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diff --git a/42932-8.txt b/42932-0.txt index 218839f..3d5eee7 100644 --- a/42932-8.txt +++ b/42932-0.txt @@ -1,42 +1,4 @@ -Project Gutenberg's Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 3, by Plotinos (Plotinus) - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with -almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or -re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included -with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org - - -Title: Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 3 - In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four Periods - -Author: Plotinos (Plotinus) - -Translator: Kenneth Sylvan Guthrie - -Release Date: June 13, 2013 [EBook #42932] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PLOTINOS: COMPLETE WORKS, V. 3 *** - - - - -Produced by Charlene Taylor, Joe C, Charlie Howard, and -the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at -http://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from images -generously made available by The Internet Archive/Canadian -Libraries) - - - - - - - - +*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 42932 *** VOLUME III. @@ -1933,7 +1895,7 @@ contains within itself the cause which, if distinct from being, is nevertheless inseparable therefrom. All things are implied in each other[100]; taken together, they form the total, perfect and universal Being; their perfection is bound up with, and is inherent in their -cause; thus a (creature's) "being," its "characteristic" (to ti ên +cause; thus a (creature's) "being," its "characteristic" (to ti ên einai), and its "cause" (why-ness) fall together. (Before asking an important question we must premiss that) in the intelligible world the cause that is complementary to a being is ultimately united to @@ -11881,7 +11843,7 @@ continually played upon in meanings "experiencing," "suffering," intransitive, but as verbs expressing a completed action or state, (as to think), and those expressing successive action, (as, to walk). The French language makes this distinction by using with these latter the -auxiliary "être." Each of these two classes are subdivided into some +auxiliary "être." Each of these two classes are subdivided into some verbs expressing an absolute action, by which the subject alone is modified; and into other verbs expressing relative action, referring to, or modifying an exterior object. These alone are used to form the @@ -11986,7 +11948,7 @@ ii. 3.17, 18. [320] See iii. 7.11. -[321] To ti ên einai. +[321] To ti ên einai. [322] See i. 6. @@ -12419,363 +12381,4 @@ anchor would be in page range 992-995. End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 3, by Plotinos (Plotinus) -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PLOTINOS: COMPLETE WORKS, V. 3 *** - -***** This file should be named 42932-8.txt or 42932-8.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/4/2/9/3/42932/ - -Produced by Charlene Taylor, Joe C, Charlie Howard, and -the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at -http://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from images -generously made available by The Internet Archive/Canadian -Libraries) - - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions -will be renamed. - -Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no -one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation -(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without -permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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You may copy it, give it away or -re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included -with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org - - -Title: Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 3 - In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four Periods - -Author: Plotinos (Plotinus) - -Translator: Kenneth Sylvan Guthrie - -Release Date: June 13, 2013 [EBook #42932] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PLOTINOS: COMPLETE WORKS, V. 3 *** - - - - -Produced by Charlene Taylor, Joe C, Charlie Howard, and -the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at -http://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from images -generously made available by The Internet Archive/Canadian -Libraries) - - - - - - -</pre> - +<div>*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 42932 ***</div> <div class="transnote" id="extlink"> <p class="in0 center bold">Transcriber's Notes</p> @@ -2533,7 +2491,7 @@ things are implied in each <span class="locked">other<a name="FNanchor_100" id=" they form the total, perfect and universal Being; their perfection is bound up with, and is inherent in their cause; thus a (creature's) "being," its "characteristic" -(to ti ên einai), and its "cause" (why-ness) fall together. +(to ti ên einai), and its "cause" (why-ness) fall together. (Before asking an important question we must premiss that) in the intelligible world the cause that is complementary to a being is ultimately united to it. @@ -15248,7 +15206,7 @@ think), and those expressing successive action, (as, to walk). The French language makes this distinction by using with -these latter the auxiliary "être." +these latter the auxiliary "être." Each of these two classes are subdivided into some verbs expressing an absolute action, by @@ -15493,7 +15451,7 @@ said Aristotle. Eth. Nic. i. 6.2.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> <p><a name="Footnote_321" id="Footnote_321" href="#FNanchor_321" class="fnanchor">321</a> To ti -ên einai.</p></div> +ên einai.</p></div> <div class="footnote"> @@ -16318,385 +16276,6 @@ on page <a href="#Page_974">974</a> or <a href="#Page_975">975</a>.</p> <a href="#Page_992">992</a>–995.</p> </div> - - - - - - - -<pre> - - - - - -End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 3, by -Plotinos (Plotinus) - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PLOTINOS: COMPLETE WORKS, V. 3 *** - -***** This file should be named 42932-h.htm or 42932-h.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/4/2/9/3/42932/ - -Produced by Charlene Taylor, Joe C, Charlie Howard, and -the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at -http://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from images -generously made available by The Internet Archive/Canadian -Libraries) - - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions -will be renamed. - -Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no -one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation -(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without -permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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You may copy it, give it away or -re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included -with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org - - -Title: Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 3 - In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four Periods - -Author: Plotinos (Plotinus) - -Translator: Kenneth Sylvan Guthrie - -Release Date: June 13, 2013 [EBook #42932] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: ASCII - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PLOTINOS: COMPLETE WORKS, V. 3 *** - - - - -Produced by Charlene Taylor, Joe C, Charlie Howard, and -the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at -http://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from images -generously made available by The Internet Archive/Canadian -Libraries) - - - - - - - - - -VOLUME III. - -WORKS OF PLOTINOS - - - - - PLOTINOS - Complete Works - - In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four Periods; - - With - BIOGRAPHY by PORPHYRY, EUNAPIUS, & SUIDAS, - COMMENTARY by PORPHYRY, - ILLUSTRATIONS by JAMBLICHUS & AMMONIUS, - STUDIES in Sources, Development, Influence; - INDEX of Subjects, Thoughts and Words. - - by - KENNETH SYLVAN GUTHRIE, - - Professor in Extension, University of the South, Sewanee; - A.M., Sewanee, and Harvard; Ph.D., Tulane, and Columbia. - M.D., Medico-Chirurgical College, Philadelphia. - - VOL. III - Porphyrian Books, 34-45. - - COMPARATIVE LITERATURE PRESS - P. O. Box 42, ALPINE, N.J., U.S.A. - - - - - Copyright, 1918, by Kenneth Sylvan Guthrie. - All Rights, including that of Translation, Reserved. - - Entered at Stationers' Hall, by - George Bell and Sons, Portugal Street, Lincoln's Inn, London. - - - - -SIXTH ENNEAD, BOOK SIX. - -Of Numbers. - - -MANIFOLDNESS IS DISTANCE FROM UNITY, AND EVIL. - -1. Does manifoldness consist in distance from unity? Is infinity -this distance carried to the extreme, because it is an innumerable -manifoldness? Is then infinity an evil, and are we ourselves evil when -we are manifold? (That is probable); or every being becomes manifold -when, not being able to remain turned towards itself, it blossoms out; -it extends while dividing; and thus losing all unity in its expansion, -it becomes manifoldness, because there is nothing that holds its parts -mutually united. If, nevertheless, there still remain something that -holds its parts mutually united, then, though blossoming out, (the -essence) remains, and becomes manifoldness. - - -HOW MANIFOLDNESS IS AN EVIL. - -But what is there to be feared in magnitude? If (the essence) that has -increased could feel (it would feel that which in itself has become -evil; for) it would feel that it had issued from itself, and had even -gone to a great distance (from itself). No (essence), indeed, seeks -that which is other than itself; every (essence) seeks itself. The -movement by which (an essence) issues from itself is caused either by -"audacity," or necessity. Every (being) exists in the highest degree -not when it becomes manifold or great, but when it belongs to itself; -now this occurs when it concentrates upon itself. That which desires to -become great in some other manner is ignorant of that in which true -greatness consists; instead of proceeding towards its legitimate goal, -it turns towards the outside. Now, on the contrary, to turn towards -oneself, is to remain in oneself. The demonstration of this may be seen -in that which participates in greatness; if (the being) develop itself -so that each of its parts exist apart, each part will indeed exist, but -(the being) will no longer be what it originally was. To remain what it -is, all its parts must converge towards unity; so that, to be what it -was in its being, it should not be large, but single. When it possesses -magnitude, and quantity inheres in it, it is destroyed, while when it -possesses unity, it possesses itself. Doubtless the universe is both -great and beautiful; but it is beautiful only so far as the unity holds -it in from dissipating into infinity. Besides, if it be beautiful, it -is not because it is great, but because it participates in beauty; now, -if it need participation in beauty, it is only because it has become so -large. Indeed, isolated from beauty, and considered in itself as great, -it is ugly. From this point of view, what is great is with beauty in -the relation obtaining between matter and form, because what needs -adornment is manifold; consequently, what is great has so much more -need of being adorned and is so much more ugly (as it is great). - - -WHAT IS THE NUMBER OF THE INFINITE. - -2. What opinion should we hold of that which is called the number of -infinity? We must begin by examining how it can be a number, if it be -infinite. Indeed, sense-objects are not infinite; consequently, the -number which inheres in them could not be infinite, and he who numbers -them, does not number infinity. Even if they were multiplied by two, or -by more, they still could always be determined; if they were multiplied -in respect of the past or the future, they would still be determined. -It might be objected that number is not infinite in an absolute manner, -but only (in a relative manner) in this sense, that it is always -possible to add thereto. But he who numbers does not create numbers; -they were already determined, and they existed (before being conceived -by him who was numbering them). As beings in the intelligible world are -determined, their number is also determined by the quantity of beings. -Just as we make man manifold by adding to him the beautiful, and other -things of the kind, we can make an image of number correspond to the -image of every intelligible being. Just as, in thought, we can multiply -a town that does not exist, so can we multiply numbers. When we number -the parts of time, we limit ourselves to applying to them the numbers -that we have in ourselves, and which, merely on that account, do not -cease remaining in us. - - -HOW THE INFINITE REACHED EXISTENCE. - -3. How did the infinite, in spite of its infiniteness, reach existence? -For the things which have arrived at existence, and which subsist, -have been preparatorily contained in a number. Before answering this -question, we must examine whether, when it forms part of veritable -essences, multitude can be evil. On high, the manifoldness remains -united, and is hindered from completely being manifoldness, because -it is the one essence; but this is inferior to unity by this very -condition that it is manifoldness, and thus, is imperfect in respect -to unity. Therefore, though not having the same nature as the One, but -a nature somewhat degraded (in comparison with unity), manifoldness is -inferior to unity; but, by the effect of the unity which it derives -from the One (since it is the one essence), it still possesses a -venerable character, reduces to unity the manifold it contains, and -makes it subsist in an immutable manner. - - -HOW INFINITY CAN SUBSIST IN THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD. - -How can infinity subsist in the intelligible world? Either it exists -among the genuine essences, and then is determined; or it is not -determined, and then it does not exist among the veritable essences, -but it must be classified among the things which exist in perpetual -becoming, such as time.[1] The infinite is determinate, but it is not -any the less infinite; for it is not the limit[2] which receives the -determination, but the infinite[3]; and between the boundary and the -infinite there is no intermediary that could receive the determination. -This infinite acts as if it were the idea of the boundary, but it is -contained by what embraces it exteriorly. When I say that it flees, I -do not mean that it passes from one locality to another, for it has no -locality; but I mean that space has existed from the very moment that -this infinite was embraced.[4] We must not imagine that what is called -the movement of the infinite consists in a displacement, nor admit that -the infinite by itself possesses any other of the things that could be -named; thus the infinite could neither move, nor remain still. Where -indeed would it halt, since the place indicated by the word "where" -is posterior to infinity? Movement is attributed to infinity only to -explain that the infinite has no permanency. Should we believe that the -infinite exists on high in one only and single place, or that it arises -there, and descends here below? No: for it is in respect to one only -and single place that we are enabled to conceive both what has risen -and does not descend, as well as that which descends.[5] - - -INFINITE IS CONCEIVED BY THE THOUGHT'S MAKING ABSTRACTION OF THE FORM. - -How then can we conceive the infinite? By making abstraction of form -by thought. How will it be conceived? We may conceive of the infinite -as simultaneously being the contraries, and not being them. It will -have to be conceived as being simultaneously great and small; for the -infinite becomes both of these.[6] It may also be conceived as both -being moved, and being stable[7]; for the infinite becomes these two -things also. But before the infinite becomes these two contraries, -it is neither of them in any determinate manner; otherwise, you -would have determined it. By virtue of its nature, the infinite is -these things therefore in an indeterminate and infinite manner; -only on this condition will it appear to be these contrary things. -If, by applying your thought to the infinite, you do not entice -it into a determination, as into a net, you will see the infinite -escaping you, and you will not find anything in it that would be a -unity; otherwise, you would have determined it. If you represented -to yourself the infinite as a unity, it would seem to you manifold; -if you say that it is manifold, it will again make game of you; for, -all things do not form a manifold where no one thing is one. From -still another standpoint, the nature of the infinite is movement, and -according to another nature, stability; for its property of being -invisible by itself constitutes a movement which distinguishes it from -intelligence[8]; its property of not being able to escape, of being -exteriorly embraced, of being circumscribed within an unescapable -circle constitutes a sort of stability. Movement therefore cannot be -predicated of infinity, without also attributing stability to it. - - -HOW OTHER NUMBERS FORM PART OF THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD. - -4. Let us now examine how the numbers form part of the intelligible -world. Are they inherent in the other forms? Or are they, since all -eternity, the consequences of the existence of these forms? In the -latter case, as the very essence possessed primary existence, we would -first conceive the monad; then, as movement and stability emanated from -it, we would have the triad; and each one of the remaining intelligible -entities would lead to the conception of some of the other numbers. If -it were not so, if a unity were inherent in each intelligible entity, -the unity inherent in the first Essence would be the monad; the unity -inherent in what followed it, if there be an order in the intelligible -entities, would be the "pair"; last, the unity inhering in some other -intelligible entity, such as, for instance, in ten, would be the decad. -Nevertheless this could not yet be so, each number being conceived as -existing in itself. In this case, will we be compelled to admit that -number is anterior to the other intelligible entities, or posterior -thereto? On this subject Plato[9] says that men have arrived to the -notion of number by the succession of days and nights, and he thus -refers the conception of number to the diversity of (objective) things. -He therefore seems to teach that it is first the numbered objects that -by their diversity produce numbers, that number results from movement -of the soul, which passes from one object to another, and that it is -thus begotten when the soul enumerates; that is, when she says to -herself, Here is one object, and there is another; while, so long as -she thinks of one and the same object, she affirms nothing but unity. -But when Plato says that being is in the veritable number, and that the -number is in the being,[10] he intends to teach that by itself number -possesses a hypostatic substantial existence, that it is not begotten -in the soul which enumerates, but that the variety of sense-objects -merely recalls to the soul the notion of number. - - -PYTHAGOREAN INTELLIGIBLE NUMBERS DISCUSSED. - -5. What then is the nature of number? Is it a consequence, and -partially an aspect of each being, like man and one-man, essence and -one-essence? Can the same be said for all the intelligibles, and -is that the origin of all numbers? If so, how is it that on high -(in the intelligible world) the pair and triad exist? How are all -things considered within unity, and how will it be possible to reduce -number to unity, since it has a similar nature? There would thus be a -multitude of unities, but no other number would be reduced to unity, -except the absolute One. It might be objected that a pair is the -thing, or rather the aspect of the thing which possesses two powers -joined together, such as is a composite reduced to unity, or such as -the Pythagoreans conceived the numbers,[11] which they seem to have -predicated of other objects, by analogy. For instance, they referred -to justice as the (Tetrad, or) group-of-four,[12] and likewise for -everything else. Thus a number, as for instance a group-of-ten, would -be considered as a single (group of) unity, and would be connected -with the manifold contained in the single object. This, however, is an -inadequate account of our conception of "ten"; we speak of the objects -after gathering (ten) separate objects. Later, indeed, if these ten -objects constitute a new unity, we call the group a "decad." The same -state of affairs must obtain with intelligible Numbers. If such were -the state of affairs (answers Plotinos), if number were considered only -within objects, would it possess hypostatic existence? It might be -objected, What then would hinder that, though we consider white within -things, that nevertheless the White should (besides) have a hypostatic -substantial existence? For movement is indeed considered within -essence, and yet (it is agreed that) movement possesses a "hypostatic" -substantial existence within essence. The case of number, however, -is not similar to that of movement; for we have demonstrated that -movement thus considered in itself is something unitary.[13] Moreover, -if no more than such a hypostatic substantial existence be predicated -of number, it ceases to be a being, and becomes an accident, though -it would not even then be a pure accident; for what is an accident -must be something before becoming the accident (of some substance). -Though being inseparable therefrom, it must possess its own individual -nature in itself, like whiteness; and before being predicated of -something else, it already is what it is posited. Consequently, if -one be in every (being), one man is not identical with man; if "one" -be something different from "man"[14] and from every other (being), -if it be something common to all (beings), one must be anterior to -all men and to all other (beings), so that man and all other beings -may be one. The one is therefore anterior to movement, since movement -is one, and likewise anterior to essence, to allow for essence also -being one. This of course does not refer to the absolute Unity that is -recognized as superior to essence, but of the unity which is predicated -of every intelligible form. Likewise, above that of which the decad is -predicated subsists the "Decad in itself," for that in which the decad -is recognized could not be the Decad in itself. - - -THE INTELLIGIBLE UNITY AND DECAD EXIST BEFORE ALL NUMBERS ONE OR TEN. - -Does unity therefore inhere in essences, and does it subsist with -them? If it inhere in essences, or if it be an accident, as health is -an accident of man, it must be something individual (like health). If -unity be an element of the composite, it will first have to exist -(individually), and be an unity in itself, so as to be able to unify -itself to something else; then, being blended with this other thing -that it has unified, it will not longer remain really one, and will -thereby even become double. Besides, how would that apply to the decad? -What need of the (intelligible) Decad has that which is already a -decad, by virtue of the power it possesses? Will it receive its form -from that Decad? If it be its matter, if it be ten and decad only -because of the presence of the Decad, the Decad will have first to -exist in itself, in the pure and simple state of (being a) Decad. - - -WHAT IS THE NATURE OF THESE INTELLIGIBLE NUMBERS? - -6. But if, independently of the things themselves, there be an One -in itself, and a Decad in itself; and if the intelligible entities -be unities, pairs, or triads, independently of what they are by -their being, what then is the nature of these Numbers? What is their -constitution? It must be admitted that a certain Reason presides over -the generation of these Numbers. It is therefore necessary clearly to -understand that in general, if intelligible forms at all exist, it is -not because the thinking principle first thought each of them, and -thereby gave them hypostatic existence. Justice, for instance, was -not born because the thinking principle thought what justice was; nor -movement, because it thought what movement was. Thus thought had to be -posterior to the thing thought, and the thought of justice to justice -itself. On the other hand, thought is anterior to the thing that owes -its existence to thought, since this thing exists only because it is -thought. If then justice were identical with such a thought, it would -be absurd that justice should be nothing else than its definition; for -in this case, the thinking of justice or movement, would amount to -a conception of these objects (by a definition). Now this would be -tantamount to conceiving the definition of a thing that did not exist, -which is impossible. - - -JUSTICE, LIKE AN INTELLECTUAL STATUE, WAS BORN OF ITSELF. - -The statement that in what is immaterial, knowledge and the known thing -coincide,[15] must not be understood to mean that it is the knowledge -of the thing which is the thing itself, nor that the reason which -contemplates an object is this object itself, but rather, conversely, -that it is the thing which, existing without matter, is purely -intelligible and intellection. I do not here mean the intellection -which is neither a definition nor an intuition of a thing; but I say -that the thing itself, such as it exists in the intelligible world, -is exclusively intelligence and knowledge. It is not (the kind of) -knowledge that applies itself to the intelligible, it is the (actual) -thing itself which keeps that knowledge (thereof possessed by reason) -from remaining different from it, just as the knowledge of a material -object remains different from that object; but it is a veritable (kind -of) knowledge, that is, a knowledge which is not merely a simple -image of the known thing, but really is the thing itself. It is not -therefore the thought of the movement which produced movement in -itself, but the movement in itself which produced the thought, so that -the thought thinks itself as movement, and as thought. On the one hand, -intelligible movement is thought by the intelligible Essence; on the -other hand, it is movement in itself because it is first--for there -is no movement anterior thereto; it is real movement, because it is -not the accident of a subject, but because it is the actualization of -the essence which moves, and possesses actualized (existence); it is -therefore "being," though it be conceived as different from essence. -Justice, for instance, is not the simple thought of justice; it is a -certain disposition of Intelligence, or rather it is an actualization -of a determinate nature. The face of Justice is more beautiful than the -evening or morning stars, and than all visible beauty.[16] Justice may -be imagined as an intellectual statue which has issued from itself and -which has manifested itself such as it is in itself; or rather, which -subsists essentially in itself. - - -INTELLIGENCE THINKS THINGS NOT BECAUSE THEY EXIST, BUT BECAUSE IT -POSSESSES THEM. - -7. We must, in fact, conceive intelligible essences as subsisting in -one nature, and one single nature as possessing and embracing all -(things). There no one thing is separated from the others, as in the -sense-world, where the sun, moon, and other objects each occupy a -different locality; but all things exist together in one unity; such -is the nature of intelligence. The (universal) Soul imitates it, -in this respect, as does also the power called Nature, conformably -to which, and by virtue of which individuals are begotten each in -a different place, while she remains in herself. But, although all -things exist together (in the unity of Intelligence), each of them -is none the less different from the others. Now, these things which -subsist in Intelligence and "being," are seen by the Intelligence that -possesses them, not because it observes them, but because it possesses -them without feeling the need of distinguishing them from each other; -because from all eternity they have dwelt within it distinct from each -other. We believe in the existence of these things on the faith of -those who admire them, because they have participated therein. As to -the magnitude and beauty of the intelligible world, we can judge of -it by the love which the Soul feels for it, and if other things feel -love for the Soul, it is because she herself possesses an intellectual -nature, and that by her the other things can, to some extent, become -assimilated to Intelligence. How indeed could we admit that here below -was some organism gifted with beauty, without recognizing that the -Organism itself (the intelligible world[17]) possesses an admirable and -really unspeakable beauty? Further, the perfect Organism is composed of -all the organisms; or rather it embraces all the organisms; just as our -Universe is one, yet simultaneously is visible, because it contains all -the things which are in the visible universe. - - -WHAT AND HOW IS EVERY INTELLIGIBLE ENTITY. - -8. Since then the (universal) Organism possesses primary existence, -since it is simultaneously organism, intelligence, and veritable -"Being"; and as we state that it contains all organisms, numbers, -justice, beauty, and the other similar beings--for we mean something -different by the Man himself, and Number itself, and Justice itself--we -have to determine, so far as it is possible in such things, what is the -condition and nature of each intelligible entity. - - -NUMBER MUST EXIST IN THE PRIMARY ESSENCE. - -(To solve this problem) let us begin by setting aside sensation, and -let us contemplate Intelligence by our intelligence exclusively. Above -all, let us clearly understand that, as in us life and intelligence -do not consist of a corporeal mass, but in a power without mass, -likewise veritable "Being" is deprived of all corporeal extension, -and constitutes a power founded on itself. It does not indeed consist -in something without force, but in a power sovereignly vital and -intellectual, which possesses life in the highest degree, intelligence, -and being. Consequently, whatever touches this power participates in -the same characteristics according to the manner of its touch; in a -higher degree, if the touch be close; in a lower degree, if the touch -be distant. If existence be desirable, the completest existence (or, -essence) is more desirable still. Likewise, if intelligence deserve -to be desired, perfect Intelligence deserves to be desired above -everything; and the same state of affairs prevails in respect to life. -If then we must grant that the Essence is the first, and if we must -assign the first rank to Essence, the second to Intelligence, and the -third to the Organism,[18] as the latter seems already to contain all -things, and Intelligence justly occupies the second rank, because it -is the actualization of "Being"--then number could not enter into the -Organism, for before the organism already existed one and two ("Being" -and Intelligence). Nor could number exist in Intelligence, for before -Intelligence was "Being," which is both one and manifold. (Number -therefore must exist, or originate, in the primary Being.) - - -NUMBER FOLLOWS AND PROCEEDS FROM ESSENCE. - -9. It remains for us to discover whether it were "Being," in the -process of division, that begat number, or whether it be the number -that divided "Being." (This is the alternative:) either "being," -movement, stability, difference and identity produced number, or it is -number that produced all these (categories, or) genera. Our discussion -must start thus. Is it possible that number should exist in itself, or -must we contemplate two in two objects, three in three objects, and -so forth? The same question arises about unity as considered within -numbers; for if number can exist in itself independently of numbered -things,[19] it can also exist previously to the essences. Can number -therefore exist before the essences? It might be well preliminarily to -assert that number is posterior to the Essence, and proceeds therefrom. -But then if essence be one essence, and if two essences be two -essences, one will precede essence, and the other numbers will precede -the essences. (Would number then precede the essences) only in thought -and conception, or also in the hypostatic existence? We should think -as follows. When you think of a man as being one, or the beautiful as -being one, the one that is thus conceived in both (beings) is something -that is thought only afterward. Likewise, when you simultaneously -consider a dog and a horse, here also two is evidently something -posterior. But if you beget the man, if you beget the horse or the dog, -or if you produce them outside when they already exist in you, without -begetting them, nor producing them by mere chance (of seeing them), you -will say, "We should go towards one (being), then pass to another, and -thus get two; then make one more being, by adding my person." Likewise, -(beings) were not numbered after they were created, but before they -were created, when (the creator) decided how many should be created. - - -NUMBER SPLIT THE UNITY INTO PLURALITY; PYTHAGOREAN IDENTIFICATION OF -IDEAS AND NUMBERS. - -The universal Number therefore existed before the essences (were -created); consequently, Number was not the essences. Doubtless, Number -was in Essence; but it was not yet the number of Essence; for Essence -still was one. But the power of Number, hypostatically existing within -it, divided it, and made it beget the manifold. Number is either the -being or actualization (of Essence); the very Organism and Intelligence -are number. Essence is therefore the unified number, while the essences -are developed number; Intelligence is the number which moves itself, -and the Organism is the number that contains. Since therefore Essence -was born from Unity, Essence, as it existed within Unity, must be -Number. That is why (the Pythagoreans[20]) called the ideas unities and -numbers. - - -TWO KINDS OF NUMBER: ESSENTIAL AND UNITARY. - -Such then is "essential" Number (number that is "Being"). The other -kind of number, which is called a number composed of digits, or -"unities," is only an image of the former. The essential Number is -contemplated in the intelligible forms, and assists in producing them; -on the other hand, it exists primitively in essence, with essence, and -before the essences. The latter find therein their foundation, source, -root and principle.[21] Indeed, Number is the principle of Essence, -and rests in it, otherwise it would split up. On the contrary, the -One does not rest upon essence; otherwise essence would be one before -participating in the One; likewise, what participates in the decad -would be the decad already before participating in the decad. - - -ESSENCE IS A LOCATION FOR THE THINGS YET TO BE PRODUCED. - -10. Subsisting therefore in the manifold, Essence therefore became -Number when it was aroused to multiplicity, because it already -contained within itself a sort of preformation or representation of -the essences which it was ready to produce, offering the essences, as -it were, a locality for the things whose foundation they were to be. -When we say, "so much gold," or, "so many other objects," gold is one, -and one does not thereby intend to make gold out of the number, but -to make a number out of the gold; it is because one already possesses -the number that one seeks to apply it to gold, so as to determine -its quality. If essences were anterior to Number, and if Number were -contemplated in them when the enumerating power enumerates the objects, -the number of the (beings), whatever it is, would be accidental, -instead of being determined in advance. If this be not the case, then -must number, preceding (the beings) determine how many of them must -exist; which means that, by the mere fact of the primitive existence of -the Number, the (beings) which are produced undergo the condition of -being so many, and each of them participates in unity whenever they are -one. Now every essence comes from Essence because essence, by itself, -is Essence; likewise, the One is one by itself. If every (being) be -one, and if the multitude of (beings) taken together form the unity -that is in them, they are one as the triad is one, and all beings also -are one; not as is the Monad (or Unity), but as is a thousand, or any -other number. He who, while enumerating, produced things, proclaims -that there are a thousand of them, claims to do no more than to tell -out what he learns from the things, as if he was indicating their -colors, while really he is only expressing a condition of his reason; -without which, he would not know how much of a multitude was present -there. Why then does he speak so? Because he knows how to enumerate; -which indeed he knows if he know the number, and this he can know only -if the number exist. But not to know what is the number, at least under -the respect of quantity, would be ridiculous, and even impossible. - - -AN OBJECT'S EXISTENCE IMPLIES A PREVIOUS MODEL IN ITSELF. - -When one speaks of good things, one either designates objects which are -such by themselves, or asserts that the good is their attribute. If -one designate the goods of the first order,[22] one is speaking of the -first Hypostasis, or rank of existence; if one designate the things of -which the good is the attribute, this implies the existence of a nature -of the good which has been attributed to them, or which produces this -characteristic within them, or which is the Good in itself, or which, -producing the good, nevertheless dwells in its own nature. Likewise, -when, in connection with (beings), we speak of a decad, (or, group of -ten), one is either referring to the Decad in itself, or, referring -to the things of which the decad is an attribute, one is forced to -recognize the existence of a Decad in itself, whose being is that of a -decad. Consequently, the conferring of the name "decad" implies either -that these (beings) are the Decad in itself, or above them in another -Decad whose being is that of being a Decad in itself. - - -UNITY AND NUMBER PRECEDE THE ONE AND THE MANY BEINGS. - -In general, everything which is predicated of an object either comes -to it from without, or is its actualization. Unless by nature it -be inconstant, being present now, and absent then, if it be always -present, it is a being when the object is a being. If it be denied that -its nature were that of a being, it will surely be granted that it is a -part of the essences, and that it is an essence. Now, if the object can -be conceived without the thing which is its actualization, this thing -nevertheless exists contemporaneously with it, even though in thought -it be conceived posteriorily. If the object cannot be conceived without -this thing, as man cannot be conceived of without one, in this case -one is not posterior to man, but is simultaneous, or even anterior, -since the man's subsistence is entirely dependent thereon. As to us, we -recognize that Unity and Number precede (Essence and the essences). - - -UNITY MUST EXIST IN THE INTELLIGIBLE BEFORE BEING APPLIED TO MULTIPLE -BEINGS. - -11. It may be objected that the decad is nothing else than ten unities. -If the existence of the One be granted, why should we not also grant -the existence of ten unities? Since the supreme Unity (the unity of the -first Essence), possesses hypostatic existence, why should the case -not be the same with the other unities (the complex unities contained -within each of the essences)? It must not be supposed that the supreme -Unity is bound up with a single essence; for in this case each of the -other (beings) would no longer be one. If each of the other (beings) -must be one, then unity is common to all the (beings); that is that -single nature which may be predicated of the multiple (beings), and -which must, as we have explained it, subsist in itself (in the primary -essence) before the unity which resides in the multiple (beings). - - -THE SUPREME UNITY ADJUSTS ALL LOWER GROUP UNITIES. - -As unity is seen in some one (being), and then in some other, if the -second unity possess hypostatic existence also, then the supreme Unity -(of the first Essence) will not alone possess hypostatic existence, -and there will be thus a multitude of unities (as there is a multitude -of beings). If the hypostatic existence of the first Unity be alone -acknowledged, this will exist either in the Essence in itself, or in -the One in itself. If it exist in the Essence in itself, the other -unities (which exist in the other beings) will then be such merely by -figure of speech, and will no longer be subordinated to the primary -unity; or number will be composed of dissimilar unities, and the -unities will differ from each other in so far as they are unities. -If the primary unity exist already in the Unity in itself, what need -would that Unity in itself have of that unity to be one? If all that be -impossible, we shall have to recognize the existence of the One which -is purely and simply one, which, by its "being" is entirely independent -of all the other beings, which is named the chief Unity, and is -conceived of as such. If unity exist on high (in the intelligible -world) without any object that may be called one, why might not another -One (the one of the first Being) subsist on high also? Why would -not all the (beings), each being a separate unity, not constitute a -multitude of unities, which might be the "multiple unity"? As the -nature (of the first Being) begets, or rather, as it has begotten (from -all eternity); or at least, as it has not limited itself to one of the -things it has begotten, thus rendering the unity (of the first Being) -somewhat continuous; if it circumscribe (what it produces) and promptly -ceases in its procession, it begets small numbers; if it advance -further, moving alone not in foreign matters, but in itself, it begets -large numbers. It thus harmonizes every plurality and every being with -every number, knowing well that, if each of the (beings) were not in -harmony with some number, either they would not exist, or they would -bear neither proportion, measure, nor reason. - - -ONE AND UNITY ARE WITHIN US; INDEPENDENTLY OF THE ONE OUTSIDE. - -12. (Aristotle[23]) objects that "One" and "Unity" have no hypostatic -(or, genuine) existence. Everywhere the One is something that is one. -That is nothing but a simple modification experienced in our soul in -presence of each essence. We might as easily affirm that when we assert -"essence," this is but a simple modification of our soul, Essence (in -itself) being absolutely nothing. If it be insisted that Essence exists -because it excites and strikes our soul, which then represents it to -herself, we see that the soul is equally impressed by the One, and -represents Him to herself. Besides, we should ask (Aristotle) if this -modification or conception of our soul do not bear to us the aspect of -unity or the manifold? So much the more, we often say that an object -is not one; evidently we then are not deriving the notion of unity from -the object, because we are affirming that there is no unity in it. -Unity therefore dwells within us, and it is in us without the object of -which we predicate that it is some one thing. - - -THERE IS INDEED A UNITARY MODE OF EXISTENCE IN OUTSIDE OBJECTS. - -It may be objected that having this unity in our soul depends on -receiving from the exterior object a notion and an image, which is a -conception furnished by this object. As the philosophers who profess -this opinion do not differentiate the species of one and of number, -and as they allow them no other hypostatic existence (than to be -conceived by our soul), if they (practically do) allow them any sort -of hypostatic existence, it will be very interesting to scrutinize the -opinions of these.[24] They then say that the notion or conception -that we have of the one or of the number derives from the objects -themselves, is a notion as much "a posteriori" as those of "that,"[25] -"something," "crowd," "festival," "army," or of "multitude"; for, just -as the manifold is nothing without the multiple objects, nor a festival -without the men gathered to celebrate the religious ceremony, thus -"the One" is nothing without the one object, when we posit the one, -conceiving it alone, having made an abstraction of everything else. The -partisans of this opinion will cite many examples of the same kind, as -the "right hand side," "the upper part," and their contraries. What -reality indeed (to speak as they do), can the "right hand side" possess -outside of a person who stands or sits here or there[26]? The case is -similar with "the upper side," which refers to a certain part of the -universe, and the "lower side" to another.[27] Our first answer to -this argument is that we will allow that there is a certain kind of -existence in the things themselves of which we have just spoken; but -that this mode of existence is not identical in all things, considered -either in respect to each other, or each in respect to the One which is -in all. Further, we intend to refute one by one these arguments that -have been opposed to us. - - -THE NOTION OF THE SUBJECT ONE DOES NOT COME FROM THE SUBJECT ITSELF. - -13. To begin with, it is unreasonable to insist that the notion of -the subject one comes to us from the subject itself (which is one), -from the visible man, for instance, or from some other animal, or -even some stone. Evidently the visible man and the One are things -entirely different, which could not be identified[28]; otherwise, -our judgment would not be able (as it is) to predicate unity of the -non-man. Besides, as the judgment does not operate on emptiness for -the right side, and other such things, seeing a difference of position -when it tells us that an object is here, or there; likewise, it also -sees something when it says that an object is one; for it does not -experience there an affection that is vain, and it does not affirm -unity without some foundation. It cannot be believed that the judgment -says that an object is one because it sees that it is alone, and that -there is no other; for, while saying that there is no other, the -judgment implicitly asserts that the other is one. Further, the notions -of "other" and "different" are notions posterior to that of unity; -if the judgment did not rise to unity, it would not assert either -the "other" nor the "different"; when it affirms that an object is -alone, it says, "there is one only object"; and therefore predicates -unity before "only." Besides, the judgment which affirms is itself a -substantial (being) before affirming unity of some other (being); and -the (being) of which it speaks is one likewise before the judgment -either asserts or conceives anything about it. Thus (being) must be one -or many; if it be many, the one is necessarily anterior, since, when -the judgment asserts that plurality is present, it evidently asserts -that there is more than one; likewise, when it says that an army is -a multitude, it conceives of the soldiers as arranged in one single -corps. By this last example, it is plain that the judgment (in saying -one body), does not let the multitude remain multitude, and that it -thus reveals the existence of unity; for, whether by giving to the -multitude a unity which it does not possess, or by rapidly revealing -unity in the arrangement (which makes the body of the multitude), the -judgment reduces multitude to unity. It does not err here about unity, -any more than when it says of a building formed by a multitude of -stones that it is a unity; for, besides, a building is more unified -than an army.[29] If, further, unity inhere in a still higher degree in -that which is continuous, and in a degree still higher in what is not -divisible,[30] evidently that occurs only because the unity has a real -nature, and possesses existence; for there is no greater or less in -that which does not exist. - - -UNITY, THOUGH BY PARTICIPATION EXISTING IN SENSE-OBJECTS, IS -INTELLIGIBLE. - -Just as we predicate being of every sense-thing, as well as of every -intelligible thing, we predicate it in a higher degree of intelligible -things, attributing a higher degree (of substantiality) to the (beings -that are veritable than to sense-objects), and to sense-objects than -to other genera (of physical objects); likewise, clearly seeing -unity in sense-objects in a degree higher than in the intelligible -(essences), we recognize the existence of unity in all its modes, and -we refer them all to Unity in itself. Besides, just as "being and -essence"[31] are nothing sensual, though sense-objects participate -therein, so unity, though by participation it inhere in sense-objects, -is not any the less an intelligible Unity. Judgment grasps it by an -intellectual conception; by seeing one thing (which is sensual) it also -conceives another which it does not see (because it is intelligible); -it therefore knew this thing in advance; and if judgment knew it in -advance, judgment was this thing, and was identical with that whose -existence it asserted. When it says, "a certain" object, it asserts the -unity, as, when it speaks of "certain" objects, it says that they are -two or more. If then one cannot conceive of any object whatever without -"one," "two," or some other number, it becomes possible to insist that -the thing without which nothing can be asserted or conceived, does not -at all exist. We cannot indeed deny existence to the thing without -whose existence we could not assert or conceive anything. Now that -which is everywhere necessary to speak and to conceive must be anterior -to speech and conception, so as to contribute to their production. If, -besides, this thing be necessary to the hypostatic existence of every -essence--for there is no essence that lacks unity--it must be anterior -to being, and being must be begotten by it. That is why we say "an -essence" instead of first positing "essence," and "a" only thereafter, -for there must be "one" in essence, to make "several" possible; but -(the converse is not true; for) unity does not contain essence, unless -unity itself produce it by applying itself to the begetting of it. -Likewise, the word "that" (when employed to designate an object) is -not meaningless; for instead of naming the object, it proclaims its -existence, its presence, its "being," or some other of its kinds of -"essence." The word "that" does not therefore express something without -reality, it does not proclaim an empty conception, but it designates an -object as definitely as some proper name. - - -UNITY ONLY AN ACCIDENT IN SENSE-THINGS, BUT SOMETHING IN ITSELF IN THE -INTELLIGIBLE. - -14. As to those who consider unity as relative, they might be told -that unity could not lose its proper nature merely as a result of -the affection experienced by some other being without itself being -affected. It cannot cease being one without experiencing the privation -of unity by division into two or three. If, on being divided, a mass -become double without being destroyed in respect to its being a mass, -evidently, besides the subject, there existed unity; and the mass lost -it because the unity was destroyed by the division. So this same thing -which now is present, and now disappears, should be classified among -essences wherever it be found; and we must recognize that, though it -may be an accident of other objects, it nevertheless exists by itself, -whether it manifest in sense-objects, or whether it be present in -intelligent entities; it is only an accident in posterior (beings, -namely, the sense-objects); but it exists in itself in the intelligible -entities, especially in the first Essence, which is One primarily, and -only secondarily essence. - - -TWO IS NOT AN ADDITION TO ONE, BUT A CHANGE (REFUTATION OF ARISTOTLE). - -The objection that unity, without itself experiencing anything, by the -mere addition of something else, is no longer one, but becomes double, -is a mistake.[32] The one has not become two, and is not that which -has been added to it, nor that to which something has been added. Each -of them remains one, such as it was; but two can be asserted of their -totality, and one of each of them separately. Two therefore, not any -more than "pair," is by nature a relation. If the pair consisted in -the union (of two objects), and if "being united" were identical with -"to duplicate," in this case the union, as well as the pair, would -constitute two. Now a "pair" appears likewise in a state contrary (to -that of the reunion of two objects); for two may be produced by the -division of a single object. Two, therefore, is neither reunion nor -division, as it would have to be in order to constitute a relation. - - -OBJECTS PARTICIPATE IN NUMBERS JUST AS THEY PARTICIPATE IN ALL -INTELLIGIBLE ENTITIES. - -What then is the principal cause (by virtue of which objects -participate in numbers)? A being is one by the presence of one; double, -because of the presence of the pair; just as it is white because of the -presence of whiteness; beautiful, because of the presence of beauty; -and just by that of justice. If that be not admitted, we shall be -reduced to asserting that whiteness, beauty and justice are nothing -real, and that their only causes are simple relations; that justice -consists in some particular relation with some particular being; that -beauty has no foundation other than the affection that we feel; that -the object which seems beautiful possesses nothing capable of exciting -this affection either by nature, or by acquirement. When you see an -object that is one, and that you call single, it is simultaneously -great, beautiful, and susceptible of receiving a number of other -qualifications. Now why should unity not inhere in the object as -well as greatness and magnitude, sweetness and bitterness, and other -qualities? We have no right to admit that quality, whatever it be, -forms part of the number of beings, whilst quantity is excluded; nor -to limit quantity to continuous quantity, while discrete quantity is -excluded from the conception of quantity; and that so much the less as -continuous quantity is measured by discrete quantity. Thus, just as -an object is great because of the presence of magnitude, as it is one -by the presence of unity; so is it double because of the presence of -being a pair, and so forth.[33] - - -THE VERITABLE NUMBERS ARE INTELLIGIBLE ENTITIES. - -Should we be asked to describe the operation of the participation of -objects in unity and in numbers, we shall answer that this question -connects with the more general problem of the participation of objects -in intelligible forms. Besides, we shall have to admit that the decad -presents itself under different aspects, according as it is considered -to exist either in discrete quantities, or in continuous quantities, -or in the reduction of many great forces to unity, or, last, into -the intelligible entities to which we are later raised. It is among -them, indeed, that are found the veritable Numbers (spoken of by -Plato,[10]) which, instead of being considered as discovered in other -(beings), exist within themselves; such is the Decad-in-itself, which -exists by itself, instead of simply being a decad[34] composed of some -intelligible entities. - - -NUMBER EXISTS BEFORE EVERY ANIMAL, AND THE UNIVERSAL ANIMAL. - -15. (From the above discussion about the intelligibility of numbers) -let us now return to what we said in the beginning. The universal -(Being) is veritable Essence, Intelligence, and perfect living -Organism; and at the same time contains also all the living organisms. -Our universe, which also is an organism, by its unity imitates so -far as it can the unity of the perfect living Organism. I say, to -the extent of its capacity, because, by its nature, the sense-world -has departed from the unity of the intelligible world; otherwise, it -would not be the sense-world. Moreover, the universal living Organism -must be the universal Number; for if it were not a perfect number, -it would lack some number; and if it did not contain the total number -of living organisms, it would not be the perfect living Organism. -Number therefore exists before every living organism, and before the -universal living Organism. Man and the other living organisms are in -the intelligible world; so far as they are living organisms, and so far -as the intelligible world is the universal living Organism; for man, -even here below, is a part of the living Organism, so far as itself is -a living organism, and as the living Organism is universal; the other -living organisms are also in the living Organism, so far as each of -them is a living organism. - - -THE INTELLIGIBLE AS POTENTIAL AND ACTUALIZED IN THE SOUL. - -Likewise, Intelligence, as such, contains all the individual -intelligences as its parts.[35] These, however, form a number. -Consequently, the number which is in the Intelligence does not occupy -the first degree. So far as the number is in Intelligence, it is equal -to the quantity of the actualizations of Intelligence. Now, these -actualizations are wisdom, justice, and the other virtues, science, -and all the (ideas) whose possession characterizes it as veritable -Intelligence. (If then science exist in the Intelligence) how does it -happen that it is not there in some principle other than itself? In -Intelligence the knower, the known, and science are one and the same -thing; and with everything else within it. That is why every (entity) -exists in the intelligible world in its highest degree. For instance, -within it, Justice is no accident, though it be one in the soul, as -such; for intelligible entities are in the soul (only in) potential -condition (so long as she remains no more than soul); and they are -actualized when the soul rises to Intelligence and dwells with it.[36] - - -NUMBER AS THE UNIVERSAL BOND OF THE UNIVERSE. - -Besides Intelligence, and anterior thereto, exists Essence. It contains -Number, with which it begets (beings); for it begets them by moving -according to number, determining upon the numbers before giving -hypostatic existence to the (beings), just as the unity (of essence) -precedes its (existence), and interrelates it with the First (or, -absolute Unity). Numbers interrelate nothing else to the First; it -suffices for Essence to be interrelated with Him, because Essence, on -becoming Number, attaches all (beings) to itself. Essence is divided -not so far as it is a unity (for its unity is permanent); but having -divided itself conformably to its nature in as many things as it -decided on, it saw into how many things it had divided itself; and -through this (process) it begat the number that exists within itself; -for it divided itself by virtue of the potentialities of number, and it -begat as many (beings) as number comported. - - -THE GENERATION OF EVERYTHING REGULATED BY NUMBER. - -The first and veritable Number is therefore the source and -principle[21] of hypostatic existence for beings. That is the reason -that even here below, the classified both discrete and continuous -quantity[38] and, with a different number, it is some other thing that -is begotten, or nothing more can be begotten. Such are the primary -Numbers, so far as they can be numbered. The numbers that subsist in -other things play two parts. So far as they proceed from the First, -they can be numbered; so far as they are below them, they measure other -things, they serve to enumerate both numbers and things which can be -enumerated. How indeed could you even say "ten" without the aid of -numbers within yourself? - - -DIFFICULTIES CONNECTED WITH THESE INTELLIGIBLE NUMBERS. - -16. The first objection might be, Where do you locate, or how do you -classify these primary and veritable Numbers? All the philosophers (who -follow Aristotle) classify numbers in the genus of quantity. It seems -that we have above treated of quantity, and classified both discrete -and continuous quantity[38] among other "beings." Here however we -seem to say that these Numbers form part of the primary Essences, and -add that there are, in addition, numbers that serve for enumerations. -We are now asked how we make these statements agree, for they seem -to give rise to several questions. Is the unity which is found among -sense-beings a quantity? Or is unity a quantity when repeated, while, -when considered alone and in itself, it is the principle of quantity, -but not a quantity itself? Besides, if unity be the principle of -quantity, does it share the nature of quantity, or has it a different -nature? Here are a number of points we ought to expound. We shall -answer these questions, and here is what we consider our starting-point. - - -UNITY CONTAINED IN SENSE-OBJECTS IS NOT UNITY IN ITSELF. - -When, considering visible objects, by which we ought to begin, we -combine one (being) with another, as for instance, a horse and a dog, -or two men, and say that they form two; or, when considering a greater -number of men we say they are ten, and form a group of ten, this number -does not constitute being, nor an (accident) among sense-objects; it is -purely and simply a quantity. Dividing this group of ten by unity, and -making unity of its parts, you obtain and constitute the principle of -quantity (unity) for a unity thus derived from a group of ten. - - -NUMERALS PREDICATED OF THE MAN IN HIMSELF ARE ESSENTIAL. - -But when you say that the Man considered in himself is a number, as, -for instance, a pair, because he is both animal and reasonable, we -have here no more than a simple modality. For, while reasoning and -enumerating we produce a quantity; but so far as there are here two -things (animal and reasonable), and as each of them is one, as each -completes the being of the man, and possesses unity; we are here using -and proclaiming another kind of number, the essential Number. Here the -pair is not posterior to things; it does not limit itself to expressing -a quantity which is exterior to essence; it expresses what is in the -very being of this essence, and contains its nature. - - -COLLECTIVE NOUNS USED AS PROOF OF INDEPENDENT EXISTENCE. - -Indeed, it is not you who here below produce number when you by -discursive reason range through things that exist by themselves, and -which do not depend for their existence on your enumeration; for you -add nothing to the being of a man by enumerating him with another. That -is no unity, as in a "choric ballet." When you say, ten men, "ten" -exists only in you who are enumerating. We could not assert that "ten" -exists in the ten men you are enumerating, because these men are not -co-ordinated so as to form a unity; it is you yourself who produce ten -by enumerating this group of ten, and by making up a quantity. But -when you say, a "choric ballet," an "army," there is something which -exists outside of these objects, and within yourself.[39] How are we -to understand that the number exists in you? The number which existed -in you before you made the enumeration has another mode (of existence) -(than the number that you produce by enumeration). As to the number -which manifests itself in exterior objects and refers to the number -within yourself, it constitutes an actualization of the essential -numbers, or, is conformable to the essential Numbers; for, while -enumerating you produce a number, and by this actualization you give -hypostatic existence to quantity, as in walking you did to movement. - - -THE NUMBER WITHIN IS THE NUMBER CONSTITUTIVE OF OUR BEING. - -In what sense does the number which is within us (before we enumerate) -have a mode (of existence) other (than the one we produce in -enumeration)? Because it is the number constitutive of our being, -which, as Plato says,[40] participates in number and harmony, and is a -number and harmony; for the soul is said to be neither a body nor an -extension; she therefore is a number, since she is a being. The number -of the body is a being of the same nature as the body; the number of -the soul consists in the beings which are incorporeal like souls. Then, -for the intelligible entities, if the animal itself be plurality, if -it be a triad, the triad that exists in the animal is essential. As to -the triad which subsists, not in the animal, but in essence, it is the -principle of being. If you enumerate the animal and the beautiful, each -of these two in itself is a unity; but (in enumerating them), you beget -number in yourself, and you conceive a certain quantity, the pair. If -(like the Pythagoreans) you say that virtue is a group of four, or -tetrad, it is one so far as its parts (justice, prudence, courage, and -temperance) contribute to the formation of a unity; you may add that -this group of four, or tetrad, is a unity, so far as it is a kind of -substrate; as to you, you connect this tetrad with the one that is -inside of you.[41] - - -HOW A NUMBER MAY BE CALLED INFINITE.[42] - -17. As the reasons here advanced would seem to imply that every number -is limited, we may ask in which sense may a number be said to be -infinite? This conclusion is right, for it is against the nature of -number to be infinite. Why do people then often speak of a number as -infinite? Is it in the same sense that one calls a line infinite? A -line is said to be infinite, not that there really exists an infinite -line of this kind, but to imply the conception of a line as great as -possible, greater than any given line. Similarly with number. When -we know which is the number (of certain objects), we can double it -by thought, without, on that account, adding any other number to the -first. How indeed would it be possible to add to exterior objects the -conception of our imagination, a conception that exists in ourselves -exclusively? We shall therefore say that, among intelligible entities, -a line is infinite; otherwise, the intelligible line would be a simple -quantative expression. If however the intelligible line be not this, it -must be infinite in number; but we then understand the word "infinite" -in a sense other than that of having no limits that could not be -transcended. In what sense then is the word "infinite" here used? In -the sense that the conception of a limit is not implied in the being of -a line in itself. - - -INTELLIGIBLE LINE POSTERIOR TO NUMBER, AND EXISTS IN THE INTELLIGIBLE. - -What then is the intelligible line, and where does it exist? It is -posterior to number[43]; for unity appears in the line, since this -starts from the unity (of the point), and because it has but one -dimension (length); now the measure of dimension is not a quantative -(entity). Where then does the intelligible Line exist? It exists only -in the intelligence that defines it; or, if it be a thing, it is but -something intellectual. In the intelligible world, in fact, everything -is intellectual, and such as the thing itself is. It is in this same -world, likewise, where is made the decision where and how the plane, -the solid, and all other figures are to be disposed. For it is not -we who create the figures by conceiving them. This is so because the -figure of the world is anterior to us, and because the natural figures -which are suitable to the productions of nature, are necessarily -anterior to the bodies, and in the intelligible world exist in the -state of primary figures, without determining limits, for these forms -exist in no other subjects; they subsist by themselves, and have no -need of extension, because the extension is the attribute of a subject. - - -THE INTELLIGIBLE SPHERICAL FIGURE THE PRIMITIVE ONE. - -Everywhere, therefore, in essence, is a single (spherical) figure,[44] -and each of these figures (which this single figure implicitly -contained) has become distinct, either in, or before the animal. When -I say that each figure has become distinct, I do not mean that it has -become an extension, but that it has been assigned to some particular -animal; thus, in the intelligible world, each body has been assigned -its own characteristic figure, as, for instance, the pyramid to the -fire.[45] Our world seeks to imitate this figure, although it cannot -accomplish this, because of matter. There are other figures here below -that are analogous to the intelligible figures. - - -FIGURES PRE-EXIST IN THE INTELLIGIBLE. - -But are the figures in the living Organism as such, or, if it cannot -be doubted that they are in the living Organism, do they anteriorly -exist in the Intelligence? If the Organism contained Intelligence, -the figures would be in the first degree in the Organism. But as it -is the Intelligence that contains the Organism, they are in the first -degree in Intelligence. Besides, as the souls are contained in the -perfect living Organism, it is one reason more for the priority of -the Intelligence. But Plato says,[46] "Intelligence sees the Ideas -comprised within the perfect living Organism." Now, if it see the -Ideas contained in the perfect living Organism, Intelligence must be -posterior to the latter. By the words "it sees" it should be understood -that the existence of the living Organism itself is realized in this -vision. Indeed, the Intelligence which sees is not something different -from the Organism which is seen; but (in Intelligence) all things form -but one. Only, thought has a pure and simple sphere, while the Organism -has an animated sphere.[47] - - -INFINITY IN NUMBER ARISES FROM POSSIBILITY OF INCREASING GREATEST -IMAGINABLE PHYSICAL NUMBER. - -18. Thus, in the intelligible world, every number is finite. But we -can conceive of a number greater than any assigned number, and thus it -is that our mind, while considering the numbers, produces the (notion -of the) infinite. On the contrary, in the intelligible world, it is -impossible to conceive a number greater than the Number conceived (by -divine Intelligence); for on high Number exists eternally; no Number -is lacking, or could ever lack, so that one could never add anything -thereto. - - -AS UNMEASURED THE INTELLIGIBLE NUMBER MIGHT BE CALLED INFINITE. - -Nevertheless, the intelligible Number might be called infinite in the -sense that it is unmeasured. By what, indeed, could it be measured? -The Number that exists on high is universal, simultaneous one and -manifold, constituting a whole circumscribed by no limit (a whole that -is infinite); it is what it is by itself. None of the intelligible -beings, indeed, is circumscribed by any limit. What is really limited -and measured is what is hindered from losing itself in the infinite, -and demands measure. But all of the intelligible (beings) are measures; -whence it results that they are all beautiful. So far as it is a living -organism, the living Organism in itself is beautiful, possessing an -excellent life, and lacking no kind of life; it does not have a life -mingled with death, it contains nothing mortal nor perishable. The -life of the living Organism in itself has no fault; it is the first -Life, full of vigor and energy, a primary Light whose rays vivify -both the souls that dwell on high, and those that descend here below. -This Life knows why it lives; it knows its principle and its goal; -for its principle is simultaneously its goal. Besides, universal -Wisdom, the universal Intelligence, which is intimately united to the -living Organism, which subsists in it and with it, still improves it; -heightening its hues as it were by the splendor of its wisdom, and -rendering its beauty more venerable. Even here below, a life full of -wisdom is that which is most venerable and beautiful, though we can -hardly catch a glimpse of such a life. On high, however, the vision of -life is perfectly clear; the (favored initiate) receives from Life both -capacity to behold and increased vitality; so that, thanks to a more -energetic life, the beholder receives a clearer vision, and he becomes -what he sees. Here below, our glance often rests on inanimate things, -and even when it turns towards living beings, it first notices in them -that which lacks life. Besides, the life which is hidden in them is -already mingled with other things. On high, on the contrary, all the -(beings) are alive, entirely alive, and their life is pure. If at the -first aspect you should look on something as deprived of life, soon the -life within it would burst out before your eyes. - - -ESSENCE ALONE POSSESSES SELF-EXISTENCE. - -Contemplate therefore the Being that penetrates the intelligibles, and -which communicates to them an immutable life; contemplate the Wisdom -and Knowledge that resides within them, and you will not be able to -keep from deriding this inferior nature to which the vulgar human -beings attribute genuine "being." It is in this supreme "Being" that -dwell life and intelligence, and that the essences subsist in eternity. -There, nothing issues (from Essence), nothing changes or agitates it; -for there is nothing outside of it that could reach it; if a single -thing existed outside of ("being"), ("being") would be dependent on it. -If anything opposed to (essence) existed, this thing would escape the -action of ("being"); it would no longer owe its existence to ("being"), -but would constitute a common principle anterior to it, and would be -essence. Parmenides[48] therefore was right in saying that the Essence -was one; that it was immutable, not because there was nothing else -(that could modify it), but because it was essence. Alone, therefore, -does Essence possess self-existence. How then could one, to Essence, -refuse to attribute existence, or any of the things of which it is an -actualization, and which it constitutes? So long as it exists, it gives -them to itself; and since it exists always, these things therefore -eternally subsist within it. - - -THE POWER AND BEAUTY OF ESSENCE IS TO ATTRACT ALL THINGS. - -Such are the power and beauty of Essence that it (charms and) attracts -all things, holding them as it were suspended, so that these are -delighted to possess even a trace of its perfection, and seek nothing -beyond, except the Good. For Essence is anterior to the Good in respect -to us (when we climb up from here below to the intelligible world). -The entire intelligible world aspires to the Life and Wisdom so as to -possess existence; all the souls, all the intelligences likewise aspire -to possess it; Essence alone is fully self-sufficient. - - - - -SECOND ENNEAD, BOOK EIGHT. - -Of Sight; or of Why Distant Objects Seem Small.[49] - -(OF PERSPECTIVE.) - - -VARIOUS THEORIES OF PERSPECTIVE. - -1. What is the cause that when distant visible objects seem smaller, -and that, though separated by a great space, they seem to be close to -each other, while if close, we see them in their true size, and their -true distance? The cause of objects seeming smaller at a distance might -be that light needs to be focussed near the eye, and to be accommodated -to the size of the pupils[50]; that the greater the distance of the -matter of the visible object, the more does its form seem to separate -from it during its transit to the eyes; and that, as there is a form -of quantity as well as of quality, it is the reason (or, form) of the -latter which alone reaches the eye. On the other hand, (Epicurus) -thinks that we feel magnitude only by the passage and the successive -introduction of its parts, one by one; and that, consequently, -magnitude must be brought within our reach, and near us, for us to -determine its quantity. - - -QUALITY IS MORE ESSENTIAL THAN QUANTITY. - -(Do objects at a distance seem smaller) because we perceive magnitude -only by accident, and because color is perceived first? In this case, -when an object is near, we perceive its colored magnitude; when at a -distance, we perceive first its color, not well enough distinguishing -its parts to gather exact knowledge of its quantity, because its -colors are less lively. Why should we be surprised at magnitudes -being similar to sounds, which grow weaker as their form decreases -in distinctness? As to sounds, indeed, it is the form that is sought -by the sense of hearing, and here intensity is noticed only as an -accident. But if hearing perceive magnitude only by accident, to what -faculty shall we attribute the primitive perception of intensity -in sound, just as primitive perception of magnitude in the visible -object is referable to the sense of touch? Hearing perceives apparent -magnitude by determining not the quantity but the intensity of sounds; -this very intensity of sounds, however, is perceived only by accident -(because it is its proper object). Likewise, taste does not by accident -feel the intensity of a sweet savor. Speaking strictly, the magnitude -of a sound is its extent. Now the intensity of a sound indicates its -extent only by accident, and therefore in an inexact manner. Indeed a -thing's intensity is identical with the thing itself. The multitude of -a thing's parts is known only by the extent of space occupied by the -object. - - -DIFFERENCES OF COLOR AID IN THE PERCEPTION OF MAGNITUDE. - -It may be objected that a color cannot be less large, and that it -can only be less vivid. However, there is a common characteristic in -something smaller and less vivid; namely, that it is less than what -it is its being to be. As to color, diminution implies weakness; -as to size, smallness. Magnitude connected with color diminishes -proportionally with it. This is evident in the perception of a varied -object, as, for instance, in the perception of mountains covered with -houses, forests, and many other objects; here the distinctness of -detail affords a standard by which to judge of the whole. But when the -view of the details does not impress itself on the eye, the latter -no longer grasps the extent of the whole through measurement of the -extent offered to its contemplation by the details. Even in the case -where the objects are near and varied, if we include them all in one -glance without distinguishing all their parts, the more parts our -glance loses, the smaller do the objects seem. On the contrary, if we -distinguish all their details, the more exactly do we measure them, -and learn their real size. Magnitudes of uniform color deceive the eye -because the latter can no longer measure their extent by its parts; and -because, even if the eye attempt to do so, it loses itself, not knowing -where to stop, for lack of difference between the parts. - - -DISAPPEARANCE OF THE FORM IMPLIES THAT OF THE SIZE. - -The distant object seems to us close because our inability to -distinguish the parts of the intervening space does not permit us to -determine exactly its magnitude. When sight can no longer traverse the -length of an interval by determining its quality, in respect to its -form, neither can it any longer determine its quantity in respect to -magnitude. - - -REFUTATION OF ARISTOTLE'S "VISUAL ANGLE" THEORY. - -2. Some[51] hold that distant objects seem to us lesser only because -they are seen under a smaller visual angle. Elsewhere[52] we have shown -that this is wrong; and here we shall limit ourselves to the following -considerations. The assertion that a distant object seems less because -it is perceived under a smaller visual angle supposes that the rest -of the eye still sees something outside of this object, whether this -be some other object, or something external, such as the air. But if -we suppose that the eye sees nothing outside of this object, whether -this object, as would a great mountain, occupy the whole extent of the -glance, and permit nothing beyond it to be seen; or whether it even -extend beyond the sweep of the glance on both sides, then this object -should not, as it actually does, seem smaller than it really is, even -though it fill the whole extension of the glance. The truth of this -observation can be verified by a mere glance at the sky. Not in a -single glance can the whole hemisphere be perceived, for the glance -could not be extended widely enough to embrace so vast an expanse. Even -if we grant the possibility of this, and that the whole glance embraces -the whole hemisphere; still the real magnitude of the heaven is greater -than its apparent magnitude. How then by the diminution of the visual -angle could we explain the smallness of the apparent magnitude of the -sky, on the hypothesis that it is the diminution of the visual angle -which makes distant objects appear smaller? - - - - -FIRST ENNEAD, BOOK FIVE. - -Does Happiness Increase With Time?[53] - - -HAPPINESS HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH DURATION OF TIME. - -1. Does happiness increase with duration of time? No: for the feeling -of happiness exists only in the present. The memory of past happiness -could not add anything to happiness itself. Happiness is not a word, -but a state of soul. But a state of soul is a present (experience), -such as, for instance, the actualization of life. - - -HAPPINESS IS NOT THE SATISFACTION OF THE DESIRE TO LIVE. - -2. Might happiness not be the satisfaction of the desire of living and -activity, inasmuch as this desire is ever present with us? (Hardly). -First, according to this hypothesis, the happiness of to-morrow would -ever be greater than that of to-day, and that of the following day -than that of the day before, and so on to infinity. In this case, the -measure of happiness would no longer be virtue (but duration). Then, -the beatitude of the divinities will also have to become greater from -day to day; it would no longer be perfect, and could never become -so.[54] Besides, desire finds its satisfaction in the possession of -what is present, both now, and in the future. So long as these present -circumstances exist, their possession constitutes happiness. Further, -as the desire of living can be no more than the desire to exist, the -latter desire can refer to the present only, inasmuch as real existence -(essence) inheres only in the present. Desire for a future time, or -for some later event, means no more than a desire to preserve what -one already possesses. Desire refers neither to the future nor the -past, but to what exists at present. What is sought is not a perpetual -progression in the future, but the enjoyment of what exists from the -present moment onward. - - -INCREASED HAPPINESS WOULD RESULT ONLY FROM MORE PERFECT GRASP. - -3. What shall be said of him who lived happily during a longer period, -who has longer contemplated the same spectacle? If such longer -contemplation resulted in a clearer idea thereof, the length of time -has served some useful purpose; but if the agent contemplated it in the -same manner for the whole extent of time, he possesses no advantage -over him who contemplated it only once. - - -PLEASURE IS UNCONNECTED WITH HAPPINESS. - -4. It might be objected that the former of these men enjoyed pleasure -longer than the other. This consideration has nothing to do with -happiness. If by this (enjoyed) pleasure we mean the free exercise -(of intelligence), the pleasure referred to is then identical with -the happiness here meant. This higher pleasure referred to is only to -possess what is here ever present; what of it is past is of no further -value. - - -LENGTH OF HAPPINESS DOES NOT AFFECT ITS QUALITY. - -5. Would equal happiness be predicated of three men, one who had been -happy from his life's beginning to its end, the other only at its end, -and the third, who had been happy, but who ceased being such.[55] This -comparison is not between three men who are happy, but between one man -who is happy, with two who are deprived of happiness, and that at the -(present moment) when happiness (counts most). If then one of them have -any advantage, he possesses it as a man actually happy compared with -such as are not; he therefore surpasses the two others by the actual -possession of happiness. - - -IF UNHAPPINESS INCREASE WITH TIME, WHY SHOULD NOT HAPPINESS DO SO? - -6. (It is generally agreed that) all calamities, sufferings, griefs -and similar evils are aggravated in proportion to their duration. If -then, in all these cases, evil be increased with time, why should not -the same circumstance obtain in the contrary case? Why should happiness -also not be increased?[56] Referring to griefs and sufferings, it might -reasonably be said that they are increased by duration. When, for -example, sickness is prolonged, and becomes a habitual condition, the -body suffers more and more profoundly as time goes on. If, however, -evil ever remain at the same degree, it does not grow worse, and -there is no need of complaining but of the present. Consideration of -the past evil amounts to considering the traces left by evil, the -morbid disposition whose intensity is increased by time, because its -seriousness is proportionate to its duration. In this case it is not -the length of time, but the aggravation of the evil which adds to -the misfortune. But the new degree (of intensity) does not subsist -simultaneously with the old, and it is unreasonable to predicate -an increase as summation of what is no more to what now is. On the -contrary, it is the fixed characteristic of happiness to have a fixed -term, to remain ever the same. Here also the only increase possibly -due to duration of time depends on the relation between an increase -in virtue and one in happiness; and the element to be reckoned with -here is not the number of years of happiness, but the degree of virtue -finally acquired. - - -AS ADDITION IS POSSIBLE WITH TIME, WHY CANNOT HAPPINESS INCREASE? - -7. It might be objected that it is inconsistent to consider the present -only, exclusive of the past (as in the case of happiness), when we -do not do so in respect of time. For the addition of past to present -unquestionably lengthens time. If then we may properly say that time -becomes longer, why may we not say the same of happiness?--Were we to -do so, we would be applying happiness to divisions of time, while it -is precisely to bring out the indivisibility of happiness that it is -considered to be measured by the present exclusively. While considering -time, in respect of things that have vanished, such as, for instance, -the dead, it is perfectly reasonable to reckon the past; but it would -be unreasonable to compare past happiness with present happiness -in respect to duration, because it would be treating happiness as -something accidental and temporary. Whatever might be the length of -time that preceded the present, all that can be said of it is, that -it is no more. To regard duration while considering happiness is to -try to disperse and fraction something that is one and indivisible, -something that exists only in the present. That is why time is called -an image of eternity, inasmuch as it tends to destroy eternity's -permanence through its own dispersion.[57] By abstracting permanence -from eternity, and appropriating it, time destroys eternity; for a -short period, permanence may survive in association with time; but as -soon as it becomes fused with it, eternity perishes. Now as happiness -consists in the enjoyment of a life that is good, namely in that which -is proper to Essence (in itself), because none better exists, it must, -instead of time, have, as a measure, eternity itself, a principle -which admits neither increase nor diminution, which cannot be compared -to any length, whose nature it is to be indivisible, and superior to -time. No comparison, therefore, should be instituted between essence -and non-essence, eternity and time, the perpetual and the eternal; -nor should extension be predicated of the indivisible. If we regard -existence of Essence in itself, it will be necessary to regard it -entire; to consider it, not as the perpetuity of time, but as the very -life of eternity, a life which instead of consisting of a series of -centuries, exists entire since all centuries. - - -NOT EVEN MEMORIES OF THE PAST INCREASE HAPPINESS. - -8. Somebody might object that by subsisting till the present, the -memory of the past adds something more to him who has long lived -happily. In this case it will be necessary to examine what is meant by -this memory. If it mean the memory of former wisdom, and if it mean -that he who would possess this memory would become wiser on account -of it, then this memory differs from our question (which studies -happiness, and not wisdom). If it mean the memory of pleasure, it -would imply that the happy man has need of much pleasure, and cannot -remain satisfied with what is present. Besides, there is no proof that -the memory of a past pleasure is at all pleasant; on the contrary, it -would be entirely ridiculous to remember with delight having tasted a -delicious dish the day before, and still more ridiculous remembering -such an enjoyment ten years ago. It would be just as ridiculous to -pride one self on having been a wise man last year. - - -NOT EVEN THE MEMORY OF VIRTUE INCREASES HAPPINESS. - -9. Could not the memory of virtuous actions contribute to happiness? -No: for such a memory cannot exist in a man who has no virtue at -present, and who thereby is driven to seek out the memory of past -virtues. - - -LENGTH OF TIME IS OF NO IMPORTANCE, NOT EVEN AS OPPORTUNITY OF VIRTUE. - -10. Another objection is that length of time would give opportunity -for doing many beautiful deeds; while this opportunity is denied him -who lives happily only a short period. This may be answered by denying -happiness to a man on the grounds of having done many beautiful -deeds. If several parts of time and several actions are to constitute -happiness, then it would be constituted by things that are no more, -that are past, and by present things; whereas our definition of -happiness limits it exclusively to the present. Then we considered -whether length of time add to happiness. There remains only to examine -whether happiness of long duration be superior because of yielding -opportunities of doing more beautiful deeds. To begin with, the man -who is inactive may be just as happy, if not more happy than he who is -active. Besides, it is not actions themselves which yield happiness; -(the sources of happiness) are states of mind, which are the principles -of beautiful actions. The wise man enjoys welfare while active, but not -because of this activity; he derives (this welfare) not from contingent -things, but from what he possesses in himself. For it might happen even -to a vicious man to save his fatherland, or to feel pleasure in seeing -it saved by some other. It is not then these activities which are the -causes of the enjoyment of happiness. True beatitude and the joys it -yields must be derived from the constant disposition of the soul. To -predicate it of activity, would be to make it depend on things alien to -virtue and the soul. The soul's actualization consists in being wise, -and in exercising her self-activity; this is true happiness. - - - - -SECOND ENNEAD, BOOK SEVEN. - -About Mixture to the Point of Total Penetration. - - -REFUTATION OF ANAXAGORAS AND DEMOCRITUS. - -1. The subject of the present consideration is mixture to the point -of total penetration of the different bodies. This has been explained -in two ways: that the two liquids are mingled so as mutually to -interpenetrate each other totally, or that only one of them penetrates -the other. The difference between these two theories is of small -importance. First we must set aside the opinion of (Anaxagoras and -Democritus[58]), who explain mixture as a juxtaposition, because this -is a crude combination, rather than a mixture.[59] Mixture should -render the whole homogeneous, so that even the smallest molecules might -each be composed of the various elements of the mixture. - - -REFUTATION OF ARISTOTLE AND ALEXANDER OF APHRODISIAS. - -As to the (Peripatetic) philosophers who assert that in a mixture only -the qualities mingle, while the material extension of both bodies are -only in juxtaposition, so long as the qualities proper to each of -them are spread throughout the whole mass, they seem to establish the -rightness of their opinion by attacking the doctrine which asserts that -the two bodies mutually interpenetrate in mixture.[60] (They object) -that the molecules of both bodies will finally lose all magnitude -by this continuous division which will leave no interval between the -parts of either of the two bodies; for if the two bodies mutually -interpenetrate each other in every part, their division must become -continuous. Besides, the mixture often occupies an extent greater than -each body taken separately, and as great as if mere juxtaposition -had occurred. Now if two bodies mutually interpenetrate totally, the -resulting mixture would occupy no more place than any one of them -taken separately. The case where two bodies occupy no more space than -a single one of them is by these philosophers explained by the air's -expulsion, which permits one of the bodies to penetrate into the -pores of the other. Besides, in the case of the mixture of two bodies -of unequal extent, how could the body of the smaller extend itself -sufficiently to spread into all the parts of the greater? There are -many other such reasons. - - -REFUTATION OF THE STOICS. - -We now pass to the opinions of (Zeno and the other Stoic) -philosophers,[61] who assert that two bodies which make up a mixture -mutually interpenetrate each other totally. They support this view -by observing that when the bodies interpenetrate totally, they are -divided without the occurrence of a continuous division (which would -make their molecules lose their magnitude). Indeed, perspiration -issues from the human body without its being divided or riddled with -holes. To this it may be objected that nature may have endowed our -body with a disposition to permit perspiration to issue easily. To -this (the Stoics) answer that certain substances (like ivory[62]), -which when worked into thin sheets, admit, in all their parts, a liquid -(oat-gruel) which passes from one surface to the other. As these -substances are bodies, it is not easy to understand how one element -can penetrate into another without separating its molecules. On the -other hand, total division must imply mutual destruction (because -their molecules would lose all magnitude whatever). When, however, two -mingled bodies do not together occupy more space than either of them -separately (the Stoics) seem forced to admit to their adversaries that -this phenomenon is caused by the displacement of air. - - -EXPLANATION OF MIXTURE THAT OCCUPIES MORE SPACE THAN ITS ELEMENTS. - -In the case where the compound occupies more space than each element -separately, it might (though with little probability), be asserted, -that, since every body, along with its other qualities, implies size, a -local extension must take place. No more than the other qualities could -this increase perish. Since, out of both qualities, arises a new form, -as a compound of the mixture of both qualities; so also must another -size arise, the mixture combining the size out of both. Here (the -Peripatetics) might answer (the Stoics): "If you assert a juxtaposition -of substances, as well as of the masses which possess extension, you -are actually adopting our opinions. If however one of the masses, with -its former extension, penetrate the entire mass of the other, the -extension, instead of increasing, as in the case where one line is -added to another by joining their extremities, will not increase any -more than when two straight lines are made to coincide by superimposing -one on the other." - - -CASE OF MIXTURE OF UNEQUAL QUANTITIES. - -The case of the mixture of a smaller quantity with a greater one, such -as of a large body with a very small one, leads (the Peripatetics) -to consider it impossible that the great body should spread in all -the parts of the small one. Where the mixture is not evident, the -(Peripatetics) might claim that the smaller body does not unite with -all the parts of the greater. When however the mixture is evident, -they can explain it by the extension of the masses, although it be -very doubtful that a small mass would assume so great an extension, -especially when we attribute to the composite body a greater extent, -without nevertheless admitting its transformation, as when water -transforms itself into air. - - -EVAPORATION MAY LEAD TO A THIRD THEORY OF MIXTURE. - -2. What happens when a mass of water transforms itself into air? This -question demands particular treatment; for how can the transformed -element occupy a greater extension? (We shall not try to explain -it on either the Peripatetic or Stoic principles) because we have -sufficiently developed above the numerous reasons advanced by both -those schools. We had better now consider which of the two systems -we ourselves might adopt, and on which side lies reason. Besides, we -should consider whether, besides these both, there be not place for a -third opinion. - - -REFUTATION OF STOIC EXPLANATION OF EVAPORATION. - -When water flows through wool, or when paper allows water to filter -through it, why does not the whole of the water pass through these -substances (without partly remaining within them)? If the water remain -therein partially, we shall not be able to unite the two substances -or masses. Shall we say that the qualities alone are confused (or, -mingled)? Water is not in juxtaposition with the paper, nor is lodged -in its pores; for the whole paper is penetrated thereby, and no -portion of the matter lacks that quality. If matter be united to -quality everywhere, water must everywhere be present in the paper. -If it be not water that everywhere is present in the paper, but only -(humidity which is) the quality of the water, where then is the water -itself? Why is not the mass the same? The matter that has insinuated -itself into the paper extends it, and increases its volume. Now this -augmentation of volume implies augmentation of mass; and the latter -implies that the water has not been absorbed by the book, and that the -two substances occupy different places (and do not interpenetrate each -other). Since one body causes another to participate in its quality, -why would it not also make it participate in its extension? By virtue -of this union with a different quality, one quality, united with a -different one, cannot, either remain pure, or preserve its earlier -nature; it necessarily becomes weaker. But one extension, added to -another extension, does not vanish. - - -REFUTATION OF PERIPATETIC EXPLANATION OF EVAPORATION. - -One body is said to divide another, by penetrating it. This -assertion, however, demands demonstration, for it is more reasonable -to suppose that qualities may penetrate a body without dividing -it. Such demonstration is attempted by the claim that qualities -are incorporeal.[63] But if matter itself be as incorporeal as the -qualities, why could not some qualities along with the matter penetrate -into some other body? That some solids do not penetrate other bodies, -is due to their possession of qualities incompatible with that of -penetration. The objection that many qualities could not, along with -matter, penetrate some body, would be justified only if it were the -multitude of qualities that produced density; but if density be as much -of a quality as corporeity, the qualities will constitute the mixture -not in themselves alone, but only as they happen to be determined. -On the other hand, when matter does not lend itself to mixture, this -occurs not by virtue of its being matter, but as matter united to some -determinative quality. That is all the truer as matter is receptive to -any magnitude, not having any of its own. But enough of this. - - -THE BODY IS RATIONALIZED MATTER. - -3. Since we have spoken of corporeity, it must be analyzed. Is it a -composite of all qualities, or does it constitute a form, a "reason," -which produces the body by presence in matter? If the body be the -composite of all the qualities together with matter, this totality of -qualities will constitute corporeity. But if corporeity be a reason -which produces the body by approaching matter, doubtless it is a reason -which contains all the qualities. Now, if this reason be not at all a -definition of being, if it be a reason productive of the object, it -will not contain any matter. It is the reason which applies itself to -matter, and which, by its presence, produces the body there. Body is -matter with indwelling "reason." This "reason," being a form, may be -considered separately from matter, even if it were entirely inseparable -therefrom. Indeed, "reason" separated (from matter), and residing -in intelligence, is different (from "reason" united to matter); the -"Reason" which abides within Intelligence is Intelligence itself. But -this subject (I shall) refer to elsewhere.[64] - - - - -SIXTH ENNEAD, BOOK SEVEN. - -How Ideas Multiplied, and the Good.[65] - - -A. HOW IDEAS MULTIPLY. - - -THE EYES WERE IMPLANTED IN MAN BY DIVINE FORESIGHT. - -1. When the (higher) Divinity, or (some lower) divinity,[66] sent -souls down into generation, He gave to the face of man eyes suitable -to enlighten him,[67] and placed in the body the other organs suited -to the senses, foreseeing that (a living organism) would be able to -preserve itself only on condition of seeing, hearing and touching -contiguous objects, to enable it to select some, and to avoid others. - - -SENSES NOT GIVEN TO MAN BECAUSE OF EXPERIENCE OF MISFORTUNES. - -But can you explain this divine foresight? You must not believe that He -would have begun by making (animals) who perished for lack of senses, -and that later (the divinity) gave senses to man and other animals so -that they could preserve themselves from death.[68] - - -NOR BECAUSE OF GOD'S FORESIGHT OF THESE MISFORTUNES. - -It might, indeed, be objected that (the divinity) knew that the living -organism would be exposed to heat, cold, and other physical conditions; -and that as a result of this knowledge, to keep them from perishing, -He granted them, as tools, senses and organs. In our turn we shall -ask whether the divinity gave the organs to the living organisms -that already possessed the senses, or whether, He endowed souls with -senses and organs simultaneously. In the latter case, though they were -souls, they did not previously possess the sensitive faculties. But if -the souls possessed the sensitive faculties since the time they were -produced, and if they were produced (with these faculties) in order -to descend into generation, then it was natural for them to do so. In -this case it seems that it must be contrary to their nature to avoid -generation, and to dwell in the intelligible world. They would seem -made to belong to the body, and to live in evil. Thus divine Providence -would retain them in evil, and the divinity would arrive at this result -by reasoning; in any case, He would have reasoned. - - -FORESIGHT OF CREATION IS NOT THE RESULT OF REASONING. - -If the divinity reason, we are forced to wonder what are the principles -of this reasoning; for, if it were objected that these principles are -derived from some other reasoning, we shall, nevertheless, in the -process of ascending, have to find something anterior to all reasoning; -namely, a point of departure. Now from whence are the principles of -reasoning derived? Either from the senses or the intelligence. (Could -the divinity have made use of principles derived from the senses?) -(When God created) there were no senses in existence yet; therefore -(the divinity must have reasoned) from principles derived from -Intelligence. But if the premises were conceptions of Intelligence, -then it was impossible for knowledge and reasoning to have some -sense-thing as object, as reasoning that has intelligible principles -and conclusion could not result in producing a conception of the -sense-(world). Therefore the foresight which presided over the creation -of a living being or of a whole world could not have been the result of -reasoning.[69] - - -BOTH REASONING AND FORESIGHT ARE ONLY FIGURATIVE EXPRESSIONS. - -There is indeed no reasoning in the divinity. When we speak of it, -in connection with the divinity, it is only to explain that He has -regulated everything as might have been done by some wise man, who -would have reasoned about results. Attributing foresight to the -divinity indicates merely that He has disposed everything as might have -been done by some wise man who had foreseen results.[70] Indeed the -only use of reasoning is to put in order things whose existence is not -anterior to that of reasoning, every time that that (Intelligence), -the power superior to reasoning, is not strong enough. Likewise, -prevision is necessary in this case, because he who makes use of it -does not possess a power that would enable him to forego or do without -it. Prevision proposes to effect some one thing instead of another, -and seems to fear that that which it desires might not occur. But, -for a (being) which can do but one thing, both foresight and the -reasoning that decides between contraries, are useless; for there is -no need of reasoning when, of two contrary courses of action, one only -is possible. How would the Principle which is single, unitary and -simple, have need to reflect that He must do one thing, so that some -other might not take place, or to judge that the second would occur as -alternative to the first? How could He say that experience has already -demonstrated the utility of some one thing, and that it is well to make -use of it? If the divinity acted thus, then indeed would He have had -recourse to prevision, and consequently, to reasoning. It is on this -hypothesis that we said above that the divinity gave animals senses -and faculties; but it is quite a problem to know what and how He really -gave them. - - -IN GOD ALL THINGS WERE SIMULTANEOUS, THOUGH WHEN REALIZED THEY -DEVELOPED. - -Indeed, if it be admitted that in the divinity no actualization is -imperfect, if it be impossible to conceive in Him anything that is not -total or universal, each one of the things that He contains comprises -within Himself all things. Thus as, to the divinity, the future is -already present, there could not be anything posterior to Him; but what -is already present in Him becomes posterior in some other (being). Now -if the future be already present in the divinity, it must be present -in Him as if what will happen were already known; that is, it must be -so disposed as to find itself sufficiently provided for, so as not to -stand in need of anything. Therefore, as all things existed already -within the divinity (when living beings were created), they had been -there from all eternity; and that in a manner such that it would later -be possible to say, "this occurred after that." Indeed, when the things -that are in the divinity later develop and reveal themselves, then one -sees that the one is after the other; but, so far as they exist all -together, they constitute the universal (Being), that is, the principle -which includes its own cause. - - -IN THE INTELLIGIBLE, EVERYTHING POSSESSES ITS REASON AS WELL AS ITS -FORM. - -2. (By this process) we also know the nature of Intelligence, which -we see still better than the other things, though we cannot grasp -its magnitude. We admit, in fact, that it possesses the whatness -(essence[71]), of everything, but not its "whyness" (its cause); or, -if we grant (that this "cause" be in Intelligence), we do not think -that it is separated (from its "whatness" (or, essence[72]). Let -us suppose that, for instance, the man, or, if possible, the eye, -should offer itself to our contemplation (in the intelligible world) -as a statue, or as a part of it, would do. The man that we see on -high is both essence[73] and cause. As well as the eye, he must be -intellectual, and contain his cause. Otherwise, he could not exist in -the intelligible world. Here below, just as each part is separated from -the others, so is the cause separated (from the essence). On high, on -the contrary, all things exist in unity, and each thing is identical -with its cause. This identity may often be noticed even here below, as -for instance, in eclipses.[74] It would therefore seem probable that -in the intelligible world everything would, besides the rest, possess -its cause, and that its cause constitutes its essence. This must be -admitted; and that is the reason why those who apply themselves to -grasp the characteristic[75] of each being succeed (in also grasping -its cause). Indeed that which each (being) is, depends on the "cause of -such a form."[76] To repeat: not only is a (being's) form its cause, -(which is incontestable), but yet, if one analyses each form considered -in itself, its cause will be found. The only things which do not -contain their causes are those whose life is without reality, and whose -existence is shadowy. - - -INTELLIGENCE CONTAINS THE CAUSE OF ALL ITS FORMS. - -What is the origin of the cause of what is a form, which is -characteristic of Intelligence? It is not from Intelligence, because -the form is not separable from Intelligence, combining with it to form -one single and same thing. If then Intelligence possess the forms -in their fulness, this fulness of forms implies that they contain -their cause. Intelligence contains the cause of each of the forms it -contains. It consists of all these forms taken together, or separately. -None of them needs discovery of the cause of its production, for -simultaneously with its production, it has contained the cause of its -hypostatic existence. As it was not produced by chance, it contains all -that belongs to its cause; consequently, it also possesses the whole -perfection of its cause. Sense-things which participate in form do not -only receive their nature from it, but also the cause of this nature. -If all the things of which this universe is composed be intimately -concatenated; and if the universe, containing all things, also contain -the cause of each of them; if its relation with them be the same as -that of the body with its organs, which do not mature successively, but -which, towards each other, are mutually related as cause and effect; -so much the more, in the intelligible world, must things have their -"causes," all of them in general in respect to the totality, and each -independently in respect to itself. - - -IN THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD EACH BEING IS ACCOMPANIED BY ITS WHYNESS. - -Since all intelligible (entities) have a hypostatic consubstantial -existence affording no room for chance; and as they are not separated -from each other, things that are caused must bear these their causes -within themselves, and each of them has some sort of a cause, though -without really possessing one. If there be no cause for the existence -of the intelligibles; and if, though isolated from all causes, they be -self-sufficient; it can only be because they carry their cause along -with them, when they are considered in themselves. As they contain -nothing fortuitous, and as each of them is manifold, and as its cause -is all that they contain, we might assign this cause to themselves. -Thus in the intelligible world "being" is preceded, or rather -accompanied by its cause, which is still more "being" than cause, -or rather which becomes identified with it. What superfluousness, -indeed, could there be in intelligence, unless its conceptions -resemble imperfect productions? If its conceptions be perfect, one -could neither discover what they lack, nor define their cause, and, -since they possess everything, they also possess their cause. There, -"being" and cause are united; the presence of both is recognized -in each conception, in each actualization of intelligence. Let us, -for instance, consider the intelligible Man; he seems complete, in -his totality; all his attributes were his simultaneously from the -beginning; he was always entirely complete. It is the characteristic -of that which is generated not always to be what it ought to be, and -to need to acquire something. The intelligible Man is eternal; he is -therefore always complete; but that which becomes man must be generated -(being). - - -INTELLIGENCE DID NOT DELIBERATE BEFORE MAKING SENSE-MAN. - -3. But why could Intelligence not have deliberated before producing -the sense-man? The (man we know by our senses) was (created) by -similitude to the (intelligible Man), nothing can be added to him, -nothing subtracted. It is a mere supposition to say that Intelligence -deliberates and reasons. The theory that things were created, implies -preliminary deliberation and reasoning; but (the latter becomes -impossible) in the case of eternal generation, for that which -originates eternally,[77] cannot be the object of a deliberation. -Intelligence could not deliberate without having forgotten the course -it had followed before; it cannot improve later on without implying -that its beginnings were not perfectly beautiful; had they been this, -they would have remained so. If things be beautiful, it is that they -represent their cause well; for even here below an object is beautiful -only if it possess all its legitimate possessions; that is, if it -possess its proper form. It is the form that contains everything; -the form contains the matter, in the sense that it fashions matter, -and leaves nothing formless therein. But it would contain something -formless if a man lacked some part, as, for instance, an organ such as -the eye. - - -BEING CONTAINS ITS CAUSE. - -Thus, a thing is fully explained by the clearing up of its cause. Why -should there be eyebrows above the eye? That it may possess all that -is implied in its being. Were these parts of the body given to man to -protect him from dangers? That would be to establish within being a -principle charged to watch over being. The things of which we speak -are implied in the being that existed before them. Consequently, being -contains within itself the cause which, if distinct from being, is -nevertheless inseparable therefrom. All things are implied in each -other[100]; taken together, they form the total, perfect and universal -Being; their perfection is bound up with, and is inherent in their -cause; thus a (creature's) "being," its "characteristic" (to ti en -einai), and its "cause" (why-ness) fall together. (Before asking an -important question we must premiss that) in the intelligible world -the cause that is complementary to a being is ultimately united to -it. We must also premiss that, by virtue of its perfection, divine -Intelligence contains the causes (as well as the beings[78]), so -that it is only "a posteriori" that we observe that things are well -regulated. If then the possession of senses, and indeed of particular -ones, be implied in the form of man by the eternal necessity and -perfection of divine Intelligence, then the intelligible Man was by -no means mere intelligence, receiving the senses when descending into -generation. (If then having senses be implied in the form of man), does -not Intelligence incline towards the things here below? In what do -these senses (which are attributed to the intelligible Man) consist? -Are these senses the potentiality of perceiving sense-objects? But it -would be absurd that, on high, man should from all eternity possess -the potentiality of feeling, yet feel only here below, and that this -potentiality should pass to actualization only when the soul became -less good (by its union to the body). - - -SUCH QUESTIONS DEMAND SCRUTINY OF THE INTELLIGIBLE MAN. - -4. To answer these questions, we would have to go back to the nature -of the intelligible Man. Before defining the latter, however, it -would indeed be far better to begin by determining the nature of the -sense-man, on the supposition that we know the latter very well, while -perhaps of the former, we have only a very inexact notion. - - -DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE MAN KNOWN BY THE SENSES AND THE INTELLIGIBLE MAN. - -But there are some (Aristotelians or Peripatetics) who might think -that the intelligible Man and the sense-man form but one. Let us first -discuss this point. Does the sense-man have a being different from the -soul which produces him, and makes him live and reason? Is he the soul -that is disposed in some special manner? Is he the soul that uses the -body in some particular way? If man be a reasonable living organism, -and if the latter be composed of soul and body, this definition of man -will not be identical with that of the soul. If the man be defined as -being the composite of the reasonable soul and the body, how can he be -an immortal hypostatic existence? This definition suits the sense-man -only from the moment that the union of the soul and the body has -occurred; it expresses what will be, instead of setting forth what we -call the Man-in-himself; rather than being a real determination of his -characteristics, it would be only a description which would not reveal -the original being. Instead of defining form engaged in matter, it -indicates what is the composite of soul and body, after the union has -occurred. In this case, we do not yet know what is man considered in -his being, which is intelligible. To the claim that the definition of -sense-things should express something composite, it might be answered, -that we do acknowledge that we must not determine the consistence of -each thing. Now if it be absolutely necessary to define the forms -engaged in matter, we must also define the being that constitutes the -man; that is necessary especially for those (Peripateticians) who, by a -definition, mean a statement of a being's original "characteristics." - - -MAN DEFINED AS A REASONABLE SOUL. - -What then is the "being" of man? This really is asking for the -"man-ness" of a man, something characteristic of him, and inseparable -from him. Is the genuine definition of a man that "he is a reasonable -animal"? Would not this rather be the definition of the composite -man? What is the being that produces the reasonable animal? In the -above definition of man, "reasonable animal" means "reasonable life"; -consequently, man may be called the "reasonable life." But can life -exist without a soul? (No), for the soul will give the man reasonable -life; and in this case, instead of being a substance, man will be -only an actualization of the soul; or even, the man will be the soul -herself. But if man be the reasonable soul, what objection will there -be to his remaining man even when his soul should happen to pass into a -different body (as that of a brute animal)? - - -MAN AS A SOUL SUBSISTING IN A SPECIAL REASON. - -5. Man must therefore have as "reason" (or, as essence), something else -than the soul. Still, in this case, man might be something composite; -that is, the soul would subsist in a particular "reason," admitting -that this "reason" was a certain actualization of the soul, though this -actualization could not exist without its producing principle. Now such -is the nature of the "seminal reasons." They do not exist without the -soul; for the generating reasons are not inanimate; and nevertheless -they are not the soul purely and simply. There is therefore nothing -surprising in the statement that these (human) beings are ("seminal) -reasons." - - -THESE REASONS ARE THE ACTUALIZATIONS OF THE SOUL WHICH BEGETS THE -ANIMAL. - -Of which soul are these reasons,[79] which do not beget the man -(though they do beget the animal), then the actualization? Not of the -vegetative soul; they are the actualizations of the (reasonable) soul -which begets the animal,[80] which is a more powerful, and therefore -a more living soul. Man is constituted[81] by the soul disposed in -some manner, when present to matter disposed in some particular -fashion--since the soul is some particular thing, according as she is -in some particular disposition--even in the body. In the bodies, she -fashions a resembling form. So far as the nature of the body allows -it, she thus produces an image of the man, as the painter himself -makes an image of the body; she produces, I repeat, an inferior man -(the sense-man, the animal), which possesses the form of man, his -reasons, morals, dispositions, faculties, although in an imperfect -manner, because he is not the first man (the intellectual man). He has -sensations of another kind; sensations which, though they seem clear, -are obscure, if they be compared to the superior sensations of which -they are the images. The superior man (the reasonable man) is better, -has a diviner soul, and clearer sensations. It is he doubtless to whom -Plato refers (when he says, Man is the soul[82]); in his definition he -adds, "which makes use of the body," because the diviner man dominates -the soul which uses the body, and thus uses the body only in an -indirect manner.[83] - - -NATURE OF THE COMBINATION BEGOTTEN BY THE SOUL. - -In fact, the soul attaches herself to the thing begotten by the soul, -because she was capable of feeling. The soul does this by vivifying it -more; or rather, the soul does not attach herself thereto, but draws it -to herself. She does not depart from the intelligible world, but even -while remaining in contact with it, she holds the inferior soul (which -constitutes the sense-man) suspended to herself; and by her reason she -blends herself with this reason (or, she unites herself to this being -by her "being"). That is why this man (known by the senses), who by -himself is obscure, is enlightened by this illumination. - - -THE THREE MEN IN EACH OF US. - -6. What is the relation of the sense-power within the superior -Soul (or, in the rational soul)? Intelligible sensation perceives -(intelligible) objects that, speaking strictly, are not sensible, -and corresponds to the (intelligible) manner in which they are -perceivable. Thus (by this intelligible sense-power) the Soul perceives -the supersensual harmony and also the sensual, but in a manner such -as the sense-man perceives it, relating it so far as possible to the -superior harmony,[99] just as he relates the earthly fire to the -intelligible Fire, which is above, and which the superior Soul felt in -a manner suitable to the nature of this fire. If the bodies which are -here below were up there also, the superior Soul would feel them and -perceive them. The man who exists on high is a Soul disposed in some -particular manner, capable of perceiving these objects; hence the man -of the last degree (the sense-man) being the image of the intelligible -Man, has reasons (faculties) which are also images (faculties possessed -by the superior Man). The man who exists in the divine Intelligence -constitutes the Man superior to all men. He illuminates the second -(the reasonable man), who in his turn illuminates the third (the -sense-man). The man of this last degree somewhat possesses the two -others; he is not produced by them, he is rather united to them. The -man who constitutes us actualizes himself as the man of the last -degree. The third receives something of the second; and the second is -the actualization of the first.[84] Each man's nature depends on the -"man" according to whom he acts (the man is intellectual, reasonable, -or sensual according as he exercises intelligence, discursive reason, -or sensibility). Each one of us possesses the three men in one sense -(potentially); and does not possess them in another (in actualization; -that is, he does not simultaneously exercise intellect, reason, or -sense). - - -FATE OF THESE THREE MEN, IN BRUTALIZATION AND IN DIVINIZATION. - -When the third life (the sense-power) which constitutes the third -man, is separated from the body, if the life that precedes it (the -discursive reason) accompany it without nevertheless being separated -from the intelligible world, then one may say that the second is -everywhere the third is. It might seem surprising that the latter, when -passing into the body of a brute, should drag along that part which -is the being of man. This being was all beings (potentially); only, at -different times, it acts through different faculties. So far as it is -pure, and is not yet depraved, it wishes to constitute a man, and it -is indeed a man that it constitutes; for to form a man is better (than -to form a brute), and it does what is best. It also forms guardians -of the superior order, but such as are still conformable to the being -constituent of manhood. The (intellectual) Man, who is anterior to this -being, is of a nature still more like that of the guardians, or rather, -he is already a divinity. The guardian attached to a divinity is an -image of him, as the sense-man is the image of the intellectual man -from whom he depends; for the principle to which man directly attaches -himself must not be considered as his divinity. There is a difference -here, similar to that existing between the souls, though they all -belong to the same order.[86] Besides, those guardians whom Plato -simply calls "guardians" (demons), should be called guardian-like, or -"demonic" beings.[87] Last, when the superior Soul accompanies the -inferior soul which has chosen the condition of a brute, the inferior -soul which was bound to the superior soul--even when she constituted -a man--develops the ("seminal) reason" of the animal (whose condition -she has chosen); for she possesses that "reason" in herself; it is her -inferior actualization. - - -ANIMAL SEMINAL REASONS MAY BE CONTRARY TO SOUL'S NATURE; THOUGH NOT TO -THE SOUL HERSELF. - -7. It may however be objected that if the soul produce the nature of a -brute only when she is depraved and degraded, she was not originally -destined to produce an ox or a horse; then the ("seminal) reason" of -the horse, as well as the horse itself, will be contrary to the nature -(of the soul). No: they are inferior to her nature, but they are not -contrary to her. From her very origin, the soul was (potentially) the -("seminal) reason" of a horse or a dog. When permitted, the soul which -was to beget an animal, produces something better; when hindered, she -(only) produces what accords with the circumstances. She resembles the -artists who, knowing how to produce several figures, create either -the one they have received the order to create, or the one that is -most suited to the material at hand. What hinders the (natural and -generative) power of the universal Soul, in her quality of universal -("seminal) Reason," from sketching out the outlines of the body, before -the soul powers (or, individual souls) should descend from her into -matter? What hinders this sketch from being a kind of preliminary -illumination of matter? What would hinder the individual soul from -finishing (fashioning the body sketched by the universal Soul), -following the lines already traced, and organizing the members pictured -by them, and becoming that which she approached by giving herself some -particular figure, just as, in a choric ballet, the dancer confines -himself to the part assigned to him? - - -THE SENSE-WORLD AND THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD ARE CONNECTED BY THE -MANIFOLD TRIPLE NATURE OF MAN. - -Such considerations have been arrived at merely as result of -scrutiny of the consequences of the principles laid down. Our -purpose was to discover how sensibility occurs in the man himself, -without intelligible things falling into generation. We recognized -and demonstrated that intelligible things do not incline towards -sense-things, but that, on the contrary, it is the latter that aspire -and rise to the former, and imitate them; that the sense-man derives -from the intellectual man the power of contemplating intelligible -entities, though the sense-man remain united to sense-things, as the -intellectual man remains united to the intelligible entities. Indeed, -intelligible things are in some respects sensual; and we may call them -such because (ideally) they are Bodies, but they are perceived in a -manner different from bodies. Likewise, our sensations are less clear -than the perception which occurs in the intelligible world, and that -we also call Sensation, because it refers to Bodies (which exist on -high only in an ideal manner). Consequently, we call the man here below -sensual because he perceives less well things which themselves are less -good; that is, which are only images of intelligible things. We might -therefore say that sensations here below are obscure thoughts, and that -the Thoughts on high are distinct Sensations. Such are our views about -sensibility. - - -INTELLIGIBLE ANIMALS DO NOT INCLINE TOWARDS THE SENSE-WORLD FOR THEY -ARE PRE-EXISTING, AND ARE DISTINCT FROM THEIR CREATING IMAGE. - -8. (Now let us pass to the other question we asked). How does it -happen that all the Animals who, like the Horse itself, are contained -in divine Intelligence, do not incline towards the things here below -(by generating them)? Doubtless, to beget a horse, or any other animal -here below, divine Intelligence must hold its conception; nevertheless -it must not be believed that it first had the volition of producing -the horse, and only later its conception. Evidently, it could not have -wished to produce the horse, but because it already had the conception -thereof; and it could not have had the conception thereof but because -it had to produce the horse. Consequently, the Horse who was not -begotten preceded the horse who later was to be begotten. Since the -first Horse has been anterior to all generation, and was not conceived -to be begotten, it is not because the divine Intelligence inclines -towards the things here below, nor because it produces them, that it -contains the intelligible Horse and the other beings. The intelligible -entities existed already in Intelligence (before it begat) and the -sense-things were later begotten by necessary consequence; for it was -impossible that the procession should cease with the intelligibles. Who -indeed could have stopped this power of the (Intelligence) which is -capable of simultaneous procession, and of remaining within itself? - - -IRRATIONAL ANIMALS MUST EXIST WITHIN INTELLIGENCE, UNLESS MAN ALONE WAS -TO EXIST. - -But why should these Animals (devoid of reason) exist in the divine -Intelligence? We might understand that animals endowed with reason -might be found within it; but does this multitude of irrational animals -seem at all admirable? Does it not rather seem something unworthy of -the divine Intelligence? Evidently the essence which is one must be -also manifold, since it is posterior to the Unity which is absolutely -simple; otherwise, instead of being inferior to it, it would fuse -with it. Being posterior to that Unity, it could not be more simple, -and must therefore be less so. Now as the unity was the One who is -excellent, essence had to be less unitary, since multiplicity is the -characteristic of inferiority. But why should essence not be merely -the "pair" (instead of the manifold)? Neither of the elements of the -Pair could any longer be absolutely one, and each would itself become a -further pair; and we might point out the same thing of each of the new -elements (in which each element of the primary Pair would have split -up). Besides, the first Pair contains both movement and stability; it -is also intelligence and perfect life. The character of Intelligence -is not to be one, but to be universal; it therefore contains all the -particular intelligences; it is all the intelligences, and at the -same time it is something greater than all. It possesses life not as -a single soul, but as a universal Soul, having the superior power of -producing individual souls. It is besides the universal living Organism -(or, Animal); consequently, it should not contain man alone (but also -all the other kinds of animals); otherwise, man alone would exist upon -the earth. - - -MANY ANIMALS ARE NOT SO IRRATIONAL AS DIFFERENT. - -9. It may be objected that Intelligence might (well) contain the -ideas of animals of a higher order. But how can it contain the ideas -of animals that are vile, or entirely without reason? For we should -consider vile every animal devoid of reason and intelligence, since it -is to these faculties that those who possess them owe their nobility. -It is doubtless difficult to understand how things devoid of reason -and intelligence can exist in the divine Intelligence, in which are -all beings, and from which they all proceed. But before beginning the -discussion of this question, let us assume the following verities as -granted: Man here below is not what is man in the divine Intelligence, -any more than the other animals. Like them, in a higher form, he dwells -within (the divine Intelligence); besides, no being called reasonable -may be found within it, for it is only here below that reason is -employed; on high the only acts are those superior to discursive -reason.[88] - -Why then is man here below the only animal who makes use of reason? -Because the intelligence of Man, in the intelligible world, is -different from that of other animals, and so his reason here below must -differ from their reason; for it can be seen that many actions of other -animals imply the use of judgment. - -(In reply, it might be asked) why are not all animals equally -rational? And why are not all men also equally rational? Let us -reflect: all these lives, which represent as many movements; all -these intelligences, which form a plurality; could not be identical. -Therefore they had to differ among each other, and their difference -had to consist in manifesting more or less clearly life and -intelligence; those that occupy the first rank are distinguished by -primary differences; those that occupy the second rank, by secondary -differences; and so forth. Thus, amidst intelligences, some constitute -the divinities, others the beings placed in the second rank, and -gifted with reason; further, other beings that we here call deprived -of reason and intelligence really were reason and intelligence in the -intelligible world. Indeed, he who thinks the intelligible Horse, for -instance, is Intelligence, just as is the very thought of the horse. -If nothing but thought existed, there would be nothing absurd in that -this thought, while being intellectual, might, as object, have a being -devoid of intelligence. But since thought and the object thought fuse, -how could thought be intellectual unless the object thought were so -likewise? To effect this, Intelligence would, so to speak, have to -render itself unintelligent. But it is not so. The thing thought is -a determinate intelligence, just as it is a determinate life. Now, -just as no life, whatever it be, can be deprived of vitality, so no -determinate intelligence can be deprived of intellectuality. The very -intelligence which is proper to an animal, such as, for instance, man, -does not cease being intelligence of all things; whichever of its -parts you choose to consider, it is all things, only in a different -manner; while it is a single thing in actualization, it is all things -in potentiality. However, in any one particular thing, we grasp only -what it is in actualization. Now what is in actualization (that is, a -particular thing), occupies the last rank. Such, in Intelligence, for -instance, is the idea of the Horse. In its procession, Intelligence -continues towards a less perfect life, and at a certain degree -constitutes a horse, and at some inferior degree, constitutes some -animal still inferior; for the greater the development of the powers of -Intelligence, the more imperfect these become. At each degree in their -procession they lose something; and as it is a lower degree of essence -that constitutes some particular animal, its inferiority is redeemed -by something new. Thus, in the measure that life is less complete in -the animal, appear nails, claws, or horns, or teeth. Everywhere that -Intelligence diminishes on one side, it rises on another side by the -fulness of its nature, and it finds in itself the resources by which to -compensate for whatever it may lack. - - -APPARENT IMPERFECTIONS ARE ONLY LOWER FORMS OF PERFECTION. - -10. But how can there be anything imperfect in the intelligible world? -Why does the intelligible Animal have horns? Is it for its defense?[89] -To be perfect and complete. It is to be perfect as an animal, perfect -as intelligence, and perfect as life; so that, if it lack one quality, -it may have a substitute. The cause of the differences, is that -what belongs to one being finds itself replaced in another being by -something else; so that the totality (of the beings) may result in the -most perfect Life, and Intelligence, while all the particular beings -which are thus found in the intelligible essence are perfect so far as -they are particular. - - -CO-EXISTENCE OF UNITY AND MULTIPLICITY DEMANDS ORGANIZATION IN SYSTEM. - -The essence must be simultaneously one and manifold. Now it cannot be -manifold if all the things that exist within it be equal; it would -then be an absolute unity. Since therefore (essence) forms a composite -unity, it must be constituted by things which bear to each other -specific differences, such that its unity shall allow the existence of -particular things, such as forms and reasons (beings). The forms, such -as those of man, must contain all the differences that are essential -to them. Though there be a unity in all these forms, there are also -things more or less delicate (or highly organized), such as the eye or -the finger. All these organs, however, are implied in the unity of the -animal, and they are inferior only relatively to the totality. It was -better that things should be such. Reason (the essence of the animal) -is animal, and besides, is something different from the animal. Virtue -also bears a general character, and an individual one. The totality (of -the intelligible world) is beautiful, because what is common (to all -beings), does not offer any differences. - - -BUT HOW COULD THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD CONTAIN VEGETABLES OR METALS? - -11. (The Timaeus of Plato[90]) states that heaven has not scorned to -receive any of the forms of the animals, of which we see so great -a number. The cause must be that this universe was to contain the -universality of things. Whence does it derive all the things it -contains? From on high? Yes, it received from above all the things that -were produced by reason, according to an intelligible form. But, just -as it contains fire and water, it must also contain plant-life. Now, -how could there be plant-life in the intelligible world? Are earth and -fire living entities within it? For they must be either living or dead -entities; in the latter case, not everything would be alive in the -intelligible world. In what state then do the above-mentioned objects -find themselves on high (in the intelligible world)? - -First it can be demonstrated that plants contain nothing opposed to -reason; since, even here below, a plant contains a "reason" which -constitutes its life.[91] But if the essential "reason" of the plant, -which constitutes it, is a life of a particular kind, and a kind of -soul, and if this "reason" itself be a unity, is it the primary Plant? -No: the primary Plant, from which the particular plant is derived, is -above that "reason." The primary Plant is unity; the other is multiple, -and necessarily derives from this unity. If so, the primary Plant must -possess life in a still higher degree, and be the Plant itself from -which the plants here below proceed, which occupy the second or third -rank, and which derive from the primary Plant the traces of the life -they reveal. - - -HOW THE EARTH EXISTS IN THE INTELLIGIBLE. - -But how does the earth exist in the intelligible world? What is its -essence? How can the earth in the intelligible world be alive there? -Let us first examine our earth, that is, inquire what is its essence? -It must be some sort of a shape, and a reason; for the reason of the -plant is alive, even here below. Is there then a living ("seminal) -reason" in the earth also? To discover the nature of the earth, -let us take essentially terrestrial objects, which are begotten or -fashioned by it. The birth of the stones, and their increase, the -interior formation of mountains, could not exist unless an animated -reason produced them by an intimate and secret work. This reason is -the "form of the earth,"[92] a form that is analogous to what is -called nature in trees. The earth might be compared to the trunk of a -tree, and the stone that can be detached therefrom to the branch that -can be separated from the trunk. Consideration of the stone which is -not yet dug out of the earth, and which is united to it as the uncut -branch is united to the tree, shows that the earth's nature, which -is a productive force, constitutes a life endowed with reason; and -it must be evident that the intelligible earth must possess life at -a still higher degree, that the rational life of the earth is the -Earth-in-itself, the primary Earth, from which proceeds the earth here -below. - - -THE FIRE AS IT IS IN THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD. - -If fire also be a reason engaged in matter, and in this respect -resemble the earth, it was not born by chance. Whence would it -come?[93] Lucretius thought it came from rubbing (sticks or stones). -But fire existed in the universe before one body rubbed another; -bodies already possess fire when they rub up against one another; for -it must not be believed that matter possesses fire potentially, so -that it is capable of producing it spontaneously. But what is fire, -since the principle which produces the fire, giving it a form, must -be a "reason"? It is a soul capable of producing the fire, that is, a -"reason" and a life, which (fuse) into one thing. That is why Plato -says that in every object there is a soul[94]; that is, a power capable -of producing the sense-fire. Thus the principle which produces the fire -in our world is a "fiery life," a fire that is more real than ours. -Since then the intelligible Fire is a fire more real than ours, it also -possesses a moral life. The Fire-in-itself therefore possesses life. -There is a similar "reason" in the other elements, air and water. Why -should not these things be as animated as earth is? They are evidently -contained in the universal living Organism, and they constitute parts -thereof. Doubtless life is not manifest in them, any more than in the -earth; but it can be recognized in them, as it is recognized in the -earth, by its productions; for living beings are born in the fire, and -still more in the water, as is better known; others also are formed -in the air. The flames that we daily see lit and extinguished do not -manifest in the universal Soul (because of the shortness of their -duration); her presence is not revealed in the fire, because she does -not here below succeed in reaching a mass of sufficient permanency. - - -WATER AND AIR AS INTELLIGIBLE ENTITIES. - -It is not otherwise with water and air. If by their nature these -elements were more consistent, they would reveal the universal Soul; -but as their essence is dispersed, they do not reveal the power that -animates them. In a similar case are the fluids occurring in our body, -as, for instance, the blood; the flesh, which seems animated, is formed -at the expense of the blood.[95] The latter must therefore enjoy the -presence of the soul, though it seem deprived of the (soul) because -(the blood) manifests no sensibility, opposes no resistance, and by its -fluidity easily separates itself from the soul that vivifies it, as -happens to the three elements already mentioned. Likewise the animals -which Nature forms out of condensed air feel without suffering.[96] As -fixed and permanent light penetrates the air so long as the air itself -is permanent, the soul also penetrates the atmosphere surrounding her -without being absorbed by it. Other elements are in the same case. - - -THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD IS A COMPLETE MODEL OF THIS OUR UNIVERSE. - -12. We therefore repeat that since we admit that our universe is -modeled on the intelligible World, we should so much the more recognize -that the latter is the universal living Organism, which constitutes -all things because it consists of perfect essence. Consequently in the -intelligible world, the heavens also are an animated being, not even -lacking what here below are called the stars; indeed the latter are -what constitutes the heavens' essence. Neither is the Earth on high -something dead; for it is alive, containing all the Animals that walk -on the ground, and that are named terrestrial, as well as Vegetation -whose foundation is life. On high exist also the Sea and the Water in -universal condition, in permanent fluidity and animation, containing -all the Animals that dwell in the water. Air also forms part of the -intelligible world, with the Animals that inhabit the air, and which on -high possess a nature in harmony with it. How indeed could the things -contained in a living being not also themselves be living beings? -Consequently they are also such here below. Why indeed should not all -the animals necessarily exist in the intelligible World? The nature of -the great parts of this world indeed necessarily determines the nature -of the animals that these parts contain. Thus from the "having" and -"being" (existence and nature) of the intelligible world is derived -that of all the beings contained therein. These things imply each -other. To ask the reason for the existence of the Animals contained in -the intelligible world, is to ask why exists this very world itself, -or the universal living Organism, or, what amounts to the same thing, -why exist the universal Life, the universal Soul, in which are found no -fault, no imperfection, and from which everywhere overflows the fulness -of life. - - -ALL THINGS UNITED BY A COMMON SOURCE. - -All these things derive from one and the same source; it is neither a -breath nor a single heat; but rather a single quality, which contains -and preserves within itself all the qualities, the sweetness of the -most fragrant perfumes, the flavor of the wine, and of the finest tasty -juices, the gleam of the most flashing colors, the softness of the -objects which flatter touch with the greatest delicacy, the rhythm and -harmony of all the kinds of sounds which can charm the hearing. - - -SIMPLICITY OF THE INTELLIGIBLE DOES NOT DENY COMPOSITENESS, BUT INFERS -HEIGHT OF SOURCE. - -13. Neither Intelligence, nor the Soul that proceeds therefrom, are -simple; both contain the universality of things with their infinite -variety, so far as these are simple, meaning that they are not -composite, but that they are principles and actualizations; for, in -the intelligible world, the actualization of what occupies the last -rank is simple; the actualization of what occupies the first rank is -universal. Intelligence, in its uniform movement, always trends towards -similar and identical things; nevertheless, each of them is identical -and single, without being a part; it is on the contrary universal, -because what, in the intelligible world, is a part, is not a simple -unit, but a unity that is infinitely divisible. In this movement, -Intelligence starts from one object, and goes to another object which -is its goal. But does all that is intermediary resemble a straight -line, or to a uniform and homogeneous body? There would be nothing -remarkable about that; for if Intelligence did not contain differences, -if no diversity awoke it to life, it would not be an actualization; its -state would not differ from inactivity. If its movement were determined -in a single manner, it would possess but a single kind of (restricted) -life, instead of possessing the universal Life. Now it should contain -an universal and omnipresent Life; consequently, it must move, or -rather have been moved towards all (beings). If it were to move in a -simple and uniform manner, it would possess but a single thing, would -be identical with it, and no longer proceed towards anything different. -If however it should move towards something different, it would have -to become something different, and be two things. If these two things -were then to be identical, Intelligence would still remain one, and -there would be no progress left; if, on the contrary, these two things -were to be different, it would be proceeding with this difference, and -it would, by virtue of this difference joined to its divinity, beget -some third thing. By its origin, the latter is simultaneously identical -and different; not of some particular difference, but of all kinds -of difference, because the identity it contains is itself universal. -Thus being universal difference as well as universal identity, this -thing possesses all that is said to be different; for its nature -is to be universal differentiation (to spread over everything, to -become everything else). If all these differences preceded this -(Intelligence), the latter would be modified by them. If this be not -the case, Intelligence must have begotten all the differences, or -rather, be their universality. - - -INTELLIGENCE EVOLVES OVER THE FIELD OF TRUTH. - -Essences ("beings") therefore cannot exist without an actualization -of Intelligence. By this actualization, after having produced some -("being"), Intelligence always produces some other one, somehow -carrying out the career which it is natural for veritable Intelligence -to carry out within itself; this career is that of the beings, of -which each corresponds to one of its evolutions, (or, it roams around -among beings, so that through its roaming around these beings unite -and form.) Since Intelligence is everywhere identical, its evolutions -imply permanence, and they make it move around the "field of truth"[97] -without ever issuing therefrom. It occupies this whole field, because -Intelligence has made itself the locality where its evolutions -operate, a locality which is identical with what it contains. This -field is varied enough to offer a career to be fulfilled; if it were -not universally and eternally varied, there would be a stopping-place -where variety would cease; and, were Intelligence to stop, it would -not think; and if it had never stopped, it would have existed without -thought (or, it would not exist). This however, is not the case; -therefore thought exists, and its universal movement produces the -fulness of universal "Being." Universal "Being," however, is the -thought that embraces universal Life, and which, after each thing, ever -conceives some other; because, since that which within it is identical -is all so different. It continually divides and ever finds something -different from the others. In its march, Intelligence ever progresses -from life to life, from animated (beings) to animated (beings); just -as some traveller, advancing on the earth, finds all that he travels -through to be earth, whatever variations thereof there may have been. -In the intelligible world, the life whose field one traverses is always -self-identical, but it is also always different. The result is that -(this sphere of operations) does not seem the same to us, because in -its evolution, which is identical, life experiences (or, traverses) -things which are not the same. That however does not change this life, -for it passes through different things in a uniform and identical -manner. If this uniformity and identity of Intelligence were not -applied to different things, Intelligence would remain idle; it would -no longer exist in actualization, and no more be actualization. Now -these different things constitute Intelligence itself. Intelligence is -therefore universal, because this universality forms its very nature. -Being thus universal, Intelligence is all things; there is nothing in -it which does not contribute to its universality; and everything is -different, so as to be able still to contribute to totality, by its -very difference. If there were no difference, if everything in it were -identical, the being of Intelligence would be diminished, inasmuch as -its nature would no more co-operate towards its harmonic consummation. - - -INTELLIGENCE CONTAINS THE INFINITE AS SIMULTANEOUSNESS OF ONE AND MANY -AND AS FRIENDSHIP. - -14. By intellectual examples we can understand the nature of -Intelligence, and see that it could not be a unity which does not admit -any kind of difference. As example, consider the ("seminal) reason" of -a plant, and that of an animal. If it be only a unity, without any kind -of variety, it is not even a "reason," and what is born will be no more -than matter. This "reason" must therefore contain all the organs; and, -while embracing all matter, it must not leave any part of it to remain -identical with any other. For instance, the face does not form a single -mass; it contains the nose and the eyes. Nor is even the nose something -simple; it contains different parts whose variety make of it an organ; -if it were reduced to a state of absolute simplicity, it would be no -more than a mass. Thus Intelligence contains the infinite, because -it is simultaneously one and manifold; not indeed like a house, but -as is a ("seminal) reason" which is manifold interiorly. It contains -within, therefore, a sort of figure (or scheme) or even a picture, on -which are interiorly drawn or inscribed its powers and thoughts; their -division does not take place exteriorly, for it is entirely interior. -Thus the universal living Organism embraces other living beings, -within which may be discovered still smaller living beings, and still -smaller powers, and so on till we arrive at the "atomic form."[98] -All these forms are distinguished from each other by their division, -without ever having been confounded together, though they all occur in -the constitution of a single unity. Thus exists in the intelligible -world that union (by Empedocles) called "friendship"; but such union -is very different from that which exists in the sense-world.[163] In -fact, the latter is only the image of the first, because it is formed -of completely disparate elements. Veritable union however consists -in forming but a single (thing) without admitting of any separation -between (elements). Here below, however, objects are separated from -each other. - - -B. A STUDY OF THE GOOD. - - -ALL SOULS ARE UNITED BY THEIR HIGHEST, WITH INTELLIGENCE SHINING DOWN -FROM THE PEAK THEY FORM. - -15. Who then will be able to contemplate this multiple and universal -Life, primary and one, without being charmed therewith, and without -scorning every other kind of life? For our lives here below, that -are so weak, impotent, incomplete, whose impurity soils other lives, -can be considered as nothing but tenebrous. As soon as you consider -these lives, you no longer see the others, you no longer live with -these other lives in which everything is living; which are relieved -of all impurity, and of all contact with evil. Indeed, evil reigns -here below only[164]; here where we have but a trace of Intelligence -and of the intelligible life. On the contrary, in the intelligible -world exists "that archetype which is beneficent (which possesses the -form of Good"), as says Plato,[101] because it possesses good by the -forms (that is, by the ideas). Indeed, the absolute Good is something -different from the Intelligence which is good only because its life -is passed in contemplating the Good. The objects contemplated by -Intelligence are the essences which have the form of Good, and which -it possesses from the moment it contemplates the Good. Intelligence -receives the Good, not such as the Good is in itself, but such as -Intelligence is capable of receiving it. The Good is indeed the -supreme principle. From the Good therefore, Intelligence derives its -perfection; to the Good Intelligence owes its begetting of all the -intelligible entities; on the one hand, Intelligence could not consider -the Good without thinking it; on the other, it must not have seen in -the Good the intelligible entities, otherwise, Intelligence itself -could not have begotten them. Thus Intelligence has, from the Good, -received the power to beget, and to fill itself with that which it has -begotten.[102] The Good does not Himself possess the things which He -thus donates; for He is absolutely one, and that which has been given -to Intelligence is manifold. Incapable in its plenitude to embrace, and -in its unity to possess the power it was receiving, Intelligence split -it up, thus rendering it manifold, so as to possess it at least in -fragments. Thus everything begotten by Intelligence proceeds from the -power derived from the Good, and bears its form; as intelligence itself -is good, and as it is composed of things that bear the form of Good, it -is a varied good. The reader may be assisted in forming a conception of -it by imagining a variegated living sphere, or a composite of animated -and brilliant faces. Or again, imagine pure souls, pure and complete -(in their essence), all united by their highest (faculties), and then -universal Intelligence seated on this summit, and illuminating the -whole intelligible region. In this simile, the reader who imagines -it considers it as something outside of himself; but (to contemplate -Intelligence) one has to become Intelligence, and then give oneself a -panorama of oneself. - - -INTELLIGENCE CONTAINS ALL THINGS THAT ARE CONFORMED TO THE GOOD. - -16. Instead of stopping at this multiple beauty, it must be abandoned -to rise (to the Good), the supreme principle. By reasoning not -according to the nature of our world, but according to that of the -universal Intelligence, we should with astonishment ask ourselves -which is the principle that has begotten it, and how it did so.[103] -Each one (of the essences contained in the Intelligence) is a -(particular) form, and somehow has its own type. As their common -characteristic is to be assimilated to the Good, the consequence is -that Intelligence contains all the things conformable to the Good. It -possesses therefore the essence which is in all things; it contains all -the animals, as well as the universal Life within them, and all the -rest. - - -THE GOOD IS NOT ONLY THE CAUSE OF BEING, BUT ITS INTUITION AS WELL. - -Why must these things be considered as goods, when considered from -this point of view? The solution of this problem may be arrived at -from the following consideration. When for the first time Intelligence -contemplated the Good, this its contemplation split the Good's unity -into multiplicity. Though itself were a single being, this its thought -divided the unity because of its inability to grasp it in its entirety. -To this it may be answered that Intelligence was not yet such the first -time it contemplated the Good. Did it then contemplate the Good without -intelligence? Intelligence did not yet see the Good; but Intelligence -dwelt near it, was dependent on it, and was turned towards it.[104] -Having arrived at its fulness, because it was operating on high, and -was trending towards the Good, the movement of Intelligence itself led -it to its fulness; since then it was, no longer a single movement, but -a movement perfect and complete. It became all things, and possessing -self-consciousness, it recognized that itself was all things. It thus -became intelligence, which possesses its fulness so as to contain what -it should see, and which sees by the light that it receives from Him -from whom it derives what it sees. That is why the Good is said to be -not only the cause of "being," but rather the cause of the vision of -"being." As for sense-objects, the sun is the cause that makes them -exist, and renders them visible, as it is also the cause of vision, -and as however the sun is neither the vision nor the visible objects, -likewise the Good is the cause of being and of intelligence,[105] it -is a light in respect of the beings that are seen and the Intelligence -that sees them; but it is neither the beings nor the Intelligence; it -is only their cause; it produces thought by shedding its light on the -beings and on Intelligence. It is thus that Intelligence has arrived -to fulness, and that on arriving at fulness it has become perfect and -has seen. That which preceded its fulness is its principle. But it has -another principle (which is the Good), which is somewhat exterior to -it, and which gave it its fulness, and while giving it this fulness -impressed on it the form (of itself, the Good). - - -ALL IS INTELLIGENCE; BUT THIS IS DIFFERENTIATED INTO UNIVERSAL AND -INDIVIDUAL. - -17. How can (these beings) exist within Intelligence, and constitute -it, if they were neither in that which has given, nor in that which -has received this fulness, since, before receiving its fulness from -the Good, Intelligence had not yet received (these beings)? It is -not necessary that a principle should itself possess what it gives; -in intelligible things, it suffices to consider the giver superior, -and the receiver inferior; that (giving and receiving) is the content -of generation in the order of veritable beings.[106] What occupies -the front rank must be in actualization; posterior things must be -in potentiality of what precedes them. What occupies the front rank -is superior to what occupies the second rank; the giver, likewise -is superior to the gift, because it is better. If then there be a -Principle anterior to actualization, it must be superior both to -actualization and to life; and because it gave life to Intelligence it -is more beautiful, still more venerable than Life. Thus Intelligence -received life, without necessity for the principle from which it -received life having had to contain any variety. Life is the impress -of Him who gave it, but it is not his life. When Intelligence -glanced towards Him, it was indeterminate; as soon as it fixed its -glance on Him, it was determined by Him, although He himself had no -determination. As soon indeed as Intelligence contemplated the One, -Intelligence was determined by Him, and from Him it received its -determination, limit and form. The form exists in the receiver; the -giver has none of it. This determination has not been imposed from -without on Intelligence as is the case for the limit imposed on some -magnitude; it is the determination characteristic of that Life, which -is universal, multiple and infinite, because it has radiated from -the supreme Nature. That Life was not yet the life of any particular -principle; otherwise, it would have been determined as an individual -life. Nevertheless it has been determined, and by virtue of that -determination it is the life of a multiple unity. Each one of the -things that constitute its multiplicity has likewise been determined. -Indeed, life has been determined as multiplicity (of beings) because of -its own multiplicity; as unity, because of the very determination it -has received. What has been determined as unity? Intelligence, because -it is the determined life. What was determined as multiplicity? The -multiplicity of intelligences. Everything therefore is intelligence; -only, the Intelligence that is one is universal; while the -intelligences which form multiplicity are individual. - - -MULTIPLICITY OF INTELLIGENCES IMPLIES THEIR MUTUAL DIFFERENCES. - -If universal Intelligence comprises all the individual intelligences, -might not the latter all be identical? No, for then there would be but -one of them. The multiplicity of the intelligences implies therefore a -difference between them.[107] But how does each differ from the others? -Its difference resides in its being one; for there is no identity -between the universal Intelligence, and any particular intelligence. -Thus, in Intelligence, life is universal power; the vision which -emanates from it is the power of all things; and then Intelligence -itself, when it is formed, manifests all these things to us. He who -is seated above all of them is their principle, though they do not -serve Him as foundation; for, on the contrary, He is the foundation -of the form of the first forms, without Himself having any forms. In -respect to the Soul, Intelligence plays the part that the First plays -in respect to Intelligence; Intelligence sheds its light on the Soul, -and, to determine her, rationalizes her by communicating that of which -itself is the trace. The Intellect, therefore, is the trace of the -First; and while it is a form which develops in plurality, the First -has no shape nor form, so as to give form to all the rest. If itself -were a form, Intelligence would be nothing more than the "reason" -(the soul).[108] That is why the First could not have contained any -multiplicity; otherwise, its multiplicity itself would have had to be -traced to some superior principle. - - -LIFE, INTELLIGENCE, AND IDEA BEAR THE FORM OF THE GOOD. - -18. In what respects do the (entities) which are contained by -Intelligence seem to bear the form of the Good? Is it because each of -them is a form, or because each is beautiful, or perhaps for some other -reason? All that proceeds from the Good bears its characteristics or -impressions, or at least bears something derived from it, just as that -which is derived from the fire bears a trace of the fire,[109] and as -that which is derived from sweetness somehow betrays it. Now that, -which, in Intelligence, is derived from the Good is life, for life is -born from the actualization of the Good, and from Him again is derived -the beauty of forms. Therefore all these things, life, intelligence, -and idea will bear the form of Good. - - -THIS FORM OF THE GOOD MAY, HOWEVER, EXIST AT VARYING DEGREES. - -But what element is common to them? It does not suffice for them to -proceed from the Good to have something identical; they must also have -some common characteristic; for a same principle may give rise to -different things; or again, one and the same thing may become different -while passing from the giving principle into the receivers; for there -is a difference between that which constitutes the first actualization, -and that which is given thereby. Thus, that which is in the things of -which we speak is already different. Nothing hinders the characteristic -of all these things (in life, intelligence and idea) from being the -form of Good, but this form exists at different degrees in each of them. - - -INTELLIGENCE AND LIFE ARE ONLY DIFFERENT DEGREES OF THE SAME REALITY. - -In which of these things does the form of the Good inhere in the -highest degree? The solution of this problem depends on the following -one. Is life a good merely as such, even if it were life pure and -simple? Should we not rather limit that word "life" to the life which -derives from the Good, so that mere proceeding from the Good be a -sufficient characterization of life? What is the nature of this life? -Is it the life of the Good? No: life does not belong to the Good; it -only proceeds therefrom. If the characteristic of life be proceeding -from the Good, and if it be real life, evidently the result would be -that nothing that proceeds from the Good would deserve scorn, that -life as life should be considered good, that the same condition of -affairs obtains with the primary and veritable Intelligence, and that -finally each form is good and bears the form of Good. In this case, -each of these (life, intelligence and idea) possess a good which is -either common, or different, or which is of a different degree. Since -we have admitted that each of the above-mentioned things contains a -good in its being, then it is good chiefly because of this good. Thus -life is a good, not in so far as it is merely life, but in so far as -it is real life and proceeds from the Good. Intelligence likewise is -a good so far as it essentially is intelligence; there is therefore -some common element in life and intelligence. Indeed, when one and the -same attribute is predicated of different beings, although it form -an integral part of their being, it may be abstracted therefrom by -thought; thus from "man" and "horse" may be abstracted "animal"; from -"water" and "fire," "heat"; but what is common in these beings is a -genus, while what is common in intelligence and life, is one and the -same thing which inheres in one in the first degree, and in the other -in the second. - - -IS THE WORD GOOD A COMMON LABEL OR A COMMON QUALITY? - -Is it by a mere play on words that life, intelligence and ideas are -called good? Does the good constitute their being, or is each good -taken in its totality? Good could not constitute the being of each -of them. Are they then parts of the Good? The Good, however, is -indivisible. The things that are beneath it are good for different -reasons. The primary actualization (that proceeds from the Good) is -good; likewise, the determination it receives is good, and the totality -of both things is good. The actualization is good because it proceeds -from the Good; the determination, because it is a perfection that -has emanated from the Good; and the combination of actualization and -determination because it is their totality. All these things thus are -derived from one and the same principle, but nevertheless they are -different. Thus (in a choric ballet) the voice and the step proceed -from one and the same person, in that they are all perfectly regulated. -Now they are well regulated because they contain order and rhythm. -What then is the content in the above-mentioned things that would make -them good? But perhaps it may be objected that if the voice and step -are well regulated, each one of them entirely owes it to some external -principle, since the order is here applied to the things that differ -from each other. On the contrary, the things of which we speak are each -of them good in itself. And why are they good? It does not suffice to -say that they are good because they proceed from the Good. Doubtless we -shall have to grant that they are precious from the moment that they -proceed from the Good, but reason demands that we shall determine that -of which their goodness consists. - - -GOOD CANNOT BE A DESIRE OF THE SOUL. - -19. Shall the decision of what is good be entrusted to the desire -of the soul?[110] If we are to trust this affection of the soul, we -shall be declaring that whatever is desirable for her is good; but -we would not be seeking why the Good is desired. Thus, while we use -demonstrations to explain the nature of every entity, we would be -trusting to desire for the determination of the Good. Such a proceeding -would land us in several absurdities. First, the Good would only be an -attribute. Then, since our soul has several desires, and each of the -latter has different objects, we would not be able to decide which -of these objects would be the best, according to desire. It would be -impossible to decide what would be better before we know what is good. - - -NO NEED TO SEEK THE CAUSE OF GOOD AS IN THE INTELLIGIBLE THE CAUSE -COINCIDES WITH THE NATURE. - -Shall we then define the good as the virtue characteristic of each -being (as say the Stoics)? In this case, by strictly following (the -course of dialectics) we would reduce the Good to being a form and a -reason. But, having arrived there, what should we answer if we were -asked on what grounds these things themselves are good? In imperfect -things, it seems easy to distinguish the good, even though it be not -pure; but in intelligible things we may not immediately succeed in -discovering the Good by comparison with the inferior things. As there -is no evil on high (in the intelligible world), and as excellent -things exist in themselves, we find ourselves embarrassed. Perhaps we -are embarrassed only because we seek the cause ("whyness") (of the -good), whereas the cause ("whyness") is here identical with the nature -("whatness"), as intelligible entities are good in themselves. Nor -would we have solved the problem if we were to assign some other cause -(of the Good), such as the divinity, to which our reason has not yet -forced us to repair. However, we cannot retire, and we must seek to -arrive by some other road to something satisfactory. - - -PYTHAGOREAN OPPOSITIONS ARE ALSO WORTHLESS AS EXPLANATIONS OF GOOD. - -20. Since therefore we have given up desires as forms in the -determination of the nature and quality (of the good), shall we have -recourse to other rules, such as, for instance (the Pythagorean[104]) -"oppositions," such as order and disorder, proportion and -disproportion, health and sickness, form and formlessness, being and -destruction, consistence and its lack? Who indeed would hesitate to -attribute to the form of good those characteristics which constitute -the first member of each of these opposition-pairs? If so, the -efficient causes of these characteristics will also have to be traced -to the good; for virtue, life, intelligence and wisdom are comprised -within the form of good, as being things desired by the soul that is -wise. - - -GOOD NOT DEFINED BY INTELLIGENCE, AS THE SOUL HAS OTHER ASPIRATIONS. - -It will further be suggested (by followers of Aristotle) that we -stop at Intelligence, predicating goodness of it. For life and soul -are images of Intelligence. It is to Intelligence that the soul -aspires, it is according to Intelligence that the soul judges, it is -on Intelligence that the soul regulates herself, when she pronounces -that justice is better than injustice, in preferring every kind of -virtue to every kind of vice, and in holding in high estimation what -she considers preferable. Unfortunately, the soul does not aspire -to Intelligence exclusively. As might be demonstrated in a long -discussion, Intelligence is not the supreme goal to which we aspire, -and not everything aspires to Intelligence, whilst everything aspires -to the Good. The (beings) which do not possess intelligence do not -all seek to possess it, while those who do possess it, do not limit -themselves to it. Intelligence is sought only as the result of a train -of reasoning, whilst Good is desired even before reason comes into -play. If the object of desire be to live, to exist always, and to be -active, this object is not desired because of Intelligence, but because -of its being good, inasmuch as the Good is its principle and its goal. -It is only in this respect that life is desirable. - - -THE GOOD IS INTELLIGENCE AND PRIMARY LIFE. - -21. What then is the one and only cause to whose presence is due the -goodness (of life, intelligence and idea)? Let us not hesitate to say: -Intelligence and primary Life bear the form of Good; it is on this -account alone that they are desirable; they bear the form of Good in -this respect, that the primary Life is the actualization of the Good, -or rather the actualization that proceeds from the Good, and that -intelligence is determination of this actualization. (Intelligence and -primary Life) are fascinating, and the soul seeks them because they -proceed from the Good; nevertheless the soul aspires to them (only) -because they fit her, and not because they are good in themselves. On -the other hand, the soul could not disdain them because they bear the -form of good; though[112] we can disdain something even though it be -suitable to us, if it be not a good besides.[112] It is true that we -permit ourselves to be allured by distant and inferior objects, and -may even feel for them a passionate love; but that occurs only when -they have something more than their natural condition, and when some -perfection descends on them from on high. Just as the bodies, while -containing a light mingled with their (substance), nevertheless need -illumination by some other light to bring out their colors,[113] so the -intelligible entities, in spite of the light that they contain, need to -receive some other more powerful light, so as to become visible, both -for themselves, and for others. - - -GOOD CONSISTS IN ILLUMINATION BY THE EXTREME. - -22. When the soul perceives the light thus shed by the Good on -the intelligible entities, she flies towards them, tasting an -indescribable bliss in the contemplation of the light that illuminates -them. Likewise here below, we do not like the bodies for themselves, -but for the beauty that shimmers in them.[114] Each intelligible entity -owes its nature to none but to itself; but it only becomes desirable -when the Good, so to speak, illuminates and colors it, breathing -grace into the desired object, and inspiring love into the desiring -heart. As soon as the soul reacts to the influence of the Good, she -feels emotion, swells with fancy, is stung by desire, and love is born -within her.[115] Before reacting to the influence of good she feels no -transports when facing the beauty of Intelligence; for this beauty is -dead so long as it is not irradiated by the Good. Consequently the soul -still remains depressed and bowed down, cold and torpid, in front of -Intelligence. But as soon as she feels the gentle warmth of the Good, -she is refreshed, she awakes, and spreads her wings; and instead of -stopping to admire the Intelligence in front of her, she rises by the -aid of reminiscence to a still higher principle (the First). So long as -there is anything superior to what she possesses, she rises, allured -by her natural leaning for the Inspirer of love; so she passes through -the region of Intelligence, and stops at the Good because there is -nothing beyond. So long as she contemplates Intelligence, she surely -enjoys a noble and magnificent spectacle, but she does not yet fully -possess the object of her search. Such would be a human countenance, -which, in spite of its beauty, is not attractive, for lack of the -charm of grace. Beauty is, indeed, rather the splendor that enhalos -proportion, than proportion itself; and it is properly this splendor -which challenges love. Why indeed does beauty shine radiantly on the -face of a living person, and yet leave hardly a trace after death, -even when the complexion and features are not yet marred? Why, among -different statues, do the most life-like ones seem more beautiful than -others that may be better proportioned? Why is a living being, though -ugly, more beautiful than a pictured one, even though the latter were -the most handsome imaginable? The secret is that the living form seems -to us most desirable, because it possesses a living soul, because it is -most assimilated to the Good; because the soul is colored by the light -of the Good, and because, enlightened by the Good she is more wakeful -and lighter, and because in her turn she lightens the burdens, awakes, -and causes participation of the Good, so far as she may be able, in the -body within which she resides. - - -THE SUPREME IS THE GOOD BECAUSE OF HIS SUPREMACY. - -23. Since it is this Principle which the soul pursues, which -illuminates Intelligence, and whose least trace arouses in us so great -an emotion, there is no ground for astonishment if it possess the power -of exerting its fascination on all beings, and if all rest in Him -without seeking anything beyond. If indeed everything proceeds from -this principle, then there is nothing better, and everything else is -below Him. Now, how could the best of beings fail to be the Good? If -the Good be entirely self-sufficient, and have need of nothing else, -what could it be except the One who was what He is before all other -things, when evil did not yet exist? If all evils be posterior to -Him, if they exist only in the objects that in no way participate in -the Good, and which occupy the last rank, if no evil exist among the -intelligibles, and if there be nothing worse than evil (just as there -is nothing better than the Good), then evils are in complete opposition -to this principle, and it could be nothing else. To deny the existence -of the Good, we would also have to deny the existence of evil; and -the result would be a complete indifference of choice between any two -particular things; which is absurd. All other things called good refer -to Him, while He refers to nothing else. - - -THE GOOD AS CREATOR AND PRESERVER. - -But if this be the nature of the Good, what does He do? He made -Intelligence, and life. By the intermediation of Intelligence, He made -the souls and all the other beings that participate in Intelligence, -in Reason, or in Life. Moreover, who could express the goodness of Him -who is their source and principle? But what is He doing at the present -time? He preserves what He has begotten, He inspires the thought in -those who think, He vivifies the living, by His spirit,[116] He imparts -to all (beings) intelligence and life, and to those who are unable to -receive life, at least existence. - - -MANY FURTHER QUESTIONS ABOUT THE GOOD; FOR THE INDIVIDUAL IT IS -ILLUMINATION. - -24. And what is He doing for us? To answer this question, we would -still have to explain the light by which Intelligence is illuminated, -and in which the Soul participates. But we shall have to postpone this -discussion, and mention various other questions which may be asked. -Is the Good goodness, and does it receive this name because it is -desirable for some being? Is that which is desirable for some being the -good of this being, and do we call the Good that which is desirable -for all beings? Is being desirable not rather a simple characteristic -of the Good, and must not that which is desirable have a nature such -that it would deserve the name of Good?[117] Besides, do the beings -that desire the Good desire it because they receive from it something, -or merely because possession thereof causes bliss? If they do receive -something from it, what does it consist of? If the possession of the -Good give them joy, why should their joy come from possession of the -Good, rather than from possession of anything else? ls the Good such -by what is characteristic of it, or by something else? Is the Good an -attribute of some other being, or is the Good good for itself? Must not -the Good rather be good for others, without being good for itself? For -whom anyway is the Good good? For there is a certain nature (matter) -for which nothing is good. - - -ATTRIBUTING GOOD TO LIFE IS ONLY THE RESULT OF FEAR OF DEATH. - -Nor can we ignore an objection raised by an opponent who is difficult -to convince (Plato's Philebus): "Well, my friends, what then is this -entity that you celebrate in such pompous terms, ceaselessly repeating -that life and intelligence are goods, although you said that the -Good is above them? What sort of a good might the Intellect be? What -sort of a good should (a man) have, who thinks the Ideas themselves, -contemplating everything in itself? Perhaps, indeed, a man, when he -enjoys these (Ideas and contemplations), might be deceived into calling -them a good merely because he happened to be in pleasant circumstances; -but should these circumstances become unpleasant, on what grounds would -he call them a good? Merely because they (possess) existence? But what -pleasure or benefit could this afford him? If he did not consider -self-love as the foundation thereof, what difference could there be -for him between existence and non-existence? It is therefore to this -natural physical error (of self-love), and to the fear of death, that -we must trace the cause of the ascription of good to intelligence and -life."[118] - - -PLATO'S ANSWER TO PHILEBUS: THERE ARE TWO GOODS, THE HUMAN AND THE -UNIVERSAL. - -25. Plato therefore mingled the Good with pleasure, and did not -posit the Good exclusively in Intelligence, as he wrote in the -Philebus.[119] Appreciating this difficulty, he very rightly decided -on one hand that good did not consist in pleasure alone, and on the -other, that it did not consist in intelligence alone, inasmuch as he -failed to discover in it anything to arouse our desire. Perhaps Plato -had still another motive (in calling the Good a mixture), because he -thought that, with such a nature, the Good is necessarily full of -charm, desirable both for the seeker and the finder; whence it would -result that he who is not charmed has not found the Good, and that, -if he who desires be not happy, he evidently does not yet possess the -Good. It is not without a reason (that Plato formed this conception of -the Good); for he was not seeking to determine the universal Good, but -the good of man; and as such human good refers to (man, who is) a being -different from the absolute Good, then it becomes for him something -different from the Good in itself; and would therefore be defective and -composite. That is why (according to Plato), that which is alone and -single has no good, but is good in another and a higher sense. - - -THE ARISTOTELIAN SUPREME GOOD.[120] - -The good must then be desirable; but it is good not because it is -desirable, but it is desirable because it is good.[121] Thus in the -order of beings, rising from the last to the First, it will be found -that the good of each of them is in the one immediately preceding, -so long as this ascending scale remain proportionate and increasing. -Then we will stop at Him who occupies the supreme rank, beyond which -there is nothing more to seek. That is the First, the veritable, the -sovereign Good, the author of all goodness in other beings. The good -of matter is form; for if matter became capable of sensation it would -receive it with pleasure. The good of the body is the soul; for without -her it could neither exist nor last. The good of the soul is virtue; -and then higher (waits), Intelligence. Last, the good of Intelligence -is the principle called the Primary nature. Each of these goods -produces something within the object whose good it is. It confers order -and beauty (as form does on matter); or life (as the soul does on the -body); or wisdom and happiness (as intelligence does on soul). Last, -the Good communicates to Intelligence its influx, and actualization -emanating from the Good, and shedding on Intelligence what has been -called the light of the Good. The nature of this we shall study later. - - -THE TRUE GOOD IMPLIES A COUNTERFEIT GOOD. - -26. Recognition of goodness and so-called "possession" thereof consist -of enjoyment of the presence of good by the being who has received from -nature the faculty of sensation. How could it make a mistake about the -matter? The possibility of its being deceived implies the existence -of some counterfeit; in this case, the error of this being was caused -by that which resembled its good; for this being withdraws from what -had deceived it as soon as the Good presents itself. The existence of -a particular good for each being is demonstrated by its desire and -inclination. Doubtless, the inanimate being receives its good from -without; but, in the animated being, the desire spontaneously starts -to pursue the Good. That is why lifeless bodies are the objects of -solicitude and care of living beings, while the living beings watch -over themselves. - - -THE GOOD CANNOT BE PLEASURE WHICH IS CHANGEABLE AND RESTLESS. - -Now when a being has attained the good it was pursuing it is sure of -possessing it as soon as it feels that it is better, feels no regret, -is satisfied, takes pleasure therein, and seeks nothing beyond. What -shows the insufficiency of pleasure is that one does not always like -the same thing; doubtless pleasure ever charms, but the object which -produces it is not the same; it is always the newest object that -pleases most. Now the good to which we aspire must not be a simple -affection, existing only in him who feels it; for he who mistakes -this affection for the Good remains unsatisfied, he has nothing but -an affection that somebody else might equally feel in presence of -the Good. Consequently no one will succeed in making himself enjoy a -pleasure he has not achieved[122]; such as, for instance, rejoicing in -the presence of an absent son; or, for a glutton to relish imaginary -food; or, for a lover, to tremble at the touch of his absent mistress, -or (to thrill in a theoretic) orgasm. - - -A THING'S GOOD IS ITS FORM; OR, ITS INTIMACY WITH ITSELF. - -27. What is the essential of a being's nature? Form. Matter achieves -(recognition) through its form; and a soul's destiny is realized by the -virtue which is its form. Next we may ask whether this form be a good -for a being merely because it suits its (nature)? Does desire pursue -that which is suitable to it, or not? No: a being is suited by its -like; now, though a being seek and love its like, its possession does -not imply the possession of its good. Are we then not implying that -something is suitable to a being, on the strength of its being the good -of that being? The determination of what is suitable to a being belongs -to the superior Being of whom the lower being is a potentiality. When -a being is the potentiality of some other, the being needs the other; -now the Being which it needs because it is superior is, by that very -fact, its good. Of all things matter is the most indigent, and the form -suitable to it is the last of all; but, above it, one may gradually -ascend. Consequently, if a being be good for itself, so much the more -will it consider good what is its perfection and form, namely, the -being that is better than it, because of a superior nature, and of -supplying the good (of the lower being). But why should that which -a being receives from a superior Being be its good? Is it not this -because it is eminently suited to it? No: It is so merely because it is -a portion of the Good. That is why the purest and best Beings are those -that have most intimacy with themselves.[124] Besides it is absurd to -seek the cause why what is good, is good for itself; as if, by the mere -fact of its being good, it should betray its own nature and not love -itself. Nevertheless, speaking of simple beings, it might be asked -whether a being which does not contain several things different from -each other either possesses intimacy with itself, or can be good for -itself. - - -PLEASURE MAY ACCOMPANY THE GOOD, BUT THE GOOD IS INDEPENDENT THEREOF. - -Now, if all that has been said be right, it is only a gradual upward -analysis that reveals the good that is suitable to the nature of -any being. Desire does not constitute the good, but is born from -its presence. Those who acquire the good receive something from it. -Pleasure accompanies the acquirement of good; but even should pleasure -not accompany the good, the good should, none the less be chosen, and -sought for its own sake. - - -MATTER IS IMPROVED BY FORM, THE DREAM OF THE GOOD. - -28. Let us consider the implications of the principles we have studied. -If that which a being receives as good be everywhere a form, if the -good of matter be a form, we might ask ourselves whether matter, -granting it here the faculty of volition, would even wish to be a -form? Such a wish would be tantamount to a wish to be destroyed. (But -matter could not wish this), for every being seeks its own good. But -perhaps matter might not wish to be matter, but simply to be essence; -possessing which, matter would wish to free itself from all the evil -within it. But how can that which is evil (for such is the nature of -matter) desire the good?[125] Besides, we are not attributing desire -to matter itself. It was only to meet the exigencies of the discussion -that we employed the hypothesis which accorded sensibility to matter, -if indeed it can be granted to matter without destroying its nature. -We have at least shown that when form has come, as a dream of the -Good,[126] to unite itself to matter, the latter found itself in a -better condition. - - -MATTER IS NOT WICKEDNESS, BUT NEUTRAL EVIL. - -All we have said above goes on the assumption that matter is the evil. -But if it were something else, as, for instance, malice, and if the -essence of matter were to receive sensation, would intimacy with what -is better still be the good of matter? But if it were not the malice -itself of matter which choose the good, it was what had become evil in -matter. If the essence (of matter) were identical with evil, how could -matter wish to possess this good? Would evil love itself, if it had -self-consciousness? But how could that which is not lovable be loved? -For we have demonstrated that a being's good does not consist in that -which is suitable to it. Enough about this, however. - - -THE GOOD IS A NATURE WHICH POSSESSES NO KIND OF FORM ITSELF. - -But if the good be everywhere a form; if, in the measure that one -rises (along the ladder of beings), there is a progression in the -form--for the soul is more of a form than the form of the body; in the -soul herself there are graduated forms, and intelligence is more of a -form than the soul--the good follows a progression evidently inverse -to that of matter; the Good exists in that which is purified and -freed from matter, and exists there in proportion to its purity (from -matter); so it exists in the highest degree in that which lays aside -all materiality. Finally, the Good in itself, being entirely separated -from all matter; or rather, never having had any contact with it, -constitutes a nature which has no kind of form, and from which proceeds -the first form (Intelligence). But of this more later.[127] - - -THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE GOOD FROM PLEASURE PROVED BY THE TEMPERATE MAN. - -29. Supposing then that the pleasure does not accompany the good, but -that anterior to pleasure there have existed something which would -have naturally given rise to it (because of its goodness); why then -might not the good be considered lovable? But the mere assertion that -good is lovable, already implies that it is accompanied by pleasure. -But supposing now that the good could exist without being lovable -(and consequently not accompanied by pleasure). In that case, even in -presence of the good, the being that possesses sensibility will not -know that the good is present. What would however hinder a being from -knowing the presence of the good without feeling any emotion at its -possession, which would exactly represent the case of the temperate -man who lacks nothing? The result would be that pleasure could not be -suitable to the First (being), not only because He is simple, but also -because pleasure results from the acquisition of what is lacking (and -the First lacks nothing, therefore could not feel pleasure). - - -EVEN SCORN OF LIFE IMPLIES THE EXISTENCE OF THE GOOD. - -But, in order that this truth may appear in its full light, we shall -first have to clear away all the other opinions, and especially have -to refute the teaching opposite to ours. This is the question asked of -us: "What will be the fruit gathered by him who has the intelligence -necessary to acquire one of these goods (such as existence and life), -if on hearing them named, he be not impressed thereby, because he -does not understand them, either because they seem to him no more -than words, or because his conception of each of these things should -differ (from our view of them), or because in his search for the Good -he seeks some sense-object, such as wealth, or the like?" The person -who thus scorns these things (existence and life), thereby implicitly -recognizes that there is within him a certain good, but that, without -knowing in what it consists, he nevertheless values these things -according to his own notion of the Good; for it is impossible to say, -"that is not the good," without having some sort of knowledge of the -good,[128] or acquaintance therewith. The above speaker seems to betray -a suspicion that the Good in itself is above Intelligence. Besides, if -in considering the Good in itself, or the good which most approaches -it, he do not discern it, he will nevertheless succeed in getting a -conception of it by its contraries; otherwise, he would not even know -that the lack of intelligence is an evil, though every man desire to -be intelligent, and glory in being such, as is seen by the sensations -which aspire to become notions. If intelligence, and especially primary -Intelligence, be beautiful and venerable, what admiration might not -then be felt by him who could contemplate the generating principle, -the Father of Intelligence?[129] Consequently, he who affects to scorn -existence and life receives a refutation from himself and from all -the affections he feels. They who are disgusted of life are those who -consider not the true life, but the life which is mingled with death. - - -TWO INTERPRETATIONS OF PLATO'S OPINION ABOUT THE GOOD. - -30. Now, rising in thought to the Good, we must examine whether -pleasure must be mingled with the Good to keep life from remaining -imperfect, even if we should, besides, contemplate the divine things, -and even Him who is their principle. When (Plato[119]) seems to -believe that the good is composed of intelligence, as subject, and -also of affection which wisdom makes the soul experience, he is not -asserting that this blend (of intelligence and pleasure) is either -the goal (of the soul), or the Good in itself. He only means that -intelligence is the good, and that we enjoy its possession. This is -a first interpretation of (Plato's) opinion about the Good. Another -interpretation is that to mingle intelligence with pleasure is to -make a single subject of both of them, so that in acquiring or in -contemplating such an intelligence we possess the good; for (according -to the partisans of this opinion), one of these things could not exist -in isolation, nor, supposing that it could so exist, it would not be -desirable as a good. But (shall we ask them), how can intelligence be -mingled with pleasure so as to form a perfect fusion therewith? Nobody -could be made to believe that the pleasure of the body could be mingled -with Intelligence; such pleasure is incompatible even with the joys of -the soul. - - -PLEASURE IS INDEED AN ACCESSORY TO ALL GOODS OF THE SOUL. - -The element of truth in all this, however, is that every action, -disposition and life is joined by some accessory (pleasure or pain) -that unites with it. Indeed, sometimes action meets an obstacle to its -natural accomplishment, and life is affected by the mixture of a little -of its contrary, which limits its independence; sometimes, however, -action is produced without anything troubling its purity and serenity, -and then life flows along a tranquil course. Those who consider that -this state of intelligence is desirable, and preferable to everything -else, in their inability to express their thoughts more definitely, -say that it is mingled with pleasure. Such likewise is the meaning of -expressions used by those who apply to divine things terms intended -to express joy here below, and who say, "He is intoxicated with -nectar! Let us to the banquet! Jupiter smiles!"[130] This happy state -of intelligence is that which is the most agreeable, the most worthy -of our wishes, and of our love; nor is it transitory, and does not -consist in a movement; its principle is that which colors intelligence, -illumines it, and makes it enjoy a sweet serenity. That is why -Plato[131] adds to the mixture truth, and puts above it that which -gives measure. He also adds that the proportion and the beauty which -are in the mixture pass from there into the beautiful. That is the -good that belongs to us, that is the fate that awaits us. That is the -supreme object of desire, an object that we will achieve on condition -of drawing ourselves up to that which is best in us. Now this thing -full of proportion and beauty, this form composed (of the elements of -which we have spoken), is nothing else but a life full of radiance, -intelligence and beauty. - - -THE SOUL SCORNING ALL THINGS BELOW RISES TO THE GOOD. - -31. Since all things have been embellished by Him who is above them, -and have received their light from Him; since Intelligence derives -from Him the splendor of its intellectual actualization; by which -splendor it illuminates nature; since from Him also the soul derives -her vital power, because she finds in Him an abundant source of life; -consequently, Intelligence has risen to Him, and has remained attached -to Him, satisfied in the bliss of His presence; consequently also the -soul, to the utmost of her ability, turned towards Him, for, as soon as -she has known Him and seen Him, she was, by her contemplation, filled -with bliss; and, so far as she could see Him, she was overwhelmed -with reverence. She could not see Him without being impressed with -the feeling that she had within herself something of Him; it was this -disposition of hers that led her to desire to see Him, as the image -of some lovable object makes one wish to be able to contemplate it -oneself. Here below, lovers try to resemble the beloved object, to -render their body more gracious, to conform their soul to their model, -by temperance and the other virtues to remain as little inferior as -possible to Him whom they love, for fear of being scorned by Him; -and thus they succeed in enjoying intimacy with Him.[132] Likewise, -the soul loves the Good, because, from the very beginning she is -provoked to love Him. When she is ready to love, she does not wait -for the beauties here below to give her the reminiscence of the Good; -full of love, even when she does not know what she possesses, she is -ever seeking; and inflamed with the desire to rise to the Good, she -scorns the things here below. Considering the beauties presented by -our universe, she suspects that they are deceptive, because she sees -them clothed upon with flesh, and united to our bodies, soiled by -the matter where they reside, divided by extension, and she does not -recognize them as real beauties, for she cannot believe that the latter -could plunge into the mire of these bodies, soiling and obscuring -themselves.[133] Last, when the soul observes that the beauties here -below are in a perpetual flux, she clearly recognizes that they derive -this splendor with which they shine, from elsewhere.[134] Then she -rises to the intelligible world; being capable of discovering what she -loves, she does not stop before having found it, unless she be made -to lose her love. Having arrived there, she contemplates all the true -beauties, the true realities[135]; she refreshes herself by filling -herself up with the life proper to essence. She herself becomes genuine -essence. She fuses with the Intelligible which she really possesses, -and in its presence she has the feeling (of having found) what she was -seeking so long. - - -THE AUTHOR OF THIS PERFECTION MUST BE ABOVE IT. - -32. Where then is He who has created this venerable beauty, and this -perfect life? Where is He who has begotten "being"? Do you see the -beauty that shines in all these forms so various? It is well to dwell -there; but when one has thus arrived at beauty, one is forced to seek -the source of these essences and of their beauty. Their author Himself -cannot be any of them; for then He would be no more than some among -them, and a part of the whole. He is therefore none of the particular -forms, nor a particular power, nor all of the forms, nor all the powers -that are, or are becoming, in the universe; He must be superior to all -the forms and all the powers. The supreme Principle therefore has no -form; not indeed that He lacks any; but because He is the principle -from which all intellectual shapes are derived. Whatever is born--that -is, if there be anything such as birth--must, at birth, have been some -particular being, and have had its particular shape; but who could have -made that which was not made by anybody? He therefore is all beings, -without being any of them; He is none of the other beings because He is -anterior to all of them; He is all other beings because He is their -author. What greatness shall be attributed to the Principle who can do -all things? Will He be considered infinite? Even if He be infinite, -He will have no greatness, for magnitude occurs only among beings -of the lowest rank. The creator of magnitude could not himself have -any magnitude; and even what is called magnitude in "being" is not a -quantity. Magnitude can be found only in something posterior to being. -The magnitude of the Good is that there be nothing more powerful than -He, nothing that even equals Him. How indeed could any of the beings -dependent on Him ever equal Him, not having a nature identical with -His? Even the statement that God is always and everywhere does not -attribute to Him any measure, nor even, a lack of measure--otherwise, -He might be considered as measuring the rest; nor does it attribute to -Him any figure (or, outward appearance). - - -THE SUPREME IS LIMITLESS. - -Thus the Divinity, being the object of desire, must be the most desired -and the most loved, precisely because He has no figure nor shape. The -love He inspires is immense; this love is limitless, because of the -limitlessness of its object. He is infinite, because the beauty of its -object surpasses all beauty. Not being any essence, how indeed could -the (divinity) have any determinate beauty? As supreme object of love, -He is the creator of beauty.[136] Being the generating power of all -that is beautiful, He is at the same time the flower in which beauty -blooms[137]: for He produces it, and makes it more beautiful still by -the superabundance of beauty which He sheds on her. He is therefore -simultaneously the principle and goal of beauty.[138] As principle of -beauty, He beautifies all that of which He is the principle. It is not -however by shape that He beautifies; what He produces has no shape, or, -to speak more accurately, He has a shape in a sense different from the -habitual meaning of this term. The shape which is no more than a shape -is a simple attribute of some substance, while the Shape that subsists -in itself is superior to shape. Thus, that which participates in beauty -was a shape; but beauty itself has none. - - -ABSOLUTE BEAUTY IS A FORMLESS SHAPE. - -33. When we speak of absolute Beauty, we must therefore withdraw from -all determinate shape, setting none before the eyes (of our mind); -otherwise, we would expose ourselves to descending from absolute -beauty to something which does not deserve the name of beauty but by -virtue of an obscure and feeble participation[139]; while absolute -Beauty is a shapeless form, if it be at all allowed to be an idea (or -form). Thus you may approach the universal Shape only by abstraction. -Abstract even the form found in the reason (that is, the essence), by -which we distinguish one action from another. Abstract, for instance, -the difference that separates temperance from justice, though both be -beautiful. For by the mere fact that intelligence conceives an object -as something proper, the object that it conceives is diminished, even -though this object were the totality of intelligible entities; and, -on the other hand, if each of them, taken apart, have a single form, -nevertheless all taken together will offer a certain variety. - - -THE SUPREME IS ESSENTIAL BEAUTY; THE SHAPELESS SHAPER; TRANSCENDENT. - -We still have to study the proper conception of Him who is superior -to the Intelligence that is so universally beautiful and varied, but -who Himself is not varied. To Him the soul aspires without knowing -why she wishes to possess Him; but reason tells us He is essential -beauty, since the nature of Him who is excellent and sovereignly -lovable cannot absolutely have any form. That is why the soul, whatever -object you may show her in your process of reducing an object to a -form, ever seeks beyond the shaping principle. Now reason tells us -in respect to anything that has a shape, that as a shape or form is -something measured (or limited), (anything shaped) cannot be genuinely -universal, absolute, and beautiful in itself, and that its beauty is -a mixture. Therefore though the intelligible entities be beautiful -(they are limited); while He who is essential beauty, or rather the -super-beautiful, must be unlimited, and consequently have no shape or -form. He who then is beauty in the first degree, and primary Beauty, is -superior to form, and the splendor of the intelligible (world) is only -a reflection of the nature of the Good. - - -THUS LOVE BEGINS PHYSICALLY BUT BECOMES SPIRITUAL. - -This is proved by what happens to lovers; so far as their eyes remain -fixed on a sense-object, they do not yet love genuinely. Love is born -only when they rise above the sense-object, and arrive at representing -in their indivisible soul an image which has nothing more of sensation. -To calm the ardor that devours them they do indeed still desire to -contemplate the beloved object; but as soon as they come to understand -that they have to rise to something beyond the form, they desire the -latter; for since the very beginning they felt within themselves the -love for a great light inspired by a feeble glow. The Shape indeed is -the trace of the shapeless. Without himself having any shape, He begets -shape whenever matter approaches Him. Now matter must necessarily be -very distant from Him, because matter does not possess forms of even -the last degree. Since form inherent in matter is derived from the -soul, not even mere form-fashioned matter is lovable in itself, as -matter; and as the soul herself is a still higher form, but yet is -inferior to and less lovable than intelligence, there is no escape from -the conclusion that the primary nature of the Beautiful is superior to -form. - - -THE FORMLESSNESS OF THE SUPREME IS PROVED BY THE FACT THAT THE SOUL -WHEN APPROACHING HIM SPONTANEOUSLY RIDS HERSELF OF FORMS. - -34. We shall not be surprised that the soul's liveliest transports of -love are aroused by Him, who has no form, not even an intelligible one, -when we observe that the soul herself, as soon as she burns with love -for Him, lays aside all forms soever, even if intelligible; for it is -impossible to approach Him so long as one considers anything else. The -soul must therefore put aside all evil, and even all good; in a word, -everything, of whatever nature, to receive the divinity, alone with the -alone. When the soul obtains this happiness, and when (the divinity) -comes to her, or rather, when He manifests His presence, because the -soul has detached herself from other present things, when she has -embellished herself as far as possible, when she has become assimilated -to Him by means known only to the initiated, she suddenly sees Him -appear in her. No more interval between them, no more doubleness; the -two fuse in one. It is impossible to distinguish the soul from the -divinity, so much does she enjoy His presence; and it is the intimacy -of this union that is here below imitated by those who love and are -loved, when they consummate union. In this condition the soul no longer -feels (her body); she no more feels whether she be alive, human, -essence, universality, or anything else. Consideration of objects -would be a degradation, and the soul then has neither the leisure nor -the desire to busy herself with them. When, after having sought the -divinity, she finds herself in His presence, she rushes towards Him, -and contemplates Him instead of herself.[140] What is her condition at -the time? She has not the leisure to consider it; but she would not -exchange it for anything whatever, not even for the whole heaven; for -there is nothing superior or better; she could not rise any higher. -As to other things, however elevated they be, she cannot at that time -stoop to consider them. It is at this moment that the soul starts to -move, and recognizes that she really possesses what she desired; she at -last affirms that there is nothing better than Him. No illusion could -occur there; for where could she find anything truer than truth itself? -The soul then is what she affirms; (or rather), she asserts it (only), -later, and then she asserts it by keeping silence. While tasting this -beatitude she could not err in the assertion that she tastes it. If -she assert that she tastes it, it is not that her body experiences an -agreeable titillation, for she has only become again what she formerly -used to be when she became happy. All the things that formerly charmed -her, such as commanding others, power, wealth, beauty, science, now -seem to her despicable; she could not scorn them earlier, for she had -not met anything better. Now she fears nothing, so long as she is with -Him, and contemplates Him. Even with pleasure would she witness the -destruction of everything, for she would remain alone with Him; so -great is her felicity. - - -THE SOUL SCORNS EVEN THOUGHT: SHE IS INTELLECTUALIZED AND ENNOBLED. - -35. Such, then, is the state of the soul that she no longer values -even thought, which formerly excited her admiration; for thought is a -movement, and the soul would prefer none. She does not even assert -that it is Intelligence that she sees, though she contemplate only -because she has become intelligence, and has, so to speak, become -intellectualized, by being established in the intelligible place. -Having arrived to Intelligence, and having become established therein, -the soul possesses the intelligible, and thinks; but as soon as she -achieves the vision of the supreme Divinity, she abandons everything -else. She behaves as does the visitor who, on entering into a palace, -would first admire the different beauties that adorn its interior, -but who regards them no longer as soon as she perceives the master; -for the master, by his (living) nature, which is superior to all the -statues that adorn the palace, monopolizes the consideration, and -alone deserves to be contemplated; consequently the spectator, with -his glance fixed on Him, henceforward observes Him alone. By dint of -continual contemplation of the spectacle in front of him, the spectator -sees the master no longer; in the spectator, vision confuses with the -visible object. What for the spectator first was a visible object, -in him becomes vision, and makes him forget all that he saw around -himself. To complete this illustration, the master here presenting -himself to the visitor must be no man, but a divinity; and this -divinity must not content Himself with appearing to the eyes of him who -contemplates Him, but He must penetrate within the human soul, and fill -her entirely. - - -INTELLIGENCE HAS THE TWO POWERS OF INTELLIGENCE AND LOVE. - -Intelligence has two powers: by the first, which is her own power of -thinking, she sees what is within her. By the other she perceives -what is above her by the aid of a kind of vision and perception; -by the vision, she first saw simply; then, by (perceptive) seeing, -she received intellection and fused with the One. The first kind of -contemplation is suitable to the intelligence which still possesses -reason; the second is intelligence transported by love. Now, it is -when the nectar intoxicates her,[141] and deprives her of reason, -that the soul is transported with love, and that she blossoms into a -felicity that fulfils all her desires. It is better for her to abandon -herself to this intoxication than to remain wise. In this state -does intelligence successively see one thing, and then another? No: -methods of instruction (or, constructive speech) give out everything -successively; but it is eternally that intelligence possesses the -power of thought, as well as the power not to think; that is, to see -the divinity otherwise than by thought. Indeed, while contemplating -Him, she received within herself germs, she felt them when they were -produced and deposited within her breast; when she sees them, she is -said to think; but when she sees the divinity, it is by that superior -power by virtue of which she was to think later. - - -THE SOUL DOES NOT THINK GOD, FOR IN THAT CONDITION SHE DOES NOT THINK. - -As to the soul, she sees the divinity only by growing confused, as it -were by exhausting the intelligence which resides in her; or rather, -it is her first intelligence that sees; but the vision the latter -has of the divinity reaches down to the soul, which then fuses with -intelligence. It is the Good, extending over intelligence and the soul, -and condescending to their level, which spreads over them, and fuses -them; hovering above them, it bestows on them the happy vision, and the -ineffable feeling of itself. It raises them so high that they are no -more in any place, nor within anything whatever, in any of the senses -in which one thing is said to be within another. For the Good is not -within anything; the intelligible location is within it, but it is not -in anything else. Then the soul moves no more, because the divinity is -not in motion. To speak accurately, she is no longer soul, because the -divinity does not live, but is above life; neither is she intelligence, -because the divinity is above intelligence; because there must be -complete assimilation (between the soul and the divinity). Finally, the -soul does not think even the divinity, because in this condition she -does not think at all. - - -THE TOUCH WITH THE GOOD IS THE GREATEST OF SCIENCES. - -36. The remainder is plain. As to the last point, it has already been -discussed. Still it may be well to add something thereto, starting from -the point reached, and proceeding by arguments. Knowledge, or, if it -may be so expressed, the "touch of the Good," is the greatest thing -in the world. Plato[142] calls it the greatest of sciences, and even -so he here applies this designation not to the vision itself of the -Good, but to the science of the Good that may be had before the vision. -This science is attained by the use of analogies,[143] by negations -(made about the Good), by the knowledge of things that proceed from -it, and last by the degrees that must be taken (or, upward steps that -must be climbed to reach up to Him.[165]) (These then are the degrees) -that lead up (to the divinity): purifications, virtues that adorn the -soul, elevation to the intelligible, settling in the intelligible, and -then the banquet at which nectar feeds him who becomes simultaneously -spectator and spectacle, either for himself, or for others.[144] -Having become Being, Intelligence, and universal living Organism, (the -initiate) no longer considers these things as being outside of him; -having arrived at that condition, she approaches Him who is immediately -above all the intelligible entities, and who already sheds His radiance -over them. (The initiate) then leaves aside all the science that has -led him till there; settled in the beautiful, he thinks, so long as he -does not go beyond that (sphere of) being. But there, as it were raised -by the very flood of intelligence, and carried away by the wave that -swells, without knowing how, he suddenly sees. The contemplation which -fills his eye with light does not reveal to him anything exterior; -it is the light itself that he sees. It is not an opposition between -light on one side, and the visible object on the other; nor is there -on one side intelligence, and on the other the intelligible entity; -there is only the (radiation) which later begets these entities, and -permits them to exist within it. (The divinity) is no more than the -radiation that begets intelligence, begetting without being consumed, -and remaining within itself. This radiation exists, and this existence -alone begets something else. If this radiation were not what it was, -neither would the latter thing subsist. - - -GOD BEING ABOVE THOUGHT IGNORES EVERYTHING. - -37. They who attributed thought to the First Principle have at least -not attributed to Him the thought of things that are inferior to Him, -or which proceed from Him.[145] Nevertheless some of them claimed that -it was absurd to believe that the divinity ignored other things. As -to the former, finding nothing greater than the Good, they attributed -to (the divinity) the thought of Himself,[146] as if this could add -to His majesty, as if even for Him, thinking were more than being -what He is, and it were not the Good Himself which communicates His -sublimity to intelligence. But from whom then will the Good derive -His greatness? Would it come from thought, or from Himself? If He -derive it from thought, He is not great by himself; or at least, He -is no more sovereignly great. If it be from Himself that He derives -His greatness, He is perfectly anterior to thought, and it is not -thought that renders Him perfect. Is He forced to think because He is -actualization, and not merely potentiality? If He is a being that ever -thinks, and if this be the meaning of actualization,[147] we would be -attributing to the Good two things simultaneously: "being" and thought; -instead of conceiving of Him as a simple Principle, something foreign -is added to Him, as to eyes is added the actualization of sight,[148] -even admitting that they see continually. (The divinity) is in -actualization, in the sense that He is both actualization and thought, -is He not? No, for being thought itself, He must not be thinking, as -movement itself does not move.[149] But do not you yourselves say that -(the divinity) is both being and actualization? We think that being -and actualization are multiple and different things, whilst the First -is simple. To the principle that proceeds from the First alone belongs -thought, a certain seeking out of its being, of itself, and of its -origin. It deserves the name of intelligence only by turning towards -(the First) in contemplation, and in knowing Him. As to the unbegotten -Principle, who has nothing above Him, who is eternally what He is, what -reason might He have to think? - - -THE FIRST PRINCIPLE HAS NO FUNCTION. - -That is why Plato rightly says that the Good is above Intelligence. To -speak of an "unthinking" intelligence would be a self-contradiction; -for the principle whose nature it is to think necessarily ceases to be -intelligent if it does not think. But no function can be assigned to a -principle that has none, and we cannot blame it for idleness because it -does not fulfil some function; this would be as silly as to reproach -it for not possessing the art of healing. To the first Principle then -should be assigned no function, because there is none that would suit -Him. He is (self) sufficient, and there is nothing outside of Him -who is above all; for, in being what He is, He suffices Himself and -everything else. - - -OF THE FIRST PRINCIPLE WE MAY NOT EVEN SAY THAT IT IS. - -38. Of the First we may not even say, "He is." (He does not need this), -since we do not either say of Him, "He is good." "He is good" is said -of the same principle to which "He is" applies. Now "He is" suits -the (divinity) only on the condition that He be given no attribute, -limiting oneself to the assertion of His existence. He is spoken of -as the Good, not as predicating an attribute or quality of Him, but -to indicate that He is the Good itself. We do not even approve of -this expression, "He is the Good," because we think that not even the -article should be prefixed thereto; but inasmuch as our language would -fail to express an entire negation or deprivation, then, to avoid -introducing some diversity in it, we are forced to name it, but there -is no need to say "it is," we simply call it, "the Good." - - -THE SELF-SUFFICIENT GOOD DOES NOT NEED SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS THEREOF. - -But how could we admit (the existence of) a nature without feeling -or consciousness of itself? We might answer this, What consciousness -of self can (the divinity) have? Can He say, "I am?" But (in the -above-mentioned sense), He is not. Can He say, "I am the Good"? Then -He would still be saying of Himself "I am" (whereas we have just -explained that this He cannot do[150]). What then will He add (to -his simplicity) by limiting Himself to saying, "The Good"? For it is -possible to think "the Good" apart from "He is" so long as the Good -is not, as an attribute, applied to some other being. But whoever -thinks himself good will surely say "I am the good"; if not, he will -think the predicate "good," but he will not be enabled to think that -he is so himself. Thus, the thought of good will imply this thought, -"I am the good." If this thought itself be the Good, it will not be -the thought of Him, but of the good, and he will not be the Good, but -the thought.[151] If the thought of good is different from the Good -itself, the Good will be prior to the thought of the good. If the Good -be self-sufficient before the thought, it suffices to itself to be the -Good; and in this respect has no need of the thought that it is the -Good. - - -THE GOOD IS A SIMPLE PERCEPTION OF ITSELF; A TOUCH. - -39. Consequently, the Good does not think itself either as good, nor -as anything else; for it possesses nothing different from itself. It -only has "a simple perception of itself in respect to itself"; but as -there is no distance or difference in this perception it has of itself, -what could this perception be but itself? That is why it perceives a -difference where being and intelligence appear. In order to think, -intelligence must admit identity and difference simultaneously. On the -one hand, without the relation between the Intelligible and itself, -the (mind) will not distinguish itself from (the intelligible); and on -the other, without the arising of an "otherness" which would enable -it to be everything, it would not contemplate all (earthly) entities. -(Without this difference), intelligence would not even be a "pair." -Then, since intelligence thinks, if it think really, it will not think -itself alone, for why should it not think all things? (Would it not do -so) because it was impotent to do so? In short, the principle which -thinks itself ceases to be simple, because in thinking itself it must -think itself as something different, which is the necessary condition -of thinking itself.[152] We have already said that intelligence cannot -think itself without contemplating itself as something different. -Now in thinking, intelligence becomes manifold (that is, fourfold): -intelligible object (thing thought) and intelligent subject (thinker); -movement (or, moved[153]), and everything else that belongs to -intelligence. Besides, it must be noticed, as we have pointed out -elsewhere, that, to be thought, any thought, must offer variety[154]; -but (in the divinity) this movement is so simple and identical that -it may be compared to some sort of touch, and partakes in nothing of -intellectual actualization (therefore, thought cannot be attributed -to the divinity). What? Will (the divinity) know neither others nor -Himself, and will He remain immovable in His majesty? (Surely). All -things are posterior to Him; He was what He is before them. The thought -of these things is adventitious, changeable, and does not apply to -permanent objects. Even if it did apply to permanent objects, it would -still be multiple, for we could not grant that in inferior beings -thought was joined to being, while the thoughts of intelligence would -be empty notions. The existence of Providence is sufficiently accounted -for by its being that from which proceed all (beings). How then (in -regard to all the beings that refer to Him) could (the divinity) think -them, since He does not even think Himself, but remains immovable in -His majesty? That is why Plato,[149] speaking of "being," says that it -doubtless thinks, but that it does not remain immovable in its majesty. -By that he means that, no doubt, "being" thinks, but that that which -does not think remains immovable in its majesty; using this expression -for lack of a better one. Thus Plato considers the Principle which is -superior to thought as possessing more majesty, nay, sovereign majesty. - - -THE FIRST PRINCIPLE HAS NO THOUGHT AS THE FIRST ACTUALIZATION OF A -HYPOSTASIS. - -40. That thought is incompatible with the first Principle is something -well known by all those who have (in ecstasy) risen to Him.[155] To -what we have already said, we shall however add several arguments, if -indeed we succeed in expressing thought comprehensibly; for conviction -should be fortified by demonstration.[156] In the first place, observe -that all thought exists within a subject, and proceeds from some -object. Thought that is connected with the object from which it is -derived, has the being to which it belongs, as subject. It inheres in -him because it is his actualization, and completes his potentiality, -without, itself, producing anything; for it belongs exclusively to the -subject whose complement it is. Thought that is hypostatically united -with "being," and which underlies its existence, could not inhere in -the object from which it proceeds; for, had it remained in him, it -would not have produced anything. Now, having the potentiality of -producing, it produced within itself; its actualization was "being," -and it was united thereto. Thus thought is not something different -from "being"; so far as this nature thinks itself, it does not think -itself as being something different; for the only multiplicity therein -is that which results from the logical distinction of intelligent -subject (thinker) and intelligible object (the being thought), as we -have often pointed out. That is the first actualization which produced -a hypostasis (or, form of existence), while constituting "being"; -and this actualization is the image of a Principle so great that -itself has become "being." If thought belonged to the Good, instead -of proceeding therefrom, it would be no more than an attribute; it -would not, in itself, be a hypostatic form of existence. Being the -first actualization and the first thought, this thought has neither -actualization nor thought above it. Therefore, by rising above this -"being" and this thought, neither further "being" nor thought will be -met with; we would arrive to the Principle superior to "being," and -thought, an admirable principle, which contains neither thought nor -being, which in solitary guise dwells within itself, and which has no -need of the things which proceed from Him. He did not first act, and -then produce an actualization (he did not begin by thinking in order -later to produce thought); otherwise, he would have thought before -thought was born. In short, thought, being the thought of good, is -beneath Him, and consequently does not belong to Him. I say: "does not -belong to Him," not denying that the Good can be thought (for this, I -admit); but because thought could not exist in the Good; otherwise, the -Good and that which is beneath it--namely, the thought of Good--would -fuse. Now, if the good be something inferior, it will simultaneously be -thought and being; if, on the contrary, good be superior to thought, it -must likewise belong to the Intelligible.[157] - - -EVEN IF THE GOOD THOUGHT, THERE WOULD BE NEED OF SOMETHING SUPERIOR. - -Since therefore thought does not exist in the Good, and since, on -the contrary, it is inferior to the Good, and since it must thus -worship its majesty, (thought) must constitute a different principle, -and leaves the Good pure and disengaged from it, as well as from -other things. Independent of thought, the Good is what it is without -admixture. The presence of the Good does not hinder it from being pure -and single. If we were to suppose that Good is both thinking subject -and thought object (thinker and thought) or "being," and thought -connected with "being," if thus we make it think itself,[158] it will -need something else, and thus things will be above it. As actualization -and thought are the complement or the consubstantial hypostasis (or, -form of existence) of another subject, thought implies above it another -nature to which it owes the power of thinking; for thought cannot think -anything without something above it. When thought knows itself, it -knows what it received by the contemplation of this other nature. As -to Him who has nothing above Him, who derives nothing from any other -principle, what could He think, and how could He think himself? What -would He seek, and what would He desire? Would He desire to know the -greatness of His power? But by the mere fact of His thinking it, it -would have become external to Him; I call it exterior, if the cognizing -power within Him differed from that which would be known; if on the -contrary they fuse, what would He seek? - - -THOUGHT IS A HELP FOR SUB-DIVINE NATURES. - -41. It would seem that thought was only a help granted to natures -which, though divine, nevertheless do not occupy the first rank; -it is like an eye given to the blind.[159] But what need would the -eye have to see essence, if itself were light? To seek light is the -characteristic of him who needs it, because he finds in himself nothing -but darkness.[159] Since thought seeks light, while the light does not -seek the light, the primary Nature, not seeking the light (since it is -light itself), could not any more seek thought (since it is thought -that seeks light); thinking could not suit it, therefore. What utility -or advantage would thought bring him, inasmuch as thought itself needs -aid to think? The Good therefore has not self-consciousness, not having -need thereof; it is not doubleness; or rather, it is not double as is -thought which implies (besides intelligence) a third term, namely, the -intelligible (world). If thought, the thinking subject (the thinker) -and the thought object (the thought) be absolutely identical, they form -but one, and are absolutely indistinguishable; if they be distinct, -they differ, and can no more be the Good. Thus we must put everything -aside when we think of this "best Nature," which stands in need of no -assistance. Whatever you may attribute to this Nature, you diminish -it by that amount, since it stands in need of nothing. For us, on the -contrary, thought is a beautiful thing, because our soul has need of -intelligence. It is similarly a beautiful thing for intelligence, -because thought is identical with essence, and it is thought that gave -existence to intelligence. - - -THE GOOD IS NOT GOOD FOR ITSELF, BUT ONLY FOR THE NATURES BELOW IT. - -Intelligence must therefore fuse with thought, and must always be -conscious of itself, knowing that each of the two elements that -constitute it is identical with the other, and that both form but a -single one. If it were only unity, it would be self-sufficient, and -would have no further need of receiving anything. The precept "know -thyself" applies only to natures which, because of their multiplicity, -need to give an account of themselves, to know the number and the -quality of their component elements, because they either do not know -them entirely, or even not at all; not knowing what power in them -occupies the first rank, and constitutes their being.[160] But if -there be a Principle which is one by itself, it is too great to know -itself, to think itself, to be self-conscious, because it is nothing -determinate for itself. It receives nothing within itself, sufficing -itself. It is therefore the Good not for itself, but for other natures; -these indeed need the Good, but the Good has no need of itself; it -would be ridiculous, and would fail to stand up to itself. Nor does it -view itself; for, from this look something would arise, or exist for -Him. All such things He left to the inferior natures, and nothing that -exists in them is found in Him; thus (the Good) is not even "being." -Nor does (the Good) possess thought, since thought is united to being, -and as primary and supreme thought coexisted with essence. Therefore, -one can not (as says Plato[150]), express (the divinity) by speech, -nor have perception nor science of Him, since no attribute can be -predicated of Him. - - -THE BEAUTIFUL THE SUPREME OF THREE RANKS OF EXISTENCE. - -42. When you are in doubt about this matter, and when you wonder how -you should classify these attributes to which reasoning has brought -you, reject from among the things of the second order what seems -venerable; attribute to the First none of the things that belong to the -second order; neither attribute to those of the second order (that is, -to Intelligence), what belongs to those of the third (that is, to the -Soul); but subsume under the first Principle the things of the second -order, and under the second principle the things of the third. That -is the true means of allowing each being to preserve its nature, and -at the same time to point out the bond that connects the lower things -with the higher, and showing thus that the inferior things depend on -the superior ones, while the superior ones remain in themselves. That -is why (Plato) was right in saying,[161] "All things surround the King -of all, and exist on his account." "All things" means "all beings." -"All things exist on his account" means that He is the cause of their -existence, and the object of their desire, because His nature is -different from theirs, because in Him is nothing that is in them, since -they could not exist if the First possessed some attribute of what is -inferior to Him. Therefore, if Intelligence be comprised within what -is meant by "all things," it could not belong to the First. When (in -the same place Plato calls the divinity) "the cause of all beauty," -he seems to classify beauty among the Ideas, and the Good above the -universal beauty.[162] After thus having assigned the intelligible -(entities) to the second rank, he classifies, as dependent on them, -the things of the third order, which follow them. Last, to that which -occupies the third rank, to the universal Soul, he subsumes the world -that is derived therefrom. As the Soul depends on the Intelligence, and -as Intelligence depends on the Good, all things thus depend from the -Good in different degrees, mediately or immediately. In this respect, -the things which are the most distant from the Good are the objects of -sense, which are subsumed under the Soul. - - - - -SIXTH ENNEAD, BOOK EIGHT. - -Of the Will of the One. - - -A. OF HUMAN FREE WILL. - - -DOES FREE WILL BELONG TO GOD ONLY, OR TO OTHERS ONLY? - -1. Do the divinities themselves possess free will, or is this limited -to human beings, because of their many weaknesses and uncertainties? -(For we assume that) the divinities possess omnipotence, so that it -would seem likely that their actions were free and absolutely without -petty restrictions. Or must we hold that the (supreme) One alone -possesses omnipotence, and unhampered free will, while in other beings -(free will and opportunity) either ignore each other, or conflict? We -shall therefore have to determine the nature of free will in first -rank beings (the divinities) and also the supreme Principle (the One), -although we acknowledge that both of them are omnipotent. Besides, in -respect to this omnipotence, we shall have to distinguish possibility -from actualization, present or future. - - -FREE WILL MUST BE FOR MEN, IF IT IS TO BE FOR THE DIVINITIES. - -Before attacking these questions, we must, as is usual, begin by -examining whether we ourselves possess freedom of will.[166] First -then, in what sense do we possess free will (or, responsibility, "that -something depends on us"); or rather, what conception we should form -of it? To answer this question will be the only means of arriving at -a conclusion about whether or not freedom of will should be ascribed -to the divinities, let alone (the supreme) Divinity. Besides, while -attributing to them freedom of will, we shall have to inquire to what -it applies, either in the other beings, or in the Beings of the first -rank. - - -RESPONSIBILITY DEPENDS ON VOLUNTARINESS. - -What are our thoughts when we inquire whether something depends on us? -Under what circumstances do we question this responsibility? We ask -ourselves whether we are anything, and whether really anything depends -on us when undergoing the buffets of fortune, of necessity, of violent -passions that dominate our souls, till we consider ourselves mastered, -enslaved, and carried away by them? Therefore we consider as dependent -on ourselves what we do without the constraint of circumstances, -necessity, or violence of passions--that is, voluntarily, and without -an obstacle to our will.[167] Hence the following definition: We are -responsible for that which depends on our will, which happens or which -is omitted according to our volition.[168] We indeed call voluntary -what we unconstrainedly do and consciously.[169] On us depends only -that of which we are the masters to do or not to do. These two notions -are usually connected, though they differ theoretically. There are -cases when one of them is lacking; one might, for instance, have the -power to commit a murder; and nevertheless if it were one's own father -that he had ignorantly killed, it would not be a voluntary act.[170] In -this case, the action was free, but not voluntary. The voluntariness of -an action depends on the knowledge, not only of the details, but also -of the total relations of the act.[171] Otherwise, why should killing a -friend, without knowing it, be called a voluntary action? Would not the -murder be equally involuntary if one did not know that he was to commit -it? On the contrary hypothesis, it may be answered that one had been -responsible for providing oneself with the necessary information[172]; -but nevertheless it is not voluntarily that one is ignorant, or that -one was prevented from informing oneself about it.[173] - - -ON WHICH PSYCHOLOGICAL FACULTY IS THE FREEDOM OF WILL BASED? - -2. But to which part of ourselves should we refer free will? To -appetite or desire, to anger or sex passion, for instance? Or shall it -be to the reason, engaged in search after utility, and accompanied by -desire? If to anger or sex passion,[174] we should be supposed to grant -freedom of will to brutes, to children, to the angry, to the insane, -to those misled by magic charms, or suggestions of the imagination, -though none of such persons be master of himself? If again (we are to -ascribe freedom of will) to reason accompanied by desire, does this -mean to reason even when misled, or only to right reason, and right -desire?[175] One might even ask whether reason be moved by desire, or -desire by reason.[176] For, admitting that desires arise naturally, a -distinction will nevertheless have to be established: if they belong -to the animal part, and to the combination (of soul and body), the -soul will obey the necessity of nature; if they belong to the soul -alone, many things which are generally attributed to the domain of our -free will will have to be withdrawn therefrom. Besides, passions are -always preceded by some sort of abstract reasoning. Further, how can -imagination itself--which constrains us; and desire--which drags us -whither Necessity compels, make us "masters of ourselves"[177] under -these circumstances? Besides, how can we be "masters of ourselves" -in general when we are carried away? That faculty of ours which -necessarily seeks to satisfy its needs, is not mistress of the things -towards which it is compelled to move.[177] How should we attribute -freedom of will to (a soul) that depends on something else? (To a soul) -which, in this thing, holds the principle of her own determinations? -(To a soul) that regulates her life thereby, and derives therefrom her -nature? (To a soul) that lives according to the instructions received -therefrom? Freedom of will would then have to be acknowledged even in -inanimate things; for even fire acts according to its inborn nature. - - -PRELIMINARY KNOWLEDGE DOES NOT SETTLE THE LIBERTARIAN PROBLEM. - -Some person might try to establish a distinction founded on the fact -that the animal and the soul do not act unconsciously. If they know -it by mere sensation, how far does that sensation contribute to the -freedom of will? For sensation, limiting itself to perception, does not -yield the percipient mastery over anything.[179] If they know it by -knowledge, and if this knowledge contain only the accomplished fact, -their actions are then determined by some other principle. If, even -independently of desire, reason or knowledge make us perform certain -actions, or dominate us,[180] to what faculty shall the action be -ascribed, and how does it occur? If reason produce another desire, how -does it do so? If reason manifest itself and liberate us by the process -of calming our desires, the free will lies no longer in the action, but -in intelligence; for every action, however much directed by reason, -would then be something mixed, not revealing an unconfused free will. - - -LIBERTY REFERRED TO THE ACTION OF INTELLIGENCE. - -3. The question must be examined carefully, for it will later be -applied to the divinities. Responsibility has been traced to the -will, and this to reason first, and later to right reason. Better, to -reason enlightened by knowledge; for freedom of will is not possessed -incontestably if one be ignorant of why his decision or action is -good, if one have been led to do the right thing by chance, or by some -sensible representation. Since the latter is not within our power, we -could not impute to free will the actions it inspired. By "sensible -representation," or, "phantasy,"[181] we mean the imagination excited -within us by the passions of the body; for it offers us different -images according as the body has need of food, of drink, or of sensual -pleasures. Those who act according to the "sensible representations" -excited within them by divers qualities of the humors of the body are -not wholly responsible for their actions. That is why depraved men, who -usually act according to these images, do not, according to us, perform -actions that are free and voluntary. We ascribe free will only to him -who, enfranchised from the passions of the body, performs actions -determined solely by intelligence. We refer liberty, therefore, to the -noblest principle, to the action of the intelligence[182]; we regard -as free only the decisions whose principle it is, and as voluntary, -only the desires it inspires. This freedom is that which we ascribe to -the divinities, who live in conformity with Intelligence, and with the -Desire of which it is the principle.[183] - - -INTELLIGENCE HAS CONVERSION TO GOOD AND "BEING IN ITSELF." - -4. We might ask how that which is produced by a desire could be -autocratically free, since the desire implies a need, and drags us -towards something exterior; for whoever desires really yields to an -inclination, even though the latter should lead him to the Good. We -might further ask whether intelligence, doing that which is in its -nature to do, in a manner conformable to its nature, is free and -independent, since it could have done the opposite. Further, we may ask -whether we have the right to attribute free will to that which does not -do any deeds; last, whether that which does a deed, is not, by the mere -fact that every action has a purpose, subject to an external necessity. -How indeed could one attribute freedom to a being that obeys its nature? - -We (might answer), how can one say of this being that it obeys, if it -be not constrained to follow something external? How would the being -that directs itself towards the Good be constrained, if its desire be -voluntary, if it direct itself towards the Good, knowing that it is -such? Only involuntarily does a being depart from the Good, only by -constraint does it direct itself towards that which is not its good; -that is the very nature of servitude, not to be able to reach one's -own good, and to be thwarted by a superior power to which obedience -is compulsory. Servitude displeases us, not because it deprives us of -the liberty to do evil, but because it hinders us going towards our -own, from ensuing our own good, forced as we are to work at the good -of someone else. When we speak of "obeying our nature," we distinguish -(in the being that obeys its nature) two principles, the one which -commands, and the other which obeys.[182] - -But when a principle has a simple nature, when it is a single -actualization, when it is not other in potentiality than it is in -actualization, how would it not be free? It cannot be said to be acting -conformably to its nature, because its actualization is not different -from its being, and because, within it, essence and action coincide. -It surely is free, if it act neither for another, nor in dependence on -another. If the word "independent" be not suitable here, if it be too -weak, we must at least understand that this Principle does not depend -on any other, does not recognize it as the ruler of its actions, any -more than of its being, since it itself is principle. - -Indeed, if Intelligence depend upon a further principle, at least this -one is not external, but is the Good itself. If then it be in the Good -itself that it finds its welfare, so much the more does it itself -possess independence and liberty, since it seeks them only in view -of the Good. When therefore Intelligence acts in conformity with the -Good, it has a higher degree of independence; for it possesses already -the "conversion to the Good," inasmuch as it proceeds from the Good, -and the privilege of being in itself, because Intelligence is turned -towards the Good; now it is better for Intelligence to remain within -itself, since it is thus turned towards the Good. - - -FREEDOM OF WILL AND VIRTUE ARE INDEPENDENT OF THE ACTIONS. - -5. Do autocratic freedom and independence inhere in pure and thinking -Intelligence exclusively, or are they also found in the soul which -applies its contemplative activity to intelligence, and its practical -activity to virtue? If we grant liberty to the practical activity of -the soul, we will not extend it to its results; for of this we are not -always masters. But if liberty is attributed to the soul which does -good, and which, in everything acts by herself, we are near the truth. - -How would that depend on us? As it depends on us to be courageous when -there is a war. Nevertheless, admitting that it then depends on us -to be courageous, I observe that, if there were no war, we could not -perform any action of this nature. Likewise, in all other virtuous -deeds, virtue always depends on accidental circumstances which force -us to do some particular thing.[182] Now if we were to give virtue -the liberty of deciding whether it desired a war, so as to be able to -offer a proof of courage; or desired injustices, as opportunities to -define and to respect rights; or wished that people might be poor to be -able to show forth its liberality; or whether it preferred to remain -at rest, because everything was in order; might virtue not prefer to -remain inactive in case nobody needed her services.[183] Similarly a -good physician, such as Hippocrates, for instance, would wish that his -professional services should not be needed by anybody. If then virtue -when applied to actions be forced to engage in such activities, how -could it possess independence in all its purity? Should we not say -that actions are subject to Necessity, whilst the preliminary volition -and reasoning are independent? If this be so, and since we locate free -will in that which precedes its execution, we shall also have to locate -autocratic freedom and independence of virtue outside of the (actual) -deed. - - -VIRTUE AS INTELLECTUALIZING HABIT LIBERATES THE SOUL. - -What shall we now say of virtue considered as "habit" or disposition? -Does it not occupy itself with regulating and moderating the passions -and desires when the soul is not healthy? In what sense do we then say -that it depends on us to be good, and that "virtue has no master?"[184] -In this sense, that it is we who will and choose; more, in the sense -that virtue, by its assistance, yields us liberty and independence, -and releases us from servitude. If then virtue be another kind of -intelligence, "a habit that intellectualizes the soul," even in this -respect must liberty be sought not in practical activity, but in the -intelligence divorced from activity. - - -LIBERTY REFERS TO THE INTERIOR LIFE, RATHER THAN TO THE EXTERIOR. - -6. How then did we previously refer liberty to volition, saying that -"that which depends on us, our responsibility, is that which occurs -according to our will"? Yes, but we added, "or does not occur." If -indeed we be right, and if we continue to support our former opinion, -we shall have to recognize that virtue and intelligence are their -own mistresses, and that it is to them that we must refer our free -will and independence. Since they have no master, we shall admit that -(our) intelligence remains within itself, that virtue must equally -remain calm in itself, regulating the soul so as to make her good, -and that in this respect it itself is both free, and enfranchises the -soul. If passions or necessary actions arise, (virtue) directs them -automatically; nevertheless she still preserves her independence (or, -freedom) by getting into relations with everything. For instance, -(virtue) does not engage in exterior things to save the body in times -of danger; on the contrary, she abandons it, if it seem advisable; -she orders the man to renounce even life, wealth, children, and -fatherland; for her object is to be honorable, relinquishing anything -beneath her dignity. This evidently shows that our liberty of action -and independence do not refer to practical matters, nor to external -occupations, but to interior activity, to thought, to the contemplation -of virtue itself. This virtue must be considered as a kind of -intelligence, and must not be confused with the passions that dominate -and govern reason; for these, as (Plato[185]) says, seem to derive -something from the body, though trained by exercise and habit. - - -LIBERTY DEPENDS ON THE HIGHEST INTELLIGENCE. - -Liberty therefore belongs to the immaterial principle, and to this -should be traced our free will. This principle is the volition which -rules itself, and which remains within itself; even when by necessity -compelled to take some resolution affecting external affairs. All that -proceeds from (the immaterial principle) and exists by it, depends on -us, and is free; what is outside of it, and with it; what it itself -wills and carries out unhindered, also constitutes what primarily -depends on us. The contemplative and primary Intelligence therefore -possesses independence, because in the accomplishment of its function -it depends on no other being, because fulfilling (its function, -Intelligence) remains entirely turned towards itself, exclusively -engaged with itself, resting in the Good, living according to its -will, satisfied, and without needs. Besides, will is nothing more -than thought; but it was called "will" because it was conformed to -intelligence; for will imitates what conforms to intelligence. On -the one hand, will desires the Good; on the other, for Intelligence -to think truly, is to abide within the Good. Intelligence therefore -possesses what the will desires, and, in attaining these its desires, -will becomes thought. Since, therefore, we define liberty as the will's -achievement of the Good, why should not liberty also be predicated of -the Intelligence which is founded on (the Good) that is the object of -the desire of our will? If, however, there should still be objection -to ascribing liberty to intelligence, this could be the case only by -ascribing it to something still higher (namely, super-Intelligence). - - -THE SOUL IS FREE BY INTELLIGENCE, WHICH IS FREE BY ITSELF. - -7. The soul therefore becomes free when, by the aid of intelligence, -she defies all obstacles in her ascent to the Good; and whatever she -does for the sake of the Good is responsible action. Intelligence, -however, is free by itself. - - -B. OF THE FREE WILL OF THE SUPREME. - -(_Let us now consider the free will of the Good._) - - -THE GOOD IS THE DESIRABLE IN ITSELF. - -8. The nature of the Good is that which is desirable for its own sake. -It is by the Good that the Soul and Intelligence exercise liberty when -the Soul can attain the Good without obstacle, and when Intelligence -can enjoy its possession. Now since the Good's empire extends over all -lower treasures; since He occupies the front rank; since He is the -Principle to which all beings wish to rise, on whom they all depend, -and from whom all derive their power and liberty; it would be difficult -to attribute to Him a liberty similar to our human freedom of will, -when we can hardly, with propriety, predicate such a human liberty of -Intelligence. - - -THE GOOD IS FREE, BUT NOT MERELY BY CHANCE. - -Here some rash person,[186] drawing his arguments from some other -school of thought, may object that, "If the Good be indeed good, this -occurs only by chance. A man is not master of what he is (that is, -of his own nature), because his own nature does not depend on himself -(that is, is not due to self-determination). Consequently, he enjoys -neither freedom nor independence, as he acts or withholds action as -he is forced by necessity." Such an assertion is gratuitous, and even -self-contradictory. It destroys all conception of will, liberty and -independence, reducing these terms to being labels, and illusions. He -who advances such an opinion is forced to maintain not only that it -is not within the power of anybody to do or not to do some thing, but -also that the word "liberty" arouses no conception in his mind, and is -meaningless. If however he insist that he does understand it, he will -soon be forced to acknowledge that the conception of liberty bears a -conformity with the reality which he at first denied. The conception -of a thing exerts no interference on its substance ("being"); it can -do nothing by itself, nor can it lead to hypostatic existence. It is -limited to pointing out to us which being obeys others, which being -possesses free will, which being depends on no other, but is master of -its own action, a privilege characteristic of eternal beings so far as -they are eternal, or to beings which attain the Good without obstacle -(like the Soul), or possess it (like Intelligence). It is therefore -absurd to say that the Good, which is above them, seeks other higher -good beyond itself. - - -BEING AND ACTUALIZATION CONSTITUTE ONE SELF-EXISTENT PRINCIPLE. - -Nor is it any more accurate to insist that the Good exists by chance. -Chance occurs only in the lower and multiple things. We on the contrary -insist that the First does not exist by chance, and that one cannot -say that He is not master of His birth, since He was not born.[187] -It is not any less absurd to assert that He is not free because He -acts according to His nature; for such an assertion would seem to -imply that freedom consists in actions contrary to one's nature. Last, -His solitariness (or, unity) does not deprive Him of liberty, because -this unity does not result from His being hindered by anybody else -(from having anything else), but from His being what He is, from His -satisfying (or, pleasing) Himself, as He could not be any better; -otherwise, it would be implied that one would lose one's liberty on -attaining the Good. If such an assertion be absurd, is it not the -summit of absurdity to refuse to predicate autocratic liberty of the -Good because of His being good, because He remains within Himself and -because since all beings aspire towards Him, He Himself aspires to -nothing else than Himself, and has no need of anything? As His higher -hypostatic existence is simultaneously His higher actualization--for -in Him these two aspects fuse into one, since they do so even in -Intelligence--His essence is no more conformed to His actualization, -than His actualization to His essence. He cannot be said to actualize -according to His nature, nor that His actualization and His higher life -are traced up into His higher being (so to speak). But as His higher -being and His higher (actualization) are intimately united, and coexist -since all eternity, the result is that these two entities constitute a -single Principle, which depends on itself, and nothing else. - - -PHYSICAL QUALITIES USED OF THE SUPREME ONLY BY ANALOGY. - -8. We conceive of the self-rule as no accident of the Good; but, from -the self-rule proper to (all) beings, we rise, by abstraction of the -contraries, to Him who Himself is liberty and independence, thus -applying to this Principle the lower attributes that we borrow from -inferior beings (that is, the Soul and Intelligence), because of our -impotence to speak properly of Him. Such indeed are the terms that we -could use in referring to Him, though it would be absolutely impossible -to find the proper expression, not only to predicate anything of Him, -but even to say anything whatever about Him. For the most beautiful and -venerable things do no more than imitate Him, who is their principle. -Nevertheless, from another standpoint, He is not their principle, since -this their imitation must be denied, and we must withdraw, as too -inferior, even the terms "liberty" and "self-rule," for these terms -seem to imply a tendency towards something else, an obstacle, even if -only to avoid it; the coexistence of other beings, even if only to -imitate Him uninterruptedly. Now no tendency should be attributed to -the Good. He is what He is before all other things, since we do not -even say of Him, "He is," so as not to establish any connection between -Him and "beings." Neither can we say of Him, "according to His nature"; -for this expression indicates some later relation. It is indeed applied -to intelligible entities, but only so far as they proceed from some -other principle; that is why it is applied to "being," because it -is born of the (Good). But if we refer "nature" to temporal things, -it could not be predicated of "being"; for to say that "being" does -not exist by itself would be to affect its existence; to say that it -derives its existence from something else is equivalent to asserting -that it does not exist by itself. Nor should we say of the Good that -"His nature is accidental," nor speak of contingency in connection with -(the Divinity); for He is contingent neither for Himself nor for other -beings; contingency is found only in the multiple beings which, already -being one thing, have accidentally become some other. How indeed -could the First exist accidentally? for He did not reach His present -condition fortuitously enough to enable us even to ask, "How did He -become what He is?" No chance led Him (to become His present self), -nor led Him to hypostatic existence; for chance and luck did not exist -anteriorly to Him, since even they proceed from a cause, and exist only -in things that grow[188] (or, "become"). - - -"CONTINGENCE" MIGHT BE APPLIED TO THE SUPREME, IF THE WORD BE -RE-DEFINED. - -9. If however anybody applied the term "contingency" to the Divinity, -we should not dispute about the word, but go back of it to its -underlying meaning. Do you, by it, mean that the First is a principle -of particular nature and power; and that if He had had a different -nature, He would still, as principle, have conformed to the nature He -would have had? Also, that if He had been less perfect, He would still -have actualized in conformity with His being? We should answer such -an assertion thus: it was impossible for the higher Principle of all -things to be contingent; or to be less perfect accidentally, or good -in some other manner, as some higher thing that was less complete. -As the principle of all things must be better than they, He must be -determinate; and by this is here meant that He exists in an unique -manner. This, however, not by necessity; for necessity did not exist -before Him. Necessity exists only in the beings that follow the first -Principle, though the latter impose no constraint upon them. It is by -Himself that the First exists uniquely. He could not be anything but -what He is; He is what He ought to have been; and not by accident. -He is that; He had to be what He was. So "He who is what He ought to -have been" is the principle of the things that ought to exist. Not by -accident, nor contingently, therefore, is He what He is; He is what He -had to be; though here the term "had to be" is improper. (If we be -permitted to explain what we mean by an illustration, we may say that) -the other beings have to await the appearance of their king--which -means, that He shall posit Himself as what He really is, the true King, -the true Principle, the true Good. Of Him it must not even be said -that He actualizes in conformity with the Good, for then He would seem -subordinate to some other principle; we must say only that He is what -He is. He is not conformed to the Good, because He is the Good itself. - - -NOT EVEN ESSENCE IS CONTINGENT, LET ALONE SUPER-ESSENCE. - -Besides, there is nothing contingent, even in (that which is beneath -the First), namely, Essence-in-itself; for if any contingency -inhered in it, it itself would be contingent. But Essence cannot -be contingent, for not fortuitously is it what it is; nor does it -derive what it is from anything else, because the very nature of -Essence is to be Essence. This being the case, how could "He who is -above Essence" be considered as being what He is fortuitously? For He -begat Essence, and Essence is not what it is fortuitously, since it -exists in the same manner as "Being," which is what is "Being" and -Intelligence--otherwise, one might even say that Intelligence was -contingent, as if it could have been anything but what is its nature. -Thus He who does not issue from Himself, and does not incline towards -anything whatever, is what He is in the most special sense. - - -THE SUPREME IS THE POWER REALLY MASTER OF HIMSELF. - -What now could be said (to look down) from some (peak) overhanging -(Essence and Intelligence), upon (their principle)? Could you -describe what you saw from there as being what it is fortuitously? -Certainly not! Neither His nature nor His manner would be contingent. -He is merely (an absolute, unexplainable) existence (a "thus"). Even -this term "thus," however, would be improper, for, on applying it to -the First, it would become determinate, and become "such a thing." -Whoever has seen the First would not say He was, or was not that; -otherwise, you would be reducing Him to the class of things which may -be designated as this or that; but the First is above all these things. -When you shall have seen Him who is infinite ("indefinite"), you will -be able to name all the things that are after Him (you will be able to -name Him whom all things follow); but you must not classify Him among -these. Consider Him as the universal Power essentially master (of -himself), which is what He wishes; or rather, who has imposed His will -upon (all) beings, but who Himself is greater than all volition, and -who classifies volition as below Himself. (To speak strictly therefore) -He did not even will to be what He is (he did not even say, I shall be -that); and no other principle made Him be what He is. - - -THE SUPREME BANISHES ALL CHANCE BY ASSIGNING LIMIT AND SHAPE TO EACH -FORM. - -10. He (Strato the Peripatetic?) who insists that the Good is what it -is by chance, should be asked how he would like to have it demonstrated -to him that the hypothesis of chance is false--in case it be false--and -how chance could be made to disappear from the universe? If there be -a nature (such as the nature of the one Unity), which makes (chance) -disappear, it itself could not be subject to chance. If we subject -to chance the nature which causes other beings not to be what they -are by chance, nothing will be left that could have been derived -from chance. But the principle of all beings banishes chance from the -universe by giving to each (being) a form, a limitation, and a shape; -and it is impossible to attribute to chance the production of beings -thus begotten in a manner conforming to reason. A cause exists there. -Chance reigns only in things that do not result from a plan, which are -not concatenated, which are accidental. How indeed could we attribute -to chance the existence of the principle of all reason, order, and -determination? Chance no doubt sways many things[188]; but it could -not control the production of intelligence, reason, and order. Chance, -in fact, is the contrary of reason; how then could (chance) produce -(reason)? If chance do not beget Intelligence, so much the more could -it not have begotten the still superior and better Principle; for -chance had no resources from which to produce this principle; chance -itself did not exist; and it would not have been in any manner able -to impart eternal (qualities). Thus, since there is nothing anterior -to the (Divinity), and as He is the First, we shall have to halt our -inquiry about this Principle, and say nothing more about Him, rather -examining the production of the beings posterior to Him. As to Him -himself, there is no use considering how He was produced, as He really -was not produced. - - -THE SUPREME AS MASTER OF HIS OWN BEING. - -Since He was not produced, we must suppose that He is the master of -His own being. Even if He were not master of His own being, and if, -being what He is, He did not endow Himself with "hypostatic" form -of existence, and limited Himself to utilizing His resources, the -consequence is that He is what He is necessarily, and that He could -not have been different from what He is. He is what He is, not because -He could have been otherwise, but because His nature is excellent. -Indeed, even if one be sometimes hindered from becoming better, no one -is ever hindered by any other person from becoming worse. Therefore, if -He did not issue from Himself, He owes it to Himself, and not to any -outside hindrance; He must essentially be that which has not issued -from itself. The impossibility of becoming worse is not a mark of -impotence, because, if (the Divinity) do not degenerate, He owes it to -Himself, (and derives it) from Himself. His not aspiring to anything -other than Himself constitutes the highest degree of power, since He is -not subjected to necessity, but constitutes the law and necessity of -other beings. Has necessity then caused its own (hypostatic) existence? -No, it has not even reached there, inasmuch as all that is after the -First achieved (hypostatic) existence on His account. How then could -He who is before (hypostatic) existence (or, which has achieved a form -of existence), have derived His existence from any other principle, or -even from Himself? - - -IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO TRANSCEND THE FIRST. - -11. What then is the Principle which one cannot even say that it is -(hypostatically) existent? This point will have to be conceded without -discussion, however, for we cannot prosecute this inquiry. What -indeed would we be seeking, when it is impossible to go beyond, every -inquiry leading to some one principle, and ceasing there? Besides, all -questions refer to one of four things: existence, quality, cause and -essence. From the beings that follow Him, we conclude to the essence -of the First, in that sense in which we say He exists. Seeking the -cause of His existence, however, would amount to seeking an (ulterior) -principle, and the Principle of all things cannot Himself have a -principle. An effort to determine His quality would amount to seeking -what accident inheres in Him in whom is nothing contingent; and there -is still more clearly no possible inquiry as to His existence, as -we have to grasp it the best we know how, striving not to attribute -anything to Him. - - -THE ORIGIN OF GOD PUZZLES US ONLY BECAUSE WE HABITUALLY START FROM SOME -PRE-EXISTENT CHAOS. - -(Habitually) we are led to ask these questions about the nature (of -the divinity) chiefly because we conceive of space and location as -a chaos, into which space and location, that is either presented to -us by our imagination, or that really exists, we later introduce the -first Principle. This introduction amounts to a question whence and -how He came. We then treat Him as a stranger, and we wonder why He is -present there, and what is His being; we usually assume He came up -out of an abyss, or that He fell from above. In order to evade these -questions, therefore, we shall have to remove from our conception -(of the divinity) all notion of locality, and not posit Him within -anything, neither conceiving of Him as eternally resting, and founded -within Himself, nor as if come from somewhere. We shall have to content -ourselves with thinking that He exists in the sense in which reasoning -forces us to admit His existence, or with persuading ourselves that -location, like everything else, is posterior to the Divinity, and that -it is even posterior to all things. Thus conceiving (of the Divinity) -as outside of all place, so far as we can conceive of Him, we are not -surrounding Him as it were within a circle, nor are we undertaking to -measure His greatness, nor are we attributing to Him either quantity -or quality; for He has no shape, not even an intelligible one; He is -not relative to anything, since His hypostatic form of existence is -contained within Himself, and before all else. - - -THE SUPREME, BEING WHAT HE IS, IS NOT PRODUCED BY CHANCE. - -Since (the Divinity) is such, we certainly could not say that He is -what He is by chance. Such an assertion about Him is impossible, -inasmuch as we can speak of Him only by negations.[189] We shall -therefore have to say, not that He is what He is by chance; but that, -being what He is, He is not that by chance, since there is within Him -absolutely nothing contingent. - - -EVEN WE MAY BE SAID TO BE MASTERS OF OURSELVES; HOW MUCH MORE THE -SUPREME! - -12. Shall we not even refuse to say that (the divinity) is what He is, -and is the master of what He is, or of that which is still superior? -Our soul still moots this problem, because she is not yet entirely -convinced by what we have said. Our considerations thereof are as -follows. By his body, each one of us is far separated from "being"; but -by his soul, by which he is principally constituted, he participates -in "being," and is a certain being; that is, he is a combination -of "difference" and "being." Fundamentally, we are therefore not a -"being"; we are not even "being"; consequently, we are not masters of -our "being"; "being" itself rather is master of us, since it furnishes -us with "difference" (which, joined with "being," constitutes our -nature). As, in a certain degree, we are nevertheless the "being" that -is master of us, we may, in this respect, even here below, be called -masters of ourselves. As to the Principle which absolutely is what -He is, which is "Being" itself, so that He and His being fuse, He is -master of Himself, and depends on nothing, either in His existence or -"being." He does not even need to be master of Himself since (He is -being), and since all that occupies the first rank in the intelligible -world is classified as "being." - - -HOW THE SUPREME IS EVEN BEYOND HIS OWN MASTER. - -As to Him who made "being" (equivalent to) freedom, whose nature it is -to make free beings, and who (therefore) might be called the "author of -liberty"--excuse the expression--to what could He be enslaved? It is -His being (or, nature) to be free; or rather, it is from Him that being -derives its freedom; for (we must not forget that) "being" is posterior -to Him, who Himself (being beyond it), "has" none. If then there be any -actualization in Him, if we were to consider that He was constituted -by an actualization, He would nevertheless contain no difference, -He will be master of His own self that produces the actualization, -because He Himself and the actualization fuse (and are identical). -But if we acknowledge no actualization whatever (in the Divinity), if -we predicate actualization only of the things that tend towards Him, -and from Him derive their hypostatic existence, we should still less -recognize in Him any element that is master, or that masters. We should -not even say that He was master of Himself, nor that He had a master, -but because we have already predicated of "being" what is meant by -being master of oneself. We therefore classify (the Divinity) in a rank -higher still. - -But how can there be a principle higher than the one that is master -of Himself? In the Principle which is master of Himself, as being and -actualization are two (separate) entities, it is actualization that -furnishes the notion of being master of oneself. As however we saw that -actualization was identical with "being," in order to be called master -of itself, actualization must have differentiated itself from being. -Therefore (the Divinity), which is not constituted by two things fused -into unity, but by absolute Unity, being either only actualization, or -not even mere actualization, could not be called "master of Himself." - - -ALL SUCH LANGUAGE ABOUT THE DIVINITY IS METAPHORICAL. - -13. Although the above expressions, when applied to the (divinity), are -really not exact, we are nevertheless forced to use them in connection -with this disquisition. We therefore repeat what was above rightly -stated, that no doubleness, not even if merely logical, should be -admitted to our idea of the Divinity. Nevertheless, that we may be -better understood, we shall for a moment lay aside the strictness of -language demanded by reason. - - -THE SUPREME IS MASTER OF HIMSELF BECAUSE HIS VERY ESSENCE DEPENDS ON -HIMSELF. - -Now supposing the existence of actualizations in the divinity, and that -these actualizations depend on His will--for he could not actualize -involuntarily--and that simultaneously they constitute His being; in -this case, His will and His being will be identical (that is, will -fuse). Such as He wished to be, He is. That He wills and actualizes in -conformity to His nature, will not be said in preference to this, that -His being conforms to His will and His actualization. He is absolutely -master of Himself, because His very essence depends on Himself. - - -THE SUPREME IS A UNITY OF WILL, BEING AND ACTUALIZATION. - -Here arises another consideration. Every being, that aspires to the -Good, wishes to be the Good far more than to be what it is; and thinks -itself as existing most, the more it participates in the Good. Its -preference is to be in such a state, to participate in the Good as much -as possible, because the nature of the Good is doubtless preferable in -itself. The greater the portion of good possessed by a being, the freer -and more conformable to its will is its nature (being); then it forms -but one and the same thing with its will, and by its will achieves -hypostatic existence (or, a form of existence). So long as a being -does not possess the Good, it wishes to be different from what it is; -so soon as the being possesses it, the being wishes to be what it is. -This union, or presence of the Good in a being, is not fortuitous; its -"being" is not outside of the Will (of the Good); by this presence of -the Good it is determined, and on that account, belongs to itself. If -then this presence of the Good cause every being to make and determine -itself, then evidently (the Divinity) is primarily and particularly -the principle through which the rest may be itself. The "being" (of -the Good) is intimately united with the will (the Divinity) has to be -such as He is--if I may be permitted to speak thus--and He cannot be -understood unless He wishes to be what He is. As in Him everything -concurs (in a consummation), He wishes to be, and is what He wishes; -His will and Himself form but one (are identical, or, fuse). He is not -any the less one, for He finds that He is precisely what He may have -wished to be. What indeed could He have wished to be, if not what He is? - - -THE SUPREME WOULD WISH TO BE WHAT HE IS. - -Now supposing that (the divinity) were given the chance to choose what -He would like to be, and that He were permitted to change His nature, -He would not desire to become different from what He is; He would not -find in Himself anything that displeased Him, as if He had been forced -to be what He is; for He as ever willed, and still wills to be what -He is. The nature of Good is really His will; He has neither yielded -to a lure, nor (blindly) followed his own nature, but He preferred -Himself, because there was nothing different that He could have wished -to be. With this, contrast that other beings do not find implied in -their own being the reason of pleasing themselves, and that some of -them are even dissatisfied with themselves. In the hypostatic existence -of the Good, however, is necessarily contained self-choice, and -self-desire; otherwise, there would be nothing in the whole universe -that could please itself, since one pleases himself only inasmuch as he -participates in the Good, and possesses an image of it within oneself. - - -EVERY TERM, WHEN APPLIED TO THE DIVINITY, SHOULD BE PRECEDED BY A -PARTICLE REMINDING IT IS ONLY USED METAPHORICALLY. - -We must, however, ask indulgence for our language; when speaking of the -(divinity) we are, by the necessity of being understood, obliged to -make use of words which a meticulous accuracy would question. Each of -them should be prefixed by a (warning) particle, (meaning "somewhat," -or) "higher." - - -THE SUPREME IS CHOICE, BEING, WILL, SELF-DIRECTION, AND SELF-EXISTENCE. - -The subsistence of the Good implies that of choice and will, because -He could not exist without these two. But (in the Divinity) (these -three, choice, being and will) do not form a multiplicity; they must -be considered as having fused. Since He is the author of will, He must -evidently also be the author of what is called self-direction ("being -for oneself"). This leads us to say that He made Himself; for, since He -is the author of will, and as this will is more or less His work, and -as it is identical with His essence, (we may say that) He gave himself -the form of (hypostatic) existence. Not by chance therefore is He what -He is; He is what He is because He wished to be such. - - -IN ANALYSIS CONTINGENCY IS ELIMINATED. - -14. Here is still another point of view from which the subject under -discussion may be regarded. Each one of the beings that are said to -be existent, is either identical with its essence, or differs from -it. Thus, some particular man differs from the Man-essence, only -participating therein. On the contrary, the soul is identical with -the Soul-essence, when she is simple, and when she is not predicated -of anything else. Likewise, the Man-in-himself is identical with the -Man-essence. The man who is other than the Man-essence is contingent; -but the Man-essence is not contingent; the Man-in-himself exists in -himself. If then the essence of man exist by itself, if it be neither -fortuitous nor contingent, how could contingency be predicated of Him -who is superior to Man in himself, and who begat him, from whom all -beings are derived, since His is a nature simpler than the Man-essence, -and even of essence in general? If, in ascending towards greater -simplicity, contingency decreases, so much the more impossible is -it that contingency could extend to the Nature that is the simplest -(namely, the Good). - - -THE SUPREME IS BOTH BEING AND CAUSE. - -Let us also remember that each of the beings which exist genuinely, -as we have said, and which have received their form of hypostatic -existence from the Good, likewise owe it to Him that they are -individual, as are the similarly situated sense-beings. By such -individual beings is here meant having in one's own being the cause -of his hypostatic existence. Consequently, He who then contemplates -things can give an account of each of their details, to give the -cause of the individuality of eyes or feet, to show that the cause of -the generation of each part is found in its relations with the other -parts, and that they have all been made for each other. Why are the -feet of a particular length? Because some other organ is "such"; for -instance, the face being such, the feet themselves must be such. In -one word, the universal harmony[190] is the cause on account of which -all things were made for each other.[191] Why is the individual such -a thing? Because of the Man-essence. Therefore the essence and the -cause coincide. They issued from the same source, from the Principle -which, without having need of reasoning, produced together the essence -and the cause. Thus the source of the essence and the cause produces -them both simultaneously. Such then are begotten things, such is their -principle, but in a much superior and truer manner; for in respect of -excellence, it possesses an immense superiority over them. Now since -it is not fortuitously, neither by chance, nor contingently, that -the things which bear their cause in themselves, are what they are; -since, on the other hand, (the Divinity) possesses all the entities of -which He is the principle, evidently, being the Father of reason, of -cause, and of causal being--all of them entities entirely free from -contingence--he is the Principle and type of all things that are not -contingent, the Principle which is really and in the highest degree -independent of chance, of fortune, and of contingency; He is the cause -of Himself, He is He by virtue of Himself; for He is Self in a primary -and transcendent manner. - - -THE SUPREME CO-EXISTS WITH HIMSELF, AND IS SUCH AS HE WISHES TO BE. - -15. He is simultaneously the lovable and love; He is love of himself; -for He is beautiful only by and in Himself. He coexists with Himself -only on condition that the thing, which exists in Himself, is identical -with Him. Now as in Him the thing that coexists is identical with Him, -and as in Him also that which desires, and that which is desirable play -the part of hypostasis and subject, here once more appears the identity -of desire and "being." If this be so, it is evidently again He who is -the author of Himself, and the master of Himself; consequently, He was -made not such as some other being desired it, but He is such as He -Himself desires. - - -MEN ESCAPE CHANCE BY INFERIOR ISOLATION; THEREFORE THE SUPREME MUST BE -FREE. - -When we assert that (the Divinity) Himself receives nothing, and is -received by no other being, we thereby in another way prove that He -is what He is, not by chance. This is the case because He isolates -Himself, and preserves Himself uninfected from all things. Besides, -we sometimes see that our nature possesses something similar, when it -finds itself disengaged from all that is attached to us, and subjects -us to the sway of fortune and fatality--for all the things that we call -ours are dependent, and undergo the law of fortune, happening to us -fortuitously. Only in this manner is one master of himself, possessing -free will, by virtue of an actualization of the light which has the -form of the Good, of an actualization of the Good, which is superior to -intelligence; of an actualization which is not adventitious, and which -is above all thought. When we shall have risen thither, when we shall -have become that alone, leaving all the rest, shall we not say that we -are then above even liberty and free will? Who then could subject us -to chance, to fortune, to contingency, since we shall have become the -genuine life, or rather, since we shall be in Him who derives nothing -from any other being, who is solely himself? When other beings are -isolated, they do not suffice themselves; but He is what He is, even -when isolated. - - -THE ASCENT OF LIFE WITNESS TO THE DISAPPEARANCE OF CONTINGENCY. - -The first hypostatic form of existence does not consist in an inanimate -entity or in an irrational life; for an irrational life is but weak in -essence, being a dispersion of reason, and something indeterminate. On -the contrary, the closer life approaches reason, the further is it from -contingency, for that which is rational has nothing to do with chance. -Ascending then (to the Divinity) He does not seem to us to be Reason, -but what is still more beautiful than Reason; so far is He from having -arisen by chance! Indeed, He is the very root of Reason, for it is the -goal at which all things find their consummation. He is the principle -and foundation of an immense Tree which lives by reason; He remains in -Himself, and imparts essence to the Tree by the reason He communicates. - - -THE SUPREME AS EVERYWHERE AND NOWHERE; AS INCLINATION AND IMMANENCE. - -16. As we assert, and as it seems evident that (the Divinity) is -everywhere and nowhere, it is necessary thoroughly to grasp and -understand this conception, as it applies to the subject of our -studies. Since (the Divinity) is nowhere, He is nowhere fortuitously; -since He is everywhere, He is everywhere what He is. He himself is -therefore what is named omnipresence, and universality. He is not -contained within omnipresence, but is omnipresence itself, and He -imparts essence to all the other beings because they are all contained -within Him who is everywhere. Possessing the supreme rank, or rather -Himself being supreme, He holds all things in obedience to Himself. For -them He is not contingent; it is they that are contingent to Him, or -rather, that connect with Him; for it is not He who contemplates them, -but they who look at Him. On His part, He, as it were, moves towards -the most intimate depths within Himself, loving Himself, loving the -pure radiance of which He is formed, Himself being what He loves, that -is, giving Himself a hypostatic form of existence, because He is an -immanent actualization, and what is most lovable in Him constitutes the -higher Intelligence. This Intelligence being an operation, He himself -is an operation; but as He is not the operation of any other principle, -He is the operation of Himself; He therefore is not what chance makes -of Him, but what He actualizes. He is the author of Himself, inasmuch -as He exists particularly because He is His own foundation, because He -contemplates Himself, because, so to speak, He passes His existence -in contemplating Himself. He therefore is, not what He fortuitously -found Himself to be, but what He himself wishes to be, and as His will -contains nothing fortuitous, He is even in this respect independent -of contingency. For, since His will is the will of the Best that is -in the universe, it could not be fortuitous. If one were to imagine -an opposite movement, one will easily recognize that His inclination -towards Himself, which is His actualization, and His immanence in -Himself make of Him what He is. Indeed, should (the divinity) incline -towards what is outside of Himself, He would cease being what He -is. His actualization, in respect to Himself, is to be what He is; -for He and that actualization coincide. He therefore gives Himself -a hypostatic form of existence, because the actualization that He -produces is inseparable from Himself. If then the actualization of (the -divinity) did not merely commence, but if, on the contrary, it dated -from all eternity; if it consist in an exciting action,[192] identical -to Him who is excited; and if, besides this exciting action, He be -ever-being super-intellection, then (the divinity) is what He makes -himself by His exciting action. The latter is superior to "Being," to -Intelligence, and to the Life of Wisdom; it is Himself. He therefore -is an actualization superior to Life, Intelligence and Wisdom; these -proceed from Him, and from Him alone. He therefore derives essence from -Himself, and by Himself; consequently, He is, not what He fortuitously -found Himself to be, but what He willed to be. - - -PROVIDENCE, THE PLAN OF THE UNIVERSE, IS FROM ETERNITY. - -17. Here is another proof of it. We have stated that the world and the -"being" it contains are what they would be if their production had been -the result of a voluntary determination of their author, what they -would still be if the divinity exercising a prevision and prescience -based on reasoning, had done His work according to Providence. But -as (these beings) are or become what they are from all eternity, -there must also, from eternity--within the coexistent beings, exist -("seminal) reasons" which subsist in a plan more perfect (than that -of our universe); consequently, the intelligible entities are above -Providence, and choice; and all the things which exist in Essence -subsist eternally there, in an entirely intellectual existence. If the -name "Providence" be applied to the plan of the universe, then immanent -Intelligence certainly is anterior to the plan of the universe, and the -latter proceeds from immanent Intelligence, and conforms thereto.[193] - - -THE SUPREME, ASSISTED BY INTELLIGENCE, WOULD HAVE NO ROOM FOR CHANCE. - -Since Intelligence is thus anterior to all things, and since all -things are (rooted) in such an Intelligence as principle, Intelligence -cannot be what it is as a matter of chance. For, if on one hand, -Intelligence be multiple, on the other hand it is in perfect agreement -with itself, so that, by co-ordination of the elements it contains, it -forms a unity. Once more, such a principle that is both multiple and -co-ordinated manifoldness, which contains all ("seminal) reasons" by -embracing them within its own universality, could not be what it is as -a result of fortune or chance. This principle must have an entirely -opposite nature, as much differing from contingency, as reason from -chance, which consists in the lack of reason. If the above Intelligence -be the (supreme) Principle, then Intelligence, such as it has been here -described, is similar to this Principle, conforms to it, participates -in it, and is such as is wished by it and its power. (The Divinity) -being indivisible, is therefore a (single) Reason that embraces -everything, a single (unitary) Number, and a single (Divinity) that is -greater and more powerful than the generated (universe); than He, none -is greater or better. From none other, therefore, can He have derived -His essence or qualities. What He is for and in Himself, is therefore -derived from Himself; without any relation with the outside, nor with -any other being, but entirely turned towards Himself. - - -CHANCE COULD NOT CAUSE THE ONE THAT IS THE CENTRE OF THE CIRCULAR -INTELLIGENCE. - -18. If then you seek this (Principle), do not expect to find anything -on the outside of Him; in Him seek all that is after Him, but do -not seek to penetrate within Him; for He is what is outside (of -everything), the comprehension of all things, and their measure.[194] -Simultaneously, He is the internal, being the most intimate depth of -all things; (in which case) the external would be (represented by) -Reason and Intelligence, which like a circumference fit around Him and -depend from Him. Indeed, Intelligence is such only because it touches -Him, and so far as it touches Him, and depends from Him[195]; for it is -its dependence from Him that constitutes its intelligence. It resembles -a circle which is in contact with its centre. It would be universally -acknowledged that such a circle would derive all its power from the -centre, and would, in a higher sense, be centriform. Thus the radii -of such a circle unite in a single centre by extremities similar to -the distal and originating (extremities). These (distal) extremities, -though they be similar to the centric ones, are nevertheless but faint -traces thereof; for the latter's potentiality includes both the radii -and their (distal) extremities; it is everywhere present in the radii, -manifests its nature therein, as an immature development. This is an -illustration how Intelligence and Essence were born from (the divinity) -as by effusion or development; and by remaining dependent from the -intellectual nature of the Unity, it thereby manifests an inherent -higher Intelligence, which (speaking strictly), is not intelligence, -since it is the absolute Unity. A centre, even without radii or -circumference, is nevertheless the "father" of the circumference and -the radii, for it reveals traces of its nature, and by virtue of an -immanent potency, and individual force, it begets the circumference -and the radii which never separate from it. Similarly, the One is the -higher archetype of the intellectual power which moves around Him, -being His image. For in the Unity there is a higher Intelligence which, -so to speak, moving in all directions and manners, thereby becomes -Intelligence; while the Unity, dwelling above Intelligence, begets it -by its power. How then could fortune, contingency and chance approach -this intelligence-begetting Power, a power that is genuinely and -essentially creative? Such then is what is in Intelligence, and such is -what is in Unity, though that which is in Him is far superior. - - -AS CAUSE, SUITABILITY, AND OPPORTUNITY, THE SUPREME IS BEYOND CHANCE. - -(As illustration), consider the radiance shed afar by some luminous -source that remains within itself; the radiation would represent -the image, while the source from which it issues would be the -genuine light.[196] Nevertheless, the radiation, which represents -the intelligence, is not an image that has a form foreign (to its -principle), for it does not exist by chance, being reason and cause -in each of its parts. Unity then is the cause of the cause; He is, in -the truest sense, supreme causality, simultaneously containing all the -intellectual causes He is to produce; this, His offspring, is begotten -not as a result of chance, but according to His own volition. His -volition, however, was not irrational, fortuitous, nor accidental; -and as nothing is fortuitous in Him, His will was exactly suitable. -Therefore Plato[197] called it the "suitable," and the "timely," to -express as clearly as possible that the (Divinity) is foreign to all -chance, and that He is that which is exactly suitable. Now if He be -exactly suitable, He is so not irrationally. If He be timely, He must -(by a Greek pun), also be "supremely sovereign" over the (beings) -beneath Him. So much the more will He be timely for Himself. Not by -chance therefore is He what He is, for He willed to be what He is; -He wills suitable things, and in Him that which is suitable, and the -actualization thereof, coincide. He is the suitable, not as a subject, -but as primary actualization manifesting Him such as it was suitable -for Him to be. That is the best description we can give of Him, in our -impotence to express ourselves about Him as we should like.[198] - - -NO PERSON WHO HAS SEEN THE SUPREME COULD POSSIBLY CALL HIM CHANCE. - -19. By the use of the above indications (it is possible), to ascend to -Him. Having done so, grasp Him. Then you will be able to contemplate -Him, and you will find no terms to describe His (greatness). When you -shall see Him, and resign any attempt at spoken description, you will -proclaim that He exists by Himself in a way such that, if He had any -being, it would be His servant, and would be derived from Him. No one -who has ever seen Him would have the audacity to maintain that He is -what He is by chance; nor even to utter such a blasphemy, for He would -be confounded by his own temerity. Having ascended to Him, the (human -observer) could not even locate His presence, as it were rising up -everywhere before the eyes of his soul. Whichever way the soul directs -her glances, she sees Him, unless, on considering some other object, -she abandons the divinity by ceasing to think of Him. - - -THE SUPREME IS ABOVE BEING BECAUSE NOT DEPENDENT THEREON. - -The ancient (philosophers), in enigmatical utterances, said that (the -divinity) is above "being."[199] This must be understood to mean not -only that He begets being, but because He is not dependent on "being" -or on Himself. Not even His own "being" is to Him a principle; for He -himself is the principle of "being." Not for Himself did he make it; -but, having made it, He left it outside of Himself, because He has no -need of essence, since He himself made it. Thus, even though He exist, -He does not produce that which is meant by that verb. - - -HAVING MADE HIMSELF DOES NOT IMPLY ANY PRIORITY IN THE DIVINITY. - -20. It will be objected that the above implies the existence (of the -Divinity) before He existed; for, if He made Himself, on the one hand, -He did not yet exist, if it was Himself that He made; and on the other, -so far as it was He who made, He already existed before Himself, since -what has been made was Himself. However, (the Divinity) should be -considered not so much as "being made" but as "making," and we should -realize that the actualization by which He created Himself is absolute; -for His actualization does not result in the production of any other -"being." He produces nothing but Himself, He is entirely Himself; -we are not dealing here with two things, but with a single entity. -Neither need we hesitate to admit that the primary actualization has no -"being"; but that actualization should be considered as constituting -His hypostatic form of existence. If within Him these two were to be -distinguished, the superlatively perfect Principle would be incomplete -and imperfect. To add actualization to Him would be to destroy His -unity. Thus, since the actualization is more perfect than His being, -and since that which is primary is the most perfect, that which is -primary must necessarily be actualization. He is what He is as soon -as He actualizes. He cannot be said to have existed before He made -Himself; for before He made Himself He did not exist; but (from the -first actualization) He already existed in entirety. He therefore is an -actualization which does not depend on being, (an actualization) that -is clearly free; and thus He (originates) from Himself. If, as to His -essence, He were preserved by some other principle, He himself would -not be the first proceeding from Himself. He is said to contain Himself -because He produces (and parades) Himself; since it is from the very -beginning that He caused the existence of what He naturally contains. -Strictly, we might indeed say, that He made Himself, if there existed a -time when He himself began to exist. But since He was what He is before -all times, the statement that He made Himself means merely that "having -made" and "himself" are inseparable; for His essence coincides with -His creative act, and, if I may be permitted to speak thus, with his -"eternal generation." - - -HOW THE SUPREME MAY BE SAID TO COMMAND HIMSELF. - -Likewise, the statement that the (divinity) commands Himself may be -taken strictly, if in Him be two entities (the commander and the -commanded); but if (we may not distinguish such a pair of entities) -there is only one entity within Him, and He is only the commander, -containing nothing that obeys. How then, if He contain nothing that was -commanded, could He command Himself? The statement that He commands -Himself means that, in this sense, there is nothing above Him; in which -case He is the First, not on account of the numerical order, but by His -authority and perfectly free power. If He be perfectly free, He cannot -contain anything that is not free; He must therefore be entirely free -within Himself. Does He contain anything that is not Himself, that He -does not do, that is not His work? If indeed He contained anything that -was not His work, He would be neither perfectly free nor omnipotent; He -would not be free, because He would not dominate this thing; nor would -He be omnipotent, because the thing whose making would not be in His -power would even thereby evade His dominion. - - -FURTHER OBJECTIONS TO THE SELF-AUTOCRACY OF THE DIVINITY. - -21. Could (the divinity) have made Himself different from what He made -Himself? (If he could not, He would not have been omnipotent). If you -remove from Him the power of doing evil, you thereby also remove the -power of doing good. (In the divinity), power does not consist in the -ability to make contraries; it is a constant and immutable power whose -perfection consisted precisely in not departing from unity; for the -power to make contraries is a characteristic of a being incapable of -continuously persisting in the best. Self-creation (the actualization -by which the divinity created Himself) exists once for all, for it -is perfect. Who indeed could change an actualization produced by the -will of the Divinity, an actualization that constitutes His very will? -But how then was this actualization produced by the volition (of the -divinity) which did not yet exist? - -What could be meant by the "volition of (the Divinity") if He had not -yet willed hypostatic form of existence (for Himself)? Whence then -came His will? Would it have come from His being (which, according to -the above objection) was not yet actualized? But His will was already -within His "being." In the (Divinity), therefore, there is nothing -which differs from His "being." Otherwise, there would have been in -Him something that would not have been His will. Thus, everything in -Him was will; there was in Him nothing that did not exercise volition; -nothing which, therefore, was anterior to His volition. Therefore, -from the very beginning, the will was He; therefore, the (Divinity) -is as and such as He willed it to be. When we speak of what was the -consequence of the will (of the Divinity), of what His will has -produced, (we must indeed conclude that) His will produced nothing that -He was not already. The statement that (the Divinity) contains Himself -means (no more than that) all the other beings that proceed from Him -are by Him sustained. They indeed exist by a sort of participation in -Him, and they relate back to Him. (The Divinity) Himself does not need -to be contained or to participate; He is all things for Himself; or -rather, He is nothing for Himself, because He has no need of all the -other things in respect to Himself. - - -THE OBSTACLE TO THE DIVINITY IS FAILURE TO ABSTRACT ENOUGH FROM HIM. - -Thus, whenever you wish to speak of (the Divinity), or to gain a -conception of Him, put aside all the rest. When you will have made -abstraction of all the rest, and when you will thus have isolated -(the Divinity), do not seek to add anything to Him; rather examine -whether, in your thought, you have not omitted to abstract something -from Him. Thus you can rise to a Principle of whom you could not later -either assert or conceive anything else. Classify in the supreme rank, -therefore, none but He who really is free, because He is not even -dependence on Himself; and because he merely is Himself, essentially -Himself, while each of the other beings is itself, and something else -besides. - - - - -SECOND ENNEAD, BOOK ONE. - -Of the Heaven.[200] - - -HEAVEN, THOUGH IN FLUX, PERPETUATES ITSELF BY FORM. - -1. Nothing will be explained by the perfectly true (Stoic) statement -that the world, as corporeal being that ever existed and that will ever -exist, is indebted for the cause of its perpetuity to the volition -of the divinity. We might find an analogy between the change of the -elements, and the death of animals without the perishing of the form of -the species here below, and the universe above, whose body is subject -to a perpetual flux and flow. Thus the divine volition could preserve -for it the same specific form in spite of successive alterations, so -that, without perpetually retaining numerical unity, it would ever -preserve the specific unity of form. It would indeed be a remarkable -discrepancy in the methods of nature that here below in animals the -form alone should be perpetual, while in the heaven and the stars their -individuality should be considered as perpetual as their form. - - -THERE MUST INEVITABLY BE CHANGE IN HEAVEN. - -The incorruptibility of the heaven has been ascribed to its containing -within its breast all things,[201] and to the non-existence of any -other thing into which it could change, as well as to the impossibility -of its meeting anything exterior that could destroy it. These theories -would indeed, in a reasonable manner, explain the incorruptibility -of heaven considered as totality, and universe; but would fail to -explain the perpetuity of the sun and of the other stars which are -parts of heaven, instead of being the whole universe, as is the heaven. -It would seem more reasonable that, just like the fire and similar -things, the stars, and the world considered as universe would possess -a perpetuity chiefly of form. It is quite possible that the heaven, -without meeting any destructive exterior thing, should be subjected to -a perpetual destruction such that it would preserve nothing identical -but the form, from the mere mutual destruction of its parts. In this -case its substrate, being in a perpetual flux, would receive its form -from some other principle; and we would be driven to recognize in the -universal living Organism what occurs in man, in the horse, and in -other animals; namely, that the man or horse (considered as species) -lasts forever, while the individual changes. (According to this view, -then) the universe will not be constituted by one ever permanent -part, the heaven, and another ceaselessly changing one, composed of -terrestrial things. All these things will then be subject to the same -condition though they might differ by longer or shorter duration, since -celestial bodies are more durable. Such a conception of the perpetuity -characteristic of the universe and its parts contains less ambiguity -(than the popular notion), and would be freed from all doubt if we -were to demonstrate that the divine power is capable of containing the -universe in this manner. The theory that the world contains something -perpetual in its individuality would demand not only a demonstration -that the divine volition can produce such an effect, but also an -explanation why certain things (according to that theory) are always -identical (in form and individuality), while other things are identical -only by their form. If the parts of the heaven alone remained -identical (by their individuality), all other things also should -logically remain (individually) identical. - - -REJECTION OF THE OPINION OF HERACLITUS. - -2. An admission that the heaven and the stars are perpetual in their -individuality, while sublunary things are perpetual only in their form, -would demand demonstration that a corporeal being can preserve its -individuality as well as its form, even though the nature of bodies -were a continual fluctuation. Such is the nature that the physical -philosophers,[202] and even Plato himself, attribute not only to -sublunar bodies, but even to celestial ones. "For," asks (Plato[203]), -"how could corporeal and visible objects subsist ever immutable and -identical with themselves?" (Plato) therefore admits the opinion of -Heraclitus that "the sun itself is in a state of perpetual becoming -(or, growth)."[204] - - -ARISTOTLE HAS TO DEPEND ON QUINTESSENCE. - -On the contrary, in the system of Aristotle, the immutability of the -stars is easily explained, but only after accepting his theory of a -fifth element (the quintessence[205]). If, however, it be rejected, -it would be impossible to demonstrate that the heaven, let alone its -parts, the sun and the stars, do not perish, while (as Aristotle does) -we regard the body of the heaven as being composed of the same elements -as terrestrial animals. - - -PLOTINOS'S VIEWS SUPPORTED BY THE HEAVEN'S POSSESSION OF THE SOUL AND -BODY. - -As every animal is composed of soul and body, the heaven must owe the -permanence of its individuality to the nature either of its soul, or -of its body; or again, to that of both. On the hypothesis that its -incorruptibility is due to the nature of its body, the Soul's only -function will be to animate it (by uniting with the body of the world). -On the contrary hypothesis that the body, by nature corruptible, -owes its incorruptibility exclusively to the Soul, there is need of -demonstration that the state of the body does not naturally oppose -this constitution and permanence (for, naturally constituted objects -admit of no disharmony); but that, on the contrary, here matter, by -its predisposition, contributes to the accomplishment of the divine -volition. - - -FLUCTUATION NEED NOT INTERFERE WITH CONTINUANCE. - -3. (It might however be objected) that the body of the world could -not contribute to the immortality of the world, since the body itself -fluctuates perpetually. But this fluctuation does not take place in -an outward direction, while the body (of the world) remains ever the -same because this fluctuation occurs so entirely within the world that -nothing issues therefrom. The world therefore could neither increase -nor diminish, nor further grow old. (As proof of this we may) consider -how, from all eternity, the earth constantly preserves the same shape -and mass; similarly, the air never diminishes, any more than the water. -The changes within them do not affect the universal living Organism. -Even we human beings subsist a long while, in spite of the perpetual -change of our constituent parts, and though some of these parts even -issue from the body. So much the more will the world's nature, from -which nothing issues, sufficiently harmonize with the nature of the -universal Soul to form along with her an organism which ever remains -the same, and subsists for ever. - - -FIRE, THOUGH AN APPARENT EXCEPTION, STILL CONFORMS TO THIS PROCEDURE. - -For example, fire (as the principal element of the heaven), is both -lively and swift, and cannot remain in the inferior regions, any more -than the earth can abide in the superior regions. When it has reached -these regions where it is to remain, it becomes established in the most -suitable place. But even so, like all other bodies, it still seeks to -extend in all directions. However, it cannot ascend, since there is no -place higher than the one it occupies; nor can it descend, because of -the opposition of its own nature. The only thing left for it to do is -to yield to the guidance and natural impulsion of the life-imparting -universal Soul, that is, to move into the most beautiful place, in the -universal Soul. Its falling from here is prevented by the universal -Soul's circular movement which dominates and supports it, as well as -by its innate indisposition to descend, so that its continuance in -the higher regions is unopposed. (The fire has no similarity with) -the constitutive parts of our body which are forced to derive their -suitable form from elsewhere. If unaided, they are not even capable of -preserving their organization. Merely to subsist, they are forced to -borrow parts from other objects. The case is entirely different with -the fire of the heaven, which needs no food because it loses nothing. -If indeed it allowed anything to escape, we might indeed be forced to -state that when in the heaven a fire is extinguished, a substitute must -be lit. But in such a case the universal living Organism would no more -remain identical. - - -THE IMMORTALITY OF THE HEAVEN IS DUE TO RESIDENCE THERE OF THE -UNIVERSAL SOUL. - -4. Apart from the exigencies of our argument, it may be interesting to -consider whether there be any wastage off from heaven, so as to create -a need of being (replenished or) fed, so to speak; or whether all its -contents, being once for all established, subsist there naturally, -without allowing any of their substance to escape. In the latter case -we would be driven further to inquire whether the heaven be composed -of fire exclusively or principally[213]; and whether, while dominating -the other elements, the fire engages them in its course. Were we to -associate (with fire) the Soul, which is the most powerful of all -causes, so as to unite her with elements so pure and excellent (just -as, in other animals, the soul chooses the best parts of the body -as dwelling-place), we would have produced a solid argument for the -immortality of the heaven. Aristotle indeed says that the flame surges, -and that the fire devours everything with an insatiable avidity[206]; -but he was evidently speaking only of the terrestrial fire, for the -celestial fire is calm, immovable, and in harmony with the nature of -the stars. - - -THE HEAVEN'S IMMORTALITY ALSO DUE TO THE UNIVERSAL SOUL'S SPONTANEOUS -MOTION. - -A still more important reason for the immortality of the heaven -is that the universal Soul, moving with remarkable spontaneity, -immediately succeeds the most perfect principles (such as the Good, -and Intelligence). She could not therefore allow the annihilation of -anything which had once been posited within her. Ignorance of the cause -that contains the universe could alone permit denial that the universal -Soul which emanates from the divinity excels all other bonds in -strength. It is absurd to believe that after having contained something -during a certain period, she could ever cease doing so. This would -imply that she had done so till now by some violence; which would again -infer the existence of some plan more natural than the actual state, -and actual admirable disposition of beings within the very constitution -of the universe; which would lastly suggest a force capable of -destroying the organization of the universe, and of undermining the -sovereignty of the governing Soul. - - -THE IMMORTALITY OF THE HEAVEN PROVED BY ITS NEVER HAVING HAD TO BEGIN. - -We have elsewhere[207] shown that it would be absurd to suppose that -the world ever had a beginning. This however implies that it will -never cease to exist. Why indeed should it not continue to do so? Its -component elements are not, like wood, and similar things, exposed -to wastage. Their continued subsistence, however, implies that the -universe that they form must also ever subsist. On the other hand, even -if they were subject to a perpetual change, the universe must still -subsist because the principle of this change subsists continually. -Moreover, it has elsewhere been shown[224] that the universal Soul is -not subject to repentance, because she governs the universe without -difficulties or fatigue, and that even in the impossible case that the -body of the universe should happen to perish, she would not thereby be -altered. - - -WHY CELESTIAL THINGS LAST LONGER THAN TERRESTRIAL ONES. - -5. The reason why celestial things endure beyond terrestrial -animals and elements has been thus stated by Plato[225]: "Divine -animals were formed by the divinity Himself, while the animals -here below were formed by the divinities, His offspring." What the -divinity (Himself) does could not possibly perish. This implies the -existence, below the demiurge (Intelligence), of the celestial Soul, -with our souls.[208] From the celestial Soul derives and flows an -apparent-form-of-an-image,[209] which forms terrestrial animals. This -inferior soul imitates her intelligible principle (the celestial Soul), -without, however, being able to resemble her completely--because she -employs elements which are less good (than the celestial elements); -because the place where she operates with them is less good (than -heaven)--and because the materials that she organizes could not remain -united. Consequently, terrestrial animals could not last for ever. For -the same reason this soul does not dominate terrestrial bodies with as -much power (as the celestial Soul dominates celestial things), because -each of them is governed by another (human) soul. - - -IMMORTALITY DOES NOT EXTEND TO THE SUB-LUNAR SPHERE. - -If we be right in attributing immortality to the heaven, we shall have -to extend that conception to the stars it contains; for unless its -parts endured, neither could the heaven. However, the things beneath -the heaven do not form part of it. The region which constitutes the -heaven does not extend further down than the moon. As to us, having -our organs formed by the (vegetative) soul which was given us by the -celestial divinities (the stars), and even the heaven itself,[210] -we are united to the body by that soul. Indeed, the other soul (the -reasonable soul), which constitutes our person, our "me,"[211] is not -the cause of our being,[212] but of our well-being (which consists in -our intellectual life). She comes to join our body when it is already -formed (by the vegetative soul), and contributes to our being only by -one part, by giving us reason (in making of us reasonable beings, and -men). - - -THE STARS CONTAIN NOT ONLY FIRE, BUT TANGIBLE EARTH. - -6. Is the heaven composed exclusively of fire? Does the fire allow -any of its substance to flow off, or escape? Does it, therefore, need -being fed? (Plato[213]) thinks the body of the universe is composed of -earth and fire; fire to explain its being visible, and earth to explain -its being tangible. This would lead us to suppose that the stars are -composed of fire not exclusively, but predominatingly, since they seem -to possess a tangible element. This opinion is plausible because Plato -supports it with reasonable grounds. Sense, sight and touch would lead -us to believe that the greater part, if not the whole, of the heaven, -is fire. But reason suggests that the heaven also contains earth, -because without earth it could not be tangible.[214] This however does -not imply that it contains also air and water. It would seem absurd -to think that water could subsist in so great a fire; nor could air -survive therein without immediately being transformed to steam. It -might be objected that two solids which play the parts of extremes in -a proportion, cannot be united without two means.[213] This objection, -however, might have no cogency, for this mathematical relation might -not apply to natural things, as indeed we are led to surmise by the -possibility of mingling earth and water without any intermediary. -To this it may be answered that earth and water already contain the -other elements. Some persons might think that the latter could not -effectually unite earth and water; but this would not disturb our -contention that the earth and water are related because each of these -two elements contains all the others. - - -EARTH CONTAINS ALL THE OTHER ELEMENTS. - -Besides, we shall have to examine whether the earth be invisible -without fire, and the fire intangible without the earth. Were this the -case, nothing would possess its own proper being. All things would be -mixed; each would reclaim its name only by the element preponderating -in it; for it has been claimed that the earth could not exist without -the humidity of water, which alone keeps all its parts united. Even -were this granted, it would, none the less, remain absurd to say that -each of these elements is something, while claiming that it does not -possess any characteristically individual constitution, except by its -union with the other elements, which, nevertheless, would not, any -the more, exist individually, each in itself. What reality, indeed, -would inhere in the nature or being of the earth, if none of its parts -were earth except because the water that operated as a bond? Besides, -with what could water unite without the preliminary existence of an -extension whose parts were to be bound together for the formation of -a continuous whole? The existence of an extension, however small it -be, will imply the self-existence of earth, without the assistance of -water; otherwise, there would be nothing for water to bind together. -Nor would the earth have any need of air, since the air exists before -the observation of any change within it. Nor is fire any more necessary -to the constitution of the earth; fire only serves in making it -visible, like all other objects. It is indeed reasonable to assert that -it is fire which renders objects visible, and it is a mistake[215] to -state that "one sees darkness," which cannot be seen any more than -silence can be heard. Besides, there is no necessity for fire to be in -earth; light suffices (to make it visible). Snow, and many other very -cold substances are, without any fire, very brilliant--that is, unless -we say that the fire approached them, and colored them before leaving -them. - - -ELEMENTS ARE NEVERTHELESS INDIVIDUAL. - -As to the other elements, could not water exist without participating -in the earth? Air could certainly not be said to participate in earth, -because of its penetrability. It is very doubtful that the fire -contains any earth, because it does not seem continuous, and does not, -by itself, seem to be tri-dimensional. True, fire does seem to contain -solidity, but not of a tri-dimensional kind; it seems rather to be a -sort of resistance corporeal nature[214]). Only of earth may hardness -be predicated; indeed, gold, in liquid state, is dense; not because it -is earth, but because it possesses density, and is solidified. It would -therefore not be unreasonable that fire, apart by itself, could subsist -by the power of the Soul which sustains it by her presence. The bodies -of (certain among) the guardian spirits consist of fire.[216] - - -TERRESTRIAL ELEMENTS, HOWEVER, DO NOT DEGRADE THE HEAVEN. - -It is unlikely that the universal Organism is composed of universal -elements. That terrestrial animals are thus composed is certain; but -to introduce the terrestrial element into the composition of the -heaven would be to admit something contrary to nature, and to the -order thereby established. (Epicurus's opinion that) the stars carry -terrestrial bodies along in their rapid flight is undemonstrable. -Besides, the presence of the earth would be an obstacle to the shine -and splendor of the celestial fire. - - -PLATO POSTULATED THE EXISTENCE OF EARTH AS BASIS OF LIFE. - -7. Plato's view[217] is to be accepted. The universe must contain -something solid, impenetrable, so that the earth, when established in -the middle of the universe, might offer a firm foundation for all the -animals that walk on it, and that these animals might possess a certain -solidity by the very fact of their terrestriality; so that the earth -might, by itself, possess the property of continuousness; that it might -be illuminated by fire, might also participate in water, so as not to -be desiccated, and so that its parts might unite, and that the air -might somewhat lighten its mass. - - -ELEMENTS ARE KINDRED THROUGH THEIR COMMON GROUND, THE UNIVERSE-BODY. - -The earth was mingled with the upper fire not to produce the stars, -but because fire has something terrestrial, as earth has something -igneous, as a result of all the bodies being contained within the -body of the universe. In short, every one of the elements includes -mixture of itself and of the other with which it participates. This -results from the interrelating community existing within the universe -(the "sympathy"). So each element, without combining with any other, -borrows some of its properties. For example, water participates in the -fluidity of the air, without however mingling therewith; so the earth -does not possess the fire, but derives its brightness from it. On -the other hand, a mixture would render all properties common to both -elements, confounding them together,[218] and would not limit itself -to merely approximating earth and fire, that is, a certain solidity -with a certain density. On this subject we can invoke the authority of -(Plato[219]), "The divinity lit this light in the second circle above -the earth," thereby referring to the sun, which he elsewhere calls "the -most brilliant star." - -By these words he hinders us from admitting that the sun is anything -else than fire. He also indicates that fire has no quality other than -light, which he considers as distinct from flame, and as possessing -only a gentle heat. This light is a body. From it emanates another -being that we, by verbal similarity, also call light, and which we -acknowledge to be incorporeal. This second kind of light derives from -the former, being its flower and brightness, and constitutes the -essentially white (that is, brilliant) body (of lightning, or comets). -(Unfortunately, however), the word "terrestrial" (which designates the -element allied to the fire, as we have said above), we are wont to -regard unfavorably because Plato makes the earth consist of solidity, -while we speak of the earth as a unity, though (Plato) distinguishes -several qualities within this element. - - -NATURE OF THE CELESTIAL FIRE AND LIGHT. - -The fire of which we speak above emits the purest light, and resides -in the highest region, by virtue of its nature. These celestial flames -are entirely distinct from the earthly flame, which after ascending -to a certain height, and meeting a greater quantity of air, becomes -extinguished. After ascending, it falls back on to the earth, because -(as a comet) it cannot rise any further; it stops in the sublunar -regions, though rendering the ambient air lighter. In those cases in -which it continues to subsist in higher regions, it becomes weaker, -gentler, and acquires a heatless glow, which is but a reflection of the -celestial light. The latter, on the other hand, is divided partly among -the stars in which it reveals great contrasts of magnitude and color, -and partly in the atmosphere. Its invisibility to our eyes is caused -both by its tenuity, and transparence, which causes it to become as -tangible as pure air, and also because of its distance from the earth. - - -CELESTIAL LIGHT IS NOT EXPOSED TO ANY WASTAGE. - -8. Since this light subsists in elevated regions, because the purity of -its nature forces it to remain in pure regions, it cannot be subject -to any wastage (or, leakage). Such a nature could not allow any escape -either downwards or upwards, nor could it meet anything that would -force it to descend. Moreover, it will be remembered that there is a -great difference of condition in a body united to, or separated from a -soul; and in this case the body of the heaven is everywhere united to -the (universal) Soul. - - -THE HEAVEN DOES NOT NEED THE ACTION OF EITHER AIR OR FIRE. - -Besides, all that approaches the heaven is either air or fire. What -of it is air cannot affect the heaven. What of it is fire can neither -influence the heaven, nor touch it, to act on it. Before acting on the -heaven, it would have to assume its nature; besides, fire is less great -or powerful than the heaven. Moreover, the action of fire consists in -heating; whereas, 1, that which is to be heated cannot have been hot by -itself; and as, 2, that which is to be dissolved by fire must first be -heated, inasmuch as it is this heating which causes a change of nature. -No other body is needed for either the subsistence of the heaven, or -for the functioning of its natural revolutions.[220] Moreover, the -heaven does not move in a straight line, because it is in the nature of -celestial things to remain immovable, or to move in a circular orbit, -and not to assume any other kind of movement without compulsion by some -superior force. - - -THE STARS ARE INEXHAUSTIBLE. AND NEED NO REFRESHMENT. - -Stars, therefore, stand in need of no feeding,[221] and we should not -judge them according to our own circumstances. Indeed, our (human) -soul, which contains our bodies, is not identical with the Soul that -contains the heaven; our soul does not reside in the same place, while -the world-Soul does not, like our composite bodies lose (excreta). Not -as our bodies do the stars need continual metabolic replacing food. -From our conception of celestial bodies we should remove all ideas of -a change that could modify their constitution. Terrestrial bodies are -animated by an entirely different nature[222]; which though because -of its weakness is incapable of insuring them a durable existence, -nevertheless imitates the superior nature (of the celestial Soul) by -birth and generation. Elsewhere[223] we have shown that even this -very celestial Soul cannot partake of the perfect immutability of -intelligible things. - - - - -FOURTH ENNEAD, BOOK SIX. - -Of Sensation and Memory. - - -STOIC DOCTRINES OF SENSATIONS AND MEMORIES HANG TOGETHER. - -If we deny that sensations are images impressed on the soul, similar -to the impression of a seal,[226] we shall also, for the sake of -consistency, have to deny that memories are notions or sensations -preserved in the soul by the permanence of the impression, inasmuch -as, according to our opinion, the soul did not originally receive any -impression. The two questions, therefore, hang together. Either we -shall have to insist that sensation consists in an image impressed on -the soul, and memory, in its preservation; or, if either one of these -opinions be rejected, the other will have to be rejected also. However, -since we regard both of them as false, we shall have to consider the -true operation of both sensation and memory; for we declare that -sensation is as little the impression of an image as memory is its -permanence. The true solution of the question, on the contrary, will -be disclosed by an examination of the most penetrating sense,[227] and -then by induction transferring the same laws to the other senses. - - -A. OF SENSATION. - - -THE SENSE OF SIGHT DOES NOT POSSESS THE IMAGE SEEN WITHIN ITSELF. - -In general the sensation of sight consists of perception of the visible -object, and by sight we attain it in the place where the object is -placed before our eyes, as if the perception operated in that very -place, and as if the soul saw outside of herself. This occurs, I -think, without any image being produced nor producing itself outside -of the soul, without the soul receiving any impression similar to that -imparted by the seal to the wax. Indeed, if the soul already in herself -possessed the image of the visible object, the mere possession of this -image (or type) would free her from the necessity of looking outside -of herself. The calculation of the distance of the object's location, -and visibility proves that the soul does not within herself contain -the image of the object. In this case, as the object would not be -distant from her, the soul would not see it as located at a distance. -Besides, from the image she would receive from within herself, the soul -could not judge of the size of the object, or even determine whether -it possessed any magnitude at all. For instance, taking as an example -the sky, the image which the soul would develop of it would not be -so great (as it is, when the soul is surprised at the sky's extent). -Besides, there is a further objection, which is the most important of -all. If we perceive only the images of the objects we see, instead of -seeing the objects themselves, we would see only their appearances or -adumbrations. Then the realities would differ from the things that we -see. The true observation that we cannot discern an object placed upon -the pupil, though we can see it at some little distance, applies with -greater cogency to the soul. If the image of the visible object be -located within her, she will not see the object that yields her this -image. We have to distinguish two things, the object seen, and the -seeing subject; consequently, the subject that sees the visible object -must be distinct from it, and see it as located elsewhere than within -itself. The primary condition of the act of vision therefore is, not -that the image of the object be located in the soul, but that it be -located outside of the soul. - - -SENSATIONS ARE NOT EXPERIENCES, BUT RELATIVE ACTUALIZATIONS. - -2. After denying that sensation consists of such an operation, it is -our duty to point out the true state of affairs. Though it be objected -that thus the soul would be considered as judging of things she does -not possess, it is nevertheless plain that it is the characteristic -of a power, not to experience or suffer, but to develop its force, -to carry out the function to which it is destined. If the soul is to -discern a visible or audible object the latter must consist of neither -images nor experiences, but actualizations relative to the objects -which naturally belong to the domain of these actualizations of the -soul. Those who deny that any faculty can know its object without -receiving some impulsion from it imply that the faculty suffers, -without really cognizing the object before it; for this soul-faculty -should dominate the object instead of being thereby dominated. - - -THIS IS TRUE NOT ONLY OF SIGHT BUT OF HEARING, TASTE AND SMELL. - -The case of hearing is similar to that of sight. The impression is -in the air; the sounds consist in a series of distinct vibrations, -similar to letters traced by some person who is speaking. By virtue -of her power and her being, the soul reads the characters traced in -the air, when they present themselves to the faculty which is suitable -to reception of them. As to taste and smell also, we must distinguish -between the experience and the cognition of it; this latter cognition -constitutes sensation, or a judgment of the experience, and differs -therefrom entirely.[228] - - -COGNITION OF INTELLIGIBLE OBJECTS STILL LESS ADMITS OF AN IMPRESSION. - -The cognition of intelligible things still less admits of an -experience or impression; for the soul finds the intelligible things -within herself, while it is outside of herself that she contemplates -sense-objects. Consequently the soul's notions of intelligible entities -are actualizations of a nature superior to those of sense-objects, -being the actualizations of the soul herself, that is, spontaneous -actualizations. We shall however have to relegate to another -place[229] the question whether the soul sees herself as double, -contemplating herself as another object, so to speak, and whether she -sees intelligence as single in a manner such that both herself and -intelligence seem but one. - - -B. OF MEMORY. - - -MEMORY ACTS THROUGH THE SYMPATHY OF THE SOUL'S HIGHEST SELF. - -3. Treating of memory, we must begin by attributing to the soul a -power which, though surprising, is perhaps really neither strange -nor incredible. The soul, without receiving anything, nevertheless -perceives the things she does not have. The (secret of this) is that -by nature the soul is the reason of all things, the last reason of -intelligible entities, and the first reason of sense-objects.[230] -Consequently the soul is in relation with both (spheres); by the -intelligible things the soul is improved and vivified; but she is -deceived by the resemblance which sense-objects bear to intelligible -entities, and the soul descends here below as if drawn by her -alluring charm. Because she occupies a position intermediary between -intelligible entities and sense-objects, the soul occupies a position -intermediary between them. She is said to think intelligible entities -when, by applying herself to them, she recalls them. She cognizes them -because, in a certain manner, she actually constitutes these entities; -she cognizes them, not because she posits them within herself, but -because she somehow possesses them, and has an intuition of them; -because, obscurely constituting these things, she awakes, passing -from obscurity to clearness, and from potentiality to actualization. -For sense-objects she acts in the same way. By relating them to what -she possesses within herself, she makes them luminous, and has an -intuition of them, possessing as she does a potentiality suitable to -(a perception of) them; and, so to speak, to begetting them. When the -soul has applied the whole force of her attention to one of the objects -that offer themselves to her, she, for a long while, thereby remains -affected as if this object were present; and the more attentively she -considers it, the longer she sees it.[231] That is why children have a -stronger memory; they do not quickly abandon an object, but lingeringly -fix their gaze upon it; instead of allowing themselves to be distracted -by a crowd of objects, they direct their attention exclusively to some -one of them. On the contrary, those whose thought and faculties are -absorbed by a variety of objects, do not rest with any one, and do no -more than look them over. - - -MEMORY IS NOT AN IMAGE, BUT THE REAWAKENING OF A FACULTY. - -If memory consisted in the preservation of images,[232] their -numerousness would not weaken memory. If memory kept these images -stored within itself, it would have no need of reflection to recall -them, nor could memory recall them suddenly after having forgotten -them. Further, exercise does not weaken, but increases the energy -and force of memory, just as the purpose of exercise of our feet or -hands is only to put ourselves in a better condition more easily to -accomplish certain things which are neither in our feet nor our hands, -but to which these members become better adapted by habit. - -Besides (if memory be only storage of images), why then does one not -remember a thing when it has been heard but once or twice? Why, when -it has been heard often, is it long remembered, although it was not -retained at first? This can surely not be because at first only some -part of the images had been retained; for in that case those parts -would be easily recalled. On the contrary, memory is produced suddenly -as a result of the last hearing or reflexion. This clearly proves that, -in the soul, we are only awaking the faculty of memory, only imparting -to it new energy, either for all things in general, or for one in -particular. - -Again, memory does not bring back to us only the things about which -we have reflected; (by association of ideas) memory suggests to us -besides a multitude of other memories through its habit of using -certain indices any one of which suffices easily to recall all the -remainder[233]; how could this fact be explained except by admitting -that the faculty of memory had become strengthened? - -Once more, the preservation of images in the soul would indicate -weakness rather than strength, for the reception of several impressions -would imply an easy yielding to all forms. Since every impression is -an experience, memory would be measured by passive receptivity; which, -of course, is the very contrary of the state of affairs. Never did any -exercise whatever render the exercising being more fitted to suffering -(or, receptive experience). - -Still another argument: in sensations, it is not the weak and impotent -organ which perceives by itself; it is not, for instance, the eye that -sees, but the active potentiality of the soul. That is why old people -have both sensations and memories that are weaker. Both sensation and -memory, therefore, imply some energy. - -Last, as we have seen that sensation is not the impression of an image -in the soul, memory could not be the storage-place of images it could -not have received. - - -MEMORY NEEDS TRAINING AND EDUCATION. - -It may be asked however, why, if memory be a "faculty" (a potentiality) -or disposition,[234] we do not immediately remember what we have -learned, and why we need some time to recall it? It is because we need -to master our own faculty, and to apply it to its object. Not otherwise -is it with our other faculties, which we have to fit to fulfil their -functions, and though some of them may react promptly, others also may -need time to gather their forces together. The same man does not always -simultaneously exercise memory and judgment, because it is not the -same faculty that is active in both cases. Thus there is a difference -between the wrestler and the runner. Different dispositions react -in each. Besides, nothing that we have said would militate against -distinguishing between the man of strong and tenacious soul who would -be inclined to read over what is recalled by his memory, while he who -lets many things escape him would by his very weakness be disposed to -experience and preserve passive affections. Again, memory must be a -potentiality of the soul, inasmuch as the soul has no extension (and -therefore could not be a storage-place for images which imply three -dimensions). - - -SOUL EVENTS OCCUR VERY DIFFERENTLY FROM WHAT IS SUPPOSED BY THE -UNOBSERVANT OR UNREFLECTIVE. - -In general all the processes of the soul occur in a manner very -different from that conceived by unobservant men. Psychic phenomena -occur very differently from sense-phenomena, the analogy of which may -lead to very serious errors. Hence the above unobservant men imagine -that sensations and memories resemble characters inscribed on tablets -or sheets of paper.[235] Whether they consider the soul material (as do -the Stoics), or as immaterial (as do the Peripatetics), they certainly -do not realize the absurd consequences which would result from the -above hypothesis. - - - - -SIXTH ENNEAD, BOOK ONE. - -Of the Ten Aristotelian and Four Stoic Categories. - - -HISTORICAL REVIEW OF CATEGORIES. - -1. Very ancient philosophers have investigated the number and kinds -of essences. Some said there was but one;[296] others, that there was -a limited number of them; others still, an infinite number. Besides, -those who recognized but a single (essence) have advanced opinions very -different, as is also the case with those who recognized a limited or -unlimited number of essences. As the opinions of these philosophers -have been sufficiently examined by their successors, we shall not -busy ourselves therewith. We shall study the doctrine of those who, -after having examined the opinions of their predecessors, decided on -determinate numbers (of essences); admitting neither a single essence, -because they recognized that there was a multiplicity even in the -intelligibles; nor an infinite number of essences, because such an -infinity could not exist, and would render all science impossible; but -who, classifying the essences whose number is limited, and seeing that -these classifications could not be considered elements, looked on them -as "kinds." Of these, some (the Peripatetic Aristotelians) proposed -ten, while others proposed a lesser number (the Stoics taught four), or -a greater number (the Pythagorean "oppositions," for instance). As to -the kinds, there is also difference of opinions: some looked upon the -kinds as principle (Plotinos himself); while others (Aristotle) held -that they formed classes. - - -OF THE TEN ARISTOTELIAN CATEGORIES.[236] - - -STATEMENT OF ARISTOTLE'S POSITION. - -Let us first examine the doctrine that classifies essence into ten -(kinds). We shall have to investigate whether it be necessary to -acknowledge that its partisans recognize ten kinds, all of which bear -the name of essence, or ten categories; for they say[237] that essence -is not synonymous in everything, and they are right. - - -ARISTOTLE'S CATEGORIES NEGLECT THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD. - -Let us begin by asking these philosophers whether the ten kinds -apply equally to sense-(essences), and intelligible (essences), or -whether they all apply to the sense-(essences), and some only to -the intelligible (essences); for here there are no longer mutual -relations. We must therefore inquire which of those ten kinds apply to -intelligible essences, and see whether intelligible essences can be -reduced to one single kind, that would also apply to sense-essences; -and whether the word "being"[238] can be applied simultaneously to -intelligible and sense-entities, as a "homonymous" label. For if -"being" be a homonym,[239] there are several different kinds. If, -however, it be a synonym (or, name of common qualities) it would be -absurd that this word should bear the same meaning in the essences -which possess the highest degree of existence, and in those which -possess its lower degree; for the things among which it is possible to -distinguish both primary and lower degrees could not belong to a common -kind. But these (Aristotelian) philosophers do not, in their division, -regard the (Platonic) intelligible entities. They therefore did not -mean to classify all beings; they passed by those that possess the -highest degree of existence.[295] - - -1. Being.[240] - -2. Let us further examine if these ten divisions be kinds, and how -being could form a kind; for we are forced to begin our study here. - - -INTELLIGIBLE AND SENSE-BEING COULD NOT FORM A SINGLE KIND. - -We have just said that intelligible being and sense-being could not -form a single kind.[241] Otherwise, above both intelligible being, -and sense-being, there might be some third entity which would apply -to both, being neither corporeal nor incorporeal; for if it were -incorporeal, the body would be incorporeal; and if it were corporeal, -the incorporeal would be corporeal. - - -QUESTIONS RAISED BY ARISTOTELIAN THEORIES. - -In the first place, what common element is there in matter, form, and -the concretion of matter and form? The (Aristotelians) give the name -of "being" alike to these three entities, though recognizing that they -are not "being" in the same degree. They say that form is more being -than is matter,[242] and they are right; they would not insist (as -do the Stoics) that matter is being in the greater degree. Further, -what element is common to the primary and secondary beings, since the -secondary owe their characteristic title of "being" to the primary ones? - - -WHAT IS "BEING" IN GENERAL? - -In general, what is being? This is a question to which the -(Aristotelians) could find no answer; for such mere indication of -properties is not an essential definition of what it is, and it would -seem that the property of being a thing that is susceptible of -successively admitting their contraries, while remaining identical, and -numerically one,[243] could not apply to all (intelligible) beings. - -3. Can we assert that "being" is a category that embraces -simultaneously intelligible being, matter, form, and the concretion of -form and matter, on the same justification that one may say that the -race of the Heraclidae form a kind, not because all its members possess -a common characteristic, but because they are all descended from a -common ancestry? In such case, the first degree thereof will belong to -this being (from which all the rest is derived), and the second degree -to the other things which are less beings. What then hinders that all -things form a single category, since all other things of which one may -say, "they subsist," owe this property to "being?" - -Might it then be said that the other things are affections (or, -modifications),[232] and that the beings are (hierarchically) -subordinated to each other in a different manner? In this case, -however, we could not stop at (the conception of) "being," and -determine its fundamental property so as to deduce from it other -beings. Beings would thus be of the same kind, but then would possess -something which would be outside of the other beings.[244] Thus the -secondary substance would be attributed to something else, and leave -no meaning to "whatness" (quiddity or quality), "determinate form" -(thatness), "being a subject," "not being a subject," "being in no -subject," and "being attributed to nothing else,"[245] (as, when one -says, whiteness is a quality of the body, quantity is something of -substance, time is something of movement, and movement is something -of mobility), since the secondary "being" is attributed to something -else.[246] Another objection would be, that the secondary being is -attributed to the primary Being, in another sense (than quality is -to being), as "a kind," as "constituting a part," as "being thus -the essence of the subject," while whiteness would be attributed to -something else in this sense that it is in a subject.[247] Our answer -would be that these things have properties which distinguish them from -the others; they will consequently be gathered into a unity, and be -called beings. Nevertheless, no kind could be made up out of them, nor -thus arrive at a definition of the notion and nature of being. Enough -about this; let us pass to quantity. - - -2. QUANTITY. - -4. The Aristotelians call quantity first "number," then "continuous -size," "space," and "time."[248] To these concepts they apply the -other kinds of quantity; as for instance, they say that movement is a -quantity measured by time.[249] It might also be said reciprocally, -that time receives its continuity from movement. - - -CONTINUOUS AND DEFINITE QUANTITY HAVE NOTHING IN COMMON. - -If continuous quantity be quantity as far as it is continuous, then -definite quantity will no longer be quantity. If, on the contrary, -continuous quantity be quantity only accidentally, then there is -nothing in common between continuous and definite quantity. We will -grant that numbers are quantities, although if their nature of being -quantities were plain, one would not see why they should be given that -name. As to the line, the surface, and the body, they are called sizes -and not quantities; and the latter name is given them only when they -are estimated numerically; as when, for instance, they are measured -by two or three feet.[249] A body is a quantity only in so far as -it is measured, just as space is a quantity only by accident, and -not by its spatiality. We must here not consider what is quantity by -accident, but by its quantitativeness, quantity itself. Three oxen -are not a quantity; in this case, the quantity is the number found in -them. Indeed, three oxen belong already to two categories. The case -is similar with the line, and the surface, both of which possess such -quantity. But if the quantity of surface be quantity itself, why would -surface itself be a quantity? It is no doubt only when determined by -three or four lines that the surface is called a quantity. - - -NUMBERS ARE NOT QUANTITY IN ITSELF. - -Shall we then say that numbers alone are quantity? Shall we attribute -this privilege to Numbers in themselves, which are beings, because -they exist in themselves?[250] Shall we grant the same privilege to -numbers existing in things which participate in them, and which serve -to number, not unities, but ten oxen, for example, or ten horses? -First, it would seem absurd that these numbers should not be beings, -if the former ones be such. Then, it will seem equally absurd that -they should exist within the things they measure, without existing -outside them,[251] as the rules and instruments which serve to measure -exist outside of the objects they measure. On the other hand, if these -numbers that exist in themselves serve to measure, and nevertheless do -not exist within the objects that they measure, the result will be that -these objects will not be quantities since they will not participate in -quantity itself. - - -NUMBER IS NOT IN QUANTITY; BUT QUANTITY IS IN NUMBER. - -Why should these numbers be considered quantities? Doubtless because -they are measures. But are these measures quantities, or quantity -itself? As they are in the order of beings, even if they should not -apply to any of the other things, the numbers will nevertheless remain -what they are, and they will be found in quantity. Indeed, their unity -designates an object, since it applies to another; then the number -expresses how many objects there are, and the soul makes use of number -to measure plurality. Now, when measuring thus, the soul does not -measure the "whatness" (or, quality) of the object, since she says -"one," "two," whatever be their objects, even if of opposite nature; -she does not determine the character of each thing, for instance, if it -be warm or beautiful; she limits herself to estimating its quantity. -Consequently, whether we take Number in itself, or in the objects which -participate therein, quantity exists not in these objects, but in the -number; quantity finds itself not in the object three feet long, but in -the number three. - - -MAGNITUDE AND NUMBERS WOULD BE OF A DIFFERENT TYPE OF QUANTITY. - -Why then should sizes also be quantities? Probably because they -approximate quantities, and because we call quantities all objects that -contain quantities, even though we do not measure them with quantity in -itself. We call large what numerically participates in much; and small -what participates in little. Greatness and smallness are quantities, -not absolute, but relative; nevertheless the Aristotelians say that -they are relative quantities so far as they seem to be quantities.[252] -That is a question to be studied; for, in this doctrine, number is a -kind apart, while sizes would hold second rank; it is not exactly a -kind, but a category which gathers things which are near each other, -and which may hold first or second rank. As to us, we shall have to -examine if the Numbers which exist in themselves be only substances, or -if they be also quantities. In either case, there is nothing in common -between the Numbers of which we speak, and those which exist in things -which participate therein.[253] - - -SPEECH AS A QUANTITY. - -5. What relation to quantity exists in speech, time, and movement? - -First, let us consider speech. It can be measured.[254] In this -respect, speech is a quantity, but not in so far as it is speech, whose -nature is to be significant, as the noun, or the verb.[255] The vocal -air is the matter of the word, as it also is of the noun and the verb, -all which constitute the language. The word is principally an impulse -launched on the air, but it is not a simple impulse; because it is -articulated it somehow fashions the air; consequently it is a deed, -but a significant one. It might be reasonably said that this movement -and impulse constitute a deed, and that the movement which follows is -a modification, or rather that the first movement is the deed, and the -second movement is the modification of another, or rather that the deed -refers to the subject, and the modification is in the subject. If the -word consisted not in the impulse, but in the air, there would result -from the significant characteristic of the expressive impulse two -distinct entities, and no longer a single category. - - -NEITHER IS TIME A QUANTITY. - -Let us pass to time.[256] If it exist in what measures, that which -measures must be examined; it is doubtless the soul, or the present -instant. If it exist in what is measured, it is a quantity so far as it -has a quantity; as, for instance, it may be a year. But, so far as it -is time, it has another nature; for what has such a quantity, without -(essentially) being a quantity, is not any the less such a quantity. - - -QUANTITY AS EQUAL AND UNEQUAL DOES NOT REFER TO THE OBJECTS. - -As to (Aristotle's) assertion that the property of quantity is to be -both equal and unequal,[257] this property belongs to quantity itself, -and not to the objects which participate in quantity, unless it be by -accident, so far as one does not consider these objects in themselves. -A three foot object, for instance, is a quantity so far as it is taken -in its totality; but it does not form a kind with quantity itself; -only, along with it, it is traced back to a kind of unity, a common -category. - - -RELATION.[258] - -6. Let us now consider relation. Let us see whether, in relative -matters, there be something common that constitutes a kind, or which is -a point of union in any other manner. Let us, before everything else, -examine whether relation (as, for example, left and right, double and -half, and so forth) be a kind of "hypostasis," or substantial act, -or an habituation; or, whether it be a kind of hypostatic existence -in certain things, while in others it is not so; or whether it be -this under no circumstances. What is there indeed that is particular -in relations such as double and half; surpasser and surpassed; in -possession, and in disposition; lying down, standing, sitting; in -the relation of father and son; of master and slave; in the like and -different; the equal and unequal; the active and passive; measurer and -measured; sensation and knowledge? Knowledge, for instance, relates -to the object which can be known, and sensation to sense-object; for -the relation of knowledge to the object which can be known has a kind -of hypostatic existence in the actualization relative to the form of -the object which can be known; likewise with the relation of sensation -to the sense-object. The same may be said about the relation of the -"active" to the "passive," which results in a single actualization, -as well as about the relation between the measure and the measured -object, from which results mensuration. But what results from the -relation of the similar to the similar? If in this relation there be -nothing begotten, one can at least discover there something which -is its foundation, namely, the identity of quality; nevertheless, -neither of these two terms would then have anything beside their proper -quality. The same may be said of equal things, because the identity -of quantity precedes the manner of being of both things; this manner -of being has no foundation other than our judgment, when we say, This -one or that one are of the same size; this one has begotten that one, -this one surpasses that one. What are standing and sitting outside of -him who stands or sits? As to the possession, if it apply to him who -possesses, it rather signifies the fact of possession; if it apply to -what is possessed, it is a quality. As much can be said of disposition. -What then exists outside of the two relative terms, but the comparison -established by our judgment? In the relation of the thing which -surpasses the thing which is surpassed, the first is some one size, -and the second is some other size; those are two independent things, -while as to the comparison, it does not exist in them, except in our -judgment. The relation of left to right and that of the former to the -latter consist in the different positions. It is we who have imagined -the distinction of right to left; there is nothing in the objects -themselves that answers thereto. The former and the latter are two -relations of time, but it is we who have established that distinction. - - -WHETHER THESE RELATIONS ARE SUBJECTIVE OR OBJECTIVE. - -7. If, when we speak of things, we utter nothing true, then there is -nothing real in the relation, and this kind of being has no foundation. -But if, when we compare two moments, we say, This one is anterior, -and that one is posterior, we speak truly, then we conceive that the -anterior and the posterior are something independent of the subjects in -which they exist. Likewise with the left and the right, as well as with -sizes; we admit that in these, besides the quantity which is suitable -to them, there is a certain habituation, as far as the one surpasses -and the other is surpassed. If, without our enunciating or conceiving -anything, it be real that such a thing is the double of another; if the -one possess while the other is possessed, even if we had known nothing -about it; if the objects had been equal before we had noticed them; if -they be likewise identical in respect of quality; finally if, in all -relative things, there be a habituation which is independent of the -subjects in which it is found; and if we limit ourselves to noticing -its existence (without creating it); if the same circumstances obtain -in the relation of knowledge to what can be known, a relation which -evidently constitutes a real habituation; if it be so, there is nothing -left to do but to ask whether this habituation (named a relation) be -something real. We shall have to grant, however, that this habituation -subsists in certain subjects as long as these subjects remain such as -they were, and even if they were separate; while, in other subjects, -this habituation is born only when they are brought together. We shall -also have to grant that, in the very subjects that remain, there are -some in which this habituation is annihilated or altered (such as, for -example, the left direction, or proximity). This has led people to -believe that in all these relations there is nothing real. This point -having been granted, we shall have to seek what common element there -is in all these relations, and to examine whether what is common to -them all constitutes a kind, or an accident; and last, we shall have to -consider how far that which we have discovered corresponds to reality. - - -RELATIONS ARE SIMULTANEOUS EXISTENCES. - -We should call relative not what is said absolutely of another thing, -such as, for instance, the habits of the soul and the body; nor what -belongs to such a thing, nor what is in such a thing (as for instance -the soul is said to be the soul of such an individual, or to be in -such a subject), but what wholly derives its existence from this -habit (called relation). By "hypostatic existence" I here mean not -the existence which is proper to subjects, but the existence which is -called relative; as, for instance, the double causes the (correlative) -existence of the half; while it does not cause the existence of the -two foot object, nor of two in general, nor the one foot object, nor -one in general. The manner of existence of these objects consists in -that this one is two, and that one one. As a result of this, when these -objects exist, the first is called double, and is such in reality; and -the second is half. These two objects have therefore simultaneously and -spontaneously effected that the one was double, and the other half. -They have been correlatively begotten. Their only existence lies in -their correlation, so that the existence of the double lies in its -surpassing the half, and the half derives its existence from its being -surpassed by the double. Consequently these two objects are not, the -one anterior, and the other posterior, but simultaneous.[259] We might -also examine whether or not other things do not also possess this -simultaneity of existence, as happens with father and son, and other -similar cases. The son continues to exist, indeed, even after the death -of the father; brother also survives brother, since we often say that -some one person resembles some other deceased person. - - -DISTINCTION BETWEEN ACTIVE HABITUATION IMMEDIATE AND REMOTE. - -8. The above digression gives us the opportunity of investigating -why there should be a difference between these relations, and those -of which we spoke above. However, we should be glad to have the -Aristotelians first state what community of existence obtains in this -correlation. It would be impossible to claim that this community was -anything corporeal. If then it be corporeal, it must exist either -within the very subjects, or without them. If such a habituation be -identical among all, it is a synonym. If it be a habituation which -differs according to the subjects in which it exists, it is a homonym; -for the mere name of "habituation" (in different things) does not -always correspond to the existence of any genuine similarity. Should -we then divide the habituations into two classes, recognizing that -certain objects have an inert and inactive habituation, implying -simultaneity of existence, and that other objects have a habituation -always implying "potentiality" and "actualization," so that before -"actualizing" the "potentiality" be already ready to exert itself, and -to pass from "potentiality" to "actualization" in the approximation -of relative conditions? Must we assert that in general certain things -actualize, while others limit themselves to existing? Must we also -assert that that which limits itself to existence only gives its -correlative a name, while that which actualizes gives it existence? Of -this latter kind of things are the father and son, the "active" and -"passive," for such things exert a kind of life and action. Must we -then divide habituation in several kinds, not as possessing something -similar and common in the differences, but as having a nature different -in each member of the division, and thus constituting a "homonym" -(or, mere verbal label)? In this case, we would apply to the active -habituation the names of "doing" and "suffering," because both imply an -identical action. Further, we will have to posit another "habituation" -which, without itself actualizing, implies something which acts in -two relative terms. For example, there is equality; which equates -two objects; for it is equality which renders things equal, just as -identity makes them identical; just as the names "great" and "small" -are derived one from the presence of greatness, and the other from -that of smallness. But if we should consider greatness and smallness -in the individuals which participate therein, it must be acknowledged -that such individual is greater by the act of greatness which manifests -in him, and that another is smaller because of the inherent act of -littleness. - - -HABITUATIONS ARE REASONS THAT PARTICIPATE IN FORMS. - -9. It must therefore be granted that in the things of which we -first spoke, such as knowing and doing (active being), there is an -actualization, an habituation, and an actualizing reason; while in the -other things there is a participation in form and reason. For indeed, -if the bodies were the only essences, the relative habituations would -bear no reality. If, on the contrary, we assign the first rank in -existence to incorporeal things, and to the reasons, and if we define -the habituations as reasons that participate in the forms, we should -say that what is double has the double for its cause, and what is -half, has the half as its cause; and that other things are what they -are named because of the presence of the same, or of the contrary -form. Now either two things simultaneously receive one the double, -and the other the half, and one greatness, and the other smallness; -or contraries such as resemblance and dissimilarity are to be found -in each thing, as well as identity and difference; and everything -finds itself simultaneously similar and dissimilar, identical and -different. It might be objected that if one object were ugly, and -another uglier still, they are such because they participate in a form. -Not so; for if these two objects be equally ugly, they are equal in -the absence of the form. If they be unequally ugly, the least ugly is -such because it participates in a form which does not sufficiently -subdue matter, and the uglier is such because it participates in a -form which does so still less. They could, besides, be judged from the -standpoint of deprivation, comparing them to each other as if they -contained some form. The sensation is a form that results from two -things (of that which feels, and that which is felt); so also with -knowledge. In respect to the thing possessed, possession is an act -which contains, which has a kind of efficacy. As to mensuration, which -is an actualization of measure, in respect of the measured object, it -consists in a reason. - - -WHILE SOME ARISTOTELIAN CATEGORIES ARE LOGICALLY POSSIBLE, THE OBJECTS -SUBSUMED ARE IMPOSSIBLE. - -If then, considering the constitution of the relative relations as a -generic form, it be admitted that it constitutes an unity, it forms -a classification; consequently it constitutes an existence and a -form in all things. But if the reasons (or, relations) be opposed to -each other, if the above-mentioned differences obtain among them, -they do not constitute a class, and everything must be reduced to a -resemblance, or category. Now, even if we admit that the things of -which we have spoken can be reduced to a unity, it does not follow that -all the things gathered under the same category by the Aristotelians, -could be reduced to a single sort. Indeed, they lump together into -the same classification, both objects and mere statements of their -absence, as well as the objects which derive their appellation from -them; as, for instance, doubleness itself, and the double object. -Now how is it possible to reduce to the same classification both a -thing and the mere lack of it, as, for instance, doubleness and the -non-double, the relative and the non-relative? This is as absurd as it -would be to gather into the same classification the living "being," -and the non-living "being." Worse yet, how could one assort together -duplication and the double object, whiteness and the white object? Such -things could not possibly be identical. - - -3. QUALITIES.[260] - -10. We are now to consider quality, on account of which a being is said -to be "such." What can be the nature of this quality that it exerts the -power of deciding of the phenomena of objects? Is there a same, single -quality which is something common to all qualities, and which, by its -differences, forms classifications? Or are the qualities so different -that they could not constitute one and the same classification? What -is there in common between capacity and disposition[261] (that is, the -physical power), the affective quality, the figure, and the exterior -form?[262] - - -THE LACK OF POWERS CANNOT BE SUBSUMED UNDER THE SAME CATEGORY AS THE -POWERS. - -What shall be said of thickness and thinness, of fatness and leanness? -If the element common to these conceptions be a power belonging to -the capacities, dispositions, and physical powers, which gives to -each object the power it possesses, the statements of the absence of -power will no longer be classified along with (the powers). Besides, -in what sense can we call the figure and form of each thing a "power?" -Further, essence would have been deprived of all powers that were -essential, retaining only those it might have received. Then, quality -would comprehend all actualizations of the beings, which, properly, -are actualizations only so far as they act spontaneously; and also -all actualizations of these properties, but only so far as they -really exist. But quality consists in (unessential) powers (such -as habituations and dispositions) classified below beings.[263] -For instance, boxing ability does not belong among necessary human -qualifications, such as rational functions. The latter would not be -called a quality (as we would speak of boxing ability); and reasoning -would be considered a quality only figuratively. - - -MERE DIFFERENTIALS OF BEINGS ARE NOT GENUINE QUALITIES. - -A quality is therefore a power which adds (essential) characteristics -to already existing beings. These characteristics which differentiate -beings can therefore be called qualities only figuratively. Qualities -are, rather, actualizations and reasons, or parts of reasons, which -proclaim the "whatness," though the latter seem to qualify being. -As to the qualities which really deserve this name, which "qualify" -things, which we generally call "potentialities," they are the -reasons and shapes, either of the soul or the body, such as beauty or -ugliness.[264] - - -NOT ALL QUALITIES ARE REASONS. - -How can all qualities be potentialities? It is easy to see that beauty -and health are qualities. But how could ugliness and sickness, weakness -and general impotence, be qualities? Is it because they qualify certain -things? But what hinders the qualified things from being called -such by mere nomenclature, as homonyms, and not because of a single -(all-sufficient) reason? Besides, what would hinder them from being -considered not only according to one of the four modes,[265] but even -after each one of the four, or at least after any two of them? First, -the quality does not consist in "acting" and "experiencing";[266] so -that it is only by placing oneself at different viewpoints that one -could call what "acts" and "experiences" a quality, in the same sense -as health and sickness, disposition and habitude, force and weakness. -Thus power is no longer the common element in these qualities, and -we shall have to seek something else possessing this characteristic, -and the qualities will no longer all be reasons. How indeed could a -sickness, become a habituation, or be a reason? - - -QUALITY IS NOT A POWER BUT DISPOSITION, FORM AND CHARACTER. - -Shall the affections which consist in the forms and powers, and their -contraries, the privations, be called qualities?[267] If so, one kind -will no longer exist; and we shall have to reduce these things to -a unity, or category; that is why knowledge is called a form and a -power, and ignorance a privation and impotence. Must we also consider -impotence and sickness a form, because sickness and vice can and do -accomplish many things badly? Not so, for in this case he who missed -his aim would be exerting a power. Each one of these things exerts -its characteristic activity in not inclining towards the good; for it -could not do what was not in its power. Beauty certainly does have some -power; is it so also with triangularity? In general, quality should -not be made to consist in power, but rather in the disposition, and to -consider it as a kind of form of character. Thus the common element in -all qualities is found to be this form, this classification, which no -doubt is inherent in being, but which certainly is derivative from it. - - -QUALITY CONSISTS IN A NON-ESSENTIAL CHARACTER. - -What part do the powers (or, potentialities) play here? The man who is -naturally capable of boxing owes it to a certain disposition. It is so -also with somebody who is unskilful in something. In general, quality -consists in a non-essential characteristic; what seems to contribute to -the being, or to add to it, as color, whiteness, and color in general, -contributes to the beings as far as it constitutes something distinct -therefrom, and is its actualization; but it occupies a rank inferior -to being; and though derived therefrom, it adds itself thereto as -something foreign, as an image and adumbration. - - -UGLY QUALITIES ARE IMPERFECT REASONS. - -If quality consist in a form, in a character and a reason, how -could one thus explain impotence and ugliness? We shall have to do -so by imperfect reasons, as is generally recognized in the case of -ugliness.[268] But how can a "reason" be said to explain sickness? It -contains the reason of health, but somewhat altered. Besides, it is -not necessary to reduce everything to a reason; it is sufficient to -recognize, as common characteristic, a certain disposition foreign to -being, such that what is added to being be a quality of the subject. -Triangularity is a quality of the subject in which it is located, not -by virtue of its triangularity, but of its location in this subject, -and of enduing it with its form. Humanity has also given to man his -shape, or rather, his being. - - -THERE IS ONLY ONE KIND OF QUALITY; OF WHICH CAPACITY AND DISPOSITION -PARTAKE. - -11. If this be so, why should we recognize several kinds of qualities? -Why should we distinguish capacity and disposition? Whether quality be -durable or not, it is always the same; for any kind of a disposition -is sufficient to constitute a quality; permanence, however, is only -an accident, unless it should be held that simple dispositions are -imperfect forms, and that capacities are perfect forms. But if these -forms be imperfect, they are not qualities; if they be already -qualities, permanence is but an accident. - - -PHYSICAL POWERS DO NOT FORM A SECONDARY KIND OF QUALITY. - -How can physical powers form a secondary kind of qualities? If they -be qualities only so far as they are powers, this definition would -not suit all qualities, as has been said above. If boxing ability be -a quality as far as it is a disposition, it is useless to attribute -to it a power, since power is implied in habituation. Further, how -should we distinguish the natural boxing ability from that which is -scientifically acquired? If both be qualities, they do not imply any -difference so far as one is natural, and the other acquired; that is -merely an accident, since the capacity of boxing is the same form in -both cases. - - -THE DERIVATION OF QUALITIES FROM AFFECTION IS OF NO IMPORTANCE. - -What does it matter that certain qualities are derived from an -affection, and that others are not derived therefrom? The origin of -qualities contributes nothing to their distinction or difference. If -certain qualities be derived from an affection, and if others do not -derive therefrom, how could they be classified as one kind? If it -be said that some imply "experiencing" while others imply "action," -they can both be called qualities merely by similarity of appellation -(homonymy). - - -SHAPE IS NOT A QUALITY; BUT SPECIFIC APPEARANCE, OR REASON. - -What could be said of the shape of every thing? If we speak of the -shape as far as something has a specific form, that has no regard to -quality; if it be spoken of in respect to beauty or ugliness, together -with the form of the subject, we there have a reason. - - -ARISTOTLE WAS WRONG IN CALLING "ROUGH," "UNITED," "RARE," AND "DENSE" -QUALITIES. - -As to rough, united, rare and dense[269] these could not be called -qualities; for they do not consist only in a relative separation or -reapproximation of the parts of a body, and do not proceed everywhere -from the inequality or equality of position; if they did, they might be -regarded as qualities. Lightness and weight, also, could be correctly -classified, if carefully studied. In any case, lightness is only a -verbal similarity (a "homonym") unless it be understood to mean -diminution of weight. In this same class might also be found leanness -and slimness, which form a class different from the four preceding -ideas. - - -PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY OF QUALITY. - -12. What other scheme of analysis of quality could we find, if the -above were declared unsatisfactory? Must we distinguish first the -qualities of the soul from those of the body, and then analyse the -latter according to the senses, relating them to sight, hearing, taste, -smell and touch? - -To begin with, how can the qualities of the soul be divided? Will they -be related to the faculty of desire, to anger, or reason? Will they -be divided according to their suitable operations, or according to -their useful or harmful character? In this case, would we distinguish -several ways of being useful or harmful? Should we then likewise divide -the properties of the bodies according to the difference of their -effects, or according to their useful or harmless character, since this -character is a property of quality? Surely; to be useful or harmful -seems to be the property of both the quality, and the thing qualified. -Otherwise, we should have to seek some other classification. - - -RELATION BETWEEN THE THING QUALIFIED AND THE QUALITY. - -How can the thing qualified by a quality refer to the quality? This -must be studied, because the thing qualified and the quality do not -belong to a common kind. If the man capable of boxing be related to -the quality, why should not the same quality obtain between the active -man and activity? If then the active man be something qualified, -"activity" and "passivity" should not be referred to relation. It would -seem preferable to relate the active man to the quality if he be active -by virtue of a power, for a power is a quality; but if the power be -essential, in so far as it is a power, it is not something relative, -nor even something qualified. We should not consider that activity -corresponds to increase; for the increase, so far as it increases, -stands in relation only to the less; while activity is such by itself. -To the objection that activity, so far as it is such, is something -qualified, it might be answered that, at the same time, as far as it -can act on something else, and that it is thus called active, it is -something relative. In this case the man capable of boxing and the art -of boxing itself must be in relation. For the art of boxing implies a -relation; all the knowledge it imparts is relative to something else. -As to the other arts, or at least, as to the greater number of other -arts, it may, after examination, be said that they are qualities, so -far as they give a disposition to the soul; as far as they act, they -are active, and, from this standpoint, they refer to something else, -and are relative; and besides, they are relative in the sense that they -are habituations. - - -ACTIVITY DOES NOT ALTER THE QUALITY. - -Will we therefore have to admit that activity, which is activity only -because it is a quality, is something substantially different from -quality? In animated beings, especially in those capable of choice -because they incline towards this or that thing, activity has a really -substantial nature. What is the nature of the action exercised by the -inanimate powers that we call qualities? Is it participation in their -qualities by whatever approaches them? Further, if the power which -acts on something else simultaneously experiences (or "suffers"), -how can it still remain active? For the greater thing, which by -itself is three feet in size, is great or small only by the relation -established between it, and something else (smaller). It might indeed -be objected that the greater thing and the smaller thing become such -only by participation in greatness or smallness. Likewise, what is both -"active" and "passive" becomes such in participating in "activity" and -"passivity." - - -ARE THE SENSE-WORLD AND THE INTELLIGIBLE SEPARATE, OR CLASSIFIABLE -TOGETHER? - -Can the qualities seen in the sense-world, and those that exist in -the intelligible world, be classified together in one kind? This -question demands an answer from those[270] who claim that there are -also qualities in the intelligible world. Should it also be asked -of those who do not admit of the existence on high of kinds, but -who limit themselves to attributing some habit to Intelligence? It -is evident that Wisdom exists in Intelligence; if this Wisdom be -homonymous (similar in name only) with the wisdom which we know here -below, it is not reckoned among sense-things; if, on the contrary it be -synonymous (similar in nature also) with the wisdom which we know here -below, quality would be found in intelligible entities, as well as in -sense-things (which is false); unless indeed it be recognized that all -intelligible things are essences, and that thought belongs among them. - -Besides, this question applies also to the other categories. In -respect to each of them it might be asked whether the sensible and -the intelligible form two different kinds, or belong to a single -classification. - - -4. WHEN. - -13. As to the category of time, "when," the following thoughts are -suggested. - - -IF TIME BE A QUANTITY; WHY SHOULD "TIME WHEN" FORM A SEPARATE CATEGORY? - -If to-morrow, to-day, and yesterday, as well as other similar divisions -of time, be parts of time, why should they not be classed in the same -classification as time itself, along with the ideas "it has been," -"it is," and "it will be?" As they are kinds of time, it seems proper -that they should be classified along with time itself. Now time is -part of quantity. What then is the use of another category? If the -Aristotelians say that not only "it has been" and "it will be" are -time-concepts, but "yesterday" and "formerly," which are varieties -of "there has been" are also time-concepts (for these terms are -subordinated to "there has been"), that it is not only "now" that is -time, but that "when" is such also, they will be forced to answer as -follows: First, if "when" be time, time exists; then, as "yesterday" -is past time, it will be something composite, if the past be something -else than time; we will have to erect two categories, not merely a -simple category. For instance, they say both that "when" is in time, -without being time, and say that "when" is that which is in time. An -example of this would be to say that Socrates existed "formerly," -whereby Socrates would really be outside of (present) time. Therefore -they are no longer expressing something single. But what is meant by -Socrates "being in time," and that some fact "is in time?" Does it mean -that they are "part of time?" If, in saying "a part of time," and "so -far as it is a part of time," the Aristotelians believe that they are -not speaking of time absolutely, but only of a past part of time, they -are really expressing several things. For this "part," so far as it is -a part, is by them referred to something; and for them the past will be -some thing added (to Time), or it will become identified with "there -has been," which is a kind of time. But if they say that there is a -difference, because "there has been" is indeterminate, while "formerly" -and "yesterday" are determinate, we shall be deciding something about -"there has been;" then "yesterday" will be the determination of "there -has been," so that "yesterday" will be determined time. Now, that -is a quantity of time; so that if time be a quantity, each one of -these two things will be a determined quantity. But, if, when they -say "yesterday" they mean thereby that such an event has happened in -a determined past time, they are still expressing several things. -Therefore, if some new category is to be introduced whenever one thing -acts in another, as here happened of what occurred in time, we might -have to introduce many additional categories, for in a different thing -the action is different. This will, besides, become clearer in what is -to follow on the category of place. - - -5. WHERE, OR, PLACE. - - -IF "WHERE" AND "PLACE" ARE DIFFERENT CATEGORIES, MANY MORE MIGHT BE -ADDED. - -14. The Aristotelians (while treating of this category) say, Where? For -instance, "to the Lyceum," or, "to the Academy." The Academy and the -Lyceum are then places and parts of places, as the "top," the "bottom," -and "here" are parts or classes of place. The only difference consists -in a greater determination. If then the top, the bottom, and the middle -be places, as, for instance, "Delphi is the middle of the earth," and, -"the Lyceum and other countries are near the middle of the earth," what -else but place do we have to seek, since we have just said that each -of these things denotes a place? If, when we say "where?" we assert -that one thing is in another place, we are not expressing something -single and simple. Besides, each time that we affirm that such a man -is there, we are creating a double relation, namely, the relation of -the man who is there, with the place where he is, and the relation of -the containing place and the contained man. Why therefore should we not -reduce this to the class of relations, since the relation of both terms -with each other produces something? Besides, what is the difference -between "here" and "at Athens?" The Aristotelians grant that "here" -indicates the place; consequently, the same is true of "in Athens." If, -"in Athens" be equivalent to "being in Athens," this latter expression -contains two categories, that of place, and that of being. Now, this -should not be the case; for as one should not say "Quality exists," -but only, "quality." Besides, if being in place and being in time -presuppose categories other than place and time, why would "being in a -vase" not also constitute a separate category? Why would it not be so -with "being in matter," with "being in the subject," and in general of -a part "being in the whole," or the "whole in the parts," the "genus in -the species," and the "species in the genus?" In this manner we would -have a far greater number of categories. - - -6. ACTION AND EXPERIENCING?[271] - -The subject of action gives rise to the following considerations. - - -ACTUALIZATION A FAR BETTER CATEGORY THAN DOING OR ACTING. - -15. The Aristotelians hold that number and quantity, and other things -referring to being should be subordinated to being; thus they classify -quantity as in a genus different from being. Quality also refers to -being, it also is erected into a separate genus. Consequently, as -action also refers to being, it is also considered a separate genus. -Must then "acting," or rather "action," from which "acting" is derived, -be considered a separate genus, as we consider that quality, from -which qualification is derived, is a separate genus? (As to these -derivations), it might be asked whether there were no distinction -between "action," "to act," and "active," or between "to act," and -"action?" "To act" expresses the idea of "active," while "action" does -not express it. "To act" means "to be in some action;" or rather, "in -actualization." Consequently, "actualization" expresses a category -rather than "action;" since actualization is predicated of being, like -quality, as was said above; and actualization, like movement, also -relates to being; but movement necessarily constitutes a class of -essence. How indeed could we admit that quantity, quality and relation -each form a genus, in respect to being, and yet refuse to movement, -which equally refers to being, the privilege of also forming a genus of -being? - - -HOW CAN MOVEMENT BE IN TIME, IF CHANGE BE OUTSIDE OF TIME? - -16. It may be objected that movement is an imperfect -actualization.[272] In that case actualization should be given -the first rank; and under that genus would follow the species of -movement, with the quality of imperfection, by saying that movement -is an actualization, and adding (the specific difference) that it is -imperfect. To say that movement is an imperfect actualization does -not deprive it of being an actualization, but implies that though it -be actualization, there is in it succession, not to arrive at being -actualization, (which it is already), but to accomplish something from -which it is yet entirely distinct. Then (when that goal is reached), -it is not the movement that becomes perfect, but the thing which was -the goal. For instance, walking is walking from the very first step; -but if there be a mile to go, and the mile be not yet finished, what -is lacking of the mile is not lacking to the walking or to movement -(taken absolutely), but to that particular walk. For the walk was -walking and movement from the very first step; consequently, he who -is moving has already moved, and he who cuts has already cut.[273] -Just as actualization, movement has no need of time; it needs time -only to become such an action. If then actualization be outside of -time, movement, taken absolutely, must also be outside of time. The -objection that movement is in time because it implies continuity -(proves too much; for in that case) intuition itself, if prolonged, -would also imply continuity, and therefore would be in time. Reasoning -by induction, it may be seen, 1, that one can always distinguish -parts in any kind of movement; 2, that it would be impossible to -determine when and since when the movement began, or to assign the -definite point of departure; 3, that it is always possible to divide -movement by following it up to its origin, so that in this manner -movement that has just begun would find itself to have begun since -infinite time, and, 4, that movement would be infinite in regard to -its beginning. The fact is that the Aristotelians distinguish movement -from actualization; they affirm that actualization is outside of time, -but that time is necessary to movement; not indeed to some particular -movement, but to movement in itself, because, according to their -views, it is a quantity. Nevertheless, they themselves acknowledge -that movement is a quantity only by accident, as, for instance, when -it is a daily movement, or when it has some particular duration. Just -as actualization is outside of time, nothing hinders movement from -having begun outside of time, and time from being connected with -movement only because the movement has a certain duration. Indeed, it -is generally granted that changes occur outside of time, for it is -usual to say, The changes occur either suddenly or successively. Now -if change can occur outside of time, why should it not be so also with -movement? We here speak of change, and not of "having changed;" for -change does not necessarily have to be accomplished (while "having -changed" signifies an accomplished fact, and consequently implies the -notion of time). - - -ACTION AND EXPERIENCING MAY BE SUBSUMED UNDER MOVEMENT, BUT CANNOT BE -CONSIDERED AS SEPARATE CATEGORIES. - -17. It may be objected that actualization and movement do not, by -themselves, form a genus, but belong to the genus of relation, because -actualization exists through the power of something active, and -movement exists by the power of some motor, as such. We might answer -that relative conceptions are produced by habituation (the manner of -being) even of things, and not only through the relation established -between them by the mind. As the habituation is a mode of "hypostatic" -existence, although it be the "thing of something else," or although -it refer to something else,[274] it nevertheless possesses its nature -before being a relation. Now this actualization, this movement, this -habituation, which is the "thing of some other thing" nevertheless -possesses the property of existing and of being conceived by itself -before being a relation; otherwise, all things would be relative -conceptions; for there is nothing, not excluding the soul herself, -which does not bear some relation to something else. Moreover, why are -"action" and "acting" not relatives? For they necessarily are either a -movement or an actualization. If the Aristotelians consider "action" a -relative, and make a genus of "acting," why then do they not also place -"movement" among the relatives, and make a genus of "moving?" They -might, indeed, have subsumed under the genus "movement" the two species -"action" and "reaction" (or, "suffering"); but they have no right to -make two distinct genera of "acting" and "reacting," as they generally -do. - - -ON ARISTOTELIAN PRINCIPLES, EVEN INTELLECTION WOULD BE MOVEMENT OR -ACTUALIZATION. - -18. We must further examine if the Aristotelians have the right -to say that acting contains both actualizations and movements, -the actualizations producing themselves instantaneously, and the -movements successively; as, for instance, dividing implies time. -Or will they say that all actualizations are movements, or, at -least, are accompanied by movements? Will they trace all actions to -"experiencing" (or, reactions), or will they acknowledge absolute -actions, like walking or speaking? Or will they distinguish all actions -that relate to "experiencing" as movements, and all absolute actions -as actualizations? Or will they place actions of both kinds among -movements, and among actualizations? They would no doubt classify -walking, which is an absolute thing, as movement; and thinking, which -is a verb without passive voice, as an actualization.[275] Otherwise -the Aristotelians will be obliged to insist that there is nothing -active in walking or thinking. But if walking and thinking do not -belong to the category of acting, it will be necessary to explain to -what they do belong. Will it be said that thinking relates to the -thinkable (the intelligible), as intellection does,[276] because -sensation relates to the sense-object? If sensation be related to -the sense-object, why do they not equally relate "sensing" (feeling) -to the sense-object? Sensation, relating to something else, has a -relation with that thing; but, besides that relation, it has the -property of being an "action" or an "experience" (or, reaction). If -therefore reaction (or, suffering), besides belonging to something -else, or depending on something else, has the property of itself -being something, like actualization, then walking, besides belonging -to something else (to the feet), and depending on something else (on -the motive power), nevertheless by itself possesses the property of -being movement. In this case, it will have to be recognized that -intellection, besides being a relation, by itself also is a movement or -an actualization. - - -DO CERTAIN ACTIONS APPEAR IMPERFECT WHEN NOT JOINED TO TIME? - -19. Let us now examine if certain actualizations seem to be imperfect -when they are not joined to time, thus identifying themselves with -movements, as life identifies itself with living. For (according to -the Aristotelians) the life of each (being) is accomplished in a -perfect time, and happiness is an actualization; not an individual -one, indeed, but a sort of movement.[277] Consequently we will have -to call life and happiness movements, and movement will have to be -made a genus, though recognizing that movement forms a genus very -different from quantity and quality; and, like them, relates to being. -This genus could be divided into two species, movements of body and -movements of soul, or movements spontaneous and communicated; or -again, movements proceeding from the beings themselves, or movements -proceeding from others. In this case, the movements proceeding from the -beings themselves are actions, whether they communicate to others, or -remain absolute in themselves (and not communicating to others, like -speaking and walking); and the movements proceeding from others are -"reactions" though the communicated movements seem to be identical with -the movements proceeding from others. For example, division is one and -the same thing, whether it be considered within him who divides, or in -that which is divided; nevertheless dividing is something different -from being divided. Or again, division is not one and the same thing -according as it proceeds from him who divides, or as it is received -by him who is divided; to divide means to cause in the divided thing -another movement, which is the result of the dividing action or -movement. Perhaps, indeed, the difference does not lie in the very fact -of being divided, but in the movement which results from the division, -as for instance, in suffering; for this is what constitutes reaction -(or "passion"). - -What are we to say if there be no suffering? We might answer that -the actualization of him who acts is simply present in such a thing -(without correlative reaction). There are thus two manners of acting; -to act within oneself, and to act outside of oneself. No more will -it then be said that the first mode is proper acting, and the second -reacting, but that there are two ways of acting outside of oneself, -acting and reacting. For instance, writing is an operation in which -one acts on something else without a correlative reaction, because in -writing one produces nothing but the very actualization of writing, -and not something else, like experiencing; for the quality of writing -that has been produced is nothing that reacts (or, experiences). As to -walking, though the earth be stepped on by the feet, it does not react -(or, experience) as a consequence. On the contrary, if it be the body -of an animal that is trod under feet, it may be conceived that there -is reaction, because one then thinks of the suffering endured by the -animal thus trod on, and not of the walking; otherwise, this reaction -would have been conceived before (the notion of this reaction would -have been implied in the very notion of walking). - - -ACTION AND REACTION FORM BUT A SINGLE GENUS. - -Thus, in everything, acting forms but a single genus along with -reacting, which (by the Aristotelians) is considered its opposite. -Reacting is what follows acting, without being its contrary; to be -burnt, for instance, follows burning, but is not its contrary. In -this case, the reaction is what results in the object itself from the -fact of burning, or of being burnt, which form but one (process), -whether the result be suffering, or something else, as, for instance, -depreciation. It might be objected, When one (being) makes another -suffer, is it not true that the one acts, and the other reacts? -Here from a single actualization result two facts, an action, and a -reaction. Besides, it is not necessary to include in the action the -will to cause suffering; it has only produced something else as a -result of which it causes suffering, something which occurring in the -being that suffers, and being one single (occurrence), that causes -suffering. What then is this one identical thing which is anterior to -the suffering? When there is no suffering, is there not nevertheless -a reaction in him in whom is the modification? For instance, in him -who hears? No: to hear is not to react, and sensation is not really -a reaction;[278] but to suffer is to experience a reaction, and the -reaction is not the contrary of the action (in the sense we have -explained). - - -REACTIONS NEED NOT BE PASSIVE, BUT MAY BE ACTIVE. - -20. Let it be granted, then, that reaction is not the contrary of -action. Nevertheless, as it differs therefrom, it could not share -the same genus. If both reaction and action be movements, they share -the same genus, that of alteration, which is a movement, as respects -quality.[279] When alteration proceeds from the being endowed with -quality, is there any action, though this being remain impassible? Yes, -for though impassible, it is active. It may be asked, is this being no -longer active when it acts on some other object, as, for instance, by -striking it, and then reacts? The answer is, that it would be active -and passive simultaneously. If it be active, when it reacts--when, for -instance, it rubs--why is it considered active rather than passive? -Because it reacts in being rubbed while it rubs. Could we say that, -because it is moved while moving, there were in it two movements? But -how could there be two movements in it? Shall we assert that there -is but one? In this case, how could the same movement be action and -reaction simultaneously? Doubtless, it will be considered action, in -so far as it proceeds from the mover; and reaction, inasmuch as it -passes from the mover into the moved; and this, without ceasing to be -one and the same thing. Would you say that reaction was a movement of -a kind different from action? How then would the altering movement -in a certain manner modify what reacts without an equal reaction in -what is acting? But how (can we conceive) of reaction in that which -acts on another object? Is the mere presence of the movement in the -moved sufficient to constitute reaction?[280] But if, on one hand, the -("seminal) reason" of the swan whitens, and on the other hand the swan -that is being born becomes white, shall we say that the swan is passive -in becoming what it is his nature to be? If he becomes white even after -his birth, is he still passive? If one thing increase, and another -thing be increased, will we admit that the thing that increases reacts? -Will we rather attribute reaction to the thing qualified? If one thing -be embellished, and another thing embellishes it, could we say that -the embellished thing reacts?[281] If however, the embellishing thing -decreases, and, like tin, tarnishes, or on the contrary, like copper, -takes on polish; shall we say that the tin acts, and the copper reacts -(that is, "suffers")? Besides, it would be impossible to say that that -which learns is passive (suffering)? Would this be because the action -of him who acts passes into him? But how could there be any reaction -("suffering") since there is nothing there but an act? This action, -no doubt, is not a reaction ("suffering"); but he who receives it is -passive, because he participates in passivity. Indeed, from the fact -that the learner does not himself act, it does not necessarily result -that he is passive; for learning is not being struck, but grasping and -discerning, as takes place with the process of vision. - - -DEFINITION OF REACTION OR SUFFERING. - -21. How may we define the fact of "reaction"? We do not approve of -the definition that it is the passing of the actualization from one -being into another, if its receiver appropriate it. Shall we say that -a (being) reacts when there is no actualization, but only an effective -experience? But is it not possible that the being that reacts becomes -better; while, on the contrary, the one who acts, loses? A (being) -may also act in an evil manner, and exercise on another a harmful -influence; and the actualization may be shameful, and the affective -experience be honorable. What distinction shall we then establish -(between action and reaction)? Shall we say that an action is to cause -(an actualization) to pass from self into others, and that reaction -is to receive in oneself (an action) from someone else? But then what -about the (actualizations) produced in oneself which do not pass into -others, such as thought and opinion? One can even excite oneself by a -reflection or opinion of emotive value, without this emotion having -been aroused by anybody else. We shall therefore define an action as -a spontaneous movement, whether this movement remain in the being who -produces it, or whether it pass into somebody else. - -What then are the faculty of desire, and desire in general? If desire -be excited by the desired thing (it is an experience, or passion), even -if we should not take into consideration the cause of its excitement, -and even if we only noticed that it arose later than the object; for -this desire does not differ from an impression or an impulsion. - -Shall we then, among desires, distinguish actions when they proceed -from intelligence, and experiences when they invoke and draw (on the -soul), so that the being be less passive by what it receives from -others, than by what it receives from itself? Doubtless a being can -act upon itself. (We can then define) an affective experience, and a -being's experience, as follows. They consist of undergoing, without any -contribution from oneself, a modification which does not contribute -to "being," and which, on the contrary, alters, or at least, does not -improve. - -To this (definition) it may be objected that if warming oneself consist -in receiving such heat as partially contributes to the subject's being, -and partly does not do so, then we have here one and the same thing -which both is, and is not an experience. To this it may be answered -that there are two ways of warming oneself. Besides, even when the -heating contributes to the being, it does so only in the degree that -some other object experiences. For instance, the metal will have -to be heated, and undergo an experience, for the production of the -being called statue, although this statue itself be heated only -incidentally. If then the metal become more beautiful by the effect -of that which heats it, or by the effect of the heating itself, it -undergoes an experience; for there are two manners of (undergoing an -experience, or) suffering: the one consists in becoming worse, and the -other in becoming better--or at least, in not altering. - - -TRANSMISSION, RECEPTION AND RELATION UNDERLIE ACTION AND EXPERIENCE. - -22. The cause that a being undergoes an experience is that it contains -the kind of movement called alteration, whichever way it modify him; -on the contrary, action means to have in oneself a definite movement, -derived from oneself, or a movement which has its goal in some other -being, and its origin in self. In both cases there is movement; -but with this distinction: that action, so far as it is action, is -impassible; while an experience consists in the experiencer's reception -of a disposition new to him, without the reception of anything that -contributes towards his being; so as to avoid (the case of the statue, -above, where) the experience happened to one being (the metal), while -it was another being that was produced (the statue). Consequently, the -same thing will in one state be an action, and in other, an experience. -Thus the same movement will in one being be an action, because it -is considered from a certain viewpoint; and from another it will be -an experience, because it is disposed some other way. Action and -experience seem therefore to be relative, if one consider the action -in its relation with experience, since the same thing is action in the -one, and experience in the other. Also, because neither of these two -can be considered in itself, but only in him who acts, or experiences, -when the one moves, and the other is moved. Each of these terms -therefore implies two categories; one gives the movement, the other -receives it; consequently we have transmission and reception, which -result in relation. If he who received the movement possesses it as -he possesses color, why could it not also be said that he possessed -movement? Absolute movements, such as walking (and thinking) possess -steps and thought. - - -PREDICTION AND RESPONSIVENESS TO IT DO NOT FALL UNDER DEFINITION FOR -ACTION AND EXPERIENCE. - -Let us now consider whether prediction be an action, and whether -adapting one's course to the prediction of somebody else would -constitute experiencing; for prediction comes from one being and -applies to another. However, although prediction apply to some other, -we would not consider prediction an action, nor being directed by the -prediction of somebody else an experience. In general, not even thought -is an action; thought, indeed, does not pass in to the object thought, -but functions within itself; it is not at all an action. Actualizations -are not at all actions, and not all of them perform actions; indeed, -they may do so only accidentally. It might be objected that a man who -was walking would certainly impress on the ground the trace of his -steps, and would thereby perform an action. Such an action would be the -consequence of something else, or the man would act accidentally; and -it would be accidental, because the man was not thinking of it. It is -in this way that even inanimate things perform some action, that fire -heats, and medicine cures. But enough of this. - - -7. POSSESSION. - -23. Let us now examine the category of "having" (possession). - - -HAVING IS SO INDEFINITE AND VARIOUS THAT IT CANNOT BE A CATEGORY. - -If the verb "to have" be used in several senses, why might we not -apply to this category all the various uses of the word; for instance, -quantity, because quantity has size; quality, because it has color; the -father, because he has a son; the son, because he has a father; and, in -general, all kinds of possession? Will it be said that the other things -that can be possessed have already been classified under the categories -considered above, and that the category of "having" comprises only -arms, foot-wear, and clothing? This might be answered by the question -why "having" these objects should constitute a category, and why -burning them, cutting them, burying them, or throwing them away, would -not equally constitute one or more categories? If the answer be that -all these things form one category because they refer to the body, -this would then also make another category if we placed a garment -over a litter; or likewise if someone were covered with clothing. -If another answer be that the category of "having" consists in the -"manner of containing,"[282] and in possession,[283] then all things -which are possessed will have to be reduced to this category, which -will thus contain all possession, whatever it be, since the nature of -the possessed object could not here prevail to form some distinction. -On the other hand, if the category of "having" must exclude having a -quantity or quality, because the latter ideas already form their own -categories; nor having parts, because of the category of being (which -includes parts); why should this category contain having arms, when -arms, as well as foot-wear, belong to the category of being? In any -case, how could the statement, "He has arms" be considered something -simple, which could be reduced to any one category? That statement -expresses the same idea as "He is armed." Can this expression ("he -has arms") refer only to a man, or even to his statue? The living man -possesses very differently from possession by a statue, and the verb -"to have" is used only as a verbal label (a homonym), just as the -verb "to stand up" would mean something very different according as -it referred to a man or a statue. Besides, is it reasonable to make a -generic category of some merely incidental characteristic? - - -8. SITUATION. - -24. As to the category of situation, it contains also such incidental -characteristics as being raised, or seated. Here the Aristotelians -do not make a category of situation, by itself, but of the kind of -situation, as when it is said, "He is placed in such a posture"--a -phrase in which "to be placed" and "in such a posture" express two -entirely different ideas--or again, "he is in such a place." Now, as -posture and location have already been studied, what is the use in -here combining two categories into one? If, on the other hand, the -expression "he is seated" indicate an action or an experience, must it -not then be reduced to the category of action or experience? It would -moreover amount to the same thing to say "he is raised," as to say, "he -is situated above;" just as we say he is situated in the middle, or, he -is situated below. Besides, being seated has already been treated of -under the category of relation; why should, "being raised" not also be -a relative entity, since the category of relation includes the thing -to the left, and the thing to the right, as well as the left and right -hand themselves? - -Enough of these reflections (about Aristotelian categories). - - -B. CRITICISM OF THE STOIC CATEGORIES. - -25. Let us now pass to the (Stoic) philosophers[284] who, recognizing -four categories only, divide everything into "substances," "qualities," -"modes," and "relations;" and who, attributing to all (beings) -something common, thus embrace them into a single genus. - - -THE CATEGORY OF SOMETHING COMMON IS ABSURD. - -This doctrine raises a great number of objections, especially in that -it attributes to all beings something in common, and thus embraces them -in a single class. Indeed, this "something" of which they speak is -quite incomprehensible; as also is how it could adapt itself equally to -bodies and to incorporeal beings, between which they do not allow for -sufficient distinction to establish a distinction in this "something." -Besides, this something either is, or is not an essence; if it be an -essence, it must be a form; if it be not an essence, there result a -thousand absurdities, among which would be that essence is not an -essence. Let us therefore leave this point, and devote ourselves to the -division into four categories. - - -1. SUBSTANCE; ACCORDING TO THEM IT IS SPLIT UP. - -The Stoics assign the first rank to substances, and place matter before -the other substances. From this it results that the Stoics assign to -the same rank their first Principle, and with it the things which are -inferior thereto. First, they reduce to a single class both anterior -and posterior things, though it be impossible to combine them in this -manner. In fact, every time that things differ from each other in that -some are anterior, and others posterior, those which are posterior owe -their essence to those which are anterior. On the contrary, when things -are comprised within one and the same class, all equally owe their -essence to this class, since a class is "what is affirmed of kinds of -things in regard to essence." The Stoics themselves recognize this by -saying that all things derive their essence from matter. - -Besides, when they count but a single substance, they do not enumerate -the beings themselves, but they seek their principles. Now there is a -great difference between treating of principles and treating of beings. -If the Stoics recognize no essence other than matter, and think that -other things are modifications of matter, they are wrong in reducing -essence and other things to a common class; they should rather say -that essence is being, and that other things are modifications, and -then distinguish between these modifications. Further, it is absurd to -assert that (among essences), some should be substances, and others -should be other things (such as qualities, modes and relations); for -the Stoics recognize but a single substance, which does not contain any -difference, unless by division as of mass into parts; besides, they -should not attribute divisibility to their substance, because they -teach that it is continuous. They should therefore say, "substance" -(and not "substances"). - - -MATTER CANNOT BE THE PRIMARY PRINCIPLE. - -26. What is most shocking in the Stoic doctrine, is that they assign -the first rank to what is only a potentiality, matter, instead of -placing actualization before potentiality.[285] It is impossible for -the potential to pass to actualization if the potential occupy the -first rank among beings. Indeed, the potential could never improve -itself; and it implies the necessary anteriority of actualization; -in which case potentiality is no longer a principle. Or, if it be -insisted that actualization and potentiality must be simultaneous, -both principles will be found depending on chance. Besides, even if -actualization be contemporaneous with potentiality, why should not the -first rank be assigned to actualization? Why should this (matter) be -an essence, rather than those (forms)? Whoever asserts that form is -posterior bears the burden of proof; for matter does not beget form, -and quality could not arise from what has no quality; nor actualization -from what is potential; otherwise, actualization would have existed -anteriorly, even in the system of the Stoics. According to them, even -God is no longer simple: He is posterior to matter; for He is a body -constituted by form and matter.[286] Whence then does He derive His -form? If the divinity exist without matter, He is incorporeal, by -virtue of His being principle and reason, and the active principle -would thus be incorporeal. If, even without having matter, the divinity -be composite in essence, by virtue of His body, the Stoics will have to -postulate some other kind of matter which may better suit the divinity. - - -MATTER IS NOT A BODY "WITHOUT QUALITY, BUT WITH MAGNITUDE" (A STOIC -DEFINITION). - -Besides, how could matter be the first Principle, if it be a body? -If the body of which the Stoics speak be of another nature, then -matter can be called a body only figuratively.[287] If they say that -the common property of the body is to have three dimensions, they -are speaking of the mathematical body. If on the contrary they join -impenetrability to the three dimensions, they are no more talking about -something simple. Besides, impenetrability is a quality, or is derived -from a quality; but what is the source of impenetrability? Whence comes -tri-dimensional extension? Who endued matter with extension? Matter, -indeed, is not contained in the idea of tri-dimensional extension -any more than the latter is contained in the notion of matter. -Consequently, since matter thus participates in size,[288] it is no -longer a "simple" matter. - - -ABSOLUTE EXISTENCE PRECEDES CONTINGENT EXISTENCE. - -Moreover, whence is derived the unification of matter? Matter is not -unity, but it participates in unity. They would have had to realize -that the material mass is not anterior to everything, and that the -first rank pertains to what is not one mass, to Unity itself. Then -they would have to descend from Unity to multiplicity, from what is -size-less to actual sizes; since, if size be one, it is not because it -is Unity itself, but only because it participates in unity. We must -therefore recognize that what possesses primary and absolute existence -is anterior to what exists contingently. But how does contingency -itself exist? What is its mode of existence? If the Stoics had examined -this point, they would have finally hit upon (the absolute Unity) which -is not unity merely contingently. By this expression is here meant what -is not one by itself, but by others. - - -THE STOIC GOD IS ONLY MODIFIED MATTER. - -27. The Stoics did well, indeed, to assign the principle of everything -to the first rank; but they should not have recognized as principle, -and accepted as "being" what was shapeless, passive, devoid of life -and intelligence, dark, and indefinite. Because of the universe's -beauty, they are forced to introduce within it a divinity; but -the latter derives His very essence from matter; He is composite -and posterior (to matter); rather, He is no more than "modified -matter."[288] Consequently, if matter be the subject, there must -necessarily be outside of it some other principle which, acting upon -matter, makes of it the subject of the qualities which He imparts -thereto. If this principle resided in matter, and Himself were the -subject; if, in other words, He were contemporaneous with matter, He -could not reduce matter to the state of a subject. Now it is entirely -impossible (for this principle) to constitute a subject concurrently -with matter; for in such a case both would have to serve as subject -to something higher; and what could it be, since there could be no -further principle to make a subject of them, if all things had already -been absorbed into this (concurrent) subject? A subject is necessarily -subject to something; not to what it has in itself, but to that whose -action it undergoes. Now, it undergoes the action of that which itself -is not subject by itself; consequently, of that which is outside of -itself. This point has evidently been overlooked by the Stoics. - - -IF EVERYTHING BE DERIVED FROM MATTER, MATTER CAN NO LONGER BE THEIR -SUBJECT. - -On the other hand, if matter and the active principle need nothing -exterior, if the subject that they constitute can itself become all -things by assuming different forms, as a dancer, who can assume all -possible attitudes, this subject would no longer be a subject, but -He will be all things. Just as the dancer is not the subject of the -attitudes (for they are his actualizations), likewise the "matter" -of the Stoics will no longer be the subject of all things, if all -things proceed from matter; or rather, the other things will no longer -really exist, they will be nothing but "modified matter," just as the -attitudes are nothing but the "modified dancer." Now if the other -things no longer really exist, matter is no longer a subject; it is -no longer the matter of the essences, but is matter exclusively. It -will no longer even be matter, because what is matter must be matter -of something; but that which refers to something else belongs to the -same classification as that thing, just as half belongs to the same -classification as the double, and is not the being of the double. But -how could non-essence, except by accident, refer to essence? But the -absolute Essence and matter itself refer to essence by virtue of being -essence. Now if that which is to be is a simple potentiality, it cannot -constitute "being," which consequently matter could not be.[289] - - -THE MONISM OF THE STOICS BREAKS DOWN, JUST LIKE DUALISM. - -Consequently, the Stoics, who reproach other philosophers (such as -Plato) for making up beings out of non-beings,[290] themselves make up -a non-being out of a being.[291] Indeed (in the system of the Stoics), -the world, such as it is, is not being. It is certainly unreasonable -to insist that matter, which is a subject, should nevertheless be -"being," and that bodies should not, any more than matter be "being"; -but it is still more unreasonable to insist that the world is "being," -not by itself, but only by one of its parts (namely, matter); that the -organism does not owe its being to the soul, but only to matter; and -last, that the soul is only a modification of matter, and is something -posterior to others. From whom then did matter receive animation? -Whence comes the hypostatic existence of the soul? How does, matter -receive form? For, since matter becomes the bodies, the soul is -something else than matter. If the form came from something else than -the soul, quality, on uniting to matter, would produce not the soul, -but inanimate bodies. If something fashion matter and create the soul, -the created soul would have to be preceded by a "creating soul." - - -THE FAULT OF THE STOICS IS TO HAVE TAKEN SENSATION AS GUIDE. - -28. The Stoic theory raises numberless further objections; but we -halt here lest we ourselves incur ridicule in combating so evident an -absurdity. It suffices if we have demonstrated that these philosophers -mistake non-essence for absolute essence; (putting the cart before -the horse), they assign the First rank to what should occupy the -last. The cause of their error is that they have chosen sensation -as guide, and have consulted nothing else in determining both their -principles, and consequences. Being persuaded that the bodies are -genuine essences,[292] and refusing to believe that they transform -themselves into each other, they believed that what subsisted in -them (in the midst of their changes) is the real essence, just as -one might imagine that place, because it is indestructible, is more -essential than (metabolic) bodies. Although in the system of the -Stoics place remain unaltered, these philosophers should not have -regarded as essence that which subsists in any manner soever; they -should, first, have considered what are the characteristics necessarily -possessed by essence, the presence of which (characteristics) makes -it subsist without undergoing any alteration. Let us indeed suppose -that a shadow would continuously subsist by following something which -changes continuously; the shadow, however, would not be no more -real than the object it follows. The sense-world, taken together -with its multiple objects, is more of an essence than the things it -contains, merely because it is their totality. Now if this subject, -taken in its totality, be non-essence, how could it be a subject? The -most surprising thing, however, is that the (Stoics), in all things -following the testimony of sensation, should not also have affirmed -that essence can be perceived by sensation; for, to matter, they do -not attribute impenetrability, because it is a quality (and because, -according to them, matter has no quality). If they insist that matter -is perceived by intelligence,[293] it could only be an irrational -intelligence which would consider itself inferior to matter, and -attribute to it, rather than to itself, the privilege of constituting -genuine essence. Since in their system intelligence is non-essence, how -could any credibility attach to that intelligence when it speaks of -things superior to it, and with which it possesses no affinity? But we -have said enough of the nature of these subjects, elsewhere.[294] - - -2. QUALITY. - - -QUALITIES ARE INCORPOREAL. - -29. Since the Stoics speak of qualities, they must consider these as -distinct from subjects; otherwise, they would not assign them to the -second rank. Now, to be anything else than the subjects, qualities must -be simple, and consequently, not composite; that is, they must not, -in so far as they are qualities, contain any matter. In this case, -the qualities must be incorporeal and active; for, according to the -Stoics, matter is a passive subject. If, on the contrary, the qualities -themselves be passive, the division into subjects and qualities is -absurd, because it would classify separately simple and composite -things, and then reunite them into one single classification. Further, -it is faulty in that it locates one of the species in another (matter -in the qualities), as if science were divided into two kinds, of which -one would comprise grammar, and the other grammar with something -additional. - - -"SEMINAL REASONS," AS QUALIFIED MATTER, WOULD BE COMPOSITE; AND -SECONDARY. - -If the Stoics say that the qualities are "qualified matter," then their -("seminal) reasons" being not merely united to nature, but (fully) -material, will no doubt form a composite; but before forming this -composite they themselves will already be composed of matter and forms; -they themselves will therefore be neither reasons nor forms. - - -THE FOUR STOIC CATEGORIES EVAPORATE, LEAVING MATTER ALONE AS BASIS. - -If the (Stoics) say that the "reasons" are only modified matter, they -then admit that qualities are modes, and the (Stoics) should locate -the reasons in the fourth category, of relation. If however relation -be something different from modality, in what does that difference -consist? Is it that modality here possesses greater reality? But if -modality, taken in itself, be not a reality, why then make of it a -category? Surely it would be impossible to gather in a single category -both essence and non-essence. In what then does this modification of -matter consist? It must be either essence or non-essence. If it be -essence, it is necessarily incorporeal. If it be non-essence, it is -nothing but a word, and matter alone exists. In this case, quality -is nothing real, and modality still less. As to the fourth category, -relation, absolutely no reality whatever will inhere in it. This Stoic -system, therefore, contains nothing else but matter. - - -THE CULT OF MATTER IMPLIES IGNORING SOUL AND INTELLIGENCE. - -But on whose authority do we learn this? Surely, not on that of -matter itself, unless that, because of its modification, it becomes -intelligence; but this (alleged) modification is but a meaningless -addition; it must therefore be matter which perceives these things, -and expresses them. If we should ask whether matter utter sensible -things, we might indeed ask ourselves how matter thinks and fulfils -the functions of the soul, although matter lacks both soul and -intelligence. If, on the contrary, matter utter something nonsensical, -insisting that it is what it is not, and what it could not be, to whom -should this silly utterance be ascribed? Surely only to matter, if it -could speak. But matter does not speak; and he who speaks thus does -so only because he has borrowed much from matter, that he has become -its slave, though he have a soul. The fact is that he is ignorant of -himself, as well as of the nature of the faculty which can divulge the -truth about this subject (intelligence). - - -3. MODALITY. - - -MODALITY SHOULD NOT OCCUPY EVEN THE THIRD RANK OF EXISTENCE. - -30. It is absurd to assign the third rank to modalities, and even -assign to them any place whatever; for all modalities refer to matter. -It may however be objected to this that there are differences between -the modalities; the various modifications that matter undergoes are -not the same thing as the modalities; the qualities are doubtless -modalities of matter, but the modalities, in the strict sense of -the word, refer to qualities. (The answer to this is that) since the -qualities are only modalities of matter, the technical modalities -mentioned by the (Stoics) themselves reduce to matter, and necessarily -relate thereto. In view of the many differences obtaining between them, -how otherwise could modalities form a category? How could one reduce to -a single classification the length of three feet, and whiteness--since -one is a quantity, and the other a quality? How could time and place -be reduced thereto? Besides, how would it be possible to consider -as modalities such expressions as "yesterday," "formerly," "in the -Lyceum," and, "in the Academy"? How could time be explained as a -modality? Neither time, nor things which are in time, nor place, nor -the things which are in place, could be modalities. How is "to act" a -modality, since he who acts is not himself a modality, but rather acts -within some modality, or even, acts simply? Nor is he who undergoes an -experience any more of a modality; he experiences something rather in -a modality, or rather, he undergoes some experience in such a manner. -Modality rather suits the (Aristotelian) categories of situation and -possession; and as to possession, no man even possesses "in such or -such a modality," but possesses purely and simply. - - -4. RELATION; THE STOICS CONFUSE THE NEW WITH THE ANTERIOR. - -31. If the Stoics did not, along with the other discussed categories, -reduce relation to a common kind, there might be good grounds to -examine whether they attributed substantial (or, hypostatic) reality -to these manners of "being"; for often, they do not attribute to them -any. But what is to be said of their confusing things new and anterior -in one same classification? This is evidently an absurdity; for surely -one and two must exist before the half or the double. - -As to the philosophers (Plato, for instance), who have taught other -opinions about essences and their principles, considered as finite or -infinite, corporeal or incorporeal, or both simultaneously corporeal -or incorporeal, we will examine each of these opinions separately, -considering also the historic objections of the ancient (philosophers). - - - - -SIXTH ENNEAD, BOOK TWO. - -The Categories of Plotinos.[297] - -1. After having discussed the doctrine of the ten categories (of -Aristotle), and spoken of the (Stoics) who reduce all things to a -single genus, and then distribute them in four species, we must still -set forth our own opinion on the subject, striving however to conform -ourselves to the doctrine of Plato. - - -PLOTINOS IS FORCED TO DEMONSTRATION OF HIS DIVERGENCE FROM PLATO. - -If it were our opinion that essence was one, we would not need to study -whether there was one single genus for all things, whether all genera -could not be reduced to a single one; whether there were principles; -whether the genera were at the same time principles; or whether all -principles are genera, without saying conversely that all genera are -principles; or, if we must distinguish between them, say that some -principles are simultaneously genera, or some genera are principles, -or, finally, whether all principles be genera without the genera being -principles, and conversely. But, since we do not acknowledge that -essence is one, the reasons[298] for which were advanced by Plato -and other philosophers, we find ourselves forced to treat all these -questions, and first to explain why we recognize genera of essences, -and what number we decide on. - - -PLOTINOS ADDS TO ESSENCE ETERNITY, TO MAKE ESSENCE INTELLIGIBLE. - -As we are going to treat of essence or essences, we must before -everything else clear up the significance of essence, which we are -now considering, and distinguish it from what other people mean by -that word, which we would more likely call that which becomes, what -is never genuine essence. And besides, it must be clearly understood -that in making this distinction, we do not intend to divide a genus -in species of the same nature; as Plato tried to do.[299] For it -would be ridiculous to subsume under the same genus both essence and -non-essence, or Socrates, and the image of Socrates. The kind of -divisions here attempted will therefore only consist in separating -things essentially different, as, for instance, explaining that -apparent essence is not the same as the veritable Essence, by -demonstrating that the latter's nature is entirely different. To -clarify this its nature, it will be necessary to add to the idea of -essence that of eternity, and thus to demonstrate that the nature of -being could never be deceptive. It is of this kind of essence (that is, -of the intelligible Essence), that we are going to treat, admitting -that it is not single. Later[300] we shall speak of generation, of what -becomes, and of the sense-world. - - -HIERARCHICAL CONSTITUTION OF THE UNIVERSE. - -2. Holding as we do that the world-Essence is not one, we must face -the question whether the number of beings is determinate, or infinite. -To say that world-Essence is not one, however, is to say that it is -both one and multiple, a varied unity that embraces a multitude. It is -therefore necessary that the One, so conceived, be one so far as it -forms a single genus, containing as species the essences by which it is -simultaneously one and multiple; or there must be several genera, but -that they all be subsumed under the single one; or again, that there -be several genera which however be not mutually subsumed, of which -each, being independent of the others, may contain what is below it, -consisting of less extended genera, or species below which there are no -more than individuals; so that all these things may contribute to the -constitution of a single nature, together making up the organization of -the intelligible world, which we call world-Essence (or "being"). - - -THE ELEMENTS OF THE UNIVERSE ARE PRINCIPLES AND GENERA SIMULTANEOUSLY. - -Under these circumstances, the divisions that we establish are -no more only genera, they are simultaneously the very principles -of world-Essence; on the one hand they are genera, because they -contain less extended genera, beneath which are species, which end -in individuals; they are also principles, because world-Essence is -composed of multiple elements, and because these elements constitute -the totality of Essence. If it were only stated that world-Essence is -composed of several elements, and that these elements, by co-operation, -constitute the All, without adding that they branch out into lower -species, our divisions would indeed be principles, but they would no -longer be genera. For instance, if it be said that the sense-world -is composed of four elements, such as fire, or other elements, these -elements are indeed principles, but not genera, unless this name be -used as a verbal similarity (or, homonym, or pun). - - -BEING ACTUALIZATIONS, BOTH GENERA AND INDIVIDUALS WILL BE DISTINCT. - -Admitting therefore the existence of certain genera, which are -simultaneously principles, we must still consider whether they should -be conceived so that these genera, along with the things contained by -each of them, commingle, fuse, and form the whole by their blending. If -so, the genera would exist potentially, but not in actualization; none -would have anything characteristic. Further, granting the distinctness -of the genera, can we grant that the individuals blend? But what then -would become of the genera themselves? Will they subsist by themselves, -and will they remain pure, without mutual destruction of the mingled -individuals? Later we shall indicate how such things could take place. - - -FUNDAMENTAL UNITY OF GENERA WOULD DESTROY SPECIES; MANIFOLDNESS MUST -PRE-EXIST. - -Now that we have explained the existence of genera, which, besides, -are principles of being, and that from another point of view there are -principles (or elements), and compounds, we shall have to set forth the -criterion by which we constitute these genera; we shall have to ask how -they may be distinguished from each other, instead of reducing them to -a single (principle), as if they had been united by chance, although it -does indeed seem more rational to reduce them to a single (principle). -It would be possible to reduce them in this way if all things were -species of essence, if the individuals were contained within these -species, and if there were nothing outside of these species. But such a -supposition would destroy the species--for such species would no longer -be species, or forms;--and from that moment there would be no further -need for reducing plurality to unity, and everything forming a single -unity; so that, all things belonging to this One, no being outside of -the One would exist, as far as it was something else. - -How indeed could the One have become manifold, and how could it have -begotten the species, if nothing but it existed? For it would not be -manifold if there were not something to divide it, such as a size; now -that which divides is other than that which is divided. The mere fact -that it divides itself, or imparts itself to others, shows that it was -already divisible before the division. - - -THERE IS MORE THAN ONE GENUS, FOR NOT EVERYTHING CAN BE SUBSUMED UNDER -BEING AND ESSENCE. - -For this and other reasons, therefore, we must take good care to -avoid assertion of a single genus; for it would be impossible to -apply to everything the denominations of "being" and essence.[342] -If indeed there be very different objects called essence, this is -only accidentally, just as if one called the color white a being; for -strictly we cannot apply "being" to white, as considered alone.[301] - - -THE ONE IS SO FAR ABOVE ALL THE GENERA AS NOT TO BE COUNTED. - -3. We therefore assert the existence of several genera, and that this -plurality is not accidental. These divers genera, however, depend from -the One. But even though they do depend from the One, if the One be not -something which may be affirmed of each of them as considered in its -being, then nothing hinders each of them, having nothing similar to -the others, from constituting a genus apart. We also grant that the -One, existing outside of the genera which are begotten of Him, is their -cause, although the other essences considered in their being do not -proclaim this. Yes indeed, the One is outside of the other essences. -Besides, He is above them; so much so, that He is not counted as one of -them; for it is through Him that the other essences exist, which, so -far as they are genera, are equal. - - -WE ARE DISCUSSING HERE NOT THE ABSOLUTE ONE, BUT THE ESSENTIAL RELATED -ONE. - -Still, it will be asked, Of what nature is the One which does not -count among the genera? This (absolute One) is outside of our present -consideration; for we are not studying Him who is above essence,[342] -but the essences themselves. We must therefore pass by the absolute -One, and seek the one which is counted among the genera. - - -THE RELATED ONE IS IN SOME GENERA, BUT NOT IN OTHERS. - -To begin with (if we consider the related One from this point of view), -it will seem astonishing to see the cause numbered along with the -effects. It would indeed be unreasonable to cram into a single genus -both superior and inferior things. If nevertheless, on counting the one -amidst the essences of which He is the cause, He was to be considered -as a genus to which the other essences were to be subordinated, -and from which they differed; if, besides, the one was not to be -predicated of the other essences either as genus, or in any other -respect, it would still be necessary that the genera which possessed -essence subsume species under them; since, for instance, by moving, -you produce walking, and yet walking cannot be considered a genus -subordinate to you; but above the walking there existed nothing else -that could, in respect to it, operate as a genus; and if nevertheless -there existed things beneath walking, walking would, in respect to -them, be a genus of the essences. - - -THE PARTS OF A MANIFOLD UNITY ARE APART ONLY FOR EXAMINATION. - -Perhaps, instead of saying that the one is the cause of the other -things, we would have to admit that these things are as parts and -elements of the one; and that all things form a single nature in -which only our thought establishes divisions; so that, by virtue of -its admirable power, this nature be unity distributed in all things, -appearing and becoming manifold, as if it were in movement, and that -the one should cease being unity as a result of the fruitfulness of -its nature. If we were to enumerate successively the parts of such a -nature, we would grant to each of them a separate existence, ignoring -that we had not seen the whole together. But after thus having -separated the parts, we would soon reapproximate them, not for long -being able to keep apart the isolated elements which tend to reunite. -That is why we could not help making a whole out of them, letting -them once more become unity, or rather, be unity. Besides, this will -be easier to understand when we shall know what these essences are, -and how many are the genera of essences; for we shall then be able to -conceive their mode of existence. And as, in these matters, it is not -well to limit oneself to negations, but to aim at positive knowledge, -and at the full intelligence of the subject here treated, we shall have -to make this inquiry. - - -THE GENERA OF ESSENCE WILL BE DETERMINED BY AN EXAMINATION OF THE -PROBLEM OF THE ONE AND MANY. - -4. If, on occupying ourselves with this sense-world, we wished to -determine the nature of bodies, would we not begin by studying some -part thereof, such as a stone? We could then distinguish therein -substance, quantity--such as dimension--and quality, such as color; -and after having discovered these same elements in other bodies, -we could say that the elements of the corporeal nature are being, -quantity, and quality; but that these three coexist; and that, though -thought distinguish them, all three form but one and the same body. -If, besides, we were to recognize that movement is proper to this -same organization, would we not add it to the three elements already -distinguished? These four elements, however, would form but a single -one, and the body, though one, would, in its nature, be the reunion -of all four. We shall have to take the same course with our present -subject, intelligible Being, and its genera and principles. Only, -in this comparison, we shall have to make abstraction of all that -is peculiar to bodies, such as generation, sense-perception, and -extension. After having established this separation, and having thus -distinguished essentially different things, we shall arrive at the -conception of a certain intelligible existence, which possesses real -essence, and unity in a still higher degree. From this standpoint, -one might be surprised how the (substance which is thus) one can be -both one and many. In respect to bodies, it is generally recognized -that the same thing is both one and many; the body can indeed be -divided infinitely; color and appearance, for instance, are therein -very differing properties, since they are separated here below. But -in respect to the soul, if she be conceived as one, without extent, -dimension and absolutely simple, as it appears at first sight, how -could we, after that, believe that the soul were manifold? We should -have here expected to reach unity, all the more as, after having -divided the animal in body and soul, and after having demonstrated that -the body is multiform, composite and diverse, one might well, on the -contrary, have expected to find the soul simple; and to have accepted -this conclusion as final, as the end of our researches. We would thus -have taken the soul as a sample of the intelligible world, just as the -body represents the sense-world. Having thus considered this soul, -let us examine how this unity can be manifold; how, in its turn, the -manifold can be unity; not indeed a composite formed of separable -parts, but a single nature simultaneously one and manifold. For, as -we have already said, it is only by starting from this point and -demonstrating it, that we will establish solidly the truth about the -genera of essence. - - -THE SOUL IS A PLURAL UNITY OF SEMINAL REASONS. - -5. The first consideration that meets us is that each body, whether -of animals or plants, is multiple, by virtue of its colors, forms, -dimensions, the kinds of parts, and diversity of their position; and -that nevertheless all things derive from unity, whether from the -absolutely simple Unity, or from the habituation of the universal -Unity, or from some principle having more unity--and consequently -more essence--than the things it produces; because, the further the -distance from unity, the less the essence. The principle which forms -the bodies must therefore be one, without either being absolutely -one, nor identical with the One; otherwise, it would not produce a -plurality that was distant from unity; consequently, it must be a -plural-unity. Now this principle is the soul; therefore she must be -a plural unity. This plurality, however, consists of the ("seminal) -reasons" which proceed from the soul. The reasons, indeed, are not -other than the soul; for the soul herself is reason, being the -principle of the reasons; the reasons are the actualization of the soul -which acts according to her being; and this being is potentiality of -the reasons.[303] The soul is therefore plurality simultaneously with -unity; which is clearly demonstrated by the action she exerts on other -things. - - -THE SOUL IS A DEFINITE ESSENCE AS PARTICULAR BEING. - -But what is the soul considered apart from all action, if we examine in -her the part which does not work at formation of the bodies?[304] Will -not a plurality of powers still be found therein? As to world-Essence, -nobody even thinks of depriving the soul of it. But is her acknowledged -essence the same as that predicated of a stone? Surely not. Besides, -even in the essence of the stone, "being" and "being a stone" are -inseparable concepts, just as "being" and "being a soul" are, in the -soul, but one and the same thing.[305] Must we then regard as different -in her essence on one side, and on the other the remainder (what -constitutes the being); so that it would be the difference (proper to -being) which, by being added to her, constituted the soul? No: the soul -is no doubt a determinate essence; not as a "white man," but only as -a particular being; in other words, she has what she has by her very -being. - - -THE ESSENCE OF THE SOUL DERIVES FROM ITS BEING; ADDING LIFE TO ESSENCE. - -6. However, could we not say that the soul does not have all that she -has through her being, in this sense, that in her we must distinguish -on one hand essence, and on the other some kind of essence? If the soul -possess such a kind of essence, and if this kind of essence come to her -from without, the whole will no longer be the being of the soul so far -as she is soul; only partially will it be the being of the soul, and -not in totality. Besides, what would be the essence of the soul without -the other things which constitute her being? Will the essence be the -same for the soul as for the stone? Will we not rather have to insist -that this essence of the soul derives from her very being; that this -essence is her source and principle; or rather, that it is all that the -soul is, and consequently is life; and finally that in the soul life -and essence fuse? - - -SOUL UNITY DOES NOT RESEMBLE THE UNITY OF A REASON, INCLUDING PLURALITY. - -Shall we say that this unity resembles that of a "reason" (of a -form)? No. The substance of the soul is one; but such unity does not -exclude duality or even plurality; for it admits of all the attributes -essential to the soul. - - -THE SOUL IS BOTH BEING AND LIFE. - -Should we say that the soul is both being and life, or that she -possesses life? To say that the soul possesses life would mean that the -possessor is not inherently alive, or that life does not inhere in her -"being." If then we cannot say that one of the two possesses the other, -we shall have to recognize that both are identical, or that the soul is -both one and manifold, in her unity embracing all that appears in her; -that in herself she is one, but manifold in respect to other things; -that, although she be one by herself, she makes herself multiple by -her movement; that, while forming a whole which is one, she seeks to -consider herself in her multiplicity. So Essence also does not remain -unitary, because its potentiality extends to all it has become. It is -contemplation that makes it appear manifold, the necessary thought has -multiplied it. If it appear as one only, it is only because it has not -yet thought, and it really is still only one. - - -THE FIRST TWO GENERA ARE BEING AND MOVEMENT. - -7. What and how much can be seen in the soul? Since we have found -in the soul both being and life, and as both being and life are -what is common in every soul, and as life resides in intelligence, -recognizing that there is (besides the soul and her being) intelligence -and its life, we shall posit as a genus what is common in all life; -namely, movement; consequently, being and movement, which constitute -primary life, will be our first two categories. Although (in reality) -they fuse, they are distinguished by thought, which is incapable -of approaching unity exclusively; and whose exercise compels this -distinction. Besides, it is possible, you can, in other objects, -clearly see essence, as distinct from movement or life, although their -essence be not real, and only shadowy or figurative.[306] Just as -the image of a man lacks several things, and, among others, the most -important, life; likewise, the essence of sense-objects is only an -adumbration of the veritable essence, lacking as it does the highest -degree of essence, namely, vitality, which appears in its archetype. -So you see it is quite easy to distinguish, on one hand, essence from -life, and, on the other, life from essence. Essence is a genus, and -contains several species; now movement must not be subsumed under -essence, nor be posited within essence, but should be equated with -essence. When we locate movement within essence, it is not that we -consider life is the subject of movement, but because movement is -life's actualization; only in thought can either exist separately. -These two natures, therefore, form but a single one; for essence exists -not in potentiality, but in actualization; and if we conceive of these -two genera as separated from each other it will still be seen that -movement is within essence, and essence within movement. In the unity -of essence, the two elements, when considered separately, imply each -other reciprocally; but thought affirms their duality, and shows that -each of the two series is a double unity. - - -ANOTHER GENUS IS STABILITY, WHICH IS ONLY ANOTHER KIND OF MOVEMENT. - -Since then it is in the sphere of essence that movement appears, and -since movement manifests its perfection far rather than it divides -its being; and since essence, in order to carry out the nature here -assigned to it, must always persevere in movement, it would be still -more absurd to deny it stability, than to refuse it movement. The -notion and the conception of stability are still more in harmony -with the nature of essence than are those of movement; for it is in -essence that may be found what is called "remaining in the same state," -"existing in the same manner," and "being uniform." Let us therefore -assert that stability is a genus different from movement, of which it -seems to be the opposite. - - -DISTINCTION BETWEEN STABILITY AND ESSENCE. - -In many ways it can be shown that stability must be kept apart -from essence. In the first place, if stability were identical with -essence, why should it be so, rather than movement, which is life, -the actualization of being, and of essence itself? Since we have -distinguished between movement and essence, and since we have said that -it is both identical therewith, and still at the same time different -from it; and because essence and movement are different from each other -from one viewpoint, but from another, are identical; we must also (in -thought) distinguish stability from essence without separating it -(in existence); and by separating it in thought, we shall be making -a distinct genus of it. Indeed, if stability and essence were to -be confused together in a perfect union, if we were to acknowledge -no difference between them, we would still be obliged to identify -stability with movement by the intermediation of essence; in this -way stability and movement would together form but one and the same -thing.[307] - - -ESSENCE, STABILITY AND MOVEMENT EXIST BECAUSE THOUGHT BY INTELLIGENCE. - -8. We must posit these three genera (essence, movement, and stability) -because intelligence thinks each of them separately. By thinking -them simultaneously, Intelligence posits them; and, as soon as -Intelligence thinks them, they are (in existence). The things whose -existence ("essence") implies matter do not exist in Intelligence; -for otherwise they would be immaterial. On the contrary, immaterial -things come into existence by merely being thought. So then contemplate -pure Intelligence, instead of seeking it with your bodily eyes, fix -on it your interior gaze. Then will you see the hearth of "Being," -where shines an unsleeping light; you will see therein how essences -subsist as simultaneously divided and united; you will see in it an -abiding life, the thought which applies not to the future, but to the -present; which possesses it already, and possesses it for ever; which -thinks what is intimate to it, and not what is foreign. Intelligence -thinks: and you have actualization and movement. Intelligence thinks -what is in itself: and you have "being" and essence; for, by merely -existing, Intelligence thinks: Intelligence thinks itself as existing, -and the object to which Intelligence applies its thought exists also. -The actualization of Intelligence on itself is not "being"; but the -object to which it refers, the Principle from which it derives, is -essence. Essence, indeed, is the object of intuition, but not intuition -itself; the latter exists (has "essence") only because it starts from, -and returns thereto. Now as essence is an actualization, and not a -potentiality, it unites both terms (existence and intuition, object and -subject), and, without separating them, it makes of intuition essence, -and of essence intuition. Essence is the unshakable foundation of all -things, and support of their existence; it derives its possessions from -no foreign source, holding them from itself, and within itself. It is -simultaneously the goal of thought, because it is stability that never -needed a beginning, and the principle from which thought was born, -because it is unborn stability; for movement can neither originate -from, nor tend towards movement. The idea also belongs to the genus of -stability, because it is the goal (or limit) of intelligence; but the -intellectual actualization by which it is thought constitutes movement. -Thus all these things form but one thing; and movement, stability, -and the things which exist in all essences constitute genera (or -classifications). Moreover, every essence posterior to these genera is, -in its turn, also definite essence, definite stability, and definite -movement. - - -THIS TRIUNE PLAY IMPLIES ALSO IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE. - -Summing up what we have discovered about the nature of Essence, we find -first three genera. Then, these three, Essence, Movement and Stability -were contemplated respectively by the essence, movement and stability -within ourselves, which we also harmonized with those intelligibles. -Then again we lost the power of distinguishing them by uniting, -confusing, and blending these three genera. But a little later we -divided, extricated and distinguished them so as again to see essence, -movement and stability; three things, of which each exists apart. The -result of this process then is that they are regarded as different, -discerning them by their differences, and recognizing difference in -essence by positing three things each of which exists apart. On the -other hand, if they be considered in their relation with unity and in -unity, if they be all reduced to being something single and identical, -one may see the arising, or rather the existing of identity. To the -three genera already recognized, therefore, we shall have to add -identity or difference, or (in Platonic language[308]), "sameness and -other-ness." These two classifications added to the three others, -will in all make five genera for all things. Identity and difference -(are genuine genera, indeed, because they) also communicate their -characteristics to inferior (beings), each of which manifests some such -element. - - -THESE FIVE GENERA ARE PRIMARY BECAUSE NOTHING CAN BE AFFIRMED OF THEM. - -These five genera that we thus recognize are primary, because nothing -can be predicated of them in the category of existence (being). No -doubt, because they are essences, essence might be predicated of them; -but essence would not be predicated of them because "being" is not a -particular essence. Neither is essence to be predicated of movement -or stability, for these are species of essence. Neither does essence -participate in these four genera as if they were superior genera -under which essence itself would be subsumed; for stability, movement, -identity and difference do not protrude beyond the sphere of essence, -and are not anterior thereto. - - -WHY NOT ADD OTHERS SUCH AS UNITY, QUANTITY, QUALITY, OR RELATION? - -9. These and similar (Platonic) arguments demonstrate that those are -genuinely primary genera; but how are we to prove they are exclusive? -Why, for example, should not unity, quantity, quality, relation, and -further (Aristotelian) categories, be added thereto? - - -NEITHER ABSOLUTE NOR RELATIVE UNITY CAN BE A CATEGORY. - -Unity (may mean two things). The absolute Unity, to which nothing may -be added, neither Soul, nor Intelligence, nor anything else, cannot be -predicated as attribute of anything, and therefore cannot be a genus. -But if we are referring to the unity which we attribute to essence, -when we say that essence is one, it is no longer the original Unity. -Besides, how could the absolute One, which within itself admits of no -difference, beget species? If it cannot do this, it cannot be a genus. -How indeed could you divide unity? By dividing it, you would multiply -it; and thus Unity-in-itself would be manifold, and in aspiring to -become a genus it would annihilate itself. Besides, in order to divide -this unity into species, you would have to add something to unity, -because it does not contain differences such as exist in being. -Intelligence might well admit differences between essences, but this -could not possibly be the case with unity. The moment you add a single -difference, you posit duality, and consequently destroy unity; for -everywhere the addition of a single unity causes any previously -posited number to disappear. - - -UNITY IS NOT SYNONYMOUS WITH ESSENCE. - -It may be objected that the unity which is in essence, in movement, -and the remainder of the genera, is common to all of them, and that -one might therefore identify unity with essence.[309] It must then be -answered that, just as essence was not made a genus of other things -because they were not what was essence, but that they were called -essences in another sense, here likewise unity could not be a common -attribute of other things, because there must be a primary Unity, -and a unity taken in a secondary sense. If, on the other hand, it -be said that unity should not be made a genus of all things, but -something which exists in itself like the others, if afterwards unity -be identified with essence, then, as essence has already been listed -as one of the genera, we would be merely uselessly introducing a -superfluous name.[310] Distinguishing between unity and essence is an -avowal that each has its separate nature; the addition of "something" -to "one" makes a "certain one"; addition of nothing, on the other -hand, allows unity to remain absolute, which cannot be predicated of -anything. But why could this unity not be the First Unity, ignoring -the absolute Unity? For we use "first Unity" as a designation of the -essence which is beneath the "absolute Unity." Because the Principle -anterior to the first Essence (that is, the first and absolute Unity) -is not essence; otherwise, the essence below Him would no longer be -the first Essence; here, on the contrary, the unity which is above -this unity is the absolute Unity. Besides, this unity which would -be separated from essence only in thought, would not admit of any -differences. - -Besides, there are three alternatives. Either this unity alleged to -inhere in essence will be, just like all other essences, a consequence -of the existence of essence; and consequently, would be posterior -to it. Or, it will be contemporaneous with essence and the other -(categories); but a genus cannot be contemporaneous with the things of -which it is the genus. The third possibility is that it may be anterior -to essence; in which case its relation to Essence will be that of a -principle, and no longer a genus containing it. If then unity be not a -genus in respect to essence, neither can it be a genus in respect of -other things; otherwise, we would have to say of essence also that it -was a genus embracing everything else. - - -ESSENCE CANNOT BECOME A GENUS SO LONG AS IT REMAINS ONE. - -Considering unity according to its essence, it seems to fuse and -coincide with absolute Essence, for essence, so far as it trends -towards unity, is a single essence; but in so far as it is posterior to -unity, it becomes all things it can be, and becomes manifold. Now, so -far as essence remains one and does not divide, it could not constitute -a genus. - - -ELEMENTS OF ESSENCE CAN BE SAID TO BE ONE ONLY FIGURATIVELY. - -10. In what sense, therefore, could each of the elements of essence -be called "one"? In that it is something unitary, without being unity -itself; for what is a "certain one" is already manifold. No species is -"one" except figuratively[306]; for in itself it is manifold. It is -in the same sense that, in this sense-world, we say that an army, or -a choric ballet, constitute a unity. Not in such things is absolute -unity; and therefore it may not be said that unity is something common. -Neither does unity reside in essence itself, nor in the individual -essences; therefore, it is not a genus. When a genus is predicated of -something, it is impossible to predicate of the same thing contrary -properties; but of each of the elements of universal essence it is -possible to assert both unity and its opposite. Consequently (if we -have called unity a genus), after having predicated of some essence -unity as a genus, we would have affirmed, of the same essence, that -unity was not a genus. Unity, therefore, could not be considered one -of the primary genera; for essence is no more one than it is manifold. -As to the other genera, none of them is one without being manifold; -much less could unity be predicated of the secondary genera of which -each is quite manifold. Besides, no genus, considered in its totality, -is unitary; so that if unity were a genus, it would merely thereby -cease being unity; for unity is not a number, and nevertheless it would -become a number in becoming a genus. Of course, numbers include an -alleged unity, as soon as we try to erect it into a genus, it is no -longer a unity, in a strict sense. Among numbers unity is not applied -to them as would have been a genus; of such unity it is merely said -that it is among numbers, not that it is a genus; likewise, if unity -were among the essences, it would not be there as genus of essence, nor -of anything else, nor of all things. Again, just as the simple is the -principle of the composite without being considered a genus in respect -to it--then it would be simultaneously simple and composite--so, if one -were considered to be a principle, it could not be a genus in respect -to things subsumed under it; and therefore will be a genus neither for -essence, nor for other (categories or things). - - -VARIOUS ARGUMENTS AGAINST UNITY AS A CATEGORY. - -If unity were to be considered a genus, it could be that only in -respect to the things of which each is said to be one;[309] as if, -for instance, one should, from "being," deduce the unity contained -within it. Unity would then be the genus of certain things; for just -as essence is a genus, not in respect to all things, but in respect -to those species that possess essence, so unity would be a genus -in respect to the species that possess unity. This, however, is -impossible; for things do not differ in respect to unity, as they do in -respect to essence. - -It might further be objected that if the same divisions which were -applied to essence were applied to unity, and if essence be a genus -because it divides itself, and manifests itself as the same in a -number of things, why then should unity also not be a genus, since it -appears in as many things as essence, and similarly divides itself? -Mere recurrence of something in several essences is no proof it is a -genus; whether in respect to the essences in which it occurs, or to -others. Merely being common to several essences by no means constitutes -a genus. No one will claim that a point is a genus for lines or for -anything else, though points be found in all lines. As said, unity -is found in every number, and nevertheless it is not a genus for -any number, or for anything else. The formation of a genus demands -that what is common to several things show specific differences, -constituting species, and be predicated of what exists. But what are -the specific differences within unity? What species does it form? If to -this it be answered that it forms the same species as essence, then it -blends with essence, and (unity) is (as said above), only another name -for essence; and essence, as category, suffices. - - -GENUINE RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITY AND ESSENCE. - -11. The questions here to be solved are, how unity subsists within -essence, how they both divide, and in general how any genera divide; -and whether their two divisions be identical, or different. To solve -these questions, we shall first have to ask how in general any thing -whatever is said to be one, and is one; then, if it can be said in the -same sense that essence is one, in what sense this is said. Evidently, -unity is not the same for everything. It cannot even be understood in -the same sense in respect to sense-things, and intelligible things; not -any more than essence is identical for these two order of (beings), -or even for sense-things compared to each other. The idea of unity is -not the same in reference to a choric ballet, an army, a vessel or a -house; it is even less so in respect of one of these things, and when -it deals with continuous objects. And nevertheless, by their unity all -these things imitate the same archetype, some from far, some from near. -Intelligence, surely, is assuredly that which most approaches absolute -Unity; for although the soul already possess unity, Intelligence -possesses it far more intensely; for it is the one essence. - - -UNITY REIGNS STILL MORE IN THE GOOD. - -Is the expression of the essence of something simultaneously the -expression of its unity, so that it possesses as much unity as it -possesses essence? Or does this simultaneousness exist without any -direct proportion between the amount of unity and essence? Yes; for it -is possible that something have less unity without, on that account, -having any the less essence; an army, a choric ballet have not less -essence than a house, though far less unity. The unity present in -each thing seems therefore to aspire to the Good, which has the most -unity;[311] for the closer something approaches the Good, the greater -unity does it achieve; that is the criterion of greater or less unity. -Indeed, every (being) desires not only merely to be (alive), but to -enjoy the Good. That is why everything, so far as it can, hastens to -become one, and those (beings) which by nature possess unity naturally -trend towards Him by desiring to unite with themselves. For every -(being) hastens not to separate from others, but on the contrary their -tendency is to tend towards each other and themselves. That is why all -souls, while preserving their individual nature, would like to fuse -into a single soul. The One reigns everywhere in the sense-world, as -well as in the Intelligible. It is from Him that everything originates, -it is towards Him that everything trends. In Him do all (beings) seek -their principle and their goal; for only therein do they find their -good; only by that does each (being) subsist, and occupies its place -in the universe; once that it exists, no (being) could help trending -towards the One. This occurs not only in nature, but even in the arts; -where each art seeks, to the extent of its ability, to conform its -works to unity, to the extent of its ability, and to the possibilities -of its works. But that which succeeds best, is Essence itself, which is -quite close to unity. - - -FURTHER REASONS WHY UNITY IS NOT A CATEGORY. - -Consequently, in speaking of (beings) other than (essence itself), as, -for instance, of man, we say simply "man" (without adding to it the -idea of unity[312]); if however we say "a man," it is to distinguish -him from two; if however we use the word one in still another sense, it -is by adding to it "some" (as, "someone"). Not so is it with essence; -we say, "being one," conceiving of "being" ("essence") and one, as if -forming a single whole, and in positing essence as one, we emphasize -its narrow affinity with the Good. Thus conceived, essence becomes -one;[313] and in the one finds its origin and goal. Nevertheless it is -not one as unity itself, but rather in a different manner, in this -sense that the (unity of essence) admits priority and posteriority. -What then is (the unity of essence)? Must it not then be considered -similar in all the parts (of essence), as something common to all (and -consequently, as forming a genus)? But in the first place, the point is -also something common to all the lines, and nevertheless it is not a -genus; in the numbers, unity is something common to all, and is not any -more of a genus. Indeed, the unity which is found in the monad, in the -dyad (or pair), and in other numbers, cannot be confused with unity in -itself. Then, nothing hinders there being in essence some anterior, and -other posterior parts, both simple and compound ones (which would be -impossible for the One in itself). Even if the unity found everywhere -in all the parts of essence were everywhere identical, by the mere fact -that it would offer no difference, it could not give rise to species, -and consequently, it could not be a genus. - - -BY TENDING TOWARDS THE ONE, EVERYTHING TENDS TOWARDS THE GOOD. - -12. We therefore assert (that by moving towards unity everything moves -towards the Good). How can it be, however, that Goodness should consist -in coming closer to unity, even for number, which is inanimate?[314] -This question might as well be asked about any inanimate object -whatever. If we were told that such (beings) do not enjoy (existence), -we might answer that we are here treating of beings according to -their proximity to unity only. If, for instance, we were asked how -a point can participate in the Good, we might answer by a retort, -asking whether we are dealing with the Point in itself. Then we would -answer by the observation that the state of affairs was the same for -all things of the same kind. If however we were pressed about the -point considered as existing in some object, as, for instance, in the -circle, we would answer that for such a point, the Good is the good -of the circle (of which it forms part); that such is the Good towards -which it aspires, and that it seeks that as far as possible through the -intermediation of the circle. - - -THESE GENERA EXIST IN BOTH THE SUBORDINATE OBJECTS, AND THEMSELVES. - -But how could we realize such genera? Are all these genera susceptible -of division, or do they lie entire within each of the objects they -comprehend? If so, how does this unity find itself? Unity exists -therein as a genus, just as the whole exists within the plurality. - -Does unity exist only in the objects that participate therein? Not only -in these objects, but also in itself. This point will be studied later. - - -QUANTITY IS A SECONDARY GENUS, THEREFORE NOT A FIRST. - -13. Now why should we not posit quantity among the primary genera? And -why not also quality? Quantity is not one of the primary genera like -those we have posited, because the primary genera coexist with essence -(which is not the case with quantity). Indeed, movement is inseparable -from essence; being its actualization and life. Stability is implied in -being; while identity and difference are still more inseparable from -essence; so that all these (categories) appear to us simultaneously. As -to number (which is discrete quantity), it is something posterior. As -to (mathematical) numbers, far more are they posterior both to these -genera, and themselves; for the numbers follow each other; the second -depends on the first, and so forth; the last are contained within the -first. Number, therefore, cannot be posited among the primary genera. -Indeed, it is permissible to doubt whether quantity may be posited -as any kind of a genus. More even than number, extension (which is -continuous quantity), shows the characteristics of compositeness, and -of posteriority. Along with number, the line enters into the idea of -extension. This would make two elements. Then comes surface, which -makes three. If then it be from number that continuous dimension -derives its quantitativeness, how could this dimension be a genus, when -number is not? On the other hand, anteriority and posteriority exist -in dimension as well as in numbers. But if both kinds of quantities -have in common this, that they are quantities, it will be necessary to -discover the nature of quantity. When this will have been found, we -shall be able to make of it a secondary genus; but it could not rank -with the primary genera. If, then, quantity be a genus without being a -primary one, it will still remain for us to discover to which higher -genus, whether primary or secondary, it should be subsumed. - - -NUMBER AND DIMENSION DIFFER SO MUCH AS TO SUGGEST DIFFERENT -CLASSIFICATION. - -It is evident that quantity informs us of the amount of a thing, -and permits us to measure this; therefore itself must be an amount. -This then is the element common to number (the discrete quantity), -and to continuous dimension. But number is anterior, and continuous -dimension proceeds therefrom; number consists in a certain blending -of movement and stability; continuous dimension is a certain movement -or proceeds from some movement; movement produces it in its progress -towards infinity, but stability arrests it in its progress, limits -it, and creates unity. Besides, we shall in the following explain the -generation of number and dimension; and, what is more, their mode of -existence, and how to conceive of it rightly. It is possible that we -might find that number should be posited among the primary genera, but -that, because of its composite nature, continuous dimension should -be posited among the posterior or later genera; that number is to be -posited among stable things, while dimension belongs among those in -movement. But, as said above, all this will be treated of later. - - -QUALITY IS NOT A PRIMARY GENUS BECAUSE IT IS POSTERIOR TO BEING. - -14. Let us now pass on to quality. Why does quality also fail to -appear among the primary genera? Because quality also is posterior -to them; it does indeed follow after being. The first Being must -have these (quantity and quality) as consequences, though being is -neither constituted nor completed thereby; otherwise, being would be -posterior to them. Of course, as to the composite beings, formed of -several elements, in which are both numbers and qualities, they indeed -are differentiated by those different elements which then constitute -qualities, though they simultaneously contain common (elements). As to -the primary genera, however, the distinction to be established does -not proceed from simpleness or compositeness, but of simpleness and -what completes being. Notice, I am not saying, "of what completes 'some -one' being"; for if we were dealing with some one being, there would -be nothing unreasonable in asserting that such a being was completed -by a quality, since this being would have been in existence already -before having the quality, and would receive from the exterior only the -property of being such or such. On the contrary, absolute Being must -essentially possess all that constitutes it. - - -COMPLEMENT OF BEING IS CALLED QUALITY ONLY BY COURTESY. - -Besides, we have elsewhere pointed out[315] that what is a complement -of being is called a quality figuratively only;[306] and that what is -genuinely quality comes from the exterior, posteriorly to being. What -properly belongs to being is its actualization; and what follows it is -an experience (or, negative modification). We now add that what refers -to some being, cannot in any respect be the complement of being. There -is no need of any addition of "being" (existence) to man, so far as -he is a man, to make of him a (human) being. Being exists already in -a superior region before descending to specific difference; thus the -animal exists (as being) before one descends to the property of being -reasonable, when one says: "Man is a reasonable animal."[316] - - -THE FOUR OTHER CATEGORIES DO NOT TOGETHER FORM QUALITY. - -15. However, how do four of these genera complete being, without -nevertheless constituting the suchness (or, quality) of being? for they -do not form a "certain being." The primary Essence has already been -mentioned; and it has been shown that neither movement, difference, nor -identity are anything else. Movement, evidently, does not introduce any -quality in essence; nevertheless it will be wise to study the question -a little more definitely. If movement be the actualization of being, if -essence, and in general all that is in the front rank be essentially an -actualization, movement cannot be considered as an accident. As it is, -however, the actualization of the essence which is in actualization, -it can no longer be called a simple complement of "being," for it is -"being" itself. Neither must it be ranked amidst things posterior -to "being," nor amidst the qualities; it is contemporaneous with -"being," for you must not suppose that essence existed first, and then -moved itself (these being contemporaneous events). It is likewise -with stability; for one cannot say that essence existed first, and -then later became stable. Neither are identity or difference any -more posterior to essence; essence was not first unitary, and then -later manifold; but by its essence it is one manifold. So far as it -is manifold, it implies difference; while so far as it is a manifold -unity, it implies identity. These categories, therefore, suffice to -constitute "being." When one descends from the intelligible world -to inferior things, he meets other elements which indeed no longer -constitute absolute "being," but only a "certain being," that possesses -some particular quantity or quality; these are indeed genera, but -genera inferior to the primary genera. - - -RELATION IS AN APPENDAGE EXISTING ONLY AMONG DEFINITE OBJECTS. - -16. As to relation, which, so to speak, is only an offshoot or -appendage,[317] it could certainly not be posited amidst the primary -genera. Relation can exist only between one thing and another; it is -nothing which exists by itself; every relation presupposes something -foreign. - - -NEITHER CAN PLACE OR TIME FIGURE AMONG THEM.[318] - -The categories of place and time are just as unable to figure among the -primary genera. To be in a place, is to be in something foreign; which -implies two consequences:[319] a genus must be single, and admits of -no compositeness. Place, therefore, is no primary genus. For here we -are dealing only with veritable essences. - -As to time, does it possess a veritable characteristic? Evidently -not. If time be a measure, and not a measure pure and simple, but the -measure of movement,[320] it also is something double, and consequently -composite. (This, as with place, would debar it from being ranked -among the primary genera, which are simple). Besides, it is something -posterior to movement; so that it could not even be ranked along with -movement. - - -ACTION, EXPERIENCE, POSSESSION AND LOCATION ARE SIMILARLY -UNSATISFACTORY. - -Action and experience equally depend on movement. Now, as each of -them is something double, each of them, consequently, is something -composite. Possession also is double. Location, which consists in -something's being in some definite way in something else, actually -comprises three elements. (Therefore possession and location, because -composite, are not simple primary genera). - - -NEITHER ARE GOOD, BEAUTY, VIRTUE, SCIENCE, OR INTELLIGENCE. - -17. But why should not the Good, beauty, virtues, science, or -intelligence be considered primary genera? If by "good" we understand -the First, whom we call the Good itself, of whom indeed we could not -affirm anything, but whom we call by this name, because we have none -better to express our meaning, He is not a genus; for He cannot be -affirmed of anything else. If indeed there were things of which He -could be predicated, each of them would be the Good Himself. Besides, -the Good does not consist in "being," and therefore is above it. But if -by "good" we mean only the quality (of goodness), then it is evident -that quality cannot be ranked with primary genera. Does this imply that -Essence is not good? No; it is good, but not in the same manner as the -First, who is good, not by a quality, but by Himself. - -It may however be objected that, as we saw above, essence contains -other genera, and that each of these is a genus because it has -something in common, and because it is found in several things. If then -the Good be found in each part of "being" or essence, or at least, in -the greater number of them, why would not also the Good be a genus, and -one of the first genera? Because the Good is not the same in all parts -of Essence, existing within it in the primary or secondary degree; and -because all these different goods are all subordinate to each other, -the last depending on the first, and all depending from a single Unity, -which is the supreme Good; for if all participate in the Good, it is -only in a manner that varies according to the nature of each. - - -IF THE GOOD BE A GENUS, IT MUST BE ONE OF THE POSTERIOR ONES. - -If you insist that the Good must be genus, we will grant it, as a -posterior genus; for it will be posterior to being. Now the existence -of (the Aristotelian) "essence,"[321] although it be always united to -Essence, is the Good itself; while the primary genera belong to Essence -for its own sake, and form "being." Hence we start to rise up to the -absolute Good, which is superior to Essence; for it is impossible for -essence and "being" not to be manifold; essence necessarily includes -the above-enumerated primary genera; it is the manifold unity. - - -IF THE EXCLUSIVE GOOD MEAN UNITY, A NEW GENUS WOULD BE UNNECESSARY. - -But if by Good we here mean the unity which lies in Essence, we would -not hesitate to acknowledge that the actualization by which Essence -aspires to Unity is its true good, and that that is the means by -which it receives the form of Good. Then the good of Essence is the -actualization by which it aspires to the Good; that act constitutes its -life; now this actualization is a movement, and we have already ranked -movement among the primary genera. (It is therefore useless to make a -new genus of "Good conceived as unity"). - - -BEAUTY IS TREATED SIMILARLY TO THE GOOD. - -18. As to the beautiful, if that be taken to mean the primary and -supreme Beauty, we would answer as about the Good, or at least, we -would make an analogous answer. If however we mean only the splendor -with which the Idea shines, it may be answered that that splendor -is not the same everywhere; and that, besides, it is something -posterior.[322] If the beautiful be considered as absolute Being, it -is then already comprised with the "Being" already considered (and -consequently does not form a separate genus[323]). If it be considered -in respect to us human beings, who are spectators, and if it be -explained as producing in us a certain emotion, such an actualization -is a movement; but if, on the contrary, it be explained as that -tendency which draws us to the beautiful, this still is a movement. - - -KNOWLEDGE IS EITHER A MOVEMENT OR SOMETHING COMPOSITE. - -Knowledge is pre-eminently movement; for it is the intuition of -essence; it is an actualization, and not a simple habit. It should, -therefore, also be reduced to movement.[299] It may also be reduced to -stability (if considered as a durable actualization); or rather, it -belongs to both genera. But if it belong to two different genera, it is -something of a blend; but anything blended is necessarily posterior (to -the elements which enter into the blend, and it cannot therefore either -be a primary genus). - - -INTELLIGENCE, JUSTICE, VIRTUES AND TEMPERANCE ARE NO GENERA. - -Intelligence is thinking essence, a composite of all genera, and not a -single genus. Veritable Intelligence is indeed essence connected with -all things; consequently it is all essence. As to essence considered -alone, it constitutes a genus, and is an element of Intelligence. -Last, justice, temperance, and in general all the virtues are so many -actualizations of Intelligence. They could not, therefore, rank amidst -the primary genera. They are posterior to a genus, and constitute -species. - - -ESSENCE DERIVES ITS DIFFERENCES FROM THE OTHER CO-ORDINATE CATEGORIES. - -19. Since these four categories (which complete essence, namely, -movement, stability, identity and difference) (with Essence as a fifth) -constitute the primary genera, it remains to be examined whether each -of them, by itself, can beget species; for instance, whether Essence, -entirely by itself, could admit divisions in which the other categories -would have no share whatever. No: for, in order to beget species, the -genus would have to admit differences derived from outside; these -differences would have to be properties belonging to Essence as such, -without however being Essence. But from where then would Essence have -derived them? Impossibly from what does not exist. If then they were -necessarily derived from that which exists, as only three other genera -of essences remain,[324] evidently, Essence must have derived its -differences from these genera, which associate themselves with Essence, -while yet enjoying a simultaneous existence. But from this very fact -that these genera enjoy an existence simultaneous (with Essence), they -serve to constitute it, as it is composed of the gathering of these -elements. How then could they be different from the whole that they -constitute? How do these genera make species out of all (these beings)? -How, for instance, could pure movement produce species of movement? -The same question arises in connection with the other genera. Besides, -we must avoid (two dangers:) losing each genus in its species, and, -on the other hand, reducing it to the state of a simple predicate, -by considering it only in its species. The genus must exist both in -its species and in itself. While blending (with the species), it must -in itself remain pure and unblended; for, if it should contribute to -"being" otherwise (by blending with its species), it would annihilate -itself. Such are the questions that must be examined. - - -INTELLIGENCE AS A COMPOSITE IS POSTERIOR TO THE CATEGORIES. - -Now, we have above posited certain premises. Intelligence, and even -every intelligence, includes within itself all (essences). We ranked -(Essence or Being) above all species that are parts thereof. Essence -is not yet Intelligence. From these it results that already developed -Intelligence is already something posterior. We shall therefore make -use of this study to achieve the goal we had set ourselves (namely, -to determine the relation of the genus to its contained species). We -shall therefore make use of Intelligence as an example to extend our -knowledge of this subject. - - -KNOWLEDGE IS THE ACTUALIZATION OF THE NOTIONS WHICH ARE POTENTIAL -SCIENCE. - -20. Let us, therefore, suppose that Intelligence was in a state in -which it did not yet attach itself to anything in particular, so that -it had not yet become an individual intelligence. Let us conceive it -similar to knowledge considered by itself before the notions of the -particular species, or to the knowledge of a species taken before -the notions of the contained parts. Universal Knowledge, without (in -actualization) being any particular notion, potentially lies within -all notions, and reciprocally, each particular notion is one single -thing in actualization, but all things in potentiality; likewise -with universal Knowledge. The notions which thus refer to a species -exist potentially in universal Knowledge, because, while applying -itself to a species, they potentially are also universal Knowledge. -Universal Knowledge is predicated of each particular notion, without -the particular notion being predicated of universal Knowledge; but -universal Knowledge must none the less subsist in itself without -blending (with anything else[325]). - - -INTELLIGENCE IS THE POTENTIALITY OF THE INTELLIGENCES WHICH ARE ITS -ACTUALIZATIONS. - -The case is similar with Intelligence. There is a kind of existence -of universal Intelligence, which is located above the particular -actualized intelligences, and is different from that of the particular -intelligences. These are filled with universal notions: universal -Intelligence furnishes to the particular intelligences the notions -they possess. It is the potentiality of these intelligences all of -which it contains in its universality; on their side, these, in their -particularity, contain universal Intelligence just as a particular -science implies universal science. The great Intelligence exists in -itself, and the particular intelligences also exist in themselves; -they are implied in universal Intelligence, just as this one is -implied in the particular intelligences. Each one of the particular -intelligences exists simultaneously in itself, and in something else -(in the universal Intelligence), just as universal Intelligence -exists simultaneously in itself and in all the others. In universal -Intelligence, which exists in itself, all particular intelligences -exist potentially, because it actually is all the intelligences, -and potentially each of them separately. On the contrary, these are -actualizations of the particular intelligences, and potentially -universal Intelligence. Indeed, so far as they are what is predicated -of them, they are actualizations of what is predicated; so far as -they exist in the genus that contains them, they are this genus -potentially.[326] Genus, as such, is potentially all the species it -embraces; it is none of them in actuality; but all are implied therein. -So far as genus is in actualization what exists before the species, it -is the actualization of the things which are not particular. As occurs -in the species, these particular things achieve such actualization only -by the actualization which emanates from the genus, and which, with -regard to them, acts as cause. - - -HOW INTELLIGENCE, THOUGH ONE, PRODUCES PARTICULAR THINGS. - -21. How then does Intelligence, though remaining one, by Reason produce -particular things? This really amounts to asking how the inferior -genera derive from the four Genera. We shall then have to scrutinize -how this great and ineffable Intelligence, which does not make use -of speech, but which is entire intelligence, intelligence of all, -universal, and not particular or individual intelligence, contains all -the things which proceed therefrom. - -(Of the essences it contains) it possesses the number, as it is both -one and many. It is many, that is, (it is) many potentialities, which -are admirable powers, full of force and greatness, because they are -pure; powers that are vigorous and veritable because they have no goal -at which they are forced to stop; consequently being infinite, that -is, supreme Infinity, and Greatness. If then we were to scrutinize -this greatness and beauty of being, if by the splendor and light -which surround it, we were to distinguish what Intelligence contains, -then would we see the efflorescing of quality. With the continuity -of actualization we would behold greatness, in quiescent condition. -As we have seen one (number), two (quality), and three (greatness), -greatness, as the third thing, presents itself with universal quantity. -Now, as soon as quality and quantity show themselves to us, they unite, -blend into one and the same figure (outward appearance). Then comes -difference, which divides quality and quantity, whence arise different -qualities, and differences of figure. The presence of identity produces -equality, and that of difference, inequality, both in quantity, number, -and dimension; hence the circle, the quadrilateral, and the figures -composed of unequal things; hence numbers that are similar, and -different, even and uneven. - - -THIS INTELLECTUAL LIFE POSSESSES THE REASONS OR IDEAS. - -Thus intellectual Life, which is the perfect actualization, embraces -all the things that our mind now conceives, and all intellectual -operations. In its potentiality it contains all things as essences, -in the same manner as Intelligence does. Now Intelligence possesses -them by thought, a thought which is not discursive (but intuitive). -The intellectual life therefore possesses all the things of which -there are "reasons" (that is, ideas); itself is a single Reason, -great, perfect, which contains all reasons,[327] which examines them -in an orderly fashion, beginning with the first, or rather, which has -ever examined them, so that one could never really tell that it was -examining them.[328] For all things that we grasp by ratiocination, -in whatever part soever of the universe they may be located, are -found as intuitively possessed by Intelligence. It would seem as if -it was Essence itself which, (being identical with Intelligence), had -made Intelligence reason thus (by producing its conceptions),[329] -as appears to happen in the ("seminal) reasons" which produce the -animals.[330] In the (ideas, that is in the "seminal) reasons" which -are anterior to ratiocination, all things are found to possess a -constitution such that the most penetrating intelligence would have -considered best, by reasoning.[331] We should therefore expect (great -and wonderful things) of these Ideas, superior and anterior to Nature -and ("seminal) reasons." There Intelligence fuses with "Being;"[329] -neither in essence nor intelligence is there anything adventitious. -There everything is smoothly perfect, since everything there is -conformable to intelligence. All Essence is what Intelligence demands; -it is consequently veritable primary Essence; for if it proceeded from -some other (source), this also would be Intelligence. - - -FROM ESSENCE ARE BORN ALL LIVING ORGANISMS. - -Thus Essence reveals within itself all the Forms and universality. This -could not have been particular; for it could not be single, the double -presence of difference and identity demanding it to be simultaneously -one and many. Since, from its very origin, Essence is one and many, all -the species it contains must consequently simultaneously contain unity -and plurality, revealing dimensions, qualities, and different figures; -for it is impossible that Essence should lack anything, or should -not be complete universality; for it would no longer be universal, -if it were not complete. Life, therefore, penetrates every thing; is -everywhere present within it. Hence results that from that Life must -have been born all living organisms, for since matter and quality are -found within their bodies, these also are not lacking. Now, as all -living organisms are born within it, and have ever subsisted within it, -they were essentially embraced within eternity, yet, taken separately, -each of them is a different essence. Taken together they form a unity. -Consequently, the complex and synthetic totality of all these living -organisms is Intelligence, which, thus containing all (beings), is the -perfect and essential living Organism. When Intelligence allows itself -to be contemplated by what derives existence from it, Intelligence -appears thereto as the intelligible, and receives this predicate -properly and truly.[332] - - -THUS INTELLIGENCE BEGETS WORLD SOUL AND INDIVIDUAL SOULS. - -22. This was what Plato meant, when he said, enigmatically, -"Intelligence contemplates the Ideas contained within the perfect -living Organism; it sees what they are, and to how many they -amount."[333] Indeed, the (universal) Soul, which ranks immediately -after Intelligence, possesses the Ideas in herself inasmuch as she is -a soul; but she sees them better in the Intelligence which is above -her.[334] Likewise, our own intelligence, which also contains the -ideas, sees them better when it contemplates them in the superior -Intelligence; for, in itself, it can only see; but in the superior -Intelligence it sees that it sees.[335] Now this intelligence that -contemplates the ideas is not separated from the superior Intelligence, -for it proceeds therefrom; but as it is the plurality that has -proceeded from the unity, because it adds difference (to identity), -it becomes manifold unity. Being thus both unity and plurality, -Intelligence, by virtue of its multiple nature, produces the plurality -(of beings). Besides, it would be impossible to discover therein -anything that was numerically unitary, or anything that might be called -individual. Whatever be contemplated in it, it is always a form, for -it contains no matter. That is why, again, Plato, referring to this -truth, said that "being" was divided to infinity.[336] Descending from -genus to species, we have not yet arrived at infinity; for that which -thus arises is defined by the species that have been begotten by a -genus; the name of infinity applies better to the last species, which -can no longer be divided into species. That is why (as Plato teaches), -"when one has arrived at individuals, they must be abandoned to -infinity."[337] Thus, the individuals are infinite so far as they are -considered in themselves; but, in so far as they are embraced by unity, -they are reduced to a number. - -Intelligence therefore embraces what comes after it, the Soul; so that -the Soul, till the last of her powers, is contained by a number; as to -the last power (matter), it is entirely infinite[338] Considered in -this condition (where, turning towards what is below it, it begets the -Soul), Intelligence is a part (because it applies itself to something -particular), though it possess all things, and though, in itself, it -be universal; the intelligences which compose it are each a part (each -constituting a particular intelligence by virtue of the actualization -of Intelligence which exists (and thus exists in itself). As to the -Soul, she is the part of a part (that is, a part of the Intelligence -which itself is a part, as has just been said), but exists by virtue -of the actualization of the Intelligence which acts outside of itself. -Indeed, when Intelligence acts in itself, the actualizations it -produces are the other intelligences; when it acts outside of itself, -it produces the Soul. When in her turn, the Soul acts as genus or -species, she begets the other souls which are her species. These souls -themselves have two actualizations; the one, directed towards what is -above them, constitutes their intelligence; the other, directed towards -what is below them, gives birth to the other rational powers, and even -to a last power which is in contact with matter, and which fashions -it.[339] The inferior part of the soul does not hinder the whole -remainder from remaining in the superior region.[340] Besides, this -inferior part is only the very image of the soul; it is not separated -from her,[341] but it resembles the image reflected by a mirror, an -image which persists only so long as the model remains before the -mirror. What should be our conception of the model placed before the -mirror? Down through what is immediately above the image (that is, down -through the soul herself), we have the intelligible world, composed -of all the intelligible entities, where everything is perfect. The -sense-world is no more than the imitation thereof, and it imitates -that intelligible world so far as it can, in that it itself is a -living organism which is the image of the perfect living Organism. The -sense-world imitates it as the portrait that is painted, or reflected -by the surface of water reproduces the person situated before the -painter, or above the water. This portrait obtained by the painting, or -reflected by the surface of the water is not the image of the composite -which constitutes the man (the soul and body), but of one or two parts -only, the body which was fashioned by the soul. Likewise, therefore, -the sense-world, which was made to resemble the intelligible world, -offers us images, not of its creator, but of the (essences) contained -within its creator, among which is man, along with all other animals. -Now, in common with its creator, each living organism possesses life, -though each possess it differently; both, besides, equally form part of -the intelligible world. - - - - -SIXTH ENNEAD, BOOK THREE. - -Plotino's Own Sense-Categories. - - -GENERA OF THE PHYSICAL ARE DIFFERENT FROM THOSE OF THE INTELLIGIBLE. - -1. We have thus declared our views about (intelligible) Being, and -shown how they agree with the doctrines of Plato. Now we have to study -the "other nature" (the Being of the sense-world); and we shall have -to consider whether it be proper to establish here the same genera as -for the intelligible world, or to posit a greater number, by adding -some to those already recognized; or whether the genera differ in each -being entirely, or only partially, some remaining identical, while -others differ. If any of them be identical in both beings, that can be -understood only by analogy;[343] that is what will become evident when -each of these beings are fully understood. - - -THE WORLD MUST BE STUDIED, JUST AS ONE WOULD ANALYZE THE VOICE. - -This is by what we must begin. Having to speak of sense-objects, and -knowing that all of them are contained in this world here below, -we must first scrutinize this world, establish within it divisions -according to the nature of the (beings) which compose it, and then -distribute them into genera, just as we would do if we had to analyze -the voice whose nature is infinite (by the diversity of sounds it -produces), reducing it to a definite number of kinds.[344] Observing -the elements common to many sounds, we would reduce them to one unity, -then, to a superior unity, further to a supreme unity, in which these -sounds appear as a small number of classes. Then, the elements common -to these individuals would be called "species," and that common to -various species would be called a genus. As to the voice, it is easy -enough to discover each species, to reduce all the species to unity, -and to predicate of all of them (as highest genus or category) the -general element, the voice. But an analysis as summary as this is -impossible with the (more complicated universe). In the sense-world we -will have to recognize several genera, which will differ from those of -the intelligible world, since the sense-world itself differs from the -intelligible world so much that it is not its counterpart, but only its -image, whose only element common (to its model) is the name. - - -WE MUST FIRST DISSECT AWAY THE SOUL FROM THE BODY, TO EXAMINE IT. - -As here below in the "mixture" (or blend, the soul), and the -composition (the body) (which form our nature) there are two parts, -soul and body, the totality of which forms the living organism;[345] -as the nature of the soul belongs to the intelligible world, and -consequently does not belong to the same order of things as the -sense-world, we shall, however difficult it may be, have to separate -the soul[346] from the sense-objects which we are here alone to -consider. (We shall illustrate this by a parable). He who would wish -to classify the inhabitants of a town according to their dignities and -professions, would have to leave aside the foreign residents. As to the -passions which arise from the union of the soul with the body, or, that -the soul experiences because of the body,[347] we shall later examine -how they should be classified.[348] This however must follow our study -of the sense-objects. - - -WHAT IS BEING IN THE INTELLIGIBLE IS GENERATION IN THE SENSE-WORLD. - -2. First let us consider what mundane name "Being" must be applied to. -To begin with, it must be explained that physical nature can receive -the name of "being" only as a figure of speech;[343] or rather, should -not receive it at all, since it implies the idea of perpetual flowing -(that is, change[349]); so, the more suitable denomination would be -"generation."[350] We shall also have to acknowledge that the things -that belong to generation are very different; nevertheless all bodies, -some simple (such, as elements), the others composite as mixtures), -together with their accidents and effects, must, during the process of -classification, be reduced to a single genus. - -In bodies, one may besides distinguish on one hand matter, on the -other, the form imprinted thereon; and we designate each of these -separately as a genus, or subsume both under a unity, inasmuch as -we designate both by the common label[343] of "being," or rather, -"generation." But what is the common element in matter and form? -In what manner, and of what is matter a genus? For what difference -inheres in matter? In what sequence could we incorporate that which is -composed of both? But in the case that that which is composed of both -be itself corporeal being, while neither of the two is a body, how then -could either be incorporated in a single genus, or within the same -genus along with the compound of both? How (could this incorporation -into a single genus be effected with) the elements of some object and -the object itself? To answer that we should begin by the (composite) -bodies: which would be tantamount to learning to read by beginning with -syllables (and not with letters). - - -CAN WE ANALYZE THIS WORLD BY ANALOGY WITH THE INTELLIGIBLE? - -Let us now grant that symmetrical analysis by individual objects is -impossible. Might we not, as a means of classification, then employ -analogy? In this case the (intelligible, higher) "being" would here be -represented by matter; and movement above, by form here, which would -thus quicken and perfect matter. The inertia of matter would correspond -to rest above, while the (intelligible) identity and difference would -correspond to our earthly manifold resemblance and differences.[351] -(Such an analogic method would misrepresent the state of affairs -in this world). To begin with, matter does not receive form as its -life or actualization, but (form) approaches and informs (matter) as -something foreign (form deriving from being, while matter is only a -deception; so that there is no kinship between them). Then in the -(intelligible world) form is an actualization and motion, while here -below movement is different, being accidental; we might far rather -call form the halting or rest of matter, for form defines that which -in itself is indefinite (unlimited). There (in the intelligible world) -identity and difference refer to a single essence, which is both -identical and different. Here below, essence differs only relatively, -by participation (in the difference) for it is something identical and -different, not by consequence, as above, but here below, by nature. As -to stability, how could it be attributed to matter, which assumes all -dimensions, which receives all its forms from without, without itself -ever being able to beget anything by means of these forms? Such a -division, therefore, will have to be given up. - - -PHYSICAL CATEGORIES ARE MATTER, FORM, COMBINATION, ATTRIBUTES AND -ACCIDENTS. - -3. What classification shall we adopt? There is first matter, then -form, and further the combination which results from their blending. -Then we have a number of conceptions which refer to the three preceding -classes, and are predicated of them; the first, simply, as attributes; -the others, besides, as accidents. Among the latter, some are contained -within the things, while others contain them; some of them are actions, -and the others experiences (passions) or their consequences. - - -THE THREE FIRST PHYSICAL CATEGORIES OF MATTER, FORM AND COMBINATION. - -Matter is something common which is found in all things;[352] -nevertheless it does not form a genus because it does not admit of any -differences, unless its differences consist in appearing in different -forms; as, here, fire, and there, air. Philosophers who consider that -matter is a genus base this opinion on the fact that matter is common -to all the things in which it exists, or that it stands in the relation -of the whole to the parts of particular objects (or, "matters"). In -this case, however, the term "genus" would be used in a sense differing -from the one it bears usually. It would then be no more than an only -or single element, if we admit that an element can be a genus. If, -conceiving that matter is united to matter, or exists within it, we add -form to matter, matter would thereby be differentiated from the other -forms, but it will not comprehend every being-like form. Were we to -call the generating principle of being "form," and were we to call the -reason which constitutes the form "being-like reason," we shall not -yet have clearly defined the nature of "being." Finally, if we give the -name of "being" only to the combination of matter and form, the result -will be that neither of these two (matter or form taken separately) -will themselves be "being." If, however, we were to assert that not -only their combination, but also each of them separately were "being," -we then would be faced with the problem of what is common to all three. - - -DIFFERENT PHYSICAL CATEGORIES. - -As to the things which are simply posited as attributes, they should, -as principles or elements, be classified under relation. Among the -accidents of things, some, like quantity and quality, are contained -within them; while others contain them, as time and place. Then there -are actions and experiences, as movements; then their consequences, as -"being in time," and "being in place"; the latter is the consequence of -the combination, the former is the consequence of movement. - - -FIVE PHYSICAL CATEGORIES. - -We decide, therefore, that the three first things (matter, form, and -their combination) contribute to the formation of a single genus, -which, by a figure of speech, we call ("corporeal) Being," a genus -which is common to them, and whose name applies to all three. Then -come the other genera; such as relation, quantity and quality; the -(relation of) being "contained in place," and "in time"; movement; and -place and time. But as the category of "time" and "place" would render -superfluous that of "being in place" and of "being in time,"[353] we -should limit ourselves to the recognition of five genera, of which the -first ("being") comprises matter, form and the combination.[354] If, -however, we should not count matter, form and combination as a single -genus, our analysis will assume the following shape: matter, form, -combination, relation, quantity, quality, and movement. Otherwise, the -latter three might be subsumed under relation, which possesses more -extension than they. - - -SENSE-BEING. - -4. What is the common element in these three things (matter, form and -their combination)? What constitutes their (sublunary, mundane or) -earthly "being"? Is it because matter, form and their combination -form a foundation for other things? In that case, as matter is the -foundation, or seat of form, then form will not be in the genus of -"being." But, as the combination also forms foundation for other -things, then form united to matter will be the subject of the -combinations, or rather, of all the things which are posterior to the -combination, as quantity, quality, and movement. - - -BEING IS THAT WHICH IS PREDICATED OF NOTHING ELSE. - -It would seem that (physical) "being" is that which is not predicated -of anything else;[355] for whiteness and blackness may, for instance, -be predicated of some white or black subject. Likewise with the idea -of "doubleness";--I mean here not the doubleness which is the opposite -of one half, but the doubleness predicated of some subject, as when -one says "this wood is double." So also paternity, and science, are -attributes of another subject, of which that is said. So space is that -which limits, and time that which measures something else. But fire, -or wood considered as such, are not attributes. Neither are Socrates, -nor composite being (composed of matter and form), nor form which is -in the "being," because it is not a modification of any other subject. -Indeed, form is not an attribute of matter; it is an element of the -combination. "Man" and "form of man" are one and the same thing.[356] -Matter also is an element of the combination; under this respect, it -may be predicated of a subject, but this subject is identical with -itself. On the contrary, whiteness, considered in itself, exists only -in the subject of which it may be predicated. Consequently, the thing -which exists only in the subject of which it is predicated is not -(physical) "being."[356] "Being," on the contrary, is that which is -what it is by itself. In case it form part of some subject, then it -completes the combination; whose elements exist each in itself, and -which are predicated of the combination only in a condition other than -that of existing in it. Considered as a part, "being" is relative to -something other than itself; but considered in itself, in its nature, -in what it is, it is not predicable of anything.[357] - - -PHYSICAL BEING IS THE PRINCIPLE OF ALL OTHER THINGS. - -To be a subject is then a property common to matter, to form, and -to the combination. But this function of subject is fulfilled -differently by matter in respect to form, and by form in respect to -the modifications, and by the combination; or rather, matter is not a -subject in respect to form; form is the complement which completes it -when it still is only matter, and when it exists only potentially.[358] -To speak strictly, form is not in matter; for when one thing forms only -a unity with something else, one cannot say that one is in the other -(as some accident in its subject). Only when both are taken together -do matter and form form a subject for other things;[359] thus Man -in general, and a particular man constitute the subject of passive -modifications; they are anterior to the actions and consequences which -relate to them. "Being" therefore is the principle from which all other -things derive, and by which they exist; that to which all passive -modifications relate, and from which all actions proceed.[360] - - -RELATION BETWEEN PHYSICAL AND INTELLIGIBLE TERMS ARE MERELY VERBAL. - -5. Such are the characteristics of sense-being. If in any way they also -suit intelligible "being," it is only by analogy,[343] or by figure -of speech (homonymy).[361] So, for instance, the "first" is so called -in respect of the remainder; for it is not absolutely first, but only -in respect to the things which hold an inferior rank; far more, the -things which follow the first are also called first in respect to those -which follow. Likewise, in speaking of intelligible things, the word -"subject" is used in a different sense. It may also be doubted that -they suffer ("experience"), and it is evident that if they do suffer, -it is in an entirely different manner.[362] - - -PHYSICAL BEING IS THAT WHICH IS NOT IN A SUBJECT. - -Not to be in a subject is then the common characteristic of all -"being," if, by "not being in a subject," we mean "not to form part -of any subject," and "not to contribute to the formation of a unity -therewith." Indeed, that which contributes to the formation of a -composite being, with something else, could not be in that thing as -in a subject; form therefore is not in matter as in a subject, and -neither is "man" in Socrates as in a subject, because "man" forms part -of Socrates.[363] Thus, "being" is that which is not in a subject. -If we add that "being" is not predicated of any subject, we must also -add, "insofar as this subject is something different from itself;" -otherwise "man," predicated of some one man, would not be comprised -within the definition of "being," if (in asserting that "being" is not -predicated of any subject), we did not add, "so far as this subject -is something different from itself." When I say, "Socrates is a man," -I am practically saying, "White is white," and not, "wood is white." -While actually asserting that "Socrates is a man," I am asserting that -a particular man is a man, and to say "The man who is in Socrates is a -man," amounts to saying "Socrates is Socrates," or, "that particular -reasonable living organism is a living organism." - - -ALL THE OTHER PHYSICAL CATEGORIES REFER TO MATTER, FORM OR COMBINATION. - -It might however be objected that the property of "being" does not -consist in being a subject; for the difference (as, for instance, a -biped), is also one of those things which are not in a subject.[363] If -"biped" be considered as a part of being, we are compelled to recognize -that "biped" is not in a subject; but if by "biped" we do not mean some -particular "being" but the property of being a biped, then we are no -longer speaking of a being, but of a quality, and "biped" will be in a -subject. - -But time and place do not seem to be in a subject! If we define time as -"the measure of movement,"[364] (there are two possibilities). First, -time might be measured movement; and then it will be in movement as in -a subject, while movement itself will be in the moved thing. Or, time -will be what measures (the soul, or the present moment), and then it -will be in what measures as in a subject. As to space, as it is the -limit of what contains, it will also reside in what contains.[365] It -is otherwise with the "being" that we are here considering. "Being," -then, will have to be considered as consisting in either one, or in -several, or in all the properties of which we are speaking; because -these properties simultaneously suit matter, form, and the combination. - - -BEING DRAWS ITS EXISTENCE FROM THE INTELLIGIBLE. - -6. It may perhaps be objected that we have here indicated the -properties of "being," but we have not described its nature. Such a -request amounts to asking to see what sense-being is; now sense-being -is, and "being" is not something which can be seen. - -What then? Are fire and water not beings? Doubtless, they are. But are -they beings merely because they are visible? No. Is it because they -contain matter? No. Is it because they have a form? No. Is it because -they are combinations? No. They are "beings," because they "are." - -But one can also say that quantity, as well as that quality "is!" Yes, -doubtless, but if we speak thus about quantity and quality, it is only -by a figure of speech.[343],[361], [366] - -Then, in what consists the being of earth, fire, and other similar -things? What is the difference between the being of these things and -of others? The essence of the earth, of the fire, and so forth, exists -in an absolute manner, while the essence of other things (is relative) -and for instance, means merely being white. "Is" added to white is not -the same thing as "essence" taken absolutely; is it? Certainly not. -Essence taken absolutely is essence in the first degree; "to be" added -to white, is essence by participation, essence in the second degree; -for "to be," added to white, makes white an essence; and white added -to essence makes the being white; that is why white is an accident for -essence, and "to be" an accident to white. It is not the same thing as -if we said, Socrates is white, and, the White is Socrates; for in both -cases Socrates is the same being; but it is not thus with whiteness; -for, in the second case, Socrates is contained in the white, and in -the first case, white is a pure accident. When we say, the being is -white, the white is an accident of being; but when we say, the White -is essence, the white contains essence. In short, white possesses -existence only because it refers to "being," and is in "being." It -is therefore from "being" that it receives its existence. On the -contrary, essence draws its existence from itself; and from white it -receives whiteness, not because it is in the white, but because the -white is within it.[366] As the essence which is in the sense-world is -not Essence by itself, we must say that it draws its existence from -the veritable Essence, in itself; and, finally, the White in itself -possesses essence because it participates in the intelligible Essence. - - -BEING CANNOT BE ASCRIBED TO MATTER, WHICH DERIVES ITS BEING FROM THE -INTELLIGIBLE. - -7. If somebody should object that material things derive their essence -from matter, we should have to ask from whence matter itself draws its -essence and existence; for we have elsewhere demonstrated that matter -does not hold the first rank.[367] - -If, however, it be further objected, that the other things could not -exist without being in matter, we will answer that that is true only -for sense-things. But if matter be anterior to sense-things, that does -not hinder itself being posterior to many other things, and to all -intelligible things; for the existence of matter is far more obscure -than the things in matter, if these things be ("seminal) reasons," -which participate deeper in essence, while matter is completely -irrational, being an adumbration, and a decay of reason.[368] - -It may further be objected that matter gives essence to material -things, as Socrates gives essence to the white that is in him. We will -answer that what possesses a superior degree of Essence may well confer -a lesser degree of essence to what possesses a still inferior degree -thereof, but that the reciprocal or converse condition is impossible. -Now, as form is more essence than matter,[369] essence cannot be -predicated equally of matter and form, and "being" is not a genus whose -species is matter, form and the combination.[370] These three things -have several common characteristics, as we have already said, but -they differ in respect to essence; for when something which possesses -a superior degree of essence approaches something which possesses an -inferior degree (as when form approaches matter), this thing, although -anterior in (the ontological) order, is posterior in respect to being; -consequently, if matter, form and the combination be not "beings" -equally, no longer is being for them something common, like a genus. -Nevertheless, "being" will be in a less narrow relation with things -which are posterior to matter, to form, and to the combination, though -it gives each of them the property of belonging to themselves. It is -thus that life has different degrees, one stronger, the other weaker, -and that the images of a same object are some more lively, others more -obscure.[371] If essence be measured by a lower degree of essence, and -if the superior degree which exists in other things be omitted, essence -thus considered will be a common element. But that is not a good way of -procedure. Indeed, each whole differs from the others, and the lesser -degree of essence does not constitute something that was common to all; -just as, for life, there is not something common to vegetative life, to -sensitive life, and rational life.[371] - - -ESSENCES DIFFER ACCORDING TO PARTICIPATION IN FORM. - -Consequently, essence differs both in matter and in form; and these two -(entities) depend from a third (intelligible Being), which communicates -itself to them unequally. The anterior Being possesses a better nature -("essence") than any posterior being, not only when the second proceeds -from the first, and the third from the second; but when two things -proceed from one and the same thing, the same (condition of affairs) -may be observed. Thus does the clay (when fashioned by the potter) -become a tile not only according as it participates in the fire more -or less (is more or less thoroughly baked). Besides, matter and form -do not proceed from the same intelligible principle;[372] for the -intelligibles also differ among each other. - - -DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MATTER AND FORM DUE TO THAT OF INTELLIGIBLE ENTITIES -FROM WHICH THEY DEPEND. - -8. Besides, it is not necessary to divide the combination in form and -matter, now that we speak of sense-being, a "being" which has to be -perceived by the senses, rather than by reason. Neither is it necessary -to add of what this being is composed; for the elements which compose -it are not beings, or at least not sense-beings. What has to be done -here is to embrace in a single genus what is common to stone, to earth, -to water, and to the things compounded of them; namely, to plants and -animals so far as they respond to sensation. In this way, we shall -consider both form and matter; for sense-being contains them both. Thus -fire, earth, and their intermediaries are both matter and form; as to -the combinations, they contain several beings united together. What -then is the common characteristic of all these beings, which separates -them from other things? They serve as subjects to other things, and are -not contained in one subject, and do not belong to something else;[373] -in short, all the characteristics we have enumerated above suit -sense-being. - - -SENSE-BEING CONSISTS IN THE REUNION OF QUALITIES AND MATTER. - -But how shall we separate the accidents from sense-being, if it have -no existence without dimension or quality? Of what will sense-being -consist, if we remove from it dimension, figure (or outward -appearance), color, dryness, and humidity? For sense-beings are -qualified. The qualities which change simple into qualified "being" -refer to something. Thus, it is not the entire fire which is being, -but something of the fire, one of its parts. Now what is this part, if -it be not matter? Sense-being, therefore, consists in the reunion of -quality and matter; and being is constituted by the totality of these -things blended in a single matter. Each thing taken separately will be -quality or quantity, and so forth; but the thing whose absence makes -"being" incomplete is a part of that being. As to the thing which is -added to already complete being, it has its own place;[374] and it is -not lost in the blending which constitutes "being." I do not say that -such a thing, taken with others, is a being when it completes a matter -of some particular size and quality, and that it is no more than a -quality when it does not complete this mass; I say that even here below -not everything is "being," and that only the totality which embraces -everything is "being." Let none complain that we are constituting -"being" as of that which is not being; for even the totality is not -a veritable "being." (Here this word is used in both sensual and -intelligible senses, as a pun), and only offers the image of the -veritable (Being), which possesses essence independently of all that -refers to it, and itself produces the other things because it possesses -veritable (Existence). Here below the substrate possesses essence only -incompletely, and, far from producing other things, is sterile; it is -only an adumbration, and onto this adumbration are reflected images -which have only the appearance (instead of real existence.)[375] - - -CLASSIFICATION OF BODIES. - -9. So much then for what we had to say of sense-being, and the genus it -constitutes. It remains to analyze it into species. Every sense-being -is a body; but there are elementary and organized bodies; the former -are fire, earth, water and air; the organized bodies are those of -plants and animals, which are distinguished from each other by their -forms. The earth and the other elements may be divided into species. -Plants and bodies of animals may be classified according to their -forms; or we could classify apart the terrestrial animals, that inhabit -the earth, and those which belong to some other element. We might also -analyze bodies into those that are light, heavy, or intermediary; the -heavy bodies remaining in the middle of the world, the light bodies in -the superior region which surrounds the world, and the intermediary -bodies dwelling in the intermediary region. In each one of these -regions the bodies are distinguished by their exterior appearance (or, -figure); thus there exist the bodies of the (stars, or) celestial -bodies, and then those that belong to particular elements. After having -distributed the bodies according to the four elements, they could be -blended together in some other manner, and thus beget their mutual -differences of location, forms, and mixtures. Bodies could also be -distinguished as fiery, terrestrial, and so forth, according to their -predominating element. - - -PRIMARY AND SECONDARY BEINGS ARE DIVIDED BY NO SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE. - -As to the distinction drawn between primary and secondary being,[376] -it must be admitted that some particular fire, and the universal Fire -differ from each other in this, that the one is individual, and the -other universal; but the difference between them does not seem to -be essential. Indeed, does the genus of quality contain both White, -and a particular white; or Grammar, and some particular grammatical -science? How far does Grammatical science then have less reality than -some particular grammatical science, and Science, than some particular -science? Grammatical science is not posterior to some particular -grammatical science; Grammatical science must already have existed -before the existence of the grammatical science in you, since the -latter is some grammatical science because it is found in you; it is -besides identical with universal Grammatical science. Likewise, it -is not Socrates that caused him who was not a man to become a man; -it is rather the universal Man who enabled Socrates to be a man; for -the individual man is man by participation in the universal Man. What -then is Socrates, if not some man? In what does such a man contribute -to render "being" more "being"? If the answer be that he contributes -thereto by the fact that the universal Man is only a form, while a -particular man is a form in matter, the result will only be that a -particular man will be less of a man; for reason (that is, essence) is -weaker when it is in matter. If the universal Man consist not only in -form itself, but is also in matter, in what will he be inferior to the -form of the man who is in matter, since it will be the reason of the -man which is in matter? By its nature the universal is anterior, and -consequently the form is anterior to the individual. Now that which -by its nature is anterior is an absolute anterior. How then would the -universal be less in being? Doubtless the individual, being better -known to us, is anterior for us; but no difference in the things -themselves results.[377] Besides, if we were to admit the distinction -between primary and secondary beings, the definition of "being" would -no longer be one; for that which is first and that which is second are -not comprised under one single definition, and do not form a single and -same genus. - - -BODIES MAY BE CLASSIFIED NOT ONLY BY FORMS; BUT BY QUALITIES; ETC. - -10. Bodies may also be distinguished by heat or dryness, wetness -or cold, or in any other desired manner, by taking two qualities -simultaneously, then considering these things as a composition and -mixture, and ceasing at the combination thereof. Or, bodies may be -divided in terrestrial bodies, that dwell on the earth, or distribute -them according to their forms, and the differences of animals; by -classifying not the animals themselves, but their bodies, which are -their instruments,[378] as it were. It is proper to establish a -classification according to the forms, as it is equally reasonable -to classify bodies according to their qualities, such as heat, cold, -and so forth. If it be objected that bodies are constituted rather -by their qualities, it may be answered that they are just as much -classified by their blends, their colors, and their figures. When -analyzing sense-being, it is not unreasonable to classify it according -to the differences that appear to the senses.[379] This ("being") does -not possess absolute (Essence); it is the totality of the matter and -qualities which constitutes the sense-being, since we have said that -its hypostatic existence consists in the union of the things perceived -by the senses, and that it is according to the testimony of their -senses that men believe in the existence of things. - - -BODIES ARE CLASSIFIABLE ACCORDING TO SPECIFIC FORMS. - -The composition of the bodies being varied, they may also be classified -according to the specific forms of the animals. Such, for instance, -would be the specific form of a man united to a body; for this form -is a quality of body, and it is reasonable to analyze it according to -the qualities. If it should be objected that we have said above that -some bodies are simple, while others are composite, thus contrasting -the simple and the composite, we shall answer that, without regarding -their composition, we have also said that they are either brute or -organized. The classification of bodies should not be founded on the -contrast between the simple and the composite, but, as we first did, we -may classify the simple bodies in the first rank. Then, by considering -their blendings, one may start from another principle to determine the -differences offered by the composites under the respect of their figure -or their location; thus, for instance, bodies might be classified -in celestial and terrestrial. This may close our consideration of -sense-being, or generation. - - -DEFINITION OF QUANTITY. - -11. Let us now pass to quantity and quantitatives. When treating -of quantity, we have already said that it consists in number and -dimension, in so far as some thing possesses such a quantity, that -is, in the number of material things, and in the extension of the -subject.[380] Here indeed we are not treating of abstract quantity, -but of a quantity which causes a piece of wood to measure three feet, -or that horses are five in number. Consequently, as we have said, -we should call extension and number (considered from the concrete -viewpoint) "quantitatives"; but this name could could be applied -neither to time nor space; time, being the measure of movement,[381] -re-enters into relation; and place, being that which contains -the body,[382] consists of a manner of being, and consequently, -in a relation. (So much the less should we call time and place -"quantitatives," as) movement, though continuous, does not either -belong to the genus of quantity. - - -LARGE AND SMALL ARE CONCEPTIONS BELONGING TO QUANTITY. - -Should "large" and "small" be classified within the genus of quantity? -Yes: for the large is large by a certain dimension, and dimension is -not a relation. As to "greater" and "smaller," they belong to relation; -for a thing is greater or smaller in relation to something else, just -as when it is double. Why then do we sometimes say that a mountain is -large, and that a grain of millet is small? When we say that a mountain -is small, we use the latter term instead of smaller; for they who -use this expression themselves acknowledge that they call a mountain -small only by comparing it to other mountains, which implies that here -"little" stands for "smaller." Likewise, when we say that a grain of -millet is large, this does not mean "large" in any absolute sense, but -large only for a grain of millet; which implies that one compares it to -things of the same kind, and that here "large" means "larger."[383] - - -BEAUTY IS CLASSIFIED ALONG WITH THE RELATIVES. - -Why then do we not also classify the beautiful among the relatives? -Because beauty is such by itself, because it constitutes a quality, -while "more beautiful" is a relative. Nevertheless the thing which is -called beautiful would sometimes appear ugly, if it were compared to -some other, as, for instance, if we were to contrast the beauty of men -with that of the gods; hence the expression (of Heraclitus's[384]): -"The most beautiful of monkeys would be ugly if compared with an animal -of a different kind." When beauty is predicated of something, it is -considered in itself; it might perhaps be called more beautiful or more -ugly if it were compared to another. Hence it results that, in the -genus of which we are treating, an object is in itself great because of -the presence of greatness, but not in respect to some other. Otherwise, -we would be obliged to deny that a thing was beautiful because of -the existence of some more beautiful one. Neither therefore must we -deny that a thing is great because there is only one greater than it; -for "greater" could not exist without "great," any more than "more -beautiful" without "beautiful." - - -QUANTITY ADMITS OF CONTRARIES (POLEMIC AGAINST ARISTOTLE).[385] - -12. It must therefore be admitted that quantity admits of contraries. -Even our thought admits of contraries when we say "great" and "small," -since we then conceive of contraries, as when we say, "much and -little"; for much and little are in the same condition as great and -small. Sometimes it is said, "At home there are many people," and by -this is intended a (relatively) great number; for in the latter case -it is a relative. Likewise it is said, "There are few people in the -theatre," instead of saying, "there are less people," (relatively); -but when one uses the word "many" a great multitude in number must be -understood. - - -HOW MULTITUDE IS CLASSIFIED WITH RELATIVES. - -How then is multitude classified among relatives? It forms part of -relatives in that multitude is an extension of number, while its -contrary is a contraction. Likewise is it with continuous dimension; we -conceive of it as prolonged. Quantity therefore has a double origin: -progression of unity, and of the point. If either progression cease -promptly, the first one produces "little," and the second, "small." -If both be prolonged, they produce "much," and "large." What then is -the limit that determines these things? The same question may be asked -about the beautiful, and about warmth; for there is also "warmer"; -only, the latter is a relative, while Warm, taken absolutely, is a -quality. As there is a "reason" of the beautiful (a reason that would -produce and determine the beautiful), likewise there must be a reason -for the Great, a reason by participation in which an object becomes -great, as the reason of the Beautiful makes beautiful. Such are the -things for which quantity admits contraries. - - -THERE IS NO CONTRARY FOR PLACE. - -For space, there is no contrary, because strictly space does not belong -to the genus of quantity. Even if space were part of quantity, "high" -would not be the contrary of anything unless the universe contained -also "low." The terms high and low, applied to parts, signify only -higher and lower than something else. It is so also with right and -left, which are relatives. - - -CLASSIFICATION OF SYLLABLES AND SPEECH. - -Syllables and speech are quantitatives; they might be subjects in -respect to quantity, but only so by accident. Indeed, the voice, by -itself, is a movement,[386] it must therefore be reduced to movement -and action. - - -DISCRETE QUANTITY QUITE DISTINCT FROM CONTINUOUS QUANTITY. - -13. We have already explained that discrete quantity is clearly -distinguished from continuous quantity, both by its own definition, and -the general definition (for quantity).[387] We may add that numbers are -distinguished from each other by being even and odd. If besides there -be other differences amidst the even and odd numbers, these differences -will have to be referred to the objects in which are the numbers, or to -the numbers composed of unities, and not any more to those which exist -in sense-beings. If reason separate sense-things from the numbers they -contain, nothing hinders us then from attributing to these numbers the -same differences (as to the numbers composed of unities).[388] - - -ELEMENTS OF CONTINUOUS QUANTITY. - -What distinctions are admitted by continuous quantity? There is the -line, the surface, and the solid; for extension may exist in one, -two or three dimensions (and thus count the numerical elements of -continuous size) instead of establishing species.[389] In numbers thus -considered as anterior or posterior to each other, there is nothing in -common, which would constitute a genus. Likewise in the first, second -and third increases (of a line, surface, and solid) there is nothing in -common; but as far as quantity is found, there is also equality (and -inequality), although there be no extension which is quantitative more -than any other.[390] However, one may have dimensions greater than -another. It is therefore only in so far as they are all numbers, that -numbers can have anything in common. Perhaps, indeed, it is not the -monad that begets the pair, nor the pair that begets the triad, but it -may be the same principle which begets all the numbers. If numbers be -not derivative, but exist by themselves, we may, at least within our -own thought, consider them as begotten (or, derivative). We conceive -of the smaller number as the anterior, the greater as posterior. But -numbers, as such, may all be reduced to unity. - - -STUDY OF GEOMETRICAL FIGURES. - -The method of classification adopted for numbers may be applied to -sizes, and thus distinguish the line, the surface, and the solid or -body, because those are sizes which form different species. If besides -each of these species were to be divided, lines might be subdivided -into straight, curved and spiral; surfaces into straight and curved; -solids into round or polyhedral bodies. Further, as geometers do, may -come the triangle, the quadrilateral, and others. - - -STUDY OF THE STRAIGHT LINE. - -14. But what about the straight line? Is it not a magnitude? Possibly; -but if it be a magnitude, it is a qualified one.[391] It is even -possible that straightness constitutes a difference of the (very nature -of the) line, as line, for straightness refers solely to a line; -and besides, we often deduce the differences of "Essence" from its -qualities. That a straight line is a quantity added to a difference -does not cause its being composed of the line, and of the property of -straightness; for, were it thus composed, straightness would be its -chief difference. - - -STUDY OF THE TRIANGLE. - -Now let us consider the triangle, which is formed of three lines. Why -should it not belong to quantity? Would it be so, because it is not -constituted by three lines merely, but by three lines arranged in some -particular manner? But a quadrilateral would also be constituted by -four lines arranged in some particular manner. (But being arranged in -some particular manner does not hinder a figure from being a quantity). -The straight line, indeed, is arranged in some particular manner, and -is none the less a quantity. Now if the straight line be not simply a -quantity, why could this not also be said of a limited line? For the -limit of the line is a point, and the point does not belong to any -genus other than the line. Consequently, a limited surface is also -a quantity, because it is limited by lines, which even more belong -to quantity. If then the limited surface be contained in the genus -of quantity, whether the surface be a triangle, a quadrilateral, a -hexagon, or any other polygon, all figures whatever will belong to the -genus of quantity. But if we assigned the triangle or quadrilateral -to the genus of quality merely because we are speaking of some one -definite triangle or quadrilateral, nothing would hinder one and the -same thing from being subsumed under several categories. A triangle -would then be a quantity so far as it was both a general and particular -magnitude, and would be a quality by virtue of its possessing a -particular form. The same might be predicated of the Triangle in -itself because of its possessing a particular form; and so also with -the sphere. By following this line of argument, geometry would be -turned into a study of qualities, instead of that of quantities, -which of course it is. The existing differences between magnitudes -do not deprive them of their property of being magnitudes, just as -the difference between essences does not affect their essentiality. -Besides, every surface is limited, because an infinite surface is -impossible. Further, when I consider a difference that pertains to -essence, I call it an essential difference. So much the more, on -considering figures, I am considering differences of magnitude. For -if the differences were not of magnitude, of what would they be -differences? If then they be differences of magnitude, the different -magnitudes which are derived from differences of magnitude should -be classified according to the species constituted by them (when -considered in the light of being magnitudes). - - -GEOMETRY STUDIES QUANTITIES, NOT QUALITIES. - -15. But how can you qualify the properties of quantity so as to call -them equal or unequal?[392] Is it not usual to say of two triangles -that they are similar? Could we not also predicate similarity of -two magnitudes? Doubtless, for what is called similarity,[393] -does not conflict with similarity or dissimilarity in the genus of -quantity.[394] Here, indeed, the word "similarity" is applied to -magnitudes in a sense other than to quality. Besides, if (Aristotle) -said that the property characteristic of quantities is to enable them -to be called equal or unequal, this does not conflict with predicating -similarity of some of them. But as it has been said that the special -characteristic of qualities is to admit of being called similar -or dissimilar, we must, as has already been explained, understand -similarity in a sense other than when it is applied to magnitudes. -If similar magnitudes be identical, we must then consider the other -properties of quantity and quality which might be present in them -(so as clearly to contrast their differences). It may also be said -that the term "similarity" applies to the genus of quantity so far as -this contains differences (which distinguish from each other similar -magnitudes). - - -DIFFERENCES WHICH COMPLETE THE BEING MUST BE PREFIXED TO THAT TO WHICH -THEY REFER. - -In general, the differences which complete a being should be classified -along with that of which they are the differences, especially when a -difference belongs to a single subject. If a difference complete the -being of a subject, and do not complete the being of another, this -difference should be classified along with the subject whose being it -completes, leaving that whose being it does not complete for separate -consideration. By this we do not mean completing the Being in general, -but completing some particular being, so that the subject spoken of as -a particular one admits no further essential addition. We therefore -have the right to say that triangles, or that quadrilaterals, as -well as surfaces and solids, are equal, and to predicate equality or -inequality of quantitative entities. But we yet have to study whether -quality only can be said to be similar or dissimilar.[395] - - -WHETHER QUALITY ONLY CAN BE CALLED SIMILAR OR DISSIMILAR. - -When we were treating of things that were qualified, we had already -explained that matter, united to quantity, and taken with other things, -constitutes sense-being; that this "being" seems to be a composite -of several things, that it is not properly a "whatness,"[396] but -rather qualification (or, qualified thing). The ("seminal) reason," -for instance that of fire, has more of a reference to "whatness," -while the form that the reason begets is rather a qualification. -Likewise, the ("seminal) reason" of man is a "whatness," whilst the -form that this reason gives to the body, being only an image of reason, -is rather a qualification. Thus if the Socrates that we see was the -genuine Socrates, his mere portrait composed of no more than colors -would also be called Socrates. Likewise, although this ("seminal) -reason" of Socrates be that which constitutes the genuine Socrates, we -nevertheless also apply the name of Socrates to the man that we see; -yet the colors, or the figure of the Socrates we see, are only the -image of those which are contained by his ("seminal) reason." Likewise, -the reason of Socrates is itself only an image of the veritable reason -(of the idea) of the man. This is our solution of the problem.[397] - - -THE VARIOUS TERMS EXPRESSING QUALITY. - -16. When we separately consider each of the things which compose -sense-being and when we wish to designate the quality which exists -among them, we must not call it "whatness," any more than quantity -or movement, but rather name it a characteristic, employing the -expressions "such," "as," and "this kind." We are thus enabled to -indicate beauty and ugliness, such as they are in the body. Indeed, -sense-beauty is no more than a figure of speech,[343] in respect to -intelligible beauty; it is likewise with quality, since black and white -are also completely different (from their "reason," or their idea). - - -THE SEMINAL REASON HARMONIZES WITH ITS APPEARING ACTUALIZATION. - -Is the content of ("seminal) reason" and of a particular reason, -identical with what appears, or does it apply thereto only by a -figure of speech?[343] Should it properly be classified among the -intelligible, or the sense-objects? Sensual beauty of course evidently -differs from intelligible beauty; but what of ugliness--in which -classification does it belong? Must virtue be classified among -intelligible or sensual qualities, or should we locate some in each -class? (All this uncertainty is excusable, inasmuch) as it may be asked -whether even the arts, which are "reasons," should be classified among -sense-qualities? If these reasons be united to a matter, they must have -matter as their very soul. But what is their condition here below, when -united to some matter? These reasons are in a case similar to song -accompanied by a lyre;[398] this song, being uttered by a sense-voice, -is in relation with the strings of the lyre, while simultaneously being -part of the art (which is one of these "seminal reasons"). Likewise, -it might be said that virtues are actualizations, and not parts (of -the soul). Are they sense-actualizations? (This seems probable), for -although the beauty contained in the body be incorporeal, we still -classify it among the things which refer to the body, and belong -to it. As to arithmetic, and geometry, two different kinds must be -distinguished: the first kind deals with visible objects, and must -be classified among sense-objects; but the second kind deals with -studies suitable to the soul, and should therefore be classified among -intelligible entities. Plato[399] considers that music and astronomy -are in the same condition. - - -MANY OTHER CONCEPTIONS BELONG AMONG SENSE-QUALITIES. - -Thus the arts which relate to the body, which make use of the organs, -and which consult the senses, are really dispositions of the soul, but -only of the soul as applied to corporeal objects; and consequently, -they should be classified among sense-qualities.[400] Here also belong -practical virtues, such as are implied by civil duties, and which, -instead of raising the soul to intelligible entities, fructify in the -actions of political life, and refer to them, not as a necessity of our -condition, but as an occupation preferable to everything else.[401] -Among these qualities we shall have to classify the beauty contained in -the ("seminal) reason," and, so much the more, black and white. - - -IN SPITE OF THIS CLASSIFICATION THE SOUL HERSELF REMAINS INCORPOREAL. - -But is the soul herself a sense-being, if she be disposed in a -particular way, and if she contain particular "reasons" (that is, -faculties, virtues, sciences and arts, all of which refer to the body, -and which have been classified as sense-qualities)?[402] It has already -been explained that these "reasons" themselves are not corporeal; but -that they have been classified among sense-qualities only because they -referred to the body, and to the actions thereby produced. On the other -hand, as sense-quality has been defined as the meeting of all the -above enumerated entities, it is impossible to classify incorporeal -Being in the same genus as the sensual being. As to the qualities -of the soul, they are all doubtless incorporeal, but as they are -experiences (or, sufferings, or, passions) which refer to terrestrial -things, they must be classified in the genus of quality, just as the -reasons of the individual soul. Of the soul we must therefore predicate -experience, however dividing the latter in two elements, one of which -would refer to the object to which it is applied, and the other to -the subject in which it exists.[403] Though then these experiences -cannot be considered as corporeal qualities, yet it must be admitted -they relate to the body.[404] On the other hand, although we classify -these experiences in the genus of quality, still the soul herself -should not be reduced to the rank of corporeal being. Last, when we -conceive of the soul as without experiences, and without the "reasons" -above-mentioned, we are thereby classifying her along with the World -from which she descends,[405] and we leave here below no intelligible -being, of any kind whatever. - - -QUALITIES ARE CLASSIFIED AS CORPOREAL AND OF THE SOUL. - -17. Qualities, therefore, should be classified as of the body, and of -the soul.[406] Even though all the souls, as well as their immaterial -qualities, be considered as existing on high, yet their inferior -qualities must be divided according to the senses, referring these -qualities either to sight, hearing, feeling, taste, or smell. Under -sight, we will classify the differences of colors; under hearing, -that of the sounds; and likewise, with the other senses. As to the -sounds, inasmuch as they have but a single quality, they will have to -be classified according to their being soft, harsh, agreeable, and the -like. - - -DIFFERENCES OF BEING SHOULD BE DISTINGUISHED ACCORDING TO QUALITY. - -It is by quality that we distinguish the differences which inhere in -being, as well as the actualizations, the beautiful or ugly actions, -and in general, all that is particular. Only very rarely do we discover -in quantity differences which constitute species; so much is this the -case, that it is generally divided by its characteristic qualities. We -must therefore leave quantity aside, and that leads us to wonder how we -may divide quality itself (since it is made use of to distinguish other -things).[407] - - -DIFFERENCE OF QUALITY CANNOT BE DISTINGUISHED BY SENSATION. - -What sort of differences, indeed, might we use to establish such -divisions, and from what genus would we draw them? It seems absurd to -classify quality by quality itself. This is just as if the difference -of "beings" were to be called "beings." By what indeed could one -distinguish white from black, and colors from tastes and sensations -of touch? If we distinguish the difference of these qualities by the -sense-organs, these differences would no longer exist in the subjects. -How indeed could one and the same sense distinguish the difference of -the qualities it perceives? Is it because certain things exercise an -action that is constructive or destructive on the eyes, or the tongue? -We would then have to ask what is the constructive or destructive -element in the sensations thus excited? Yet, even were this answered, -such an answer would not explain wherein these things differ.[407] - - -DIFFERENCE IN EFFECTS IS LIMITED TO THE INTELLIGIBLES. - -A further possibility is that these things should be classified -according to their effects, and that it is reasonable to do so with -invisible entities, such as sciences; but this would not be applicable -to sense-objects. When indeed we divide sciences by their effects, and -when, in general, we classify them according to the powers of the soul, -by concluding from the diversity of their effects that they differ, -our mind grasps the difference of these powers, and it determines not -only with what objects they deal, but it also defines their reason (or, -essence). Let us admit that it is easy to distinguish arts according -to their reasons, and according to the notions they include; but is it -possible to divide corporeal qualities in that manner? Even when one -studies the intelligible world, there is room for doubt as to how the -different reasons distinguish themselves from each other; it is easy -enough to see that white differs from black; but in what does it do so? - - -IT IS ABSURD TO DISTINGUISH BEING, QUALITIES AND DIFFERENCES BY -THEMSELVES. - -18. All the questions we have asked show that we doubtless must -seek to discover the differences of the various (beings), so as to -distinguish them from each other; but that it is as impossible as it -is unreasonable to inquire what are the differences of the differences -themselves.[408] Being of beings, quantities of quantities, qualities -of qualities, differences of differences cannot be discovered; but we -should, wherever possible, classify exterior objects, either according -to their effects, or according to salient characteristics. When this is -impossible, objects should be distinguished, as for instance dark from -light green. - -But how is white distinguished from black? Sensation or intelligence -tell us that those things are different without informing us of their -reason; either sensation, because its function is not to set forth the -reason of things, but only to bring them somehow to our attention; or -intelligence, because it discerns things that are simple by intuition, -without having to resort to ratiocination, and limits itself to the -statement that something is such or such. Besides, in each one of the -operations of intelligence there is a difference (a special distinctive -characteristic) which enables it to distinguish different things, -without this difference (which is proper to each of the operations of -intelligence) itself having need to be discerned by the help of some -other difference. - - -SOME QUALITIES ARE DIFFERENCES. - -Are all qualities differences, or not? Whiteness, colors, qualities -perceived by touch and taste, may become differences between different -objects, though they themselves be species. But how do the sciences -of grammar or of music constitute differences? The science of grammar -renders the mind grammatical, and the science of music renders the mind -musical, especially if they be untaught; and these thus become specific -differences. Besides, we have to consider whether a difference be drawn -from the same genus (from which the considered things are drawn), or -from some other genus. If it be drawn from the same genus, it fulfils, -for the things of this genus, the same function as does a quality to -the quality to which it serves as difference. Such are virtue and -vice; virtue is a particular habit, and vice is also a particular -habit; consequently, as habits are qualities, the differences of these -habits (either of virtue or vice) will be qualities. It may perhaps be -objected that a habit without difference is not a quality, and that it -is the difference alone which constitutes the quality.[409] We will -answer that it is (commonly) said that sweet is good, and that bitter -is bad; this then implies a recognition of their difference by a habit -(a manner of being), and not by a quality. - -What if sweet be said to be "crude," or thick and bitter, thin or -refined? The answer is that coarseness does not inform us of the nature -of sweetness, but indicates a manner of being of what is sweet; and -similarly, with what is refined. - - -THERE ARE DIFFERENCES WHICH ARE NOT QUALITIES. - -There remains for us to examine if a difference of a quality never be a -quality, as that of a being is not a being, nor that of a quantity, a -quantity. Does five differ from three by two? No: five does not differ -from three, it only exceeds it by two. How indeed could five differ -from three by two, when five contains two? Likewise, a movement does -not differ from a movement by a movement. As to virtue and vice, here -is one whole opposed to another whole, and it is thus that the wholes -are distinguished. If a distinction were drawn from the same genus, -that is, from quality, instead of founding itself on another genus; as, -for instance, if one said that such a vice referred to pleasures, some -other to anger, some other to acquisitiveness, and if one were to admit -that such a classification was good; it would evidently result that -there are differences that are not qualities. - - -VARIOUS DERIVATIVES OF THE CATEGORY OF QUALITY. - -19. As has been indicated above, the genus of quality contains the -(beings) which are said to be qualified (qualitative entities), -inasmuch as they contain some quality (as, for instance, the handsome -man, so far as he is endowed with beauty).[410] These (beings) however -do not properly belong to this genus, for otherwise there would here -be two categories. It suffices to reduce them to the quality which -supplies their name. - -So non-whiteness, if it indicate some color other than white, is a -quality; if it express merely a negation, or an enumeration, it is -only a word, or a term which recalls the object; if it be a word, -it constitutes a movement (so far as it is produced by the vocal -organ); if it be a name or a term, it constitutes, so far as it is a -significative, a relative. If things be classed not only by genera, if -it be admitted that each assertion and expression proclaim a genus, our -answer must be that some affirm things by their mere announcement, and -that others deny them. It may perhaps be best not to include negations -in the same genus as things themselves, since, to avoid mingling -several genera, we often do not include affirmations. - -As to privations, it may be remarked that if the things of which -there are privations are qualities, then the privations themselves -are qualities, as "toothless," or "blind."[411] But "naked" and -(its contrary) "clothed" are neither of them qualities; they rather -constitute habits, and thus belong among relatives. - -Passion, at the moment it is felt, does not constitute a quality, but -a movement; when it has been experienced, and has become durable, it -forms a quality;[410] further, if the (being) which has experienced -the passion have kept none of it, it will have to be described as -having been moved, which amounts to the same thing as really being -moved. However, in this case, the conception of time will have to be -abstracted from that of movement; for we must not add the conception of -the present to that of movement.[412] - -Finally, (the adverb) "well," and the other analogous terms may be -reduced to the simple notion of the genus of quality. - -It remains to examine if we must refer to the genus of quality "being -red" without also doing so for "reddening"[410] for "blushing" does -not belong to it, because he who blushes suffers (experiences), or is -moved. But as soon as he ceases blushing, if he have already blushed, -this is a quality; for quality does not depend on time, but consists -in being such or such; whence it follows that "having blushed" is a -quality. Therefore we shall regard as qualities only habits, and not -mere dispositions;[410] being warm, for instance, and not warming up; -being sick, but not becoming sick. - - -CONTRARINESS IS NOT THE GREATEST POSSIBLE DIFFERENCE. - -20. Does every quality have an opposite?[410] As to vice and virtue, -there is, between the extremes, an intermediary quality which is -the opposite of both,[411] but, with colors, the intermediaries -are not contraries. This might be explained away on the ground that -the intermediary colors are blends of the extreme colors. However, -we ought not to have divided colors in extremes and intermediaries, -and opposed them to each other; but rather have divided the genus of -color into black and white, and then have shown that other colors are -composed of these two, or differentiated another color that would be -intermediate, even though composite. If it be said that intermediary -colors are not opposite to the extremes because opposition is not -composed of a simple difference, but of a maximal difference,[413] it -will have to be answered that this maximal difference results from -having interposed intermediaries; if these were removed, the maximal -difference would have no scale of comparison. To the objection that -yellow approximates white more than black, and that the sense of sight -supports this contention; that it is the same with liquids where there -is no intermediary between cold and hot; it must be answered that -white and yellow and other colors compared to each other similarly -likewise differ completely; and, because of this their difference, -constitute contrary qualities; they are contrary, not because they -have intermediaries, but because of their characteristic nature. Thus -health and sickness are contraries, though they have no intermediaries. -Could it be said that they are contraries because their effects differ -maximally? But how could this difference be recognized as maximal since -there are no intermediaries which show the same characteristics at -a less degree? The difference between health and sickness could not -therefore be demonstrated to be maximal. Consequently, oppositeness -will have to be analyzed as something else than maximal difference. -Does this mean only a great difference? Then we must in return ask -whether this "great" mean "greater by opposition to something -smaller," or "great absolutely"? In the first case, the things which -have no intermediary could not be opposites; in the second, as it is -easily granted that there is a great difference between one nature and -another, and as we have nothing greater to serve as measure for this -distance, we shall have to examine by what characteristics oppositeness -might be recognized. - - -CONTRARIES ARE THOSE THINGS THAT LACK RESEMBLANCE. - -To begin with, resemblance does not mean only belonging to the same -genus, nor mere confusion from more or less numerous characteristics, -as, for instance, by their forms. Things that possess resemblance, -therefore, are not opposites. Only things which have nothing identical -in respect to species are opposites;[414] though we must add that they -must belong to the same genus of quality. Thus, though they have no -intermediaries, we can classify as opposites the things which betray -no resemblance to each other; in which are found only characteristics -which do not approximate each other, and bear no kind of analogy to -each other. Consequently, objects which have something in common in the -respect of colors could not be contraries. Besides, not everything is -the contrary of every other thing; but one thing is only the contrary -of some other; and this is the case with tastes as well as with colors. -But enough of all this. - - -QUALITIES ADMIT OF DEGREE. - -Does a quality admit of more or less?[410] Evidently the objects which -participate in qualities participate therein more or less. But the -chief question is whether there be degrees in virtue or justice? If -these habits possess a certain latitude, they have degrees. If they -have no latitude, they are not susceptible of more or less. - - -REASONS WHY MOVEMENT IS A CATEGORY. - -21. Let us pass to movement.[415] Admittedly movement is a genus with -the following characteristics: first, movement cannot be reduced to -any other genus; then, nothing higher in the scale of being can be -predicated of it; last, it reveals a great number of differences which -constitute species. - - -MOVEMENT CANNOT BE REDUCED TO ANY HIGHER GENUS. - -To what genus could (movement) be reduced? It constitutes neither the -being nor the quality of the (being) in which it exists. It is not -even reducible to action, for in passion (or, experience) there are -several kinds of movements; and it is the actions and passions which -are reducible to movement. Further, movement need not necessarily be -a relative merely because movement does not exist in itself, that it -belongs to some being, and that it exists in a subject; otherwise, we -should have to classify quality also as a relation; for quality belongs -to some (being) and exists in a subject; it is not so however, with -a quantity. It might be objected that, though each of them exist in -some subject, the one by virtue of its being a quality, and the other, -of being a quantity, they themselves are not any the less species of -essences. The same argument would apply to movement; though it belong -to some subject, it is something before belonging to a subject, and -we must consider what it is in itself. Now what is relative is not -at first something by itself, and then the predicate of something -else;[416] but what is born of the relation existing between two -objects, is nothing else outside the relation to which it owes its -name; thus the double, so far as it is called doubleness, is neither -begotten, nor exists except in the comparison established between it -and a half, since, not being conceived of before, it owes its name and -its existence to the comparison thus established. - - -IS CHANGE ANTERIOR TO MOVEMENT? - -What then is movement? While belonging to a subject, it is something -by itself before belonging to a subject, as are quality, quantity, -and being. To begin with, nothing is predicated before it, and of -it, as a genus. Is change[417] anterior to movement? Here change is -identical with movement, or if change is to be considered a genus, it -will form a genus to be added to those already recognized. Besides, it -is evident that, on this hypothesis, movement will become a species, -and to it will be opposed, as another species, "generation," as, -for instance, "generation" is a change, but not a movement.[418] -Why then should generation not be a movement? Is it because what is -generated does not yet exist, and because movement could not exist in -non-being? Consequently, neither will generation be a change. Or is -this so because generation is an alteration and increase, and because -it presupposes that certain things are altered, and increase? To -speak thus is to busy ourselves with things that precede generation. -Generation presupposes production of some other form; for generation -does not consist in an alteration passively undergone, such as being -warmed, or being whitened; such effects could be produced before -realization of the generation. What then occurs in generation? There -is alteration. Generation consists in the production of an animal or -plant, in the reception of a form. Change is much more reasonably to -be considered a species, than movement; because the word change means -that one thing takes the place of another, while movement signifies -the actualization by which a being passes from what is proper to it, -to what is not, as in the translation from one place to another. If -that be not admitted (to define movement), it will at least have to be -acknowledged that the action of studying it, as that of playing the -lyre, and in general, all the movements that modify a habit, would -be subsumed within our definition. Alteration therefore could not be -anything else but a species of movement; since it is a movement which -produces passage from one state to another.[419] - - -DEFINITION OF ALTERATION. - -22. Granting that alteration is the same thing as movement, so far as -the result of movement is to render something other than it was, (we -still have to ask) what then is movement? To indulge in a figurative -expression,[343] it is the passage of potentiality to the actualization -of which it is the potentiality.[420] - - -MOVEMENT AS A FORM OF POWER. - -Let us, indeed, suppose, that something which formerly was a -potentiality succeeds in assuming a form, as "potentiality that becomes -a statue," or that passes to actualization, as a man's walk.[421] In -the case where the metal becomes a statue, this passage is a movement; -in the case of the walking, the walk itself is a movement, like the -dance, with one who is capable of it. In the movement of the first -kind, where the metal passes into the condition of being a statue, -there is the production of another form which is realized by the -movement.[422] The movement of the second kind, the dance, is a simple -form of the potentiality, and, when it has ceased, leaves nothing that -subsists after it.[423] - - -MOVEMENT IS ACTIVE FORM, AND CAUSE OF OTHER FORMS. - -We are therefore justified in calling movement "an active form that -is aroused," by opposition to the other forms which remain inactive. -(They may be so named), whether or not they be permanent. We may add -that it is "the cause of the other forms," when it results in producing -something else. This (sense-) movement may also be called the "life of -bodies." I say "this movement," because it bears the same name as the -movements of the intelligence, and those of the soul. - - -QUESTIONS ABOUT MOVEMENT. - -What further proves that movement is a genus, is that it is very -difficult, if not impossible, to grasp it by a definition. But how can -it be called a form when its result is deterioration, or something -passive? It may then be compared to the warming influence of the rays -of the sun, which exerts on some things an influence that makes them -grow, while other things it shrivels. In both cases, the movement has -something in common, and is identical, so far as it is a movement; the -difference of its results is due to the difference of the beings in -which it operates. Are then growing sick and convalescence identical? -Yes, so far as they are movements. Is their difference then due to -their subjects, or to anything else? This question we will consider -further on, while studying alteration. Now let us examine the elements -common to all movements; in that way we shall be able to prove that -movement is a genus. - - -COMMON ELEMENT IN GROWTH, INCREASE AND GENERATION. - -First, the word "movement" can be used in different senses, just as -essence, when considered a genus. Further, as we have already said, -all the movements by which one thing arrives at a natural state, or -produces an action suitable to its nature, constitute so many species. -Then, the movements by which one thing arrives at a state contrary to -its nature, have to be considered as analogous to that to which they -lead. - -But what common element is there in alteration, growth and generation, -and their contraries? What is there in common between these movements, -and the displacement in space, when you consider the four movements, -as such?[425] The common element is that the moved thing, after the -movement, is no longer in the former state; that it no more remains -quiet, and does not rest so long as the movement lasts. It ceaselessly -passes to another state, alters, and does not remain what it was; for -the movement would be vain if it did not make one thing other than it -was. Consequently "otherness" does not consist in one thing becoming -other than it was, and then persisting in this other state, but in -ceaseless alteration. Thus, time is always different from what it was -because it is produced by movement; for it is movement measured in its -march and not in its limit of motion, or stopping point; it follows, -carried away in its course. Further, one characteristic common to -all kinds of movement is that it is the march (or process) by which -potentiality and possibility pass into actualization; for every object -in movement, whatever be the nature of this movement, succeeds in -moving only because it formerly possessed the power of producing an -action, or of experiencing the passion of some particular nature. - - -MOVEMENT FOR SENSE-OBJECTS. - -23. For sense-objects, which receive their impulse from without, -movement is a stimulus which agitates them, excites them, presses them, -prevents them from slumbering in inertia, from remaining the same, and -makes them present an image of life by their agitation and continual -mutations. Besides, one must not confuse the things that move with -movement; walking is not the feet, but an actualization of the power -connected with the feet. Now as this power is invisible, we perceive -only the agitation of the feet; we see that their present state is -quite different from that in which they would have been, had they -remained in place, and that they have some addition, which however, is -invisible. Thus, being united to objects other than itself, the power -is perceived only accidentally, because one notices that the feet -change place, and do not rest. Likewise, alteration in the altered -object, is recognized only by failure to discover in it the same -quality as before. - - -MOVEMENT AS INFLUX. - -What is the seat of a movement acting on an object by passing from -internal power to actualization? Is it in the motor? How will that -which is moved and which suffers be able to receive it? Is it in the -movable element? Why does it not remain in the mover? Movement must -therefore be considered as inseparable from the mover, although not -exclusively; it must pass from the mover into the mobile (element) -without ceasing to be connected with the mover, and it must pass -from the mover to the moved like a breath (or influx).[426] When the -motive power produces locomotion, it gives us an impulse and makes -us change place ceaselessly; when it is calorific, it heats; when, -meeting matter, it imparts thereto its natural organization, and -produces increase; when it removes something from an object, this -object decreases because it is capable thereof; last, when it is the -generative power which enters into action, generation occurs; but if -this generative power be weaker than the destructive power, there -occurs destruction, not of what is already produced, but of what was -in the process of production. Likewise, convalescence takes place as -soon as the force capable of producing health acts and dominates; and -sickness occurs, when the opposite power produces a contrary effect. -Consequently, movement must be studied not only in the things in -which it is produced, but also in those that produce it or transmit -it. The property of movement consists therefore in being a movement -endowed with some particular quality, or being something definite in a -particular thing. - - -MOVEMENT OF DISPLACEMENT IS SINGLE. - -24. As to movement of displacement, we may ask if ascending be the -opposite of descending, in what the circular movement differs from the -rectilinear movement, what difference obtains in throwing an object -at the head or at the feet. The difference is not very clear, for in -these cases the motive power is the same. Shall we say that there is -one power which causes raising, and another that lowers, especially -if these movements be natural, and if they be the result of lightness -or heaviness? In both cases, there is something in common, namely, -direction towards its natural place, so that the difference is derived -from exterior circumstances. Indeed, in circular and rectilinear -movement, if someone move the same object in turn circularly and -in a straight line, what difference is there in the motive power? -The difference could be derived only from the figure (or outward -appearance) of the movement, unless it should be said that the -circular movement is composite, that it is not a veritable movement, -and that it does not produce any change by itself. In all of these -cases, the movement of displacement is identical, and presents only -adventitious differences. - - -EXPLANATION OF COMPOSITION AND DECOMPOSITION. - -25. Of what do composition (blending, or mixture) and decomposition -consist? Do they constitute other kinds of movement than those already -noticed, generation and destruction, growth and decrease, movement -of displacement and alteration? Shall composition and decomposition -be reduced to some one of these kinds of motion, or shall we look -at this process inversely? If composition consist in approximating -one thing to another, and in joining them together; and if, on the -other hand, decomposition consist in separating the things which were -joined, we have here only two movements of displacement, a uniting, -and a separating one. We should be able to reduce composition and -decomposition to one of the above recognized kinds of motion, if -we were to acknowledge that this composition was mingling,[427] -combination, fusion, and union--a union which consists in two things -uniting, and not in being already united. Indeed, composition includes -first the movement of displacement, and then an alteration; just as, -in increase, there was first the movement of displacement, and then -movement in the kind of the quality.[428] Likewise, here there is first -the movement of displacement, then the composition or decomposition, -according as things approximate or separate.[429] Often also -decomposition is accompanied or followed by a movement of displacement, -but the things which separate undergo a modification different from -the movement of displacement; similarly, composition is a modification -which follows the movement of displacement, but which has a different -nature. - - -COMPOSITION AND DECOMPOSITION ARE NOT ALTERATIONS. - -Shall we have to admit that composition and decomposition are -movements which exist by themselves, and analyze alteration into them? -Condensation is explained as undergoing an alteration; that means, as -becoming composite. On the other hand, rarefaction is also explained -as undergoing an alteration, namely, that of decomposition; when, for -instance, one mingles water and wine, each of these two things becomes -other than it was, and it is the composition which has operated the -alteration. We will answer that here composition and decomposition no -doubt precede certain alterations, but these alterations are something -different than compositions and decompositions. Other alterations -(certainly) are not compositions and decompositions, for neither can -condensation nor rarefaction be reduced to these movements, nor are -they composed of them. Otherwise, it would be necessary to acknowledge -the (existence of) emptiness. Besides, how could you explain blackness -and whiteness, as being composed of composition and decomposition? -This doctrine would destroy all colors and qualities, or at least, -the greater part of them; for if all alteration, that means, all -change of quality, consisted in a composition or decomposition, the -result would not be the production of a quality, but an aggregation or -disaggregation. How indeed could you explain the movements of teaching -and studying by mere "composition"? - - -MOVEMENTS DIVIDED IN NATURAL, ARTIFICIAL, AND VOLUNTARY. - -26. Let us now examine the different kinds of movements. Shall we -classify movements of displacement in movements upwards and downwards, -rectilinear or curvilinear, or in movements of animate and inanimate -beings? There is indeed a difference between the movement of inanimate -beings, and that of animate beings; and these latter have different -kinds of motion, such as walking, flying, and swimming. Their movements -could also be analyzed in two other ways, according as it was -conformable to, or against their nature; but this would not explain -the outer differences of movements. Perhaps the movements themselves -produce these differences, and do not exist without them; nevertheless, -it is nature that seems to be the principle of the movements, and of -their exterior differences. It would further be possible to classify -movements as natural, artificial, and voluntary; of the natural, there -are alteration and destruction; of the artificial, there are the -building of houses, and construction of vessels; of the voluntary, -there are meditation, learning, devoting oneself to political -occupations, and, in general, speaking and acting. Last, we might, in -growth, alteration and generation, distinguish the natural movement, -and that contrary to nature; or even establish a classification founded -on the nature of the subjects in which these movements occur. - - -DISTINCTION BETWEEN STABILITY AND STILLNESS. - -27. Let us now study stability or stillness, which is the contrary of -movement.[425] Are we to consider it itself a genus, or to reduce it -to some one of the known genera? First, stability rather suits the -intelligible world, and stillness the sense-world. Let us now examine -stillness. If it be identical with stability, it is useless to look for -it here below where nothing is stable, and where apparent stability -is in reality only a slower movement. If stillness be different from -stability, because the latter refers to what is completely immovable, -and stillness to what is actually fixed, but is naturally movable -even when it does not actually move, the following distinction should -be established. If stillness here below be considered, this rest is -a movement which has not yet ceased, but which is imminent; if by -stillness is understood the complete cessation of movement in the -moved, it will be necessary to examine whether there be anything here -below that is absolutely without movement. As it is impossible for one -thing to possess simultaneously all the species of movement, and as -there are necessarily movements that are not realized in it--since it -is usual to say that some particular movement is in something--when -something undergoes no displacement, and seems still in respect to -this movement, should one not say about it that in this respect it is -not moving? Stillness is therefore the negation of movement. Now no -negation constitutes a genus. The thing we are considering is at rest -only in respect to local movement; stillness expresses therefore only -the negation of this movement. - - -MOVEMENT IS MORE THAN THE NEGATION OF REST. - -It may perhaps be asked, why is movement not rather the negation of -rest? We shall then answer that movement (is something positive), that -it brings something with it; that it has some efficiency, that it -communicates an impulsion to the subject, that produces or destroys -many things; stillness, on the contrary, is nothing outside of the -subject which is still, and means no more than that the latter is still. - - -IN THE INTELLIGIBLE STABILITY DOES NOT IMPLY STILLNESS. - -But why should we not regard the stability of intelligible things also -as a negation of movement? Because stability is not the privation of -movement; it does not begin to exist when movement ceases, and it does -not hinder it from simultaneous existence with it. In intelligible -being, stability does not imply the cessation of movement of that whose -nature it is to move.[430] On the contrary, so far as intelligible -being is contained in (or, expressed by) stability, it is stable; -so far as it moves, it will ever move; it is therefore stable by -stability, and movable by movement. The body, however, is no doubt -moved by movement, but it rests only in the absence of movement, when -it is deprived of the movement that it ought to have. Besides, what -would stability be supposed to imply (if it were supposed to exist -in sense-objects)? When somebody passes from sickness to health, he -enters on convalescence. What kind of stillness shall we oppose to -convalescence? Shall we oppose to it that condition from which that man -had just issued? That state was sickness, and not stability. Shall we -oppose to it the state in which that man has just entered? That state -is health, which is not identical with stability. To say that sickness -and health are each of them a sort of stability, is to consider -sickness and health as species of stability, which is absurd. Further, -if it were said that stability is an accident of health, it would -result that before stability health would not be health. As to such -arguments, let each reason according to his fancy! - - -CONCLUSION OF THE STUDY. - -28. We have demonstrated that acting and experiencing were movements; -that, among the movements, some are absolute, while others constitute -actions or passions.[431] - -We have also demonstrated that the other things that are called genera -must be reduced to the genera we have set forth.[432] - -We have also studied relation, defining it as a habit, a "manner of -being" of one thing in respect of another, which results from the -co-operation of two things; we have explained that, when a habit of -being constitutes a reference, this thing is something relative, not -so much as it is being, but as far as it is a part of this being, as -are the hand, the head, the cause, the principle, or the element.[433] -The relatives might be divided according to the scheme of the ancient -(philosophers), by saying that some of them are efficient causes, while -others are measures, that the former distinguish themselves by their -resemblances and differences, while the latter consist in excess or in -lack. - -Such are our views about the (categories, or) genera (of existence). - - - - -THIRD ENNEAD, BOOK SEVEN. - -Of Time and Eternity.[435] - - -A. ETERNITY. - - -INTRODUCTION. ETERNITY EXISTS PERPETUALLY, WHILE TIME BECOMES. - -(1.)[436] When saying that eternity and time differ, that eternity -refers to perpetual existence, and time to what "becomes" (this visible -world), we are speaking off-hand, spontaneously, intuitionally, and -common language supports these forms of expression. When however we -try to define our conceptions thereof in greater detail, we become -embarrassed; the different opinions of ancient philosophers, and often -even the same opinions, are interpreted differently. We however shall -limit ourselves to an examination of these opinions, and we believe -that we can fulfil our task of answering all questions by explaining -the teachings of the ancient philosophers, without starting any minute -disquisition of our own. We do indeed insist that some of these ancient -philosophers, these blessed men[437] have achieved the truth. It -remains only to decide which of them have done so, and how we ourselves -can grasp their thought. - - -ETERNITY IS THE MODEL OF ITS IMAGE, TIME. - -First, we have to examine that of which eternity consists, according -to those who consider it as different from time; for, by gaining a -conception of the model (eternity), we shall more clearly understand -its image called time.[438] If then, before observing eternity, we form -a conception of time, we may, by reminiscence, from here below, rise to -the contemplation of the model to which time, as its image, resembles. - - -RELATION BETWEEN THE AEON AND INTELLIGIBLE BEING. - -1. (2). How shall we define the aeon (or, eternity)? Shall we say -that it is the intelligible "being" (or, nature) itself, just as -we might say that time is the heaven and the universe, as has been -done, it seems, by certain (Pythagorean) philosophers?[439] Indeed, -as we conceive and judge that the aeon (eternity) is something very -venerable, we assert the same of intelligible "being," and yet it is -not easy to decide which of the two should occupy the first rank; -as, on the other hand, the principle which is superior to them (the -One) could not be thus described, it would seem that we would have -the right to identify intelligible "being" (or, nature), and the aeon -(or, eternity), so much the more as the intelligible world and the -aeon (age, or eternity), comprise the same things. Nevertheless, were -we to place one of these principles within the other, we would posit -intelligible nature ("being") within the aeon (age, or eternity). -Likewise, when we say that an intelligible entity is eternal, as -(Plato) does:[346] "the nature of the model is eternal," we are -thereby implying that the aeon (age or eternity) is something distinct -from intelligible nature ("being"), though referring thereto, as -attribute or presence. The mere fact that both the aeon (eternity) and -intelligible nature ("being"), are both venerable does not imply their -identity; the venerableness of the one may be no more than derivative -from that of the other. The argument that both comprise the same -entities would still permit intelligible nature ("being") to contain -all the entities it contains as parts, while the aeon (or age, or -eternity) might contain them as wholes, without any distinctions as -parts; it contains them, in this respect, that they are called eternal -on its account. - - -FAULTS OF THE DEFINITION THAT ETERNITY IS AT REST, WHILE TIME IS IN -MOTION. - -Some define eternity as the "rest"[440] of intelligible nature -("being"), just like time is defined as "motion" here below. In this -case we should have to decide whether eternity be identical with -rest in general, or only in such rest as would be characteristic of -intelligible nature ("being"). If indeed eternity were to be identified -with rest in general, we would first have to observe that rest could -not be said to be eternal, any more than we can say that eternity is -eternal, for we only call eternal that which participates in eternity; -further, under this hypothesis, we should have to clear up how movement -could ever be eternal; for if it were eternal, it would rest (or, it -would stop). Besides, how could the idea of rest thus imply the idea -of perpetuity, not indeed of that perpetuity which is in time, but of -that of which we conceive when speaking of the aeonial (or, eternal)? -Besides, if the rest characteristic of intelligible "being" in itself -alone contain perpetuity, this alone would exclude from eternity the -other genera (or categories) of existence. Further yet, eternity has to -be conceived of as not only in rest, but (according to Plato[438]) also -in unity, which is something that excludes every interval--otherwise, -it would become confused with time;--now rest does not imply the idea -of unity, nor that of an interval. Again, we assert that eternity -resides in unity; and therefore participates in rest without being -identified therewith. - - -ETERNITY AS A UNION OF THE FIVE CATEGORIES. - -2. (3). What then is that thing by virtue of which the intelligible -world is eternal and perpetual? Of what does perpetuity consist? -Either perpetuity and eternity are identical, or eternity is related -to perpetuity. Evidently, however, eternity consists in an unity, but -in an unity formed by multiple elements, in a conception of nature -derived from intelligible entities, or which is united to them, or -is perceived in them, so that all these intelligible entities form -an unity, though this unity be at the same time manifold in nature -and powers. Thus contemplating the manifold power of the intelligible -world, we call "being" its substrate; movement its life; rest its -permanence; difference the manifoldness of its principles; and -identity, their unity.[441] Synthesizing these principles, they fuse -into one single life, suppressing their difference, considering -the inexhaustible duration, the identity and immutability of their -action, of their life and thought, for which there is neither change -nor interval. The contemplation of all these entities constitutes -the contemplation of eternity; and we see a life that is permanent -in its identity, which ever possesses all present things, which does -not contain them successively, but simultaneously; whose manner of -existence is not different at various times, but whose perfection is -consummate and indivisible. It therefore contains all things at the -same time, as in a single point, without any of them draining off; it -resides in identity, that is, within itself, undergoing no change. Ever -being in the present, because it never lost anything, and will never -acquire anything, it is always what it is. Eternity is not intelligible -existence; it is the (light) that radiates from this existence, whose -identity completely excludes the future and admits nothing but present -existence, which remains what it is, and does not change. - - -THE LIFE OF THE INTELLIGENCE IS EVER CONTEMPORANEOUS. - -What that it does not already possess could (intelligible existence) -possess later? What could it be in the future, that it is not now? -There is nothing that could be added to or subtracted from its -present state; for it was not different from what it is now; and it -is not to possess anything that it does not necessarily possess now, -so that one could never say of it, "it was"; for what did it have -that it does not now have? Nor could it be said of it, "it will be"; -for what could it acquire? It must therefore remain what it is. (As -Plato thought[438]), that possesses eternity of which one cannot say -either "it was," or "will be," but only, "it is;" that whose existence -is immutable, because the past did not make it lose anything, and -because the future will not make it acquire anything. Therefore, on -examining the existence of intelligible nature, we see that its life is -simultaneously entire, complete, and without any kind of an interval. -That is the eternity we seek. - - -ETERNITY IS NOT AN ACCIDENT OF THE INTELLIGIBLE, BUT AN INTIMATE PART -OF ITS NATURE. - -3. (4). Eternity is not an extrinsic accident of (intelligible) nature, -but is in it, of it, and with it. We see that it is intimately inherent -in (intelligible nature) because we see that all other things, of which -we say that they exist on high, are of and with this (intelligible) -nature; for the things that occupy the first rank in existence must be -united with the first Beings, and subsist there. Thus the beautiful -is in them, and comes from them; thus also does truth dwell in them. -There the whole in a certain way exists within the part; the parts -also are in the whole; because this whole, really being the whole, is -not composed of parts, but begets the parts themselves, a condition -necessary to its being a whole. In this whole, besides, truth does -not consist in the agreement of one notion with another, but is the -very nature of each of the things of which it is the truth. In order, -really to be a whole, this real whole must be all not only in the sense -that it is all things, but also in the sense that it lacks nothing. In -this case, nothing will, for it, be in the future; for to say that, -for it, something "will be" for it implies that it lacked something -before that, that it was not yet all; besides, nothing can happen to it -against nature, because it is impassible. As nothing could happen to -it, for it nothing "is to be," "will be," or "has been." - - -TO BEGOTTEN THINGS THE FUTURE IS NECESSARY; BUT NOT TO THE INTELLIGIBLE. - -As the existence of begotten things consists in perpetually acquiring -(something or another), they will be annihilated by a removal of their -future. An attribution of the future to the (intelligible) entities of -a nature contrary (to begotten things), would degrade them from the -rank of existences. Evidently they will not be consubstantial with -existence, if this existence of theirs be in the future or past. The -nature ("being") of begotten things on the contrary consists in going -from the origin of their existence to the last limits of the time -beyond which they will no longer exist; that is in what their future -consists.[442] Abstraction of their future diminishes their life, and -consequently their existence. That is also what will happen to the -universe, in so far as it will exist; it aspires to being what it -should be, without any interruption, because it derives existence from -the continual production of fresh actualizations; for the same reason, -it moves in a circle because it desires to possess intelligible nature -("being"). Such is the existence that we discover in begotten things, -such is the cause that makes them ceaselessly aspire to existence -in the future. The Beings that occupy the first rank and which are -blessed, have no desire of the future, because they are already all -that it lies in them to be, and because they possess all the life they -are ever to possess. They have therefore nothing to seek, since there -is no future for them; neither can they receive within themselves -anything for which there might be a future. Thus the nature ("being") -of intelligible existence is absolute, and entire, not only in its -parts, but also in its totality, which reveals no fault, which lacks -nothing, and to which nothing that in any way pertains to nonentity -could be added; for intelligible existence must not only embrace in -its totality and universality all beings, but it must also receive -nothing that pertains to nonentity. It is this disposition and nature -of intelligible existence that constitutes the aeon (or eternity); -for (according to Aristotle)[443] this word is derived from "aei on," -"being continually." - - -DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ETERNITY AND PERPETUITY. - -4. (5). That this is the state of affairs appears when, on applying -one's intelligence to the contemplation of some of the intelligible -Entities, it becomes possible to assert, or rather, to see that it is -absolutely incapable of ever having undergone any change; otherwise, it -would not always exist; or rather, it would not always exist entirely. -Is it thus perpetual? Doubtless; its nature is such that one may -recognize that it is always such as it is, and that it could never be -different in the future; so that, should one later on again contemplate -it, it will be found similar to itself (unchanged). Therefore, if -we should never cease from contemplation, if we should ever remain -united thereto while admiring its nature, and if in that actualization -we should show ourselves indefatigable, we would succeed in raising -ourselves to eternity; but, to be as eternal as existence, we must not -allow ourselves to be in anyway distracted from contemplating eternity, -and eternal nature in the eternal itself. If that which exists thus be -eternal, and exists ever, evidently that which never lowers itself to -an inferior nature; which possesses life in its fulness, without ever -having received, receiving, or being about to receive anything; this -nature would be "aidion," or perpetual. Perpetuity is the property -constitutive of such a substrate; being of it, and in it.[443] Eternity -is the substrate in which this property manifests. Consequently reason -dictates that eternity is something venerable, identical with the -divinity.[444] We might even assert that the age ("aion," or eternity) -is a divinity that manifests within itself, and outside of itself in -its immutable and identical existence, in the permanence of its life. -Besides, there is nothing to surprise any one if in spite of that we -assert a manifoldness in the divinity. Every intelligible entity is -manifoldness because infinite in power, infinite in the sense that it -lacks nothing; it exercises this privilege peculiarly because it is not -subject to losing anything. - - -ETERNITY IS INFINITE UNIVERSAL LIFE THAT CANNOT LOSE ANYTHING. - -Eternity, therefore, may be defined as the life that is at present -infinite because it is universal and loses nothing, as it has no past -nor future; otherwise it would no longer be whole. To say that it is -universal and loses nothing explains the expression: "the life that is -at present infinite." - - -ETERNITY IS SEMPITERNAL EXISTENCE. - -5. (6). As this nature that is eternal and radiant with beauty refers -to the One, issues from Him, and returns to Him, as it never swerves -from Him, ever dwelling around Him and in Him, and lives according -to Him, Plato was quite right[438] in saying not casually, but with -great profundity of thought, that "eternity is immutable in unity." -Thereby Plato not only reduces the eternity to the unity that it is -in itself, but also relates the life of existence to the One itself. -This life is what we seek; its permanence is eternity. Indeed that -which remains in that manner, and which remains the same thing, that -is, the actualization of that life which remains turned towards, and -united with the One, that whose existence and life are not deceptive, -that truly is eternity. (For intelligible or) true existence is to -have no time when it does not exist, no time when it exists in a -different manner; it is therefore to exist in an immutable manner -without any diversity, without being first in one, and then in -another state. To conceive of (existence), therefore, we must neither -imagine intervals in its existence, nor suppose that it develops or -acquires, nor believe that it contains any succession; consequently -we could neither distinguish within it, or assert within it either -before or after. If it contain neither "before" nor "after," if the -truest thing that can be affirmed of it be that it is, if it exist as -"being" and life, here again is eternity revealed. When we say that -existence exists always, and that there is not one time in which it -is, and another in which it is not, we speak thus only for the sake -of greater clearness; for when we use the word "always," we do not -take it in an absolute sense; but if we use it to show that existence -is incorruptible, it might well mislead the mind in leading it to -issue out from the unity (characteristic of eternity) to make it run -through the manifold (which is foreign to eternity). "Always" further -indicates that existence is never defective. It might perhaps be better -to say simply "existence." But though the word "existence" suffices to -designate "being," as several philosophers have confused "being" with -generation, it was necessary to clear up the meaning of existence by -adding the term "always." Indeed, though we are referring only to one -and the same thing by "existence" and "existing always," just as when -we say "philosopher," and "the true philosopher," nevertheless, as -there are false philosophers, it has been necessary to add to the term -"philosophers" the adjective "true." Likewise, it has been necessary to -add the term "always" to that of "existing," and that of "existing" to -that of "always;" that is the derivation of the expression "existing -always," and consequently (by contraction), "aion," or, eternity. -Therefore the idea "always" must be united to that of "existing," so as -to designate the "real being." - - -THE CREATOR, BEING OUTSIDE OF TIME, PRECEDES THE UNIVERSAL ONLY AS ITS -CAUSE. - -"Always" must therefore be applied to the power which contains no -interval in its existence, which has need of nothing outside of what -it possesses, because it possesses everything, because it is every -being, and thus lacks nothing. Such a nature could not be complete -in one respect, but incomplete in another. Even if what is in time -should appear complete, as a body that suffices the soul appears -complete, though it be complete only for the soul; that which is in -time needs the future, and consequently is incomplete in respect to -the time it stands in need of; when it succeeds in enjoying the time -to which it aspires, and succeeds in becoming united thereto, even -though it still remain imperfect it still is called perfect by verbal -similarity. But the existence whose characteristic it is not to need -the future, not to be related to any other time--whether capable -of being measured, or indefinite, and still to be indefinite--the -existence that already possesses all it should possess is the very -existence that our intelligence seeks out; it does not derive its -existence from any particular quality, but exists before any quantity. -As it is not any kind of quantity, it could not admit within itself -any kind of quantity. Otherwise, as its life would be divided, it -would itself cease to be absolutely indivisible; but existence must -be as indivisible in its life as in its nature ("being"). (Plato's -expression,[446]) "the Creator was good" does indeed refer to the -notion of the universe, and indicates that, in the Principle superior -to the universe, nothing began to exist at any particular time. Never, -therefore, did the universe begin to exist within time, because though -its Author existed "before" it, it was only in the sense that its -author was the cause of its existence. But, after having used the word -"was," to express this thought, Plato immediately corrects himself, -and he demonstrates that this word does not apply to the Things that -possess eternity. - - -TO STUDY TIME WE HAVE TO DESCEND FROM THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD. - -6. (7). Speaking thus of eternity, it is not anything foreign to us, -and we do not need to consult the testimony of anybody but ourselves. -For indeed, how could we understand anything that we could not -perceive? How could we perceive something that would be foreign to us? -We ourselves, therefore, must participate in eternity. But how can we -do so, since we are in time? To understand how one can simultaneously -be in time and in eternity, it will be necessary to study time. We -must therefore descend from eternity to study time. To find eternity, -we have been obliged to rise to the intelligible world; now we are -obliged to descend therefrom to treat of time; not indeed descending -therefrom entirely, but only so far as time itself descended therefrom. - - -B. TIME. - - -THE OPINIONS OF THE PHILOSOPHERS ABOUT TIME MUST BE STUDIED. - -If those blessed ancient philosophers had not already uttered their -views about time, we would only need to add to the idea of eternity -what we have to say of the idea of time, and to set forth our opinion -on the subject, trying to make it correspond with the already expressed -notion of eternity. But we now must examine the most reasonable -opinions that have been advanced about time, and observe how far our -own opinion may conform thereto. - - -TIME CONSIDERED EITHER AS MOTION; AS SOMETHING MOVABLE; OR SOMETHING OF -MOTION. - -To begin with, we may divide the generally accepted opinions about -time into three classes: time as movement, as something movable, or -as some part of movement. It would be too contrary to the notion of -time to try to define it as rest, as being at rest, or as some part of -rest; for time is incompatible with identity (and consequently with -rest, and with what is at rest). Those who consider time as movement, -claim that it is either any kind of movement, or the movement of the -universe. Those who consider it as something movable are thinking of -the sphere of the universe; while those who consider time as some part -of movement consider it either as the interval of movement, or as its -measure, or as some consequence of movement in general, or regular -movement. - - -POLEMIC AGAINST THE STOICS; TIME IS NOT MOVEMENT. - -7. (8). Time cannot (as the Stoics claim,[447]) be movement. Neither -can we gather together all movements, so as to form but a single one, -nor can we consider the regular movement only; for these two kinds of -motion are within time. If we were to suppose that there was a movement -that did not operate within time, such a movement would still be far -removed from being time, since, under this hypothesis, the movement -itself is entirely different from that in which the movement occurs. -Amidst the many reasons which, in past and present, have been advanced -to refute this opinion, a single one suffices: namely, that movement -can cease and stop, while time never suspends its flight. To the -objection that the movement of the universe never stops, we may answer -that this movement, if it consist in the circular movement (of the -stars, according to Hestius of Perinthus; or of the sun, according to -Eratosthenes[447]) operates within a definite time, at the end of which -it returns to the same point of the heavens, but it does not accomplish -this within the same space of time taken up in fulfilling the half of -its course. One of these movements is only half of the other, and the -second is double. Besides, both, the one that runs through half of -space, and the one that runs through the whole of it, are movements of -the universe. Besides, it has been noticed that the movement of the -exterior sphere is the swiftest. This distinction supports our view, -for it implies that the movement of this sphere, and the time used to -operate it, are different entities; the most rapid movement is the one -that takes up the least time, and runs through the greatest amount of -space; the slowest movements are those that employ the longest time, -and run through only a part of that space.[448] - - -POLEMIC AGAINST THE PYTHAGOREANS: TIME IS NOT WHAT IS MOVABLE. - -On the other hand, if time be not the movement of the sphere, -evidently it is far less (than that which is movable, as thought the -Pythagoreans,[449]) or (as Pythagoras thought), the sphere (of heaven) -itself, as some have thought, because it moves. (This fact alone is -sufficient to refute the opinion that confuses time with that which is -movable). - - -POLEMIC AGAINST THE STOIC ZENO: TIME IS NO INTERVAL OF MOVEMENT. - -Is time then some part of movement? (Zeno[450]) calls it the interval -of movement; but the interval is not the same for all movements, even -if the latter were of similar nature; for movements that operate within -space may be swifter or slower. It is possible that the intervals of -the most rapid and of the slowest movement might be measured by some -third interval, which might far more reasonably be considered time. But -which of these three intervals shall be called time? Rather, which of -all the intervals, infinite in number as they are, shall time be? If -time be considered the interval of the regular movement, it will not be -the particular interval of every regular movement; otherwise, as there -are several regular movements, there would be several kinds of time. If -time be defined as the interval of movement of the universe, that is, -the interval contained within this movement, it will be nothing else -than this movement itself. - - -PERSISTENT MOVEMENT AND ITS INTERVAL ARE NOT TIME, BUT ARE WITHIN IT. - -Besides, this movement is a definite quantity. Either this quantity -will be measured by the extension of the space traversed, and the -interval will consist in that extension; but that extension is space, -and not time. Or we shall say that movement has a certain interval -because it is continuous, and that instead of stopping immediately it -always becomes prolonged; but this continuity is nothing else than the -magnitude (that is, the duration) of the movement. Even though after -consideration of a movement it be estimated as great, as might be said -of a "great heat"--this does not yet furnish anything in which time -might appear and manifest; we have here only a sequence of movements -which succeed one another like waves, and only the observed interval -between them; now the sequence of movements forms a number, such as -two or three; and the interval is an extension. Thus the magnitude of -the movement will be a number, say, such as ten; or an interval that -manifests in the extension traversed by the movement. Now the notion -of time is not revealed herein, but we find only a quantity that is -produced within time. Otherwise, time, instead of being everywhere, -will exist only in the movement as an attribute in a substrate, which -amounts to saying that time is movement; for the interval (of the -movement) is not outside of movement, and is only a non-instantaneous -movement. If then time be a non-instantaneous movement, just as we -often say that some particular instantaneous fact occurs within time, -we shall be forced to ask the difference between what is and what is -not instantaneous. Do these things differ in relation to time? Then the -persisting movement and its interval are not time, but within time. - - -POLEMIC AGAINST STRATO: TIME IS NOT MOTION AND REST. - -Somebody might object that time is indeed the interval of movement, but -that it is not the characteristic interval of movement itself, being -only the interval in which movement exerts its extension, following -along with it. All these terms lack definition. This (extension) is -nothing else than the time within which the movement occurs. But -that is precisely the question at issue, from the very start. It is -as if a person who had been asked to define time should answer "time -is the interval of the movement produced within time." What then is -this interval called time, when considered outside of the interval -characteristic of movement? If the interval characteristic of time -be made to consist in movement, where shall the duration of rest be -posited? Indeed, for one object to be in motion implies that another -(corresponding object) is at rest; now the time of these objects is the -same, though for one it be the time of movement, and for the other the -time of rest (as thought Strato[451]). What then is the nature of this -interval? It cannot be an interval of space, since space is exterior -(to the movements that occur within it). - - -POLEMIC AGAINST ARISTOTLE: TIME IS NOT THE NUMBER AND MEASURE OF -MOVEMENT. - -8. (9). Let us now examine in what sense it may be said (by -Aristotle[452]) that time is the number and measure of movement, -which definition seems more reasonable, because of the continuity -of movement. To begin with, following the method adopted with the -definition of time as "the interval of movement," we might ask whether -time be the measure and number of any kind of movement.[453] For how -indeed could we give a numerical valuation of unequal or irregular -movement. What system of numbering or measurement shall we use for -this? If the same measure be applied to slow or to swift movement, -in their case measure and number will be the same as the number ten -applied equally to horses and oxen; and further, such measure might -also be applied to dry and wet substances. If time be a measure of -this kind, we clearly see that it is the measure of movements, but we -do not discover what it may be in itself. If the number ten can be -conceived as a number, after making abstraction of the horses it served -to measure, if therefore a measure possess its own individuality, -even while no longer measuring anything, the case must be similar -with time, inasmuch as it is a measure. If then time be a number in -itself, in what does it differ from the number ten, or from any other -number composed of unities? As it is a continuous measure, and as it -is a quantity, it might, for instance, turn out to be something like -a foot-rule. It would then be a magnitude, as, for instance, a line, -which follows the movement; but how will this line be able to measure -what it follows? Why would it measure one thing rather than another? -It seems more reasonable to consider this measure, not as the measure -of every kind of movement, but only as the measure of the movement it -follows.[452] Then that measure is continuous, so far as the movement -it follows itself continue to exist. In this case, we should not -consider measure as something exterior, and separated from movement, -but as united to the measured movement. What then will measure? Is it -the movement that will be measured, and the extension that will measure -it? Which of these two things will time be? Will it be the measuring -movement, or the measuring extension? Time will be either the movement -measured by extension, or the measuring extension; or some third thing -which makes use of extension, as one makes use of a foot-rule, to -measure the quantity of movement. But in all these cases, we must, as -has already been noticed, suppose that movement is uniform; for unless -the movement be uniform, one and universal, the theory that movement is -a measure of any kind whatever will become almost impossible. If time -be "measured movement," that is, measured by quantity--besides granting -that it at all needs to be measured--movement must not be measured by -itself, but by something different. On the other hand, if movement -have a measure different from itself, and if, consequently, we need a -continuous measure to measure it, the result would be that extension -itself would need measure, so that movement, being measured, may have -a quantity which is determined by that of the thing according to which -it is measured. Consequently, under this hypothesis, time would be -the number of the extension which follows movement, and not extension -itself which follows movement. - - -NOR CAN TIME BE A NUMBERED NUMBER (AS ARISTOTLE CLAIMED[452]). - -What is this number? Is it composed of unities? How does it measure? -That would still have to be explained. Now let us suppose that we had -discovered how it measures; we would still not have discovered the time -that measures, but a time that was such or such an amount. Now that is -not the same thing as time; there is a difference between time and some -particular quantity of time. Before asserting that time has such or -such a quantity, we have to discover the nature of that which has that -quantity. We may grant that time is the number which measures movement, -while remaining exterior thereto, as "ten" is in "ten horses" without -being conceived with them (as Aristotle claimed, that it was not a -numbering, but a numbered number). But in this case, we still have to -discover the nature of this number that, before numbering, is what it -is, as would be "ten" considered in itself.[454] It may be said that it -is that number which, by following number, measures according to the -priority and posteriority of that movement.[452] Nor do we yet perceive -the nature of that number which measures by priority and posteriority. -In any case, whatever measures by priority or posteriority, or by -a present moment,[455] or by anything else, certainly does measure -according to time. Thus this number (?) which measures movement -according to priority or posteriority, must touch time, and, to measure -movement, be related thereto. Prior and posterior necessarily designate -either different parts of space, as for instance the beginning of a -stadium, or parts of time. What is called priority is time that ends -with the present; what is called posteriority, is the time that begins -at the present. Time therefore is something different from the number -that measures movement according to priority or posteriority,--I do -not say, any kind of movement, but still regular movement. Besides, -why should we have time by applying number either to what measures, or -to what is measured? For in this case these two may be identical. If -movement exist along with the priority and posteriority which relate -thereto, why will we not have time without number? This would amount -to saying that extension has such a quantity only in case of the -existence of somebody who recognizes that it possesses that quantity. -Since (Aristotle[456]) says that time is infinite, and that it is such -effectually, how can it contain number without our taking a portion of -time to measure it? From that would result that time existed before -it was measured. But why could time not exist before the existence -of a soul to measure it? (Aristotle) might have answered that it was -begotten by the soul. The mere fact that the soul measures time need -not necessarily imply that the soul produced the time; time, along -with its suitable quantity, would exist even if nobody measured it. If -however it be said that it is the soul that makes use of extension to -measure time, we will answer that this is of no importance to determine -the notion of time. - - -POLEMIC AGAINST EPICURUS: TIME IS NOT AN ACCIDENT OR CONSEQUENCE OF -MOVEMENT. - -9. (10). When (Epicurus[457]) says that time is a consequence of -movement, he is not explaining the nature of time; this would demand a -preliminary definition of the consequence of movement. Besides, this -alleged consequence of movement--granting the possibility of such -a consequence--must be prior, simultaneous, or posterior. For, in -whatever way we conceive of it, it is within time. Consequently, if the -consequence of movement be time, the result would be that time is a -consequence of movement in time (which is nonsense). - - -PLOTINOS CAN GO NO FURTHER IN REFUTING ENDLESS DEFINITIONS OF TIME. - -Now, as our purpose is to discover, not what time is not, but what -it really is, we notice that this question has been treated at great -length by many thinkers before us; and if we were to undertake to -consider all existing opinions on the subject, we would be obliged to -write a veritable history of the subject. We have here, however, gone -to the limit of our ability in treating it without specializing in it. -As has been seen, it is easy enough to refute the opinion that time -is the measure of the movement of the universe, and to raise against -this opinion the objections that we have raised against the definition -of time as the measure of movement in general, opposing thereto the -irregularity of movement, and the other points from which suitable -arguments may be drawn. We are therefore free to devote ourselves to an -explanation of what time really is. - - -THE NATURE OF TIME WILL BE REVEALED BY ITS ORIGIN. - -10. (11). To accomplish this we shall have to return to the nature -which, as we pointed out above, was essential to eternity; that -immutable life, wholly realized all at once, infinite and perfect, -subsisting in, and referring to unity. Time was not yet, or at least, -it did not yet exist for the intelligible entities. Only, it was yet -to be born of them,[458] because (as was the world), time, by both its -reason and nature, was posterior to the (intelligible entities[459]). -Are we trying to understand how time issued from among intelligible -entities while these were resting within themselves? Here it would be -useless to call upon the Muses, for they did not yet exist. Still this -might perhaps not be useless; for (in a certain sense, that time had -already begun, then, so far as they existed within the sense-world) -they existed already. In any case, the birth of time will be plain -enough if we consider it only as it is born and manifested. Thus much -can be said about it. - - -TIME AROSE AS MEASUREMENT OF THE ACTIVITY OF THE UNIVERSAL SOUL. - -Before priority and posteriority, time, which did not yet exist, -brooded within existence itself. But an active nature (the universal -Soul), which desired to be mistress of herself, to possess herself, and -ceaselessly to add to the present, entered into motion, as did time, -along with (the Soul). We achieve a representation of the time that -is the image of eternity, by the length that we must go through with -to reach what follows, and is posterior, towards one moment, and then -towards another.[460] - - -LIKE TIME, SPACE IS THE RESULT OF THE PROCESSION OF THE UNIVERSAL SOUL. - -As the universal Soul contained an activity that agitated her, and -impelled her to transport into another world what she still saw on -high, she was willing to retain all things that were present at the -same time. (Time arose not by a single fiat, but as the result of a -process. This occurred within the universal Soul, but may well be -first illustrated by the more familiar process within) Reason, which -distributes unity, not indeed That which remains within itself, but -that which is exterior to itself. Though this process seem to be a -strengthening one, reason developing out of the seed in which it -brooded unto manifoldness, it is really a weakening (or destructive -one), inasmuch as it weakened manifoldness by division, and weakened -reason by causing it to extend. The case was similar with the universal -Soul. When she produced the sense-world, the latter was animated by -a movement which was only an image of intelligible movement. (While -trying to strengthen) this image-movement to the extent of the -intelligible movement, she herself (weakened), instead of remaining -exclusively eternal, became temporal and (involuntarily) subjected what -she had produced to the conditions of time, transferring entirely into -time not only the universe, but also all its revolutions. Indeed, as -the world moves within the universal Soul, which is its location, it -also moves within the time that this Soul bears within herself.[461] -Manifesting her power in a varied and successive manner, by her mode -of action, the universal Soul begat succession. Indeed, she passes -from one conception to another, and consequently to what did not exist -before, since this conception was not effective, and since the present -life of the soul does not resemble her former life. Her life is varied, -and from the variety of her life results the variety of time.[462] - - -TIME IS THE LIFE OF THE SOUL CONSIDERED IN THE MOVEMENT BY WHICH SHE -PASSES FROM ONE ACTUALIZATION TO ANOTHER. - -Thus, the extension of the life of the soul produces time, and the -perpetual progression of her life produces the perpetuity of time, and -her former life constitutes the past. We may therefore properly define -time as the life of the soul considered in the movement by which she -passes from one actualization to another. - - -WHAT ETERNITY IS TO INTELLIGENCE, TIME IS TO THE UNIVERSAL SOUL. - -We have already decided that eternity is life characterized by rest, -identity, immutability and infinity (in intelligence). It is, further, -(admitted that) this our world is the image of the superior World -(of intelligence). We have also come to the conclusion that time -is the image of eternity. Consequently, corresponding to the Life -characteristic of Intelligence, this world must contain another life -which bears the same name, and which belongs to that power of the -universal Soul. Instead of the movement of Intelligence, we will have -the movement characteristic of a part of the soul (as the universal -Soul ceaselessly passes from one thought to another). Corresponding to -the permanence, identity, and immutability (of Intelligence), we will -have the mobility of a principle which ceaselessly passes from one -actualization to another. Corresponding to the unity and the absence -of all extension, we will have a mere image of unity, an image which -exists only by virtue of continuity. Corresponding to an infinity -already entirely present, we will have a progression towards infinity -which perpetually tends towards what follows. Corresponding to what -exists entirely at the same time, we will have what exists by parts, -and what will never exist entire at the same time. The soul's existence -will have to be ceaseless acquiring of existence; if it is to reveal an -image of the complete, universal and infinite existence of the soul; -that is the reason its existence is able to represent the intelligible -existence. - - -TIME IS AS INTERIOR TO THE SOUL AS ETERNITY IS TO EXISTENCE. - -Time, therefore, is not something external to the soul, any more than -eternity is exterior to existence. It is neither a consequence nor a -result of it, any more than eternity is a consequence of existence. It -appears within the soul, is in her and with her, as eternity is in and -with existence. - - -TIME IS THE LENGTH OF THE LIFE OF THE UNIVERSAL SOUL. - -11. (12). The result of the preceding considerations is that time -must be conceived of as the length of the life characteristic of the -universal Soul; that her course is composed of changes that are equal, -uniform, and insensible, so that that course implies a continuity of -action. Now let us for a moment suppose that the power of the Soul -should cease to act, and to enjoy the life she at present possesses -without interruption or limit, because this life is the activity -characteristic of an eternal Soul, an action by which the Soul does -not return upon herself, and does not concentrate on herself, though -enabling her to beget and produce. Now supposing that the Soul -should cease to act, that she should apply her superior part to the -intelligible world, and to eternity, and that she should there remain -calmly united--what then would remain, unless eternity? For what room -for succession would that allow, if all things were immovable in unity? -How could she contain priority, posteriority, or more or less duration -of time? How could the Soul apply herself to some object other than -that which occupies her? Further, one could not then even say that -she applied herself to the subject that occupied her; she would have -to be separated therefrom in order to apply herself thereto. Neither -would the universal Sphere exist, since it does not exist before -time, because it exists and moves within time. Besides, even if this -Sphere were at rest during the activity of the Soul, we could measure -the duration of her rest because this rest is posterior to the rest -of eternity. Since time is annihilated so soon as the Soul ceases to -act, and concentrates in unity, time must be produced by the beginning -of the Soul's motion towards sense-objects, by the Soul's life. -Consequently (Plato[463]) says that time is born with the universe, -because the Soul produced time with the universe; for it is this very -action of the Soul which has produced this universe. This action -constitutes time, and the universe is within time. Plato does indeed -call the movements of the stars, time; but evidently only figuratively, -as (Plato) subsequently says that the stars were created to indicate -the divisions of time, and to permit us to measure it easily. - - -TIME IS NOT BEGOTTEN BY MOVEMENT, BUT ONLY INDICATED THEREBY. - -Indeed, as it was not possible to determine the time itself of the -Soul, and to measure within themselves the parts of an invisible and -uncognizable duration, especially for men who did not know how to -count, the (world) Soul created day and night so that their succession -might be the basis of counting as far as two, by the aid of this -variety. Plato[464] indicates that as the source of the notion of -number. Later, observing the space of time which elapses from one dawn -to another, we were able to discover an interval of time determined by -an uniform movement, so far as we direct our gaze thereupon, and as -we use it as a measure by which to measure time. The expression "to -measure time" is premeditated, because time, considered in itself, is -not a measure. How indeed could time measure, and what would time, -while measuring, say? Would time say of anything, "Here is an extension -as large as myself?" What indeed could be the nature of the entity that -would speak of "myself"? Would it be that according to which quantity -is measured? In this case, time would have to be something by itself, -to measure without itself being a measure. The movement of the universe -is measured according to time, but it is not the nature of time to be -the measure of movement; it is such only accidentally; it indicates -the quantity of movement, because it is prior to it, and differs from -it. On the other hand, in the case of a movement produced within a -determinate time, and if a number be added thereto frequently enough, -we succeed in reaching the knowledge of how much time has elapsed. -It is therefore correct to say that the movement of the revolution -operated by the universal Sphere measures time so far as possible, by -its quantity indicating the corresponding quantity of time, since it -can neither be grasped nor conceived otherwise. Thus what is measured, -that is, what is indicated by the revolution of the universal Sphere, -is time. It is not begotten, but only indicated by movement. - - -MOVEMENT IS SAID TO BE MEASURED BY SPACE, BECAUSE OF ITS -INDETERMINATION. - -The measure of movement, therefore, seems to be what is measured by -a definite movement, but which is other than this movement. There is -a difference, indeed, between that which is measured, and that which -measures; but that which is measured is measured only by accident. -That would amount to saying that what is measured by a foot-rule is -an extension, without defining what extension in itself is. In the -same way, because of the inability to define movement more clearly -because of its indeterminate nature, we say that movement is that which -is measured by space; for, by observation of the space traversed by -movement, we can judge of the quantity of the movement. - - -TIME IS MEASURED BY MOVEMENT, AND IN THAT SENSE IT IS THE MEASURE OF -MOVEMENT. - -12. (13). The revolution of the universal Sphere leads us therefore to -the recognition of time, within which it occurs. Not only is time that -in which (all things "become," that is, grow), but time has to be what -it is even before all things, being that within which everything moves, -or rests with order and uniformity. This is discovered and manifested -to our intelligence, but not produced by regular movement and rest, -especially by movement. Better than rest, indeed, does movement lead us -to a conception of time, and it is either to appreciate the duration -of movement than that of rest. That is what led philosophers to define -time as the measure "of" movement, instead of saying, what probably -lay within their intention, that time is measured "by" movement. Above -all, we must not consider that definition as adequate, adding to it -that which the measured entity is in itself, not limiting ourselves -to express what applies to it only incidentally. Neither did we ever -discern that such was their meaning, and we were unable to understand -their teachings as they evidently posited the measure in the measured -entity. No doubt that which hindered us from understanding them was -that they were addressing their teachings to learned (thinkers), or -well prepared listeners, and therefore, in their writings, they failed -to explain the nature of time considered in itself, whether it be -measure or something measured. - - -PLATO DOES MAKE SOME STATEMENTS THAT ALLOW OF BEING JUSTIFIED. - -Plato himself, indeed, does say, not that the nature of time is to -be a measure or something measured, but that to make it known there -is, in the circular movement of the universe, a very short element -(the interval of a day), whose object is to demonstrate the smallest -portion of time, through which we are enabled to discover the nature -and quantity of time. In order to indicate to us its nature ("being"), -(Plato[438]) says that it was born with the heavens, and that it is -the mobile image of eternity. Time is mobile because it has no more -permanence than the life of the universal Soul, because it passes on -and flows away therewith; it is born with the heavens, because it is -one and the same life that simultaneously produces the heavens and -time. If, granting its possibility, the life of the Soul were reduced -to the unity (of the Intelligence), there would be an immediate -cessation of time, which exists only in this life, and the heavens, -which exist only through this life. - - -TIME AS THE PRIOR AND POSTERIOR OF THE MOVEMENT OF THIS LIFE WOULD BE -ABSURD. - -The theory that time is the priority and posteriority of this (earthly) -movement, and of this inferior life, is ridiculous in that it -would imply on one hand that (the priority and posteriority of this -sense-life) are something; and on the other, refusing to recognize -as something real a truer movement, which includes both priority and -posteriority. It would, indeed, amount to attributing to an inanimate -movement the privilege of containing within itself priority with -posteriority, that is, time; while refusing it to the movement (of the -Soul), whose movement of the universal Sphere is no more than an image. -Still it is from the movement (of the Soul) that originally emanated -priority and posteriority, because this movement is efficient by -itself. By producing all its actualizations it begets succession, and, -at the same time that it begets succession, it produces the passing -from one actualization to another. - - -THE PRIMARY MOVEMENT OF INTELLIGENCE THE INFORMING POWER OF TIME. - -(Some objector might ask) why we reduce the movement of the universe -to the movement of the containing Soul, and admit that she is within -time, while we exclude from time the (universal) Soul's movement, which -subsists within her, and perpetually passes from one actualization -to another? The reason is that above the activity of the Soul there -exists nothing but eternity, which shares neither her movement nor her -extension. Thus the primary movement (of Intelligence) finds its goal -in time, begets it, and by its activity informs its duration. - - -WHY TIME IS PRESENT EVERYWHERE; POLEMIC AGAINST ANTIPHANES AND -CRITOLAUS. - -How then is time present everywhere? The life of the Soul is present in -all parts of the world, as the life of our soul is present in all parts -of our body. It may indeed be objected,[465] that time constitutes -neither a hypostatic substance, nor a real existence, being, in -respect to existence, a deception, just as we usually say that the -expressions "He was" and "He will be" are a deception in respect to -the divinity; for then He will be and was just as is that, in which, -according to his assertion, he is going to be. - -To answer these objections, we shall have to follow a different method. -Here it suffices to recall what was said above, namely, that by seeing -how far a man in motion has advanced, we can ascertain the quantity -of the movement; and that, when we discern movement by walking, we -simultaneously concede that, before the walking, movement in that man -was indicated by a definite quantity, since it caused his body to -progress by some particular quantity. As the body was moved during -a definite quantity of time, its quantity can be expressed by some -particular quantity of movement--for this is the movement that causes -it--and to its suitable quantity of time. Then this movement will be -applied to the movement of the soul, which, by her uniform action, -produces the interval of time. - - -THE MOVEMENT OF THE SOUL IS ATTRIBUTED TO THE PRIMARY MOVEMENT. - -To what shall the movement of the (universal) Soul be attributed? -To whatever we may choose to attribute it. This will always be some -indivisible principle, such as primary Motion, which within its -duration contains all the others, and is contained by none other;[466] -for it cannot be contained by anything; it is therefore genuinely -primary. The same obtains with the universal Soul. - - -APPROVAL OF ARISTOTLE: TIME IS ALSO WITHIN US. - -Is time also within us?[467] It is uniformly present in the universal -Soul, and in the individual souls that are all united together.[468] -Time, therefore, is not parcelled out among the souls, any more than -eternity is parcelled out among the (Entities in the intelligible -world) which, in this respect, are all mutually uniform. - - - - -FOOTNOTES: - - -[1] Arist. Physics, iii. 7. - -[2] Or, the finished, the boundary, the Gnostic Horos. - -[3] Plato, Philebus, 24; Cary, 37. - -[4] Plato, Timaeus, p. 52; Cary, 26. - -[5] See vi. 3.13. - -[6] See Plato, Philebus, Cary, 40; see ii. 4.11. - -[7] See vi. 3.27. - -[8] See ii. 4.10. - -[9] Timaeus, 39; Cary, 14; see iii. 7.11. - -[10] Parmenides, 144; Cary, 37. - -[11] Possibly a reference to Numenius' book thereon. - -[12] Aristotle, Met. i. 5; Jamblichus, de Vita. Pyth. 28.150; and -29.162; found in their oath; also Numenius, 60. - -[13] See vi. 2.7. - -[14] See vi. 6.5. - -[15] As thought Plato and Aristotle combined, see Ravaisson, Essay, ii. -407. - -[16] Atheneus, xii. 546; see i. 6.4. - -[17] Plato, Timaeus, 39e, Cary, 15. - -[18] See iii. 8.7. - -[19] As thought the Pythagoreans; see Sextus Empiricus, Hypotyposes -Pyrrh. 3.18, p. 165. - -[20] Olympiodorus, Comm. I Alcibiades, x. p. 95; Arist. Met., i. 5; -Sextus Emp., H. P., iii. 152; Porphyry; Vit. Pyth., 48. - -[21] As said Theon of Smyrna, of the Pythagoreans, ii. p. 23; -Jamblichus, Vit. Porph. 28.150; 29.162. - -[22] See i. 8.2. - -[23] Met. x. 2; iv. 2; v. - -[24] Peripatetic commentators on Aristotle's Metaphysics, which was -used as a text-book in Plotinos's school. - -[25] See end of Sec. 13. - -[26] See vi. 1.6. - -[27] See Aristotle, Categories, ii. 6. - -[28] As Aristotle thought, Met. x. 2. - -[29] See vi. 9.2. - -[30] Met. x. 1. - -[31] The Numenian secret name of the divinity, fr. 20. - -[32] Met. xiii. 7. - -[33] Aristotle, Met. x. 2. - -[34] Aristotle, Metaph. xiii. 7. - -[35] See iv. 8.3. - -[36] See iv. 4.5. - -[37] See v. 7.3. - -[38] See vi. 3.13. - -[39] See vi. 9.1. - -[40] See Timaeus, 35; Cary, 12. Jamblichus, On the Soul, 2; Macrobius, -Dream of Scipio, i. 5. - -[41] See Jamblichus, About Common Knowledge of Mathematics. - -[42] See Sec. 2. - -[43] Macrobius, Dream of Scipio, 1.5. - -[44] Parmenides quoted in Plato's Theataetus, 180 E. Jowett, iii. 383. - -[45] Plato, Timaeus, 56; Cary, 30. - -[46] In the Timaeus, 39; Cary, 14. - -[47] Parmenides, quoted by Plato, in the Sophists, 244; Cary, 61. - -[48] In Plato's Theataetus, 180; Jowett Tr. iii. 383. - -[49] Evidently Porphyry had advanced new objections that demanded an -addition to the former book on the theory of vision; see iv. 5. - -[50] As thought the Stoics. - -[51] Like Aristotle, de Sensu et Sensili, 2. - -[52] iv. 5. - -[53] These ten disjointed reflections on happiness remind us of -Porphyry's questioning habit, without which, Plotinos said, he might -have had nothing to write; see Biography, 13. - -[54] As Epicurus thought the divinities alone enjoyed perfect -happiness, Diog. Laert. x. 121. - -[55] See Aristotle, Nic. Ethics, 1.10. - -[56] See Cicero, de Finibus, ii. 27-29. - -[57] See iii. 7. - -[58] Plutarch, Dogm. Philos. i. 17; Stob. Eclog. i. 18. - -[59] Arist. Topic. iv. 2; de Gener. et Cor. i. 10; Ravaisson, EMA, i. -422. - -[60] As did Alexander of Aphrodisias, in his treatise on "Mixture;" -Ravaisson, EMA, ii. 297. - -[61] Stob. Eclog. i. 18. - -[62] See Plutarch, "Whether Wickedness Renders One Unhappy." - -[63] As said Numenius, 44. - -[64] See vi. 7. This is another proof of the chronological order, as -vi. 7 follows this book. - -[65] Bouillet explains that in this book Plotinos summated all that -Plato had to say of the Ideas and of their dependence on the Good, in -the Timaeus, Philebus, Phaedrus, the Republic, the Banquet, and the -Alcibiades; correcting this summary by the reflections of Aristotle, -in Met. xii. But Plotinos advances beyond both Plato and Aristotle in -going beyond Intelligence to the supreme Good. (See Sec. 37.) This -treatise might well have been written at the instigation of Porphyry, -who desired to understand Plotinos's views on this great subject. - -[66] The famous Philonic distinction between "ho theos," and "theos." - -[67] Plato, Timaeus, p. 45, Cary, 19. - -[68] See iii. 2. - -[69] See iii. 2.1. - -[70] Plato's Timaeus, pp. 30-40, Cary, 10-15. - -[71] An Aristotelian idea, from Met. vii. 1. - -[72] Aristotle, Met. vii. 17. - -[73] Met. vii. 1. - -[74] Met. vii. 7. - -[75] Aristotle, Met. v. 8. - -[76] Met. 1.3. - -[77] See ii. 9.3. - -[78] Aristotle, de Anima, ii. 2; Met. vii. 17. - -[79] Porphyry, Of the Faculties of the Soul, fr. 5. - -[80] See ii. 5.3. - -[81] Aristotle, de Anima, i. 3; ii. 2-4. - -[82] Plato, I Alcibiades, p. 130, Cary, 52. - -[83] See i. 1.3. - -[84] Bouillet explains this as follows: Discursive reason, which -constitutes the real man, begets sensibility, which constitutes the -animal; see i. 1.7. - -[85] See iii. 4.3-6. - -[86] See iii. 4.6. - -[87] These demons are higher powers of the human soul. - -[88] See iv. 3.18. - -[89] Plato, Timaeus, p. 76, Cary, 54. - -[90] p. 39, Cary, 15. - -[91] Plato, Timaeus, p. 77, Cary, 55. - -[92] See iv. 4.22. - -[93] Lucretius, v. 1095. - -[94] Diogenes Laertes, iii. 74. - -[95] Plato, Timaeus, p. 80, Cary, 61. - -[96] See iv. 3.18. - -[97] Plato, Phaedrus, p. 248, Cary, 60; see i. 3.4. - -[98] See v. 7. - -[99] See v. 1.9. - -[100] See i. 8.6, 7. - -[101] Rep. vi. p. 509, Cary, 19. - -[102] See v. 1.7. - -[103] See v. 1.5. - -[104] See v. 1.7. - -[105] Plato, Rep. vi. p. 509, Cary, 19. - -[106] See v. 1.6. - -[107] See iv. 8.3. - -[108] See v. 1.4. - -[109] See v. 1.6. - -[110] Arist. Nic. Eth. 1.1. - -[111] See Arist., Met. i. 5. - -[112] According to Plato's Banquet, p. 206, Cary, 31. - -[113] See iv. 5.7. - -[114] See 1.6. - -[115] Plato, Phaedrus, p. 249, Cary, 63. - -[116] See v. 1.2. - -[117] See vi. 7.25. - -[118] Plato, Philebus, p. 60, Cary, 141; Gorgias, p. 474, Cary, 66. - -[119] p. 61, Cary, 144. - -[120] See Met. xii. - -[121] Met xii. 7. - -[122] Plato, Rep. vi., p. 505, Cary, 17. - -[123] According to the proverb, like seeks its like, mentioned by -Plato, in his Banquet; p. 195, Cary, 21. - -[124] Plato, Gorgias, p. 507, Cary, 136. - -[125] See i. 8.5. - -[126] Plato, Timaeus, p. 52, Cary, 26. - -[127] See below, Sec. 32. - -[128] Plato, Rep. vi., p. 506, Cary 17. - -[129] As said Plato, Republic vi., p. 508, Cary, 19. - -[130] See iii. 5.9. - -[131] In his Philebus, p. 65, Cary, 155. - -[132] As Plato said, in his Banquet, p. 184, Cary, 12. - -[133] See i. 6.5. - -[134] See i. 6.7. - -[135] As says Plato, in his Banquet, p. 210, Cary, 35. - -[136] As Plato says, in his Phaedrus, p. 250, Cary, 65. - -[137] As Plato says, in his Banquet, p. 183, Cary, 11. - -[138] See i. 6.9. - -[139] See i. 6.8. - -[140] As Plato said, in his Banquet, p. 211, Cary, 35. - -[141] See iii. 5.9. - -[142] Rep. vi., p. 505, Cary, 16. - -[143] See iii. 3.6. - -[144] As thought Plato, in the Banquet, p. 210, Cary, 35. - -[145] Arist. Met. xii. 9; see v. 1.9. - -[146] Met. xii. 7. - -[147] Met. xii. 9. - -[148] See iv. 6.3. - -[149] Met. xii. 8. - -[150] Plato, Rep. vi. p. 509, Cary, 19. - -[151] Met. xii. 7. - -[152] See v. 3.10. - -[153] See vi. 2.7. - -[154] See v. 3.11. - -[155] See iii. 9.6. - -[156] See vi. 5.11. - -[157] See v. 3.13. - -[158] Arist. Met. xii. 7. - -[159] As thought Plato, Rep. vi., p. 508, Cary, 19. - -[160] See iv. 3.1. - -[161] Letter ii. 312; Cary, p. 482. - -[162] See i. 6, end. - -[163] Numenius, fr. 32. - -[164] See Numenius, fr. 48. - -[165] Banquet, p. 211, Cary, 35. - -[166] As Aristotle asks, Eth. Nic. iii. - -[167] Arist. Nic. Eth. iii. 1. - -[168] Eud. Eth. ii. 6. - -[169] Nic. Eth. iii. 2. - -[170] Eud. Mor. ii. 9. - -[171] Nic. Eth. iii. 2. - -[172] Nic. Eth. iii. 6. - -[173] Plato, Alcinous, 31; this is opposed by Aristotle, Nic. Eth. iii. -2.6. - -[174] Aristotle, Eud. Eth. ii. 10. - -[175] Aristotle, Mor. Magn. i. 32; Nic. Eth. iii. 6. - -[176] Aristotle, Nic. Eth. iii. 4. - -[177] Arist. de Anim. iii. 10. - -[178] de Anim. iii. 9. - -[179] Magn. Mor. i. 17. - -[180] de Anim. iii. 9. - -[181] This Stoic term had already been noticed and ridiculed by -Numenius, 2.8, 13; 3.4, 5; Guthrie, Numenius, p. 141. He taught that -it was a casual consequence of the synthetic power of the soul (52). -Its relation to free-will and responsibility, here considered, had been -with Numenius the foundation of the ridicule heaped on Lacydes. - -[182] Nic. Eth. x. 8. - -[183] Nic. Eth. x. 7. - -[184] Plato, Republic, x. p. 617; Cary, 15. - -[185] In his Phaedo, p. 83; Cary, 74. - -[186] Such as Strato the Peripatetic, and the Epicureans. - -[187] Plato, Rep. x. p. 596c; Cary, 1. - -[188] See Jamblichus's Letter to Macedonius, on Destiny, 5. - -[189] See iii. 9, end. - -[190] Numenius, 32. - -[191] See vi. 7.2. - -[192] Aris. Met. ix. 1; xii. 9; Nic. Eth. x. 8; Plato Timaeus, p. 52; -Cary, 26; Plotinos, Enn. ii. 5.3. - -[193] This etymology of "providence" applies in English as well as in -Greek; see iii. 2.1. - -[194] Plato, Laws, iv., p. 716; Cary, 8. - -[195] Arist. Met. xii. 7. - -[196] See iii. 8.9. - -[197] In his Cratylos, p. 419; Cary, 76. - -[198] See iii. 9, end. - -[199] As said Plato in the Timaeus, p. 42; Cary, 18; see Numenius, 10, -32. - -[200] In this book Plotinos uses synonymously the "Heaven," the -"World," the "Universal Organism or Animal," the "All" (or universe), -and the "Whole" (or Totality). This book as it were completes the -former one on the Ideas and the Divinity, thus studying the three -principles (Soul, Intelligence and Good) cosmologically. We thus have -here another proof of the chronological order. In it Plotinos defends -Plato's doctrine against Aristotle's objection in de Anima i. 3. - -[201] As thought Heraclitus, Diog. Laert. ix. 8; Plato, Timaeus, p. 31; -Cary, 11; Arist. Heaven, 1, 8, 9. - -[202] Such as Heraclitus. - -[203] In the Cratylus, p. 402; Cary, 41. - -[204] Rep. vi., p. 498; Cary, 11. - -[205] See Apuleius, de Mundo, p. 708; Ravaisson, E.M.A. ii. 150; Plato, -Epinomis, c. 5. - -[206] Which would render it unfit for fusion with the Soul, Arist., -Meteorology, i. 4; Plato, Tim., p. 58; Cary, 33. - -[207] See ii. 9.3; iii. 2.1; iv. 3.9. - -[208] Phaedo, p. 109; Cary, 134; that is, the universal Soul is here -distinguished into the celestial Soul, and the inferior Soul, which is -nature, the generative power. - -[209] The inferior soul, or nature. - -[210] See ii. 3.9-15. - -[211] See i. 1.7-10. - -[212] As is the vegetative soul, which makes only the animal part of -us; see i. 1.7-10. - -[213] In his Timaeus, p. 31; Cary, 11. - -[214] Timaeus, p. 56; Cary, 30. - -[215] See i. 8.9. - -[216] Plato, Epinomis, p. 984; Cary, 8. - -[217] In the Timaeus, p. 31, 51; Cary 11, 24, 25. - -[218] See ii. 7. - -[219] Who in his Timaeus says, p. 39; Cary, 14. - -[220] See ii. 2. - -[221] As thought Heraclitus and the Stoics, who thought that the stars -fed themselves from the exhalations of the earth and the waters; see -Seneca, Nat. Quest. vi. 16. - -[222] See ii. 1.5. - -[223] See iii. 7; Plotinos may have already sketched the outline of -this book (number 45), and amplified it only later. - -[224] See ii. 9.6, or 33; another proof of the chronological order. - -[225] In his Timaeus, p. 69; Cary, 44. - -[226] As the Stoics think, Plutarch, Plac. Phil. iv. 11. - -[227] As Aristotle would say, de Anima, iii. 3. - -[228] Aristotle, de Sensu, 6. - -[229] v. 3. - -[230] Porphyry, Principles, 24. - -[231] Arist., Mem. et Rec., 2. - -[232] Porphyry, Principles, 25. - -[233] Aristotle, Mem. et Rec., 2. - -[234] Porphyry, Treatise, Psych. - -[235] Locke's famous "tabula rasa." - -[236] Substance, Quantity, Quality, Relation, When, Where, -Action-and-Reaction, to Have, and Location. Aristotle's treatment -thereof in his Categories, and Metaphysics. - -[237] Met. v. 7. - -[238] Or, substance, "ousia." - -[239] Cat. i. 1, 2; or, mere label in common. - -[240] Aristotle, Met. vii. 3, distinguished many different senses of -Being; at least four principal ones: what it seems, or the universal, -the kind, or the subject. The subject is that of which all the rest is -an attribute, but which is not the attribute of anything. Being must be -the first subject. In one sense this is matter; in another, form; and -in the third place, the concretion of form and matter. - -[241] See ii. 4.6-16, for intelligible matter, and ii. 4.2-5 for -sense-matter. - -[242] Arist., Met. vii. 3. - -[243] Arist., Cat. 2.5.25. - -[244] Arist., Cat. ii. 5.15. - -[245] Arist., Met. vii. 1; Cat. ii. 5. - -[246] Categ. ii. 5.1, 2. - -[247] Cat. ii. 5.16, 17. - -[248] Cat. ii. 6.1, 2. - -[249] Met. v. 13. - -[250] Met. xiii. 6. - -[251] Met. xiii. 3. - -[252] Categ. ii. 6.18-23. - -[253] See vi. 6. - -[254] Categ. ii. 6.4. - -[255] Arist., Hermeneia, 4. - -[256] See iii. 7.8. - -[257] Categ. ii. 6.26. - -[258] Categ. ii. 7.1; Met. v. 15. - -[259] Categ. ii. 7.17-19. - -[260] See Categ. viii. - -[261] Arist., Categ. ii. 8.3, 7, 8, 13, 14. - -[262] See ii. 6.3. - -[263] See ii. 6.3. - -[264] See ii. 6.1. - -[265] These are: 1, capacity and disposition; 2, physical power or -impotence; 3, affective qualities; 4, the figure and exterior form. - -[266] Met. v. 14. - -[267] Categ. ii. 8. - -[268] See i. 6.2. - -[269] Categ. ii. 8.15. - -[270] Among whom Plotinos is not; see vi. 1.10. - -[271] The reader is warned that the single Greek word "paschein" is -continually played upon in meanings "experiencing," "suffering," -"reacting," or "passion." - -[272] Met. xi. 9. - -[273] That is, "to move" and "to cut" express an action as perfect as -"having moved" and "having cut." - -[274] As Aristotle says, Categ. ii. 7.1. - -[275] Plotinos proposes to divide verbs not as transitive and -intransitive, but as verbs expressing a completed action or state, (as -to think), and those expressing successive action, (as, to walk). The -French language makes this distinction by using with these latter the -auxiliary "etre." Each of these two classes are subdivided into some -verbs expressing an absolute action, by which the subject alone is -modified; and into other verbs expressing relative action, referring -to, or modifying an exterior object. These alone are used to form the -passive voice, and Plotinos does not want them classified apart. - -[276] In Greek the three words are derived from the same root. - -[277] See i. v. - -[278] See iii. 6.1. - -[279] Categ. iii. 14. - -[280] For this movement did not constitute reaction in the mover. - -[281] That is, the Greek word for "suffering." - -[282] A Greek pun, "kathexis." - -[283] A Greek pun, "hexis" also translated "habit," and "habitude." - -[284] See Chaignet, Hist. of Greek Psychology, and Simplicius, -Commentary on Categories. - -[285] See iv. 7.14. This is an Aristotelian distinction. - -[286] See ii. 4.1. - -[287] By verbal similarity, or homonymy, a pun. - -[288] See ii. 4.1. - -[289] See ii. 5.5. - -[290] For Plato placed all reality in the Ideas. - -[291] Logically, their conception of matter breaks down. - -[292] Cicero, Academics, i. 11. - -[293] See ii. 4.10. - -[294] See Enn. ii. 4, 5; iii. 6. Another proof of the chronological -order. - -[295] Plotinos was here in error; Aristotle ignored them, because he -did not admit existence. - -[296] This refers to the Hylicists, who considered the universe as -founded on earth, water, air or fire; or, Anaxagoras, who introduced -the category of mind. - -[297] Plotinos's own categories are developed from the thought of -Plato, found in his "Sophists," for the intelligible being; and yet -he harks back to Aristotle's Categories and Metaphysics, for his -classification of the sense-world. - -[298] See vi. 4, 6, 9. - -[299] In his "Sophist." p. 248 e-250; Cary, 72-76. - -[300] In vi. 3. - -[301] See vi. 3.6. - -[302] See vi. 3.3. - -[303] See iii. 2.16. - -[304] That is, the higher part, the principal power of the soul; see -ii. 3.17, 18. - -[305] Here "being" and "essence" have had to be inverted. - -[306] Verbal similarity, homonymy, or pun. - -[307] See Plato's Sophists, p. 250 c; Cary, 75. - -[308] Sophists, p. 254 d; Cary, 86. - -[309] As said Aristotle, Met. iv. 2. - -[310] Plato, Sophist, p. 245; Cary, 63. - -[311] See vi. 9.1. - -[312] See vi. 4. - -[313] Arist., Met. xiv. 6. - -[314] Aristotle. Met. xiv. 6. - -[315] See ii. 6.2. - -[316] See vi. 7.3-6. - -[317] As said Aristotle. Eth. Nic. i. 6.2. - -[318] Against Aristotle. - -[319] See vi. 1.14. - -[320] See iii. 7.11. - -[321] To ti en einai. - -[322] See i. 6. - -[323] See v. 8. - -[324] Counting identity and difference as a composite one? See note 11. - -[325] See iv. 9.5. - -[326] See iv. 8.3. - -[327] See iii. 2.16. - -[328] See iv. 8.8. - -[329] See iii. 8.7. - -[330] See iii. 8.2. - -[331] See iii. 2.2. - -[332] See iii. 9.1. - -[333] See 3.9.1; Timaeus, p. 39; Cary, 14. - -[334] See ii. 9.1. - -[335] See v. 3.4. - -[336] Plato, Philebus, p. 18; Cary, 23. - -[337] Plato, Philebus, p. 17 e; Cary, 21. - -[338] See iii. 4.1. - -[339] See iv. 8.3-7. - -[340] See iv. 8.8. - -[341] See iv. 4.29. - -[342] Here Plotinos purposely mentions Numenius's name for the divinity -(fr. 20.6), and disagrees with it, erecting above it a supreme Unity. -This, however, was only Platonic, Rep. vi. 19, 509 b., so that Plotinos -should not be credited with it as is done by the various histories of -philosophy. Even Numenius held the unity, fr. 14. - -[343] This means, by mere verbal similarity, "homonymy," or, punning. - -[344] As said Plato, in his Philebus, p. 18, Cary, 23. - -[345] See i. 1.7. - -[346] See Bouillet, vol. 1, p. 380. - -[347] See iii. 6.1-5. - -[348] See sect. 16. - -[349] See ii. 1.2. - -[350] Or, mortal nature, or, decay; see i. 8.4; ii. 4.5-6. - -[351] See vi. 2.7, 8. - -[352] See ii. 4.6. - -[353] See vi. 1.13, 14. - -[354] In vi. 3.11, and vi. 1.13, 14, he however subsumes time and place -under relation. - -[355] According to Aristotle, Met. vii. 3. - -[356] Aristotle, Met. viii. 5.6. - -[357] Aristotle, Categ. ii. 5. - -[358] See ii. 5.4. - -[359] Met. vii. 11. - -[360] Met. vii. 17. - -[361] See ii. 4.3-5. - -[362] See iii. 6. - -[363] Categ. ii. 5. - -[364] See iii. 7.8. - -[365] See sect. 11. - -[366] Arist. Met. vii. 1. - -[367] See vi. 1.26. - -[368] See ii. 4.10. - -[369] See Met. vii. 3. - -[370] See vi. 1.2, 3. - -[371] See iii. 8.7. - -[372] Matter is begotten by nature, which is the inferior power of the -universal Soul, iii. 4.1.; and the form derives from Reason, which is -the superior power of the same Soul, ii. 3.17. - -[373] Met. v. 8. - -[374] Being an accident, Met. v. 30, see[434]. - -[375] See iii. 6.12. - -[376] See Categ. ii. 5.1-2. - -[377] Plotinos is here defending Plato's valuation of the universal, -against Aristotle, in Met. vii. 13. - -[378] Arist. de Anima, ii. 1. - -[379] See sect. 8. - -[380] Plotinos follows Aristotle in his definition of quantity, but -subsumes time and place under relation. Plot., vi. 1.4; Arist. Categ. -ii. 6.1, 2. - -[381] Arist. Met. v. 13. - -[382] See vi. 3.5; iii. 6.17. - -[383] Categ. ii. 6. - -[384] Quoted by Plato in his Hippias, p. 289, Cary, 20. - -[385] See Categ. 2.6. - -[386] See vi. 1.5. - -[387] See sect. 11. - -[388] See vi. 6. - -[389] Met. v. 6. - -[390] Categ. iii. 6.26. - -[391] Met. v. 14. - -[392] Categ. ii. 6.26. - -[393] In speaking of quality, Categ. ii. 8.30. - -[394] Following the Latin version of Ficinus. - -[395] Bouillet remarks that Plotinos intends to demonstrate this by -explaining the term "similarity" not only of identical quality, but -also of two beings of which one is the image of the other, as the -portrait is the image of the corporeal form, the former that of the -"seminal reason," and the latter that of the Idea. - -[396] By this Plotinos means the essence, or intelligible form, vi. 7.2. - -[397] See vi. 7.3-6. - -[398] See iii. 6.4. - -[399] In his Banquet, p. 186-188; Cary, 14, 15. - -[400] See v. 9.11. - -[401] See i. 2.1. - -[402] See vi. 7.5. - -[403] See iii. 6.4. - -[404] Categ. ii. 8.3, 7, 8, 13, 14. - -[405] See i. 1.2. - -[406] Arist. Categ. ii. 8.8-13. - -[407] Met. v. 14. - -[408] Met. vii. 12. - -[409] Met. v. 14. - -[410] Categ. ii. 8. - -[411] Arist. Categ. iii. 10. - -[412] See vi. 1.17. - -[413] Met. v. 10. - -[414] Categ. iii. 11. - -[415] Categ. iii. 14. - -[416] Categ. ii. 7. - -[417] By a pun, this "change" is used as synonymous with the -"alteration" used further on. - -[418] Arist. de Gen. i. 4. - -[419] Alteration is change in the category of quality, Arist. de Gen. -i. 4; Physics, vii. 2. - -[420] Arist. Metaph. ix. 6; xi. 9. - -[421] Met. xi. 9. - -[422] See ii. 5.1, 2. - -[423] See ii. 5.2. - -[424] See ii. 5.2. - -[425] Categ. iii. 14. - -[426] Arist. Met. xi. 9. - -[427] See ii. 7. - -[428] Arist. de Gen. i. 5. - -[429] Arist. de Gen. i. 10. - -[430] Here we have Numenius's innate motion of the intelligible, fr. -30.21. - -[431] See vi. 1.15-22. - -[432] Namely, time, vi. 1.13; place, vi. 1.14; possession, vi. 1.23; -location, vi. 1.24. - -[433] For relation, see vi. 1.6-9. - -[434] For Aristotle says that an accident is something which exists in -an object without being one of the distinctive characteristics of its -essence. - -[435] In this book Plotinos studies time and eternity comparatively; -first considering Plato's views in the Timaeus, and then the views of -Pythagoras (1), Epicurus (9), the Stoics (7), and Aristotle (4, 8, 12). - -[436] The bracketed numbers are those of the Teubner edition; the -unbracketed, those of the Didot edition. - -[437] See ii. 9.6. - -[438] As thought Plato, in his Timaeus, p. 37, Cary, 14. - -[439] Stobaeus. Ecl. Phys. i. 248. - -[440] A category, see vi. 2.7. - -[441] See vi. 2.7. - -[442] Or, with Mueller, "therefore, in a permanent future." - -[443] De Caelo, i. 9. - -[444] That is, with this divinity that intelligible existence is. - -[445] Arist. Met. iii. 2. - -[446] In the Timaeus, p. 29, Cary 10. - -[447] Stob. Ecl. Physic. ix. 40. - -[448] Porphyry, Principles, 32, end. - -[449] Especially Archytas, Simplicius, Comm. in Phys. Aristot. 165; -Stob. Ecl. Physic. Heeren, 248-250. - -[450] Stobaeus, 254. - -[451] See Stobaeus, 250. - -[452] Aristotle, Physica, iv. 12. - -[453] Mueller: "Whether this may be predicated of the totality of the -movement." - -[454] See vi. 6.4-10. - -[455] As Aristotle, Phys. iv. 11, claimed. - -[456] In Physica, iii. 7. - -[457] Stobaeus, Ecl. Phys. ix. 40. - -[458] When collectively considered as "A-pollo," following Numenius, -42, 67, Plotinos, v. 5.6. - -[459] See ii. 9.3. - -[460] See iii. 7.1, Introd. - -[461] See iii. 6.16, 17. - -[462] Porphyry, Principles, 32. - -[463] In the Timaeus, p. 38, Cary, 14. - -[464] In his Timaeus, p. 39, Cary, 14, 15. - -[465] As by Antiphanes and Critolaus, Stobaeus, Eclog. Phys. ix. 40, p. -252, Heeren. - -[466] See iii. 7.2. - -[467] As thought Aristotle, de Mem. et Remin. ii. 12. - -[468] See iv. 9. - - - - -Transcriber's Notes: - - -Punctuation and spelling were made consistent when a predominant -preference was found in this four-volume set; otherwise they were not -changed. - -Simple typographical errors were corrected. Inconsistent capitalization -has not been changed. - -Ambiguous hyphens at the ends of lines were retained. - -Infrequent spelling of "Plotinus" changed to the predominant "Plotinos." - -Several opening or closing parentheses and quotation marks are -unmatched; Transcriber has not attempted to determine where they belong. - -Page 678: A line containing "How then could one," appears to have been -partly duplicated in the original. The duplicate text, which has been -removed here, was: "Essence sence possess self-existence. How then -could". - -Page 690, footnote 53 (originally 1): "he might have had noth-" does -not complete on the next line and has been changed here to "he might -have had nothing". - -Page 700: The two opening parentheses in '(from its "whatness" (or, -essence[72]).' share the one closing parenthesis; unchanged. - -Page 744: unmatched closing quotation mark removed after "a being is -suited by its like". - -Page 804: Closing parenthesis added after "single (unitary". - -Page 823: "resistance corporeal nature[15])." has no matching opening -parenthesis; unchanged here. - -Page 930: Phrase beginning "(each constituting a particular -intelligence" appears to share its closing parenthesis with the phrase -"(and thus exists in itself)." - -Page 935: Closing parenthesis in phrase "composite as mixtures)," does -not have a matching opening parenthesis; unchanged. - -Page 984: Footnote 395 (originally 53), "corporeal form, the former -that of" originally was "corporeal form, the latter that of". - - -Footnote Issues: - -In these notes, "anchor" means the reference to a footnote, and -"footnote" means the information to which the anchor refers. Anchors -occur within the main text, while footnotes are grouped in sequence at -the end of this eBook. The structure of the original book required some -exceptions to this, as explained below. - -The original text used chapter endnotes. In this eBook, they have been -combined into a single, ascending sequence based on the sequence in -which the footnotes (not the anchors) occurred in the original book, -and placed at the end of the eBook. - -Three kinds of irregularities occurred in the footnotes: - -1. Some footnotes are referenced by more than one anchor, so two or -more anchors may refer to the same footnote. - -2. Some anchors were out of sequence, apparently because they were -added afterwards or because they are share a footnote with another -anchor. They have been renumbered to match the numbers of the footnotes -to which they refer. - -3. Some footnotes have no anchors. These are noted below. - -Page 679: Footnote 37 has no anchor. The missing anchor would be on -page 670. - -Page 771: Footnote 85 (originally 21) has no anchor. The missing anchor -would be on page 709 or 710. - -Page 772: Footnote 111 (originally 47) has no anchor. The missing anchor -would be on page 736. - -Page 772: Footnote 123 (originally 59) has no anchor. The missing -anchor would be on page 744 or 745. - -Page 811: Footnote 178 (originally 13) has no anchor. The missing -anchor would be on page 776. - -Page 932: Footnote 302 (originally 6) has no anchor. The missing anchor -would be on page 895 or 896. - -Page 984: Footnote 424 (originally 82) has no anchor. The missing -anchor would be on page 974 or 975. - -Page 1015: Footnote 445 (originally 11) has no anchor. 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