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diff --git a/40845-8.txt b/40845-8.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 685fe2f..0000000 --- a/40845-8.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,1834 +0,0 @@ -Project Gutenberg's The Connexion Between Taste and Morals, by Mark Hopkins - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with -almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or -re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included -with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org/license - - -Title: The Connexion Between Taste and Morals - Two lectures - -Author: Mark Hopkins - -Release Date: September 23, 2012 [EBook #40845] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE CONNEXION BETWEEN TASTE *** - - - - -Produced by Bill Tozier, David E. Brown and the Online -Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net - - - - - - - - - - THE - CONNEXION - BETWEEN - TASTE AND MORALS: - TWO LECTURES - - BY - MARK HOPKINS, D. D. - PRESIDENT OF WILLIAMS COLLEGE. - - Boston: - PUBLISHED BY DUTTON AND WENTWORTH. - 1841. - - - - -LECTURE I. - - -Is the prevalence of a cultivated taste, favorable to morals? Is there a -connexion, either in individuals, or in communities, between good taste -and good morals? - -When I began to reflect upon this point with reference to a public -discussion of it, I put the above questions to three educated men, as I -happened to meet them. The first said, he had not thought of it, but -that, at the first view, he did not believe there was any such -connexion; the second said he should wish to see it proved before he -would believe it; and the third said, he thought there was such a -connexion. This difference of opinion among educated men, led me to -think that an investigation of the subject might be a matter of -interest, and perhaps of profit. As every thing, in this country, -depends upon a sound state of morals in the community, whatever bears -upon that, deserves our most careful scrutiny. - -To discuss this subject understandingly, we must know precisely what we -are talking about. What then is taste? This term is sometimes used to -express mere desire, as a taste for dress, or for low pleasures. It can -hardly be necessary to say that that is not the meaning now attached to -it. Taste is defined by Alison, to be, "That faculty of the human mind -by which we perceive and enjoy whatever is beautiful or sublime in the -works of nature or of art." According to this definition, which is -sufficiently correct for our present purpose, it will be perceived that -there is, first, a perception of certain qualities in external objects, -and then, according to the nature of the object, an emotion of beauty, -or of sublimity in the mind. These emotions are, of course, incapable of -definition except by stating the occasions on which they arise, and can -be known only by being felt. To talk of an emotion to those who have not -felt it, is like talking of colors to the blind. And here I may remark, -that these terms, beauty and sublimity, have, in common with those -denoting sensations, an ambiguity which has often produced confusion. As -the term heat is used to denote both the sensation we feel on -approaching the fire, and that quality in the fire which produces the -sensation, so beauty and sublimity are sometimes used to express the -emotions in the mind, and sometimes those qualities in external objects -which are fitted to produce them, though there is, of course, in the -external object, no emotion, nor any thing resembling one. - -If this account of taste be correct, it will be perceived that it -cannot, with any propriety, be compared, as it often has been, to a -bodily sense. The impression upon a bodily sense, necessarily follows -the presence of the object, and is uniform in all mankind. A tree -clothed in fresh foliage is necessarily seen, and seen to be green by -all who turn their eyes upon it. The same tree, when seen, may be -pronounced by one individual to be beautiful, by another, from some -peculiar association, to be the reverse, and by a third, however -beautiful in itself, it may be looked upon without any emotion at all. -It is, therefore, a great mistake to suppose, as many do, that those -qualities in objects which awaken the emotions of taste, act directly -and necessarily upon us, like those which affect the senses. - -A second preliminary inquiry is, What are the causes which produce these -emotions? And here I barely remark, without inquiring after any common -principle by which they produce similar results, that these causes -differ widely from each other. The emotions may be awakened by natural -objects, by sound, by the products of the imagination, by the -combinations of the intellect, and by certain manifestations of the -affections and moral character. - -A third inquiry is, how the taste can be cultivated? This obviously can -be done only on two conditions. The first is, that we put ourselves in -situations adapted to produce the emotions of taste; and the second is, -that we preserve a state of mind that will permit those emotions to -arise. This last, a proper state of mind, though less often considered, -is quite as important as the first. "It is," says the poet, - - "The soul that sees; the outward eyes - Present the object, but the mind descries, - And thence delight, disgust, or cool indifference rise." - -Upon him whose mind is engrossed by care, or ruffled by passion, the -most beautiful objects make no impression. To perceive and enjoy them, -the mind must be calm. The beauties and sublimities of nature are like -the stars, which the storm shuts out, but when the heavens are serene, -they come out, one after another, to the eye that is watching for them, -till the firmament glows with their light. He, therefore, and he only, -who, in a proper state of mind, will place himself in the presence of -beautiful or sublime objects, and will compare the effects produced -under different circumstances, will improve his taste, both in its -susceptibility to emotion, and in its power of discrimination. - -The question then, which we are now prepared to discuss, is, whether -such a cultivation and improvement of the taste, has a favorable effect -upon the moral character? - -That it has such an effect, I infer, first, because we find in the -emotions of taste, to say the least, an innocent source of enjoyment for -our leisure hours, and the mind that is innocently happy, is less -accessible to temptation. Indolence, mere vacuity, we all know, is the -porch of vice, and the great dangers to the young arise from their -leisure hours--from the want of some means of innocent mental -exhilaration, in which they can be induced to spend those hours. It was -said by Franklin, that leisure was a time in which to do something -useful; but all are not Franklins. If leisure time can be, as it is by -many, usefully employed, so much the better; but he who should provide -for our youth the means and the inducements to spend their leisure time -innocently, would be a public benefactor. In our cities, where the -temptations to mere sensual gratification are so numerous and obtrusive, -and where natural objects are very much excluded, this is a point of -great importance, and of great difficulty. Until of late very little of -this kind has been attempted, unless theatres may be called an attempt. -But theatres with us are out of the question, for Miss Martineau says -that "the Americans have very little dramatic taste; and that the spirit -of puritanism still rises up in such fierce opposition to the stage, as -to forbid the hope that this grand means of intellectual exercise will -ever be made the instrument of moral good to society there, that it -might be made." She says, moreover, so hopeless is our case, that "those -who respect dramatic entertainments the most highly, will be the most -anxious that the American theatres should be closed." Theatres are -indeed out of the question, and I trust it will be a long time before we -shall make progress backwards, to that state of morals which is produced -by the instructions even of an English theatre. - -It is in view of the want now under consideration, that the -establishment of Associations for literary purposes, and for procuring -popular lectures open to all, is not only a new, but a most promising -feature in the history of our cities. Man needs, and must have, -excitement and mental exhilaration, and our Creator, if we would but see -it, has not been inattentive to this want of our frame. No; to supply -it, we have the pleasures of rational social converse, the play of the -affections, the duties of kindness and benevolence--does a man feel -depressed, let him do a good action--and last, but not least, the -gratifications of taste: all the pleasure to be derived from the concord -of sweet sounds, from the charms of literature, from the forms and -colors and groupings of nature, from her sunrisings and sunsettings, -from her landscapes of mountain and valley and lake and river, from the -stars that roll in their courses, and the flowers that nod to each other -by the way-side.--These are the sources of mental exhilaration which God -has provided; and they are, to the artificial stimulants of theatrical -exhibitions and of gambling, what the cold water that was drank in Eden -is to brandy and gin. May I not here venture to say to young men, -'Beware how you spend your _leisure_ hours! your character and destiny -in life will probably turn upon it.' Among the means, as I have already -said, of spending these hours at least innocently, the gratifications of -taste are conspicuous. They seem for this very purpose to have been had -distinctly in view in the fitting up of this world; and so far as they -lure the mind from the lower gratifications of sense, they must be -favorable to morals. - -The remarks now made respect taste chiefly as a guard against evil; but -I cannot dismiss this head without noticing more fully its positive -influence, as a source of innocent enjoyment, upon morals. A good taste, -and I do not hold myself answerable for its perversions, involves a -ready susceptibility to the emotions of beauty and sublimity, and of -course a readiness to receive pleasure from the common appearances of -nature, and from every free and natural expression of good feeling. It -is, in my view, of the first importance both to character and to -happiness, that the young should cultivate a relish for those simple and -natural pleasures, the sources of which are open to all. It is important -to happiness. How much happiness does the young florist secure, who can -look upon the common violet as it opens its eye from under the snows of -the early spring, with much the same pleasure as upon the choice exotic -which is resorted to and exclusively admired by those who have -unfortunately been taught that it is vulgar to admire what is common! -How much happiness does he secure who is touched by a beautiful action -wherever he sees it, who appreciates sympathy wherever he finds it, and -however expressed! A mind rightly constituted in this respect, drinks in -enjoyment from the objects and occurrences of daily life, as the eye -does light. It is also essential to character. How many young men enter -life with a false estimate of the advantages which wealth and fashion -can confer; who find their happiness, not in the contemplation and -pursuit of appropriate objects, but in what others think of them, and to -whom the world becomes insipid unless _they_ make a figure in it! Let -now misfortune come upon such men, and the world fails them. _Their_ -world is gone; they have no resource; they become, generally dishonest, -sometimes inefficient and gloomy, and commit suicide. These persons come -to consider the common and truly great blessings which God has given as -nothing unless they may possess those artificial and egotistical -enjoyments which arise from conventional society. They see not the -splendid ornaments and rich provisions which, to adopt, with a slight -accommodation, the beautiful language of another, are gathered round the -earth for them;--"its ocean of air above, its ocean of water beneath, -its zodiac of lights, its tent of dropping clouds, its striped coat of -climates, its fourfold year." It is nothing to them, if they have not -man for their servant, that "all the parts of nature incessantly work -into each other's hands for their profit; that the wind sows the seed, -the sun evaporates the sea, the wind blows the vapor to the field, the -ice on the other side of the planet condenses the rain on this, and thus -the endless circulations of the divine charity nourish man." What a -change when such a person is brought back to a true relish of the simple -pleasures of nature! Even sickness, depriving him for a time of what he -had undervalued, if it bring him back to this, is a blessing; and then -the result may be stated in the words of Gray:-- - - "See the wretch who long has tost - On the thorny bed of pain, - At length regain his vigor lost, - And breathe and walk again." - -Then, - - "The meanest flow'ret of the vale, - The simplest note that swells the gale, - The common sun, the air, the skies, - To him are opening paradise!" - -Then, though he may hold little property by that title which the law -gives, he yet feels that the universe is his for those nobler purposes -for which it was intended to act on the spirit: - - "His are the mountains, and the valleys his, - And the resplendent rivers;" - -and he looks back upon his former discontent as the petulance of a -child. The simple beauties and the glad voices of nature have made him a -man again. - -But again, I infer that there is a connexion between good taste and good -morals, because there is an analogy between those qualities in matter -which excite the emotions of taste, and those relations on which morals -depend. So much is this the case, that some philosophers found morality -upon a theory of the beautiful, considering it a sublime harmony. In all -beautiful objects in nature, or in art, there is an order, a propriety, -a fitness, a proportion; and the impression which these make upon us is -so analogous to that which is made by virtuous conduct, that we use the -same terms to express both. To me, indeed, it seems that beauty in -matter is to moral beauty what instinct is to reason, or what the light -of the moon is to that of the sun; containing some of the same elements, -but destitute of the highest. Hence, as we should naturally expect, -morals furnish that region in the province of taste in which she gathers -those flowers that are richest in beauty and sweetest in perfume. - - "Is aught so fair, - In all the dewy landscape of the spring, - In the bright eye of Hesper, or the morn, - In nature's fairest forms, is aught so fair - As virtuous friendship?" - -But I observe again, that as there is the analogy just pointed out -between their causes, so there is an affinity between the emotions -themselves of taste and correct moral feeling, and the transition from -one to the other is obvious. This point requires illustration. That our -emotions are associated in groups, is practically known to every body. -Even the child does not ask his father for a sixpence when he is in an -ill temper, because he knows the transition is not easy from ill temper -to generosity. Deep grief cannot pass at once to sudden joy. It must be -by a gradual transition, first to a tender melancholy, and then to -cheerfulness, and then to joy. "The garment of sorrow," as Coleridge -expresses it, "must be drawn off so gradually, and that to be put in its -stead so gradually slipt on and feel so like the former, that the -sufferer shall be sensible of the change only by the refreshment." It is -by understanding well these affinities of the feelings that the orator -can continue to control them as they pass over their widest range. The -necessity of a suitable state of mind in order that the emotions of -taste may arise, has already been noticed, and what I now observe is, -that a state of correct moral feeling is more favorable to these -emotions than any other. There is between them such an affinity that -they readily associate with each other; while there is, between the -emotions of taste and a vicious state of mind, no such affinity, but -they are to a great extent incompatible. - -The external world often gives back to us but the image of our own -thoughts, and hence may seem almost as variable as the dim forms of -twilight to which the imagination gives its own shape. This tendency of -the mind to cast its own hue over nature, or rather to receive different -emotions from external objects, according to its own state, is well -illustrated by Crabbe, in his tale called "The Lover's Journey." In this -tale, Orlando, the lover, starts on a pleasant morning with the -expectation of finding the object of his affections at a village, where -she had agreed to meet him. The first part of his journey lay across a -heath covered with furze. But hear him:-- - - "Men may say - A heath is barren; nothing is so gay; - Barren or bare to call this charming scene - Argues a mind possessed by care or spleen." - -And thus he went on, admiring the wholesome wormwood and the vigorous -brier, till he reached the village, and then disappointment came. The -lady had gone to a village some miles further on, under circumstances -that vexed him, and led him to doubt her affection. He doubted even -whether he should proceed, but at length determined to see and upbraid -her. Now hear him again, as he passes along by the side of a beautiful -river:-- - - "I hate these scenes, Orlando angry cried; - And these proud farmers, yes, I hate their pride; - See that sleek fellow, how he stalks along, - Strong as an ox, and ignorant as strong. - These deep, fat meadows I detest; it shocks - One's feelings there to see the grazing ox;-- - For slaughter fatted--as a lady's smile - Rejoices man, and means his death the while." - -And if mere disappointment, without a consciousness of guilt and -remorse, could produce such effects, what must we expect when the mind -is not at peace with itself? Tendencies are shown by extreme cases, and -it is in perfect consistency with the nature of things that Milton makes -Satan exclaim, on seeing Eden in its united innocence and beauty, - - "O hell! what do mine eyes with grief behold!" - -Who can imagine a miser, even, to say nothing of a thief, or a drunkard, -lifting his eyes from his buried heaps, and enjoying the scene before -him, however beautiful? While he who performs a deed of charity at the -end of his walk, will find nature wearing a richer dress on his return. -The mind conscious of rectitude is at peace with itself, and is in that -calm state which permits it to enjoy whatever is pleasing. - -But not only, as in the cases now mentioned, is a right state of moral -feeling favorable to taste, but the emotions of taste also tend to -introduce moral ideas and emotions. It is, as I conceive, chiefly from -this fact that nature has a tendency to lead the mind "up to nature's -God;" for we must all be conscious that when we view nature as beautiful -or sublime, this tendency is strongest. No one can have stood by -Niagara, or upon the White Mountains, without feeling this. Hence the -groves and the high hills were the first places of worship. Hence the -Indian sacrifices to the Great Spirit when he passes through the wild -rapids. And as we associate the beauties of nature with the wisdom and -goodness of God, so do we, in many cases, instinctively infer from the -displays of taste in man, something of his moral character. Who, for -example, in travelling through a solitary forest, if he should come, as -there are many such, to a neat log-house, with a trellised woodbine at -the door, and with every thing orderly and clean about it, would not -expect to pass by unmolested, or, if he should call, to be civilly and -kindly treated?--whereas, if every thing bore the appearance of filth -and dilapidation, and the only signs of taste were those which indicated -a taste for rum, he might well quicken his pace for fear he should be -waylaid. No one expects to find indications of taste about the dwelling -of a drunkard, or of one abandoned to any low vice. I appeal to any one -who hears me, whether he has not felt that it was an indication of a -good moral character, and an encouragement to charity, when he has -entered some poor dwelling and found that there was still kept alive, in -the midst of poverty, a susceptibility to the emotions, and a regard to -the requisitions of taste. - -I have just observed, that there is an affinity between correct moral -feeling and the emotions of taste. I now observe, that the highest -pleasures of taste cannot be enjoyed without correct views on great -moral subjects, and especially respecting the being and attributes of -God. Whatever may be said of the power of material objects, in -themselves considered, to produce the emotions of taste, it is certain -that their chief power depends on the conceptions of the mind which they -awaken as signs. A single instance will illustrate this. Most of us have -probably felt the emotion of sublimity on hearing what we supposed to be -distant thunder, which vanished, and perhaps seemed ridiculous, the -moment we ascertained that the sound was produced by the rumbling of a -cart. In this case, it is obvious that the emotion depended, not on the -sound itself, but on the conception of the mind awakened by it. Now this -is pre-eminently the case in the works of nature. How different must be -the emotions awakened by a view of the evening firmament in the mind of -him who should suppose the stars to be mere points of light, set at no -great distance above him, and moving around the earth solely for the -convenience of man, from those awakened in the mind of him to whom those -points of light indicate the existence of an infinite space; and of -suns, and worlds, and systems without number, and at distances which -cause the wing of the strongest imagination to flag! How different the -emotions produced by the comet now, as it returns at its predicted -period, from those excited as it fired - - "the length of Ophiucus huge - In the Arctic sky, and, from his horrid hair," - -was supposed to shake "pestilence and war!" As, therefore, he who cannot -see beyond the stars as they appear to the sense, must lose by far the -highest pleasure which they are adapted as objects of taste to give; so -he who knows the physical structure of the universe, and who yet does -not see in it, and behind it, an infinite and beneficent Intelligence, -cannot have connected with his view those conceptions which awaken the -highest emotions of beauty and sublimity. - -The relations of man to nature are much less intimate than those of God, -and yet our emotions in view of nature are greatly modified by the view -which we take of _His_ dignity and moral character. It was when Hamlet -supposed there was foul corruption and a general want of principle in -society, that "this goodly frame, the earth," seemed to him but "a -steril promontory;" "this most excellent canopy, the air, look you, this -brave o'erhanging firmament," why, it appeared no other thing to him -"than a foul and pestilent congregation of vapors." It was when her -inhabitants were oppressed and degraded, that the natural beauty, which -is still as bright as ever on the shores of Greece, seemed in the eye of -the poet but as - - "The loveliness in death - That parts not quite with parting breath, - But beauty with that fearful bloom, - That hue which haunts it to the tomb, - So coldly sweet, so deadly fair, - We start, for life is wanting there." - "'Twas Greece, but living Greece no more." - -We must all have felt that a shade of sadness was cast over the face of -nature when we have thought of the passions, and wars, and lust, and -rapine of man, in connexion with her quiet scenes. On the other hand, -were the moral state of the world what we trust it shall one day -be,--did universal purity, and goodness, and love reign,--would not the -sun seem to shine with a more benignant radiance; instead of the thorn, -would there not come up the fir-tree: would not the mountains and hills -break forth into singing, and all the trees of the field clap their -hands? - -And if the emotions of taste are thus modified by our views of man, how -much more must they be by those respecting God! How must a blank atheism -hang the heavens in sackcloth, and cover the earth with a pall, and turn -the mute promisings of nature into a mockery, and make of her mighty -fabric one great charnel-house of death, without the hope of a -resurrection! On the other hand, how must the beauty and sublimity of -nature and of the universe be heightened, the moment we perceive them in -their connexion with God! Nothing is more common than to hear those, who -emerge from that practical atheism in which most men live, speak of the -new perceptions of beauty and sublimity with which they look upon the -works of nature:-- - - "In that blest moment, Nature, throwing wide - Her veil opaque, discloses, with a smile, - The Author of her beauties, who, retired - Behind his own creation, works unseen - By the _impure_, and hears his power denied." - -All our investigations into nature show that man has no faculties to -which there are not corresponding and adequate objects. As infinite as -he is in reason, yet the works of God are not exhausted by the -operations of that reason. No intellectual Alexander ever sat down and -wept for the want of more worlds to conquer. As vast as is his -imagination, the revelations of astronomy, as sober facts, go beyond any -thing that the imagination had conceived. And is it so, that, in the -region of taste alone, the faculties of man have no adequate object? But -it is only when nature, like the Bible, is seen to be full of God, that -she is clothed with her true sublimity. It is only when "the heavens -declare the glory of God and the firmament showeth his handy work," that -they correspond to the highest conceptions either of the taste or of the -intellect. Man rests in the Infinite alone, and the universe without a -God is not in harmony with his constitution, even when he is considered -as endowed with taste only. But if our views on moral subjects thus -modify the emotions of taste, it cannot be doubted that those emotions -react upon our moral views, tending to elevate and purify them. - -I remark again, that the emotions of taste are favorable to morals, -because they are disinterested. As admiration becomes intense, men -forget themselves, and, in proportion as they thus find enjoyment, they -are prepared for that higher enjoyment which a disinterested performance -of duty brings with it. Whenever we see excellence in another, we are -bound to admire it without reference to sect or party; and admiration, -thus bestowed, is almost always connected with a high moral character. -The beauty who can truly forget herself in her admiration for another, -deserves admiration for qualities far higher and nobler than beauty. - -I only observe further, that a cultivated taste is favorable to morals, -because the cultivation of one of our powers has a tendency to -strengthen the rest.--This, I know, is disputed, and it is even supposed -that the union of certain powers in any high degree is impossible. Thus, -it is often supposed that a remarkable memory and a sound judgment do -not go together; and it must be confessed that the memory may be so -cultivated as not to strengthen the judgment. But when I speak of -cultivating a faculty, I mean cultivating it on correct principles and -with reference to the end for which it was given. Those who remember -events as isolated, or only as they are connected by the relations of -time and place, and who do not see and remember them as connected by the -relations of cause and effect, means and end, premises and conclusion, -do not, by such an exercise of the memory, strengthen the judgment, -though they certainly show that it has great need of being strengthened. -Of what possible use can it be, to the forming of a correct judgment on -any point, for a good woman to remember the precise age of every child -in the neighborhood? It is these walking chronicles, these living -almanacs, who will tell you the weather for all time past, if not for -all time to come, who get the credit of having great memories and little -judgment. But such a memory is, to one cultivated on correct principles, -only what a room full of minerals and birds and fish and insects and -rubbish, promiscuously tumbled together, is to a well-arranged museum. -Who does not know that experience is the best enlightener of the -judgment?--And where does experience garner her stores but in the -memory? It is obvious that he who has the best memory of past events, in -their true connexions, will have the best possible materials for forming -a judgment of the future. The same opposition is generally supposed to -exist between the imagination and the judgment. But it occasionally -happens that an individual, like Edmund Burke, unites the most gorgeous -imagination with the profoundest judgment; and then it is seen that the -analogies which the imagination suggests yield important lights to the -judgment instead of misleading it. I know that the imagination, striking -its roots into the hotbed of novel-reading, may overtop the judgment; -but, judiciously cultivated, I contend that it is not unfavorable to the -judgment. And if, in these cases, a judicious cultivation of one power -tends to strengthen the other, much more will the cultivation of taste -have a favorable tendency upon the moral nature, since these departments -of the mind have never been supposed to be in opposition, but are, as we -have seen, closely allied to each other. - -But all this time it has probably been objected that, however plausible -the reasoning may be on this subject, it is yet contrary to experience. -If it were so, it might perhaps be said of it, as was said by Euler of a -demonstrated property of the arch, "this is contrary to all experience, -but is nevertheless true:"--it is so in the nature of things, but the -materials are refractory. But let us see how far it is contrary to -experience; or rather, whether we cannot, so far as it is thus contrary, -satisfactorily account for it. - -In order to this, we must make, as it seems to me, three important -distinctions. And, first, we must distinguish between taste considered -as a power of judging, and as a susceptibility to emotion. This -distinction is often overlooked. Mr. Blair, for instance, defines taste -to be, "the power of receiving pleasure or pain from the beauties or -deformities of nature and of art;" in which, regard is had to the -susceptibility only. But afterwards, when contrasting taste with genius, -he says--"Taste is the power of judging, genius is the power of -executing;" in which the susceptibility to emotion is left out of sight. -Can I make this distinction obvious? When an unpractised person sees for -the first time a grand historical picture, or reads a beautiful poem, he -gives himself up to the emotion; he is absorbed; he takes no note of -time; he forgets where he is, and neither knows nor cares why he is -pleased. The eye drinks in beauty as the thirsty man the cold water, and -it refreshes the soul. He sees the picture, or reads the poem, again and -again, and at length sits down to give an account to a friend of that -which had pleased him. Now, he wishes to state the reasons why he was -pleased, and he begins to inquire what those qualities were which -produced the effect. Here is the rudiment of philosophical criticism, -and he goes on perhaps investigating, till he discovers those general -principles of taste according to which the work was executed. As long, -however, as his mind is thus occupied in analyzing, he feels no emotion -of beauty or sublimity. But as this is an enticing species of logic, he -may follow it till a work of art shall give him pleasure only by its -conformity to certain principles, true or false, which he may have -established for himself, and till he becomes a cold critic, or perhaps a -reviewer by trade. He may become a mere teller in the bank of taste, to -pronounce on what is genuine, and hand it over to others to be used and -enjoyed. Now, a man who writes a skilful review of a work of genius, and -tells us why we are or ought to be pleased, is supposed to be a man of -taste; and the writing of the review is considered as an exercise of -taste. This is true of taste considered as a power of judging, but not -as a power of feeling. If it were so, the mass of men would be in a -pitiable condition. God no more intended that the uninitiated should -wait to be pleased with the beauty which they see, until its principles -are analyzed, and they are told when and why they ought to be pleased, -than He intended they should wait to be cheered and warmed by the rays -of the sun, till they should see light decomposed into the seven colors -of the prismatic image. But it is by cherishing and keeping alive these -universal emotions, which belong to the race, and which find excitement -everywhere, that I suppose there is a healthful effect produced on the -moral character. The power of genuine philosophical criticism; the power -of going back, if I may so express it, into the workshop of nature, and -seeing how she mixes her colors, is a rare, a valuable and a dignified -power; but it is still an exercise of the intellect, and I am not aware -that it has any peculiarly favorable effect upon the moral character. -Indeed, when literature and the fine arts become fashionable, and much -the subject of conversation, there is a vast deal of this kind of -criticism, which is fallen into from imitation and vanity, and which can -have no good effect upon morals except as it supplies the place of -scandal. It is not, then, in an egotistical and vain community, who read -works of genius, and look at pictures, not to admire and enjoy them, but -that they may themselves talk about them and be admired, that any good -effect upon the moral character is to be expected from the prevalence of -what they are pleased to call taste. How far this comes to be the case -with communities in which taste is said to be prevalent, and morals are -corrupt, I leave others to judge. - -The second distinction which I would make, is that between the -cultivation of a taste for the fine arts and for natural objects. This I -consider a distinction of much importance on this subject; and I propose -to give some reasons why the cultivation of the fine arts--as painting, -sculpture, architecture, poetry--has less tendency than a taste for -natural objects to improve the character. This I am bound to do; because -it is well known that certain nations, as the Spartans and ancient -Romans, considered a taste for the fine arts as having a tendency to -corrupt morals; and some of the sterner moralists of modern times, -especially religious moralists, have objected to it on the same ground. -It must also be conceded that those nations, as the Greeks and Italians, -among whom these arts have flourished most, have been exceedingly -corrupt, and that that corruption has co-existed with an advanced state -of the arts in question. - -And, first, I remark, that a taste for the fine arts cannot be general -in a community of any considerable extent. If we suppose such a taste, -when formed, to have a tendency to improve the morals, yet how few, in a -country like ours, have an opportunity to form it! The products of the -arts are to be found, for the most part, only in cities; and of the -inhabitants of cities, it is only those who have leisure and wealth, who -are affected by them. It ought also to be observed that, as these arts -do not come to perfection in the early stages of society, they cannot -produce their effect till wealth and luxury have had time to work -general corruption. - -But I observe again that, as the power either of executing or of judging -in these arts is confined to comparatively a few, it becomes a mark of -distinction and a ground of ostentation, and thus there comes to be the -appearance of more taste than there really is. The artist finds himself -a candidate for fame and wealth through his skill, and hence his -passions are aroused and his interests are involved. If successful, he -is flattered, perhaps almost deified; if unsuccessful, he becomes -irritable and sinks back on the proud consciousness of neglected merit. -This peculiar position will account for the bad character of many -artists. Those also who _patronize_ the arts, as it is significantly -termed, often do it from ostentation. What better resource has an -ordinary person who has money, and who wishes to be distinguished in the -fashionable world, than to become a patron of the fine arts? I knew a -person who spent several thousand dollars for pictures, and who, to my -certain knowledge, knew and cared nothing about them except as they -affected her standing in the fashionable world. But of those who have a -good degree of taste, there are few whose motives are not mixed. And -then it is to be remembered, that a product of art may be viewed in many -different aspects. It may be regarded as costing so much, as requiring -such a frame, or to be placed in such a light, or as an ornamental piece -of furniture, while there is but a single point of view in which it can -be regarded as gratifying taste. The moment a picture comes to be -considered as an ornament, or an article of furniture, you might as well -have a looking-glass or a pier-table. It not unfrequently happens, that -the owner of fine pictures thinks so much of them as ornamental or -valuable, so much of their framing, or light, or preservation, that he -becomes indifferent to them in the only point of view in which they are -truly valuable. - -But again, in order to see this point in its true light we must consider -the peculiar rank which is held by the pleasures connected with the fine -arts. These pleasures are addressed to the eye and to the ear, and hold -a middle rank between the lower pleasures of sense on the one hand, and -the higher enjoyments of the intellect and of the affections on the -other; and may readily associate with, and promote either. This point is -well stated by Lord Kames. It is observed by him, that "in touching, -tasting, and smelling, we are sensible of the impression made upon the -organ, and are led to place there the pleasant or painful feeling caused -by that impression;" but that with respect to hearing and seeing, "we -are insensible to the organic impression, and hence conceive the -pleasures derived from these senses to be more refined and spiritual -than those which seem to exist externally at the organ of sense, and -which are conceived to be merely corporeal. These pleasures," says he, -"being sweet and moderately exhilarating, are, in their tone, equally -distant from the turbulence of passion and the languor of indolence, and -by that tone are perfectly well qualified not only to revive the spirits -when sunk by sensual gratification, but also to relax them when -overstrained in any violent pursuit." "Organic pleasures," he observes -again, "have naturally a short duration; when prolonged, they lose their -relish; when indulged to excess, they beget satiety and disgust; and to -restore a proper tone of mind, nothing can be more happily contrived -than the exhilarating pleasures of the eye and ear." Now this is -precisely the use, and all the use that many make of the fine arts, and -I may add, to some extent of the beauties of nature too. How many -wealthy sensualists are there in our cities who give an appearance of -elevation and refinement to their low and selfish mode of life, by -collecting about them specimens of the arts! These men may be best -compared to that amphibious animal, the frog. They come up occasionally -from that lower element in which they live, into a region of light and -beauty, but no sooner are they a little refreshed than they plunge again -into the mud of sensual gratification. It is men like these, who, when -their capacity for the lower pleasures is exhausted, drive in their -carriages about the cities of the old world (perhaps we are not yet -sufficiently corrupt,) and set up to be _virtuosi_. It is easy to see -how such a taste must bear upon morals. - -But I remark once more, that the fine arts may be made to pander -directly to vice. From the middle rank which the pleasures derived from -them hold, they readily associate, as has been said, both with the -higher and the lower. Thus, music may quicken the devotions of a seraph, -and lend its strains to cheer the carousals of the bacchanal; and -poetry, painting and sculpture, while they have power to elevate, and -charm, and purify the mind, may be made direct stimulants to the vilest -and lowest passions. It is indeed from this quarter that we are to look -for danger from the prevalence of these arts. It was thus that they -corrupted the ancient cities; and those who have seen the abominable -statuary dug from the ruins of Herculaneum and Pompeii, do not wonder -that they were buried under a sea of fire. The same process of -corruption through these arts has gone to a fearful extent on the -eastern continent, and has commenced in this country. Clothed in this -garment of light, vice finds access where it otherwise could not. Under -the pretence of promoting the fine arts, modesty is cast aside, and -indecent pictures are exhibited, and respectable people go to see them. -If I might utter a word of warning to the young, it would be to beware -of vice dressed in the garments of taste. The beauties of nature are -capable of no such perversion. All the associations connected with them -tend to elevate and to purify the mind. No case can be adduced in which -a taste for gardening or for natural objects has corrupted a people. -While, therefore, I believe that the cultivation of the arts, in their -genuine spirit of beauty and of purity, has a tendency to improve the -character, it would appear that they are greatly liable to abuse, and -that they have been extensively abused. - -But though I may thus dispose of the general objection from the -co-existence in many cases of refinement in the arts and corrupt morals, -yet this, I think, will not fully meet the objection which first arose -in the minds of some, from those numerous individual instances in which -men have been eminent for taste and genius, and at the same time -corrupt. What, you have been ready to say, do you make of such a case -as that of Byron? Now I would here make an inquiry, how far, and in what -sense, those productions of genius which have a corrupt tendency are -really consistent with good taste. Take the Don Juan of Byron for -instance. To say nothing of principle, such a work certainly is not -compatible with a correct _moral_ taste. That it is in some sense, -however, a work of taste, cannot be denied; but it seems to me to be -only as a splendid palace, built in a low and fetid morass, is a work of -taste. The palace may be beautiful, but it was in bad taste _to set it -there_. Particular rooms may be elegantly furnished, but still there -comes up from the surrounding marsh a pestilential miasm, and it may be -said of the atmosphere around it, as was said of that around New Orleans -a few autumns since, that "all is beauty and all is death." So far -therefore as these works have a corrupt tendency, they cannot be said to -be in the highest sense consistent with good taste. But still it is said -that corrupt men have produced works of the highest genius and of the -best taste that have had no such tendency. This is granted, but it is to -be accounted for from the fact that men of genius are often men of -strong passions and of wayward and unbalanced minds, and from the -peculiar temptations in which, as I have already said, they are placed. -Taste seems to me to be, to such men, what the music of David was to -Saul,--it charms away the evil spirit, but it is only for a time. - -But we now pass to the third distinction which was to be made, and that -is, between a true taste for natural objects and the fine arts, and -what is called taste in the world of fashion. The point of distinction -to which I would draw your attention is well stated by Stewart. "It is -obvious," says he, "that the circumstances which please in the objects -of taste are of two kinds: first, those which are fitted to please by -nature, or by associations which all mankind are led to form by their -common condition; and secondly, those which please in consequence of -associations arising from local and accidental circumstances. Hence -there are two kinds of taste; the one enabling us to judge of those -beauties which have a foundation in the human constitution; the other, -of such objects as derive their principal recommendation from the -influence of fashion. These two kinds of taste are not always united in -the same person; indeed, I am inclined to think that they are united but -rarely. The perfection of the one depends much on the degree in which we -are able to free the mind from the influence of casual associations; -that of the other, on the contrary, depends on a faculty of association -which enables us to fall in at once with all the turns of the fashion, -and, as Shakspeare expresses it, to catch the tune of the times." -Association is the sole foundation of the value which we put upon some -articles, and of the beauty which we find in others. Thus, a lock of -hair, valueless in itself, may, from associations connected with it, -have a value which money cannot measure; and articles of dress, which -would otherwise be to us indifferent, or odious, become beautiful by -their association with those persons whom we have been accustomed to -consider as models of elegance. It is indeed astonishing what an effect -this principle will have upon our feelings; and from looking too -exclusively at facts connected with it, some have been led to doubt -whether there is any such thing as a permanent principle of taste. It -would really seem, that, within the bounds of comfort and decency, both -of which are often outraged by fashion, one mode of dress may come to be -as becoming as another. The wigs, the knee-buckles, the small-clothes, -the long-skirts and cocked-hats of our grandfathers, were as becoming -then, as is now the dress of the present day. Says Sir Joshua Reynolds, -"If an European, when he has cut off his beard, and put false hair on -his head, or bound up his own natural hair in regular hard knots, as -unlike nature as he can possibly make it, and after having rendered them -immovable by the help of the fat of hogs, has covered the whole with -flour, laid on by a machine with the utmost regularity; if, when thus -attired, he issues forth and meets a Cherokee Indian, who has bestowed -as much time at _his_ toilet, and laid on, with equal care and -attention, his yellow and red ochre on particular parts of his forehead -or cheeks, as he judges most becoming; whoever of these two despises the -other for his attention to the fashion of his country; whichever feels -himself provoked to laugh, is the barbarian." Good taste with respect to -the fashions, then, would seem to consist, not in following them, or in -paying them attention, except so far as to avoid attracting notice in -any way by dress; for it is a strong indication, when a person seeks -notice from that, that there is about him little else that is worthy of -notice. The foundation of taste in the fashions, however, being what I -have now stated, it is obvious that a quick perception of their -ever-varying changes and a ready and careful accommodation to them, can -belong, whether in man or woman, only to a mind essentially frivolous; -and that such a taste, if not absolutely incompatible with a perception -of all that is permanently grand and beautiful in the works of God, is -yet seldom connected with it. Such a taste must, of course, rather -injure than promote good morals. - - -I have now considered taste as exercised indifferently upon any objects -within its appropriate province. It still remains that I should say -something, which I propose to do in another Lecture, on Moral Taste, or -on taste having moral actions for its object. - - - - -LECTURE II. - - -It was observed on a former occasion, that material objects produce -their effect upon taste chiefly as signs; but it is the opinion of Mr. -Alison, of Mr. Jeffries, and others of high authority on this point, -that it is solely as signs--solely as suggesting intellectual and moral -qualities--that they have an effect. It is quite evident that mere -matter in a chaotic state, or in any state which is not either produced -by mind or such as mind would produce, cannot be beautiful; and hence it -is said that it can be beautiful only as a means of indicating qualities -that do not belong to itself. - -The great difficulty which this theory has to encounter arises from the -apparent instantaneousness with which the emotion seems to arise when a -beautiful object is presented. But this is not a conclusive objection, -because emotions which can arise only from association seem to come in -the same way. How instantaneous, for instance, are the emotions that -throng up when he who has been long on a foreign shore sees, for the -first time, the stars and stripes of his country's flag as it enters the -port where he is;--and yet, these emotions can be awakened by it only as -a link of association with scenes that are past, or as a sign of his -country's presence and protection. I have heard the rainbow adduced as -an instance of an object which produces the emotion of beauty without a -reference to any thing beyond itself. But what was the impression made -by it more than two thousand years ago, upon the mind of one who had no -theory to maintain?--"Look upon the rainbow," says he, "and praise Him -that made it: very beautiful it is in the brightness thereof. It -compasseth the heavens about with a glorious circle, and _the hands of -the Most High have bended it_." How apparently instantaneous, yet how -different, are our emotions when looking at the cheek flushed by the -bloom of health, or suffused by the blush of shame, or reddened by -anger, or wearing that hectic flush which is the flag of distress held -out by nature when she is sinking in consumption!--And yet no one can -doubt, if these indications were reversed, that the emotions would be -reversed also. It is conceded by all, that it is the expression, the -indication of mental and moral qualities, that gives its highest beauty -to the human countenance. There are no features which may not be so -lighted up with noble or tender emotion as to be beautiful. But is -there, it will be asked, _no_ beauty in any combination of features, or -of matter, except as connected with expression? I am inclined to think -there is what may be called an instinctive beauty on the perception of -certain colors and forms; but it is of little value compared with that -of which a rational and reflective being can give an account to himself. -Even this, however, presupposes the action of mind upon matter, though -that action is not recognized by us as the cause of our emotion. It is -therefore still true that, as the beauty of the early morning is -produced solely by a reflexion from the sun while he is still below the -horizon, so the beauty of matter is wholly a reflexion from that great -central orb of mind which has never yet beamed upon the eye of man in -its direct effulgence--that, to him who views it aright, the beauty of -this world is but the morning twilight of heaven. - -But, however this question may be decided, the fact that it can be made -a question at all, shows how largely moral ideas and emotions enter into -the province of taste, and the intimate connexion there is between taste -and morals. What is called moral taste is, in fact, discriminated from -taste in general, only as it has the moral actions of free and -intelligent agents for its object. When we look at a moral action, there -is a plain difference between our perception of it as right, and our -perception of it as beautiful. In one case there arises the feeling of -_approbation_, in the other of _admiration_, which are entirely -distinct, and may exist in very different proportions. - -It is, indeed, not always easy to distinguish the point at which -approbation and admiration run into each other; and in treating of this -subject, I shall first say a few words of that border-ground between -taste and morals where the dividing line seems to be unsettled. Where, -for example, shall we place that feeling which we have in view of the -manner of doing a thing, in distinction from the thing done? Is that -feeling merely the result of taste, or are there mingled with it some -elements of moral approbation or disapprobation? Where will you place a -mean action in distinction from a dishonest one? I have heard it -disputed whether neatness is a virtue, a matter of moral obligation, or -merely a requisition of taste. Is a man under moral obligation to be -neat in his person? It is along this dividing line that all those -actions lie which relate to the proprieties and courtesies of life--all -those smaller attentions to the convenience and comfort of others, and -that delicate regard to their feelings, which have been designated by -the French as the smaller morals. - -In regard to this very extensive, and therefore important department of -human conduct, there seem to be two common mistakes. The first consists -in disregarding it altogether. There are many men whose characters, in -their sketching and outline, are fine, and which, seen at a distance, -appear well; but on approaching them, they seem coarse and very -imperfect. In all the great duties of life they appear to advantage; but -through negligence, or some greater failing, the minor duties, and -especially the department of manners, is entirely neglected. They seem -like stately trees, in the trunk and main branches of which the sap -circulates vigorously, but does not reach and animate the smaller twigs, -and give to the leaves their perfect green. - -A second, and more common mistake, is the giving up of this department -to the control of taste under the guidance of selfishness. The manners -are polished, and all the forms of politeness adopted, not for the -purpose of making others happy, but of securing to ourselves their -esteem, and of effecting our own ends in life. This is the school of -manners recommended by Chesterfield, and young persons are often -exhorted to pay attention to their manners on this ground. In this case -the sap does not circulate at all, and the leaves are painted. - -But to me it seems, that this whole class of actions falls within the -province of morality. Wherever human happiness is concerned, there is -room for principle to operate, and the constitution of society will -never be sound, and its beauty will never be perfect, till the sap of -principle circulates to the extremities of human action. The true polish -and beauty of society can result only from the principle of benevolence -showing itself in a graceful and practical attention to the minor wants -and to the feelings of others. But whatever we may decide in regard to -their respective limits in this department, it is obvious that taste, so -far as it goes, must be favorable to morals. - -We now pass to what is indisputably the province of morals. And here our -first inquiry will be, what are the circumstances under which the -emotions of taste are awakened by moral actions? In reply to this -inquiry I observe, that the emotion of beauty, leaving sublimity for the -present out of the question, is awakened by a moral action chiefly, -and perhaps solely, when it springs from the principle of duty acting in -coincidence with the desires, the affections, or some other natural and -inferior principle of action. This point is of practical importance, and -requires illustration. Man, as we all know, has various principles of -action,--such as instincts, desires, affections, passions. These may -impel him to a course of action directly opposed to that indicated by a -sense of duty, and they may also lead him to perform the same actions as -are dictated by it; and the position is, that moral beauty arises when -there is a partial or entire coincidence between the principle of duty -and these inferior powers. - -That this is so is evident, because there are many actions which are -right, which are imperatively required by duty, which yet do not awaken -in the mind of the impartial spectator any admiration--for we must here -keep in mind the distinction already made between admiration and -approbation. The simple payment of a debt, for example, does not awaken -any admiration, though we approve the act and should strongly condemn -him who should not do it when it was in his power. In this case, there -can be mingled with the performance of duty no play of the generous -emotions. He who performs all his actions solely from a sense of duty, -has our approbation, our respect; but he who, in addition to this, is -possessed of warm affections, which always coincide in their promptings -with what is right, has also our admiration and love. Duty is to the -affections, in the conduct of life, what logic is to rhetoric in a -discourse. Logic forms an excellent body for a discourse; we assent to -it, we approve it, it is good, all good, but it awakens no admiration. -It is not till rhetoric sends its warm life-blood to mantle on the cold -cheek of logic, and clothes its angular form in the garments of taste, -that we begin to admire the discourse. And so it is with duty. It is an -excellent body to the course of our conduct in life; nothing else will -do, but it may be so performed as to appear unamiable and even -repulsive. In order to be beautiful, there must be connected with it -some manifestation of natural affection or graceful emotion. - -And here I may remark, that though we have a right to expect of every -man that he will do his duty, yet the display of this beauty is not -equally within the power of all, since the existence and manifestation -of emotion depend, to some extent, upon the temperament. As there are -some who have naturally a meagre intellect, so there are others whose -minds seem to be barren of those finer sympathies and affections of our -nature which are the verdure of the soul, and upon which the eye always -rests with pleasure. The characters of some good men are dry and -unattractive. They are harsh, and hard-visaged, and seem too much like -wooden men, moved by rule and calculation. Such persons often seem -better, and worse, than they really are. Their freedom from -extravagancies on the one hand, and on the other, that want of feeling -which is wrongly termed by many hardness of heart, is equally the result -of temperament. - -That the doctrine which I now advocate is correct, appears also from the -effect produced upon our feelings when we observe habit taking the place -of sentiment in the performance of duty. We have all seen persons enter -upon a course of virtuous activity, and continue it for a time from a -sense of duty, sustained by ardent feeling; but after a time the feeling -has died away, and there has come in its stead habit, or a regard to -consistency, to sustain the sense of duty in keeping up the same course -of external action. When this change has taken place, we are all -conscious that the beauty of the conduct is greatly diminished;--its -spirit has vanished; the dew of its youth is exhaled. - -I said that this was a practical point, and I now wish to show, in -connexion with it, precisely how it is that mischief arises from the -perversion of moral taste; as was shown, in the former Lecture, how it -arises from its perversion in other things. In opposition to the hard -and dry characters mentioned above, there are those whose -susceptibilities are acute, whose sympathies are quick, whose feelings -are generous, whose affections are ardent, who do every thing so -promptly and so heartily that impulse seems almost to supply the place -of principle. There is something very attractive in a character of this -kind; there is an ease and freedom about it which seems to put aside all -labor of calculation, and it moreover exhibits our nature in the -pleasing garb of natural goodness. It is for this reason that novelists, -who draw men as they wish to have them, and not as they are, have -almost universally made these fine instincts of humanity the guide of -their hero, and the basis of his character. This is, indeed, if I -understand it, the basis of this kind of literature, and one chief -source of the injury it produces. The exhibition of these instincts, and -affections, and emotions, springing up at random and acting without the -control of principle, holds out no stimulus to exertion; and their -possession and exercise is often in fact, and often too in books, -connected with great corruption of moral character. - -Taking, therefore, as the main ingredient in the character of those who -are to make the chief figure in this kind of writing, what Miss -Martineau calls _spontaneousness_, and which she and a certain wise -friend of hers in Boston thought should by all means be encouraged and -_reverenced_, we may mix the other materials somewhat to our taste. An -excellent and much-approved receipt for the hero of a novel is the -following:--1st. Make him handsome, for beauty is to the body what -spontaneousness is to the mind, a sort of physical spontaneousness. Or, -if you do not make him handsome, do what amounts to much the same thing, -give him an _air_; let him have something about him that is peculiar, so -that those who scan him closely may observe, under those apparently -indifferent features, a certain something, a sign of the fire that is -slumbering within. 2d. If you find it necessary, for fashion's sake, to -put him at school, or at any place for study, make him idle, generous, -somewhat mischievous, a great hater of mathematics, (for, so far as my -knowledge extends, no hero of a novel ever yet knew any thing about -mathematics,) give him some whimsical pursuit for the hours when he -chooses to do any thing, and then make him speak, as he has occasion, -Italian, French and Spanish, which he learned by instinct. 3d. _Make him -act from impulse, and not from principle, and get him into difficulty -through the influence of these same generous impulses._ It is on -difficulties thus created that the plot must turn. 4th. Get him in love. -5th. Make him run a gauntlet of difficulties a volume and a half long, -furnishing a new illustration of that old adage, "the course of true -love never did run smooth." 6th. Marry him, and let him live many years -in perfect felicity. - -We commonly hear it said, that the chief mischief of novel-reading -arises from the false pictures of life which novels present. This is -doubtless a source of no small mischief; but in my view, a much greater -evil arises from their holding up, directly or indirectly, false -principles of action, and casting contempt upon the true; from their -leading young persons to admire that which they esteem graceful rather -than that which is respectable and right in the conduct of life. There -is in those works an unnatural separation made between the principle of -virtue and that which gives to virtue its beauty; and principle is -represented as formal and cold, and perhaps ridiculous. Prudence, -especially, is a virtue which no heroine of a novel must ever be guilty -of. In a recent work, which deserves great credit for avoiding the -general fault just mentioned, we are yet told that prudence was a -virtue for which the heroine was never famous, and a slight odium is -cast upon the virtue itself by making it appear, in the rival of the -heroine, somewhat stiff and pragmatical. - -It is thus that these works awaken extensively, in the minds of the -young, associations unfavorable to the sterner and sterling virtues; and -in many cases, these amiable qualities are so associated with vice as to -render it attractive. It is thus that we are presented by popular -novelists--and in such a manner as I know carries along the sympathies -of many young men, while their imaginations are rendered familiar with -the haunts of vice--with gentlemen robbers who rob in style; who are so -generous that they never rob the poor; who never shed human blood if -people will give up their money without it; and if they are occasionally -obliged to blow out the brains of some agent of the law, they are really -sorry for it, though they do not see how such impertinent fellows could -expect any thing better. It is thus that the impression is received, -that a certain class of impulses is sufficient to secure success in -life, and even to excuse the want of principle; and young men with their -heads full of pictures, not perhaps so bad as this, yet fundamentally -the same, rush eagerly into life without fixed principles and fixed -aims. - -To him who is without experience, there is no sight more beautiful than -that of a young man of an ingenuous nature entering upon life, and -resting upon his own good impulses to keep him from evil. But such a -sight, even when there has been no corruption like that just spoken of, -now causes apprehension in me; for I have seen him who had every thing, -in his person and in his sensibilities, to excite admiration and love, -tarrying long at the wine, and seeking mixed wine; I have seen him going -to that "house" which "is the way to hell;" and therefore it is that I -would utter a solemn protest against any thing which would divorce the -beauty of virtue from the principle of virtue, or which would give an -impression that there is security without fixed principle. Even -"genius," with all these amiable qualities-- - - "Yet may lack the aid - Implored by humble minds and hearts afraid, - May leave to timid souls the shield and sword - Of the tried faith and the resistless word; - Amid a world of dangers venturing forth, - Frail but yet fearless, proud in conscious worth, - Till strong temptation, in some fatal time, - Assails the heart and wins the soul to crime." - -Then, - - "All that honor brings against the force - Of headlong passion, aids its rapid course; - Its slight resistance but provokes the fire, - As wood-work stops the flame, and then conveys it higher." - -With such a basis to the characters presented, it will follow of course, -that the emotions and the sensibilities will be chiefly addressed in -these works, and thus they become the principal means of promoting that -false and selfish sensibility which is so often cultivated in refined -society. This is a more refined species of intemperance, and is to the -mind what intemperance in strong drink is to the body. It causes -excitement for the mere selfish enjoyment produced by it, without -leading to any exertion. And as the grosser species of intemperance is -more common among one sex, so it is to be feared, that this more refined -species is more common among the other; and that for both, circulating -libraries, and other libraries, instead of furnishing wholesome -entertainment, are too often converted into mere intellectual -dram-shops. There are many who seek chiefly for excitement, who have a -constant craving for it, whose emotions and mental sensibilities have -become accustomed to a set of artificial stimulants till they are -sensible to no other, and they become as remorselessly selfish as the -drunkard himself. I would sooner apply for an act of genuine kindness, -one which should reach actual want, to a woman in a log-house, upon the -side of a mountain, surrounded by hungry children, than to the daintiest -young lady whose sensibilities have spindled up and wilted in the -artificial heat of novel-reading. In order to perform the duties of -benevolence and philanthropy, it is indispensable that the sensibilities -should be kept alive to the impressions of misery as it actually -presents itself in all its squalid accompaniments. - - "Sweet are the tears that from a Howard's eye - Drop on the cheek of one he lifts from earth; - And he who works me good with unmoved face, - Does it but half; he chills me while he aids, - My benefactor, not my fellow-man. - But even this, this cold benevolence, - Seems worth, seems manhood, when there rise before me - The sluggard Pity's vision-weaving tribe, - Who sigh for wretchedness, yet shun the wretched, - Nursing, in some delicious solitude, - Their slothful loves and dainty sympathies!" - -It was this esteem in which mankind hold the sensibilities and impulses, -this preference of spontaneousness without its connexion with principle, -which gave its popularity to what has been called the sentimental -school--the results of which ought to teach society a lesson not soon to -be forgotten. Concerning this school, it is justly remarked by -Coleridge, that "all the mischief achieved by Hobbes, and the whole -school of materialists, will appear inconsiderable if it be compared -with the mischief effected and occasioned by the sentimental philosophy -of Sterne and his numerous imitators. The vilest appetites, and the most -remorseless inconstancy towards their objects, acquired the title of the -_heart_--the irresistible feelings--the too tender sensibility: and if -the frosts of prudence, the icy chains of human law, thawed and vanished -at the genial warmth of human nature, who _could_ help it? It was an -amiable weakness." - -I would here remark, that I have no objection to fictitious writings as -such. There are those to which I do not object. Let them cease, first, -to present false pictures of life: secondly, to array the sensibilities -and associations of the mind against principle: and, thirdly, let them -cease to create and feed a morbid craving for excitement, and to destroy -the balance between the feelings and the judgment: and I shall not -object to them. The mass of these writings, however, do produce each -and all of these effects, and are, so far, indisputably pernicious. - -I have been thus particular in pointing out the evils which arise from -arraying what is beautiful and graceful in morals and in conduct against -that which is right, because I do not believe that the community are -sufficiently warned against the mischief it is working, and in many -cases are not perhaps aware of the manner in which it is wrought. Evil -gains advantage over man by dividing him against himself, by bringing -into collision faculties that were intended to work harmoniously -together; and we may regard it as settled, that whoever or whatever -would set up mere impulses, or sensibilities, or emotions, in the place -of the reason and conscience of man, is thus dividing him against -himself. It is with the conscience of man as it is with a king. He may -have his prime minister, who is his chief favorite, and next to himself, -but he must never abandon his power, or suffer the highest subject to -depose him from the throne. The desires and affections are then only -truly beautiful, when they are in ready attendance at the court of their -rightful sovereign. - -Having now spoken of the manner in which evil is done by those who care -to please rather than to improve mankind, I cannot leave this part of -the subject without suggesting, to the friends of principle and of -religion, how much, if what has been said is correct, they may do to -counteract this evil by a free, a hearty, a joyful, and therefore an -attractive, mode of doing that which is right. Whence have arisen those -associations of coldness and formality and gloom, as connected with -duty, which haunt the imaginations of many young persons, and which have -just as little existence in reality as other spectres of the night? Is -it not in part from an unnatural austerity, or from a cowardly and -faltering step, a want of freedom and power and beauty in the -exhibitions of virtue and principle on the part of those who profess to -adhere to them? It is not as it should be, when the glad and the -graceful emotions readily spring up by the side of every path that we -walk in except the path of duty. He who marches under the banner of -principle is not only to feel that he is engaged in a good cause, but is -also to see in that cause a beauty which shall be to him what music is -to the soldier, giving cheerfulness to his countenance and alacrity to -his step. His is not indeed to be the unchastened, and reckless, and -merely animal joy that is unconscious of the evil that exists, and that -is to be met; but it is to be the joy of him who, though he is -travelling in a difficult and obscure path, yet sees before him the -bright and steady light of his own happy home. The more those who act -from principle are able to combine, with the most perfect rectitude and -uncompromising faithfulness, the cultivation and play of all the -graceful and tender emotions, the more will they do to promote the cause -in which they labor. I know, and here is the difficulty, that most -virtue is too feeble for this; and I would not that there should be put -on any affectation of freedom or ease. Virtue should move easily and -gracefully only as it is strong, but it should become strong that it -may move easily and gracefully, and thus become to all men as beautiful -as it is obligatory. - -It is not a little that the Christian religion has suffered from the -mistakes of its adherents on this point. It had been better if they had -more regarded the spirit of its Founder when He commanded his disciples, -even when they fasted, not to be of a sad countenance, as the hypocrites -were. The impression we get of Paul, notwithstanding his labors and -sufferings, is that he was a happy man. If he was sometimes "sorrowful," -he was yet "always rejoicing." The movements of his spirit were so ready -and free, in view of the great subjects that filled his mind, that he -reminds us more than any other man of the "rapt seraph that adores and -burns." What is it, indeed, that gives its perfect beauty to our -conception of the worship of heaven? Is it not, that the most perfect -law is there fully obeyed, and is yet no restraint upon the highest and -freest expansion of feeling? It is when this is so, and then only, that -moral beauty is perfect. - -We have thus far considered moral beauty only. We now pass to another -branch of our subject, the moral sublime. When speaking on taste in -general, it was not necessary, for any purposes I then had in view, that -I should make a distinction between beauty and sublimity, either as they -exist in themselves, or as they are occasioned by outward objects. -Indeed, it is the opinion of many writers, that there is no radical -distinction between them, but that sublimity is merely the feeling of -beauty heightened. This seems to me doubtful, even in material beauty; -but in our present department, the occasions on which they arise are so -different, that they must be distinguished. It was for this reason that -I treated of beauty by itself. - -It has been observed, that the emotion of moral beauty arises when there -is a coincidence between the sense of duty and certain inferior -principles of action. I now observe, that the emotion of moral sublimity -is awakened, when the sense of duty is opposed by inclination, or -affection, or by any or all the inferior principles of action, and -triumphs over them. Its principle consists in a power of self-control -and of self-sacrifice, in those cases in which they are difficult. - -The illustration of this point will lead to a further confirmation of -what was said in reference to moral beauty. No sight, for example, can -be more beautiful than that of a family in which there is mutual -attachment, and in which the performance of every duty is sweetened by -affection. How beautiful is the assiduity of a child, who bears with -every infirmity, and soothes every care, and anticipates every want, of -a parent in sickness or in age! It is beautiful, but not sublime. The -conduct of that young man, who labors hard and denies himself the -ordinary pleasures of the young that he may support an aged mother, or -add to her comfort, is highly beautiful; but natural affection -coöperates with a sense of duty, and therefore it is not sublime. No one -has ever considered as sublime the conduct of Æneas, when he bore his -aged father upon his shoulders from the flames of Troy. But when the -ancient Brutus, with a power that was supreme, sat in judgment on his -own son who was accused of being a traitor, and when he gave the sign to -the lictor to take him to execution, then there was a struggle, then -inflexible justice triumphed over natural affection, and it was--not -beautiful, it was too awful for that--but it was sublime. That act of -our Saviour, (if I may be permitted to refer to such a scene in this -connexion,) by which he remembered his mother upon the cross and -provided for her wants, was beautiful--how beautiful! His prayer for his -murderers was sublime. It is, in general, acts of tenderness, -gentleness, condescension, pity, gratitude, humanity, that are -beautiful; while it is, on the other hand, acts of magnanimity, of -fortitude, of inflexible justice, of high patriotism, and, on proper -occasions, of contempt of danger and of death, that are sublime. In all -these latter cases it will be seen that the principle is the same, and -that the sublime emotion is awakened by virtuous self-control, in union -with high resolve. - -We hence see why it is that periods of difficulty, and oppression, and -persecution, are favorable to the exhibition of the moral sublime. They -test the amount of attachment to principle which there is among men, and -the sacrifices which they are willing to make for it. Accordingly, it -has been in such emergencies that men have arisen, who, under the -inspiration of the great principles of civil and religious liberty, -have been ready to go in the face of every danger, wherever their duty -should call them; as Luther was determined to go to the diet of Worms, -though he should find as many devils in that city as there were tiles -upon the houses. These are the men, who, though they have been opposed, -and vilified, and persecuted in their day, have yet received the homage -of after ages; who have stood as the beacon-lights of the world, and -whose names have been the watchword of those who have rallied and struck -for the united reign of liberty and law. Such men have almost always -been in advance of their age, and the people of that age have not -comprehended them. They have reverenced the great men of former times; -they have built the sepulchres of the prophets, but have persecuted -those who were sent unto _them_. It is not therefore surprising that -Seneca has spoken so largely of the benefits of adversity, as alone -giving an opportunity for the display of the heroic virtues, and has -said that a good man, struggling with adversity, was a spectacle worthy -of the gods. - -But it is not necessary to the existence, though it may be to the -exhibition, of moral heroism, that we should be placed in circumstances -of external adversity. Wherever there is moral combat, there may be -moral sublimity, and this combat is necessary for the accomplishment of -that triumph which every man is called to gain over himself. The force -and grandeur of virtue are then seen when we sacrifice to it our -appetites, our avarice, our pride, our vanity, our ambition, our -resentments, till every evil passion is brought into subjection to -reason and conscience. - -Such being the nature of the moral sublime, it is obvious that there is -much less danger to morals from its perversion than from the perversion -of the beautiful. There is here no natural passion to come in as an ally -of principle; and which may take the place of it, but it is duty -struggling single-handed, and triumphing over all the might of external -nature, and all the force of human propensity. Virtue may indeed exist -in perfect serenity, and be exercised without an obstacle; but in this -world, and it is that which makes it a place of probation, there is -little virtue except on the condition of struggling against and -overcoming inclination or passion. If we succeed in this struggle, we -feel in our own breasts a peace which is not only present happiness, but -the promise of future reward; and we awaken in the breasts of others the -emotions of moral sympathy, of approbation, of sublimity in its highest -forms, till they are ready to welcome us with acclaim, and we find that -virtue is not only happiness, but is also "glory, and honor, and -immortality." - -But though moral beauty and sublimity are so different in their nature -and in the occasions on which they arise, it must not be supposed that -they do not often blend with each other in actual life. The general -course of Howard, for instance, being in accordance with the dictates of -humanity, had great moral beauty, and yet the sacrifices which he made -were often so great as to cause that course to partake of the moral -sublime. - -If the account of moral taste, now given, be correct, the analysis of -the subject is the only argument needed. Its cultivation must, of -course, be favorable to morals, since it would lead, in its perfect -state, to the same course of conduct as would be required by principle. -There is, indeed, a whole school of philosophers, that of Shaftesbury, -who have looked upon virtue, and have recommended it, as beautiful -rather than as obligatory; who have regarded it as a sentiment rather -than a principle; and whose writings have been calculated to awaken -enthusiasm in the cause of virtue, but not to give it its proper -sanctions. So far, however, as this class of feelings would lead us, it -is in the direct path of virtue, and they may, no doubt, be so -cultivated, and especially by the young, as to furnish efficient aid to -the principle of duty. Perhaps few persons, rightly educated, are aware -how many wrong actions they avoid with the greater care because they are -also mean; how many right actions they perform with the greater -readiness because they are in accordance with the requisitions of a -cultivated moral taste. Considered as a principle of action, such a -taste provides an effectual security against the grossness connected -with many vices, and cherishes a temper of mind friendly to all that is -amiable, or generous, or elevated in our nature. While, therefore, we -regard taste as an important ally to the sense of duty, we are not to -rely chiefly upon it. It would need stability, and would be constantly -liable to be led astray by the influence of fashion, or of casual -association. We may however do more, we should do more to combine them; -to unite taste and principle in the conduct of life; to do, ourselves, -and to lead others to do, what is becoming, as well as what is right. - -Man is capable of forming to himself an ideal model, of embodying a -conception of excellence such as he has never seen, and of acting with -reference to it. It is this which renders him capable of progression; -and one great reason why men are stationary, is, that they have in their -minds no fixed and definite standard of excellence after which they are -reaching. Young men, to whom I speak, here is the point at which many of -you doubtless fail. You are borne on by the current, and form to -yourselves no worthy object of pursuit, after which you bring -yourselves, by self-discipline, steadily to labor. But without doing -this, no man ever yet exerted a high and worthy influence; no man ever -can. Permit me then to propose to you, in your capacity as social -beings, an object after which you may thus strive. It is the combination -of perfect moral principle with perfect simplicity and refinement of -manners--the union, in the conduct of life, of Morals and Taste. - -There remains but a single consideration which I shall adduce, to show -that there is the connexion between taste and morals for which I -contend. It is, that we naturally associate with goodness, beauty of -form; and that in a perfect state, we conceive of goodness as surrounded -by objects that are pleasing to the taste. Perhaps this may not have -been noticed by all, but a little attention to what passes in our own -minds will convince us that it is so. This natural association of beauty -and goodness perhaps arises from the fact, that every indication of -goodness as expressed in the countenance is pleasing, and may be -heightened into beauty. It is surprising how soon we come to regard as -pleasing, the most ordinary features, when we have associated with them -a fund of good qualities; or rather, the features soon become like the -letters of a book, which we regard only for the meaning they convey. As -I have said before, no features are so ordinary that they may not come -to appear to us beautiful by the expression of good qualities; and if I -may suppose, which I would by no means assert, that there are any homely -persons present, I would congratulate them on the inducements they have -to cultivate the only beauty that is permanent, or that can be the -foundation of lasting attachment. - -Not only however may homely features become beautiful by their -expression, but we have, I think, a natural association of positive -beauty as connected with the goodness which we have not seen, and of -positive deformity as connected with vice. When we read of good men -even, we regard them as having something in their appearance -corresponding with their character, and no man, I am sure, can suppose -that Benedict Arnold had a countenance that was pleasant to look upon. -But what is conclusive on this point is, that no man ever conceived of -Satan in his proper form, as beautiful, or ever conceived of an angel, -except as clothed in light and beauty. - -It is this natural supposition of the connexion of beauty of mind with -beauty of form, that gives its plausibility and point to a dream of Sir -Isaac Bickerstaff, as related in one of the Tattlers. He seemed to -himself to be in an open plain, surrounded by an immense assembly of -females, in the midst of whom the goddess of justice sat enthroned, and -holding in her hand a mirror of such peculiar properties as to reflect -the faces of those who looked into it in exact correspondence with their -characters. This mirror was held up and turned before the assembly, and -the effect may well be imagined. Some beautiful women had the -satisfaction of seeing their faces become still more beautiful, while -many more were shocked to see themselves converted into perfect frights. -Some who were homely before, became still more so; while many unassuming -and modest persons, who had never dreamed of being handsome, and so had -sought the approbation of their own consciences, were surprised to see -how their faces were brightened up. There was however one face, which -seemed to beam with a celestial radiance, and was so surprisingly -beautiful that Sir Isaac determined at once on making proposals to the -lady, if he could but ascertain to whom it belonged. This, by careful -attention, he was soon enabled to do, and found that it was a little, -grey-headed, wrinkled old woman who stood by his side. - -There is something ludicrous in the manner in which this is set forth, -but it involves a most serious and pleasing truth. It is as much a part -of the disorders of the present state of things, that goodness is ever -connected with any thing but beauty, as it is that virtue is depressed -while vice triumphs. In a perfect organization and state of things, -matter would be entirely flexible to the action of spirit, and, of -course, intellectual and moral beauty, as well as their opposites, must -stamp their impress perfectly on the features. This we believe will be -the case when the physical nature of man shall be reorganized, and the -good shall not only be beautiful, but, as I have already remarked that -we are naturally led to expect, shall be surrounded with all those -objects that are pleasing to the taste. That these expectations are -natural may be shown from the writings of all the heathen poets, and it -is pleasing to observe how perfectly they coincide with the -representations of the Scriptures on this point. We are there taught, -not only that the righteous shall shine forth as the sun, but their -dwelling-place is described as a city whose foundations are garnished -with all manner of precious stones, whose streets are of pure gold, and -whose gates are of pearl. - -Thus, as we associate with royalty its regalia, so do we associate with -goodness, beauty, which seems to be its natural appendage; and not only -in the Scriptures, but also in our own constitution, do we find a -promise, that Goodness and Beauty shall be finally and forever united. - - - - -TRANSCRIBER'S NOTES: - - - Text in italics is surrounded with underscores: _italics_. - - - - - -End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Connexion Between Taste and Morals, by -Mark Hopkins - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE CONNEXION BETWEEN TASTE *** - -***** This file should be named 40845-8.txt or 40845-8.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/4/0/8/4/40845/ - -Produced by Bill Tozier, David E. 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