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-Project Gutenberg's The Connexion Between Taste and Morals, by Mark Hopkins
-
-This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
-almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
-re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
-with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org/license
-
-
-Title: The Connexion Between Taste and Morals
-       Two lectures
-
-Author: Mark Hopkins
-
-Release Date: September 23, 2012 [EBook #40845]
-
-Language: English
-
-Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1
-
-*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE CONNEXION BETWEEN TASTE ***
-
-
-
-
-Produced by Bill Tozier, David E. Brown and the Online
-Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net
-
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-
-
-  THE
-  CONNEXION
-  BETWEEN
-  TASTE AND MORALS:
-  TWO LECTURES
-
-  BY
-  MARK HOPKINS, D. D.
-  PRESIDENT OF WILLIAMS COLLEGE.
-
-  Boston:
-  PUBLISHED BY DUTTON AND WENTWORTH.
-  1841.
-
-
-
-
-LECTURE I.
-
-
-Is the prevalence of a cultivated taste, favorable to morals? Is there a
-connexion, either in individuals, or in communities, between good taste
-and good morals?
-
-When I began to reflect upon this point with reference to a public
-discussion of it, I put the above questions to three educated men, as I
-happened to meet them. The first said, he had not thought of it, but
-that, at the first view, he did not believe there was any such
-connexion; the second said he should wish to see it proved before he
-would believe it; and the third said, he thought there was such a
-connexion. This difference of opinion among educated men, led me to
-think that an investigation of the subject might be a matter of
-interest, and perhaps of profit. As every thing, in this country,
-depends upon a sound state of morals in the community, whatever bears
-upon that, deserves our most careful scrutiny.
-
-To discuss this subject understandingly, we must know precisely what we
-are talking about. What then is taste? This term is sometimes used to
-express mere desire, as a taste for dress, or for low pleasures. It can
-hardly be necessary to say that that is not the meaning now attached to
-it. Taste is defined by Alison, to be, "That faculty of the human mind
-by which we perceive and enjoy whatever is beautiful or sublime in the
-works of nature or of art." According to this definition, which is
-sufficiently correct for our present purpose, it will be perceived that
-there is, first, a perception of certain qualities in external objects,
-and then, according to the nature of the object, an emotion of beauty,
-or of sublimity in the mind. These emotions are, of course, incapable of
-definition except by stating the occasions on which they arise, and can
-be known only by being felt. To talk of an emotion to those who have not
-felt it, is like talking of colors to the blind. And here I may remark,
-that these terms, beauty and sublimity, have, in common with those
-denoting sensations, an ambiguity which has often produced confusion. As
-the term heat is used to denote both the sensation we feel on
-approaching the fire, and that quality in the fire which produces the
-sensation, so beauty and sublimity are sometimes used to express the
-emotions in the mind, and sometimes those qualities in external objects
-which are fitted to produce them, though there is, of course, in the
-external object, no emotion, nor any thing resembling one.
-
-If this account of taste be correct, it will be perceived that it
-cannot, with any propriety, be compared, as it often has been, to a
-bodily sense. The impression upon a bodily sense, necessarily follows
-the presence of the object, and is uniform in all mankind. A tree
-clothed in fresh foliage is necessarily seen, and seen to be green by
-all who turn their eyes upon it. The same tree, when seen, may be
-pronounced by one individual to be beautiful, by another, from some
-peculiar association, to be the reverse, and by a third, however
-beautiful in itself, it may be looked upon without any emotion at all.
-It is, therefore, a great mistake to suppose, as many do, that those
-qualities in objects which awaken the emotions of taste, act directly
-and necessarily upon us, like those which affect the senses.
-
-A second preliminary inquiry is, What are the causes which produce these
-emotions? And here I barely remark, without inquiring after any common
-principle by which they produce similar results, that these causes
-differ widely from each other. The emotions may be awakened by natural
-objects, by sound, by the products of the imagination, by the
-combinations of the intellect, and by certain manifestations of the
-affections and moral character.
-
-A third inquiry is, how the taste can be cultivated? This obviously can
-be done only on two conditions. The first is, that we put ourselves in
-situations adapted to produce the emotions of taste; and the second is,
-that we preserve a state of mind that will permit those emotions to
-arise. This last, a proper state of mind, though less often considered,
-is quite as important as the first. "It is," says the poet,
-
-                  "The soul that sees; the outward eyes
-  Present the object, but the mind descries,
-  And thence delight, disgust, or cool indifference rise."
-
-Upon him whose mind is engrossed by care, or ruffled by passion, the
-most beautiful objects make no impression. To perceive and enjoy them,
-the mind must be calm. The beauties and sublimities of nature are like
-the stars, which the storm shuts out, but when the heavens are serene,
-they come out, one after another, to the eye that is watching for them,
-till the firmament glows with their light. He, therefore, and he only,
-who, in a proper state of mind, will place himself in the presence of
-beautiful or sublime objects, and will compare the effects produced
-under different circumstances, will improve his taste, both in its
-susceptibility to emotion, and in its power of discrimination.
-
-The question then, which we are now prepared to discuss, is, whether
-such a cultivation and improvement of the taste, has a favorable effect
-upon the moral character?
-
-That it has such an effect, I infer, first, because we find in the
-emotions of taste, to say the least, an innocent source of enjoyment for
-our leisure hours, and the mind that is innocently happy, is less
-accessible to temptation. Indolence, mere vacuity, we all know, is the
-porch of vice, and the great dangers to the young arise from their
-leisure hours--from the want of some means of innocent mental
-exhilaration, in which they can be induced to spend those hours. It was
-said by Franklin, that leisure was a time in which to do something
-useful; but all are not Franklins. If leisure time can be, as it is by
-many, usefully employed, so much the better; but he who should provide
-for our youth the means and the inducements to spend their leisure time
-innocently, would be a public benefactor. In our cities, where the
-temptations to mere sensual gratification are so numerous and obtrusive,
-and where natural objects are very much excluded, this is a point of
-great importance, and of great difficulty. Until of late very little of
-this kind has been attempted, unless theatres may be called an attempt.
-But theatres with us are out of the question, for Miss Martineau says
-that "the Americans have very little dramatic taste; and that the spirit
-of puritanism still rises up in such fierce opposition to the stage, as
-to forbid the hope that this grand means of intellectual exercise will
-ever be made the instrument of moral good to society there, that it
-might be made." She says, moreover, so hopeless is our case, that "those
-who respect dramatic entertainments the most highly, will be the most
-anxious that the American theatres should be closed." Theatres are
-indeed out of the question, and I trust it will be a long time before we
-shall make progress backwards, to that state of morals which is produced
-by the instructions even of an English theatre.
-
-It is in view of the want now under consideration, that the
-establishment of Associations for literary purposes, and for procuring
-popular lectures open to all, is not only a new, but a most promising
-feature in the history of our cities. Man needs, and must have,
-excitement and mental exhilaration, and our Creator, if we would but see
-it, has not been inattentive to this want of our frame. No; to supply
-it, we have the pleasures of rational social converse, the play of the
-affections, the duties of kindness and benevolence--does a man feel
-depressed, let him do a good action--and last, but not least, the
-gratifications of taste: all the pleasure to be derived from the concord
-of sweet sounds, from the charms of literature, from the forms and
-colors and groupings of nature, from her sunrisings and sunsettings,
-from her landscapes of mountain and valley and lake and river, from the
-stars that roll in their courses, and the flowers that nod to each other
-by the way-side.--These are the sources of mental exhilaration which God
-has provided; and they are, to the artificial stimulants of theatrical
-exhibitions and of gambling, what the cold water that was drank in Eden
-is to brandy and gin. May I not here venture to say to young men,
-'Beware how you spend your _leisure_ hours! your character and destiny
-in life will probably turn upon it.' Among the means, as I have already
-said, of spending these hours at least innocently, the gratifications of
-taste are conspicuous. They seem for this very purpose to have been had
-distinctly in view in the fitting up of this world; and so far as they
-lure the mind from the lower gratifications of sense, they must be
-favorable to morals.
-
-The remarks now made respect taste chiefly as a guard against evil; but
-I cannot dismiss this head without noticing more fully its positive
-influence, as a source of innocent enjoyment, upon morals. A good taste,
-and I do not hold myself answerable for its perversions, involves a
-ready susceptibility to the emotions of beauty and sublimity, and of
-course a readiness to receive pleasure from the common appearances of
-nature, and from every free and natural expression of good feeling. It
-is, in my view, of the first importance both to character and to
-happiness, that the young should cultivate a relish for those simple and
-natural pleasures, the sources of which are open to all. It is important
-to happiness. How much happiness does the young florist secure, who can
-look upon the common violet as it opens its eye from under the snows of
-the early spring, with much the same pleasure as upon the choice exotic
-which is resorted to and exclusively admired by those who have
-unfortunately been taught that it is vulgar to admire what is common!
-How much happiness does he secure who is touched by a beautiful action
-wherever he sees it, who appreciates sympathy wherever he finds it, and
-however expressed! A mind rightly constituted in this respect, drinks in
-enjoyment from the objects and occurrences of daily life, as the eye
-does light. It is also essential to character. How many young men enter
-life with a false estimate of the advantages which wealth and fashion
-can confer; who find their happiness, not in the contemplation and
-pursuit of appropriate objects, but in what others think of them, and to
-whom the world becomes insipid unless _they_ make a figure in it! Let
-now misfortune come upon such men, and the world fails them. _Their_
-world is gone; they have no resource; they become, generally dishonest,
-sometimes inefficient and gloomy, and commit suicide. These persons come
-to consider the common and truly great blessings which God has given as
-nothing unless they may possess those artificial and egotistical
-enjoyments which arise from conventional society. They see not the
-splendid ornaments and rich provisions which, to adopt, with a slight
-accommodation, the beautiful language of another, are gathered round the
-earth for them;--"its ocean of air above, its ocean of water beneath,
-its zodiac of lights, its tent of dropping clouds, its striped coat of
-climates, its fourfold year." It is nothing to them, if they have not
-man for their servant, that "all the parts of nature incessantly work
-into each other's hands for their profit; that the wind sows the seed,
-the sun evaporates the sea, the wind blows the vapor to the field, the
-ice on the other side of the planet condenses the rain on this, and thus
-the endless circulations of the divine charity nourish man." What a
-change when such a person is brought back to a true relish of the simple
-pleasures of nature! Even sickness, depriving him for a time of what he
-had undervalued, if it bring him back to this, is a blessing; and then
-the result may be stated in the words of Gray:--
-
-  "See the wretch who long has tost
-    On the thorny bed of pain,
-  At length regain his vigor lost,
-    And breathe and walk again."
-
-Then,
-
-  "The meanest flow'ret of the vale,
-  The simplest note that swells the gale,
-  The common sun, the air, the skies,
-  To him are opening paradise!"
-
-Then, though he may hold little property by that title which the law
-gives, he yet feels that the universe is his for those nobler purposes
-for which it was intended to act on the spirit:
-
-  "His are the mountains, and the valleys his,
-  And the resplendent rivers;"
-
-and he looks back upon his former discontent as the petulance of a
-child. The simple beauties and the glad voices of nature have made him a
-man again.
-
-But again, I infer that there is a connexion between good taste and good
-morals, because there is an analogy between those qualities in matter
-which excite the emotions of taste, and those relations on which morals
-depend. So much is this the case, that some philosophers found morality
-upon a theory of the beautiful, considering it a sublime harmony. In all
-beautiful objects in nature, or in art, there is an order, a propriety,
-a fitness, a proportion; and the impression which these make upon us is
-so analogous to that which is made by virtuous conduct, that we use the
-same terms to express both. To me, indeed, it seems that beauty in
-matter is to moral beauty what instinct is to reason, or what the light
-of the moon is to that of the sun; containing some of the same elements,
-but destitute of the highest. Hence, as we should naturally expect,
-morals furnish that region in the province of taste in which she gathers
-those flowers that are richest in beauty and sweetest in perfume.
-
-                  "Is aught so fair,
-  In all the dewy landscape of the spring,
-  In the bright eye of Hesper, or the morn,
-  In nature's fairest forms, is aught so fair
-  As virtuous friendship?"
-
-But I observe again, that as there is the analogy just pointed out
-between their causes, so there is an affinity between the emotions
-themselves of taste and correct moral feeling, and the transition from
-one to the other is obvious. This point requires illustration. That our
-emotions are associated in groups, is practically known to every body.
-Even the child does not ask his father for a sixpence when he is in an
-ill temper, because he knows the transition is not easy from ill temper
-to generosity. Deep grief cannot pass at once to sudden joy. It must be
-by a gradual transition, first to a tender melancholy, and then to
-cheerfulness, and then to joy. "The garment of sorrow," as Coleridge
-expresses it, "must be drawn off so gradually, and that to be put in its
-stead so gradually slipt on and feel so like the former, that the
-sufferer shall be sensible of the change only by the refreshment." It is
-by understanding well these affinities of the feelings that the orator
-can continue to control them as they pass over their widest range. The
-necessity of a suitable state of mind in order that the emotions of
-taste may arise, has already been noticed, and what I now observe is,
-that a state of correct moral feeling is more favorable to these
-emotions than any other. There is between them such an affinity that
-they readily associate with each other; while there is, between the
-emotions of taste and a vicious state of mind, no such affinity, but
-they are to a great extent incompatible.
-
-The external world often gives back to us but the image of our own
-thoughts, and hence may seem almost as variable as the dim forms of
-twilight to which the imagination gives its own shape. This tendency of
-the mind to cast its own hue over nature, or rather to receive different
-emotions from external objects, according to its own state, is well
-illustrated by Crabbe, in his tale called "The Lover's Journey." In this
-tale, Orlando, the lover, starts on a pleasant morning with the
-expectation of finding the object of his affections at a village, where
-she had agreed to meet him. The first part of his journey lay across a
-heath covered with furze. But hear him:--
-
-                "Men may say
-  A heath is barren; nothing is so gay;
-  Barren or bare to call this charming scene
-  Argues a mind possessed by care or spleen."
-
-And thus he went on, admiring the wholesome wormwood and the vigorous
-brier, till he reached the village, and then disappointment came. The
-lady had gone to a village some miles further on, under circumstances
-that vexed him, and led him to doubt her affection. He doubted even
-whether he should proceed, but at length determined to see and upbraid
-her. Now hear him again, as he passes along by the side of a beautiful
-river:--
-
-  "I hate these scenes, Orlando angry cried;
-  And these proud farmers, yes, I hate their pride;
-  See that sleek fellow, how he stalks along,
-  Strong as an ox, and ignorant as strong.
-  These deep, fat meadows I detest; it shocks
-  One's feelings there to see the grazing ox;--
-  For slaughter fatted--as a lady's smile
-  Rejoices man, and means his death the while."
-
-And if mere disappointment, without a consciousness of guilt and
-remorse, could produce such effects, what must we expect when the mind
-is not at peace with itself? Tendencies are shown by extreme cases, and
-it is in perfect consistency with the nature of things that Milton makes
-Satan exclaim, on seeing Eden in its united innocence and beauty,
-
-  "O hell! what do mine eyes with grief behold!"
-
-Who can imagine a miser, even, to say nothing of a thief, or a drunkard,
-lifting his eyes from his buried heaps, and enjoying the scene before
-him, however beautiful? While he who performs a deed of charity at the
-end of his walk, will find nature wearing a richer dress on his return.
-The mind conscious of rectitude is at peace with itself, and is in that
-calm state which permits it to enjoy whatever is pleasing.
-
-But not only, as in the cases now mentioned, is a right state of moral
-feeling favorable to taste, but the emotions of taste also tend to
-introduce moral ideas and emotions. It is, as I conceive, chiefly from
-this fact that nature has a tendency to lead the mind "up to nature's
-God;" for we must all be conscious that when we view nature as beautiful
-or sublime, this tendency is strongest. No one can have stood by
-Niagara, or upon the White Mountains, without feeling this. Hence the
-groves and the high hills were the first places of worship. Hence the
-Indian sacrifices to the Great Spirit when he passes through the wild
-rapids. And as we associate the beauties of nature with the wisdom and
-goodness of God, so do we, in many cases, instinctively infer from the
-displays of taste in man, something of his moral character. Who, for
-example, in travelling through a solitary forest, if he should come, as
-there are many such, to a neat log-house, with a trellised woodbine at
-the door, and with every thing orderly and clean about it, would not
-expect to pass by unmolested, or, if he should call, to be civilly and
-kindly treated?--whereas, if every thing bore the appearance of filth
-and dilapidation, and the only signs of taste were those which indicated
-a taste for rum, he might well quicken his pace for fear he should be
-waylaid. No one expects to find indications of taste about the dwelling
-of a drunkard, or of one abandoned to any low vice. I appeal to any one
-who hears me, whether he has not felt that it was an indication of a
-good moral character, and an encouragement to charity, when he has
-entered some poor dwelling and found that there was still kept alive, in
-the midst of poverty, a susceptibility to the emotions, and a regard to
-the requisitions of taste.
-
-I have just observed, that there is an affinity between correct moral
-feeling and the emotions of taste. I now observe, that the highest
-pleasures of taste cannot be enjoyed without correct views on great
-moral subjects, and especially respecting the being and attributes of
-God. Whatever may be said of the power of material objects, in
-themselves considered, to produce the emotions of taste, it is certain
-that their chief power depends on the conceptions of the mind which they
-awaken as signs. A single instance will illustrate this. Most of us have
-probably felt the emotion of sublimity on hearing what we supposed to be
-distant thunder, which vanished, and perhaps seemed ridiculous, the
-moment we ascertained that the sound was produced by the rumbling of a
-cart. In this case, it is obvious that the emotion depended, not on the
-sound itself, but on the conception of the mind awakened by it. Now this
-is pre-eminently the case in the works of nature. How different must be
-the emotions awakened by a view of the evening firmament in the mind of
-him who should suppose the stars to be mere points of light, set at no
-great distance above him, and moving around the earth solely for the
-convenience of man, from those awakened in the mind of him to whom those
-points of light indicate the existence of an infinite space; and of
-suns, and worlds, and systems without number, and at distances which
-cause the wing of the strongest imagination to flag! How different the
-emotions produced by the comet now, as it returns at its predicted
-period, from those excited as it fired
-
-            "the length of Ophiucus huge
-  In the Arctic sky, and, from his horrid hair,"
-
-was supposed to shake "pestilence and war!" As, therefore, he who cannot
-see beyond the stars as they appear to the sense, must lose by far the
-highest pleasure which they are adapted as objects of taste to give; so
-he who knows the physical structure of the universe, and who yet does
-not see in it, and behind it, an infinite and beneficent Intelligence,
-cannot have connected with his view those conceptions which awaken the
-highest emotions of beauty and sublimity.
-
-The relations of man to nature are much less intimate than those of God,
-and yet our emotions in view of nature are greatly modified by the view
-which we take of _His_ dignity and moral character. It was when Hamlet
-supposed there was foul corruption and a general want of principle in
-society, that "this goodly frame, the earth," seemed to him but "a
-steril promontory;" "this most excellent canopy, the air, look you, this
-brave o'erhanging firmament," why, it appeared no other thing to him
-"than a foul and pestilent congregation of vapors." It was when her
-inhabitants were oppressed and degraded, that the natural beauty, which
-is still as bright as ever on the shores of Greece, seemed in the eye of
-the poet but as
-
-            "The loveliness in death
-  That parts not quite with parting breath,
-  But beauty with that fearful bloom,
-  That hue which haunts it to the tomb,
-  So coldly sweet, so deadly fair,
-  We start, for life is wanting there."
-  "'Twas Greece, but living Greece no more."
-
-We must all have felt that a shade of sadness was cast over the face of
-nature when we have thought of the passions, and wars, and lust, and
-rapine of man, in connexion with her quiet scenes. On the other hand,
-were the moral state of the world what we trust it shall one day
-be,--did universal purity, and goodness, and love reign,--would not the
-sun seem to shine with a more benignant radiance; instead of the thorn,
-would there not come up the fir-tree: would not the mountains and hills
-break forth into singing, and all the trees of the field clap their
-hands?
-
-And if the emotions of taste are thus modified by our views of man, how
-much more must they be by those respecting God! How must a blank atheism
-hang the heavens in sackcloth, and cover the earth with a pall, and turn
-the mute promisings of nature into a mockery, and make of her mighty
-fabric one great charnel-house of death, without the hope of a
-resurrection! On the other hand, how must the beauty and sublimity of
-nature and of the universe be heightened, the moment we perceive them in
-their connexion with God! Nothing is more common than to hear those, who
-emerge from that practical atheism in which most men live, speak of the
-new perceptions of beauty and sublimity with which they look upon the
-works of nature:--
-
-  "In that blest moment, Nature, throwing wide
-  Her veil opaque, discloses, with a smile,
-  The Author of her beauties, who, retired
-  Behind his own creation, works unseen
-  By the _impure_, and hears his power denied."
-
-All our investigations into nature show that man has no faculties to
-which there are not corresponding and adequate objects. As infinite as
-he is in reason, yet the works of God are not exhausted by the
-operations of that reason. No intellectual Alexander ever sat down and
-wept for the want of more worlds to conquer. As vast as is his
-imagination, the revelations of astronomy, as sober facts, go beyond any
-thing that the imagination had conceived. And is it so, that, in the
-region of taste alone, the faculties of man have no adequate object? But
-it is only when nature, like the Bible, is seen to be full of God, that
-she is clothed with her true sublimity. It is only when "the heavens
-declare the glory of God and the firmament showeth his handy work," that
-they correspond to the highest conceptions either of the taste or of the
-intellect. Man rests in the Infinite alone, and the universe without a
-God is not in harmony with his constitution, even when he is considered
-as endowed with taste only. But if our views on moral subjects thus
-modify the emotions of taste, it cannot be doubted that those emotions
-react upon our moral views, tending to elevate and purify them.
-
-I remark again, that the emotions of taste are favorable to morals,
-because they are disinterested. As admiration becomes intense, men
-forget themselves, and, in proportion as they thus find enjoyment, they
-are prepared for that higher enjoyment which a disinterested performance
-of duty brings with it. Whenever we see excellence in another, we are
-bound to admire it without reference to sect or party; and admiration,
-thus bestowed, is almost always connected with a high moral character.
-The beauty who can truly forget herself in her admiration for another,
-deserves admiration for qualities far higher and nobler than beauty.
-
-I only observe further, that a cultivated taste is favorable to morals,
-because the cultivation of one of our powers has a tendency to
-strengthen the rest.--This, I know, is disputed, and it is even supposed
-that the union of certain powers in any high degree is impossible. Thus,
-it is often supposed that a remarkable memory and a sound judgment do
-not go together; and it must be confessed that the memory may be so
-cultivated as not to strengthen the judgment. But when I speak of
-cultivating a faculty, I mean cultivating it on correct principles and
-with reference to the end for which it was given. Those who remember
-events as isolated, or only as they are connected by the relations of
-time and place, and who do not see and remember them as connected by the
-relations of cause and effect, means and end, premises and conclusion,
-do not, by such an exercise of the memory, strengthen the judgment,
-though they certainly show that it has great need of being strengthened.
-Of what possible use can it be, to the forming of a correct judgment on
-any point, for a good woman to remember the precise age of every child
-in the neighborhood? It is these walking chronicles, these living
-almanacs, who will tell you the weather for all time past, if not for
-all time to come, who get the credit of having great memories and little
-judgment. But such a memory is, to one cultivated on correct principles,
-only what a room full of minerals and birds and fish and insects and
-rubbish, promiscuously tumbled together, is to a well-arranged museum.
-Who does not know that experience is the best enlightener of the
-judgment?--And where does experience garner her stores but in the
-memory? It is obvious that he who has the best memory of past events, in
-their true connexions, will have the best possible materials for forming
-a judgment of the future. The same opposition is generally supposed to
-exist between the imagination and the judgment. But it occasionally
-happens that an individual, like Edmund Burke, unites the most gorgeous
-imagination with the profoundest judgment; and then it is seen that the
-analogies which the imagination suggests yield important lights to the
-judgment instead of misleading it. I know that the imagination, striking
-its roots into the hotbed of novel-reading, may overtop the judgment;
-but, judiciously cultivated, I contend that it is not unfavorable to the
-judgment. And if, in these cases, a judicious cultivation of one power
-tends to strengthen the other, much more will the cultivation of taste
-have a favorable tendency upon the moral nature, since these departments
-of the mind have never been supposed to be in opposition, but are, as we
-have seen, closely allied to each other.
-
-But all this time it has probably been objected that, however plausible
-the reasoning may be on this subject, it is yet contrary to experience.
-If it were so, it might perhaps be said of it, as was said by Euler of a
-demonstrated property of the arch, "this is contrary to all experience,
-but is nevertheless true:"--it is so in the nature of things, but the
-materials are refractory. But let us see how far it is contrary to
-experience; or rather, whether we cannot, so far as it is thus contrary,
-satisfactorily account for it.
-
-In order to this, we must make, as it seems to me, three important
-distinctions. And, first, we must distinguish between taste considered
-as a power of judging, and as a susceptibility to emotion. This
-distinction is often overlooked. Mr. Blair, for instance, defines taste
-to be, "the power of receiving pleasure or pain from the beauties or
-deformities of nature and of art;" in which, regard is had to the
-susceptibility only. But afterwards, when contrasting taste with genius,
-he says--"Taste is the power of judging, genius is the power of
-executing;" in which the susceptibility to emotion is left out of sight.
-Can I make this distinction obvious? When an unpractised person sees for
-the first time a grand historical picture, or reads a beautiful poem, he
-gives himself up to the emotion; he is absorbed; he takes no note of
-time; he forgets where he is, and neither knows nor cares why he is
-pleased. The eye drinks in beauty as the thirsty man the cold water, and
-it refreshes the soul. He sees the picture, or reads the poem, again and
-again, and at length sits down to give an account to a friend of that
-which had pleased him. Now, he wishes to state the reasons why he was
-pleased, and he begins to inquire what those qualities were which
-produced the effect. Here is the rudiment of philosophical criticism,
-and he goes on perhaps investigating, till he discovers those general
-principles of taste according to which the work was executed. As long,
-however, as his mind is thus occupied in analyzing, he feels no emotion
-of beauty or sublimity. But as this is an enticing species of logic, he
-may follow it till a work of art shall give him pleasure only by its
-conformity to certain principles, true or false, which he may have
-established for himself, and till he becomes a cold critic, or perhaps a
-reviewer by trade. He may become a mere teller in the bank of taste, to
-pronounce on what is genuine, and hand it over to others to be used and
-enjoyed. Now, a man who writes a skilful review of a work of genius, and
-tells us why we are or ought to be pleased, is supposed to be a man of
-taste; and the writing of the review is considered as an exercise of
-taste. This is true of taste considered as a power of judging, but not
-as a power of feeling. If it were so, the mass of men would be in a
-pitiable condition. God no more intended that the uninitiated should
-wait to be pleased with the beauty which they see, until its principles
-are analyzed, and they are told when and why they ought to be pleased,
-than He intended they should wait to be cheered and warmed by the rays
-of the sun, till they should see light decomposed into the seven colors
-of the prismatic image. But it is by cherishing and keeping alive these
-universal emotions, which belong to the race, and which find excitement
-everywhere, that I suppose there is a healthful effect produced on the
-moral character. The power of genuine philosophical criticism; the power
-of going back, if I may so express it, into the workshop of nature, and
-seeing how she mixes her colors, is a rare, a valuable and a dignified
-power; but it is still an exercise of the intellect, and I am not aware
-that it has any peculiarly favorable effect upon the moral character.
-Indeed, when literature and the fine arts become fashionable, and much
-the subject of conversation, there is a vast deal of this kind of
-criticism, which is fallen into from imitation and vanity, and which can
-have no good effect upon morals except as it supplies the place of
-scandal. It is not, then, in an egotistical and vain community, who read
-works of genius, and look at pictures, not to admire and enjoy them, but
-that they may themselves talk about them and be admired, that any good
-effect upon the moral character is to be expected from the prevalence of
-what they are pleased to call taste. How far this comes to be the case
-with communities in which taste is said to be prevalent, and morals are
-corrupt, I leave others to judge.
-
-The second distinction which I would make, is that between the
-cultivation of a taste for the fine arts and for natural objects. This I
-consider a distinction of much importance on this subject; and I propose
-to give some reasons why the cultivation of the fine arts--as painting,
-sculpture, architecture, poetry--has less tendency than a taste for
-natural objects to improve the character. This I am bound to do; because
-it is well known that certain nations, as the Spartans and ancient
-Romans, considered a taste for the fine arts as having a tendency to
-corrupt morals; and some of the sterner moralists of modern times,
-especially religious moralists, have objected to it on the same ground.
-It must also be conceded that those nations, as the Greeks and Italians,
-among whom these arts have flourished most, have been exceedingly
-corrupt, and that that corruption has co-existed with an advanced state
-of the arts in question.
-
-And, first, I remark, that a taste for the fine arts cannot be general
-in a community of any considerable extent. If we suppose such a taste,
-when formed, to have a tendency to improve the morals, yet how few, in a
-country like ours, have an opportunity to form it! The products of the
-arts are to be found, for the most part, only in cities; and of the
-inhabitants of cities, it is only those who have leisure and wealth, who
-are affected by them. It ought also to be observed that, as these arts
-do not come to perfection in the early stages of society, they cannot
-produce their effect till wealth and luxury have had time to work
-general corruption.
-
-But I observe again that, as the power either of executing or of judging
-in these arts is confined to comparatively a few, it becomes a mark of
-distinction and a ground of ostentation, and thus there comes to be the
-appearance of more taste than there really is. The artist finds himself
-a candidate for fame and wealth through his skill, and hence his
-passions are aroused and his interests are involved. If successful, he
-is flattered, perhaps almost deified; if unsuccessful, he becomes
-irritable and sinks back on the proud consciousness of neglected merit.
-This peculiar position will account for the bad character of many
-artists. Those also who _patronize_ the arts, as it is significantly
-termed, often do it from ostentation. What better resource has an
-ordinary person who has money, and who wishes to be distinguished in the
-fashionable world, than to become a patron of the fine arts? I knew a
-person who spent several thousand dollars for pictures, and who, to my
-certain knowledge, knew and cared nothing about them except as they
-affected her standing in the fashionable world. But of those who have a
-good degree of taste, there are few whose motives are not mixed. And
-then it is to be remembered, that a product of art may be viewed in many
-different aspects. It may be regarded as costing so much, as requiring
-such a frame, or to be placed in such a light, or as an ornamental piece
-of furniture, while there is but a single point of view in which it can
-be regarded as gratifying taste. The moment a picture comes to be
-considered as an ornament, or an article of furniture, you might as well
-have a looking-glass or a pier-table. It not unfrequently happens, that
-the owner of fine pictures thinks so much of them as ornamental or
-valuable, so much of their framing, or light, or preservation, that he
-becomes indifferent to them in the only point of view in which they are
-truly valuable.
-
-But again, in order to see this point in its true light we must consider
-the peculiar rank which is held by the pleasures connected with the fine
-arts. These pleasures are addressed to the eye and to the ear, and hold
-a middle rank between the lower pleasures of sense on the one hand, and
-the higher enjoyments of the intellect and of the affections on the
-other; and may readily associate with, and promote either. This point is
-well stated by Lord Kames. It is observed by him, that "in touching,
-tasting, and smelling, we are sensible of the impression made upon the
-organ, and are led to place there the pleasant or painful feeling caused
-by that impression;" but that with respect to hearing and seeing, "we
-are insensible to the organic impression, and hence conceive the
-pleasures derived from these senses to be more refined and spiritual
-than those which seem to exist externally at the organ of sense, and
-which are conceived to be merely corporeal. These pleasures," says he,
-"being sweet and moderately exhilarating, are, in their tone, equally
-distant from the turbulence of passion and the languor of indolence, and
-by that tone are perfectly well qualified not only to revive the spirits
-when sunk by sensual gratification, but also to relax them when
-overstrained in any violent pursuit." "Organic pleasures," he observes
-again, "have naturally a short duration; when prolonged, they lose their
-relish; when indulged to excess, they beget satiety and disgust; and to
-restore a proper tone of mind, nothing can be more happily contrived
-than the exhilarating pleasures of the eye and ear." Now this is
-precisely the use, and all the use that many make of the fine arts, and
-I may add, to some extent of the beauties of nature too. How many
-wealthy sensualists are there in our cities who give an appearance of
-elevation and refinement to their low and selfish mode of life, by
-collecting about them specimens of the arts! These men may be best
-compared to that amphibious animal, the frog. They come up occasionally
-from that lower element in which they live, into a region of light and
-beauty, but no sooner are they a little refreshed than they plunge again
-into the mud of sensual gratification. It is men like these, who, when
-their capacity for the lower pleasures is exhausted, drive in their
-carriages about the cities of the old world (perhaps we are not yet
-sufficiently corrupt,) and set up to be _virtuosi_. It is easy to see
-how such a taste must bear upon morals.
-
-But I remark once more, that the fine arts may be made to pander
-directly to vice. From the middle rank which the pleasures derived from
-them hold, they readily associate, as has been said, both with the
-higher and the lower. Thus, music may quicken the devotions of a seraph,
-and lend its strains to cheer the carousals of the bacchanal; and
-poetry, painting and sculpture, while they have power to elevate, and
-charm, and purify the mind, may be made direct stimulants to the vilest
-and lowest passions. It is indeed from this quarter that we are to look
-for danger from the prevalence of these arts. It was thus that they
-corrupted the ancient cities; and those who have seen the abominable
-statuary dug from the ruins of Herculaneum and Pompeii, do not wonder
-that they were buried under a sea of fire. The same process of
-corruption through these arts has gone to a fearful extent on the
-eastern continent, and has commenced in this country. Clothed in this
-garment of light, vice finds access where it otherwise could not. Under
-the pretence of promoting the fine arts, modesty is cast aside, and
-indecent pictures are exhibited, and respectable people go to see them.
-If I might utter a word of warning to the young, it would be to beware
-of vice dressed in the garments of taste. The beauties of nature are
-capable of no such perversion. All the associations connected with them
-tend to elevate and to purify the mind. No case can be adduced in which
-a taste for gardening or for natural objects has corrupted a people.
-While, therefore, I believe that the cultivation of the arts, in their
-genuine spirit of beauty and of purity, has a tendency to improve the
-character, it would appear that they are greatly liable to abuse, and
-that they have been extensively abused.
-
-But though I may thus dispose of the general objection from the
-co-existence in many cases of refinement in the arts and corrupt morals,
-yet this, I think, will not fully meet the objection which first arose
-in the minds of some, from those numerous individual instances in which
-men have been eminent for taste and genius, and at the same time
-corrupt. What, you have been ready to say, do you make of such a case
-as that of Byron? Now I would here make an inquiry, how far, and in what
-sense, those productions of genius which have a corrupt tendency are
-really consistent with good taste. Take the Don Juan of Byron for
-instance. To say nothing of principle, such a work certainly is not
-compatible with a correct _moral_ taste. That it is in some sense,
-however, a work of taste, cannot be denied; but it seems to me to be
-only as a splendid palace, built in a low and fetid morass, is a work of
-taste. The palace may be beautiful, but it was in bad taste _to set it
-there_. Particular rooms may be elegantly furnished, but still there
-comes up from the surrounding marsh a pestilential miasm, and it may be
-said of the atmosphere around it, as was said of that around New Orleans
-a few autumns since, that "all is beauty and all is death." So far
-therefore as these works have a corrupt tendency, they cannot be said to
-be in the highest sense consistent with good taste. But still it is said
-that corrupt men have produced works of the highest genius and of the
-best taste that have had no such tendency. This is granted, but it is to
-be accounted for from the fact that men of genius are often men of
-strong passions and of wayward and unbalanced minds, and from the
-peculiar temptations in which, as I have already said, they are placed.
-Taste seems to me to be, to such men, what the music of David was to
-Saul,--it charms away the evil spirit, but it is only for a time.
-
-But we now pass to the third distinction which was to be made, and that
-is, between a true taste for natural objects and the fine arts, and
-what is called taste in the world of fashion. The point of distinction
-to which I would draw your attention is well stated by Stewart. "It is
-obvious," says he, "that the circumstances which please in the objects
-of taste are of two kinds: first, those which are fitted to please by
-nature, or by associations which all mankind are led to form by their
-common condition; and secondly, those which please in consequence of
-associations arising from local and accidental circumstances. Hence
-there are two kinds of taste; the one enabling us to judge of those
-beauties which have a foundation in the human constitution; the other,
-of such objects as derive their principal recommendation from the
-influence of fashion. These two kinds of taste are not always united in
-the same person; indeed, I am inclined to think that they are united but
-rarely. The perfection of the one depends much on the degree in which we
-are able to free the mind from the influence of casual associations;
-that of the other, on the contrary, depends on a faculty of association
-which enables us to fall in at once with all the turns of the fashion,
-and, as Shakspeare expresses it, to catch the tune of the times."
-Association is the sole foundation of the value which we put upon some
-articles, and of the beauty which we find in others. Thus, a lock of
-hair, valueless in itself, may, from associations connected with it,
-have a value which money cannot measure; and articles of dress, which
-would otherwise be to us indifferent, or odious, become beautiful by
-their association with those persons whom we have been accustomed to
-consider as models of elegance. It is indeed astonishing what an effect
-this principle will have upon our feelings; and from looking too
-exclusively at facts connected with it, some have been led to doubt
-whether there is any such thing as a permanent principle of taste. It
-would really seem, that, within the bounds of comfort and decency, both
-of which are often outraged by fashion, one mode of dress may come to be
-as becoming as another. The wigs, the knee-buckles, the small-clothes,
-the long-skirts and cocked-hats of our grandfathers, were as becoming
-then, as is now the dress of the present day. Says Sir Joshua Reynolds,
-"If an European, when he has cut off his beard, and put false hair on
-his head, or bound up his own natural hair in regular hard knots, as
-unlike nature as he can possibly make it, and after having rendered them
-immovable by the help of the fat of hogs, has covered the whole with
-flour, laid on by a machine with the utmost regularity; if, when thus
-attired, he issues forth and meets a Cherokee Indian, who has bestowed
-as much time at _his_ toilet, and laid on, with equal care and
-attention, his yellow and red ochre on particular parts of his forehead
-or cheeks, as he judges most becoming; whoever of these two despises the
-other for his attention to the fashion of his country; whichever feels
-himself provoked to laugh, is the barbarian." Good taste with respect to
-the fashions, then, would seem to consist, not in following them, or in
-paying them attention, except so far as to avoid attracting notice in
-any way by dress; for it is a strong indication, when a person seeks
-notice from that, that there is about him little else that is worthy of
-notice. The foundation of taste in the fashions, however, being what I
-have now stated, it is obvious that a quick perception of their
-ever-varying changes and a ready and careful accommodation to them, can
-belong, whether in man or woman, only to a mind essentially frivolous;
-and that such a taste, if not absolutely incompatible with a perception
-of all that is permanently grand and beautiful in the works of God, is
-yet seldom connected with it. Such a taste must, of course, rather
-injure than promote good morals.
-
-
-I have now considered taste as exercised indifferently upon any objects
-within its appropriate province. It still remains that I should say
-something, which I propose to do in another Lecture, on Moral Taste, or
-on taste having moral actions for its object.
-
-
-
-
-LECTURE II.
-
-
-It was observed on a former occasion, that material objects produce
-their effect upon taste chiefly as signs; but it is the opinion of Mr.
-Alison, of Mr. Jeffries, and others of high authority on this point,
-that it is solely as signs--solely as suggesting intellectual and moral
-qualities--that they have an effect. It is quite evident that mere
-matter in a chaotic state, or in any state which is not either produced
-by mind or such as mind would produce, cannot be beautiful; and hence it
-is said that it can be beautiful only as a means of indicating qualities
-that do not belong to itself.
-
-The great difficulty which this theory has to encounter arises from the
-apparent instantaneousness with which the emotion seems to arise when a
-beautiful object is presented. But this is not a conclusive objection,
-because emotions which can arise only from association seem to come in
-the same way. How instantaneous, for instance, are the emotions that
-throng up when he who has been long on a foreign shore sees, for the
-first time, the stars and stripes of his country's flag as it enters the
-port where he is;--and yet, these emotions can be awakened by it only as
-a link of association with scenes that are past, or as a sign of his
-country's presence and protection. I have heard the rainbow adduced as
-an instance of an object which produces the emotion of beauty without a
-reference to any thing beyond itself. But what was the impression made
-by it more than two thousand years ago, upon the mind of one who had no
-theory to maintain?--"Look upon the rainbow," says he, "and praise Him
-that made it: very beautiful it is in the brightness thereof. It
-compasseth the heavens about with a glorious circle, and _the hands of
-the Most High have bended it_." How apparently instantaneous, yet how
-different, are our emotions when looking at the cheek flushed by the
-bloom of health, or suffused by the blush of shame, or reddened by
-anger, or wearing that hectic flush which is the flag of distress held
-out by nature when she is sinking in consumption!--And yet no one can
-doubt, if these indications were reversed, that the emotions would be
-reversed also. It is conceded by all, that it is the expression, the
-indication of mental and moral qualities, that gives its highest beauty
-to the human countenance. There are no features which may not be so
-lighted up with noble or tender emotion as to be beautiful. But is
-there, it will be asked, _no_ beauty in any combination of features, or
-of matter, except as connected with expression? I am inclined to think
-there is what may be called an instinctive beauty on the perception of
-certain colors and forms; but it is of little value compared with that
-of which a rational and reflective being can give an account to himself.
-Even this, however, presupposes the action of mind upon matter, though
-that action is not recognized by us as the cause of our emotion. It is
-therefore still true that, as the beauty of the early morning is
-produced solely by a reflexion from the sun while he is still below the
-horizon, so the beauty of matter is wholly a reflexion from that great
-central orb of mind which has never yet beamed upon the eye of man in
-its direct effulgence--that, to him who views it aright, the beauty of
-this world is but the morning twilight of heaven.
-
-But, however this question may be decided, the fact that it can be made
-a question at all, shows how largely moral ideas and emotions enter into
-the province of taste, and the intimate connexion there is between taste
-and morals. What is called moral taste is, in fact, discriminated from
-taste in general, only as it has the moral actions of free and
-intelligent agents for its object. When we look at a moral action, there
-is a plain difference between our perception of it as right, and our
-perception of it as beautiful. In one case there arises the feeling of
-_approbation_, in the other of _admiration_, which are entirely
-distinct, and may exist in very different proportions.
-
-It is, indeed, not always easy to distinguish the point at which
-approbation and admiration run into each other; and in treating of this
-subject, I shall first say a few words of that border-ground between
-taste and morals where the dividing line seems to be unsettled. Where,
-for example, shall we place that feeling which we have in view of the
-manner of doing a thing, in distinction from the thing done? Is that
-feeling merely the result of taste, or are there mingled with it some
-elements of moral approbation or disapprobation? Where will you place a
-mean action in distinction from a dishonest one? I have heard it
-disputed whether neatness is a virtue, a matter of moral obligation, or
-merely a requisition of taste. Is a man under moral obligation to be
-neat in his person? It is along this dividing line that all those
-actions lie which relate to the proprieties and courtesies of life--all
-those smaller attentions to the convenience and comfort of others, and
-that delicate regard to their feelings, which have been designated by
-the French as the smaller morals.
-
-In regard to this very extensive, and therefore important department of
-human conduct, there seem to be two common mistakes. The first consists
-in disregarding it altogether. There are many men whose characters, in
-their sketching and outline, are fine, and which, seen at a distance,
-appear well; but on approaching them, they seem coarse and very
-imperfect. In all the great duties of life they appear to advantage; but
-through negligence, or some greater failing, the minor duties, and
-especially the department of manners, is entirely neglected. They seem
-like stately trees, in the trunk and main branches of which the sap
-circulates vigorously, but does not reach and animate the smaller twigs,
-and give to the leaves their perfect green.
-
-A second, and more common mistake, is the giving up of this department
-to the control of taste under the guidance of selfishness. The manners
-are polished, and all the forms of politeness adopted, not for the
-purpose of making others happy, but of securing to ourselves their
-esteem, and of effecting our own ends in life. This is the school of
-manners recommended by Chesterfield, and young persons are often
-exhorted to pay attention to their manners on this ground. In this case
-the sap does not circulate at all, and the leaves are painted.
-
-But to me it seems, that this whole class of actions falls within the
-province of morality. Wherever human happiness is concerned, there is
-room for principle to operate, and the constitution of society will
-never be sound, and its beauty will never be perfect, till the sap of
-principle circulates to the extremities of human action. The true polish
-and beauty of society can result only from the principle of benevolence
-showing itself in a graceful and practical attention to the minor wants
-and to the feelings of others. But whatever we may decide in regard to
-their respective limits in this department, it is obvious that taste, so
-far as it goes, must be favorable to morals.
-
-We now pass to what is indisputably the province of morals. And here our
-first inquiry will be, what are the circumstances under which the
-emotions of taste are awakened by moral actions? In reply to this
-inquiry I observe, that the emotion of beauty, leaving sublimity for the
-present out of the question, is awakened by a moral action chiefly,
-and perhaps solely, when it springs from the principle of duty acting in
-coincidence with the desires, the affections, or some other natural and
-inferior principle of action. This point is of practical importance, and
-requires illustration. Man, as we all know, has various principles of
-action,--such as instincts, desires, affections, passions. These may
-impel him to a course of action directly opposed to that indicated by a
-sense of duty, and they may also lead him to perform the same actions as
-are dictated by it; and the position is, that moral beauty arises when
-there is a partial or entire coincidence between the principle of duty
-and these inferior powers.
-
-That this is so is evident, because there are many actions which are
-right, which are imperatively required by duty, which yet do not awaken
-in the mind of the impartial spectator any admiration--for we must here
-keep in mind the distinction already made between admiration and
-approbation. The simple payment of a debt, for example, does not awaken
-any admiration, though we approve the act and should strongly condemn
-him who should not do it when it was in his power. In this case, there
-can be mingled with the performance of duty no play of the generous
-emotions. He who performs all his actions solely from a sense of duty,
-has our approbation, our respect; but he who, in addition to this, is
-possessed of warm affections, which always coincide in their promptings
-with what is right, has also our admiration and love. Duty is to the
-affections, in the conduct of life, what logic is to rhetoric in a
-discourse. Logic forms an excellent body for a discourse; we assent to
-it, we approve it, it is good, all good, but it awakens no admiration.
-It is not till rhetoric sends its warm life-blood to mantle on the cold
-cheek of logic, and clothes its angular form in the garments of taste,
-that we begin to admire the discourse. And so it is with duty. It is an
-excellent body to the course of our conduct in life; nothing else will
-do, but it may be so performed as to appear unamiable and even
-repulsive. In order to be beautiful, there must be connected with it
-some manifestation of natural affection or graceful emotion.
-
-And here I may remark, that though we have a right to expect of every
-man that he will do his duty, yet the display of this beauty is not
-equally within the power of all, since the existence and manifestation
-of emotion depend, to some extent, upon the temperament. As there are
-some who have naturally a meagre intellect, so there are others whose
-minds seem to be barren of those finer sympathies and affections of our
-nature which are the verdure of the soul, and upon which the eye always
-rests with pleasure. The characters of some good men are dry and
-unattractive. They are harsh, and hard-visaged, and seem too much like
-wooden men, moved by rule and calculation. Such persons often seem
-better, and worse, than they really are. Their freedom from
-extravagancies on the one hand, and on the other, that want of feeling
-which is wrongly termed by many hardness of heart, is equally the result
-of temperament.
-
-That the doctrine which I now advocate is correct, appears also from the
-effect produced upon our feelings when we observe habit taking the place
-of sentiment in the performance of duty. We have all seen persons enter
-upon a course of virtuous activity, and continue it for a time from a
-sense of duty, sustained by ardent feeling; but after a time the feeling
-has died away, and there has come in its stead habit, or a regard to
-consistency, to sustain the sense of duty in keeping up the same course
-of external action. When this change has taken place, we are all
-conscious that the beauty of the conduct is greatly diminished;--its
-spirit has vanished; the dew of its youth is exhaled.
-
-I said that this was a practical point, and I now wish to show, in
-connexion with it, precisely how it is that mischief arises from the
-perversion of moral taste; as was shown, in the former Lecture, how it
-arises from its perversion in other things. In opposition to the hard
-and dry characters mentioned above, there are those whose
-susceptibilities are acute, whose sympathies are quick, whose feelings
-are generous, whose affections are ardent, who do every thing so
-promptly and so heartily that impulse seems almost to supply the place
-of principle. There is something very attractive in a character of this
-kind; there is an ease and freedom about it which seems to put aside all
-labor of calculation, and it moreover exhibits our nature in the
-pleasing garb of natural goodness. It is for this reason that novelists,
-who draw men as they wish to have them, and not as they are, have
-almost universally made these fine instincts of humanity the guide of
-their hero, and the basis of his character. This is, indeed, if I
-understand it, the basis of this kind of literature, and one chief
-source of the injury it produces. The exhibition of these instincts, and
-affections, and emotions, springing up at random and acting without the
-control of principle, holds out no stimulus to exertion; and their
-possession and exercise is often in fact, and often too in books,
-connected with great corruption of moral character.
-
-Taking, therefore, as the main ingredient in the character of those who
-are to make the chief figure in this kind of writing, what Miss
-Martineau calls _spontaneousness_, and which she and a certain wise
-friend of hers in Boston thought should by all means be encouraged and
-_reverenced_, we may mix the other materials somewhat to our taste. An
-excellent and much-approved receipt for the hero of a novel is the
-following:--1st. Make him handsome, for beauty is to the body what
-spontaneousness is to the mind, a sort of physical spontaneousness. Or,
-if you do not make him handsome, do what amounts to much the same thing,
-give him an _air_; let him have something about him that is peculiar, so
-that those who scan him closely may observe, under those apparently
-indifferent features, a certain something, a sign of the fire that is
-slumbering within. 2d. If you find it necessary, for fashion's sake, to
-put him at school, or at any place for study, make him idle, generous,
-somewhat mischievous, a great hater of mathematics, (for, so far as my
-knowledge extends, no hero of a novel ever yet knew any thing about
-mathematics,) give him some whimsical pursuit for the hours when he
-chooses to do any thing, and then make him speak, as he has occasion,
-Italian, French and Spanish, which he learned by instinct. 3d. _Make him
-act from impulse, and not from principle, and get him into difficulty
-through the influence of these same generous impulses._ It is on
-difficulties thus created that the plot must turn. 4th. Get him in love.
-5th. Make him run a gauntlet of difficulties a volume and a half long,
-furnishing a new illustration of that old adage, "the course of true
-love never did run smooth." 6th. Marry him, and let him live many years
-in perfect felicity.
-
-We commonly hear it said, that the chief mischief of novel-reading
-arises from the false pictures of life which novels present. This is
-doubtless a source of no small mischief; but in my view, a much greater
-evil arises from their holding up, directly or indirectly, false
-principles of action, and casting contempt upon the true; from their
-leading young persons to admire that which they esteem graceful rather
-than that which is respectable and right in the conduct of life. There
-is in those works an unnatural separation made between the principle of
-virtue and that which gives to virtue its beauty; and principle is
-represented as formal and cold, and perhaps ridiculous. Prudence,
-especially, is a virtue which no heroine of a novel must ever be guilty
-of. In a recent work, which deserves great credit for avoiding the
-general fault just mentioned, we are yet told that prudence was a
-virtue for which the heroine was never famous, and a slight odium is
-cast upon the virtue itself by making it appear, in the rival of the
-heroine, somewhat stiff and pragmatical.
-
-It is thus that these works awaken extensively, in the minds of the
-young, associations unfavorable to the sterner and sterling virtues; and
-in many cases, these amiable qualities are so associated with vice as to
-render it attractive. It is thus that we are presented by popular
-novelists--and in such a manner as I know carries along the sympathies
-of many young men, while their imaginations are rendered familiar with
-the haunts of vice--with gentlemen robbers who rob in style; who are so
-generous that they never rob the poor; who never shed human blood if
-people will give up their money without it; and if they are occasionally
-obliged to blow out the brains of some agent of the law, they are really
-sorry for it, though they do not see how such impertinent fellows could
-expect any thing better. It is thus that the impression is received,
-that a certain class of impulses is sufficient to secure success in
-life, and even to excuse the want of principle; and young men with their
-heads full of pictures, not perhaps so bad as this, yet fundamentally
-the same, rush eagerly into life without fixed principles and fixed
-aims.
-
-To him who is without experience, there is no sight more beautiful than
-that of a young man of an ingenuous nature entering upon life, and
-resting upon his own good impulses to keep him from evil. But such a
-sight, even when there has been no corruption like that just spoken of,
-now causes apprehension in me; for I have seen him who had every thing,
-in his person and in his sensibilities, to excite admiration and love,
-tarrying long at the wine, and seeking mixed wine; I have seen him going
-to that "house" which "is the way to hell;" and therefore it is that I
-would utter a solemn protest against any thing which would divorce the
-beauty of virtue from the principle of virtue, or which would give an
-impression that there is security without fixed principle. Even
-"genius," with all these amiable qualities--
-
-                "Yet may lack the aid
-  Implored by humble minds and hearts afraid,
-  May leave to timid souls the shield and sword
-  Of the tried faith and the resistless word;
-  Amid a world of dangers venturing forth,
-  Frail but yet fearless, proud in conscious worth,
-  Till strong temptation, in some fatal time,
-  Assails the heart and wins the soul to crime."
-
-Then,
-
-      "All that honor brings against the force
-      Of headlong passion, aids its rapid course;
-      Its slight resistance but provokes the fire,
-  As wood-work stops the flame, and then conveys it higher."
-
-With such a basis to the characters presented, it will follow of course,
-that the emotions and the sensibilities will be chiefly addressed in
-these works, and thus they become the principal means of promoting that
-false and selfish sensibility which is so often cultivated in refined
-society. This is a more refined species of intemperance, and is to the
-mind what intemperance in strong drink is to the body. It causes
-excitement for the mere selfish enjoyment produced by it, without
-leading to any exertion. And as the grosser species of intemperance is
-more common among one sex, so it is to be feared, that this more refined
-species is more common among the other; and that for both, circulating
-libraries, and other libraries, instead of furnishing wholesome
-entertainment, are too often converted into mere intellectual
-dram-shops. There are many who seek chiefly for excitement, who have a
-constant craving for it, whose emotions and mental sensibilities have
-become accustomed to a set of artificial stimulants till they are
-sensible to no other, and they become as remorselessly selfish as the
-drunkard himself. I would sooner apply for an act of genuine kindness,
-one which should reach actual want, to a woman in a log-house, upon the
-side of a mountain, surrounded by hungry children, than to the daintiest
-young lady whose sensibilities have spindled up and wilted in the
-artificial heat of novel-reading. In order to perform the duties of
-benevolence and philanthropy, it is indispensable that the sensibilities
-should be kept alive to the impressions of misery as it actually
-presents itself in all its squalid accompaniments.
-
-  "Sweet are the tears that from a Howard's eye
-  Drop on the cheek of one he lifts from earth;
-  And he who works me good with unmoved face,
-  Does it but half; he chills me while he aids,
-  My benefactor, not my fellow-man.
-  But even this, this cold benevolence,
-  Seems worth, seems manhood, when there rise before me
-  The sluggard Pity's vision-weaving tribe,
-  Who sigh for wretchedness, yet shun the wretched,
-  Nursing, in some delicious solitude,
-  Their slothful loves and dainty sympathies!"
-
-It was this esteem in which mankind hold the sensibilities and impulses,
-this preference of spontaneousness without its connexion with principle,
-which gave its popularity to what has been called the sentimental
-school--the results of which ought to teach society a lesson not soon to
-be forgotten. Concerning this school, it is justly remarked by
-Coleridge, that "all the mischief achieved by Hobbes, and the whole
-school of materialists, will appear inconsiderable if it be compared
-with the mischief effected and occasioned by the sentimental philosophy
-of Sterne and his numerous imitators. The vilest appetites, and the most
-remorseless inconstancy towards their objects, acquired the title of the
-_heart_--the irresistible feelings--the too tender sensibility: and if
-the frosts of prudence, the icy chains of human law, thawed and vanished
-at the genial warmth of human nature, who _could_ help it? It was an
-amiable weakness."
-
-I would here remark, that I have no objection to fictitious writings as
-such. There are those to which I do not object. Let them cease, first,
-to present false pictures of life: secondly, to array the sensibilities
-and associations of the mind against principle: and, thirdly, let them
-cease to create and feed a morbid craving for excitement, and to destroy
-the balance between the feelings and the judgment: and I shall not
-object to them. The mass of these writings, however, do produce each
-and all of these effects, and are, so far, indisputably pernicious.
-
-I have been thus particular in pointing out the evils which arise from
-arraying what is beautiful and graceful in morals and in conduct against
-that which is right, because I do not believe that the community are
-sufficiently warned against the mischief it is working, and in many
-cases are not perhaps aware of the manner in which it is wrought. Evil
-gains advantage over man by dividing him against himself, by bringing
-into collision faculties that were intended to work harmoniously
-together; and we may regard it as settled, that whoever or whatever
-would set up mere impulses, or sensibilities, or emotions, in the place
-of the reason and conscience of man, is thus dividing him against
-himself. It is with the conscience of man as it is with a king. He may
-have his prime minister, who is his chief favorite, and next to himself,
-but he must never abandon his power, or suffer the highest subject to
-depose him from the throne. The desires and affections are then only
-truly beautiful, when they are in ready attendance at the court of their
-rightful sovereign.
-
-Having now spoken of the manner in which evil is done by those who care
-to please rather than to improve mankind, I cannot leave this part of
-the subject without suggesting, to the friends of principle and of
-religion, how much, if what has been said is correct, they may do to
-counteract this evil by a free, a hearty, a joyful, and therefore an
-attractive, mode of doing that which is right. Whence have arisen those
-associations of coldness and formality and gloom, as connected with
-duty, which haunt the imaginations of many young persons, and which have
-just as little existence in reality as other spectres of the night? Is
-it not in part from an unnatural austerity, or from a cowardly and
-faltering step, a want of freedom and power and beauty in the
-exhibitions of virtue and principle on the part of those who profess to
-adhere to them? It is not as it should be, when the glad and the
-graceful emotions readily spring up by the side of every path that we
-walk in except the path of duty. He who marches under the banner of
-principle is not only to feel that he is engaged in a good cause, but is
-also to see in that cause a beauty which shall be to him what music is
-to the soldier, giving cheerfulness to his countenance and alacrity to
-his step. His is not indeed to be the unchastened, and reckless, and
-merely animal joy that is unconscious of the evil that exists, and that
-is to be met; but it is to be the joy of him who, though he is
-travelling in a difficult and obscure path, yet sees before him the
-bright and steady light of his own happy home. The more those who act
-from principle are able to combine, with the most perfect rectitude and
-uncompromising faithfulness, the cultivation and play of all the
-graceful and tender emotions, the more will they do to promote the cause
-in which they labor. I know, and here is the difficulty, that most
-virtue is too feeble for this; and I would not that there should be put
-on any affectation of freedom or ease. Virtue should move easily and
-gracefully only as it is strong, but it should become strong that it
-may move easily and gracefully, and thus become to all men as beautiful
-as it is obligatory.
-
-It is not a little that the Christian religion has suffered from the
-mistakes of its adherents on this point. It had been better if they had
-more regarded the spirit of its Founder when He commanded his disciples,
-even when they fasted, not to be of a sad countenance, as the hypocrites
-were. The impression we get of Paul, notwithstanding his labors and
-sufferings, is that he was a happy man. If he was sometimes "sorrowful,"
-he was yet "always rejoicing." The movements of his spirit were so ready
-and free, in view of the great subjects that filled his mind, that he
-reminds us more than any other man of the "rapt seraph that adores and
-burns." What is it, indeed, that gives its perfect beauty to our
-conception of the worship of heaven? Is it not, that the most perfect
-law is there fully obeyed, and is yet no restraint upon the highest and
-freest expansion of feeling? It is when this is so, and then only, that
-moral beauty is perfect.
-
-We have thus far considered moral beauty only. We now pass to another
-branch of our subject, the moral sublime. When speaking on taste in
-general, it was not necessary, for any purposes I then had in view, that
-I should make a distinction between beauty and sublimity, either as they
-exist in themselves, or as they are occasioned by outward objects.
-Indeed, it is the opinion of many writers, that there is no radical
-distinction between them, but that sublimity is merely the feeling of
-beauty heightened. This seems to me doubtful, even in material beauty;
-but in our present department, the occasions on which they arise are so
-different, that they must be distinguished. It was for this reason that
-I treated of beauty by itself.
-
-It has been observed, that the emotion of moral beauty arises when there
-is a coincidence between the sense of duty and certain inferior
-principles of action. I now observe, that the emotion of moral sublimity
-is awakened, when the sense of duty is opposed by inclination, or
-affection, or by any or all the inferior principles of action, and
-triumphs over them. Its principle consists in a power of self-control
-and of self-sacrifice, in those cases in which they are difficult.
-
-The illustration of this point will lead to a further confirmation of
-what was said in reference to moral beauty. No sight, for example, can
-be more beautiful than that of a family in which there is mutual
-attachment, and in which the performance of every duty is sweetened by
-affection. How beautiful is the assiduity of a child, who bears with
-every infirmity, and soothes every care, and anticipates every want, of
-a parent in sickness or in age! It is beautiful, but not sublime. The
-conduct of that young man, who labors hard and denies himself the
-ordinary pleasures of the young that he may support an aged mother, or
-add to her comfort, is highly beautiful; but natural affection
-coöperates with a sense of duty, and therefore it is not sublime. No one
-has ever considered as sublime the conduct of Æneas, when he bore his
-aged father upon his shoulders from the flames of Troy. But when the
-ancient Brutus, with a power that was supreme, sat in judgment on his
-own son who was accused of being a traitor, and when he gave the sign to
-the lictor to take him to execution, then there was a struggle, then
-inflexible justice triumphed over natural affection, and it was--not
-beautiful, it was too awful for that--but it was sublime. That act of
-our Saviour, (if I may be permitted to refer to such a scene in this
-connexion,) by which he remembered his mother upon the cross and
-provided for her wants, was beautiful--how beautiful! His prayer for his
-murderers was sublime. It is, in general, acts of tenderness,
-gentleness, condescension, pity, gratitude, humanity, that are
-beautiful; while it is, on the other hand, acts of magnanimity, of
-fortitude, of inflexible justice, of high patriotism, and, on proper
-occasions, of contempt of danger and of death, that are sublime. In all
-these latter cases it will be seen that the principle is the same, and
-that the sublime emotion is awakened by virtuous self-control, in union
-with high resolve.
-
-We hence see why it is that periods of difficulty, and oppression, and
-persecution, are favorable to the exhibition of the moral sublime. They
-test the amount of attachment to principle which there is among men, and
-the sacrifices which they are willing to make for it. Accordingly, it
-has been in such emergencies that men have arisen, who, under the
-inspiration of the great principles of civil and religious liberty,
-have been ready to go in the face of every danger, wherever their duty
-should call them; as Luther was determined to go to the diet of Worms,
-though he should find as many devils in that city as there were tiles
-upon the houses. These are the men, who, though they have been opposed,
-and vilified, and persecuted in their day, have yet received the homage
-of after ages; who have stood as the beacon-lights of the world, and
-whose names have been the watchword of those who have rallied and struck
-for the united reign of liberty and law. Such men have almost always
-been in advance of their age, and the people of that age have not
-comprehended them. They have reverenced the great men of former times;
-they have built the sepulchres of the prophets, but have persecuted
-those who were sent unto _them_. It is not therefore surprising that
-Seneca has spoken so largely of the benefits of adversity, as alone
-giving an opportunity for the display of the heroic virtues, and has
-said that a good man, struggling with adversity, was a spectacle worthy
-of the gods.
-
-But it is not necessary to the existence, though it may be to the
-exhibition, of moral heroism, that we should be placed in circumstances
-of external adversity. Wherever there is moral combat, there may be
-moral sublimity, and this combat is necessary for the accomplishment of
-that triumph which every man is called to gain over himself. The force
-and grandeur of virtue are then seen when we sacrifice to it our
-appetites, our avarice, our pride, our vanity, our ambition, our
-resentments, till every evil passion is brought into subjection to
-reason and conscience.
-
-Such being the nature of the moral sublime, it is obvious that there is
-much less danger to morals from its perversion than from the perversion
-of the beautiful. There is here no natural passion to come in as an ally
-of principle; and which may take the place of it, but it is duty
-struggling single-handed, and triumphing over all the might of external
-nature, and all the force of human propensity. Virtue may indeed exist
-in perfect serenity, and be exercised without an obstacle; but in this
-world, and it is that which makes it a place of probation, there is
-little virtue except on the condition of struggling against and
-overcoming inclination or passion. If we succeed in this struggle, we
-feel in our own breasts a peace which is not only present happiness, but
-the promise of future reward; and we awaken in the breasts of others the
-emotions of moral sympathy, of approbation, of sublimity in its highest
-forms, till they are ready to welcome us with acclaim, and we find that
-virtue is not only happiness, but is also "glory, and honor, and
-immortality."
-
-But though moral beauty and sublimity are so different in their nature
-and in the occasions on which they arise, it must not be supposed that
-they do not often blend with each other in actual life. The general
-course of Howard, for instance, being in accordance with the dictates of
-humanity, had great moral beauty, and yet the sacrifices which he made
-were often so great as to cause that course to partake of the moral
-sublime.
-
-If the account of moral taste, now given, be correct, the analysis of
-the subject is the only argument needed. Its cultivation must, of
-course, be favorable to morals, since it would lead, in its perfect
-state, to the same course of conduct as would be required by principle.
-There is, indeed, a whole school of philosophers, that of Shaftesbury,
-who have looked upon virtue, and have recommended it, as beautiful
-rather than as obligatory; who have regarded it as a sentiment rather
-than a principle; and whose writings have been calculated to awaken
-enthusiasm in the cause of virtue, but not to give it its proper
-sanctions. So far, however, as this class of feelings would lead us, it
-is in the direct path of virtue, and they may, no doubt, be so
-cultivated, and especially by the young, as to furnish efficient aid to
-the principle of duty. Perhaps few persons, rightly educated, are aware
-how many wrong actions they avoid with the greater care because they are
-also mean; how many right actions they perform with the greater
-readiness because they are in accordance with the requisitions of a
-cultivated moral taste. Considered as a principle of action, such a
-taste provides an effectual security against the grossness connected
-with many vices, and cherishes a temper of mind friendly to all that is
-amiable, or generous, or elevated in our nature. While, therefore, we
-regard taste as an important ally to the sense of duty, we are not to
-rely chiefly upon it. It would need stability, and would be constantly
-liable to be led astray by the influence of fashion, or of casual
-association. We may however do more, we should do more to combine them;
-to unite taste and principle in the conduct of life; to do, ourselves,
-and to lead others to do, what is becoming, as well as what is right.
-
-Man is capable of forming to himself an ideal model, of embodying a
-conception of excellence such as he has never seen, and of acting with
-reference to it. It is this which renders him capable of progression;
-and one great reason why men are stationary, is, that they have in their
-minds no fixed and definite standard of excellence after which they are
-reaching. Young men, to whom I speak, here is the point at which many of
-you doubtless fail. You are borne on by the current, and form to
-yourselves no worthy object of pursuit, after which you bring
-yourselves, by self-discipline, steadily to labor. But without doing
-this, no man ever yet exerted a high and worthy influence; no man ever
-can. Permit me then to propose to you, in your capacity as social
-beings, an object after which you may thus strive. It is the combination
-of perfect moral principle with perfect simplicity and refinement of
-manners--the union, in the conduct of life, of Morals and Taste.
-
-There remains but a single consideration which I shall adduce, to show
-that there is the connexion between taste and morals for which I
-contend. It is, that we naturally associate with goodness, beauty of
-form; and that in a perfect state, we conceive of goodness as surrounded
-by objects that are pleasing to the taste. Perhaps this may not have
-been noticed by all, but a little attention to what passes in our own
-minds will convince us that it is so. This natural association of beauty
-and goodness perhaps arises from the fact, that every indication of
-goodness as expressed in the countenance is pleasing, and may be
-heightened into beauty. It is surprising how soon we come to regard as
-pleasing, the most ordinary features, when we have associated with them
-a fund of good qualities; or rather, the features soon become like the
-letters of a book, which we regard only for the meaning they convey. As
-I have said before, no features are so ordinary that they may not come
-to appear to us beautiful by the expression of good qualities; and if I
-may suppose, which I would by no means assert, that there are any homely
-persons present, I would congratulate them on the inducements they have
-to cultivate the only beauty that is permanent, or that can be the
-foundation of lasting attachment.
-
-Not only however may homely features become beautiful by their
-expression, but we have, I think, a natural association of positive
-beauty as connected with the goodness which we have not seen, and of
-positive deformity as connected with vice. When we read of good men
-even, we regard them as having something in their appearance
-corresponding with their character, and no man, I am sure, can suppose
-that Benedict Arnold had a countenance that was pleasant to look upon.
-But what is conclusive on this point is, that no man ever conceived of
-Satan in his proper form, as beautiful, or ever conceived of an angel,
-except as clothed in light and beauty.
-
-It is this natural supposition of the connexion of beauty of mind with
-beauty of form, that gives its plausibility and point to a dream of Sir
-Isaac Bickerstaff, as related in one of the Tattlers. He seemed to
-himself to be in an open plain, surrounded by an immense assembly of
-females, in the midst of whom the goddess of justice sat enthroned, and
-holding in her hand a mirror of such peculiar properties as to reflect
-the faces of those who looked into it in exact correspondence with their
-characters. This mirror was held up and turned before the assembly, and
-the effect may well be imagined. Some beautiful women had the
-satisfaction of seeing their faces become still more beautiful, while
-many more were shocked to see themselves converted into perfect frights.
-Some who were homely before, became still more so; while many unassuming
-and modest persons, who had never dreamed of being handsome, and so had
-sought the approbation of their own consciences, were surprised to see
-how their faces were brightened up. There was however one face, which
-seemed to beam with a celestial radiance, and was so surprisingly
-beautiful that Sir Isaac determined at once on making proposals to the
-lady, if he could but ascertain to whom it belonged. This, by careful
-attention, he was soon enabled to do, and found that it was a little,
-grey-headed, wrinkled old woman who stood by his side.
-
-There is something ludicrous in the manner in which this is set forth,
-but it involves a most serious and pleasing truth. It is as much a part
-of the disorders of the present state of things, that goodness is ever
-connected with any thing but beauty, as it is that virtue is depressed
-while vice triumphs. In a perfect organization and state of things,
-matter would be entirely flexible to the action of spirit, and, of
-course, intellectual and moral beauty, as well as their opposites, must
-stamp their impress perfectly on the features. This we believe will be
-the case when the physical nature of man shall be reorganized, and the
-good shall not only be beautiful, but, as I have already remarked that
-we are naturally led to expect, shall be surrounded with all those
-objects that are pleasing to the taste. That these expectations are
-natural may be shown from the writings of all the heathen poets, and it
-is pleasing to observe how perfectly they coincide with the
-representations of the Scriptures on this point. We are there taught,
-not only that the righteous shall shine forth as the sun, but their
-dwelling-place is described as a city whose foundations are garnished
-with all manner of precious stones, whose streets are of pure gold, and
-whose gates are of pearl.
-
-Thus, as we associate with royalty its regalia, so do we associate with
-goodness, beauty, which seems to be its natural appendage; and not only
-in the Scriptures, but also in our own constitution, do we find a
-promise, that Goodness and Beauty shall be finally and forever united.
-
-
-
-
-TRANSCRIBER'S NOTES:
-
-
-  Text in italics is surrounded with underscores: _italics_.
-
-
-
-
-
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