multitude of other memories through its habit of using +certain indices any one of which suffices easily to recall all the +remainder[233]; how could this fact be explained except by admitting +that the faculty of memory had become strengthened? + +Once more, the preservation of images in the soul would indicate +weakness rather than strength, for the reception of several impressions +would imply an easy yielding to all forms. Since every impression is +an experience, memory would be measured by passive receptivity; which, +of course, is the very contrary of the state of affairs. Never did any +exercise whatever render the exercising being more fitted to suffering +(or, receptive experience). + +Still another argument: in sensations, it is not the weak and impotent +organ which perceives by itself; it is not, for instance, the eye that +sees, but the active potentiality of the soul. That is why old people +have both sensations and memories that are weaker. Both sensation and +memory, therefore, imply some energy. + +Last, as we have seen that sensation is not the impression of an image +in the soul, memory could not be the storage-place of images it could +not have received. + + +MEMORY NEEDS TRAINING AND EDUCATION. + +It may be asked however, why, if memory be a "faculty" (a potentiality) +or disposition,[234] we do not immediately remember what we have +learned, and why we need some time to recall it? It is because we need +to master our own faculty, and to apply it to its object. Not otherwise +is it with our other faculties, which we have to fit to fulfil their +functions, and though some of them may react promptly, others also may +need time to gather their forces together. The same man does not always +simultaneously exercise memory and judgment, because it is not the +same faculty that is active in both cases. Thus there is a difference +between the wrestler and the runner. Different dispositions react +in each. Besides, nothing that we have said would militate against +distinguishing between the man of strong and tenacious soul who would +be inclined to read over what is recalled by his memory, while he who +lets many things escape him would by his very weakness be disposed to +experience and preserve passive affections. Again, memory must be a +potentiality of the soul, inasmuch as the soul has no extension (and +therefore could not be a storage-place for images which imply three +dimensions). + + +SOUL EVENTS OCCUR VERY DIFFERENTLY FROM WHAT IS SUPPOSED BY THE +UNOBSERVANT OR UNREFLECTIVE. + +In general all the processes of the soul occur in a manner very +different from that conceived by unobservant men. Psychic phenomena +occur very differently from sense-phenomena, the analogy of which may +lead to very serious errors. Hence the above unobservant men imagine +that sensations and memories resemble characters inscribed on tablets +or sheets of paper.[235] Whether they consider the soul material (as do +the Stoics), or as immaterial (as do the Peripatetics), they certainly +do not realize the absurd consequences which would result from the +above hypothesis. + + + + +SIXTH ENNEAD, BOOK ONE. + +Of the Ten Aristotelian and Four Stoic Categories. + + +HISTORICAL REVIEW OF CATEGORIES. + +1. Very ancient philosophers have investigated the number and kinds +of essences. Some said there was but one;[296] others, that there was +a limited number of them; others still, an infinite number. Besides, +those who recognized but a single (essence) have advanced opinions very +different, as is also the case with those who recognized a limited or +unlimited number of essences. As the opinions of these philosophers +have been sufficiently examined by their successors, we shall not +busy ourselves therewith. We shall study the doctrine of those who, +after having examined the opinions of their predecessors, decided on +determinate numbers (of essences); admitting neither a single essence, +because they recognized that there was a multiplicity even in the +intelligibles; nor an infinite number of essences, because such an +infinity could not exist, and would render all science impossible; but +who, classifying the essences whose number is limited, and seeing that +these classifications could not be considered elements, looked on them +as "kinds." Of these, some (the Peripatetic Aristotelians) proposed +ten, while others proposed a lesser number (the Stoics taught four), or +a greater number (the Pythagorean "oppositions," for instance). As to +the kinds, there is also difference of opinions: some looked upon the +kinds as principle (Plotinos himself); while others (Aristotle) held +that they formed classes. + + +OF THE TEN ARISTOTELIAN CATEGORIES.[236] + + +STATEMENT OF ARISTOTLE'S POSITION. + +Let us first examine the doctrine that classifies essence into ten +(kinds). We shall have to investigate whether it be necessary to +acknowledge that its partisans recognize ten kinds, all of which bear +the name of essence, or ten categories; for they say[237] that essence +is not synonymous in everything, and they are right. + + +ARISTOTLE'S CATEGORIES NEGLECT THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD. + +Let us begin by asking these philosophers whether the ten kinds +apply equally to sense-(essences), and intelligible (essences), or +whether they all apply to the sense-(essences), and some only to +the intelligible (essences); for here there are no longer mutual +relations. We must therefore inquire which of those ten kinds apply to +intelligible essences, and see whether intelligible essences can be +reduced to one single kind, that would also apply to sense-essences; +and whether the word "being"[238] can be applied simultaneously to +intelligible and sense-entities, as a "homonymous" label. For if +"being" be a homonym,[239] there are several different kinds. If, +however, it be a synonym (or, name of common qualities) it would be +absurd that this word should bear the same meaning in the essences +which possess the highest degree of existence, and in those which +possess its lower degree; for the things among which it is possible to +distinguish both primary and lower degrees could not belong to a common +kind. But these (Aristotelian) philosophers do not, in their division, +regard the (Platonic) intelligible entities. They therefore did not +mean to classify all beings; they passed by those that possess the +highest degree of existence.[295] + + +1. Being.[240] + +2. Let us further examine if these ten divisions be kinds, and how +being could form a kind; for we are forced to begin our study here. + + +INTELLIGIBLE AND SENSE-BEING COULD NOT FORM A SINGLE KIND. + +We have just said that intelligible being and sense-being could not +form a single kind.[241] Otherwise, above both intelligible being, +and sense-being, there might be some third entity which would apply +to both, being neither corporeal nor incorporeal; for if it were +incorporeal, the body would be incorporeal; and if it were corporeal, +the incorporeal would be corporeal. + + +QUESTIONS RAISED BY ARISTOTELIAN THEORIES. + +In the first place, what common element is there in matter, form, and +the concretion of matter and form? The (Aristotelians) give the name +of "being" alike to these three entities, though recognizing that they +are not "being" in the same degree. They say that form is more being +than is matter,[242] and they are right; they would not insist (as +do the Stoics) that matter is being in the greater degree. Further, +what element is common to the primary and secondary beings, since the +secondary owe their characteristic title of "being" to the primary ones? + + +WHAT IS "BEING" IN GENERAL? + +In general, what is being? This is a question to which the +(Aristotelians) could find no answer; for such mere indication of +properties is not an essential definition of what it is, and it would +seem that the property of being a thing that is susceptible of +successively admitting their contraries, while remaining identical, and +numerically one,[243] could not apply to all (intelligible) beings. + +3. Can we assert that "being" is a category that embraces +simultaneously intelligible being, matter, form, and the concretion of +form and matter, on the same justification that one may say that the +race of the Heraclidae form a kind, not because all its members possess +a common characteristic, but because they are all descended from a +common ancestry? In such case, the first degree thereof will belong to +this being (from which all the rest is derived), and the second degree +to the other things which are less beings. What then hinders that all +things form a single category, since all other things of which one may +say, "they subsist," owe this property to "being?" + +Might it then be said that the other things are affections (or, +modifications),[232] and that the beings are (hierarchically) +subordinated to each other in a different manner? In this case, +however, we could not stop at (the conception of) "being," and +determine its fundamental property so as to deduce from it other +beings. Beings would thus be of the same kind, but then would possess +something which would be outside of the other beings.[244] Thus the +secondary substance would be attributed to something else, and leave +no meaning to "whatness" (quiddity or quality), "determinate form" +(thatness), "being a subject," "not being a subject," "being in no +subject," and "being attributed to nothing else,"[245] (as, when one +says, whiteness is a quality of the body, quantity is something of +substance, time is something of movement, and movement is something +of mobility), since the secondary "being" is attributed to something +else.[246] Another objection would be, that the secondary being is +attributed to the primary Being, in another sense (than quality is +to being), as "a kind," as "constituting a part," as "being thus +the essence of the subject," while whiteness would be attributed to +something else in this sense that it is in a subject.[247] Our answer +would be that these things have properties which distinguish them from +the others; they will consequently be gathered into a unity, and be +called beings. Nevertheless, no kind could be made up out of them, nor +thus arrive at a definition of the notion and nature of being. Enough +about this; let us pass to quantity. + + +2. QUANTITY. + +4. The Aristotelians call quantity first "number," then "continuous +size," "space," and "time."[248] To these concepts they apply the +other kinds of quantity; as for instance, they say that movement is a +quantity measured by time.[249] It might also be said reciprocally, +that time receives its continuity from movement. + + +CONTINUOUS AND DEFINITE QUANTITY HAVE NOTHING IN COMMON. + +If continuous quantity be quantity as far as it is continuous, then +definite quantity will no longer be quantity. If, on the contrary, +continuous quantity be quantity only accidentally, then there is +nothing in common between continuous and definite quantity. We will +grant that numbers are quantities, although if their nature of being +quantities were plain, one would not see why they should be given that +name. As to the line, the surface, and the body, they are called sizes +and not quantities; and the latter name is given them only when they +are estimated numerically; as when, for instance, they are measured +by two or three feet.[249] A body is a quantity only in so far as +it is measured, just as space is a quantity only by accident, and +not by its spatiality. We must here not consider what is quantity by +accident, but by its quantitativeness, quantity itself. Three oxen +are not a quantity; in this case, the quantity is the number found in +them. Indeed, three oxen belong already to two categories. The case +is similar with the line, and the surface, both of which possess such +quantity. But if the quantity of surface be quantity itself, why would +surface itself be a quantity? It is no doubt only when determined by +three or four lines that the surface is called a quantity. + + +NUMBERS ARE NOT QUANTITY IN ITSELF. + +Shall we then say that numbers alone are quantity? Shall we attribute +this privilege to Numbers in themselves, which are beings, because +they exist in themselves?[250] Shall we grant the same privilege to +numbers existing in things which participate in them, and which serve +to number, not unities, but ten oxen, for example, or ten horses? +First, it would seem absurd that these numbers should not be beings, +if the former ones be such. Then, it will seem equally absurd that +they should exist within the things they measure, without existing +outside them,[251] as the rules and instruments which serve to measure +exist outside of the objects they measure. On the other hand, if these +numbers that exist in themselves serve to measure, and nevertheless do +not exist within the objects that they measure, the result will be that +these objects will not be quantities since they will not participate in +quantity itself. + + +NUMBER IS NOT IN QUANTITY; BUT QUANTITY IS IN NUMBER. + +Why should these numbers be considered quantities? Doubtless because +they are measures. But are these measures quantities, or quantity +itself? As they are in the order of beings, even if they should not +apply to any of the other things, the numbers will nevertheless remain +what they are, and they will be found in quantity. Indeed, their unity +designates an object, since it applies to another; then the number +expresses how many objects there are, and the soul makes use of number +to measure plurality. Now, when measuring thus, the soul does not +measure the "whatness" (or, quality) of the object, since she says +"one," "two," whatever be their objects, even if of opposite nature; +she does not determine the character of each thing, for instance, if it +be warm or beautiful; she limits herself to estimating its quantity. +Consequently, whether we take Number in itself, or in the objects which +participate therein, quantity exists not in these objects, but in the +number; quantity finds itself not in the object three feet long, but in +the number three. + + +MAGNITUDE AND NUMBERS WOULD BE OF A DIFFERENT TYPE OF QUANTITY. + +Why then should sizes also be quantities? Probably because they +approximate quantities, and because we call quantities all objects that +contain quantities, even though we do not measure them with quantity in +itself. We call large what numerically participates in much; and small +what participates in little. Greatness and smallness are quantities, +not absolute, but relative; nevertheless the Aristotelians say that +they are relative quantities so far as they seem to be quantities.[252] +That is a question to be studied; for, in this doctrine, number is a +kind apart, while sizes would hold second rank; it is not exactly a +kind, but a category which gathers things which are near each other, +and which may hold first or second rank. As to us, we shall have to +examine if the Numbers which exist in themselves be only substances, or +if they be also quantities. In either case, there is nothing in common +between the Numbers of which we speak, and those which exist in things +which participate therein.[253] + + +SPEECH AS A QUANTITY. + +5. What relation to quantity exists in speech, time, and movement? + +First, let us consider speech. It can be measured.[254] In this +respect, speech is a quantity, but not in so far as it is speech, whose +nature is to be significant, as the noun, or the verb.[255] The vocal +air is the matter of the word, as it also is of the noun and the verb, +all which constitute the language. The word is principally an impulse +launched on the air, but it is not a simple impulse; because it is +articulated it somehow fashions the air; consequently it is a deed, +but a significant one. It might be reasonably said that this movement +and impulse constitute a deed, and that the movement which follows is +a modification, or rather that the first movement is the deed, and the +second movement is the modification of another, or rather that the deed +refers to the subject, and the modification is in the subject. If the +word consisted not in the impulse, but in the air, there would result +from the significant characteristic of the expressive impulse two +distinct entities, and no longer a single category. + + +NEITHER IS TIME A QUANTITY. + +Let us pass to time.[256] If it exist in what measures, that which +measures must be examined; it is doubtless the soul, or the present +instant. If it exist in what is measured, it is a quantity so far as it +has a quantity; as, for instance, it may be a year. But, so far as it +is time, it has another nature; for what has such a quantity, without +(essentially) being a quantity, is not any the less such a quantity. + + +QUANTITY AS EQUAL AND UNEQUAL DOES NOT REFER TO THE OBJECTS. + +As to (Aristotle's) assertion that the property of quantity is to be +both equal and unequal,[257] this property belongs to quantity itself, +and not to the objects which participate in quantity, unless it be by +accident, so far as one does not consider these objects in themselves. +A three foot object, for instance, is a quantity so far as it is taken +in its totality; but it does not form a kind with quantity itself; +only, along with it, it is traced back to a kind of unity, a common +category. + + +RELATION.[258] + +6. Let us now consider relation. Let us see whether, in relative +matters, there be something common that constitutes a kind, or which is +a point of union in any other manner. Let us, before everything else, +examine whether relation (as, for example, left and right, double and +half, and so forth) be a kind of "hypostasis," or substantial act, +or an habituation; or, whether it be a kind of hypostatic existence +in certain things, while in others it is not so; or whether it be +this under no circumstances. What is there indeed that is particular +in relations such as double and half; surpasser and surpassed; in +possession, and in disposition; lying down, standing, sitting; in +the relation of father and son; of master and slave; in the like and +different; the equal and unequal; the active and passive; measurer and +measured; sensation and knowledge? Knowledge, for instance, relates +to the object which can be known, and sensation to sense-object; for +the relation of knowledge to the object which can be known has a kind +of hypostatic existence in the actualization relative to the form of +the object which can be known; likewise with the relation of sensation +to the sense-object. The same may be said about the relation of the +"active" to the "passive," which results in a single actualization, +as well as about the relation between the measure and the measured +object, from which results mensuration. But what results from the +relation of the similar to the similar? If in this relation there be +nothing begotten, one can at least discover there something which +is its foundation, namely, the identity of quality; nevertheless, +neither of these two terms would then have anything beside their proper +quality. The same may be said of equal things, because the identity +of quantity precedes the manner of being of both things; this manner +of being has no foundation other than our judgment, when we say, This +one or that one are of the same size; this one has begotten that one, +this one surpasses that one. What are standing and sitting outside of +him who stands or sits? As to the possession, if it apply to him who +possesses, it rather signifies the fact of possession; if it apply to +what is possessed, it is a quality. As much can be said of disposition. +What then exists outside of the two relative terms, but the comparison +established by our judgment? In the relation of the thing which +surpasses the thing which is surpassed, the first is some one size, +and the second is some other size; those are two independent things, +while as to the comparison, it does not exist in them, except in our +judgment. The relation of left to right and that of the former to the +latter consist in the different positions. It is we who have imagined +the distinction of right to left; there is nothing in the objects +themselves that answers thereto. The former and the latter are two +relations of time, but it is we who have established that distinction. + + +WHETHER THESE RELATIONS ARE SUBJECTIVE OR OBJECTIVE. + +7. If, when we speak of things, we utter nothing true, then there is +nothing real in the relation, and this kind of being has no foundation. +But if, when we compare two moments, we say, This one is anterior, +and that one is posterior, we speak truly, then we conceive that the +anterior and the posterior are something independent of the subjects in +which they exist. Likewise with the left and the right, as well as with +sizes; we admit that in these, besides the quantity which is suitable +to them, there is a certain habituation, as far as the one surpasses +and the other is surpassed. If, without our enunciating or conceiving +anything, it be real that such a thing is the double of another; if the +one possess while the other is possessed, even if we had known nothing +about it; if the objects had been equal before we had noticed them; if +they be likewise identical in respect of quality; finally if, in all +relative things, there be a habituation which is independent of the +subjects in which it is found; and if we limit ourselves to noticing +its existence (without creating it); if the same circumstances obtain +in the relation of knowledge to what can be known, a relation which +evidently constitutes a real habituation; if it be so, there is nothing +left to do but to ask whether this habituation (named a relation) be +something real. We shall have to grant, however, that this habituation +subsists in certain subjects as long as these subjects remain such as +they were, and even if they were separate; while, in other subjects, +this habituation is born only when they are brought together. We shall +also have to grant that, in the very subjects that remain, there are +some in which this habituation is annihilated or altered (such as, for +example, the left direction, or proximity). This has led people to +believe that in all these relations there is nothing real. This point +having been granted, we shall have to seek what common element there +is in all these relations, and to examine whether what is common to +them all constitutes a kind, or an accident; and last, we shall have to +consider how far that which we have discovered corresponds to reality. + + +RELATIONS ARE SIMULTANEOUS EXISTENCES. + +We should call relative not what is said absolutely of another thing, +such as, for instance, the habits of the soul and the body; nor what +belongs to such a thing, nor what is in such a thing (as for instance +the soul is said to be the soul of such an individual, or to be in +such a subject), but what wholly derives its existence from this +habit (called relation). By "hypostatic existence" I here mean not +the existence which is proper to subjects, but the existence which is +called relative; as, for instance, the double causes the (correlative) +existence of the half; while it does not cause the existence of the +two foot object, nor of two in general, nor the one foot object, nor +one in general. The manner of existence of these objects consists in +that this one is two, and that one one. As a result of this, when these +objects exist, the first is called double, and is such in reality; and +the second is half. These two objects have therefore simultaneously and +spontaneously effected that the one was double, and the other half. +They have been correlatively begotten. Their only existence lies in +their correlation, so that the existence of the double lies in its +surpassing the half, and the half derives its existence from its being +surpassed by the double. Consequently these two objects are not, the +one anterior, and the other posterior, but simultaneous.[259] We might +also examine whether or not other things do not also possess this +simultaneity of existence, as happens with father and son, and other +similar cases. The son continues to exist, indeed, even after the death +of the father; brother also survives brother, since we often say that +some one person resembles some other deceased person. + + +DISTINCTION BETWEEN ACTIVE HABITUATION IMMEDIATE AND REMOTE. + +8. The above digression gives us the opportunity of investigating +why there should be a difference between these relations, and those +of which we spoke above. However, we should be glad to have the +Aristotelians first state what community of existence obtains in this +correlation. It would be impossible to claim that this community was +anything corporeal. If then it be corporeal, it must exist either +within the very subjects, or without them. If such a habituation be +identical among all, it is a synonym. If it be a habituation which +differs according to the subjects in which it exists, it is a homonym; +for the mere name of "habituation" (in different things) does not +always correspond to the existence of any genuine similarity. Should +we then divide the habituations into two classes, recognizing that +certain objects have an inert and inactive habituation, implying +simultaneity of existence, and that other objects have a habituation +always implying "potentiality" and "actualization," so that before +"actualizing" the "potentiality" be already ready to exert itself, and +to pass from "potentiality" to "actualization" in the approximation +of relative conditions? Must we assert that in general certain things +actualize, while others limit themselves to existing? Must we also +assert that that which limits itself to existence only gives its +correlative a name, while that which actualizes gives it existence? Of +this latter kind of things are the father and son, the "active" and +"passive," for such things exert a kind of life and action. Must we +then divide habituation in several kinds, not as possessing something +similar and common in the differences, but as having a nature different +in each member of the division, and thus constituting a "homonym" +(or, mere verbal label)? In this case, we would apply to the active +habituation the names of "doing" and "suffering," because both imply an +identical action. Further, we will have to posit another "habituation" +which, without itself actualizing, implies something which acts in +two relative terms. For example, there is equality; which equates +two objects; for it is equality which renders things equal, just as +identity makes them identical; just as the names "great" and "small" +are derived one from the presence of greatness, and the other from +that of smallness. But if we should consider greatness and smallness +in the individuals which participate therein, it must be acknowledged +that such individual is greater by the act of greatness which manifests +in him, and that another is smaller because of the inherent act of +littleness. + + +HABITUATIONS ARE REASONS THAT PARTICIPATE IN FORMS. + +9. It must therefore be granted that in the things of which we +first spoke, such as knowing and doing (active being), there is an +actualization, an habituation, and an actualizing reason; while in the +other things there is a participation in form and reason. For indeed, +if the bodies were the only essences, the relative habituations would +bear no reality. If, on the contrary, we assign the first rank in +existence to incorporeal things, and to the reasons, and if we define +the habituations as reasons that participate in the forms, we should +say that what is double has the double for its cause, and what is +half, has the half as its cause; and that other things are what they +are named because of the presence of the same, or of the contrary +form. Now either two things simultaneously receive one the double, +and the other the half, and one greatness, and the other smallness; +or contraries such as resemblance and dissimilarity are to be found +in each thing, as well as identity and difference; and everything +finds itself simultaneously similar and dissimilar, identical and +different. It might be objected that if one object were ugly, and +another uglier still, they are such because they participate in a form. +Not so; for if these two objects be equally ugly, they are equal in +the absence of the form. If they be unequally ugly, the least ugly is +such because it participates in a form which does not sufficiently +subdue matter, and the uglier is such because it participates in a +form which does so still less. They could, besides, be judged from the +standpoint of deprivation, comparing them to each other as if they +contained some form. The sensation is a form that results from two +things (of that which feels, and that which is felt); so also with +knowledge. In respect to the thing possessed, possession is an act +which contains, which has a kind of efficacy. As to mensuration, which +is an actualization of measure, in respect of the measured object, it +consists in a reason. + + +WHILE SOME ARISTOTELIAN CATEGORIES ARE LOGICALLY POSSIBLE, THE OBJECTS +SUBSUMED ARE IMPOSSIBLE. + +If then, considering the constitution of the relative relations as a +generic form, it be admitted that it constitutes an unity, it forms +a classification; consequently it constitutes an existence and a +form in all things. But if the reasons (or, relations) be opposed to +each other, if the above-mentioned differences obtain among them, +they do not constitute a class, and everything must be reduced to a +resemblance, or category. Now, even if we admit that the things of +which we have spoken can be reduced to a unity, it does not follow that +all the things gathered under the same category by the Aristotelians, +could be reduced to a single sort. Indeed, they lump together into +the same classification, both objects and mere statements of their +absence, as well as the objects which derive their appellation from +them; as, for instance, doubleness itself, and the double object. +Now how is it possible to reduce to the same classification both a +thing and the mere lack of it, as, for instance, doubleness and the +non-double, the relative and the non-relative? This is as absurd as it +would be to gather into the same classification the living "being," +and the non-living "being." Worse yet, how could one assort together +duplication and the double object, whiteness and the white object? Such +things could not possibly be identical. + + +3. QUALITIES.[260] + +10. We are now to consider quality, on account of which a being is said +to be "such." What can be the nature of this quality that it exerts the +power of deciding of the phenomena of objects? Is there a same, single +quality which is something common to all qualities, and which, by its +differences, forms classifications? Or are the qualities so different +that they could not constitute one and the same classification? What +is there in common between capacity and disposition[261] (that is, the +physical power), the affective quality, the figure, and the exterior +form?[262] + + +THE LACK OF POWERS CANNOT BE SUBSUMED UNDER THE SAME CATEGORY AS THE +POWERS. + +What shall be said of thickness and thinness, of fatness and leanness? +If the element common to these conceptions be a power belonging to +the capacities, dispositions, and physical powers, which gives to +each object the power it possesses, the statements of the absence of +power will no longer be classified along with (the powers). Besides, +in what sense can we call the figure and form of each thing a "power?" +Further, essence would have been deprived of all powers that were +essential, retaining only those it might have received. Then, quality +would comprehend all actualizations of the beings, which, properly, +are actualizations only so far as they act spontaneously; and also +all actualizations of these properties, but only so far as they +really exist. But quality consists in (unessential) powers (such +as habituations and dispositions) classified below beings.[263] +For instance, boxing ability does not belong among necessary human +qualifications, such as rational functions. The latter would not be +called a quality (as we would speak of boxing ability); and reasoning +would be considered a quality only figuratively. + + +MERE DIFFERENTIALS OF BEINGS ARE NOT GENUINE QUALITIES. + +A quality is therefore a power which adds (essential) characteristics +to already existing beings. These characteristics which differentiate +beings can therefore be called qualities only figuratively. Qualities +are, rather, actualizations and reasons, or parts of reasons, which +proclaim the "whatness," though the latter seem to qualify being. +As to the qualities which really deserve this name, which "qualify" +things, which we generally call "potentialities," they are the +reasons and shapes, either of the soul or the body, such as beauty or +ugliness.[264] + + +NOT ALL QUALITIES ARE REASONS. + +How can all qualities be potentialities? It is easy to see that beauty +and health are qualities. But how could ugliness and sickness, weakness +and general impotence, be qualities? Is it because they qualify certain +things? But what hinders the qualified things from being called +such by mere nomenclature, as homonyms, and not because of a single +(all-sufficient) reason? Besides, what would hinder them from being +considered not only according to one of the four modes,[265] but even +after each one of the four, or at least after any two of them? First, +the quality does not consist in "acting" and "experiencing";[266] so +that it is only by placing oneself at different viewpoints that one +could call what "acts" and "experiences" a quality, in the same sense +as health and sickness, disposition and habitude, force and weakness. +Thus power is no longer the common element in these qualities, and +we shall have to seek something else possessing this characteristic, +and the qualities will no longer all be reasons. How indeed could a +sickness, become a habituation, or be a reason? + + +QUALITY IS NOT A POWER BUT DISPOSITION, FORM AND CHARACTER. + +Shall the affections which consist in the forms and powers, and their +contraries, the privations, be called qualities?[267] If so, one kind +will no longer exist; and we shall have to reduce these things to +a unity, or category; that is why knowledge is called a form and a +power, and ignorance a privation and impotence. Must we also consider +impotence and sickness a form, because sickness and vice can and do +accomplish many things badly? Not so, for in this case he who missed +his aim would be exerting a power. Each one of these things exerts +its characteristic activity in not inclining towards the good; for it +could not do what was not in its power. Beauty certainly does have some +power; is it so also with triangularity? In general, quality should +not be made to consist in power, but rather in the disposition, and to +consider it as a kind of form of character. Thus the common element in +all qualities is found to be this form, this classification, which no +doubt is inherent in being, but which certainly is derivative from it. + + +QUALITY CONSISTS IN A NON-ESSENTIAL CHARACTER. + +What part do the powers (or, potentialities) play here? The man who is +naturally capable of boxing owes it to a certain disposition. It is so +also with somebody who is unskilful in something. In general, quality +consists in a non-essential characteristic; what seems to contribute to +the being, or to add to it, as color, whiteness, and color in general, +contributes to the beings as far as it constitutes something distinct +therefrom, and is its actualization; but it occupies a rank inferior +to being; and though derived therefrom, it adds itself thereto as +something foreign, as an image and adumbration. + + +UGLY QUALITIES ARE IMPERFECT REASONS. + +If quality consist in a form, in a character and a reason, how +could one thus explain impotence and ugliness? We shall have to do +so by imperfect reasons, as is generally recognized in the case of +ugliness.[268] But how can a "reason" be said to explain sickness? It +contains the reason of health, but somewhat altered. Besides, it is +not necessary to reduce everything to a reason; it is sufficient to +recognize, as common characteristic, a certain disposition foreign to +being, such that what is added to being be a quality of the subject. +Triangularity is a quality of the subject in which it is located, not +by virtue of its triangularity, but of its location in this subject, +and of enduing it with its form. Humanity has also given to man his +shape, or rather, his being. + + +THERE IS ONLY ONE KIND OF QUALITY; OF WHICH CAPACITY AND DISPOSITION +PARTAKE. + +11. If this be so, why should we recognize several kinds of qualities? +Why should we distinguish capacity and disposition? Whether quality be +durable or not, it is always the same; for any kind of a disposition +is sufficient to constitute a quality; permanence, however, is only +an accident, unless it should be held that simple dispositions are +imperfect forms, and that capacities are perfect forms. But if these +forms be imperfect, they are not qualities; if they be already +qualities, permanence is but an accident. + + +PHYSICAL POWERS DO NOT FORM A SECONDARY KIND OF QUALITY. + +How can physical powers form a secondary kind of qualities? If they +be qualities only so far as they are powers, this definition would +not suit all qualities, as has been said above. If boxing ability be +a quality as far as it is a disposition, it is useless to attribute +to it a power, since power is implied in habituation. Further, how +should we distinguish the natural boxing ability from that which is +scientifically acquired? If both be qualities, they do not imply any +difference so far as one is natural, and the other acquired; that is +merely an accident, since the capacity of boxing is the same form in +both cases. + + +THE DERIVATION OF QUALITIES FROM AFFECTION IS OF NO IMPORTANCE. + +What does it matter that certain qualities are derived from an +affection, and that others are not derived therefrom? The origin of +qualities contributes nothing to their distinction or difference. If +certain qualities be derived from an affection, and if others do not +derive therefrom, how could they be classified as one kind? If it +be said that some imply "experiencing" while others imply "action," +they can both be called qualities merely by similarity of appellation +(homonymy). + + +SHAPE IS NOT A QUALITY; BUT SPECIFIC APPEARANCE, OR REASON. + +What could be said of the shape of every thing? If we speak of the +shape as far as something has a specific form, that has no regard to +quality; if it be spoken of in respect to beauty or ugliness, together +with the form of the subject, we there have a reason. + + +ARISTOTLE WAS WRONG IN CALLING "ROUGH," "UNITED," "RARE," AND "DENSE" +QUALITIES. + +As to rough, united, rare and dense[269] these could not be called +qualities; for they do not consist only in a relative separation or +reapproximation of the parts of a body, and do not proceed everywhere +from the inequality or equality of position; if they did, they might be +regarded as qualities. Lightness and weight, also, could be correctly +classified, if carefully studied. In any case, lightness is only a +verbal similarity (a "homonym") unless it be understood to mean +diminution of weight. In this same class might also be found leanness +and slimness, which form a class different from the four preceding +ideas. + + +PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY OF QUALITY. + +12. What other scheme of analysis of quality could we find, if the +above were declared unsatisfactory? Must we distinguish first the +qualities of the soul from those of the body, and then analyse the +latter according to the senses, relating them to sight, hearing, taste, +smell and touch? + +To begin with, how can the qualities of the soul be divided? Will they +be related to the faculty of desire, to anger, or reason? Will they +be divided according to their suitable operations, or according to +their useful or harmful character? In this case, would we distinguish +several ways of being useful or harmful? Should we then likewise divide +the properties of the bodies according to the difference of their +effects, or according to their useful or harmless character, since this +character is a property of quality? Surely; to be useful or harmful +seems to be the property of both the quality, and the thing qualified. +Otherwise, we should have to seek some other classification. + + +RELATION BETWEEN THE THING QUALIFIED AND THE QUALITY. + +How can the thing qualified by a quality refer to the quality? This +must be studied, because the thing qualified and the quality do not +belong to a common kind. If the man capable of boxing be related to +the quality, why should not the same quality obtain between the active +man and activity? If then the active man be something qualified, +"activity" and "passivity" should not be referred to relation. It would +seem preferable to relate the active man to the quality if he be active +by virtue of a power, for a power is a quality; but if the power be +essential, in so far as it is a power, it is not something relative, +nor even something qualified. We should not consider that activity +corresponds to increase; for the increase, so far as it increases, +stands in relation only to the less; while activity is such by itself. +To the objection that activity, so far as it is such, is something +qualified, it might be answered that, at the same time, as far as it +can act on something else, and that it is thus called active, it is +something relative. In this case the man capable of boxing and the art +of boxing itself must be in relation. For the art of boxing implies a +relation; all the knowledge it imparts is relative to something else. +As to the other arts, or at least, as to the greater number of other +arts, it may, after examination, be said that they are qualities, so +far as they give a disposition to the soul; as far as they act, they +are active, and, from this standpoint, they refer to something else, +and are relative; and besides, they are relative in the sense that they +are habituations. + + +ACTIVITY DOES NOT ALTER THE QUALITY. + +Will we therefore have to admit that activity, which is activity only +because it is a quality, is something substantially different from +quality? In animated beings, especially in those capable of choice +because they incline towards this or that thing, activity has a really +substantial nature. What is the nature of the action exercised by the +inanimate powers that we call qualities? Is it participation in their +qualities by whatever approaches them? Further, if the power which +acts on something else simultaneously experiences (or "suffers"), +how can it still remain active? For the greater thing, which by +itself is three feet in size, is great or small only by the relation +established between it, and something else (smaller). It might indeed +be objected that the greater thing and the smaller thing become such +only by participation in greatness or smallness. Likewise, what is both +"active" and "passive" becomes such in participating in "activity" and +"passivity." + + +ARE THE SENSE-WORLD AND THE INTELLIGIBLE SEPARATE, OR CLASSIFIABLE +TOGETHER? + +Can the qualities seen in the sense-world, and those that exist in +the intelligible world, be classified together in one kind? This +question demands an answer from those[270] who claim that there are +also qualities in the intelligible world. Should it also be asked +of those who do not admit of the existence on high of kinds, but +who limit themselves to attributing some habit to Intelligence? It +is evident that Wisdom exists in Intelligence; if this Wisdom be +homonymous (similar in name only) with the wisdom which we know here +below, it is not reckoned among sense-things; if, on the contrary it be +synonymous (similar in nature also) with the wisdom which we know here +below, quality would be found in intelligible entities, as well as in +sense-things (which is false); unless indeed it be recognized that all +intelligible things are essences, and that thought belongs among them. + +Besides, this question applies also to the other categories. In +respect to each of them it might be asked whether the sensible and +the intelligible form two different kinds, or belong to a single +classification. + + +4. WHEN. + +13. As to the category of time, "when," the following thoughts are +suggested. + + +IF TIME BE A QUANTITY; WHY SHOULD "TIME WHEN" FORM A SEPARATE CATEGORY? + +If to-morrow, to-day, and yesterday, as well as other similar divisions +of time, be parts of time, why should they not be classed in the same +classification as time itself, along with the ideas "it has been," +"it is," and "it will be?" As they are kinds of time, it seems proper +that they should be classified along with time itself. Now time is +part of quantity. What then is the use of another category? If the +Aristotelians say that not only "it has been" and "it will be" are +time-concepts, but "yesterday" and "formerly," which are varieties +of "there has been" are also time-concepts (for these terms are +subordinated to "there has been"), that it is not only "now" that is +time, but that "when" is such also, they will be forced to answer as +follows: First, if "when" be time, time exists; then, as "yesterday" +is past time, it will be something composite, if the past be something +else than time; we will have to erect two categories, not merely a +simple category. For instance, they say both that "when" is in time, +without being time, and say that "when" is that which is in time. An +example of this would be to say that Socrates existed "formerly," +whereby Socrates would really be outside of (present) time. Therefore +they are no longer expressing something single. But what is meant by +Socrates "being in time," and that some fact "is in time?" Does it mean +that they are "part of time?" If, in saying "a part of time," and "so +far as it is a part of time," the Aristotelians believe that they are +not speaking of time absolutely, but only of a past part of time, they +are really expressing several things. For this "part," so far as it is +a part, is by them referred to something; and for them the past will be +some thing added (to Time), or it will become identified with "there +has been," which is a kind of time. But if they say that there is a +difference, because "there has been" is indeterminate, while "formerly" +and "yesterday" are determinate, we shall be deciding something about +"there has been;" then "yesterday" will be the determination of "there +has been," so that "yesterday" will be determined time. Now, that +is a quantity of time; so that if time be a quantity, each one of +these two things will be a determined quantity. But, if, when they +say "yesterday" they mean thereby that such an event has happened in +a determined past time, they are still expressing several things. +Therefore, if some new category is to be introduced whenever one thing +acts in another, as here happened of what occurred in time, we might +have to introduce many additional categories, for in a different thing +the action is different. This will, besides, become clearer in what is +to follow on the category of place. + + +5. WHERE, OR, PLACE. + + +IF "WHERE" AND "PLACE" ARE DIFFERENT CATEGORIES, MANY MORE MIGHT BE +ADDED. + +14. The Aristotelians (while treating of this category) say, Where? For +instance, "to the Lyceum," or, "to the Academy." The Academy and the +Lyceum are then places and parts of places, as the "top," the "bottom," +and "here" are parts or classes of place. The only difference consists +in a greater determination. If then the top, the bottom, and the middle +be places, as, for instance, "Delphi is the middle of the earth," and, +"the Lyceum and other countries are near the middle of the earth," what +else but place do we have to seek, since we have just said that each +of these things denotes a place? If, when we say "where?" we assert +that one thing is in another place, we are not expressing something +single and simple. Besides, each time that we affirm that such a man +is there, we are creating a double relation, namely, the relation of +the man who is there, with the place where he is, and the relation of +the containing place and the contained man. Why therefore should we not +reduce this to the class of relations, since the relation of both terms +with each other produces something? Besides, what is the difference +between "here" and "at Athens?" The Aristotelians grant that "here" +indicates the place; consequently, the same is true of "in Athens." If, +"in Athens" be equivalent to "being in Athens," this latter expression +contains two categories, that of place, and that of being. Now, this +should not be the case; for as one should not say "Quality exists," +but only, "quality." Besides, if being in place and being in time +presuppose categories other than place and time, why would "being in a +vase" not also constitute a separate category? Why would it not be so +with "being in matter," with "being in the subject," and in general of +a part "being in the whole," or the "whole in the parts," the "genus in +the species," and the "species in the genus?" In this manner we would +have a far greater number of categories. + + +6. ACTION AND EXPERIENCING?[271] + +The subject of action gives rise to the following considerations. + + +ACTUALIZATION A FAR BETTER CATEGORY THAN DOING OR ACTING. + +15. The Aristotelians hold that number and quantity, and other things +referring to being should be subordinated to being; thus they classify +quantity as in a genus different from being. Quality also refers to +being, it also is erected into a separate genus. Consequently, as +action also refers to being, it is also considered a separate genus. +Must then "acting," or rather "action," from which "acting" is derived, +be considered a separate genus, as we consider that quality, from +which qualification is derived, is a separate genus? (As to these +derivations), it might be asked whether there were no distinction +between "action," "to act," and "active," or between "to act," and +"action?" "To act" expresses the idea of "active," while "action" does +not express it. "To act" means "to be in some action;" or rather, "in +actualization." Consequently, "actualization" expresses a category +rather than "action;" since actualization is predicated of being, like +quality, as was said above; and actualization, like movement, also +relates to being; but movement necessarily constitutes a class of +essence. How indeed could we admit that quantity, quality and relation +each form a genus, in respect to being, and yet refuse to movement, +which equally refers to being, the privilege of also forming a genus of +being? + + +HOW CAN MOVEMENT BE IN TIME, IF CHANGE BE OUTSIDE OF TIME? + +16. It may be objected that movement is an imperfect +actualization.[272] In that case actualization should be given +the first rank; and under that genus would follow the species of +movement, with the quality of imperfection, by saying that movement +is an actualization, and adding (the specific difference) that it is +imperfect. To say that movement is an imperfect actualization does +not deprive it of being an actualization, but implies that though it +be actualization, there is in it succession, not to arrive at being +actualization, (which it is already), but to accomplish something from +which it is yet entirely distinct. Then (when that goal is reached), +it is not the movement that becomes perfect, but the thing which was +the goal. For instance, walking is walking from the very first step; +but if there be a mile to go, and the mile be not yet finished, what +is lacking of the mile is not lacking to the walking or to movement +(taken absolutely), but to that particular walk. For the walk was +walking and movement from the very first step; consequently, he who +is moving has already moved, and he who cuts has already cut.[273] +Just as actualization, movement has no need of time; it needs time +only to become such an action. If then actualization be outside of +time, movement, taken absolutely, must also be outside of time. The +objection that movement is in time because it implies continuity +(proves too much; for in that case) intuition itself, if prolonged, +would also imply continuity, and therefore would be in time. Reasoning +by induction, it may be seen, 1, that one can always distinguish +parts in any kind of movement; 2, that it would be impossible to +determine when and since when the movement began, or to assign the +definite point of departure; 3, that it is always possible to divide +movement by following it up to its origin, so that in this manner +movement that has just begun would find itself to have begun since +infinite time, and, 4, that movement would be infinite in regard to +its beginning. The fact is that the Aristotelians distinguish movement +from actualization; they affirm that actualization is outside of time, +but that time is necessary to movement; not indeed to some particular +movement, but to movement in itself, because, according to their +views, it is a quantity. Nevertheless, they themselves acknowledge +that movement is a quantity only by accident, as, for instance, when +it is a daily movement, or when it has some particular duration. Just +as actualization is outside of time, nothing hinders movement from +having begun outside of time, and time from being connected with +movement only because the movement has a certain duration. Indeed, it +is generally granted that changes occur outside of time, for it is +usual to say, The changes occur either suddenly or successively. Now +if change can occur outside of time, why should it not be so also with +movement? We here speak of change, and not of "having changed;" for +change does not necessarily have to be accomplished (while "having +changed" signifies an accomplished fact, and consequently implies the +notion of time). + + +ACTION AND EXPERIENCING MAY BE SUBSUMED UNDER MOVEMENT, BUT CANNOT BE +CONSIDERED AS SEPARATE CATEGORIES. + +17. It may be objected that actualization and movement do not, by +themselves, form a genus, but belong to the genus of relation, because +actualization exists through the power of something active, and +movement exists by the power of some motor, as such. We might answer +that relative conceptions are produced by habituation (the manner of +being) even of things, and not only through the relation established +between them by the mind. As the habituation is a mode of "hypostatic" +existence, although it be the "thing of something else," or although +it refer to something else,[274] it nevertheless possesses its nature +before being a relation. Now this actualization, this movement, this +habituation, which is the "thing of some other thing" nevertheless +possesses the property of existing and of being conceived by itself +before being a relation; otherwise, all things would be relative +conceptions; for there is nothing, not excluding the soul herself, +which does not bear some relation to something else. Moreover, why are +"action" and "acting" not relatives? For they necessarily are either a +movement or an actualization. If the Aristotelians consider "action" a +relative, and make a genus of "acting," why then do they not also place +"movement" among the relatives, and make a genus of "moving?" They +might, indeed, have subsumed under the genus "movement" the two species +"action" and "reaction" (or, "suffering"); but they have no right to +make two distinct genera of "acting" and "reacting," as they generally +do. + + +ON ARISTOTELIAN PRINCIPLES, EVEN INTELLECTION WOULD BE MOVEMENT OR +ACTUALIZATION. + +18. We must further examine if the Aristotelians have the right +to say that acting contains both actualizations and movements, +the actualizations producing themselves instantaneously, and the +movements successively; as, for instance, dividing implies time. +Or will they say that all actualizations are movements, or, at +least, are accompanied by movements? Will they trace all actions to +"experiencing" (or, reactions), or will they acknowledge absolute +actions, like walking or speaking? Or will they distinguish all actions +that relate to "experiencing" as movements, and all absolute actions +as actualizations? Or will they place actions of both kinds among +movements, and among actualizations? They would no doubt classify +walking, which is an absolute thing, as movement; and thinking, which +is a verb without passive voice, as an actualization.[275] Otherwise +the Aristotelians will be obliged to insist that there is nothing +active in walking or thinking. But if walking and thinking do not +belong to the category of acting, it will be necessary to explain to +what they do belong. Will it be said that thinking relates to the +thinkable (the intelligible), as intellection does,[276] because +sensation relates to the sense-object? If sensation be related to +the sense-object, why do they not equally relate "sensing" (feeling) +to the sense-object? Sensation, relating to something else, has a +relation with that thing; but, besides that relation, it has the +property of being an "action" or an "experience" (or, reaction). If +therefore reaction (or, suffering), besides belonging to something +else, or depending on something else, has the property of itself +being something, like actualization, then walking, besides belonging +to something else (to the feet), and depending on something else (on +the motive power), nevertheless by itself possesses the property of +being movement. In this case, it will have to be recognized that +intellection, besides being a relation, by itself also is a movement or +an actualization. + + +DO CERTAIN ACTIONS APPEAR IMPERFECT WHEN NOT JOINED TO TIME? + +19. Let us now examine if certain actualizations seem to be imperfect +when they are not joined to time, thus identifying themselves with +movements, as life identifies itself with living. For (according to +the Aristotelians) the life of each (being) is accomplished in a +perfect time, and happiness is an actualization; not an individual +one, indeed, but a sort of movement.[277] Consequently we will have +to call life and happiness movements, and movement will have to be +made a genus, though recognizing that movement forms a genus very +different from quantity and quality; and, like them, relates to being. +This genus could be divided into two species, movements of body and +movements of soul, or movements spontaneous and communicated; or +again, movements proceeding from the beings themselves, or movements +proceeding from others. In this case, the movements proceeding from the +beings themselves are actions, whether they communicate to others, or +remain absolute in themselves (and not communicating to others, like +speaking and walking); and the movements proceeding from others are +"reactions" though the communicated movements seem to be identical with +the movements proceeding from others. For example, division is one and +the same thing, whether it be considered within him who divides, or in +that which is divided; nevertheless dividing is something different +from being divided. Or again, division is not one and the same thing +according as it proceeds from him who divides, or as it is received +by him who is divided; to divide means to cause in the divided thing +another movement, which is the result of the dividing action or +movement. Perhaps, indeed, the difference does not lie in the very fact +of being divided, but in the movement which results from the division, +as for instance, in suffering; for this is what constitutes reaction +(or "passion"). + +What are we to say if there be no suffering? We might answer that +the actualization of him who acts is simply present in such a thing +(without correlative reaction). There are thus two manners of acting; +to act within oneself, and to act outside of oneself. No more will +it then be said that the first mode is proper acting, and the second +reacting, but that there are two ways of acting outside of oneself, +acting and reacting. For instance, writing is an operation in which +one acts on something else without a correlative reaction, because in +writing one produces nothing but the very actualization of writing, +and not something else, like experiencing; for the quality of writing +that has been produced is nothing that reacts (or, experiences). As to +walking, though the earth be stepped on by the feet, it does not react +(or, experience) as a consequence. On the contrary, if it be the body +of an animal that is trod under feet, it may be conceived that there +is reaction, because one then thinks of the suffering endured by the +animal thus trod on, and not of the walking; otherwise, this reaction +would have been conceived before (the notion of this reaction would +have been implied in the very notion of walking). + + +ACTION AND REACTION FORM BUT A SINGLE GENUS. + +Thus, in everything, acting forms but a single genus along with +reacting, which (by the Aristotelians) is considered its opposite. +Reacting is what follows acting, without being its contrary; to be +burnt, for instance, follows burning, but is not its contrary. In +this case, the reaction is what results in the object itself from the +fact of burning, or of being burnt, which form but one (process), +whether the result be suffering, or something else, as, for instance, +depreciation. It might be objected, When one (being) makes another +suffer, is it not true that the one acts, and the other reacts? +Here from a single actualization result two facts, an action, and a +reaction. Besides, it is not necessary to include in the action the +will to cause suffering; it has only produced something else as a +result of which it causes suffering, something which occurring in the +being that suffers, and being one single (occurrence), that causes +suffering. What then is this one identical thing which is anterior to +the suffering? When there is no suffering, is there not nevertheless +a reaction in him in whom is the modification? For instance, in him +who hears? No: to hear is not to react, and sensation is not really +a reaction;[278] but to suffer is to experience a reaction, and the +reaction is not the contrary of the action (in the sense we have +explained). + + +REACTIONS NEED NOT BE PASSIVE, BUT MAY BE ACTIVE. + +20. Let it be granted, then, that reaction is not the contrary of +action. Nevertheless, as it differs therefrom, it could not share +the same genus. If both reaction and action be movements, they share +the same genus, that of alteration, which is a movement, as respects +quality.[279] When alteration proceeds from the being endowed with +quality, is there any action, though this being remain impassible? Yes, +for though impassible, it is active. It may be asked, is this being no +longer active when it acts on some other object, as, for instance, by +striking it, and then reacts? The answer is, that it would be active +and passive simultaneously. If it be active, when it reacts--when, for +instance, it rubs--why is it considered active rather than passive? +Because it reacts in being rubbed while it rubs. Could we say that, +because it is moved while moving, there were in it two movements? But +how could there be two movements in it? Shall we assert that there +is but one? In this case, how could the same movement be action and +reaction simultaneously? Doubtless, it will be considered action, in +so far as it proceeds from the mover; and reaction, inasmuch as it +passes from the mover into the moved; and this, without ceasing to be +one and the same thing. Would you say that reaction was a movement of +a kind different from action? How then would the altering movement +in a certain manner modify what reacts without an equal reaction in +what is acting? But how (can we conceive) of reaction in that which +acts on another object? Is the mere presence of the movement in the +moved sufficient to constitute reaction?[280] But if, on one hand, the +("seminal) reason" of the swan whitens, and on the other hand the swan +that is being born becomes white, shall we say that the swan is passive +in becoming what it is his nature to be? If he becomes white even after +his birth, is he still passive? If one thing increase, and another +thing be increased, will we admit that the thing that increases reacts? +Will we rather attribute reaction to the thing qualified? If one thing +be embellished, and another thing embellishes it, could we say that +the embellished thing reacts?[281] If however, the embellishing thing +decreases, and, like tin, tarnishes, or on the contrary, like copper, +takes on polish; shall we say that the tin acts, and the copper reacts +(that is, "suffers")? Besides, it would be impossible to say that that +which learns is passive (suffering)? Would this be because the action +of him who acts passes into him? But how could there be any reaction +("suffering") since there is nothing there but an act? This action, +no doubt, is not a reaction ("suffering"); but he who receives it is +passive, because he participates in passivity. Indeed, from the fact +that the learner does not himself act, it does not necessarily result +that he is passive; for learning is not being struck, but grasping and +discerning, as takes place with the process of vision. + + +DEFINITION OF REACTION OR SUFFERING. + +21. How may we define the fact of "reaction"? We do not approve of +the definition that it is the passing of the actualization from one +being into another, if its receiver appropriate it. Shall we say that +a (being) reacts when there is no actualization, but only an effective +experience? But is it not possible that the being that reacts becomes +better; while, on the contrary, the one who acts, loses? A (being) +may also act in an evil manner, and exercise on another a harmful +influence; and the actualization may be shameful, and the affective +experience be honorable. What distinction shall we then establish +(between action and reaction)? Shall we say that an action is to cause +(an actualization) to pass from self into others, and that reaction +is to receive in oneself (an action) from someone else? But then what +about the (actualizations) produced in oneself which do not pass into +others, such as thought and opinion? One can even excite oneself by a +reflection or opinion of emotive value, without this emotion having +been aroused by anybody else. We shall therefore define an action as +a spontaneous movement, whether this movement remain in the being who +produces it, or whether it pass into somebody else. + +What then are the faculty of desire, and desire in general? If desire +be excited by the desired thing (it is an experience, or passion), even +if we should not take into consideration the cause of its excitement, +and even if we only noticed that it arose later than the object; for +this desire does not differ from an impression or an impulsion. + +Shall we then, among desires, distinguish actions when they proceed +from intelligence, and experiences when they invoke and draw (on the +soul), so that the being be less passive by what it receives from +others, than by what it receives from itself? Doubtless a being can +act upon itself. (We can then define) an affective experience, and a +being's experience, as follows. They consist of undergoing, without any +contribution from oneself, a modification which does not contribute +to "being," and which, on the contrary, alters, or at least, does not +improve. + +To this (definition) it may be objected that if warming oneself consist +in receiving such heat as partially contributes to the subject's being, +and partly does not do so, then we have here one and the same thing +which both is, and is not an experience. To this it may be answered +that there are two ways of warming oneself. Besides, even when the +heating contributes to the being, it does so only in the degree that +some other object experiences. For instance, the metal will have +to be heated, and undergo an experience, for the production of the +being called statue, although this statue itself be heated only +incidentally. If then the metal become more beautiful by the effect +of that which heats it, or by the effect of the heating itself, it +undergoes an experience; for there are two manners of (undergoing an +experience, or) suffering: the one consists in becoming worse, and the +other in becoming better--or at least, in not altering. + + +TRANSMISSION, RECEPTION AND RELATION UNDERLIE ACTION AND EXPERIENCE. + +22. The cause that a being undergoes an experience is that it contains +the kind of movement called alteration, whichever way it modify him; +on the contrary, action means to have in oneself a definite movement, +derived from oneself, or a movement which has its goal in some other +being, and its origin in self. In both cases there is movement; +but with this distinction: that action, so far as it is action, is +impassible; while an experience consists in the experiencer's reception +of a disposition new to him, without the reception of anything that +contributes towards his being; so as to avoid (the case of the statue, +above, where) the experience happened to one being (the metal), while +it was another being that was produced (the statue). Consequently, the +same thing will in one state be an action, and in other, an experience. +Thus the same movement will in one being be an action, because it +is considered from a certain viewpoint; and from another it will be +an experience, because it is disposed some other way. Action and +experience seem therefore to be relative, if one consider the action +in its relation with experience, since the same thing is action in the +one, and experience in the other. Also, because neither of these two +can be considered in itself, but only in him who acts, or experiences, +when the one moves, and the other is moved. Each of these terms +therefore implies two categories; one gives the movement, the other +receives it; consequently we have transmission and reception, which +result in relation. If he who received the movement possesses it as +he possesses color, why could it not also be said that he possessed +movement? Absolute movements, such as walking (and thinking) possess +steps and thought. + + +PREDICTION AND RESPONSIVENESS TO IT DO NOT FALL UNDER DEFINITION FOR +ACTION AND EXPERIENCE. + +Let us now consider whether prediction be an action, and whether +adapting one's course to the prediction of somebody else would +constitute experiencing; for prediction comes from one being and +applies to another. However, although prediction apply to some other, +we would not consider prediction an action, nor being directed by the +prediction of somebody else an experience. In general, not even thought +is an action; thought, indeed, does not pass in to the object thought, +but functions within itself; it is not at all an action. Actualizations +are not at all actions, and not all of them perform actions; indeed, +they may do so only accidentally. It might be objected that a man who +was walking would certainly impress on the ground the trace of his +steps, and would thereby perform an action. Such an action would be the +consequence of something else, or the man would act accidentally; and +it would be accidental, because the man was not thinking of it. It is +in this way that even inanimate things perform some action, that fire +heats, and medicine cures. But enough of this. + + +7. POSSESSION. + +23. Let us now examine the category of "having" (possession). + + +HAVING IS SO INDEFINITE AND VARIOUS THAT IT CANNOT BE A CATEGORY. + +If the verb "to have" be used in several senses, why might we not +apply to this category all the various uses of the word; for instance, +quantity, because quantity has size; quality, because it has color; the +father, because he has a son; the son, because he has a father; and, in +general, all kinds of possession? Will it be said that the other things +that can be possessed have already been classified under the categories +considered above, and that the category of "having" comprises only +arms, foot-wear, and clothing? This might be answered by the question +why "having" these objects should constitute a category, and why +burning them, cutting them, burying them, or throwing them away, would +not equally constitute one or more categories? If the answer be that +all these things form one category because they refer to the body, +this would then also make another category if we placed a garment +over a litter; or likewise if someone were covered with clothing. +If another answer be that the category of "having" consists in the +"manner of containing,"[282] and in possession,[283] then all things +which are possessed will have to be reduced to this category, which +will thus contain all possession, whatever it be, since the nature of +the possessed object could not here prevail to form some distinction. +On the other hand, if the category of "having" must exclude having a +quantity or quality, because the latter ideas already form their own +categories; nor having parts, because of the category of being (which +includes parts); why should this category contain having arms, when +arms, as well as foot-wear, belong to the category of being? In any +case, how could the statement, "He has arms" be considered something +simple, which could be reduced to any one category? That statement +expresses the same idea as "He is armed." Can this expression ("he +has arms") refer only to a man, or even to his statue? The living man +possesses very differently from possession by a statue, and the verb +"to have" is used only as a verbal label (a homonym), just as the +verb "to stand up" would mean something very different according as +it referred to a man or a statue. Besides, is it reasonable to make a +generic category of some merely incidental characteristic? + + +8. SITUATION. + +24. As to the category of situation, it contains also such incidental +characteristics as being raised, or seated. Here the Aristotelians +do not make a category of situation, by itself, but of the kind of +situation, as when it is said, "He is placed in such a posture"--a +phrase in which "to be placed" and "in such a posture" express two +entirely different ideas--or again, "he is in such a place." Now, as +posture and location have already been studied, what is the use in +here combining two categories into one? If, on the other hand, the +expression "he is seated" indicate an action or an experience, must it +not then be reduced to the category of action or experience? It would +moreover amount to the same thing to say "he is raised," as to say, "he +is situated above;" just as we say he is situated in the middle, or, he +is situated below. Besides, being seated has already been treated of +under the category of relation; why should, "being raised" not also be +a relative entity, since the category of relation includes the thing +to the left, and the thing to the right, as well as the left and right +hand themselves? + +Enough of these reflections (about Aristotelian categories). + + +B. CRITICISM OF THE STOIC CATEGORIES. + +25. Let us now pass to the (Stoic) philosophers[284] who, recognizing +four categories only, divide everything into "substances," "qualities," +"modes," and "relations;" and who, attributing to all (beings) +something common, thus embrace them into a single genus. + + +THE CATEGORY OF SOMETHING COMMON IS ABSURD. + +This doctrine raises a great number of objections, especially in that +it attributes to all beings something in common, and thus embraces them +in a single class. Indeed, this "something" of which they speak is +quite incomprehensible; as also is how it could adapt itself equally to +bodies and to incorporeal beings, between which they do not allow for +sufficient distinction to establish a distinction in this "something." +Besides, this something either is, or is not an essence; if it be an +essence, it must be a form; if it be not an essence, there result a +thousand absurdities, among which would be that essence is not an +essence. Let us therefore leave this point, and devote ourselves to the +division into four categories. + + +1. SUBSTANCE; ACCORDING TO THEM IT IS SPLIT UP. + +The Stoics assign the first rank to substances, and place matter before +the other substances. From this it results that the Stoics assign to +the same rank their first Principle, and with it the things which are +inferior thereto. First, they reduce to a single class both anterior +and posterior things, though it be impossible to combine them in this +manner. In fact, every time that things differ from each other in that +some are anterior, and others posterior, those which are posterior owe +their essence to those which are anterior. On the contrary, when things +are comprised within one and the same class, all equally owe their +essence to this class, since a class is "what is affirmed of kinds of +things in regard to essence." The Stoics themselves recognize this by +saying that all things derive their essence from matter. + +Besides, when they count but a single substance, they do not enumerate +the beings themselves, but they seek their principles. Now there is a +great difference between treating of principles and treating of beings. +If the Stoics recognize no essence other than matter, and think that +other things are modifications of matter, they are wrong in reducing +essence and other things to a common class; they should rather say +that essence is being, and that other things are modifications, and +then distinguish between these modifications. Further, it is absurd to +assert that (among essences), some should be substances, and others +should be other things (such as qualities, modes and relations); for +the Stoics recognize but a single substance, which does not contain any +difference, unless by division as of mass into parts; besides, they +should not attribute divisibility to their substance, because they +teach that it is continuous. They should therefore say, "substance" +(and not "substances"). + + +MATTER CANNOT BE THE PRIMARY PRINCIPLE. + +26. What is most shocking in the Stoic doctrine, is that they assign +the first rank to what is only a potentiality, matter, instead of +placing actualization before potentiality.[285] It is impossible for +the potential to pass to actualization if the potential occupy the +first rank among beings. Indeed, the potential could never improve +itself; and it implies the necessary anteriority of actualization; +in which case potentiality is no longer a principle. Or, if it be +insisted that actualization and potentiality must be simultaneous, +both principles will be found depending on chance. Besides, even if +actualization be contemporaneous with potentiality, why should not the +first rank be assigned to actualization? Why should this (matter) be +an essence, rather than those (forms)? Whoever asserts that form is +posterior bears the burden of proof; for matter does not beget form, +and quality could not arise from what has no quality; nor actualization +from what is potential; otherwise, actualization would have existed +anteriorly, even in the system of the Stoics. According to them, even +God is no longer simple: He is posterior to matter; for He is a body +constituted by form and matter.[286] Whence then does He derive His +form? If the divinity exist without matter, He is incorporeal, by +virtue of His being principle and reason, and the active principle +would thus be incorporeal. If, even without having matter, the divinity +be composite in essence, by virtue of His body, the Stoics will have to +postulate some other kind of matter which may better suit the divinity. + + +MATTER IS NOT A BODY "WITHOUT QUALITY, BUT WITH MAGNITUDE" (A STOIC +DEFINITION). + +Besides, how could matter be the first Principle, if it be a body? +If the body of which the Stoics speak be of another nature, then +matter can be called a body only figuratively.[287] If they say that +the common property of the body is to have three dimensions, they +are speaking of the mathematical body. If on the contrary they join +impenetrability to the three dimensions, they are no more talking about +something simple. Besides, impenetrability is a quality, or is derived +from a quality; but what is the source of impenetrability? Whence comes +tri-dimensional extension? Who endued matter with extension? Matter, +indeed, is not contained in the idea of tri-dimensional extension +any more than the latter is contained in the notion of matter. +Consequently, since matter thus participates in size,[288] it is no +longer a "simple" matter. + + +ABSOLUTE EXISTENCE PRECEDES CONTINGENT EXISTENCE. + +Moreover, whence is derived the unification of matter? Matter is not +unity, but it participates in unity. They would have had to realize +that the material mass is not anterior to everything, and that the +first rank pertains to what is not one mass, to Unity itself. Then +they would have to descend from Unity to multiplicity, from what is +size-less to actual sizes; since, if size be one, it is not because it +is Unity itself, but only because it participates in unity. We must +therefore recognize that what possesses primary and absolute existence +is anterior to what exists contingently. But how does contingency +itself exist? What is its mode of existence? If the Stoics had examined +this point, they would have finally hit upon (the absolute Unity) which +is not unity merely contingently. By this expression is here meant what +is not one by itself, but by others. + + +THE STOIC GOD IS ONLY MODIFIED MATTER. + +27. The Stoics did well, indeed, to assign the principle of everything +to the first rank; but they should not have recognized as principle, +and accepted as "being" what was shapeless, passive, devoid of life +and intelligence, dark, and indefinite. Because of the universe's +beauty, they are forced to introduce within it a divinity; but +the latter derives His very essence from matter; He is composite +and posterior (to matter); rather, He is no more than "modified +matter."[288] Consequently, if matter be the subject, there must +necessarily be outside of it some other principle which, acting upon +matter, makes of it the subject of the qualities which He imparts +thereto. If this principle resided in matter, and Himself were the +subject; if, in other words, He were contemporaneous with matter, He +could not reduce matter to the state of a subject. Now it is entirely +impossible (for this principle) to constitute a subject concurrently +with matter; for in such a case both would have to serve as subject +to something higher; and what could it be, since there could be no +further principle to make a subject of them, if all things had already +been absorbed into this (concurrent) subject? A subject is necessarily +subject to something; not to what it has in itself, but to that whose +action it undergoes. Now, it undergoes the action of that which itself +is not subject by itself; consequently, of that which is outside of +itself. This point has evidently been overlooked by the Stoics. + + +IF EVERYTHING BE DERIVED FROM MATTER, MATTER CAN NO LONGER BE THEIR +SUBJECT. + +On the other hand, if matter and the active principle need nothing +exterior, if the subject that they constitute can itself become all +things by assuming different forms, as a dancer, who can assume all +possible attitudes, this subject would no longer be a subject, but +He will be all things. Just as the dancer is not the subject of the +attitudes (for they are his actualizations), likewise the "matter" +of the Stoics will no longer be the subject of all things, if all +things proceed from matter; or rather, the other things will no longer +really exist, they will be nothing but "modified matter," just as the +attitudes are nothing but the "modified dancer." Now if the other +things no longer really exist, matter is no longer a subject; it is +no longer the matter of the essences, but is matter exclusively. It +will no longer even be matter, because what is matter must be matter +of something; but that which refers to something else belongs to the +same classification as that thing, just as half belongs to the same +classification as the double, and is not the being of the double. But +how could non-essence, except by accident, refer to essence? But the +absolute Essence and matter itself refer to essence by virtue of being +essence. Now if that which is to be is a simple potentiality, it cannot +constitute "being," which consequently matter could not be.[289] + + +THE MONISM OF THE STOICS BREAKS DOWN, JUST LIKE DUALISM. + +Consequently, the Stoics, who reproach other philosophers (such as +Plato) for making up beings out of non-beings,[290] themselves make up +a non-being out of a being.[291] Indeed (in the system of the Stoics), +the world, such as it is, is not being. It is certainly unreasonable +to insist that matter, which is a subject, should nevertheless be +"being," and that bodies should not, any more than matter be "being"; +but it is still more unreasonable to insist that the world is "being," +not by itself, but only by one of its parts (namely, matter); that the +organism does not owe its being to the soul, but only to matter; and +last, that the soul is only a modification of matter, and is something +posterior to others. From whom then did matter receive animation? +Whence comes the hypostatic existence of the soul? How does, matter +receive form? For, since matter becomes the bodies, the soul is +something else than matter. If the form came from something else than +the soul, quality, on uniting to matter, would produce not the soul, +but inanimate bodies. If something fashion matter and create the soul, +the created soul would have to be preceded by a "creating soul." + + +THE FAULT OF THE STOICS IS TO HAVE TAKEN SENSATION AS GUIDE. + +28. The Stoic theory raises numberless further objections; but we +halt here lest we ourselves incur ridicule in combating so evident an +absurdity. It suffices if we have demonstrated that these philosophers +mistake non-essence for absolute essence; (putting the cart before +the horse), they assign the First rank to what should occupy the +last. The cause of their error is that they have chosen sensation +as guide, and have consulted nothing else in determining both their +principles, and consequences. Being persuaded that the bodies are +genuine essences,[292] and refusing to believe that they transform +themselves into each other, they believed that what subsisted in +them (in the midst of their changes) is the real essence, just as +one might imagine that place, because it is indestructible, is more +essential than (metabolic) bodies. Although in the system of the +Stoics place remain unaltered, these philosophers should not have +regarded as essence that which subsists in any manner soever; they +should, first, have considered what are the characteristics necessarily +possessed by essence, the presence of which (characteristics) makes +it subsist without undergoing any alteration. Let us indeed suppose +that a shadow would continuously subsist by following something which +changes continuously; the shadow, however, would not be no more +real than the object it follows. The sense-world, taken together +with its multiple objects, is more of an essence than the things it +contains, merely because it is their totality. Now if this subject, +taken in its totality, be non-essence, how could it be a subject? The +most surprising thing, however, is that the (Stoics), in all things +following the testimony of sensation, should not also have affirmed +that essence can be perceived by sensation; for, to matter, they do +not attribute impenetrability, because it is a quality (and because, +according to them, matter has no quality). If they insist that matter +is perceived by intelligence,[293] it could only be an irrational +intelligence which would consider itself inferior to matter, and +attribute to it, rather than to itself, the privilege of constituting +genuine essence. Since in their system intelligence is non-essence, how +could any credibility attach to that intelligence when it speaks of +things superior to it, and with which it possesses no affinity? But we +have said enough of the nature of these subjects, elsewhere.[294] + + +2. QUALITY. + + +QUALITIES ARE INCORPOREAL. + +29. Since the Stoics speak of qualities, they must consider these as +distinct from subjects; otherwise, they would not assign them to the +second rank. Now, to be anything else than the subjects, qualities must +be simple, and consequently, not composite; that is, they must not, +in so far as they are qualities, contain any matter. In this case, +the qualities must be incorporeal and active; for, according to the +Stoics, matter is a passive subject. If, on the contrary, the qualities +themselves be passive, the division into subjects and qualities is +absurd, because it would classify separately simple and composite +things, and then reunite them into one single classification. Further, +it is faulty in that it locates one of the species in another (matter +in the qualities), as if science were divided into two kinds, of which +one would comprise grammar, and the other grammar with something +additional. + + +"SEMINAL REASONS," AS QUALIFIED MATTER, WOULD BE COMPOSITE; AND +SECONDARY. + +If the Stoics say that the qualities are "qualified matter," then their +("seminal) reasons" being not merely united to nature, but (fully) +material, will no doubt form a composite; but before forming this +composite they themselves will already be composed of matter and forms; +they themselves will therefore be neither reasons nor forms. + + +THE FOUR STOIC CATEGORIES EVAPORATE, LEAVING MATTER ALONE AS BASIS. + +If the (Stoics) say that the "reasons" are only modified matter, they +then admit that qualities are modes, and the (Stoics) should locate +the reasons in the fourth category, of relation. If however relation +be something different from modality, in what does that difference +consist? Is it that modality here possesses greater reality? But if +modality, taken in itself, be not a reality, why then make of it a +category? Surely it would be impossible to gather in a single category +both essence and non-essence. In what then does this modification of +matter consist? It must be either essence or non-essence. If it be +essence, it is necessarily incorporeal. If it be non-essence, it is +nothing but a word, and matter alone exists. In this case, quality +is nothing real, and modality still less. As to the fourth category, +relation, absolutely no reality whatever will inhere in it. This Stoic +system, therefore, contains nothing else but matter. + + +THE CULT OF MATTER IMPLIES IGNORING SOUL AND INTELLIGENCE. + +But on whose authority do we learn this? Surely, not on that of +matter itself, unless that, because of its modification, it becomes +intelligence; but this (alleged) modification is but a meaningless +addition; it must therefore be matter which perceives these things, +and expresses them. If we should ask whether matter utter sensible +things, we might indeed ask ourselves how matter thinks and fulfils +the functions of the soul, although matter lacks both soul and +intelligence. If, on the contrary, matter utter something nonsensical, +insisting that it is what it is not, and what it could not be, to whom +should this silly utterance be ascribed? Surely only to matter, if it +could speak. But matter does not speak; and he who speaks thus does +so only because he has borrowed much from matter, that he has become +its slave, though he have a soul. The fact is that he is ignorant of +himself, as well as of the nature of the faculty which can divulge the +truth about this subject (intelligence). + + +3. MODALITY. + + +MODALITY SHOULD NOT OCCUPY EVEN THE THIRD RANK OF EXISTENCE. + +30. It is absurd to assign the third rank to modalities, and even +assign to them any place whatever; for all modalities refer to matter. +It may however be objected to this that there are differences between +the modalities; the various modifications that matter undergoes are +not the same thing as the modalities; the qualities are doubtless +modalities of matter, but the modalities, in the strict sense of +the word, refer to qualities. (The answer to this is that) since the +qualities are only modalities of matter, the technical modalities +mentioned by the (Stoics) themselves reduce to matter, and necessarily +relate thereto. In view of the many differences obtaining between them, +how otherwise could modalities form a category? How could one reduce to +a single classification the length of three feet, and whiteness--since +one is a quantity, and the other a quality? How could time and place +be reduced thereto? Besides, how would it be possible to consider +as modalities such expressions as "yesterday," "formerly," "in the +Lyceum," and, "in the Academy"? How could time be explained as a +modality? Neither time, nor things which are in time, nor place, nor +the things which are in place, could be modalities. How is "to act" a +modality, since he who acts is not himself a modality, but rather acts +within some modality, or even, acts simply? Nor is he who undergoes an +experience any more of a modality; he experiences something rather in +a modality, or rather, he undergoes some experience in such a manner. +Modality rather suits the (Aristotelian) categories of situation and +possession; and as to possession, no man even possesses "in such or +such a modality," but possesses purely and simply. + + +4. RELATION; THE STOICS CONFUSE THE NEW WITH THE ANTERIOR. + +31. If the Stoics did not, along with the other discussed categories, +reduce relation to a common kind, there might be good grounds to +examine whether they attributed substantial (or, hypostatic) reality +to these manners of "being"; for often, they do not attribute to them +any. But what is to be said of their confusing things new and anterior +in one same classification? This is evidently an absurdity; for surely +one and two must exist before the half or the double. + +As to the philosophers (Plato, for instance), who have taught other +opinions about essences and their principles, considered as finite or +infinite, corporeal or incorporeal, or both simultaneously corporeal +or incorporeal, we will examine each of these opinions separately, +considering also the historic objections of the ancient (philosophers). + + + + +SIXTH ENNEAD, BOOK TWO. + +The Categories of Plotinos.[297] + +1. After having discussed the doctrine of the ten categories (of +Aristotle), and spoken of the (Stoics) who reduce all things to a +single genus, and then distribute them in four species, we must still +set forth our own opinion on the subject, striving however to conform +ourselves to the doctrine of Plato. + + +PLOTINOS IS FORCED TO DEMONSTRATION OF HIS DIVERGENCE FROM PLATO. + +If it were our opinion that essence was one, we would not need to study +whether there was one single genus for all things, whether all genera +could not be reduced to a single one; whether there were principles; +whether the genera were at the same time principles; or whether all +principles are genera, without saying conversely that all genera are +principles; or, if we must distinguish between them, say that some +principles are simultaneously genera, or some genera are principles, +or, finally, whether all principles be genera without the genera being +principles, and conversely. But, since we do not acknowledge that +essence is one, the reasons[298] for which were advanced by Plato +and other philosophers, we find ourselves forced to treat all these +questions, and first to explain why we recognize genera of essences, +and what number we decide on. + + +PLOTINOS ADDS TO ESSENCE ETERNITY, TO MAKE ESSENCE INTELLIGIBLE. + +As we are going to treat of essence or essences, we must before +everything else clear up the significance of essence, which we are +now considering, and distinguish it from what other people mean by +that word, which we would more likely call that which becomes, what +is never genuine essence. And besides, it must be clearly understood +that in making this distinction, we do not intend to divide a genus +in species of the same nature; as Plato tried to do.[299] For it +would be ridiculous to subsume under the same genus both essence and +non-essence, or Socrates, and the image of Socrates. The kind of +divisions here attempted will therefore only consist in separating +things essentially different, as, for instance, explaining that +apparent essence is not the same as the veritable Essence, by +demonstrating that the latter's nature is entirely different. To +clarify this its nature, it will be necessary to add to the idea of +essence that of eternity, and thus to demonstrate that the nature of +being could never be deceptive. It is of this kind of essence (that is, +of the intelligible Essence), that we are going to treat, admitting +that it is not single. Later[300] we shall speak of generation, of what +becomes, and of the sense-world. + + +HIERARCHICAL CONSTITUTION OF THE UNIVERSE. + +2. Holding as we do that the world-Essence is not one, we must face +the question whether the number of beings is determinate, or infinite. +To say that world-Essence is not one, however, is to say that it is +both one and multiple, a varied unity that embraces a multitude. It is +therefore necessary that the One, so conceived, be one so far as it +forms a single genus, containing as species the essences by which it is +simultaneously one and multiple; or there must be several genera, but +that they all be subsumed under the single one; or again, that there +be several genera which however be not mutually subsumed, of which +each, being independent of the others, may contain what is below it, +consisting of less extended genera, or species below which there are no +more than individuals; so that all these things may contribute to the +constitution of a single nature, together making up the organization of +the intelligible world, which we call world-Essence (or "being"). + + +THE ELEMENTS OF THE UNIVERSE ARE PRINCIPLES AND GENERA SIMULTANEOUSLY. + +Under these circumstances, the divisions that we establish are +no more only genera, they are simultaneously the very principles +of world-Essence; on the one hand they are genera, because they +contain less extended genera, beneath which are species, which end +in individuals; they are also principles, because world-Essence is +composed of multiple elements, and because these elements constitute +the totality of Essence. If it were only stated that world-Essence is +composed of several elements, and that these elements, by co-operation, +constitute the All, without adding that they branch out into lower +species, our divisions would indeed be principles, but they would no +longer be genera. For instance, if it be said that the sense-world +is composed of four elements, such as fire, or other elements, these +elements are indeed principles, but not genera, unless this name be +used as a verbal similarity (or, homonym, or pun). + + +BEING ACTUALIZATIONS, BOTH GENERA AND INDIVIDUALS WILL BE DISTINCT. + +Admitting therefore the existence of certain genera, which are +simultaneously principles, we must still consider whether they should +be conceived so that these genera, along with the things contained by +each of them, commingle, fuse, and form the whole by their blending. If +so, the genera would exist potentially, but not in actualization; none +would have anything characteristic. Further, granting the distinctness +of the genera, can we grant that the individuals blend? But what then +would become of the genera themselves? Will they subsist by themselves, +and will they remain pure, without mutual destruction of the mingled +individuals? Later we shall indicate how such things could take place. + + +FUNDAMENTAL UNITY OF GENERA WOULD DESTROY SPECIES; MANIFOLDNESS MUST +PRE-EXIST. + +Now that we have explained the existence of genera, which, besides, +are principles of being, and that from another point of view there are +principles (or elements), and compounds, we shall have to set forth the +criterion by which we constitute these genera; we shall have to ask how +they may be distinguished from each other, instead of reducing them to +a single (principle), as if they had been united by chance, although it +does indeed seem more rational to reduce them to a single (principle). +It would be possible to reduce them in this way if all things were +species of essence, if the individuals were contained within these +species, and if there were nothing outside of these species. But such a +supposition would destroy the species--for such species would no longer +be species, or forms;--and from that moment there would be no further +need for reducing plurality to unity, and everything forming a single +unity; so that, all things belonging to this One, no being outside of +the One would exist, as far as it was something else. + +How indeed could the One have become manifold, and how could it have +begotten the species, if nothing but it existed? For it would not be +manifold if there were not something to divide it, such as a size; now +that which divides is other than that which is divided. The mere fact +that it divides itself, or imparts itself to others, shows that it was +already divisible before the division. + + +THERE IS MORE THAN ONE GENUS, FOR NOT EVERYTHING CAN BE SUBSUMED UNDER +BEING AND ESSENCE. + +For this and other reasons, therefore, we must take good care to +avoid assertion of a single genus; for it would be impossible to +apply to everything the denominations of "being" and essence.[342] +If indeed there be very different objects called essence, this is +only accidentally, just as if one called the color white a being; for +strictly we cannot apply "being" to white, as considered alone.[301] + + +THE ONE IS SO FAR ABOVE ALL THE GENERA AS NOT TO BE COUNTED. + +3. We therefore assert the existence of several genera, and that this +plurality is not accidental. These divers genera, however, depend from +the One. But even though they do depend from the One, if the One be not +something which may be affirmed of each of them as considered in its +being, then nothing hinders each of them, having nothing similar to +the others, from constituting a genus apart. We also grant that the +One, existing outside of the genera which are begotten of Him, is their +cause, although the other essences considered in their being do not +proclaim this. Yes indeed, the One is outside of the other essences. +Besides, He is above them; so much so, that He is not counted as one of +them; for it is through Him that the other essences exist, which, so +far as they are genera, are equal. + + +WE ARE DISCUSSING HERE NOT THE ABSOLUTE ONE, BUT THE ESSENTIAL RELATED +ONE. + +Still, it will be asked, Of what nature is the One which does not +count among the genera? This (absolute One) is outside of our present +consideration; for we are not studying Him who is above essence,[342] +but the essences themselves. We must therefore pass by the absolute +One, and seek the one which is counted among the genera. + + +THE RELATED ONE IS IN SOME GENERA, BUT NOT IN OTHERS. + +To begin with (if we consider the related One from this point of view), +it will seem astonishing to see the cause numbered along with the +effects. It would indeed be unreasonable to cram into a single genus +both superior and inferior things. If nevertheless, on counting the one +amidst the essences of which He is the cause, He was to be considered +as a genus to which the other essences were to be subordinated, +and from which they differed; if, besides, the one was not to be +predicated of the other essences either as genus, or in any other +respect, it would still be necessary that the genera which possessed +essence subsume species under them; since, for instance, by moving, +you produce walking, and yet walking cannot be considered a genus +subordinate to you; but above the walking there existed nothing else +that could, in respect to it, operate as a genus; and if nevertheless +there existed things beneath walking, walking would, in respect to +them, be a genus of the essences. + + +THE PARTS OF A MANIFOLD UNITY ARE APART ONLY FOR EXAMINATION. + +Perhaps, instead of saying that the one is the cause of the other +things, we would have to admit that these things are as parts and +elements of the one; and that all things form a single nature in +which only our thought establishes divisions; so that, by virtue of +its admirable power, this nature be unity distributed in all things, +appearing and becoming manifold, as if it were in movement, and that +the one should cease being unity as a result of the fruitfulness of +its nature. If we were to enumerate successively the parts of such a +nature, we would grant to each of them a separate existence, ignoring +that we had not seen the whole together. But after thus having +separated the parts, we would soon reapproximate them, not for long +being able to keep apart the isolated elements which tend to reunite. +That is why we could not help making a whole out of them, letting +them once more become unity, or rather, be unity. Besides, this will +be easier to understand when we shall know what these essences are, +and how many are the genera of essences; for we shall then be able to +conceive their mode of existence. And as, in these matters, it is not +well to limit oneself to negations, but to aim at positive knowledge, +and at the full intelligence of the subject here treated, we shall have +to make this inquiry. + + +THE GENERA OF ESSENCE WILL BE DETERMINED BY AN EXAMINATION OF THE +PROBLEM OF THE ONE AND MANY. + +4. If, on occupying ourselves with this sense-world, we wished to +determine the nature of bodies, would we not begin by studying some +part thereof, such as a stone? We could then distinguish therein +substance, quantity--such as dimension--and quality, such as color; +and after having discovered these same elements in other bodies, +we could say that the elements of the corporeal nature are being, +quantity, and quality; but that these three coexist; and that, though +thought distinguish them, all three form but one and the same body. +If, besides, we were to recognize that movement is proper to this +same organization, would we not add it to the three elements already +distinguished? These four elements, however, would form but a single +one, and the body, though one, would, in its nature, be the reunion +of all four. We shall have to take the same course with our present +subject, intelligible Being, and its genera and principles. Only, +in this comparison, we shall have to make abstraction of all that +is peculiar to bodies, such as generation, sense-perception, and +extension. After having established this separation, and having thus +distinguished essentially different things, we shall arrive at the +conception of a certain intelligible existence, which possesses real +essence, and unity in a still higher degree. From this standpoint, +one might be surprised how the (substance which is thus) one can be +both one and many. In respect to bodies, it is generally recognized +that the same thing is both one and many; the body can indeed be +divided infinitely; color and appearance, for instance, are therein +very differing properties, since they are separated here below. But +in respect to the soul, if she be conceived as one, without extent, +dimension and absolutely simple, as it appears at first sight, how +could we, after that, believe that the soul were manifold? We should +have here expected to reach unity, all the more as, after having +divided the animal in body and soul, and after having demonstrated that +the body is multiform, composite and diverse, one might well, on the +contrary, have expected to find the soul simple; and to have accepted +this conclusion as final, as the end of our researches. We would thus +have taken the soul as a sample of the intelligible world, just as the +body represents the sense-world. Having thus considered this soul, +let us examine how this unity can be manifold; how, in its turn, the +manifold can be unity; not indeed a composite formed of separable +parts, but a single nature simultaneously one and manifold. For, as +we have already said, it is only by starting from this point and +demonstrating it, that we will establish solidly the truth about the +genera of essence. + + +THE SOUL IS A PLURAL UNITY OF SEMINAL REASONS. + +5. The first consideration that meets us is that each body, whether +of animals or plants, is multiple, by virtue of its colors, forms, +dimensions, the kinds of parts, and diversity of their position; and +that nevertheless all things derive from unity, whether from the +absolutely simple Unity, or from the habituation of the universal +Unity, or from some principle having more unity--and consequently +more essence--than the things it produces; because, the further the +distance from unity, the less the essence. The principle which forms +the bodies must therefore be one, without either being absolutely +one, nor identical with the One; otherwise, it would not produce a +plurality that was distant from unity; consequently, it must be a +plural-unity. Now this principle is the soul; therefore she must be +a plural unity. This plurality, however, consists of the ("seminal) +reasons" which proceed from the soul. The reasons, indeed, are not +other than the soul; for the soul herself is reason, being the +principle of the reasons; the reasons are the actualization of the soul +which acts according to her being; and this being is potentiality of +the reasons.[303] The soul is therefore plurality simultaneously with +unity; which is clearly demonstrated by the action she exerts on other +things. + + +THE SOUL IS A DEFINITE ESSENCE AS PARTICULAR BEING. + +But what is the soul considered apart from all action, if we examine in +her the part which does not work at formation of the bodies?[304] Will +not a plurality of powers still be found therein? As to world-Essence, +nobody even thinks of depriving the soul of it. But is her acknowledged +essence the same as that predicated of a stone? Surely not. Besides, +even in the essence of the stone, "being" and "being a stone" are +inseparable concepts, just as "being" and "being a soul" are, in the +soul, but one and the same thing.[305] Must we then regard as different +in her essence on one side, and on the other the remainder (what +constitutes the being); so that it would be the difference (proper to +being) which, by being added to her, constituted the soul? No: the soul +is no doubt a determinate essence; not as a "white man," but only as +a particular being; in other words, she has what she has by her very +being. + + +THE ESSENCE OF THE SOUL DERIVES FROM ITS BEING; ADDING LIFE TO ESSENCE. + +6. However, could we not say that the soul does not have all that she +has through her being, in this sense, that in her we must distinguish +on one hand essence, and on the other some kind of essence? If the soul +possess such a kind of essence, and if this kind of essence come to her +from without, the whole will no longer be the being of the soul so far +as she is soul; only partially will it be the being of the soul, and +not in totality. Besides, what would be the essence of the soul without +the other things which constitute her being? Will the essence be the +same for the soul as for the stone? Will we not rather have to insist +that this essence of the soul derives from her very being; that this +essence is her source and principle; or rather, that it is all that the +soul is, and consequently is life; and finally that in the soul life +and essence fuse? + + +SOUL UNITY DOES NOT RESEMBLE THE UNITY OF A REASON, INCLUDING PLURALITY. + +Shall we say that this unity resembles that of a "reason" (of a +form)? No. The substance of the soul is one; but such unity does not +exclude duality or even plurality; for it admits of all the attributes +essential to the soul. + + +THE SOUL IS BOTH BEING AND LIFE. + +Should we say that the soul is both being and life, or that she +possesses life? To say that the soul possesses life would mean that the +possessor is not inherently alive, or that life does not inhere in her +"being." If then we cannot say that one of the two possesses the other, +we shall have to recognize that both are identical, or that the soul is +both one and manifold, in her unity embracing all that appears in her; +that in herself she is one, but manifold in respect to other things; +that, although she be one by herself, she makes herself multiple by +her movement; that, while forming a whole which is one, she seeks to +consider herself in her multiplicity. So Essence also does not remain +unitary, because its potentiality extends to all it has become. It is +contemplation that makes it appear manifold, the necessary thought has +multiplied it. If it appear as one only, it is only because it has not +yet thought, and it really is still only one. + + +THE FIRST TWO GENERA ARE BEING AND MOVEMENT. + +7. What and how much can be seen in the soul? Since we have found +in the soul both being and life, and as both being and life are +what is common in every soul, and as life resides in intelligence, +recognizing that there is (besides the soul and her being) intelligence +and its life, we shall posit as a genus what is common in all life; +namely, movement; consequently, being and movement, which constitute +primary life, will be our first two categories. Although (in reality) +they fuse, they are distinguished by thought, which is incapable +of approaching unity exclusively; and whose exercise compels this +distinction. Besides, it is possible, you can, in other objects, +clearly see essence, as distinct from movement or life, although their +essence be not real, and only shadowy or figurative.[306] Just as +the image of a man lacks several things, and, among others, the most +important, life; likewise, the essence of sense-objects is only an +adumbration of the veritable essence, lacking as it does the highest +degree of essence, namely, vitality, which appears in its archetype. +So you see it is quite easy to distinguish, on one hand, essence from +life, and, on the other, life from essence. Essence is a genus, and +contains several species; now movement must not be subsumed under +essence, nor be posited within essence, but should be equated with +essence. When we locate movement within essence, it is not that we +consider life is the subject of movement, but because movement is +life's actualization; only in thought can either exist separately. +These two natures, therefore, form but a single one; for essence exists +not in potentiality, but in actualization; and if we conceive of these +two genera as separated from each other it will still be seen that +movement is within essence, and essence within movement. In the unity +of essence, the two elements, when considered separately, imply each +other reciprocally; but thought affirms their duality, and shows that +each of the two series is a double unity. + + +ANOTHER GENUS IS STABILITY, WHICH IS ONLY ANOTHER KIND OF MOVEMENT. + +Since then it is in the sphere of essence that movement appears, and +since movement manifests its perfection far rather than it divides +its being; and since essence, in order to carry out the nature here +assigned to it, must always persevere in movement, it would be still +more absurd to deny it stability, than to refuse it movement. The +notion and the conception of stability are still more in harmony +with the nature of essence than are those of movement; for it is in +essence that may be found what is called "remaining in the same state," +"existing in the same manner," and "being uniform." Let us therefore +assert that stability is a genus different from movement, of which it +seems to be the opposite. + + +DISTINCTION BETWEEN STABILITY AND ESSENCE. + +In many ways it can be shown that stability must be kept apart +from essence. In the first place, if stability were identical with +essence, why should it be so, rather than movement, which is life, +the actualization of being, and of essence itself? Since we have +distinguished between movement and essence, and since we have said that +it is both identical therewith, and still at the same time different +from it; and because essence and movement are different from each other +from one viewpoint, but from another, are identical; we must also (in +thought) distinguish stability from essence without separating it +(in existence); and by separating it in thought, we shall be making +a distinct genus of it. Indeed, if stability and essence were to +be confused together in a perfect union, if we were to acknowledge +no difference between them, we would still be obliged to identify +stability with movement by the intermediation of essence; in this +way stability and movement would together form but one and the same +thing.[307] + + +ESSENCE, STABILITY AND MOVEMENT EXIST BECAUSE THOUGHT BY INTELLIGENCE. + +8. We must posit these three genera (essence, movement, and stability) +because intelligence thinks each of them separately. By thinking +them simultaneously, Intelligence posits them; and, as soon as +Intelligence thinks them, they are (in existence). The things whose +existence ("essence") implies matter do not exist in Intelligence; +for otherwise they would be immaterial. On the contrary, immaterial +things come into existence by merely being thought. So then contemplate +pure Intelligence, instead of seeking it with your bodily eyes, fix +on it your interior gaze. Then will you see the hearth of "Being," +where shines an unsleeping light; you will see therein how essences +subsist as simultaneously divided and united; you will see in it an +abiding life, the thought which applies not to the future, but to the +present; which possesses it already, and possesses it for ever; which +thinks what is intimate to it, and not what is foreign. Intelligence +thinks: and you have actualization and movement. Intelligence thinks +what is in itself: and you have "being" and essence; for, by merely +existing, Intelligence thinks: Intelligence thinks itself as existing, +and the object to which Intelligence applies its thought exists also. +The actualization of Intelligence on itself is not "being"; but the +object to which it refers, the Principle from which it derives, is +essence. Essence, indeed, is the object of intuition, but not intuition +itself; the latter exists (has "essence") only because it starts from, +and returns thereto. Now as essence is an actualization, and not a +potentiality, it unites both terms (existence and intuition, object and +subject), and, without separating them, it makes of intuition essence, +and of essence intuition. Essence is the unshakable foundation of all +things, and support of their existence; it derives its possessions from +no foreign source, holding them from itself, and within itself. It is +simultaneously the goal of thought, because it is stability that never +needed a beginning, and the principle from which thought was born, +because it is unborn stability; for movement can neither originate +from, nor tend towards movement. The idea also belongs to the genus of +stability, because it is the goal (or limit) of intelligence; but the +intellectual actualization by which it is thought constitutes movement. +Thus all these things form but one thing; and movement, stability, +and the things which exist in all essences constitute genera (or +classifications). Moreover, every essence posterior to these genera is, +in its turn, also definite essence, definite stability, and definite +movement. + + +THIS TRIUNE PLAY IMPLIES ALSO IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE. + +Summing up what we have discovered about the nature of Essence, we find +first three genera. Then, these three, Essence, Movement and Stability +were contemplated respectively by the essence, movement and stability +within ourselves, which we also harmonized with those intelligibles. +Then again we lost the power of distinguishing them by uniting, +confusing, and blending these three genera. But a little later we +divided, extricated and distinguished them so as again to see essence, +movement and stability; three things, of which each exists apart. The +result of this process then is that they are regarded as different, +discerning them by their differences, and recognizing difference in +essence by positing three things each of which exists apart. On the +other hand, if they be considered in their relation with unity and in +unity, if they be all reduced to being something single and identical, +one may see the arising, or rather the existing of identity. To the +three genera already recognized, therefore, we shall have to add +identity or difference, or (in Platonic language[308]), "sameness and +other-ness." These two classifications added to the three others, +will in all make five genera for all things. Identity and difference +(are genuine genera, indeed, because they) also communicate their +characteristics to inferior (beings), each of which manifests some such +element. + + +THESE FIVE GENERA ARE PRIMARY BECAUSE NOTHING CAN BE AFFIRMED OF THEM. + +These five genera that we thus recognize are primary, because nothing +can be predicated of them in the category of existence (being). No +doubt, because they are essences, essence might be predicated of them; +but essence would not be predicated of them because "being" is not a +particular essence. Neither is essence to be predicated of movement +or stability, for these are species of essence. Neither does essence +participate in these four genera as if they were superior genera +under which essence itself would be subsumed; for stability, movement, +identity and difference do not protrude beyond the sphere of essence, +and are not anterior thereto. + + +WHY NOT ADD OTHERS SUCH AS UNITY, QUANTITY, QUALITY, OR RELATION? + +9. These and similar (Platonic) arguments demonstrate that those are +genuinely primary genera; but how are we to prove they are exclusive? +Why, for example, should not unity, quantity, quality, relation, and +further (Aristotelian) categories, be added thereto? + + +NEITHER ABSOLUTE NOR RELATIVE UNITY CAN BE A CATEGORY. + +Unity (may mean two things). The absolute Unity, to which nothing may +be added, neither Soul, nor Intelligence, nor anything else, cannot be +predicated as attribute of anything, and therefore cannot be a genus. +But if we are referring to the unity which we attribute to essence, +when we say that essence is one, it is no longer the original Unity. +Besides, how could the absolute One, which within itself admits of no +difference, beget species? If it cannot do this, it cannot be a genus. +How indeed could you divide unity? By dividing it, you would multiply +it; and thus Unity-in-itself would be manifold, and in aspiring to +become a genus it would annihilate itself. Besides, in order to divide +this unity into species, you would have to add something to unity, +because it does not contain differences such as exist in being. +Intelligence might well admit differences between essences, but this +could not possibly be the case with unity. The moment you add a single +difference, you posit duality, and consequently destroy unity; for +everywhere the addition of a single unity causes any previously +posited number to disappear. + + +UNITY IS NOT SYNONYMOUS WITH ESSENCE. + +It may be objected that the unity which is in essence, in movement, +and the remainder of the genera, is common to all of them, and that +one might therefore identify unity with essence.[309] It must then be +answered that, just as essence was not made a genus of other things +because they were not what was essence, but that they were called +essences in another sense, here likewise unity could not be a common +attribute of other things, because there must be a primary Unity, +and a unity taken in a secondary sense. If, on the other hand, it +be said that unity should not be made a genus of all things, but +something which exists in itself like the others, if afterwards unity +be identified with essence, then, as essence has already been listed +as one of the genera, we would be merely uselessly introducing a +superfluous name.[310] Distinguishing between unity and essence is an +avowal that each has its separate nature; the addition of "something" +to "one" makes a "certain one"; addition of nothing, on the other +hand, allows unity to remain absolute, which cannot be predicated of +anything. But why could this unity not be the First Unity, ignoring +the absolute Unity? For we use "first Unity" as a designation of the +essence which is beneath the "absolute Unity." Because the Principle +anterior to the first Essence (that is, the first and absolute Unity) +is not essence; otherwise, the essence below Him would no longer be +the first Essence; here, on the contrary, the unity which is above +this unity is the absolute Unity. Besides, this unity which would +be separated from essence only in thought, would not admit of any +differences. + +Besides, there are three alternatives. Either this unity alleged to +inhere in essence will be, just like all other essences, a consequence +of the existence of essence; and consequently, would be posterior +to it. Or, it will be contemporaneous with essence and the other +(categories); but a genus cannot be contemporaneous with the things of +which it is the genus. The third possibility is that it may be anterior +to essence; in which case its relation to Essence will be that of a +principle, and no longer a genus containing it. If then unity be not a +genus in respect to essence, neither can it be a genus in respect of +other things; otherwise, we would have to say of essence also that it +was a genus embracing everything else. + + +ESSENCE CANNOT BECOME A GENUS SO LONG AS IT REMAINS ONE. + +Considering unity according to its essence, it seems to fuse and +coincide with absolute Essence, for essence, so far as it trends +towards unity, is a single essence; but in so far as it is posterior to +unity, it becomes all things it can be, and becomes manifold. Now, so +far as essence remains one and does not divide, it could not constitute +a genus. + + +ELEMENTS OF ESSENCE CAN BE SAID TO BE ONE ONLY FIGURATIVELY. + +10. In what sense, therefore, could each of the elements of essence +be called "one"? In that it is something unitary, without being unity +itself; for what is a "certain one" is already manifold. No species is +"one" except figuratively[306]; for in itself it is manifold. It is +in the same sense that, in this sense-world, we say that an army, or +a choric ballet, constitute a unity. Not in such things is absolute +unity; and therefore it may not be said that unity is something common. +Neither does unity reside in essence itself, nor in the individual +essences; therefore, it is not a genus. When a genus is predicated of +something, it is impossible to predicate of the same thing contrary +properties; but of each of the elements of universal essence it is +possible to assert both unity and its opposite. Consequently (if we +have called unity a genus), after having predicated of some essence +unity as a genus, we would have affirmed, of the same essence, that +unity was not a genus. Unity, therefore, could not be considered one +of the primary genera; for essence is no more one than it is manifold. +As to the other genera, none of them is one without being manifold; +much less could unity be predicated of the secondary genera of which +each is quite manifold. Besides, no genus, considered in its totality, +is unitary; so that if unity were a genus, it would merely thereby +cease being unity; for unity is not a number, and nevertheless it would +become a number in becoming a genus. Of course, numbers include an +alleged unity, as soon as we try to erect it into a genus, it is no +longer a unity, in a strict sense. Among numbers unity is not applied +to them as would have been a genus; of such unity it is merely said +that it is among numbers, not that it is a genus; likewise, if unity +were among the essences, it would not be there as genus of essence, nor +of anything else, nor of all things. Again, just as the simple is the +principle of the composite without being considered a genus in respect +to it--then it would be simultaneously simple and composite--so, if one +were considered to be a principle, it could not be a genus in respect +to things subsumed under it; and therefore will be a genus neither for +essence, nor for other (categories or things). + + +VARIOUS ARGUMENTS AGAINST UNITY AS A CATEGORY. + +If unity were to be considered a genus, it could be that only in +respect to the things of which each is said to be one;[309] as if, +for instance, one should, from "being," deduce the unity contained +within it. Unity would then be the genus of certain things; for just +as essence is a genus, not in respect to all things, but in respect +to those species that possess essence, so unity would be a genus +in respect to the species that possess unity. This, however, is +impossible; for things do not differ in respect to unity, as they do in +respect to essence. + +It might further be objected that if the same divisions which were +applied to essence were applied to unity, and if essence be a genus +because it divides itself, and manifests itself as the same in a +number of things, why then should unity also not be a genus, since it +appears in as many things as essence, and similarly divides itself? +Mere recurrence of something in several essences is no proof it is a +genus; whether in respect to the essences in which it occurs, or to +others. Merely being common to several essences by no means constitutes +a genus. No one will claim that a point is a genus for lines or for +anything else, though points be found in all lines. As said, unity +is found in every number, and nevertheless it is not a genus for +any number, or for anything else. The formation of a genus demands +that what is common to several things show specific differences, +constituting species, and be predicated of what exists. But what are +the specific differences within unity? What species does it form? If to +this it be answered that it forms the same species as essence, then it +blends with essence, and (unity) is (as said above), only another name +for essence; and essence, as category, suffices. + + +GENUINE RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITY AND ESSENCE. + +11. The questions here to be solved are, how unity subsists within +essence, how they both divide, and in general how any genera divide; +and whether their two divisions be identical, or different. To solve +these questions, we shall first have to ask how in general any thing +whatever is said to be one, and is one; then, if it can be said in the +same sense that essence is one, in what sense this is said. Evidently, +unity is not the same for everything. It cannot even be understood in +the same sense in respect to sense-things, and intelligible things; not +any more than essence is identical for these two order of (beings), +or even for sense-things compared to each other. The idea of unity is +not the same in reference to a choric ballet, an army, a vessel or a +house; it is even less so in respect of one of these things, and when +it deals with continuous objects. And nevertheless, by their unity all +these things imitate the same archetype, some from far, some from near. +Intelligence, surely, is assuredly that which most approaches absolute +Unity; for although the soul already possess unity, Intelligence +possesses it far more intensely; for it is the one essence. + + +UNITY REIGNS STILL MORE IN THE GOOD. + +Is the expression of the essence of something simultaneously the +expression of its unity, so that it possesses as much unity as it +possesses essence? Or does this simultaneousness exist without any +direct proportion between the amount of unity and essence? Yes; for it +is possible that something have less unity without, on that account, +having any the less essence; an army, a choric ballet have not less +essence than a house, though far less unity. The unity present in +each thing seems therefore to aspire to the Good, which has the most +unity;[311] for the closer something approaches the Good, the greater +unity does it achieve; that is the criterion of greater or less unity. +Indeed, every (being) desires not only merely to be (alive), but to +enjoy the Good. That is why everything, so far as it can, hastens to +become one, and those (beings) which by nature possess unity naturally +trend towards Him by desiring to unite with themselves. For every +(being) hastens not to separate from others, but on the contrary their +tendency is to tend towards each other and themselves. That is why all +souls, while preserving their individual nature, would like to fuse +into a single soul. The One reigns everywhere in the sense-world, as +well as in the Intelligible. It is from Him that everything originates, +it is towards Him that everything trends. In Him do all (beings) seek +their principle and their goal; for only therein do they find their +good; only by that does each (being) subsist, and occupies its place +in the universe; once that it exists, no (being) could help trending +towards the One. This occurs not only in nature, but even in the arts; +where each art seeks, to the extent of its ability, to conform its +works to unity, to the extent of its ability, and to the possibilities +of its works. But that which succeeds best, is Essence itself, which is +quite close to unity. + + +FURTHER REASONS WHY UNITY IS NOT A CATEGORY. + +Consequently, in speaking of (beings) other than (essence itself), as, +for instance, of man, we say simply "man" (without adding to it the +idea of unity[312]); if however we say "a man," it is to distinguish +him from two; if however we use the word one in still another sense, it +is by adding to it "some" (as, "someone"). Not so is it with essence; +we say, "being one," conceiving of "being" ("essence") and one, as if +forming a single whole, and in positing essence as one, we emphasize +its narrow affinity with the Good. Thus conceived, essence becomes +one;[313] and in the one finds its origin and goal. Nevertheless it is +not one as unity itself, but rather in a different manner, in this +sense that the (unity of essence) admits priority and posteriority. +What then is (the unity of essence)? Must it not then be considered +similar in all the parts (of essence), as something common to all (and +consequently, as forming a genus)? But in the first place, the point is +also something common to all the lines, and nevertheless it is not a +genus; in the numbers, unity is something common to all, and is not any +more of a genus. Indeed, the unity which is found in the monad, in the +dyad (or pair), and in other numbers, cannot be confused with unity in +itself. Then, nothing hinders there being in essence some anterior, and +other posterior parts, both simple and compound ones (which would be +impossible for the One in itself). Even if the unity found everywhere +in all the parts of essence were everywhere identical, by the mere fact +that it would offer no difference, it could not give rise to species, +and consequently, it could not be a genus. + + +BY TENDING TOWARDS THE ONE, EVERYTHING TENDS TOWARDS THE GOOD. + +12. We therefore assert (that by moving towards unity everything moves +towards the Good). How can it be, however, that Goodness should consist +in coming closer to unity, even for number, which is inanimate?[314] +This question might as well be asked about any inanimate object +whatever. If we were told that such (beings) do not enjoy (existence), +we might answer that we are here treating of beings according to +their proximity to unity only. If, for instance, we were asked how +a point can participate in the Good, we might answer by a retort, +asking whether we are dealing with the Point in itself. Then we would +answer by the observation that the state of affairs was the same for +all things of the same kind. If however we were pressed about the +point considered as existing in some object, as, for instance, in the +circle, we would answer that for such a point, the Good is the good +of the circle (of which it forms part); that such is the Good towards +which it aspires, and that it seeks that as far as possible through the +intermediation of the circle. + + +THESE GENERA EXIST IN BOTH THE SUBORDINATE OBJECTS, AND THEMSELVES. + +But how could we realize such genera? Are all these genera susceptible +of division, or do they lie entire within each of the objects they +comprehend? If so, how does this unity find itself? Unity exists +therein as a genus, just as the whole exists within the plurality. + +Does unity exist only in the objects that participate therein? Not only +in these objects, but also in itself. This point will be studied later. + + +QUANTITY IS A SECONDARY GENUS, THEREFORE NOT A FIRST. + +13. Now why should we not posit quantity among the primary genera? And +why not also quality? Quantity is not one of the primary genera like +those we have posited, because the primary genera coexist with essence +(which is not the case with quantity). Indeed, movement is inseparable +from essence; being its actualization and life. Stability is implied in +being; while identity and difference are still more inseparable from +essence; so that all these (categories) appear to us simultaneously. As +to number (which is discrete quantity), it is something posterior. As +to (mathematical) numbers, far more are they posterior both to these +genera, and themselves; for the numbers follow each other; the second +depends on the first, and so forth; the last are contained within the +first. Number, therefore, cannot be posited among the primary genera. +Indeed, it is permissible to doubt whether quantity may be posited +as any kind of a genus. More even than number, extension (which is +continuous quantity), shows the characteristics of compositeness, and +of posteriority. Along with number, the line enters into the idea of +extension. This would make two elements. Then comes surface, which +makes three. If then it be from number that continuous dimension +derives its quantitativeness, how could this dimension be a genus, when +number is not? On the other hand, anteriority and posteriority exist +in dimension as well as in numbers. But if both kinds of quantities +have in common this, that they are quantities, it will be necessary to +discover the nature of quantity. When this will have been found, we +shall be able to make of it a secondary genus; but it could not rank +with the primary genera. If, then, quantity be a genus without being a +primary one, it will still remain for us to discover to which higher +genus, whether primary or secondary, it should be subsumed. + + +NUMBER AND DIMENSION DIFFER SO MUCH AS TO SUGGEST DIFFERENT +CLASSIFICATION. + +It is evident that quantity informs us of the amount of a thing, +and permits us to measure this; therefore itself must be an amount. +This then is the element common to number (the discrete quantity), +and to continuous dimension. But number is anterior, and continuous +dimension proceeds therefrom; number consists in a certain blending +of movement and stability; continuous dimension is a certain movement +or proceeds from some movement; movement produces it in its progress +towards infinity, but stability arrests it in its progress, limits +it, and creates unity. Besides, we shall in the following explain the +generation of number and dimension; and, what is more, their mode of +existence, and how to conceive of it rightly. It is possible that we +might find that number should be posited among the primary genera, but +that, because of its composite nature, continuous dimension should +be posited among the posterior or later genera; that number is to be +posited among stable things, while dimension belongs among those in +movement. But, as said above, all this will be treated of later. + + +QUALITY IS NOT A PRIMARY GENUS BECAUSE IT IS POSTERIOR TO BEING. + +14. Let us now pass on to quality. Why does quality also fail to +appear among the primary genera? Because quality also is posterior +to them; it does indeed follow after being. The first Being must +have these (quantity and quality) as consequences, though being is +neither constituted nor completed thereby; otherwise, being would be +posterior to them. Of course, as to the composite beings, formed of +several elements, in which are both numbers and qualities, they indeed +are differentiated by those different elements which then constitute +qualities, though they simultaneously contain common (elements). As to +the primary genera, however, the distinction to be established does +not proceed from simpleness or compositeness, but of simpleness and +what completes being. Notice, I am not saying, "of what completes 'some +one' being"; for if we were dealing with some one being, there would +be nothing unreasonable in asserting that such a being was completed +by a quality, since this being would have been in existence already +before having the quality, and would receive from the exterior only the +property of being such or such. On the contrary, absolute Being must +essentially possess all that constitutes it. + + +COMPLEMENT OF BEING IS CALLED QUALITY ONLY BY COURTESY. + +Besides, we have elsewhere pointed out[315] that what is a complement +of being is called a quality figuratively only;[306] and that what is +genuinely quality comes from the exterior, posteriorly to being. What +properly belongs to being is its actualization; and what follows it is +an experience (or, negative modification). We now add that what refers +to some being, cannot in any respect be the complement of being. There +is no need of any addition of "being" (existence) to man, so far as +he is a man, to make of him a (human) being. Being exists already in +a superior region before descending to specific difference; thus the +animal exists (as being) before one descends to the property of being +reasonable, when one says: "Man is a reasonable animal."[316] + + +THE FOUR OTHER CATEGORIES DO NOT TOGETHER FORM QUALITY. + +15. However, how do four of these genera complete being, without +nevertheless constituting the suchness (or, quality) of being? for they +do not form a "certain being." The primary Essence has already been +mentioned; and it has been shown that neither movement, difference, nor +identity are anything else. Movement, evidently, does not introduce any +quality in essence; nevertheless it will be wise to study the question +a little more definitely. If movement be the actualization of being, if +essence, and in general all that is in the front rank be essentially an +actualization, movement cannot be considered as an accident. As it is, +however, the actualization of the essence which is in actualization, +it can no longer be called a simple complement of "being," for it is +"being" itself. Neither must it be ranked amidst things posterior +to "being," nor amidst the qualities; it is contemporaneous with +"being," for you must not suppose that essence existed first, and then +moved itself (these being contemporaneous events). It is likewise +with stability; for one cannot say that essence existed first, and +then later became stable. Neither are identity or difference any +more posterior to essence; essence was not first unitary, and then +later manifold; but by its essence it is one manifold. So far as it +is manifold, it implies difference; while so far as it is a manifold +unity, it implies identity. These categories, therefore, suffice to +constitute "being." When one descends from the intelligible world +to inferior things, he meets other elements which indeed no longer +constitute absolute "being," but only a "certain being," that possesses +some particular quantity or quality; these are indeed genera, but +genera inferior to the primary genera. + + +RELATION IS AN APPENDAGE EXISTING ONLY AMONG DEFINITE OBJECTS. + +16. As to relation, which, so to speak, is only an offshoot or +appendage,[317] it could certainly not be posited amidst the primary +genera. Relation can exist only between one thing and another; it is +nothing which exists by itself; every relation presupposes something +foreign. + + +NEITHER CAN PLACE OR TIME FIGURE AMONG THEM.[318] + +The categories of place and time are just as unable to figure among the +primary genera. To be in a place, is to be in something foreign; which +implies two consequences:[319] a genus must be single, and admits of +no compositeness. Place, therefore, is no primary genus. For here we +are dealing only with veritable essences. + +As to time, does it possess a veritable characteristic? Evidently +not. If time be a measure, and not a measure pure and simple, but the +measure of movement,[320] it also is something double, and consequently +composite. (This, as with place, would debar it from being ranked +among the primary genera, which are simple). Besides, it is something +posterior to movement; so that it could not even be ranked along with +movement. + + +ACTION, EXPERIENCE, POSSESSION AND LOCATION ARE SIMILARLY +UNSATISFACTORY. + +Action and experience equally depend on movement. Now, as each of +them is something double, each of them, consequently, is something +composite. Possession also is double. Location, which consists in +something's being in some definite way in something else, actually +comprises three elements. (Therefore possession and location, because +composite, are not simple primary genera). + + +NEITHER ARE GOOD, BEAUTY, VIRTUE, SCIENCE, OR INTELLIGENCE. + +17. But why should not the Good, beauty, virtues, science, or +intelligence be considered primary genera? If by "good" we understand +the First, whom we call the Good itself, of whom indeed we could not +affirm anything, but whom we call by this name, because we have none +better to express our meaning, He is not a genus; for He cannot be +affirmed of anything else. If indeed there were things of which He +could be predicated, each of them would be the Good Himself. Besides, +the Good does not consist in "being," and therefore is above it. But if +by "good" we mean only the quality (of goodness), then it is evident +that quality cannot be ranked with primary genera. Does this imply that +Essence is not good? No; it is good, but not in the same manner as the +First, who is good, not by a quality, but by Himself. + +It may however be objected that, as we saw above, essence contains +other genera, and that each of these is a genus because it has +something in common, and because it is found in several things. If then +the Good be found in each part of "being" or essence, or at least, in +the greater number of them, why would not also the Good be a genus, and +one of the first genera? Because the Good is not the same in all parts +of Essence, existing within it in the primary or secondary degree; and +because all these different goods are all subordinate to each other, +the last depending on the first, and all depending from a single Unity, +which is the supreme Good; for if all participate in the Good, it is +only in a manner that varies according to the nature of each. + + +IF THE GOOD BE A GENUS, IT MUST BE ONE OF THE POSTERIOR ONES. + +If you insist that the Good must be genus, we will grant it, as a +posterior genus; for it will be posterior to being. Now the existence +of (the Aristotelian) "essence,"[321] although it be always united to +Essence, is the Good itself; while the primary genera belong to Essence +for its own sake, and form "being." Hence we start to rise up to the +absolute Good, which is superior to Essence; for it is impossible for +essence and "being" not to be manifold; essence necessarily includes +the above-enumerated primary genera; it is the manifold unity. + + +IF THE EXCLUSIVE GOOD MEAN UNITY, A NEW GENUS WOULD BE UNNECESSARY. + +But if by Good we here mean the unity which lies in Essence, we would +not hesitate to acknowledge that the actualization by which Essence +aspires to Unity is its true good, and that that is the means by +which it receives the form of Good. Then the good of Essence is the +actualization by which it aspires to the Good; that act constitutes its +life; now this actualization is a movement, and we have already ranked +movement among the primary genera. (It is therefore useless to make a +new genus of "Good conceived as unity"). + + +BEAUTY IS TREATED SIMILARLY TO THE GOOD. + +18. As to the beautiful, if that be taken to mean the primary and +supreme Beauty, we would answer as about the Good, or at least, we +would make an analogous answer. If however we mean only the splendor +with which the Idea shines, it may be answered that that splendor +is not the same everywhere; and that, besides, it is something +posterior.[322] If the beautiful be considered as absolute Being, it +is then already comprised with the "Being" already considered (and +consequently does not form a separate genus[323]). If it be considered +in respect to us human beings, who are spectators, and if it be +explained as producing in us a certain emotion, such an actualization +is a movement; but if, on the contrary, it be explained as that +tendency which draws us to the beautiful, this still is a movement. + + +KNOWLEDGE IS EITHER A MOVEMENT OR SOMETHING COMPOSITE. + +Knowledge is pre-eminently movement; for it is the intuition of +essence; it is an actualization, and not a simple habit. It should, +therefore, also be reduced to movement.[299] It may also be reduced to +stability (if considered as a durable actualization); or rather, it +belongs to both genera. But if it belong to two different genera, it is +something of a blend; but anything blended is necessarily posterior (to +the elements which enter into the blend, and it cannot therefore either +be a primary genus). + + +INTELLIGENCE, JUSTICE, VIRTUES AND TEMPERANCE ARE NO GENERA. + +Intelligence is thinking essence, a composite of all genera, and not a +single genus. Veritable Intelligence is indeed essence connected with +all things; consequently it is all essence. As to essence considered +alone, it constitutes a genus, and is an element of Intelligence. +Last, justice, temperance, and in general all the virtues are so many +actualizations of Intelligence. They could not, therefore, rank amidst +the primary genera. They are posterior to a genus, and constitute +species. + + +ESSENCE DERIVES ITS DIFFERENCES FROM THE OTHER CO-ORDINATE CATEGORIES. + +19. Since these four categories (which complete essence, namely, +movement, stability, identity and difference) (with Essence as a fifth) +constitute the primary genera, it remains to be examined whether each +of them, by itself, can beget species; for instance, whether Essence, +entirely by itself, could admit divisions in which the other categories +would have no share whatever. No: for, in order to beget species, the +genus would have to admit differences derived from outside; these +differences would have to be properties belonging to Essence as such, +without however being Essence. But from where then would Essence have +derived them? Impossibly from what does not exist. If then they were +necessarily derived from that which exists, as only three other genera +of essences remain,[324] evidently, Essence must have derived its +differences from these genera, which associate themselves with Essence, +while yet enjoying a simultaneous existence. But from this very fact +that these genera enjoy an existence simultaneous (with Essence), they +serve to constitute it, as it is composed of the gathering of these +elements. How then could they be different from the whole that they +constitute? How do these genera make species out of all (these beings)? +How, for instance, could pure movement produce species of movement? +The same question arises in connection with the other genera. Besides, +we must avoid (two dangers:) losing each genus in its species, and, +on the other hand, reducing it to the state of a simple predicate, +by considering it only in its species. The genus must exist both in +its species and in itself. While blending (with the species), it must +in itself remain pure and unblended; for, if it should contribute to +"being" otherwise (by blending with its species), it would annihilate +itself. Such are the questions that must be examined. + + +INTELLIGENCE AS A COMPOSITE IS POSTERIOR TO THE CATEGORIES. + +Now, we have above posited certain premises. Intelligence, and even +every intelligence, includes within itself all (essences). We ranked +(Essence or Being) above all species that are parts thereof. Essence +is not yet Intelligence. From these it results that already developed +Intelligence is already something posterior. We shall therefore make +use of this study to achieve the goal we had set ourselves (namely, +to determine the relation of the genus to its contained species). We +shall therefore make use of Intelligence as an example to extend our +knowledge of this subject. + + +KNOWLEDGE IS THE ACTUALIZATION OF THE NOTIONS WHICH ARE POTENTIAL +SCIENCE. + +20. Let us, therefore, suppose that Intelligence was in a state in +which it did not yet attach itself to anything in particular, so that +it had not yet become an individual intelligence. Let us conceive it +similar to knowledge considered by itself before the notions of the +particular species, or to the knowledge of a species taken before +the notions of the contained parts. Universal Knowledge, without (in +actualization) being any particular notion, potentially lies within +all notions, and reciprocally, each particular notion is one single +thing in actualization, but all things in potentiality; likewise +with universal Knowledge. The notions which thus refer to a species +exist potentially in universal Knowledge, because, while applying +itself to a species, they potentially are also universal Knowledge. +Universal Knowledge is predicated of each particular notion, without +the particular notion being predicated of universal Knowledge; but +universal Knowledge must none the less subsist in itself without +blending (with anything else[325]). + + +INTELLIGENCE IS THE POTENTIALITY OF THE INTELLIGENCES WHICH ARE ITS +ACTUALIZATIONS. + +The case is similar with Intelligence. There is a kind of existence +of universal Intelligence, which is located above the particular +actualized intelligences, and is different from that of the particular +intelligences. These are filled with universal notions: universal +Intelligence furnishes to the particular intelligences the notions +they possess. It is the potentiality of these intelligences all of +which it contains in its universality; on their side, these, in their +particularity, contain universal Intelligence just as a particular +science implies universal science. The great Intelligence exists in +itself, and the particular intelligences also exist in themselves; +they are implied in universal Intelligence, just as this one is +implied in the particular intelligences. Each one of the particular +intelligences exists simultaneously in itself, and in something else +(in the universal Intelligence), just as universal Intelligence +exists simultaneously in itself and in all the others. In universal +Intelligence, which exists in itself, all particular intelligences +exist potentially, because it actually is all the intelligences, +and potentially each of them separately. On the contrary, these are +actualizations of the particular intelligences, and potentially +universal Intelligence. Indeed, so far as they are what is predicated +of them, they are actualizations of what is predicated; so far as +they exist in the genus that contains them, they are this genus +potentially.[326] Genus, as such, is potentially all the species it +embraces; it is none of them in actuality; but all are implied therein. +So far as genus is in actualization what exists before the species, it +is the actualization of the things which are not particular. As occurs +in the species, these particular things achieve such actualization only +by the actualization which emanates from the genus, and which, with +regard to them, acts as cause. + + +HOW INTELLIGENCE, THOUGH ONE, PRODUCES PARTICULAR THINGS. + +21. How then does Intelligence, though remaining one, by Reason produce +particular things? This really amounts to asking how the inferior +genera derive from the four Genera. We shall then have to scrutinize +how this great and ineffable Intelligence, which does not make use +of speech, but which is entire intelligence, intelligence of all, +universal, and not particular or individual intelligence, contains all +the things which proceed therefrom. + +(Of the essences it contains) it possesses the number, as it is both +one and many. It is many, that is, (it is) many potentialities, which +are admirable powers, full of force and greatness, because they are +pure; powers that are vigorous and veritable because they have no goal +at which they are forced to stop; consequently being infinite, that +is, supreme Infinity, and Greatness. If then we were to scrutinize +this greatness and beauty of being, if by the splendor and light +which surround it, we were to distinguish what Intelligence contains, +then would we see the efflorescing of quality. With the continuity +of actualization we would behold greatness, in quiescent condition. +As we have seen one (number), two (quality), and three (greatness), +greatness, as the third thing, presents itself with universal quantity. +Now, as soon as quality and quantity show themselves to us, they unite, +blend into one and the same figure (outward appearance). Then comes +difference, which divides quality and quantity, whence arise different +qualities, and differences of figure. The presence of identity produces +equality, and that of difference, inequality, both in quantity, number, +and dimension; hence the circle, the quadrilateral, and the figures +composed of unequal things; hence numbers that are similar, and +different, even and uneven. + + +THIS INTELLECTUAL LIFE POSSESSES THE REASONS OR IDEAS. + +Thus intellectual Life, which is the perfect actualization, embraces +all the things that our mind now conceives, and all intellectual +operations. In its potentiality it contains all things as essences, +in the same manner as Intelligence does. Now Intelligence possesses +them by thought, a thought which is not discursive (but intuitive). +The intellectual life therefore possesses all the things of which +there are "reasons" (that is, ideas); itself is a single Reason, +great, perfect, which contains all reasons,[327] which examines them +in an orderly fashion, beginning with the first, or rather, which has +ever examined them, so that one could never really tell that it was +examining them.[328] For all things that we grasp by ratiocination, +in whatever part soever of the universe they may be located, are +found as intuitively possessed by Intelligence. It would seem as if +it was Essence itself which, (being identical with Intelligence), had +made Intelligence reason thus (by producing its conceptions),[329] +as appears to happen in the ("seminal) reasons" which produce the +animals.[330] In the (ideas, that is in the "seminal) reasons" which +are anterior to ratiocination, all things are found to possess a +constitution such that the most penetrating intelligence would have +considered best, by reasoning.[331] We should therefore expect (great +and wonderful things) of these Ideas, superior and anterior to Nature +and ("seminal) reasons." There Intelligence fuses with "Being;"[329] +neither in essence nor intelligence is there anything adventitious. +There everything is smoothly perfect, since everything there is +conformable to intelligence. All Essence is what Intelligence demands; +it is consequently veritable primary Essence; for if it proceeded from +some other (source), this also would be Intelligence. + + +FROM ESSENCE ARE BORN ALL LIVING ORGANISMS. + +Thus Essence reveals within itself all the Forms and universality. This +could not have been particular; for it could not be single, the double +presence of difference and identity demanding it to be simultaneously +one and many. Since, from its very origin, Essence is one and many, all +the species it contains must consequently simultaneously contain unity +and plurality, revealing dimensions, qualities, and different figures; +for it is impossible that Essence should lack anything, or should +not be complete universality; for it would no longer be universal, +if it were not complete. Life, therefore, penetrates every thing; is +everywhere present within it. Hence results that from that Life must +have been born all living organisms, for since matter and quality are +found within their bodies, these also are not lacking. Now, as all +living organisms are born within it, and have ever subsisted within it, +they were essentially embraced within eternity, yet, taken separately, +each of them is a different essence. Taken together they form a unity. +Consequently, the complex and synthetic totality of all these living +organisms is Intelligence, which, thus containing all (beings), is the +perfect and essential living Organism. When Intelligence allows itself +to be contemplated by what derives existence from it, Intelligence +appears thereto as the intelligible, and receives this predicate +properly and truly.[332] + + +THUS INTELLIGENCE BEGETS WORLD SOUL AND INDIVIDUAL SOULS. + +22. This was what Plato meant, when he said, enigmatically, +"Intelligence contemplates the Ideas contained within the perfect +living Organism; it sees what they are, and to how many they +amount."[333] Indeed, the (universal) Soul, which ranks immediately +after Intelligence, possesses the Ideas in herself inasmuch as she is +a soul; but she sees them better in the Intelligence which is above +her.[334] Likewise, our own intelligence, which also contains the +ideas, sees them better when it contemplates them in the superior +Intelligence; for, in itself, it can only see; but in the superior +Intelligence it sees that it sees.[335] Now this intelligence that +contemplates the ideas is not separated from the superior Intelligence, +for it proceeds therefrom; but as it is the plurality that has +proceeded from the unity, because it adds difference (to identity), +it becomes manifold unity. Being thus both unity and plurality, +Intelligence, by virtue of its multiple nature, produces the plurality +(of beings). Besides, it would be impossible to discover therein +anything that was numerically unitary, or anything that might be called +individual. Whatever be contemplated in it, it is always a form, for +it contains no matter. That is why, again, Plato, referring to this +truth, said that "being" was divided to infinity.[336] Descending from +genus to species, we have not yet arrived at infinity; for that which +thus arises is defined by the species that have been begotten by a +genus; the name of infinity applies better to the last species, which +can no longer be divided into species. That is why (as Plato teaches), +"when one has arrived at individuals, they must be abandoned to +infinity."[337] Thus, the individuals are infinite so far as they are +considered in themselves; but, in so far as they are embraced by unity, +they are reduced to a number. + +Intelligence therefore embraces what comes after it, the Soul; so that +the Soul, till the last of her powers, is contained by a number; as to +the last power (matter), it is entirely infinite[338] Considered in +this condition (where, turning towards what is below it, it begets the +Soul), Intelligence is a part (because it applies itself to something +particular), though it possess all things, and though, in itself, it +be universal; the intelligences which compose it are each a part (each +constituting a particular intelligence by virtue of the actualization +of Intelligence which exists (and thus exists in itself). As to the +Soul, she is the part of a part (that is, a part of the Intelligence +which itself is a part, as has just been said), but exists by virtue +of the actualization of the Intelligence which acts outside of itself. +Indeed, when Intelligence acts in itself, the actualizations it +produces are the other intelligences; when it acts outside of itself, +it produces the Soul. When in her turn, the Soul acts as genus or +species, she begets the other souls which are her species. These souls +themselves have two actualizations; the one, directed towards what is +above them, constitutes their intelligence; the other, directed towards +what is below them, gives birth to the other rational powers, and even +to a last power which is in contact with matter, and which fashions +it.[339] The inferior part of the soul does not hinder the whole +remainder from remaining in the superior region.[340] Besides, this +inferior part is only the very image of the soul; it is not separated +from her,[341] but it resembles the image reflected by a mirror, an +image which persists only so long as the model remains before the +mirror. What should be our conception of the model placed before the +mirror? Down through what is immediately above the image (that is, down +through the soul herself), we have the intelligible world, composed +of all the intelligible entities, where everything is perfect. The +sense-world is no more than the imitation thereof, and it imitates +that intelligible world so far as it can, in that it itself is a +living organism which is the image of the perfect living Organism. The +sense-world imitates it as the portrait that is painted, or reflected +by the surface of water reproduces the person situated before the +painter, or above the water. This portrait obtained by the painting, or +reflected by the surface of the water is not the image of the composite +which constitutes the man (the soul and body), but of one or two parts +only, the body which was fashioned by the soul. Likewise, therefore, +the sense-world, which was made to resemble the intelligible world, +offers us images, not of its creator, but of the (essences) contained +within its creator, among which is man, along with all other animals. +Now, in common with its creator, each living organism possesses life, +though each possess it differently; both, besides, equally form part of +the intelligible world. + + + + +SIXTH ENNEAD, BOOK THREE. + +Plotino's Own Sense-Categories. + + +GENERA OF THE PHYSICAL ARE DIFFERENT FROM THOSE OF THE INTELLIGIBLE. + +1. We have thus declared our views about (intelligible) Being, and +shown how they agree with the doctrines of Plato. Now we have to study +the "other nature" (the Being of the sense-world); and we shall have +to consider whether it be proper to establish here the same genera as +for the intelligible world, or to posit a greater number, by adding +some to those already recognized; or whether the genera differ in each +being entirely, or only partially, some remaining identical, while +others differ. If any of them be identical in both beings, that can be +understood only by analogy;[343] that is what will become evident when +each of these beings are fully understood. + + +THE WORLD MUST BE STUDIED, JUST AS ONE WOULD ANALYZE THE VOICE. + +This is by what we must begin. Having to speak of sense-objects, and +knowing that all of them are contained in this world here below, +we must first scrutinize this world, establish within it divisions +according to the nature of the (beings) which compose it, and then +distribute them into genera, just as we would do if we had to analyze +the voice whose nature is infinite (by the diversity of sounds it +produces), reducing it to a definite number of kinds.[344] Observing +the elements common to many sounds, we would reduce them to one unity, +then, to a superior unity, further to a supreme unity, in which these +sounds appear as a small number of classes. Then, the elements common +to these individuals would be called "species," and that common to +various species would be called a genus. As to the voice, it is easy +enough to discover each species, to reduce all the species to unity, +and to predicate of all of them (as highest genus or category) the +general element, the voice. But an analysis as summary as this is +impossible with the (more complicated universe). In the sense-world we +will have to recognize several genera, which will differ from those of +the intelligible world, since the sense-world itself differs from the +intelligible world so much that it is not its counterpart, but only its +image, whose only element common (to its model) is the name. + + +WE MUST FIRST DISSECT AWAY THE SOUL FROM THE BODY, TO EXAMINE IT. + +As here below in the "mixture" (or blend, the soul), and the +composition (the body) (which form our nature) there are two parts, +soul and body, the totality of which forms the living organism;[345] +as the nature of the soul belongs to the intelligible world, and +consequently does not belong to the same order of things as the +sense-world, we shall, however difficult it may be, have to separate +the soul[346] from the sense-objects which we are here alone to +consider. (We shall illustrate this by a parable). He who would wish +to classify the inhabitants of a town according to their dignities and +professions, would have to leave aside the foreign residents. As to the +passions which arise from the union of the soul with the body, or, that +the soul experiences because of the body,[347] we shall later examine +how they should be classified.[348] This however must follow our study +of the sense-objects. + + +WHAT IS BEING IN THE INTELLIGIBLE IS GENERATION IN THE SENSE-WORLD. + +2. First let us consider what mundane name "Being" must be applied to. +To begin with, it must be explained that physical nature can receive +the name of "being" only as a figure of speech;[343] or rather, should +not receive it at all, since it implies the idea of perpetual flowing +(that is, change[349]); so, the more suitable denomination would be +"generation."[350] We shall also have to acknowledge that the things +that belong to generation are very different; nevertheless all bodies, +some simple (such, as elements), the others composite as mixtures), +together with their accidents and effects, must, during the process of +classification, be reduced to a single genus. + +In bodies, one may besides distinguish on one hand matter, on the +other, the form imprinted thereon; and we designate each of these +separately as a genus, or subsume both under a unity, inasmuch as +we designate both by the common label[343] of "being," or rather, +"generation." But what is the common element in matter and form? +In what manner, and of what is matter a genus? For what difference +inheres in matter? In what sequence could we incorporate that which is +composed of both? But in the case that that which is composed of both +be itself corporeal being, while neither of the two is a body, how then +could either be incorporated in a single genus, or within the same +genus along with the compound of both? How (could this incorporation +into a single genus be effected with) the elements of some object and +the object itself? To answer that we should begin by the (composite) +bodies: which would be tantamount to learning to read by beginning with +syllables (and not with letters). + + +CAN WE ANALYZE THIS WORLD BY ANALOGY WITH THE INTELLIGIBLE? + +Let us now grant that symmetrical analysis by individual objects is +impossible. Might we not, as a means of classification, then employ +analogy? In this case the (intelligible, higher) "being" would here be +represented by matter; and movement above, by form here, which would +thus quicken and perfect matter. The inertia of matter would correspond +to rest above, while the (intelligible) identity and difference would +correspond to our earthly manifold resemblance and differences.[351] +(Such an analogic method would misrepresent the state of affairs +in this world). To begin with, matter does not receive form as its +life or actualization, but (form) approaches and informs (matter) as +something foreign (form deriving from being, while matter is only a +deception; so that there is no kinship between them). Then in the +(intelligible world) form is an actualization and motion, while here +below movement is different, being accidental; we might far rather +call form the halting or rest of matter, for form defines that which +in itself is indefinite (unlimited). There (in the intelligible world) +identity and difference refer to a single essence, which is both +identical and different. Here below, essence differs only relatively, +by participation (in the difference) for it is something identical and +different, not by consequence, as above, but here below, by nature. As +to stability, how could it be attributed to matter, which assumes all +dimensions, which receives all its forms from without, without itself +ever being able to beget anything by means of these forms? Such a +division, therefore, will have to be given up. + + +PHYSICAL CATEGORIES ARE MATTER, FORM, COMBINATION, ATTRIBUTES AND +ACCIDENTS. + +3. What classification shall we adopt? There is first matter, then +form, and further the combination which results from their blending. +Then we have a number of conceptions which refer to the three preceding +classes, and are predicated of them; the first, simply, as attributes; +the others, besides, as accidents. Among the latter, some are contained +within the things, while others contain them; some of them are actions, +and the others experiences (passions) or their consequences. + + +THE THREE FIRST PHYSICAL CATEGORIES OF MATTER, FORM AND COMBINATION. + +Matter is something common which is found in all things;[352] +nevertheless it does not form a genus because it does not admit of any +differences, unless its differences consist in appearing in different +forms; as, here, fire, and there, air. Philosophers who consider that +matter is a genus base this opinion on the fact that matter is common +to all the things in which it exists, or that it stands in the relation +of the whole to the parts of particular objects (or, "matters"). In +this case, however, the term "genus" would be used in a sense differing +from the one it bears usually. It would then be no more than an only +or single element, if we admit that an element can be a genus. If, +conceiving that matter is united to matter, or exists within it, we add +form to matter, matter would thereby be differentiated from the other +forms, but it will not comprehend every being-like form. Were we to +call the generating principle of being "form," and were we to call the +reason which constitutes the form "being-like reason," we shall not +yet have clearly defined the nature of "being." Finally, if we give the +name of "being" only to the combination of matter and form, the result +will be that neither of these two (matter or form taken separately) +will themselves be "being." If, however, we were to assert that not +only their combination, but also each of them separately were "being," +we then would be faced with the problem of what is common to all three. + + +DIFFERENT PHYSICAL CATEGORIES. + +As to the things which are simply posited as attributes, they should, +as principles or elements, be classified under relation. Among the +accidents of things, some, like quantity and quality, are contained +within them; while others contain them, as time and place. Then there +are actions and experiences, as movements; then their consequences, as +"being in time," and "being in place"; the latter is the consequence of +the combination, the former is the consequence of movement. + + +FIVE PHYSICAL CATEGORIES. + +We decide, therefore, that the three first things (matter, form, and +their combination) contribute to the formation of a single genus, +which, by a figure of speech, we call ("corporeal) Being," a genus +which is common to them, and whose name applies to all three. Then +come the other genera; such as relation, quantity and quality; the +(relation of) being "contained in place," and "in time"; movement; and +place and time. But as the category of "time" and "place" would render +superfluous that of "being in place" and of "being in time,"[353] we +should limit ourselves to the recognition of five genera, of which the +first ("being") comprises matter, form and the combination.[354] If, +however, we should not count matter, form and combination as a single +genus, our analysis will assume the following shape: matter, form, +combination, relation, quantity, quality, and movement. Otherwise, the +latter three might be subsumed under relation, which possesses more +extension than they. + + +SENSE-BEING. + +4. What is the common element in these three things (matter, form and +their combination)? What constitutes their (sublunary, mundane or) +earthly "being"? Is it because matter, form and their combination +form a foundation for other things? In that case, as matter is the +foundation, or seat of form, then form will not be in the genus of +"being." But, as the combination also forms foundation for other +things, then form united to matter will be the subject of the +combinations, or rather, of all the things which are posterior to the +combination, as quantity, quality, and movement. + + +BEING IS THAT WHICH IS PREDICATED OF NOTHING ELSE. + +It would seem that (physical) "being" is that which is not predicated +of anything else;[355] for whiteness and blackness may, for instance, +be predicated of some white or black subject. Likewise with the idea +of "doubleness";--I mean here not the doubleness which is the opposite +of one half, but the doubleness predicated of some subject, as when +one says "this wood is double." So also paternity, and science, are +attributes of another subject, of which that is said. So space is that +which limits, and time that which measures something else. But fire, +or wood considered as such, are not attributes. Neither are Socrates, +nor composite being (composed of matter and form), nor form which is +in the "being," because it is not a modification of any other subject. +Indeed, form is not an attribute of matter; it is an element of the +combination. "Man" and "form of man" are one and the same thing.[356] +Matter also is an element of the combination; under this respect, it +may be predicated of a subject, but this subject is identical with +itself. On the contrary, whiteness, considered in itself, exists only +in the subject of which it may be predicated. Consequently, the thing +which exists only in the subject of which it is predicated is not +(physical) "being."[356] "Being," on the contrary, is that which is +what it is by itself. In case it form part of some subject, then it +completes the combination; whose elements exist each in itself, and +which are predicated of the combination only in a condition other than +that of existing in it. Considered as a part, "being" is relative to +something other than itself; but considered in itself, in its nature, +in what it is, it is not predicable of anything.[357] + + +PHYSICAL BEING IS THE PRINCIPLE OF ALL OTHER THINGS. + +To be a subject is then a property common to matter, to form, and +to the combination. But this function of subject is fulfilled +differently by matter in respect to form, and by form in respect to +the modifications, and by the combination; or rather, matter is not a +subject in respect to form; form is the complement which completes it +when it still is only matter, and when it exists only potentially.[358] +To speak strictly, form is not in matter; for when one thing forms only +a unity with something else, one cannot say that one is in the other +(as some accident in its subject). Only when both are taken together +do matter and form form a subject for other things;[359] thus Man +in general, and a particular man constitute the subject of passive +modifications; they are anterior to the actions and consequences which +relate to them. "Being" therefore is the principle from which all other +things derive, and by which they exist; that to which all passive +modifications relate, and from which all actions proceed.[360] + + +RELATION BETWEEN PHYSICAL AND INTELLIGIBLE TERMS ARE MERELY VERBAL. + +5. Such are the characteristics of sense-being. If in any way they also +suit intelligible "being," it is only by analogy,[343] or by figure +of speech (homonymy).[361] So, for instance, the "first" is so called +in respect of the remainder; for it is not absolutely first, but only +in respect to the things which hold an inferior rank; far more, the +things which follow the first are also called first in respect to those +which follow. Likewise, in speaking of intelligible things, the word +"subject" is used in a different sense. It may also be doubted that +they suffer ("experience"), and it is evident that if they do suffer, +it is in an entirely different manner.[362] + + +PHYSICAL BEING IS THAT WHICH IS NOT IN A SUBJECT. + +Not to be in a subject is then the common characteristic of all +"being," if, by "not being in a subject," we mean "not to form part +of any subject," and "not to contribute to the formation of a unity +therewith." Indeed, that which contributes to the formation of a +composite being, with something else, could not be in that thing as +in a subject; form therefore is not in matter as in a subject, and +neither is "man" in Socrates as in a subject, because "man" forms part +of Socrates.[363] Thus, "being" is that which is not in a subject. +If we add that "being" is not predicated of any subject, we must also +add, "insofar as this subject is something different from itself;" +otherwise "man," predicated of some one man, would not be comprised +within the definition of "being," if (in asserting that "being" is not +predicated of any subject), we did not add, "so far as this subject +is something different from itself." When I say, "Socrates is a man," +I am practically saying, "White is white," and not, "wood is white." +While actually asserting that "Socrates is a man," I am asserting that +a particular man is a man, and to say "The man who is in Socrates is a +man," amounts to saying "Socrates is Socrates," or, "that particular +reasonable living organism is a living organism." + + +ALL THE OTHER PHYSICAL CATEGORIES REFER TO MATTER, FORM OR COMBINATION. + +It might however be objected that the property of "being" does not +consist in being a subject; for the difference (as, for instance, a +biped), is also one of those things which are not in a subject.[363] If +"biped" be considered as a part of being, we are compelled to recognize +that "biped" is not in a subject; but if by "biped" we do not mean some +particular "being" but the property of being a biped, then we are no +longer speaking of a being, but of a quality, and "biped" will be in a +subject. + +But time and place do not seem to be in a subject! If we define time as +"the measure of movement,"[364] (there are two possibilities). First, +time might be measured movement; and then it will be in movement as in +a subject, while movement itself will be in the moved thing. Or, time +will be what measures (the soul, or the present moment), and then it +will be in what measures as in a subject. As to space, as it is the +limit of what contains, it will also reside in what contains.[365] It +is otherwise with the "being" that we are here considering. "Being," +then, will have to be considered as consisting in either one, or in +several, or in all the properties of which we are speaking; because +these properties simultaneously suit matter, form, and the combination. + + +BEING DRAWS ITS EXISTENCE FROM THE INTELLIGIBLE. + +6. It may perhaps be objected that we have here indicated the +properties of "being," but we have not described its nature. Such a +request amounts to asking to see what sense-being is; now sense-being +is, and "being" is not something which can be seen. + +What then? Are fire and water not beings? Doubtless, they are. But are +they beings merely because they are visible? No. Is it because they +contain matter? No. Is it because they have a form? No. Is it because +they are combinations? No. They are "beings," because they "are." + +But one can also say that quantity, as well as that quality "is!" Yes, +doubtless, but if we speak thus about quantity and quality, it is only +by a figure of speech.[343],[361], [366] + +Then, in what consists the being of earth, fire, and other similar +things? What is the difference between the being of these things and +of others? The essence of the earth, of the fire, and so forth, exists +in an absolute manner, while the essence of other things (is relative) +and for instance, means merely being white. "Is" added to white is not +the same thing as "essence" taken absolutely; is it? Certainly not. +Essence taken absolutely is essence in the first degree; "to be" added +to white, is essence by participation, essence in the second degree; +for "to be," added to white, makes white an essence; and white added +to essence makes the being white; that is why white is an accident for +essence, and "to be" an accident to white. It is not the same thing as +if we said, Socrates is white, and, the White is Socrates; for in both +cases Socrates is the same being; but it is not thus with whiteness; +for, in the second case, Socrates is contained in the white, and in +the first case, white is a pure accident. When we say, the being is +white, the white is an accident of being; but when we say, the White +is essence, the white contains essence. In short, white possesses +existence only because it refers to "being," and is in "being." It +is therefore from "being" that it receives its existence. On the +contrary, essence draws its existence from itself; and from white it +receives whiteness, not because it is in the white, but because the +white is within it.[366] As the essence which is in the sense-world is +not Essence by itself, we must say that it draws its existence from +the veritable Essence, in itself; and, finally, the White in itself +possesses essence because it participates in the intelligible Essence. + + +BEING CANNOT BE ASCRIBED TO MATTER, WHICH DERIVES ITS BEING FROM THE +INTELLIGIBLE. + +7. If somebody should object that material things derive their essence +from matter, we should have to ask from whence matter itself draws its +essence and existence; for we have elsewhere demonstrated that matter +does not hold the first rank.[367] + +If, however, it be further objected, that the other things could not +exist without being in matter, we will answer that that is true only +for sense-things. But if matter be anterior to sense-things, that does +not hinder itself being posterior to many other things, and to all +intelligible things; for the existence of matter is far more obscure +than the things in matter, if these things be ("seminal) reasons," +which participate deeper in essence, while matter is completely +irrational, being an adumbration, and a decay of reason.[368] + +It may further be objected that matter gives essence to material +things, as Socrates gives essence to the white that is in him. We will +answer that what possesses a superior degree of Essence may well confer +a lesser degree of essence to what possesses a still inferior degree +thereof, but that the reciprocal or converse condition is impossible. +Now, as form is more essence than matter,[369] essence cannot be +predicated equally of matter and form, and "being" is not a genus whose +species is matter, form and the combination.[370] These three things +have several common characteristics, as we have already said, but +they differ in respect to essence; for when something which possesses +a superior degree of essence approaches something which possesses an +inferior degree (as when form approaches matter), this thing, although +anterior in (the ontological) order, is posterior in respect to being; +consequently, if matter, form and the combination be not "beings" +equally, no longer is being for them something common, like a genus. +Nevertheless, "being" will be in a less narrow relation with things +which are posterior to matter, to form, and to the combination, though +it gives each of them the property of belonging to themselves. It is +thus that life has different degrees, one stronger, the other weaker, +and that the images of a same object are some more lively, others more +obscure.[371] If essence be measured by a lower degree of essence, and +if the superior degree which exists in other things be omitted, essence +thus considered will be a common element. But that is not a good way of +procedure. Indeed, each whole differs from the others, and the lesser +degree of essence does not constitute something that was common to all; +just as, for life, there is not something common to vegetative life, to +sensitive life, and rational life.[371] + + +ESSENCES DIFFER ACCORDING TO PARTICIPATION IN FORM. + +Consequently, essence differs both in matter and in form; and these two +(entities) depend from a third (intelligible Being), which communicates +itself to them unequally. The anterior Being possesses a better nature +("essence") than any posterior being, not only when the second proceeds +from the first, and the third from the second; but when two things +proceed from one and the same thing, the same (condition of affairs) +may be observed. Thus does the clay (when fashioned by the potter) +become a tile not only according as it participates in the fire more +or less (is more or less thoroughly baked). Besides, matter and form +do not proceed from the same intelligible principle;[372] for the +intelligibles also differ among each other. + + +DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MATTER AND FORM DUE TO THAT OF INTELLIGIBLE ENTITIES +FROM WHICH THEY DEPEND. + +8. Besides, it is not necessary to divide the combination in form and +matter, now that we speak of sense-being, a "being" which has to be +perceived by the senses, rather than by reason. Neither is it necessary +to add of what this being is composed; for the elements which compose +it are not beings, or at least not sense-beings. What has to be done +here is to embrace in a single genus what is common to stone, to earth, +to water, and to the things compounded of them; namely, to plants and +animals so far as they respond to sensation. In this way, we shall +consider both form and matter; for sense-being contains them both. Thus +fire, earth, and their intermediaries are both matter and form; as to +the combinations, they contain several beings united together. What +then is the common characteristic of all these beings, which separates +them from other things? They serve as subjects to other things, and are +not contained in one subject, and do not belong to something else;[373] +in short, all the characteristics we have enumerated above suit +sense-being. + + +SENSE-BEING CONSISTS IN THE REUNION OF QUALITIES AND MATTER. + +But how shall we separate the accidents from sense-being, if it have +no existence without dimension or quality? Of what will sense-being +consist, if we remove from it dimension, figure (or outward +appearance), color, dryness, and humidity? For sense-beings are +qualified. The qualities which change simple into qualified "being" +refer to something. Thus, it is not the entire fire which is being, +but something of the fire, one of its parts. Now what is this part, if +it be not matter? Sense-being, therefore, consists in the reunion of +quality and matter; and being is constituted by the totality of these +things blended in a single matter. Each thing taken separately will be +quality or quantity, and so forth; but the thing whose absence makes +"being" incomplete is a part of that being. As to the thing which is +added to already complete being, it has its own place;[374] and it is +not lost in the blending which constitutes "being." I do not say that +such a thing, taken with others, is a being when it completes a matter +of some particular size and quality, and that it is no more than a +quality when it does not complete this mass; I say that even here below +not everything is "being," and that only the totality which embraces +everything is "being." Let none complain that we are constituting +"being" as of that which is not being; for even the totality is not +a veritable "being." (Here this word is used in both sensual and +intelligible senses, as a pun), and only offers the image of the +veritable (Being), which possesses essence independently of all that +refers to it, and itself produces the other things because it possesses +veritable (Existence). Here below the substrate possesses essence only +incompletely, and, far from producing other things, is sterile; it is +only an adumbration, and onto this adumbration are reflected images +which have only the appearance (instead of real existence.)[375] + + +CLASSIFICATION OF BODIES. + +9. So much then for what we had to say of sense-being, and the genus it +constitutes. It remains to analyze it into species. Every sense-being +is a body; but there are elementary and organized bodies; the former +are fire, earth, water and air; the organized bodies are those of +plants and animals, which are distinguished from each other by their +forms. The earth and the other elements may be divided into species. +Plants and bodies of animals may be classified according to their +forms; or we could classify apart the terrestrial animals, that inhabit +the earth, and those which belong to some other element. We might also +analyze bodies into those that are light, heavy, or intermediary; the +heavy bodies remaining in the middle of the world, the light bodies in +the superior region which surrounds the world, and the intermediary +bodies dwelling in the intermediary region. In each one of these +regions the bodies are distinguished by their exterior appearance (or, +figure); thus there exist the bodies of the (stars, or) celestial +bodies, and then those that belong to particular elements. After having +distributed the bodies according to the four elements, they could be +blended together in some other manner, and thus beget their mutual +differences of location, forms, and mixtures. Bodies could also be +distinguished as fiery, terrestrial, and so forth, according to their +predominating element. + + +PRIMARY AND SECONDARY BEINGS ARE DIVIDED BY NO SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE. + +As to the distinction drawn between primary and secondary being,[376] +it must be admitted that some particular fire, and the universal Fire +differ from each other in this, that the one is individual, and the +other universal; but the difference between them does not seem to +be essential. Indeed, does the genus of quality contain both White, +and a particular white; or Grammar, and some particular grammatical +science? How far does Grammatical science then have less reality than +some particular grammatical science, and Science, than some particular +science? Grammatical science is not posterior to some particular +grammatical science; Grammatical science must already have existed +before the existence of the grammatical science in you, since the +latter is some grammatical science because it is found in you; it is +besides identical with universal Grammatical science. Likewise, it +is not Socrates that caused him who was not a man to become a man; +it is rather the universal Man who enabled Socrates to be a man; for +the individual man is man by participation in the universal Man. What +then is Socrates, if not some man? In what does such a man contribute +to render "being" more "being"? If the answer be that he contributes +thereto by the fact that the universal Man is only a form, while a +particular man is a form in matter, the result will only be that a +particular man will be less of a man; for reason (that is, essence) is +weaker when it is in matter. If the universal Man consist not only in +form itself, but is also in matter, in what will he be inferior to the +form of the man who is in matter, since it will be the reason of the +man which is in matter? By its nature the universal is anterior, and +consequently the form is anterior to the individual. Now that which +by its nature is anterior is an absolute anterior. How then would the +universal be less in being? Doubtless the individual, being better +known to us, is anterior for us; but no difference in the things +themselves results.[377] Besides, if we were to admit the distinction +between primary and secondary beings, the definition of "being" would +no longer be one; for that which is first and that which is second are +not comprised under one single definition, and do not form a single and +same genus. + + +BODIES MAY BE CLASSIFIED NOT ONLY BY FORMS; BUT BY QUALITIES; ETC. + +10. Bodies may also be distinguished by heat or dryness, wetness +or cold, or in any other desired manner, by taking two qualities +simultaneously, then considering these things as a composition and +mixture, and ceasing at the combination thereof. Or, bodies may be +divided in terrestrial bodies, that dwell on the earth, or distribute +them according to their forms, and the differences of animals; by +classifying not the animals themselves, but their bodies, which are +their instruments,[378] as it were. It is proper to establish a +classification according to the forms, as it is equally reasonable +to classify bodies according to their qualities, such as heat, cold, +and so forth. If it be objected that bodies are constituted rather +by their qualities, it may be answered that they are just as much +classified by their blends, their colors, and their figures. When +analyzing sense-being, it is not unreasonable to classify it according +to the differences that appear to the senses.[379] This ("being") does +not possess absolute (Essence); it is the totality of the matter and +qualities which constitutes the sense-being, since we have said that +its hypostatic existence consists in the union of the things perceived +by the senses, and that it is according to the testimony of their +senses that men believe in the existence of things. + + +BODIES ARE CLASSIFIABLE ACCORDING TO SPECIFIC FORMS. + +The composition of the bodies being varied, they may also be classified +according to the specific forms of the animals. Such, for instance, +would be the specific form of a man united to a body; for this form +is a quality of body, and it is reasonable to analyze it according to +the qualities. If it should be objected that we have said above that +some bodies are simple, while others are composite, thus contrasting +the simple and the composite, we shall answer that, without regarding +their composition, we have also said that they are either brute or +organized. The classification of bodies should not be founded on the +contrast between the simple and the composite, but, as we first did, we +may classify the simple bodies in the first rank. Then, by considering +their blendings, one may start from another principle to determine the +differences offered by the composites under the respect of their figure +or their location; thus, for instance, bodies might be classified +in celestial and terrestrial. This may close our consideration of +sense-being, or generation. + + +DEFINITION OF QUANTITY. + +11. Let us now pass to quantity and quantitatives. When treating +of quantity, we have already said that it consists in number and +dimension, in so far as some thing possesses such a quantity, that +is, in the number of material things, and in the extension of the +subject.[380] Here indeed we are not treating of abstract quantity, +but of a quantity which causes a piece of wood to measure three feet, +or that horses are five in number. Consequently, as we have said, +we should call extension and number (considered from the concrete +viewpoint) "quantitatives"; but this name could could be applied +neither to time nor space; time, being the measure of movement,[381] +re-enters into relation; and place, being that which contains +the body,[382] consists of a manner of being, and consequently, +in a relation. (So much the less should we call time and place +"quantitatives," as) movement, though continuous, does not either +belong to the genus of quantity. + + +LARGE AND SMALL ARE CONCEPTIONS BELONGING TO QUANTITY. + +Should "large" and "small" be classified within the genus of quantity? +Yes: for the large is large by a certain dimension, and dimension is +not a relation. As to "greater" and "smaller," they belong to relation; +for a thing is greater or smaller in relation to something else, just +as when it is double. Why then do we sometimes say that a mountain is +large, and that a grain of millet is small? When we say that a mountain +is small, we use the latter term instead of smaller; for they who +use this expression themselves acknowledge that they call a mountain +small only by comparing it to other mountains, which implies that here +"little" stands for "smaller." Likewise, when we say that a grain of +millet is large, this does not mean "large" in any absolute sense, but +large only for a grain of millet; which implies that one compares it to +things of the same kind, and that here "large" means "larger."[383] + + +BEAUTY IS CLASSIFIED ALONG WITH THE RELATIVES. + +Why then do we not also classify the beautiful among the relatives? +Because beauty is such by itself, because it constitutes a quality, +while "more beautiful" is a relative. Nevertheless the thing which is +called beautiful would sometimes appear ugly, if it were compared to +some other, as, for instance, if we were to contrast the beauty of men +with that of the gods; hence the expression (of Heraclitus's[384]): +"The most beautiful of monkeys would be ugly if compared with an animal +of a different kind." When beauty is predicated of something, it is +considered in itself; it might perhaps be called more beautiful or more +ugly if it were compared to another. Hence it results that, in the +genus of which we are treating, an object is in itself great because of +the presence of greatness, but not in respect to some other. Otherwise, +we would be obliged to deny that a thing was beautiful because of +the existence of some more beautiful one. Neither therefore must we +deny that a thing is great because there is only one greater than it; +for "greater" could not exist without "great," any more than "more +beautiful" without "beautiful." + + +QUANTITY ADMITS OF CONTRARIES (POLEMIC AGAINST ARISTOTLE).[385] + +12. It must therefore be admitted that quantity admits of contraries. +Even our thought admits of contraries when we say "great" and "small," +since we then conceive of contraries, as when we say, "much and +little"; for much and little are in the same condition as great and +small. Sometimes it is said, "At home there are many people," and by +this is intended a (relatively) great number; for in the latter case +it is a relative. Likewise it is said, "There are few people in the +theatre," instead of saying, "there are less people," (relatively); +but when one uses the word "many" a great multitude in number must be +understood. + + +HOW MULTITUDE IS CLASSIFIED WITH RELATIVES. + +How then is multitude classified among relatives? It forms part of +relatives in that multitude is an extension of number, while its +contrary is a contraction. Likewise is it with continuous dimension; we +conceive of it as prolonged. Quantity therefore has a double origin: +progression of unity, and of the point. If either progression cease +promptly, the first one produces "little," and the second, "small." +If both be prolonged, they produce "much," and "large." What then is +the limit that determines these things? The same question may be asked +about the beautiful, and about warmth; for there is also "warmer"; +only, the latter is a relative, while Warm, taken absolutely, is a +quality. As there is a "reason" of the beautiful (a reason that would +produce and determine the beautiful), likewise there must be a reason +for the Great, a reason by participation in which an object becomes +great, as the reason of the Beautiful makes beautiful. Such are the +things for which quantity admits contraries. + + +THERE IS NO CONTRARY FOR PLACE. + +For space, there is no contrary, because strictly space does not belong +to the genus of quantity. Even if space were part of quantity, "high" +would not be the contrary of anything unless the universe contained +also "low." The terms high and low, applied to parts, signify only +higher and lower than something else. It is so also with right and +left, which are relatives. + + +CLASSIFICATION OF SYLLABLES AND SPEECH. + +Syllables and speech are quantitatives; they might be subjects in +respect to quantity, but only so by accident. Indeed, the voice, by +itself, is a movement,[386] it must therefore be reduced to movement +and action. + + +DISCRETE QUANTITY QUITE DISTINCT FROM CONTINUOUS QUANTITY. + +13. We have already explained that discrete quantity is clearly +distinguished from continuous quantity, both by its own definition, and +the general definition (for quantity).[387] We may add that numbers are +distinguished from each other by being even and odd. If besides there +be other differences amidst the even and odd numbers, these differences +will have to be referred to the objects in which are the numbers, or to +the numbers composed of unities, and not any more to those which exist +in sense-beings. If reason separate sense-things from the numbers they +contain, nothing hinders us then from attributing to these numbers the +same differences (as to the numbers composed of unities).[388] + + +ELEMENTS OF CONTINUOUS QUANTITY. + +What distinctions are admitted by continuous quantity? There is the +line, the surface, and the solid; for extension may exist in one, +two or three dimensions (and thus count the numerical elements of +continuous size) instead of establishing species.[389] In numbers thus +considered as anterior or posterior to each other, there is nothing in +common, which would constitute a genus. Likewise in the first, second +and third increases (of a line, surface, and solid) there is nothing in +common; but as far as quantity is found, there is also equality (and +inequality), although there be no extension which is quantitative more +than any other.[390] However, one may have dimensions greater than +another. It is therefore only in so far as they are all numbers, that +numbers can have anything in common. Perhaps, indeed, it is not the +monad that begets the pair, nor the pair that begets the triad, but it +may be the same principle which begets all the numbers. If numbers be +not derivative, but exist by themselves, we may, at least within our +own thought, consider them as begotten (or, derivative). We conceive +of the smaller number as the anterior, the greater as posterior. But +numbers, as such, may all be reduced to unity. + + +STUDY OF GEOMETRICAL FIGURES. + +The method of classification adopted for numbers may be applied to +sizes, and thus distinguish the line, the surface, and the solid or +body, because those are sizes which form different species. If besides +each of these species were to be divided, lines might be subdivided +into straight, curved and spiral; surfaces into straight and curved; +solids into round or polyhedral bodies. Further, as geometers do, may +come the triangle, the quadrilateral, and others. + + +STUDY OF THE STRAIGHT LINE. + +14. But what about the straight line? Is it not a magnitude? Possibly; +but if it be a magnitude, it is a qualified one.[391] It is even +possible that straightness constitutes a difference of the (very nature +of the) line, as line, for straightness refers solely to a line; +and besides, we often deduce the differences of "Essence" from its +qualities. That a straight line is a quantity added to a difference +does not cause its being composed of the line, and of the property of +straightness; for, were it thus composed, straightness would be its +chief difference. + + +STUDY OF THE TRIANGLE. + +Now let us consider the triangle, which is formed of three lines. Why +should it not belong to quantity? Would it be so, because it is not +constituted by three lines merely, but by three lines arranged in some +particular manner? But a quadrilateral would also be constituted by +four lines arranged in some particular manner. (But being arranged in +some particular manner does not hinder a figure from being a quantity). +The straight line, indeed, is arranged in some particular manner, and +is none the less a quantity. Now if the straight line be not simply a +quantity, why could this not also be said of a limited line? For the +limit of the line is a point, and the point does not belong to any +genus other than the line. Consequently, a limited surface is also +a quantity, because it is limited by lines, which even more belong +to quantity. If then the limited surface be contained in the genus +of quantity, whether the surface be a triangle, a quadrilateral, a +hexagon, or any other polygon, all figures whatever will belong to the +genus of quantity. But if we assigned the triangle or quadrilateral +to the genus of quality merely because we are speaking of some one +definite triangle or quadrilateral, nothing would hinder one and the +same thing from being subsumed under several categories. A triangle +would then be a quantity so far as it was both a general and particular +magnitude, and would be a quality by virtue of its possessing a +particular form. The same might be predicated of the Triangle in +itself because of its possessing a particular form; and so also with +the sphere. By following this line of argument, geometry would be +turned into a study of qualities, instead of that of quantities, +which of course it is. The existing differences between magnitudes +do not deprive them of their property of being magnitudes, just as +the difference between essences does not affect their essentiality. +Besides, every surface is limited, because an infinite surface is +impossible. Further, when I consider a difference that pertains to +essence, I call it an essential difference. So much the more, on +considering figures, I am considering differences of magnitude. For +if the differences were not of magnitude, of what would they be +differences? If then they be differences of magnitude, the different +magnitudes which are derived from differences of magnitude should +be classified according to the species constituted by them (when +considered in the light of being magnitudes). + + +GEOMETRY STUDIES QUANTITIES, NOT QUALITIES. + +15. But how can you qualify the properties of quantity so as to call +them equal or unequal?[392] Is it not usual to say of two triangles +that they are similar? Could we not also predicate similarity of +two magnitudes? Doubtless, for what is called similarity,[393] +does not conflict with similarity or dissimilarity in the genus of +quantity.[394] Here, indeed, the word "similarity" is applied to +magnitudes in a sense other than to quality. Besides, if (Aristotle) +said that the property characteristic of quantities is to enable them +to be called equal or unequal, this does not conflict with predicating +similarity of some of them. But as it has been said that the special +characteristic of qualities is to admit of being called similar +or dissimilar, we must, as has already been explained, understand +similarity in a sense other than when it is applied to magnitudes. +If similar magnitudes be identical, we must then consider the other +properties of quantity and quality which might be present in them +(so as clearly to contrast their differences). It may also be said +that the term "similarity" applies to the genus of quantity so far as +this contains differences (which distinguish from each other similar +magnitudes). + + +DIFFERENCES WHICH COMPLETE THE BEING MUST BE PREFIXED TO THAT TO WHICH +THEY REFER. + +In general, the differences which complete a being should be classified +along with that of which they are the differences, especially when a +difference belongs to a single subject. If a difference complete the +being of a subject, and do not complete the being of another, this +difference should be classified along with the subject whose being it +completes, leaving that whose being it does not complete for separate +consideration. By this we do not mean completing the Being in general, +but completing some particular being, so that the subject spoken of as +a particular one admits no further essential addition. We therefore +have the right to say that triangles, or that quadrilaterals, as +well as surfaces and solids, are equal, and to predicate equality or +inequality of quantitative entities. But we yet have to study whether +quality only can be said to be similar or dissimilar.[395] + + +WHETHER QUALITY ONLY CAN BE CALLED SIMILAR OR DISSIMILAR. + +When we were treating of things that were qualified, we had already +explained that matter, united to quantity, and taken with other things, +constitutes sense-being; that this "being" seems to be a composite +of several things, that it is not properly a "whatness,"[396] but +rather qualification (or, qualified thing). The ("seminal) reason," +for instance that of fire, has more of a reference to "whatness," +while the form that the reason begets is rather a qualification. +Likewise, the ("seminal) reason" of man is a "whatness," whilst the +form that this reason gives to the body, being only an image of reason, +is rather a qualification. Thus if the Socrates that we see was the +genuine Socrates, his mere portrait composed of no more than colors +would also be called Socrates. Likewise, although this ("seminal) +reason" of Socrates be that which constitutes the genuine Socrates, we +nevertheless also apply the name of Socrates to the man that we see; +yet the colors, or the figure of the Socrates we see, are only the +image of those which are contained by his ("seminal) reason." Likewise, +the reason of Socrates is itself only an image of the veritable reason +(of the idea) of the man. This is our solution of the problem.[397] + + +THE VARIOUS TERMS EXPRESSING QUALITY. + +16. When we separately consider each of the things which compose +sense-being and when we wish to designate the quality which exists +among them, we must not call it "whatness," any more than quantity +or movement, but rather name it a characteristic, employing the +expressions "such," "as," and "this kind." We are thus enabled to +indicate beauty and ugliness, such as they are in the body. Indeed, +sense-beauty is no more than a figure of speech,[343] in respect to +intelligible beauty; it is likewise with quality, since black and white +are also completely different (from their "reason," or their idea). + + +THE SEMINAL REASON HARMONIZES WITH ITS APPEARING ACTUALIZATION. + +Is the content of ("seminal) reason" and of a particular reason, +identical with what appears, or does it apply thereto only by a +figure of speech?[343] Should it properly be classified among the +intelligible, or the sense-objects? Sensual beauty of course evidently +differs from intelligible beauty; but what of ugliness--in which +classification does it belong? Must virtue be classified among +intelligible or sensual qualities, or should we locate some in each +class? (All this uncertainty is excusable, inasmuch) as it may be asked +whether even the arts, which are "reasons," should be classified among +sense-qualities? If these reasons be united to a matter, they must have +matter as their very soul. But what is their condition here below, when +united to some matter? These reasons are in a case similar to song +accompanied by a lyre;[398] this song, being uttered by a sense-voice, +is in relation with the strings of the lyre, while simultaneously being +part of the art (which is one of these "seminal reasons"). Likewise, +it might be said that virtues are actualizations, and not parts (of +the soul). Are they sense-actualizations? (This seems probable), for +although the beauty contained in the body be incorporeal, we still +classify it among the things which refer to the body, and belong +to it. As to arithmetic, and geometry, two different kinds must be +distinguished: the first kind deals with visible objects, and must +be classified among sense-objects; but the second kind deals with +studies suitable to the soul, and should therefore be classified among +intelligible entities. Plato[399] considers that music and astronomy +are in the same condition. + + +MANY OTHER CONCEPTIONS BELONG AMONG SENSE-QUALITIES. + +Thus the arts which relate to the body, which make use of the organs, +and which consult the senses, are really dispositions of the soul, but +only of the soul as applied to corporeal objects; and consequently, +they should be classified among sense-qualities.[400] Here also belong +practical virtues, such as are implied by civil duties, and which, +instead of raising the soul to intelligible entities, fructify in the +actions of political life, and refer to them, not as a necessity of our +condition, but as an occupation preferable to everything else.[401] +Among these qualities we shall have to classify the beauty contained in +the ("seminal) reason," and, so much the more, black and white. + + +IN SPITE OF THIS CLASSIFICATION THE SOUL HERSELF REMAINS INCORPOREAL. + +But is the soul herself a sense-being, if she be disposed in a +particular way, and if she contain particular "reasons" (that is, +faculties, virtues, sciences and arts, all of which refer to the body, +and which have been classified as sense-qualities)?[402] It has already +been explained that these "reasons" themselves are not corporeal; but +that they have been classified among sense-qualities only because they +referred to the body, and to the actions thereby produced. On the other +hand, as sense-quality has been defined as the meeting of all the +above enumerated entities, it is impossible to classify incorporeal +Being in the same genus as the sensual being. As to the qualities +of the soul, they are all doubtless incorporeal, but as they are +experiences (or, sufferings, or, passions) which refer to terrestrial +things, they must be classified in the genus of quality, just as the +reasons of the individual soul. Of the soul we must therefore predicate +experience, however dividing the latter in two elements, one of which +would refer to the object to which it is applied, and the other to +the subject in which it exists.[403] Though then these experiences +cannot be considered as corporeal qualities, yet it must be admitted +they relate to the body.[404] On the other hand, although we classify +these experiences in the genus of quality, still the soul herself +should not be reduced to the rank of corporeal being. Last, when we +conceive of the soul as without experiences, and without the "reasons" +above-mentioned, we are thereby classifying her along with the World +from which she descends,[405] and we leave here below no intelligible +being, of any kind whatever. + + +QUALITIES ARE CLASSIFIED AS CORPOREAL AND OF THE SOUL. + +17. Qualities, therefore, should be classified as of the body, and of +the soul.[406] Even though all the souls, as well as their immaterial +qualities, be considered as existing on high, yet their inferior +qualities must be divided according to the senses, referring these +qualities either to sight, hearing, feeling, taste, or smell. Under +sight, we will classify the differences of colors; under hearing, +that of the sounds; and likewise, with the other senses. As to the +sounds, inasmuch as they have but a single quality, they will have to +be classified according to their being soft, harsh, agreeable, and the +like. + + +DIFFERENCES OF BEING SHOULD BE DISTINGUISHED ACCORDING TO QUALITY. + +It is by quality that we distinguish the differences which inhere in +being, as well as the actualizations, the beautiful or ugly actions, +and in general, all that is particular. Only very rarely do we discover +in quantity differences which constitute species; so much is this the +case, that it is generally divided by its characteristic qualities. We +must therefore leave quantity aside, and that leads us to wonder how we +may divide quality itself (since it is made use of to distinguish other +things).[407] + + +DIFFERENCE OF QUALITY CANNOT BE DISTINGUISHED BY SENSATION. + +What sort of differences, indeed, might we use to establish such +divisions, and from what genus would we draw them? It seems absurd to +classify quality by quality itself. This is just as if the difference +of "beings" were to be called "beings." By what indeed could one +distinguish white from black, and colors from tastes and sensations +of touch? If we distinguish the difference of these qualities by the +sense-organs, these differences would no longer exist in the subjects. +How indeed could one and the same sense distinguish the difference of +the qualities it perceives? Is it because certain things exercise an +action that is constructive or destructive on the eyes, or the tongue? +We would then have to ask what is the constructive or destructive +element in the sensations thus excited? Yet, even were this answered, +such an answer would not explain wherein these things differ.[407] + + +DIFFERENCE IN EFFECTS IS LIMITED TO THE INTELLIGIBLES. + +A further possibility is that these things should be classified +according to their effects, and that it is reasonable to do so with +invisible entities, such as sciences; but this would not be applicable +to sense-objects. When indeed we divide sciences by their effects, and +when, in general, we classify them according to the powers of the soul, +by concluding from the diversity of their effects that they differ, +our mind grasps the difference of these powers, and it determines not +only with what objects they deal, but it also defines their reason (or, +essence). Let us admit that it is easy to distinguish arts according +to their reasons, and according to the notions they include; but is it +possible to divide corporeal qualities in that manner? Even when one +studies the intelligible world, there is room for doubt as to how the +different reasons distinguish themselves from each other; it is easy +enough to see that white differs from black; but in what does it do so? + + +IT IS ABSURD TO DISTINGUISH BEING, QUALITIES AND DIFFERENCES BY +THEMSELVES. + +18. All the questions we have asked show that we doubtless must +seek to discover the differences of the various (beings), so as to +distinguish them from each other; but that it is as impossible as it +is unreasonable to inquire what are the differences of the differences +themselves.[408] Being of beings, quantities of quantities, qualities +of qualities, differences of differences cannot be discovered; but we +should, wherever possible, classify exterior objects, either according +to their effects, or according to salient characteristics. When this is +impossible, objects should be distinguished, as for instance dark from +light green. + +But how is white distinguished from black? Sensation or intelligence +tell us that those things are different without informing us of their +reason; either sensation, because its function is not to set forth the +reason of things, but only to bring them somehow to our attention; or +intelligence, because it discerns things that are simple by intuition, +without having to resort to ratiocination, and limits itself to the +statement that something is such or such. Besides, in each one of the +operations of intelligence there is a difference (a special distinctive +characteristic) which enables it to distinguish different things, +without this difference (which is proper to each of the operations of +intelligence) itself having need to be discerned by the help of some +other difference. + + +SOME QUALITIES ARE DIFFERENCES. + +Are all qualities differences, or not? Whiteness, colors, qualities +perceived by touch and taste, may become differences between different +objects, though they themselves be species. But how do the sciences +of grammar or of music constitute differences? The science of grammar +renders the mind grammatical, and the science of music renders the mind +musical, especially if they be untaught; and these thus become specific +differences. Besides, we have to consider whether a difference be drawn +from the same genus (from which the considered things are drawn), or +from some other genus. If it be drawn from the same genus, it fulfils, +for the things of this genus, the same function as does a quality to +the quality to which it serves as difference. Such are virtue and +vice; virtue is a particular habit, and vice is also a particular +habit; consequently, as habits are qualities, the differences of these +habits (either of virtue or vice) will be qualities. It may perhaps be +objected that a habit without difference is not a quality, and that it +is the difference alone which constitutes the quality.[409] We will +answer that it is (commonly) said that sweet is good, and that bitter +is bad; this then implies a recognition of their difference by a habit +(a manner of being), and not by a quality. + +What if sweet be said to be "crude," or thick and bitter, thin or +refined? The answer is that coarseness does not inform us of the nature +of sweetness, but indicates a manner of being of what is sweet; and +similarly, with what is refined. + + +THERE ARE DIFFERENCES WHICH ARE NOT QUALITIES. + +There remains for us to examine if a difference of a quality never be a +quality, as that of a being is not a being, nor that of a quantity, a +quantity. Does five differ from three by two? No: five does not differ +from three, it only exceeds it by two. How indeed could five differ +from three by two, when five contains two? Likewise, a movement does +not differ from a movement by a movement. As to virtue and vice, here +is one whole opposed to another whole, and it is thus that the wholes +are distinguished. If a distinction were drawn from the same genus, +that is, from quality, instead of founding itself on another genus; as, +for instance, if one said that such a vice referred to pleasures, some +other to anger, some other to acquisitiveness, and if one were to admit +that such a classification was good; it would evidently result that +there are differences that are not qualities. + + +VARIOUS DERIVATIVES OF THE CATEGORY OF QUALITY. + +19. As has been indicated above, the genus of quality contains the +(beings) which are said to be qualified (qualitative entities), +inasmuch as they contain some quality (as, for instance, the handsome +man, so far as he is endowed with beauty).[410] These (beings) however +do not properly belong to this genus, for otherwise there would here +be two categories. It suffices to reduce them to the quality which +supplies their name. + +So non-whiteness, if it indicate some color other than white, is a +quality; if it express merely a negation, or an enumeration, it is +only a word, or a term which recalls the object; if it be a word, +it constitutes a movement (so far as it is produced by the vocal +organ); if it be a name or a term, it constitutes, so far as it is a +significative, a relative. If things be classed not only by genera, if +it be admitted that each assertion and expression proclaim a genus, our +answer must be that some affirm things by their mere announcement, and +that others deny them. It may perhaps be best not to include negations +in the same genus as things themselves, since, to avoid mingling +several genera, we often do not include affirmations. + +As to privations, it may be remarked that if the things of which +there are privations are qualities, then the privations themselves +are qualities, as "toothless," or "blind."[411] But "naked" and +(its contrary) "clothed" are neither of them qualities; they rather +constitute habits, and thus belong among relatives. + +Passion, at the moment it is felt, does not constitute a quality, but +a movement; when it has been experienced, and has become durable, it +forms a quality;[410] further, if the (being) which has experienced +the passion have kept none of it, it will have to be described as +having been moved, which amounts to the same thing as really being +moved. However, in this case, the conception of time will have to be +abstracted from that of movement; for we must not add the conception of +the present to that of movement.[412] + +Finally, (the adverb) "well," and the other analogous terms may be +reduced to the simple notion of the genus of quality. + +It remains to examine if we must refer to the genus of quality "being +red" without also doing so for "reddening"[410] for "blushing" does +not belong to it, because he who blushes suffers (experiences), or is +moved. But as soon as he ceases blushing, if he have already blushed, +this is a quality; for quality does not depend on time, but consists +in being such or such; whence it follows that "having blushed" is a +quality. Therefore we shall regard as qualities only habits, and not +mere dispositions;[410] being warm, for instance, and not warming up; +being sick, but not becoming sick. + + +CONTRARINESS IS NOT THE GREATEST POSSIBLE DIFFERENCE. + +20. Does every quality have an opposite?[410] As to vice and virtue, +there is, between the extremes, an intermediary quality which is +the opposite of both,[411] but, with colors, the intermediaries +are not contraries. This might be explained away on the ground that +the intermediary colors are blends of the extreme colors. However, +we ought not to have divided colors in extremes and intermediaries, +and opposed them to each other; but rather have divided the genus of +color into black and white, and then have shown that other colors are +composed of these two, or differentiated another color that would be +intermediate, even though composite. If it be said that intermediary +colors are not opposite to the extremes because opposition is not +composed of a simple difference, but of a maximal difference,[413] it +will have to be answered that this maximal difference results from +having interposed intermediaries; if these were removed, the maximal +difference would have no scale of comparison. To the objection that +yellow approximates white more than black, and that the sense of sight +supports this contention; that it is the same with liquids where there +is no intermediary between cold and hot; it must be answered that +white and yellow and other colors compared to each other similarly +likewise differ completely; and, because of this their difference, +constitute contrary qualities; they are contrary, not because they +have intermediaries, but because of their characteristic nature. Thus +health and sickness are contraries, though they have no intermediaries. +Could it be said that they are contraries because their effects differ +maximally? But how could this difference be recognized as maximal since +there are no intermediaries which show the same characteristics at +a less degree? The difference between health and sickness could not +therefore be demonstrated to be maximal. Consequently, oppositeness +will have to be analyzed as something else than maximal difference. +Does this mean only a great difference? Then we must in return ask +whether this "great" mean "greater by opposition to something +smaller," or "great absolutely"? In the first case, the things which +have no intermediary could not be opposites; in the second, as it is +easily granted that there is a great difference between one nature and +another, and as we have nothing greater to serve as measure for this +distance, we shall have to examine by what characteristics oppositeness +might be recognized. + + +CONTRARIES ARE THOSE THINGS THAT LACK RESEMBLANCE. + +To begin with, resemblance does not mean only belonging to the same +genus, nor mere confusion from more or less numerous characteristics, +as, for instance, by their forms. Things that possess resemblance, +therefore, are not opposites. Only things which have nothing identical +in respect to species are opposites;[414] though we must add that they +must belong to the same genus of quality. Thus, though they have no +intermediaries, we can classify as opposites the things which betray +no resemblance to each other; in which are found only characteristics +which do not approximate each other, and bear no kind of analogy to +each other. Consequently, objects which have something in common in the +respect of colors could not be contraries. Besides, not everything is +the contrary of every other thing; but one thing is only the contrary +of some other; and this is the case with tastes as well as with colors. +But enough of all this. + + +QUALITIES ADMIT OF DEGREE. + +Does a quality admit of more or less?[410] Evidently the objects which +participate in qualities participate therein more or less. But the +chief question is whether there be degrees in virtue or justice? If +these habits possess a certain latitude, they have degrees. If they +have no latitude, they are not susceptible of more or less. + + +REASONS WHY MOVEMENT IS A CATEGORY. + +21. Let us pass to movement.[415] Admittedly movement is a genus with +the following characteristics: first, movement cannot be reduced to +any other genus; then, nothing higher in the scale of being can be +predicated of it; last, it reveals a great number of differences which +constitute species. + + +MOVEMENT CANNOT BE REDUCED TO ANY HIGHER GENUS. + +To what genus could (movement) be reduced? It constitutes neither the +being nor the quality of the (being) in which it exists. It is not +even reducible to action, for in passion (or, experience) there are +several kinds of movements; and it is the actions and passions which +are reducible to movement. Further, movement need not necessarily be +a relative merely because movement does not exist in itself, that it +belongs to some being, and that it exists in a subject; otherwise, we +should have to classify quality also as a relation; for quality belongs +to some (being) and exists in a subject; it is not so however, with +a quantity. It might be objected that, though each of them exist in +some subject, the one by virtue of its being a quality, and the other, +of being a quantity, they themselves are not any the less species of +essences. The same argument would apply to movement; though it belong +to some subject, it is something before belonging to a subject, and +we must consider what it is in itself. Now what is relative is not +at first something by itself, and then the predicate of something +else;[416] but what is born of the relation existing between two +objects, is nothing else outside the relation to which it owes its +name; thus the double, so far as it is called doubleness, is neither +begotten, nor exists except in the comparison established between it +and a half, since, not being conceived of before, it owes its name and +its existence to the comparison thus established. + + +IS CHANGE ANTERIOR TO MOVEMENT? + +What then is movement? While belonging to a subject, it is something +by itself before belonging to a subject, as are quality, quantity, +and being. To begin with, nothing is predicated before it, and of +it, as a genus. Is change[417] anterior to movement? Here change is +identical with movement, or if change is to be considered a genus, it +will form a genus to be added to those already recognized. Besides, it +is evident that, on this hypothesis, movement will become a species, +and to it will be opposed, as another species, "generation," as, +for instance, "generation" is a change, but not a movement.[418] +Why then should generation not be a movement? Is it because what is +generated does not yet exist, and because movement could not exist in +non-being? Consequently, neither will generation be a change. Or is +this so because generation is an alteration and increase, and because +it presupposes that certain things are altered, and increase? To +speak thus is to busy ourselves with things that precede generation. +Generation presupposes production of some other form; for generation +does not consist in an alteration passively undergone, such as being +warmed, or being whitened; such effects could be produced before +realization of the generation. What then occurs in generation? There +is alteration. Generation consists in the production of an animal or +plant, in the reception of a form. Change is much more reasonably to +be considered a species, than movement; because the word change means +that one thing takes the place of another, while movement signifies +the actualization by which a being passes from what is proper to it, +to what is not, as in the translation from one place to another. If +that be not admitted (to define movement), it will at least have to be +acknowledged that the action of studying it, as that of playing the +lyre, and in general, all the movements that modify a habit, would +be subsumed within our definition. Alteration therefore could not be +anything else but a species of movement; since it is a movement which +produces passage from one state to another.[419] + + +DEFINITION OF ALTERATION. + +22. Granting that alteration is the same thing as movement, so far as +the result of movement is to render something other than it was, (we +still have to ask) what then is movement? To indulge in a figurative +expression,[343] it is the passage of potentiality to the actualization +of which it is the potentiality.[420] + + +MOVEMENT AS A FORM OF POWER. + +Let us, indeed, suppose, that something which formerly was a +potentiality succeeds in assuming a form, as "potentiality that becomes +a statue," or that passes to actualization, as a man's walk.[421] In +the case where the metal becomes a statue, this passage is a movement; +in the case of the walking, the walk itself is a movement, like the +dance, with one who is capable of it. In the movement of the first +kind, where the metal passes into the condition of being a statue, +there is the production of another form which is realized by the +movement.[422] The movement of the second kind, the dance, is a simple +form of the potentiality, and, when it has ceased, leaves nothing that +subsists after it.[423] + + +MOVEMENT IS ACTIVE FORM, AND CAUSE OF OTHER FORMS. + +We are therefore justified in calling movement "an active form that +is aroused," by opposition to the other forms which remain inactive. +(They may be so named), whether or not they be permanent. We may add +that it is "the cause of the other forms," when it results in producing +something else. This (sense-) movement may also be called the "life of +bodies." I say "this movement," because it bears the same name as the +movements of the intelligence, and those of the soul. + + +QUESTIONS ABOUT MOVEMENT. + +What further proves that movement is a genus, is that it is very +difficult, if not impossible, to grasp it by a definition. But how can +it be called a form when its result is deterioration, or something +passive? It may then be compared to the warming influence of the rays +of the sun, which exerts on some things an influence that makes them +grow, while other things it shrivels. In both cases, the movement has +something in common, and is identical, so far as it is a movement; the +difference of its results is due to the difference of the beings in +which it operates. Are then growing sick and convalescence identical? +Yes, so far as they are movements. Is their difference then due to +their subjects, or to anything else? This question we will consider +further on, while studying alteration. Now let us examine the elements +common to all movements; in that way we shall be able to prove that +movement is a genus. + + +COMMON ELEMENT IN GROWTH, INCREASE AND GENERATION. + +First, the word "movement" can be used in different senses, just as +essence, when considered a genus. Further, as we have already said, +all the movements by which one thing arrives at a natural state, or +produces an action suitable to its nature, constitute so many species. +Then, the movements by which one thing arrives at a state contrary to +its nature, have to be considered as analogous to that to which they +lead. + +But what common element is there in alteration, growth and generation, +and their contraries? What is there in common between these movements, +and the displacement in space, when you consider the four movements, +as such?[425] The common element is that the moved thing, after the +movement, is no longer in the former state; that it no more remains +quiet, and does not rest so long as the movement lasts. It ceaselessly +passes to another state, alters, and does not remain what it was; for +the movement would be vain if it did not make one thing other than it +was. Consequently "otherness" does not consist in one thing becoming +other than it was, and then persisting in this other state, but in +ceaseless alteration. Thus, time is always different from what it was +because it is produced by movement; for it is movement measured in its +march and not in its limit of motion, or stopping point; it follows, +carried away in its course. Further, one characteristic common to +all kinds of movement is that it is the march (or process) by which +potentiality and possibility pass into actualization; for every object +in movement, whatever be the nature of this movement, succeeds in +moving only because it formerly possessed the power of producing an +action, or of experiencing the passion of some particular nature. + + +MOVEMENT FOR SENSE-OBJECTS. + +23. For sense-objects, which receive their impulse from without, +movement is a stimulus which agitates them, excites them, presses them, +prevents them from slumbering in inertia, from remaining the same, and +makes them present an image of life by their agitation and continual +mutations. Besides, one must not confuse the things that move with +movement; walking is not the feet, but an actualization of the power +connected with the feet. Now as this power is invisible, we perceive +only the agitation of the feet; we see that their present state is +quite different from that in which they would have been, had they +remained in place, and that they have some addition, which however, is +invisible. Thus, being united to objects other than itself, the power +is perceived only accidentally, because one notices that the feet +change place, and do not rest. Likewise, alteration in the altered +object, is recognized only by failure to discover in it the same +quality as before. + + +MOVEMENT AS INFLUX. + +What is the seat of a movement acting on an object by passing from +internal power to actualization? Is it in the motor? How will that +which is moved and which suffers be able to receive it? Is it in the +movable element? Why does it not remain in the mover? Movement must +therefore be considered as inseparable from the mover, although not +exclusively; it must pass from the mover into the mobile (element) +without ceasing to be connected with the mover, and it must pass +from the mover to the moved like a breath (or influx).[426] When the +motive power produces locomotion, it gives us an impulse and makes +us change place ceaselessly; when it is calorific, it heats; when, +meeting matter, it imparts thereto its natural organization, and +produces increase; when it removes something from an object, this +object decreases because it is capable thereof; last, when it is the +generative power which enters into action, generation occurs; but if +this generative power be weaker than the destructive power, there +occurs destruction, not of what is already produced, but of what was +in the process of production. Likewise, convalescence takes place as +soon as the force capable of producing health acts and dominates; and +sickness occurs, when the opposite power produces a contrary effect. +Consequently, movement must be studied not only in the things in +which it is produced, but also in those that produce it or transmit +it. The property of movement consists therefore in being a movement +endowed with some particular quality, or being something definite in a +particular thing. + + +MOVEMENT OF DISPLACEMENT IS SINGLE. + +24. As to movement of displacement, we may ask if ascending be the +opposite of descending, in what the circular movement differs from the +rectilinear movement, what difference obtains in throwing an object +at the head or at the feet. The difference is not very clear, for in +these cases the motive power is the same. Shall we say that there is +one power which causes raising, and another that lowers, especially +if these movements be natural, and if they be the result of lightness +or heaviness? In both cases, there is something in common, namely, +direction towards its natural place, so that the difference is derived +from exterior circumstances. Indeed, in circular and rectilinear +movement, if someone move the same object in turn circularly and +in a straight line, what difference is there in the motive power? +The difference could be derived only from the figure (or outward +appearance) of the movement, unless it should be said that the +circular movement is composite, that it is not a veritable movement, +and that it does not produce any change by itself. In all of these +cases, the movement of displacement is identical, and presents only +adventitious differences. + + +EXPLANATION OF COMPOSITION AND DECOMPOSITION. + +25. Of what do composition (blending, or mixture) and decomposition +consist? Do they constitute other kinds of movement than those already +noticed, generation and destruction, growth and decrease, movement +of displacement and alteration? Shall composition and decomposition +be reduced to some one of these kinds of motion, or shall we look +at this process inversely? If composition consist in approximating +one thing to another, and in joining them together; and if, on the +other hand, decomposition consist in separating the things which were +joined, we have here only two movements of displacement, a uniting, +and a separating one. We should be able to reduce composition and +decomposition to one of the above recognized kinds of motion, if +we were to acknowledge that this composition was mingling,[427] +combination, fusion, and union--a union which consists in two things +uniting, and not in being already united. Indeed, composition includes +first the movement of displacement, and then an alteration; just as, +in increase, there was first the movement of displacement, and then +movement in the kind of the quality.[428] Likewise, here there is first +the movement of displacement, then the composition or decomposition, +according as things approximate or separate.[429] Often also +decomposition is accompanied or followed by a movement of displacement, +but the things which separate undergo a modification different from +the movement of displacement; similarly, composition is a modification +which follows the movement of displacement, but which has a different +nature. + + +COMPOSITION AND DECOMPOSITION ARE NOT ALTERATIONS. + +Shall we have to admit that composition and decomposition are +movements which exist by themselves, and analyze alteration into them? +Condensation is explained as undergoing an alteration; that means, as +becoming composite. On the other hand, rarefaction is also explained +as undergoing an alteration, namely, that of decomposition; when, for +instance, one mingles water and wine, each of these two things becomes +other than it was, and it is the composition which has operated the +alteration. We will answer that here composition and decomposition no +doubt precede certain alterations, but these alterations are something +different than compositions and decompositions. Other alterations +(certainly) are not compositions and decompositions, for neither can +condensation nor rarefaction be reduced to these movements, nor are +they composed of them. Otherwise, it would be necessary to acknowledge +the (existence of) emptiness. Besides, how could you explain blackness +and whiteness, as being composed of composition and decomposition? +This doctrine would destroy all colors and qualities, or at least, +the greater part of them; for if all alteration, that means, all +change of quality, consisted in a composition or decomposition, the +result would not be the production of a quality, but an aggregation or +disaggregation. How indeed could you explain the movements of teaching +and studying by mere "composition"? + + +MOVEMENTS DIVIDED IN NATURAL, ARTIFICIAL, AND VOLUNTARY. + +26. Let us now examine the different kinds of movements. Shall we +classify movements of displacement in movements upwards and downwards, +rectilinear or curvilinear, or in movements of animate and inanimate +beings? There is indeed a difference between the movement of inanimate +beings, and that of animate beings; and these latter have different +kinds of motion, such as walking, flying, and swimming. Their movements +could also be analyzed in two other ways, according as it was +conformable to, or against their nature; but this would not explain +the outer differences of movements. Perhaps the movements themselves +produce these differences, and do not exist without them; nevertheless, +it is nature that seems to be the principle of the movements, and of +their exterior differences. It would further be possible to classify +movements as natural, artificial, and voluntary; of the natural, there +are alteration and destruction; of the artificial, there are the +building of houses, and construction of vessels; of the voluntary, +there are meditation, learning, devoting oneself to political +occupations, and, in general, speaking and acting. Last, we might, in +growth, alteration and generation, distinguish the natural movement, +and that contrary to nature; or even establish a classification founded +on the nature of the subjects in which these movements occur. + + +DISTINCTION BETWEEN STABILITY AND STILLNESS. + +27. Let us now study stability or stillness, which is the contrary of +movement.[425] Are we to consider it itself a genus, or to reduce it +to some one of the known genera? First, stability rather suits the +intelligible world, and stillness the sense-world. Let us now examine +stillness. If it be identical with stability, it is useless to look for +it here below where nothing is stable, and where apparent stability +is in reality only a slower movement. If stillness be different from +stability, because the latter refers to what is completely immovable, +and stillness to what is actually fixed, but is naturally movable +even when it does not actually move, the following distinction should +be established. If stillness here below be considered, this rest is +a movement which has not yet ceased, but which is imminent; if by +stillness is understood the complete cessation of movement in the +moved, it will be necessary to examine whether there be anything here +below that is absolutely without movement. As it is impossible for one +thing to possess simultaneously all the species of movement, and as +there are necessarily movements that are not realized in it--since it +is usual to say that some particular movement is in something--when +something undergoes no displacement, and seems still in respect to +this movement, should one not say about it that in this respect it is +not moving? Stillness is therefore the negation of movement. Now no +negation constitutes a genus. The thing we are considering is at rest +only in respect to local movement; stillness expresses therefore only +the negation of this movement. + + +MOVEMENT IS MORE THAN THE NEGATION OF REST. + +It may perhaps be asked, why is movement not rather the negation of +rest? We shall then answer that movement (is something positive), that +it brings something with it; that it has some efficiency, that it +communicates an impulsion to the subject, that produces or destroys +many things; stillness, on the contrary, is nothing outside of the +subject which is still, and means no more than that the latter is still. + + +IN THE INTELLIGIBLE STABILITY DOES NOT IMPLY STILLNESS. + +But why should we not regard the stability of intelligible things also +as a negation of movement? Because stability is not the privation of +movement; it does not begin to exist when movement ceases, and it does +not hinder it from simultaneous existence with it. In intelligible +being, stability does not imply the cessation of movement of that whose +nature it is to move.[430] On the contrary, so far as intelligible +being is contained in (or, expressed by) stability, it is stable; +so far as it moves, it will ever move; it is therefore stable by +stability, and movable by movement. The body, however, is no doubt +moved by movement, but it rests only in the absence of movement, when +it is deprived of the movement that it ought to have. Besides, what +would stability be supposed to imply (if it were supposed to exist +in sense-objects)? When somebody passes from sickness to health, he +enters on convalescence. What kind of stillness shall we oppose to +convalescence? Shall we oppose to it that condition from which that man +had just issued? That state was sickness, and not stability. Shall we +oppose to it the state in which that man has just entered? That state +is health, which is not identical with stability. To say that sickness +and health are each of them a sort of stability, is to consider +sickness and health as species of stability, which is absurd. Further, +if it were said that stability is an accident of health, it would +result that before stability health would not be health. As to such +arguments, let each reason according to his fancy! + + +CONCLUSION OF THE STUDY. + +28. We have demonstrated that acting and experiencing were movements; +that, among the movements, some are absolute, while others constitute +actions or passions.[431] + +We have also demonstrated that the other things that are called genera +must be reduced to the genera we have set forth.[432] + +We have also studied relation, defining it as a habit, a "manner of +being" of one thing in respect of another, which results from the +co-operation of two things; we have explained that, when a habit of +being constitutes a reference, this thing is something relative, not +so much as it is being, but as far as it is a part of this being, as +are the hand, the head, the cause, the principle, or the element.[433] +The relatives might be divided according to the scheme of the ancient +(philosophers), by saying that some of them are efficient causes, while +others are measures, that the former distinguish themselves by their +resemblances and differences, while the latter consist in excess or in +lack. + +Such are our views about the (categories, or) genera (of existence). + + + + +THIRD ENNEAD, BOOK SEVEN. + +Of Time and Eternity.[435] + + +A. ETERNITY. + + +INTRODUCTION. ETERNITY EXISTS PERPETUALLY, WHILE TIME BECOMES. + +(1.)[436] When saying that eternity and time differ, that eternity +refers to perpetual existence, and time to what "becomes" (this visible +world), we are speaking off-hand, spontaneously, intuitionally, and +common language supports these forms of expression. When however we +try to define our conceptions thereof in greater detail, we become +embarrassed; the different opinions of ancient philosophers, and often +even the same opinions, are interpreted differently. We however shall +limit ourselves to an examination of these opinions, and we believe +that we can fulfil our task of answering all questions by explaining +the teachings of the ancient philosophers, without starting any minute +disquisition of our own. We do indeed insist that some of these ancient +philosophers, these blessed men[437] have achieved the truth. It +remains only to decide which of them have done so, and how we ourselves +can grasp their thought. + + +ETERNITY IS THE MODEL OF ITS IMAGE, TIME. + +First, we have to examine that of which eternity consists, according +to those who consider it as different from time; for, by gaining a +conception of the model (eternity), we shall more clearly understand +its image called time.[438] If then, before observing eternity, we form +a conception of time, we may, by reminiscence, from here below, rise to +the contemplation of the model to which time, as its image, resembles. + + +RELATION BETWEEN THE AEON AND INTELLIGIBLE BEING. + +1. (2). How shall we define the aeon (or, eternity)? Shall we say +that it is the intelligible "being" (or, nature) itself, just as +we might say that time is the heaven and the universe, as has been +done, it seems, by certain (Pythagorean) philosophers?[439] Indeed, +as we conceive and judge that the aeon (eternity) is something very +venerable, we assert the same of intelligible "being," and yet it is +not easy to decide which of the two should occupy the first rank; +as, on the other hand, the principle which is superior to them (the +One) could not be thus described, it would seem that we would have +the right to identify intelligible "being" (or, nature), and the aeon +(or, eternity), so much the more as the intelligible world and the +aeon (age, or eternity), comprise the same things. Nevertheless, were +we to place one of these principles within the other, we would posit +intelligible nature ("being") within the aeon (age, or eternity). +Likewise, when we say that an intelligible entity is eternal, as +(Plato) does:[346] "the nature of the model is eternal," we are +thereby implying that the aeon (age or eternity) is something distinct +from intelligible nature ("being"), though referring thereto, as +attribute or presence. The mere fact that both the aeon (eternity) and +intelligible nature ("being"), are both venerable does not imply their +identity; the venerableness of the one may be no more than derivative +from that of the other. The argument that both comprise the same +entities would still permit intelligible nature ("being") to contain +all the entities it contains as parts, while the aeon (or age, or +eternity) might contain them as wholes, without any distinctions as +parts; it contains them, in this respect, that they are called eternal +on its account. + + +FAULTS OF THE DEFINITION THAT ETERNITY IS AT REST, WHILE TIME IS IN +MOTION. + +Some define eternity as the "rest"[440] of intelligible nature +("being"), just like time is defined as "motion" here below. In this +case we should have to decide whether eternity be identical with +rest in general, or only in such rest as would be characteristic of +intelligible nature ("being"). If indeed eternity were to be identified +with rest in general, we would first have to observe that rest could +not be said to be eternal, any more than we can say that eternity is +eternal, for we only call eternal that which participates in eternity; +further, under this hypothesis, we should have to clear up how movement +could ever be eternal; for if it were eternal, it would rest (or, it +would stop). Besides, how could the idea of rest thus imply the idea +of perpetuity, not indeed of that perpetuity which is in time, but of +that of which we conceive when speaking of the aeonial (or, eternal)? +Besides, if the rest characteristic of intelligible "being" in itself +alone contain perpetuity, this alone would exclude from eternity the +other genera (or categories) of existence. Further yet, eternity has to +be conceived of as not only in rest, but (according to Plato[438]) also +in unity, which is something that excludes every interval--otherwise, +it would become confused with time;--now rest does not imply the idea +of unity, nor that of an interval. Again, we assert that eternity +resides in unity; and therefore participates in rest without being +identified therewith. + + +ETERNITY AS A UNION OF THE FIVE CATEGORIES. + +2. (3). What then is that thing by virtue of which the intelligible +world is eternal and perpetual? Of what does perpetuity consist? +Either perpetuity and eternity are identical, or eternity is related +to perpetuity. Evidently, however, eternity consists in an unity, but +in an unity formed by multiple elements, in a conception of nature +derived from intelligible entities, or which is united to them, or +is perceived in them, so that all these intelligible entities form +an unity, though this unity be at the same time manifold in nature +and powers. Thus contemplating the manifold power of the intelligible +world, we call "being" its substrate; movement its life; rest its +permanence; difference the manifoldness of its principles; and +identity, their unity.[441] Synthesizing these principles, they fuse +into one single life, suppressing their difference, considering +the inexhaustible duration, the identity and immutability of their +action, of their life and thought, for which there is neither change +nor interval. The contemplation of all these entities constitutes +the contemplation of eternity; and we see a life that is permanent +in its identity, which ever possesses all present things, which does +not contain them successively, but simultaneously; whose manner of +existence is not different at various times, but whose perfection is +consummate and indivisible. It therefore contains all things at the +same time, as in a single point, without any of them draining off; it +resides in identity, that is, within itself, undergoing no change. Ever +being in the present, because it never lost anything, and will never +acquire anything, it is always what it is. Eternity is not intelligible +existence; it is the (light) that radiates from this existence, whose +identity completely excludes the future and admits nothing but present +existence, which remains what it is, and does not change. + + +THE LIFE OF THE INTELLIGENCE IS EVER CONTEMPORANEOUS. + +What that it does not already possess could (intelligible existence) +possess later? What could it be in the future, that it is not now? +There is nothing that could be added to or subtracted from its +present state; for it was not different from what it is now; and it +is not to possess anything that it does not necessarily possess now, +so that one could never say of it, "it was"; for what did it have +that it does not now have? Nor could it be said of it, "it will be"; +for what could it acquire? It must therefore remain what it is. (As +Plato thought[438]), that possesses eternity of which one cannot say +either "it was," or "will be," but only, "it is;" that whose existence +is immutable, because the past did not make it lose anything, and +because the future will not make it acquire anything. Therefore, on +examining the existence of intelligible nature, we see that its life is +simultaneously entire, complete, and without any kind of an interval. +That is the eternity we seek. + + +ETERNITY IS NOT AN ACCIDENT OF THE INTELLIGIBLE, BUT AN INTIMATE PART +OF ITS NATURE. + +3. (4). Eternity is not an extrinsic accident of (intelligible) nature, +but is in it, of it, and with it. We see that it is intimately inherent +in (intelligible nature) because we see that all other things, of which +we say that they exist on high, are of and with this (intelligible) +nature; for the things that occupy the first rank in existence must be +united with the first Beings, and subsist there. Thus the beautiful +is in them, and comes from them; thus also does truth dwell in them. +There the whole in a certain way exists within the part; the parts +also are in the whole; because this whole, really being the whole, is +not composed of parts, but begets the parts themselves, a condition +necessary to its being a whole. In this whole, besides, truth does +not consist in the agreement of one notion with another, but is the +very nature of each of the things of which it is the truth. In order, +really to be a whole, this real whole must be all not only in the sense +that it is all things, but also in the sense that it lacks nothing. In +this case, nothing will, for it, be in the future; for to say that, +for it, something "will be" for it implies that it lacked something +before that, that it was not yet all; besides, nothing can happen to it +against nature, because it is impassible. As nothing could happen to +it, for it nothing "is to be," "will be," or "has been." + + +TO BEGOTTEN THINGS THE FUTURE IS NECESSARY; BUT NOT TO THE INTELLIGIBLE. + +As the existence of begotten things consists in perpetually acquiring +(something or another), they will be annihilated by a removal of their +future. An attribution of the future to the (intelligible) entities of +a nature contrary (to begotten things), would degrade them from the +rank of existences. Evidently they will not be consubstantial with +existence, if this existence of theirs be in the future or past. The +nature ("being") of begotten things on the contrary consists in going +from the origin of their existence to the last limits of the time +beyond which they will no longer exist; that is in what their future +consists.[442] Abstraction of their future diminishes their life, and +consequently their existence. That is also what will happen to the +universe, in so far as it will exist; it aspires to being what it +should be, without any interruption, because it derives existence from +the continual production of fresh actualizations; for the same reason, +it moves in a circle because it desires to possess intelligible nature +("being"). Such is the existence that we discover in begotten things, +such is the cause that makes them ceaselessly aspire to existence +in the future. The Beings that occupy the first rank and which are +blessed, have no desire of the future, because they are already all +that it lies in them to be, and because they possess all the life they +are ever to possess. They have therefore nothing to seek, since there +is no future for them; neither can they receive within themselves +anything for which there might be a future. Thus the nature ("being") +of intelligible existence is absolute, and entire, not only in its +parts, but also in its totality, which reveals no fault, which lacks +nothing, and to which nothing that in any way pertains to nonentity +could be added; for intelligible existence must not only embrace in +its totality and universality all beings, but it must also receive +nothing that pertains to nonentity. It is this disposition and nature +of intelligible existence that constitutes the aeon (or eternity); +for (according to Aristotle)[443] this word is derived from "aei on," +"being continually." + + +DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ETERNITY AND PERPETUITY. + +4. (5). That this is the state of affairs appears when, on applying +one's intelligence to the contemplation of some of the intelligible +Entities, it becomes possible to assert, or rather, to see that it is +absolutely incapable of ever having undergone any change; otherwise, it +would not always exist; or rather, it would not always exist entirely. +Is it thus perpetual? Doubtless; its nature is such that one may +recognize that it is always such as it is, and that it could never be +different in the future; so that, should one later on again contemplate +it, it will be found similar to itself (unchanged). Therefore, if +we should never cease from contemplation, if we should ever remain +united thereto while admiring its nature, and if in that actualization +we should show ourselves indefatigable, we would succeed in raising +ourselves to eternity; but, to be as eternal as existence, we must not +allow ourselves to be in anyway distracted from contemplating eternity, +and eternal nature in the eternal itself. If that which exists thus be +eternal, and exists ever, evidently that which never lowers itself to +an inferior nature; which possesses life in its fulness, without ever +having received, receiving, or being about to receive anything; this +nature would be "aidion," or perpetual. Perpetuity is the property +constitutive of such a substrate; being of it, and in it.[443] Eternity +is the substrate in which this property manifests. Consequently reason +dictates that eternity is something venerable, identical with the +divinity.[444] We might even assert that the age ("aion," or eternity) +is a divinity that manifests within itself, and outside of itself in +its immutable and identical existence, in the permanence of its life. +Besides, there is nothing to surprise any one if in spite of that we +assert a manifoldness in the divinity. Every intelligible entity is +manifoldness because infinite in power, infinite in the sense that it +lacks nothing; it exercises this privilege peculiarly because it is not +subject to losing anything. + + +ETERNITY IS INFINITE UNIVERSAL LIFE THAT CANNOT LOSE ANYTHING. + +Eternity, therefore, may be defined as the life that is at present +infinite because it is universal and loses nothing, as it has no past +nor future; otherwise it would no longer be whole. To say that it is +universal and loses nothing explains the expression: "the life that is +at present infinite." + + +ETERNITY IS SEMPITERNAL EXISTENCE. + +5. (6). As this nature that is eternal and radiant with beauty refers +to the One, issues from Him, and returns to Him, as it never swerves +from Him, ever dwelling around Him and in Him, and lives according +to Him, Plato was quite right[438] in saying not casually, but with +great profundity of thought, that "eternity is immutable in unity." +Thereby Plato not only reduces the eternity to the unity that it is +in itself, but also relates the life of existence to the One itself. +This life is what we seek; its permanence is eternity. Indeed that +which remains in that manner, and which remains the same thing, that +is, the actualization of that life which remains turned towards, and +united with the One, that whose existence and life are not deceptive, +that truly is eternity. (For intelligible or) true existence is to +have no time when it does not exist, no time when it exists in a +different manner; it is therefore to exist in an immutable manner +without any diversity, without being first in one, and then in +another state. To conceive of (existence), therefore, we must neither +imagine intervals in its existence, nor suppose that it develops or +acquires, nor believe that it contains any succession; consequently +we could neither distinguish within it, or assert within it either +before or after. If it contain neither "before" nor "after," if the +truest thing that can be affirmed of it be that it is, if it exist as +"being" and life, here again is eternity revealed. When we say that +existence exists always, and that there is not one time in which it +is, and another in which it is not, we speak thus only for the sake +of greater clearness; for when we use the word "always," we do not +take it in an absolute sense; but if we use it to show that existence +is incorruptible, it might well mislead the mind in leading it to +issue out from the unity (characteristic of eternity) to make it run +through the manifold (which is foreign to eternity). "Always" further +indicates that existence is never defective. It might perhaps be better +to say simply "existence." But though the word "existence" suffices to +designate "being," as several philosophers have confused "being" with +generation, it was necessary to clear up the meaning of existence by +adding the term "always." Indeed, though we are referring only to one +and the same thing by "existence" and "existing always," just as when +we say "philosopher," and "the true philosopher," nevertheless, as +there are false philosophers, it has been necessary to add to the term +"philosophers" the adjective "true." Likewise, it has been necessary to +add the term "always" to that of "existing," and that of "existing" to +that of "always;" that is the derivation of the expression "existing +always," and consequently (by contraction), "aion," or, eternity. +Therefore the idea "always" must be united to that of "existing," so as +to designate the "real being." + + +THE CREATOR, BEING OUTSIDE OF TIME, PRECEDES THE UNIVERSAL ONLY AS ITS +CAUSE. + +"Always" must therefore be applied to the power which contains no +interval in its existence, which has need of nothing outside of what +it possesses, because it possesses everything, because it is every +being, and thus lacks nothing. Such a nature could not be complete +in one respect, but incomplete in another. Even if what is in time +should appear complete, as a body that suffices the soul appears +complete, though it be complete only for the soul; that which is in +time needs the future, and consequently is incomplete in respect to +the time it stands in need of; when it succeeds in enjoying the time +to which it aspires, and succeeds in becoming united thereto, even +though it still remain imperfect it still is called perfect by verbal +similarity. But the existence whose characteristic it is not to need +the future, not to be related to any other time--whether capable +of being measured, or indefinite, and still to be indefinite--the +existence that already possesses all it should possess is the very +existence that our intelligence seeks out; it does not derive its +existence from any particular quality, but exists before any quantity. +As it is not any kind of quantity, it could not admit within itself +any kind of quantity. Otherwise, as its life would be divided, it +would itself cease to be absolutely indivisible; but existence must +be as indivisible in its life as in its nature ("being"). (Plato's +expression,[446]) "the Creator was good" does indeed refer to the +notion of the universe, and indicates that, in the Principle superior +to the universe, nothing began to exist at any particular time. Never, +therefore, did the universe begin to exist within time, because though +its Author existed "before" it, it was only in the sense that its +author was the cause of its existence. But, after having used the word +"was," to express this thought, Plato immediately corrects himself, +and he demonstrates that this word does not apply to the Things that +possess eternity. + + +TO STUDY TIME WE HAVE TO DESCEND FROM THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD. + +6. (7). Speaking thus of eternity, it is not anything foreign to us, +and we do not need to consult the testimony of anybody but ourselves. +For indeed, how could we understand anything that we could not +perceive? How could we perceive something that would be foreign to us? +We ourselves, therefore, must participate in eternity. But how can we +do so, since we are in time? To understand how one can simultaneously +be in time and in eternity, it will be necessary to study time. We +must therefore descend from eternity to study time. To find eternity, +we have been obliged to rise to the intelligible world; now we are +obliged to descend therefrom to treat of time; not indeed descending +therefrom entirely, but only so far as time itself descended therefrom. + + +B. TIME. + + +THE OPINIONS OF THE PHILOSOPHERS ABOUT TIME MUST BE STUDIED. + +If those blessed ancient philosophers had not already uttered their +views about time, we would only need to add to the idea of eternity +what we have to say of the idea of time, and to set forth our opinion +on the subject, trying to make it correspond with the already expressed +notion of eternity. But we now must examine the most reasonable +opinions that have been advanced about time, and observe how far our +own opinion may conform thereto. + + +TIME CONSIDERED EITHER AS MOTION; AS SOMETHING MOVABLE; OR SOMETHING OF +MOTION. + +To begin with, we may divide the generally accepted opinions about +time into three classes: time as movement, as something movable, or +as some part of movement. It would be too contrary to the notion of +time to try to define it as rest, as being at rest, or as some part of +rest; for time is incompatible with identity (and consequently with +rest, and with what is at rest). Those who consider time as movement, +claim that it is either any kind of movement, or the movement of the +universe. Those who consider it as something movable are thinking of +the sphere of the universe; while those who consider time as some part +of movement consider it either as the interval of movement, or as its +measure, or as some consequence of movement in general, or regular +movement. + + +POLEMIC AGAINST THE STOICS; TIME IS NOT MOVEMENT. + +7. (8). Time cannot (as the Stoics claim,[447]) be movement. Neither +can we gather together all movements, so as to form but a single one, +nor can we consider the regular movement only; for these two kinds of +motion are within time. If we were to suppose that there was a movement +that did not operate within time, such a movement would still be far +removed from being time, since, under this hypothesis, the movement +itself is entirely different from that in which the movement occurs. +Amidst the many reasons which, in past and present, have been advanced +to refute this opinion, a single one suffices: namely, that movement +can cease and stop, while time never suspends its flight. To the +objection that the movement of the universe never stops, we may answer +that this movement, if it consist in the circular movement (of the +stars, according to Hestius of Perinthus; or of the sun, according to +Eratosthenes[447]) operates within a definite time, at the end of which +it returns to the same point of the heavens, but it does not accomplish +this within the same space of time taken up in fulfilling the half of +its course. One of these movements is only half of the other, and the +second is double. Besides, both, the one that runs through half of +space, and the one that runs through the whole of it, are movements of +the universe. Besides, it has been noticed that the movement of the +exterior sphere is the swiftest. This distinction supports our view, +for it implies that the movement of this sphere, and the time used to +operate it, are different entities; the most rapid movement is the one +that takes up the least time, and runs through the greatest amount of +space; the slowest movements are those that employ the longest time, +and run through only a part of that space.[448] + + +POLEMIC AGAINST THE PYTHAGOREANS: TIME IS NOT WHAT IS MOVABLE. + +On the other hand, if time be not the movement of the sphere, +evidently it is far less (than that which is movable, as thought the +Pythagoreans,[449]) or (as Pythagoras thought), the sphere (of heaven) +itself, as some have thought, because it moves. (This fact alone is +sufficient to refute the opinion that confuses time with that which is +movable). + + +POLEMIC AGAINST THE STOIC ZENO: TIME IS NO INTERVAL OF MOVEMENT. + +Is time then some part of movement? (Zeno[450]) calls it the interval +of movement; but the interval is not the same for all movements, even +if the latter were of similar nature; for movements that operate within +space may be swifter or slower. It is possible that the intervals of +the most rapid and of the slowest movement might be measured by some +third interval, which might far more reasonably be considered time. But +which of these three intervals shall be called time? Rather, which of +all the intervals, infinite in number as they are, shall time be? If +time be considered the interval of the regular movement, it will not be +the particular interval of every regular movement; otherwise, as there +are several regular movements, there would be several kinds of time. If +time be defined as the interval of movement of the universe, that is, +the interval contained within this movement, it will be nothing else +than this movement itself. + + +PERSISTENT MOVEMENT AND ITS INTERVAL ARE NOT TIME, BUT ARE WITHIN IT. + +Besides, this movement is a definite quantity. Either this quantity +will be measured by the extension of the space traversed, and the +interval will consist in that extension; but that extension is space, +and not time. Or we shall say that movement has a certain interval +because it is continuous, and that instead of stopping immediately it +always becomes prolonged; but this continuity is nothing else than the +magnitude (that is, the duration) of the movement. Even though after +consideration of a movement it be estimated as great, as might be said +of a "great heat"--this does not yet furnish anything in which time +might appear and manifest; we have here only a sequence of movements +which succeed one another like waves, and only the observed interval +between them; now the sequence of movements forms a number, such as +two or three; and the interval is an extension. Thus the magnitude of +the movement will be a number, say, such as ten; or an interval that +manifests in the extension traversed by the movement. Now the notion +of time is not revealed herein, but we find only a quantity that is +produced within time. Otherwise, time, instead of being everywhere, +will exist only in the movement as an attribute in a substrate, which +amounts to saying that time is movement; for the interval (of the +movement) is not outside of movement, and is only a non-instantaneous +movement. If then time be a non-instantaneous movement, just as we +often say that some particular instantaneous fact occurs within time, +we shall be forced to ask the difference between what is and what is +not instantaneous. Do these things differ in relation to time? Then the +persisting movement and its interval are not time, but within time. + + +POLEMIC AGAINST STRATO: TIME IS NOT MOTION AND REST. + +Somebody might object that time is indeed the interval of movement, but +that it is not the characteristic interval of movement itself, being +only the interval in which movement exerts its extension, following +along with it. All these terms lack definition. This (extension) is +nothing else than the time within which the movement occurs. But +that is precisely the question at issue, from the very start. It is +as if a person who had been asked to define time should answer "time +is the interval of the movement produced within time." What then is +this interval called time, when considered outside of the interval +characteristic of movement? If the interval characteristic of time +be made to consist in movement, where shall the duration of rest be +posited? Indeed, for one object to be in motion implies that another +(corresponding object) is at rest; now the time of these objects is the +same, though for one it be the time of movement, and for the other the +time of rest (as thought Strato[451]). What then is the nature of this +interval? It cannot be an interval of space, since space is exterior +(to the movements that occur within it). + + +POLEMIC AGAINST ARISTOTLE: TIME IS NOT THE NUMBER AND MEASURE OF +MOVEMENT. + +8. (9). Let us now examine in what sense it may be said (by +Aristotle[452]) that time is the number and measure of movement, +which definition seems more reasonable, because of the continuity +of movement. To begin with, following the method adopted with the +definition of time as "the interval of movement," we might ask whether +time be the measure and number of any kind of movement.[453] For how +indeed could we give a numerical valuation of unequal or irregular +movement. What system of numbering or measurement shall we use for +this? If the same measure be applied to slow or to swift movement, +in their case measure and number will be the same as the number ten +applied equally to horses and oxen; and further, such measure might +also be applied to dry and wet substances. If time be a measure of +this kind, we clearly see that it is the measure of movements, but we +do not discover what it may be in itself. If the number ten can be +conceived as a number, after making abstraction of the horses it served +to measure, if therefore a measure possess its own individuality, +even while no longer measuring anything, the case must be similar +with time, inasmuch as it is a measure. If then time be a number in +itself, in what does it differ from the number ten, or from any other +number composed of unities? As it is a continuous measure, and as it +is a quantity, it might, for instance, turn out to be something like +a foot-rule. It would then be a magnitude, as, for instance, a line, +which follows the movement; but how will this line be able to measure +what it follows? Why would it measure one thing rather than another? +It seems more reasonable to consider this measure, not as the measure +of every kind of movement, but only as the measure of the movement it +follows.[452] Then that measure is continuous, so far as the movement +it follows itself continue to exist. In this case, we should not +consider measure as something exterior, and separated from movement, +but as united to the measured movement. What then will measure? Is it +the movement that will be measured, and the extension that will measure +it? Which of these two things will time be? Will it be the measuring +movement, or the measuring extension? Time will be either the movement +measured by extension, or the measuring extension; or some third thing +which makes use of extension, as one makes use of a foot-rule, to +measure the quantity of movement. But in all these cases, we must, as +has already been noticed, suppose that movement is uniform; for unless +the movement be uniform, one and universal, the theory that movement is +a measure of any kind whatever will become almost impossible. If time +be "measured movement," that is, measured by quantity--besides granting +that it at all needs to be measured--movement must not be measured by +itself, but by something different. On the other hand, if movement +have a measure different from itself, and if, consequently, we need a +continuous measure to measure it, the result would be that extension +itself would need measure, so that movement, being measured, may have +a quantity which is determined by that of the thing according to which +it is measured. Consequently, under this hypothesis, time would be +the number of the extension which follows movement, and not extension +itself which follows movement. + + +NOR CAN TIME BE A NUMBERED NUMBER (AS ARISTOTLE CLAIMED[452]). + +What is this number? Is it composed of unities? How does it measure? +That would still have to be explained. Now let us suppose that we had +discovered how it measures; we would still not have discovered the time +that measures, but a time that was such or such an amount. Now that is +not the same thing as time; there is a difference between time and some +particular quantity of time. Before asserting that time has such or +such a quantity, we have to discover the nature of that which has that +quantity. We may grant that time is the number which measures movement, +while remaining exterior thereto, as "ten" is in "ten horses" without +being conceived with them (as Aristotle claimed, that it was not a +numbering, but a numbered number). But in this case, we still have to +discover the nature of this number that, before numbering, is what it +is, as would be "ten" considered in itself.[454] It may be said that it +is that number which, by following number, measures according to the +priority and posteriority of that movement.[452] Nor do we yet perceive +the nature of that number which measures by priority and posteriority. +In any case, whatever measures by priority or posteriority, or by +a present moment,[455] or by anything else, certainly does measure +according to time. Thus this number (?) which measures movement +according to priority or posteriority, must touch time, and, to measure +movement, be related thereto. Prior and posterior necessarily designate +either different parts of space, as for instance the beginning of a +stadium, or parts of time. What is called priority is time that ends +with the present; what is called posteriority, is the time that begins +at the present. Time therefore is something different from the number +that measures movement according to priority or posteriority,--I do +not say, any kind of movement, but still regular movement. Besides, +why should we have time by applying number either to what measures, or +to what is measured? For in this case these two may be identical. If +movement exist along with the priority and posteriority which relate +thereto, why will we not have time without number? This would amount +to saying that extension has such a quantity only in case of the +existence of somebody who recognizes that it possesses that quantity. +Since (Aristotle[456]) says that time is infinite, and that it is such +effectually, how can it contain number without our taking a portion of +time to measure it? From that would result that time existed before +it was measured. But why could time not exist before the existence +of a soul to measure it? (Aristotle) might have answered that it was +begotten by the soul. The mere fact that the soul measures time need +not necessarily imply that the soul produced the time; time, along +with its suitable quantity, would exist even if nobody measured it. If +however it be said that it is the soul that makes use of extension to +measure time, we will answer that this is of no importance to determine +the notion of time. + + +POLEMIC AGAINST EPICURUS: TIME IS NOT AN ACCIDENT OR CONSEQUENCE OF +MOVEMENT. + +9. (10). When (Epicurus[457]) says that time is a consequence of +movement, he is not explaining the nature of time; this would demand a +preliminary definition of the consequence of movement. Besides, this +alleged consequence of movement--granting the possibility of such +a consequence--must be prior, simultaneous, or posterior. For, in +whatever way we conceive of it, it is within time. Consequently, if the +consequence of movement be time, the result would be that time is a +consequence of movement in time (which is nonsense). + + +PLOTINOS CAN GO NO FURTHER IN REFUTING ENDLESS DEFINITIONS OF TIME. + +Now, as our purpose is to discover, not what time is not, but what +it really is, we notice that this question has been treated at great +length by many thinkers before us; and if we were to undertake to +consider all existing opinions on the subject, we would be obliged to +write a veritable history of the subject. We have here, however, gone +to the limit of our ability in treating it without specializing in it. +As has been seen, it is easy enough to refute the opinion that time +is the measure of the movement of the universe, and to raise against +this opinion the objections that we have raised against the definition +of time as the measure of movement in general, opposing thereto the +irregularity of movement, and the other points from which suitable +arguments may be drawn. We are therefore free to devote ourselves to an +explanation of what time really is. + + +THE NATURE OF TIME WILL BE REVEALED BY ITS ORIGIN. + +10. (11). To accomplish this we shall have to return to the nature +which, as we pointed out above, was essential to eternity; that +immutable life, wholly realized all at once, infinite and perfect, +subsisting in, and referring to unity. Time was not yet, or at least, +it did not yet exist for the intelligible entities. Only, it was yet +to be born of them,[458] because (as was the world), time, by both its +reason and nature, was posterior to the (intelligible entities[459]). +Are we trying to understand how time issued from among intelligible +entities while these were resting within themselves? Here it would be +useless to call upon the Muses, for they did not yet exist. Still this +might perhaps not be useless; for (in a certain sense, that time had +already begun, then, so far as they existed within the sense-world) +they existed already. In any case, the birth of time will be plain +enough if we consider it only as it is born and manifested. Thus much +can be said about it. + + +TIME AROSE AS MEASUREMENT OF THE ACTIVITY OF THE UNIVERSAL SOUL. + +Before priority and posteriority, time, which did not yet exist, +brooded within existence itself. But an active nature (the universal +Soul), which desired to be mistress of herself, to possess herself, and +ceaselessly to add to the present, entered into motion, as did time, +along with (the Soul). We achieve a representation of the time that +is the image of eternity, by the length that we must go through with +to reach what follows, and is posterior, towards one moment, and then +towards another.[460] + + +LIKE TIME, SPACE IS THE RESULT OF THE PROCESSION OF THE UNIVERSAL SOUL. + +As the universal Soul contained an activity that agitated her, and +impelled her to transport into another world what she still saw on +high, she was willing to retain all things that were present at the +same time. (Time arose not by a single fiat, but as the result of a +process. This occurred within the universal Soul, but may well be +first illustrated by the more familiar process within) Reason, which +distributes unity, not indeed That which remains within itself, but +that which is exterior to itself. Though this process seem to be a +strengthening one, reason developing out of the seed in which it +brooded unto manifoldness, it is really a weakening (or destructive +one), inasmuch as it weakened manifoldness by division, and weakened +reason by causing it to extend. The case was similar with the universal +Soul. When she produced the sense-world, the latter was animated by +a movement which was only an image of intelligible movement. (While +trying to strengthen) this image-movement to the extent of the +intelligible movement, she herself (weakened), instead of remaining +exclusively eternal, became temporal and (involuntarily) subjected what +she had produced to the conditions of time, transferring entirely into +time not only the universe, but also all its revolutions. Indeed, as +the world moves within the universal Soul, which is its location, it +also moves within the time that this Soul bears within herself.[461] +Manifesting her power in a varied and successive manner, by her mode +of action, the universal Soul begat succession. Indeed, she passes +from one conception to another, and consequently to what did not exist +before, since this conception was not effective, and since the present +life of the soul does not resemble her former life. Her life is varied, +and from the variety of her life results the variety of time.[462] + + +TIME IS THE LIFE OF THE SOUL CONSIDERED IN THE MOVEMENT BY WHICH SHE +PASSES FROM ONE ACTUALIZATION TO ANOTHER. + +Thus, the extension of the life of the soul produces time, and the +perpetual progression of her life produces the perpetuity of time, and +her former life constitutes the past. We may therefore properly define +time as the life of the soul considered in the movement by which she +passes from one actualization to another. + + +WHAT ETERNITY IS TO INTELLIGENCE, TIME IS TO THE UNIVERSAL SOUL. + +We have already decided that eternity is life characterized by rest, +identity, immutability and infinity (in intelligence). It is, further, +(admitted that) this our world is the image of the superior World +(of intelligence). We have also come to the conclusion that time +is the image of eternity. Consequently, corresponding to the Life +characteristic of Intelligence, this world must contain another life +which bears the same name, and which belongs to that power of the +universal Soul. Instead of the movement of Intelligence, we will have +the movement characteristic of a part of the soul (as the universal +Soul ceaselessly passes from one thought to another). Corresponding to +the permanence, identity, and immutability (of Intelligence), we will +have the mobility of a principle which ceaselessly passes from one +actualization to another. Corresponding to the unity and the absence +of all extension, we will have a mere image of unity, an image which +exists only by virtue of continuity. Corresponding to an infinity +already entirely present, we will have a progression towards infinity +which perpetually tends towards what follows. Corresponding to what +exists entirely at the same time, we will have what exists by parts, +and what will never exist entire at the same time. The soul's existence +will have to be ceaseless acquiring of existence; if it is to reveal an +image of the complete, universal and infinite existence of the soul; +that is the reason its existence is able to represent the intelligible +existence. + + +TIME IS AS INTERIOR TO THE SOUL AS ETERNITY IS TO EXISTENCE. + +Time, therefore, is not something external to the soul, any more than +eternity is exterior to existence. It is neither a consequence nor a +result of it, any more than eternity is a consequence of existence. It +appears within the soul, is in her and with her, as eternity is in and +with existence. + + +TIME IS THE LENGTH OF THE LIFE OF THE UNIVERSAL SOUL. + +11. (12). The result of the preceding considerations is that time +must be conceived of as the length of the life characteristic of the +universal Soul; that her course is composed of changes that are equal, +uniform, and insensible, so that that course implies a continuity of +action. Now let us for a moment suppose that the power of the Soul +should cease to act, and to enjoy the life she at present possesses +without interruption or limit, because this life is the activity +characteristic of an eternal Soul, an action by which the Soul does +not return upon herself, and does not concentrate on herself, though +enabling her to beget and produce. Now supposing that the Soul +should cease to act, that she should apply her superior part to the +intelligible world, and to eternity, and that she should there remain +calmly united--what then would remain, unless eternity? For what room +for succession would that allow, if all things were immovable in unity? +How could she contain priority, posteriority, or more or less duration +of time? How could the Soul apply herself to some object other than +that which occupies her? Further, one could not then even say that +she applied herself to the subject that occupied her; she would have +to be separated therefrom in order to apply herself thereto. Neither +would the universal Sphere exist, since it does not exist before +time, because it exists and moves within time. Besides, even if this +Sphere were at rest during the activity of the Soul, we could measure +the duration of her rest because this rest is posterior to the rest +of eternity. Since time is annihilated so soon as the Soul ceases to +act, and concentrates in unity, time must be produced by the beginning +of the Soul's motion towards sense-objects, by the Soul's life. +Consequently (Plato[463]) says that time is born with the universe, +because the Soul produced time with the universe; for it is this very +action of the Soul which has produced this universe. This action +constitutes time, and the universe is within time. Plato does indeed +call the movements of the stars, time; but evidently only figuratively, +as (Plato) subsequently says that the stars were created to indicate +the divisions of time, and to permit us to measure it easily. + + +TIME IS NOT BEGOTTEN BY MOVEMENT, BUT ONLY INDICATED THEREBY. + +Indeed, as it was not possible to determine the time itself of the +Soul, and to measure within themselves the parts of an invisible and +uncognizable duration, especially for men who did not know how to +count, the (world) Soul created day and night so that their succession +might be the basis of counting as far as two, by the aid of this +variety. Plato[464] indicates that as the source of the notion of +number. Later, observing the space of time which elapses from one dawn +to another, we were able to discover an interval of time determined by +an uniform movement, so far as we direct our gaze thereupon, and as +we use it as a measure by which to measure time. The expression "to +measure time" is premeditated, because time, considered in itself, is +not a measure. How indeed could time measure, and what would time, +while measuring, say? Would time say of anything, "Here is an extension +as large as myself?" What indeed could be the nature of the entity that +would speak of "myself"? Would it be that according to which quantity +is measured? In this case, time would have to be something by itself, +to measure without itself being a measure. The movement of the universe +is measured according to time, but it is not the nature of time to be +the measure of movement; it is such only accidentally; it indicates +the quantity of movement, because it is prior to it, and differs from +it. On the other hand, in the case of a movement produced within a +determinate time, and if a number be added thereto frequently enough, +we succeed in reaching the knowledge of how much time has elapsed. +It is therefore correct to say that the movement of the revolution +operated by the universal Sphere measures time so far as possible, by +its quantity indicating the corresponding quantity of time, since it +can neither be grasped nor conceived otherwise. Thus what is measured, +that is, what is indicated by the revolution of the universal Sphere, +is time. It is not begotten, but only indicated by movement. + + +MOVEMENT IS SAID TO BE MEASURED BY SPACE, BECAUSE OF ITS +INDETERMINATION. + +The measure of movement, therefore, seems to be what is measured by +a definite movement, but which is other than this movement. There is +a difference, indeed, between that which is measured, and that which +measures; but that which is measured is measured only by accident. +That would amount to saying that what is measured by a foot-rule is +an extension, without defining what extension in itself is. In the +same way, because of the inability to define movement more clearly +because of its indeterminate nature, we say that movement is that which +is measured by space; for, by observation of the space traversed by +movement, we can judge of the quantity of the movement. + + +TIME IS MEASURED BY MOVEMENT, AND IN THAT SENSE IT IS THE MEASURE OF +MOVEMENT. + +12. (13). The revolution of the universal Sphere leads us therefore to +the recognition of time, within which it occurs. Not only is time that +in which (all things "become," that is, grow), but time has to be what +it is even before all things, being that within which everything moves, +or rests with order and uniformity. This is discovered and manifested +to our intelligence, but not produced by regular movement and rest, +especially by movement. Better than rest, indeed, does movement lead us +to a conception of time, and it is either to appreciate the duration +of movement than that of rest. That is what led philosophers to define +time as the measure "of" movement, instead of saying, what probably +lay within their intention, that time is measured "by" movement. Above +all, we must not consider that definition as adequate, adding to it +that which the measured entity is in itself, not limiting ourselves +to express what applies to it only incidentally. Neither did we ever +discern that such was their meaning, and we were unable to understand +their teachings as they evidently posited the measure in the measured +entity. No doubt that which hindered us from understanding them was +that they were addressing their teachings to learned (thinkers), or +well prepared listeners, and therefore, in their writings, they failed +to explain the nature of time considered in itself, whether it be +measure or something measured. + + +PLATO DOES MAKE SOME STATEMENTS THAT ALLOW OF BEING JUSTIFIED. + +Plato himself, indeed, does say, not that the nature of time is to +be a measure or something measured, but that to make it known there +is, in the circular movement of the universe, a very short element +(the interval of a day), whose object is to demonstrate the smallest +portion of time, through which we are enabled to discover the nature +and quantity of time. In order to indicate to us its nature ("being"), +(Plato[438]) says that it was born with the heavens, and that it is +the mobile image of eternity. Time is mobile because it has no more +permanence than the life of the universal Soul, because it passes on +and flows away therewith; it is born with the heavens, because it is +one and the same life that simultaneously produces the heavens and +time. If, granting its possibility, the life of the Soul were reduced +to the unity (of the Intelligence), there would be an immediate +cessation of time, which exists only in this life, and the heavens, +which exist only through this life. + + +TIME AS THE PRIOR AND POSTERIOR OF THE MOVEMENT OF THIS LIFE WOULD BE +ABSURD. + +The theory that time is the priority and posteriority of this (earthly) +movement, and of this inferior life, is ridiculous in that it +would imply on one hand that (the priority and posteriority of this +sense-life) are something; and on the other, refusing to recognize +as something real a truer movement, which includes both priority and +posteriority. It would, indeed, amount to attributing to an inanimate +movement the privilege of containing within itself priority with +posteriority, that is, time; while refusing it to the movement (of the +Soul), whose movement of the universal Sphere is no more than an image. +Still it is from the movement (of the Soul) that originally emanated +priority and posteriority, because this movement is efficient by +itself. By producing all its actualizations it begets succession, and, +at the same time that it begets succession, it produces the passing +from one actualization to another. + + +THE PRIMARY MOVEMENT OF INTELLIGENCE THE INFORMING POWER OF TIME. + +(Some objector might ask) why we reduce the movement of the universe +to the movement of the containing Soul, and admit that she is within +time, while we exclude from time the (universal) Soul's movement, which +subsists within her, and perpetually passes from one actualization +to another? The reason is that above the activity of the Soul there +exists nothing but eternity, which shares neither her movement nor her +extension. Thus the primary movement (of Intelligence) finds its goal +in time, begets it, and by its activity informs its duration. + + +WHY TIME IS PRESENT EVERYWHERE; POLEMIC AGAINST ANTIPHANES AND +CRITOLAUS. + +How then is time present everywhere? The life of the Soul is present in +all parts of the world, as the life of our soul is present in all parts +of our body. It may indeed be objected,[465] that time constitutes +neither a hypostatic substance, nor a real existence, being, in +respect to existence, a deception, just as we usually say that the +expressions "He was" and "He will be" are a deception in respect to +the divinity; for then He will be and was just as is that, in which, +according to his assertion, he is going to be. + +To answer these objections, we shall have to follow a different method. +Here it suffices to recall what was said above, namely, that by seeing +how far a man in motion has advanced, we can ascertain the quantity +of the movement; and that, when we discern movement by walking, we +simultaneously concede that, before the walking, movement in that man +was indicated by a definite quantity, since it caused his body to +progress by some particular quantity. As the body was moved during +a definite quantity of time, its quantity can be expressed by some +particular quantity of movement--for this is the movement that causes +it--and to its suitable quantity of time. Then this movement will be +applied to the movement of the soul, which, by her uniform action, +produces the interval of time. + + +THE MOVEMENT OF THE SOUL IS ATTRIBUTED TO THE PRIMARY MOVEMENT. + +To what shall the movement of the (universal) Soul be attributed? +To whatever we may choose to attribute it. This will always be some +indivisible principle, such as primary Motion, which within its +duration contains all the others, and is contained by none other;[466] +for it cannot be contained by anything; it is therefore genuinely +primary. The same obtains with the universal Soul. + + +APPROVAL OF ARISTOTLE: TIME IS ALSO WITHIN US. + +Is time also within us?[467] It is uniformly present in the universal +Soul, and in the individual souls that are all united together.[468] +Time, therefore, is not parcelled out among the souls, any more than +eternity is parcelled out among the (Entities in the intelligible +world) which, in this respect, are all mutually uniform. + + + + +FOOTNOTES: + + +[1] Arist. Physics, iii. 7. + +[2] Or, the finished, the boundary, the Gnostic Horos. + +[3] Plato, Philebus, 24; Cary, 37. + +[4] Plato, Timaeus, p. 52; Cary, 26. + +[5] See vi. 3.13. + +[6] See Plato, Philebus, Cary, 40; see ii. 4.11. + +[7] See vi. 3.27. + +[8] See ii. 4.10. + +[9] Timaeus, 39; Cary, 14; see iii. 7.11. + +[10] Parmenides, 144; Cary, 37. + +[11] Possibly a reference to Numenius' book thereon. + +[12] Aristotle, Met. i. 5; Jamblichus, de Vita. Pyth. 28.150; and +29.162; found in their oath; also Numenius, 60. + +[13] See vi. 2.7. + +[14] See vi. 6.5. + +[15] As thought Plato and Aristotle combined, see Ravaisson, Essay, ii. +407. + +[16] Atheneus, xii. 546; see i. 6.4. + +[17] Plato, Timaeus, 39e, Cary, 15. + +[18] See iii. 8.7. + +[19] As thought the Pythagoreans; see Sextus Empiricus, Hypotyposes +Pyrrh. 3.18, p. 165. + +[20] Olympiodorus, Comm. I Alcibiades, x. p. 95; Arist. Met., i. 5; +Sextus Emp., H. P., iii. 152; Porphyry; Vit. Pyth., 48. + +[21] As said Theon of Smyrna, of the Pythagoreans, ii. p. 23; +Jamblichus, Vit. Porph. 28.150; 29.162. + +[22] See i. 8.2. + +[23] Met. x. 2; iv. 2; v. + +[24] Peripatetic commentators on Aristotle's Metaphysics, which was +used as a text-book in Plotinos's school. + +[25] See end of Sec. 13. + +[26] See vi. 1.6. + +[27] See Aristotle, Categories, ii. 6. + +[28] As Aristotle thought, Met. x. 2. + +[29] See vi. 9.2. + +[30] Met. x. 1. + +[31] The Numenian secret name of the divinity, fr. 20. + +[32] Met. xiii. 7. + +[33] Aristotle, Met. x. 2. + +[34] Aristotle, Metaph. xiii. 7. + +[35] See iv. 8.3. + +[36] See iv. 4.5. + +[37] See v. 7.3. + +[38] See vi. 3.13. + +[39] See vi. 9.1. + +[40] See Timaeus, 35; Cary, 12. Jamblichus, On the Soul, 2; Macrobius, +Dream of Scipio, i. 5. + +[41] See Jamblichus, About Common Knowledge of Mathematics. + +[42] See Sec. 2. + +[43] Macrobius, Dream of Scipio, 1.5. + +[44] Parmenides quoted in Plato's Theataetus, 180 E. Jowett, iii. 383. + +[45] Plato, Timaeus, 56; Cary, 30. + +[46] In the Timaeus, 39; Cary, 14. + +[47] Parmenides, quoted by Plato, in the Sophists, 244; Cary, 61. + +[48] In Plato's Theataetus, 180; Jowett Tr. iii. 383. + +[49] Evidently Porphyry had advanced new objections that demanded an +addition to the former book on the theory of vision; see iv. 5. + +[50] As thought the Stoics. + +[51] Like Aristotle, de Sensu et Sensili, 2. + +[52] iv. 5. + +[53] These ten disjointed reflections on happiness remind us of +Porphyry's questioning habit, without which, Plotinos said, he might +have had nothing to write; see Biography, 13. + +[54] As Epicurus thought the divinities alone enjoyed perfect +happiness, Diog. Laert. x. 121. + +[55] See Aristotle, Nic. Ethics, 1.10. + +[56] See Cicero, de Finibus, ii. 27-29. + +[57] See iii. 7. + +[58] Plutarch, Dogm. Philos. i. 17; Stob. Eclog. i. 18. + +[59] Arist. Topic. iv. 2; de Gener. et Cor. i. 10; Ravaisson, EMA, i. +422. + +[60] As did Alexander of Aphrodisias, in his treatise on "Mixture;" +Ravaisson, EMA, ii. 297. + +[61] Stob. Eclog. i. 18. + +[62] See Plutarch, "Whether Wickedness Renders One Unhappy." + +[63] As said Numenius, 44. + +[64] See vi. 7. This is another proof of the chronological order, as +vi. 7 follows this book. + +[65] Bouillet explains that in this book Plotinos summated all that +Plato had to say of the Ideas and of their dependence on the Good, in +the Timaeus, Philebus, Phaedrus, the Republic, the Banquet, and the +Alcibiades; correcting this summary by the reflections of Aristotle, +in Met. xii. But Plotinos advances beyond both Plato and Aristotle in +going beyond Intelligence to the supreme Good. (See Sec. 37.) This +treatise might well have been written at the instigation of Porphyry, +who desired to understand Plotinos's views on this great subject. + +[66] The famous Philonic distinction between "ho theos," and "theos." + +[67] Plato, Timaeus, p. 45, Cary, 19. + +[68] See iii. 2. + +[69] See iii. 2.1. + +[70] Plato's Timaeus, pp. 30-40, Cary, 10-15. + +[71] An Aristotelian idea, from Met. vii. 1. + +[72] Aristotle, Met. vii. 17. + +[73] Met. vii. 1. + +[74] Met. vii. 7. + +[75] Aristotle, Met. v. 8. + +[76] Met. 1.3. + +[77] See ii. 9.3. + +[78] Aristotle, de Anima, ii. 2; Met. vii. 17. + +[79] Porphyry, Of the Faculties of the Soul, fr. 5. + +[80] See ii. 5.3. + +[81] Aristotle, de Anima, i. 3; ii. 2-4. + +[82] Plato, I Alcibiades, p. 130, Cary, 52. + +[83] See i. 1.3. + +[84] Bouillet explains this as follows: Discursive reason, which +constitutes the real man, begets sensibility, which constitutes the +animal; see i. 1.7. + +[85] See iii. 4.3-6. + +[86] See iii. 4.6. + +[87] These demons are higher powers of the human soul. + +[88] See iv. 3.18. + +[89] Plato, Timaeus, p. 76, Cary, 54. + +[90] p. 39, Cary, 15. + +[91] Plato, Timaeus, p. 77, Cary, 55. + +[92] See iv. 4.22. + +[93] Lucretius, v. 1095. + +[94] Diogenes Laertes, iii. 74. + +[95] Plato, Timaeus, p. 80, Cary, 61. + +[96] See iv. 3.18. + +[97] Plato, Phaedrus, p. 248, Cary, 60; see i. 3.4. + +[98] See v. 7. + +[99] See v. 1.9. + +[100] See i. 8.6, 7. + +[101] Rep. vi. p. 509, Cary, 19. + +[102] See v. 1.7. + +[103] See v. 1.5. + +[104] See v. 1.7. + +[105] Plato, Rep. vi. p. 509, Cary, 19. + +[106] See v. 1.6. + +[107] See iv. 8.3. + +[108] See v. 1.4. + +[109] See v. 1.6. + +[110] Arist. Nic. Eth. 1.1. + +[111] See Arist., Met. i. 5. + +[112] According to Plato's Banquet, p. 206, Cary, 31. + +[113] See iv. 5.7. + +[114] See 1.6. + +[115] Plato, Phaedrus, p. 249, Cary, 63. + +[116] See v. 1.2. + +[117] See vi. 7.25. + +[118] Plato, Philebus, p. 60, Cary, 141; Gorgias, p. 474, Cary, 66. + +[119] p. 61, Cary, 144. + +[120] See Met. xii. + +[121] Met xii. 7. + +[122] Plato, Rep. vi., p. 505, Cary, 17. + +[123] According to the proverb, like seeks its like, mentioned by +Plato, in his Banquet; p. 195, Cary, 21. + +[124] Plato, Gorgias, p. 507, Cary, 136. + +[125] See i. 8.5. + +[126] Plato, Timaeus, p. 52, Cary, 26. + +[127] See below, Sec. 32. + +[128] Plato, Rep. vi., p. 506, Cary 17. + +[129] As said Plato, Republic vi., p. 508, Cary, 19. + +[130] See iii. 5.9. + +[131] In his Philebus, p. 65, Cary, 155. + +[132] As Plato said, in his Banquet, p. 184, Cary, 12. + +[133] See i. 6.5. + +[134] See i. 6.7. + +[135] As says Plato, in his Banquet, p. 210, Cary, 35. + +[136] As Plato says, in his Phaedrus, p. 250, Cary, 65. + +[137] As Plato says, in his Banquet, p. 183, Cary, 11. + +[138] See i. 6.9. + +[139] See i. 6.8. + +[140] As Plato said, in his Banquet, p. 211, Cary, 35. + +[141] See iii. 5.9. + +[142] Rep. vi., p. 505, Cary, 16. + +[143] See iii. 3.6. + +[144] As thought Plato, in the Banquet, p. 210, Cary, 35. + +[145] Arist. Met. xii. 9; see v. 1.9. + +[146] Met. xii. 7. + +[147] Met. xii. 9. + +[148] See iv. 6.3. + +[149] Met. xii. 8. + +[150] Plato, Rep. vi. p. 509, Cary, 19. + +[151] Met. xii. 7. + +[152] See v. 3.10. + +[153] See vi. 2.7. + +[154] See v. 3.11. + +[155] See iii. 9.6. + +[156] See vi. 5.11. + +[157] See v. 3.13. + +[158] Arist. Met. xii. 7. + +[159] As thought Plato, Rep. vi., p. 508, Cary, 19. + +[160] See iv. 3.1. + +[161] Letter ii. 312; Cary, p. 482. + +[162] See i. 6, end. + +[163] Numenius, fr. 32. + +[164] See Numenius, fr. 48. + +[165] Banquet, p. 211, Cary, 35. + +[166] As Aristotle asks, Eth. Nic. iii. + +[167] Arist. Nic. Eth. iii. 1. + +[168] Eud. Eth. ii. 6. + +[169] Nic. Eth. iii. 2. + +[170] Eud. Mor. ii. 9. + +[171] Nic. Eth. iii. 2. + +[172] Nic. Eth. iii. 6. + +[173] Plato, Alcinous, 31; this is opposed by Aristotle, Nic. Eth. iii. +2.6. + +[174] Aristotle, Eud. Eth. ii. 10. + +[175] Aristotle, Mor. Magn. i. 32; Nic. Eth. iii. 6. + +[176] Aristotle, Nic. Eth. iii. 4. + +[177] Arist. de Anim. iii. 10. + +[178] de Anim. iii. 9. + +[179] Magn. Mor. i. 17. + +[180] de Anim. iii. 9. + +[181] This Stoic term had already been noticed and ridiculed by +Numenius, 2.8, 13; 3.4, 5; Guthrie, Numenius, p. 141. He taught that +it was a casual consequence of the synthetic power of the soul (52). +Its relation to free-will and responsibility, here considered, had been +with Numenius the foundation of the ridicule heaped on Lacydes. + +[182] Nic. Eth. x. 8. + +[183] Nic. Eth. x. 7. + +[184] Plato, Republic, x. p. 617; Cary, 15. + +[185] In his Phaedo, p. 83; Cary, 74. + +[186] Such as Strato the Peripatetic, and the Epicureans. + +[187] Plato, Rep. x. p. 596c; Cary, 1. + +[188] See Jamblichus's Letter to Macedonius, on Destiny, 5. + +[189] See iii. 9, end. + +[190] Numenius, 32. + +[191] See vi. 7.2. + +[192] Aris. Met. ix. 1; xii. 9; Nic. Eth. x. 8; Plato Timaeus, p. 52; +Cary, 26; Plotinos, Enn. ii. 5.3. + +[193] This etymology of "providence" applies in English as well as in +Greek; see iii. 2.1. + +[194] Plato, Laws, iv., p. 716; Cary, 8. + +[195] Arist. Met. xii. 7. + +[196] See iii. 8.9. + +[197] In his Cratylos, p. 419; Cary, 76. + +[198] See iii. 9, end. + +[199] As said Plato in the Timaeus, p. 42; Cary, 18; see Numenius, 10, +32. + +[200] In this book Plotinos uses synonymously the "Heaven," the +"World," the "Universal Organism or Animal," the "All" (or universe), +and the "Whole" (or Totality). This book as it were completes the +former one on the Ideas and the Divinity, thus studying the three +principles (Soul, Intelligence and Good) cosmologically. We thus have +here another proof of the chronological order. In it Plotinos defends +Plato's doctrine against Aristotle's objection in de Anima i. 3. + +[201] As thought Heraclitus, Diog. Laert. ix. 8; Plato, Timaeus, p. 31; +Cary, 11; Arist. Heaven, 1, 8, 9. + +[202] Such as Heraclitus. + +[203] In the Cratylus, p. 402; Cary, 41. + +[204] Rep. vi., p. 498; Cary, 11. + +[205] See Apuleius, de Mundo, p. 708; Ravaisson, E.M.A. ii. 150; Plato, +Epinomis, c. 5. + +[206] Which would render it unfit for fusion with the Soul, Arist., +Meteorology, i. 4; Plato, Tim., p. 58; Cary, 33. + +[207] See ii. 9.3; iii. 2.1; iv. 3.9. + +[208] Phaedo, p. 109; Cary, 134; that is, the universal Soul is here +distinguished into the celestial Soul, and the inferior Soul, which is +nature, the generative power. + +[209] The inferior soul, or nature. + +[210] See ii. 3.9-15. + +[211] See i. 1.7-10. + +[212] As is the vegetative soul, which makes only the animal part of +us; see i. 1.7-10. + +[213] In his Timaeus, p. 31; Cary, 11. + +[214] Timaeus, p. 56; Cary, 30. + +[215] See i. 8.9. + +[216] Plato, Epinomis, p. 984; Cary, 8. + +[217] In the Timaeus, p. 31, 51; Cary 11, 24, 25. + +[218] See ii. 7. + +[219] Who in his Timaeus says, p. 39; Cary, 14. + +[220] See ii. 2. + +[221] As thought Heraclitus and the Stoics, who thought that the stars +fed themselves from the exhalations of the earth and the waters; see +Seneca, Nat. Quest. vi. 16. + +[222] See ii. 1.5. + +[223] See iii. 7; Plotinos may have already sketched the outline of +this book (number 45), and amplified it only later. + +[224] See ii. 9.6, or 33; another proof of the chronological order. + +[225] In his Timaeus, p. 69; Cary, 44. + +[226] As the Stoics think, Plutarch, Plac. Phil. iv. 11. + +[227] As Aristotle would say, de Anima, iii. 3. + +[228] Aristotle, de Sensu, 6. + +[229] v. 3. + +[230] Porphyry, Principles, 24. + +[231] Arist., Mem. et Rec., 2. + +[232] Porphyry, Principles, 25. + +[233] Aristotle, Mem. et Rec., 2. + +[234] Porphyry, Treatise, Psych. + +[235] Locke's famous "tabula rasa." + +[236] Substance, Quantity, Quality, Relation, When, Where, +Action-and-Reaction, to Have, and Location. Aristotle's treatment +thereof in his Categories, and Metaphysics. + +[237] Met. v. 7. + +[238] Or, substance, "ousia." + +[239] Cat. i. 1, 2; or, mere label in common. + +[240] Aristotle, Met. vii. 3, distinguished many different senses of +Being; at least four principal ones: what it seems, or the universal, +the kind, or the subject. The subject is that of which all the rest is +an attribute, but which is not the attribute of anything. Being must be +the first subject. In one sense this is matter; in another, form; and +in the third place, the concretion of form and matter. + +[241] See ii. 4.6-16, for intelligible matter, and ii. 4.2-5 for +sense-matter. + +[242] Arist., Met. vii. 3. + +[243] Arist., Cat. 2.5.25. + +[244] Arist., Cat. ii. 5.15. + +[245] Arist., Met. vii. 1; Cat. ii. 5. + +[246] Categ. ii. 5.1, 2. + +[247] Cat. ii. 5.16, 17. + +[248] Cat. ii. 6.1, 2. + +[249] Met. v. 13. + +[250] Met. xiii. 6. + +[251] Met. xiii. 3. + +[252] Categ. ii. 6.18-23. + +[253] See vi. 6. + +[254] Categ. ii. 6.4. + +[255] Arist., Hermeneia, 4. + +[256] See iii. 7.8. + +[257] Categ. ii. 6.26. + +[258] Categ. ii. 7.1; Met. v. 15. + +[259] Categ. ii. 7.17-19. + +[260] See Categ. viii. + +[261] Arist., Categ. ii. 8.3, 7, 8, 13, 14. + +[262] See ii. 6.3. + +[263] See ii. 6.3. + +[264] See ii. 6.1. + +[265] These are: 1, capacity and disposition; 2, physical power or +impotence; 3, affective qualities; 4, the figure and exterior form. + +[266] Met. v. 14. + +[267] Categ. ii. 8. + +[268] See i. 6.2. + +[269] Categ. ii. 8.15. + +[270] Among whom Plotinos is not; see vi. 1.10. + +[271] The reader is warned that the single Greek word "paschein" is +continually played upon in meanings "experiencing," "suffering," +"reacting," or "passion." + +[272] Met. xi. 9. + +[273] That is, "to move" and "to cut" express an action as perfect as +"having moved" and "having cut." + +[274] As Aristotle says, Categ. ii. 7.1. + +[275] Plotinos proposes to divide verbs not as transitive and +intransitive, but as verbs expressing a completed action or state, (as +to think), and those expressing successive action, (as, to walk). The +French language makes this distinction by using with these latter the +auxiliary "être." Each of these two classes are subdivided into some +verbs expressing an absolute action, by which the subject alone is +modified; and into other verbs expressing relative action, referring +to, or modifying an exterior object. These alone are used to form the +passive voice, and Plotinos does not want them classified apart. + +[276] In Greek the three words are derived from the same root. + +[277] See i. v. + +[278] See iii. 6.1. + +[279] Categ. iii. 14. + +[280] For this movement did not constitute reaction in the mover. + +[281] That is, the Greek word for "suffering." + +[282] A Greek pun, "kathexis." + +[283] A Greek pun, "hexis" also translated "habit," and "habitude." + +[284] See Chaignet, Hist. of Greek Psychology, and Simplicius, +Commentary on Categories. + +[285] See iv. 7.14. This is an Aristotelian distinction. + +[286] See ii. 4.1. + +[287] By verbal similarity, or homonymy, a pun. + +[288] See ii. 4.1. + +[289] See ii. 5.5. + +[290] For Plato placed all reality in the Ideas. + +[291] Logically, their conception of matter breaks down. + +[292] Cicero, Academics, i. 11. + +[293] See ii. 4.10. + +[294] See Enn. ii. 4, 5; iii. 6. Another proof of the chronological +order. + +[295] Plotinos was here in error; Aristotle ignored them, because he +did not admit existence. + +[296] This refers to the Hylicists, who considered the universe as +founded on earth, water, air or fire; or, Anaxagoras, who introduced +the category of mind. + +[297] Plotinos's own categories are developed from the thought of +Plato, found in his "Sophists," for the intelligible being; and yet +he harks back to Aristotle's Categories and Metaphysics, for his +classification of the sense-world. + +[298] See vi. 4, 6, 9. + +[299] In his "Sophist." p. 248 e-250; Cary, 72-76. + +[300] In vi. 3. + +[301] See vi. 3.6. + +[302] See vi. 3.3. + +[303] See iii. 2.16. + +[304] That is, the higher part, the principal power of the soul; see +ii. 3.17, 18. + +[305] Here "being" and "essence" have had to be inverted. + +[306] Verbal similarity, homonymy, or pun. + +[307] See Plato's Sophists, p. 250 c; Cary, 75. + +[308] Sophists, p. 254 d; Cary, 86. + +[309] As said Aristotle, Met. iv. 2. + +[310] Plato, Sophist, p. 245; Cary, 63. + +[311] See vi. 9.1. + +[312] See vi. 4. + +[313] Arist., Met. xiv. 6. + +[314] Aristotle. Met. xiv. 6. + +[315] See ii. 6.2. + +[316] See vi. 7.3-6. + +[317] As said Aristotle. Eth. Nic. i. 6.2. + +[318] Against Aristotle. + +[319] See vi. 1.14. + +[320] See iii. 7.11. + +[321] To ti ên einai. + +[322] See i. 6. + +[323] See v. 8. + +[324] Counting identity and difference as a composite one? See note 11. + +[325] See iv. 9.5. + +[326] See iv. 8.3. + +[327] See iii. 2.16. + +[328] See iv. 8.8. + +[329] See iii. 8.7. + +[330] See iii. 8.2. + +[331] See iii. 2.2. + +[332] See iii. 9.1. + +[333] See 3.9.1; Timaeus, p. 39; Cary, 14. + +[334] See ii. 9.1. + +[335] See v. 3.4. + +[336] Plato, Philebus, p. 18; Cary, 23. + +[337] Plato, Philebus, p. 17 e; Cary, 21. + +[338] See iii. 4.1. + +[339] See iv. 8.3-7. + +[340] See iv. 8.8. + +[341] See iv. 4.29. + +[342] Here Plotinos purposely mentions Numenius's name for the divinity +(fr. 20.6), and disagrees with it, erecting above it a supreme Unity. +This, however, was only Platonic, Rep. vi. 19, 509 b., so that Plotinos +should not be credited with it as is done by the various histories of +philosophy. Even Numenius held the unity, fr. 14. + +[343] This means, by mere verbal similarity, "homonymy," or, punning. + +[344] As said Plato, in his Philebus, p. 18, Cary, 23. + +[345] See i. 1.7. + +[346] See Bouillet, vol. 1, p. 380. + +[347] See iii. 6.1-5. + +[348] See sect. 16. + +[349] See ii. 1.2. + +[350] Or, mortal nature, or, decay; see i. 8.4; ii. 4.5-6. + +[351] See vi. 2.7, 8. + +[352] See ii. 4.6. + +[353] See vi. 1.13, 14. + +[354] In vi. 3.11, and vi. 1.13, 14, he however subsumes time and place +under relation. + +[355] According to Aristotle, Met. vii. 3. + +[356] Aristotle, Met. viii. 5.6. + +[357] Aristotle, Categ. ii. 5. + +[358] See ii. 5.4. + +[359] Met. vii. 11. + +[360] Met. vii. 17. + +[361] See ii. 4.3-5. + +[362] See iii. 6. + +[363] Categ. ii. 5. + +[364] See iii. 7.8. + +[365] See sect. 11. + +[366] Arist. Met. vii. 1. + +[367] See vi. 1.26. + +[368] See ii. 4.10. + +[369] See Met. vii. 3. + +[370] See vi. 1.2, 3. + +[371] See iii. 8.7. + +[372] Matter is begotten by nature, which is the inferior power of the +universal Soul, iii. 4.1.; and the form derives from Reason, which is +the superior power of the same Soul, ii. 3.17. + +[373] Met. v. 8. + +[374] Being an accident, Met. v. 30, see[434]. + +[375] See iii. 6.12. + +[376] See Categ. ii. 5.1-2. + +[377] Plotinos is here defending Plato's valuation of the universal, +against Aristotle, in Met. vii. 13. + +[378] Arist. de Anima, ii. 1. + +[379] See sect. 8. + +[380] Plotinos follows Aristotle in his definition of quantity, but +subsumes time and place under relation. Plot., vi. 1.4; Arist. Categ. +ii. 6.1, 2. + +[381] Arist. Met. v. 13. + +[382] See vi. 3.5; iii. 6.17. + +[383] Categ. ii. 6. + +[384] Quoted by Plato in his Hippias, p. 289, Cary, 20. + +[385] See Categ. 2.6. + +[386] See vi. 1.5. + +[387] See sect. 11. + +[388] See vi. 6. + +[389] Met. v. 6. + +[390] Categ. iii. 6.26. + +[391] Met. v. 14. + +[392] Categ. ii. 6.26. + +[393] In speaking of quality, Categ. ii. 8.30. + +[394] Following the Latin version of Ficinus. + +[395] Bouillet remarks that Plotinos intends to demonstrate this by +explaining the term "similarity" not only of identical quality, but +also of two beings of which one is the image of the other, as the +portrait is the image of the corporeal form, the former that of the +"seminal reason," and the latter that of the Idea. + +[396] By this Plotinos means the essence, or intelligible form, vi. 7.2. + +[397] See vi. 7.3-6. + +[398] See iii. 6.4. + +[399] In his Banquet, p. 186-188; Cary, 14, 15. + +[400] See v. 9.11. + +[401] See i. 2.1. + +[402] See vi. 7.5. + +[403] See iii. 6.4. + +[404] Categ. ii. 8.3, 7, 8, 13, 14. + +[405] See i. 1.2. + +[406] Arist. Categ. ii. 8.8-13. + +[407] Met. v. 14. + +[408] Met. vii. 12. + +[409] Met. v. 14. + +[410] Categ. ii. 8. + +[411] Arist. Categ. iii. 10. + +[412] See vi. 1.17. + +[413] Met. v. 10. + +[414] Categ. iii. 11. + +[415] Categ. iii. 14. + +[416] Categ. ii. 7. + +[417] By a pun, this "change" is used as synonymous with the +"alteration" used further on. + +[418] Arist. de Gen. i. 4. + +[419] Alteration is change in the category of quality, Arist. de Gen. +i. 4; Physics, vii. 2. + +[420] Arist. Metaph. ix. 6; xi. 9. + +[421] Met. xi. 9. + +[422] See ii. 5.1, 2. + +[423] See ii. 5.2. + +[424] See ii. 5.2. + +[425] Categ. iii. 14. + +[426] Arist. Met. xi. 9. + +[427] See ii. 7. + +[428] Arist. de Gen. i. 5. + +[429] Arist. de Gen. i. 10. + +[430] Here we have Numenius's innate motion of the intelligible, fr. +30.21. + +[431] See vi. 1.15-22. + +[432] Namely, time, vi. 1.13; place, vi. 1.14; possession, vi. 1.23; +location, vi. 1.24. + +[433] For relation, see vi. 1.6-9. + +[434] For Aristotle says that an accident is something which exists in +an object without being one of the distinctive characteristics of its +essence. + +[435] In this book Plotinos studies time and eternity comparatively; +first considering Plato's views in the Timaeus, and then the views of +Pythagoras (1), Epicurus (9), the Stoics (7), and Aristotle (4, 8, 12). + +[436] The bracketed numbers are those of the Teubner edition; the +unbracketed, those of the Didot edition. + +[437] See ii. 9.6. + +[438] As thought Plato, in his Timaeus, p. 37, Cary, 14. + +[439] Stobaeus. Ecl. Phys. i. 248. + +[440] A category, see vi. 2.7. + +[441] See vi. 2.7. + +[442] Or, with Mueller, "therefore, in a permanent future." + +[443] De Caelo, i. 9. + +[444] That is, with this divinity that intelligible existence is. + +[445] Arist. Met. iii. 2. + +[446] In the Timaeus, p. 29, Cary 10. + +[447] Stob. Ecl. Physic. ix. 40. + +[448] Porphyry, Principles, 32, end. + +[449] Especially Archytas, Simplicius, Comm. in Phys. Aristot. 165; +Stob. Ecl. Physic. Heeren, 248-250. + +[450] Stobaeus, 254. + +[451] See Stobaeus, 250. + +[452] Aristotle, Physica, iv. 12. + +[453] Mueller: "Whether this may be predicated of the totality of the +movement." + +[454] See vi. 6.4-10. + +[455] As Aristotle, Phys. iv. 11, claimed. + +[456] In Physica, iii. 7. + +[457] Stobaeus, Ecl. Phys. ix. 40. + +[458] When collectively considered as "A-pollo," following Numenius, +42, 67, Plotinos, v. 5.6. + +[459] See ii. 9.3. + +[460] See iii. 7.1, Introd. + +[461] See iii. 6.16, 17. + +[462] Porphyry, Principles, 32. + +[463] In the Timaeus, p. 38, Cary, 14. + +[464] In his Timaeus, p. 39, Cary, 14, 15. + +[465] As by Antiphanes and Critolaus, Stobaeus, Eclog. Phys. ix. 40, p. +252, Heeren. + +[466] See iii. 7.2. + +[467] As thought Aristotle, de Mem. et Remin. ii. 12. + +[468] See iv. 9. + + + + +Transcriber's Notes: + + +Punctuation and spelling were made consistent when a predominant +preference was found in this four-volume set; otherwise they were not +changed. + +Simple typographical errors were corrected. Inconsistent capitalization +has not been changed. + +Ambiguous hyphens at the ends of lines were retained. + +Infrequent spelling of "Plotinus" changed to the predominant "Plotinos." + +Several opening or closing parentheses and quotation marks are +unmatched; Transcriber has not attempted to determine where they belong. + +Page 678: A line containing "How then could one," appears to have been +partly duplicated in the original. The duplicate text, which has been +removed here, was: "Essence sence possess self-existence. How then +could". + +Page 690, footnote 53 (originally 1): "he might have had noth-" does +not complete on the next line and has been changed here to "he might +have had nothing". + +Page 700: The two opening parentheses in '(from its "whatness" (or, +essence[72]).' share the one closing parenthesis; unchanged. + +Page 744: unmatched closing quotation mark removed after "a being is +suited by its like". + +Page 804: Closing parenthesis added after "single (unitary". + +Page 823: "resistance corporeal nature[15])." has no matching opening +parenthesis; unchanged here. + +Page 930: Phrase beginning "(each constituting a particular +intelligence" appears to share its closing parenthesis with the phrase +"(and thus exists in itself)." + +Page 935: Closing parenthesis in phrase "composite as mixtures)," does +not have a matching opening parenthesis; unchanged. + +Page 984: Footnote 395 (originally 53), "corporeal form, the former +that of" originally was "corporeal form, the latter that of". + + +Footnote Issues: + +In these notes, "anchor" means the reference to a footnote, and +"footnote" means the information to which the anchor refers. Anchors +occur within the main text, while footnotes are grouped in sequence at +the end of this eBook. The structure of the original book required some +exceptions to this, as explained below. + +The original text used chapter endnotes. In this eBook, they have been +combined into a single, ascending sequence based on the sequence in +which the footnotes (not the anchors) occurred in the original book, +and placed at the end of the eBook. + +Three kinds of irregularities occurred in the footnotes: + +1. Some footnotes are referenced by more than one anchor, so two or +more anchors may refer to the same footnote. + +2. Some anchors were out of sequence, apparently because they were +added afterwards or because they are share a footnote with another +anchor. They have been renumbered to match the numbers of the footnotes +to which they refer. + +3. Some footnotes have no anchors. These are noted below. + +Page 679: Footnote 37 has no anchor. The missing anchor would be on +page 670. + +Page 771: Footnote 85 (originally 21) has no anchor. The missing anchor +would be on page 709 or 710. + +Page 772: Footnote 111 (originally 47) has no anchor. The missing anchor +would be on page 736. + +Page 772: Footnote 123 (originally 59) has no anchor. The missing +anchor would be on page 744 or 745. + +Page 811: Footnote 178 (originally 13) has no anchor. The missing +anchor would be on page 776. + +Page 932: Footnote 302 (originally 6) has no anchor. The missing anchor +would be on page 895 or 896. + +Page 984: Footnote 424 (originally 82) has no anchor. The missing +anchor would be on page 974 or 975. + +Page 1015: Footnote 445 (originally 11) has no anchor. The missing +anchor would be in page range 992-995. + + + + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 3, by +Plotinos (Plotinus) + +*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 42932 *** |