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diff --git a/38283-h/38283-h.htm b/38283-h/38283-h.htm new file mode 100644 index 0000000..32b6dc4 --- /dev/null +++ b/38283-h/38283-h.htm @@ -0,0 +1,3219 @@ +<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN" + "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd"> +<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xml:lang="en" lang="en"> + <head> + <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;charset=iso-8859-1" /> + <meta http-equiv="Content-Style-Type" content="text/css" /> + <title> + The Project Gutenberg eBook of Schopenhauer, by Thomas Whittaker. + </title> + <style type="text/css"> + +body { + margin-left: 10%; + margin-right: 10%; +} + + h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6 { + text-align: center; /* all headings centered */ + clear: both; +} + +p { + margin-top: .75em; + text-align: justify; + margin-bottom: .75em; +} + +hr { + width: 33%; + margin-top: 2em; + margin-bottom: 2em; + margin-left: auto; + margin-right: auto; + clear: both; +} + +hr.chap {width: 65%} + +table { + margin-left: auto; + margin-right: auto; +} + +.pagenum { /* uncomment the next line for invisible page numbers */ + /* visibility: hidden; */ + position: absolute; + color: gray; + right: 1%; + font-size: smaller; + text-align: right; +} /* page numbers */ + +.hanging-indent { + margin-left: 5%; + margin-right: 5%; + text-indent: -2em; + padding-left: 2em; +} + +.hanging-indent-small { + margin-left: 5%; + margin-right: 5%; + text-indent: -1em; + padding-left: 1em; +} + +.center {text-align: center;} + +.smcap {font-variant: small-caps;} + +/* Footnotes */ +.footnote {margin-left: 10%; margin-right: 10%; font-size: 0.9em;} + +.footnote .label {position: absolute; right: 84%; text-align: right;} + +.fnanchor { + vertical-align: super; + font-size: .8em; + text-decoration: + none; +} + +/* Transcriber's notes */ +.transnote {background-color: #E6E6FA; + color: black; + font-size:smaller; + padding:0.5em; + margin-bottom:5em; + font-family:sans-serif, serif; } + + </style> + </head> +<body> + + +<pre> + +The Project Gutenberg EBook of Schopenhauer, by Thomas Whittaker + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Schopenhauer + +Author: Thomas Whittaker + +Release Date: December 12, 2011 [EBook #38283] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK SCHOPENHAUER *** + + + + +Produced by Albert László and the Online Distributed +Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This file was +produced from images generously made available by The +Internet Archive) + + + + + + +</pre> + + +<hr class="chap" /> + +<h3><span class="smcap">Philosophies Ancient and Modern</span></h3> + +<p> </p> + +<h1>SCHOPENHAUER</h1> + +<p> </p> + +<hr class="chap" /> + +<h2><a name="NOTE" id="NOTE"></a>NOTE</h2> + + +<p>As a consequence of the success of the series of <i>Religions +Ancient and Modern</i>, Messrs. <span class="smcap">Constable</span> have decided to issue +a set of similar primers, with brief introductions, lists of dates, +and selected authorities, presenting to the wider public the +salient features of the <i>Philosophies</i> of Greece and Rome and of +the Middle Ages, as well as of modern Europe. They will +appear in the same handy Shilling volumes, with neat cloth +bindings and paper envelopes, which have proved so attractive +in the case of the <i>Religions</i>. The writing in each case will be +confided to an eminent authority, and one who has already +proved himself capable of scholarly yet popular exposition +within a small compass.</p> + +<p>Among the first volumes to appear will be:—</p> + +<div class="hanging-indent"><p><b>Early Greek Philosophy.</b> By <span class="smcap">A. W. Benn</span>, author of <i>The Philosophy +of Greece, Rationalism in the Nineteenth Century</i>.</p> + +<p><b>Stoicism.</b> By Professor <span class="smcap">St. George Stock</span>, author of <i>Deductive Logic</i>, +editor of the <i>Apology of Plato</i>, etc.</p> + +<p><b>Plato.</b> By Professor <span class="smcap">A. E. Taylor</span>, St. Andrews University, +author of <i>The Problem of Conduct</i>.</p> + +<p><b>Scholasticism.</b> By Father <span class="smcap">Rickaby</span>, S.J.</p> + +<p><b>Hobbes.</b> By Professor <span class="smcap">A. E. Taylor</span>.</p> + +<p><b>Locke.</b> By Professor <span class="smcap">Alexander</span>, of Owens College.</p> + +<p><b>Comte and Mill.</b> By <span class="smcap">T. Whittaker</span>, author of <i>The +Neoplatonists, Apollonius of Tyana and other Essays</i>.</p> + +<p><b>Herbert Spencer.</b> By <span class="smcap">W. H. Hudson</span>, author of <i>An Introduction +to Spencer's Philosophy</i>.</p> + +<p><b>Schopenhauer.</b> By <span class="smcap">T. Whittaker</span>.</p> + +<p><b>Berkeley.</b> By Professor <span class="smcap">Campbell Fraser</span>, D.C.L., LL.D.</p> + +<p><b>Bergsen.</b> By Father <span class="smcap">Tyrrell</span>.</p></div> + + +<hr class="chap" /> + +<h1>SCHOPENHAUER</h1> + +<p> </p> + +<h3>By</h3> + +<h2>THOMAS WHITTAKER</h2> + +<h5>AUTHOR OF 'COMTE AND MILL,' ETC.</h5> + +<p> </p> +<p> </p> + +<h5>LONDON<br /> +<small>ARCHIBALD CONSTABLE & CO LTD</small><br /> +1909</h5> + + +<hr class="chap" /> + +<h2><a name="CONTENTS" id="CONTENTS"></a>CONTENTS</h2> + +<div class='center'> +<table border="0" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0" summary="Contents"> + +<tr><td align='left'><small>CHAP.</small></td> +<td align='left'></td> +<td align='left'><small>PAGE</small></td></tr> + +<tr><td align='right'><small>I.</small></td> +<td align='left'><span class="smcap">Life and Writings</span>,</td> +<td align='right'><a href='#Page_1'>1</a></td></tr> + +<tr><td align='right'><small>II.</small></td> +<td align='left'><span class="smcap">Theory of Knowledge</span>,</td> +<td align='right'><a href='#Page_15'>15</a></td></tr> + +<tr><td align='right'><small>III.</small></td> +<td align='left'><span class="smcap">Metaphysics of the Will</span>,</td> +<td align='right'><a href='#Page_29'>29</a></td></tr> + +<tr><td align='right'><small>IV.</small></td> +<td align='left'><span class="smcap">Æsthetics</span>,</td> +<td align='right'><a href='#Page_49'>49</a></td></tr> + +<tr><td align='right'><small>V.</small></td> +<td align='left'><span class="smcap">Ethics</span>,</td> +<td align='right'><a href='#Page_65'>65</a></td></tr> + +<tr><td align='right'><small>VI.</small></td> +<td align='left'><span class="smcap">Historical Significance</span>,</td> +<td align='right'><a href='#Page_86'>86</a></td></tr> + +<tr><td align='right'></td> +<td align='left'><span class="smcap">Selected Works</span>,</td> +<td align='right'><a href='#Page_93'>93</a></td></tr> + +</table></div> + +<hr class="chap" /><p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_1" id="Page_1">[Pg 1]</a></span></p> + +<h1><a name="SCHOPENHAUER" id="SCHOPENHAUER"></a>SCHOPENHAUER</h1> + + +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_I" id="CHAPTER_I"></a>CHAPTER I</h2> + +<h3>LIFE AND WRITINGS</h3> + + +<p>Arthur Schopenhauer may be distinctively +described as the greatest philosophic writer of +his century. So evident is this that he has +sometimes been regarded as having more importance +in literature than in philosophy; but this +is an error. As a metaphysician he is second to +no one since Kant. Others of his age have surpassed +him in system and in comprehensiveness; +but no one has had a firmer grasp of the essential +and fundamental problems of philosophy. +On the theory of knowledge, the nature of reality, +and the meaning of the beautiful and the good, +he has solutions to offer that are all results of a +characteristic and original way of thinking.</p> + +<p>In one respect, as critics have noted, his spirit +is different from that of European philosophy in +general. What preoccupies him in a special way +is the question of evil in the world. Like the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_2" id="Page_2">[Pg 2]</a></span> +philosophies of the East, emerging as they do +without break from religion, Schopenhauer's +philosophy is in its outcome a doctrine of redemption +from sin. The name of pessimism commonly +applied to it is in some respects misleading, +though it was his own term; but it is correct if +understood as he explained it. As he was accustomed +to insist, his final ethical doctrine coincides +with that of all the religions that aim, for their +adepts or their elect, at deliverance from 'this +evil world.' But, as the 'world-fleeing' religions +have their mitigations and accommodations, so +also has the philosophy of Schopenhauer. At +various points indeed it seems as if a mere +change of accent would turn it into optimism.</p> + +<p>This preoccupation does not mean indifference +to the theoretical problems of philosophy. No +one has insisted more strongly that the end of +philosophy is pure truth, and that only the few +who care about pure truth have any concern with +it. But for Schopenhauer the desire for speculative +truth does not by itself suffice to explain +the impulse of philosophical inquiries. On one +side of his complex character, he had more +resemblance to the men who turn from the world +to religion, like St. Augustine, than to the normal +type of European thinker, represented pre-emi<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_3" id="Page_3">[Pg 3]</a></span>nently +by Aristotle. He was a temperamental +pessimist, feeling from the first the trouble of +existence; and here he finds the deepest motive +for the desire to become clear about it. He saw +in the world, what he felt in himself, a vain effort +after ever new objects of desire which give no +permanent satisfaction; and this view, becoming +predominant, determined, not indeed all the ideas +of his philosophy, but its general complexion as +a 'philosophy of redemption.'</p> + +<p>With his pessimism, personal misfortunes had +nothing to do. He was, and always recognised +that he was, among the most fortunately placed +of mankind. He does not hesitate to speak +sometimes of his own happiness in complete +freedom from the need to apply himself to any +compulsory occupation. This freedom, as he has +put gratefully on record, he owed to his father, +Heinrich Floris Schopenhauer, who was a rich +merchant of Danzig, where the philosopher was +born on the 22nd of February 1788. Both his +parents were of Dutch ancestry. His mother, +Johanna Schopenhauer, won celebrity as a novelist; +and his sister, Adele, also displayed some +literary talent. Generalising from his own case, +Schopenhauer holds that men of intelligence +derive their character from their father and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_4" id="Page_4">[Pg 4]</a></span> +their intellect from their mother. With his +mother, however, he was not on sympathetic +terms, as may be read in the biographies. His +father intended him for a mercantile career, and +with this view began to prepare him from the +first to be a cosmopolitan man of the world. The +name of Arthur was given to him because it is +spelt alike in the leading European languages. +He was taken early to France, where he resided +from 1797 to 1799, learning French so well that +on his return he had almost forgotten his German. +Portions of the years 1803 to 1804 were spent +in England, France, Switzerland, and Austria. In +England he was three months at a Wimbledon +boarding-school kept by a clergyman. This experience +he found extremely irksome. He afterwards +became highly proficient in English: was +always pleased to be taken for an Englishman, +and regarded both the English character and +intelligence as on the whole the first in Europe; +but all the more deplorable did he find the oppressive +pietism which was the special form taken in +the England of that period by the reaction against +the French Revolution. He is never tired of +denouncing that phase of 'cold superstition,' +the dominance of which lasted during his lifetime; +for the publication of Mill's <i>Liberty</i> and of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_5" id="Page_5">[Pg 5]</a></span> +Darwin's <i>Origin of Species</i>, which may be considered +as marking the close of it, came only the +year before his death.</p> + +<p>The only real break in the conformity of +Schopenhauer's circumstances to his future career +came in 1805, when he was placed in a merchant's +office at Hamburg, whither his father had +migrated in disgust at the annexation of his +native Danzig, then under a republican constitution +of its own, by Prussia in 1793. Soon +afterwards his father died; but out of loyalty he +tried for some time longer to reconcile himself +to commercial life. Finding this at length impossible, +he gained permission from his mother, +in 1807, to leave the office for the gymnasium. +At this time he seems to have begun his classical +studies, his education having hitherto been exclusively +modern. They were carried on first at +Gotha and then at Weimar. In 1809 he entered +the university of Göttingen as a student of +medicine. This, however, was with a view only +to scientific studies, not to practice; and he transferred +himself to the philosophical faculty in +1810. Generally he was little regardful of +academical authority. His father's deliberately +adopted plan of letting him mix early with the +world had given him a certain independence of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_6" id="Page_6">[Pg 6]</a></span> +judgment. At Göttingen, however, he received +an important influence from his teacher, G. E. +Schulze (known by the revived scepticism of +his <i>Ænesidemus</i>), who advised him to study Plato +and Kant before Aristotle and Spinoza. From +1811 to 1813 he was at Berlin, where he heard +Fichte, but was not impressed. In 1813 the +degree of Doctor of Philosophy was conferred on +him at Jena for the dissertation <i>On the Fourfold +Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason</i> +(<i>Ueber die vierfache Wurzel des Satzes vom zureichenden +Grunde</i>, 2nd ed., 1847). This was the +first result of his Kantian studies. In the same +year he began to be acquainted with Goethe at +Weimar, where his mother and sister had gone +to reside in 1806. A consequence of this +acquaintance was that he took up and further +developed Goethe's theory of colours. His dissertation +<i>Ueber das Sehen und die Farben</i> was +published in 1816. A second edition did not +appear till 1854; but in the meantime he had +published a restatement of his doctrine in Latin, +entitled <i>Theoria Colorum Physiologica</i> (1830). +This, however, was an outlying part of his work. +He had already been seized by the impulse to +set forth the system of philosophy that took +shape in him, as he says, by some formative<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_7" id="Page_7">[Pg 7]</a></span> +process of which he could give no conscious +account. His great work, <i>Die Welt als Wille +und Vorstellung</i>, was ready for publication +before the end of 1818, and was published with +the date 1819. Thus he is one of the most +precocious philosophers on record. For in that +single volume, written before he was thirty, the +outlines of his whole system are fixed. There +is some development later, and there are endless +new applications and essays towards confirmation +from all sources. His mind never rested, +and his literary power gained by exercise. Still, +it has been said with truth, that there never +was a greater illusion than when he thought that +he seldom repeated himself. In reality he did +little but repeat his fundamental positions with +infinite variations in expression.</p> + +<p>After completing his chief work, Schopenhauer +wrote some verses in which he predicted +that posterity would erect a monument to him. +This prediction was fulfilled in 1895; but, for the +time, the work which he never doubted would +be his enduring title to fame seemed, like Hume's +<i>Treatise</i>, to have fallen 'deadborn from the press.' +This he attributed to the hostility of the academical +philosophers; and, in his later works, attacks +on the university professors form a characteristic<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_8" id="Page_8">[Pg 8]</a></span> +feature. The official teachers of the Hegelian +school, he declared, were bent only on obtaining +positions for themselves by an appearance of +supporting Christian dogma; and they resented +openness on the part of any one else. +Yet on one side he maintained that his own +pessimism was more truly Christian than their +optimism. The essential spirit of Christianity is +that of Brahmanism and Buddhism, the great +religions that sprang from India, the first home +of our race. He is even inclined to see in it +traces of Indian influence. What vitiates it in +his eyes is the Jewish element, which finds its +expression in the flat modern 'Protestant-rationalistic +optimism.' As optimistic religions, he +groups together Judaism, Islam, and Græco-Roman +Polytheism. His antipathy, however, +only extends to the two former. He was himself +in great part a child of Humanism and of the +eighteenth century, rejoicing over the approaching +downfall of all the faiths, and holding that +a weak religion (entirely different from those he +admires) is favourable to civilisation. Nothing +can exceed his scorn for nearly everything that +characterised the Middle Ages. With Catholicism +as a political system he has no sympathy +whatever; while on the religious side the Pro<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_9" id="Page_9">[Pg 9]</a></span>testant +are as sympathetic to him as the Catholic +mystics. What is common to all priesthoods, +he holds, is to exploit the metaphysical need of +mankind (in which he also believes) for the sake +of their own power. Clericalism, 'Pfaffenthum,' +whether Catholic or Protestant, is the object of +his unvarying hatred and contempt. If he had +cared to appreciate Hegel, he would have found +on this point much community of spirit; but of +course there was a real antithesis between the +two as philosophers. No 'conspiracy' need be +invoked to explain the failure of Schopenhauer +to win early recognition. Belief in the State and +in progress was quite alien to him; and Germany +was then full of political hopes, which found +nourishment in optimistic pantheism. What at +length gave his philosophy vogue was the collapse +of this enthusiasm on the failure of the revolutionary +movement in 1848. Once known, it +contained enough of permanent value to secure +it from again passing out of sight with the next +change of fashion.</p> + +<p>The rest of Schopenhauer's life in its external +relations may be briefly summed up. For a few +years, it was diversified by travels in Italy and +elsewhere, and by an unsuccessful attempt at +academical teaching in Berlin. In 1831 he<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_10" id="Page_10">[Pg 10]</a></span> +moved to Frankfort, where he finally settled +in 1833. He lived unmarried there till his death +on the 21st of September 1860. The monument, +already spoken of, was unveiled at Frankfort on +the 6th of June 1895.</p> + +<p>The almost unbroken silence with which his +great work was received, though it had a distempering +effect on the man, did not discourage +the thinker. The whole series of Schopenhauer's +works, indeed, was completed before he attained +anything that could be called fame. Constantly +on the alert as he was to seize upon confirmations +of his system, he published in 1836 his short +work <i>On the Will in Nature</i>, pointing out verifications +of his metaphysics by recent science. In +1839 his prize essay, <i>On the Freedom of the Human +Will</i> (finished in 1837), was crowned by the Royal +Scientific Society of Drontheim in Norway. This +and another essay, <i>On the Basis of Morality</i>, <i>not</i> +crowned by the Royal Danish Society of Copenhagen +in 1840, he published in 1841, with the +inclusive title, <i>Die beiden Grundprobleme der +Ethik</i>. In 1844 appeared the second edition of +his principal work, to which there was added, +in the form of a second volume, a series of +elucidations and extensions larger in bulk than +the first. This new volume contains much of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_11" id="Page_11">[Pg 11]</a></span> +his best and most effective writing. His last +work, <i>Parerga und Paralipomena</i>, which appeared +in 1851 (2 vols.), is from the literary point +of view the most brilliant. It was only from this +time that he began to be well known among the +general public; though the philosophic 'apostolate' +of Julius Frauenstädt, who afterwards +edited his works, had begun in 1840. His activity +was henceforth confined to modifying and extending +his works for new editions; an employment +in which he was always assiduous. In +consequence of this, all of them, as they stand, +contain references from one to another; but the +development of his thinking, so far as there was +such a process after 1818, can be easily traced +without reference to the earlier editions. There +is some growth; but, as has been said, it does not +affect many of the chief points. A brief exposition +of his philosophy can on the whole take it as +something fixed. The heads under which it must +fall are those assigned to the original four books +of <i>Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung</i>.</p> + +<p>Although Schopenhauer discountenanced the +attempt to connect a philosophers biography +with his work, something has to be said about +his character, since this has been dwelt on to his +disadvantage by opponents. There is abundant<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_12" id="Page_12">[Pg 12]</a></span> +material for a personal estimate in the correspondence +and reminiscences published after his +death by his disciples Julius Frauenstädt and +Wilhelm Gwinner. The apparent contradiction +is at once obvious between the ascetic consummation +of his ethics and his unascetic life, +carefully occupied in its latter part with rules for +the preservation of his naturally robust health. +He was quite aware of this, but holds it absurd +to require that a moralist should commend only +the virtues which he possesses. It is as if the +requirement were set up that a sculptor is to be +himself a model of beauty. A saint need not be +a philosopher, nor a philosopher a saint. The +science of morals is as theoretical as any other +branch of philosophy. Fundamentally character +is unmodifiable, though knowledge, it is allowed, +may change the mode of action within the limits +of the particular character. The passage to the +state of asceticism cannot be effected by moral +philosophy, but depends on a kind of 'grace.' +After all, it might be replied, philosophers, +whether they succeed or not, do usually make +at least an attempt to live in accordance with +the moral ideal they set up. The best apology +in Schopenhauer's case is that the fault may +have been as much in his ideal as in his failure<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_13" id="Page_13">[Pg 13]</a></span> +to conform to it. The eloquent pages he has +devoted to the subject of holiness only make +manifest the inconsequence (which he admits) +in the passage to it. For, as we shall see, this +has nothing in common with the essentially +rational asceticism of the schools of later antiquity; +which was a rule of self-limitation in view of the +philosophic life. He did in a way of his own +practise something of this; and, on occasion, he +sets forth the theory of it; but he quite clearly +sees the difference. His own ideal, which he +never attempted to practise, is that of the self-torturing +ascetics of the Christian Middle Age. +Within the range of properly human virtue, he +can in many respects hold his own, not only as +a philosopher but as a man. If his egoism and +vanity are undeniable, he undoubtedly possessed +the virtues of rectitude and compassion. What +he would have especially laid stress on was the +conscientious devotion to his work. With complete +singleness of purpose he used for a disinterested +end the leisure which he regarded as the most fortunate +of endowments. As he said near the close +of his life, his intellectual conscience was clear.</p> + +<p>Of Schopenhauer's expositions of his pessimism +it would be true to say, as Spinoza says of the +Book of Job, that the matter, like the style, is not<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_14" id="Page_14">[Pg 14]</a></span> +that of a man sitting among the ashes, but of one +meditating in a library. This of course does not +prove that they are not a genuine, if one-sided, +rendering of human experience. All that can be +said is that they did not turn him away from +appreciation of the apparent goods of life. His +own practical principle was furnished by what he +regarded as a lower point of view; and this gives +its direction to the semi-popular philosophy of +the <i>Parerga</i>. From what he takes to be the +higher point of view, the belief that happiness is +attainable by man on earth is an illusion; but he +holds that, by keeping steadily in view a kind of +tempered happiness as the end, many mistakes +may be avoided in the conduct of life, provided +that each recognises at once the strength and +weakness of his own character, and does not +attempt things that, with the given limitations, +are impossible. Of the highest truth, as he conceived +it, he could therefore make no use. Only +by means of a truth that he was bound to hold +half-illusory could a working scheme be constructed +for himself and others. This result may give us +guidance in seeking to learn what we can from +a thinker who is in reality no representative of a +decadence, but is fundamentally sane and rational, +even in spite of himself.</p><hr class="chap" /><p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_15" id="Page_15">[Pg 15]</a></span></p> + + + + +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_II" id="CHAPTER_II"></a>CHAPTER II</h2> + +<h3>THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE</h3> + +<p>The title of Schopenhauer's chief work is rendered +in the English translation, <i>The World as +Will and Idea</i>. Here the term 'idea' is used in +the sense it had for Locke and Berkeley; namely, +any object of mental activity. Thus it includes +not merely imagery, but also perception. Since +Hume distinguished ideas' from 'impressions,' +it has tended to be specialised in the former +sense. The German word, <i>Vorstellung</i>, which it +is used to render, conveys the generalised meaning +of the Lockian 'idea,' now frequently expressed +in English and French philosophical works by the +more technical term 'presentation' or 'representation.' +By Schopenhauer himself the word +'Idea' was used exclusively in the sense of the +Platonic Idea, which, as we shall see, plays an +important part in his philosophy. The distinction +is preserved in the translation by the use of +a capital when Idea has the latter meaning; but<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_16" id="Page_16">[Pg 16]</a></span> +in a brief exposition it seems convenient to adopt +a more technical rendering of <i>Vorstellung</i>; and, +from its common employment in psychological +text-books, I have selected 'presentation' as the +most suitable.</p> + +<p>The first proposition of Schopenhauer's philosophical +system is, 'The world is my presentation.' +By this he means that it presents itself as appearance +to the knowing subject. This appearance is +in the forms of time, space and causality. Under +these forms every phenomenon necessarily +appears, because they are <i>a priori</i> forms of the +subject. The world as it presents itself consists +entirely of phenomena, that is, appearances, +related according to these forms. The most fundamental +form of all is the relation between object +and subject, which is implied in all of them. +Without a subject there can be no presented +object.</p> + +<p>Schopenhauer is therefore an idealist in the +sense in which we call Berkeley's theory of the +external world idealism; though the expressions +used are to some extent different. The difference +proceeds from his following of Kant. His Kantianism +consists in the recognition of <i>a priori</i> +forms by which the subject constructs for itself an +'objective' world of appearances. With Berkeley<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_17" id="Page_17">[Pg 17]</a></span> +he agrees as against Kant in not admitting +any residue whatever, in the object as such, that +is not wholly appearance. But while he allows +that Berkeley, as regards the general formulation +of idealism, was more consistent than Kant, he +finds him, in working out the principle, altogether +inadequate. For the modern mind there is henceforth +no way in philosophy except through Kant, +from whom dates the revolution by which scholastic +dualism was finally overthrown. Kant's +systematic construction, however, he in effect +reduces to very little. His is a much simplified +'Apriorism.' While accepting the 'forms of sensible +intuition,' that is, time and space, just as +Kant sets them forth, he clears away nearly all +the superimposed mechanism. Kant's 'Transcendental +Æsthetic,' he says, was a real discovery in +metaphysics; but on the basis of this he for the +most part only gave free play to his architectonic +impulse. Of the twelve 'categories of the understanding,' +which he professed to derive from the +logical forms of judgment, all except causality are +mere 'blind windows.' This alone, therefore, +Schopenhauer adopts; placing it, however, not at +a higher level but side by side with time and +space, Kant's forms of intuition. These three +forms, according to Schopenhauer, make up the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_18" id="Page_18">[Pg 18]</a></span> +understanding of men and animals. 'All intuition +is intellectual.' It is not first mere appearance +related in space and time, and waiting for understanding +to organise it; but, in animals as in +man, it is put in order at once under the three +forms that suffice to explain the knowledge all +have of the phenomenal world.</p> + +<p>To Reason as distinguished from Understanding, +Schopenhauer assigns no such exalted function as +was attributed to it in portions of his system by +Kant, and still more by some of his successors. +The name of 'reason,' he maintains, ought on +etymological grounds to be restricted to the faculty +of abstract concepts. This, and not understanding, +is what distinguishes man from animals. It +discovers and invents nothing, but it puts in a +generalised and available form what the understanding +has discovered in intuition.</p> + +<p>For the historical estimation of Schopenhauer, +it is necessary to place him in relation to Kant, +as he himself always insisted. Much also in his +chief work is made clearer by knowledge of his +dissertation <i>On the Fourfold Root of the Principle +of Sufficient Reason</i>, to which he is constantly +referring. Later, his manner of exposition became +more independent; so that he can be read by the +general reader with profit simply by himself, and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_19" id="Page_19">[Pg 19]</a></span> +without reference to antecedents. Still, it will +always be advisable for an expositor to follow his +directions, at least to the extent of giving some +short account of the dissertation. This I proceed +to give approximately in the place to which he +has assigned it in his system.</p> + +<p>The name of the principle (<i>principium rationis +sufficientis</i>) he took over from Leibniz and his +successor Wolff, but gave it a new amplitude. +With him, it stands as an inclusive term for four +modes of connection by which the thoroughgoing +relativity of phenomena to one another is constituted +for our intelligence. The general statement +adopted is, 'Nothing is without a reason +why it should be rather than not be.' Its four +forms are the principles of becoming (<i>fiendi</i>), of +knowing (<i>cognoscendi</i>), of being (<i>essendi</i>), and +of acting (<i>agendi</i>). (1) Under the first head +come 'causes.' These are divided into 'cause +proper,' for inorganic things; 'stimulus,' for the +vegetative life both of plants and animals, and +'motive,' for animals and men. The law of causation +is applicable only to changes; not to the +forces of nature, to matter, or to the world as a +whole, which are perdurable. Cause precedes +effect in time. Not one thing, but one state of a +thing, is the cause of another. From the law of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_20" id="Page_20">[Pg 20]</a></span> +causation there results an infinite series <i>a parte +ante</i> as well as <i>a parte post</i>. (2) The principle of +sufficient reason of knowing is applicable to concepts, which +are all derived from intuition, that +is, from percepts. The laws of logic, which come +under this head, can yield nothing original, but +can only render explicit what was in the understanding. +(3) Under the third head come arithmetical +and geometrical relations. These are +peculiar relations of presentations, distinct from +all others, and only intelligible in virtue of a pure +<i>a priori</i> intuition. For geometry this is space; +for arithmetic time, in which counting goes on. +Scientifically, arithmetic is fundamental. (4) As +the third form of causality was enumerated +'motive' for the will; but in that classification it +was viewed from without, as belonging to the +world of objects. Through the direct knowledge +we have of our own will, we know also from +within this determination by the presentation we +call a motive. Hence emerges the fourth form of +the principle of sufficient reason. This at a later +stage makes possible the transition from physics +to metaphysics.</p> + +<p>All these forms alike are forms of necessary +determination. Necessity has no clear and true +sense but certainty of the consequence when the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_21" id="Page_21">[Pg 21]</a></span> +ground is posited. All necessity therefore is conditional. +In accordance with the four expressions +of the principle of sufficient reason, it takes the +fourfold shape of physical, logical, mathematical, +and moral necessity.</p> + +<p>The sharp distinction between logical and +mathematical truth, with the assignment of the +former to conceptual and of the latter to intuitive +relations, comes to Schopenhauer directly from +Kant. So also does his view that the necessary +form of causation is sequence; though here his +points of contact with English thinkers, earlier +and later, are very marked. Only in his statement +of the 'law of motivation' as 'causality seen +from within' does he hint at his own distinctive +metaphysical doctrine. Meanwhile, it is evident +that he is to be numbered with the group of +modern thinkers who have arrived in one way or +another at a complete scientific phenomenism. +Expositors have noted that in his earlier statements +of this he tends to lay more stress on the +character of the visible and tangible world as +mere appearance. The impermanence, the +relativity, of all that exists in time and space, +leads him to describe it, in a favourite term +borrowed from Indian philosophy, as Maya, or +illusion. Later, he dwells more on the relative<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_22" id="Page_22">[Pg 22]</a></span> +reality of things as they appear. His position, +however, does not essentially alter, but only finds +varying expression as he turns more to the +scientific or to the metaphysical side. From +Hume's view on causation he differs not by +opposing its pure phenomenism, but only by +recognising, as Kant does, an <i>a priori</i> element in +the form of its law. German critics have seen in +his own formulation an anticipation of Mill, and +this is certainly striking as regards the general +conception of the causal order, although there is +no anticipation of Mill's inductive logic. On the +same side there is a close agreement with Malebranche +and the Occasionalists, pointed out by +Schopenhauer himself. The causal explanations +of science, he is at one with them in insisting, +give no ultimate account of anything. All its +causes are no more than 'occasional causes,'—merely +instances, as Mill expressed it afterwards, +of 'invariable and unconditional sequence.' From +Mill of course he differs in holding its form to be +necessary and <i>a priori</i>, not ultimately derived +from a summation of experiences; and, with the +Occasionalists, he goes on to metaphysics in its +sense of ontology, as Mill never did. The difference +here is that he does not clothe his metaphysics +in a theological dress.</p><p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_23" id="Page_23">[Pg 23]</a></span></p> + +<p>In the later development of his thought, +Schopenhauer dealt more expressly with the +question, how this kind of phenomenism is +reconcilable with a scientific cosmogony. On one +side the proposition, 'No object without subject,' +makes materialism for ever impossible; for the +materialist tries to explain from relations among +presentations what is the condition of all presentation. +On the other side, we are all compelled +to agree with the materialists that knowledge of +the object comes late in a long series of material +events. Inorganic things existed in time before +life; vegetative life before animal life; and only +with animal life does knowledge emerge. +Reasoned knowledge of the whole series comes +only at the end of it in the human mind. This +apparent contradiction he solves by leaving a +place for metaphysics. Our representation of the +world as it existed before the appearance of life +was indeed non-existent at the time to which we +assign it; but the real being of the world had +a manifestation not imaginable by us. For this, +we substitute a picture of a world such as we +should have been aware of had our 'subject,' with +its <i>a priori</i> forms of time, space, and causality, +been then present. What the reality is, is the +problem of the thing-in-itself (to use the Kantian<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_24" id="Page_24">[Pg 24]</a></span> +term). This problem remains over; but we know +that the metaphysical reality cannot be matter; +for matter, with all its qualities, is phenomenal. +It exists only 'for understanding, through understanding, +in understanding.' These discriminations +made, Schopenhauer offers us a scientific +cosmogony beginning with the nebular hypothesis +and ending with an outline of organic evolution. +This last differs from the Darwinian theory in +supposing a production of species by definite steps +instead of by accumulation of small individual +variations. At a certain time, a form that has all +the characters of a new species appears among +the progeny of an existing species. Man is the +last and highest form to be evolved. From +Schopenhauer's metaphysics, as we shall see, it +follows that no higher form of life will ever +appear.</p> + +<p>A word may be said here on a materialistic-sounding +phrase which is very prominent in +Schopenhauer's later expositions, and has been +remarked on as paradoxical for an idealist. The +world as presentation, he often says, is 'in the +brain.' This, it must be allowed, is not fully +defensible from his own point of view, except +with the aid of a later distinction. The brain as +we know it is of course only a part of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_25" id="Page_25">[Pg 25]</a></span> +phenomenon of the subject,—a grouping of +possible perceptions. How then, since it is itself +only appearance, can it be the bearer of the whole +universe as appearance? The answer is that +Schopenhauer meant in reality 'the being of the +brain,' and not the brain as phenomenon. He +had a growing sense of the importance of +physiology for the investigation of mind; and +his predilection led him to adopt a not quite +satisfactory shorthand expression for the correspondence +we know scientifically to exist between +our mental processes and changes capable of +objective investigation in the matter of the +brain.</p> + +<p>In science his distinctive bent was to the +borderland between psychology and physiology. +Hence came the attraction exercised on him by +Goethe's theory of colours. To his own theory, +though, unlike his philosophical system, it has +always failed to gain the attention he predicted +for it, the merit must be allowed of treating the +problem as essentially one of psychophysics. +What he does is to attempt to ascertain the +conditions in the sensibility of the retina that +account for our actual colour-sensations. This +problem was untouched by the Newtonian +theory; but Schopenhauer followed Goethe in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_26" id="Page_26">[Pg 26]</a></span> +the error of trying to overthrow this on its own +ground. He had no aptitude for the special +inquiries of mathematics and physics, though he +had gained a clear insight into their general +nature as sciences. On the psycho-physical side +there is to-day no fully authorised theory. The +problem indeed has become ever more complex. +Schopenhauer's attempt, by combination of sensibilities +to 'light' and 'darkness,' to explain the +phenomena of complementary colours, deserves +at least a record in the long series of essays of +which the best known are the 'Young-Helmholtz +theory' and that of Hering. It marks an indubitable +advance on Goethe in the clear distinction +drawn between the mixture, in the ordinary +sense, that can only result in dilution to different +shades of grey, and the kinds of mixture from +which, in their view, true colours arise.</p> + +<p>A characteristic position in Schopenhauer's +theory of knowledge, and one that is constantly +finding new expression in his writings, is the +distinction between abstract and intuitive knowledge already +touched on. Intuitive knowledge +of the kind that is common to men and animals, +as we have seen, makes up, in his terminology, +the 'understanding'; while 'reason' is the distinctively +human faculty of concepts. When he<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_27" id="Page_27">[Pg 27]</a></span> +depreciates this, as he often does, in comparison +with 'intuition,' it must be remembered that he +does not limit this term to perception of particulars, +but ascribes to what he calls the +'Platonic Idea' a certain kind of union between +reason and 'phantasy,' which gives it an intuitive +character of its own. Thus intuition can stand, +though not in every case for what is higher, yet +always for that which is wider and greater and +more immediate. Whatever may be done with +reflective reason and its abstractions, every +effectual process of thought must end, alike for +knowledge and art and virtue, in some intuitive +presentation. The importance of reason for +practice is due to its generality. Its function is +subordinate. It does not furnish the ground of +virtuous action any more than æsthetic precepts +can enable any one to produce a work of art; +but it can help to preserve constancy to certain +maxims, as also in art a reasoned plan is necessary +because the inspiration of genius is not every +moment at command. Virtue and artistic genius +alike, however, depend ultimately on intuition: +and so also does every true discovery in science. +The nature of pedantry is to try to be guided +everywhere by concepts, and to trust nothing to +perception in the particular case. Philosophy<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_28" id="Page_28">[Pg 28]</a></span> +also Schopenhauer regards as depending ultimately +on a certain intuitive view; but he allows +that it has to translate this into abstractions. +Its problem is to express the <i>what</i> of the world +in abstract form: science dealing only with the +<i>why</i> of phenomena related within the world. +This character of philosophy as a system of +abstract concepts deprives it of the immediate +attractiveness of art; so that, as he says in one +place, it is more fortunate to be a poet than a +philosopher.</p><hr class="chap" /><p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_29" id="Page_29">[Pg 29]</a></span></p> + + + + +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_III" id="CHAPTER_III"></a>CHAPTER III</h2> + +<h3>METAPHYSICS OF THE WILL</h3> + + +<p>We have seen that scientific explanation does +not go beyond presentations ordered in space and +time. This is just as true of the sciences of +causation—the 'ætiological' sciences—as it is of +mathematical science. All that we learn from +Mechanics, Physics, Chemistry and Physiology, +is 'how, in accordance with an infallible rule, +one determinate state of matter necessarily +follows another: how a determinate change +necessarily conditions and brings on another +determinate change.' This knowledge does not +satisfy us. We wish to learn the significance of +phenomena; but we find that from outside, while +we view them as presentations, their inner meaning +is for ever inaccessible.</p> + +<p>The starting-point for the metaphysical knowledge +we seek is given us in our own body. The +animal body is 'the immediate object of the +subject': in it as presentation the 'effects' of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_30" id="Page_30">[Pg 30]</a></span> +'causes' in the order of presentations external +to it are first recognised. Now in virtue of his +body the investigator is not pure knowing +subject standing apart from that which he knows. +In the case of the particular system of presentations +constituting his organism, he knows what +these presentations signify, and that is his <i>will</i> +in a certain modification. The subject appears +as individual through its identity with the +body, and this body is given to it in two different +ways: on one side as object among objects, and +subjected to their laws; on the other side as the +will immediately known to each. The act of +will and the movement of the body are not two +different states related as cause and effect; for +the relation of cause and effect belongs only to +the object, the phenomenon, the presentation. +They are one and the same act given in different +manners: the will, immediately to the subject; +the movement, in sensible intuition for understanding. +The action of the body is the objectified +act of will. Called at first the immediate +object of presentation, the body may +now, from the other side, be called 'the objectivity +of the will.'</p> + +<p>Thus, as was said, the 'law of motivation' +discloses the inner nature of causality. In<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_31" id="Page_31">[Pg 31]</a></span> +causality in general we know only relations of +phenomena; but in the case of our own body we +know something else that those relations express; +namely, the act of will determined by motives. +Now there are in the world as presentation other +systems like that which we call our body. Unless +all these are to be supposed mere phantoms without +inner reality, we must infer by analogy, in +correspondence with like phenomena, other individual +wills similar to that which we know in ourselves. +This inference from analogy, universally +admitted in the case of human and animal bodies, +must be extended to the whole corporeal world. +The failure to take this step is where the purely +intellectual forms of idealism have come short. +Kant's 'thing-in-itself,' which is not subject to +the forms by which presentations become experience, +but which experience and its forms indicate +as the reality, has been wrongly condemned by +his successors as alien to idealism. It is true +that Kant did in some respects fail to maintain +the idealistic position with the clearness of +Berkeley; but his shortcoming was not in affirming +a thing-in-itself beyond phenomena. Here, +in Schopenhauer's view, is the metaphysical +problem that he left a place for but did not solve. +The word of the riddle has now been pronounced.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_32" id="Page_32">[Pg 32]</a></span> +Beyond presentation, that is, in itself and according +to its innermost essence, the world is that +which we find in ourselves immediately as will. +By this it is not meant that a falling stone, for +example, acts from a motive; knowledge and the +consequent action from motives belongs only to +the determinate form that the will has in animals +and men; but the reality in the stone also is the +same in essence as that to which we apply the +name of will in ourselves. He who possesses this +key to the knowledge of nature's innermost +being will interpret the forces of vegetation, of +crystallisation, of magnetism, of chemical affinity, +even of weight itself, as different only in phenomenal +manifestation but in essence the same; +namely, that which is better known to each than +all else, and where it emerges most clearly is +called will. Only the will is thing-in-itself. It is +wholly different from presentation, and is that of +which presentation is the phenomenon, the visibility, +the objectivity. Differences affect only the +degree of the appearing, not the essence of that +which appears.</p> + +<p>While the reality everywhere present is not +will as specifically known in man, the mode +of indicating its essence by reference to this, +Schopenhauer contends, is a gain in insight. The<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_33" id="Page_33">[Pg 33]</a></span> +thing-in-itself ought to receive its name from +that among all its manifestations which is the +clearest, the most perfect, the most immediately +illumined by knowledge; and this is man's will. +When we say that every force in nature is to be +thought of as Will, we are subsuming an unknown +under a known. For the conception of Force is +abstracted from the realm of cause and effect, +and indicates the limit of scientific explanation. +Having arrived at the forces of nature on the one +side and the forms of the subject on the other, +science can go no further. The conception of +Will can make known that which was so far concealed, +because it proceeds from the most intimate +consciousness that each has of himself, where the +knower and the known coincide.</p> + +<p>By this consciousness, in which subject and +object are not yet set apart, we reach something +universal. In itself the Will is not individualised, +but exists whole and undivided in every single +thing in nature, as the Subject of contemplation +exists whole and undivided in each cognitive +being. It is entirely free from all forms of the +phenomenon. What makes plurality possible is +subjection to the forms of time and space, by +which only the phenomenon is affected. Time +and space may therefore be called, in scholastic<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_34" id="Page_34">[Pg 34]</a></span> +terminology, the 'principle of individuation.' +While each of its phenomena is subject to the +law of sufficient reason, which is the law of +appearance in these forms, there is for the Will as +thing-in-itself no rational ground: it is 'grundlos.' +It is free from all plurality, although its phenomena +in space and time are innumerable. It is +one, not with the unity of an object or of a concept, +but as that which lies outside of space and +time, beyond the <i>principium individuationis</i>, +that is, the possibility of plurality. The individual, +the person, is not will as thing-in-itself, +but phenomenon of the will, and as such determined. +The will is 'free' because there is +nothing beyond itself to determine it. Further, +it is in itself mere activity without end, a blind +striving. Knowledge appears only as the accompaniment +of its ascending stages.</p> + +<p>Here we have arrived at the thought which, in +its various expressions, constitutes Schopenhauer's +metaphysics. That this cannot be scientifically +deduced he admits; but he regards it as +furnishing such explanation as is possible of +science itself. For science there is in everything +an inexplicable element to which it runs back, +and which is real, not merely phenomenal. From +this reality we are most remote in pure mathe<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_35" id="Page_35">[Pg 35]</a></span>matics +and in the pure <i>a priori</i> science of nature +as it was formulated by Kant. These owe their +transparent clearness precisely to their absence of +real content, or to the slightness of this. The +attempt to reduce organic life to chemistry, this +again to mechanism, and at last everything to +arithmetic, could it succeed, would leave mere +form behind, from which all the content of phenomena +would have vanished. And the form would +in the end be form of the subject. But the enterprise +is vain. 'For in everything in nature there +is something of which no ground can ever be +given, of which no explanation is possible, no +cause further is to be sought.' What for man is +his inexplicable character, presupposed in every +explanation of his deeds from motives, that for +every inorganic body is its inexplicable quality, +the manner of its acting.</p> + +<p>The basis of this too is will, and 'groundless,' +inexplicable will; but evidently the conception +here is not identical with that of the Will that is +one and all. How do we pass from the universal +to that which has a particular character or +quality? For of the Will as thing-in-itself we are +told that there is not a greater portion in a man +and a less in a stone. The relation of part and +whole belongs exclusively to space. The more<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_36" id="Page_36">[Pg 36]</a></span> +and less touches only the phenomenon, that is, +the visibility, the objectivation. A higher degree +of this is in the plant than in the stone, in the +animal than in the plant, and so forth; but the +Will that is the essence of all is untouched by +degree, as it is beyond plurality, space and time, +and the relation of cause and effect.</p> + +<p>The answer to the question here raised is given +in Schopenhauer's interpretation of the Platonic +Ideas. These he regards as stages of objectivation +of the Will. They are, as Plato called them, +eternal forms related to particular things as +models. The lowest stage of objectivation of the +Will is represented by the forces of inorganic +nature. Some of these, such as weight and impenetrability, +appear in all matter. Some are +divided among its different kinds, as rigidity, +fluidity, elasticity, electricity, magnetism, chemical +properties. They are not subject to the +relation of cause and effect, but are presupposed +by it. A force is neither cause of an effect nor +effect of a cause. Philosophically, it is immediate +objectivity of the will; in ætiology, <i>qualitas +occulta</i>. At the lowest stages of objectivation, +there is no individuality. This does not appear +in inorganic things, nor even in merely organic +or vegetative life, but only as we ascend the scale<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_37" id="Page_37">[Pg 37]</a></span> +of animals. Even in the higher animals the +specific enormously predominates over the individual +character. Only in man is the Idea +objectified in the individual character as such. +'The character of each individual man, so far as +it is thoroughly individual and not entirely comprehended +in that of the species, may be regarded +as a particular Idea, corresponding to a peculiar +act of objectivation of the Will.'</p> + +<p>Schopenhauer warns us against substituting +this philosophical explanation for scientific ætiology. +The chain of causes and effects, he points +out, is not broken by the differences of the +original, irreducible forces. The ætiology and +the philosophy of nature go side by side, regarding +the same object from different points of view. +Yet he also gives us in relation to his philosophy +much that is not unsuggestive scientifically. +His doctrine is not properly evolutionary, since +the Ideas are eternal; but he has guarded incidentally +against our supposing that all the +natural kinds that manifest the Ideas phenomenally +must be always represented in every world. +For our particular world, comprising the sun and +planets of the solar system, he sets forth in the +<i>Parerga</i> an account of the process by which it +develops from the nebula to man. This was<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_38" id="Page_38">[Pg 38]</a></span> +referred to in the preceding chapter. In his +fundamental work he describes a struggle, +present through the whole of nature, in which +the phenomenal manifestations of the higher +Ideas conquer and subjugate those of the lower, +though they leave them still existent and ever +striving to get loose. Here has been seen an +adumbration of natural selection: he himself +admits the difficulty he has in making it clear. +We must remember that it is pre-Darwinian.</p> + +<p>Knowledge or intelligence he seeks to explain +as an aid to the individual organism in its +struggle to subsist and to propagate its kind. It +first appears in animal life. It is represented by +the brain or a large ganglion, as every endeavour +of the Will in its self-objectivation is represented +by some organ; that is, displays itself for presentation +as such and such an appearance. +Superinduced along with this contrivance for +aid in the struggle, the world as presentation, +with all its forms, subject and object, time, space, +plurality and causality, is all at once there. +'Hitherto only will, it is now at the same time +presentation, object of the knowing subject.' +Then in man, as a higher power beyond merely +intuitive intelligence, appears reason as the power +of abstract conception. For the most part,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_39" id="Page_39">[Pg 39]</a></span> +rational as well as intuitive knowledge, evolved +originally as a mere means to higher objectivation +of the Will, remains wholly in its service. +How, in exceptional cases, intellect emancipates +itself, will be discussed under the heads of +Æsthetics and Ethics.</p> + +<p>That this view implies a teleology Schopenhauer +expressly recognises. Indeed he is a very +decided teleologist on lines of his own, and, in +physiology, takes sides strongly with 'vitalism' +as against pure mechanicism. True, the Will is +'endless' blind striving, and is essentially divided +against itself. Everywhere in nature there is +strife, and this takes the most horrible forms. +Yet somehow there is in each individual manifestation +of will a principle by which first the +organism with its vital processes, and then the +portion of it called the brain, in which is represented +the intellect with its <i>a priori</i> forms, are +evolved as aids in the strife. And, adapting all +the manifestations to one another, there is a +teleology of the universe. The whole world, with +all its phenomena, is the objectivity of the one +and indivisible Will; the Idea which is related +to all other Ideas as the harmony to the single +voices. The unity of the Will shows itself in the +unison of all its phenomena as related to one<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_40" id="Page_40">[Pg 40]</a></span> +another. Man, its clearest and completest objectivation, +is the summit of a pyramid, and could +not exist without this. Inorganic and organic +nature, then, were adapted to the future appearance +of man, as man is adapted to the development +that preceded him. But in thinking the +reality, time is to be abstracted from. The +earlier, we are obliged to say, is fitted to the +later, as the later is fitted to the earlier; but the +relation of means to end, under which we cannot +help figuring the adaptation, is only appearance +for our manner of knowledge. And the harmony +described does not get rid of the conflict inherent +in all will.</p> + +<p>In this account of Schopenhauer's metaphysical +doctrine, I have tried to make the exposition as +smooth as possible; but at two points the discontinuity +can scarcely be concealed. First, the +relation of the universal Will to the individual +will is not made clear; and, secondly, the emergence +of the world of presentation, with the +knowledge in which it culminates, is left unintelligible +because the will is conceived as mere +blind striving without an aim. As regards the +first point, disciples and expositors have been able +to show that, by means of distinctions in his later +writings, apparent contradictions are to some<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_41" id="Page_41">[Pg 41]</a></span> +extent cleared away; and, moreover, that he +came to recognise more reality in the individual +will. On the second point, I think it will be +necessary to admit that his system as such breaks +down. But both points must be considered in +their connection.</p> + +<p>One of the most noteworthy features of +Schopenhauer's philosophy is, as he himself +thought, the acceptance from first to last of Kant's +distinction between the 'empirical' and the 'intelligible' +character of the individual. Every act +of will of every human being follows with necessity +as phenomenon from its phenomenal causes; +so that all the events of each person's life are +determined in accordance with scientific law. +Nevertheless, the character empirically manifested +in the phenomenal world, while it is completely +necessitated, is the expression of something that +is free from necessitation. This 'intelligible +character' is out of time, and, itself undetermined, +manifests itself through that which develops in +time as a chain of necessary causes and effects. +That this doctrine had been taken up, without +any ambiguity as regards the determinism, by +Schelling as well as by himself, he expressly +acknowledges; and he finds it, as he also finds +modern idealism, anticipated in various passages<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_42" id="Page_42">[Pg 42]</a></span> +by the Neo-Platonists. His adaptation of it to +his doctrine of the Ideas is distinctly Neo-Platonic +in so far as he recognises 'Ideas of individuals'; +but of course to make Will the essence belongs to +his own system. 'The intelligible character,' he +says, 'coincides with the Idea, or, yet more precisely, +with the original act of will that manifests +itself in it: in so far, not only is the empirical +character of each man, but also of each animal +species, nay, of each plant species, and even of +each original force of inorganic nature, to be regarded +as phenomenon of an intelligible character, +that is, of an indivisible act of will out of time.' +This is what he called the '<i>aseitas</i>' of the will; +borrowing a scholastic term to indicate its derivation +(if we may speak of it as derived) from +itself (<i>a se</i>), and not from a supposed creative act. +Only if we adopt this view are we entitled to +regard actions as worthy of moral approval or +disapproval. They are such not because they are +not necessitated, but because they necessarily +show forth the nature of an essence the freedom +of which consists in being what it is. Yet he +could not but find a difficulty in reconciling this +with his position that the one universal Will is +identical in all things, and in each is 'individuated' +only by space and time. For the Ideas, like the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_43" id="Page_43">[Pg 43]</a></span> +thing-in-itself, are eternal, that is, outside of time +as well as space; and all the things now enumerated, +forces of nature, plant and animal species, +and individual characters of men, are declared to +be in themselves Ideas.</p> + +<p>He in part meets this difficulty by the subtlety +that time and space do not, strictly speaking, +determine individuality, but arise along with it. +The diremption of individualities becomes explicit +in those forms. Yet he must have perceived that +this is not a complete answer, and various modifications +can be seen going on. His first view +clearly was that the individual is wholly impermanent, +and at death simply disappears; nothing +is left but the one Will and the universal Subject +of contemplation identical in all. Metempsychosis +is the best mythological rendering of what happens, +but it is no more. Later, he puts forward the not +very clearly defined theory of a 'palingenesia' by +which a particular will, but not the intellect that +formerly accompanied it, may reappear in the +phenomenal world. And the hospitality he +showed to stories of magic, clairvoyance, and +ghost-seeing, is scarcely compatible with the view +that the individual will is no more than a +phenomenal differentiation of the universal will. +A speculation (not put forward as anything more)<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_44" id="Page_44">[Pg 44]</a></span> +on the appearance of a special providence in the +destiny of the individual, points, as Professor +Volkelt has noted, to the idea of a guidance, not +from without, but by a kind of good daemon or +genius that is the ultimate reality of the person. +On all this we must not lay too much stress; but +there is certainly one passage that can only be +described as a definite concession that the individual +is real in a sense not at first allowed. +Individuality, it is said in so many words +(<i>Parerga</i>, ii. § 117), does not rest only on the +'principle of individuation' (time and space), and +is therefore not through and through phenomenon, +but is rooted in the thing-in-itself. 'How deep +its roots go belongs to the questions which I do +not undertake to answer.'<a name="FNanchor_1_1" id="FNanchor_1_1"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_1" class="fnanchor">[1]</a></p> + +<p>This tends to modify considerably, but does not +overthrow, Schopenhauer's original system. In +very general terms, he is in the number of the +'pantheistic' thinkers; and it is remarkable, on +examination, how these, in Europe at least, have +nearly always recognised in the end some permanent +reality in the individual. This is contrary +to first impressions: but the great names +may be cited of Plotinus, John Scotus Erigena, +Giordano Bruno, Spinoza (in Part v. of the <i>Ethics</i>),<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_45" id="Page_45">[Pg 45]</a></span> +and finally of Schopenhauer's special aversion, +Hegel, who has been supposed most unfavourable +of all to any recognition of individuality as real. +It is more true, Hegel maintains, that the individuality +determines its world than that it is +determined by it; and there is no explanation +why the determination should be such and such +except that the individuality was already what it +is.<a name="FNanchor_1_2" id="FNanchor_1_2"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_2" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> And, if Schopenhauer's more imaginative +speculations seek countenance from the side of +empiricism, there is nothing in them quite so +audacious as a speculation of J. S. Mill on disembodied +mind, thrown out during the time when +he was writing his <i>Logic</i>.<a name="FNanchor_2_3" id="FNanchor_2_3"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_3" class="fnanchor">[3]</a></p> + +<p>The association with pantheism Schopenhauer +accepts in principle, though the name is not congenial +to him. In his system the Will is one and +all, like the 'Deus' of Spinoza. The difference is +that, instead of ascribing perfection to the universe +that is its manifestation, he regards the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_46" id="Page_46">[Pg 46]</a></span> +production of a world as a lapse from which +redemption is to be sought. His doctrine has +been rightly described, in common with the predominant +philosophical doctrines of his period, +as a resultant of the deepened subjective analysis +brought by Kant into modern philosophy on the +one side, and of the return to Spinoza in the +quest for unity of principle on the other. Why, +then, it may be asked, are Fichte, Schelling, and +Hegel the constant objects of his attack? The +true explanation is not the merely external one, +that they were his successful rivals for public +favour, but is to be found in a real antithesis of +thought. Within the limits of the idealism they +all hold in common, Schopenhauer is at the +opposite pole. In spite of his attempt to incorporate +the Platonic Ideas, and in spite of his +following of Kant, whose 'intelligible world' was +in essence Platonic or neo-Platonic, he could find +no place in his system for a rational order at the +summit. Now this order was precisely what +Fichte and Hegel aimed at demonstrating. If +Schopenhauer is less unsympathetic in his +references to Schelling, that is because Schelling's +world-soul appeared to him to prefigure his own +attempt to discover in nature the manifestation +of a blindly striving will or feeling rather than<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_47" id="Page_47">[Pg 47]</a></span> +reason. Suspicious as he shows himself of +possible plagiarisms by others, the charge cannot +be retorted against himself. The supreme principle +of Fichte, it has been pointed out, has an +actively volitional character and was formulated +before Schopenhauer's: but then it is essentially +rational. For Hegel, what is supreme is the +world-reason. Hence they are at one with Plato +in holding that in some sense 'mind is king.' +For Schopenhauer, on the contrary, mind, or +pure intellect, is an emancipated slave. Having +reached its highest point, and seen through the +work of the will, it does not turn back and +organise it, but abolishes it as far as its insight +extends.</p> + +<p>Yet to say merely this is to give a wrong impression +of Schopenhauer. Starting though he +does with blind will, and ending with the flight +of the ascetic from the suffering inherent in the +world that is the manifestation of such a will, he +nevertheless, in the intermediate stages, makes +the world a cosmos and not a chaos. And the +Platonists on their side have to admit that 'the +world of all of us' does not present itself on the +surface as a manifestation of pure reason, and +that it is a serious task to 'rationalise' it. Where +he completely fails is where the Platonic systems<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_48" id="Page_48">[Pg 48]</a></span> +also fail, though from the opposite starting-point. +His attempt to derive presentation, intellect, +knowledge, from blind striving, is undoubtedly +a failure. But so also is the attempt of the +Platonising thinkers to deduce a world of mixture +from a principle of pure reason without aid from +anything else empirically assumed. Not that in +either case there is failure to give explanations +in detail; but in both cases much is taken from +experience without reduction to the principles of +the system. What we may say by way of comparison +is this: that if Schopenhauer had in so +many words recognised an immanent Reason as +well as Will in the reality of the universe, he +would have formally renounced his pessimism; +while it cannot be said that on the other side a +more explicit empiricism in the account of the +self-manifestation of Reason would necessarily +destroy the optimism.</p><hr class="chap" /><p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_49" id="Page_49">[Pg 49]</a></span></p> + + + + +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_IV" id="CHAPTER_IV"></a>CHAPTER IV</h2> + +<h3>ÆSTHETICS</h3> + + +<p>A portion of Schopenhauer's system by which +its pessimism is considerably mitigated is his +theory of the Beautiful and of Fine Art. The +characteristic of æsthetic contemplation is, he +finds, that intellect throws off the yoke and +subsists purely for itself as clear mirror of the +world, free from all subjection to practical purposes +of the will. In this state of freedom, +temporary painlessness is attained.</p> + +<p>The theory starts from his adaptation of the +Platonic Ideas. Regarded purely as an æsthetic +theory, it departs from Plato, as he notes; for, +with the later Platonists, who took up the defence +of poetic myths and of the imitative arts as +against their master, he holds that Art penetrates +to the general Idea through the particular, and +hence that the work of art is no mere 'copy of a +copy.' The difference of the Idea from the +Concept is that it is not merely abstract and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_50" id="Page_50">[Pg 50]</a></span> +general, but combines with generality the characters +of an intuition.</p> + +<p>The Ideas, as we have seen, constitute the +determinate stages of objectivation of the Will. +The innumerable individuals of which the Ideas +are the patterns are subject to the law of sufficient +reason. They appear, that is to say, under the +forms of time, space, and causality. The Idea is +beyond these forms, and therefore is clear of +plurality and change. Since the law of sufficient +reason is the common form under which stands +all the subject's knowledge so far as the subject +knows as individual, the Ideas lie outside the +sphere of knowledge of the individual as such. +If, therefore, the Ideas are to be the object of +knowledge, this can only be by annulling individuality +in the knowing subject.</p> + +<p>As thing-in-itself, the Will is exempt even +from the first of the forms of knowledge, the form +of being 'object for a subject.' The Platonic +Idea, on the other hand, is necessarily an object, +something known, a presentation. It has laid +aside, or rather has not taken on, the subordinate +forms; but it has retained the first and most +general form. It is the immediate and most +adequate possible objectivity of the Will; whereas +particular things are an objectivation troubled by<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_51" id="Page_51">[Pg 51]</a></span> +the forms of which the law of sufficient reason is +the common expression.</p> + +<p>When intellect breaks loose from the service of +the will, for which it was originally destined in +the teleology of nature, then the subject ceases +to be merely individual and becomes pure will-less +subject of knowledge. In this state the beholder +no longer tracks out relations in accordance with +the principle of sufficient reason—which is the +mode of scientific as well as of common knowledge—but +rests in fixed contemplation of the given +object apart from its connection with anything +else. The contemplator thus 'lost' in the object, +it is not the single thing as such that is known, +but the Idea, the eternal form, the immediate +objectivity of the Will at this stage. The correlate +of this object—the pure Subject exempt from the +principle of sufficient reason—is eternal, like the +Idea.</p> + +<p>The objectivation of the Will appears faintly in +inorganic things,—clouds, water, crystals,—more +fully in the plant, yet more fully in the animal, +most completely in man. Only the essential in +these stages of objectivation constitutes the Idea. +Its development into manifold phenomena under +the forms of the principle of sufficient reason, is +unessential, lies merely in the mode of knowledge<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_52" id="Page_52">[Pg 52]</a></span> +for the individual, and has reality only for this. +It is not otherwise with the unfolding of that +Idea which is the completest objectivation of the +Will. To the Idea of Man, the occurrences of +human history are as unessential as the shapes +they assume to the clouds, as the figures of its +whirlpools and foam-drift to the stream, as its +frost-flowers to the ice. The same underlying +passions and dispositions everlastingly recur in +the same modes. It is idle to suppose that anything +is gained. But also nothing is lost: so the +Earth-spirit might reply to one who complained +of high endeavours frustrated, faculties wasted, +promises of world-enlightenment brought to +nought; for there is infinite time to dispose of, +and all possibilities are for ever renewed.</p> + +<p>The kind of knowledge for which the Ideas are +the object of contemplation finds its expression +in Art, the work of genius. Art repeats in its +various media the Ideas grasped by pure contemplation. +Its only end is the communication of +these. While Science, following the stream of +events according to their determinate relations, +never reaches an ultimate end, Art is always at +the end. 'It stops the wheel of time; relations +vanish for it: only the essence, the Idea, is its +object.' The characteristic of genius is a pre<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_53" id="Page_53">[Pg 53]</a></span>dominant +capacity for thus contemplating things +independently of the principle of sufficient reason. +Since this requires a forgetting of one's own +person and the relations between it and things, +the attitude of genius is simply the completest +'objectivity.' The 'subjectivity' opposed to this, +in Schopenhauer's phraseology, is preoccupation +with the interests of one's own will. It is, he +says, as if there fell to the share of genius a +measure of intelligence far beyond the needs of +the individual will: and this makes possible the +setting aside of individual interests, the stripping +off of the particular personality, so that the subject +becomes 'pure knowing subject,' 'clear world-eye,' +in a manner sufficiently sustained for that which +has been grasped to be repeated in the work of +art. A necessary element in genius is therefore +Imagination. For without imagination to represent, +in a shape not merely abstract, things that +have not come within personal experience, genius +would remain limited to immediate intuition, and +could not make its vision apprehensible by others. +Nor without imagination could the particular +things that express the Idea be cleared of the +imperfections by which their limited expression +of it falls short of what nature was aiming at +in their production. 'Inspiration' is ascribed to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_54" id="Page_54">[Pg 54]</a></span> +genius because its characteristic attitude is intermittent. +The man of genius cannot always remain +on a height, but has to fall back to the +level of the common man, who can scarcely at all +regard things except as they affect his interests,—have +a relation to his will, direct or indirect.</p> + +<p>This is the statement in its first outline of a +theory that became one of Schopenhauer's most +fruitful topics. Many are the pages he has devoted +to the contrast between the man of genius +and 'the wholesale ware of nature, which she +turns out daily by thousands.' The genius is for +him primarily the artist. Scientific genius as a +distinctive thing he does not fully recognise; and +he regards men of action, and especially statesmen, +rather as men of highly competent ability +endowed with an exceptionally good physical +constitution than as men of genius in the proper +sense. Philosophers like himself, who, as he +frankly says, appear about once in a hundred +years, he classes in the end with the artists; +though this was left somewhat indeterminate in +his first exposition. The weakness of the man of +genius in dealing with the ordinary circumstances +of life he allows, and even insists on. Genius, +grasping the Idea in its perfection, fails to understand +individuals. A poet may know man pro<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_55" id="Page_55">[Pg 55]</a></span>foundly, +and men very ill. He admits the +proximity of genius to madness on one side, and +explains it in this way. What marks the stage +of actual madness, as distinguished from illusion +or hallucination, is complete disruption of the +memory of past life, of the history of the personality +as something continuous; so that the particular +thing is viewed by itself, out of relation. This +gives a kind of resemblance to the attitude of +genius, for which present intuition excludes from +view the relations of things to each other. Or, as +we may perhaps sum up his thought in its most +general form, 'alienation' or dissolution of personality +has the resemblance often noted between +extremes to the impersonality, or, as he calls it, +'objectivity,' that is super-personal.</p> + +<p>In spite of his contempt for the crowd, he has +to admit, of course, that the capacity of genius +to recognise the Ideas of things and to become +momentarily impersonal must in some measure +belong to all men; otherwise, they could not even +enjoy a work of art when produced. Genius has +the advantage only in the much higher degree +and the greater prolongation of the insight. +Since, then, the actual achievement of the artist +is to make us look into the world through his +eyes, the feelings for the beautiful and the sublime<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_56" id="Page_56">[Pg 56]</a></span> +may be treated irrespectively of the question +whether they are aroused by nature and human +life directly or by means of art.</p> + +<p>Æsthetic pleasure in contemplation of the +beautiful proceeds partly from recognition of the +individual object not as one particular thing but +as Platonic Idea, that is, as the enduring form of +this whole kind of things; partly from the consciousness +the knower has of himself not as +individual, but as pure, will-less Subject of Knowledge. +All volition springs out of need, therefore +out of want, therefore out of suffering. No attained +object of will can give permanent satisfaction. +Thus, there can be no durable happiness +or rest for us as long as we are subjects of will. +'The Subject of Will lies continually on the turning +wheel of Ixion, draws ever in the sieve of +the Danaides, is the eternally thirsting Tantalus. +But in the moment of pure objective contemplation, +free from all interest of the particular +subjectivity, we enter a painless state: the wheel +of Ixion stands still. The Flemish painters +produce this æsthetic effect by the sense of +disinterested contemplation conveyed in their +treatment of insignificant objects. There are +certain natural scenes that have power in themselves, +apart from artistic treatment, to put us in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_57" id="Page_57">[Pg 57]</a></span> +this state; but the slightest obtrusion of individual +interest destroys the magic. Past and distant +objects, through their apparent detachment, have +the same power. The essential thing æsthetically, +whether we contemplate the present or the past, +the near or the distant, is that only the world +of presentation remains; the world as will has +vanished.</p> + +<p>The difference between the feelings of the +Beautiful and of the Sublime is this. In the feeling +of the beautiful, pure intelligence gains the +victory without a struggle, leaving in consciousness +only the pure subject of knowledge, so that +no reminiscence of the will remains. In the feeling +of the sublime, on the other hand, the state +of pure intelligence has to be won by a conscious +breaking loose from relations in the object that +suggest something threatening to the will; though +there must not be actual danger; for in that case +the individual will itself would come into play, +and æsthetic detachment would cease. Elevation +above the sense of terror has not only to be consciously +won but consciously maintained, and +involves a continuous reminiscence, not indeed of +any individual will, but of the will of man in +general, so far as it is expressed through its objectivity, +the human body, confronted by forces<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_58" id="Page_58">[Pg 58]</a></span> +hostile to it. Pre-eminently this feeling arises +from contrast between the immensities of space +and time and the apparent insignificance of man. +It means in the last resort that the beholder is +upheld by the consciousness that as pure subject +of knowledge (not as individual subject) he himself +bears within him all the worlds and all the +ages, and is eternal as the forces that vainly seem +to threaten him with annihilation.</p> + +<p>On the objective side, and apart from the subjective +distinction just set forth, the sublime and +the beautiful are not essentially different. In +both cases alike, the object of æsthetic contemplation +is not the single thing, but the Idea that +is striving towards manifestation in it. Whatever +is viewed æsthetically is viewed out of relation to +time and space: 'along with the law of sufficient +reason the single thing and the knowing individual +are taken away, and nothing remains over +but the Idea and the pure Subject of Knowledge, +which together make up the adequate objectivity +of the Will at this stage.' There is thus a sense +in which everything is beautiful; since the Will +appears in everything at some stage of objectivity, +and this means that it is the expression of some +Idea. But one thing can be more beautiful than +another by facilitating æsthetic contemplation.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_59" id="Page_59">[Pg 59]</a></span> +This facilitation proceeds either from the greater +clearness and perfection with which the particular +thing shows forth the Idea of its kind, or from the +higher stage of objectivation to which that Idea +corresponds. Man being the highest stage of +objectivation of the Will, the revelation of his +essence is the highest aim of art. In æsthetic +contemplation of inorganic nature and vegetative +life, whether in the reality or through the medium +of art, and in appreciation of architecture, the subjective +aspect, that is to say, the enjoyment of pure +will-less knowledge, is predominant; the Ideas +themselves being here lower stages of objectivity. +On the other hand, when animals and men are +the object of æsthetic contemplation or representation, +the enjoyment consists more in the objective +apprehension of those Ideas in which the essence +of the Will is most clearly and fully manifested.</p> + +<p>Of all Schopenhauer's work, its æsthetic part +has met with the most general appreciation. +Here especially he abounds in observations drawn +directly, in his own phrase, from intuition. To +make a selection of these, however, is not appropriate +to a brief sketch like the present. I pass +on, therefore, to those portions of his theory of +Art by which he makes the transition, in terms of +his system, to Morality.</p><p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_60" id="Page_60">[Pg 60]</a></span></p> + +<p>From Architecture onward the arts are obliged +to represent the Will as divided. Here, at the +first stage, its division subsists only in a conflict +of inorganic forces which have to be brought to +equilibrium. The conflict between weight and +rigidity is in truth the only æsthetic material of +architecture as a fine art. When we come to +animal and lastly to human life, which, in the +Plastic Arts and in Poetry, as form, individualised +expression, and action, is the highest object of +æsthetic representation, the vehemence of divided +will is fully revealed; and here too is revealed +the essential identity of every will with our own. +In the words of the Indian wisdom, 'Tat twam +asi'; 'that thou art.' Under the head of Ethics +it will be shown expressly that by this insight, +when it reacts on the will, the will can deny itself. +For the temporary release from its striving, given +in æsthetic contemplation, is then substituted +permanent release. To this 'resignation,' the +innermost essence of all virtue and holiness, and +the final redemption from the world, Art itself, at +its highest stages, points the way.</p> + +<p>The summits of pictorial and poetic art Schopenhauer +finds in the great Italian painters so far as +they represent the ethical spirit of Christianity, +and in the tragic poets, ancient and modern. It<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_61" id="Page_61">[Pg 61]</a></span> +is true that the poverty of their sacred history or +mythology puts the Christian artists at a disadvantage; +but events are merely the accidents of +their art. Not in these, as related according to +the law of sufficient reason, is the essence, but in +the spirit we divine through the forms portrayed. +In their representation of men full of that spirit, +and especially in the eyes, we see mirrored the +knowledge that has seized the whole essence of +the world and of life, and that has reacted on +the will, not so as to give it motives, but as a +'quietive'; whence proceeds complete resignation, +and with it the annulling of the will and of the +whole essence of this world. Of tragedy, the +subject-matter is the conflict of the will with +itself at its highest stage of objectivity. Here +also the end is the resignation brought on by +complete knowledge of the essence of the world. +The hero, on whom at last this knowledge has +acted as a quietive, gives up, not merely life, but +the whole will to live. 'The true meaning of +tragedy is the deeper insight, that what the hero +expiates is not his particular sins, but original sin, +that is, the guilt of existence itself.' To illustrate +this position Schopenhauer is fond of quoting a +passage from Calderon which declares that the +greatest sin of man is to have been born.</p><p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_62" id="Page_62">[Pg 62]</a></span></p> + +<p>It seems strange that, after deriding as he does +the popular notion of 'poetic justice' so detached +a thinker should imagine an at least equally one-sided +view to receive its final confirmation from +the Spanish dramatist's poetic phrasing of a +Christian dogma. The great tragic poets, for +Schopenhauer also, are Æschylus, Sophocles and +Shakespeare. Now it is safe to say that by none +of these was any such general doctrine held either +in conceptual or in intuitive form. The whole +effect of any kind of art, of course he would +admit, cannot be packed into a formula; but if +we seek one as an aid to understanding, some +adaptation of his own theory of the sublime would +probably serve much better as applied to tragedy +than his direct theory of the drama. In the case +of pictorial art, all that is proved by what he says +about the representation of ascetic saintliness, is +that this, like many other things, can be so +brought within the scope of art as to make us +momentarily identify ourselves with its Idea in +the impersonal manner he has himself described. +His purely æsthetic theory is quite adequate to +the case, without any assumption that this is the +representation of what is best. Art, pictorial or +poetic, can no more prove pessimism than optimism. +We pick out expressions of one or the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_63" id="Page_63">[Pg 63]</a></span> +other for quotation according to our moods or +subjective preferences; but, if we have the feeling +for art itself, our sense of actual æsthetic value +ought to be independent of these.</p> + +<p>Schopenhauer's æsthetic theory, however, does +not end here. There follows the part of it by +which he has had an influence on artists themselves. +For him, a position separate from all the +other arts is held by music. While the rest +objectify the Will mediately, that is to say, by +means of the Ideas, Music is as immediate an +objectivation of the whole Will as the world itself, +or as the Ideas, of which the pluralised phenomenon +constitutes the sum of particular things. +The other arts speak of the shadow, music of the +substance. There is indeed a parallelism, an analogy, +between Music and the Ideas; yet Music +never expresses the phenomenon in which these are +manifested, but only the inner essence behind the +appearance, the Will itself. In a sense it renders +not feeling in its particularity, but feeling <i>in +abstracto</i>; joy, sorrow, not a joy, a sorrow. The +phenomenal world and music are to be regarded +as two different expressions of the same thing. +The world might be called embodied Music as +well as embodied Will. 'Melodies are to a certain +extent like general concepts, an abstract of reality.'<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_64" id="Page_64">[Pg 64]</a></span> +A complete explanation of music, that is, a detailed +repetition of it in concepts, were this +possible, would be a complete explanation of the +world (since both express the same thing) and +therefore a true and final philosophy. As music +only reaches its perfection in the full harmony, +'so the one Will out of time finds its perfect objectivation +only in complete union of all the stages +which in innumerable degrees of heightened distinctness +reveal its essence.' But here, too, +Schopenhauer adds, the Will is felt, and can +be proved, to be a divided will; and the deliverance +wrought by this supreme art, as by all the others, +is only temporary.</p><hr class="chap" /><p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_65" id="Page_65">[Pg 65]</a></span></p> + + + + +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_V" id="CHAPTER_V"></a>CHAPTER V</h2> + +<h3>ETHICS</h3> + + +<p>Permanent redemption from the suffering of the +world is to be found only in the holiness of the +ascetic; but to this there are many stages, constituting +the generally accepted human virtues. +Of these Schopenhauer has a rational account +to give in terms of his philosophy; and if the +last stage does not seem to follow by logical +sequence from the others, this is only what is to +be expected; for it is reached, in his view, by a +sort of miracle. To the highest kind of intuitive +knowledge, from which the ascetic denial of the +will proceeds, artistic contemplation ought to +prepare the way; and so also, on his principles, +ought the practice of justice and goodness. Yet +he is obliged to admit that few thus reach the +goal. Of those that do reach it, the most arrive +through personal suffering, which may be deserved. +A true miracle is often worked in the repentant +criminal, by which final deliverance is achieved.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_66" id="Page_66">[Pg 66]</a></span> +Though the 'intelligible character' is unalterable, +and the empirical character can only be the unfolding +of this, as every great dramatist intuitively +recognises, yet the 'convertites,' like Duke +Frederick in <i>As You Like It</i>, are not to be regarded +as hypocrites. The 'second voyage' to the harbour, +that of the disappointed egoist, on condition +of this miracle, brings the passenger to it as +surely as the first, that of the true saints, which is +only for the few. And in these equally a miraculous +conversion of the will has to be finally +worked.</p> + +<p>At the entrance to his distinctive theory of +ethics, Schopenhauer places a restatement of his +metaphysics as the possible basis of a mode of +contemplating life which, he admits, has some +community with an optimistic pantheism. The +Will, through the presentation and the accompanying +intelligence developed in its service, +becomes conscious that that which it wills is precisely +the world, life as it is. To call it 'the will +to live' is therefore a pleonasm. 'Will' and 'will +to live' are equivalent. For this will, life is everlastingly +a certainty. 'Neither the will, the thing-in-itself +in all phenomena, nor the subject of +knowledge, the spectator of all phenomena, is ever +touched by birth and death.' It is true that the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_67" id="Page_67">[Pg 67]</a></span> +individual appears and disappears; but individuality +is illusory. Past and future exist only in +conceptual thought. 'The form of life is a present +without end, howsoever the individuals, phenomena +of the Idea, come into existence and vanish +in time, like fugitive dreams.' Only as phenomenon +is each man different from the other +things of the world: as thing-in-itself he is the +Will, which appears in all, and death takes away +the illusion that divides his consciousness from +the rest. 'Death is a sleep in which the individuality +is forgotten: everything else wakes again, +or rather has remained awake.' It is, in the expression +adopted by Schopenhauer later, an +awakening from the dream of life: though this +bears with it somewhat different implications; +and, as has been said, his theory of individuality +became modified.</p> + +<p>With the doctrine of the eternal life of the +Will are connected Schopenhauer's theories, developed +later, of the immortality of the species +and of individualised sexual love. The latter is +by itself a remarkable achievement, and constitutes +the one distinctly new development +brought to completion in his later years; for the +modifications in his theory of individuality are +only tentative. His theory of love has a deter<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_68" id="Page_68">[Pg 68]</a></span>minate +conclusion, of great value for science, and +not really compatible, it seems to me, with his +pessimism. In its relation to ethics, on which he +insisted, it is rightly placed in the position it +occupies, between the generalised statement of +his metaphysics just now set forth on the one +side, and his theory of human virtue on the +other.</p> + +<p>The teleology that manifests itself in individualised +love is, in his view, not related in reality to +the interests of the individual life, but to those of +the species. That this is immortal follows from +the eternity of the Idea it unfolds.<a name="FNanchor_1_4" id="FNanchor_1_4"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_4" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> The end +sought is aimed at unconsciously by the person. +Fundamentally, for Schopenhauer, teleology must +of course be unconscious, since the will is blind, +and will, not intelligence, is primordial. Its +typical case is the instinct of animals; but the +'instinctive' character belongs also to the accomplishment +of the highest aims, as in art and +virtue. What characterises individualised love +internally is the aim, attributed to 'nature' or +'the species,' at a certain typical beauty or per<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_69" id="Page_69">[Pg 69]</a></span>fection +of the offspring. The lover is therefore +deluded in thinking that he is seeking his own +happiness. What looks through the eyes of +lovers is the genius of the race, meditating on the +composition of the next generation. It may, in the +complexity of circumstances, be thwarted. When +it reaches its end, often personal happiness is +sacrificed. Marriages dictated by interest tend +to be happier than love-matches. Yet, though +the sacrifice of the individual to the race is involuntary +in these, egoism is after all overcome; +hence they are quite rightly the object of a +certain admiration and sympathy, while the +prudential ones are looked upon with a tinge of +contempt. For here too that element appears +which alone gives nobility to the life either of +intellect or of art or of moral virtue, namely, the +rising above a subjective interest of the individual +will.</p> + +<p>No doubt there are touches of pessimism in +this statement; but the general theory does not +seem reconcilable finally with pessimism as +Schopenhauer understands it. For it is a definitely +stated position of his that nature keeps up the +process of the world by yielding just enough to +prevent discontinuance of the striving for an +illusory end. Yet he admits here in the result<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_70" id="Page_70">[Pg 70]</a></span> +something beyond bare continuance of life; for +this is already secured without the particular +modification of feeling described. What the feeling +is brought in to secure is a better realisation +of the type in actual individuals; and such realisation +is certainly more than bare subsistence +with the least possible expenditure of nature's +resources.</p> + +<p>As the immediate preliminary to his ethics +proper, Schopenhauer restates his doctrine on the +intelligible and the empirical character in man, +and lays down a generalised psychological position +regarding the suffering inherent in life. +Everything as phenomenon, we have seen already, +is determined because it is subject to the law of +sufficient reason. On the other hand, everything +as thing-in-itself is free; for 'freedom' means +only non-subjection to that law. The intelligible +character of each man is an indivisible, unalterable +act of will out of time; the developed and +explicit phenomenon of this in time and space is +the empirical character. Man is his own work, +not in the light of knowledge, but before all +knowledge; this is secondary and an instrument. +Ultimately, freedom is a mystery, and takes us +beyond even will as the name for the thing-in-itself. +In reality, that which is 'will to live' need<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_71" id="Page_71">[Pg 71]</a></span> +not have been such (though we cannot see how +this is so), but has become such from itself and +from nothing else. This is its '<i>aseitas</i>.' Hence +it is in its power to deny itself as will to live. +When it does this, the redemption (like the fall) +comes from itself. This denial does not mean +annihilation, except relatively to all that we know +under the forms of our understanding. For the +will, though the nearest we can get to the thing-in-itself, +is in truth a partially phenomenalised +expression of this. As the will to live expresses +itself phenomenally, so also does the denial of the +will to live, when this, by special 'grace,' is +achieved. Only in man does the freedom thus +attained find phenomenal expression. That man +can attain to it proves that in him the will has +reached its highest possible stage of objectivation; +for, after it has turned back and denied itself, +there is evidently nothing more that we can call +existence, that is to say, phenomenal existence, +beyond. What there is beyond in the truth of +being is something that the mystics know—or +rather, possess, for it is beyond knowledge—but +cannot communicate.</p> + +<p>The psychological reason that can be assigned +for the ascetic flight from the world is that all +pleasure, happiness, satisfaction, is merely nega<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_72" id="Page_72">[Pg 72]</a></span>tive. +The will is a striving that has no ultimate +aim. It is sustained only by hindrances. Hindrance +means suffering; and every satisfaction +attained is only temporary, a mere liberation from +need, want, pain, which is positive. Suffering +increases with the degree of consciousness. The +life of civilised man is an alternation between +pain and <i>ennui</i>, which can itself become as intolerable +a suffering as anything. The problem +of moral philosophy, then, is ultimately how +redemption from such a world is to be attained, +but only so far as this is a matter of conceptual +knowledge. For philosophy, being from beginning +to end theoretical, cannot work the practical +miracle by which the will denies itself.</p> + +<p>The intuitive, as distinguished from merely +conceptual, knowledge by which the return is +made, consists essentially in a clear insight into +the identity of the suffering will in all things and +the necessity of its suffering as long as it is will +to live. This, then, is the true foundation of +morality. The universe as metaphysical thing-in-itself, +as noumenon, has an ethical meaning. All +its stages of objectivation, though in the process +what seems to be aimed at is preservation of the +will as manifested, have in truth for their ultimate +aim its redemption by suppression of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_73" id="Page_73">[Pg 73]</a></span> +the phenomenal world in which it manifests +itself.</p> + +<p>Affirmation of the will is affirmation of the +body, which is the objectivity of the will. The +sexual impulse, since it affirms life beyond the +death of the individual, is the strongest of self-affirmations. +In it is found the meaning of the +mythical representation that has taken shape in +the theological dogma of original sin. For by this +affirmation going beyond the individual body, +suffering and death, as the necessary accompaniment +of the phenomenon of life, are reaffirmed, +and the possibility of redemption this time +declared fruitless. But through the whole process +there runs eternal justice. The justification of +suffering is that the will affirms itself; and the +self-affirmation is justified by payment of the +penalty.</p> + +<p>Before the final redemption—which is not for +the world but for the individual—there are many +stages of ethical progress. These consist in the +gradual overcoming of egoism by sympathy. And +here Schopenhauer proceeds to set forth a practical +scheme for the social life of man, differing from +ordinary utilitarianism only by reducing all sympathy +to pity, in accordance with his view that +there can be no such thing as positive happiness.</p><p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_74" id="Page_74">[Pg 74]</a></span></p> + +<p>He begins with a theory of justice, legal and +moral, very much on the lines of Hobbes, except +that he regards it as up to a certain point <i>a +priori</i>. Here he is consistent throughout. As +in his philosophical account of mathematics and +physics, so also in his aesthetics and ethics, he +retained, side by side with a strong empirical +tendency, belief in certain irreducible <i>a priori</i> +forms without which our knowledge cannot be +constituted. The pure ethical theory of justice, +he says, bears to the political theory the relation +of pure to applied mathematics. Injustice he +holds to be the positive conception. It means +the breaking into the sphere of another person's +will to live. The self-affirmation of the will that +appears in one individual body is extended to +denial of the will that appears in other bodies. +Justice consists in non-encroachment. There is +a 'natural right,' or 'moral right,' of resistance to +injustice by infliction of what, apart from the attempted +encroachment, would be wrong. Either +force or deception may be used; as either may be +the instrument of injustice. The purely ethical +doctrine of justice applies only to action; since +only the not doing of injustice depends on us. +With the State and its laws, the relation is reversed. +The object of these is to prevent the suffering of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_75" id="Page_75">[Pg 75]</a></span> +injustice. The State is not directed against egoism, +but has sprung out of a rationalised collective +egoism. It has for its purpose only to avoid the +inconvenient consequences of individual aggressions +on others. Outside of the State, there is a +right of self-defence against injustice, but no right +of punishment. The punishment threatened by +the State is essentially a motive against committing +wrong, intended to supply the place of ethical +motives for those who are insufficiently accessible +to them. Actual infliction of it is the carrying +out of the threat when it has failed, so that in +general the expectation of the penalty may be +certain. Revenge, which has a view to the past, +cannot be justified ethically: punishment is +directed only to the future. There is no right +in any one to set himself up as a moral judge +and inflict pain; but man has a right to do what +is needful for social security. The criminal's acts +are of course necessitated; but he cannot justly +complain of being punished for them, since it is +ultimately from himself, from what he is, that +they sprang.</p> + +<p>With the doctrine of 'eternal justice,' touched +on above, we pass into a different region of +thought. What is responsible for the guilt in +the world is the Will by which everything exists,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_76" id="Page_76">[Pg 76]</a></span> +and the suffering everlastingly falls where the +guilt is. Take the case of apparently unpunished +injustice (from the human point of view) expressing +itself in the extreme form of deliberate cruelty. +Through this also, eternal justice, from which +there is no escape, is fulfilled. 'The torturer and +the tortured are one. The former errs in thinking +he has no share in the torture; the latter in +thinking he has no share in the guilt.' For all +the pain of the world is the expiation of the sin +involved in the self-affirmation of will, and the +Will as thing-in-itself is one and the same in all.</p> + +<p>If this could satisfy any one, there would be no +need to go further. The whole being as it ought +to be, why try to rectify details that are absolutely +indifferent? But of course the implication is that +individuality is simply illusory; and this, as has +been said, was a position that Schopenhauer +neither could nor did consistently maintain. +Indeed, immediately after setting forth this theory +of 'eternal justice,' he goes on to a relative justification +of those acts of disinterested vengeance +by which a person knowingly sacrifices his own +life for the sake of retribution on some extraordinary +criminal. This, he says, is a form of +punishment, not mere revenge, although it involves +an error concerning the nature of eternal<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_77" id="Page_77">[Pg 77]</a></span> +justice. Suicide involves a similar error, in so +far as it supposes that the real being of the individual +can be assailed through its phenomenal +manifestation. It is not a denial of the will to +live, but a strong affirmation of it, only not in the +given circumstances: different circumstances are +desired with such intensity that the present cannot +be borne. Therefore the individual manifestation +of the will is not suppressed. Yet, one might +reply, if individuality is an illusion attached to +the appearance in time and space of a particular +organism, it would seem that, with the disappearance +of this, all that distinguishes the +individual must disappear also.</p> + +<p>Schopenhauer had no will thus to escape from +life; nor did he afterwards devote himself to +expounding further his theory of eternal justice. +What he wrote later, either positively or as mere +speculation, implies both greater reality in the +individual and more of cosmic equity to correspond. +His next step, even at his first stage, is +to continue the exposition of a practicable ethics +for human life. His procedure consists in adding +beneficence to justice, with the proviso already +mentioned, which is required by his psychology, +that all beneficence can consist only in the relief +of pain. For Schopenhauer, as for Comte, what<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_78" id="Page_78">[Pg 78]</a></span> +is to be overcome is 'egoism,' an excessive degree +of which is the mark of the character we call +'bad.' The 'good' is what Comte and Spencer +call the 'altruistic' character. This difference +between characters Schopenhauer goes on to +explain in terms of his metaphysics. The egoist +is so deluded by the principle of individuation +that he supposes an absolute cleft between his +own person and all others. The remorse of +conscience from which he suffers proceeds in +part from an obscure perception that the principle +of individuation is illusory. Genuine virtue +springs out of the intuitive (not merely abstract) +knowledge that recognises in another individuality +the same essence as in one's own. The +characteristic of the good man is that he makes +less difference than is customary between himself +and others. Justice is an intermediate stage +between the encroaching egoism of the bad and +positive goodness. In the renunciation of rights +of property, and provision for all personal needs +without aid from others, practised by some +religious and philosophical ascetics, it is passing +over into something more. There is, however, +a certain misunderstanding involved in so interpreting +strict justice; for there are many ways +in which the rich and powerful can be positively<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_79" id="Page_79">[Pg 79]</a></span> +beneficent. At the other extreme, when they +simply live on their inherited wealth, without +doing anything in return, their mode of life is +morally, though not legally, unjust. Rights of +property Schopenhauer derived from labour +spent on the things appropriated. The injustice, +in many ways, of the present social order he quite +recognises. If he has no sympathy with revolutions, +it is because he has no belief in the +realisation of an ideal state. This follows from +his view of history. Human life, it is his conviction, +never has been and never will be different +as a whole. Redemption from evil can be +attained only by the individual. All that the +State can do is to provide certain very general +conditions of security under which there will be +no hindrance to those who desire to live in +accordance with a moral ideal.</p> + +<p>Yet there are qualifications to make. Many +passages in Schopenhauer's writings prove his +firm belief in the future triumph of reason over +superstition. It is to the honour of humanity, +he says, that so detestable a form of evil +as organised religious persecution has appeared +only in one section of history. And, in his +own personal case, he has the most complete +confidence that the truths he has put forth<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_80" id="Page_80">[Pg 80]</a></span> +cannot fail sometime to gain a hearing. In all +cases, error is only temporary, and truth will +prevail. His language on this subject, and indeed +often on others, is indistinguishable from +that of an optimist.</p> + +<p>In the last resort, his pessimism entrenches +itself behind the psychological proposition that +every satisfaction is negative, being only the +removal of a pain. If this is unsustainable, there +is nothing finally in his Metaphysics of Will to +necessitate the pessimistic conclusion drawn. +The mode of deduction by which he proceeds is +to argue first to the position already noticed: +that all that love of others on which morality is +based is fundamentally pity. True benevolence +can only be the desire to relieve others' pain, +springing from the identification of this with +our own. For that reason, moral virtue must +finally pass over into asceticism—the denial of +the will to live. In others, if we are able to see +through the principle of individuation, we recognise +the same essence as in ourselves, and we +perceive that as long as this wills it must +necessarily suffer. The end then is to destroy the +will to live. This is to be done by <i>askesis</i>, self-mortification. +The first step is complete chastity. +If, says Schopenhauer, the highest phenomenon<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_81" id="Page_81">[Pg 81]</a></span> +of will, that is, man, were to disappear through +a general refusal to affirm life beyond the +individual body, man's weaker reflexion in the +animal world would disappear also, and the +consciousness of the whole would cease. Knowledge +being taken away, the rest would vanish +into nothingness, since there is 'no object without +subject.' That this will come to pass, however, +he certainly did not believe. He has no cosmogony, +like that of Hartmann, ending in a general +redemption of the universe by such a collective +act. Nor did he hold, like his later successor +Mainländer, that through the conflict and gradual +extinction of individualities, 'this great world +shall so wear out to nought.' The world for +him is without beginning and without end. But +the exceptional individual can redeem himself. +What he does when he has reached the height of +holiness is by voluntary poverty and all other +privations, inflicted for their own sake, to break +and kill the will, which he recognises as the +source of his own and of the world's suffering +existence. In his case not merely the phenomenon +ends at death, as with others, but the +being is taken away. To be a 'world-overcomer' +in this sense (as opposed to a 'world-conqueror') +is the essence of sanctity when cleared of all the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_82" id="Page_82">[Pg 82]</a></span> +superstitious dogmas by which the saints try to +explain their mode of life to themselves.</p> + +<p>The absolutely pure expression of this truth is +to be found only in philosophy; but of the +religions Buddhism comes nearest to expressing +it without admixture. For the Buddhist saint +asks aid from no god. True Christianity, however,—the +Christianity of the New Testament +and of the Christian mystics,—agrees both with +Buddhism and with Brahmanism in ultimate aim. +What spoils it for Schopenhauer is the Judaic +element. This, on one side, infects it with the +optimism of the Biblical story of creation, in +which God 'saw everything that he had made, +and, behold, it was very good.' On the other +side, it contaminates the myth of original sin, +which bears in itself a profound philosophical +truth, by this same doctrine of a creative God; +from which follows all the injustice and irrationality +necessarily involved in the Augustinian +theology, and not to be expelled except with its +theism. Nevertheless, the story of the Fall of +Man, of which that theology, in its fundamentally +true part, is a reasoned expression, is the one +thing, Schopenhauer avows, that reconciles him +to the Old Testament. The truth that it clothes +he finds also among the Greeks; Empedocles,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_83" id="Page_83">[Pg 83]</a></span> +after the Orphics and Pythagoreans, having +taught that the soul had been doomed to wander +because of some antenatal sin. And the mysticism +that accompanies all these more or less pure expressions +of one metaphysical truth he finds represented +by the Sufis even in optimistic Islam; so +that he can claim for his philosophy a world-wide +consent.</p> + +<p>Religion, if we take this to include mysticism, +at once rises above philosophy and falls below it. +As 'metaphysics of the people,' it is a mythological +expression of philosophical truth: as +mysticism, it is a kind of 'epi-philosophy.' +Beyond pure philosophy Schopenhauer does not +profess to go; but he accepts what the mystics +say as the description of a positive experience +which becomes accessible when supreme insight +is attained intuitively. For the philosopher as +such, insight into that which is beyond the forms +of our knowledge and even beyond the will itself, +remains only conceptual; though it is within the +province of philosophy to mark out the place for +this. The 'something else' that is left when the +will has been denied, is indicated by the 'ecstasy,' +'illumination,' 'union with God,' spoken of by +the mystics. Paradoxically, some of the mystics +themselves even have identified it with 'nothing';<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_84" id="Page_84">[Pg 84]</a></span> +but the result of the denial of the will to live is to +be called nothing only in relation to the world as +we know it. 'On the other hand, to those in +whom the will has turned back and denied itself, +this so very real world of ours with all its suns +and milky ways is—nothing.'</p> + +<p>In this terminus of his philosophy, Schopenhauer +recognised his kinship with Indian thought, +of which he was a lifelong student. To call his +doctrine a kind of Buddhism is, however, in some +ways a misapprehension. Undoubtedly he accepts +as his ideal the ethical attitude that he finds to +be common to Buddhism and the Christianity of +the New Testament; but metaphysical differences +mark him off from both. We have seen that he +rejects the extra-mundane God of Semitic derivation, +adopted by historical Christianity. Indeed +he is one of the most pronounced anti-Jehovists +of all literature. But equally his belief in a positive +metaphysical doctrine marks him off from +Buddhism, according to the account given of it by +its most recent students, who regard it either as +ultimately nihilistic or as having no metaphysics +at all, but only a psychology and ethics. Nor can +he be precisely identified with the Vedantists of +orthodox Hinduism. Their ultimate reality, if +we are to find an analogue for it in European<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_85" id="Page_85">[Pg 85]</a></span> +metaphysics, seems to resemble the hypostasised +<i>ego</i> of Fichte, or the Kantian 'transcendental +unity of apperception', much more than it +resembles Schopenhauer's blindly striving will as +thing-in-itself. Even in practical ethics, he does +not follow the Indian systems at all closely. +Philosophical doctrines of justice are of course +purely European; and Schopenhauer himself +points out the sources of his own theory. In his +extension of ethics to animals, on which he lays +much stress, he cites the teachings of Eastern +non-Semitic religions as superior to the rest; but +he does not follow the Indians, nor even the +Pythagoreans, so far as to make abstinence from +flesh part of the ideal. He condemns vivisection +on the ground that animals have rights: certain +ways of treating them are unjust, not simply uncompassionate. +The discussion here again is of +course wholly within European thought. Thus, +in trying to determine his significance for modern +philosophy, we may consider his system in its +immediate environment, leaving it to more special +students to determine how far it received a +peculiar colouring from the Oriental philosophies, +of which, in his time, the more exact knowledge +was just beginning to penetrate to the West.</p><hr class="chap" /><p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_86" id="Page_86">[Pg 86]</a></span></p> + + + + +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_VI" id="CHAPTER_VI"></a>CHAPTER VI</h2> + +<h3>HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE</h3> + + +<p>Schopenhauer is not one of the philosophers +who have founded a school, though he has had +many disciples and enthusiastic admirers. The +pessimism that was for a time a watchword with +certain literary groups has passed as a mode, and +his true significance must be sought elsewhere. +Of the thinkers who have followed him in his +pessimism, two indeed stand out as the architects +of distinct systems, Eduard von Hartmann and +Philipp Mainländer (both already incidentally +referred to); but while they are to be classed unquestionably +as philosophers, their systems contain +an element that their master would have regarded +as mythological. Schopenhauer declared as +clearly as any of the Greeks that the phenomenal +world is without beginning and without end. +Kant's positing of an 'antinomy' on this point he +regarded as wholly without rational justification. +What Kant calls the 'antithesis,' namely, the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_87" id="Page_87">[Pg 87]</a></span> +infinite series, can be logically proved for phenomena. +The 'thesis,' which asserts a beginning in +time, is defended by mere fallacies. Now Hartmann +and Mainländer both hold, though in +different fashions, that there is a world-process +from a beginning to an end, namely, the extinction +of consciousness. This is the redemption of +the world. Their affinity, therefore, seems to be +with the Christian Gnostics rather than with the +pure philosophers of the Greek tradition, continued +in modern times by Bruno, Spinoza, and +Schopenhauer.</p> + +<p>Whatever may be thought of the pessimism +by which Schopenhauer's mood is distinguished +from that of his precursors, few will fail to recognise +that special doctrines of his system contain +at least a large portion of truth. His theories of +Art, of Genius, and of Love are enough to found +an enduring reputation for any thinker, even if +there were nothing else of value in his writings. +But there is much else, both in systematic construction +and in the illumination of detail. I +have been inclined to put forward first of all the +translation into idealistic terms of the universal +sentiency held by the Ionian thinkers to be inherent +in the primordial elements of nature. +While they viewed the world as an objective<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_88" id="Page_88">[Pg 88]</a></span> +thing having psychological qualities, Schopenhauer, +after the long intermediate process of +thought, could treat it as phenomenal object with +a psychological or subjective essence. For both +doctrines alike, however, mind or soul is immanent. +Still, it must be allowed that a difference +remains by which Schopenhauer was even more +remote than they were from the later Greek +idealism. As they were not materialists, so they +did not exclude reason from the psychical properties +of their substances. Schopenhauer, while +he rejected the materialism of their ancient and +modern successors alike, took the step of formally +derationalising the elements of mind. This, no +doubt, is unsustainable ultimately, if reason is +ever to emerge from them. Yet the one-sidedness +of the position has had a peculiar value in +combating an equally one-sided rationalistic +idealism. This is recognised by clear-sighted +opponents. And Schopenhauer's calling the non-rational +or anti-rational element in the world +'will' helps to make plainer the real problem of +evil. There is truth in the Hegelian paradox that +'pessimism is an excellent basis for optimism.' +An optimist like Plotinus saw that, even if good +comes of evil, the case of the optimist must fail +unless evil can be shown to be a necessary con<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_89" id="Page_89">[Pg 89]</a></span>stituent +of the world. The Platonic and Neo-Platonic +'matter,' a principle of diremption or +individuation, like time and space for Schopenhauer, +was an attempt to solve this problem; but +something more positive seemed to be needed +as the source of the stronger manifestations of +evil. To the strength of these Plato drew attention +in a passage (<i>Republic</i>, x. 610<a name="FNanchor_1_5" id="FNanchor_1_5"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_5" class="fnanchor">[5]</a>) where it is +acknowledged that injustice confers a character of +vitality and sleeplessness upon its possessor. In +the notion of a blind and vehement striving, +Schopenhauer supplies something adequate; only, +to maintain a rational optimism, it must be regarded +as a necessary element in a mixture, not +as the spring of the whole.</p> + +<p>Much might be said on the teleology by which +he tries to educe intelligence from the primordial +strife. Against his view, that it is evolved as +a mere instrument for preserving races in a +struggle, another may be set that is ready to +hand in a dialogue of Plutarch.<a name="FNanchor_2_6" id="FNanchor_2_6"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_6" class="fnanchor">[6]</a> The struggle +among animals, it is there incidentally argued, +has for its end to sharpen their intelligence. +Both these theories are on the surface compatible<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_90" id="Page_90">[Pg 90]</a></span> +with evolution. If, leaving aside the problem of +mechanism, we try to verify them by the test of +results, the latter undoubtedly seems the more +plausible. For if the struggle was a means to +the improvement of intelligence, nature has succeeded +more and more; whereas, if her intention +was to preserve races, she has continually failed. +This argument is at any rate perfectly valid +against Schopenhauer himself; for he holds in +common with the optimistic teleologists that +'nature does nothing in vain.'</p> + +<p>I will conclude with a few detached criticisms +on the ethical doctrine which he regarded as the +culmination of his system. The antithesis, it +may first be noted, between the temporary release +from the vehemence of the will that is gained +through art, and the permanent release through +asceticism, is not consistently maintained. Schopenhauer +admits that the knowledge which for +the ascetic is the 'quietive' of the will has to be +won anew in a perpetual conflict. 'No one can +have enduring rest on earth.' Again, revision of +his doctrine concerning the reality of the individual +would, I think, necessitate revision also of +the position that not only asceticism but 'all true +and pure love, nay, even freely rendered justice, +proceeds from seeing through the <i>principium<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_91" id="Page_91">[Pg 91]</a></span> +individuationis</i>.' If the individual is in some +sense ultimately real, then love must be to a certain +extent literally altruism. We are brought +down to the elementary fact, in terms of the +metaphysics of ethics, that the object of love is a +real being that is itself and not ourselves, though +having some resemblance to us and united in +a larger whole. An objection not merely verbal +might indeed be taken to Schopenhauer's metaphysics +of ethics strictly on his own ground. If +it is purely and simply the essence of ourselves +that we recognise in everything, does not this reduce +all love finally to a well-understood egoism? +The genuine fact of sympathy seems to escape his +mode of formulation. And, in the end, we shall +perhaps not find the ascetic to be the supreme +ethical type. Of the self-tormenting kind of +asceticism, it is not enough to say with Schopenhauer +that, since it is a world-wide phenomenon +of human nature, it calls for some account from +philosophy. The account may be sufficiently +rendered by historical psychology; the result +being to class it as an aberration born of the illusions +incident to a certain type of mind at a certain +stage. Indeed, that seems to be the conclusion +of the Buddhists, who claim to have transcended +it by finding it superfluous for the end it aims at.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_92" id="Page_92">[Pg 92]</a></span> +Let us then take, as our example of the completed +type, not the monks of the Thebaid, but the +mild ascetics of the Buddhist communities. Does +not this type, even in its most attractive form, +represent a 'second best'? Is not the final +judgment that of Plato, that to save oneself is +something, but that there is no full achievement +unless for the life of the State also the ideal has +been brought nearer realisation? When there is +nothing in the world but irredeemable tyranny or +anarchy, flight from it may be the greatest success +possible as far as the individual life is concerned; +but this is not the normal condition of humanity. +Finally, may not some actual achievement, either +practical or, like that of Schopenhauer, speculative, +even if accompanied by real imperfections of +character, possess a higher human value than the +sanctity that rests always in itself?</p> + + + +<hr class="chap" /> + +<h3>FOOTNOTES</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_1_1" id="Footnote_1_1"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_1"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> <i>Werke</i>, ed. Frauenstädt, vol. vi. p. 243.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_1_2" id="Footnote_1_2"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_2"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> <i>Phänomenologie des Geistes</i>, Jubiläumsausgabe, ed. G. Lasson, +pp. 201-3.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_2_3" id="Footnote_2_3"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_3"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> Letter to Robert Barclay Fox, May 10, 1842. Printed in +Appendix to <i>Letters and Journals of Caroline Fox</i>, third ed., +vol. ii. pp. 331-2. 'To suppose that the eye is <i>necessary</i> to +sight,' says Mill, 'seems to me the notion of one immersed in +matter. What we call our bodily sensations are all in the +mind, and would not necessarily or probably cease, because the +body perishes.'</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_1_4" id="Footnote_1_4"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_4"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> The disappearance of species in time raises difficulties in +more than one way for his philosophy; but he formally escapes +refutation by the suggestion, already noted, that the Idea need +not always be manifested phenomenally in the same world. +This, however, he did not work out.</p></div> +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_1_5" id="Footnote_1_5"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_5"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> Cited in one of the introductory essays to Jowett and +Campbell's edition, vol. ii.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_2_6" id="Footnote_2_6"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_6"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> <i>De Sollertia Animalium</i>, 27.</p></div> + + +<hr class="chap" /><p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_93" id="Page_93">[Pg 93]</a></span></p> + + + +<h2><a name="SELECTED_WORKS" id="SELECTED_WORKS"></a>SELECTED WORKS</h2> + + +<h4><i>English Translations</i></h4> + +<div class="hanging-indent-small"><p><i>The World as Will and Idea.</i> Translated by <span class="smcap">R. B. Haldane</span> +and <span class="smcap">J. Kemp</span>. 3 vols. 1883-6.</p> + +<p><i>Two Essays</i>: I. <i>On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of +Sufficient Reason</i>. II. <i>On the Will in Nature</i>. Bohn's +Philosophical Library, 1889.</p> + +<p><i>Religion: A Dialogue, and other Essays.</i> Selected and translated +by <span class="smcap">T. Bailey Saunders</span>. 3rd ed., 1891. [A series +of other volumes of selections excellently translated by Mr. +Saunders has followed.]</p> + +<p><i>Selected Essays of Arthur Schopenhauer.</i> With a Biographical +Introduction and Sketch of his Philosophy. By <span class="smcap">E. Belfort +Bax</span>. 1891.</p> + +<p><i>The Basis of Morality.</i> Translated with Introduction and +Notes by <span class="smcap">A. B. Bullock</span>. 1903.</p></div> + + +<h4><i>Biographical and Expository</i></h4> + +<div class="hanging-indent-small"><p><i>Arthur Schopenhauer: His Life and Philosophy.</i> By <span class="smcap">Helen +Zimmern</span>. 1876.</p> + +<p><i>Life of Arthur Schopenhauer.</i> By Professor <span class="smcap">W. Wallace</span>. +1890.</p><p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_94" id="Page_94">[Pg 94]</a></span></p> + +<p><i>La Philosophie de Schopenhauer.</i> Par <span class="smcap">Th. Ribot</span>. 2nd ed., +1885.</p> + +<p><i>Arthur Schopenhauer.</i> Seine Persönlichkeit, seine Lehre, +sein Glaube. Von <span class="smcap">Johannaes Volkelt</span>. 3rd ed., 1907.</p> + +<p><i>Schopenhauer-Lexikon.</i> Von <span class="smcap">Julius Fradenstädt</span>. 2 vols., +1871.</p></div> + +<p> </p> + +<p class="center">Printed by T. and A. <span class="smcap">Constable</span>, Printers to His Majesty +at the Edinburgh University Press</p> + + + + + + + + + +<pre> + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Schopenhauer, by Thomas Whittaker + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK SCHOPENHAUER *** + +***** This file should be named 38283-h.htm or 38283-h.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/3/8/2/8/38283/ + +Produced by Albert László and the Online Distributed +Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This file was +produced from images generously made available by The +Internet Archive) + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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