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diff --git a/42930.txt b/42930.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 5380988..0000000 --- a/42930.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,10124 +0,0 @@ -Project Gutenberg's Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 1, by Plotinos (Plotinus) - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with -almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or -re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included -with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org - - -Title: Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 1 - In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four Periods - -Author: Plotinos (Plotinus) - -Translator: Kenneth Sylvan Guthrie - -Release Date: June 13, 2013 [EBook #42930] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: ASCII - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PLOTINOS: COMPLETE WORKS, V. 1 *** - - - - -Produced by Charlene Taylor, Joe C, Charlie Howard, and -the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at -http://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from images -generously made available by The Internet Archive/Canadian -Libraries) - - - - - - - - - - PLOTINOS - Complete Works - - In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four Periods; - - With - BIOGRAPHY by PORPHYRY, EUNAPIUS, & SUIDAS, - COMMENTARY by PORPHYRY, - ILLUSTRATIONS by JAMBLICHUS & AMMONIUS, - STUDIES in Sources, Development, Influence; - INDEX of Subjects, Thoughts and Words. - - by - KENNETH SYLVAN GUTHRIE, - - Professor in Extension, University of the South, Sewanee; - A.M., Sewanee, and Harvard; Ph.D., Tulane, and Columbia. - M.D., Medico-Chirurgical College, Philadelphia. - - COMPARATIVE LITERATURE PRESS - P. O. Box 42, ALPINE, N.J., U.S.A. - - - - - Copyright, 1918, by Kenneth Sylvan Guthrie. - All Rights, including that of Translation, Reserved. - - Entered at Stationers' Hall, by - George Bell and Sons, Portugal Street, Lincoln's Inn, London. - - - - - PLOTINOS - Complete Works - - In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four Periods; - - With - BIOGRAPHY by PORPHYRY, EUNAPIUS, & SUIDAS, - COMMENTARY by PORPHYRY, - ILLUSTRATIONS by JAMBLICHUS & AMMONIUS, - STUDIES in Sources, Development, Influence; - INDEX of Subjects, Thoughts and Words. - - by - KENNETH SYLVAN GUTHRIE, - - Professor in Extension, University of the South, Sewanee; - A.M., Sewanee, and Harvard; Ph.D., Tulane, and Columbia. - M.D., Medico-Chirurgical College, Philadelphia. - - VOL. I - Biographies; Amelian Books, 1-21. - - COMPARATIVE LITERATURE PRESS - P. O. Box 42, ALPINE, N.J., U.S.A. - - - - -FOREWORD - - -It is only with mixed feelings that such a work can be published. -Overshadowing all is the supreme duty to the English-speaking world, -and secondarily to the rest of humanity to restore to them in an -accessible form their, till now, unexploited spiritual heritage, with -its flood of light on the origins of their favorite philosophy. And -then comes the contrast--the pitiful accomplishment. Nor could it -be otherwise; for there are passages that never can be interpreted -perfectly; moreover, the writer would gladly have devoted to it every -other leisure moment of his life--but that was impossible. As a matter -of fact, he would have made this translation at the beginning of his -life, instead of at its end, had it not been for a mistaken sense of -modesty; but as no one offered to do it, he had to do it himself. If he -had done it earlier, his "Philosophy of Plotinos" would have been a far -better work. - -Indeed, if it was not for the difficulty and expense of putting it -out, the writer would now add to the text an entirely new summary of -Plotinos's views. The fairly complete concordance, however, should -be of service to the student, and help to rectify the latest German -summary of Plotinos, that by Drews, which in its effort to furnish a -foundation for Hartmann's philosophy of the unconscious, neglected both -origins and spiritual aspects. However, the present genetic insight of -Plotinos's development should make forever impossible that theory of -cast-iron coherence, which is neither historical nor human. - -The writer, having no thesis such as Drews' to justify, will -welcome all corrections and suggestions. He regrets the inevitable -uncertainties of capitalization (as between the supreme One, -Intelligence World-Soul and Daemon or guardian, and the lower -one, intelligence, soul and demon or guardian); and any other -inconsistencies of which he may have been guilty; and he beseeches the -mantle of charity in view of the stupendousness of the undertaking, -in which he practically could get no assistance of any kind, and also -in view of the almost insuperable difficulties of his own career. He, -however, begs to assure the reader that he did everything "ad majorem -Dei gloriam." - - - - -INDEX. - - - PLOTINOS' COMPLETE WORKS. - - Preface 1 - - Concordance of Enneads and Chronological Numbers 2 - - Concordance of Chronological Numbers and Enneads 3 - - Biography of Plotinos, by Porphyry 5 - - Biographies by Eunapius and Suidas 39 - - Amelian Books, 1-21 40 - - Amelio-Porphyrian Books, 22-23 283 - - Porphyrian Books, 34-45 641 - - Eustochian Books, 46-54 1017 - - - PLOTINIC STUDIES - - IN SOURCES, DEVELOPMENT AND INFLUENCE. - - 1. Development in the Teachings of Plotinos 1269 - - 2. Platonism: Significance, Progress, and Results 1288 - - 3. Plotinos' View of Matter 1296 - - 4. Plotinos' Creation of the Trinity 1300 - - 5. Resemblances to Christianity 1307 - - 6. Indebtedness to Numenius 1313 - - 7. Value of Plotinos 1327 - - Concordance to Plotinos i - -An outline of the doctrines of Plotinos is published under the title -"The Message of Plotinos." - - - - -CONCORDANCE OF ENNEADS AND CHRONOLOGICAL NUMBERS - - - i.1 53 iii.1 3 v.1 10 - - i.2 19 iii.2 47 v.2 11 - - i.3 20 iii.3 48 v.3 49 - - i.4 46 iii.4 15 v.4 7 - - i.5 36 iii.5 50 v.5 32 - - i.6 1 iii.6 26 v.6 24 - - i.7 54 iii.7 45 v.7 18 - - i.8 51 iii.8 30 v.8 31 - - i.9 16 iii.9 13 v.9 5 - - ii.1 40 iv.1 4 vi.1 42 - - ii.2 14 iv.2 21 vi.2 43 - - ii.3 52 iv.3 27 vi.3 44 - - ii.4 12 iv.4 28 vi.4 22 - - ii.5 25 iv.5 29 vi.5 23 - - ii.6 17 iv.6 41 vi.6 34 - - ii.7 37 iv.7 2 vi.7 38 - - ii.8 35 iv.8 6 vi.8 39 - - ii.9 33 iv.9 8 vi.9 9 - - -CONCORDANCE OF CHRONOLOGICAL NUMBERS AND ENNEADS - - 1 i.6 19 i.2 37 ii.7 - - 2 iv.7 20 i.3 38 vi.7 - - 3 iii.1 21 iv.2 39 vi.8 - - 4 iv.1 22 vi.4 40 ii.1 - - 5 v.9 23 vi.5 41 iv.6 - - 6 iv.8 24 v.6 42 vi.1 - - 7 v.4 25 ii.5 43 vi.2 - - 8 iv.9 26 iii.6 44 vi.3 - - 9 vi.9 27 iv.3 45 iii.7 - - 10 v.1 28 iv.4 46 i.4 - - 11 v.2 29 iv.5 47 iii.2 - - 12 ii.4 30 iii.8 48 iii.3 - - 13 iii.9 31 v.8 49 v.3 - - 14 ii.2 32 v.5 50 iii.5 - - 15 iii.4 33 ii.9 51 i.8 - - 16 i.9 34 vi.6 52 ii.3 - - 17 ii.6 35 ii.8 53 i.1 - - 18 v.7 36 i.5 54 i.7 - - - - -Life of Plotinos And Order of his Writings - -By PORPHYRY. (_Written when about 70 years of age, see 23._) - - - I. PLOTINOS, LIKE PORPHYRY, DESPISED HIS PHYSICAL NATURE, BUT A - PICTURE OF HIM WAS SECURED. - -Plotinos the philosopher, who lived recently, seemed ashamed of having -a body. Consequently he never spoke of his family or home (Lycopolis, -now Syout, in the Thebaid, in Egypt). He never would permit anybody -to perpetuate him in a portrait or statue. One day that Amelius[1] -begged him to allow a painting to be made of him, he said, "Is it not -enough for me to have to carry around this image[2], in which nature -has enclosed us? Must I besides transmit to posterity the image of this -image as worthy of attention?" As Amelius never succeeded in getting -Plotinos to reconsider his refusal, and to consent to give a sitting, -Amelius begged his friend Carterius, the most famous painter of those -times, to attend Plotinos's lectures, which were free to all. By dint -of gazing at Plotinos, Carterius so filled his own imagination with -Plotinos's features that he succeeded in painting them from memory. -By his advice, Amelius directed Carterius in these labors, so that -this portrait was a very good likeness. All this occurred without the -knowledge of Plotinos. - - -II. SICKNESS AND DEATH OF PLOTINOS; HIS BIRTHDAY UNKNOWN. - -Plotinos was subject to chronic digestive disorders; nevertheless, -he never was willing to take any remedies, on the plea that it was -unworthy of a man of his age to relieve himself by such means. Neither -did he ever take any of the then popular "wild animal remedy," because, -said he, he did not even eat the flesh of domestic animals, let alone -that of savage ones. He never bathed, contenting himself, with daily -massage at home. But when at the period of the plague, which was most -virulent,[3] the man who rubbed him died of it, he gave up the massage. -This interruption in his habits brought on him a chronic quinsy, which -never became very noticeable, so long as I remained with him; but after -I left him, it became aggravated to the point that his voice, formerly -sonorous and powerful, became permanently hoarse; besides, his vision -became disturbed, and ulcers appeared on his hands and feet. All this -I learned on my return, from my friend Eustochius, who remained with -him until his end. These inconveniences hindered his friends from -seeing him as often as they used to do, though he persisted in his -former custom of speaking to each one individually. The only solution -of this difficulty was for him to leave Rome. He retired into Campania, -on an estate that had belonged to Zethus, one of his friends who had -died earlier. All he needed was furnished by the estate itself, or -was brought to him from the estate at Minturnae, owned by Castricius -(author of a Commentary on Plato's Parmenides, to whom Porphyry -dedicated his treatise on Vegetarianism). Eustochius himself told me -that he happened to be at Puzzoli at the time of Plotinos's death, -and that he was slow in reaching the bedside of Plotinos. The latter -then said to him, "I have been waiting for you; I am trying to unite -what is divine in us[4] to that which is divine in the universe." Then -a serpent, who happened to be under Plotinos's death-bed slipped into -a hole in the wall (as happened at the death of Scipio Africanus, -Pliny, Hist. Nat. xv. 44), and Plotinos breathed his last. At that -time Plotinos was 66 years old (in 270, born in 205), according to the -account of Eustochius. The emperor Claudius II was then finishing the -second year of his reign. I was at Lilybaeum; Amelius was at Apamaea -in Syria, Castricius in Rome, and Eustochius alone was with Plotinos. -If we start from the second year of Claudius II and go back 66 years, -we will find that Plotinos's birth falls in the 18th year of Septimus -Severus (205). He never would tell the month or day of his birth, -because he did not approve of celebrating his birth-day either by -sacrifices, or banquets. Still he himself performed a sacrifice, and -entertained his friends on the birth-days of Plato and Socrates; and on -those days those who could do it had to write essays and read them to -the assembled company. - - -III. PLOTINOS'S EARLY EDUCATION. - -This is as much as we learned about him during various interviews -with him. At eight years of age he was already under instruction by a -grammarian, though the habit of uncovering his nurse's breast to suck -her milk, with avidity, still clung to him. One day, however, she so -complained of his importunity that he became ashamed of himself, and -ceased doing so. At 28 years of age he devoted himself entirely to -philosophy. He was introduced to the teachers who at that time were -the most famous in Alexandria. He would return from their lectures -sad and discouraged. He communicated the cause of this grief to one -of his friends, who led him to Ammonius, with whom Plotinos was not -acquainted. As soon as he heard this philosopher, he said to his -friend, "This is the man I was looking for!" From that day forwards -he remained close to Ammonius. So great a taste for philosophy did he -develop, that he made up his mind to study that which was being taught -among the Persians, and among the Hindus. When emperor Gordian prepared -himself for his expedition against the Persians, Plotinos, then 39 -years old, followed in the wake of the army. He had spent between 10 -to 11 years near Ammonius. After Gordian was killed in Mesopotamia, -Plotinos had considerable trouble saving himself at Antioch. He reached -Rome while Philip was emperor, and when he himself was 50 years of age. - - -THE SCHOOL OF AMMONIUS. - -Herennius, (the pagan) Origen, and Plotinos had agreed to keep secret -the teachings they had received from Ammonius. Plotinos carried out his -agreement. Herennius was the first one to break it, and Origen followed -his example. The latter limited himself to writing a book entitled, -"Of Daemons;" and, under the reign of Gallienus, he wrote another one -to prove that "The Emperor alone is the Only Poet" (if the book was -a flattery; which is not likely. Therefore it probably meant: "The -King (of the universe, that is, the divine Intelligence), is the only -'demiurgic' Creator.") - - -PLOTINOS AN UNSYSTEMATIC TEACHER. - -For a long period Plotinos did not write anything. He contented himself -with teaching orally what he had learned from Ammonius. He thus passed -ten whole years teaching a few pupils, without committing anything to -writing. However, as he allowed his pupils to question him, it often -happened that his school was disorderly, and that there were useless -discussions, as I later heard from Amelius. - - -AMELIUS, PLOTINOS'S FIRST SECRETARY. - -Amelius enrolled himself among the pupils of Plotinos during the third -year of Plotinos's stay in Rome, which also was the third year of the -reign of Claudius II, that is, 24 years. Amelius originally had been -a disciple of the Stoic philosopher Lysimachus.[5] Amelius surpassed -all his fellow-pupils by his systematic methods of study. He had -copied, gathered, and almost knew by heart all the works of Numenius. -He composed a hundred copy-books of notes taken at the courses of -Plotinos, and he gave them as a present to his adopted son, Hostilianus -Hesychius, of Apamea. (Fragments of Amelius's writings are found -scattered in those of Proclus, Stobaeus, Olympiodorus, Damascius, and -many of the Church Fathers.) - - -IV. HOW PORPHYRY CAME TO PLOTINOS FOR THE FIRST TIME, IN 253. - -In the tenth year of the reign of Gallienus, I (then being twenty -years of age), left Greece and went to Rome with Antonius of Rhodes. -I found there Amelius, who had been following the courses of Plotinos -for eighteen years. He had not yet dared to write anything, except a -few books of notes, of which there were not yet as many as a hundred. -In this tenth year of the reign of Gallienus, Plotinos was fifty-nine -years old. When I (for the second, and more important time) joined -him, I was thirty years of age. During the first year of Gallienus, -Plotinos began to write upon some topics of passing interest, and in -the tenth year of Gallienus, when I visited him for the first time, he -had written twenty-one books, which had been circulated only among a -very small number of friends. They were not given out freely, and it -was not easy to go through them. They were communicated to students -only under precautionary measures, and after the judgment of those who -received them had been carefully tested. - - -PLOTINOS'S BOOKS OF THE FIRST PERIOD (THE AMELIAN PERIOD). - -I shall mention the books that Plotinos had already written at that -time. As he had prefixed no titles to them, several persons gave them -different ones. Here are those that have asserted themselves: - - 1. Of the Beautiful. i. 6. - - 2. Of the Immortality of the Soul. iv. 7. - - 3. Of Fate. iii. 1. - - 4. Of the Nature of the Soul. iv. 1. - - 5. Of Intelligence, of Ideas, and of Existence. v. 9. - - 6. Of the Descent of the Soul into the Body. iv. 8. - - 7. How does that which is Posterior to the First - Proceed from Him? Of the One. v. 4. - - 8. Do all the Souls form but a Single Soul? iv. 9. - - 9. Of the Good, or of the One. vi. 9. - - 10. Of the Three Principal Hypostatic Forms of - Existence, v. 1. - - 11. Of Generation, and of the Order of Things - after the First, v. 2. - - 12. (Of the Two) Matters, (the Sensible and - Intelligible). ii. 4. - - 13. Various Considerations, iii. 9. - - 14. Of the (Circular) Motion of the Heavens. ii. 2. - - 15. Of the Daemon Allotted to Us, iii. 4. - - 16. Of (Reasonable) Suicide, i. 9. - - 17. Of Quality, ii. 6. - - 18. Are there Ideas of Individuals? v. 7. - - 19. Of Virtues. i. 2. - - 20. Of Dialectics. i. 3. - - 21. (How does the Soul keep the Mean between - Indivisible Nature and Divisible Nature?) iv. 2. - -These twenty-one books were already written when I visited Plotinos; he -was then in the fifty-ninth year of his age. - - -V. HOW PORPHYRY CAME TO PLOTINOS FOR THE SECOND TIME (A. D. 263-269). - -I remained with him this year, and the five following ones. I had -already visited Rome ten years previously; but at that time Plotinos -spent his summers in vacation, and contented himself with instructing -his visitors orally. - -During the above-mentioned six years, as several questions had been -cleared up in the lectures of Plotinos, and at the urgent request of -Amelius and myself that he write them down, he wrote two books to prove -that - - -PLOTINOS'S BOOKS OF THE SECOND PERIOD (THE PORPHYRIAN PERIOD). - - 22. The One and Identical Existence is Everywhere - Entire, I, vi. 4. - - 23. Second Part Thereof. vi. 5. - -Then he wrote the book entitled: - - 24. The Superessential Transcendent Principle - Does Not Think. Which is the First Thinking - Principle? And Which is the Second? v. 6. - -He also wrote the following books: - - 25. Of Potentiality and Actualization. ii. 5. - - 26. Of the Impassibility of Incorporeal - Entities. iii. 6. - - 27. Of the Soul, First Part. iv. 3. - - 28. Of the Soul, Second Part. iv. 4. - - 29. (Of the Soul, Third; or, How do We See?) iv. 5. - - 30. Of Contemplation. iii. 8. - - 31. Of Intelligible Beauty. v. 8. - - 32. The Intelligible Entities are not Outside of - Intelligence. Of Intelligence and of Soul. v. 5. - - 33. Against the Gnostics. ii. 9. - - 34. Of Numbers. vi. 6. - - 35. Why do Distant Objects Seem Small? ii. 8. - - 36. Does Happiness (Consist in Duration?) i. 5. - - 37. Of the Mixture with Total Penetration. ii. 7. - - 38. Of the Multitude of Ideas; Of the Good. vi. 7. - - 39. Of the Will. vi. 8. - - 40. (Of the World). ii. 1. - - 41. Of Sensation, and of Memory. iv. 6. - - 42. Of the Kinds of Existence, First. vi. 1. - - 43. Of the Kinds of Existence, Second. vi. 2. - - 44. Of the Kinds of Existence, Third. vi. 3. - - 45. Of Eternity and Time. iii. 7. - -Plotinos wrote these twenty-four books during the six years I spent -with him; as subjects he would take the problems that happened to come -up, and which we have indicated by the titles of these books. These -twenty-four books, joined to the twenty-one Plotinos had written before -I came to him, make forty-five. - - -VI. PLOTINOS'S BOOKS OF THE THIRD PERIOD (THE EUSTOCHIAN PERIOD). - -While I was in Sicily, where I went in the fifteenth year of the reign -of Gallienus, he wrote five new books that he sent me: - - 46. Of Happiness. i. 4. - - 47. Of Providence, First. iii. 2. - - 48. Of Providence, Second. iii. 3. - - 49. Of the Hypostases that Act as Means of - Knowledge, and of the Transcendent. v. 3. - - 50. Of Love. iii. 5. - -These books he sent me in the last year of the reign of Claudius II, -and at the beginning of the second. - -Shortly before dying, he sent me the following four books: - - 51. Of the Nature of Evils. i. 8. - - 52. Of the Influence of the Stars. ii. 3. - - 53. What is the Animal? What is Man? i. 1. - - 54. Of the First Good (or, of Happiness). i. 7. - -These nine books, with the forty-five previously written, make in all -fifty-four. - -Some were composed during the youth of the author, others when in -his bloom, and finally the last, when his body was already seriously -weakened; and they betray his condition while writing them. The -twenty-one first books seem to indicate a spirit which does not yet -possess all its vigor and firmness. Those that he wrote during the -middle of his life, show that his genius was then in its full form. -These twenty-four books may be considered to be perfect, with the -exception of a few passages. The last nine are less powerful than the -others; and of these nine, the last four are the weakest. - - -VII. VARIOUS DISCIPLES OF PLOTINOS. - -Plotinos had a great number of auditors and disciples, who were -attracted to his courses by love of philosophy. - -Among this number was Amelius of Etruria, whose true name was -Gentilianus. He did indeed insist that in his name the letter "l" -should be replaced by "r," so that his name should read "Amerius," from -"ameria" (meaning indivisibility, though Suidas states that it was -derived from the town of Ameria, in the province of Umbria), and not -Amelius, from "amellia" (negligence). - -A very zealous disciple of Plotinos was a physician from Scythopolis -(or, Bethshean, in Palestine), named Paulinus, whose mind was full of -ill-digested information and whom Amelius used to call Mikkalos (the -tiny). - -Eustochius of Alexandria, also a physician, knew Plotinos at the end -of his life, and remained with him until his death, to care for him. -Exclusively occupied with the teachings of Plotinos, he himself became -a genuine philosopher. - -Zoticus, also, attached himself to Plotinos. He was both critic and -poet; he corrected the works of Antimachus, and beautifully versified -the fable of the Atlantidae. His sight gave out, however, and he died -shortly before Plotinos. Paulinus also, died before Plotinos. - -Zethus was one of the disciples of Plotinos. He was a native of Arabia, -and had married the daughter of Theodosius, friend of Ammonius. He was -a physician, and much beloved by Plotinos, who sought to lead him to -withdraw from public affairs, for which he had considerable aptitude; -and with which he occupied himself with zeal. Plotinos lived in very -close relations with him; he even retired to the country estate of -Zethus, distant six miles from Minturnae. - -Castricius, surnamed Firmus, had once owned this estate. Nobody, in our -times, loved virtue more than Firmus. He held Plotinos in the deepest -veneration. He rendered Amelius the same services that might have been -rendered by a good servant, he displayed for me the attentions natural -towards a brother. Nevertheless this man, who was so attached to -Plotinos, remained engaged in public affairs. - -Several senators, also, came to listen to Plotinos. Marcellus, -Orontius, Sabinillus and Rogatianus applied themselves, under Plotinos, -to the study of philosophy. - -The latter, who also was a member of the senate, had so detached -himself from the affairs of life, that he had abandoned all his -possessions, dismissed all his attendants, and renounced all his -dignities. On being appointed praetor, at the moment of being -inaugurated, while the lictors were already waiting for him, he refused -to sally forth, and carry out any of the functions of this dignity. -He even failed to dwell in his own house (to avoid needless pomp); he -visited his friends, boarding and sleeping there; he took food only -every other day; and by this dieting, after having been afflicted -with gout to the point of having to be carried around in a litter, he -recovered his strength, and stretched out his hands as easily as any -artisan, though formerly his hands had been incapacitated. Plotinos was -very partial to him; he used to praise him publicly, and pointed him -out as a model to all who desired to become philosophers. - -Another disciple of Plotinos was Serapion of Alexandria. At first he -had been a rhetorician, and only later applied himself to philosophy. -Nevertheless he never was able to cure himself of fondness for riches, -or usury. - -Me also, Porphyry, a native of Tyre, Plotinos admitted to the circle of -his intimate friends, and he charged me to give the final revision to -his works. - - -VIII. PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF PLOTINOS. - -Once Plotinos had written something, he could neither retouch, nor even -re-read what he had done, because his weak eyesight made any reading -very painful. His penmanship was poor. He did not separate words, and -his spelling was defective; he was chiefly occupied with ideas. Until -his death he continuously persisted in this habit, which was for us -all a subject of surprise. When he had finished composing something in -his head, and when he then wrote what he had meditated on, it seemed -as if he copied a book. Neither in conversation nor in discussion did -he allow himself to be distracted from the purpose of his thoughts, -so that he was able at the same time to attend to the needs of -conversation, while pursuing the meditation of the subject which busied -him. When the person who had been talking with him went away, he did -not re-read what he had written before the interruption, which, as has -been mentioned above, was to save his eyesight; he could, later on, -take up the thread of his composition as if the conversation had been -no obstacle to his attention. He therefore was able simultaneously to -live with others and with himself. He never seemed to need recuperation -from this interior attention, which hardly ceased during his slumbers, -which, however, were troubled both by the insufficiency of food, -for sometimes he did not even eat bread, and by this continuous -concentration of his mind. - - -IX. PLOTINOS AS GUARDIAN AND ARBITRATOR. - -There were women who were very much attached to him. There was his -boarding house keeper Gemina, and her daughter, also called Gemina; -there was also Amphiclea, wife of Aristo, son of Jamblichus, all -three of whom were very fond of philosophy. Several men and women -of substance, being on the point of death, entrusted him with their -boys and girls, and all their possessions, as being an irreproachable -trustee; and the result was that his house was filled with young boys -and girls. Among these was Polemo, whom Plotinos educated carefully; -and Plotinos enjoyed hearing Polemo recite original verses (?). -He used to go through the accounts of the managers with care, and -saw to their economy; he used to say that until these young people -devoted themselves entirely to philosophy, their possessions should -be preserved intact, and see that they enjoyed their full incomes. -The obligation of attending to the needs of so many wards did not, -however, hinder him from devoting to intellectual concerns a continuous -attention during the nights. His disposition was gentle, and he was -very approachable by all who dwelt with him. Consequently, although he -dwelt full twenty-six years in Rome, and though he was often chosen as -arbitrator in disputes, never did he offend any public personage. - - -X. HOW PLOTINOS TREATED HIS ADVERSARY, OLYMPIUS. - -Among those who pretended to be philosophers, there was a certain man -named Olympius. He lived in Alexandria, and for some time had been a -disciple of Ammonius. As he desired to succeed better than Plotinos, -he treated Plotinos with scorn, and developed sufficient personal -animosity against Plotinos to try to bewitch him by magical operations. -However, Olympius noticed that this enterprise was really turning -against himself, and he acknowledged to his friends that the soul of -Plotinos must be very powerful, since it was able to throw back upon -his enemies the evil practices directed against him. The first time -that Olympius attempted to harm him, Plotinos having noticed it, said, -"At this very moment the body of Olympius is undergoing convulsions, -and is contracting like a purse." As Olympius several times felt -himself undergoing the very ills he was trying to get Plotinos to -undergo, he finally ceased his practices. - - -HOMAGE TO PLOTINOS FROM A VISITING EGYPTIAN PRIEST. - -Plotinos showed a natural superiority to other men. An Egyptian priest, -visiting Rome, was introduced to him by a mutual friend. Having decided -to show some samples of his mystic attainments, he begged Plotinos to -come and witness the apparition of a familiar spirit who obeyed him on -being evoked. The evocation was to occur in a chapel of Isis, as the -Egyptian claimed that he had not been able to discover any other place -pure enough in Rome. He therefore evoked Plotinos's guardian spirit. -But instead of the spirit appeared a divinity of an order superior to -that of guardians, which event led the Egyptian to say to Plotinos, -"You are indeed fortunate, O Plotinos, that your guardian spirit is -a divinity, instead of a being of a lower order." The divinity that -appeared could not be questioned or seen for as long a period as they -would have liked, as a friend who was watching over the sacrificed -birds choked them, either out of jealousy, or fear. - - -PLOTINOS'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE PUBLIC MYSTERIES. - -As Plotinos's guardian spirit was a divinity, Plotinos kept the eyes of -his own spirit directed on that divine guardian. That was the motive of -his writing his book[6] that bears the title "Of the Guardian Allotted -to Us." In it he tries to explain the differences between the various -spirits that watch over mankind. Aurelius, who was very scrupulous -in his sacrifices, and who carefully celebrated the Festivals of the -New Moon (as Numenius used to do?) (on the Calends of each month), -one day besought Plotinos to come and take part in a function of that -kind. Plotinos, however, answered him, "It is the business of those -divinities to come and visit me, and not mine to attend on them." We -could not understand why he should make an utterance that revealed so -much pride, but we dared not question the matter. - - -XI. PLOTINOS AS DETECTIVE AND AS PROPHET; PORPHYRY SAVED FROM SUICIDE. - -So perfectly did he understand the character of men, and their methods -of thought, that he could discover stolen objects, and foresaw what -those who resided with him should some day become. A magnificent -necklace had been stolen from Chione, an estimable widow, who resided -with him and the children (as matron?). All the slaves were summoned, -and Plotinos examined them all. Then, pointing out one of them, he -said, "This is the culprit." He was put to the torture. For a long -while, he denied the deed; but later acknowledged it, and returned the -necklace. Plotinos used to predict what each of the young people who -were in touch with him was to become. He insisted that Polemo would -be disposed to amorous relations, and would not live long; which also -occurred. As to me, he noticed that I was meditating suicide. He came -and sought me, in his house, where I was staying. He told me that this -project indicated an unsound mind, and that it was the result of a -melancholy disposition. He advised me to travel. I obeyed him. I went -to Sicily,[7] to study under Probus, a celebrated philosopher, who -dwelt in Lilybaeum. I was thus cured of the desire to die; but I was -deprived of the happiness of residing with Plotinos until his death. - - -XII. THE PROJECT OF A PLATONOPOLIS COMES TO NAUGHT. - -The emperor Gallienus and the empress Salonina, his wife, held Plotinos -in high regard. Counting on their good will, he besought them to have a -ruined town in Campania rebuilt, to give it with all its territory to -him, that its inhabitants might be ruled by the laws of Plato. Plotinos -intended to have it named Platonopolis, and to go and reside there -with his disciples. This request would easily have been granted but -that some of the emperor's courtiers opposed this project, either from -spite, jealousy, or other unworthy motive. - - -XIII. PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF PLOTINOS'S DELIVERY. - -In his lectures his delivery was very good; he knew how to make -immediate apposite replies. Nevertheless, his language was not correct. -For instance, he used to say "anamnemisketai" for "anamimnesketai"; -and he made similar blunders in writing. But when he would speak, his -intelligence seemed to shine in his face, and to illuminate it with -its rays. He grew especially handsome in discussions; a light dew of -perspiration appeared on his forehead, gentleness radiated in his -countenance, he answered kindly, but satisfactorily. For three days I -had to question him, to learn from him his opinions about the union -of the body with the soul; he spent all that time in explaining to me -what I wanted to know.[8] A certain Thaumasius, who had entered into -the school, said that he wanted to take down the arguments of the -discussion in writing, and hear Plotinos himself speak; but that he -would not stand Porphyry's answering and questioning. "Nevertheless," -answered Plotinos, "if Porphyry does not, by his questions, bring up -the difficulties that we should solve (notice, in the course of the -Enneads, the continual objections), we would have nothing to write." - - -XIV. PHILOSOPHICAL RELATIONS OF PLOTINOS. - -The style of Plotinos is vigorous and substantial, containing more -thoughts than words, and is often full of enthusiasm and emotion. -He follows his own inspirations rather than ideas transmitted by -tradition. The teachings of the Stoics and Peripatetics are secretly -mingled among his works; the whole of Aristotle's Metaphysics is -therein condensed. Plotinos was fully up to the times in geometry, -arithmetic, mechanics, optics and music, although he did not take an -over-weening interest in these sciences. At his lectures were read -the Commentaries of Severus, of Cronius;[9] of Numenius,[10] of Gaius -and Atticus (Platonic Philosophers, the latter, setting forth the -differences between Plato and Aristotle);[11] there were also readings -of the works of the Peripatetics, of Aspasius, of Alexander (of -Aphrodisia, whose theory of Mixture in the Universe Plotinos studies -several times), of Adrastus, and other philosophers of the day. None of -them, however, was exclusively admired by Plotinos. In his speculations -he revealed an original and independent disposition. In all his -researches he displayed the spirit of Ammonius. He could readily -assimilate (what he read); then, in a few words, he summarized the -ideas aroused in him by profound meditation thereon. One day Longinus's -book "On the Principles," and his "On Antiquarians" were read. Plotinos -said, "Longinus is a literary man, but not a philosopher." Origen (the -Pagan[12]) once came among his audience; Plotinos blushed, and started -to rise. Origen, however, besought him to continue. Plotinos, however, -answered that it was only natural for lecturers to cease talking when -they were aware of the presence, in the audience, of people who already -knew what was to be said. Then, after having spoken a little longer, he -rose. - - -XV. PORPHYRY EARNED RECOGNITION AT THE SCHOOL OF PLOTINOS. - -At a celebration of Plato's birthday I was reading a poem about the -"Mystic Marriage" (of the Soul) when somebody doubted my sanity, -because it contained both enthusiasm and mysticism. Plotinos spoke -up, and said to me, loud enough to be heard by everybody, "You have -just proved to us that you are at the same time poet, philosopher, and -hierophant." On this occasion the rhetorician Diophanes read an apology -on the utterances of Alcibiades in Plato's "Banquet," and he sought to -prove that a disciple who seeks to exercise himself in virtue should -show unlimited "complaisance" for his teacher, even in case the latter -were in love with him. Plotinos rose several times, as if he wanted to -leave the assembly; nevertheless, he restrained himself, and after the -audience had dispersed, he asked me to refute the paper. As Diophanes -would not communicate it to me, I recalled his arguments, and refuted -them; and then I read my paper before the same auditors as those who -had heard what had been said by Diophanes. I pleased Plotinos so much, -that several times he interrupted me by the words, "Strike that way, -and you will become the light of men!" When Eubulus, who was teaching -Platonism at Athens, sent to Plotinos some papers on Platonic subjects, -Plotinos had them given to me to examine them and report to him about -them. He also studied the laws of astronomy, but not as a mathematician -would have done; he carefully studied astrology; but realizing that no -confidence could be placed in its predictions, he took the trouble to -refute them several times, in his work.[13] - - -XVI. PLOTINOS'S POLEMIC AGAINST THE GNOSTICS. - -At that time there were many Christians, among whom were prominent -sectarians who had given up the ancient philosophy (of Plato and -Pythagoras), such as Adelphius and Aquilinus. They esteemed and -possessed the greater part of the works of Alexander of Lybia, -of Philocomus, of Demostrates and of Lydus. They advertised the -Revelations of Zoroaster, of Zostrian, of Nicotheus, of Allogenes, of -Mesus, and of several others. These sectarians deceived a great number -of people, and even deceived themselves, insisting that Plato had not -exhausted the depths of intelligible "being," or essence. That is why -Plotinos refuted them at length in his lectures, and wrote the book -that we have named "Against the Gnostics." The rest (of their books) -he left me to investigate. Amelius wrote as much as forty books to -refute the work of Zostrian; and as to me, I demonstrated by numerous -proofs that this alleged Zoroastrian book was apocryphal, and had only -recently been written by those of that ilk who wished to make people -believe that their doctrines had been taught by Zoroaster. - - -XVII. START OF THE AMELIO-PORPHYRIAN CONTROVERSY, OVER NUMENIUS. - -The Greeks insisted that Plotinos had appropriated the teachings of -Numenius. Trypho, who was both a Stoic and a Platonist, insisted -on this to Amelius, who wrote a book that we have entitled, "On -the Difference Between the Teachings of Plotinos and Numenius." He -dedicated it to me under the title, "To Basil" (the King, recently used -as a name, "Royal"). That was my name before I was called "Porphyry," -the "Purple One." In my own home language (Phoenician) I used to be -called "Malchus"; that was my father's name, and in Greek "Malchus" -is translated by "Basileus" (Basil, or King). Indeed, Longinus, who -dedicated his book "On Instinct" to Cleodamus, and me jointly, there -calls me "Malchus"; and Amelius has translated this name in Greek, just -as Numenius translated "Maximus" (from Latin into Greek by) "Megaos" -(the great one). (I will quote the letter in full). - -"Greetings from Amelius to Basil (Royal, or Purple One): - -"You may be sure that I did not have the least inclination even -to mention some otherwise respectable people who, to the point of -deafening you, insist that the doctrines of our friend (Plotinos) are -none other than those of Numenius of Apamea. It is evident enough that -these reproaches are entirely due to their desire to advertise their -oratorical abilities. Possessed with the desire to rend Plotinos to -pieces, they dare to go as far as to assert that he is no more than a -babbler, a forger, and that his opinions are impossible. But since you -think that it would be well for us to seize the occasion to recall -to the public the teachings of which we approve (in Plotinos's system -of philosophy), and in order to honor so great a man as our friend -Plotinos by spreading his teachings--although this really is needless, -inasmuch as they have long since become celebrated--I comply with your -request, and, in accordance with my promise, I am hereby inscribing to -you this work which, as you well know, I threw together in three days. -You will not find in it that system and judiciousness natural to a book -composed with care; they are only reflections suggested by the lectures -(received from Plotinos), and arranged as they happened to come to -mind. I, therefore, throw myself on your indulgence, especially as the -thought of (Plotinos, that) philosopher whom some people are slandering -to us, is not easy to grasp, because he expresses the same ideas in -different manners in accordance with the exigencies of the occasion. -I am sure you will have the goodness to correct me, if I happen to -stray from the opinions of Plotinos. As the tragic poet says somewhere, -being overwhelmed with the pressure of duties, I find myself compelled -to submit to criticism and correction if I am discovered in altering -the doctrines of our leader. You see how anxious I am to please you. -Farewell!" - - -XVIII. POLEMIC BETWEEN AMELIUS AND PORPHYRY; AMELIUS TEACHES PORPHYRY. - -I have quoted this letter in full to show that, even in the times -of Plotinos himself, it was claimed that Plotinos had borrowed and -advertised as his own teachings of Numenius; also that he was called -a trifler, and in short that he was scorned--which happened chiefly -because he was not understood. Plotinos was far from the display and -vanity of the Sophists. When lecturing, he seemed to be holding a -conversation with his pupils. He did not try to convince you by a -formal argument. This I realized from the first, when attending his -courses. I wished to make him explain himself more clearly by writing -against him a work to prove that the intelligible entities subsist -outside of intelligence.[14] Plotinos had Amelius read it to him; and -after the reading he laughingly said to him, "It would be well for you -to solve these difficulties that Porphyry has advanced against me, -because he does not clearly understand my teachings." Amelius indeed -wrote a rather voluminous work to answer my objections.[15] In turn, -I responded. Amelius wrote again. This third work at last made me -understand, but not without difficulty, the thought of Plotinos; and I -changed my views, reading my retraction at a meeting. Since that time, -I have had complete confidence in the teachings of Plotinos. I begged -him to polish his writings, and to explain his system to me more at -length. I also prevailed upon Amelius to write some works. - - -XIX. HOW THE WORKS OF PLOTINOS WERE PUT INTO SHAPE. - -You may judge of the high opinion of Plotinos held by Longinus, from a -part of a letter he addressed to me. I was in Sicily; he wished me to -visit him in Phoenicia, and desired me to bring him a copy of the works -of that philosopher. This is what he wrote to me about the matter: - -"Please send me the works; or rather, bring them with you; for I shall -never cease begging you to travel in this one of all other countries, -were it only because of our ancient friendship, and of the sweetness of -the air, which would so well suit your ruined health;[16] for you must -not expect to find any new knowledge here when you visit us. Whatever -your expectations may be, do not expect to find anything new here, -nor even the ancient works (of myself, Longinus?) that you say are -lost. There is such a scarcity of copyists here, that since I have been -here I have hardly been able to get what I lacked of Plotinos here, by -inducing my copyist to abandon his usual occupations to devote himself -exclusively to this work. Now that I have those works of Plotinos you -sent me, I think I have them all; but these that I have are imperfect, -being full of errors. I had supposed that our friend Amelius had -corrected the errors of the copyist; but his occupations have been too -pressing to allow of his attending to this. However passionately I -desire to examine what Plotinos has written about the soul, and about -existence, I do not know what use to make of his writings; these are -precisely those of his works that have been most mis-written by the -copyists. That is why I wish you would send them to me transcribed -exactly; I would compare the copies and return them promptly. I repeat -that I beg you not to send them, but to bring them yourself with the -other works of Plotinos, which might have escaped Amelius. All those he -brought here I have had transcribed exactly; for why should I not most -zealously seek works so precious? I have often told you, both when we -were together, and apart, and when you were at Tyre, that Plotinos's -works contained reasonings of which I did not approve, but that I -liked and admired his method of writing; his concise and forceful -style, and the genuinely philosophical arrangement of his discussions. -I am persuaded that those who seek the truth must place the works of -Plotinos among the most learned." - - -XX. OPINION OF LONGINUS, THE GREAT CRITIC, ABOUT PLOTINOS. - -I have made this rather long quotation only to show what was thought -of Plotinos by the greatest critic of our days, the man who had -examined all the works of his time. At first Longinus had scorned -Plotinos, because he had relied on the reports of people ignorant (of -philosophy). Moreover, Longinus supposed that the copy of the works of -Plotinos he had received from Amelius was defective, because he was not -yet accustomed to the style of Plotinos. Nevertheless, if any one had -the works of Plotinos in their purity, it was certainly Amelius, who -possessed a copy made upon the originals themselves. I will further add -what was written by Longinus about Plotinos, Amelius, and the other -philosophers of his time, so that the reader may better appreciate -this great critic's high opinion of them. This book, directed against -Plotinos and Gentilianus Amelius, is entitled "Of the Limit (of Good -and Evil?)" and begins as follows: - -"There were, O Marcellus Orontius[17] many philosophers in our -time, and especially in the first years of our childhood--for it -is useless to complain of their rarity at the present; but when I -was still a youth, there were still a rather goodly number of men -celebrated as philosophers. I was fortunate enough to get acquainted -with all of them, because I traveled early with our parents in many -countries. Visiting many nations and towns, I entered into personal -relations with such of these men as were still alive. Among these -philosophers, some committed their teachings to writings, with the -purpose of being useful to posterity, while others thought that it -was sufficient for them to explain their opinions to their disciples. -Among the former are the Platonists Euclides, Democritus (who wrote -Commentaries on the Alcibiades, on the Phaedo, and on the Metaphysics -of Aristotle), Proclinus, who dwelt in the Troad, Plotinos and his -disciple Gentilianus Amelius, who are at present teaching at Rome; -the Stoics Themistocles, Phebion, and both Annius and Medius, who -were much talked of only recently, and the Peripatetician Heliodorus -of Alexandria. Among those who did not write their teachings are the -Platonists Ammonius (Saccas) and (the pagan) Origen,[18] who lived -with him for a long while, and who excelled among the philosophers -of that period; also Theodotus and Eubulus, who taught at Athens. Of -course, they did write a little; Origen, for instance, wrote about "The -Guardian Spirits"; and Eubulus wrote Commentaries on the Philebus, -and on the Gorgias, and "Observations on Aristotle's Objections -against Plato's Republic." However, these works are not considerable -enough to rank their authors among those who have seriously treated -of philosophy; for these little works were by them written only -incidentally, and they did not make writing their principal occupation. -The Stoics Herminus, Lysimachus,[19] Athenaeus and Musonius (author -of "Memorable Events," translated in Greek by Claudius Pollio), -who lived at Athens. The Peripateticians Ammonius and Ptolemy, who -were the most learned of their contemporaries, especially Ammonius, -whose erudition was unequalled, none of these philosophers wrote any -important work; they limited themselves to writing poems, or festal -orations, which have been preserved in spite of them. I doubt very -much that they wished to be known by posterity merely by books so -small (and unrepresentative), since they had neglected to acquaint us -with their teachings in more significant works. Among those who have -left written works, some have done no more than gather or transcribe -what has been left to us from the ancient (philosophers); among these -are Euclides, Democritus and Proclinus. Others limited themselves to -recalling some details extracted from ancient histories, and they -tried to compose books with the same materials as their predecessors, -as did Annius, Medius, and Phebio; the latter one trying to make -himself famous by style, rather than by thought. To these we might -add Heliodorus, who has put in his writings nothing that had not been -said by the ancients, without adding any philosophical explanation. -But Plotinos and Gentilianus Amelius, have shown that they really made -a profession of being writers, both by the great number of questions -they treated, and by the originality of their doctrines. Plotinos -explained the principles of Pythagoras and Plato more clearly than his -predecessors; for neither Numenius, nor Cronius, nor Moderatus,[20] nor -Thrasyllus,[21] come anywhere near the precision of Plotinos when they -touch on the same topics. Amelius tried to follow in his footsteps, -and adopted the greater part of his ideas; but differs from him in -the verbosity of his demonstrations, and the diffusion of his style. -The writings of these two men alone deserve special consideration; -for what is the use of criticizing the works of imitators; had we -not better study the authors whose works they copied, without any -additions, either in essential points, or in argumentation, doing no -more than choosing out the best? This has been our method of procedure -in our controversy with Gentilianus Amelius's strictures on justice, -in Plato's works; and in my examination of Plotinos's books on the -Ideas.[22] So when our mutual friends Basil of Tyre, (Porphyry[23]), -who has written much on the lines of Plotinos, having even preferred -the teachings of Plotinos to my own (as he had been my pupil), -undertook to demonstrate that Plotinos's views about the Ideas were -better than my own, I have fully refuted his contentions, proving that -he was wrong in changing his views on the subject.[24] Besides, I have -criticized several opinions of Gentilianus Amelius and Plotinos, -as for instance in the "Letter to Amelius" which is long enough to -form a whole book. I wrote it to answer a letter sent me from Rome by -Amelius, which was entitled "The Characteristics of the Philosophy of -Plotinos."[25] I, however, limited myself to entitling my little work, -"A Letter to Amelius." - - -XXI. RESULTS OF LONGINUS'S CRITICISM AND VINDICATION OF PLOTINOS'S -ORIGINALITY. - -From the above it will be seen that Plotinos and Amelius are superior -to all their contemporaries by the great number of questions they -consider, and by the originality of their system; that Plotinos had -not appropriated the opinions of Numenius, and that he did not even -follow them; that he had really profited by the opinions of the -Pythagoreans (and of Plato); further, that he was more precise than -Numenius, Cronius, and Thrasyllus. After having said that Amelius -followed in the footsteps of Plotinos, but that he was prolix and -diffuse in his expositions, which characteristic forms the difference -between their styles, he speaks of me, who at that time had known -Plotinos for only a short time, and says, "Our mutual friends, Basil -(King) of Tyre (Porphyry), who has written much, taking Plotinos -as his model." By that he means that I have avoided the rather -unphilosophical diffuseness of Amelius, and have imitated the (concise) -style of Plotinos. The quotation of the judgment of this famous man, -the first critic of his day, should decide of the reverence due to -our philosopher, Plotinos. If I had been able to visit Longinus when -he begged me to do so, he would not have undertaken the refutation he -wrote, before having clearly understood Plotinos's system. - - -XXII. THE APOLLONIAN ORACLE ABOUT PLOTINOS. - -(But when I have a long oracle of Apollo to quote, why should I delay -over a letter of Longinus's, or, in the words of the proverb, quoted in -Iliad xxii. 126 and Hesiod Theogony 35), "Why should I dally near the -oak-trees, or the rock?" If the testimony of the wise is to be adduced, -who is wiser than Apollo, a deity who said of himself, "I know the -number of the grains of sand, and the extent of the ocean; I understand -the dust, and I hear him who does not speak!" This was the divinity who -had said that Socrates was the wisest of men; and on being consulted by -Amelius to discover what had become of the soul of Plotinos, said: - - "Let me sing an immortal hymn to my dear friend! - Drawing my golden bow, I will elicit melodious sounds from - my lyre. - I also invoke the symphonic voice of the choir of Muses, - Whose harmonious power raises exultant paeans, - As they once sang in chorus in praise of Achilles, - A Homeric song in divine inspiration. - Sacred choir of Muses, let us together celebrate this man, - For long-haired Apollo is among you! - "O Deity, who formerly wert a man, but now approachest - The divine host of guardian spirits, delivered from the - narrowing bonds of necessity - That enchains man (while in the body), and from the tumult - caused by the - Confusing whirlwind of the passions of the body, - Sustained by the vigor of thy mind, thou hastenest to swim - (And like the sage Ulysses in Phaeacia), to land on a shore - not submerged by the waves, - With vigorous stroke, far from the impious crowds. - Persistently following the straightening path of the - purified soul, - Where the splendor of the divinity surrounds you, the home - of justice, - Far from contamination, in the holy sanctuary of initiation, - When in the past you struggled to escape the bitter - waves,[26] - When blood-stained life eddied around you with repulsive - currents, - In the midst of the waters dazed by frightening tumult, - Even then the divinities often showed you your end;[27] - And often, when your spirit was about to stray from the - right path, - The immortals beckoned you back to the real end; the eternal - path, - Enlightening your eyes with radiant beams in the midst of - gloomy darkness. - No deep slumber closed your eyelids, and when shaken by the - eddies (of matter), - You sought to withdraw your eyes from the night that pressed - down upon them; - You beheld beauties hidden from any who devote themselves to - the study of wisdom. - "Now that you have discarded your cloak of mortality, and - ascended - Climbing out from the tombs of your angelic soul, - You have entered the choir of divinities, where breathes a - gentle zephyr. - There dwell friendship, and delightful desire, ever - accompanied by pure joy; - There may one quench one's thirst with divine ambrosia; - There bound by the ties of love, one breathes a gentle air, - under a tranquil sky. - There dwell the sons of Jupiter, who lived in the golden age; - The brothers Minos and Rhadamanthus, the just Aeacus, - The divine Plato, the virtuous Pythagoras, - And all those who formed the band of immortal love, - And who by birth belong to the most blessed of divinities. - Their soul tastes continual joy amidst perpetual feasts! - And you, blessed man, after having fought many a valiant - fight, - In the midst of chaste angels, you have achieved eternal - Felicity. - "Here, O Muses, let us close this hymn in honor of Plotinos; - Cease the mazes of the dancing of the graceful choir; - This is what my golden lyre had to say of this eternally - blessed man!" - - -XXIII. PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF PLOTINOS; THE ECSTATIC TRANCES. - -This oracle (pieced out of numerous quotations) says (in some now lost -lines, perhaps) that Plotinos was kindly, affable, indulgent, gentle, -such as, indeed we knew him in personal intercourse. It also mentions -that this philosopher slept little, that his soul was pure, ever -aspiring to the divinity that he loved whole-heartedly, and that he did -his utmost to liberate himself (from terrestrial domination) "to escape -the bitter waves of this cruel life." - -That is how this divine man, who by his thoughts often aspired to the -first (principle), to the divinity superior (to intelligence), climbing -the degrees indicated by Plato (in his Banquet), beheld the vision -of the formless divinity, which is not merely an idea, being founded -on intelligence and the whole intelligible world. I, myself, had the -blessed privilege of approaching this divinity, uniting myself to him, -when I was about sixty-eight years of age. - -That is how "the goal (that Plotinos sought to achieve) seemed to -him located near him." Indeed, his goal, his purpose, his end was to -approach the supreme divinity, and to unite himself with the divinity. -While I dwelt with him, he had four times the bliss of reaching that -goal, not merely potentially, but by a real and unspeakable experience. -The oracle adds that the divinities frequently restored Plotinos to the -right path when he strayed from it, "enlightening his eyes by radiant -splendor." That is why it may truthfully be said that Plotinos composed -his works while in contemplation of the divinities, and enjoying that -vision. "Thanks to this sight that your 'vigilant' eyes had of both -interior and exterior things, you have," in the words of the oracle, -"gazed at many beauties that would hardly be granted to many of those -who study philosophy." Indeed, the contemplation of men may be superior -to human contemplation; but, compared to divine knowledge, if it be of -any value whatever, it, nevertheless, could not penetrate the depths -reached by the glances of the divinities. - -Till here the oracle had limited itself to indicating what Plotinos -had accomplished while enclosed in the vesture of the body. It then -proceeds to say that he arrived at the assembly of the divinities where -dwell friendship, delightful desire, joy, and love communing with the -divinity, where the sons of God, Minos, Rhadamanthus, and Aeacus are -established as the judges of souls. Plotinos joined them, not to be -judged, but to enjoy their intimacy, as did the higher divinities. -There indeed dwell Plato, Pythagoras, and the other sages who formed -the choir of immortal love. Reunited with their families, the blessed -angels spend their life "in continued festivals and joys," enjoying the -perpetual beatitude granted them by divine goodness. - - -XXIV. CONTENTS OF THE VARIOUS ENNEADS. - -This is what I have to relate of the life of Plotinos. He had, however, -asked me to arrange and revise his works. I promised both him and his -friends to work on them. I did not judge it wise to arrange them in -confusion chronologically. So I imitated Apollodorus of Athens, and -Andronicus the Peripatetician, the former collecting in ten volumes -the comedies of Epicharmus, and the latter dividing into treatises the -works of Aristotle and Theophrastus, gathering together the writings -that referred to the same subject. Likewise, I grouped the fifty-four -books of Plotinos into six groups of nine (Enneads), in honor of the -perfect numbers six and nine. Into each Ennead I have gathered the -books that treat of the same matter, in each case prefixing the most -important ones. - -The First Ennead contains the writings that treat of Morals. They are: - - 1. What is an Animal? What is a Man? 53. - 2. Of the Virtues, 19. - 3. Of Dialectics, 20. - 4. Of Happiness, 46. - 5. Does Happiness (consist in Duration)? 36. - 6. Of Beauty, 1. - 7. Of the First Good, and of the Other Goods, 54. - 8. Of the Origin of Evils, 51. - 9. Of (Reasonable) Suicide, 16. - -Such are the topics considered in the First Ennead; which thus contains -what relates to morals. - -In the Second Ennead are grouped the writings that treat of Physics, of -the World, and of all that it contains. They are: - - 1. (Of the World), 40. - 2. Of the (Circular) Motion (of the Heavens), 14. - 3. Of the Influence of the Stars, 52. - 4. (Of both Matters) (Sensible and Intelligible), 12. - 5. Of Potentiality and Actuality, 25. - 6. Of Quality (and of Form), 17. - 7. Of Mixture, Where there is Total Penetratration, 37. - 8. Of Vision. Why do Distant Objects Seem Smaller? 35. - 9. (Against Those Who say that the Demiurgic - Creator is Evil, as well as The World Itself), - Against the Gnostics, 33. - -The Third Ennead, which also relates to the world, contains the -different speculations referring thereto. Here are its component -writings: - - 1. Of Destiny, 3. - 2. Of Providence, the First, 47. - 3. Of Providence, the Second, 48. - 4. Of the Guardian Spirit who was Allotted to Us, 15. - 5. Of Love, 50. - 6. Of the Impassibility of Incorporeal Things, 26. - 7. Of Eternity of Time, 45. - 8. Of Nature, of Contemplation, and of the One, 30. - 9. Different Speculations, 13. - -We have gathered these three Enneads into one single body. We have -assigned the book on the Guardian Spirit Who has been Allotted to Us, -in the Third Ennead, because this is treated in a general manner, and -because it refers to the examination of conditions characteristic -of the production of man. For the same reason the book on Love was -assigned to the First Ennead. The same place has been assigned to the -book on Eternity and Time, because of the observations which, in this -Ennead, refer to their nature. Because of its title, we have put in the -same group the book on Nature, Contemplation, and the One. - -After the books that treat of the world, the Fourth Ennead contains -those that refer to the soul. They are: - - 1. Of the Nature of the Soul, the First, 4. - 2. Of the Nature of the Soul, the Second, 21. - 3. Problems about the Soul, the First, 27. - 4. Problems about the Soul, the Second, 28. - 5. (Problems about the Soul, the Third, or) Of - Vision, 29. - 6. Of Sensation, of Memory, 41. - 7. Of the Immortality of the Soul, 2. - 8. Of the Descent of the Soul into the Body, 6. - 9. Do not all Souls form a Single Soul? 8. - -The Fourth Ennead, therefore, contains all that relates to Psychology. - -The Fifth Ennead treats of Intelligence. Each book in it also contains -something about the principle superior to intelligence, and also about -the intelligence characteristic of the soul, and about Ideas. - - 1. About the three Principal Hypostatic Forms of - Existence, 10. - 2. Of Generation, and of the Order of Things - Posterior to the First, 11. - 3. Of the Hypostatic Forms of Existence that Transmit - Knowledge, and of the Superior Principle, 49. - 4. How that which is Posterior to the First Proceeds - from it? Of the One, 7. - 5. The Intelligibles are not Outside of Intelligence. - Of the Good, 32. - 6. The Super-essential Principle Does Not Think. - Which is the First Thinking Principle? - Which is the Second? 24. - 7. Are there Ideas of Individuals? 18. - 8. Of Intelligible Beauty, 31. - 9. Of Intelligence, of Ideas, and of Existence, 5. - -We have gathered the Fourth and Fifth Ennead into a single volume. Of -the Sixth Ennead, we have formed a separate volume, so that all the -writings of Plotinos might be divided into three parts, of which the -first contains three Enneads, the second two; and the third, a single -Ennead. - -Here are the books that belong to the Sixth Ennead, and to the Third -Volume. - - 1. Of the Kinds of Existence, the First, 42. - 2. Of the Kinds of Existence, the Second, 43. - 3. Of the Kinds of Existence, the Third, 44. - 4. The One Single Existence is everywhere Present - in its Entirety, First, 22. - 5. The One Single Existence is everywhere Present - in its Entirety, Second, 23. - 6. Of Numbers, 34. - 7. Of the Multitude of Ideas. Of the Good, 38. - 8. Of the Will, and of the Liberty of the One, 39. - 9. Of the Good, or of the One, 9. - -This is how we have distributed into six Enneads the fifty-four books -of Plotinos. We have added to several of them, Commentaries, without -following any regular order, to satisfy our friends who desired to have -explanations of several points. We have also made headings of each -book, following the chronological order, with the exception of the book -on The Beautiful, whose date of composition we do not know. Besides, -we have not only written up separate summaries for each book, but also -Arguments, which are contained among the summaries.[28] - -Now we shall try to punctuate each book, and to correct the mistakes. -Whatever else we may have to do besides, will easily be recognized by a -reading of these books. - - - - -LIFE OF PLOTINOS, BY EUNAPIUS. - -The philosopher Plotinos came from Egypt; to be accurate, I will add -that his home was Lycopolis. This fact was not set down by the divine -Porphyry, though he himself, as he reports, was a student of Plotinos, -and had spent a great part of his life near him. - -The altars dedicated to Plotinos are not yet cold; and not only are his -books read by the learned more than are even those of Plato, but even -the multitude, though incapable of clearly understanding his doctrine, -nevertheless conforms its conduct of life to his suggestions. - -Porphyry has set down all the details of the life of this philosopher, -so that little can be added thereto; besides Porphyry seems to have -clearly expounded many of Plotinos's writings. - - - - -LIFE OF PLOTINOS, BY SUIDAS. - -Plotinos of Lycopolis, philosopher, disciple of that Ammonius who -had once been a porter, was the teacher of Amelius, who himself had -Porphyry as pupil; the latter formed Jamblichus, and Jamblichus -Sopater. Plotinos prolonged his life till the seventh year of the reign -of Gallienus. He composed fifty-four books, which are grouped in six -enneads. His constitution was weakened by the effects of the sacred -disease (epilepsy). He wrote besides other works. - - - - -FIRST ENNEAD, BOOK SIXTH. - -Of Beauty. - - -REVIEW OF BEAUTY OF DAILY LIFE. - -1. Beauty chiefly affects the sense of sight. Still, the ear perceives -it also, both in the harmony of words, and in the different kinds of -music; for songs and verses are equally beautiful. On rising from the -domain of the senses to a superior region, we also discover beauty -in occupations, actions, habits, sciences and virtues. Whether there -exists a type of beauty still higher, will have to be ascertained by -discussion. - - -PROBLEMS CONCERNING HIGHER BEAUTY. - -What is the cause that certain bodies seem beautiful, that our ears -listen with pleasure to rhythms judged beautiful, and that we love the -purely moral beauties? Does the beauty of all these objects derive -from some unique, immutable principle, or will we recognize some one -principle of beauty for the body, and some other for something else? -What then are these principles, if there are several? Or which is this -principle, if there is but one? - - -WHAT IS THE PRINCIPLE BY PARTICIPATION IN WHICH THE BODY IS BEAUTIFUL? - -First, there are certain objects, such as bodies, whose beauty exists -only by participation, instead of being inherent in the very essence -of the subject. Such are beautiful in themselves, as is, for example, -virtue. Indeed, the same bodies seem beautiful at one time, while at -another they lack beauty; consequently, there is a great difference -between being a body and being beautiful. What then is the principle -whose presence in a body produces beauty therein? What is that element -in the bodies which moves the spectator, and which attracts, fixes and -charms his glances? This is the first problem to solve; for, on finding -this principle, we shall use it as a means to resolve other questions. - - -POLEMIC AGAINST SYMMETRY, THE STOIC DEFINITION OF BEAUTY. - -(The Stoics), like almost everybody, insist that visual beauty consists -in the proportion of the parts relatively to each other and to the -whole, joined to the grace of colors. If then, as in this case, -the beauty of bodies in general consists in the symmetry and just -proportion of their parts, beauty could not consist of anything simple, -and necessarily could not appear in anything but what was compound. -Only the totality will be beautiful; the parts by themselves will -possess no beauty; they will be beautiful only by their relation with -the totality. Nevertheless, if the totality is beautiful, it would seem -also necessary that the parts be beautiful; for indeed beauty could -never result from the assemblage of ugly things. Beauty must therefore -be spread among all the parts. According to the same doctrine, the -colors which, like sunlight, are beautiful, are beautiful but simple, -and those whose beauty is not derived from proportion, will also be -excluded from the domain of beauty. According to this hypothesis, how -will gold be beautiful? The brilliant lightning in the night, even -the stars, would not be beautiful to contemplate. In the sphere of -sounds, also, it would be necessary to insist that what is simple -possesses no beauty. Still, in a beautiful harmony, every sound, even -when isolated, is beautiful. While preserving the same proportions, the -same countenance seems at one time beautiful, and at another ugly. -Evidently, there is but one conclusion: namely, that proportion is -not beauty itself, but that it derives its beauty from some superior -principle. (This will appear more clearly from further examples). Let -us examine occupations and utterances. If also their beauty depended on -proportion, what would be the function of proportion when considering -occupations, laws, studies and sciences? Relations of proportion could -not obtain in scientific speculations; no, nor even in the mutual -agreement of these speculations. On the other hand, even bad things may -show a certain mutual agreement and harmony; as, for instance, were we -to assert that wisdom is softening of the brain, and that justice is a -generous folly. Here we have two revoltingly absurd statements, which -agree perfectly, and harmonize mutually. Further, every virtue is a -soul-beauty far truer than any that we have till now examined; yet it -could not admit of proportion, as it involves neither size nor number. -Again, granting that the soul is divided into several faculties, who -will undertake to decide which combination of these faculties, or of -the speculations to which the soul devotes itself, will produce beauty? -Moreover (if beauty is but proportion), what beauty could be predicated -of pure intelligence? - - -BEAUTY CONSISTS IN KINSHIP TO THE SOUL. - -2. Returning to our first consideration, we shall examine the nature -of the element of beauty in bodies. It is something perceivable at the -very first glance, something which the soul recognizes as kindred, and -sympathetic to her own nature, which she welcomes and assimilates. -But as soon as she meets an ugly object, she recoils, repudiates it, -and rejects it as something foreign, towards which her real nature -feels antipathy. That is the reason why the soul, being such as it is, -namely, of an essence superior to all other beings, when she perceives -an object kindred to her own nature, or which reveals only some traces -of it, rejoices, is transported, compares this object with her own -nature, thinks of herself, and of her intimate being as it would be -impossible to fail to perceive this resemblance. - - -BEAUTY CONSISTS IN PARTICIPATION IN A FORM. - -How can both sensible and intelligible objects be beautiful? Because, -as we said, sensible objects participate in a form. While a shapeless -object, by nature capable of receiving shape (physical) and form -(intelligible), remains without reason or form, it is ugly. That which -remains completely foreign to all divine reason (a reason proceeding -from the universal Soul), is absolute ugliness. Any object should be -considered ugly which is not entirely molded by informing reason, -the matter, not being able to receive perfectly the form (which the -Soul gives it). On joining matter, form co-ordinates the different -parts which are to compose unity, combines them, and by their harmony -produces something which is a unit. Since (form) is one, that which it -fashions will also have to be one, as far as a composite object can -be one. When such an object has arrived at unity, beauty resides in -it, and it communicates itself to the parts as well as to the whole. -When it meets a whole, the parts of which are perfectly similar, it -interpenetrates it evenly. Thus it would show itself now in an entire -building, then in a single stone, later in art-products as well as in -the works of nature. Thus bodies become beautiful by communion with -(or, participation in) a reason descending upon it from the divine -(universal Soul). - - -THE SOUL APPRECIATES THE BEAUTIFUL BY AN AESTHETIC SENSE. - -3. The soul appreciates beauty by an especially ordered faculty, whose -sole function it is to appreciate all that concerns beauty, even -when the other faculties take part in this judgment. Often the soul -makes her (aesthetic) decisions by comparison with the form of the -beautiful which is within her, using this form as a standard by which -to judge. But what agreement can anything corporeal have with what -is incorporeal? For example, how can an architect judge a building -placed before him as beautiful, by comparing it with the Idea which he -has within himself? The only explanation can be that, on abstracting -the stones, the exterior object is nothing but the interior form, no -doubt divided within the extent of the matter, but still one, though -manifested in the manifold? When the senses perceive in an object the -form which combines, unites and dominates a substance which lacks -shape, and therefore is of a contrary nature; and if they also perceive -a shape which distinguishes itself from the other shapes by its -elegance, then the soul, uniting these multiple elements, fuses them, -comparing them to the indivisible form which she bears within herself, -then she pronounces their agreement, kinship and harmony with that -interior type. - - -INSTANCES OF CORRESPONDENCE OF OUTER SENSE BEAUTY WITH ITS IDEA. - -Thus a worthy man, perceiving in a youth the character of virtue, is -agreeably impressed, because he observes that the youth harmonizes -with the true type of virtue which he bears within himself. Thus also -the beauty of color, though simple in form, reduces under its sway -that obscurity of matter, by the presence of the light, which is -something incorporeal, a reason, and a form. Likewise, fire surpasses -all other bodies in beauty, because it stands to all other elements -in the relation of a form; it occupies the highest regions;[29] it is -the subtlest of bodies because it most approaches the incorporeal -beings; without permitting itself to be penetrated by other bodies, it -penetrates them all; without itself cooling, it communicates to them -its heat; by its own essence it possesses color, and communicates it -to others; it shines and coruscates, because it is a form. The body -in which it does not dominate, shows but a discolored hue, and ceases -being beautiful, merely because it does not participate in the whole -form of color. Once more, thus do the hidden harmonies of sound produce -audible harmonies, and also yield to the soul the idea of beauty, -though showing it in another order of things. Audible harmonies can be -expressed in numbers; not indeed in any kind of numbers, but only in -such as can serve to produce form, and to make it dominate. - - -TRANSITION FROM SENSE BEAUTY TO INTELLECTUAL BEAUTY. - -So much then for sense-beauties which, descending on matter like images -and shadows, beautify it and thereby compel our admiration. 4. Now we -shall leave the senses in their lower sphere, and we shall rise to the -contemplation of the beauties of a superior order, of which the senses -have no intuition, but which the soul perceives and expresses. - - -INTERIOR BEAUTIES COULD NOT BE APPRECIATED WITHOUT AN INTERIOR MODEL. - -Just as we could not have spoken of sense-beauties if we had never -seen them, nor recognized them as such, if, in respect to them, we had -been similar to persons born blind, likewise we would not know enough -to say anything about the beauty either of the arts or sciences, or of -anything of the kind, if we were not already in possession of this kind -of beauty; nor of the splendor of virtue, if we had not contemplated -the ("golden) face of Justice," and of temperance, before whose -splendor the morning and evening stars grow pale. - - -MORAL BEAUTIES MORE DELIGHTFUL THAN SENSE-BEAUTIES. - -To see these beauties, they must be contemplated by the faculty our -soul has received; then, while contemplating them, we shall experience -far more pleasure, astonishment and admiration, than in contemplation -of the sense-beauties, because we will have the intuition of veritable -beauties. The sentiments inspired by beauty are admiration, a gentle -charm, desire, love, and a pleasurable impulse. - - -THEY WHO FEEL THESE SENTIMENTS MOST KEENLY ARE CALLED LOVERS. - -Such are the sentiments for invisible beauties which should be felt, -and indeed are experienced by all souls, but especially by the most -loving. In the presence of beautiful bodies, all indeed see them; but -not all are equally moved. Those who are most moved are designated -"lovers."[30] - - -THE CAUSE OF THESE EMOTIONS IS THE INVISIBLE SOUL. - -5. Let us now propound a question about experiences to these men who -feel love for incorporeal beauties. What do you feel in presence of the -noble occupations, the good morals, the habits of temperance, and in -general of virtuous acts and sentiments, and of all that constitutes -the beauty of souls? What do you feel when you contemplate your inner -beauty? What is the source of your ecstasies, or your enthusiasms? -Whence come your desires to unite yourselves to your real selves, and -to refresh yourselves by retirement from your bodies? Such indeed are -the experiences of those who love genuinely. What then is the object -which causes these, your emotions? It is neither a figure, nor a color, -nor any size; it is that (colorless) invisible soul, which possesses -a wisdom equally invisible; this soul in which may be seen shining -the splendor of all the virtues, when one discovers in oneself, or -contemplates in others, the greatness of character, the justice of the -heart, the pure temperance, the imposing countenance of valor, dignity -and modesty, proceeding alone firmly, calmly, and imperturbably; and -above all, intelligence, resembling the divinity, by its brilliant -light. What is the reason that we declare these objects to be -beautiful, when we are transported with admiration and love for them? -They exist, they manifest themselves, and whoever beholds them will -never be able to restrain himself from confessing them to be veritable -beings. Now what are these genuine beings? They are beautiful. - - -LOVE OF BEAUTY EXPLAINED BY AVERSION FOR OPPOSITE. - -But reason is not yet satisfied; reason wonders why these veritable -beings give the soul which experiences them the property of exciting -love, from which proceeds this halo of light which, so to speak, -crowns all virtues. Consider the things contrary to these beautiful -objects, and with them compare what may be ugly in the soul. If we -can discover of what ugliness consists, and what is its cause, we -shall have achieved an important element of the solution we are -seeking. Let us picture to ourselves an ugly soul; she will be given -up to intemperance; and be unjust, abandoned to a host of passions, -troubled, full of fears caused by her cowardliness, and of envy by her -degradation; she will be longing only for vile and perishable things; -she will be entirely depraved, will love nothing but impure wishes, -will have no life but the sensual, and will take pleasure in her -turpitude. Would we not explain such a state by saying that under the -very mask of beauty turpitude had invaded this soul, brutalized her, -soiled her with all kinds of vices, rendering her incapable of a pure -life, and pure sentiments, and had reduced her to an existence obscure, -infected with evil, poisoned by lethal germs; that it had hindered her -from contemplating anything she should, forcing her to remain solitary, -because it misled her out from herself towards inferior and gloomy -regions? The soul fallen into this state of impurity, seized with an -irresistible inclination towards the things of sense, absorbed by her -intercourse with the body, sunk into matter, and having even received -it within herself, has changed form by her admixture with an inferior -nature. Not otherwise would be a man fallen into slimy mud, who no -longer would present to view his primitive beauty, and would exhibit -only the appearance of the mud that had defiled him; his ugliness -would be derived from something foreign; and to recover his pristine -beauty he would have to wash off his defilement, and by purification be -restored to what he once was. - - -UGLINESS IS ONLY A FOREIGN ACCRETION. - -We have the right to say that the soul becomes ugly by mingling with -the body, confusing herself with it, by inclining herself towards it. -For a soul, ugliness consists in being impure, no longer unmingled, -like gold tarnished by particles of earth. As soon as this dross is -removed, and nothing but gold remains, then again it is beautiful, -because separated from every foreign body, and is restored to its -unique nature. Likewise the soul, released from the passions begotten -by her intercourse with the body when she yields herself too much to -it, delivered from exterior impressions, purified from the blemishes -contracted from her alliance with the body--that is, reduced to -herself, she lays aside that ugliness which is derived from a nature -foreign to her. - - -VIRTUES ARE ONLY PURIFICATIONS. - -6. Thus, according to the ancient (Platonic or Empedoclean) maxim, -"courage, temperance, all the virtues, nay, even prudence, are but -purifications." The mysteries were therefore wise in teaching that the -man who has not been purified will, in hell, dwell at the bottom of a -swamp; for everything that is not pure, because of its very perversity, -delights in mud, just as we see the impure swine wallow in the mud -with delight. And indeed, what would real temperance consist of, if it -be not to avoid attaching oneself to the pleasures of the body, and -to flee from them as impure, and as only proper for an impure being? -What else is courage, unless no longer to fear death, which is mere -separation of the soul from the body? Whoever therefore is willing to -withdraw from the body could surely not fear death. Magnanimity is -nothing but scorn of things here below. Last, prudence is the thought -which, detached from the earth, raises the soul to the intelligible -world. The purified soul, therefore, becomes a form, a reason, an -incorporeal and intellectual essence; she belongs entirely to the -divinity, in whom resides the source of the beautiful, and of all the -qualities which have affinity with it. - - -THE SOUL'S WELFARE IS TO RESEMBLE THE DIVINITY. - -Restored to intelligence, the soul sees her own beauty increase; -indeed, her own beauty consists of the intelligence with its ideas; -only when united to intelligence is the soul really isolated from all -the remainder. That is the reason that it is right to say that "the -soul's welfare and beauty lie in assimilating herself to the divinity," -because it is the principle of beauty and of the essences; or rather, -being is beauty, while the other nature (non-being, matter), is -ugliness. This is the First Evil, evil in itself, just as that one (the -First Principle) is the good and the beautiful; for good and beauty -are identical. Consequently, beauty or good, and evil or ugliness, are -to be studied by the same methods. The first rank is to be assigned to -beauty, which is identical with the good, and from which is derived -the intelligence which is beautiful by itself. The soul is beautiful -by intelligence, then, the other things, like actions, and studies, -are beautiful by the soul which gives them a form. It is still the -soul which beautifies the bodies to which is ascribed this perfection; -being a divine essence, and participating in beauty, when she seizes an -object, or subjects it to her dominion, she gives to it the beauty that -the nature of this object enables it to receive. - - -APPROACH TO THE GOOD CONSISTS IN SIMPLIFICATION. - -We must still ascend to the Good to which every soul aspires. Whoever -has seen it knows what I still have to say, and knows the beauty of -the Good. Indeed, the Good is desirable for its own sake; it is the -goal of our desires. To attain it, we have to ascend to the higher -regions, turn towards them, and lay aside the garment which we put on -when descending here below; just as, in the (Eleusynian, or Isiac) -mysteries, those who are admitted to penetrate into the recesses of the -sanctuary, after having purified themselves, lay aside every garment, -and advance stark naked. - - -THE SUPREME PURPOSE OF LIFE IS THE ECSTATICAL VISION OF GOD. - -7. Thus, in her ascension towards divinity, the soul advances until, -having risen above everything that is foreign to her, she alone with -Him who is alone, beholds, in all His simplicity and purity, Him from -whom all depends, to whom all aspires, from whom everything draws -its existence, life and thought. He who beholds him is overwhelmed -with love; with ardor desiring to unite himself with Him, entranced -with ecstasy. Men who have not yet seen Him desire Him as the Good; -those who have, admire Him as sovereign beauty, struck simultaneously -with stupor and pleasure, thrilling in a painless orgasm, loving -with a genuine emotion, with an ardor without equal, scorning all -other affections, and disdaining those things which formerly they -characterized as beautiful. This is the experience of those to whom -divinities and guardians have appeared; they reck no longer of the -beauty of other bodies. Imagine, if you can, the experiences of those -who behold Beauty itself, the pure Beauty, which, because of its -very purity, is fleshless and bodiless, outside of earth and heaven. -All these things, indeed are contingent and composite, they are not -principles, they are derived from Him. What beauty could one still wish -to see after having arrived at vision of Him who gives perfection to -all beings, though himself remains unmoved, without receiving anything; -after finding rest in this contemplation, and enjoying it by becoming -assimilated to Him? Being supreme beauty, and the first beauty, He -beautifies those who love Him, and thereby they become worthy of love. -This is the great, the supreme goal of souls; this is the goal which -arouses all their efforts, if they do not wish to be disinherited of -that sublime contemplation the enjoyment of which confers blessedness, -and privation of which is the greatest of earthly misfortunes. Real -misfortune is not to lack beautiful colors, nor beautiful bodies, -nor power, nor domination, nor royalty. It is quite sufficient to -see oneself excluded from no more than possession of beauty. This -possession is precious enough to render worthless domination of -a kingdom, if not of the whole earth, of the sea, or even of the -heavens--if indeed it were possible, while abandoning and scorning all -that (natural beauty), to succeed in contemplating beauty face to face. - - -THE METHOD TO ACHIEVE ECSTASY IS TO CLOSE THE EYES OF THE BODY. - -8. How shall we start, and later arrive at the contemplation of this -ineffable beauty which, like the divinity in the mysteries, remains -hidden in the recesses of a sanctuary, and does not show itself -outside, where it might be perceived by the profane? We must advance -into this sanctuary, penetrating into it, if we have the strength to do -so, closing our eyes to the spectacle of terrestrial things, without -throwing a backward glance on the bodies whose graces formerly charmed -us. If we do still see corporeal beauties, we must no longer rush at -them, but, knowing that they are only images, traces and adumbrations -of a superior principle, we will flee from them, to approach Him -of whom they are merely the reflections. Whoever would let himself -be misled by the pursuit of those vain shadows, mistaking them for -realities, would grasp only an image as fugitive as the fluctuating -form reflected by the waters, and would resemble that senseless -(Narcissus) who, wishing to grasp that image himself, according to the -fable, disappeared, carried away by the current. Likewise he would wish -to embrace corporeal beauties, and not release them, would plunge, -not his body, but his soul into the gloomy abysses, so repugnant to -intelligence; he would be condemned to total blindness; and on this -earth, as well as in hell, he would see naught but mendacious shades. - - -HOW TO FLY TO OUR FATHERLAND. - -This indeed is the occasion to quote (from Homer) with peculiar force, -"Let us fly unto our dear fatherland!" But how shall we fly? How escape -from here? is the question Ulysses asks himself in that allegory -which represents him trying to escape from the magic sway of Circe -or Calypso, where neither the pleasure of the eyes, nor the view of -fleshly beauty were able to hold him in those enchanted places. Our -fatherland is the region whence we descend here below. It is there that -dwells our Father. But how shall we return thither? What means shall -be employed to return us thither? Not our feet, indeed; all they could -do would be to move us from one place of the earth to another. Neither -is it a chariot, nor ship which need be prepared. All these vain helps -must be left aside, and not even considered. We must close the eyes of -the body, to open another vision, which indeed all possess, but very -few employ. - - -HOW TO TRAIN THIS INTERIOR VISION. - -9. But how shall we train this interior vision? At the moment of -its (first) awakening, it cannot contemplate beauties too dazzling. -Your soul must then first be accustomed to contemplate the noblest -occupations of man, and then the beautiful deeds, not indeed those -performed by artists, but those (good deeds) done by virtuous men. -Later contemplate the souls of those who perform these beautiful -actions. Nevertheless, how will you discover the beauty which their -excellent soul possesses? Withdraw within yourself, and examine -yourself. If you do not yet therein discover beauty, do as the artist, -who cuts off, polishes, purifies until he has adorned his statue -with all the marks of beauty. Remove from your soul, therefore, all -that is superfluous, straighten out all that is crooked, purify and -illuminate what is obscure, and do not cease perfecting your statue -until the divine resplendence of virtue shines forth upon your sight, -until you see temperance in its holy purity seated in your breast. -When you shall have acquired this perfection; when you will see it in -yourself; when you will purely dwell within yourself; when you will -cease to meet within yourself any obstacle to unity; when nothing -foreign will any more, by its admixture, alter the simplicity of your -interior essence; when within your whole being you will be a veritable -light, immeasurable in size, uncircumscribed by any figure within -narrow boundaries, unincreasable because reaching out to infinity, -and entirely incommensurable because it transcends all measure and -quantity; when you shall have become such, then, having become sight -itself, you may have confidence in yourself, for you will no longer -need any guide. Then must you observe carefully, for it is only by the -eye that then will open itself within you that you will be able to -perceive supreme Beauty. But if you try to fix on it an eye soiled by -vice, an eye that is impure, or weak, so as not to be able to support -the splendor of so brilliant an object, that eye will see nothing, not -even if it were shown a sight easy to grasp. The organ of vision will -first have to be rendered analogous and similar to the object it is to -contemplate. Never would the eye have seen the sun unless first it had -assumed its form; likewise, the soul could never see beauty, unless she -herself first became beautiful. To obtain the view of the beautiful, -and of the divinity, every man must begin by rendering himself -beautiful and divine. - - -THE LANDMARKS OF THE PATH TO ECSTASY. - -Thus he will first rise to intelligence, and he will there contemplate -beauty, and declare that all this beauty resides in the Ideas. Indeed, -in them everything is beautiful, because they are the daughters and the -very essence of Intelligence. - -Above intelligence, he will meet Him whom we call the nature of the -Good, and who causes beauty to radiate around Him; so that, to repeat, -the first thing that is met is beauty. If a distinction is to be -established among the intelligibles, we might say that intelligible -beauty is the locus of ideas, and that the Good, which is located above -the Beautiful, is its source and principle. If, however, we desire to -locate the Good and the Beautiful within one single principle, we might -regard this one principle first as Good, and only afterwards, as Beauty. - - -REFERENCES. - -Page 40, line 4, Equally Beautiful, Phaedrus p. 250, Cary 63-65; -Hippias Major, 295, Cary 44; Philebus p. 17, Cary 20, 21. - -Page 41, line 11, Stoic definition, Cicero, Tusculans, iv. 13. - -Page 44, line 30, Obscurity of Matter, Timaeus, p. 31, Cary 11; -Philebus, p. 29, Cary 52. - -Page 45, line 22, Superior Order, Banquet 210, Cary 34; Timaeus, p. 31, -Cary 11. - -Page 45, line 35, Golden Face of Justice, Athenaeus, Deipnosophistae, -xii. 546. - -Page 46, line 10, Pleasurable Impulse, Banquet, p. 191, Cary 17, 18; -Cratylos, p. 420, Cary 78-80. - -Page 47, line 5, Justice of the Heart, Banquet, p. 209, Cary 33; -Republic, iii. 402, Cary 12. - -Page 48, line 23, Ugliness, Banquet, p. 215-217, Cary 39, 40; Philebus, -p. 66, Cary 158, 159. - -Page 49, line 4, Purifications, Phaedo, p. 69, Cary 37. - -Page 49, line 32, Assimilating to Divinity, Republic x. p. 613, Cary 12. - -Page 50, line 1, Good and Beautiful, Timaeus, p. 35, Cary 12. - -Page 50, line 5, Identical with Good, Philebus, p. 64, Cary 153-155; -First Alcibiades, p. 115, Cary 23, 24. - -Page 51, line 1, 2, He who Beholds, Phaedrus, p. 278, Cary 145. - -Page 51, line 8, Ardor without Equal; line 15, Very Purity; Banquet, p. -210, 211; Cary 34, 35. - -Page 51, line 29, Confers Blessedness, Phaedrus, p. 250, Cary 64. - -Page 53, line 16, Interior Vision, Republic, x., p. 533, Cary 13. - -Page 53, line 34, Temperance Seated, Phaedrus, p. 279, Cary 147. - -Page 54, line 19, Organ of Vision, Timaeus, p. 45, Cary 19. - -Page 54, line 23, Assumed its form, Republic, vi., p. 508, Cary 19. - -Page 54, line 29, Rise to Intelligence, Philebus, p. 64, Cary 153-155. - - - - -FOURTH ENNEAD, BOOK SEVEN. - -Of the Immortality of the Soul: Polemic Against Materialism. - - -IS THE SOUL IMMORTAL? - -1. Are we immortal, or does all of us die? (Another possibility would -be that) of the two parts of which we are composed, the one might be -fated to be dissolved and perish, while the other, that constitutes our -very personality, might subsist perpetually. These problems must be -solved by a study of our nature. - - -THE BODY AS THE INSTRUMENT OF THE SOUL. - -Man is not a simple being; he contains a soul and a body, which is -united to this soul, either as tool, or in some other manner.[31] This -is how we must distinguish the soul from the body, and determine the -nature and manner of existence ("being") of each of them. - - -THE BODY IS COMPOSITE, AND THEREFORE PERISHABLE. - -As the nature of the body is composite, reason convinces us that it -cannot last perpetually, and our senses show it to us dissolved, -destroyed, and decayed, because the elements that compose it return -to join the elements of the same nature, altering, destroying them -and each other, especially when this chaos is abandoned to the soul, -which alone keeps her parts combined. Even if a body were taken alone, -it would not be a unity; it may be analyzed into form and matter, -principles that are necessary to the constitution of all bodies, even -of those that are simple.[32] Besides, as they contain extension, -the bodies can be cut, divided into infinitely small parts, and thus -perish.[33] Therefore if our body is a part of ourselves,[34] not all -of us is immortal; if the body is only the instrument of the soul, as -the body is given to the soul only for a definite period, it still is -by nature perishable. - - -THE SOUL IS THE INDIVIDUALITY, AS ITS FORM, AND AS A SKILLED WORKMAN. - -The soul, which is the principal part of man, and which constitutes man -himself,[35] should bear to the body the relation of form to matter, or -of a workman to his tool;[36] in both cases the soul is the man himself. - - -IF THE SOUL IS INCORPOREAL, WE MUST STUDY INCORPOREALITY. - -2. What then is the nature of the soul? If she is a body, she can be -decomposed, as every body is a composite. If, on the contrary, she is -not a body, if hers is a different nature, the latter must be examined; -either in the same way that we have examined the body, or in some other -way. - - -A.--THE SOUL IS NOT CORPOREAL (AS THE STOICS THOUGHT). - -(a.) (Neither a material molecule, nor a material aggregation of -material atoms could possess life and intelligence.) First, let -us consider the nature of this alleged soul-body. As every soul -necessarily possesses life, and as the body, considered as being the -soul, must obtain at least two molecules, if not more (there are three -possibilities): either only one of them possesses life, or all of -them possess it, or none of them. If one molecule alone possesses -life, it alone will be the soul. Of what nature will be that molecule -supposed to possess life by itself? Will it be water (Hippo), air -(Anaximenes, Archelaus, and Diogenes), earth, or fire (Heraclitus, -Stobaeus?[37]) But those are elements that are inanimate by themselves, -and which, even when they are animated, possess but a borrowed life. -Still there is no other kind of body. Even those (philosophers, like -the Pythagoreans) who posited elements other (than water, air, earth -and fire) still considered them to be bodies, and not souls, not even -attributing souls to them. The theory that life results from the union -of molecules of which, nevertheless, none by itself possesses life, is -an absurd hypothesis. If further any molecule possesses life, then a -single one would be sufficient. - - -NEITHER MIXTURE NOR ITS PRINCIPLE WILL EXPLAIN LIFE AS A BODY. - -The most irrational theory of all is that an aggregation of molecules -should produce life, that elements without intelligence should beget -intelligence. Others (like Alexander of Aphrodisia) insist that to -produce life these elements must be mingled in a certain manner. That -would, however, imply (as thought Gallen and Hippocrates[38]) the -existence of a principle which produces order, and which should be the -cause of mixture or, temperament,[39] and that should alone deserve -being considered as soul. No simple bodies could exist, much less -composite bodies, unless there was a soul in the universe; for it is -(seminal) reason which, in, adding itself to matter, produces body.[40] -But surely a (seminal) reason could proceed from nowhere except a soul. - - -NO ATOMIC AGGREGATION COULD PRODUCE A SELF-HARMONIZING UNITY. - -3. (b.) (No aggregation of atoms could form a whole that would be one -and sympathetic with itself.) Others, on the contrary, insist that the -soul is constituted by the union of atoms or indivisibles (as thought -Leucippus, Democritus and Epicurus.[41]) To refute this error, we have -to examine the nature of sympathy (or community of affection, a Stoic -characteristic of a living being,[42]) and juxtaposition.[43] On the -one hand an aggregation of corporeal molecules which are incapable of -being united, and which do not feel cannot form a single sympathetic -whole such as is the soul, which is sympathetic with herself. On -the other hand, how could a body or extension be constituted by (a -juxtaposition of) atoms? - - -SOUL IS A SIMPLE SUBSTANCE, WHILE EVERY BODY IS COMPOSED OF MATTER AND -FORM. - -(c.) (Every body is a composite of matter and form, while the soul is -a simple substance.) Inasmuch as matter possesses no quality,[44] the -matter of no simple body will be said to possess life in itself. That -which imparts life to it must then be its form. If form is a "being," -the soul cannot simultaneously be matter and form; it will be only -matter or form. Consequently, the soul will not be the body, since -the body is not constituted by matter exclusively, as could be proved -analytically, if necessary. - - -IF SOUL IS ONLY AN AFFECTION OF MATTER, WHENCE THAT AFFECTION? - -(d.) (The soul is not a simple manner of being of matter, because -matter could not give itself a form.) Some Stoics might deny that form -was a "being," asserting the soul to be a mere affection (or, manner -of being) of matter.[45] From whence then did matter acquire this -affection and animating life? Surely matter itself could not endow -itself with a form and a soul. That which endows matter or any body -with life must then be some principle alien and superior to corporeal -nature. - - -NO BODY COULD SUBSIST WITHOUT THE POWER OF THE UNIVERSAL SOUL. - -(e.) (No body could subsist without the power of the universal soul.) -Besides no body could subsist without the power of the universal Soul -(from Numenius[46]). Every body, indeed, is in a perpetual flow and -movement (as thought Heraclitus, in Plato, Cratylus[47]), and the world -would soon perish if it contained nothing but bodies, even if some one -of them were to be called soul; for such a soul, being composed of -the same matter as the other bodies, would undergo the same fate that -they do; or rather, there would not even be any body, everything would -remain in the condition of shapeless matter, since there would exist -no principle to fashion it. Why, there would not even be any matter, -and the universe would be annihilated to nothingness, if the care of -keeping its parts united were entrusted to some body which would have -nothing but the name of soul, as for instance, to air, or a breath -without cohesion,[48] which could not be one, by itself. As all bodies -are divisible, if the universe depended on a body, it would be deprived -of intelligence and given up to chance. How, indeed, could there be -any order in a spirit which itself would need to receive order from a -soul? How could this spirit contain reason and intelligence? On the -hypothesis of the existence of the soul, all these elements serve to -constitute the body of the world, and of every animal, because all -different bodies together work for the end of all; but without the -soul, there is no order, and even nothing exists any more. - - -IF THE SOUL IS NOT SIMPLE MATTER, SHE MUST BE A SUBSTANTIAL FORM. - -4. (f) (If the soul is anything but simple matter, she must be -constituted by a substantial form.) Those who claim that the soul -is a body are, by the very force of the truth, forced to recognize -the existence, before and above them, of a form proper to the soul; -for they acknowledge the existence of an intelligent spirit, and an -intellectual fire (as do the Stoics, following in the footsteps of -Heraclitus, Stobaeus[49]). According to them, it seems that, without -spirit or fire, there cannot be any superior nature in the order of -beings, and that the soul needs a location where she may be built -up. On the contrary, it is bodies alone that need to be built up on -something, and indeed, they are founded on the powers of the soul. -If really we do believe that the soul and life are no more than a -spirit, why add the qualification "of a certain characteristic,"[50] -a meaningless term employed when forced to admit an active nature -superior to that of bodies. As there are thousands of inanimate -spirits, not every spirit is a soul. If only that spirit is a -soul which possesses that "special characteristic," this "special -characteristic" and this "manner of being" will either be something -real, or will be nothing. If they are nothing, there will be nothing -real but spirit, and this alleged "manner of being" is nothing more -than a word. In that system, therefore, nothing but matter really -exists. God, the soul, and all other things are no more than a word; -the body alone really subsists. If, on the contrary, that "manner of -being" is something real, if it is anything else than substrate or -matter, if it resides in matter without being material or composed of -matter, it must then be a nature different from the body, namely, a -reason (by a pun).[51] - - -THE BODY EXERTS A UNIFORM ACTION, WHILE THE SOUL EXERTS A VARIED ONE. - -(g.) (The body exerts an uniform action, while the soul exerts a very -diverse action.) The following considerations further demonstrate the -impossibility of the soul being a body. A body must be hot or cold, -hard or soft, liquid or solid, black or white, or qualities differing -according to its nature. If it is only hot or cold, light or heavy, -black or white, it communicates its only quality to what comes close -to it; for fire could not cool, nor ice heat. Nevertheless, the soul -produces not only different effects in different animals, but contrary -effects even in the same being; she makes certain things solid, dense, -black, light, and certain others liquid, sparse, white, or heavy. -According to the different quality of the body, and according to its -color, she should produce but a single effect; nevertheless, she exerts -a very diverse action. - - -THREE MORE PROOFS OF THE INCORPOREITY OF THE SOUL. - -5. (h.) (The body has but a single kind of motion while the soul has -different ones.) If the soul is a body, how does it happen that she -has different kinds of motion instead of a single one, as is the -case with the body? Will these movements be explained by voluntary -determinations, and by (seminal) reasons? In this case neither the -voluntary determinations, nor these reasons, which differ from each -other, can belong to a single and simple body; such a body does not -participate in any particular reason except by the principle that made -it hot or cold. - - -BODIES CAN LOSE PARTS, NOT SO THE SOUL. - -(i.) (Souls cannot, as do bodies, lose or gain parts, ever remaining -identical.) The body has the faculty of making its organs grow within -a definite time and in fixed proportions. From where could the soul -derive them? Its function is to grow, not to cause growth, unless -the principle of growth be comprehended within its material mass. If -the soul that makes the body grow was herself a body, she should, on -uniting with molecules of a nature similar to hers, develop a growth -proportional to that of the organs. In this case, the molecules that -will come to add themselves to the soul will be either animate or -inanimate; if they are animate, how could they have become such, and -from whom will they have received that characteristic? If they are not -animate, how will they become such, and how will agreement between -them and the first soul arise? How will they form but a single unity -with her, and how will they agree with her? Will they not constitute a -soul that will remain foreign to the former, who will not possess her -requirements of knowledge? This aggregation of molecules that would -thus be called soul will resemble the aggregation of molecules that -form our body. She would lose parts, she would acquire new ones; she -will not be identical. But if we had a soul that was not identical, -memory and self-consciousness of our own faculties would be impossible. - - -THE SOUL IS EVERYWHERE ENTIRE; THAT IS NOT THE CASE WITH THE BODY. - -(j.) (The soul, being one and simple, is everywhere entire, and has -parts that are identical to the whole; this is not the case with -the body.) If the soul is a body, she will have parts that are not -identical with the whole, as every body is by nature divisible. If then -the soul has a definite magnitude of which she cannot lose anything -without ceasing to be a soul, she will by losing her parts, change her -nature, as happens to every quantity. If, on losing some part of its -magnitude, a body, notwithstanding, remains identical in respect to -quality, it does not nevertheless become different from what it was, -in respect to quantity, and it remains identical only in respect to -quality, which differs from quantity. What shall we answer to those who -insist that the soul is a body? Will they say that, in the same body, -each part possesses the same quality as the total soul, and that the -case is similar with the part of a part? Then quantity is no longer -essential to the nature of the soul; which contradicts the hypothesis -that the soul needed to possess a definite magnitude. Besides the soul -is everywhere entire; now it is impossible for a body to be entire in -several places simultaneously, or have parts identical to the whole. -If we refuse the name of soul to each part, the soul is then composed -of inanimate parts. Besides, if the soul is a definite magnitude, she -cannot increase or diminish without ceasing to be a soul; but it often -happens that from a single conception or from a single germ are born -two or more beings, as is seen in certain animals in whom the germs -divide;[52] in this case, each part is equal to the whole. However -superficially considered, this fact demonstrates that the principle -in which the part is equal to the whole is essentially superior to -quantity, and must necessarily lack any kind of quantity. On this -condition alone can the soul remain identical when the body loses its -quantity, because she has need of no mass, no quantity, and because her -essence is of an entirely different nature. The soul and the (seminal) -reasons therefore possess no extension. - - -THE BODY COULD NOT POSSESS SENSATION. - -6. (k.) (The body could not possess either sensation, thought, or -virtue.) If the soul were a body, she would not possess either -sensation, thought, science, virtue, nor any of the perfections that -render her more beautiful. Here follows the proof. - - -IMPOSSIBILITY FOR THE BODY TO HAVE SENSATION. - -The subject that perceives a sense-object must itself be single, and -grasp this object in its totality, by one and the same power. This -happens when by several organs we perceive several qualities of a -single object, or when, by a single organ, we embrace a single complex -object in its totality, as, for instance, a face. It is not one -principle that sees the face, and another one that sees the eyes; it -is the "same principle" which embraces everything at once. Doubtless -we do receive a sense-impression by the eyes, and another by the ears; -but both of them must end in some single principle. How, indeed, could -any decision be reached about the difference of sense-impressions -unless they all converged toward the same principle? The latter is -like a centre, and the individual sensations are like radii which -from the circumference radiate towards the centre of a circle. This -central principle is essentially single. If it was divisible, and if -sense-impressions were directed towards two points at a distance from -each other, such as the extremities of the same line, they would either -still converge towards one and the same point, as, for instance, the -middle (of the line), or one part would feel one thing, and another -something else. It would be absolutely as if I felt one thing, and you -felt another, when placed in the presence of one and the same thing (as -thought Aristotle, de Anima[53]). Facts, therefore, demonstrate that -sensations centre in one and the same principle; as visible images are -centred in the pupil of the eye; otherwise how could we, through the -pupil, see the greatest objects? So much the more, therefore, must -the sensations that centre in the (Stoic) "directing principle"[54] -resemble indivisible intuitions and be perceived by an indivisible -principle. If the latter possessed extension, it could, like the -sense-object, be divided; each of its parts would thus perceive one -of the parts of the sense-object, and nothing within us would grasp -the object in its totality. The subject that perceives must then be -entirely one; otherwise, how could it be divided? In that case it could -not be made to coincide with the sense-object, as two equal figures -superimposed on each other, because the directing principle does not -have an extension equal to that of the sense-object. How then will we -carry out the division? Must the subject that feels contain as many -parts as there are in the sense-object? Will each part of the soul, in -its turn, feel by its own parts, or will (we decide that) the parts of -parts will not feel? Neither is that likely. If, on the other hand, -each part feels the entire object, and if each magnitude is divisible -to infinity, the result is that, for a single object, there will be an -infinity of sensations in each part of the soul; and, so much the more, -an infinity of images in the principle that directs us. (This, however, -is the opposite of the actual state of affairs.) - - -AGAINST THE STOICS, SENSATIONS ARE NOT IMPRESSIONS OF A SEAL ON WAX. - -Besides, if the principle that feels were corporeal, it could feel only -so long as exterior objects produced in the blood or in the air some -impression similar to that of a seal on wax.[55] If they impressed -their images on wet substances, as is no doubt supposed, these -impressions would become confused as images in water, and memory would -not occur. If, however, these impressions persisted, they would either -form an obstacle to subsequent ones, and no further sensation would -occur; or they would be effaced by the new ones, which would destroy -memory. If then the soul is capable of recalling earlier sensations, -and having new ones, to which the former would form no obstacle, it is -because she is not corporeal. - - -SENSATION CANNOT BE RELAYED FROM SENSE-ORGAN TO DIRECTING PRINCIPLE. - -7. The same reflections may be made about pain, and one's feeling of -it. When a man's finger is said to give him pain, this, no doubt, -is a recognition that the seat of the pain is in the finger, and -that the feeling of pain is experienced by the directing principle. -Consequently, when a part of the spirit suffers, this suffering is felt -by the directing principle, and shared by the whole soul.[56] How can -this sympathy be explained? By relay transmission, (the Stoic) will -answer; the sense-impression is felt first by the animal spirit that -is in the finger, and then transmitted to the neighboring part, and -so on till it reaches the directing part. Necessarily, if the pain is -felt by the first part that experiences it, it will also be felt by the -second part to which it is transmitted; then by the third, and so on, -until the one pain would have caused an infinite number of sensations. -Last the directing principle will perceive all these sensations, adding -thereto its own sensation. Speaking strictly, however, each of these -sensations will not transmit the suffering of the finger, but the -suffering of one of the intermediate parts. For instance, the second -sensation will relay the suffering of the hand. The third, that of -the arm, and so on, until there will be an infinity of sensations. -The directing principle, for its part, will not feel the pain of the -finger, but its own; it will know none but that, it will pay no -attention to the rest, because it will ignore the pain suffered by the -finger. Therefore, relayed sensation is an impossibility, nor could -one part of the body perceive the suffering felt by another part; for -the body has extension, and, in every extension, parts are foreign to -each other (the opposite of the opinion of Cleanthes, Nemesius).[57] -Consequently, the principle that feels must everywhere be identical -with itself; and among all beings, the body is that which is least -suitable to this identity. - - -THE BODY CANNOT THINK. - -8. If, in any sense whatever, the soul were a body, we could not think. -Here is the proof. If feeling[58] is explained as the soul's laying -hold of perceptible things by making use of the body, thinking cannot -also of making use of the body. Otherwise, thinking and feeling would -be identical. Thus, thinking must consist in perceiving without the -help of the body (as thought Aristotle[59]). So much the more, the -thinking principle cannot be corporeal. Since it is sensation that -grasps sense-objects, it must likewise be thought, or intellection, -that grasps intelligible objects. Though this should be denied, it will -be admitted that we think certain intelligibles entities, and that we -perceive entities that have no extension. How could an entity that -had extension think one that had no extension? Or a divisible entity, -think an indivisible one? Could this take place by an indivisible part? -In this case, the thinking subject will not be corporeal; for there -is no need that the whole subject be in contact with the object; it -would suffice if one of its parts reached the object (as Aristotle said -against Plato).[60] If then this truth be granted, that the highest -thoughts must have incorporeal objects, the latter can be cognized only -by a thinking principle that either is, or becomes independent of body. -Even the objection that the object of thought is constituted by the -forms inherent in matter, implies that these forces cannot be thought -unless, by intelligence, they are separated from matter. It is not by -means of the carnal mass of the body, nor generally by matter, that -we can effect the abstraction of triangle, circle, line or point. To -succeed in this abstraction, the soul must separate from the body, and -consequently, the soul cannot be corporeal. - - -THE BODY CANNOT POSSESS VIRTUE. - -Neither do beauty or justice possess extension, I suppose; and their -conception must be similar. These things can be cognized or retained -only by the indivisible part of the soul. If the latter were corporeal, -where indeed could virtues, prudence, justice and courage exist? In -this case, virtues (as Critias thought),[61] would be no more than -a certain disposition of the spirit, or blood (as Empedocles also -thought).[62] For instance, courage and temperance would respectively -be no more than a certain irritability, and a fortunate temperament of -the spirit; beauty would consist in the agreeable shape of outlines, -which cause persons, in whom they occur, to be called elegant and -handsome. Under this hypothesis, indeed, the types of spirit might -possess vigor and beauty. But what need would it have of temperance? -On the contrary, the spirit would seek to be agreeably affected by the -things it touches and embraces, to enjoy a moderate heat, a gentle -coolness, and to be in contact only with sweet, tender, and smooth -entities. What incentive would the spirit have to apportion rewards to -those who had deserved them? - - -IF VIRTUE WERE CORPOREAL IT WOULD BE PERISHABLE. - -Are the notions of virtue, and other intelligible entities by the soul -thought eternal, or does virtue arise and perish? If so, by what being, -and how will it be formed? It is the same problem that remains to be -solved. Intelligible entities must therefore be eternal and immutable, -like geometrical notions, and consequently cannot be corporeal. -Further, the subject in whom they exist must be of a nature similar to -theirs, and therefore not be corporeal; for the nature of body is not -to remain immutable, but to be in a perpetual flow. - - -BODIES ARE ACTIVE ONLY BY MEANS OF INCORPOREAL POWERS. - -(9.) There are men who locate the soul in the body, so as to give her -a foundation in some sphere of activity, to account for the various -phenomena in the body, such as getting hot or cold, pushing on or -stopping, (and the like). They evidently do not realize that bodies -produce these effects only through incorporeal powers, and that those -are not the powers that we attribute to the soul, which are thought, -sensation, reasoning, desire, judiciousness, propriety and wisdom, all -of them entities that cannot possible be attributes of a corporeal -entity. Consequently, those (materialists) attribute to the body all -the faculties of incorporeal essences, and leave nothing for the latter. - - -WHY BODIES ARE ACTIVATED BY INCORPOREAL POWERS. - -The proof that bodies are activated only by incorporeal faculties may -be proved as follows: Quantity and quality are two different things. -Every body has a quantity, but not always a quality, as in the case of -matter, (according to the Stoic definition, that it was a body without -quality, but possessing magnitude[63]). Granting this, (you Stoic) will -also be forced to admit that as quality is something different from -quantity, it must consequently be different from the body. Since then -every body has a quantity, how could quality, which is no quantity, be -a body? Besides, as we said above,[64] every body and mass is altered -by division; nevertheless, when a body is cut into pieces, every -part preserves the entire quality without undergoing alteration. For -instance, every molecule of honey, possesses the quality of sweetness -as much as all the molecules taken together; consequently that -sweetness cannot be corporeal; and other qualities must be in a similar -case. Moreover, if the active powers were corporeal, they would have to -have a material mass proportional to their strength or weakness. Now -there are great masses that have little force, and small ones that have -great force; demonstrating that power does not depend on extension, and -should be attributed to some (substance) without extension. Finally, -you may say that matter is identical with body, and produces different -beings only by receiving different qualities (the Stoics considering -that even the divinity was no more than modified matter, their two -principles being matter and quality;[65] the latter, however, was also -considered as body). How do you (Stoics) not see that qualities thus -added to matter are reasons, that are primary and immaterial? Do not -object that when the spirit (breath) and blood abandon animals, they -cease to live; for if these things are necessary to life, there are -for our life many other necessities, even during the presence of the -soul (as thought Nemesius).[66] Besides, neither spirit nor blood are -distributed to every part of the body. - - -THE SOUL CAN PENETRATE THE BODY; BUT TWO BODIES CANNOT PENETRATE EACH -OTHER. - -(10). The soul penetrates the whole body, while an entire body cannot -penetrate another entire body. Further, if the soul is corporeal, and -pervades the whole body, she will, with the body, form (as Alexander -of Aphrodisia pointed out) a mixture,[67] similar to the other bodies -(that are constituted by a mixture of matter and quality, as the Stoics -taught). Now as none of the bodies that enter into a mixture is in -actualization[68] the soul, instead of being in actualization in the -bodies, would be in them only potentially; consequently, she would -cease to be a soul, as the sweet ceases to be sweet when mingled with -the bitter; we would, therefore, have no soul left. If, when one body -forms a mixture with another body, total penetration occurs, so that -each molecule contains equal parts of two bodies and that each body -be distributed equally in the whole space occupied by the mass of the -other, without any increase of volume, nothing that is not divided will -remain. Indeed, mixture operates not only between the larger parts -(which would be no more than a simple juxtaposition); but the two -bodies must penetrate each other mutually, even if smaller--it would -indeed be impossible for the smaller to equal the greater; still, when -the smaller penetrates the larger it must divide it entirely. If the -mixture operates in this manner in every part, and if no undivided -part of the mass remain, the body must be divided into points, which -is impossible. Indeed, were this division pushed to infinity, since -every body is fully divisible, bodies will have to be infinite not only -potentially, but also in actuality. It is therefore impossible for -one entire body to penetrate another in its entirety. Now as the soul -penetrates the entire body, the soul must be incorporeal (as thought -Nemesius).[69] - - -THE STOIC DEVELOPMENT FROM HABIT TO SOUL AND INTELLIGENCE WOULD MAKE -THE PERFECT ARISE FROM THE IMPERFECT, AN IMPOSSIBILITY. - -(11). (If, as Stoics claim, man first was a certain nature called -habit,[70] then a soul, and last an intelligence, the perfect would -have arisen from the imperfect, which is impossible). To say that -the first nature of the soul is to be a spirit, and that this spirit -became soul only after having been exposed to cold, and as it were -became soaked by its contact, because the cold subtilized it;[71] this -is an absurd hypothesis. Many animals are born in warm places, and do -not have their soul exposed to action of cold. Under this hypothesis, -the primary nature of the soul would have been made dependent on the -concourse of exterior circumstances. The Stoics, therefore, posit as -principle that which is less perfect (the soul), and trace it to a -still less perfect earlier thing called habit (or form of inorganic -things).[72] Intelligence, therefore, is posited in the last rank -since it is alleged to be born of the soul, while, on the contrary, -the first rank should be assigned to intelligence, the second to the -soul, the third to nature, and, following natural order, consider -that which is less perfect as the posterior element. In this system -the divinity, by the mere fact of his possessing intelligence, is -posterior and begotten, possessing only an incidental intelligence. -The result would, therefore, be that there was neither soul, nor -intelligence, nor divinity; for never can that which is potential pass -to the condition of actualization, without the prior existence of some -actualized principle. If what is potential were to transform itself -into actualization--which is absurd--its passage into actualization -will have to involve at the very least a contemplation of something -which is not merely potential, but actualized. Nevertheless, on the -hypothesis that what is potential can permanently remain identical, it -will of itself pass into actualization, and will be superior to the -being which is potential only because it will be the object of the -aspiration of such a being. We must, therefore, assign the first rank -to the being that has a perfect and incorporeal nature, which is always -in actualization. Thus intelligence and soul are prior to nature; the -soul, therefore, is not a spirit, and consequently no body. Other -reasons for the incorporeality of the soul have been advanced; but the -above suffices (as thought Aristotle).[73] - - -II. THE SOUL IS NEITHER THE HARMONY NOR ENTELECHY OF THE BODY--THE SOUL -IS THE HARMONY OF THE BODY; AGAINST THE PYTHAGOREANS. - -(12). a. Since the soul is not corporeal, its real nature must be -ascertained. Shall we assert that she is something distinct from the -body, but dependent thereon, as, for instance, a harmony? Pythagoras, -indeed, used this word in a technical sense; and after him the harmony -of the body has been thought to be something similar to the harmony -of a lyre. As tension produces in the lyre-strings an affection -(or, manner of being, or state) that is called harmony, likewise, -as contrary elements are mingled in our body, an individual mixture -produces life and soul, which, therefore, is only an individual -affection of this mixture. - - -WHY THE SOUL IS NOT A HARMONY. - -As has already been said above[74] this hypothesis is inadmissible for -several reasons. To begin with, the soul is prior (to the body), and -the harmony is posterior thereto. Then the soul dominates the body, -governs it, and often even resists it, which would be impossible if -the soul were only a harmony. The soul, indeed, is a "being," which -harmony is not. When the corporeal principles of which we are composed -are mingled in just proportions, their temperament constitutes health -(but not a "being," such as the soul). Besides, every part of the body -being mingled in a different manner should form (a different harmony, -and consequently) a different soul, so that there would be several -of them. The decisive argument, however, is that this soul (that -constitutes a harmony) presupposes another soul which would produce -this harmony, as a lyre needs a musician who would produce harmonic -vibrations in the strings, because he possesses within himself the -reason according to which he produces the harmony. The strings of the -lyre do not vibrate of themselves, and the elements of our body cannot -harmonize themselves. Nevertheless, under this hypothesis, animated and -orderly "being" would have been made up out of inanimate and disordered -entities; and these orderly "beings" would owe their order and -existence to chance. That is as impossible for parts as for the whole. -The soul, therefore, is no harmony. - - -THE SOUL IS NOT THE ENTELECHY OF THE BODY (POLEMIC AGAINST ARISTOTLE). -ARISTOTLE'S STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM.[75] - -(13). b. Now let us examine the opinion of those who call the soul an -entelechy. They say that, in the composite, the soul plays the part of -form in respect to matter, in the body the soul animates. The soul, -however, is not said to be the form of any body, nor of the body as -such; but of the natural body, that is organized, and which possesses -life potentially.[76] - - -IF THE SOUL IS AN ENTELECHY, SHE IS A DIFFERENT ONE THAN ARISTOTLE'S. - -If the soul's relation to the body is the same as that of the statue -to the metal, the soul will be divided with the body, and on cutting -a member a portion of the soul would be cut along with it. According -to this teaching, the soul separates from the body only during sleep, -since she must inhere in the body of which she is the entelechy, in -which case sleep would become entirely inexplicable. If the soul be an -entelechy, the struggle of reason against the passions would become -entirely impossible. The entire human being will experience but one -single sentiment, and never be in disagreement with itself. If the -soul be an entelechy, there will perhaps still be sensations, but mere -sensations; pure thoughts will have become impossible. Consequently -the Peripateticians themselves are obliged to introduce (into human -nature) another soul, namely, the pure intelligence, which they -consider immortal.[77] The rational soul, therefore, would have to be -an entelechy in a manner different from their definition thereof, if -indeed this name is at all to be used. - - -IF AN ENTELECHY BE GRANTED, IT IS INSEPARABLE FROM THE BODY. - -The sense-soul, which preserves the forms of sense-objects previously -perceived, must preserve them without the body. Otherwise, these forms -would inhere in the body like figures and corporeal shapes. Now, if -the forms inhered in the sense-soul in this manner, they could not -be received therein otherwise (than as corporeal impressions). That -is why, if we do grant the existence of an entelechy, it must be -inseparable from the body. Even the faculty of appetite, not indeed -that which makes us feel the need of eating and drinking, but that -which desires things that are independent of the body, could not either -be an entelechy.[78] - - -NEITHER COULD THE SOUL OF GROWTH BE AN ENTELECHY. - -The soul's faculty of growth remains to be considered. This at least -might be thought an inseparable entelechy. But neither does that suit -her nature. For if the principle of every plant is in its root, and if -growth takes place around and beneath it,[79] as occurs in many plants, -it is evident that the soul's faculty of growth, abandoning all the -other parts, has concentrated in the root alone; it, therefore, was not -distributed all around the soul, like an inseparable entelechy. Add -that this soul, before the plant grows, is already contained in the -small body (of the seed). If then, after having vivified a great plant, -the soul's faculty of growth can condense into a small space, and if -later it can, from this small space, again spread over a whole plant, -it is evidently entirely separable from the (plant's) matter. - - -THE ENTELECHY IS NOT A FORM OF THE BODY, AS THE SOUL TRANSMIGRATES. - -Besides, as the soul is indivisible, the entelechy of the divisible -body could not become divisible as is the body. Besides, the same soul -passes from the body of one animal into the body of some other. How -could the soul of the first become that of the second, if she were only -the entelechy of a single one? The example of animals that metamorphose -demonstrates the impossibility of this theory. The soul, therefore, is -not the simple form of a body; she is a genuine "being," which does -not owe its existence merely to her being founded on the body, but -which, on the contrary, exists before having become the soul of some -individual animal. It is, therefore, not the body that begets the soul. - - -THE SOUL IS AN INCORPOREAL AND IMMORTAL ESSENCE. THE SOUL BEING NONE OF -CORPOREAL POSSIBILITIES, MUST BE INCORPOREAL. - -c. What then can be the nature of the soul, if she is neither a -body, nor a corporeal affection, while, nevertheless, all the active -force, the productive power and the other faculties reside in her, or -come from her? What sort of a "being," indeed, is this (soul) that -has an existence independent of the body? She must evidently be a -veritable "being." Indeed, everything corporeal must be classified as -generated, and excluded from genuine "being," because it is born, and -perishes, never really exists, and owes its salvation exclusively to -participation in the genuine existence, and that only in the measure of -its participation therein. - - -THE PERSISTENCE OF THE CHANGEABLE IMPLIES THE ETERNAL IN THE -BACKGROUND.[80] - -9. (14). It is absolutely necessary to postulate the existence of -a nature different from bodies, by itself fully possessing genuine -existence, which can neither be born nor perish. Otherwise, all other -things would hopelessly disappear, as a result of the destruction of -the existence which preserves both the individuals and the universe, -as their beauty and salvation. The soul, indeed, is the principle of -movement (as Plato thought, in the Phaedrus); it is the soul that -imparts movement to everything else; the soul moves herself. She -imparts life to the body she animates; but alone she possesses life, -without ever being subject to losing it, because she possesses it by -herself. All beings, indeed, live only by a borrowed life; otherwise, -we would have to proceed from cause to cause unto infinity. There -must, therefore, exist a nature that is primarily alive, necessarily -incorruptible and immortal because it is the principle of life for -everything else. It is thereon that must be founded all that is divine -and blessed, that lives and exists by itself, that lives and exists -supremely, which is immutable in its essence, and which can neither -be born nor perish. How indeed could existence be born or perish? If -the name of "existence" really suited it, it must exist forever, just -as whiteness is not alternately black and white. If whiteness were -existence itself, it would, with its "being" (or nature) (which is, to -be whiteness), possess an eternal existence; but, in reality, it is no -more than whiteness. Therefore, the principle that possesses existence -in itself and in a supreme degree will always exist. Now this primary -and eternal existence can not be anything dead like a stone, or a piece -of wood. It must live, and live with a pure life, as long as it exists -within itself. If something of it mingles with what is inferior, this -part meets obstacles in its aspiration to the good; but it does not -lose its nature, and resumes its former condition on returning to a -suitable condition (as thought Plato, in his Phaedo[81]). - - -THE SOUL IS INCORPOREAL BECAUSE OF HER KINSHIP WITH THE DIVINE. - -10. (15). The soul has affinities with the divine and eternal nature. -This is evident, because, as we have demonstrated it, she is not a -body, has neither figure nor color, and is impalpable. Consider the -following demonstration. It is generally granted that everything that -is divine and that possesses genuine existence enjoys a happy and wise -life. Now let us consider the nature of our soul, in connection with -that of the divine. Let us take a soul, not one inside of a body, which -is undergoing the irrational motions of appetite and anger, and the -other affections born of the body, but a soul that has eliminated all -that, and which, so far as possible, had no intercourse with the body. -Such a soul would show us that vices are something foreign to the -nature of the soul, and come to her from elsewhere, and that, inasmuch -as she is purified, she in her own right possesses the most eminent -qualities, wisdom, and the other virtues (as thought Plato[82]). If -the soul, when re-entering into herself, is such, how could she not -participate in this nature that we have acknowledged to be suitable -to every thing that is eternal and divine? As wisdom and real virtue -are divine things, they could not dwell in a vile and mortal entity; -the existence that receives them is necessarily divine, since it -participates in divine things by their mutual affinity and community. -Anyone who thus possesses wisdom and virtue in his soul differs little -from the superior beings; he is inferior to them only by the fact of -his having a body. If all men, or at least, if many of them held their -soul in this disposition, no one would be sceptic enough to refuse to -believe that the soul is immortal. But as we consider the soul in her -present condition of being soiled by vices, no one imagines that her -nature is divine and immortal. - - -THE SOUL, LIKE OTHER THINGS, SHOULD BE JUDGED IN HER PUREST CONDITION. - -Now when we consider the nature of some being, it should be studied -in its rarest condition, since extraneous additions hinder it from -being rightly judged. The soul must be therefore considered only after -abstraction of foreign things, or rather, he who makes this abstraction -should observe himself in that condition. He then will not doubt that -he is immortal, when he sees himself in the pure world of intelligence. -He will see his intelligence occupied, not in the observation of some -sense-object that is mortal, but in thinking the eternal by an equally -eternal faculty.[83] He will see all the entities in the intelligible -world, and he will see himself become intelligible, radiant, and -illuminated by the truth emanating from the Good, which sheds the light -of truth on all intelligible entities.[84] Then (like Empedocles, in -Diog. Laertes[85]), he will have the right to say: - -"Farewell, I am now an immortal divinity." - -For he has ascended to the divinity, and has become assimilated -thereto. As purification permits one to know the better things, so the -notions we have within us, and which constitute real science, are made -clear. Indeed, it is not by an excursion among external objects that -the soul attains the intuition of wisdom and virtue, but by re-entering -into herself, in thinking herself in her primitive condition. Then she -clears up and recognizes in herself the divine statues, soiled by the -rust of time. Likewise, if a piece of gold were animated and released -itself from the earth by which it was covered, after first having been -ignorant of its real nature because it did not see its own splendor, -it would admire itself when considering itself in its purity; it would -find that it had no need of a borrowed beauty, and would consider -itself happy to remain isolated from everything else.[86] - - -EVEN ON THE STOIC HYPOTHESIS THE SOUL MUST BE IMMORTAL. - -11. (16). What sensible man, after having thus considered the nature -of the soul, could still doubt of the immortality of a principle which -derives life from naught but itself, and which cannot lose it? How -could the soul lose life, since she did not borrow it from elsewhere, -and since she does not possess it as fire possesses heat? For, without -being an accident of fire, the heat, nevertheless, is an accident -of its matter; for fire can perish. But, in the soul, life is not an -accident that comes to add itself to a material subject to constitute a -soul. In fact, there is here an alternative: either life is a genuine -"being," which is alive by itself; in which case this "being" is -the soul that we are seeking to discover, and immortality cannot be -refused her; or the soul is a composite, and she must be decomposed -until we arrive at something immortal which moves by itself; and such -a principle could not be subject to death. Further, when (Stoics) -say that life is only an accidental modification of matter, they are -thereby forced to acknowledge that the principle that imparted this -modification to matter is immortal, and incapable of admitting anything -contrary to what it communicates (that is, life, as said Plato, in his -Phaedo[87]), but there is only a single nature that possesses life in -actualization. - - -THERE IS NO CONCEIVABLE WAY IN WHICH SOUL COULD PERISH. - -12. (17). (The Stoics), indeed, claim that every soul is perishable. -In this case, everything should long since have been destroyed. Others -might say that our soul were mortal, while the universal Soul were -immortal. On them, however, is the burden of proof of a difference -between the individual and universal souls. Both of them, indeed, -are a principle of movement; both live by themselves; both grasp -the same object by the same faculty, either by thinking the things -contained in heaven, or by considering the nature ("being") of each -being, ascending unto the first principle. Since our soul thinks -absolute essences either by the notions she finds within herself, or by -reminiscence, she evidently is prior to the body. Possessing knowledge -of eternal entities, she herself must be eternal. All that dissolves, -existing only by its compositeness, can naturally dissolve in the -same manner that it became composite. But the soul is a single, simple -actualization, whose essence is life; not in this manner therefore -can the soul perish. Neither could the soul perish by division into -a number of parts; for, as we have shown, the soul is neither a mass -nor a quantity. As little could the soul perish by alteration; for -when alteration destroys anything, it may remove its form, but leaves -its matter; alteration, therefore, is a characteristic of something -composite. Consequently as the soul cannot perish in any of these ways, -she is imperishable. - - -DESCENT INTO THE BODY NEED NOT CONFLICT WITH THE ETERNITY OF SOUL. - -13. (18). If intelligible entities are separated from sense objects, -how does it happen that the soul descends into a body?[88] So long as -the soul is a pure and impassible intelligence, so long as she enjoys -a purely intellectual life like the other intelligible beings, she -dwells among them; for she has neither appetite nor desire. But that -part which is inferior to intelligence and which is capable of desires, -follows their impulsion, "proceeds" and withdraws from the intelligible -world. Wishing to ornament matter on the model of the Ideas she -contemplated in Intelligence, in haste to exhibit her fruitfulness, -and to manifest the germs she bears within her (as said Plato, in the -Banquet[89]), the soul applies herself to produce and create, and, as -result of this application, she is, as it were, orientated (or, in -"tension") towards sense-objects. With the universal Soul, the human -soul shares the administration of the whole world, without, however, -entering it; then, desiring to administer some portion of the world -on her own responsibility, she separates from the universal Soul, and -passes into a body. But even when she is present with the body, the -soul does not devote herself entirely to it, as some part of her -always remains outside of it; that is how her intelligence remains -impassible.[90] - - -THE SOUL AS THE ARTIST OF THE UNIVERSE. - -The soul is present in the body at some times, and at other times, -is outside of it. When, indeed, following her own inclination, she -descends from first-rank entities (that is, intelligible entities) to -third-rank entities (that is, earthly entities), she "proceeds" by -virtue of the actualization of intelligence, which, remaining within -herself, embellishes everything by the ministration of the soul, and -which, itself being immortal, ordains everything with immortal power; -for intelligence exists continuously by a continuous actualization.[91] - - -ALL SOULS HAVE IMMORTALITY, EVEN IF SUNK INTO ANIMALS OR PLANTS. - -14. (19). What about the souls of animals inferior to man? The -(rational) souls that have strayed so far as to descend into the bodies -of animals are nevertheless still immortal.[92] Souls of a kind other -(than rational souls), cannot proceed from anything else than the -living nature (of the universal Soul); and they necessarily are the -principles of life for all animals. The case is the same with the souls -that inhere in plants. Indeed, all souls have issued from the same -principle (the universal Soul), all have an individual life, and are -indivisible and incorporeal essences ("beings"). - - -EVEN IF THE SOUL HAS DIFFERENT PARTS, THE ORIGINAL PARTS SURVIVE. - -To the objection that the human soul must decompose because she -contains three parts, it may be answered that, when souls issue from -here below, those that are purified leave what had been added to them -in generation (the irrational soul,[93]) while the other non-purified -souls do free themselves therefrom with time. Besides, this lower -part of the soul does not itself perish, for it exists as long as -the principle from which it proceeds. Indeed, nothing that exists is -annihilated. - - -THE HISTORIC EVIDENCE FOR IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL. - -15. (20). This, then, is our answer to those who seek a philosophical -demonstration. Those who are satisfied with the testimony of faith and -sense, may be referred to those extracts from history which furnish -numerous proofs thereof.[94] We may also refer to the oracles given by -the divinities who order an appeasement of the souls who were victims -of some injustice, and to honor the dead,[95] and to the rites observed -by all towards those who live no more;[96] which presupposes that their -souls are still conscious beyond. Even after leaving their bodies, -many souls who lived on the earth have continued to grant benefits to -men.[97] By revelation of the future;[98] and rendering other services, -they themselves prove that the other souls cannot have perished. - - As the first book was evidently Platonic, the second seems - Numenian, reminding us of the latter's book on the Immortality - of the Soul, one of the arguments from which we find in 3 E. - - - - -THIRD ENNEAD, BOOK FIRST. - -Concerning Fate. - - -POSSIBLE THEORIES ABOUT FATE. - -1. The first possibility is that there is a cause both for the things -that become, and those that are; the cause of the former being their -becoming, and that of the latter, their existence. Again, neither of -them may have a cause. Or, in both cases, some may have a cause, and -some not. Further, those that become might have a cause, while, of -these that exist, some might partly have a cause. Contrariwise, all -things that exist may have a cause, while of those that become, parts -may have a cause, and part not. Last, none of the things that become -might have any cause. - - -EXCEPT THE FIRST, ALL THINGS ARE CAUSED. - -Speaking of eternal things, the first cannot be derived from other -causes, just because they are first. Things dependent from the first, -however, may indeed thence derive their being. To each thing we should -also attribute the resultant action; for a thing's being is constituted -by its displayed energy. - - -STOIC AND EPICUREAN CAUSELESS ORIGIN REALLY THE UTMOST DETERMINISM. - -Now among the things that become, or among those that although -perpetually existent do not always result in the same actions, it may -be boldly asserted that everything has a cause. We should not admit -(the Stoic contention[99]) that something happens without a cause, -nor accept the (Epicurean[100]) arbitrary convergence of the atoms, -nor believe that any body initiates a movement suddenly and without -determining reason, nor suppose (with Epicurus again[101]) that the -soul undertakes some action by a blind impulse, without any motive. -Thus to suppose that a thing does not belong to itself, that it could -be carried away by involuntary movements, and act without motive, would -be to subject it to the most crushing determinism. The will must be -excited, or the desire awakened by some interior or exterior stimulus. -No determination (is possible) without motive. - - -EVERY GOOD THING HAS SOME CAUSE; NATURE BEING THE ULTIMATE CAUSE. - -If everything that happens has a cause, it is possible to discover -such fact's proximate causes, and to them refer this fact. People go -downtown, for example, to see a person, or collect a bill. In all cases -it is a matter of choice, followed by decision, and the determination -to carry it out. There are, indeed, certain facts usually derived -from the arts; as for instance the re-establishment of health may be -referred to medicine and the physician. Again, when a man has become -rich, this is due to his finding some treasure, or receiving some -donation, to working, or exercising some lucrative profession. The -birth of a child depends on its father, and the concourse of exterior -circumstances, which, by the concatenation of causes and effects, -favored his procreation; for example, right food, or even a still more -distant cause, the fertility of the mother, or, still more generally, -of nature (or, in general, it is usual to assign natural causes). - - -PROXIMATE CAUSES ARE UNSATISFACTORY; WE MUST SEEK THE ULTIMATE ONES. - -2. To stop, on arriving at these causes, and to refuse further -analysis, is to exhibit superficiality. This is against the advice of -the sages, who advise ascending to the primary causes, to the supreme -principles. For example, why, during the full moon, should the one man -steal, and the other one not steal? Or, why, under the same influence -of the heavens, has the one, and not the other, been sick? Why, by use -of the same means, has the one become rich, and the other poor? The -difference of dispositions, characters, and fortunes force us to seek -ulterior causes, as indeed the sages have always done. - - -MATERIALISTS SUPPORT DETERMINISM. - -Those sages who (like Leucippus, Democritus and Epicurus) assumed -material principles such as the atoms, and who explain everything by -their motion, their shock and combinations, pretend that everything -existent and occurring is caused by the agency of these atoms, their -"actions and reactions." This includes, according to them, our -appetites and dispositions. The necessity residing in the nature of -these principles, and in their effects, is therefore, by these sages, -extended to everything that exists. As to the (Ionic Hylicists), who -assume other physical (ultimate) principles, referring everything to -them, they thus also subject all beings to necessity. - - -HERACLITUS, THOUGH MORE SPIRITUAL, IS ALSO DETERMINIST. - -There are others (such as Heraclitus[102]), who, seeking the (supreme) -principle of the universe, refer everything to it; saying that this -principle penetrates, moves, and produces everything. This they -call Fate, and the Supreme Cause. From it they derive everything; -its motions are said to give rise not only to the things that are -occurring, but even our thought. That is how the members of an animal -do not move themselves, but receive the stimulus from the "governing -principle" within them. - - -THE ASTROLOGERS MAKE COSMIC DEDUCTIONS FROM PROGNOSTICATION. - -Some (of the astrologers) explain everything by the circular motion of -the heavens, by the relative positions of the planets and stars, and by -their mutual aspects (or, relations). They base this (principle) on the -prevalent habit of deducing therefrom conjectures about futurity. - - -THE STOIC DETERMINISM IS BASED ON VARIOUS THEORIES. - -Others (like the Stoic Chrysippus[103]) define Fate otherwise: it -is "the concatenation of causes" in "their connection towards the -infinite," by which every posterior fact is the consequence of an -anterior one. Thus the things that follow relate to the things that -precede, and, as their effects, necessarily depend thereupon. Amidst -these (Stoic) philosophers there are two conceptions of Fate: some -consider that everything depends from a single principle, while others -do not. These views we shall study later. - -We shall first examine the system with which we began; later we shall -review the others. - - -THE PHYSICAL THEORIES ARE ABSURD. - -3. To refer everything to physical causes, whether you call them -atoms or elements, and from their disordered motion to deduce order, -reason and the soul that directs (the body), is absurd and impossible; -nevertheless, to deduce everything from atoms, is, if possible, still -more impossible; and consequently many valid objections have been -raised against this theory. - - -THE STOIC POLEMIC AGAINST THE EPICUREANS. - -To begin with, even if we do admit such atomic principles, their -existence does not in any way inevitably lead to either the necessity -of all things, or fatality. Let us, indeed, grant the existence of -atoms; now some will move downwards--that is, if there is an up -and down in the universe--others obliquely, by chance, in various -directions. As there will be no order, there will be nothing -determinate. Only what will be born of the atoms will be determinate. -It will therefore be impossible to guess or predict events, whether by -art--and indeed, how could there be any art in the midst of orderless -things?--or by enthusiasm, or divine inspiration; for prediction -implies that the future is determined. True, bodies will obey the -impulses necessarily communicated to them by the atoms; but how could -you explain the operations and affections of the soul by movements of -atoms? How could atomic shock, whether vertical or oblique, produce -in the soul these our reasonings, or appetites, whether necessarily, -or in any other way? What explanation could they give of the soul's -resistance to the impulsions of the body? By what concourse of atoms -will one man become a geometrician, another become a mathematician -and astronomer, and the other a philosopher? For, according to that -doctrine we no longer produce any act for which we are responsible, we -are even no longer living beings, since we undergo the impulsion of -bodies that affect us just as they do inanimate things. - - -APPLICATION OF THIS POLEMIC TO THE PHYSICISTS. - -The same objections apply to the doctrine of the philosophers who -explain everything by other physical causes (such as "elements"). -Principles of inferior nature might well warm us, cool us, or even make -us perish; but they could not beget any of the operations which the -soul produces; these have an entirely different cause. - - -RESTATEMENT OF HERACLITUS'S POSITION. - -4. But might (Heraclitus) suppose that a single Soul interpenetrating -the universe produces everything, and by supplying the universe with -motion supplies it simultaneously to all its constituent beings, so -that from this primary cause, would necessarily flow all secondary -causes, whose sequence and connection would constitute Fate? Similarly, -in a plant, for instance, the plant's fate might be constituted by the -("governing") principle which, from the root, administers its other -parts, and which organizes into a single system their "actions" and -"reactions."[104] - - -THIS WOULD INTERFERE WITH SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS AND RESPONSIBILITY. - -To begin with, this Necessity and Fate would by their excess destroy -themselves, and render impossible the sequence and concatenation of -the causes. It is, indeed, absurd to insist that our members are moved -by Fate when they are set in motion, or innervated, by the "governing -principle." It is a mistake to suppose that there is a part which -imparts motion, and on the other hand, a part which receives it from -the former; it is the governing principle that moves the leg, as it -would any other part. Likewise, if in the universe exists but a single -principle which "acts and reacts," if things derive from each other -by a series of causes each of which refers to the preceding one, it -will no longer be possible to say truly that all things arise through -causes, for their totality will constitute but a single being. In that -case, we are no longer ourselves; actions are no longer ours; it is no -longer we who reason; it is a foreign principle which reasons, wills, -and acts in us, just as it is not our feet that walk, but we who walk -by the agency of our feet. On the contrary, common sense admits that -every person lives, thinks, and acts by his own individual, proper -life, thought and action; to each must be left the responsibility of -his actions, good or evil, and not attribute shameful deeds to the -universal cause. - - -RESTATEMENT OF THE ASTROLOGICAL THEORY OF FATE. - -5. Others, again, insist that this is not the state of affairs. Their -disposition depends on the circular movement of the heaven which -governs everything, on the course of the stars, of their mutual -relative position at the time of their rising, of their setting, of -their zenith, or of their conjunction. Indeed, such are the signs -on which are founded prognostications and predictions of what is to -happen, not only to the universe, but also to each individual, both as -to his fortunes and his thought. It is noticed that the other animals -and vegetables increase or decrease according to the kind of sympathy -existing between them and the stars, that all other things experience -their influence, that various regions of the earth differ according to -their adjustment with the stars, and especially the sun; that from the -nature of these regions depend not only the character of the plants -and animals, but also human forms, size, color, affections, passions, -tastes, and customs. In this system, therefore, the course of the stars -is the absolute cause of everything. - - -REFUTATION OF THE ASTROLOGICAL SYSTEM. - -To this we answer that our astrologer attributes indirectly to the -stars all our characteristics: will, passions, vices and appetites; -he allows us no role other than to turn like mills, instead of -responsibility, as befits men, producing actions that suit our nature. -On the contrary, we should be left in possession of what belongs to us -by the observation that the universe limits itself to exercising some -influence on what we possess already thanks to ourselves, and which -is really characteristic of us. Moreover, one should distinguish the -deeds in which we are "active," from those in which we are necessarily -"passive," and not deduce everything from the stars. Nobody, indeed, -doubts that the differences of place and climate exert an influence -over us, imparting to us, for instance, a cool or warm-hearted -disposition. Heredity also should be considered; for children usually -resemble their parents by their features, form, and some affections of -the irrational soul. Nevertheless, even though they resemble them by -their facial features, because they are born in the same place, they -may differ in habits and thoughts, because these things depend on an -entirely different principle. In addition, we can adduce to the support -of this truth the resistance which the soul offers to the temperament -and to the appetites. As to the claim that the stars are the causes of -everything, because one can predict what is to happen to each man from -a consideration of their positions, it would be just as reasonable to -assert that the birds and the other beings which the augurs consult as -omens produce the events of which they are the signs. - - -HOROSCOPES QUESTIONED; THEY DO NOT ACCOUNT FOR SIMULTANEOUS DIFFERENCES. - -This leads us to consider, more in detail, what sort of facts may be -predicted according to the inspection of the positions occupied by the -stars presiding over the birth of a man. They who, from the assertion -that the stars indicate a man's future, draw the consequence that the -stars produce them, are in error. In some person's horoscope which -indicates birth from noble parents, on either maternal or paternal -side, this nobility of birth cannot be attributed to the stars, as -this nobility subsisted already in the parents before the stars had -taken the position according to which the horoscope is cast. Besides, -astrologers pretend they can discover the parent's fortune from the -birth of their children, and from the condition of the parents the -disposition and fate of the unborn offspring. From a child's horoscope, -they announce his brother's death; and from a woman's horoscope, the -fortunes of her husband, and conversely. It is unreasonable to refer to -the stars things which evidently are necessary consequences of parental -conditions. We then reach a dilemma: the cause lies either in these -antecedent conditions, or in the stars. The beauty and ugliness of -children, when they resemble their parents, must evidently be derived -from them, and not from the course of the stars. Moreover, it is -probable that at any one moment are born a crowd of human and animal -young; now, inasmuch as they are born under the same star, they all -ought to have the same nature. How does it then happen that, in the -same positions, stars produce men and other beings simultaneously (as -Cicero asks[105])? - - -HEREDITY MORE IMPORTANT THAN STAR-INFLUENCE; CONTINUATION. - -6. Each being derives his character from his nature. One being is a -horse because he is born from a mare, while another is human, because -born from a human mother; and more: he is that particular horse, and -that particular man because he is born from such and such a horse, or -woman. Doubtless, the course of the stars may modify the result, but -the greatest part of the influence must be allowed to heredity. - - -STARS AFFECT THE PHYSICAL, NOT THE MENTAL BEING. - -The stars act on the body only in a physical way, and thus impart -to them heat, cold, and the variety of temperament which results -therefrom. But how could they endow the man with habits, tastes, and -inclinations which do not seem to depend on the temperament, such as -the avocation of a surveyor, a grammarian, a gambler, or an inventor? - - -IRRATIONAL CLAIMS OF ASTROLOGERS. - -Besides, nobody would admit that perversity could come from beings who -are divinities. How could one believe that they are the authors of the -evils attributed to them, and that they themselves become evil because -they set or pass under the earth, as if they could possibly be affected -by the fact that, in regard to us, they seem to set; as if they did not -continue to wander around the heavenly sphere, and remained in the same -relation to the earth? Besides it is incredible that because a star -is in such or such a position in respect of another star, it becomes -better or worse, and that it affects us with goodness when it is well -disposed, and evil in the contrary case. - - -STARS SERVE AS LETTERS IN WHICH TO READ NATURE. - -We grant that by their movement the stars co-operate in the -conservation of the universe, and that they simultaneously play in it -another part. They serve as letters for those skilled in deciphering -this kind of writing; and who, by the observation of the figures formed -by the stars, read into them future events according to the laws of -analogy, as for instance, if one presaged high deeds from seeing a bird -fly high. - - -RESTATEMENT OF THE STOIC DOCTRINE, AND THE HERACLITIAN. - -7. There remains to be considered the (Stoic) doctrine which, -concatenating and interrelating all things among each other, -establishes "a single cause which produces everything through seminal -reasons." This doctrine reattaches itself to (Heraclitus's) which -deduces from the action of the universal Soul the constitution and the -movements of the individuals as well as those of the universe. - - -ALEXANDER OF APHRODISIA'S POLEMIC AGAINST THE STOICS. - -In this case, even if we possessed the power of doing something by -ourselves, we would not be any the less than the remainder of the -universe subjected to necessity, because Fate, containing the whole -series of causes, necessarily determines each event. Now since Fate -includes all causes, there is nothing which could hinder the occurrence -of that event, or alter it. If then everything obeys the impulsion of -a single principle, nothing is left to us but to follow it. Indeed, -in this case, the fancies of our imagination would result from -anterior facts, and would in turn determine our appetites; our liberty -would then have become a mere word; nor would we gain any advantage -from obeying our appetites, since our appetites themselves will be -determined by anterior facts. We would have no more liberty than the -other animals, than children, or the insane, who run hither and yon, -driven by blind appetites; for they also obey their appetites, as fire -would do, and as all the things which fatally follow the dispositions -of their nature. These objections will be decisive for those capable of -apprehending them; and in the search for other causes of our appetites -they will not content themselves with the principles which we have -examined. - - -THE HUMAN SOUL AS AN INDEPENDENT PRINCIPLE. - -8. What other cause, besides the preceding, will we have to invoke -so as to let nothing occur without a cause, to maintain order and -interdependence of things in the world, and in order to preserve the -possibility of predictions and omens without destroying our personality? - -We shall have to introduce among the number of beings another -principle, namely: the soul; and not only the World-soul, but even the -individual soul of every person. In the universal concatenation of -causes and effects, this soul is a principle of no little importance, -because, instead of, like all other things, being born of a "seminal -reason," it constitutes a "primary cause." Outside of a body, she -remains absolute mistress of herself, free and independent of the -cause which administers the world. As soon as she has descended into -a body, she is no longer so independent, for she then forms part of -the order to which all things are subjected. Now, inasmuch as the -accidents of fortune, that is to say, the surrounding circumstances, -determine many events, the soul alternately yields to the influence -of external circumstances, and then again she dominates them, and -does what she pleases. This she does more or less, according as she -is good or evil. When she yields to the corporeal temperament, she is -necessarily subjected to desire or anger, discouraged in poverty, or -proud in prosperity, as well as tyrannical in the exercise of power. -But she can resist all these evil tendencies if her disposition is -good; she modifies her surroundings more than she is affected by them; -some things she changes, others she tolerates without herself incurring -guilt. - - -THE SOUL IS FREE WHEN FOLLOWING REASON. - -9. All things therefore, which result either from a choice by the soul, -or from exterior circumstances, are "necessary," or determined by a -cause. Could anything, indeed, be found outside of these causes? If we -gather into one glance all the causes we admit, we find the principles -that produce everything, provided we count, amidst external causes, -the influence exercised by the course of the stars. When a soul makes -a decision, and carries it out because she is impelled thereto by -external things, and yields to a blind impulse, we should not consider -her determination and action to be free. The soul is not free when, -perverting herself, she does not make decisions which direct her in the -straight path. On the contrary, when she follows her own guide, pure -and impassible reason, her determination is really voluntary, free and -independent, and the deed she performs is really her own work, and not -the consequence of an exterior impulse; she derives it from her inner -power, her pure being, from the primary and sovereign principle which -directs her, being deceived by no ignorance, nor vanquished by the -power of appetites; for when the appetites invade the soul, and subdue -her, they drag her with them by their violence, and she is rather -"passive" than "active" in what she does. - - -THE SOUL OBEYS FATE ONLY WHEN EVIL. - -10. The conclusion of our discussion is that while everything is -indicated and produced by causes, these are of two kinds: First the -human soul, and then only exterior circumstances. When the soul acts -"conformably to right reason" she acts freely. Otherwise, she is -tangled up in her deeds, and she is rather "passive" than "active." -Therefore, whenever she lacks prudence, the exterior circumstances are -the causes of her actions; one then has good reason to say that she -obeys Fate, especially if Fate is here considered as an exterior cause. -On the contrary, virtuous actions are derived from ourselves; for, when -we are independent, it is natural for us to produce them. Virtuous -men act, and do good freely. Others do good only in breathing-spells -left them in between by their passions. If, during these intervals, -they practice the precepts of wisdom, it is not because they receive -them from some other being, it is merely because their passions do not -hinder them from listening to the voice of reason. - - As the first book seemed Platonic, and the second Numenian, so - this third one seems called forth by the practical opposition - of astrologers or Gnostics. Later in life, his thirty-third - book, ii. 9, was to take up again this polemic in more extended - form. This chronologic arrangement of Plotinos's first three - books reveals his three chief sources of interest--devotion to - Plato, reliance on Numenius, and opposition to the Gnostics and - astrologers. - - - - -FOURTH ENNEAD, BOOK FIRST. - -Of the Being of the Soul. - - -It is in the intelligible world that dwells veritable being. -Intelligence is the best that there is on high; but there are also -souls; for it is thence that they descended thither. Only, souls have -no bodies, while here below they inhabit bodies and are divided there. -On high, all the intelligences exist together, without separation or -division; all the souls exist equally together in that world which -is one, and there is no local distance between them. Intelligence -therefore ever remains inseparable and indivisible; but the soul, -inseparable so long as she resides on high, nevertheless possesses a -divisible nature. For her "dividing herself" consists in departing -from the intelligible world, and uniting herself to bodies; it might -therefore be reasonably said that she becomes divisible in passing -into bodies, since she thus separates from the intelligible world, -and divides herself somewhat. In what way is she also indivisible? -In that she does not separate herself entirely from the intelligible -world, ever residing there by her highest part, whose nature it is to -be indivisible. To say then that the soul is composed of indivisible -(essence) and of (essence) divisible in bodies means then no more -than that the soul has an (essence) which dwells partly in the -intelligible world, and partly descends into the sense-world, which -is suspended from the first and extends downwards to the second, as -the ray goes from the centre to the circumference. When the soul -descended here below, it is by her superior part that she contemplates -the intelligible world, as it is thereby that she preserves the nature -of the all (of the universal Soul). For here below she is not only -divisible, but also indivisible; her divisible part is divided in a -somewhat indivisible manner; she is indeed entirely present in the -whole body in an indivisible manner, and nevertheless she is said to -divide herself because she spreads out entirely in the whole body. - - - - -FIFTH ENNEAD, BOOK NINE. - -Of Intelligence, Ideas and Essence. - - -THE SENSUAL MAN, THE MORAL, AND THE SPIRITUAL. - -1. From their birth, men exercise their senses, earlier than their -intelligence,[106] and they are by necessity forced to direct their -attention to sense-objects. Some stop there, and spend their life -without progressing further. They consider suffering as evil, and -pleasure as the good, judging it to be their business to avoid the one -and encompass the other. That is the content of wisdom for those of -them that pride themselves on being reasonable; like those heavy birds -who, having weighted themselves down by picking up too much from the -earth, cannot take flight, though by nature provided with wings. There -are others who have raised themselves a little above earthly objects -because their soul, endowed with a better nature, withdraws from -pleasures to seek something higher;[107] but as they are not capable -of arriving at contemplation of the intelligible, and as, after having -left our lower region here, they do not know where to lodge, they -return to a conception of morality which considers virtue to consist -in these common-place actions and occupations whose narrow sphere they -had at first attempted to leave behind. Finally a third kind is that -of those divine men who are endowed with a piercing vision, and whose -penetrating glance contemplates the splendor of the intelligible world, -and rise unto it, taking their flight above the clouds and darkness of -this world. Then, full of scorn for terrestrial things, they remain up -there, and reside in their true fatherland with the unspeakable bliss -of the man who, after long journeys, is at last repatriated. - - -THE HIGHER REGION REACHED ONLY BY THOSE WHO ARE BORN PHILOSOPHERS. - -2. Which is this higher region? What must be done to reach it? One must -be naturally disposed to love, and be really a born philosopher.[108] -In the presence of beauty, the lover feels something similar to the -pains of childbirth; but far from halting at bodily beauty, he rises -to that aroused in the soul by virtue, duties, science and laws. Then -he follows them up to the cause of their beauty, and in this ascending -progress stops only when he has reached the Principle that occupies -the first rank, that which is beautiful in itself.[109] Then only does -he cease being driven by this torment that we compare to the pains of -childbirth. - - -LOVE IS TRANSFORMED INTO PROGRESSIVELY HIGHER STAGES. - -But how does he rise up thither? How does he have the power to do -so? How does he learn to love? Here it is. The beauty seen in bodies -is incidental; it consists in the shapes of which the bodies are -the matter.[110] Consequently the substance changes, and it is seen -changing from beauty to ugliness. The body has only a borrowed beauty. -Who imparted that beauty to the body? On the one hand, the presence of -beauty; on the other, the actualization of the soul which fashioned the -body, and which gave it the shape it possesses. But is the soul, by -herself, absolute beauty? No, since some souls are wise and beautiful, -while some others are foolish and ugly. It is therefore only by wisdom -that the soul is beautiful. But from what is her wisdom derived? -Necessarily from intelligence; not from the intelligence that is -intelligent at some time, though not at others, but from the genuine -Intelligence, which is beautiful on that very account.[111] Shall we -stop at Intelligence, as a first principle? Or shall we on the contrary -still rise above it? Surely so, for Intelligence presents itself to us -before the first Principle only because it is, so to speak, located in -the antechamber of the Good.[112] It bears all things within itself, -and manifests them, so that it displays the image of the Good in -manifoldness, while the Good itself remains in an absolute simple unity. - - -PROOFS FOR THE EXISTENCE AND NATURE OF INTELLIGENCE. - -3. Let us now consider the Intelligence which reason tells us is -absolute essence and genuine "being," and whose existence we have -already established in a different manner. It would seem ridiculous -to inquire whether Intelligence form part of the scale of beings; but -there are men who doubt it, or who at least are disposed to ask for a -demonstration that Intelligence possesses the nature we predicate of -it, that it is separated (from matter), that it is identical with the -essences, and that it contains the ideas. This is our task. - - -IN THE HUMAN WORLD EVERYTHING IS A COMPOSITE OF FORM AND MATTER. - -All things that we consider to be essences are composites; nothing -is simple or single, either in works of art, or in the products of -nature.[113] Works of art, indeed, contain metal, wood, stone, and are -derived from these substances only by the labor of the artist, who, by -giving matter its form makes of it a statue, or bed, or house. Among -the products of nature, those that are compounds or mixtures may be -analyzed into the form impressed on the elements of the compound; so, -for instance, we may in a man, distinguish a soul and body, and in the -body four elements. Since the very matter of the elements, taken in -itself, has no form, every object seems composed of matter and of some -principle that supplies it with form.[114] So we are led to ask whence -matter derives its form, and to seek whether the soul is simple, or -whether it contains two parts, one of which plays the parts of matter, -and the other of form,[115] so that the first part would be similar -to the form received by the metal of a statue, and the latter to the -principle which produces the form itself. - - -THE WORLD-SOUL ALSO IS A COMPOUND OF FORM AND MATTER. - -Applying this conception to the universe, we rise to Intelligence, -recognizing therein the demiurgic creator of the world. It was -in receiving from it its shapes by the intermediation of another -principle, the universal Soul, that the (material) substances became -water, air, earth and fire. On the one hand, the Soul shapes the -four elements of the world;[116] on the other, she receives from -Intelligence the (seminal) reasons,[117] as the souls of the artists -themselves receive from the arts the reasons which they work out.[118] -In Intelligence, therefore, there is a part which is the form of the -soul; it is intelligence considered, as shape. There is another which -imparts shape, like the sculptor who gives the metal the shape of -the statue, and which in itself possesses all it gives.[119] Now the -(shapes) which the Intelligence imparts to the soul connect with the -truth as closely as possible, while those which the soul imparts to the -body are only images and appearances.[120] - - -WHY OUR ASCENT CANNOT STOP WITH THE SOUL. - -4. Why should we not, on arriving at the Soul, stop there, and consider -her the first principle? Because Intelligence is a power different -from the Soul, and better than the Soul; and what is better must, by -its very nature, precede (the worst). The Stoics[121] are wrong in -thinking that it is the Soul which, on reaching her perfection, begets -Intelligence. How could that which is potential pass into actualization -unless there were some principle that effected that transition? If -this transition were due to chance, it could not have occurred at -all. The first rank must therefore be assigned to that which is in -actualization, which needs nothing, which is perfect, while imperfect -things must be assigned to the second rank. These may be perfected -by the principles that begat them, which, in respect to them, play a -paternal part, perfecting what they had originally produced that was -imperfect. What is thus produced is matter, as regards the creating -principle, and then becomes perfect, on receiving its form from it. -Besides, the Soul is (often) affected; and we need to discover some -thing that is impassible, without which everything is dissolved by -time; therefore there is need of some principle prior to the soul. -Further, the Soul is in the world; now there must be something that -resides outside of the world, and which consequently would be superior -to the Soul; for since that which inheres in the world resides within -the body, or matter, if nothing existed outside of the world, nothing -would remain permanent. In this case, the (seminal) reason of man, -and all the other reasons could be neither permanent nor eternal. The -result of all these considerations, as well as of many others that -we could add thereto, is the necessary assertion of the existence of -Intelligence beyond the Soul. - - -INTELLIGENCE IS IN ACTUALIZATION BECAUSE ITS THOUGHT IS IDENTICAL WITH -ITS ESSENCE OR EXISTENCE. - -5. Taking it in its genuine sense, Intelligence is not only -potential, arriving at being intelligent after having been -unintelligent--for otherwise, we would be forced to seek out some -still higher principle--but is in actualization, and is eternal. As -it is intelligent by itself, it is by itself that it thinks what it -thinks, and that it possesses what is possesses. Now since it thinks -of itself and by itself, it itself is what it thinks. If we could -distinguish between its existence and its thought, its "being" would be -unintelligent; it would be potential, not in actualization. Thought, -therefore, must not be separated from its object, although, from -sense-objects, we have become accustomed to conceive of intelligible -entities as distinct from each other. - - -REASONS, AS ARCHETYPES, MUST HAVE EXISTED BEFORE STOIC "HABIT," NATURE -OR SOUL. - -Which then is the principle that acts, that thinks, and what is the -actualization and thought of Intelligence, necessary to justify the -assertion that it is what it thinks? Evidently Intelligence, by its -mere real existence, thinks beings, and makes them exist; it therefore -is the beings. Indeed, the beings will either exist outside of it, or -within it; and in the latter case they would have to be identical with -it. That they should exist outside of Intelligence, is unthinkable; -for where would they be located? They must therefore exist within -it, and be identical with it. They could not be in sense-objects, as -common people think, because sense-objects could not be the first -in any genus. The form which inheres in their matter is only the -representation of existence; now a form which exists in anything -other than itself is put in it by a superior principle, and is its -image. Further, if Intelligence must be the creative power of the -universe, it could not, while creating the universe, think beings as -existent in what does not yet exist. Intelligible entities, therefore, -must exist before the world, and cannot be images of sense-objects, -being on the contrary, their archetypes, and constituting the "being" -of Intelligence. It might be objected that the (seminal) reasons -might suffice. These reasons are, no doubt, eternal; and, if they be -eternal and impassible, they must exist within the Intelligence whose -characteristics we have described, the Intelligence which precedes -the "habit,"[122] nature,[123] and the soul,[124] because here these -entities are potential.[125] - - -INTELLIGENCE IS POSTULATED BY THE GENERAL NECESSITIES OF THE WORLD. - -Intelligence, therefore, essentially constitutes all beings; and when -Intelligence thinks them, they are not outside of Intelligence, and -neither precede nor follow it. Intelligence is the first legislator, -or rather, it is the very law of existence. Parmenides[126] therefore -was right in saying, "Thought is identical with existence." The -knowledge of immaterial things is therefore identical with those things -themselves. That is why I recognize myself as a being, and why I have -reminiscences of intelligible entities. Indeed, none of those beings is -outside of Intelligence, nor is contained in any location; all of them -subsist in themselves as immutable and indestructible. That is why they -really are beings. If they were born, or perished, they would possess -existence only in an incidental manner, they would no longer be beings; -it would be the existence they possessed which would be essence. It -is only by participation that sense-things are what they are said to -be; the nature that constitutes their substance derives its shape from -elsewhere, as the metal receives its shape from the sculptor, and wood -from the carpenter; while the image of art penetrates into the matter, -the art itself remains in its identity, and within itself possesses -the genuine existence of the statue or of the bed. That is how the -bodies' general necessity of participating in images shows that they -are different from the beings; for they change, while the entities are -immutable, possess within themselves their own foundation, and have -no need of existing in any location, since they have no extension, -and since they subsist in an intellectual and absolute existence. -Again,[127] the existence of the bodies needs to be guarded[128] by -some other principle, while intelligence, which furnishes the existence -for objects in themselves perishable, has need of nothing to make -itself subsist. - - -INTELLIGENCE CONTAINS ALL BEINGS GENERATIVELY. - -6. Thus Intelligence actually constitutes all beings; it contains them -all, but not locally; it contains them as it possesses itself; it is -identical with them. All entities are simultaneously contained within -it, and in it remain distinct, as many kinds of knowledge may exist -within the soul without their number causing any confusion; each of -them appears when needed, without involving the others. If in the soul -each thought be an actualization independent of other thoughts, so much -the more must Intelligence be all things simultaneously, with this -restriction, however, that each of them is a special power. Considered -in its universality, Intelligence contains all entities as the genus -contains all species, as the whole contains all parts. Even the seminal -powers bear the impress of this universality. Each one, considered in -its totality, is a centre which contains all the parts of the organism -in an undivided condition; nevertheless in it the reason of the eyes -differs from that of the hands, and this diversity is manifested by -that of the organs begotten (therefrom).[129] Each of the powers of -the seed, therefore, is the total unity of the seminal reason when this -power is united to the others which are implied therein. What in the -seed is corporeal contains matter, as, for instance, humidity; but the -seminal reason is the entire form; it is identical with the generative -power, a power which itself is the image of a superior power of the -soul. This generative power contained in seeds is[130] usually called -"nature." Proceeding from the superior powers as light radiates from -the fire, it tames and fashions matter, imparting thereto the seminal -reason[131] without pushing it, or moving it as by levers. - - -THERE ARE SCIENTIFIC NOTIONS THAT ARE POSTERIOR, BUT SOME THAT ARE -PRIOR. - -7. The scientific notions that the soul forms of sense-objects, by -discursive reason, and which should rather be called opinions,[132] -are posterior to the objects (they deal with); and consequently, -are no more than images of them. But true scientific notions -received from intelligence by discursive reasons do not contain any -sense-conceptions. So far as they are scientific notions, they are -the very things of which they are the conceptions; they reveal the -intimate union of intelligence and thought. Interior Intelligence, -which consists of the primary (natures) possesses itself intimately, -resides within itself since all eternity, and is an actualization. It -does not direct its glances outside of itself, because it possesses -everything within itself; it does not acquire, and does not reason to -discover things that may not be present to them. Those are operations -characteristic of the soul. Intelligence, remaining fixed within -itself, is all things simultaneously. Nevertheless, it is not thought -which makes each of them subsist; it is only because intelligence -thought the divinity or movement, for instance, that the divinity -or movement exists.[133] When we say that thoughts are forms, we -are mistaken if thereby we mean that the intelligible exists only -because Intelligence thinks it. On the contrary, it is only because -the intelligible exists, that Intelligence can think. Otherwise, how -would Intelligence come to think the intelligible? It cannot meet the -intelligible by chance, nor waste itself in fruitless efforts. - - -THOUGHT IS THE FORM, SHAPE THE ACTUALIZATION OF THE BEING. - -8. Since the thought is something essentially one (?), the form, which -is the object of thought, and the idea[134, 134a] are one and the same -thing. Which is this thing? Intelligence and the intellectual "being," -for no idea is foreign to intelligence; each form is intelligence, and -the whole intelligence is all the forms; every particular form is a -particular intelligence. Likewise science, taken in its totality, -is all the notions it embraces; every notion is a part of the total -science; it is not separated from the science locally, and exists -potentially in the whole science.[135] Intelligence resides within -itself, and by possessing itself calmly, is the eternal fulness of -all things. If we conceived it as being prior to essence, we would -have to say that it was the action and thought of Intelligence which -produced and begat all beings. But as, on the contrary, it is certain -that essence is prior to Intelligence, we should, within the thinking -principle, first conceive the beings, then actualization and thought, -just as (the nature) of fire is joined by the actualization of the -fire, so that beings have innate intelligence (?[148]) as their -actualization. Now essence is an actualization; therefore essence and -intelligence are but a single actualization, or rather both of them -fuse.[136] Consequently, they form but a single nature, as beings, -the actualization of essence, and intelligence. In this case the -thought is the form, and the shape is the actualization of the being. -When, however, in thought we separate essence from Intelligence, we -must conceive one of these principles as prior to the other. The -Intelligence which operates this separation is indeed different from -the essence from which it separates;[137] but the Intelligence which -is inseparable from essence and which does not separate thought from -essence is itself essence and all things. - - -INTELLIGENCE CONTAINS THE UNIVERSAL ARCHETYPE. - -9. What then are the things contained within the unity of Intelligence -which we separate in thinking of them? They must be expressed without -disturbing their rest, and we must contemplate the contents of -Intelligence by a science that somehow remains within unity. Since -this sense-world is an animal which embraces all animals, since it -derives both its general and special existence from a principle -different from itself,[138] a principle which, in turn, is derived -from intelligence, therefore intelligence must itself contain the -universal archetype, and must be that intelligible world of which -Plato[139] (well) says; "Intelligence sees the ideas contained within -the existing animal."[140] Since an animal, whose (seminal) reason -exists with the matter fit to receive it, must of course be begotten, -so the mere existence of a nature that is intellectual, all-powerful, -and unhindered by any obstacle--since nothing can interpose between it -and the (substance) capable of receiving the form--must necessarily be -adorned (or, created) by intelligence, but only in a divided condition -does it reveal the form it receives, so that, for instance, it shows -us on one hand a man, and on the other the sun, while intelligence -possesses everything in unity. - - -IN THE SENSE-WORLD ONLY THOSE THINGS THAT ARE FORMS PROCEED FROM -INTELLIGENCE. - -10. Therefore, in the sense-world, all the things that are forms -proceed from intelligence; those which are not forms do not proceed -therefrom. That is, in the intelligible world we do not find any of -the things that are contrary to nature, any more than we find what is -contrary to the arts in the arts themselves. Thus the seminal reason -does not contain the defects, such as limping would be in a body. -Congenital lameness is due to the reason's failure to dominate matter, -while accidental lameness is due to deterioration of the form (idea?). - - -NATURAL CHARACTERISTICS ARE DERIVED FROM THE CATEGORIES IN THE -INTELLIGIBLE. - -The qualities that are natural, quantities, numbers, magnitudes, -states, actions and natural experiences, movements and recuperations, -either general or particular, are among the contents of the -intelligible world, where time is replaced by eternity,[141] and space -is replaced by the "telescoping" of intelligible entities (that are -within each other). As all entities are together in the intelligible -world, whatever entity you select (by itself) is intellectual and -living "being," identity and difference, movement and rest;[142] it is -what moves, and what is at rest; it is "being," and quality; that is, -it is all. There every essence is in actualization, instead of merely -being in potentiality; consequently it is not separated from quality. - - -THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD FAILS TO CONTAIN EARTHLY IMPERFECTIONS. - -Does the intelligible world contain only what is found in the -sense-world, or does it contain anything additional?... Let us consider -the arts, in this respect. To begin with, the intelligible world -does not contain any imperfection. Evils here below come from lack, -privation, omission; it is a state of matter, or of anything similar to -matter, which failed to be completely assimilated.[143] - - -SOME ARTS ARE PURELY EARTHLY; OTHERS, LIKE MUSIC, INTELLIGIBLE. - -11. Let us therefore consider the arts and their products. Unless as -represented within human reason, we cannot refer to the intelligible -world arts of imitation such as painting, sculpture, dancing, or -acting, because they are born here below, take sense-objects as models, -representing their forms, motions, and visible proportions.[144] If, -however, we possess a faculty which, by studying the beauties offered -by the symmetry of animals, considers the general characteristics of -this symmetry, it must form part of the intellectual power which, on -high, contemplates universal symmetry. Music, however, which studies -rhythm and harmony, is, so far as it studies what is intelligible in -these things, the image of the music that deals with intelligible -rhythm. - - -THERE ARE MANY AUXILIARY ARTS WHICH HELP THE PROGRESS OF NATURE. - -The arts which produce sense-objects, such as architecture and -carpentry, have their principles in the intelligible world, and -participate in wisdom, so far as they make use of certain proportions. -But as they apply these proportions to sense-objects, they cannot -wholly be referred to the intelligible world, unless in so far as -they are contained within human reason. The case is similar with -agriculture, which assists the growth of plants; medicine, which -increases health, and (gymnastics) which supplies the body with -strength as well as vigor,[145] for on high there is another Power, -another Health, from which all living organisms derive their needed -vigor. - - -OTHER ARTS ARE INTELLIGIBLE WHEN APPLIED TO THE INTELLIGIBLE. - -Last, whenever rhetoric, strategy, private and public finance and -politics weave beauty in their deeds, and they glance above, they -(discover) that they have added to their science a contribution from -the intelligible science. - -The science of geometry, however, which deals (wholly) with -intelligible entities, must be referred to the intelligible world. So -also with philosophy, which occupies the first rank among sciences -because it studies essence. This is all we have to say about arts and -their products. - - -THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD CONTAINS ONLY UNIVERSAL IDEAS; PARTICULARITIES -ARE DERIVED FROM MATTER. - -12. If the intelligible world contains the idea of Man, it must also -contain that of the reasonable man, and of the artist; and consequently -the idea of the arts that are begotten by Intelligence. We must -therefore insist that the intelligible world contains the ideas of the -universals, the idea of Man as such, and not, for instance, that of -Socrates. Still we shall have to decide whether the intelligible world -does not also contain the idea of the individual man, that is, of the -man considered with the things that differ in each individual; for one -may have a Roman nose and the other a pug nose. These differences are -indeed implied within the idea of man, just as there are differences -within the idea of animal. But the differences between a Roman or a -snub nose are derived from matter. Likewise, amidst the varieties of -colors, some are contained within the seminal reason, while others are -derived from matter and space. - - -BESIDES IDEAS OF INDIVIDUAL SOULS AND INTELLIGENCE, THE INTELLIGIBLE -WORLD CONTAINS THE SOUL ITSELF AND INTELLIGENCE ITSELF. - -13. It remains for us to study whether the intelligible world contains -only what is in the sense-world, or whether we should distinguish from -the individual soul the Soul itself, from the particular intelligence, -Intelligence itself, as we have above distinguished the particular -man from Man himself. We should not consider all things here below as -images of archetypes, for instance, the soul of a man as the image -of the Soul herself. Only degrees of dignity differentiate souls; -but these souls are not the Soul itself. As the Soul itself exists -really, it must also contain a certain wisdom, justice and science, -which are not images of wisdom, justice, and intelligible science, as -sense-objects are images of intelligible entities, but which are these -very entities located here below in entirely different conditions of -existence; for they are not locally circumscribed. Therefore when the -soul issues from the body, she preserves these things within herself; -for the sense-world exists only in a determinate place, while the -intelligible world exists everywhere; therefore all that the soul -contains here below is also in the intelligible world. Consequently if, -by "sense-objects" we really mean "visible" things, then indeed the -intelligible world contains entities not present in this sense-world. -If, on the contrary, we include within the "sense-world" the soul and -all she implies, then all things that are above are present here below -also. - - -THE SUPREME BEING ENTIRELY ONE DOES NOT EXPLAIN THE ORIGIN OF THE -MANIFOLD. - -14. Can we identify the nature that contains all the intelligibles -(Intelligence) with the supreme Principle? Impossible, because the -supreme Principle must be essentially one, and simple, while essences -form a multitude. But as these essences form a multitude, we are forced -to explain how this multitude, and all these essences can exist. How -can (the single) Intelligence be all these things? Whence does it -proceed? This we shall have to study elsewhere.[146] - - -THE SOUL RECEIVES ACCIDENTS FROM MATTER, BUT DEFECTS ARE NOT IN THE -INTELLIGIBLE. - -It may further be asked whether the intelligible world contains the -ideas of objects which are derived from decay, which are harmful or -disagreeable, such as, for instance, mud or excreta. We answer that -all the things that universal Intelligence receives from the First -are excellent. Among them are not found ideas of those dirty and vile -objects mentioned above; Intelligence does not contain them. But though -receiving from Intelligence ideas, the soul receives from matter -other things, among which may be found the above-mentioned accidents. -Besides, a more thorough answer to this question must be sought for in -our book where we explain "How the Multitude of Ideas Proceeds from the -One."[147] - - -NOT ALL EARTHLY ENTITIES HAVE CORRESPONDING IDEAS. - -In conclusion, the accidental composites in which Intelligence does not -share and which are formed by a fortuitous complex of sense-objects, -have no ideas corresponding to them in the intelligible world. Things -that proceed from decay are produced only because the Soul is unable to -produce anything better in this case; otherwise she would have rather -produced some object more agreeing with nature; she therefore produces -what she can. - - -EVEN THE ARTS ARE DEPENDENT ON THE SOUL. - -All the arts concerned with things natural to man are contained within -the ideas of Man himself. The Art that is universal is prior to the -other arts; but Art is posterior to the Soul herself, or rather, to -the life that is in Intelligence before becoming soul, and which, on -becoming soul, deserves to be called the Soul herself. - - -DIFFICULT PASSAGES. - -(Transcriber's note: see footnotes 134a and 148.) - - - - -FOURTH ENNEAD, BOOK EIGHTH. - -Of the Descent of the Soul Into the Body.[149] - - -THE EXPERIENCE OF ECSTASY LEADS TO QUESTIONS. - -1. On waking from the slumber of the body to return to myself, and on -turning my attention from exterior things so as to concentrate it on -myself, I often observe an alluring beauty, and I become conscious of -an innate nobility. Then I live out a higher life, and I experience -atonement with the divinity. Fortifying myself within it, I arrive -at that actualization which raises me above the intelligible. But -if, after this sojourn with the divinity, I descend once more from -Intelligence to the exercise of my reasoning powers, I am wont to ask -myself how I ever could actually again descend, and how my soul ever -could have entered into a body, since, although she actually abides -in the body, she still possesses within herself all the perfection I -discover in her. - - -HERACLITUS, THE ORIGINATOR OF THESE QUESTIONS, ANSWERS THEM OBSCURELY. - -Heraclitus, who recommends this research, asserts that "there are -necessary changes of contraries into each other;" he speaks of -"ascenscions" and of a "descent," says that it is "a rest to change, -a fatigue to continue unremittingly in the same kinds of work, and to -be overwrought. He thus reduces us to conjectures because he does not -explain himself definitely; and he would even force us to ask how he -himself came to discover what he propounds. - - -EMPEDOCLES, AS A POET, TELLS OF PYTHAGOREAN MYTHS. - -Empedocles teaches that "it is a law for souls that have sinned to -fall down here below;" and that "he himself, having withdrawn from -the divinity, came down to the earth to become the slave of furious -discord." It would seem that he limited himself to advancing the ideas -that Pythagoras and his followers generally expressed by symbols, both -on this and other subjects. Besides Empedocles is obscure because he -uses the language of poetry. - - -PLATO SAYS MANY CONTRADICTORY THINGS THAT ARE BEAUTIFUL AND TRUE. - -Last, we have the divine Plato, who has said so many beautiful things -about the soul. In his dialogues he often spoke of the descent of -the soul into the body, so that we have the right to expect from him -something clearer. Unfortunately, he is not always sufficiently in -agreement with himself to enable one to follow his thought. In general, -he depreciates corporeal things; he deplores the dealings between the -soul and the body; insists[150] that the soul is chained down to it, -and that she is buried in it as in a tomb. He attaches much importance -to the maxim taught in the mysteries that the soul here below is as -in a prison.[151] What Plato calls the "cavern"[152] and Empedocles -calls the "grotto," means no doubt the sense-world.[153] To break her -chains, and to issue from the cavern, means the soul's[154] rising to -the intelligible world. In the Phaedrus,[155] Plato asserts that the -cause of the fall of the soul is the loss of her wings; that after -having once more ascended on high, she is brought back here below by -the periods;[156] that there are souls sent down into this world by -judgments, fates, conditions, and necessity; still, at the same time, -he finds fault with the "descent" of the soul into the body. But, -speaking of the universe in the Timaeus,[157] he praises the world, and -calls it a blissful divinity. He states that the demiurgic creator, -being good, gave it a soul to make it intelligent, because without the -soul, the universe could not have been as intelligent as it ought to -have been.[158] Consequently, the purpose of the introduction of the -universal Soul into the world, and similarly of each of our souls was -only to achieve the perfection of the world; for it was necessary for -the sense-world to contain animals equal in kind and numbers to those -contained in the intelligible world. - - -QUESTIONS RAISED BY PLATO'S THEORIES. - -2. Plato's theories about the soul lead us to ask how, in general, the -soul has, by her nature, been led to enter into relations with the -body. Other questions arise: What is the nature of the world where the -soul lives thus, either voluntarily or necessarily, or in any other -way? Does the Demiurge[159] act without meeting any obstacle, or is it -with him as with our souls? - - -HUMAN BODIES ARE MORE DIFFICULT TO MANAGE THAN THE WORLD-BODY. - -To begin with, our souls, charged with the administration of bodies -less perfect than the world, had to penetrate within them profoundly in -order to manage them; for the elements of these bodies tend to scatter, -and to return to their original location, while, in the universe, all -things are naturally distributed in their proper places.[160] Besides, -our bodies demand an active and vigilant foresight, because, by the -surrounding objects they are exposed to many accidents; for they -always have a crowd of needs, as they demand continual protection -against the dangers that threaten them.[161] But the body of the world -is complete and perfect. It is self-sufficient; it has nothing to -suffer contrary to its nature; and consequently, it (acts) on a mere -order of the universal Soul. That is why the universal Soul can remain -impassible, feeling no need, remaining in the disposition desired by -her own nature. That is why Plato says that, when our soul dwells with -this perfect Soul, she herself becomes perfect, soaring in the ethereal -region, and governing the whole world.[162] So long as a human soul -does not withdraw from the (universal) Soul to enter into a body, and -to belong to some individual, she easily administers the world, in the -same manner, and together with the universal Soul. Communicating to the -body essence and perfection is therefore, for the soul, not an unmixed -evil; because the providential care granted to an inferior nature does -not hinder him who grants it from himself remaining in a state of -perfection. - - -HOW THE TWO-FOLD SOUL EXERTS A TWO-FOLD PROVIDENCE. - -In the universe there are, indeed, two kinds of providences.[163] -The first Providence regulates everything in a royal manner, without -performing any actions, or observing the details. The second, operating -somewhat like an artisan, adjusts its creative power to the inferior -nature of creatures by getting in contact with them.[164] Now as the -divine Soul (or, the principal power,[165] always administers the -whole world in the first or regal way, dominating the world by her -superiority, and by injecting into the world her lowest power (nature), -we could not accuse the divinity of having given a bad place to the -universal Soul. Indeed, this universal Soul was never deprived of her -natural power, possessing it always, because this power is not contrary -to her being, possessing it uninterruptedly from all eternity. - - -STAR-SOULS, LIKE UNINCARNATE SOULS, GOVERN THE WORLD UNTROUBLEDLY. - -(Plato) further states that the relation of the souls of the stars -to their bodies is the same as that of the universal Soul to the -universe,[166] where he makes the stars participate in the movements -of the universal Soul. He thus grants to those souls the blessedness -which is suitable to them. The intercourse of the soul with the body -is usually blamed for two things: because it hinders the soul from -busying herself with the conceptions of intelligence, and then because -it exposes her to agreeable or painful sensations which fill her with -desires. Now neither of these two results affect the soul that has not -entered into a body, and which does not depend thereon by belonging -to some particular individual. Then, on the contrary, she possesses -the body of the universe, which has no fault, no need, which can cause -her neither fears nor desires, because she has nothing to fear. Thus -no anxiety ever forces her to descend to terrestrial objects, or to -distract herself from her happy and sublime contemplation. Entirely -devoted to divine things, she governs the world by a single power, -whose exercise involves no anxiety. - - -DIFFERENCES BETWEEN HUMAN AND COSMIC INCARNATION. - -3. Consider now the human soul which[167] undergoes numberless ills -while in the body, eking out a miserable existence, a prey to griefs, -desires, fears, sufferings of all kinds, for whom the body is a tomb, -and the sense-world a "cave" or "grotto." This difference of opinions -about the condition of the universal Soul and the human soul is not -contradictory, because these two souls do not have the same reasons -for descent into a body. To begin with, the location of thought, that -we call the intelligible world,[168] contains not only the entire -universal Intelligence, but also the intellectual powers, and the -particular intelligences comprised within the universal Intelligence; -since there is not only a single intelligence, but a simultaneously -single and plural intelligence. Consequently, it must also have -contained a single Soul, and a plurality of souls; and it was from the -single Soul, that the multiple particular and different souls had to be -born, as from one and the same genus are derived species that are both -superior and inferior, and more or less intellectual. Indeed, in the -intelligible world, there is, on one hand, the (universal) Intelligence -which, like some great animal, potentially contains the other -intelligences. On the other hand, are the individual intelligences, -each of which possess in actualization what the former contains -potentially. We may illustrate by a living city that would contain -other living cities. The soul of the universal City would be more -perfect and powerful; but nothing would hinder the souls of the other -cities from being of the same kind. Similarly, in the universal Fire, -there is on one hand a great fire, and on the other small fires, while -the universal Being is the being of the universal Fire, or rather, is -the source from which the being of the universal Fire proceeds. - - -THE RATIONAL SOUL POSSESSES ALSO AN INDIVIDUALITY. - -The function of the rational soul is to think, but she does not limit -herself to thinking. Otherwise there would be no difference between her -and intelligence. Besides her intellectual characteristics, the soul's -characteristic nature, by virtue of which she does not remain mere -intelligence, has a further individual function, such as is possessed -by every other being. By raising her glance to what is superior to her, -she thinks; by bringing them down to herself, she preserves herself; by -lowering them to what is inferior to her, she adorns it, administers -it, and governs it. All these things were not to remain immovable in -the intelligible world, to permit of a successive issue of varied -beings, which no doubt are less perfect than that which preceded them, -but which, nevertheless, exist necessarily during the persistence of -the Principle from which they proceed. - - -INCARNATE SOULS WEAKEN BECAUSE THEY CONTEMPLATE THE INDIVIDUAL. - -4. There are individual souls which, in their conversion[169] towards -the principle from which they proceed, aspire to the intelligible -world, and which also exercise their power on inferior things, just -as light, which does not disdain to throw its rays down to us though -remaining suspended to the sun on high. These souls must remain -sheltered from all suffering so long as in the intelligible world they -remain together with the universal Soul. They must besides, in heaven, -share with it the administration of the world; like kings who, being -colleagues of the great King of the universe, share the government with -Him, without themselves descending from their thrones, without ceasing -to occupy a place as elevated as He. But when they pass from this -state in which they live with the universal Soul to a particular and -independent existence, when they seem weary of dwelling with another, -then each of them returns to what belongs to her individually. Now -when a soul has done that for a long while, when she withdraws from -the universal Soul, and distinguishes herself therefrom, when she -ceases to keep her glances directed towards the intelligible world; -then, isolating herself in her individual existence, she weakens, and -finds herself overwhelmed with a crowd of cares, because she directs -her glance at something individual. Having therefore separated herself -from the universal Soul as well as from the other souls that remain -united thereto, and having attached herself to an individual body, and -concentrating herself exclusively on this object, which is subjected to -the destructive action of all other beings, she ceases to govern the -whole to administer more carefully a part, the care of which forces -her to busy herself, and mingle with external things, to be not only -present in the body, but also to interpenetrate it. - - -THIS PROCESS EXPLAINS THE CLASSIC EXPRESSIONS ABOUT HER CONDITION. - -Thus, in the common expression, she has lost her wings, and is chained -by the bonds of the body, because she gave up the calm existence she -enjoyed when with the universal Soul she shared the administration -of the world; for when she was above she spent a much happier life. -The fallen soul is therefore chained or imprisoned, obliged to -have recourse to the senses because she cannot first make use of -intelligence. She is, as it is said, buried in a tomb, or cavern. But -by her conversion towards thought, she breaks her bonds, she returns -upwards towards higher regions, when, starting from the indications of -reminiscence she rises to the contemplation of the essences;[170] for -even after her fall she always preserves something superior to the body. - - -SOULS AS AMPHIBIANS. - -Souls therefore are necessarily amphibians;[171] since they alternately -live in the intelligible world, and in the sense-world; staying longer -in the intelligible world when they can remain united to supreme -Intelligence more permanently, or staying longer or preponderatingly -here below when nature or destiny imposes on them a contrary fate. That -is the secret meaning of Plato's words[172] to the effect that the -divinity divides the seeds of the souls formed by a second mixture in -the cup, and that He separates them into (two) parts. He also adds that -they must necessarily fall into generation after having been divided -into a definite number. Plato's statement that the divinity sowed the -souls,[173] as well as the divinity's address to the other deities, -must be taken figuratively. For, in reference to the things contained -in the universe, this implies that they are begotten or produced; for -successive enumeration and description implies an eternal begetting, -and that those objects exist eternally in their present state. - - -SOULS DESCENDING TO HELP ARE SENT BY GOD. - -5. Without any inherent contradiction it may therefore be asserted -either,[174] that the souls are sowed into generation, that they descend -here below for the perfection of the universe, or that they are shut up -in a cavern as the result of a divine punishment, that their fall is -simultaneously an effect of their will and of necessity--as necessity -does not exclude voluntariness--and that they are in evil so long as -they are incarnate in bodies. Again, as Empedocles says, they may -have withdrawn from the divinity, and have lost their way, and have -committed some fault that they are expiating; or, as says Heraclitus, -that rest consists in flight (from heaven, and descent here below), -and that the descent of souls is neither entirely voluntary, nor -involuntary. Indeed, no being ever falls voluntarily; but as it is by -his own motion that he descends to lower things, and reaches a less -happy condition, it may be said that he bears the punishment of his -conduct. Besides, as it is by an eternal law of nature that this being -acts and suffers in that manner, we may, without contradiction or -violence to the truth, assert that the being who descends from his rank -to assist some lower thing is sent by the divinity.[175] In spite of -any number of intermediate parts (which separate) a principle from its -lower part, the latter may still be ascribed to the former.[176] - - -THE TWO POSSIBLE FAULTS OF THE SOUL. - -Here there are two possible faults for the soul. The first consists in -the motive that determines her to descend. The second is the evil she -commits after having descended here below. The first fault is expiated -by the very condition of the soul after she has descended here below. -The punishment of the latter fault, if not too serious, is to pass into -other bodies more or less promptly according to the judgment delivered -about her deserts--and we speak of a "judgment" to show that it is the -consequence of the divine law. If however the perversity of the soul -passes all measure, she undergoes, under the charge of guardians in -charge of her chastisement, the severe punishments she has incurred. - - -PROMPT FLIGHT HERE BELOW LEAVES THE SOUL UNHARMED BY HER STAY HERE. - -Thus, although the soul have a divine nature (or "being"), though she -originate in the intelligible world, she enters into a body. Being a -lower divinity, she descends here below by a voluntary inclination, for -the purpose of developing her power, and to adorn what is below her. If -she flee promptly from here below, she does not need to regret having -become acquainted with evil, and knowing the nature of vice,[177] -nor having had the opportunity of manifesting her faculties, and to -manifest her activities and deeds. Indeed, the faculties of the soul -would be useless if they slumbered continuously in incorporeal being -without ever becoming actualized. The soul herself would ignore what -she possesses if her faculties did not manifest by procession, for -everywhere it is the actualization that manifests the potentiality. -Otherwise, the latter would be completely hidden and obscured; or -rather, it would not really exist, and would not possess any reality. -It is the variety of sense-effects which illustrates the greatness of -the intelligible principle, whose nature publishes itself by the beauty -of its works. - - -CONTINUOUS PROCESSION NECESSARY TO THE SUPREME. - -6. Unity was not to exist alone; for if unity remained self-enclosed, -all things would remain hidden in unity without having any form, and no -beings would achieve existence. Consequently, even if constituted by -beings born of unity, plurality would not exist, unless the inferior -natures, by their rank destined to be souls, issued from those beings -by the way of procession. Likewise, it was not sufficient for souls to -exist, they also had to reveal what they were capable of begetting. -It is likewise natural for each essence to produce something beneath -it, to draw it out from itself by a development similar to that of a -seed, a development in which an indivisible principle proceeds to the -production of a sense-object, and where that which precedes remains in -its own place at the same time as it begets that which follows by an -inexpressible power, which is essential to intelligible natures. Now -as this power was not to be stopped or circumscribed in its actions by -jealousy, there was need of a continuous procession until, from degree -to degree, all things had descended to the extreme limits of what was -possible;[178] for it is the characteristic of an inexhaustible power -to communicate all its gifts to everything, and not to permit any of -them to be disinherited, since there is nothing which hinders any of -them from participating in the nature of the Good in the measure that -it is capable of doing so. Since matter has existed from all eternity, -it was impossible that from the time since it existed, it should not -participate in that which communicates goodness to all things according -to their receptivity thereof.[179] If the generation of matter were -the necessary consequence of anterior principles, still it must not -be entirely deprived of the good by its primitive impotence, when -the cause which gratuitously communicated "being" to it remained -self-enclosed. - - -SENSE-OBJECTS ARE NECESSARY AS REVEALERS OF THE ETERNAL. - -The excellence, power and goodness of intelligible (essences) -are therefore revealed by sense-objects; and there is an eternal -connection between intelligible (entities) that are self-existent, and -sense-objects, which eternally derive their existence therefrom by -participation, and which imitate intelligible nature to the extent of -their ability. - - -THE SOUL'S NATURE IS OF AN INTERMEDIATE KIND. - -7. As there are two kinds of being (or, existence), one of sensation, -and the other intelligible, it is preferable for the soul to live in -the intelligible world; nevertheless, as a result of her nature, it -is necessary for her also to participate in sense-affairs.[180] Since -she occupies only an intermediate rank, she must not feel wronged at -not being the best of beings.[181] Though on one hand her condition be -divine, on the other she is located on the limits of the intelligible -world, because of her affinity for sense-nature. She causes this -nature to participate in her powers, and she even receives something -therefrom, when, instead of managing the body without compromising -her own security, she permits herself to be carried away by her own -inclination to penetrate profoundly within it, ceasing her complete -union with the universal Soul. Besides, the soul can rise above the -body after having learned to feel how happy one is to dwell on high, by -the experience of things seen and suffered here below, and after having -appreciated the true Good by the comparison of contraries. Indeed -the knowledge of the good becomes clearer by the experience of evil, -especially among souls which are not strong enough to know evil before -having experienced it.[182] - - -THE PROCESSION OF INTELLIGENCE IS AN EXCURSION DOWNWARDS AND UPWARDS. - -The procession of intelligence consists in descending to things that -occupy the lowest rank, and which have an inferior nature,[183] for -Intelligence could not rise to the superior Nature. Obliged to act -outside of itself, and not being able to remain self-enclosed, by a -necessity and by a law of its nature, intelligence must advance unto -the soul where it stops; then, after having communicated of itself to -that which immediately follows it, intelligence must return to the -intelligible world. Likewise, the soul has a double action in her -double relation with what is below and above her. By her first action, -the soul manages the body to which she is united; by the second, she -contemplates the intelligible entities. These alternatives work out, -for individual souls, with the course of time; and finally there occurs -a conversion which brings them back from the lower to the higher -natures. - - -THE UNIVERSAL SOUL, HOWEVER, IS NOT DISTURBED BY THE URGENCIES BELOW -HER. - -The universal Soul, however, does not need to busy herself with -troublesome functions, and remains out of the reach of evils. She -considers what is below her in a purely contemplative manner, while at -the same time remaining related to what is above her. She is therefore -enabled simultaneously on one side to receive, and on the other to -give, since her nature compels her to relate herself closely with the -objects of sense.[184] - - -THE SOUL DOES NOT ENTIRELY ENTER INTO THE BODY. - -8. Though I should set myself in opposition to popular views, I shall -set down clearly what seems to me the true state of affairs. Not the -whole soul enters into the body. By her higher part, she ever remains -united to the intelligible world; as, by her lower part, she remains -united to the sense-world. If this lower part dominates, or rather, if -it be dominated (by sensation) and troubled, it hinders us from being -conscious of what the higher part of the soul contemplates. Indeed -that which is thought impinges on our consciousness only in case it -descends to us, and is felt. In general, we are conscious of what goes -on in every part of the soul only when it is felt by the entire soul. -For instance, appetite, which is the actualization of lustful desire, -is by us cognized only when we perceive it by the interior sense or by -discursive reason, or by both simultaneously. Every soul has a . lower -part turned towards the body, and a higher part turned towards divine -Intelligence. The universal Soul manages the universe by her lower part -without any kind of trouble, because she governs her body not as we do -by any reasoning, but by intelligence, and consequently in a manner -entirely different from that adopted by art. The individual souls, -each of whom administers a part of the universe,[185] also have a part -that rises above their body; but they are distracted from thought -by sensation, and by a perception of a number of things which are -contrary to nature, and which come to trouble them, and afflict them. -Indeed, the body that they take care of constitutes but a part of the -universe, is incomplete, and is surrounded by exterior objects. That -is why it has so many needs, why it desires luxuriousness, and why it -is deceived thereby. On the contrary, the higher part of the soul is -insensible to the attraction of these transitory pleasures, and leads -an undisturbed life. - - - - -FIFTH ENNEAD, BOOK FOUR. - -How What is After the First Proceeds Therefrom; of the One. - - -NECESSITY OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE FIRST. - -1. Everything that exists after the First is derived therefrom, either -directly or mediately, and constitutes a series of different orders -such that the second can be traced back to the First, the third to the -second, and so forth. Above all beings there must be Something simple -and different from all the rest which would exist in itself, and which, -without ever mingling with anything else, might nevertheless preside -over everything, which might really be the One, and not that deceptive -unity which is only the attribute of essence, and which would be a -principle superior even to being, unreachable by speech, reason, or -science. For if it be not completely simple, foreign to all complexity -and composition, and be not really one, it could not be a principle. It -is sovereignly absolute only because it is simple and first. For what -is not first, is in need of superior things; what is not simple has -need of being constituted by simple things. The Principle of everything -must therefore be one and only. If it were admitted that there was a -second principle of that kind, both would constitute but a single one. -For we do not say that they are bodies, nor that the One and First is a -body; for every body is composite and begotten, and consequently is not -a principle; for a principle cannot be begotten.[186] Therefore, since -the principle of everything cannot be corporeal, because it must be -essentially one, it must be the First. - - -THE FIRST NECESSARILY BEGETS A SECOND, WHICH MUST BE PERFECT. - -If something after the One exist, it is no more the simple One, but -the multiple One. Whence is this derived? Evidently from the First, -for it could not be supposed that it came from chance; that would -be to admit that the First is not the principle of everything. How -then is the multiple One derived from the First? If the First be not -only perfect, but the most perfect, if it be the first Power, it must -surely, in respect to power, be superior to all the rest, and the other -powers must merely imitate it to the limit of their ability. Now we -see that all that arrives to perfection cannot unfruitfully remain in -itself, but begets and produces. Not only do beings capable of choice, -but even those lacking reflection or soul have a tendency to impart -to other beings, what is in them; as, for instance, fire emits heat, -snow emits cold; and plant-juices (dye and soak) into whatever they -happen to touch. All things in nature imitate the First principle by -seeking to achieve immortality by procreation, and by manifestation -of their qualities. How then would He who is sovereignly perfect, who -is the supreme Good, remain absorbed in Himself, as if a sentiment of -jealousy hindered Him from communicating Himself, or as if He were -powerless, though He is the power of everything? How then would He -remain principle of everything? He must therefore beget something, just -as what He begets must in turn beget. There must therefore be something -beneath the First. Now this thing (which is immediately beneath the -First), must be very venerable, first because it begets everything -else, then because it is begotten by the First, and because it must, -as being the Second, rank and surpass everything else. - - -INTELLIGENCE CANNOT BE THE FIRST, AND RANKS ALL ELSE. - -2. If the generating principle were intelligence, what it begot would -have to be inferior to intelligence, and nevertheless approximate -it, and resemble it more than anything else. Now as the generating -principle is superior to intelligence, the first begotten thing is -necessarily intelligence. Why, however, is the generating principle not -intelligence? Because the act of intelligence is thought, and thought -consists in seeing the intelligible; for it is only by its conversion -towards it that intelligence achieves a complete and perfect existence. -In itself, intelligence is only an indeterminate power to see; only by -contemplation of the intelligible does it achieve the state of being -determined. This is the reason of the saying, "The ideas and numbers, -that is, intelligence, are born from the indefinite doubleness, and the -One." Consequently, instead of being simple, intelligence is multiple. -It is composed of several elements; these are doubtless intelligible, -but what intelligence sees is none the less multiple. In any case, -intelligence is simultaneously the object thought, and the thinking -subject; it is therefore already double. - - -THE FIRST AND SECOND AS HIGHER AND LOWER INTELLIGIBLE ENTITIES. - -But besides this intelligible (entity, namely, intelligence), there is -another (higher) intelligible (the supreme Intelligible, the First). -In what way does the intelligence, thus determined, proceed from the -(First) Intelligible? The Intelligible abides in itself, and has need -of nothing else, while there is a need of something else in that which -sees and thinks (that is, that which thinks has need of contemplating -the supreme Intelligible). But even while remaining within Himself, the -Intelligible (One) is not devoid of sentiment; all things belong to -Him, are in Him, and with Him. Consequently, He has the conception of -Himself, a conception which implies consciousness, and which consists -in eternal repose, and in a thought, but in a thought different from -that of intelligence. If He begets something while remaining within -Himself, He begets it precisely when He is at the highest point of -individuality. It is therefore by remaining in His own state that -He begets what He begets; He procreates by individualizing. Now as -He remains intelligible, what He begets cannot be anything else -than thought; therefore thought, by existing, and by thinking the -Principle whence it is derived (for it could not think any other -object), becomes simultaneously intelligence and intelligible; but this -second intelligible differs from the first Intelligible from which it -proceeds, and of which it is but the image and the reflection. - - -THE SECOND IS THE ACTUALIZATION OF THE POTENTIALITY OF THE FIRST. - -But how is an actualization begotten from that self-limited -(intelligible)? We shall have to draw a distinction between an -actualization of being, and an actualization out of the being of each -thing (actualized being, and actualization emanating from being). -Actualized being cannot differ from being, for it is being itself. But -the actualization emanating from being--and everything necessarily has -an actualization of this kind--differs from what produces it. It is as -if with fire: there is a difference between the heat which constitutes -its being, and the heat which radiates exteriorly, while the fire -interiorly realizes the actualization which constitutes its being, -and which makes it preserve its nature. Here also, and far more so, -the First remains in His proper state, and yet simultaneously, by His -inherent perfection, by the actualization which resides in Him, has -been begotten the actualization which, deriving its existence from so -great a power, nay, from supreme Power, has arrived at, or achieved -essence and being. As to the First, He was above being; for He was the -potentiality of all things, already being all things. - - -HOW THE FIRST IS ABOVE ALL BEING. - -If this (actualization begotten by the First, this external -actualization) be all things, then that (One) is above all things, -and consequently above being. If then (this external actualization) -be all things, and be before all things, it does not occupy the same -rank as the remainder (of all other things); and must, in this respect -also, be superior to being, and consequently also to intelligence; for -there is Something superior to intelligence. Essence is not, as you -might say, dead; it is not devoid of life or thought; for intelligence -and essence are identical. Intelligible entities do not exist before -the intelligence that thinks them, as sense-objects exist before the -sensation which perceives them. Intelligence itself is the things that -it thinks, since their forms are not introduced to them from without. -From where indeed would intelligence receive these forms? Intelligence -exists with the intelligible things; intelligence is identical with -them, is one with them. Reciprocally, intelligible entities do not -exist without their matter (that is, Intelligence). - - - - -FOURTH ENNEAD, BOOK NINE. - -Whether All Souls Form a Single One? - - -IF ALL SOULS BE ONE IN THE WORLD-SOUL, WHY SHOULD THEY NOT TOGETHER -FORM ONE? - -1. Just as the soul of each animal is one, because she is entirely -present in the whole body, and because she is thus really one, because -she does not have one part in one organ, and some other part in -another; and just as the sense-soul is equally one in all the beings -which feel, and just as the vegetative soul is everywhere entirely -one in each part of the growing plants; why then should your soul and -mine not form a single unity? Why should not all souls form but a -single one? Why should not the universal (Soul) which is present in -all beings, be one because she is not divided in the manner of a body, -being everywhere the same? Why indeed should the soul in myself form -but one, and the universal (Soul) likewise not be one, similarly, since -no more than my own is this universal (Soul) either material extension, -or a body? If both my soul and yours proceed from the universal (Soul), -and if the latter be one, then should my soul and yours together form -but a single one. Or again, on the supposition that the universal -(Soul) and mine proceed from a single soul, even on this hypothesis -would all souls form but a single one. We shall have to examine in what -(this Soul which is but) one consists. - - -SOULS MAY NOT FORM A NUMERIC UNITY, BUT MAY FORM A GENERIC UNITY. - -Let us first consider if it may be affirmed that all souls form but one -in the sense in which it is said that the soul of each individual is -one. It seems absurd to pretend that my soul and yours form but one in -this (numerical) sense; for then you would be feeling simultaneously -with my feeling, and you would be virtuous when I was, and you would -have the same desires as I, and not only would we both have the same -sentiments, but even the identical sentiments of the universal (Soul), -so that every sensation felt by me would have been felt by the entire -universe. If in this manner all the souls form but one, why is one soul -reasonable, and the other unreasonable, why is the one in an animal, -and the other in a plant? On the other hand, if we do not admit that -there is a single Soul, we will not be able to explain the unity of the -universe, nor find a single principle for (human) souls. - - -THE UNITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SEVERAL SOULS NEED NOT IMPLY THEIR BEING -IDENTICAL. - -2. In the first place, if the souls of myself and of another man form -but one soul, this does not necessarily imply their being identical -with their principle. Granting the existence of different beings, the -same principle need not experience in each the same affections. Thus, -humanity may equally reside in me, who am in motion, as in you, who may -be at rest, although in me it moves, and it rests in you. Nevertheless, -it is neither absurd nor paradoxical to insist that the same principle -is both in you and in me; and this does not necessarily make us feel -the identical affections. Consider a single body: it is not the left -hand which feels what the right one does, but the soul which is present -in the whole body. To make you feel the same as I do, our two bodies -would have to constitute but a single one; then, being thus united, our -souls would perceive the same affections. Consider also that the All -remains deaf to a multitude of impressions experienced by the parts -of a single and same organism, and that so much the more as the body -is larger. This is the state of affairs, for instance, with the large -whales which do not feel the impression received in some one part of -their body, because of the smallness of the movement. - - -SYMPATHY DOES NOT FORCE IDENTITY OF SENSATION. - -It is therefore by no means necessary that when one member of the -universe experiences an affection, the latter be clearly felt by the -All. The existence of sympathy is natural enough, and it could not -be denied; but this does not imply identity of sensation. Nor is it -absurd that our souls, while forming a single one should be virtuous -and vicious, just as it would be possible that the same essence be at -motion in me, but at rest in you. Indeed, the unity that we attribute -to the universal (Soul) does not exclude all multiplicity, such a -unity as befits intelligence. We may however say that (the soul) is -simultaneously unity and plurality, because she participates not only -in divisible essence in the bodies, but also in the indivisible, -which consequently is one. Now, just as the impression perceived by -one of my parts is not necessarily felt all over my body, while that -which happens to the principal organ is felt by all the other parts, -likewise, the impressions that the universe communicates to the -individual are clearer, because usually the parts perceive the same -affections as the All, while it is not evident that the particular -affections that we feel would be also experienced by the Whole. - - -UNITY OF ALL BEINGS IMPLIED BY SYMPATHY, LOVE, AND MAGIC ENCHANTMENT. - -3. On the other hand, observation teaches us that we sympathize with -each other, that we cannot see the suffering of another man without -sharing it, that we are naturally inclined to confide in each other, -and to love; for love is a fact whose origin is connected with the -question that occupies us. Further, if enchantments and magic charms -mutually attract individuals, leading distant persons to sympathize, -these effects can only be explained by the unity of soul. (It is well -known that) words pronounced in a low tone of voice (telepathically?) -affect a distant person, and make him hear what is going on at a great -distance. Hence appears the unity of all beings, which demands the -unity of the Soul. - - -WHAT OF THE DIFFERENCES OF RATIONALITY, IF THE SOUL BE ONE? - -If, however, the Soul be one, why is some one soul reasonable, another -irrational, or some other one merely vegetative? The indivisible part -of the soul consists in reason, which is not divided in the bodies, -while the part of the divisible soul in the bodies (which, though being -one in herself, nevertheless divides herself in the bodies, because -she sheds sentiment everywhere), must be regarded as another power of -the soul (the sensitive power); likewise, the part which fashions and -produces the bodies is still another power (the vegetative power); -nevertheless, this plurality of powers does not destroy the unity of -the soul. For instance, in a grain of seed there are also several -powers; nevertheless this grain of seed is one, and from this unity is -born a multiplicity which forms a unity. - - -THE POWERS OF THE SOUL ARE NOT EXERCISED EVERYWHERE BECAUSE THEY DIFFER. - -But why do not all the powers of the soul act everywhere? Now if we -consider the Soul which is one everywhere, we find that sensation is -not similar in all its parts (that is, in all the individual souls); -that reason is not in all (but in certain souls exclusively); and that -the vegetative power is granted to those beings who do not possess -sensation, and that all these powers return to unity when they separate -from the body. - - -THE BODY'S POWER OF GROWTH IS DERIVED FROM THE WHOLE, AND THE SOUL; BUT -NOT FROM OUR SOUL. - -If, however, the body derive its vegetative power from the Whole and -from this (universal) Soul which is one, why should it not derive it -also from our soul? Because that which is nourished by this power forms -a part of the universe, which possesses sensation only at the price of -"suffering." As to the sense-power which rises as far as the judgment, -and which is united to every intelligence, there was no need for it to -form what had already been formed by the Whole, but it could have given -its forms if these forms were not parts of the Whole which produces -them. - - -THE UNITY OF THE SOULS IS A CONDITION OF THEIR MULTIPLICITY. - -4. Such justifications will preclude surprise at our deriving all -souls from unity. But completeness of treatment demands explanation -how all souls are but a single one. Is this due to their proceeding -from a single Soul, or because they all form a single one? If all -proceed from a single one, did this one divide herself, or did she -remain whole, while begetting the multitude of souls? In this case, how -could an essence beget a multitude like her, while herself remaining -undiminished? We shall invoke the help of the divinity (in solving this -problem); and say that the existence of the one single Soul is the -condition of the existence of the multitude of souls, and that this -multitude must proceed from the Soul that is one. - - -THE SOUL CAN BEGET MANY BECAUSE SHE IS AN INCORPOREAL ESSENCE. - -If the Soul were a body, then would the division of this body -necessarily produce the multitude of souls, and this essence would be -different in its different parts. Nevertheless, as this essence would -be homogeneous, the souls (between which it would divide itself) would -be similar to each other, because they would possess a single identical -form in its totality, but they would differ by their body. If the -essence of these souls consisted in the bodies which would serve them -as subjects, they would be different from each other. If the essence -of these souls consisted in their form, they would, in form, be but -one single form; in other terms, there would be but one same single -soul in a multitude of bodies. Besides, above this soul which would be -one, but which would be spread abroad in the multitude of bodies, there -would be another Soul which would not be spread abroad in the multitude -of bodies; it would be from her that would proceed the soul which -would be the unity in plurality, the multiple image of the single Soul -in a single body, like a single seal, by impressing the same figure -to a multitude of pieces of wax, would be distributing this figure -in a multitude of impressions. In this case (if the essence of the -soul consisted in her form) the soul would be something incorporeal, -and as she would consist in an affection of the body, there would be -nothing astonishing in that a single quality, emanating from a single -principle, might be in a multitude of subjects simultaneously. Last, -if the essence of the soul consisted in being both things (being -simultaneously a part of a homogeneous body and an affection of the -body), there would be nothing surprising (if there were a unity of -essence in a multitude of subjects). We have thus shown that the soul -is incorporeal, and an essence; we must now consider the results of -this view. - - -HOW AN ESSENCE CAN BE ONE IN A MULTITUDE OF SOULS IS ILLUSTRATED BY -SEED. - -5. How can an essence be single in a multitude of souls? Either this -one essence is entire in all souls, or this one and entire essence -begets all souls while remaining (undiminished) in itself. In either -case, the essence is single. It is the unity to which the individual -souls are related; the essence gives itself to this multitude, and yet -simultaneously the essence does not give itself; it can give of itself -to all individual souls, and nevertheless remain single; it is powerful -enough to pass into all simultaneously, and to be separated from none; -thus its essence remains identical, while being present in a multitude -of souls. This is nothing astonishing; all of science is entirely in -each of its parts, and it begets them without itself ceasing to remain -entire within itself. Likewise, a grain of seed is entire in each of -its parts in which it naturally divides itself; each of its parts has -the same properties as the whole seed; nevertheless the seed remains -entire, without diminution; and if the matter (in which the seed -resides) offer it any cause of division, all the parts will not any the -less form a single unity. - - -THIS MIRACLE IS EXPLAINED BY THE USE OF THE CONCEPTION OF POTENTIALITY. - -It may be objected that in science a part is not the total science. -Doubtless, the notion which is actualized, and which is studied to -the exclusion of others, because there is special need of it, is -only partially an actualization. Nevertheless, in a latent manner it -potentially comprises all the other notions it implies. Thus, all the -notions are contained in each part of the science, and in this respect -each part is the total science; for what is only partially actualized -(potentially) comprises all the notions of science. Each notion that -one wishes to render explicit is at one's disposition; and this in -every part of the science that is considered; but if it be compared -with the whole science, it seems to be there only potentially. It -must not, however, be thought that the particular notion does not -contain anything of the other notions; in this case, there would -be nothing systematic or scientific about it; it would be nothing -more than a sterile conception. Being a really scientific notion, it -potentially contains all the notions of the science; and the genuine -scientist knows how to discover all its notions in a single one, and -how to develop its consequences. The geometrical expert shows in his -demonstrations how each theorem contains all the preceding ones, to -which he harks back by analysis, and how each theorem leads to all the -following ones, by deduction. - - -DIFFICULT AS THESE EXPLANATIONS ARE, THEY ARE CLEAR INTELLIGIBLY. - -These truths excite our incredulity, because here below our reason -is weak, and it is confused by the body. In the intelligible world, -however, all the verities are clear, and each is evident, by itself. - - - - -SIXTH ENNEAD, BOOK NINE. - -Of the Good and the One. - - -UNITY NECESSARY TO EXISTENCE OF ALL BEINGS. - -1. All beings, both primary, as well as those who are so called on any -pretext soever, are beings only because of their unity. What, indeed -would they be without it? Deprived of their unity, they would cease to -be what they are said to be. No army can exist unless it be one. So -with a choric ballet or a flock. Neither a house nor a ship can exist -without unity; by losing it they would cease to be what they are.[187] -So also with continuous quantities which would not exist without unity. -On being divided by losing their unity, they simultaneously lose their -nature. Consider farther the bodies of plants and animals, of which -each is a unity. On losing their unity by being broken up into several -parts, they simultaneously lose their nature. They are no more what -they were, they have become new beings, which themselves exist only so -long as they are one. What effects health in us, is that the parts of -our bodies are co-ordinated in unity. Beauty is formed by the unity of -our members. Virtue is our soul's tendency to unity, and becoming one -through the harmony of her faculties. - - -THE SOUL MAY IMPART UNITY, BUT IS NOT UNITY. - -The soul imparts unity to all things when producing them, fashioning -them, and forming them. Should we, therefore, after rising to the -Soul, say that she not only imparts unity, but herself is unity in -itself? Certainly not. The soul that imparts form and figure to -bodies is not identical with form, and figure. Therefore the soul -imparts unity without being unity. She unifies each of her productions -only by contemplation of the One, just as she produces man only -by contemplating Man-in-himself, although adding to that idea the -implied unity. Each of the things that are called "one" have a unity -proportionate to their nature ("being"); so that they participate in -unity more or less according as they share essence[188] (being). Thus -the soul is something different from unity; nevertheless, as she exists -in a degree higher (than the body), she participates more in unity, -without being unity itself; indeed she is one, but the unity in her -is no more than contingent. There is a difference between the soul -and unity, just as between the body and unity. A discrete quantity -such as a company of dancers, or choric ballet, is very far from being -unity; a continuous quantity approximates that further; the soul gets -still nearer to it, and participates therein still more. Thus from the -fact that the soul could not exist without being one, the identity -between the soul and unity is suggested. But this may be answered -in two ways. First, other things also possess individual existence -because they possess unity, and nevertheless are not unity itself; as, -though the body is not identical with unity, it also participates in -unity. Further, the soul is manifold as well as one, though she be not -composed of parts. She possesses several faculties, discursive reason, -desire, and perception--all of them faculties joined together by unity -as a bond. Doubtless the soul imparts unity to something else (the -body), because she herself possesses unity; but this unity is by her -received from some other principle (namely, from unity itself). - - -BEING AND ESSENCE IDENTICAL WITH UNITY. - -2. (Aristotle[189]) suggests that in each of the individual beings -which are one, being is identical with unity. Are not being and essence -identical with unity, in every being and in every essence, in a manner -such that on discovering essence, unity also is discovered? Is not -being in itself unity in itself, so that if being be intelligence, -unity also must be intelligence, as intelligence which, being essence -in the highest degree, is also unity in the first degree, and which, -imparting essence to other things, also imparts unity to them? What -indeed could unity be, apart from essence and being? As "man," and "a -man" are equivalent,[190] essence must be identical with unity; or, -unity is the number of everything considered individually; and as one -object joined to another is spoken of as two, so an object alone is -referred to as one. - - -UNITY IS NOT A NUMBERING DEVICE, BUT IS IDENTICAL WITH EXISTENCE. - -If number belongs to the class of beings, evidently the latter must -include unity also; and we shall have to discover what kind of a being -it is. If unity be no more than a numbering device invented by the -soul, then unity would possess no real existence. But we have above -observed that each object, on losing unity, loses existence also. We -are therefore compelled to investigate whether essence and unity be -identical either when considered in themselves, or in each individual -object. - - -EVEN UNIVERSAL ESSENCE CONTAINS MANIFOLDNESS. - -If the essence of each thing be manifoldness, and as unity cannot be -manifoldness, unity must differ from essence. Now man, being both -animal and rational, contains a manifoldness of elements of which -unity is the bond. There is therefore a difference between man and -unity; man is divisible, while unity is indivisible. Besides, universal -Essence, containing all essences, is still more manifold. Therefore -it differs from unity; though it does possess unity by participation. -Essence possesses life and intelligence, for it cannot be considered -lifeless; it must therefore be manifold. Besides, if essence be -intelligence, it must in this respect also be manifold, and must be -much more so if it contain forms; for the idea[191] is not genuinely -one. Both as individual and general it is rather a number; it is one -only as the world is one. - - -BESIDES, ABSOLUTE UNITY IS THE FIRST, WHICH INTELLIGENCE IS NOT. - -Besides, Unity in itself is the first of all; but intelligence, forms -and essence are not primary. Every form is manifold and composite, and -consequently must be something posterior; for parts are prior to the -composite they constitute. Nor is intelligence primary, as appears from -the following considerations. For intelligence existence is necessarily -thought and the best intelligence which does not contemplate exterior -objects, must think what is above it; for, on turning towards itself, -it turns towards its principle. On the one hand, if intelligence be -both thinker and thought, it implies duality, and is not simple or -unitary. On the other hand, if intelligence contemplate some object -other than itself, this might be nothing more than some object better -than itself, placed above it. Even if intelligence contemplate itself -simultaneously with what is better than it, even so intelligence is -only of secondary rank. We may indeed admit that the intelligence which -has such a nature enjoys the presence of the Good, of the First, and -that intelligence contemplates the First; but nevertheless at the same -time intelligence is present to itself, and thinks itself as being all -things. Containing such a diversity, intelligence is far from unity. - - -UNITY AS ABOVE ALL THINGS, INTELLIGENCE AND ESSENCE. - -Thus Unity is not all things, for if so, it would no longer be unity. -Nor is it Intelligence, for since intelligence is all things, unity -too would be all things. Nor is it essence, since essence also is all -things. - - -UNITY IS DIFFICULT TO ASCERTAIN BECAUSE THE SOUL IS FEARFUL OF SUCH -ABSTRUSE RESEARCHES. - -3. What then is unity? What is its nature? It is not surprising that -it is so difficult to say so, when it is difficult to explain of what -even essence or form consist. But, nevertheless, forms are the basis -of our knowledge. Everything that the soul advances towards what is -formless, not being able to understand it because it is indeterminate, -and so to speak has not received the impression of a distinctive type, -the soul withdraws therefrom, fearing she will meet nonentity. That is -why, in the presence of such things she grows troubled, and descends -with pleasure. Then, withdrawing therefrom, she, so to speak, lets -herself fall till she meets some sense-object, on which she pauses, and -recovers; just as the eye which, fatigued by the contemplation of small -objects, gladly turns back to large ones. When the soul wishes to see -by herself, then seeing only because she is the object that she sees, -and, further, being one because she forms but one with this object, she -imagines that what she sought has escaped, because she herself is not -distinct from the object that she thinks. - - -THE PATH OF SIMPLIFICATION TO UNITY. - -Nevertheless a philosophical study of unity will follow the following -course. Since it is Unity that we seek, since it is the principle -of all things, the Good, the First that we consider, those who will -wish to reach it must not withdraw from that which is of primary rank -to decline to what occupies the last, but they must withdraw their -souls from sense-objects, which occupy the last degree in the scale -of existence, to those entities that occupy the first rank. Such a -man will have to free himself from all evil, since he aspires to -rise to the Good. He will rise to the principle that he possesses -within himself. From the manifold that he was he will again become -one. Only under these conditions will he contemplate the supreme -principle, Unity. Thus having become intelligence, having trusted his -soul to intelligence, educating and establishing her therein, so that -with vigilant attention she may grasp all that intelligence sees, -he will, by intelligence, contemplate unity, without the use of any -senses, without mingling any of their perceptions with the flashes -of intelligence. He will contemplate the purest Principle, through -the highest degree of the purest Intelligence. So when a man applies -himself to the contemplation of such a principle and represents it to -himself as a magnitude, or a figure, or even a form, it is not his -intelligence that guides him in this contemplation for intelligence -is not destined to see such things; it is sensation, or opinion, the -associate of sensation, which is active in him. Intelligence is only -capable of informing us about things within its sphere. - - -UNITY AS THE UNIFORM IN ITSELF AND FORMLESS SUPERFORM. - -Intelligence can see both the things that are above it, those which -belong to it, and the things that proceed from it. The things that -belong to intelligence are pure; but they are still less pure and less -simple than the things that are above Intelligence, or rather than what -is above it; this is not Intelligence, and is superior to Intelligence. -Intelligence indeed is essence, while the principle above it is not -essence, but is superior to all beings. Nor is it essence, for essence -has a special form, that of essence, and the One is shapeless even -intelligible. As Unity is the nature that begets all things, Unity -cannot be any of them. It is therefore neither any particular thing, -nor quantity, nor quality, nor intelligence, nor soul, nor what is -movable, nor what is stable; it is neither in place nor time; but it -is the uniform in itself, or rather it is formless, as it is above all -form, above movement and stability. These are my views about essence -and what makes it manifold.[192] - - -WHY IT IS NOT STABLE, THOUGH IT DOES NOT MOVE. - -But if it does not move, why does it not possess stability? Because -either of these things, or both together, are suitable to nothing but -essence. Besides, that which possesses stability is stable through -stability, and is not identical with stability itself; consequently it -possesses stability only by accident, and would no longer remain simple. - - -BEING A PRIMARY CAUSE, UNITY IS NOTHING CONTINGENT. - -Nor let anybody object that something contingent is attributed to Unity -when we call it the primary cause. It is to ourselves that we are then -attributing contingency, since it is we who are receiving something -from Unity, while Unity remains within itself. - - -UNITY CANNOT BE DEFINED; WE CAN ONLY REFER TO IT BY OUR FEELINGS OF IT. - -Speaking strictly, we should say that the One is this or that (that is, -we should not apply any name to it). We can do no more than turn around -it, so to speak, trying to express what we feel (in regard to it); for -at times we approach Unity, and at times withdraw from it as a result -of our uncertainty about it. - - -WE CANNOT COMPREHEND UNITY, WHICH WE APPROACH ONLY BY A PRESENCE. - -4. The principal cause of our uncertainty is that our comprehension of -the One comes to us neither by scientific knowledge, nor by thought, as -the knowledge of other intelligible things, but by a presence which is -superior to science. When the soul acquires the scientific knowledge -of something, she withdraws from unity and ceases being entirely one; -for science implies discursive reason and discursive reason implies -manifoldness. (To attain Unity) we must therefore rise above science, -and never withdraw from what is essentially One; we must therefore -renounce science, the objects of science, and every other right (except -that of the One); even to that of beauty; for beauty is posterior to -unity, and is derived therefrom, as the day-light comes from the sun. -That is why Plato[193] says of (Unity) that it is unspeakable and -undescribable. Nevertheless we speak of it, we write about it, but only -to excite our souls by our discussions, and to direct them towards this -divine spectacle, just as one might point out the road to somebody who -desired to see some object. Instruction, indeed, goes as far as showing -the road, and guiding us in the way; but to obtain the vision (of the -divinity), is the work suitable to him who has desired to obtain it. - - -THOSE WHO SEE GOD WITHOUT EMOTION HAVE FAILED TO RID THEMSELVES OF -PHYSICAL HINDRANCES, AND HAVE NOT BECOME UNIFIED. - -If your soul does not succeed in enjoying this spectacle, if she does -not have the intuition of the divine light, if she remains cold and -does not, within herself, feel a rapture such as that of a lover who -sees the beloved object, and who rests within it, a rapture felt by him -who has seen the true light, and whose soul has been overwhelmed with -brilliance on approaching this light, then you have tried to rise to -the divinity without having freed yourself from the hindrances which -arrest your progress, and hinder your contemplation. You did not rise -alone, and you retained within yourself something that separated you -from Him; or rather, you were not yet unified. Though He be absent -from all beings, He is absent from none, so that He is present (to -all) without being present (to them). He is present only for those -who are able to receive Him, and who are prepared for Him, and who -are capable of harmonizing themselves with Him, to reach Him, and as -it were to touch Him by virtue of the conformity they have with Him, -and also by virtue of an innate power analogous to that which flows -from Him, when at last their souls find themselves in the state where -they were after having communicated with Him; then they can see Him -so far as his nature is visible. I repeat: if you have not yet risen -so far, the conclusion must be that you are still at a distance from -Him, either by the obstacles of which we spoke above, or by the lack -of such instruction as would have taught you the road to follow, and -which would have imbued you with faith in things divine. In any case, -you have no fault to find with any but yourself; for, to be alone, all -you need to do is to detach yourself from everything. Lack of faith in -arguments about it may be remedied by the following considerations. - - -HOW SUCH AS RISE AS FAR AS THE SOUL MAY ACHIEVE FAITH IN THE -INTELLIGIBLE. - -5. Such as imagine that beings are governed by luck or chance, and -that they depend on material causes are far removed from the divinity, -and from the conception of unity. It is not such men that we are -addressing, but such as admit the existence of a nature different from -the corporeal one, and who at least rise (to an acknowledgment of the -existence of) the Soul. These should apply themselves to the study of -the nature of the soul, learning, among other truths, that she proceeds -from Intelligence, and that she can achieve virtue by participating in -Intelligence through reason. They must then acknowledge the existence -of an Intelligence superior to the intelligence that reasons, namely, -to discursive reason. They must (also realize) that reasonings imply -an interval (between notions), and a movement (by which the soul -bridges this interval). They must be brought to see that scientific -knowledge consists also of reasons of the same nature (namely, rational -notions), reasons suitable to the soul, but which have become clear, -because the soul has received the succession of intelligence which is -the source of scientific knowledge. By intelligence (which belongs to -her), the soul sees the divine Intellect, which to it seems sensual, -in this sense that it is perceptible by intelligence, which dominates -the soul, and is her father;[194] that is, the intelligible world, a -calm intellect which vibrates without issuing from its tranquility, -which contains everything, and which is all. It is both definite and -indefinite manifoldness, for the ideas it contains are not distinct -like the reasons (the rational notions), which are conceived one by -one. Nevertheless, they do not become confused. Each of them becomes -distinct from the others, just as in a science all the notions, -though forming an indivisible whole, yet each has its own separate -individual existence.[195] This multitude of ideas taken together -constitutes the intelligible world. This is the (entity) nearest -to the First. Its existence is inevitably demonstrated by reason, -as much as the necessity of the existence of the Soul herself; but -though the intelligible world is something superior to the Soul, it is -nevertheless not yet the First, because it is neither one, nor simple, -while the one, the principle of all beings, is perfectly simple. - - -THE SUPREME IS ONE ONLY IN A FIGURATIVE SENSE. - -The principle that is superior to what is highest among beings, to -Intelligence (or intellect, or intelligible world) (may well be sought -after). There must indeed be some principle above Intelligence; for -intelligence does indeed aspire to become one, but it is not one, -possessing only the form of unity. Considered in itself, Intelligence -is not divided, but is genuinely present to itself. It does not -dismember itself because it is next to the One, though it dared to -withdraw therefrom. What is above Intelligence is Unity itself, an -incomprehensible miracle, of which it cannot even be said that it -is essence, lest we make of it the attribute of something else, and -to whom no name is really suitable. If however He must be named, we -may indeed call Him in general Unity, but only on the preliminary -understanding that He was not first something else, and then only -later became unity. That is why the One is so difficult to understand -in Himself; He is rather known by His offspring; that is, by Being, -because Intelligence leads up to Being. The nature of the One, indeed, -is the source of excellent things, the power which begets beings, while -remaining within Himself, without undergoing any diminution, without -passing into the beings to which He gives birth.[196] If we call this -principle Unity, it is only for the mutual convenience of rising to -some indivisible conception, and in unifying our soul. But when we say -that this principle is one and indivisible, it is not in the same sense -that we say it of the (geometric) point, and of the (arithmetical unity -called the) monad. What is one in the sense of the unity of the point -or the monad, is a principle of quantity, and would not exist unless -preceded by being and the principle which precedes even that being. It -is not of this kind of unity that we must think; still we believe that -the point and the monad have analogy with the One by their simplicity -as well as by the absence of all manifoldness and of all division. - - -THE ONE MAY BE CONCEIVED OF AS INDIVISIBLE AND INFINITE. - -6. In what sense do we use the name of unity, and how can we conceive -of it? We shall have to insist that the One is a unity much more -perfect than the point of the monad; for in these, abstracting -(geometric) magnitude, and numerical plurality, we do indeed stop -at that which is most minute, and we come to rest in something -indivisible; but this existed already in a divisible being, in a -subject other than itself, while the One is neither in a subject other -than itself, nor in anything divisible. If it be indivisible, neither -is it of the same kind as that which is most minute. On the contrary, -it is that which is greatest, not by (geometric) magnitude, but by -power; possessing no (geometric) magnitude, it is indivisible in its -power; for the beings beneath it are indivisible in their powers, and -not in their mass (since they are incorporeal). We must also insist -that the One is infinite, not as would be a mass of a magnitude which -could be examined serially, but by the incommensurability of its power. -Even though you should conceive of it as of intelligence or divinity, -it is still higher. When by thought you consider it as the most perfect -unity, it is still higher. You try to form for yourself an idea of a -divinity by rising to what in your intelligence is most unitary (and -yet He is still simpler); for He dwells within Himself, and contains -nothing that is contingent. - - -THE ONE IS SELF-SUFFICIENT AND NEEDS NOTHING FOR ESTABLISHMENT. - -His sovereign unity may best be understood by His being -self-sufficient; for the most perfect principle is necessarily that -which best suffices Himself, and which least needs anything else. Now -anything that is not one, but manifold, needs something else. Not -being one, but being composed of multiple elements, its being demands -unification; but as the One is already one, He does not even need -Himself. So much the more, the being that is manifold needs as many -things as it contains; for each of the contained things exists only by -its union with the others, and not in itself, and finds that it needs -the others. Therefore such a being needs others, both for the things -it contains, as for their totality. If then there must be something -that fully suffices itself, it must surely be the One, which alone -needs nothing either relatively to Himself, or to the other things. It -needs nothing either to exist, or to be happy, or to be composed. To -begin with, as He is the cause of the other beings, He does not owe His -existence to them. Further, how could He derive His happiness from -outside Himself? Within Him, happiness is not something contingent, but -is His very nature. Again, as He does not occupy any space, He does not -need any foundation on which to be edified, as if He could not sustain -Himself. All that needs compounding is inanimate; without support it is -no more than a mass ready to fall. (Far from needing any support) the -One is the foundation of the edification of all other things; by giving -them existence, He has at the same time given them a location. However, -that which needs a location is not (necessarily) self-sufficient. - - -THE SUPREME, AS SUPERGOODNESS, COULD NOT ASPIRE TO ANYTHING ELSE. - -A principle has no need of anything beneath it. The Principle of all -things has no need of any of them. Every non-self-sufficient being is -not self-sufficient chiefly because it aspires to its principle. If the -One aspired to anything, His aspiration would evidently tend to destroy -His unity, that is, to annihilate Himself. Anything that aspires -evidently aspires to happiness and preservation. Thus, since for the -One there is no good outside of Himself, there is nothing that He could -wish. He is the super-good; He is the good, not for Himself, but for -other beings, for those that can participate therein. - - -THE ONE IS NOT THINKER BUT THOUGHT ITSELF. - -Within the One, therefore, is no thought, because there can be no -difference within Him; nor could He contain any motion, because the -One is prior to motion, as much as to thought. Besides, what would -He think? Would He think Himself? In this case, He would be ignorant -before thinking, and thought would be necessary to Him, who fully -suffices to Himself. Neither should He be thought to contain ignorance, -because He does not know Himself, and does not think Himself. Ignorance -presupposes a relation, and consists in that one thing does not know -another. But the One, being alone, can neither know nor be ignorant -of anything. Being with Himself, He has no need of self-knowledge. -We should not even predicate of Him presence with Himself, if we are -to conceive of Him Unity in sheer purity. On the contrary, we should -have to leave aside intelligence, consciousness, and knowledge of -self and of other beings. We should not conceive of Him as being that -which thinks, but rather as of thought. Thought does not think; but -is the cause which makes some other being think; now the cause cannot -be identical with that which is caused. So much the more reason is -there then to say that that which is the cause of all these existing -things cannot be any one of them. This Cause, therefore, must not be -considered identical with the good He dispenses, but must be conceived -as the Good in a higher sense, the Good which is above all other goods. - - -THE SOUL MUST BE STRIPPED OF FORM TO BE ILLUMINATED BY PRIMARY NATURE. - -7. Your mind remains in uncertainty because the divinity is none of -these things (that you know). Apply it first to these things, and -later fix it on the divinity. While doing so, do not let yourself -be distracted by anything exterior for the divinity is not in any -definite place, depriving the remainder of its presence, but it is -present wherever there is any person who is capable of entering into -contact therewith. It is absent only for those who cannot succeed -therein. Just as, for other objects, one could not discover what one -seeks by thinking of something else, and as one should not add any -alien thing to the object that is thought if one wishes to identify -oneself therewith; likewise here one must be thoroughly convinced that -it is impossible for any one whose soul contains any alien image to -conceive of the divinity so long as such an image distracts the soul's -attention. It is equally impossible that the soul, at the moment that -she is attentive, and attached to other things, should assume the form -of what is contrary to them. Just as it is said of matter that it must -be absolutely deprived of all qualities to be susceptible of receiving -all forms; likewise, and for a stronger reason, the soul must be -stripped of all form, if she desire to be filled with and illuminated -by the primary nature without any interior hindrance. Thus, having -liberated herself from all exterior things, the soul will entirely -turn to what is most intimate in her; she will not allow herself to be -turned away by any of the surrounding objects and she will put aside -all things, first by the very effect of the state in which she will -find herself, and later by the absence of any conception of form. She -will not even know that she is applying herself to the contemplation of -the One, or that she is united thereto. Then, after having sufficiently -dwelt with it, she will, if she can, come to reveal to others this -heavenly communion. Doubtless it was enjoyment of this communion -that was the basis of the traditional conversation of Minos with -Jupiter.[197] Inspired with the memories of this interview, he made -laws which represented it, because, while he was drawing them up, he -was still under the influence of his union with the divinity. Perhaps -even, in this state, the soul may look down on civil virtues as hardly -worthy of her,[198] inasmuch as she desires to dwell on high; and this -does indeed happen to such as have long contemplated the divinity. - - -ON SELF-KNOWLEDGE DEPENDS RECOGNITION OF DIVINE KINSHIP. - -(In short), the divinity is not outside of any being. On the contrary, -He is present to all beings, though these may be ignorant thereof. -This happens because they are fugitives, wandering outside of Him or -rather, outside of themselves. They cannot reach Him from whom they -are fleeing, nor, having lost themselves, can they find another being. -A son, if angry, and beside himself, is not likely to recognize his -father. But he who will have learnt to know himself will at the same -time discover from where he hails.[199] - - -TO BE ATTACHED TO THE CENTRE CONSTITUTES DIVINITY. - -8. Self-knowledge reveals the fact that the soul's natural movement is -not in a straight line, unless indeed it have undergone some deviation. -On the contrary, it circles around something interior, around a centre. -Now the centre is that from which proceeds the circle, that is, the -soul.[200] The soul will therefore move around the centre, that is, -around the principle from which she proceeds; and, trending towards it, -she will attach herself to it, as indeed all souls should do. The souls -of the divinities ever direct themselves towards it; and that is the -secret of their divinity; for divinity consists in being attached to -the Centre (of all souls). Anyone who withdraws much therefrom is a man -who has remained manifold (that is, who has never become unified), or -who is a brute.[201] - - -THE CELEBRATED SIMILE OF THE MAN WHOSE FEET ARE IN A BATH-TUB. - -Is the centre of the soul then the principle that we are seeking? -Or must we conceive some other principle towards which all centres -radiate? To begin with, it is only by analogy that the words "centre" -and "circle" are used. By saying that the soul is a circle, we do not -mean that she is a geometrical figure, but that in her and around her -subsists primordial nature.[202] (By saying that she has a centre, we -mean that) the soul is suspended from the primary Principle (by the -highest part of her being), especially when she is entirely separated -(from the body). Now, however, as we have a part of our being contained -in the the body, we resemble a man whose feet are plunged in water, -with the rest of his body remaining above it. Raising ourselves above -the body by the whole part which is not immerged, we are by our own -centre reattaching ourselves to the Centre common to all beings, just -in the same way as we make the centres of the great circles coincide -with that of the sphere that surrounds them. If the circles of the -soul were corporeal, the common centre would have to occupy a certain -place for them to coincide with it, and for them to turn around it. But -since the souls are of the order of intelligible (essences), and as -the One is still above Intelligence, we shall have to assert that the -intercourse of the soul with the One operates by means different from -those by which Intelligence unites with the intelligible. This union, -indeed, is much closer than that which is realized between Intelligence -and the intelligible by resemblance or identity; it takes place by the -intimate relationship that unites the soul with unity, without anything -to separate them. Bodies cannot unite mutually;[203] but they could -not hinder the mutual union of incorporeal (essences) because that -which separates them from each other is not a local distance, but their -distinction and difference. When there is no difference between them, -they are present in each other. - - -THE FAMOUS ILLUSTRATION OF THE COSMIC CHORAL BALLET. - -As the One does not contain any difference, He is always present; and -we are ever present to Him as soon as we contain no more difference. -It is not He who is aspiring to us, or who is moving around us; on -the contrary, it is we who are aspiring to Him. Though we always move -around Him, we do not always keep our glance fixed on Him. We resemble -a chorus which always surrounds its leader, but (the members of) which -do not always sing in time because they allow their attention to be -distracted to some exterior object; while, if they turned towards the -leader, they would sing well, and really be with him. Likewise, we -always turn around the One, even when we detach ourselves from Him, and -cease knowing Him. Our glance is not always fixed on the One; but when -we contemplate Him, we attain the purpose of our desires, and enjoy the -rest taught by Heraclitus.[204] Then we disagree no more, and really -form a divine choric ballet around Him. - - -FOLLOWING NUMENIUS, PLOTINOS DESCRIBES THE SUPREME AS GIVER. - -9. In this choric ballet, the soul sees the source of life, the source -of intelligence, the principle of being, the cause of the good, and -the root of love. All these entities are derived from the One without -diminishing Him. He is indeed no corporeal mass; otherwise the things -that are born of Him would be perishable. However, they are eternal, -because their principle ever remains the same, because[205] He does -not divide Himself to produce them, but remains entire. They persist, -just as the light persists so long as the sun remains.[206] Nor are we -separated from the One; we are not distant from Him, though corporeal -nature, by approaching us, has attracted us to it (thus drawing us -away from the One).[207] But it is in the One that we breathe and have -our being.[208] He gave us life not merely at a given moment, only to -leave us later; but His giving is perpetual, so long as He remains what -He is, or rather, so long as we turn towards Him. There it is that -we find happiness, while to withdraw from Him is to fall. It is in -Him that our soul rests; it is by rising to that place free from all -evil that she is delivered from evils; there she really thinks, there -she is impassible, there she really lives. Our present life, in which -we are not united with the divinity, is only a trace or adumbration -of real life. Real life (which is presence with the divinity) is the -actualization of intelligence. It is this actualization of intelligence -which begets the divinities by a sort of silent intercourse with the -One; thereby begetting beauty, justice and virtue. These are begotten -by the soul that is filled with divinity. In Him is her principle -and goal; her principle, because it is from there that she proceeds; -her goal, because there is the good to which she aspires, so that by -returning thither she again becomes what she was. Life here below, in -the midst of sense-objects, is for the soul a degradation, an exile, a -loss of her wings.[209] - - -THE PARABLE OF CUPID AND PSYCHE, LEADING UP TO DIVINIZATION. - -Another proof that our welfare resides up there is the love that is -innate in our souls, as is taught in the descriptions and myths which -represent love as the husband of the soul.[210] In fact, since the -soul, which is different from the divinity, proceeds from Him, she -must necessarily love Him; but when she is on high[211] her love is -celestial; here below, her love is only commonplace; for it is on high -that dwells the celestial Venus (Urania); while here below resides -the vulgar and adulterous Venus.[212] Now every soul is a Venus, as -is indicated by the myth of the birth of Venus and Cupid, who is -supposed to be born simultaneously with her.[213] So long as she -remains faithful to her nature, the soul therefore loves the divinity, -and desires to unite herself to Him, who seems like the noble father -of a bride who has fallen in love with some handsome lover. When -however the soul has descended into generation, deceived by the false -promises of an adulterous lover, she has exchanged her divine love for -a mortal one. Then, at a distance from her father, she yields to all -kinds of excesses. Ultimately, however, she grows ashamed of these -disorders; she purifies herself, she returns to her father, and finds -true happiness with Him. How great her bliss then is can be conceived -by such as have not tasted it only by comparing it somewhat to earthly -love-unions, observing the joy felt by the lover who succeeds in -obtaining her whom he loves. But such mortal and deceptive love is -directed only to phantoms; it soon disappears because the real object -of our love is not these sense-presentations, which are not the good -we are really seeking. On high only is the real object of our love; -the only one with which we could unite or identify ourselves, which we -could intimately possess, because it is not separated from our soul -by the covering of our flesh. This that I say will be acknowledged by -any one who has experienced it; he will know that the soul then lives -another life, that she advances towards the Divinity, that she reaches -Him, possesses Him, and in his condition recognizes the presence of -the Dispenser of the true life. Then she needs nothing more. On the -contrary, she has to renounce everything else to fix herself in the -Divinity alone, to identify herself with Him, and to cut off all that -surrounds Him. We must therefore hasten to issue from here below, -detaching ourselves so far as possible from the body to which we still -have the regret of being chained, making the effort to embrace the -Divinity by our whole being, without leaving in us any part that is not -in contact with Him. Then the soul can see the Divinity and herself, so -far as is possible to her nature. She sees herself shining brilliantly, -filled with intelligible light; or rather, she sees herself as a pure -light, that is subtle and weightless. She becomes divinity, or, rather, -she is divinity. In this condition, the soul is a shining light. If -later she falls back into the sense-world, she is plunged into darkness. - - -WHY DOES THE SOUL AFTER REACHING YONDER NOT STAY THERE? - -10. Why does the soul which has risen on high not stay there? Because -she has not yet entirely detached herself from things here below. But -a time will come when she will uninterruptedly enjoy the vision of the -divinity, that is, when she will no longer be troubled by the passions -of the body. The part of the soul that sees the divinity is not the -one that is troubled (the irrational soul), but the other part (the -rational soul). Now she loses the sight of the divinity when she does -not lose this knowledge which consists in demonstratings, conjectures -and reasonings. In the vision of the divinity, indeed, that which sees -is not the reason, but something prior and superior to reason; if that -which sees be still united to reason, it then is as that which is seen. -When he who sees himself sees, he will see himself as simple, being -united to himself as simple, and will feel himself as simple. We should -not even say that he will see, but only that he will be what he sees, -in case that it would still here be possible to distinguish that which -sees from that which is seen, or to assert that these two things do -not form a single one. This assertion, however, would be rash, for in -this condition he who sees does not, in the strict sense of the word, -see; nor does he imagine two things. He becomes other, he ceases to be -himself, he retains nothing of himself. Absorbed in the divinity, he is -one with it, like a centre that coincides with another centre. While -they coincide, they form but one, though they form two in so far as -they remain distinct. In this sense only do we here say that the soul -is other than the divinity. Consequently this manner of vision is very -difficult to describe. How indeed could we depict as different from -us Him who, while we were contemplating Him, did not seem other than -ourselves, having come into perfect at-one-ment with us? - - -ILLUSTRATION FROM THE SECRECY OF THE MYSTERY-RITES. - -11. That, no doubt, is the meaning of the mystery-rites' injunction not -to reveal their secrets to the uninitiated. As that which is divine is -unspeakable, it is ordered that the initiate should not talk thereof to -any (uninitiated person) who have not had the happiness of beholding it -(the vision). - - -THE TRANCE OR ENTHEASM OF ECSTASY. - -As (this vision of the divinity) did not imply (the existence of) two -things, and as he who was identical to Him whom he saw, so that he -did not see Him, but was united thereto, if anyone could preserve the -memory of what he was while thus absorbed into the Divinity, he would -within himself have a faithful image of the Divinity. Then indeed had -he attained at-one-ment, containing no difference, neither in regard -to himself, nor to other beings. While he was thus transported into -the celestial region, there was within him no activity, no anger, nor -appetite, nor reason, nor even thought. So much the more, if we dare -say so, was he no longer himself, but sunk in trance or enthusiasm, -tranquil and solitary with the divinity, he enjoyed an the calm. -Contained within his own "being," (or, essence), he did not incline to -either side, he did not even turn towards himself, he was indeed in a -state of perfect stability, having thus, so to speak, become stability -itself. - - -ABOVE BEAUTY AND ABOVE VIRTUE THIS ECSTATIC SIMPLIFICATION IS A -COMMUNION. - -In this condition, indeed, the soul busies herself not even with -the beautiful things, for she rises above beauty, and passes beyond -even the (Stoic) "choir of virtues." Thus he who penetrates into -the interior of a sanctuary leaves behind him the statues placed -(at the entrance) of the temple. These indeed are the first objects -that will strike his view on his exit from the sanctuary, after he -shall have enjoyed the interior spectacle, after having entered into -intimate communion, not indeed with an image or statue, which would -be considered only when he comes out, but with the divinity. The very -word "divine spectacle" does not, here, seem sufficient (to express the -contemplation of the soul); it is rather an ecstasy, a simplification, -a self-abandonment, a desire for intercourse, a perfect quietude, and -last, a wish to become indistinguishable from what was contemplated in -the sanctuary.[214] Any one who would seek to see the Divinity in any -other way would be incapable of enjoying His presence. - - -THE SPIRITUAL TRUTH OF THE ANCIENT MYSTERIES. - -By making use of these mysterious figures, wise interpreters wished -to indicate how the divinity might be seen. But the wise hierophant, -penetrating the mystery, may, when he has arrived thither, enjoy -the veritable vision of what is in the sanctuary. If he have not -yet arrived thither, he can at least conceive the invisibility (for -physical sight) of That which is in the sanctuary; he can conceive the -source and principle of everything, and he recognizes it as the one -particular principle worthy of the name. (But when he has succeeded -in entering into the sanctuary) he sees the Principle, enters into -communication with it, unites like to like, leaving aside no divine -thing the soul is capable of acquiring. - - -SUBSEQUENT ECSTATIC EXPERIENCES OF THE SOUL. - -Before obtaining the vision of the divinity, the soul desires what -yet remains to be seen. For him, however, who has risen above all -things, what remains to be seen is He who is above all other things. -Indeed, the nature of the soul will never reach absolute nonentity. -Consequently, when she descends, she will fall into evil, that is, -nonentity, but not into absolute nonentity. Following the contrary -path, she will arrive at something different, namely, herself. From -the fact that she then is not in anything different from herself, -it does not result that she is within anything, for she remains in -herself. That which, without being in essence, remains within itself, -necessarily resides in the divinity. Then it ceases to be "being," -and so far as it comes into communion with the Divinity it grows -superior to "being" (it becomes supra-being). Now he who sees himself -as having become divinity, possesses within himself an image of the -divinity. If he rise above himself, he will achieve the limit of his -ascension, becoming as it were an image that becomes indistinguishable -from its model. Then, when he shall have lost sight of the divinity, -he may still, by arousing the virtue preserved within himself, and -by considering the perfections that adorn his soul, reascend to the -celestial region, by virtue rising to Intelligence, and by wisdom to -the Divinity Himself. - - -THE SOUL'S ULTIMATE FATE IS DETACHMENT AND FLIGHT. - -Such is the life of the divinities; such is also that of divine and -blessed men; detachment from all things here below, scorn of all -earthly pleasures, and flight of the soul towards the Divinity that she -shall see face to face (that is, "alone with the alone," as thought -Numenius).[215] - - - - -FIFTH ENNEAD, BOOK ONE. - -The Three Principal Hypostases, or Forms of Existence. - - -AUDACITY THE CAUSE OF HUMAN APOSTASY FROM THE DIVINITY. - -1. How does it happen that souls forget their paternal divinity? Having -a divine nature, and having originated from the divinity, how could -they ever misconceive the divinity or themselves? The origin of their -evil is "audacity,"[216] generation, the primary diversity, and the -desire to belong to none but themselves.[217] As soon as they have -enjoyed the pleasure of an independent life, and by largely making use -of their power of self-direction, they advanced on the road that led -them astray from their principle, and now they have arrived at such an -"apostasy" (distance) from the Divinity, that they are even ignorant -that they derive their life from Him. Like children that were separated -from their family since birth, and that were long educated away from -home finally lose knowledge of their parents and of themselves, so our -souls, no longer seeing either the divinity or themselves, have become -degraded by forgetfulness of their origin, have attached themselves -to other objects, have admired anything rather than themselves, have -like prodigals scattered their esteem and love on exterior objects, -and have, by breaking the bond that united them to the divinities, -disdainfully wandered away from it. Their ignorance of the divinity -is therefore caused by excessive valuation of external objects, and -their scorn of themselves. The mere admiration and quest after -what is foreign implies, on the soul's part, an acknowledgment of -self-depreciation. As soon as a soul thinks that she is worth less than -that which is born and which perishes, and considers herself as more -despicable and perishable than the object she admires, she could no -longer even conceive of the nature and power of the divinity. - - -CONVERSION IS EFFECTED BY DEPRECIATION OF EXTERNALITIES, AND -APPRECIATION OF THE SOUL HERSELF. - -Souls in such conditions may be converted to the Divinity, and raised -to the supreme Principle, to the One, to the First, by being reasoned -with in two ways. First, they may be led to see the worthlessness of -the objects they at present esteem;[218] then they must be reminded of -the origin and dignity of the soul. The demonstration of the latter -point logically precedes that of the former; and if clearly done, -should support it. - - -KINSHIP OF THE HUMAN SOUL WITH THE DIVINE. - -It is the second point, therefore, that we shall here discuss. It is -related to the study of the object we desire to know; for it is the -soul that desires to know that object. Now the soul must first examine -her own nature in order to know whether she possess the faculty of -contemplating the divinity, if this study be suited to her, and if she -may hope for success therein. For indeed if the soul be foreign to -divine things, the soul has no business to ferret out their nature. If -however a close kinship obtains between them, she both can and should -seek to know them. - - -SOULS ARE DIVINE BECAUSE THE WORLD WAS CREATED BY THE UNIVERSAL SOUL. - -2. This is the first reflection of every soul.[219] By an influx of -the spirit of life, the universal Soul produced all the animals upon -earth, in the air and in the sea, as well as the divine stars, the -sun, and the immense heaven. It was the universal Soul that gave form -to the heavens, and which presides over their regular revolutions; -and she effects all that without mingling with the being to whom -she communicates form, movement and life. The universal Soul is far -superior to all created things. While the latter are born or die in -the measure that she imparts to them, or withdraws from them their -life, she herself is "being" and eternal life, because she could not -cease being herself. To understand how life can simultaneously be -imparted to the universe and to each individual, we must contemplate -the universal Soul. To rise to this contemplation, the soul must be -worthy of it by nobility, must have liberated herself from error, and -must have withdrawn from the objects that fascinate the glances of -worldly souls, must have immersed herself in a profound meditation, -and she must have succeeded in effecting the silence not only of the -agitations of the body that enfolds her, and the tumult of sensations, -but also of all that surrounds her. Therefore let silence be kept -by all--namely, earth, air, sea, and even heaven. Then let the soul -represent to herself the great Soul which, from all sides, overflows -into this immovable mass, spreading within it, penetrating into it -intimately, illuminating it as the rays of the sun light and gild a -dark cloud. Thus the universal Soul, by descending into this world -redeemed this great body from the inertia in which it lay, imparting to -it movement, life and immortality. Eternally moved by an intelligent -power, heaven became a being full of life and felicity. The presence -of the Soul made an admirable whole from what before was no more than -in inert corpse, water and earth, or rather, darkness of matter, which, -as Homer[220] says, was an "object of horror for the divinities." - - -SOUL-POWER REVEALED IN THE SIMULTANEITY OF CONTROL OVER THE WORLD. - -The nature and power of the Soul reveal themselves still more -gloriously in the way she embraces and governs the world at will. She -is present in every point of this immense body, she animates all its -parts, great and small. Though these may be located in different parts, -she does not divide as they do, she does not split up to vivify each -individual. She vivifies all things simultaneously, ever remaining -whole and indivisible, resembling the intelligence from which she was -begotten by her unity and universality.[221] It is her power which -contains this world of infinite magnitude and variety within the bonds -of unity. Only because of the presence of the Soul are heaven, sun, and -stars divinities; only because of her are we anything; for "a corpse is -viler than the vilest dung-hill."[222] - - -AS LIFE TRANSFIGURES MATTER, SO THE UNIVERSAL SOUL GLORIFIES US. - -But if the deities owe their divinity to the universal Soul, she -herself must be a divinity still more venerable. Now our soul is -similar to the universal Soul. Strip her of all coverings, consider her -in her pristine purity, and you will see how precious is the nature of -the soul, how superior she is to everything that is body.[223] Without -the soul, no body is anything but earth. Even if you add to earth fire, -water and air, still there is nothing that need claim your veneration. -If it be the Soul that imparts beauty to the body, why should we -forget the souls within ourselves, while prostituting our admiration on -other objects? If it be the soul that you admire in them, why do you -not admire her within yourselves? - - -THE SOUL AS THE HYPOSTATIC ACTUALIZATION OF INTELLIGENCE. - -3. Since the nature of the Soul is so divine and precious, you may -be assured of being able to reach the divinity through her; with her -you can ascend to Him. You will not need to search for Him far from -yourself; nor will there be several intermediaries between yourself and -Him. To reach Him, take as guide the divinest and highest part of the -Soul, the power from which she proceeds, and by which she impinges on -the intelligible world. Indeed, in spite of the divinity which we have -attributed to her, the Soul is no more than an image of Intelligence. -As the exterior word (speech) is the image of the (interior) word (of -thought?) of the soul, the Soul herself is the word and actualization -of Intelligence.[224] She is the life which escapes from Intelligence -to form another hypostatic form of existence, just as the fire contains -the latent heat which constitutes its essence ("being"), and also -the heat that radiates from it outside. Nevertheless, the Soul does -not entirely issue from within Intelligence; she does partly reside -therein, but also forms (a nature) distinct therefrom. As the Soul -proceeds from Intelligence, she is intelligible; and the manifestation -of her intellectual power is discursive reason. From Intelligence -the Soul derives her perfection, as well as her existence; only in -comparison with Intelligence does the Soul seem imperfect. The Soul, -therefore, is the hypostatic substance that proceeds from Intelligence, -and when the Soul contemplates Intelligence the soul is reason -actualized. Indeed, while the soul contemplates Intelligence, the Soul -intimately possesses the things she thinks; from her own resources she -draws the actualizations she produces; these intellectual and pure -actualizations are indeed the Soul's only characteristic activities. -Those of an inferior nature really proceed from a foreign principle; -they are passions. - - -THE SOUL'S RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE IS THAT OF MATTER TO FORM. - -Intelligence therefore, makes the Soul diviner, because Intelligence -(as a father) begets the Soul, and grants its (helpful) presence to -the Soul. Nothing intervenes between them but the distinction between -their natures. The Soul is to Intelligence in the same relation as -that obtaining between form and matter.[225] Now the very matter of -Intelligence is beautiful, because it has an intellectual form, and is -simple. How great then, must Intelligence be, if it be still greater -than the Soul. - - -THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD IS THE ARCHETYPE OF OURS. - -4. The dignity of Intelligence may be appreciated in still another way. -After having admired the magnitude and beauty of the sense-world, the -eternal regularity of its movement, the visible or hidden divinities, -the animals and plants it contains, we may (taking our direction from -all this), rise to this world's archetype, a more real World. There -we may contemplate all the intelligible entities which are as eternal -as the intelligible world, and which there subsist within perfect -knowledge and life. There preside pure intelligence and ineffable -wisdom; there is located the real Saturnian realm,[226] which is -nothing else than pure intelligence. This indeed embraces every -immortal essence, every intelligence, every divinity, every soul; -everything there is eternal and immutable. Since its condition is -blissful, why should Intelligence change? Since it contains everything, -why should it aspire to anything? Since it is sovereignly perfect, -what need of development would it have? Its perfection is so much -completer, since it contains nothing but perfect things, and since -it thinks them; it thinks them, not because it seeks to know them, -but because it possesses them.[227] Its felicity is not in any way -contingent on anything else; itself is true eternity, of which time -furnishes a moving image of the sphere of the soul. Indeed, the soul's -action is successive, and divided by the different objects that attract -its attention. Now it thinks Socrates, and then it thinks a horse; -never does it grasp but one part of reality, while intelligence always -embraces all things simultaneously. Intelligence, therefore, possesses -all things immovable in identity. It is; it never has anything but the -present;[228] it has no future, for it already is all it could ever -later become; it has no past, for no intelligible entity ever passes -away; all of them subsist in an eternal present, all remain identical, -satisfied with their present condition. Each one is both intelligence -and existence; all together, they are universal Intelligence, universal -Existence. - - -ABOVE INTELLIGENCE AND EXISTENCE IS THEIR SIMULTANEOUS PRINCIPLE. - -Intelligence exists (as intelligence) because it thinks existence. -Existence exists (as existence) because, on being thought, it makes -intelligence exist and thinks.[229] There must therefore exist -something else which makes intelligence think, and existence exist, -and which consequently is their common principle. In existence they -are contemporaneous and substantial, and can never fail each other. -As intelligence and existence constitute a duality, their common -principle in this consubstantial unity that they form, and which is -simultaneously existence and intelligence, the thinking subject and -the object thought; intelligence as thinking subject, and existence -as object thought; for thought simultaneously implies difference and -identity. - - -THE SIX CATEGORIES FROM WHICH ALL THINGS ARE DERIVED. - -The first principles, therefore, are existence and intelligence, -identity and difference, movement and rest.[230] Rest is the condition -of identity; movement is the condition of thought, since the latter -presupposes the differences of the thinking subject and of the object -thought, and because it is silent if reduced to unity. The elements -of thought (subject and object) must thus stand in the relation -of differences, but also in that of unity, because they form a -consubstantial unity, and because there is a common element in all that -is derived therefrom. Besides, here difference is nothing else than -distinction. The plurality formed by elements of thought constitutes -quantity and number;[231] and the characteristic of every element, -quality.[232] From these first principles (the categories, that are the -genera of being) all things are derived. - - -THE SOUL AS NUMBER CONNECTED WITH INTELLIGENCE. - -5. Thus the human soul is full of this divinity (of Intelligence); -she is connected therewith by these (categories), unless the soul -(purposely) withdraws from (that intelligence). The Soul approaches -Intelligence, and thus having been unified, the Soul wonders, 'Who -has begotten this unity?' It must be He who is simple, who is prior -to all multiplicity, who imparts to Intelligence its existence and -manifoldness, and who consequently produces number. Number, indeed, -is not something primitive; for the One is prior to the "pair." The -latter ranks only second, being begotten and defined by unity, by -itself being indefinite. As soon as it is defined, it is a number in -so far as it is a "being"; for these are the grounds on which the Soul -also is a number.[233] - - -THOUGHT IS ACTUALIZATION OF SIGHT, AND BOTH FORM BUT ONE THING. - -Besides everything that is a mass or a magnitude could not occupy -the first rank in nature; those gross objects which are by sensation -considered beings must be ranked as inferior. In seeds, it is not the -moist element that should be valued, but the invisible principle, -number, and the (seminal) reason. Number and "pair" are only names -for the reasons (ideas) and intelligence. The "pair" is indeterminate -so far as it plays the part of substrate (in respect to unity). The -number that is derived from the pair, and the one, constitute every -kind of form, so that Intelligence has a shape which is determined by -the ideas[234] begotten within it. Its shape is derived in one respect -from the one, and in another respect, from itself, just like actualized -sight. Thought, indeed, is actualized sight, and both these entities -(the faculty and the actualization) form but one. - - -MYSTERY OR DERIVATION OF SECOND FROM FIRST. - -6. How does Intelligence see, and what does it see? How did the Second -issue from the First, how was it born from the First, so as that the -Second might see the First? For the soul now understands that these -principles must necessarily exist. She seeks to solve the problem often -mooted by ancient philosophers. "If the nature of the One be such as -we have outlined, how does everything derive its hypostatic substance -(or, form of existence), manifoldness, duality, and number from the -First? Why did the First not remain within Himself, why did He allow -the leakage of manifoldness seen in all beings, and which we are -seeking to trace back to the First?" We shall tell it. But we must, to -begin with, invoke the Divinity, not by the utterance of words, but by -raising our souls to Him in prayer. Now the only way to pray is (for -a person), when alone, to advance towards the One, who is entirely -alone. To contemplate Unity, we must retire to our inner sanctuary, -and there remain tranquil above all things (in ecstasy); then we must -observe the statues which as it were are situated outside of (soul and -intelligence), and in front of everything, the statue that shines in -the front rank (Unity), contemplating it in a manner suitable to its -nature (in the mysteries).[235] - - -GENERATION IS THE RADIATION OF AN IMAGE. - -All that is moved must have a direction towards which it is moved; we -must therefore conclude that that which has no direction towards which -it is moved must be at a stand-still, and that anything born of this -principle must be born without causing this principle to cease being -turned towards itself. We must, however, remove from our mind the idea -of a generation operated within time, for we are here treating of -eternal things. When we apply to them the conception of generation, -we mean only a relation of causality and effect. What is begotten by -the One must be begotten by Him without any motion on the part of -the One; if He were moved, that which was begotten from Him would, -because of this movement, be ranked third, instead of second.[236] -Therefore, since the One is immovable, He produces the hypostatic -(form of existence) which is ranked second, without volition, consent, -or any kind of movement. What conception are we then to form of this -generation of Intelligence by this immovable Cause? It is a radiation -of light which escapes without disturbing its quietness, like the -splendor which emanates perpetually from the sun, without affecting -its quietness, which surrounds it without leaving it. Thus all things, -in so far as they remain within existence, necessarily draw from -their own essence ("being") and produce externally a certain nature -that depends on their power, and that is the image of the archetype -from which it is derived.[237] Thus does fire radiate heat; thus snow -spreads cold. Perfumes also furnish a striking example of this process; -so long as they last, they emit exhalations in which everything that -surrounds them participates. Everything that has arrived to its point -of perfection begets something. That which is eternally perfect begets -eternally; and that which it begets is eternal though inferior to -the generating principle. What then should we think of Him who is -supremely perfect? Does He not beget? On the contrary, He begets that -which, after Him, is the greatest. Now that which, after Him, is the -most perfect, is the second rank principle, Intelligence. Intelligence -contemplates Unity, and needs none but Him; but the Unity has no need -of Intelligence. That which is begotten by the Principle superior -to Intelligence can be nothing if not Intelligence; for it is the -best after the One, since it is superior to all other beings. The -Soul, indeed, is the word and actualization of Intelligence, just as -Intelligence is word and actualization of the One. But the Soul is an -obscure word. Being an image of Intelligence, she must contemplate -Intelligence, just as the latter, to subsist, must contemplate the -One. Intelligence contemplates the One, not because of any separation -therefrom, but only because it is after the One. There is no -intermediary between the One and Intelligence, any more than between -Intelligence and the Soul. Every begotten being desires to unite -with the principle that begets it, and loves it, especially when the -begetter and the begotten are alone. Now when the begetter is supremely -perfect, the begotten must be so intimately united to Him as to be -separated from Him only in that it is distinct from Him. - - -INTELLIGIBLE REST IS THE DETERMINATION AND FORM BY WHICH THEY SUBSIST. - -7. We call Intelligence the image of the One. Let us explain this. -It is His image because Intelligence is, in a certain respect, -begotten by Unity, because Intelligence possesses much of the nature -of its father, and because Intelligence resembles Him as light -resembles the sun. But the One is not Intelligence; how then can the -hypostatic (form of existence) begotten by the One be Intelligence? -By its conversion towards the One, Intelligence sees Him; now it is -this vision[238] which constitutes Intelligence. Every faculty that -perceives another being is sensation or intelligence; but sensation -is similar to a straight line, while intelligence resembles a -circle.[239] Nevertheless, the circle is divisible, while Intelligence -is indivisible; it is one, but, while being one, it also is the -power of all things. Now thought considers all these things (of -which Intelligence is the power), by separating itself, so to speak, -from this power; otherwise, Intelligence would not exist. Indeed, -Intelligence has a consciousness of the reach of its power, and this -consciousness constitutes its nature. Consequently, Intelligence -determines its own nature by the means of the power it derived from -the One; and at the same time Intelligence sees that its nature -("being") is a part of the entities which belong to the One, and that -proceed from Him. Intelligence sees that it owes all its force to the -One, and that it is due to Him that Intelligence has the privilege of -being a "being" (or, essence). Intelligence sees that, as it itself -is divisible, it derives from the One, which is indivisible, all the -entities it possesses, life and thought; because the One is not any of -these things. Everything indeed is derived from the One, because it is -not contained in a determinate form; it simply is the One, while in the -order of beings Intelligence is all things. Consequently the One is not -any of the things that Intelligence contains; it is only the principle -from which all of them are derived. That is why they are "being," for -they are already determined, and each has a kind of shape. Existence -should be contemplated, not in indetermination, but on the contrary in -determination and rest. Now, for Intelligible entities, rest consists -in determination, and shape by which they subsist. - - -MYTHS OF SATURN, JUPITER AND RHEA. - -The Intelligence that deserves to be called the purest intelligence, -therefore, cannot have been born from any source, other than the first -Principle. It must, from its birth, have begotten all beings, all the -beauty of ideas, all the intelligible deities; for it is full of the -things it has begotten; it devours them in the sense that it itself -retains all of them, that it does not allow them to fall into matter, -nor be born of Rhea.[240] That is the meaning of the mysteries and -myths; "Saturn, the wisest of the divinities, was born before Jupiter, -and devoured his children." Here Saturn represents intelligence, big -with its conceptions, and perfectly pure.[241] They add, "Jupiter, as -soon as he was grown, in his turn begat." As soon as Intelligence is -perfect, it begets the Soul, by the mere fact of its being perfect, -and because so great a power cannot remain sterile. Here again the -begotten being had to be inferior to its principle, had to represent -its image, had, by itself, to be indeterminate, and had later to be -determined and formed by the principle that begat it. What Intelligence -begets is a reason, a hypostatic form of existence whose nature it -is to reason. The latter moves around Intelligence; is the light that -surrounds it, the ray that springs from it. On the one hand it is bound -to Intelligence, fills itself with it; enjoys it, participates in it, -deriving its intellectual operations from it. On the other hand, it is -in contact with inferior things, or rather, begets them. Being thus -begotten by the Soul, these things are necessarily less good than the -Soul, as we shall further explain. The sphere of divine things ends -with the Soul. - - -PLATO TEACHES THREE SPHERES OF EXISTENCE.[242] - -8. This is how Plato establishes three degrees in the hierarchy -of being[243]: "Everything is around the king of all." He is here -speaking of first rank entities. He adds, "What is of the second order -is around the second principle; and what is of the third order is -around the third principle." Plato[244] further says that "God is the -father of the cause." By cause, he means Intelligence; for, in the -system of Plato, it is Intelligence which plays the part of demiurgic -creator. Plato adds that it is this power that forms the Soul in the -cup.[245] As the cause is intelligence, Plato applies the name of -father to the absolute Good, the principle superior to Intelligence and -superior to "Being." In several passages he calls the Idea "existence -and intelligence." He therefore really teaches that Intelligence is -begotten from the Good, and the Soul from Intelligence. This teaching, -indeed, is not new; it has been taught from the most ancient times, but -without being brought out in technical terms. We claim to be no more -than the interpreters of the earlier philosophers, and to show by the -very testimony of Plato that they held the same views as we do. - - -THIS DOCTRINE TAUGHT BY PARMENIDES. - -The first philosopher who taught this was Parmenides, who identified -Existence and Intelligence, and who does not place existence among -sense-objects, "for, thought is the same thing as existence."[246] -He adds[247] that existence is immovable, although being thought. -Parmenides thus denies all corporeal movement in existence, so as that -it might always remain the same. Further, Parmenides[248] compares -existence to a sphere, because it contains everything, drawing thought -not from without, but from within itself. When Parmenides, in his -writings, mentions the One, he means the cause, as if he recognized -that this unity (of the intelligible being) implied manifoldness. -In the dialogue of Plato he speaks with greater accuracy, and -distinguishes three principles: the First, the absolute One; the -second, the manifold one; the third, the one and the manifold. He -therefore, as we do, reaches three natures. - - -ANAXAGORAS TEACHES THE SAME THING. - -9. Anaxagoras, who teaches a pure and unmingled Intelligence[249] -also insists that the first Principle is simple, and that the One is -separated from sense-objects. But, as he lived in times too ancient, he -has not treated this matter in sufficient detail. - - -HERACLITUS ALSO TAUGHT THE SAME THING. - -Heraclitus also taught the eternal and intelligible One; for Heraclitus -holds that bodies are ceaselessly "becoming" (that is, developing), and -that they are in a perpetual state of flux.[250] - - -EMPEDOCLES TAUGHT THE SAME THING. - -In the system of Empedocles, discord divides, and concord unites; now -this second principle is posited as incorporeal, and the elements play -the part of matter.[251] - - -ARISTOTLE TAUGHT THE SAME THING. - -Aristotle, who lived at a later period, says that the First Principle -is separated from (sense-objects), and that it is intelligible.[252] -But when Aristotle says that He thinks himself, Aristotle degrades Him -from the first rank. Aristotle also asserts the existence of other -intelligible entities in a number equal to the celestial spheres, -so that each one of them might have a principle of motion. About -the intelligible entities, therefore, Aristotle advances a teaching -different from that of Plato, and as he has no plausible reason for -this change, he alleges necessity. A well-grounded objection might here -be taken against him. It seems more reasonable to suppose that all the -spheres co-ordinated in a single system should, all of them, stand -in relation to the One and the First. About Aristotle's views this -question also might be raised: do the intelligible entities depend on -the One and First, or are there several principles for the intelligible -entities? If the intelligible entities depend on the One, they will -no doubt be arranged symmetrically, as, in the sense-sphere, are the -spheres, each of which contains another, and of which a single One, -exterior to the others, contains them, and dominates them all. Thus, in -this case, the first intelligible entity will contain all entities up -there, and will be the intelligible world. Just as the spheres are not -empty, as the first is full of stars, and as each of the others also -is full of them, so above their motors will contain many entities, and -everything will have a more real existence. On the other hand, if each -of the intelligible entities is a principle, all will be contingent. -How then will they unite their action, and will they, by agreement, -contribute in producing a single effect, which is the harmony of -heaven? Why should sense-objects, in heaven, equal in number their -intelligible motors? Again, why are there several of these, since they -are incorporeal, and since no matter separates them from each other? - - -WHAT THE PYTHAGOREANS TAUGHT ON THE SUBJECT. - -Among ancient philosophers, those who most faithfully followed the -doctrine of Pythagoras, of his disciples, and of Pherecydes, have -specially dealt with the intelligible.[253] Some of them have committed -their opinions to their written works; others have set them forth only -in discussions that have not been preserved in writing. There are -others of them, also, who have left us nothing on the subject. - - -TO THE THREE PRINCIPLES IN THE UNIVERSE MUST CORRESPOND THREE -PRINCIPLES IN US. - -10. Above existence, therefore, is the One. This has by us been -proved as far as could reasonably be expected, and as far as such -subjects admit of demonstration. In the second rank are Existence and -Intelligence; in the third, the Soul. But if these three principles, -the One, Intelligence, and the Soul, as we have said, obtain in nature, -three principles must also obtain within us. I do not mean that -these three principles are in sense-objects, for they are separate -therefrom; they are outside of the sense-world, as the three divine -principles are outside of the celestial sphere, and, according to -Plato's expression,[254] they constitute the "the interior man." -Our soul, therefore, is something divine; it has a nature different -(from sense-nature), which conforms to that of the universal Soul. -Now the perfect Soul possesses intelligence; but we must distinguish -between the intelligence that reasons (the discursive reason), and -the Intelligence that furnishes the principles of reasoning (pure -intelligence). The discursive reason of the soul has no need, for -operation, of any bodily organ;[255] in its operations, it preserves -all its purity, so that it is capable of reasoning purely. When -separated from the body, it must, without any hesitation, be ranked -with highest intellectual entities. There is no need of locating it -in space; for, if it exist within itself, outside of body, in an -immaterial condition, it is evidently not mingled with the body, and -has none of its nature. Consequently Plato[256] says, "The divinity -has spread the Soul around the world." What he here means is that -a part of the Soul remains in the intelligible world. Speaking of -our soul he also says, "she hides her head in heaven."[257] He also -advises us to wean the soul from the body; and he does not refer to -any local separation, which nature alone could establish. He means -that the soul must not incline towards the body, must not abandon -herself to the phantoms of imagination, and must not, thus, become -alienated from reason. He means that the soul should try to elevate -to the intelligible world her lower part which is established in the -sense-world, and which is occupied in fashioning the body.[258] - - -THERE MUST BE AN OBJECTIVE JUSTICE AND BEAUTY TO WHICH WE ARE -INTIMATELY UNITED. - -11. Since the rational soul makes judgments about what is just or -beautiful, and decides whether some object is beautiful, whether such -an action be just, there must exist an immutable justice and beauty -from which discursive reason draws its principles.[259] Otherwise, how -could such reasonings take place? If the soul at times reasons about -justice and beauty, but at times does not reason about them, we must -possess within ourselves the intelligence which, instead of reasoning, -ever possesses justice and beauty; further, we must within us possess -the cause and Principle of Intelligence, the Divinity, which is not -divisible, which subsists, not in any place, but in Himself; who is -contemplated by a multitude of beings, by each of the beings fitted -to receive Him, but which remains distinct from these beings, just as -the centre subsists within itself, while all the radii come from the -circumference to centre themselves in it.[260] Thus we ourselves, by -one of the parts of ourselves, touch the divinity, unite ourselves with -Him and are, so to speak, suspended from Him; and we are founded upon -Him (we are "edified" by Him) when we turn towards Him. - - -THESE PRINCIPLES LAST EVER; EVEN THOUGH WE ARE DISTRACTED FROM THEM. - -12. How does it happen that we possess principles that are so elevated, -almost in spite of ourselves, and for the most part without busying -ourselves about them? For there are even men who never notice them. -Nevertheless these principles, that is, intelligence, and the principle -superior to intelligence, which ever remains within itself (that is, -the One), these two principles are ever active. The case is similar -with the soul. She is always in motion; but the operations that go -on within her are not always perceived; they reach us only when they -succeed in making themselves felt. When the faculty that is active -within us does not transmit its action to the power that feels, this -action is not communicated to the entire soul; however, we may not be -conscious thereof because, although we possess sensibility, it is not -this power, but the whole soul that constitutes the man.[261] So long -as life lasts, each power of the soul exercises its proper function by -itself; but we know it only when communication and perception occur. In -order to perceive the things within us, we have to turn our perceptive -faculties towards them, so that (our soul) may apply her whole -attention thereto.[262] The person that desires to hear one sound -must neglect all others, and listen carefully on its approach. Thus we -must here close our senses to all the noises that besiege us, unless -necessity force us to hear them, and to preserve our perceptive faculty -pure and ready to listen to the voices that come from above. - - - - -FIFTH ENNEAD, BOOK TWO. - -Of Generation, and of the Order of things that Rank Next After the -First. - - -WHY FROM UNITY THIS MANIFOLD WORLD WAS ABLE TO COME FORTH. - -1. The One is all things, and is none of these things. The Principle -of all things cannot be all things.[263] It is all things only in the -sense that all things coexist within it. But in it, they "are" not yet, -but only "will be."[264] How then could the manifoldness of all beings -issue from the One, which is simple and identical, which contains no -diversity or duality? It is just because nothing is contained within -it, that everything can issue from it.[265] In order that essence -might exist, the One could not be (merely) essence, but had to be the -'father' of essence, and essence had to be its first-begotten. As the -One is perfect, and acquires nothing, and has no need or desire, He -has, so to speak, superabounded, and this superabundance has produced a -different nature.[266] This different nature of the One turned towards -Him, and by its conversion, arrived at the fulness (of essence). Then -it had the potentiality of contemplating itself, and thus determined -itself as Intelligence. Therefore, by resting near the One, it became -Essence; and by contemplating itself, became Intelligence. Then by -fixing itself within itself to contemplate itself, it simultaneously -became Essence-and-Intelligence. - - -BY SIMILAR EFFUSION OF SUPERABUNDANCE INTELLIGENCE CREATED THE SOUL. - -Just like the One, it was by effusion of its power that Intelligence -begat something similar to itself. Thus from Intelligence emanated an -image, just as Intelligence emanated from the One. The actualization -that proceeds from Essence (and Intelligence) is the universal -Soul. She is born of Intelligence, and determines herself without -Intelligence issuing from itself, just as Intelligence itself proceeded -from the One without the One ceasing from His repose. - - -SIMILARLY THE UNIVERSAL SOUL, BY PROCESSION, BEGETS NATURE. - -Nor does the universal Soul remain at rest, but enters in motion to -beget an image of herself. On the one hand, it is by contemplation of -the principle from which she proceeds that she achieves fulness; on the -other hand, it is by advancing on a path different from, and opposed -to (the contemplation of Intelligence), that she begets an image of -herself, sensation, and the nature of growth.[268] Nevertheless, -nothing is detached or separated from the superior principle which -begets her. Thus the human soul seems to reach down to within that -of (plant) growth.[269] She descends therein inasmuch as the plant -derives growth from her. Nevertheless it is not the whole soul that -passes into the plant. Her presence there is limited to her descent -towards the lower region, and in so far as she produces another -hypostatic substance, by virtue of her procession, which occurs by her -condescension to care for the things below her. But the higher part of -the Soul, that which depends on Intelligence, allows the Intelligence -to remain within itself.... - -What[270] then does the soul which is in the plant do? Does she not -beget anything? She begets the plant in which she resides. This we -shall have to study from another standpoint. - - -PROCESSION IS UNIVERSAL FROM HIGHEST TO LOWEST. - -2. We may say that there is a procession from the First to the last; -and in this procession each occupies its proper place. The begotten -(being) is subordinated to the begetting (being). On the other hand, -it becomes similar to the thing to which it attaches, so long as it -remains attached thereto. When the soul passes into the plant, there -is one of her parts that unites thereto (the power of growth); but -besides, it is only the most audacious[271] and the most senseless -part of her that descends so low. When the soul passes into the brute, -it is because she is drawn thereto by the predominance of the power -of sensation.[272] When she passes into man, it is because she is led -to do so by the exercise of discursive reason, either by the movement -by which she proceeds from Intelligence, because the soul has a -characteristic intellectual power, and consequently has the power to -determine herself to think, and in general, to act. - - -THE SOUL IS NOWHERE BUT IN A PRINCIPLE THAT IS EVERYWHERE AND NOWHERE. - -Now, let us retrace our steps. When we cut the twigs or the branches -of a tree, where goes the plant-soul that was in them? She returns to -her principle,[273] for no local difference separates her therefrom. -If we cut or burn the root, whither goes the power of growth present -therein? It returns to the plant-power of the universal Soul, which -does not change place, and does not cease being where it was. It ceases -to be where it was only when returning to its principle; otherwise, it -passes into another plant; for it is not obliged to contract, or to -retire within itself. If, on the contrary, it retire, it retires within -the superior power.[274] Where, in her turn, does the latter reside? -Within Intelligence, and without changing, location; for the Soul is -not within any location, and Intelligence still less. Thus the Soul is -nowhere; she is in a principle which, being nowhere, is everywhere.[275] - - -THE SOUL MAY REMAIN IN AN INTERMEDIATE LIFE. - -If, while returning to superior regions, the soul stops before reaching -the highest, she leads a life of intermediary nature.[276] - - -ALL THESE THINGS ARE IN INTELLIGENCE, WITHOUT CONSTITUTING IT. - -All these entities (the universal Soul and her images) are -Intelligence, though none of them constitutes Intelligence. They are -Intelligence in this respect, that they proceed therefrom. They are -not Intelligence in this respect that only by dwelling within itself -Intelligence has given birth to them.[277] - - -THE WHOLE UNIVERSE IS ONE IMMENSE CONCATENATION OF ALL THINGS. - -Thus, in the universe, life resembles an immense chain in which every -being occupies a point, begetting the following being, and begotten by -the preceding one, and ever distinct, but not separate from the (upper) -generating Being, and the (lower) begotten being into which it passes -without being absorbed. - - - - -SECOND ENNEAD, BOOK FOUR. - -Of Matter. - - -MATTER AS SUBSTRATE AND RESIDENCE OF FORMS. - -1. Matter is a substrate (or subject) underlying nature, as thought -Aristotle,[278] and a residence for forms. Thus much is agreed upon by -all authors who have studied matter, and who have succeeded in forming -a clear idea of this kind of nature; but further than this, there is no -agreement. Opinions differ as to whether matter is an underlying nature -(as thought Aristotle),[279] as to its receptivity, and to what it is -receptive. - - -THE STOIC CONCEPTION OF MATTER. - -(The Stoics, who condensed Aristotle's categories to four, substrate, -quality-mode and relation),[280] who admit the existence of nothing -else than bodies, acknowledge no existence other than that contained -by bodies. They insist that there is but one kind of matter, which -serves as substrate to the elements, and that it constitutes "being"; -that all other things are only affections ("passions") of matter, or -modified matter: as are the elements. The teachers of this doctrine do -not hesitate to introduce this matter into the (very nature of the) -divinities, so that their supreme divinity is no more than modified -matter.[281] Besides, of matter they make a body, calling it a -"quantityless body," still attributing to it magnitude. - - -MATTER ACCORDING TO THE PYTHAGOREANS, PLATONISTS AND ARISTOTELIANS. - -Others (Pythagoreans, Platonists and Aristotelians) insist that matter -is incorporeal. Some even distinguish two kinds of matter, first, the -(Stoic) substrate of bodies, mentioned above; the other matter being of -a superior nature, the substrate of forms and incorporeal beings. - - -THE ARISTOTELIAN INTELLIGIBLE MATTER. - -2. Let us first examine whether this (latter intelligible) matter -exists, how it exists, and what it is. If (the nature) of matter -be something indeterminate, and shapeless, and if in the perfect -(intelligible beings) there must not be anything indeterminate or -shapeless, it seems as if there could not be any matter in the -intelligible world. As every (being) is simple, it could not have any -need of matter which, by uniting with something else, constitutes -something composite. Matter is necessary in begotten beings, which make -one thing arise out of another; for it is such beings that have led to -the conception of matter (as thought Aristotle).[282] It may however be -objected that in unbegotten beings matter would seem useless. Whence -could it have originated to enter in (among intelligible beings), -and remain there? If it were begotten, it must have been so by some -principle; if it be eternal, it must have had several principles; in -which case the beings that occupy the first rank would seem to be -contingent. Further, if (in those beings) form come to join matter, -their union will constitute a body, so that the intelligible (entities) -will be corporeal. - - -INTELLIGIBLE MATTER IS NOT SHAPELESS. - -3. To this it may first be answered that the indeterminate should not -be scorned everywhere, nor that which is conceived of as shapeless, -even if this be the substrate of the higher and better entities; for -we might call even the soul indeterminate, in respect to intelligence -and reason, which give it a better shape and nature. Besides, when -we say that intelligible things are composite (of matter and form), -this is not in the sense in which the word is used of bodies. Even -reasons would thus be called composite, and by their actualization -form another alleged composite, nature, which aspires to form. If, -in the intelligible world, the composite tend toward some other -principle, or depend thereon, the difference between this composite -and bodies is still better marked. Besides, the matter of begotten -things ceaselessly changes form, while the matter of the intelligible -entities ever remains identical. Further, matter here below is subject -to other conditions (than in the intelligible world). Here below, -indeed, matter is all things only partly, and is all things only -successively; consequently, amidst these perpetual changes nothing is -identical, nothing is permanent. Above, on the contrary, matter is all -things simultaneously, and possessing all things, could not transform -itself. Consequently, matter is never shapeless above; for it is not -even shapeless here below. Only the one (intelligible matter) is -situated differently from the other (sense-matter). Whether, however, -(intelligible matter) be begotten, or be eternal, is a question that -cannot be determined until we know what it is. - - -THE NATURE OF IDEAS IMPLIES AN INDIVIDUAL FORM, WHICH AGAIN IMPLIES A -SUBSTRATE. - -4. Granting now the existence of ideas, whose reality has been -demonstrated elsewhere,[283] we must draw their legitimate -consequences. Necessarily ideas have something in common, inasmuch as -they are manifold; and since they differ from each other, they must -also have something individual. Now the individuality of any idea, -the difference that distinguishes it from any other, consists of its -particular shape. But form, to be received, implies a substrate, that -might be determined by the difference. There is therefore always a -matter that receives form, and there is always a substrate (even in -ideas, whose matter is genus, and whose form is its difference). - - -RELYING ON THE PUN BETWEEN WORLD AND ADORNMENT, PLOTINOS CONCLUDES -THAT IF THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD BE THE IMAGE OF THIS, IT MUST ALSO BE A -COMPOSITE OF FORM AND MATTER. - -Besides, our world is an image of the intelligible world. Now as our -world is a composite of matter (and form), there must be matter also on -high (that is, in the intelligible world). Otherwise, how could we call -the intelligible world "kosmos" (that is, either world, or adornment), -unless we see matter (receiving) form therein? How could we find form -there, without (a residence) that should receive it? That world is -indivisible, taken in an absolute sense; but in a relative sense, is it -divisible? Now if its parts be distinct from each other, their division -or distinction is a passive modification of matter; for what can be -divided, must be matter. If the multitude of ideals constitute an -indivisible being, this multitude, which resides in a single being, has -this single being as substrate, that is, as matter and is its shapes. -This single, yet varied substrate conceives of itself as shapeless, -before conceiving of itself as varied. If then by thought you abstract -from it variety, forms, reasons, and intelligible characteristics, that -which is prior is indeterminate and shapeless; then there will remain -in this (subject) none of the things that are in it and with it. - - -THE BOTTOM OF EVERYTHING IS MATTER, WHICH IS RELATIVE DARKNESS. - -5. If, we were to conclude that there were no matter in intelligible -entities, because they were immutable, and because, in them, matter is -always combined with (shape), we would be logically compelled to deny -the existence of matter in bodies; for the matter of bodies always -has a form, and every body is always complete (containing a form -and a matter). Each body, however, is none the less composite, and -intelligence observes its doubleness; for it splits until it arrives to -simplicity, namely, to that which can no longer be decomposed; it does -not stop until it reaches the bottom things. Now the bottom of each -thing is matter. Every matter is dark, because the reason (the form) -is the light, and because intelligence is the reason.[284] When, in an -object, intelligence considers the reason, it considers as dark that -which is below reason, or light. Likewise, the eye, being luminous, -and directing its gaze on light and on the colors which are kinds of -light, considers what is beneath, and hidden by the colors, as dark and -material. - - -INTELLIGIBLE MATTER CONSISTS OF REAL BEING, ESPECIALLY AS SHAPED. - -Besides, there is a great difference between the dark bottom of -intelligible things and that of sense-objects; there is as much -difference between the matter of the former and of the latter as there -is between their form. The divine matter, on receiving the form that -determines it, possesses an intellectual and determinate life. On -the contrary, even when the matter of the bodies becomes something -determinate, it is neither alive nor thinking; it is dead, in spite -of its borrowed beauty.[285] As the shape (of sense-objects) is only -an image, their substrate also is only an image. But as the shape (of -intelligible entities) possesses veritable (reality), their substrate -is of the same nature. We have, therefore, full justification for -calling matter "being," that is, when referring to intelligible -matter; for the substrate of intelligible entities really is "being," -especially if conceived of together with its inherent (form). For -"being" is the luminous totality (or complex of matter and form). -To question the eternity of intelligible matter is tantamount to -questioning that of ideas; indeed, intelligible entities are begotten -in the sense that they have a principle; but they are non-begotten in -the sense that their existence had no beginning, and that, from all -eternity, they derive their existence from their principle. Therefore -they do not resemble the things that are always becoming, as our world; -but, like the intelligible world, they ever exist. - - -THE CATEGORIES OF MOVEMENT AND DIFFERENCE APPLIED TO INTELLIGIBLES. - -The difference that is in the intelligible world ever produces matter; -for, in that world, it is the difference that is the principle of -matter, as well as of primary motion. That is why the latter is also -called difference, because difference and primary motion were born -simultaneously.[286] - -The movement and difference, that proceed from the First (the Good), -are indeterminate, and need it, to be determinate. Now they determine -each other when they turn towards it. Formerly, matter was as -indeterminate as difference; it was not good because it was not yet -illuminated by the radiance of the First. Since the First is the source -of all light, the object that receives light from the First does not -always possess light; this object differs from light, and possesses -light as something alien, because it derives light from some other -source. That is the nature of matter as contained in intelligible -(entities). Perhaps this treatment of the subject is longer than -necessary. - - -SUBSTRATE IS DEMANDED BY TRANSFORMATION OF ELEMENTS, BY THEIR -DESTRUCTION AND DISSOLUTION. - -6. Now let us speak of bodies. The mutual transformation of elements -demonstrates that they must have a substrate. Their transformation is -not a complete destruction; otherwise (a general) "being"[287] would -perish in nonentity. Whereas, what is begotten would have passed -from absolute nonentity to essence; and all change is no more than -the passing of one form into another (as thought Aristotle).[288] It -presupposes the existence of permanent (subject) which would receive -the form of begotten things only after having lost the earlier form. -This is demonstrated by destruction, which affects only something -composite; therefore every dissolved object must have been a composite. -Dissolution proves it also. For instance, where a vase is dissolved, -the result is gold; on being dissolved, gold leaves water; and so -analogy would suggest that the dissolution of water would result in -something else, that is analogous to its nature. Finally, elements -necessarily are either form, or primary matter, or the composites -of form and matter. However, they cannot be form, because, without -matter, they could not possess either mass nor magnitude. Nor can -they be primary matter, because they are subject to destruction. They -must therefore be composites of form and matter; form constituting -their shape and quality, and matter a substrate that is indeterminate, -because it is not a form. - - -THE VIEWS OF EMPEDOCLES AND ANAXAGORAS ON MATTER. - -7. (According to Aristotle),[289] Empedocles thinks matter consists -of elements; but this opinion is refuted by the decay to which they -are exposed. (According to Aristotle),[290] Anaxagoras supposes -that matter is a mixture and, instead of saying that this (mixture) -is capable of becoming all things, he insists that it contains all -things in actualization. Thus he annihilates the intelligence that -he had introduced into the world; for, according to him, it is not -intelligence that endows all the rest with shape and form; it is -contemporaneous with matter, instead of preceding it.[291] Now it is -impossible for intelligence to be the contemporary of matter, for if -mixture participate in essence, then must essence precede it; if, -however, essence itself be the mixture, they will need some third -principle. Therefore if the demiurgic creator necessarily precede, -what need was there for the forms in miniature to exist in matter, -for intelligence to unravel their inextricable confusion, when it is -possible to predicate qualities of matter, because matter had none of -its own, and thus to subject matter entirely to shape? Besides, how -could (the demiurgic creator) then be in all? - - -REFUTATION OF ANAXIMANDER'S VIEWS ABOUT MATTER. - -(Anaximander)[292] had better explain the consistence of the infinity -by which he explains matter. Does he, by infinity, mean immensity? In -reality this would be impossible. Infinity exists neither by itself, -nor in any other nature, as, for instance, the accident of a body. The -infinite does not exist by itself, because each of its parts would -necessarily be infinite. Nor does the infinite exist as an accident, -because that of which it would be an accident would, by itself, be -neither infinite, nor simple; and consequently, would not be matter. - - -REFUTATION OF DEMOCRITUS'S ATOMS AS EXPLANATIONS OF MATTER. - -(According to Aristotle's account of Democritus),[293] neither could -the atoms fulfil the part of matter because they are nothing (as before -thought Cicero).[294] Every body is divisible to infinity. (Against -the system of the atoms) might further be alleged the continuity and -humidity of bodies. Besides nothing can exist without intelligence -and soul, which could not be composed of atoms. Nothing with a nature -different from the atoms could produce anything with the atoms, because -no demiurgic creator could produce something with a matter that lacked -continuity. Many other objections against this system have and can be -made; but further discussion is unnecessary. - - -MATTER IS NOTHING COMPOSITE, BUT BY NATURE SIMPLE AND ONE. - -8. What then is this matter which is one, continuous, and without -qualities? Evidently, it could not be a body, since it has no quality; -if it were a body, it would have a quality. We say that it is the -matter of all sense-objects, and not the matter of some, and the form -of others, just as clay is matter, in respect to the potter, without -being matter absolutely (as thought Aristotle).[295] As we are not -considering the matter of any particular object, but the matter of all -things, we would not attribute to its nature anything of what falls -under our senses--no quality, color, heat, cold, lightness, weight, -density, sparseness, figure or magnitude; for magnitude is something -entirely different from being large, and figure from the figured -object. Matter therefore is not anything composite, but something -simple, and by nature one (according to the views of Plato and -Aristotle combined).[296] Only thus could matter be deprived of all -properties (as it is). - - -MATTER AND THE INFORMING PRINCIPLE MUST BE CONTEMPORARIES TO ACCOUNT -FOR THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONS. - -The principle which informs matter will give it form as something -foreign to its nature; it will also introduce magnitude and all the -real properties. Otherwise, it would be enslaved to the magnitude -of matter, and could not decide of the magnitude of matter, and -magnitude would be dependent on the disposition of matter. A theory -of a consultation between it and the magnitude of matter would be -an absurd fiction. On the contrary, if the efficient cause precede -matter, matter will be exactly as desired by the efficient cause, and -be capable of docilely receiving any kind of form, including magnitude. -If matter possessed magnitude, it would also possess figure, and -would thus be rather difficult to fashion. Form therefore enters into -matter by importing into it (what constitutes corporeal being); now -every form contains a magnitude and a quantity which are determined by -reason ("being"), and with reason. That is why in all kinds of beings, -quantity is determined only along with form; for the quantity (the -magnitude) of man is not the quantity of the bird. It would be absurd -to insist on the difference between giving to matter the quantity of a -bird, and impressing its quality on it, that quality is a reason, while -quantity is not a form; for quantity is both measure and number. - - -ANTI-STOIC POLEMIC, AGAINST THE CORPOREITY OF MATTER AND QUANTITY. - -9. It may be objected that it would be impossible to conceive of -something without magnitude. The fact is that not everything is -identical with quantity. Essence is distinct from quantity; for many -other things beside it exist. Consequently no incorporeal nature has -any quantity. Matter, therefore, is incorporeal. Besides, even quantity -itself is not quantative, which characterizes only what participates -in quantity (in general); a further proof that quantity is a form, -as an object becomes white by the presence of whiteness; and as that -which, in the animal, produces whiteness and the different colors, is -not a varied color, but a varied reason; likewise that which produces a -quantity is not a definite quantity, but either quantity in itself, or -quantity as such, or the reason of quantity. Does quantity, on entering -into matter extend matter, so as to give it magnitude? By no means, for -matter had not been condensed. Form therefore imparts to matter the -magnitude which it did not possess, just as form impresses on matter -the quality it lacked.[297] - - -BY ABSTRACTION, THE SOUL CAN FIND AND DESCRY THE QUALITY-LESS -THING-IN-ITSELF: THIS PROCESS IS CALLED "BASTARD REASONING." - -10. (Some objector) might ask how one could conceive of matter without -quantity? This might be answered by a retort. How then do you (as you -do) manage to conceive of it without quality? Do you again object, -by what conception or intelligence could it be reached? By the very -indetermination of the soul. Since that which knows must be similar to -that which is known (as Aristotle[298] quotes from Empedocles), the -indeterminate must be grasped by the indeterminate. Reason, indeed, -may be determined in respect to the indeterminate; but the glance -which reason directs on the indeterminate itself is indeterminate. -If everything were known by reason and by intelligence, reason here -tells us about matter what reason rightly should tell us about it. By -wishing to conceive of matter in an intellectual manner, intelligence -arrives at a state which is the absence of intelligence, or rather, -reason forms of matter a "bastard" or "illegitimate" image, which is -derived from the other, which is not true, and which is composed of the -other (deceptive material called) reason. That is why Plato[299] said -that matter is perceived by a "bastard reasoning." In what does the -indetermination of the soul consist? In an absolute ignorance, or in -a complete absence of all knowledge? No: the indeterminate condition -of the soul implies something positive (besides something negative). -As for the eye, darkness is the matter of all invisible color, so -the soul, by making abstraction in sense-objects of all things that -somehow are luminous, cannot determine what then remains; and likewise, -as the eye, in darkness (becomes assimilated to darkness), the soul -becomes assimilated to what she sees. Does she then see anything else? -Doubtless, she sees something without figure, without color, without -light, or even without magnitude.[300] If this thing had any magnitude, -the soul would lend it a form. - - -DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MENTAL BLANK AND IMPRESSION OF THE SHAPELESS. - -(An objector might ask) whether there be identity of conditions -between the soul's not thinking, and her experience while thinking of -matter? By no means; when the soul is not thinking of anything, she -neither asserts anything, nor experiences anything. When she thinks -of matter, she experiences something, she receives the impression of -the shapeless. When she presents to herself objects that possess shape -and magnitude, she conceives of them as composite; for she sees them -as distinct (or, colored?) and determined by qualities they contain. -She conceives of both the totality and its two constituent elements. -She also has a clear perception, a vivid sensation of properties -inherent (in matter). On the contrary, the soul receives only an -obscure perception of the shapeless subject, for there is no form -there. Therefore, when the soul considers matter in general, in the -composite, with the qualities inherent in this composite, she separates -them, analyzes them, and what is left (after this analysis), the soul -perceives it vaguely, and obscurely, because it is something vague and -obscure; she thinks it, without really thinking it. On the other hand, -as matter does not remain shapeless, as it is always shaped, within -objects, the soul always imposes on matter the form of things, because -only with difficulty does she support the indeterminate, since she -seems to fear to fall out of the order of beings, and to remain long in -nonentity. - - -THE COMPOSITION OF A BODY NEEDS A SUBSTRATE. - -11. (Following the ideas of Aristotle,[301] Plotinos wonders whether -some objector) will ask whether the composition of a body requires -anything beyond extension and all the other qualities? Yes: it demands -a substrate to receive them (as a residence). This substrate is not a -mass; for in this case, it would be an extension. But if this substrate -have no extension, how can it be a residence (for form)? Without -extension, it could be of no service, contributing neither to form -nor qualities, to magnitude nor extension. It seems that extension, -wherever it be, is given to bodies by matter. Just as actions, effects, -times and movements, though they do not imply any matter, nevertheless -are beings, it would seem that the elementary bodies do not necessarily -imply matter (without extension), being individual beings, whose -diverse substance is constituted by the mingling of several forms. -Matter without extension, therefore, seems to be no more than a -meaningless name. - - -MATTER AS THE IMAGE OF EXTENSION, CAN YET BE RESIDENCE OF FORM. - -(Our answer to the above objection is this:) To begin with, not every -residence is necessarily a mass, unless it have already received -extension. The soul, which possesses all things, contains them all -simultaneously. If it possessed extension, it would possess all -things in extension. Consequently matter receives all it contains in -extension, because it is capable thereof. Likewise in animals and -plants there is a correspondence between the growth and diminution of -their magnitude, with that of their quality. It would be wrong to claim -that magnitude is necessary to matter because, in sense-objects, there -exists a previous magnitude, on which is exerted the action of the -forming principle; for the matter of these objects is not pure matter, -but individual matter (as said Aristotle).[302] Matter pure and simple -must receive its extension from some other principle. Therefore the -residence of form could not be a mass; for in receiving extension, it -would also receive the other qualities. Matter therefore, is the image -of extension, because as it is primary matter, it possesses the ability -to become extended. People often imagine matter as empty extension; -consequently several philosophers have claimed that matter is identical -with emptiness. I repeat: matter is the image of extension because the -soul, when considering matter, is unable to determine anything, spreads -into indetermination, without being able to circumscribe or mark -anything; otherwise, matter would determine something. This substrate -could not properly be called big or little; it is simultaneously big -and little (as said Aristotle).[303] It is simultaneously extended -and non-extended, because it is the matter of extension. If it were -enlarged or made smaller, it would somehow move in extension. Its -indetermination is an extension which consists in being the very -residence of extension, but really in being only imaginary extension, -as has been explained above. Other beings, that have no extension, -but which are forms, are each of them determinate, and consequently -imply no other idea of extension. On the contrary, matter, being -indeterminate, and incapable of remaining within itself, being moved to -receive all forms everywhere, ever being docile, by this very docility, -and by the generation (to which it adapts itself), becomes manifold. It -is in this way its nature seems to be extension. - - -POLEMIC AGAINST MODERATUS OF GADES, FORMS DEMAND A RESIDENCE, VASE, or -LOCATION. - -12. Extensions therefore contribute to the constitutions of bodies; -for the forms of bodies are in extensions. These forms produce -themselves not in extension (which is a form), but in the substrate -that has received extension. If they occurred in extension, instead of -occurring in matter, they would nevertheless have neither extension -nor (hypostatic) substance; for they would be no more than reasons. -Now as reasons reside in the soul, there would be no body. Therefore, -in the sense-world, the multiplicity of forms must have a single -substrate which has received extension, and therefore must be other -than extension. All things that mingle form a mixture, because they -contain matter; they have no need of any other substrate, because each -of them brings its matter along with it. But (forms) need a receptacle -(a residence), a "vase" (or stand), a location (this in answer to -the objection at the beginning of the former section). Now location -is posterior to matter and to bodies. Bodies, therefore, presuppose -matter. Bodies are not necessarily immaterial, merely because actions -and operations are. In the occurrence of an action, matter serves as -substrate to the agent; it remains within him without itself entering -into action; for that is not that which is sought by the agent. One -action does not change into another, and consequently has no need -of containing matter; it is the agent who passes from one action to -another, and who, consequently, serves as matter to the actions (as -thought Aristotle).[304] - - -NOT EVEN CORPOREITY INHERES IN MATTER WHICH IS REACHED BY BASTARD -REASONING. - -Matter, therefore, is necessary to quality as well as to quantity, -and consequently, to bodies. In this sense, matter is not an empty -name, but a substrate, though it be neither visible nor extended. -Otherwise, for the same reason, we would be obliged also to deny -qualities and extension; for you might say that each of these things, -taken in itself, is nothing real. If these things possess existence, -though their existence be obscure, so much the more must matter possess -existence, though its existence be neither clear nor evident to the -senses. Indeed, matter cannot be perceived by sight, since it is -colorless; nor by hearing, for it is soundless; nor by smell or taste, -because it is neither volatile nor wet. It is not even perceived by -touch, for it is not a body. Touch cognizes only body, recognizes that -it is dense or sparse, hard or soft, wet or dry; now none of these -attributes is characteristic of matter. The latter therefore can be -perceived only by a reasoning which does not imply the presence of -intelligence, which, on the contrary, implies the complete absence of -matter; which (unintelligent reasoning therefore) deserves the name of -"bastard" (or, illegitimate) reasoning.[305] Corporeity itself,[306] is -not characteristic of matter. If corporeity be a reason (that is, by a -pun, a 'form'), it certainly differs from matter, both being entirely -distinct. If corporeity be considered when it has already modified -matter and mingled with it, it is a body; it is no longer matter pure -and simple. - - -THE SUBSTRATE IS NOT A QUALITY COMMON TO ALL ELEMENTS; FOR THUS IT -WOULD NOT BE INDETERMINATE. - -13. Those who insist that the substrate of things is a quality common -to all elements are bound to explain first the nature of this quality; -then, how a quality could serve as substrate; how an unextended, -immaterial (?) quality could be perceived in something that lacked -extension; further, how, if this quality be determinate, it can be -matter; for if it be something indeterminate, it is no longer a -quality, but matter itself that we seek. - - -EVEN THIS PRIVATION MIGHT BE CONSIDERED A QUALITY; BUT SUCH A USE OF -THE TERM WOULD DESTROY ALL COHERENT REASONING. - -Let us grant that matter has no quality, because, by virtue of its -nature, it does not participate in a quality of any other thing. What, -however, would hinder this property, because it is a qualification in -matter, from participating in some quality? This would be a particular -and distinctive characteristic, which consists of the privation of all -other things (referring to Aristotle)?[307] In man, the privation of -something may be considered a quality; as, for instance, the privation -of sight is blindness. If the privation of certain things inhere in -matter, this privation is also a qualification for matter. If further -the privation in matter extend to all things, absolutely, our objection -is still better grounded, for privation is a qualification. Such an -objection, however, amounts to making qualities and qualified things -of everything. In this case quantity, as well as "being," would be -a quality. Every qualified thing must possess some quality. It is -ridiculous to suppose that something qualified is qualified by what -itself has no quality, being other than quality. - - -BY A PUN BETWEEN "DIFFERENCE" AND "OTHERNESS," PLOTINOS DEFINES THE -CHARACTERISTIC OF MATTER AS BEING A DISPOSITION TO BECOME SOMETHING -ELSE. - -Some one may object that that is possible, because "being something -else" is a quality. We would then have to ask whether the thing that -is other be otherness-in-itself? If it be otherness-in-itself, it -is so not because it is something qualified, because quality is not -something qualified. If this thing be only other, it is not such by -itself, it is so only by otherness, as a thing that is identical -by identity. Privation, therefore, is not a quality, nor anything -qualified, but the absence of quality or of something else, as silence -is the absence of sound. Privation is something negative; qualification -is something positive. The property of matter is not a form; for its -property consists precisely in having neither qualification nor form. -It is absurd to insist that it is qualified, just because it has no -quality; this would be tantamount to saying that it possessed extension -by the very fact of its possessing no extension. The individuality -(or, property) of matter is to be what it is. Its characteristic -is not an attribute; it consists in a disposition to become other -things. Not only are these other things other than matter, but besides -each of them possesses an individual form. The only name that suits -matter is "other," or rather, "others," because the singular is too -determinative, and the plural better expresses indetermination. - - -PRIVATION IS A FORM OF MATTER. - -14. Let us now examine if matter be privation, or if privation be -an attribute of matter. If you insist that privation and matter are -though logically distinct, substantially one and the same thing, you -will have to explain the nature of these two things, for instance, -defining matter without defining privation, and conversely. Either, -neither of these two things implies the other, or they imply each other -reciprocally, or only one of them implies the other. If each of them -can be defined separately, and if neither of them imply the other, -both will form two distinct things, and matter will be different from -privation, though privation be an accident of matter. But neither of -the two must even potentially be present in the definition of the -other. Is their mutual relation the same as that of a stub nose, and -the man with the stub nose (as suggested by Aristotle)?[308] Then each -of these is double, and there are two things. Is their relation that -between fire and heat? Heat is in fire, but fire is not necessarily -contained in heat; thus matter, having privation (as a quality), as -fire has heat (as a quality), privation will be a form of matter, and -has a substrate different from itself, which is matter.[309] Not in -this sense, therefore, is there a unity (between them). - - -PRIVATION IS NONENTITY, AND ADDS NO NEW CONCEPT. - -Are matter and privation substantially identical, yet logically -distinct, in this sense that privation does not signify the presence of -anything, but rather its absence? That it is the negation of beings, -and is synonymous with nonentity? Negation adds no attribute; it limits -itself to the assertion that something is not. In a certain sense, -therefore, privation is nonentity. - - -BEING SUBSTANTIALLY IDENTICAL, BUT LOGICALLY DISTINCT IS NONSENSE. - -If matter be called nonentity in this sense that it is not essence, -but something else than essence, there is still room to draw up two -definitions, of which one would apply to the substrate, and the other -to the privation, merely to explain that it is a disposition to become -something else? It would be better to acknowledge that matter, like the -substrate, should be defined a disposition to become other things. If -the definition of privation shows the indetermination of matter, it can -at least indicate its nature. But we could not admit that matter and -privation are one thing in respect to their substrate, though logically -distinct; for how could there be a logical distinction into two things, -if a thing be identical with matter as soon as it is indeterminate, -indefinite, and lacking quality? - - -MATTER AS THE INFINITE IN ITSELF. - -15. Let us further examine if the indeterminate, or infinite, be an -accident, or an attribute of some other nature; how it comes to be an -accident, and whether privation ever can become an accident. The things -that are numbers and reasons are exempt from all indetermination, -because they are determinations, orders, and principles of order for -the rest. Now these principles do not order objects already ordered, -nor do they order orders. The thing that receives an order is different -from that which gives an order, and the principles from which the order -is derived are determination, limitation and reason. In this case, that -which receives the order and the determination must necessarily be the -infinite (as thought Plato).[310] Now that which receives the order is -matter, with all the things which, without being matter, participate -therein, and play the part of matter. Therefore matter is the infinite -itself.[311] Not accidentally is it the infinite; for the infinite is -no accident. Indeed, every accident must be a reason; now of what being -can the infinite be an accident? Of determination, or of that which is -determined? Now matter is neither of these two. Further, the infinite -could not unite with the determinate without destroying its nature. -The infinite, therefore, is no accident of matter (but is its nature, -or "being"). Matter is the infinite itself. Even in the intelligible -world, matter is the infinite. - - -THE INFINITE MAY BE EITHER IDEAL OR REAL, INFINITE OR INDEFINITE. - -The infinite seems born of the infinity of the One, either of its -power, or eternity; there is no infinity in the One, but the One is -creator of the infinite. How can there be infinity simultaneously above -and below (in the One and in matter)? Because there are two infinities -(the infinite and the indefinite; the infinite in the One, the -indefinite in matter). Between them obtains the same difference as the -archetype and its image.[312] Is the infinite here below less infinite? -On the contrary, it is more so. By the mere fact that the image is -far from veritable "being," it is more infinite. Infinity is greater -in that which is less determinate (as thought Aristotle).[313] Now -that which is more distant from good is further in evil. Therefore the -infinite on high, possessing the more essence, is the ideal infinite; -here below, as the infinite possesses less essence, because it is far -from essence and truth, it degenerates into the image of essence, and -is the truer (indefinite) infinite. - - -MATTER AS THE INFINITE IN ITSELF. - -Is the infinite identical with the essence of the infinite? There is -a distinction between them where there is reason and matter; where -however matter is alone, they must be considered identical; or, better, -we may say absolutely that here below the infinite does not occur; -otherwise it would be a reason, which is contrary to the nature of the -infinite. Therefore matter in itself is the infinite, in opposition -to reason. Just as reason, considered in itself, is called reason, -so matter, which is opposed to reason by its infinity, and which is -nothing else (than matter), must be called infinite. - - -MATTER IS NONESSENTIAL OTHERNESS. - -16. Is there any identity between matter and otherness? Matter is not -identical with otherness itself, but with that part of otherness which -is opposed to real beings, and to reasons. It is in this sense that -one can say of nonentity that it is something, that it is identical -with privation, if only privation be the opposition to things that -exist in reason. Will privation be destroyed by its union with the -thing of which it is an attribute? By no means. That in which a (Stoic) -"habit" occurs is not itself a "habit," but a privation. That in -which determination occurs is neither determination, nor that which -is determined, but the infinite, so far as it is infinite. How could -determination unite with the infinite without destroying its nature, -since this infinite is not such by accident? It would destroy this -infinite, if it were infinite in quantity; but that is not the case. On -the contrary, it preserves its "being" for it, realizes and completes -its nature; as the earth which did not contain seeds (preserves its -nature) when it receives some of them; or the female, when she is -made pregnant by the male. The female, then, does not cease being a -female; on the contrary she is so far more, for she realizes her nature -("being"). - - -INDIGENCE IS NECESSARILY EVIL. - -Does matter continue to be evil when it happens to participate in -the good? Yes, because it was formerly deprived of good, and did not -possess it. That which lacks something, and obtains it, holds the -middle between good and evil, if it be in the middle between the two. -But that which possesses nothing, that which is in indigence, or rather -that which is indigence itself, must necessarily be evil; for it is not -indigence of wealth, but indigence of wisdom, of virtue, of beauty, of -vigor, of shape, of form, of quality. How, indeed, could such a thing -not be shapeless, absolutely ugly and evil? - - -THE RELATION OF BOTH KINDS OF MATTER TO ESSENCE. - -In the intelligible world, matter is essence; for what is above it (the -One), is considered as superior to essence. In the sense-world, on the -contrary, essence is above matter; therefore matter is nonentity, and -thereby is the only thing foreign to the beauty of essence. - - - - -THIRD ENNEAD, BOOK NINE. - -Fragments About the Soul, the Intelligence, and the Good. - - -DIFFERENCE BETWEEN INTELLIGENCE AND THE EXISTING ANIMAL. - -1. Plato says, "The intelligence sees the ideas comprised within -the existing animal." He adds, "The demiurge conceived that this -produced animal was to comprise beings similar and equally numerous -to those that the intelligence sees in the existing animal." Does -Plato mean that the ideas are anterior to intelligence, and that they -already exist when intelligence thinks them? We shall first have to -examine whether the animal is identical with intelligence, or is -something different. Now that which observes is intelligence; so -the Animal himself should then be called, not intelligence, but the -intelligible. Shall we therefrom conclude that the things contemplated -by intelligence are outside of it? If so, intelligence possesses only -images, instead of the realities themselves--that is, if we admit that -the realities exist up there; for, according to Plato, the veritable -reality is up there within the essence, in which everything exists in -itself. - - -RELATION BETWEEN INTELLIGENCE AND THE INTELLIGIBLE. - -(This consequence is not necessary). Doubtless Intelligence and the -intelligible are different; they are nevertheless not separated. -Nothing hinders us from saying that both form but one, and that they -are separated only by thought; for essence is one, but it is partly -that which is thought, and partly that which thinks. When Plato says -that intelligence sees the ideas, he means that it contemplates the -ideas, not in another principle, but in itself, because it possesses -the intelligible within itself. The intelligible may also be the -intelligence, but intelligence in the state of repose, of unity, of -calm, while Intelligence, which perceives this Intelligence which has -remained within itself, is the actuality born therefrom, and which -contemplates it. By contemplating the intelligible, intelligence is -assimilated thereto and is its intelligence, because Intelligence -thinks the intelligible it itself becomes intelligible by becoming -assimilated thereto, and on the other hand also something thought. - -It is (intelligence), therefore, which conceived the design in -producing in the universe the four kinds of living beings (or -elements), which it beholds up there. Mysteriously, however, Plato here -seems to present the conceiving-principle as different from the other -two principles, while others think that these three principles, the -animal itself (the universal Soul), Intelligence and the conceiving -principle form but a single thing. Shall we here, as elsewhere, admit -that opinions differ, and that everybody conceives the three principles -in his own manner? - - -THE WORLD-SOUL IS THE CONCEIVING-PRINCIPLE. - -We have already noticed two of these principles (namely, intelligence, -and the intelligible, which is called the Animal-in-itself, or -universal Soul). What is the third? It is he who has resolved to -produce, to form, to divide the ideas that intelligence sees in -the Animal. Is it possible that in one sense intelligence is the -dividing principle, and that in another the dividing principle is not -intelligence? As far as divided things proceed from intelligence, -intelligence is the dividing principle. As far as intelligence itself -remains undivided, and that the things proceeding from it (that is, -the souls) are divided, the universal Soul is the principle of this -division into several souls. That is why Plato says that division is -the work of a third principle, and that it resides in a third principle -that has conceived; now, to conceive is not the proper function of -intelligence; it is that of the Soul which has a dividing action in a -divisible nature. - - -HOW THE SOUL ASCENDS TO THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD. THE INTELLIGIBLE IS -POSSESSED BY TOUCHING IT WITH THE BEST PART OF ONESELF. - -2. (As Nicholas of Damascus used to say) the totality of a science -is divided into particular propositions, without, however, thereby -being broken up into fragments, inasmuch as each proposition contains -potentially the whole science, whose principle and goal coincide. -Likewise, we should so manage ourselves that each of the faculties we -possess within ourselves should also become a goal and a totality; and -then so arrange all the faculties that they will be consummated in -what is best in our nature (that is, intelligence). Success in this -constitutes "dwelling on high" (living spiritually); for, when one -possesses the intelligible, one touches it by what is best in oneself. - - -OF THE DESCENT OF THE SOUL INTO THE BODY. THE SOUL IS NOT IN THE BODY; -BUT THE BODY IS IN THE SOUL. - -3. The universal Soul has not come into any place, nor gone into any; -for no such place could have existed. However, the body, which was in -its neighborhood, participated in her, consequently, she is not inside -a body. Plato, indeed, does not say that the soul is in a body; on the -contrary, he locates the body in the soul. - - -INDIVIDUAL SOULS, HOWEVER, MAY BE SAID TO COME AND GO. - -As to individual souls, they come from somewhere, for they proceed from -the universal Soul; they also have a place whither they may descend, -or where they may pass from one body into another; they can likewise -reascend thence to the intelligible world. - - -THE UNIVERSAL SOUL EVER REMAINS IN THE INTELLIGIBLE. - -The universal Soul, on the contrary, ever resides in the elevated -region where her nature retains her; and the universe located below her -participates in her just as the object which receives the sun's rays -participates therein. - - -HOW THE SOUL INCARNATES. - -The individual soul is therefore illuminated when she turns towards -what is above her; for then she meets the essence; on the contrary, -when she turns towards what is below her, she meets non-being. This -is what happens when she turns towards herself; on wishing to belong -to herself, she somehow falls into emptiness, becomes indeterminate, -and produces what is below her, namely, an image of herself which -is non-being (the body). Now the image of this image (matter), is -indeterminate, and quite obscure; for it is entirely unreasonable, -unintelligible, and as far as possible from essence itself. (Between -intelligence and the body) the soul occupies an intermediary region, -which is her own proper domain; when she looks at the inferior region, -throwing a second glance thither, she gives a form to her image (her -body); and, charmed by this image, she enters therein. - - -BY ITS POWER, THE ONE IS EVERYWHERE. - -4. How does manifoldness issue from Unity? Unity is everywhere; for -there is no place where it is not; therefore it fills everything. -By Him exists manifoldness; or rather, it is by Him that all things -exist. If the One were only everywhere, He would simply be all things; -but, as, besides, He is nowhere, all things exist by Him, because He -is everywhere; but simultaneously all things are distinct from Him, -because He is nowhere. Why then is Unity not only everywhere, but also -nowhere? The reason is, that Unity must be above all things, He must -fill everything, and produce everything, without being all that He -produces. - - -THE SOUL RECEIVES HER FORM FROM INTELLIGENCE. - -5. The soul's relation to intelligence is the same as that of sight to -the visible object; but it is the indeterminate sight which, before -seeing, is nevertheless disposed to see and think; that is why the soul -bears to intelligence the relation of matter to form. - - -WE THINK AN INTELLECTUAL NATURE BY THINKING OURSELVES. - -6. When we think, and think ourselves, we see a thinking nature; -otherwise, we would be dupes of an illusion in believing we were -thinking. Consequently, if we think ourselves, we are, by thinking -ourselves, thinking an intellectual nature. This thought presupposes -an anterior thought which implies no movement. Now, as the objects -of thought are being and life, there must be, anterior to this -being, another being; and anterior to this life, another life. -This is well-known to all who are actualized intelligences. If the -intelligences be actualizations which consist in thinking themselves, -we ourselves are the intelligible by the real foundation of our -essence, and the thought that we have of ourselves gives us its image. - - -THE ONE IS SUPERIOR TO REST AND MOTION. - -7. The First (or One) is the potentiality of movement and of rest; -consequently, He is superior to both things. The Second principle -relates to the First by its motion and its rest; it is Intelligence, -because, differing from the First, it directs its thought towards Him, -while the First does not think (because He comprises both the thinking -thing, and the thing thought); He thinks himself, and, by that very -thing, He is defective, because His good consists in thinking, not in -its "hypostasis" (or existence). - - -OF ACTUALITY AND POTENTIALITY. - -8. What passes from potentiality to actuality, and always remains -the same so long as it exists, approaches actuality. It is thus that -the bodies such as fire may possess perfection. But what passes from -potentiality to actuality cannot exist always, because it contains -matter. On the contrary, what exists actually, and what is simple, -exists always. Besides, what is actual may also in certain respects -exist potentially. - - -THE GOOD IS SUPERIOR TO THOUGHT; THE HIGHEST DIVINITIES ARE NOT THE -SUPREME. - -9. The divinities which occupy the highest rank are nevertheless -not the First; for Intelligence (from which proceed the divinities -of the highest rank, that is, the perfect intelligences) is (or, is -constituted by) all the intelligible essences, and, consequently, -comprises both motion and rest. Nothing like this is in the First. -He is related to nothing else, while the other things subsist in Him -in their rest, and direct their motion towards Him. Motion is an -aspiration, and the First aspires to nothing. Towards what would He, -in any case, aspire? He does not think himself; and they who say that -He thinks Himself mean by it only that He possesses Himself. But when -one says that a thing thinks, it is not because it possesses itself, -it is because it contemplates the First; that is the first actuality, -thought itself, the first thought, to which none other can be anterior; -only, it is inferior to the principle from which it derives its -existence, and occupies the second rank after it. Thought is therefore -not the most sacred thing; consequently, not all thought is sacred; the -only sacred thought is that of the Good, and this (Good) is superior to -thought. - - -THE GOOD IS SUPERIOR EVEN TO SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS AND LIFE. - -Will the Good not be self-conscious? It is claimed by some that the -Good would be good only if it possessed self-consciousness. But if it -be Goodness, it is goodness before having self-consciousness. If the -Good be good only because it has self-consciousness, it was not good -before having self-consciousness; but, on the other hand, if there be -no goodness, no possible consciousness can therefore exist. (Likewise, -someone may ask) does not the First live? He cannot be said to live, -because He Himself gives life. - - -THE SUPREME IS THEREFORE ABOVE THOUGHT. - -Thus the principle which is self-conscious, which thinks itself (that -is, Intelligence), occupies only the second rank. Indeed, if this -principle be self-conscious, it is only to unite itself to itself by -this act of consciousness; but if it study itself, it is the result -of ignoring itself, because its nature is defective, and it becomes -perfect only by thought. Thought should therefore not be attributed to -the First; for, to attribute something to Him would be to imply that He -had been deprived thereof, and needed it. - - - - -SECOND ENNEAD, BOOK TWO. - -About the Movement of the Heavens. - - -QUESTIONS ABOUT THE MOVEMENTS OF THE HEAVENS. - -1. Why do the heavens move in a circle? Because they imitate -Intelligence. But to what does this movement belong? To the Soul, or -to the body? Does it occur because the Soul is within the celestial -sphere, which tends to revolve about her? Is the Soul within this -sphere without being touched thereby? Does she cause this sphere to -move by her own motion? Perhaps the Soul which moves this sphere should -not move it in the future, although she did so in the past; that is, -the soul made it remain immovable, instead of ceaselessly imparting -to it a circular movement. Perhaps the Soul herself might remain -immovable; or, if she move at all, it will at least not be a local -movement. - - -THREE KINDS OF MOVEMENT. - -How can the Soul impart to the heavens a local movement, herself -possessing a different kind of motion? Perhaps the circular movement, -when considered by itself, may not seem a local movement. If then it be -a local movement only by accident, what is its own nature, by itself? -It is the reflection upon itself, the movement of consciousness, of -reflection, of life; it withdraws nothing from the world, it changes -the location of nothing, while embracing all. Indeed, the power which -governs the universal Animal (or world) embraces everything, and -unifies everything. If then it remained immovable, it would not embrace -everything either vitally or locally; it would not preserve the life of -the interior parts of the body it possesses, because the bodily life -implies movement. On the contrary, if it be a local movement, the Soul -will possess a movement only such as it admits of. She will move, not -only as soul, but as an animated body, and as an animal; her movement -will partake both of the movement proper to the soul, and proper to the -body. Now the movement proper to the body is to mobilize in a straight -line; the movement proper to the Soul, is to contain; while both of -these movements result in a third, the circular movement which includes -both transportation and permanence. - - -FIRE MOVES STRAIGHT ONLY PRELIMINARILY. - -To the assertion that the circular movement is a corporeal movement, -it might be objected that one can see that every body, even fire, -moves in a straight line. However, the fire moves in a straight line -only till it reaches the place assigned to it by the universal order -(it constitutes the heavens, which are its proper place). By virtue of -this order its nature is permanent, and it moves towards its assigned -location. Why then does the fire as soon as it has arrived there, not -abide there quiescently? Because its very nature is constant movement; -if it went in a straight line, it would dissipate; consequently, it -necessarily possesses a circular motion. That is surely a providential -arrangement. Providence placed fire within itself (because it -constitutes the heavens, which are its location); so that, as soon as -it finds itself in the sky it must spontaneously move in a circle. - - -WHY SOUL ASSUMES A CIRCULAR MOTION. - -We might further say that, if the fire tended to move in a straight -line, it must effect a return upon itself in the only place where it is -possible (in the heavens), inasmuch as there is no place outside of the -world where it could go. In fact there is no further place, beyond the -celestial fire, for itself constitutes the last place in the universe; -it therefore moves in a circle in the place at its disposal; it is its -own place, but not to remain immovable, but to move. In a circle, the -centre is naturally immovable; and were the circumference the same, it -would be only an immense centre. It is therefore better that the fire -should turn around the centre in this living and naturally organized -body. Thus the fire will tend towards the centre, not in stopping, for -it would lose its circular form, but in moving itself around it; thus -only will it be able to satisfy its tendency (towards the universal -Soul). However, if this power effect the movement of the body of the -universe, it does not drag it like a burden, nor give it an impulsion -contrary to its nature. For nature is constituted by nothing else -than the order established by the universal Soul. Besides, as the -whole Soul is everywhere, and is not divided into parts, it endows the -sky with all the ubiquity it can assimilate, which can occur only by -traversing all of it. If the Soul remained immovable in one place, she -would remain immovable as soon as the heavens reached this place; but -as the Soul is everywhere, they would seek to reach her everywhere. -Can the heavens never reach the Soul? On the contrary, they reach her -ceaselessly; for the Soul, in ceaselessly attracting them to herself, -endues them with a continual motion by which she carries them, not -towards some other place, but towards herself, and in the same place, -not in a straight line, but in a circle, and thus permits them to -possess her in all the places which she traverses. - - -WHY THE HEAVENS DO NOT REMAIN STILL. - -The heavens would be immovable if the Soul rested, that is, if she -remained only in the intelligible world, where everything remains -immovable. But because the Soul is in no one determinate place, and -because the whole of her is everywhere, the heavens move through the -whole of space; and as they cannot go out of themselves, they must move -in a circle. - - -HOW OTHER BEINGS MOVE.[314] - -2. How do the other beings move? As none of them is the whole, but -only a part, consequently, each finds itself situated in a particular -place. On the contrary, the heavens are the whole; they constitute the -place which excludes nothing, because it is the universe. As to the law -according to which men move, each of them, considered in his dependence -towards the universe, is a part of all; considered in himself, he is a -whole. - - -WHY THE HEAVENS MOVE IN A CIRCLE. - -Now, if the heavens possess the Soul, wherever they are, what urges -them to move in a circle? Surely because the Soul is not exclusively in -a determinate place (and the world does not exclusively in one place -desire to possess her). Besides, if the power of the Soul revolve -around the centre, it is once more evident that the heavens would move -in a circle. - - -DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE CENTRE OF THE SOUL AND THE BODY. - -Besides, when we speak of the Soul, we must not understand the term -"centre" in the same sense as when it is used of the body. For the -Soul, the centre is the focus of (the intelligence) whence radiates a -second life (that is, the Soul); as to the body, it is a locality (the -centre of the world). Since, however, both soul and body need a centre, -we are forced to use this word in an analogous meaning which may suit -both of them. Speaking strictly, however, a centre can exist only for -a spherical body, and the analogy consists in this, that the latter, -like the Soul, effects a reflection upon itself. In this case, the Soul -moves around the divinity, embraces Him, and clings to Him with all -her might; for everything depends from Him. But, as she cannot unite -herself to Him, she moves around Him. - - -THE ADDITION OF OUR BODIES INTRODUCES CONFLICTING MOTIONS. - -Why do not all souls act like the universal Soul? They do act like -her, but do so only in the place where they are. Why do our bodies not -move in a circle, like the heavens? Because they include an element -whose natural motion is rectilinear; because they trend towards other -objects, because the spherical element[315] in us can no longer easily -move in a circle, because it has become terrestrial, while in the -celestial region is was light and movable enough. How indeed could it -remain at rest, while the Soul was in motion, whatever this movement -was? This spirit(ual body) which, within us, is spread around the soul, -does the same thing as do the heavens. Indeed, if the divinity be in -everything, the Soul, which desires to unite herself to Him, must move -around Him, since He resides in no determinate place. Consequently, -Plato attributes to the stars, besides the revolution which they -perform in common with the universe, a particular movement of rotation -around their own centre. Indeed, every star, in whatever place it may -be, is transported with joy while embracing the divinity; and this -occurs not by reason, but by a natural necessity. - - -HOW MOTION IS IMPARTED TO LOWER EXISTENCES. - -3. One more subject remains to be considered. The lowest power of -the universal Soul (the inferior soul),[316] rests on the earth, -and thence radiates abroad throughout the universe. The (higher, or -celestial) power (of the world-Soul) which, by nature, possesses -sensation, opinion, and reasoning, resides in the celestial spheres, -whence it dominates the inferior power, and communicates life to it. -It thereby moves the inferior power, embracing it in a circle; and -it presides over the universe as it returns (from the earth) to the -celestial spheres. The inferior power, being circularly embraced by -the superior power, reflects upon itself, and thus operates on itself -a conversion by which it imparts a movement of rotation to the body -within which it reacts. (This is how motion starts) in a sphere that -is at rest: as soon as a part moves, the movement spreads to the rest -of it, and the sphere begins to revolve. Not otherwise is our body; -when our soul begins to move, as in joy, or in the expectation of -welfare, although this movement be of a kind very different from that -natural to a body, this soul-movement produces local motion in the -body. Likewise the universal Soul, on high, while approaching the Good, -and becoming more sensitive (to its proximity), thereby impresses the -body with the motion proper to it, namely, the local movement. (Our own -human) sense-(faculty), while receiving its good from above, and while -enjoying the pleasures proper to its nature, pursues the Good, and, -inasmuch as the Good is everywhere present, it is borne everywhere. -The intelligence is moved likewise; it is simultaneously at rest and -in motion, reflecting upon itself. Similarly the universe moves in a -circle, though simultaneously standing still. - - - - -THIRD ENNEAD, BOOK FOUR. - -Of Our Individual Guardian. - - -OUTLINE OF NATURES IN THE UNIVERSE. - -Other principles remain unmoved while producing and exhibiting -their ("hypostases," substantial acts, or) forms of existence. The -(universal) Soul, however, is in motion while producing and exhibiting -her ("substantial act," or) forms of existence, namely, the functions -of sensation and growth, reaching down as far as (the sphere of the) -plants. In us also does the Soul function, but she does not dominate -us, constituting only a part of our nature. She does, however, -dominate in plants, having as it were remained alone there. Beyond -that sphere, however, nature begets nothing; for beyond it exists no -life, begotten (matter) being lifeless. All that was begotten prior -to this was shapeless, and achieved form only by trending towards its -begetting principle, as to its source of life. Consequently, that -which is begotten cannot be a form of the Soul, being lifeless, but -must be absolute in determination. The things anterior (to matter, -namely, the sense-power and nature), are doubtless indeterminate, -but only so within their form; the are not absolutely indeterminate; -they are indeterminate only in respect of their perfection. On the -contrary, that which exists at present, namely, (matter), is absolutely -indeterminate. When it achieves perfection, it becomes body, on -receiving the form suited to its power. This (form) is the receptacle -of the principle which has begotten it, and which nourishes it. It is -the only trace of the higher things in the body, which occupies the -last rank amidst the things below. - - -AFTER DEATH, MAN BECOMES WHAT HE HAS LIVED. - -2. It is to this (universal) Soul especially that may be applied -these words of Plato:[317] "The general Soul cares for all that is -inanimate." The other (individual) souls are in different conditions. -"The Soul (adds Plato), circulates around the heavens successively -assuming divers forms"; that is, the forms of thought, sense or growth. -The part which dominates in the soul fulfills its proper individual -function; the others remain inactive, and somehow seem exterior to -them. In man, it is not the lower powers of the soul that dominate. -They do indeed co-exist with the others. Neither is it always the -best power (reason), which always dominates; for the inferior powers -equally have their place. Consequently, man (besides being a reasonable -being) is also a sensitive being, because he possesses sense-organs. -In many respects, he is also a vegetative being; for his body feeds -and grows just like a plant. All these powers (reason, sensibility, -growth), therefore act together in the man; but it is the best of them -that characterizes the totality of the man (so that he is called a -"reasonable being"). On leaving the body the soul becomes the power she -had preponderatingly developed. Let us therefore flee from here below, -and let us raise ourselves to the intelligible world, so as not to fall -into the pure sense-life, by allowing ourselves to follow sense-images, -or into the life of growth, by abandoning ourselves to the pleasures -of physical love, and to gormandizing; rather, let us rise to the -intelligible world, to the intelligence, to the divinity! - - -LAWS OF TRANSMIGRATION. - -Those who have exercised their human faculties are re-born as men. -Those who have made use of their senses only, pass into the bodies of -brutes, and particularly into the bodies of wild animals, if they have -yielded themselves to the transports of anger; so that, even in this -case, the difference of the bodies they animate is proportioned to the -difference of their inclinations. Those whose only effort it was to -satisfy their desires and appetites pass into the bodies of lascivious -and gluttonous animals.[318] Last, those who instead of following -their desires or their anger, have rather degraded their senses by -their inertia, are reduced to vegetate in plants; for in their former -existence they exercised nothing but their vegetative power, and they -worked at nothing but to make trees of themselves.[319] Those who -have loved too much the enjoyments of music, and who otherwise lived -purely, pass into the bodies of melodious birds. Those who have reigned -tyrannically, become eagles, if they have no other vice.[320] Last, -those who spoke lightly of celestial things, having kept their glance -directed upwards, are changed into birds which usually fly towards the -high regions of the air.[321] He who has acquired civil virtues again -becomes a man; but if he does not possess them to a sufficient degree, -he is transformed into a sociable animal, such as the bee, or other -animal of the kind. - - -OUR GUARDIAN IS THE NEXT HIGHER FACULTY OF OUR BEING. - -3. What then is our guardian? It is one of the powers of our soul. -What is our divinity? It is also one of the powers of our soul. (Is it -the power which acts principally in us as some people think?) For the -power which acts in us seems to be that which leads us, since it is -the principle which dominates in us. Is that the guardian to which we -have been allotted during the course of our life?[323] No: our guardian -is the power immediately superior to the one that we exercise, for it -presides over our life without itself being active. The power which -is active in us is inferior to the one that presides over our life, -and it is the one which essentially constitutes us. If then we live -on the plane of the sense-life, our guardian is reason; if we live on -the rational plane, our guardian will be the principal superior to -reason (namely, intelligence); it will preside over our life, but it -itself does not act, leaving that to the inferior power. Plato truly -said that "we choose our guardian"; for, by the kind of life that we -prefer, we choose the guardian that presides over our life. Why then -does He direct us? He directs us during the course of our mortal life -(because he is given to us to help us to accomplish our (destiny); but -he can no longer direct us when our destiny is accomplished, because -the power over the exercise of which he presided allows another power -to act in his place (which however is dead, since the life in which it -acted is terminated). This other power wishes to act in its turn, and, -after having established its preponderance, it exercises itself during -the course of a new life, itself having another guardian. If then we -should chance to degrade ourselves by letting an inferior power prevail -in us, we are punished for it. Indeed, the evil man degenerates because -the power which he has developed in his life makes him descend to the -existence of the brute, by assimilating him to it by his morals. If -we could follow the guardian who is superior to him, he himself would -become superior by sharing his life. He would then take as guide a -part of himself superior to the one that governs him, then another -part, still more elevated until he had arrived at the highest. Indeed, -the soul is several things, or rather, the soul is all things; she -is things both inferior and superior; she contains all the degrees -of life. Each of us, in a certain degree, is the intelligible world; -by our inferior part we are related to the sense-world, and by our -superior part, to the intelligible world; we remain there on high by -what constitutes our intelligible essence; we are attached here below -by the powers which occupy the lowest rank in the soul. Thus we cause -an emanation, or rather an actualization which implies no loss to the -intelligible, to pass from the intelligible into the sense-world. - - -THE INTELLIGIBLE DOES NOT DESCEND; IT IS THE SENSE-WORLD THAT RISES. - -4. Is the power which is the act of the soul always united to a body? -No; for when the soul turns towards the superior regions, she raises -this power with her. Does the universal (Soul) also raise with herself -to the intelligible world the inferior power which is her actualization -(nature)? No: for she does not incline towards her low inferior -portion, because she neither came nor descended into the world; but, -while she remains in herself, the body of the world comes to unite with -her, and to offer itself to receive her light's radiation; besides, her -body does not cause her any anxiety, because it is not exposed to any -peril. Does not the world, then, possess any senses? "It has no sight" -(says Plato[324]) "for it has no eyes. Neither has it ears, nostrils, -nor tongue." Does it, then, as we, possess the consciousness of what is -going on within it? As, within the world, all things go on uniformly -according to nature, it is, in this respect, in a kind of repose; -consequently, it does not feel any pleasure. The power of growth -exists within it without being present therein; and so also with the -sense-power. Besides, we shall return to a study of the question. For -the present, we have said all that relates to the question in hand. - - -THE GUIDANCE OF THE GUARDIAN DOES NOT INTERFERE WITH MORAL -RESPONSIBILITY. - -5. But if (before coming on to the earth) the soul chooses her life -and her guardian, how do we still preserve our liberty? Because what -is called "choice" designates in an allegorical manner the character -of the soul, and her general disposition everywhere. Again, it is -objected that if the character of the soul preponderate, if the soul -be dominated by that part which her former life rendered predominantly -active, it is no longer the body which is her cause of evil; for if -the character of the soul be anterior to her union with the body; if -she have the character she has chosen; if, as said (Plato), she do not -change her guardian, it is not here below that a man may become good or -evil. The answer to this is, that potentially man is equally good or -evil. (By his choices) however he may actualize one or the other. - - -THE SOUL HAS THE POWER TO CONFORM TO HER CHARACTER THE DESTINY ALLOTTED -TO HER. - -What then would happen if a virtuous man should have a body of evil -nature, or a vicious man a body of a good nature? The goodness of the -soul has more or less influence on the goodness of the body. Exterior -circumstances cannot thus alter the character chosen by the soul. When -(Plato) says that the lots are spread out before the souls, and that -later the different kinds of conditions are displayed before them, -and that the fortune of each results from the choice made amidst the -different kinds of lives present--a choice evidently made according to -her character--(Plato) evidently attributes to the soul the power of -conforming to her character the condition allotted to her. - - -OUR GUARDIAN IS BOTH RELATED TO US, AND INDEPENDENT OF US. - -Besides, our guardian is not entirely exterior to us; and, on the -other hand, he is not bound to us, and is not active in us; he is -ours, in the sense that he has a certain relation with our soul; he is -not ours, in the sense that we are such men, living such a life under -his supervision. This is the meaning of the terms used (by Plato) in -the Timaeus.[325] If these be taken in the above sense, all explains -itself; if not, Plato contradicts himself. - - -OUR GUARDIAN HELPS US TO CARRY OUT THE DESTINY WE HAVE CHOSEN. - -One can still understand thus why he says that our guardian helps us -to fulfil the destiny we have chosen. In fact, presiding over our -life, he does not permit us to descend very far below the condition we -have chosen. But that which then is active is the principle below the -guardian and which can neither transcend him, nor equal him; for he -could not become different from what he is. - - -THAT MAN IS VIRTUOUS WHOSE HIGHEST PRINCIPLE IS ACTIVE WITHIN HIM. - -6. Who then is the virtuous man? He in whom is active the highest part -of the soul. If his guardian contributed to his actions, he would not -deserve being called virtuous. Now it is the Intelligence which is -active in the virtuous man. It is the latter, then, who is a guardian, -or lives according to one; besides, his guardian is the divinity. -Is this guardian above Intelligence? Yes, if the guardian have, as -guardian, the principle superior to Intelligence (the Good). But why -does the virtuous man not enjoy this privilege since the beginning? -Because of the trouble he felt in falling into generation. Even before -the exercise of reason, he has within him a desire which leads him -to the things which are suitable to him. But does this desire direct -with sovereign influence? No, not with sovereignty; for the soul is so -disposed that, in such circumstances becoming such, she adopts such a -life, and follows such an inclination. - - -BETWEEN INCARNATIONS IS THE TIME OF JUDGMENT AND EXPIATION. - -(Plato) says that the guardian leads the soul to the hells,[326] -and that he does not remain attached to the same soul, unless this -soul should again choose the same condition. What does the guardian -do before this choice? Plato teaches us that he leads the soul to -judgment, that after the generation he assumes again the same form -as before; and then as if another existence were then beginning, -during the time between generations, the guardian presides over the -chastisements of the souls, and this period is for them not so much a -period of life, as a period of expiation. - - -EVEN THE SOULS ENTERING INTO ANIMAL BODIES HAVE A GUARDIAN. - -Do the souls that enter into the bodies of brutes also have a guardian? -Yes, doubtless, but an evil or stupid one. - - -CONDITION OF SOULS IN THE HIGHER REGIONS. - -What is the condition of the souls that have raised themselves on high? -Some are in the sensible world, others are outside of it. The souls -that are in the sense-world dwell in the sun, or in some other planet, -or in the firmament, according as they have more or less developed -their reason. We must, indeed, remember that our soul contains in -herself not only the intelligible world, but also a disposition -conformable to the Soul of the world. Now as the latter is spread out -in the movable spheres and in the immovable sphere by her various -powers, our soul must possess powers conformable to these, each of -which exercise their proper function. The souls which rise from here -below into the heavens go to inhabit the star which harmonizes with -their moral life, and with the power which they have developed; with -their divinity, or their guardian. Then they will have either the same -guardian, or the guardian which is superior to the power which they -exert. This matter will have to be considered more minutely. - - -FATE OF THE DIVISIBLE HUMAN SOUL. - -As to the souls which have left the sense-world, so long as they remain -in the intelligible world, they are above the guardian condition, -and the fatality of generation. Souls bring with them thither that -part of their nature which is desirous of begetting, and which may -reasonably be regarded as the essence which is divisible in the body, -and which multiplies by dividing along with the bodies. Moreover, if -a soul divide herself, it is not in respect to extension; because she -is entirely in all the bodies. On the other hand, the Soul is one; and -from a single animal are ceaselessly born many young. This generative -element splits up like the vegetative nature in plants; for this nature -is divisible in the bodies. When this divisible essence dwells in the -same body, it vivifies the body, just as the vegetative power does for -plants. When it retires, it has already communicated life, as is seen -in cut trees, or in corpses where putrefaction has caused the birth of -several animals from a single one. Besides, the vegetative power of the -human soul is assisted by the vegetative power that is derived from the -universal (Soul), and which here below is the same (as on high). - - -FATE CONSISTS IN THE UNPREDICTABLE CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH ALTER THE -LIFE-CURRENTS. - -If the soul return here below, she possesses, according to the life -which she is to lead, either the same guardian, or another. With her -guardian she enters into this world as if in a skiff. Then she is -subjected to the power (by Plato) called the Spindle of Necessity;[327] -and, embarking in this world, she takes the place assigned to her by -fortune. Then she is caught by the circular movement of the heavens, -whose action, as if it were the wind, agitates the skiff in which the -soul is seated; or rather, is borne along. Thence are born varied -spectacles, transformations and divers incidents for the soul which -is embarked in this skiff; whether because of the agitation of the -sea which bears it, or because of the conduct of the passenger who is -sailing in the bark, and who preserves her freedom of action therein. -Indeed, not every soul placed in the same circumstances makes the same -movements, wills the same volitions, or performs the same actions. For -different beings, therefore, the differences arise from circumstances -either similar or different, or even the same events may occur to -them under different circumstances. It is this (uncertainty) that -constitutes Providence. - - - - -FIRST ENNEAD, BOOK NINE. - -Of Suicide. - - -EVIL EFFECTS OF SUICIDE ON THE SOUL HERSELF. - -1. (As says pseudo-Zoroaster, in his Magic Oracles), "The soul should -not be expelled from the body by violence, lest she go out (dragging -along with her something foreign," that is, corporeal). In this case, -she will be burdened with this foreign element whithersoever she may -emigrate. By "emigrating," I mean passing into the Beyond. On the -contrary, one should wait until the entire body naturally detaches -itself from the soul; in which case she no longer needs to pass into -any other residence, being completely unburdened of the body. - - -HOW TO DETACH THE SOUL FROM THE BODY NATURALLY. - -How will the body naturally detach itself from the soul? By the -complete rupture of the bonds which keep the soul attached to the body, -by the body's impotence to fetter the soul, on account of the complete -destruction of the harmony which conferred this power on it. - - -VOLUNTARY SOUL-DETACHMENT IS FORBIDDEN. - -One may not voluntarily disengage oneself from the fetters of the body. -When violence is employed, it is not the body which disengages itself -from the soul, it is the soul which makes an effort to snatch herself -from the body, and that by an action which accomplishes itself not in -the state of impassibility (which suits a sage), but as the result of -grief, or suffering, or of anger. Now such an action is forbidden, or -unworthy. - - -SUICIDE UNAVAILABLE EVEN TO AVOID INSANITY. - -May one not forestall delirium or insanity, if one become aware of -their approach? To begin with, insanity does not happen to a sage, and -if it does, this accident should be considered one of those inevitable -things which depend from fatality, and in which case one should direct -one's path less according to his intrinsic quality than according to -circumstances; for perhaps the poison one might select to eject the -soul from the body might do nothing but injure the soul. - - -SUICIDE IS UNADVISABLE, FOR TWO REASONS. - -If there be an appointed time for the life of each of us, it is -not well to forestall the decree of Providence, unless, as we have -said,[328] under absolute compulsion. - -Last, if rank obtained above depend on the state obtaining at the time -of exit from the body, no man should separate himself from it so long -as he might still achieve progress.[329] - - - - -SECOND ENNEAD, BOOK SIX. - -Of Essence and Being. - - -DISTINCTION BETWEEN ESSENCE AND BEING. - -1. Is "essence" something different from "being"? Does essence indicate -an abstraction of the other (four categories), and is being, on the -contrary, essence with the other (four categories), motion and rest, -identity and difference? Are these the elements of being? Yes: "being" -is the totality of these things, of which one is essence, the other is -motion, and so forth. Motion, therefore, is accidental essence. Is it -also accidental "being?" Or is it being completely? Motion is being, -because all intelligible things are beings. But why is not each of the -sense-things a being? The reason is, that on high all things form only -a single group of totality, while here below they are distinct one from -another because they are images that have been distinguished. Likewise, -in a seminal (reason), all things are together, and each of them is -all the others; the hand is not distinct from the head; while, on the -contrary, in a body all the organs are separate, because they are -images instead of being genuine beings. - - -DISTINCTION BETWEEN COMPLEMENTS OF BEING, AND QUALITIES. - -We may now say that, in the intelligible world, qualities are the -characteristic differences in being or essence. These differences -effect distinction between the beings; in short, they cause them to -be beings. This definition seems reasonable. But it does not suit the -qualities below (in the sense-world); some are differences of being, -as biped, or quadruped (as thought Aristotle);[330] others are not -differences, and on that very account are called qualities. Still, -the same thing may appear a difference when it is a complement of -the being, and again it may not seem a difference when it is not a -complement of the being, but an accident: as, for instance, whiteness -is a complement of being in a swan, or in white lead; but in a human -being like you, it is only an accident (as thought Aristotle).[331] So -long as the whiteness is in the ("seminal) reason," it is a complement -of being, and not a quality; if it be on the surface of a being, it is -a quality. - - -DISTINCTION BETWEEN ESSENTIAL AND MODAL QUALITIES. - -Two kinds of qualities must be distinguished; the essential quality, -which is a peculiarity of its being, and the mere quality, which -affects the being's classification. The mere quality introduces no -change in the essence, and causes none of its characteristics to -disappear; but, when the being exists already, and is complete, -this quality gives it a certain exterior disposition; and, whether -in the case of a soul or body, adds something to it. Thus visible -whiteness, which is of the very being of white lead, is not of the -being of the swan, because a swan may be of some color other than -white. Whiteness then completes the being of white lead, just as heat -completes the being of fire. If igneousness is said to be the being -of fire, whiteness is also the being of white lead. Nevertheless, -the igneousness of the visible fire is heat, which constitutes the -complement of its being; and whiteness plays the same part with respect -to white lead. Therefore (differing according to the difference of -various beings) the same things will be complements of being, and -will not be qualities, or they will not be complements of being, and -will be qualities; but it would not be reasonable to assert that -these qualities are different according to whether or not they are -complements of being, since their nature is the same. - - -DISTINCTION BETWEEN WHATNESS AND AFFECTIONS OF BEING. - -We must acknowledge that the reasons which produce these things (as -heat, and whiteness) are beings, if taken in their totality; but on -considering their production, we see that what constitutes a whatness -or quiddity (the Aristotelian "what it were to be") in the intelligible -world, becomes a quality in the sense-world. Consequently, we always -err on the subject of the quiddity, when we try to determine it, -mistaking the simple quality for it (as thought Plato),[332] for, when -we perceive a quality, the fire is not what we call fire, but a being. -As to the things which arrest our gaze, we should distinguish them from -the quiddity, and define them by the qualities of sense (objects); for -they do not constitute the being, but the affections of being. - - -ACTUALIZED BEING LESS PERFECT THAN ESSENCE. - -We are thus led to ask how a being can be composed of non-beings? It -has already been pointed out that the things subject to generation -could not be identical with the principles from which they proceed. Let -us now add that they could not be beings. But still, how can one say -that the intelligible being is constituted by a non-being? The reason -is that in the intelligible world since being forms a purer and more -refined essence, being really is somehow constituted by the differences -of essence; or rather, we feel it ought to be called being from -considering it together with its energies (or, actualizations). This -being seems to be a perfecting of essence; but perhaps being is less -perfect when it is thus considered together with its actualizations; -for, being less simple, it veers away from essence. - - -SUCHNESS IS LATER THAN BEING AND QUIDDITY. - -2. Let us now consider what quality in general is; for when we shall -know this, our doubts will cease. First, must it be admitted that one -and the same thing is now a quality, and then a complement of being? -Can one say that quality is the complement of being, or rather of such -a being? The suchness of being implies a previously existing being and -quiddity. - - -BEING CANNOT PRECEDE SUCH BEING. - -Taking the illustration of fire, is it "mere being" before it is "such -being?" In this case, it would be a body. Consequently, the body will -be a being; fire will be a hot body. Body and heat combined will not -constitute being; but heat will exist in the body as in you exists the -property of having a stub nose (as said Aristotle).[333] Consequently, -if we abstract heat, shine and lightness, which seem to be qualities, -and also impenetrability, nothing will remain but tridimensional -extension, and matter will be "being." But this hypothesis does not -seem likely; it is rather form which will be "being." - - -FORM IS NOT A QUALITY; BUT A REASON. - -Is form a quality? No: form is a reason. Now what is constituted by -(material) substance, and reason? (In the warm body) it is neither what -burns, nor what is visible; it is quality. If, however, it be said that -combustion is an act emanating from reason, that being hot and white -are actualities, we could not find anything to explain quality. - - -QUALITIES ARE ACTS OF BEING, PROCEEDING FROM REASONS AND ESSENTIAL -POTENTIALITIES. - -What we call a complement of being should not be termed a quality, -because they are actualizations of being, actualizations which proceed -from the reasons and the essential potentialities. Qualities are -therefore something outside of being; something which does not at times -seem to be, and at other times does not seem not to be qualities; -something which adds to being something that is not necessary; for -example, virtues and vices, ugliness and beauty, health, and individual -resemblance. Though triangle, and tetragon, each considered by itself, -are not qualities; yet being "transformed into triangular appearance" -is a quality; it is not therefore triangularity, but triangular -formation, which is a quality. The same could be said of the arts -and professions. Consequently, quality is a disposition, either -adventitious or original, in already existing beings. Without it, -however, being would exist just as much. It might be said that quality -is either mutable or immutable; for it forms two kinds, according to -whether it be permanent or changeable. - - -DIFFERENCE BETWEEN INTELLIGIBLE AND SENSE-QUALITY. - -3. The whiteness that I see in you is not a quality, but an -actualization of the potentiality of whitening. In the intelligible -world all the things that we call qualities are actualizations. -They are called qualities because they are properties, because they -differentiate the beings from each other, because in respect to -themselves they bear a particular character. But since quality in -the sense-world is also an actualization, in what does it differ -from the intelligible quality? The sense-quality does not show the -essential quality of every being, nor the difference or character of -substances, but simply the thing that we properly call quality, and -which is an actualization in the intelligible world. When the property -of something is to be a being, this thing is not a quality. But when -reason separates beings from their properties, when it removes nothing -from them, when it limits itself to conceiving and begetting different -from these beings, it begets quality, which it conceives of as the -superficial part of being. In this case, nothing hinders the heat of -the fire, so far as it is natural to it, from constituting a form, an -actualization, and not a quality of the fire; it is a quality when it -exists in a substance where it no longer constitutes the form of being, -but only a trace, an adumbration, an image of being, because it finds -itself separated from the being whose actualization it is. - - -QUALITIES ARE ACCIDENTAL SHAPES OF BEING. - -Qualities, therefore, are everything that, instead of being -actualizations and forms of beings, are only its accidents, and only -reveal its shapes. We will therefore call qualities the habituations -and the dispositions which are not essential to substances. The -archetypes (or models) of qualities are the actualizations of the -beings, which are the principles of these qualities. It is impossible -for the same thing at one time to be, and at another not to be a -quality. What can be separated from being is quality; what remains -united to being is being, form, and actualization. In fact, nothing can -be the same in itself, and in some other condition where it has ceased -to be form and an actualization. What, instead of being the form of a -being, is always its accident, is purely and exclusively a quality. - - - - -FIFTH ENNEAD, BOOK SEVEN. - -Do Ideas of Individuals Exist? - - -TWO POSSIBLE HYPOTHESES OF IDEAS OF INDIVIDUALS. - -1. Do ideas of individuals (as well as of classes of individuals), -exist? This means that if I, in company with some other man, were to -trace ourselves back to the intelligible world, we would there find -separate individual principles corresponding to each of us. (This might -imply either of two theories.) Either, if the individual named Socrates -be eternal, and if the soul of Socrates be Socrates himself, then the -soul of each individual is contained in the intelligible world. Or -if, on the contrary, the individual named Socrates be not eternal, if -the same soul can belong successively to several individuals, such as -Socrates or Pythagoras, then (as Alcinoous, e. g., and other Platonists -insist), each individual does not have his idea in the intelligible -world. - - -THE FIRST (NON-PLATONIC) HYPOTHESIS ALONE RIGHT. - -If the particular soul of each man contains ("seminal) reasons" of -all the things she does, then each individual corresponds to his idea -in the intelligible world, for we admit that each soul contains as -many ("seminal) reasons" as the entire world. In this case, the soul -would contain not only the ("seminal) reasons" of men but also those -of all animals, the number of these reasons will be infinite, unless -(as the Stoics teach) the world does not re-commence the identical -series of existences in fixed periods; for the only means of limiting -the infinity of reasons, is that the same things should reproduce -themselves. - - -DIFFERENCE OF THINGS DEPEND ON THEIR SEMINAL REASONS. - -But, if produced things may be more numerous than their specimens, -what would be the necessity for the "reasons" and specimens of all -individuals begotten during some one period? It would seem that the -(idea of) the "man himself" to explain the existence of all men, and -that the souls of a finite number of them could successively animate -men of an infinite number. (To this contention we demur: for) it -is impossible for different things to have an identical ("seminal) -reason." The (idea of) the man himself would not, as model, suffice -(to account) for men who differ from each other not only by matter, -but also by specific differences. They cannot be compared to the -images of Socrates which reproduce their model. Only the difference -of the ("seminal) reasons" could give rise to individual differences. -(As Plato said),[334] the entire period contains all the ("seminal) -reasons." When it recommences, the same things rearise through the same -"reasons." We need not fear that, as a consequence, there would be an -infinite (number or variety) of them in the intelligible world; for the -multitude (of the seminal reasons) constitutes an indivisible principle -from which each issues forth whenever active. - - -SEX ALONE WOULD NOT ACCOUNT FOR THIS DIVERSITY. - -2. (First objection): The manner in which the ("seminal) reasons" -of the male and female unite, in the act of generation, suffices to -account for the diversity of individuals, without implying that each -of them possesses its own ("seminal) reason." The generating principle, -the male, for example, will not propagate according to different -("seminal) reasons," since it possesses all of them, but only according -to its own, or those of its father. Since it possesses all of the -("seminal) reasons," nothing would hinder it from begetting according -to different "reasons," only, there are always some which are more -disposed to act than are others. - - -EXPLANATION OF THE DIVERSITY FROM SAME PARENTS - -(Second objection): Please explain how differing individuals are -born from the same parents. This diversity, if it be anything -more than merely apparent, depends on the manner in which the two -generating principles concur in the act of generation; at one time -the male predominates, at other times, the female; again, they may -both act equally. In either case, the ("seminal) reason" is given in -its entirety, and dominates the matter furnished by either of the -generating principles. - - -VARIETY MAY DEPEND ON THE LATENCY OF PART OF SEMINAL REASONS. - -(Third objection): What then is the cause of the difference of the -individuals conceived in some other place (than the womb, as in the -mouth), (as Aristotle[335] and Sextus Empiricus[336] asked)? Would -it arise from matter being penetrated by the ("seminal) reason" in -differing degrees? In this case, all the individuals, except one, would -be beings against nature (which, of course, is absurd). The varieties -of the individuals are a principle of beauty; consequently, form cannot -be one of them; ugliness alone should be attributed to the predominance -of matter. In the intelligible world, the ("seminal) reasons" are -perfect, and they are not given any less entirely for being hidden. - - -LEIBNITZ'S DOCTRINE OF THE INDISCERNIBLES. - -(Fourth objection): Granting that the ("seminal) reasons" of the -individuals are different, why should there be as many as there are -individuals which achieve existence in any one period? It is possible -that identical "reasons" might produce individuals differing in -external appearance; and we have even granted that this may occur -when the ("seminal) reasons" are given entirely. It is asked, is -this possible when the same "reasons" are developed? We teach that -absolutely similar things might be reproduced in different periods; -but, within the same period, there is nothing absolutely identical. - - -THERE ARE DIFFERENT IDEAS FOR TWINS, BRETHREN, OR WORKS OF ART. - -3. (Fifth objection): But how could ("seminal) reasons" be different in -the conception of twins, and in the act of generation in the case of -animals who procreate multiple offspring? Here it would seem that when -the individuals are similar, there could be but one single "reason." -No so; for in that case there would not be so many "reasons" as there -are individuals; and, on the contrary, it will have to be granted that -there are as many as there are individuals that differ by specific -differences, and not by a mere lack of form. Nothing therefore hinders -us from admitting that there are different "reasons," even for animal -offspring which show no difference, if there were such. An artist -who produces similar works cannot produce this resemblance without -introducing in it some difference which depends on reasoning; so that -every work he produces differs from the others, because he adds some -difference to the similarity. In nature, where the difference does not -derive from reasoning, but only from differing ("seminal) reasons" the -(individual) difference will have to be added to the specific form, -even though we may not be able to discern it. The ("seminal) reason" -would be different if generation admitted chance as to quantity (the -number of offspring begotten). But if the number of things to be born -is determinate, the quantity will be limited by the evolution and -development of all the "reasons," so that, when the series of all -things will be finished, another period may recommence. The quantity -suitable to the world, and the number of beings who are to exist -therein, are things regulated and contained in the principle which -contains all the "reasons" (that is, the universal Soul), from the very -beginning. - - - - -FIRST ENNEAD, BOOK TWO. - -Concerning Virtue. - - -VIRTUE THE ROAD TO ESCAPE EVILS. - -1. Man must flee from (this world) here below (for two reasons): -because it is the nature of the soul to flee from evil, and because -inevitable evil prevails and dominates this world here below. What -is this flight (and how can we accomplish it)? (Plato),[337] tells -us it consists in "being assimilated to divinity." This then can be -accomplished by judiciously conforming to justice, and holiness; in -short, by virtue. - - -CAN THESE VIRTUES BE ASCRIBED TO THE DIVINITY? - -If then it be by virtue that we are assimilated (to divinity), does -this divinity to whom we are trying to achieve assimilation, Himself -possess virtue? Besides, what divinity is this? Surely it must be He -who must most seem to possess virtue, the world-Soul, together with the -principle predominating in her, whose wisdom is most admirable (supreme -Intelligence)--for it is quite reasonable that we should be assimilated -to Him. Nevertheless, one might, unreflectingly, question whether all -virtues might suit this divinity; whether, for instance, moderation in -his desires, or courage could be predicated of Him; for, as to courage, -nothing can really harm Him, and He therefore has nothing to fear; and -as to moderation, no pleasant object whose presence would excite His -desires, or whose absence would in Him awaken regrets, could possibly -exist. But inasmuch as the divinity, just as we ourselves, aspires to -intelligible things, He is evidently the source of our gracious sanity -and virtues. So we are forced to ask ourselves, "Does the divinity -possess these virtues?" - - -HOMELY VIRTUES ASSIMILATE US TO DIVINITY ONLY PARTIALLY. - -It would not be proper to attribute to Him the homely (or, civil) -virtues, such as prudence, which "relates to the rational part of our -nature"; courage, which "relates to our irascible part"; temperance, -which consists of the harmonious consonance of our desires and our -reason; last, of justice, which "consists in the accomplishment by all -these faculties of the function proper to each of them," "whether to -command, or to obey," (as said Plato[338]). But if we cannot become -assimilated to the divinity by these homely virtues, that process -must demand similarly named virtues of a superior order. However, -these homely virtues would not be entirely useless to achieve that -result, for one cannot say that while practising them one does not at -all resemble the divinity as they who practise them are reputed to be -godlike. These lower virtues do therefore yield some resemblance to the -divinity, but complete assimilation can result only from virtues of a -higher order. - - -THE DIVINE NEED NOT POSSESS THE LOWER VIRTUES BY WHICH WE ARE -ASSIMILATED TO HIM. - -Virtues, even if they be not homely, are therefore ultimately ascribed -(to the divinity). Granting that the divinity does not possess the -homely virtues, we may still become assimilated to Him by other virtues -for with virtues of another order the case might differ. Therefore, -without assimilating ourselves to the divinity by homely virtues we -might nevertheless by means of virtues which still are ours, become -assimilated to the Being which does not possess virtue. - -This may be explained by an illustration. When a body is warmed by the -presence of fire, the fire itself need not be heated by the presence of -another fire. It might be argued that there was heat in the fire, but -a heat that is innate. Reasoning by analogy, the virtue, which in the -soul is only adventitious, is innate in Him from whom the soul derives -it by imitation; (in other words, the cause need not necessarily -possess the same qualities as the effect). - -Our argument from heat might however be questioned, inasmuch as the -divinity really does possess virtue, though it be of a higher nature. -This observation would be correct, if the virtue in which the soul -participates were identical with the principle from which she derives -it. But there is a complete opposition; for when we see a house, the -sense-house is not identical with the intelligible House, though -possessing resemblance thereto. Indeed, the sense-house participates in -order and proportion, though neither order, proportion, nor symmetry -could be attributed to the idea of the House. Likewise, we derived -from the divinity order, proportion and harmony, which, here below, -are conditions of virtue, without thereby implying that the divinity -Himself need possess order, proportion, or harmony. Similarly, it is -not necessary that He possess virtue, although we become assimilated to -Him thereby. - -Such is our demonstration that human assimilation to the divine -Intelligence by virtue does not (necessarily imply) (in the divine -Intelligence itself) possession of virtue. Mere logical demonstration -thereof is not, however, sufficient; we must also convince. - - -THERE ARE TWO KINDS OF RESEMBLANCE. - -2. Let us first examine the virtues by which we are assimilated to -the divinity, and let us study the identity between our soul-image -which constitutes virtue, and supreme Intelligence's principle -which, without being virtue, is its archetype. There are two kinds -of resemblance: the first entails such identity of nature as exists -when both similar things proceed from a same principle; the second is -that of one thing to another which precedes it, as its principle. In -the latter case, there is no reciprocity, and the principle does not -resemble that which is inferior to it; or rather, the resemblance must -be conceived entirely differently. It does not necessitate that the -similar objects be of the same kind; it rather implies that they are of -different kinds, inasmuch as they resemble each other differently. - - -HOW HOMELY VIRTUES MAY ASSIMILATE MAN TO THE SUPREME. - -(It is difficult to define) what is virtue, in general or in -particular. To clear up the matter, let us consider one particular -kind of virtue: then it will be easy to determine the common essence -underlying them all. - -The above-mentioned homely virtues really render our souls gracious, -and improve them, regulating and moderating our appetites, tempering -our passions, delivering us from false opinions, limiting us within -just bounds, and they themselves must be determined by some kind of -measure. This measure given to our souls resembles the form given to -matter, and the proportion of intelligible things; it is as it were -a trace of what is most perfect above. What is unmeasured, being no -more than formless matter, cannot in any way resemble divinity. The -greater the participation in form, the greater the assimilation to the -formless; and the closer we get to form, the greater the participation -therein. Thus our soul, whose nature is nearer to divinity and more -kindred to it than the body is, thereby participates the more in the -divine, and increases that resemblance enough to make it seem that the -divinity is all that she herself is. Thus arises the deception, which -represents her as the divine divinity, as if her quality constituted -that of the divinity. Thus are men of homely virtues assimilated to the -divinity. - - -PLATO DISTINGUISHES BETWEEN THE HOMELY AND THE HIGHER VIRTUES. - -3. We will now, following (Plato),[339] speak of another kind of -assimilation as the privilege of a higher virtue. We will thus better -understand the nature of homely virtues, and the higher virtues, -and the difference between them. Plato is evidently distinguishing -two kinds of virtues when he says that assimilation to the divinity -consists in fleeing from (the world) here below; when he adds the -qualification "homely" to the virtues relating to social life; and when -in another place he asserts[340] that all virtues are processes of -purification; and it is not to the homely virtues that he attributes -the power of assimilating us to the divinity. - - -HOW VIRTUES PURIFY. - -How then do the virtues purify? How does this process of purification -bring us as near as possible to the divinity? So long as the soul is -mingled with the body, sharing its passions and opinions, she is evil. -She becomes better, that is, she acquires virtues, only when, instead -of agreeing with the body, she thinks by herself (this is true thought, -and constitutes prudence); when she ceases to share its passions (in -other words, temperance); when she no longer fears separation from the -body (a state called courage); and last, when reason and intelligence -can enforce their command (or justice). - - -SELF-CONTROL IS ASSIMILATION TO THE DIVINITY. - -We may therefore unhesitatingly state that the resemblance to the -divinity lies in such regulation, in remaining impassible while -thinking intelligible things; for what is pure is divine and the -nature of the divine action is such that whatever imitates it thereby -possesses wisdom. But it is not the divinity that possesses such a -disposition, for dispositions are the property of souls only. Besides, -the soul does not think intelligible objects in the same manner as the -divinity; what is contained in the divinity is contained within us in -a manner entirely different, or even perhaps is not at all contained. -For instance, the divinity's thought is not at all identical with -ours; the divinity's thought is a primary principle from which our -thought is derived and differs. As the vocal word is only the image -of the interior reason[341] of the soul, so also is the word of the -soul only the image of the Word of a superior principle; and as the -exterior word, when compared to the interior reason of the soul, seems -discrete, or divided, so the reason of the soul, which is no more than -the interpreter of the intelligible word, is discrete, in comparison -with the latter. Thus does virtue belong to the soul without belonging -either to absolute Intelligence, nor to the Principle superior to -Intelligence. - - -PURIFICATION PRODUCES CONVERSION; AND VIRTUE MAKES USE OF THIS. - -4. Purification may be either identical with the above-defined virtue, -or virtue may be the result of purification. In this case, does virtue -consist of the actual process of purification, or in the already -purified condition? This is our problem here. - -The process of purification is inferior to the already purified -condition; for purity is the soul's destined goal. (Negative) purity -is mere separation from extraneous things; it is not yet (positive) -possession of its prize. If the soul had possessed goodness before -losing her purity, mere purification would be sufficient; and even in -this case the residuum of the purification would be the goodness, and -not the purification. What is the residuum? Not goodness; otherwise, -the soul would not have fallen into evil. The soul therefore possesses -the form of goodness, without however being able to remain solidly -attached thereto, because her nature permits her to turn either to the -good, or the evil. The good of the soul is to remain united to her -sister intelligence; her evil, is to abandon herself to the contrary -things. After purifying the soul, therefore, she must be united to the -divinity; but this implies turning her towards Him. Now this conversion -does not begin to occur after the purification, but is its very result. -The virtue of the soul, therefore, does not consist in her conversion, -but in that which she thereby obtains. This is the intuition of her -intelligible object; its image produced and realized within herself; an -image similar to that in the eye, an image which represents the things -seen. It is not necessary to conclude that the soul did not possess -this image, nor had any reminiscence thereof; she no doubt possessed -it, but inactively, latently, obscurely. To clarify it, to discover her -possessions, the soul needs to approach the source of all clearness. -As, however, the soul possesses only the images of the intelligibles, -without possessing the intelligibles themselves, she will be compelled -to compare with them her own image of them. Easily does the soul -contemplate the intelligibles, because the intelligence is not foreign -to her; when the soul wishes to enter in relations with them, all the -soul needs to do is to turn her glance towards them. Otherwise, the -intelligence, though present in the soul, will remain foreign to her. -This explains how all our acquisitions of knowledge are foreign to us -(as if non-existent), while we fail to recall them. - - -THE LIMIT OF PURIFICATION IS THAT OF THE SOUL'S SELF-CONTROL. - -5. The limit of purification decides to which (of the three hypostases -of) divinity the soul may hope to assimilate and identify herself; -therefore we shall have to consider that limit. To decide that would -be to examine the limit of the soul's ability to repress anger, -appetites, and passions of all kinds, to triumph over pain and similar -feelings--in short, to separate her from the body. This occurs when, -recollecting herself from the various localities over which she had, as -it were, spread herself, she retires within herself; when she estranges -herself entirely from the passions, when she allows the body only such -pleasures as are necessary or suitable to cure her pains, to recuperate -from its fatigues, and in avoiding its becoming importunate; when she -becomes insensible to sufferings; or, if that be beyond her power, in -supporting them patiently, and in diminishing them by refusing to share -them; when she appeases anger as far as possible, even suppressing -it entirely, if possible; or at least, if that be impossible, not -participating therein; abandoning to the animal nature all unthinking -impulses, and even so reducing to a minimum all reflex movements; -when she is absolutely inaccessible to fear, having nothing left to -risk; and when she represses all sudden movements, except nature's -warning of dangers. Evidently, the purified soul will have to desire -nothing shameful. In eating and drinking, she will seek only the -satisfaction of a need, while remaining foreign to it; nor will she -seek the pleasures of love; or, if she does, she will not go beyond the -exactions of nature, resisting every unconsidered tendency, or even in -remaining within the involuntary flights of fancy. - - -THE INFLUENCE OF REASON IS SUGGESTIVE. - -In short, the soul will be pure from all these passions, and will -even desire to purify our being's irrational part so as to preserve -it from emotions, or at least to moderate their number and intensity, -and to appease them promptly by her presence. So would a man, in the -neighborhood of some sage, profit thereby, either by growing similar -to him, or in refraining from doing anything of which the sage might -disapprove. This (suggestive) influence of reason will exert itself -without any struggle; its mere presence will suffice. The inferior -principle will respect it to the point of growing resentful against -itself, and reproaching itself for its weakness, if it feel any -agitation which might disturb its master's repose. - - -THE GOAL OF PURIFICATION IS SECOND DIVINITY, INTELLIGENCE. - -6. A man who has achieved such a state no longer commits such faults; -for he has become corrected. But his desired goal is not to cease -failing, but to be divine. In case he still allows within himself -the occurrence of some of the above-mentioned unreflecting impulses, -he will be simultaneously divinity and guardian, a double being; or -rather, he will contain a principle of another nature (Intelligence), -whose virtue will likewise differ from his. If, however, he be not -troubled by any of those motions, he will be wholly divine; he will be -one of those divinities "who (as Plato said)[342] form the attending -escort of the First." It is a divinity of such a nature that has -come down from above to dwell in us. To become again what one was -originally, is to live in this superior world. He who has achieved that -height dwells with pure Intelligence, and assimilates himself thereto -as far as possible. Consequently, he feels none of those emotions, nor -does he any more commit any actions, which would be disapproved of by -the superior principle who henceforth is his only master. - - -THE HIGHER VIRTUES MERGE INTO WISDOM. - -For such a being the separate virtues merge. For him, wisdom consists -in contemplating the (essences) possessed by Intelligence, and with -which Intelligence is in contact. There are two kinds of wisdom, one -being proper to intelligence, the other to the soul; only in the latter -may we speak of virtue. In the Intelligence exists only the energy (of -thought), and its essence. The image of this essence, seen here below -in a being of another nature, is the virtue which emanates from it. -In Intelligence, indeed, resides neither absolute justice, nor any of -those genuinely so-called virtues; nothing is left but their type. Its -derivative in the soul is virtue; for virtue is the attribute of an -individual being. On the contrary, the intelligible belongs to itself -only, and is the attribute of no particular being. - - -INCARNATE JUSTICE IS INDIVIDUAL; IF ABSOLUTE, IT IS INDIVISIBLE. - -Must justice ever imply multiplicity if it consist in fulfilling its -proper function? Surely, as long as it inheres in a principle with -several parts (such as a human soul, in which several functions may -be distinguished); but its essence lies in the accomplishment of -the function proper to every being, even when inhering in a unitary -principle (such as Intelligence). Absolute and veritable Justice -consists in the self-directed action of an unitary Principle, in which -no parts can be distinguished. - - -THE HIGHER FORMS OF THE VIRTUES. - -In this higher realm, justice consists in directing the action of the -soul towards intelligence; temperance is the intimate conversion of -the soul towards intelligence; courage is the (suggestive fascination) -or impassibility, by which the soul becomes similar to that which it -contemplates; since it is natural for intelligence to be impassible. -Now the soul derives this impassibility from the virtue which hinders -her from sharing the passions of the lower principle with which she is -associated. - - -EVEN THE LOWER VIRTUES ARE MUTUALLY RELATED. - -7. Within the soul the virtues have the same interconnection obtaining -within Intelligence between the types superior to virtue. For -Intelligence, it is thought that constitutes wisdom and prudence; -conversion towards oneself is temperance; the fulfillment of one's -proper function is justice, and the intelligence's perseverance in -remaining within itself, in maintaining itself pure and separated from -matter, is analogous to courage. To contemplate intelligence will -therefore, for the soul, constitute wisdom and prudence, which then -become virtues, and no longer remain mere intellectual types. For the -soul is not identical with the essences she thinks, as is intelligence. -Similarly, the other soul-virtues will correspond to the superior -types. It is not otherwise with purification, for since every virtue is -a purification, virtue exacts preliminary purification; otherwise, it -would not be perfect. - - -THE HIGHER VIRTUES IMPLY THE LOWER; BUT NOT CONVERSELY. - -The possessor of the higher virtues necessarily possesses the -potentiality for the inferior virtues; but the possessor of the lower -does not, conversely, possess the higher. Such are the characteristics -of the virtuous man. - - -PRUDENCE TO DECIDE WHETHER IT IS POSSIBLE TO POSSESS VIRTUES -UNSYMMETRICALLY? - -(Many interesting questions remain). Is it possible for a man to -possess the higher or lower virtues in accomplished reality, or -otherwise (merely theoretically)? To decide that, we would have -individually to examine each, as, for example, prudence. How could -such a virtue exist merely potentially, borrowing its principles -from elsewhere? What would happen if one virtue advanced naturally -to a certain degree, and another virtue to another? What would you -think of a temperance which would moderate certain (impulses), while -entirely suppressing others? Similar questions might be raised about -other virtues, and the arbiter of the degree to which the virtues have -attained would have to be prudence. - - -THE HOMELY VIRTUES MUST BE SUPPLEMENTED BY DIVINE DISCONTENT. - -No doubt, under certain circumstances, the virtuous man, in his -actions, will make use of some of the lower, or homely virtues; -but even so he will supplement them by standards or ideas derived -from higher virtues. For instance, he will not be satisfied with -a temperance which would consist in mere moderation, but he will -gradually seek to separate himself more and more from matter. Again, he -will supplement the life of a respectable man, exacted by common-sense -homely virtues; he will be continually aspiring higher, to the life of -the divinities; for our effort at assimilation should be directed not -at mere respectability, but to the gods themselves. To seek no more -than to become assimilated to respectable individuals would be like -trying to make an image by limiting oneself to copying another image, -itself modelled after another image (but not copying the original). -The assimilation here recommended results from taking as model a -superior being. - - - - -FIRST ENNEAD, BOOK THREE. - -Of Dialectic, or the Means of Raising the Soul to the Intelligible -World. - - -SEARCH FOR A DEMONSTRATION OF DIVINITY SUCH THAT THE DEMONSTRATION -ITSELF WILL DEIFY. - -1. What method, art or study will lead us to the goal we are to -attain, namely, the Good, the first Principle, the Divinity,[343] by a -demonstration which itself can serve to raise the soul to the superior -world? - - -METHODS DIFFER ACCORDING TO INDIVIDUALS; BUT THERE ARE CHIEFLY TWO. - -He who is to be promoted to that world should know everything, or at -least, as says (Plato),[344] he should be as learned as possible. In -his first generation he should have descended here below to form a -philosopher, a musician, a lover. That is the kind of men whose nature -makes them most suitable to be raised to the intelligible world. But -how are we going to raise them? Does a single method suffice for all? -Does not each of them need a special method? Doubtless. There are two -methods to follow: the one for those who rise to the intelligible world -from here below, and the other for those who have already reached -there. We shall start by the first of these two methods; then comes -that of the men who have already achieved access to the intelligible -world, and who have, so to speak, already taken root there. Even these -must ceaselessly progress till they have reached the summit; for one -must stop only when one has reached the supreme term. - - -RETURN OF THE SOUL OF THE PHILOSOPHER, MUSICIAN AND LOVER. - -The latter road of progress must here be left aside (to be taken up -later),[345] to discuss here fully the first, explaining the operation -of the return of the soul to the intelligible world. Three kinds of men -offer themselves to our examination: the philosopher, the musician, -and the lover. These three must clearly be distinguished, beginning by -determining the nature and character of the musician. - - -HOW THE MUSICIAN RISES TO THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD. - -The musician allows himself to be easily moved by beauty, and admires -it greatly; but he is not able by himself to achieve the intuition of -the beautiful. He needs the stimulation of external impressions. Just -as some timorous being is awakened by the least noise, the musician is -sensitive to the beauty of the voice and of harmonies. He avoids all -that seems contrary to the laws of harmony and of unity, and enjoys -rhythm and melodies in instrumental and vocal music. After these purely -sensual intonations, rhythm and tunes, he will surely in them come to -distinguish form from matter, and to contemplate the beauty existing in -their proportions and relations. He will have to be taught that what -excites his admiration in these things, is their intelligible harmony, -the beauty it contains, and, in short, beauty absolute, and not -particular. He will have to be introduced to philosophy by arguments -that will lead him to recognize truths that he ignored, though he -possessed them instinctively. Such arguments will be specified -elsewhere.[346] - - -HOW THE LOVER RISES TO THE INTELLIGIBLE. - -2. The musician can rise to the rank of the lover, and either remain -there, or rise still higher. But the lover has some reminiscence of the -beautiful; but as here below he is separated (from it, he is incapable -of clearly knowing what it is). Charmed with the beautiful objects -that meet his views, he falls into an ecstasy. He must therefore be -taught not to content himself with thus admiring a single body, but, -by reason, to embrace all bodies that reveal beauty; showing him what -is identical in all, informing him that it is something alien to the -bodies, which comes from elsewhere, and which exists even in a higher -degree in the objects of another nature; citing, as examples, noble -occupations, and beautiful laws. He will be shown that beauty is found -in the arts, the sciences, the virtues, all of which are suitable means -of familiarizing the lover with the taste of incorporeal things. He -will then be made to see that beauty is one, and he will be shown the -element which, in every object, constitutes beauty. From virtues he -will be led to progress to intelligence and essence, while from there -he will have nothing else to do but to progress towards the supreme -goal. - - -HOW THE PHILOSOPHER RISES TO THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD. - -3. The philosopher is naturally disposed to rise to the intelligible -world. Borne on by light wings, he rushes thither without needing to -learn to disengage himself from sense-objects, as do the preceding men. -His only uncertainty will concern the road to be followed, all he will -need will be a guide. He must therefore be shown the road; he must be -helped to detach himself entirely from sense-objects, himself already -possessing, as he does, the desire, being since a long while already -detached therefrom by his nature. For this purpose he will be invited -to apply himself to mathematics, so as to accustom him to think of -incorporeal things, to believe in their existence. Being desirous -of instruction, he will learn them easily; as, by his nature, he is -already virtuous, he will need no more than promotion to the perfection -of virtue. After mathematics, he will be taught dialectics, which will -perfect him. - - -WHAT DIALECTICS IS. - -4. What then is this dialectics, knowledge of which must be added -to mathematics? It is a science which makes us capable of reasoning -about each thing, to say what it is, in what it differs from the -others, in what it resembles them, where it is, whether it be one of -the beings, to determine how many veritable beings there are, and -which are the objects that contain nonentity instead of veritable -essence. This science treats also of good and evil; of everything that -is subordinated to (being), the Good, and to its contrary; of the -nature of what is eternal, and transitory. It treats of each matter -scientifically, and not according to mere opinion. Instead of wandering -around the sense-world, it establishes itself in the intelligible -world; it concentrates its whole attention on this world, and after -having saved our soul from deceit, dialectics "pastures our soul in the -meadow of truth,"[347] (as thought Plato). Then it makes use of the -Platonic method of division to discern ideas, to define each object, -to rise to the several kinds of essences[348] (as thought Plato); -then, by thought concatenating all that is thence derived, dialectics -continues its deductions until it has gone through the whole domain -of the intelligible. Then, by reversing, dialectics returns to the -very Principle from which first it had started out.[349] Resting -there, because it is only in the intelligible world that it can find -rest, no longer needing to busy itself with a multitude of objects, -because it has arrived at unity, dialectics considers its logic, which -treats of propositions and arguments. This logic is an art subordinate -to dialectics just as writing is subordinate to thought. In logic, -dialectics recognizes some principles as necessary, and others as -constituting preparatory exercises. Then, along with everything else, -subjecting these principles to its criticism, it declares some of them -useful, and others superfluous, or merely technical. - - -DIALECTICS IS THE HIGHEST PART OF PHILOSOPHY. - -5. Whence does this science derive its proper principles? Intelligence -furnishes the soul with the clear principles she is capable of -receiving. Having discovered and achieved these principles, dialectics -puts their consequences in order. Dialectics composes, and divides, -till it has arrived at a perfect intelligence of things; for according -to (Plato),[350] dialectics is the purest application of intelligence -and wisdom. In this case, if dialectics be the noblest exercise of -our faculties, it must exercise itself with essence and the highest -objects. Wisdom studies existence, as intelligence studies that -which is still beyond existence (the One, or the Good). But is not -philosophy also that which is most eminent? Surely. But there is no -confusion between philosophy and dialectics, because dialectics is the -highest part of philosophy. It is not (as Aristotle thought) merely -an instrument for philosophy, nor (as Epicurus thought) made up of -pure speculations and abstract rules. It studies things themselves, -and its matter is the (real) beings. It reaches them by following a -method which yields reality as well as the idea. Only accidentally -does dialectics busy itself with error and sophisms. Dialectics -considers them alien to its mission, and as produced by a foreign -principle. Whenever anything contrary to the rule of truth is advanced, -dialectics recognizes the error by the light of the truths it contains. -Dialectics, however, does not care for propositions, which, to it, -seem only mere groupings of letters. Nevertheless, because it knows -the truth, dialectics also understands propositions, and, in general, -the operations of the soul. Dialectics knows what it is to affirm, to -deny, and how to make contrary or contradictory assertions. Further, -dialectics distinguishes differences from identities, grasping the -truth by an intuition that is as instantaneous as is that of the -senses; but dialectics leaves to another science, that enjoys those -details, the care of treating them with exactness. - - -THE VARIOUS BRANCHES OF PHILOSOPHY CROWNED BY DIALECTICS. - -6. Dialectics, therefore, is only one part of philosophy, but the most -important. Indeed, philosophy has other branches. First, it studies -nature (in physics), therein employing dialectics, as the other arts -employ arithmetic, though philosophy owes far more to dialectics. Then -philosophy treats of morals, and here again it is dialectics that -ascertains the principles; ethics limits itself to building good habits -thereon, and to propose the exercises that shall produce those good -habits. The (Aristotelian) rational virtues also owe to dialectics the -principles which seem to be their characteristics; for they chiefly -deal with material things (because they moderate the passions). The -other virtues[351] also imply the application of reason to the passions -and actions which are characteristic of each of them. However, prudence -applies reason to them in a superior manner. Prudence deals rather -with the universal, considering whether the virtues concatenate, and -whether an action should be done now, or be deferred, or be superseded -by another[352] (as thought Aristotle). Now it is dialectics, or its -resultant science of wisdom which, under a general and immaterial form, -furnishes prudence with all the principles it needs. - - -WITHOUT DIALECTICS LOWER KNOWLEDGE WOULD BE IMPERFECT. - -Could the lower knowledge not be possessed without dialectics or -wisdom? They would, at least, be imperfect and mutilated. On the other -hand, though the dialectician, that is, the true sage, no longer -need these inferior things, he never would have become such without -them; they must precede, and they increase with the progress made in -dialectics. Virtues are in the same case. The possessor of natural -virtues may, with the assistance of wisdom, rise to perfect virtues. -Wisdom, therefore, only follows natural virtues. Then wisdom perfects -the morals. Rather, the already existing natural virtues increase and -grow perfect along with wisdom. Whichever of these two things precedes, -complements the other. Natural virtues, however, yield only imperfect -views and morals; and the best way to perfect them, is philosophic -knowledge of the principles from which they depend. - - - - -FOURTH ENNEAD, BOOK TWO. - -How the Soul Mediates Between Indivisible and Divisible Essence. - - -OUTLINE OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF IV. 7. - -1. While studying the nature ("being") of the soul, we have shown -(against the Stoics) that she is not a body; that, among incorporeal -entities, she is not a "harmony" (against the Pythagoreans); we have -also shown that she is not an "entelechy" (against Aristotle), because -this term, as its very etymology implies, does not express a true idea, -and reveals nothing about the soul's (nature itself); last, we said -that the soul has an intelligible nature, and is of divine condition; -the "being" or nature of the soul we have also, it would seem, clearly -enough set forth. Still, we have to go further. We have formerly -established a distinction between intelligible and sense nature, -assigning the soul to the intelligible world. Granting this, that the -soul forms part of the intelligible world, we must, in another manner, -study what is suitable to her nature. - - -EXISTENCE OF DIVISIBLE BEINGS. - -To begin with, there are (beings) which are quite divisible and -naturally separable. No one part of any one of them is identical with -any other part, nor with the whole, of which each part necessarily is -smaller than the whole. Such are sense-magnitudes, or physical masses, -of which each occupies a place apart, without being able to be in -several places simultaneously. - - -DESCRIPTION OF INDIVISIBLE ESSENCE. - -On the other hand, there exists another kind of essence ("being"), -whose nature differs from the preceding (entirely divisible beings), -which admits of no division, and is neither divided nor divisible. -This has no extension, not even in thought. It does not need to be -in any place, and is not either partially or wholly contained in any -other being. If we dare say so, it hovers simultaneously over all -beings, not that it needs to be built up on them,[353] but because -it is indispensable to the existence of all. It is ever identical -with itself, and is the common support of all that is below it. It is -as in the circle, where the centre, remaining immovable in itself, -nevertheless is the origin of all the radii originating there, and -drawing their existence thence. The radii by thus participating in -the existence of the centre, the radii's principle, depend on what is -indivisible, remaining attached thereto, though separating in every -direction.[354] - - -BETWEEN THEM IS AN INDIVISIBLE ESSENCE WHICH BECOMES DIVISIBLE WITHIN -BODIES. - -Now between entirely indivisible ("Being") which occupies the first -rank amidst intelligible beings, and the (essence) which is entirely -divisible in its sense-objects, there is, above the sense-world, -near it, and within it, a "being" of another nature, which is not, -like bodies, completely divisible, but which, nevertheless, becomes -divisible within bodies. Consequently, when you separate bodies, the -form within them also divides, but in such a way that it remains entire -in each part. This identical (essence), thus becoming manifold, has -parts that are completely separated from each other; for it then is a -divisible form, such as colors, and all the qualities, like any form -which can simultaneously remain entire in several things entirely -separate, at a distance, and foreign to each other because of the -different ways in which they are affected. We must therefore admit that -this form (that resides in bodies) is also divisible. - - -BY PROCESSION THE SOUL CONNECTS THE TWO. - -Thus the absolutely divisible (essence) does not exist alone; there is -another one located immediately beneath it, and derived from it. On -one hand, this inferior (essence) participates in the indivisibility -of its principle; on the other, it descends towards another nature by -its procession. Thereby it occupies a position intermediary between -indivisible and primary (essence), (that is, intelligence), and the -divisible (essence) which is in the bodies. Besides it is not in the -same condition of existence as color and the other qualities; for -though the latter be the same in all corporeal masses, nevertheless the -quality in one body is completely separate from that in another, just -as physical masses themselves are separate from each other. Although -(by its essence) the magnitude of these bodies be one, nevertheless -that which thus is identical in each part does not exert that community -of affection which constitutes sympathy,[355] because to identity is -added difference. This is the case because identity is only a simple -modification of bodies, and not a "being." On the contrary, the nature -that approaches the absolutely indivisible "Being" is a genuine "being" -(such as is the soul). It is true that she unites with the bodies and -consequently divides with them; but that happens to her only when she -communicates herself to the bodies. On the other hand, when she unites -with the bodies, even with the greatest and most extended of all (the -world), she does not cease to be one, although she yield herself up to -it entirely. - - -DIVISION AS THE PROPERTY OF BODIES, BUT NOT THE CHARACTERISTIC OF SOUL. - -In no way does the unity of this essence resemble that of the body; -for the unity of the body consists in the unity of parts, of which -each is different from the others, and occupies a different place. Nor -does the unity of the soul bear any closer resemblance to the unity of -the qualities. Thus this nature that is simultaneously divisible and -indivisible, and that we call soul is not one in the sense of being -continuous (of which each part is external to every other); it is -divisible, because it animates all the parts of the body it occupies, -but is indivisible because it entirely inheres in the whole body, and -in each of its parts.[356] When we thus consider the nature of the -soul, we see her magnitude and power, and we understand how admirable -and divine are these and superior natures. Without any extension, the -soul is present throughout the whole of extension; she is present in a -location, though she be not present therein.[357] She is simultaneously -divided and undivided, or rather, she is never really divided, and she -never really divides; for she remains entire within herself. If she -seem to divide, it is not in relation with the bodies, which, by virtue -of their own divisibility, cannot receive her in an indivisible manner. -Thus division is the property of the body, but not the characteristic -of the soul. - - -SOUL AS BOTH ESSENTIALLY DIVISIBLE AND INDIVISIBLE. - -2. Such then the nature of the soul had to be. She could not be either -purely indivisible, nor purely divisible, but she necessarily had to be -both indivisible and divisible, as has just been set forth. This is -further proved by the following considerations. If the soul, like the -body, have several parts differing from each other, the sensation of -one part would not involve a similar sensation in another part. Each -part of the soul, for instance, that which inheres in the finger, would -feel its individual affections, remaining foreign to all the rest, -while remaining within itself. In short, in each one of us would inhere -several managing souls (as said the Stoics).[358] Likewise, in this -universe, there would be not one single soul (the universal Soul), but -an infinite number of souls, separated from each other. - - -POLEMIC AGAINST THE STOIC PREDOMINATING PART OF THE SOUL. - -Shall we have recourse to the (Stoic) "continuity of parts"[359] -to explain the sympathy which interrelates all the organs? This -hypothesis, however, is useless, unless this continuity eventuate -in unity. For we cannot admit, as do certain (Stoic) philosophers, -who deceive themselves, that sensations focus in the "predominating -principle" by "relayed transmission."[360] To begin with, it is a wild -venture to predicate a "predominating principle" of the soul. How -indeed could we divide the soul and distinguish several parts therein? -By what superiority, quantity or quality are we going to distinguish -the "predominating part" in a single continuous mass? Further, under -this hypothesis, we may ask, Who is going to feel? Will it be the -"predominating part" exclusively, or the other parts with it? If that -part exclusively, it will feel only so long as the received impression -will have been transmitted to itself, in its particular residence; but -if the impression impinge on some other part of the soul, which happens -to be incapable of sensation, this part will not be able to transmit -the impression to the (predominating) part that directs, and sensation -will not occur. Granting further that the impression does reach the -predominating part itself, it might be received in a twofold manner; -either by one of its (subdivided) parts, which, having perceived the -sensation, will not trouble the other parts to feel it, which would be -useless; or, by several parts simultaneously, and then we will have -manifold, or even infinite sensations which will all differ from each -other. For instance, the one might say, "It is I who first received -the impression"; the other one might say, "I received the impression -first received by another"; while each, except the first, will be -in ignorance of the location of the impression; or again, each part -will make a mistake, thinking that the impression occurred where -itself is. Besides, if every part of the soul can feel as well as the -predominating part, why at all speak of a "predominating part?" What -need is there for the sensation to reach through to it? How indeed -would the soul recognize as an unity the result of multiple sensations; -for instance, of such as come from the ears or eyes? - - -THE SOUL HAS TO BE BOTH ONE AND MANIFOLD, EVEN ON THE STOIC HYPOTHESES. - -On the other hand, if the soul were absolutely one, essentially -indivisible and one within herself, if her nature were incompatible -with manifoldness and division, she could not, when penetrating into -the body, animate it in its entirety; she would place herself in its -centre, leaving the rest of the mass of the animal lifeless. The -soul, therefore, must be simultaneously one and manifold, divided and -undivided, and we must not deny, as something impossible, that the -soul, though one and identical, can be in several parts of the body -simultaneously. If this truth be denied, this will destroy the "nature -that contains and administers the universe" (as said the Stoics); which -embraces everything at once, and directs everything with wisdom; a -nature that is both manifold, because all beings are manifold; and -single, because the principle that contains everything must be one. It -is by her manifold unity that she vivifies all parts of the universe, -while it is her indivisible unity that directs everything with wisdom. -In the very things that have no wisdom, the unity that in it plays the -predominating "part," imitates the unity of the universal Soul. That is -what Plato wished to indicate allegorically by these divine words[361]: -"From the "Being" that is indivisible and ever unchanging; and from -the "being" which becomes divisible in the bodies, the divinity formed -a mixture, a third kind of "being." The (universal) Soul, therefore, -is (as we have just said) simultaneously one and manifold; the forms -of the bodies are both manifold and one; the bodies are only manifold; -while the supreme Principle (the One), is exclusively an unity. - -Paragraph 3 of this book (iv. 2,--21) will be found in its logical -position--judging by the subject matter,--on pages 75 to 78, in the -middle of iv. 7,--2. - - - - -FOOTNOTES: - -[1] See 7. - -[2] See vi. 7, 8. - -[3] A.D. 262. - -[4] See vi. 5, 1. - -[5] See 20. - -[6] iii. 4. - -[7] See above, 6. - -[8] See iv. 2. - -[9] Often quoted by Porphyry in his Cave of the Nymphs. - -[10] See 3. - -[11] Euseb. Prep. Ev. xi. 2; xv. 4-9, 12-13. - -[12] See 3. - -[13] See ii. 3; iii. 1, 2, 4. - -[14] See v. 5. - -[15] This suggests that Suidas was right in claiming that Amelius was -the teacher of Porphyry. - -[16] See 11. - -[17] See 7. - -[18] See 3. - -[19] See 3. - -[20] Mentioned in Porphyry's Life of Pythagoras, 48, living under Nero. - -[21] Living under Tiberius, see Suetonius, Life of Tiberius, 14. - -[22] See vi. 5. - -[23] See 17. - -[24] See 18. - -[25] See 17. - -[26] See ii. 3. 17. - -[27] See 23. - -[28] The fragments of all this are probably the Principles of the -Theory of the Intelligibles, by Porphyry. - -[29] See ii. 1. - -[30] See i. 3. - -[31] As pilot, perhaps, iv. 3. 21. - -[32] See ii., 4. 6. - -[33] See ii. 7. 1. - -[34] See i. 1. 10. - -[35] See i. 9. 8. 10. - -[36] See iv. 3. 20, 21. - -[37] Ecl. Phys., p. 797, Heeren and Aristotle, de Anima, i. 2. - -[38] See Nemesius, de Nat. Hom. 2. - -[39] See ii. 7, 1. - -[40] See ii. 7, 3. - -[41] Stob. Ecl. Phys. 797. - -[42] See ii. 3, 5. - -[43] See ii. 7, 1. - -[44] ii. 4, 7. - -[45] See iv. 7, 8. - -[46] Euseb., Prep. Ev. xv. 17. - -[47] p. 54, Cousin. - -[48] Cicero, Tusculans, i. 9. - -[49] Ecl. Phys. 797, Cicero, de Nat. Deor. iii. 14. - -[50] See ii. 4, 1. 'pos echon.' of Dikearchus and Aristoxenus. - -[51] See ii. 6, on 'logos.' - -[52] See v. 7, 3. - -[53] iii. 2. - -[54] See iv. 2, 2. - -[55] iv. 2, 1. - -[56] Plutarch, de Placitis Philosoph, iii. 8. The Stoic definition -of sensation being that senses are spirits stretched (by relays with -"tension") from the directing principle to the organs. - -[57] de Nat. Hom. 2. - -[58] See iv. 4, 23. In the words of Zeno, as, for the Stoics, the -principal act of the intelligence was comprehensive vision, "phantasia -kataleptike." - -[59] de Anima, iii. 4, 5. - -[60] de Anima, i. 3. - -[61] de Anim. Arist. i. 2. - -[62] Cicero, Tusculans, i. 9. - -[63] See ii. 4, 1. - -[64] See iv. 7, 5. - -[65] See ii. 4, 1. - -[66] de Nat. Hom. 2. - -[67] See ii. 7. - -[68] See ii. 7, 1. - -[69] Nat. Hom. 2. - -[70] See ii. 4, 16. - -[71] As thought Chrysippus, in Plutarch, de Stoic. Repugnant. - -[72] See ii. 4, 16. - -[73] Met. xii. 6; see ii. 5, 3. - -[74] iv. 7, 3. - -[75] From end of iv. 2, 3. - -[76] Aristotle, de Anima, ii. 1. - -[77] Arist. de Anima, ii. 2; iii. 5. - -[78] See Aristotle, de Anima, i. 5. - -[79] See Aristotle, de Anima, ii. 2. - -[80] Here we resume Ennead IV. Book 7. The bracketed numbers are those -of the Teubner text; the unbracketed those of the Didot edition. - -[81] Page 299, Cousin. - -[82] Quoted in i. 1, 12, in Republic x. - -[83] See i. 1, 11. - -[84] See i. 6, 9. - -[85] See viii. 62. - -[86] See i. 6, 5. - -[87] Page 297, Cousin. - -[88] See iv. 8, 5. - -[89] Pages 206, 312, 313, Cousin. - -[90] See iv. 8, 8. - -[91] See iv. 8, 6, 7. - -[92] See i. 1, 11. - -[93] See iv. 5, 7. - -[94] Cicero, Tusculans, i. 12-16. - -[95] Such as Porphyry's "Philosophy derived from Oracles." - -[96] Plato, in Diog. Laert., iii. 83. - -[97] Cicero, Tusculans, i. 18, 37. - -[98] Cicero, Tusculans, i. 12, 18; de Divinat, i. 58. - -[99] Chrysippus, in Cicero, de Fato, 10. - -[100] Cicero, de Finibus, i. 6. - -[101] Cicero, de Natura Deorum, i. 25. - -[102] Stobeus, Ecl. Phys. i. 6, p. 178. - -[103] Aulus Gellius, Noctes Atticae, vi. 2. - -[104] As thought the Stoics, Cicero, de Nat. Deor. ii. 11. - -[105] Cicero, de Divinatione, ii. 44. - -[106] As thought Plato, in the Phaedo, C81. - -[107] See i. 6.8. - -[108] See i. 3.1. - -[109] See i. 3. - -[110] See i. 6.2. - -[111] See i. 6.6. - -[112] See i. 6.9, and the Philebus of Plato, C64. - -[113] As suggested in the Phaedo of Plato. - -[114] See ii. 4.6. - -[115] The rational soul and intelligence, see iii. 9.5. - -[116] See ii. 9.12; iv. 4.14. - -[117] See ii. 3.17. 18; ii. 9.2, 3; vi. 4.9. - -[118] A pun on "reason," or "logos," i. 6.2; ii. 3.16; ii. 4.3; ii. -6.2; ii. 7.3. - -[119] See iv. 4.1012. - -[120] Far from the truth; see iii. 8.3. 7. - -[121] Stoics, see iv. 7.8. - -[122] Or Stoic form of inorganic objects. - -[123] The form of lower living beings. - -[124] The form of human nature. - -[125] See iv. 7.14. - -[126] Parmenides, see v. 1.8. - -[127] As Plato hints in his Cratylos, C50, by a pun between "soma" and -"sozesthai." - -[128] The later theological "saved." - -[129] See Aristotle, de Gen. i. 18. - -[130] By Stoics. - -[131] See iii. 8.1-3. - -[132] See v. 5.1. - -[133] See v. 1.4. - -[134] In Greek a pun on "eidos" and "idea." - -[134a] This sentence might well be translated as follows: "When -therefore thought (meets) the essentially one, the latter is the form, -and the former the idea." While this version seems more literal, it -makes no connected sense with what follows. - -[135] See iv. 9.5. - -[136] See iii. 9.1. - -[137] See iii. 9.1. - -[138] The universal Soul. - -[139] Timaeus, C39. - -[140] See iii. 9.1. - -[141] See iii. 7.10. - -[142] See ii. 7.2. - -[143] To form, see i. 6.2. - -[144] As thought Plato, in his Republic, x. - -[145] As thought Plato in Gorgias, C464. - -[146] vi. 7. - -[147] vi. 7. - -[148] Or, "so that it may contain the intelligence which is -one, as its own actualization." - -[149] See iv. 3.9-17. - -[150] In the Cratylus, C400. - -[151] As in the Phaedo, C62. - -[152] Republic, vii, C514. - -[153] See Jamblichus, Cave of the Nymphs, 8. - -[154] Procession, or rising. - -[155] C246. - -[156] Of the universe. - -[157] C34. - -[158] Timaeus, C30. - -[159] The Creator, who is the universal Soul. - -[160] See iv. 3.9-11. - -[161] See iv. 3.17. - -[162] As thought Plato in his Phaedrus, C246. - -[163] The First belongs to the principal power of the universal Soul, -the second to its natural and plant power, see iii, 8.1 and iv. 4.13. - -[164] See iv. 4.13. - -[165] See ii. 3.18. - -[166] As in the Timaeus, C42. - -[167] iv. 8.1. - -[168] See iv. 2.2. - -[169] See iv. 3.6.7. - -[170] As thought Plato in his Phaedrus, C249 and Phaedo, C72. - -[171] That lead an alternate or double life. - -[172] In his Timaeus, C42, 69. - -[173] In the stars. - -[174] As does Plato, see iv. 8.1. - -[175] As a messenger, see iv. 3.12.13. - -[176] See ii. 9.2. - -[177] Without having given herself up to it. - -[178] See i. 8.7. - -[179] That is, of form, ii. 4.4. - -[180] See iv. 6.3. - -[181] See iii. 2.8. - -[182] See iv. 8.5. - -[183] See iv. 3.18. - -[184] See ii. 9.2. - -[185] That is, the body to which she is united. - -[186] As thought Plato in his Parmenides, C154. - -[187] See vi. 6.13. - -[188] "Being." It has been found impossible, in order to preserve -good English idiom, to translate "ousia" by "being," and "to on" by -"essence," with uniformity. Where the change has been made, the proper -word has been added in parentheses, as here. - -[189] In his Metaphysics, iv. 2. - -[190] Aristotle, Met. iv. 2. - -[191] Evidently a pun on forms and ideas. - -[192] See vi. 2.7. - -[193] In the Timaeus not accurately quoted. - -[194] As Plato said in the Timaeus, 37. - -[195] See iv. 9.5. - -[196] See vi. 8.11. - -[197] Odyss. xix. 178. - -[198] See i. 2.2. - -[199] See iv. 3.1. - -[200] See ii. 2.2. - -[201] See the beginning of Plato's Republic, ix. - -[202] See i. 8.7. - -[203] Because they do not allow of mutual penetration. - -[204] See iv. 8.5. - -[205] As thought Numenius 29. - -[206] See ii. 3. - -[207] See i. 8.14. - -[208] See Acts, xvii. 25, 27, 28. - -[209] See iv. 3.7, following the Phaedrus of Plato. - -[210] Cupid and Psyche, as interpreted by Apuleius. - -[211] See iii. 5.2. - -[212] See iii. 5.4. - -[213] See iii. 5.7-9. - -[214] See v. 5.11; i. 6.7, 8; v. 8.4; vi. 9.11. It has been contended -that this was a description of the Isiac temple in Rome. - -[215] Num. 10. - -[216] By virtue of which, according to the Pythagoreans, the dyad -"dared" to issue from the unity. - -[217] That is the desire which leads souls to separate themselves -primitively from the divinity, and to unite themselves to bodies. - -[218] We have seen this elsewhere, i. 3.1. - -[219] See ii. 2.3. - -[220] Iliad xx. 65. - -[221] See vi. 4.4. - -[222] As said Heraclitus, Plutarch, Banquet, iv. 4. - -[223] See iv. 7.10. - -[224] See i. 2.3; iv. 3.11. - -[225] See iii. 9.5. - -[226] As thought Plato in his Cratylus, C. xi. 39, and Macrobins, in -his Commentary on the Dream of Scipio, i. 11. - -[227] See i. 8.2; ii. 9.2. - -[228] See iii. 7.2-4. - -[229] See v. 9.2, 7. - -[230] See vi. 2. - -[231] See vi. 8. - -[232] See vi. 3. - -[233] See iii. 6.1. - -[234] Pun on "ideas" and "forms." - -[235] vi. 9. 11. This seems to refer to the Roman temple of Isis in -front of which stood the statues of the divinities, vi. 9.11. - -[236] Would be soul, instead of intelligence. - -[237] See v. 4.1. - -[238] See iii. 8.10. - -[239] As thought Plato, Laws, x.; see ii. 2.3. - -[240] See iii. 6.19. - -[241] As thought Plato, in the Cratylos, C. xi. 39. - -[242] This paragraph is founded on Numenius 36, 39. - -[243] See Plato's Second Letter, 312; in English, Burges, p. 482; i. -8.2. - -[244] In Timaeus, 34. - -[245] In his Timaeus, C43. - -[246] As quoted by Clemens Al. Strom. vi. p. 627. - -[247] In Simplicius, Comm. in Phys. Arist., 9. - -[248] See Plato's Sophists, C244. - -[249] See ii. 7.7. - -[250] See ii. 1.2. - -[251] See ii. 4.7. - -[252] See Metaph. xii. 7.8. - -[253] Referring to Numenius's work on "The Good," and on the -"Immateriality of the Soul." - -[254] In the Acibiades, C36. - -[255] See i. 1.9. - -[256] In his Timaeus, C30. - -[257] In the Phaedrus. - -[258] See iii. 6.5. - -[259] See v. 3.3. - -[260] From the circumference, see iii. 8.7. - -[261] Cicero, Tusculans, i. 22. - -[262] See i. 4.9. - -[263] See iii. 9.9. - -[264] See iii. 8.9. - -[265] iii. 9.4. - -[266] iii. 8.9. - -[267] See v. 1.7. - -[268] See i. 1.8; iv. 9.3. - -[269] See iii. 4.1, 2. - -[270] Fragment belonging here, apparently, but misplaced at end of next -paragraph. - -[271] See v. 1.1. - -[272] See iii. 4.2. - -[273] See iv. 4.29; iv. 5.7. - -[274] That is, in the principal power of the universal soul, see ii. -3.18. - -[275] See vi. 5; that is, within intelligence. - -[276] Between celestial and terrestrial life; see iii. 4.6. - -[277] See iii. 8.7. - -[278] Met. vii. 3. - -[279] Met. v. 8. - -[280] Diog. Laertes vii. 61. - -[281] See Cicero, de Nat. Deor. i. 15. - -[282] Met. viii. 1. - -[283] See vi. 7. - -[284] See i. 8.4. - -[285] See i. 8.15. - -[286] Plotinos's six categories are identity, difference, being, life, -motion and rest. See v. 1; v. 2; vi. 2. - -[287] Not the absolute eternal existence, nor the totality of the -constitutive qualities of a thing, as in ii. 6. - -[288] Met. xii. 2. - -[289] Met. i. 3. - -[290] Met. xi. 6. - -[291] See v. 1.9. - -[292] As reported by Diog. Laert. ii. 2. - -[293] Met. i. 4; vii. 13. - -[294] de Nat. Deor. i. 24. - -[295] Met. viii. 4. - -[296] In the Timaeus, C49-52, Met. vii. 3. - -[297] See ii. 7.3. - -[298] In Met. iii. 4 and de Anima i. 2.5; ii. 5. - -[299] In the Timaeus. - -[300] See i. 8.9; ii. 4.12. - -[301] Met. vii. 3, see iii. 6.7-19. - -[302] Met. viii. 4. - -[303] Met. i. 6. - -[304] Met. vii. 7. - -[305] See ii. 4.10. - -[306] See ii. 7.3. - -[307] Met. xii. 2. - -[308] Met. vi. 1; vii. 5. - -[309] See i. 2.1. - -[310] In the Philebus, 252. - -[311] The same definition is given of "evil" in i. 8.10-14. - -[312] See i. 8.8. - -[313] Physics. iii. 7. - -[314] This paragraph interrupts the argument. - -[315] Plato's spirit in the Timaeus, C79. - -[316] The inferior soul, see ii. 3.18. - -[317] In his Phaedrus, C246. - -[318] Plato, Phaedo, C. i. 242. - -[319] Plato, Tim. C77. - -[320] Plato, Rep. x. p. 291. - -[321] Plato, Tim. 91. - -[322] The text is very difficult. - -[323] Plato, Rep. x. p. 617-620. - -[324] In the Timaeus. - -[325] C90. - -[326] Phaedo, p. 107, c. i. p. 300. - -[327] Rep. x. 616, p. 234. - -[328] In i. 2.8, 16. - -[329] See ii. 9.18. - -[330] As thought Aristotle, Met. v. 14. - -[331] As thought Aristotle, Met. v. 30. - -[332] As thought Plato, Letter 7, 343. - -[333] As said Aristotle, Met. vii. 5. - -[334] Phaedros C1,217. - -[335] de Gen. An. 4.2. - -[336] Adv. Math. 5.102 p. 355. - -[337] Theataetus, C2,132. - -[338] Rep. iv. E3,434. - -[339] Theataetus, 176. - -[340] Plato, Phaedo, 69. - -[341] Pun on the word "logos," which means both reason and word. - -[342] Plato, Phaedrus, 246. - -[343] v. 1.1. - -[344] In his Phaedrus, Et. 266. - -[345] In v. 1.1. - -[346] i. 3. 4, 5, 6; i. 6. - -[347] In his Phaedrus, p. 248. - -[348] In his Politician, p. 262. - -[349] v. 1. - -[350] In his Sophist., p. 253. - -[351] See i. 2.3-6. - -[352] Morals i. 34, 35; Nicom. Eth., vi. 8, 11. - -[353] See iv. 1.22. - -[354] See iii. 8.7. - -[355] See iv. 2.2. - -[356] See iv. 3.19, 22, 23; iv. 4.28. - -[357] See iv. 3.20-22. - -[358] Cicero, de Nat. Deor. ii. 31-33. - -[359] See 4.7.6, 7. - -[360] Plutarch, de Plac. Phil. v. 21; Cicero, de Nat. Deor. ii. 11. The -"predominating principle" had appeared in Plato's Timaeus, p. 41. - -[361] Of the Timaeus, p. 35. - - - - -Transcriber's Notes: - - -Punctuation and spelling were made consistent when a predominant -preference was found in this four-volume set; otherwise they were not -changed. - -Simple typographical errors were corrected. Inconsistent capitalization -has not been changed. - -Ambiguous hyphens at the ends of lines were retained. - -Infrequent spelling of "Plotinus" changed to the predominant "Plotinos." - -Several opening or closing parentheses and quotation marks are -unmatched; Transcriber has not attempted to remedy them. - -The "Index" near the beginning of the book actually is a Table of -Contents for the four-volume set. - -Page 11: the last paragraph seems to end abruptly: "to prove that" - -Page 94: "parent's" probably should be "parents'", but is unchanged -here. - -Page 236: the closing parenthesis for "(destiny)" also seems to be -the closing parenthesis for the phrase beginning "(because he is -given ...". There are several instances in this text where a closing -quotation mark is shared in a similar manner. - - -Footnote Issues: - -In these notes, "anchor" means the reference to a footnote, and -"footnote" means the information to which the anchor refers. Anchors -occur within the main text, while footnotes are grouped in sequence at -the end of this eBook. The structure of the original book required two -exceptions to this, as explained below. - -The original text used a combination of footnotes (indicated by -symbols) and endnotes (indicated by numbers). In this eBook, they have -been combined into a single, ascending sequence based on the sequence -in which the footnotes occurred in the original book, and placed at the -end of the eBook. Several irregularities are explained below. - -Footnotes sometimes were printed in a different sequence than their -anchors (as on page 60: third and fourth footnotes were printed in -incorrect sequence). and the symbols used for the anchors sometimes -were in a different sequence than the footnotes (as on page 72, second -and third symbols). Except as noted below, all footnotes have been -resequenced to match the sequence of their anchors. - -Page 85: The last footnote is printed out of sequence and followed by -a paragraph that appears to be a final comment. In this eBook, that -footnote has been repositioned to be in the sequence of its anchor. - -Pages 111 and 118: Anchor 134 (originally 29) originally referred to two -footnotes. 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